The History of Gustavus Adolfus

Theodor Dodge The History of Gustavus Adolfus GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS A HISTORY OF THE ART OF WAR FROM ITS REVIVAL AFTER T...

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Theodor Dodge

The History of Gustavus Adolfus

GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS A HISTORY OF THE ART OF WAR FROM ITS

REVIVAL AFTER THE MIDDLE AGES TO THE END OF THE SPANISH

SUCCESSION WAR, WITH A

DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE MOST

FAMOUS CAMPAIGNS OF THE GREAT S7/EDE

.

.

.

BY

THEODORE AYRAULT DODGE

r

42^ BOSTON AND

NEY/

YORK

HOUGHTON MIFFLIN AND COMPANY 1895

s>.-

To

THE AMERICAN SOLDIER WHO. NOT BRED TO ARMS, BUT NURTURED BY INDEPENDENCE, HAS ACHIEVED THE PROUDEST RANK AMONG THE VETERANS OF HISTORY

AliE

DEDICATED

" Faites la guerre offensive

comme Alexandre, Annibal, Cisar,

Gustave Adolphe, Turenne, le prince Eugene et Frederic ; lisez, relisez Vhistoire de lew quatre-vingt-huit campagnes ; modHez-vous sur gyx, c^est le seul moyen de devenir grand capitaine etde surprendre le sicret de Vart ; votre ginie, airisi eclairi, vous ferarejeter des max-

—

imes opposees "

La

d,

celles

de ces grands hommes.^'

— Napoleon.

tactique, les Evolutions, la science de Vofficier de ginie, de

Vofficier d'artillerie peuvent s'apprendre

dans

les traitis ;

—

inais la

connaissance de la grande tactique ne s'acquiert que par Vexp6rience etpar Vetude de rhistoire des campagnesde tous lesgrandscapitaines."

— Napoleon.

PREFACE.

That

immense gap of sixteen and a

the

half centuries which

intervenes between the last campaign of Julius Caesar and the first /

J

campaign

must be

of

justified

Gustavus Adolphus

almost untouched,

by once more reminding the reader that the

made no attempt

author has

is left

to cover the history of war, but

seeks only to indicate the origin and growth of what to-day

we o

No

call the art of war.

preface, however long, can explain

the purpose of the volumes of which the present

ie

one, so

well as the few words of Najjoleon which have been chosen as a motto,

and which follow the dedicatory page.

" Read,

reread the history of their eighty-eight campaigns," says this last of the

A

Great Captains.

growth of the art of war

is

history of the

origin

campaigns of those leaders whose deeds have created the

The

history of

would

detail

war

call for

is

and

in reality only the story of the

beyond

limit

;

to treat

it

art.

in equal

hundreds of volumes, and the author

has contemplated no such work.

A

distinguished professor of history^ recently wrote the

author

:

"

You

will

have an embarrassing wealth of material

in the military changes

As

from Caesar

I run over the time, I see

skill

wald

to

Gustavus Adolphus.

how you can

use your narrative

on the slaughter of the legions of Varus in the Teuto;

the

hurried marches of Aurelian while his soldiers

sung that wild song of slaughter given by Flavius Vopiscus the Goths of Alaric and the 1

Huns

of Attila.

Samuel Willard, LL. D.

3 f (.17

;

and the struaale

PREFACE.

viii

of

armed mobs

the saving of

at

Chalons

the skillful

;

work

Europe by Leo the Isaurian,

of Belisarius

whose work the

to

picturesque battle of Tours was but a supplement

the cam-

;

paigns of Charlemagne, earliest in modern times to march

converging columns upon an enemy

and that greatest of

;

knights and crusaders,

cavalry battles, greatest that ever was

all

or ever will be, Dorylseum

;

the

Normans

at Hastings

the

;

Swiss piling up the rampart of ten thousand dead at St.

Jacobs

;

the vain charge of Talbot, representative of the out-

going chivalry, against cannon and earthworks at Chatillon these,

and two score more

— how can you leave them out — how

from the old to the new, can you put them in ? " in the is

of

drama

change

of the illustrations of the

And

of history hacl

just because

none of these

the Great Captains, indeed, had no such

the deeds of ;

it

Many

not within the scope of this work to narrate them.

influence

acts

any influence on the art of war,

but though these

may none

the less have found a

place in their general military history, there

is

nothing to

warrant the author in going outside of the Great Captains to dilate

upon mere

acts of heroism or

mere scenes of carnage.

Hence, though the period between the Danish campaign of 1611

is

Munda

in

45

B. C.

dismissed with a mere sum-

mary, the author does not believe that he has

any

left

war

unfilled in the actual history of the art of

;

t hat

more or

jrom

le ss

expertly by his successors,

jt

gaj)

and as

revival began wi th Gustavus Adolphus and was carried jv ard

and

w ill

its

for-

be found

the beginning of th r nrvontomith cti^ntury

down

in

1815^ the narrritive in this and future volumeswil l cover most of the inipo rtant wars

Every victories

.

nation, in gazing at the glories which surround its

and

its

standing of the

heroes, latter.

stands out unequaled

;

is

apt to lose sight of the comparative

To

the Prussian, Frederick the

to the Scandinavian,

Gustavus

;

Only to the

PRE FA CE.

ix

rrenehman, Napoleon

;

to the Austrian, Prince

Archduke Charles

;

to the

the

Wellington.

It

only when

is

Eugene or

Englishman, Marlborough or each

of

these

generals

is

grouped with the others on the theatre of war where he played his part, that one can properly gauge his place

To some

the captains.

of

us Anglo-Saxons

it

among

may seem

heresy to assume that Prince Eugene was equal as a general to the

Duke

of

Marlborough.

And

yet, such

was the

case.

Alone, he conducted more successful campaigns, he won more

and he did more

victories

first-rate

work than Marlborough

while at Blenheim, Oudenarde and Malplaquet, he bore half the burden and

won

When

half the renown.

the facts are

looked at dispassionately, the place assigned to each of the great generals in these volumes will,

it

is

believed, be borne

out by the mature judgment of any military student not suffering from patriotic astigmatism. It

is

map.

comparatively easy to write up a campaign without a

This

tell-tale

absent, errors can be

more

easily covered

a general allegation will suffice for a more specific one.

:

But

the author has striven to so illustrate his work with charts as that every statement

ence to the terrain. battle-fields,

may

The

ancient

maps

off

by

refer-

of the country and of

while full of information and suggestiveness, are

apt to be topographically

wrong and hence misleading

hoped the maps and charts acceptable.

be readily checked

The same

in this

volume

will

;

it

is

prove more

care has been exjjended on

them by

personal visits to the battle-fields as was given to former

volumes

and

;

but they are intended rather to illustrate the text

to aid in

comprehending the campaigns than as samples

The amount of ground to be covered being made on a smaller scale than here-

of the geographer's art.

has resulted in their tofore.

Little space could be spared for the exploits of individual

PREFACE.

X generals or divisions

what was

fined to

;

Dates

'

the

a clear understanding

Particular heroism has been rarely men-

except in the case of the leading generals,

into the

fit

the battle descriptions have been con-

strictly essential to

of the manoeuvres.

tioned

;

followed,

does not

and puzzling

in the old records are inaccurate

New

it

scheme of the work.

Style (ten days later than the

—

hoped without many

is

it

;

but

Old Style) has been

errors.

The

political

histoiy of the times has beeu only incidentally mentioned

the author can scarcely vouch for

he pretends

to

being free from error,

its

—

no knowledge of the intricate state imbroglios

of the sixteenth century.

The

authorities to which this

volume

Having no knowledge

numerous.

indebted are very

is

of Swedish, the author has

been obliged to rely upon German, French or Italian transla-

home

tions of the

records

have carefully covered

;

this

men

but such eminent

ground

as

Droysen

and most of the better

;

class of historical works, such as Geijer's Sveriges Historia,

or Gustavus' Letters, exist in

German.

Moreover, the cam-

paigns which made Gustavus forever great were rather a part of the history of

Germany than

The following works, among some

contribution, rain, Billow,

of

of

Sweden.

others,

them very

have been laid under

freely

:

Arkenholtz, Beau-

Chemnitz, Coxe, Desormeaux, Droysen, Duvivier,

Dudik, Feuquieres, Forster, Gallitzin, Gfrorer, Grimoard,

Gualdo Prioratp, Harte, Hurter,

Julius,

Kausler,

Keym,

Oman,

Puffen-

Khevenhiiller, Lediard, Lossau, Mauvillon, dorf, Quincy,

Le

Ramsay, Ranke, Swedish

Intelligencer, Soden,

Soldat Suedois, Sporschill, Theatrum Europseum, Viller-

mont, Voltaire, Zaber, Zanthier, a great number of memoirs, dispatches

and

letters

of

many

the

generals,

and old

German records. The aumany eminent historians and critics

Netherland, Niirnberg and other thor has drawn from too

of

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

....

FAOE

Reappearance of Infantry. 1315-1500 Sixteenth Century III. Changes in Tactics. IV. The Swedish Army-Changes. 1523-1632 V. The Swedish Organization and Tactics. 1611-

10

CHAPTER I.

The Era of Cavalry.

378-1315

II.

.

1

.

—

.

.

.

VI.

VIII.

63 The Young Prince and King. -79 The Polish Wars. 1617-1625 Religious Phase. The Thirty Years' War. 1611-1617 •

.

•

.

86

1618-1625

IX.

~

The Danish

X. The Polish XI.

XII.

28

47

1632

VII.

22

Period.

Wars Wars

1625-1630

continue.

end. The Polish The Swedish Period begins.

.

.

1625-1627

1628-1629

.100

.

.

117

•

.

.

.131

January to June, 145

1630

XIII. Gustavus lands in Germany.

June to August, 157

1630

XIV. Gustavus attacks the Enemy. September to 172 December, 1630 January, XV. Winter - Quarters at Barwalde. 192

1631

XVI. Gustavus and Tilly manceuvre.

February to 201

April, 1630

215 XVII. Magdeburg. September, 1630, to May, 1631 June and XVIII. Gustavus advances to the Elbe. •

229

July, 1631

XIX. Tilly invades Hesse-Cassel and Saxony. gust, 1631

Au244

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

xiv

XX. Breitenfeld. September 17, 1631 257 XXI. Towards the Main. September and October, .

.

.

1631

272

XXII. Mainz. November, 1631 288 XXIII. To THE Danube. December, 1631, to April, 1632 301 XXIV. The Crossing of the Lech. April 15, 1632 312 XXV. The Reappearance of Wallenstein. January .

to JxfNE, 1632

325

XXVI. NiJRNBERG. July and August, 1632 XXVII. The Assault on the Alte Veste.

.

341

.

.

September,

1632

353

.364 XXVIII. Sparring. September, 1632 XXIX. Back to Saxony. October and November, 1632 373 .

XXX.

LuTZEN.

November

.

.

1632

16,

386

XXXI. The Man and Soldier XXXII. Nordlingen. 1633-1634 XXXIII. Cromwell.

XXXIV. TuRENNE.

XXXV. CoNDE

398 412

1642-1651 1634 TO August, 1644

AT RocROY.

May

19,

XXXVI. Freiburg. August, 1644 XXXVII. Mergentheim. May 5, 1645 XXXVIII. Allerheim. August XXXIX. CoNDE AT Dunkirk. 1646

XL. XLI. XLII. XLIII.

XLIV.

XLV.

5,

421

....

1643

.

.

.

.

.

.

437

.450 458

.

1645

.

.

.

468

.478

.

September and October, 488

.

.497 TuRENNE AND Wrangel. 1646-1647 War ends. 1648 .507 Years' The Thirty 1650-1656 519 against Turenne. CoNDE 540 Arras and Valenciennes. 1654-1656 Dunkirk. The Battle of the Dunes, 1657. May 553 AND June, 1658 Army Organization and Tactics Early Seven669 teenth to Early Eighteenth Century .

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.582 XLVI. Turenne in Holland. 1672 592 XLVII. MoNTECucuLi. 1673 XLVIIL Senef, August 11, and Sinsheim, June 16, 1674 602 XLIX. Entzheim, October 4, 1674. Turkheim, January .

5,

L.

.

.

.

.

614

1675

Turenne's Last Campaign.

1675

•

633

CONTENTS.

TAB] LI.

The

Siegt^ of

-

.

1683

LII.

Lux':;mburg a

;at.

LIII.

Pkince Euge:

st

LIV. Eugene agai

xv 645

1690-1693

Catinat.

.eroi

.

.

655

.

1701

.

.

and Vendome.

1702

681

LV. ViLLARS.

1703

697

LVI. Marlborough and Eugene.

August 13, 1704 LVIII. Eugene and Vendome. 1705 LIX. Ramillies. May 23, 1706 LX. Turin. September 7, 1706 LXI. OUDENARDE AND LiLLE. JuLY

1704

LVII. Blenheim.

.

September

11,

709

.

.

723

....

737

750 757 11

AND OCTOBER

1708

LXII. Malplaquet. LXIII. Spain.

668

1701-

1709

22,

....

1704-1710

769. 792

810

LXIV. ViLLARS AGAINST MarLBOROUGH AND EuGENE. 17101712

LXV. Charles

817

XII.

1700-1709

Appendix A.

Some Modern Marches

Appendix B. Index

Casualties in Some Modern Battles

831

849 .

.

.

850 853

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.

PAGE

Portrait of Gustavus,

after

Van Dyke (Munich Gallery) Frontispiece

(15th Century)

Knight.

7

(15th Century)

Knight.

Knight

6

(13th Century)

Dismounted Knight.

Knight.

7

(13th Century)

Armor.

in

(12th Century)

8

....... ........

(16th Century)

Swiss Halberdier.

Swiss Sergeant Halberdier

(16th Century)

Swiss Pikeman.

Lance and Halberd Heads.

Swiss Pikeman.

12

(16th Century)

(15th Century)

Genevese Mercenary.

...... ...... .....

(16th Century)

(15th Century)

Bernese Soldiers.

11 11

(16th Century)

Swiss Captain.

9 11

English Long-bowman.

(14th Century)

English Long-bowman.

(14th Century)

.

.

-^

.

.

.

.

.

.

.12 13 13

14

.14 14

Cross-bowman.

(12th Century)

15

Cross-bowman.

(12th Century)

15

Cross-bowman.

(15th Century)

15

Cross-bowmen.

(15th Century)

16

Hand Gun Bombard

of

Big Cannon. Bombardelle.

French Gun.

Hand

18

Rhodes

(calibre,

22

in.)

(15th Century)

(loth Century)

(15th Century)

Bombardelle.

Mounted Culverineer

......... ........

(15th Century)

18

18 19 19

19

19

Cross-bow.

(15th Century)

20

Cross-bow.

(loth Century)

20

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.

xviii

Haud

Culveriu, 1480

21

Arquebusier, 1507

.

.

(14th Century)

Officer.

Dauzig Citizeu Soldier (taking oath)

32

(16th Century)

Lansquenet.

21

27

33

Musketeer, 1572

33

.34

Pikeman, 1534 Pikemau, 1572

34

Grenadier, 1696

35

Officer of

French Foot, 1647

Arquebus and Rest.

35

(16th Century)

36

Musketeer, 1630

36

Museum Wheel-lock, Stockholm Museum

37

Match-lock, Stockholm

.... ..........

Pistol Flint-lock (1613),

Early Bayonets

Stockholm

English Soldier (unequipped)

German

Officer,

Museum

39

...... ....... ...

(17th Century)

Croat Siege-guus, Stockholm

Museum

Museum Gun, Stockholm Museum

Thi'ee-pounder Regimental Gun, Stockholm

Three-pounder Leather

38

39

.

1630

Dragoon, 1616

Hungarian Irregular.

37 37

.

.

.

40 40 41 42

43

.43

Early Mortars

44

Early Mortar

44 46

Culverin, 1500

Suit

worn by Gustavus

at the Dirschau

Combat

.

.

.

.49

Swedish Musketeer Swedish Pikeman

50

.......... ....... .......... ........ .

Swedish Officer Swedish Cuirassier

50 51

52

Swedish Ensign of Cuirassiers

53

Cannon suggested

62

Axel Oxenstiera

Sweden and the Riga Arquebus.

in the

15th Century

Baltic

(16th Century)

68 71

82

85

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.

xix

The Bohemian Revolt

91

95

Tilly Tilly's

MancEuvres

Baden

in

97

Halberd with Gun (16th Century)

Map

99

Denmark

Christian of

103

of Danish Period

104

105

Walleusteiu Stralsund, partly

Genevese. Polish

from an old plan

(16th Century)

Horseman

.

Ill

116

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.118

.

The Vistula-Oder-Elbe Country

120

Danzig and Vicinity

122

Mewe

Operation at

Stuhm Operation Albanese Horseman The Landing-place

124 138

..........

Oder-Elbe Country

162 of Thirty Years'

War

171

174

Ribnitz

The Attack on Garz "

158 160

Stettin

Pikeman

144

Advance Pikes

!

Swiss Pikehead.

188

"

191

(15th Century)

200

Demmin

202

Frankfort

211

Halberd Head

214

Magdeburg

221

228

(15th Century)

Swiss Sword.

The Werben Camp Burgstall Operation

.......... ........ ........ .........

Horse and Equipments used by Gustavus Elbe-Main Country

at Liitzen

.

.

.

239 241

243 245

Leipsic and Breitenf eld

249

Brigade and Half-brigade

256

The Armies

262

in

Line

Battle of Breitenfeld.

Gustavus, by

Van

(2d Phase)

Mierevelt

The Main Country

267 271

284

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.

XX Mainz

292

Landskneeht.

(16tli

Century)

Statue of Gustavus Adolphus in Stockholm

300 .

.

.

.

.311

The Upper Danube Country

313

Crossing of the Lech

315

(15th Century)

Match-lock.

324

•

Nurnberg

338

Arquebus.

(16th Century)

340

The Rival Camps

342

(16th Century)

Swords.

352

Gustavus Adolphus, from Augsburg bust

363

A Burgundian.

372

......... ....... ..........

(15th Century)

Region near Liitzen

378

Gustavus praying before Liitzen

385

Battle of Lutzen

387

Musket

(16th Century)

Battle-axe.

Fusee Arrows

Battle of Nordlingen

397 411

417

French Sergeant, 1630

420

Cromwell

424

Battle of Marston

Moor

425

Battle of

Naseby

428

Battle of

Dunbar

432

Battle of Worcester

434

Pistol Sword.

436

(16th Century)

Turenne

440

The Rhine Country

446

Freiburg

448

.

French Halberdiers.

Condd

at

Rocroy

.......... (15th Century)

Battle of Rocroy"^

.

French Musketeer, 1647

449

450 452

457

Freiburg Battles ^

459

Philipsbiirg

464

.....

French Infantry Soldier, 1660 Operation of Mergentheim Battle of

Mergentheim

French Dragoon.

^

(17th Century)

.467 471

473 477

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.

xxi

....... .........

479

Nidda Operation

499

Kirchheim Operation

.... ........ ........

502

Battle of AUerheim'

Norman

(7th Ceutury)

Soldier.

Vicinity of Dunkirk

Dunkirk Crusader's Cannon

Breech-loading Portable Gun.

Zumarshausen Operation Battle of Lens

.

.

.

Three-barreled Carbine.

(15th Ceutury)

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

(16th Century.)

Belgium and Northern France Battle of

Champ

Blanc

Vicinity of Paris

Battle of St. Antoiue

.......... .........

Campaign on the Somme

.

.

.

.

.

.

...

.

.

Dunkirk and the Battle of the Dunes

.

.

.

.

.

(15th Century)

French Dragoon.

(17th Century)

Army

on the March

Pistol

Sword.

.

.

.

,

.

.

.

.... ... .

(16th Century)

(late in life)

Corps, 1688

.

.

......

549 552 559 568

581

585

593

601

.603 .

.

.604

Sinsheim Operation

607

Battle of Sinsheim

Entzheim Operation

536

595

".

Battle of Senef.'

French Musketeer.

528

530

591

Turenne-Montecuculi Operation

Du

526

574

Montecueuli

Condd

520

546 .

(16th Ceutury)

Garde

515

518

542

............

Sword.

506 508

539

.

Pistol

.

........

Operation on the Scheldt

Holland

.

(15th Century)

Arras

Knight.

496

525

Paris-Orleans Country

Valenciennes

489 491

523

Operation of Gien

Portable Gun.

487

610

.......... (End

of 17th Century)

613

619

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.

xxii

.........

Battle of Entzheim Tiirklieim Operation

620 627

Turkheim 7

Battle of

630

(16th Century)

French Carbine.

Campaign

632

.........

Terrain of 1675 Campaign of 1675

Mounted Arquebusier.

634

.

635

(16th Century)

644

Vienna-Ofen Country

646

Turkish Soldier

647

.......... ......... ........... ............ ......... .......... .......... ..........

Turkish Soldier

'.

Siege of Vienna

651

Polish Cavalryman

653

Luxemburg

656

Battle of Fleurus "

657

Catinat

658

Battle of Steenkirke

,,

648

660

Battle of Neerwinden

663

Battle of Marsaglia

666

French Musketeer.

-

(17th Century)

Prince Eugene

Zenta Campaign

.

North Italy

Chiari Operation

Vendome

/'

Battle of Luzzara

Duke

of

Marlborough

French Cannon.

The Rhine-Danube Country Cannon Royal. French Mortar.

(16th Century)

Battle of Blenheim

Four-barreled Gun.

(16th Century)

Battle of Cassano

The Line Culverin.

........ ....... ........ ......

(16th Century)

Assault on the Schellenberg

671

672 676 682

686 689 692

(16th Century)

Villars

667

696 700 702 708

714 722

725 736 740

Dyle

747

(16th Century)

749

of the

Battle of Ramillies

752

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. Northern Italy

The

Battle of Turin

xxiii

•......,.

758 763

(16th Century)

Pike Breaker.

768

Battle of Oudenarde

776

Brussels-Lille Region

,

783

Siege of Lille

785

Battle of Malplaquet

801

Bombard.

(15th Century)

Spain

809 811

........... ........

Heavy Cavalryman. Douay Region

(16th Century)

816 818

Quesnoy-Landrecies Region

824

Roofed Gun.

830

(16th Century)

Campaigns of Charles XII

832

Narva

834

The Dwina

837

Pultowa' Russian Soldier

Turkish Soldier

.......,,.

846 847 848

;:

GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS.

THE ERA OF CAVALRY. As

the ranks

became

high estate.

Hand

into fashion,

and

to

filled

hand

ballistic

with mercenaries, the

tactics

in efficiency

beyond the

tect the vast frontier of the empire, cavalry

proved that horse could ride down

German

honorable.

foot,

cavalry, enlisted

and the footmau sank into

Roman

came

legionaries,

to be essential.

by the emperors, proved

in their great raids there

knight,

who

tactics or strategy, in

The Teutonic

was

in line of

and to proAdrianople

its

preeminence,

While the western nations

hard knocks, the Byzantines kept up a species of military

but discretion ranked higher.

little horse.

for centuries reigned supreme.

art,

relied

— one

at the

up

set ries

He knew

equaled his courage.

enemy, in

— and

which valor was

Useful in holding back the Moor,

but one

tactics,

— to charge

he was frequently routed by bad ground.

succeeded the knights, but were no better.

war

Of strategy and

of sieges.

Crusades were full of prowess

;

prized,

Feudalism introduced the mailed

deep squares, and accident often decided the day.

castles led to a

on

of form

races depended on stout infantry

the Viking and the Magyar, he was not a soldier in the best sense stability

its

and mounted service became the more

insignificance.

and stratagem, rather than pure

from

legion fell

gave way to missile weapons, the bow came

machines and portable stakes appeared

The barbarians grew

battle.

378-1315.

his in-

;

straight

Armies were

Armored mercena-

Feudalism called for tactics there

castles

was none.

The

they gave us no military lessons, except that of

blind devotion.

The

feature characterizing the history of the art of war,

from the mation,

fall of

is

the

Koman

empire to the era of the Refor-

the rise of cavalry as the main reliance of nations,

and the corresponding decadence lasted for

many

of infantry.

This condition

centuries, until the English long-bow

and the

THE LEGION DEGENERATES.

2

Swiss pike and halberd, coupled to the growth of firearms, again reduced the horseman to his true level. essential

arm

quite displace

Cavalry

is

an

even the rapid-firing weapon of to-day cannot

;

it

but

;

neither fitted to stand alone, nor

Only when the footman

to dominate infantry.

reliance of the

is

it

commander can

the main

is

the art of war reach

its his^hest

development.

We zenith

have seen how the

when

Roman

legion,

which was

at its

the burgess-soldier's stanch courage put a term

to Hannibal's splendid bid for the conquest of Italy, degen-

erated by easy and natural gradations until

mercenary body, unable

In proportion as

of the peninsula.

became burdened with and

lost so

much

ballistic

of its

became a merely

it

to cope with the barbarian invaders it

forfeited character

machines,

marching speed

that, to

forces which could effectually be transferred

it

grew unwieldy,

it

have at hand

from one

threat-

ened point on the enormous imperial frontier to another, the

Emperor Constantine began from each legion

its

to increase the cavalry

by taking

auxiliary turmai, and collecting these

into large bodies destined to serve alone.

The enemies armed savages had been

of

Rome, moreover, were no longer the

brawn,

—

Their weapons and accoutrements

of yore.

vastly improved

legion could not slash still

less

ill-

its

by contact with the empire, and the

way through a body of mere human its own diminished stanchness.

so with

That the old Roman quality had perished was abundantly proven by the numerous

ballistic

machines, and by the beams

and stakes carried along on pack-mules, not

for the ancient

purpose of intrenching the nightly camp, but to save the legion from cavalry attacks

on the

field

of battle.

These

supplementary engines and tools meant that the legion had

been reduced to an un-Roman defensive. In the battle of Adrianople (a. d. 378), the Gothic squad-

CAVALRY DESTROYS AN ARMY.

3

rons accomplished what cavalry liad never compassed since

Hannibal's Numidians waded in the gore of Cannie,

Roman

destroyed a

the belief that

than on ride

it

army.

was more honorable

foot, for the

down

Goth had found

Roman

the vaunted

— they

This battle was the capstone to

on horseback

to fight

that, unassisted,

While

legionar}'.

due more to the deterioration of the foot than

he could this

was

to the meliora-

tion of the horse, yet while the latter continued to gain, the

former continued to

For a thousand

lose.

cavalry was uppermost.

It naturally

long-bow of the hardy British yeoman

French chivalry

Adriauople made longer uphold the

With

it

this lesson in

—

mowed down

the empire.

until the

the super-

evident that the legions alone could no

supremacy.

mind, Theodosius began to enlist bands

and from now on the Roman

soldier quite

and the barbarian horseman became the

lost caste,

come

the supe-

at Crecy.

Roman

of Teutonic chiefs,

j^ears to itself

became and remained,

rior of foot, as indeed it

cilious

deemed

Indeed, he proved his right to the

title

pillar of

by riding

down the veteran Gallic legions which had risen under Magnus Maximus, and by more than one other noteworthy deed of prowess.

Another change soon became apparent.

man, already used

to the support

The Roman

of ballistic

foot-

machines and

portable stakes in the line of battle, began to rely more and

more on

missile weapons,

quarters.

The bow

ages

;

;

but

it it

to discard the

for the first time

Not but what the bow cavalry

and

is

arms of

close

became a Roman weapon.

an admirable arm, especially against

has asserted

itself

was a new thing

at intervals

to see the

Roman

from remotest legionary take

kindly to long-distance weapons, and a thing to excite one's pity.

Cavalry reigned supreme.

At

a later

day the Gothic horse-

BYZANTINE ART.

4

man

rode to and fro throughout Italy, and

Roman

that infantry, such as the

was no match for the best

further proved

had then become,

legion

mounted

of

still

troops.

All Europe

soon vied in arming and training cavalry, and infantry sank to a

still

lower

defend walls.

It

level.

was

fit

only for garrison duty,

—

The Roman cavalry ended by adopting

to

the

bow, and became the same body which had annihilated Crassus on the plains of Mesopotamia.

Horse-archers and

The

horse-lancers were the choice of the day.

latter, the

heavy squadrons, were more unwieldy, but they were able at

down

least to ride

It

the Oriental horse-archer.

was thus arose

all

over Europe the idea that cavalry

should be the chief and only arm service alone

was honorable

;

the idea that

mounted

the idea that the footman

;

was

a sloven and a coward.

The Byzantines

were, in matters military, the legitimate

successors of the old

Roman

empire.

Their armies for cen-

back the barbarian inroads from the east

turies held

were, during their

life,

the best of their kind.

;

they

They have

been much disparaged by historians, and in a sense

it is

that the Byzantines were not successful

all that,

but for

;

true

they had an art in their wars, while in the west of Europe

thews and sinews won the day. of the

Frank appeal

to our

And

Saxon

than the ambush, stratagem

while the doughty blows

instinct of manliness rather

and

studied method

of

the

Byzantine, yet the latter showed more intelligence in what

he did and in the way he did

main

to us

from

this era,

it.

Several books of tactics

and the means of successfully com-

bating the various races that might be met or

Saracen

eastern

— were

re-

— Frank, Magyar

assiduously discussed.

emperors did succeed

in

holding

Moreover the their

territory

against western assaults for generations.

The strength

of the Byzantines lay in their heavy cavalry.

THE PERIOD OF CHAOS. and

up

this tliey set

two

in

and a knowledge of how

discretion

showed a higher kii held

to utilize varying condi-

were deemed a better quality.

not so highly consider'"

as

'

Bull-headed pluck was

was in the west

it

of soldierly ability,

;

— even

A

place in the Byzantine scheme.

its

whose three

reserve,

Courage was valued highly, but

successive shocks tokl well.

tions

and a

lines

5

stratagem treachery

similar tendency

was shown in the seventeenth century in the preference manoeuvres over battles

of

and was not Hannibal called per-

;

fidious because he resorted to ruse in his unequal struggle

Rome ?

against ponderous

Despite these

facts,

which sound

worse in the telling than they actually were, the Byzantines,

war

so far as an art in ries

is

concerned, were a half dozen centu-

ahead of any nation in the west.

From

the era of the Byzantine empire onward for

centuries

it is

war or the mislead. little

—

impossible to speak with

History there

art of war.

Of war there was much as we understand it, none

—

is

none

of art in

;

many

much accuracy about

until

;

chronicles

war there was

Gustavus Adolphus

asain infused method into what others had done with no

method

at

of Csesar

all. :

Strategy had rarely shown

and never rose

to the

rank

of grand-tactics.

If a

to the

of originality

work he had

and

infantry, not horse, ;

was

It

was Gothic

which marched down the Italian peninbut

it

was the cavalry

Narses which jn-oved fatal to them

;

and

of Belisarius

and of

for three centuries

the Franks kept increasing their proportion of

The

to do, he

skill.

All nations did not go to war mounted.

sula under Totila

tribe,

commander

to pattern his battle-tactics to the gi-ound

on which he fought and

deemed a marvel

the days

was whatever suited each nation or

tactics

was able enough

itself since

mounted men.

bulk of the Teutonic forces remained foot

;

and while

Charles Martel and Charles the Great had a goodly array of

THE FEUDAL KNIGHT.

6

cavalry, their armies were really infantry, supplemented to a

moderate extent by horse.

When and the

kingdom

the

local counts

of Charles the

began

Great was broken up

to acquire a semi-independence,

feudalism arose, and horsemen acquired tance.

They had

their merits.

greater impor-

still

was they who kept back

It

that era from north, east and south. Without them Christendom might have been overrun no

the vast inroads of

;

wonder the knight

in

armor won the regard

of the whole earth.

In England the superiority of the horseman was not demonstrated until the battle of Hastings,

when William's

horse,

backed by his archers, did their share

in

overthrowing

Harold's

brave but reckless axemen

but

;

the superiority of the knight in

armor was as marked during the feudal period in Britain as

it

was

on the continent.

From

the establishment of feu-

dalism until the Swiss at Morgarten

and the

English

at

Crecy

proved the ability of good foot to withstand the best of cavalry, the Knight.

(15th Century.)

horseman was preeminent. not a good soldier

of discij^line

;

;

He

was

he had no idea

courage, a certain ability to use his cumbrous

weapons, and the sort of faith in his own invincibility which helped to render him invincible, were his only recommendations.

was

There was no art in what he

to charge

straight

at the

did.

enemy on

charged on good ground, no foe could

His only sight.

resist his

tactics

When

impact

;

he

but

he might end his gallop in a marsh, or against a palisade.

At Mansoura,

St. Louis'

knights were entangled in the streets

— CUMBROUS ARMIES. The

a town and utterly worsted.

of

kniglit

was ignorant

was formed " battles

emy

;

Each army

of art.

in three

great columns or

" these galloped

upon the

tussle of hours,

en-

and, after a

similarly marshaled,

one or the other would

be forced back, often by an accident of terrain or on account of leader.

To

set

the loss of a

a successful ambush was

a rarity which was applauded as a wonder.

For many centuries armies moved

Dismounted Knight. (13th Century.)

into the enemy's territory, not to secure

a strategic point, but to ravage the land and secure plunder

from the harassed people.

Victualing by any method was not

attempted, and so soon as one section was eaten out, another

must be sought, irrespective Battles were rare.

The

of

its

military value.

rival armies did

no reconnoitring,

and thus

at times scarcely

knew each other's whereabouts. They met by accident

more often than by

design,

and

not

infre-

quently sent word to each other to meet at a given spot and fight as

the

it

out,

had

Cimbri

in-

vited Marius to battle at Vercellae.

Even then

it

exceeded their ability to Knight.

day

to deploy

marshal their

forces

fair terms, for

it

on

(15th Century.)

a small marching column into

A modern army manoeuvres thrice as

rapidly.

took

all

line of battle.

; ;

RAIDS OR SIEGES. The feudal knight was

so utterly without discipline or reli-

ability that mercenaries gradually crept into favor.

mercenary was cast in the same mould armor,

;

But the

he was a

man

in

not a knight, and was

if

equally bold and useless, though

more

So long

loyal to his chief.

was paid, he would stay

as he

with the colors, which was more

than you could count on in the

The mercenary became

knight.

the support of autocratic mon-

archs Knight

in

Armor.

;

but when, at the end of a

war, bands of mercenaries began

(13th Century.)

to

of the country, seeking a

became

and fro over the face

and unquestionable danger.

called for castles

sieges rather than a

Many

to

lord and fresh campaigns, they

of questionable utility

The feudal system of

new

move

;

castles led to a

war of manoeuvring and

fighting.

day more

of these castles were to the armies of that

serious obstacles than Ehrenbreitstein or Gibraltar to a

ern force.

They began by being simple

they ended by being elaborate and

two ways of capturing them walls,

and to the

These

castles

gunpowder, ;

artillery

less

as this warrior

all skill,

were

adapted.

For generations after the inven-

had small

effect

on these

made

typical

work

;

solid

of the mailed knight

practically no impress on the art of

war, so the Crusades teach us no useful lessons. equally unpractical

ill

and reduced operations

than the ancient catapults and rams.

The Crusades were the and

There were but

which disregarded their existence, or to

a series of tiresome sieges.

feudal structures

solid.

mod-

in construction

starvation or undermining the

latter the mediaeval armies

robbed war of

to the scale of raids

tion of

:

war

each served

its

Both were

purpose, but neither war

THE CRUSADES.

9

nor warrior was worthy of imitation, unless less

devotion of the latter.

did feats of arms record

all

;

it

be in the guile-

There were abimdant and splen-

there was nothing to repay study.

the deeds of valor which war has evoked

record the history of the

human

race

;

our task

To

is

but to

is to

evolve

the history of the art of war from these deeds:

in

other

words, to separate from the mere acts of courage those

in-

stances of intelligent application of courage which have added to our

knowledge of what constitutes modern war.

The

thou-

sand years during which cavalry was the sole dependence of

Europe have

in this sense

few lessons for the military

student.

Knight.

(12th Century.)

;;

II.

REAPPEARANCE OF INFANTRY.

1315-1500.

who

It was the plucky peasant of Switzerland and Britain value of foot.

and

The Swiss

muscular grasp these weapons were

in their

reestablished the

carried an eighteen-foot pike, or a heavy halberd irresistible.

They fought

in

an echeloned line of three solid bodies, which cavalry could not break, nor the infantry of the day withstand, (1.31.5)

and they were hardy marchers.

(1339) one in the open later were

Only when broken could they be beaten, as they

field.

by the Spanish sword and buckler.

of the English long-bow, with

its

Eqiially splendid

;

Poitiers (1356)

proved that the day of infantry had come back. stakes could not be approached like other foot.

was not

invincible.

At Cr^ey

cloth-yard shaft.

utterly overthrew the French chivalry

was

At Morgarten

they destroyed an army of knights in a mountain pass, and at Laupen

by cavalry

;

was the record

(1346) this

weapon

and Agineourt (1415)

The long-bowman behind

his

when broken or on the march he

Swiss and Briton proved to the knight in armor that he Zisca's wagon-fort

was another link

the Hussites became a terror in Germany.

same chain

in the

The disappearance

of feudalism,

the growth of intelligence, and the invention of gunpowder all contributed to reestablish warfare as a science.

rausket

;

The cross-bow began

and the unwieldy knight gave way

kings gained power and raised their

own

to the

armies,

and toward 1600 conditions arose which might

to be replaced

more

by the

active footman.

As

war became more regular

rehabilitate the art of war.

It was the courage of the hardy peasantry of two western nations quite as

much

as the invention of

gunpowder, which

put a term to the ascendancy of the feudal knight, and reestablished infantry as the

arm which should bear

The English long-bowman with

of battle.

the brunt

his cloth-yard

shaft found that he could annihilate the best of cavalry

a distance

;

from

the Swiss pikeman proved that armored knights

could not ride

down

his steady array of protended spears.

These facts were a revelation, and at once modified the

posi-

SWISS PIKEMAN.

11

Each new development of shock and missile tactics. The Swiss array was a modern revival of the old tion of the

horseman in war.

represented

a

phalanx of Philip and Alexander; and, though the

bow was one

most ancient of weapons,

it

had never

yet been what the English

made it. The Swiss pike was

of the

yeoman

eighteen feet

long, with a steel head of from twelve

was grasped in

to thirty-six inches, Swiss Halberdier (leth Century.)

both hands, and held shoulder high, with a downward slant.

The

second,

third and fourth rank pikes protruded beyond the

front

;

application the sarissa of Macedon,

bled in length and

but

it

This arm resem-

the rest were held upright.

was

Around

differently held.

the central pen-

non of the Swiss column stood the halberdiers, who wielded an eight-foot heavy-headed

weapon which could cleave the best of armor, lop off

or even,

it is

arms or

legs,

said, decapitate

Without the up-

a horse.

land brawn and tremendous national spirit which inspired

the

Swiss,

these

even

however,

weapons

would have

availed nothing. It was hardy strength, the love of country,

and the Swiss Sergeant Halberdier.

instinct

which lent them

of

liberty

teri-or.

Swiss Pikeman.

The

Swiss were

rapidly

(IGth Century.)

SWISS TACTICS.

12

mobilized and swift on the march. early

Roman

Like the

legions, they always attacked,

wearing no armor, could

not

and

only keep well

ahead of the cumbrous armies of the day, but descend on the enemy's line with an impetus like the avalanches of their native hills.

They employed

light troops,

cross-bowmen, to skirmish ahead of the columns, and these retired into the intervals

when the charge was

opened.

The Swiss had no It

great generals.

was the courage and

steadfastness,

the weapons and skill of the

men

But they had an admi-

which won.

rable battle-field tactics.

They mar-

shaled three columns, Vorhut (van-

Swiss Captain. (16th Century.)

guard), Gewaltshaufen (power-mass)

and Nachhut (rear-guard), and launched them on the foe

in

echelon, with the advantage of successive impact, indepen-

dence of movement and the safety of each column from partaking of the repulse of another.

At

times the three columns

were marshaled with the centre or the

wings in advance,

a partial checker-wise forma-

The wedge and

tion.

hollow square, or

the

"hedge-

hog," showed that the Swiss

had

studied

the

tactical

Lance and Halberd Heads.

forms of antiquity.

(IGth Century.)

The

first

victory of

the

Swiss foot, at Morgarten in 1315, was not due to formation or

tactics.

its

superior

The feudal horsemen were lured

into

;

FOOT BEATS HORSE.

13

an icy mountain-pass, with a precipice above them on the

and a lake below them on the

right,

left

and here

:

they were destroyed by rolling logs

and bowlders down upon and thus hurling

their line,

them

into the gulf beneath.

This, coupled to a furious

attack

front

with

the

deadly halberd, gave the

no room to

knights their to

lances

in

set

rest,

or

swing their swords.

Morgarten

was not

battle

was a

;

and

prise

but

it

it

a

surBernese Soldiers.

butchery

(15th Century.)

opened the eyes

of the arrogant knight to the fact that, even

though he be afoot, a

man 's

a

man

for

At Laupen (1339) "^

infantry,

a' that.

the Swiss

unsustained

quite

f

and in the open

^

with

2

bristling pikes,

^

heavy horse backed by the

its

serried

field,

met,

ranks and

an array of

The

2

best infantry of the day.

[;

foot

was quickly dispersed,

2

and

all

power of the

the

armored knights could not drive the columns from their

ground.

Infantry,

dozen centuries of decay, had again proved

its

Bannockburn accomplished the same end of the world

and

in a different

way.

after

a

worth.

in another part

FOOT AGAINST FOOT.

14 It

was only by similar

tactics to their owii

— by dismounted

heavy cavalry, or by bodies of footmen formed on the same method, such as the Landsknechte of

Germany

— that

Later on the Span-

their match. iards,

met

the Swiss

with sword and buckler, found

that they could annihilate the Swiss

column,

the

like

if,

legionaries

against the phalanx at Pydna, they

could but once

penetrate a gap.

Foot could be matched by foot infantry had asserted

over horse, and

in

its

;

but

superiority

a combat

be-

tween the two arms, the pike was Genevese Mercenary.

useful

when sword and

shield

were

{15th Century.)

of

had a

distinct

What

no account

;

advantage over the Spanish

the Swiss column line.

placed a limit to the utility of the Swiss column was

the revival of castrametation and the improve-

ment

umn ill

A

of artillery.

adapted

carrying

to

works, nor could

under of

col-

with long spears was

well

cannon.

points,

-

it

live

salvos

plied

These weak

and yet more

inter-

cantonal jealousies, and a

consequent in English Long-

bowman. (14th Century.)

deterioration

discipline,

eventually

sealed the fate of the Swiss

English Long-

bowman.

array.

(14th Century.)

Of even more

interest

than the Swiss footman's mastery of cavalry

is

the wonderful

;

THE ENGLISH LONG-BOW. result obtained

by the long-bow

of the Englishman.

the reign of John, the cross-bowman

Whatever

ant.

its origin, it

long-bow into favor.

15

had been

was Edward

I.

Until

in the ascend-

who brought

the

At Falkirk (1298)

the long-bowmen did wonders, and while at

Bannockburn (1314) want

caused their overthrow, at

it

of support

was they who

Crecy (1346) proved to the haughty

chivalry of France that a arisen.

With

new

era had

their flanks protected

from

the charges of horse and their stakes set

up before them, the

line of

long - bowmen, vomiting

Poitiers

fire

of

(1356)

was cumulative

mony, and Agincourt (1415) made beyond

cavil

three-foot

be reached by the best of cav-

shafts, coidd not alry.

its

Cross-bowman. (12th Century.)

it

testi-

plain

that infantry was regaining

its

proper place in war.

That the French, victories against the Cross-bo'wrnan.

lish is

later in this century,

won

Eng-

due to the fact

(12th Centiiry.)

that they

had learned

to

enemy only at a disadvanand not when the long-bowman

attack the tage,

could put in his best work

upon them on the march

;

they

fell

in lieu of

Once

assaulting their chosen ground.

broken up, the long-bowmen were no

more invulnerable than any other they were in fact cavalry charges, or try led.

at

of

foot

the mercy stout

armed with good hand

to

of

Cross-bowman. (15th Century.)

infan-

hand weapons and vigorously

;

ZISCA'S WAGON-BURG.

16

That the knights recognized the growing value is

shown

well

of infantry

now

the fact that large bodies were

in

quently dismounted to fight on

foot,

and that with

fre-

their

heavy armor and weapons they could more than once bear

down

the

lighter

line

— provided

unmailed infantry,

of

always that they had not to march far or

The Germans learned another

fast.

lesson as to the efficiency of foot, in the Hussite wars

of

the

John

century.

fifteenth

was

Zisca

traordinary man.

an

ex-

He

well

understood that his

half-

armed, undisciplined peasant rabble, with religious

zeal,

all

could

their

not

cope with trained troops,

and

least of all

cavalry.

and with

bay,

he, too, helped teach the

tactics

grew

to the offensive,

over the land with more

and moved

centre

;

outside

this

would gallop up one

:

the

to

changed

and fro

to

charge

Hussites, in oj^en field, would

German army.

in five columns, the artillery

again two long ones.

rear

The

into the very teeth of a

marshaled

to

swiftness than their opponents

and woe betide the heavy horse which dared in on the wagon-burg.

tac-

This wagon-

to be so exact that Zisca's armies

from the defensive

march

wagon-

heavy-armed rider that the

footman, well used, was more than his equal.

camp

his

scheme developed into a science of defensive

fortress

at

(15th Century.)

Cross-bowmen.

tics,

with feudal

But he stood

They were

and cavalry in the

two short wagon-columns, and then

As by

magic, the short wagon-columns

form a front

line

and back

whole structure was lashed

to

form a

together

with

EXIT OF FEUDAL KNIGHT. chains or ropes

;

17

on each wagon niotinted

its

special squad

in the twinkling of

an

eye, almost a

of defenders,

and

Roman camp

in the midst of the enemy's battalions.

from out

this

lo,

camp would

whose fanatical fury was

sally

men

with

flails

and

And pikes,

So dreaded were they

irresistible.

that a handful of Hussites would sometimes disperse an army.

Nothing but

artillery could successfully

demolish these wagon-

burgs, and Zisca had always a superior equipment of guns

German armies

silence the enemy's.

This tactics was not within the domain

to face the Hussites.

of regular warfare of

means

man

to end,

but

;

it

finally

Internal dissensions

foot-

among Bohe-

broke up this remarkable method of defensive

But while

tactics.

was an instance of able adaptation

and a further proof of the value of the

jjroperly put to use.

mians

to

could finally not be got

it

existed,

it

worked towards the same

end of destroying the ascendancy of horse.

So long as the feudal power remained

in force, there

small chance of a revival of the art of war. satisfied

But

was

princes, dis-

with the untrustworthiness of the forces raised under

the feudal system, resorted to mercenaries, either in time of

war, or to protect their real or pretended rights against their

own

vassals.

plished

with

it

its

Feudalism outgrew

usefulness.

It

accom-

way to something better, taking who from one point of view is the preux

mission and gave

that warrior

chevalier of all the ages, bully,

its

and from another the typical armed

— the mailed knight.

References to explosive substances like gunpowder, or to

burning substances literally as old as

like

Greek

Moses.

fire,

Among

are to be found in works later references,

some of

the Brahmins of Alexander's time are said by Philostratus to

have been able to " overthrow their enemies with tempests

and thunderbolts shot from Syracuse,

is

their walls

;

" Archimedes, at

said by Plutarch to have " cast huge stones from

"

GUNPOWDER.

18

machines with a great noise " Ca-

his

;

ligula is stated by Dion Cassius to have had machines which " imitated thunder

Hand Gun.

;

and lightning and

emitted

and Marcus Graccus

in the eighth cen-

stones

tury gives a receipt of one pound of sulphur, two of willow charcoal and six of saltpetre, for the discharge of what

we

should call a rocket.

The use

of

Greek

fire

was understood as early

century, but powder was

as the sixth

earliest used in China, perhaps a

thousand years before Christ,

and was introduced

Euro-

to

pean notice by the Saracens. Schwartz nor

Neither

can be said to be

Early tury

in

its

Bacon

inventor.

the fourteenth

cannon

cen- Borabard

and gunpowder

of Rhodes.

Threw Stone

appear to have been known in Florence

made

of

them among the

the arsenal at

guns

Rouen

— are said

to

;

stores in the

and

in

1346

;

1338 mention

in

Tower g-uns

Calibre, 22

in.

Ball of 650 pounds.

of

is

London and

— perhaps

hand

have been used at Crecy.

It is certain that the

Spanish Moors, shortly after 1326,

had made the use of

gunpowder,

arms well

and

known

fire-

cannon in west-

ern Europe, and by the end of the cen-

tury they were the

common property of At first all armies. their high cost pre-

Big Cannon.

(15th Century.)

cluded their USC CX-

EARLY ARTILLERY. cept in sieges and the defense of towns

;

19 it

was

niucli later,

at the battle of Rosabeck, in 1382, between the

French, that tillery

At

field-ar-

appeared.

the end of the

fourteenth

century

guns

cast

were

of Bombardelle.

and

(ir)th

Century.)

and

copper

bronze, iron,

Dutch and

Some

called hombardce.

of these were

huge

speci-

mens, which consumed large charges of powder, and hurled stone balls of from one hundred to one thousand pounds

Mortars appeared in Italy about the middle of the

weight.

fifteenth century.

The French use

of

which

field

first -

made

artillery,

be trans-

could

ported in the army train. French Gun

That which accompanied

Charles VIII. to Italy in 1494 was, comparatively speaking, light,

rapid of

fell into line,

In the

fire

and well served.

Other nations gradually

and Gustavus made artillery of really light calibre.

ficfteenth

and sixteenth centupart of the

ries

infantry bore

fire-

arms. These were at first ly

extreme-

crude,

being

merely a gun-barHand

Bombardelle.

(loth Century.)

rel

stick

by a match

had

all

;

lashed

and

to

a

Mounted

Culveri-

neer.

set off

but by the end of the sixteenth centmy they

grown

to

have a lock, and the form of the weapon

began to approach the musket.

;

THE CROSS-BOW DISAPPEARS.

20

In the second half of the fifteenth century firearms and artillery

had become a necessary part

The feudal

an army.

equipment of

of the

organization was disappearing, and

power of kings received

the

more

recognition.

things combined to

Both these

make

possi-

ble a revival in the art of war.

Standing

armies had become

the rule, and war was no longer exclusive

the Cross-bow. (15th Century.)

sumed set

back to

discipline

its

proper function

;

its

prerogative

As

the nobleman.

of

infantry re-

sway and cavalry was

as artillery improved

and

was enforced, those conditions gradually obtained

on which Gustavus Adolphus exercised so marked an

influ-

Since the Byzantine art disappeared, there had been

ence.

no basis on which

to build such a thing as a science of

war

but a proper

was now

basis

formed.

By

the mid-

dle of the six-

teenth century cross-bow

the

disappeared, and

Cross-bow.

(15th Century.)

infantry

was armed with

pikes, halberds

and muskets.

musketeers were but ten or fifteen to a large the

number increased

At first the company but ;

until, early in the seventeentli century,

two thirds of the men were armed with muskets.

They

all

wore light helmets and breastplates.

The Dutch, tical

progress.

in their

wars against Spain, made marked

Particularly,

Maurice

of

tac-

Nassau improved

MAURICE OF NASSAU. the musket and lock,

made

rules for the footmen, introduced

the cadeuced step, and prescribed

and deployments. same

21

Other able

many evolutions, ployments

soldiers

were working in the

direction.

Hand

Culveriu.

(1480.)

Arquebusier.

(1507.)

;

III.

CHANGES IN TACTICS. — SIXTEENTH CENTURY. Heavy

horse had fought in column

was resumed. The foot was ployed of

then in one long ILae

;

huge squares

pikemen thirty or forty deep, with cross-bowmen or musketeers on the corners

As

or sides.

artillery

and firearms improved, the depth was reduced.

battles stood in line or checker-wise,

Up

between them. of battle

later it

;

and skirmishers operated

was mixed with

it,

From

and a reserve was kept.

;

was

Parallel order

it

invariable

;

Marches were

in close column, with

rewards

officers.

There was no

ransom then sprang up,

camps grew

into

discipline.

Uj) to about 1500 prisoners

brilliant.

vise.

Pursuit

action.

van and flankers, but at no

The

Food was got by plunder.

mercenary troops introduced rank and command

became the

;

those

who

raised the

killed

to the sad increase of the train.

;

the system of

Earthworks around

In besieging fortresses treachery was resorted

of besieging remained crude until the sixteenth century,

Prior to lip

improved

tlie

it,

and engineering began

sixteenth century

heavy cavalry in one long

grew up

it

when

to,

and

The

art

the Italians, and

to take on a better form.

had been a habit

line (e/i haye).

The

to

The

foot

draw

rule then

of marshaling all cavalry in solid columns,

opened in order to use their firearms.

use

men

Punishments were Draconic

had been

the ancient siege devices were used until the introduction of artillery.

later the Dutch,

was

fell to the

the lines were cumbrous, and battles

The tram was enormous.

great distance.

the six-

Artillery

delayed their marches, and always

were bloody because the troops once in could not be got out of

was unknown.

and

to the fifteenth century the horse stood in front of the line

too heavy to follow troops victor.

These

in front of

teenth century the cavalry was put on or beliind the flanks.

of

column

later the

;

into big battalia or " battles,"

which

was likewise

marshaled in heavy squares, called battalia or "battles."

The cross-bowmen,

later the musketeers,

rear ranks of these battles, and a rest of

file

formed the front and on each

them were posted on the four corners

flank.

The

in bodies, of

1

«

which,

when

men

23

the front rank had fired,

The depth

rest to load.

to forty

BA TTLES."

;

it

retired behind the

of these battles long remained thirty

but as artillery became more dangerous, early

in the seventeenth century,

men, and even

As

to five.

was reduced to ten and eight

it

a general rule, the pikemen and

halberdiers fought in close, the cross-bowmen and musketeers in open, ranks

hand

in other words, the long-range

;

and hand

The

fighters kept to their appropriate formations.

was opened by volunteers, or men chosen by

lot

to

fight

{enfants

perdu8^ forlorn hopes), who skirmished out in front, and

though they

rallied in

groups in case they were attacked by

cavalry, they were often ridden down.

In line of

was wont

to

battle, the cavalry,

up

to the fifteenth century,

be in front, the foot in the rear.

Later, the

columns of foot were for mutual support mixed with those of horse in the same line, as the it

fire

of the cross-bowmen woidd,

was thought, make the work of the horse more easy

reserve of heavy horse

and foot was kept in the

rear.

and a

;

C^rom

\

the sixteenth century on, the foot stood habitually in the centre, the cavalry

was no

on the flanks, or behind the flanks.

The

set battle-order.

battles

were placed

There

wind

and,

if possible,

with the sun and

in the rear.

The

artillery

was placed

in batteries at

any commanding

part of the line, and the horses or oxen which dragged sent to the rear.

were

it

It could neither follow the troops in a vic-

tory nor sustain an advance, and in case of disaster was sure to fall into the

lery

grew

enemy's hands.

in importance

:

its

Despite these demerits,

advantages outweighed

its

artil-

short-

comings.

The introduction

Open

of firearms brought about

many

/

one con-

in

tinuous line, or checker- wise, or at times in concave order.

Open ground was sought

/

changes.

order became essential, and cavalry looked on

its

fire

1

;

RANK AND COMMAND.

24

The horsemen awaited

as superior to the cold weapon.

charge and received a charge the though,

if

men

a

with salvos of musketry, while during

it

stopped to

fire

without firearms, they

a volley, or often several

still

charged as of

and fought on

dragoons dismounted

The

foot.

fought in open or closed order, according as

The

old.

infantry

bore missile or

it

close-quarter weapons.

The

rival lines

were slowly formed behind a cloud of

Duels between cham^Hons or small bodies were

mishers.

was almost invariable

Parallel order

quent.

skir-

or turning^

movements were rare or

fre-

flank attacks

;

In the four-

accidental.

teenth and fifteenth centuries battles were often sanguinary,

and ended

in the annihilation of one army.

Firearms reduced

the casualties because battles were sooner decided.

was almost never undertaken.

It

Pursuit

was in fact a traditional

habit to remain three days on the field of victory, to celebrate the event and to divide the booty.

Marches were conducted allowed

;

the

in as

heavy columns as the roads

cavalry and foot were mixed

Van- and

strongly escorted, was in a separate column.

guard and flankers were put

out,

the artillery,

;

rear-

but at no great distance.

The baggage-train grew enormously in size non-combatants and women accomjpanied the army in almost incredible numbers, and the soldiers were followed by their prisoners and Combooty, in whatever fashion they could be transported. pared to the orderliness of an army of to-day, the army of ;

three hundred years ago was worse than a mob.

During the feudal stand

it,

era,

rank and command, as we under-

did not exist; but the employment of mercenary

troops gradually evolved a system.

The monarch appointed

the army commanders and the colonels the latter selected as the captains captains the men who raised the companies ;

;

chose their lieutenants

;

and the men were often permitted to

RANSOMS. select the petty (or

25

non-commissioned)

This ancient

officers.

device was substantially the system which prevailed in raising

volunteer regiments during our civil war.

On

recruitment the

men were

expected to report with a

given number of days' rations, after which the prince they served was supposed to keep them in victual so

ill

but this was

;

done that plunder was the universal means of subsist-

There were no magazines until much

ence.

requisitions on the enemy's territory were

later

;

regular

unknown, food was

usually brought from the army's base, and this was a long and tedious process, whose irregularity forbade rapid manceuvres,

and gave

rise

Nor

plunder.

hunger and sickness,

to

was there any method

rule

ment was even more

Even

desertions

to

until long after regular armies

in feeding troojjs,

shiftlessly

and

had become the and

their pay-

conducted than the rationing.

so late as the fourteenth

and

fifteenth centuries the

feudal organizations showed no discij)line whatever

;

but the

growth of mercenary organizations made severer methods imperative.

Francis

I.

many made these

In the sixteenth, Ferdinand the Catholic in Spain,

and Henry

codes

II. in

France, and Charles V. in Ger-

codes of laws for their respective armies. the

Under

punishments were Draconic, and rewards

were allotted for courage and exemplary service

;

but unless

a general was able and much beloved by his men, no laws could keep up a discipline such as to-day we take for granted. Prisoners in feudal times had been habitually treated with

such cruelty that few escaped with their nobles could buy release.

But

little

by

little

lives.

som sprang up under which even the common hope for freedom. but

it

pered

Only the

a system of ransoldier could

This was a step in the right direction,

increased the train to a dangerous degree, and hamstill

further the

movements

of troops.

In the fourteenth and fifteenth centm-ies armies camped

SIEGES.

26 without mucli

though the wagons were

artificial protection,

used as defenses

but firearms soon made

;

essential for

it

camps to be surrounded by earthworks, on which guns were mounted.

The

profiles of these

works gradually became more

marked, and bastions and outworks were the

artillery

parks were fortified

lest

erected.

Especially

the guns

should be

captured.

In attacking

fortresses, the ancient

towers, catapults

and

means

Greek

ballistas,

fire

of rams,

and

movable

like devices

remained in use until the introduction of gunpowder.

Walls

and contravallation were thrown up, and

of circumvallation

mining was commonly resorted

In the sixteenth and

to.

made in the cpnThese new methods,

seventeenth centuries great advance was

duct of sieges, especially by the Italians.

improved on

engineering.

of

up

in the Netherlands, led

Treacherous

dealings

to the

were

modern

first

art

essayed

with the commandant of a strong place, or with a friendly Secret escalade might be attempted.

party within walls.

neither was available, a regular

If

Trenches were dug, at

first

siege

Batteries were erected to

command

breaches were operated.

Powder was

mining

;

walls were

up the

from

fortress this

fire,

too costly to use in

made

in

antiquity.

threw burning substances

siege-lines, built

to disturb the operations,

selves

the enemy's walls, and

undermined by heat, as

The besieged kept up a heavy at night to light

was undertaken.

without system, later in zigzags.

sorties,

assaults with stubbornness.

outworks from which

and defended them-

To a

storm-captured

no quarter was given, and the defenders fought with

knowledge.

The wars

in the Netherlands in the last half of the six-

teenth century gave a great impetus to engineering.

Out-

works grew in extent and importance, and inner works were built to enable the besieged to hold the fortress even after

DAWN OF NEW

ERA.

Regular sieges were long drawn

the loss of the walls.

Trenches were opened beyond cannon-shot or saps nearer to

;

and breastworks

common their

command

the tops of the walls.

of our

Breaches were carried by

origin in these days.

The besieged

storming parties made up of volunteers. ually learned in a cruder

now jDut into use. The role played by

Many

mantelets, fascines, sand-bags, had

devices, such as

modern

at given distances took

All but the breaching batteries were

the place of parallels.

placed so as to

out.

covered trenches

;

way

all

grad-

the arts of defense which

are

exaggerated

;

it

the invention of

was an

gunpowder has been

not a cause

effect,

;

gunpowder was

but one manifestation of the growth of the world out of the

darkness of the Middle Ages

was another. intelligence,

It

was

;

the advance in military art

in reality the

dawn

of the

new

era of

the emergence from the ignorance which had

engulfed Europe for a thousand years, which lay at the root of all

redeem

these

improvements.

It

was time mankind should

itself.

Officer.

(14th Century.)

;;

IV.

THE SWEDISH ARMY-CHANGES. f

From Alexander

to Gustavus,

new

to Csesar, the art of

war

1523-1632.

rose to a great height

sank into oblivion; Gustavus re-created JW

it

Ancient arms were simple

direction to war.

from Caesar

;

Gunpowder gave a

armies needed no magazines,

;

When

nor trains to carry munitions, and everything tended to battle.

firearms

and cannon were introduced, the strong places where the munitions lay became so important as to be fortified,

munitions

;

raised

was heavy

artillery

could not be

made

decisive

by recruitment

Marked

or press-gangs,

tactical

and

siers

all

war was formal.

The

;

was fire.

still

deep

The musket,

shortened.

;

men

as a standing

but Gustavus reduced

The men wore

to dispense with the crutch-rest

finally the

first

pikemen gradually gave way to musketeers,

deployed to three deep to

The pike was

victories

;

Troops were

and their quality was bad. C Sweden

file

;

after

many

it

to

armor and a pot

light

grew

stages,

light

paper cartridges were introduced

The foot got organized into companies and command were settled. Fire grew more rapid, especially

bayonet was added.

regiments, and rank and

among

and

advance was soon made, and troops grew more mobile.

especially for light troops.

helmet.

;

regular army, drawn therefrom, had no mer-

its

Infantry was the bulk of the force

six, Avhieh

far from their

marches were slow and tedious

In France there were then but fifteen thousand

cenaries\

enough

Armies could not go

of sieges. ;

by pursuit

created a national militia, and

army.

and armies sought rather to capture these than

Hence a system

to fight battles.

the Swedes, but minor tactics

and dragoons

;

was

crude.

light horse existed in eastern

ized into cornets

and regiments.

Gustavus taught

it

Cavalry consisted of cuiras-

Europe only

all

;

Cavalry had grown to rely on

to charge at a gallop.

The Swedish

artillery

was organ-

its

firearms

was far ahead

of any other.

Gustavus made light and handy guns, which could keep up with

the troops and

fire

with rapidity

;

time the king used leather guns.

and h°

The

ii)Y°"*^°d ^-^pd ammiiTiitinn

artillery

was reduced

At

one

to a system of

regular calibres, and the handling of guns became a science.

It

is

desirable to review part of what has been said in

former volumes, in order to lead up to the military status of

Sweden, when Gustavus Adolphus was on the throne.

His-

ANCIENT ARMIES. tory shows us tliree

main periods to the

from remote antiquity

29

in the art of

war

Rome

decadence of

from

During the

first

period, the art of

work

first

the second,

;

during the Middle Ages, and down to Gustavus the beginning of Gustavus'

the

:

;

the third,

to the present day.

war under the Greeks and

Romans, and notably under Alexander, Hannibal and

Caesar,

attained a height such that, in view of the uncertainty in war-

and of the changeableness of

fare

tactics arising

from the

may be

said to dispute the

palm with that of the nineteenth century.

During the second

rapidity of

modern

period, the art of

invention,

war sank

it

became

intelligent

;

and

third period, the art of

rise, as

people again

to this rise the introduction of gun-

From

powder contributed.

and

to its lowest level, as letters

were forgotten, and began slowly to

arts

the genius of Gustavus in the

war acquired a notable impetus and a

which, invigorated by the great deeds of Frederick and

life

Napoleon, has brought It

it

to the present high development.

was the introduction of gunpowder into Europe which

gave the key-note to the new science of war, so different from that which obtained in

among

the ancients.

The two

periods

which war has really flourished, and which have been not

over three hundred years in length, were separated by a gap of

many

marked

centuries.

The

distinction

between the two was a

one.

The armies

of the

numerically large.

Greeks and Romans were, as a

rule, not

Their method of victualing troops was

such that food could be found almost everywhere, and

it

was

not usually necessary to establish storehouses of provisions or to bring rations

from a great distance.

ancients were simple, spears, darts

any

place,

of the

long

—

— could be readily manufactured

in

and those which did not

and arrows

and by the

The weapons

soldiers themselves.

military stores were unessential to an

army

last

Great arsenals of in the field

;

nor

;

ANCIENTS NEEDED ONLY TACTICS.

30

had powder and

ball, or other

ammunition, to be brought up

from the rear to supply the waste of

For

battle.

this reason

the ancients had no need of fortresses, or depots in their rear.

Communication with home was of

less

the introduction of gunpowder with reasons which

make

modern times were

importance than after machinery, and the

all its

the security of a base so essential in

to the ancients of

no moment whatever.

With the ancients battle was the one important feature. The nature of their weapons brought them at once into close To withdraw an army from quarters, and kept them there. battle with a moderate loss sible,

no

—

to all but the very

artillery to

things went

if

wrong was imposThere was

few great generals.

keep the enemy

at a distance

and arrest

his

pursuit while the beaten troops were retired out of action

and the possible

rival lines if

there

were too much intermingled to make

had been.

Adctory for one side

commonly

resulted in

for the other.

generals of antiquity needed no art except

The average

the art of fighting battles,

what we

Battles

and fearful massacre

this

call strategy

—

in other words, tactics.

was an unessential

They marched

art.

their armies out to a convenient plain in

To them

which to

fight,

and

everything depended on the victory they there might win.

The great

captains of antiquity were undeniably able strate-

gists as well as fine tacticians

of intellectual

them

common

;

sense,

but strategy

and

is

the very essence

their clear vision enabled

to see the advantage of doing that

reduced to rules and called a science,

which we have now

^ which

indeed

is

but

a collection of those things which the great captains have

taught us how to do.

In modern times, when the introduction of firearms, for infantry and cavalry alike, became universal; artillery

became

accompanied armies larger,

and they had

;

when

when much

their numerical force

to be fed

and supplied with

INDECISIVE VICTORIES. ammunition from magazines in

31

their rear, the importance of

these depots became so great that they were invariably turned into fortresses

;

and

an equal importance to

their vahxe lent

the lines of communication out to the

These

them.

lines

had

be protected at

to

their interruption for even a

the

army thus

cut

army depending upon all

hazards, for

few days might bring disaster to

off.

Again, the transportation of rations and material of war required long trains, and consumed

much

time.

The

loss of

a convoy or of a fortress was as harmful as the

loss of

a bat-

tle.

Thus

in a certain sense battles forfeited their original

importance, and people took instead to manoeuvring on the

enemy's communications or to capturing his fortresses. Victories, to be decisive,

orous pursuit der, loaded

;

must as a

by

rule be followed

and the armies of the early period

of

vig-

gunpow-

down, depending on depots, and followed by a

horde of non-combatants, often exceeding in number the arms-bearing men, were cumbrous and unsuited to pursuit.

A further

reason

why

battles

were followed by so

was that they were delivered only loss

on the enemy

— from

any ulterior purpose.

gain

to defeat, destroy or inflict

purely tactical reasons

The

little

art of

making

— without

battle subserve a

larger purpose in the general campaign-scheme, so that a vic-

tory shall be of due effect, was not then understood.

modern

times, of recent origin.

effort to

make war a

It

is,

in

Thus, though there was an

science, to reduce

it

to rides, the lack of

broader knowledge and the cumbrous method of the day ren-

dered the average campaigns, even up to the end of the seventeenth century, slow, long drawn-out and indecisive

;

full of

wrong, ill-digested methods, of a curious sort of formality or subservience to certain hard and fast rules.

Sweden was the

first

for herself a regular

and

country in Europe which built up at the

same time national military

MERCENARY

32 organization. small,

— had

to the king. tion, or

SOLDIERS.

In other countries what army there existed was originally served as a species of

guard of honor

In case of war, troops were raised by conscrip-

under a rude militia system, by voluntary or press-

gang enlistments, or by the purchase

of mercenaries.

In the

sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the soldier of

fortune

was a typical character, equally useful

and unreliable

and dan-

in war,

gerous in war and peace alike. These

men earned

their livelihood

by arms

as a trade, not as a profession

expected' to live on their pay tions,

and they hoped

The

by plunder.

by

garrisoned

to

;

grow

free towns

their

they

and

citizens,

ra-

rich

were

who

were enrolled in a regular body for defense and policing of their

the city Danzig- Citizen Soldier (tak-

ing oath).

From an

;

in case they

needed additional

forces they resorted to mercenaries.

Sweden was a noteworthy excep-

old print.

tion.

As

early

as

the

sixteenth

century the Vasa kings laid the foundation of a national regular army, and Gustavus Adolphus perfected

it.

The

Swedish army was a pattern organization, in which there were no mercenaries.

It

consisted

of

a given number of

regular troops, raised, paid, fed and equipped by the state,

and back

The

of these stood a militia

kept up by the people.

regulars were intended for wars outside the national ter-

ritory, the militia for the defense of the fatherland

regulars were kept at full

The

raising of the troops

;

strength by drafts from the

and the militia.

was based on a careful system of

land-tenure, under which all able-bodied males from fifteen

years up were called into service

;

and Gustavus introduced

SWEDISH ARMY SYSTEM.

33

a novel method under which each soldier was supposed to

own and

to

be supported and equipped by a certain parcel of

land, rising in size

and imi^ortauce accord-

ing to arm and grade.

The

and

militia consisted of eight cavalry

twenty infantry regiments, each raised in

whole or in part in a given

own

and kept on foot

inhabitants,

expense of that

its

its

at the

The men

district.

liable to duty assembled

under

from

district

there

a given time

at

standard, and each district raised

from three hundred

King Eric

strove to

from each

set

of

to six

hundred men.

make

the conscripts

twelve

into

districts

regiment, but these proved too irregidar in

number

of three thousand to a regiment

to eleven

hundred and seventy-six

;

Lansquenet. (16th Century.)

a

The

size.

was

finally

early

reduced

and Gustavus equalized

companies and regiments.

The

was carefully

its full

drilled,

kept at

militia

com-

plement by annual drafts, and relieved

from taxes and some other burdens.

As

Sweden was poorly populated, and the militia contributed to the regular contino'ent

no more than twelve or

sand

men

ally compelled

to

fill

fifteen thou-

a year, Gustavus was eventuto

resort to mercenaries

his war-thinned ranks;

ments came to his army from

and

all

regi-

parts of

Germany, the Netherlands and England. Musketeer.

But the Swedes were the leaven

of the

(1572.)

lump.

The ization.

other nations of

Europe boasted no such

All middle Europe was

split

up

settled organ-

into petty princi-

;

INTELLIGENT ORGANIZERS.

34

a size which precluded armies worthy

palities, of

Of

the name.

Of

next.

German

the Catholic

were perhaps the best

lenstein's

;

troops,

German

the Protestant

Wal-

ranked

Tilly's

troops, the

Saxons were deemed to hold the palm, though they did not prove Hessians, and the

it

at Breitenfeld

army

;

then the

of Brunswick-Liineburg,

the latter being patterned on the Swedish.

mark had

pj'actically

at the time,

had only

no army system. fifteen

thousand

Den-

France,

men

as a

standing army, with cadres that could be increased to fifty thousand in case of

need, of

which ten thousand woidd be mounted.

This

was a mere fraction of what she called out under the Grand Monarque.

Though

there

had been

little

advance in gen-

eral military organization, the tactical

systems of the various coun-

tries

had improved.

Pikeman. (1534.)

Maurice

of

William and

Orange,

Spinola,

Henry IV. and Coligny each contributed something to the discipline and structure of troops

and Gustavus put on the capstone in the Swed-« ish

The wars

army changes.

lands and

Germany

in the Nether-

in the sixteenth

and

sev-

enteenth centuries had shown up the defects

which had come down from feudal times, and the bright intellects

among

riders

and

their

servants set themselves the task of supplying

the remedy.

But

to create a system

which

should permanently affect the art of war re-

mained for Gustavus Adolphus. Infantry, in the early part of the seventeenth

\1M~M~ Pikeman. (1572.)

PIKE AND MUSKET.

pikemen and musketeers, and with the

century, consisted of

from one third

efficiency of firearms the latter increased

two thirds of the dred and

fifty

35

In Swedish companies of one hun-

force.

men, there were

and

enty-five musketeers

to

sev-

fifty-nine

pikemen, the rest being petty and

commissioned keteers

The mus-

officers.

reckoned

were

as

light

troops, best fitted for scouting and

outpost service

;

they had a pot

helmet, a sabre and

The

a musket.

men were

pike-

the heavy

and

armed,

were

deemed superior

in

—

we

value,

what

should call the troops of

the

had

full

finally replaced

foot shaft,

Their eighteen-foot pikes

by

partisans, with eleven-

and two-foot double-edged head,

four inches in width.

Later, the length of the

and shaft appears

partisan

down

(1696.)

body-armor, and until the seventeenth

century thigh-pieces.

were

Grenadier.

They

line.

to

to not over eight feet.

have been cut Gusta\T.is fore-

saw that musketry was the arm of the future,

and gradually decreased the number ^5""" Foot.

men "^iTf^ (1647.)

as well as took

from the weight ° _

armor

to

add

between riflemen who

fired

hand grenades dates back was coined at the defense of

of their

_

to their mobility.

introduced entire regiments of musketeers.

of pike-

In 1631 he

The

distinction

guns and grenadiers who threw "

The w^ord " grenadier Eatisbon by the Swedes in 1G32,

to him.

FORKED REST.

36

when

who took

those soldiers

the risk of handling and easting

hand grenades from the walls were given extra pay for the riflemen could fire from behind cover as they could not. The ;

officers of

Bow-

infantry carried a partisan and a sword.

men

did not exist in Germany.

In 1623 Gustavus organized the Swedish companies of one

hundred and

fifty

men,

Four com-

in files six deep.

panies

made a

" squadron " or

battalion

;

eight

companies a

regiment

;

three

regiments

"great regiment Arquebus and Rest.

Some regiments

(IGth Century.)

up

set

a

or brigade.

enlisted in for-

eign parts had but one hun-

dred and twenty

men

to the comjjany.

The companies and

battalions stood in line with varying intervals between them.

The arming

of the infantry underwent a considerable There appears to have been a number of " double-

change.

pay " men (veterans)

as far

back as Eric's time.

and wore armor, and numbered

ried the pike

three fourths of the force.

They

The

and cross-bow,

old arquebus

heavy and clumsy, with their forked the

rest,

musket

needed a

were replaced by but

;

rest.

It

this

still

was provid-

ed with a match-lock, a device originally

the

missed latter

more

flint-lock, fire

;

reliable

which

than often

but gradually the

was improved, and drove

out the match.

About 1626

car-

at times nearly

Musketeer.

(1630.)

;

SUCCESSIVE GUNLOCKS. Gustavus lightened

tlie

musket

sufficiently to dispense with

and introduced the wheel-lock

the crutch,

37

and

;

in his

wars

against the Poles, not

/—irrii^^fl

above taking a hint

^\_

from any source, he resorted

Roman,

to

old

the

one might

or,

say, the English long-

bowman's

habit

having the

men

Matchlock.

(Stockholm Museum.)

of

carry sharpened palisades, not for camping,

but to erect a defense against the

behind which they could

Polish

upon them.

fire

from

lancers

This was a species of survival of

the musket it

finally

-

rest

became

only an iron-point-

ed rod (Stockholm Museum.

Wlieel-lock.

as

it

loaded

It

down

was carried after a while

the

men and

made

in

it

as-

the origin

in the train,

militated against rapidity.

The next important improvement first

to

have

cribed of the bayonet.

and

;

some

in firearms,

and

this

was

the

Swedish army, was the introduction of

paper cartridges. Of these the ried

men

ten,

with spare

and

ball,

car-

together

powder in

Pistol Flint-lock

Stockholm Museujn.)

car-

tridge-boxes or " bandoliers " slung across the chest from left

shoulder to right side

from right shoulder

;

while a sword

to left side.

56^(0 7 7

hung

The bayonet and

in a belt flint-lock

;;

ORGANIZATION OF FOOT.

38

were introduced in France some time after Gustavus' death

and the troops armed with

handy musket

this

though the name probably came

(^facile

from focus —

—fusil

fire,

Italian

The bayonet was mounted on

focile) were called fusiliers.

a wooden plug to be inserted in the bore of the musket.

made

first

It

appearance in the wars in the Netherlands.

its

Infantry, in all the European countries, finally got divided into regiments

and companies

numerical strength.

but these were of no especial

;

The company

occasionally ran

up

as

high as three hundred men, and the

regiment to over four thousand. tavus' regular regiments

were more uni-

The companies had one hundred

form.

and

Gus-

men, and eight

fifty

panies

made a

regiment.

to twelve

com-

In 1630 eight

companies were deemed a battalion or It goes without saying that

regiment. Early Bayonets.

the exigencies of active service often

changed

all this.

A note by Oxenstiern

which speaks of foot regiments varying between

exists

hundred and nineteen hundred men from four

to eight

much more.

companies

To one who

;

;

fifteen

cavalry regiments with

and they must have varied

has served with regiments which

from one thousand men would run down, in the course of a campaign, to two hundred or ation

;

less, this

seems a very small vari-

but Swedish recruits were used to equalize old regi-

ments, not to

make new

The Swedish

ones.

militia regiment

varied according to the population of the district in which

was

raised.

In the bulk of the countries of Germany about

two thousand men made officers

ter

it

uj)

an infantry regiment, and

its

were a colonel, lieutenant-colonel, major, quartermas-

and regimental clerk

;

a barber and one assistant,

were surgeon and apothecary

;

who

a provost-marshal and one as-

;

MORE RAPID sistant

;

a chaplain and one assistant

a judge advocate and

;

The infantry company had a

his clerk.

39

FIRE.

captain, a lieutenant,

an ensign, two sergeants, one muster-clerk, a quartermaster, an armorer, six corporals, two drummers and a service there were ninety to fifteen

upper and

fifer.

common

ninety-four

In active soldiers,

twenty-one lower file-leaders and four

muster-boys.

Loading and

firing,

with the constant

improvement in firearms, grew more rapid

and yet

it

took ninety-five to ninety-nine

" motions "

to

complete

the

operation,

though Gustavus had abolished a large

number

of

useless ones.

On

the other

hand, the minor tactics of the foot-soldier

was very crude, and was confined

to the

simple facings, wheelings,

ployments and de-

The

ployments.

solid

masses or phalanxes of the

Spanish style

mained

in

use by

English Soldier

re-

(unequipped).

all

but the Swedes, while Gustavus set up his

men

six deep, the

pikemen

in the centre,

the musketeers on the flanks or in small

intermingled bodies, and later three deep.

The cavalry

consisted of cuirassiers

dragoons, the latter fantry.

German Officer.

There had been mounted arque-

(1630.)

busiers, but

up

and

being mounted in-

Gustavus gave these weapons

in favor of lighter firearms in all cavahy regiments.

In the imperial armies were heavy cavalry, carbineers and Croats or Hungarian irregulars.

These three species of horse

were known by different names in different countries, and

TYPES OF CAVALRY.

4C

varied in them

came still

When Gustavus

all.

to the throne, the cavalry

was

considered the more honorable

arm; but the

nobility,

which grew

poorer as the commonalty gained in intelligence,

to

keep

this

were unable voluntarily

arm up

to its ancient

standard, and Gustavus was finally .

compelled to recruit his cavalry in the same

manner

was not strong ragoou.

As

horse-armor was discarded

efficiency,

more useful

in

as his foot.

It

Sweden were only

some thirty -five hundred mounted

(1016.)

troops.

the

;

carbine,

;

the firearm gained in the lance gave

and the dragoons, introduced

way

to

into the

Swedish army from Germany in 1611, were furnished with an infantry musket and dismounted to fight.

They were

really

bodies of infantry, comprising both musketeers and pikemen,

them

and mounted

to enable

move

They lacked

fast.

cavalryman's distinctive

to

the

boots

and spurs.

Yet they were not

bad cavalry

;

record as

their

The

such was good.

cuirassier

retained helmet, cuirass of front

and back

pieces,

sword and two

but from this time on

pistols

;

light

cavalry

has

constantly

gained in relative efficiency over

Hungarian Irregular. (ITtli

Century.)

the heavy.

Like

foot, the horse

was organized into regiments and com-

panies, the latter also called " squadrons " or " cornets."

The

Swedish cavalry regiments had a colonel, a lieutenant-colonel

REGIMENTAL OFFICERS.

41

and major, a quartermaster, regimental clerk and a barbersurgeon.

Tlie cavalry cornet, or

company, had a captain with

four horses, a lieutenant and an ensign with three horses each, two corporals with two horses each, a quartermaster

with two horses, a muster-clerk, a chaplain, a provost, a barber, a farrier, each with one horse, two trumpeters and one

hundred and two common

and

men with

fifteen

dred and

one hundred

or, all told,

;

horses.

twenty-five

The strength

soldiers

one hun-

of the cavalry reg-

iments of other countries was very various, and the difficulty of procuring horses often dis-

mounted great numbers

of

The imperial companies

men. aver-

aged one hundred horses, the regiments eight hundred.

The Croat.

Swedish regiments of cavalry

had eight

cornets, aggregating one thousand horses.

The main was

its

trouble with the horse prior to Gustavus' day

slowness in charging.

when each rank would to reload.

The

light

It

would ride

successively fire

the enemy,

uj) to

and then wheel

horsemen served as scouts

;

off

the hea\y

cavalry lacked elan, never undertaking the true role of horse.

The Swedish

cuirassiers,

on the contrary, were taught to ride

at a gallop, to fire their pistols at speed,

naked weapon. in

any one point,

Gustavus' doing. discipline,

and then take

If they were superior to the it

was in

On

German

their better tactics,

and

to the

cavalry this

was

the whole, the Swedish cavalry, barring

was no better than the German

cavalry was not as good as the best

;

perhaps the heavy

German

squadrons, on

account of the smaller size of the Swedish horses, nor the light as o^ood as the Croat irreg-ulars.

;

SWEDISH ARTILLERY.

42

But there was no question artillery.

as to the superiority of

Swedish

Gustavus Adolphus introduced marked changes iu

arm, mainly by making the guns and carriages lighter

this

and handier, and by adapting their movements to those of the other arms and to the requirements of the battle-field. In this, as in all his military efforts, his

rapidity of

There were, according ship, field.

tons

;

motto was mobility and

fire.

to size, three kinds of

The twenty-four-pounder

the twenty-four-pounder field-gun

hundred pounds.

guns

:

siege,

siege-gun weighed three

only twenty-seven

The twelve-pounder siege-gun weighed a

ton and a half, the twelve-pounder field-gun only eighteen

hundred pounds.

The six-pounder

siege-gun weighed three

Siege-Guns. a,

Twenty-four pounder; calibre, 5 inches; weight, 6,000 pounds. (Stockhohn calibre, 4 inches weight, 2,600 b, Twelve-pounder Artillery Museum.) poimds. (Stockholm Artaiery Museum.) c, Six-pounder; calibre, 3.3 inches (Stockholm Artillery Museum.) weight, 1,700 poimds. ;

fourths of a ton

;

;

the six-pounder field-gun twelve hundred

pounds. There were also three-pounders and two-pounders for

The ship-guns were intermediate in heft. There was some variation in these measurements and weights. The

field

use.

heavy siege-guns took go into the

field.

thirty-six horses to

move, and could not

There were various patterns of guns, can-

;

A LEATHER CANNON. non-royal, culver 'ns, falconets, single

and

and mortars

liglit)

;

43

and double

but the latter were not

The

All these pieces w^re extremely unhandy.

heavy

(i. e.

much

used.

single cannon-

royal was twelve f oet long and called for twenty-four horses to transport

One

;

culverins needed sixteen.

of Gustavus' artillery officers, von Siegeroth, in doing

practice

and

it

work with gims, new had found

old,

that

"==^

shorter guns, properly constructed, fective.

were

equally

ef-

rz]

Three-pounder Regimental Gun.

In 1624 Gustavus

Calibre, 2.6 inches

;

weight, 450 pounds.

(Stockholm Artillery Museum.)

commanded and a year or three

old

all

unserviceable

later

men

and

ordnance to be recast into newer patterns

he himself contrived a gun which one horse

could handle to good

tended as a regimental piece later

two of them.

and the

It

cartridge,

wired to the

ball.

in-

was an iron three- and four-pounder,

which weighed

half, consisted of the

case,

;

This gun was

effect.

and eacl^ regiment had one and

less

than a pound and a

charge held in a thin turned wooden

This was the

first artillery

cartridge,

the original fixed

ammuni-

The gun was

tion.

after-

wards introduced into other

European armies

Not only

piece Suedoise.

had Tbree-pounder Leather Gun. Calibre, 2.6 inches

;

weight, 450 pounds.

(Stockholm Artillery Museum.)

it

as the

the virtue of lesser

weight,

but

its

cartridge

was always ready, and

it

could be fired eight times to six shots of a musketeer with the

awkward arm

of the day.

-Gustavus' merit thus lay in making guns which could be handled more like our own than the cumbrous ordnance then in use.

In the wars against the Poles he employed with

MORTARS.

44

leather cannon, a fact

profit the so-called

\s

hich shows

how

lacking in power the artillery of the day must have been.

These guns were invented in the early tw inties by Colonel

Wurmbrandt, and

consisted of a thin copT,er tube reinforced

by iron rings and bands, then bound with rope the whole covered with sole leather.

screw in and out, as discharges

it

set in cement,

The tube was made

grew heated by from eight

and had to be cooled.

shaped out of two oak planks.

The gun-carriage was

Three men could carry a gun,

which without carriage weighed ninety pounds, and was

Of

with a light charge.

mention made

and

to

to twelve

fired

fourteen of these cannon only

after being used in

is

1628-29 in Poland,

they disappeared in favor of the king's four-pounder castiron guns.

These

last

named

regimental guns remained in

common

use in Europe until

the artillery was reorganized

and

massed

The capacity

by Frederick. for

and the rapidity Gustavus'

evolutions of

batteries

fire

of

excited

universal admiration.

and canister were generally employed shot only in siege-guns.

Early Mortar.

Grape in the field-guns,

Gustavus used his

round

cannon in masses

EARLY ENGLISH CANNON. and the excellence of

as well as with regiments,

largely contributed J

to

his

successes.

Swedes was immensely superior any other European army /what

artillery

was

the king was the

;

into

Hand

more general use

;

German

of

fire-balls, etc.,

chemists

experts took

it

grew

made

came their

some-

to be

up, and the troops were

The regimental guns were attended by

better instructed.

panies for the reserve guns. the Swedes

show

used at the siege of

Artillery-practice

grenadiers detailed for the work

among

first

gTcnades, shells,

as the

discoveries.

thing of a science

first to

really capable.

in 1634.

many new

his artillery

This arm with the

in effectiveness to that of

Mortars throwing bombs were

Lamotte

45

;

;

and there were

special com-

Musketeers supported the guns

cavalry was wont to do so in the imperial

army.

In this connection the following extract from Holingshed's Chronicles, showing what English ordnance at the end of the sixteenth century was,

The names net,

may

not be uninteresting

of our greatest ordnance are

whose weight

is

commonly

two hundred pounds, and

and a quarter within the mouth. pounds, and his wideness

is

:

—

these

;

Minion

Falconet weigheth

five

hundred

two inches within the mouth.

Falcon

is

witliin the

poiseth eleven hundred pounds, and hath three

inches and a quarter within the

pounds, and

Rohi-

hath one inch

it

hath eight hundred pounds, and two inches and a half

mouth

:

mouth

;

Sacre hath sixteen hundred

three inches and a half wide in the

mouth

;

Demi-

Culverin weigheth three thousand pounds, and hath four inches

and a half within the mouth and

five inches

;

Culverin hath four thousand pounds

and a half within the mouth

;

Denii-Cannon,

six

thousand pounds, and six inches and a half within the mouth

;

Cannon, seven thousand pounds, and seven inches within the mouth

;

E-Cannon, eight thousand pounds, and seven inches within the

mouth

;

Basilisk,

nme thousand

pounds, eight inches and three

POWDER AND

46

By

quarters within the mouth.

come by the weight point blank, finally

The Names

of every shot,

Kobinet Falconet Falcon

Weight

.

.

Sacre

.

.

.

Demi-Culverin .

Demi-Cannon Cannon E-Cannon .

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

to

scores

it

it is

doth

easy to flee

at

be had to the same, and

Scores of

of

the Shot.

1

.

Basilisk

is

Carriage.

pound.

4^ pounds. 5 pounds. 9 pounds. 18 pounds. 30 pounds. 60 pounds. 42 pounds. 60 pounds.

Culverin.

Pounds of Powder.

0^.

2 pounds. 2^ pounds.

Minion .

how many

also

inches in height each bullet ought to carry.

of the Greatest Ordnance.

Culverin

which proportions

and how much powder

how many

BALLS.

14 16 17 18

20 25 38 20 20 21

(1500.)

Height

of Bullet.

1 (inch)

2

^ 5 9 18 28

44 20 60

2| 3

4

II

;

V.

THE SWEDISH ORGANIZATION AND GuSTAVUS was unable

TACTICS.

1611-1632.

early to uniform his troops, but he gave

each a

special color of regimental flag.

In arms and equipment there was uniformity,

and the men were warmly clad

in their peasant's dress,

fur-lined boots for winter.

deep

tliree

The

in firing

;

His

first

improvement was

and had waterproof to lessen the

file

to

but the pikemen stood in close serried order, six deep.

brigades had alternate bodies of musketeers and pikemen, and foot was

mixed with horse

was ployed into column

Though

active one.

own

All changes tended towards rapid

in jjarts of the line.

The cavalry from

and mobility.

ten

was

down

also cut

From an

to three ranks,

body Gustavus made

fire

and

it

an

the artillery was used in masses, each regiment kept

its

to charge.

inert

In battle the skirmishers held the ground while the line formed

pieces.

then the cavalry cleared the front, the artillery opened, and the line advanced, to

first

fire,

rear-guard

then to push of pike.

His men were rapid goers.

made ul

;

In marches Gustavus dispensed with a

when marching toward, with a van when marching from, the enemy.

his three

In battle he paid keen heed to the terrain, and

arms work together. The

good conduct was universal

ifThe pay was small but regidar

discipline of the

the food was ample, and was obtained, not

;

by plunder, but from magazines carefully provided.

The

tered in towns or fortified camps.

V

duties were strictly observed.

Rewards and punishments were

Swedes was wonder-

the usual military crimes were quite absent.

;

train

The

troops were quar-

was much decreased.

Religious

Promotion went by seniority and just.

service.

There were regimental schools for the

many of whom, as well as their wives, went with the women were not tolerated. As an engineer, Gustavus was far day he had many experts fortification was wonderfully well

children of soldiers, troops.

Loose

ahead of his done

navy

;

;

;

and field-works were constructed rapidly and

as well as the

army was

efiiciently.

The Swedish

largely increased and brought to a state of high

efficiency.

Gustavus Adolphus nator of uniforms.

This

is is

usually referred to as the origi-

not strictly correct.

Swedish regiments were known by a

Some

color, not of the

of the

uniform

"

SWEDISH UNIFORMS.

48

but o£ the standard. for

ensign

its

blue

the

;

Ehrenreuter's regiment had red silk Vizthum regiment, old blue Winkel's, ;

Teuffel's, yellow

;

regiment, white

Hepburn's, green

;

the three

;

;

the Pomeranian

Hanse regiments,

The

black.

ensign was of one solid color, on which figured an emblem.

Such was one of white damask, with the royal crown

mounted by a and on the

rose,

other,

"

and "

Gustavus Adolphus " on one

Touch me not or you

'11

surside,

get burnt

;

a blood-red standard, with a flame and a figure

or, again,

bearing sword and scales, and the motto " For King and Justice."

For many years Gustavus had no uniforms for

At

men

the beginning of his reign the

peasant's dress in which he reported.

ment alone was there uniformity, save ants dressed alike.

his troops.

served, each in the

In arms and equipin so far as the peas-

In 1613 a uniformed royal body-guard

was organized, and in 1621 Gustavus ordered that the

sol-

diers of the line be clad, alike so far as possible, instead of in the long jerkin

and smock-frock

they should not be despised land."

A

;

of the Swedish peasant well,

carded.

among

the nations of the out-

year after he ordered that companies and regi-

ments be uniformly clad but wore

of the peasant, " so that

all this

took time.

as ill-appearing louts in

clothing

was coarse, but being hand-made

and a good garment might not be

So that even

The

in

it

lightly dis-

1626 people spoke of the Swedes

bad

clothes.

The uniformed

troops

indeed donned their uniforms only on dress occasions, as at the visit of princes, or at reviews in their honor.

They some-

times had holiday insignia issued for special use;

at the

Altmarkt Conference the men on duty wore blue and gold tabards.

When

the matter got settled, the

men appear

to

have worn a sleeveless tunic and loose knee-breeches, which, indeed, was the national cut of dress

;

and over

this their

;

NATIONAL DRESS.

An

armor and equipments.

49

undergarment covered the arms

the legs were clad in coarse woolen stockings and the feet shoes or bootees, according to season, for the foot and

in

dragoons

;

The infantryman wore

in boots for the cavalry.

at times a species of gaiter

from the knee down.

Clothing

depots were established at several of the

Swedish

cities

;

but although the work was

done in these depots, the patterns are

all

said to have

come from

Paris, then already

the centre of fashions, small and great. is

It

true that Gustavus eventually arrived at

uniforming his troops

for years his efforts

;

lay in that direction, but he aimed at providing

men had

warm and

still

more

The

useful clothing. 1

r.

.

T

lur garments and gloves, lur-lmed

boots and woolen stockings, and

many had

S^* "^o™ ^y ^^js

Combat.

a

Gusta-

at the Dirschau

(Stock-

sort of Russian bootee of waterproof leather.

These were in part issued to the troops, in part bought by the individual soldiers.

It

was the protection afforded by

such clothing that enabled Gustavus to conduct his ^^^nter

campaigns in Germany,

—

and confusion

to the astonishment

of his enemies.

^-

The

chief

improvement in the

tactical formation,

and

this

was brought about by the introduction of gunpowder, lay the lessening of the depth of the

how

file

;

and yet

it

is

in

curious

old-fashioned soldiers like Tilly stuck to their deej) bat-

when artillery was becoming effective. Gustavus made many other changes in the formation and mancEu\a'ing of the tles

troops.

Infantry had already got set up in not exceeding ten

ranks.

The musketeers

stood in closed

but with open

files

ranks, which gave space for the rank which had fired to retire to reload,

and they sometimes attacked

in

almost in what we should call a skirmish line

;

open order, the pikemen

DEPTH OF

50 stood files.

in

ranks and

closed

Gustavus

FILE.

reduced

first

the formation of musketeers to six ranks,

which for

closed into three

firing

this

;

re-

mained the pattern for many years,

and

at the close of the

Thirty Years' versal.

War

The

was

uni-

disap-

battle

peared, and was succeeded

by a proper

fire line.

In

line the pike-

men were

Swedish Musketeer.

placed

in the centre, with the musketeers

on the flanks

or grouped at the corners of the bodies

;

or else

the divisions of musketeers and pikemen alternated.

A mass of men ready for action was called a tertia, or battalion (battle), or squadron.

and

these

Sj)ain

strong;

among

battles

In Germany

were several thousand

the French they consisted of not

over five or six hundred men.

brigaded his regiments, and gave to

first

many The

Gustavus

brigades a peculiar color of standard.

exigencies of the service

demanded

fre-

quent changes, and we hear of brigades of

two regiments formed in

five lines, of

which

the two rear ones were the reserve, and in

them the

divisions of

eers alternated. in it

Lord Reay's

Swedish Pikeman.

Such a formation

set

front

;

up

Or

shown ;

but

again, the brigade

in three lines, so as to

this

is

sketch, of which later

was not universal.

was

pikemen and musket-

show more

was the formation adopted by

;

SWEDISH BRIGADES. At

Gustavus at Breitenfeld.

51

another period the brigade

still

was formed with a division of pikemen

and four

in advance,

At

divisions of musketeers in two lines in the rear.

Liitzen,

a dozen Swedish companies were ployed into column, one

behind the other, and had eight companies in one line as a

Any

reserve.

in

one of these brigade-formations was handier

movement, and

deep masses ful

and

;

endangered by

less

was particularly

it

from having the reserve

It

artillery,

than the usual

use-

to call upon.

seems odd that there should not be

more certainty minor

as to the organization

and

an army of modern days

tactics of

but matters were in a transition period,

due to the constant improvements in listics,

and there

no moment of time

is

when any one method even in Sweden.

when arms

bal-

universally obtained,

might be

It

difficult,

of precision call forth so

many

changes, to say just what the organization of infantry is to-day, or

Going back

years.

may be within

five

to include our civil Swedish

war, in view of the changes in countries,

it

might intleed puzzle one to

prolixity just

Officer.

all civilized

state without great

what a regiment or a brigade

is

;

and records

were not so carefully kept in the seventeenth century. of the foreign regiments in Gustavus'

formation and

drill,

efficiency of the

Taught by

which

it

body should be

his studies,

army had each

was wise not

Many its

affected.

Gustavus revived the ancient habit

of mixing small detachments of infantry with cavalry.

made

own

to alter, lest the

He

these composite bodies from two hundred to four hun-

dred strong, and gave each on e a field-gun. occasions he detailed

men from

form a

musketeers.

cor2}S d^ elite of

On

important

different organizations to

;

SWEDISH CAVALRY.

52

The ino-

infantry

commonly

fired in salvos

by ranks, succeed-

ranks coming forward, while the one which had fired

Gustavus introduced

retired through the intervals to reload.

the habit of having the front rank kneel so as to

fire

with-

out shifting ranks, as this was apt to unsettle the line.

On

_occasion he used what was virtually a

The cavalry had ranks.

its

by

file.

hitherto been formed in from four to ten

Gustavus cut

/jncreased

fire

mobility.

it

down to three ranks, which much The fancy skirmishing (ca^^acoles)

was abolished, as well as the use of firearms as the resource in the attack.

The king

insisted that the squadrons

should charge at a gallop with pistols or naked blade quite in accordance with his

sole

own tremendous

fire

a style

;

and energy.

The Swedish cavalry rode two or more lines, company

in in

rear of company, or checker-

wise

;

occasionally in one line

en muraille. relied

made

on

Other horse

it

still

alone,

which

excessively

slow.

its fire

There were exceptions

:

no

better cavalry stood in line

than splendid Pappenheim's but as a rule the cavalry of the day was inert.

With Gus-

tavus, on the contrary, even

the dragoon partook

more

the impulse of the

cavalry-

of

Swedish Cuirassier.

man

than of the stolidity of the infantry soldier

;

while in

the other armies the dragoon remained a mere well-trans-

ported footman.

In his intelligent management of both these

arms Gustavus soon had

imitators.

His

victories

showed

the superiority of his system so thoroughly that the whole

ACTS OF A BATTLE.

53

world turned from the ancient methods to study what he had introduced.

was the habit

It

in all armies to place the horse in the

wings; and a sort of precedence by seniority that decided the place in line

made

the con-

stant shifting of regiments awk-

ward and dangerous.

Gustavus

kept cavalry in the wings, but he also placed cavalry companies in

\

1

1

each

rear of

infantry,

of

line

where they served

to aid in re-

establishing any sudden check.

The the

artillery

or

front,

was posted along on

Under

ground.

advantageous

Gustavus

the

three arms supported each other

much

in the

modern way. Herein

consisted the value of the kind's

His army became a well-

method.

designed machine, with

Swedish Ensign of

opierating smoothly, instead of a disjointed mass,

eral parts

Cuirassiers.

all parts

worked out

of time,

and

whose

failed at the critical

sev-

mo-

ruent to -sustain gne_an other.

The

acts of a battle

were these.

The ground was

first

held by the small bodies of skirmishers, who, from their dan-

gerous calling, were called forlorn hopes, or enfants per-

Jiu8

and behind these the

;

order. ers,

the cavalry charged

tain they [alike line.

;

lines quietly

formed in parallel

Then, often not waiting to withdraw these skirmish-

had formed,

which done, the

Under

its

down

the front to clear out the cur-

to the destruction of friend artillery

opened

smoke the cavahy

would charge again

;

fire

and

foe

along the entire

— usually on the flanks —

the foot would get into musket-range,

BATTLE ORDER.

54

and

if

could unsettle the enemy, would finally come to

it

" push of pike." tactics,

There being rarely anything

a battle plan, the lines got

or

Whichever

much

like

grand-

intermixed.

side could retain the best semblance of formation,

or rather the side which

showed the

less confusion,

would be

apt to win.

An army rear-guard

;

marched usually

when

and

Light troops formed the van and

There were two or three columns, each a

and

in order of battle,

so

more ground than formerly ;

especially

;

Occasionally the

line.

Armies began

columns marched checker-wise.

good marches

line

formed that the platoons or

companies could readily wheel into

I

force

Gustavus dispensed with rear-guard when march-

ing towards the enemy. flankers.

main

in van-guard,

to get over

made

the Swedes

but the rate was not equal to the best of

this

i_century.

In battles more heed was now paid to topography, and the operations were better suited to

more decided

The

role.

While the order of

nition.

it.

Artillery played a

utility of reserves

battle

came

into recog-

remained parallel and there

was no grand-tactics, yet flanking marches, the advance of

and other

a second line through a wearied

first line,

manoeuvres, were not uncommon.

Gustavus made none but

The value

parallel front attacks.

disposition of the troops

cover the musketeers

men

;

:

like

of his tactics lay in the

in so placing the

pikemen as

to

the musketeers as to sustain the pike-

;

while each brigade sustained the other and each was

all-sufficient to itself,

jnovable

fortress.

separate'body than

with well-protected flanks, like a small

But its

it

was rather the mobility of each

solidity

which lent

it

self-sustaining

4Dower.

The parent

of grand-tactics

is

ability to

out mobility bodies cannot do this

;

manoeuvre

;

with-

and Gustavus, from the

SWEDISH PEASANTRY. new

conditions imposed

by gunpowder,

55

wrought out

first

which enabled men to move rapidly on the

details

battle-field.

Basing on his work, later commanders introduced what we

now know

Gustavus especially saw how to

as grand-tactics.

adapt his troops and position to the topography and the conditions

;

he seized the vital moment in a battle and made

the most of

it.

To him belongs

the credit of

first,

in

modern

times, forcing the passage of a rapid river in the face of a

And

strong and able enemy.

even though he failed

in his

showed the world that

assault on the Alte Veste, Gustavus

there need be no hesitancy in storming intrenchnjents or

Bath operations had

strong positions.

As

imitators.

the king's was better than any other European

organization, so

it

was superior in

fisted

and stout-hearted,

ing.

The Swedes

their walls with

it

in

men

many

;

big-

suffer-

with walls, but

" was a contemporary saying.

they had emerged from serfdom

in

esprit de

excellent

no wise feared danger or

" do not defend their

men

and

discipline

The Swedish primeval peasantry was

^coiys.

army

Since

peasants had acquired

property, and each proprietor was held to furnish a

man

to

The crown had grown to and the reason the Vasa family

the government or to the army. rely greatly

on the people,

had so strong a hold on the masses was that they always sided with the peasantry against the nobles and clergy.

The pay

of the

Swedish troops was small

;

in

1630 was twelve million rix dollars

regularly paid during the is

life of

;

and there

is

some question

several records vary greatly.

high

;

but the troops were

may

There

details the entire

as to the amounts.

The following

but we do not know what each

or what deductions

narrow

Gustavus Adolphus.

no table in the Swedish archives which

pay-roll,

the

The budget

exchequer of the country allowed no greater.

officer

The

strikes us as

had

to maintain,

have been made for rations, clothing,

/

PAY OF ARMY.

56 arms,

A lower scale

etc.

and

of the generals

a month

lars

of

;

pay

given in other records.

was

scale of regimental

of cavalry, 300.

Colonel

pay in the foot was

,

.

The

.

.

.

:

184 rix dollars a month.

80 "

"

"

Major

61 "

"

"

30 "

"

"

18 "

"

"

30 "

"

"

"

"

Chief quartermaster (2)

each

Judge advocates

(2)

each

each

12 "

Regimental clerk

30 "

Clerk of council of war

18

Surgeons

(4)

Provost-marshals

(4)

(2)

10 3

each

Hangman

The

'

scale of

company pay was

"

12 "

each

Assistant of marshal

Beadles

rate

—

Lieutenant-colonel

Chaplains

and

colonel

was presumably assimilated

of the lesser staff-officers

to that of their regimental grade.

The

;

and colonel and chief quartermaster, 500

and quartermaster

colonel

The pay

Field marshal, 1,000 rix dol-

:

colonel-general of artillery, 600

;

scouts

chief of

each

staff

is

:

.

7

"

" " "

—

Captain

61 rix dollars a month.

Lieutenant

30 "

Ensign (ancient)

30

Sergeants

(2)

9 "

each

Assistant ensign

,

7

"

" "

"

"

Assistant quartermaster

7 "

"

"

Armorer

7 "

"

"

4 " "

"

"

File leaders (15) each

5 "

"

"

Under

4

"

"

Company

clerk

7

Musicians Corporals

(6)

6

each

leaders (2) each

Privates

.

.

.

Officers' servants

"

.

,

3i " 3 "

QUARTERS AND RATIONS.

57

In the cavalry the rates were considerably higher,

— espe-

cially for the field-officers.

The

troops were fed from magazines,

— one

of the

most

important of the improvements of Gustayus, who established depots in suitable localities, and saw to full

it

that they were kept

from Sweden, or by systematic contributions from the There was a regular staff of commis-

countries traversed.

who

saries

distributed provisions to the regiments in bulk,

and they were then issued also to

up

men by the

major,

who seems

have been charged with the fatigue and policing duties

of the camp. fset

to the

Sutlers or traders were permitted at times to

their booths near by.

fwere well cared for

;

During Gustavus'

after his death things

life

the troojis

went on

in a

more

hap-hazard way, and the army was apt to be fed and paid

from the

results of plunder.

Gustavus quartered his troops in towns or tified

camps, in huts or

tents.

cities; if in for-

Wherever they were, camp

and garrison duties were obligatory, and

discipline

was never

relaxed.

The baggage-train was much decreased by Gustavus. A cavalry company was allowed ten wagons an infantry com;

pany

three, the regimental staff eight.

large allowance in the

;

To

us this seems a

but the train and camp-followers of an army

seventeenth century were far beyond any modern

limit.

The one thing which made Gustavus' army a power was the man himself into its very pith. The Swedish

infusion of the

troops were instinct with strong religious feeling, and exhibited the fjualities that spring from

it,

— good behavior, obedience, At own example, which was a

absence of crime, cheerful courage and good discipline. the root of this lay Gustavus'

never- varying pattern of soldierly bearing.

Regular morning

and evening prayers were introduced by the king

;

he

first

REGULATIONS.

58

/commissioned chaplains.

by the

priests,

Before battle there was a service

and a dedication

army

of the

to the service of

Regular days of prayer were ajipointed at intervals

[God.

in General Orders,

Germany

it

and Gustavus caused

army a

distributed to the

to

be printed and

In

special Soldiers' Prayer-Book.

was to most men

a wonderful sight to see the

distinguished field-marshal kneeling upon the ground beside the humblest private in earnest prayer.

Promotion went

strictly

by

seniority

and

services

;

nepotism

I

was unknown.

The

must begin

highest in the land

had done.

foot of the military ladder, as the king himself

At

at the

the siege of Riga, in 1621, Gustavus issued a set of field

They

regulations which long remained in force.

a regimental court-martial, of

was president and

members

;

established

which the commanding

" assessors " elected

officer

by the regiment were

and a standing general court-martial, which had

the royal marshal of

To

as members.

Sweden

the

as president

monarch was the

and higher

officers

Provost-

last appeal.

marshals might arrest on suspicion any offender, and imprison

and bring him before the court any '

;

but they might not hang for

offense, except resistance to their orders.

The regimental

court tried for thieving, insubordination, cowardice

minor crimes

;

all

the higher court had cognizance of civil causes

in the army, treason tion,

and

and the more

serious crimes.

by beheading or hanging, was the

lot of

Decima-

any regiment

which ran away in action, and the regiment was thenceforth out of

camp and do menial

held to

lie

itself.

" Riding the wooden horse " with a musket tied to

service

till it

retrieved

each foot, shacldes, bread-and-water-arrest, were common.

There was no flogging.

Even

small breaches of discipline

were severely punished, and misdemeanors were visited impartially

with regard to persons.

ished with death,

among

The higher crimes were

ptin-

others theft, plunder, violence to

;

!

DUELING.

59

women, cowardice, or the surrender extremity. The articles of war were

of a fortress, except in

testimony

is

excellent.

The

universal

:

in 1631,

Gustavus had to issue an adhorta-

toriuni to the troops on account of acts of plunder,

number

of

men were

_ish so ldiers_were

As

executed.

An

tribunal or court of

officers'

honor existed for passing on their misdoings. especially severe on dueling,

It is related that he permitted

meet

one of you

the provost-marshal at hand,

other

!

"

who

officers,

who

:

"

Now, gentlemen,

killed

!

at

it,

Moreover, I have

will at once execute the

Cheerful prospect

A soldier's wife was but the bane of the

among

is

two

that he hunself attended

;

the duel, and said to the principals till

Gustavus wasV l^"^

which was forbidden under painl

especially requested leave, to

and stop you not

and a

a rule, however, the Swed-

exemplary, in word and deed, far beyond

the soldier of that century.

of death.

But

that there were few brea,clies of discipline.

they did occur

allowed to accompany the regiment

German army, a

troop of loose

the camp-followers, was unknown.

were schools for the children of

soldiers,

women

In each regiment

many

of

whom,

according to the curious cvistom of those days, accompanied their fathers, even on campaigns. ,

lessly punished, so

motion, presents of it

was,

it

crimes were remorse-

money and

pensions.

But

excellent as

must be admitted that the perfect organization

the Swedish

^ All

As

were services adequately rewarded, by pro-

army did not

of

outlive Gustavus himself.

other European armies at this time were alike, and

characterized

by disorder and

rarely paid, ill-fed

over-luxurious

;

the

and

indiscipline.

scantily clothed.

men

barely provided

The The for.

troops were

officers

were

The troops

were carelessly quartered in the towns or wherever

it

came

easiest, and their presence was the signal of grievous oppres-

sion

;

while in the wake of a marching

army

stalked desola-

^

ENGINEERING.

60

The baggage - train was enormous,

tion.

as the

men were

permitted to carry along their plunder, and the number of

non-combatants

hard to

is

In one army of forty

credit.

thousand men, one hundred and forty thousand camp-followers are said to

The armies were

have been counted.

cut-throats, outcasts

and

soldiers of fortune,

and

full of

their con-

duct was that of highway robbers, even in the land of friends. Despite capital punishment for a number of crimes, and the penalty was often exacted, such a body could not be kept

from gruesome

woman nor

atrocities,

child escaped.

from which indeed neither man,

But prisoners had come

well treated because they were expected to pay ransoms

uncommon. Rewards were

acts of heroism were not

as punishments.

as

to ;

be

and

marked

Especially Wallenstein was distinguished

for the severity of his punishments

and the splendor

of his

rewards.

Gustavus was himseK an expert, and he organized a superb -'-eorps

of engineers.

see scores of

men

In Germany, folk were astonished to of science

accompany the army, and

to

note the way they were put to use in intrenching positions.

Franz von Traytor was the " general of should say, chief of engineers

we named Porticus was noted special corps of miners

;

;

fortifications," or, as

and an engineer -officer

for excellent work.

There was a

but the entire army was drilled in

throwing up fortifications and in pontoon-bridging. cavalry were taught to throw a bridge.

By

Even

the

spreading this

knowledge so thoroughly throughput the army, Gustavus could intrench himself on unavailable ground, and quickly repair

and make serviceable the walls of places he captured. He wrote a series of " Instructions " on this subject which are clear

had

and sound.

to teach,

He had

learned aU that the Netherlands

and had bettered on some of

Field-fortification in this era

it.

was common.

Outlying posts

RANK AND COMMAND.

61

were defended by redoubts and star-shaped forts with sades, drawbridges

and

all

manner

of entanglements.

pali-

Armies

in the field, as well as those besieging strong places, covered

themselves with works more or less complicated.

was not dissimilar

to the

Roman camp,

with

its

A

camp

wall and

parade-ground and careful divisions,

ditch, streets of tents,

the difference being mainly one of arms and organization.

/Gustavus adopted the system of

field-fortification

been brought to perfection in the Netherlands

I

in

many ways.

;

which had

but he altered

Instead of having a single line of unbroken

1

it

\^

works, he would build a series of mutually supporting isolated

works, in two or more

much

troops with a

In his camps he placed his

lines.

greater front than usual, and allowed

own rear. Rank and command were as follows The king was supreme.
its

baggage in

its :

a general-field-colonel, and over smaller armies, commanders,

general-commanders and field-marshals. only two commanders, Jacob de

There were

Wrangel.

Bernard von Thiirn, who came

to

lands with a regiment of foot, was

Then came the

The

company officers.

its

field -marshal,

Ake

general-field-majors.

Sweden from the Nethermade a general-field-major. and majors, and then

In 1626 there were

fifteen colonels

and

In 1630 Gustavus Jlorn was

Tott and John

nucleus' of a general staff chief,

Gardie and Hermann

and

colonels, lieutenant-colonels

nineteen lieutenant-colonels.

made

la.

field-majors,

In 1623 there were

was begun

Baner generals. ;

Kniphausen was

and he was succeeded by Baudissin. The chief Germany was the twenty-seven-year-old, but

of artillery in

exceptioMiUy able. Colonel Torstenson.

Permanent

fortification

was rather blindly borrowed from

the system of the Netherlands.

Sieges were formally con-

ducted with lines of circmn- and contra-vallation carefuUy

THE NAVY.

62 prepared.

appear

means it

till

Regular trendies, as we understand them, did not towards the end of the Thirty Years' War.

of siege

was laborious rather than

scientific

;

be claimed that Gustavus was peculiarly able in his

The

nor can sieges.

The navy was much increased. Many ships were bought in Germany more were built by Swedish private capital. In ;

1630 the Mercury of thirty-two guns was the

flagship.

The

Westerwik had twenty-six guns, the Apollo and Pelican twenty each, the Andromeda eighteen, the Rainbow thirteen, the Stork twelve, the Parrot ten, the Black

Dolphin two.

In 1632 there were

ships of war, whose crews

hundred and

sixty

five

eight, the

admirals and fifty-four

numbered from

forty-eight to one

men.

Cannon suggested

Dog

in the 15th Century.

VI.

THE YOUNG PRINCE AND KING. GuSTAvus Vasa, the grandfather

He

exceptional force.

1611-1617.

was a prince

of Gustavus Adolphiis,

cated the peasantry, and took their part against the priests and nobles.

commerce and created a merchant marine.

fostered

cultured and strong

showed

it

and was deposed.

John had a tendency

He

All the Vasas were able,

but there was a touch of insanity in the family.

;

of

introduced Protestantism into Sweden, raised and edu-

to

Romanism, and

Erie

his son

Sigismund turned Catholic on inheriting from his mother the throne of Poland.

By

he forfeited the Swedish crown

this act

hero,

was made king.

showed wonderful

ability.

He

and a

fine speaker,

At

religious.

was carefully educated, and

mastered several languages and was a keen

engaged

;

he was a good

eleven he entered the army, and was allowed to attend the

He watched

in that of 1611 against

this year,

the Russian campaign of 1610, and

Though

Denmark. and marked

intelligence, persistency

IX. died

man

and was physically strong, open hearted, brave and

meetings of the royal council.

showed

and Charles, the father of our 1.594,

His character as a lad was the promise of the

studeut.

writer

;

Gustavus was born in

only successful in part, he

originality in

what he did.

crowned, found himself at war with Russia, Poland and Denmark.

paign of 1612 exhibited ability

Sweden

to

but

;

it

was only successful in so far as

make a peace by purchasing from Denmark some

Next year there were no

operations, but in 1615-16 the

Russia from Finland and

won a

began to be attracted to him.

and the war

The

Charles

and Gustavus, who, though only seventeen, was at once

large strip of territory.

The camit

enabled

territory in 1613.

young king attacked

The

eyes of Europe

In 1617 Russia ceded the conquered provinces,

closed.

grandfatlier of Gustavus Adolplius, the great Gus-

tavus Vasa (1523-1560), was a character,

man

of sound

and powerful

and a truly noteworthy Protestant prince.

he who laid the foundation of the growth of Sweden. he came to the throne, the Swedes were

all

It

was

When

but a semi-barbar-

ous people, who, said the king, were so shortsighted as to rob

GUSTAVUS

.^

VASA.

who ventured among them. much for the country, however,

The Reforma-

every mercliant tion did so

that a hundred

years later Gustavus Adolphus saw his people as advanced in

and culture

intelligence

as

any nation

cracies of the Continent.

Sweden was not merely a

The growth

religious revival

Gustavus Vasa,

to political facts.

man, was far from a profoundly

Europe

of northern

among

and the Swedish nobility held high rank

of

Lutheranism in it

;

;

the aristo-

was largely due

founder, though a great

its

religious

man

;

but he saw

that by confiscating the estates of the church, he could help

forward the national finances as well as bind the nobles to his cause

and that by getting

;

rid of the priests,

who

all

desired

a single and Catholic Scandinavia under the rule of Denmark,

he would establish his own family more firmly on the throne. It

was he, in

Vasa

family.

tavus

I.

fact,

who made

the throne hereditary in the

In addition to introducing Protestantism, Gus-

established a

commerce

for

middle class as against the nobles the territory of the country

;

by means

Sweden by favoring the and he added largely to of encroachments on his

neighbors that were equally in fashion then as now. this

head of the Vasas who created the Swedish

improved the

style

of ship-building

fleet,

It

was

and who

by bringing Venetian

workmen to instruct his own thorough but less subtle designUnder him the Swedish merchant marine grew to a Gustavus Vasa left his crown to his eldest, reputable size.

ers.

and dukedoms by

Sigismund

to his other sons,

and was succeeded

in turn

son Eric, his second son John and the latter's son

his first ;

and then by

his fourth son Charles IX., the

father of Gustavus Adolphus.^

The

entire family

were able

men and

broad.

The Vasas

stood so far above any of the other Swedes that they said to have reigned ^

by a

sort of

Homeric

See Vasa Family-Tree, page 65.

right.

may be

Not only

SIGISMUND.

65

possessed of force of character and brains, most of

them were

highly cultured, well read in literature, and versed in the arts

and

Many were

sciences.

had a markedly good

King Eric was it}'^

able, but he

which, coupled to

resided in the his brother

Vasa

The Vasa blood

truly noble men.

strain.

showed evidences of the insan-

vigorous intellect, unquestionably

its

He was

family.

John ascended the

deposed in 1567, and

John

throne.

Catholicism, though he never avowed so

much

inclined to

but he mar-

;

and when the Jarghel-

ried Catherine Jarghellon of Poland,

made king

lon monarchs died out, his son Sigismund was

of

Poland, and, as was imperative, became a Catholic at the

same

time.

In order not to

by

forfeit his claim to the throne of

change of

his

pri%aleges to the nobles

but the country had a parliamen-

;

tary government, the four Estates

peasants

— having

force of arms, to

failed in his end,

— nobles,

clergy, citizens,

each a voice, and the three last named

were stanch Protestants.

by

Sweden

Sigismund granted extravagant

religion,

Despite Sigismund's

make Sweden a

efforts,

even

Catholic country, he

was eventually deprived of the crown, and

VASA FAMILY-TREE. Gustavus Vasa

(I.)

1523-1560.

I

Eric XIV. 1560-1568.

John

III.

Magnus.

156S-1592

^Catherine Jarghellon.

Sigismund, 1592-1004,

King

of

Anna Maria=:Charles IX.rr of the Palatinate.

1004-1611.

Christina of Holstein.

John, d. 1622.

Poland

Gustavus

(II.)

Adolphus,

1611-1632,

=rMaria Elinore of Brandenburg. I

XII. 1697-1718.

Christina. 1632-1654.

Charles Philip, d. 1622.

CHARLES

6()

IX.

retired to Poland, breathing vengeance.

In 1604 Charles

IX. became king, and the throne was entailed on son,

his eldest

Gustavns Adolphus, and his descendants, " being Protes-

With

tants."

this patriarchal family

came honestly by

back of him, the prince

his ability, his uprightness, his courage

and

his energy.

Gustaviis

II.,

or Gustaviis Adolphus, was born in Stock-

holm, December 19 (N. S.), 1594, son by his second wife of the then

Duke

throne.

By

Catherine,

nephew Sigismund was on the had had but one daughter,

Charles, whose

his first wife Charles

who married Count John

life-long friend

Casimir, and became the

and adviser of the future monarch, and the

progenitress of the succeeding kings.

Charles was not as brilliant as most of the Vasas, but he

was practical to the

last degree,

importance than high culture that which Charles lacked,

a quality at the time of more the mother of Gustavus had

;

and the young prince was

sur-

romided by every advantage which strong intelligence and high mental and moral aims could bring him.

wanted some of the burly he none the

less exhibited in

He

ability of his father.

zation of the

laws

;

kingdom

;

If Charles

IX.

intellectual qualities of the family,

a high degree the common-sense

did

much

for the military organi-

he compiled the

first

code of Swedish

he labored hard at the financial status and equalization

of taxes,

and gave a new impetus

to

mining: he ordered

made

topographical surveys of the kingdom to be

;

and he

prepared the way for his son in a fashion which coidd scarcely

have been bettered. Charles was happily born to reign over an unspoiled people.

The Swedish peasantry was rude and

was stout and

loyal.

Like the

Scandinavian land had trained

endure

;

and

religion

soil of its

ignorant, but

New

dwellers to

it

England, the

wo»k and

had made them earnest and

true.

to

In

.

GUSTAVUS AS A CHILD. fact, his faith

to both

67

represented to the Swedish peasant his fealty

God and

much

king-,

as

does to the Russian of

it

to-day, but with a broader intelligence.

Gustavus Adolphus was a lad of great personal beauty

and strength, and soil for careful

his naturally alert

Even

training.

mind was a pregnant

in his

boyhood he showed

that breadth of quality which later in life lent

preeminence,

— a deep and earnest religious

him such

nature, strongly

imbued with the tenets of Protestantism, an unswerving

warm

moral character,

and a

affections, great amiability, frankness

strict sense of rectitude.

Coupled with these from

ear-

youth there were noted in him that species of courage

liest

which absolutely ignores danger, and those habits of mind and heart which are wont

And

human and

manly

to call forth the

virtues.

as this species of character usually possesses its purely side, so

we

find in the king certain failings in temper

tricks of thought

He was cloak

;

which

all

the more endear

him

to us.

not a mere king of high heels and wig and ermine

man

he was a

enacting his role in the face and eyes

of all the world.

Many .

a pretty story

"

told of his childhood.

is

go into that wood," said his nurse to him one day are big snakes there replied the brave

One of

day,

!

"

"

But

fellow, "

little

when he was taken

just give

and

I

'11

j^referred.

one there," replied the five-year-old prince.

It

?

"

was natural that

of the

The

his tastes shoidd

V,

langua

.•.'^,

ducted

iiudoi-

"

an

all

" !

officer

Why,

that

And why, Your

student,

-vi

:

;

and took a keen

belles-lettres.

-.I'.'

run to war

it

was part

as well as inheritance. ;

o

them

" Because she has got the most guns."

Vasa education Icui

"

not

" there

a stout stick," kill

to see a naval review,

rank asked him which ship he

Royal Highness

me

soon

Do

;

interest in

His education was con-

ight of his father

and mother, and

of

HUS TUTORS.

68

Axel Oxenstiern, wlio as

later

became

prime minister as well

his

His father drew up a memorandum

most intimate friend.

of routine for him, which,

by no means lacking the same

reli-

common

sense in mai'ked

contrast to that

drawn up by the

gious impulse, stands out for

its

father

Frederick

of

the

Great.

Charles had the utmost faith in future

the

I lie

Gustavus.

of

on his death-bed,

faciei^ said he

when an unusually knotty tion arose

and

ques-

which had puzzled him

his council,

and which he was

fain to put into other hands.

Gustavus' masters were selected

Swed-

after consultation with the

Axel Oxenstiern.

supreme

men and

generals.

Sweden was noted

eigners to

its

court,

tutor

the

of

by a German, Helmer (or Otto) von able

;

Count de

military instructor, and later one

his

sj)ecial

was John Skytte, clerk

court, assisted

Mbrner, both traveled

was

His

Estates.

ish

of

la

his

Gardie trusted

for inviting distinguished for-

and never

failed to

make

the best use

of their abilities.

Gustavus became an exceptionally clever

He

linguist.

read and could fairly express himself in Greek, Latin, Dutch, \

Italian,

Russian and Polish, beside his native tongue

read history to good his favorite book,

During

effect,

— and

— Xenophon

et Pacis,"

was

is

and dignified

He

distinguished by style

;

he

was

in his studies.

Commentary, " De Jure

his constant companion.

history of the Vasas which of his subject

in the original

was well rounded

his campaigns, Grotius'

;

has its

left

Belli

us a

clear grasp

he spoke and wrote with

equal pointedness and force, and was considered to be the

HE ENTERS THE ARMY. Many

Sweden.

\3^6St- orator in

religious ones, are

still

69

of his poems, particularly the

sung by rich and poor in Sweden, as

Luther's are in Germany.

In gj^mnastic sports, and in the

use of weapons, he was unexcelled, and was a skillful horse-

Not only had he courage, but

man.

On

health were exceptional.

his bodily strength

one occasion, when he

and

felt

an

attack of fever coming on from undue exposure, he sweated it off

by a prolonged and

young

His temper was exceedingly quick, and

Count Brahe. his

violent fencing-bout with

in

youth a blow followed a word with scarce an interval

;_,

but he always made honest and ample amends for his hastiness,

and

later in life

The

control.

he learned the rare virtue of

eyes of all

Sweden were

self-

early riveted on the

promising heir to the throne, and great things were hoped of him.

When,

in 1604,

Gustavus reached ten years of age, his

cousin Sigismund had already been deposed on account of his

Catholic fanaticism, which had pushed to the

him

to acts intolerable

Swedes, and Gustavus' father, as Charles IX., sat

upon the throne.

Sigismund retired to Poland, and both he

and

kingdom threatened and proved

his powerful

to

be the

most dangerous opponents Sweden could have. In his eleventh year Gustavus entered the army at the lowest step, and worked his in statecraft he

ministry,

worth.

way

was allowed

to

patiently up. sit

and the council soon learned Quite without pedantry,

volumes for his instructors,

— the

As

—a

to

ajapreciate

economy

thing which speaks

of northern Europe,

duties as future ruler.

The death

his

lad exhibited a clean-cut

idea of the strength and weakness of Sweden, of role in the

a training

at the meetings of the

its

and of

of Philip II.

proper

his

own

had relieved

hordes of soldiers of fortune from duty in the Netherlands,

and many men trained

in this

famous school of war came

;

HIS FIRST CAMPAIGN.

70

Stockholm

to

who was

to offer their services to the king,

These

expected soon to measure swords with Poland.

vet-

erans were dear to Gustavus, because from them he learned of the warlike deeds of

War

was even then

Maurice of Nassau,

and his dream

his pride

his special hero. ;

the old Viking

blood throbbed lustily in his veins.

Much

to his chagrin,

Gustavus was not permitted to serve

Russian campaign of 1610, but he went to Finland

in the

and watched

near by under the guidance of de la Gardie

it

and when he reached the age

of seventeen, his father, with

the consent of the Estates, declared of wearing a sword," in the

The Goth was strong

;

to

— " worthy

a small command

in 1611.

:

young prince

the

in

indeed in the Vasa blood

mark

of age,

— and he was given

war with Denmark

instinct

him

;

it

seethed

Eric at times showed the tiger

prosaic Charles once challenged the king of Den-

And

personal combat.

in this his first taste of

war, Gustavus showed the utmost coolness and disregard of

danger, riding up into the immediate vicinity of the

when

out reconnoitring,

and scanning them through

quite unconscious that fear

was an

The young general raised some and essayed

to relieve

most men.

instinct with

forces in

enemy

his glass,

West Gothland

Kalmar, then under siege

;

but fortune

Danes, who

captured the fortress as well

as Elfsborg on the west coast.

Young Gustavus, however,

seemed

to favor the

shipped his detachment over to Oland, and took this island

and the his

fortress of

hands a

letter

Borgholm.

fortress of Christianopel,

hundred horse. accident.

He

On

his return there fell into

from the Danish commander of the small begging the Danish king for

Gustavus at once made use of

this

five

lucky

clad five hundred Swedes in Danish fashion,

led them himself

to Christianopel, reached the place at night,

was admitted, and took possession of the

fortress.

These

THE BALTIC. early exploits showed the stuff of which the prince was made,

and exhibited that

ability to utilize favorable opportunities

which later became so marked a

Genius for war

The same mental mer

is

only genius given a warlike direction.

tissue

or the musician,

trait.

if

which makes the poet, the astronocoupled to vigorous character, and

I

SWEDEN'S NEIGHBORS. make

given the opportunities o£ war, will

But

the captain.

the character must equal the intellect, and the opportunity

be of the highest.

During the reign

IX. Sweden was but a small

of Charles

and unconsidered country.

Beside Stockholm, her only

of importance were Westeras,

Orebro and Kalmar.

cities

Gothen-

borg did not grow to be important until after Gustavus' Sweden's neighbors were, moreover,

death.

and mood

to

push her hard.

by her two

Baltic

Denmark

fortresses of

all in

a position

held the key to the

Kronborg (Elsinore) and

Helsingborg on either side of The Sound, and the southern provinces of the Swedish peninsula, as well as

only by tress

mouth

the river Gote, at the

Elf sborg, and

neutralized

this,

all

Sweden could reach

belonged to the Danish crown.

of

Norway, the sea

which was the

for-

though in Swedish hands, was largely

by the not far

distant

Danish

fortress of Bohus.

Thus holding the key of the Baltic, Denmark claimed to control its commerce, and was a neighbor much to be dreaded. One of the dreams of Christian IV. was once more to organize

a single Scandinavian dynasty under the rule of his

house

;

an aspiration that made him anti-Swedish

own

to the core.

Holland had also asserted herself in the commerce of the Baltic, but not in such a

manner

as to provoke war.

All

she desired was free trade everywhere and non-interference.

— War for

with Russia, then a minor power, had been going on

some years, for Sigismund and Charles IX. were each

seeking to place on the Russian throne a claimant friendly to his

own

itself

and

interest.

Apart from

politics, the

matter resolved

into a struggle for Livonia between Sweden and Poland,

Sweden had obtained a

at the time of Charles' death,

sort of foothold in that province.

Russia's ambition was to

recover her Baltic possessions, and the king of Poland was intent on regaining the

crown of Sweden.

I

MADE

^^-.TAVUS The only

KING.

73

who had a hand

other prince

in the

game

of

northern European politics was George William, the elector of Brandenburg.

This sleepy potentate had no broader idea

of policy than to hold

on to what he already had, and to keep

He was

out of war either for religion or any other cause. the distinct reverse of what a Hohenzollern It

is

apt to be.

was on October 30, 1611, that Charles IX.

died.

As

a

matter of precedent, Gustavus Adolphus could not ascend the throne until he was twenty-four years old. tional were the circumstances surrounding

two months, on December

But

so excep-

Sweden that within

whom, had confided Gustavus and

17, 1611, the ministry, to

as a species of regency, Charles

the welfare of Sweden, clad the seventeen-year-old prince in the fidlest power as king

;

the people accepted him as such

and during his twenty-one years'

reign,

;

no Swedish subject

Gustavus chose Axel Oxenstiern,

ever regretted this action.

himself only twenty-eight years old, as prime minister, and

during

life

was devoted

statesmen and generals. as

to

him

as one of the best of his

Oxenstiern was as prudent and calm

Gustavus was impetuous and high-strung.

The

two, with

a friendship so unusual between king and minister, could not

The

have been better matched.

plement of those of the other.

qualities of each It

were a com-

seems strange enough that

these two men, whose imited ages were but forty-five years,

should have thus set forth on so gigantic an undertaking.

Few young monarchs have up the

reins of government.

cibly that of Alexander. in

many

ever been so harassed on taking

Gustavus' situation recalls for-

Not only was

there great distress

parts of Sweden, not only were the finances of the

country on a questionable basis, but Sweden was actually at

war with Denmark, Russia and Poland

;

and these countries

were apt to hold the young king cheap. It

was manifest that Gustavus could not cope with

all

NEW

A

74 these powers at once

;

METHOD.

that his only safety lay in finishing,

The

possible, the war with each one singly.

Denmark was

the most pressing;

dormant, and could be staved

if

with

conflict

the others were all bvit

off for

a season.

Christian had begun the war in April, and within

two

months had appeared before and captured Kalmar, and greatly strengthened

was

its

The

works.

also in the possession of the Danes,

fortress of Elfsborg

and the young king

foresaw that to attempt their recapture would involve more

He

time than he had at command.

Danish

sion into

territory, as

determined on an incur-

an easier means of accomplish-

ing his object, and in 1612, leaving a force in the vicinity of

Elfsborg to prevent further aggression by the Danes from

army

that quarter, he marched with the bulk of his

into

Schbnen, where Christian had stationed a detachment.

According to the military art of the day, unusual

if

offensive

not unwise proceeding.

was an

this

To undertake a sharp

on one point of the theatre of war as a defensive

would

measure to another part, simple as the problem

is,

never have occurred to the average general of

the early

seventeenth century.

But Gustavus had not studied the

Convinced that he was right in

of great captains in vain. his theory, he followed

singborg.

lives

up

his

movement by besieging Hel-

The plan should have succeeded, but

the Danes,

with a sudden onslaught on his army, placed him in grave danger, and forced him to raise the siege. ther discouraged the young king nor drove pose. itself,

Its effect

was the reverse

;

his

This failure nei-

him from

mood was

his pur-

elasticity

and he determined on an irruption into Norway

this too

proved

fruitless,

;

but

and despite good calcidation the

whole campaign came to naught.

A

severer test of Gustavus' character and ability could

scarcely have been made.

No

doubt there were many innuen-

GUSTAVUS UNDER FAILURE. does by the wiseacres of broken

war

maxims

75

of the science of

such a failure would have drawn the temper of most

;

But

men.

like Frederick after Mollwitz, the

the clearer and felt the

more

king only saw

and the operations,

reliant;

though unsuccessful, go to show that the bent of the future

mind had already grown beyond

great warrior's

the formal

limitations of the military art of his century.

One

incident in the campaign

Widsjo, he and his horse

fell

many men,

term

close to putting a ice

on the lake of

through, and he was with

Military manoeuvres on the

culty rescued.

ing of

came

In a battle on the

to the king's career.

ice,

diffi-

or the engulf-

are no rarities in these northern latitudes.

This was but one of a series of accidents and wounds, generally

brought on by the king's inordinately reckless gallantry.

He

is

the captain

Homeric quality

who most resembles Alexander

He

of his courage.

in the

could not keep out of

the fray.

Meanwhile the Danes, under personal command tian,

of Chi'is-

prepared an expedition against Elfsnabben and Jonko-

ping.

The

latter

was a border

fortress,

and both were impor-

tant places from a military standpoint, to hold which would

give the rior of

Danes a secondary base

Sweden.

to forestall

for the invasion of the inte-

Gustavus had taken up a position near by,

any such movement, but was, both by land and

sea, distinctly

weaker than the enemy.

Harboring small

made bold to push for Stockholm, hoping to capture it out of hand during He had already reached Waxholm, the absence of the king.

respect for his youthful opponent. Christian

within a half dozen

miles of the capital,

when Gustavus,

catching the alarm, returned at the head of a

roused and armed

all

ing boldly out to meet Christian at to

withdraw.

smaU

force,

the able-bodied population, and march-

Waxholm, compelled him

DANISH PEACE.

76

Disappointed in the results of this unimportant campaign,

and under the influence

of

England, Christian, who utterly

lacked the moral equipment of Gustavus, and over held

much

in check

able set of men,

now

by

who was more-

his nobles, a turbulent, unreason-

expressed his willingness to

Gustavus, who was a soldier to his finger-tips, the necessity of ending

by negotiation a

would fain have ended by the sword

peace.

felt bitterly

war which he

first

but he was glad to be

;

any price of his nearest and most dangerous enemy,

rid at

and

make

Christian, at the peace of

Knarod, January 19, 1613,

yielded up Kalmar, and later Elfsborg and his other conquests,

on payment by Sweden of an indemnity of a million

rix thaler, about eight

hundred and

fifty

thousand

dollars.

This was a heavy tax for so small and poor a country, but the peace was thrice the

of Elfsborg,

No

made with

money.

in

was imposed for the ransom

territory

left intact.

tutor,

de la Gardie, the general there

and

for energy

sian throne,

which at

this

and Gustavus now declined sole

for the Rus-

time was a shuttlecock between

several rival factions, but Charles

His

fair mili-

Gustavus' younger brother, Charles Philip, had

skill.

some time before been selected as a candidate

act,

to the

His father had already conquered Ingria

command, had won a reputation

tary

was

Denmark than Gustavus turned

His old

Carelia.

honor, and was abundantly worth

special tax

and Swedish

sooner rid of

Russian question.

and

A

IX. had not approved the

to assert the claim

by arms.

purpose was to prevent the king of Poland from

putting on the throne a tool of his own.

Nor did he

in

1613

consider himself quite ready to undertake so extensive an affair

It

;

for the

was at

beautiful

Danish war had delayed

this

his preparations.

time that Gustavus' love affair with the

young Countess von Brahe occurred, and

said that this too contributed to his delays.

At

it

has been

all events,

GUSTAVUS ATTACKS RUSSIA.

11

nothing was accomplished until the next year, 1614, by which time he had fully completed his equipment for a Russian

campaign.

Michael Feodorovitch, the ancestor of the Romanoffs, had been elected czar

;

but de la Gardie, on behalf of Sweden,

protested against the choice, for the general

pretensions of his

was more an

young

still

favored the

Though Gustavus'

prince.

effort to strengthen the

object

grasp of Sweden on the

Baltic than to push his brother's claims, he was none the less

After some

keenly bent on war.

up a two

effort,

years' truce with Poland,

he managed to patch

and sent Charles Philip

with troops to Wiborg, in the Swedish province of Finland, to protect

it

from invasion.

Some exchanges had

already

taken place between de la Gardie and the Russians, and the

war was

fairly inaugurated.

In 1615 the J'oung monarch marched with an army from Finland into Ingria, past the present burg, took

Angdov by

site of

St.

Peters-

storm, conquered the whole province,

besieged Pleskov, which was strongly fortified, and, fuially successfid in reducing

it,

made

jiroposals

the mediation of Great Britain.

In this campaign de in

command, and

la

But these were

his teacher in the art, as he

to

Frederick,

He was or

to

his pedagogue,

discipline.

and

his

to

Alexander.

of his

experience.

Like these other great captains, from the

Swedish

had been

Gustavus what old

Parmenio

But GustaAiis himself made good use shadowed

rejected.

Gardie was the young king's second

tutor in the science, of war.

Schwerin was

of peace through

start

he over-

laid the first foundations of

In lieu of the fearful acts of violence

which accompanied the raising and the progress of any army of that day, all sians

was order and quiet system.

Even

the Rus-

acknowledged that the behavior of the Swedes was

vastly better than that of their owti troojjs in their

own

land.

A WELL-BEHAVED ARMY.

78

Every one who placed himself under Swedish protection was in fact protected the army was fed by contributions regularly ;

levied

by

and paid for

What

death.

plundering by individuals was punished

;

the regulations prescribed from the cabinet

was actually carried out on the

young king began

The reputation

field.

of the

The one man who gauged Gustavus accurately was Wallenstein, though he would allow him no ability as compared with himself. " By all

to spread all over Europe.

means help Sigismund

day.

"

He

is

to crush him," said he at a later

a worse foe than ever was the Turk."

Gustavus was early approached to take part with the Protestants of gle

Germany, where the wise foresaw the

which promised to break

versity of Heidelberg

came

An

out.

to

bitter strug-

envoy from the Uni-

beg him to act as mediator

between the Lutherans and the Calvinists

;

and Landgrave

Moritz of Hesse asked him to join a Protestant alliance for

mutual protection.

But while

the

young monarch watched

events with a keen eye, he wisely refrained from any under-

taking which might interfere with his activity against his hereditary enemies, and especially Sigismund.

He

kept on

good terms with Christian, who, though he was often a cause of grave anxiety, never again overtly attacked

Sweden, but

with fair honesty held to the " brotherly compact " he had

sworn with Gustavus over his wine

;

and a truce was made

with Russia looking towards a peace.

The year 1616 was

spent in Finland, in building up this province,

with the burdens of war

:

much exhausted

and by the treaty

of Stolbowa,

February 27, 1617, Russia, hard pressed between Sweden and Poland, definitely ceded to Sweden the provinces of Ingria

and

Carelia, with the fortresses of

gorod, Janra of money.

Kexholm, Noteborg, Ivan-

and Koporie, and paid over a considerable sum

VII.

THE POLISH WARS. Having

vainly striven to

make peace with

1617-1625. Poland, and having secured only

a truce, Gnstaviis set to work to carry out his projected army changes, and at intervals traveled in

At

Brandenburg.

Germany.

In 1620 he n>arried the

sister of the elector of

the end of the Polish truce, in 1621, he sailed with a fleet to

Poland was harassed by the Turks, and though

Livonia, and laid siege to Riga.

the siege was difficult, Riga fell in September, and the king occupied Courland.

Thus hemmed

in,

ruptions, lasted

Sigismund made a fresh truce, which, with one or two

The

till 162.5.

and of the emperor, and would not agree

The

Gustavus as illegitimately king.

Sweden

size

was exceptional

to a

intervals

permanent peace, looking on

made by

the several truces gave

on a sound financial and military

leisure to establish herself

which for her

inter-

Polish king was under the control of the Jesuits

;

and

estates, people

and king

all

basis,

one

worked

in

hearty harmony.

Having

happily settled

tlie

differences with

Denmark and

Russia, Gustavus strove to transform into a permanent peace his

two years' truce with Sigismmid

duced no

effect

conceivable

on

this fanatic.

;

but his best efforts pro-

Sigismund plotted in every

manner against the country

of his birth

war must eventuate was not doubtful. delayed the

was again

The

crisis.

in 1618,

;

and that

But circumstances

truce, already several times extended,

and very fortunately for Sweden, renewed

by Sigismund, owing

to the other complications of Poland,

—

mainly the invasion of the southern part of that kingdom by

— and

through the

This aid was a

first-fruit of

Bethlen Gabor, prince of Transylvania, mediation of Kino- Christian. the peace Gustavus the

had made with Denmark, and afforded

young monarch the

leisure to carry out the changes in

GUSTAVUS MARRIES.

80

and

discipline

which he had already so auspiciously

tactics

begun.

During 1619 and 1620,

at intervals in this work,

generally

Europe.

Shortly after his accession

— he had

Gustavus

through a part of western

traveled,

incognito,

— as already mentioned

had a passionate attachment

for a beautiful

young

Swedish court. Countess Ebba von Brahe (who

lady of the used,

by the way,

flute,

on which

accompany the king's playing

to is

it

of the

hoped that he was a better performer

than that other great captain and petty musician of Sans Souci)

and though

;

his devotion

was

entirely honorable, the

queen-mother contrived to break up his purpose of sharing

In

may

his throne

with the lady.

that there

is

He had by

a Dutch lady a natural son, born in 1616, who, at

Liitzen,

won

it

be noted

but one record of immorality against Gustavus.

his spurs

on the

an age of sexual

laxity, this

ically essential

that

have an

this connection

heir,

and

field

where

his father fell.

was a clean record.

Gustavus shoidd wed

after

It

was

In

polit-

Sweden must

;

a trip to Berlin as Captain Gars

(Gustavus Adolphus Rex Sueciae) he married the the young elector of Brandenburg.

From

sister of

this alliance the

Swedish Estates were warranted in hoping much

for Bran-

;

denburg was able to help in the complicated business with Poland.

During

this period of travel

that his thoughts were never less in testing all the

new

away from home, nor

He

army or

the building

journeyed as far as Heidelberg

;

beauties of the Palatinate must have struck

gular contrast to his of places

his activity

things he saw which might con-

tribute to the perfection of his

Sweden.

Gustavus' letters show

own rugged

plains

;

up

of

the cultivated

him

as a sin-

and what he learned

and people enabled him the better

to

understand

the religious struggle which had already been inaugurated,

and

in

which he was destined to bear the giant's part.

;

POLISH WAR.

81

The Thirty Years' "War was already two years terror reigned in

many parts

of

Germany.

old,

and

Gustavus foresaw

that Sweden, though geographically removed from the scene of conflict,

and

would sooner or

be drawn into the vortex

later

1621 he sought once more to renew the truce with

in

Sigismund, under the political control

Poland, but in vain.

of his I'elative the emperor,

and under the religious control of

the Jesuits, then the growing power of the

Roman Church,

could not be influenced, especially as a fourteen years' truce

which he had just concluded with Russia saved him harmless

from danger was

in that quarter.

before,

and

peoj)le

young monarch with hearty

their

wdll.

war

If

supervened, but Sweden

more ready than ever

in every sense

and ministry alike sustained good

War

must

it

be,

no better time could perhaps have been

During the

chosen for Sweden.

five years' respite

had organized both her finances and her been carefully

troojjs.

Gustavus

Taxes had

and the raising of men for the army had

laid,

been systematically based on a tenure of land which equalized the burdens.

The

priests

from the pulpit preached the war,

the nobility was encouraged to yield cause,

and the

The

societ3^

soldier

officer

its

best efforts to the

was given an honorable position

who bore him

in

well was considered the

equal of the noble, and the aristocracy was thus merged into the military scheme. arose a

new form

For the

first

of government,

time in modern days there

— the

military monarchy.

East Gotldand had fallen to the crown on the death of Gustavus' cousin John, diminishing the chances of internal strife

and

his marriage,

foothold in

As

a

it

Germany

first act in

Gustavus

set out to

was thought, had given him a

;

political

despite the opposition of Poland.

the opening of the campaign of 1621,

conquer Livonia, to which the Swedish

royal family ever since

King

Eric's time

had some preten-

RIGA.

82 sions,

though pretensions of this kind, in the sixteenth and

seventeenth centuries, were wont to have a slender basis.

With

a

fleet of

one hundred and fifty-eight vessels, the king-

landed twenty-four thousand men, mostly infantry, at the

mouth

of the

Dwina

River, took the fort

commanding

it,

and

In this and his

opened the siege of Riga on August 13.

future Polish wars Gustavus had the assistance of his later so celebrated generals,

The

Horn, Baner, Torstenson and Wrangel.

siege of this important city proved difficult.

It

was

strong, contained a goodly garrison, and, though on the score of religion Livonia

was not warmly attached

noted for stout,

if

to Sigismund,

The Poles were

the city had a public-spirited population.

Luckily for Gustavus,

spasmodic, fighting.

Sigismund was unable

to send re-

inforcements to Riga because of

an inroad of three hundred thousand Turks, the result of his defeat at Jassy the year before

;

and

no imperial aid was forthcoming.

The

siege

was vigorously pushed

;

a line of contravallation was built,

and the army divided

into four

unequal corps according to the

The king was

lay of the land.

personally active in every step of

While unknown

insisting

day, he encouraged the

men by

the operation. Kiga.

his presence

ple of

on discipline

that

and enthusiasm, and afforded them the exam-

what a commander-in-chief should

true soldier's

at

way

of winning their love.

offered terms to the

garrison

ment, and a belated army of

be.

He had

the

Gustavus thrice

before opening a bombardrelief,

ten thousand strong,

COURLAND INVADED.

83

Two

under Prince Radziwill, was attacked and beaten.

of

the outer works, a redoubt and a half moon, were taken by

storm

;

but two other assaults were driven back, and Horn

Mining was then resorted

and Baner both wounded. September

;

to cross the

own

a gallery of the king's

wet ditch

;

this

was partly

to in

invention was laid on filled

up, and every-

thing was prepared for an assault in force upon the breaches

opened.

Annoyed

at the stubborn defense, the

determined to explode j)lace,

and give

it

up

all

to

king had

the mines at once, to storm the

plunder

;

but in the six hours' truce

granted September 16, before the assault should begin, the garrison wisely concluded to surrender.

four weeks.

Well

The

satisfied at the victory,

had lasted

siege

Gustavus treated

the people of Riga with generosity, and after banishing the Jesuits,

who had behaved

in a peculiarly hostile

an oath of fealty from the town.

manner, took

The campaign had opened

felicitously.

From Riga Gustavus marched through Courland and as a matter of of two thousand

to Mittau,

strategic safety, placed a friendly garrison

men

in the

town

;

for the

duke

of Courland

was on terms of amity with Sweden. Before moving into Poland, where he hoped to compel a peace, the king again approached Sigismund with offers of negotiation.

Sigismmid was only half tractable

not conclude peace

;

;

he would

but owing to the trouble which the

Turks and Tartars were giving him, he did agree

to continue

the truce another year, leaving to the Swedes, as a guaranty, the already conquered part of Livonia.

Hereupon Gustavus

evacuated Courland, and returned to Stockholm, late in 1621.

The

promise. of the campaign had been fulfilled; but quiet

was not restored without another warlike incident. The king's brother, Charles Philip, died in 1622 self

had

as yet

no heir

;

and

;

he him-

these circumstances renewed the

;

DANZIG.

84

aspirations of Sigismund to the Swedish throne.

could better

fit

into the plans of the

under the advice of the

latter,

Sigismund began

build ships in

fleet, Si-

to the free city of Danzig, hoising to

harbor, a work for which

its

to think of

As Poland had no

carrying the war into Sweden.

gismund betook himself

Nothing

Emperor Ferdinand, and

its

vast

commerce

and connection with the Hanse towns afforded ample means.

A less harm

suspicious

in this

;

mind than Gustavus' would have seen no

but the Swedish king was alert

towards the

;

middle of June, 1622, he appeared before Danzig with a strong

bind

fleet,

and

after

some negotiation compelled the

city to

This prompt action led up to the

itself to neutrality.

proposal of an armistice by Sigismund himself, and to a further renewal of the old truce

home.

;

whereupon Gustavus returned

Signed in June, 1622,

truce

this

Sweden

left

possession of Livonia, and of some places in Courland

was kept up by more or

in ;

it

less irregular extensions for three

years.

make peace was Germany looked on

Sigismund's unwillingness to ural.

The

Gustavus,

Catholic princes of

who came

not unnatProtestant

of the junior Vasas, as an usurper of the

Swedish throne, and would gladly have seen Catholic

mund back ability,

in

Sigis-

They feared Gustavus' restless to humble him. The

his place.

and were ready for anything

Jesuits ceased not to foster the oppression of the Protestants.

Under

their influence,

Sigismund would not enter into a per-

manent peace, for that was treason truce was a

mere military

tavus showed himself at

incident.

all

to his religion, while a

On

the other hand, Gus-

times ready to

make terms with

Sigismund, on the basis of the good of Sweden. offers

of peace

Poinpey.

remind one

of Caesar's

many

His constant proposals to

Both Caesar and Gustavus were no doubt honestly

desirous of peace on terms satisfactory to the cause of each

THE each was careful to

NEW

he deemed his

rights.

Of

<

r^

man

said

king of Sweden

;

a substantial part of

the two, however, Gustavus

was by far the more frank and upright If ever a

85

himself on record as a peace-maker,

j)Jace

though neither would have give \«^hat

ARltY.

in his protestations.

what he meant and stuck

to

it, it

was the

Caesar veiled his meaning in diction which

never committed him to any definite action.

At home Gustavus was

sure of his ground.

king, ministry and people was in dition of

marked

any other country of Europe.

The unity

of

contrast to the con-

Scarce a chapter in

the world's history exhibits afPection, confidence and mutual

helpfulness

between prince and people in equal measure.

The king took no

step without consulting the Estates,

they and the ministry never failed to sustain him.

new

In the

organization of the Swedish army, which, in 1625, he

more formally undertook, he had the hearty support classes.

was

and

Under

raised,

of all

a regular army of eighty thousand

it,

men

in addition to the equally large militia system

already adverted

to.

He was now

must come, though he definitively to

felt

ready for any war which

that he was not yet prepared

embrace the cause of

his

Protestants.

Arquebus.

(16th Century.)

German

brother

VIII.

THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR. RELIGIOUS PHASE. The

Thirty Years'

Germany

War

originated in

tlie

desire of the Catholic princes of

growth of Protestantism, and

to prevent the

in the desire of the

emperor to make his rule a real instead of a nominal one.

many

lacked consistency that

princes would

work

it

did not represent the people.

cal autocrats

;

The

there

;

other.

was a German

several potentates were practi-

the Diet was their meeting-place

erned themselves.

These two aims so

and not the

for one

There were seven prince-electors who chose the emperor Diet, but

1618-1625.

;

only the free cities gov-

The emperor's power was small

;

though nominally the

The

fountain head, he could enforce his will only by the ban of the empire.

two

religions

were more at odds in temporal than spiritual matters.

Much

of

the property of the Catholic bishoprics had been secularized where people had

adopted the new

religion,

and the Peace of Augsburg,

in 1552,

had

settled

Fifty years later things could not revert to that status,

questions thus arising.

and yet the Catholics were bent on recovering, the Protestants on holding, what they had since taken. olics

;

Maximilian of Bavaria was the champion of the Cath-

Christian of Anhalt of the Protestants.

did not act in

common

;

The Lutherans and

Calvinists

the leading Protestant princes were not helpful.

A

Protestant Union was formed in 1608 to prevent the Catholics from retaking

what the Protestants already had

;

a Catholic League followed.

struggle went on, war was not precipitated until 1618,

out her

new

king, Ferdinand,

Though

the

when Bohemia drove

and the emperor undertook

to replace him.

In

1619 Ferdinand himself was elected emperor, Frederick of the Palatinate was chosen king of Bohemia, and the war was prosecuted in earnest.

There was

no community of action among the Protestants, and neither party won success until, in 1620,

Tilly,

Frederick was defeated near Prague by the imperial general

and driven from Bohemia, while Mansfeld and

who commanded Protestant country. The armies of the day,

wick,

telling,

in

north

living

and the land suffered much.

Germany was reduced, and Germany

as well.

later Christian of Bruns-

armies, were driven

up

in1;o

the

Weser

by plunder, were barbarous beyond

Tilly kept on, until

the emperor resolved on putting

by 1623

all

south

down Protestantism

Mansfeld and Brunswick alone stood in the way.

;

CAUSES

Though

0±

the operations of the Iv

to the entrance

on

its

stage of the gre^

vahie as a military study, a few pages mnsi subject to

show the desperate

situation of

tti*.-s

tavus fhially threw himself into the scale against

and the persecution of the Protestants. As little jDossible will be taken from the more important phases.

The remote causes

of the

war were twofold

the purpoa

:

of the Catholic powers to weld the chains of religion ou pro-

testing

Europe

and the purpose of the emperor

;

make his Germany

to

ride a real instead of a nominal one over entire for the

Hapsburgs had long dreamed of a universal EuroThese two purposes were inconsistent; they

pean empire.

could not live together. fully to

Potentates

who would work

compass the religious end would

faith-

sacrifice religion to

prevent a reestablishment of imperial rule.

And

it

was

this

inconsistency which brought about the eccentricities of the

among

war, and lay at the root of the never-ending changes the contestants

;

which led Catholic France to subsidize Prot-

estant Sweden, and prevented Maximilian of Bavaria from

working kindly under his brother in the

faith, the

Emperor

Ferdinand.

Not but what the Protestants were

to blame.

The Luther-

ans and Calvinists were as incapable of continued joint as they were intolerant of

quarrels, quite as olics,

much

each other's dogmas

effort,

and

their

as the diverse purposes of the Cath-

operated to prolong the struggle.

this imbroglio that

;

It

was the knot of

Gustavus Adolphus essayed

to cut

;

and

implacable as were the contestants, unreasonable as were their motives,

he succeeded, before his early death, in perma-

nently preventing the emperor from fettering Protestantism,

and

in giving the death-blow to imperialism.

the realization of both the causal aspirations.

He

thwarted

The

sixteen

;

xAN EMPIRE. succeeded his death were due

,/iaich

^ and in his

petty jealousies of those

who

con-

name, and who during his

life

had

^aonable unanimity with or against him. .J?''

^i^arice

war was

religious toleration

completed

;

but

it

;

The what Germany

was Gustavus who made the

/s -of France a possible thing,

/^hepe were four phases

to the Thirty Years'

War:

the

Religious, the Danish, the Swedish, the French.

To

German

us English peoples, the construction of the

empire in the seventeenth century that there

an enigma.

is

was an emperor, and we read of a

diet,

We

hear

and

it

is

hard to comprehend why the people had no voice in the gov-

But they

ernment.

had none whatever.

practically

The

land was ruled by a few princes, each possessing within his

own borders almost

absolute power.

There was a vast number of small

which were seven princes called

electors,

:

the archbishops

of

four of them were temporal tors of

Cologne, Trier and Mainz

the king of Bohemia, the elec-

Brandenburg and Saxony and the

The emperor was Csesars

:

among

who, on the death

Three of them were

of one, chose the succeeding emperor. religious

principalities,

elector-palatine.

the acknowledged successor of the

and of Charles the Great

;

Roman

but he had no real power,

except in so far as he was also king of some particular country.

As emperor he

held a mere empty

posed to be the source of everything of kingdoms, principalities

;

title.

He was

from him

sup-

holdings

all

and powers were deemed

to

have

been derived, but the princes who so held under him resented the slightest interference with their acts.

The Diet was

in

no sense a popular assembly.

being a mouthpiece of the people, the smaller princes.

It

it

Far from

did not even represent

was a mere congress of the larger

CONVENTION OF PASSAU.

89

autocrats, to arrange their, so to speak, international rights.

The only power was to put him

the emperor could exert against a prince

the ban of the empire, a mild species

to

which hurt him not the

of lay excommunication,

vided he had a good army and a

To be

peace with his neighbors. into Circles, each of

Germany was

which had an imperial court

questions between the princes

from being always

and was

full treasury,

sure,

least, pro-

fair,

;

at

divided

to decide

but the decisions were far

and yet farther from being generally

respected.

The Estates met

the empire, some of the princes to wit,

of

The

in the Diet in three Houses.

electors, excepting

the king of Bohemia, who only voted in the election of an

emperor, formed the

first

;

inferior body,

was

Except for the sentation. tlie

filled

;

the third,

by representatives

latter, the

number

the second contained a

smaller princes, ecclesiastical and lay

of

deemed an

of the free cities.

people was utterly without repre-

Nothing better proves

this

than the fact that at

beginning of the seventeenth century the vast majority

(stated at ninety per cent.) of the population of

was Protestant, while the Diet was opposed

Germany

to Protestantism

;

and the further fact that most of the lay princes, members of the Diet, as individuals sustained the

not actually profess

it.

new

religion, if they did

This condition of

affairs

was fraught

with, and naturally resulted in, war.

Under to the

Chai'les V., the Convention of Passau, in 1552, led

Peace of Augsburg, which attempted

to settle the

many

vexed questions arising from the very natural seizure of Catholic

Church property

in entirely Protestant countries ; but the

Augsburg terms provided nothing

for the future,

Lutheranism, not Calvinism, was recognized.

new

religion

and only

Meanwhile, the

was growing, and matters could not practically

be measured by a standard fixed at any given time.

There

RELIGIOUS QUARRELS.

90

ecclesiastical property

were further seizures of monasteries

;

and eight

in reality only a prince

The

bishop, as he was

who

called,

still

was

sometimes spoke of himself as

So things went on

Administrator.

rifling of

the great northern bishoprics

of

The

became Protestant.

and

for a generation or more.

Protestants did not grow in wisdom as they grew in

Theological quarrels arose

stature.

among them, which gave

the Jesuits, as being all of one mind, a fair claim to a hear-

ing

and

;

finally

the

At

to gain

questions in dispute were the rights

of the Protestant administrators, larized lands.

more

Catholics began once

The two main

ground.

and the

status of the secu-

the end of the century the Catholics insisted

on going back to the Augsburg basis of 1552

the Protestants

;

desired to modify matters to suit the conditions of the day.

The

disputes

more

waxed

hotter, but there appears to

hostility manifested

by the princes than the

have been people.

As

a rule, the Catholic and Protestant populations tolerated each other fairly well.

All this grew worse and worse.

was the champion of the Catholics Calvinist,

Maximilian of Bavaria ;

Christian of Anhalt, a

was the leader of the Protestants

;

John George,

elector of Saxony, a Lutheran, played the part of peace-

maker.

Maximilian was an able

good army.

He

true measure of values, all

that

man

with an ample treasury and a

held to the Peace of Augsburg as the only

had been done

and in

to

conform

more than

to this

meant

to ujjroot

The Prot-

fifty years.

estant princes found the ownership of the ancient Catholic

lands altogether too convenient to be given up faith agreed with their liking.

The

Protestantism was in the south

;

and

their

most unprotected part of

German

states,

which lay

between Catholic Bavaria and the bishoprics of Bamberg and

Wiirzburg on the one

side,

and those of

Worms and

Sj)eyer,

PROTESTANT UNION.

91

the electorates on the Rhine and the Spanish possessions on the other.

These south German Protestants were

vinists, as their brethren in the north

mainlj'- Cal-

were mostly Lutherans.

Christian of Anhalt was a stanch Calvinist, and an able politician, in fact too

armed

;

Christian

much

Maximilian wisely

of a diplomat.

sought to accomplish results by finesse.

Every one foresaw an

irrepressible conflict.

The Bohemian

Revolt.

Finally, in 1607, a religious riot in

the emperor, with only a

show of

Donauworth induced

trial, to

put

it

to the ban,

and Maximilian was appointed

to execute the decree,

he did with inexcusable rigor.

At

south

— Niirnberg, Ulm

this,

and Strasburg

which

the free cities of the

— took alarm, and

in

1608 a Protestant Union, under the leadership of Christian (and incidentally of Frederick of the Palatinate), was formed for

mutual defense.

To

it

belonged Hesse-Cassel, Wiirtem-

CATHOLIC LEAGUE.

92

and many

berg, Baclen-Durlacli

and Hesse-Darmstadt refused lenburg,

Pomerania

neutral.

The Union

and

by nearly

and lower Rhine

all ;

League under Maximilian, which was

the princes of south

Germany, the Main

but the emperor took no part in

and

succeeding conventions

John George

peace.

and

ality to enforce his

trouble went on.

his

it

The and

who was a good sportsman ruler, despite

his

good intentions, had not the person-

moderate views, and the seething of the

It is fruitless to follow all the phases of

the singular struggle

1618,

it.

for war,

nothing toward

diets effected

of Saxony,

and a deep drinker rather than a wise extensive power

remained

same year was followed by the

— Union and Leagnie — stood ready

two parties

Saxony

;

Brandenburg, Meck-

;

Brunswick - Liineburg

in the

creation of a Catholic

joined

of the free towns

to join

;

but

never ceased until

it

finally,

in

broke out into open war.

In 1611 Rudolph, king of Bohemia, who was also archduke of Austria

and German emperor, was driven from the throne

Bohemia by

of

who next year, on The Bohemians had

Matthias,

his brother

Rudolph's death, was elected emperor. extorted from of conscience.

and

in the

Rudolph a

sort of imperial charter for .

This charter

M atthias

sou ght to

freedom

un dermine,

Bohemian Diet o f 16 1X>- the Estates were_per-

suaded into acknowledging Matthias' cousin. Catholic

Fer-_^

dinand of Styria, as hereditary king of a throne which Jjad always_Jbfie»~-electiye!

talons

its

Thrr^^ie House of Austria fastened

upon Bohemia, and

shortly, as

was

the persecutions of the Protestants became

to be expected,

more marked.

In 1618 the Bohemians rose under Count Henry of Thurn, the

new king was deposed,

his regents expelled in the

famous

defenestration of Prague, the Jesuits were driven from the land,

and

thirty directors were chosen

to their brother Protestants.

who appealed

John George

of

for help

Saxony refused

THE WAR OPENS.

93

any except such aid as would reconcile them

to the empire,

but Frederick of the Palatinate took up their cause in theory.

The Protestants

Moravia, SUesia, Lusatia and Upper

in

Every one was expecting a struggle The emperor was fairly driven into

Austria began to arm.

and sought

war

;

him a

to

be ready.

but his low treasury and internal troubles prepared for difficult task.

Bohemia

raised thirty thousand men.

Count Mansfeld, an

able officer but distinctly a soldier of fortune, just at the end of his service

under the duke of Savoy, joined the Bohemians

with a small division

;

Silesia

and Brunswick sent troo ps.

Neutral Brandenburg and Saxe- AYeimar promised

and

ot her countries, notably Holland,

money.

secret aid,

Negat ive

assist-

ance in the way_o f an attack on Austria was hoped frpm.

Prot estan t Bethlen Gabor, and even from theJTurks.

Three strong places

emperor

:

in

Bohemia had remained

Catholic Pilsen, Budweis and

Krummau.

of advancing at once on the emperor. Counts

Mansfeld engaged

in a siege of these fortresses,

The emperor

was actually taken.

true to the

sent against

Instead

Thurn and and Pilsen them small

armies under Dampierre and Bouquoi, the latter a general

educated in the best school of that day, the Netherlands

;

the operations of 1618 were trivial, and the

Diet,

which had pulled dowai

him by any

effective

naturally promised

members made the

its

its

king, showed no sign of replacing

government. aid

;

Bohemian

but

The Protestant Union

but the disagreements between

its

assistance of questionable utility to the

Bohemians.

The succeeding winter was ma«l0 noteworthy by the beginning of depredations on the part of the unfed, unpaid troops, of

license

which was the disgraceful characteristic of the

Thirty Years'

many into

War, and which ended by transforming Ger-

a desert and retarding her progress a hundred years.

THE BOHEMIANS UNWISE.

94

In 1619 Matthias died, and in August Ferdinand deposed king o£ Bohemia, was elected.

had openly

Bohemia

revolted.

to

Silesia

Mansfeld remained during the year

and actually reached and cannonaded the

Almost any man but Ferdinand woidd have succumbed

made

the future emperor was

Dampierre turned

to help

Thurn returned

the defensive

Moravia.

;

;

but

Vienna and drove Thurn away,

to

him

in a battle near

Bohemia, and Bouquoi took to

Dampierre made an unsuccessful foray into

None

of these operations

Never was a better chance

Had

city.

and luckily for him

of iron,

while Bouquoi faced Mansfeld and beat

Prague.

in

Thurn marched through Mora-

watch Bouquoi.

via on Vienna,

Moravia and

the

II.,

the joint forces of

had any

result.

for independence

Bohemia and

its allies

thrown away. been used in

one body, they could at this moment have secured anything at the gates of ical

means

They chose

Vienna

in lieu of

;

but the Bohemians resorted to

polit-

pushing the war with military vigor.

as their king Frederick of the Palatinate,

who

was son-in-law of James of England, and who, they believed, possessed friends of the helpful sort.

proved

false.

palatine

— would

Frederick

— as

Their calcidations

king of Bohemia and

become the strongest

elector-

Germany,

23rince in

possessing two out of the seven electoral votes, a fact which

aroused the keenest jealousy of every other potentate, especially

John George, and even

stirred

up the Union

;

while,

on

King James did naught to aid his kinsman. The Bohemians made a treaty with Bethlen Gabor, though the latter was too busy in seeking to tear Hungary from the

the other hand,

emperor's grasp to be more than an indirect ally

appealed to Gustavus for assistance.

;

and they

Bouquoi, with twelve

thousand men, retired to the imperial capital, and established a camp on the

left

bank of the Danube, below Vienna, back-

ing on the river, a position curiously considered by the mili-

JAN TZERKLAS. men

tary

of that time the strongest a general

men

Tliurn with ten thousand sixteen thousand

and

quoi,

».

joined Bethlen GaK

the two essayed in vain to drive out

;

at last, wearied with winter campaigning,

Betu

Gabor made a separate peace with the emperor, and was compelled

much

too

no

Thur^^

His several advances on Vienna,

to retire.

had borne

in detail,

But they had been

fruit.

brilliantly conceived.

These two years, neglected

by Bohemia, enabled the emperor to conduct a strong offen-

He had

sive in 1620.

time by inducing jealous

his

Saxony ick

utilized

;

by

Spain

to side against Freder-

Bavaria and

inciting

activity

to

frightening

the

withdrawing

its

new king

of

and

;

Union

by „

into

aid from the

Bohemia, so as

to

defend

The Lower

itself.

Palatinate was soon threatened by twenty thousand the Spanisli general Spi nola,

who marched up

U inon^ reduced

the Netherlands to Mainz, and, despite the the

P alatinate

on the

imilian

in obilized

League

colle cted

the

left

bank

Bavarian

an army

at

o f the Rhine

them

;

all

while JMax-

and_the Catholic

t roops,

The Bohemians Anhalt, who was^arely

Donauworth.

were inexpert ly led by Christian of able to hold

men under

the Rhine from

together.

The duke

of Bavaria,

whose

generahin-chiefwas the celebrated Cou nt Tilly a Wall oon, ,

Jan Tzerklas by name, reduced the Prn tpstn.nfs of TTpppv Austriajn August, joined Bouquoi'sfo rces, a nd with thousand

men

marched

into

I3o hemia

.

Frederick,

fifty

whose

friends at the first sign of danger all seemed to forsake him.

\

;

WHITE

"

HILL."

The

nth his army towards Mansfeld at Pilsen. armies were

,ii

J discipline, .

ill

supplied, suffered

and plundered right and

Mansfeld did not agree.

The

latter

and on November

sharply,

White fled

behaved and

ill

Hill, near

Frederick

left.

Tilly,

whose army

supplied, followed Frederick

ill

1620,

8,

at

the battle of

Prague, utterly defeated him.

the country, and was put

to the

ban

by

the

Frederick

of the empire.

operation on the part of Tilly deserves praise. profited

disease,

remained in Pilsen,

.nd Frederick retired towards Prague.

was equally

from

The

He had

his opponent's weakness.

Bohe mia was soon subjugated.

Mansfeld held Pilsen some

time, but eventually"fetired to the

Upper

Palatinate.

The

land was punished in a frightful manner, according to the fanatical

method of the day.

while, reduced Silesia,

The

elector of Saxony,

and was allowed

to

annex Lusatia as

John George was a peace-maker, or

his reward.

in so proclaiming himself, but

was consistent

mean-

at least he

he was always

ready to earn a new strip of territory, and he kept his eye on the main chance.

In 1621 the emperor set himself to reduce the Palatinate Frederick would not sue for amnesty.

Spinola had already

put his foot on the Lower Palatinate, and was visiting the land with the wonted atrocities.

Ulm and

Niirnberg made terms.

Denmark and

England, the Netherlands,

Switzerland sought to encourage the Union to

better efforts, but this

hands were

Hesse-Cassel, Strasburg,

free,

and

body lacked a capable leader whose it

broke up

in

April.

Mansfeld en-

deavored to defend the Upper Palatinate for Frederick, but his troops

and

it

were

if

anything more lawless than the enemy's,

was well that he was eventually forced

to retire.

It is impossible to describe the barbarity of these armies.

The

soldier

was a professional who hired himself

to the gen-

(

MANSFELD.

97

eral promising tlie greatest chance of plunder,

and

tliere

not a vice or a brutality from which he shrank, even

enemy's country, murder, rapine and

friends, while in the

"

incendiarism were the rule of every day.

men

are

nuns? " asked

fianism; and yet Tilly's

Tilly, in

answer

Do you

think

my

to complaints of ruf-

army was comparatively well

woman nor

Neither man,

was

among

in hand.

child escaped the ruthless savagery

of the soldier of the Thirty Years'

War,

— excepting always

those under the control of Gustavus Adolphus.

And

such

sol-

diers were all the less efficient, for their habits clashed with

every military plan

armies moved to seek plunder, not suc-

;

Yet such was the method of

cess.

troops that

and maintainiusr

was deemed a matter of course that these things

it

The

should be.

raising'

effect

on the country or on the army was not

considered.

From nate,

the Upper, Mansfeld

where he won some

down

to the

Lower

Palati-

slight

successes against Spinola,

then sat

marched

and

Hagenau,

in

watching Tilly on the Neckar,

and

on

Spinola

Meanwhile,

the

Bethlen

^y"

Main.

Gabor

again appeared on the scene.

Bouquoi had been his

army was

If Frederick straits,

was

Now came for

and

in desperate

Ferdinand's

was far from

forces

killed,

in full retreat.

position

easy.

an accession of the

Tilly's Manceuvres.

Protestants.

Early in May, 1622, Christian of Brunswick, an adventurer almost as desperate as Mansfeld, starting from the north, and the margrave of Baden-Durlach from the south, each with

;

TILLY'S MANCEUVRES.

98

twenty thousand men, marcliecl to join Mansfelcl, who crossed the Khine, and after meeting the margrave at Wiesloch, de-

feated Tilly in an ambush.

But, wasting his time, he allowed

Tilly to join the Spanish forces,

and

to

march on the mar-

grave, who had again separated from him.

Wimpfen on May

at

6,

Falling on him

before Mansfeld could come up, Tilly

defeated him, meanwhile holding Brunswick in check by a

detachment of Spinola's troops borrowed for the occasion.

On

these being later withdrawn, Brunswick

to the

Main country

to join Mansfeld.

crossing the river at Hbchst

June

and badly cut him up.

rear,

Frankenthal now easily

Tilly caught

20, attacked

Heidelberg,

him

him

in the

Mannheim and

fell to Tilly.

Space forbids us to detail Tilly

esting operations.

But

marched down

this, as

well as

had manoeuvred

many

other inter-

skillfully.

By keep-

ing in one body he had prevented the junction of three armies

men

of twenty thousand set of

each,

and beaten them

in detail,

manoeuvres which abundantly deserve study.

by a

They are

one of the early instances of clever strategic work following

upon the blank page was not usually

fertile

and Brunswick were nate,

of the

Middle Ages.

And

in strategic manoeuvres.

finally driven out of the

yet Tilly

Mansfeld

Lower

Palati-

passed through and devastated Alsace and Lorraine,

and retired

to

Metz

;

and from thence,

after a brush with the

Spanish troops, Mansfeld, with his army, entered the service of the Netherlands.

Claiming his reward for Tilly's accomplishment, Maximilian was

made

Emboldened by war

elector,

and given the Upper Palatinate.

success, the

emperor resolved to carry the

to the north against the

dukes of Mecklenburg, Bruns-

wick and Pomerania.

The war was thus

He had

reason for congratulation.

transferred to the Weser.

Frederick

had dismissed Mansfeld and Bnmswick from his employ

TILLY DEFEATS MANSFELD.

99

but far from disbanding their forces, these generals foresaw

means of subsistence and renown in marching There was notiiing they so to another section. himself.

was

north, Tilly

desired

Each was fighting, not for Protestantism, but for North Germany was as much opposed to them as

as peace.

it

their armies little

If

to Tilly.

Mansfeld and Brunswick had not moved

improbable that the emperor would have sent

is

it

beyond the Palatinate

have been patched up. their work,

some kind

;

But these

and the men who were supposed

pions of the

new

faith

grew

to

be

would

of a peace

free lances kept about to

be the cham-

most intolerable

its

foes.

Mansfield, in 1623, devastated the Catholic holdings on the left

bank of the Rhine with

his Netherlands troops, while

Brunswick lay beyond the Werra with some twenty-five thousand Dutch and north Germans, near Gottingen,

moved upon

him, crossed the river in his front,

detachment around his

left

This time, however, the

wing.

Brunswick

veteran coimted without his host. sively

on each part of Tilly's army, and beat

losing part of his forces

Mansfeld.

by disbandment, he

Tilly followed,

loss.

Only

six

it

fell

fell

succes-

singly.

back

But

to join

and attacking him August 6

Stadtlohn, west of Miinster, on the

grievous

Tilly

and sent a

thousand

at

Ems, defeated him with

men out of twenty thouNo further operations

sand succeeded in joining Mansfeld.

were undertaken this year, but ter-quarters,

all

the armies went into win-

accompanied by the usual course of atrocious

devastation of the countries they occupied.

Halberd with Gun.

(16th Century.)

IX.

THE DANISH PERIOD.

1625-1630.

GuSTAvcs had repeatedly been appealed to by the German Protestants for him too busy to respond. Eecog-nizing that

aid; but his Polish wars kept

Sweden would be

eventually

involved, he expected to cooperate, but in his

larly furnishing funds to the Protestant armies, but lacking a

there

was no

on certain land

consistent action.

terms

distinct

made a

;

but Christian of Denmark underbid him, and Eng-

treaty with Christian, under

Bavarian general

emperor to

;

The two had

Living by plunder,

While Tilly advanced against Dessau bridge

at the

whom

to join Bethlen

Brunswick and Mansfeld were

To oppose

Christian

;

Gabor

all

siege

and

;

Christian, Wallenstein defeated Mansfeld

in Transylvania, thus

Gustavus,

now arrived, took All Germany was

but from

he!3,vy loss,

1629 was let

wasting the campaign. returned.

To

With

into

the

emperor's, save the free cities

this latter place, in 1628, Wallenstein, after a long

was driven back.

King Christian sued

who was

shortly to

come upon the

scene.

weak

opposition than

for peace,

and

in

War

is

The war had been

re-

Results had been obtained

by able measures.

detail the complicated political

;

him well back

on easy terms, so that Wallenstein might devote himself to

off

the Thirty Years'

work

Mansfeld's

Meanwhile Tilly

the reins, and pushed Christian into

morselessly conducted, and without broad method. rather from

to Christian's

but he then weakly followed when Mansfeld pushed south

Wallenstein

the Danish islands.

men

seventy thousand

defeated Christian at Lutter in 1626, and in 1627 drove

and Stralsund

Tilly, the

these armies weighed heavily on the

army was eventually disbanded, and Wallenstein Holstein.

was

and the celebrated Wallenstein was commissioned by the

an army.

raise

sixty thoTisand.

worthy leader,

In 1625 Gustavus offered to undertake the war

Thus began the Danish phase.

to serve.

land.

own

France, England and Holland, all anti-Hapsburg, had been irregu-

fashion.

and

religious events of

without the scope of the present

nor can we dwell on

its

early military manoeuvres.

the exception of a few of Tilly's and Wallenstein's,

the marches

and countermarches of the plundering hordes

EFFECT ON SWEDEN. have no value

;

101

military history of Gustavus, and of a

tlie

few great captains who succeeded him, claims our attention. During all this seething of the German imbroglio, Sweden

was engaged on other business.

As a

strong Protestant, Gus-

tavus was ambitious to help his downtrodden brethren of the faith

;

but he was a stronger Swede, and he looked primarily

to the welfare of

That this welfare was Gustavus had the intelligence to see, as his grandfather, the great Gustavus I., had seen that the

bound up

his fatherland.

in its religion,

;

European

conflict could

by means of strange

be settled only by the sword and

political alliances

that, unless

;

Sweden

soon took an active part in the struggle she would eventually

be passively crushed

all

:

young king was ready

this

was plain

and the

to him,

to act so soon as the time

But though hot-headed

was

ripe.

though embracing with

in the fray,

exceptional fervor a cause he had once joined, Gustavus was cool net.

and dispassionate, prudent and calculating, in the cabiTrue Swedish polity would not permit him to under-

take a work which might lay him open to the treachery of

Sigismund, which might again bring Sweden under the dictation of

Poland

;

nor could he put his hand to so great a busi-

ness unless he was

war than

more amply equipped with the sinews

own poor land could

his

be done he was willing to join the

now

ion was

pointing.

ready to see the latter undertake first

man

King Christian it

to

of

of

In the work to

furnish.

whom

public oj)in-

Denmark,

or he was

single-handed.

But

of

importance to him was peace or a lasting truce with

Poland

;

upon the

Gustavus would not needlessly altar even of Protestantism

beyond danger from outside foes Gustavus

set

;

;

sacrifice

and such a peace or truce

himself resolutely to conquer.

his eyes to the suffering in to his manifest capacity.

Sweden

she must be placed

Not

Germany, he limited

closing

his action

GUSTAVUS' PLAN.

102

There was, moreover, a feeling in Gustavus' mind,

that, in

a military sense, he could best aid the Protestant cause by an

advance upon the emperor's dominions through

Silesia,

—

by reaching out towards Bethlen Gabor, who had married the sister of his queen, and was one of his devout admirers. This plan likewise necessitated a previous conquest or neutralization of

Poland, some place near which would then

serve as a base of operations.

This idea was in fact worked out from the then standj)oint

much

in

detail.

While Christian

Denmark

of

should con-

duct a campaign in support of the Protestants in the west of

Germany, Gustavus, with Danzig or Stettin

would

as a base,

march up the Oder through Silesia, straight on the emperor's The Silesians, mainly Protestants, hereditary possessions. would, as he knew, rise in his support and contribute heavily in recruits to

;

Bethlen Gabor would

compel her neutrality

;

fall

upon Poland and help

the countries to be marched through

were fruitful and able to sustain large armies practicable, the

But

be passed.

Holland — who duce

it.

With

;

alone

had

elastic finances

reference to this plan,

Gabor was the most

It

it

— would not

pro-

must be remarked

had weaknesses

;

for Beth-

unreliable of men, and Poland was

not beyond being a serious

much

the road was

Warta being the only considerable river to and England and all this demanded money

that Gustavus recognized that len

;

enemy

in his rear.

But

it

was

habit to deal in the possibilities of any given

his

He had

situation.

the

true

gift

of

imagination, without

which the captain, alike with the musician, the poet, the astronomer, never grows to his greatest stature.

encounter

many

of his imaginings.

They

all

had

W^e

shall

their prac-

tical value.

For twelve years before Gustavus had any part Thirty Years' War,

hostilities

and

atrocities

in the

had been con-

;;

CHRISTIAN UNDERTAKES WAR. stantly going on

;

103

and France, England and Holland,

ing to see the Hapsburgs gain

tlie

unwill-

upper hand in Europe,

but without consistent plans, had been alternately subsidizing and forsaking the Protestant princes of Germany. three

moneyed powers could not work

the

German

These

having each

In 1624 Gustavus made to

a different motive and aim.

England a proposal

in unison,

undertake

to

business on condition

that a port on the south shore of

the

Baltic

was assured him, and

another in the North Sea should have that

abundant

that he

;

subsidies

England should pay

for seven-

teen thousand of the fifty thousand

men he deemed essential that Denmark shoidd be neutralized by an ;

English

fleet

in

that he himself

command

The Sound; and should have sole

of all forces

under arms.

But Christian was negotiating wards the same end

;

he was

to-

willChristian of

ing to accept

he could not see as far as Gustavus did the English government accepted in 1625.

Thirty Years'

War

was

The Danish

period.

Denmark.

much lower terms

in

what

is

;

and

his offer

Until 1629 the

laiown as the Danish

king's object in undertaking the

war

cannot be said to have been as ingenuous as that of the

Swede

;

he acted more from a desire to enrich himseK out of

the bishopric of

Bremen and

other neighboring ecclesiastical

foundations, than from any strong championship of Protestantism.

Nor was he

fitted to the task of

commanding the

armies of several nationalities, officered by training

and

ideas,

men

of diverse

which the Protestants would put under

WALLENSTEIN TO OPPOSE HIM.

104

100

Danish Period.

arms.

But

away from

the

Swedisli

monarch's war kept Sigismund

Christian's field, which

Christian never doubted his

own

was a help pro ability.

It

tanto^

and

was no doubt

well that Gustavus was left to fhiish the Polish problem

before he undertook a war so distant from the Vistula.

He

could afford to bide his time. Christian thus assumed the lead of the

To oppose him

German Protestants.

the emperor in 1625 commissioned Wallen-

commanded

stein to recruit

an army.

Maximilian.

The Dane was promised a busy campaign.

Tilly

still

the forces of

MANSFELD AND BRUNSWICK. England i greed joined the

to subsidize

105

Mansfeld and Brunswick, who

now commander-in-chief, thus gi\ang him some men. But these troops were not rendezvoused

sixty thousand

had crossed the Weser Lukewarm towards Mansfeld,

until November-, 1625, while Tilly

into lower

Saxony

in July.

the British subsidies were irregular as a bold

;

but the

latter's career

and measurably successful adventurer was height-

ened in brilliancy by relying largely on his own resources. Christian's

weak

Count Thurn, and

service

margrave

the

was

opening

though he had in his

;

Baden-

of

Durlach (young Bernard of

Saxe-Weimar,

later so cele-

brated, was present too), he

merely places

and

fortified

his

sat

camp

conduct a Tilly,

sundry

garrisoned

at

down

in

a

Bremen,

to

small war with

who duly appeared

front.

He was

in

appar-

ently unmindfid of the fact that Wallenstein was rapidly

putting afield an

army

for

Wallenstein.

the emperor, and that dan-

gers were encompassing Tilly

him on every

Between them

side.

and Wallenstein may have had seventy thousand men.

Albrecht von Waldstein, or Wallenstein, was born a Bohe-

mian Protestant, and educated as a Moravian early threw himself into the

was limited

He

arms

to belief in himself

;

but though he

of the Jesuits, his religion

and the tenets of astrologj\

entered the service of the emperor as a young man, and

earned his praise and gratitude by

many

able military

and

;

WALLENSTEIN.

106

He became

schemes.

diplomatic

wealthier by his

own

speculations,

and was already prince

men

Friedland, and one of the most powerful

when Ferdinand needed It is alleged that

to raise

by marriage,

wealthy

an army.

Wallenstein agreed with Ferdinand that

he would sustain his army on the country that the emperor promised to support

;

but

That

it.

matter come to the same thing.

On

the other

low

his

constituted authorities.

It

treas-

made

by contributions from the regularly was

all

one

;

the countries through

which Wallenstein passed were invariably

left

To

a desert.

army was what both emperor and general aimed

the means by which

it

the

hand Wallen-

be no plundering

stein probably agreed that there should

that he would raise victual

probable

it is

ury forbade his carrying out such an undertaking

create an

of

Bohemia,

in

at

was raised or fed or paid was imma-

terial to either.

Wallenstein's method of supporting his

army was no other

than that of the adventurer Mansf eld, but he did

systematic way, acting in every land he entered as

well

;

he took good care of them

;

if

He

the supreme lord, whose only law was I will.

men

in a

it

more

he were paid his

he kept them out of

danger until he disciplined them into the semblance of an

army

;

he was himself magnificent, and deemed nothing too

good for

his followers.

blunt soldier, whose sional

Tilly,

on the other hand, was a rough,

men worked hard and had but an

reward in the sack of a town.

on a much more splendid,

if

no more

The Czech was unquestionably an ferred, to be sure, to avoid battle

occa-

Wallenstein's army was efficient scale.

able strategist

and resort

to

;

he pre-

manoeuvre

but according to the art of that day, he had few peers.

;

An

equally shrewd politician, he harbored schemes looking towards the unity of

Germany under

the Hapsburgs, with equality of

the two religions, in which schemes he himself should figure

HE DEFEATS MANSFELD. as leader

lOT

but these material strivings not unf requently inter-

;

fered witli his better military knowledge.

commander, he did not of his strategy

Unlike a great

call the political situation to the aid

he rather subordinated his strategy to his

;

political desires, forgetful that it is only after victory that

may

one

While Wallenstein served a Catholic

gainfully do this.

master, he had the breadth to see that in religious toleration lay the best chance to spread the imperial power

end he constantly

this

strove.

Jealous of any competition in the to

open a campaign on his own

He

Christian.

Wallenstein resolved

field,

lines

about the

left

flank of

passed from Bohemia into Saxony, crossed to

bank

the right

and toward

;

of the

Elbe

at Dessau,

where he

fortified

a

strong bridge-head, and prepared to advance on the Danish

To

king. in

counteract this advance, Mansfeld,

who had been

Liibeck country and in Brandenburg, crossed the

the

Havel, took Zerbst, and in late April, 1626, marched boldly

on towards the Dessau bridge. capture

it

defenses,

failed

and

;

W allenstein

at the right

His attempt, April held his

moment debouched

uj)on

their

Mans-

exhausted troops, which had shown some gallantry in

feld's

the advance,

and cut

Mansfeld was

his

elastic.

army

to pieces.

With

Silesia (the devastation of the

steads

made

end

May moved

of

in

homeat the

towards Hungary, via Crossen, Gross Gloto join Bethlen

again at war with the emperor.

thousand

of

and

war and the burning

half the population ready to enlist),

gau and the Jablunka Pass,

six

John Ernest of Brandenburg and

the help of

Saxe-Weimar, he again recruited forces

some

25, to

men behind

Gabor, who was

Wallenstein, sending to Tilly

men under Merode,

followed Mansfeld, a

fact so singular, so eccentric in both a military

and a

collo-

quial sense, that only the fear of grave danger to Ferdinand

from the

joint operations of

Mansfeld and Bethlen Gabor, can

;

TILLY DEFEATS CHRISTIAN.

108 explain

By some

it.

instruction

especial

authorities he is stated to have receivQpl

from Vienna

to follow Mansfeld,

that under these he unwillingly directed his

bogk towards the Oder. feld to lure

It

and

via Juter-

was a creditable thing for Mans-

an old and able soldier like Wallenstein after

him, and away from his proper sphere

;

and

discreditable to Wallenstein to be so lured

whom

march

it

was equally

away by a man

to

he would have referred with a sneer.

Mansfeld was not as fortunate as his manoeuvre was bold. In December, 1626, Bethlen Gabor made a new peace with Ferdinand, and Mansfeld was driven to disband his army and

make

to

his

had died

own way

to Venice,

in the spring.

where he died.

Brunswick

Neither of these soldiers of fortime

lived to see the awful burning of the fire they

had so largely

helped to kindle. Wallenstein's retrograde march had been useless, and he did not again get to work in north 1627.

He had

Germany

until late in

wasted two campaigns.

While Wallenstein was thus occupied, Tilly followed up In May, 1626, Christian marched towards Christian.

King

the Elbe to the aid of Mansfeld, or rather to lay his

hand on

Weser bishoprics, but found that both he and WallenHe attacked the Dessau stein had moved towards Hungary.

the

position, but, aided

by a reinforcement from

Tilly, the gar-

by Wallenstein drove him back, and he Brunswick, and sat down to the siege of several

rison left there retired to

towns.

Nothing but smaller operations took place between

the rival armies, and these mostly fell out in favor of Tilly.

After taking Gottingen, and learning that Christian had

advanced on him as far as Nordheim, Tilly moved toward the reinforcements Wallenstein

and turned on his adversary.

had sent him, drew them

in,

Christian withdrew, but Tilly

followed him up, reaching him at Lutter, August 27, 1626

;

IMPERIAL SUCCESS. Cliristian's

109

unpaid troops fought in a half-hearted manner,

and Tilly defeated

hiiu badly.

Christian retired to Holstein

This operation redounds to Tilly's credit, and

to recruit.

caused the Protestant princes to shake their heads as to Christian's

carry out

to

ability

liis

programme.

German

Protestantism was not to be thus conserved.

The common

In truth, Christian was in a bad way.

folk

had a song, of which the refrain ran, "Perhaps within a year he

'11

A

be,

everywhere,

He

king without a kingdom."

—

to

sent embassies

England, Holland, Venice.

France and

Holland gave only a part of the promised subsidies

;

yet by

praiseworthy exertions he got together in the winter of 1626-27

an army of thirty thousand men.

Saxon

Circle, he

defensive

peror

;

ritory,

The

Cut

off

from the lower

had thrown that part of Germany into a

attitude;

and now Brunswick turned

Mecklenburg ordered the Danish troops out of and Brandenburg sent reinforcements

em-

to the

its ter-

to the Poles.

wonderfid. imperial successes of the past five years in

war and

had

politics

Denmark

left

uphold the

to

only Mecklenburg, Pomerania and integi'ity of

Ferdinand dreamed of extending

and there were

folk,

empire to the Baltic

even Protestants, who deemed such a

consummation not wholly ill-doings of

his

the Protestant faith.

to

be regretted

for as against the

;

Mansfeld and Brunswick, Ferdinand and the

empire stood for order.

1627 by reducing

Silesia

His armies opened the campaign of ;

Tilly crossed the Elbe at Artheu-

burg in August, and moved into Holstein. defended himself against Tilly's advance

who had marched with nearly

Christian stoutly ;

tlirough Silesia and Brandenburg, burning

and extorting the scene.

all

manner

of contributions,

Sending Arnim

to

but Wallenstein,

a hundred thousand

men

and plundering,

now appeared on

Pomerania, and Schlick to

Mecklenburg, each with a small army, Wallenstein crossed

ILL-DISCIPLINED TROOPS.

110 the Elbe at

Winsen towards Tilly,

into Jutland. in September,

the end of August, and

moved

meanwhile, had again beaten Christian

and the king, leaving garrisons

in Gliickstadt

and other strong places, had gradually retired up the peninsula to avoid further battle.

On

the arrival of Wallenstein,

who, as the emperor's general, claimed to be the ranking cer, Tilly

was sent back across the Elbe, ostensibly

tect the joint communications, but really to

offi-

to pro-

be got out of the

way, while Wallenstein cleared the peninsula of the Protestant forces,

and drove the Danes

islands, whither,

having no

Though one

them.

miral," he

had no

fleet,

of his titles

ships,

to take refuge

the

in

he could not well pursue was that of " Imperial Ad-

and could not

towns with a

isolate

harbor.

There was widespread opposition

to Wallenstein' s military

sway, and especially to his soldiery. friend in north

Germany.

dinand's army,

emperor.

while

He had

scarcely a

Every one protested against Fer-

technically

remaining loyal

to

the

The great Czech's work was, however, done with

and he was shortly rewarded zeal and military intelligence by Ferdinand with the duchy of Mecklenburg, which, having sustained Denmark, was declared to be forfeited and he had ;

;

already been created duke of Friedland.

saw the emperor

The end

in full control of the shore of the Baltic,

save only Stralsund, and in possession of countries.

Pomerania was occupied;

tock were taken their own.

inces It

;

1627

of

all

its

abvitting

Wismar and Ros-

only the Hanse towns and Stettin

Brunswick and Hesse-Cassel were the

held

still

sole prov-

which maintained any show of independence.'

must be said

to Wallenstein's credit that,

however

intol-

erable his regime, he was not fighting the battles of the Jesuits,

or of religious

Catholic were one.

oppression.

To him

Protestant and

His controlling idea was imperialism

—

WALLENSTEIN ELATED. Hapsbui'gism

— aud

to accomplish this

all religious disputes aside.

from

and Wallenstein was compelled

The Czech was self the

he was willing to

lay-

But Ferdinand could not recog-

nize his duties as emperor apart olic,

Ill

his duties as a Cath-

to follow his dictation.

at the height of his glory.

He dreamed

him-

conqueror of Germany, at the head of a powerful

army, in the new role of deliverer of the empire, advancing

Stralsund. Partly from an old plan.

He

on the Turks, and taking Constantinople. Catholic League

;

forgot the

he forgot Maximilian and Tilly.

And

he

forgot in his dreams, but not in reality, the king of Sweden.

So long as Gustavus held sway on the

it.

He had

— and

been watching the career of the

as he jeeringly called him,

now did, knew " Snow King,"

Baltic, as he

Wallenstein's power was an uncertain term,

he

and while he did not hokl him

a great value, as measured by

his only standard, himself,

at

he

STRALSUND.

112

yet saw in Gustavus' holding of the Baltic grave cause to fear for his

own schemes.

Stralsund was

now

the saving clause.

was of equal importance

fied city

to all Protestants.

Denmark, the Hanse towns,

land, Holland, Sweden,

She could,

to help her.

This strongly

like Danzig,

all

forti-

Engjoined

be provisioned from the

Gustavus had always recognized the value of Stralsund

sea.

as the best strategic base on the Baltic.

moment

He had

at one

conceived the idea of conducting a defensive cam-

paign in Germany, and of going to Stralsund in person to organize

League

it

from

there.

would be

It

fatal if the

Catholic

He had

should control so important a harbor.

al-

ready sent Stralsund supplies, and dispatched six hundred

men imder adviser.

a good

Colonel Eosladin, with a naval

officer.

Admiral Flemming; and

in

1625 he had made a

and defensive, with the town.

twenty years' treaty, offensive

Stralsund was not one of the so-called free

was

practically on the

allegiance both to

same

basis,

it,

whereupon Wallen stein ordered

Count Arnim,

to besiege the city.

island of Riigen,

the

mouth

But she

Pomerania and the emperor.

declined to admit the imperial army, whose

ceded

but

cities,

though she owed nominal

Arnim

ill

fame had

his

pre-

lieutenant.

already held the

and soon took Djinholm, which commanded

of the harbor; but in

him out of this latter The town held a number

ers drove

March, 1628, the Stralsund-

island.

of

old

soldiers, six

hundred

Danes, and six hundred Swedes, and the citizens were instinct with courage.

In

May

Gustavus had sent them a cargo of

powder, and Christian, who was

now

putting Stralsund on a solid footing. at the unexpected resistance, his

lieutenant.

was fain

in earnest, joined in

Wallenstein, angered to

come

" I will take Stralsund, were

heaven by chains," he

is,

to the aid of it

hung

to

somewhat doubtfully, quoted as

WALLENSTEIN BAFFLED. saying; and to table

" I will

:

a deputation of citizens

make your

sent their property

But

it

after

was met

citizens

Wallenstein, surprised,

on with the

but made no

siege,

arrival at Stralsund, about the

his

end of June, he ordered a storm, and kept

mense excess

The

city as flat as this."

but showed no signs of yielding.

Soon

pointed to his

lie

and families aboard ship or to Sweden,

nettled, disconcerted, kept

progress.

113

up three

it

at all points, despite valor, ability

No

of force.

days.

and im-

greater result followed a twenty-

Without a

four hours' bombardment.

fleet,

means

or

of cre-

ating one, the siege ran the same course as Gustavus' siege

On

of Danzig.

Danish

July 9 and 10 more Danish troops and a

fleet arrived,

and a week

under Leslie and Brahe.

later

Wallenstein

two thousand Swedes felt his

abated his demands, but with no result

;

weakness, and

and on July

24,

1628, he retired from the siege with a loss of twelve thousand

men,

Stralsund had taken the

baffled.

first

step in saving

Protestantism in Germany.

In 1628 matters in Germany were ripe for absolutism.

The

Jesuits anticipated full control of

European

ideal of Ferdinand, to recover the lost dignities

the empire

;

The

affairs.

and power of

and either the ideal of Maximilian,

to recover

for the church its lost property, or the ideal of Wallenstein, to

found unity on a military government, seemed about

realized.

union of

Gustavus' ideal of a Corjjus HJvang elicorum all

Protestant powers for self-defense

No

been formulated. the

Hanse towns

work compared

;

to

part of

and

Germany now

to reduce these

to

be

— or

— had

not

stood out except

seemed but a small

what had already been accomplished.

To

a deputation of Hanse towns which pleaded for Stralsund, ,

Wallenstein had replied

each of you in turn after all

Germany,

it

was on

" I will have Stralsund

:

!

"

this

first,

and

But when they had conquered commercial rock that the efforts

PEACE OF LUBECK.

114

Ferdinand and Wallenstein were wrecked.

of is

Truly,

money

the sinews of war.

Meanwhile Stade,

by

Tilly,

TiUy

mouth

at the

of the Elbe,

had been taken

but Gliickstadt held out, and in January, 1629,

retired

from

this

though Wallenstein lent his

place,

The towns,

personal aid.

the merchant class in other words,

had demonstrated that they were greater than these vaunted generals

They had put a

Caesars.

limit to their conquests.

was the siege of Stralsund which brought conviction

It

the

stronger in their rights than the successor of the

;

mind

of

Gustavus that Sweden must and now might throw

He

herself into the scale against the Hapsburgs.

on land, but though

had

lost courage.

who

recognized,

if

at sea she still held her

to

show

12, 1629, Christian

this

it.

At

the Peace of Liibeck,

was freed from the obligations he

at the inception of his luckless

with

uncommon

securely to shelve

vus

;

leniency,

;

but Christian was

for Wallenstein

him before he undertook

wanted

to master Gusta-

and on the promise that he would thereafter stand

from German

cam-

Danish period of the Thirty Years' War, the

emperor had been completely successful treated

own. Christian

he did not acknowledge, his own limitations,

had taken on himself In

far-

Finally begging for mercy, Wallenstein,

was only too ready

paigns.

was

Denmark had been subdued

sighted, as Christian was not.

May

to

affairs.

aloof

Christian even received back the lands

which the emperor had taken. Wallenstein had already received his reward.

Maximilian

was now given the Upper Palatinate and that part of the Lower Palatinate which is on the right bank of the Rhine, coupled to

its

electoral vote

;

and within these lands Protes-

tantism was soon interdicted.

The emperor had begun some

rebellious subjects

;

the

war by seeking

to discipline

he had ended by conquering

all

EDICT OF RESTITUTION. The Edict

Germany.

of Restitution

— compelled the Protestants Passau in 1552

;

— issued May

by them

1629

since the Peace of

and Wallenstein was charged

The archbishoprics

19,

to restore to the Catholics all

the religious property acquired

done.

115

of

to see this

Magdeburg and Bremen,

the

bishoprics of Minden, Verden, Halberstadt, Liibeck, Ratz-

burg, Miznia, Merseburg, berg,

Naumburg, Brandenburg, Havel-

Lebus and Camin, and one hundred and twenty smaller

foundations, were torn from the Protestant clergy and their

With Wallen-

congregations, and restored to the Catholics. stein at the head, this

was not done leniently

:

all

from the Alps

to the Baltic,

of the doing.

Protestantism was fairly proscribed.

Germany,

gToaned under the awfid manner In some

In Nordlingen there

localities it

was worse than in

was not a

single Catholic, but the imj)erial commissioners

marked

nevertheless

others.

the churches and their property for

all

surrender to Catholic priests.

To be truthful, the fault had lain with the Protestants. They had never stood by each other, nor acted for any time in concert

their political jealousies

;,

their religious aspirations.

both

in politics

better cause

the other hand, the emperor,

and war, had shown a persistency worthy of a

while his generals, Wallenstein and Tilly, and

;

his right-hand his courage

On

had been stronger than

man, the

and

elector of Bavaria,

had well seconded

intelligence.

Meanwhile two strong men had been watching the successes of Ferdinand

and dread of of

:

Richelieu from his jealousy of the Hapsburgs

of their ascendancy

Sweden and

;

and Gustavus from

his love

fear that Protestantism would be trodden out

Germany, There

this

is little

in the

war which savors

campaigns of the

of

what to-day we

first

twelve years of

call military

method.

Occasional smaller pieces of work were excellently done, but

PURPOSELESS WAR.

116

the whole was unsystematic, and the grand strategy of the field

was forgotten in the

political ideas of the leaders,

in the commissariat demands of the armies.

parceled out like Germany, this was not to be wondered

The armies marched Allies did not

pose.

rich in booty

hither

work

and

In a country at.

and yon without consistent purinto each other's hands.

A town

was as much an objective of every commander

as a fortress at a key-point or the

army

of the

enemy

;

and

the habit of living on the country was coupled with atrocities, the recital of the least of which

makes

one's blood curdle.

Wallenstein, Tilly, Mansfeld and Brimswick were guilty of acts of savagery

which would stamp them with eternal infamy,

— except that such was

the era.

Marches were mere devas-

tating raids, only then having an ulterior object

conquest of a province lay in the way

was believed that no marching array made

We is

fortress should all

be

when

the

and the fact that

it

left in the rear of

a

;

operations slow and indecisive.

shall see a different

method while Gustavus Adolphus

in the field.

All this anticipates the Polish campaigns of Gustavus from

1625

to 1629, to

which we must now return.

Genevese.

(16th Century.)

THE POLISH WARS CONTINUE.

1625-1627.

In 1625, unable to prolong the truce with Poland, Gustavus, with twenty thousand men, set

sail for Livonia,

and thence invaded Courland.

met by a Polish army, which he defeated

at

Walhof

Here he was His idea stiU

in January.

was that he might aid the Protestants by pushing a column through SUesia. In 1626, with reinforcements, he sailed for Pillau, which he took, though belonged to Brandenburg Danzig, seizing tial

harbor.

all

it

then advanced on Konigsberg, and down towards

;

the towns on the way, and besieged this, to the Poles, essen-

Sigismund came up with an army and blockaded Mewe, which the

Swedes had taken

but Gustavus relieved

;

by a

it

brilliant coup.

In 1627 the

Poles under Koniezpolski tried, before the king's arrival, with partial success, to raise the siege of

Danzig

;

and cut

but when Gustavus reached Danzig,

some of the Swedish reinforcements

off

affairs

changed.

The

some, was here wounded, and matters remained at a standstill. Poles drew near

and

;

severely wounded. in

in

While invalided, a naval engagement took place

valescent, the king captured

of

marked

In August the

an ensuing engagement Gustavus was again and more

which the Swedes were beaten, but the siege was not

in the place.

Owing

raised.

some surrounding towns, and more

to his late arrival

and two wounds,

this

off

Danzig,

When

con-

effectually shut

campaign was not

gain.

After

new

the completion of the

Sweden, and the failure of

all

manent peace with Sigismund

military organization of

attempts to negotiate a perto replace the existing truce,

Gustavus, like a true soldier, made up his mind,

must

;

king, too venture-

be, to

open

hostilities

if

by vigorous measures.

war

it

With

twenty thousand men, on a fleet of seventy-six vessels, he again set sail for the

mouth

of the

Dwina, in June, 1625, captured

Kockenhusen and other points held by the Poles and reduced the entire province. colonel with two thousand

men

The attempt to

in Livonia, of a Polish

retake Riga failed, the

POLISH CAVALRY.

118 detaclmient being

all

Marshal Stanislaus driven off with

but destroyed

and a second one by

;

thousand men, was

Sapielia, with three

From Riga Gustavus

a loss of all the gvins.

crossed the border into Courland and captured Mittau and

The

Bauske.

cold weather had come, but the king

was better

equipped to conduct a winter campaign than the enemy his

men, with

;

for

their fur-lined boots of waterproof, oiled leather

and thick stockings, and otherwise coarsely but serviceably,

warmly and uniformly

clad,

could keep the field at any

season.

Field

-

Marshals

Leon Sapieha and

Gosiecowski, with

twenty-six hundred cavalry and thirteen hundred

vanced

the

to

foot, ad-

rescue

of

Gustavus went out

Bauske. to

meet them, relying mainly

on

his excellent infantry, for

he had

little

horse.

Early

recognizing the value of foot, it

was he who

times

put

place

with

it

;

its

He

modern proper to

the

believed in

and, moreover, the Swed-

ish horses

were too small for

anything but

Polish Horseman.

in

relation

other arms. it

first in

light

cavalry,

so that, until bigger animals

could be got in Germany, he fain must put up with what he had. place

Once Gustavus found how much upon

reliance he could

his foot, he never ceased to devote his best ener-

gies to its development. erals' reliance

was on

On

the other hand, the Polish gen-

their superior cavalry,

which was their

nation's favorite arm.

Gustavus had as yet commanded

in

no pitched

battle,

and

BATTLE OF WALHOF. he was eager to measure swords

met

119

Walhof, in Courland, January 16, 1626, and the king

at

hundred

utterly worsted the Poles, with loss of sixteen

many

The armies

enemy.

witli the

much

prisoners,

baggage and many

of the artillery,

standards, the Swedish loss being small.

results rather

from which we can divine

than

tactics, there is

method

his

Stockholm

in the Castle of

in

Lithuania, followed by Gustavus,

the king again endeavored to

make

light.

Sapieha

fled

way took

the

But part

peace.

Warsaw was

to

Bir-

of the

and with

seized,

of Lithuania a heavj^ contribution in

diffi-

The king

Peace was not upon the cards.

culty released.

fire

which success accomplished,

;

to

The

of attack.

who on

zen and another strong place

embassy which he sent

no record

1697 destroyed many papers

which might have given us more

demanded

There are no de-

Except the king's brief dispatches home,

tails of this battle.

which dwelt on

killed,

money, and,

the season being advanced, left de la Gardie to seciu-e his

conquests in Livonia, and returned to Stockholm, with the

from another quarter

in the spring.

restricted in strategic operations

by the Polish

by advancing up

the Vistula, he

intention of attacking

Being

still

war, the king thought that

might connect on

his right with Christian of

Mansfeld, and on his

left

with Bethlen Gabor.

was the one already referred heart of the empire.

But

it

Denmark, or This project

to for a joint effort to reach the

was never put into execution.

From Stockholm, on June 15, 1626, the king, with twentysix thousand men on one hundred and fifty ships, sailed to the coast of East Prussia, landing near the fortress of Pillau, at the

mouth

of the Frische Haff.

of Brandenburg, as

his brother-in-law, the elector

Prussia, then a sion to occupy tect

his

fief of it

Poland

;

duke

of

and Gustavus asked permis-

as a storehouse,

reembarkation.

This place belonged to

and a strong place

But the

inert

elector

to pro-

demanded

BLCkJT LANGUAGE. three weeks to consider the matter

spare

;

121

Gustavus had uo time

With

ble arguments compelled the elector to neutrality. characteristic bluntness he said to

you prefer

to

him

:

am

"I

his

aware that

keep a middle course, but such a course will

You must

break your neck.

am

to

he summarily took Pillau, and by equally unanswera-

;

hold on to

me

or to Poland.

I

your brother Protestant, and have married a Brandenburg

princess

;

I will fight for you

I have good engineers, self.

and defend

and know a

I doubt not I shall defend

My men,

devil.

you

if

like,

it

— the

are poor Swedish peasant louts,

but they can deal you lusty blows, and

and

shall

soon be given finer clothing."

;

my-

bit of the business

against Poland or

dirty

ill-clad

this city of yoiu-s.

His

acts,

moreover,

argued better than his phrases.

In case he should make an advance through Brandenburg,

army would

Gusta\T.is did not lose sight of the fact that his

be moving

into a position

where

it

would become the strategic

Denmark, who stood

centre of a line, of which the king of

between the Elbe and the Weser, was the right, and Mansfeld,

on the Oder, was the

left.

All his lines of advance

were duly weighed, and his active mind made potential plans

But

far ahead. rior to

his

immediate task was simpler

;

and supe-

any plan for joining the German struggle was the

intent to cut Poland off

from access

to the Baltic, as

already had Russia, by the occupation of the entire coast

he

line.

He never lost sight of his great aspiration, " Dominiinn Maris BalticV^ He gauged its value rightly. Gustavus continued his advance. ened until

it

promised neutrality.

Konigsberg was threatBrauusberg, Frauenburg

and Tolkemit were surrendered July 1-3, and the Jesuits here and elsewhere were expelled from the confiscated

;

ical matter,

for these priests were

and did

infinite

harm.

cities,

and

mixed up

their goods

in every polit-

Elbing, July

6,

and Mari-

DANZIG.

122 enburg, July

8,

followed

suit, as well as all

the towns of

West

But Dirschau and Danzig, which had broken neuand were in dread accordingly, held out. Gustavus

Prussia. trality,

moved on Danzig, and camping mouth

He

Weichselmiinde.

quered

in the

of the Vistula, reconnoitred the

districts,

Werder, near the

town and the

fortress

then began to recruit from the con-

and crossing the Vistula on a bridge of boats

Danzig and Vicinity.

below Dirschau, July 12, he stormed that town and Mewe, to hold which cut Danzig

The

off

from her trade with the

king's hope was not only to take Danzig as a base and

depot for himself

— " sedes

— but to hamper the Poles to

interior.

an essential harbor.

belli

" was the phrase of the day

by cutting

off

from them access

Everything looked promising, when

suddenly Sigismund appeared on the theatre of operations with thirty thousand men, and camped at Graudenz, several days'

march up the

Vistula.

;

^D^ISMUND APPEARS. Danzig was a strong the

title of richest

city,

123

It disputed

place.

mart of eastern Europe.

with Novgorod

was a free

It

owing mere nominal allegiance to Poland, and was a

prize for

him who

from the

sea,

controlled

But

it.

it

could be provisioned

which Gustavus seemed unable to prevent.

Danzig proved valuable to the Swedes as an object-lesson

and from

his experience here the

sund how to defy Wallenstein ary value,

its

king was able to show Stral-

but though

;

it

had

this second-

obstinacy in holding out largely neutralized the

Swedish successes in the four years of the Polish war.

The presence of Sigismund quite altered Gustavus' plans. Though much weaker than the Poles, the king deemed it wise at once to

march against them.

were no permanent defense field.

;

Led by Sigismund and

advanced to Marienburg

;

The

fortresses he

had taken

he must beat the Poles in the his son, Vladislas, the

enemy

on meeting the Swedes, a few

unimportant skirmishes occurred, when the Poles withdrew, crossed the Vistula near Neuenburg,

Mewe from

and began a

siege of

the south.

The Swedish commandant was prepared uttermost, but

Mewe

needed

victual, and,

to resist to the

though such an

operation was then unusual, Gustavus personally headed a

reinforcement and succor-train for the garrison with three

thousand foot and three hundred

horse.

tempts at secrecy, the plan was discovered to stop the convoy,

and with

occupied a position athwart

light horse

its

;

Despite due

at-

the Poles essayed

and some

artillery

Rather than bring the

path.

whole Polish army down upon himself, the king resorted to a ruse, gave his

and proceeded

movement the appearance to withdraw.

of a reconnoissance,

His clever dispositions deceived

the Poles, and throwing out Coimt

Thurn with part of his by active demonstra-

force to divert the enemy's attention tions,

he himself made a detour with his convoy somewhat out

HANDSOME OPERA

124

Thurn performed

and covered by horse.

of sight

xST.

work

his

so well that the Poles, under the impression that the Swedish

garrison was about to be drawn from place would fall to them in

Their manifest

advance.

Mewe, and that the any event, made no serious was

role

to attack sharply,

and

to closely observe the place r»Bj»0OtfOf5QC»)

to ascertain the real

purpose

Swedes.

They did

Thurn had a

severe skir-

the

of

neither.

mish with the Polish horse,

put

'

light

which alone had been

in,

and was obliged

to

withdraw a space for fear of being cut

off

from the king.

But he held the

force

in

check, and the Poles, though

they had abundant time, neglected to reinforce

managed

tavus his

Mewe from

convoy into

it.

Gus-

luckily to run

the north side, and then turned

to protect the withdrawal of Thurn.

The Poles had used but a small part in actual

numbers ten

of their troops,

that Gustavus was in force, and feinting to their

good

position.

though

They feared draw them from

to one of the Swedes.

A

simple demonstration on either of

the Swedish flanks would have disclosed the true situation,

and been

fatal to the king's project.

Gustavus retired safely

up river to Dirschau, and the Poles raised the blockade of

Mewe.

Their

loss, stated at five

hundred men, far exceeded

that of the Swedes. It

is

rare

that

a fortress has been re-victualed in this

fashion in the teeth of so numerous besiegers.

As an

opera-

;

DANZIG RELIEVED. tion

it

was quite imusual then, and

The management

of the affair

not usual at any period.

is

was

125

In the fighting

perfect.

Gustavus had himself led his men, and, as was his wont, run grave danger, being,

it is

said, twice

captured in the fray, and

He had

twice cut out by his immediate companions.

tested

the quality of the Poles, who, except for undoubted bravery,

had

little

in the

way

of

good soldiership

to

recommend them,

and did not appear to be dangerous opponents. generals had

should do which blockades a town, and finds

by a handful of the enemy seeking

On

Polish hebetude.

Mewe.

in politics,

attacked

to relieve the place.

Bold

the succeeding day he marched in force

Sigismund,

made

itself

had been, he was well seconded by

as Gustavus' attempt

into

Sigismund's

a narrow appreciation of what a large army

less persistent in

war than obstinate

signs of desiring peace, but coupled his pro-

posals with impossible conditions.

Placing his troops under

Oxenstiern in winter-quarters, for the year was far spent, the

king returned to Stockholm.

The ministry and people

sup-

ported his refusal to listen to the Polish conditions, and a

more reasonable proposal was drawn up and sent

to

Warsaw

but as Sigismund did not answer before the next year, the

war went

on.

The command

of the Poles, at the opening of 1627,

was

who was sent to raise home but the Swedes

given to Crown-Marshal Koniezpolski,

Gustavus was at

the siege of Danzig.

;

Mewe, Elbing and Pillau, thus encirTo break through this line, Koniezpolski saw

held Putzig, Dirschau, cling the city.

that Putzig afforded the easiest means, and he was as successful in his venture as

he was bold.

The garrison

of Putzig,

unfortunately short of both munitions and food, was quickly

reduced to right to

straits

march

;

but though surrendering,

out with colors flying.

it

obtained the

This again opened the

communication of Danzig with Germany, and neutralized

all

SWEDISH REVERSES.

126

Gustavus' work so far

Eight thousand

luck.

Nor was

clone.

recruits,

coming

this the

to the

end

of

ill-

Swedes from

Germany, were met hy Koniezpolski on the march from and driven back to Hammerstein, and the place forced, on April

manner not

15, to capitulate, in a

The

garrison.

were made prisoners

officers

Colonels Streif and Teuf el

— and

the

— among

men

them

released on a

This was a notable piece of partisan warfare.

year's parole.

During

creditable to the Swedish

this period of

Swedish reverses, Gustavus had been

kept in Stockholm by contrary winds.

By no means

cast

down by these backsets, he doubted not to overcome them when he should reach the ground. Sailing from Elfsnabben

May the

4,

he landed on the 8th at Pillau.

army

When

he reached

at Dirschau with the six thousand troops he

brought, he found

increased by recruitment up to thirty-five

it

But

thousand men.

had

to his surprise

he also found that the

Brandenburg had taken up arms against him, and had raised four thousand " blue coats " for his suzerain elector of

These were intrenched near Pillau, at Loch-

Sigismund.

Gustavus made short work of the matter

stadt.

speedily captured the j

[

listed the entire

little

body under

;

he set out,

Prussian army, and forcibly en-

own

his

standard.

George Wil-

liam learned his lesson, and thereafter remained neutral.

Gustavus began by a careful reconnoissance of the works

The

surrounding Danzig.

Head," or

strip of

citizens

had occupied the " Danzig

land at the west mouths of the Vistula,

and here was a redoubt which Gustavus especially desired to reconnoitre.

While thus engaged,

the works from a boat, he was flesh of the hip,

operations. forces

;

May

25, 1627, viewing

wounded by a

bullet in the

which laid him up, and further delayed

During

this period the Poles concentrated their

Sigismund threatened de

the king was compelled to send

la

Horn

Gardie in Livonia, and to his assistance.

GUSTAVUS TWICE WOUNDED.

127

Gustavus Adolphus was personally much too venturesome

commanding

for a

general.

In

this particular the family ten-

dency to insanity perhaps manifested itself

;

but his was as

admirable a form of the disease as that of "Macedonia's

The same day on which he was wounded, he had been almost captured by two Polish horsemen, who suddenly sprang upon him while out reconnoitring and far from his

Madman."

attendants

;

and but a few weeks before, he had barely

escaped being cut down in a cavalry skirmish. postulations were of any fit

But no

ex-

Gustavus would run risks

avail.

only for officers of lower rank.

For

this

venturesome-

ness Oxeustiern attempted to take him to task, saying that

a monarch had no right to risk a jects.

But Gustavus

life so

cited Alexander,

needful to his sub-

and the necessity of "

showing his men that they must despise danger. better fate could overtake

king, in which place quietly replied.

it

me

than to die doing

my

has pleased heaven to set

What

duty as

me?"

he

In this particular the monarch could not be

controlled.

Meanwhile, Koniezpolski drew within six miles, and imdertook, on

August

18, a reconnoissance of the

Swedish

posi-

Gustavus headed a body of cavalry and drove back

tion.

the Polish horse, which retired through the village of Eo-

This place lay in a country

kitken. ravines, lery. hill,

and the

village

much

cut up by hills and

was held by Polish infantry and

artil-

Gustavus had placed some batteries on a convenient with orders to attack the village, and had galloped up an

adjoining height to reconnoitre,

when he was again wounded The Swedes,

through the right shoulder, near the neck.

somewhat disheartened, withdrew.

The bullet was deep and could not be cut out, and the wound proved dangerous. Gustavus at first feared that it was his mortal hurt

;

and, indeed, he was kept from duty for

128

DANZIG AGAIN SHUT

three months.

Meanwhile the

related that the king's

wound, was led

IN.

went slowly on.

siege

It

is

body physician, while dressing the

say that he had always feared this or

to

"

worse, as His Majesty so constantly courted danger.

Ne

sutor ultra crepidam," answered the royal patient.

On

recovery Gustavus recaptured Putzig, and once more

cut Danzig from

Swedish

fleet

its

communication with Germany, while a

of

The

under Sternskjold blockaded the port.

Danzigers had also patched up a

fleet

;

and under command

Admiral Dickmann, a Dane, they made, November 28, an

attack on the Swedish navy, and inflicted a severe defeat

upon

it,

but not without heavy loss of their own.

Dickmann

and a Swedish captain

— some say

and Sternskjold both Sternskjold

fell,

— blew up

his ship rather than surrender.

This

naval battle exhibits the strength and ability of Danzig.

The misfortune seemed

to cap the adverse occurrences of the

had won but an empty triumph,

year, though the Danzigers

and

at

a loss of

five

hundred of

their

best sailors.

A

stronger fleet was brought up, and Gustavus began to draw his lines closer about the city. ally, it

Haff.

was

essential to capture

The

dered.

two towns south of the Frische

General Tott that against Gutt-

The former was taken by storm

No

fight in the

effectu-

king, though not yet convalescent, headed the

party against Wormditt; stiidt.

In order to do this

further

;

the latter surren-

another minor naval

operations, save

harbor of Danzig, occurred this year, and Gus-

tavus returned to Stockholm in December, partly for the benefit of his health.

The campaign almost a failure,

of this year

— owing

was of small account,

to the adverse weather,

the king from the scene of

action,

delays occasioned by his wounds.

enemy took

no better

and

It

— indeed

which kept

to the aggravating

was fortunate that the

advantage of

their

opportunities.

BAD SWEDISH POSITION. Nothing can excuse their carelessness

129

in not assuming- the

offensive during this period, in connection with the garrison of Danzig.

The Poles never lacked

A vigorous

rarely well led.

policy

courage, but they were

must have occasioned

seri-

ous complications to Gustavus' lieutenants, and might have

brought disaster

for Gustavus

;

had not

sufficient forces, to

blockade so strong a place as Danzig, and at the same time hold head to an army fully equaling his own, and vigorously

Koniezpolski opened against Gustavus' lieuten-

directed.

ants with vigor

but he drew back to a

;

strict defensive after

the arrival of the king.

There were uncomjjleted

fortifications

and Hagelberg, near Danzig, which

it

on the Bischofsberg

has been said should

have been attacked by Gustavus, but even their capture

would not necessarily have brovight about the place

for

;

Swedish ordnance, though

the

fall

the

of the

best then

known, was not capable of reaching every part of the town from those eminences and the Danzigers would have fought ;

hard.

It

seems that Gustavus might have been wiser to

resort to a simple blockade,

dilatory

the

enemy was

campaign.

and

in July, before the

ready, to fall on

Had

very

and cripple him

he accomplished the

latter,

have turned on Danzig with a better chance

;

for

he coidd

for without

the moral support of the presence of Sigismund's armj^, the

town would scarcely have might have secured

resisted so stoutly

;

and easy terms

it.

Moreover, in a military sense, the Swedes were not well placed.

The time

for the Polish

army

to attack

was while his attention was taken up by the desire to capture

Gustavus

siege.

His

Danzig before moving on the enemy was

perhaps a mistake.

As Lossau

has pointed out, had the

Poles defeated Gustavus while he lay near the

punish his army badly and thrust

it

city, so as to

back towards the west.

WALLENSTEIN'S OPINION.

130

his line of retreat

would have been through an extremely

poor country, in which an army, especially one partly broken up, could scarcely subsist

army up

;

the Vistula, even

whereas an advance on the Polish if

resulting in defeat, would have

army unknown to

given Gustavus a better chance to retire and to save his

But these were new problems

whole.

the soldiers of the day

working them our own

out.

;

He

of war,

and the Swedish monarch was slowly cannot be held to look at war from

point of view, illumined as

it

is

by the work

Frederick and a Napoleon, as well as by his own still

hampered by the fear of

And

of his era.

;

of a

for he

was

fortresses, so strong a sentiment

happily Koniezpolski showed indolence to

a degree which corrected the evils which might have flowed

from Gustavus' position and wounds. Danzig had

so far resisted Gustavus' best efforts.

It

was

a proud city, without religious prejudices, and while owing slender allegiance to Poland, value.

tained

In

by

this it

it

held

its

own

rights at a high

was seconded by Holland, and morally

sus-

powers which preferred not to see the Baltic

all

reduced to the position of a Swedish lake. It

must be

said to the credit of Wallenstein's foresight

that he was constant in his ad\'ice to the emperor to assist

the Poles.

Gustavus was allowed

If

to

win success he would

prove the worst enemy

the empire could have, he wrote to

He would

gladly have accepted Gustavus as an

Ferdinand. ally, if

the monarch could

entering into the

now by

German

enacting the chief role.

all waters,

at a cheap price be kept

from

imbroglio, where he himself was

With

his usual habit of sowing

Wallenstein even sought diplomatic means of

establishing communication with Gustavus, meanwhile doing his best to cripple him, Baltic,

Arnim,

and instructing

to prevent

the

his lieutenant

Swedes at

landing in Pomerania or Mecklenburg.

all

on the

hazards from

XI.

THE POLISH WARS END. Again

joining his

army near Danzig,

1628-1629.

in 1G28,

Gustavus pushed the siege

Koniezpolski indulged in making sundry diversions against him, and in a sharp battle drove to fall,

when unusual

;

but the king marched out

;

him up the

Danzig was about

Vistula.

floods overflowed the country,

and drove the Swedes out

Gustavus had been studying the German situation, had made a

of their works.

treaty as to Baltic trade with

When

into Stralsund.

Denmark, and had thrown a force and munitions

the emperor overran all north

Germany except

the free

towns, the king saw that he must shortly enter the contest, and he pushed the

In 1629 the emperor sent a force to join them, and

Poles hard for a peace. operations

became

initial success, biit

with heavy

loss.

The enemy moved sharply on Gustavus, and with

active.

within a few days he turned the tables and defeated them

This, coupled to the exhaustion of Poland

tion of France, brought about a six years' truce, under

army

lems.

for

all

In these Polish wars Gustavus, like Csesar in Gaul, had trained

his conquests. his

and the interven-

which Gustavus held

its

He had

future

work

learned to

in

know

Germany, and himself in war's broader probhis

men and

gradually transformed the slow-moving

He was now

mobile force.

During

they to lean on him

army

ready to enter the

of the

lists

day

into

;

and he had

an active and

for Protestantism.

the winter, in relation to commerce in the Baltic,

Gustavus had made a treaty with Denmark, which granted

him a passage through The Sound, importance.

—a

In the spring of 1628 he

matter of prime

left

Stockholm with

Near Danzig he encountered seven of the city's which he took five and sank one and landed prob-

thirty ships. vessels, of

ably near Putzig. zig,

;

The Swedish

fleet cruised

opposite

Dan-

but could not prevent the place from being victualed by

Polish blockade-runners.

near Dirschau, in

its

The army was

stiU concentrated

location of last year, but

Gustavus

desired to establish a foothold at some point nearer to

Dan-

SWEDISH VICTORY.

132 zio-

and personally headed a body of seven thou-

Jbe selected

;

sand men, and, unexpectedly to the enemy, threw them across the Vistula, on a quickly constructed bridge, to the island

Werder, which he took.

called the Kleine

him a

better position from which to threaten

No

the place.

occurred

;

serious fighting is spoken of

but in

ish annals

this respect there are

we have more data about

;

those of Gustavus.

and

This island gave

The Swede did not

;

and choke

many gaps

Swed-

in

Caesar's battles than

write commentaries

his dispatches are usually bare of military detail,

full of

off

very likely none

;

though

matter dwelt on at that day.

Without undertaking any endeavored

to

serious operation, Koniezpolski

interrupt the

several of the towns held

by diversions against

siege

by the Swedes.

He

captured Mewe,

again took Putzig, and, gradually approaching Danzig, hoped to effect

something which might raise the

siege.

Gustavus

detailed General Tott with a cavalry force to watch these

Tott

operations.

fell into

an ambush west of Grebin, but

though surrounded by thrice his without harm

and brought

;

force,

he cut himself out

he even captured some prisoners and

in the

news

of the enemy's force.

flags,

Unwilling to

attack the Swedish army, Koniezpolski annoyed the besieging force materially,

and Gustavus determined Immediately upon

his interference.

to rid himself of

this affair of Tott, leav-

ing a part of his forces before Danzig, he suddenly marched

with the bulk of them on the Polish army, met and attacked it

not far from his camp,

not known,

— and

by

— the

exact locality, curiously,

is

his sharp initiative well kept up, the

mobility of his foot and his vastly superior artillery, defeated it

with a loss of three thousand men, four guns and fourteen

flags, fell,

and drove

it

well

up the Vistula.

Koniezpolski himself

heavily wounded.

It is

a grievous loss in the study of the

life of

Gustavus,

FAILURE AT DANZIG. that so

known

little is

schooling, as

know

it

be identified.

Gaul was

much

as

and yet even the

loss,

named, nor can

of these Polish battles

Spain Hannibal's

of Hannibal's Iberian,

The king now tightened It

battle-field is neither

This war was the monarch's

Caesar's, or

we do

Caesar's Gallic, battles than

sea.

so little of the

;

Here was a general engagement with a high

siege of Danzig.

percentage of

133

;

but we

and much more of

of these.

on Danzig, by land and

his grip

woidd soon have been reduced by hunger, had

been for a serious

Swedes out of

flood

their trenches

not

it

which drove the

in the Vistula,

and camps, and forced Gustavus

And

to raise the siege all but totally.

same time

at the

Sigismund came on the scene with heavy reinforcements for Koniezpolski, which complicated the situation

Sigismund was more implacable than

still

ever.

more.

Approaches

from the Dutch states-general to bring about a peace were

met with

Leagued with the emperor, Spain and

refusal.

thumb

the Catholic powers, and under the

would

listen

to

no argument.

probable arrival of a Spanish

He

fleet in

looked forward to the the Baltic as well as to

an imperial auxiliary corps from Germany subsidies

all

of the Jesuits, he

;

he had received

from both branches of the Hapsburgs, and the Polish

parliament had voted him generous supplies.

Moreover, as

the emperor, in 1628, had succeeded in gaining the upper hand in

Germany, Sigismund was emboldened by the

failure of

the Swedes at Danzig to hope, not only to drive them from

Poland and Livonia, but eventually to carry the war into Sweden, and again lay claim

to the throne of his ancestors.

After the failure of their own disjointed

efforts, there

had

been but two sources from which the Protestants of Germany could expect assistance

Denmark.

They had

great profit, and as

it

:

from Gustavus, or from Christian of

enlisted the services of the latter to no

was inexpedient for Sweden

to under-

FAILURE AT STRALSUND.

134

take two wars at the same time and the Polish king

make

not

peace, they coukl, for the

Gustavus.

moment, not co

But when Christian was driven back by Ti

many

Wallenstein to the confines of Jutland,

of the Jr'rotes-

tants again turned to the king with urgent appeals for help.

Wallenstein had already selected Stralsund as the most available base for operations against

Sweden or Denmark, and

was blockading

to the Baltic

Such a threat

it.

had naturally

brought Christian and Gustavus closer together, and the treaty they

dom

it,

to

defend the free-

Christian went personally to Stralsund,

of the Baltic.

provisioned fleet

made included an agreement and saw

to its proper

manning and the Danish ;

destroyed several vessels sent by Sigismund to the help

All this had occurred during the king's

of Wallenstein.

blockade of Danzig

;

by Stralsund's brave of the emperor,

and

finally

resistance, as well as

who disapproved

nacy, to give up the blockade. reality a

Swedish victory

of the town

;

for

own

Wallenstein was compelled

by the command

of his generalissimo's obsti-

This imperial reverse was in it

was due

to the heroic defense

by the garrison which Gustavus had

sent thither

under Colonel Leslie.

The

siege of Stralsund

every point of view that

it

was so noteworthy a

pute the place of Wallenstein

And fail

among remarkable

yet Wallenstein was a great soldier.

before Danzig

The defense

failure

from

alone, says Lossau, suffices to dis-

generals.

Did not Gustavus

?

opened to Gustavus himself an

of Stralsund

important foothold for operations in Germany, as well as for the protection of the Baltic this fact is

shown

;

and that he had well weighed

in the treaty which he

one extremely favorable to

it

made with

and of equal value

the city,

to the pro-

jects of the king.

The imperial party paid small heed

to Gustavus.

Wal-

;

SMALL OPERATIONS. lenstein

135

by no means underrated the king, but he

Had

overrated himself.

might have placed Gustavus next ing captains of Europe,

distinctly

he stated the case as he saw

among

to himself

— proximus,

it,

he

the com-

sed longo intervallo.

His structure of mind had not the self-confidence which accurately gauges the opposition while relying it

on

its

own powers

rather possessed the self-esteem which arrogates all to

own

capacity and allows nothing to the opponent.

its

This was

the secret of Wallensteiu's great strength, and of his singiUar

weakness as

He won

well.

where seK-assertion alone can

when he met equal power, he lost. The emperor did not keej) Sigismuud provided with money as had been agreed, and had Polish coffers not always been win

;

at a low ebb, the king

might have found

maintain his footing near Danzig. siege,

more

difficult to

Gustavus received considerable accessions of troops,

including two thousand cavalry from

grave Otto Ludwig

army

it

After the raising of the

;

Germany under Rhine-

but he was unable to bring the Polish

to a decisive battle on terms

which he could accept.

Koniezpolski confined himself to small operations and occupied strong positions self

;

and Gusta\ais was fain

with half measures.

to content him-

The Swedes took Neuenburg,

burg with much material, and Schwetz

;

Stras-

and one detachment

under Baudissin undertook a gallant raid to the gates of

Warsaw, where

it

produced the utmost consternation,

wliile

Wrangel made a bold foraging expedition inland from Elbing. Later Baudissin was captured, but exchanged. The Poles made a few unimportant gains, and on one occasion actually surprised the Swedish army but they failed to follow up ;

their successes.

The singular political complications made the war in Germany drag slowly on. Having won his exceptional triumphs, the emperor, as we have seen, began tampering with Chris-

;

CONGRESS OF LUBECK.

136 tian of

Denmark,

at Liibeck, and

arid finally

May

(1628-29) a congress was held

From

1629, peace ensued.

22,

peace, Gustavus, king of Sweden,

and Frederick,

ex-elector

Gustavus had

of the Palatinate, were expressly excluded.

sent his representatives to the congress, but Wallenstein

arrogantly refused them

admittance

;

this

had

nor was any notice

taken of the king's protest by either the emperor or Wallen-

Gustavus had

stein.

nand

;

Congress

;

it

when excluded from

the Liibeck

nor would he receive an imperial mission, because

accompanying documents the

in the

an embassy to Ferdi-

at the time sent

but he recalled

formally denied him.

title of

king had been

But he made a public demand

restoration of the staUis quo ante helium.

The

for the

refusal of

Wallenstein to recognize Sweden was one of the immediate reasons of Gustavus undertaking the Protestant cause in Ger-

many

;

for

it

was the one thing wanting to convince him that

Sweden would

The

shortly

become involved.

successes of the emperor

acts of Wallenstein

had the

and the many high-handed

effect of

bringing the Protestants

into warmer sympathy, and his brethren in Germany once

again turned to Gustavus for leadership.

Distinct appeals

had been theretofore made in 1615, 1619, 1621 and 1622 but never had the cause so sadly needed help, nor Sweden

been so nearly ready.

The conditions seemed

kins: asrainst his will into the contest

on for ten years. scale,

to

drag the

which had been

France had already flung herself

sroing;

in the

out of antagonism to Spain and fear for the balance of

power

in Europe,

and had offered herself as intermediary

to procure a peace with Poland, so as to untie Gustavus'

hands.

It

was

fully determined in

Sweden, so early as Feb-

ruary, 1629, that Gustavus should at no distant date to the assistance of

move

Germany.

In the beginning of this year (1629), during the king's

IMPERIAL AID TO POLAND. absence at home, Wrangel

The

winter-quarters.

caught up with beat

it

and drove

it,

not take.

The

137

upon the Polish army

fell

latter retired,

in its

but Wrangel followed,

at the village of Gurzno, near Strasburg, it

to Thorn,

which place, however, he could

by the burdens of

Poles, severely oppressed

the war, earnestly desired peace, but Sigismund was ready to consent to

no more than a short truce even under the

pressure of the Brandenburg and

made

truce even was so

Dutch

ministers

as to be capable at

;

and

this

any time of being

broken.

Meanwhile an imperial army under Count Arnim,

of seven

thousan.d foot, two thousand horse and some artillery, was

api^roaching to aid the Poles.

Gustavus joined the Swedish

army

when Arnim made

in June, about the time

tion with Koniezpolski at Graudenz.

his junc-

As Sweden was

at

peace with the empire, this was a gratuitous act of war by the emperor;

it

interference in

was

really intended to retard the

Germany, and

it

accomplished

its

Swedish purpose.

There was a considerable body of Swedish horse at Marienwerder, and this the king

now

reinforced with foot to meet

the enemy's threat, sending at the same time a protest to

Wallenstein for his breach of the comity of nations.

Gustavus had eight thousand foot and Koniezpolski, with his deliver battle.

much

His plan was good, and might have been

dangerous to any one not watchful.

from Graudenz along the river purposing to bear Swedes.

thousand horse.

five

superior forces, determined to

off to

flats

On June

27 he marched

towards Marienwerder,

Stiihm and turn the

left flank of

But Gustavus had already concluded

the

to retire to

Marienburg, and his column was defiling along the Stuhm road.

So soon

as he

was instructed as

to Koniezpolski 's

march, he sent the rhinegrave with a body of eight himdred horse to protect the narrows between the lakes at Stuhm, so

V A MANCEUVRE LOST.

138

enemy from the marching column and make a long detour, and with strict orders not

as to head off the

them

oblige

to bring

to

on an engagement, but merely to occupy the enemy's

The enemy's

attention.

alry reached Honigfeld

cav-

the

;

king's orders were not obeyed,

and when he shortly arrived with the rear-gTiard

of

his

army, he found that the rhine-

had

grave into

attacked,

fallen

an ambuscade, and been

beaten with a loss of two hun-

dred men.

In his endeavor

combat

to sustain him, a hot

Gustavus

of cavalry ensued.

again was in the thick of the fray,

Stuhm

and narrowly escaped

A

death or capture.

Operation.

Polish

cavalryman seized him by the shoulder-belt, but

escaped.

Gustavus slipped

it

over his head and

His party was beaten back, but the

defile at

lost a

number

The from

f aidt

this

of

men,

had

flags

and guns.

lain with the landgrave

engagement that Gustavus'

always as watchful as

it

Stuhm

He had

was held, and the whole force regained Marienburg. but

it

appears

light cavalry

was not

;

should have been, or not always put

to proper use.

Perhaps the lack of enterprise on the part

of Koniezpolski

may have bred

this carelessness.

Nothing-

trains cavalry except an active enemy.

Gustavus' spirit was singularly

elastic.

Unable

to sit still

under defeat, he went again at the problem, and retrieved his disaster.

The enemy advanced

to

Nogat, really a part of the delta of the Vistula.

the

soon river

Gustavus

;

VICTORY AND TRUCE.

139

moved upon them, and in a sharj) and decisive encounter defeated them with a loss of four thousand men. Ti» details of the battle are not it is

known.

Some

historians ignore

it.

g^^t

manifest that the campaign did not end with a defea.of

The

the Swedes.

of Gustavus lies in the dispatches

government

many

sole evidence of

of the operation

from the army

to the

home

and the king's singular modesty of statement

;

much

robs the after-world of

it

ought to know.

to Oxenstiern about the battle of Breitenfeld

His

letter

might be the

There were no war-

description of a small cavalry combat.

correspondents in those days, and the Swedish officers were

making history

too busy with

to write

it.

Fancy a

our day in which the enemy forfeits four thousand thus lost to fame

!

battle in

men being

Triumphal columns are erected by some

nations to perpetuate battles where the loss has been but a

dozen

And

!

yet this

Many of the actions casualties ran

up

is

not without parallel in modern days.

about Petersburg in 1864 and 1865, where

into the thousands, are barely recorded with

name many outpost-combats where hundreds bit the dust known only as " the picket-fight of such a date." The ill-success of their late venture had a further tendency to make the Poles long for peace and the barbarous cona

;

are

;

duct of the troops of Arnim, a pestilence which broke out in the

camp

of the allies

bringing in supplies, the

and kept the country people from

growing fear of Gustavus, and the

dwindling prospect of success combined to make Sigismund

more

Negotiations were opened in August, 1629,

tractable.

and, under the influence of the French ambassador, were

ended in a at

nia

six years' truce.

Stuhmsdorf ;

;

and by

its

This was signed, on October

terms Sweden retained

Memel, Pillau and some other places

all

in ducal Prussia

Braunsberg, Tolkemit and Elbing in Polish Prussia. zig

5,

Livo-

Dan-

remained neutral, but by a separate treaty agreed to pay

GUSTAVUS' SCHOOLING.

140

two

Sweden

of ^*^ customs into Gustavus' treasury,

tliirr^

restorp^ the rest of Poland and Courland to Sigismund.

no peace should result from the

r'^se

in

^s

But

Marienburg

truce,

be again surrendered to Sweden, being meanwhile

to

neld by the elector of Brandenburg in trust.

was formally recognized as king,

—a

Gustavus

marked concession by

Sigismund. Richelieu truce

;

no doubt had weight

bringing about this

in

he was the last ounce in the scale

doubtful, even

if

;

but

it

scarcely

is

France had not acted as intermediary, that

He

Sigismund would have concluded peace.

and

his subjects

were exhausted by the war. Thus, after eight years, ended the early wars of Gustavus

The king had conducted

Adolphus.

six

campaigns against

Poland, and two against Denmai-k and Russia.

These cam-

paigns, not possessing the importance of his later ones, and

lacking a record of their remarkable features,

— for

it

is

often the details which show up the military ability displayed in a campaign,

— were

yet what trained Gustavus in the

habits of war, and permitted

him

to view the struggle in

Gei'many from a broader basis of experience practical school in

cunning his

it

army

task.

He

leader of

would

which he could teach

so soon

;

they were a

his right

hand the

need on the European stage, and

could be hardened into a body

fit

for

its

arduous

entered the Danish war a young and inexperienced

men

;

he emerged from the last Polish campaign

ready equipped to prove himself in the coming two years one of the world's great captains.

In these campaigns Gustavus had observed the practical

working of

his

new army

organization,

the then existing system of tactics

and learned a Jbtid

and

strategy.

He

was

enabled to gauge the advantages of his

own method, which,

the short remaining term of his

he moulded into what

life,

in

;

CAVALRY AND ARTILLERY. was the origin of the modern

141

— into what brought

art of war,

the world back to dispositions both intellectual and humane.

These campaigns had been conducted against different peoples,

— Danes, Russians, Poles, — and He

varied experience. ers

and armies, and

the king had gleaned

learned the habits of different lead-

own ways

strove to adapt his

to theirs.

His infantry underwent a good schooling against the large

and excellent forces of Russian and Polish cavalry, and learned to protect

itself

against this arm.

It

was swift on

the march, and steadier in defeat and victory than any imperial troops, even

if

no more stanch in battle than the Walloons of

His own cavalry the king had gradually im-

Father Tilly.

proved by imitating the Poles, and by adding discipline and ensemble to

There was superb horse on the other

it.

Black Brigade, for instance, under

Pappenheim good.

Had

but,

;

it

its

side, the

model cavalry

leader,

headed by the king, the Swedish was as

earlier

met the German

have held head against proved in organization,

it.

drill

cavalry,

it

Gustavus' artillery,

could not

much

im-

and technical knowledge, gave

a wonderful account of

itself.

He had

studied what the

Turks had done, and had

j)rofited

by their

errors.

got the biggest guns which could be cast

quicldy served, and accurate of aim.

and patterns

;

;

They had

he made his handy,

Theirs were of

all sizes

he reduced the matter to some sort of

There were heavy guns, needing port ; siege-guns,

much

smaller

;

scale.

thirty-six horses to trans-

and

and

field-guns, six-, four-

two-pounders, the latter being handled by one horse.

The

regimental four-pounder could be fired faster than a musket

and the leather cannon, originally adopted for weight, were driven out

by the monarch's

Swedish success was largely due

and ordnance

skill,

their small

light metal gun.

to technical engineering

which seconded the energy and ingenuity

infused by Gustavus into the armies under his control.

As

;

142

ACTION, ACTION, ACTION!''

'^

an engineer, he was far ahead of Wallenstein or

understood the value of field-works in their best sense engineer companies were numerous

works

to protect his

and by quickly

;

He

Tilly. ;

his

building-

men, he would stand on ground the

enemy would abandon.

Under Gustavus' watchful vice

had grown

medical attendance,

camp and

discipline,

field

garrison duty, reached a high grade.

extra exertion were recognized

manosuvres,

Energy and

luxury was discountenanced

;

The

the troops looked earnest, severe, but they were kindly. officers

to

had

all

work and

ser-

Equipment, arms, rationing,

and

drill

branch of the

eye, every

in efficiency.

served from the bottom up, and had learned

Promotion was by seniority and merit.

to obey.

Of

Justice was pronounced.

many Romanists

the

in the

Swedish ranks, none complained of unfair treatment.

As

in the little, so in the large.

country he entered with a

sucking out plaints,

its life-blood.

Gustavus treated each

eye to economics, instead of

strict

The popidation made no com-

and he could nourish and keep

his

men

together in

camp, when the enemy must disperse in cantonments, and run the risk of being destroyed before concentration. In the seventeen years Gustavus had been king, each campaign had added to the

army.

skill

and

There was no question of

any European army

efficiency of the

its

And

of its day.

Swedish

distinct superiority over chiefly

was

this

shown

in substituting the idea of mobility for the old idea of weight.

Speed was the watchword

of Gustavus' tactics

speed which won his victories. action, action

;

was

his

His motto was, "Action,

"

his generals

arch-leader

it

!

In these campaigns,

know

;

too, not

only had Gustavus learned to

and men, but they had gauged their mon-

and there had arisen that mutual confidence,

esteem and affection which only the great captain effectually

GUSTAVUS' MOTIVES. As

commands.

143

there was no clanger or labor which

their

general and king did not share, in which he did not bear an

equal part, so the Swedish army saw in him a harbinger of protection in disaster

victory, a sure

itself into

chief

every soldier in the army.

advantage which

ate the

and army gives

ever reaches

its fidl

;

Gustavus'

;

acter, bravery, religious ardor, honesty

own

char-

and humanity infused Nothing can exagger-

good understanding between

tliis

no leader who lacks the divine spark

measure.

In listening to the

last

appeal of the Protestants to under-

take their cause, Gustavus was actuated by faith in his gion,

by an honest sense of the dangers and needs of Sweden,

and by

which personal or national ambition had

feelings in

no foothold. remarks or ambition to

;

a

It is

task

difficidt

letters of the

to

twist even isolated

king into a semblance of personal

impossible, from the whole of his utterances,

is

it

deduce any ambition but that of serving his country and his

His address

country's God.

shows his mood

:

and must be met

"

great.

we must and

The Hapsburgs sires.

are threatening Sweden, It is a question of de-

The times

are bad, the danger

at the

unusual sacrifices and load

unite to bear.

It is

a fight for parents, for wife

all

house and hearth, for country and religion."

the people's answer was as full of courage and of mean-

ing as the king's address. old

1630 plainly

Let us not look

child, for

And

to the Estates in

instantly, stanclily.

fending the land of our is

reli-

Roman

burgess-blood

It

was

when

like the upswelling of the

the unparalleled disaster of

Cannae threatened the ^ate with annihilation uprising of the North disruption in 1861. viduals

bviilt

private broils

when

it

was

like the

Heavier taxes were wiUingly paid

and equipped

and

;

the nation was threatened with

vessels

;

every

man

;

indi-

laid aside his

griefs, stood shoulder to shoulder

and linked

hands with his neighbor for God, King and Fatherland.

THE SNOW KING.

144

— in a great but arrogant man, — with

The openly expressed opinion tain respect a measure of this

of

Wallen stein,

cer-

regard to the undertaking of the king of Sweden to lead the Protestant cause in Germany, was well shown in his boast that he would "drive the

rods

Snow King from Germany

with

;

if

he shoidd dare to show his face there " and Ferdi-

nand, puffed up with his wonderful successes, echoed the opinion with "

we ?

:

"

So we have got a new

But Wallenstein knew

better, if

little

enemy, have

Ferdinand did

not.

His private correspondence and statements show a clear appreciation of the danger which the arrival of Gustavus

threatened to his carefully erected structure.

tavus there,

might find

d

Alone, Wal-

Germany as its strongest warrior with Gushe knew that he had a rival, he feared that he

lenstein ruled

;

his master.

^

Albanese Horseman.'

XII.

JANUARY TO JUNE,

THE SWEDISH PERIOD BEGINS. 1630.

In twelve years (1618

No

to 1630)

the emperor liad overrun all Germany.

one had been found to hold head to Wallenstein and Tilly, and the Protes-

tants turned in despair to Gustavus. pion, aside,

was a wrecked cause he was

defensive or an offensive

of

;

Though he placed

and people.

he had no personal ambition

Sweden and

too

of Protestantism,

;

much

raised

was a busy

of the king were

he proposed to protect the interests

— and what

Sweden needed was sea.

" a " bastion

The winter

Munitions were collected, taxes equalized, troops

one.

and equipped under the new system, and seventy-six thousand men

were placed under arms, of

many.

the

reliance on the Protes-

The motives

on the south shore of the Baltic, to enable her to control that of 1629-30

rise of

lists.

tant princes, his general calculations were just.

honorable

cham-

Whether Sweden should conduct a war was promptly settled by the king, sustained

Gustavus entered the

his Estates

to

Happily Wallenstein was put

aid.

and France was ready to pay money to check the dangerous

Hapsburgs.

by

It

and none of the Powers lent active

whom

thirteen thousand were destined for Ger-

This number the king expected to double by recruitment there, for the

emperor had at

least one

him was a mere nucleus

hundred thousand men.

for accessions

Before tlie beginning many was about equally and Catholic princes

;

What

from the German

of

tlie

Gustavus took

witli

princes.

Thirty Years' War, Ger-

divided

between

the

Protestant

and when the former took up arms,

the emperor's authority extended over not more than half of

the territory which

is

comprised between the Rhine and the

Oder, the Alps and the Baltic. years of war (1618-1630)

At

the expiration of twelve

the entire territory

named had

been overrun by the imperial forces, save only the free towns of the north, Stettin

and the

fortress

of Stralsund.

The

/

;

GERMANY COWED.

146

Protestants had begun the war with encouraging prospects

now

they were

come

to

disunited and cowed.

was under these con-

It

from many sources entreaties reached Gustavus

ditions that

to the rescue of his brothers in the faith

these conditions which the

monarch faced

it

;

was

becoming the

in

champion of Protestantism. Gustavus had for

was

action

at least

two years foreseen that he must

German

take a hand in the

fully determined

imbroglio

;

early in 1629 such

but when, in 1630, he finally

;

appeared upon the scene, he was called on to contemplate so

wrecked a cause, that the boldest soldier with inexhaustible resources would scarce have cared to face

with

almost

alone,

Sweden

at his back,

the

it

good-will of

sole

while he stood

;

poverty-stricken

and the very men who most ardently

besought his aid were the ones who afforded him the least

He had

assistance. if

notv.^

public.

no earne st

France was uncertain, for though Kichelieu was

and tenderecTsubsidies,

of Austria

method aijdr-ilfeultimate aim were not those

England could not be

vus.

neutral

enemy^though.XIlltistiaii jDroffered friendship in

bound on the destruction his

Denmark was

al lies.

of Gusta-

Hol land jtliough the

relied on.

states-general approved its attitiide,-JKa.s---^e*4o«s-u3£ZSweden's

prestige in tlieBaltic,

and was ready

matter from purely commercial motives, Gustavus' defeat as

Hamburg

much

as

by

hand

to take a

— ready

in the

to gain

by

Liibeck and

his victories.

limited their helpfulness to trading silver for the

The dukes

army-chest against Swedish copper.

of

Pomera-

nia and Mecklenburg tendered assistance indeed, as well as the

margrave

of

Baden, the administrator of Magdeburg

and Landgrave William

much

this

meant.

of

Hesse

and Bethlen Gabor was dead. throw

;

but we shall see

And meanwhile Poland was

itself heartily into the scale

how

bitter as gall,

Not a power was ready ;

the

German

to

princes were

"

FERDINAND MASTER. at odds

fortune

among themselves and cowed by overwhelmingand while the Hanse towns had armed to proW

;

themselves, they cared not to aid Protestantism for any but selfish motives.

Money was

The one thing

their god.

Gustavus' favor was that the grasping

in

measures of Ferdinand had for some time excited the gravest

among even

discontent cruelties

the Catholic jirinces

;

that the savage

and ruthless devastation of the war had exasperated

the Protestants and roused the horror of Europe. tates looked with distrust

imperial ambition liberties of

of

;

for Austria

Germany.

power lead him

?

now had

;

On

the other hand, most of the Prot-

had accepted the emperor's

some of them, led by personal motives, were

with him

A

ing.

at her feet the very

Whither might not Ferdinand's greed

estant princes, to save themselves,

sway

All poten-

upon the growing manifestations of

;

in accord

others again sought protection in a neutral bear-

mere handful, notably the dukes of Hesse-Cassel

and Brunswick-Liineburg, as well as the free towns of the Hanseatic League,

still

maintained a bold front of opposi-

while Stralsund had held her

tion,

own with

the aid of a

Swedish garrison, and Magdeburg had stood a siege by Wallenstein.

But with these few brave exceptions, Germany had

bowed her head

to the

stroke,

showing neither power nor

will to withstand the imperial dictation, or to fight for her

religion or independence.

man

Ferdinand was master.

princes would probably have gone over to

body, had they not feared his future policy. entire matter in his grasp.

nand and

But no man

is

foolishly quarreled with his electors

lost their loyal support, while the

The Gerhim in a

He had

all-wise

;

on a side

the

Ferdiissue,

Edict of Eestitution,

issued in March, 1629, completed the break-up of confidence.

Not only were none of the other European powers anxious to come to Germany's assistance, but none of them were pre-

y^v-^

FRANCE AND SWEDEN. .

do

to

for once

were

so.

drew her

still

England was busy with

intestine disquiet,

end of the year made peace with Spain, which

-^ in the

closer to the

The Netherlands

Hapsburgs.

war with Spain, and the

at

last thing they

wanted

was an inroad by the victorious armies of Wallenstein, Tilly or Pappenheim.

not the

so,

Spain herself was Hapsburg, and were she

she had, in addition to the war in the Netherlands,

Mantuan imbroglio

into peace,

in Italy.

Denmark had been

and then bought into neutrality for a

beaten

price,

and

Christian was morbidly jealous of Gustavus, and ready to

do anything underhand

to

thwart his plans.

were an uncertain element.

The Turks

Brandenburg had sent troops

to Poland,

and had scarcely forgiven Gustavus' foray on her

territory.

Saxony

resist

bound by her oath

felt

to the

armed aggression, while John George, the

intent on peace at

any

price.

The

emperor to elector,

was

other Protestant princes in

means beyond power

Only France and Sweden remained.

Though France had

were either frightened or reduced to help.

at first inclined towards the emperor, or at least towai'ds the

League and Bavaria, when matters took too decided a turn in Ferdinand's favor. Cardinal Richelieu

clearly

saw that

political gain lay in aiding the Protestants, so as to

the

power

of

Austria

openly enter the

lists

;

weaken

but as Catholic France could not

on behalf of Protestantism, Richelieu

preferred to use his influence with Sweden to take up the cause, relying for eventual results

upon the location and

healthy condition of the Swedish nation and the proven ents of

its

tal-

king.

The two marked

features of

European

politics of the

day

were thus Austria's aggressiveness, and the change of the foreign policy of France. It

was not

difficult to

induce Gustavus to enter into this

1^

HEALTHY NATION.

A

^^Hplan.

^^Bthe

The Swedes,

in

149

opinion, needed a "bastion" on

liis

southern shore of the Baltic in order to maintain their

^^^Kupremacy on this sea and Stralsund was just that. But ^^Hpustayus' demands were at first deprngrl to Q hioh hy Frmir'P ^^^tle asked a considerable lump sum down and six hund red ;

thou"Sand

rix~7Iollars

a year as

This Richelieu

subsidy.

decline d, thoughThis o'ene ral course remai ned hejjjj

he eventually came to Gustavus' terms.

Sweden was

neither a populous nor a rich country.

numbered but a million and a half

of souls,

budget ran up to not exceeding twelve million rix

^\t she made up matei'ial

in a great degree for this

resources

her

tried

war against Denmark, Russia and Poland;

anil the genius of its king, sustained

of Jiis people,

of

and particularly her

Th e army had been

rwiarkable military organization. ijiits eight years'

dollars.

weakness in

by the simplicity and strength

people, her well-regulated government

She

and her annual

and coupled

by the love and devotion

to the strong Prntp^stant spntim pnt

made Gustavus a noteworthy champion. Many reasons weighed with Sweden and the king. That the emjDeror lljid sent an army to help the king of Poland against him of the nation,

v/hile

he was at peace with the empire

;

that the Swedish

^fjmbassy had been thrust from the congress at

LUbeck and

heaped with contumely, ranlded deeply in Gustavus' nature. Sensible, frank

and generous, he was yet

relating to his dignity,

and prompt

sensitive in matters

to resent

any affront

to

Sweden. The oppressions of the Pr(5testants appealed strongly to botii

BwedeJn

king and nation.

now

that

was ambitious

to

Danger unquestionably threatened

Germany had succumbed, and Gustavus show that

his country

was not a cipher

in

the religious and political complications of Europe.

\yhen the question came up as

to

whether Sweden should

wage a defensive war within her own borders, or an

offensive

OFFENSIVE OR DEFENSIVE?

150

war

in

Germany, many

o£ the

inclined to the former view,

The emperor,

Oxenstiern.

more conservative statesmen notably the prime minister,

said he,

had one hundred and

sixty thousand veteran troops, while Protestant Germany was

How could Sweden

exhausted. lists

with her small army enter the

against such a host, and without aid?

Better spend

strong fleet and hold the south shore of the Baltic.

money on a

Oxenstiern's idea was perhaps not a mere inert defensive, for

he was willing to argue the other plan

but he proposed

;

any offensive which might be undertaken

to conduct

to the

and to remain strictly on the defensive in The king gave many reasons against this. His

east of the Oder,

Pomerania.

idea was merely to observe the country to the east of the Oder,

and

to resort to a stout offensive in north

Germany.

Sweden,

he argued, could count more than Oxenstiern would allow on the aid of the Protestant princes and free towns of if

once upon

its

soil.

Germany,

The Hanse towns, which had held a

convention at Liibeck in November, 1629, where they had

now sought alliance with powers, and had made efforts to secure

agreed to arm for mutual defense, the several Protestant the aid of Sweden.

had made a bid for the Hanse towns by

lenstein

which

Stralsvmd must not be forsaken.

failing,

had shown the

he had attacked Stralsund by force. ability of the free

towns to defend themselves,

Magdeburg had proven her

ready to

German

fleet.

less

An

offensive

war

now

to hold the

Germany woidd

in

soil

for her people of the atrocities of such a

its

militia

and

;

cost

and the saving

war

as

was being

The

defens.^ of

fleet, if

a Swedish

waged on the mainland was a manifest duty. well be left to

grow

and prevent the emperor from

than the defense of her own

Sweden could

to

All were

stanchness.

was imperative for Sweden

coast of the Baltic,

building a

Sweden

It

aid.

flattery,,

This city

and no time must be given for the idea of defense cold.

Wal-

THE KING'S PLAN. dangerous thing of

Should he once become absolute

all.

Germany, the emperor could no longer be con-

master in trolled,

Delay was the most

the emperor in Germany.

army opposed

151

and Sweden would be

danger than ever.

in greater

In order to feel the pulse of the nation, the king convened in

Upsala eleven of the leading Swedish senators

mature

and on

;

by the king, these men

discussioii of the case presented

unanimously agreed that an offensive in Germany was the wiser course.

In the event, Gusta"sais was mistaken in his reliance on the willingness or aoility of the Protestant princes of Ger-

many

to lend their aid

he had gauged them at too high a

;

by

value, for they proved \o be controlled selfish

interests rather than

or their country.

estimates

;

for in

their fears or their

by the good

of their religion

But he was not mistaken

in his financial

1632 the war consumed only one sixth of

the Swedish revenue.

The

plan was comprehensive

king's

and he never

;

lost

Unless he controlled the Baltic,

sight of the value of the sea.

he had no base whatsoever, and what he proposed was quite as

much

army, as

to equip a big it

Swedish fleet and a

was merely

had no value without a powerful Swedish

saw more plainly than the king

dominium maris

Swedish

That a base on the

and there conduct a land campaign. Baltic

fair-sized

Swedish forces in Germany

to land

;

for years he

fleet

had

no

man

striven for

Baltici.

Gustavus' motives in undertaking this war have been the subject of grave discussion

and much disagreement.

not be alleged that they were purely religious, that solely as the

much.

But

It canit

was

champion

of Protestantism that he risked so

may be

honestly claimed that he had no per-

it

sonal ambition to subserve.

He was by

Viking, a species of colonizing fighter

;

birth

and nature a

but he neither sought

WAS GUSTAVUS AMBITIOUS?

152

Sweden

foreign conquest nor foreign gold. lustful for both

his fatherland,

but Gustavus strove

;

first

later

became over

for the defense of

and next for the defense of his

empire with himself as

ruler

its

;

but there

evidence to sustain this view, while there

testimony to controvert

No monarch

it.

is

He

religion.

German

has been accused of seeking to create a Protestant is

no tangible

a multitude of

ever had a more

intimate friend and confidant than Gustavus possessed in Axel

Oxenstiern, his chancellor, trusted advis'3r and one of his able generals

more

;

subject first

Many years

grew

the Baltic coast

"

:

whom

to the

With

this land

was

to contain

and

possible to endure,

He

view

it

was that he

later one with

it

first

was then

Russia with regard to

Then he attacked

the

emperor, and demanded as war-indemnity from the

Pomerania

whom

to

and Mecklenburg.

become

Roman

German

imperial lands should be given in exchange,

clij)ped of all territory

was

con-

took the coast and river mouths from Poland

seizing the lucrative customs.

princes, to

Sweden,

Great Belt and the lands abutting

this in

cluded a peace with Denmark, as favorable as

by

when the

he harbored the idea of some day becoming

;

Norway, Denmark

the Baltic.

truth was

King Gus :avus Adolphus wanted

emperor of Scandinavia, and

Baltic.

in

after Gustavus' death,

into a controversy, Oxenstiern wrote in a

private communication

on the

man

nor was there ever a

ingrained.

ours.

down

It

Denmark was

to the

also

to

be

Great Belt, and Norway

was on these

lines that this great

king intended to construct an independent kingdom. that, as the saying goes, he desired to be

But

German emperor

is

not true."

So unbounded was the confidence of king had

little

difficulty in

people, the Estates

He

his subjects that the

impressing his opinion on the

and ministry, and shortly the work began.

opened negotiations with the anti-Hapsburg peoples.

He

SWEDISH PREPARATIONS. Ms

appointed

153

Count John Casimir,

brother-in-law,

his repre-

sentative in Sweden, commissioned to act with the advice of

the council and of Field-Marshals de la Gardie and Wrangel.

He made

arrangements for internal government for a

long-

absence, leaving explicit instruction as to land administration, recruiting

and

He

future.

accumidated present moneys and

He

accompany the army. built a

number

new

ordered

He

on the coast opposite Denmark.

and

and war material for the

taxes, loans, victual

suj^plies

to

fortresses to be built

strengthened his fleet

of transports.

There were great preparations in Sweden during the winter of 1629-30.

The

nitre

and sulphur works were kept busy

shipping to the powder-mills at

Naka and Watinge.

Calcu-

were made for furnishing a ton and a half of powder

lations

per regiment per month, and about

fifty cartridges

per man,

plus twenty-four hundred pounds of lead and thirty-six hun-

dred pounds of match punk, of which the consumption was necessarily large.

driven

;

The armories

in all parts of

and armor, helmets, partisans,

Sweden were

pikes, spades

and picks

were turned out by government and by private firms.

regiment was to have issued to

it five

Each

hundred and seventy-six

muskets and bandoliers, four hundred and thirty-two

sets of

armor, four hundred and thirty-two pikes and one thousand

and eight helmets and swords. tisans

were issued to the three

In addition, forty-eight par-

and three non-commis-

officers

sioned officers of each of the eight companies, and sixteen

drums

to the regiment.

In order to equalize taxes so that the aristocracy should not escape, a mill-tax, or tax on corn, had been laid in 1625 in

1627

it

was changed

war-tax was added.

to a poll-tax

The income

in

;

and now,

in 1630,

;

a

1630 was about twelve

million rix dollars, of which three fourths was spent on the

war

;

but in 1631 and 1632 the cost ran down to

five

and a

FORCES RAISED.

154

and two and a fourth million and foreign subsidies began to help

rix dollars

half

The

German

out.

clergy preached the cause as heartily as the recruiting

enforced

officers

it.

All males from sixteen to sixty must

report at the local rendezvous, and those

holders or rest,

for

;

who worked

for

wages were

man was drawn by

each tenth

who were not houseOf the

first enrolled.

lot

from those between

eighteen and thirty, excepting miners, especially in the nitre

and sulphur mines, and manufacturers of arms and ammuniOnly one son was taken from a family a man having tion. ;

On

no sons was excused. were made

out,

much

enlistment, papers in triplicate

and the men were subse-

as with us,

The

quently mustered in companies.

trooi>s

assembled at

Kalmar, Elfsnabben and other places for shipment rendezvous, in

to general

May, 1630.

Arrangements had been made for raising men abroad as

Kniphausen and Spens were recruiting to

well as at home.

good

effect in

no luck.

England

Many

Falkenberg, in the Netherlands, had

recruits were got

diers of the late

and Danzig.

;

from the mustered-out

Danish war, and

in

sol-

Brandenburg, Poland

In June, 1629, Colonel Morton arrived with

two regiments of Scotchmen. In the conquered towns of Livonia and Prussia there were twelve thousand men.

still

These were

under Oxenstiern, who recruited them up

a reserve

left as

to twenty-one thou-

Six thousand more, under Leslie, wei-e in Stralsund

sand.

and on the island

of Eiigen.

Leslie was active in recruiting,

and the Hanse towns furnished a few men.

By

the early

months of 1630 there had been organized an army of seventysix

thousand men, of which forty-three thousand were Swedes

and

in the fleet

were three thousand more.

thirteen thousand were destined for

Germany,

Of to

;

this total,

which were

added, by reinforcements during 1630, twenty-three hundred

COST PER MAN. men from Sweden,

155

twenty-eight hundred from Finland, two

thousand from Livonia, thirteen thousand six hundred fi'om Prussia,

and the

six

thousand garrison of Stralsund, an aggre-

gate of about forty thousand men.

den sixteen thousand men,

in

left in

Swe-

Finland six thousand

five

hundred, in the Baltic provinces seven thousand six hundred,

The mated

—

five

thousand, in Prussia

thirty-five

cost of the forty thousand at eighteen

There were

men

men in all. Germany was esti-

thousand

in

hundred thousand rix dollars a year, or

forty-five rix dollars per

This 'amount varied during

man.

Gustlvus' reign from forty-one and one third to fifty-two rix

man

dollars per class of

Cheap enough

per year.

men, and the Swedes were of the

service for

any

best.

Gustavus had no doubt that he would receive considerable accessions from the friendly princes of

Germany

;

and men

from the disbanded armies of Mansfeld and Brunswick,

was believed, only waited

The armies

large squads.

mustered

teen thousand

But

men

body

substantial

of

Denmark and Poland,

would furnish abundant

out,

it

his arrival to join his standard in lately

His

recruits.

thir-

woidd, he calculated, be increased to a

so soon as he placed foot

on German

soil.

as against the seventy-five thousand aggregate on Gus-

tavus' muster-rolls, of

which he led but thirteen thousand

Germany, Wallenstein and which

easily reached a

hundred thousand men.

Gustavus issued no formal declaration of war. on his

ally,

sive one.

Stralsund,

But

to

Tilly were yet afoot, with armies

made

the

war appear

to

The him a

certain negotiations between the king

emperor, which Gustavus well

knew would come

attack defen-

and the

to nothing,

were carried on for a while through the intermediation of Christian of

Denmark.

Stettin, the capital of

Pomerania,

was being threatened by the imperial army, and Gustavus felt that

he must save the town.

He was

ready to

sail

from

'

FINAL ARRANGEMENTS.

156

Elfsnabben, whither

end

of

the troops were forwarded, by the

all

May, but adverse winds kept him

in port three weeks.

His forces were embarked on two hundred transports, pro-

by thirty men-of-war. The mouths of the Oder were to be the point of debarkation, and Gustavus had made himself familiar with every rood tected

From

of the country.

this point

he proposed to

treat with, the cities

sund, and especially Stettin, and

make

latter place,

up the Oder.

The general plan was

had

Pomerania had never been comfort to the imperialists

by

his base sti'ong

fully

upon the conditions

to wait

or

from whence he could advance

a depot at the

details

seize,

along the coast on either side of Stral-

;

worked out

of the

the

;

moment.

and had given aid and

friendly,

but when the news came that

Gustavus would probably land on her shores, Duke Bogislav, a very old man, sent an embassy to Gustavus to pray him not to

make a

sedes belli on his territory.

without mincing words, that on their

He

self within

attitude

depended

Germans when he should have reached

his conduct to the

their shores.

Gustavus answered,

own

should

sail for

Pomerania, establish him-

her borders, and use her as by her future acts she

deserved to be used.

Before embarking, the king issued a proclamation appointing three days of public fasting and prayer for the success of the cause.

After making

all

arrangements for the government of his

kingdom, Gustavus' three-year-old daughter Christina was accepted as his heir

king

and

left the

to all

;

to her all

fatherland in

Swedes swore

fealty,

May, 1630, on what was

the world a holy mission,

— to

indeed, but never to return.

\

and the to

him

accomplish

it,

XIII.

GUSTAVUS LANDS IN GERMANY. JUNE TO AUGUST, GusTAVUS

Usedom and

camped

in

it

Oderburg, near by.

and

take, wliile the

to

ToUense

secure,

fortified.

As

communication between Stralsund,

and Gustavus

set to

work

to extend

blockade the places along the coast which he could not

enemy strengthened

The king

to preserve his neutrality, took

Every place taken was strongly

rest of the coast, the

and East Prussia was not

his holding,

Occupying

upon which a favorable treaty was made, and the Swedes

;

enemy held the

force.

and landed at the mouth o£ the Oder without

Wollin, he set his fleet to cruise along the coast, advanced on

and garrisoned

Stettin

30,

imperial generals retiring to Garz and Anklam.

and though Duke Bogislav sought

Stettin,

the

May

sailed

opposition, the

1630.

first

in his front

;

Garz, and there

encamped the bulk

of their

intended to secure his foothold and the line of the

but while so operating, the enemy took Clempenow and Oxenstiern, from

Pasewalk, massacred the garrisons, and seized the Tollense.

who kept steadily at work Magdeburg declared in favor of the

East Prussia, was pushing out towards the king,

making firm

his standing

on the coast

;

Swedes, and Colonel Falkenberg was sent thither to take command.

The

troops were

embarked June

9,

1630

;

and

after a delay

of three weeks, waiting for a favorable wind, the fleet set sail

with

its

weather

burden

further retarded

still

Stockholm

;

so precious to Protestant its

Germany.

progress in the open off

a stormy passage ensued, during which the ship-

ping beat about several days, and was with together

;

Heavy

but

it

finally

made

difficulty

kept

land, and anchored July

4 in

the lee of the island of Riigen, close to Usedom, near the

mouth

of the

Peene River.

The two hundred

men-of-war had aboard six thousand

sailors,

transports

and

ninety-two com-

panies of foot, one hundred and sixteen companies (half-

squadrons) of horse, and eight hundred guns of

Denmark had

recently

made

efforts to

all calibres.

purchase the island

;

THE LANDING.

158

of Riigen, an acquisition which would have

the mouth

of the

Oder

made a base

at

For some

quite insecure for Sweden.

time the imperialists had held the bulk of the island, of which a large part belonged to the city of Stralsund essential to clear the coast,

that

it

and

;

On March

Eiigen should be recaptured.

took the island of Hiddensee, and garrisoned

hundred men

;

as

it

was

was determined by Gustavus

it

13 Leslie with three

on the 29th he put over troops to Riigen, and

captured the works at the several landing-places out of hand.

The

imperialists tried in vain to eject the Swedes,

and

at the

end of April retired wholly from Riigen, except a garrison

hundred men

of three

one of the

in

/«

likewise

mS

the Swedes.

The imperial

man

and

equally

which on June 7

Riigen was thus secured to

fell.

cruel

forts,

general, Torquato

Conti, a

even among the wolves of that day, incompetent, was at Anklam,

twenty miles to the south. heard of the

fleet

So soon

as he

being sighted, he sent de-

tachments to light

fires

along the beach,

hoping Gustavus would believe that a large

was on hand.

But the ruse

hostile

force

failed

Conti lost his best chance of dealing

;

the Swedes a hearty blow as they landed, and his

The Landingplace.

parties retired

from the

coast.

Boats,

ordered some time before by Gustavus, were

on hand under control of his own

officers

;

the king headed the landing parties, and the troops were

disembarked on Usedom.

when he reached

As

Africa, so

Caesar

is

said to have fallen

Gustavus, on landing here,

stumbled on the gang-plank, and slightly injured his knee not recorded to have turned the matter into an

but he

is

omen.

The Swedish blood flowed

too calmly to need such

;

LACK OF RATIONS.

On

adventitious aid.

putting foot on shore, he knelt and

up unaffected prayer

offered

159

;

then seized a spade, and began

himself the \/ork of intrenching a line to cover the landing. It took

two days

sively set to

to

work

disembark

new ones were drawn of

the companies were succes-

;

an old line of defenses was occupied

;

up, and soon the

first

intrenchments

Peenemiinde, which place was included in the Victual issued to the

were completed.

consumed

men had been mostly

and passage

in tho long delay

circuit,

;

provisions

had

been ordered to be collected in Stralsund, but the king found

on hand only a small supply.

It

was not an encouraging

beginning.

Gustavus was wont to speak his mind

;

and for

this lack

of provision he roundly held to task John Skytte, to

he had committed the business

;

whom

he moreover sent urgent

dispatches to Oxenstiern, in Prussia, to hurry forward supplies

;

and feehng reasonably

secure,

on July 28 he sent

six

men-of-war and thirty-six other vessels to the chancellor for their transportation.

Further to protect from inroads the coast already occupied,

Gustavus ordered a suitable naval force to cruise between

Two

Travemiinde and Riigen.

days after landing, he took

twelve hundred musketeers and a small body of horse, and started out southerly towards the region oj)posite

reconnoitre the country. imperialists

had

Arrived

built a fort

there, he

Wolgast

on the island to protect the

Reconnoitring the rear of the fort from the

ing.

and sending back for a force the horse which

to

found that the

of four thousand

crosswater*,

men, and

all

had already got mounted, Gustavus prepared

to take the place

;

but the imperial garrison retired to the

mainland.

On fort,

July 11 Gustavus

left

a thousand musketeers in the

and with three thousand foot and twenty-five hundred

FIRST OPERATIONS.

160

horse set out to sweep imperialists

Usedom

to

had

built

WoUin

Usedom

two

clear of the enemy.

forts to protect the passage

across the Swine inlet.

approach the garrison

fled over to

The from

Oi\ the Swedes'

WoUin, burned

its

boats

Oder-Elbe Country.

and the WoUin defenses, and island. lin,

Gustavus managed

garrisoned the fort, and

as the

Divenow

inlet,

ing the bridge across

retired

to

the back of the

to get boats, put across to

made

Wol-

after the fugitives as far

but was too late to prevent their burnit.

Having thus secured the mouths

of the Oder, the king returned to headquarters in Usedom.

ADVANCE ON STETTIN.

161

No, sooner landed than Gustavus incorporated in his army five thousand of the garrison of Stralsund. He had made

good prOaress

for not only did his possession of Stralsund,

;

Usedom and Wollin

secure the mouths of the Oder, but it a''mosfc certain claim to Stettin, the capital of Pomerania, sfdl 15. the ha'nds of Duke Bogislav. The entire

gave him an

coast of north Germ., xy^ g;ave Stralsund, the island of

what

Gustavuj^.

Eugen, was held, however, by Happily, Wallenstein was away, and no one

had tak ^ ^ and

the imperialists.

made any

sensible effort to .irrest the

Pomerania Stettin, It

Stettin,

from

divided

is

in 00

its position,

was a natural

had been besieged by the

General Savelli

Swedish advance.

two parts by the Oder, and capital of the duchy.

imperialists, but without success.

comitry southeast of Stralsund while Conti was on the west bank of the Oder. When the v/as in the

imperial generals saw that the Swedes had actually

they retired, Savelli to

Garz on the

left

Anklam and

iccnf|g(]

Conti up the Oder to

and Greifenhagen on the right bank.

This

gave Gustavus a chance to thrust himself in between the two parts,

and he made arrangements

to

advance on Stettin.

In April, before leaving Sweden, the king had sought to influence this well-fortified city in his behalf,

seen that Stettin had stoutly defended rialists.

While Conti was

Colonel Leslie in

lax,

command

itself

against the impe-

Gustavus was

of Wollin,

dom, and both under Kniphausen,

to

and we have

active.

He

Kagg of Usewhom was committed

General

the general supervision of the territory so far taken detailed officers to patrol the

landing-places

Usedom near

;

left

;

he

coast to secure all possible

and went in person to the southern

jjart of

the Swine, to collect boats on which to ship a

suitable force for

an advance on

Stettin.

On

July 18 he had

seventy-four companies, eight thousand seven hundred and

twenty-three men, ready to be shipped.

On

July 19 they

WANT OF

162

were put aboard such

Stettin

number, as were

vessels, tifty-one in

up the

of suitable draught to sail

made

SUPPORT.

rivjiK,

—

Kext day

ttie fleet

by noon, and Gustavus landed part of the troops near the rustle of Oder-

burg Ijelow, wV.jre he took up a goodi

On'3

Evar

-

posi^^ jn.

w

'il
jlical

exp«3ct to see the

powe rs of Germany

unit^' to receive

Gustavus with

Nothing shows their

ope^i arms.

supmeiicss uiore than the fact

and

only

save

that,

this

garrison,

Stralsund,

was held by

— not

a

his

city,

—

own

not a

prince, not a circle, did aught to

welcome the champion they

had

called.

Every one waited

how

his perilous under-

to see Stettin.

taking would result, before committing himself to the Swedish monarch's support.

an

ill

beginning

;

It

was

had not Gustavus been of a buoyant nature,

he might have faltered now

Pomerania would

have

;

but worse was yet to come. liked

to

remain

neutral,

and

Bogislav tried his old tactics to influence the Swedes to leave

him the to

so

;

but Gustavus would none of

commander

of Stettin,

admit the Swedes

if it

;

who was

under orders of the duke, declined

He

sent a

in the habit of recognizing messages

The

colonel

on the

drummer

flotilla

as bearer

speedily turned back with answer that

Damitz shoidd come himself, as the king

rank.

Colonel Damitz,

in fact, threatened to fire

should approach closer.

of a message,

it.

of

Sweden was not

from men of regimental

came with some ambassadors from the

duke, but they had no authority to allow the occupation of

THE ''WHITE BRIGADE." the city

:

nor was any headway made until the king told

Bogislav in so held, that he

many

words, at an interview which was shortly

would countenance no neutrality on the part of

the Germans, and that he had

take Stettin by force "

he tolerate delay.

if

made

suitable arrangements to

not willingly yielded.

Every procrastinator

is

Neither would not a Fabius,"

Gustaviis already divined that the anticipated Ger-

said he.

man

163

support would not be forthcoming, and he proposed to

handle this lethargic temperament without gloves.

Stettin

was given up.

The Swedish

troops,

owing perhaps

to the lateness of the

hour on that day, did not march into Stettin through the city gates, but

through some incomplete defenses, and took formal

possession on July 20.

As

the imperial forces were gather-

ing near by at Garz, Gustavus woidd not prejudice his position

by a minute's

A treaty

loss of time.

was concluded by which Swedish influence was

made predominant

in all matters,

commercial and

political,

and three thousand men of the Pomeranian rarrison of Stettin,

under Damitz, were taken into the Swedish service

as the "

White Brigade."

The

city of Stettin

They proved to be

three companies of the Swedish guard.

sum sway

of

excellent troops.

was garrisoned by three regiments and

Having paid a goodly

money, Bogislav was permitted to resume nominal

The

in Pomerania.

real

control

remained with the

Swedes.

This acquisition of Stettin was a vast gain for Gustavus, and

an equal detriment

to Ferdinand.

been got without the his base of operations,

So

man.

loss of a

far the foothold

had

Gustavus had secured

and there shortly came an accession of

troops from Prussia, from disbanded

men who had served with

Mansfeld or under the Danish

and from other

The

flag,

conditions were such that a

man

sources.

could earn his bread as

;

CAREFUL ADVANCE.

164

a soldier with greater safety from the perils of war than as a

many sought

farmer, and

refuge in the ranks.

five

These new

army up

enrollments ran the effective of Gustavus'

to twenty-

thousand men.

After having thus yielded to Gustavus, Bogislav could scarcely

make

his peace with the emperor,

though he with

good right claimed that the imperial troops had abandoned him.

Pomerania was pronounced

and the

rebellious,

of the imperial forces were redoubled, a fact which

cruelties

added

to

Gustavus' welcome as a possible deliverer.

About

this time there are said to

to assassinate the

Catholics

;

have been several attempts

Swedish king, prompted by fanatical

Roman

but such matters have no special interest for us

here.

Gustavus' habit was to secure his every step.

A notable

engineer, he put his knowledge into daily practice. in lamentable condition,

was

at once taken in hand,

Stettin,

and

fortifications strengthened according to the best art.

had been ordered

to

its

Leslie

do the like by Stralsund, as well as to

fortify Bergen, the chief city of Kiigen, to restore the

works

at the ferry, to erect forts at several important places, to

make

strong the

camp

in a state of

at Peenemiinde,

and

WoUin and Cammin

on Usedom.

to fortify all the villages

opposite were to be placed

good defense the Divenow ;

and the bridge

to the

mainland

to

be

to

be held by redoubts

rebuilt,

and strengthened

with a bridge-head.

The works

of Stettin were extended to

with trenches, redoubts and well-devised

burg was erected a large camp. entire laboring population, the

and the army quartered ments

beyond Oderburg,

lines,

and near Oder-

In four days, by using the

work was

substantially done,

there, except the three garrison regi-

in the town.

Gustavus had brought only foot

to Stettin.

The cavalry

—

SECURING EACH STEP. thirteen companies under Colonel Teiiffel to follow with one thousand musketeers,

The march

at Wollin.

— had been ordered by way

of the bridge

was somewhat delayed

;

Gustavus, growing anxious, sent out a scouting party to

and see

of Teuffel

165

what had become

officer

who

of the column.

deserted,

and gave the enemy

to gather

;

party was an

tliis

He now

all

the news he had been able

but though the imperialists broke up on July 23,

to intercept Teuffel, this officer

camp

In

had formerly been an imperialist.

headed them

off

and reached

in safety.

To

celebrate

successful

worthily his

landing Gustavus

appointed July 23 as a day of prayer, and

was duly

it

observed throughout the army.

While

is

it

true that Gustavus

himself on the Oder, there was

still

had strongly established a deal

imperialists held the whole country into

The

be desired.

left to

which he had

they extended in a huge semicircle

thus driven a wedge

;

around his position at

Stettin,

from Colberg on the

east,

which

was held by a big detachment, to Wolgast on the west, where troops were assembling lished above Stettin, at to

or

while the

;

camp which they had

estab-

Garz and Greifenhagen, allowed them

—

say Politz, make a diversion on any point along the Oder from which they might cut off the mouth of the Ihna

—

the Swedes from Stralsund and the Peenemiinde camp.

The town point

of

Damm,

commanding the

opposite Stettin, was an important

east branch of the Oder.

On

Gustavus sent Count Brahe with his squadron to place

;

and

this

drew within the Swedish

seize the

lines the entire

stream and the mouth of the Plone River. fort

July 22

As an

outpost a

was begun between Stettin and Garz, and large

were accumulated in Stettin.

Damitz was

stores

told off to take

Stargard, which capitulated after a short struggle.

and Greif enberg were shortly after taken

Oder

;

Treptow

Damitz

seized

A CLEVER OPERATION.

166

Sazig in the beginning of August

and Naugart and Plate

;

This series of operations gave the Swedes

were captured.

the possession of the territory inclosed by the Oder, Plone

and Rega

rivers,

Each

hagen.

and cut Colberg

from Garz and Greifen-

off

place taken was strengthened and garrisoned.

In reconnoitring towards Garz on one occasion, Gustavus again subjected himself to undue

He

risk.

rode ahead with

an escort of twenty horsemen, followed by a second detach-

ment he

and entering a

of seventy,

fell into

an ambush,

himself was captured.

good luck would have to rescue him.

It

not previously exj)lored,

defile

was overpowered, and he

his escort

His captors did not know him, and as it

the rear squadron i^ode

up

in season

was by mere chance that he had not been

cut down.

Gradually the king extended his grasp towards Oxenstiern in Prussia,

whom

he ordered to send an able

officer to

occupy

the Stolpe country, while he himself proposed to invest Colberg.

Riigenwalde, by a lucky accident, was seized by a force

of three small Scotch regiments

Munroe.

Munroe

Pillau,

under Colonel

This body, sent out on another errand, had been

shipwrecked

town.

from

;

but by a combination of daring and good sense,

contrived to turn

ill

into good fortune,

He won warm commendation from

On the other hand

it is

and

seized the

the king.

related that an enterprising Swedish

colonel conceived the project of a sudden attack on an out-

lying post of the enemy's at Garz

but, not possessing the

;

enemy heard of it, Though the officer king gave him a sharp

virtue of silence, his plan leaked out, the

and the attack was beaten back with brought in two stands of

colors, the

reprimand on the score of allowing

No

loss.

his plan to

become known.

courage or good conduct could excuse an idle tongue,

said he.

Quite as important as the closing in on Colberg was to

DIFFICULTIES.

167

reach out overlaud towards Leslie in Stralsuud.

was theoretically well placed, with Oxenstiern on Leslie on his right

The

his left

either.

imperialists

Only by water could he surely still

held Uckermiinde and the

Peene country, Anklam, Wolgast and Greifswalde. cially

Anldam was

important, as

Espe-

threatened Usedom, and

it

had taken up

here, on Gustavus' landing, Savelli

But the

and

but practically he was not certain in his

;

communications with reach them.

Gustavus

imperialists were lacking in wisdom.

his stand.

Lest Gustavus

should advance south from Stettin, the bulk of the forces in the Peene country were

drawn

into the

Garz-Greifenhagen

and Gustavus ordered Kagg from Usedom

position,

Anklam.

So

imperialists,

little

that

in

same breath he cautioned Kagg

the

against a possible ruse de guerre.

once fortified

occupy

to

could he understand the fatuity of the

Anldam was

taken and at

though as the population was not favorable

;

to

the Swedes, the work was slow,

Uckermiinde was also occupied

;

and Barth, near

sund, fell to Gustavus without effort.

very important places, as

it

Stral-

Wolgast, one of the

held the key to the road from the

Swedish camp at Peenemiinde to the continent, capitulated to

Kniphausen, July 28

;

but the garrison retired to the

and held out with stubborn courage

castle,

till

August

16.

Greifswalde seemed no longer tenable for the imperialists;

and yet

The

it

held out.

manceuvres was practically to control

result of these

the coast from Stralsund to Wollin on one side of the

Oder

mouth, and the shutting in of Colberg on the other. Still

one.

Gustavus' occupation was far from being a perfect

His main army lay

Oderburg and in

the

Until

/

chain

Stettin ;

all three

;

in three

detachments

:

his

own

at

Kagg's basing on Usedom, as a link

Kniphausen's on Peenemiinde or Stralsund.

were so placed as to be able to act as one

A HEROIC DEFENSE.

168

body, Gustavus would not rest content.

Anklam

session of

of the Tollense, they could scarce

Savelli

as to prevent

Nor would

tlie

pos-

Unless the Swedes held the line

suffice.

his

present such a front to

And

puncturing their defense.

though Stolpe alone would not control Farther (eastern) Pomerania,

this section

Hither (western) Pom-

might wait.

erania was of greater importance, and this the king set out to

occupy.

Such, then, was the

problem before Gustavus could

first

venture on a march to Mecklenburg, which was one of his

Kagg had

early projects.

already got a footing on the Peene,

but as the imperialists might at any

moment move on him,

on Kniphausen from the Mecklenburg

or

garrisons, because they

Demmin,

held the fords over the Tollense at Treptow and

Gustavus gave Kniphausen instructions to move forward on places in his front

all

;

while

Kagg was

so to operate as to

and prevent Kniphausen from

seize the line of the Tollense

being taken in flank while he pushed out from Stralsund.

The

operation would forestall

joint

reinforcements to the

places they might attack.

A small as

Swedish outpost had already been pushed as far

Clempenow, and on August 12

where he

still

as he heard of the fall of the

up from Greifswalde, and marched,

bj''

Savelli,

way

of

Wolgast

at the

stormed Clempenow.

— far too small a force

itself

fell

;

garrison to put

with true Swedish heroism

one

officer

and

six

all his

Demmin, on Clempenow, The

men

;

of

where

So soon

it.

he himself broke

foit,

head of nearly

on the way a reinforcement from Garz.

men

from Greifswalde,

was, sent a detachment to watch

receiving

On August

28 he

barely a hundred it

was

— defended

nearly the whole

surrendered.

force

number

This gave Savelli

control of the Tollense region, and he at once strengthened

Demmin, Loitz and Clempenow,

while he garrisoned Trep-

A SLAUGHTER. tow, Neu-Brandenburg and Friedland.

169

By this

salient,

basing

on the Tollense and with apex at Greifswalde, the Swedes were thus held back to the Savelli woidd push on

But

coast,

Anldam.

had another

Savelli

tegic success as a

and Kniphausen feared that

idea.

was not so much a

It

momentary triumj)h he

stra-

The small

desired.

and unprotected town of Pasewalk was held by a hundred and fifty

Swedes as an outpost

to Stettin.

occupied in greater force, but Gustavus all his

It should

have been

felt that

he needed

troops in Oderbiu'g, especially as he was organizing a

movement

to

Mecklenburg, and was reluctant to eat up his

aggregate in garrisons. Stralsund

;

and

it is

a force there was.

For the moment, indeed, he was in

possible that he did not

Savelli

know how

sent to Pasewalk a

small

body

of a

thousand men, and on a foggy morning in early September the imperialists surprised the place, of whose condition they

had learned by the treachery zens

who were on duty

Swedes were

left to

of

done to save the place.

They

man, and the town was burned luck, but

the

;

citi-

and the

defend themselves in scattered detach-

ments against the overwhelming

The Swedes and

The

some townsmen.

fled at the first assaidt

Nothing could be

force.

fell,

arms in hand,

imperialists coidd boast of

Swedes had

to the last

to the ground.

illustrated

the

about even

noble qualities

infused into them by their monarch.

On

the other side of the Oder, Oxenstiern was at the head

of the reserves in Pillau

and Elbing.

To open proper land

communications with him, and to afford safe transportation for reinforcements

berg had

still

and victual from

to be taken.

there,

The duty

Cammin and

Col-

of clearing the country

between the Oder and the Elbing region was now intrusted to

Kniphausen, with

whom

Oxenstiern cooperated.

Accord-

ing to the then military idea, that every strong place shoidd

SAVAGE CONDUCT.

170

be either taken or observed before any advance could be

made beyond It

this

it,

had been

was no easy business.

originally agreed between Bogislav

imperialists that the

and the

two most important fords of the lower

Oder, Garz and Greifenhagen, should remain in the bands of

On

the Pomeranian troops. forcibly

Gustavus' landing, Conti had

demanded admittance

ants yielded,

and moving

and imagined that he was

in,

to these places

command-

the

;

Conti strengthened the works,

after a fashion blockading Stettin.

Astride the river, he lay strongly intrenched in the Garz

camp on the left bank of the Oder, connected with the bank by a bridge and a bridge-head, whose approaches

right

were covered by the

little

town of Greifenhagen.

Though

his strength did not warrant Conti in interfering with the

king's operations on the coast line

and Greifenhagen were

and lower Oder, yet Garz

really the gates of

merely to hold them was a

Brandenburg, and

All Conti pretended to

benefit.

do was to ravage the neighboring country, and throw' succor into Colberg. rial force

It

is

tion,

was assembling

At

to

attempt to

the same time a small impe-

in western Mecklenburg.

no part of our province

to detail the fiendish devasta-

burning, rapine and murders of the imperial troops.

Scarce a valuable within reach escaped these licensed thieves,

woman

scarce a

broken of

up, not

escaped their lust

;

not a

a family but was ruined.

Brandenburg issued an

edict

home but was The elector

calling on all persons to

arrest marauders, or, failing ability to do this, to shoot

But the peasantry was helpless. unarmed countryman do against prowling

down.

the teeth

What ruffians

them

could an

armed

to

?

In early August, under Christian William, the dispossessed administrator,

who had

secretly returned,

in revolt against the imperial rule

Magdeburg

and declared

rose

in favor of a

MAGDEBURG. Swedish

Ill

The uprising was not

alliance.

cleverly

managed,

nor had Gustavus, unprepared for distant business, desired

such early action taken the

first

;

and no sooner had Christian William

step than he called on the

take the second.

with instructions to do

burg in a

burg

;

all that

and hold

The king was preparing

to

factor in his larger calculations, not the

Nor was

now

the road

it

him

for the Prot-

march

but Magdeburg was another thing

movement.

to help

was possible to put Magde-

state of perfect defense,

estant cause.

Swedes

Gustavus sent him Colonel Falkenberg,

;

it

to

Mecklen-

was but one

main objective of a

thither open to him.

Just

the question of good winter-quarters was occupying his

thoughts.

To extend

his possession of the coast, so as to

Hamburg and reached. Mag-

gain a foothold on the Elbe and parley with Liibeck, was on his programme, but not yet

deburg was important, but thing,

and

it

it

was far removed.

was not the one important Christian William looked at

the Swedish plan of campaign from the narrow standpoint of his

own

interest

;

Gustavus kept the whole theatre of war in

his eye.

^W"

Pikeman

of Thirty Years'

War.

XIV.

GUSTAVUS ATTACKS THE ENEMY. SEPTEMBER TO DECEMBER, 1630. Mecklenburg had been

given to Wallenstein, and Gustavus proposed to

reinstate the dukes, as well as reach out towards Liibeck

He

deburg, Hesse-Cassel and Lauenburg. to Stralsund,

left

the Oder, returned

and headed a column on Rostock and Wismar.

enemy threatened

Ribnitz, but as the

his

whose arrogance had given general

men

He

captured

holdings south of Stralsund, he

advanced no further, and returned to his "bastion." lenstein,

and Hamburg, Mag-

Horn on

Tilly

now replaced Waland hosts of the

dissatisfaction,

The king returned

with the Swedes.

latter' s

disbanded

Stettin,

whence he dispersed a large imperial force near Demmin, and shortly

enlisted

after visited the siege of Colberg, parties.

complete his bastion stroke

;

from which he had beaten back several

Though contemplating an advance first,

and not

to the Elbe, he

deemed

to close the year without

it

to

relief

wise to

some handsome

he made careful preparations to attack Greifenhagen and Garz,

fell

suddenly on them, carried them by storm, and drove the imperialists headlong

up the Oder towards tically

Ciistrin.

The king now

This was a marked success.

prac-

held the entire coast line of Pomerania, and out to East Prussia, and had

a wedge firmly driven into Germany along the Oder.

coming year was good,

if

only some of the

German

So soon as Gustavus had made plated a

movement

into

His standing for the

princes would join him.

his base secure, he contem-

Mecklenburg

to restore his cousins,

the dukes, whose territory had been given to Wallenstein for his services against northern

tion with the

Germany

;

duke of Hesse-Cassel, who,

to

open up connec-

so far,

was the only

who had volunteered active aid, with the administrator of Magdeburg, who asked for assistance, and with the duke of Saxe-Lauenburg, who jjromised it. Liibeck and Hamburg were also on his programme and while the

German

prince

;

route proposed was not direct,

it

was the only one he could

MOVE ON MECKLENBURG.

173

pursue without the permission of the electors to cross Bran-

denburg and Saxony.

The king had been up

to

Wolgast and

Stralsund, but had returned early in September.

The

imperialists held

Wismar and

Gustavus was anxious to secure, as

him

Rostock, towns which

this route

to provision himself for the winter

rial forces

and

would enable

to keej) the impe-

from the coast near the lower Oder.

Before mov-

made a reconnoissance to ascertain whether he coidd push the enemy from Garz. But he found their camp so strong that for the moment he declined

ing towards Mecklenburg, Gustavus

the attack.

It looks as if

it

woidd have been wiser to dispose

of the imperial general in his front before undertaking an

advance apparently so eccentric as one towards Mecklenburg.

But Gustavus saw

that as Conti

was bound

mole, buried within his fortifications,

him

it

to remain, like

a

was safe to disregard

he recognized the danger in the enemy's holding Ros-

;

tock and Wismar, which ports were necessary to his scheme

an

for controlling the shore of the Baltic so as to exclude

inimical or even neutral fleet

;

he believed that a handsome

diversion elsewhere would aid eventual operations

Oder

;

on the

and he must carefully consider the matter of winter-

quarters, for which pui'pose

Mecklenburg was well adapted.

General Gustavus Horn had, in August, brought reinforce-

ments from Finland and Livonia, and him the king a large part of the army in

Stettin, giving

left

him orders

on the defensive, forward what reinforcements he coidd lect,

and in case

retire

of being attacked

towards his

chief.

He mioht

with

to act col-

by overwhelming odds

to

use his time in making; a

diversion on Greifswalde, which ought to be

had before

spring,

so as to

keep communications open between Stettin and Stral-

sund.

Should the Garz army attempt an operation in force

towards the king, a,nd

march

Horn was

to his assistance.

to let the Greifswalde project go,

NO GERMAN

174

The king

left Stettin

AID.

by boat, September

with three

4,

He

thousand men, and reached Wolgast the next day.

expected to take over some troops from Teuffel and the Fin-

and calculated that the

landers,

"Hamburg" and "Liibeck"

with some forces from Prussia, would give his

regiments,

column not far from nine thousand foot and four thousand horse.

But he had pitched

Pur-

his expectations too high.

posing to move by sea on Rostock,

it

not only turned out

that there were not ships enough, but the reinforcements from

Prussia were not at hand

;

there was a deal of sickness in

camp, and supplies and money came in slowly.

was growing stronger Stettin.

Worse

still,

The enemy

and Teuffel was needed

in Garz,

apathy reigned in a population which

should have risen en masse to welcome Gustavus

mans had seen so woefully

their

in

hope so constantly

ground under the imperial

fail,

;

the Gei*-

they had been

heel, that they

dared

not afford aid and comfort to their

new champion. It

was September 9 when Gusreached

tavus troops

Stralsund.

The

days

later,

followed

six

and were embarked

;

but rough

weather holding them aboard for nearly three weeks, about every sixth

man was

ill,

and the cavalry

well-nigh exhausted. of

these

Under

stress

adverse circumstances,

Gustavus substituted a land invasion for the one

by

sea,

Ribnitz.

his

From frontiers

men and

and put

material ashore.

Stralsund the column headed for Mecklenburg, the of

which were stoutly held by

Savelli.

Barth, the Recknitz was reached, where in the morass

Passing

made by

RIBNITZ TAKEN. the river near

its

mouth

175

Dammgarten,

lay the village of

while on the further side of the river, in Mecklenburg, ap-

proachable by a ford from Dammgarten, was Ribnitz.

country had been wasted by the imperial forces so that the

many

king was not only called on in

so

;

The

much

places to

distribute corn to the famishing peasantry, but to refrain

from victualing soldiers

He

in others.

needed and could

paid in coin for

Dammgarten, though possessing a tower was held but by ten men, who

fifty

foot

of

that the

some strength,

gave

at once

September 25 General Baner marched one hundred and

all

collect.

up, and on

it

In Ribnitz were

in.

and two hundred

horse,

and

the ford was protected by a redoubt in the marsh, with a ditch twenty-five feet wide wall,

eighty men,

and

redoubts flanked the main one.

a palisaded

fifteen feet deep,

Two

and a number of guns.

Expecting the

smaller

fleet to co-

operate in taking Rostock and Wismar, Gustavus had no siege-guns with him; Stralsiind,

avoid

bad weather

and only the

this

kept the ships at

still

were on hand.

light fieldpieces

redoubt, Gustavus

threw two pontoon

across the river near the mouth,

To

bridges

and though the imperial gar-

rison sought to disturb the woi'k, on the 26th

was ready,

it

and next day Gustavus appeared before Ribnitz.

The enemy's horse came out

for a skirmish, but meeting a

bold front they retired towards Rostock. for a short hour,

when

The

foot resisted

by

the gates were blown open

petards,

the place entered, and the imperialists taken prisoners.

The

heavy guns having arrived, the garrison in the redoubt which

had refused

to surrender

was battered

out.

A

foothold in

Mecklenburg was thus obtained, and the troops were given a short rest in Ribnitz.

Here the king learned that the imperial bling in the

Demmin

forces were assem-

country, where Montecuculi

—

later so

ROSTOCK.

176

— had arrived with a body of horse

distingvaished

;

and

believ-

ing that they were about to follow him into Mecklenburg to

head all

Horn

advance, he ordered

off his further

to send

the troops he could spare, keeping in Stettin and

him

Anklam

only what was needed for defense.

Meanwhile on October

2,

with one thousand men, Gusta-

vus set out to capture a small but strong fort near Wiistrow,

on the

known

inlet

as the Binnensee

;

next day the garrison

surrendered, and the ground so far occupied was duly strengthened.

The by a

imperialists

was guarded only by

It

ruse.

had formerly got possession

Once

save an inconvenient circuit.

held the town for Wallenstein. ;

Rostock

and the impe-

asked permission to march through the place to

rial troops

tance

its citizens,

of

this port

It

in,

they remained, and

was a place of impor-

and Wismar once secured by the Swedes,

they woidd control

the

entire

coast

from Stralsund

to

Liibeck, on the friendship of which city Gustavus placed considerable reliance.

Rostock

but the

;

sume time

Ribnitz was a sort of outwork to

capture

of

the latter place would con-

the situation in the Demniin region in the centre

;

of his line appeared to require the king's personal attention

more than a

siege

on an extreme flank

and he renounced

;

his present design upon Rostock and turned to other business.

While Gustavus was threatening Mecklenburg, the imperialists

had not been

idle.

Conti had tried the strength of

the Stettin works, but was driven back with a loss of three

hundred men

;

and some

foragers, with attempts on holtz near join

him

Damm.

if

slight

exchanges occurred between

Damm

and GoUnow, and on Buch-

To watch Gustavus'

operations so as to

necessary, and to conduct the small

forced ujjon him, kept

Horn busy enough.

war thus

THE FIVE-COLUMN PLAN. Gustavus had a singularly

fertile brain,

177

and his correspond-

ence details a variety of plans which from time to time he considered, generally rejecting all but that which

moment most

Though

available.

on the manceuvi'es which now ensued, low out the king's ideas.

army

the imperial

was to

was

at the

the matter has no bearing it is

interestino- to fol-

His general scheme before pushing

to battle

— always

his ultimate object

to stimulate the activity of the friends of the cause,

encourage the arming of the Protestant population

He hoped from

the theatre of war.

all

—

and over

available resources, the

Netherlands, Prussia, Poland, Livonia, as well as Germany, to increase his aggregate force to seventy or eighty

men, not counting

With

allies.

this strength

thousand

he had consid-

ered a specific scheme of moving in five different armies forwai'd

from along the whole coast

Liibeck, the lines,

Weser and Bremen,

upon the heart

of

line,

in

Germany.

Colberg, Stralsund,

more or

less concentric

This was an apparently

dangerous division of forces, warrantable only on the assumption that

some of these columns would be those of

whose active aid he could not otherwise hope

who would

for the time being assist in a negative

positive way. lines

:

In effect

it

one through central

allies

to obtain, if

and

not a

was to be an operation on two

Germany and one

u]3

the Oder,

straight on Vienna.

This five-column plan

is

spread out in a letter to Oxenstiern

from Eibnitz, dated October

8,

1630.

Horn and

the king, shovdd have forty-six thousand men,

Oder, holding Brandenburg and Silesia

;

Teuffel, says

march up the

the king with forty-

two thousand, the " Royal Army," would base on Pomerania

and Mecklenburg of ten thousand

the

;

the fourth should be a

Magdeburg army

men, whose task should be the Elbe country

Hanse towns,

led

by the archbishop of Bremen, should

cooperate with Hamilton and Leslie, both of

whom were

OXENSTIERN'S PLAN.

178

These columns, a hun-

expected to raise considerable forces.

dred thousand and over strong, would, thought the king, be This was a sanguine view of the

sure to compel a peace. case,

was

and though

it

warranted in believing that he could raise during

fairly

the coming winter,

and

to

was based on a strength which Gustavus

it

do Oxenstiern

was perhaps too rose-colored a scheme justice,

and told the king that he would

The

;

he saw this aspect of the plan, find his

means unequal

to

it.

much more

chancellor was, unquestionably, an able man,

conservative than the king, and his best adviser.

His weak-

ness lay in his sometimes leaning towards a defensive policy,

and with

all his

strong sense, he lacked the divine afflatus.

His own plan, which in

this

same month he worked out with

a great deal of care, was to garrison Pomerania with twelve

men men

thousand thousand

to project a

;

while the Royal

Army

and be manoeuvred

The king

column of fourteen or

along the Oder through Silesia, under

to

fifteen

Horn

should consist of over thirty thousand,

meet the imperial forces on the Elbe.

in this instance

gave heed to Oxenstiern's ideas,

especially as the late harvest in

Sweden had not been up

the usual mark, and taxes lay heavily on the people.

own plan had been but before

and

A the it

in the existing

still

tentatively

drawn up

;

for,

to

His long

could be inaugurated, there came about a marked

it

change

;

much

conditions, very

he did not attempt to carry

it

in his favor,

out.

congress in Ratisbon to devise means to put an end to

war

in

ended,

Germany had been in

sitting nearly six

November, 1630,

in the

Count Tilly with supreme command stein, against

whom

months, and

emperor's investing

in the place of

the Catholic potentates

Wallen-

had conceived a

great prejudice, for his unmeasured assumption and the utter license of his troops.

The

result of this

change was that a

large part of the army, enlisted for service under Wallenstein's

WALLENSTEIN DISPLACED. command, was disbanded, and the

personal

179

total imperial forces

were reduced to some seventy thousand men, of which the

bulk were in southwestern Germany, or engaged in the war in

Thus

Italy.

in the early part of the

emperor was unable cient forces.

to

;

by Wallenstein's

it

is

men

as wonderful a

made good

thing to say of the king that he spoiled

and

the

suffi-

Considerable numbers of these disbanded

under Gustavus' banner

enlisted

German campaign,

meet Gustavus' invasion with

soldiers of

men

fearful indiscipline, as to tell of

Hannibal that he made out of the

southern Italy

riff-raff of

who could stand up against the legions of Marcellus and Nero. Thus reinforcements came from an unexpected quarter and Falkenberg's men began to come forward from soldiers

;

Holland.

Had

Gustavus intended a

definite adherence to the

five-column plan, he woidd have been in better shajDC to carry it

out than in October he could have hoped to be. It appears singular to us that

upon the displacement

Wailenstein the disbanding of substantially

army should

follow.

But the method

all

of

the imperial

of raising troops at

Wailenstein no doubt had, with each

that day was peculiar.

regimental commander, a personal contract under which the latter served

and received pay for himself and

this contract fell

Many who had

his

men

;

and

when Wailenstein ceased from command.

may have many may have been but most of the men

been in the imperial service before

remained as a nucleus of a fresh army

;

sent in small bodies to other armies

;

were mustered out with their general, and were at liberty to enlist whei'e they would.

The of

chief complaint

Ratisbon was the

It

was

all

one to them.

made by every member ill

of the Congress

behavior of Wallenstein's forces,

from whose depredations friends and foes alike had suffered

and

after his dismissal, orders were issued to

under severe restraint

;

keep the

men

but troops which have once enjoyed

VICTORY NEAR DEMMIN.

180

hand

a loose rein cannot be fully brought in

and Germany

;

was never freed from the worst horrors of war until her was occupied by Gustavus

ritory

death was

humanity

successors, or

At

if

ter-

nor indeed after the king's

;

war an element recognized by

in

his

recognized, enforced.

the time of Wallenstein's dismissal,

said that Gus-

it is

tavus approached him through Count Thurn to negotiate for his services

Gustavus

;

but this will be referred to definitively

was not ready

to

by the apathy

later.

He

gave up his five-column scheme.

launch out on so broad a manoeuvre. Taught

of the Protestant princes, his caution

came

German campaigns it so often and he choked down the Vasa recklessness,

the surface, as in his felicitously did

;

Charles XII. was never able to do,

— and concluded

to

so

— as

to

narrow

his operations to the completion of his bastion, to concentrate

instead of

parceling out his forces, and

operate on some point in the Tollense

marked descent from

his larger

caution, method, exactness,

line.

scheme

;

for the nonce to

This looks like a

but

it

which Gustavus was

was just

this

to teach the

His base was not yet perfectly secure, and he delayed

world.

made it so. We shall many months. He selected

bolder operations until he should have see

him

Denimin foiir

in rapid action before

as his objective,

and

left

Baner with some three or

thousand troops to blockade the place, and to hold the

territory

between

it

and the Recknitz River, while he returned

to Stettin with four thousand

men.

Shortly after, learning

that six thousand troops under Savelli relief of

Demmin, he broke up

had marched

to the

thither with a force of four

thousand men, met the imperialists in the vicinity of the place,

engaged them, and, by the greater mobility of the

Swedish infantry and

them back train

to

its

dashing courage, defeated and drove

Rostock with

and many standards.

loss of their entire artillery

and

SIEGE OF COLBERG. Here again was a

181

brilliant feat of arms, the details

exact locality even of which are unknown.

Were

kept in this era.

ciently vouched for rial

records,

it

and the

Records were

not that the bare facts are

suffi-

by the Swedish dispatches and the impe-

we should be tempted

to

set

these successes as mere paper-victories.

down some

prehensive to seek for such adventitious aid. details

man

His mind was too com-

to claim a victory or hide a defeat.

by not knowing the

of

But Gustavus was

quite free from that particular weakness which induces a

lose

ill

It

is

we who

the victor himself loses

;

nothing.

Gustavus returned to berg, the

During

Stettin.

his absence

Schaum-

had made a further

successor of Conti,

useless

attempt to take Stettin, and had then sent a force to release

At

Colberg from the Swedish blockade.

the moment, this

was one of the most important places along the

The

coast.

king's initial plan was to extend his base so as to include the

whole Baltic shore, much as Alexander deemed the whole east coast of the Mediterranean essential as a base to

from which

The Swedes already held a goodly

advance into Persia.

part of the shore line, and Colberg, a strong fortress, was indispensable to complete isolated the town,

and cut

The

it.

was held by an imperial garrison, of the

Swedish

stiern in Prussia

line, as well as ;

operations

from Garz

it off

it

;

had

so far

but so long as

it

threatened the left flank

communications with Oxen-

and even Gustavus was not yet

free

from

the prejudice of the day with regard to fortresses.

Colberg was held by Colonel Mors, and blockaded by Colonel Sperreuter.

On

September 23 the

sent five companies of cavalry to

place

;

im23erialists at Gai'z

make

their

way

into the

but Horn heard of their presence, headed them

and compelled them son feared

to return

its ability to

by a long

hold out.

circuit.

The

off,

garri-

ATTEMPT TO RELIEVE COLBERG.

182

Knipliausen, wlio was

now

Colberg region,

in charge of the

expected to operate mainly with trooj)s to come from Oxen-

Towards the end

stiern.

deserters

and scouts that a marked

movement

Horn

ascertained from

stir in

Garz indicated a

of October

He

in force towards Colberg.

strengthened Goll-

now, and sent word to Knipliausen to hurry forward the

oncoming Prussian troops the line of the Persante.

Belgard or Corlin, and occupy

to

threw several companies into

much

He made

Knipliausen was active.

Schievelbein the rallying-poiut of it

;

arriving troops, and

all

but the Prussian troojis were

delayed.

On November

Horn

7

got news of the actual march of a

heavy column from Garz in the direction of Colberg.

Delay-

ing a day lest the manoeuvre should be a mere feint to lure

him from

Stettin,

to Treptow.

Horn marched by Gollnow and Greifenberg

Instructed of his purpose, Knipliausen,

the Persante, left a suitable force under Colonel

still

Hepburn

on to

hold this position, cautioned Sjierreuter to stand firm, and contain the

garrison of Colberg, and himself marched to

From

Treptow, which he reached November 10.

two Swedish generals moved

to Rossentin near

here the

Colberg to

await the enemy.

The

imperialists

had made a big

circuit to avoid detection,

and on the night of November 10 Schievelbein. their attack,

Here Colonel and they swerved

ing out his patrols,

Horn was

their

Muiiroe off

column reached

held

head against

towards Colberg.

ments, and they advanced until they found that

athwart their path.

Horn the

followed and gave them battle.

fighting,

Horn

Discouraged, they turned to

possibilities of good

Keep-

well advised of their move-

stood

retire,

but

A heavy fog prevented

management, and

Horn, who had accomplished

after desultory

his aim, fell

back to

the Persante, and the imperialists towards their base, their

OPERATIONS OF PAPPENHEIM.

183

attempt to relieve Colberg having jiroven a dismal failure.

Lest in his absence his camp should be attacked, Horn then returned to Stettin by the direct road.

The movements

of the

Swedes

in

Mecklenburg and Pome-

From

rania had so far been parts of one great whole. nitz

Rib-

Gustavus was reaching out towards Liibeck and projectoperation towards the

ing an

The duke

Elbe.

of

Saxe-

Lauenburg, a small principality on the lower Elbe, was preparing to join him, while Magdeburg, further up the river, stood as an allied outpost in front of this right flank.

tavus progressed with his

loomed up

him

to

in his

mind

occupy in

movement on

as a suitable point on the

force.

But

it

was not

As Gus-

Magdeburg

Ribnitz,

to be.

Elbe for Christian

William, the administrator, was unfortunately not the

man

to

second Gustavus' broad plan, even in so far as his one city fitted into it

and Lauenburg proved too weak

Pappenheim

the

fire of

These

to accomplish

After a short period of success the latter succumbed

his aim. to

;

in a battle at Ratzburg,

—a

failure that

drew

Liibeck, which had been recruiting for the king.

new

factors

in

the

problem

made

it

doubtful

whether Gustavus could accomplish any strategic good by pushing forward to the Elbe at the present moment. entertain an

ting late,

army might be

and the

difficult, as

financial question

To

the season was get-

was not an easy one.

Troops and material arrived slowly from Prussia, and an advance meant to consume large forces for garrisons.

enemy had reinforced the troops

in

The

Mecklenburg, and to

advance would open to attack the newly conquered bastion.

Already somewhat reduced by labor and sickness, the army ought soon to be given

As he

its

winter

rest.

could place no reliance on

German

was convinced that he must concentrate his instinct as a soldier called

aid,

efforts.

Gustavus

Yet

his

on him to end the campaign by

ADVANCE ON GARZ.

184

some stroke worthy

of his reputation.

was as much a

It

matter of moral effect as of material gain that he was aiming to compass, to show that the

Germany on no

child's errand.

Snow King had come to But how? By advancing

towards the Elbe he could make no sensible gain, and not to

win was

of itself failure.

On

studying the entire situation,

he determined to return to Stettin, to draw the enemy from

Garz and beat him stood.

Kniphausen

Horn and

him where he

in the field, or to attack still

held for the advance to the Elbe.

Teuffel were of Gustavus' opinion, but they coun-

seled speed, lest the

enemy should

retire to

Frankfort and

intrench his winter-quarters.

Gustavus had returned to Stralsund.

Oxenstiern was

ordered to forward cavalry as soon as possible

was drawn on for troops for

Stettin

the works near Ribnitz, garrison

it,

;

Baner was

and then

the infantry to be sent via Wolgast to self,

;

Horn

Kniphausen to complete

join ;

Gustavus

Gustavus him-

with the cavalry, would march to Stargard, be joined by

Sperreuter and the Prussian cavalry, making a total of thirteen thousand five hundred foot and six thousand horse, and

with these the king purposed to move on Garz. All this was admirably planned.

But Oxenstiern wrote

that he could only send the Prussian troops by detachments,

and Kniphausen reported that he could scarce spare a hundred men.

do to

;

For a moment Gustavus was uncertain what

go on with the plan, be his force more or It

to

then his courage rose to the occasion, and he determined

was

less.

at this time that he heard of the enemy's failure to

On November

relieve Colberg.

16 he reached Greifenberg,

and here Horn, Kniphausen and Baudissin were ordered

As

consultation.

near Colberg

Mecklenburg

;

for

Horn was instructed to remain Baner and Ake Tott were drawn in from a result,

to reinforce

him

;

Gustavus returned

to Stettin.

COUNCILS OF WAR. .

On November

21 he reached the

city,

185

and heard sundry

He

rumors of a renewed attempt on Colberg.

scarcely

believed this probable, for the enemy, after the late experi-

would be unapt to break up with a small

ence,

force,

and a

large one would at this season have difficidty in victualing

but he notified Horn to instruct the population along the probable route to drive their cattle to a place of safety. imperialists, however,

belief that the

Gustavus

The

were contemplating a movement, in the

Swedes would not expect

satisfied himself of the fact,

So soon as

one.

he ordered Horn from

Greifenberg down to the line of the Ihna, to take up a position between Stargard to draw, if essential,

and GoUnow and hold the

from Bauer's and Dargess'

fords,

troops.

and

On

Horn was carrying out his instructions, he received new ones from Gustavus, who had ascertained that the proposed movement was delayed or postponed, that December

1,

while

only five or six thousand foot remained in Garz, and that,

owing

to

scant forage,

various villages

in

Here was an opportunity

side.

Gusta\ms could either

for a stroke. fall

the cavalry had been cantoned in

on the east

collect his cavalry

smartly on the enemy's scattered horse

from Horn

and with

this

He GoUnow for

ments.

all available

forces,

join

;

and

or he could call

them

to

his own,

column attack the depleted Garz intrench-

surrimoned Horn, Kniphausen and Baudissin to

a conference.

Gustavus was one of the men who belies the old military

saw that a council of war never

fights.

opinion of his marshals and thus become facts,

It

Having sought the familiar with all the

he himself decided, and always for a vigorous policy.

is

not usual to detail the to and fro manoeuvres of troops

under the orders and counter-orders given by the commanding general as the kaleidoscopic

game changes under

his eye

only the marches or attacks finally decided on are wont to be

IMPORTANCE OF STRALSUND.

186

mentioned, while the intermediate period, during which the

commander ignored

;

is

but

petty details of these,

and

fencing to discover his enemy's weak guard,

now and then

interesting

it is ;

for all operations,

it is

however

who gauges

the general

to enter into even

large, are

made up

accurately the mean-

ing of the information brought in by his scouts, and

then orders

skillfully, that

is

who

succeeds on the chessboard of war.

Gustavus was by no means certain of the outcome of the attack he proposed to deliver

;

but to make provision for an

unsuccessful result and then to put his whole soul into the

work was natural

to his character.

He had

determined that

the campaign should not end until he had forced a battle on

the enemy, but he recognized the dangers which might follow

Like

failure.

to

all his utterances, his letter

dated December

John Casimir, commending Sweden and

daughter to his care in case of disaster, his instructions to the

When

explicit.

his

affecting.

is

Swedish people were

5,

own wife and

And

to the last degree

Tott and Baner were ordered away from

Stralsund, Generals Sten Bjelke, Rynnig and Soop were left in joint

command,

—a

curious division of authority which

largely obtained all through the era of which

Eighteen hundred and

fifty

men were

we

are treating.

left in Stralsund,

and

Anklam, WoUin, Cammin, Uckermiinde, Barth and Ribnitz each had a garrison,

— the

total of garrisons in places already

captured running up to ten thousand six hundred men. these joint

commanders Gustavus gave

aster, to look well to Stralsund,

hazards kept safe for Sweden. at liberty to

towns

;

draw

in

some or

orders, in case of dis-

— so that

it

might be at

Should they need all of

To

it,

all

they were

the garrisons of adjoining-

but they were in no case to lose courage or to give up

The command in Stettin, where forty-four hunmen were left in garrison, was given to Colonels Carl

Stralsund. ^dred

Baner and

Leslie.

Early in December the available troops

IMPERIALISTS POORLY were got together in

;

Tott's

OFF.

187

and Bauer's regiments were ordered

from west Pomerania, Horn's corps and other troops from

Some

east Pomerania.

twenty-five hnndred horse

came from

Prussia and, added to the force from Stettin, the king lected eight thousand foot

gnns, each

and

drawn by twenty-four

horses,

and a number of

Part of the force was to go by land from

field-pieces.

where they rendezvoused, part by water on the

had been

all

Gustavus

December 24

set out to drive the

That the imperial forces

in

from cold and hunger, and actually

in

for

—

which

and after

;

the start was made,

enemy from Garz were

and

his intrenchments.

in a

wretched plight

in a worse state of discipline,

no condition at

Swedish army,

moment

Damm,

fleet,

along lying in the Oder at Stettin

careful inspection, on

col-

thousand horse, ten siege-

six

this

—

season to withstand the

by the king

justified the selection

moving upon them, though he had no

of this

entirely

go upon, but rather judged from his

reliable evidence to

military experience and instincts.

It

was in truth

so.

Count

Schaumberg, the new commander of the imperial forces on the Oder, gave to his chief, Tilly, the most distressing reports of the condition of the army, in which, said he, there

not over four thousand footmen

was

better, but half

fit

for service.

was dismounted and

him by

held to show results.

It

Conti,

He

all inefficient.

begged for an inspector who should report the forces turned over to

were

The cavalry state of the

and with which he was

was the lack of victual which had

driven him to send away the horse to the outlying districts,

even so far as the Neumark.

were on a better footing. shape

;

warmly

In the Swedish camp matters

The home

troops were in good

the newer recruits were getting into order

;

all

were

clad, fairly well fed, full of an excellent spirit,

in condition for

any work.

The

and

difference between the old

system and that introduced by Gustavus was pronounced.

THE ADVANCE.

188 Colonel di

men

;

Capua held Greifenhagen with some thousand camp at Garz. Schaumberg began

the rest lay in the

already to think of retreat to Landsberg to defend the line

He

Warta.

of the

harbored fears that both

it

and Frank-

might

fort

and

fall,

his retreat to Silesia

be cut did

off,

not

ranted

war-

feel

leaving

in

without

post

his

but he

from

instructions

He

TiUy. not

immediate

and

did

an

anticipate

attack

was

his position

good

though

his

troops were not.

Greifenhagen lay The Attack on

on low ground be-

Garz.

tween

and a

line of hills

command

which slope down towards

it.

the

Keglitz

These

hills

the town, which had only a wall of no great strength,

with a few towers but no flanking bastions, and a dry ditch protected by another light wall.

The

route of the Swedes lay along both sides of the Oder,

and the army was accompanied by the bridge, to keep

and a

flying

up connection between the separated wings.

Marching on the fenhagen

flotilla

right bank, the Swedish van reached Grei-

late in the evening,

the imperialists within walls.

and

after a smart skirmish, drove

Don Capua had no

Gustavus with his entire army was upon him

;

idea that

he looked on

CAPTURE OF GREIFENHAGEN. The Swedes camped

the body as a mere reconnoissance.

night in a wood near by.

189

Next morning

all

joined in a solemn

Some

Christmas-day service, and the attack was begiin.

up

the siege-guns were hauled shot

distant

of

to the highest hill, not a musket-

from the town, and, protected by an infantry

detachment, opened

and the king

over-

In a short while a breach was made,

fire.

headed the assaulting party.

in person

Twice

the Swedes were driven back, but on the third attempt the imperialists gave ground,

and Don Capua, who had behaved

with gallantry, was forced to turn from the fierce onslaught.

But Leslie

lay in wait in the rear of the imperialists, on the

Oder, aboard the boats, and by a heavy

on the Swedish

drove them back

Thus hemmed

musketry.

line of

fire

Gustavus' loss was small

entire force surrendered.

;

the

in,

that of

enemy was reported between one and two hundred. Startled from his fancied security, Schaumberg made up his

the

mind

to

summary retreat,

if

Pomerania

on the Tollense, where, by a vigor-

to join the imperial forces

ous push, he might

possible towards west

make

the Swedes nervous as to their

communications, and thus draw the

fire

of their advance

up

the Oder.

Next day Gustavus broke up early and marched along the bank towards Marwitz, near by which a fort protected

right

the bridge to Garz.

and was strongly the

This bridge-head had a deep wet ditch

held.

army marched on

The king

anticipated resistance,

the place in order of battle.

garrison did not even wait their coming. of horse put in its appearance, they

burned side.

it,

Out

and

But the

So soon as the van

withdrew over the bridge,

and took up a position in a work on the further of this they were driven

and thence retired

by the Swedish

artillery,

to Garz.

Schaumberg no longer delayed Pomerania, for the Swedes on the

;

he could not reach west left

bank were upon him.

DEFEAT OF ENEMY.

190

He

burned

tlie

Oder bridge

at Garz, threw bis

guns into the

marsb, destroyed so far as he was able the public buildings, gates and defenses, as well as the victual he could not carry

and marched hastily away

to the south, putting the torch

to every village on the route,

and leaving scarce a spear of

off,

grass beliind.

Cavalry under Baudissin was sent in pursuit, which captured

much

wagons

material, said to have included three

full of

plunder

and detachments were hurried on

;

towards Ciistrin and Landsberg to cut the enemy fords and bridges there.

retired rapidly

up the

off

from the

Following to Pyritz, Gustavus drove

which

out the garrison,

hundred

headlong

fled

bank

left

;

and Schaimaberg

to Frankfort,

and marched

part of his forces to Landsberg on the Warta, to hold the line of that important river.

The Swedes followed them

up, and

in several rear-guard combats inflicted considerable loss

upon

them, badly cutting up four of the best imperial regiments.

The king headed

direct for Landsberg,

the town that he did not know

that-

it

and

was

it

in

was lucky for

bad

case, with

few troops, empty magazines, twelve guns, and only eight or Ignorant of the

nine hundred-weight of powder.

vus did not attack; moreover his bitter cold, his

own

men were

was getting

victual

short,

facts,

weary,

Gustait

was

and he feared

imperial concentration on the line of the Warta, which would

prevent his holding Landsberg,

if

taken.

Konigsberg in the Neumark, where he rested ing on

Horn with

He

retired

to

his troops, call-

the foot and Tott with the cavalry to follow

up and complete the rout

;

while Leslie on the left bank

should advance inland and seize Locknitz, Prenzlow and the

Uckermark. Schwedt.

Patrols were set along the river as far up as

To be ready

for further operations,

be forced upon him, Gustavus

if

these should

called for all available troops

from Oxenstiei'n and Horn.

\

A BRILLIANT GAIN. Though

the king's, army

opposition had been weak,

won

a brilliant advantage.

191

had been much the better and the it

cannot be denied that he had

had driven the enemy out of

lie

good iutrenchments, at that day considered a distinguished feat of arms,

and although the operations were neither bloody

nor on a vast

scale,

Germany rang with

they redounded greatly to his credit. his praises

;

fear."

^^^^^

"

AU

in Vienna " they shook with

Advance Pikes " !

XV. WINTER-QUARTERS AT BARWALDE. JANUARY, GusTAVus had

He had

as yet no idea of the petty jealousies of the

German

princes.

every right to expect the elector of Brandenburg to stand by him.

But George William aimed

1631.

felt

more bound

emperor than

to the

at neutrality, but allowed the imperial troops

Gustavus built a Richelieu

made a

Germany,

all

fortified

camp

treaty to pay

mutual friendly

upheavals to be made.

Tilly

to his religion

he

Here

Barwalde, and housed his troops.

at

him

;

what he denied the Swedes.

for keeping thirty-six thousand troops in

states to

have due protection, and no violent

On

was on the Weser.

hearing of the capture of

Garz, he started towards the Oder, but shortly returned and undertook, with

Pappenheim, the siege of Magdeburg. Leipsic,

and though Gustavus was

in

The

Protestants held a convention in

Germany

at the request of

there was no mention of the king in their deliberations. his base on the

Oder before he moved

to the Elbe,

deburg by threatening Frankfort, so as February Tilly marched to the Oder.

to

draw

Some

many

Gustavus sought to aid Mag-

Tilly

away from

there,

and

in

slight mancEuvring took JDlace,

but no serious operations, except that Tilly compelled the Swedes to siege of Landsberg.

of them,

Anxious to complete

raise the

Gustavus determined to draw him from the Oder into the

open country.

Gustavus' lem was

trials

difficult

were about to begin.

enough

The

military prob-

but as yet the king had no idea

;

of the complex network of paltry prides

and

jealousies,

private grudges and selfish interests, in which he would

be caught, and which would seriously hamper his best It is

efforts.

wonderfid that he had the courage to enter upon any

campaign from the

in

Germany,

start beset

him

after tasting ;

it

is

the difficulties which

doubly wonderful that within

two years he should have reduced land.

of

now

to possession

the whole

A DROWSY POTENTATE. George William, the drowsy

elector of

193

Brandenburg, had

repeatedly exchanged embassies with Gustavus, but not to offer assistance

from

;

his

one aspiration was to save his dominions

Neutrality was his only thought

invasion.

desj)ite

;

which he allowed the passage of Schaumberg's fleeing forces through his fortress of Ciistrin, of neiitrality.

— of

itself

was between the devil and the deep

tor

Gustavus or the emperor

either

the baldest breach

Gustavus demanded equal passage.

and

;

was able

either

He began

him with condign punishment.

The

He must

sea.

elec-

offend to visit

early in January

with a declination to allow Gustavus to pass Ciistrin, on a

number

of trivial pretexts, mainly his duty to the empire

demanding actual possession

the king answered by

fortress, instead of free passage

;

the elector must not, said

Gustavus, shield the imperialists and

Though Gustavus was

long-suffering,

without fear, favor or affection

how

far he

but

prate

of

when he was

it

was

difficult to

say

might trench on the rights of Brandenburg,

lest

as a friend

The

neutrality.

acted

;

it

he should force George William into open enmity.

him

;

of the

;

He needed

he must keep him at least neutral.

imperialists

had reassembled twelve thousand men in

Frankfort, and as the elector persisted in denying the Swedes

a passage through Ciistrin, Gustavus, unwilling to advance with this fortress and Landsberg in his rear, for the

moment

pocketed his wrath, and took up quarters at Schwedt, and at Biirwalde, on the right

bank

of the Oder, at

which

latter place

he constructed an intrenched camp, and housed his main force.

He line

repaired the Garz works in order to keep open his

Tott

Oder

blockaded Landsberg with four thousand men under

;

;

and sent out detachments

isolated plundering

to clean

Brandenburg

of the

bands of imperialists which were overrun-

ning the country and harassing a friendly population.

woidd have been glad

to

He

push on and relieve Magdeburg

BUSY WINTER-QUARTERS.

194

from Pappenlieim's blockade

was winter above

all,

march

;

his

new

;

recruits

but his Swedes needed rest

had

to

be got into shape

was not yet free from danger.

his base

to the Elbe, his line of operation

interruption

by the

imperialists

it

and,

;

Should he

would be open to

from Frankfort

in the present tone of the electors of

;

;

and indeed,

Brandenburg and Sax-

ony, he could not venture to cross their territory.

Gustavus had good reason for

In six

self-gratulation.

months the Swedes had advanced from the seacoast line of the

the line covered

by the Trebel-Tollense-Ucker, only Demmin

and Greifswalde, and east of the Oder only Colberg places were blockaded frontier of

to the

Warta, leaving in the emperor's possession, within

by

his forces,

;

these

and Baner lay on the

Mecklenburg with four thousand men. Gustavus had secured so easy a triumph

It is true that

against no well-organized resistance. tinctly unskillfvd

Conti had been

dis-

and what with Wallenstein dismissed and

;

his forces disbanding, with Tilly far off in the

men

seeking to gather Wallenstein's

Weser

country,

into the fold of

the

League, though the aggregate of the enemy had been large, only isolated garrisons and weak divisions had been on hand

He had

to oppose him.

With

military opposition.

hoped for a battle in the field to

months

;

encountered more political than the true soldier's ardor, he had

but not only had he met no real army

outmanoeuvre and beat

took

it

;

many weary

to force Tilly to the point of risking his master's

cause in a general engagement.

In the camj) at Biirwalde Gustavus lay in the early weeks of 1631, busying himself with recruitment

prepare his

men

for

more vigorous measures

and with urging the Protestant princes

He

issued a proclamation to all

cruelties to return,

and

so.

in the spring,

to concerted action.

who had

and many did

discipline, to

fled

from imperial

Contributions on the

TREATY WITH FRANCE. countiy were regularly levied and paid

195 Billeted soldiers

for.

were forbidden to ask more than bed, the right to cook at the general

and vinegar

fire, salt,

bad quality of

to correct the

the water of the plains.

To win

the elector of Brandenburg's active help, Gustavus

used his best endeavors, but this Protestant sovereign, and brother-in-law of the king, preferred an ignominious neutrality

;

— more discreditable

and

still

— the head

of the Luther-

ans in Germany, John George of Saxony, simply ignored

Such was the

Gustavus' advances.

king had come to hebetude

;

in

aid.

Gustavus.

this,

it

was

there was one real cause of con-

Former negotiations had

to

cooperate with

failed,

owing to certain

formalities on which both parties could not agree.

January

it

the

was jealousy.

Richelieu plainly desired

gratulation.

men

In George William's case

John George's

To counterbalance

attitude of the

But on

Gustavus and Louis XIII. concluded a

23, 1631,

by which the king

five years' treaty,

of

Sweden agreed

to

maintain thirty thousand infantry and six thousand horse in

Germany, against a payment

of

three hundred thousand

equaled two rix dollars) for the past year's

livres (five livres

expenses, and a future annual subvention of a million livres,

May

payable

15 and November 15, in Paris or Amsterdam,

at Gustavus' option.

The

other terms of the treaty contemplated protection of

mutual friends and of the Baltic, the freedom of commerce,

and generally the

restitution of the status

quo ante helium.

In conquered territory Gustavus agreed to respect certain laws of the empire, and not to disturb the Catholic religion

where he found

it

duly established.

The

open for any princes to join who desired

common

cause.

With Bavaria and

friendship should be maintained,

if

the

treaty

was

to be

to cooperate in the

League neutrality or

they would do their part.

TILLY MOVES EAST.

196

now in supreme command of the imperial forces, lay on the Weser awaiting reinforcements from Italy and recruits from the League, Though he knew how worthCount

less

Tilly,

were his lieutenants and troops on the Oder and the

A

he took no action to direct or relieve them. ioned soldier, not able,

coast,

slow, old-fash-

measured by the high standard, yet

if

not without marked capacity in his way, Tilly was noted for

He had

never having lost a great battle.

always waited for

the advantage to be on his side before engaging

but he was

;

far behind the times in dealing with such an antagonist as

Gustavus. to

head

avail.

Count Pappenheim had repeatedly urged

off

the Swedes

Tilly

in

his chief

overrunning the land, but to no

would not move

till

he_got ready.

mood he was rudely startled by the disasOut ter to Schaumberg, who wrote that he had saved a bare four thousand foot and an equal number of horse; and that it of this inert

would be lucky for the king

he could hold Frankfort and Landsberg,

if

was aiming

at the roads to Silesia,

and

his

own

/^

men were down-hearted Sehaumberg's

January 9 he was His lax habit had

Tilly

in Halberstadt

;

receiving

had broken camp January

13, in

;

on

Calbe.

him Garz and Greifenhagen.

lost

The Protestant

On

to the last degree.

first intelligence,

the beginning of

princes, in

February,

1631, assembled in Leipsic at the invitation of the elector of Saxony.

There were represented the houses of Saxony,

Brandenburg and Hesse, and some smaller principalities, as well as all the free towns. This body was convened to devise measures for withstanding the imperial tyranny, but ally

accomplished nothing, and

their deliberations,

not even mentioned.

it is

it

actu-

a marvelous fact that in

which lasted two months, Gustavus was

The tone

the elector of Saxony,

who

of the convention

still

deemed

appeals to Ferdinand and without war,

it

was given by

possible,

to bring

by simple

back matters

MAGDEBURG ATTACKED. to their original basis

and

and

to reconcile the Protestant

The convention acted

Catholic claims.

197

as

If

Germany was

profound peace, instead of almost on the eve of

in a state o£

Except for what was said by

political

and

William

of Hesse, not a voice

social disruption.

was raised which

sented the disturbance which prevailed.

fairly repre-

In answer to

all

the

advances of Gustavus, only a timid outside intimation was

conveyed to him that, under favorable conditions and on his

own pledges

to

do and to refrain from doing

manner

all

of

uncertain things, the friendship and good-will of the Evangelical

principalities

John George

might perhaps be extended

obstinate, high-handed

him or

For

him,

believed Gustavus to be an unessential

still

and

factor in the problem,

spondence.

to

all

his doings,

still

Ferdinand by meekly worded corre-

the Protestant body paid any heed to

Gustavus might as well have remained

Such were

quietly in Sweden.

hoped that he could sway

his

German

friends.

Meanwhile, the imperial forces had been winning some successes in the Elbe country.

summer

of 1630,

Christian William, in the late

had armed Magdeburg, Halberstadt and

other neighboring towns, had driven the imperial forces from the region, and carried on an assiduous small war. success

was

But

his

Pappenheim, with seventeen thou-

short-lived.

sand men, having, as already narrated, surrounded the duke

Lauenburg and captured

of

returned and blockaded

This was not the

his

army on

Magdeburg

first

the lower Elbe,

in September.

attack on this proud

Hanse

city.

In the summer of 1629 Wallenstein, engaged in enforcing the Edict of Restitution, had laid siege to the

failure

at

Stralsund and of his

it,

own

but mindful of

reputation,

accepted a ransom of one hundred thousand dollars, and in September. sive

Magdeburg then patched up a

had left

treaty, offen-

and defensive, with the other League towns,

— Ham-

TREATY WITH MAGDEBURG.

198 burg, Liibeck,

and

Bremen, Brunswick

Hildesheini.

In

June, 1630, the ex-administrator got possession of the place,

and made the treaty already mentioned with Gustavus

in

August, by which the king agreed to have a heed to the city in all its dangers, to defend

it

without cost, never to forsake

or to conclude any peace in which

it,

No

before

The

it,

and opened

his lines.

fact that such a treaty

fact that

was not protected.

it

made than Pappenheim appeared

sooner was this treaty

was made, and the additional

Magdeburg was captured and sacked before Gustait, have been made the text of many accusa-

vus could reach

tions against the

Swedish king.

It is a

common

allegation

that before this disaster could occur, Gustavus was

march

to the relief of the city.

but there were

He had

but half

north, line,

command

the

and the entire

he was scarcely

ing to

all

is

many considerations won his base on the

might not lightly prejudice adventure,

This

reports

it.

bound

a charge easily

to

made

for the king to weigh.

sea or the Oder,

and he

Until he could, beyond a per-

Oder from the

territory

justified in

line of the

Warta

back of the Trebel-Tollense advancing inland.

from Magdeburg, and

to all

probabilities, the city could hold out against indefinitely, and, if Tilly joined him, against

Accordmilitary

Pappenheim

both for two or

The king had small doubt that he could keep the Oder country by threatening Frankfort, the loss

three months. Tilly in

of which would open the road through Silesia directly to the

He was

hereditary possessions of the emperor.

communication

with

Magdeburg, and

whereof he spoke, and his

lettei-s

to

may be

humanly

said,

it

he

knew

Falkenberg show his

feelings in the matter with perfect clearness.

that

in constant

thought

Despite

all

remains true that Gustavus did what was

possible to succor

Magdeburg.

foreseen all the difficulties in his path

He may

not have

when he made the

TILLY REACHES THE ODER. treaty, but he

burg could it

was

resist

fairly justified, in

199

assuming that Magde-

a longer siege, and that

it

would not be (as

was) treacherously surrendered by the imperial party

within

its

mand,

walls

and.

;

he sent one of his best

money

to raise troops

;

officers to

take com-

and he received credible

information that Tilly was on the point of abandoning the siege, as

he actually was on the eve of the storm.

to the point,

Still

Gustavus could hardly anticipate the unreason-

ing opposition of Brandenburg and Saxony

;

he had the best

of reasons for believing that he wovdd have forced the

Magdeburg should weaken within a short march of the city when

to battle long before

actually It

more

;

enemy

and he was

it

was taken.

not worth while, in view of Gustavus' life-work, to

is

combat the statement that he deliberately abandoned Magdeburg to her it

fate.

If

any accusation be brought against him,

should be for miscalculation of what he could accomplish

Magdeburg held

while

tion of the facts, but

out.

it is

All this anticipates the narra-

well to bear the matter in mind, in

order to appreciate the king's operations between the date of the treaty and the fall of

Magdeburg.

In February, 1631, the main imperial army under Tilly

made

finally

its

appearance in Gustavus' front.

and rather inert generalissimo had been

The aged

at fault in not sooner

sustaining his forces on the Oder, but he was unused to the

winter operations to which the

Snow King's

activity

had

foi'ced

After his ineffectual start for the Oder, he had been

him.

tempted to move to the assistance of Pappenheim at Magdeburg Tilly

:

but when he heard

began

be lost

;

so

how hard

pressed Schaumberg was,

to fear for Silesia, should the line of the

Warta

he abandoned the Magdeburg scheme and crossed

the Elbe at Dessau.

Then

via Treuenbrietzen

and Saarmund,

some twenty thousand strong, he marched on Frankfort, which he reached January 18, 1631. This gave the imperialists thirty-

GUSTAVUS AND TILLY SPAR.

200

Gustavus had succeeded in helping

four thousand men.

Magdeburg by drawing

From

Tilly

from

its

gates.

Frankfort, leaving a garrison of five hundred of his

best troops in the place, Tilly

marched

Landsberg, and

to

compelled the Swedes to raise the siege and

main camp

at Biirwalde.

The sturdy

tain indications of a readiness to

twenty-five thousand his intrenched

camp

fall

back

to the

old warrior gave cer-

draw the king, who had but

men and many

of these detached,

to a battle in the

open

;

from

but he did not

choose to assault the Barwalde works, nor was a special offer of battle

made.

lenburg problem.

Gustavus was engrossed with the Meck-

Until he should quite clear the imperialists

out of the territory near the coast, he could not be satisfied of

its

security

defense, he

threatened.

made

;

and

to sustain

Magdeburg

in her courageous

must advance from a base which could not be

The antagonism

this all the

more

true.

of

Brandenburg and Saxony

There was another idea

liu'king

mind that a threat towards the towns still held by the enemy in Mecklenburg would draw Tilly thither from the Frankfort region, and afi^ord him an opportunity to return

in Gustavus'

and capture

:

this city

and Landsberg out of hand.

These

strong places were essential to the operations he contemplated

between the Elbe and the Oder, but he could scarcely hope get hold of them so long as Tilly was within their walls.

by

luring Tilly to follow him, he

to

And

might so manoeuvre as

to

get a chance of battle in the open, or of catching the imperial

army

at a disadvantage, wdiile not affording the

occasion to return to Magdeburg.

Swiss Pikehead.

(15th Century.)

enemy an

XVI.

GUSTAVUS AND TILLY MANCEUVRE. FEBRUARY TO APRIL, With

twelve thousand

men Gustavus moved The

slowly followed on a southerly route.

minor towns.

He

bastion.

1630.

Colberg shortly

into the

Demmin region. Tilly Demmin and several

king- captured

and only Greifswalde held out within his

fell,

contemplated a movement on the Elbe, hut Tilly showed signs of

attacking- his lines,

and the king feared he might break through.

Instead of

so large a scheme, Tilly took Neu-Brandeuburg, and, massacring the garrison,

fort

Gustavus believed that a sharp threat on Frank-

Magdeburg.

retired towards

would again draw Tilly away from

thousand fell,

this ally,

and

in

March, with fourteen

a large force of guns, he advanced up the Oder.

men and

and Frankfort was taken by storm, with a number of general

Ciistrin officers.

This was a brilliant exploit, and for his lesson in audacity modern war

The

dered.

bastion was thus pushed forward to the Warta, and the road to

Vienna was open.

Had

deburg.

Such a

situation shoidd have called Tilly

not Gustavus felt

it

duty to relieve the

his

advanced directly on the emperor.

now a

semicircle

away from Mag-

city,

he might have

Tilly did indeed start to the relief of

Frankfort, but being too late, headed back to Magdeburg. ing was

is

Advancing on Landsberg, the place surren-

indebted to the Swedish king.

from Mecklenburg

to Prussia,

The Swedish

hold-

with a chain of strong

places all the way, Frankfort in the centre.

In pursuance of Oder, Gustavus

and

alry

left

;

Horn

not to

to hold the

risk

if

enemy

;

and

at Soldin, with six cav-

to the Landsberg-Ciistrin

to seize

the opportunity offered.

in Pyritz,

the

camp

an engagement, but to act defensively

against superior forces

berg

in a

six infantry regiments fronting towards the AVarta,

and under orders line

TiUy away from the

his design to entice

Frankfort and Lands-

Horn's reserves would

lie

Stargard and GoUnow, so as to protect the Oder,

Neumark and

eastern Pomerania.

Should the enemy

GUSTAVUS ATTACKS DEMMIN.

202

go into winter-quarters, Horn might attack Landsberg and Driesen,

tlie

two most important points on the

line of the

Warta-Netze.

On

January 26 Gustavus himself

with six cavalry

set out

and four infantry regiments, plus some Stettin all

twelve thousand men.

battalions, in

Kniphausen, who commanded in

the Stralsund region and was

now

besieging Greifswalde, was

Marching by way

sent orders to be ready to join the king.

of Stettin, where he crossed the Oder, past Locknitz, which

he took, Pasewalk and Waldeck, Gustavus

left

At Neu-Brandenburg

rison in Prenzlow.

the imperialists

The small

capitulated February 2, and were paroled. rison of

Treptow retired

lest it

a small gar-

gar-

should be taken prisoner, and

Clempenow was captured a day or two later. To hold these towns protected the proposed siege of

min.

It

Dem-

was cold winter

weather, but the possession of western

Pomera-

nia was too important to

delay

till

spring.

Demmin,

anciently

a

strong place, had been re-

paired

Demmin.

ists.

the Peene-Trebel-ToUense region.

by the It

imperial-

was the apex of

Savelli held

it

with seven-

teen hundred men, while in Loitz, near by, lay six hundred

more, and fifteen hundred in Greifswalde. to fortify,

and

art

had been

Demmin was

easy

called to the aid of nature.

It

was surrounded by a bastioned earthwork with a wide wet ditch and glacis

work

;

and the

vicinity

was commanded by a

field-

inclosing a strong tower, north of the town, on the left

TILLY FOLLOWS. bank

203

Peene and surrounded hy the morass made by

of the

Tilly

the river.

had

told Savelli that he

must hold the place

had supplies and ammunition

at least fourteen days, as he

in

abundance.

That the marsh was frozen helped the besiegers

somewhat.

In addition to ordering Kniphausen to join him

at

Demmin

with

all

his available foot

his cavalry

ward was

;

The king saw

Demmin. had

that Loitz

sessed a castle of

was cut

Tilly

first to

bank

left

some strength.

off

met

this

starting himself

he

left

berg ;

It

stood

and pos-

This was accomplished,

from Greifswalde, and the road from

march

whom

the king again

of Gustavus

by leaving Schaumberg

Frankfort with eight thousand men, and with twenty thousand

at the situation,

Mecklenburg,

for

he had delayed some time.

Frankfort, he feared that If

be taken, for

of the Peene,

to bring his batteries.

In the vicinity of

Perturbed

for-

Torstenson with the artillery

Stralsund was opened for Kniphausen,

admonished

Treptow with

Clempenow,

detached work on the

Savelli

to

and with eight hundred musketeers he went

to reconnoitre

to follow to

like a

and some siege-guns,

march

the king had instructed Baudissin to

Horn would

seize

If

on Lands-

he stayed, that Gustavus would advance across the

Havel on Magdeburg.

Finally he chose the least dangerous

course and set out early in February.

He could break

through

Gustavus' lines at Prenzlow, Neu-Brandenburg, or some point

on the Trebel-Recknitz, Greifswalde

;

if

or he could

he wanted to go to the

march

proposed to attack Magdeburg.

relief of

straight to the Havel,

His course was

the ensuing manoeuvres Tilly was

seeking to

away from Frankfort and the open road

plain.

if

he

During

draw Gustavus

to Silesia, as well as

to prevent his marching to the relief of

Magdeburg; and

Gustavus' aim was to keep Tilly from adding his army to the besieging forces at Magdeburg, and to take Frankfort and

SAVELLI SURRENDERS.

204

Landsberg from

liim

On

by a stratagem.

the direct road

up

the Oder the king had got possession of all the towns, so that Tilly was obliged to

Berlin:

of

move

his

columns by a detour south

via Beskow, Fiirstenwalde, Mittenwalde,

mund, Brandenburg and Neu-Ruppin.

Saar-

This, to be

sure,

enabled him to cover the line of the Havel, which would head

Gustavus

on

off

from Magdeburg

but he was seriously delayed

;

his march by the opposition of several towns. The king learned of Tilly's march, from Horn, on February

Selecting Malchin as a good outpost to prevent inter-

10.

with his operations against Demmin, he ordered

ference

Kniphausen and

Baudissin

and meanwhile

thither;

dis-

patched Captain Moltke with thirty-six horse to reconnoitre This

the place.

officer

managed

make

to

that the king was close by with the

the

enemy

believe

Demmin army, and

seized

the town, though the garrison was thrice the size of his force. tion,

For a mere scouting party,

this

own

was a pretty opera-

and opened the way for the approaching troops.

On

February 12 Gustavus marched from Loitz on Demmin, sending cavalry ahead to cut off Savelli from retreat.

13th he reached the work on the

Landsknechte retired

left

to the tower.

On

the

bank, whose garrison of

Out

of this they were

driven by mining, and rather than be blown into the air they surrendered, the

At

men

enlisting

under the Swedish

colors.

the same time approaches were ojjened and pushed on

the right

bank against Demmin.

cluded he had better

make

terms.

In two days Savelli con-

He was

allowed to retire

with the honors of war, conditioned on his army and himself

not serving in Pomerania and Mecldenburg for three ensu-

ing months.

Having yielded up a place which could have

offered a long resistance, Savelli withdrew to Neu-Ruppiu.

Much fell

artillery

to the

and a

Swedes.

large

supply of

corn and forage

Tilly found grievous

fault with

his

A STRONG CURTAIN. lieutenant

He

205

he would accept, and indeed there was, no excuse.

;

desired to

make an example

of Savelli

but this

;

officer,

who had

friends at court, got off with a few months' arrest,

and was

later given higher

Demmin these

it

allowed free exit for

all

Among

personal effects.

who had made an attempt on money he had received from

the king's

being asked whether he would confiscate the it

life,

his treachery.

the

replied that

mind

capitulation of

was the baggage of Quinti del Ponte, a deserter and

traitor,

in

The

employment.

stuff,

and

On

Gustavus

was included in the terms, and that he had no

to take petty revenge

on the man.

In view of the Swedish successes

along the

all

Pomeranian Estates were now persuaded

line,

the

to raise ten thou-

sand foot and three thousand horse to garrison the land, a help which released an equal

number

Gustavus had surely deserved

field.

of

Swedes

for the

this first assistance.

For the moment, and not anticipating much manoeuvring on

Tilly's part, the

king appears to have deferred his designs

on Frankfort in favor of putting his men for needed rest in winter-quarters.

Behind

his curtain of

strong places, he

designed to clean up his work by the capture of Colberg and Greifswalde, and perhaps of Rostock and Wismar, and with

nothing in his rear, the more safely advance to the relief of

Magdeburg, and approach Hamburg and Liibeck.

The proOder to

jected line of winter-quarters was to extend from the

Stralsund

:

Baner

and ToUense tre

;

command

of the right along the Trebel

Kniphausen at Neu-Brandenburg

Teuffel and Baudissin on the

Ucker line

;

in

;

beyond the Oder, Horn.

left,

in the cen-

along the upper

The strong

places on the

were Ribnitz, Dammgarten, Tribsies, Demmin, Malchin,

Clempenow, Treptow, Neu-Brandenburg, Prenzlow, Garz and Schwedt.

East of the Oder the line would run parallel to

the Warta-Netze.

Near Wolgast were Kagg and Tott with

TILLY ON THE WAR-PATH.

206

The king personally went

the reserve cavalry.

new

oversee the whole or to plan line lay the

Swedish

from Frankfort

operations.

imperialists,

to Stettin to

Oj)posite this

with an irregular front

Magdeburg, and outlying forces

to

in the

Rostock-Wismar country.

Not meaning

to lie idle because he contemplated winter-

Baner was instructed by the king

quarters,

of Greif swalde

from the south, but

to

to press the siege

have a heed

enemy should break through the line to relieve to help with his cavalry,

and

Now

Knii^hausen, as needed.

Baner

the imperial army,

to lend a

hand

it.

to

lest the

Tott was

Baner or

that he was quite cut off from

called

on the commandant of

Greifswalde to surrender, but Colonel Perusi refused terms

and prepared for defense. Gustavus had seriously considered a march up the Oder through Silesia

;

but the attitude of Brandenburg and Sax-

ony held him back. founded

;

Tilly's

dread in this quarter was

ill-

but the old-fashioned soldier justly feared some

operation which he could not fathom, and chose the

Ruppin

country as a good place from which to attack any novel problem.

In going to Stettin the king

with some distrust

;

but he had

could hold their own.

Kniphausen was

information in his front,

and

left his lieutenants

a right to believe that they

late in

active in procuring

February had come to

the conclusion that Tilly was about to attack Prenzlow, so as to

break through the

line to relieve Greifswalde.

had the same notion, and cautioned the

officers in

Gustavus

command

to be ready to concentrate to oppose any such attempt. Later indications were that Tilly was aiming at Neu-Bran-

denburg, and Kniphausen sent notice to Baner and Baudis-

Like information was received by the king, who sent word to Baner to sustain Kniphausen, as he could do without weakenino- his sieae lines. On March 6 Baner reached Friedsin.

FALL OF COLBERG. land,

where he was

207

to await the king's further orders

dissin had broken up towards the same place

likewise prepared to

The

move

to

months under Boetius, and victual,

;

Bauking-

Kniphausen's assistance.

had been

siege of Colberg

;

and the

finally,

on continuously for

going-

on March

from lack of

2,

Colonel Mors surrendered, marched out with the

honors of war, and was given free passage to Landsberg.

The

fall of

Colberg made available the bulk of the garrisons

Neumark Leslie was left command of what remained the surplus force was ordered Stettin, and on March 7 Gustavus, thus reinforced, reached

of the surrounding places in the in to

;

;

Pasewalk.

Meanwhile Tilly slowly advanced

Demmin

Savelli there with the

Neu-Ruppin, found

to

and learned

garrison,

of the

Thence he headed for Neu-Brandenburg.

loss of Colberg.

Gustavus had sent word to Kniphausen

denburg manfully

(or, if

to hold

Neu-Bran-

he had to surrender, to make good

terms), and he would within a few days either relieve him or

undertake an operation to draw Tilly away.

begun

that Gustavus had

;

was an

did not believe that Tilly was

merely aiming at Neu-Brandenburg.

worth his while

fact

to revert to his old plan of

He

attack on Frankfort.

The

scarcely

It

seemed

he concluded that the imperial general was

concentrating for a dash on either Stettin or Greifswalde.

The apex

of the Stralsund-Greifswalde position

and even should Neu-Brandenburg for the place could be got Tilly,

willing

angered at the to

come

to

back

fall, it

later.

loss of Colberg,

battle

Demmin,

is

was no

fatal loss,

It looks a little as if

was at

with the king

;

this

moment

but Gustavus

thought best to draw him away from his Mecklenburg lines

by a diversion on Frankfort and Landsberg, convinced that he would follow.

There was a greater gain here, and

danger in case of defeat.

less

In pursuance of this plan, the

MERCILESS MASSACRE.

208

king ordered some of the troops east of the Oder to Krah:iii^, opposite Schwedt, and Torstenson and Carl Baner, with some

camp he had

bridge materials and victual, to a

artillery,

intrenched on the Oder between Schwedt and Vierraden.

Purposing to

mand

Baner

call

to his

own

side,

he

Horn

Demmin

with orders to cover Wolgast, Loitz and if

left

in com-

of the forces behind the Peene, Trebel and Recknitz,

necessary, on Anklam and Stralsund

;

and

;

to retire,

in case Tilly

should advance on Gustavus, to follow him up, leaving only

a small force behind him.

The king some small

away by

Tilly paid no heed to his move-

miscalculated.

He had

ments.

indeed no deep design, but was looking for

success.

He was

able manoeuvring.

not active enough to be seduced

From Neu-Ruppin, on March

Stargard, just south of Neu-Brandenburg.

12, he reached

This latter was not a place which could be easily defended.

Gustavus called

it

a " naked spot," and Kniphausen had not

Nor had he got

a single guii.

messengers had been captured

;

the

and instead of capitulating

;

man determined

honorably, the brave old thrice refused Tilly's

the king's final orders

to hold on,

and

demand, replying that he would defend

the town to the last man. Tillj'^

began a furious cannonade, and kept

breached the mean walls with his

town March

23.

The

the Swedes surprised

resistance Tilly

neither asked nor given Tilly gave the rison.

town up

was heroic

;

beyond measvire. four hundred

to plunder,

up two days,

the fighting of

Quarter was

imperialists

fell^

and annihilated the gar-

Every male was ruthlessly slaughtered, except Knip-

hausen and three other riot.

;

it

and stormed the

artillery,

officers.

Outrage of every kind ran

— as

a species of revenge for the

Nothing was spared,

capture of

Demmin and

Colberg

;

but

it

was a sad contrast to

the recent conduct of the Swedes under parallel conditions.

BACK TO MAGDEBURG.

209

the imperialists no strategic good, for Tilly

It did

advantage in advancing farther.

He was

not a

saw no

man

to

he

encouraged hy success, nor had he any surplus enterprise to boast

of.

Friedland

Why neither is

is

a bare twenty miles from Neu-Brandenburg.

Baner nor Baudissin came

The

not explained.

ure

to

When Horn

is

may have

to Knijjhausen's aid

lain in the king's fail-

rather blind design, and in orders a

guess Tilly's

record of which

error

not on hand.

ascertained the fall of Neu-Brandenburg, he

withdrew the troops from Friedland, leaving only a garrison, broke down the bridge at Treptow, and retired to Demmin,

and Greifswalde by

to protect the approaches to Stralsund

holding the fords of the Peene and Trebel.

Tilly,

on weigh-

ing the difficulty of marching on either Stralsund, Greifs-

walde or Anklam, and fearing that, by a sudden dash, Gustavus might seize the passage of the Havel, concluded to retire to

Neu-Ruppin.

When

he did

Horn returned

so,

to

Friedland.

A

small compensation for the Neu-Brandenburg disaster

shortly occurred

when

thousand horse on

its

met a detachment of a

the rhinegrave

way from Rostock

and completely destroyed

to the imperial army,

it.

Count Pappenheim had made

to the elector of

Bavaria

many

complaints of Tilly's dilatoriness, and about this time

there

came orders

to Tilly to let everything lapse

fered with the capture of

have retired as

it

Magdeburg.

No

inter-

doubt Tilly would

was, for without reason he became nervous

about the Dessau bridge.

He

wanted

where the convention was being held

;

to

to contradictory instructions, he chose

should suit every one's ideas,

be near Leipsic,

and as

representative of both the empire and the

him

which

his position as

League subjected

an operation which

— the siege of Magdeburg.

ADVANCE ON FRANKFORT.

210

On

Tilly's retiring

from the Neu-Branclenburg holocaust,

Gustavus imagined that he was aiming at Prenzlow, to march

up the Ucker self,

to the sea, interpose

and deliver

between Horn and him-

battle to one or other

he ordered Horn to

;

via Pasewalk to Lijcknitz, so as to be able at any

march

moment

to join him, while Carl

Baner was instructed

fight in

make

one body and with a good camp in his rear.

But

ascertained that Tilly had retired to Neu-Ruppin,

when he

to

draw

intention to return to

Mag-

he gave up his defensive attitude, and struck so as

away from

Tilly

to

Gustavus thus prepared to

secure the works of Schwedt.

He

deburof.

would do

his

now manifest

believed that

this,

a direct

and sent Horn back

threat to the

on Frankfort

command

of the

Stralsund-Stettin country, with orders to push the siege of

Greifswalde, and to send a body of horse to watch the east side of the Oder.

make

a

If

he captured Greifswalde, he

move on Rostock,

other quarter.

or threaten

could

in

some

Bauer accompanied the king.

Just as the king was about to rialists

Mecklenburg

start,

he heard that the impe-

from Landsberg had sent out a detachment and had

captured Arnswalde. teen thousand

This moved him to speed.

men and two hundred

guns, on

With fourMarch 27,

1631, he broke up from Schwedt, headed his column along

both Oder banks for Frankfort, the main force on the bank, and the right flank

flotilla

and west,

in

company.

The

and rear of the army was protected by the camp

at Schwedt, as well as led the

and flying-bridge

left

by flanking detachments.

column with the cavalry

artillery.

;

The horse scoured

the country well to the

and a detachment captured Oranienburg,

a possible threat to the flank.

Baudissin

the king followed with foot

On March

to forestall

30 the column

reached Wrietzen. Ciistrin

was

of the first importance.

Gustavus had an

A BOLD ASSAULT.

211

intelligent observer here, received frequent information,

knew

all

The commandant, Colonel Kracht,

about the place.

was speedily convinced

of the uselessness of resistance,

gave up the place on demand. April

1,

and and

Continuing the advance on

the outlying posts and scout-

ing parties of the imperialists were encountered.

was

No set

On

the

2d the army

in front of Frankfort.

sooner arrived than the king

about a siege.

Some

sand imperial troops

six thou-

were

the

in

town, and a number of distinguished officers,

Marshal Tiefenbach, Count

Schaumberg,

General

and Colonel Sparre.

Montecuculi

They had

de-

termined on defense, and burned the

Frankfort.

suburbs.

The Swedish army lay on

the hills to await the

prepare material for the siege.

fleet,

Gustavus reconnoitred.

first

On

April 3 three batteries were ])lanted opposite the

The

Guben

and three regiments posted opposite the Lebus fire

On

night trenches were opened, not without opposition.

the

gate,

and

from the batteries was

was made.

effective,

gate.

and a small breach

In the late afternoon a body of

men was

sent

forward to capture the outworks, so as to drive the enemy within walls, or, as some authorities rather improbably state,

an attack was begun by a junior Swedish motion, and then followed

uj).

However

officer

on his own

started, the

Swedes

advanced with exceptional gallantry, got through the ditch, clambered up the wall, tore down the palisades, and drove

from the town gates. But they Some musketeers planted ladders, reached and blew the gates down with petards. Nothing

the imperialists helter-skelter

did not stop here. the wall,

INTELLIGENT AUDACITY.

212

Every man met

covikl resist the fury of the soldiery.

was cut down seventeen hundred were ;

killed,

in

arms

Count Schaum-

berg among them, and one thousand were captured, including

many

officers

;

A

Neu-Brandenburg

part of the garrison

many were drowned two general

was taken.

of stores

The

for three hours to plunder, in retaliation

for the massacre at

was taken.

amount

a large

town was given up

the Oder.

in

officers,

but no

;

made

A

citizen's life

efforts to escape

small part, including

escaped towards Silesia; individuals

reached refuge even as far as Glogau. This capture of a walled city with strong defenses and

number

heavily garrisoned, containing a

of capable military

men, without waiting for a perfect breach, was an exceptional

and earned the Swedes great

venture,

spread

fast,

ence the

and the king hoped that the victory would

German

The modern for

The news

credit.

art of

war

more than one lesson

is

indebted to Gustavus Adolphus

in audacity.

It

was well that the

world should learn that bold assaults are justifiable this the

Swedish hero led the way.

and especially the

influ-

princes to join him.

;

and

in

This capture of Frankfort,

later crossing of the

Lech and the

assault

on the Alte Veste, were object lessons of exceptional value. Not but what breaches had been stormed before Gustavus' time. It is

not for ordinary boldness that he deserves credit

should be awarded the acts

highest encomium

;

but he

for doing those

which in his era were condemned as foolhardy, and for

showing the world that intelligent audacity

is

not of necessity

rashness.

From

Frankfort, on April

5,

Gustavus with

all

and three thousand foot advanced on Landsberg. dragoons drove before

it

the Croats, of

the horse

The van

whom many

of

still

infested the country, and inflicted heavy loss on these savage

marauders.

Out

of twelve hundred, not

two hundred got

LANDSBERG CAPTURED. away.

On

town.

Horn had been ordered

April 7 the Swedes reached the vicinity of the cross

to

Schwedt, and head for Landsberg, with collect, to

213

He

help shut in the town.

all

the

river

from

the force he coidd

arrived the same day

as the king.

Gustavus had supposed that Tilly would take some vigorous action to relieve Landsberg, and ordered Baner to break

down

the Ciistrin bridge, to finish a redoubt already com-

menced there and make

it

as strong as possible,

river,

to hold

Gustavus purposed

to

off,

Should he try Crossen,

as Tilly could not cross at Schwedt.

up

and

This would head the imperial army

Frankfort stoutly.

check him with his cavalry;

should he go as far south as Glogau, Gustavus would pay no

heed to him, as he hoped in that case to be through with

Landsberg before the enemy coidd reach Baner, with

five

king April 15.

On

against Landsberg.

it.

regiments from Frankfort, joined the the same day operations were opened

The town

lay in the valley,

and pos-

sessed a castle, and an outlying fort, on whose possession

depended the security of the artillery against the fort,

reverse.

castle.

Gustavus directed

and placed guns

After no great interchange of

of a sortie, a

demand was made

;

so as to take

fire,

his

it

in

and the repulse

and, April 16, in pursu-

ance of a short negotiation, the garrison of four thousand

men

surrendered, and received free exit on agreement not to for eight

serve

Swedish

drew

left flank

in the

Silesia

months.

Crossen speedily followed.

The

was thus abundantly secured, and the king

bulk of his forces to Frankfort.

The road

to

was open.

Now, had Gustavus, indifferent as to

as

is

sometimes alleged, really been

Magdeburg, would he not have chosen the

plan long urged by Oxenstiern, and have himself advanced

through Silesia on Vienna, instead as he did of intrusting

MAGDEBURG?

SILESIA OR

214 this section to

Count Horn?

Such an advance would

suited his paymaster, Richelieu

heart of his

enemy

he was

;

;

^^ave

would have struck at the

it

justified

by the neglect

of the

own and

men he had come

to help in looking solely to his

Swedish interests

he would have had a walk-over to Vienna,

;

and have possibly made a

brilliant coup'

That, instead of

the alluring route, he chose to turn back towards the

who needed dered,

help, but

who

said no thanks for

sufficient proof that

is

what he

men ten-

he was faithful to the cause he

had undertaken beyond what can be said of most great captains.

Tilly

had remained a long time inactive

and then started

in the direction of

learned that Gustavus had

moved

at

Neu-Ruppin,

Magdeburg.

When

he

against Frankfort, he also

turned that way, sending word to the place that he was on the road to relieve

was too

late,

it

;

but hearing at Brandenburg that he

he sat down not far from Berlin to wait.

believed that Gustavus would either to

Magdeburg, and he was unwilling

His desire was

to

march on to follow

Silesia or

him

He back

to Silesia.

draw the king from the Oder towards the

Elbe, so that he might engage battle with him on favorable

terms

;

failing which, to capture

an example of mission. until

But

as would frighten the Protestants into sub-

it

for

Landsberg

The king

Magdeburg, and make such

some time he embraced no

fell

sent

action.

Not

did he start for the Elbe.

word

of his wonderful success to

Magde-

burg, promised succor within two months, and said that he

based his calculations on the belief that the town could hold out easily at least so long.

XVII.

MAGDEBURG. SEPTEMBER, Magdebukg had been and the

city

became a

Magdeburg

returned to

to help

Gustavus decided to march to

force,

enmity

But he was opposed by the

electors of

the Swedes to cross his terri-

reluctantly yielded

latter to

;

even the danger to Magde-

permit a Swedish march across his land to

its

men

held the balance of power, Gustavus might not provoke

and believing with reason that Magdeburg could hold out several

;

weeks longer, he urged his negotiations for passage. sharply pushed. thii'ty

when

Meanwhile, the siege was

Falkenberg had twenty-five hundred men, Tilly and Pappen-

thousand, but the resistance was stubborn.

the advent of the king, contemplated withdrawal tions,

made

After taking Frankfort, as Tilly

though the imperialists had gone to and fro at will. As John George with

forty thousand

heim

Gustavus had

several forts, the walls

Pappenheim, who had been there many months,

its relief.

when he

burg would not induce the

his

whom

1631.

or to occupy the fortresses essential to the Swedish advance, until the

king threatened

relief,

fortress.

The former forbade

Brandenbmg and Saxony. tory,

TO MAY,

well fortified by Falkenberg,

The Elbe bridge was protected by

sent thither. strong,

1630,

the garrison was off

its

;

Finally, TiUy, fearing

but during previous negotia-

guard because an imperial herald was within

walls awaiting answer to Tilly's ultimatum, an assault, aided by the treachery of citizens,

was made on

May

20, the place

and forty thousand souls perished.

was taken, given up

to plunder, burned,

This holocaust was properly charged by

Gustavus to John George.

In the

light of his recent success,

plate an advance on the Elbe.

Gustavus might contem-

His base was secure.

was no clanger of interruption from Poland, and open to him,

There

Silesia

was

Tilly gave up hope of regaining the Oder, but

for a while he lay near Brandenburg, far as Crossen.

He

and sent parties out as

threatened Berlin, but the citizens put

the city in a state of defense, burned the suburbs, and flatly

denied him victual

:

and on the

fall of

Landsberg he marched

TILLTS MILITARY FAITH.

216

towards Magdeburg, and crossed at Dessau.

he

felt that

he must hold the Elbe, and he was impelled to

wreak on Magdeburg a vengeance Tilly was

The Oder gone,

still

for the loss of Frankfort.

a slave to the old method, in which the deter-

rent virtue of cruelty was an article of faith.

It is

proven

by modern investigation that the wanton slaughter and burning at Magdeburg were not by his command, but the fact

remains that Tilly was a representative of the old school, one of

whose tenets was that the sack

of a city

of right to which the soldier had a claim.

was a species

In this light he

cannot be absolved from the barbarism exhibited in that unfortunate

Now

city.

was surely Gustavus' time

he resolutely set about

it.

The

to relieve

Magdeburg, and

military danger of such an

advance was past, and the king's assurances of speedy succor

were founded on ception of path,

means

this fact.

logistic difficulties

ness.

excess of the winter's hard

So much was

on for the troops

Pomera-

home and

the cavalry had run

;

work and deprivation

below that of the enemy in

this the fact that the

effective-

king was called

time to punish depredations, and yet the

first

— horse

;

remittances from

;

abroad came in after tedious delays

so as to be appreciably

were by no

Victual was hard to get

surmounted.

nia was slow in filling her quota

down by

as yet no con-

the political difficulties which lay athwart his

and the military and all

But Gustavus had

and foot

alike

"

Many

— suffered

at times almost to

little

support," com-

was of small account compared

to the difficulty

the verge of mutiny.

excuses,

plained the king.

But

all this

of bringing the electors of

helpful attitude.

march through the cerned should

fall

Brandenburg and Saxony

to a

Gustavus could not begin an unauthorized territory of

upon

his rear

either, lest the ;

prince con-

and he was able

to

make

ARGUMENT BY CANNON.

217

They were not small potentates should Brandenburg and Saxony join hands

no impression upon them. like Bogislav

;

to resist the king, his helj^fulness to the cause of Protestant-

The business

ism was at an end. force

called for diplomacy, not

and George William had already been antagonized by

;

the Custrin matter.

On

April 21 the king himself was in Ciistrin, where he

worked out

his plans for the

Magdeburg

His

expedition.

next step must be to the fortress of Spandau, as a secondary

Horn was

base to secure his advance.

the Oder, with headquarters in Custrin,

command on and was to make up left in

a new army from the recruits collected in Pomerania and

A garrison was

arriving from Sweden.

May

and a rendezvous was given for troops destined for the It ity

army

placed in Landsberg, 1, at

Kbpenick, to

of the Elbe.

was hard to argue George William out of his neutralcommissioners effected nothing

;

in Berlin proved of no avail.

;

a personal interview

Until Gustavus, in a

righteous indignation, declared almost at the cannon's that unless Custrin and

Spandau were voluntarily

woidd occupy them by

force,

manifest that he

must rely on

possession,

on Saxony

reliance

tary power

;

man

is

of

mouth It

was

not promises. ;

he placed no

he believed himself in Gustavus' mili-

he weakened, and finally came to terms.

of both Ciistrin

Magdeburg

;

fit

yielded, he

he made no headway.

George William could expect no imperial aid

the

all

and Spandau was given

incident should be closed

;

to

Control

Gustavus until the

but the vacillation of

no better shown than in the fact that George Wil-

liam wrote an apologetic letter to the emperor, excusing his action,

and stating that he had caused as great a delay as

possible.

No

A pretty champion

sooner in Spandau

for the

Dessau bridge,

of his faith indeed

than, on

in the

May

8,

!

Gustavus started

hope that he would have

less

ALL ROADS CLOSED.

ji^lS

His back was scarcely

trouble with the elector of Saxony.

turned when George William alleged fresh mostly his duty to the empire of Spandau,

—

where Gustavus had

The opposition amounted

men.

in delivering left

difficulties

up

—

full control

but a small body of

to nothing, but

was an addi-

Compulsion alone was an argument

tional source of worry.

with this shortsighted potentate, who, from a species of moral cowardice

difficult

tended neutrality. tie,

to

understand,

It

was hard to rupture the old imperial

clung to his pre-

still

even for religion.

When

Oder country, Gus-

Tilly finally retired from the

him up

tavus intended promptly to follow

but the road open

;

had been completely barred

to the imperialists

Bran-

to him.

denburg once opened, he must reckon with Saxony

John George would not allow him

The only

tenberg or Dessau.

to cross his fords at

;

and Wit-

other road was via Branden-

burg and Mockern, through a country which had been so completely devastated that ish

gave an

which was

commissariat,

ill

He

promise to the Swed-

ebb-tide

at

Magdeburg was already

the bridge at besiegers.

it

;

were scarce, or had been destroyed

by the enemy

toon-train,

and

much time

;

so

as to be

moreover

hands of the

could not well advance to the aid of Magde-

burg from any point lower down the Elbe

seized

and

in the

;

;

means

for the bridges

the boats had

the river was wide

to secure

;

all

been

he had no pon-

;

of crossing

would consume

the vicinity he must occupy had been devastated, unfit

to sustain operations

should attempt to cross,

it

must be

;

and wherever he

in the face of a superior

enemy.

Every avenue

to his objective

anxious to relieve his faithful

— as a matter of — sense compromise be held

to

seemed closed

ally,

;

and while

Gustavus could scarcely

good faith or a matter of common

his

whole military scheme, built up

STUBBORN JOHN GEORGE.

219

with endless care and caution, by so moving as to endanger his communications, magazines

and jwints

cVapj^ui, tu ii--k

an uprising of Brandenburg and Saxony in his rear.

His

difficulties

estant princes

Denmark, who, save himself

;

Most Prot-

can scarcely be overestimated.

still

looked at him as a secon'^ Christian of

at the proper time,

might

cause to

sell their

they not only refused his advances, but declined

to raise troops for the

common

cause.

The

electors of

Bran-

denbiu'g and Saxony could not have done less for him had

In truth they woidd have proven a

they been open enemies.

simpler factor in the problem had they met him sword in

hand.

Gustavus represented

John George with the utmost

to

frankness the condition of Magdeburg, as also his Tilly's relative strength, sies,

begged

this

own and

and by correspondence and embas-

head of the German Protestants for aid in

perilous venture.

The

elector

would scarcely deign

to

and answers, when they came, were argumentative

his

answer solely.

The diplomatic interchanges

are interesting, but they do not

come within our province.

That John George forbade a

march through

his

territory suffices

to

explain Gustavus'

long delay in carrying out his promise to stand by the city of

Magdeburg

in its distress.

the balance of power

;

Magdeburg

Had

— and

he been

— perhaps — while

gaping at his boldness stuff to save

outnumbered him

;

the

the elector of Brandenburg in his rear

was not to be relied upon, not a Charles XII.

Tilly

an army of forty thousand men, held

elector of Saxony, with

;

to be brief, so,

Gustavus was

he might have relieved

the dull-witted electors were

but he would not have been of the

Protestantism in Germany.

Happily for

us,

he was better balanced, and woidd not risk Sweden and the future of the faith on a hair-brained advance, however brilliant.

He

felt

constrained to remain on the Havel, along

PAPER CAMPAIGN.

A

220

which he advanced as far as he might, until he could over-

came the

Saxon

inertia of the

Putting aside politics forty thous-'iid solved.

Tlii^*^

—

elector.

John George with

in this case

— the military problem could

men

by way

or four stout marches

his

be readily

of Dessau, the

destruction there of Tilly's force, the building of a bridge-

head to preserve his

and the summary attack of the

line,

enemy besieging Magdeburg were among

we assume

But

if

one,

and that he was bound

cations,

we can

to disregard all political compli-

scarcely imagine his pushing far into the tan-

gled network before him.

because they

the possibilities.

was merely a military

that Gustavus' duty

made

All great soldiers have succeeded

politics subserve their military

and so did the Swedish monarch.

We

may imagine

and rapid advance which some historians have his duty to

may

picture

make, to redeem its

success

;

scheme the bold

told us

was

it

Magdeburg

his pledge to

;

we

but we shall have created a paper

campaign, and a paper hero, we shall not have depicted the

Gustavus who saved the Reformation in Germany, and who

was the father of modern war.

Gustavus was not great

because he was either cautious or bold

;

he was great because

he knew when to be cautious and when to be bold. We shall see him bold enough by and by. To return to Magdeburg. Colonel Falkenberg had been sent by Gustavus to take charge of its defense in the fall of 1630, and had entered the city October 19. situation far

from bad.

The enemy had

sand men, was merely observing the

city,

confident that he could hold the jilace for

was warmly welcomed, and took full command,

— the

his influence

less

fomid the

than six thou-

and Falkenberg

felt

many months.

He He

was

at once felt.

administrator retaining only his

body-guard and a sort of advisory control, recruiting outside

He

— and

and repairing the works within.

began

THE DEFENSES OF MAGDEBURG. The Elbe

at

Magdeburg has a number

The bridge over the

together.

enemy, the

of islands close

river utilized th«ge,

bridge-head stood on the right bank.

221

and a

Perceiving that the

attacking

l)y

from

islan
up

river, could cut off the

bridge,

Falkenberg

built a big

work at the

south end of the most

important one, and for the several sections of the

bridge

To

strengthen

redoubts.

bridge - head

the

on

the

work

right

bank,

called

" Trutzkaiser "

a

erected

on

the

Miihlberg, a

hill

near

was

by which commanded it.

Magdeburg-.

Two heaxy works

were built on the south of the town, one on the water's edge,

and one in the outer corner

;

a

number

of bastions

were

constructed to strengthen the city wall, and the Sudenb.^.'g

suburb was protected by a strong redoubt.

On

the west the

two gates were strengthened by two horn-works and a crownwork.

The north

side,

where the Neustadt

lay, possessed a

round bastion on a point surrounded by a dry arm of the Elbe.

The

suburb was

gate here was fortified with two towers, and the itself

AVork was \agorously pushed,

intrenched.

and by the end of the year the

Magdeburg was a and

intelligence.

walls.

fortress.

citizens could truly claim that

Falkenberg had shown energy

But Magdeburg had a weak spot within

Christian William, the town council,

the military

PAPPENHEIM RESTLESS.

222

under Falkenberg, the common Catholics — each

disaffe^tet'

folk,

and a strong party

of

mind —

group of a different

furnished abundant means for disagreement and promise of treachery.

and yet

its

city

Between Gustavus

Magdeburg.

Tilly paid small heed to

and that scornful

he scarcely knew which way to turn

capture would have been almost the hardest blow

Pappenheim understood

he could deal the Swedes.

this well.

For months correspondence ran between the imperial army and the Magdeburg

coimcil,

and

it

alists

waver in

to

its

numbered some

fealty to Gustavus, of the

was not infrequently put ests

;

were made to bring

But Falkenberg never permit-

the city back to the empire.

ted

efforts

most

though the imperi-

He

influential citizens.

to it to reconcile conflicting inter-

but though he could not accomplish the moral task,

he mastered the material one, and during the winter of 1630-31, he

labored to

and

stronger,

make new

at designing

the ones.

surrounding

On

defenses

the right bank,

whence Gustavus was expected, were erected the " Trutz-

Pappenheim

" furthest to the east,

nearer thi town

burg Succor." thi" right

men, plus

;

A

and the " Trutz-Tilly

and upstream a large work, the " Magdeline of

heavy intrenchments arose along

bank, and Falkenberg had twenty-five hundred citizen-militia, to

man

them.

In November Tilly had proposed to besiege the

city,

but

contented himself with leaving Pappenheim to blockade while he turned towards Gustavus.

He

adapted

to so

was more

Pappenheim was a hot-headed

slow a process as this blockade in his style

;

it

left his lieutenant

with ten thousand men, but at times drew on this for other service.

city

"

;

to

number

officer,

storm the

and he fretted under the

task.

Count Wolf von Mansfeld had a small army near by, but no assistance, a fact which irritated Pappenheim

ill

still

lent

more.

STORMING THE OUTWORKS.

223

Finally, toward the beginning of April, Tilly

was moved by

Pappenheiin's entreaties to permit him to take active measures

and the gallant lieutenant needed no second order.

;

Falkenberg could not pretend his limited to

number

of

withdraw into the

He

men.

city.

to hold his long enceinte with

The

might have been wise sooner defiant " Trutz-Papjienheim "

was selected as a beginning, and and

after equally gallant assault

resistance, this redoubt, with the "

and the " Trutz-Tilly,''

fell

on April

9.

Magdeburg Succor " On the morrow two

more works on the right bank succumbed

impetuous energy and heavy excess of forces feld did a

more moderate share

redoubts.

The Magdeburgers

and

fully five

The

arrived.

forces

;

while Mans-

in taking the three lost all their

Some

hundred men. joint

Pappenheim's

to

Buckau

outljdng works

ten days later Tilly

before the town

amounted

to

twenty-five thousand men, plus a detachment of nearly five

thousand more at the Dessau bridge. for Falkenberg's small garrison,

than two thousand

soldiers.

This was fearful odds

now reduced

He had

felt

more

to little

able to hold his

works against Pappenheim, but now he had twelve times

his

force to face.

Shortly after the fall of Frankfort. Tilly had received orders to march to the protection of the emperor's u itary lands,

that city.

this

was impossible.

To

divide

would be to insure the failure of both detachments in Silesia, as

League and the empire

capture

The

Magdeburg

;

it

was.

;

forces

and the

Tilly served both

and a council of war decided to

as a first step.

imperialists were

now

able to attack the works at the

bridge-head and on the islands.

The

garrisons defended

themselves nobly, even according to Pappenheim's high mate,

.

which would be threatened by the capture oi

To do

emperor had troops the

,

bvit eventually,

esti-

about April 30, Falkenberg deemed

it

GUSTAVUS' DIFFICULTIES.

224 best to

The

draw them

citizens

off as

and the bridge and islands were

in,

began

lost.

as far

months ago.

News came from time its

and Gustavus seemed

to despair,

to time

from the Swedish army, and

successes faintly cheered the weary waiters

tiations with

Brandenburg and Saxony were

disheartening.

;

but the nego-

to the last degree

Falkenberg and the council wrote repeatedly

to the king, representing the growing scarcity of victual

powder, the intention of the

enemy

to control the

and

Elbe by a

bridge at Schonebeck, eight miles up river, the almost muti-

nous condition of the people, the unheli^fuluess of the administrator

;

and prayed for speedy succor

But Gustavus was powerless

— " or

we

are lost."

the two electors barred his

;

way.

There may have been men in the world's history who would have braved even these conditions, who would have frayed a path across Brandenburg and Saxony in the teeth of any opposition,

and have marched

to the relief of

without regard to what lay behind them.

Magdeburg

But there have

also

been gigantic failures in the world's history from just such impetuousness.

No

one can accuse Gustavus of lack of per-

sonal boldness.

Of

all

great captains he

D^d:^- in his reckless disregard of danger,

donian could show no more wounds. capacity to face responsibility

Gustavus did for the

art of

berance of his courage, ery which impels a

from

man

his exceptional

existing conditions

less

— was

most like Alex-

is

and even the Mace-

His moral force as marked.

war sprang

less

—

his

But what

from the exu-

from that species of moral brav-

to take

abnormal

risks,

than

it

did

power of calculating correctly by the

what course would most certainly tend

the eventual success of the whole scheme.

gambler's instinct so strongly as Napoleon.

to

He had not the Had he let loose

the reins of his gallantry, he would never have grown to be

TILLY PUZZLED. the champion of Protestantism

225

no one can

;

tell

what might

have become of the cause of Reform in Germany.

Gustavus certainly could not have saved Falkenberg now leveled the suburbs

On May

to protect the town.

4 the inhabitants of the Sudenberg retired within

the walls,

and

heim moved

suburb was burned

this

two hundred and

fifty

in,

and when Pappen-

When

fired.

all

there were not quite twenty-

men, horse and

foot,

Pappenheim

regular approaches in the ruins of the Neustadt.

Fearing that Gustaviis would come to

had reduced in

;

was

to the Neustadt, this too

outlying garrisons were di-awn

began

Such a

it.

it,

He

May.

trator, to

he

relief before

its

Tilly opened negotiations with the

town early

wrote to the mayor and council, to the adminis-

But the advances were refused and

Falkenberg.

messages again sent to Gustavus, praying hard for immediate

The

succor.

council, however,

offered

to leave the whole

matter to the joint decision of the electors of Brandenburg

and Saxony, and the Hanse towns

they held their messen-

;

gers ready to depart upon this errand, so soon as Tilly should

send a safe-conduct Tilly

and of

;

was puzzled what

all this

to do.

he received clear notice.

He

cessive advances to Kcipeniek, Berlin,

heard of Gustavus' suc-

Spandau, Potsdam.

learned that negotiations were going on with

He

John George,

as

well as George William, and he feared their early success.

He was

apprehensive

Dessau.

He must

fear, for

in

Saxon army should appear

get possession of

else retire, baffled, as

deemed himself

lest the

Magdeburg

speedily, or

Wallenstein had done at Stralsund.

bad

case,

when he

really

a*-.

He

had no cause

to

he had a larger force than Gusta\nis, unless Saxony

should join the king.

On

the

first

appearance of Swedish

cavalry near Zerbst, Tilly destroyed the Dessau bridge.

While using the

work

his

in the

most persuasive measures against the town,

trenches went on.

The bombardment was

PROPOSAL TO TREAT.

226

May

opened on of

it, tlie

and was kept up three days.

17,

Under cover

approaches in the Neustadt, in the Sudenberg and

Pappenheim,

on the island progressed. to the very

margin

of the ditch,

He

stadt with trenches.

and

in the Neustadt, got

fairly

seamed the Neu-

sapped the counterscarp and pushed

a covered gallery over the ditch, while the defenders were kept off the walls

by a heavy

biggest of the towers five

Breaches were operated

fire.

fell

;

;

the

Pappenheim pushed

indefatigable

approaches to the fausse-braye of the new bastion, tore

He

out the palisades, and laid several hundred ladders.

worked on the other

side of this bastion as well,

key-point for his proposed assault.

The defenses

making of the

it

a

town

were also weakened on the west and on the river fronts.

The defenders opposed from the enemy's hot

work with equal energy.

Fires

were kept down by systematic

The besieged countermined, and patched up

measures.

works as

this

balls

fast as these

were disturbed

powder they could not maintain a steady

On May

the

but from want of

;

fire.

18 Tilly again dispatched a herald into the town.

During the two weeks neither refused

it

since the proposal to arbitrate, he

nor sent a safe-conduct

;

had

and now, on the

score of time, he declined to allow the submission of the case.

-He practically demanded unconditioned surrender, or threaten!

ed to storm the town.

The approach

of the Swedes, of

which Tilly now hourly exj)ected to hear, spurred his determination to adopt any course, right or wrong, to get possession of the city.

The

council was convened,

together on

May

and the

19 to frame an answer.

to treat with Tilly.

citizens

It

were called

was determined

Falkenberg protested, and asked for a

meeting with the council, to be held at 4 A. m. on the 20th.

On

the afternoon of the 19th the fire of the imperialists

ceased,

and they could be

seen,

from the town, moving the

TILLTS TREACHERY.

227

The townspeople began to hope that Gusta\iis was nearing, and Tilly was in fact on the point of siege-guns to the rear.

giving up the siege, lest he should be interrupted by the "

He

Snow King."

still

hoped that

town would accept

his ultimatum,

war

what

to determine

to

At

do.

at the last

moment

the

and he called a council of this council

it

was sug-

gested that an assaidt, delivered at an early morning hour,

had succeeded elsewhere and might succeed suggestion Tilly eagerly grasped

at.

He

here,

and

this

determined to storm

the breaches at daylight next day.

Through the

knew all that was They kept him posted as to the

disaffected Catholics Tilly

going on in the town.

strength of the guard at various points, the hours of

relief,

the means of defense, the want of powder

is

and there

;

not

wanting evidence that messages were thrown from the walls

on the morning of the 20th, before sunrise,

now was

to the effect that

the very time.

Whatever the other

beyond dispute that while

facts, it is

the council was sitting in debate on Tilly's ultimatum, while the imperial herald was

still

within the walls of

awaiting the council's answer, the

forward to the walls.

It is

army

of Tilly

Magdeburg was ordered

beyond dispute that the general-

issimo had given every indication to the to^vn that he still

was

negotiating and would await a final answer, and yet he

Pappenheim

sent

to storm the works.

This treachery

is

on

a par with that of Caesar against the Usipetes and Tenchtheri.

At

daylight some of the guard had left the walls, prompted

thereto by the knowledge that the idtimatum was being discussed,

and the

to fear.

The

ters

belief that there

officers of

At

were more lax than usual.

ration,

was nothing for the moment

rank were

Pappenheim assaulted

at

all at

the council.

Mat-

7 A. M., after quiet prepa-

two points

:

the round bas-

FORTY THOUSAND DEAD.

228 tioii

near

Elbe, where a party of Croats was sent forward,

tlie

and the bastion which he had

so vigorously approached,

he in person led the party.

The Croats

way

in.

Pappenheim found only a few

the watch surrounding the chaplain at

where

easily forced their

sentries on

hand and

morning prayers

and

;

he pushed his party over the walls with scarce a semblance of opposition.

He was

having things

all

own way, when

his

Falkenberg appeared, hastily summoned from the council

men he

chamber, and met him with what

could instantly

For a brief moment Falkenberg was able

collect.

both the Croats and Pappenheim

;

but he soon

penheim was receiving constant accessions in less than an

in storming

;

Pap-

and

to his force,

hour there remained nothing to

Mansf eld was slow

to check

fell.

resist

him.

but when Pappenheim had

way into the town. plunder. The horrors of

effected his entrance, he too forced his

The

city

was given over

scene have been

thousand

souls.

all too

to

often dwelt on.

the

There perished forty

Treachery was followed by

its

fellow,

mas-

sacre. It will always

It

is

remain doubtful how Magdeburg was burned.

charged to Tilly unjustly

;

Pappenheim, Falkenberg, the

citizens, the imperial troops, have each in turn been accused

of deliberately destroying the beautiful city.

Magdeburg a

pile of ashes

alone escaped.

Swiss

The event

left

surrounding the cathedral, which

fcjwoid.

(15th Century.)

XVIII.

GUSTAVUS ADVANCES TO THE ELBE. JUNE AND JULY, 1631.

The

capture of Magdeburg meant retreat for Gustavus, lest Brandenburg

and Saxony should back

enough

from

;

emperor and endanger his bastion.

side with the

to the Havel,

and here awaited

he essayed no forward movement

Italy,

which he desired

shortly ordered to

to

draw

stanch

;

on him, Gustavus strengthened the Havel to yield

up Spandau

the bastion, fell

now

tavus,

;

for the war.

the king.

and he was

in the

Magdeburg

coimtry.

Seeing that Tilly did not advance line,

and compelled George William

Shortly Greifswalde, the last town within

Mecklenburg was overrun, and the dukes

reinstated.

Gus-

secure at all points, extended his right flank to the Elbe, to

draw Tilly from Hesse-Cassel Werben.

;

to compel their submis-

the landgrave and the duke of Saxe-

Gustavus.

allies of

fell

reinforcements were coming up

Pappenheim remained

Hesse-Cassel prepared for resistance

Weimar were

;

in before attacking Gustavus

move on Hesse-Cassel and Saxony,

sion to the imperial dictates.

He

But the Walloon had won fame

Tilly.

Tilly did in fact

The

;

crossed the river, and intrenched a

at

advanced cavalry-parties and cut them up.

latter fell on his

Incensed, Tilly marched on

camp

come up, joined Pappenheim and moved towards

Werben and attacked

the

camp

but, severely

;

punished, he retired.

At

the downfall of the proud Lutheran city, the Catholics

rejoiced with cruel taunts

ened,

many cowed by

;

many

Protestants were disheart-

her awful fate.

the imperial lightning might strike ? to foretell a deliverer in the

Who knew where No

next

one was seer enough

The only

Swedish monarch.

man

in Germany who gauged his value was Wallenstein. The capture of Magdeburg meant retreat for Gustavus.

Had

he reached the place in time to drive

denburg and Saxony might have joined

off Tilly,

his cause

;

Bran-

now they

OPEN TO ATTACK.

230

were more likely to be enemies who might cut him the sea.

delay

;

He must

force

Saxony must

wait.

Brandenburg

from

off

to his will without

As some were

inclined to blame

Magdeburg, he issued a manifesto,

the king for forsaking

couched in no equivocal terms, putting the blame on John George, where ures

;

properly belonged, for his obstructive meas-

it

and, quite out of patience with the time-serving of the

Protestants, prepared to retire.

He was

Had

fortunate in one thing.

him

Tilly followed

up, sustained by Saxony, the Swedes might have been crowded

back to the

But Tilly

coast.

sat

down

entire venture at

an end, as a

this restraint

;

Gustavus'

less well-poised leader's

might

Pappenheim chafed

have been, as Christian's had been.

under

to enjoy his success,

He deemed

and never dreamed of an advance.

but he was young and ardent, and he

was not the commander-in-chief. Having; for the

moment no inducement

to

advance to the

Elbe, and uncertain as to Tilly's manoeuvres, Gustavus again

assumed the

line of the

Oder

Schaumberg, so that the Swedish army might driven back

;

He

dis-

bridge

at

as a 2^oint d^rpjoui.

patched orders to Horn to rebuild the Oder

and Frankfort was

retire

on

it

if

to be fortified to the highest

These precautions were

degree by chief engineer Portions. wise, but, as matters eventuated, they

were not needed.

There was no doubt in Gustavus' mind that the enemy

would now

seize the opportunity

which victory had given

him, and be prepared to meet him.

open to attack from against on the

line

Silesia,

of

and

The Swedish this

was

the Oder-Warta.

to be It

line

was

guarded

was open

to

attack from Dessau, and this could be met by holding the line of the Spree-Havel.

An

imperial attack from Mecklen-

burg was improbable on accoimt of the promised restoration of its dukes

;

and

if

Greifswalde were once secured, Pome-

THE

This

rania was tolerably safe.

and from

line, if

it

NEW

a long but good defensive

left

Gustaviis could deboucli towards the Elbe,

enemy did not break down

the

231

LINE.

By

his defense.

pivoting

on Frankfort he could swing forward his right, and by securing a strong place on the Elbe, his

but

would be protected by such places as Stettin and

it

Frankfort on the right line

new base would be more much territory,

Its front w^ould cover

firmly held than ever.

left,

and Hamburg and Liibeck on the

while in the centre Gustavus would fortify a strong

;

on the Havel.

Hamilton was shortly expected

in the

Weser with a goodly force, and this would add Bremen to the cause and extend the line to the North Sea.

The command

He had

early in July.

was given

of the important centre

denburg and Eathenow

three brigades ;

:

to

Baner

Teuffel's at Bran-

Hepburn's at Potsdam

;

a third

was di^aded between Bernau and the Biitzow country, which was a

latter place

of

Mecklenburg.

The

defile in the

in this part

Headquarters were at Fehrbellin.

was intrusted

left

network of lakes

to

Horn.

He had

a bare fifteen

hundred men, and news came that the imperialists

in Silesia,

encouraged by the Magdeburg success, would soon move

down

The outpost

the Oder.

at Crossen occasionally

had

touch with the enemy, and in May, as suggested by Pappenheim, a try,

number

Glogau coun-

of regiments assembled in the

and threatened Crossen and

Ziilliehau.

To meet

this

threat,

Gustavus ordered Horn

to strengthen

Crossen, to

recruit

up

Neumark, and

particularly

his garrisons in the

to hold the bridges at Frankfort, Ciistrin

He was

to turn Arenswalde,

strong places to retire on.

vus assured

Horn

and Schaumberg.

Barwalde and Kbnigsberg into

If Crossen

that he would

was attacked, Gusta-

hurry to

his

relief

with

troops from the Havel and Spree.

Happily for the cause, the imperialists lacked earnestness.

WEAK CONDUCT.

TILLY'S

232

They had stomach for their plundering they had none for Horn had time to carry out his orders the serious war. They took Kotbus imperialists played with the business. ;

;

;

Horn captured Griineberg and soon after Gustavus advanced him to Crossen, where he erected a strongly intrenched camp. On the whole, the horror of Magdeburg enraged rather ;

than discouraged the Protestants

;

and despite the threats

of

the emperor they continued to equip troops, though without

Hesse-Cassel and Saxe- Weimar were

joint action.

the most active

army It

;

among

while the elector of Saxony used his large

to preserve his neutrality.

was at Stettin that Gustavus received an embassy from and an auxiliary

Russia, tendering good-will

corps.

The

king declined the troops, but received the minister with pleasure, Tilly's

and sent back friendly thanks

conduct after his victory at Magdeburg was not

that of a great soldier.

May

to the czar.

He

lamely explained, in a letter of

26 to the elector of Bavaria, that until he knew which

way Gustavus had must remain in the walls, that the

fill

retired,

situ ; that

up the

enemy had

ditch,

he was unable to pursue him, and it

would take some time to raze

and see

to victualing

seized all the defiles in

Magdeburg

Brandenburg

that this electorate was so destitute of provision that no

could move through

it;

army

and, as victual was growing scarce,

he suggested a march against Hesse-Cassel and Thuringia,

where was abundance.

This he wrote, while Gustavus stood

on the Havel, anxious as military standpoint

George William

;

;

to the

enemy's advance from a

actually dreading

its political effect

mistrusting some combination that might drive the sea. self

way

How

Tilly could imagine that he

from the theatre to farther

on

fearing that he might lose his initiative,

him back

to

might absent him-

of active operations without opening the

Swedish advance,

it is

hard to

see.

Curiously,

TILLY FINALLY MOVES.

233

Pappenheim, who usually had the happy trick of seeking the enemy, rather favored the plan of Tilly

man

to dally in its execution,

if

but he was not the

;

adopted.

In view of the generalissimo's representations and the continued arming of the

Protestants,

emperor did order

the

Tilly to take measures to compel the minor powers to cease

warlike preparations, as being inconsistent with their fealty

He

but the old general was hard to get started. in

Magdeburg

till

the beginning of

June

the Swedes and

that with

imilian

which he expected

;

and wrote

to

Max-

Saxons joining hands,

and with Hesse-Cassel arming

daily,

;

remained

his rear, he feared to be surrounded

and

his

in

army compro-

mised.

was a queer compound of courage and the want

Tilly

No man

and

old

hundred

fields

;

but he lacked that larger

and moral force which enables one

to accept responsibility.

fighter

it.

possessed more personal gallantry, as he had demon-

strated on a lectual

of

to

gauge danger

was a noble

battle-field

but he suffered from strategic myopia.

;

man

He

took courage,

left five

intel-

Finally the

thousand foot and seven hun-

dred horse in Magdeburg, under Mansfeld, and Pappenheim near by with a small army, and at the head of seventeen

thousand

five

hundred

eight guns, broke

foot,

seven thousand horse and twenty-

up towards Hesse-Cassel.

imperial troops devastated the country with

and committed untold the

atrocities.

To

League furnished nine thousand

horse

;

On fire

;

way

numbers

and two thousand ;

in Silesia

from Italy twenty-five thousand

were started north under Aldringer and Fiirstenberg. latter

the

and sword,

swell their

foot

the Netherlands, four Spanish regiments

were ten thousand men

the

came up very slowly

;

The

some of the columns took a

year to reach the Elbe from Mantua, being delayed in Swabia

and Franconia by

their orders to

compel the Leipsic Conven-

BRAVE WILLIAM OF HESSE.

234

emperor and disarm.

tion states to submit to the

looked serious for Hesse-Cassel

;

but for

Matters

the dangers men-

all

acing him, the gallant landgrave ceased not from his work.

William of Hesse-Cassel was young, but a man of

So early

had offered

as August, 1630, he

action.

his assistance to

Gustavus, averring that he could not bring much, but that

two

his

and Ziegenhain, should be shut

fortresses, Cassel

the imperialists and open to him. treaty with

him

and urged him

;

to

Gustavus concluded a

combine with the

of Weimar, Culmbach and Wiirtemberg, and the of Frankfort-on-the-Main,

between them could

to

free

states

towns

Merseburg and Strasburg, which

readily

arm ten thousand men.

The

landgrave did his best, but the interference of the imperialists

prevented him, and

Duke Bernard

of

worked with him, from accomplishing much.

Weimar, who

At

Convention, these two were almost the only ones

Under

for the Swedes.

as

it

the Leipsic

who spoke

the Leipsic agreement, they armed,

was understood, for defense, but

really proposing to aid

As

Tilly approached, the

Gustavus and

to seek

his

aid.

landgrave mobilized his men, beset the defiles and roads, strengthened his fortresses, and peremptorily refused Tilly's

demands elector

Fortunately for the cause, the

for contribution.

of

Saxony, though

still

claiming

neutrality,

angered by the menaces of Tilly, and determined to the uttermost any inroads on his territory

Gustavus kept

and

after

strictly to his

by

was

resist to

either party.

agreement with Brandenburg,

some tedious negotiations succeeding the

fall of

Magdeburg, on June 9 surrendered Spandau, which had been turned over to him only until the fate of that city should be decided. If

we look

at the

mere military question, Gustavus was

not justified in his anxiety tion, political

and

;

but a study of the entire situa-

military, shows us that the antagonism of

GEORGE WILLIAM SUCCUMBS. Saxony and the

unreliability of

To

in a questionable case.

up the and

if

line of the

Brandenburg placed the king

surrender Spandau meant to give

Havel, as well as touch with the Elbe

demand back

the elector should

Gustavus

Ciistrin, Stettin itself

would not be

safe.

any course

prevent such a catastrophe.

to

William

that

imj)erial

army

if

235

he was justified in

felt that

He

told

George

he so chose he would leave him to fight the single-handed.

This was in reality the last

He would

thing the time-serving elector dared face.

have

been happy to leave Spandau and Ciistrin in Swedish hands as the price of support, but, as

Had

it

his habit, he delayed

not been for abandoning Hesse-Cassel and

Weimar, he would have gladly returned

to the Oder.

Gustavus had complied with his obligation

and

the fast

mind

his

loose conduct of

mouth

battle,

;

but, sick of

George William, he made up

to cut the knot of the difficulty

after the surrender of at the

and

along the Havel, awaited Tilly's

talked, while Gustavus,

advance.

was

;

and some days

Spandau, he marched on Berlin, and

of his cannon, supported

by

his

forced the elector to a fresh treaty,

Swedes should retain Spandau for good sage through Ciistrin, or indeed occupy

;

it

army

in line of

by which the

have constant paswith their troops

;

and the elector shoidd pay the Swedes thirty thousand thalers

The

a month. to

an end

ing,

;

trifling of

George William was thus brought

he concluded to come to an amicable understand-

and the treaty was subscribed amid

festivities.

The king concentrated near Brandenburg some twelve thousand men, and while awaiting events, secured his position

by taking and strengthening neighboring towns on the Elbe and Havel.

Greifswalde in his rear was the last outstanding

fortress in Pomerania. rialists,

Early in June a stray party of impe-

perhaps on a reconnoissance, appeared before Malchin,

and led Gustavus

to believe that an attack on Stralsund or

TOTT'S SUCCESSES.

236

He

the relief of Greif swalde was in contemplation.

ordered

O

General

Ake

Tott, one of

his best officers, to collect all

available troops in Loitz on

meet him

;

June

where he intended to

20,

but unable to leave Brandenburg, he intrusted

the entire conduct of the affair to Tott, who, with twenty-two

hundred men, marched on Greifswalde, and on the night of

June 22-23 opened

his trenches.

On

bombardment begun.

repelled and a

the 23d a sortie was

This was followed by

the appearance of a herald, and on June 25 the imperialists

marched

The commandant,

out.

Perusi,

cess Tott

had been

For

the matter would have been less easy.

was made field-marshal, and ordered

against Rostock and

To have an eye

Wismar,

to

to the situation,

on to Greifswalde

;

killed, or

this brilliant suc-

to

advance

open the road to Liibeck.

Gustavus shortly after went

but finding that Tott was abreast of the

business, he returned to

Spandau July

With a suitable van of cavalry, moved into Mecklenburg, spread all

2.

the

new

field-marshal

over the country, took

Biitzow and Schwan, drove the imperialists before him, and

blockaded Rostock.

A

detachment

marched south from

Malchin, and seized Mirow and Plan. Liibeck, waiting with a small army, and

The dukes were

them, though Giistrow and Schwerin held out Tott reduced

all

till

midsummer,

Mecklenburg except Rostock, Wismar and

Many men from

Domitz.

in

in connection with

the garrisons thus taken preferred

to enlist in the

Swedish service to being paroled or held as

On

July 5 the dukes were formally reinstated in

prisoners. their rights

a

selfish

;

but they showed small gratitude

;

they acted in

and shortsighted manner, and every pound of bread

for the troops

which had reinstated them had to be wrung

from their unwilling grasp. Baner,

whom Gustavus had

left

on the Havel, with instruc-

tions to occupy all the strong places on that river, to strengthen

ACCESSIONS OF RECRUITS.

237

Spandau and Brandenburg, and

the works of

build a

to

redoubt at Potsdam, took Havelberg by storm on June 22,

and strongly garrisoned clear to a

Gustavus could now see his way

it.

campaign on the Elbe

burg and Brandenburg under

manded

all

;

with Pomerania, Mecklen-

he practically com-

his control,

the country to the north of that river

;

and Tilly

The scene had changed.

was otherwise occupied.

many

After what seemed to

his decisive victory at

Magde-

burg, Tilly, under his instructions to enforce the Edict of Restitution,

compel

to

the

disarmament of

the

German moved

princes, or to incorporate their troops in his owti army,

via Aschersleben

June

Oldisleben and Miihlhausen June

9,

16-26, and captured Gotha, Eisenach and Weimar, while

Erfurt bought

itself off

by a payment

out detachments right and ists

left,

of

money.

He

sent

demanding that the imperial-

be admitted into the fortresses

that the landgrave

;

should disband his army, furnish the empire five regiments, give over Cassel and Ziegenhain to imperial garrisons,

pay the contributions which he should his forces at Cassel,

The landgrave had sure,

but

William firmly refused.

six

Magdebui-g was loth

on

his energy

sel in

;

and

Assembling

Tilly wavered.

thousand or more men, recruits to be

soldiers, in

still

assess.

his fortresses,

to attack them.

and the

Age was

but his presence none the

less

victor of

encroaching

put Hesse-Cas-

a perilous case.

About

this

time some eight thousand

were arriving in Stettin.

Of

these,

men from Sweden

four thousand were

brought to the main force on the Havel, and four thousand

were sent to Tott, who was to join the king with old troops to

an equal number.

lish troops,

At

the same time seven thousand

Eng-

under Marquis Hamilton, landed in the mouth of

the Peene, instead of in the Weser, as expected.

ments were sent

to

Horn on

These

regi-

the Oder, and he was ordered to

ON THE ELBE.

A FOOTING

238

new men on

leave a total of four thousand

pare to join the king with the balance.

and

that line,

pre-

Gustavus aimed at

having service-hardened men at the front.

Hamilton's troops

are said not to have been of the best quality of the

campaign they ran down

disease

and desertion, and were in a sad

to fifteen

;

before the end

hundred men by

state of discipline.

Heartily tired of the timidity and unhelpfulness of the Protestant princes, the king

now saw

efforts in possession of the bastion

which he had originally aimed

Sweden

;

and the idea began

himself by his

own

on the south of the Baltic

to possess for the safety of

to impress itself

upon him that

his brothers in the faith cared so little for his help, he

if

might hold

this bastion,

whose walls would be the

and the questionable tendencies

this course

seem not unadvisable

;

of

now addressed

but to complete the work,

The question

himself.

a

Denmark made

Gustavus must plant his foot firmly on the Elbe, and to he

in

Both the lack

purely defensive attitude against the emperor. of funds

lines of

Spree-Havel and Elbe, and stand

the Oder-Warta,

this

of the defensive

might wait. Arrived in Spandau, he determined to push at once for the Elbe, not only to complete his bastion, but to draw Tilly away

from Hesse-Cassel.

Heading seven thousand

foot

and three

thousand horse, he moved from Brandenburg out towards Burg.

He

imagined that he might tempt Pappenheim from

Magdeburg

across the river,

and engage him

;

but failing

this,

he headed downstream, to Jerichow, which he reached

July

8.

Pappenheim had an outpost

and was

site,

at the

moved upstream, for

moment

to lead

there.

him

at

On

Tangermiinde, oppo-

July 9 the king again

to believe that

he was aiming

Magdeburg, and Pappenheim marched up to anticipate

him.

Like Csesar on the Elaver, Gustavus immediately

marched back

to Jerichow, put a

few hundred men across

NOTEWORTHY

A

CROSSING.

on boats, captured Tangermiinde and well as

down

and

river

built a bridge,

and took up a strongly

Werben,

opposite

confluence of

and

its

Stendal and Arneburg, collected

castle

all

July 10, as

the boats up and

on which he crossed his army,

fortified

camp near

the town of

the

the Havel

Elbe.

the

239

Utiliz-

ing the embankments as

works, he built a fort on the right

bank

to protect

his bridge, which he

up

from

moved

Tangermiinde,

and threw up another at the

mouth

had

Havelberg

fort

of the Havel.

already

The Werben Camp.

been taken, and Gustavus' position

on the Elbe was made reasonably secure,

penheim retired

The

garrisons of these places were captured, and the

sent in a

body

Pap-

to Halberstadt.

to headquarters.

As

the king

men

came out

to

inspect them, they fell on

their

" Get up," said the king, " I

am no god for you to fall down You have all acted like brigands

before."

Then he added,

and deserve the gallows your

;

"

knees to beg for mercy.

but I will make you a present of

lives."

Though he would have

liked to

march on Magdeburg, Gus-

tavus contented himself with what he had got. for the offensive

had expected

was damped by the conduct

to find frank

and

His feeling

of the

faithful allies.

men he

He

held

Brandenburg in the leash, but Saxony was not to be moved, and he was prise.

at a loss to explain Tilly's queer lack of enter-

Gustavus could get no money

cult that

;

victualing was so

diffi-

on one or two occasions the population had cause to

TILLY ADVANCES.

240

complain of excesses by the troops

The weeks

sickness.

in

;

there was a vast deal of

Werben during July and August,

1631, were perhaps the monarch's most disheartening period.

One allies

—

of his objects

— had

to

draw the enemy away from

been accomplished by the march to Werben.

Pappenheim, single-handed,

unequal to the task of facing

felt

His chief threw up

Gustavus, and called Tilly to his aid. his half-hearted attack

troops on

its

his

and hurried back

borders,

had

his victory he

on Hesse-Cassel,

lost

left

a portion of his

to the Elbe.

Despite

two months and accomplished nothing,

while Gustavus had greatly bettered his position.

Joining

Pappenheim, TiUy, with twenty-seven thousand men, took position at Wolmirstadt below

Magdeburg, and on July 27

threw out three regiments of cavalry towards Werben to

Gustavus was ready

reconnoitre.

To help

protect the

Havel

line,

suitable garrisons in Frankfort,

some cavalry

to scout the

to

meet him in earnest.

he ordered Horn to leave

Landsberg and Crossen, and

Oder-Warta, and to march with

all

his available force to Fiirstenwalde, detaching meanwliile a

thousand musketeers to Brandenburg.

Tott was to send an

equal number.

The king had not exceeding

sixteen thousand men, but

he took advantage of the isolation of Tilly's cavalry party.

Prom Arneburg, concentrated his

twelve miles up the river, where he had

own

cavalry, he marched,

gen, and sent out patrols, to reconnoitre.

The

and

latter

later

an

August

1, to Bellin-

intelligent staff-officer

brought in some prisoners and

information as to the enemy's whereabouts, acting on which the king advanced at nightfall halfway to Burgstall.

Here

he divided his force, which was about four thousand strong, into three columns.

attack Burgstall

on Angern

;

;

The

first,

under the rhinegrave, was to

the second, under Baudissin, was to fall

the king with the third would advance between

A CAVALRY COMBAT. The columns were

on Rheindoif.

the two others

241 set

in

motion.

The rhinegrave

captui'ecl Burgstall, cut clown or dispersed

the imperial regiment there stationed, and took

At Augern the attack was equally losing three

hundred

killed

its

baggage.

successful, the

and many prisoners.

enemy-

When

the

king reached Rheiudorf, he found Tilly's

men, who had caught the

Though

alarm, drawn up in line.

he had with him but three hun-

dred horse, he

fell

with fury upon

imperial regiment,

the

which

of-

fered no worthy resistance, and cut it

to pieces

;

darkness, but

part escaped in the the baggage was

all

In the fray Gustavus, with

taken.

his usual recklessness, rode into the

midst of the enemy, was surrounded,

and but for the

fidelity

and cour-

age of Captain Harold Stake, would

have liant

lost his life.

foray the

After this

bril-

party retired

Bellingen, and to

Werben

to

the next

day, stationing the cavalry at StenBirrgstall Operation.

dal.

This capital stroke decidedly

raised the morale of the men, while the imperialists felt the

blow to a greater degree than the

To make up

for this defeat,

loss warranted.

which he appeared

to resent

keenly, Tilly, leaving Wolmirstiidt ^\^th fifteen thousand foot

and seven thousand horse, moved on August 6 at

Werben, drew up

in battle

order,

camp

and cannonaded the

works with sixteen heavy guns, sharply but

He was

to the

ineffectively.

doubtful about assault, as no practicable breach had

TILLY DEFEATED.

242

been made, until he was given to understand by what he supposed were disaffected soldiers in Gustavus' service, that at a given time next day the Swedish guns would be spiked at a particular part o£ the tion,

Relying upon this informa-

line.

which he had no means of verifying, he sent

the assault

August

But the Swedish guns

7.

were in good hands

;

Tilly's onslaught,

—

his

men

as always

to

—

though delivered with

the old soldier's wonted elan and in massed columns, was met

by

so

murderous a

fire

that

its

onset was checked

side gate,

and galloping

in on the Walloon's flank,

completed his discomfiture with extremely heavy

In this cavalry charge young

Weimar

less

reckless exposure

was often without

battle

justification, his

produced a wonderful

effect

on the

Where the king exhibited such a man lack bravery ? The result of markedly for good, results

losses.

Duke Bernard

of

Saxe-

distinguished himself and attracted the monarch's

While Gustavus'

eye.

while the

moment debouched

cavalry under Baudissin at the opportune

from a

;

— indefensible

of his person in

example none the

officers of the

spirit,

army.

how should any

Gustavus' gallantry was as

it

was, and sad as

its

proved in the succeeding year.

Seeing no gain from remaining in Gustavus' front, Tilly retired to

Tangermiinde August

of six thousand killed

August 7 Horn had arrived in flank.

vicinity

He had

incurred a loss

and wounded within a few days, plus

a great number of desertions.

men, he hastily retired

9.

Thence, hearing that on

at Ratlienow with nine thousand

to Wolmirstadt, lest he should be taken

The imperial general thus

left

where so long he had triumphed.

under a cloud the

The two

captains

had measured swords, and unconquered Tilly had given up the field without a victory.

As

Tilly might be about to cross the Elbe, to pierce the

Havel

line,

Gustavus prepared a bridge over the Dosse, so as

THE BASTION SECURED. readily to retire to

and

defense, and ordered

its

But

flood the river.

243

Bauer

Tilly did not venture

to

dam

any forward

movement.

The king had consumed a year the southern shore of the Baltic.

seemed to savor

of over-caution

;

in securing his bastion

on

At times his conduct had but when we consider that

he landed in Germany with but thirteen thousand

men

;

that

he had received no assistance from the folk he had come to aid

;

that he was opposed by superior numbers, the

of the year shows

up splendidly, and

worth any amount assured,

of

and the time

how nobly he improved

his caution

recklessness.

for action

sum

His base was now

had come.

We

shall see

it.

Horse and Equ'pments used by Gustavus at holm Museum.)

total

had been

Liitzen.

(Stock-

XIX. TILLY INVADES HESSE-CASSEL AND SAXONY. AUGUST, 1631.

The it

south

German

Protestants had all submitted to the imperial decrees

remained to force the north German

Werben camp

the

principalities into line.

Gustavus

well garrisoned, and assumed position on the Havel.

left

Tilly

marched on Hesse-Cassel, where the landgrave and Bernard held head him, and then against Saxony, with orders to disarm

with

was

fire

Marking

it.

The

and sword, he reached Leipsic and gave his ultimatum.

had brought

in sad case, but he

his troubles

and

days' resistance, Tilly captured Leipsic,

on his own head.

sat

down

to

his progress

elector

After a few

to await reinforcements.

Meanwhile Gustavus advanced to the Elbe, anticipating what must

follow.

Driven to desperation, John George made a treaty, offensive and defensive, with the king, and Gustavus crossed the Elbe and marched to join the Saxon army,

which was put at

his entire disposal.

A

and the two armies advanced towards

covmcil of Leipsic.

war determined on attack, Gustavus, with his line of

small brigades and shallow formation, armed with handy muskets, and aided

by

quick-firing cannon,

renowned

Leipsic, facing north

For many

was

was

It

Tilly.

;

to

measure himself against the heavy battles of

activity against bulk.

Tilly lay with his

back

to

Gustavus was advancing southerly.

montlis the imperial troops under Fiirstenberg,

Aldringer and Fugger had been marching up from Italy, had

moved

into

Swabia and Franconia, and by untold outrage

compelled the Protestant princes who were acting under the Leipsic Convention, to submit to the emperor, to enlist under the imperial banners the troops raised for their

and

to

pay heavy

reinforce Tilly,

the

Main.

central

and

penalties.

their

Tilly remained

point

These

officers

head of column at

T

Wolmirs^

own

defense,

had orders

to

ad already crossed dt,

which was a

between Brandenburg, Saxony and Hesse-

2**

(0

^s

^>& ^^'^ ^'

TREATY WITH HESSE.

246 Cassel,

badly

and enabled him

off as to

discipline,

watch them

to

though in

men always behaved

battle,

be

came

tunes with the Swedes

men

in

Landgrave William

and a treaty offensive and defensive

;

which Weimar was included.

could be raised by these states

their fortresses to

nobly.

definitely to cast in his for-

;

the Swedes should protect the n !W

and

Ten thousand

it

was agreed that

allies,

who would open

Gustavus and close them

The landgrave did not obligations to

commanded

events,

Werben,

to

camp

said to their credit, Tilly's

it

well, as their chief

While the king was awaiting of Hesse-Cassel

was made,

His troops were

all.

health and victual, and quite wanting in

feel that

to the emperor.

Gustavus had failed

in his

and shortly went back to watch

Magdeburg,

his territory.

For

his gallantry displayed in Tilly's

Duke Bernard

of Saxe- Weimar

ittack on W^erben,

had been made colonel of

Gustavus' body-guard cavalry regiment.

With

the landgrave

the king sent back two of his best battalions as a nucleus for drill

and

take

command of

and

discipline,

it

was arranged that Bernard should

the Hessian contingent, as the landgrave had

mucJi confidence in his military leaving in the

skill.

Then, in mid-August,

Werben camp, under Baudissin and

force sufficient to defend

king moved by his

left,

it,

Teuffel, a

with eighteen thousand troops the

back of the Havel, and took post

at

Havelberg, Brandenburg and Rathenow, in a position to concentrate and

move on any

point.

He

considered the Havel,

under the circumstances, a better rendezvous than Werben.

Each detachment had

orders

to

act

on the defensive

if

attacked, utilizing the near-by strong places, until the king

came up

to its assistance.

since the disaster at to wait on Saxony,

Gustavus had materially gained

Magdeburg, but he was

still

compelled

whose action he believed the enemy under

the positive orders of the emperor would shortly force

;

or

BOLD BERNARD.

247

should Tilly advance, by confining him to the devastated strip

between the Havel and the Elbe, the king hoped to drive him

back on Saxony, and thus oblige the elector the quicker decide whose cause he would embrace.

moved on

his

Saxon border,

new

Meanwhile, as Tilly

errand, Gustavus

to be ready to help

to

advanced nearer the

John George whenever

the elector should be ready to help himself.

The

imperialists

played into his hands.

had

Tilly

definite

bring

orders to

— by the sword.

been,

German Germany had

the north

princes back to their fealty, as those of south

From Tangermiinde

he had notified

the Hessians that they must choose between landgrave and

With

emperor, and the loyal Hessians gave a noble reply.

but

five

thousand

down the

men under

gauntlet.

He

command, Bernard threw

his

captured Fritzlar at the end of

August, while the duke of Hersfeld laid Fulda under contribution.

This was bold conduct in face of the approach of

the Italian troops, eager to do by Hesse-Cassel as they had

done by the south German

and Weimar

^8

;

settled itself.

and from here, under

But the danger

states.

to

Tilly reached Eisleben his

new

Hesse

August

instructions, he ordered

Aldringer with his seven thousand men, and Fiirstenberg with his twenty thousand, to join him for an attack on Saxony.

Tiefenbach from Silesia was to demonstrate on the

Saxon

rear, while

The reason that

it

Fugger was sent against Hesse-Cassel.

of this change of plan

was time

his authority.

to

was that the emperor

He had

already

made some demands

and July, after a long correspondence dating back and he now proposed to show that It

was for

this

felt

compel Saxony to disarm and submit

his

in

to

May

to 1630,

demands must be met.

purpose that Ferdinand ordered Tilly to move

on John George and enforce the Edict of Restitution.

Between them the imperial generals had thirty-four thou-

JOHN GEORGE HARASSED.

248

sand men, and Aldringer had got as far as Jena. troops

moved towards Leipsic with

astation,

— two hundred

burning villages lay in his wake,

and reached Halle September

They

finally

Tilly's

the usual barbarous dev-

4,

—

and Merseburg next day.

went into camp between the two

places,

and

roving about, plundered the entire neighborhood of Merse-

Naumbm-g and

burg,

He demanded

Zeitz.

Here

Tilly declared himself.

John George should quarter and feed the imperial army, disband his new levies, serve under his (Tilly's) that

orders with a suitable contingent,

emperor, and disavow any and

all

formally recognize the

connection with the Swed-

ish business.

John George was

in pitiable case

;

but sympathy for him

Saxony was torn by three

would be wasted.

Swedish, the imperial and the neutral.

parties,

Between

the

his ties to

the emperor, his Lutheranism, and his desire to erect in Ger-

many

a Third Party which should grow to be strong enough

to control both the

knew

not which

at his orates.

emperor and the emperor's enemies, he

way

He

to turn.

was

at this

And

yet

fire

and sword were

moment under

the control of

Count Arnim, who was a Brandenburger and a Lutheran, had been Wallenstein's lieutenant at Stralsund, had served with Koniezpolski against Gustavus in Poland, and

become Saxon generalissimo. as

much Arnim's

had now

The Third Party notion was

pet idea as the Corpus Evangelicorum, or

union of the Protestant powers, was Gustavus'.

In

all

his negotiations with

John George, the king had

shown himself frank and aboveboard in his desire to subHe was even now serve the cause of religion in Germany. ready to leave the cause with John George and retire to

Sweden, providing his rights and those of fitly

recognized.

He

his fatherland

were

had done everything to persuade the

elector to joint efforts, but

John George could not bring him-

COURAGEOUS self to

LEIPSIC.

an alliance with Sweden until the

249

last

ray of hope was

gone of reconciling the two religions under the empire.

Nearing Leipsic,

Tilly,

on September

8,

demanded a

sup-

ply of victual from this city

;

but the

were bold

citizens

in their reply.

Un-

master,

less

their

the

elector,

sented, they

con-

would

have no dealings

The

with Tilly. imperial

general

appeared

before

the

gates,

devas-

the

entire

tated region,

and again

demanded ters

and

Again

quarrations.

refused, he

moved

on

the

town, camped near

Mbckern,

and

threatened Leipsic

with utter destruction unless

it

surLeipsic and Breitenfeld.

rendered.

More

bold than discreet, the citizens replied as before.

Tilly

opened trenches, planted a heavy battery of siege-guns and mortars at Pfaffendorf, and intrenched the heights at Eutritsch to bar the road from Diiben, by which the Swedes

might come. walls,

The

citizens

and replied with some

burned the suburbs, manned the effect to Tilly's fire,

which began

TILLY CAPTURES LEIPSIC.

250 September

After nearly a day's bombardment Tilly

14.

again demanded surrender, and threatened the city with the fate

Magdeburg

of

in

case

the gates were not forthwith

opened.

The tured

three messengers sent by the elector had been cap-

Leipsic did not

;

know how near

relief

was

and

;

fur-

ther resistance being mere madness, Tilly's idtimatum was

accepted September 16. paid, the small garrison

Four hundred thousand

marched out with the honors

and Tilly occupied the town.

on the

to the north of the city,

hills oj^posite

Leipsic in his rear.

of war,

Scarcely within walls, Tilly

received news of the approach of the

marched

were

florins

allies.

and drew up

He

at once

in battle order

Podelwitz and Gobschelwitz, and with

He would

have been glad to wait for

Aldringer and Fugger, but reinforcements were to be denied him.

The plundering and

devastation of the imperial

army had

embittered the elector, whose obstinate clinging to his impossible neutrality

vailed on

him

garrisons, he

Torgau

was now reaping

its

reward, and finally pre-

Not counting

to declare against the empire.

had some eighteen thousand men assembled

in

to prevent Tilly's reaching Dresden.

Gustavus had advanced

to

with five thousand cavalry.

Wittenberg on September

2,

Baner and Teuffel followed,

while to Tott was committed the duty of holding the bastion,

Horn was

should matters turn out badly.

to

form a new

army, on the nucleus of the Havel troops, from a promised

Brandenburg contingent, some Swedish cavalry Scotch battalions, and the to

be ready,

The

if

ordered, to

men

of

move on

;

and

Silesia.

Swedis'i army, on September

and Wittenberg.

to arrive, the

Hamilton and Leslie

3,

had reached Coswig

John George having succumbed, Branden-

burg and Saxony, from whatever motives, were arrayed on the

GUSTAVUS CROSSES THE ELBE. Swedish

251

An

and Giistavus saw daylight before him.

side,

alliance offensive

and defensive was made

at Coswig,

Septem-

ber 10, by which the elector agreed to give the Swedish

army

a month's pay, furnish

it

most important

All defiles were to be open to Gusta-

cities.

with rations, and admit

vus and closed to the imperialists affairs

was

the conduct of military

The king agreed

were given to break the colors,

uj), all

Horn was

army crossed

the

Elbe

be

to

to di'ive the impe-

from Saxony, and stand by John George

Had Brandenburg and Saxony joined him might not have been accomplished

to his

and no peace was

to be left to Gustavus,

concluded without him. rialists

;

it

to the last.

a year before, what

Hereupon, instant orders

!

available forces were called in to

instructed to join the king, and the at

Wittenberg and headed for Diiben

on the Mulde, the rendezvous with the Saxons.

The

" order of battle " in which they passed the bridge

On

interesting.

hvindred

September 9 a cavalry detachment of

men had

is

five

crossed and been spread out as a curtain

to cover the bridge

;

and on September 12 Quartermaster-

General Bouillon, with three hundred cavalry and a small wagon-train, joined them.

September

13.

First

The army

itself

marched a vanguard

began

of

to cross

two thousand

a detachment of cavalry, and twelve guns drawn by

foot,

teams of eleven to thirty-one horses

wagons came

;

ordnance and munition

next, carts loaded with cannon-balls, nine regi-

mental pieces with their munition wagons, four blue and white cornets.

all

followed by

His majesty of Sweden in

person followed, under special escort of two cavalry cornets,

with black and gold pennants, his battle-charger led behind

him

;

and then several other cornets, blue and

orange, yellow, red, blue, green.

Behind these

red, white, filed

four

royal six-horse canopy coaches and two royal baggage wagons,

and again cavalry cornets, green, blue and

red.

Then

fol-

DECISION TO FIGHT.

252 lowed

and

infantry regiments witli their pieces and powder

tlie

baggage wagons and pack-horses

ball carts, the

then the bulk of the cavalry with

all its

baggage.

;

and

Last

filed

the general wagon-column under escort of horse and foot.

The army

halted at Kernberg towards evening, and next

day, September 14,

September

reached Diiben.

it

From Torgau the

elector reached the vicinity of Diiben

Gustavus rode over

15.

warmly greeted the troops, which were

drawn up

to

the

Saxon army,

and narrowly inspected

elector,

parade order.

in

He

the

estimated

the six regiments each of horse and foot at twenty thousand

men, though they are elsewhere given

A

the Swedish

joint inspection of

at sixteen thousand.

army

There

followed.

were twenty thousand foot and seventy-five hundred horse in line.

At nials,

a council of war immediately succeeding these ceremo-

Gustavus advised a

imperial

army and seek

general battle. to Tilly's,

He

to place

he

and suggested the beyond

at a disadvantage before a

it

distress

Brandenburg and SaxFor himself, he

defeat.

seas, for which purpose he

base to embark from and a the procrastinator

out the

tire

spoke of his ability to do this as superior

ony would be in in case of a could retire

manoeuvres to

series of

fleet.

Curiously,

now urged immediate

said,

had a good

John George

battle.

He was

anxious to save Saxony from the plundering to which

it

was

being subjected, was unwilling to subsist two armies during the suggested manoeuvres, and had great confidence in the

Swedish capacity for deliver battle, to

the

relief

and of

it

fighting.

was determined

Leipsic.

marched from Diiben

Gustavus was not loth to

to

On

the

to

march without delay

16th the allied army

Wolkau.

" In the early twilight of the 6tli (16th N. S.)

we passed

through Diiben and reached the hamlet of Wolkau, one and

NUMBERS UNCERTAIN. a half

(German) miles from

253

Leipsic, near evening," writes

the king, from whose letters or dispatches comes a good bit of

information

;

"

and here we rested over

On

night.

the 7th

(17th), in the gray of the morning, I ordered the bugles to

sound the march, and as between us and Leipsic there were

no woods, but a vast

plaiu, I

deployed the army into battle

order and marched towards that

a

city.

hill in

our front, and behind

it

the bulk of his army."

It is not possible accurately to

two armies.

gauge the numbers of the

Apparently good authorities

differ,

and even

Swedish records are at variance with regard

the

On

Saxons. the

After an hour and a

march, we saw the enemy's vanguard with artillery on

half's

:

had twenty-six thousand eight hundred men

nineteen thousand one hundred foot, and seven

The

thousand seven hundred horse.

been

forty-five

Tilly's

the

the day of the battle the Swedes, according to

official list,

in line, viz.

to

army be

joint forces

may have

thousand men.

Neither can the strength of

justly given, but

it

no doubt

fell

a good deal

short of forty thousand men.

Until Frederick the Great astonished Euroj)e with his grand-tactics, there are but

few battles of modern times which

Armies met

exhibit novelty in manoeuvre.

drew up

in parallel order,

in a formal

ensued a hand to hand conflict

much wanting

in the element

of calculation or the utilization of favorable conditions

ever stood the

way,

advanced on each other, and there

hammering or staved

off

;

who-

demoralization the

longer won.

The

battle of Breitenfeld

by quick decision and

was a good sample of retrieving,

action,

an impending

disaster, of utiliz-

ing an opportunity offered, of true battle-captain's work.

was

not. noteworthy for

call grand-tactics, for it

should be

;

but

it

was

any

special exhibition of

was not fought as

it

It

what we now

was intended

it

essentially noteworthy as being the first

OLD SPANISH TACTICS.

254

great engagement in which the modern tactics of mobility,

Gustavus Adolphus was the originator and expo-

of which

nent, were opposed to the Middle Ages

tactics of

which the new Sjvedish was opposed

the

to

;

in

In this sense the contest was as interesting as the

method.

matching of phalanx against

The Spanish

tactics,

marshaling heavy bodies

legion.

as already explained, consisted in

— battalia or

battles

—

of troops in

such masses that their mere advance should be

and that they should break a charge the

weight

old Spanish

breaks

cliff

vip

The

the waves.

upon them as

of cavalry

was

line

irresistible,

set

up with

foot

heavy squares in the centre, and horse in heavy columns on

in

the wings,

and

the squares

sist

had shaken the enemy, the duty of the horse was

The

him down.

to ride

and the charge of

after the fire of the artillery

infantry battalia were wont to con-

of fifty files ten deep, of

pushing, not fighting force

which mass the bulk was mere

;

and on the four corners stood

groups of musketeers, two or three deep

;

while other musket-

eers were put out as skirmishers to protect the flanks of the

Such was the Spanish battalion

battalia.

fortress with

;

bastions at the corners, and

it

was an oblong-

surrounded by

outworks.

In these huge masses of human brawn the weapons were equally cumbersome.

The pike was long and heavy,

of use

only to keep an opponent at a distance, not to demolish him

by stroke

of

arm

;

and the old musket, requiring ninety-nine

"times and motions " to handle, and a crutch to lean fire,

was

cavalry it

had

as slow

much

less

ineffective as the artillery.

lumbering.

and had learned

carbines or pistols.

it

on to

Nor was

Like a child with a new

fallen in love with its firearms,

shock-tactics, its

and

had come

the toy,

to discard its

to rely on repeated salvos of

These salvos were delivered from

near at hand, and the squadrons lost the

momentum

of the

SWEDISH TACTICS. fiill

gallop charge from a distance.

infantry, one regiment differing

No

armor or weapons.

of

value

by

;

but set

own

its

What

it

It

255 was

really

mounted

from another only in weight

doubt

all

had a defensive

this

going at any pace, and

it

would

fall

apart

weight.

Gustavus had been introducing and practicing his

troops to use, ever since he ascended the throne, was a

which could be rapidly

fired,

and a formation

in

gun

which men

The Swedes had now next to no movements their musket was so light

could readily manoeuvre.

armor

to

hamper

their

as to need no crutch,

;

and

its

wheel-lock was vastly better

than the match-lock of the imperialists.

In addition to this,

Gustavus' artillery was immeasurably superior, and the regi-

mental pieces could actually follow the regiments. Moreover, instead of these large bodies, which were

in-

tended to act together and be mutually dependent, the Swedes

had a

line

made up

was independent and not of collecting

of smaller battle groups, each of which self-sustaining.

all his

horse in a mass on each flank, but of

alternating bodies of horse

To

soldiers

tion seems as

it

Gustavus had the habit

and

foot in parts of the line itself.

brought up under the modern system, this forma-

odd enough, but

had suited

it

well suited the

at times the ancient tactics

;

need no longer dash uselessly against the

fire

of that day,

bodies of cavalry battles,

but the

horse and foot were able to support each other in an advance.

When

the musketeers

the horse pushed out

worked equally well

;

had broken the enemy by and charged him.

their fire,

In retreat they

the musketeers protected the horse, and

the horse prevented the broken foot from being ridden down.

In the centre of the line the foot was not always mixed with horse is

;

but the units were smaller.

stated at one thousand two

The

full

Swedish brigade

hundred and twenty -four men,

and was made up of either one strong or two or three weak

SWEDISH BRIGADE.

256 regiments.

It

was a

sort of

wedge

of one

body

pikemen

of

backed by two others, and in the intervals and on the flanks

who might break out, deploy to fire, and At Breitenfeld the brigades The sketch of Lord Reay was not the

bodies of musketeers

again retire into the brigade. stood in three lines.

common

order of the Swedish brigade formation, though

may have bodies

i—-1

l^ifepl

n-MusK^TEERs

P.=

Swedish

service.

exists

in the use of the

words " half-

l"*'^"l

brigade "

what

P,^EM6N

called " brigade."

U99M.I l"***-"]

applied to foreign

in

Perhaps the difference

^XTT] |^,fep| pil \s.\bp\ ri9X7r|

Brigade and HaK-brigade.

for

half-brigade of

Lord Reay's sketch.

others

The leading

Lord Reay's ,

i

agram corresponds

usually referred to as a brigade

to

three deep in fact

for firing in battle,

the

;

fu'st

gave much more

di•

is

the rear half-brigade does not.

;

files

though supposed to be six deep

rank knelt and the other two stood. effective fire

,

what

already explained, the line had been reduced to

As

it

and reduced

casualties.

This Fire

was delivered by platoon or by rank, and each rank having fired

had but two others

In the imperial army

What

it

to pass to

go to the rear and load.

might have nine ranks to

he utilized by carefully marshaling his second line his first line lost in

by

reserves.

It

lacked strength.

gave

it

It

had nearly as many men, over

both power and

We

The

elasticity.

latter has life

shall see

and what

must not be supposed that the Swedish

as a rigid cast-iron bar differs blade.

;

weight was made up by a second line or

metre of front, as the imperialists.

lineal

pass.

Gustavus gained in men by his shallow formation,

how

Its organization

The two armies

from an

differed

elastic steel sword-

which the other

these two systems

line

six to the

lacks.

worked

in the first

general engagement where they fairly and squarely met.

XX. BREITENFELD. SEPTEMBER The

Leipsie plain

for artillery.

He had

Tilly

is

wide and

flat,

with here and there a rolling hillock good

had an admirable

line,

Swedes were not handsome, but the

flanks,

lot,

and with his guns admirably posted.

Early

Brushing away

into line with the Saxons on their left.

principally horse

;

TiUy stood

astir,

the Swedes

in a

Each regiment had

under Torstenson was on the

left centre.

battle opened with artillery,

break the Swedish right

;

and

marched

came

Tilly's outposts, they

;

the right wing under Ban^r was

the king led the centre, mostly of foot

with horse and foot.

its

;

Horn on the

The Saxon formation

restless

left,

guns, and the reserve artillery

Pappenheim rode

is

not known.

out, unordered,

but Ban^r met him manfully, and drove him

off in

Next, Fiirstenberg charged in on the Saxons, and sent them flying to

flight.

Tilly

the rear.

had viewed these unauthorized advances

and wheeled

his left,

in

dismay

;

but the

the Saxons imcovered Gustavus' flank; he prepared to strike

flight of

there,

The Saxons were a

In the Swedish wings horse was mixed

with the foot in alternate small detachments

to

The

eager to fight.

there.

but they did not know what fighting meant.

towards the enemy with cheer.

The

men were was

stuff

seventeen great battles, with Pappenheim and Fiirstenberg on the

of

line

and a splendid array of veterans.

never lost a great battle, and his

bespangled

1631.

17,

in

upon him.

him

Forming a crotchet of

Gustavus was ready.

he reinforced Horn, and then, heading the cavalry of the right, he

down the late line of battle, captured Tilly's guns, and turned them on The centre swung round so as to prolong Horn's new line, and the enemy. Torstenson's guns took Tilly's squares in flank. The battle was won; but

rode

brave Tilly with his Walloons held firm until fairly torn to shreds. thrice

The

wounded, the old hero was borne

victory

The

was complete.

by

Then,

his beaten troops (T elite.

Activity had proved superior to weight.

original intention of Tilly

sively behind the Elster

ants should arrive, but

on

off the field

had been

and Saale

to operate defen-

until his belated lieuten-

Pappenheim had been hotly urging

his chief the necessity of at once

quellmg the

spirit of the

THE TWO ARMIES.

258

Protestants by beating them in battle, as he had no doubt

unconquered Tilly could do.

Few

of the generals sustained

the chief in waiting for reinforcements, and Tilly listened to the plea of his

young and ardent

The

officers.

events around

Leipsic brought the armies together, and after the capture

down with

of the city, Tilly sat

onmarch

The

of the

new

evolutions of an army.

it

to await the

admirably adapted for the

is

It stretches for miles in either direc-

tion with but slight accentuation, if

to

allies.

plain north of Leipsic

are as

back

his

and what slopes do

created for the play of artillery.

Tilly

exist

had previ-

ously sent out and intrenched some heights at Entritsch so as to hold the road from Diiben, and

had

selected for his line

the elevation facing Podelwitz and Gobschelwitz athwart the

advance; his batteries, protected in a slight way by

allied

earthworks, lay near the turnpike.

While the Swedes and Saxons, of

in the gray of the

September 17, 1631, were preparing

bach

in their advance

column

to these

morning

to cross the

Lober-

on Leipsic, Tilly led his brilliant

same heights and out beyond; and some

time before the arrival of the

allies,

had drawn up

his long

array, with Breitenfeld to the rear of his left, a mile or so

away, and Seehausen behind his right.

The sun and wind

were both at his back, a feature much in his favor. In contrast to the rough and rusty Swedes, Tilly com-

manded a bered

splendid-looking set of veterans.

men who had

His army num-

followed him for years, and

he had never yet been conquered in a battle.

among

these were his Walloons, at the head of

knew

that

Prominent

whom

he

took his stand on his white battle-charger, which was laiown to every

man

in line.

As

the rugged old veteran of seventy-

two passed along, shouts of "Father Tilly!" rang from battalion to battalion.

There was no feeling of imcertainty

TILLY'S FORMATION.

That full-throated cheer presaged

the imperial army.

ill

259

success.

As

variously computed, Tilly had from thirty-two to forty

He drew

thousand men, of which a quarter was cavalry.

up the infantry

in seventeen great battalia, of fifteen

dred to two thousand

men

each, in the centre,

hun-

and ranged

the horse in similar masses of about one thousand men, ten

deep, on

the flanks.

cuirassiers

was on the

come up, was on the Italy,

Pappenheim with

personally

right, with the cavalry just

back from

under Isolani, in

but twenty-six guns.

Fiirstenberg,

in line batteries

credited with

is

it

seems as

there

if

difficult to handle,

new antagonist without an more nearly equal

he must well know.

effectiveness

Tilly

This was the number reported as

His guns were

scarcely meet his

line.

first

captured by the Swedes, but

been more.

famous black

his

who had

left,

must have

but he would

effort to place

to the Swedish,

whose

His heavy guns were

placed between the right wing and the centre

;

his light

guns

in front of the centre.

has been asserted on the generally plausible ground of

It

the custom of the day, that Tilly's

two

lines.

all

deep battalia, he had scarce enough

regular second line. of

army was drawn up

two

lines;

in

old pictures of the battle show but one

and Tilly covered so great a stretch of front

line,

his

But

Only the

men

Italian author

that,

to

with

form a

Gualdo speaks

other accounts mention no second one.

How-

ever disposed, the imperial line was longer than the allied, the Swedish. Tilly had many won success by wheeling in on the enemy's flank, and he may have hoped to do so here. Not prolific of novelties

considerably overlapping

times

in tactics, he based his faith

on the time-tried manoeuvre.

His men bound white kerchiefs

word was "Jesu-Maria! "

in their hats,

and the watch-

GUSTAVUS' FORMATION.

260

With

a small column of cavalry, Pappenheim had been

sent forward to arrest the allied advance at the

Loberbach,

stream

little

perchance some advantage might be had of

if

them.

At

early daylight the Swedes had fallen into line, and

advanced in battle order across the even plain from Wolkau, towards Leipsic.

After an hour and a half's march they

ran across the enemy's van, and then caught sight of the imperial array on the slopes where

To

it

had taken up

its

stand.

cross the Loberbach, the armies were compelled to ploy

and here they encountered the skirmishers of

into column,

Pappenheim

;

but they threw them back, and crossed at the

several fords.

The Swedes held

the right and centre; the Saxons the

but the two armies fought as separate organizations.

left;

no record of the Saxon formation

There

is

be of

interest.

The Saxons

;

the Swedish

may

lay on the east of the Diiben

road; the Swedes on the west.

The Swedish

centre had in

first line

four brigades of foot

under Generals Winkel, Carl Hall, Teuffel and stiern;

Ake Oxen-

in reserve to the first line the cavalry regiment of

Ortenburg, and the Scottish infantry under Monroe and

Ramsey.

In second line the centre had three brigades, of

which one Scotch under General Hepburn, and two German

under Generals Vitzthum and Thurn.

Behind

this

stood

the reserve cavalry under Schafmann and Kochtitzky.

At

the head of the right wing, which was mostly cavalry,

stood Field-Marshal Baner, second in command. line

In

first

were the East Gothland, Smaland, West Gothland, and

two Finland regiments under Tott; and the Wiinsch and Stalhandske regiments, the best of their kind.

Between each

two of the small cavalry divisions there was stationed a body of two hundred musketeers.

In reserve was the Rhinegrrave

THE SAXONS.

261

In second line stood the cavalry regiments of

regiment. Sperreuter,

Damitz, and the Courland and Livonia regi-

ments.

Field-Marshal Horn commanded the line stood the cavalry

left

In

wing.

first

regiments of Baudissin, Calenbach and

Horn, interspersed with the bodies of two hundred musketeers already mentioned.

In second

line.

regiments.

same body

There was no reserve to

Between each of

this first

came Courville's and Hall's cavah*y

line

two cavalry divisions was the

two hundred musketeers.

The regimental what we might

pieces were in

front of the regiments;

call the reserve artillery

was massed

in front

of the left centre under Torstenson.

On

the left of

Horn came

the Saxons, destined by their

utter lack of discipline, not to say cowardice, to aid in win-

ning the battle.

The whole Swedish army wore hopeful green branches their

headgear, and the pass-word was

"God

in

with us!"

Gustavus, who, despite his growing bulkiness, was always a noble figure, addressed the troops amid great enthusiasm.

He

wore but his common buff coat, and a gray hat with a

green feather.

Armor he had long ago

fortable; for the

Danzig bullet

still

discarded as uncom-

lay in his shoulder, and

he was irritated by the weight of the cuirass.

He

sought but

the protection of the Ahnighty.

The Saxon army was freshly equipped, and looked well. The imperialists wore gold and silver ornamented clothes,

— — the plunder of an hundred towns, and from their headgear nodded

fine

plumes.

Their horses were big showy Germans

the Swedish horses were small

other soldiers on this

field,

and gaunt.

Compared

the Swedish peasant

to the

made a

slender show; but the stuff was in him, as his fine friends

and foes alike found out and

lonsr

remembered.

r>-

PAPPENHEIM'S ERROR. So soon

as they

263

came within range, the imperial

artillery

began playing on the

allies,

under constant

but when the Swedish guns could be

fire;

and

their marshaling took place

got up, they were put in battery, and replied three shots for one.

The advance and dei^loyment

taken

till

of

the allied line had

nearly noon, and for two hours and a half after

that time, there was no exchange except a cannonade, which

indeed went on during the whole day.

Pappenheim's splendid cuirassiers had returned from the Loberbach and had taken place in line. All were now awaiting some incident to call for an opening attack; the imperialists expected the allies to advance,

making sure

Pappenheim was growing

Having stood

impatient.

number

and Gustavus was

that all was ready, to give the signal call. restless.

Swedish

the

He was

bold

and

artillery fire for a

of hours, he could contain himself no longer.

Gath-

ering his five thousand horse in hand, and without awaiting

down upon Bauer, who

orders from his chief, he thundered

held the Swedish right, galloping in on him at the head of the best cavalry division then in arms. lieutenant's mistake before he

"They have robbed me cried,

of

Tilly recognized his

had ridden a hundred yards.

my

honor and

my

glory!" he

throwing up his arms in despair.

In order to place his line where the disadvantage of dust

would not be so great plain

— the

wind was southwest and the

parched from a long drouth

crossing the Loberbach,

moved

— Gustavus

had, after

well to his right, to establish

his position.

The idea enough

of

Pappenheim was that he could edge

to outflank the

wheel, push in and destroy their flank.

Baner.

He

forgot,

to the left

Swedes, and then, by a half right

too,

him from the main body

that his of the

He

did not

know

advance would separate

army

at a time

when he

PAPPENHEIM DEFEATED.

264

might be sadly needed.

His action was

in every sense to

blame.

Not only was Pappenheim's advance an worse,

it

what was

error,

failed.

The Swedish formation and excellent behavior easily withThe "commanded musketeers" as the stood the shock.

—

small bodies interspersed with the cavalry were called

—

received the cuirassiers with withering salvos, and between shots the Finns

and Goths charged out on the horsemen

with a gallantry which cheered the whole right flank.

Baner

at once understood the purpose of the brave but over-impetu-

ous Pappenheim; and

from the Swedish

when the imperial commander turned

front,

and rode around

met before he was ready by a

its flank,

he was

counter-charge from one

stiff

of the cavalry regiments in reserve behind the first line.

Not discouraged, though checked, Pajtpenheim renewed and renewed

his charges.

Seven times did he

rally his

men, and

dash down upon the Swedish front and flank; but the musketeers

—

fit

prototype of Fritz's Prussian foot

ground as steadily in the hand

to

hand

— stood their

conflict as if they

been on parade, and the Swedish cavalry, thovigh far,

wavered not from their doughty resistance.

lighter

had

by

The Hol-

stein infantry regiment, which was sent by Tilly to Pappen-

heim's support, was cut to pieces, and the duke

head of

his

men.

No

fell at

the

impression whatever had been created

by Pappenheim's advance; and even

this

preux chevalier was

eventually thrown back, decimated and unnerved, was fol-

lowed sharply by Baner and driven fled

off the field.

The wreck

towards Halle, and Gustavus discreetly recalled the pur-

suers to the line. It

must be remembered that the cavalry charge

day was not delivered at a gallop. at a trot,

and

of that

The troops rather rode

at a convenient distance halted to use their

THE SAXONS RUN AWAY. So long

firearms.

draw

their swords.

as there It

"arm

they did not

left,

was not a question of

cavalry was not then the

moment;"

of the

impact

solid

fought

it

horseback, and the footman's "push of

infantry on

like

was a volley

265

pike" was much more common than the horseman's cold steel, so

steadiness,

came

broken infantry

On

When

long as the enemy showed a front.

he could not break

if

was

the allied left the result

charge of

the imperial

cavalry,

it.

different indeed.

The

under Fiirstenberg

and

back after Papj)enheim had

Isolani, could not long be held

started on his

he lost

the cavalryman's chance; he could slash up

mistaken ride; the squadrons

gallant but

drove forward, straight upon the Saxon array.

Nor did

they meet a line of Swedish veterans ; except for some efforts

by the horse and tion the

moment

artillery,

they crushed in the Saxon forma-

they reached

ners, the unseating of a

few

and the

it;

officers,

loss of

was enough

a few gunto send the

bespangled battalions of John George to the right-about.

The

was seized with an equal

elector

he and his

terror;

body-guard turned and spurred away to Eilenburg. short half hour the imperial cavalry of the right

the whole

Saxon contmgent

— nearly half

the field; having done which,

it

the

In a

had driven

army

— from

prej)ared to turn in

now naked left flank of the king of Sweden. The Swedish train behind the army caught the

upon

the

from the flying Saxons, and made

much

As non-combatants

disorder.

its

way

infection

to the rear, in

they were mostly hired

Germans, on whose stanchness no reliance could be placed.

The it

it

battle

had begun without the orders of Father Tilly;

was running

its

course without any Interference by

was going quite against his wishes.

from his position

Saxon

flight

in the centre,

But

him

at this juncture,

he was quick to see that the

had opened a chance by which he might repair

DISASTER TURNED INTO VICTORY.

266

the errors already made, and win the day. left

was open; and

Tilly's centre of

The Swedish Spanish

irresistible

now outnumbered

battalia not only overlapped

it,

king- at least three to two.

Moreover Tilly was compelled

to act, for the fire

but he

from Torstenson's quick-served guns was

He

gTOwing deadlier every minute. advance

wake

in the

the

gave

the

order

to

of Fiirstenberg, and, in the belief that

the king would not separate his left from his centre, obliqued to the right, so as to get well

beyond Gustavus'

direction of his

movement was

road; and be

said

it

the east of the Diiben

to

for the credit of Tilly's manoeuvring

capacity, that a part of his heavy line of battalia to

march obliquely

left,

and

to the right,

it

was able

partial wheel to the

started out over two hours before,

the Swedish naked flank the north, to

make a

advance in serried ranks against the position

still

where, when

The

left.

;

while Fiirstenberg rode further to

come down upon

But Gustavus was manoeuvre twice as

had stood

its rear.

alive to the danger,

and Horn could

fast as the best of Tilly's battles.

Under

Gustavus' instructions Horn smartly wheeled his wing to the

left,

threw out detachments to hold the ditches of the

Diiben road,

and was ready

to

meet the imperial general

long before he reached the spot; while the king, hastily

drawing Vitzthum's and Hepburn's brigades from the second line of the centre,

the

left.

The

threw them in to sustain the new line on

fight here

was thus established on a

safe basis,

Swedes drove the impe-

and despite

their heroic charges the

rial cavalry

back, and were ready to attack the battalia

when

they should put in their appearance.

Now came

the

moment

and the king grasped right,

it

for Gustavus

in a twinkling.

and

his mobile line,

Riding back to the

he gave hurried orders to Baner, and heading the

West Gothland

horse

down along

the front of the Swedish

SUPERB MANCEUVRE.

.4

he sent them charging at a furious gallop in on the

line,

Here

flank of Tilly's battles.

was

267

was cold

not a volley

steel;

but the squadrons dashed straight at the enemy

fired,

with the

it

momentum

of a

Gustavus

pas de charge.

himself waited but to seize

East

Smalanders,

the

Gothlanders and Finns, foiu"

regiments, — and •

—

fol-

lowed hard along, bearing

up the

to the right

where

slope

stood the im-

still

These were

perial guns.

heavy and hard

move,

to

Battle of Breitenfeld.

and

and

king

the

(2d Phase.)

his

horsemen swept over them wholesale, captured them trice,

in

a

sabred the gunners where they stood, and in a few

minutes turned the battery against the flank of Tilly's

now standing

at

Never, in modern days, had the chances

to turn the tide.

of battle been

line,

bay where the brave old soldier had hoped

improved by so rapid, so masterly,

so bold a

manoeuvre.

The temporary promise and the faihu'e of direction

to

the

its left,

Ime

of

of success of the imperial right,

had thus given a new and curious

The Swedish

battle.

almost at right angles to where

it

had

first

left

stood

been marshaled,

with Tilly, in more or less irregular order from his unwonted

manoeuvre, facing

it.

The king had

caj)tured Tilly's origi-

nal position, and was not only pounding the imperialists

with their

own

cannon-balls, but Torstenson had

his reserve artillery,

centre,

which had stood

swung round

in front of the

and was pouring the contents of

Swedish

his munition wagons,

on a line parallel to the late Swedish front, into the huge,

SPLENDID FIGHTING.

268

Gustavus now made a general wheel

defiant squares. left

of

his centre and right, so as to prolong the

by

He

Horn.

enemy

hand

off

from Leipsic, but the

won, and there was a

to be

still

fight along the

fierce

the cavalry

now It

of

hands and

;

left

was

all

the artillery

upon the

field, it

solely a question

would stand before their resistance was turned of

how tough Father

Tilly was.

way

Tilly's veterans fought in a

fame

and their general's reputation.

own

own

to preserve their

Standing at bay with

the Swedish array on two sides of them, torn by the their

was

the victory should be; of what losses the

how complete

imperialists into flight

all

battle

and prolonged hand

With

Dtiben road.

could, however, end but one way.

in his

front

had already, by capturing the imperial bat-

teries, cut the

to

to the

new

fire

of

and the enemy's guns; with their cavalry in dis-

tant flight,

no reserves to

aid,

no hope of anything but

destruction, the battles of Tilly stuck manfully to their task.

Gaps were torn

in their ranks to

no purpose.

There they

stood, partly from gallant love of their rough old

chief,

partly from the sheer inertia of their massed formation, as the ranks of Porus

had stood

at the

Hydaspes, as the

Russian hollow square would stand at Kunersdorf towards spread

nightfall, fast,

and

the

.

Finally,

Once begun, it save a small body of braves who

stampede began.

shortly,

surrounded Tilly, the infantry battalia melted into a mass of

fugitives.

There was

no organization

left.

Pappen-

heim's famous horsemen had hours ago been broken, and

with Fiirstenberg's had fled; and Tilly's battles crumbled before the activity of the Swedish onslaught.

The Saxon guns were recaptured by the Swedes. The army lost seven thousand killed, six thousand

imperial

wounded and captured, whole train. The rest

all its artillery,

of the

army

ninety flags and the

fled in

every direction,

GUSTAVUS PURSUES.

269

mostly towards Halle, wliither, thrice wounded and scarcely escaping capture, Tilly also to Halberstadt.

made

liis

way, and from thence

Here he joined Pappenheim, and

he could of his forces,

retired

to

collected

the

line

what the

of

Weser. It is related that,

so soon as the battle

was

fairly

Gustavus dismounted, kneeled on the blood-stained

and offered up thanks

to the

Giver of Victory, while

by him joined earnestly

in his pious act.

such sincerity was inbred,

—

won, field,

all

near

With Gustavus

like the unsj)oken battle prayers

of Stonewall Jackson.

The

king, whose loss had not exceeded twenty-one hun-

dred killed and wounded, ture Leipsic, and

With

his usual

left

the Saxon contingent to cap-

followed up the retreating

imperialists.

push he himself headed a body of fifteen

hundred horse, and at Merseburg, on September 19, overtook a considerable detachment, beat sand prisoners.

He

it,

and captured three thou-

occupied Halle, September 21, but did

not pursue beyond the Saale, for he wished to be secure in his

foothold in

Saxony before he moved

western or southern Germany.

decisively

into

The imperial garrison

in

Leipsic surrendered September 23, and the Saxons returned to Torgau.

After lying some time in the Halberstadt region, Tilly

moved

to the

"Whose

Weser, where he recovered his strength rapidly.

house doth burn. Must soldier turn" was true, and

he found plenty of Breitenfeld, the

recruits. first

great battle of the

modern

era,

is

more than one way. Counting out the Saxons, who were but a source of weakness, the king was heavily

peculiar in

outnumbered, and was attacked successively and in force on both flanks, in a manner which on more than one occasion has proved fatal to an army.

Attempted flank attacks some-

THE PROTESTANT HERO.

270

times open gaps in the line which delivers them, and result

more harm

in

to

than gain made against the enemy.

it

this case, the flank attacks,

met with great constancy; and Pappenheun's

vigor, were

and

In

while not lacking in direction

being delivered without orders, took the control of the battle out of the hands of the general in command.

which led up

to Tilly's

The

situation

overthrow was none of his making,

though Pappenheim afterwards complained of not being supported in his

first

charge, and

was

it

Tilly's putting all his

strength into the manoeuvre on the naked Swedish left flank

which practically broke up his

happened had Tilly been faced by a tles

and few generals,

;

in

any

apparently good an opening. led

by Gustavus' splendid

moment and

to seize the

won

the battle,

It

line of

slow-moving bat-

would have neglected so

was the Swedish mobility, and

his true

coup

d^oeil

order the manoeuvre needed, which

like

line

era,

vigor,

rather than

Against a heavy

This would not have

line.

would doubtless have been

Tilly's his

own

errors which

lost

it.

imperial general

the

victorious, despite the error of

Pappenheim. Gustavus was at once recognized as the Protestant Hero.

Those who had looked askance at him, who had likened him to Christian of

those lest

who had

Denmark, were now vociferous

heavy retribution should await them

now openly

in his praise;

feared to join his standard by word or deed,

declared for him.

All

in case of failure,

Germany was overrun

with pamphlets to laud hun, with pictures and medals of

Gustavus the Great.

For once the Catholic press and pam-

phleteers were silenced.

whelming.

The

Their defeat had been too over-

Nothing could be said

spirit of the

victory as the king

to excuse

it.

Swedes was as much heightened by

had gained

in glory.

this

The enlistment

of

prisoners and the gathering up of garrisons swelled the ranks

THE SWEDES ELATED. b£ the Protestant allies.

A

271

new army assembled on

the

lower Elbe; Tott besieged Rostock, while Landgrave Wil-

liam and

Duke Bernard

held Fiigger in

check,

cleaned

Hesse-Cassel of imperial troops, and made enterprising raids into adjoining Catholic territory.

SUSTIVE ADOLPHE, ROI DC SDICDE. m P»r Miihicl Van Micrtvtll cl gfuvt P^r W J. RtlT. |033.1

-^1

XXI.

TOWARDS THE MAIN. SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER, In fourteen months Gnstavus had not only securely established but at Breitenfeld had

qiiite

changed the aspect of the cause

;

1631.

his bastion,

laggards

all

now crowded around him with offers of ielp. Tilly retired behind Weser the Catholics saw in the Snow King a dangerous opponent and Protestant prospects were flattering. Even Wallenstein aspired to serve ;

;

king, but Gustavus mistrusted him.

With Saxony and Brandenburg

the the the

as allies,

Gustavus moved confidently to the Erfurt country, through Thuringia to the Main, and to the bishopries dubbed the Priest's Alley, leaving John George to

command an

Many thought

operation towards Silesia.

the king should march

was method, not temerity, which distinguished Gus-

direct

on Vienna

tavus,

and he preferred not to prejudice what was already won.

but

;

it

Tilly

was

He

used

watched by a minor column, and the king pushed on to the Main. his interior lines

;

every strip gained was carefully guarded

;

made with the lands he crossed, and with the free cities, such The Main was reached early in October, Wiirzburg and its castle butions levied, and the Jesuits banished.

marched

to AsehafEenburg, joined the

treaties

were

as Niirnberg.

taken, contri-

Tilly meanwhile raised a nfew army,

duke of Lorraine, and began

to operate

timorously in the region south of the Main, with near forty thousand men.

Only

fourteen months had elapsed since Gustavus had

landed in Germany, but by his far-seeing, cautious and well-digested plans, crowned tenfeld,

Protestants.

He had

to

of Brei-

secured a firm footing in northern

Germany, where he held

down

by the decisive victory

he had completely changed the prospects of the

all

but a few of the strong places

Saxony, and had isolated these.

tions with

Sweden were secured by the

and he had practically established

nium Maris

Baltici.

After

His communicacontrol of the sea,

his long-coveted

many and

Domi-

vexatious delays he

THE SNOW KING. Cassel and

Weimar, and was strengthened by

troops, tendered

On

Brandenburg, Saxony, Hesse-

treaties with

had concluded

273

accessions of

and promised from many other quarters.

landing, the horizon was dark and impromising

;

had now cleared, and the sim of success blazed forth the hearts of

all.

As Gustavus had gained gained in aplomb and aj)peared slow

what

is

the sky to cheer

moral weight, so

in

and cautious, but they had been

better,

were

by the

justified

with but one serious failure,

at times

sure, and,

He had met

results.

— Magdeburg, — and

this

was

Breitenfeld had placed

chargeable to the elector of Saxony.

him on the most prominent

army had

his

His operations had

confidence.

j)edestal in

Europe.

The

Catholics

He

no longer looked de haut en has on the "Snow King."

was a redoubtable opponent

as well as the Protestant Hero,

— the "Lion of the North and Bulwark of the Faith." imperialists

had

lost in spirit

and organization

all

The

that the

Their retreat to the Weser opened

Swedes had gained.

the heart of the emperor's possessions to the king's thrust,

with but a trivial force in the way.

had received from

his

"new

little

The emperor's authority^ enemy" an almost fatal

blow, and the Protestants of north and west Germany, who,

cowed of

into submission,

Swedish

aid,

now

had feared

rose,

under Gustavus' standards. distinctly shifted the

the Protestant

a great

was

to establish

These fourteen months had

Gustavus had risen beyond being

He was now

German war,

welcome the uncertainty

moral superiority from the Catholic to

party.

king of Sweden.

to

and with hearty good-will enlisted

in

the leader of the attack in

which the task he had imdertakeu

beyond

future

religions all over the land.

a condition to leave to others.

question the equality of

But the work was not yet Gustavus had put his hand

the plow, and might not look back.

It required the

in to

same

TERROR OF CATHOLICS.

274

wise and vigorous action in the future, to com2:)lete the structure which had been so well builded in the past. Tilly's lamentable failure to withstand the

Swedish advance

draw attention

who had been Bohemian The terror which

began again

to

nursing his wrath

in

to Wallenstein,

a species of court in his

nursing his gout in Karlsbad.

castles, or

had been engendered by Gustavus' successes on the Oder now sank into insignificance before the terror inspired by the battle of Breitenfeld.

The

walls of cities hundreds of miles

manned; Bohe-

distant from the scene of action were kept

mian

forests

were laid low to block the roads upon which

was feared that the king might advance; equijjped

new army;

a

the

in

in

Ingolstadt

it

Prague they they

churches

prayed to be "delivered from the devil and the Swedes, the

Vienna was said

Finns and the Lapps."

to be

"dumb

with

fright;" the emperor was so nearly at the end of his wits, say some questionable chroniclers, that he sought means of

bringing about peace, and even contemplated flight to Gratz.

Universal terror pointed the world to Wallenstein.

he could inspire confidence favor, in the It

is

Years'

army and

;

outside.

a curious fact that of the noted soldiers of the Thirty

War, only Pappenheim was

Pappenheim was a bold and able before he rose to higher

command.

Wallenstein was a Czech

Tilly a

man

;

Only

the popular sentiment was in his

of the

;

a German, and while

lieutenant, he

was

killed

Gustavus was a Swede

Walloon Turenne a French;

minor generals, the only German who won repute

was Bernard of Weimar, and he forfeited

his all at

Nord-

lingen.

Oddly, Wallenstein had been looking in another direction,

— towards

his old antagonist,

said to have been

made

to

Gugtavus.

him about

they certainly were by the

Approaches are

these days

by England;

Swedish monarch, and these

WALLENSTEIN'S OPPORTUNITY.

27o

Wallenstein had not thrust aside, though he openly denied them.

Tilly heard the runior of such negotiations

the Czech with

it;

but Wallenstein reassured him.

same way Gustavus sought reach Saxony.

He was

accomplish his

end,

Nor would

employ.

Like the

rest he

more important

and taxed

to

Arnim,

influence

to

not above any honorable means to

and Wallenstein was it

In the so as

have made any odds

was a mercenary, even to the fortunes of

if

no

in if

man's

he had been.

a great one.

Still

Germany, Wallenstein

stood in correspondence with Arnim.

was

It

keeping

in

with the spirit of the times that these secret negotiations shoidd go on.

Save Gusta^^^s, scarce a potentate in EurojDC

had a disinterested servant.

The great Bohemian, unlike

most of his contemporaries, was not hide-bound by

He had

religion.

broader aims, and would have welcomed an era of

tolerance, in

which he could

strive for a

German

empire,

under the Hapsburgs, to be uj)held by himself as military chief.

In another sense Gustavus had equal aspirations,

but not for the German, crown.

His dismissal from command had

Wallenstein hard.

hit

In the summer of 1631 he undoubtedly stood ready to enter into

an alliance with Gustavus, and

cause, to revenge his

to serve the Protestant

wrongs on Ferdinand.

Gustavus was

almost on the point of intrusting him with an army, but is

doubtful

if,

in the

Swedish

it

Wallenstein would

service,

Then came the battle of Breitenfeld; and the emperor began once more to look towards his ancient general. But Wallenstein was disinclined to listen, and for

have proved a success.

a while

it

appeared as

— Gustavus,

if

the three strongest

Richelieu, and Wallenstein

men

— were

in

to

Europe form an

anti-Hapsburg triumvirate.

Now

that Gustavus

had shown

princes joined the cause.

his strength, the

They made a

Anhalt

treaty at Halle to

WHAT ROUTE?

276

pay three thousand rix dollars a month,

by the king and

bridges as directed

to build forts

at their

own

and

cost, to

hold their strong places and defiles for the Swedes while

denying passage to the emperor, and generally to act under Gustavus' direction, in exchange for the protection afforded

by the

alliance.

As when Magdeburg was

crying aloud for succor, there

was again more than one road open

Should he move against west Germany and

choose his plan. the beaten

He must

to Gustavus.

army

of Tilly,

who was now basing himself on

the Catholic princes of the Rhine ; should he march through

Franconia

on

the Thurino^ian forest

and

"Priest's

the

Alley;" or should he move southeastward, on the emperor's

At a

hereditary possessions ?

council of

shortly after the victory, the elector of of

Weimar were

field,

own and

for Gustavus

to do, with

his army's flight

sent to congratulate

battle-

After the battle the king had

him on

the victory, and to thank

John George was

dull

from the

had treated him, as he could well afford

an easy touch.

for having suggested an immediate

— and

at Halle

John George had recovered from

present.

the disgrace of his

war held

Saxony and William

movement on

as far

him

the enemy,

from appreciating the

touch of satire in the facts as Gustavus was from intending

any

slur.

At

this

council

advised a march on Vienna. military plea for

it.

A

many

others

Count Horn made a

strono-

Oxenstiern and

summary

operation, they thought,

against the emperor in his capital would bring

peace which would set

all

There were few forces

— perhaps

Tiefenbach in Silesia, and

— to oppose ised to

care

him

to a

the questions of Europe at rest.

less in

ten thousand

men under

Bohemia under Maradas

such a march, and the elector of Saxony promfor

the

southwest.

strongly in favor of such a project

That the sentiment was is

shown by the

fact that,

AN ADVANCE ON VIENNA?

277

twenty years afterwards, Oxenstiern reiterated his opinion before the senate in Stockholm that such a

have been the wisest one to make.

march would

The chancellor could be

venturesome on occasion.

But though not slow

to see the advantages suggested, the

plan did not meet with the king's idea of a systematic

method

of carrying on the

honor, did

campaign

nor, be

;

So far

tant friends.

said to his

had come, not from the bold-

residts

ness, but the caution of his operations.

and held was by gressed,

it

chime with the pledges he had given his Protes-

it

What

and by doing nothing which had not

general plan.

he had won

intelligently securing each step as he pro-

Still,

fully all the pros

as

its

place in the

was his wont, the king weighed care-

and cons, and listened patiently

to every

suggestion.

Small confidence could be

felt in

the ability of the Saxon

army, beaten so easily at Breitenfeld, to do satisfactory work against imperial forces in the

Main

should order a concentration there. cially

Arnim, would be glad

territory;

for

John George

country,

if

Ferdinand

John George, and espe-

German

to control the south

had

political

and

financial

schemes to push there, and Arnim his Third Party business;

none of which appealed to Gustavus' common sense.

The king

preferred personally to undertake south Germany, while the

Saxons should sustain a force of twelve thousand Swedes, and a Bohemian

army

(should he be

won

to

be placed under Wallenstein's

over),

push on to Vienna,

and the

latter

command

with this force might

Moreover, Gustavus never quite

his anxiety as to his communications, for he reposed

lost

no faith

John George or George William, and conceive the possibility, even if remote, of Saxony

in the constancy of

could

still

and Brandenburg rising behind him, should he be too far distant.

A

single check in a

movement on Vienna

b}^ his

THE KING'S IDEA.

278

main force would be surely

fatal.

He knew

the iron will of

Ferdinand, and did not believe that even the sack of his

The emperor had already

woidd bring him to terms.

capital

been tried in this matter,

now

— and Vienna

day was not

at that

Like the Madrid of the eigh-

the capital which

it

teenth century,

might be taken by an enemy a dozen times

it

is.

without affecting the war.

Ferdinand might

retire to the

south and involve Gustavus in an extremely dangerous stern

Nor was a march on Vienna

chase.

the best

way

the withdrawal of the Edict of Restitution.

to

compel

Nothing- but

Gustavus' presence could stay Tilly from visiting on any of the

The king

Protestant cities _ the fate of Magdeburg.

must consider the work

to be

done before winter, and decide

where he might best dispose his

troojDS.

Along the Main

lay the rich Catholic bishoprics, — and here he could not only victual his

How much

tants.

the

men, but repair the wrongs of

his brother Protes-

more negotiation was needful

Protestant princes

to

work

together was

to induce

uncertain.

Breitenfeld had changed people's faces, but the king had

not forgotten his long struggle with Brandenburg and Saxony, and he believed that a single failure would renew the

doubtful attitude of most of his present supporters.

The king's immediate

move

to the

idea was that he would personally

Erfurt cou^ntry for winter-quarters, and govern

his further operations

perse his men,

from

there.

Not that he would

dis-

but he would accumulate magazines, and

own headquarters here, while the troops lay in Thuringia, with Hesse, Weimar and Saxony near by; and from here he would move on the Franconian bishojjrics, compel contributions, recruit up an army for a brilliant cam-

make

his

paign in 1632, and quests,

and

utilize the

winter to consolidate his con-

to bring his allies to

men and money

work

as well as smiles

in unison

and promises.

and furnish Tilly

must

NO MARCH ON VIENNA. be considered; but the king deemed

own

right

his proposal

Germany would

western

sufficient to secure his

it

by defensive means against him and the Rhineland

and

princes,

279

emperor; while,

successful,

if

Germany

in western

parties agreed that

would win as firm a footing

it

as he already

it

had

his

All

northern.

in

was not worth while

Such an advance with

the Weser.

and arm south-

to occupy, free

cut Tilly off from Bavaria and the

to follow Tilly to

main force would

be taking the king away from his general direction, which should lead to southern

Germany and towards

the emperor.

Though he must not be overlooked, operations against Tilly need not be conducted by the main force; a part of the allied armies, while protecting the king's flank, could pre-

vent the imperialists gaining dangerous headway.

The march on Vienna was given ferred to operate

from

his

enemies at the same time.

interior

With

his

Germany

from which

to

into activity,

all

his

main force he would to Swabia, to rouse

and gain a vantage-gi'oimd

Bavaria.

attack

against

lines

move through Thuringia and Franconia southern

Gustavus pre-

over.

When

he

have

shoidd

secured the whole region from the lower Oder to the middle

and upper Rhine, he could operate against Bavaria and

Meanwhile the Saxon, and perhaps

Austria from the west.

Wallenstein's, campaign against Silesia, via would

up the semblance

army

of an operation against Vienna;

of Hesse-Cassel

Tilly,

prevent his

it

venturing into western

did not suit

and the

and Weimar would operate against

No doubt

secure the king's right.

though

Bohemia and Mora-

secure the king's left in his advance, and keep

all

this plan

Germany, and was the wisest,

the Swedish generals, as

it

tainly did not satisfy the king's paymaster, Richelieu. this far-seeing

port.

cer-

But

statesman did not withdraw his financial sup-

LOSSAU'S CRITICISM.

280

The plan thus finally adopted by Gustavus has been much by soldiers. Folard likens his declination to march on Vienna to that of Hannibal, who failed to march on Kome after the overwhelming victory of Cannae. The com-

criticised

parison

— though

not so intended

—

is

Both

an apt one.

Gustavus and Hannibal were right in their action.

Lossau gives a better

Tilly, he argues,

set of reasons.

was beaten, but he should, with Fugger and Aldringer, have been followed up and annihilated.

men under Horn

ten thousand

For

this purpose, eight to

or Baner sufficed; and

when

the work was accomplished, the corps could rejoin the main

army.

The

elector of

lem of the south

Saxony could

German

easily

manage the prob-

— there

states with a small force,

being no great opposition there, and could lend Gustavus a

march on Vienna, which there

large part of his forces for a

was at the moment no organized army

to oppose.

Through

Bohemia and Moravia the Swedish army coidd be victualed,

raising

easily

and such a march might have made the subsequent

of

Wallenstein's army impossible.

In the event,

he says, Gustavus was compelled to operate on the Danube

imder much

less

favorable conditions.

On

the Baltic, in

Saxony, in Bohemia, in Westphalia, in Hesse, in Thuringia, in Franconia, everything

emperor. lost

went well for Gustavus

Ferdinand had but

fifty

;

ill

for the

thousand men; he had

more than half Germany; Hungary was threatened;

Bavaria was unreliable

;

the Protestants of

Austria were in revolt.

What

Upper and Lower

better time for Gustavus to

push home than the present? All this

is

fair

tavus' advent in

and proper

criticism.

But, prior to Gus-

Germany, there had been,

of the Christian era,

many

been no methodical ones.

in the history

bold operations, and there had

It

was method that Gustavus was

to teach in war, not alone boldness.

This

last quality is

GUSTAVUS' ORDERS. common, when taken by

combined with discretion

itself;

As Alexander would

is rare.

281 it

not advance into the heart of

Persia until he had acquired as a base the entire eastern

Mediterranean coast; as Hannibal declined after both Trasi-

mene and Cannae

Rome;

march on

to

crossing the Rubicon, took all

as

Caesar,

after

the towns on the Adriatic

before he would march to the capital, so Gustavus

decided to

make

now

sure of what he had, and to risk nothino; for

In the purely military aspect, he was

a questionable gain.

right; taking the political factors into account, doubly so.

— which

In pursuance of this general scheme sighted, reckoned

on

all

demands

paid due heed to the

and had a basis of broad but judgment

— the

was

far-

the political and military factors, of

Protestant

his

allies,

to the world novel military

Swedish monarch

Baner was

work.

set to

ordered to leave a garrison in Landsberg, to deliver up possession of Frankfort

burg, to take

be

and Crossen

command

of the

in condition for the field,

Werben

garrisons,

and

to

to the elector of

Saxon army when to

draw

in the

Brandenit

should

Havel and

assume a strong position near

Calbe on the Elbe, building forts at Rosenburg and Dessau, the mouths of the Saale and the Mulde.

He was

to send

a cavalry force to take Halberstadt, and to aim at capturing

Magdeburg;

in fact,

Baner was

of the bastion of all imperialists

Tott,

who

to clear the western skirts

and then

to

watch

lay on the lower Elbe, with the

it.

same end in

view was instructed to seek helpful alliances in the Bruns-

wick-Liineburg-Lauenburg territory, and with the free

Bremen, Liibeck and Hamburg.

He was

cities

to

besiege

Rostock, and capture the outstanding towns in the

Bremen

of

region.

All recruits to arrive from England, Scotland and

the Netherlands

land in the

— and

Weser and

they were a large body join Tott.

— were

to

STRATEGIC CHANGE.

282

Oxenstiei-n was instructed to order sundry Prussian gar-

from which most

risons to Ponierania,

He had

had been drawn. king,

who was glad

of the seasoned troops

ah*eady reported in person to the

to have

him near

at

hand

as an adviser.

Starting on September 27 from Halle, the king, with

way

twenty-six thousand men, headed for Thuringia, by

Querfurt.

He

was not sure that he could push beyond

of

this

section before winter.

On

October 2 Erfurt, one of the chief

of Mainz, primate clever stratagem of

final treaty

Germany, was

of Catholic

Duke William, and

after

seized

much

by a

discus-

and was strongly garrisoned.

sion agreed to serve the cause,

Here a

cities of the elector

was made with the four brothers of the

house of Saxe-Weimar.

The operations

of the year

the strategic position.

had brought about a change

in

In securing his bastion on the Baltic,

Gustavus had a base which called for a front of operations

from say Landsberg

running east and west,

He now

Werben.

to

found himself backing on the Elbe and Saale.

His

rear was protected by the Frankfort-Crossen line, and no

enemy was near

it

except Tiefenbach in Silesia.

Along the

Elbe-Saale he lay practically facing west, with the <jentre point of operations at Erfurt, and groups of forces on his right extending

down

and Baner, on completing William

These groups, under Tott

the Elbe. their

in the Saale region

;

work would

join

while the Royal

Landgrave

Army

would

push through the Thuringian Forest to the Werra, and on through Franconia to the Main. the forces on the as

aid

But

in

their

as well

advance through Silesia and

until the imperial allies along

witli the Sj)anish

tralized,

Oder by driving back the enemy,

the Saxons

Bohemia.

This advance would help

the

Rhine,

Netherlands at their back, could be neu-

Gustavus could not safely extend

his base so as to

project a line of advance on the heart of the empire.

GUSTAVUS' FORCES.

the forces controlled by Gustavus and expected

At Erfurt

to be raised were substantially as follows

numbered eighteen thousand by eleven thousand

increase

The Royal Army

:

hundred dragoons and

foot, six

hundred cavalry, which

seventy-five

was

it

purposed

in the field

which were

and

hundred

six

thousand and twenty-six hundred respectively.

had

five

garrison,

thousand

five

thirty-

be increased by

five

in

to

and seventy-five hundred

foot

Baner had four thousand men

horse.

283

to

Tott

hundred Swedes and eight thousand

Mecklenburgers, plus ten thousand eight hundred in garrison; all to be increased by six thousand

Dutch

troops, five

thousand recruits, eight thousand in new regiments thirty

-

five

hundred Swedish cavalry.

and

Hesse - Cassel had

ten thousand men, to be increased by seven thousand; and

Weimar was

to raise eleven

the seventy thousand

men

thousand

preferred to

was

immediately under the

serve

king, Gustavus left the reigning duke, William of

command

it

These calculations were

by the promise.

As Bernard in

Thus

hundred.

already under the colors,

hoped, would be nearly doubled. well borne out

five

Weimar,

of the Thuringian territory, to recruit for the

above contingents, and gave him as a nucleus twenty-six

hundred foot and four hundred horse.

How

far Gustavus planned his advance

from Erfurt can-

but he sent embassies to Bayreuth and to

not be said;

He

Niirnberg to pave the way.

took no step in the dark.

The army advanced through the Thiiringerwald range in two colmnns one via Gotha and Meiningen, one under the :

king in

person

via

Arnstadt (October

Schleusingen (October lished.

8),

7),

Ilmenau and

where headquarters were estab-

The two columns reunited

at the fortress of

hofen, the key to the bishopric of AViirzburg,

cumbed only

to Torstenson's

a strong garrison.

Konigs-

which suc-

heavy guns, and was

left

with

284

The next

PRIESTS

AND FRIARS DECAMP.

place essential to clear the country between the

Saale and the

Main was

Schweinfvirt, which surrendered,

and received a sure commandant with a Gustavus was greeted by the

dom, but there was a great

suitable garrison.

laity as the harbinger of freeflight of priests

and

friars.

He

issued a proclamation covering all kinds and conditions of

JESUIT PROPERTY CONFISCATED.

He had

men.

from further

285

come, he said, to protect the Protestants

injustice;

but

all,

whatever their

faith,

obeyed the law, would be protected from injury.

who

Arrived

October 13 at Wiirzburg, the capital of Franconia, whose prince-bishop had

the town capitulated October

fled,

15;

but the garrison and chief inhabitants retired with their valuables to the castle of Marienburg, on the further bank,

where they deemed themselves quite beyond reach. This castle

lies

on a high rock, perpendicular on the water

but approachable from the land.

side,

tected

by a deep

The bridge over

were no other defenses.

broken down, but sent over

it,

The

ditch, with a half -moon

this

and Colonel Leslie put across

The

Main had been

the

was repaired; Colonel Ramsay was

a detachment, under a heavy considerably.

gate was pro-

outwork; there

place

fire,

in boats, each with

by which they suffered

refused terms,

opened lines and erected batteries.

and the Swedes

After the destruction

of one of the towers, on October 18, about 5 A. M., the castle Lillie

was stormed by several regiments, led by Colonels and Burt.

Though

stoutly

defended,

the

party

gained the half -moon with ladders, and drove out the garrison,

pursuing which through the drawbridge,

the fugitives, the Swedes pushed on, blew

and captured the place.

let

down

Immense booty was

down

for

the gate,

taken,

as

Marienburg was the strongest place on the Main, and had been made a storehouse for valuables

;

a vast amount of ord-

nance-stores was got; and the bishop's valuable library was sent to

Upsala University.

Wiirzburg was mulcted eighty

thousand rix dollars, and town and castle were strengthened

and suitably held.

All Jesuit property was confiscated, but

no person was injured.

The

tavus, hostis huniani generis,

Jesuit was, according to Gus-

and was treated accordingly.

Protestant worship was restored.

GUSTAVUS OUTWITTED.

286

At Wiirzburg was made a

and

came with

some regiments; and an embassy from Wiir-

offers to raise

With

temberg arrived.

and

treaty between the king

the duke of Liiueburg

the Franconian Circle;

Niirnberg, after long negotiations

delays, a treaty offensive

and defensive was concluded

October 21, and the city raised a garrison of three thousand foot

and two hundred and

defenses.

Bayreuth.

fifty horse,

the same time a

bishop-electors of Cologne,

its

made with Anspach and demand was made on the

Similar treaties were

At

and strengthened

Mainz and Trier

to

acknowledge

Gustavus' authority; to pay forty thousand rix dollars a

month;

to furnish provisions;

open forts and

to

defiles to

the Swedes, and to deny these to the emperor; and to give

Protestants full religious equality with Catholics.

Franconia was rich;

ing had good results. little

from the war; and

gain.

its

it

Recruit-

had suffered

joining the cause was a

marked

Business kept Gustavus in Wiirzburg a month.

The progress

the Swedes began to excite terror all

of

through Catholic Germany; some of the princes were content to accept the situation, front.

The bishop

of

some

Bamberg,

fled,

some showed a bold

to gain time, entered into

feigned negotiations with Gustavus,

who decided

to press

on to the Rhine, and wished to avoid a present expedition

up the Main by which ruse the bishop managed ;

possessions until Tilly later baffled the king,

came

— as a rule a

to the rescue.

to hold his

He

cleverly

difficult matter.

After his defeat at Breitenfeld, as already narrated, TiUy

had made

his

way

north, with the relics of his army, a mere

disorganized mob, of which barely half were armed.

On

September 20 he reached Halberstadt, where Pappenheim joined him; thence he marched to Hildesheim, crossed the

Weser

at

Corvey near Hoxter, and drew

troops on September 23.

in

the Cologne

Hearing that Gustavus had headed

UNLUCKY LORRAINE.

287

south to Thuringia, after a while he himself turned towards

Early

Hesse.

in October, at Fritzlar, Aldringer,

who from

Jena had retired via Erfurt, and Fugger joined him, giving

and half

Tilly eighteen thousand foot,

Seeing that Gustavus

moved

as

much

cavalry.

continued onward to the Main,

still

same direction by way

of Fulda and move around the head of the Swedish Aschaffenburg, so as to advance, cross the Main, and work south of the king, to

Tilly

in the

He had

regain possession of Wiirzburg. his

own

forces the thirteen thousand

of Lorraine,

who had made a

As

it

view to join to

of the shifty

duke

treaty with the emperor,

had

Worms, and was moving

crossed the Rhine in September at

on Aschaffenburg.

men

in

But the duke did not escape

disaster.

happened, Gustavus had gone down the Main, recon-

On November

noitring.

not

2,

many

miles from Wiirzburg,

he ran across the enemy's van of four thousand men.

Send-

ing back for Baudissin's body of four thousand horse and

two thousand musketeers, he far

on the enemy's camp not

fell

from Bischofsheim and dispersed the entire body.

duke

retired, with the relics,

join Tilly in Miltenburg,

on his main bodj^ managed to

and the

some thirty-eight thousand men.

movements

at Wiirzburg.

ing on either Wiirzburg,

though he cared

for

little

The

He

joint forces

amounted

to

Gustavus learned of Tilly's understood that he was aim-

Schweinfurt, or Bamberg; but

him

so long as Niirnberg could

take care of herself, he was careful to protect his allied cities

and

to close all available defiles.

When

Tilly

marched away from the Weser and towards

Franconia, Landgrave William and

some good work. and the landgrave for Tilly

at

The fell

latter

Duke Bernard put

in

gave a hearty blow to Fugger;

on Vacha, took a big convoy intended

Corbach, and captured Miinden and Hoxter.

These outside operations cannot be detailed.

XXII. MAINZ. NOVEMBER, Leaving

Tilly,

Pappenheim returned

to the

1631.

Weser

;

Tilly

Maximilian to protect Bavaria, and sat down at Windsheim.

down

river to secure his hold on the

Taking

the Danube. 16.

He had

resisted

all the cities

Main and the Rhine before turning toward

on the way, he reached Frankfort November Mainz, which had a Spanish garrison,

thirty-two thousand men.

and Gustavus marched up the Rhine,

;

from the

While

bank.

left

crossed,

place,

;

city

was besieging

twenty-six thousand

men

but at Frankfort he learned that Tilly had failed before the

which had resisted

December

the place

and attacked the

so engaged, he heard that Tilly

Niirnberg, and at once started with a column of

towards his ally

was ordered by Gustavus moved

22,

Returning to Mainz, Gustavus took

all his threats.

and quartered his army there.

During

this period

Pappenheim was operating against Gustavus' lieutenants on the Weser, showing ability,

but accomplishing no substantial

Tilly took vus' troops

up

qiiarters in the

and

allies at this

resvilt.

On

retiring

The

Nordlingen country.

time shows eighty thousand

with an equal number to be raised during the winter, the thirteen thousand

men who landed

With Fugger

taken

Anspach November off

— a marked contrast to

Rothemburg and Windsheim, had

20.

crossed

it,

and

He had

to Westphalia, a territory

separated from Papchief, preferred to

some one must defend

It is asserted that Tilly intended to bring

for the emperor.

on another general engagement at an early date. perhaps doubtful

reached

Gustavus had not succeeded in

from Bavaria.

penheim, who, unable to agree with his

march back

Gusta-

the colors,

near Stralsund a year and a half before.

devastated Franconia where he

him

men under

and Aldringer Tilly had marched from

Miltenburg and

cutting

from Niirnberg,

official list of

;

This

is

for though Tilly never lacked courage, he

lacked enterprise of a certain stamp, and had scarcely yet

TILLY ENERGETIC.

When

Breitenfeld.

forgotten

had recovered

a march to the

Main

he reached the Tauber, he

and could choose a

his base

289

safe defensive, or

He

to seek his adversary.

did not do

the latter; for, whatever his intentiox^s, his master, Maximilian, nervously fearing for his borders, ordered

and not

stop at covering Bavaria,

which might lead twelve thousand

number

sent an eqtf5t

lay

down

officers

at

to

the

up

positions with

at his orders, he

was tempted

command, but was dissuaded by

his

the king,

seize

who was watching

his operations, laid

Cregiingen, and

his

it

all

Palatinate

a

;

an ambus-

and imme-

made a descent on four imperial regiments

fourteen thousand

Lower

sent

on Wertheim, but without success, for

cade for the detachment and severely handled diately after

to

immediate

He

and Maximilian's personal request.

detachment to

to

Donauworth and Guntzenhausen, the Upper Palatinate, and began to

From annoyance

recruit.

Tilly took

to battle.

men

him

to undertake operations

but destroyed them.

men

of reinforcement

at

Shortly receiving

from Alsatia, the

and Wiirtemberg, and emboldened by

numbers, Tilly advanced columns to Rothemburg, Winds-

heim and Ochsenfurt, and took up a position the king being for the

moment

at

Windsheim,

sick in Wiirzburg.

Considering the total defeat of Tilly not

many weeks

back, he had shown commendable energy in coming to the protection of his master's territory, and in tial

attacks on the

of the elector

numerical,

and

it

if

new

allies of

Sweden.

making even parBut the timidity

had prevented the veteran from

utilizing his

not actual, superiority at the points attacked;

had enabled the Swedes, without opposition,

themselves firmly on the Main.

vented the seizure of the

have made

Main

to plant

That Tilly could have preis

improbable, but he might

it difficult.

Holding Thuringia and Franconia, the king did not for the

DOWN THE

290

moment down to

care to

move on

MAIN.

Tilly; the possession of the

the Rhine seemed

more important; and

moving- to the upper Main, had yielded up

Leaving Horn with

defend the lower.

and two thousand horse

and

complete

to

started

down

the

the

Main November

power

to

thousand foot

Franconia,

of 9,

all

by

Wiirzburg bishopric,

to hold the

subjection

five

Main

Tilly,

the

king-

with eighteen thousand

men, intending to gain control of or neutralize the bishopries of

Mainz, Trier and Cologne, the other Catholic Rhine

princes and the Spanish troops, to relieve the Palatinate, and to take advantage of the richness of the country to

add

to

moving against southern Ger-

his material strength before

many, Bavaria and Austria.

His general scheme, as we

have seen, was built on procuring large accessions of troops.

Whatever

historians

march on Vienna

may

say of Gustavus' declination to

after the victory of Breitenfeld, they can-

not complain that he was not thorough in what he undertook to

do in lieu thereof

wiser.

;

and the event proves

While one cannot prove

that a

would not have brought Ferdinand

his

own plan

the

march on Vienna

to his knees,

it

remains

certain that, had Gustavus undertaken this course, the world

would have remained the poorer by many lessons in methodical war.

The

now undertaking was not difficult, for the much opposition, and Before leaving along the Main were weak.

task he was

Catholic princes were unable to offer the garrisons

Wiirzburg, he sent out Colonel Hubalcl, with twenty-two

hundred dragoons and

cuirassiers, to capture

Hanau, which

November 10; Geluhausen, Friedburg and Hbchst surrendered, and on November 17 As the enemy was at Rothemburg, Rothenfels did the like.

this

officer

did by storm on

the king personally headed a detachment and fully garrisoned

Schweinfurt; and a strong body was

left

in

Wiirzburg.

WORDY DEFIANCE.

A

The bulk of the

Royal

of the

Army marched down

291

on the

Main, a smaller body on the right bank.

gage, artillery and

supplies

between the troops.

found ready

A

to join the

were floated down

large

number

of

bank The bag-

left

on

boats

the towns were

Swedish cause, Wertheim on the

20th, Miltenburg on the 21st, Aschaffenburg on the 22d,

Steinheim on the 25th, and Offenbach on the 26th. fort, after

28th.

some delay, concluded

The

Frank-

number on the

garrisons, as a ride, entered the Swedish service.

At Frankfort stadt,

to swell this

a mild treaty was

made with Hesse Darm-

which until now had held aloof; that principality

reserved

powers, but gave up, until the war shoidd

all its

be ended, the fortress of Riisselsheim, which, standing between

Mainz and Frankfort, was

On November to

Hochst,

of

marked importance.

28, through Frankfort,

Gustavus marched

Kbnigstein, Florsheim and Kostheim;

and

at

him fourteen thousand men from HesseLandgrave William, which, as Tilly had

H(3chst there joined

under

Cassel,

moved away from

the Weser, were no longer needed there.

This gave Gustavus thirty-two thousand men, with which

he sat down on the right bank of the Rhine, astride the

Main, the bulk of the force threatening Mainz. This great city possessed a powerful bridge-head in the fortified

town of Kastel on the right bank of the Rhine

two

;

thousand Spanish troops under Count Silva which formed the garrison of

Mainz vowed they would

man

die to the last

sooner than give up the place; and on being asked by the elector if he

enough

to

had enough troops, Silva replied that he had

whip three kings of Sweden.

The

citizens

made

some advances, but Gustavus recalled to their mind their hitherto stubborn refusals to treat,

render without terms.

drove piles in the

Main

The

and declined any but

elector prepared for defense

at its

sur;

he

mouth, sank ships, and clogged

MAINZ ISOLATED.

292

river with stones; having done

up the left

Worms

to

The garrison

Cologne.

and prepared for a stout

lost heart,

was

it

it

and breastworks lay Mainz.

He

it,

Ehi'enfels

bridge of boats at Hochst

isolate

possible to take

difficult

the city in order to besiege

Mouse Tower and

ill-treated the

citizens

resistance.

The king did not deem right bank, and

site

which he

Silva to protect his capital, and fled with the bishop of

;

to

Mainz from the

cross the river below

though Bernard had taken the near Bing^en.

numerous boats

in the river,

There was a

fitted

with guns

and Gustavus began to

seized the custom-house buildings oppo-

Bingen, and Walluf, and levied on the country contri-

butions of forty-five thousand rix dollars a month.

out detachments to the Lahn, and took places, with

right

much

booty.

He

Limburg and

sent

other

Having meanwhile reduced the

bank as far up as the Neckar, he was preparing

to

GUSTAVUS' CONTEMPT OF DEATH. cross above,

when news reached him

that Tilly

293

was besieging

Niirnberg.

This was

a

Gustavus liostponed his designs

surprise.

against Mainz, left

things as they were, and started De-

cember

9,

He had

with him seventeen thousand foot and nine thousand

determined

horse of the

While

his

made a

to

relieve

Niirnberg by a battle.

Swedish, Hesse-Cassel and

Weimar

trooj)s.

columns were defiling through Frankfort, he

definitive treaty with that city

;

and learning

at the

same time that Tilly had given up the siege of Niirnberg and retired to the Danube, he again returned to the Ehine. This raid persuaded the king that Tilly might push in on

and he made dispositions accordingly.

his communications,

Horn's corps was strengthened by drafts on Teuffel and on Niirnberg, with headquarters at Windsheim, so as to sustain at

need either the king or Saxony; Duke William was

ordered to push his army from Thuringia forward towards

Horn should be suddenly armies were made

Schweinfurt, lest

Horn and

the

Weimar

Thus

detached.

a link between,

or a reserve to the king or the elector of Saxony.

While

maintaining his kingly dignity, Gustavus

strictly

was easily approached by priest

ger;

it

One

all.

day, in Frankfort, a

in the anteroom with a concealed dag-

was discovered

was currently reported that a band of Jesuits had

bound themselves with an oath

and bets

to take his life;

were laid in Augsburg that Gustavus would not months.

Much

Gustavus was urged said to have replied

the protection of in

may have been

of this

'

'

is

Then you would have me disregard

God?"

His very contempt of death was

some respects a safeguard.

About

this

time are recorded

some utterances of the king concerning his mission

many and

six

live

but when

keep a body-guard about hmi, he

to :

idle talk,

his duty to Protestantism.

One day

in

Ger-

at table with

OUTFLANKING MAINZ.

294

the king of Boliemia, the landgrave of Darmstadt and

many

other prmces, the king said: "Believe me, I love a comfortable life as well as any man, and I have no desire to die an

The emperor would

early death.

peace with not leave

Were

On

it

me to get me to so many innocent

not for

He

separate

But

I dare

me

gone."

Gustavus went seriously at the Mainz prob-

the landgrave to blockade the city from the

left

right bank,

make a

people subject to his revenge.

would soon get

this, I

his return

lem.

readily

return to Sweden.

— the Rhinegau, — and

and down on either to the south side,

side the

occupy the country up

to

Main; he himself passed over

and on December 10 made a demonstration

On December

towards Heidelberg.

he turned quickly down

13,

from Gernsheim,

Oppenheim

river to a point opposite

These refused

where was a redoubt held by Spanish troops.

to surrender; but having undertaken a piece of work, Gusta\ais

was not

easily arrested.

Despite the opposition of the

Spanish cavalry on both banks, on the night of December

16-17 he put three hundred men built a bridge near

in boats across the Rhine,

Gernsheim, probably at one of the bends

where his guns could protect the operation, crossed in the succeeding two days, December 17 and troops,

took

Oppenheim,

stormed

the

18,

castle,

towards and blockaded Mainz, and cut the city

Rhine up and down, as well as from the Main. redoubt on the right bank surrendered. here, the king

by

his reckless

properly accompanied, disregard of danger eventually

fell

On December

22,

off

his

all

advanced

from the

The

isolated

In a reconnoissance

pushing out to the front, not

was again

all

was a growing

a victim to

with

His

but captured.

evil.

No wonder

he

it.

after

two days'

siege.

Count

Silva,

despite his heroic protests to do or die, surrendered Mainz,

and the troops were allowed the honors of war.

Most

of

MAINZ OCCUPIED. them entered the king's this capture of

service.

was a question whether

It

Mainz was not an

295

act of

war against Spain,

which Gustavus would have preferred to avoid, as

But Silva had

was one against the Austrian Hapsburgs. received orders to be helpful to

his quarrel

Mainz against Sweden, and

No war had

Spain was already in the Baltic at Wismar.

been declared or was considered to

war had been committed by both

exist,

parties.

and yet

acts of

Gustavus was

ready for what must come, and the ministry and estates sustained him.

A

contribution of eighty thousand rix dollars

was levied on Mainz

;

one of forty-one thousand rix dollars

on the Jesuits, and another of forty thousand on the Catholic priests.

These were hard terms, for the Spaniards had

already plimdered the town

The king quartered surrounding country. defense, surrounded

the

it

but the money was paid.

;

his foot in

He

Mainz, the horse in the

put the city in a state of excellent

with works, built a strong redoubt on

Jacobsberg, replaced the bridge of boats across the

Ehine

to Kastel

and made a new one

to Kostheim, fortified

Main and Rhine by a strong fortress, " Gustavburg, " on the left Main bank, gave the left bank of the Rhine in charge of Duke Bernard, established his winter-quarters and his court in the city, and moved for the moment to Frankfort, where he was made happy by the queen joining him. The elector of Mainz soon after broke off his connection with the emperor. About this time, also, the duke of Lorraine withdrew his forces, much weakened the confluence of the

by sickness and

home side

desertion,

from

Tilly's army,

to defend his territory, threatened

and the Swedes on the

other.

and hurried

by France on one

His army was soon

dis-

banded by active contact with the French, who took Trier, Coblentz and Hermannstein (now Ehrenbreitstein), and he too forswore his fealty to the emperor.

PAPPENHEIM ON THE WESER.

296

The Spanish

troops were lying on the Moselle, and from

Mainz Gustavus organized an army to operate against them. Ehinegrave Otto Liidwig,

command

in

of

its

vanguard,

defeated at Creuznach a body of Spaniards with a loss of

seven hundred killed, and later captured a number of places

near by.

It is asserted that

Gustavus contemplated a march

to the Netherlands to give the Spaniards the couj) de grace ;

but Tilly was too threatening a factor, and the Dutch promised to

keep the Spanish army busy.

Whatever

his project,

he did not in fact move far from the Mainz country; nor did

it

prove essential, for in the course of January and Feb-

ruary, 1632, under the instances of

Duke Bernard,

all

the

Catholic princes of the Rhine, as far as the Netherlands,

pledged themselves to neutrality

heim did the

draw

like; the

occupied both banks of

Tilly

Sj)eyer

and the Protestant the middle

Lower Palatmate, Cologne, and

When

Worms,

and Mann-

Spanish troops were forced to with-

to the Netherlands,

in the region

;

Rhine,

allies securely

Alsatia,

the

other principalities.

marched from the Weser

to Swabia, he left

between the Elbe, the sea and the Weser

but a small body of troops to sustain the Catholic garrisons.

The most important imperial towns were Magdeburg, Rostock,

Wismar, and

D(3mitz.

Pappenheim, who,

will

it

be

remembered, had parted with Tilly in the Anspach region,

and returned sand men,

to Westphalia,

had collected some eight thou-

and, in November,

1631,

raised the

siege

of

Madgeburg, which an equal force of Swedes under Baner had

just brought to the point of surrender.

into his strong position at Calbe,

Baner

retired

and Pappenheim shortly

evacuated Magdeburg, burned the Elbe bridge and moved against Liineburg.

He

soon found himself surrounded by

the superior forces of Tott, Hamilton, Baner, and the bishop of

Bremen, and a considerable accession of men raised

for

TILLY'S

Baner

in Thuringia;

lie

MOVEMENTS.

was compelled

297 behind the

to retire

Weser, into the lower Rhenish Provinces, against which the

duke of Hesse-Cassel continued in such a

manner

Saxon Circle and Bremen by burg, Domitz, Rostock, cessively captured

from the south,

to operate

as distinctly to aid Liineburg, the lower

Then Magde-

his diversions.

Wismar and

other towns were suc-

by Tott and the Protestant

allies.

All this was not, however, accomplished without some culty;

Pappenheim operated with boldness and

for

prevented the

from joining

allies

forces, compelled Tott to

and when,

give up the siege of Stade,

Baner and Duke William joining

strained to retire to Westphalia, he sat

Saxony.

After he

the lower

left,

Magdeburg, was able tavus, as

by way

is

to

no space

down near

Cassel

to join Wallenstein in

Baudissin and Liineburg had freer

But

and Baner,

after taking-

move with a considerable part

of Thuringia

Duke William,

stadt, also did.

was con-

Elbe and the Weser region were quite

cleared of the emperor's troops,

his force

in consequence of

in his front, he

and held himself until he was ordered

play;

diffi-

skill,

and Franconia

to join

after taking Gottingen

Gus-

and Duder-

this is anticipating events;

to devote to the details of these

of

and there

minor operations.

Their object and result were to conserve the bastion which the king had erected with so

When much Horn,

men

much time and

skill.

Gustavus marched down the Main, Tilly, though

superior in force,

whom

to hold the

trary orders

still

undertook no operations against

the king had left with eight to ten thousand

upper

river,

—a

fact largely

and pusillanimity of the

due to the con-

elector of Bavaria.

contented himself with devastating the region between

He

Wind-

sheim and Anspach; and on November 28 he marched from

Anspach, via Schwabach, on Niirnberg, demanded money

and

rations,

and threatened

to lay siege to the place.

The

NURNBERG DEFIES

298

manned

citizens

TILLY.

the walls, and even sent out the newly levied

troops to skirmish with the enemy.

Magdeburg, unless

city with the fate of

demands; but the threat was Tilly's

army

Tilly threatened the

suffered

from a want

complied with his

it

and the siege

idle

short-lived.

of provisions; the elector

feared that he would get cut off from Bavaria, and ordered

him back; a portion

of his forces

Bohemia; a Protestant traitor,

officer in the

was already detached

to

emperor's service proved

and brought about an explosion

in the

ammunition

depot of Tilly's artillery park; everything seemed to conspire

December

against him, and, on

and quartered

his troops

on the

from the borders of Bohemia temberg.

It

was

to

meet

4,

he withdrew to Nordlingen, left

bank

of the

Danube,

to the upper Neckar and Wiir-

this threat of Tilly's

on Niirnberg

that Gustavus had so suddenly left Mainz.

Instead of making his winter-quarters in Erfurt, Gustavus

had advanced

Rhine and Main, had conquered a large

and could choose

territory,

would.

to the

A year

before, he

his winter-quarters

had wintered

where he

at Biirwalde in the

midst of privation and danger, with disappointment and

him

uncertainty staring

in the face;

now, he could winter in

the golden city of the Rhine, in the enjoyment of plenty,

and with the approbation

of

all

Germany.

Booty was

immense; the arsenals of Wiirzburg supplied quantities of munition and clothing; victual was abundant; and the poor

Swedish peasant reveled

He had

in

Franconian wheat and wine.

never dreamed of such luxury ; he ate and drank to

his heart's content.

A

Capua was more

to be feared than

a Valley Forge.

There

is

in the

Swedish archives an

the troops at this time under Gustavus'

official list,

giving

command, and

indi-

cating what was needed to bring the companies and regi-

ments up

to full strength.

GUSTAVUS' FORCES. Army

In the

of the Rhine, under the king's

with the colors 113 companies of foot,

companies

Hogendorf, 12

;

Vitzthum, 8 say, 8

Hepburn, 12

;

Hamilton,

;

Lunsdel, 8

up

these

viz.

Winkel, 12

;

;

men was

Bandr, 8

;

ilton's recruits

;

Wallenstein, 8

;

Ruthven, 8

;

viz.

And

a further increase of

40 companies of 3,000 men of

:

80 companies of 150 men each,

to be recruited

Solms, Isemburg and Nassau, and by Hubald and Hornig.

had

alry

Goths, 8

in

line

83 companies,

Finns, 8

;

Ussier, 10

;

viz.

Callenbach, 8

;

the rhinegrave, 12

Livonians, 5

;

;

West

Tott, 12

;

Courlanders, 4.

;

Ham-

by von

The cav-

Smalanders, 8 companies

:

Duke Bernard, 8

;

;

Ram-

;

normal strength of 150 men per com-

to

contemplated,

command, there were

the Royal regiment of 12

Munroe, 8

;

pany, there were to be raised 6,521 men.

18,000

:

men, plus 3,000 of Hamilton's re-

Total, 10,521

8.

To bring

cruits.

299

;

Total, 5,300

men, to be recruited up to normal of 9,175 men.

To

added 20 companies, with 2,500 men

by von Solms, John

The present

of Hesse, and Taupadel.

to be raised

;

total

these were to be

was 18,821 men.

The grand

would thus be 46,717 men.

total

In the Franconian Army, under Horn, were 63 companies of

Axel

Lillie,

Thurn, 8

;

8 companies

;

von Reike, 12

Oxenstiern, 8 ;

;

Erich Hand, 8

Wallenstein, 8

;

Dragoons,

;

3.

foot, viz.:

Hard, 8

von

;

Total, 5,161

men, to be increased by 12,844 men, by recruits from von Solms, Margrave Hans George, Truchsetz, Mussfeld, Canoski and Hastfelir. cavalry had 36 companies, ben, 8

;

Sperreuter, 4

;

viz.

:

Baudissin, 12

East Goths, 4

;

and 600

;

of

by

recruits

The landgrave be raised to 7,200 to 4,000. total,

He

of Hesse

total

total,

The present

to be 29,655

had 6 regiments of

Proposed

total,

foot,

for

men.

with 6,000 men, to

Present

18,400 men.

corps had 56 companies of 3,900 men, to be raised

men.

The Lower Saxon Army, under ;

was

32 companies of cavalry, with 2,000 men, to be raised

;

The Mecklenburg

foot

from Duke

proposed to raise 6 new regiments of 7,200 men.

8,000 men.

to 11,100

The grand

The

Witzle-

Brandenburg, the duke of Wei-

mar, von Dundorp, von Hoffenhiilt and Truchsetz.

duty were 8,280 men.

;

imder Hastfehr.

recruits

Total, 3,119 men, to be increased by 8,531 men,

Ernest, von Solms, the margrave

Kochtitzki, 8

Tott,

13,000 men.

Proposed

total,

had 136 companies of 12,000

To be

8 companies of 1,000 horse.

raised, 7,850

men.

Present

20,850 men.

The Magdeburg Army, under Ban^r, had 10,437 men, to be raised to 30,821

men

;

194

companies,

with

69 companies cavalry, with

AN ENORMOUS ARMY.

300

1,800 men, to be raised to 8,375 men.

posed

total,

Total present, 12,237 men.

The Weimar Corps, under Duke William, had 5 regiments men, to be raised to 6,000 to 2,500.

Pro-

39,196 men.

Present

total,

;

and 20 companies of 1,000

4,000

;

proposed

of 3,000

horse, to be raised

total, 8,500.

Garrison troops were 10,416 men, to be increased to 13,150.

In

Erfurt were 2,545 men, to be increased to 4,825.

In addition to these new German troops, Gustavus expected

in the

spring of 1632 from Sweden, 48 companies of foot, of 7,200 men, and

12 companies of cavalry, of 1,500 men.

The grand ors at the

and

total, then,

which Gustavus had under the

col-

end of 1631 was 63,700 foot and 16,000 cavalry;

this he

had good reason

to hope, for the

campaign of

1632, to increase up to 153,000 foot and 43,500 horse.

Such an army had never yet been seen

Landsknecht.

in

Germany.

(16th Century.)

Gus

.

;tandp

XXIII.

TO THE DANUBE. DECEMBER, At in

Mainz Gustavus held

At

Europe.

this

his winter's court,

yet everything hinged on the king's

whether Germany was

to

regions to reduce

army

Everything looked smUing

iibe.

that

and

shook their heads, and wondered

;

was crowded

on the surface,

Still,

to the wall.

late winter

In 1632, however,

the king rarely had under his personal

as he should.

At Mainz he had all

command

as

over one hundred thousand men,

apparently essential

burg, Hesse, Saxony, Magdeburg, Mecklenburg, lower

Main.

;

There were too many places to hold, too many

but these were in eight several parcels,

During the

;

the Protestants were in the ascendant both in a political and

;

the theatre was too extended.

new

most prominent monarch

be made subservient to Sweden.

military sense, while the emperor

large an

1632.

All Europe was agog at his wonder-

life.

ful accomplishments, but the graybeards

went well

— the

TO APRIL,

time he could have claimed the crown of Germany

he did not shows the purity of his ambition.

all

1631,

:

Mainz, Wiirz-

Saxony and

Horn and TUly did some manoeuvring on

garrisons.

the upper

Gustavus came to Horn's assistance, and Tilly moved back to the Dan-

The king

followed,

crossed the

Danube

at

Donauworth, and TUly

intrenched himself behind the Lech at Rain, to protect Bavaria.

It was a splendid court rather than the rude winter-quarters of a

campaigning army which was seen at Mainz in the

winter of 1631-32; and ambassadors from every European

power paid tiations

monarch.

Nego-

Treaties were

made

their respects to the victorious

consumed the days and weeks.

with the duke of Brunswick and the city; a new one with

Mecklenburg and formal ones with Liibeck, Liineburg and Bremen.

Negotiations

Ulm and

Strasburg.

observed of

all

were

pursued

with Wiirtemberg,

Gustavus was the centre-point, the

observers, the most powerful of the kings of

the earth, the most brilliant individual of the times.

And

EUROPE AT ODDS AND EVENS.

302 yet

t

on

G

'^eclisli

as

j)lish hi

him

standing was uncertain; everything hinged

and

his purposes;

ged on his own

for there

life,

in his peculiar work.

He

without arrogance.

and what he could accom-

was no one to succeed

Gustavus recognized

might have claimed, and without

contest have been allowed, the crown of a

Germany ation

;

—a

all

this fact

he asked was a

German

Corpus Evangelicorum

new kingdom

Protestant Confeder-

— under himself

as chief.

This desire might have taken formal shape, had the of

Brandenburg and Saxony been

of

electors

like the other allies; but

they remained intractable, the one from hebetude, the other

from envy.

The whole

of

Europe was

were buried under the

dictates of religion political motives

was if

and evens.

at odds

still

selfish personal

and

shifty; Charles I. promised nothing,

He

tion of Frederick to the

his promises,

w^as, in fact, plotting

the emperor, and would do anything Palatinate.

or

England

which governed every monarch.

made, would be worthless.

The

with

to secure the restora-

Maximilian was for

a while in league with Richelieu, who was eager to secure neutrality for the Catholic

House

of

Hapsburg.

He

League while humiliating the

sought to compass some agreement

between the League and Gustavus; but

and

finally,

this

was

when he accepted Gustavus' conditions

the League a neutrality which should reduce

twelve thousand in

men and

tie it

hand and

foot,

its

difficult;

to allow

army

to

Maximilian

anger threw over Richelieu, and thereafter clave to the

emperor.

Denmark was

jealous of Swedish successes; but

her recent punishment forbade her to followed their loadstone, gold.

war with Gustavus, tion.

Poland was

friendly.

as either

act.

The Netherlands

Spain was or was not at

saw

fit

to construe the situa-

bitter as gall, but impotent.

Brandenburg was

inert.

Russia was

Ferdinand kept on his

A GREAT TRANSFORMATION. way with

his

303

Richelieu and

usual directness.

Gustavus

were equally anti-Hapsburg, but from different standpoints.

And

finally

first to

John George

of Saxony, ruled

by Arnini, leaned

His great

Gustavus, then to Ferdinand.

foible

jealousy of the king; his worst defect was an ancient

unreasoning sense of fealty to the empire

his

;

was

and

main aim was

a Third Party in Germany, which, under his lead, should

dominate both the emperor and the king

and he alternately

;

corresponded with Gustavus and with Wallenstein. ful to neither because faithless to himself,

to be the

means

the horrors of

of wrecking his

war on

his

own

he was destined

cause,

own dominions.

Faith-

and

of visiting

And

yet

John

George believed that he was honesty personified, and in a certain sense he

was

had dropped

so; but he

the times that he could neither gauge the

so far

German

behind

situation,

nor appreciate what kind of honesty the times demanded.

Our

attention

is

constantly

drawn

to the transformation

which had taken place since the king had come upon the scene.

The

situation forces itself

upon

us.

"When Gustavus

landed with his thirteen thousand men, the Protestant cause

was on the wane, the party utterly discouraged, and the emperor everywhere successful. one hundred and field.

fifty

thousand

Recruiting was active.

were in league with the Swedes.

Now men

Gustavus had nearly in^

garrison and in the

All the Protestant princes

France was sustaining the

cause by means which neutralized the Catholic princes on the Rhine, and the rest were dominated by the conditions

surrounding them.

The Swedes were on

Bavaria, cutting the emperor from

Cologne and Trier,

— and were

nand had sent

to

of

the Rhine bishoprics, —

about to invade his domin-

ions, while his "buffer-state," Bavaria,

by the abject fear of the

the borders

was made unreliable

elector for his possessions.

Ferdi-

Poland for troops, but these were refused

ALL DUE TO GUSTAVUS.

804 on

tlie

plea of a threat from Russia,

Gustavus.

Pope Urban

alleging

war

tlie

perliaj)S fostered

Ferdinand

refused

From Spain he

could hope nothing, for she

Turkey was threatening

ness for revolt.

in readi-

Lower

to invade

Switzerland favored the Protestants.

Austria.

HajDsburg

Upper Austria was

in the Netherlands.

by

countenance,

to be not for Catholicism, but for

aggrandizement.

was busy

—

And

still

worse, the emperor had but eighty thousand men, of which

and

sixty thousand, ill-cared for left

bank

the

protect

to

inroads,

in

bad

Danube, from Swabia

of the

inheritance

and the

of

to

emperor from

the

rest in garrisons or

detachments in

lower Saxony, Westphalia, on the Elbe,

where they scarcely held their own. all directions,

but to small

effect.

heart, lay

on the

Moravia, striving further Silesia,

Weser and Rhine,

He was recruiting in And more than all, the

moral superiority had gone over to the

side of the Protes-

This astonishing change was entirely due to Gustavus'

tants.

methodical handiwork.

There had been a suggestion, hard to be traced to that

source, stated,

peace

could

be

had

on

terms

its

indefinitely

but these were not such that Ferdinand could accept

them.

It

him again

was sheer inability to

to help himself that induced

turn to Wallenstein, the

whom Gustavus had

idea of

employing

given up for fear that he could not be

trusted.

The results

casual observer might be led to say that all these

sprang directly from the victory of Breitenf eld

that

;

had Gustavus beaten the enemy in a great battle at an earlier

day, his standing would have been as good and

time saved.

and of the

But a

results as he

worked them

out, will convince the

student that the solid gain Gustavus had

from

his careful

much

careful survey of the king's problem,

method than from

made came more

his splendid victory.

A

WHY GUSTAVUS WAS

GREAT.

305

not have taught him the true

Breitenfeld in 1630 would

German situation. He would have leaned on German support; he would have taken too

inwardness of the

more heavily

favorable a view of the helpfulness of his

allies, and he might have undertaken operations which would have resulted

Had

in his overthrow. it,

and

utilized

for

it

he pushed for an early victory, won

an advance into Germany without his

carefully established base, not only

woidd he not have been

the great exponent of methodical war, but he would scarcely

have redeemed the Protestant cause.

Gustavus belongs to

the six Great Captains because of his careful his boldness

combined;

the other,

was

it

if

his scrupulous care in

method and

won him more than

either quality

doing well whatever

he undertook to do.

But

brilliant as Gustavus' standing was, splendid as

political structure

fare;

had

German

been his achievements, the conditions existing in the

promised no certainty of continuing wel-

and these conditions reacted on the military problem

more than they would

vastly

there was

in a

war

of conquest.

In 1632

altogether too extended a theatre of operations;

such, in fact, as to forbid one leadership. tions in Franconia

Gustavus' opera-

and Bavaria had small influence on those

of his lieutenants; but the outside operations were of no

great moment, except in so far as they weakened the Eoyal

Army.

What

interest there

is

centres in the

work

of the

king and of his great opponent, Wallenstein.

There

is

nowhere a crisp statement of Gustavus' plan for

the campaign of 1632 ; nor anything to lated a definite one,

down

the

show that he formu-

beyond the general scheme of moving

Danube and occupying

the lands on

its

either bank.

In no other war was the influence of petty states on the general military

scheme so prominent; no other great captain

waging an offensive war was ever compelled

to

weigh so

NUMEROUS SOVEREIGNTIES.

306

many and

— the — he might

a conqueror, Frederick,

Had

inconsiderable questions. of

role

Gustavus come as

other great captains, save

all

have brushed aside these

requirements, and have dealt

smaller

solely with the larger factors

but he came as a liberator, to restore and not take away, to build

up and not tear down; and every one

principalities

The

had

to be considered as a sovereign nation.

contrast between his patience with the

and Napoleon's brusque method marked.

It is all the

twenty-eight months

European

From

Gustavus enacted

is

that, in the short

on

part

his

the

a military point of view, his forces were in detach-

While Gustavus was

at

Mainz,

hundred thousand men was

in eight

eighteen thousand under his

thousand under Horn on the Main

Baner

princes

stage, he accomplished so vast a result.

his active roll of over one :

German

dealing with them

of

more astonishing

ments altogether too small.

armies

of the petty

in

Magdeburg;

own command

;

twenty

thirteen thousand under

;

Tott moving from Mecklenburg to

lower Saxony had thirteen thousand

;

the Saxons had twenty

thousand; William of Hesse, eight thousand; the duke of

Mecklenburg, four thousand to

twenty thousand more.

essential

where

it

;

and

in various garrisons fifteen

Every one

stood ; and yet

it

of these armies

seemed as

if

was

none of them

could stand alone, and the year 1632 shows us Gustavus striding

from place

to place to help first this

detachment and

then that, arresting a necessary manoeuvre here to save an irretrievable loss yonder; a condition due to the lamentable

division of

Germany

his difficulties, the

unequaled in

into petty sovereignties.

Still,

despite

king accomplished a year's work perhaps

all military history;

captain was happy enough to

and,

do, he

as no

sealed

other great the

deed of

conserved Protestantism which, unrequited, he gave to his

German

brethren, with his life's blood.

TILLY MOVES ON HORN. When, towards

tlie

307

1631, Tilly had withdrawn

close of

from before Niirnberg, Horn gathered what forces he could readily spare

from other work and marched from Rothemburg

along the Tauber to Mergentheim, and thence to the Neckar,

took Heilbronn and Wimpfen, and drove Tilly's troops in

Having cleaned Swabia

that region back to the Danube.

of

Catholic troops, he was ordered by Gustavus to Windsheim, to recruit, for part of his

army had been detached

to

deburg, where Paj)penheim was confronting Baner.

quota was fourteen thousand

men

;

Mag-

Horn's

but he did not reach

it,

being hindered by a two weeks' truce between Gustavus and the

League pending certain

At

negotiations.

expiration

its

Horn turned towards Francouia, where he threw back a force of a thousand foot

and

and horse coming from Forscheim,

after occupying Hochstiidt

by surrender, captured Bam-

berg and sat down there.

At

This was an open town without defenses.

February Tilly advanced against

Horn made

in Nbrdlingen.

it

from

the end of

his winter-quarters

preparations to hold out, as he

expected reinforcements from lower Saxony, and built long lines of

works around the town.

not yet in hand. thrice his force, at

Tilly

had at

But

least

his

new

troops were

twenty thousand men,

and coming from Nordlingen, had assembled

Neumarkt and thence advanced.

Horn had not

got

Bam-

berg in order for defense, when the enemy's van put in appearance. orders,

drawn

One

of

his

into action,

cavalry regiments was,

was beaten, and

bridge on the

against

in falling back,

The panic

demoralized a newly recruited infantry battalion. spread, the troojjs abandoned the works

its

and

fled

over the

Regnitz into the towai, with the enemy at

Horn headed a regiment drove the enemy back over the

their heels.

of foot

horse,

river,

until the bridge could be

and one

of

and held him

broken down; and he saved his

NEW

A

308 artillery

But he deemed

and baggage.

to Eltnian,

down

PLAN. It

prudent to retire

the Main, and then collecting his

army

at

Hassfurt (where in a cavalry combat he won a handsome success),

he marched to Schweinfurt, and later took up a

position

at

Wiirzburg.

Gustavus blamed Horn for

which he said unduly encouraged the enemy.

affair,

this

Tilly

retook Bamberg, and went on to Hassfurt to attack Horn,

but the Swede had already retired with

and had marched on ceased

his

pursuit

to

impedimenta,

Schweinfurt,

besiege

Horn had

intrenching the town,

all his

Gustavus at Geldersheim.

to join

left

Tilly

where, after

a garrison of three regi-

ments.

Early

in

1632 Gustavus seems

to

have made a plan to

base on Mainz, march up the Rhine into the Palatinate, take Heidelberg,

down

the

lieutenants

hausen,

move thence

Danube from and

Bacharach,

and had

taken

just

which tended to keep the Span-

all of

from too great activity in Alsatia, and he was about

ready to

He

His

had captured Braunfels on the Lahn, Boben-

Kirchberg

Creuznach by storm, iards

and follow

into Wiirtemberg,

headwaters into Bavaria.

its

start,

at once

when he heard

changed

of Tilly's advance on

his plan to a

Horn, hoping between them

march up the Main,

to drive Tilly

Horn. to join

beyond the Dan-

ube and to follow him into Bavaria.

Duke Bernard was

left

hold head against the

under Oxenstiern in

Spaniards.

Alsatj^a,

agree; and Gustavus soon called Bernard to his

He

to

But the two did not

own

side.

committed to the landgrave the duty of keeping watch

of the elector of

Cologne and other Rhenish princes; he

left

Weser with

the

Tott to act against Pappenheim on the

troops of the lower Saxon Circle, and Bauer on the Elbe;

and now, secure

in every step he

had so far taken, he started

from Hochst, March 15, with twenty thousand men, through

TILLY RETIRES.

309

Frankfort and Steinheim to Aschaffenburg, and across to

He had

Lohr, where he rested March 18. berg-

and Schweinfurt not

written to Niirn-

to lose heart at the fall of

He

berg, but to persevere in the good cause.

joined

BamHorn

near Schweinfurt, and concentrated the bulk of his troops at Kitzingen,

bring Tilly's

March 21-24. His avowed purpose was to army to battle, for Wallenstein was again

and the king would

afoot,

like to disable Tilly before the

He was

imperial forces could concentrate.

working

to this

end when he heard what turned out to be the false news that Tilly

had marched towards the Upper Palatinate.

On

this the

king resolved to leave three thousand men to

an outpost to Franconia, and head for the Danube,

act as

away from the more

instead of following Tilly

He

in Swabia.

and with

forty-five

(March 26-28) and the

way

did not

Up

to the

now

essential

work

ordered in Baner and William of Weimar,

thousand Fiirth

Danube.

men

set

out via

Windsheim

(March 30) towards Niirnberg, on The fact that Tilly had not moved

affect his plan.

to the 24th Tilly

had

lain in the

Bamberg

country,

but on the king's approach he declined to again tempt his fortune in a battle, gathered

all

the forces under his com-

mand, and withdrew up the Regnitz by way

Forscheim

The king's smart advance had prevented

and Erlangen. Tilly

of

from detaching any forces against Oxenstiern on the

Rhine.

Both armies were apparently aiming

but Tilly concluded to pass by the

Neumarkt

to

Ingolstadt.

city,

for Niirnberg,

and marched through

Here he crossed

the

Danube,

proceeded upstream, and sat down near the fortress of Rain,

behind the Lech.

Maximilian had conceived the notion that Gustavus would prefer battle with Tilly to an invasion of Bavaria, and had

ordered his jjeneralissimo to withdraw towards Bohemia or

GUSTAVUS ENTERS NURNBERG.

310

Austria, and manoeuvre to join Wallenstein's

new

imperial

army.

He

But

war council strongly opposed leaving the entrance

his

hoped thus to draw Gustavus from Bavaria.

Bavaria open his

army

;

and Tilly was withdrawn

to the

to

Danube, and

so placed as to prevent Gustavus' inroad.

As

the

Swedish king would probably aim for Swabia, the Lech

would be a strong this lack of

on which to defend the land.

line

purpose in the elector which had given

the rumor Gustavus had heard, and

had shaped

sion which

dictory orders, no

At

Under such

Tilly's march.

was

rise to

later deci-

wonder that Tilly was unequal

tion with which at his best he this time

was the

it

It

contra-

to a situa-

was scarcely abreast.

Gustavus would have been glad to enter into

a bond of neutrality with Maximilian, and rather expected

an embassy

sure of his ground to reliance on

he took the

was yet too

to ti'eat of peace; but the elector

make advances.

He

placed great

what Wallenstein would accomplish when once field,

and

felt

reasonably confident of the future.

Gustavus, accompanied by Frederick of the Palatinate

and other

notables, entered Niirnberg in state,

March

and was received by the population with enthusiasm.

31,

But

he could not delay; his movements were decided by the retreat of the enemy.

Having inspected the

defenses, he

turned to follow Tilly, moved via Schwabach and Monheun,

and reached Donau worth April

5.

Here he bombarded and

captured the works on the Schellenberg in front of the town, forced the two thousand infantry there to a precipitate flight across the

Danube with a

Donauworth, restored

its

which the enemy had tried the left

bank with a

had already agreed places on the way.

loss of five

works,

and

to destroy.

hundred men, took rebuilt

the

bridge

Horn was sent along Ulm, which

suitable force, to occupy

to

an

alliance,

and take other fords and

This duty Horn accomplished in good

WURTEMBERG collecting

style,

much

311

JOINS.

provision and material.

Hochstiidt

was garrisoned by two thousand foot and eight hundred horse all

;

Dillingen, Lauingen, Grundelfingen, Gruitzburg were

friendly;

Lichtenau,

taken by Sperreuter.

Pappenheim and Wiilzburg were

The duke

of

Wiirtemberg declared

against the emperor, and raised eight thousand

men

for the

cause.

Tilly

made no

Breitenfeld, lost

pretense to oppose

much

all this.

He

had, since

of his desire to cross swords with the

Swedes, and his present orders were limited to the defense of Bavaria.

Statue of Gustavus Aclolphus in Stockholm.

XXIV. THE CROSSING OF THE LECH. APRIL Having

crossed the Danube, Gustavus

was on the

left

bank

Tilly held an apparently inexpugnable position on the other side

noissance satisfied the king that the position could be forced.

unheard of

;

of the Lech. ;

but a recon-

Such a thing was

Establishing a heavy bat-

but Gustavus did unheard-of things.

tery on the river bank, under cover of

1632.

15,

and of .the smoke of burning

its fire

straw, he sent over a party to build a bridge-head, threw a pontoon bridge, and

crossed his men.

The

imperialists

met

the crossing in force, but the king

pushed on and drove them out of Rain.

From

Tilly was mortally wounded.

Rain the king moved up the Lech to take Augsburg, and then marched on Maximilian retired to Ratisbon

Ingolstadt. laid siege

to Ingolstadt.

was threatening Saxony

armies,

from thence. the country,

command

;

Danube and

of the

imperial

Gustavus marched on Munich, to draw him

Wallenstein's inroad into Saxony constrained

was tampering with the

military threat elector,

Crossing the Danube self

the king crossed the

In Swabia he seized the principal towns, and was fast reducing

when

Worse than the

north.

;

Wallenstein, again in

on the

left

bank

was

that,

him

move

to

through Arnim, Wallenstein

and thus sapping Gustavus' communications.

at

Donauworth, the king found him-

of the Lech, behind which, intrenched

north of Rain, lay Tilly and the elector, who here came up to

At a council of army was too much

direct his generalissimo's operations.

war,

it

had been decided that

Tilly's

lacking in morale to face Gustavus offensively, and that

it

should act strictly on the defensive until Wallenstein, who

was again ments.

afoot, could

at least send reinforce-

In their front was the Lech, and in their rear the

small river left

come up, or

Ach

;

the right flank leaned on the

was protected by Rain.

Danube

;

the

Redoubts had been built along

the low-lying river front and joined

by intrenchments

;

and

A BIT OF AUDACITY.

314

heavy guns

suitable batteries

in

up

fords of the Lech,

held by Tilly

;

to

stood

at

Augsburg, and

the bridges

intervals.

this city also,

The were

had been destroyed and the towns

occupied.

king might turn Tilly out of his posi-

If he so chose, the

tion at

Rain by crossing the Lech above him, or he might

coop him up in a corner where he could not victual and thus force

him out

to fight; but this

would take time, and

after

a careful reconnoissance, he assured himself of the actual weakness of the enemy's apparently impregnable position.

Both banks were a low, marshy

which to-day has been

plalin,

drained by canaling the Lech; then the marsh lay between the

Catholic

further

away from the banks.

was in a woody for

defile

Higher land lay

river.

The bulk

of

Tilly's

army

back of the low ground, waiting Gustavus chose a third course.

Wallenstein's arrival.

He had

concentrated his forces at Nordheim, ready for any

operation.

He

a bold stroke. far

and the

position

believed that the proper time had come for

From

the fact that his whole campaign thus

had been cautious and systematic, neglecting no point

from which trouble might

arise, it will not

Gustavus lacked audacity.

He was by

do to assume that

nature overbold, and

he now determined to impose on the enemy by crossing the river in their teeth,

and attacking them

in the intrenehments

behind which they believed themselves invulnerable.

The

moral advantage to be gained by such a blow he esteemed

would more than compensate for the ure.

At

Horn brought up

— and

or danger of fail-

loss,

the comicil of war preceding the

they were

all

when

the questionable conditions of the case,

many and

grave,

— Gustavus

the words of Alexander at the Granicus:

crossed a sea and so

a mere brook?"

attack,

many

replied, in

"What, have we now by

big rivers, to be stopped

The attack was decided

on.

PREP/dRSU^ONS TO CROSS.

On

315

April 13, at earJ?;^inawn, Gustavus made a reconnois-

sance close to the enemy's works.

Coming near an

imperial

outpost on the other side, the king shouted across to

"Good morning, mein Herr!

sentry:

"Thank

you, Herr, Tilly

the man, and then asked

"Oh, he

is

Where

in quartern in

v" Comrade, where

is

old Tilly?"

Rain," replied is

the

in his quarters too! " replied Gustavus.

's

the

king?"

"Why,

you don't say the king gives you quar-

s

^AVM•vw^

.,^''\.0•>»•'''''^^''•^v>,

"Oh,

ters?"

yes, /^'>•'•^•r,.v^•^'

indeed to us

have

come over

;

and you

fine quarters

laughed he

as

shall

" I

Gustavus rode

away,

merry over the adventure.

Preparations had

been

speedily

gun, a

be-

battery

seventy

-

two

of

guns

was erected on the left

bank where

it

was higher than the

and

right,

was a bend

where in

the

Crossing of the Lech.

stream with convexity

toward the Swedes; and under cover of a constant

directed

fire,

by the king

in person, a bridge was thrown in the bend in such a way that the artillery and musketeers on the banks could protect it and when it was nearly done, there was set over a party of three hundred Finns, who were con;

cealed

by burning damp straw

to produce thick smoke,

and

FORCING THEOACITyAGE.

316 to each of

whom was

promised

teiisto& dollars in case of suc-

In the night of April 14-15 the boat-bridge was com-

cess.

pleted and a bridge-head of parthworks thrown up.

The

king led the infantry atross, and sent some of the cavalry above the enemy's posi-

upstream to ford

t^\e

tion, while the rest

with the artiiV'ry

river

just

filed across

the bridge

April 16. Tilly

They

and the

elector strove to interrupt these proceedings.

issued from their

camp with

they concealed in a wood on their ish

bridge-head, and

made from

left,

this

opposite the Swed-

cover a

number

attacks on the Swedes, at the same time opening all the

fire

of

from

guns which could be brought to bear on the bridge

But the

or the advancing enemy. batteries inflicted in the

which

selected troops,

much

wood were driven out

infantry more than held

cross fire of the

greater loss on them.

its

in confusion,

and

Swedish

The troops the Swedish

own, while the cavalry made a

demonstration upon their flank.

The engagement was

of

no mean proportions; the Swedish cavalry threw back the imperial horse which was sent in successive columns against

them, and the infantry was put in to quite an extent; but the affair was in the main an artillery duel.

Tilly

had

his

thigh shattered by a cannon-ball, of which wound, though

Gustavus sent him

his body-surgeon, the

died two weeks later, and Aldringer,

was wounded thousand

in the head.

men were

killed or

From

grim old

soldier

who succeeded him,

twelve hundred to two

wounded on the Swedish

side

the imperial casualties are stated at four thousand men.

At

the loss of

and took refuge

— the elector being — the imperial troops

their leaders

small account as a soldier

in their intrenched

held of

lost heart,

camp.

The king made

no assault, owing to oncoming darkness, Ignorance of the work, and the exhaustion of his men, but remained on the

NO PURSUIT UNDERTAKEN. He

battle-field.

had

lost

had gained

The imperial army

his object.

morale and organization, and his own had gained

Though the enemy should have been able

in equal measure. to

317

hold the works, whici were Strong, against the

which Avould have been made next day, during the

tbfi.

Neubuc^ und thence

night to

at/./z.cJs

elector retired

Ingolstadt,

to

where he took up a position surrounding the fortress and intrenched.

Gustavus has been

criticised for not following the

sharply and seeking to beat fight; for their retreat

him

was made

maxim

Indeed, vigorously to pursue

any victorious general.

rarest feat of

disorder; but so

Practically, until Napoleon's day, there

of war.

was no pursuit.

much

had not yet been recognized

to take advantage of a victoiy

as a

rear-guard

in at least a in

enemy

is

almost the

It has not

been over

frequently seen since Napoleon's day.

Nor may a captain

be fairly criticised from the standpoint of the art of a later day.

He must

found

it

and

left

be tried by the standard of the art as he it.

But

it

would seem that even

did not tactically pursue the

enemy

if

Gustavus

after the victory on the

Lech, he might have been wise to follow him up as a strategic operation.

He

could have sent part of his forces to

Augsburg under Baner or Horn, and have himself sought to

inflict

a fresh defeat on Maximilian before he could

recover from his late demoralization, or be joined by lenstein.

But the king had

now repeated

his

own way

the procedure which had succeeded so well in

Pomerania and the Franconian coimtry, and began cupy the newly taken territory

He

Wal-

of doing things; he

in a systematic

to oc-

manner.

crossed the Lech, April 17, with the remainder of his

cavalry and the infantry, took Rain, seized all the towns

along the right bank of the river to Augsburg, and ordered

Torstenson and the heavy guns up the

left

bank

to

Ober-

ON TO

318

INGOLSTATjT.

hausen; and, to collect victual and contributions from tributary towns, he sent out a detachment into the

country.

on

Neuburg

Augsburg, though a free city, was held in subjection

by the imperial garrison. There wls a bridge across but this haa iij^*^n smeared with pitch, preparatory it

the

all

Gustavus mover? up

fire.

and threw

Lechhausen,

his

tlie

right bank,

pontoon

bridges

the Lech, to setting

camped

at

the

across

stream.

The

triangle

Ulm-Augsburg-Donauworth was exception-

Had Gustavus

ally strong. 6eZ^i,"

as he calls

odds.

But defense was

it,

desired

it

as a defensive "secZem

he could have held

it

agamst large

Swabia

the last thing to think of.

occupied, he proposed to

move down

the Danube, and on

April 20 he entered Augsburg, which made some opposition to his demands, took its oath of fealty

and promise of

contribution, left Lechhausen April 26, and headed

down

the river Paar towards Ingolstadt, the strongest fortress in

Bavaria.

Horn was

in advance with the cavalry.

The main column

got to Aichach on the 26th, to Schrobenhausen the 27th,

and

to within eight miles of the river opposite Ingolstadt

the 28th.

on

In reconnoitring, Gustavus found the enemy on

the north bank, with a strong bridge-head on the south to protect the stone bridge leading across Ingolstadt.

Danube from

the

Alongside of this stone bridge the enemy had

thrown a pontoon bridge, and built a redoubt as head.

At

daylight on the 29th an attack was

its

bridge-

made on

this

redoubt, but the Swedes were driven back with a loss of

twenty

killed.

The troops were put

into

camp

opposite

Ingolstadt.

Early on April 30 Gustavus made a second reconnoissance,

and riding too near the works, had

under him.

A

his horse shot

cannon-ball passed just behind the calf of

MAXIMILIAN WORRIED. his leg

319

and went througli the horse, which

fell.

Without

any expression of astonishment Gustavus extricated himself,

mounted another horse and went on with his work. Shortly after, one of the princes of Baden was killed near him by a cannon-ball, and when Gustavus returned to camp, these events were

made

the subject of discussion between

Among

his generals at dinner.

"I take God and tribulation I left

my

my

am

conscience to witness, as well as all the

undergoing and shall undergo, that I have

kingdom and

security of

my

him and

other things Gustavus said:

I

all

deem

of value, solely for the

fatherland, to put an end to the fearful reli-

gious tyranny which exists, to replace in their rights and free-

dom to

the Evangelical princes and estates of Germany, and

win for us

all

a permanent peace."

He

concluded his

conversation by referring lightly to his danger: lives

for

"Whoso

honor must know how to die for the universal

good," he said.

More status.

curious than the military situation was the political

The

elector of Bavaria

tavus' offers of neutrality;

and appealing for aid

had formerly refused Gus-

now he was

to Wallenstein,

chiefly instrvimental in causing not it

flying

whose

from the king

fall

he had been

many months

was he who now desired an accommodation.

ago; and

He made

propositions for a truce and subsequent peace, but the king-

refused these as the elector had refused his own.

He had

no confidence in Maximilian, and believed, as was the

fact,

that he desired a truce merely to wait for Wallenstein. It is

thought by some

critics that

embraced his present opportunity from Bohemia and Austria; but Tilly's death

Maximilian

it

Gustavus should have

of cutting the elector off

was no easy

lost his head,

task.

and on

May

After 2 for-

sook Ingolstadt, which, from the nature of the case, had not been yet blockaded.

He had

lost

confidence

in

his

WALLENSTEIN THREATENS SAXONY.

320

army, as his army had in him, and was eager for Wallen-

He

have some strong soul to lean on.

stein, to

unhindered by Neustadt, where he crossed the

withdrew

river, to Ratis-

bon, which, though a free city, he occupied by stratagem,

and thus secured

communications with Bohemia.

his

So soon as Gustavus saw that the garrison was being with-

drawn from the bridge-head redoubt, he stormed the Danube,

down

sat

to besiege Ingolstadt,

Horn

on to ascertain the enemy's movements. Neustadt,

it,

crossed

and sent Horn followed to

found that the Bavarian army had headed to

Ratisbon, scoured the country thoroughly, and sent detach-

ments as far as

its

gates.

While opening the Wallenstein had of Saxony,

sand men.

siege of Ingolstadt, the king heard that

left

army

part of his

worry the elector

to

and was advancing on Bavaria with twenty thouIt

was important

Saxony from imperial

to save

badgering or influence, for comparatively

might induce John George

make

to

his

of

little

either

peace with

the

emperor; and Arnim, who practically controlled him, was really

in

wise to to rouse

league with

make matters

Wallenstein away from Saxony.

left

May

4,

— he

had but

a corps of observation at

the interior of Bavaria.

WoUenzach May

5,

its

fight him,

but to entice

He

the

just

raised

gates,

Horn was

As Gustavus advanced on Munich,

its

moment

and reached

later,

Mosburg

and levied fell

He had

miscalcu-

Czech was the more intent on Saxony.

the king thought he would

May

tribute.

he heard that Wallen-

stein showed no sign of following him.

lated: the

of

—

and marched into

recalled,

took Landshut two days

and Freising surrendered and paid

siege

begun the work,

ten thousand rix dollars contribution. 6,

it

so threatening in Bavaria as not only

Maximilian to follow and

Ingolstadt

Gustavus deemed

Wallenstein.

move

For a

to the aid of this,

A RABID POPULATION. his

most important

Bavaria, to send

prepared to leave Baner in

Oxenstiern against the Span-

to help

Rhine-Main country, and himself

iards in the

While

succor John George.

news,

He

ally.

Horn

321

— that

so engaged, he

march

to

to

heard fresh

Wallenstein proposed to join the elector of This made

Bavaria with his whole force.

it

imperative that

own army, but keep well his first view and moved on

Gustaviis should not parcel out his

He

concentrated.

Munich.

The

reverted to

capital

was taken without

difficulty,

a contri-

bution of forty thousand rix dollars was levied, and there

was found great

store of material

and guns, of wdiich

latter

one hundred and nineteen buried ones were dug up.

Gus-

tavus remained here three weeks.

The

cities

received the Swedes without great difficulty,

but the poiJulation of the country districts of Bavaria and

Swabia remained

hostile,

and kept up a constant small war.

who were caught singly or away from were visited with mayhem, or death by

compa-

Soldiers

their

nies

torture,

many hundred

"God

rian churches were said to run:

the Swedish

country's enemy,

save us from our

Gustavus took no

devil."

revenge for this conduct, but levied contributions only.

Munich he

said:

Magdeburg,

— but

"I could

inflict

fear not,

and

Prayers in the Bava-

soldiers thus perished.

To

on you the penalties of

my word

is

worth more than

your capitulation papers." Gustavus'

troops

in

Swabia had captured Nordlingen,

Landsberg, Fiissen, Memmingen, Kempten, Leutkirch and other places. rose

But the holding was

and a few imperial

officers

reached ten thousand men. to handle the business, his

insecure.

and killed the Swedish garrisons

in

headed the

some

The peasantry of these towns,

rising,

which

finally

Colonel Taupadel was unable

and Colonel Rutliven from

hand with equal unsuccess.

Ulm

Towards the end

of

tried

May,

BOHEMIA AND

322

Ulm was

threatened by Ossa with detachments of troops

Gustavus

raised for Wallenstein.

and

started for

Ulm,

and that the

to his operations in

arrested Wallenstein 's of the

had taken Prague.

heed to the growth

little

and

Munich,

He had

in strength of the great

Bohemia

to

paid

Czech

and yet he could not have

;

movements without the cooperation

Saxon army, whose theatre was

but which had as miserably failed in

had

in

Here he heard

Saxons were treating with Wallen-

latter

too

Baner

left

Memmingen.

via

his great distress that the stein,

SILESIA.

to

have been Bohemia,

its

action as the elector

in his promises.

To go back some months

two imperial generals, Tiefen-

:

bach and Gotz, with ten thousand men, had pushed their way, in October, 1631, from Silesia into Lusatia and Brandenburg, had, as usual, devastated their route, and had sent parties out as far as Berlin

Ferdinand had made up his

happily of no long duration.

mind

Their career was

and Dresden.

that a policy of excoriation towards

Saxony was not a

paying one, and to try a milder experiment, recalled these raiders.

After they had

left,

there moved, in accordance

with Gustavus' general scheme, from Torgau and Frankfort

on the Oder into Bohemia and

Silesia,

a force of

Saxons

under Arnim, of Swedes from the Elbe under Baner, and of

English

under Hamilton,

twenty -five thousand men.

numbering from twenty

to

In Bohemia they received help

from the population, and no great imperial force offered resistance.

On November

10 they took Budin and Prague,

where they beat the enemy in a smart combat, thrust the imperialists

back from Nimburg on Tabor, and

ber captured Eger and Pilsen. strained to call just

to the

come up from

in DecemThe emperor was con-

business Marshal Gallas,

Italy; but this officer

thing was redolent of success.

was slow.

Bohemia was

who had Every-

friendly; impe-

THE RHINE COUNTRY.

323

rial opposition scarcely existed; the Protestants of

Austria

were gaining heart for action; the Transylvanian prince Rakoczi

—^an

fell

upon Hungary and penetrated

as far as Austria,

But the Saxon

admirable diversion.

elector, appar-

ently on the eve of success, began to listen to the wily coun-

Arnim, who was

cils of

in correspondence with Wallenstein,

and instead of pushing on towards Moravia and into Austria, to second Gustavus' manoeuvres, returned to Dresden, sat

him down, and considered whether he could not make

satis-

factory terms with the emperor and save himself from so

big a military budget.

It

was at

this

reappeared on the scene in person.

tune that Wallenstein

This trickery separated

the English and Swedish brigades from the Saxons; they retired

from the undertaking, while the Saxons under Arnim

remained in Bohemia to conduct a petty war and

to

plunder

the land.

The new

set

of conditions centring

about Wallenstein

induced Gustavus to return to Ingolstadt with his main force.

William of Weimar was right

bank

of the

left

with a corps in Bavaria, on the

Danube, and Horn with a corps was

occupy the upper Rhine and Swabia.

to

Recruiting for the

Swedes went on even as far as Switzerland.

Meanwhile the Rhine was a scene Swedes, French, Spanish and Germans

French army had appeared

in

of conflict in all

Lorraine to chastise

for joining Tilly a year before, and, isolated, he

return to his fealty on any terms.

Main, he gave the control of the French hands

;

for

it

When left

bank

which

bore a hand. its

duke

was glad

Gustavus of the

A to

left the

Rhine into

was better that Richelieu should have

control here than to let the section lapse into the hands of

the Spaniards or Austrians.

Oxenstiern had orders to respect the French holdings, little

as

Gustavus liked the attitude of Richelieu; and the

OUTSIDE OPERATIONS.

324

operations of the prince of Orange came to the chancellor's

But meanwhile the

aid.

imperialists

and Spaniards were

idle.

Generals Ossa, Fiirstenburg and Montecuculi gave

trouble;

and Count Embden moved up the Rhine capturing

not

sundry places.

At Speyer a Swedish

colonel capitulated,

but the place was later evacuated by the imperialists.

Pap-

penheim moved from the Weser on the Rhine country. the other hand Horn,

from the confines

who had been ordered

of Bavaria, took

to the

On

Rhine

Lahneck, Stolzenfels and

Coblenz in July.

agam induced

These Hapsburg successes

despite their strained relations with Sweden, to

the

common enemy; and what

had the

effect of

making

lighter for Oxenstiern

work on the

orders,

to conduct the Moselle campaign,

To

of

to his support in Niirnberg.

available troops to the

the

forces

of

work against

they did west of the Rhine east

bank the

and Horn.

Then came the king's march

the

French,

the

which more anon, to Oxenstiern

and prepared

left

Horn

to send all

main army. the

duke

of

Wiirtemberg,

who had

declared against the emperor and raised eight thousand men,

Gustavus added some Alsatian regiments and some of Oxenstiern's

old

troops,

and

this

army, under Horn, reduced

Baden-Durlach, and made a handsome campaign in Alsatia.

The

details of these operations cannot be given.

They

were merely the policing of the outside of the arena, within

whose bounds the giants struggled for the mastery.

Match-lock.

(16th Century.)

XXV. THE REAPPEARANCE OF WALLENSTEIN. JANUARY TO JUNE, Despite

1632.

Gustaviis' open-handed dealing,

many

Unselfish devotion to any cause

was too rare

trust bim.

honorable conduct seem great disaster

was

suspicion

;

Too great

real.

bad

as

success

princes of Europe did not

make

to

had the same

as abject fear.

When

Ferdinand found

himself so hard beset he returned to Wallenstein, the only soldier

stem the engulfing in 1630,

The great

tide.

would make none but

emperor's transfer of

all his

his

in their

own terms

;

and these were practically

it

in

offset Gustaviis' Corpus

first role

in

Evangelicorum

Germany, clung ;

Bohemia, attacked the

John George,

to his

;

jeal-

Third Party to

Brandenburg was uncertain

was fearful of too much Swedish influence

the.

Thus equipped,

powers on the theatre of war.

weakest point by tampering with Saxony.

ous of Gustavus' playing

who might

Czech, stUl smarting from his deposition

Wallenstein soon raised an army, and assembling

Swedes

the king's

effect as too

;

France

other powers held aloof.

WTien

Wallenstein entered Saxony, John George called for aid, and leaving Ban^r to continue his

men.

work

He was

was marching

in Bavaria, the

own

action

tenants, he finally

moved

Works were

new commander-in-chief, but was two days

to join the

who late.

Gustavus was unable to fathom his design so as to

Wallenstein lay at Eger.

determine his

king started north with eighteen thousand

anxious to interpose between Wallenstein and Maximilian,

;

but, having ordered reinforcements to Niimberg,

erected all round

it,

and put the place

from

all

his lieu-

in a state of defense.

and here Gustavus awaited

his opponent.

Instead of smartly attacking the king near Eger with his threefold larger force, Wallenstein slowly followed, reaching Niirnberg the

The

success

without

its

won by Gustavus Adolphus had not been

disadvanta^ies.

As

his brothers in the faith

looked on him with distrust when he

many,

so

end of June.

now both

first

had

landed in Ger-

the Protestant and Catholic extremists

began to fear that the astonishing victories he had won might lead the king

to

extend his empire over Germany.

GCISTAVUS' INSECURITY.

326 Self-control

and honest purpose were not the common

attri-

butes of the rulers of that clay; and however frank and consistent

Gustavus had been, few people but fancied that there

was something back of

generous,

his

outspoken conduct

which they could not fathom, but none the

less dreaded.

In

addition to this the Catholics harbored an especial fear for

They knew

their religion.

that the Lutherans

When

hardly dealt with.

had been

would their own turn

come?

France, too, had begun to see a danger in Swedish victories; Richelieu wanted an agent,

not a tool; he had no use for

if

a master, and he was already half inclined to enter the to

or to France. if

He would

put a limit to Gustavus' career of trimnph.

surely do so, should

it

lists

reach a stage dangerous to Europe

Richelieu was able to understand Gustavus

any one could, but he acted on the theory of distrusting

every one until he proved himself honest; of not trusting too far either honest It

man

or rogue.

•

was true from the other standpoint that Gustavus had

reached the highest cess,

pinnacle of

fame and material

and that the emperor had correspondingly

nand's case at the end of 1631 was desperate.

lost.

suc-

Ferdi-

He had

not

only been beaten in the game of war, but he seemed to have forfeited all his friends.

He had

turned to England, France,

the Italian princes, the pope, and could get help from none.

Even

the pope was an out and out Gustavus man.

Ferdi-

make peace with the elector of Saxony, but Wallenstein, who was smarting from his dismissal, had Arnim vmder his thumb, and Arnim swayed Jolm George. His position had grown worse and worse. From the Baltic

nand had

to the

tried to

boundary

of

erland, the Swedish

and now stood

in

France and to the

foothills

of Switz-

king had carved his victorious path, absolute

control.

France was threat-

ening Trier, whose elector had been forced into neutrality.

WALLENSTEIN'S TERMS. The

elector of Mainz, the bishops of

burg had

The

fled.

The duke

hemia.

Saxony had overrun Bo-

The

Lorraine had been disarmed.

of

Ems

the

in

of

Bamberg and Wiirz-

everywhere under arms,

Protestants were revolution

elector

327

country.

and there was

Bavaria was imreaMable.

The Spaniards had been beaten out of the Lower Palatinate. The Turks threatened. The Swiss had all but joined Gastavus.

Ferdinand was not himself capable of commanding^

his armies.

What

could he do?

was too dangei'ous.

Under

He must win him

back or succumb.

these circumstances, towards the close of

emperor turned

to the

1631 the

Bohemian, who alone seemed able

save him from a further

We

Wallenstein against him

downward

to

coui-se.

have seen how Wallenstein had been sowing by

all

how near he had come to entering into the service of Gustavus; how he had sought means, by negotiations with his enemies, of paying back Ferdinand in his own coin. waters;

Now

that he was needed, Wallenstein was not to be had on

any but the most humiliating terms.

He

took rather than

The imperial treasury was empty

was given the command.

Ferdinand was at the very end of his resources, material and moral; and he stood out against no conditions to buy back the only soldier in ish hero. lists

Germany

capable of matching the Swed-

Before Wallenstein would consent to enter the

emperor formally agreed to leave

again, the

to

him

the exclusive military power over all imperial possessions; the civil power over all imperial territory in the possession of the

enemy, including the right to confiscate lands; the

absolute right

to

dictate operations;

and

in

all

cases

of

reward and punishment the emperor's action was to require Wallenstein's consent.

Ferdinand agreed to stay personally

away from the army, and sion,

money and

material.

to

keep

it

furnished with provi-

In addition to this Wallenstein

WALLENSTEIN'S WOLVES.

328

was

have Iree entry into

to

imperial lands, to be rein-

all

duchy of Mecklenburg, and

stated in tHe

at the expiration

of the wav, of whose event he had no manner of doubt, to

be rewa^rded by one of the imperial hereditary dukedoms.

He

received, in January, 1632, a provisional appointment

to su-preme

command

months

for three

;

in April

it

was made

j)ermanent.

Such a contract with a subject was was unusual; and

it

of necessity

as

meant

degrading as

that,

when

it

his use-

fulness should have past, Wallenstein would be put out of

harm's way by

outcome to cally put a

means

fair

or foul.

There could be no other

Wallenstein, in assuming command, practi-

it.

term to his own career, however

brilliant

it

might

meanwhile be.

The promise

to victual the

new army was

a mere farce.

Ferdinand had no money, and both he and Wallenstein

knew

that the

must

forces

live

by plunder.

Magdeburg wolves were tame compared of Wallenstein's

many

brutes

new

in

On the

the

to the wild beasts

Never, perhaps, have so

divisions.

under one standard disgraced the name of

soldier, in every act except the

age.

Even

mere common virtue

of cour-

appointment, Wallenstein at once began to recruit,

Netherlands,

Poland,

Austria,

— everywhere.

Croatia, the Tyrol,

It

Silesia,

Moravia,

was not long before

his reputation, his riches, his generosity,

brought about him

These he assembled near Znaim in

forty thousand men.

Moravia, twenty -five miles north of Vienna. This activity soon changed favor of Ferdinand. as an able soldier,

the political conditions

in

Wallenstein was a real power as well

and

his apparent reconciliation with the

emperor brightened the Catholic horizon beyond anything since

the horror

of

Magdeburg.

The

situation,

already

colored by jealousy of Gustavus, seemed to shift as by the

THE SAXON WEATHER-COCK. tiu-ning of a kaleidoscope.

329

France was an uncertain

ally.

Brandenburg and Saxony could not be counted on: John George had already invited George William to join in an Gustavus' friends in Germany feared

anti-Swedish alliance.

These circumstances tended

the result of the reconciliation. to put

an end to the king's bold offensive, inclined him to

greater caution

warned him

than he had exhibited since Breiteiifeld,

to hold fast to the position

he had conquered in

Bavaria and Swabia, on the upper Danube, on the Main,

and the Rhenish country, rather than press farther on into the bowels of the land.

The most uncertain element was Saxony. was born

to

plexity.

On

John George

keep his friends and his enemies in equal perthe very eve of destruction,

he had tlu'own

himself into the arms of Gustavus, and the king had treated

him with exceptional seemed oblivious.

to

first

off

by money

would do

it.

;

now

he

He

his every effort

could not bear

in Protestant

role

Ger-

believed that an accession

forgot his

of the days of sore distress;

own solemn compact

he could not appreciate the

danger Sweden was running in

He

which he now

George had long imagined that Gustavus could

Jolui

of territory

He

influence.

have Gustavus enact the

be bought

fact of

Under the suasion of Arnim,

was to rid himself of Swedish

many.

—a

generosity,

this

war on German

soil.

claimed support from Gustavus; he forswore in the same

breath the fealty he had pledged to the

Saxony from tion of

fire

and sword.

John George

;

man who had

Gustavus foresaw the

and he did

his best to prevent

saved

vacillait.

He

ceased not in his negotiations; he kept a diplomatic agent at the elector's elbow; he wearied not in urging to hold fast to the right,

lenstem, even as he had delivered evil star rei2:ned

John George

and he promised rescue from Wal-

him from

over the court of Dresden.

Tilly.

But an

SAXONY INVADED.

330

JMaximilian, fearful of Wallenstein's revenge for his share in the latter's dismissal, begged the emperor to forbid his

Bavaria; but Ferdinand's voice had no weight

entering

with the new generalissimo.

Bohemia from the Saxons, tavus, to

and it

to

Wallenstein's desire to rescue to break their treaty with

weaken the king's communications with

draw him out

Gus-

his base,

Germany, was more potent

of south

;

constrained the Czech to march to Bohemia rather than

This he did in February, 1632, and without a

Bavaria.

pretense of opposition, the Saxons fled from Wallenstein's

army on its first appearance. For many months Wallenstein had been tampering with Arnim, who practically controlled John George. The Czech

now

represented that he was anxious to keep peace with

Saxony; he showed the emperor's formal authority, and assured the elector that the Edict of Restitution should be

He

annulled in his dominions.

pretended that his warlike

advance was but a matter of form,

lest the Jesuits

should

suspect his design ; but that he was ready at any time to

who might also percompact. The elector was

conclude an alliance with John George,

suade Brandenburg to join the disposed to an accord,

if

it

would save

slow in making up his mind.

Prague on

May

18,

his land; but he

was

Meanwhile Wallenstein took

and drove the Saxons back

to their

own

borders.

By

this time the

king had moved into Bavaria, and Maxi-

milian again appealed to the emperor,

now praying

for

Wallenstein's aid, and agreeing to serve under his com-

mand.

Placated by this concession, Wallenstein

thousand

men under Maradas

marched with

his

army

to Eger.

to

protect

From

left ten

Bohemia, and

here he

made an

inroad into Saxony, plundering and burning as he advanced.

He

wished to show John George the sort of thing he might

APPEALS TO JOHN GEORGE.

331

Then, hearing that

expect in case he delayed too long.

Maximilian was seeking a junction with him, Wallenstein returned to Eger, and thence advanced to Tirschenreut, to receive the elector,

and

to gain the advantage

which the

Bavarian army would lend him.

John George had eighteen thousand sand horse.

He

other side.

lay at Leitmeritz, and a march for Gustavus

from Munich thither was far from easy. there was enough of an

Danube

leave the

what had been

at this

and urged,

Corpus Evangelicorum.

weighed against what

Properly employed,

army to defend Saxony, while to moment looked like a sacrifice of Gustavus ceased not

so far accomplished.

his negotiations, his

and eight thou-

foot

This was a large body to throw from one to the

in lieu of every other matter,

But no appeal

John George

to

this shortsighted potentate

deemed for

the present advantage of Saxony.

When

Gustavus at Memmingen learned of the

fall

of

Prague, he also heard of a raid on Munich by Colonel

who had been

Craatz,

disaster to the land,

down

of a small

could,

body

marched

Here he

elector to spy out the

his way barred, sat The king had at once deterHe returned to Munich at the head

and who, finding

march north.

to

by the

Weissemburg.

to besiege

mined

sent

of horse,

called in

regiments from

and gathering

Baner with troops from Munich, and some

Memmingen.

He was

too late

Weissemburg, which had capitulated June 7 articles of capitulation

Of

the

;

to

save

but as the

were broken,' he wrote to Maximilian

demanding Craatz 's punishment, or he would of faith on

the news he

all

Donauworth, which he reached June 12.

to

visit the

breach

Munich. first

importance was to sustain John George, as a

political

and military

Weimar

to

necessity.

Magdeburg

The king

sent

William of

to collect all the available troops

and

GUSTAVUS NOT CONCENTRATED.

332

inarch to Saxony, where he would hhnself join him, and

wrote the elector that he should rely on him for victual to the daily

amount

of sixteen thousand pounds of bread,

eight

thousand pounds of beef and sixteen thousand "measures" of beer, at the places mentioned on the itinerary, viz.

15th of June, Aschersleben

;

16th, Eisleben

the

:

and Friedsburg

17th, Halle; 18th, Skeuditz; 19th, Leipsic; 20th, Wiirzen; 21st, Oschatz; 22d,

Meissen; 23, Dresden.

As

matters even-

tuated, these supplies were never sent.

His mind once made up

to

march north and interpose

between Wallenstein and the Bavarians, Gustavus

left

ten

men under Bauer in Bavaria, and Bernard at Memmingen, with orders to keep the enemy out of Swabia

thousand

and Bavaria by every practicable means, paying especial heed to Augsburg; and started June 14 from Donauworth, with ten thousand foot and eight thousand horse, in pursuit of Maximilian.

On

June 16 he was

at

Schwabach

;

on the

18th at Fiirth.

During the spring ciently concentrated.

of

1632 Gustavus had not kept

He

cannot well be held to have fore-

seen the turn affairs were to take, but credit

to

suffi-

it

is

scarcely to his

be forced to move against two armies number-

ing at least sixty thousand men, with only eighteen thousand of all arms, If the

and no reinforcements within many days' march.

monarch

is

subject to criticism at any time during his

German campaigns, it is at this moment, and for this lapse. Where were the one hundred and fifty thousand men with which he was to open the campaign of 1632? pacificator, protector,

had induced him

over the theatre of war. friends led

him

His

The

to spread

role of

them

all

desire to rescue his Protestant

to prejudice his military standing.

The immediate task was

to interpose

between Maximilian

and Wallenstein: nothing more helpful could be done

for

GUSTAVUS TOO LATE. John George.

was June 20 that Gustavus learned that

It

Maximilian had

left

garrisons in lugolstadt and

and was marching by way

Amberg, and

of

had started from the Eger country If he could reach

just one chance.

head

He

333

to

Ratisbon

that Wallenstein

meet him.

There was

Weiden first, he might

still

and beat Maximilian before Wallenstein came up.

off

On

could reckon on both of these generals being slow.

June 21 he

Fiirth via Lauf,

left

and on the 22d was

at

Hersbruck, with van at Sulzbach, which the Bavarians had reached June 17.

where

On June

25 the army was at Vilseck,

could threaten the road leading from

it

Weiden, over which the Bavarians must pass

Amberg

to

Wallen-

to join

But despite good calculation and good marching,

stein.

Gustavus was just too

late.

He

learned at Vilseck that, the

day before, the Bavarian van had met Wallensteiu's van

at

Weiden.

Now

comes what some historians have characterized as

a curious phase in Gustavus'

character.

Throughout

his

campaigns he had shown caution as remarkable as Caesar's; but he had exhibited a boldness and a power of taking and holding the initiative which were as wonderful as Alexander's.

All Europe looked with open eyes at this Lion of

the North,

who

in

two short years had marched from the

seacoast well up the Oder, to the Elbe, to the Main, to the

— even

to the confines of

ground as

to hold against all

Rhine, to far beyond the Danube, the Alps

;

who

opposition the

so covered his territory he

traversed;

who had not only

beaten the best armies of the empire and the League, but

had reduced Ferdinand stood,

still

to the very verge of ruin.

Here he

with the initiative in his hand, and though with

small numbers, yet with troops flushed with success, able to compass the almost impossible.

What would

and

he do ?

For some days Gustavus hesitated; he shifted plans contin-

WHAT COURSE SHALL BE TAKEN?

334 ually,

and

He had

for the first time appeared to forfeit his initiative.

never done this before, except when Saxony stood

between him and Magdebnrg

more than want

To

valid excuse.

of troops; he

and there had then been a

;

be sure, he was hampered by

must wait

for reinforcements,

necessarily reduced to a role of extreme caution

slower to decide than first

we have been wont

;

and was

but he was

to see him.

His

idea was that Wallenstein and Maximilian purposed to

overrun Saxony; and in lieu of marching the Royal to the aid of the elector, he bethought

Danube, lay siege

to Ingolstadt,

him

and seek

Army

to return to the

draw the enemy

to

away from Saxony by a smart diversion on the hereditary possessions of Ferdinand.

the

enemy

with his

Again, he thought that should

actually enter Saxony, he would

own column,

march

to

Dresden

sustained by the Rhine and Thurin-

Again, he planned to march via Coburg, draw

gian armies.

in the Liineburg

and Hesse

forces,

and head for Meissen.

Again, after a couple of days, as the enemy

still

remained at

Eger, Gustavus imagined they might be aiming for Franconia, or perhaps for Bavaria,

and he would stand where he

was and wait developments.

He

called in

Duke William

and the duke of Liineburg by rapid marches, via Coburg to the

Bamberg

while Landgrave

country,

remain as a check to Pappenheim.

William

should

But Hersbruck, where

he now lay, lacked victual, and was a bad point for a rendezvous, and

if

Gustavus was to give up offensive action,

was evident that he must

retire.

— the

natural rendezvous?

up Bavaria, and

especially Niirnberg,

Should he move to the Main

That would be

to give

it

which was not to be thought

of.

Finally, Gustavus settled

on Niirnberg for concentration, as the place where he was nearest to all the points

demanding

his attention.

This apparent indecision has been much discussed, and by

A HYPERACTIVE MIND. some

critics

335

has been held up against the king.

appear to need much notice, except because

It does not

has already

it

Gustavus with his small force had merely been

provoked

it.

mentally

alert,

while his bulky opponents, Wallenstein and

Maximilian, had inertly lain in quarters, waiting for the

The

king to decamp. active

fact

is

that Gustaviis

mind; we have seen evidences of

continually conjuring

up some new idea

it

had a hyper-

He was

before.

as to

what the enemy

He

was,

an anchor to windward.

He

Sweden, or to Oxenstiern, or to some

inti-

might do, and framing schemes to coimteract so to speak, constantly casting

it.

wrote

much

mate

he was free in stating his plans to his correspondents

and it

;

this

to

amplitude of resources looks like indecision, when

was a mere discussion of hypothetical

Gustavus

cases.

did not, like Caesar, write commentaries at the close of his

campaign, in which he could state motives which accorded with the event; he wrote as and when he thought, in the

midst of the utter uncertainty of events, and he voiced his every idea.

The apparent

What

thinking aloud.

indecision

great captain

was a mere habit of

who always

thoughts would escape the charge of indecision?

voiced his

We judge

the captain Alexander from the records of his friends;

nibal from the story of his enemies;

Han-

Caesar from what he

himself penned after the achievement; Frederick from his silent

now

deeds alone; and we are but even

finding what

the real Napoleon was, from the memoirs of his contemporaries.

his

own

What we know

of

Gustavus

letters written at the

is

largely

moment.

drawn from

Let us be slow to

criticise.

Consistency

is

a jewel, no doubt

with himself, and

false

but a

who keeps up with

times, cannot always be consistent.

may prove

;

man who

is.

honest

the events of stirring

What

seems true to-day

to-morrow; the wise step of the morning

KEEPING FAITH WITH NURNBERG.

336

As

be a fatal one at sundown.

may

events chase each other

onward, no one can long remain of the same mind. In a certain sense consistency is narrowness, and in this sense the

Swede was broad he took no pains purpose when he made it.

great of

at Hersbruck, or in the Niirnberg region, were

Royal Army, uow numberiug

Duke

of

....

Weimar, from the Saale

Oxenstiern, from the Rhine

Duke

of Luneburg,

from the Weser

Landgrave of Hesse, from Cologne

.

.

.

.

.

.

Baudissin, from lower Saxony

Total

change

by mid-

forces Gustavus reckoned on concentrating

The June

to conceal a

;

:

—

Foot.

Horse.

9,000

6,500

4,000

1,500

4,000

1,500

2,000

1,500

2,000

1,500

3,000

2,000

24,000

14,500

In addition to which Saxony was to furnish 6,000 foot, 4,000 horse.

Grand

total,

30,000 foot, 18,500 horse.

and Ban^r from Bavaria were ordered

When

enemy's junction had

that Wallensteiu might

with north Germany, he

was

from Swabia

Gustavus definitely ascertained that his operation

to hinder the

He had

berg.

Later, Bernard

to Niirnberg.

at Fiirth,

now all

failed,

and comprehended

operate on his communications the

more stood firmly

visited the place

June

19,

when

for Niirn-

the

army

had inspected the walls and works, and

dis-

cussed peace and the Corpus Evangelicorum with the council.

To

protect this city, to lure Wallenstein from Sax-

ony, and to act on the defensive until he could recruit his forces,

A

was now

his manifest role.

strong sense of fidelity was mixed with the king's deci-

sion to.

march

had agreed as there

to Niirnberg:

he could not desert the city he

to stand or fall by.

was

at

Magdeburg.

There was no force majeure

He had

no choice.

Niirnberg

was at that time the cross-roads of the areat routes between

i

CORPUS EVANGELICORUM.

337

Saxony and the Main, the upper Rhine and the Danube The city was Gustavus' choicest ally, and held

countries.

not only a Swedish and friendly garrison, but a large supply

and material of war.

of victual

Despite place.

Niirnberg was not his best

advantages,

these

From

a military standpoint, Mainz or Wiirzburg

At Mainz

was preferable.

the

king was more

strongly

posted; at Wiirzburg, with Oxenstiern in the Palatinate,

and Bernard

in Swabia, he

would have been

apex of

at the

and the only outside enemy was Pappenheim on the Weser, and he was neutralized by Tott. a strong triangle;

Maximilian would not have moved far from Bavaria, and of Wallenstein

up against

Gustavus had no

Once

his reserves.

dinand would be hopeless. aspect, but the

Niirnberg.

Germany,

lest

could not

he backed

defeat Wallenstein, and Fer-

This was the purely military

moral fact remained that he might not desert

Moreover the king was unwilling

to leave south

he should create an imfortunate impression,

lose the fruits of his

new-made

fear, so soon as

hard-won successes, and prejudice his

The alternative of battle remained but he allies. now advance on Wallenstein, having no more than ;

For Wallenstein numbered more than

a third his force. sixty thousand

men, and rumor ran that Pappenheim was

on the march to join him. Quite apart from the military situation, Gustavus was ready to make a universal peace,

Evangelicorum.

George some time since

and

it

if

it

included the Corjjus

This project he had submitted to John ;

he now again did so to Niirnberg,

was made a subject of careful consideration as

to

Gustavus could certainly have made

means and terms.

peace with Ferdinand, and have kept for himself Mecklen-

But what then became of the Corjnis which he had sacrifieed so much ?

burg and Pomerania. Evangelicorum, for

ARRIVAL AT NURNBERG.

338

Gustavus had sent ahead his engineer, Hans Olaf,

examine the defenses of Niirnberg.

to

Arrived there June 29,

he inspected the works in person, and gave directions where to bniki

new

intrenclunents.

He made

requisition on Niirn-

berg for fourteen thousand pounds of bread a day; the balance he expected to get from Franconia.

Returning to

Hersbruck, he started with the army on July

1.

The

foot

Niirnberg'.

marched

direct; the horse via Altdorf

;

on July 3 the army

arrived at Niirnberg, and with the aid of the citizens, Gus-

tavus began to surround the town with a cordon of redoubts.

Niirnberg southwest, west.

The

is

irregularly oval in shape

from northeast

to

from east

to

and the Pegnitz runs through

it

walls were good, and the citizens had already

done much to strengthen them.

Gustavus planned a new

set of outer works, according to the

most approved Swedish

I

DEFENSES OF NURNBERG.

339

theory; soldiers and citizens were alike told off in fatigue parties; all

worked with a

and

will,

in fourteen days the

These works, destined to contain the Swed-

task was done.

army, were strongest on south and west, for Gustavus

ish

rightly conjectured that Wallenstein,

was hardly

to

if

he followed him, as

be questioned, would camp on the

hills

at

the foot of which the Rednitz ran, and which lay on the

southwest

and four miles from, the town across the

of,

The moat was twelve line

A

feet

plain.

wide and eight feet deep, and the

was strengthened by a great number of minor works.

new redoubt was

into the city,

built at the entrance of the river Pegnitz

and one

at its outlet,

and a ravelin and a horn-

work were constructed between the

Spittler

and the Lady

Gates on the south of the town.

A

of

line

earthworks

extended around the entire place, from the market village

Wbhrd

of

on the east to the Judenbuhl on the north, and

round to the Pegnitz at the

On

St. John's.

the other side of

Pegnitz were two extensive redoubts, at the

Lead Garden

" and the Gostenhof,

works and ditches, and

in front of

the Gostenhof redoubt

were several outworks and half-moons. gates was

works,

meadow

one

land, which

between

South of the

was protected by extra

Steinbiihl

between Steinbiihl and the city

"White

connected by suitable

;

and

Schweinau,

city

strong-

another

and on the Rotenbach road,

on the edge of the wood, there was a strong redoubt, and still

another on

the

Altdorf

speaking, formed a big

bow on

the outlet of the Pegnitz to

the north of the city from

its inlet.

were two bows, one from the Pegnitz outlet,

The works, broadly

road.

On

inlet

both ending at the main gates.

the south there

and one from

On

Gustavus mounted some three hundred guns of captured Bavarian and Swabian guns

The good

spirits

its

these works all sizes,

the

among them.

and the determination of the Niirnber-

WALLENSTEIN ARRIVES.

340 gers to stand

eighteen to

by Gustavus were marked.

fifty

All citizens from

The

years old were put under arms.

men undertook guard duty

elderly

town and on the town

in the

For the outworks, there were made up of the enrolled young men twenty-four bodies of from eighty-one to one hundred and fourteen men, each known by a red and white walls.

flag,

in the

and on a blue square

letter of the alphabet.

The

militia

strong, plus two regiments of

upper corner a golden

was about three thousand

recruits,

one being of three

Thus from the

thousand, one of eighteen hundred men.

Niirnbergers Gustavus had eight thousand foot and three

hundred horse.

The Swedish troops

the city were at

outside

first

well

supplied with rations; but these soon rose in price, and some

These breaches of discipline

excesses were complained of.

were treated summarily, by hanging the common

and making the

officers

pay heavy damages.

soldiers,

There was, no

doubt, cause of complaint; but the Swedes were angels com-

pared to the fiends in Wallenstein's army.

The king

dered the population to bring into the town

the provisions

of the adjoining country.

The

ments had already been ordered

The king pushed out a part reconnoitre. lenstein

all

several armies or reinforceto

head towards Niirnberg.

of the cavalry to

This party was, however, driven

moved with more than

sixty thousand

berg, reaching the place early in July.

^^^^^^ Ai'quebus.

or-

(lOth Century.)

Neumarkt in,

to

and Wal-

men

to Niirn-

XXVI. NURNBERG. JULY AND AUGUST, If Gustavus

is

taxable with

ill

management

1632.

for being in Wallenstein's front

with but a third his force, his activity made up for lack of numbers. stein erected a vast

every means

known

He was more

camp

to the military art

than cautious.

were sixty thousand

men

ing towns.

Gustavus waited for his reinforcements.

in the imperial

Nothing but small war

In the crowded city sickness supervened.

In this starving-match

Gustavus was not certain that Wallen-

might not decamp and march toward Franconia or the north, and

ordered his arriving reinforcements as to head off either movement. in

Tliere

camp, one hundred and twenty thou-

Gustavus captured a convoy, and Wallenstein took some adjoin-

neither side could claim an advantage. stein

by

it

but he showed no symptom of attack.

;

sand souls in Niirnberg, and supplies soon ran short.

was waged.

Wallen-

four miles from Niirnberg, and strengthened

By

niid-Augiist, Oxenstiern arrived.

every rule of warfare Wallenstein

should have attacked Oxenstiern or Gustavus before the junction neither.

but he did

;

Gustavus marched out, ready for battle, but there was no

imperial camp, and he

met

his lieutenant at

If caution as a general solid merits of

so

Finally,

stir in

the

Bruck.

may be said to have been one of the may it be called one of the glar-

Gustavus, so

ing defects of Wallenstein.

Though outnumbering

his oppo-

nent three to one, the imperial general remained at Eger until

Gustavus withdrew from his front.

his course for this waiting: ijame.

Wallenstein had not the instinct of battle

which inspired Gustavus

:

and

whom

enemy whom he had drive from before him with a

against an

contemptuously threatened to rod,

Having argued out

campaign, he had concluded to play a

he ought to have crushed in the

first

engage-

ment, he deliberately declined to undertake the offensive.

So

soon as the Swedish army left his front, he followed on sev-

TA UPA DEL PUNISHED.

342

eral roads via Tirsclienreut,

Weiden, Amberg and

whicli place he left July 5 for Lauterliofen.

Gustavus had

left

In

Sulzbacli, this

town

a detachment under Taupadel, who, out

with a regiment of dragoons and some squadrons of cuirassiers

on a reconnoissance, learned that the enemy's

artillery,

covered by four thousand men, was in Neumarkt.

More

brave than discreet, Taupadel sallied forth to attack Neumarkt, ran across the enemy, was lured into an ambush, and

on July 6 was

all

The king heard

but annihilated.

of his

The Rival Camps.

dilemma and sought

to cut

him

out,

but the harm was done

before he could come up.

On

July 10, at Neumarkt, the Bavarian and imperial

armies were completely merged. ities

As

to their strength, author-

vary between sixty and eighty thousand men.

Roth and Schwabach were occupied.

seized,

Marching out with

Next day

and the upper Rednitz was

his cavalry

by way

of Fiirth,

Gustavus carefully observed his opj)onent, and drew up line at

in

Cadolzburg, in a position whose flanks were secure.

WALLENSTEIN'S CAMP. Far too weak for

battle,

343

he yet invited attack, which Wallen-

" There has been enough fighting

stein declined.

show them another method,"

;

I will

said the Czech.

Gustavus' road to Donauworth was

now

cut

After a

off.

enemy advanced to Stein, and here and at Zirndorf they intrenched a camp some four miles from Niirnberg, which in three days, by employing large details, was two days'

rest, the

It stretched

completed.

bank

Rednitz

of the

;

from Stein

and was cut in halves by the

miles,

The south and

camp were

The

the

and

fortified at its southeast extrem-

Opposite Gerbersdorf the trees were cut down, and

A

redoubts built along the Rednitz. lay on the southwest corner.

The

strong square redoubt

smaller north half, around

Zirndorf, was the strongest part of the

wooded

where

it

;

it

leaned on

had three redoubts, with a fourth one

made

as safe as art could do

enceinte,

it.

above the Rednitz, lay a ruined

the Alte Veste, with a lodge near culiarly strengthened,

ditches

;

by

;

and the

In the wood at

the northern extremity, on the Burgstall, a hill two fifty feet

east

in front

Three strong batteries were estab-

most northerly point of the

lished at the

heights were

camp

and was especially well defended on the

hills,

and opposite Dambach.

and

east

more strongly intrenched.

larger half contained the villages of Kreutles

and Altenburg, and was well

side,

a dozen

stream Bibert,

were a wagon bridge and a foot bridge.

north sides of the

ity.

little

of

Over the Bibert, within the

which empties into the Rednitz. lines,

to Fiirth along the left

had a circumference

it

hundred

castle, called

and these were

pe-

being surrounded by palisades and

heavy guns were mounted, and through the woods

slashings were cut for their

more strong, square single wall

and

fort.

fire.

The

Further to the west lay one rest of the

camp had only a

ditch.

The Swedes had sought

to interfere with these operations,

WALLENSTEIN'S WEAK METHOD.

344

but had, whenever a small party ventured out and crossed the Rednitz, been thrust back

;

head of a big division of horse,

enemy from

of luring the

and when Gustavus, filed

his defenses,

induce a single regiment to come forth.

method manifestly excluded into

at the

out one day, in the hope

he was unable to Wallenstein's

new

unless he was forced

fighting,

it.

Despite his vast superiority of numbers, and though the elector urged

an attack,

out, the imperial

lest his

land should be entirely eaten

commander refrained from a vigorous

against the king, fancying that he could blockade

policy

him

in

Niirnberg and compel him by hunger to submit to a peace.

He

had already cut him

off

from Swabia and Bavaria, and

he harbored great faith in this Fabian policy.

The conception

of the j)lan cannot be said to do credit to Wallenstein's intelligence or energy

;

but the execution was consistent and

The method was weak, but Wallenstein was

thorough.

adapted to the task.

He was

fact that the king's fortified

and

brought to

camp was

it,

exceptionally strong,

that, according to the ideas of the times, it

to attack intrenchments even with overwhelming

was Wallenstein's habit not

— or he had

against

held,

and was unwilling

him by any but the very

man

not to be questioned.

and

He had

safest system.

Snow King to operate

No

really

it is

soldier

—

is

much more

limited than

it

really

alleged that, being a devout believer in astrol-

ogy, he had had last only till

— a great

Again, Wallenstein estimated the pro-

vision of the allies to be ;

It

ever more markedly lacked the fighting instinct

and that Wallenstein was a great man

was

forces.

to.

conceived a different opinion of the ability of the

great

was unwise

to fight unless all the conditions

were beyond question in his favor,

from what he originally

well

moreover, by the

it

foretold

him

that Gustavus' fortune would

toward the close of the current year.

For some

AND

HIS POSITION

TROOPS.

months the king had shown a willingness

345

to conclude peace,

on terms which should protect both Sweden and the

German

Protestants, a fact which Wallenstein misconstrued.

Pie was from understanding the firm character of the monarch,

far

and the impossibility of compelling him would

feel to

be harmful to his

own

slightest degree derogatory to his

man and an

able soldier

which he

Sweden, or in the

Gustavus

dignity.

He knew him

better understood Wallenstein. tious

to a peace

allies or to

to be

an ambi-

but he did not credit him

;

As Wallenstein had originally Gustavus, so Gustavus now erred but

with being a great general.

—

erred in underrating

— in

a lesser degree

in

underrating Wallenstein, for the

Bohemian had a marvelous power

of biding his time,

and a

conception of strategy leagued to politics beyond that of any

man

of his day,

— save

That the quality of

only the king.

Wallenstein's troops was not high Gustavus knew, while his

own, though few, were of the very

He

believed that,

own

until his rein-

best.

despite his small force, he could hold his

forcements arrived, and, as he was habituated to do, he put his trust in Providence,

own

and

relied

upon

Wallenstein was surrounded by his old

it

cannot be said that his

was not the leaven honest Swede

although

It

men were

in the imperial

made

this, too,

lenstein's position

one.

army and

his

in the

had was

commanded

its

of almost

;

it

Gallas and

of the best.

army which

There

the rugged,

body commanded by Gustavus,

questionable elements.

strategically

and

But Wal-

tactically a strong-

the road from Niiruberg to the

and the middle Rhine country, and Swabia

officers,

Sparre and Piccolomini among them

Aldi'inger, Holcke,

but

his

genius.

Main

as well as those to Bavaria

was, in the light of those days, in the light

any day, inexpugnable

;

and the Czech was strong

on the defensive, and believed that he was so placed as to

A BRILLIANT FORAY.

346

await events longer than his enemy.

Detachments of

restless

Croats were sent out to the north, south and even east of Niirnberg, to seize and keep the roads the more effectually,

and with orders

to hold the

Swedes to

their defenses

and pre-

vent their foraging. this situation the rival

In

armies lay for weeks, waging

only a small war, in which the Swedes were generally suc-

The most important

cessful.

of

these operations was an

attack of Wallenstein's, July 15, on a part of the Swedish defenses erroneously pointed out to

him

as a vulnerable spot,

which, not driven home, failed with a loss of three hundred

men

;

but on August 6 the imperialists captured the fortress

of Lichtenau,

by which they could threaten the king's com-

munications with Wiirtemberg.

To

Gustavus sent

offset this,

out Taupadel, with three regiments of dragoons and cuirassiers, to

capture a train of a thousand wagons of victual which

was on the way

to Wallenstein's

camp from Bavaria, and on

August 9 Taupadel escaladed Freistadt and captured the On his way back he met Gustavus, who had gone convoy. out to sustain him with three thousand men.

had dispatched a force

to intercept Taupadel, but its com-

mander, Sparre, was not fortunate.

He

of cavalry, twenty companies of Croats

The king attacked him with

his

had four squadrons

and

five

force.

hundred

foot.

customary fury, riding into

the midst of the combat, in which he lost a escort,

Wallenstein

number

of his

but after a short, sharp fight he corraled the whole

Sparre was himself taken prisoner.

The

officers en-

gaged were rewarded with gold medals, and each man was given a rix dollar.

The opposing far

beyond

forces remained inactive.

Gustavns waited

his calculation for his reinforcements

;

and

it

was

fortunate that Wallenstein was unwilling to attack, and preferred the slower process of starvation.

So far-seeing had

HUNGER AND

DISEASE.

347

the king's preparations been that for some weeks there

no scarcity of food in the

mon

any beleaguered

in

city

and camp beyond what

many

was

com-

There was, however, lack of

place.

forage for the beasts, and

is

died.

Wallenstein's Croats

were the more able foragers, and soon had better mounts to keep up the work.

Foreseeing want of bread, should the

imperial general persist in his policy, Gustavus offered to

make peace stood to

berg

its

Niirnberg so elected, but the city bravely

if

Actual hunger

guns.

first

then in the Swedish camp

;

;

appeared in Niirn-

last

in Wallenstein's.

This general's severity and natural lack of feeling stood him

good stead in holding down

in

his

men.

It did not take long to reduce

condition.

both armies to a pitiable

There were one hundred and thirty-eight bakers

in Niirnberg, but they could not

bake bread

fast

enough to

the hungry mouths of citizens, soldiers and numerous

fill

refugees.

All told, there were one hmidred and twenty-five

thousand souls set in,

;

the companion of hunger, disease,

by and by

and ere long deaths grew beyond the capacity

Corpses lay in the streets ditch were filled

;

;

to bury.

the graveyard and the pauper's

lack of f oi'age had killed half the horses,

and the stench of decaying carcases and unburied bodies bred a pestilence. Under circumstances like these, order could not

always be preserved so well. ter

;

;

it

was a wonder that

it

was preserved

In the imperial camp matters were not much bet-

hunger and disease claimed an almost equal number of

victims.

This sitting down to starve each other out seems an unwarranted method of conducting war, as well as a costly one

but

it

was with good reason that Gustavus remained

for he could

quiet,

neither desert Niirnberg nor strike until he

could gather his forces.

Whatever the king's excuse, there

was no good reason for Wallenstein's

failure to bring about

HEADING OFF WALLENSTEIN.

348

work before Gustavus could be

active

Those who

reinforced.

claim for the Bohemian an ability beyond his contemporaries are called on to explain this singular

want

of enterprise, as

well as other lapsed in the Niirnberg campaign.

Gustavus had not been, and

still

was

not, certain as to

When

Wallenstein's movements would be.

what

at Niirnberg he

heard of his march on Schwabach, he imagined that his purpose might be to march to the Rhine or to Wiirzburg, or to interpose between Qxenstiern and himself.

and Gustavus altered

serious matter,

He

lieutenants:^

This would be a

his former orders to his

Instructed Oxenstiern to

march

to Wiirz-

burg, and to keep in touch with the enemy, hold the Main,

and prevent Wallenstein from getting victual from that region.

Baner he ordered

to

leave

Ulm and Augsburg

strongly garrisoned, and to join Oxenstiern at Wiirzburg.

Loth

to give

up

his hold

on either the Main or the Danube,

the king's idea was to keep a line of strong j)laces between

— Mergen-

these rivers, along the Tauber and the Wormitz,

theim, Rothemburg, Dinkelsbiihl, Nordlingen, —

Wallenstein from marching to the Rhine. Niirnberg would cut him

off

Upper

Palatinate,

to victual

and perhaps

of food, as Wallenstein was seeking to

Swabia proved a weak first

done

well,

them back and

to

Fiissen,

Augsburg.

link.

and had extended

Craatz, sustained

head

off

position at

from the Bamberg and Culm-

bach country, and compel him eaten-out

to

The

from Bavaria or the to retire

make him

from want

do.

Baner and Bernard had their holdings, but

at

General

by the Catholic population, had then forced

Augsburg

;

had taken Friedberg, Landsberg

and had even entered

into secret dealings with

Baner found that neither he nor Bernard could

leave the country until Craatz was definitely beaten.

On

July 30 Bernard was

at

Fiissen,

Baner

in Dietfurt.

Oxenstiern had reached Wiirzburg July 23 with seven thou-

OXENSTIERN'S PLAN. sand men,

— none

349

too soon, as Wallenstein's light cavalry

was overrunning the region

;

and the landgrave joined the

more on the who was marching on Saxony, on

Duke Wilnew

chancellor with four thousand

28th.

liam,

receiving his

orders,

headed for the Main, and on the 27th was at

Ilild-

burghausen, where he received a reinforcement of four foot

and two horse regiments from Saxony.

From the news made up his

received from Baner and Bernard, Oxenstiern

mind

He

that

it

was

no't

possible to carry out the king's orders.

could not hold the line from Wiirzburg to Donauworth

with his own troops alone. landgrave, of

In view of the approach of the

Duke William and

plan of his own,

viz.

:

the Saxons, he adopted a

to hold the strong places

leave a free corps to manoeuvre in the region,

Bamberg

with the rest up river to the

on the Main,

and

territory.

to

march

Duke Wil-

liam from Schweinfurt, which he had reached, was to meet

him near Hassfurt, and between them they would use up Holcke, who was assembling in the vicinity. Should Holcke from Bamberg, they would follow him up, beat him,

retire

and be ready

to join

The chancellor began

Gustavus at Niirnberg when desired. to execute this

did actually drive back the

scheme July 31, and

enemy towards Bamberg, and

recapture Hassfurt.

This change Gustavus did not approve. to

He

still

desired

keep Wallenstein from marching to the Rhine, or from

victualing on the

He

Main

country, as he imagined he might.

preferred a concentration near Rothemburg, with an ad-

vance on Anspach or Lichtenau, from whence Oxenstiern could either join Gustavus or push the enemy.

The advan-

tage of this plan was the control of a rich country for victual-

Holcke could be disregarded

ing.

in the

plish

Bamberg country held by

no permanent harm.

;

for with the strong places

the Swedes, he could accom-

Gustavus' plan would keep Wal-

OXENSTIERN'S ROUTE.

350

away from Swabia, which Oxenstiern's plan would and if the game was to be famine, the king was anxious

lenstein

not

;

him

to confine

to a limited area.

Still

Gustavus, who reposed

him

the greatest confidence in his chancellor, wrote

appeared most advantageous

main intention

;

to act as

but urged him to keep the

in view, to get together the troops,

keep up

commmiications with Niirnberg, and not to be drawn into battle before joining the king.

Duke

This Oxenstiern did.

William joined him August 16

Kitzingen

at

;

and

all

Swa-

bian forces which coidd possibly be sj^ared marched towards him, Ruthven being

Baner had

lately

left to

hold the land.

been successful in that region.

He had

recaptured Friedburg and Landsberg, and pushed Craatz out of the country.

On August

dience to Oxenstiern's

call,

and August 15 both stood

To to

7 he reached Nordlingen in obe-

awaited Bernard from Ottingen,

at Kitzingen.

reach Gustavus, three roads were open to the

move

or via

direct towards the

Anspach

enemy and intrench

to the south of

him

;

new army

in his front

Windsheim or Aurach at Ems-

or to

Neustadt on the Aisch, then down to the

kirchen, and the Rednitz at Bruck, and thus pass to the north of him.

Gustavus preferred the

last because,

the enemy could not hinder the junction the decision to Oxenstiern, bidding

down upon himself.

;

him not

once at Bruck,

but he wisely to call the

left

enemy

In case of attack he must hold himself

at least a day, the king

would come

to his relief,

them they would give the enemy a beating.

and between

These prelimi-

nary instructions were rendered nugatory by Wallenstein's remaining

and

inert,

but they were much in the king's style

so soon as he concluded that Wallenstein

;

would venture

nothing, he bade Oxenstiern hurry forward his troops.

The

chancellor broke

the 19th he was at

up from Kitzingen August 17

;

on

Windsheim, and rested two days. Receiv-

OXENSTIERN ARRIVES.

351

ing Gustavus' orders to march direct to Bruck, after a day of prayer on the 22d,

orders,

— he

moved

— rather

an odd delay under existing

Neustadt the 23d, and on to Brack,

to

where he foimd that Gustavus had built a bridge across the Wallenstein could now no longer prevent the junc-

Rednitz. tion, if

he wished to do

thousand

The

so.

men had been

king's small

reinforced

army

of twenty

by Oxenstiern's

thirteen

thousand, the landgrave's four thousand, the duke's six thou-

more than double

sand, and five thousand Saxons, to

its

strength.

By '

every rule of the

art,

even in that day, Wallenstein

should have taken steps to prevent these reinforcements from reaching the king.

That he would do

provided for in Gustavus' movements

so ;

was anticipated and

that he did not was

made a matter of sneering criticism in the Swedish camp. Gusta^ms now welcomed a general engagement as an outlet to a situation which every day and every additional mouth rendered more lines,

and

it

critical.

is

But Wallenstein kept

distinctly to his discredit to

close to his

have done

His conduct has been called Fabian, but the phrase

happy

is

so.

not a

Fabius had no troops which could encounter

one.

Hannibal's.

He

in fighting.

Hannibal had shown the Romans

refused to fight, because there was no gain

that he could beat

them under any conditions

all too

often

in the field

;

Fabius chose a policy of small war, of cutting Hannibal's communications, of fighting detached forces chosen

it,

he carried

it

out,

hamper the Carthaginians.

and

so

and, having

;

worked as

seriously to

But Wallenstein had a huge

overweight of men, not, to be sure, the equals of the Swedish veterans, but troops which

had been under

his

command

for

months, largely composed of mercenaries who were

six to eight

old soldiers,

and men who shortly

could fight

he had always boasted that he was in every mili-

;

at Liitzen

showed that they

WALLENSTEIN LETHARGIC.

352

tary respect Gustavus' superior

ing the Snow King, at

whom

;

his one

had but a fraction of

delivering battle while Gustavus force,

and

chance of annihilat-

he had jeered for years, was in

on his lieutenants

in then turning

and

;

to

his

do this

he had had abundant opportunity, gallantly offered him by the battle-eager Swede. in his

own way was

The utmost

But Wallenstein did nothing. active

;

Wallenstein was lethargy

that can be said for

confidence in his troops

;

Deliberately to starve any

army

is

ill

chosen time and place.

a poor way of preparing

After this criticism, however,

to say that to the plan

it is

but justice

which Wallenstein had with premedi-

tation adopted, he clung with perfect consistency. itself

itself.

that he lacked

he desired opportunity for

If

organization and discipline, he had

for battle.

him was

but he was not occupymg a position

where he could better them.

it

Fabius

ranks him low as a general

;

The plan

the execution of the plan

was masterly.

Having heard that Oxenstiern had reached Bruck, the king, with part of his forces,

moved out

to

meet him,

fully

prepared for attack in case Wallenstein should interfere with his manoeuvre.

But there was not even a show

king and his lieutenant safely joined hands.

Swords.

(16th ("entury.)

of

it,

and the

XXVII.

THE ASSAULT ON THE ALTE VESTE. SEPTEMBER, Additional

forces

consumed more

Gustawis sought

armies.

battle.

food.

Starvation was depleting both

On August

31 he drew up in order along the

Rednitz to invite Wallenstein out, but the Czech would not

Gustavus bombarded his camp, but with no better to

have the matter

He

out.

September 2 he captured point,

could

Fiirth.

would command the enemy's

would not do

On September

so.

had calculated

could be hauled up

;

fight,

To

distress.

On

lodgment here, the strongest

camp

to force an entrance elsewhere

;

3 the king assaulted the Alte Veste. hill to force his

way

in,

He

but no guns

the Swedes had but their muskets, pikes and brave hearts

down

defenses

day and

night,

and next morning, they stood

Still

Next day

stir.

The king was bound

but not bear his men's

to break

loss of

result.

effect a

entire

up the

to get artillery

1632.

manned by cannou and equal numbers.

perhaps four thousand

men

;

to their

but in vain

;

work

For a whole a

like heroes, at

Gustavus retired

baffled.

he nearly succeeded, and he deserves credit for showing the world that

good infantry may attack stout works heavily manned, with the hope of carry-

The Swedes were

ing them.

On September battle,

17 the king sent Wallenstein a formal challenge to

and drew up on the 18th

Disheartened, Gustavus stein

beaten, but not demoralized. Wallenstein took no

The armies remained two more weeks on

advantage of his victory.

meet him.

to

But the Czech did not budge.

moved towards Wurzburg.

decamped and marched

The

to

the spot.

come out

Three days

later

Wallen-

to Forseheim.

concentration of his forces gave Gustavus nearly fifty

thousand

men

but

;

it

ran up the number to be fed, including

Niirnberg, to thrice as many.

There was

little

food

the whole vicinity

made big gaps citizens.

left,

The

situation

critical.

and no forage within twenty miles

had been eaten up.

in the

grew

Disease and hunger

Swedish ranks, and yet more among the

Matters were not better in Wallenstein's camp.

Fugger had arrived from Bavaria with eight thousand men.

GUSTAVUS BOUND TO FIGHT.

354

and tliough Wallenstein sent Holcke with Saxony, he

still

had over

thousand to

six

thousand men in camp.

forty-five

Here were two hundred thousand mouths crying for bread. The exhaustion of the country, the small war waged by the Swedes, and the capture of his great convoy brought grave

At Eger, Wallenstein had had

distress to the imperialists.

sixty thousand

want

The number thousand

Sundry detachments and depletion from

men.

of victual is

had run down

;

there

:

forces,

— Bruck and Niirnberg — had, say this

and the bald

tion aloof, induced

force

from Niirnberg.

may

It

to

move on from

was on Tuesday, August

The

outlet,

and he

camps

31, that out of both the

army debouched

Bruck.

beat or

his intrenchments.

for battle. militia,

The

about

lines

and a camp guard

forces united in Kleinreut,

into battle order opposite the imperial nitz,

hard to

To

the enemy.

him back from Niirnberg was the only

left at

letters of

is

fact that he could not long hold starva-

him

Niirnberg were occupied by the

was

This

be, the king's present equality of

souo-ht to entice Wallenstein

the Swedish

Both

in the estimate.

convoys might have come from the Main coun-

However

try.

some error

is

that day, to be rationed

understand

by a good quarter.

given in the Swedish archives as thirty-six

men but

Swedish camps

this force

and went

camp along

the Red-

with three heavy batteries suitably posted.

Here was a challenge stein raised not a finger.

to

tempt any

A mere

soldier.

But Wallen-

artillery fire, not

severe one, was all he condescended

to.

even a

A couple of

small

bodies issued from the gates, and advanced to skirmishing contact, but

within walls.

on being pressed by the Swedes, retired quickly In one of these skirmishes Baner was unfor-

tunately wounded.

up intrenchments

Remaining

in position, the

Swedes threw

for the batteries during the night

next day bombarded the enemy's camp.

;

and the

But on account

of

HE CHOOSES its

area

vast

was

fire

tlie

A POINT.

355

and the reply was

ineffective,

weak.

As nitz,

Wallenstein's

an attack upon

f;ble, lest

camp it

lay close to

by fording the

the men, disarranged

edge of the Red-

tlie

river

was hardly

by crossing

advis-

in the teeth of

But the The king lacked the

the enemy, should be unable to resist a stout sally.

matter must be brought to a head.

Whatever we may say

jiatience of Wallenstein.

of audacity of the imperial general

opposite of Napoleon's " toujours de I'audace

!

"),

De

of the

want

(and he was the very

I'audace, encore

de I'audace,

we cannot deny him

the ability to

hold in hand a large body of the most insubordinate elements

during a period of the utmost distress

;

or the persistency to

carry through his plan without swerving, however tempted

by

his

enemy

to the arbitrament of battle.

This

no small

is

honor.

During the night battle,

of

September 1-2, Gustavus, intent on

broke up from camp, captured Fiirth, crossed the

Rednitz, and, opposite Wallenstein's fortifications, encamped close to the

on his

enemy, so disposed that the cavalry should attack

right,

where was the weakest part of the wall, while

the foot, under his

Why

own command, should

assault on the

left.

Gustavus chose this, the strongest place in Wallen-

stein's line, is

key of the

not certain

position,

nate the camp.

;

but he accurately gauged

it

as the

from which, once taken, he would domi-

If he ruptured the wall at

any other

he would not succeed in the same measure as

if

point,

he forced an

entrance on the north, where on the Burgstall lay the Alte Veste. such,

From no

advantage

his victory.

demned

;

;

other point could he use his artillery to

from no other point could he be

The

front along the

so sure of

Rednitz had been con-

the side furthest from the city was too distant as

a tactical point; to gain a foothold on the south end gave

A SUPERB ASSAULT.

356

Be

but promise of a half success.

he chose

up

this place, not

his reasons as they

may,

doubting that his guns could be got

to aid in the attack.

All day long on the 2d Gustavus was busy fortifying tho

new camp and making approaches to the formidable lines While so engaged he received word from scouts and some prisoners that Wallenstein was on the point of retiring, and

would leave a strong rear-guard behind

The work was hurried

on,

The news proved

Wallenstein was in truth moving, but

clear the

the

trenches.

and the Swedish approaches were

got close to the camp-ditch.

of quarters,

in

it

to

be false

was only a change

from the north end further down the camp,

ground for the coming attack

;

to

but Gustavus stood

to his decision for an assault next day.

On

Friday, September

the Swedish foot,

1632, somewhat before 10 a. m.,

3,

who had stuck green boughs

good cheer, were launched against the heights

as a token of

The

crowned by the Alte Veste.

with great effort only could a few

hand and got It

in their hats

into position

;

hill

was steep and rugged

light

guns be hauled up by

most of them remained behind.

the Swedish side, entirely an infantry battle.

was, on

Practically the artillery accomplished nothing, and while the

horse aided what

could,

it

had

to fight

dismounted and not

The Swedes advanced with

as cavalry.

siasm and

it

confidence.

Had

the utmost enthu-

they not defeated better troops

What were intrenchments to whom had stormed breaches time and

than these at Breitenfeld? them, every again

?

man

The

at this point,

fire

of

grew deadly.

Aldringer,

who commanded

was sharply reinforced by Wallenstein with

six

infantry regiments, on whose heels came speeding almost all the rest of the army. his

Gustavus was omnipresent, leading on

men, putting in regiments here and companies

laboring hard to get guns up the slope.

there,

and

This was all-impor-

DESPERATE FIGHTING. The enemy afterwards confessed

tant.

357

that a good battery

at the Alte Veste would have driven them out of camp.

Swcides acted the part of men.

from the imperial cannon, of which there were over a

ister

hundred

in line,

and the volleys

so constant as to

musketry from the

of

make one continuous

oAvn '^ith utter contempt of death.

Fug'ger

fell,

ter

The

Despite the grape and can-

:

among

Many

imperial officers

The Swedes fared no

the number.

scores of superior officers ^ere killed

in the thick of

it.

Toi'steason was captured

was shot under him

;

Bernard's horse

;

the king's boot-sole was shot away.

The

and from time

to

to time

seemed

To meet one

just within their grasp.

bet-

every one was

;

general officers were doing their fidl duty. freely put in,

walls,

roar, they held' their

The

troops were

have success

desperate advance,

Wallenstein launched one of his best cavalry regiments, the

Kronberg, at the Swedish thrust

it

line,

but Stiilhandske's Finns

back decimated.

Thrice the gallant Swedish foot captured the Burgstall

were they hustled out with grievous

thrice

followed each one that lost ground.

No

loss.

A new line

troops ever showed

better heart, but the Alte Veste could not be held

They

took, however,

the castle,

if

taken.

under gallant Bernard, a height facing

and had they been able

to get

guns up

there, they

coidd have pounded the castle to pieces, and raked AVallenstein's

camp.

courage.

— as

Scandinavian grit well seconded a Viking's

For twelve mortal hours the bloody work went on,

Wallenstein expressed

" caldissiraamente^^ gain.

— but

in a letter

it

Breitenfeld

;

the

emperor,

Swedes had made no real

the

— the Swedes

said

imperialists, hotter than

the

All agree that the fighting was hot,

hotter than

to the

battle of the AVhite Hill.

At dusk

a slow rain began to

and slopes too slippery

to leave

fall,

which made the roads

any hope of

success.

Had

HEAVY

358

LOSSES.

the fight been continued two hours more, said prisoners, the imperialists

would have run out of ammunition and been com-

pelled to retire.

But Gustavus

The Swc des

called a halt.

held their ground through the night, and the firing betwgen

Early next morning the king

the lines never ceased. the eliances of one

but to no

more

effect.

sally

WaUenstein saw

his advantage, ar^d re-

By

doubled the force of his counter attack.

pushed the Swedes out of the

down the

wood they had

The

the slope and back to Fiirth.

twenty-four hours.

Many

The Swedish

field.

In the

had

battle

lost half as

lasted

left

given at from two

many

There

Though

it

failed,

is

no

as the Swedes.

Swede belonged the honor, to the Czech the victory. and the king had not won.

it

But

;

had been the only means

break the deacUock,

upon

between WaUenstein and Gustavus, to

this first battle

not to win here was to lose

had

along held,

dead and wounded W6re

loss is variously

WaUenstein

10 a. m. he

all

thousand to four thousand killed and wounded. official list.

tr;'ed

from the woods which he hold,

was none the

and with a heavy

king to

left to the

less true that the assault

Like

loss.

cessful assaults, like Fredericksburg,

similar misuc-

all

Kenesaw, Cold Harbor,

in our civil war, Gustavus' attack

on the Alte Veste has been

denounced as reckless and out of

place.

was a

distinct gain to the

modern

art of

But war

for

aU

that, it

and as a

;

first

attempt to compass what was then deemed impossible, should

may sometimes be

be exempt from the blame which

on other

failures.

It

had

at that

day been usual

ate a breach in the wall of a fortress,

a column perhaps the

entire

assault It

many

times

and then

greater

in

garrison of the place to storm

to

to launch

numbers than it,

was attempted unless the breach was

had been considered impossible

visited

to oper-

but no such practicable.

storm a fortified camp,

not because the walls could not be breached, but because the

/'

359

GUSIbLE'E ^'uSTIFIED.

defenders were presumably as numerous as the attacking

And

force.

yet

^7as essential that attacks

it

should find

tions

modern called

-^eir

Some brave

soid

was

and

thf t his

;

posi-

on to prove that such an attack was feasible,

art could not be developed.

therefore justifiable +^iis

on such

Without them, the

place in war.

;

Gustavus' very failure demonstrated

men were

shortly proved

by

not disheartened by the failure, they

their gallantry at Liitzen

;

and

since the

introduction of firearms, the king deserves credit for

showing the world the

ability of

first

good infantry to attack and

hold themselves in front of strong intrenchments manned by equal nimibers and mounted by plenty of great successor, Frederick,

made

attempted was achievable

and the heroic

and

his gallant

was

as distinct a step

splendid

nor

is

Swedes

;

way

it

was a

it

Had

the attack on

woidd have won unstinted

Gustavus understood his failure in his front, he

king

not always a disgrace or loss

victory always a gain or glory.

the Alte Veste succeeded,

mander

effort of the

into the Alte Veste

forward in the art of war as is

His

artillery.

plain that what Gustavus

to force their

Defeat

exj^loit.

it

;

praise.

with a vigorous com-

would be rimning a grave risk

;

with

Wallenstein he was, barring loss of men, no whit worse

In a

letter to the

of his assault, acknowledged his failure,

the

wounded and continued

seven thousand Fiirth.

He was

off.

Niirnberg council he explained the reason

workmen

and asked care for

issues of bread, as well as six or

to finish his intrenchments near

determined not to leave Niirnberg so long as

there was any hope of success. Gusta\T.is had, since his negotiations with Wallenstein in

the fall of 1631,

made

the imperial general.

several further attempts to influence

In the spring of 1632 he

is

have approached him, and he did so again when Niirnbero'.

But

at this time Wallenstein

was

said to first

in

in nesrotiation

UTTER

360

S'lAOSSE^ION.

with Jokn George, and would listen to no advances, though

Gustavus

is

In July there were renewed

crown.

him

said to have offered to help

stein's willingness to

to the

Bohemian

e-^^idences of

work toward a peace

;

Wallen-

and now Gusta-

vus sent Colonel Sparre, recently captured, to AVallenstein,

with overtures for the exchange of prisoners and incidentally

Exchanges were

to treat of peace.

effected,

but Wari;ensiei^-'

referred the other question to Vienna, where

delayed that

it

was so long

it

was practically dropped.

Gustavus worked uninterruptedly on

tiie

Fiirth intrench-

ments, which he prolonged from the Rednitz above the village

with a northerly sweep to the rear, a distance of over two

So long

miles. success.

as there

was any chance, he

Rations had grown so short that the

but once in three or four days

;

still

hoped for

men

got bread

no forage could be had within

Yet the Swedes had open communications

a day's march.

Kitziiigen and Wiirzburg, while Wallenstein

the road to Neumarkt.

It

to

had not even

was reported September 9 that he

could not hold himself over three days more.

Wallenstein did not budge.

He

For

all that,

sat sullenly in place.

It

was

a game of patience.

The

rival armies

— starving though

on the spot two weeks after the

they were

battle, the

— remained

Swedes alone

carrying on a small war, while Wallenstein forbade replies to their attacks.

Hunger was now

at its height,

haps the worse in the imperial camp. state the loss of each

in the

and was per-

Contemporary writers

army to have been twenty thousand men

two and a half months they lay near Niirnberg.

number,

in

the Swedi.ili

army

at least, is exaggerated.

the city ten thousand people are said to have died. cattle all perished,

and the

vicinity

This

In

The

was transformed into a

desert.

It

was evident

to the king that

no further advantage could

/

A NOBLE'E Mol^LENGE.

He

be gained by remaining atilreal'nberg. entice nor force Wallenstein

He

ture his camp.

reestablish himself

Germany, or

else

o'l /

to battle

could neither

he could not cap

;

determined to cut the knot

upon

his direct

to go

on with

liis

strung to play longer at this game. ;

either to

;

communications with north operations in Swabia,

He was

basing on the Mainz-Wiirzburg country.

he had offered battle

361

He

had

too high-

tried assault

he had sought negotiation.

All had

Wallenstein was the colder-blooded, and, in such a

failed.

Niirnberg was

contest, the stronger.

men, — eight regiments of

foot,

left well

numbering

supplied with

forty-four

hundred

men, and three hundred horse, under brave old Kniphausen while Oxenstiern was to remain in the city to represent the king.

Having done

this,

Gustavus sent Wallenstein, on September

17, a formal challenge to

day

at the appointed

;

come out

to battle

on the next

hour he drew up the entire army and

marched past the imperial camp, stopping on the way nonade

But Wallenstein would not be tempted

it.

;

to can-

he did

not even answer the defiance.

There

is

a touch of j^athetic gallantry in Gusta^'us'

which appeals

to the heart of every

intoxication of battle

;

there

is

man who

has ever

moved by any taimt.

of enthusiasm the

erence the

manes

memory

the

a touch of sullen grandeur in

the refusal of the challenge by the proud Czech,

not be

felt

act,

The veteran

of the noble

who woidd

salutes with a thrill

Swede

;

he cannot rev-

of his foeman.

Failing in every effort to obtain an advantage over Wallenstein,

Gustavus concluded to leave the

camp and marched unchallenged ments towards Wiirzburg. zenn

;

the next at

Weinsheim

His ;

field

he broke

:

past Wallenstein's intrenchfirst

camp was

at

Langen-

he then marched to Neustadt,

whence he started September 23 for Windsheim.

The army

WALLE^J^OyN WINS.

362

with detacliments had shruil

men.

Here occurred a curious tary reached the king, to to congratulate

was

lisi

about twenty-four thousand

'<^^

him on

less appropriate

Wallenstein,

An

episode.

se-j

the

embassy from Tar-

Wonder

of the North, and

The time

his splendid achievements.

than after Breitenfeld or Rain.

who had watched

this

proceeding without

apparent interest, now waited until the 22d, when Gustavus

had reached Neustadt.

As

there was no further danger of

an ambush, after burning his camp and the inclosed hamlets,

and leaving a vast number

and wounded behind and a

of sick

quantity of baggage, he also broke up, and passing almost

under the walls of Niirnberg, moved, September 23, through Fiirth

and Bruck

Niirnberg.

to Forscheim, burning all the villages near

The indignant garrison

sallied out,

and

inflicted

considerable loss on Wallenstein's rear-guard.

The imperial general had won,

— won by standing

three days longer than the Swedes, and offer of battle.

had come

What

he had won

by refusing every

it is difficidt

to Niirnberg to capture the city

Gustavus presumably to beat him in

;

stantial advantage

He

But he had

Each army had

a battle would have consumed

;

no sub-

had been gained except by Gustavus in

the safety of Niirnberg. vring.

to say.

he had followed

battle.

conducted solely a camjiaign of depletion. lost thrice the lives

famine

Each

leader again took to manoeu-

Arrived in Forscheim, Wallenstein also could muster

a bare twenty-four thousand men.

The reasons Wallenstein gave the emperor

for not follow-

ing up Gustavus in what he was pleased to call his retreat after a lost battle

did he wish to

were that he could not quickly

tire out, his cavalry,

the country to forage

;

collect,

nor

which was dispersed about

that Gustavus held all the passes and

could head him off at every point

;

and that he preferred not

GUSTAVUS THE MORE SOLDIERLY.

363

to risk the gain

he had already made.

excuses to

" I attacked the enemy's intrenchments and

offer.

Gustavus had no

was beaten back," said he; "but could I have had him the open

field,

I

would have shown another

result."

in

He

proved his words good at Liitzen.

may

Statesmen greater

man

;

differ as to

who had shown himself the

but the fame of the captain

with the soldiers of

may

safely be left

all generations.

Gustavus Adolphus. From

bust modeled in 1632, at Augsburg (considered the best portrait of the king at the time of his death).

XXVIII. SEPTEMBER,

SPARRING. After

1632.

the breaking of the Niirnherg deadlock, Gustavus imagined that

Wallenstein would head for Saxony to resume operations to so manoeuvre as to tempt

him away.

some Swedes, was

where

in Silesia,

it

The" Saxon

and he sought

;

army under Amim, with

had pushed the enemy well up the Oder.

In September Wallenstein's lieutenants invaded Saxony from south and east,

and devastated the

But uncertain what Wallenstein would

region.

do, Gusta-

vus marched back to Swabia and resumed his operations, hoping that a threat to

move down

Danube would

the

tion in

Upper Austria

George

coiild hold

favored this plan

;

forestall the

An

Saxon campaign.

insurrec-

offered an opening, and Gustavus believed that

head for a while against Wallenstein.

John

Oxenstiern strongly

While

but Gustavus eventually chose to reduce Swabia.

proceeding with this work he ascertained that Wallenstein, paying no heed to the Danube, was steadily marching on Saxony, the one

This he must meet.

ish armor.

weak spot

in the

Swed-

Meanwhile the operations on the Weser and

near Gustavus' bastion were progressing, on the whole in favor of the Swedes,

though Pappenheim had been active and all

was ordered

these forces

occur.

The

within his

instability of

own

to Saxony,

;

but

John George had again resulted

to the

to

Bamberg, took

clear.

bulk of

in bringing

war

it,

sent detach-

most important neighboring towns, and detailed

Gallas with a small corps towards Saxony.

was

finally the

borders.

Wallenstein advanced ments

intelligent

where the great struggle promised to

His intention

He would now compel John George

the imperial will, as he was on the point of doing

to

bend

when

to

inter-

rupted by the presence of Gustavus at Weiden and by his

march

to Niirnberg.

When

Wallenstein followed Gustavus to Niirnberg the

king had utilized some of the Saxon troops, thus become

GUSTAVUS RESUMES HIS WORK. available, while the

365

bulk under Arnim, with the Pomeranian

and Brandenburg" armies, held Lusatia and

Silesia.

Shortly after Saxony had sent some regiments to Gustavus

— thus convincing

him

John George's

of

loyalty

had marched from the Niirnberg country on that

by the beginning

of September, devastating

he reached the vicinity of Dresden.

— Holcke state,

and

unmercifully,

In the beginning of

October Gallas joined him near Freiburg, which they took as well as Meissen.

Here the Saxons defended the

river,

and the imperialists marched on Oschatz, keeping up devastations in a

The

result of

manner

John George's

country again the

battle-field.

his brother Protestants,

of the

On

as systematic as

was

vacillation

Had

it

was to

their

fiendish.

make

his

he heartily joined with

Saxony would have been spared most

she suffered at the hands of the emperor's armies.

ills

September 26, at Windsheim, the king ascertained

Wallenstein's retirement from Niirnberg, but he learned none of the details, nor whether the elector

him.

by

If,

his hesitation opposite

king had prejudiced his regain to act.

it

had separated from

Wallenstein at Eger, the

initiative,

here was a chance to

but he had barely sufficient information on which

;

He might

leave a part of his forces in Thuringia, to

be ready to march to the aid of Saxony

if

threatened

;

with

the rest, resume the conquest of Swabia, and from there push

down

Danube on

the

Or he might send

the emperor's hereditary possessions.

a slender column to Swabia, and march

with the bulk of his force against Wallenstein, who, he already guessed, was bound for Saxony. leon would have done the

otherwise

;

latter

;

Frederick or Napo-

but Gustavus reasoned

he could not desert his friends along the Danube.

Battle-eager as he was, his feeling for

was the stronger

method

in

what he did

instinct.

Gustavus had learned that Wallenstein would not necessa-

A PROPOSED FORAY.

366

rily follow his lead,

— the Czech cared not for the devastation

of Bavaria or Austria, provided he personally suffered not,

— and by marching down the Danube, the imperial It

designs.

it

was not certain that

commander would be induced to give up his own might mean to leave Saxony to her fate, should

he go far from the Main.

Still,

he believed that John George

would have force enough, with his

own army and

a small

Swedish contingent, to hold head against Wallenstein, who during the approaching winter season would not be exceptionally active,

A

and "he began work on a broader scheme.

rebellion of the peasantry

had long been brewing

the

in

Austrian provinces, where Protestantism had been put down

much cruelty and it was still a question whether a march down the Danube to their aid might not give the imperialists enough to think about at home to prevent Walwith

lenstein

;

from pushing

These provinces were

his offensive.

already on the verge of an uprising, and had sent messages

begging for

aid,

He

which Gustavus had indeed promised.

proposed to leave, out of his royal army,

thousand foot

five

and two thousand horse on the Main, and

to

head seven

thousand foot and forty-three hundred horse on the foray

named. Oxenstiern, though far more cautious than the king, was

warmly

in favor of the plan, as he

feld, of a

march on Vienna.

He

had been,

after Breiten-

believed that Wallenstein

and Maximilian could not refrain from flying to the succor of these threatened lands, from which they drew their supply

and which should be protected

of recruits,

Gustavus

finally declined

at

any

sacrifice.

the plan, and curiously chose

instead an operation towards the

Lake

of Constance, in order

to reduce the country at the headwaters of the Rhine

Danube.

and

This does not strike the modern soldier as a wise

manoeuvre, though

it

was much

in

Gustavus'

style,

whose

AN EXAMPLE.

367

general scheme always included the possession of

from the point of entrance

to

poning the Danube matter, he eight thousand

men

lands

all

some natural boundary. left

Bernard

Post-

command

in

in the Schweinfurt country to

of

watch the

imperial army, prevent a raid into Franconia, and in case it

started towards Saxony, to

move north and

Kuthven, with ten thousand men, was

George.

Danube and Lech

to control Bavaria.

Rhine and Hesse troops, continued

Duke George

along the Weser.

Brimswick and the lower Saxon fi'om Niirnberg to lower

Saxony

which had fallen into bad

On

the

way back

to

John

protect left

on the

Baudissin, with the

to

watch Pappenheim

of Liineburg

was

to

guard

Oxenstiern was sent

Circle.

to administer that territory,

repair.

Windsheim from Niirnberg, whither

he had gone to discuss plans with Oxenstiern, Gustavus inspected the wrecked imperial camp, where so

men had

bravely sacrificed themselves

;

many

of his

and on October 1 he

broke up from Windsheim and marched south by way of

Nbrdlingen and Donauwbrth (October

Dinkelsbiihl,

and 5), where he crossed the Danube which the Bavarians were besieging.

3,

4

to the relief of Rain,

On

arrival,

he found

that the Swedish commander. Colonel Mitschefal, had sur-

rendered the place the day before, with the Swedish army right at hand.

an example

Of

this act of cowardice

Gustavus made

Mitschefal was tried and executed.

:

made preparations the enemy cut him

king-

by

He marched up

the

off

from Augsburg.

Lech, across at Biberbach, and down to Rain. tion of the

The

to recapture Rain, for its possession

The

capitula-

town brushed away what the king would have

was a threat

to the

felt

communications between Bavaria, Swabia

and the Main.

Ready stance,

march towards the Lake of ConGustavus heard from Oxenstiern that Wallenstein to continue his

THE RHINE CAMPAIGN.

368

had marched

to

Bamberg, and from Baudissin that Papf)en-

He

heim was threatening Hesse. news.

delayed action for further

Should Wallenstein move on Bernard and join Pap-

penheim, he instructed Bernard to hold the fords of the

Main and withdraw

to

Rothemburg or Nbrdlingen, where

Gustavus would meet him and move promptly on the enemy.

Should Pappenheim march on Franconia, Bernard was to

Main and throw him

stay on the

move on Saxony, there was at to anticipate, providing

Gustavus would continue on pushing his

initiative

;

lost.

discontinued,

The

to the uplands.

He was

again

Wallenstein's campaign so far had ;

in

reality nothing

summer's operations had interrupted, not

Gustavus' general plan.

He

still

hoped

draw Wallenstein south and get at him in the open least to sever

to his

to winter in Franconia,

only checked the Swedish programme

had been

much danger

John George remained true

Should Wallenstein seek

compact.

Should Wallenstein

back.

this season not

;

to

or at

Maximilian from him, and reduce to the lowest

point his capacity to

harm Saxony.

Meanwhile Horn, on the Rhine, had captured Coblenz, Strasburg and other places, and had driven the Spanish and

Lorraine forces out of Germany. to clean the

Lower

The king

instructed

him

Palatinate, while the rhinegrave drove the

imperialists out of Alsatia.

Benfeld, Schlettstadt, Tiirkheim,

Colmar were occupied, Frankenthal captured, and Heidelberg blockaded.

Li the bastion country, Pappenheim and Tott

were equally matched, but the Swedes had got possession of the

Bremen

archbishopric.

Wallenstein paid no heed to Gustavus' operations.

He

remained for a while near Bamberg, quartered his troops for their

needed rest over a large area, collected food, and levied

contributions to pay his troops.

Bernard prevented

his taking

Schweinfurt, and beset the passes of the Thiiringerwald to

OPERATIONS ON WESER. keep him from Erfurt. Wallenstein

on and took Coburg,

finally

— Taupadel held out

369

broke up, marched in the fort,

— pur-

posing to move through the Forest to attack Saxony from the

But hearing that Bernard from Schweinfurt, by a march on Hildburghausen and Schleusingen, was threatening west.

his flank,

changed

and unwilling his plan,

to encounter even his small force, he

marched by way

Cronach and Hof, on

of

October 20 reached Plauen, and at Altenburg joined Gallas

and Holcke.

At Coburg Maximilian withdrew

eight

his

thousand men, leaving Wallenstein sixteen thousand, and, glad to quit the haughty duke of Friedland, returned to save his possessions.

At Ratisbon he was

joined

by

six

thousand

troops raised by the Spaniards in Italy.

Ordering Pappenheim to join him in Franconia or Saxony, Wallenstein from Altenburg advanced on Leipsic.

Gustavus was hoping

Czech had

the

draw him away from John George,

remorselessly marched on

this

ally.

In

manoeuvring and persistency of purpose, Gustavus

strategic

had met

to

While

his match.

A page may well be

devoted to the operations on the Weser.

Since his separation from Tilly, Pappenheim had been con-

ducting an active campaign in Westphalia and the lower

Saxon in

Circle.

Early in 1632 Mansfeld had been besieged

Magdeburg by Bauer, and was on the point of capitidawhen Pappenheim suddenly appeared, and by a coui) de

tion

')nain

relieved him.

Gustavus, then in the Main region,

debated a march to the assistance of Baner, but

Baner joined Duke William

too late.

penheim

retired across the

forces to the south,

Weser.

to Hildesheim.

to retire to Cassel.

was quite

and Pap-

When the king called these

Pappenheim recrossed the Weser and feU

on the corps of Kagg, who alone was

him back

it

in January,

left

behind, and pushed

Landgrave William was compelled

BAUDISSIN VICE TOTT.

370

In January Tott had

finally

captured Wismar, had crossed

down

the Elbe at Domitz, and had sat

mouth.

its

Tott had formerly done

now appeared control

work, but he

efficient

He

to lose his energy.

to besiege Stade at

needed the immediate

Repeatedly instructed to join

of the king.

Kagg

and the landgrave, on one pretense or other he neglected do of

so,

and remained

in the

Bremen

territory, the

which drifted into the worst condition.

sank into an equally low

plaints reached the king's ears.

Pappenheim marched against

tion,

government

Kagg's command

and frequent

state,

to

serious com-

Ready to utilize the Tott, who continued

situalazily

to blockade Stade.

To

replace Tott Gustavus sent Baudissin, who, less strong

than Pappenheim, at

hem

all

events went to work

Bremen from the Weser. Pappenheim was

attempt was to

his

enemy

in the

;

and

his first

peninsula, and

cut

him

to

disconcert this plan, and while Baudissin joined

George

off

in

June

at Hildesheim,

landgrave from meeting his

allies

skillful

enough

Duke

Pappenheim prevented the

by a

threat to his territory.

From Hesse Pappenheim moved towards

Hildesheim, and

July 8 captured the Moritzburg, but withdrew without battle

and across the Weser and Rhine

to Maestricht, heedless of

the orders of Maximilian to march on Niirnberg, where he

was much needed. Gustavus equally needed Duke George

at Niirnberg,

but

for fear of Pappenheim he only drew some troops from him,

and

left

him

to sustain Baudissin.

marched across the

Weser with

The

latter, in

eight thousand

August,

men

Westphalia, to hold head against Pappenheim' s forces

into left

Duke George undertook the siege Both were succeeding well when Pappen-

there under Gronfeld, and of Wolfenbiittel.

heim reappeared on the scene, forced Baudissin back, defeated him at Brakel, and crossed the

Weser

slightly

at Hoxter, in

SITUATION IN GERMANY. the teeth of the Swede,

who

tured Hildesheim, October

retired to Hesse.

371

He

and thus had open

9,

then cap-

to

him the

whole country as far as the Elbe. This was the

moment when Maradas was

threatening and

Holcke and Gallas were invading Saxony, and Wallenstein

was

John George

at Coburg.

to his

aid

made

haste

and already

;

to

do

so,

on Liineburg

called

in retreat before

to

come

Pappenheim, he

marching towards Wittenburg and

Torgau.

Germany had undergone a remarkable change during the past year. The Swedish bastion, from Danzig to Hamburg, remained substantially the same. The line of the Warta was still held, with Frankfort as an advanced work, and outposts in Silesia. The entire country between the Elbe and the Weser was practically in the hands The

situation

of the Protestants

in

;

for though

Pappenheim, while manoeuvring

on the Weser, had kept that region in constant turmoil, now that he had

moved

to

Saxony, Baudissin, utilizing his absence,

overran Berg and Cologne, and, capturing almost cities,

all

the

again compelled the bishop elector of Cologne to neu-

trality.

Thuringia and the entire Main coiuitry were firmly

held by the Swedes. Alsatia,

Horn, as we have seen, had conquered

and driven the Spaniards from the Lower Palatinate.

Wiirtemberg and Swabia were occupied by the Swedes, and there was only Maximilian of

— a weak

opponent

—

in the

way

the march of a strong and well-led column do^^^l the

Danube

to Vienna.

But there was a weak spot and Wallenstein had thrust

in the king of Sweden's harness,

straight at

it.

Saxony was the

one uncertain element, and though formally in alliance with Gustavus, and bound to liim by every

now, at the

critical

moment,

tie

— when

of gratitude and honor, to

certain Protestant success, to break faith

keep faith meant

meant almost as

cer-

JOHN GEORGE FAITHLESS.

372

— the

failure,

tain

emperor had lenstein to fire

to

had

elector

violated all

so dubiously carried out with fair

and sword, and

it

which Wal-

words coupled

had been concluded between them

resume the old system of coercion.

Silesia into Lusatia,

The

his pledges.

failed in the policy of conciliation,

Maradas had

Moving

in

June from

as usual destroyed in the

most cold-blooded manner every hamlet along the

Arnim marched to meet this from the Oder joined him, and

threat,

a corps

the imperial

of

army

route.

Swedes

retired to

the upper Oder, and from there back to the borders of

Hun-

gary, leaving the Saxons to reconquer and hold all Silesia.

But while Arnim was thus winning an apparent was

at a distance,

sent

and the two other columns of imperialists

by Wallenstein under Gallas and Holcke moved

Saxony and took possession the Elbe.

from

success, he

of the

into

whole electorate west of

This should have drawn the Saxon army back

Silesia,

but

it

did not.

Saxon indecision was again,

as at Breitenfeld, the cause of a vast change in the Swedish

plan of campaign, and her

soil

became, as

should, the theatre of conflict.

A Burgnndian. (15th Century.)

it

was but

just

it

375 slowness,

XXIX. BACK TO SAXONY. OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER, ,

The

1632.

struggle for initiative between Gustavus and Wallenstein had been

The king had drawn Wallenstein from Saxony to Niirnberg, but now resumed his work there, ordering Pappenheim to join him.

about even.

Wallenstein had

Nearing Leipsie with threats to level

it

unless surrendered, he took

it,

and

The

uncertain attitude of

Saxony and Brandenburg, and the questionable bearing

of the greater powers

down

sat

to

await events and ravage the land.

with regard to further Swedish conquests, warned the king to look well to bastion.

mined him

to

march

to Saxony.

•

Leaving a

sufficient force in

Swabia and on

November

thence pushed

the Main, he headed for Erfurt, joined Bernard on,

2,

and November 9 crossed the Saale, whose fords he had been wise enough

seize.

liis

Anxiety as to what John George might do, despite his treaty, deter-

to

Writing to the elector to send him what troops he could, he reconnoi-

tred in his front at

Naumburg.

Arnim would not

return

from

Not believing that Gustavus woidd attack him, he dispersed ing Pappenheim to Halle

quickly ordered

;

him back.

Silesia,

and the

Wallenstein was uncertain what to do.

elector sent Gustavus no assistance.

his forces, send-

but when he saw that the king meant to

fight,

he

Gustavus would have liked to join the Saxons

before engaging, but aware that Pappenheim was away, he decided on battle as

he was.

For some months

•

there

had been a measuring

moral

of

strength between Gustavus and Wallenstein, and so far there

had been no great advantage on the

side of either,

from a military aspect distinctly greater

ability

though

and charac-

ter

had been exhibited by the king.

to

Saxony had drawn Gustavus away from work he had

Wallenstein's threat

undertaken in Bavaria; Gustavus' threat on Eger and his taking position at Niirnberg had drawn Wallenstein from

work he had begun

in Saxony.

Niirnberg, the initiative had

all

In the operations around

come from Gustavus,

as

it

JOHN GEORGE FAITHLESS.

372

—

failure,

tain

tlie

emperor had failed lenstein to fire

to

had

elector

violated all

so dubiously carried out with fair

and sword, and

it

which Wal-

words coupled

had been concluded between them

resume the old system of coercion.

Silesia into Lusatia,

The

his pledges.

in the policy of conciliation,

Maradas had

Moving

June from

in

as usual destroyed in the

most cold-blooded manner every hamlet along the

Arnim marched to meet this from the Oder joined him, and

threat,

a corps

the imperial

of

army

route.

Swedes

retired to

the upper Oder, and from there back to the borders of

Hun-

gary, leaving the Saxons to reconquer and hold all Silesia.

But while Arnim was thus winning an was

at a distance,

sent

by Wallenstein under Gallas and Holcke moved

Saxony and took possession the Elbe.

from

ajjparent success, he

and the two other columns of imperialists

of the

into

whole electorate west of

This should have drawn the Saxon army back

Silesia,

but

it

did not.

Saxon indecision was again,

as at Breitenfeld, the cause of a vast change in the Swedish

plan of campaign, and her

soil

became, as

should, the theatre of conflict.

A

Burgundian.

(15th Century.)

it

was but

just

it

XXIX. BACK TO SAXONY. OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER, The

1632.

struggle for initiative between Gustavus and Wallenstein had been

The king had drawn Wallenstein from Saxony to Niirnberg, but now resumed his work there, ordering Pappenheim to join him.

about even.

Wallenstein had

Nearing Leipsic with threats

down

sat

to

to level

it

unless surrendered, he took

await events and ravage the land.

The

it,

and

uncertain attitude of

Saxony and Brandenburg, and the questionable bearing of the greater powers with regard to further Swedish conquests, warned the king to look well to his bastion.

Anxiety as to what John George might do, despite his treaty, deter-

mined him

to

march

to Saxony.

•

Leaving a

sufficient force in

Swabia and on

November

thence pushed

the Main, he headed for Erfurt, joined Bernard on,

2,

and November 9 crossed the Saale, whose fords he had been wise enoxigh

seize.

Writing

to the elector to

tred in his front at

Arnim would

Naumburg.

elector sent Gustavus

no

not return from Silesia, and the

Wallenstein was uncertain what to do.

assistance.

Not believing that Gustavus would attack him, he dispersed ing Pappenheim to Halle

quickly ordered

;

him back.

to

send him what troops he could, he reconnoi-

his forces, send-

but when he saw that the king meant to Gustaviis

would have liked

fight,

he

to join the Saxons

before engaging, but aware that Pappenheim was away, he decided on battle as

he was.

For some months

•

there

had been a measuring

of moral

strength between Gustavus and Wallenstein, and so far there

had been no great advantage on the

side of either,

from a military aspect distinctly greater

ability

though

and charac-

ter

had been exhibited by the king.

to

Saxony had drawn Gustavus away from work he had

undei'taken in Bavaria

;

Wallenstein's threat

Gustavus' threat on Eger and his

taking position at Niirnberg had drawn Wallenstein from

work he had begun

in Saxony.

Niirnberg, the initiative had

all

In the operations around

come from Gustavus,

as

it

WALLENSTEIN to

leaving

liis

A

GREAT MAN.

Munich

Wallenstein had

;

leclined the gage of battle.

con-

was Gustavus' move-

It

ment which broke up the deadlock, though he had failed in his assault on the Alte Veste. Then Gustavus resumed the lead but Wallenstein, with a persistency which does him vast credit,

paid no heed to the king's threat against the Austrian

marched on Saxony, and resumed

possessions, leisurely efforts to

John George back

drive

His movement was designed

Danube by

to

draw the king away from the

seriously threatening his communications.

a question as to

who

his

into the imperial fold.

should yield to the other

;

and

It

was

in this

case Wallenstein's utter disregard of misfortune which did

not personally affect himself stood him in good stead

;

while

Gustavus' loyalty to Saxony weakened his strategic purpose.

There

is

no denying Wallenstein the

title

of a great

man

nor can large military ability be gainsaid him, despite his

He

utter lack of the true soldier's audacity.

is

the only gen-

Gustavus ever met who was a foeman worthy of his steel, who on more than one occasion compelled the Swede to change his own manoeuvres to follow those of his opponent.

eral

This was largely due to the complex political conditions enlacing the Swedish problem, while the Czech was practically

untrammeled

;

but

it

was

in part

strong character and indisputable skill.

A touch of the

stein tridy great

human

;

if

due

to Wallenstein's

unadventurous military

divine spark would have

and were not so many

vices

made Wallenand so much

suffering to be laid at his door, he would almost stand

unsurpassed in the history of his times. Wallenstein's general plan was not to surround Saxony,

but to concentrate his forces so as to meet Gustavus, who,

about the end of October, he learned was already on the

march towards him. to

From Coburg he

ordered Pappenheim

march on Leipsic or Merseburg, and

to seize

Torgau or

LEIPSIC CAPTURED.

375

some other Elbe crossing; and, impatient

at his slowness,

reprimanded him for conducting war on his own score instead of obeying orders.

But Wallenstein was

heim had grasped the necessity

Pappen-

in error.

of joining his chief,

and was

already aiming for Erfurt via Miililhausen and Langensalza

and when he heard that Gustavus had reached Erfurt, he turned aside

pa^st

Buttstadt towards Merseburg, there crossed

the Saale and reported.

The imperial armies went

into

camp

at Weissenfels.

With

threats like those of Tilly a year before, Wallenstein

marched against Leipsic, and was met by a

The commandant

of the Pleissenburg, or inner fortress,

on two successive days called on

captured the suburbs despite a heavy

bombard

A third

it.

demand was

Then Wallenstein opened gave

in,

it

could not

his

fire,

refused, as

which threatened not to leave man or dog

aware that

was

to surrender, but he gal-

Early on October 31 Holcke advanced on the

lantly refused. city,

similar refusal.

to

was a fourth,

alive in the place.

The town,

batteries.

make a prolonged

and began

well

resistance, finally

and received favorable conditions

;

and two days

later the Pleissenburg did the like.

Wallenstein's light troops

now

raided the entire coimtry

between the Saale and the Elbe, and even beyond.

and Saalfeld were taken

stadt, Kalila

refuge wherever they could,

Magdeburg. surrendered

—

in

;

Neu-

the peasantry sought

Erfurt, Wittenberg and

Torgau, Weissenfels, Merseburg, Naumburg, ;

Halle was occupied, but the fortress held out.

Gustavus had learned that Wallenstein had

and was marching north towards Coburg.

left

Bamberg,

Oxenstiern w^as

anxious to have him disregard this manoeuvre, and continue his

own scheme.

The king and

that the forces in and about

the chancellor both believed

Saxony

sufficed for her to hold

her own; that Wallenstein would not quietly permit the

SHOULD GUSTAVUS AID SAXONY?

376

emperor's hereditary possessions

the

devastation of

having once drawn Wallenstein away from Saxony, be done again by vigorous measures on the Danube.

Main and Saxon armies held

the fortresses,

— such

that,

;

could

it

If the

as

Mag-

deburg, Wittenberg and Dresden, Frankfort, Wiirzburg and Schweinfurt,

— and

on a

stood

strict

he would 'probably not conduct larger ojaerations tavus could country.

If

idea

;

Saxony

suffered,

would be her own

it

;

it

Magdeburg

save

knew

Saxony

if

fault.

had been Gustavus'

;

?

He had

he had saved Niirnberg

;

striven to

should he do

Moreover, he feared for his bastion

was

that Wallenstein

vring,

;

while Gus-

but he had promised John George to come to his

assistance at just such a juncture as this.

less for

;

but destroy Bavaria and the entire Danube

all

This was sound military reasoning

own

Wallen-

defensive,

would be able to do no permanent damage to the cause

stein

not in battle

his equal in persistent

;

he

manoeu-

and, what was worse, the European

;

powers were beginning to look on Gustavus' cause as the losing one.

The

His star was, they feared, declining.

latter

been warmly interested in the

had never

Netherlanders

Swedes,

The

was an element of the utmost gravity.

— commercial

relations forbade

it

;

should a peace

be made by the king with Spain, their position would be less friendly.

France stood in a questionable

still

attitude, despite

Gustavus' help in securing for Louis the control of the

bank

of the Rhine,

and the payment

on at Barwalde stood in danger.

left

of the subsidies agreed

Denmark had never been

frank in her peaceful declarations, and, now that she had control of the Baltic,

indeed, rumors

was ripe for any anti-Swedish plot

came that such negotiations were on

England ought surely

lost

to

be Gustavus' ally; but relations

with her were strained, and sonable treaty had failed.

foot.

all

attempts to patch up a rea-

Frederick

had not yet been

GUSTAVUS STARTS NORTH.

377

restored to the Palatinate, though Gustavus certainly intended that he should be, and this was a further cause for English

The

grumbling.

brilliant successes of

others had failed had begun

and had been followed by apprehension of what might prove to be

Gustavus where

by provoking universal

jealousy,

of his downfall

These puzzling

its result.

conditions weighed sorely on Gustavus, and

all

and

political

was they rather

it

than the military situation which led him to his action.

With

the aid of his old

he

neutrality,

But with

less

than

this,

the situation.

he was too good a soldier to risk

His

at so vast a cost.

show what he considered first

or at least their ingenuous

himself quite abreast of

what he had won His

allies,

felt

his

problem

letters at this

time

to be.

duty was to put Saxony beyond question on such

a basis as once more to be the outwork of his Baltic bastion.

He had stein

;

battle.

not quite lost hope of personally controlling Wallen-

failing which, he

had

faith that he could beat

Alive with this feeling, he

left

him

in

Pfalzgraf Christian

with four brigades and three thousand cavalry, to contain

Maximilian, so that he might not again join Wallenstein put necessary garrisons along the Danube, Rain, Augsburg and other places, started for Erfurt.

He

ordered

sin thither with all their troops

was

to join

passed Niirnberg on his

Kniphausen

way

on October 18

Duke William and

and

him on the march

— and

;

;

— Donauwbrth,

at all hazards.

Baudis-

Bernard

should Maximilian have

south, he purposed to take along

too.

Passing Donauw'orth, the column reached Nbrdlingen October 20, and Rothemburg (via Dinkelsbiihl) October 27.

On

the 22d, with an escort of seven hundred cavahy, Gustavus

went ahead to Niirnberg,

to consult with Oxenstiern.

chancellor was to remain in south ters in

Uhn, and,

The

Germany, with headquar-

as a general scheme,

was

to convene all the

THE MARCH TO SAXONY.

378

Circles having the good of Protestantism at heart, their fighting

and victualing powers,

to sustain the

and

king and

In this interview Gustavus, as

oppose the emperor.

join

if

in

anticipation of his early death, gave Oxenstiern all necessary instructions

as to the

government of Sweden during the

minority of his daughter Christina.

From Rothemburg

army marched

the

vember

1,

Kitzingen to

Decamping from here No-

Schweinfurt and Sclileusingen.

Hegion near

via

Liitzen.

the Thuringian Forest was passed at night

at Arnstadt,

November

2,

wisely crossed the mountains to head off

Erfurt and Weimar.

The

to Erfurt,

Pappenheim from

and remained

in

camp

army

passed

;

for

Buttstadt,

5,

they

several days.

Breaking up from Erfurt, the king, eager for the

and

troops needed rest, and two days

were given them at Arnstadt, whence, November

marched

;

Gustavus joined Bernard, who had

battle,

headed

which Pappenheim had recently

and Colonel Brandenstein was wisely sent forward

INSTRUCTIONS TO JOHN GEORGE. through Kbsen

Naumburg, which he

defile to

army was ployed

presence of the enemy the

umns and

was occupied in

army

to

light

Kosen

8

might compel the In that day,

to cross the Saale.

the defile was of great importance.

many At

November

force, which, unless held,

make a long detour

In the

took.

into battle col-

The enemy's

the country suitably patrolled.

troops fell back along the Saale, and on

379

To-day, the country has

roads.

morning on November 9 Gustavus crossed the

early

Saale at the Altenburg ford with the Swedish cavalry foot

At noon

crossed at Kosen.

Naumburg, and occupying a camp gate, proceeded to

was

the whole

the

army passed

in front of the Jacob's

throw up works.

The

king's intention

do here what he had done at Niirnberg

to

;

:

intrench a

camp, wait for the Saxon army, and then force battle on Wallenstein.

Constantly in touch with John George, Gustavus had uninterruptedly advised

him

of the situation

at stake in the loyalty of

tions

and he had

;

Saxony

;

he had too much

to neglect these negotia-

kej)t the elector well posted as to

what

troops woidd be in his vicinity and ready to lend a hand in case of attack. to to

draw

occupy

ments

;

On

starting north, he

begged John George Swedish army

his troops together so as to join the all

defiles

and strong places with large detachfrom "Wallenstein

to cut off victual

;

and not

to be

frightened by the reputed strength of the enemy, whose actual strength had been depleted numerically and morally.

From

Arnstadt he wrote again, asking for at least three thousand horse to be sent to Naumburg.

From Naumbiu-g he

conjured

the elector to send all available forces to the Saale,

Duke George

those of

let

the foot, artillery and baggage

perhaps via Mansfeld.

;

to

first

of

hurry forward the cavalry, and

all

come by the

safest road,

—

There was no time to bring troops

ARNIM'S TREACHERY.

380

from afar hand

A

sia.

the immediate

;

work must be done with those

Arnim should be ordered

though, indeed,

;

from

in

at

Sile-

small cavalry force, said the king, should be sent to

Wittenberg and scout out towards Halle

He purged John George

to clear the country.

to rouse the entire population,

and

order the peasantry to carry on a small war against the

He had come

invaders.

to save

Saxony

He

put her own shoulder to the wheel.

but Saxony must

;

himself was waiting

Above

only to learn the enemy's whereabouts and intentions.

he urged an immediate junction of the Saxon with the

all

Swedish army.

Duke George was Wittenberg, and

sent orders to break

to join the

up from Torgau and

king as quickly as possible with

the cavalry.

Arnim, despite orders

to return,

Silesia, while the imperialists

He

region.

but

was

still

finally in

foolishly

Silesia;

and

his stay in

in the Leipsic

person visited Dresden, November

urged that the after

was prolonging

had concentrated j)lace for

the Saxon

making a flimsy inspection

Liineburg troops, he again

left,

5,

army of the

insisting that he could at best

spare a couple of regiments for Saxony.

And

he managed to

convince the elector that he was right.

John George was conducting a paign.

He

not a military cam-

again took to petty discussions of trivial points,

enemy was within from desolating them by while the

With

political,

his dominions,

the

sole

and was prevented

presence of Gustavus.

every desire, he said, of sending troops, the bulk of the

army was

in Silesia,

and that on hand was essential

the fortresses and the crossings of the Elbe. good-will, however, he

about

fifteen

To

to protect

exhibit his

would send two regiments, a

foi'ce of

hundred cavalry, which shoidd join Duke George

and with him march

to the

by solemn treaty agreed

Swedish army.

to give

John George had

Gustavus the control of his

ADVANCE TO BATTLE.

381

army the king had forsaken liis own plans on the Danube to fly to the aid of his ally, and now John George Even this force offered him a paltry fifteen hundred men entire

;

I

came

too late.

By November

14 Gustavus had substantially ascertained

the situation of the imperialists.

There were but two of

trusted generals with him, Bernard

which

latter officer,

reposed

much

fighting,

— and

and old Kniphausen,

his

in

brave though not always lucky, Gustavus

As was natural, Bernard advised was the mood of the king. Kniphausen

confidence. this

advised waiting for the Saxon and Liineburg reinforcements, the weight of which

But

advice Gustavus recognized.

delay for these meant to permit Wallenstein to collect his

which Gustavus learned were much scattered.

forces,

to

own

Before

the Saxons, Hessians and Liiueburgers could arrive, Pappeu-

heim would be back, said the king, and before this took place.

when unexpectedly

"

was

to fight

weak

so

and Wallenstein seemed

attacked,

undecided what to do.

his desire

The enemy was never

to

as

be

your king and leader, will go

I,

ahead and show every one the path of honor."

Gustavus

decided to advance on the morrow and fight.

Wallenstein had taken measures to have his outlying armies join him.

milian

;

Aldringer had been ordered away from Maxi-

Gallas had been called

mander did not

anticipate an immediate challenge.

suggested by Pappenheim to

make a

Bernard had already Joined the king, ation.

but the imperial com-

in,

The generalissimo

hoping to be able

to

It

was

raid on Erfurt, but as this

was a useless oper-

sent detachments to Naimibiu'g,

occupy the

defile at

Kosen, and the pas-

sages of the Saale, but these detachments

came too

late

Gustavus had anticipated him.

While Gustavus was lenstein

straining every nerve for battle,

acted with indecision.

He

called

Wal-

a council

of

BOTH PREPARE FOR BATTLE.

384

and hurry back by forced marches,

— a thing he should have " Let nothing prevent

done without waiting for the council. your being with

me

early to-morrow

(November 16) with

all

your forces," wrote the general, anxious not to fight without his fiery lieutenant to this

In consequence of

uphold his hands.

manoeuvre, Wallenstein found the bulk of his army at

Liitzen on the 15th, and from here he sent out parties to scour

In his front were the fords of the Eippach, held

the country.

by to

Isolani's Croat cavalry outposts.

As Gustavus advanced

Rippach and Poserna, he met these detachments, which

disputed the passage

;

but they were brushed aside, and late

on November 15 the Swedes crossed the stream.

Gustavus

spent some hours in reconnoitring the ground in his front. It

a question whether the line of the Eippach

is

would not have been a stronger defensive rialists.

But Wallenstein had given

instructions to hold the passage, nor tain the outposts with

his cavalry

latter

not

— the Swedes lay on

known

to sus-

withdrew on

Darkness prevented pursuit.

Between the Eippach, the Saale and Liitzen is

no clear

had he arranged

any vigor, and the

the approach of the Swedes.

spot

itself

line for the impe-

their

— the

arms

exact

in line of

battle.

It is impossible to

do more than guess at the force of the

two armies which were to wrestle for the mastery on the

morrow.

For the Swedes the data vary between

thirty thousand

men.

It is only certain that Gustavus'

was much weaker than Wallenstein's. bered eighteen thousand scarcely have

number was

had

less

fifteen

men

;

It

while the

by

army

may have numimperialists

can

and

this

than twenty-five thousand

to be reinforced

and

;

fully eight thousand more,

whenever Pappenheim should come up.

Once

set

on

battle,

parity of numbers.

Gustavus took no account of the

He knew

that

it

dis-

was Wallenstein's strong

intrenchments,

him the

lost

i

entire eonfiden

the 15th the

o-,

coach in whicl tions for the

m

strength, but

G

by

saying- that

of Wallenstein

burned open

to

show

Thi crowded around field.

death.

This intei

grim old Frederick

ion of

Swedes and

advanced to Lutzen 3way, whose ditches the ate the battle of ,he

enemy's

riven •:

from

left

his

by a

ground

leaned on the Floss-

f ont

centre of the right

centre, the rattles in the

Solidity

musketeers.

was

enemy in his and cavalry was in

parallel to the

th foot, '

and regimental Kniphausen in the cen-

in front;

c,

fighting.

After a

but the Swedish

The

erialleft.

hegan to swing se, the Swedsaster to his

the place his

men,

Hs

time

ight hy

ued the

nd the •o

in a

r

fled

of

A PARALLEL BATTLE. ous statements you of the

manner

ever, in the

in

may

387

sketch out a dozen different theories

which

it

main a simple

was

lost

and won.

It was,

how-

battle in parallel order, fought out

with extraordinary obstinacy, and one whose phases were only those which

may always

parts of each line roll

occur in such an action, as the several

forward and back, in response to rein-

Battle of Liitzen.

forcements brought up, or to gallant attacks made or repulsed,

The

principal facts are clear

the hour at which

;

but such interesting ones as

Pappenheim came upon the

periods in the battle at which Gustavus and killed, or

indeed which was killed

dictory statement. of the

The

manner

first,

are

field,

or the

Pappenheim were

wrapped

in contra-

There are indeed many different

stories

of Gustavus' death.

plain of Liitzen

is

low and

flat.

Cutting

it

substan-

l

THE FORMATION.

388 tially

from southwest

to northeast runs the turnpike

which

leads through Liitzen village from Weissenfels to Leipsic.

This was Wallenstein's j)roper line of retreat, for he could not well give up Leipsic,

George needed like a it

it

for winter-quarters as

causeway above the plain

straight, others with a

the Flossgraben, is

he was to stand between John

if

Naumburg; and he well. The road here lies some of the old maps show

Dresden and Gustavus

at

unessential

:

—

as

it

;

at

marked curve between Liitzen and

may

all details

then have had

but the matter

;

On

cannot possibly be reconciled.

either side of the road are deep ditches, generally containing

water

;

but though apparently at the time of the battle they

were dry, they were such field-works

;

still

as to

make an

excellent line of

and these ditches Wallenstein ordered

to be well

dug out during the night, and lined them with a strong force of musketeers. Running north and south a trifle less than two miles to the east of Liitzen was the Flossgraben, a dull stream

meandering down towards

Zeitz,

and not so deep but that both

cavalry and infantry could wade

The causeway

it.

could likewise be crossed by both arms less

a serious obstacle,

who

intended to fight

much

;

but

in favor of

it

ditch

was none the

the imperialists,

on the defensive, as they had at the

Alte Veste.

Wallenstein drew up his army back of the causeway and facing southeast, with the right flank behind and leaning on the village of Liitzen, which he had set afire to prevent the

Swedes from attempting to drive the left flank leaning on the refused, say

some

the imperial line

authorities.

If the road

may have conformed

thus have had a wing thrown back.

had a small

his forces out

flying

;

and with

Flossgraben and somewhat

was not

straight,

to its direction

It is probable that

wing out beyond the Flossgraben

tainly the ubiquitous Croats

and

must have pushed

;

he

cer-

to the other

WALLENSTEIN'S DEFENSES. put

side, to

could do

389

harassing tactics to better use than they

tlieir

in the line of battle.

Along Wallenstein's

front, then, ran the causeway, wliich

stood up noticeably above the surrounding plain

eye of the imperial general

it

seemed

his

men

his route towards

to

retain

to the

he could hold it

and throw

keep Leipsic and

hold

to

Merseburg and Halle, where lay part

of his

and from which he was anxiously expecting the return

troops,

of

To

equally well to their task.

back the Swedish attack meant

if

and

good chance

to yield a

of duplicating the victory of last August,

;

Pappenheim,

—

his stanchest lieutenant.

Not

to be driven

from the causeway was victory enough for Wallenstein,

just

as the defense of the Alte Veste was in his eyes a notable feat of arms.

He

did not gauge victory from the standpoint

of the great captain.

Not

far

back of the causeway,

in front of the

imperial

right wing, was posted a battery of heavy guns,

and another

The former

stood on a

was in front of the right

centre.

slight rise just_nOTth_jQLJLiitzen, in the midst of windmills.

The number

of guns has been, like that of the forces engaged,

very variously stated. in the centre in style,

The

greater part of the infantry was

four great battalia, set up in the Spanish

and arrayed substantially as they had been at Breiten-

feld.

Much

discussion has been indulged in to

the imperial general had his

army

up

set

own hand

there exists a plan in Wallenstein's disposition.

to have

this as

it

forces were

and

for such a

may, the battle does not appear

depended on there being any given number of

The imperial solidity

Be

show that

in three lines,

drawn up

played the main part, and

it

in

lines.

an order in which

was Wallenstein's pur-

pose to fight a strictly defensive battle, holding the causeway

from Liitzen to the Flossgraben as his

line of works.

A portion of the infantry was posted

7

in the windmills

and

CHANCE FOR A FLANK ATTACK.

390

in the gardens

The

which surround the village of Liitzen.

imperial cavalry composed the wings of the army, the left

under Holcke and Piccolomini, though

it

Pappenheim would

command

arrive

in season

was interspersed with horse

CoUoredo

;

was hoped that the left

It is said that, in imitation of Gustavus' tactics, foot

wing.

the

to

the imperial right, under

in

and they could well have been put

;

many garden

to use

behind

walls.

Wallenstein himself remained with the centre, and was

carried in a

litter,

The advance

mounting a

as his gout prevented his

of the

horse.\

Swedes from Naumburg was such that

they were marching directly upon the flank of the imperial

army.

It

would seem as

Wallenstein's better line would

if

have been across the turnpike, not along suggested, behind the Ripj^ach, to fall in

—

it,

— perhaps, as

so as to enable

on his right when he should

Pappenheim

arrive.

Frederick

would have sharply punished the great Czech for such a tical

blunder

but,

;

like

Alexander

at

Arbela,

tac-

Gustavus

declined to " steal a victory," and drew up for a parallel

Unless the king's idea of marching on Pegau and

battle.

Grimma

to join the Saxons, coupled to the

knowledge that

Wallenstein lay in and about Liitzen, had led him to camp the day before somewhat to the south of the village, to see

why he

flank attack.

it is

hard

should not have used his opportunity for a

But

battle-tactics

was as yet a simple

affair

Gustavus had done enough for the art of war in leaching armies mobility

;

he cannot be held to complete the science to

which he contributed so much. is

that

the king

desired

Leipsic and not towards

to it

;

Perhaps the best explanation drive the

enemy away from

or, in case of defeat, to retire

towards the Saxons on the Elbe.

In two columns corresponding to the two proposed to

figlit in,

lines of battle

Gustavus advanced, and drew

he

ujj in line

"FORWARD IN

NAME!"

GOD'S

at a distance of less than a mile from,

We

enemy.

know

his formation better

Four half brigades were posted

Count Brahe was Kniphausen

command

in

and

391

parallel to, the

than Wallenstein's.

in the centre of each line.

of those in

the

The

of those in the second line.

first

right

line

and

left

wings of the second line of the centre, under Kniphausen, were composed of horse. Colonel

Ohm,

In

was cavalry under

reserve

In front of the

in rear of Kniphausen.

in-

fantry centre there was one battery (some authorities say

two) of twenty-six heavy guns

;

and near forty

light regi-

mental pieces stood in front of the musketeers who

On

tained the horse.

both wings of the

squadi'ons of horse, each two separated

first

line

sv;s-

were

by detachments

of

foot.

In the wings of the second line there was only cav-

alry.

Liitzen lay in front of the Swedish left wing,

right lay on the Flossgraben.

wing was placed or

later got

nard commanded the handske and

his

left

No

and the

doubt a Swedish flying

beyond

this

waterway.

wing, and the king, with

Finns as a body guard, the

right.

BerStiil-

The

baggage was near Meuchen, behind the Flossgraben. Gustavus rarely

slept

much

in the presence of the

enemy,

but he passed the night in his traveling-coach with Bernard

and Kniphausen.

The drums were beaten long before day-

and the Swedish army bestirred

light,

by

Prayers were

itself.

the chaplains, and " Fine Feste

Burg " and one of own hymns were sung as the men fell in. Gusta\ais rode his brown charger and wose no armor.

said

Gustavus'

Bernard and Kniphausen begged him helmet.

But a

His battle-speech

he refused.

to his

the point, and he rode ahead with "

Jesu \

!

The

Jesu

!

to

wear cuirass and

cuirass irritated his old shoulder-wound,

men was

Forward

in

and

short and to

God's name

" on his lips.

object Gustavus aimed at was to cut Wallenstein off

THE BLACK DEVILS.

392

from Leipsic, so as to recapture the place and unite with John George. His tactics then was to pivot on his own left, which faced Liitzen, and to drive the imperial left and centre away

from the causeway .j To

Though

the troops

this

he addressed himself.

had stood

to

arms

at daylight,

it

was ten

o'clock before they reached contact with the enemy.

This

delay was largely due to the fog which blanketed the plain,

but

an interesting thing for those of us who have seen an

it is

army on

the

march deploy from marching column

into line,

battle with high percentage of casualties

and win a pitched

in three or four hours, to note the length of time the formal

marshaling of an army took prior to the day of that

Once

less tactician, Frederick.

heavy

artillery duel,

Swedes opened a

aligned, the

which lasted a

rest-

full hour,

and under

its

cover they advanced near the turnpike and stood ready for

hand

to

hand work.

When

he deemed that his artillery had made a sufficient

impression, the king personally led forward his right wing of

He

horse and foot, and gallantly charged on the causeway.

was received by a heavy longed

tussle, the

fire

;

but after a sharp and pro-

king drove the imperial musketeers from

the ditches on both sides of the causeway, crossed this obstacle,

and made a

successful attack on the enemy's left

beyond, driving the Croats

off

in

wing

the wildest flight.

So

stanch had their advance been that the imperial baggage park

was threatened, and was summarily transferred from the to the rear of the right,

The king gave at all hazards to

where lay the heavy

batteries.

orders to pay small heed to the Croats, but

break the ranks of the

fine troops

under Piccolomini fought

they were,

and

their

intrepid

wounded

;

by the

tremendous successive

but

left

desj)ite

cuirassiers.

like the

These

black devils

commander was repeatedly

their bravery, they

were forced back

impacts of

the

scpadrons

SWEDISH CENTRE headed by the king. left

wing was

all

393

Meanwhile the cavahy

of the Swedish

but equally fortunate against the horse on

And

the imperial right. in the centre

FAILS.

not to be behindhand, the infantry

had advanced, driven the musketeers

j)ell-mell

out of their ditches, crossed the causeway, and taken the

The

imperial battery opposite the centre.

been sharp and marked

But the success was

all

along the

gain had

initial

line.

After crossing the cause-

short-lived.

way, the foot brigades wheeled somewhat to the

left to

take

the imperial centre in flank, a manoeuvre which exposed their

own

;

and before they could make an impression which was

effectual rial

on the battles of Wallenstein, several of the impe-

cavalry regiments of the left centre and

left,

which had

somewhat

retired,

were again massed, and bore down on the

victorious

Swedes

like a torrent.

and

Thus taken

in the face of a superior force, the gallant brigades failed

to hold their own,

back and stanchly.

and

stout struggle were driven

after a

lost the battery

In one regiment every captain was shot down.

A disaster

was wavering.

successively advanced

The

thrown back in disorder.

to the rescue, but only to be

as

They had fought

they had taken.

The Yellow cavalry and the Blues had line

crisply in flank

might

result.

The

loss

was

sudden as the gain had been, and the infantry was retiring

across the causeway. to Gustavus,

who was

Word still

driving the

and who believed that the whole advance.

As

line

enemy on the

right,

had kept

initial

at the Alte Veste, Wallenstein

to fight a battle offensive. victory, so far as

was sent

of this state of affairs

its

had no ambition

If he could hold the turnpike, the

he needed

it,

would be won.

that the Swedish central attack had failed,

and

his

And now men had

reoccupied the causeway ditches, he did not push them out to accentuate his gain, but held

them

in their place.

A few

squadrons alone galloped out beyond the imperial front.

GUSTAVUS' LAST WOUND.

394

While the king was reestablishing order in his right wing, somewhat unsettled by its hard-earned advance, and was preparing for a second blow, he learned of the retreat of his centre.

His fears were aroused for the success of the day, and he once headed the

Smaland cavalry regiment, and with

at

his

usual impetuosity galloped over to the aid of his hard-pressed infantry.

The king was heavy, but he rode good

only by three

In his over-eagerness, and followed

fast.

stock and

companions, he galloped far ahead of his column, and in the

down upon

fog which was again coming

the

field,

aimed for

the place, slightly back of the causeway, where he expected to find his infantry, but

fallen

back

;

here,

just

now

a stray party of impe-

down upon him by simple accident, unaThe king was shot in the bridle-arm swerving towards his own line, he received a was.

it

and, his horse

He

bullet through the body. last

lines,

rode

rial cuirassiers

ware of who

from which the brigades had

between the

fell

from

his horse with his

and mortal wound.

There was at the time a species of

by the

falling

lull in

the battle, caused

back of the Swedish centre and the momen-

tary j)ause of the right.

As

the imperialists had no idea of

advancing beyond the causeway, there was a wide open space in their front,

and

it

was during

and between the

this lull

causeway and his own front that Gustavus

was announced less

back

to the

to the

Swedish

appearance excited the

Some time

army by

after

lines,

men

fell.

His death

his charger galloping rider-

covered with blood, and his

to a frenzy of revenge.

midday Count Pappenheim appeared on

the field from Halle, leading his van of cavalry.

come with

his best troops at a double-quick.

ing where Gustavus fought, to the

enemy,

— with

He had

Eagerly inquir-

— his death was

not yet

known

a column composed of eight cavalry

regiments, which he quickly assembled, he

fell

sharply on the

VICTORY IN THE BALANCE. Swedish right wing and forced

back, practically regaining

it

the ground their initial advance had won.

Centre and right

were weakening before the imperial attack left

held

its

own

395

but the Swedish and about Liitzen, and Wallenstein's

in

;

lack of push saved the Swedes harmless from disaster. this juncture, or

and

killed,

somewhat

gallant

later,

At

Pappenheim was

his regiments, lacking his fiery leadership, hesi-

tated and fell back

the Swedish

;

once more

right could

gather for a blow.

On

learning of the king's death, Bernard,

the Swedish

left,

who was on

immediately took command, and rej)laced

the king on the right.

Kniphausen led the

Brahe replaced Bernard on the

left,

Count

centre.

where the cavalry had

already sharply and successfully attacked the causeway, Liit-

zen and the enemy's right wing.

Ee-f orming the ranks in the

which only Torstenson's guns now

intervals of quiet,

inter-

rupted, Bernard ordered an advance all along the line, though

the day was fast wearing away.

The Swedes again pressed

forward, this time screwed up to the highest pitch.

Between

the darkness and the fog, manoeuvring had become impossi-

was a mere brute push for mastery.

It

ble.

took Pappenheim's place, resist the rial left.

fro

in

renewed attack of the Swedish horse on the impe-

The

rival lines clashed,

a frantic death-struggle.

mixed, and rolled to and

In their

Swedes carried everything before them.

body

Piccolomini

and led several regiments up to

first

charge the

They recovered the

and again drove the imperialists far be-

of the king,

yond the causeway.

But some time

after 4 p. m. the rest of

Pappenheim's cavalry came up, and, maddened by the news of their splendid leader's death, they drove

on the Swedish line which gained the

more pushed the

man

assailants

could presage victory.

lost

home a charge

ground, and once

back across the causeway.

No

SWEDISH VICTORY.

396

But gallant Bernard

of

Weimar would

though even brave old Kniphausen gested

Torstenson's

it.

guns were

One more

nerved to avenge the king.

manes

still

have sug-

to

able

the

;

line

patched up, and every Swedish heart was

could be again

the

hear of no retreat, said

is

of the dead hero,

was made for

effort

and the charge was given with

the vigor of loving despair.

The decimated ranks

Northlanders closed up shoulder to shoulder, the

of the

first

and

second lines were merged into one, and forward they went in the foggy dusk, with a will which even they had never shown

Nothing could

before.

right, centre, left,

resist

tremendous onset.

their

On

everywhere and without a gap, the Swedes

The imperial army was torn

carried all before them.

into

many moment

shreds and swept far back of the causeway, where so

men had

brave

that day bitten the dust.

some ammunition chests

in the

ness had descended on the field

mourn

this

in rear of the imperial line exploded,

which multiplied the confusion

there to

At

Dark-

enemy's ranks.

but the Swedes remained

;

their beloved king, while the imperial forces

sought refuge from the fearful slaughter and retired out of range. I

Liitzen has been called a drawn battle. cally a lery,

Swedish

The

victory.

a number of standards, and,

thousand

men

in killed,

it

wounded and

drawn.

Swedes

But slept

this

is

is

cited as

said, ten or twelve

field,

Part of the

That Wallenstein

proof that the battle was

was rather the usual want of

on the

was unequivo-

prisoners.

force fled to Merseburg, part to Leipsic.

could reach Leipsic

It

imperialists lost all their artil-

pursuit.

and next day returned

The

leisurely to

Weissenfels, to weep for their dead lord)

Quite unaware that any future historian would find ground to state that the battle

the relics of his

army

was drawn, Wallenstein retreated with to

Bohemia.

\

The

loss of the

Swedes

GUSTAVUS' WISDOM.

397

has been called numerically equal to that of the enemy. Especially was I

The

it

greater in the loss of

its king-

Swedes and the

dispositions of the

and captainJ of

A-igor

repeated attacks had been eminently praiseworthy. stein

showed indecision

in fighting a defensive battle

criticism can be passed

was a

tfieir

Wallen;

but no

on the manner of his fighting.

It

by each

battle-royal in every sense, nobly fought out

side^

(The Swedes had destroyed the last army of the emperor. At the opening of the year Ferdinand had been at the end of his resources, when Wallenstein came to his aid and the ;

now been

great Czech had

We

utterly defeated.

Gustavus had already accomplished

;

know what

he stood on the thresh-

old of the imperial hereditary possessions, with every land

from the Rhine and the Alps

subject to his control, and firmly heldJi battle of Liitzen, can

peace on his

we doubt

own terms

in

and the Vistula

to the Baltic

Had

he outlived the

that he would have dictated

Vienna

?

And would

been a peace promising more durable results than reached Vienna after

his

initial

His wisdom was fully proven posed of his

;

victory

at

Battle-axe.

not have

if

he had

Breitenfeld

but a higher power had

life.

Musket

it

(16th Century.)

?

dis-

XXXI. THE MAN AND SOLDIER. Gdstavus was in

tall,

strong and handsome, royal in bearing, condescending

manner, with noble features, golden hair and a clear blue eye.

and scholarship he had no superiors

hymns which

;

In intellect

he was an eloquent speaker, and wrote

are sung to-day all over Sweden.

His dignity never

but though intimate with few, he was approachable by

left

Of a

all.

him

;

sensitive

nature, he was in youth quick of word, but he learned self-control and patience.

Earnest piety was a constant

His ambition was pure. all,

but himself decided.

age

;

giiide,

No

Alexander had no more wounds

work

to others

;

to justice

him with more

in the field, trusting

punishment.

in

A

soldier

many

He

:

method according

careful accumulation of supplies ity of fire

;

;

allies,

activity in

well-timed audacity

is

;

;

marches and manoeuvres

in defeating Tilly

than

all this,

;

may

be conducted on

he lived, he would have dictated religious peace in Germany it.

is

know

We

sui-e

the fact that

at Niirnberg, admirable con-

;

won

It

;

his honqyable purpose with his blood.

he taught the world that war

is

rapid-

and overrunning the Main

Had

He

;

the necessity of a

on the Lech and at the Alte Veste,

;

magnificent contempt of danger and difficulty

and at Liitzen he sealed

taught the

In winning his bastion, Gustavus

not foolhardiness.

country, boldness, rapidity and rare skill

;

He

the security which resides in discipline

showed caution backed by vigor

stancy

Gustavus exhib-

to one well-considered plan

the value of taking and holding key-points

base and communications

Splen-

feast.

hard worker, he

can scarcely be said to have

In dealing with his half-hearted

lessons

he consulted

;

splendid cour-

no man's eyes but his own, nor leaving

ited the patience of Hannibal, the persuasiveness of Caesar.

modern

and good deeds.

he went to danger as to a

summary

which he might do himself.

been aided by Fortune.

him

captain ever bore

did in reward, he was just but

was doubly busy

impelling

In strength of will he was unchanging

More

civilized lines. ;

as

it

was, he

properly called the Father of the Modern Art of War.

a curious

fact,

and much

so little about the

Hero

to

be regretted, that we

of the Thirty Years'

War.

are told endless facts about Frederick and Napoleon

we know much

less

about Gustavus.

;

«

INTELLECT AND CHARACTER. Gustavus Adolphus was of

but he was inclined, in the

;

interfered with his virility that

him

Koman.

little

His hair and

and kindly, yet

his nose strongly

His daughter. Queen Christina, wrote of him as a

very handsome as

soft

His forehead was lofty and

proud look.

and a

he had large light blue eyes, very

;

and luminous, with a

expressive, eager

he

fondness for physical

his

into danger as to a feast.

beard were golden yellow

;

few years of

last

This condition, however, so

his life, to corpulence.

exertion led

and powerful frame

tall

dignity, coupled to suavity,

had a royal bearing, great noble carriage

399

is testified

in all he did,

man

by

;

he was certainly kingly in his demeanor,

all his

Earnest and liberal

contemporaries.

no one who came near him but

felt

the influence

of his character.

To an uncommon breadth

of intellect Gustavus joined the

well-poised knowledge of the apt scholar and the iron

Once convinced that he was

the true soldier.

He was

could bar the execution of his project. sensitive

— one might say touchy —

temper was but

and

patient.

superficial

at heart he

rare,

was kindly, charitable

to fair dealing

cloak.

He

and uprightness.

fond of reading, well acquainted with the keenly the works of

Religion

read daily and at length in his Bible,

and prayed as openly and unreservedly as he spoke.

that

is

His quick

religion.

His piety was honest, outwardly and inwardly,

and impelled him was never a

;

of a quick,

habit, coupled, as

and

to a deep feeling for right, truth

will of

right, nothing

Hugo

Grotius.

He

classics,

He was

and studied

once, however, said

had Grotius himself been a commanding general, he

woidd have seen that many of

his precepts could not

be

carried out.

Gustavus spoke eloquently, and wrote easily and with a certain directness which in itself thinker.

His hymns are

still

is

the best style for a clear

sung among the country folk

FRIENDSHIP FOR OXENSTIERN.

400 of

Sweden with the fervor

which the

in

jjeople shrines his

memory. Condescending, kind and generous, Gustavus was often

When,

splendid in his rewards for bravery and merit.

Ake

youth, the later Field-Marshal

in his

Tott performed some act

of signal gallantry, the king thanked

him before the whole

forces paraded under arms, ennobled

him on the

spot,

and

own hands hung his sword upon him. But Gustavus was equally summary and severe. Once, on complaint being made of marauding by Swedish soldiers, the king assembled

with his

and severely held them

all his officers

into the

camp and

seeing a stolen

to task

cow

;

then, going

in front of the tent

man by the hair and handed " Come here, my son," said he

of a petty officer, he seized the

him over

to the executioner.

;

" better that I punish thee, than that

vengeance on

While

me and

God, for thy

the whole army."

singularly quick tempered, Gustavus was eager to

undo a wrong he might commit.

" I bear

my

subjects' errors

with patience," he said, " but they too must put quick speech."

He

up with

Every one ;

his

my

condescended often, at times too much,

but no one was ever known to take advantage of his

ness

sin, visit

affability.

in his presence felt the subtle influence of great-

meed was

the hearty respect of all

who approached

him. Intimate with few men, and these only his leading generals or the princes he

much

markedly on to

happened

to

be cast with, Gustavus was

attached to his chancellor. Axel Oxenstiern, and relied his judgment.

speak plainly to the king.

Only Oxenstiern was privileged "

You

are too cold in all things,

and hamper me too much," once said the monarch. replied the chancellor, " but did I not

cold water on the

up."

It

was

fire,

" True,"

now and then throw

your Majesty had long since burned

chiefly at dinner,

which at that day was eaten

GAUDIUM CERTA MINIS.

401

before noon, that the king- talked, and discussion then was

ample.

This always busy monarch was especially busy in the

field.

Like Napoleon in his early years, he saw throughout everything with his

own eye

;

and always rode with the van of the army.

know what was his life

was

many

in his front

life

he would not rely on others,

His eagerness to

times put him in peril of

but he never overlooked an advantage of ground, nor

;

an order to meet the requirements of the

late in giving

In the cabinet he was strong and suggestive, the

occasion.

prime mover in every scheme

;

and though he constantly held

councils of war, they never failed to fight.

He

studied to

lieim high

poral

;

;

his opponents. He gauged Pappenwas " brave, but nothing but an old cor-

know

Tilly

Wallenstein he underrated, partly because he

"

pomp and

liked his

he did him ample

egotism, and feared his loyalty.

Pappenheim was

yet to

What he admired

that which he himself so notably possessed,

— a quick decision and

fiery execution.

Sensitive to a degree with regard to his royal dignity,

dis-

Gustavus himself was too great

justice.

harbor petty jealousy of greatness in others. in

And

Gustavus hated adulation.

name and

Just prior to Liltzen,

when, in passing through Naumburg, the people prostrated themselves, he remarked with a protest well,

but I fear

God

will

punish

me

:

"

Our

cause stands

for the folly of this

people."

Except Alexander, no great captain showed the true love of battle as

Such was but

fight.

down

it

his

burned in the breast of Gustavus Adolphus.

own contempt

When

the king was ready at any

his life for victory,

sustain

him ?

of death, that his

how should

With such

army could not

moment

to lay

not the rank and

file

a leader, a defeat like Tilly's at

Breitenfeld, or Wallenstein's at Liitzen, was not possible.

THE MASTERS HAND.

402

Nor was

his courage a

mere physical quality

intellectual courage equaled

;

his moral

and

Hannibal's march into Italy

it.

was but one grade bolder than Gustavus' into Germany Caesar's attack at Zela was no more reckless, if less matured, than Gustavus' at the Lech.

The

military student

may read

the records of

war

for seven-

teen centuries succeeding the death of Caesar, without finding in its conduct

any mark of that art and purpose which the

great Roman,

as well as

Abundant courage, abundant

stantly exhibited.

abundant opportunity

When,

method.

Alexander and Hannibal, so con-

will

intelligence,

be found, but no broad, clean-cut

however, the student turns to the page which

narrates the operations of the Swedish king, he once again recognizes the

hand

The same method which

of the master.

has delighted him in the annals of the Macedonian, the Carthaginian and the

Roman

is

apparent

the broad, firm ideal

;

and never swerving moral force of which those captains were such brilliant examples

may be

the

of

second rank

who

;

and from now on,

art,

he will find generals

seen

thanks to the impress made on the

intelligently carry

forward what

Gustavus Adolphus rescued from the oblivion of so many centuries.

The

operations of Gustavus in the Thirty Years'

divisible into three epochs.

From his appearance

to his passing of the Elbe, his conduct of affairs

by great

caution.

It

must be borne

in

mind

in

War

are

Germany

was marked

that Gustavus

had, barring the technical skill of the day, no military teach-

ing except that which came from his study of the deeds of the ancients, his

and no guide except

day and in

less.

This

first

was consumed

his day,

his

own

genius.

War, up

to

had been unmethodical and purpose-

epoch was of fourteen months' duration, and in securing a foothold in

Pomerania, Meck-

lenburg and Brandenburg, in so careful and methodical a

GUSTAVUS' METHOD. manner

as to stand out in contrast to

403

any other camj)aign of

Every circumstance was against him.

this era.

He had

but

slender means to oppose the emperor's apparently unlimited

He came upon

resources.

when the cause The Protestant princes whom

the scene at a time

he had embraced was a wreck.

he sought to help, at whose request he had undertaken the gigantic task, in lieu of flocking to his standard, looked on

him with Yet he

and afforded him small countenance.

suspicion,

lost

not courage.

steadily on,

and reached

With a clear aim his

in view, he pressed

end gradually, step by

bent every effort to secure the cooperation of the coldly scanned his work.

He

exhibited patience akin to

nibal's, persuasiveness like to Caesar's,

He

ander's.

them

:

grasp.

Han-

captured fortresses at the key-points and held

from the Swedish

accumulated supplies where he could be sure of

keeping them Niirnberg

so

boldness equal to Alex-

rarely was a strong place wrested

He

He

step.

men who

:

German campaign

but once during his

— was

He

he out of victual.

— at

firmly secured his

communications with the base he thus carefully established

and with Sweden, and never manoeuvred

He

gradually overcame the shortsighted policy of his brother

Protestants,

and strengthened himself with

accessions of recruits. for

so as to lose them.

many

He

allies

and fresh

acted, not as the leaders of armies

centuries had acted, as

countries they traversed were

if

the population of the

mere brute

beasts,

mere pro-

ducers of food for the great and their hirelings, but with a spirit of kindliness

and Christian charity which won over

the populations to his side.

which was the marvel of

its

He kept

all

troops under a discipline

day, supplied their wants

by

legit-

imate means, paid them regidarly, and allowed no marauding or jslunder.

The few

instances in which the Swedes were

convicted of crimes which were then the daily accompaniment of the profession of

arms were summarily punished.

Gusta-

BOLDNESS SUCCEEDS CAUTION.

404

vus understood how to avoid battle with an enemy who was too strong to beat

;

how

him away from the key-points them himself against an enemy who was his

to lead

of the theatre of operations, so as to secure

how

to operate energetically

equal or his inferior in strength ability of his troops

;

how

how

;

to

employ the

to infuse into his

enthusiasm on the battle-field

;

how

men

tactical

his

own

to utilize a victory to a

greater extent than any of his predecessors of the Middle

Ages or

of his

own

era,

and how

to heighten

and maintain

the morale of his troops in victory and defeat alike.

only failure of Gustavus'

Magdeburg from failure to

first

powers of resistance, of

to the perverse refusal of the

Swedes a passage over

Then came

Tilly's perseverance,

Saxon

elector to

and

allow the

his territory.

the second epoch.

intelligent conduct, the

place between the sea, the his flanks

This was due not to his

the hands of Tilly.

advance to her rescue, but to a natural miscalcula-

tion of her

and

The

epoch was his inability to save

and rear from

So soon

king had

Oder and all

as,

by

his cautious

set himself firmly in

the Elbe,

had protected

probability of danger, and had

persuaded the electors of Brandenburg and Saxony to join his standard, in other

at once altered his

words had established his bastion, he

method

When

of operation.

would stand he assumed the

offensive, crossed

the

enemy

the Elbe,

attacked him at Breitenfeld, added immensely to his strength

and morale by beating him, and, leaving a portion

of his

troops to operate with the allies and to protect his flanks and

communications, he advanced rapidly into the very heart of

Germany.

In three weeks, he had established himself firmly

on the Main, in Franconia and Thuringia

;

in ten days after,

he had advanced down the Main to the Rhine, taking strong places on the his

way

;

in three

all

months more, he had

hands on the whole middle Rhine country

;

and

in

the laid

two

THE ALLIES CHANGE. and a half months from

this last period,

Danube, beaten the enemy

at the

405

he had crossed the

Lech by one

of the boldest

operations undertaken since the Christian era, and had occu-

pied almost

Thus

Bavaria.

all

in eight months,

from Sep-

tember, 1631, to June, 1632, he had traversed and held a

much

larger territory than he

had previously gained

in four-

and had become the most powerful of the monarchs of Europe. He put to use the boldest and most decisive operateen,

tions,

and yet never failed in the method and caution which

were his guide

;

by

his skill,

courage and intelligence he

established himself as firmly in southern

A

previously done in northern.

Germany

as he

had

glance at the territory he

— from the north shores of the Baltic the of the Alps, — and a comparison of with that conquered by covered,

to

foothills

it

any other captain

modern

and the measure

of the

few months during which he was actively a combatant

in the

Thirty Years'

of

War,

times,

will satisfy the

the past masters in the military art

we remember

most exacting admirer of ;

and

this especially so, if

the political entanglements in which the king

was caught, the

fact that he

came

to save

and that statesmanship often dictated

and not

to conquer,

his manoeuvres rather

than his clear grasp of the strategic situation.

Gustavus was now cess

;

at the height of his reputation

the eyes of all

and

suc-

Europe were upon him, and he was

ready to attack Austria from the west. Here begins the third

epoch of his operations.

changed

;

At

this juncture the policy of

France

she feared that Gustavus would aspire to a political

prominence which would unsettle the balance of power in

Europe

;

began

his allies

crown of Germany

Germany who was

;

in

to suspect

him

of aspiring to the

and Wallenstein, the only any sense worthy

the king, raised a large army,

to

soldier in

be matched against

and by marching on Saxony

threatened the Swedish communications with the Baltic,

estalb-

GUSTAVUS VERSUS WALLENSTEIN.

406

much

lished with so

his allies

changed back the

The whole

skill.

were whole-hearted, and his policy suddenly

to the cautious

importance in

first

all his

one he had early shown.

his

own

now

Second

By

to this

his

bastion in north

was the protection of

had promised

city he

which

apt to be thrown

Main

resources, were his communications with the

and the Rhine, and with

Germany.

allied Niirnberg,

to

succor, should she be attacked.

taking position at Niirnberg, he accomplished

ends, for he

Of

operations, whether offensive

or defensive, particularly so as he was

on

situation

Gustavus was no longer so secure as he had been

changed.

when

care and

these

all

drew Wallenstein away from Saxony, and kept

At

him away from the Main and Rhine.

Niirnberg, so long

as his forces remained largely inferior to Wallenstein's, Gus-

tavus acted on the defensive, indulging only in small war

;

but when, by his lieutenants coming up, the Swedish army

grew

to equal Wallenstein's,

Gustavus again went over to an

offensive startling in its boldness. It cannot

be denied that, while Wallenstein was in the

field,

Gustavus gave over part of his initiative to the Bohemian

had never done

as he

owing

Had

before.

But

this

to the political difficulties

the elector of

was

in a great

Saxony been the firm and

Gustavus that Gustavus was to him

;

beset.

loyal ally to

had the king not been

compelled to look sharply for treason in his rear, ful

measure

by which he was

it

whether he would have yielded any part of his

is

doubt-

initiative,

even to his great opponent.

When

his offensive at Niirnberg failed

and

his provision

quite gave out, Gustavus retired, not at once to Bavaria, but to the

Main, to make sure of his communications there

so soon as

it

;

and

appeared that Wallenstein had no immediate

thought of disturbing these, leaving a lieutenant to observe him, Gustavus again took

vq) his

old thread

and returned

to

ALTERNATING BOLDNESS AND CAUTION.

407

Bavaria to complete his conquest of Swabia and Wiirtemberg.

Then, for the second time, Wallenstein, by moving on Saxony, coupled to the

and now more Baltic,

His

work

life's

communications with the

His march

to

Saxony and and

his attack

so vast, so solid

and

deci-

on the

skillful.

striving here closed in a glorious death

the great king accomplished in

it

and

to resort to quick

at Liitzen were rapid, bold

Germany was that

attitude of the elector, threatened,

and compelled him again

sive operations.

enemy

weak

seriously, the king's

little

;

but the

over two years in

so intelligently planned,

remains scarcely doubtful that, had he lived, he would

have dictated to entire Germany the terms upon which the

men

religious faith of all

The student

should be held and practiced.

of Gustavus' life will notice in these several

epochs a peculiarly intelligent adaptation of his work to the

From

existing conditions.

his landing at Riigen to his pas-

sage of the Elbe, there was a cautious but by no means indecisive policy, to be largely ascribed to the

ness of the

German

Protestants

of his cousins, the dukes of

;

unexpected cold-

to the ungrateful laxness

Mecklenburg;

hebetude of the elector of Brandenburg

;

to the brainless

to the unintelligent

yearning for neutrality of the elector of Saxony.

lem was one of

Elbe

politics,

not war.

From

The

jjrob-

the crossing of the

to the starving-match at Niirnberg, the student will see

exceptional activity and courage, in no wise lacking intelli-

From

gent, methodical caution. to Gustavus' death

upon the

the break-up at Niirnberg

field at Liitzen,

he will recog-

nize an alternation as the circumstances dictated,

cautious manoeuvring of the

first

from the

epoch to the intrepid energy

of the second.

From and

Caesar's time on,

intellectually carried

Gustavus was the

first

who

firmly

through a campaign on one well-

considered, fully digested, broad, and far-seeing plan, and

(

HEEDING COUNSEL.

408

who swerved therefrom only

for the time being to

ditions which could not be foreseen

meet con-

from the beginning

whose

;

grasp was such that, whatever the conduct of the enemy, he

was never compelled to abandon, but at most plan

to vary, his

and whose work was done against an enemy

;

much

times

his

hearted loyalty

superior,

at

most

and among friends whose

half-

made them more dangerous than

the foe.

Gustavus was in the habit of assembling his generals council.

The advice

of his

opposed to what he did did.

;

but they could not see as far as he

Not even Oxenstiern's

king's.

And

crisp

;

He

to the

listened patiently to all

but he decided the action himself.

who maintained and

judgment was equal

a council of war under Gustavus never deterred

the king from pushing home. his generals

It

was he

the consistency of his course through good

evil fortune alike.

Each

variation

had

its definite

object,

which attained, the general plan was at once resumed. all

in

most trusted lieutenants was often

In

Gustavus did there was a certain intelligent sequence and

interdependence of movements that produced a perfectly systematic whole, in which the unity of plan was never disturbed.

And

with this broad plan there always went hand in hand a

upon which depended the

careful execution of detail

of the whole.

was

His occupation remained firm

success^

his victualing

movements accomplished what Even when, as before Niirnberg, or

sufficient to his needs

he sought to attain.

;

;

his

before Liitzen, he was driven to change his operation lest his allies in

north

Germany should play him own project.

false, it

was only

to defer, not to abandon, his

In pursuance of his cautious policy Gustavus neglected no step of his advance.

He

left

behind him no important

tress or city without observing,

he held the passages of erecting

suitable

all

blockading or besieging

forit

important rivers in his path by

bridge-heads, or by

occupying necessary

/

VIGOR OF EXECUTION. towns which controlled them

;

409

he kept upon his line of opera-

tions

suitable detachments, often armies, or

met

force

upon them by a prompt movement of

his

He

upon the enemy.

as not to decrease his

so

managed

own

for the

allies

strength, nor to lose the ability to

enemy

work they could best perform

offensive in his

own hands,

his lieutenants should act

main force

the division of his armies

concentrate at least as rapidly as the

main

he used his

;

he

;

on the defensive, unless they out-

;

and called for the most com^age

intelligence.

Noteworthy as was Gustavus' caution, tion

when he undertook a

His caution was not the caution of Wallenstein, who

able.

of foe

and friend

;

it

men by

devastating the land

was the caution which watched

line of communications, his victual, his

allies

;

force

his base

munition and his

while his decisiveness lay in his intelligent choice

between

the

his vigor of execu-

fighting offensive was as remark-

fought shy of battle, and fed his

and

due

to all

while he himself always undertook the part which

entailed the greatest labor,

and

the

kejjt

generally so ordering that

numbered the enemy, and then he urged them vigor

threats in

sharj)

when

movement upon the enemy with

whole

his

the conditions were favorable to a battle, or

when

moral superiority of the troops would allow, and the

policy of seizing important provinces izing the resources of the country

the circle of his operations.

and

and

cities,

and

of util-

of allies so as to increase

His caution was such

that,

by

every step he advanced into the heart of Germany, he weak-

ened the enemy by just so much.

Wallenstein

left the

he crossed useless to the enemy because he had pillaged he went held

it

;

land it

as

Gustavus spared the country he traversed, but he

by enlisting the population in

ful military occupation.

and manoeuvres shows

The simple

their value.

his favor,

and by

recital of his

care-

marches

TRULY A GREAT CAPTAIN.

410

The

secret of Gustavus' successes lay, not in the element of

may be

luck, for luck

him

said on the whole to have run against

rather than in his favor,

— not

against

him

as

ran

it

against the Carthaginian, but certainly not in his favor as

ran in Caesar's,

— the

and

secret lay in his broad

it

intelligent

general plan, in his adherence to the work as he had originally cut

it

and

out,

in his suiting his bold operations or cautious

As

manoeuvres to the circumstances as they existed or arose. with Alexander, Hannibal and Caesar, self

this

it

was the man him-

whose very brain and soul were put into

man

possessed all those

which produce

of

war whenever they

results in

his

work

and

;

head and heart coexist with that

Equally great as monarch and as

other factor, opportunity. soldier,

qualities

he united in his one person the art of both.

nation and his

army were devoted

shown devotion.

to

him

His

as history has rarely

His motives were perhaps the highest and

purest which have ever inspired any of the great captains pursuit of

them was

and noble, open-handed and

steadfast

above-board, courageous and discreet. ligence,

and

sound judgment, strong

carefulness, he

great captains,

we look

is

his

;

will,

In weighing

his intel-

perseverance, hardihood

properly put in the rank of the six

— three

of ancient, three of

modern days.

further and gauge the results of what he did,

view the purposeless and barbarous nature of war as

If

if it

we

was

we weigh the influence which his short two years' campaign had upon all modern war, we may indeed in a moral sense, and in a sense making toward civili-

conducted up to his day

zation, place

if

;

Gustavus Adolphus yet higher.

out the importance of key-points tresses

—

in holding a country

by careful accumulation of every territory traversed

;

;

His pointing

— at that time generally

for-

the value of feeding an army

supplies, instead of

by ravaging

the use of a carefully drawn plan

of operations, extending over the whole ground to be covered

FATHER OF MODERN WAR. and the propriety of waging war ilized spirit,

marks the

first

Gustavus Adolphus has the

all

more Christian and

step towards the

civ-

modern system.

fairly earned the title of

Father of

War, and must be acknowledged as the others who re-created methodical, systematic,

Modern Art

captain of

in a

411

intellectual war,

of

and who taught the world that there could

exist such a thing as civilized warfare.

After his death his lieutenants endeavored to carry out his system

;

but there was no one, not even Oxenstiern, who was

equal to the task.

them

;

in

many

They

retained something of what he gave

things they slid back into the old ruts

war again assumed the aspect of gigantic

Among

his enemies, during the

;

and

raids.

remainder of the Thirty

Years' War, history shows nothing but inhumanity, over

which

it is

well to

draw a

veil.

Fusee Arrows.

XXXII. NORDLINGEN. The

1633-1634.

death of Gustavus altered the entire aspect of German

was no longer a centre

point, for Oxenstiern

There

afPairs.

was not a monarch

;

but he and

Kichelieu kept on with the work which Gustavus had so well builded. of the powers stepped out of the Swedish programme, but the

Bernard next year was

was

manoeuvre in Silesia

to

succeeded well

Upper Austria

;

;

down

to operate ;

the

army

a third

Danube

;

and

;

Horn kept the

The

imperialists out of Swabia.

He

later returning to

then moved on the Oder

;

camp, while

but his conduct

Bohemia, he was assassinated in February,

Archduke Ferdinand took command

to its relief,

Silesian force

fortified

of the imperial force, captured

Eatisbon and Donauworth, and sat down before Nordlingen.

went

The Weser army

in Westphalia.

Bernard and Ban^r, along the Danube, advanced as far as

his lieutenants invaded Saxony.

1634.

on.

a Saxon-Swedish force

advanced against Walleusteiu, who prudently retu'ed to a

was weak

Many

war went

Bernard and Horn

but attacking the archduke without proper concentration,

they frittered away their strength, and were disastrously defeated, with the

bulk of their army, and

loss of the

mark

as lieutenants of Gustavus

Men who made

all their material.

found that there

is

more

to

a

war than they had

understood.

The

death of Gustavus Adolplius completely changed the

current o£ affairs in Germany.

Its first effect

began

to

empire.

make approaches

The majority

against the

it

essential to

Hapsburgs.

of

them

shortly

leading to reconciliation to the

Richelieu was the only

than ever was

practi-

which bound the Protestant

cal rupture of all the treaties

princes to the Swedish cause.

was a

It

man who saw

that

now more

uphold the balance of power

was he who stepped

induced the Swedes to continue the war.

in

and

Oxenstiern was

the natural successor of Gustavus in the control of both the military

and

political issues

;

he agreed with the French min-

OXENSTIERN AS CHIEF.

413

and despite her exhaustion, Sweden went on, hoping

ister,

Gustavus had fought,

gain, in the end, the object for which

Swedish

least as

as far at

treaty with Russia

was concerned.

seciu-ity

was renewed

uance of the existing truce

;

Poland agreed

and the

;

to

The

to a contin-

and

entire resources

confidence of the Swedish nation were given to the great

But even Oxenstiern was not a Gustavus.

chancellor.

German

princes,

who had been ready

The

to follow the lead of the

splendid king, were unwilling to subordinate themselves to a

mere prime minister vailing on

them

and Richelieu had much ado

;

in pre-

to so act as not to forfeit the gain already

In one way or other, however, they were fairly well

made.

committed to the cause

;

and

for

two years the work and

—

method

of Gustavus

least as

was possible without the presence of the man and

went on under Oxenstiern,

so far at

king himself.

The

strategic plan contemplated three lines of operation.

Bernard, with the bullv of the Swedish army, was to move into south

vus,

Germany, pick up the troops

left there

by Gusta-

and then, basing on the Main, work down the valley

the Danube.

Part of the Swedish army, with the Saxon and

Brandenburg contingents, was Another

Silesia.

of

Bohemia and

to operate in

part, with the troops of the

Hessian and

lower Saxon Circle, was to hold Westphalia and protect north Germany.

sumed

The winter succeeding

Liitzen was con-

in preparing for the execution of the comprehensive

plan.

But Ferdinand was not him

of his arch-enemy,

idle.

The fortune

of

war had

rid

and he foresaw greater advantages

from a continuance of the struggle than from any peace which could be made with Richelieu

To be

sure, the

and had

to

army

of Wallenstein

be recruited anew

;

at the council-board.

was almost broken up,

but the Bavarian forces were

WALLENSTEIN'S WEAK POLICY.

414 intact,

and had been considerably increased by accessions

from Lorraine and from Spanish

Few

troops.

things go fur-

which has been claimed for

ther to disprove the standing

Wallenstein as the best captain of his era than the secondary role he now played, after the only his

man who was

equal had been removed by the accident of

In the spring of 1633 the

began operations more

allies

In the Weser country they

vigorously than the imperialists.

beat the forces of Merode and Gronfeld, and cajjtured

On

fortresses.

had been forced out

of Bavaria

Swabia

into

and while Horn drove the

;

Switzerland and besieged

Constance, Bernard pushed the emperor's army

took Ratisbon before

river,

spot,

whom

Gallas,

once dispatched from Bohemia to

on the

many

Danube, Bernard joined Baner, who

the

imperialists out of

called

battle.

down

the

Wallenstein at

succor, could arrive

its

and then crossed the Isar and moved on Upper

Austria.

Meanwhile Aldringer, whose duty

marched

into the Tyrol,

it

was

to contain

Horn,

where he joined a heavy body of

Spanish troops and pushed his way through Swabia on Alsatia,

hoping both to neutralize Horn and to entice Bernard

away from

his

Danube

Horn

conquests.

drawing in what reinforcements he could

followed,

;

and Aldringer

found his scheme so unpromising of success that he

To hand

offset these gains, the Catholic

in Silesia

marched through Lusatia ince.

The

and Saxony.

early in the year,

and overran that prov-

Wallenstein met this operation by moving from Bohe-

mia into

Silesia,

sterberg,

from which, despite very great superiority

he

retired.

armies had the upper

allies,

into Silesia

after

i-etired

where he took up a

on the approach of the

policy on Wallenstein's part

redounds

little to

his credit.

is

fortified

allies.

difficult

camp

at Miin-

in force,

This defensive

to understand,

and

Meanwhile Holcke and Pic-

THE GREAT CZECH ASSASSINATED. colomini invaded Saxony

;

415'

the former took Leipsic, the latter

Arnim hurried back to defend the Thurn with but twenty-five hundred men

Dresden.

threatened

electorate, leaving

This was Wallenstein's opportunity, for he had

in Silesia,

He moved

forty thousand men.

on Thurn, beat him, and

marched down the Oder, captured Frankfort and Landsberg,

But the imperial gener-

and even raided beyond the Warta. al's

operations essentially lacked vigor, even with nothing to

oppose him

;

and he

finally yielded to the entreaties of the

emperor and returned on Bavaria the

Upper

to hold

to

Bohemia, from whence he marched

head against Bernard.

Palatinate did indeed force

His approach of

Bernard

to retire

;

but Wallenstein went into winter-quarters, owing to the late season, ready to

march on Saxony or back

The great Czech's

spring.

cut short.

to Bavaria in the

career was, however, summarily

His peculiar character and faithlessness had made

him too many enemies among the

He

Ferdinand down.

rich

and powerful, from

was assassinated in February, 1634,

in the fortress of Eger.

At

the beginning of the spring of 1634 Bernard again

advanced on Upper Austria.

The imperial army was now

wholly at the disposition of the emperor

Archduke Ferdinand, was placed of Lorraine,

who with

the place, cajitured

the left

bank

;

and

his son, the

command, with Gallas

This force marched on Ratisbon, joined the

as his second.

duke

in

it

the Bavarian

army was besieging

on the 26th of July, and marched up

of the river.

Bernard retired

to

Augsburg,

gathered in Horn's troops, and took post at Lauiugen.

archduke moved to Donauw(3rth, and taking

marched on and

it

August

The 16,

laid siege to Nordlingen.

Meanwhile Baner and Arnim had advanced

into

Bohemia,

but had been beaten at Prague on the 28th of June, and had returned to Saxony.

THE PLAIN OF NORDLINGEN.

416

Nbrdlingen called on Bernard for assistance.

The duke,

with Horn, had sixteen thousand foot and ten thousand horse,

but the archduke and Gallas had thirty-five thousand

Bernard desired

over.

ation of the

or

to await the rhinegrave, but the situ-

town had become desperate

much

but could not

assault,

men

;

had withstood one

it

He

longer hold out.

decided on

attacking the imperial army.

The archduke was carrying on only

the siege from the south

but a reinforcement that Bernard managed to send the

;

garrison did not hinder the operations, which were pressed

Horn advised taking up

vigorously.

a strong position and

trying to cut off the besiegers from victual for a battle,

and he was sustained by a majority of the higher

He

officers.

but Bernard was

;

still felt

the enthusiasm of Liitzen.

It was,

how-

ever, with great surprise that, on the 5tli of September, the

imperial lain

commander saw the army

back in the

hills

had

of the allies, which

on the road to Ulm, appear and

offer

battle.

The

plain of Nordlingen

is

bounded on the southwest and

south, at a distance of three or four miles

a chain of

hills,

which

rise

from the

from three hundred to

hills,

six

hundred

Ulm, are other

Neai'er the town, across the road to

feet.

by

city,

perhaps one hundred feet high, and between the two

runs a small brook, the Goldbach or Forellenbach.

It

was

here that the archduke undertook to defend his siege operations

from interruption by the

On

allies.

the latter, he left only five thousand

men

advanced to meet Bernard with the

rest.

anticipate them, and as the vanguard

higher

hills,

back.

It

the imperial cavalry fell

was essential for Bernard

of the debouches

He

from these

hills,

the approach of in the lines,

He

was able to

out from the

filed

upon

and

it

and drove

it

to gain full possession

and

this

he accomplished.

was anxious, before the enemy could do

so, to seize

the

THE ARMIES IN LINE. lower chain of battle-field

;

417

these were practically the

hills, as

key

to the

and he sent out a brigade of infantry with a

battery to get a foothold there, while he himself deployed his

army

But the day was

in the valley along the Goldbach.

far gone,

and

as the allied artillery

satisfactory position, the

was not able

duke deferred the attack

to get a till

the

the night fortifying the hills he

had

morrow.

The archduke spent secured,

and

He

in placing batteries to advantage.

&"'

"

\..^

'

4.

occupied

/

''''''""'^''•..i.cH.,v^'';^'"

Battle of N6rdlins;'en.

On

a line from Schmahingen to Hohlheim.

Aalburg on

his

left

he expended special care, and placed

The cavalry

there his best troops, the Spanish foot. left

the heights of

wing lay behind works

in

two

lines

;

the

held the right with a good part of the cavalry. all told,

of the

German

foot

There were,

seventeen thousand foot and thirteen thousand horse.

At daybreak their position in

under Bernard.

of

Sej)tember 6 the

allies

broke out from

two columns, the right under Horn, the

Horn was

nard near Ederheim and

to attack near

alono- the

Ulm

left

Schmahingen, Ber-

road.

The duke had

BAD MANAGEMENT.

418 no

higher

difficulty in seizing the rest of the

The

the imperial van had occujDied,

themselves with bombarding the

hills,

which only

imperialists contented

hills so

occupied from their

Horn's cavalry, meanwhile, by a

batteries opposite.

had got around the Aalburg position and attacked

it

circuit,

in flank,

while the foot had deployed in front of the imperial works

and had advanced

But the cavalry was driven

to the assault.

back on the infantry

line,

and though the Swedes, with

their

and

ancient gallantry, captured the

first line

some

and after holding themselves

of the guns, they paused,

some time, were thrust out with

loss

severely punished regiments turned to

whole

line fell

the left in

now

back

in confusion.

sallied out against

in a short while the entire

a few of the most

flee,

and gradually the

The imperial

them

some ammunition wagons tended

and

;

of intrenchments

;

cavalry of

an unlucky explosion

to increase the difficulty,

Swedish column was

driftins;

back, sharply followed by the archduke's cavalry squadrons.

Were

these the same Swedes

front of the Alte Veste,

who

stood twenty-four hours in

who time and again

thrust Wallen-

stein's best troops out of their defenses at the Liitzen cause-

way? trial,

Where was

that bold spirit, that endurance under

which Gustavus had breathed into their ranks

?

This failure of the allied right made a bad impression upon the centre and

left.

Their work ceased to show that energy

which commands success.

Bernard sent some regiments

to

the aid of Horn, and committed the grave error of detailing

a considerable part of his troops towards Nordlingen to seek

communication with the garrison, at a moment when he should have concentrated one spot to stave

all his forces for

off

a decisive blow on some

the impending disaster.

one outcome to such conduct.

The

There was but

division

sent

on

this

absurd errand was attacked and cut up by the imperialists,

and the archdidie

at once

assumed the

offensive.

TOTAL DEFEAT. Horn, during

had reassembled

this time,

ments, and was ready to advance anew

had taken

all

419 his scattered regi-

but the Spaniards

;

the positions he had vacated, and he was unable

The reinforcement which Bernard had sent to its own There was a lack of common purpose in the allied account. army. The imperial artillery was so effectively served that to recapture one of them.

him

Horn, after a

lost its

way, and began operations on

six hours' battle,

was fain

the allied left matters were no better itable fighting, so ill-directed as to

gave way in confusion, and

Horn's cavalry had decamped ageous example, stood

them

;

On

much

cred-

after

be useless, this wing too

his foot,

the

Ulm

under his own cour-

ground where he had

its

turnpike.

last rallied

but the entire column was cut up or captured, Horn

and three general

The

to withdraw.

and

down

fled ;

;

officers

among

the latter.

defeat of the allies was total, and

nard's lack of definite plan.

men were

It

is

it

was due

to Ber-

said that twelve thousand

wounded, eight thousand men captured

killed or

one hundred and seventy flags and eighty guns, and the entire

hands of the archduke, whose

train, fell into the set

down

as a bare twelve

Nordlingen surrendered next day. Alsatia with his broken forces. fatally checked.

losses are

hundred men.

The

Bernard retired allied cause

to

had been

This battle ended what we have called the

Swedish period of the Thirty Years' War. In May, 1635, peace was made at Prague between the

The elector received Lusatia, and the Magdeburg was given for life to his son

empire and Saxony. archbishopric of Auo-ustus.

It

was

ao-reed that the ecclesiastical estates

which

were not held immediately from the emperor, and which had

been confiscated before the convention of Passau (1552), should remain to the present possessors forever

;

all

others

should remain until 1667 in the hands of the present possess-

PEACE WITH THE EMPEROR.

420 ors,

and then

forever, unless

meanwhile be made.

A

some new arrangement should

general amnesty was given to all

except the Bohemian and Palatinate rebels.

Common

cause

was

to

be made against Sweden, and only Lutheran worship

was

to

be tolerated.

of

This peace was accepted by the elector

Brandenburg and most

of the Protestant potentates.

French Sergeant. (1630.)

XXXIII. CROMWELL.

1642-1651.

Ckomwell vras one of the greatest of men. He was the originator of the New Model

high.

the regular

who

defeated successively

all

His rank among generals soldier of the

is less

Commonwealth,

—

He was

the militia of the royalists.

an accomplished cavalry leader, who never failed to win whenever he charged.

But Cromwell was not a great opposition to

him was never

rather than brilliant

;

strategist,

serious.

however good a

His record of

tactician

and the

;

victories is interesting

Marston Moor, Naseby, Dunbar, Worcester, make grand

chapters in English history, but they do not teach us what Breitenfeld and

Blenheim

do.

No

one can underrate the services of Cromwell to England

was a man capable of doing splendidly anything

to

which he put

his

hand

;

;

he as

statesman he has had few equals, but as a mere soldier he can scarcely aspire

That he copied Gustavus was but natural

to the second rank.

Europe, ever since 1630, had been copying him

memory

to assert that

he was so lacking

As a

Gustavus had been doing.

As

school.

Ten

a

man he was

and

it is

;

the whole of

a slur on Cromwell's

in intelligence as not to

soldier he

is strictly

essentially English

know what

a product of the Swedish

— and his own prototype.

years after the death of Gustavus on the field of

Liitzen, the civil at

;

war

in

England broke

out.

Charles stood

Nottingham with a patchwork army of ten thousand men.

Prince Rupert ("Rupert of the Rhine," son of Frederick of the Palatinate and Elizabeth of England) was in of the horse.

The parliament army

but equally scrappy, lay in officers in

War

;

its front,

of double

its

command numbers,

under Devereux.

Many

both armies had been trained in the Thirty Years'

but there were as

there were soldiers.

many tramps under both

colors as

Roughly, the middle classes and the

southern and eastern counties were with the parliament

upper

classes, the

;

the

peasantry and the northern and western

THE ''NEW MODEL."

422

counties were with the king

but there was no such line

;

Except unmethodical

of demarcation as in ovir civil war.

and the

operations,

fact that

Cromwell began

to discipline

his " Ironsides " in the winter of 1642, little occurred for

The parliament

two years.

and England rors of the

felt in

war

in

Cromwell began of

lost rather

than gained ground,

a lesser degree what had been the hor-

Germany. his "

New Model

" discipline with a troop,

There was nothing new in

which he was captain.

was but the imitation by a strong,

resolute, intelligent

it

;

it

man

of

what another great man and greater captain had done within the generation.

Cromwell was broad enough

what he and

other Englishmen had watched, the wonder-

ful

all

campaigns of 1630, 1631 and 1632 in Germany

wise enough, when the occasion came,

To

they taught. reflection of

a

to understand

man and

is

no

slight

and

to apply the lessons

assert that his military skill

Gustavus'

;

to

was but a

Cromwell, who as

a ruler was the equal of the Swede.

Cromwell's

men were

honest, pious yeomen.

He

could have, no better material on which to work

asked, he ;

and he

trained himself as he trained them, rising from captain of a trooi3 to colonel of

commander

of

a regiment, general of a brigade of horse,

an army, captain-general.

muster-rolls were twenty thousand horse, or twenty regiments

sabres

each.

and

among

and

the parliament five

it

first

stood,

At

was home

Cromwell

the officers of regiments and

troops were numbers of his relations and friends. alry corps

thousand

seventy-five troops of sixty

In the cavalry, as

served as caj^tain, and

foot

On

The

cav-

to him.

Edgehill, on October 23, 1642, the royalists had twelve

thousand men, the parliament fifteen thousand.

Volcanic

Rupert, on the royal right, charged and routed Essex's

and then characteristically turned

to j^lunder in

left,

Kineton.

The

NOBLESSE OBLIGE.

423

royal left had equal success, and the battle seemed

lost,

when

came up

there

thirteen troops of the cavalry of the par-

among them

liament,

Cromwell's.

less

they at once turned the

was mowed down

it

;

Of

army bore

Rupert only returned

from capture and

to cover the

Edgehill jjroved that Rupert was gal-

army

;

that the royal foot was wretched

But

of the parliament lacked cohesion.

showed in England what

man may

that a

help-

the four (some say six) thousand loss the royal

the most.

lant but misteady

that the

The infantry was

tide.

like grass.

in season to save the king retreat.

ideas in

Riding in on the victorious royal

their heads than plunder. foot,

They had other

Gusta\T.is

had shown

in

;

and

it

also

Germany,

carry the Bible into camj), and yet use his

sabre-arm like the best of the

fire-eaters,

— as

no

fire-eater

ever can.

He knew

Cromwell recognized what noblesse oblige meant. that the parliamentary

army was made up

(as he said) of

" old decayed serving-men, and tapsters and such kind of

lows

" he

;

saw that " the

spirits of

fel-

such base, mean fellows

"

could not encounter "gentlemen's sons, younger sons and persons of quality that

;

" he

bued with a motive

God

fear of

they did."

We is

an

;

made some

conscience of what

" from that day forward, they were never

invention.

compliment

He himself would

all this to

not have done

Cromso.

It

to Oliver Cromwell's intelligence to say

that with the Thirty Years' fessedly

sjsirit

gentlemen will go," men im-

English peoples are wont to ascribe

own ill

a

and he " raised such men as had the

before them, and

And

spirit, of

Their noblesse was the fear of God.

beaten."

well's

must have " men of a

likely to go as far as

is

War

drawing to a

close,

with con-

numerous Englishmen and Scotchmen under

his stan-

dard who had served with the Swedes, he should not have

known what Gustavus Adolphus had begun

to

do twenty,

COUNTRYMEN BEAT CAVALIERS.

424

ten, years before

had completed

;

how he had transformed soldiers, who

his poor Swedish peasant louts into invincible

could beat the emperor's chivalry with no other talisman than

Cromwell, says Baxter, " had especial care to get

the Bible. religious

men

into

troop

his

;

these

men were

of greater

understanding than common, soldiers, and made not money

but that which they took for the public

felicity to

be their

end."

The

minutiae of drill Cromwell early learned from Captain

(or Colonel)

John Dalbier, a Dutch service

who had seen

veteran,

on the continent

own

he made his discipline,

ducted " the

and

were

of

well

con-

men

that

where

countries

came leaped It

so his

but

;

rules

they

for joy of them."

was he who, following Gus-

tavus, created in

England the

nucleus of what was really a

body

In May, 1643, he won his

Cromwell.

first

Grantham

;

of regular troops.

independent

fight

near

and though twice outnumbered, his horse rode

through the enemy without a check.

It

was a notable lesson

to see plain

countrymen ride down cavaliers who were two

one of them

;

it

pike or the English long-bow. the

In July Cromwell again met

enemy near Gainsborough, where,

with the pistol

to

rings in one's ears like the story of the Swiss

in

hand

to

hand work

and naked blade, he drove them

sharply pursued them of royal infantry,

;

off

and

but unable to meet the larger body

he cleverly covered the

Atten-

In August Cromwell became

tion

was attracted

ond

to the earl of Manchester,

to him.

retreat.

who commanded

sec-

ten thousand

CROMWELL'S DISCIPLINE. foot

;

and

in

—

October

combat

in a

horsed and narrowly escaped with his

had begun, and

won a

"

As

life

but he pays his twelvej)ence :

if

His career of victory His men had

for Colonel Cromwell, he hath

thousand brave men, well disciplined

the stocks or worse

— he again defeated

was unceasing.

his activity

reputation.

which he was un-

in

a large force of cavalry at Winceby.

425

one

;

;

man

and no

he be drunk he

if

calls the other

two

swears set

is

Roundhead, he

in is

cashiered."

In 1644 the parliamentary forces began to gain ground, especially as the

Scotch sustained

them with twenty

men

thousand

and near York, Moor,

at Marston

°"^''"'

on

July

2,

over

of

""?

.?

= q, cp a

9,.q. cp cp cp

RUPElRr „,„5,

p 5 o 5,

5,

5g

twenty-

thousand

men met alist

I?

army

combined

five

O^

the

a roy-

force

somewhat

of less

Marston Moor.

strength.

The Roundheads were

from York, with Rupert on

retiring

their trail.

They drew up

slight slope

behind the White Syke Ditch, between Long

Marston and Tockwith.

meet the

to

fiery royalist

Rupert marshaled his army facing

them, on the moor, with Wilstrup wood in his rear.

some hours

to put the

men

in line.

army Cromwell commanded the Leslie in reserve. this field

on a

He had some

left

It took

In the parliamentary wing, of horse, with

four thousand

men

;

and on

he was to earn the sobriquet of Ironsides for him-

WHAT A CHARGE

426

The

and his God-fearing yeomen.

self

WAS. Scotch, nine thousand

strong, in two long lines, held the centre, under Lord Fair-

The cavalry

fax.

The

Fairfax.

Facing tle

The

left,

was equally of

right

foot,

and there were good was seven

The

horse.

foot,

centre.

under Newcas-

commanded

of horse, he

The It

was led by Sir Thomas

right

was on either flank of the

Rupert drew up the

this array,

and King.

the

of

artillery

artillery

in person.

was near the

reserves.

an attack was made.

in the evening before

But an

Battle was thought to be deferred to the morrow.

attack was precipitated by the parliamentary foot, a part of

which pushed through the

The

the royal artillery.

ditch,

and got roughly handled by

right under Fairfax followed on,

but the bad ground somewhat unsettled the

way by

half

the hot charge of Bupert,

line,

and, met

was broken, and

it

When

Rupert could turn inward on the infantry centre. Cromwell, on the

left,

saw

the difficulty

in passing the ditch, he obliqued his

which the centre had

wing

to the left, so as

to clear this treacherous obstacle, and, outflanking the royal

right wing, went thundering slightly

wounded

down upon

the moor.

Though

in the neck, he paused not in his advance.

Striking terror into the royalist ranks as he rode on, "

made them

as stubble to our swords," he said.

was utterly routed, and the centre of foot began

right

that initial success castle's

was not a presage

White Coats

of victory.

call

was an advance, with an occasional pause

but

mad

had a concentrated energy

it

to feel

Only New-

arrested his advance.

Cromwell's charge was not what we it

God

Rupert's

in

it

a charge to-day to fire

and load

which even Rupert's

gallop could not equal.

The

right of each

army had been

of each was in perilous case.

perch

?

destroyed.

The

centre

On whose banners would victory

THE

NEW

MODEL.

427

Rupert's success had unsettled his squadrons

Cromwell's

;

Returning from pursuit, the royalist

were in perfect order.

foimd the commoner drawn up on the moor, astride his own of battle, ready to test one

late line

Fairfax had collected part of his

wood

strup

Rupert and

;

Four thousand men

Moor won

while

to flight.

bit the dust

on

this field.

INIarston

the north of England for the parliament.

Cromwell was becoming the leading

The

;

the edge of Wil-

There was no resisting the Iron-

men took

his

men on

Before he could re-form,

to prolong his line.

Cromwell was upon him. sides

more struggle

losses in the south of

England.

soldier of

successes in the north were offset

by corresponding

England, and there was need of the

Self-Denying Ordinance, under which members of parliament

who cumbered

the

army must

resign their

The

commands.

passage of this measure, which was Cromwell's work, removed

much

useless material

New Model

from the army, and made room for the

reorganization, which

armies of about ten thousand ter of

was equally

men

his.

The

three

each were, during the win-

1644-45, consolidated into a regular body of twenty-two

thousand men, and placed under Sir Thomas Fairfax

Cromwell was the moving

spirit.

His cavalry body,

;

like

but

our

volunteers in 1864 and 1865, had long been a regular corps,

and this

now gave the new army was

it

The

leaven to the whole lump. also the nucleus of the

fact that

Commonwealth

towards wliich England was tending has here no especial interest

for

us

;

as

an army

The New Model was voted to

it

was a notable

foot, six

hundred horse, and one thousand dragoons

body underwent a thorough was apparent as soon as

it

There were

in February, 1645.

be fourteen thousand four himdred

drill

and

;

institution.

thousand six

and the whole

discipline.

The

effect

met the enemy.

In June, 1645, Fairfax lay near Naseby awaiting Crom-

"GOD OUR STRENGTH!"

428

whom

well,

had

lie

whom

and for

cavalry,

specially desired to

come and command the

the Self-Denying Ordinance had been

His arrival was the sign for

suspended.

On June

battle.

dawn, Fairfax drew up opposite the king with fourteen thousand men the foot in the centre, the cavalry 14, at early

;

under Cromwell, who chose to place Ireton with

ments and the dragoons on the right with

regiments,

six

left,

— some

thirty-six

The ,i^''\„-^',v

five regi-

while he retained the

hundred men.

royal

army was

considerably less

in

nimibers, and on

its

right

stood

Rupert,

,oO

.0°'

opposite

aO^'

and

kZ

tion

X

The composiof

both

''''

/V

at

Marston

Moor

the royal

army were

""V •SToct^

forces

was better than

V"\

on

in the centre the

king.

ia«i.>'V

;

Langdale

left

its

^000-^:^0000^-..

Ireton

;

in

said to be fifteen hun-

dred

Naseby.

officers

who had

seen service, and the

parliamentary army was well drilled and disciplined. royalists

had an admirable position on Dust Hill

heads one near Naseby.

;

the

The

Round-

Lantford Hedge had been lined

with parliamentary dragoons.

The

royalists

would have been wise not soon.

On

They

opened the action by an advance.

his side

to leave their vantage-gromid so

Cromwell, with "

God

our strength

as

a watch-cry, met this onset by a counter charge with his entire wing.

The

several columns of horse rode at the

enemy

with perfect confidence in their cause and in their chief, and

k

DISCRETION OR DASH?

429

" not one body of the enemy's horse which they charged but

There was no question of the victory here.

they routed."

Not

so

on the

Rupert had ridden up Mill Hill at the

left.

head of the royal squadrons, had charged home, and Ireton,

The charge

stanch as he was, could not stand the impact.

here was, as at Marston, probably at a incline,

and Ireton advanced

Rupert no doubt equally halted

had successively

;

and only

to fire.

— they were rare on

pursued

royalists

routed wing ahnost to

this

Naseby, and began to make for the parliamentary the centre Fairfax's foot was at

by Charles' rapid charge

made good countenance

;

but they

and once more

rallied,

to the foe.

At

Cromwell, having dispersed the royal

the same

moment

wing of horse,

left

in flank

it

This gallant

field.

White Fairfax's own

tertia^ like

Coats at Marston Moor, held themselves until

the

regiment of foot went at them with clubbed muskets with Cromwell's sabres they were

had behaved with conspicuous

hewn

in pieces.

his

men

In hand, as

needs discretion as

much

Rupert had as

dash

;

;

fruit.

then

Charles

but Cromwell

not.

A

cavalry

and certainly

harder to teach troopers to obey the " Recall " than follow the " Charge."

;

gallantry.

Rupert and Ci-omwell had done equal work

officer

and

one tertia standing, drove the rest

rear, and, leaving but

headlong from the

In

train.

driven in on the reserves

first

wheeled inward on the royal centre, taking

had held

rank

Real charges

Twice wounded, Ireton was captured, and

the continent. elated

was up an

after each

was the charge resumed.

fired

were not known in England at that day,

the

It

trot.

meet him, halting

to

it

it is

is

to

This virtue in Cromwell now bore

Rupert's men, returning from the pursuit of Ireton,

had they been

met them

in

hand, and had Cromwell, in excess of ardor,

in cavalry

retrieving the day.

combat alone, were quite capable of

But Rupert was

fiery

;

Cromwell was

PRESTON PANS.

430

Like GustaATus he knew when

wary and

fiery both.

prudent.

Instead of trusting to his Ironsides alone, he

to

Fairfax drew up the foot, the guns and the horse in an proachable

new

line,

in their front, they sion,

chased nearly

The There

and irre-

and when Charles and Rupert, who

hoped for a chance of mending the day, saw the

be

still

solid array

gave up the contest and retired in confuall

way

the

to Leicester.

royal loss was heavy, but the killed were never known. wei'e five

thousand prisoners,

and baggage, and best which sealed

the guns, standards

all

of all the king's private papers,

His army was annihilated

his political fate.

he never collected another.

The it

Naseby

likeness of

to

Marston Moor

was Cromwell who won both

marked

is

and

;

battles.

For a year following Naseby, Cromwell and Fairfax were engaged in crushing the In

all

royalists in the south of

there were some sixty small

England.

combats and

sieges,

storms, ending with the capture by assault of Bristol, Sep-

tember 10 and 11, where Rupert was extinguished

;

and of

Basing House, October 14. In August, 1647, the army asserted the parliament.

its

right to dictate to

In April, 1648, the second

out, coupled with the invasion of the Scotch.

subdued the rising

in

civil

war broke

Cromwell

first

Wales, and then turned to Scotland.

In August he fought the battle of Preston Pans, in Yorkshire, the first in

which he was in chief command.

The

enemy, twenty-four thousand strong, was marching south in a long, straggling column, without any pretense to tactical skill,

and without scouting the country.

them with

his nine

to 20th)

them down

when they woidd

fell

on

thousand men, broke their column in two,

and for three days (17th miles, cutting

Cromwell

stand.

right It

pursued them some thirty

and

left

was not a

and fighting them battle,

but rather a

WAS IT MASSACRE running pursuit

the loss of the Scotch and northern-country

;

men was enormous ended the second

431

Cromwell's was

;

civil

This stroke

trivial.

war.

Ireland had embraced the cause of Charles

To

had proclaimed him king. had

subdued

to be conquered, Ireland

lot fell Ireland.

He

II.-;

Scotland

preserve the union, Scotland ;

and

Cromwell's

to

landed in Dublin in May, 1649, with

nine thousand men, which he shortly increased to fifteen

thousand.

With

thousand

ten

men

Drogheda, just north of Dublin.

he

advanced on

first

The enemy had a

garrison

On

Septem-

three thousand strong in this well- walled town.

ber 3 Cromwell reached the place, but not until the 10th did

This was slow work, but when begun,

the batteries open.

A

the rest was sharply done.

On

was refused. assaidt in

was driven back

;

less

history of the Thirty Years'

War

" I forbade

not a gentle

From

art.

act.

The

it

similar siege

and

in the

them

suffice for that era, if

any that were

to spare

arms in the town," explains Cromwell's

ing out of Papists,"

;

a soldier finds an answer

charge of barbarity which will

not for our days.

first

than one hundred

In a military sense the work was good

to the

The

Cromwell headed the second, pushed

and annihilated the garrison, losing

men.

in

formal demand of surrender

the 12th the place was stormed.

rule,

and war

is

a religious standpoint, as the "rootis

not our province to examine the

and destruction

of

Wexford (south

of

Dublin) followed, with the cutting down of two thousand men

and a

loss of

twenty Cromwellians.

No

doubt

combatants, presumably some women, perished

an unfortunate incident of the capture.

Cromwell overran the land. storming the town

These lessons

;

;

many

non-

but this was

During the winter

At Clonmel he

lost heavily in

elsewhere his losses were curiously small.

sufficed.

Though

lasted three years moi-e, there

was

the revolution little

of

it.

in

Ireland

NARROW PURITANISM.

432

No

doubt both these so-called massacres are in a sense

as inexcusable as that of Magxleburg, where forty thousand souls were cut off in one

same

The

treaciiery.

seasonably offered,

way

day

rule

;

but there was in neither the

was plain

The

Cromwell speaks

" Refusing conditions

were put to the sword."

all

of the era, to free the world

done so much.

:

fact that

for the

less

It

was the

from which Gustavus had

priests

were not spared by

Briton than the leniency of

Gustavus does for the Swede. It

was after

campaign that so many,

this

it

is

said forty

f.^^

....c.t>5^-Dunbar.

thousand, Irishmen passed as professional soldiers to the continent.

As

a mere soldier Cromwell had done well in Ireland, and

with no great means

;

as

man and

soldier,

he would have

done better to heed the lessons of Gustavus.

His conduct

was the very essence of narrow Puritanism.

But he had

intentionally cut

down none but men

Fairfax resigned

made

;

captain-general

Cromwell ;

and

in

retired to England,

and was

Jidy he crossed the Scotch

border with sixteen thousand men. of the Scotch army,

in arms.

Leslie was in

command

some twenty-two thousand strong, and

A SHARP HOUR'S WORK. sought to

tire

433

out Cromwell by a Fabian policy.

This

all

but succeeded, and, worn by wet and hunger, the English

army on a

Dunbar,

retired to

to

be near the

The

fleet.

city

was

and a haK wide, and the only

sort of peninsula, a mile

As

they

approached Dunbar, Leslie followed and held the road.

He

road to

ran over

it

hills

had trapped Cromwell

;

otherwise

inaccessible.

and drawing up along the Lammer-

hills, he cut him off from the only road to England. Cromwell's " poor, scattered, hungry, discouraged army " of

muir

thousand

eleven

number

men was

sad

in

case,

with twice

their

Had

Leslie

of well-provisioned Scots in their front.

kept to his Fabian strategy,

it

might have gone hard with

But fearing that the English might embark and

Cromwell.

escape him, he pushed out his right wing to the coast, hoping to surround

and cut them

Leslie's left lay its front,

on the

to pieces in the operation. hills,

with an impassable ravine in

but the brook which ran through the ravine to the

sea broadened out lower down so as to be easily fordable.

Cromwell was not slow bilities

;

he made

to see the lapse,

and

his plans accordingly.

1650, before daylight, he got his

to grasp its possi-

On

men under

guns in a position to keep up a heavy

September

fire on,

and thus

vent Leslie's left from deploying, and marshaled his to attack his right in force.

By

line

and crossing the ravine

covered the disgarnishing of his

Cromwell initial

fell

lustily

upon

pre-

army

6 A. M. Cromwell advanced the Scotch left from

the artillery fire sufficed to prevent

forming

3,

arms, put his

in their front,

own

Leslie's

right;

and thus

and meanwhile

right wing.

Bar an

check which was quickly repaired, the onset met with

entire success.

Cromwell sent a column around by the sea

take the Scotch line in flank, and within an hour the

was fully routed. the left finally

The

came

right flank

to its support,

to

enemy

was crushed, and when it

was but

to

be ridden

DISPARITY OF LOSSES.

434

down by

its

own

demoralization.

The all

victory

flying squadrons,

and

partake of their

to

The whole Scotch army

fled

dismay.

in

was completed while singing " O praise the Lord,

ye nations."

There were three thousand Scotch

slain,

only two officers and twenty

men had

ten thousand

Of

taken, with all the baggage and material.

the English It

had been

discipline

which had

fallen.

won over numbers, and undoubted cour-

The

age.

battle

one to

leads

look

the

overin

faults

preceding

strategy

Edinburgh and

it.

Glasgow

surren-

dered.

Next

year, after

some operations

made

II.

dash Worcester.

Charles found

him.

little

for

in

Charles

Scotland,

a

bold

England.

Nothing

abashed,

Cromwell

followed

of the support he anticipated,

and

reached Worcester with not over fifteen thousand men, while at the

end of August Cromwell arrived with

Charles took up a position in the angle as

it

runs into the Severn.

thirty thousand.

made by

Just above, on the

the

left

Teme

bank

of

the Severn, lay Worcester, well fortified, with the Eoyal Fort

on the southeast corner, and a bridge across the river Charles also held in force the bridge over the

road leadino' to the Malvern Hills.

;

Teme and

The Severn

and the

bridsre lower

ABLE TACTICS.

His Worcester bridge ena-

down, at Upton, he destroyed. bled

him

to cross quickly to

435

and

fro,

and here he prepared

to

play his last card, expecting that Cromwell would assault

from the north.

With

of troops

his excess

safely divide

He

having in this a manifest advantage.

his forces,

in the town, set

up

his batteries

river,

and cannonaded

lucky

daj^,

lines in

Cromwell coidd

it

on the

hill

closed

on the east of the

for nearly a week, waiting for his

the 3d of September, but meanwhile drawing his

He had

more and more.

down

the

bridge,

and

sent Fleetwood

Severn to cross and hold the enemy to the Teme.

On

the day set Fleetwood attacked the

under cover of

this

across the Severn

Teme

attack two bridges were thrown, one

and one across the Teme,

close together,

thus taking Charles' triangle in reverse, and obliging him to

withdraw into Worcester, which he did in the afternoon.

From and

here he broke out on Cromwell's force on the left bank,

for a

Cromwell ter

;

moment gained

success

to reinforce this

wing

and the

royalists

;

but the bridges enabled

in season to prevent disas-

were forced within walls, after a hearty

The Royal Fort was taken by

struggle.

storm, and by eight

The

in the evening the city gates were captured.

mere massacre

rest

was

three thousand Scotch were killed, ten thou-

Cromwell

sand taken.

The

;

lost

tactics of this battle

two hundred men.

was admirable.

was a

It

fit

clos-

ing to Cromwell's military career, which had lasted from his forty-third to his fifty-second year.

Judged by if

success,

Cromwell was a greater

gauged by the rules

strategist ble.

;

in

tactics,

of

the art.

He was

soldier than

not a skillful

within a certain limit, he was admira-

Following immediately in the steps of the great conti-

nental captain, he organized and

army, which none of the

disciplined

a wonderful

less well-drilled royalists

could ever

CROMWELL NOT A GREAT CAPTAIN.

436

The

resist.

forces

opposed never stood his blows long

lie

and judged by opposition, he does not stand high. losses in

storming strong places, except at Clonmel, were

At

always small, testifying to poor defense.

he lost

men

fifty

;

at

Dunbar twenty-two

While mere

hundred.

general, they

had

His

must

still

losses

;

at

Preston Pans

Worcester two

do not necessarily measure the

be considered in the light of what he

to oppose him.

That Cromwell was one undeniable

;

that for

England he wrought

of its rulers ever did

highest standard, he certain.

He

of the great

is

but a truism

may be

;

men

of history is

as almost no other that, tried

called a great general

by the

ington, for instance) have been, eminent in arms

;

but that

he deserves to rank with the great captains no capable familiar with their history has ever pretended

rank with the second

Eugene and

less

is

was what some other truly great men (Wash-

— with — can

class

their fellows

;

critic

that he

may

Turenne, Marlborough,

scarcely be allowed.

That

he did such splendid work for England came from his exceptional

equipment of character and

He was

intelligence.

a worthy follower and, like

all

an imitator of Gustavus Adolphus.

Pistol

8 word.

(16th Century

the rest of Europe,

XXXIV. TURENNE. Three ries

:

TO AUGUST,

sets of great soldiers exist in the seventeenth

those grouped about Gustavus, about

Eugene and Marlborough. and by narrating the

1634

first set,

and-

It

now come

Swedish generals

whom

and eighteenth centu-

Cond^ and Turenne, and about

was they who created the modern

we

their deeds

1644.

are writing

to the second.

art of war,

have dealt with

After the death of Gustavus, the

— Bernard,

he had trained

We

its history.

Ban^r, Torstenson

connection with France conducted brilliant campaigns over

aU Germany

— in

;

lacking the solid method of their great chief, their work had no result.

but,

In

1646 the last of these generals, Wrangel, operated successfully with Turenne.

Born

in 1611,

Turenne

first

saw

service in Holland with his uncle, the prince

of Orange, proved himself gallant

and

intelligent,

and rapidly rose

under successive commanders on the Khine and

fession,

in his pro-

His

in Italy.

first

independent campaign as field-marshal, in 1G44, opened with a successful raid across the

Rhine and towards the upper Danube

;

this

was followed by a march

on Freiburg, which was blockaded by the Bavarian Mercy.

tempted to relieve

it,

Turenne

but his army, which had been given over to him

worst order, proved weak, and his operation failed.

Cond^ was sent

at-

in the

to his aid.

In the military era to which Gustavus Aclolphus by right of eminence

and

priority gives the

ods into which our subject-matter

The

first

title,

there are three peri-

may conveniently be

includes those generals

divided.

who were grouped about

Gustavus, and the events in which they enacted their brilliant

The second

parts.

stage

includes those generals

when Turenne conducted

his

who were on

the

campaigns in the Thirty

War, the War with Spain, and the Wars in the Netherlands. The third period includes the generals who acted with or against Prince Eugene and Marlborough in the War of

Years'

the Spanish Succession.

By narrating the military life

of Gus-

SWEDISH-FRENCH PHASE.

438 tavus,

we have already covered the

make

clear the second

narrate

all

the

We can best

period.

first

and third periods not by an attempt

war history of

their times, but

to

by keeping more

or less closely to the masterly campaigns of Turenne, Prince

Eugene and Marlborough themselves to the skillful work of Conde, Vendome, Villars and Montecuculi; to the campaigns of Luxemburg and Catiuat for it was the novel and ;

;

useful elements in what they did which so distinctly enriched

way for that greater we depart from the History of the Art of War,

the art of war, and which prepared the teacher, Frederick, king of Prussia.

course thus prescribed by this it

of

will

If

be but to notice such a splendid event as the defense

Vienna by John Sobieski, or such an

erratic genius as

Charles XII.

In this design, space limits us to the narration of a portion Part must be

only of the campaigns of these able captains.

omitted to

still

;

another part can be sketched with but few strokes

other parts more time will be allotted

ground thus covered we

;

and from the

shall conceive a fairly

good idea of

what was done by them towards developing the art

of which

they were past masters.

From 1635 Years'

War

to the

was

French phase.

in

Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the Thirty

what

is

called the French, or the Swedish-

Because of Gustavus' death, or of the defec-

tion of Saxony,

Brandenburg and other

late Protestant allies,

the Swedes were none the less intent on carrying out the

purpose bequeathed to them by their great monarch, though indeed Sweden was compelled to fight her " bastion " on the Baltic.

if

she would preserve

France would make no peace

on terms acceptable to the empire, and so the war went on.

The north German

potentates were to an extent eliminated

from the problem, and the theatre of war was somewhat changed even

as the ideal of the

war was modified, but Riche-

BANER AND TORSTENSON. lieu

and Oxenstiern never wavered.

439 Nord-

Bj' the battle of

lingen Bernard had forfeited his duchy of Franconia, and he

was glad

to serve

under the

carving for himself a

France, with the hope of

segis of

new duchy out

in 1639 the French retained

his

On

of Alsatia.

his death

army.

After the battle of Nordlingen, the operations of the Protestant allies

had been mainly

in

The Swedes

two bodies.

under Baner, based on Gustavus' bastion, had manoeuvred

toward Saxony and Bohemia, while the army of Bernard, properly a part of the Swedish forces, but entertained by

France, had operated on the Rhine, in Alsatia and Swabia,

sometimes in connection with the French armies, sometimes alone.

In 1638 Bernard crossed the Rhine above Basle, captured

many towns

in Swabia, besieged Breisach

imperial armies of

and beat

off several

His other campaigns were rather

relief.

weak.

The

operations of Baner from 1636 to 1641 showed great

energy fine

;

but his boldness was misplaced, and despite

forays into

Saxony and Bohemia, and even

many

as far as

Ratisbon, he was invariably forced back to Pomerania by the larger imperial armies

won some

and

their allies.

No

victories,

and he

him a

splendid ones, as at Wittstock, secui'ed

foot-

hold beyond the bastion, which Wrangel meanwhile defended.

In 1641 Baner died and Torstenson assumed command.

Extending over the entire territory from Denmark

to Vi-

enna, the latter's manoeuvres were in a high degree bold and brilliant

won a

;

but they were quite without

victory at Leipsic

;

again in 1644 at Juterbok, and in

1645 at Jankowitz, over the imperial

much which

is

In 1642 he

result.

trooj)s;

admirable characterized his work

markedly aided the operations of the French, cannot be jirouounced successful.

but though ;

his

though he

campaigns

Like that of the others,

CONTRASTED WITH GUSTAVUS.

440 liis

work lacked the

As

a lieutenant, especially as an

yond

solidity

shown by

king and teacher.

his

artillerist,

he had been be-

criticism.

This want of permanent success by the generals he had

brought up, and who had no superiors at the time, emphasizes the value of Gustavus'

own

careful method.

covered the same ground which he had as far

they

;

opponents

heim

;

won

His lieutenants

won

;

they marched

victories apparently as splendid

less able

they had

;

than Tilly, or Wallenstein, or Pappen-

and yet the result of

all

they did was naught, or at

best they merely kept the ball in

play until exhaustion put an end

drawn out match

to the long

of

nations.

In

1646

Field

-

Marshal

Wrangel, the

last of

lieutenants,

commanded

Gustavus' the

Swedish army, and worked in connection with Turenne. spired

In-

by the great Frenchman,

their joint

campaigns were quite

out of the ordinary.

Turenne.

Henri de

la

Tour d'Auvergne,

Viscount of Turenne, was born in 1611 in Sedan, son of the

Duke

of Bouillon

and Elizabeth, daughter of William of

He was

a sickly youth, and up to his twelfth year

Orange.

gave no promise of

ability.

But

his father,

who

superin-

tended his education, roused the lad's latent ambition, and he finally excelled in his studies. estant.

He was

educated a Prot-

Like Gustavus Adolphus, he was fond of reading

the heroic deeds of Alexander the Great in Quintus Curtius,

and from these romantic pages he imbibed

his early love

of war, then as always the noblest of professions, but then

I

TURENNE'S EARLY TRAINING. more highly considered,

as

it

was more

441

essential,

than

it

is

to-day.

When

twelve years old, his father died, his elder brother

inherited the

and Henri was sent

title,

But soon

Maurice of Orange.

this

much

guardian also died

own

that Henri was thrown on his

to his uncle. Prince

service as a private in 1625, he rose within a year

by distinguished conduct

to a captaincy, and, especially

Herzogenbusch of Prince

in 1629,

at

earned the respect and approbation

Maurice, who then said of him that he would

become a great French

and

Entering the

to develop his extraordinary character.

Dutch

;

contributed

resources

When

leader.

service as colonel,

at the siege of

La

for bravery that he

and

in

nineteen,

he entered the

command

of his regiment,

Motte, in 1634, he so approved himself

was promoted on the spot

marechal

to be

The next year he served imder Cardinal La Valwho went to the aid of the Swedes and, in connection with Duke Bernard, relieved Mainz. On the retreat of the army Turenne was noted for his untiring activity and his de camp.

lette,

intelligence in procuring rations.

In 1636

special request for Turenne's services,

La

and

Vallette

made

at the siege of

Zabern, while Bernard, after two failures, captured the upper town, Turenne stormed and took the lower town and citadel,

doing wonders of courage and receiving a serious wound.

Towards the end Franche Comte

of the

campaign he forced Gallas from

in a rapid, dashing style, defeating his vet-

eran opponent near Jussey, following him up and taking

many siege

prisoners.

When

later Gallas

endeavored to raise the

which Bernard was conducting against

intercepted and drove

him back

Joinville,

Turenne

across the Rhine.

In 1637 Turenne took part in

La

Vallette's

campaign in

Pieardy, and during the rainy season at Landrecies,

when the

trenches were constantly full of water, was again promiJfcut;

AN UNPARALLELED

442

working incessantly himself and en-

in rationing the troojDS,

This solicitude for the welfare

during privation cheerfully.

men was

his

of

through

a trait which distinguished Turenne

Demanding much

life.

good

all his efforts to their

— sometimes

health,

for a

;

all

of the soldiers, he devoted

he was singularly careful of their

own

to his

moment thought

At

SIEGE.

strategic loss

and he never

;

His men were devoted to him.

of self.

the age of twenty-six, for the capture of the castle of

Solre in the Hennegau, and the heroic defense of the fortified

camp

Maubeuge, Turenne was given

at

and as such

general,

in

During the eight months

at the siege of Breisach. siege,

of this

he fought in three combats and three general engage-

ments

;

and a long attack

his energy. fort

his step as lieutenant-

1638 led reinforcements to Bernard

of intermittent fever did not abate

Finally, he stormed

which was a key-point

and captured an isolated

of the investment,

and the

fortress

of Breisach surrendered.

Sent to Lombardy in the spring of 1639, to serve in the

army

Count Harcourt, Turenne covered

of

Chieri,

and fought successfully

La

at

the

of

siege

Next year he

Route.

pursued the enemy, after the siege of Casale, and captured

many

trophies

and

Hereupon he induced Har-

all his train.

court to invest Turin, where Prince

command,

while the citadel

Singularly, General Lleganes

Thus the French

Harcourt.

by the prince Lleganes,

driven court

—a

off

;

of Savoy, he

Thomas

in

now came up and blockaded

force in the citadel

was besieged

by Harcourt, and the

quite unparalleled

situation.

latter

by

Lleganes was

Turenne, though again wounded, victualed Har-

by bringing a large convoy

safely

shortly thereupon Turin surrendered. to Paris,

Savoy was

of

was held by a French garrison.

and during

his absence,

from Pignerol

;

and

Harcourt was called

Turenne captured Moncalvo

and besieged Ivrea, which surrendered

to

Harcourt on his

WHAT TURENNE HAD LEARNED. Prince Thomas

return.

Turenne was appointed

army

in Italy

;

now to the

443

entered the French service

command, under him,

and recognizing the remarkable

of the

qualities of

him with the main To induce the Spaniards to evacuate Piedmont, Turenne made apparent arrangements to transfer ojaerations

the young general, the prince intrusted direction.

to the

duchy of Milan, and

laid siege to Alexandria,

which

he blockaded, so disposing his troops as purposely to leave a gap in his lines.

Through

gap the Spanish general,

this

at

the head of almost the entire garrison of the fortress of Trino,

essayed to relieve Alexandria.

Allowing

this to take place,

Turenne sharply turned on Trino and captured skillful feat of

for

which

arms he was made field-marshal, and

here,

after seventeen years' active apprenticeship, vices

it,

ended

his ser-

under other generals.

Turenne had learned leader,

his trade,

and understood how

was well equipped for a

to distinguish the true

false in military situations.

he owed certain qualities to those under

From

the prince of

and especially how

plans, to maturely consider them, so long as

and then

was possible to carry them

it

whom he

Orange he had learned how

positions, the besieger's art,

from the

In his memoirs he has said that served.

to choose

to

draw up

to alter nothing

out.

From Bernard

he had learned not to be blinded by success nor cast down

by

failure

errors,

;

neither to blame himself nor to forgive his

but to correct these and strive to change

From La

Vallette he

ill

own

fortune.

had learned the importance of keeping

in touch with his soldiers in the field.

From Harcourt he

had learned that matui-e consideration of the problem,

fol-

lowed by unceasing activity and rapid decision, were the surest elements of success in war.

We know more we do

of the detail of Turenne's

of those of Gustavus,

campaigns than

— indeed, we have

the memoirs

TURENNE'S VALUE.

444

of the Frencli marshal,

of the king

we

are dealing with

which the whole

and welfare

ress

— and there

is

civilized

a

immense

difference in

—

issues,

world depended for

on

issues

future prog-

its

Turenne we deal with

in narrating that of

;

marked

In narrating the work

in which they wrought.

the manner

the operations of bodies which occupied a position of less

prominence on the theatre of war, and form a tunity of working on so broad a

few

rivals

;

of his lesser operations deserve the

War

wont to depend as much on smaller

work well done is it

is

as on the labors of the giants

allotted to

expend

their efforts

Like Stonewall Jackson or Sheridan

fields.

soldier with

and many

closest study.

generals

of the oppor-

was yet a

field,

important

less

But Turenne, though deprived

page in history.

war, Turenne, in his early campaigns, of large-sized armies

;

and

;

to

few

on the broadest in our

was not in

own civil command

nor indeed was he often allowed that

complete independence of action which breeds the highest results

;

but whether in

command

No

liant.

command

an army corps or

of

an army, he was always

of

solid, original

better pattern exists in military annals

;

and

in

bril-

no captain

has done more uniformly excellent work. If we were to select

we

the material

which to study the grand, turn. first

It

it

possess of all

is

must

any one

soldier's

campaigns from

the operations of war, from the minor to

perhaps to those of Turenne we might best

be, moreover, borne in

mind that he was the

great soldier to succeed Gustavus, and that as such he

was called on

to create

much

of

what he

did.

Turenne

is

one of the most sagacious, profound of our teachers.

As an independent commander, Turenne began his campaigns towards the close of the Thirty Years' War, 1644 to 1648.

him

His

first

army, as field-marshal, was given over to

in the worst possible condition.

It

was the army of the

upper Rhine, which had been beaten at Tuttlingen, had

lost

PROPORTION OF CAVALRY. the bulk o£

its

together with

all its artillery

officers,

or

six

445

seven thousand prisoners,

and baggage

;

and had made

its

way, with difficulty and in utter disorder, back to Alsatia.

This force, as a mark of confidence, was intrusted by Cardinal Mazarin to Turenne for the purpose of reorganization

but

it

won

Had

was a sad compliment to pay him.

a

name

for exceptional ability, he

he not already

would scarce have

been awarded so onerous a duty. In December, 1643, though not long back from the siege of Trino, less task,

and

had been devastated ters in the

Turenne undertook

invalided,

still

and joined the army

at

use his

own

;

in January, he

went into

his winter-quar-

mountains of Lorraine, and began his labor by

The French government was

salutary and sensible methods. illiberal in

his thank-

Colmar and because Alsatia

moneys, and Turenne was compelled to largely capital

and

credit,

which happily were excellent.

His cavalry became good, but though

his infantry could not

be put on an equal footing, in four months he was able take the

It will be noted, in all the wars of the period

we

are

to

field.

now

upon which

entering, that the cavalry was the principal arm,

ahnost always equal, often superior, in numbers to the infantry,

and

thus, in the line of

battle or in other operations,

occupying a space and a position unduly prominent.

It

was

a final flickering up again of the mediaeval idea of the supe-

mounted men, which Gustavus had proved be erroneous, and to which Frederick, with the wonder-

rior efficiency of

to

ful battalions drilled

by

his father, gave the death-blow at

MoUwitz.

The enemy had

lain

quietly

in

winter - quarters, doing

nothing except to besiege Ueberlingen, which

fell in

May.

Early in the same month Turenne assembled his army in Alsatia, and, crossing the

Rhine near Breisach with a part of

446

RAID ON BLACK FOREST.

The Rhine Country.

his trooiDS,

ing in the

marched toward the sources hills of

of the

Danube.

Hear-

the Black Forest of a body of two thou-

sand raiding Bavarian horse, he hunted

it uj)

;

and attacking

RESISTANCE OF SMALL GARRISONS. it

smartly, beat

and captured many

it

The

dred men.

rest retired

had captured Hohentwiel.

This the

of

and four hun-

on the Bavarian army, which

heightened the

spirits

officers

447

foray instructed and

little

French

army, which then

returned to Lorraine, and enabled Turenne to gauge

its

quality.

The enemy had number

enlisting a lingen,

rested

in

good winter-quarters, and by

French prisoners taken

of the

had materially increased

their strength.

of July Freiburg in the Breisgau

varian field-marshal, Mercy,

through the Black Forest. to eight

at Tutt-

In the month

was blockaded by the Ba-

who had marched on

the place

The garrison had been

increased

hundred men, which then was beyond the usual

Artillery at that time was not powerful,

works was greater,

them was

so.

— or

and the

size.

belief in

rather the disinclination to attack

In the siege of a place, the inhabitants were

apt to serve on the walls as well as the garrison

;

and many

defenses of towns in which even big breaches had been

were long and gallant in the extreme.

The smallness

made

of the

garrisons of important places, and the stanch resistance of

which they were capable, Freiburg section of

lies at

country

the foot of the mountains of that rugged

known

where they inclose the of a crescent.

strike us to-day with wonder.

as the

Black Forest, at a place

alluvial plain of the

Rhine in the form

This inclosed level has high and inaccessible

rocks on the right as you come from Breisach, and at that

day had a wooded swamp on the

left

;

it

was apf)roachable

from the Rhine by only a single road through a ran several miles between the

hills,

defile

which

and might be

easily

defended.

Turenne had a short

five

thousand foot and the same num-

ber of horse, with twenty guns. at

Breisach, and

He

again crossed the Rhine

moved on Freiburg, hoping

to

surprise

DISGRACEFUL RETREAT.

448

Mercy and

The enemy had

to raise the blockade.

large foraging party,

sent out a

and did not learn of the approach of

the French until the latter

came within

six miles of them,

when, recalling his foragers, Mercy prepared for action.

Turenne reconnoitred the enemy's occupy a

hill

near

j)osition,

and sought

Uf haufen which commanded

it

;

to

but the

infantry sent forward proved inefficient, and, owing to the

cowardice of two color-bearers, got panic-stricken and

back

in disorder

from the

hill,

which

at the

fell

moment was held

Freiburg.

by only a picket

The enemy

of twenty men.

at once rein-

forced the picket, but did not follow the French.

remained on the

combat having

fell

field

out to his advantage

failed, the

Turenne

some time, during which a cavalry ;

but his plan of a surprise

dominant force of the enemy induced him

to retire after these slight

engagements, and Freiburg surren-

dered to Mercy, being, however, allowed the honors of war. This failure was perhaps

less the fault of

Turenne than of

the miserable condition of his troops, especially the infantry.

NAPOLEON'S CRITICISM.

And

yet

tliis

same infantry,

stood decimation quailed. tion,

as

we

449

shall see, shortly after

under which even veterans might have

Napoleon casts a slur at Turenne for

which was, indeed, rather

pitiable,

this opera-

and suggests that he

should have taken up a strong position and gone into camp, so as to

annoy the enemy.

But Turenne probably saw

after

the panic that he could not count on his foot to serve

and preferred

well at this juncture,

to

harden

manoeuvres before encountering larger forces.

down

opposite an

ity.

The news

it

of the backset

by minor

Merely

enemy he could not attack was

him

to sit

of no util-

having reached Versailles, he

was, morever, ordered by the court to suspend operations until he could be reinforced

the Great Conde, of Rocroy,

by the duke of Enghien,

— who had leaped

and despite

his

into

—

later

fame by the victory

youth was deemed able to accom-

plish all things.

French Halberdiers, (15th Century.)

XXXV. CONDE AT ROCROY. MAY BoKN

Cond^ distinguished himself

in 1621,

siege of Arras,

command

and

19, 1643.

in his nineteenth year at the

his royal connections rapidly

advanced him.

by the Spaniards under Marshal Melos, and attacked the enemy difficulties.

With

meanwhile broken up the French

left,

pletely around the Spanish army,

The Spanish

Cond^ rode with

his cavalry

thus dispersed both cavalry wings of the Spaniards.

work

once

of a

young commander,

made Cond^

Louis

But

was dearly bought and

this

was a doubly famous

marked left,

and

right having

column com-

and took the successful enemy

resisted so stanchly that the victory

the

despite

he destroyed the Spanish

his right -wing of cavalry

turned in on the infantry centre under Fuentes.

He

In 1643, in

of the northern frontier of France, he advanced to Rocroy, besieged

in the rear.

the centre of foot

As

at grave risk.

victory

;

and

it

at

the national hero.

of Bourbon,

duke

of Enghien, and,

on

his father's

He

death, prince of Conde, was born September 8, 1621.

was

and

early,

all

through

life,

noted for diligent application to literature

as

and

man

a

broad

of

ability.

himself

in

and ranked

arts,

culture

fine

He

and

distinguished

war as early as

his

nineteenth year, at the siege of

Arras

;

and two years

later,

the campaign of Roussillon,

commendation for ery.

Cond^ at Rocroy.

skill

in

won

and brav-

His royal connections

yield-

ed him exceptional opportunities,

and

in

1643 he was given charge

of the defense of the northern frontier of France.

ADVANCE UNOPPOSED. The preceding camijaign here had been army had been destroyed

disastrous

at Honnecourt,

Low

Melos, governor-general of the the head of a splendid

army

duke

until 1646,

thousand were horse, I'Hopital side to

stood at

lie at his feet.

him, though he remained

was able

— and

and Gassion.

who

Countries,

to concentrate forces

twenty-three thousand men,

to

a French

of twenty-seven thousand men,

will continue to call

Enghien

of

amounting

;

and Field-Marshal

already imagined Picardy and ChamiDagne to

Conde, as we

451

—

which seven

of

had under him Marshals de

The former had been placed

which he was, however, unable

Melos had opened

full of forests,

to do.

woods and marshes,

Melos had occupied

all

where the

was unap-

it

the avenues,

and had

Conde

bodies of scouts patrolling the country on every side.

had a strong

enemy was

to-day

it is

side,

In a military sense

less extensive.

proachable.

—

— and was aj)proachable only through long and

narrow paths, except from the Champagne

woods were

The town lay

his trenches before Rocroy.

in a plain then covered with

mined

at his

check any possible excess of youthful ardor, a thing

He

instinct for battle.

the

way

felt that to

destroy the

to secure the safety of France

to relieve Rocroy,

;

even at the risk of fighting

he deter;

and

in

order to reach the three or four miles wide plain near the city,

where alone there was room

to manoeuvre, at the

head of

a body of cavalry, suitably sustained by foot, he forced his

way through

the woods early on

May

18, took j)OSsession of a

height at the outlet to cover his columns, and successfully

debouched into the open.

Melos did not oppose

his passage

because he himself desired battle, was not averse to winning

a Aactory when the enemy had no chance of retreat, and believed the French ally was.

He was

army

to

be much smaller than

well seconded

it

actu-

by Field-Marshal Fuentes,

a veteran of experience and proven courage.

IMITATION OF GUSTAVUS.

452

Concle had fully matured his plans the day before, had issued exact instructions, and the troops all filed into line in

He

the prescribed order.

himself

commanded

the right with

Gassion as his second; de I'Hopital commanded the

left;

d'Espenant was at the head of the foot (corps de hataille) in

Battle of Rocroy.

the centre

;

and there was a reserve under Marshal

Between each two squadrons was a body

manded musketeers," ful at Breitenfeld

— Gustavus' old

and

Liitzen.

of

fifty

Sirot.

" com-

disposition, so success-

Dragoons and

light cavalry

were on either flank, and the baggage had been sent to

Aubenton. Melos, who harbored no doubt that with his veteran army

SLOW MARSHALING.

453

he could beat the unseasoned French troops of his young and inexperienced opponent, drew up his army, but with the sensible belief that on the

who

lay a day's

march

to the rear, to

his six thousand men.

that on which of

day of battle you should have

man, he sent word to General Beck,

in line every available

Conde had marshaled

Albuquerque commanded the

right.

come up rapidly with

Melos' line occupied a height facing his army.

left,

The duke

and he himself the

Count Fuentes, whom many years of war had crippled

so that he could not ride, like Wallenstein at Liitzen, led

the famous Spanish infantry from a

To marshal an army affair of time

;

and

it

litter.

was, in the seventeenth century, an

was

six o'clock in the evening before

the rival generals were ready to join issue, though an

had been going on

lery duel

of the French,

who

all

lost three

artil-

day, rather to the disadvantage

hundred men

for the Spanish

;

Even though late, Conde was about to attack, and, accompanied by de I'Hopital, was busy with his final dispositions, when La Ferte, inspired by the foolish idea of making a brilliant coup and of throwing a force into batteries

were the

Rocroy,

left his post in the line at

cavalry,

and enabled Melos, who had a keen military

better.

sharply advance his boldly

in,

ture his

;

the

own

the head of the left wing

Had

right.

eye, to

the Spaniard pushed

day would have been beyond a peradven-

but he did not do so

;

La

Ferte was recalled,

and the gap he had made was patched up. gone, however, and

Conde reluctantly put

Daylight had

off his attack to

the

morrow.

Between the two armies lay lower land, and underbrush opposite the Spanish thousand musketeers, hoping to

left,

fall

on Conde's flank when

he should lead out his right wing of cavalry got wind of the ambush, and his

first

here, in the

Melos had hidden a

;

but Conde had

act in the

morning

twi-

''NOT LOST, SIRS!"

454 was

light

men and

on these

to fall

them

cut

which he sent Gassion forward and well first line

of his cavalry to attack

to pieces

after

;

to the right with the

Albuquerque

in flank, while

he himself with the remainder should attack in front.

back of

line of retreat lay

his right,

and

this

His

he must protect

Surprised at the manoeuvre, Albuquerque

at all hazards.

nevertheless detached eight squadrons against Gassion, and

prepared to receive Conde with a firm charge was too fiery

Conde drove

;

the fury of hot-headed youth

impulse of the prince of the blood

was ridden down and suit,

in

fled

upon the enemy with

horsemen followed the

his

;

But the French

foot.

in

;

Albuquerque's cavalry

and Conde sent Gassion

;

in j)ur-

while he himself turned in on the flank of Melos' infantry,

which he wrought fearful carnage among the Germans,

Walloons and was beyond

Not

cavahy out

at too fast a

winded and

in

gait, so that it

some disorder

counter-charge and drove

and Melos pursued

pieces,

the French right the success

Victory seemed near at hand.

Marshal de I'Hopital had started

so on the left.

his, fell

On

Italians.

all expectation.

his

it

Melos met

;

back

;

by a sharp

it

de I'Hopital was wounded,

advantage just as Conde had done

on the flank of part of the French infantry, cut captured

La

his

reached the enemy

Ferte and

all

it

to

and actually

his guns,

The enemy had purchased a promise of with equal ease as Conde. The case looked desperate.

reached the reserve. victory

The merest

who

accident would turn the scale either way.

was urged by many

led the reserve,

retire, for the battle

was

lost, said they.

of the

"

Not

Sirot and his companions have not yet fought

brave

officer,

and manfully held

chance on either

his ground.

!

Sirot,

runaways to

lost, sirs

;

for

" replied the

It

was an even

side.

But Conde, learning of the what only the true

disaster to his

own

left,

now did

instinct of war, the clear soldier's eye

and

A SUPERB GALLOP. heart, could dictate.

If

455

he did not win with the squadrons he

personally led, he saw that the battle was lost

;

and with the

energy of a Coenus or a Hasdrubal he spurred on, and

back of the Spanish

foot,

round

to the

still

on,

enemy's right, out to

the front, took Melos' victorious cavalry in the rear, sent whirling back in the wake of the fugitives of the

tured

La

it

recap-

left,

Ferte and the guns, and took every one of the

Spanish batteries on that flank.

Few

been made

Gassion ably seconded his

chief field

by any squadrons.

by completing the

rout,

such superb rides have

and nothing remained on the

except the splendid old Spanish infantry, which, like

Father Tilly's Walloons at Breitenfeld, refused to decamp. It

his

had been confronted by d'Espenant, who, however, with newer battalions, had not dared to come hand

with the veterans. their guns,

and

to

hand

These, grouped with teeth set around

in the mid^t of panic

and

disaster, resolved to

pluck victory from defeat, or to die where they stood.

Who

knew what so brave a body might yet accomplish ? Beck was near at hand with six thousand fresh troops, dreaded factor in the uncertain problem.

—a

Detaching gallant

Gassion with his handful of cavalry to hold him in check at every hazard, Conde himself prepared to beat resistance

of

the

Spanish battalions.

taken his place in line after having of the Spanish centre

He

down

the stern

had now again

made an

entire circuit

and having destroyed both

its

wings.

Reassembling his squadrons, with the superb battle decision

which always characterized him, and inspiring them with

his

own undaunted courage, he drove them home upon the Spanish foot. But he had not counted on what these men could Masking his guns do, nor on the iron will of old Fuentes. by a thin

line of foot,

squadrons were within batteries,

and reserving fifty paces,

his fire until the

French

the veteran uncovered his

and opened upon the approaching horsemen

his

456

.1

BATH OF BLOOD

eighteen pieces charged with grape, while the line gave so

withering a volley that even Conde's men, flushed with victory and their prince's ardor, could not face the hail, but fell

back

squadrons, he might

still

Fuentes possessed but a few

have wrested a victory from the

Not a Spanish sabre was on the

French.

had

Had

in grave disorder.

Every man

field.

fled.

A

second time the prince headed his horse, a second time

A

he was thrown back.

third charge was no

Fuentes, from his

the crisis was doubtful.

more successful

litter,

could watch

with grim satisfaction his youthful antagonist breaking his

on the Spanish square as the waves break on the rock.

lines

He

had not

But

lost yet.

at this

moment

Conde changed

the reserve under

came up.

Sirot

his tactics to a less reckless one, as he should

have sooner done

:

with the gendarmes he rode round the

flanks of the Spanish foot,

and put

his infantry in in front.

Fuentes saw himself surrounded by superior numbers on

To

The day was

This was decisive.

sides.

save a remnant of his men, the old Spaniard

attempt to surrender

;

all

irretrievably gone.

made an

but the French either understood not

or could not be restrained, and a frightful butchery ensued.

The

battle of

Rocroy ended

in a bath of blood

learning that there was no more Spanish

came

to a right-about

and precipitately

army

;

and Beck,

left to rescue,

retired, leaving be-

hind some guns.

The Spanish

losses

were immense.

Out

of eighteen thou-

sand foot, nine thousand are said to have been killed where they stood, and seven thousand were taken, with three hundred flags and

The French

losses are stated at

only two thousand killed and wounded. it

the guns,

Splendid Fuentes

died where he had fought.

correct,

all

immense booty.

If the figures are

was but a modern sample of the butchery usual

in

THE HERO OF FRANCE. "

ancient warfare.

How many

are

a Spanish officer after the battle. prisoners,

— they are

all

" !

457

you?" asked a French "

of

Count the dead and the

was the answer.

After this magnificent victory, in which Conde exhibited singular courage battle

-

captain,

and energy, and proved himself a born

he took Diedenhofen (Thionville) on the

Moselle and returned to Paris, where he was the hero of the hour.

His princely blood, coupled

ability,

made

to

marked courage and

too rare a combination to be overlooked.

French Musketeer.

(1647.)

XXXVI. FREIBURG. AUGUST, Aftkr

On

mand.

hj a long

circuit

around his

made on

The

left flank.

and the French were divided attack was

men

;

fighting

days after, a second and rather miscalculated

new works and was

retired definitively.

the Rhine, taking Speyer,

Cond^ returned

To

;

and again

it

;

to France,

was jealous

of the other

;

but

;

to Philips-

upon which Turenne moved

Worms, Mainz and other towns; and and Turenne resumed

The two French generals were warm

Philipsburg. neither

equally sanguinary

The French commander then marched

burg, and after a handsome siege eairtured

Landau.

Turenne

was prolonged and bloody,

After four days a turning manoeuvre was attempted

Mercy withdrew.

down

him and take com-

in his works,

but Mercy withdrew to another position, and

Two

the

believed equal to any

to reinforce

two generals attacked Mercy

his arrival the

allowed them to reunite.

Mercy

who was

Turenne's failure at Freiburg, Cond^,

emergency, was sent with ten thousand

1644.

his

friends throughout life

each was active in his colleague's

return to Turenne's operations.

later

position at

interests.

Shortly after his

fail-

ure at Freiburg, Conde crossed the Rhine at Breisach with his

in

army

of ten thousand

He

command.

men and Marshal Grammont

had marched

second

from the Moselle, one hun-

dred and eighty miles in thirteen days, then a rapid progress.

Conde joined Turenne, August had taken up

fifteen or

2, at

camp which

the

the latter

twenty miles from Breisach, and, as

command of the combined forces, he moved forward to Freiburg. Mercy had fortified the height which Turenne had tried to seize some weeks before, and now held superior taking

it

in force.

He had

eight thousand foot

horse, excellent troops, discipline

and had added

had given the regiments

their position.

The

hill

and seven thousand

to the strength

all

which

that art could do for

he occupied was strongly intrenched

UNWISE DIVISION OF FORCES.

459

with a redoubt on the right and a line of works and abatis

and with

the

other, he

camp

swamp on one

side

The main

quite shut out approach to the city.

lay in the rear of the intrenched

noissance was at once undertaken to the enemy's position,

and

it

;

and the mountains on the

hill.

A careful recon-

by Conde and Turenne up

was determined that the chief

should advance against the height in front while, mider cover of his sharp demonstration,

through the woods and in

Turenne should make

defiles

round Mercy's

his

way

left flank,

push

The main

on the plain, and thus take him in reverse.

Freiburg Battles.

attack was set for five o'clock in the afternoon of August 3, so as to give his

way by

Turenne what was deemed ample time

the long and difficult circuit mentioned.

to

make It

was

known that the enemy had made the route almost impassable by an intrenchment at the outlet of the defile, and by trees felled across the jjath. The plan was made in the not then

dark.

If

Mercy's

Conde or Turenne could break through or turn

line,

they could reach the Fi-eiburg plain

;

but by no

other means could this be done from the direction on which

they were operating.

Their division was extra hazardous,

even on the assumption that Mercy would keep to his works.

A GALLANT ASSAULT.

460

Conde had

six

thousand foot and three to four thousand

and among

horse,

were Marshal Grammont

his lieutenants

and Generals d'Espenant and Marsin. thousand men, half horse, half

At 5

foot.

Conde launched

M.

P.

Turenne had ten

his

men

to the attack, there

him and

having- been no special signal agreed on between

Turenne.

was held

It

in reserve on the flanks, to protect

possible.

The

common on

so

was work for infantry only, and the cavalry it

so far as

of those vine-terraced slopes,

Up

the Rhine.

and took the

order,

was one

hill

the troops went in gallant

it

line of abatis

;

but their

loss

was consid-

erable, and they paused at the foot of the works, and began

and

to spread in their uncertainty to right shelter. This pause looked

generalissimo in the face to hesitate.

;

search of

and there was too much

Dismounting, with

and they dashed up the

left in

Failure stared the young

critical.

all his

slope on foot,

the troops for a fresh assault.

No

generals and

at stake staff,

he

and personally headed

nation responds to gal-

lantry of this sort quicker than the French; the battalions

again knit ranks, took fresh heart, and poured over the

intrenchments like a flood. the three thousand Bavarians

The

hill

who had

was won, and out of so bravely defended

a bare hundred escaped the ensuing massacre.

it,

The

situation

was

still

Not knowing the ground,

desperate.

Conde feared a night attack by Mercy with fresh troops on his

own men, who were

the fort he had taken

up the

slopes,

the morning.

;

unsettled

by

victory.

He

occupied

with immense exertion got his cavalry

and there waited anxiously for Turenne and

Had

he known the situation, he might have

taken the enemy who lay in front of Turenne in reverse

but the uncertainty of darkness precluded any further

Turenne had started

much

at daylight,

had made

his

action.

way with

exertion for sixteen or eighteen miles through the rug-

MERCY WITHDRAWS. ged ground defile

much

Unable

where

to

him behind

their stout line

open ground

to get his cavalry out into

could deploy to suj)port him, he was baffled.

it

as the best

Both

of the

larger force of the Bavarians than

had faced Conde held head of works.

mouth

to within a short distance of the

but here a

;

461

way out

lines stood in close fighting contact,

forty paces,

— and

But

of a desperate position, he boldly attacked.

— the reports say

the battle lasted fiercely through the late

afternoon and evening, and scarcely ceased at night.

French troops behaved dred

men without

well,

At

this spot the

hmidred men.

some

since before a picket of twenty

phenomenon constantly occurring

curious.

In

Bavarians

in war,

at

hun-

men,

and always

two thousand

lost

fact, the casualties of

stated

authorities

Each army was

The

loss of fifteen

These were the same men who

flinching.

had decamped not long

—a

and stood a

five

both sides are by

an aggregate of

six

thousand.

severely punished.

Haply, the action of Mercy cut the knot of the French leaders' difficidty.

On

account of his depletion he dreaded

a fresh battle under the same conditions night, lest between the prince

;

and during the

and the marshal he should

not be able to hold himself on the lower ground and should suffer a

tion

more marked

defeat,

he withdrew to a new posi-

back of the old one, leaning

horse, on

which was of

his right,

the outworks of Freiburg.

Turenue and Conde

were able to join hands and once more breathe situation

had been a bad one, but Mercy's

freely.

retiring

Their

had saved

them harmless. Turenne advised an attack on the to

make one on

4th, but

Conde declined

the score of the exhaustion of the troops.

Mercy threw up stronger than the

fresh works. first

His position was

one, but cramped.

His

if

possible

artillery, sus-

tained by four thousand foot, was posted so as to sweep the

PARTIAL ATTACKS.

462 approaches of the

and he was able

hill,

had erected in the

late

the right to

Turenne

make room

and with

logs,

The succeeding day, August contested battle.

5,

felt

abatis.

brought on another hotly

enemy

the

Conde on

for

he

His front he covered with

siege.

works constructed of rough

to utilize the lines

early,

his left,

troops were got into touch with the enemy.

edging to

and the

latter's

During a

lidl in

when the two French commanders

the opening of the fighting,

were reconnoitring with a view to a combined assault on the Bavarian

lines,

and had ordered that no manceuvres should

be undertaken in their absence, the restless commander of Conde's French infantry of the ried

away by imprudent

front that seemed weakly held

who understood

padel,

left, also

tial

met

General d'Espenant, car-

;

work

in his

seeing which, General Tau-

that he was to follow the lead of the

threw forward his

attacks were

left,

ardor, advanced on a

in force,

first line

from the

and brought on a

Both

right.

series of par-

engagements quite lacking ensemble; the French bat-

talions lost heart

and

fell

back from work which, well inau-

gurated, they would have cheerfully done

was

to disturb the tactical plans of the

and

to bring about ,

an indecisive

result.

heavy

losses

and the

result

French commanders,

on both

Turenne confesses

had the enemy known the French

;

sides,

followed by

memoirs

that,

situation, they could

have

in his

destroyed the army, as the losses during the day had been

between two and three thousand men in the wasteful ing.

had

But the Bavarians were lost

in equally

some twelve hundred

killed,

bad and

case, for

his

fight-

Mercy

men were

apparently more demoralized than the French, who had Conde

and Turenne

The

line of

of retreat, of

Abbey

to sustain their flagging zeal.

communications and supply, and now

Mercy was through

in his rear to Villingen.

sole line

the valley of St. Peter's

Conde, being unable to see

MERCY RETIRES FOR

GOOD.

463

success in another front attack, on the 9th essayed to cut this line

by a flank march

This march

via Langendenzlingen.

was conducted expertly, but Mercy

at once perceived its pur-

ground was open and revealed the direction of

pose, for the

He

the French columns.

promptly withdrew, and marched

on his base in Wiirtemberg.

Conde and Turenne on the 5th had

If the joint attack of

not been spoiled by the folly of d'Espenant, there was promvictory.

As

had been reduced by nearly

half,

of a

ise

by over

meaux

handsome

five

thousand men, in

French

states the

it

was, the Bavarian

and the French

this three days'

loss in killed

Desor-

work.

and wounded at

thousand men, and the Bavarian at nine thousand.

French had captured

all

army

joint forces

six

But the

Mercy's guns.

The French followed Mercy, but

their

van under Rosen

suffered a check in a gallantly sustained cavalry

combat

;

and

the extent of their present gain was the capture of a part of

Mercy's

The country was

train.

pursuit profitable,

too mountainous to

make a

and lack of victual drove them back

to

Freiburg, as well as the fact that they were not equipped for

lengthy operations and considered themselves too far from their base, the Rhine. five

hundred men

They concluded, though

had but

it

in garrison, not to lay siege to Freiburg,

whose possession Conde thought would bring no marked advantage, and would scarcely save the army from the necessity of retiring to Alsatia

and Lorraine

to winter.

Conde, whose ideas were always broad, deemed

it

wiser to

turn downstream on Philipsburg, to capture which fortress

would

result in

commanding a

large section of country on

the right bank of the Rhine, on which the readily subsist one, but the to

head him

till

spring.

The

siege

army might more

would be a

enemy could not now reach the place off

;

difficult

in season

Strasburg would furnish victual by boats

MARCH ON

464

down the

river

;

and in

PHILIPSBURG.

this city

he eoukl, on his own

borrow money for the paymasters. try

was the main objection

Lack

to the plan.

Batteries were prepared in Breisach

Rhine on pontoons, with as could be gathered.

credit,

of sufficient infan-

much

and

floated

down

Cavalry parties were sent out to

places likely to offer opposition

the

material and food as

on the march

;

seize

and the van

Philipsburg-.

under Kosen followed.

On August

16 the army broke up,

with Turenne in the lead, and advanced valley to Philipsburg,

Turenne

down

the Rhine

where they arrived August 25, and

at once blockaded

the place.

The garrison was

probably under a thousand men. Philipsburg was one of the most important places on the

Rhine, and lay in a plain surrounded by woods and marshes. It

had only earthwork defenses, but these were very strong,

mounted with one hundred guns, and the water from the

river

PHILIPSBURG SURRENDERS. flowed into wide and deep ditches. side,

south, —

— the

manded

the river.

had a

it

Approachable on but one which

fort

and Conde saw the

it,

fairly well

com-

had been acquired by France

Philipsburg-

from the Swedes, who had captured retaken

465

but the emperor had

it,

strategic advantage of its

possession.

In order to control the

was

first

vallation

redoubt there situated

river, the

captured by Turenne in a night attack.

and circumvallation

approaches were made,

were then opened.

lines

by Grammont

one

Contra-

Turenne, on the 7th of September

;

and

Two

one by

next day a sortie was

driven back, and a few days later an attempt to relieve the

The approaches were

place was successfully resisted.

vigor-

ously j)ushed, and the commander. Colonel Bamberg, despair-

ing of holding out, and anxious to save the large stores and treasury for the emperor, finally accepted terms, and Philijjsburg surrendered

During the

September 12.

siege, the

French sent out a small detachment, which took Germersheim and occupied Speyer. In his memoirs Turenne complains that the French infantry

had

heart in

lost

behaved well of discipline

at times, ;

and

ill

They had

at times, proving a certain lack

and yet they had shown exceptional

stand hammering, requisite of

the Freiburg campaign.

— not

the

heavy percentage of men

o\\\j,

but the most essential

They had

the soldier. ;

ability to

lost

an exceptionally

and those who served through our

1864 campaign in Virginia

will

remember that the extreme

depletion of a rapid succession of battles will sometimes react

on even the best of troops.

The day

after the

surrender Turenne, under instructions

from Conde, crossed the Rhine with

man

cavalry and a chosen body of

his

five

two thousand Ger-

hundred musketeers,

and learning that a Spanish column was on the march

to

/

A GAINFUL CAMPAIGN.

466

Frankenthal, he sent a suitable detachment, which attacked this

body, captured five hundred, and dispersed or killed the

rest.

to

The marshal then moved

Worms and

his infantry

on boats down

Opj)enheim, of which he took the former out

of hand, while

the latter fell to Rosen's

cavalry

disem-

;

barked, and advanced by forced marches without baggage to

Mainz, which was at the moment disgarnished of troops.

This important

city,

whose possession secured the highway

between France and her

ally Hesse,

though a Bavarian dra-

goon force under Colonel Wolf sought

to relieve

some negotiations surrendered, on a threat

Wolf

surrender was refused or

to

it,

storm

after it

if

Conde shortly

admitted.

put in an appearance with the army, and took possession.

The

elector

of

Mainz had gone

French occupied the whole Creuznach, which held out.

Frankfort

Small forces were

Oppenheim and Worms, and to Philipsburg.

to

;

and the

vicinity, except only the castle of

Mainz,

left in

the French generals returned

After reducing Creuznach, Turenne under-

took the siege of Landau, where the French forces had just lost their

commander, and on September

only a few days, the place

19, with a delay of

fell.

After the capture of a few more smaller fortresses (Neustadt,

Mannheim, Bacharach and

others)

Conde withdrew

to

France by way of Kaiserslautern and Metz, and Turenne remained at Philipsburg, with a much reduced

campaign had eventuated

force.

The

in decided gain.

Conde and Turenne were worthy

of each other.

Except

for a later temporary estrangement during the wars of the

Fronde, they remained firm friends through

life,

neither jeal-

ous of the other's accomplishment or ability, and able when together to work in perfect accord.

Conde, who in these

early campaigns

knew how to utilize to his own advantage,

was

his superior in rank,

Turenne's experience, energy and

skill

GENEROUS EN. FRIENDS. but he never begrudged

was

liis

lieutenant the appreciation which

his just due, nor denied

the victories

won by

our own

firm, as civil

him

his share of the

And

their joint efforts.

was the case with many of the generals

war.

As

fail to see

how

largely

Turenne contributed

justice requires, as in the case of

— though these

;

yet no one

to this

generals were equal in

and

battles of

command,

mand, our thoughts the credit of

which the glory

Though Lee was

instinctively

the flank

and

— that we

is

There

universally

yielded rather to the lieutenant than to the captain.

was Chancellorsville.

;

Marlborough and Eugene,

should award to each his good half of the glory won. are campaigns

in

general in command, Conde was of

course entitled to the teclinical credit of success

can

honor in

while opposed

the wars of the Fronde, their friendship

to each other in

remained

467

award

in

Such

supreme com-

to Stonewall

Jackson

march and attack which were the

beginning of the end in that, from the Confederate aspect, superb campaign.

It

was so in some of the campaigns of

Turenne and Conde.

French Infantry Soldier. (1660.)

/

/

XXXVII. MERGENTHEIM. MAY Before going

into winter-quarters,

5,

1645.

Turenne once more crossed the Rhine

but as he found Mercy quiet on the Neckar, he undertook nothing.

;

Next

spring (1645) he again put over his army, and turning Mercy's position by the left,

him

cut

off

by

But he sians

retired to Dinkelsbiihl

;

Turenne followed

Here, for ease of victualing, he spread out his forces over

too wide an area

ensuing,

Mercy

from Swabia.

to Mergentheim. ;

Mercy and Werth moved sharply on him, and

his troops

in the battle

behaving badly, Turenne was defeated with heavy

loss.

where he was joined by ten thousand Hes-

skillfully retired to Hesse,

and Swedes, and again immediately advanced on the enemy, who was

besieging Kirchhain.

command sand men. position,

Cond^ with eight thousand men now came up, and took

The Swedes

of the joint army.

retired, leaving

him seventeen thou-

Crossing the Neckar, the French at Heilbronn turned the Bavarians'

who

retired to

Dinkelsbiihl.

Feuchtwangen, and after a few days' manoeuvring to

Following them up, the French generals forced them back to

Allerheim, where they determined to attack them.

Shortly

after

Conde's departure, Turenne ascertained

that, after repairing his losses,

Mercy had

left

Wiirtemberg,

and was marching on Heidelberg and Mannheim. pected that

away

to

the

Bavarian general designed to entice

cover Speyer,

Worms and

ingly left two thousand

men

sus-

him

Mainz, in order mean-

while to seize Philipsburg by a couj) de main.

(?amp,

He

He

accord-

near this fortress in an intrenched

threw a bridge, and crossed the Rhine near Speyer

with his cavalry and a few musketeers, sent small detach-

ments to

Worms and

tect all four places.

as

it

cies.

was of

Mainz, and took It

Gustavus,

full precaution to pro-

was a common habit of Turenne, to provide

for remote contingen-

Mercy, however, had no such far-reaching intention

;

he

HANDSOME MANCEUVRE.

A

469

Mannheim, and

remained quiet between Heidelberg and

Turenne assumed that for want of provision he preferred not

He

to cross the Rhine.

therefore sent the bidk of his troops

to Lorraine into winter-quarters, keeping but a few cavalry

regiments

near the Rhine, and these he

The two thousand

towns.

what remained

of the foot

billeted

Turenne marched

several

the

to Alsatia.

Soon afterwards Turenne heard that the duke had passed the Moselle with

in

foot remained at Philipsburg

six

of Lorraine

thousand men, had captured

and Simmern among them, and

places, Castellaun

Hurriedly marching with

was investing Bacharach.

five

hundred horse on Mainz and Bingen, he spread the rumor that this was but the van of the entire army, which in truth

he made arrangements to mobilize, and forced the duke back.

Then taking the

castle of

Creuznach, which had held out in

the last siege, he definitely retired, in December, 1644, into

bank

winter-quarters along the left

quarters in Speyer.

of the Rhine, with head-

The year had been

full of activity,

and

fairly successful.

In early April of 1645 Turenne again entered the with six thousand

foot, five

thousand horse and

fifteen guns,

crossed the Rhine on a bridge of boats at Speyer,

on Pforzheim. pate Mercy,

He hoped

who

in

whose troops were yet spread

With

all

his cavalry alone,

antici-

Neckar with a force which

to six or seven

ing reinforcements to the imperial

ments.

and moved

opening the campaign to

lay beyond the

had been diminished

field

thousand

men by

army

Bohemia, and

in

send-

over the country in canton-

and leaving

his foot to fol-

low on by rapid marches, Turenne crossed the Neckar near

Marbach, April 16, through a ford which was not watched

by the enemy, and marched along the right bank past Heilbronn

to

Schwiibisch-Hall, in order to throw Mercy,

had intended

to

move southward

into

who

Swabia, back in a

ITS SUCCESS.

470 northerly direction.

manoeuvre

and

;

had cut him

Danube

This was a neat

and well-executed

now

to follow out his plan,

off,

and recover

his

communications with the

Mercy was obliged

country,

Turenne

that

move

at once to

easterly,

towards Dinkelsbiihl and Feuchtwangen, by a considerable circuit.

At one moment during

his

advance with

Turenne feared that Mercy would

umn, which was

far in the rear

and turned back towards a chance to

slip

by him

attack the column of foot.

and separated from the horse,

he did not, however, venture to

But

for thus retracing his steps,

Turenne would have earned the chance his horse,

and

col-

This afforded watchful Mercy

it.

;

cavalry

his

on his infantry

fall

to follow

Mercy with

to give his rear-guard a hearty slap

but

;

through his career he was noted for scrupulous care

;

all

and

while this in the long run served him admirably, at times looks like over-caution.

it

In this case Mercy gained abundant

leisure to escape.

Turenne had accomplished any danger

and had warded

his object,

of the enemy's invasion of Alsatia

;

off

but as Mercy

had got away from him without a blow, Turenne assembled all his forces at

Hall, and

moved north on Mergentheim

(or

Marienthal) on the Tauber, so as to have in his rear and

open

to

him the

allied

to hope that before

from there

;

He had good

Hessian country.

summer he should

reason

receive reinforcements

on the arrival of which he counted on pushing

into the heart of

Germany, a thing which

did not feel strong enough to attempt.

at the

Near

moment he

this

town he

put the foot and artillery into camp.

By

his able turning

manoeuvre he had hustled the enemy

out of a position threatening to France, and then reestablished himself by a change of base where he could rely either upon his holdings in Alsatia or

on his Hessian

allies.

The

entire

A SURPRISE. operation was skillful

;

in

it

we

see a

471

gleam of the purposeful

manoeuvring of the future.

From Mergentheim Turenne

sent General

Rosen with four

or five cavalry regiments as an outpost up the Tauber towards

Rothemburg, and quartered the convenience of foraging, in rear.

rest of his cavalry, for greater

towns two or three hours in the

This was a manifest error, for the enemy was not far

distant,

was

good heart and ably

in

led,

and Turenne knew

Operation of Mergentheim.

nothing of his intentions centrated.

In

effect,

;

he ought to have kept well con-

within a day or

so,

he learned that the

Bavarians had broken up at Feuchtwangen, and were moving

on him at Mergentheim. parties out,

Rosen had not had enough scouting

and the information preceded the enemy's van

but a few hours.

Immediately ordering Rosen back

to a position

where he

could be sustained, Turenne called in his outlying cavalry parties,

and instructed Rosen

to take position in rear of a

FIGHTING IN THE WOODS.

472

wood

lay some distance in front of Mergentheim, at

wliicli

wliicli obstacle

and

he could conveniently assemble

all his forces,

He

desirable retire to a better point for battle.

if

should,

observes Napoleon, have ordered his forces to assemble at

Mergentheim, which was behind the Tauber and nearer for all

the outlying regiments, certainly at a point further behind

But

the outposts than the one he chose.

to

make matters

worse, by misunderstanding his orders, Rosen took position in front of the

wood, where, as alleged by Turenne, he could

neither hold himself, nor easily retreat, nor be readily supported,

and where the enemy,

if

he attacked him, was sure to

bring on an engagement on unfavorable ground.

This was

Mercy advanced on him, and Turenne

in fact what occurred.

found himself compelled to sustain his lieutenant under awk-

ward

conditions.

Our own

habit of frequently fighting in the woods during

the civil

war breeds among American

soldiers a belief that a

forest

not so marked an obstacle as

it is

is

ered in Europe. times, a

But

wood even

free

from the underbrush

forest

was considered a very serious post

foot

and so

;

was

difficult

wont

to be consid-

Turenne's days, and in fact at

in

it

deemed

of the

to attack,

to get troops

all

American if

held by

through an

open wood in good order, that a few squadrons posted beyond it

were believed to be able

troops emerging from rally

much

to

it.

break up the organization of

to

The nature

do with the matter

;

of the

wood had natu-

but on such a terrain as

our " Wilderness," no European army would for a think of manoeuvring. plain

;

and

posed to

it

fall

They

are too

to the

open

was under such conditions that Turenne pro-

upon

his

enemy

after

through the wood and was apt to be

The

much used

moment

in

the latter had passed

broken order.

three thousand infantry which had arrived Turenne

placed on the right of the cavalry, equally in the wood, and

THE FRENCH DEMORALIZED. As

in the left wing.

command

of

the Bavarians advanced in two lines, the

Mercy and the

led forward his

own

on the Bavarian

right,

much

disorder.

French infantry

himself took up post

and the horse on the wings, the right under

foot in the centre

in

He

by two other squadrons.

sustained

473

left of

cavalry, fell

and threw

John de Werth, Turenne

upon the horse

it

back on the second

But meanwhile Werth

in the

in first line

wood, and the

latter,

attacked

line

the

which had been

hurried into action

and

felt as if it

had

been surprised, and

was

moreover

poor

in

from

order

having been pushed

through the wood, after but

a single

salvo seemed to lose heart, and, attacked in front

and on both

flanks,

fled,

ing with

it

squadrons

carry-

,<^^0

the two of

cav-

Mergentheim Battle.

alry which sustained it.

This disgraceful conduct, which now enabled Werth left

wing of

did in equal disorder.

Rosen

to threaten Turenne's flank, forced the

horse to retire also, which

it

was captured, and Turenne was forced

to cut himself out

so nearly

French

compromised that he

sword in hand.

The

fault here

appears to have been not more due to the position than to the lack of endurance of the troops

same infantry which

;

and yet

this

was the

at Freiburg the year before had so

cheerfully stood decimation.

In Turenne's rear lay

still

another wood.

Here he boldly

TURENNE'S FRANKNESS.

474

essayed a further defense with three fresh cavalry regiments

which had just come up, and some twenty-five hundred

But

runaways.

and came on

as the

in fine shape,

retrieving" his loss,

and

up

enemy prudently took time

He

definitively retired.

ments that were

to reform

and he could make no headway

Turenne accepted

the Tauber on the

rallied

good

his defeat in

in

part,

personally covered the retreat

Main with two

of the three cavalry regi-

accompany the

intact, detailing the third to

disorganized foot, which he ordered to retreat to the border of

Hesse ; but as the Bavarians followed him up more sharply than usual, and as he disputed every inch of the way, he lost

heavily in

fighting. artillery,

pursuit,

The

men and battle of

baggage and

and guns in the rear-guard

flags

Mergentheim had

cost

him

all his

The tactical The Bavarians,

hundred men.

fifteen

however, did not continue

far.

according to the habit of the day, remained on the

field to

celebrate the victory.

In his memoirs Turenne openly acknowledges his defeat.

In

this respect the

French marshal

is

Whether

a model.

the

advantage lay with him or with the enemy, he always frankly confesses

it.

Unlike so many generals, whose retreat from the

field of battle belies their

Turenne

grandiloquent reports of victory,

and thus

lays bare the facts, shows us his errors,

gives us lessons

which can never be learned from prevaricat-

ing dispatches.

The Bavarians soon followed Turenne siege to Kirchhain

;

Turenne

to

Hesse and laid

Near

retired to Cassel.

this

place he joined the six thousand Hessians, and the Swedes

who, four thousand strong, had come up from Brunswick

under Konigsmark

;

by which

accessions, with his

thousand horse and one thousand

five

up a

men; and with

force of fifteen thousand

once advanced on Kirchhain.

hundred

This was

all

foot,

own

four

he made

these he at

done within twelve

CONDE AGAIN IN COMMAND. after

clays

ness of

showing an

defeat,

his

elasticity

movement which were admirable

475

and a quick-

for Cassel

;

is

about

a hundred miles from Mergentheim, and there were negotia-

which consumed some days and delayed Turenne's

tions

action as

much as

the reorganization of his troops.

Raising

the siege of Kirchhain, the Bavarians at once retired to Fran-

Turenne shortly led

conia.

sand

men coming by way

did at Ladenburg, near

his forces to join the eight thou-

of Speyer under Conde, which he

Mannheim, on July

Conde again assimied command.

5.

He had

been campaign-

ing on the Meuse, where France desired a foothold strong

enough

to control Lorraine, a province essential to her

mvmications with

Germany

tinue his work, he

;

and having

had been ordered

to the relief of Turenne,

whose defeat had demoralized the French court. abundant confidence

—a

in

mind

They had

Conde, but lacked belief in Turenne,

rather curious want of discrimination, yet easily bred

Rocroy and the two

of

com-

left Villeroi to con-

last

campaigns.

They changed

their

ere long.

Though

in

command, Conde, unlike the

court,

had the good

sense to recognize the worth of Turenne, and took counsel of his

ample knowledge and courage

once moved up the

But

left

jNIercy anticipated

finding the

bank them

make choose between a march up crossing and a

it

and the two generals

of the

the

river

river towards

to

entertain

;

and

and holding the

difficult to force,

they had to

Swabia or another

march towards the Danube country.

Swedish contingent refused

at

Neckar on Heilbronn.

at this important place

Bavarians beyond

passage there so as to

;

The

the former plan,

fearing by so distant an operation to be cut off from north

Germany and the French commanders finally decided on Wimpfen, which place they took, and crossed the Neckar ;

on a bridge they

built.

Here Konigsmark,

in consequence of

THE ENEMY RETIRES.

476

a disagreement with Conde, and restless at serving under so

young a commander, towards the Main.

Turenne, taking a

left

the French and led his Swedes back

The Hessians stood number of places on

by,

and Conde and

the way,

moved on

Rothemburg. So soon as the French had crossed the Neckar, Bavarians retired on a substantially parallel line to

the

Feuchtwangen, where they

set

up an intrenched

French commanders offered Mercy for

Mercy deemed

it

The

camj).

but without avail

better to retire to another intrenched

The

camp, behind Dinkelsbiihl. to the

battle,

rival armies

had got back

same campaigning ground on which they had manoeu-

From

vred a month or two before.

Dinkelsbiihl, in a few

days, leaving a small garrison in this place, the

enemy retired,

and camped behind a wood several miles further back, apparently as a stratagem to induce the French to besiege the just left,

of

camp

an operation which might afford them an occasion attack.

Turenne and Conde followed

and stopping

at Dinkelsbiihl to capture the

making a favorable

lip this retreat,

intrenched camp, soon learned that the army under

Leaving a small body

was advancing on them.

Mercy

to observe

Both Conde

the camp, the French set out to meet the enemy.

and Turenne accompanied the van, while Grammont brought

up the main army.

At break

of

day the French, who had marched

struck the Bavarian van, and this retired on

which was intrenched in a brook and some ponds.

difficult position

An

with a loss of three hundred

all-day's

its

at night,

main body,

behind a marshy

cannonade resulted,

men on each

side

;

but though

the Bavarians could not be successfully attacked in their position,

retire

they feared for their line of retreat, and concluded to

towards Nordlingen.

Having

so far failed

by front

operations to gain any advantage over the enemy, two hours before daylight next day the French generals, turning the

]

THE ENEMY STANDS. Bavarian position by the

right, also

477

marched on Nbrdlingeu,

which they reached by nine o'clock, and camped in the plain, leaving the baggage train in some of the villages in the rear.

The Bavarian army, which had been

reinforced

by seven

thousand imperial troops under General Glein, had divined the manoeuvre, and lest they should be cut

off,

had already

reached Nbrdlingen plain in light order, and seized an advantageous position.

French Dragoon.

(17th Century.)

XXXVIII. ALLERHEIM. AUGUST The

Bavarian right, under Glein, lay on the Wennenberg

Mercy, back of and in Allerheim village

and

in the castle of Allerheim.

;

their left,

Grammont and drove

it

their centre,

But Turenne, on the French

left,

Werth broke

;

well to the rear

by splendid

the French

efforts

broke Glein's for-

might have completed the Bavarian victory

Bavarians retired, and the French kept the

would have liked

them and they Turenne went

but he

;

the

field.

enemy moved back

The

losses

of the

The French

Danube.

After capturing Trier and Oberwesel,

retired to the Rhine.

On

;

for its activity,

it

was favora-

the whole, the campaign

was highly creditable

rolling plain of Nordlingen, watered

to Turenne.

by the Wormitz

and Eger, is a dozen miles in diameter, and the town its

southwestern edge.

lies

mile and a half apart.

near

Near the southeastern edge, backing

up against the Wormitz, lay the enemy, between two

The Wennenberg

is

about one hundred and twenty feet high and

crowned by the

hills,

a

about one hun-

dred and sixty feet above the plain, and steep

at the time

The

were very heavy.

to winter in Swabia, but the Bavarians demonstrated towards

into winter-quarters.

ble to the French

The

;

hill

the day was very doubt-

:

did not utilize his advantage in the best manner, and night came on.

Nordlingen surrendered

under

After defeating Grammont, Werth, by

mation and captured the Wennenberg. striking Turenne's right,

;

under Werth, on the

Cond^, in the Fi-ench centre, essayed with his

infantry to capture Allerheim, but was driven back right under ful.

1645.

5,

;

the other,

less steep,

castle of Allerheim.

was

Between

them, a quarter of a mile further forward, lay the village of

From

Allerheim.

deep gully is

much

;

the castle hill to Allerheim ran a wide and

from Allerheim

cut up.

to the

Wennenberg

the ground

In this admirable defensive position, pro-

posing to fight for the jjossession of Nordlingen and

t?vt

A CRITICAL PERIOP. he could not compass a victory here by even his best

efforts

the victor of Rocroy had met a more stubborn task than he

had yet faced.

This cold-blooded infantry fighting lacked

the touch-and-go of

While

this

cavahy work.

was going on, Conde had directed Grammont

Werth but

to attack

;

the count, on ascertaining the presence

of the gully above referred to, maintained that he could not

Bavarian line

I'each the

leaving

him

;

and Conde rode over

a defensive

to

to the left,

To show how mistaken

role.

he was, soon after Conde's departure the Bavarian cavalry of

by Werth

the left wing, led

in

person, rode

out,

crossed the gully without difficulty, and attacked the French

Grammont,

cavalry under driving

it

it

it

partly in flank, and

back after a mere attempt at resistance.

the confusion Marshal

Had

striking

Grammont was

not been for the reserve of this wing,

have won the victory right here

what checked

his progress,

Werth could complete

;

Werth would

but General Chabot some-

and so much time elapsed before

the wreck of the French right, that the

Werth

opportunity slipped out of his hands. eventually crush

In

shot and captured.

Grammont, and

did, however,

threw the

disaster

this

French infantry of the centre and the cavalry

in its support

completely out of AUerheim.

Matters looked dubious for the French. left there

was a man

of energy

and

Happily, on their

resources, of caution

called for, of gallantry not second to Conde's

could deal jon lusty blows.

had been unable

During

;

a

this time, while

to capture Allerheim,

when

man who Conde

and Grammont had

been driven from his foothold on the right, Turenne, with the cavalry of the

French

left,

had gallantly and repeatedly

charged in on the enemy's right, and, after a tough conflict

and much line

loss,

had, despite the bad ground, driven the

back on the second.

Here he was

for a

moment

first

checked,

TURBNNE TURNS THE ^jartly

SCALE.

by the fresh troops brought up by Glein, and partly of the French disaster in the village and on the

by the view It

right.

was a

critical

moment, one of those which show up troops which had not been beaten

The only French

the man.

were under his command still

but Turenne, who though wounded

;

kept in the saddle, was not to be easily discouraged

saw that he held the

fate of victory in his grasp

coidd save the French from another defeat. the Hessians,

who were

fresh and eager;

He

;

;

he

only he

ordered up

Conde put

in

an

appearance to help encourage the troops, and, returning to the charge, the two generals definitely drove back the Bavarian right

At

wing

of cavalry,

which had advanced into the

Wennenberg was sharply

infantry of their right on the

attacked

;

Turenne's

men caught

the heroism of their chief

and

plain.

the same time, under cover of this charge, the Bavarian

all

and

;

the ardor of victory and

in the melee

General Glein

the artillery were captured.

Having completed the discomfiture French

despite the success of the battle in his

He

own hands.

of

left,

the French right,

Werth now had

the

should have turned directly

against Turenne and have struck a blow at his naked flank,

while he was busy breaking up the Bavarian right.

done

so,

Had

he

Turenne would have been destroyed, and there was

no obstacle in Werth's way.

The French

right was broken,

and the centre had been driven out of AUerheim and well

The Bavarians held the town, and the road was open. But Werth, though instinct with gallantry of the first water, back.

and

of unquestioned ability, did not here exhibit the coup

iToeil of

a battle captain.

of AUerheim, directly

Instead of riding across the front

at Turenne's

by the way he had gone

out,

open flank, he returned

and came

into action

of the village, arriving too late to be of any use.

reached Turenne, in

fact,

by the rear

When

he

he struck him, not in flank, as he

HEAVY might have

483

LOSSES.

hut in front, or at best at an oblique angle.

clone,

His work was thus quite

ineffective,

and Turenne was able

to

turn against him and throw him back from the Wennenberg.

Night had come on.

The

left of

each army was victorious,

the French

somewhat the more advanced, and well beyond

Allerheim.

The

right

wing of each had been utterly worsted.

Supposing themselves cut

by Turenne's advance, the

off

Neither side had

Bavarian troops in Allerheim surrendered.

won an undisputed victory, but after midnight the Bavarian army confessed defeat by quietly withdrawing from the field, unaware that the French were themselves were

whom at

as badly demoralized as they

and their retreat compensated Turenne,

;

to

the credit of the victory was due, for his late defeat "

Mergentheim.

Were

I not Conde, I

Turenne " exclaimed the young I

tation over

what

his lieutenant

spite the fact that

victory to Conde,

it

would wish

to be

general-in-chief in his exul-

had accomplished; and de-

Napoleon awards the main praise of

was

really

this

Turenne's battle — as Conde in

a letter to the queen of Sweden generously acknowledges.

Had

the fighting continued next day,

able that the

had

badly placed.

to the

and with a woody Danube,

The French had

— four thousand all the

Of

in full retreat

were wounded.

;

;

battle

The French

manner. infantry

The

were

— but

lost

had captured

an equal number

beside, with nearly all their battle

Mercy was

their generals,

and Werth

in case of defeat they

The Bavarians

Bavarian guns.

defile in their rear

suffered heavily in casualties,

and wounded,

in killed

and two thousand captured flags.

more than prob-

Bavarians would have been beaten, as they

lost their leaders,

on their route

it is

loss

killed,

Glein captured,

of the French generals, all three

was contested

in the

handsomest

had been most severe

in

the

a bare twelve hundred serviceable foot could be

gathered under arms.

BATTLE DISCIPLINE.

484 In

this battle of

Allerheim (or, as

often called, of

it is

Nordlingen) the French cavalry of the right had behaved badly; that of the left with commendable steadiness.

French

infantry at that time has been taxed

writers with being-

The men, they

lamentably bad.

would attack once in good heart, but

if

And

could not be rallied.

we

men

as Turenne, Conde,

work under the

Vendome and

mood, they were

their uncertain

dispersed, they

yet they fought stanchly here, and

shall see that they did noble

such

said,

beaten in an assault,

Once

there was no more fight left in them.

The

by contemporary

influence of

Despite

Villars.

at times capable of very gal-

lant fighting, as their percentage of loss well shows.

Heavy

A

casualties are not always a sure test of steadiness.

may win

division which marches straight at the foe

small loss

;

its loss will

may

a division which hesitates

vmder the enemy's

fire,

and

be no test of

if

its

push or

snffer decimation

— or even

defeated its

if it

divisions, with

heavy

—

as an instance,

Heavy

losses

is

may be

both

sides,

wins

—

Butchery

resistance.

apart, only long-protracted fighting between equally losses on

at a

matched

— the Bloody Angle

a test of battle courage and discipline. accidental.

Nordlingen did not await the French attack, but at once surrendered, and the captured Bavarians were leave for

home without weapons.

allowed to

Turenne followed up the

enemy's retreat to Donauworth with his cavalry, whence he returned to the army rest,

retired

to

;

and Conde and

Dinkelsbiihl,

he, after a

few days'

which likewise surrendered.

This rearward movement Turenne explains by lack of money

and consequent

inability to victual so far

from the Rhine and

Neckar country.

Conde now

left the

mont, who had

army, seriously

ill,

and Count Gram-

been released, took his place

and he continued operations

jointly.

;

but Turenne

Turenne was

so far his

THE FRENCH RETIRE. superior, as even that of Conde, that

sense of justice to see

him

it

485

grates upon one's

so often second in

was by an extension of the ancient

command.

It

belief that kings divinely

inherit their rights into the superstition that princes are born

generals, that the

hands

unfit to hold

where he deserved

command it,

of armies

was often placed in

and that Turenne did not

But

to be.

his merit

alwaj^s stand

was so well recoo-

nized by his suiaeriors that he was uniformly given entire

lat-

itude in his operations.

The French now marched back

to Heilbronn, but

having

small siege material, could not take this strongly garrisoned place

;

and thence by a sudden change

of plan they

advanced

on Schwabisch-Hall, hoping to push the enemy back over the

Danube, so as

to enable

them

But the

to winter in Swabia.

Bavarian army, reinforced by seven thousand imperial cavalry

and dragoons, took up

left

bank, and demonstrated towards the French

latter,

its

stand at Donauwbrth on the ;

when

not liking to go into winter-quarters too near an

superior to itself in niunbers,

deemed

it

the

army

best to retire on the

Main and Neckar. This withdrawal appears to have been made on a slender pretext but the reasons alleged by the ;

old historians are often quoted in these pages, even

do not appeal to us as sound. six

The French

hundred men in Wimpfen, and retired

at this point.

swim the

number

From

of

The water was

river,

left

when they

a garrison of

Neckar

aci'oss the

so deep that the cavalry

had

to

each one taking a footman with him, and a

men and wagons were

lost.

here the French army again withdrew to Philips-

burg, hoping to

camp permanently on

the Bavarians followed

it

up.

position between Philipsburg

the right bank, and

Turenne began an intrenched and the Rhine, and sent his

cavalry and baggage over to the left bank on boats

;

while,

finding that they could accomplish nothing further, the Bava-

486

AN ACTIVE CAMPALGN.

rians returned to

Wimpfen, captured

as

it,

was

to be expected,

and went into winter-quarters.

The French army under Grammont marched back to France, but Turenne, learning that the enemy was kept too busy in Flanders to hinder him, moved on Trier, captured

by a two days'

siege,

gave

over for occupation to the allied

it

and stormed the

elector of Trier, besieged

it

wesel on the Rhine, and then, placing his

castle of

army

Ober-

in winter-

quarters along the Rhine and Moselle, he personally repaired to Paris.

This campaign

by

its

distinguished from those of the period

is

and by seeking

stirring activity,

may

fairly

battle rather than

be placed the victory at AUerheim, and the speed

shown by Conde and Turenne

is

highly commendable, com-

The Bavarian move-

pared with that of other commanders.

ments followed the French, who initiative.

The advantage,

if

in every case retained the

any, was on the French side,

though they ended where they began technical

by

Against the defeat at Mergentheim

besieging strong places.

than

Many

real.

of

the

and

;

it

was rather

campaigns of

this era

appear to us to have no very manifest objective, as they had

no very definite outcome

;

and armies were wont

their base for winter-quarters.

rounds in a boxing match the other,

if

;

to return to

Such campaigns were mere

each opponent sought to

tire

there was no particular object to gain.

out

It

is

the peculiar indefiniteness of almost all campaigns of the day

preceding and following him which throws the clear-cut purpose of Gustavus into such took, he held

;

relief.

What

other generals rarely did

The biographers

of

Conde are wont

Gustavus once

so.

to ascribe to

him

all

the credit of this and other campaigns in which Turenne and

he worked jointly

;

tains best indicates

but the after history of both these cap-

who was

the more able man.

Conde

TO knew ter's

well

how

WHOM THE

CREDIT?

to put Turenne's ability to use,

487 and the

lat-

modesty never permitted him

to

trench on his superior's

must be said

to

Conde's credit that he

prerogative

;

but

it

was always generous in the division of honors.

Norman

Soldier.

(7th Century.)

XXXIX. CONDE AT DUNKIRK. SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER, The duke

commanded

of Orleans

Under him Cond^ served ceeded to the

until the

commander, Leyden, inundated the

The

victualed

was put

who

to

difficulties

by sea it

the capture of Dunkirk, the most impor-

First proceeding to Hondschoten, he thence took

From here he advanced along

fortified Furnes.

plies.

the French in the Netherlands in 1646.

duke had captured Mardyk, when he suc-

command and undertook

tant fortress on the coast.

;

were grave

there

1646.

vicinity to prevent

:

Cond^ from getting sup-

the garrison of ten thousand

was danger

of an

army

and

the coast on Dunkirk, whose

of relief

men

coming up

could be ;

Cond6

But he made a treaty with the Dutch,

to get victual or material.

not only helped shut the place in by sea, but began a diversion against the

Spaniards.

He worked

incessantly,

and was lucky

ference from the outside.

His

several sorties repulsed.

On October

gained in the place, and ten days relieved

On

in

having no serious

inter-

and af)proaches were duly completed, and

lines

1

and 2 assaults were made, a footing

later,

Cambray, and the campaign

Dunkirk surrendered.

Cond^ then

closed.

account of his royal birth the duke of Orleans had

been put in command of the troops operating in the

Low

Countries, and in 1646 Conde, though conscious of his supe-

appears to have willingly and conscientiously

rior ability,

served under him. as

The army had

of the latter place, the

on the coast it.

cautiously advanced as far

Mardyk, below Dunkirk, when Conde proposed the

;

most important and strongest fortress

but his chief had not the courage to undertake

Mardyk had been captured

the previous year

of Orleans after a costly twenty days' siege, later seized

by the Spaniards

by the duke

and had been

in a cleverly designed

den attack, with merely nominal lines

siege

loss

;

and sud-

now, after opening

and trenches, and after several bloody

sorties

and

CONDE ASSUMES COMMAND.

489

attempts to relieve the town from the outside, the French

managed

with his few

satisfied

from Dunkirk, and took

to cut the place off

upon which the duke,

despairing- of further successes, laui'els,

it

and

prudently retired to Paris to

and Conde received command of an

celebrate his triumph,

With

exhausted army of ten thousand men.

this

handful

he undertook the proposed operation against Dunkirk, to reduce which he had to contain the large Spanish army, beat the marquis of Caracena,

— who

lay in the way, intrenched

Vicinity of Dunkirk.

within a network of canals and rivers,

hold the sea against a Spanish this singular

the dikes

ways

;

;

country

is

— capture Furnes, and

fleet.

The communication

mostly by canal

;

in

the roads run along

the rivers are largely turned into artificial water-

and campaigning

region between

is

correspondingly

Mardyk and Nieuport

small streams and canals

;

it

is

is

The

difficult.

entirely cut

up by

well adapted for defense,

difficult for the offensive.

In pursuance of his bold plan, Conde marched September 4 to Hondschoten, where he deposited his heavy train. first

objective

was Furnes.

To

His

cross the several canals fed

FURNES CAPTURED.

490

by the Colme and held by troops as nvimerous as his own, he organized three columns which he himself was to sustain with the reserve, as might be needed.

The

first

column,

under Marshal Gassion, headed for Furnes and threw back

The

the Spanish force towards Caracena at Nieuport. ond, under General Laval, marched on Gassion's the line of the

Colme

equal celerity.

The

Gassion's

towards Vulpen.

I'ight

canals, third,

and accomplished

sec-

left to force

its

object with

under Villequier, was headed on This column met unex-

pected resistance, but, being properly supported by Conde,

drove in the enemy, and then pushed for Furnes, which town

was taken by sustain

to

it,

Spanish general having declined

assault, the

though

was

it

essential

undertake a siege of Dunkirk.

whoever should

to

It is not probable that the

Spaniards anticipated so apparently foolhardy an act as an investment of that fortress.

At

the council of

war which Conde

desire manifested to besiege

Conde convinced

place, while

ing the other was equally great

by the

court, to

called, there

whom

;

was some

Dunkirk

in lieu of

his lieutenants that the latter

more important

the

Menin

;

but

was vastly

the difficulty of besieg-

and

his plan

was approved

such matters had customarily to

all

be referred,

Dunkirk all

the

is

built

way from

on the dunes which extend up the coast

The

Calais.

Furnes and Nieuport

lie

on the east

and on the west Mardyk.

new town

lay outside.

huge towers

;

sea bounds

The

The

;

it

on the north

Bergen on the south,

old town was fortified

walls were thick

;

the

and flanked by

while a brick-lined ditch one hundred and

twenty feet wide was fed by canals from the river Colme.

The

sea,

breaking in towards the town, opened a

fine port,

which art had made capable of holding eight hundred vessels,

and

its

entrance was defended by an extension of the

IMPORTANCE OF DUNKIRK. fortifications

artillery

kirk,

491

on the dunes, and by two breakwaters on which

was mounted.

Three great canals led out of Dun-

Low

and boats could sail thither to every city of the

Countries.

^

The

dried-herring trade had originally given

importance to this city

power

it

had been

;

and since

cajjtured

by

growth

to wealth

and

several of the nations in suc-

Charles V. had granted

cession.

its

it

many

privileges,

was the bulwark of the Hapsburg dominion

and

it

in the Nether-

Dunkirk.

lands.

Its trade

with the interior and by sea was immense

;

it

maintained a number of privateers which did much damage to the

French ports and commerce, and

engaged the Dutch thousand

fleet.

soldiers, four

Its

thousand

trained burghers, and was under

it

sailors

had successfully

consisted of

garrison

three

and three thousand

command

of the marquis of

Leyden, who had won great repute by defending Maestricht for three

The

months against a large Dutch army.

difficulties

were indeed great.

Condi's army of ten

CONDI'S DIFFICULTIES.

492

thousand men was tired out, and had

little

with which to undertake further work kirk

a waste of sand, with none but

is

no subsistence for

was not strong and might

but good-will

the vicinity of

water, affording

means

of constructing

Furnes, the base for the siege, the hands of the Span-

fall into

who, moreover, were able at any time to relieve Dun-

iards,

The Dutch

kirk from the sea or along the beach at low tide.

were uncertain and somewhat jealous

moment from

Dun-

swamp

troops, nor indeed

works deserving the name.

;

left

to

be bought

Calais,

off

by the enemy.

allies,

liable

at

any

Victual had to come

and the Dunkirkers had inundated the land by

opening the canal-sluices, so that provision could not be hauled overland, while a tempestuous sea or the enemy's

might

at

fleet

any moment interrupt the supply coming by water.

Worse than all, the season was getting late, and success must be won soon or not at all. The duke of Lorraine was in camp on the border of Holland

;

Marshals Piccolomini and Beck, with the main Spanish

army, lay under the cannon of Dendermonde

under those of Nieuport.

On

troops believed in Conde, while the

Dutch question was the most

enemy was

pressing,

by sending an able ambassador

;

Caracena

the other hand, the French

to the

supine.

and Conde

The

settled that

Hague, who so far won

the assistance of the States-General that

Van Tromp

soon

patroled the sea near Dunkirk, and the prince of Orange

undertook a diversion against the Spaniards.

Conde ordered La

Ferte,

the Lys, to be ready at any

who had four thousand men on moment to join him he sent for ;

part of the garrisons in Picardy

armed

;

for rest

six

thousand

and

drill into

;

the Boulognese militia was

men came to him by sea and were put Mardyk two thousand Poles recruited ;

by Baron Sirot and one thousand English placed in Calais.

recruits were

All these were so posted that they could

IN FRONT OF DUNKIRK.

493

be concentrated in twenty-four hours, and fifteen small

frig-

ates were ordered to patrol the mouth of the port of Dunkirk.

Furnes was stoutly

fortified

and a large supply

under Conde's own

hundred men was put

rison of one thousand five

was

of provision

eye, a gar-

in the to^vn,

collected there.

Two

weeks after the army reached Furnes, so active had been

his

measures that Conde advanced on Dunkirk with ten thou-

sand foot and

The

five

thousand horse.

leader himself with the

first

nearest to the enemy, along the coast

marched on

Dunkirk

;

his left, along the canal

column took the road Gassion with the second

running from Furnes

to

Rantzau with the third marched across country All the columns reached their objectives

towards the Colme. in

;

good season.

Once quartered

in front of

Dunkirk, the French were in

no danger of attack save from the direction of Nieuport. Gassion held the line from the sea to the middle of the

dunes

;

next him Conde to the Furnes canal

astride the canal of

Bei-gen.

;

then Rantzau

Villequier, with

the

Boulo-

gnese, held the west of the town to the sea to head off succor

from

St.

Omer.

Marshes or places controlled by the French

closed the circuit.

Ten Dutch men-of-war and the fifteen mouth of the port. The canals

frigates effectually shut the

were bridged, and a line of circumvallation begun, which consisted of a palisaded

and sodded wall and a

ditch, the latter

twelve feet wide and six feet deep, and another similar one

The highest

forty paces from the

first.

were crowned by

mounted with

forts

of the dune-hills

suitable guns, while

on

the wide beach, where the low tide afforded an approach, the

defenses were held in place by a multitude of piles, left open to

admit the waves.

and as

this

means was

Rations were brought by the canals, insufficient

to be utilized, the inimdation

and the country roads had

was arrested by driving

piles at

FIERCE FIGHTING.

494

the moutlis of the sluices, backing these

up with huge

stones,

and then stopping the whole with a prodigious mass of earth. All useless horses and men were sent to the rear, and troops were moved from place to place as most needed. The distribution of rations, in which

made under Conde's own

it

was

eye, for

essential to economize,

was

enough victual could not be

got up, on account of the bad weather at sea and the deep

The men soon

roads on land.

the lack of good food;

felt

and the bad weather and absence of material made sible suitably to

In

five

men

tions,

at once opened.

Seeing that the health of

could not long be kept up under the existing condi-

Conde pressed the

to sacrifice

by

impos-

days from arrival of the army the lines were done

and trenches were the

it

house them.

men

disease.

in assaults rather than lose

He made

and concluded

siege with vigor, determining wisely

to

open two approaches

conduct in person, covered the

on the east side north of

it

;

an equal, number

a careful reconnoissance of the place, :

one, which he

last bastion

was

to

towards the sea

the other was directed at the horn-work

This was executed on

under the two marshals.

the night of September 24-25, and sixty guns in all were

mounted.

Next day, the marshals delivered a hill

fierce attack

near the horn-work, and captured

and sharp

gallant efforts to retake

it,

four hours, with heavy

loss, resulted.

it

;

on a dune-

but Leyden made

fighting, lasting twenty-

At

the approaches of

Conde fighting was carried on daily with great determinaLeyden was active, and as fast as the French gained one

tion

;

point, they

found fresh works to encounter

;

behind every

breach they uncovered a demi-lune.

Meanwhile the Spaniards had concentrated

their several

armies, but they delayed action in the belief that the difficulties of

the siege and the unfavorable elements would drive

DUNKIRK SURRENDERS. Conde from

his task

495

without their interference.

After a

careful reconnoissance of the French position, moreover, the

Spanish commanders found the works too strong wise to attack them

was learned

and the

;

fact that the prince of

be preparing a diversion to

to

assist the

on reconnoissance,

to

;

make

it

Orange French

An

compelled them to carefully consider their plans.

on Furnes was proposed

to

attack

but the works at this place proved,

be likewise too strong to promise suc-

The unenterprising Spanish commanders eventually deemed it best to resort to relieving Dunkirk by sea; but cess.

this project

bemg

attempted, also failed

;

for no sooner

had

Dutch and French squadrons

the pilots caught sight of the

cruising in the offing than they sought refuge in flight.

On

the night of October 1-2 a serious assault was

made

both on the bastion and the horn-work, and a lodgment was

Three days

effectuated.

tempt failed.

made an

at-

break through the French lines near the beach, but

to

Leyden now saw that the end was approaching

He had made

friends on the outside

Conde coidd

common

;

he

and on October 11 he capitulated with

listened to proposals,

the honors of war.

of

later the Spaniards

a noble defense, but his

had acted with a

pitiful lack of vigor.

ascribe his success to their indolence

motive, as

much

as to his

own

and want

energy.

After this splendid triumph Conde undertook to relieve Courtray, which, lying as forces,

it

did in the midst of the enemy's

needed a convoy of victual and 'powder to enable

hold out.

He

water, where

sent the material

it

was discharged

loaded on horses and carts.

down

the

Lys

to

it

to

Wervick by

in such shape as to be quickly

Shortly after midnight on the

day appointed, the column of cavalry destined for the expedition

was ready

;

each horseman took a bag behind his saddle

the rest was laden on carts, and the column advanced be-

tween Menin and Ypres, in each of which places the enemy

COURTRAY RELIEVED.

496

had

Before he had marched

forces.

of Lorraine

many

and Piccolomini came out

leagues, the

duke

to dispute his passage,

but Conde held himself so compact and ready that, barring a rear-guard

fight,

which

fell

out to the advantage of the

French, no serious attempt was made.

Courtray without the

The return

trip

loss of

The

prince entered

a man.

might be none the

less perilous

;

for Lor-

raine and Piccolomini chose the best positions to cut off,

along whatever road he might choose.

turned by the same route

;

Conde

The column

re-

and Conde's countenance was

so

firm, he marched with so much good order, and held himself

so ready for a combat, that the allied generals left

him

free

exit.

Beyond

this

handsome

feat,

nothing was done this year in

the Netherlands which deserves

operations kept

esijecial

mention.

Conde's

him away from the German theatre and

Turenne freehanded.

Crusader's Cannon.

left

XL.

TURENNE AND WRANGEL.

1646-1647.

In 1646 Turenne and Wrangel conducted a joint campaign.

After some

noxious delays due to political scheming of the rival courts, the French and

Swedes joined

in the

Cologne

and advanced on the imperial array,

district

which, under the archduke, lay on the Nidda.

made a handsome movement around off

from

advanced

hLs base,

to

Arrived in presence, Turenne

him

his opponent's left flank, and, cutting

Thus compromised,

the Danube.

The

attempt to march north, the archduke followed.

after an

allies crossed the

Dan-

ube and besieged Augsburg, untU the archduke returned and drove them

Here the

taking post at Kirchheim.

around the imperial

allies

again

and marched on the

left

made

a brilliant

off,

movement

interior, caixsing the

Bavarian

troops to separate from the imperial, and the elector was forced into a peace.

In 1647 the emperor was quite alone

;

but the political necessity of not allow-

ing the empire to be crushed resulted in withdrawing Turenne and

from the completion of their work of 1646. of the Rhine, aud, after suppressing a

mutiny among

fined himself under Mazarin's orders to

In 1648 he again joined Wrangel,

Turenne returned to the his

minor operations

who meanwhile,

German

Wrangel left

bank

troops, con-

in the Netherlands.

single,

had been forced

back to the Weser.

The campaign

of

1646

in

Germany, save an early

ruption by Mazarin, was conducted on Tureune's in connection with tlie

was operating to join him, rial

until

Swedish general Wrangel.

Hesse and lower Saxony

in

and

to

;

inter-

own

plan,

The

latter

Turenne proposed

manoeuvre in one body against the impe-

army, half of which consisted of Bavarians, and which

now had

usually stood

and operated between them.

This was a soundly conceived plan, looking to concentrated instead of scattering operations, and for a wonder Mazarin

approved

it.

It

was agreed with Torstenson and Wrangel

MAZARIN'S INTERFERENCE.

498

Swedes should march by way of Hesse and the

that the

French by way

Turenne, who had

of Nassau, to join hands.

wintered in the Rhine-Moselle region, concentrated in May,

and was on the point

of building a bridge of boats at Bacha-

rach to cross the Rhine, when Mazarin suddenly forbade this

movement, on the plea that the Bavarians had promised not to unite with the imperialists

Rhine

bank

orders,

Turenne was bound

of the

if

the French would remain on

and much

the left

;

to obey.

as he disapproved the

He

saw through the

promise, which the Bavarians had only given as a ruse

for

;

they did unite with the imperialists and move against the

Swedes with scarcely a semblance of delay, taking post This treachery again brought Mazarin's

beyond the Main. orders for action,

The

paign.

made by a

but

it

circuit, for it

at Bacharach.

crossing

altered the

entire

was impossible

cam-

plan of

junction of French and Swedes must

now be

to accomplish

Turenne was compelled

to

it

by

throw

a garrison of several regiments into Mainz, ford the Moselle

some twenty miles above Coblentz, move through the rate

down

to Cologne,

and thence on Wesel and

electo-

east to Lipp-

stadt,

keeping Wrangel apprised by couriers of his wherea-

bouts.

All this consumed more than a month of hard march-

ing and

much

negotiation with neutral states, and

was meanwhile compelled

to maintain himself

Wrangel

by a system of

manoeuvres and intrenched camps, which, relying on the fact that field-works were rarely attacked at that day, he very cleverly did,

and thus saved himself from being drawn

into a

general engagement.

When

the

enemy learned

they went into camp.

that Turenne was near at hand,

Joining at Giessen, the

seven thousand infantry, ten

allies

had

thousand cavalry and sixty

guns, with which they advanced to the vicinity of the enemy,

but did not see their way clear to an attack.

The imperial

HANDSOME TURNING MOVEMENT.

499

army was under the command of Archduke Leopold William, and lay behind the Nidda in a strong position near Ilben-

The

stadt.

allies

camped near Friedburg.

After a short

delay for reconnoitring and preparation, they developed the l)lau of

their

moving around the enemy's

own

and through the

left,

left,

hill

leaving Frankfort on

countiy to Heilbronn,

thus forcing the imperialists back, or perhaps cutting them off

from the Main, the

Neckar and the DanThis, on due con-

ube.

sideration, proved to be

much

too

and the

of a circuit,

shortly

allies

adopted another route with

same object

the

About

view.

in

June

middle of sent

to

they

hundred

fifteen

cavalry

the

seize

the

passage of the Nidda at

Bonames,

and

so

soon as this was done

Nidda Operation.

they moved at daylight

one day by their right around the the

Bonames

ford.

left of the

The archduke, unaware

of

archduke to

what they

in-

men under arms, but did not attack them on took many generations to teach soldiers the ad-

tended, put his the

march

:

it

vantage of falling on a marchino^ column.

The

allies

the Nidda, drove back Werth's cavalry, and reached the same day.

From

Windecken on

the left

from access

to the

Buchheim

here they marched on the morrow to

bank

of the Nidder, a confluent of the

Nidda, and by taking and occupying off

crossed

it

in force, cut the

Main, except by a

enemy

difficult circuit.

THE ALLIES IN SWABIA.

500

Thus separated from Franconia, Swabia and Bavaria, the archduke took a bold step and determined to move into the

Hesse and Cologne phalia, relieve

district

;

if

followed, to go as far as

West-

and thus draw Turenne and Wrangel away north and the imperial lands from invasion. But this manceuvre

was of no

avail, for

Turenne and Wrangel, guessing

his errand,

marched

while the archduke started northerly on

calling in his

his intention,

— Turenne — Mainz garrison, and moved southward. There

to Aschaff enburg,

the

crossed

Main,

are few things which show the able soldier more than the

power

to retain his initiative,

to the

enemy

weaken

his

and

to

as will suffice for safety,

own

plans.

much heed and not so much

pay

so

only as to

This manoeuvre had been beautifully

planned as well as admirably executed.

It was, says

Napo-

leon, " plein d'audace et de sagesse."

The

allies

army. in

To

had now no more

to

fear

from the imperial

cover the country more effectually, they marched

two columns a number of miles apart, the French by way

of Schorndorf

and Lauingen, and the Swedes by Nordlingen

and Donauworth, captured and

garrisoned

these

towns,

crossed the Danube, and found themselves in a rich and plentiful country,

where they could victual their troops

to great

advantage, and had the enemy's land at their mercy.

From the Danube Turenne sent a detachment of five hunmen to Augsburg, and was himself about to move on the place, when Wrangel, who had crossed the Lech, and in dred

the blockade of Rain had for aid.

met with stubborn

resistance, called

Turenne moved on Rain, whose capture

his pres-

ence assured, but he thereby forfeited his chance to take

Augsburg, which the enemy meanwhile occupied with a force of fifteen

hundred men from Memmingen.

The archduke,

moreover, gained time by this delay to return to the Danube

and Lech from

his attempted

diversion north.

It

was an

THE ARCHDUKE FEINTS.

501

Augsburg

error on Turenne's part not to capture

first,

and

then to march to the assistance of Wrangel, who could just well

as

Rain once captured, Turenne and

have waited.

Wrangel determined

to

withdraw to the

bank

left

Lech, and to undertake the siege of Augsburg their siege operations were as rapidly

and

;

of the

but though

skillfully

pushed as

without siege-guns they could be, and though they did indeed, at a loss of five or six ditch, the

hundred men, advance

to the

main

archduke got back through Franconia and the Up-

per Palatinate, and before they could reduce

burg by the right bank.

it,

reached Augs-

Augsburg was then a short distance

from the Lech, and the space and works between the town

and

made quite untenable by the enemy's heavy Though the marshals sought to drive the enemy

river were

artillery.

away from

his position, they

archduke forced the

allies,

were unable to do

by

his constant

so,

and the

and well-directed

fire,

from the siege and back

fied

a camp as well as strengthened the town defenses.

Having gained

so

Lauingen, where they

forti-

much, the archduke moved across the

Lech and out on the road

Wrangel

to

to

Memmingen.

Turenne and

Ulm, Tiibingen and

believed that he was aiming at

Heilbronn, so as to pass around their right, manoeuvre them fi'om their rich holding about Lauingen,

and push them back

This would have forfeited the results of the

to Franconia.

entire campaign,

and have

left

them no

satisfactory winter-

quarters, nor the chance of accumulating material so as to

afford promise of doing better in a

imperial

army was much

vided for. at the

The

enemy

to attack or

ranted

;

allied generals

one.

Moreover the

determined to move straight

despite that they were not well equipped,

and

manoeuvre in his front as circumstances war-

for the whole

they should

new

superior in numbers, and better pro-

now

do.

German campaign depended on what They moved from Lauingen Novem-

TURENNE OUTFLANKS

502

HIM.

ber 5 towards Memmingen, and next day after reaching

it,

on the enemy's camp at Kirchheim, which they reconnoitred.

The

fact that this

and ravines

camp was

in front that

it

so well jjrotected

cess led to a superb manoeuvre.

alry in

their front to hold

November

7,

Leaving two thousand cav-

them

there, the allies

unnoticed past the enemy's

in the archduke's rear, captured the

point and

all

left to

moved,

Landsberg,

Lech bridge

at that

the imperial magazines in the place, which had

\X

?

by marshes

could not be attacked with suc-

\0

J,0

OONAUWORTH

REMARKABLE CAMPAIGN.

A

The imperial

Thierhaupten.

troops

moved

503

to Ratisbou, leav-

ing the Bavarians to defend their own land, " Les manoeuvres

entre

Memmingen

et

pour deposter I'archiduc de son camp

Landsberg," says Napoleon, " sont pleins

d'audaee, de sagesse et de genie resultats

elles sont

fecondes en grands

militaires les doivent etudier."

les

;

;

This praise

march on the Nidda and the march on Landsberg combine to make this campaign a marked one.

is

well earned

The

allies

;

the

remained three weeks on the right bank of the

Memmingen and

Lech, and then, November 23, moved to into extended winter-quarters

as the Danube,

;

and the Swedes towards the Lake

The French captured

stance.

the French spread out as far

Swedes took Bregenz and Meinau, but they Lindau.

win

failed to

During the winter, however, Turenne and Wrangel,

in a raid with six thousand cavalry, beat the enemy,

rendezvoused at Rain, in a smart action, with heavy

The Congress

Ulm now

of

who had loss.

In the following

assembled.

March, 1647, a treaty was made by which the elector

spring,

of Bavaria cut loose

from the emperor, and Lauingen, Giin-

Ulm, Donauwbrth, Memmingen and

delfingen, Hochstadt,

Uberlingen remained in the hands of the to

of Con-

the castle of Tiibingen, the

forestall

allies.

This was

a fresh alliance between the elector and the

empire.

This campaign tion of the

is

remarkable in several ways.

The

junc-

Swedish and French armies in the presence of the

imperial forces was admirably managed.

The campaign was

conducted by two armies, under two generals who remained in accord throughout,

—a

noteworthy circumstance,

fit

totype of the cooperation of Marlborough and Eugene. allies

pro-

The

were weaker than the archduke, but they twice out-

manoeuvred him.

shown by

its

The

results,

decisive nature of the

— the

campaign was

separation of Bavaria from the

MAZARIN ARRESTS OPERATIONS.

504

The credit of the campaign is no doubt due to both Wrangel and Turenne. Napoleon only praises Turenne, but Wrangel must be given a share of the credit. Though in no empire.

sense Turenne's equal, he was a soldier beyond the average.

No

doubt Baner and Torstenson had done more brilliant

work

;

with a

but they were not fortunate enough to be associated

man

Turenne, and their labors came to naught.

like

The emperor was now

alone.

He

had no

Swedes and French were decidedly

had

in the field fourteen thousand infantry

sand cavalry

;

the emperor but

allies left.

The

superior.

and twenty thou-

thousand foot and six

five

thousand horse, under the Archduke Leopold. small showing compared

made

;

to

This was a

what Wallenstein and Tilly had

Germany was

but the whole of

The latter

exhausted, both in

men and means. Turenne and Wrangel were ready of their last year's operations.

court prevented

who

It

this.

to reap the advantages

But the policy

would not do

to

of the

French

permit the emperor,

was the head of the Catholic rulers, to be quite sub-

Turenne was ordered from Germany, where he woidd

dued.

have done good work, to the Netherlands, to conduct with a limited force a slow and profitless campaign of sieges.

All

Turenne's protests were in vain, despite the best of reason-

Conde had been ordered with a larger

ing.

where he was able

On

the

way

force to Catalonia,

to accomplish little.

to his

new

field of

operations,

Turenne had

taken H(3chst, Steinheim, Aschaffenburg and other places

had crossed the Rhine at Philipsburg, and marched into the country between Strasburg and Zabern. cavalry, late

Weimar

But the German

regiments, General Rosen

command-

ing, declined to advance further until paid six months' arrears

then owing them. better

by

They had an

idea that they could do

enlisting in the emperor's service.

Turenne had no

I

CIVILIAN MANAGEMENT.

505

funds.

The mutineers

Rhine.

Turenne followed them with part of

under Rosen, recrossed the

in a body,

his force,

finding clemency of no avail, arrested

Rosen

;

left

without a leader, part of the muti-

part marched towards the Tauber country.

Turenne attacked

these, killed

Some were

reorganized

rest.

he carefully laid his plans,

and sent him under guard to

at Ettlingen,

Thus

Philipsburg. neers gave in

and

But

for several days endeavored to pacify Rosen and them.

two hundred and dispersed the

some went into the Swedish

;

service.

In quelling this mutiny Turenne had Mazarin's policy had negatived

army

for the year,

ments.

There

all

much

lost

time.

the utility of the French

and had practically

German

lost the

It

was typical

is

no pretense that the management of the

regi-

management.

civilian

nations would be safer in the hands of the

than in those of the statesmen.

affairs of

army commanders

Such a theory

in

America

would tend towards the substitution of autocracy for republiThose versed in statecraft ought to be able to hold

canism.

the nation's helm to better advantage than solely to

arms

;

but

it is

real or alleged necessities of the state

fere with military operations

the military side of history,

;

educated

must

so often inter-

and as we are looking only

we

at

are compelled at times to lay

the blame of the failure of campaigns

who

men

the misfortune of generals that the

upon those statesmen

use war, as they often must, not to succeed from a purely

own schemmoment be most

military standpoint, but as subsidiary to their ing, to

win or

to risk loss as

may

at the

expedient. civil

war

were interfered with by the Washington

politicians.

So

they were, from a soldier's point of view

but the soldier

It is often said that our operations

looks at things from but one side

;

during the

;

there were

many

other

OPERATIONS REOPENED.

506

and weighty questions only success in the it

may be

was good

field,

said that, ;

be considered, which involved not

to

but the integrity of the nation

on the whole, the

political

and management ;

certainly so according to the light the country's

leaders then had,

if

not according to what shines on us now.

After this serious delay Turenne reorganized what was of the

Weimar

to Flanders, he

moved

into

to pursue a negative role,

by the capture

of a

Luxemburg, where he was ordered and to hold the enemy's attention

few small

the prime minister placed his

The Bavarians were again took from the

left

regiments, and, sending part of his cavalry

Swedes

forced them back to the

places. allies,

This woeful policy of

the Swedes, in bad case.

prevailed on to join the emperor

all

;

hard-won conquests, and

their

Weser

country, seizing all the terri-

tory so laboriously gotten from

them by Turenne and Wran-

Then, after

gel.

was gone, and there was danger that

all

the balance might tip in the other direction to the disadvan-

tage of France, Turenne received orders from the court again to join the Swedes.

management.

may

This well illustrates the idea of civilian

So far

as statesmanship goes, this

not) kave been good policy

how lamentable Turenne moved rapidly on

;

may

(or

but from a military stand-

j)oint,

the Main, raised the siege of

Frankenthal, marched on Mainz, captured the castle of Falkenstein, crossed the Rhine at boats,

and

in January, 1648,

Hesse-Darmstadt.

But

numbers or equipment

as

Oppenheim on a bridge

the Swedes were not ready in

for an immediate campaign,

retired to Strasburg the

of

went into winter-quarters in

same month.

Breech-loading Portable Gun.

(15th Century.)

Turenne

XLI.

THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR ENDS. TuRENNE ment

joined

Wrangel

as to plans, the

in

1648.

1G48 in Franeonia, and after a slight disagree-

two operated towards the Danube.

Crossing at Lauingen,

they followed the imperialists up to Zumarshausen, and in

back to the Lech with heavy

They then

Monteeuculi. falling

loss,

crossed the

back behind the Inn.

Lech and moved

Following across the

whole country up to the Inn, which rapid

To punish

unable to pass. all

;

drove them

river,

to the Isar, the Isar,

enemy

they occupied the

having no pontoons, they were

the elector for last year's treachery, they devastated

Bavaria in their control.

hereditary lands

May

despite their fine rear-guard fighting under

They were now on

the edge of the emperor's

but a new imperial army arriving at Passau on the lower

Inn, the allies retired to the lower Isar, whither the imperialists followed,

As autumn came

both sides intrenched camps. operations

had contributed During

behind the Lech.

effectually to

this camjjaign

to an end, the allies,

the Peace of Westphalia, retired

Turenne had fed

try without mterfertng with his strategic manoeuvres. after a fruitless

campaign

in Spain,

and

whose bold

his

men on

the coun-

In Augiist of this year,

Cond^ was transferred

to the Netherlands,

and defeated Archduke Leopold at Lens.

In February, 1648, when Wrangel got ready so notified Turenne, the latter,

crossed the Rhine at

Franeonia.

The

move and

though not yet well equipped,

Mainz and joined the Swedish army

allies

sand horse and nearly sure, but

to

had nine thousand fifty

guns

one whose strength lay in

;

foot,

in

twelve thou-

not a large force, to be

its

commanders.

Turenne

frankly declared to the elector of Bavaria that he should treat

him

and the

as for his late treachery he deserved to be treated allies

crossed the

army towards the Danube, latter

Main and followed as far as

;

the imperial

Ingolstadt, until the

went into camp under the guns of the

fortress.

The

RECONNOITRING THE ENEMY.

508 two

allied generals

plans.

for the first time disagreed as to

Wrangel wanted

Turenne victual

now

move on

to

the Ujiper Palatinate,

to stay in Swabia, as being a better territory to

section having

troops, the former

been eaten out.

The disagreement in no wise interrupted good-will, though there was

no inconsiderable

minor generals, which suasiveness to allay.

it

friction

required

all

among many

of the

Turenne's patient per-

The French army moved

to the

Bam-

berg country, Wrangel toward his goal, and after a short separation, the latter becoming aware that without

he was helpless, the

allies

Turenne

again joined at Rothemburg on the

Tauber, and both armies moved to Wiirtemberg, and took up quarters at

Reutlingen and Gbi^pingen.

This tribute to

Turenne by Wrangel shows where

lay

the

and

strength

greater ability.

Hearin

enemy

was

that

the

not

far

from Ulm, the

marched

perialists

and Augsburg,

that place

ten miles from the river.

the

Danube, while the im-

Zumarshausen Operation.

tion between

allies

toward

at

took

posi-

Zumarshausen,

Arrived at Lauingen, Turenne

and Wrangel personally headed three thousand horse and advanced on a reconnoissance across the great distance of the enemy.

river, to within

no

Hidden by a marsh through

which they threaded, they ascertained that the imperialists were carelessly stationed

had no outposts or

;

patrols.

were pasturing their horses, and

They determined on

attack,

and

sheltering the three thousand horse where they stood, sent

back orders

to the

two armies to advance at night in

light

A FINE RETREAT.

The orders were executed

order, leaving the train behind.

with exceptional speed

;

509

the allied divisions reached the scene,

were quickly rested, and again ployed into column 2 A. M. on

May

French army to

their

attack,

17, they

in the lead with a

van of cavalry.

;

and at the

lines,

But, alive

coming, the enemy had determined not to await

had thrown out

ments and protect the

thirty squadrons to cover their

train,

already in full retreat.

who commanded

feld,

approached the enemy's

had burned

their camp,

move-

and were

Count Holzapfel and Count Gronsthe

imperial and

respectively, after the experience of 1646,

Bavarian forces

had feared

be

to

cut off from

Augsburg by another turning manoeuvre, and

had marched

at night, the armies in the

The moral

train.

half

won

command

effect of the

this camj)aign.

van followed by the

1646 operations had already

The enemy's rear-guard was under

of Montecuculi, with but sixteen

eight hundred musketeers and four guns.

hundred horse,

The route

lay

through a wooded and marshy territory, and the train could be got forward only with extreme

Following hard

difficulty.

upon, the French van of cavalry at 7 A. M.

fell

sharply on

the rear-guard, under Montecuculi, who, though reinforced

by about one thousand men under Holzapfel, and though ing his

own with

hold-

great ability and fierce determination, was

forced back in confusion.

Count Holzajjfel was

killed,

and

Montecuculi barely escaped capture.

The French thus kept his horse

column.

Wrangel

The main army was prevented by the laboring

from coming back this

the rear busy while

sent

forward on either flank of the marching rear-guard train

and of

to the assistance of the rear-guard,

whole body of infantry, thirteen hundred were taken

prisoners, while the rest dispersed of standards

way through

;

eight guns

and wagons were captured. to the

main body.

At

and a number

The horse

cut

night the imperial

its

arni}^,

HEARTY PURSUIT.

510

hard pressed by the behind the

little

took position in

allies,

much

confusion

Turenne and Wrangel

river Schmutter.

endeavored to force the passage, but they had no guns, and

it

was stoutly defended by Duke Ulrich of Wiirtemberg, who held his

men

troops and till

together under extremely severe

losses.^

As

the

artillery had not yet got up, the attack was put off

daylight next day.

May

18, the

enemy meanwhile being But

cannonaded by what guns happened to be on hand.

during the night the enemy, now under Fermor and Gronsfeld, retired

behind the Lech to the protection of the guns of

Augsburg, having

hundred men

lost twenty-three

in killed,

wounded and prisoners, eight guns, six standards and three hundred and fifty-three wagons. The loss of the allies was The enemy would scarcely have lost more men also heavy. engagement had they stood their ground

in a general

much

the allies had accomplished

;

and

with small means.

The main Franco-Swedish column had not been able to and the bulk of the fighting had been by the van.

follow,

As

a sample

of

stout

pursuit

it

was

excellent,

and the

defense by Montecuculi during the retreat, and that of Ulrich at the Schmutter, were of the best.

The allied marshals rested a day, main force to come up, and on

the

— May

18,

—

The Bavarians burned

Wrangel moved on Rain.

to enable

the next Turenne and the bridge

over the Lech, and took up the old position Tilly had held sixteen years before against Gustavus

some cannonading they allies restored the bridge,

sand

men 12,

;

but after

on Munich.

The

crossed the Lech, leaving two thou-

to hold the bridge, and, sending one thousand horse

to harass the enemy's retreat,

June

Adolphus

retired at night

on Freising on the

behind the

Munich and

Inn,

sending

moved on Neuburg, and

Isar.

The Bavarians

fell

then,

back

strong infantry detachments to

Ingolstadt and garrisoning Wasserburg, while

THE ALLIES ON THE INN. tlie

elector personally

The

Tyrol.

allies

went

now

611

Salzburg and thence to the

to

crossed the Isar, occupied Landshut,

— preferring to use that at — and pushed towards Wasserburg, which, however,

broke the bridge at Freising

Landshut

proved to be so strongly garrisoned that

Marching downstream

taken.

it

could not be well

to Miihldorf to cross the Inn,

they were again balked, having no pontoons, and the river

being exceptionally wide, deep and rapid, with a rocky bed, in

which

hardly be driven.

piles could

Turenne and Wrangel had now manoeuvred and forced their

way

to the very

boundary of Upper Austria, had taken

possession of all Bavaria, and had rationed their troops on

As a

the country.

lesson to the elector for his treachery in

breaking his treaty,

all

the overrun portion of Bavaria was

This was done with no light touch, and the

devastated.

who

Bavarians,

found

in

had jjrayed openly in from the " Swedish Devil,"

sixteen years before

their churches to be delivered

Turenne and Wrangel a foe as

bitter

and unrelent-

ing as Gusta^iis Adolphus had been upright and placable. If they shoidd cross the Inn, the allies

would find a great

Upper the mood

deal of support, for the population of

Austria, as for

many years

for revolt

it

the emperor.

had been, was

still

in

from

This advance they were prepared to make and

no doubt would have done, but for a sudden turn in fortune, which, as usual

all

through the Thirty Years' War, seemed

to protect the hereditary possessions of the emjjeror.

Marshal Piccolomini and General Enkevort early

Field-

in July

had

assembled ten thousand foot and fifteen thousand horse with a

lot of

guns at Passau and Wilshofen, had crossed the Dan-

ube and moved to Eggenfelden, on the

which stood near Miihldorf.

Wrangel found Landshut

it

essential

to Diugolfing

allies'

left

flank,

Thus threatened, Turenne and to

retire,

on the lower

which they did via Isar,

where they

in-

PEACE OF WESTPHALIA.

512

trenched a camp and built a bridge.

Piccolomini and Enke-

vort did the like near Landau, a dozen miles below.

Tbe habit

of intrenching

was with Turenne, who preferred

the offensive in all cases, a mere relic of the system of the

We

day.

shall,

in the next

favor of battles in the open

Eugene did not

century, see

disappear in

it

and yet even Marlborough and

;

quite cut loose

from the habits

of thought

they had inherited.

In

About

this time the imperial forces

Swedish outpost as

if

at a village near their

by

by Wrangel with

— particularly one on

his batteries

Piccolomini was

the

Wrangel by

the end of

of either

but they were

Franco-Swedish

Landshut bridge

to

fruitless.

to send reinforcements to

army, and Turenne and

They

therefore

Moosburg back

till

posi-

camp

August had exhausted the victual

followed and took up a

—

the enemy's

which had been raided by Konigs-

the vicinity of Dingolfing.

than a month

;

now compelled

to save Prague,

mark from

reigned.

camp, and made a threat

There were one or two attacks on the other's

either army,

Bohemia

midsummer.

till

endeavored to entrap a

But nothing came

to approach the allies.

attempt. tion

remained

this situation the rival armies

new camp

the

moved

of the Isar

September

Then Turenne and Wrangel

enemy

For more

at Landshut.

end of

via the

the

;

of

—

inactivity

retired behind

the

Lech, and on October 11 established themselves between

Augsburg and Landsberg

Hence Danube and moved

at Schwiibisch-Miinchen.

they marched to Donauw(5rth, crossed the

The imperial army followed from

on EichstJidt.

the Isar, as

far as the Lech.

Shortly after came the Peace of Westphalia,

Turenne's and Wrangel's operations had

Turenne took

uj)

near Niirnbera-.

winter-quarters

in

much

to

which

contributed.

Swabia, and Wrangel

WAR CONTINUES.

513

This last joint campaign of Turenne and Wraugel wortliily

crowned the Thirty Years' War.

After those of Gustavus

Adolphus, this and the campaign of 1646 are the most note-

worthy and the most productive of says

generals,

Napoleon, moved

The

results.

tlirough

allied

length and

the

breadth of Germany with a rapidity and decision unknown to

war

at that time.

Their success came from their ability

and proper method, from the strong

feeling for the offensive

which characterized Turenne, and from the boldness and intelligence of their every step.

The armies were fed possible

from

their small

largely on the country.

of the population during the advance.

But

in retreat the

found the magazines they had prepared absolutely

allies still

essential,

and they mixed the system of an

of magazines in

effective

requisitions with that

manner.

Since Gustavus' time,

the magazine system had been the only one in use. victualing

was done by magazines

war nourish war,

— a method which

is,

aspect, the one system contributes to

The

live

Turenne had small armies on requisitions from

true system

is

From

to

the other to

feed,

and could

surrounding

towns. :

maga-

on the line of advance and at places of

and requisitions

— paid or enforced — on

ward and flank movements and on

The

speed,

a military

a proper combination of the two

zines at proper places

possible refuge,

the

Turenne made

however, incompatible

with the humanity inculcated by Gustavus.

security.

Gustavus'

and regidarly-paid-for

contributions from the territories traversed.

easilj^

This was

number, and the usual friendliness

last years of the

for-

retreats.

Thirty Years'

War

were mixed up

with the war of France against Spain in such a manner as materially to enlarge the theatre and scope of operations.

The war was no longer one

Germany

against

the Catholic emperor to secure freedom of worship.

It be-

of Protestant

ROHAN AND CONBE.

514

came a general European war, waged between France and the Hapsburgs for the supreme control of European politics.

France was shortsighted in many ways. divided her forces so in

Germany and

as, for instance, in

She constantly

1635

to have armies

the Netherlands, in northern Italy, in the

Valteline, in Roussillon

and

in Spain, not to count

resources spent upon the navy.

The

immense

result naturally

was

that instead of accomplishing results so that a peace with

Spain should accompany the general Peace of Westj)halia in

1648, the Franco-Sj)anish war dragged along a dozen

years more.

Almost the only noteworthy

oj)erations during this

whole

period occurred in 1635 to 1637 in the Valteline, where the

Duke

Rohan defended

of

that territory with a small force

against Spanish troops advancing from northern Italy, and against an imperial

way

army which sought

of the valley of the

Adda.

As

to join the former

by

a sample of mountain

warfare, these operations deserve study.

In 1647 Conde was sent to Catalonia, where he failed in the siege of Lerida, owing to lack of

men and

The

material.

operations have no especial interest, save to recall those of

CsBsar on the same terrain.

always did, in the end

;

the

The great Roman won, Frenchman

haps no blot on a captain's record to graveyard of military reputations. inspired

It

lost fail

;

but in

it

as he

is

per-

Spain, that

needed the genius that

a Hamilcar or a Hannibal to succeed in such a

country.

In 1648 Conde was again the end of

weeks.

May

in the

Low

Countries, and at

took the town of Ypres after a siege of two

His biographers make much of many of Conde's

operations which wear, on the whole, an air of triviality

without underrating

much

this great soldier, it

of Conde's best

is

;

and

noticeable that

work was done when associated with

CONDE MANCEUVRING.

515

Turenne, and his worst when opposed to this commander. Later in the year Conde won a battle at Lens over Archduke Leopold.

The

civil

turmoils of the Fronde had begun, and

won would

the Spaniards believed that a great battle

them a permanent footing

give

in France, if not indeed access to

The archduke had eighteen thousand men and and the army was really commanded under

the capital.

thirty-eight guns,

He had, after taking the town of Lens, marshaled his line facing northerly, with the right leaning on him by Baron Beck.

that place,

and the forces posted on high and excellent defen-

.

<*

J.^'<''

!^^'=^.V^''^*

»*

\

«-"'

Battle of Lens.

siv^e

ground.

at Allerheim,

He hoped and

that

Conde would

attack, as he

in such case felt confident of success.

had

But

Conde, who was approaching from the Yjires and Dunkirk country, and six

who had but

fourteen thousand men, of which

thousand were horse, and

spect to blindly attack

;

clined an assault, and strove

nent down into the plain. the day of grand-tactics efforts

produced no

result,

was too circum-

less artillery,

though he drew

uj) in line,

by every means

The armies

he de-

to lure his oppo-

lay in parallel order

had not come.

Finding that his

Conde determined

to fall

back for

A BRILLIANT VICTORY.

516

La

forage and victual to

Bassee, north of Lens, and at day-

break on August 20 he moved to the rear in

Thus tempted, Beck

sallied

six cohimns.

out with his light horse and

attacked the French, badly defeating the cavalry rear-guard.

Conde answered with

heavy cavalry

his

but

;

this, too, after

Under cover

preliminary success, was beaten back.

engagement, and seeing that he could do no faced about, and drew up on the heights half

Lens and Neus, a

La

on the road to

village

a

of this

less, Conde way between

Bassee, mean-

while essaying a charge in person to extricate his heavy horse,

Though

which was hard pressed.

ill

delivered and driven

back, the general result of the entire series of combats was to give lost

Conde time

to

marshal his

line

;

and what was

really a

opening had induced the Spaniards to leave their advan-

tageous post in the expectation of improving a victory already

The cavalry which had been beaten Conde

half won.

put in second

who

line,

and then advanced

lay on higher ground than the French, but not as

still

The

favorably as before. battle

came

old records,

men

wisely

to attack the archduke,

cavalry lines which opened the

into very close

—

clashed,

-

contact,

— four

and while the foot

paces, say the

Then

before a pistol shot was fired.

the horse-

in the centre of each

army

advanced, the squadrons swayed to and fro in the usual confusion

of

a parallel battle.

Finally, on

French horse won the day, and was able

both wings, the

to turn

inward on

the Spanish foot, with which the French cotys de hataille

was already

The

fiercely engaged.

battle

and

killed,

was gained.

six

broke up, and nearly

—

all

The enemy

thousand prisoners. all

the officers,

lost

The

four thousand

rest of the

— some

army

eight hundred,

the guns and one hundred and twenty standards were

taken.

Lens made a fourth spendid victory

lace of

gems, though

it

in Conde's neck-

was by impulsive fighting and not

VALUE OF GUSTAVUS' WORK. manoeuvring that

it

was won.

Beck died

efforts for the year.

The opeiations from the

517

checkmated the Spanish

It

of his wounds.

battle of Liitzen to the

Peace of

Westphalia redound almost as much to the glory of Gustavus

Adolphus

as those

The manoeuvres

which he himself conducted in Germany. were indeed

of his successors

brilliant,

but

they lacked the solidity and the results of those of the great

What

Swede.

who built in

Gustavus did stayed done

;

and

it

was he

the foundation of the structure of Protestant success

A

Germany.

century of operations such as those which

preceded and succeeded his could not contribute as

much

to

the cause as did his manoeuvres in the few months he re-

mained upon the theatre

of war.

It

was exhaustion pure and

simple which put an end to the Thirty Years'

War

;

that the

end was in favor of Protestantism was solely due to what Gustavus had done.

The Peace

of

Westphalia was the

which dragged on from 1643 a

fief

to 1648.

Wismar, the of

Sweden in eastern

Werden, and an indemnity

received outright (not as a

fief

Philipsburg.

some other towns.

of five million rix dollars.

dollars.

votes.

France

all

Alsace, and the right

Strasburg remained

free, as

did

Hesse-Cassel got Hersfeld, Schaumberg,

the fiefs of the foundation of

sand rix

Bremen

of the empire) Metz, Toul,

Verdun, Pignerol, Breisach, about to garrison

Pomerania,

secularized bishoprics (not the city) of

She became a member of the Diet with three

of

received, as

of the empire, all western Pomerania, Stettin, Garz,

Damm, GoUnow, Wollin and Usedom and

fruit of negotiations

Minden and

six

hundred thou-

Brandenburg was indemnified

Pomerania by the bishoprics

of Halberstadt,

for her loss

Minden and

Camin, and by Magdeburg after the death of August of Saxony.

Mecklenburg and Brunswick received small

torial rights.

terri-

TERMS OF PEACE.

518

The

secular

and

ecclesiastical affairs of the

empire were

rearranged so as to place Catholics and Protestants on a substantial equality

was

to

;

and the ownership of

remain forever as

it

ecclesiastical estates

existed January 1, 1624.

The

Austrian and Bohemian Protestants gained nothing; but elsewhere freedom of worsliip w^as fairly well established.

The imperial

courts in the several Circles were to be equally

divided between Protestants and Catholics.

The peace was guaranteed by France and Sweden.

Three-barreled Carbine.

(16th Century.) k

XLII.

CONDE AGAINST TURENNE. The war between grew

France and Spain went on, and the

from Spain, led an army nificant operations the it

;

The

from the Netherlands.

laid siege to Rh^tel,

under an amnesty.

to Paris

moved from

princes held Paris,

The duke

into France

French

Cond^ took up arms against the

court

After some insig-

Turenne defended

court, while

it.

place to place, under escort of the army, while the

was called

in

by Mazarin

of the capital resulted.

as an ally, but he

went over

much plunder

to

in France.

Fert^ and Turenne later transferred the war to near Paris, and in July a

battle

was

foug'ht in the

Faubourg Saint-Antoine,

in

which Cond^ was only

saved by being admitted through the gates into the capital.

crowded to the

frontier,

in the Spanish service to

In 1651

In 1652 the Fronde broke out

and a campaign of manoeuvres south

of Lorraine

Fronde

of the

and Turenne attempted to

Cond^, and was got rid of only after he had collected

La

war

but he was met by Duplessis and seriously defeated.

Turenne returned again, and

civil

Cond^ was imprisoned, and Turenne, seeking aid

to larger proportions.

relieve

1650-1656.

march on

and Tui-enne opposed him

Paris, but

and checkmated

and the court returned

to Paris. ;

Later he was

In 1653 Cond^ was

Cond^ made several attempts

Turenne cleverly kept between him and the

capital,

all his efforts.

Despite the Peace

of Westphalia, the

war between France

and Spain went on, and the unhappy French were consmued not only by a harassing conflict upon their borders, but by the

still

more disheartening

Stripped of

its

rection under

civil

war

of the

Fronde

at

home.

complex character, the Fronde was an insur-

some of the French princes against Mazarin's

government for Anne of Austria, queen regent during the minority of Louis

XIV.

Political difficulties during

this

period obliged Turenne to flee to Holland until an amnesty

was declared

at its close.

His

political course at the

opening

520

THE FRONDE.

of the struggle has been

much

criticised

try men's souls, as every civil

multitudes of honest

men

;

but

was a time

it

to

war must do, and there were

misled.

In 1650 the internal trouble grew apace others of like sentiments were seized arin in the castle of Vincennes.

;

Conde and

and imprisoned by Maz-

Turenne sought

to

head the

TURENNE INVADES FRANCE. Conde

old troops of

at the castle of Stenay,

521

on the Meuse, for

the purpose of rescue, but, unable to gain over

more than

a few Frenchmen, he entered into negotiations with Arch-

duke Leopold William, governor-general Netherlands, raise troops,

of

Spanish

the

who gave him two hundred thousand thalers to and fifty thousand thalers a month for rations,

together with a personal subvention, and further agreed, in addition to what Turenne should enroll, to furnish and keep

two thousand foot and three thousand horse under the

latter's

Having reached a further understanding with the

orders.

Spaniards, looking towards the forcing of a peace by Spain

on Mazarin, and having made of the queen regent a spectful but fruitless

demand

a Spanish army into France.

for negotiations,

re-

Turenne led

Having, with the money fur-

nished him, gathered together a few thousand men, and with

army put on

these joined the Spanish

foot according to agree-

ment, he crossed the border from the Netherlands.

The

Spanish idea was to invade Picardy while Turenne should invade

Champagne but Turenne ;

insisted

on marching in one

body, to seize strong places in the interior, and to work in unison with the adherents of the Fronde,

Bordeaux and elsewhere.

and Guise were invested taken,

and

owing

Capelle,

The

allies

which made operations

The

to Vervins,

rival

all

but im-

later captured

La

where the archduke

armies were

strength, ten to twelve thousand foot

sand horse.

Guise could not be

the royal French army,

drew back, a week

and thence moved

took command.

who had armed in Le Catelet

fortresses of

in June, but

to the presence of

to a very rainy season

possible.

The small

and

of

about equal

six to seven thou-

Turenne induced the Spanish army to move

forward to the Aisne, taking and garrisoning Chateau Porcien

and Rhetel, and the French army

retired to

Rheims.

Turenne suggested the advisability of moving along the Aisne,

RETREAT FROM RH^TEL.

522 turning- this

army by the

to free the imprisoned

left,

Fronde

and marching straight on Paris leaders,

Conde among them but ;

the Spanish commander had not the stomach to agree to such

a manoeuvre, which was not perhaps as discreet as

— though

indeed in

its

it

very boldness lay safety,

was bold,

— and

re-

The princes were transferred But Turenne undertook a

fused even to cross the Aisne.

to another prison near Orleans.

grand reconnoissance towards Fismes with three thousand horse and five hundred musketeers, attacked ten regiments of

French cavalry which were stationed there and threw them back on Soissons, capturing Spaniards, sending

The

hundred prisoners.

five

a detachment

La

to

Ferte-Milon,

at

Turenne's suggestion, then marched on Fismes, to a position

between the French army at Rheims and the capital

what reasons cannot be

said,

;

but, for

took no advantage of their

favorable situation, further than to undertake a month's negotiations with the

duke

of Orleans,

which eventuated in no-

The Spaniards then retired to the east and besieged Mouzon on the Meuse. After a seven weeks' siege Mouzon

thing.

surrendered, the Spanish troops retired to winter-quarters in

Flanders, and Turenne remained with his eight thousand

men

near Montfaucon, in the

Aisne.

The French army

finally, in

to

December,

its relief,

sat

hills

down

between the Meuse and idly in

laid siege to Rhetel.

but as he arrived too

late,

Champagne, and Turenne hurried

the place having sur-

rendered December 13, he started to return to Montfaucon,

marching by his

left.

Intent on bringing Turenne to battle, the French com-

mander. Marshal Duplessis, followed him south from Rhetel,

and reached

his front

December

15.

ferred to retire, he nevertheless drew left of

like

Though Turenne up on the heights

the valley route he was pursuing.

pre-

to the

Duplessis did the

on the right of the valley, and both armies in parallel

TURENNE DEFEATED.

523

order marched at half a cannon-shot distance by the flank

Inasmuch

along the valley.

five or six miles

as he could not

well avoid battle, and observing that on the French right flank there was but

little

together and marched

near the

Champ

cavalry,

own horse turn the enemy

Turenne drew

his

down into the valley to At first the operation looked

Blanc.

like a

success, as the

French cavalry of the right wing was some-

what dispersed

;

but the second line remained firm, and

Turenne's troops — mostly raw

Battle of

levies

Champ

The

Blanc.

same thing took place on Turenne's first

— gTew unsteady.

right,

where an attack at

promised success and then miscarried.

So soon as he

perceived the weakening of Turenne's troops, Duplessis drew

some cavah'y from

his right,

brought

it

over to his

left,

and

charged in with a vigor which completed Turenne's defeat.

The men behaved routed.

general flight

Bar

He

lost the

officers,

with

le

five

Due.

t^dly, and the great French soldier

was

bulk of his force in prisoners, several

and by good luck only saved himself by a

hundred cavalry south through Champagne to

Here he reassembled part

of his troops

and

CONDE ATTACKS TURENNE.

524

moved back

of the

battle does not ing,

Meuse

to

Montmedy, where he went

into

Napoleon's criticism on his engaging in

winter-quarters.

seem

to

be sound.

He was

justified in fight-

even though the enemy outnumbered him

;

in fact, he

could scarcely avoid accepting battle, for DujDlessis forced

on him

but luck was against him, and his

;

old soldiers, on

During

this

whom

he could

men were

it

not his

rely.

campaign Turenne was dependent on the

archduke, and could not operate on his

own

Leopold had nothing to do with the defeat

at

ideas,

Champ

though Blanc.

In the next year (1651) Turenne returned to Paris, a general

amnesty having been granted.

The French

were freed, and Mazarin was banished.

princes

Turenne sought

to

patch up a peace between France and Spain, but, unable to

do

so,

he returned to France.

In 1652 the Fronde troubles again broke out, and the court was obliged to leave the capital and seek refuge with the army.

Conde, who was the leader of the party of the

princes, sought to induce his old brother soldier, Turenne, to join

him

in operating against the

who had returned refused, and he

government of Mazarin,

after a short banishment.

But Turenne

and Marshal Hocquincourt, with nine thou-

sand men each, mostly horse, were sent to operate against

Conde, who had taken command of the army of the Fronde that had been under the leadership of the duke of Beaufort,

and, fourteen thousand strong, lay in position between targis

Mon-

and the Loire.

Conde held Montargis, and lay near

camped

at Briare,

by.

Turenne was

with Hocquincourt at Bleneau, covering

the peripatetic court which was sojourning at Gien.

cavalry was dispersed for ease of foraging.

Conde was approaching

in

Their

Learning that

person, the two royal generals

were about to concentrate their forces further to the north.

CONDE CHECKED. If

525

he would strike either singly, Concle had no time to lose

and having ascertained

their situation

by a

spy, he

;

made a

night attack on Hocquincourt, whom, leading a small body of horse with his accustomed rapidity and success, he surprised

and drove

in disorder

from

Briare, hoping to take

But

ner.

the

latter

his post.

He

then turned towards

Turenne unawares in the same manhad

caught the alarm, and was already

in

between

line

Ozouer and Bleneau, where he held a position he had previously reconnoitred, and

which was the

sole route

by

which Conde could advance,

wood and

a defile between a

a marsh. Conde was checked at this point after a smart

combat

;

Hocquincourt, find-

ing that he was

not

jjur-

sued, rejoined his colleague

by a

circuit,

and Turenne,

whose plan was court

rather

to

guard the

than

conduct Operation of Gien.

a brilliant offensive, retired to Gien. His total loss had been six hundred killed and six hundred prisoners, but Hocquincourt had forfeited his guns

Conde's loss was but four hundred men. in this first operation, the court

Had Conde won

would have been

in extremis;

but the prince retired to Chatillon with his army and personally

went

to Paris,

where he arrived April 11, and, though

he had accomplished naught, assumed the role of conqueror

among

On

his

many

adherents in the capital.

learning Conde's absence, Turenne at once

moved

to

TURENNE ABLY MANOEUVRES.

526 Auxerre.

His (or Mazarln's) plan was to

war as near Paris as practicable.

From

fix the theatre of

Auxerre, by an

able and rapid series of marches, Turenne kept on to Sens

and Corbeil.

Tavannes, in

command

of Conde's army, could

Paris-Orleans Country.

do nothing to arrest his movement, and when Turenne

camped

at

chief.

Tavannes advanced

to

his army, Condc, with but a

a

finally

Arpajon he had cut Tavannes from Paris and Etampes, few

Thus

isolated

his

from

recruits, sought to place in

state of defense St. Cloud, Charenton, Neuilly

and other

THE DUKE OF LORRAINE. suburbs of

Negotiations

Paris.

—

largely

527

underhanded

—

were meanwhile afoot, in which Mazarin on one side and

Conde on the other acted the

principal roles, each vainly

seeking to outwit the other.

Turenne kept up

He

his activity.

attacked Tavannes dur-

ing a military fete at Etampes, and did him damage to the

men

extent of two or three thousand

aged his part of the enterprise so to send

him

to

but Hocquincourt man-

;

ill

that Mazarin concluded

Flanders, and to rely solely on Turenne,

thus assembled under his

own

colors twelve thousand

who men.

Tavannes had but eight thousand.

Meanwhile Conde took

Denis.

St.

Melun, and Turenne laid siege

to

Once out

fended the place furiously.

The

Etampes.

court went to

Tavannes

de-

was

of material, he

about to surrender, when Conde, from Paris, succeeded in

The king

throwing a convoy of munitions into the town.

sought to exert the influence of his personal presence, but in vain; Tavannes pleaded sickness and would not ajjpear on the walls to parley with Louis, and the town was again on the point of surrender,

upon the

when

the

duke of Lorraine came

This treacherous ally had been called in

scene.

by Mazarin, who imagined that he could control him

La

no sooner had Lorraine safely passed the army of

;

but

Ferte

than he declared for Conde, and was warmly welcomed in Paris. It

seemed as

could

if

Conde, with the duke of Lorraine's army,

now move

Turenne.

to

Etampes and deal the

But though

he was not to be easily led than fighting

;

ravaging right Georges.

and

his

and

last

the duke was both a knave ;

blow to

and a

army merely passed through the left,

fool,

plunder was more in his line

finally

Mazarin began again

Turenne advanced towards him

;

land,

reaching Villeneuve to

negotiate

with

and on the promise

St.

him of the

CONDE NEAR

528

army giving up

royal

the siege of Etanipes and j)ermitting

to leave with the booty

the duke

PARIS.

which he had gathered

along his route, the new-comer was got rid

had

and was on the eve of compelled to

retii'e

;

success,

Etampes,

in the siege of

was thus by

political necessity

but he moved to a position near the

duke of Lorraine, prepared shameful contract.

men

thousand

lost nearly four

all

Turenne, who

of,

By

to force

him

to carry out his

a sharp march across the Seine, he

reached the duke's camp, and at a risk of pushing him to

him

battle, obliged

a

new agreement

for good,

to sign

to leave

and actually

to

march away before Conde,

who was on

the road, could

join him.

The

of an outsider

resulted

large

in

section

had merely

ravaging of

a

France,

and had done no good

to

The duke

of

either party.

Vicinity of Paris.

calling In

Lorraine alone had made

a gain.

He had moved away

with an enormous amoimt of

plunder, the result of Mazarin's interference in the military operations.

Conde, with his army of but

camp

at St. Cloud.

He had

five

thousand men, was in

possession of the sole near-by

bridge over the Seine, and by crossing to one or the other side could

thus hold head the better to Turenne's eleven

thousand men

;

and the

latter,

though he advanced into the

for the moment attempted nothing against the The queen, however, had disgarnished the frontiers and created a new army under La Ferte, equal to Turenne's, vicinity,

prince.

whicli

was designed

to operate in conjunction with him.

CONDE TRAPPED. Turenne had moved

Lagny

to

529

Marne

sur

head

to

off rein-

forcements for Conde, said to be approaching from the Netherlands

;

but finding them

Conde

attack

still

far away, he

in connection with his

new

constructed a bridge at Epinay, and

Ferte should cross and

on the

fall

it

preferred to

He had La

coadjutor.

was agreed that

left flank of

Conde's camp,

while Turenne should remain on the right bank to prevent his repassing the

Conde guessed

river.

saw the building of the bridge the two

armies should be

beyond Paris,

St.

down upon him

had been

it

He

inside the walls.

of the Seine

the j)lan

friendly,

and Marne, as

move through

and the

to seek refuge

now

as

fiercely

and would not allow

chose Charenton, at the confluence his retreat.

From

Cloud he could move thither along the

could

when he

and was compelled ere

the fickle capital was

for

opposed to him as

him

;

his

camp

at

bank, or he

left

the suburbs of Paris on the right

bank

being an equally short route and with better

latter

roads, he chose

it,

ing out early July

— unwisely, as

the event proved.

Start-

he had already traversed the Bois de

5,

Boulogne, the Faubourgs St. Honore, Montmartre, St. Denis

and

St.

Martin, and the van had got beyond St. Antoine,

when he perceived ing from the north.

and determined

the head of the king's column approach-

Turenne had ascertained

his

movement,

him on the march, a

fact

which pre-

to attack

vented Conde's reaching Charenton without a battle. manifest that, fallen

upon

dier as

;

if

It

was

he continued his march, his rear would be

and there was no probability that

Turenne would permit him

so able a sol-

Marne.

to cross the

was trapped, but he did the only possible thing

:

He

he recalled

Tavannes, who led the column, and who managed to rejoin his chief with

some

loss.

Conde was indeed army, thrice his

in

ill

size, in his

case.

In his front the

rear the walls of Paris,

kinsf's

manned

CITY FIGHTING.

530

by the

militia,

determined to bar his entry to the town, now

his only refuge.

His defeat seemed so certain that the walls

were crowded by Parisians, then as now eager sight-seers while on the heights of Charonne stood the king and court

Conde, as was always

to witness his inevitable destruction.

his

mood, determined

and

to sell his life

cause dear.

his

There were some intrenchments in his front which had been erected to arrest the duke of Lorraine should he attempt to

levy blackmail on Paris, and these

he

defenses

utilized.

His position was good

in hav-

ing concentric roads in his rear

which enabled him to sustain his fighting lines

in a it,

bag

;

but he was

;

Turenne well knew

and drew

around

his line

him from Charonne

He

river.

then

three attacks

:

organized

himself in the

Marquis

centre.

the

to

St.

Maigrin

on his right, and the duke of Noailles on his

Battle of St. Antoine.

opposed him

and Tavannes on right and

left,

Conde

left.

with

Nemours

holding himself with a small

following ready to march to any point seriously endangered.

Each French general knew

the other

:

it

was surely

to

be a

death struggle. Desirous of making a certainty of the his wont, seeking to save lives,

while waiting for

La

fight,

and, as was

Turenne began to skirmish,

Fert^, but Mazarin ordered him instantly

to close with the prince

and destroy him.

He

could not

tell

what might occur within the walls of Paris. Turenne obeyed.

Conde met the

first

assault on the centre

by a

sortie,

and

PARIS ADMITS CONDE. repulsed all

it

531

and shortly a sanguinary struggle was engaged

;

along the

Maigrin carried the works

St.

line.

de Charonne, and

in the

in

Rue

the fire from the housetops and

desjjite

Conde met

windows, kept on his way.

his battalions at the

market-place and drove them back headlong, with a heavy

In the king's centre progress was made only

loss in officers.

more severe

at yet

hand

Conde had posted troops

loss, for

house and garden, and the

in every

was deadly.

fire

It was a hand to Meanwhile Noailles carried and was fast closing in on

fight at almost all points.

the intrenchments in his front,

Nemours, when Conde appeared upon the scene and thrust

him back.

But

despite all

head of the royal army,

Conde could

still

forged on

;

do, Turenne, at the

and though several

He

times driven back, kejit steadily gaining ground.

reached the abbey

Rue

St.

and thence worked

;

his

finally

way along

the

Antoine until Conde in person stopped him west of

At

its walls.

was desperate.

The men

in Noailles anew,

and forced

this point the conflict

fought like devils.

Turenne sent

the fighting everywhere, while

La

Ferte arrived and prepared

Conde was being netted

to get in Conde's rear.

when

;

his annihi-

fortunately,

by the

intercession

of Mile, de Montpensier, daughter of the

duke

of Orleans,

lation appeared certain

;

the gates of Paris were opened to

pass St.

in, as to

Jaques.

a temple of refuge.

He had

him and he was allowed

He

two thousand men

lost

to

retired into the Quartier ;

Turenne prob-

ably more.

Conde did not long remain sand men

left,

and La Ferte.

He

cost,

he had but four thouto face

both Turenne

turned to Spain, which had had an easy

drawn the

and had recaptured many that

;

and could not undertake

task since the court had

such risk and

in Paris

had

forces

from the

frontiers,

Even Dunkirk, won at them. The archduke saw

fortresses.

fallen to

Conde would be an exceptionally valuable

ally,

and

dis-

TURENNE ON THE DEFENSIVE.

532

patched Fuensalclegna to his aid

who was again afoot, entered

and the duke

;

Champagne

at the

And

that Fuensaldegna entered Picardy.

of Lorraine,

same time

though the Span-

iard yielded no hearty assistance to Conde, on the other

hand

the duke of Lorraine remained with the prince some time.

Alarmed

new

at this

alliance, the coiu't

was for retiring to

Burgundy and Lyon, but Turenne persuaded them was the one thing stay near the

army and

to

move

to Pontoise, behind the river

Oise, north of Paris, where he assured afford

them due

Learning advanced

to

them that he could

protection.

approach of the duke of Lorraine, Turenne

of the

Compiegne, hoping

the Spaniards.

that flight

and induced them to

to ruin the cause,

He

to prevent his junction with

failed in his efforts, but shortly the bulk

of the Flanders contingent

returned home, leaving but a

small detachment of cavalry with the duke of Lorraine

whereupon Turenne

retired to near Paris to prevent

But

and Lorraine from joining hands. failed,

raine

owing

met

to the interference of

at Ablon,

and

Conde

this project likewise

Mazarin Conde and Lor;

as they considerably

outnumbered

Turenne, the latter was driven to resort to the defensive.

He

placed his army behind the forest of Villeneuve St. Georges, in the angle of the Seine

and Yeres, from which

coup de main., he ousted Lorraine. to attack

him

The

allies

place,

by a

were unwilling

in this excellent position, but sought instead to

cut off his convoys and to hold

him

to his

camp.

Conde

posted his forces in four corps around the royal army and in close proximity to

it,

but was unable to cut Turenne from

access to Corbeil, where lay his munitions, despite his numer-

ous parties sent abroad to worry him and starve him out

and though for the moment Turenne was almost blockade, he was never out of victual.

and

left

the

army

;

and the duke

in a state of

But Conde

of Lorraine

fell sick

had neither the

THE KING REENTERS ability

533

nor the steadiness to carry out the plan Conde had

inaugurated. in,

PARIS.

Turenne managed

and on the

fall

of

safel}' to

get

all his

convoys

Montrond, which another royal army

had been besieging, he received three thousand men

as rein-

forcements.

The

ill

management

fickle Pai'isians as ity,

much

to

any change.

his Corbeil magazines,

By

did manoeuvre.

way

campaign had disheartened the

as the eating out of the entire vicin-

and had predisposed them

had exhausted

his

of the

to Corbeil

;

Turenne, who

now undertook a

thence he started, in two columns so dis-

posed that he could at short notice wheel

left into line, for

Tournan, and in three days crossed the Marne at reached Senlis

;

splen-

march on October 4-5, he made

a night

and thence

to Pontoise,

Meaux and

where lay the court.

Conde, who had now been definitely abandoned by the Paris-

Champagne,

ians, left the capital for

as the neighborhood of

Paris coidd no longer sustain an army.

While Conde and

the duke of Lorraine retreated towards the Aisne, the king, via St. for

Germain and

St.

Cloud, reentered Paris,

which he might thank the constancy and

— a triumph

skill of

Turenne,

whose courage and steadfastness under the pressure of grave difficulties

had been altogether beyond

praise.

In Champagne Conde took Chateau Porcieu, Khetel, Mouzon and Ste. Menehould, and

made a

definite treaty with the

Spaniards, by which in consideration of his serving as generalissimo of their armies, all joint conquests on French terri-

tory should be his.

under his orders

;

He now had

twenty-five thousand

success appeared about to smile

but the treaty was never carried out ness.

The means

of securing

wdtli

men

upon him

any show of

fair-

any such conquests as had been

contemplated were afforded him but for a short period, though he was able to take Bar small places.

le

Due, Void, Commerci and many

These gains were in a sense

losses

;

they left

IMPOVERISHED RESOURCES.

534

him but a small

own army,

relic of his

for his foot

was

all

distributed in the captured places.

Turenne and La Ferte, kingdom, moved forward siege to

Bar

Conde came

Due.

le

after quieting the centre of the

became unmanageable

and

laid

but his

men

to the Lorx^aine frontier, to its rescue,

at the capture of a small

town through

which they passed, and where was stored a good deal of wine,

and returned to Clermont and thence army took Bar le Due, Barrois, Chateau Porcien and Vervins. Turenne would now have been and he was driven to Stenay.

The

off

royal

glad to bring Conde to battle, but the latter retired into

Luxemburg,

Only Conde and the duke Fronde was practically

at

now

of Orleans

held out

the

;

an end, a work clearly due to the

patient skill of Turenne.

At

the opening of 1653

Conde held Rhetel,

hould, Mouzon, Stenay and Clermont

and he had seven

Burgundy, Bellegarde

;

men

as

in

Champagne,

many

in

lax,

The

generation to grow up to furnish men. killed

action,

Ferte,

owing

to

who had

It

The

;

and and

needed a new

existing genera-

off.

The French opened gundy and Guienne

in

operations at the

for both the Spaniards

French were much weakened by the never-ending wars

had been

;

to eight thousand

the era of big armies had not yet come.

tion

Mene-

Guienne, and numerous

secret partisans all through France.

opening of the year were

Ste.

Champagne

in

;

the campaign in

Champagne, Bur-

the Spaniards were late in coming into

impoverished resources.

Turenne and La

ten thousand horse, seven thousand foot and

a few guns, took Chateau Porcien, which had again fallen to the Spaniards, and Rhetel.

Conde's possession of Mouzon,

Stenay and Rhetel kept open an entrance into France, and the capture of the latter upset his plans.

In July the arch-

TURENNE'S SOUND ADVICE. duke and

lie

535

entered Picardy with nearly thirty thousand

men, Spaniards, Germans,

Of

French refugees.

Walloons and

Italians, Lorrainers,

body eleven thousand were horse,

this

They assembled at La Capelle, and pushed by a rapid march to Fonsomme whence Conde hoped by lively measures to reach Paris. But Fuensaldegna, and there were forty guns.

;

was purposely slow; he wished

jealous of Conde's success,

to besiege Arras, because this town,

to Spain and not

The

advance.

to

Conde

dispute

Turenne and La Ferte to reach

if

taken, would belong

while Conde naturally desired to

;

much

consumed

leisure to return

Ribemont \aa Vervins with twelve thousand men,

Many

accompanied by Mazarin and the king.

what "

it

and gave

time,

from Rhetel, and

opinions of

was best to do were given, but Turenne had

The danger

is

"

great," said he.

centrate all our forces,

march

to

What we

need

his is

way.

to con-

meet the enemy, choose

the best places for defense, hold head to his superior forces

without fighting him, and wait until Conde divides his forces,

—

as he

must do

if

he would march on Paris,

—

to attack

Accepting this very sound advice, the

the parts in detail."

court retired to Compiegne.

The French passed

the Oise,

and with care approached the

Spaniards under Conde, who had also crossed and advanced

with the

Somme on

Along Conde's route gates, but

their right all

and the Oise on

their left.

the undefended towns opened their

he put in no garrisons, contenting himself with

taking an oath of fealty, for fear of depleting his forces.

This was his last chance, and he would take no

and money he got in plenty and by way of ;

on Roie, and took to go further. try,

it

in

two days.

Turenne moved

risk.

Rations

Ham he

advanced

Here Fuensaldegna refused to Guiscard, a

wooded coun-

good for defense, and

sat

down

on

La

Fere, but Fuensaldegna was

latter proposed to turn

to

watch Conde.

The

CONDE'S ACTIVITY.

536 slow,

and Tiirenne, guessing

garrisoned

Failing at

it.

his intention, reached

La

Fere,

it first

and

Conde suggested Peronne

or Corbie as a good objective, but Fuensaldegna would accept neither suggestion

;

he kept his eye on Arras as the preferable

scheme, and Turenne, moreover, forestalled Conde by throwing a garrison into both places.

JIOl^rrRELUIl-

",.,.11;

HElbOIN

Hearing, at this time, that a

'I,

'

'f.ix

Campaign on the Somme.

way from Cambray to the Spaniards, Somme at Ham, Turenne marched by

large convoy was on the

and crossing the Peronne his

own

to

Bapaume, and drove the convoy

use.

Thus met

fighting, as he

Turenne

to battle ?

his biographer

at all points

had superior forces

He

put

Desormeaux

;

into Corbie for

Conde determined on

how

but

should he bring

work. As says At one time he approached

all his skill to :

"

him threatening attack with his whole moved away precipitately to entice him might take him unawares on the march

;

force, at another

to

decamp

he

so that he

again he offered him

CONDE AND TURENNE MANCEUVRE. the bait of a signal advantage which ity

;

and again he moved on the principal towns

But

as if to undertake their capture. all

was but a trap

the resources of the art,

wisdom guided

all

Hannibal."

against

Conde did not dare

in real-

of Picardy^

in vain did he display

— suspicion, circumspection

the steps of Turenne.

And

537

It

and

was Fabius

despite his superiority of

force,

advance on Paris with Turenne in

to

his rear.

The French had gone of

into

camp

at

Mont

St.

Quentin north

and covering Peronne the Somme between the enemy and ;

Turenne seemed

to protect him,

cover behind intrenchments.

and neither marshal sought a

Conde, by a circuit and a secret

Somme and a brook which flowed in front La Ferte, and aj)peared suddenly

march, crossed the

of the royal camp, deceived

on Turenne's right cleverly withdrew

At once

flank.

by

his left

;

catching alarm, the latter

Conde followed with the

cav-

Turenne took up a new and very

alry ready for action.

strong position a couple of miles to the east on a wooded

Conde followed,

plain near Buire, and began to intrench.

occupied an adjoining position, and attack

;

but the Spanish foot was

preparations to

coming up, and the

late in

moment passed Turenne's works grew too strong make an assault advisable. The Spanish forces remained

favorable to

made

;

three days in front of Turenne, seeking by skirmishing and feints to

one,

draw him out

;

but Turenne's role was a defensive

and Conde coidd accomplish nothing.

The prince then sought would not cooperate.

to invest Guise

;

but the Lorrainers

Turenne threw two thousand men into

the place, and the Spaniards remained in

camp

at

Vermand.

Hither came Archduke Leopold, but his presence added to the military

The

treaty he

little

scheme and internal troubles were increased.

had made with the Spaniards gave Conde the

rank of generalissimo and was supposed to invest him with the

supreme command, but

power the archduke and Fuen-

to this

saldegna sought to put a limit

by

AT ROCROY.

CONDJ^ AGAIN

538

;

they effected their purposes

commanders against him

inciting the several corps

;

and

there being a number of separate bodies composing the Spanish army, only absolute obedience to one

With

efficient.

made

tary progress could be

Conde returned

quarrels.

changed

head could keep

it

the smallest opposition, no satisfactory mili-

his position to

;

to

and there were never-ending near St. Quentin

Golancourt near

;

Turenne

He

Ham.

could

not be reached, and was yet a never-ceasing threat.

Having

failed

to

accomplish aught in Picardy against

Turenne, Conde changed the theatre of war to Champagne,

and resolved yielded

besiege

to

The archduke finally To accomplish his end, Conde

Rocroy.

him the command.

must deceive Turenne.

He

dispatched several small bodies

Bapaume, Dourlens, Hesdin and Montreuil, and while

to

Turenne was speeding detachments ened attacks, Conde moved

But he had more had had

head

to

rapidl}^ to

difficulty in taking

in beating the Spanish

valorous defense of the garrison

ousy of Fuensaldegna

;

off these threat-

Rocroy and invested

than he formerly

it

army under

its walls.

continual rains

;

it.

;

The

the jeal-

the defection of the duke of Lorraine,

who left in the middle of the siege with all his troops, and many other minor difficulties told against him. Turenne made no effort to disturb the siege, for Conde had too strongly held

all

which Rocroy

is

Mouzon.

the defiles which approach the plain in situated.

A

and even

new

preferred instead to take

After a siege of twenty-five days Conde captured

Rocroy, and from here he try,

He made

raids all through the coun-

to the vicinity of Paris.

royal

army now besieged

Ste.

Turenne and La Ferte covered the work. to raise the siege,

but uselessly

;

Menehoidd, and

Conde endeavored

he was tied hand and foot

WHICH WAS THE GREATER? by

his allies.

plete success,

539

Thus the campaign ended with Turenne's comthou;:;h he had but half his opponent's forces.

Conde's cause was falling into ruin. This campaign has been

but

it

is

Conde and Turenne. greater

much

man

;

praised by military critics,

show the difference between

chiefly of interest to

By many Conde

has been called the

but despite his exceptional boldness and

skill

in battle, his restless energy, his high military capacity his

many

work against fortune which Turenne

No

so constantly exhibited.

doubt Conde was hampered by his

nearly

and

splendid successes, he did not have the power to

all his

allies

;

but

campaigns, was Turenne by his superiors

yet he rose above them and

;

in

and

accomplished results on the

whole greater than any of Conde.

Portable Gun.

so,

(15th Century.)

XLIII.

ARRAS AND VALENCIENNES. As 1654 of Arras.

opened, while the French besieged Stenay, the allies began the siege

The French covering army had been The

was small.

garrison

1654-1656.

allied

There were two

fifteen miles.

surprised

by Cond^, and the

works were strong, and stretched lines,

in a circle of

with ditch and wall and wolf-pits.

Tu-

renne came to the relief of Arras while Cond4 and Fuensaldegna were opening the trenches, and by clever positions cut the allies off from nearly supplies.

Stenay was taken and

mined on assaulting the Spanish heroic fighting

its

force sent to Turenne,

lines.

The Spanish army was

successful.

In 1655 there was some handsome

almost broken up, and Arras was relieved. effect.

In 1656 the French sat down before

Valenciennes, a very strong city on the Scheldt, Turenne and

pying the right and

came

to its relief,

left

distress the French.

night, assaulted

La

—

men was

opened

the frontier.

16, at

Turenne was

witli tlie besieging of

Conde's immense possessions

in

and Cond^

Valenciennes was a good offset for Arras.

army under Marshal La sand

Fertd occu-

opposite Turenne, and inundated the country to

works and completely defeated him.

The 1654 campaign sole relic of

La

of Austria

Building bridges over the Scheldt, Cond^ on July

Perth's

forced from the siege.

Don John

banks respectively.

made works

all their

finally deter-

This was done August 24, and despite

by Cond^, proved completely

manceuvring, but to no great

who

Ferte.

Turenne with

Champagne, covering the

The

— by

siege

tlie

Stenay

French

fifteen thou-

and watching

army of Conde and the archduke, moved from the Netherlands and sat To cover this fortress General de Arras. allied

thirty thousand strong,

down

to besiege

Bar had been lying near by with a negligent

;

flying

column

Conde with ten thousand cavalry

;

but he was

cleverly inter-

posed between him and the town, and was so speedily

lowed by

six

fol-

thousand Lorrainers that he was able to invest

INTERFERENCE OF FUENSALDEGNA.

541

while next clay the archduke and Count Fuensaldegna

it;

Wal-

arrived with fourteen thousand Spaniards, Italians and loons and completed the work.

Arras was one of the ramparts of France, but de Bar's failure to

throw himself into the town on the appearance of

Conde's column weak.

the garrison under Montdejeu far too

left

Conde began

and a wall ten

lines of circumvallation in

a circuit of

These consisted of a ditch twelve feet wide

eighteen miles.

feet high,

an outer ditch nine

feet

added

on the low land, was

to which,

wide and ten deep

;

and along the

whole of the line were erected redoubts every hundred paces,

Between the double

amply armed with guns.

were

lines

twelve checker-wise rows of wolf-pits for defense against cavalry

;

and a

line of contravallation

was erected over much of

the distance to hold head against sorties. the labor of the whole

In ten days, with

army and twelve thousand countrymen

impressed into service, the work was completed.

Though

the

garrison was small, the French were enterprising, and in three successive attempts they broke through the lines before

they were complete, and threw six hundred horse into the town, losing, however, an equal

Fuensaldegna was is

still

so constantly dwelt

number

at odds with Conde.

it

what he

tion cannot be doubted, but to

set out to do,

That there was

reads like a stereotyped excuse.

had he been able

This feature

on by his biographers as an explana-

tion of Conde's failure to accomplish

that

in the venture.

Conde would have seemed greater

surmount

this difficulty.

It is success in

the face of obstacles which peculiarly appeals

surely Gustavus

fric-

had more obstinacy among

tend with than Conde ever dreamed

of.

to us

;

and

his allies to con-

Too much

insist-

ence on the interference of superiors or colleagues does not

tend to raise the reputation of a general.

Conde knew Arras

well,

and advised two approaches, so as

TURENNE AT ARRAS.

542 to divide the

enemy's efforts

;

Fuensaldegna chose an appar-

ently easy but really difficidt place for one aj^proach, insisted

on so opening

it

;

and as a

result, at the

month he had made no progress worth mention. The danger

and

end of a Arras

to

in-

duced Mazarin in July to order Turenne and

from the Meuse Conde,

La

Ferte

to its relief.

learning

their

of

march, proposed to go out

and give the enemy battle but Fuensaldegna would not budge, and on July 19 Tu-

renne put in an aj)pearance

on the east of the

j)lace

and

seized Mouchi-le-Preux, cut-

ting the Spaniards off from

Douay, Bouchain and Valenciennes

;

and by cleverly

posing his parties,

dis-

— sending

a suitable detachment to Ba-

paume, one to

to

Lens and one

Peronne, — was

able

to

intercept their convoys from

Cambray, Lille, Aire and Omer. Arras.

He

set

up

his

St.

camp

between the Scarpe and the Cogeul, on ground high and

dry,

and threw his works along his front from one river to

the other.

thus

all

St,

Pol alone was

left to

but besieged in their own

the allies: they were lines,

and could get

no victual except what was brought in by horsemen and packs.

Shortly Stenay was captured, and under Hocquin-

AN ATTACK PLANNED. court

its

besiegers

moved

543

who with

to join Tiirenne,

squadrons went out to meet him at Bapaume, took

and Mont

fifteen St.

St. Eloi on the way, and on his return placed

on the opposite side of the town, on a

hill

known

Pol

him

as Caesar's

This absence of Turenne was the proper occasion for

camp.

an attack on the French, which Conde was eager

make

to

but Fuensaldegna was self-opinionated, and ajDparently pos-

power

sessed the

The all

of enforcing his views.

besiegers began to lack victual

but starved out, and had

it

;

they were at one time

not been for a cleverly con-

ducted convoy of provisions from Douay, they would have

been driven from the

For two weeks longer

siege.

Spaniards had been seven weeks on the spot lay in presence, exchanging only artillery

— the two armies Turenne had

fire.

Where

reconnoitred carefully on two separate occasions.

Conde had taken found

it

on the south of the town, he

position,

impracticable to attack, but he thought

;

in fact, he

his

was the only one of the French who

saw any chance of success

was determined

the line

His lieutenants were not of

could be broken elsewhere. opinion

— the

But Turenne

in the offensive.

to relieve Arras, for

Montdejeu was getting

out of powder, as he managed to let Turenne know; and it

was

of his

finally

own

nando de

agreed that each French marshal, at the head

on the quarters of

corps, should fall Solis

on the northwest

side,

Don

Ferdi-

and on that part of

Fuensaldegna's quarters on the north nearest to Solis, these

being the furthest from the quarters of Conde and apparently the weakest part of the line there should be

made

:

and that

to create a diversion

three false attacks, one on Conde, one on

the Lorrainers, and one opposite the archduke.

was

set for the night of

At it

August 24-25, the eve

sunset Turenne and

La

The attack

of St. Louis.

Ferte broke up, and so soon as

was dark crossed the Scarpe on four bridges prepared

A FINE ASSAULT.

544

beforehand, leaving only the sick and non-combatants in

Arrived at the rendezvous given to Hocquincourt,

camp.

they found him delayed by more than two hours, an unpar-

The

donable blunder, as he was close to the place of attack.

moon

shortly

became obscured, and

deemed

conditions Turenne

The columns

court.

preceded by

it

southeast wind

the

Under such favorable

blew towards the assaidting party.

wise not to wait for Hocquin-

Turenne and La Ferte were each

of

five battalions in line, to

cover as wide a space

and these were headed by pioneers with

as possible,

and

hurdles, ladders, picks

renne's left

;

La

shovels.

fascines,

Ferte was on Tu-

Hocquincourt was to have formed on his

There were twenty-six thousand men in

line

;

right.

enemy

the

still

had more by two thousand. Turenne reached the o'clock without discovery

by the enemy, he out

much

Roi

et

assault

way

which he quickly got

La

matches were seen

across the

fired the

The

first

;

and with-

and second

French heart, and the

Italian foot

Montdejeu from within Arras made a of

enemy's works at 2

was wild; the password, "Vive

Turenne " always

was given home.

the

threw forward his men

fire

!

of

so soon as his

loss jjushed his

The enemy's

ditches. le

at once

foot ;

was driven

in,

and

sortie to aid the attack,

notice.

Ferte was not equally successful opposite Count Fuen-

him

saldegna, but Turenne's success enabled

forward

;

and when Hocquincourt

finally to

at length arrived

in the Lorrainers, the defeat of the Spaniards

push

and drove

was complete

the French held half their works, and could communicate

with the garrison of Arras. alleged, did

Conde learn

of the

which was to have been made on not delivered.

Why

not arrest his notice

Not

until five o'clock,

disaster.

his lines

The

it

is

false attack

was for some reason

the sound of the exceptional firing did is

not stated.

It

must have been a

COMPLETE SUCCESS. strong wind to blow

from him.

it

545

Conde

at once flew to

arms, headed some of his cavalry, crossed the Scarpe by of the archduke's quarters,

and

way

furiously on a jjart of

fell

La

had dispersed for plunder, and on his which had come down into the low land, and threw them

Ferte's line

troops that

into disorder

and La

;

and had not Turenne gathered

his

own

La

Ferte's artillery, taken post on the hill

forces

Ferte had

abandoned, and met Conde's stout assault in person, the result might even at this late hour have been changed for Conde ;

always charged like a whirlwind.

Finding himself opposed by Turenne, and being moreover taken in rear by Montdejeu from Arras and by Hocquincourt on the flank, after a two hours' gallant fight Conde was forced to retire, which he did towards Cambray with the wreck of the army.

duke

fled to

The

Douay, where Fuensaldegna joined him.

Conde who saved what remained

The Spaniards

lost

wounded, but they

arch-

It

was

killed

and

of the Spanish forces.

men

but three thousand

left all their sixty-three

guns on the spot

two thousand train wagons, nine thousand horses and great booty

fell to

the French.

This was a brilliant operation of Turenne's, combinations, and added greatly to his repute.

full of able

Louis XIV.,

who with

the court was at Peronne, visited Arras

ferred on

him command

of all the

and con-

French forces here.

Tu-

renne crossed the Scheldt, intending to march on Brussels.

He

actually did cross the border, but

Conde

gathered'' forty

squadrons and the militia of the country, and though weak in

numbers, with that characteristic

path

;

restless activity

when roused

to action,

which was so marked a

manoeuvred athwart

his

and Turenne, aware that there were many divisions to

back Conde up in case the French advanced too

Maubeuge and then

into winter-quarters in

operations at Arras deserve close study.

far, retired to

December.

The

CLEVER MANCEUVRES.

546

In 1655 both armies were equally strong, some twenty-five

thousand men each.

The French stood

at Guise

and Laon,

the Spaniards not far from Landrecies, where Conde was in

command, and besieged and

at

Mons, where the archduke

successively captured Landrecies

pelle.

While he

sion on

La

Fere, where the French court was

Turenne from

saldegna would not undertake the

and La Ca-

Conde advised a

lay at Landrecies,

resident, thinking to lure

Turenne

lay.

his

at the

work

ojieration,

;

diver-

moment

but Fuen-

and Conde con-

The

tented himself with heading sundry raids into Picardy. siege of Landrecies lasted a

month

Conde could not

;

rupt

it,

for

inter-

Turenne had

provisioned for a long siege,

and

to cut his

no

of

convoys was

avail.

Turenne, joined by the king, then advanced

the

Sambre

as far as

down

Thuin

Conde and the Spaniards retired

beyond the Scheldt

^nd Sambre, and erected an

Operation on the Scheldt.

intrenched tion

defensive posi-

behind the Haine in a country so inundated that an

approach to

it

thought force

it

position

from Conde

would redound

them

;

to the

to

of

lines, strongly gar-

Ghislain.

The king

honor of the French arms to

by a flank manoeuvre and by twice crossing the

Conde

;

and

his plan

crossed the Sambre, and via chain.

St.

but Turenne showed how he could turn this

Scheldt, once above Valenciennes, tress

The

was impracticable.

risoned, extended

Masking

at Neuville,

this fortress,

and again below the

was

adojjted.

for-

The French

Bavay marched towards BouTurenne crossed the Scheldt

and the enemy, who had

retired to Valenciennes,

FRIENDS BECOME FOES. and established themselves with

likewise crossed

Amand.

leaning on St.

547 their left

Arrived opposite them, Turenne

sent Castelnau to fall on their right flank, while he attacked

them

The enemy

in front.

retired

towards the fortress of

Conde, and though Turenne ordered Castelnau to

them

rear so as to hold

until he could

weakly done that they escaped.

Conde and the Spaniards any value

on their

this

was so

Turenne's presence forced

to retire

their defensive line

fall

come up,

toward Tournay,

nullified

might have had, and enabled

the French to lay siege to Conde.

Up

moment Conde and Turenne, though on oppo-

to this

site sides,

had been firm

friends.

But

Conde

at this time

inter-

cepted a dispatch of Turenne's in which the latter referred to his late retreat as a flight, in a

not forgive

;

manner which Conde could

and for a time the warring friends were foes

in earnest.

In the of

last half of

Conde and

retreat,

August Turenne captured the Ghislain,

St.

fortresses

and the enemy continued his

though Conde undertook some smaller operations, and

conducted them handsomely with his body of six thousand cavalry.

The archduke,

afraid

strengthened the fortresses, by so

and did

practically nothing.

of

the

French advance,

much weakening

his

army,

Late in the year, in November,

both armies sought winter-quarters.

Next

Don John of Austria replaced Archcommand of the imperial forces Conde was

year, 1656,

duke Leopold

in

;

second to him, and could not operate on his own judgment.

Don

John, who brought the manners and ideas of the court

to the

conduct of the army, did nothing but move to and

and besiege small

forts

ciennes, Quesnoy, Lens,

fro,

on the line between Tournay, Valen-

Bethune and

St.

Quentin

in southern

Flanders, and on the northern boundary of Artois and Picardy.

In resisting

this ill-considered species of aggression.

AT VALENCIENNES.

548

Turenne exhibited remarkable powers aimed for Tournay

parties

thousand

men under

;

the works, and anticipating the French place, held

in a surprise of the

could come up and invest

on until the Spanish army

Though

it.

of the Spanish generals, Conde, on this this year,

At

must be

Both

of manoeuvring.

but Conde threw a body of four

tied

by the inertness

and other occasions

said to have operated with ability.

the beginning of summer, on June 14 and 15, Turenne

opened trenches in front of Valenciennes, building

lines of

circumvallation on both sides of the Scheldt, he occupying the right bank.

La

Ferte,

who came up

later, the left.

had sixteen thousand men, half cavalry, number.

its affluents

flowed through and around

and made the country a network of marshes up and down

From

river.

plain

a

Turenne

Ferte a less

Valenciennes was a strong and rich city on the

Scheldt, which with it,

La

hill,

Valenciennes to the town of Conde

is

a vast

but on the west the town and river are dominated by

;

Mont

Tiu'enne occupied the plain on the east

Azin.

of the town, the

army

of

La

Ferte the west, including

Mont

Azin, and over the Scheldt were a bridge above and another below, by which the two armies could

Turenne's plans were well laid

men

in the garrison,

drilled,

;

intercommunicate.

there were but two thousand

though some ten thousand

citizens

were

and the capture of Valenciennes seemed but a ques-

tion of time.

Don John had had a

not yet got his forces in hand

flying corps,

and

his first

scheme was

to

;

but Conde

open the

reser-

voir sluices of Bouchain to throw the waters of the river

down upon

the French.

The inundation increased

of the river to one thousand paces, erals

the width

and kept the French gen-

busy diverting the floods by canals and embankments.

Finally they succeeded in throwing the inundation back from their

camps and

into the city, flooding one of its quarters.

ABLE DIVERSIONS.

549

Don John and Conde, with twenty thousand men, now moved from Douay towards Valenciennes, and, establishing

main camp on the south

their

of the city opposite the left

of

Turenne's lines at half cannon-shot distance, with their own left

on the Scheldt and the right on the Rouelle, they occu-

pied both banks of the river, and threw sevei-al bridges across.

The bulk

of the force lay where

threatened Turenne, and

it

this general believed that the attack

would be made,

if

at all.

Valenciennes.

on him.

Conde, for a week or more, made nightly attacks on

Turenne or La Ferte, always lively a fashion that the

imtil they

at

new

were almost tired

out.

St.

and

after so

Then, for the night of

Jidy 9-10, he prepared an attack on

Marsin from

points,

French troops were kept under arms

Amand was

to hold

La

Ferte.

Turenne

in

Marshal check by

demonstrating with his six thousand men, while Conde and

Don John

should

fall

on his colleague.

Notice was contrived

to be got to the garrison to increase its fire

and

to

open the

CONDJ^ ASSAULTS.

550

sluices, so as, if possible, to

The

garrison

tlie

French bridges unavail-

Conde remembered Turenne's

able for mutual succor. liant operation at

make

bril-

Arras and proposed to have his revenge.

had been much reduced, and had Turenne

assaulted before this moment, the town must have fallen.

was time that the Spaniards should

It

From the La Ferte army but La

act, if at all.

preparations of the allies Turenne divined that

would be attacked, and offered him haK Ferte,

who was absurdly

his

;

jealous of his colleague, rejected the

offer.

Before his arrival, Turenne had built strong defenses

to his

camp, but

La

Ferte had demolished half of them,

Conde and Don John mean-

as being quite unnecessary.

while assembled their July,

moved

men on

across the river,

Ferte's works

the evening of the 16th of

and reaching the ditch of La

before they were

discovered,

delivered

assault so suddenly as to be completely successful.

La

an

Though

Ferte gathered the cavalry and defended his ground man-

fully,

Conde drove him

Turenne sent over

to

in,

La

and of the

six regiments

Ferte's assistance, two

which

met the

The inundation and short shrift prevented Turenne from aiding him with more men, though he made a stout effort to do so. While the Spanish foot made its way

same

fate.

into Valenciennes,

Conde and the horse attacked the

flying

French, drove them into the flooded river or cut them down,

and

of all

La

Ferte's forces only two thousand escaped the

sword, drowning or capture, the Spanish loss being a bare

The

hundred.

fight

lasted

an hour only.

meanwhile attacked Turenne, but was repulsed. interrupted, to

Marsin had

Thus rudely

Turenne abandoned the siege and hastily retired

Quesnoy, where, with the sixteen thousand men and six

guns

left

believed,

him, he took up a stand to meet Conde, who, he

would follow and urge

battle.

But Don John would

not leave Valenciennes for immediate pursuit, and when he

A MASTERLY RETREAT. finally

Turenne was ready

followed,

551

He

an attack.

for

feared that to retire too far would alarm the court and unduly

encourage the enemy cers,

his

;

and, against the "advice of all his

prepared for battle.

men

hand

in

;

Nothing but

his

offi-

own courage kept

and, seeing his firm front, the Spanish

army declined to attack, and retired to Conde. The whole operation at Valenciennes was an work by Conde, and though

it

able piece of

apparently succeeded because

Turenne had not been as careftd as he might

in his outpost

and did not soon enough receive notice

of the enemy's

service,

manoeuvre,

it

was none the

success at Arras.

The

less

a fair match for Turenne's

La

fault mainly lay with

Ferte,

who

was unwilling to heed any suggestions of his colleague.

He

Turenne was by no means disheartened. his activity,

and constantly annoyed the enemy

morale of his troops. one of his highest

lost

none of

to sustain the

Turenne's elasticity under defeat

is

Apparently unwilling to push

qualities.

Turenne further, the enemy now besieged the town of Conde, as

if

for lack of a better objective

successively on

;

captured

it,

Cambray, Lens and Bethune.

and moved Constantly

hovering around them, seeking an advantage, Turenne

fol-

lowed their movements, and held himself ready for battle at

any auspicious moment.

so little

It

is

a subject of regret that

space can be given to operations which are alto-

gether admirable.

Maubeuge.

Finally Conde and

Turenne went

Don John

retired to

into winter-quarters behind the

Somme.

When

they are the only ones in the

smaller bodies are as interesting and as those of

the larger ones

;

when they

ments from the main army, contributing manoeuvres, they do not ever worthy of study.

command

the operations of

field,

may be

quite as skillful

are mere detach-

to

and following

its

the same attention, how-

But though an enormous army com-

SMALL VERSUS LARGE ARMIES.

552

pels a certain admiration which

bulk (whether indeed in

art,

inseparable from mere

is

architecture, engineering or

even literature), a general does not necessarily earn praise for ably

commanding

of the smaller army.

more than that

of

it

beyond what we bestow on the leader

We 1812

;

admire Napoleon's 1796 campaign nor can

it

be said that Grant's

Wilderness campaign was as able as that of Jackson in the Valley.

While Turenne

led smaller armies than

Marlborough, they were nohe the

less

Eugene or

the armies which

enacted the principal roles in the wars in which he was

engaged, and deserve as ample recognition as at the

head of

thrice the force.

He

later

he had stood

if

showed

his capacity

to handle large armies with equal ease.

Knig^ht.

(15th Century.)

1;

XLIV. DUNKIRK. THE BATTLE OF THE DUNES,

AND JUNE, Louis

liad

MAY

1657.

1658.

agreed with Cromwell to capture Dunkirk, which had again fallen

and turn

to the Spaniards,

it

over to the English, against a contingent of six

In 16.57 the campaign consisted solely of manoeuvres between

thousand men.

the coast and the Scheldt

but in 1658, after there had been a number of

;

seri-

ous desertions from the French to Cond^, and the affairs of the king seemed des-

Turenne undertook

perate,

them by the capture

to retrieve

of Dunkirk, under

peculiarly harassing conditions, which almost promised failure.

year was bad, the

The time

than when Cond^ had taken

difficulties greater

it,

of

and the

threat of a relieving army certain.

The English fleet, however, assisted Turenne,

and

Finally, after the trenches were opened,

later the English contingent.

John and Cond^ appeared Turenne went out

Dunes

;

to

at

Fumes, and, leaving

meet them.

On June

the English ships assisted with their

no artillery

;

the ground

was iU-adapted

six

thousand

men at

14 was fought the battle of the fire

the Spaniards had brought

;

to horse

;

and after a stout

Turenne won the day, and drove back the enemy, who retreated tresses.

Dunkirk shortly surrendered.

Don

the siege,

conflict

to his for-

After some minor operations the cam-

paign ended, and next year came the Peace of the Pyrenees.

Louis XIV. had made a

treaty offensive

and defensive

with Cromwell, by which England was to furnish six thou-

sand

men

to France,

and deliver

it

and Louis agreed

to the English.

to capture

Charles II. and his brother, the duke of York,

had been depending on the countenance left

for the

of the

the Spanish army.

commanded

who

so far

French court,

Netherlands, where the dukes of

Gloucester thereafter

Dunkirk

In consequence of this treaty,

York and

a small Irish contingent in

In May, 1657, Turenne concentrated at

Amiens, intending to march

to the seaboard in

pursuance of

554

'

the projected capture

new

of his

recruits

kirk.

and

But the

late arrival both

ae English contingent prevented

^

The Spaniards concentrated Flanders, and Turenne conceived a new plan which the any

his accomplishing

in

ERROR.

court approved.

La

resrlt.

sent to the border to hold

been wont

men was Luxemburg, where he had

Ferte with fifteen thousand

Conde

in

Turenne himb?lf, with twenty-five

to winter, while

thousand men, proposed to march to the river Lys, as

bound

for the coast, whence he

if

would sharply turn on Cam-

bray, whose gari-ison was reduced by detachments

;

and dur-

he would rely on the English, who were

ing this operation

La

Ferte,

to divert from his purpose the attention of the enemy.

This

soon to land on the seaboard, and on the activity of

plan Turenne inaugurated by a rapid march toward the Lys,

which led Don John to watch

Cambray

with

his horse,

all

reached Cambray

to fear for the coast fortresses

and cease

on perceiving which, Turenne broke up

;

and by a rapid day and night march

May

29, and blockaded

followed close behind.

town, and stood across the road to Bouchain

and hurried forward

his

The infantry

it.

Turenne crossed the Scheldt near the ;

threw bridges,

works so vigorously that in two days

the blockade was complete.

The Spaniards had already begged Conde to leave Luxemburg to care for itself and come to the protection of the Netherlands, and

had got

to

La

Ferte having failed to keep him busy, he

Mons, from whence, with three thousand horse,

by rapid marching he reached Valenciennes May on which Turenne blockaded Cambray.

From

29, the

day

Valenciennes

Conde's guide haj)pened to mislead him, and gave his column a wrong direction from which he emerged on the main road, while Turenne had

made

preparations to meet

him on a road

through a densely wooded country, which in fact Conde had intended to take.

Thus by mere accident Conde went around

TURENNE ON THE DEFENSIVE. Turenne ing the

;

655

and having, from Valenciennes, succeeded

commander

of the

Cambray

in notify-

garrison of his purpose,

while Turenne's lines were disgarnished by his absence, he contrived, under cover of a smart night attack on the

and

cavalry,

a^d three or four hun-

at a loss of thirty officers

dred men, to enter Cambray.

French

This was a very handsome

operation, in which Conde's energy

was deservedly aided by

his luck.

As

the rest of Conde's

retired

Scheldt,

army was near

and moved on Le Catelet and

St.

the St. Quentin garrison of four thousand

La of

at hand,

who had been sent to Luxemburg, in the hope that Ferte,

besiege

him

With

reinforced

Montmedy, the key

the vigorous prosecution of

to separate his forces, or to

which he could take advantage.

of the

Queutin.

men he

the siege there would attract the attention of the lead

Turenne

from Cambray, marched up the right bank

enemy and

commit some error of

After a heroic resistance of

Montmedy succumbed, and La Ferte turned over The latter was now joined by the six thousand English who had landed on the coast, but this fact six weeks,

his forces to Turenne.

drew the attention

of

the

enemy

to operations there

;

and

with every means of assuming the offensive, Turenne, as he says, felt constrained, while in the midst of so

fortresses

and

in the presence of so strong

on the defensive.

many

an enemy, to act

If he undertook a siege of

any of them,

he feared that the enemy would make a raid into the

him some one

or snatch from

The

of his

own

strong

interior,

ill-garrisoned cities.

situation required a defensive attitude

;

by waiting he

might gain an opportunity of taking the enemy at a disadvantage

;

and he

sat

down

in the region

between the Scheldt

and Sambre,

No

captain

is

always at his best.

When we

see

him con-

duct a splendid campaign one year, we are naturally led to

PURPOSELESS MARCHING.

556

expect equal originality, boldness and skill in the succeeding

But history shows us no man who

year.

same

level

soldiers

and

;

this

is

uniformly on the

was peculiarly the case in

when

this era,

were under the restraint of a certain fortnality in the In the game of war there constantly occur,

military art.

moreover, situations which appear to paralyze the action of the rival leaders

;

game of chess, manner as down and wait a very common

situations where, as at a

one moves in the dark, or tentatively, or in such a to invite a

To

move from the opponent.

sit

for the next operation of your opponent

Not

occurrence in every campaign.

to

is

do so

is

the province

of few men.

Don John had manoeuvred meanwhile between and Sambre, but

marched on seize out of

As

no opportunity for

finding

Calais,

the

Meuse he

action,

which Conde had suggested a plan to

hand by an attack

at low tide

from the sea

front.

matters turned out, he found himself too late by a couple

of hours

;

and seeing that he could not Meuse, thinking

John returned

to the

Arriving after

its fall,

not activity

is

this

;

clear objective or a well-conceived plan.

Finally, having gathered if

Montmedy.

army and gaining not

Purposeless marching

word presupposes a looked as

to relieve

Don

he continued to march to and fro with-

out any apparent aim, fatiguing his the least residt.

seize the place,

reinforcements at Luxemburg,

Don John was

preparing to invade France

Conde indeed suggested a raid on

Paris.

To

give the Span-

iards something else to think of, Turenne,

by a march

seventy-five miles in three days, reached the

Lys and

aded the fortress of tentions,

St.

Venant.

of

block-

Whatever Don John's

in-

he now advanced to the rescue, but sat down to besiege

Ardres instead of relieving culty,

it

and the

St.

Venant.

loss of several of his convoys,

Venant, and then sent

five

After much

diffi-

Turenne took

thousand cavalry

St.

to the assistance

LOUIS IN BAD LUCK.

Don John, who

of Ardres.

557

could easily have taken the

place by assault, gave up the siege and, sharply pushed by the French, retired on Gravelines and Dunkirk. followed, took

Mardyk under

his nose,

it.

rival armies

went into winter-quarters.

had been and

ditions

and put an English

This ended the year's manoeuvres, and the

garrison into

tions

Turenne

small,

to his

Turenne had

opponents as

Though

the opera-

work

to his con-

fitted his

Conde had

well.

as usual

been controlled by the Spanish generals, who well knew, by petty opposition and by subterfuge and half-hearted work,

how

to nullify his best efforts.

more

in his

coup

cVoeil

manoeuvring in the open tide

His power, moreover, lay

and fervor on the field,

or in

which in any campaign might

Matters turned against Louis

battle-field

than in

stemming a disastrous

set against

him.

XIV. during

the winter of

1657-58, and as a result Turenne got placed in a most cult

Hocquincourt, with the garrison of Hesdin,

situation.

went over

Conde

to

;

several fortresses surrendered

in

Normandy

rose

in

revolt

as well as in the army, a of troops

marked

was small

Dunkirk, and threatened

;

to

aU

classes of the people

spirit of dissatisfaction

Cromwell was impatient withdraw his troops and

place was speedily captured.

spired to give an

ill

The

the

to get fleet,

Everything con-

difficulties.

had broken the dikes and flooded the whole

Bergen.

;

turn to the situation.

But Dunkirk presented singular iards

Marshal

the long-continued weakness of

;

the government brought about, in

unless this

;

an attempt to surprise Ostende, was captured

d'Aumont,

number

diffi-

The Spanvicinity to

fortress itself lay in the midst of three others,

Gravelines, Bergen and Furnes, all in the hands of the Spaniards.

to

This made the victualing and the delivery of material

an army besieging Dunkirk a task almost beyond execu-

tion.

France had no one to look to but Turenne, and he was

ADVANCE ON DUNKIRK.

558 at the

What

head of a woefully small army.

He had

no one but hhnself to rely on.

as the horizon blackened

:

could he do

?

But the man grew

he resolved to have Dunkirk

;

and

by undertaking the almost impossible, he showed himself

to

be truly great.

He

concentrated part of his army near Amiens in April,

and marched with eight thousand men

to St.

Venant on the

upper Lys, while three thousand men accompanied the no-

madic court

to Calais.

On

the

way

a detachment which took Cassel

;

to

Dunkirk, he sent out

repaired, as he advanced,

the roads, which were almost bottomless, with boards, fas-

and stones

cines

turned Bergen by the right, and in early

;

May, having learned and that the dition

forts

that the garrison of the place was weak,

on the Bergen canal, which

might arrest

his advance,

if

in

good con-

had not been completed, he

determined to push on Dunkirk, between this place and Furnes, over the flooded

East of Dunkirk was a

district.

redoubt built on the only practicable road, but this had not

been suitably garrisoned and was readily taken. It

was a desperate undertaking

to

advance over a country

where the floods grew deeper every day, but Turenne happily found a dike available, which led up

Dunkirk and Bergen.

To

to the

utilize the

two

forts

between

dike the forts must be

who had been fortunate enough The to receive six thousand fresh men, moved against them. enemy sent a detachment from Dunkirk to their aid but first

captured, and Turenne,

;

Turenne drove

this back,

reduced the redoubts, which had not

been kept up in proper shape for defense, and utilized them himself. It

was too early

in the year to expect to succeed in crossing

the flooded region with all his material of war

renne looked not back. first

He

;

and yet Tu-

debated whether he had not best

besiege Bergen, which would be easier to capture than

SEVERE LABORS. Dunkirk

;

but he saw that

if

for a

his declared intention of besieging

the moral control of his

Dunkirk

army and

alone, not Bergen,

and conserve the English ful personal enthusiasm

559

moment he turned from Dunkirk, he would of the situation.

to their

was

which would satisfy Cromwell

alliance.

Only Turenne's wonder-

and the devotion of

his trooj)s ena-

bled him to get so far as to undertake the siege.

up

It

lose

middle in water, ill-housed and

Though

ill-fed,

the

men

worked with a will; bridges were built over the flooded low

Dunkirk and the Battle of the Dunes.

lands, the canals

and

from Hondschoten and Furnes were repaired,

army

in twenty-four hours after their completion the

stood upon the Dunes.

The garrison

of Dunkirk, though not as large as

it

should

have been, yet numbered nearly three thousand men. of these troops

drawn

had been camped

into the fortress.

outside, but they

Part

were now

Don John and Conde, who

with

their armies were in Brussels, supposed that as a matter of

course Turenne would

first

besiege

Furnes, Bergen and

THE ENEMY ASTONISHED.

560

and thus consume much time.

Gravelines,

John reinforced the garrison

Don

Indeed,

Omer, believing

of St.

it

to be

They never gave a thought reach Dunkirk nor did they

threatened rather than Dunkirk.

French being able

to the

to

;

Turenne could there victual

believe

enemy been on hand near Furnes force,

into

Dunkirk and

which the

forestalling his operations

off.

marching

but, as

;

to

is

wont

Fortune

goddess could not disregard.

fickle

knew

iards

their

was an appeal

Having reached the place and invested better

the

or Bergen, even in small

Turenne could hardly have prevented

to be the case, Turenne's boldness

Had

army.

his

it

before the Span-

of his intention to do so,

Turenne was scarcely

No

to build a line of cir-

cumvallation

;

hand

materials were at

the

wind overnight would

blow down the

works which the men had piled up during the day, or the tide

would wash them away

;

material had to come from

all

Calais as well as forage and rations.

Turenne was repeating

Conde's experience of a few years before under vastly worse conditions.

Thunderstruck at the news that Turenne had laid siege to Dunkirk,

Don John and Conde

speedily started thither, but

Turenne had already blockaded the sea front by means

of the

English troops under Generals Lockhart and Morgan, aided

by the

fleet

frigates,

tion

of twenty ships of the line

and a number of

and had protected himself by a

line of circumvalla-

The

men were a fit comThe marshal had

on the land

side.

labors of the

plement of the constancy of their leader.

put himself and them in a place where there was but one outlet,

—

victory.

Had

he failed and the French been com-

pelled to retreat, the whole force ture have been destroyed.

win his

;

Turenne determined

efforts.

would beyond a peradven-

There was no choice except to win,

to

and fortune smiled upon

Trenches were opened at

the

beginning of

DON JOHN AND CONDE COME summer, on the night of June 4-5, one

5G1

UP.

set for the English,

one for the French, and a number of sorties were repulsed.

Seven days

later,

on July 12,

Don John, Conde and

the whole

Spanish army came up, and at once sent forward a force to reconnoitre Turenne's position.

Turenne had already heard of their arrival at Furnes. They had marched so hurriedly that they had brought no artillery,

and were

ill

supplied with infantry ammunition,

Dunkirk by a coup de main,

believing that they could relieve

and that Tui'enne's

be so stout but that they

lines could not

could break through.

This was an assumption which might

hold in the case of a fortress approachable on

but

all sides,

not in the case of Dunkirk.

Don John

Conde advised camp-

called a council of war.

ing between the canals of Furnes and Hondschoten, to wait for the

artillery,

cut

his

off

and meanwhile

rations.

enemy and

to harass the

Don John

decided

on

advance

to

Turenne's lines in his actual condition and at once, though the

ground was such that

manoeuvre

;

cavalry had not space to

his

nor were there any guns to oppose to those of

the French.

The only means

of arriving

from Furnes, which

coast, to the dunes or sandhills on which

is

Dunkirk

near the lies,

by marching between the sea and the Furnes canal.

was This

path was composed solely of beach and dunes, and narrowed as

it

approached Turenne's

by innumerable ficial.

little

However

terrain, the

lines.

It was, moreover, cut

difficult it

was

to

marshal troops on such

archduke was determined to raise the

Conde had no means

up

canals and waterways, natural and arti-

siege,

and

of opposing his will.

Turenne, who was not aware of the badly equipped condition of the

enemy, saw that his

lines

were not strong enough

to defend against a well-directed attack in force

:

and he was

THE SPANISH WITHOUT GUNS.

562

by nature more inclined

men

in the trenches to

He

to the offensive.

left six

push the work on the

siege,

thousand

which had

already reached the counterscarp, but which had not yet got a secure footing, concentrated the rest, nine thousand foot and six

thousand horse, with ten guns, behind the works near the

enemy was approaching

sea opposite where the

headed a regiment of cavalry

;

;

personally

and on June 13 attacked the

Spanish van, consisting of a large force of horse, and drove back.

it

In the combat Hocquincourt, who had recently gone

over to Conde, was killed.

The enemy's main

force

was

still

five miles distant.

Tu-

renne marched out of his lines and drew up to await the Spaniards,

who on

the same day advanced into closer contact,

while the marshal did the like, seized some of the higher dune-hills,

and threw up such works as the sandy

The

absence of material permitted.

rival

lines

soil

and

were now

within two thousand yards, and both bridged the Furnes

A

from

his master

— came

—a

page who had

fled

in during the succeeding night

and

canal in several places.

deserter

found Turenne wrapped in his mantle, cogitating the events of the morrow.

The page brought the news

had no guns, a

fact

that the

enemy

which gave Turenne fresh ardor.

He

determined on summary attack, and sent to ask his English " Whenever Marshal allies if they sustained his reasons.

Turenne

is

ready, so are we," said they

;

" he can give us his

we have whipped the enemy." The Spaniards probably had no great confidence in Conde they certainly did not listen to him they were convinced reasons after

;

;

that

Turenne would not attack them, and

were far from sound.

and neighboring well as success.

Turenne had sent

their dispositions

his train to

Mardyk

places, so as to be prepared for failure as

He now drew up

flank on the canal

and the

left

in

two

on the

lines,

sea,

with the right

where the English

I

SLOW ADVANCE.

A supported

fleet

563

the foot in the centre, and the horse, sus-

it,

tained by a few battalions, on either flank, ten squadrons

The English were

in reserve behind each wing.

in the left

wing, the French composed the right and part of the flying

column

of horse lay

from the town, or

become

behind the army to head

to help

any part of the

line

dejaleted.

thousand were horse, but their

not come up, and is

off sorties

which might

The Spanish army had fourteen thousand men, six

A

left.

all their force

which

artillery, as rej)orted,

was not put in

;

had

for part,

it

They approached

had been sent out foraging.

alleged,

of

up the

quite near the French position, having set

foot in the

front line, the horse in the second, posted on the right in

four lines, on the left in six or eight lines, on account of the naiTow terrain

— between manded

— which

was barely a league in width

Don John com-

the Furnes canal and the sea.

the Spanish right,

Conde the

Next day, June

they spent the night.

In this position

left.

14,

entire confidence that he should beat the

Turenne, with

enemy, marched

forward, attacked them at daybreak with a heavy artillery fire,

and then followed up the attack with

enemy's outposts were driven get at the main line

slowness of the at that day,

;

in,

his troojss.

The

and Turenne was anxious

to

but in his memoirs he complains of the

march

in line of battle.

and the guns, hard

It

was indeed slow

to work, could deliver but four

or five shots during the advance.

When Don John observed

the English fleet manoeuvring off

the shore, he feared to send his cavalry into action along the

should be destroyed by the

beach, lest

it

drew

in rear of the infantry.

it

up

of the ships,

and

his right flank

was

fire

Thus

manner by horse, and the foot felt The English regiments advanced with deter-

not protected in the usual the less secure.

mination and

fell

on the enemy's

right,

where stood the best

SHARP FIGHTING.

564 Spanish

well posted on a dune-hill;

foot,

sustained by

cross-fire

from the

and they were

and by the action

fleet

of

the left-wing French horse, which joined in the attack on the Si3anish right,

and then outflanked

The English charge,

beach.

successful

by moving along the

it

despite stubborn courage, was

they advanced thrice, and were thrice

not at

first

rolled

back from the dune-hills by main push of Sj)anish pikes.

;

But British blood was up

they would not be denied

;

old Cromwellian heart was there.

men

"

The French

but those English fight like demons," said

;

;

the

fight like

Don John,

who with Caracena bravely sought to repair their errors by The beach being disgarnished of

honest Spanish gallantry.

Spanish troops, the French were able in addition to the cavalry to get some guns trained on the Spanish right flank on

the dune-hills and to batter

was well

to the rear,

disengage

itself to

and

it

in such close masses that

Meanwhile the French infantry some

right, thus

close

it

could not

charge.

through the deep sand, smartly after

The Spanish cavalry

heartily.

work drove

it

of the centre, struggling

fell in.

on the main

line,

The Spaniards

and

of the

taken in front and on both flanks, were finally

defeated with great slaughter, fled in confusion, and were

sharply pursued, though Conde sent some horse out to take in reverse the French squadrons, which had advanced too far.

On

the Spanish

left,

where Conde stood, the ground was

Conde had divined that defeat lay before Have you ever been in a battle?" asked he of Gloucester before the action opened. "No."

not so easily won. the

allies.

"

the duke of

"Well, you'll see a big one

But he hoped

Conde.

lost in half

to cut

through and succor Dunkirk.

Crequi commanded on the French right where.

an hour," rejoined

;

Turenne was every-

At the outset the Spanish first line of troops was by the demoralization of two battalions, who fled

unsettled

TURENNE

WINS.

Turenne attacked with

after one discharge.

drove back Conde four hundred paces charged with his massed column on the horse, threw

it

;

his cavah-y

but Conde

less

and

all

but broke

though the infantry behaved with

line,

mass of foot on the dunes

the

finally

stopped his progress.

and

rallied,

numerous French

back six hundred paces, and

through Turenne's stanchness;

565

Fearing disaster in case Conde made

another charge, Turenne headed some fresh horse in person

and

to forestall such an event,

Spanish

left

after desperate fighting,

— the

being weakened by the disaster to the right,

drove in his line and almost captured the prince himself,

The

whose cavalry had got dispersed.

and Turenne, carefid not followed

rally,

During the

it

victory

was complete,

Conde an opportunity

to give

to

smartly up.

battle the garrison

den made a hearty

sortie,

under the marquis of Ley-

and reached and burned the tents

of the battalions in the besieging lines

;

but he was eventu-

ally driven back.

The French

loss

was small

;

the Spanish

army

lost

thousand men, killed and wounded, and three thousand oners.

It fled to Furnes, to

which place Turenne followed,

and

here, under the guns of the fortress, pursuit

On

the advice of the duke of York, the Spanish

itself

up

in the fortresses,

in Nieuport, in Ypres.

Don John

Having pursued

Conde

was checked.

army shut

in Ostende, Fuensaldegna

and the prince of Ligny

in Bruges,

Such was the

battle of the Dunes.

the beaten

army

as far as Furnes,

Turenne

The

returned to the siege, which he prosecuted with vigor.

English had been gallant and

were

one pris-

less practiced in sieges

useful in the battle, but they

and could not do much

here.

A

lodgment was made on the counterscarp by a sharp attack,

and the besiegers made work.

Shortly, on

June

their

25,

way

to the foot of

Dunkirk surrendered,

the last it

being

OTHER FORTRESSES SURRENDER.

566

the ninth day after the battle, and was, according to agree-

The

ment, delivered to the English.

men on both was

sides

one half the garrison had

;

cost

many

Leyden

fallen.

killed.

Few

sieges

Dunkirk

redound more

to the credit of

to that of Turenne.

any captain than

The courage with which he

undertook an almost hopeless task, because to

had

siege

it

was the thing

be done, and the constancy with which he carried the work

to completion, are admirable

Two

from every standpoint.

days after the surrender of Dunkirk, Bergen was sur-

rounded

;

trenches were opened

;

next day the outworks were

captured and a lodgment made in the counterscarp the 29th the place surrendered

men

as prisoners of war.

also capitulated.

its

;

and on

garrison of nine hundred

Furnes, which had but eighty men,

Turenne sent a body

of troops to Rous-

briigge to watch Ypres, and marched to Dixmuiden, which lay between the four fortresses above named, took 6, after

no great

four parts.

He

effort,

owing

July

and thus cut the Spanish army

was planning

Ostende, hoping to destroy the arin,

it

in

move on Nieuport and enemy in detail, when Mazto

to the king's illness, unwisely

commanded him

to cease operations.

On

the king's recovering, to give

tinguish himself

La

he was sent to besiege Gravelines, while

Turenne sent an observing detachment

own tion

position at to

Ferte a chance to dis-

to Nieuport, held his

Dixmuiden, and thus protected him,

reinforcing

him with a thousand men.

in addi-

An army

under Marsin coming from Luxemburg by the upper Lys and

Ypres

to relieve Gravelines,

Turenne took post

and put out a curtain of detachments

to

at Dunkirk,

head Marsin

the latter retired again to Ypres and the upper Lys.

Ferte took Gravelines in twenty-six days, after

and rather inexpertly, and then went back

much

to France.

off;

La loss

b

A REMARKABLE CAMPAIGN. Partly from

La

Ferte's

567

Turenne then placed a

troops,

reserve of ten thousand foot and ten thousand horse at Hesdin to protect the frontier

;

assembled the rest at Dixmuiden, and

marched on the Lys and the Scheldt, sending raiders Brussels

Ligny

won Oudenarde,

;

as far as

surprised and beat the prince of

at the Lys, captured Ypres,

September 26,

in a five

rested his troops a few days, covered for four

daj^s' siege,

weeks the new building of works at Menin and Oudenarde,

He had

and took Grammont and Ninove.

on,

Turenne

left five

thousand

and returned with the

— greatly

— the

siege of

Dunes and the overrunning

Dunkirk, the

of the Netherlands

aided in making the terms of the treaty of the

Pyrenees favorable to France. chal general des armees religion,

in the captured fortresses,

rest to France.

This remarkable campaign battle of the

men

thus overrun a

As December came

large part of the Spanish Netherlands.

Turenne was created Mare-

had he been willing

;

to

change his

he could have become constable of France.

Turenne exhibited military and personal highest order.

If he

had been independent

gifts of the

so as to

very

work on

a larger scale, he might possibly have reached equality with

But he was always hampered by the

the six great captains. political

difficulties

of

the king, and

enmity of the ministers. acter,

He

possessed the intellect and char-

but never had the requisite opportunity.

hand Conde, while tle-captain,

and

full of the resources

brilliant in

by the

particularly

On

the other

which make the bat-

some ways which Turenne was

not,

boasted qualities of endurance, patience and equanimity less

marked than Turenne

his opponent.

in a great battle,

One can imagine Conde

beating

but one would expect Turenne to

win any campaign from Conde under equal conditions. After the peace of the Pyrenees in 1659, Conde was reinstated in all his honors

and property, returned home and

568

PEACE OF THE PYRENEES.

entered the service of France.

France received some

torial enlargements, especially in the

the duke of Lorraine was partially reinstated

XIV. married Maria

terri-

Spanish Netherlands ;

and Louis

Theresa, daughter of the king of Spain,

who, in consideration of a dowry, renounced her inheritance.

French Dragoon. (17th Century.)

right of

XLV.

ARMY ORGANIZATION AND

TACTICS. EARLY SEVENTEENTH TO EARLY EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.

Standing armies became common improvements were made, except tavus' system

was imitated

were introduced

;

in the seventeenth century,

in details

;

and not

in letter

cavalry grew lighter

l^o g^eat

the method was cumbrous in spirit.

Bayonet and

uniforms came into general use

;

companies, squadrons and regiments were more regular in strength.

was not up

to Gustavns' scale of lightness, but ordnance

nery improved.

In 1648 the foot

Turenne reduced the depth, and rode in three ranks in several columns,

mous.

camps came

;

common

;

era

was one of

small war.

;

to

;

but

The horse

also

steel.

Marches were

Good

be made.

but battle was

outpost service began

and the baggage

much hampered by

;

posi-

less consid-

armies grew

trains

were enor-

;

the governments.

fortresses

Engineering

became numerous and

Battles lacked character and were usually accidental.

from siege

to siege.

men and material. own ability.

strong.

manoeuvres on the enemy's communications and

sieges,

almost replaced the musket

By

to three.

Rationing was awkwardly done, but medical service grew in efficiency.

developed more than any other art

or

into favor

Pursuit was rare

pontoons were now

Generals were usually

The

down

and were slow, as roads often had

ered than manoeuvring. ;

and the theory of gun-

but the cavalryman rarely used cold

;

tions rather than intrenched

to be larger

later it got

and

;

Artillery

habitually stood in eight ranks

still

Gus-

;

flint-lock

;

The spade

armies moved from one strong place to another,

War lost some

of

its

horrors, but

was

still

costly in

Whatever success was won by any general came from

the middle of

learned, in large part

the seventeenth

his

century nations had

from the lessons of the Thirty Years'

War, that there was not only more security, but more economy in keeping on foot at all times at least the skeleton organization of a considerable body of troops, than there in discharging at the

was

end of every campaign the men who had

IMPROVEMENTS IN DETAIL.

570

fought through

and making new

it,

levies for the next one.

Hence, following in

^iie

may be

become universal towards the end

said to have

footsteps of Sweden, standing armies

century, a fact vhich naturally fostered pline

and a deeper study of the

Sweden, France was the

first

disci-

After

country, under the leadership of

found a permanent force

Great Elector, followed

more careful

real problems of war.

Louvois, the Great Monarch's great ister, to

of this

;

—

if

narrow

— war min-

Brandenburg, under the

and other nations gradually dropped

;

After this period only a part of the forces under

into line.

the colors were disbanded at the close of any given war.

The period

following the Peace of Westphalia in

1648

gave no great impulse to the art of war proper, but though

men worked was an

the foundation on which

unreal one, there

were many and marked improvements in matters of

During the era in shaping

era of Louis

So far

XIV.

(le

grand

— the

The bayonet,

lock.

its

it

to

siecle) it

distant

said to have been first used in drill

and

flint-

1660 by

discipline),

have originated in Bayonne, gave the death-blow to

and hand

fire of

to

hand

a line of foot

fighting

form from the Spanish masses

grew

to a

appearance

;

much

;

now equipped

and the

had

to the

for both

flint-lock

much more rapid and

several armies of Europe, which

line,

during the

introduction of bayonet and

the pikemen, for the musketeer was

the

;

was France.

General Martinet (father of rigidity in

and

was Sweden that led

modern conditions

as the infantry went, the chief improvements were

armament,

in the

Gustavus Adolphus

of

war towards

detail.

telling.

made The

essentially varied in

Swedish three-rank

greater resemblance in organization and

the light and heavy foot, as separate arms, dis-

appeared, and the only light troops remaining were the com2)agnies

franches

of France, the

many, and the Pandours

Jager or Schiltzen of Ger-

of Austria.

Grenadiers for hurling

THE SEVERAL ARMS. hand grenades made

tlieir

ppearance,

571

first

by companies,

then by regiments.

Uniforms were introduced by Louis XIV. in 1665, and gradually came into general use.

uniforms before, but

company

all

his guards in

There had been

the troopj did not wear

them

;

a

or a regiment was a harleqpin affair compared to

the troops of the eighteenth century.

The company was the ing numbers, from

tactical unit,

fifty or sixty

three hundred in Austria. five

it

consisted of vary-

in France to

two or

Battalions varied equally, from

companies in Brandenburg to seventeen in France.

The cavalry was made first

but

men

lighter in

arms and equipment. The

idea of the knight, on the discovery of gunpowder, had

been to encase himself and his steed in impenetrable

steel

but as firearms had gained in penetration, horse armor finally disappeared, and only helmet and breastplate remained to the

heavy trooper.

Pistols, carbines

firearms of the cavalry

;

and musketoons were the

a sword or sabre the cold weapon.

Dragoons carried the infantry musket with a bayonet, and

came more and more irregular light horse,

into favor.

made up

They, with cuirassiers and

the bulk of the

mounted troops

but mounted grenadiers were also introduced.

The squadron was

the tactical unit of the cavalry,

consisted of a total of about one hundred

and

and seventy men

The regiments varied from four hunmen in strength, according to the

in three companies.

dred to eighteen hundred decade or the country.

Artillery ceased to be merely a guild of cannoneers, as

had long been, and became an inherent part

More this

intelligence

arm

;

it

was devoted

grew

markedly improved. be a trade,

it

in

to,

strength

But while

it

of the army.

and more money spent on, and importance, and was artillery service

ceased to

did not put on the dignity of a special arm.

ARTILLERY AND INFANTRY.

572

nor was artillery of any great

utility in the field until well

along in the eighteenth century.

Guns, however, in imita-

tion of the Swedes, were li^itened, particularly so in France

powder was gradually crmpounded on better recipes metal was improved

;

;

gun-

;

paper and linen cartridges were intro-

duced gun-carriage? were provided with the aiming wedge and many new styks of guns and mortars, and ammunition for them were invented. Science lent its aid to practical men, ;

and not only exhausted chemical ingenuity

in prej)aring jjow-

der and metal, but mathematical formulas were made for the artilleryman,

and the value

XIV. founded

Louis

tion of arsenals

ized

of ricochet firing

was begun.

basis,

for the tactics of the guns.

and careful

But although sensibly improved, the fire,

was

still

field

work,

it

dis-

horses.

managed ;

to haul, principally because the

used for sieges and for

were

rules

artillery, in addition

unskillf uUy

in small bodies all along the line of battle

and hard

crea-

These were served by

mounted men and generally hauled by contract to being slow of

and the

Finally the artillery was organ-

on a battery and regimental

made

was discovered.

several artillery schools,

it

;

stood

and being heavy same guns were

was far from being,

even relatively to the other arms, the weapon which

it

is

to-day.

At

the end of the Thirty Years'

ally stood in eight ranks, the

which deployed to

this

was not

who were

his admirers

pikemen in the centre and the

into one three deep

fire

at once taken

the infantry habitu-

Gustavus had made a six-deep

musketeers on the flanks. file,

War

up by the other

and

;

but though

nations, even those

imitators, still the

improvement

in firearms necessarily led to a less deep formation.

Turenne who it

first

reduced the French

was further diminished

The ranks

file

to four, three

to six

It

was

men whence ;

and even two men.

stood four paces apart, but closed up to

fire,

and

IMPROVEMENT IN FIREARMS. The formation

doubled up for a charge.

573

of squares

was com-

relic of the Sj)anish " battles."

mon, a

The horse rode trained to

file

in three ranks, of

out, ploy into

The squadrons

enemy's flanks.

The French

from each other.

make a longer

The

front.

which the third was often

stood at squadron distance

firearms

— the troops forgot that cold steel

be given

;

to

the cavalry

trot.

had one lamentable sequence, must

at times they

they deemed a stout

and a bold and

;

two ranks,

at times rode in

drill manceu\T.-es of

were simple, and commonly performed at a

The improvement of

and envelop the

closer order,

fire

skillful

still

rely

on the

the best attack that could

manoeuvre or an

assault,

even though crowned with success, was looked upon as a dan-

— a blunder.

gerous departure from correct precedent,

the cavalry (except the Swedish) so far forgot believe that

its fire

was

strongest point.

its

few salvos were given before a charge,

by such

tactics cavalry

they rode at a slow

and with the

Conde did

soon lost

trot,

infantry.

at Rocroy.

its

if

In any event a

in a charge

and the dragoons mostly

Few men were

He

Even

role as to

one was made, and

Even

elan.

its

fonglit as

capable of doing what

was an exception in the use of

cavalry.

Marches were conducted

As

brous fashion. five or

lery

in

what seems

to us a highly

army moved

a general rule, an

more columns, the middle one consisting

and

manded

trains,

down by

This de-

much

labor and

compensated for only by the enemy being tied

the same method.

miles distant,

if

To change

in the presence of the

a

camp

to a place ten

enemy, roads would be

constructed so as to enable the troops to

move according

given formula in a set number of colimins. over

of the artil-

and the outer ones of cavalry.

the preparation of roads, and cost

loss of time,

cum-

in three,

The roads

to a all

Europe, from early winter to late spring, fully six

MARCHES CUMBROUS.

674

months, were impassable, and necessitated going into winterquarters,

go

and during

this season superior officers

on leave of absence.

off

It

were apt to

was only a man of exceptional

energy who would conduct a winter campaign.

Army

'

Armies no longer

on the March.

so uniformly intrenched

they took up advantageous positions

They camped

racks.

pany

Able generals made

topography

;

and

their

camps

tents replaced bar-

in a sort of order of battle with

streets, the foot in the centre

flanks.

;

their

not so the average

com-

and the cavalry on the

camps coincide with the

officer.

BATTLE RARE. But the lack chief

of mobility of

bib

organized forces was their

Manoeuvres were slow and cumbrous.

characteristic.

Even the French could not manoeuvre as we understand it and so soon as an army sought to go beyond the simplest tactics or to

change

its

parallel order in battle, so soon did

What

run the risk of dissolution.

Gustavus had accom-

plished in this respect did not outlive him.

advance of his the

movement

era.

of

of strategy were profound.

in

details to

skillful as his larger

views

Not even Swedish troops

manoeuvred as rapidly and

his death

He was away

His adaptation of the smaller

an army was as

it

after

skillfully as his

own

Royal Army. Battle was the last thing thought of except

by such men

Conde, Turenne, Prince Eugene or Marlborough. occurred,

it

was rather apt

erately planned

to

When

be a battle of accident

engagement was

rare.

A decisive

;

as

one

a delib-

battle like

Rocroy, AUerheim, Blenheim or Turin was yet more rare.

Few

generals,

allel order.

when they

fought, did so in other than in par-

Flank attacks, not

to

speak of grand-tactics, as

Frederick or Napoleon understood them, were almost unheard

The English were perhaps as original as any other people and sought to make the infantry and cavalry

of.

in this matter,

sustain each other in their attack.

Even

Pursuit, as Alexander had pursued, was unknown. after a great victory, the victors battle.

the

It

was looked on as a

remained on the

field of

sort of blunder to pursue, lest

enemy shoidd turn and renew

the battle.

A

bridge of

gold was to be preferred.

Outpost service was begun in siderable development. for the soldier. territory

this era,

and reached a con-

This was looked on as the best school

Small war and manoeuvi-ing over extensive

were the operations most highly considered.

To

manoeuvre your enemy out of his chosen position was deemed

VICTUALING.

576

a greater feat, and more in accordance with the true principles of the art, than to destroy or disable his

army

in a great

battle.

Compared with

earlier times, the armies of the last part

of this era were numerically large,

— the

reaching often a total as high as two

The proper tled.

ratio of the three

armies of France

hundred thousand men.

arms was by no means

set-

Cavalry was proportionately numerous, at times quite

equaling the infantry, or even exceeding

occupied thrice the space.

it,

while in line

it

gun per

Artillery averaged one

thousand men. to be

more common, and an immense

private baggage

and numerous camp followers

Pontoon trains grew

amount

of

cumbered the army

trains, to

such an extent that the tale of

non-combatants often rose to equal the for-duty It

had become the fashion

tavus Adolphus, but

it

to imitate the

was generally only the

the spirit which was imitated.

magazine of any given army was as a rule a

flour

and not

was baked into bread

The

principal

fortress,

where

In case of danger, the

large supplies were accumulated.

it

letter

This applied to the system of

victualing armies from established magazines.

meal or

roster.

methods of Gus-

at the

magazine

;

otherwise

was transported two or three days' march towards the

army, and there baked in to nine days

was not composed

immense

field bakeries.

was sent forward

trains,

of

Bread for from

to the troops.

As

six

the ration

concentrated material, this required

which were managed by contractors.

Sol-

diers were expected to carry three days' rations in their hav-

ersacks, a supply which they eked out

country.

Detachments baked

in

by depredations on the

the

neighboring towns

small ones were boarded by the inhabitants.

All this practically prevented troops from moving to any distance from their magazines.

When

an army had got

five

CIVILIAN INTERFERENCE.

511

march away from its jjrincipal magazine, it must sit down and wait for the establishment of a new one. While this made it reasonably certain that the troops would be fed, days'

it

prevented any but the slowest and most limited move-

Turenne broke through

ments.

frequently rationed his

At

country.

magazine habit, and

this

army by forced

requisitions

on the

times his marches were rapid and extensive.

Medical service was more carefully attended to in

this era

Especially the French had an excellent

than ever before.

hospital staff attached to

armies

its

;

not excellent in the

sense of our Sanitary Commission or the

Red Cross

service,

but a marked gain on what existed in the previous genera-

For

tions.

in almost all wars prior to this period, to be

wounded meant,

severely

if

massacre was escaped, to be

left

to the tender mercies of the elements, or to the robbery and

human

violence of the

wolves

who prowled about

the battle-

fields.

A marked factor in

the slow

and trammeled method of the

armies of this era was the control exercised over aenerals in the field

by the home government,

A general men

had

his plan of

quite unfamiliar with war,

itations

were

which might

example of

and

arise.

him by

any conditions

Marshal Turenne was a noteworthy

And

this pernicious interference.

to

to

certain geographical lim-

set to his action, irrespective of

wars were wont

army being

either king or minister.

campaign marked out

be conducted by

allies,

as,

moreover,

the general of each

subject to separate control, as well as not infre-

quently at odds with his fellows, the lack of vigor and purpose was scarcely to be wondered

Conde

in the service of the

at.

We

have only to recall

Spanish government, to see how

great this evil might be.

But even

if

in the armies themselves, the imitation of Gustavus,

misguided, had brought about a

much

better state of

IMPROVEMENTS OF THE

578

had theretofore

discipline than

ERA. Except that gokl

existed.

and family influence were potent

to secure military

commis-

unearned promotion, and that luxury was rampant

sions or in

many

—

this feature is

of the armies,

The end

of

— things never tolerated by Gustavus,

a distinct tribute to the great Swede.

the seventeenth and beginning of the eigh-

teenth century formed a brilliant epoch in engineering.

France and the Netherlands, such distinguished men

cially in

as

Vauban and Coehorn

art far

carried this branch of the military

beyond other countries.

Whole

part of Europe.

Fortifications covered every

frontiers bristled with them,

The

every important town became a fortress.

which works were erected is

beyond

The

Espe-

armament

to resist the

and

skill

with

of the

day

praise.

art of besieging

was equally advanced by the

intro-

duction of parallels and ricochet firing, and in the improve-

ments of the methods of approach. This

era, then,

is

firing, as against the

steel

;

one of the growth of deployments for

massing of troops

of the use of cold

;

of brilliant advance in engineering

;

of

wrong or mis-

taken theories and singular immobility of armies.

Yet

it

was an era which continued the good work begun by Gustavus Adolphus, and helped to lay the foundation for the

new

art of

war

to be soon

expounded by the great masters,

Frederick and Napoleon.

Owing

to

the general

introduction

of

the vast increase of material of war, which

necessity of

bringing

it

securely keeping this material and of

safely

to the front, there

commanding

their communications. ;

his

was deemed to the

the part of the

war

it

to

and owing

to transport with the armies

essential

and

firearms,

successors

grew

;

to be a nervous

officers, of

dread on

being severed from

Gustavus had introduced method into

and

imitators

sought to reduce his

OVER-CAUTIOUS METHOD. method

to a set of theoretical rules,

579

which should bind every

one, under however varying factors.

As

in the case of other

great captains, Gustavus' imitators failed to understand his

method, and while copying his

Unmindful

general aim.

of

that Gustavus could be bold

and cautious, the

detail, quite lost sight of his

changed conditions, forgetful

and rapid as well as methodical

theorists of this era sought,

by blind adher-

ence to his system of slow and cautious manoeuvres, to develop

a new art of war.

So soon as they entered a

territory,

intrenched themselves so as to be sure to hold

it

they

they con-

;

tented themselves with capturing or defending fortresses

;

they dared not move far from their magazines lest these

should be cut

off

by the enemy, and they rarely went beyond

the conduct of small war.

The

fact that the early wars of

were largely in the Netherlands, a country dotted

this era

with fortified towns, and cut by numerous rivers, dikes and streams, increased

artificial

the timidity of the jjrevailing

method, and reduced operations to cautious manoeuvring to cut

enemy's or preserve one's own communications with

tlie

important magazines. It

was deemed practically impossible

an enemy's

to pass

fortress without leaving a large force to observe

were long, and costly in

was wont

men and

material

to be destroyed during or after the siege

was invariably reduced to a

vicinity

it.

Sieges

a captured town

;

desert.

and the

;

Or, at a given

period in the siege, the garrison capitulated, marched out to join its

the

own

forces,

damage done.

and large sums were spent

The more

captured the more garrisons

became

The

;

objective of a

while

an army of invasion

and the weaker

detailed,

the enemy, meanwhile, gaining as

some special it

fortresses it

the

campaign was, as a

fortress,

to repair

it

it lost.

rule, the capture of

and one half the army would besiege

other manoeuvred to

keep

the

enemy from

INDECISIVE BATTLES.

580

approaching to raise the

If

siege.

was a campaign

it

of

manoeuvres on the enemy's communications, the army was

up

split

into detachments, each of

small war, in the belief that the

would add up

More than

to as

much

which conducted an absurd

sum

of the small successes

as the result of one great victory.

consuming bread, and

half the time, armies were

using up material, without doing any acts which, according to

our estimate,

As

fall

under the head of conducting serious war.

pursuit was never made, so battles lacked character and

decisiveness.

This grew to be so marked a feature of the sys-

tem that military men costly in lives

came

finally

and unfruitful

was deemed almost a blunder

;

1675 was deemed to show higher in distinguished battles, even

heim, Turin and Ramillies, this era

might

in a sense

lowed on a victory.

condemn

to

To come

in results.

if

all

battles as

to battle

such a campaign as 1646 or skill

than those culminating

decisive

;

and except Blen-

the general engagements of

be called useless, for no results

The march on and

battle of Turin

fol-

was

a brilliantly conceived and ably conducted operation, taken as a whole, the best of this era

;

but even Blenheim and Ramil-

lies

were fruitful quite as much by accident as by design.

The

battles of

in design

Conde and Turenne were

and decisive

in results as

in

no sense as clear

was Turin

;

or indeed as

were Breitenfeld or LUtzen.

With

the disappearance of battles as a factor in the success

of operations, there arose a false estimate of the value of

movements or

positions taken to sever the communications of

the enemy, or to conserve one's own. pelled his

enemy

to retreat

A

by cutting him

zines of food or war-material

was held

general off

from

to do a

who comhis

maga-

more able

act

than one who in a great battle destroyed his enemy's army

and he was honored accordingly. was narrowed down

to

Thus the usual campaign

operations against the enemy's com-

A FICTITIOUS ART.

581

munications, to feints to draw his attention from the real

manoeuvre, to attacks on isolated places by lesser detachments,

and

to small

fied

war

else shut

was the era

It

themselves up in

forti-

Nothing was done without the aid of

towns or camps.

strong lines.

Armies sought positions of

of all kinds.

and intrenched, or

security

The general who

of the spade.

best understood

how

to suit his

man who won.

For

to attack a fortified line

works

to his position

was the

was deemed a

hazard not to be lightly undertaken.

War of

somewhat of

lost

its

horrors, to be sure, but the loss

men, owing to the long drawn out character of the opera-

tions,

was

was no

greater.

less

than of yore

and the expenditure of wealth

;

Wars were wont

to be ended

by the exhaustion

of the exchequer of one or other opponent, not

by any par-

ticular military success.

The

result of all this misapplication of principle

was

that,

with the exception of a few brilliant generals, war was con-

ducted on an entirely

fictitious basis.

Nothing

the campaigns of these generals can be

Even they were

trivial.

ill-conceived

method

in

war except

deemed other than

often trammeled by the slow and

of the day.

Whatever

success

was won

by Turenne, Conde, Eugene, Marlborough, Montecuculi, Ven-

dome and

Villars

strength.

But though

was due it is

to their

their

own

individuality

and

campaigns which developed

whatever growth there was, none of them can be said to have earned the place in the rank of Great Captains which clearly

due to Gustavus Adolphus.

Pistol

Sword.

(16th Century.)

is

XLVI.

TURENNE IN HOLLAND. While

1672.

the other European powers were busy, Louis

XIV. saw a chance

to

conquer the Netherlands, and in 1G67-68, with Turenne leading, he overran

Vauban

Flanders, and

power

restore the balance of allies

fortified

The Dutch formed a

Comt^.

;

Meanwhile Cond^ conquered Franche

it.

Triple Allianc^ with

Sweden and England

that he could invade Holland from the east.

Under Turenne and Cond^,

Louis' army, one hundred thousand strong, entered Holland.

advised destroying in garrisons, ister, coiild

all

and to push on to Amsterdam time was

;

country, and prevented an advance.

sand men, was sent to head

ofP

;

and was ordered

;

generals

but Louis and Louvois, his war-min-

and William of Orange flooded the

lost,

In August Turenne, with seventeen thou-

the two armies imder the Great Elector and

tecuculi, forty-three thousand strong,

Holland

The

the fortresses they took so as not to parcel out the troops

not see so far

his instructions,

to

but in 1672 this was broken up, and Louis had such

which were marching to the

also to protect Alsatia.

he was able, by

Mon-

relief of

Though much hampered by two

skillful operations, to prevent the

allied

armies from joining, and both returned homeward.

Richelieu had

left

France the most powerful nation of

Western Europe, and Mazarin followed

The

native abilities of Louis

his

in

footsteps.

XIV., who succeeded

to the

government in 1661, were well seconded by the executive

power of first

his ministers, Colbert

and Louvois,

of

whom

the

doubled the revenue without correspondingly oppressing

the people, and the latter reorganized the

army and made

it

an excellent fighting machine.

The other European powers had each troubles.

its

own

Spain had been drained by the late wars

under the Stuarts had

under Cromwell

;

lost the

importance

it

had

;

serious

England j)ossessed

Holland was mainly devoted to fostering

its

AN ODD CASUS trade,

and increased

Germany was

War

its fleet

BELLI.

;

army

to the detriment of its

by the Thirty Years'

so completely exhausted

as to be out of the race

583

Austria was equally weak, and

could scarcely hold head to the Hungarian insurrection and the war with Turkey.

Louis territory

XIV. saw an

excellent opportunity of increasing his

by conquering Brabant and Flanders,

whose pos-

to

session he alleged a right on behalf of his wife, the daughter

The

of Philip IV. of Spain, just dead.

nor worse than any other castis tion of Louis

is

the day

belli of

The

a sufficient explanation.

was that the Spanish possessions

was no better

right

the ambi-

;

alleged claim

in the Belgian provinces

were personal estates of the Spanish Hapsburgs, and that their descent should naturally follow local law,

give

these

provinces

to

Maria Theresa.

which would

That she had

renounced her right of inheritance was voided, Louis alleged,

by the non-payment

of her dowry.

In 1667-68, with Turenne at the head of his principal army,

Louis overran Flanders, in a campaign which was more like a triumphal march than serious war

;

and Vauban was directed

to put the conquered fortresses in a

defense.

condition

perfect

of

In 1668 Conde conquered Franche Comte

with

equal ease, overrunning the province in two weeks.

John De Witt, Pensioner

of Holland, alarmed at these

unwarranted proceedings, and fearful for the independence of his fatherland,

formed with England and Sweden a Triple

Alliance to preserve the balance of power. forestalled Louis' plans, in 1668,

and

This temporarily

at the peace of

France returned Franche

Comte

received in exchange twelve fortresses,

Aix to

la

Chapelle

Spain and

among them

Tournay and Oudenarde, on the Spanish Netherlands

Lille,

frontier.

This was but an interlude, for Louis harbored a solid hatred for Holland,

where refugees from France were protected and

NEW

584

ALLIANCES.

allowed to issue their abusive pamphlets.

In 1672 Louis,

with that clever diplomatic intrigue in which he and his advisers were easily

first,

made a

private treaty in which he

purchased Charles II. of England, and another with Sweden.

These treaties broke up the Triple Alliance manij)ulations Louis

managed

;

to enlist against

sympathies o£ Emperor Leopold

I.,

and by able Holland the

the Great Elector Fred-

erick William of Brandenburg, the duke of Neuenburg, the

pope, and the duke of Savoy

including the king of

while other interested powers,

Denmark and

Mainz, remained neutral.

the electors of Trier and

Savoy promised three thousand

Cologne and Miinster were prevailed on to join France,

men.

and

;

this

important accession enabled Louis to create maga-

zines near

by her border and

weakest spot, the

east,

to invade

Holland from the

where only partially

fortified cities,

such as Arnhem, Doesburg, Ziitphen and Deventer, lay; whereas, on the south, opposite France, Holland was very strong, being protected

a series of strong places,

by the Meuse and the Waal, and by

among them Bergen op Zoom, Breda,

Herzogenbusch (Bosch), Grave and Nymwegen, to the outlying fortress of Maestricht with a

of thirteen thousand

men

;

at

at conquest,

heavy garrison

and on the lower Rhine, Wesel, fortified towns.

That Louis

Holland for setting bounds to his

late attempt

Emmerich, Rheinberg and other was angry

in addition

and jealous of her blooming commerce, was an

The

augury that the war would be more than mere play.

German

alliances procured for Louis

thousand troops.

He was

an accession of twenty

overwhelminglj'^ strong.

Turenne drew up the plans

for the campaign, to which

Depots of victual and material were to be established in the territory of Cologne and Miinster, whence the invasion was to be made as a base and

Conde

contributed his approval.

;

instead of wasting time on besieging sundry fortresses, the

TUREJSNE'S

NEW

SCHEME.

585

armies were to disregard these, turn them or observe them,

and march as a body on Amsterdam, the

If for-

capital.

tresses were taken, they were to be dismantled, to save the

detailing of garrisons, troops.

the

new

and thus weakening the main body of

This excellent plan, which distinctly foreshadowed art of war,

was carried out

so far only as the

march

HoUand.

into Holland

from the east was concerned. Louis and Louvois

were not abreast with such intelligent

ideas.

It

was only

such an intellect as Turenne possessed which could grasp the advantages and promise of such a scheme.

The French army was one hundred and two thousand strong,

and was early assembled

in cantonments

:

sixty thou-

sand between the Sambre and Meuse, thirty thousand between

INVASION OF HOLLAND.

586

Meuse and

the

district.

Moselle, and twelve thousand in the Cologne

This force was then concentrated in two main

bodies, one of sixty thousand

duke

of Orleans

thousand

five

men under

and Turenne as

leaders,

men under Conde,

while a

the king, with the

and one of twenty-

number

of smaller

detachments were to be devoted to various outside purposes.

At

sea the

was

Count d'Estrees, with forty-four ships

to join the

duke

York with

of

It

fifty.

of the line,

should be noted

Conde and Turenne had become reconciled the pique of the former had died with time, and they worked in unison that

;

and goodfellowsliip thenceforth.

The Dutch had but

twenty-five thousand land troops, and

But gallant De Ruyter commanded

these were mercenaries.

ninety-one ships of the line dikes,

the land, cut

;

up by canals and

was excellently calculated for defense, and John

man

Witt was a The French had

of force

and

De

ability.

established magazines in Bonn, Neuss

Kaiserswerth, a fact from which

De Witt drew

and

a correct infer-

ence as to their intentions; and he proposed that Holland shordd take the offensive and move into the electorates of

Cologne and Miinster, there

to destroy these stores before the

French army had rendezvoused ousies

in

But

the vicinity.

and enmities prevented the recognition of

the states-general decided against his

his

plan on the

jeal-

wisdom silly

plea

that France had not yet declared war.

Early in 1672 the French invaded Holland without delaying to besiege Maestricht, which they masked. body, under the king, but really led crossed to the right tricht,

bank

of the

The main

by Conde and Turenne,

Meuse

at Vise, above

Maes-

marched on the lower Rhine, and occupied without

difficulty the ill-defended fortresses of

Orsoy and Rees, which

were taken by Turenne, and Wesel and Emmerich, which surrendered to Conde, as well as some others, the garrisons

UNWISE DIVISION. of all of which were either frightened into surrender

native populace, or their

commanders

bribed by the French generals.

—

as a cheaper p.

Conde and Turenne

th

the face of the enemy, and with a promptness which

— though

them a marked moral advantage over the Dutch was easy — crossed

the operation itself

the Rhine near Toll-

below Emmerich, at a place where, owing to the low

huis,

water of this year, the most part of the stream could be forded by the cavalry, and there was scarce a hundred feet to

There was some small opposition made by a body of

swim.

Dutch

troops, but the

French cavalry van soon drove

and a bridge having been thrown, the all

the foot speedily crossed.

it off

rest of the horse

and

Conde was wounded, and being

moreover prostrated by the gout, Turenne remained

in sole

control.

The prince

of

Orange had taken

position

at

Arnhem

beyond the Yssel with the Dutch army, but on Turenne's advance he retired from this position towards Utrecht, rather than have do.

Arnhem

turned, as Turenne manifestly proposed to

Turenne passed the Yssel near

Arnhem.

He now

its

mouth and occupied

urged the king to push immediately on

with the entire force towards Amsterdam, to which the road

was quite open, and

to within a

few miles of which

city

some

advanced parties, four thousand strong, sent ahead under Rochefort, had already penetrated.

De Ruyter had some but at this rifice

to

success

time — Augiist

against the

27 — the

De

allied fleets

Witts

fell

a sac-

an unreasoning popular tumult, and had Turenne's

plan been carried out, nothing could have saved Holland.

William

of

stadtholder,

Orange, then twenty-two years old, was made

and put

at

the head of

affairs.

Louis, at

Louvois' instance, did just the reverse of what Turenne advised

;

he divided his army into detachments and

set to

HOLLAND PUT UNDER WATER. the

besieging

Herzogenbusch and

% ^

lacking in

now

they the

Nymwegen, Doesburg,

of

others,

and parceled out

self

-

sacrifice

for

his

The Dutch were

in garrisoning the captured places.

r

.^

fortresses

their

and

land,

little

The opening

resorted to extreme measures.

of

and the cutting of the dikes put the whole

sluices

country under water, and saved Amsterdam and the province

from the French invasion.

of Holland

This inun-

could have been prevented by Rochefort's seizing

dation

Muiden, where

is

situated the inlet of the canals

but

;

this

he foolishly omitted to do, though the place was within his grasp

and, having covered the country with water, William

;

placed his army of thirteen thousand dikes leading to Amsterdam,

advance or

The

retreat.

now

men upon

the principal

the only high roads for

operations were thus limited so that

a small force was the equal of a big one, and William

was able

to conclude alliances with Austria, Spain,

burg, most

Branden-

later too with

Thus came about a general European war.

England.

To

Germany and Denmark, and

of

the peculiar terrain of Holland was in large measure

due the course undertaken by Louis and Louvois. try has ever been so profusely

and great

no country

;

soldiers,

and Antwerp.

peculiar irregularity of

wars of this era in the belonged to

commanders tresses

than

many ;

it

Dutch

Low

Namm% such

was

it

for

towns

Another reason prevailed for the operations.

During

all

the

Countries, the troops under arms

nations and races, and served under

and

coun-

and fought tenaciously

such fortresses as Maestricht, Liittich and as Brussels

No

fortresses, small

easier to defend, harder to attack.

is

The Dutch were good

sown with

many

was no more due to the numerous

for-

to the jealousies of the respective allied

governments and of the rival generals, that the campaigns on

Dutch

soil

were wont to be so singularly unsystematic.

LOUVOIS' WEAKNESS.

589

Until the opening of winter the flooded country precluded

manoeuvres of any kind in force against allies of

;

and Turenne counseled a movement

Germany

Holland.

an attack by the new

to forestall

But Louvois would not give up

his plan of

reducing the strong places, to which duty he assigned the

duke

of

Luxemburg

;

and the

latter,

with sixteen thousand

men, was ordered to take position near Utrecht, which had been recently captured, while Turenne was detached with a paltry force of twelve thousand the

Meuse and Waal and watch Thus by

of Brandenburg.

men

to operate to the east of

for the crossing of the elector

detachments and

fruitless

sieges,

out of a force originally of one hundred thousand men, a bare eighth was allotted to the leading French general with which to

do an all-important part of

its

legitimate w^ork.

Louvois always acted in a jealous, almost a childish

spirit

towards Turenne, and was constantly doing uncalled-for and

On payment

unwise things.

he discharged took,

— some

all

of a small ransom, for example,

the garrisons captured in the towns he

thirty thousand

Dutch with fresh troops

;

men,

furnishing the

while the French were depleting

own numbers by garrisoning

their

— thus these

same

fortresses.

Not that such action was unwarrantable from Louvois' standpoint but if success was to be sought in w^orsting the enemy, ;

this

was no way

to accomplish that end.

In August two new armies came upon the scene

:

twenty-four thousand men, under the Great Elector,

one of

moved

from Halberstadt tow^ards Hildesheim, and an imperial army of nineteen thousand

men under

Field-Marshal Montecuculi

advanced from Bohemia towards Erfurt posed, after

making a

in the rear of

;

junction, to cross the

Luxemburg,

to cut

him

and these two proRhine and operate

off

from France or

compel him to retreat from Holland. The only force to oppose these

armies

and prevent

their

crossing

the

Rhine was

TURENNE ON THE RHINE.

590

Turenne's army of twelve thousand men.

This was in truth a

lamentable ending of the brilliant array which crossed the

Rhine

at

ToUhuis not many weeks before.

Turenne laiew

his opponents,

and gauged their plans with

He had only boldness and energy numbers. He knew that they would not

to oppose to their

skill.

push direct for Holland

;

not operate with unity.

enemy

the

enter Alsatia, but

and he believed that they would Despite his being but one third of

in strength, with a boldness quite at odds with the

timorous habit of the day, he determined not to defend the left

bank, but to cross the Rhjne himself, and by an active

offensive seek to checkmate their plan

on the right bank.

Indeed, Montecuculi had orders, though Turenne was unaware of

it,

not to conduct an offensive campaign, but to oppose

such an one on the elector's part in a state of anxiety

rian revolts,

by the Turks

and was afraid

Turenne increased

manner.

;

men by detachments from

for the in

emperor was kept

Poland and by Hunga-

to launch out in a whole-souled his force to seventeen

Emmerich, and marched from Wesel up the Lippe

The

phalia.

allies,

thousand

the garrisons of Wesel, Rees and

who were aiming

at the

to

West-

same general

point to compel the elector of Cologne and the bishop of

Miinster to restore to the Dutch the territory taken from

them, and to give up their alliance with the French, on hearing of Turenne's movements changed their course southerly

towards Fulda.

Rhine

to Coblentz,

into the

Rhine

Turenne pushed on up the right bank

Main

and forced them to move

still

of the

further south

region, so that they could not approach the

to effect a crossing until after passing to the south of

the Main.

Fearing for Alsatia, though indeed there was no threat that province, Louis ordered Turenne back to the left of the Rhine,

to

bank

and sent Conde with eight thousand men to

ABLE MANCEUVPdNG. support

The prince

liim.

of

Orange made a

the Rhine to aid his allies in crossing

owing

the

to

only captured

The

but the operation,

;

dispersed French detachments

Fauquemme and made an attempt on

allies, after failing to cross

Mainz and again

army over

it

feint towards

He

proved to be slow and weakly conducted.

in Holland,

roi.

many though

591

at

on the usual bridges at

managed

at Strasburg, finally

Mainz on a bridge

Charle-

own

of their

to

put their

but they were

;

soon forced by Turenne and Conde to recross, and winter, sickness

and hunger drove them, was danger that the

stadt there

in January, 1673,

allies

west and cross the Yssel into Holland

mined

back

to

This was well; but from Lipp-

Lippstadt in Westphalia.

might march

to the

and Turenne

deter-

;

to prevent this also.

He had been forbidden by Louvois to

again cross the Rhine

;

but he went bock of the minister and, on laying out his scheme, obtained permission from the king to do ing

down

with

to

so.

Mov-

Wesel, he put over and marched on Lijopstadt

sixteen

Unable

thousand men.

Turenne had rightly estimated, the

to

allies

act

together, as

gave up the idea of

wintering in Westphalia, and retired, the elector to Brandenburg, after Brunswick had refused him shelter and winterquarters,

and Montecuculi

Thus by

to

Bohemia.

cleverly utilizing the

want of unity of the

allies,

Turenne 's manoeuvres had driven them from the Rhine region back towards their respective bases, and had robbed Holland of two strong allied armies.

The Great

Elector, dissatisfied

with the emperor's laxness, concluded peace with France. This peace was, however, of short duration

renewed his alliance with Holland.

Pistol

Sword.

(16th Century.)

;

for in

1674 he

XLVII. MONTECUCULI.

1673.

In 1673 the emperor sent Montecuculi with twenty-five thousand men the prince of Orange at Bonn.

— two irreconcilable

the task to protect Alsatia and to prevent this junction,

He

duties.

advised marching to the Bohmerwald,

permission was refused.

on the Main.

if this

Turenne sought

to be done

but

;

of Wiirzburg,

though a neutral, opened

his bridges

and closed them to the French, and Turenne was much

Montecuculi manoeuvred with exceeding ability

delayed.

was

Montecuculi feinted towards Alsatia and then marched

The bishop

to the imperialists

to join

Turenne, with twenty-three thousand, was given

to force on

him

;

and made good

;

avoided battle, which

his crossing of the

Main.

Turenne, taking out garrisons, had but eighteen thousand men, and could not operate as boldly as he would have liked, owing to his orders to protect Alsatia.

Though he knew had

to

that Montecuculi would not attempt to enter Alsatia, he yet

keep south of the Main, having only one bridge.

Montecuculi's able manoeuvres, and he

Bonn.

This campaign redounds

One

much

made

Politics

had aided

his junction with the

Dutch at

to his credit.

of the best generals of this era,

and the more

interest-

ing on account of his Military Memoirs, was Count Raimondo

Montecuculi.

commands

We

have from time to time met him in minor

previous to the last campaign.

in 1608, of a military family, he ran

Born

in

Modena

away from home

to

embrace the career of arms, enlisted and rose from the ranks.

He

served with Tilly in 1629-30, where he

exceptional bravery. the

battles

He was

in

won a name

for

numerous engagements,

at

of Breitenfeld and Nordlingen, repeatedly led

storming parties, was often wounded and captured; and

wherever he stood, he distinguished himself.

had passed through later

all

By 1642 he

ranks to major-general, and two years

he became field-marshal.

In the emperor's service he

TURENNE VERSUS MONTECUCULI. was never out of employment and always

593

at the front.

In

commanded an independent army, which consisted of twenty thousand men and operated in Silesia, and No later he served in Denmark and against the Turks. 1657 he

first

general of this period has a better claim to rank with such

men

as Turenne,

Eugene and Marlborough, than Raimondo

Montecuculi.

In the spring of 1673 the emperor made a formal declaration of

mnn

war against France, and planned

to

push a heavy

col-

under Montecuculi from Bo-

hemia towards the Rhine, where, near Bonn, join

should cross and

it

the prince of Orange,

would pass the Meuse him.

meet

to

Turenne wisely advised that

an army be sent wald

who

— the

to the

rugged

Bohmer-

mountainous

country which forms the western

boundary of Bohemia stall

this

—

Montecuculi.

But Lou-

movement.

vois opposed the plan,

up a position on the

fore-

to

and

left

insisted that

bank

fine himself to its defense,

of the

and

Rhine in Alsatia and con-

to interrupting the

He

armies in their projected junction. three thousand

ent projects. leave from

bank

men

to carry out these

Again appealing

him

Turenne should take

allied

two utterly inconsist-

to the king,

to conduct a defensive

two

was given twenty-

Turenne obtained

campaign on the right

of the Rhine, but though he desired to manoeuvre well

to the north of the

zines left over

Main, where he had a number of maga-

from the

last

campaign, when he was opposing

the junction of the elector of Brandenburg and Montecuculi,

he was limited to operating in the Main country proper

and he was particularly warned

to

do nothing which might

AN IMPOSSIBLE PROGRAMME.

594

offend the neutral absolutely

In other words, his hands were

states.

He

i/ied.

furnished the brain and force, but

He was

would not afford him the ojjportunity.

his superiors

held to prevent the "junction of the imperial and Dutch

armies on his

left

and

on his right, and was

to protect Alsatia

limited in his movements,

— instructions

which before he

opened the campaign promised failure in both

French troops

In

manner, Turenne protested that the

in the

Netherlands were the ones to prevent

the junction of the

Alsatia was

tasks.

clear

frank but

his

Dutch and

imperialists

woidd no longer give way, and Turenne

;

that to protect

duty

quite inconsistent with this

set

;

but Louvois

about his thank-

less task.

To mislead Turenne crossing the

as to his intentions, Montecuculi, after

Bohmerwald, which he did

in

all

security,

directed his march, not on Bonn, but towards Niirnberg, as if

move

to

well south of the

Main and

threaten Alsatia.

Turenne, instead of being allowed to manoeuvre as he deemed best,

was at once ordered from the right

the Main, with a strict injunction to pay

but the

German

to the left first

bank

of

heed to Alsatia

who were more inclined to favor the French, denied him the use of the neutral

princes,

emperor than the

bridges at Aschaffenburg and Wiirzburg

and he was

;

in con-

sequence compelled to build one for himself near Seligenstadt.

The spun-out

negotiations in respect to these bridges

materially delayed him, and finally

when

the bishop of Wiirzburg

promised neutrality and Turenne was half unwillingly

permitted to cross at Aschaffenburg, Montecuculi had already got from Niirnberg into the

Main

country.

After occupying

Aschaffenburg and sending his van to establish magazines in Miltenburg, Bishofsheim

the Tauber, which he

and various other places along

deemed the best

line to prevent the

enemy's access to Alsatia, Turenne crossed the Main with

OPERATIONS ON THE MAIN. the bulk of the army, and

moved

595

Mergentheim early

to

in

September, to get nearer the enemy and ascertain his movements.

Montecuculi was evidently hugging the Main, and Turenne, so soon as he perceived his direction, crossed the

moved towards

the

September 10, took up a position

down

Tauber and

Rothemburg country.

in his front ready to

move

at

The enemy, on Windsheim Turenne sat ;

to right or left as his

opponent

Main or towards Alsatia. He was limited and knew that he was facing an able general.

should head to the in his orders,

J0__5O__«__JO

Turenne and Montecuculi.

The imperial general had thousand horse

;

fifteen

thousand foot and ten

Turenne, taking out garrisons, had fourteen

thousand foot and four thousand horse. tion

was

clearly to

Montecuculi's inten-

draw Turenne away from the Main,

and then, himself speedily crossing,

to oblige the

French

to

take the longer road on the south bank, while he should

push straight for Bonn.

Although on general probabilities

Turenne may have presumed as much, yet he could not divine the purpose of his antagonist, and to defend Alsatia

had been made

his

Turenne desired

paramount duty. battle.

If

he beat the enemy, he would

CURIOUS MANCEUVRING.

596

,

have accomplislied his end of holding Montecueuli back

from both the Rhine and Alsatia

;

if

beaten, he could

Tauber or the Rhine, and he

retire fighting to the

The

always, confident that he should prevail.

was

tecueuli

programme

not in his

He had

so.

to take

to join the prince of

no

under

with him.

forces

flank

was

;

as

imperialists

but Montecueuli kept out his

first

special advances towards accepting battle,

and

and before Turenne could marshal

his

and get into fighting contact, started on a

march with

Main.

Mon-

to fight

Both generals manoeuvred

from Rothemburg; and the

protection

its

;

but he did not want Turenne to think

;

in battle-order

made no

line,

object of

intact

as

a solid respect for his great opponent, and cared

liberties

for battle not far

drew up

Orange

still

felt,

his

Concealed

baggage and second

b}^ rising

before Turenne could attack.

ground, the

skillful

line towards the

first line

followed

The manceuvre had been

bril-

liantly executed.

So soon

Turenne discovered the withdrawal of the

as

enemy, which he did just as his preparations had been completed, he

though he had the enemy.

lost

The imperial army,

cal shifting of its rear,

his own left in the same direction, and much ground by the delay, he overtook

marched by

for fear of having its tacti-

ground turned into a retreat by an attack on

again stopped and drew up

point opposite the

new

;

and soon reaching a

position of the enemy,

Turenne recon-

noitred and found that the imperial general had his line with a hill in his rear

and

in front,

drawn up

and a swamp on both flanks

where he could not be assailed with any chance

of success.

That the two armies thus marched on

parallel lines in the

immediate neighborhood of each other, and without any attack on the part of Turenne, difficulty in those

is

explainable only by the

days of deploying the cumbrous battalions

TURENNE OUTMANCEUVRED. Even

battle-order.

into

the

exchange stragglers

and wagons.

The

did

flankers

and Turenne was able

fire,

to pick

597 not

seriously

up but a few

ideas of old soldiers

who have

served in these days of rapid manoeuvres must be modified before they can appreciate the operations of an

army

of

the

seventeenth century.

Both armies thus marched north

to the angle of the

Main,

where, September 12, Montecucidi took up position at Markt-

and Turenne,

breit,

self in his front,

restricted in his operations, placed him-

on the

hills

not far back from the river,

watching his chance to attack the imperialists when they should attempt to cross.

Montecuculi had worked hard, and had manifestly gained

He could now cross the Main.

the advantage.

been

able to prevent his so doing,

it

would have seriously lim-

and

at the

same

But Montecuculi had

out-

ited the operations of the imperial general,

time have protected Alsatia.

manoeuvred him, and was well posted on the critics

make

this

and

it

river.

Some

march a long-pondered and deep-laid plan

of the imperial marshal to be so,

Had Turenne

;

but he himself does not claim

it

appears rather to have been an operation

undertaken on the spur of the moment when he met the

French at an unexpected

place.

Montecuculi was now admirably placed

manoeuvres was

up the

river

all

were at his disposal,

;

the residt of his

Nearly

that he could ask.

for, after

all

the bridges

some negotiation,

the bishop of Wiirzburg broke his neutrality and allowed

Montecuculi any privilege he asked the straight road

;

so that he could take

by Wiirzburg and Lohr, threaten Aschaf-

fenburg, where Turenne had his only bridge, and thus sever his

communications with the lower Rhine country.

Politics

was fighting against Turenne as well as the able conduct his adversary.

Well aware

of this fact,

of

Turenne hurried a

MONTECUCULI CROSSES.

598

few hundred dragoons

to reinforce the garrison of Aschaffen-

burg, and remained with the balance

on the Tauber

Main open

;

for

if

to confront Montecuculi

he committed the error of crossing the

before his opponent, the road to Alsatia would be left ;

and though convinced that Montecuculi had not the

slightest intention of invading Alsatia,

Turenne might not

disregard his instructions.

Unwilling to remain in the camp he had taken up back of Ochsenfurt, not only because he

saw small chance of

inter-

fering with Montecuculi, but because the water supply was difficult

and had already led

the

army

followed.

Tauber were

some

to

Wertheim and

occupied

to

exchanges,

hostile

September 19, and next day

train ahead

Turenne sent the

protect

places enough on the

magazines and

the

overawe the population, which was anti-French to the

Glad

to

be rid of his opponent without

whose reinforcements had run men, road,

left

his force

to

core.

battle, Montecuculi,

up

to forty

thousand

Marktbreit September 26, and pursuing the straight

Main

crossed the

at

Kitzingen September 27, and

again at Wiirzburg next day, and camping at Zellingen,

began to construct two bridges at Lohr to again reach the right bank.

Once

there, Montecuculi

renne's magazines north of the

did carry

While

off

Main

de-sac here formed

Tu-

Montecuculi's army was in the cul-

by a northerly bend

especially

of the

to attack him, as the country

wooded and unfavorable, contained no arrived,

all

and indeed

one convoy.

at Zellingen,

Turenne declined

and

would have

at his mercy,

as

since

Main

him

suitable battle-gi'oimd,

to parcel out his

limited to a defensive campaign imperialists in one

but

Montecuculi's reinforcements had

he had with him but an inferior force.

stances had compelled

;

was heavily

;

Circum-

army, because

while Montecucidi kept the

body and well

in hand, with a clean-cut

TURENNE'S HANDS TIED. What

purpose.

599

here happened well illustrates the advan-

tages of the initiative. to ascertain Montecuculi's intention,

Anxious

whether to

inarch on Coblentz or to attack Aschaffenburg, whose garrison

he had now increased to one thousand men, Turenne sent a

Wertheim

large cavalry party to

and down, and throw a bridge

up

to observe the river

at Miltenburg, to

which he

Montecuculi, with his larger army,

built a bridge-head.

could readily hold Turenne on the left bank and commit

havoc on the right by suitable detachments

under his limited instructions, had

no

He

error.

sent

but ascertained

and Turenne,

be watchful to commit

and led out several reconnoitring

little,

On

parties out.

to

;

for the

enemy kept a heavy

parties,

curtain of

October 3 Montecuculi crossed at Lohr and

broke the bridges.

He was now

nearer Aschaffenburg and

Frankfort than the French, and he made a clever feint as if

With

to threaten Turenne's bridge.

the idea, fostered by

the i^arties which the imperial general sent out to observe the river, that Montecuculi might possibly recross the Main, if

only as a diversion, the French marshal strengthened

the places from

Rothemburg

the line of the Tauber and

to

Aschaffenburg so as to make

Main

a network of troops.

But

when Turenne learned that Montecuculi had marched Gelnhausen on the road onstration

to Frankfort,

to

he made a strong dem-

on Steinheim, opposite Hanau, to lead his oppo-

nent to believe that he would cross there,

which had some

effect

— an

operation

on the neutrality of Frankfort, but in

no wise hindered the enemy. straight

all

Montecuculi then pushed

on to Coblentz, where he crossed the Rhine, and

marching rapidly on Bonn, joined the prince of Orange, as projected.

He

had, assisted by the friendly neutrality of the

bishop of Wiirzburg, fairly outmanoeuvred Turenne,

be had been

able,

by marching behind the Main,

to

whom

keep in

MONTECUCULI JOINS THE DUTCH.

600

ignorance of his movements, and

who was hampered by

his

absurd home orders, and by the necessity of handling the neuwith delicacy.

tral territory

His instructions compelled him

to hold fast to the Tauber and Aschaffenburg, while Monte-

cuculi

For

had a

all

clearer purpose, a larger force

and an open road.

manoeuvre redounds to the

this the

latter's credit

most interesting pieces of work of

as one of the

this war.

In 1763 Conde had been conducting a campaign in Holland, while Louis

XIV., aided by the

sonally besieged and took Maestricht city of reasons,

of Orange,

;

skill of

Vauban, per-

but from a multipli-

Conde accomplished nothing against William

who managed,

as agreed, to advance to

Bonn

to

In order to victual, Turenne withdrew to

meet Montecuculi.

Philipsburg, where he crossed the Rhine, but to find none of the rations which had been promised by Louvois.

All these

adverse circumstances so greatly delayed his operations that

he could in no event have reached the Netherlands in season to be of service.

He had

been able to protect Alsatia, but this

province had in reality not been threatened, and Louvois' ner-

vous fear for imperial

it

had prevented Turenne from heading

army from

off

the

its actual objective.

Spain had joined the

allies.

The prince

of

Orange had

thirty thousand Dutch-Spanish troops, and with Montecuculi

he captured Bonn, and overran the whole region between the

Meuse and Rhine, a proceeding which Conde with thousand

men had been

unable to prevent.

By

his twelve

the opera-

tions, originating in the hostility of Spain, the duke of Lux-

emburg,

conducting a war of sieges in the Netherlands,

still

was practically cut

off

from France, but under Louvois'

orders he garrisoned such of the strong places as he could,

and, despite

Conde.

all

the

allies' efforts,

made good

his junction with

Maestricht was retaken from the French, a

Louis could

ill

afford.

loss

CREDIT DUE MONTECUCULI. The

elector of

Cologne and the bishop of Miinster now

forsook France for the allied cause of supplies

The whole

In this campaign the

French had

down

;

and England, for lack

which the jaarliament would not

with Holland.

firmly there.

It

vote,

made peace

aspect of the war changed.

had

allies

to vacate Holland,

marked by not a

601

the

and the

was a campaign

themselves

of manoeuvres solely,

Turenne had done

single battle.

The

advantage.

allies set

that

all

his impossible orders and his limited force permitted

;

circumstances favored the enemy and not Turenne. advice in 1672 to raze the captured

By

well proven to be sound.

Dutch

fortresses

but

His

was now

their retention nothing what-

ever had been gained, and by garrisoning them heavily the forces in the field

had been kept

under Luxemburg, Conde and Turenne

at such

low water mark that nothing could be

expected of them.

Montecuculi deserves advantages.

them

Opposed

all

credit for cleverly utilizing his

to Turenne,

slip.

Garde du Corps. (1688.)

another might have

let

XLVIII. SENEF, AUGUST Fkakce now assumed a battle with the prince

There

France.

of

make The rest

perate fighting to of his army.

it

SINSHEIM, JUNE

1674.

16,

defensive role.

In 1674 Cond^ fought a drawn

Orange

to prevent

in this

is little

AND

11,

at Senef

him from invading

engagement except the large forces and the

des-

noteworthy, and Cond^ attacked with but a portion

of the campaign was trivial.

Turenne, with a

much

smaller force, had Alsatia to defend, and did this by crossing the Rhine to

He

attack the enemy.

found them at Sinsheim, where they had taken up an

almost unassailable position on a high plateau. of the art of that day, Turenne attacked the

There was no more actual gallantry

Here, quite against the rules

enemy and defeated him

in his assault

there was vastly more calculation, and the battle had better results.

whole Sinsheim operation was not much more than a

enemy

to forestall one

By

badly.

than in Condi's at Senef, but

raid,

—a

Still,

the

blow at the

by him.

the extensive combination against her, France was

reduced to a defensive role

;

now

but this did not prevent her

generals from attacking the enemy.

In 1674 Conde again

commanded

in the Netherlands,

to check the

Dutch advance, he fought the bloody but drawn

and on the 11th of August,

battle of Senef with the prince of Orange,

well on into Brabant.

Prench deemed a There

is little

fighting pushed

No

victory.

about the battle of Senef except the furious

by Conde, and the enormous

have been suffered by the notice

;

and

it

who had advanced

peculiar results followed what the

is

allies,

loss stated to

which commends

it

to our

quite doubtful whether the statement that

the priests and their helpers, after the battle, buried twenty-

seven thousand bodies (or half the number) within a space

CONDJ^ ATTACKS. of three leagues,

was said

It

true.

is

603

in a letter of the

Mar-

quis of Louvois, written at the time, that the French loss

men

seven thousand

suspected that in this

and wounded

killed

and that

;

number had been counted

all

it

was was

those who,

campaign opened, had died or deserted.

since the

The Stadtholder had sixty-five thousand men Gondii fortythousand. The allies had advanced to Nivelle, where ;

five

they

and

Courtray

threatened

^v

Oudenarde, and were thought to be projecting

invasion of

the

Mons and

France by way of

Conde

Cambray.

lay

not far

from Charleroi, on a species

stream,

where

of

by a marshy

island surrounded

prince

the

Orange could not well

of

attack

him; and deciding therefore advance on Quesnoy, the

to

allies

Cond^

marched south

to

Senef,

presenting the flank of their long column. the point of day, they broke perialists, the

(late in life).

thus

camp

On August

11, at

in three columns, the im-

Dutch and the Spaniards, with four thousand

horse as rear-guard, heading along the Binche road for Fayx.

Conde had likewise broken camp and moved towards the marching

allies

;

and

so soon as he perceived the order

direction of their columns, he resolved on attack.

had but

his

van with him, he sent a force

and himself,

at the

rest of the allied

head of

to

his best cavalry,

and

Though he

occupy Senef,

advanced on the

rear-guard, which, so soon as the French

were discovered, took up on their line of march a good position for defense.

The preliminary

attack succeeded in break-

ing up the rear-guard, and Conde, placing his battalions of foot, as

they successively arrived, in the most advantageous

A STRONG POSITION.

604

advanced on the rear column of the enemy, which

positions,

To

he had now got near.

body could return,

this

hokl head to Conde until the main

column had drawn up on a height

approachable only through orchards and

had been

filled

line of cavalry

;

had shown

the fire he

all

To hold head

and drew up on the

his steps

CONDE

IDXEHBUPIO c;j

^ .^ ^

C? t?

-,.

^

LUX'S ATTACI\

•

•iVr.';.

t?ppp-

cp gj

'?vi£'^

^

hills

behind

Fayx, which

stand

above the surrounding

*vH.i*-^»?

^^ dj ti

IVjtil

tf e)

that time covered

-^

-^

i

i'
3 ^/" ^

/C

Into a ra-

ditches. .

vine or hollow way on his left leadino- to a

thick

Battle of Senef

wood he threw

some troops right, say the accounts,

ground was cut up

artillery

;

;

on the

were marshes and orchards, and the

so as to be capable of stubborn defense.

Fayx, in front of his

left centre,

was held by the foot and

the entire position was excessively strong.

Conde reconnoitred determined on attack. ;

by

hop - fields,

quickset hedges and

lb

•yrvr

right

and

country,

whose slopes were at

^K

gardens, ^v>

to a

I

'

z;^

.:.:'¥;".

had

hundred and fifty feet

NHVAM

cpcpcp

-^f^^

leader

from a hundred

I

CONOE.S ATt

J:-.:,

column was

at Rocroy.

F-/^

cpcppt^oap ^

this

against Conde's violent onset, the prince of

Orange retraced

O cp Q p

and

The French

driven back to the village of Fayx.

opened with

whose hedges

but Conde's brilliant charge, well seconded

;

his lieutenants, bore fruit here also

by

fields

with musketeers, and was backed by a heavy

Navailles

the

d'Enghien, the centre.

the

new

line,

and despite

Luxemburg commanded left

;

Conde and

his

its

strength

the French

son, the

Unwilling to wait for

duke

all his forces

GALLANT ONSLAUGHT.

A.

to

come up,

tion

still

prince of Orange

lest tlie

more impregnable than

it

605

make his posiwas, Conde deliv-

slioiild

already

ered battle with but a part of his army, and especially lacked infantry.

Opj)Osite

Luxemburg were

Navailles the Spaniards,

Conde

the Dutch

opposite

;

in the centre proposed to

attack that side of the village where lay the ra\dne.

'

If he

could occupy and hold this ravine, he would take the enemy in reverse

and cut

posted in Fayx.

off the elite of their foot,

As he advanced,

debouched from the wood to take in flank,

which had been

a body of imperial cavalry

his

column of attack

and Conde sent Luxemburg

to

head

it

off,

itself

which

Meanwhile Navailles was keeping the

was successfully done.

Spaniards busy, but making no progress. Conde's onset was superb, and first line

of the

enemy

promptly replaced

it

;

its

vigor hustled back the

but the cool-headed prince of Orange

by the second.

A

repeated charge

drove the enemy beyond the ravine, and the French were on the eve of raising the cry of victory. there

came

to the rescue the

But

to save the

day

heavy cavalry of the Stadtholder,

and, outnumbered four to one,

Conde was forced

to a precij)i-

tate retreat.

Conde was always

at his best in the

never cast him down.

He

glow of battle

;

defeat

gathered a column of cavalry and

dragoons from Luxemburg, and once more drove in the

enemy and

occupied the ravine.

solidly

But horse alone

could not keep what the impetuous rush had won.

To hold

foot.

It

needed

the ravine definitely, Conde ordered forward

two battalions of Swiss infantry, the only ones which hap-

pened to be at hand; but these men, already decimated, could not be got to advance

;

they had lost stomach for the

day ; and before other troops could be got up, the elan of the manoeuvre was with

it

lost

;

the ravine was retaken

the battle was forfeited.

by William, and

HEAVY

606

Conde was

in

ill

LOSSES.

If lie retired,

case.

in

ahead of his

de hataille

cot'jjs

his

foot

vanguard columns had hurried

which he could put

;

he miglit be followed

He had no more

and beaten by superior numbers. no

;

own

All he could do was to hold his

was at hand.

artillery

night

till

and

;

this

he did by repeated attacks, headed by Luxemburg and

Had

Navailles, on the village.

the prince advanced in force

on Conde he would have annihilated his army

cious

which enables him to

moment, and was not enterprising

Night put an end kept up

till

to the battle

near midnight.

from the

seize the auspi-

in victory.

but desultory fighting was

;

The

loss

Both armies were exhausted and retired

but William,

to defeat, always lacked that

though astonishingly indifferent instinct of the captain

;

had been tremendous.

terror-stricken,

and both

Conde's belated artillery and foot

field.

arrived during the night, too late to retrieve the disaster.

Conde proposed

It is said that

morrow, with what was

It has

cers lost

disabled.

But

been alleged that the

sand killed and

five

this

was not

Few

to be.

confessed to fifteen thou-

allies

The number

thousand captured.

was appalling.

The

cavalry and the foot and

left of his

guns which had come up.

renew the combat on the

to

offi-

generals but had been killed or

retreat of the allies left the

French a number

Conde treated the prisoners with

of trophies.

of

Count Stahremberg, who was sent

to

generosity.

Rheims, drank, at a

banquet there held, to the health of the prince of Orange, who, he

said,

Champagne,

The

had promised him a

" and he has kept his

rest of the

to be sure, saved cost.

It

seems as

glass of "

word

champagne

in

!

campaign lacked importance.

Conde had,

France from invasion, but at a very heavy if

he had been over eager in attacking with

but a part of his force.

He had won

charges of cavalry alone, but this

is

on other

fields

not good tactics.

by the " C^est

TURENNE CROSSES THE RHINE. magnijlque, mais ce nest j^as

l<-i

guei're ! "

607

He

coiild not

expect that charges of horse, however ardent, would always demoralize the enemy, or insure his holding what he might

Cavalry

win.

The

is

elector of

limited

by the

terrain.

Brandenburg had again joined the

some minor princes had

also

sided against Louis

and the task assigned Marshal Turenne of defending Alsatia

twelve thousand

in

allies

XIV.,

1674 was that

and the middle Rhine, for which duty

men were

given him.

His main magazines

Sinsheim Operation.

were at Zabern (Saverne), and in stand.

its

Near Heidelberg, on the other

vicinity he took his side

and down the

Rhine, lay an imperial and allied camp of ten thousand

men

under the duke of Lorraine and Marshal Caprara, and reinforcements from Franconia were on the way to join them

under General Bournonville.

At

summer Caprara showed signs of openand the French commander decided to strike

the beginning of

ing operations,

the imperial officer before his reinforcements should arrive.

He had some

fear that Alsatia might be attacked from the

Moselle region, but he provided against this by a detachment

ATTACKS HIS ENEMY.

608

of cavalry on the Saar

men

;

and with nine thousand

five

hundred

he crossed the Rhine on June 14 at Philipsburg, where

he built a bridge

and horse, with

;

and having drawn

six guns,

from

in a

few thousand foot vanguard, he

this fortress, as a

moved towards Heidelberg by the straight road, to seek the enemy. At Hockenheim he ascertained that Caprara and the having heard of his crossing, had broken

duke

of Lorraine,

up

march on Wimj)fen,

to

in the

hope

advance into the interior and prevent of Bournonville

;

to forestall the its

French

arresting the

march

and sharply turning to the right on June

15 to Wiesloch, Turenne headed the imperial generals

On

enemy was busy

the 16th, finding that the

the left to the right

and stopped him

bank

of the Elsenz, he

off.

crossing from

advanced on him

at Sinsheim.

Caprara, whose business

it

was to await reinforcements,

should have, according to the ideas of that time, and indeed of

any time, declined

moving

battle, as

into a position which

he could well have done by

Turenne could not

But

attack.

though he imagined that he had so done, his calculations proved unsound, and Turenne with characteristic boldness decided to force battle on him.

There are various accounts of the strength of the armies, but on the

field

rival

they were not far from equal.

Caprara and the duke had with them seven thousand horse, but not exceeding two thousand foot their stand

on

and they had taken up

on a plateau back of Sinsheim, with a steep access

all sides,

front.

;

and with the Elsenz

like a double ditch in its

They had occupied Sinsheim, an old fortified abbey

near by, and the edges of the plateau, and deemed themselves quite secure. of

Sinsheim

It is

was indeed a dubious place

a plain shut in by

hills,

to attack.

and into

this plain,

south of the river, Turenne had debouched and formed

Caprara ought

to

South

line.

have held Sinsheim in greater force

;

but

CAPTURES SINSHEIM.

609

he had placed only one thousand foot and four hundred dra-

goons in the gardens of the town, the town

and along the bank

by

As Turenne had no

artillery.

The

the abbey

— — the task was a

excess of force,

thousand foot and four thousand horse, ous one to face.

itself,

and had not sustained them

of the river,

had had a long

imperialists

five

seri-

rest

and the

troops were fresh, while the French had marched about ninety

miles in four days and were tired and footsore.

But Turenne

wished to strike the enemy before he was reinforced, so as to

open the campaign by a gain in moral force

on

battle.

There was, according

;

and he decided

to our ideas,

an excellent

chance of an attack on the enemy's right flank by a circuit

around Sinsheim and up the Heidelberg road, but not within the ideas of the day. universal.

this

Despite their long march the spirit of the

was good, and with

was

Parallel front attacks were

men

Turenne moved

his usual confidence

to

the attack, meanwhile using his six guns to open his way.

In front of Sinsheim were gardens and hedges proper for

and though near the

defense,

marshy

places,

it

river were a

was fordable.

number

of low

Turenne detached a force of

thirteen hundred foot and four squadrons of dragoons to attack

the town.

The

troops went at their

hour had forced the

work

river, driven the

cheerily,

enemy out

and

in

an

of the gar-

dens and back into Sinsheim, and had reached the town ditch.

Here was met a sharp

fire,

planted their ladders,

and

but the French waded the ditch, after another

hour and a half

forced an entrance, though the place was well defended, and

had

its

streets barricaded with wine-barrels filled with earth

and heavy beams from the houses. defense sent to lai'ge

whatever it

;

came too

its

garrison

late.

fled,

and

offered no

reinforcements

In Sinsheim Caprara forfeited a

part of his infantry force,

taken prisoners.

The abbey

— four

hundred men being

FORCES A STRONG POSITION.

610

Having captured Sinsheim aud driven the enemy away from the river, Turenne, not to allow him to recover from his surprise, turned quickly

The mense

on his main

whose apex, near Sinsheim, was a ravine,

triangle, at

up which Turenne must work in the

force.

plateau on which stood the imperialists was an im-

open

;

and

his

at the top there

way

in order to

debouch

was but narrow space to

Battle of Sinsheim.

deploy his men.

On

each side of the

defile lay steeps, cov-

ered on the right by orchards and vineyards, on the left by

a long quickset hedge, and everywhere practicable for un-

mounted men as

only.

Marshaling his foot in the two wings so

by occupying the hedge and a walled vineyard

to drive out the

plateau,

enemy's light troops,

and placing

still

to be able

on the edge of the

his cavalry in the centre, he advanced.

This was an intelligent formation, though a decided innovation on the rules of the

day for battle-order; but Turenne

WINS A VICTORY. was,

anything, original.

if

611

In this order the French vigor-

ously advanced up the heights, and, as they debouched, the lines

were formed with platoons of foot interspersed with the

The guns were got

squadrons in the fashion of Gustavus.

up with the

cavalry.

ravine, the

enemy had drawn up

plateau to keep

Instead of disputing the possession of the

away

back on the

fi'om Turenne's artillery fire, Cajjrara

in the second line, the this

his cavalry well

duke

of Lorraine in the first

and

;

enabled the French the more easily to make their way

up the

slopes,

and gave them more chance

to deploy.

Turenne's bold advance on the enemy, rarely paralleled in those slow and unenterprising days,

The

success.

foot,

which had

met with

to climb

its

well-deserved

up the rough, steep

hillside, so as to leave the ravine for the cavalry,

reached the level than

it fell

smartly on the imperial

which defended the edge of the plateau, and drove them

tussle,

home on the with too

it

moved onward,

ardor, Lorraine

back.

met

In following

the French battalions, which

it

it

up, however, he

met him with

was composed

deployed, the

first line

either flank

and the second

flanks

The

;

gone ahead

with a counter charge

came on

so hot a fire that

he recoiled, and Turenne's horse again formed.

;

its

in line vigorously charged

allied centre, but the right having

much

and drove

it

by additional squadrons on right and

The French horse already

left.

troojDS,

after a stout

Turenne had meanwhile been getting

in.

the cavalry forward into line, and, as front was widened

no sooner

AVhen

fully

of cavalry with foot

line of foot with horse

on

on its

while a mixed line of horse and foot stood in reserve.

field

was covered with dust so thick as

to quite hide the

operations, but the lines fought stubbornly,

taken and retaken again and again. in the heat of the fray

;

and

flags

were

Turenne, as always, was

with a few squadrons he was for an

hour in the midst of the enemy's cuirassiers

;

after a struggle

UTILITY OF THE OPERATION.

612

which

on both

reflected credit

French fervor prevailed,

sides,

and with much pushing- to and fro, but without loss of courage or ground, the French drove the enemy from the field.

The

had lasted seven hours, much time having been

battle

consumed

in

very much

Caprara and Lorraine retired

preliminaries.

broken, but not so well pursued as they might

have been, by a

through the woods to Heilbronn,

circviit

whence they returned, back of the Neckar, to Heidelberg.

The

victory

hundred and

how

six

killed

was complete ;

orders from the Court at

men

killed

But even Turenne did not know

hundred prisoners.

He

to utilize the gain.

and took post

the French loss was thirteen

;

the imperial loss two thousand

June 20

retired

— across

— possibly by

the Rhine at Philipsburg

Lachen near Neustadt, content with the pun-

He

ishment he had given the duke and Caprara.

shortly

strengthened his force up to sixteen thousand men.

There was no more gallantry in Turenne's attack on Sinsheim than in Conde's at Senef ciated with

than the

its

latter.

but the former battle, asso-

;

entire operation, strikes us

Though

the

work was done in a broader In a certain sense, in

more favorably

numbers engaged were

less,

the

style.

this raid, for

We

it

was

little

more, the

gain was hardly worth the

loss.

ideas with reference to

and the old military writers devote

much

it

;

are not given Turenne's

time to the description of battles, while rarely giving

reasons for a captain's larger operations. cutting of the knot is

;

though

important mainly in

this or that strategic

It

to

A

battle

is

the

apjjeals to our sympathies,

its results

manoeuvre

But we are rarely permitted

— the

it

is

;

it

whereas the reason for

of vastly greater

know what most

moment.

interests us,

impelling causes to any given manoeuvre or battle.

is left

to the military critic to guess these

alone elucidate the grand operations.

if

he can

;

they

ONLY A RAID. The province dent,

the

of

war

is

not to

Killing

kill.

and an unfortunate one, of war.

enemy

613

To

is

but an

inflict

inci-

a loss on

unless such a loss accomplishes some end

— as

to

put the enemy out of capacity to do harm for a season, and thus enable you to manoeuvre to advantage

have a clearly defined purpose for a

—

is

no gain.

To

battle, or to utilize

a

victory properly, was, until the days of Frederick, almost an

unknown

thing.

Gustavus was an exception

was Turenne, but not here, unless

it

;

so, frequently,

can be claimed that the

defeat at Sinsheim forestalled the allies in an invasion of Alsatia, of which there

renne had struck

the

was no immediate

enemy before

probability.

their

Tu-

junction with

Bournonville, and had to a certain extent neutralized them

but this was

all.

French Musketeer. (End of 17th Century.)

XLIX. ENTZHEIM, OCTOBER

TURKHEIM, JANUARY

1674.

4,

5,

1675.

Shortly

after Sinsheim, to forestall an invasion of Alsatia,

crossed the Rhine, advanced on the enemy,

rbcrossed,

managed thirty-five

but he put his so as to

men

seeing'

Here, October

thousand to

men

4,

Turenne attacked them.

it

up a

retired

with a small force.

The enemy

Turenne had but twenty-two thousand

;

good use, and

was drawn and both armies

fell

with some effect on their left wing,

Though

hotly contested, the battle

but the enemy vacated the

;

The enemy was now

joined

field,

by the

while

elector

which gave them fifty-seven thousand men, with which they

of Brandenburg,

went

no chance to operate advantageously, they

crowd them towards the Rhine.

Turenne held

Turenne again

back of the Neckar, and

to reach Strasburg, and again entering Alsatia, took

position at Entzheim.

had over

lay

Hereupon they crossed the Rhine and marched

drove them towards the Main.

up towards Speyer, where,

who

into winter-quarters.

To crowd them

made

out of Alsatia, Turenne

a winter march back of the Vosges Mountains, and debouching on their flank, forced

them towards the Rhine.

them near Colmar January 5. By turning their managed to drive them from the field and owing ;

commanders, the

had been vastly

Shortly

allies retired definitely across

left flank at

the Rhine.

among

the

This campaign

bank

of the

Rhine

Turenne learned that the

allies,

after his return to the left

largely reinforced,

had taken position between Mannheim and

Ladensburg, north of the Neckar and near

had

Tiirkheim, he

to disagreement

to Turenne's credit.

after the battle of Sinsheim,

nonville

left

Then, following them up, he attacked

joined,

and the

forces, to

its

mouth.

which the

Bour-

Worms

gar-

rison was added, had grown to five thousand foot and nine

To check the enemy in any attempt they might be about to make on Alsatia, the French captain deterthousand horse.

mined on dealing them a fresh blow.

TURENNE CROSSES THE RHINE. Having strengthened Zabern

so

615

that he would

have a

secure i^oint cVapind in Alsatia, Turenne gathered his forces

near Neustadt, and giving out that he woukl shortly move on Saar, he

the

headed his van of

Kaiserslautern July

3,

five

while the main

hundred cavaliy on

army marched towards

Philipsburg.

He

again crossed the Rhine at that place, from which he

took four battalions, six guns and twenty copper pontoons,

and marched via Hockenheim where the enemy's river his

was

officers

to the

Neckar

came down

fordable, but Turenne,

Wieblingen,

at

men when without detriment he

The

to reconnoitre.

who was always could be

careful of

so, built

a pon-

toon bridge, after driving away the enemy's cavalry with his

guns, and sending over some squadrons to hold the further

bank, he crossed. their

position.

His purpose was to turn the enemy out of

Having passed the

he demonstrated

river,

towards Ladensburg, while the enemy made small resistance

and retired summarily on Frankfort, via Zwingenberg and Darmstadt, reaching Langen the same day.

Turenne

lowed, but got no further than Zwingenberg. that he could not prevent

fol-

Here he saw

them from reaching Frankfort, gave

over the pursuit, and deeming

it

essential to

keep his eye on

the Moselle region, from which there was danger, he retired

and took up a position

at

enemy withdrew beyond

Weinheim and Gross-Saxen.

The

the Main, having suffered the loss of

a large number of prisoners and a yet greater moral depletion.

They expected further reinforcements, and Turenne

believed they would then seek to carry the to

watch which purpose he determined

the right bank.

into Alsatia

remain awhile on

In order to spare his own magazines at

Philipsburg, Hagenau, Germersheim,

and

to

war

Landau and Neustadt,

in accordance with orders to prevent

the

allies

from

again establishing themselves in the Lower Palatinate, or in

DEVASTATING THE PALATINATE.

616

the region between the

Main and

the Neckar, and thus be a

threat to Alsatia, he devastated the entire region, destroying

everything he coukl not

was, this

carry

Done under

off.

work was thoroughly done.

order of the day

;

it

it

Such vandalism was the

cannot well be laid at Turenne's door.

generation later, Marlborough devastated Bavaria

we

explicit

from the French government, barbarous as

instructions

A

and have

;

not the work of Sheridan in the Shenandoah Valley to

regret

The

?

allies,

as

Turenne had feared, now threatened Alsatia

from the Moselle region

army was transferred

;

and

at the

to the left

end of July the French

bank and was

established

near Neustadt, and later in the Landau region, where Turenne

remained a month, closely watching the enemy by means of

By sundry

parties scouting on both sides of the Rhine.

rein-

forcements Turenne managed to raise his army to twenty

thousand men.

The

details of the

minor operations

at this

period are extremely interesting to the student, but from lack of space cannot be given.

Having received large

from Germany and Lorraine, with

thirty-five

accessions

thousand men

the allies crossed the Rhine at Mainz, the last days of August,

and marched slowly on Speyer, which they reached September

6.

The commanding because

senior officer, Bournonville,

could not agree with his subordinates

;

and not liking the

task of attacking Turenne's lines near Landau, for Philips-

burg was on their allies

flank,

and being hard up for

victual, the

recrossed the Rhine above Speyer, September 21, on

three bridges which they threw, and later at Wiesenthal, north

camped

and south of

at

Lusheim and

Philii^sburg.

Antici-

pating that the enemy was aiming to control Strasburg,

Turenne sent a detachment out from Philipsburg road to that place at Graben, and to head the

enemy

;

to hold the

off aj^proaches

by

and dispatched a considerable body under Gen-

THE ENEMY ENTERS ALSATIA. eral

Vaubrun

617

bank

to seize the bridge-head fort on the west

the Rhine at Strasburg

;

but the latter

officer negotiated in

former detachment came too

lieu of acting, the

of

and on

late,

September 24 Caprara, who had meanwhile marched up river

and acted with commendable

vigor,

seized

Strasburg

the

This was unfortunate, for Strasburg,

bridge-head himself.

which was considered to be neutral, opened the gate of upper Alsatia.

That Alsatia was the saw

;

allies'

objective

he had already headed up

river,

Turenne now

clearly

and by September 29

he placed his entire army in a position behind the small stream

Siiffel, just

a morass, his allies

left

north of Strasburg, with his right flank on

on the

and Wantzenau in

111,

The

his rear.

were slower, but their main army again crossed, the

end of September, and took

ujj

a position near Strasburg,

behind the Briisch, in the villages of Entzheim, Geispoltz-

heim and Blesheim, where they could await reinforcements while holding part of upper Alsatia.

back of the Briisch This period

is

Turenne deserves

all

and apt life of

make

this

lay too far

stream serve as a defense.

and

skillful

manoeuvres

;

and

credit for rarely failing to divine the ene-

If one

my's purpose. cover

to

full of interesting

But they

were to write a manual which should

the operations of war, minor and major, illustrations,

could be taken for every

ones,

Turenne

jirincij^le

from the

alone.

Louvois was for holding Turenne to task for allowing the allies to

work against great odds and wanted him to retire at once

enter Alsatia, despite his fine

in defense of the province to Lorraine, lest the

;

enemy should march

into the interior

but Turenne obtained from the king permission to act as he

deemed

best,

and

to

remain in Alsatia, for here alone could

he prevent the enemy from invading France. the king

is

reasonable, strong,

— much

like the

His

man

letter to :

—

A NOTEWORTHY LETTER.

618

" Les ennemis, quelque grand iiombre de troupes qu'ils ayent, ne sauraieut dans la saison ou nous

qu'k celle de

me

sommes penser k aucune autre

de la province

faire sortir

moyens pour passer en Lorraine que ni'en allais de

oii je suis,

ne

je

sois chassd

moi-meme, comme V. M. me I'ordonne,

auront peut-etre de la peine k

me faire

faire;

enterprise

n'ayant ni vivres ni

de I'Alsaee:

si

je

je ferais ce qu'ils

quand on a un nombre

raison-

able de troupes, on ne quitte pas un pays, encore que I'ennemi en ai beau-

coup d'avantage; de V.

le service

et

je suis

M. que

persuadd

je perdisse

repasser les montagnes;

bientot obliges

qu'il

une

vaudrait beaucoup mieux pour

bataille,

que d'abandonner I'Alsaee

je le fais, Philipsbourg et Brisac seront

si

de se rendre;

imperiaux s'empareront de tout

les

le

pays depuis Mayence jusqu'k Bale, et transporteront peut-etre la guerre d'abord en Frauclie Comte', de Ik en Lori-aine, et viendront ravager la

Champagne;

je connois la force des troupes imperiales, les

commandent,

les

pays

le

g^n^raux qui

Je prend tout sur moi, et

je suis.

oii

je

me

charge des dvenements."

To

be able to bold himself, be strengthened bis magazines,

and

jjarticularly Zabern,

now placed where Alsatia

;

watched the enemy.

closely

a battle

won would

drive the

He was

enemy out

of

while from a battle lost he believed he could retire

under the guns of Zabern

;

lest the allies

should become too

strong when the elector should have joined them with his

twenty thousand men, Turenne determined to strike them before that event tions

heim.

from

his

;

and with

camp

this

end

Wantzenau

in

The enemy had

view made prepara-

move on them

to

It required all the self-reliance

Turenne possessed

tia,

at

at Entz-

and enterprise which

to face the difficulties of the situation.

twice his force

rich in victual,

they backed on upper Alsa-

;

while lower Alsatia had been

stripped by the late operations

:

lai'gely

they were placed where an

invasion of Fi*ance was easy, and they were awaiting twenty

thousand fresh forcements.

men

But

Turenne did not

At

to

while Turenne could hope for no reinattack

was

the

safest

defense, and

hesitate.

nightfall of October

2

Turenne sent dragoon

parties

ADVANCE ON THE out to bridge

ALLIES.

619

the streams he must cross to reach the Briisch,

all

— the Rhine-Ill region a perfect network — and midnight the whole army followed

of

is

at

marsh streams, Achenheim,

to

crossing the Siiffel at Lampertheim, and advancing in three

columns

the cavalry on the

:

artillery

and baggage on the

left,

the foot in the centre, the

right.

A

steady rain

made

roads extremely heavy, and the advance was slow. not the habit of the distance

;

the

day

to

It

the

was

keep outposts at any great

enemy

had none out beyond a

mile

from

Entz-

heim, and the move-

ments of the French

army were not

dis-

Reaching

covered.

Achenheim

the

in

afternoon of the 3d,

Turenne reconnoitred carefully,

and pushed

forward his van

dragoons

heim

to

during

;

following entire

and its

night

army

of

Holzthe the

Entzheim Operation.

followed,

after crossing took

up a position beyond the Briisch,

right leaning on Holzheim.

to get at the

Before

it

witli

The army had worked hard

enemy.

stretched a triangular plain three or four miles

long, in the middle of

which the enemy had drawn up when

they heard of Turenne's advance, with the centre behind Entzheim, held in force by foot and guns

;

while the

left,

thrown

forward, reached out towards the Briisch and the right towards the Erger, a small stream across which they

had

their bridges

THE ARMIES IN LINE.

620

and

Small ravines bordered by

line of retreat to Strasburg.

hedges cut up the plain

;

one of especially large

front of the left like an intrenchment

;

size lay in

and near Entzheim

were patches of woods, hedges and gardens.

The morning began

to

fall.

of October 4

opened foggy, and shortly rain

The enemy, already aware

of

Turenne's

advance,

now

French.

Turenne, cheerful and bright in word and deed, as

discovered

the

immediate presence of the

Battle of Entzheim.

he always was on the day of battle, himself led forward his lines.

He had

twenty battalions of about

six

hundred men

hundred and twenty

each,

and

men,

in all a force of about twenty-two thousand.

of battle

eighty-five squadrons of one

was the common one

line, eight in

:

ten battalions in the first

the second and two in reserve, with six squad-

rons in reserve and five between the lines.

dragoons were on the flanks, and in the of

fifteen

His order

The cavalry and

first line little

bodies

musketeers stood between each two squadrons.

Thirty guns were placed in front of the wings and centre.

FIGHTING ON THE RIGHT. The enemy had twenty-seven

621

battalions, averaging six hun-

dred and seventy men, and one hundred and twenty-three squadrons, numberizig, including dragoons and cavalry, nineteen

men

thousand

French records only they had

fifty

them

thousand

thirty-five

They stood

guns.

in

two

Some

thousand.

thirty-eight

total,

;

allot

men

but

;

and a reserve

lines

;

and, according to some accounts, were in six bodies, with

more or

less

front a

;

left

line

wing had

had a in its

of a mile long

half a mile wide, called in the various accounts

of the battle the "

much

and the

wood which was about three quarters

by nearly a

The

open intervals between them.

reentering angle at Entzheim

little

wood

;

" while on the right extended

larger one called the " big wood."

right was an extensive patch of vineyards

In front of the

and hedges.

It

a good position for the defensive battle on which the

had determined.

Caprara commanded the right

of Holstein the left

was

allies

the duke

;

Bournonville stood with the corps de

;

hataille in the centre.

The

didce of Lorraine, the

duke of

Baden and some other German princes commanded their own forces. Bournonville had occupied the little wood with foot,

and had thrown up two

lines of

works in

it,

on which

some guns were mounted. Turenne opened the attack by a cannonade line,

as

if

all

which was well sustained throughout the day. he might have turned the

force there in reverse

;

little

he did not do

along the It

seems

wood, and taken the

so,

but pushed a force

of dragoons under Boufflers directly into the wood, hoping to take

it

and

fall

promptly met at the

on the enemy's first line of

left.

This attack was

works, and Boufflers recoiled.

Turenne sent him some reinforcements, and despite additional troops put in line

by the enemy, Boufflers carried the

and captured the guns.

He

first

was, however, sto^^ped at the

second line of works, and here for three hours the fight was

FIGHTING ON THE LEFT.

622

Turenne again and again sent

kept up, hot and bloody.

rein-

forcements to Boufflers, and the enemy did thr like to their

Not

divisions.

was the wood ter

until the

French had been tnrice forced out

and the enemy driven

definitely taken

behind the ravine in their rear.

It

was

to shel-

at this point that

the English contingent fought, in which the later great duke of

Marlborough commanded a regiment.

The with

no

attention of

;

up

had been

left of the

French

partial attack here, for his plan manifestly

to crush their left

and there

allies

there

was probably not intended that there should be

it

more than a

tier;

so constantly taken

wood that

attempt to manceuvre the centre or

set

army

Turenne had been

the fierce fighting at the little

first

is

was

and throw them back towards the fronsome doubt whether the French or the

But Bournonville

advanced.

initiated

an onset

with a heavy column of cavalry cV elite on the centre of the

French

advancing on the

line,

left of

the vineyards, while

Caprara was sent out with another column on the right of the vineyards to

fall

on the

left flank of

the French, and take

the infantry centre in reverse.

On the

French

and de FOrges.

left

stood the cavalry of Counts d'Auvergne

These

officers

had advanced, or were prepar-

ing to advance, towards the big wood on the enemy's right,

and the movement was

to be followed

by General Foucault

and seven battalions of foot from the centre

;

but the French

had scarcely started when they became aware of the column of eighteen squadrons which,

about to

fall

on the French

under Caprara in person, was

left,

and of the advance of Bour-

Foreseeing danger from front and rear. General

nonville.

Foucault ployed his foot into a square cotes "

— and

their fire

;

—"

awaited attack, ordering the

fit

face des

men

deux

to reserve

but when Bournonville perceived the firm front of

the French corj^s de hataille, he declined to deliver the blow,

NO DEFINITE RESULT. and rode back whence

lie

623

Caprara, on the other hand,

came.

boldly rode around the French flank, and by the violence of

camt

his onset

close to breaking-

de rOrges returc^ed to the

line,

it

up, but d'Auvergne

faced to the

left,

and

took Caprara

himself in reverse, and hustled him back.

The

wood had ceased

fighting at the little

u]3 their point,

now

se.

He met

to give

V out a heavy force of foot under the

duke of Liineburg to retake win success

not so the

;

The enemy, unwilling

fighting on the French^ right.

it

;

but Turenne, determined to

at this part of the line, called for reinforcements.

Liineburg's advance with the bulk of the

of the right wing, the second

after another period of

moving up

heavy

first

into its place

fighting, in

;

line

and

which the enemy

and the French were each driven back four times, and four times again came to the charge, Turenne pushed Liineburg

sive

The work here was

back into Entzheim.

well

the French left was ;

but

now

so hot that

instructed to remain on the defen-

though

it

The

kept up a heavy cannonading meanwhile.

it

on the right flank had been hotly contested

battle

had lasted

all

day,

it

had led

to

nothing

;

but,

definite.

Turenne's willingness to attack shows a keen knowledge of the weakness of the enemy's army, which, though numer-

was made up of so many different parts as

ous,

It has

sion. field

was

access, off

been suggested that his proper

to attack

and

if

the allied

right,

to lack cohe-

tactics

on this

which was easier of

once demolished would enable him to cut them

from Strasburg.

Their fear for this flank would prob-

ably have given him a better chance of driving them off the field, if

point

;

he could give them a sufficiently hearty blow at this

and

it

was

feasible, as their

massed near Entzheim.

main infantry force was

But Turenne's plan seems

been to break the enemy's

left,

to

have

lead to the capture of Entz-

heim, which would thus be taken in reverse, and throw the

DRAWN

A

€24

enemy back on

retreat

line of

his

BATTLE. and across the Rhine.

This was indeed more in accordance with the ideas of the day, which did not look favorably upon a battle which would drive the enemy, especially a superior one, into a corner

where they must absolutely gerous an experiment

bered two

to one.

was deemed too dan-

and here the French were outnum-

;

In his effort to .accomplish his design,

Turenne ran the risk of

had the

It

fight.

allies stoutly

so depleting his centre

pushed home

in

t.'

and

left that,

ese quarters,

Turenne

must, with his smaller force, have suffered a galling defeat.

But the

allies

fought feebly, and only defended themselves

fi'om Turenne's attack

in with

any

;

they had not the enterprise to push

vigor.

The French had been marching and working hard

for the

two preceding nights and days, in the rain without camping all

had been on a plain deep

half the

army had been

in

mud, under heavy

fire,

and

They

fighting desperately all day.

were exhausted, and Turenne clearly saw that he could not carry out his plan against the heavy odds of the enemy.

determined to retire to his camp. lasted well on into the night,

Under a cannonade which

and leaving a brigade of cav-

alry to hold the field as an assertion of victory,

moved

his

army back

to

He

Turenne

Achenheim.

Neither side could fairly claim the victory, for the allies at the same time withdrew to their old lost

camp

at Illkirch,

having

three thousand killed, three thousand wounded, eight

guns and twenty standards. sand killed and

Why the

fifteen

French

The French

loss

was two thou-

hundred wounded, with several

loss should

colors.

be the smaller does not appear

from the course of the fighting; but these are the figures usually accepted as correct.

Turenne had a horse shot under

him, and the loss in officers was heavy.

The

allies

remained

near Strasburg, and Turenne placed himself at Marlenheim,

THE ALLIES RETIRE.

625

in advance of Zabern, where he protected his magazines at

and Hagenau,

this place

and prepare

to recuperate

for a fresh

blow.

The

battle

home on

had consisted

the left of an

solely of

an isolated attack pushed

enemy who fought on

and of a second attempted attack on

Much

his right,

the defensive,

met half way.

discussion, coupled with the usual critic's "

been had on this battle

French as

it

;

but

prevented the

penetrate into France.

was

it

from making any

allies

For

" has

if,

so far a gain to the effort to

accomplishment Turenne

this

deserves high credit, as he clearly does for his splendid cour-

With

age in attacking such superior forces. Turenne's withdrawal from the

reference to

Napoleon says

field.

" II

:

a pousse dans cette occasion la circonspection jusqu'a la timidite

il

;

savait

mieux que qui que ce

At

I'oiiinion a la guerre."

handsome bid had not

all events,

soit I'influence

to drive the allies out of Alsatia

on

fully succeeded

this

field,

de

Turenne had made a ;

and

if

he

he shortly would on

another.

The

elector of

Brandenburg

finally joined the allies

on the

14th of October at Strasburg, making a total force of thirtythree thousand foot and twenty-four thousand

meet

this serious threat, the arinere-han of

out and a

number

of regiments brought

Despite their strength, the

allies

horse.

To

France was ordered

back from Flanders.

were slow and inactive,

though they indulged in much manoeuvring, ostensibly with a view of attacking Turenne's depots at Zabern and Hage-

nau

;

them

but eventually making no progress, for Turenne headed off at

every

jioint,

meeting them by concentrating and

ably posting his forces behind the Zorn, at Detweiler, they

returned to the vicinity of their old camps, and later went into

winter-quarters,

Colmar.

the

elector

Turenne then put

his

establishing his court in

men

in quarters

behind the

A WINTER CAMPAIGN.

626

Mocler, having strengthened

Hagenau and Zabern, and

cut all

the bridges leading north from the Strasbui*g region.

The explanation

of the allies' laxness lay in the jealousy of

and the

the several leaders

By

ceedings.

who

utilizing his

entire

want

of unity in their pro-

knowledge of

this fact,

Turenne,

lay near his magazines watching the enemy, and had

been also reinforced by a few thousand men, conceived the idea that, after the beginning he had made, with some further skillful feints,

he might push the

and perhaps crowd them out

allies

back on Strasburg

They mani-

of the country.

festly desired to winter in Alsatia, not only because

their it

own

supplies

saved

it

by consuming the enemy's, but because

gave them a starting-point for the invasion of France the

Both Tranche Comte and Lorraine were

succeeding spring.

ready to welcome them, and this serious threat to France

undermine.

Turenne determined

to

and against the rule

of the day,

With a view

which was

to

to so doing,

go into winter-

quarters early, Turenne obtained permission from the king to

conduct a winter campaign.

The

trenched their position that there attack,

allies

had

so heavily in-

was no chance

for a front

and both armies extended from the Vosges

to the

Rhine, so that there was no means of reaching either flank.

In order to mislead the enemy as to his intentions, Turenne

put his own forces into winter-quarters between his magazines at

Zabern and Hagenau, both of which he had strongly

fortified

and garrisoned, and gave out that he had done with

operations for the year. ity,

for victual

He

needed patience as well as

and forage were both hard

to get.

were so thoroughly deceived as to spread their

activ-

The allies own troops

over a wide territory backing on the Rhine between Belfort

and Benfelden.

On November

29 Turenne started with

foot and thirteen thousand horse, and via

fifteen

thousand

Liitzelstein

and

A MOUNTAIN MARCH. Lixheim, which he

left

December

4,

627

he led his

men

across the

Vosges mountain paths, and along their west slope through Lorcheim, Blamont, Baccarat and Padoulx to Remiremont.

The march was admirably planned each column was given daily route, and the rendezvous was at Belfort but no one ;

its

;

Tiirkheiin Operation.

except Turenne

knew

its

purpose.

He may

have hoped to

surprise the allies, but they were not inactive, of the

and got wind

manoeuvre while Turenne was waiting at Remiremont

for his infantry column, belated

come up,

by snow and bad

as well as to collect victual.

believe that he

To

roads, to

lead the allies to

might debouch on them through some of the

mountain gaps, as well as

to prevent their using the

gaps

NOT A SURPRISE.

628

themselves, Turenne sent several detachments due east across the range to

move

and fro on the eastern

to

These

slope.

indulged in a number of exchanges with the enemy, while with his main force Turenne marched

His journey had been as it

still

further south.

fast as could be,

and yet slow

was December 27 before he reached Belfort.

hoped that

his

movements would

act on the

As

he had

enemy

in the

nature of a surprise, this march of less than five miles

a day seems unnecessarily protracted Virginia roads during our it; in

Still

for though the allies

only by remembering

Turenne was right in

knew

army

the whole

Belfort.

his calculations

of the presence of a

Remiremont, they appear

when

;

war can we account for

Turenne's time, the roads in France were not what

they are to-day.

at

civil

to

French force

have been taken unawares

aj^peared in rear of their left flank at

Here, unfortunately, Turenne had again to remain

to collect victual, a delay

great part of

its effect

which robbed

his

movement

of a

instead of being able summarily to

:

attack the enemy, he was compelled to resort to small manoeuvres.

much

The march had been exhausting strung out

;

;

he could barely feed his men

he had come so far to get

in a

column was

his

and though

;

blow before the enemy could

concentrate, he was unable to undertake a smart

and immedi-

ate attack.

Having ascertained through prisoners that the wing was under orders at Altkirch

and part

allied left

in case of attack to rendezvous, part at Colmar,

these two detachments

Turenne sought

by pushing

marched on Miihlhausen

;

in

to separate

between them, and

but he was able to take with him

only three thousand cavalry, while a small body of foot was

ordered to follow as speedily as possible.

The

ished at his appearance, yet anticipated his manoeuvre set out at once,

aston-

allies,

and their van reached Miihlhausen

;

first.

they

TURENNE MOVES ON THE ENEMY. Though with a tring party,

629

force so small as to be merely a reconnoi-

Turenne attacked the enemy near Miihlhausen,

but without advantage other than to gain a handsome victory

The

and some information.

Turenne returned towards

dred men.

was yet again compelled and

The

rest them.

was quite ahead was cumbrous

main

his

force

;

he

to victual, get his troops together

intelligent conception of this operation

of the

means

in those days

of carrying ;

and

sparsely settled mountain country, fast

was three hun-

loss of the allies

it

out.

Everything

in winter, especially in a

it

and suitably ration a column.

was impossible

to

march

Neither had the country

supplies, nor could a train be carried along at

any reasonable

pace.

On

January 2 the army was advanced

to Ensisheim,

the 4th to Pfaffenheim, marching near the

Colmar, and

because

the

roads were

valley

Pushing on towards Colmar on January

5,

to

hills

on

avoid

impassable.

Turenne found

the main force of the allies in line of battle, behind a branch of the Fechte called the Logelbach,

and covered by a number

leaned on Colmar

of works.

Their

left

plain, too

much

cut up for advantageous mancEuvring; a

;

in front

mile beyond their right lay, on the main

was a low

stream of the

Fechte, the village of Tiirldieim, which the allies had but slightly

occupied.

The branch

in

their

front

had

been

strengthened with works, and the troops stood in two lines

with a reserve.

heim

The French army marched from

in three columns,

and

at

Pfaffen-

Eggisheim threw back eight

squadrons of the enemy which were out reconnoitring.

Draw-

ing up his army of thirty thousand men, of which half was foot, in line

but beyond artillery range, in order to impose

on the

Turenne with a small force reconnoitred, and

allies,

at

once saw that Tiirkheim was the most promising point for attack.

He

proposed to try the same tactics which had

CLEVER DISPOSITIONS.

630

turn

flank furthest from

half succeeded at Entzlieim

:

their line of communications,

and by pushing boldly

itate

their

from French

exit

design, while the

army

tlie

soil.

in, facil-

In pursuance of

filed into line, the

two

first lines

this

stood

ready to engage the enemy, and were instructed to feel him,

but not so strongly as to bring on an engagement, while the third

column marched over roads supposed

to

be impassable,

Battle of Tiirkheim.

behind vineyards, and then through a mountain gap to the

Tiirkheim valley, intending to threaten

the" allied

right.

seize

the place and thus

Meanwhile, Count de I'Orges,

in

command of the French right wing, demonstrated towards the enemy in Colmar to prevent their sending reinforcements to Tiirkheim.

In

this village

were two battalions of the enemy,

which were withdrawn as the French approached.

Turenno

occupied the place, threw a force into a mill which stood

orl

FOLLOWED BY VICTORY. both sides of the stream, and drew up

631

hne behind the

in

Fechte, across the allied flank.

No

sooner had the allies perceived Turenne's manoeuvre

than they undertook to retrieve their error, and sent twelve

and

battalions, thirty squadrons

near

Turenne had

Of

their ground.

killed

the

under him, and each side

lost

and wounded but the French held ;

main array facing the

allies,

— half

a church

— often

Colmar.

While Turenne was thus making

a good rallying-point

the artillery of the French left wing

and

front,

enemy's line

;

so

that

Turenne's

the

a mile from

sure of Ttirkheira,

moved somewhat

to the

guns might half enfilade the

and Turenne was preparing

by an advance

attack

and

leaned on vineyards at Winzenheim, the right on

left flank

left

fight in

which General Foucault was killed and

his horse shot

some two hundred

guns from their second

There was a sharp

line to retake Tiirkheim. this village, in

six

in force

to follow

up

his

on the enemy's right flank,

when, toward nightfall, the

allies

they had suffered small loss

;

concluded to

retire,

and during the next

though

night, Jan-

uary 5-6, rather than further try the fortunes of battle, they left

the

field.

The French bivouacked where they fought Colmar, with hospitals and magazines,

fell to

;

the next day,

them, and thirty

squadrons were sent in joursuit of the retiring enemy.

The

allies

manifestly had no desire to engage in a winter cam-

paign

;

they

Strasburg of

;

made

their

and from

way

to Schlettstadt

here, to get safely

and shortly

to

away from touch

the all too active French commander, they crossed the

Rhine and went into winter-quarters on the right bank. Strasburg was glad to resume

its

neutrality.

That Turenne by mancEuvres, without delivering a pitched battle,

— though he had been quite ready

for one,

— had thus

been able to thrust the enemy out of Alsatia was, according

THREE GREAT VICTORIES.

632

While he was on

to the idea of his day, the highest honor.

the march, there had been a great outcry in Paris about his retreat into Lorraine

and

abandonment

his

enemy but on the completion of had in October given the king an ;

by

of Alsatia to the

the operation, of which he outline,

he was applauded

France, indeed even by his enemies.

all

by the standard

Perhaj^s, judged leon, this

mancEuvre might be

of Frederick or

criticised in

some

Napo-

of its details

:

the slowness of the march, the inability to strike a hearty

blow so soon as the army debouched from the mountains, the letting the

enemy escape without a

We

hypercriticism. steps he to

made

must judge Turenne by

in advance of

make a winter campaign

He

tain district.

port his rations

means he

army

:

Turenne braved one

:

moun-

to trans-

he carried or collected his food by whatever

:

could.

The roads were

called impassable for an

Turenne nevertheless marched on them, and reached

to attack a superior

best of

all,

enemy

:

own day

;

was deemed hazardous

It

Turenne disregarded numbers.

he succeeded in what he started out to do,

—

Turenne was well ahead

of

to thrust the allies out of Alsatia. his

and the

in a

had no modern railway on which

his goal in condition for battle.

And

his age

this is

was quite outside of rules

It

it.

But

fatal blow.

we can hardly expect

of later and greater captains

;

French had won a magnificent It is generally

and

his it

method

to equal that

remains true that the

success, thanks solely to him.

acknowledged that

this

was Turenne's best

campaign, though the following one comes close to disputing it

that

title.

Sinsheim, Entzheim and Tiirkheim, three great

victories in seven months,

make a wonderful

French Carbine.

(16th Century.)

string of jewels.

L.

TURENNE'S LAST CAJ^IPAIGN.

1675.

In 1675 the imperial forces were under Montecueuli, who burg.

paign was one

Montecueuli crossed to the

strictly of manceuvres.

but could accomplish no

result.

Failing in his victual, Montecueuli

liim at every point.

Rhine, so as to get convoys down the river

The

rival armies lay

The cambank,

left

Returning to the right bank, he began a

of able operations to seize on the approaches to Strasburg

off.

tried to seize Stras-

Turenne's duty was to keep him from this city and Alsatia.

;

;

series

but Turenne met

moved

close to the

but this source Turenne also cut

on the Rench, and finally on the same night each

sought to surprise his opponent, with the result that Montecueuli was compelled to withdraw.

Following him up, Turenne prepared to attack the imperialists

at Nieder-Sasbach,

when he was killed by a cannon-ball. The French were now

forced across the Rhine, and the war was carried into Alsatia.

have

Few

soldiers

After his death the French

a reputation as Turenne.

left as enviable

cause retrograded fast.

The

emperor had no cause to be

He

paign of 1674. plished notliing their failure,

of

satisfied

with the cam-

saw that enoi-mous forces had accom-

that divided authority lay at the root of

;

and

in

1675 he gave

sole

command

of an

army

twelve thousand foot and fourteen thousand horse to

Field - Marshal

Montecueuli,

Turenne by crossing the Rhine sharply into lower Alsatia. before,

and

it

at

On

when he had matched

brilliant soldier

who purposed

to

anticipate

Strasburg, and by pushing the last occasion, two years

himself against Turenne, this

had shown wonderful capacity

to manoeuvre,

was with strong expectation of renewed success that

the emperor

From

the

now

intrusted the opening campaign to him.

Ulm

region Montecueuli marched toward the

Rhine, and took position near Willstlidt, where he rendez-

AIMING AT STRASBURG.

634

voused the troops from the Neckar and the upper Rhine.

The population favored siderable magazines

the imperial forces

still

there were con-

;

holding over from the last year

and Montecuculi's object was to conduct a campaign in Alsatia.

To Turenne's

part

fell

the task of holding head against

Montecuculi's projected inroad.

His forces concentrated at Schlettstadt, on the left

bank above Strasburg,

and

he

them

joined

May

from Paris on

29.

was

Strasburg

main objective

the

of both

but Turenne

generals,

had the harder

task.

His army was smaller, thousand

twelve

and ten thousand

foot horse,

and Strasburg inclined to the

we

emperor

shall

see,

;

yet, as

Turenne

succeeded in his object of

keeping the enemy

away from the

Theatre of 1675 Campaign.

city

a campaign which worthily crowned a typical soldier's

and one which had by the

at that

day few equals

by

manoeuvres, in

skillful

;

life,

which, judged

state of the art, the condition of the country, the

quality of the troops and their equipment, and the cumbrous artillery,

it

has had few superiors at any day.

Though he was aiming

at Strasburg, as well as the enemy,

was Turenne's purpose

to cross to the

Rhine

On

;

and

his original plan

the right

was

bank he would be

German

side of the

to do so at Philipsburg.

freer to o^jerate,

and

less

MONTECUCULI APPEARS. hampered the left

other

in the defense of Alsatia than

bank

635

by manoeuvres on

he could better impose on Strasburg and the

;

German

neutrals,

and he could feed

his

army on the

Campaign of 1675. (The blocks show the successive positions.)

He

enemy's country.

by the

interfered with It

was

May when

moved from

appears this year not to have been court.

Montecuculi reached Willsttidt.

Turenne

Schlettstadt on Strasburg and threatened

bombardment,

in case neutrality

army harbored.

To

entice

him

it

with

was violated or the imperial thence, Montecuculi

towards Philipsburg and took measures to besiege

it,

moved lea^ang

MONTECUCULI CROSSES THE RHINE.

636

behind at Willstadt a force of six thousand to

men

with orders

occupy Strasburg- so soon as Turenne's back should be

Though Montecuculi

turned.

consummate

carried out this scheme with

and spread rumors that he would lay siege

skill,

to Philipsburg, Turenne,

whose judgment in such matters

was exceptionally keen, saw through not follow

To

son.

his

intention and did

but he sent a small body to strengthen the garri-

;

enforce his apparent purpose, Montecucidi not only

opened the siege of Philipsburg, but put a force over the

Rhine

at Speyer,

and made signs of an intention

to besiege

Turenne had moved

Landau, Zabern and Hagenau.

to

Achenheim, from which place he could dominate Strasburg quickly march to these

or

He

required. ties

watched the enemy

Turenne took no

azine-towns,

made

closely,

to

Philipsburg, as

sending

many

par-

Conscious of the strength of his mag-

out to seek news.

threat, but

or

depots,

special notice of Moutecuculi's

preparations to bridge the Rhine at Otten-

heim, twenty miles above Strasburg

;

May

and on

30 put

over Vaiibrun, with four thousand men, in boats, to protect the bridge

when thrown.

He

really besieged Philipsburg, he

where Montecuculi had

over.

if

the

enemy

would march on Freiburg,

his magazines,

his commissariat frighten

body was put

thought that

him away.

Turenne was now

and by

this threat to

On May

31 another

astride the river, with

good communications, and ready to act on either

side.

Montecuculi himself crossed with the main army to the

bank

at

Angelhausen above Speyer June

1,

as a further

attempt to draw Turenne away from Strasburg, took up a tion south of

Mannheim, backing on

his bridge,

that he would attack the French army.

left

posi-

and gave out

But Turenne was

not troubled, sent out detachments to Neustadt, Kaiserslautern raids

and Landau, and if

notified

Metz and Nancy not

to fear

they should occur, as they would be mere demonstra-

RE CROSSES made

tions

for effect.

Seeing

637

IT.

tliat

none of his operations

could intimidate or draw Turenne away from

Strasburg,

Montecucidi after but a few days retired to the right bank,

and camped not far from Philipsburg. transfer the

war

to the left bank,

Having

he now had

failed to

choice

his

between forcing battle on Turenne, starving him out, or capturing his bridges, and to the business of determining which

was best he now addressed himself.

Once

rid of his adversary

crossed the

self

Willstiidt,

Rhine

transformed

on the

at Ottenheim, it

bank, Turenne him-

left

June

forage which had been shipped

lot of

7

and

8,

took

French depot, captured a

into a

down

the Kinzig to

the enemy, and there took up a position between the Kinzig

and Schutter, covering Strasburg, which he thus neutralized.

As Strasburg was approachable

way

only by

of Kehl,

which

lay behind the Kinzig, Turenne's presence at Willstiidt sufficed

but he later broke the Kinzig bridge at Kehl, which

;

made

access to the city harder.

Turenne's position was one

which threatened Montecuculi's magazines at Offenburg, and the latter, on hearing that the French had crossed, at once

broke up and marched 'south, hoping to forestall Turenne at Willstiidt

but finding himself too

He now had

tenau. the

:

round of

first

moving the theatre Rhine

thirty thousand

late,

he stopped at Lich-

men.

Turenne had won

this

manceuvring match by permanently

of

operations to the right bank of the

by freeing Alsatia from the hardship

:

of

way to Strasbur' The next move of the ^ reneh marshal was

war

;

and by

barring the

to

make' an

attempt on Offenburg and on Oberkirch, both magazines of

The latter place was taken, but the former held and when Montecuculi marched from Lichtenau to the

the enemy. out,

relief of

Offenburg, which he reached June 15, Turenne to

meet him changed

his

front at Willstiidt, and

sat

down

TOO LONG A FRONT.

638

was now cut

closely to watch his opponent, who, as he

from

demonstration

Kehl,

against

Turenne protected

his

but

at the bridge at

accomplished

communications with the

heavy detachments at Altheim,

and

off

where he had much breadstuff, made a

Strasburg,

Ottenheim

bank by

below Ottenheim,

six miles ;

nothing.

left

but he kept his headquar-

ters in Willstiidt.

His front was

Turenne's position was not secure.

Still

To

twenty miles long.

enemy

the

at

Offenburg his bridge at

Ottenheim was nearer than he was himself, a of which Montecuculi took advantage.

situation, indeed,

Had

the imperial

moved sharply on Ottenheim, he might have caught but fortunately for Turenne in an awkward dilemma

general

;

Turenne he was too

As on June 21 he approached the men were taxed by the heavy

slow.

Schutter, the fact that his

roads induced him to stop for the night

Turenne changed

;

seeing which

by leaving part of

his position

Willstiidt to protect Strasburg,

and by moving

his

army

his bridge

at

and

protecting force to Altheim, where all preparations for such

an operation had been made his headquarters.

extending his

new camped the

Now was

cuculi

and thither he

also transferred

Lohr, but preferring not to attack

which was strong, he withdrew and again

at Offenburg.

that this threat to his bridge had failed and his line

less long,

burg,

left as far as

position,

;

Montecuculi made preparations for action,

moved

Turenne, who suspected some design on Strasto

Neumiihl

to hold the

road to Kehl.

Monte-

was now nearer the Altheim bridge than Turenne, but

not caring to duplicate his late operation, he took no advantage of the fact, and moreover Turenne had to

be lightly assailed.

of victual

From

made

it

Offenburg, on June 28, for lack

and forage, the imperial marshal moved

fen, leaving three

thousand

too strong

men

in Offenburg.

to Urlof-

To meet

this

ALONG THE RENCH.

639

manoeuvre, Turenne changed his position in i)rolongation of his left

and again stood athwart Montecuculi's road

to Stras-

burg, taking post in front of Botesweyer.

Montecuculi saw that he had failed in his undertaking to get hold of Strasburg with

its

munitions and food

and was forced

lay in a poor country,

to

move

;

and as he

to seek rations,

he made a rapid flank movement back of the Rench at the

end of June, reached the Rhine, and took up

his stand at

Scherzheim, with his right leaning on the Rhine, hoping to get victual and pontoons by water from Strasburg,

though the country was woody and

Turenne,

hai'd to operate in, fol-

lowed him on the opposite side of the Rench, placed .himself at Freistadt,

and erecting

batteries on the

Rhine islands and

anchoring boats with troops in the current, prevented the use of the waterway.

He

post a detachment at all

also ordered the

Wantzenau on

boats which might try to

The land along

the

Hagenau people

to

the Rhine, and to stop

move down

the river.

Rench being low and swampy, the

armies, with only the stream between them, remained quietly

want

of food,

was thought by each, would soon compel the other

to with-

en face for three weeks, rather than manoeuvre it

In

draw. in the

fact, the unhealthful situation, the lack of

French and lack of rations

drove each army to his line

;

activity.

in the imperial

camp

Turenne determined

up the Rench and turn Montecuculi's

meanwhile watching Caprara in OfPenburg. tating an attack on Montecuculi,

forage finally

to sti-etch left

flank,

While medi-

Turenne had been improv-

ing and fortifying a small foot-road, which had been found

by which he proposed

across the river near Wagshorst,

time to move his army. first

On

in

due

getting knowledge of Turenne 's

movements, Montecuculi, not anticipating an attack, con-

cluded that Turenne had spread himself out too

much and

and he prepared

to attack

offered a fair chance for a blow

;

TURENNE'S LAST ATTACK.

G40

Rench

the position on the

by a portion of the

in the rear

Offenburg garrison, while personally with another part of his

army he should move upon these

:

its

The

front.

Caprara with two thousand men was

from Offenburg" on the rear

at

Wagshorst

;

dispositions were to

make an

raine was to attack the centre with five thousand of four thousand

ford

;

and Montecuculi

23-24, but

it

men

was

in person

ground was

a force

move on Freistadt. made at night on July

to

actually

quite lacked ensemble

and remained without

though delivered on Turenne's depleted »

;

was detailed against the front of the intrenched

The attack thus planned was result,

attack

the duke of Lor-

difficult

in the day-time

;

lines.

at night

it

The

proved

impracticable.

When

had

this imperial operation

failed,

Turenne, leaving

a half of his force well intrenched at Freistadt, advanced

July 25 with the other half of turn Montecuculi's

had

left

his force over the

and cut him

fortified his ford over the

off

Rench

from Offenburff.

to

He

Rench on both banks, and had

established posts to hold communication with the Freistadt

His manoeuvre was a bold one, which exposed each

force.

half of his

enemy

;

army

to

be overwhelmed by the entire force of the

but Turenne had a way of relying on his knowledge

of his opponent's character, and moreover he

prepared his ground. lest

He would

had diligently

not move his entire force,

he should open the way to Strasburg to the enemy, and

he believed that a threat on his magazine would compel Montecuculi to retire.

attacks prepared to

work

horst, force,

together,

Nor was he

by Montecucvili,

disappointed.

The

several

as above said, quite failed

and Turenne had got no further than Gams-

when Montecuculi, hearing

ot his presence there in

concluded that he was to be cut

off

from Caprara at

Offenburg, and hurriedly withdrew in the night of July

25-26

to Nieder Sasbach.

Here he stood on the road which

TURENNE'S DEATH.

641

preserved his communications and ordered Caprara up to

tlie

same

place.

his force

Turenne

and followed

drew

at once to

Achern.

in tlie Freistadt half of

In

this position at

Montecuculi skillfully drew up

Sasbach

his

Nieder

and

forces,

Turenne, proposing- to push his opponents to battle, did the

He

like.

is

have

said to

felt confident of

a victorious issue

but while he was marshaling his forces, and just before moving to the attack, he was struck to death by a cannon-ball.

The French

Operations were suspended.

rOrges and Vaubrun

— coidd

generals

not agree as to

— de

who should

take command, and summarily withdrew over the Rhine at

Montecuculi followed, defeated them and carried

Altheim. the

war

However

into Alsatia.

interesting the details of this

remarkable campaign, space forbids us to give more than

its

salient features.

In 1676 Conde conducted a campaign against Montecucidi in

Germany, on the whole

successfully.

It

had no remarka-

ble details.

Turenne stood decidedly time.

He was

at the

head of the generals of

his

singular in his ability to correctly gauge his

opponents and the conditions under which he was called on

He himseK

to act.

was self-contained, shrewd and enterpris-

ing,

and far above the

He

was willing

foolish military prejudices of his day.

to conduct

operations

at

any season, and

decidedly opposed to the devotion of unnecessary time to sieges

and the parceling out of troops in minor

Ready

to fight

ojierations.

whenever he had morally or physically the

advantage of the enemy, he often engaged against marked odds.

His

tactics

was original

;

he was the

first

who

in his

day began flank attacks, and who thoughtfully prepared turning

manoeuvres.

work was done his life,

and

in his youth,

his last

his

Unlike Conde, whose most stirring

Turenne grew every year of

campaigns were by far his

best.

A SOLDIER PURE AND SIMPLE.

642

Sometimes over careful of

his

men, Turenne inspired them

with confidence in the greatest danger, and with energy to

undertake the most

by

tion

He won

difficult operations.

his kindness, reasonableness, unflurried

Alwaj^s

never-ceasing acts of generosity.

keen eye singled out the worthy

soldier,

On

never wearied in rewarding him.

among

and

his

their devo-

temper and his

men, his

good nature

one occasion he noticed

a lieutenant of dragoons, whose assiduity in his duties had quite

worn out

his horse.

some conversation about subaltern's poor steed, his

own,

—a

Turenne accosted him and, his outpost, fell to

after

admiring the

and presently suggested a trade with

noble creature, such as he always rode.

Alleg-

ing a liking for the color and the shape of the other's head, the marshal of France insisted on the trade, and rode off on the lieutenant's horse, leaving his charger behind.

Anec-

dotes such as these abound in the accounts of this great man.

Turenne was a until his death he

a

life so

soldier pure

and simple.

was that and only

uniformly devoted to arms.

active years

was passed

he worked.

He

in the field.

we must study

value as a captain

that.

From early youth Few captains lead

Nearly every one of his

To judge Turenne's

real

the conditions under which

was always hampered by the home govern-

ment, by the paucity of his troops and by the jealousy of his

His work was narrowed far below his capacity.

superiors.

In view of what he accomplished under generally unfavorable

conditions,

the Great

and especially against such opponents as

Conde and Montecuculi, he must be

earned the highest rank of

Louis credit

XIV. had much

of

;

said to have

the generals of his day.

so far condxicted his

and advantage

years undid

all

war

of conquest with

but what occurred in the following

what had been gained.

In 1678 and 1679 there was negotiated with each of the

enemies of France

— Holland,

Spain, the Empire, Sweden,

FRENCH ENCROACHMENTS. Denmark

— the

peace of Nymwegen.

643

The various

cessions

of territory were complicated, but in general terms Holland

got back her entire territory.

Spain ceded to France Franche

Comte, Valenciennes, Cambray, Ypres, Bouchain and other towns, in exchange for Charleroi, Oudenarde, Courtray, Ghent

and other

The emperor ceded Freiburg, and France garrison Philipsburg. The duke of Lorraine

places.

her right to

refused to receive back his duchy on the terms offered.

Great Elector was forced

to return

The

what he had conquered

from Sweden.

won by his able generals, Turenne and Conde Le Grand Monarque at the summit of Nothing now sufficed to his boundless ambition,

This peace,

at their head, placed his power.

and owing territorial

to the

weakness of the empire he continued his

under whatever pretext he could invent.

thefts

Saarbriick, Luxembui'g, Zweibriicken

were seized and annexed to France. lowed

;

and even Strasburg

Trier and Lorraine

fol-

the emj)eror protested, but allowed the occupation to

continue.

the revocation

Finally,

of

the

Edict of Nantes, Louis'

attempted seizure of the Palatinate and his interference in the election of the archbishop of Cologne roused the enemies of France, into

and

in

by William

1686 the League of Augsburg was entered of Orange, the emperor, the kings of Swe-

den and Spain and the electors of Saxony, Bavaria and the Palatinate

;

and

this,

owing

to the

French invasion and bar-

barous devastation of the Palatinate in 1688, culminated, in the succeeding year, in the of

Orange had become king

organized this

new

by the members

Grand

Alliance.

of England,

and

it

The prince was he who

which was joined Augsburg League, by Holland, Den-

alliance against France,

of the

mark, Savoy, by some of the smaller German princes and the pope.

France had grown too powerful

to

make peace a

PALATINATE SUCCESSION WAR.

644 probability.

James

exiled

Louis responded by espousing the cause of the

The war concerning

II.

the succession of the

All western Europe was arrayed against

Palatinate ensued.

For nine years war was waged

Louis.

in the Netherlands,

along the Rhine, in Italy, on the border of Spain, in Ireland

and at

sea.

Either the triumph or the destruction of France

should have followed this widespread warfare.

Neither oc-

curred, owing to the peculiar laxness of the conduct of at that day.

In Ireland and at sea the French

where there was a balance of

how In

to

improve

this war,

its

But neither

success.

war

lost; else-

side

knew

gains.

which raged from 1689

to 1697, there

were a

niimber of splendid French victories to which we shall return,

meanwhile turning aside to a which that radiance of a Christian state

is

brilliant feat of arms,

upon

shed which always illumines the saving

from the dominion of the pagan.

Mounted Arquebusier.

(16th Century.)

LI.

THE SIEGE OF VIENNA. The

1683.

emperor had always been at war with the Turks, and harassed by In 1682 both again occurred, and in KiSo the

Hungary.

insurrections in

Turks marched on Vienna and Stahremberg defended the

city,

laid siege to

kept open the routes by which an army of sent several di\isions, and

relief

John Sobieski, king

with twenty-six thousand men.

The emperor

it.

fled.

Count

while Charles of Lorraine with a small force

The grand

might come.

of Poland,

vizier,

The Germans

marched

to

Vienna

Kara Mustapha, had been

slow in his siege, and the defense of Stahremberg had been stubborn to the Finally, after

last degree.

citizens relief

them

over two months' siege,

when

the garrison and

were at the end of their powers and almost starved, the army of

came up

;

Sobieski and Lorraine attacked the

enemy and defeated

in a hard-fought battle at the very gates of the capital.

The Turks

sunamarily retired, and were, during the following months, quite pushed out of the land.

Except and

that the heroic defense of

its relief

Vienna by Stahremberg

by John Sobieski and Charles of Lorraine was

one of the notable feats of arms of the seventeenth century, should scarce find a place in these pages, for there

it

special lesson to be learned

actors In the splendid

from

it,

is

no

nor was any one of the

drama a captain

of the greatest note.

It was, however, in this siege that Prince

Eugene, who has done so much for the art of war, played one of his earliest,

though a modest

role, at the

age of twenty.

In 1661 a war broke out between the emperor and the Turks, to which an end was put in the splendid victory of St.

Gothard by Montecuculi.

out, fostered openly

French.

In 1682 a second war broke

by the Hungarians and

secretly

In 1683 the Turks invaded Hungary and

by the

laid siege

THE TURKS THREATEN VIENNA.

646 to Vienna.

army, two hundred thousand strong, was

Theii-

under command of Kara Mustapha, grand

to

vizier,

whom

was fntrusted the old green eagle-standard of the Prophet as a badge of success its

march

Leopold ance,

and on

;

I.,

called

May 12

Aware

to Vienna.

this force left

Belgrade on

of its destination, the emperor,

on the princes of the empire for

assist-

and made a treaty with John Sobieski, king of Poland,

MlUdS

-I

1

1

..i.(.MVf(

Vienna-Ofen Country.

to

come

to his

aid with

promising sixty thousand

army was mustered

in

forty thousand men, the emperor

men

May

at

to join him.

The

imperial

Presburg under Charles of

Lorraine, a soldier tried in the school of adversity, robbed of his inheritance

by the French, and a connection and devoted It numbered thirty-three thousand

servant of the emperor.

VIENNA DEFENSELESS. men, and with land,

and

this

647

handful Charles was holden to defend the

to garrison Presburg,

Raab and Comorn.

The Turks were already near Ofen, and on June 25 himself in a camp between the Raab and

Charles intrenchi

.1-

the Rabnitz, while Esterhazy held the line of the

Waag, and

a Polish force lay at Trentschin.

The grand

vizier

had been coimseled by Count Tbkoly, the

Hungarian insurgent, and some of

his

own

wise lieutenants not to march on Vienna,

but Kara Mustapha heeded not, and pushed

van of horse out past the Neusiedler

his

Lake and

to the line of the Leitha, leav-

ing Raab,

Comorn and Leopoldstadt on

his flank.

Charles sent his foot back to

Vienna, and with his horse retired to Haim-

The Turkish van attacked him July

burg.

and gave

7,

hard blow.

his cavalry a

enna was in a panic, and the emperor next day for Linz.

Vi-

left it

Count Stahremberg

was given command of the abandoned from which a stampede of

all

Turkish Soldier. city,

the population able to leave

soon followed, to the number of sixty thousand

The defenses of Vienna were wretched was only partly palisaded

;

;

souls.

the counterscarp

gabions were wanting, barely ten

and the ditch was dry in

guns were mounted

in the bastions,

many

entire garrison consisted of the

city

July

places.

The

guard and scarce one thousand troops of the 9,

by some twelve thousand

after taking out garrisons.

by

On

however, Charles came up with his eleven thousand

horse, followed

rience

common

line.

foot,

— what was

Stahremberg was a man of expe-

and worth, stern and unflinching, who had won

merit.

He was

just the

left

man

for the work

;

his

way

but he had

only six days to complete his preparations, for on July 13 the

STAHREMBERG ACTIVE.

648

whole country round the capital smoked from the burning villages fired

by the Tartar

remberg did wonders

every

;

In these six days Stah-

horse.

man

in

Vienna was got

to

work

the priest and the nobleman vied with the merchant, the laborer, to help on the cause.

down

Victual was collected up and

the river, north and south

munitions were got from

;

every point, and by July 13 over three hundred guns had

The spahis

been mounted. all

of the enemy's van

now swarmed

round the town, from the mountains to the river

column

;

and a

which Stahremberg

of foot appeared in the suburbs,

received with a cannonade, and drove out by destroying

As good

everything outside the walls. luck would have

it,

to garrison the city

the line troops sent

marched

same day from across the teen thousand strong guilds, students

found under

his

and

and with

others,

On

his entire

on thia four-

citizens,

Stahremberg

command some

two thousand men.

Mustapha and

;

in

river

twenty-

the 14th

Kara

army stood

be-

fore Vienna.

The Turks of

the

lost

no time.

On

the night

13th-14th the van had opened

trenches on the west of the town,

Turkish Soldier.

at

three points, and these stood under the

grand

vizier's

own command, and that of Kara Mohammed Charles, who had been lying with his Unter-Werd, retired across the Danube to the

and Ahmed Pasha. cavalry in the

Bisamberg, pursued by the enemy's horse, which pressed him hard.

The Turks then camped

in a

huge half-moon, along

the hills from the river at Schwechat to the river at Nuss-

dorf

;

and during the

heavy siege-guns

to

rest of

July they built batteries of

back up their trenches.

CHARLES OF LORRAINE. Staliremberg was the

life

and

649 Thrice

soul of everything.

a day he visited the woi-ks, and though repeatedly wounded,

He

desisted not from his constant efforts.

against the cowardly or treacherous or lazy

was

;

equally gener-

The grand

ous for courage or intelligence in the service. vizier first

was no

On

less active.

the tenth day of the siege the

mines were exploded, and

Not

daily occurrence.

sorties

and

assaults were of

to recount all these oj)erations, suf-

say that during the siege the Turks delivered eight

fice it to

assaults

relentless

and sprung forty mines

made twentyOnly seven times

the besieged

;

four sorties, and fired ten counter-mines.

did the besieged hear from the outside news of the eagerly hoped-for army of

relief.

Until the arrival of relief armies from Silesia, Moravia,

Bohemia, Poland and the principalities of the empire, Charles of Lorraine

was

to

keep open the fords of the Danube and

hold the river from

Presburg

to

Tulln.

Tokoly, on the

other hand, led a raiding party to head off the Poles, and easily captured the

town

of

Presburg

Hereupon Charles descended from

him

followed up the Hungarian, beat

;

his

the citadel held out.

Bisam

eyrie, sharply

at Landschiitz, drove

him beyond the Waag, and recaptured Presburg. risons of

Comorn, Eaab and Altenburg proved

The

gar-

useless, allow-

ing Turkish convoys to pass under their walls unmolested.

Tokoly rapidly recovered from

August 6

across the

join a Turkish force

Tabor

island,

March

at

his defeat, forced his St.

way

Johann, purposing to

which should cross the Danube at the

and then drive Charles from the Bisam

hills,

aided by a demonstration of Tartar horse on St. Pol ten to

engage his attention. tion.

But Charles was equal

to the

situa-

Sending a force against the Turks at Tabor, he pre-

vented their crossing, and himself moved against Tok(31y and

threw him back across the March.

Shortly after, he retired

SOBIESKI APPEARS.

650

to Tulln to protect the building of bridges for the approach-

ing armies of

a movement which Tokoly improved by

relief,

again crossing the

March

at

Goding with

his

own

forces

and

ten thousand Tartar cavalry, and devastating to Wblkersdorf.

In connection with

Turkish force crossed at Mar-

this raid, a

check, joined a body from Vienna, and advanced twelve thou-

sand strong up the Danube

on this body and beat fraction

was

left to

it

but Chai'les, on August 24,

;

so badly at Stamersdorf, that a

fell

mere

escape by swimming across the river.

This handsome operation speedily recalled Tokoly from his foray.

Meanwhile Sobieski's van had reached Olmiitz August and on September 4 the Tulln bridge. able but slightly to annoy his advance.

25,

Tokoly had been

Two

entire Polish army of twenty-six thousand

days later the

men

reported.

The Bavarians and Saxons, the Swabians and Franconians, had come down the Danube, and reached Krems Sej^tember During the succeeding days the passage

7.

The

Danube

of the

came

to thirty-

nine thousand foot and forty-six thousand horse.

In the

was

effected.

total forces thus reunited

absence of the emperor, the

command

fell to

Sobieski, who,

though a king, was a plain soldier and an able man, ant and bold,

who had fought

self-reli-

against the Great Elector, the

Swedes, the Cossacks and the Turks, and always with honor. Charles and he had been rival candidates for the Polish

crown

;

but they were none the

less

take that great soldier as a model

!

good friends.

" Prince,

" said Sobieski to his son.

Rather than consume time by marching round by the ley roads, Sobieski

and Charles agreed

over the Kahlenberg to the

extremity of danger.

wing, Charles of the

city,

to speed their

which was already

Sobieski took

command

val-

advance in the

of the right

left.

For two months the grand

vizier

had

lain opposite Vienna,

KARA MUSTAPHA. and had not detached a man from forestall this

army

of the

Danube.

beaten

!

"

"

Such a man," said Sobieski, "

in his front that

He had

the plain and the Wienerberg. in the trenches at

on the

9th,

already

expected to

been so blinded

relief

Leaving part of

by way

of

his forces

he moved the rest of his troops to a

Laxenburg and Neustadt, sending detachments only

Kahlenberg and

that the

is

to

passage

he knew nothing of the opera-

on his flank, and expected the army of

to the

its

From day to day Kara Mustapha had

by the work

camp

enormous forces

of relief, or to interfere with

force an entrance within the walls.

tions

his

651

army

of relief

to Griinzing,

He

did not believe

was a well-organized one

;

he did not

JUST IN TIME.

652

know

that

was led by Sobieski

it

he had no great opinion

;

of Charles.

king's battle orders were brief

The

were to hug

the river so as to

throw

:

the imperial troops

relief into

Vienna

in the

;

advance, the infantry and artillery were to precede the cavalry

once in line the latter was to

;

fill

the intervals of the first

and

generally sharp onset of the Turkish cavalry was to be

met

former

;

a third line was to be held in reserve

by throwing out the

The

relief

into ruins

;

light

came none

the

;

Spanish squadrons.

Vienna had been pounded

too soon.

but Stahremberg would not give up

;

every breach

was repaired, every assault was thro^vn back; every man, under his stern eye and active presence, did his duty.

The

question was, whether the weakened garrison and works could

a general assault,

resist

Happy

— and when

might

it

not come

?

indeed was the sore beset Kaiserstadt, when rockets

from the

hills

The grand

announced the friendly advance vizier

no longer doubted the intention of the

Christians when, on September 12, he saw the columns emerg-

ing from the

up

his

army

hills.

in five

He drew

The challenge was answered. heavy

lines,

from Nussdorf

to

Dornbach,

and himself commanded the centre, the pashas the wings. Sobieski's address to the troojJS

beaten this same enemy, you and for Poland but for Christianity

your

God

!

line

I.

:

"

We

have

To-day you fight not

not for your king, but for

I have but one order for you "

your king, follow and fear not

The

;

was fervent

:

wherever you see

!

was formed, and the

artillery at 7 A. M.

from Kahlenberg village against Nussdorf.

opened

The Poles on

the right had a long and difficult route through the mountain roads to pass over before they could reach the Turkish left

;

and the German troops fought seven long hours against

heavy odds and desperate resistance through the glens and

THE BATTLE OF VIENNA. defiles

making with splendid gallantry a

the foothills,

of

marked advance. charge in on the

Five times did the Turkish serried masses

German

lines

;

but these wavered not, though

a heavy Turkish battery on the Dobliug

term to their gain. right

had come

653

hill finally jjut

into close quarters with the enemy.

Sobieski emerged from the Dornbach hills and

Their onset

the Turkish array.

a

was 2 o'clock and neither centre nor

It

w^as gallant

;

Finally

fell sharjjly

their king

on

was

present at the point of gravest

danger

;

but

deep

the

masses of the Turkish for-

mation resisted their bravest Finally a regiment

charges.

and

of lancers broke, retreat

in its

threatened to force

back the

line

in

disorder.

But Charles was near by he ordered an advance on tlie

Turkish centre

given with a will the Poles rallied

;

;

;

it

was

under

it

one more Polish Cavalryman.

charge and the Turkish

was

rolled

up on

left

Charles captured the great

centre.

its

Dobling battery, drove back the enemy, and forced fighting for every step, to

the

now broken enemy

Wahring, while Sobieski pursued

to Hernals.

Louis of Baden headed a

few squadrons, and fought his way to the

w^est gate of

where he and Stahremberg at once made a saries,

who

still

kept up a

his way,

fire

sortie

Vienna,

on the

from their trenches.

janis-

Soon a

panic seized the Turks, and once the flight began there was

no more organization entire

army

fled

left.

In a sauve qui jieut rabble the

— barring a

back through the Wienerberg

slight stand at St. Ulrich's defiles to

Raab.

—

LAUGHABLE DIGNITY.

654

The

loss of the

Turks

given as from ten thousand to

is

That

twenty-five thousand men.

had

the siege there

In

fallen

in

of the allies

Vienna

from wounds, twenty thousand from

disease.

is

not known.

mm

thousand

The booty was

There was no marked pursuit.

enormous.

On

five

September 14 the emperor, whose

saved as by a miracle, reentered the

city.

capital

Sobieski, he went out to view the Turkish camp.

The pride-beridden

scene ensued.

for fear of losing

some of

had been

Next day, invited by

A

curious

successor of the Caesars,

his imperial dignity, treated the

king of Poland, his saviour, de haut en has, to the

infinite

disgust of the Polish army, and the annoyance, mixed with a

keen sense of

The Pole had

ridicule, of Sobieski.

too

much

good sense not to wash his hands of the absurd business but to Leopold, the personal attitude of the German emperor towards an elective king was a matter of moment.

It

had

been a question of discussion in the cabinet, and on Charles of Lorraine being asked

how

the emperor should receive such a

monarch, he replied " When he has saved the empire, with open arms " But Leopold's ideas of rank could not permit :

!

him

so far to condescend.

In the grand

vizier's tent

was found clear proof that the

war had been fostered by France

;

and Sobieski could not

deny himself the pleasure of sending a report of the battle in his

own hand

to the

Most Christian King Louis XIY.

The grand

vizier

was able enough

subordinates,

many

of

to cast the

blame on

his

whom he executed, and to justify his whom he was at first liberally

conduct to the sultan, by rewarded.

The

retreat of the Turkish

Charles and Sobieski, who followed

army was hastened by it

up

as far as Ofen.

Other engagements ensued, but they have no part in the relief of

Vienna.

1

LII.

LUXEMBURG AND CATINAT. Luxemburg was naturally

a good soldier

;

but he was stunted by the narrow

method of Louvois, which was a mere war of

army

men

in the Netherlands, to oppose less

assault sels

sion.

at Fleurus in July,

was stout enough

sieges that parceled out the

In 1690 Luxemburg had one hundred thousand

in small detachments.

Waldeck

1690-1693.

to

than sixty thousand

win a handsome

In 1692 William III. fell on

Luxemburg

to

intrenched, and again

at Neerwinden,

won a hard - fought

where the victory.

triumphs the French gained no headway, and the

same year Gatinat defeated the duke

War

allies

to

his

Brus-

owing to

loss.

In 1693 Lux-

allies

were

But

heavily

despite all these

kept the

Savoy at Marsaglia.

of

these splendid victories was comparatively

Before proceeding

He met

improve the occa-

at Steenkirke, but

ground, was beaten with very heavy

emburg again met William

acterized the

The road

victory.

was open, but Luxemburg did not know enough

difficulties of the

allies.

and coupled with a cavalry flank attack,

field.

The

In

this

result of

little.

to the brilliant

campaigns which char-

of the Spanish Succession, short mention

made of three of the battles of the French under the Luxemburg. This officer, who certainly possessed

should be

duke of

many of and who

the qualities which go to

make up a

solid general,

covered with renown the arms of France in the

Netherlands,

is

nevertheless

an excellent example of how

depressing an effect the unenterprising method of that day

could exert on even an able man, and brings out in stronger relief the

who was

immense personality

of such a soldier as Turenne,

able to cut loose from the hard and fast rules of

the then art, and despite the inert tendencies of Louvois, put his

own

individuality into what he did

Eugene and Marlborough, who

;

and

of such

men

as

cast to the winds the ancient

NARROW

A

656

RULE.

ways, refusing to be tied by an obsolete system, a'ud thus

paved the way for a Frederick and a Napoleon. either

by the narrow

Guided

rules of the art as he understood them,

or by the narrower instructions of Louvois, who, though a great war minister, did not understand war,

Luxemburg was

able to accomplish less than his opportunities

and

his

opponents should

With such

have yielded him.

what might not a Turenne

sources,

have won for France

might

Take

:

!

Louvois' one

call

war was

re-

places which

all

What we maxim

of

the enemy's strong

you can lay your hands

on so soon as you reach his

terri-

and though he had seen the

tory;

most splendid victories and the great-

Luxemburg.

France won by men moved on the enemy, he could

est successes of

who disregarded

the rule and

That

not get beyond this point in his comprehension of war. this

system called for the parceling out of troops in petty

detachments in the various

and

to the loss of

sieges, to

many men

much

useless small war,

in efforts to accomplish

what

was scarcely worth the while, he did not consider. system made him naturally timid of operations of

despise

it

sent

;

His

the advent on the theatre

a force so small that he could afford to

him

into a tremor of caution,

and resulted as

a rule in his giving his generals orders to act on the defensive.

He

what the initiative.

means

of

much time and more money in spying out enemy was doing, when he might have kept the One of his pet schemes was to rob the enemy of spent

subsistence

by devastating wide

districts, or

by

devising extensive operations to cut off the enemy's supplies.

All this was done with immense outlay and with vast

intelli-

)

TERRAIN OF FLEURUS. gence

but

;

it

657

lacked that divine spark to which,

thing, the genius for

war

is

if

to any-

due.

the opening of 1690 there stood one hundred thousand

At

French under the duke of Luxemburg on the borders of the Opposite them were eighteen thousand Span-

Netherlands.

iards under Castanaga

;

while thirty thousand allies under

Prince Waldeck lay between the Meuse and Dender. of

A body

eleven thousand Brandenburgers was approaching, and

coming

their

Luxemburg

so strongly impressed

Meuse

duke

the

;

The huge French

to stand on the defensive.

was in three corps

force

Louvois that he ordered

in

:

Marshal Boufflers leaning on the

the centre

between the Scheldt and Lys.

and Marshal Hiunieres

;

The

in the operations, but remained in

latter

body took no part

its fortified lines.

Luxem-

burg began by devastating the region occupied

but

learning

by

that

his left;

Waldeck

had marched towards Dinant on the Meuse, he drew Boufflers jDrince

with

At

men.

in

and advanced on the forty

thousand

Fleurus, northeast

of Charleroi, he

met Waldeck

at the

head of twenty-five thou-

sand

allies

prince

on July

was

Ligny and

drawai

St.

of his left,

1.

The

up with

Am and in front

distance in front of his right. front,

Battle of Fleurus.

and Fleurus some

and the land rose towards

A

small

stream ran in his

his right,

and then suddenly

dipped so as to conceal the movement of troops beyond the edge of the

was land

hill to

any one on the

of about equal height, on

level.

Beyond the brook

which lay

tlie

French.

BATTLE OF STAFFARDA.

658

Drawing up

in

two

lines on the flanks,

cavalry

officer,

lines of infantry, with the horse in

Luxemburg

with the entire

two

sent Gournay, an excellent

left

wing, under cover of the

hill of Fleurus, around to fall on the right flank of the allies.

Waldeck

neglected to scout the vicin-

ity of his position,

and knew nothing

manoeuvre.

While Gournay

of the

was on the way, the French infantry

made a

by crossing

stout front attack

the stream and marching

up the slope

of the plateau, which assault

met

in

good

style,

But Luxemburg

flank of the

broken up with extremely heavy thousand

killed.

Brussels was open initiative

to the attack

;

The

;

and

being nicely timed, so that Gour-

nay could simultaneously

Catinat.

six

and drove back.

rallied his battalions

and again led them this

Waldeck

fall

allies, their

losses,

— said

victory was decisive.

on the

array was

to have

been

The road

but neither would Luxemburg of his

to

own

advance farther, nor could he do so without orders

from Louvois. days on the

He

celebrated his triumph by camping six

battle-field,

and then

and permitted Waldeck

Brandenburg

retired across the

Sambre,

at his leisure to join the elector of

in Brussels.

In this same year Marshal Catinat won a victory over the

duke of Savoy

at Staffarda.

There were but eighteen thou-

sand French in Italy, but they were assisted by the incompetence of the duke.

Crossing the

against Catinat and met

He

him

Po from

at the

Turin, he marched

monastery of Staffarda.

intended to attack, but assuming a defensive position full

of faults, Catinat took advantage of one of these, turned his left flank

and utterly worsted him.

The French then captured

WILLIAM and overran Savoy.

^^ka,

659

in.

There are no

reliable accounts of

engagement,

ti

For

next year (1691) France put one hundred and

tlie

twenty thousand

men

As

into the field.

XIV.

pleasure to do, Louis

took the

it

Mons having taken which he Luxemburg was left in command, with

besieged

;

was

his occasional

in person

field

and

returned to Paris. instructions not to

indulge in battle unless victory was secure, and to rely mainly

on

Neither party had any apparent liking for the

his cavalry.

offensive this year political spite

;

Liege was burned by Luxemburg from

and William

;

ing to attack Marshal Boufflers

up

;

Far outnumbering the enemy, he would have

to his aid.

liked

moved on Dinant, expectsingly but Luxemburg came

III.

to fight

;

but his rigid instructions held him back.

This was the sort of campaign which Louvois deemed a hand-

some

one.

William

III.

was as

created to oppose such an unscru-

if

pulous conqueror as Louis

which

is

XIV.

He was

instinct with great projects

extension of territory

;

still

kept the

and

let the

;

he said, " he could die

this, as

Few men have

field

not of the mould

he had no craving for

but he was determined to keep what

he rightfully owned, and to do in the last dike."

;

lost so

many

battles

and

fewer yet would have broken the dikes

ocean in to destroy the work of generations in

order to preserve the autonomy of his country and the faith

and

liberty

it

enjoyed.

He was

of the stuff

which would

have given Holland as a whole back to the waves, and have

begun afresh a republic

Without being

in

New World.

any sense a great

plished results where traits

in the

soldier,

men who had many

would have wrecked their cause.

William accom-

of

the captain's

Beginning with but

a tithe of the gigantic forces of the French, he

worked up

to an equality with them

;

slowly

meanwhile, with a per-

STEENKIRKE FIELD.

660

sistency rarely matched, wresting from

more and more ground.

He was

them and hold^wo

so fond of

war

that.ene

fought at St. Denis after he knew that peace had been

He

eluded.

was not a

brilliant soldier,

ton-

but he was a safe one

in the role which he enacted.

Next vois

year, 1692, Louis in person besieged

had

again

died.

left in

On

the capture of the place,

command with

Namur.

Lou-

Luxemburg was

defensive orders, and he chose to

retire to the Brussels country,

where was more forage for

large force of cavalry, artillery and train horses.

his

William.

Battle of Steenkirke.

spread a report that he would undertake to recapture Namur,

and having made some weakened himself

feints in that direction,

to send a

detachment

and gave William the opportunity

Luxemburg

to the aid of

to fall

Namur,

on him at Steen-

kirke.

Luxemburg was camped with kirke and his left near Enghien

and

St.

Renelde

;

;

the right leaning on Steen-

William lay between Tubise

the ground between the two armies was

A BRILLIANT OPENING.

661

well accentuated by hills of one or two hundred feet above the bed of the Senne, and so

and hedges that

it

was a network

was almost impossible

army coidd such

to

cut

up by woods, marshes

of defiles, through

There happened

who

sold

news

which

manoeuvre to advantage.

ajjproach the other except

defiles.

quarters

much

by passing through

be a spy at the allied head-

to

to the French.

This

man William dis-

covered and compelled to write to Luxembui-g that the

were about to

it

Neither

seize the defiles along the Steenkirke

allies

brook in

order to protect their foragers, but without the intention of

movement

making any

special

managed

mass his men and to debouch suddenly on Lux-

to

emburg July

;

and under

this ruse de guerre

24, to the utter surprise of the latter,

who had

explained away the news which his scouts brought in by the information received from his old spy. well, but the event

The French

William had done

was not as fortunate as the beginning.

right,

composed

of horse, lay in advance of

Steenkirke, and to protect this a brigade of foot had in its front. its

Upon

this force the

blow of the

camped

allies first fell

guns were taken and turned against the French, and the

right seemed

But the

threatened with destruction.

allies

could not debouch rapidly enough from behind the brook.

Luxembm-g was active, speedily sent succor to the right, where the damage was repaired, and got his forces into line with what was, under the circumstances, most praiseworthy speed.

Luckily for the French, their front was covered by

fields inclosed

by hedges, which prevented the

summarily attacking their

line

e?i

masse.

allies

attack was feeble, and was driven back by the French line,

which then advanced and enabled the second

form

in its rear

and get out beyond the camp.

the French fought well, and William, whose

from

William's front first

line

to

Once in line, own right had

been led astray by a night march and had not come up, had

A USELESS VICTORY.

662

really accomplished nothing but a surprise of the right.

The

sides.

The ground was unsuited

alry,

fighting

was tenacious

and the whole

allel order,

and the

deliver a sudden

The

allies

and

French on both

to the operations of cav-

was a melee, quite lacking any-

affair

thing like grand-tactics.

to the last degree

battle

was

in

an irregulai par-

were not so well marshalea as to

effective blow.

Much

fault

was found

on the allied side for the failure of Count Solmes to sustain the English column.

The

of the allies, with,

is

it

was the defeat

result of the battle

claimed, ten thousand dead and as

many wounded. The French loss must have been as great. The allies abandoned most of their guns. Had William delayed his attack until he was sure that his right had come up, the victory would probably have been his, for his strata-

gem worked

well

he was hidden by the ground and by the

;

Luxemburg, and the French were quite

deceit practiced on

taken by surprise. Despite this splendid victory, the other hand, William, age,

managed

had landed

On

muiden.

to join fifteen

in Ostende,

Luxemburg did

who was

nothing.

On

curiously hard to discour-

thousand English troops, which

and then captured Furnes and Dix-

his leaving the

Netherlands these places were

recaptured by the French.

For the campaign

of

1693 Louis put no

dred and thirty thousand

men

less

in the field,

than one hun-

and personally

undertook the siege of Liege, a work which, for lack of a better objective, this time

William determined

Heidelberg

fell,

to interrupt.

About

which gave the French a chance

to

win success in Germany, and forty thousand men were sent thither

to continue the operations against

to

To

Luxemburg William, instructing him

from the Netherlands, while Louis

keep the

allies

left

from manoeuvring towards the

carry out these orders,

Luxemburg

sea-coast.

threatened Louvain

NEERWINDEN and then Liege, and

lost

FIELD.

much time

663

in useless operations

but learning in July that William had depleted his force by a number of detachments, and lay at Neerwinden on the Geete, he marched to attack him, though he had but half his force under the colors.

Neerwinden

Romsdorf

is

close to the Little Geete,

lies east of it

and the village of

on the brook of Landen or Molen-

=J^,,,^^>^;;;;;2

(±icic±)d3d3i±)i±ii±ii±id3c±icicb cbtbcb

Battle of Neerwinden.

beck, both of which streams unite to the north and form a triangular plateau

five

miles

long.

Here

William

had

camped, between Neerwinden and Romsdorf, and, hearing of

Luxemburg's approach, had the position Impregnable.

fortified his

The

line

lines,

and believed

was convex. Neerwinden

and a small ravine with a quickset hedge from the village to the Geete protected the allied right

;

the centre was covered

FIERCE COMBATS.

664

by somewhat lower land was thrown back en

in its front to

jyotence.^

Romsdorf

and proved

the left

;

useless

in

the

The weakness of the position was that it was a The right was made esjjecially strong, Neer-

battle.

crowded one. winden was

filled

with

One hundred guns

foot,

and Romsdorf was intrenched.

stood in battery along the line.

horse

was in reserve or on the

south

is

left.

The land

to

The the

than the Neerwinden plateau, but

slightly higher

gently descends towards

The beds

it.

of

the brooks are

sixty to eighty feet lower than the rolling hills.

On

the afternoon of July 28

Luxemburg

liam's front with his van of cavalry first

His

duty was to expel the enemy from Landen, which he did,

as to lean his right on

so

arrived in Wil-

and reconnoitred.

it

in the battle

he proposed to of foot.

At

daylight of July 29 the guns opened, and under a severe

fire,

deliver next day,

and here he put forty battalions

They were

the French formed for the attack. in

two

lines of foot with

two

substantially

lines of horse in their rear,

and

cavalry on both flanks in three lines.

The main

attack was opened at 6 A. M. by the French left

The French pushed vigorously

on Neerwinden. village,

but were fiercely met and driven out.

right the fighting was less marked.

On

A second

took the

in,

the French

time

Luxem-

burg assaulted Neerwinden and successfully gained an entrance, but only to be a second time ejected, partly because

the assault on the

Romsdorf was not pushed home,

enemy more

Luxemburg

so as to give

to do.

deserves great credit for not losing courage at

these two failures.

He

prepared for a new assault on Neer-

winden, and as he saw that in anticipation of

it

were disgarnishing their

Neerwinden

left centre

to protect

the allies

with more troops, he directed Marquis Feuquiere to assault the intrenchments on the west of

Romsdorf

in force.

This

CREDIT DUE WILLIAM. was done

in

665

good form, and Feuquiere made a lodgment on

the highest jjart of the ground hekl

by the

allied line,

and

thus took the foot defending Neervvinden in reverse, and in a

determined assault at the same time the duke took Neerwin-

den and held

This was the

it.

;

and had

for the allied cavalry

There had been and was nothing

of the left to put in its work. in its front

moment

been well commanded,

it

it

could have

changed front and hustled the French under Feuquiere back

by a charge on

But

their flank.

this

body

out firing a salvo or drawing a sabre, saw

of cavahy, withto retire to

Lean,

and between the duke and Feuquiere the bulk of the

allied

foot

fit

on the right was driven into the Geete, with a

eighteen thousand

men

killed,

wounded and

loss of

prisoners, one

hundred and four guns and numberless trophies. The French loss

was heavy.

There was no attempt at pursuit

burg was held by from the king

The

;

his orders to

and

finally

mischievous system ingrained in

is

The taking

a remarkable fact,

Luxem-

he sat down to besiege Charleroi.

result of this splendid victory

Louvois.

;

obtain further instructions

all

of Charleroi

and much

these defeats William kept the

was naught, owing to the the French generals by

ended

this

campaign.

It

to his credit, that despite all field.

It

would have been

otherwise had Turenne stood in the place of Luxemburg.

Luxemburg

died in

1695.

accomplished nothing.

Neerwinden

in the

Low

duke

of Savoy,

succeeded him, but

The year which saw

the victory of

Countries added one more victory to

the French arms in Italy. assist the

Villeroi

In 1691 Prince Eugene came to

and the French accomplished

In 1692 the duke raised

his forces to fifty

little.

thousand

and made a raid into the Dauphine, but without much

men

result.

In 1693, as he was besieging Pinerolo, Catinat, who had been pushed well back into the mountains, escaped from his trap, turned the duke's flank

and obliged him

to retire,

and

A CRITICAL MISTAKE.

666

then forced battle on him October 4 at Marsagiia, southwest of Turin.

When

the duke

became aware

French, he crossed the

army, leaning his

little

on

left

of

the ajoproach of the

river Cisola

this stream,

and drew up

and extending

his

his right

across to a small patch of woods which lay near another small

On

stream, unnamed.

his left

which he might have leaned ing to do

so,

he

was the height of Piosaca, on

this flank to effect

left it for the

threaten his line in reverse.

enemy

;

but neglect-

and thus

to occupy,

Both streams were almost dry at this

season,

wood

the

on

and the

duke's right was so

open that even cavalry could ride through it.

Catinat at once

seized

on the

errors

of

salient

the

duke,

and occupied the Piosaca

heights.

He

then pushed a stout

Battle of Marsagiia.

attack all along the

Savoyard

line,

and followed

Success began here.

it

up by enveloping

The duke's army was

rolled

its

left.

up on the

centre and right, and so badly defeated that some time after

he concluded peace.

During nificant.

this period the operations

The war on

by the conquest of

James was

La Hogue

on the Rhine were

insig-

the border of Spain was enlivened only

of Barcelona (1697).

lost in the battle of the

In Ireland the cause

Boyne

;

and

at

Cape

the English fleet destroyed the French fleet in

1692.

There

is

no denying

to the

French a number of

brilliant

PEACE OF RYSWICK. on land

victories

;

they were in a sense almost as splendid

as the later victories of the allies under

But

Eugene. erally did

;

667

the latter

knew how

Marlborough and

them and gen-

to utilize

And

not so the Louvois-taught French.

the result

of all their victories did not offset the general downhill ten-

dency of the fortune of France.

France had

lost so

much

that

it

would seem as

could have imposed harsh terms on her.

But

if

in the

the allies

Peace of

Ryswick (1697) she was no further mulcted than to make her yield up, except Alsatia and Strasburg, all her conquests in the Netherlands, on the Rhine and in Spain.

William

III.

In

this

peace

was acknowledged king of England and Anne

as his successor.

The main

fortresses in the Spanish Nether-

lands were to be garrisoned by the Dutch.

Freiburg, Brei-

sach and Philipsburg went to the empire; Zweibriicken to

Sweden

;

was made

Lorraine was restored to

Duke Leopold

;

the Rhine

free.

Except the work of Luxemburg and Catinat, nothing the operations since the death of Turenne

tended notice.

French Musketeer.

(17th Century.)

is

in

worthy of ex-

LIII.

PRINCE EUGENE AGAINST CATINAT. The

death, cliildless, of Charles II. of Sixain left France, Austria and Bavaria

to claim the throne

Eugene

of Savoy

;

War

and the

was French by

home, he sought

at

served throughout

of the Spanish Succession resulted.

birth, but,

By

his exceptional skill, courage

and

in

against Catinat.

He

cut a

new road down the Adige,

and gradually forced the French back.

and had not been able

Eugene regained

The

to

whom

men was

sent to Italy

crossed below Verona,

Catinat was restricted by his orders,

By

manoeuvre as he otherwise might.

all

thereafter he

and services he early

1G97 won the splendid victory of Zenta against

In 1701 Prince Eugene with thirty thousand

the Turks.

Prince

unable to get military preferment

his fortune at the court of the emperor,

life.

rose to be field-marshal,

tions,

1701.

skillful opera-

northern Italy as far as the Oglio.

intermarriages of

tlie

reigning families of Europe

have generally resulted in rival claims of territory or in

jeal-

In the opening

ousy of a preiDonderating political influence.

year of the eighteenth century a serious European question

A genealogical

arose from the death of Charles II. of Spain. table best explains the facts. Philip III. of Spain, d. 1621.

I

Anna

= Louis

\

XIII.

I

I

Maria Anna

Philip IV.

of France. !

Louis XIV. = Maria Theresa.

of Austria.

I

t

I

Charles

= Ferdinand II. Emp. I

-

|

I

Margaret Theresa

II.

= Leopold I.

d. 1700. I

]

Louis the Dauphin.

= Maria Antoinette. I

Elector of Bavaria

|

j

Joseph

I.

I

Philip of Anjou or V. of Spain.

Emp. 1705-

I

Joseph Ferdinand,

1711.

Charles VI. Emp. 17111740.

El. Prince of Bavaria.

Inasmuch

as Charles II.

Hapsburgs threatened

to

was

childless,

become extinct

and the Spanish after the general

settlement of the Peace of Ryswick, the question as to

who

''PLUS

DE PYRENEES!"

669

should succeed to the Spanish throne became the leading

one among-

made a

In 1698 the powers

the nations of Europe.

all

by which Spain, the Indies and

treaty of partition,

the Netherlands should go to the electoral prince of Bavaria

Naples and Sicily and some other minor places to the

;

Dauphin

Milan

;

to the

Archduke Charles.

This treaty,

concluded without the consent of Charles II., provoked this

monarch

into

making the prince

elector of Bavaria his sole

heir; and to this the naval powers "agreed; but the death of

the prince in 1699 reopened the entire question.

In 1700

another treaty of partition was made, by which Spain and the Indies should go to the

and Lorraine

Archduke Charles

;

Naples, Sicily

Dauphin, and Milan to the duke of

to the

Lorraine as a compensation for his own land.

changing his mind, Charles

II.

made a

possessions to Philip of Anjou,

XIV.

and

But again

will leaving his entire

in

1700 died.

Louis

then chose to disregard the treaty of partition and to act

under the

will

;

and the duke of Anjou was proclaimed as

Philip v., and started for Spain amid the cries of " II n'y a " plus de Pyrenees !

The complex nature

War of

the

of this question,

the Spanish Succession, thus had a legal and a po-

litical aspect.

On

the throne of Spain of Philip III.

the one side there were three claimants to :

Louis XIV., son of the elder daughter

and husband

of the elder daughter of Philip

IV., both of which princesses

Leopold III.

I.

which was what led to

had renounced

their inheritance

of Austria, son of the younger daughter of Philip

and husband

of

the younger daughter of Philip IV.,

both of which princesses had reserved their inheritance

Joseph Ferdinand, electoral prince of Bavaria, great-grandson of Philip IV.

Louis

XIV.

claimed the throne for his second

grandson, and Leopold for his second son. side, the

On

the other

balance of power forbade that either France or Aus-

THE CONTESTANTS.

670

tria slioulcl succeed

to the

enormous Spanish

England and Holland joined hands

The naval powers and (and

to enforce this

and

view.

estates of the empire, with Prussia

later Portugal), joined the

to prevent

territory,

emperor in a Grand Alliance

As

France from securing Spain.

allies

France

had Savoy and Mantua, Bavaria and Cologne, but in 1703

The

Savoy deserted France.

men

three great

of the

Grand

Alliance were Eugene, the emperor's general, Marlborough, the

commander

Anglo-Dutch, and A. Heinsius, pen-

of the

Holland.

sionary of

After the death of William III. in

1702, Spain played no great part in the war, and being safe

on her weakest point, the Pyrenees, France could devote her energies to Italy, the Rhine and the Netherlands.

had

interior lines

rior lines

and a single purpose

and very divergent

In population the

purj)oses.

two contestants were about equal

;

France

the allies had exte-

;

but Austria was kept busy

by her Hungarian troubles and the Turkish wars.

England

was wholly in earnest; Holland needed to defend herself against France, from whose ambition she had in the late wars suffered so much.

The other members

of the

Grand Alliance

were not easy to persuade into giving active succor. in the

work

War

of the Spanish Succession that

of Eugene, Marlborough,

Prince Eugene of Savoy was

we

Vendome and fifth

It

was

find the best

Villars.

son of Prince Maurice of

Savoy-Carignan, count of Soissons, commander of the Swiss in the

French

service,

and governor

of

mother was niece of Cardinal Mazarin. Paris, October 18, 1663,

obtain

ten,

and

Eugene sought admittance it,

He was

His

born in

and early destined for the church.

His father died when he was favor.

Champagne.

his

mother

fell into dis-

to the army, but could not

and slight physique spoke But from childhood up he had pored over Plu-

as his diminutive stature

against him. tarch's Lives

:

his firm desire

was

to

be a soldier

:

his studies

PRINCE EUGENE.

tended in this direction, and he made himself proficient in

all

every technical branch of the military

Unable

—

671

as

many

other young noblemen did

Emperor Leopold was seeking

the

art.

to get military preferment in France,

resist the incursions of the

Turks.

—

to

Eugene went

Vienna, where

well-trained volunteers to

Here, in 1683, he especially

distinguished himself in the relief of

Vienna by Sobieski, rose

speedily to

be colonel, did a

great deal of

earned tion

staff

commenda-

universal

from

duty, and

In the

his superiors.

wars against the Turks, Prince

Eugene showed himself

to

have

not only a true military eye,

but a quite uncommon courage,

moral and of

j^hysical.

His acts

Prince Eugene.

gallantry were exceptional,

and he proved that he could shoulder

responsibility.

In 1686

he rose to be major-general, and two years later field-marshal lieutenant, being then but twenty-five years of age.

He had

already been several times wounded.

The Netherlands

War

had again broken out

The

in 1689.

emperor, with Bavaria, Sweden and Spain, took the part of the prince of Orange against France, and Leopold sent Prince

Eugene deus.

to

Turin

The

to negotiate a treaty with

Duke

prince would have preferred to

Victor

Ama-

remain in

ser-

vice against the Turks, but he accomplished his mission well.

(1689-1690.)

Learning of twelve thousand

this treaty,

men

Louis

XIV.

into Piedmont.

dispatched with eighteen thousand

men

sent Catinat with

Prince Eugene was

duke Eugene fought

to reinforce the

and, in connection with him, or at times alone,

;

EUGENE'S EARLY WORK.

672

tandsomely

in the Italian

by mutual agreement

XIV. now

Louis

campaigns of 1690

Italy

tried to

became

to 1696,

neutral.

win Eugene back, by offering him

the grade of marshal of France, the governorship of

pagne and two hundred thousand

who had

clave to the emperor,

for this act of loyalty

His

first

thousand

when

livres salary

;

Cham-

but Eugene

steadily befriended him,

was placed

in larger

independent campaign was in 1697 with

men

and

commands.

the Turks under the Sultan against *&'

fifty

Kara Mus-

''f.

Zenta Campaign.

who had advanced on the empire a hundred thousand strong. He moved down between the Save and the Drave

tapha,

rivers to the

Danube-Theiss region, where, after some ma-

noeuvring between these two rivers, he checked the Turks in the siege of Peterwardein and of Szegedin.

Among

the most

interesting campaigns of this great soldier during his long

laborious life are those against the Turks, but they do not

within the scope of this work.

ended

this

campaign

is,

The

battle

and

come

which practically

however, characteristic of the man.

.ING RESPONSIBILITY.

673

bank

of the Theiss,

theianned to cross to the

Tiie''t/jS8

left

intending to pillage and devastate upper biirgen (Transylvania)

attack his

before

army

Hungary and Sieben-

and Prince Eugene determined to

;

at the passage of the bridge

At

had completed the operation.

it

which

attack the prince received dispatches, but he

it

held,

moment

the

of

said, rather

is

doubtfully, to have refused to open them, rightly guessing that they were orders not to be led into battle.

The Turkish army was drawn up

in a great

bow

in front of

the bridge near Zenta, protected by earthworks, by the bag-

gage wagons lashed together Zisca-fashion, and with an inner bridge-head.

About one hundred guns were

Zenta was near the ports,

The

right.

position.

was covered with trans-

river

and a part of the Turkish army under the sultan had

already crossed to the other side

was anxious

Having

to attack.

It

— he

;

the right on the Theiss, and

four hours of daylight.

Eugene

11.

and ascertaining that the Turks

—a

fact

at once brought his

enveloped the enemy's

this reason

under arms, the prince

left his infantry resting

were hastening to get across, confusion,

and for

;

was September

rode forward to reconnoitre

it

in

swung

it

which was apt to breed

army

into position, with

by a right wheel

His concentric

fire of artillery

highly effective and that of the Turks the reverse,

f(^r

guns were big and cumbrous and their ammunition

The attack was begun by the grand

sorted.

so that

There were but three or

lines.

was

their ill-as-

vizier sending

out a cavalry detachment, which was, however, quickly driven

back

General Rabutin on the Austrian

;

assault

;

the centre under Prince

Count Stahremberg followed.

left

opened the

Eugene and

right under

The Turks

resisted stoutly,

but the Austrians, though outnumbered two to one, stormed the earthworks and an hour later the bridge-head. fighting

was desperate and the Turkish

Here the

loss fearful, for the

A SPLENDID VICTO.HK.

674

The

Austrians gave no quarter.

victory

was

c.to 169B,

-

1 xoiu

ten thousand to twenty thousand Turks are said to have

among them many pashas and the grand camp on the other bank and an enormous booty fallen,

Austrian hands

guns and

;

flags

The

vizier.

were captured wholesale

The Austrian

the Turks retired east to Temesvar.

the

fell into ;

loss

and was

but two thousand killed and wounded.

This

first

victory of Prince Eugene's does

him great

especially in view of the responsibility he took.

credit,

After a three

days' rest he followed the Turks, but they had retired south

garrison in Temesvar.

to Belgrade, leaving a strong

occupy so much time that

siege of this place promised to

would practically consume the

Eugene preferred

of the

rest

to quarter his troops

dition with twenty-five

The

hundred

foot,

it

campaign; and

and undertake an expe-

four thousand horse and

twelve guns into Bosnia, to capture the capital, Bosna-Seraj.

The Turks were

far

from expecting an incursion, and

in less

than three weeks the prince overcame the whole province and

The

returned. the

citadel

caj)ital

held out.

was captured and accidentally burned

On

destroyed the defenses of

all

the

home march

;

the Austrians

captured towns, and the army

then went into winter-quarters.

On

returning to Vienna Prince Eugene found that his ene-

mies, under the lead of Field-Marshal Caprara, had

him

to rouse the anger of the emperor against of orders in fighting the battle of Zenta, arrest.

The

managed

for disobedience

and he was

j)laced in

people, rejoiced at the splendid victory, were,

however, with him

;

the disfavor of the emperor lasted but a

short while, and resulted in the justification of the prince,

who next year was again placed in sole command in Hungary, and made independent of the Austrian council general of war.

His short humiliation, which

wise harmed his eventual reputation.

is

also doubtful, in

no

ARMIES IN

1701.

In 1698 the Austrian army continued under command oi Prince Eugene, tory

who manoeuvred over much

the same terri-

but we cannot detail the operations, and the war event-

;

ually languished into a truce

and peace.

Prince Eugene was next employed in the

War of

the Span-

ish Succession.

At

the opening of 1701 the emperor had under his control

Of

not exceeding eighty-five thousand men.

thousand, one third horse, were sent under

and assembled the

at

Roveredo

;

these

Eugene

thirty

into Italy,

twenty-one thousand were on

Rhine, and the rest were in Austria and Hungary.

Louis

XIV. and

men, of

whom

his allies

had over two hundred thousand

seventy-five thousand were in Flanders, not

including the garrisons of the strong places, fifteen thousand

on the Moselle, forty-one thousand on the Rhine, three thousand in Alsatian garrisons, and in Italy thirty-three thousand in the field

and eleven thousand

in garrison, not to count

some twenty thousand Savoyards and Wolfenbiittel troops. Louis' large preponderance of force and his

alliance with

Bavaria opened a promising chance for a summary march on

Vienna with

his

main army, which should

join the Bavarians

by the advance

sustained on the right gent.

Such an operation might have

favor in one campaign.

succumbed, and the

him

of France,

;

Rhine and to

be

of the Italian continsettled the

war

in his

The emperor would probably have

allies

But Louis chose

been dispersed.

to act on the defensive, for he

advise

cross the

and Wolfenbiittel troops, the whole

no longer had a Turenne to

the emperor joined hands with the other enemies

and during the long war which followed, the empire,

England and Holland were held together by the splendid abilities of Eugene, Marlborough and Heinsius. In the early part of 1701 there were then in Italy some thirty-three thousand

French

in the field

;

five

thousand in

CATINAT'S POSITION. Mantua, and

six

thousand in the strong places of Mirandola,

Cremona, Pizzighetone, Lodi, Lecco and other towns.

They

were of good quality, but scarcely as able as the imperial troops,

who had

ened.

Marshal Catinat, who was

seen war in

Hungary and were

in

command, with orders

remain on the defensive and not to cross to the the Adige,

—

— took up

his stand at Rivoli

in other

words not

service-hard-

to invade

left

bank

to

of

Venetian territory,

between the lake of Garda and

the Adige, where he lay athwart the imperial advance from

NEW ROAD

A

the Tyrol into northern Italy.

was at

to drive the

Roveredo

French from

May

BUILT.

677

Prince Eugene, whose task Italy,

20, at once

perceived that he had no

by crossing

resource but to violate the neutrality of Venice

her territory, and determined to move of the Adige,

it

and who joined the army

down on

and cross the river below.

bank

the left

This was a thing

he would scarcely have dared to do unless he had known by

means

of a secret understanding with the

happy

relic of their

duke of Savoy, the

recent joint campaigns against Catinat,

that the French marshal had orders not to cross the

Eugene

for without this certainty

laid himself

absolutely cut off from his base.

that day, lay over the foothills of right bank,

and was

Eugene proposed

open

Adige

to

;

being

The only good road, at Monte Baldo along the The route

enemy.

in possession of the

was then a mere footpath, and a

to take

proper road over thirty miles long had to be built at vast

A force

exertion.

of six thousand pioneers

was

set to

and within a week several roads down the valleys Adige

affluents

were made practicable

so poor that the cavalry single at

file,

some

this

road,

and

south,

and on

May

be dismounted

his

raised

by

rocks.

ability.

sur-

Prince Eugene

28 reached Verona imdiscovered

by Catinat, whose orders not only must have relaxed

to

the difficulties, which were

despite

mounted by wonderful persistence and

moved

to lead the horses in

at others to be lowered or

down perpendicular

of the

but they remained

and the wagons and guns had

places,

windlasses up or

On

was compelled

;

work,

tied his hands, but

usual vigilance

;

for

while

who

Eugene

worked and marched behind the mountains, a proper system Eugene of spies or scouting would have revealed his project. quite outwitted his opponent.

So soon

as the

French general

discovered the imperial manoeuvre, he left part of his Eivoli and marched

down

the right

bank

army

at

of the Adijie with

PRECEDENT FOR OUR CAVALRY.

678 the rest

down

but Eugene had disposed his troops from Verona

;

in such a

way

make Catinat

as to

He

forces over a long line.

string out his

own

utilized the soutiiwesterly

bend

of the Adige below Cologna so as to compel Catinat to occupy the

bow on bad

he himself held only the chord

terrain, while

on good, and by

managed

skillful feints

to convince his oppo-

nent that he would pass the river above Verona, though his troops already reached

down

as far as

Legnano.

Catinat did

not fathom Eugene's scheme, and tired his troops by restless

marching up and down

;

and the prince, meanwhile keeping

Catinat busy at Rivoli by a small detachment, bridged the swollen Adige and the several canals to the west, put his

and taking Carpi,

forces over at Castelbaldo on July 9,

in

front of which he beat a large French cavalry party with loss of one thousand men, he crossed the Tartaro and threatened

In

Catinat's right flank.

was wounded.

this

engagement Eugene himself

Like Gustavus, he was always

the fray, and his

in the thick of

wounds were frequent, but happily not often

severe.

In

this

employed

wont

combat

at Carpi,

it

noteworthy that Eugene

is

his dragoons in exactly the

to use our cavalry in the civil

same manner as we were

war

:

he dismounted them

on ground unsuitable for cavalry, and on good terrain sent

them

in at a

better precedent for our

When

We

charge against the enemy.

could ask no

American method.

Catinat found Eugene in force below Verona, he

imagined that he was about to push towards the Po, cross

and enter the Modena his forces, leading

territory,

a strong

and he

party

still

down

to Ostiglia.

had started on a wrong theory, and could not cast

Had Eugene pushed home

at this

it

further divided

it

He off.

moment, he might have

turned his flank and rolled up the entire French army like

a

scroll

;

but bad roads, which made concentration

difficult,

CATINAT RELIEVED. and the delay

in the crossing of his

held him back, and Catinat

mary

managed

and trains

artillery

to save himself

where he concentrated

retreat on Villafranca,

tered forces.

heavy

679

Eugene made preparations

hy sumhis scat-

him the

to attack

next day, but Catinat had now gauged the enemy's purpose, gathered his dispersed forces, withdrew in the night across

His main force he posted between

the Mincio and escaped.

The

Goito and Vallegio.

prince's whole operation

had been

admirably planned and executed, and deserves study in In

fact,

detail.

one can scarcely appreciate the niceties of Eugene's

strategy otherwise than by following every one of his move-

ments day by day. Shortly after, Prince Eugene

cross the

made a

flank

movement up

and near by the French army and purposing

river past

;

to

Mincio and aim for Castiglione, he assembled his

bridge-material at Salionze, where on July 28 he put over the

army.

and

He

expected a French attack, but Catinat declined

While

retired behind the Chiese.

tried one of his fertile

treachery, but

it

in this region,

it,

Eugene

schemes to get hold of Mantua by

quite failed

;

the

enemy kept

the place.

Louis XIV., dissatisfied with Catinat's apparent neglect,

and unmindful

of

how he had been hampered by

his orders,

replaced him by Villeroi, until the arrival of whoin the duke of

Savoy as senior assumed supreme command.

The

latter

brought a reinforcement of seventeen thousand troops, which increased the French-Savoyard

By advancing a wing Eugene securely regained Tyrol, but the French tlren

to

army

to fifty

thousand men.

Peschiera and Lonato, Prince

his direct

made no

communications with the

signs of attacking him.

He

pushed forward to Castiglione and Montechiaro, and

thence to Brescia, a manoeuvre w^hich turned the

left flank of

the French and threatened their communications with France

through the Milan

district,

but which in turn laid him open

ON THE

680

OGLIO.

same danger from the larger French army, that could

to the

The duke, however, thought not

always base on Mantua.

of

any such bold scheme as a grand turning operation, but behind the Oglio, drawing in the troops from

retired

upper waters down to Caneto, so as

to present a

new

its

front to

the imperial army.

Eugene had been

now

victualing out of the

duke

of

Mantua

He had

transferred his commissariat.

Savoy that Villeroi had fighting

region, but

learned from the

orders,

and though

always active, had kept to small war only, for the enemy,

But

reinforced, quite outnumbered him.

in

now

order to hold

himself better, he advanced to the Oglio, took up a strong

down to await some ten thousaiid reinforcements of his own which were to arrive from the Tyrol along the road west of Lake Garda, and via Salo down and

position at Chiari,

to Brescia,

which

sat

He

city his position protected.

lay in the

open country, but he could lean his flanks on small streams

Po

too deep to ford, of which the basin of the in his front, he threw

To

up some works.

all

is full

and,

;

appearance

fronting oddly in a strategic light, he was tactically well

Though Chiari belonged to Venice and was occupied by a Venetian garrison, Eugene put his own troops in it by placed.

force

;

he had already violated the Venetian territory by

marching on the Chiari

left

bank

made matters no

of the Adige,

worse.

and

The enemy

this seizure of

lay opposite

him

on the other side of the Oglio. Catinat had in

good

officer,

many campaigns shown

had no merit.

and got

Eugene

his

Vendome, I

me."

At

shall fight

that time he

command on

Villeroi

was a

that score, for he

quoted as saying before the cam-

is

paign opened, " If Villeroi if

his king.

and deserved better of

favorite at court,

himself to be a

is

my

opponent, I shall beat him

with him

;

if

knew Catinat

Catinat, he better than

may

;

beat

Vendome.

LIV.

EUGENE AGAINST VILLEROI AND VENDOME. ViLLEROi's thousand

men

out result

;

first

act

was

to attack

Eugene

to Eugene's thirty thousand

and

in

;

at Palazzolo.

1701-1702.

He had

forty-five

but his attack was weak and with-

Jiovember he went into winter-quarters.

paign had been a brilliant one on Eugene's part.

The

year's

cam-

Early in February he

made a sudden attack on Cremona, broke in and captured Villeroi, but could not hold the city. Vendome was sent to take command of the French army, now numbering

fifty

Vendome, by a

skillful manoeuvre, cut

revictualed the place across the Fo.

Eugene had

thousand men.

;

him

A battle

One of the greatest generals

and served with

Turenne.

by

skill

Under James and courage

;

blockading Mantua, but his

communications and

ensued at Luzzara, which was drawn, and in Novem-

Born

peared on the theatre of war. soldier,

beeti

from

then moving around Eugene's fiank, he forced him back

ber both armies went into winter-quarters.

campaign.

off

in 16.50,

distinction in the II.

and William

was made duke

became general-in-chief

Vendome held

of this era,

the honors of the

John Churchill, now

ap-

he early approved himself a good English corps uuder Cond4 and

III.

he rose in his chosen profession

of Marlborough,

of the allies in the Netherlands.

and

finally, in

1701,

His campaigns of

1701 to 1703 were not remarkable.

Villeroi

shortly

came upon the

scene,

and as he was

ordered, determined to attack the prince before he was reinforced.

some

Catinat, his junior, remained with the army.

forty-five

With

thousand men, Villeroi crossed the Oglio at

Rudiano on August 28 and

29,

and so certain was he of easy

victory that he neglected to fetch most of his artillery with

him.

Much

in accordance with his character, this

be a foolish error.

moved on the

imj)erial

a reconnoissance.

made good

On

With

proved to

the afternoon of September 1 he

army, after the barest semblance of his thirty thousand

dispositions,

and

his

men, Eugene had

outposts gave

him

early

VILLEROI DEFEATED.

682

He had

notice of the coming of the French.

three lines, the

cavalry in the third, and in Chiari, on his left flank, and in a

number

of houses near by, he placed foot

and

line faced nearly east,

His position was strong. never doubting victory tion,

;

and

on two brooks.

his right leaned

Villeroi

His

artillery.

advanced

in

good heart,

but his attack on the prince's posi-

though heartily enough delivered and followed up, was

PAlAZXOL-OAj

Chiari Operation.

beaten five

off

by the imperial

forces,

hundred men and many

The prince declined existing

;

to

slightly

changed

right on Palazzolo,

while Eugene lost

little.

pursue the advantage against the odds

Villeroi retired in

and intrenched between

Eugene

with the loss of over twenty-

officers,

and

good order

that

place

to

Urago, near by,

and Castrezato

his position

to

his left on Chiari.

;

and

one leaning his

Autumn was

at

hand, and the rest of the year was eaten up by small war,

conducted by the imperialists with great vigor and constant success.

Each day some expedition

against the enemy's foragers,

outposts or convoys was undertaken, but Eugene,

ered that he had

won enough

who

consid-

for this campaign, did not care

A BRILLIANT CAMPAIGN. to risk

683

what he had already gained by uncertain operations on

a larger scale against so superior a force.

some bolder manoeuvres

Catinat suggested

French excess of

to utilize the

forces,

but Villeroi was not abreast of them.

At

the end of these small operations, Villeroi, on

Eugene had small chance

Urago

so carefully that

and the French

went into winter-quarters

and down

to

Novem-

of attacking him,

ber 13, retired across the Oglio below

in the country along

the Oglio

The Venetians refused Eugene

Cremona.

the

right to winter on their territory, but as he could not well retire to the

Tyrol and have

work

all his

to

do over again

next spring, in order to drive the enemy out of the Mantua region he undertook operations which secured him a

number

of places, including Marcaria, Rodondesco, Torre d' Oglio, Ostiglia, Borgoforte

and Ponte Molino,

dola,

in fact all the

towns

Mantua and Goito he captured Miranwhere was much material, in the middle of December,

of importance save

;

and Guastalla shortly after

;

strengthened the crossings of the

Oglio, nearly all of which he controlled, cut the French off

from Mantua, and himself went lines along the Oglio

into

and Mincio, with

cantonments in three his left resting on the

Headquarters were at San Benedetto, and a big outpost

Po.

lay in the

Parma

territory, while

Parma

though against the consent of the duke. eral

had a good country

concentrate.

to victual

itself

was occupied,

The imperial gen-

from and could quickly

The Savoyard army marched back

to

Pied-

mont.

According to the ideas of the day. Prince Eugene's campaign had been exceedingly brilliant tive at all times

;

but

it

is

;

he had kept the

true that he was aided

limitations of the generals opposed to him. cross the Adige, a fact

bank

;

by the

Catinat could not

which allowed Eugene

of action he desired on the east

initia-

all the liberty

the secret understand-

MANTUA SHUT

684

IN.

ing with the duke of Savoy, which gave the prince access to all

the news he desired, was a vital point in his favor; and

finally the

breaking up of the French army into small detach-

ments, together with the poor management of Villeroi,

But he had shown exceptional

in his favor.

enterprise dierly,

his

;

work

in all respects

activity

and

had been able and

sol-

and the campaign redounds much

had taken advantage of him, and

if

we should gauge

all

It is rare that great captains

enemy had given

generals

tion they encountered, there would be

He

to his honor.

the openings the

all

made

by the

ojjposi-

few great reputations.

have been matched by equal

talent.

In 1702 Prince Eugene was again in command of the imperial forces with which he had in the previous campaign

pushed the French back to the Milanese, and which he had

withdrawn towards winter to the neighborhood of Mantua.

He had

kept up an activity

of Villeroi tua,

all

winter to which the inertness

formed a great contrast

;

he had blockaded Man-

which at the beginning of January he proceeded with

some twelve thousand men

to shut in

in order to hold his lines securely, he his position with

much

care,

and

more thoroughly

;

and

watched the Po above

collected supj)lies in the

towns of Brescello, Guastalla, Luzzara, Mirandola and Borgoforte.

The enemy considerably outnumbered him; and

his

task in this campaign was to hold himself in Italy rather than to

push the enemy out

tioned in the

On

the

Parma

1st of

of

it.

General Vaudemont was

February Prince Eugene carried out a

scheme which he had for some time had fortress of

tioned,

in view, against the

Cremona, where the bulk of the French were

and where

Villeroi

was an admirable corps information.

By

sta-

country.

had

his headquarters.

of spies,

sta-

In his pay

from whom he got much

corrupting a priest, whose house was near

VILLEROI CAPTURED.

685

the north city wall, a few imperial soldiers got admitted

through a drain into the

city,

and

at the preconcerted hour of

3 A. M., opened one of the adjacent gates to a force headed by

Within a few minutes the

Prince Eugene.

latter

was

inside,

with two thousand infantry and somewhat more cavalry, and before the garrison was aware of any danger the place was taken, and Villeroi, Avhose quarters were close at hand, was

made a

prisoner.

But the event was not eral

Vaudemont (the

Villeroi)

as fortunate as the beginning.

son, for the father

had been instructed

Parma by

to

aid the

attacking and taking the

Gen-

was serving under stratagem from

Cremona bridge-head

from the south, and thus opening communication with Eugene

and an

outlet for retreat

;

but he failed to do

this,

and when

the scheme was on the very eve of success, the garrison got

under arms, and during the whole day energetically fought to expel the enemy.

Eugene, with a retire.

Finally the French gained their point, and

loss of twelve

The marquis

of Crequi was on the

the garrison, and had he

captured himself

;

hundred men, was obliged

march

to

to help

come up, Eugene might have been

but on hearing a report that Cremona

had been taken, Crequi pusillanimously turned back without attempting to verify the rumor, and Eugene got away by the

Margaret gate on the

east, crossed the Ogiio,

and

retired to

camp with his prisoner. When, on March 1, Vendome, the successor of Villeroi, arrived in Cremona and took command of the French army lying on the Adda, he first sat down to wait for some twentyfive

thousand reinforcements to arrive, and then planned to

march

to the Mincio, place himself

on the communications of

Eugene with the Tyrol, and either force him to battle, or compel him to throw up the blockade of Mantua. While waiting his accessions and the proper

moment

to act, he

made

VENDOME IN

686

ITALY.

Mantua by moving on Eugene's

an attempt

to help

on the Po

but Eugene outmanoeuvred him, met him at every

point,

;

and not only held

position

the blockade, but kept up

fast

a series of annoying raids into the Milanese and Cremona districts.

Louis Joseph, Duke of Vendome, was born in 1654, had early served

in the

Gardes du Corps in the Netherlands, under Turenne on the Rhine, and

He

under Conde in Flanders.

came familiar with

by serving

Italy

a junior in the campaigns con-

as

ducted by Catinat.

manded lona. life

in private

indecorous and

shiftless,

ambition;

little

in Spain,

and captured Barce-

A splendid soldier,

he was

showed

In 1695 he com-

French army

the

freed Palamos,

Vendome.

be-

required

it

the stimulus of arms to rouse his naturally indolent nature

and sometimes even

this failed to

do

In the

so.

often showed determination unsurpassed, as well as a

gallantry and intelligence

guard the secret of

Having had

;

field

he

marked

but he was not always careful to

his operations.

his forces raised to over fifty

thousand men,

line of the Vendome left Adda and Po sufficiently posted, and with twenty thousand men marched. May 12, over the Oglio at Pontevico, crossed

Cremona well garrisoned and the

the Mella,

May

15, at

Manerbio, turned to the right over the

Chiese at Medole, and reached Goito

May

This hand-

23,

some march, made before Eugene could do aught

to interrupt

was a clear check

commander,

or neutralize for

it

tions,

it,

to the imperial

not only cut him off from his main line of communica-

— the direct road

raised the blockade of

to the Tyrol,

Mantua on

— but

at the

the north.

The

same time prince at

MANTUA RELIEVED. He might

once recognized his situation.

drawn

into fatal manoeuvres or a

he quietly withdrew

687

more

still

to his lower

readily have been

Mantua

fatal battle

but

;

lines with troops

which had been reinforced up to thirty-nine thousand men, took up a strong position, tatone, intrenched cies of blockade.

it,

May

and here

17, near

Montanara and Cur-

held

still

But Vendome's presence

between Goito and Mantua could not

Mantua

in a spe-

in superior force

fail to

become

dangler-

ous to the imperial army, and Eugene concluded to draw in

from the towns surrounding Mantua, and

his forces

to

watch

for further developments while victualing his forces over the

bridge at Borgoforte from the magazines which he had so judiciously established in the side of the Po.

From

Modena country on

the other

Brescello to Ostiglia his possession of

Po was made secure. Upon this withdrawal

the

revictual

Eugene, Vendome was enabled to

of

Mantua, and then took up

his post opposite

Eugene

near Rivalto, where both armies remained in situ for a month, indulging only in small war and cannonading. to duplicate the capture of Villeroi

quarters at Rivalto

came

by

so close to

An

attempt

Vendome in his success as to make the seizing

French general careful where he established himself. Eugene's position was peculiar.

He

stood between the

and the Mincio, the enemy, who outnumbered him, front,

had

and Mantua on

his right, against

to intrench himself.

whose

sorties

The neutral Venetians

he

Adige with twenty-six thousand men for

their

protection,

and Eugene could have a

on

bank by marching over

their territory

of retreat was gone.

Now

Spain,

Vendome was anxious

again

;

;

own

its left

but his original line

heavily reinforced from

to oust

Eugene from

but, as he did not like to make a front Vaudemont with twenty- three thousand men tion

now

held the

line of the

line of retreat

Po

in his

his posi-

attack, he left

in his Rivalto

VENDOME ACTIVE.

688

lines astride the imperial

July

communications, and boldly started,

with the van of other twenty-three thousand, towards

7,

Cremona and Casal Maggiore, proposing by

a flank attack

Modena

seek to cut

holdings and

capture

thought, he would force

compel him to leave the

Po

him

Po and

to cross the

opponent from his

magazines.

his

into a situation

Thus, he

which would

His object in marching so far up

Italy.

Cremona was perhaps

as

his

oft

to

meet Philip V. of Spain,

who was coming on a visit to the allied armies. Eugene guessed his opponent's intention, and his detachments at Borgoforte

increased

and Brescello, where he had

bridges over the Po, and at Guastalla.

Crossing the river, July 14, in two columns, at Cremona

and Casal Maggiore, Vendome met

Eugene

imperial horse which

beat

Santa Vittoria some

at

sent out to watch the operation,

with a loss of six himdred men, captured Reggio,

it

Modena and

Carpi, and having got together thirty-six thou-

sand troops, marched to Luzzara, August 15, hoping to seize

on Eugene's bridges over the Po.

He was

doing brilliant

work.

Matters looked threatening for Eugene. battle with a sujaerior

By

he determined.

drew most

1,

men and

army

and on

if

this

Vaudemont, he with-

Po

at Bor-

from garrisons

fifty-seven guns, also

on Luzzara, and on August 3 reached

south of the crossing.

seemed as

his front, crossed the

reinforced his

twenty-six thousand straight

from

It

his only outlet,

skillfully deceiving

of his forces

August

goforte

enemy was

Strong garrisons were

up

to

marched

Sailetto, just

left in his

mag-

azine towns.

Vendome had

called on the

surrender, and on refusal citadel

by.

;

and then, heedless

The

commander

of the place to

had taken the town but not the of

Eugene, prepared

to

camp near

old accounts of this battle are a good deal confused,

DESPERATE BATTLE.

A

689

and the old

ciiarts do not show the tojiogTaphy of to-day. Along the Po near Luzzara there was said to be a canal or an embankment to arrest the frequent inundations of the

river,

and high enough

old charts call

it

to conceal a considerable army.

At

the Zero Canal.

much

that the country was

cut up by embankments, dikes,

ditches, hedges, patches of woods, so ful

The

all events, it is certain

scouting would discover

much

so that only care-

On

an enemy.

this

terrain

Eugene, who with his entire force of infantry and cavalry

had advanced

two columns along the Po, and now lay in a sort of ambush, hoped to fall suddenly on the French when in

they should go into camp, as he was advised by his scouts they

were

about to do.

Ven-

that

dome's people were exceedingly less

in

care-

outjDost

and

duty,

the

French army had

marched

up

was preparing

camp without

and

-'/

_j>i-^ACe._^

^TAft^ ^

^-.^^

^

veNaoHE

to disNDOME.S

COUUHrjS

OP

MAf^CH

covering the pres-

ence

my.

of

the ene-

Just before Battle of Luzzara.

Eugene was ready to

debouch from hiding and curiosity of

enough

to discover the

got his

men through

had Vendome.

It

fall

upon the French, Vendome,

an outpost commander, was fortunate

by the

ambush, and by the time Eugene had

the difficult country and into line, so

was 5

P.

M.

The

imperialists of the right

wing worked their way through the many obstacles and on the French

left

with great fury

;

fell

but they were met by

A DISPUTED VICTORY.

690

equal gallantry, and for hours a bloody strug^'le was maintained.

Eugene reported that

cer

and that the fighting was kept up under command

fell,

in several regimeni;' every

offi-

In the centre Vendome opposed Eugene,

of the sergeants.

On

but the latter gained some ground.

the left

tlie

imperial

gain was more marked, as the ground was more open and the

In every respect

could better operate.

cavalry

fiercely contested

Up

grand-tactics.

it

was a

but without any special show of

battle,

midnight the struggle went on

to past

along the line in places, breaking out at intervals on either side

and

;

thousand

on

it

had been hot enough

killed,

the imperial side

army some two

to cost each

and on the French

side four thousand

two thousand wounded.

and

Eugene had by

no means m.ade the gain he had anticipated, which was to drive the French from his vicinity

;

nor indeed had he

lost

the battle, for both sides claimed a victory.

Eugene, who he kept the

French it,

is

field

unusually accurate in his reports, says that

and collected

v/ere driven

all his

wounded, while the

more than one thousand paces back from

a statement which seems to vouch for an imperial success.

Both armies remained near enough together cannonading next day.

At

all

events,

summary

plished his end by putting a

to indulge in

Eugene had accomstop to

Vendome's

advance and to the danger of being driven out of the Modena country.

Vendome ordered Vaudemont Eugene kept raids,

raid

free

enough

to

to

blockade Borgoforte

even so far as into the Milanese.

is

worth mentioning.

;

but

send his light horse out on

A party

of six

One

enterprising

hundred hussars

under General Davia started from camp, rode up the Po, crossed the Enza, Parma, Taro,

Rura and Trebbia,

seized the

bridge at Arena, crossed, forced a heavy contribution on Pavia, and marched on and into Milan.

Thence easterly

IN FAVOR OF VENDOME. they crossed

Adda

tlie

691

at Cassano, the Oglio at Calcio, the

Mincio at Valleggio, and arrived safe and laden with enor-

mous booty tremendous

For

This was the sort of work Eugene's

at Ostigiia. vitality

fifty-five

was

aj^t

to inspire in his subordinates.

days the armies stood en face near Luzzara,

and Vendome only captured Guastalla. Eugene was too weak

own

to do moi-e than hold his

;

but

He made

though not Mirandola.

Vendome was

able suc-

Eugene's Modeua magazines,

cessively to seize several of

an attempt on

this place

by moving on Bondanello on the Secchia but while on the march to this latter place, Eugene quietly drew in most of the Borgoforte garrison, rapidly moved across the Secchia, ;

and on November 8 drew up

Vendome had much But he

got

shortly

to defend the river

;

and though

the larger force, he declined to attack.

Borgoforte, whose garrison was thus

depleted.

Prince Eugene attemjsted later to gain possession of the Guastalla bridge, as well as

made an

failing in both efforts, he gave

up

attack on

all his

Mantua

;

but

holdings on the left

Po and went into winter-quarters in the vicinity of Mirandola. The French, in November, also put their fifty-six thousand men (not counting garrisons) into winterbank

of the

quarters, with headquarters in Guastalla.

The campaign had been decidedly in favor of Vendome, who with his superior forces had conducted it with much ability,

and may be said

to

have gained substantial repute by his

boldness and intelligence. sure his

army was but

forced back to the right

half that of his opponent,

bank

in the Mirandola country Italy

;

and

all his

Prince Eugene, though to be

;

of the

but he had not been driven out of

operations were active and able.

Vendome had accomplished more, greater ability.

An

had been

Po and been cooped up

yet

Though

Eugene had shown the

exceptional circumstance in the cam-

EUGENE'S THEORIES.

692

paigns of 1701-1702

is

that Prince

for scarcely any support.

He

down, and subsisted his

men on

Eugene

called

built his road

on Austria

from the Tyrol

He

the enemy's territory.

so disposed his magazines that being cut off from his direct

communications with the Tyrol by no means fatally comproAll this was an unusual thing in those days.

mised him.

The operations had cost Austria little in men or Eugene had, considering his force and the fact that

material. his oppo-

nent was one of the best soldiers of the day, conducted a very handsome campaign.

campaign

of the 1702

is

Perhaps the most noteworthj^ fact that

Eugene grasped and acted on

the theory that the weaker of two generals must never await attack, but himself ick's great

power

;

assume the

and Eugene

This was Freder-

offensive.

distinctly exhibited

Luzzara he advanced on the enemy

;

during the whole cam-

paign his activity in small war never relaxed

;

and he always

managed to keep a central position with interior was

recalled to Vienna, received with enthusiasm,

president of the imperial council of war.

ceeding year he was not in the

ish Succession a soldier as remarkable as

whom

his

name was

He

lines.

and made

During the

suc-

field.

There had come upon the theatre of the

with

At

it.

War

of the Span-

Eugene, and one

John

to be imperishably coupled.

Churchill was born in Devonshire July 5, 1650, thirteen years before his colleague, his father being a royalist, his

mother a daughter of Sir Francis Drake. Paul's school, he entered the

army

the patronage of the duke of York, and the

Educated

at sixteen years old, first

at St.

under

saw service

war against Tangiers, where he was distinguished

volunteer in

all

hazardous exploits.

in

as a

In 1672, at the begin-

ning of the second Netherlands War, he was captain in the

English corps, and at

complimented him.

A

Nymwegen Turenne

highly and justly

certain position under a

French

officer

MARLBOROUGH'S EARLY WARS. had been

by a Dutch

lost

Turenne

attack.

693

said to have

is

bet a champagne supper that " son hel Anglais,^' with half the troops which had just been driven back, would take it

and Churchill gallantly won him

his bet.

earned the public thanks of Louis

XIV.

for services at the

was soon

siege of Maestricht,

made

Next year he

colonel, and, as such, in

1674, served under Turenne

on the Rhine.

Four years cipated

he

after,

in the

parti-

campaign

in

Flanders, and for three years

succeeding was with the banished duke

Netherlands

His

fidelity

of

York

and

in

the

Belgium.

earned him his Marlborough.

baronetcy and promotion and ;

when the duke became James Engaged

French ambassador.

II.

at

he was made peer and

Sedgmoor against the

surgents, he afterwards went over to

made At

lieutenant-general the battle of

William

III.,

and duke of Marlborough

in-

and was

in 1686.

Walcourt (1689) against the French, in marked skill, and the king desired

the Netherlands, he showed

him

to go to Ireland in 1690, to serve against

Marlborough declined left that country,

when he drove back

Kinsale and Ulster.

James

to go thither until after

II.

But

James had

the insurgents in Cork,

Notwithstanding his treasonable corre-

spondence with James, the king kept him in favor, and took

him he

to the Netherlands in

fell

1691

;

afld

though in the next year

from favor and was imprisoned

in the

Tower, he was

again called to court, showered with honors and dignities,

made

captain-general,

potentiary, in 1701.

and sent

to the

Netherlands as pleni-

Queen Anne, on her

accession, com-

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.

694

Mm general-in-cliief

missioned

of the English forces, and, in

1702, conferi-ed the Garter on him.

Although, under the

common

belief that the divine right

many

of ruling confers like military skill, there were

ants to the

command

Prussia, the

Archduke Charles, the

duke

of

Zell,

of the

own

choice,

— the

this action there

of the

Dutch

midsummer, the

engaged

and

in

and

com-

Owing to reach his army

Marlborough did not

Athlone having meanwhile been

earl of

Kaisersworth, which

later

troops.

raid

fell

on

June

15,

Nymwegen.

Marlborough crossed the Maas at Grave

with his sixty thousand men,

Boufflers,

was

the confidence

:

their desire to have a

checking Marshal Boufflers'

and Dutch

upon

in 1702,

the Netherlands.

the allies in

of

in the siege of

Three weeks

estates insisted

their field deputies could control.

political complications, till

Dutch

were two good reasons

in his ability,

mander whom

Hanover, the

and the duke of Marlborough,

made commander-in-chief For

elector of

claim-

king of

and especially Prince George of Denmark,

husband of Queen Anne, their

— the

armies,

allied

He was

made up

of English,

German

anxious for battle with Marshal

who had some forty thousand men, but the Dutch held him back, and he was reduced to a cam-

field deputies

Capturing Venlo, Roermond, Stevensweert

jjaign of sieges.

and

(Liege), he forced

Liittich

Mehaigne.

the

French behind the

This was already a marked gain

ation in the Netherlands on a

cut off from what they had

new

deemed

footing

;

;

it

put the

situ-

the French were

their highway, the Rhine,

and a secure waterway was open from the Dutch ports the

army

of the allies at the front,

allied position

— no mean

to

The

success.

moreover threatened Brussels and Cologne,

and Marlborough began

to be looked on as the saviour of

Had he much future

the Netherlands.

been given his own way, he might

have spared

waste of lives and treasure

;

for

U.NIMPORTANT CAMPAIGNS. Marlborough belongs

to those generals

695

who only now and

then were given an opportunity of doing their very best

whom

;

of

cannot be said honv great they might have become had they possessed unlimited power. it

Next year (1703) was a repartition of the same story. Holland at that day bristled with fortifications, built under the eye of the most distinguished engii.^eers, the

Vauban and

Dutchman Coehorn

the

presence of these interfered with free manoeu gle fortress in

rear

its

may

Frenchman

at their head,

and the

A

vrino-.

not be dangerous to an

sin-

army

;

but when they are so numerous that detachments fivom their

make up a body able to threaten the commuarmy advancing beyond their lines, great^.'^r required and unless a commander had sufficient

garrisons can

nications of an

caution

is

;

troops to detail large observation parties for each

strong

could scarcely be deemed wise to leave them behind

place,

it

him.

This view, then universal, was warmly espoused by the

Dutch

They constantly

deputies.

who had

restrained Marlborough,

and Ostende, and who

designs on AntwerjD

in

event was inclined to fight as the best military policy

he was now fain to be content with besieging Bonn.

who had returned from fell

May

15,

—

sought meanwhile to interfere

Italy,

off.

Yilleroi

tived his attempt in

and

;

but

Marlborough, who

in season to allow

with his lieutenant Overkirk had

head him

and

Villeroi,

with Marlborough's siege by an advance on Maestricht

Bonn

;

any

thousand men, to

fifty-five

Boufflers, however, quite nega-

June on Antwerp,

in

which operation

Dutch who formed the the concentrically operating forces, and Marlborough

Boufflers beat a large force of the right of

had no

Later he

success.

fell

August and September took Prussians, under

back behind the Maas, and

Huy and Limburg, and

in

the

Count Lottum, Geldern.

This campaign

is

neither of especial interest, nor does

it

THE DUTCH DEPUTIES^.

696 reflect

any great credit on

it its trivial character

the

Dutch deputies were

view of the military matism.

its

managen^-ent

;

but from giving

Marlborougti must be absolved consta^iitly at his elbow,

necessitifc;s of

and

;

for

their

the case savored of astig-

Tired of his slrow-moving masters,

— for

he saw

other generals winnin.^ victories, and felt conscious of his

—

Marlborough determined to own power to do ^Jhe like, march into Germany in 1704, and there conduct his campaign.

It wPiS evident to all that

Bavaria was the key of

the theatre^ of war.

French Cannon.

(16th Century.)

LV. VILLAES.

1703.

In 1703 Vendome opposed Staliremberg vred him, and

On

around his position to Piedmont.

by a

lines,

but the

allies,

the Rhine Villars

capturing everything on the way.

latter

made a

Crossing at Hiiningen, he marched

brilliant foray.

StoUhofen

in Italy,

Savoy having joined the

finally,

opt.
down

outmanoeu-

splendid march the camiiaign

the river to the

Later, he again crossed,

advanced to the Danube country, joined the elector of Bavaria, and pj-oposed to

march on Vienna

Some when skill.

Villars

but the elector declined the operation as too hazardous.

between him and the prince of Badtn

was succeeded by Marsin.

In this campaign occurred the

was looked on

made

;

interesting manoeuvres occurred

first

He had

operated with boldness and

bayonet charge on record.

as the battle-ground for 1704,

Bavaria

and both France and the

allies

preparations to concentrate their efforts there.

In the self the

Italian

same

campaign of 1703 Vendome did not do him-

credit as in the previous one.

His opponent

was Count Stahremberg, whose position on the right bank of the Po, where

Eugene had

difficulty, as his

ran across the

up

left the

army, was one of much

communications with the Tyrol and Austria

Po

at Ostiglia, the

Adige

at Castelbaldo,

to Triente, a treacherous route, full of obstacles,

Venetian territory, and easy to interrupt. sixty-two thousand

men

sand, and a decided

any

suitable point

to

and

through

Vendome had

Stahremberg's twenty odd thou-

advance in force on his opponent at

must have resulted

in crushing him.

But

his natural love of ease appearing this year to get the better

Vendome preferred slower operations, and divided With twenty-seven thousand men, he himself marched to Ostiglia and sent his brother, who was his second in command, with twenty thousand on the south of the Po

of him,

his forces.

STAHREMBERG'S ACTIVITY.

698

to the Secchia, behind

The

which lay Stahromberg.

movements through

well aware of the

latter,

his scouts, carefully

Po bvidge with a suitable force, As Vendome approached on the north of him, younger Vendome had actually crossed the Secchia,

held Ostiglia, covered the

and

waited.

and the

which operation Stahrerxiberg did not attempt

to prevent,

as General Alberghatti with four thousand

men had

and

pene-

trated to Finale on the south of him, Stahremberg opened

the

the sluices of

Po

entire country

the

at Ostiglia, laid

under watev so as to prevent Ven dome's advance, and turning sharply on Alberghatti, gave him a severe beating, and

again took up his post in the Mirandola region. unsettled by this unexpected and

Quite

original proceeding, the

French retired up the Po along both banks, and Vendome remained inactive for six weeks.

The duke

of Savoy, with

sedulously laboring,

a great gain into the

:

it

now

whom

Prince Eugene had been

declared for the

This proved

allies.

secured the passes in the Alps against falling

hands of the French, and made more

Danube army from

reinforcing their

Italy.

difficult their

Vendome,

after

a fruitless because indolent march to join the elector of

Bavaria in the Tyrol for an advance on Vienna,

— the emas—

culated outcome of an excellent scheme of Villars, to Italy.

He had

large forces,

and

his position

retui'ned

between Stah-

remberg and the duke of Savoy would have enabled him operate successfully against each in turn

;

to

but he did nothing,

despite his superiority, and finally went into winter-quarters at Asti, leaving his brother to face Stahremberg.

The Austrian now saw manoeuvre which makes

was a

fine one.

He

his chance,

this

campaign worth a

duke

of

notice.

It

concluded that the war in Italy could be

conducted to better advantage tlie

and executed the one

if

he should join hands with

Savoy than by operating in two

bodies, each of

BAVARIA AND BADEN.

A

which was too weak. front

but, throwing

;

as well as his

French rapidly

left,

up

699

part of Vendome's force was in his

communications with the Tyrol,

his

Mirandola magazine, he moved around the

deceived the enemy as to his intentions, pushed

up the

bank of the Po, and joined the duke

left

in

The French hovered on not infrequently placing him in grievous

Nizza della Paglia in Piedmont. his flank

and

rear,

danger, but Stahremberg turned and twisted with rapidity

and forestalled

and

skill,

was

entirely soiand, but

system and deserves of the Italian

At

Stahremberg was the hero

campaign of 1703.

the opening of the

served, Louis

was quite outside of the usual

it

praise.

all

This operation

all their efforts.

XIV., with

War his

of Succession, as above ob-

overwhelming forces and

allies,

missed his best opportunity in not taking the offensive.

1703 he determined

The

to repair his error.

German campaign was

In

theatre of the

again curiously divided, for Prince

Louis of Baden was the ally of the emperor, while the elector of Bavaria

was

allied to France, thus placing

Bavaria between two

war

of sieges, Louis

both Baden and

Resolved to conduct no longer a

fires.

XIV.

conceived the brilliant strategic

plan of a march on Vienna

down

the Danube, utilizing his

connection with the elector of Bavaria to afford him a second-

Simple as the problem appears to

ary base. really

us, the

scheme

showed strong penetration on the part of Louis and

his counselors.

Louis was to begin by imiting an army of thirty thousand

men under also

had

who

Villars with that of the elector of Bavaria,

thirty thousand

men

in the field,

thousand in garrison in his various

cities

:

and twenty odd Ingolstadt,

markt, Munich, Augsburg and smaller towns.

Neu-

Villars

was

on the upper Rhine at Hiiningen and Neuenburg, while Tallard with twelve thousand

men was on

the Moselle, holding

FRENCH AND IMPERIAL PLANS.

700

the border fortresses.

The plan

of the emperor,

on the other

hand, was to attack the elector and sunder him from the

French

alliance before Villars

he collected on the

left

bank

came up of the

and

;

for this purpose

Danube nine thousand

men under Marshal Styrum, and twenty thousand on right

bank under Marshal

Prince

Schlick.

thirty thousand imperialists, occupied the right

Louis,

bank

the

with

of the

Rhine, from the Lake of Constance to the StoUhofen tified

strung along the whole distance in small de-

line,

tachments

for-

;

held Breisach and Freiburg, and posted his main

body on the Kinzig near Kehl, where

A body

he dominated the crossing.

men was

of nine thousand

from Holland

to the Moselle to hold

head against point,

and

to

ordered

the

French at that

draw them from opera-

tions on the Rhine.

Louis Hector de Villars came of a noble family, but poor and out of

He

favor. at

was born in 1653, and

twenty distinguished himself at

Villars.

the siege of Maestricht

by such

ceptional bravery that he attracted the king's eye.

bloody battle of Senef, he was promoted on the

command Vienna

in 1678,

in 1689, roi

of a cavalry regiment.

and again

later,

and

he rose to be field-marshal.

and Catinat, and

He

field to the

was ambassador

in the

He

in October, 1702,

first

time received

command

Netherlands war

won a handsome He now

He

vic-

for

of an important army.

Villars opened the campaign in February coiip.

to

served under Ville-

tory at Friedlingen over the prince of Baden. the

ex-

After the

by a

brilliant

crossed the Rhine at Hiiningen and Neuenburg,

marched rapidly down the right bank, passed under the very

VILLA RS' FORAY.

701

walls of Breisach and Freiburg, beat a body of nine thousand

men on

the Elz, and drove the imperial forces, which were

yet in cantonments, to take refuge in the Stollhofen lines.

He rial

then took Offenburg, with the abundant supplies of mate-

and

victual of the prince of

Baden

there lying, left a

March

force to observe Kehl, which capitulated

back up the Kinzig

valley,

10,

moved

and made another big capture

in

Haslach.

The emperor, ally's territory,

quite aghast at this sudden irruption into his

hurried some troops from the

bia.

Villars, one third of

kets,

and who

it

Danube

to

Swa-

whose troops were without mus-

was purposed should march

to Bavaria,

deferred this advance, occupied Kehl, and retired across the

Rhine.

His

contrast to

brilliant raid, for such it was,

formed a curious

slow and tedious operations of the other

the

generals of this year.

This foray of Villars was really what enabled the elector of

Bavaria to turn against the imperial marshals, Styrum and Schlick; and to beat their depleted forces in detail in the

Inn-Danube region, an operation which he conducted with

marked

vigor,

winning

in

two important engagements and

pushing the enemj'^ well back.

Had

he operated with his

entire fifty thousand men, instead of leaving neaily half of

them dormant of

more

value.

As

it

was, the enemy's forces were not defi-

nitely crippled, for the imperial generals

he had put

Not long

would have been

in his fortresses, his success

had as many men as

afield.

after, Villars,

who had got

his

army

into better

shape, to counteract the renewed efforts of the imperial forces

on the Danube, added Tallard's Moselle force to his own, and crossed the Rhine at Strasburg with fifty thousand men, purjjosing to capture the Stollhofen

lines.

But Prince Louis

met him with such good countenance that he gave up

this

VILLAR plan and, leaving TaU

up

thirty thousand

^.^

^scn to Tut-

tl

lingen, through the

Bavaria

elector of

armies numbered it,

^

the prince of

^aa

^

.ealingen on

i

Baden

that

men.

s'xty thousand

May

Unable

matched

cleverly

10 joined the

The two

river.

this

to forestall

manoeuvre by

leaving fifteen thousand of his forces at Stollhofen, and

moving with sixteen thousand men joined

to Stuttgart,

by

where he

Styrum, who had advanced to meet him, and thus

made up an army of thirty-six thousand men. Villars now proposed to the elector to carry out the masterly plan already mentioned, by a march with their sixty thousand men down the valley of the Danube, straight on Vienna, leaving Tallard to hold head to the prince of Baden.

But the

elector, fearing that Tallard

and that

his

own

was unwilling

territory

might

fail in this

duty

might be devastated meanwhile,

to enter into so

extended a plan.

suggested a march through the Tyrol, whither

Villars then

Vendome could The first

send twenty thousand reinforcements from Italy. suggested march was a bold one to

an end

to the

The second and

war

;

make

it

;

might have put

but speed alone could lend

it

success.

necessitated waiting for the Italian contingent,

this forfeited the

most essential element.

Uncertain of himself, the elector was intractable with Villars,

and

this enterprising general

was fain

the precious opportunity slip away. ried out.

to lie

still

and

see

Neither plan was car-

Villars placed himself on the left

bank

of the

Dan-

ube between Lauingen and Dillingen, to protect Bavaria, while in June the elector marched to the Tyrol to meet the

French forces which should come from Italy under Vendome

;

but these, as we have seen, never reached him, and he got no farther.

army

Meanwhile the duke

of nearly forty thousand

of

Burgundy, with a fresh

men, operated against the

UVRES. of

k. -

wanting in

men

a leader was

;

^

Unwilling to attacR ingen, and having

)ng-

.

,

a division,

liad

position at

Lau-

h he sent to manoeu-

\

Danube Baden conceived a bold plan for turnholding, and for compromising the

vre against the French, beaten at one of the near-by crossings, the jDrince of

ing Villars out of his

Leaving Stj^rum and twenty thousand men

elector as well.

to watch Villars at Lauingen, he

marched with twenty-seven

thousand up the river to above Ulm, crossed, moved rapidly on Augsburg and took

it

;

and then assumed a strong position

between the Lech and the Wertach, where he cut asunder the

two armies

of the

Although

enemy.

movement compelled

this

the elector to withdraw

was a mistake,

his

advance on the Tyrol,

it

prince of

Baden himself divided

his forces

from

had speeded

his return, Villars

;

and

in that the

if

the elector

and he between them could

have crushed the prince with his smaller force beyond a doubt.

who on

But the his

was too slow to cut

elector

off

Prince Louis,

approach retired north from Augsburg

;

and hav-

ing joined Villars, the bulk of both allied armies retired to

Donauworth, where

their efforts were

now devoted

to keeping

the imperial armies apart.

Shortly after, in September, Marshal Styrum moved to

Hochstadt on the the jDrince of

Lech.

Villars

left

bank

of the

Danube, expecting

Baden somewhere west and the

of the

by a

circuit,

to join

of the

elector determined to destroy

before he could complete the junction. lingen,

mouth

him

Sending from Dil-

a force under General Jusson to attack

Styrum's rear, the Franco-Bavarian army, on September 19, prepared to

Styrum

fall

too early

upon

his front.

But Jusson advanced on

and was thrust back, and when Villars and

the elector reached his lines and drove

Styrum

in,

Jusson

VILLARS RELIEVED. made no second

705

attack, but allowed the imperialist to slip

from between the two armies and lars' dispositions,

retire to

though smartly carried

Nordlingen.

accomplish the destruction of the imperial force to join the prince

aimed

still

Leaving a body on the Lech twenty-five thousand

Ulm,

to

head

men

to

river.

to

up

Kempten, a

;

and

men, marched

to fifty-four thousand

near

perchance, by a

if

long circuit, he might accomplish his purpose reinforced

Iller

reach Styrum

The prince marched

cross-roads on the east of the upper Iller,

to insure

marched with

there, Villars

Wieblingen, on the

off the prince in his efforts to

further up the Danube.

and

to cover Bavaria

enemy

against a junction of the

Styrum

;

but as he could not well do so

;

move up

in Bavaria, he sought to

Vil-

thus failed to

X)ut,

Villars,

to

Mem-

mingen, resolved to force battle on him as a preventive measure

;

but the prince kept well ahead of him, and fearing

on a

battle at a disadvantage, passed Villars,

and made good

line well to the south of

his retreat to

Leutkirch on the other

side of the Iller.

Villars

followed, with a view of forcing

still

before

Styrum could come up

elector

had become

to battle

but his relations with the

;

so strained that while he

fresh manoeuvre he was relieved of his cessor,

him

was preparing a

command.

His suc-

Marshal Marsin, put the troops into winter-quarters on

the Lech, an example which was followed

The prince

of

Baden

finally joined

by

all

the armies.

Styrum, who marched

west from Nordlingen, and went into winter-quarters covering a wide territory, between

France

lost

much

tional boldness

in

Lake Constance and

removing

and energy as

plish the results

which would

Villars.

his

It

the Neckar.

was such excep-

which promised

tell in

her favor.

to

accom-

Had

Villars

been unhampered, we must conclude from what he did under unfavorable circumstances that he woidd have worsted the

FIRST BAYONET CHARGE.

706

average generals opposed to him, and have placed France

much

nearer to success.

able one

;

it

showed great

His 1703 camj3aign was a remarkability, singular push,

preference for fighting over manoeuvres.

opposed by an active and intelligent

and a decided

Moreover he was prince of

soldier, the

Baden,

The

operations on the Rhine, this year, were not important,

nor characterized by anything out of the ordinary, excejjt the bayonet charge on record, not preceded by

first

The

fire.

prince of Hesse was advancing on Speyer, at the head of

twenty-four thousand men, purposing to relieve

who had

Landau,

when

Field-Marshal Tallard,

place,

went out to meet him with nineteen thousand.

just

blockaded the

As

the

prince was crossing the Speyerbach, Tallard's column reached Seizing the instant, and without waiting to form

the stream.

line of battle, Tallard ployed his

umn

of attack,

enemy with It is

odd

and

marching columns into

just as they were, charged in

The

the bayonet.

result

was a

to note that military critics looked

col-

on the

brilliant victory.

on

this

charge as

a gross error, an inexcusable variation from the rules of the art,

and universally condemned

manded pikemen merely, resource,

it

;

though had Tallard com-

the charge would liave been his only

and would have been considered bold and

In any event, Tallard had won, and concluded the capture of

Landau,

to the confusion

—

his

skillfid.

work by

in our eyes

—

of the critics.

In the campaign of 1703 the emperor had been sadly hampered by the rebellion in Hungary, which monopolized troops and more attention.

The year had made

masters of the middle Rhine crossings.

many

the French

Landau and Neu-

Breisach enabled them to debouch into the enemy's country,

and Bavaria was a to reach

salient thrust

forward into

and manoeuvre on the Danube,

it

by which

In the Netherlands

PLANS FOR France had

most

The

lost nothing.

707

170Jf.

1704 needed the

in

allies

brilliant of success to retrieve their cause

to Marlborough and Eugene, they

The

and

;

and thanks

it.

was particularly important

alliance of Bavaria

contestants,

won

at the opening of the

to both

campaign the generals

on both sides looked upon that electorate as the objective and Elsewhere the campaign was

probable theatre of operations.

it

For France, Bavarian amity was useful because

marked.

less

would keep the war

French

off

and made a

territory,

sec-

ondary base for the French operations against the emperor.

To it

the emperor, Bavaria was necessary because by occupying

he robbed France of a strong

Baden

his

in

favor,

instead of seeing

Bavaria was

ill

it

ally,

and from Bavaria, with

he could carry the war into France,

waged near or within

his

own

frontiers.

placed, being the battle-ground of both con-

testants.

It fifty

was planned for 1704 thousand

troops, there

men

to

send Tallard and Marsin with

into Bavaria, where, added to the elector's

would be

ninety-five thousand

men, and

it

was

hoped that such a force might make a decided impression on the war.

But Tallard was anxious

and the

to operate alone,

king was prevailed on to order Marsin, who had wintered in the

Augsburg country,

to

march towards the sources

the Danube, take ten thousand

men

of

over from Tallard, and

with this reduced force to operate with the elector against the

emperor.

Tallard,

thus left to himself, proposed to

manoeuvre against the Stollhofen

lines,

and actually ojjened

operations. If the imperial generals

the

had concentrated

their forces

on

middle Rhine against either Tallard or Marsin, they

could have beaten prince of

the

French marshals separately.

Baden did assemble

thirty-five

men

thousand

Rothweil, and strove to cut Marsin off from Bavaria

Tlie

;

at

but he

708

MARLBOROUGH ORDERED TO GERMANY.

was slow and undecided, and instead lingen, so as to reach Marsiu's flank

Villingen, and thus opened

Bavaria

;

after

to

and

Mar sin

of

moving on Tutt-

rear, he

the

marched

main road

to

to

which he could only follow him up and take

post at Munderkingen on the Danube, while Marsin took position at

Ulm.

Meanwhile Marlborough was ordered from

the Netherlands to

Germany.

Cannon Royal.

(16th Century.)

LVI.

MARLBOROUGH AND EUGENE. The Dutch

1704.

deputies had tied Marlborough's hands in the Netherlands

in 1704 he got their consent to

move

to Bavaria,

;

but

marched unopposed up the

Rhine, crossed, joined Louis of Baden, and reached the Danube with sixty

Eugene remained

thousand men.

at Stollhofen to contain the French, while

Marlborough and Baden opposed the elector of Bavaria and Marsin.

down loss,

to

crossed to the south bank, and

Rhine and marched to the

moved on Augsburg.

relief of

now

left die

Eugene

at once

Tallard

Marsin and the elector

;

followed, leaving part of his force in Stollhofen, for without

Danube

of the

;

him the

The French withdrew from Augsburg

might be overwhelmed.

bank

Moving

Donauworth, Marlborough captured the Schellenberg with excessive

Baden besieged

Eugene joined near Donauworth.

Ingolstadt,

They had

heim) the two armies came into accidental

and Marlborough and

fifty-six

thousand men

Near Hochstadt

French and Bavarians perhaps sixty thousand.

collision,

allies

to the left

the

;

(or Blen-

and both were willing

to

fight.

Maelboeough had

determined

to

shake the

Dutch

shackles from his wrists, and his skillful diplomacy proved

equal to the task. to

his

The Dutch

estates first

gave their consent

advancing up and across the Rhine, and

later, if

he

could neutralize Villeroi, to his continuing on to Bavaria.

The emperor, with successes

of

threatened peril

to

and

;

all.

the

Hungarian

1703, was in this

With

ill

rebellion

case

;

danger to one of the principal reinforcements

all

to be

allies

was

Marlborough had got

thirty thousand English troops in the

thousand in

and the French

Vienna seemed

Low

Countries, fifty

under his immediate command

;

with sixteen

thousand men, on the opening of operations early in May, he crossed the

Meuse

at Maestricht, proceeded to

Bonn and up

MARLBOROUGH'S MARCH.

710

bank

the left

enough garrisons

after taking in

and on June 3 had marched near

to

progress, according to

modern

good for the times.

Becoming

French seemed

26,

to nearly double his force

Ladenburg on the Neckar

mouth, where he crossed a few days

its

May

the Rhine, passed at Coblentz

of

later.

had been quite

ideas,

His

slow, but

awai-e of his advance, the

to lose their heads

;

their Alsatian fortresses, particularly

they grew fearful for

Landau, and quickly

concentrated here from the Netherlands, the Moselle and the

middle Rhine

all

the troops of Villeroi, Coigny and Tallard,

nearly sixty thousand in the aggregate, to check Marlbor-

ough, whose intention they could not divine.

Luckily for

however, they made no attempt to interfere with his

hira,

progress as they readily might have done, but allowed to cross the

From

him

Rhine and move up to Ladenburg unmolested.

here Marlborough, as

if

aiming for Ulm, marched via

Heilbronn (June 8) through the rugged country which ends in the Geislingen defile,

and

debouched into the Danube

good order, June 22, joined Prince Louis'

in

flats,

thirty-

two thousand men from the upper Danube, making an army

The road

over sixty thousand strong, with forty-eight guns.

was new

to him, but

an old one to the French and German

generals.

This march

is

spoken of by English authors as an entirely

exceptional performance. it

was

in

Though

as a

than had been frequently made before. the

strategic operation

truth a stroke of the happiest,

greater,

many

of the lesser

lights

much.

Duke Bernard had gone from

the Tsar

;

it

was no more

Not

to speak of

had often done as

the Rhine

Baner had marched from the Baltic

to

way beyond the Danube

Torstenson had marched from the Baltic to Vienna

;

Turenne

and Wi-angel had repeatedly started from the upper or the lower Rhine and had pushed far into the empire,

— once

to

OVERPRAISING MARLBOROUGH. the banks of the Inn

Vienna

Montecuculi had forced his way from

;

to the Netherlands, with

Eugene had pushed

711

Turenne

him

to oppose

up

across the Alps into Italy and well

the Po, fighting- for every step; in this very campaign he

marched from

his base to the Ehine, quite as far as the

Anglo-Dutch.

It is quite inaccurate to call Marlborough's

However

unopposed march an unheard-of enterprise.

may have been

cessfully the knot of the difficulty

Eugeng-and him

ough marched

to the

Danube

by

because, as all the military

like the true soldier

In

sound of the guns.

but he does not even

;

have had any immediate

was only,

cut

at Blenheim, the bald fact is that Marlbor-

world knew, he was needed there appear to

suc-

He

strategic objective.

he was, marching toward the

common with

the others he saw that

the allied cause could be best helped on the Danube, because the French were most seriously threatening this section igetting leave

from the Dutch, he marched

his

army

;

and,

into the

enemy's country, a thing in which he had a host of prede-

The

cessors.

There

is

idea

may

on record a

very performance, and

own

indeed not have been originally

his.

him suggesting

this

letter of if

Eugene's

to

the scheme was of Marlborough's

devising, he was not the only one to see

until he

its

value. In fact,

had reached the Neckar, Eugene was the duke's only

confidant

;

and

it is

certain that the

between them long before

it

opened.

campaign was concerted It

by no means helps

Marlborough's splendid reputation to overstate his is

case.

It

we English-speaking peoples slur over the deeds of but our own heroes that we are wont to make Mailbor-

because

all

ough the only general

who leon

day

;

that one often meets folk

place Wellington as a soldier on a plane above Napo;

or that

many

solely to the Iron

and

of his

his Prussians.

of us ascribe the victory of

Waterloo

Duke, forgetful of "Marschal Vorwarts " All nations suffer from want of perspec-

712

NOTEWORTHY MEETING.

A

gauging their own military history

in

tive

the biography of a single general to err

;

in writing

perhaps impossible not

but we Anglo-Saxons are almost the worst offenders.

It is not to belittle is

it is

and

;

Marlborough,

beyond any one's

colleagues

—

his reputation as a soldier

ability to disturb,

and contemporaries that

so

—

it is

to

be just to his

much must be

said.

Marlborough, Eugene and Louis personally met in Hep-

pach in June

—

it

was the

first

meeting of the two former

and, after discussion of the situation,

—

was 'determined that

it

Marlborough and Louis should operate against the Bavaria and Marsin, while Eugene, to

elector of

whom Marlborough

and Prince Louis sent ten thousand men, with the

thirty-

seven thousand he would then have, should remain in the

StoUhofen lines to contain Tallard, Villeroi and Coigny.

There was no

upon

plans.

ate together latter

difficidty in

They would,

to this,

He had

command.

he had won battles

;

and claimed

joint forces of

May

on

but the

;

the rights of a

all

been a pupil of Montecuculi

he had served at Vienna with Sobieski

and he was high-strung, jealous and hard

The

have liked to oper-

and leave Prince Louis on the Rhine

would not agree

senior in

Eugene and Marlborough agreeing in this instance,

Marsin and the

to please.

elector of Bavaria,

who

4 joined at Wieblingen, were sixty-three thousand

men and one hundred and

thirty guns

and mortars

;

and

to

prevent Marlborough and the prince of Baden from crossing the in

Danube and marching

into Bavaria, they

had taken post

June between Lauingen and Dillingen with

the river.

had

The

forces were about equally

sixty thousand

men and

their

matched

forty-eight guns.

:

back to the allies

During Marl-

borough's march there had been some manoeuvring in the

Black Forest country, but

it

resulted in nothing which affected

the year's campaign.

Marlborough and Prince Louis, who, though the

latter

was

A BOLD FLANK MARCH. acknowledged to be

senior,

had resorted

713

to the questionable,

but at that day common, device of commanding the whole

army on

alternate days, proposed indeed to force their

enemy expected them

way

Ulm, as the

into Bavaria, but they did not try to cross at

They moved up to Giengen on by a flank march

to do.

the Brenz, and thence, at the end of June, in the presence of the enemy's army, to

enemy held

to his lines,

Donauworth.

The

and did not attack them on the march,

but allowed them to pass unmolested within a few miles, over

bad roads and under marked duke and prince was bold such a

man

as Turenne,

ing to a battle.

manoeuvre

;

to

The march

of the

but had there been at Lauingon

;

would have scarcely escaped lead-

it

To march march

difficulties.

to

Donauworth was an

enemy by the

so near the

excellent

flank was a

risk pardonable in those days, but hardly permissible in front of an active enemy.

The

unenterprising opponents.

were taking

allies

liberties

Not only was the enemy

with

indolent,

but the position of the elector and Marsin was thoroughly

Lauingen was not the place

false.

to defend Bavaria with

the allies headed for Donauworth, and even to this fact they contented themselves

sand

men

to

Count d'Arco, who commanded

and was expected

to

head

off

when they awoke

with sending ten thouat

well equipped and led, with a fifth the number. saries

Donauworth,

a force of sixty thousand

men

Such adver-

promised to be an easy prey.

Donauworth was not over well berg, near by, was intrenched, lines not quite completed.

fortified,

but the ScheUen-

and was joined to the town by

Within these works lay d'Arco's

camp.

No

general ever possessed the instinct of fighting to a

keener degree than Marlborough

;

this instinct at times over-

rode his judgment, and as he was determined to cross the river at

Donauworth, he had no sooner reached the

vicinity

A PICKED FORCE.

714

than he undertook an assault on the Schellenberg, to seize the bridge over the Danube, by which alone he could

He was

his way.

led to do so

by the

make

belief that if he delayed

d'Arco would strengchen his works so as to make them inex-

pugnable

;

and Bavarians were concentrating

that the French

opposite to bar his passage

;

and by the

fact that this

was

his

Assault on the Schellenberg.

day to

of

command, and that Prince Louis was not

make It

of a

mind

the assault.

was July

2.

Marlborough headed a vanguard of ten

thousand men, followed closely by the rest of the army.

He

reached the Wbrmitz, a small affluent of the Danube, which flowed past the Schellenberg lines, at three o'clock, crossed the stream above the place, and gave his men,

who had been Aware rest.

marching since early dawn, two or three hours'

from what he could learn of the terrain that the place was very strong, he detailed a picked force from each battalion, which, with thirty squadrons and three regiments of Prince

AN UNWISE made up a column

Louis,

ASSAULT.

715

of ten thousand five

hundred men.

Count d'Arco had some two thousand more.

The Schellenberg

were old

lines

fortifications erected

by

Gustavus Adolphus, and d'Arco was at york with a large

body

The

countrymen in repairing them.

of

about three hundred feet above the

hill

itself is

Donauworth was

river.

a fortress, but not well kept up nor sufficiently garrisoned

and the force d'Arco sent worse the

From

led.

to hold

it

was badly stationed and

the town, which lay in the conflueijce of

Wormitz and Danube,

the lines which d'Arco was

ing to intrench and hold ran over the

Danube.

Opposite the centre of the

hill

hill

and back

lay a thick wood,

through which a column could not well advance. noitring,

the

wood

s«iek-

to the

After recon-

Marlborough determined to attack on either side of ;

the assault between the

be made in force.

It looks as if

wood and Donauworth

to

he had not sufficiently stud-

ied the situation, for he chose the strongest part of the line

for the assaidt, whereas he could

more

easily

have broken

through nearer the town, where the half-finished works were

Nor was

barely waist high.

there any greater gain to be had

by getting a foothold on the Schellenberg; the town was nearer the bridge Marlborough wanted. But the assaults were delivered by his

coriJS d* elite in gallant style.

The

first

one was met with equal courage, was repulsed, and the Bavarians

made a

sortie with the bayonet,

which

in its turn

was met and broken by an English regiment, which took the

enemy

in flank.

third failed,

A

second assault had no better result.

and the Bavarians again issued

in a

A

bayonet

charge from their works, and were only checked by the cavalry.

Failure was imminent, and the loss had been fearful.

Marlborough had undertaken a desperate

But help was crossed the

at hand.

task.

Prince Louis' column now arrived,

Wormitz near Berg, and

fell

on the defenses of

716

HEAVY

d'Arco at the town.

WitA

LOSSES.

scarcely any opposition he broke

through the weak intrftnchnients, and thus took d'Arco in

Marlborough had for hours been hammering

reverse.

spot which he coid^i not break,

one he had not heeded. tion

was

lost.

when

At once

close at

at a

hand was a weak

recognizing that the posi-

d'Arco put himself at the head of two French

regiments of dragoons, ployed his foot into close columns,

Baden

cut a pgih through the

troops,

and made

his

way to

the

bridge at Donauworth, where he crossed to the south bank of

Though Marlborough had done

the Danube. ing. Prince tory, as

The

having been

first

loss of the allies

hundred

all

the fight-

Louis arrogated to himself the credit of the

killed

authorities)

;

vic-

inside the works.

was

six to seven

thousand

men

(fifteen

and four thousand wounded, say the English

that of

the Bavarians only sixteen hundred

but the bold assault, though

it

;

seems, as says Lossau, to have

been delivered rather prematurely, and was very such an impression on the elector,

costly,

made

who with Marsin

still

stood at Lauingen, and had acted with unwarrantable lethargy, that he crossed the river, threw the bulk of his Bavarian forces into his fortresses, where they were useless, retired to

Augsburg with

men, and It

sat

may be

down

all

in

Marsin's and

five

thousand of his own

an intrenched camp.

asserted that this assault was as justifiable as

that of Gustavus at the

Lech or

at the Alte Veste

;

but in

the latter case, the Swede had exhausted every other means to bring his

opponent to

battle, as

an outlet to a situation

growing daily more intolerable, while in the former the king, once set on crossing in the face of the enemy, carefully selected his point of attack

and actually got the best one.

seems to be agreed by the best Continental are all

warm

admirers of the duke,

critics,

— as who

— that the assault here was a mistake.

It

and these

indeed

is

not

?

EUGENE TO THE RESCUE.

717

Marlborough and Prince Louis crossed the Danube July

5,

took Rain, and appeared, July 23, at Augsburg, camping at Friedberg, on the road from Augsburg to Munich.

burg was too strong with the elector

to attack,

but the

;

allies

Augs-

and no terms could be made began

to devastate

Bavaria as

a means of detaching him from his alliance with France. This devastation was thorough, and conducted, says Alison,

with savage ferocity.

Three hundred towns or

villages

were

consumed, a species of vengeance for the devastation of the Palatinate

Despite this terrifying havoc the

by Turenne.

elector stood to his alliance.

Meanwhile Tallard and

had been

Villeroi

idly watching

these operations with their fifty-eight thousand men, which

Eugene was holding by lard,

who had

his presence at Stollhofen

;

but Tal-

received orders to hurry to Bavaria with some

chosen troops to the aid of Marsin and the elector, crossed the Rhine at Strasburg, July 1, with twenty-six thousand

men, and marching through the valley of the Danube, reached

Augsburg August

5.

Villeroi

and Coigny, with thirty-two

thousand men, remained to confront the Stollhofen lines and protect Tallard's rear.

So soon as Prince Eugene became

aware of Tallard's march, he grasped the danger to which his allies

would be exposed by these reinforcements

army already outnumbering sand

men under

to

an

their own, left twenty-one thou-

the count of Nassau in Stollhofen, and July

18 marched with sixteen thousand on a parallel line but through more rugged country on the north, to prevent Tallard

from doing

llngen August 4 started

his colleagues a mischief. ;

his speed

and kept ahead of him

mander had much the larger deemed

it

he was so

He

reached Dil-

had been good, but Tallard had ;

and as the French com-

force,

Eugene would not have

wise to attack, had he overtaken him. far,

Now

that

however, he determined not to return, but to

PRINCE LOUIS LEAVES.

718

and marched

reinforce the allies,

to Miinster, near

Donau-

Tallard effected his end, and with the elector of

wbrth.

Bavaria and Marsin, the army numbered some fifty-seven

thousand men, with

heavily garrisoned.

all the fortresses

It

was now the manifest duty of the French and Bavarians attack either Marlborough or tated

so long as to

and the prince

of

Eugene

singly

Marlborough

opportunity.

lose their

to

but they hesi-

;

Baden were not on good terms, and the

English general finally induced Louis to undertake the apparently useful but not essential siege of

Ingolstadt with

teen thousand men, while he himself

covered

joined Prince Eugene.

by Aichach

to

first

it

fif-

and then

For the former purpose he marched

Schrobbenhausen August

and thus took

5,

post between Ingolstadt and Augsburg.

To draw the

allies

from Bavaria, the French and the elector

adopted the singular plan of themselves moving to the

bank

of the

they would have kept the

them

allies

inactive, or

have obliged

to resort to besieging the strong places of the

country.

left

Danube, whereas by remaining where they were,

They thought, moreover,

to threaten

Danube

Eugene, and to

draw Prince Louis from the siege of Ingolstadt. Crossing at Lauingen, August 9, they moved down towards Hochstadt, on hearing of which, and on consultation with Marlborough, Eugene, who had returned to Dillingen, marched to the Schellenberg, while Marlborough

moved

secured the siege of Ingolstadt,

to

Donauworth.

which was now

The enemy had been operating on

This

still

fully invested.

exterior lines, leaving the

interior lines to the allies.

Marlborough sent twenty-two battalions and twenty-seven squadrons ahead to Eugene, and next day, August 10,

fol-

lowed in two columns, one crossing the Danube at NiederSchonfeld and the other at Rain over the Lech, and then over the

Danube

at

Donauworth.

Eugene on August 11 joined

MARLBOROUGH AND EUGENE. The two had

Marlborough's army.

enemy perhaps

the

fifty-six

thousand

men

They were now

thousand more.

five

719

to

act as colleagues in daily operations for the first time.

No difiiculty ever existed between Marlborough and Eugene They were men of altogether too big calibre as to command. be jealous of each other's precedence, or to waste time

to

discussing

his

and never

days,

Whenever they acted together, they comown army, and the joint forces on alternate

trifles.

manded each

failed to agree as to the advisability of

special operation.

It

was not a question of

was, giving orders to the other

it

mind

the

Following

is

any

whose day

a suggestion sufficed, for

of each could grasji the situation

rectly with reference to

letter

;

either,

and argue

cor-

it.

Prince Eugene's estimate of forces, given in a

dated August 25, 1704,

viz.

:— Frexch.

f

Battalions. Squadrons. Prussians 11 15

Eugene r.w.^Dane^.^^ I.

f

ana

c.

i. |

1^

Battalions. Squadrons. 29 50 18,000

(French Marsin

^

Empire

24^

!

35

f

18

74

14

14

Hanoverians 13

25

Danes

22

English

48

90

G6

1&4

1.

w.

{

(Bavarians

, ^q, -"'"""

13

37

12,000

42

87

30,000

J

36,000

Tallard

r.

and

c.

French

42

60

30,000

Total

84

147

60,000

Guns 90 Total

56,000

Guns 66

In the above estimate of the correct as all

any we can

find,

allied forces,

presumably as

though there are many others,

varying somewhat from each other, the very small per-

centage of British troops

is

striking.

We

are brought

up

to

believe

Blenheim (or Hochstiidt)

and

cannot be denied that half the glory of the battle

it

belongs to the English general. foot

was Englisli

in this war, as in

;

less

to be

an Englisli victory

But only a

fifth of

than a sixth of the cavalry.

;

the allied

England

most other land-wars she has done, fought

ACCIDENTAL BATTLE.

720 with

At

money-bags and not her men.

lier

There the British

difPerent.

tars always

sea the case was

bared their breasts,

and fought as Anglo-Saxons have always fought, on land or But if, in the battles of Marlborough for sea, like heroes. instance,

we gauge

the credit of the English according to the

troops they furnished, Blenheim and Malplaquet, Oudenarde

and Ramillies, cease

to be English victories,

—a

distinct loss

to Greater Britain.

was here,

It

nea,r

Hochstadt, that the rival armies

Though ready

almost accidental battle.

had anticipated a general engagement

The French and

occur on the left

bank

of the

it

its difficulties.

must breed a

The two

neither

was better that

to

they believed that they could beat the

manders on both

it,

Danube than on

Marlborough and Eugene were eager

ation

for

army

any particular time.

the elector desired a battle in order to drive

the allies out of Bavaria, and

the empire from

at

fell into

sides

measure arms because

enemy and thus

many days

had determined on

allied generals

should

release

was evident that the

It

battle before

it

the right

;

situ-

for the com-

fighting.

had early on the 12th ridden out on

a reconnoissance, during which they caught sight of the enemy in full march.

They withdrew

to

Tapfheim, and having from

the church tower observed the French and Bavarians go into

camp, at once returned to headquarters.

Marsin and Tallard had assumed that the the

way

to Nbrdlingen, to

allies

were on

which view some movements of the

allied cavalry, according to their

reports, contributed.

So

confirmed was Tallard in this view, indeed, that he mistook the " assembly " blown in the allied the

battle, for the

order to march.

camp on the morning of The Franco-Bavarians

had not expected an immediate encounter, nor indeed taken up any

distinct order of battle

of march,

;

they had rather camped in order

and as each French general as well as the

elector

THE TERRAIN. commanded

his

beyond him.

elector

+Iie

forces, they

had advanced

Tallard was on the right

arate bor-ies.

and

own

721 in three sep-

Marsin on

his left,

The cavalry had been

as usual

;

dioposed on the flanks of each army, and thus the bulk of the

French mounted men, when emerging from camp would occuj)y the centre of the whole infantry wings.

nor

v.'as

mainly by

to form,

separating the

This queer order neither suited the ground

adapted for

the flarks on

line,

battle.

In

fact,

owing

to the leaning of

Liitzingen and Blenheim, which were

foot, the

amount

held

of cavalry in the centre during

the battle was increased.

Knowing

enemy to be near by in force, the French made suitable dispositions. Where the cavalry

the

general had

stood, near the village of Oberklau, the line salient, so as to include the village in its

front,

but too far

doubtless

it

off to

be of

much good

would detain the

in a low, deep,

marshy bed.

made a

though

as a defense,

assailants,

slight

In their

scheme.

ran the Nebelbach

Above Oberklau

the brook was

divided into, or rather fed by, four small streams,

making

the

ground opposite Marsin and the elector much harder to cross than below the village. at

Tallard's right leaned on the

Danube

Blenheim, which village he now occupied with twenty-

seven battalions and twelve squadrons of dragoons, fifteen

— about

thousand men, a detachment which dangerously

duced his force of infantry elsewhere. possession of Oberklau

number

of

Though

the French

battalions

re-

Marsin had taken

and Liitzingen, and there placed a of foot

mixed

in

with

the

horse.

lay at the top of a gentle, long slope

which ran downward to the Nebelbach, yet the position was bad, for the trooj)s did not correspond to the terrain several

arms were not placed where they could do

service or

sustain

each other.

;

the

effective

Yet one may imagine the

French marshals arguing that the ground

in the centre

was

THE FRENCH LINE.

722 excellent for

was not

cavalry to act upon, as on right and left

it

but in that case they needed heavy infantry sup-

;

To

ports for the horse thus massed.

neglect this point

.j

invite defeat.

The bulk flanks.

and the

of the foot

was thus

in

two bodies on the extreme

These were strongly posted, the right in Blenheim left at the foot of

artillery could not cross.

rugged

hills

But though the

which cavalry and left centre

was

sus-

tained by Oberklau, yet the centre was far too extended, and

between Oberklau and Blenheim there stood eighty squadrons of horse

were

and only ten battalions of foot

in reserve.

fairly distributed all along the line.

some attention had been paid

;

To

The guns the villages

they had not only intrench-

ments, but the streets were barricaded with carts and the furniture from the houses.

Their strength did not, however,

help the weakness of the centre against a suitable attack.

Nothing but the marshy Nebelbach, no insuperable obstacle, protected

it.

French Mortar.

(16th Century.)

LVII.

BLENHEIM. AUGUST Mabsin and

the elector held the left

in line as they marched, so as to

TaUard the

;

1704.

13,

right.

They had formed

throw the bulk of their cavalry in the centre.

In the allied army, Eugene stood on the right, Marlborough on the

own army.

leading his

left,

them though alternating daily in command, they acted together as one man. ;

their front ran the Nebelbach,

Blenheim

much

in force.

The

heavier forces, Eugene

up

On

allies attacked.

French

;

and took the

village in reverse.

Marlborough captured Tallard

and decisive

left, ;

Marlborough devoted

on the right, opposed to

struggled hard for victory, but was thrice thrust

his direct assaults on Blenheim, attacked

plete,

the

Finally he drove in the elector and Marsin,

tre of horse

In

which must be crossed, and Tallard had occupied

time to capturing Blenheim, but fruitlessly

back.

each

There was absolute good-will and helpfulness between

in

Eugene followed up the Blenheim.

The French

in its results.

whUe Marlborough,

giving

and broke thi-ough the French cen-

fled to

The

victory

France

retiring

was com-

the Bavarians

;

gave up their alliance with them, and surrendered their fortresses.

One victory

had done more than several campaigns.

On of

returning' to

camp from

war was held by the

number

their reconnoissance, a council

commanders, and, though a

allied

of officers voted nay,

Marlborough and Eugene both

They feared

decided on battle.

pating their action, should

delay, lest the enemy, antici-

make

their field-works stronger

they were themselves suffering for lack of forage ual from Nordlingen was not always secure;

was rumored

to

;

their vict-

and

Villeroi

be advancing to reinforce Tallard and Marsin.

Moreover, Marlborough had been roundly abused in England for advancing so far justify his action.

from the Netherlands, and he desired to

The armies

lay but three miles apart, the

encamped on the heights behind Tapfheim, back of the plain which stretched between them and the French. Attack allies

THE

724

ALLIES' PLANS.

being decided on, they broke up, August 13, at daylight, and

advanced on the enemy in a number of columns.

Their

movements had been observed by the French, but the advance was deemed a manoeuvre lingen.

that

to protect a flank

march

to

Nord-

That the French generals did not expect a battle

day

is

shown by the

out foraging

;

fact that

much

of their cavalry

l^repare for action

the outposts were ordered back from the

;

north of the Nebelbach, and these were set on

villag:es

was

but this was called in and the order given to

fire

to prevent their being used for defense.

Marlborough and Eugene are said tred,

and

positions.

to

have again reconnoi-

have recognized the errors in the enemy's

to

By some

authorities

it

is

said that the

dis-

morning

was hazy, in which case they can scarcely have learned much

beyond satisfying themselves that the enemy had not substantially

changed the formation

by Tallard, penned allies

cast.

on the

was

It

of the

hills, so

It

between the com-

allied right wing, should

attack on Marsin to hold his attention as well as

that of the elector of Bavaria, while assail

But a note

he could see the

that the day was probably only over-

at all events first determined

manders that Eugene, who held the

make an

day before.

at the time, states that

Marlborough should

Blenheim. is

generally stated in the accounts of this battle that

Marlborough, or Eugene, or both of them, on recognizing the weakness of the enemy's centre, then and there determined to

break through at

this point

and cut the enemy

in two.

What-

ever plan was adopted was a joint one between the allied

commanders that

;

and

it

does not appear from the

initial attacks

they had so soon perceived that the centre was the

proper place on which to deliver the vital blow.

If

it is

true

that they did so, then Marlborough's early expenditure of force on

Blenheim was an

error,

and not

in accordance with

FRENCH ERRORS NOT SEEN. the plan adopted.

To

725

carry out the idea of Ibreaking the

centre, only partial attacks

on Blenheim and opposii

^

Liitz-

ingen should have been made, stout enough to hold the

enemy from

reinforcing the centre from these places, but no

"'V^'h^Y^

more.

The

action taken

by Marlborough does not warrant

the belief that the generals founded battle

their initial plan for the

on the enemy's weak centre.

The bulk

of Tallard's foot

was thus engaged in defending

Blenheim, which he, as well as Marlborough, at the key of the

battle-field.

From Blenheim

first

to

deemed

Oberklau

THE ATTACK OPENED.

726

Oberklau had nearly

there was nothing but horse.

and about

battalio'js in

it

;

then came some Bavarian and

French cavah-y, and then eighteen battalions forward of Ltitzingen hills.

thirty

thrown

of foot

along the foot of the

in a crotchet

Tallard had but ten battalions to sustain his cavalry.

Marsin and the

elector

had a second

which foot stood

line in

behind foot and horse behind horse.

Batteries lay all along

the line, judiciously disj^osed.

In Eugene's front the ground was exceptionally

and ble

it

by

was high noon before he was able

make

to

difficult,

practica-

it

up the worst places with fascines and

filling

boards from the houses in Schwenenbach

logs, or

but being cov-

;

ered by undergrowth, he had been able to push his skir-

mishers over unobserved

whereupon he sent word

;

borough that he was ready

The

to cross.

to Marl-

batteries of both

armies had been steadily at work ever since eight o'clock, with quite marked effect

engaged

;

of the left

;

Marlborough gave

attack began. infantry,

the engineers

of cavalry between

that the footmen of the

first lines

and take such position as

On

them

Lord

was intended

it

;

two of

should push over the brook

— the two rear

under their

lines to

the extreme left was a heavy

three arms under

and the

in four lines,

to enable the horse

cover to get across and form, in reserve.

his orders to his wing,

The duke's wing was

and two

had been meanwhile

Nebelbach in several places in front

in bridging the

remain

column of the

Cutts, ready to be launched against

Blenheim. This column was to

first

across the Nebelbach

have been sent to the attack by eleven

Eugene was not to the

troops,

the

;

it

is

crossing was

cover of the guns.

The French

finally

of

stated

Coxe says

fairly across until half-past twelve,

bad ground and the opposition but

;

one.

owing

the enemy's light

accomplished under

batteries

had been

so well

EUGENE DRIVEN

727

IN.

served that a loss of at least two thousand

have been

on the

inflicted

marshy but cut up by bushes of his

men

in their advance,

heart, and on his

He

is

came

before they

first

so as to break

said to to close

Eugene made

up the alignment

his attack in

assault took a battery of six

when he had broken Marsin's first in on his own, broke it, and drove brook.

men

the ground he had to cross was not only

Though

quarters.

allies

suffered seriously

line, it

guns

good ;

but

the second charged

back across the

from lack of

first

sufficient infantry,

and the guns from Oberklau could enfilade

his line.

A

second charge by the horse was driven back by the elector

and a third one was rather weakly delivered by the troops,

though headed by Eugene

in person.

tired

became

It

evi-

dent to the prince that he had too heavy a force against him.

He

was, in fact, with a third of the allied numbers,

all

cavalry at that, facing half the enemy, and on the worst

Nor

possible ground.

and nearly

indeed, save the Prussians, did his

The prince was called on to down numerous runaways the material was far less good than that of Marlborough. That Eugene kept them at cavalry behave as

it

should.

shoot

;

their work, however, the fearful list of casualties abundantly testifies.

Nothing daunted, notwithstanding backsets and

poor response to his exertions, he so ably utilized his squadrons, both afoot

and

Marsin nor

in the saddle, that neither

the elector sent any reinforcements to the centre.

While the prince was preparing and pushing Marlborough had got over the troops on

and these had lines.

fallen on the village of

Lord Cutts

lently thrown

back

his

his attack,

extreme

Blenheim

in six

left,

heavy

assaulted in gallant form, but he was vio;

successive bodies of troops were sent on

to aid in the attacks, but no impression whatsoever was made.

General Clerambault, with the infantry in Blenheim, held his

own with

ease

;

and the French

horse, breaking out

on the

FAILURE AT BLENHEIM.

728 allied

columns with much

brook, and

was with

it

renewed again and again with held their ground at

allies

lodg-ment was

made

the allied centre

drove them back across the

effect,

though the assaults were

difficulty,

brilliant courage,

that the

front of the place.

all in

No

Meanwhile the forces

in Blenheim.

had been preparing

of

push their way across

to

the Nebelbach. It

not

was a sad mistake that Tallard, during

make a counter

Had

attack.

might have been unable to get

he done

his

men

this time, did

so,

Marlborough

But the

into line.

French contented themselves with cannonading front,

and enfilading the

from the

allied centre with the batteries of

Blenheim and Oberklau.

Marlborough became convinced that he could not

Finally,

take Blenheim, and having debouched from Unterklau and

pushed his

two

first

lines of the centre

the Nebelbach, though

attack from Oberklau, he front,

and

cavalry,

under Churchill across

much hampered by drew up

finally

a serious flank his

cavalry in

his foot behind, with intervals through

thrown back, could

if

uous assault.

It

was already

retire,

and delivered an impet-

five o'clock.

hours had been wasted on Blenheim

;

which the

From

four to six

no gain had been made,

and Eugene had been struggling against heavy odds ever since half-past twelve.

alry rode at the

and though in

French

its

sion the pursuing

musketry.

follow

started, the left

line in close

wing cav-

ranks with good

effect

turn several times repulsed, on each occa-

French squadrons came upon the infan-

try line in the rear, of

But once

and were severely handled by the salvos

They had not enough

foot in the centre to

up and hold what gain they might make.

Finally,

the French horse and the ten suj^porting battalions of foot

gave wa}^

;

Marlborough seized on the propitious moment

with the keen eye of the battle-captain

;

one more charge, and

THE CENTRE BROKEN. the

enemy broke and

de la cavalier ie a

mal^je dis

tured, part pursued to Hochstadt

men

thousand

fifteen

own

gallantly

Marlborough now turned

;

and after hard

in Blenheim,

and captured the

entire body, including

Marshal Tallard, who from the centre was seeking

Blenheim

gros

Part were cut down, part cap-

they were simply ill-placed.

on the

Le

wrote Tallard in

tres mal,^''

they had held their

Still

fighting, surrounded

"

retired in great confusion.

fait

his official report.

729

to join the

force.

While Marlborough was thus earning a difficult success on left, and before he had actually broken the centre. Prince

the

Eugene, though thrice repulsed, had, after collecting and resting his men, a fourth time led an attack on Marsin's

the elector's front and left flank

driving the

enemy

;

and

this

time successfully,

well back beyond Liitzingen.

had been the harder

one.

It

was

and

at the time

His task

Marlborouah

ruptured Tallard's centre and captured that marshal, of

which

fact the

news spread rapidly, that Eugene broke down

Marsin's resistance, and when Marlborough had definitely thrust back the French cavalry, the elector and Marsin were in full retreat.

Tallard had committed a grave mistake in cooping up so

much

of his infantry in Blenheim,

and leaving nothing but

cavalry to oppose to Marlborough's centre.

a lesser mistake in giving so capture of Blenheim.

much

He may

The

latter

made

of his attention to the

have been somewhat de-

much beyond when he threw up his at-

layed by bridging the Nebelbach; but not noon.

It

was only

at five o'clock,

tempts there and devoted himself to breaking through the cavalry-centre of efforts

the enemy, that he contributed his best

to the victory.

opposite to

them a

Had Marsin and

less strong

the elector

had

opponent than Eugene, they

would have certainly detached some of their forty-two bat-

HEAVY CASUALTIES.

730

what

talions to aid the centre, with

And

resvilt it is

in the later phases of the fight,

a smaller force

to

hard to say.

had Marlborough

left

engage the Blenheim body, and turned

with his bulk against Marsin's naked right flank, the latter

would have been annihilated, and Blenheim would have fallen

As

later.

it

made good

was, Marsin

Marlborough had made up

his

his escape.

mind

to

But when

break the centre of

the French army, he put his whole soul into the work, and

won.

The French, out men, of

whom

flags, fifty

of sixty thousand, lost thirty thousand

fifteen

guns and

thousand were prisoners, two hundred

all their

eleven thousand men,

three hundred wounded.

tance

baggage.

— forty-four

tactical

The

pursuit.

allies lost

allies,

over

killed, seventy-

Eugene pursued Marsin some

dis-

Blenheim, attempted no

Marlborough, busy with

;

The

hundred

according to the questionable

custom of that time, remained

days on the

five

battle-field.

Strategic pursuit, unusual then in any event, was delayed

by

the allies because bread and forage had partially failed them.

The French, with the thirty thousand men they had left, Danube at Lauingen, left fifteen battalions in

crossed the

Ulra, gathered in the garrisons of

and leaving Bavaria to the

Rhine,

Augsburg and other

to her fate, fled along the

crossed that river,

August 31

to

Danube

places,

valley

September

2,

men of Villeroi and made up again an array

at Strasburg, joined the twenty thousand

the ten thousand of Coigny, and thus of sixty thousand

men

for the defense of France.

The troops besieging of them put at the siege

Ingolstadt were withdrawn and part of

Ulm, which surrendered Septem-

ber 11 with two hundred and fifty guns and twelve hundred barrels of powder.

The

victory of Blenheim,

of the French,

had immense

won

in

consequence of the errors

results.

After taking Ulm, the

h

TO allies

marched

WHOM THE

CREDIT?

731

to Pliilipsburg, crossed with sixty-five thou-

sand men, caj)tured Trarbach on the Moselle, and besieged

Landau. battle

Marlborough and Eugene were anxious for another

but Prince Louis would not agree to

;

on a war of force,

The French had recovered

sieges.

but had

and insisted

it,

lost all

morale

equality in

the allies were allowed to take

;

Landau and Trier and only winter put an end to their successes. The Bavarians made' a treaty in November, by which ;

their fortresses

were surrendered, and the Bavarian garrisons

discharged.

This camj)aign, thanks to these two great leaders, showed again the superiority of concentration and battle over detailed operations and sieges.

Forces had been concentrated in an

important territory, and the result of a victory had been decisive.

Even

before the battle, the assault on the position

at the Schellenberg, ation,

though delivered with too

had won marked moral

results,

did not save the elector of Bavaria

:

even without pursuit, they succumbed.

and

little deliber-

all his fortresses

after one real victory,

On

the other hand,

the Stollhofen lines were of no use whatever to the

Despite them, or because of them, Tallard his troops to

We

Marsin and then marched

must allow Eugene a

allies.

sent part of

first

to Bavaria.

full half of the credit for this

From his earliest day he was luiquesmuch a fighter as the duke, he conducted more campaigns and won more victories. There prevails among

memorable

victory.

tionably as

us Anglo-Saxons an imj)ression that Marlborough was the one

who urged on

to battle, as he

is

often assumed

to have been the chief in conmiand.

As

ranted.

the

responsibility

credit for the victory.

Eugene

praise

prince

;

;

All this

if is

not asserted quite unwar-

was equal, so must be the

Not that English

historians fail to

some, as Coxe, are honest eulogists of the

but by implication he

is

treated as

if

he had been

TO

732

EACH HIS SHARE.

Marlborough's lieutenant and not

march

every strategic

equal in

liis

command;

ascribed to the Briton, every tactical

is

manoeuvre posted to his credit; and the inference drawn

by the average reader

To some

necessarily wrong.

is

histori-

ans there was only one directing influence in this war, and that Marlborough's force

is

;

In

ignored.

the existence, in success, of any other

Dutch deputies

failure, of course, the

are omnipotent.

No on

criticism can belittle Marlborough's splendid conduct

this field

of one of

nor, on the other hand,

;

his

On

laurels.

the

must we rob Eugene

allied

with twenty

right,

thousand men, of which only a small part was gallant prince had defeated Marsin and the

foot, the

elector with

men, on ground worse adapted for attack

thirty thousand

than that opposite Marlborough, and especially bad for cavalry.

Had Eugene

not contained nearly half the enemy,

Marlborough would scarcely have been able centre, for this

to break the

would assuredly have been reinforced from

the heavy masses of foot under Marsin and the elector.

when Tallard appealed

was,

replied that he

to

fighting was of the hottest

twenty thousand

men he

is

shown by the

thousand,

— only a seventh.

aid, the latter

fact that out of his

— nearly a

men Marlborough

And

it

That Eugene's

beset.

lost six thousand,

while out of thirty-six thousand five

Marsin for

was himself too hard

As

third,

lost

but

as Eugene's force

was

mostly cavalry, which cannot as a rule be put over such bad

ground or into such

close contact,

is all

tional vigor

and determination.

As

children

loses as heavily

the more a tribute to the prince's excep-

as foot, this

to look to

and rarely

we have been taught from our schooldays up to Eugene for the success

Marlborough rather than

of Blenheim,

and

it

is

when we weigh the part

hard to eradicate the of each,

feeling.

But

from the moment that saw

THE VALUE OF BATTLES. Eugene without waiting

for authority

733

from any source inarch

out of the Stollhofen lines to follow Tallard, inspiration that lay at the very root of success,

moment

of pursuit of

the flying French

Eugene bore against greater as

so

centre

to ;

difficulties

;

—a —

brilliant

to his last

the jaart which

on the allied

right,

enable Marlborough to succeed on the left and

when we remember Zenta, Turin and Belgrade, and

the whole military life of the wonderful imperial marshal,

we must

him

cheerfully allow

full half the credit for this

great and decisive victory.

Let us lay our tribute equally at the feet of both.

Fol-

lowing in the footsteps of Gustavus, they inaugurated the era

and of

of great battles tactical

Blenheim, though the

battle-tactics.

combinations were by no means perfect, was a worthy

successor

and Liitzen

Breitenfeld

of

object-lessons in

was one

;

of

war which teach even the obstinate

which here showed the world that intrenched

those ;

and

lines, fortresses

heavily garrisoned, and other defensive devices are as nothing

compared

As

the

to offensive energy

modern

vres leading

art of

up

war

is

to battle,

and

skill

on the

battle-field.

distinctly dejDendent on manoeu-

we owe

so

to

Marlborough and

Eugene, as successors of Gustavus and predecessors of Frederick, a debt for their

grand conception of the value of

fight-

ing over mere manoeuvring.

Nor

is

this said in forgetfulness of the battles delivered

and won by Turenne and by Conde. these

who

first

was such men

as all

saw the error of carrying the theory of

forti-

fied lines too far,

and Napoleon

to

It

and who prepared the way for Frederick

make

perfect

;

and

it

may

well be said that

the two last captains woidd scarcely have risen to the height

they reached but for these same predecessors in the art of war.

With Marlborough's

splendid dij)lomatic services during

THE UNTUTORED SOLDIER.

734 the is

War

of the Succession this history has nothing to do

only as a captain that he

is

But even

gauged.

macy, the accomplishment of Eugene

may

;

it

in diplo-

well be placed

beside his colleague's.

We

are often told about the untutored soldier, whose keen

military instinct, power to divine the intentions of the enemy,

and courage of book- worm

who

make him

his convictions is full

of military saws

superior to the

and warlike instances

and Marlborough has been held up as a sample of the uneduSuch, to begin with,

cated general.

is

not the fact

;

Marl-

borough had received the best practical education of the day under

its

greatest leaders

;

and history moreover shows us

men

that the great captains of the world have been

to

whom

a generous providence gave the one quality, and whose industry and

No the

made good use

intelligence have

of the other.

one doubts the superiority of the gifted unread highly educated weakling

;

Gustavus, Frederick and Napoleon were

;

man

over

but Alexander, Hannibal,

deep-read and trained to arms as well. exception that proves the rule

own

all

Caesar

born is

and yet he got a

soldiers,

perhaps the fair military

education in the Spanish peninsula, and the best one in the

world in Gaul

;

and who knows how much he had studied

the military works and generals preceding his day?

It is

probable that he had Arrian and Xenophon and Polybius by

Had

heart.

ince?

It

he not indeed taken

had

learning to be his prov-

might be claimed because Frederick hated war,

that he was an unread soldier

and

all

profited

;

but

who

except he unearthed

by Epaminondas' matchless oblique

lain buried for

two thousand years?

applies to all captains of the second rank

:

order,

which

The same thing Miltiades,

Epami-

nondas, Hasdrubal, Pyrrhus, the consul Nero, Scipio, Sertorius,

Moltke,

Turenne,

—

all

Eugene,

Marlborough, Wellington, Lee,

were men who were educated to war, and who

KAUSLER'S OPINIO^ had read military

worm

A

history.

man need

to assimilate the lessons of history

Turenne

his

war

to a science of

a soldier

oj)portunity,

it

It

if

true that to re^

intellect,

character and

any two men, the one who

certain that, of

is

is

.

diagrams and nothing more does no

but given equal

;

x.

own, and better on them,

possible, in his own campaigns.

make

and

would soon

ceptions of a Marlborough in the field lessons of a

not ;

has faithfully studied what his predecessors in the art of war

have done will be by far the profited

;

most of them have been keen

men

students of the deeds of the great there has been one

All great captains have

better.

by reading and study

who has become

before them

;

and

if

tridy great without such

study and training, I have failed to find him in history.

do not refer to mere conquerors

;

I

I speak of great captains

whose work has instructed mankind in the art of war. It

is

possible that the present estimate of Marlborough,

the placing

him on a lower

level with

Turenne and Eugene, may evoke a protest in

But

Greater Britain.

it

level than Gustavus,

remains no

on the same

less the true estimate.

Cuidein in sua arte crede experto ; and no doubt those who

have best made war are the safest

wiU be found

to

deny

that, naval

critics of

war

war.

No

apart, the Continental

nations have, in the past two generations, outstripped

English in capacity for the military art

found the safest ones to follow best critical

work

;

one

;

the

their critics will be

and an examination

of the

of all the Continental nations will sustain

the views herein expressed.

To quote Kausler with

whom " If

there

we

is

reference to this campaign, than

no more honest panegja-ist of Marlborough

subject the conduct of the several

erals to a critical examination,

stands forth fault free."

it

commanding gen-

appears that only Eugene

.RLBOROUGWS REWARD. .ijs

been and

dct proper, /ere

.ad vie,

r^ueen

ruin,

to-day usual with the English,

is

— the

most extravagant rewards and

heaped upon Marlborough.

borne his

full share in the

Prince Eugene,

campaign and

in the

and whose master the emperor had gained more than Anne, for

his country

won nothing but the

was saved from the brink of

additional

fame which posterity

awards him.

Four-Barreled Gun.

(16th Century.)

LVIII.

EUGENE AND VENDOME. In 1705 Vendome and Eugene manceuvred duke

of

1705.

Stahremberg and the

in Italy.

Savoy bad been pushed up into a corner of Piedmont.

The campaign

here was one of the old-fashioned kind, in which

Vendome on

rather outmanosuvred the prince, and held head to

him

The

the defensive

in a battle at Cassano.

operations were between the Oglio and Adda, and both armies early retired

into winter-quarters.

In the Netherlands the campaign was equally fruitless,

and consisted merely of secondary operations. lack of

men and money

Marlborough was hampered by

and the year was frittered away on work which

;

scarcely worth the recital except to

which able generals were gradually but only slowly working. sought to open the campaigTi on the Moselle

The plan

that had been

;

made

Marlborough

but the French seized the

and obliged the duke

tive in the Netherlands,

is

show what the old method was, out of

initia-

to retm-n to protect Holland.

for an invasion of France

ended

in only protect-

ing Holland from invasion.

After

the serious defeat of 1704, Louis

to operate defensively next year.

duty of defending Brabant

;

to

To

duke

;

of

Vendome was Savoy, who in the

while

last

campaign had

eelli

and Ivrea, and now stood on the brink of

In 1705, in Italy,

lost

Susa, Pignerol, Aosta, Bardo, Ver-

of

ruin.

Vendome and Eugene were consequently

once more opposed to each other.

and the duke

was given the

Marsin was intrusted the

Rhine, to Villars the Saar and Moselle instructed finally to reduce the

XIV. determined

Villeroi

Savoy were

in a

Field-Marshal Stahremberg

bad situation

;

Vendome had

already reduced the northwestern part of Piedmont and Savoy,

and soon

after captured the fortress of Verona,

bled him to control the line of the Adige.

which ena-

Some

seventy-

seven thousand French troops were in Italy, of which Ven-

EUGENE AND VENDOME.

738

dome commanded twenty-two thousand he had just captured Verona

in

Piedmont, where

his brother, with fifteen thou-

;

sand in the Brescia country, faced the imperialists, who with eio:ht

La

thousand had retired to the west shore of Lake Garda

Feuillade held the Nizza country with eleven thousand

Laparace with

thousand was besieging Mirandola, and

five

twenty-four thousand

men were

in fortresses.

To oppose

this

extensive but in the highest degree ill-disposed array, Stah-

remberg and Savoy had only sixteen thousand men.

Prince

Eugene was given twenty-eight thousand men and ordered to Piedmont to their relief. The odds were decidedly against him and he had indeed found much ;

this

many

procuring

troops from the short-sighted Vienna ministers.

When Eugene down

difficulty in

arrived, via Triente, at Roveredo, he

moved

the Adige and attempted to cross the upper Mincio,

intending to relieve Mirandola the French, and hearing that scene, he put part of his

but checked at this river by

;

Vendome was approaching

army

the

across the lake in boats to

the west bank, sent the others around the north shore, and at

the end of

May

Gavardo.

Hoping

took up a strong position between Salo and to neutralize the prince,

fied a position in his front,

tains

and the

lake,

open country,

and returned

where he was cut

left the

to

hemmed him

in

Vendome

forti-

between the moun-

from foraging in the

off

younger Vendome

to hold

him

there,

Piedmont, where, by drawing in some of his

scattered forces, he soon captured the last outstanding fortresses of

Nizza, Villafranca and Chivasso, and drove the

duke of Savoy back

to

Turin in sore

Eugene remained a month essential reinforcements

in

distress.

his position, waiting for

from Austria.

conduct, but in front of such numbers perate

situation

of

the

attempt a march to his

duke relief,

finally

This was not brilliant

The desconstraining him to

it

was

safe.

he threw up his communica-

SHREWD MAN(EUVRING. tions with the Tyrol, turned

marched

Nave

in the night of

number

of hours,

Vendome's position by the

left,

June 22 through the mountains via

where he anticipated young Vendome by a

to Brescia,

June 27

739

and pushing

on, crossed the Ogiio at Calcio

The French general did march, but moved on a parallel line to

in the face of opposition.

not attack him on the

the south of him, via Montechiaro and Manerbio, himself

crossed the Oglio at Pontevico, and took up a position against

him between Crema and Lodi. only

moved

as far as

progress, the

came up

Eugene took Soncino, but Alarmed

Romanengo.

duke of Vendome

left

sudden

at this

Piedmont for the moment,

to join his brother, at once recrossed the Serio,

drew up opposite Eugene near Casal Moraro.

and

Both gen-

erals

began to manoeuvre, Eugene to reach Piedmont, Ven-

dome

to prevent his so doing.

ations,

The former

but none proved successful

;

have accomplished his object by a spot an

army

fully as large as those

younger Vendome

;

tried several oper-

he could better perhaps battle.

He had on

the

under the duke and the

but the enemy lay across his path, and,

fearing the depletion of even victory, he preferred manoeuvre to battle,

and sought

up or down the

to steal a passage of the

river, to join the

duke

of

Adda,

either

Savoy with forces

intact.

He

first

moved by a cautious night march on August 10

Paradiso on the upper Adda, thinking,

if

Vendome

to

did not

follow him, to find a passage to Piedmont that way.

But

Vendome knew Eugene's shrewd ways, and discovering his absence next day, made speed to follow. Leaving his brother with thirteen thousand men on the left bank at Cassano, where there was a bridge protected by a strong bridge-head

and the Ritorto

canal, he crossed to the right

bank

of the

Adda, on the Lodi bridge, with nine thousand, and marched

up

river,

where he attempted by fortifying the banks

to fore-

REDUCED TO FIGHTING.

740 stall

An

a passage by the imperialists.

accident to his pon-

toon train delayed Eugene, and before he could cross, Ven-

dome had put in an appearance. Eugene then, on August 17, stole another march back to Cassano, hoping to catch young

Vendome

at that place

Eugene would march

and beat him

to

by the duke farther down the guard only being

;

Cremona, the

left in

left

but with the idea that latter

bank

had been ordered

to Rivolta, his rear-

the Cassano bridge-head.

Prince

Eugene was about to

attack,

when Vendome, fearing this

just

contingency, returned

from the upper Adda, and

resumed

position

his

in

those defenses.

Eugene had now

tried

schemes for stealing a passage of the

Adda above and

below the French

;

he had

failed in his every device,

and was confronted the

not.

of

Savoy

were not

emperor

commander

in his front,

to this extent, for

Plis activity

had kept

and had relieved the duke

Vendome's lieutenants

at

Turin

But the prince was constantly urged by the

able.

to reach

Vendome had a

he

should force a passage or

Battle of Cassano.

the French

with

whether

question

and release the duke from

scant ten thousand

men

his

predicament

in his front,

though

in an exceptionally strong position behind the Ritorto canal,

while he himself had some twenty-four thousand

dome was

in Rivolta,

was scarcely apt if

to

and with

come up

;

young Ven-

his hyper-indolent character,

in season to aid his brother

Eugene attacked and could not

force Cassano, he woidd

VERY SHARP ASSAULTS. not be compromised

He

and

;

if

741

he won, he would gain much.

decided on attack.

Cassano lay behind the Adda, over which the bridge had a front was the Ritorto canal, with a

strong bridge-head.

In

branch running back

to the river.

its

Vendome was odd

of fortress, with a wet ditch twenty

or five feet deep.

A

feet

in a species

wide and four

stone bridge crossed the canal on the

Trevigiio road, and was stoutly held by the French. first

sent a

who with

column against

on the other

line

ties

the

rest,

Returning boldly to his work, after

Leiningen again took the bridge, aided by par;

Meanwhile

rival battalions

ranks. cost.

all

along the

Eugene now determined

to

range, the

each other's

fire into

have the bridge at any

Heading a column of troops gathered from the

them against

it

in person, carried

French made a stand. in its front, if

line, at close

were pouring a deadly

A sort of

it,

right,

he

and drove the French

In and near by

well back into the bridge-head.

for

and was forming-

crossed,

who waded the canal up to their necks in water but at critical moment he was killed, and the assault again came

to naught.

led

it,

when heavy reinforcements came up

side,

and he was hustled back. a short

under Count Leiningen,

this bridge

a gallant rush seized

Eugene

this the

wagon-burg had been erected

and the fighting was tenacious

to the last degree,

Eugene won, he would drive the French

into the

Adda.

After a long and desperate contest numbers prevailed, and the wagon-burg was taken. rescue, but

Eugene,

still

Vendome came

in person to the

in the thick of the fray, drove the

French back into the bridge-head. the battle would be won.

One more

their gallant chieftain, the imperialists followed

breastworks, and the garrison began to

throwing themselves into the

came up and stemmed the

effort

Inspired by the tremendous

river.

tide, as

fall

and

fire

of

him over the

back, hundreds

But again Vendome

Eugene reached the inner

VICTORY DISPUTED.

742

works of the bridge-head, and again Eugene

rallied his

men

The two commanders were almost face to French left wing was cut off Vendome was on The face. the point of retiring, when, in quick succession, Eugene and pressed

on.

;

received a ball in the neck obliged

him

his place

;

to

and another

which

in the knee,

General Bibra took

go back to the surgeons.

but the effort had exhausted

itself,

and, in the

absence of Eugene, the French crowded the imperialists back to the stone bridge.

This, however, Bibra held.

Meanwhile Eugene's Prussian troops had made a gallant but ineffectual attack on the French right

;

but in wading the

canal their ammunition was wetted, and they had only their

With the woimding of Eugene all chance The imperialists, after of success against Vendome had gone. a four hours' battle, retired to camp. Vendome kept the bayonets to rely on.

battle-field.

The killed

casualties were

Eugene

heavy.

subjected to the close-range

numbers, are said to have

sum equal

sand

five

to

Vendome's

fire

The French, of superior

many more, — estimates went

lost

as high as six thousand killed

be a

two thousand

and two thousand one hundred wounded.

who had been

a

lost

and four thousand wounded,

entire force.

Perhaps two thou-

hundred killed and three thousand wounded would

The

fair guess.

loss in officers of

rank was

terrible

few escaped being disabled.

Both

sides claimed the victory,

in Paris,

Vienna and Turin.

and Te Deums were sung

But Vendome had countered

his adversary's blow.

Eugene camp.

retired to Treviglio

Vendome

had had a chance falling

August 17 and intrenched a

joined his brother at Rivolta. to distinguish himself

The

on this occasion by

on the Austrian flank and rear from Rivolta

he did not do

so,

— though the

latter

;

messenger dispatched

but as to

him

WINTER-QUARTERS. with orders to this effect was captured,

him

of

743

— Vendome

command.

For two months both armies, now about equal faced each other between the

was

still

dome

Adda and

in numbers,

Euaene

the Serio.

waiting for reinforcements from the Tyrol, and Ven-

Both indulged

closely watched him.

Finally, October 10,

war.

deprived

march by the lower Serio

an active small

in

Eugene undertook a

via

secret flank

Crema around Vendome's

to try thus to break through to

Piedmont,

or, if

not

right,

this, to

cut the French off from, and himself secure better winter-

But the

quarters near, Cremona.

Montadine

rains delayed his bridge-

many

throwing

at

forestalled

him by marching rapidly

tone,

so

hours via

that

Vendome

Lodi and Pizzighe-

where were bridges and good roads, took post opposite

the prince, and beat back his attemjjted passage* of the river

with considerable

loss.

Both armies then marched upstream

on either bank of the Serio, and the prince, the river having fallen, finally

by,

succeeded in stealing a passage over a ford near

and took up a position

at Fontenella.

Vendome

opposite him, and captured Soncino with son.

its

sat

down

imperial garri-

Finally Eugene, seeing that he could not succeed in

joining the duke of Savoy, gave this year,

and

up the idea

at the beginning of

of doing

November

retired

more by a

rapid secret march across the Ogiio to Chiari, and a few days later started for Castiglione, intending to seek winter-quarters

near Mantua.

parallel

march

But Vendome again anticipated him by a and by occupying the heights

to his right,

south of Lonato, thus cutting try,

and forcing him

shore of

Lake Garda.

him

off

from the Mantua coun-

to seek winter-quarters

Vendome

on the west

himself went into canton-

ments in the Mantua country; Eugene, between Salo and

Monte Chiaro.

Leaving Count Reventlaii

prince returned to Vienna in January.

in

command, the

VENDOME'S ERRORS.

744

Vendome had and

decision.

He

largely

acted with consummate ability, quickness

This campaign redounds much to his

outnumbered Prince Eugene,

men

being seventy-seven thousand

two thousand

credit.

his total in Italy

to his opponent's thirty-

but he checkmated the imperial general in

;

all

attempts to reach Piedmont, and fought him with smaller forces.

At

of Savoy.

the

same time Eugene had done well

He had

besiege Turin

kept

Vendome

duke

busy that he could not

and while he had not been able

;

he had accomplished the

ally,

so

for the

to join his

spirit of his task if

not the

letter.

This

— except

campaign

at

Cassano

— was

conducted

according to the old fashion, by manoeuvring instead of fighting, and,

on the French

tresses.

Vendome

the

field,

side,

by holding and besieging

could have placed sixty thousand

for-

men

in

with this force have annihilated Eugene's army,

or have crippled

it

for the campaign,

and then, turning on

the duke in Turin, he would scarcely have needed to besiege the place.

Or, indeed, he might have captured Turin before

Eugene reached the fast,

and out

But the old idea

field.

of seventy-seven thousand

posed the prince in the

still

men

with but twenty-two thousand,

field

the rest being planted all over Italy in fortresses. that,

held

men, Vendome op-

Not only

but he again divided his force into two parts, one on

either side of the efforts to take

Eugene was not fortunate

Adda.

in his

advantage of this opening, but his forces were

always well concentrated, and he kept them actively employed.

Vendome's were not tional rapidity

so well in hand, but he displayed excep-

and energy.

for a single hearty blow, he

Had

he concentrated his forces

might have saved Italy

to the

French arms. It has

been said

roundabout and

that, as the

difficult

opening move, Eugene chose a

road into Italy, via Triente and the

POOR SUPPLIES FOR

745

1705.

Adige, in lieu of the road up the Inn and down the Adda,

which was the nearer route to join the duke

had taken Soneino, he remained

Adda

crossing the

and two

;

at

that after he

Romanengo instead month at Gav^

that he kept quiet, a

at Treviglio, while the

duke

of

Savoy was

That Eugene weighed the advantages

need.

;

across the Alps can scarcely be doubted, though -

why he

told

did not march by the Inn-Adda

mentioned are not only explained by the stances, but during these

active small war.

was the one who to inactivity.

Of

all

the generals

least often,

from wh?

His constant push,

was unequaled.

tions,

weeks Eugene

The

thinf^-

noteworthy in Eugene's manoeuv cling to his communications wit

and is

relied on the country, wli'

particularly to be noted

retained the initiative an-

dome was

As

is

follov

usual

great effort

thousand share of n

was the London,

making Louis

Ma^ and thp'

c t

]

f

t

r

^

ir

ne^

;

at

in

of bot^

a

A GOOD PLAN FAILS.

746

Marlborough's column already been taken and garrisoned. prince of Baden up the -.hould march up the MoseUe, the ar

;

Alsace would thus be taken in reverse, and the French

In half-pursui be thrown into a defensive attitude. argued ill for this advice, but with a slowness which ^aign, the allies

to assemble sixty thousand

began

-

Moselle, and to place thirty thousand each on the -

Scheldt.

XIV. on

Louis

his side

determined

v in the Netherlands, to put thirty-two thouthe illeroi at Maestricht, to which number Bavaria would be added later; to •ty-six thousand men to the Moselle;

r of

and

rsin with twenty-six thousand; s

towns.

Despite these enormous

campaign

lict of the giants, the

and without any worthy result. '

the French from activity in IS

on the Moselle

V fVo

"litiative 'ars

;

but they

from him. was able to

Imirable posile,

sustained

n the

rear,

dsummer, lim 3 1

;

but

accomMarlrlands, 5sault,

of

^1 'I

to e

MARLBOBOUGH WITHDRAWS. ditions,

to

Marlborough could well understand why other gen-

sometimes failed in their

erals

He

efforts.

for the lack of support given

blame

this

747

same rock that

many

so

was certainly not

him

;

but

of the allied generals

it

was on

had been

wrecked.

Marlborough broke up and headed for Maestricht, crossing

Upon

the Meuse at Vise.

his

approach the French retired

from Luttich, and Marlborough joined Overkirk, who had been in

Villei'oi's

front and had re-

Huy.

captured

But

in his absence

from the Moselle things went quite amiss. Villarssent

twenty-

Villeroi

three

thousand

men from

his

own

command,

The Line

left

nine thousand

men on

of the Dyle.

the Moselle to oppose the prince of

Baden, who later arrived there with nineteen

thousand,

headed twenty-seven thousand men and captured Trier from

by Marlborough, and marched

the forces left there

middle Rhine to join Marsin.

to the

All the advantage hoped

from the proposed plan had vanished into thin

air,

and the

Anglo-Dutch were put on the defensive.

When

Villeroi Icnew that

Marlborough was coming, he

withdrew to the sources of the Mehaigue into which was, according thing to do. to be safe.

These

The

Dames, ran north

to the ideas

fortified lines,

of the day, a profitable

lines were, however, altogether too long-

right rested on the to the

Meuse

at

Marche

les

upper Mehaigne, thence along the

Geete to Lean, and on to Aerschott back of the Demer.

THE DYLE LINE

748 Villeroi

had force enough

not enough

to

might hold

it.

TiROKEN.

to conduct extensive operations, but

keep intact so long a

line,

however

Marlborough had sixty thousand men, but great difficulty that he persuaded the active measures.

Villeroi

had

Dutch

fortified

it

skillfully

he

was only after

to agree to

any

every obstacle, and,

curiously, intrenched lines were supposed to be hard to break

through

;

but Marlborough went intelligently at

weaken

to

Villeroi's centre,

In order

it.

he demonstrated in force towards

the right of his line, which leaned on the Mehaigne, and per-

suaded the French general to draw from the other points a large

body

to reinforce it;

the night of

having accomplished which, on

July 17 Marlborough made a forced march with

his choice troops to the vicinity of

Leau, and here, at early

dawn, broke through the depleted French

lines

by a massed

attack pushed home, with slight opposition or loss.

Seeing

was no longer tenable, Villeroi

that his intrenched line

back behind the Dyle with

his left

on Louvain.

fell

This was a

fresh proof of the uselessness of such positions

;

but they

remained a favorite defensive scheme for many decades more. After much opposition by the Dutch deputies, Marlborough

made another attempt

to force the

refused to do their part,

and the

ated, proved a complete failure.

Dyle

;

project,

but the Dutch troops

though happily

initi-

Later in mid-August, Marl-

borough turned the Dyle position by

its

headwaters and

forced the French back towards Brussels, thus cutting them ojff

from the direct road

a skirmish at Waterloo attack the French

;

to France. ;

On August

Marlborough made preparations

uties

to

they facing as Wellington did in 1815,

and he facing north, in exactly reversed again,

18 there was

positions.

But

when everything was ready for attack, the Dutch depinterposed their veto, and by the next day the French

had made

their position too strong to be assaulted

by even

BETTER PREPARATIONS FOR the hero of the Schellenberg.

ough took Leau and Geete.

This

Though

it

is

Santvliet,

campaign

true that the

lack of support and had these are the efforts of is

must

many

Forced to

to

another general of his era. it is

blame for

And

his

though, as

Marlborough never

true that

it is

lost

a

also true

from one or other cause, he conducted as many barren

campaigns as any of the other generals the same rank with himself. :

But

whom we

this year bore

place in

one good

the ill-success of the Flanders campaign had the effect

stimulating the allies to proper exertions, and in 1706

Marlborough could take the of

failure.

same conditions which neutralized the best

so often asserted,

that,

of

a

things to contend against, yet

battle or failed to take a place he laid siege to,

fruit

lines of the

pronoimced

duke was not

many

Marlbor-

retire,

and leveled the be

749

1706.

field

with a suitable equipment

men and money.

Culverin.

(16th Century.)

LIX. RAMILLIES. In 1706

MAY

23, 1706.

men

Villeroi with sixty-two thousand

lay at Tirlemont.

Namur.

moved by his right and met him

Villeroi

Marlbor-

and marched on

ongh. concentrated his sixty thousand allies near Maestricht,

at Ramillies,

May

drawn

23,

up on high ground.

Marlborough, always ready for battle, made an able feint

on the French

meet which

flank

;

left, to

Villeroi transferred

much

of his force to that

upon which Marlborough attacked the French right with great deter-

mination, and though forced back more than once, by bringing all his available forces to bear, broke in the enemy's defense effect of this magnificent victory

erlands fell to the

allies.

and drove him from the

was immense.

Nearly

Kamillies saved Holland.

all

field.

The

the Austrian Neth-

Villeroi

was replaced by

Vendome.

In 1706 Louis XIV. put three hundred thousand men into the

field,

and proposed

to act offensively.

Turin and Barce-

lona were to be vigorously besieged, and the French generals in Flanders

and Italy were given fighting orders.

with the elector of Bavaria, was to erlands

;

Villars on the

Vendome was while

La

to

command

in the Neth-

Marsin on the Moselle

;

push back the imperialists to the Tyrol

Feuillade captured Turin.

It would, this spring,

Marlborough

marched

Rhine

Villeroi,

to

have well suited the inclinations of

to go in person to Italy, as he

had formerly

Germany, and there work with Eugene, instead of

being tied to the narrow ideas of the Dutch deputies

;

but

the states-general would, under no circumstances whatsoever, j)ermit

The

any of their troops to go

successes of Villars

had

of the deputies, however, that,

to the south of the Alps.

so far modified the courage

somewhat

duke was given freer play than usual

to his surprise, the

in the Netherlands.

TERRAIN OF RAMILLIES. The French, some

751

sixty-two thousand strong, and with one

hundred and thirty guns, under

Villeroi, lay near Tirlemont,

east of the Dyle, in fortified lines covering

which they believed the

About May

to operate.

allies

Namur, against

had conceived an intention

20, in the Maestricht country, near

Tongres, Marlborough concentrated his English and Dutch troops, a force of about sixty thousand

men and

one hundred

His objective was in fact Namur.

and twenty guns.

To

moved forward by his right and Andre on the Great Geete near Ra-

cover this fortress, Villeroi

took post on

Mount

St.

Marching towards Namur on the old Roman road

millies.

which here runs along the Mehaigne from east to west, Marlborough's van soon gained sight of the French camp,

and perceiving the approach of the enemy,

The French

in line.

— where

rise the

to seize

on

its

it

;

on high ground

would have been glad himseK

but Villeroi had anticipated him and

summit

cies of

plateau

Marlborough, well aware of the com-

of the position,

now

stood

in battle array, long before the bulk of the

columns reached the ground.

allied

— a sort of

Great and Little Geete rivers and several

other minor brooks.

manding nature

lay

drew up

Villeroi

His army lay

concave order on the slope of the

hill

in a spe-

back of which

runs the Louvain-Namur turnpike, with the marshy ground along the Little Geete in his front, the village of

left

leaning on the

Autre Eglise, the right stretching out towards

Tavieres on the Mehaigne, and the centre strengthened by the villages of Ramillies and Offuz.

The

position, not very

expertly taken up, was good only for defense, and Villeroi

was constitutionally inclined towards a defensive

battle.

cavalry of the left was behind the Little Geete, where

not manoeuvre

if

was well held by tured

;

needed foot,

;

it

The could

Ramillies in Villeroi' s front-centre

but could readily be turned and cap-

the cavalry of the right stretched out towards Tavieres,

VILLEROrS POSITION.

752

but had notlaing to lean on, nor were any foot supports near

by

Tavieres and an outlying hamlet beyond

it.

were

it

strengthened by some bodies of foot but lacked numbers

the

;

other villages had more, Ramillies being held by twenty battalions

;

and the

was marshaled

rest of the infantry

in

two

?-'-"''-^.., -'•'•"'•'

f.,.(.<.^

''''iW Battle of Ramillies.

lines,

with the one hundred and thirty guns suitably posted in

batteries in its front.

The array was formidable.

because the enemy was looked for along the old

It

Roman

was road

that Villeroi had massed most of his cavalry on his right, in

two

lines,

covering this approach

;

and because the cavalry

comprised the Maison du Roi, he deemed

He

forgot the lesson of Blenheim.

was strong setting

;

and few armies are drawn up

up one may not discover

it

invulnerable.

Despite errors, the line

flaws.

for battle, in

whose

A CLEVER FEINT. Knowin<5 himself

be

to

753

presence of the enemy, Marl-

in the

borough had advanced in ten columns,

six of foot in the cen-

two of cavalry on each of the flanks.

tre,

French

Riding ahead to

he at once perceived that the highest point of the

reconiioitre, line,

tomb

the right, where stood the

of

Ottomond, a

Gerraan hero of olden times, was the key of the position, and he determined to

make

it

in order to mislead the

the object of his main attack.

enemy

But

so as to deliver his assault

under the best conditions, he organized at the same time a diversion

some force against the other

in

The concave

Egiise.

position of the

wing: at

French aided him

Autre in the

execution of this task, as he himself held the chord of the

With

arc along which lay their line.

a good deal of show he

massed a heavy column and marched this village

it

to a point opposite

on perceiving which, Villeroi drew most of the

;

reserves from his centre

and dispatched them over

to sustain

An

which he deemed to be thus threatened.

his left,

general would have divined that this was no real attack

would have acted able to protect

was drawn up

itself,

in

ciently paraded

so to

and a

at the

reserve,

and having

suffi-

produce the desired impression, Marlbut the

first line,

ground which prevented

and

left,

to

all

lines

and

was abundantly

This allied column

for a while at least.

two

it

borough ordered rolling

less hastily, for the left

abler ;

its

under cover of some

being seen, over to his

same time instructed the bulk of

manoeuvre as to sustain

his cavalry

this flank.

Shortly after noon the attack was opened by the guns, the

French devoting their best efforts opposite their

left,

whose

to the

first line

column supposed

to be

crossed the Little Geete,

advanced to the foot of the crest opposite Autre Egiise, and opened

ond

fire

line

;

while under the smoke of the fusillade, the sec-

and reserve was enabled, as

left to sustain

the

main

assault.

stated, to

move

off to the

\ STOUT FIGHTING.

754

To was

give Villeroi no time to repair

A

at once precipitated.

liis

mistake, the attack

body of Dutcli troops moved

on Tavieres, while a heavy column of twelve battalions was launched against Ramillies

these attacks were driven home,

;

and though Villeroi soon perceived that he had been

by a sham

ill

it

was already too

meet the onslaught on

of foot to to jjut

attack,

his right

niisled

He had no reserves

late.

and was compelled

some horse, which he dismounted for the purpose,

But even

to sustain Tavieres.

Dutch carried the

this

place, while a

proved unavailing

column of

the

;

allied cavalry iell

on the dismounted horsemen and cut them to

The

pieces.

French horse, of which the right was mainly composed, was

now put

in

but Overkirk threw back their

;

The French second

handsome charge. Roi,

— the

first line

this officer

of.

allied squadrons,

— was

way through

and drove them back

so far

success, these

the astonished

beyond the

take in reverse the foot battalions assailing that village.

tle.

critical

line

would shortly have been enabled to

of Ramillies that they

was a

not,

Riding down on Overkirk

was somewhat disordered by

superb horsemen clave their

by a

the Maison du

flower of the French heavy cavalry,

however, so easily disposed

when

line,

It

moment, the instant which makes or mars a bat-

Perceiving the imminence of the danger, Marlborough

in person

headed a body of seventeen reserve squadrons which

he found ready to hand, sent an urgent order recalling

all

the

horse from the right, where lay twenty squadrons likewise in reserve,

and himself led

under a

telling fire

he was

all

in the

column against the

from the French

batteries.

cuirassiers,

In the fray

but captured, but his opportune charge for a

moment checked

the

enemy

;

and the aid of the twenty squad-

rons from the right, which came up at a gallop but in fine close order, reestablished the battle at this point.

same moment a body

of

Danish horse debouched

At

the

fi'om the

MARLBOROUGH PUSHES HOME. Mehaignfi lowlands and

fell

smartly on the right of the Mai-

son du Roi, and another body of Dutch

Thus Surrounded, the French cuirassiers, from the field and Marlborough,

turnect

;

of their bacV.ward

movement

755

fell

on their

left.

finally losing heart,

moment men

seizing the

as opportune, and giving his

the impetus whicli success makes so teixing after hours of

combat, pressed on witn teau.

As

numbered

^11 his

troops to the top of the pla-

usual in offensive battles, Marlborough had out-

is

opponent at the point of fighting contact, and

his

the battle was won. f roDi the field

;

But

Villeroi

was not so readily driven

he strove desperately to establish a new line by

throwing back his right to Geest a Gerompant, and bv holding fast to Offuz and Autre Egiise, so as to form a convex

order instead of the concave one with which he the allied attack.

first

received

Ramillies was not yet taken, and that would

make an outwork which might perhaps arrest the victors while he patched uj) the new line. But Marlborough gave him no time he knew too well how much the minutes count Though the j^lateau around Ottoat the instant of victory. mond was crowded with men of all arms, guns and caissons, much disordered and mixed up from the late desperate battle, ;

he pushed on in whatever order he could.

No

one better

understood the meaning of " Action, action, action

!

"

and

while this advance was making, despite the hottest defense, Ramillies

fell to

the

allies,

Villeroi could marshal

Many

a general would have

Marlborough advance

all

;

and the ground was such that

no new line in any practicable order.

now

there was no let

jjaused to re-form.

up

to his blows.

Not

so

A general

along the allied line was sounded, and the whole

mass pushed

on.

Offuz and Autre Egiise were taken, sweep-

ing the entire field clear of the French.

In utterly disorgan-

ized masses, bearing no semblance to an army, Villeroi sought

refuge at Louvain.

The

British horse pursued the

enemy

IMMENSE RESULTS.

756

almost to the gates of that

city,

on which Marlborough

advanced next day.

The French

lost

seven thousand killed and wounded, six

thousand prisoners, fifty-two guns, eight standards and

men

The

baggage.

their

killed

s^iid

wounded.

allies lost orie

three thousand six hundr©
Following the noble example of Gustavus as well

own generous

as his

all

thousand an^ sixty-six

instincts,

Marlborough showed great

consideration for the enemy's wounded,

who had equal

care

with his own, Ramillies

won nearly

all

Austrian Flanders

Brussels,

;

Louvain, Mechlin and most other towns of Brabant opened

Only the

their gates without delay.

coast towns, Antwerp,

Ostende, Nieuport and Dunkirk, held out.

Blenheim had saved Germany. Ramillies saved Holland the-ir

;

The

Turin was

and the Dutch

jjut

battle

of

to save Italy,

no bounds to

Marlborough was the national hero

joy or gratitude.

;

he was no longer hampered by the deputies.

The happy

On

discipline enforced

by Marlborough had an equally

and went

win the good-will of the country.

effect,

far to

June 6 Antwerp surrendered, and Oudenarde followed

suit.

Siege was laid to Dunkirk, and that great fortress suc-

cumbed on July September

5,

6.

A th

sand prisoners

Menin followed August October

fell to

Dendermonde

aggregate of twenty thou-

Marlborough's arms this year.

After this crushing defeat, Italy

An

4.

22,

and took the place of

Vendome was Villeroi

reinforcements came to hand.

caused by the defeat of

;

called

back from

and twenty thousand

But the moral depression

Ramillies was

so great

that the

French only i3retended to defend the northern border France.

of

LX. ^^

TURIN. SEPTEMBER

1706.

7,

If Marlborough won a great triumph at Ramillies, Eugene won an equally

When

splendid victory at Turin.

Luckily

to press Tiu-in hard.

he was on the Adige the French had begun

Vendome was called from Italy to

supplant Ville-

and the duke of Orleans, with Marsin as second, took command.

roi,

determined to march to the the Adige, crossed the

relief of

Po and advanced rapidly along

The duke followed him, but Eugene got enabled him to pursue his march.

Eugene

Savoy, and leaving the prince of Hesse on south bank westward.

its

to the pass of Stradella first,

which

Reaching Turin, he joined the duke, which

The

gave him thu'ty-six thousand men to the sixty thousand of the French. lines

about Turin were very strong, but Eugene, after a careful recounoissanee,

attacked them from the west, and so effectually did he follow up his assault that he drove the

them

into

enemy out

headlong

Turin saved

retreat.

up

of their works, broke

As

their

army and forced

Ramillies saved Holland, so the battle of

Italy, and, moreover, it resulted in driving the

French permanently

from the land. This triumph against a heavily intrenched enemy of nearly twice his strength

was indeed a glorious

both the march and

one.

Perhaps

this

It has

battle, is the best of the war.

campaign, including

few superiors

in

any

war.

If in the Netherlands Marlborough was helping to teach the world the

advantage of battle over manoeuvring and

intrenched lines,

so, in this

year, Prince

Eugene

in Italy gave

us a brilliant lesson of the same nature.

From

the

new emperor, Joseph

I.,

Eugene received the

same consideration and support which the crown had always vouchsafed him.

Early in 1706 several columns of reinforce-

ments were directed towards the west

bank

of the

Lake

Italy, to the

of Garda.

army which

lay on

Eugene reached Eove-

redo in mid- April, and Gavardo April 20, but only to find the

army

in

bad

case.

Its situation

had not been over and above

ON THE ADIGE. secure, nor

had the

been

lines

759 watched to have

sufficiently

timely notice of the enemy's approach.

On sand

of April

1 9th

the

md

men

Vendome, who had

fighting orders,

imperial ^vinter

-

forty-four thou-

made a sudden

attack on the

which were under command of

quarters,

Count Reventlau during the absence of Prince Eugene, hoping to overwhelm his army and to push it quite out of Italy. Reventlau had been in an intrenched camp, but a threatened turning movement by

way

out into the open.

The

of

San Marco induced him

to

come

assault fell first on Montechiaro,

which Vendome took, and then on Calcinato, with equal cess.

The

much

disorder, with a loss of three thousand

arrival

troops retired over the bridge of

Eugene

collected

suc-

San Marco

On

men.

some troops, and sought

in his

to hold a

had previously occupied between Gavardo and

position he

French on April 22 pushed Salo hard.

Salo, but the

Ven-

dome sought to cut him off by a flank march near the lake, and making up his mind to take the Adige route, Eugene retired by way of Riva to the Triente country. In a rearguard fight in Maderno, the enemy was worsted, and Eugene quietly

marched around the lake and concentrated on the

east shore, hoping to

push unopposed down the Adige on the

But as the French had taken possession

right bank.

sides of the lower part of the lake,

way through

to

of both

he was forced to fight his

the other side of the river.

Luckily the

Fi-ench had omitted to hold the passage at Chiuso, else they

would have quite barred the imperial passage down the valley of the Adige.

Prince Eugene marched through the Polesella

May 17, took post along the left bank at San He here awaited his reinforcements and pontoons,

valley, and,

Martino.

which on arrival would give him thousand Hessians

men and still

full

some

all told

thirty-eight

equipment, not counting ten thousand

on the way.

Vendome

left

thirty thousand

VENDOME REPLACES VILLEROL

760

men

to

watch

tlie

west

sliore of

Garda, and, committing the

error as Catinat, assumed a position in detachments

same

from Salo down, a large part lying opposite the prince, on the right

men

bank

inactive.

nearly forty thousand

Here the armies remained

thus employed.

weeks

He had

of the Adige.

Eugene could go no further

forcements came up to replace him when he

left.

Meanwhile La Feuillade had besieged Turin

men and two hundred and

forty-two thousand

guns and mortars

;

tv^o or three

until his rein-

in

May

with

thirty-seven

and leaving twenty thousand men

to

defend the capital, the duke of Savoy took refuge with eight

thousand men in the Cottian Alps at Luserna, and loudly called to Prince

Eugene

last year's failure

bank

of the Po,

Determined

for aid.

by moving

Eugene

left eight

to hold the line of the Adige,

to retrieve his

Piedmont along the right

to

thousand

men

at

Verona

which force was later joined by

the prince of Hesse with his ten thousand, started with the rest in

two detachments, July 4 and

and crossed

at

Boara and

at

between the 9th and the 14th. his operations that he

5,

down

the left bank,

Badia, below Castelbaldo,

So well concealed had been

met with but

slight opposition,

though

there were twenty-seven thousand French on the right bank

from Verona

to Badia.

Luckily for the Italian

dome from

situation, the

king now called Ven-

where Villeroi had been

Italy to the Netherlands,

defeated at Ramillies, and the duke of Orleans, with Marsin as second,

was given the command.

worthy antagonist, and

French successes in

his

Italy.

Vendome had been

removal was the death-blow to the

Eugene was

as fortunate in his

opponents as Marlborough had been in Villeroi. of

command

upset

a

all calculations,

new

The change

and the new commander

found himself face to face with an awkward duty; but he took some healthy measures, called in thirteen thousand

men

OPERATIONS ON THE from

La

Feuillade,

761

PO.

and placed ten thousand under Mendavi

opposite the prince of Hesse.

Prince Eugene had crossed the numerous canals and water-

ways south

He was

of the Adige,

and the Po at Polozella, by July 24.

detained near Finale until, on July 27, he heard of

when he moved

the actual arrival of the prince of Hesse,

upstream and over the Secchia past Carpi, and Augiist 1 over the Ledo canal

;

thence up to the line of the Parmegiano,

with a column nearly twenty-five thousand strong.

The duke

back behind the

of Orleans, meanwhile, fell

Mincio, and thinking to arrest Eugene's further march, he left thirt}^

thousand

men on

that line, crossed at

and took up a position on the Parmegiano.

San Bene-

bank of the Po,

detto with twenty-six thousand to the south

Finding his oppo-

nent on hand. Prince Eugene reconnoitred, and ascertained that the

duke lay behind a marsh made by the stream, where

he could not be readily attacked, and concluded to turn him out of this position by the south.

At

this

time the prince of Hesse began operations, and

advanced to the Mincio, and the duke, the north

bank should be changed

lest the situation

on

to his disadvantage, left

the Parmegiano, and retired across the Po, thus opening the road to Piedmont along

its

right

bank ; and

to cap the

French troubles, when he reached the Mincio he found that the prince of Hesse river at Goito.

had already secured the passage

failed to stop either of his opponents in their

His

activity

of that

Thus, despite his rapid movements, he had

westward march.

had been weak and misplaced

vring between two enemies will not suffice

;

it

;

mere manoeurequires battle.

Prince Eugene utilized the enemy's absence by capturing

Carpi August

August 9 and 15,

5,

14,

Correggio August

8,

Finale and Reggie

and advanced on and took Parma August

where the troops were given on the 16th a day of

rest

on

A RACE FOR STRADELLA.

762

account of great heat

The season was

;

and thence marched

and

dry,

the numerous

Piacenza.

to

streams did not

greatly delay the march.

The duke

of Orleans recognized his mistake

he now had

;

one more chance to stop Eugene, and that was at the pass of Stradella, where the possession of the defile between the

Apennines and the Po would have shut Eugene out from reaching Piedmont on the right bank of the river.

It

was

the key to northwestern Italy, and could be held by a small

body against a large army.

We

remember that

jilayed its

it

due part in Hannibal's campaign along the Po, as has in

all ojDerations in

saw

diike of Orleans

ahead

to this pass,

To

northern Italy.

his credit the

this chance, hurried seven

thousand

and followed with the bulk

The march was along the in wagons to make speed.

left

men

of his army.

bank, and the foot was carried

But Prince Eugene was So soon

while the duke was not.

always

it

fortunate,

as he heard that the

French

were heading for Stradella, he himself speeded a detach-

ment

of

seven thousand

men towards

the defile, followed

after a few hours by a second one, and the prince

He

the column with all his cavalry.

later joined

reached San Giovanni

July 21, and learned to his gratification that the commander of the leading

detachment had seized the

second one had gone on to Voghera. of the foot

came up

;

and on the 27th

On it

at Castelnuovo, while the

the 26th the van crossed the Bormida,

The army

stood at the Tanaro.

marched between the

and that the

the 23d the rest

next day they marched to Voghera,

and on the 25th went into camp van pushed on.

defile,

On

followed,

fortresses of Alexandria

and Tortona

— an

unusual pro-

without blockading or besieging either,

ceeding in those days, as they were held by French garrisons,

— and marching Isola,

to Nizza, crossed the Tanaro,

with van at Villafranca.

From

the

August

28, at

Tanaro Eugene,

THE ARMIES AT TURIN. on the

763

day of August, joined the duke of Savoy on

last

the upper Po, at Villastellona, whither the duke had come to

Between them they had some

meet him. men.

The

sick

The duke at Stradella,

of Savoy, did,

and baggage were sent

thousand

of Orleans, having failed to anticipate

Eugene

and thus to prevent his junction with the duke

still

managed

to get to

by the shorter road up the

The

La

thirty-six

to Alba.

Turin

left

first,

bank

marching, as he

of the Po.

With

Battle of Turin.

Feuillade he had ninety battalions and one hundred and

thirty-eight squadrons,

Turin

lies

on the

some sixty thousand men.

flat left

had a strong bridge-head and bank.

bank

of the Po,

line of

and

at that

works on the

In his prolonged siege of the place,

La

day

hilly right

Feuillade had

main attack against the

citadel, and though the had lasted four months, and the town had been much bombarded, the whole operation had been so lamentably con-

directed his siege

ducted that

its

works were

had been made

still

strong.

A breach, to be sure,

in the citadel, but several assaults

had been

THE FRENCH ON THE DEFENSIVE.

764

On

driven back.

bank was a

the left

and the troops used

line of contravallation,

in the siege were protected

by a

line of

circumvallation a dozen or more miles long, whose left flank

leaned on the

Po

the

The one battle

falls into

The

city.

Po

to

move on

lines

were cut by the

at Turin.

who were two to one of the army and give it

the imperial

but in this matter the French generals were divided

in opinion

tember

the

policy of the French,

was clearly ;

the right on the Stura, which falls into

not far below the

Dora, which

allies,

Po and

5,

;

and

finally

Marsin, at the council of war of Sep-

exhibited instructions from Louis

XIV.

giving

him

the right above the duke of Orleans to decide what action

should be taken in case of an attack on Turin ferred to await the

enemy

was a singular order

and he preThis

command and who was a better,

to a supposed second in

a marked indignity to the duke of Orleans, if

;

in the circumvallation lines.

not an older, soldier.

These circumvallation

lines were,

however, weak of themselves as well as weakly garrisoned, especially

between the Stura and Dora

tack had been anticipated by

moment were It

a

scarcely

La

battle.

force, lost

;

was wasted

French

much

at-

to fight

their

in the extent of

and the men, knowing that they were

in superior

The

of their spirit behind intrenchments.

French generals believed that the attack with any chance of success the

in the

They were stronger than

adversaries, but their strength their lines

where no

and where at the

more than eight thousand men.

was in the highest degree unwise

strictly defensive

rivers,

Feuillade,

;

allies

that they could not cross

Dora without exposing themselves

to a dangerous sortie,

and that therefore they would not try

;

reason that to the intrenchments near the tion

had not been

mon

lapse of Judgment.

paid.

were too weak to

and

it

was for

Dora proper

this

atten-

This was a curious but not uncom-

EUGENE'S COLUMNS. Meanwhile Eugene and the duke upper Po and camped at Pianezza,

of

765

Savoy crossed the

six miles

from Tiuin

they then passed around the lines of the besiegers by the

make demonstrations

south and west, leaving some bodies to

from the

east,

and took up a position between the Stura and

Dora, with headquarters at the castle of

La

Veneria.

A

large convoy coming from France was cleverly seized by the

duke, and came iu good stead.

The commandant

of Turin,

General Daun, was notified

that next day, September 7, an attack would be made, of

which a certain signal would be given.

On

the other side of the Po, across the bridge, on the

Capuchin

General Alberghatti with

lay

hill,

a

force of

twenty thousand French, to shut in the city from the right bank.

General

Daun

sent a force of six thousand militia

across to the bridge-head to prevent Alberghatti

from

detail-

ing any of his forces to aid the rest of the besiegers, case he did so, to

make

or, in

a junction with a big convoy and six

thousand Piedmontese troops which were waiting a chance to enter the city.

After a careful reconnoissance Eugene saw that north of the

Dora the French

on September

7,

line

was the weakest

that the imperial

vaUation lines of the French.

men

and these he ployed at daylight.

in line, of

and

which

into eight columns,

lines, his

was here,

the circum-

He had

thousand were horse,

and started from camp

His right leaned on the Dora, two

it

intelligence.

six

Stura, and he deploj^ed just beyond foot stood in

and

Eugene's orders for the attack

are a model of minuteness, care thirty thousand

;

army attacked

his left

on the

artillery range.

His

cavalry in a third and fourth line

there were three to four hundred paces between lines, and he

delivered his assault about an hour before noon, with all the

elan of which he was capable.

A SHARP ATTACK.

766

There were but from eight about four thousand horse six

men from

thousand

thousand foot here and

to ten

and General Daun

;

at once sent

within walls to assail them in rear.

The allied left was the first to reach the enemy's lines and make an impression, as the right had less good ground to

to

pass over.

There was the usual swaying to and fro of an

assaulting line, and the allied cavalry was once thrust back

and threatened with demoralization

but

;

was not long,

it

under the always gallant personal conduct of Eugene, who here ran his risk with the junior

officers,

before the line of

circumvallation was broken through and the French de-

fenders driven back.

up too duke

late,

The French reinforcements

and were successively beaten

of Orleans

had

in

all

came

detail.

The

called for twelve thousand

General Alberghatti on the right bank of the Po officer

deemed himself neutralized by the

montese who were trying to throw

men from ;

but this

thousand Pied-

six

Turin and by

relief into

the bridge-head garrison, and did not respond.

The garrison French

of

Turin now made a sharper

The duke

rear.

of

Marsin were both wounded, the French,

ill-led

sally

mortally

latter

on the

Field-Marshal ;

and the

and dispersed, were quite broken up and many

Po and drowned.

They

hundred wounded and

six

driven into the killed, twelve

and

Orleans

over one hundred guns and

all their

and, lacking leadership,

back, not by

fell

lost

two thousand

thousand prisoners,

baggage and material

way

of Casal or the

Milan region, where were Mendavi and a number of strong garrisons, but towards the

Alps

at Pinerolo,

Alberghatti also took, crossing the direct route to allied position.

killed

Po

which direction

at Cavoretto.

France via Susa was already cut

The

allied loss

off

Their

by the

was nine hundred and

fifty

and twenty-three hundred wounded.

Meanwhile, the prince of Hesse, besieging Castiglione, had

ITALY RESCUED.

767

been attacked by Mendavi, who had defeated and thrown him

back behind the Mincio with a

Had

the beaten Turin

army

thousand men.

loss of six

actually retired on Milan, the

campaign might not have been entirely

But the

lost.

allies

now began gradually to capture the strong places in Piedmont and the duchy of Milan, twenty-three of which fell to them

in

the succeeding three months

and seeing that he

;

could no longer hold himself in Italy, Louis

XIV.

recalled

the troops and gave up his fortresses against free exit for

The

the garrisons.

which those

results allies

gained

all

at

Blenheim and Ramillies had had.

Italy,

and were able

the borders of France. Italy

had the same immense

victory at Turin

to carry the

many and Holland were

noted victory, as Ger-

this

not.

So splendid a success against an enemy double any captain.

rarely falls to the lot of it

to

Indeed, the residts were greater, for

was permanently freed by

earned, coming as

The

war

his strength

This one was fairly

did from Eugene's decisive march to

Piedmont, where he lay upon the communications of the

French with France

;

the forcing of battle at Turin after the

selection of the best part of the line to attack

The

fortune which attended him.

mont

is

one of his best operations.

He

conceived.

and thus

prince's

all

;

and the good

march

to Pied-

was bold and well

It

threw up his communications with Germany,

hope of reinforcements, for the duke of Savoy

had but few troops

left,

as well as of victual, for the

held the entire country. difficult route,

cut up by

The

right

many

bank

streams

;

of the

and the

enemy

Po was a defile of

Stradella must be reached before the French could take

The

question of rationing his

insuperable obstacle. prince,

and

men was

But fortime

lent herself to his bold

The French made

mistakes.

at that

it.

day an almost

this year smiled

upon the

and clever manoeuvres.

Vendome

besfan

with the

THE MOST BRILLIANT CAMPAIGN.

768

same error which Catinat had made, of trying to watch the but circumstances prevented the entire line of the Adige ;

error from bearing eral

and the calling away of

fruit,

this gen-

Vendome had the only true enemy and Turin will fall. But the duke

was a great misfortune.

theory

:

beat the

of Orleans

worked on the converse

French were strong enough

dome had no chance after his i-ecall the

to

to

At

plan.

overwhelm the

times the

all

allies,

but Ven-

show what he might have done, and

They opened the

French operated badly.

road to Piedmont to Prince Eugene, did not dispute the defile at Stradella,

instead of

and while of twice

moving out

to fight him,

his strength at Turin,

remained in the Turin

lines

to be beaten.

Had Vendome army

been kept in command, or had the French

retired on Milan, Prince Eugene's triumph

have been so

brilliant.

of this campaign,

it

must be granted that the errors of the

much

French, and good fortune, helped him as

weak methods helped Marlborough. sometimes

thank mere fortune

to

whelmed and

was not over-

as Napoleon's brilliant successes were often due

;

It

as Villeroi's

But even a Caesar had that he

to the fatuity of his opponents, so with

borough.

might not

Without underrating the splendor

Eugene and Marl-

was Hannibal alone who constantly worked

against fortune, and fought able opponents.

Here again

battle

the whole, this

had done more than manoeuvring.

campaign

is

by any general during the

On

the most brilliant one conducted

War

Pike Breaker.

of the Spanish Succession.

(16tli

Century.)

LXI.

OUDENARDE AND In 1707

little

LILLE.

was done.

JULY

11

AND OCTOBER

men Vendome Marlborough was at Eugene's army was kept on the Rhine

In 1708 the French had one hundred thousand

near Mons, under the duke of Burgundy and Brussels with sixty-five thousand men. other troops replaced

until

22, 1708.

it,

when he

;

Netherlands army.

Avas to join the

After some manoeuvring Marlborough, who feared that the French would take

Oudenarde, determined on his

army was

allies

still

battle.

Eugene was personally with him, though

on the march from the Rhine.

before Eugene's

army could come up

Vendome

Finally Marlborough forced operations, and attacked the French while

cided.

both armies were crossing the Scheldt below Oudenarde. battle

desired to fight the

but Burgundy was slow and unde-

;

and commanded part of Marlborough's army.

struggle

— somewhat

irregular in character

of the French, enveloped them,

When

— the

allies

and drove the wreck of

Eugene joined

turned the right flank

their

army back

to

Ghent.

Eugene's army arrived, he and Marlborough had one hundred and

twenty thousand men, with which they undertook the siege of

French had ninety-six thousand men, but they did nothing rupt

in the'

After a long and bloody

it.

and

finally, despite a

and the French

The

retired

handsome defense by Marshal

The

Lille.

effective to inter-

Boufflers,

LUle

fell,

from Flanders.

spring after the battle of Ramillies (1707) Vendome,

with his eighty thousand men, was ordered to operate defensively against the allied

Marlborough was inactive

army ;

but

of it

but thirty-six thousand.

was the Dutch

held him back from active work, quite as ited

much

officials

as

it

who

was lim-

numbers, and the entire campaign was comj^osed of unim-

portant manoeuvres and petty operations.

war had become more complicated.

It

The

theatre of

was decided among

the allies to protect Savoy against a probable French attack, as well as to prevent

French reinforcements from being

dis-

patched to Spain, by undertaking an invasion of southern

_

TOULON OPERATION.

770 France

but this campaign had no better

;

Eugene and the duke

Savoy undertook the

of

Prince

result.

exj^edition into

France by way of the Maritime Alps, in connection with a British-Dutch

and operated against Toulon.

fleet,

After a

long and difficult march, the army reached that port at the

end of July, and found the garrison so depleted that energetic measures would have resulted in insisted

on a regular siege

;

its

this lasted

the delay the place was relieved

a month, and during

by the French.

ducted a handsome retreat, capturing Susa at

whole

affair

was a

failure,

But the duke

capture.

Eugene con-

its close.

consequent want of energy of the duke of Savoy.

blundering was not Eugene's there

is

on

Sf)ain, for

on April 25,

command

Marshal Berwick,

in

defeated the

and placed

Bourbons.

allies,

On

the

Bourbons

imperial

;

It

of the

and the

;

had no

French

special

Almanza,

at the battle of

forces, totally

Sj^ain in the possession of the

the other hand, with an

thousand men, General

That the

clear evidence

operation does not bear his thumb-marks. effect

The

apparently owing to jealousy and

army

thirteen

of

Daun conquered Naples and

ejected

but to offset this success, Villars beat an

army on the Bhine, destroyed

the StoUhofen lines,

invaded Swabia and levied contributions on the land.

In 1708 the French Netherlands army was raised to a force, not including garrisons, of one

hundred thousand men,

and concentrated near Mons, from which quarter

it

was

to

operate under the duke of Burgundy, grandson of Louis

XIV., with Vendome which should be risk.

land.

Villars

as his second

and mentor, on a plan

offensive,

but without running any serious

had a small

force on the borders of Switzer-

An army

of fifty thousand

men, under the elector of

Bavaria and Field-Marshal Berwick (who, after his victory at

Almanza, had been ordered north), stood

was

to be faced

by the

elector of

at Strasburg,

Hanover; but

and

until the

LACK OF MONEY. forces of the latter were

Ill

concentrated, Prince

all

Eugene,

with his army of thirty -five thousand Saxons, Hessians, Palatinate troops

and

Coblentz, and

when

join the

imperialists,

relieved to

was ordered

march

remain near

to

Netherlands to

to the

Anglo-Dutch army under Marlborough.

was recognized. to be

done

It

plan of action

many Well

;

in the

Countries, and in

upon the

prince.

was that the sea powers had abundant resources and

campaign

Eugene had

in a friendly land,

There were also annoying

— the

electors of

actually been sent to

where he might not take sup-

and without money wherewith

princes,

Eugene and

April to confer as to the

but the imperial exchequer was so empty that

were willing to use them.

plies,

Low

Hague

serious additional duties were laid it

excel-

was manifest that the heavy work was

this year in the

Marlborough met

The

two captains

lent result of the generous cooperation of these

buy them.

to

difficulties

with

Palatinate, and the landgrave of Hesse, all of

the secondary role they had to play, and

demands.

the

all

German

Hanover, Saxony, Mainz and the

whom

disliked

made impossible

But the diplomatic good-nature of Marlborough

and Eugene

finally

smoothed over these troubles before the

campaign opened. Marlborough had been lying near Brussels with thousand

men

(English,

sixty-five

Dutch, Danes, Hanoverians and

Prussians) and one hundred and thirteen guns.

There had

been some anticipation of treachery on the part of the garrison of Antwerp, and fearing that Vendome,

moving

into Flanders,

would go thither

the fact, Marlborough marched,

way

to that important harbor.

to Soignies,

May

who had been

to take advantage of

24, to Hal, to bar the

The French, May

26,

marched

and on June 1 moved further on and camped

between Genappe and Braine I'AUeud, about three leagues

from Marlborough, on the

allies'

left

flank.

Marlborough

VENDOME'S ABLE MANCEUVRING.

772

did not understand Vendome's purpose, but from his position

conceived fears for Louvain or even Brussels

;

and as he

needed to keep the road open for Eugene, who was by and

by

to

come on from Coblentz, he moved by a quick night

He

urgently

latter could

not yet

march, June 2—3, to a position near Louvain.

needed Eugene's assistance, but the

hand

leave the Rhine, for Berwick was on

the

in

armies here remained a month. liked to attack

Vendome and

— the

by Frederick.

Few

Both

Marlborough would have

by a

cut the knot

he did not feel strong enough to do one ever had

and

force,

Hanoverian contingent had not yet come up.

He

so.

utter disregard of

battle

;

but

had not — no

numbers displayed

ever led such battalions as the last of

the kings.

Vendome was purpose.

energetic meanwhile

;

he had a very clear

His diversion towards Louvain was a simple ruse

to keep Marlborough's eyes

away from the

The

Scheldt.

provinces acquired by the allies as a result of Ramillies were full of malcontents.

dially hated the

Dutch

They were Catholic ;

and the

latter

;

the people cor-

were not wise in their

treatment of the case, but levied taxes remorselessly.

was a most important was a

sort of

place.

In the hands of the

Ghent allies it

advanced work which defended Flanders, and

a base from which Lille, the great French fortress, could be threatened.

Vendome proposed

to

have

it,

and for some

time had been working with the authorities within walls to induce them to play into his hands.

and by able left

dispositions, energy

Li

this

he succeeded,

and a sharp march by

his

on the night of July 4 to the Senne, the French got well

ahead of Marlborough, advanced across the Dender, and on July 5 one of their parties seized Ghent by a coup de main.

Another party

laid hold of

Bruges on the same day, and

Plassendael, one of the defenses of Ostende, was captured by

MARLBOROUGH REPLIES.

773

This was a blow straight in the fa ce of the

storm July 10.

Anglo-Dutch.

On July

5,

learning of Vendome's

Marlborough,

operations

had advanced with the hope

on

of arresting his progress

,;

but the French marshal was too speedy, placed himself back of Alost to protect Ghent,

and Marlborough took

Asche, west of Brussels.

He was

on the Dender

Jiily 7,

jiosition at

ready to attack the enemy

but the harm had been already done,

He now

and battle would correct nothing.

feared the

enemy

would capture Oudenarde, as was indeed Vendome's next projected step

and he threw

;

into

it

a force taken from the

garrisons of neighboring places, sufficient to hold

before the French came to invest

the

Dutch

to so alarmino-

of Eugene's corps,

become

efPect of depressing

an extent that the Eno-lish com-

to force a battle if

just

it.

These successes of the French had the

mander determined

it,

he could do

even before the arrival

so, lest

the

Dutch should

so far demoralized as to conclude a separate peace.

Indeed, Marlborough, whose health was far from good, was himself

much

down-hearted, and

arrived at this time to cheer

long in presenting

itself,

him

it

up.

was well that Eugene

An

occasion was not

and Marlborough, with the counte-

nance of Eugene, who, escorted by a small cavalry force, had hurried ahead of his corps, was not slow to embrace

it.

Hav-

ing failed to seize Oudenarde out of hand as he had Ghent,

Vendome determined to besiege the place, and detached a force to make preparation for so doing. The fortress was central, commanded a passage of the Scheldt, whose high banks make it an easily defended river, and gave its possessor singular facilities for manoeuvring in both Brabant and Flanders.

To cover

the projected siege as well as

Ghent and

Bruges, the French position between Oordegen and Alost was as good as any.

Marlborough,

still

fearing for this impor-

ABLE TURNING MOVEMENT.

774 tant

fort'i^ess,

well

out

him a

home communications, as enemy would occupy and eat

link in his

apprehensive that the

s'i

all

to

northern Flanders, thus consuming victual he needed

}:nmself,

His

determined to forestall both accidents.

secure battle was to

France, instead of

i^lan to

move on Vendome's communications with and this had directly on his main body ;

He

manifest advantages, as the event showed.

hurried a

detachment of three regiments each of foot and horse, and under General Cadogan, July

six guns,

Lessines, with orders to bridge

by

to the

its left

it

;

the

9, to

the

Dender

at

army moved forward

same place on the 11th, and Cadogan was

again sent with sixteen battalions and thirty squadrons to bridge the Scheldt below Oudenarde. ily

The main

force speed-

followed, and next day reached and stood ready to pass

that river.

some

In forty-eight hours the troops had marched

forty miles,

cross a second.

had crossed one river and made ready to This was fast work at that day, good for

any day.

Hoping the

to prevent the allies' passage of the

Dender, of

march on which he was informed, Vendome had, July

advanced

to Ninove, where, finding that

9,

he was too late to

accomplish the end in view, and ascertaining that the

allies

were bridging the Scheldt, he conceived fears for Ghent, and in

order to cover that fortress, turned back to the river,

which he prepared to cross on distance

below

Marlborough's

detachment was ordered It fight

was apparent

to

his bridge at Gavre, a short

bridges.

The Oudenarde

in.

Vendome

that the thing to do was to

Marlborough before Eugene's corps came up, and he

advised his chief, the duke of Burgundy, to cross the Scheldt as soon as he could possibly put the troops over, to fall

upon the enemy.

Vendome

and be ready

In pursuance of this idea, in

fact,

sent to the other side the van under General Biron,

VENDOME IN THE LEASH. with orders to hold the

775

the French

allies till

army should

have got over, so that the whole force could then

them while Eyne.

in the confusion of crossing.

The operation could very well have been

moment were

as the allies at this

still

bridges and the French had their the

allied

first

fall

upon

Biron occupied carried out,

busy completing their

own

all

ready

and when

;

detachment, under Cadogan, pushed out

towards the high ground, they ran across these very forces of

No

Vendome's.

better plan could have been devised, for the

French were several hours it

in

was not promptly carried

speed.

The duke

tool in the

ened,

advance of Marlborough

and

out,

Burgundy had been,

of

hands of his able second

and the pulse

of

in quicker beats, the

its

Vendome,

;

but

;

very essence was so far, a passive

but as dangers thick-

soldier-like,

began

to throb

duke grew nervous and undecided, and

instead of pushing the troops over the river, as advised his lieutenant,

consumed the precious time

conclusion as to what he had best do.

He

afraid to go into a general engagement,

and

wise to return to Ghent.

But

it

It

coming

finally

Eyne and

to its left.

thought

late to avoid

was not long

after

Cadogan had crossed the Scheldt and pushed

and twelve battalions

by

to a

appeared to be

was already too

the one or accomplish the other. that

in

noon

his horse

of foot out to the higher land towards

He

soon struck the French van from

Gavre, which stopped him in a smart encounter and seized

Eyne. still

Notwithstanding the laxness of Burgundy, Vendome

hoped

to be able to catch the

and as troops got

over, he

formed

ground behind the Norken.

Some

English astride the river, line of battle

on the high

eighty thousand

men were

Meanwhile Marlborough and Eugene pushed forward the crossing, and by two o'clock had got over a subthus set up.

stantial part of their equal

speed and purpose

:

numbers.

It

had been a race of

Marlborough and Eugene were

instinct

BURGUNDY HESITATES.

776

with a single idea, while Venclome was hampered in

Had

did by his inexpert and hesitating chief. in

command, the

battle of

an

allied victory.

Some

all

he

he been sole

Oudenarde might not have proven critics

underrate Vendome's ability

Battle of Oudenarde.

in this campaign.

At times he

exhibited his best qualities

at others he lapsed into his indolent

Vendome's idea of the best way

to fight the battle

drive an attack firmly in on the allied right, it,

cut

it

from the river and the bridges

;

;

was

to

and by breaking

and he dispatched

a force under General Pfiffer from the left to open

manoeuvre

;

mood.

uj)

the

but Burgundy, technically in command, would

not permit the operation, alleging unsuitability of ground

near the

river.

Advancing along the Ghent road,

did, however, get as far as

Huerne and Eyne.

Pfiffer

These contin-

THE FRENCH ATTACK. ued delays and

Burgundy now that

was no longer

it

The

him.

were

irresolute orders

desired to retreat, but feasible

;

Ill

fatal to the

French.

Vendome showed him

enemy was already upon

the

brilliant opportunity for

overwhelming the

allies

while astride the river had faded as the sun grew lower.

As

the allied trooj)s were got u]3on the field, they were

marshaled on the

and

so soon as

pushed

in

first

high ground to the west from Eyne,

enough men were on hand, Cadogan was again

on that

fighting he took,

riding around

village,

which after a sharp half hour's

by attacking

its

left

it

in front with his foot

with his

squadrons.

drO'W to the vicinity of the Norken, fatuity, it

was Cadogan's

activity

Added

Pfiffer

and

with-

to Burgvindy's

which had prevented the

French from disturbing the crossing, now completed under the cover he had afforded.

The attack

behind the Norken was a serious one to

position ;

and when he found that he had been prevented by

Burgundy from seasonably

initiating

an offensive

battle,

Ven-

dome bethought him to invite attack here. But nothing would suit his chief, who now ordered some cavalry forward from the right to

see

if

he could occuj)y the Huerne plateau.

This force he shortly followed up by some

and presently

foot,

a large part of the French right was marching out to the attack. It

was well

serious,

and by

after four

when the French attack became

this time the allies

were ready for

it.

The

cavalry force pushed out from the right, having met some of the Prussian horse, fell back to Royeghem.

There was no

system in the manoeu\Tes of the French, who, now that their opportunity had passed, advanced their right in earnest.

Divining that they would make their main effort with wing,

Marlborough had deployed

his

troops

this

accordingly,

pushed forward the forces from Eyne towards Huerne and

HEAVY INFANTRY FIGHTING.

778

Herlehem, and threw out small parties the woods

and hedges beyond the

advanced ground for the troops

The Prussian horse was

to seize

and defend

line, so as to

hold the

to occupy as they arrived.

sent out to the left of this

beyond Huerne, while Shaecken was held by twenty ions.

As

yet

had been got up

little artillery

;

body

battal-

time had not

sufficed.

No

sooner had Marlborough reached this advanced position

than the French right was upon him.

Thirty battalions of

French and Swiss guards debouched from the covered country on Groemvelde, it

fell

on a small

down

up, and pushed on

the

allied force posted there, cut little

brook, taking Marlbor-

ough's advanced force absolutely in reverse.

Not slow

to

perceive or utilize their advantage, the French all too soon

caught the inspiration of success, and already the cry of

But Marlborough

tory began to resound along their lines.

was happily equal was at hand

;

to

the right, giving

to the occasion.

vic-

Eugene, the ever ready,

him Marlborough confided the work upon him

his

English troops, while, seizing the

Dutch and Hanoverians, he ing tide of defeat on the

set himself to

left of

Schaecken.

stem the threatenForeseeing that

the French would soon attack in force on their immediate front,

he sent twenty more battalions under Count Lottum to

Eugene, intending that by and by the decisive blow shoidd be given by the right third

of

all

;

so that the prince

the allied

foot —

now had about one

sixty battalions

command,

— more than twice what Marlborough

the

Well

left.

that

it

was

so, for

— under

the French columns between

Groemvelde and Schaecken were making desperate follow up their supposed gain, and

do to hold them in check.

his

retained on

Eugene had

Moreover, at

this

all

efforts to

he could

moment

the

infantry of the French left-centre advanced across the Norken, and the cavalry of their left followed to sustain them.

A HANDSOME MANCEUVRE. Cadogan onslaught

was

hustled out of Herlehem

779

by the

sudden

but the reinforcement enabled Eugene to reestab-

;

lish the fight,

and having

first

driven the French back across

the Eyne, he. turned to the plateau and broke the French

first

while the Prussian horse followed up this gain and

line,

charged clean through the French second

line,

being only

stopped by the reserve of cuirassiers in the rear, which drove it

back.

There being few guns of either army on the a pronounced

and

it

every

effect,

field to

make

the battle was one of musketry only,

took the form of desperate contests by small bodies at

patch of woods, every hedge, ditch or hamlet.

little

Opposite Marlborough west of Schaecken, where he was

French success with the Dutch

striving to turn the tide of

and Hanoverians, the fighting was similar and equally

Every

obstacle

was

utilized,

and a

series of partial

and

ate encounters resulted all along the S-shaped line.

was of small use

finally,

desjier-

Cavalry

in the country covered with hedges

copses, unless dismounted.

and

severe.

But the

and

foot fought tenaciously,

under Marlborough's strong

will,

the allied line

compelled the retreat from their advanced position of the French, who too soon had deemed the victory secure. it

was only by desperate hand

were forced back

to

Diepenbeck

to ;

But

hand fighting that they

and here ensued a

jDause.

Neither party could gain a step.

Marlborough's eye was keen.

Oycke on

his

left,

Spying the windmill of

he detached Overkirk with the reserve

cavalry and twenty Dutch battalions

beyond and turn the French despite the heavy ground cut

the veteran general

made

toward the west.

He

up by

his

French force which held the

right.

way

all

to

occupy

it,

With marked manner

thither,

move speed,

of obstacles,

and defeating a

castle of Bevere,

threw

it

off

soon got himself into a position on the

THE FRENCH SURROUNDED.

780

French right left

flank,

which was in the

and, extending his

air,

under the prince of Orange as far as he could reach,

he enveloped their forces from Bevere to Royeghem.

manoeuvre was in reality what won the troops along the Eyne, startled by a fell

and

back,

much

in

This

battle, for the

French

fire in their rear,

quickly

and

confusion,

this

was carried

throughout the army, and grew into a panic as darkness

on the field. From a species of convex order, the now swung forward into a huge concave semicircle, and

settled allies

drove the French before them at every point, crowding them in

Thus huddled together on the

more and more.

was

little

chance to fight to good of

resistance

the

effect,

plain, there

and even the

French gendarmes, who did

stoutest

their

duty

nobly, could effect nothing.

Vendome sought right-centre

to

stem the tide by a heroic assault on the

and right of the

could muster on his

left

cess of the allied left,

;

Eugene held

The ground was

onslaught.

with

allies

all

the

forces

he

but cheered with the marked suc-

so

his

much

own

against the heavy

cut up that the French

could not advance in order, and the Bavarian horse held

bravely to

its line

on the edge of the plain.

advanced his wing to cut

off the

enemy from the

Eugene now river,

and so

fully did the concave order of the enveloping force complete

the circle, that the two outer flanks met on the heights in the French rear, and indeed exchanged volleys at each other in the dark. It

was through

French nearly

left

all

this

gradually narrowing gap that the

and centre made

taken, a few only

their escape.

making

their

Their right was

way through open-

ings in the allied line to Bevere and thence towards France

and Eugene captured prisoners from

their left wholesale.

It

occurred to him to have the French "appel" (assembly)

beaten by his drums, which brought in a vast number of

A SEVERE DEFEAT. men

Had

to swell his prisoners.

army would have been forced

The French

lost

three

781

daylight lasted, the French

into surrender.

thousand

four

killed,

wounded, nine thousand prisoners, three thousand one thousand loss

officers

and one hundred standards.

was two thousand

or, as

killed

thousand deserters,

The

allied

and three thousand wounded

killed

otherwise stated, only eight hundred and twenty-five

and two thousand two hundred wounded.

In this battle of Oudenarde the French army was ahnost

broken up.

Vendome was

repair the disaster.

He

who most

the one

contributed to

gathered a handful of troops less

demoralized than the others, formed a rear-guard; arrested the flying

army and

reestablished a

When

miles in front of Ghent.

new

line three or four

next day (July 12) Marl-

borough sent twelve battalions and forty squadrons on Ghent, expecting to complete his yesterday's work, the force was received and checked by after, the

French army

a position with

its

the Bruges and point,

fell

back

Ghent

Vendome

at this place.

Shortly

back through Ghent and took behind

to the sea,

canal.

With

fortified lines

uj)

and

a heavy force at this

from which Brussels could be threatened, Vendome

believed that Marlborough would not advance into France.

Ypres, with

its fortified lines,

which the French had built to

hold the Lys-Scheldt region, soon force

sent out

fell

to an expeditionary

under the Prussian marshal Lottum

nothing further was immediately undertaken

;

;

but

Marlborough

moved up to Helchin on the Scheldt, and later, to a position on the Lys above Menin. About the 15th of July Eugene's corps arrived at Brussels,

thirty-five

thousand

strong

;

and

to

strengthen

the

French, the duke of Berwick who, when he became aware that troops were

moving from the Rhine country towards the army i7i situ, and had

Netherlands, had left part of his

A

782

headed with the

MARCH ON PARIS?

rest to the assistance of

Vendome,

also

came

up from the middle Rhine, with twenty-four thousand men, and took post near Valenciennes and Douay.

how

now appeared

army before engaging

the communications of the French

He

It

valuable had been Marlborough's action in moving on it.

had thrust the most important force of the enemy back

into a corner of Flanders,

and there was no army

own

that of Marshal Berwick between his

French

How

capital.

left

divisions

except

and the

should he utilize the favorable posi-

tion?

At

Brussels,

Ath and on

twenty thousand men, the

between the two French

Vendome's large numerically but demoralized by

armies, defeat,

the Lys, with one hundred and

allies lay

and Berwick's not strong enough

their heavy onset flushed with victory.

by some

critics that the joint

marched on one or other

to stand long against It

has been suggested

commanders should have now

But

of these divided forces.

it

is

never easy at any one era to frame your military work to the pattern of future critics of another era; and as

Vendome

was for the moment neutralized by defeat, and Berwick by lack of numbers, there were

many

other schemes for reducing

the land equally advantageous for the allied commanders to consider.

Both

of the

French armies were perhaps

judgment too strongly placed

to

warrant attack, when equal

results could be otherwise obtained.

Whatever their

nothing of the kind was attempted.

The month

consumed

in raids for material

in their

and forage, or

reasons,

of July

was

in other small

war by both armies. In discussing plans, Marlborough

is

said to have advised an

invasion of France and a march on Paris. fact that

Eugene could have been

Vendome from

left

In view of the

behind to prevent

mischievous diversions in Flanders while the

invading army should be absent, of the comparative prox-

NOT DEEMED imity of

tlie

French

in his front, this to

capital,

SAFE.

and of the lack of strong forces

was much the same operation as the march

Vienna urged on Gustavus after the

and which

so

783

many

battle of Breitenfeld,

critics stiU maintain he should

have under-

But Eugene could not have been given a force large enous'h to contain both Vendome and Berwick, who would

taken.

at once have united forces, without reducing Marlborough's

Brnssels-Lille Region.

army below

the

number

requisite for such

an invasion

;

and

the two French armies, the heavy garrisons of the intervening fortresses

and the

an array in

his rear to

lish general.

of

militia

make

the provinces were too great

the operation safe for the Eng-

In any event, the Dutch deputies would not

hear of Marlborough's absenting himself from the Countries while

Vendome remained

was incontinently shelved. agree with Marlborough

;

Low

;

and the suggestion

Eugene was

inclined at first to

but he

there

now thought

that prior to

LILLE AIMED AT.

784

an operation, some great fortress on the frontier should

sucli

be taken as a point d ^appui and magazine.

Marlborough was

in the prosecution of a

put his hand, he

he had

Obstinate as

manoeuvre

to

which

was equally diplomatic and reasona-

ble in the cabinet, and he was moreover unable to insist on

Lille,

The allies decided to undertake the siege of which Eugene was to run while Marlborough should

cover

it

his

own

view.

by posting himself between Oudenarde and Tournay.

The presence

of

Vendome

in his lines

between Ghent and

Bruges made the undertaking far from an easy one.

now

ing the navigation of the Scheldt,

French

come overland from Holland to

Lille

Oudenarde

inflicted

and victual had

to

and huge convoys must be got

;

safe

Nothing exhibits the severity

from Vendome's interruption. of the

blow which the

battle of

on the French more than the fact that

they confined themselves during to

interrupted by the

position, the ordnance, munitions

from Brussels

Lack-

all

these preparations strictly

minor schemes. Lille,

captured in

1667,

now

chief

frontier

fortress

of

France and commanding the Lys-Scheldt country, was not only one of the masterpieces of Vauban, but

by an exceptionally big garrison

—

— under

Marshal

that celebrated

soldier.

fifteen

it

was held

thousand

men

Boufflers,

who,

shrewdly anticipating an investment, had thrown himself into

The

the place at the end of July.

troops were mostly raw,

The means of defense was ample the scheme had been drawn up by Vauban himself, and was under control of his nephew, General Vauban, who

but their

spirit

was

excellent.

;

was serving in the town

make cers

;

and no

the defense a success.

Many

and noblemen were within

foreigners joined the

army

stoipie

was

left

unturned to

celebrated French

walls,

offi-

and many well-known

of the besiegers,

— among them

perhajjs the most noteworthy, a slender lad of twelve, later the

VENDOME REMAINS INACTIVE. The

great Marshal Saxe.

siege,

whichever way

was destiued to be a remarkable one,

—

equipped army was to conduct

this

larger one

;

;

for a large

it

turned,

and amply

was protected by a

and a third of over one hundi*ed thousand men

lay ready to interrupt

The

it

785

it.

great step was to get the initial convoy safely to

first

the place, without an attack by Veudome.

Luckily the latter

never dreamed of a siege

Lille

of

imagined Mons

;

he

to

be

the objective of the

convoy of which he

had

heard,

made no tion

and

he

mo-

other disturb

to

than to send a

umn

of eighteen thou-

men

part

way

the Dender.

In-

sand to

it

col-

deed he jeered at the idea of so able a as

man

Eugene undertak-

ing so impossible a

The convoy

thing.

was well conducted. It

consisted of

Siege of Lille.

five

thousand wagons containing one hundred and twenty heavy guns, sixty mortars and twenty howitzers, was fifteen miles long,

and

whence

it

left Brussels

turned

off

August

by way

Brussels garrison protected imperialists undei-took

its

6,

— via

Soignies and Ath,

of Helchin towards Lille. it

as far as

Ath

;

The

thence the

safety to Helchin, where Marl-

borouo'h received and escorted

it.

The

details of its

man-

BERWICK JOINS VENDOME.

786

agemeut furnish u

study in the art of protecting

fruitful

Marshal Berwick, who had j)ushed forward

convoys.

Amand, had suggested rupting the

allies'

to

Vendome

to St.

the advisability of inter-

plan by moving in force to some point

between Brussels and Lille

who had

but Vendome,

;

would not

as well as energetic moods,

While Eugene undertook

his lazy

listen to him.

the siege with forty thousand

men, Marlborough, with a force stated between sixty and seventy thousand, took up his position at Helchin.

This was

a well-chosen place, from which Marlborough could readily scout the country, or

move

to

any threatened point

;

and

in

order to facilitate the speedy delivery of supplies, six bridges

were built at various places on the Scheldt.

So soon as the head

August

14,

men were

set at

the big convoy reached Lille,

of

Eugene began

his

work on the

Ten thousand

operations.

lines of circumvallation

contravallation, which were nine miles in extent.

these were completed, and under

some

sorties,

Eugene opened

August 22-23. of the town, one

Two

and

before

besieged and

on the night of

attacks were chosen, both on the north

on either side of the Deule, and opposite

the horn-works at the gates of St.

On August

leine.

the

fire of

his trenches

Long

24

fire

Andre and

was opened

was finished on the 25th, and a heavy

;

fire

of the

Made-

the second parallel

was

at once begun.

Sorties were frequent, in one of which the works erected at

the chapel of the Madeleine were destroyed.

On August 30 a junction was made between the armies of Vendome and Berwick. It had required a great deal of persuasion to induce Vendome to throw up his Ghent-Bruges lines

;

but he finally

left

La Motte

in

Ghent with twenty

thousand men, and moved via Oordegen and Ninove on

Grammont, while Berwick advanced from Mons towards the same

place.

After the junction the army

— under supreme

THEY DECIDE ON ATTACK. orders

the

of

to

camped on the west

As Burgundy was a mere

tress.

— marched

duke of Burgundy

crossed the Scheldt and

787 Tournay,

of that for-

figurehead, and

Vendome

and Berwick, both able men, were

at swords' points, there

was small unity

Marlborough had made

a movement

in the

French army.

to interrupt the operation

thus concentrated, but could not do erals

now had a

by which the French

so.

The French gen-

force of over one hundred thousand men,

and

though their counsels remained divided, there was manifestly but one thing to do, and that was to relieve Lille

place,

;

with which

on September 2 they started towards the beleaguered

intent,

and soon took

uj)

a position along the

Marque on

east bank, hoping to find a chance to raise the siege.

its

Marl-

borough was early instructed of their advance, which he had been expecting, at once guessed their object, and, anticipating the mancEuvre, slipped in between them and Lille, and himself on

Marque.

September 5 assumed a

He was none

too soon.

position

behind the

Within two hours

he had established himself the French van came up.

after

The

enemy had with them some two hundred guns. Either Vendome or Berwick of his own motion would have fought but as orders from the court of Versailles had ;

impressed caution, and the two generals were so jealous of

each other and agreed so

ill

that

Burgundy could not

control

them, no plan of action could be agreed upon.

Finally, on

referring the case to Versailles, the king sent the

war minister

on to decide the action to be taken. Chamillart knew nothing of war, but he concluded that a battle

might be delivered to

Vendome and Berwick moved closer to Marlborough, taking up a position between the Marque and the advantage, and

Deule

;

to

meet which Marlborough had already constructed

a strong line to face them.

But

after all this preparation,

except a two days' cannonade, no attack was made.

Eugene

HANDSOME ASSAULTS.

788

detached enough of his besieging force to run Marlborough's strength up to eighty-five thousand men, and battle was anxiously awaited, but

The

in vain.

indeed were

colleagues

Dutch

eager to attack the French, but the

deputies, content

with the situation, vetoed the project, and Marlborough then fortified his position.

Berwick returned

to

Finally,

September 15 Vendome and

Tournay and stretched out towards Oude-

narde, and Marlborough, following,

Though still between Lille and managed so cleverly as to sever

camped near the

Scheldt.

the French, they yet had the

communications

allies'

with Brussels, and only the road to Menin remained open. Shortly the French captured the bridges over the Scheldt,

and what they had not accomplished by a

they

battle,

now

had a prospect of accomplishing by famine. In the rence,

siege-lines, sorties

and the

fire

hearty pushing, the progress

was as able as

when an

and

from both

Lille

assaults were of daily occur-

sides of. the

was strong.

was constant siege

;

but despite

was slow; Boufflers

Not

assault in force at a loss of three

until

September

thousand

7,

men gave

the allies a footing on the works, was there any special gain

and with Ghent, Bruges, Douay, Tournay,

all

hands, the case was beginning to look desperate.

tember 20 another assault in five

force,

Eugene

in person

it

On

Sep-

headed by a column of

thousand picked English troops, was delivered

given with the utmost gallantry,

French

in

;

though

was thrice repulsed, when

headed the fourth

assault,

and after two

hours' fighting a good lodgment was effected, at a loss in the

English column of two thousand killed and wounded. Eugene

was himself among the wounded, a

fact

which for a few days

seriously increased Marlborough's duties. still

On

September 23

another assault was delivered in two columns of

thousand men

;

and another lodgment was effected at a

of one thousand killed

and wounded.

five

loss

LILLE SUCCUMBS. Botli besiegers

789

and besieged were getting out of powder

but the French cunningly introduced a supply into the town by some eighteen hundred horsemen, who, each carrying a sixty-pound sack, managed to break through the investing lines

while at the same time, near the end of September,

;

Marlborough managed

to replace his exhausted store

England via Ostende, by a convoy ably

On September 30

The

men.

of at least one thousand

siege

from

led,

but with a loss

still

dragged along.

yet another stout assault was delivered

;

the

from the works never ceased, and gradually the capacity

fire

of the

town to

resist

was destroyed.

Finally, on October 22,

before a final assault was to be made. Marshal Boufflers

just,

surrendered the town and retired into the citadel, where himself six weeks

he held

December whi(5h, as

11,

was

notwithstanding

his habit,

No commander risking his

life.

nor capitulated until

longer,

number

a

Eugene frequently

of a great

army can be

Marlborough was

less

of

in

assaults,

led the column.

praised for thus

wont

to

be tempted

out of the general conduct of operations into such moods of

But while condemning the

daring.

act,

one cannot but ad-

mire the dash of the imperialist, in whose diminutive body

throbbed the heart of a

lion, as in his

militaiy intellect not surpassed

Out

brain there worked a

by any man of

of a force of fifteen thousand

his generation.

men, increased by eigh-

teen hundred horsemen, the garrison lost all but four thou-

sand

five

hundred.

The

allied loss

was three thousand

six

hundred and thirty-two killed and eight thousand three hundred and twenty -two wounded ness.

It

;

but

many more

died of sick-

was the victory of Oudenarde which so demoralized

the French that they did not interfere to better effect with this

memorable

Vendome had

siege.

rejoined the force at Ghent.

Burgundy and

Berwick remained on the Scheldt, where, from Tournay

to

THE FRENCH CORDON.

790 Oudenarde, they

fortified

all

the

crossings with

carefully

constructed works, often in double and triple lines, purj^osing

number

of small places

Bruges and Ostende, opened the

sluices at Plas-

Vendome moved in front of

From Ghent

permanently from Brussels.

to cut the allies

out and captured a

seudael near Ostende and at Nieuport, and overflowed the

country so as to cut

The

England.

off

latter

Marlborough's line of supply from

moved

across the

Lys

the capture of Lessinghe

Ven-

to attack

dome, but the Frenchman retired to Bruges.

The

flood

and

by Vendome obliged Marlborough

to send foraging parties all over the country

and well

into

Picardy, to victual the army, as well as to build high-wheeled carts to haul

powder through the inundated

At

districts.

the

beginning of November the French generals were ordered by

XIV.

Louis

to

extend their line along the Scheldt, and to

take up positions

all

around Lille in a great semicircle of

The cordon thus formed lay at Bethune, Arras, Amand, Saulces near Tournay, the right bank of

fifty leagues.

Douay, the

St.

Ghent, and behind the canal to Bruges.

Scheldt to

Small bodies only were placed along the cordon, except at Tournay, Melchin, Ghent and behind the canal. of this plan

was

to cut the allies off

The

Brussels, and meanwhile to protect France.

The weakness

of so long a line did not occur to the king; but

that

tain

scheme.

and

Vendome His

can

it

is

cer-

have had nothing to do with the

ability in this

campaign had been overlooked,

his wonderful services of the past forgotten,

which his own

object

from both the coast and

difficult disposition

— a fact to

contributed not a

little.

Both armies thus remained a month, when Berwick was again sent to the Rhine.

At

the end of

November

the French dispatched a

body of

men under the elector of Bavaria, who moved from Mons by Bi-aine I'AUeud and Hal, behind the

fifteen

thousand

CONSUMMATE

ABILITY.

Scheldt curtain, to take Brussels against that city on the 24th.

weak

wall,

;

791

and trenches were opened

Brussels had only an old and

but the garrison held bravely out, and iSlarlbor-

ough and Eugene, with

sixty-five

camp

at Marlborough's

at

thousand men, joined hands

Rouselaer, crossed the Lys, by

clever dispositions misled the enemy, and forced the Scheldt

The French

near Oudenarde.

careful construction,

was broken,

line

and the army cut

part retired to Tournay and

in two, of

which one

Grammont, and another

Having thus broken the Scheldt

Ghent.

desjoite its

lines,

Eugene

to re-

turned to the siege of Lille citadel, and Marlborough went to the relief of Brussels,

from which the

ing of his approach, sj^eedily decamped

borough marched back

The

allies

;

elector,

on hear-

whereupon Marl-

Oudenarde.

to

were not content to go into winter-quarters

Vendome lay Vendome had left while

in his to

Ghent-Bruges

La Motte

line.

Ghent, which

while he operated in the

Ostende region, was accordingly attacked and taken by a

summary

December, capitulating Januar}^

siege in

Bruges followed

suit

retired within their

soon after.

own

border,

2,

and

The French thereupon

Vendome going

into winter-

quarters between Ypres and Furnes.

During

this year the

main struggle between France and

the allies took place in the Netherlands, and the campaign

here had been one exhibiting consummate ability in strategy, tactics

and

logistics.

Elsewhere the operations were confined

to manoeuvring, but they are

of

the

studies.

more interesting

as samples

unenterprising sj^stem of the day than as military

At

the end of the campaign both j^arties appear to

have shown more signs of exhaustion than they had since the begfinninff of the war.

LXII.

MALPLAQUET. SEPTEMBER Efforts

at peace

were

fruitless,

over one hundred thousand

men

and Villars opened the 1709 campaign with

down

marched

Villars

;

Tournay and took

to its relief, took

it

They then

in July.

up a defensive

sat

lines useless.

and

position at Malplaquet,

The armies were about

the allies advanced on him.

allies

but Villars' position being too strong

Mons, from a position which rendered the French

to besiege

The

in intrenched lines near Bethune.

had one hundred and ten thousand men for attack, they laid siege to

11, 1709.

equal, each short of one

The bulk

hundred thousand men, Villars being very stoutly intrenched.

of

the fighting, though not the most bloody, was in the forest of Taisni^res, on the right, in front of

Eugene.

The Dutch on the

left assaulted

with equal heart

but the battle was not won until the French centre was disgarnished to save the left,

and Marlborough made the

final assault

which ruptured the French

line.

who had taken wounded Villars' place, withdrew in good order, with a loss of fourteen thousand men the allies had lost twenty thousand. The result of the victory was naught. The allies turned to the siege of Mons, Boufflers,

;

which they took September itary career ends.

26.

With Malplaquet, Marlborough's

Together, he and Eugene had

brilliant mil-

won Blenheim, Oudenarde and

Malplaquet; separate, he had won Ramillies and Eugene Turin. this

Honors

in

war were equal.

The

efforts to conclude

1709 were unavailing. harsh that Louis

them

;

and

felt

peace during the winter of 1708-

The

made

demands

their

so

that he could not honorably accept

his appeals to the

that, despite

allies

French people were

so effectual

unusual distress throughout France, the power

with which the new campaign was opened exceeded that of

any other in which France had ever engaged.

To Harcourt

Rhine and Alsatia; to

was intrusted the defense

of

Berwick the task

head to the duke of Savoy, who

of holding

the

threatened to debouch from the Alps

;

but Flanders was

THE RIVAL FORCES.

793

again to be the main theatre of operations.

arnere-ban were called out

;

forces were

The ban and drawn from the

Rhine, and Villars, who had replaced Veudoine, entered the

with one hundred and twelve thousand men, instinct

field

A

with enthusiasm and courage.

preliminary position was

taken up from Douay to the Lys, strongly

manner

of works, marshes

foi-tified

with

all

and inundations, and with detach-

ments out at Lannoy, Touflers and Templeuve, in a strong but extended

holding Bethmie and covering Lens.

line,

The

left

was made the stronger flank because Villars believed that

the

allies,

approach

not to lose touch with the coast, would be apt to this

way

;

and the object of the whole

Arras and Douay, fortresses which were

to be to protect

The

essential to the safety of France.

longed far to the

seemed

line

east,

and ran, more or

was

line

later pro-

by way

less well held,

of

Marchiennes and Denain, Conde and Mons, and backward

to

Maubeuge.

By

great exertions, Marlborough

supplies voted

;

managed

to get sufficient

and ten thousand men were added

English forces

in

All told, the

Flanders.

to the

allies

under

Eugene and Marlborough opened the campaign with one hundred and ten thousand men, a motley array of many

—

nationalities, but held together

and by ardent were

in a

season, at the

it

by good

discipline

and

belief in their distinguished leaders.

mood

to attack the

enemy

;

success,

They

but owing to the late

was June before their forces could assemble, and

end of June they moved forward up the Lys, and on

either side of the Deule, towards

where Villars

sat

behind his

inexpugnable defenses in the plain, and where he would have

been only too glad to accept a

from and

battle.

He

at first

imagined

their direction that the allies proposed to take Aire St.

Venant on

perhaps on Paris

;

his left,

and then move into Picardy, or

when they had,

howevei*, reached a point

VILLA RS' LINES TURNED.

794

well south of Lille, he concluded that they were about

attack him, and prepared for the event by

to

manning

his

lines.

Eugene and Marlborough

carefully reconnoitred Villars'

which they found to be altogether too strong

position,

The

attack.

right leaned on the Lille-Douay canal

had the marsh of Cambrin as a shield

tre

had received especial

which

streams and the front palisades

left,

Intrenchments lay along

and earthworks were erected everywhere, and the had a ditch

fifteen feet

two

with cavalry cantonned in the

foot-lines,

was found

wide and six feet deep,

The army was encamped behind

with corresponding rampart. this defense, in It

the cen-

inundations alternated with regularly built lines

;

entire front

rear.

;

and the

was protected by

attention,

near Bethune.

hills

;

to

by the

essential

adopt

allied generals to

some other means of opening the campaign than a foolhardy assault.

By

taking Tournay they might go far to

Villars out of the strongest part of his intrenched line right,

and

after

due deliberation they

set

turn

by the

themselves this

task.

But

first it

was wise

to deceive Villars,

manders made a demonstration if

in force

On

seriously to attack them.

com-

allied

lines, as

July 23 Eugene with the

right crossed the Deule below Lille left,

and the

towards his

;

Marlborough with the

consisting of the Anglo-Dutch, crossed the

Marque

the whole force concentrated on the upper Deule.

;

and

Villars

believed that their attack was certain, withdrew all his detach-

ments, strengthened himself with parts of the garrisons of

Tournay and other

On

the night of

tion of the it

;

fortresses,

June 27 the

enemy

allies

file

his opponents.

made a march

in such fashion that he

and then, by a sudden

troops,

and lay waiting

in the direc-

should observe

to the left, behind a curtain of

marched straight on Tournay.

So admirably was

this

CAPTURE OF TOURNAY.

795

done that by seven next morning they had reached and completely invested that fortress.

When

Villars perceived that the allies

Tournay, he did not deem

had

sat

down

before

essential to interfere with the

it

siege, but holding fast to his position, made two or three

lated attacks on the protecting force of

Amand,

and

St.

role

was

as

if

to feel

to protect the

Eugene

He

him.

at

iso-

Mortagne

understood that his

French frontier rather than

to

do

battle with the enemy.

Lying on the Scheldt, the town and

fied

large,

full of military

stores,

of

was of the

citadel

leagues reversed the roles of Lille the siege

;

Tournay from

Orchies to Pont a Tessin. 6

:

The

best.

col-

Marlborough undertook

Eugene covered the operation by a

semicircle southwest of

forti-

The outworks had been

nor was victual abundant.

drawn by Vauban, and the

Tournay was well

but the garrison was not

St.

position in a

Amand

through

Approaches were opened July

but not until the 10th were the heavy guns got up by

;

the river from Ghent.

After repeated assaults and sorties

repulsed, on the 21st a lodgment was effected in the covered

way

;

on the 27th a strong horn-work

the town surrendered, and the garrison,

The

strong, retired into the citadel. tional difficulty,

and owing

engineers, a siege of mines

weeks, with

and July 29

fell,

still

four thousand

latter offered excep-

to lack of ability in the corps of

and counter mines went on for

gi-eat loss of life.

was not

It

until

September 3

that the citadel surrendered. Villars had done nothing to interrupt the siege, but to

answer the demonstration on his right had been extending his lines

the

from Douay along the Scarpe

Scheldt.

to

Conde, and beyond

Finally, but too late to prevent

Tournay, he made another demonstration on Eugene's position was too strong

:

it

failed.

the fall of St.

Amand.

A RAPID MARCH.

796

The

allies

were

still

too

of fortresses in their front

Conde

much hampered with

— to think of advancing They had

siege operations.

the network

— Douay, Bouchain, Valenciennes, France without further

into

August 18

tried

Mar-

to seize

chiennes so as to threaten Douay, but the French had been

Deciding to complete the turning of the ene-

too watchful.

my's position then compelled them to resort to the siege of

Mons, which lay well beyond

This fortress,

Villars' right.

with Valenciennes, Douay and some minor ones, which could

be observed in case of an advance, alone remained to protect

But a passage

the French frontier at this point.

of the

Haine, the line of which was essential to secure the siege of

Mons, must be had, and Orkney was dispatched August 31 This likewise

to St. Ghislain to get hold of the crossing. failed,

but another expedition was sent out under the prince

of Hesse-Cassel,

and

who on September

3,

with four thousand foot

sixty squadrons of horse, after a

march

of forty-nine

miles in fifty-six hours, seized the passage at

Havre

Marlborough

Mons.

east of

Obourg and

at once ordered this gain

to be followed up, occupied the heights of

Jemappes west

the fortress, thus turned Villars' long lines, which he

of

had

been so laboriously constructing for months, and was enabled safely to invest

Mons from

the French side.

The Tour-

nay forces then passed the Scheldt, marched rapidly up the right

bank

made more

the investment of ;

senior,

and about

came

solely to

So to

of the Haine, crossed at

add

to the

this

Mons time

army

Obourg and Havre, and

secure.

Villars did nothing

gallant Boufflers, though

to serve

under his orders, anxious

his efforts to the success of the

French arms.

soon as Villars perceived that the allies

Mons,

it

was evident

further value.

He

to

him that

his

had

his stronghold

laid siege

was

of

no

had received from Versailles orders to

prevent the siege of

Mons even

at the risk of a general

VILLA RS' LINES USELESS. engagement

had drawn

;

in a large

had crossed the Scheldt

ciennes,

had reached the Honneau his right

still

;

body

there,

797

of troops at Valen-

and on September 4

and September 8 he moved by

further towards the east, purposing to attack

the allies under the walls of the fortress.

Mons, he chose

In order to reach

through the intervening forests by the

to pass

gap of Aulnois, and on September 9 moved

Every one was surprised

in this direction.

at the ease with wdiich the lines

that had cost such time and labor were rendered useless,

no person more so than Villars,

He had

but was ignorant as to where

might

by Hesse-Cassel him.

The

Trouille

;

it

of the crossing of the

;

Haine

and the seizure instructed

first

outposts of the allies had been thrown out to the

and as Villars moved onward,

struck these outposts September the entire allied to attack,

expected an attack,

fall

his

van of cavalry

Fearing

4.

lest

army before him, he did not take measures

though the moment was opportune.

With

more speed, indeed, Villars would have caught the arated, but

he had

when he found

a

little

allies sep-

the enemy's van in his immediate

At Mons and

moment

front, he arrested his advance.

this

taking out the forces at

Toui'uay, would scarcely

have equaled Villars

;

but he credited them with

the allies,

much

over

one hundred thousand men and one hundred guns, and declining to attack he took up a defensive

jjosition.

This was

unlike Villars.

When the one

the all

two armies are en face manoeuvring towards

who

first

enemy before he

is

a sharp offensive.

had Villars known made a marked gain hj assuming

quite ready, and

the facts, he might have

But he preferred

strengthening his position. party, at this time the

defensive battles,

battle,

attacks will in two cases out of three strike

Though

to utilize his time in

usually the

attacking

French had adopted the fashion of

— a thing

less suited to the Gallic character

TERRAIN OF MALPLAQUET.

798

than the impetuosity of assault.

by

tious

On

They had been made

cau-

the vigor of the allied generals.

September

7,

having learned that Villars had sat down

near Malplaquet and that he had fighting orders, the

allies

moved forward, leaving a small force to observe Mons. In a number of columns, headed by Eugene and Marlborough and

so disposed as to cut off

approach

to

Mons through

from the French the avenues of

the forest-gaps, the allies debouched

into the plain of Quaregnon.

Unless Villars retired, a battle

must supervene. Villars

time and

had a good army, on which he had spent much effort,

homogeneous, well-rested, in good

Among

able in every sense.

no

less

He may

idea of declining battle.

by

allies

the officers serving under

than tv^elve became marshals of France.

five

thousand

men

;

:

Allies,

two hundred and guns

;

him

He had

no

have outnumbered the

the forces are variously stated,

Kausler gives them in

both in organizations and numbers.

one place as

and

spirits,

one hundred and thirty-nine battalions,

fifty-two squadrons, one

total ninety-three

thousand men.

ans, one hundred and thirty

battalions,

hundred and

five

French and Bavari-

two hundred and sixty

squadrons, eighty guns; total ninety -five thousand men.

another place he quotes the allies at ninety thousand

In

men

the French at eighty-one thousand.

The

theatre

inclosed

of

the

immediate

operations

is

a

square

by Mons, Quievrain, Bavay, Givry, and bounded by

the Haine on the north, and the Trouille and Honneau on the east

number

of brooks.

a plateau some two hundred

covered the ground that

tered for defense. at the

is

low grazing-land of the Trouille.

many woods

ground

the south were a

terrain of Malplaquet

feet above the

so

On

and west.

The

The

village of

summit of

this

it

Malplaquet

plateau,

At

that

day

could not be betlies

in open

and from here the

THE BATTLE DELAYED.

799

brooks flow either towards the Trouille or towards the Hon.

The brooks

cut well into the surface of the country

The

ravines.

ridges between the brooks are marked.

the right of Malplaqnet as one looks towards

wood

the great

nieres, often

of Laniere

called

;

in

and Blaregnies, running through deep

places, as at Aulnois

the

Mons

To

stretches

to the left, the forest of Tais-

;

wood

of

Blangies.

In the many-

accounts of the battle, the woods are variously named, often

breeding

much

Between and beyond these woods

confusion.

open ground, which, separated by another small wooded

lies

stretch,

makes two avenues

of approach, the left one being

the "wolf -gap," the right one the gap of Aulnois.

In the

was

allied

army there were two separate corps

instinct with the

same

spirit of

inspired the two commanders.

generous rivalry which'

Eugene was on the

the allies with about two fifths of the joint forces

ough was on the

From

left

but each

;

;

right of

Marlbor-

with the larger half.

the Avindmill of Sart, on an eminence

some three

miles from Malplaquet, whither, with a big escort, they had

ridden to reconnoitre, the allied commanders on September 9 perceived the French

army

at Malplaquet,

pied the woods and the plain between.

ordered his wing, the

left,

where

it

had occu-

Marlborough at once

forward, and took position athwart

the gaps, penetrating so close to the French line as to bring-

about a smart exchange. diate attack

;

Both generals were for imme-

Eugene the more

so,

back by the Dutch deputies, who

for

Marlborough was held

insisted

on waiting until

a belated column of nineteen battalions and ten squadrons vinder

Count Lottum could arrive from Tournay, and

until St. Ghislain

was taken,

so that the allies

a secure crossing over the Haine in their rear. the

more readily accomplished because

the

enemy

in force in his front,

Villars,

also

might have All this was

on perceiving

withdrew his outlying detach-

VILLARS INTRENCHES.

800

On

raents.

the

Sei^tember 10 St. Ghislain was taken by escalade

Tournay troops came up

and so soon as the French

from the Haine, Eugene advanced

tired

and took place

What had

in prolongation of

no time

wood

in

making

to

became a

and the

fortress,

slope towards the allied position,

it

it

of

artillery it

down a

was,

lost

The edge

two gaps lay in such defenses that

in front of the

ment

His men

and they

their position impregnable.

of Taisnieres

could gentle

admirably covered every-

Abatis was laid before every intrench-

front.

its

line.

intrench.

to just this work,

scarcely be taken, while, trained as

thing in

the right, wing

his,

Marlborough's

by the time afforded Villars

offset

;

re-

been gained by the delay was more than twice

had recently been trained

the

;

redoubts arose as by magic^ topped by palisades

;

and the troops were protected by stockades placed wherever

much

the ground allowed and with

In the intrench-

skill.

ments which lay across the gaps there were

To

through which the cavalry might debouch.

wood

the edge of the

and the teries

were

The

left

was

up

;

the works on

of Taisnieres the brooks acted as a ditch,

jDrotected

which should give a set

left intervals,

by a swampy stream-head. cross-fire

Bat-

on the two approaches

a single one of twenty guns stood in the centre.

place was as desjjerate a spot to assault as the Bloody

Angle.

It

was

Its one fault

called,

and

was being cramped.

The ground was such peculiar one.

in truth was, a " trouee d'enfer."

as to

The approach

ably defended, and

to

make

the French position a

Malplaquet

itself

was admir-

the edge of the Forest of Taisnieres

held so as to throw the French

left

the centre, like a species of outwork.

was

almost a mile beyond

On

the right, through

the wood of Laniere, ran the Bavay-Binche turnpike

though the edge of the wood near Malplaquet was

;

and

fortified,

and the works leaned on the sources of the Honneau, which

NO MANOEUVRING. were rather low and swampy,

it

801

does not appear that the

road was held in force, a fact which would have permitted the French right to be easily turned.

But no advantage

Battle of Malplaquet.

was taken of

this fact

;

the order of the day.

was

pi-actically

front attacks and hard fighting were

Throughout the battle the assault

one in front, mainly by the right, with a feint

which became a real attack on the French all

along the

Villars

right,

but in effect

line.

had generously given the post of honor, on the

ANNIVERSARY OF ZENTA.

802 right,

Marshal

to

Boufflers,

and

D'Artagnan commanded the front that of the

On

himself

took

;

left.

Legal

Alberghatti had general charge of the

left.

the 10th such part of the allied

army

as

tion indulged in a cannonade, duly replied to

To

the

line of the right

was

left.

in posi-

by the French.

aid in the attack finally appointed for the 11th, the force

which Lottum had

left

under Withers, and which was coming

up from Tournay, was instructed

to cross at St. Ghislain

and

then to march through the wood of Blangies, so as near Folic to fall on the French extreme left and in favor of the

was

to

main

The

attack.

latter,

come from Eugene's corps

to force his

way on

make a diversion

by the battle orders,

Baron Schulemberg was

:

wood

the French left into the

of Taisnieres

with forty battalions of infantry, while on his

Lottum was

to attack the

same

La

left

Count

line of intrenchments with

twenty -two battalions, which would crowd the enemy at an angle to Schulemberg's onset.

by the prince

of

Half an hour

later,

an assault

Orange with thirty-one battalions on the

French right was

to

be made to occupy Villars' attention

;

but Eugene's attack was to be the main one, intended to crush the salient left of the enemy.

Schulemberg and Lottum

were to draw up with a front such as the ground dictated.

Lord Orkney, with

fifteen battalions,

was

to

advance towards

the gap, but not beyond the point reached by Lottum, on a line with

whom

he was to keep.

In other words, he was to

remain in reserve until he could attack with success. said that these orders were later

somewhat changed, but the

The day

course of the battle ran in accordance with them.

was the anniversary of Eugene's great victory

On

the French side all was enthusiasm.

works as these they could not defeat the

become of French valor? the result.

It is

at Zenta. If behind such

allies,

what had

There could be no doubt as

The enemy would here meet

their match.

to

THE ATTACK OPENED. Simon

St.

relates that

803

by a clever 7mse de guerre the

allies,

under a pretense of parley, got within the Taisnieres intrenchnients

such,

and were able

to

gauge their strength

had small influence on the

At allied

At

but the

;

fact, if

battle.

3 A. M. religious services were held throughout the

army. half-past seven on the eventful day the

cleared away,

and the guns opened

morning fog

After an interval,

fire.

not exceeding an hour, the assaulting columns were started on their perilous errand.

The

orders to the Dutch, under the

prince of Orange, were to wait thirty minutes before assault-

ing in earnest, and the prince began with only an artillery

duel

;

but Schulemberg forged straight ahead with his forty

battalions,

Lottum, with his

while

somewhat round

to the right,

twenty -two, swinging

advanced against the right of

the French outworks on the edge of the forest of Taisnieres,

thus working in towards the left of Schulemberg.

ney at the same time advanced point on a line with

owing

to the

had orders

The

first

his

Lottum and out

awkward

battalions to a

fifteen

The cavahy,

of range.

terrain, lay in

Lord Ork-

gToups in the rear, but

to press in after the foot as occasion warranted.

assault of Schulemberg, who, in five lines, headed

the advance of Eugene's wing, though stoutly delivered, was repulsed, after a struggle of

Eugene

in person,

some duration

who was ever

;

but headed by

reckless of his

life,

and aided

by the smart diversion made by General Gauvain with a detached party of three regiments on the extreme French left,

a second assault succeeded better, and in not

an hour the enemy under Alberghatti

w' ere

much

over

driven out of their

intrenchments and well back into the wood.

Marlborough meanwhile was sustaining Lottum with a

number

of

squadrons.

Some time

later than

Eugene had

penetrated the works, Lottum carried those in his

own

front,

THE GALLANT DUTCH.

804

but after the lapse of a brief holding was expulsed by a charge led by Villars in person

head of

at the

whereupon Marlborough,

;

on the over-eager enemy

his cavalry, rode in

and recaptured the works, aided by a renewed threat of

By

Lottum.

this time

some headway, and works in his entirely

On

as

fi^ont, it

Withers

La

at

Eugene had looked as

if

Folie began to

make

actually captured

the

he would push Villars

from the wood of Taisnieres.

the left, meanwhile,

where Field-Marshal Tilly was

in

nominal command, after his half hour's pause the prince

of

Orange delivered

troops were

his assault with

made up

unequaled ardor.

Dutch

of auxiliaries in the

On

including a Scotch brigade.

the

first

His

service,

rush and without a

stop the French intrenchments were carried,

and had there

been a reserve, the French right might have been then and there permanently broken. battalions

;

Boufflers

But the prince had but forty

met him

in the rear of his

seventy, turned his guns inward after

and enfiladed

no disorder.

The French second

up, and the prince of Orange could

six

and

an obstinate and bloody struggle the Dutch were thrown

out, but in

Wciy.

works with

his line,

He drew

line

make no

off with, it is said, three

now

closed

further head-

thousand killed and

thousand wounded, casualties which prove the bitterest

kind of fighting.

No

sooner had they expelled the

enemy

than the French sallied out of their works and made a gallant advance with heavy columns of foot

was danger that the

allied left

and horse.

There

would be broken, but Marl-

borough opportunely came up from the wood of Taisnieres,

and put

in a

few Hanoverian battalions to check the French,

while Eugene brought some reserves over from the right.

The matter was

reestablished,

and Boufflers withdrew within

his works.

Villars believed that,

by giving up the advanced position

DESPERATE FIGHTING. would jeopardize

of his left, he

wood

the offensive in the

805

his centre,

of Taisnieres

;

and now resumed

and in order

this with sufficient vigor, he reinforced his left with a

of battalions of

them the two diversion,

was

withdrawn from

foot

in peril,

hard that his entire

so

do

number

— among

Eugene, aided by Withers'

Irish brigades.

had pressed him

his centre,

to

left

wing

and he now pushed his counter attack with the

Lottum

utmost vigor.

and Marlborough flew

called for help,

to his aid.

Villars

had miscalculated the conditions of the

weakening of the centre proved his ruin

his

commanders soon became aware

of

a telling advantage of the lapse.

it,

battle

the

;

and were able

;

allied

to take

Eugene, who had visited

the left to aid the prince of Orange, rejoined his wing and

forced the fighting on the right.

Eugene had pushed the French

It

was already noon, and

left well

and had joined hands with Withers

;

Orkney forward

sent the column under

through the wood

and Marlborough now to

make

its

way

in at

the disgarnished French centre, which so far had not been

The

attacked in force.

fighting

Eugene had had the bulk

of the

became hotter than

French foot

though again wounded, he persisted in person,

;

and the French

left

was

ever.

contend with

on his

in leading

and he made marked progress, which

wise wounded, was unable to

on

to

;

men

Villars, like-

Withers,

too, pressed

joractically bi-oken.

The weak-

resist.

ened centre was now open

to a stanch assault notwithstand-

ing

gave way before Orkney's gallant

its

intrenchments

it

;

onset and the works were entered.

hard upon the

foot,

and after getting through the

lines,

The French guns were seized and enemy, who were now crowded into too small

charged in with a turned on the

The cavalry followed

will.

a space to be able to act effectively, and were fast losing gi'ound.

But Boufflers would not give up the

fight.

He

BOUFFLERS' FINE RETREAT.

806

headed the Maison du Roi, and charging in on the horse, completely broke

up

it

broken when he reached the

now held

;

line of

cross-fire of

some

of foot as supj)ort to his squadrons

Time and again was Eugene came up with with

his

by point-blank

batteries judiciously

Once more he

hastily placed, he retired.

checked.

Orkney's infantry, which

the French ramparts, and decimated

musketry and by the

allied

but he was himself in turn

collected a

and returned

either line forced back, his reserve cavalry,

if

column

to the fray.

and not

until

and Marlborough

English horse, could Boufflers' noble effort be

On

the allied

left,

simultaneously with the centre.

Orange and Hesse-Cassel again advanced, took the works on and held them.

the French right

ments and with his

saw that

his chances

war was

over.

left

Ousted from

his intrench-

crushed beyond usefulness, Boufflers

were gone.

The

bloodiest battle of the

But the gallant French marshal made a masterly

retreat to

Bavay, in what was, under the circumstances, astonishingly

No

good order.

pursuit could be undertaken by the

exhausted by their fearful

losses.

Though

allies,

the breaking of

the centre threw the French wings off in eccentric directions,

they reunited a dozen miles in the rear of Malplaquet. flers

carried off all but his dismounted guns

of flags

and guns on both

loss

there were losses

sides.

The wounded were returned by the The French

;

Bouf-

allies

a few days later.

was not over fourteen thousand men.

It has

been given at eight thousand killed and four thousand

hvmdred wounded.

five

In such a melee there was small chance

wounded man. The allied loss was fully twenty thousand men. in the Memoirs of Count Schulemberg as follows for a

loss, officers,

It :

is

stated

Eugene's

eighty-nine killed, two hundred and sixty-eight

wounded; men, two thousand and ninety-nine

killed,

three

EXCEPTIONAL LOSSES.

807

thousand four hundred and nine wounded loss, officers

;

Marlborough's

(including the Dutch), two hundred and seventy-

four killed, seven hundred and twelve wounded

thousand eight hundred and twenty-one eight hundred

sand

five

;

men, three

killed, nine

and forty-eight wounded.

thousand

Total, twenty thou-

hundred and twenty killed and wounded.

The

account gives for the infantry alone five thousand five

official

hundred and forty-four

killed,

and twelve thousand seven hun-

dred and six wounded and missing; add the losses in the cavalry, and the

The

same

result

and the duke.

got.

was equally shared between the

credit of the victory

prince

is

It

was Eugene's hearty work on

the allied right which induced Villars to disgarnish his centre,

and thus enabled Marlborough with a gallant onset

to

break through whei"^ he would have vainly essayed before.

What with

British there were in the battle behaved, as always,

true

lost the

Anglo-Saxon

grit.

But

Dutch regiments

the

most heavily, showing determination quite equal

to

the British battalions.

The ing, in

battle

had been one of prolonged and bloody

fight-

which mere endurance and the persistent courage of

Eugene and Marlborough contrived

to win.

The French had fought superbly, and the the victory dear. Some French accounts of the defeat to the faulty position.

push of the two

allied captains.

have retired before they had In this battle the

allies

It

allies

had bought

the battle ascribe

was rather the stubborn

Almost any generals would

lost so heavily.

formed their troops for attack

columns of deployed battalions.

The French

horse and foot, used the same formation.

in

centre, both

The innovation had

not been so generally employed before, though by no means

new. It

is

curious to state that the residt of this costly \^ctory

SPLENDID MARLBOROUGH.

808

was naught. The allies merely besieged Mons without interThe trenches were opened September 25 on ference. ;

made

October 9 a lodgment was

October 17 the outworks were stormed

town surrendered.

came

the

an end.

to

;

on

and on the 26th the

Brabant was entirely occupied.

With Malplaquet, career

;

way

covered

in the

Prince Eugene had won

brilliant

j)art

Marlborough's

of

In this Succession War, he and five

splendid victories

:

three in joint

command, Blenheim, Oudenarde and Malplaquet, though at Oudenarde Eugene was without his own troops, but present in person

and commanding a part of Marlborough's

one singly each, Eugene at Turin, Marlborough at Though Eugene had fought and won a number aside from these, as battle-commanders glory

awarded

to each.

Villeroi at Ramillies,

Marsin and the duke

of Orleans at Turin.

Marlborough

is

out to share with

From

and the coup d^adl which

erals.

He

evenly

and Eugene by Neither singly

the battle of Liitzen

He had is

the true battle

allotted to so

few gen-

handled large armies with the same ease as he

Commanded

small ones

war or on the

;

and no occurrence on the theatre

battle-field ever

threw him

off his balance.

His strategic plans were often pared down to taste of the

ity

may be

Turenne and Eugene stand

him equal honors.

fervor,

may

of battles

incontestably one of the most splendid mil-

to the battle of Mollwitz, only

devices, he

Ramillies.

really able opponent.

itary figures of this era of giants.

of

and

In their separate victories Marlborough

had been opposed by

had defeated a

;

Dutch deputies

;

had he been

suit the

might have undertaken larger operations,

believe

own and we

would have conducted them with the same

which characterized his lesser ones.

puny

left to his

abil-

Opportunity was

denied him. If

Marlborough cannot claim to stand among the

six great

MARLBOROUGH'S STANDING. captains, he

may

certainly be placed on the first step of the

But

military dais.

809

his eulogists do his solid reputation

good by such panegyrics

no

as that of Alison, who, after claim-

ing every other success in this war as the work of his hero, goes so far in his homage as to say that " by the succors "

some ten thousand men — "he sent

to

—

Eugene, he conquered

Italy at Turin."

Marlborough stands, not to It

is

is

a splendid enough leader of men, just as he

make

it

essential to rob others to clothe him.

quite as natural that some of the foreign military critics

should err in making Eugene the greater soldier of the two

though

it is

rare that ample justice

is

not done Marlborough

in the annals of the continental writers. greatest

men

of the second rank

said to he 2)rimus inter

The want

;

but he

He

is

may

one of the

not even be

2^ ares.

operations of the French this year were

hampered by

of victual, in consequence of a poor harvest,

Malplaquet, by the wounding of Villars.

The

the allies after the battle were not remarkable.

Bombard.

(15th CentTirj.)

and

after

operations of

LXIII.

V

SPAIN.

The

War

operations of the

1704-1710.

of the Spanish Succession

were generally outside

Archduke

of Spain, but in 1704 and 1705 the allies invaded Spain under the Charles, while the

Lord Galway,

duke

of

Berwick commanded the army of

for Charles, took Madrid, but

Philip.

In 1707 Galway and Berwick met at Alraanza, and the former

the coast.

was defeated

;

crowded back

and French reinforcements coming into Spain, the Their forces had been too

to Catalonia.

1708 and 1709 comparatively

little

was done; but

much

in

into Spain,

were In

Vendome now

and he and Stahremberg conducted an admirable campaign,

which the French were fully successful, and the

back

allies

dispersed.

in 1710 Marshal Stahrem-

berg beat Philip's army on the Ebro and marched to Madrid.

came

In 1706

Berwick soon drove him back to

allies

were again pushed

to the coast.

Although from 1701

to

the great

war which had desolated Europe

1714 was caused by the question of who should

succeed childless Charles II. on the throne of Spain, yet that

peninsula ring-

itself

saw but a small portion of

one or two campaigns, there was not

the military student

in

its

horrors.

much

Bar-

to interest

comparison with the work of the

giants in the Netherlands, in

Germany and

in Italy.

There were no operations there until 1704.

Towards the

end of 1703 the claimant of Spain under the treaty of partition, the

Dutch

Archduke Charles, with some nine thousand Anglo-

troops, reached

Portuguese tier of

militia,

Lisbon.

Adding

to

his

force

the

he undertook in 1704 to defend the fron-

Portugal against the army of France and Spain under

the duke of Berwick, a natural son of

James

IT.

In this he

succeeded, but an attempt to advance to Madrid miscarried.

MARCHING TO AND During

this

same year Gibraltar

and Holland.

fell to

FRO.

811

the fleet of

where he gained a foothold, roused the Spaniards rection against Philip V.,

of

England

In 1705 the archduke landed in Catalonia, to insur-

and aided by the gallant exploit

Lord Peterborough, captured Barcelona

;

but this city was

soon again laid under siege by the Franco-Spanish array.

g'O PORTO

Oou

/

V.-?

3

a'

/^^^'^''TOL.f.&OK^ >s-3r

^

III.

'^.

Spain.

In 1706, after the arrival of a British

fleet,

the archduke

drove the French with loss from the siege of Barcelona and

made

it

his base, while the

enemy

retired to Madrid.

Lord

Galway, with the Anglo-Portuguese army, captured many strong places, and in

June took Madrid and reduced

dle Spain for Charles, this success did not last

who was proclaimed long. The jealousies

all

as king.

mid-

But

usual in Spain

put an end to Galway's activity; and Berwick, aided by

BATTLE OF ALMANZA.

812

Philip's adherents in Andalusia

and the

managed

Castiles,

to

regain Madrid and push the English general out of nearly his

all

conquests

and towards

Portugal

while Charles

;

Berwick had thus manoeuvred

returned to the eastern coast.

himself into a position between his opponents' two armies. despite these losses, the archduke, at the opening of

Still,

1707, held Catalonia, Arragon and Valencia, that

is,

the north-

east corner of Spain, with a force of forty-five thousand

under Galway, who had

men

also returned to the eastern coast.

Berwick had nearly forty thousand men, and fourteen thousand more were on the way from France.

In April, 1707,

Galway concentrated some thirty-three thousand men in the he was active and enterprising, but he

province of Valencia

;

accomplished nothing of importance. of

He

harbored the idea

moving on Madrid, but Berwick, with an equal number of

men, moved on Almanza, a position from which he might threaten Galway's communications with Barcelona.

saw that he must do

battle for his holding, certainly so if

he would advance on the capital

Almanza, where he drew

uj) in

between his battalions of the

two

lines,

flanks. first line

Galway

he likewise marched to

;

two

lines,

first line.

with squadrons

in"

Berwick had also

but his foot was in the centre, his horse on the

Galway opened the attack

;

but his hermaphrodite

did not work well, probably from inexperience in this

formation.

The cavalry attacked

twice, but, after

some work,

was twice broken by the French horse, and found refuge under the fire of the foot. Finally Berwick strengthened his cavalry wings with foot from the second line, advanced for the third time, and succeeded in breaking Galway's left wing.

In pushing back the French itself

foot,

Galway's centre had got

forward in a salient from the main

line,

and somewhat

separated from the right, which enabled Berwick to take the infantry in flank where the gap occurred, and

by advancing

GALWAY FORCED his

right

BACK.

813

None

smartly he secured the victory.

accounts of

battle is very clear

the

;

the

of

but the English, as

always, fought stanchly, and their allies left them in the

Galway was cut

lurch.

up, with a loss of five thousand killed

and wounded and ten thousand prisoners lery

and

train,

and retired through the

;

he

lost all his artil-

j)i'Ovince of

towards Barcelona, with but sixteen thousand men.

Valencia

Berwick

placed some garrisons in Valencia, and followed Galway with twenty-three thousand men, forcing him back across the

through Tortosa to Lerida.

PhilijD

Ebro

V. was now king in

earnest.

About the same time Navarre

to Spain,

to Saragossa,

the duke of Orleans

came by way

of

and with nineteen thousand men advanced

where Berwick, crossing the Ebro, joined him.

This made thirty-two thousand men, and they shortly drove the English out of

Lerida and back into Catalonia, after

which both armies went into winter-quarters.

The

had been

error of the archduke

too large force of forty-five thousand sons,

so as to be unable to

Had

strength.

to disperse his

men

in various garri-

meet the enemy

he kept his army in

full force

in

sufficient

and taken

stand between Berwick and the duke of Orleans, the Tudela country, sion.

none

— he might have beaten either

— say

his

in

in succes-

In like manner, had Berwick got the duke of Orleans

move down towards the lower Ebro, and he himself at once followed up Galway, between them they might have captured to

the entire body.

Berwick was now ordered to the Netherlands

duke

of Orleans

was unable

to profit

by the gains

;

and the of 1707.

Though he had some forty thousand men in Catalonia, and was faced by Stahremberg with not much over half the number, he did nothing during 1708 and 1709 but besiege a few fortresses

;

so that

Stahremberg even threatened

to penetrate

SUCCESSES OF STAHREMBERG.

814

into the interior.

At

the opening of 1710 Stahremberg's

men, and a Portuguese

forces rose to twenty-six thousand

army

of thirty thousand foot

bled at the fortress Elvas sensibly diminished

He

frontiers.

men

all told

;

by

;

and two thcasand horse assem-

while the forces of Philij) V. were

drafts for the defense of the

had not much exceeding

thirty-five

French

thousand

and after detaching a suitable force against the

Portuguese to Estremadura, another to Andalusia, and making sundry smaller details, he had less than twenty thousand

The

with which to operate in Catalonia.

were more

early manoeuvres

for the purpose of collecting victual and of devas-

tating the land to prevent the enemy's so doing, than for

other apparent object to

march on Madrid,

;

any

but Stahremberg finally determined

join the Portuguese,

and

definitely place

the crown on Charles' head.

Advancing

in

pursuance of his design, he won a handsome

advantage on the Segre, and drove the Spaniards back to Lerida, in so

much

disorder that had he followed them

he might have destroyed them.

and material, he remained advanced on Saragossa. losses

and

to

his passage

;

move up

But waiting

inactive for

up

for victual

two weeks, when he

This gave Philip time to repair his

the right

bank

of the

Ebro

to oppose

but Stahremberg threw a pontoon bridge over

numown twenty -four

the river, crossed, attacked the Spanish army, which

bered but nineteen thousand thousand, and beat

it

men

to his

badly with loss of half

its force.

The

wreck, nine thousand strong, retired to Tudela, and thence

Aranda and Valladolid to Salamanca, which had been made the rendezvous for a new Spanish army that Vendome had just come to organize. With the new army the French via

marshal hoped to march to Almaraz on the Tagus, and prevent the junction of the Portuguese and Stahremberg least give

them

battle.

;

or at

VENDOME DEFEATS

HIM.

81i

The archduke should have devoted his energies to preventing the formation of this new army but he was eager to do ;

great things, and deserve as well

as get

He

Stahremberg could not restrain him.

the crown

and

;

chose to march on

Madrid, which he took, as well as Toledo, and parceled out

The Portuguese

his forces uselessly.

attempted, to advance

towards Madrid, but the appearance of a Spanish force of twelve thousand

men

in

Estremadura headed them

off,

and

they returned to Elvas.

Vendome, on the other hand, went sensibly

He

to work.

began by sending out small raiding parties of horse

to cut

the archduke's communications with Saragossa, and capture his convoys.

This, indeed, he

accomplished so frequently

By

that provision grew scarce in Madrid.

this time

Ven-

dome's army (Philip was formally in command) had grown to

twenty-seven

clever

thousand men, and with these he made a

march on the bridge

Almaraz over the Tagus, and

of

pushed a large force of cavalry

dome had

calculated

it

would

to Talavera.

was the end of any coop-

be,

eration of the half-hearted Portuguese,

Stahremberg could no longer hope

to

his retreat to Catalonia with sixteen

in three columns, each a day's

This, as Ven-

who summarily

left

hold himself, and began

He moved

thousand men.

march

apart.

Vendome

fol-

lowed him sharply, and at Brihuega, on the river Henares, cut off Stauhope and five thousand

guard of

him

his

men who formed

the rear-

army, and who had kept no outposts to notify

of danger.

Stahremberg quickly turned in

his tracks,

but was two days too late at Brihuega to rescue his lieutenant

;

and Vendome, not permitting him

vicinity without fighting, attacked

by.

The

battle here

was drawn

his retreat, with less than ten

to Saragossa

and thence

;

him

to retire

from the

at Villa Viciosa, near

but Stahremberg hastened

thousand men he now had

to Catalonia.

He

left,

was really in grave

SKILLFUL MANCEUVRES.

.16

danger, for Marshal Noailles was advancing across the Pyrenees on the east with twenty-seven thousand men, and might fall

on his rear and completely destroy him.

But Noailles

contented himself with besieging Gerona in lieu of advancing to the Ebro.

Vendome

followed up Stahremberg, and, cross-

ing the Segre, went into winter-quarters.

These operations are especially handsome.

by

skillful

interesting.

He had

Vendome's work was

not only raised an army, but,

manoeuvres, had separated the

allies,

Stahremberg from Madrid, and had driven to the sea with

a

loss of

two thirds his

Heavy Cavalryman. (16th Century.)

force.

his

had ousted

enemy back

LXIV. VILLARS AGAINST MARLBOROUGH AND EUGENE. 1710-1712.

In 1710 the

allies

conducted a war of

breaking through the French fortified

sieges.

Douay was

Villars

lines.

came

first

invested, after

to its relief, but did

not push the allies to battle, preferring to protect Arras from attack.

taken Douay, the

They then

allies in fact

Aire.

off.

invested Bethune, proposing to capture all the strong places up to

the coast, with a view to a line,

Having

turned on Arras, but Villars headed them

and after Bethune

new

fell,

base.

the allies

But they were no nearer

Villars took

up a

position in the

moved on and captured

St.

Hesdin

Venant and

In 1711 Bouchain was captured.

Paris.

In

1712 the English, with peace in sight, acted on the defensive; Eugene captured

Quesnoy, but failed before Landrecies, owing to a handsome attack by Villars In 1713 Eugene defended the Rhine against Villars

on his communications.

Peace supervened.

with twice his force.

In 1710 the

allies raised their forces to

forty thousand

men, of

whom

In April Eugene and Marlborough met their several

one hundred and

eighty thousand took the at

field.

Tournay, where

columns rendezvoused out of winter-quarters,

and opened the campaign by the recapture of Mortagne, which had just been seized by the French, and was essential as a step to attacking

Douay.

The French

strong line created by Villars the year before to be forced before

of the essence, the

still ;

and

held

the

this

had

Douay could be thought of. Speed being army advanced in two columns, the right

under Marlborough, the

left

under Eugene.

Marlborough

crossed the Deule at Pont a Vendin, unopposed

;

Eugene,

finding that he would have to fight for his passage at Pont

d'Auby,

filed to the right

columns reunited

at

and crossed

Lens on April

at Couriere.

21,

The two

and the French under

INVESTMENT OF DOUAY.

818

Montesquieu retired so hurriedly behind the Scarpe as to forfeit

much

of their baggage.

the Scarpe and closed in on

Eugene remained on the

Douay on

at Vitry

Marlborough crossed the right bank, while

bank and invested it from the The French then retired to Cambray. Douay had been captured by the French in 1667. It was left

north.

a large and powerful fortress, the work of Vauban, astride the Scarpe, whose inundations

made approach

to

it difficult.

Douay Region. It

was not of the newest construction, but

of the first class,

still

a strong place

and the ditch was wide and

covered way excellent.

It

The

and the

full,

had eight thousand men

in garri-

May 4-5.

son,

under Alberghatti.

On

the 9th a big siege-train arrived from Tournay

trenches were opened

on the

;

11th the batteries were pushed up to the covered way.

danger to the fortress caused Villars to be sent to with ninety thousand men.

its

special orders to report to the king.

and

into the

moved by Lens

relief

Berwick was with the army under

Assembling

at

bray, Villars, under protection of a feint on the allies of Bouchain,

The

his left via

Arras

plain, facing towards

aci'oss

Cam-

by way

the Scarpe

Douay, with reserves

DOUAY SURRENDERS. at

In anticipation of what

St. Eloy, intending battle.

Mt.

might occur, the

had

allies

two

fortified

manoeuvres became

Douay

depleted their

clear,

May

thousand men, and on

;

and

so soon as

Marlborough and Eugene

advanced

lines,

one facing east

lines,

Douay

and one west, for the protection of Villars'

819

to

meet him with sixty

30 took up the position on the

west of Douay, which extended from Vitry north to Mon-

backing on the

.tigny,

Vendin protected the

A

fortress.

strong outpost at Pont a

Here they drew up

right.

for battle,

which seemed inevitable, as Villars never lacked pugnacity.

On June

1 he advanced to the front of the position of the

whose role was, as covering the siege of Douay, neces-

allies,

On

sarily a defensive one.

Villars

deemed the

retired

June

and

line too strong to

hoping that the

went on,

!

right

bank

after capturing

retired,

and

an

assault,

of five-

was in

to relieve his

it

extre-

by the

advance

in order to prevent the allies,

Douay, from further penetrating into France,

Cambray and

took up a position with his right on

towards Arras.

fortress if

and the

;

army

Marlborough barred

of the Scarpe.

and Villars again

in

would follow

in the presence of a relieving

By mid-June the score thousand men mis, and Villars made another feint as

and

The French

be forced.

allied generals

took up a position backing on Arras

finally

siege

4,

reconnoitring, both Berwick

On June

his left out

19 the prince of Orange failed

but on the 24th made a lodgment.

The sap

had reached the counterscarp, and on the 26th Alberghatti surrendered.

He had

lost three

thousand

five

hundred men

the allies eight thousand.

Early in July, after a

advanced on Arras, the tresses at that point.

shoi-t rest,

Eugene and Maidborough

last of the triple line of

But

French

for-

Villars had ably placed himself to

prevent their advance.

His

centre from Marquion to

Mouchy

left w^as le

on the Crinchon

Preux

;

his right

;

his

between

BETHUNE

820

FALLS.

He had

Valenciennes and Bouchain.

nearly one hundred

thousand men and one hundred and thirty guns

and

;

as he saw that the allies were aiming for Arras, he his left so as to prevent

invest

and

it.

St.

coast

;

moved by

them from reaching the place

They then decided

to

to lay siege to Bethune, a for-

whose capture would lead probably

tress

so soon

to the fall of

Aire

Venant, and thus open up communication with the

and they invested the place July

Villars

15.

became

nervous for the safety of Montreuil, Hesdin and Dourlens,

towns in Picardy, the second of which places the desired to seize

and again moved by

;

He

;

left

stretching out

and here he threw up a new

line of defense.

did not care to risk a battle, which,

fatal for France.

For the same reason

if lost,

but they did not.

Perhaps the

might now be

has been suggested

it

that the allies might have sought battle to

deterrent.

indeed

his left to a position

with his right on Arras and with his

towards St. Pol

allies

marked advantage

losses of

Malplaquet were

Bethune, though well garrisoned and well pro-

visioned, fell at the

end of August.

The

details

need not be

given.

As

Villars lay so strongly posted that the allies did not

wish to attack him in his of St,

Venant and Aire.

river their possession

lines,

they

now

resorted to the siege

These towns lay on the Lys, which

would open, and they might form the

base for a movement on Calais and Boulogne, which had

been in contemplation. forward as

if

On

September 2 the

to reconnoitre Villars' lines

filing to the right,

marched on

St.

;

allies

moved

and then suddenly

Venant and Aire along

such a route as to prevent Villars from interfering with the

Both places were quickly invested. St. Venant was very strong and had eight thousand garrison, but despite the loss of an important convoy coming to the allies from

operations.

Ghent, which Villars cleverly captured or destroyed,

it

fell

MARLBOROUGH IN DISFAVOR. the end of

September.

Aire held out

till

821

November

12.

The capture

o£ these towns, however, brought the allies no

nearer Paris

;

Venant, the teen

and before Douay, Bethune, Aire and had

allies

lost

thousand

twelve

killed,

St. thir-

thousand wounded, and seven thousand prisoners or

missing-,

—a

loss

which could

ill

They had

be afforded.

cap-

tured four of the strong places of the French, with nearly thirty thousand in

this

nearer,

men

but they had made no essential progress

;

campaign.

Louis'

were bringing

intrigues

and the military success had not been

peace

brilliant.

It

was one of the old-model campaigns, the knot of which a

vic-

But

tory would have cut.

home

against Marlborough at tied than usual

;

Eugene

had been going

political matters ;

his

hands were even more

suffered from the

same cause

;

and

the campaign lacked vigor accordingly.

The campaign under

1711

of

in the

The change

difficulties.

Netherlands was conducted of ministry in

England had

brought Marlborough into disfavor, and we have Eugene's testimony to show that this reacted upon his military ardor.

The new ministry was set for peace, but allowed war to go on. Eugene was ordered to the Rhine to protect the election

new emperor in Frankfort, and took twenty-three thoumen from the army. France now had but her third line of forti*esses left, of which Arras and Cambray were of the first order. Villars

of a

sand

had created another long Canche

all

the

way

Scheldt and Sambre.

work the capture

extending from the

Namur, along the Scarpe, Sensee,

Marlborough had cut out for the year's Arras and Le Quesnoy, hoping

French frontier and invade France in

Bouchain was his

must break through assault,

to

of Bouchain,

to winter near the

1712.

line of defense,

first objective, to

Villars' lines.

and Marlborough

reach which he

These were too strong

tried ruse.

Moving by

to

his right

THE ENGLISH ON THE DEFENSIVE.

822

from the position

which he had advanced south of the

to

Scarpe, he crossed at Vitry and marched towards Bethune. Villars

moved by

west of Arras.

his left

on a parallel route to a position

Here Marlborough made a

feint to attack

him, and having convinced him that he was about to do

so,

under cover of a cavalry demonstration on Villars'

he

marched rapidly back, crossed the Scarpe breaking through the French

Etrum and marched

way but

Villars sought to to

no purpose,

Invested August 17, Bouchain

to fight.

Beyond

11.

of manoeuvring,

this

of the

jjai't

fell

nothing was done in 1711.

was not otherwise so

it

Part of his column had

Cambray, but

into battle near

easily

has been thought that Marlborough would have

it

done well

tember

Bouchain.

invested

and

at Vitry,

passed the Scheldt at

thirty-six miles in sixteen hours.

him

entice

though

lines,

left

;

campaign had been

nor had

its

activity

Sep-

In the

brilliant

been com-

parable to some of Eugene's.

In 1712 peace-negotiations were begun at Utrecht, and the

English army received orders to act on the defensive

;

Prince

Eugene, who succeeded Marlborough as commander-in-chief

Dutch

of the

forces, being

meanwhile under orders

the offensive, the two allies for the in

They had

unison.

possession

first

of

time could not act

Antwerp, Oudenarde,

Tournay, Ath, Mons, Dendermonde, Menin, Aire,

St.

to continue

Venant, Douay and Bouchain.

Lille,

Bethune,

They could

well

have pushed into Artois and Picardy, and have taken Bou-

and Calais, as

logne

Eugene was Dutch

as

seriously

proposed

hampered by

his

in his style,

It

before.

But

dealings with the

well as those with the English

unable to carry out his own ideas.

more

two years

allies,

and was

would have been much

and indeed he frequently urged the Dutch

deputies, to seek to try conclusions with Villars in a great battle rather than to sit

down

to a series of sieges, especially

BAD FAITH OF BRITISH MINISTRY. as a battle lost

would now

The plan

but destroy France.

all

823

1710 was abandoned, and Eugene chose as a starting-point

of

for his

try

march

was more

into France the other flank, because the coun-

and

fruitful

Landrecies were far

easier,

and because Quesnoy and

serious obstacles than Arras

less

and

Cambray.

Eugene assembled the troops

The

English contingent.

in

command

Villars

of the

was some one hundred

total force

and twenty thousand men and one hundred and guns.

Douay-

early in April in the

Lord Ormoud was

Marchiennes country.

had perhaps twenty thousand

thirty-six

less,

and lay

from the headwaters of the Scheldt at Le Catelet alon^ the left

bank

of the river to

Cambray, and thence stretching out

These two strong places he was bound

towards Arras.

preserve from investment

if

But

possible.

to

his position left

Conde, Valenciennes, Quesnoy and Landrecies outside his

scheme of defense.

Towards the end above Bouchain.

of

May Eugene

crossed the

Ormond advanced with him

;

Scheldt

but he had

secret orders, the fi'uit of the recent negotiations, to take part in neither a battle nor a siege,

been afforded Villars, British ministry.

— bad

and of faith

this fact little

The French were

knowledge had

creditable

to

the

in poor military case

but this treachery saved them harmless. Prince Eugene opened the siege of Quesnoy June

8,

and

undertaking, as a further menace, to devastate the French borders, so as to intimidate the population

army

at their cost, he sent twelve

and

to

keep his

hundred horse into Cham-

pagne and Lorraine, while from the Rhine, at the same time, another raiding party was sent into the Metz region.

Eugene had

for

some time suspected the bad

faith of the

English, but was scarcely prepared for so bald a breach of

common

military honor as was contained in the secret instruc-

THE ROAD TO

824 tions to

Had

Ormond. situation

into a

PARIS.

he not been wise, he might have got

where Villars could have destroyed him.

About midsummer the matter came to a head, and the Ensf. army the other allies kept faith and having,

lish left the

July

4,

;

;

captured Quesnoy, Eugene moved forward to the

He marched

siege of Landrecies. Selle,

ions

and sent the prince

and forty squadrons

of

over the Escaillon to the

Dessau ahead with thirty

to shut in Landrecies.

battal-

His main

Quesnoy-Landrecies Region

force to cover the siege

was placed between the Sambre and

the Scheldt, and his chief magazines were in Marchiennes,

behind the Scheldt and the Scarpe.

To hold communications

with these places, there had, at Denain and at Prouvy over the Scheldt, been built bridges and on the right

heads

;

bank bridge-

and between Denain and Marchiennes a double

line

of works running nearly the entire distance of ten miles,

behind which the trains could safely move. of Villars' old lines,

Paris."

and the

Denain had works

men all

called

around

These were part

them " The Road it,

to

and a garrison of

A BAD POSITION. thirteen thousand

four thousand.

825

men under Albemarle

Prince Eugene's communications with his

magazines were thus apparently protected

The

actually so.

depot of

Marcliiennes had

;

was strategically

position

all supplies lay

Dutch because

by the Lys and Scheldt.

of

in prolon-

was quite against

It

Eugene's advice that he was thus jDosted

been selected by

faulty, in that the

beyond the right flank

gation of the front of the position.

the

but they were not

;

;

Marchiennes had

its

water approaches

After the capture of Quesnoy,

Eugene would have been glad

move

to

the depots thither,

but the Dutch looked at the matter from the economic standpoint solely, and not from the military

they declined the

;

expense of moving the depots, alleging that Douay and Bouchain sufficiently protected the

line,

which ran behind the

Selle.

Villars received orders from Versailles to compel Prince

Eugene

He had

to i-aise the siege of Landrecies.

long been

ready to so act on his own judgment; for Prince Eugene

was now inuch weaker than when he had the English contingent with

the French

him

;

actually weaker than Villars.

army was concentrated and

in

Eugene's was in several detachments Villars

Moreover^

good order, while

and

much

spread.

had reconnoitred the Landrecies position and Eu-

gene's position behind the Selle, and found both too strong to assault.

But he saw that he could

on Denain or Marchiennes, and

Although the

this

niceties of strategic

easily

make an

attack

he began to consider.

manoeuvring had not yet

been studied as they were after Jomini began his work of

showing why Napoleon did what he simple as this of necessity forced military intelligence

as

Villars,

did, yet a

itself

problem so

on a man of such

and he soon formed

his

plan.

In order to be sure of

success,

ViUars must

first

draw

VILLARS TURNS EUGENE'S FLANK.

826

He

Eugene's attention away from his right flank.

crossed

the Scheldt, began to prepare military roads towards the

Sambre, advanced towards the headwaters of the July 22 camped at Cambresis and south of

threatened. Villars further agfainst the allied left

made a number

This opera-

it.

of demonstrations

on the circumvallation

make

;

Landre-

lines at

and instituted such preparations as looked

attack in that quarter to

and

convinced Eugene that his siege of Landrecies was

tion

cies,

Selle,

like a serious

he sent a cavalry party to Cartigny

a lively demonstration

against Landrecies, of which

;

he issued orders for a march

Eugene got

notice

by

his spies.

In the belief that the manoeuvre was a real one, Eugene concentrated a large part of his infantry force on his

gave undivided attention to the siege works.

left,

and

Villars left a

small force to engage him, detailed strong cavalry parties to

observe Bouchain and hold the fords of the Selle, so as to

prevent Albemarle from discovering his march country full of his hussars

;

;

filled

the

and on the evening of July 23,

sending his pontoons suitably guarded to Neuville, three miles from Bouchain, he marched unnoticed with the main

A

demonstration was

same time on the Landrecies

lines to arrest the

force in close columns in their rear.

made

at the

attention of Prince Eugene.

Neuville early July 24.

Villars crossed the Scheldt at

Albemarle must have been singularly

careless in his outpost service, for

up

to 7 A. M.,

when he

covered the marching French column at Avesne

had no information sent

him no word

dis-

Sec, he

Even Bouchain had

movements.

of their

le

of the passage at Neuville, or else the mes-

sengers had been picked up.

Going ahead, the French cavalry had

at once fallen

taken the southerly line of the Road to Paris

commandant

;

on and

while the

of Valenciennes headed part of the garrison to

take the northerly line.

When

Villars

came

uj)

with his

A BAYONET CHARGE.

827

and Denain open

infantry, he found the lines in his possession

Upon

to assault.

So soon

this

town he

notified,

as

at once directed his march.

Eugene had speedily reached the

ground, had ordered Albemarle to hold the post at ards,

heavy force

But he counted too much on Albemarle, or on

any delay on the part of

Villars.

So soon as he reached the

ground, Villars drew up his column of attack. authorities, he organized eight

paces apart

According to

columns two hundred

according to others, he drew up in one column

;

deployed battalions

forty

of

haz-

and had galloped back towards Landrecies to

;

collect troops.

some

all

and he would within a few hours sustain him with a

— the

Denain column

— and

from the

allies,

firing not a shot, but standing three volleys

he charged in with the bayonet and swept over the intrench-

ments

The

was as naught.

The

was overthrown and largely driven into the

river,

a flood.

like

allied force

resistance

The French

with a loss of eight thousand men. five

a bare

lost

hundred.

For the second time with cold

steel

and

successful,

— the

solely

time at the

first

Villars deserves great credit

in 1703.

and bold attack he knew he had not a minute

for his speedy to lose,

had been

Speyerbach

battle of

modern warfare, an attack

in

;

as a fact

had been overmatched

Eugene came up ;

the

too late

damage was

:

Albemarle

Hav-

alread}^ done.

ing taken Denain, and the bridge and redoubt at Prou\y, Villars

turned back and

30th, with all

its

pieces of ordnance. of Landrecies,

Marchiennes

Eugene was compelled

men

the

to raise the siege

Villars

army the garrisons of Ypres, Dunkirk now that the English were

fortresses, which,

out of the game, were of no more use

thousand

on

and two himdred

and retired by Mons on Tournay.

incorporated in his

and other sea

captured

garrison, material, food

stronger than

Eugene

;

;

and was by twenty

and having the advan-

EUGENE ON THE DEFENSIVE.

828

tage of moral gain of victory,

ended the campaign by

lie

besieging and recapturing Douay, Quesnoy and Bouchain. Villars earned unstinted praise for this

work, which cost

little in

of

men, made great gains, and quite

upset the calculations of the enemy. too,

handsome piece

when Louis XIV. was hard

It

was at a moment,

pushed, and

it

had a marked

influence on the negotiations for peace.

The emperor would none

of the Peace of Utrecht,

England and Holland had made with France.

which

Prince Eu-

gene, in 1713, was ordered to operate along the Rhine from

Switzerland to the boundary of Holland, the Ettlingen lines to be the central point of his scheme.

Villars lay on the

other side with one hundred and thirty thousand men, and after

some manoeuvring began the

Eugene had

sixty thousand

men

siege of

Landau.

at Ettlingen,

Prince

and might,

perhaps, have crossed the Rhine to hamper the operation.

But he lacked numbers division near Fort Louis

and concentrated demonstration

his force

4, sent

Landau

off

some horse

to Rastadt,

on the right bank opposite as a

while he himself returned to the left bank,

;

where he made a

fortified

from

all

eighty squadrons to thus,

Villars anticipated him, put over a

June

Speyer, blockaded

captured

cut

;

the

Philipsburg bridge-head,

camp, and took that at Mannheim,

communications with the Rhine, sent

Worms, captured

Kaiserslautern, and

by every means, forestalled a crossing by Eugene.

months

later

(August 20) Landau surrendered.

Two

Villars'

Eugene received no

rein-

forcements, and was forced to keep to a quiet defensive.

He

army

still

increased, while Prince

feared a crossing at

Freiburg, and sent General Vobonne

thither with eighteen thousand tified lines.

men

reoccupy the old for-

to

Villars dispatched forty battalions to Freiburg

and drove Vobonne out of battalions in Freiburs:

and

his defenses

;

the latter left twelve

retired to Rothweil.

EUGENE WINS TWO

Freiburg, which lasted many-

Villars began the siege of

weeks, but

finally,

winter-quarters,

The

on November 13, the town

received free

garrison

result

829

VICTORIES.

fell,

and the

Both parties now went

exit.

and Eugene and Villars began

into

to negatiate.

was that the Peace of Rastadt was concluded in

the spring.

Prince Eugene in this campaign had but half of Villars' troops,

and was unable

stantly watchful

He

to effectuate anything.

in the Ettlingen lines, strictly

and active

remained

on the defensive, but was con-

He

in small war.

confine Villars to the captiu'e of

did well to

Landau and Freiburg, and

to prevent his penetrating beyond the Rhine country, as with his

huge army he well might do.

A

new war breaking out with Turkey in 1716, Prince Eugene was put in chief command of one hundred and twenty-five thousand

men

in

Hungary, and a

men, near Peterwardein, Eugene

Turks, who had nearly one hundred and

left

on the

After some preliminary manoeuvi'ing with sixty

Danube. thousand

August

flotilla

5, after

fifty

attacked

the

On

thousand.

a hotly contested battle, in which Eugene's

was successful,

his right defeated,

but saved by cavalry

charges on the Turkish flank, the imperial army won a very splendid victory.

sand

The Turks

killed, the loss of

hundred and lost three

fifty flags

fled to

Belgrade with six thou-

one hmidred and sixty-four guns, one

and other

trophies.

Prince Eugene

thousand killed and two thousand wounded.

Next year Eugene captured Belgrade

after a

handsome

campaign, in which he attacked and defeated under

its

walls

a force sixfold his own, and received his thirteenth and last

wound on

Much

the field of battle.

of the brilliant

work of Eugene was against the Turks,

a subject of marked interest, but beyond the scope of our subject.

From 1718

to

1737 he was not in active

service.

FREDERICK AND EUGENE.

830

The

last

two campaigns of Prince Eugene in the war of

the Polish Succeosion were conducted against very superior

numbers,

b\it

feeljrig the

were weak.

The brave and

able soldier was

weight of his seventy-one years.

He had

done

enough to send his name down to posterity as one of the brightest in the annals of generalship.

In

this war,

young Frederick, Crown Prince

was for a few weeks present

of Prussia,

at the headquarters of the splen-

did old warrior, an occurrence which pleasantly links the era

which Marlborough and Eugene

so highly distinguished with

the magnificent era of the Last of the Kings.

Roofed Gun.

(15th Century.)

LXV. CHARLES DuETNG

the

War

1700-1709.

of the Spanish Succession two remarkable

conflict in northeastern

XII.,

XII.

Europe

Peter the Great,

:

who made

men were

in

Russia, and Charles

who undid Sweden. Charles inherited much of the Vasa ability, but its common sense. On his accession Sweden was threatened by Den-

lacked

mark, Poland and Russia.

He

ability.

Charles was a mere lad, but he showed wonderful

attacked and brought

Denmark

and then, turning on

to terras,

Russia, defeated Peter at Narva in a most brilliant engagement.

turned against Poland, fought his

way

across the Dwina,

Hence he

and beat the Poles at

In the course of a couple of years, despite the aid of Saxony, Charles

Klissow.

completely reduced Poland, and in 1706 invaded Saxony, dictated terms to both countries,

ing

this,

an army

and threatened to take a hand

he turned again on Russia. ;

in the Succession

War.

But forego-

Peter had well used his respite in creating

Charles ventured^oo far into the bleak plains of Russia, was sadly

used by the winter of 1708, and

in

1709 was wholly defeated at Pultowa, and

became a refugee among the Turks.

He

later returned to

country, meanwhile, had been despoiled of her glory.

Sweden

Charles

have been a great soldier had he possessed a balance-wheel

;

as

;

but his

XH. would

it is,

he was a

mediocre one.

While

central

Europe was being convulsed with the

gi-

gantic contest of the Spanish Succession, a war in the north

went on which has some

interest for us,

Two

in negative than in positive lessons.

enacted the chief roles,

— Peter the

Great,

work which has made Russia what she XII., who undid

all

that

;

is

fruitful rather

remarkable

who began

to-day,

but Peter's

men the

and Charles

his great predecessor,

Adolphus, had won for Sweden. strong and able

though

Gustavus

Both these men were

j^ractical

intelligence lacked

brilliancy, while Charles' brilliant intellect ran

off into the

PETER AND CHARLES.

832

family.

trait wliicli ever

in the

with the knout, but who in government and

ilized his subjects

politics

and anon cropped up

Vasa Peter was a magnificent passionate animal, who civ-

unbalanced

had a thorough,

patient, reasonable habit of

mind,

which viewed things as they actually were and marshaled

them

in methodical array.

Charles was

Campaigns

the virtues of private

in neither wine,

of Charles XII.

of his great opponent,

had none of the passions all

strict in his morality,

life

;

women nor song

;

but in poHtical matters

he was headstrong, foolish and senseless. the

Vasa

intellect

made Gustavus

;

and possessed

he was a king who indulged

He had much

of

he had much of the equipment which

so great

;

but he quite lacked that astonish-

ing mental poise which kept Gustavus from falling into a

network of

errors.

A BRILLIANT YOUNG KING.

833

Peter had found the Baltic a Swedish lake, and he deter-

mined

make

to

some value to war.

it

an open

Another

sea,

and

to

own harbors

in it of

— a thing which must

of necessity lead

bi*eeder of trouble for the

Swedes was the

to Russia,

attempt of Augustus, king of Poland and elector of Saxony, to reconquer Livonia,

mund.

Still

which Gustavus had taken from

Sigis-

another was that Frederick of Denmai-k had a

quarrel with the duke of Holstein-Gottorp, the brother-in-law of Charles XII.

;

and the

latter,

in 1697, he ascended the throne,

a mere boy of

fifteen

when,

embraced the duke's cause.

These three monarchs, Peter, Augustus and Frederick, who

deemed Sweden an easy prey, concluded a union against

The Danes invaded Schleswig

her.

the Saxons laid siege to Riga,

;

and the Russians invested Narva. The eighteen-year-old king

had as much on

his

hands at the opening of

his reign as

Vasa courage, Charles

rose superbly

Gustavus Adolphus. Instinct with the true to the occasion.

Not waiting

he sent eight thousand

men

in

were on his

side,

— that

to attack him,

Pomerania, and started from

The English and Dutch

of free

which Denmark threatened

embarked

to

May, 1700.

Stockholm

Denmark

for

fleets

commerce and an open Sound,

to close.

On

forty-three shii3s he

his Swedes, crossed over to Zealand, and, threat-

ening Copenhagen, compelled an immediate contribution of

money and

victual.

Not anticipating

Frederick was at a distance spot,

;

so speedy

an attack,

but though he hurried to the

he found himself summarily driven into the peace of

Travendal, in August, by which he indemnified Holstein and

agreed to future nevitrality towards Sweden.

handsome war.

gain.

Charles had bettered on Gustavus' Danish

But he was aided by what

his great predecessor

now powerful country and a Denmark was shelved, the two not, a

This was a

splendid army. other

had

Though

enemies were yet

PETER'S POOR ARMY.

834 threatening.

men

Peter had assembled one hundred thousand

to invade Livonia,

and Riga was being

stoutly pressed

by the Poles, and ably defended by the veteran Alberg.

In

the event, Riga being a free town of great commercial value, the Poles retired from

it,

lest

they should embroil themselves

with England and Holland.

Passing through and ravaging Ingria, Peter, with eighty

thousand men, apjjeared

Narva

before

in

Octo-

They were

ber, 1700.

not soldiers in the sense of the Swedes,

who

still

retained what Gustavus

had willed them, and though Peter was gradually seeking to teach

them

discipline,

were an

ill-fed,

they

ill-armed

and half-organized rabble, of

whom

part had

the larger

only arrows

and clubs, and soldierly

in lieu of

instinct

but the dogged,

had

persist-

Narva.

ent obedience for which the Russian has always been famous.

had purchased a great number knowledge of

And

of guns, there

artillery practice in his

army.

to himself the divine right, Peter's forces

by a German, and

the leaven of the

although Peter

was scarcely any

Not arrogating were commanded

troops was German.

Nothing shows the low condition of the Russian army more than that in

ten

their,

weeks

poor knowledge of sieges had enabled them to

make

scarcely

any progress.

Charles

A GALLANT ASSAULT. crossed

the

Baltic

two hundred

in

at Pernau, in the gulf of Riga,

835

and landing

vessels,

advanced with twenty thou-

sand men, of which four thousand were horse, to the of Narva.

Hurrying forward

to Revel,

relief

he started from here

with the horse and four thousand foot, and leaving his bag-

gage at Wesenburg, half way to Narva, marched through a country which the enemy had ruthlessly devastated, struck the Russian outposts in a defile which a handful could have

defended, and drove them the name, and

in.

No

resistance

was made worthy

moral

effect of his first

in order to utilize the

gain, without wailing for the rest of the army, Charles pushed on,

and November 29 stood

Lying on the west was

fairly strong.

fortified.

made

in front of Narva.

of the river of the

On

the east

same name, Narva

bank was a small town,

The Russians had mounted many

apjiroaches to both places,

and had

batteries,

also

had

built a line of cir-

cumvallation from the river above to the river below, nearly three miles long.

It

was of earthworks, with a deep

ditch,

some outworks well flanked, and covered by abatis and de

loiip.

Peter had gone towards

army of reinforcements command.

;

Moscow

to bring

tt^ous

up an

and General Croy (Kreuz) was

in

Tired as the troops were, indefatigable Charles set them at

making gabions and

fascines while he reconnoitred the lines.

Though he had but one man

in ten of the Russians (five

thousand foot and three thousand horse), he would not wait for the bulk of his

He knew

army

his troops,

to

come up, but ordered an

— ever

since the

day

of

Gustavus the

Swedes had outranked every army in Europe, counsel of his

own superabundant

the elan of the true cavalry leader of the great captain.

He

;

gallantry.

assault.

— and

took

Charles had

but he lacked the reserve

possessed Gustavus' fiery boldness,

perhaps the great Swede's worst

trait as

king and army

A SPLENDID VICTORY.

836

methodical caution, unquestionably

leader; and lacked his his greatest virtue.

Two columns were left

organized, the right under Welling, the

under Rhenskjold, and such batteries as had come on

The

with the king were planted so as to aid the assault. alry

cav-

in reserve, with orders to ride in so soon as the

was held

foot should have

with the cold

made a passage for them, and to drive home At 2 P. M. of November 30, on the sig-

steel.

nal given, two " fusees," the columns rushed forward with the

watchword " With God's help was

!

"

Luckily a storm of

enemy

blowing in the faces of the

assault that in a quarter-hour the lines were taken

breach practicable for cavalry was made. selves, believing in their king, the

sleet

and so hot was the

;

and a

Believing in them-

Swedes, in spite of num-

bers, broke through the Muscovite array, and cut the enemy

down by

thousands.

It

was

like the old battles of Alexan-

The enemy turned and

der against the Oriental hordes.

fled,

part towards the river on the north, where their mass broke

down

the bridge, part to some barracks on the bank, where

they offered a desperate resistance. the right wing were all captured of the line

the

left,

battle ;

left

on the

generals of

nightfall that part

was

still

unbroken,

morrow, for

which

but during the night, in imitation of

they concluded to surrender also.

The Swedes, out killed

The Russian

and by

The Russian

was secured.

and promised another Charles duly prepared

;

of eight

thousand men,

lost six

and one thousand four hundred wounded.

hundred

Of

the

Russians over eighteen thousand are said to have been cut

down.

and

Innumerable trophies were taken, and one hundred

forty-five

new bronze

guns.

The

victory

was complete,

the triumph of a disciplined handful against an unorganized

would not always be

To

who

multitude.

But

it

came up too

late

with his forty thousand reinforcements, the

thus.

Peter,

PASSAGJE OF battle of

Narva was a

by which he

837

failed not to profit,

discipline his forces while he

arm and

to

lesson

THE DWINA. was

civilizing his

Charles would have been wise to bring him to a

people.

peace or to cripple him before turning on Augustus.

XII

Charles

His

dice.

.

lacked wisdom and was a slave of blind preju-

was

chief desire

and in

;

to

humble Poland

;

he could not

was a vastly more dangerous opponent than

see that Peter

Augustus

But

his pur-

he

suit of the latter,

sight of the growing

lost

power

of the Czar.

That Russia and Poland

must

not be allowed to

work

into

each

other's

hands Charles saw clearly

enough

way to

to

but the easiest

;

prevent this was

push Peter to the

now

as Charles

wall,

could do,

but by and by might not.

He chose to half done,

the

leave his

work

and so soon as

season

opened,

ad-

vanced to the Dwina relieve Riga.

camped

He

The Dwina.

to

reached the river the middle of July, and

in the Stadts

Weide north

a column with a train

of

of the town.

artillery

By

sending

en evidence up

river,

Charles persuaded the enemy that he woidd seek to cross above, and led them to disperse their forces in detachments

along the banks, having done which he bridged the river and ferried over his troops under cover

dampened enemy.

straw, which the

The

latter

of

a heavy smoke of

north wind blew towards the

had assembled

to

oppose the crossing, and

BATTLE OF KLISSOW.

838

bank was covered by numerous defenses but they remained in place and awaited attack instead of interfer-

the left

;

After an

ing with the passage.

Charles defeated the enemy, with

and drove them back

small

loss

to

himself,

into Courland, whither he speedily fol-

lowed, taking the same

cities,

and covering much the same

ground, as Gustavus did nearly

Thence during the

check at landing,

initial

a hundred years before.

1701 he advanced into Lithuania,

rest of

taking place after place, unswerving in his determination to dethrone

Augustus as king of Poland.

In this he was

aided by the Sapieha party, between which and

His route lay up the

Oginskys, the land was torn.

the

Memel

rivals,

its

Grodno, and thence down the Bobs and Narew to

to

Warsaw, which opened

its

him

gates to

Augustus saw that he had

May

15, 1702.

to fight for Poland,

and the

two kings met near Klissow, a small place between Warsaw

and Cracow, sand

men

;

in July, 1702.

Augustus had twenty-four thou-

Charles but half as many.

marshaled as usual in two

lines,

The Swedes were

with cavalry on the wings.

Their advance was through a wood, and some manoeuvring

had to be resorted

to to get the

But Charles pushed

who formed Augustus' and

army on

with the Saxons alone.

the good conduct of these, Charles

Swedes

of three

and the Poles,

right wing, fled eai'ly in the battle

left the latter to fight

to the

suitable ground.

his offensive vigorously,

Despite

won handsomely,

at a loss

hundred killed and eight hundred

wounded, to two thousand killed and wounded of the enemy. There were forty-eight guns and one thousand seven hundred prisoners taken.

The Polish king

fled

to

Cracow, whither

To overrun the counmean that the land was

Charles followed, and took the place. try

and defeat Augustus did not

under the contiol of the conqueror. tavus' solid method.

Charles had not Gus-

The months were consumed

in taking

and garrisoning the towns of soldiers of fortune to w^

considerable force was kt

head

off the raids of the Ki.

Next

year, in

May, 1703, C

ease

ridiculous

Pultusk,

at

i.

Auaustus had assembled, each ai

The name

sand men.

ponent

of

Swede

a bare six hundred

;

rapidly did they

Augustus

flee.

tula; Charles laid siege to

wa>.

men were

it,

x

retired to ii.^

and Danzig and Elbn.^

Having

mulcted for interference with his transports.

...

finally

got control of the land, Augustus was legally deposed and the

Protestant Stanislaus Lesczinski was elected king of Poland.

During these three years devoted

to the control of Poland,

Charles had lost sight of Peter and his doings

;

but this most

dangerous opponent had not only been creating an army, but

had founded

He

1704.

St.

Petersburg in 1703 and captured Narva in

i^romised to give a better account of himself

when

he next met the Swedes.

Augustus made one more still

engaged

in

effort for

Poland.

Charles was

reducing the land, of which hundreds of

towns sent him the keys so soon as he approached.

While

he took Leopold in September, 1704, Augustus advanced

on Warsaw, from which the new king Charles and Stanislaus advanced

Schulenburg was he needed long

fight

And

ill-success.

it

men

and captured

against his

the troops, discouraged

as

Charles said,

observed, Charles so far had

by

of Poles, half-hearted

to fight for either king,

raw Saxon

seen no war, and vagabond Cossacks.

was,

it.

army, of which

This was an able general, but

They were made up

and ready

who had

such

be

command.

all his skill to control

in his cause recruits,

in

fled,

hunting,

To

not war.

met no one worthy

of

^burg, his first able oppointaet for his master than

His was a policy really

Warta, Schulenburg learned

whom arch of

he thought far

fifty

thousand

j^ht

man

same countries), he

sq in these

in extra close order on

ground where he could not

be surrounded, but had his retreat open

pikemen and musketeers mixed, kneeled over the

stooping, fired

To

the

first

;

;

his first

;

rank of

the second, slightly

the third over the two others.

Charles and

of

surprise

of his day.

and one thousand

foot

he could make his foot stand up to

^Gustavus had done

drew up

had

leagues in nine days.

jps faster than any

relief that

off,

Stanislaus, their

cavalry

could not be driven in upon this array of pikes vomiting

Schulenburg,

lead.

five

times wounded, held himself

retired in a hollow square to

and at night

Guhran,

all

day,

east of

Glogau, not far from the Oder.

The kings followed him up far as the

half.

;

led his army,

now reduced by

The Swedes followed through almost impassable

Near Rutzen, the

as

Oder the country was heavily wooded and through

wood the Saxon general

this

Beyond Guhran

sharply.

at the outlet of the woods,

little river

Bartsch just in time to escape Charles

this indefatigable

monarch found

and penned Schulenburg up and Oder.

paths.

Schulenburg crossed

in the confluence of the

Schulenburg seemed

rear-guard, he got across the

;

but

fords, led over his cavalry,

lost,

Bartsch

but by sacrificing a

Oder the succeeding

night.

Schulenburg had saved Augustus his army, but the Saxon king made no use of sonally

retired

to

it.

He

again abandoned Poland, per-

Saxony, and

fortified

Dresden.

While

841

CHARLES IN LEIPSIC.

Charles and Stanislaus were busy driving back sundry Muscovite raids on the eastern border of Poland, Sehulenburg

But he

again assembled an army and reerossed the Oder.

was met by Rhenskjold (the " Parmenio of the Northern Alexander ") at Frauenstadt, February 12, 1706, and though he had twenty thousand men to Rhenskjold's ten thousand, was the Saxon recruits decamping as at Breiutterly defeated,

—

The unequaled

tenfeld.

discipline

which Gustavus Adol-

phus had introduced among the Swedes had lasted one hundred years.

down

to a

The Russians

man

in Sehulenburg's

army were

In Sej^tember, 1706, Charles invaded Saxony.

who had Saxon

Augustus,

shut himself up in Cracow, dared not return to his

At

capital.

Leipsic Charles

His army, be

Liitzen.

cut

to save taking prisoners.

it

camped on the

the same splendid disciiDline he had inherited. dictated at Altranstiidt, near

Leipsic,

field of

was governed by

said to his credit,

Peace was

by which Augustus

renounced the Polish crown and recognized Stanislaus

;

ab-

jured his treaty with Russia and provisioned and paid the

Swedish army for the winter. Thei'e

dier

was some question as

would take

visited

him

to

what part

the Succession

in

this year,

and with

War

;

this brilliant sol-

but Marlborough

his persuasive

tongue and some

English gold, well laid out, won him to the cause of the

allies.

Charles, however, took no part in the war.

Comparisons have sometimes been drawn between Charles

The

and Gustavus.

structure erected

by the

Protestantism to Germany, and the wreck

who found Sweden it,

and

left it

left

Merely

1700

1707

—

to

who saved

by the

other,

kingdom Gustavus had made

stripped of all save honor, speak

selves.

to

the great

one,

for them-

compare the work done by Charles from

his period of success

Gustavus from 1630

to

1632

— with

that done

suffices to ffauae the

by

two men.

ALL OR NONE.

842

Gustavus, opposed by the best generals of the day, in twenty-

Germany; had he

eight months reduced to control all lived Liitzen, he

out-

would have at once dictated peace in Vienna.

Charles, against opposition barely worth the name, in seven

years reduced Poland and invaded Saxony

was insecure

;

;

but his holding

what he took he did not keep, and what he

had received from

his ancestors he lost.

At

same time

the

As

Charles was a brilliant soldier within his limits. tenant, guided

by the discretion of some great captain, he

He

would have been incomparable. rian,

was a good disciplina-

an untiring worker, gallantry personified in

with the true soldier's ambition and

one thing,

a lieu-

— the breadth which

He

skill.

battle,

and

lacked but

puts aside prejudice, which

gauges things as they really are, and which truthfully forecasts the future.

While lead

him

Chai'les

was permitting his hatred of Augustus

to the Elbe,

he

lost sight of the fact that his

to

worst

enemy, Peter, had been given years in which to build up an army, and had utilized the time

now numbered many German

well.

officers

The Russian army of experience. The

czar invaded Poland with sixty thousand men,

to

which

force Charles' lieutenant, Levenhaupt, with his regiments scat-

tered along the border in Livonia, Lithuania and Poland,

could not hold head, and sat

down

at

Lublin to gain control of Poland.

Leopold and later at

Between conquering

Swedes, and pillaging Russians and Poles, the poor land gi'oaned under fearful oppression.

Charles might even

now

have made a peace with Peter at the price of allowing him a port at his

new

capital

;

but he would have

all or

none, and

the Baltic belonged to Sweden. Stanislaus returned to Poland with Rhenskjold in August,

1707

;

Peter prudently retired into Lithuania.

a year in Saxony, Charles

left for

Having spent

Russia in September, 1707,

CHARLES CHOOSES

head of forty-three thousand men

at the

twenty thousand in Poland

;

843

ILL. ;

Levenhaupt had

there were fifteen thousand in

Finland, and recruits were coming from Sweden.

no longer an army soldiers

and

the force

officers

This was

So many

of the old

had been sent home that the

solidity of

But

still

a Swedish

mind

of Charles

of Swedish veterans.

had been impaired.

it

was

army, and with

it

that he would

dethrone Peter as he had done Auoustus.

At

this point

there was no doubt in the

began

his miscalculations.

Peter was at Grodno on the Memel, and here Charles sousrht

him out

in January, 1708, at the

head of his cavalry

;

and

though, riding on with his wonted recklessness, he reached the place at the head of but six hundred horse, Peter,

was almost taken prisoner, precipitately

retired.

who

A^^ith pru-

dent foresight the czar had made up his mind not to fight Charles, but to starve

him

What

out.

he lacked in brilliant

conduct he more than made up in good judgment. routes were open to Charles

:

on newly founded

burg via Pleskow and Novgorod, safe and apt results

;

ert the

to yield

good

on Moscow via Smolensk, a marsh part way, a desrest

the first he

was

Three

St. Peters-

peril

a southern route, the least good of

;

was always near

enough; to

his base

;

select the third

all.

On

on the second there

was a leap

in the

dark.

The whole Russian army had rendezvoused ince of Minsk.

in the prov-

Despite the perilous route and the sparsely

peopled country, quite unequal to subsist an army, Charles

pushed on, and by June 25, 1708, he had reached the Beresina at Borissov, where the czar had assembled to defend his land.

Charles,

by a march up

river,

turned him

out of his intrenchments, and he retired, devastating every-

thing on the

way

to retard the

Swedes.

Charles followed,

defeating by a bold attack a body of twenty thousand Rus-

MAZEPPA FAILS CHARLES.

844

marsh

sians intrenched behind a

at HoUosin,

and crossed the

Dniej)er (Borysthenes) at Moghilev, then the most easterly

Peter retired by way of Smolensk along

of the Polish cities.

He

the great highway to Moscow.

On September

as Charles lost.

was gaining in strength

22 Charles came near meet-

ing his death in one of the numerous vanguard fights which daily occurred,

and

in

which he exposed himself as Gustavus

used to do.

His position was becoming a perilous one, but he could not see

To

it.

enemy

fight an

enemy who

will stand, to pursue a flying

into a populous country,

is

one thing

ever-retreating foe into a desert

is

safe to

scarcely doubtful that Charles later the great Corsican,

worse

still,

would have been

had he pushed on

to

an

to follow

;

no captain.

It

lost, as

Moscow

;

is

was but,

he was persuaded to turn aside from the straight

road to a southerly one into the Ukraine, by the Cossack

hetman Mazeppa, who proposed

who promised

to join

him with

to revolt

czar,

and

men on

the

Allies

and

from the

thirty thousand

Desna, and with abundant provisions and gold. food were what Charles

now most

needed.

On

the Desna

Charles purposed to winter and prepare for a march on Mos-

cow

in the spring.

But anticipating the

destroyed Mazeppa's preparations, and the rendezvous,

it

plan, the Russians

when Charles reached

was to find only a fugitive demanding help,

not a prince with reinforcements.

Charles' only hope was

now based on Levenhaupt, who was following with fifteen thousand men and a convoy of eight thousand wagons. But the Swedish general had already fallen a prey to Peter's

army

men, who day after day forced battle now much better troops, though at fearLevenhaupt's numbers down to five thousand

of forty thousand

on him, and with his ful cost, cut

men, and seized the convoy. a wreck of brave

men and

Levenhaupt joined Charles with

without victual or munitions.

The

CHARLES DISABLED.

845

Swedish monarch was cut

off

was reduced

thousand half-starved men, was

to twenty-four

obliged to abandon

from Poland and Sweden,

guns from lack of horses to haul

his

them, and had no prospects for the future unless Stanislaus

new army. which had led him

could reach him with a

with caution

It

was boldness unmixed

to this

inability to

;

gaufe

The winter was

facts as they were, to foresee contingencies.

passed amid constant attacks by the roving bodies of liussians.

In April, 1709, Charles had but twenty thousand

Swedes

left,

still

aimed

—

at

but, with a courage

Moscow.

worthy of a better

Towards the end

of

May

fate,

he

he under-

took the siege of Pultowa, with the aid of native tribes which

about doubled his numbers

;

the place was of no importance,

but contained an abundance of victual.

how

Charles had tauoht

make war, and he found Pultowa well garrisoned and hard to take. The czar came to its relief with eighty thousand men of regular troops, plus forty thouthe Russians

to

sand Calmucks and Cossacks.

Charles went out to meet the

enemy, and on the 7th of July beat one of but he was unfortunately wounded.

its

detachments

Peter came up, and

Charles had to confide the attack of the

8th to Rhens-

kjbld, he himself being carried on a litter.

The Swedes had been besieging Pultowa from one side The Russians approached from the other and, after

only.

crossing the Vorskla, built an intrenched camp, which shortly

they gave up for a second one nearer the town. to this, opposite

the

As

a wing

Swedish camp, a number of redoubts

were constructed between two patches of woods, a body of troops was sent to attempt a crossing of the Vorskla at a point nearer the

down

town held by the Swedes, and Peter

to await events, as

he could weU afford to do.

usual, Charles determined on

parity in

summary

sat

As

attack, despite dis-

numbers, and on the morning of July

8,

1709,

PULTOWA.

846

the Swedish foot in four columns advanced to assault the redoubts, followed

by the horsemen

Between

in six columns.

the redoubts had been set up a large body of Russian horse

was summarily attacked and driven

this

back beyond the large camp.

;

in confusion well

The two woods were

too near

together to afford a chance to form line, and the king's intention

was

between the redoubts without attempting to

to pass

,//"

//

Piiltowa.

capture them, form opposite and assault the intrenched camp.

The bulk left

of the

wing took

army

finally, after great loss,

Backing on one the

fire

of

carried out this programme, but the

to assaulting the redoubts in its front,

and

got cut off from the rest of the army.

of the woods, the king

formed

one hundred and twenty Russian

line,

under

guns,

and

advanced to the assault of the camp.

Parts of his line

reached

But

it,

penetrated

line the gallant

sians

it

;

parts did not.

all

along the

Swedes encountered opposition such

had never yet shown.

as Rus-

Peter's seven years had borne

CHARLES AMONG THE TURKS. and he now had a stanch army.

fruit,

847

Gradually falling

back, the Swedes were followed up, and a heavy battle ensued Charles, on his

at the edge of the plain. little

;

litter,

could do but

General Rhenskjold was captured, and after sacrificing

a large number of his men, the king saw that the battle

was

lost.

in fairly

Vorslda.

He

retired

good order

by the way he had come, and moved

to the confluence of the

There he counted,

The

sixteen thousand men.

all told,

Dnieper and

invalided and for duty,

loss in the battle

had been

fully

four thousand.

The

battle of

Pultowa ended the career of Charles XII., so

far as any but trivial operations were concerned. tion of

The

posi-

Sweden was rudely disturbed Peter ;

established that of Russia.

Having taken

refuge with the Turks, Charles remained

with them until 1714, obstinately seeking

through their means to conduct further

campaigns against Russia.

In 1711 he

did succeed in placing Peter in a questionable situation

czar cleverly

on the Pruth, but the

managed

the Turks, in which

to it

buy a peace from

was provided that

Charles might return unmolested to Sweden.

But, angry at the peace, the king

would not leave Bender, a camp

in Bessara-

Russian Soldier.

bia where he played the role of a species of royal captive, and which, indeed, in 1713, he undertook to de-

fend against an army that sought to compel him to withdraw.

Nothing militates

so

greatly

against the

reputation

Charles XII. as a soldier, as this refusal to return home. this era of danger,

ability enough,

Sweden needed her

Sweden had

to bring matters

elasticity

king.

of

In

Charles had

enough, between them

back to some kind of satisfactory

basis.

LACKING ONE TRAIT.

848

His strategic errors in given

:

Russian campaign are easily

his

another and greater soldier committed such.

strategy

is

sound which has not patriotism as a greatest

have sought

soldiers

for-

But no

basis.

The

primarily the

good of the fatherland: Alexander made Mace-

don govern the earth

;

Hannibal had Rome

his feet, but stupid Carthage

the gift of

Caesar and Napoleon, on the theory

;

L'Etat

were patriotic strategists

c'est moi,

Gustavus and Frederick were truly such. this

dice

shattered.

is

—

military reputation

the

test

XII.

at

would not accept

spite

is

return to his

From mere

the better

word

country when

On

Charles

of

childish preju-

— he would

his country

not

needed

him, because a free return was given him, not Turkish Soldier,

conquered.

He

remained in Bender yet three

years, wearing

out his welcome, but treated

with great magnificence.

Many arch

;

volumes have been written about this singular mon-

nothing

is

easier than to

fill

others.

genius, without a balance-wheel, and in

greater part of genius.

Brilliant as

He was

war the

a

man

of

latter is the

few men have ever been,

a soldier to his finger-tips, he remains on the page of history as holding no greater rank than a magnificent corps-com-

He

mander.

returned to Sweden in 1714, and was shot, by

an assassin probably,

Sweden was despoiled minor power. Charles

What

XII., — a

abundant

skill,

which he needed

in

front of

Friedrichshall, in 1718.

of all her provinces,

she

owed

to

and became a

Gustavus she

lost

through

monarch possessing abundant courage,

abundant means, but lacking the one to

make him

truly great,

—

discretion.

trait

APPENDIX

A.

SOME MODERN MARCHES. Marches,

in the

seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, were apt to

be slow, owing to bad roads, long trains, numerous non-combatants,

and the habit

of ploying

which roads had

to

an army into several columns, for some of Following are a few samples,

be prepared.

most of which, tried by our standard, are ordinary a few, good for any era. 1. In October and November, 1632. Gustavus, with about 20,000 men of all arms, marched over bad roads, from Donauworth to Naumburg, some 270 miles by the route he took, in 18 days, or 15 ;

miles a day. 2.

In August, 1644, Cond^, with about 10,000 men of

marched from

the Moselle to Freiburg,

210 miles

in

all

arms,

13 days, or 16

miles a day. 3.

In 1657, Turenne, with over 30,000

from the Scheldt-Sambre region or 25 miles a day. 4.

In June, 1674, Turenne, with 9,000

from the Rhine 5.

to Sinsheim,

90 miles

in

men

of all arms,

marched

Lys, 75 miles in 3 days,

to the

4

men

marched 17^ miles a day.

of all arms,

days, or

In October, 1704, Charles XII., with 20.000

men

of all arms,

marched from the Vistula to the Oder, over bad roads, 180 miles in 10 days, or 18 miles a day. 6. In August, 1706, Eugene, with 25,000 men of all arms, marched from Reggio to Villa Stellona, 240 miles in 16 days, or 15 miles a day. Counting out a rest-day, owing to intense heat, the rate was 16 miles a day. 7.

In July, 1708, Marlborough, with 65.000

men

of all

arms,

marched fi-om near Brussels on Oudenarde, 40 miles in 48 hours, or 20 miles a day. 8. In September, 1709, the duke of Hesse-Cassel, with 10,000 men of all arms, marched from Douaj' to Obourg and Havre, 49 miles in 56 hours, or 21 miles a day.

APPENDIX

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851

INDEX. Administrator,

important among ancients, 30 utility not understood, 31 ; acts of a, 53 tactics of, 54 ; indecisive, 580.

90.

Adrianople, battle

;

of, 3.

Agincoui-t, 15.

Alberghatti, General, 765 et seq. ; 819. Aldringer, 244, 288, 345, 414. Allerheim, battle of, 478 et seq. ; losses at, 485.

Baudissin, 135, 190, 203, 207-209, 297, 367, 370. Bavaria, Elector of, operates with Villars, 703 at Blenheim, 725 et seq. Bavaria, importance of, 707. Bayonet, origin of, 38 introduction of, 570 charge, 706, 827. ;

Almanza, battle Alte Veste, 355

of,

812.

et seq.

;

Ambulauce, introduced, 577. Ambush, Byzantine, 4 rare, ;

;

Beck, 454.

7.

Aiihalt, princes, 275. Anklam, 107. Army, standing, 20 ; ancient, not large, 29 ; with simple weapons, 29 of various nations, 34 grows more common, 569 large, 576 slow of movement, 577. Arnim, Count, 112, 137, 139, 248, 277, 303, 322, 326, 329, 330, 365, 372, 380, 415. Arque busier, 21. Arras, siege of, 541 et seq. Art of war, periods of, 29; simple among ancients, 30 ill-digested in ;

;

;

;

Berlin, 215. Bernard of "Weimar, 234, 242, 246, 247, 271, 287, 348, 367-369 et seq., at Lutzen, 396, 413, 378, 381. 391 415 at Nordlingen, 416, 439, 441. Berwick, 770, 781, 786, 812, 813. ;

;

Bethlen Gabor, 93, 95, 97. Bishop, only a prince, 90.

Artillery tactics in 16th century, 23 Swedish guns, 42, 43 practice improves, 45 position in Hne, 53 ; improvements in, 572.

Blenheim, French position at, 721, 725, 726 battle of, 723 et seq. ; Marlborough and Eugene reconnoitre, 724 allied position at, 726 Cutts' attack, 726 Eugene's attack, 727 French defense, 728 Marlborough crosses Nebelbach, 728 breaks centre, 729 Eugene breaks left, 729 Marlborough captures Blenheim, losses at, 730 retreat of French, 729 730 honors divided, 731 discussion of battle, 732 et seq.

Augsburg,

Bogislav, 156, 161, 162

;

Middle Ages, 31 shaped by Gustavus and France, 570. ;

;

;

;

peace

of,

89

;

Gustavus

Louis

of,

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

at

699,

705,

Bombardelle, Boufflers, 621

et seq.

170.

Thirty

et seq.,

et

et seq.

Bandolier, 37.

Bournonville, 621

Bow, used by

296, 306, 348, 415, 439.

"Bastion," 149.

et seq. ;

numbers

at,

259 Saxons at, 260 chart of, 262 Pappenheim's error, 263 ; Pappen;

7

et seq.

legion, 3. Brahe, Count, 165, 391. Brahe, Countess Ebba von, 80.

Breitenfeld, 253 accidental,

695, 784, 802

seq.

Bouquoi, 93

;

of

19.

Ban^r, Field-Marshal John, 82, 189, 206, 207-209, 231, 237, 260, 281,

" Battles," 22. Battles, rare, 7, 575

et seq.,

beginning

Years' War, 92, 94. Bombard of Rhodes, 18.

712, 718.

Baden-Durlach, 97 Barwalde, 193.

;

Bohemia,

captures, 318, 500, 501. Augustus of Poland, 838 et seq.

Baden, Prince

;

;

;

INDEX.

854

the Saxons 265 Tilly sees his chance, Gustavus luanceuvres, 267 266 r^sura4 of, Tilly's Walloons, 268 269,270. originates, Brigade, Gustavus 50 formation of, 51, 256. Brussels, besieged by Elector of Bava-

helm defeated, 264 driven

off,

;

;

;

;

;

Marlborough relieves 790, 791 it, 791. Burgstall, 241, 357 et seq. ria,

;

Burgundy, duke

of,

770

et seq.

Byzantine military

art,

4

valued,

discretion

;

5.

Cadogan, General, 774

et

seq.

Calvinism, 89. relief of, 554, 555.

Campaigns, object of, 579. Camps, protected, 26 how made, 574. Cannon, various kinds, 42-46 English, ;

;

45, 46.

Caprara, 607

et seq., 617, 674. Carpi, combat of, 678. Cartridges, •>! artillery, 43. Casimir, John, 66, 153. Cassano, battle of, 740-742. Casualties, not a sure test of discipline, 484. Catinat, wins victory at Staffarda, 658, ;

et seq. ;

in Italy,

by Eugene, 677

676

;

outflanked

679

retires,

;

;

re-

lieved, 679, 680. Catholic League, 92. Cavalry, rise of, 1 displaced, 2 ; cannot stand alone, 2 massed by Constantine, 2 ; destroys an army, 3 upjiermosfc, 3 barbarian, 3 Roman adopts bow, 4 tactics in 16th century, 22 prefers firearms, 24 ; how divided in 16th century, 39, 40; irregular, 40 slow, 41 Swedish fast, 41 improved by Gustavus, 52 position in line, 53 the jjrincipal ;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

arm, 445; improvements in, 571; uses firearms too much, 573 numer;

ous, 576.

Champ Charles Charles Charles Charles Charles Charles

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

sieges Pultowa, 845 wounded, 84.5 beaten at Pultowa, 846 takes refuge with Turks, 847 at Bender, 847, 848 criticism of, 847, 848 ; his death, 848. Chiari operation, 682. Christian of Anhalt, 90, 95. Chi-istian of Brunswick, 97, 99. Christian of Denmark, attacks Sweden, 74 101 entei-s war, 103 defeated, 109; sues for peace, 114; let off easUy, 114; helps Stralsund, 134. Circles, German, 89. Citizen soldier, 32. Clempenow, 168. Coehorn, 578, 695. ;

;

;

;

;

;

;

Colberg, 181, 184

seq.

et

captured,

;

207.

Company, size of, 38 officers of, Cond^ the Great, his youth, 450

39.

;

advances on Roeroy, 451 in line before Rocroy, 452 at the battle of, 454 et seq. ; joins Turenne, 458 divides forces, 460; attacks Mercy, 460; rejoins Turenne. 461 attacks again, 462 outflanks Mercy, 463 advances on Philipsburg, 464 friendship for Turenne, 567 marches up Neckar manoeuvres with Turenne, 475 against Mercy, 476 at AUerheim, 479 et seq. ; serves under Duke of Orleans, 488 succeeds to command, 489 takes Furnes, 490 moves on Dunkirk, 492, 493 opens lines, 494 opposed by Spanish army, 494 caprelieves Courtures Dunkirk, 495 wins in Catalonia, 514 tray, 495 battle of Lens, 515, 516 imprisoned, 520 leads army of the princes, 524 attacks Turenne at Gien, 525 operates near Paris, 529 et seq. ; at battle of St. Antione, 530 et seq. ; at in Champagne, Corbeil, 532, 533 533 invades Picardy, 535 his campaign on the Somme, 536 et seq. beseiges Arras, 540 et seq. ; defeated his operations on at Arras, 545 Scheldt, 546 relieves Valenciennes, re548 et seq. ; able work of, 55 1 lieves Cambray, 555; proposes to reaches relieve Dunkirk, 560, 561 Dunkirk, 563 compared to Turenne, ;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

Blanc, battle I.

defeats Schulenburg, 840 dethrones Augustus, 840 dictates terms in Leipsic, 841 influenced by Marlborough, 841 compared to Gustavus, 841, 842 follows Peter, 843, 844 his strategic mistakes, 844 moves into the Ukraine, 844 be-

;

Cambray, siege and

665

839

of,

523

et seq.

at Naseby, 429.

Worcester, 434 IX. 66 death of, 73.

II. at

et seq.

;

Philip, 76, 77, 83. William, 170, 171. XII., his character, 832;

com-

bination against him, 832 attacks and defeats Denmark, 833 ; relieves Narva, 836 crosses Dwina, 837 defeats Augustus of Poland at Klissow, 838 ; defeats Saxons at Pol tusk, ;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

INDEX.

855

conquers Franehe Comt^, with army invading Holland, 586, 587 against Prince of Orange, 600 at Senef 602.

Dunbar, 433. Dunes, battle of the, 563 et seq. Dunkii'k, captured by Cond^, 488 et seq. ; description of, 490, 491 siege

Conti, T., 158, 161, 170, 176. Corbeil, operations near, 532, 533. Corpus Evangelicorum, 113, 248,302, 331, 336, 3-i7Courtray, 495. Craatz, 331. Cr^cy, foot at, 6, 15.

of, by Turenue, .553; its situation, 559 surrender, 566. Dwina, the battle of, 837. Dyle, lines of the, 747 et seq.

539, 567

588

;

;

;

,

;

;

Cromwell, 421 et seq. ; begins New Model, 422 imitator of Gustavus, 422 his yeomen, 422 at Edgehill, 422 how he learned his drill, 424 at Grantham and Gainsborough, 424; at Marston Moor, 425 his soldiers really regulars, 427 New Model, 427 at Naseby, 428 in south of England, 430; in Wales, 430; at Preston Pans, 430 in Ireland, 431 et seq.; at Drogheda, 431 at Wexford and Clonmel, 431 his " massacaptain-general, 432 at cres," 431 Dunbar, 433 at Worcester, 434 et gauged seq. ; as a general, 435 etseq., ;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

Edgehill. 423, 424. Edict of Restitution, 115, 147, 330. Electors, 88.

Empire, German, its constitution, 88. Engineering, Swedish, 60 grows, 578. English long-bow, 10. Entzheim, battle of, 614 et seq. ; losses ;

at,

('.24.

Eric, King, 65. Essex, 422. Estates, Swedish, 65. Estates of the empire, 89. Etampes, siege of, 526 et seq. Eugene, Prince, 645, 665 his early services, 670, 671 at Zenta, 673, 674 ;

;

in arrest, 673, 674 seq. ; builds road down ;

675 et Adige, 677

in Italy,

;

outflanks Catinat, 678 advances to the Oglio, 680 his victory at ("hiari, 682 captures Cremona and Villeroi, 685 retires south of the Po, 687, 688 at Luzzara, 689 compared to

553.

;

Cross-bow, 15, 16, 20. Crusades, contained no lessons, Crutch for musket, 37.

;

8, 9.

;

;

Culverin, 19. Custrin,211, 217,23.5. Cutts, Lord, at Blenheim, 726.

;

;

meets Marlborough, 712 at StoUhofen, 712 marches to joins Marljoin Marlborough, 717 borough, 719; reconnoitres, 720; 724 his record as battle, decides on a general, 730 et seq. ; Italy, 737 et seq.; checked on the Mincio, 738;

Vendome, 691

;

;

;

;

Damitz, 162, 163, 165.

Dammgarten,

175.

;

Dampierre, 93 et seq. Danzig, JSigismund in, 85 its 122 value, 123 naval fight at, 128 ;

;

;

;

Daun, General, 765

Demmin, 180, 202, De Witt, 583, 587.

et seq.,

770.

tries to cross

;

;

;

;

;

Diet, German, 88. Dinkelsbiihl, 476, 484. Discipline, none till 16th century, 25, 57 of Swedish army, 58, 59 ; improved, 578. Dominium Maris Baltici, 121, 151 established, 272. Donauworth, 91, 312, .331, 716. Don John, 555, 556, 560 et seq. ;

Douay, captured by allies, 818 et seq. Villars and Berwick at, 818 cannot ;

relieve, 819.

;

;

204.

Dragoons, 24, 40, 52. Drogheda, 431. Dueling, 59.

young Vendome's position, Adda, 739 attacks Cassano, 740 twice wounded, manceu\Tes on retires, 742 741 Adda, 743 unable to reach Savoy, 743 had manceuvred cleverly, 744, turns

739

siege raised, 133. D'Areo, Count, 714, 715.

in Turin campaign, 759 et seq. ; starts for Savoy, south of Po, 760

745

;

his rapid march, 761 et seq. ; reaches reaches Turin, 763 Stradella, 762 beats enemy, 766 liis march against joins Marlborough, Toulon, 770 at advances on Lille, 784 773 Lille, 785 et seq. ; over-gallant, 789 opposes Villare in Flanders, 793 and Marlborough reconnoitres, 794 and Marlborough at Tournay, 795 advance on Mons, 796 turn Villars' line, 796; at Malplaquet, 799 et seq.; compared with Marlborough, 809 at Douay, 818 et seq. ; advances with ;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

INDEX.

856

Marlborough on Arras, 820 with Marlborough captures Bethune, St. Venant and Aire, 820, 821 on the Rhine, 821 succeeds Marlborough in command of Dutch army, 822; suffers from bad faith of 'English, ;

;

;

823

;

captures Quesnoy, 824

;

his po-

Marchiennes-Denain-Lan825 broken by Villars, 82(j on Tournay, 827 operates campaigns against on Rhine, 828 victory at Belgrade, Turks, 829 sition

at

drecies, retires

;

;

;

;

Grand-tactics, 55. Great Elector, 584, 589, 607, 625, 643.

Greek

fire, 18.

Greifenhagen, 170, 188 et seq. Greifswalde, 206, 235 captured, 236. Grenadiers, how armed, 35. Gunpowder, substances like, ancient, 17; references to, 17, 18; in 14th century, 18; at Cr^cy, 18; used by Moors, 1 8 an effect, not a cause, 27 keynote of new science of war, ;

;

;

29.

Gunlocks, 37. Guns, kinds of Swedish, 42

829.

Fairfax, 426, 428, 432.

Falkenberg, 171, 220 et seq. Ferdinand, ilmperor, 92, 94 his suchis opincesses, 111; his ideal, 113 ion of Gustavus, 1 44 his situation in ill case, in 1630, 147 277, 278 303 turns to Wallenstein, 304, 322 at end of his resources, 326 turns the winner at to Wallenstein, 327 Liitzen, 397 413 makes peace with Saxony, 420. Feudalism, encouraged horseman, 6 ;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

:

;

disappears, 17.

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

File, decreases, 49, 572. Flag, Swedish, 48.

Footman, main

reliance, 2. Forlorn hopes, 23. Fortification, permanent, 61. Fortresses, necessary to store war material, 31 their influence, 579. Frankfort on Main, 291. Frankfort on Oder, 211. Frederick of the Palatinate, 93 ; chosen king, 94. ;

;

;

;

;

Fleurus, battle of, 657. Flossgraben, 388, 391 et seq.

et seq.,

Gustavus, no art until his day, 5 first perfects system, 34 organizes infantry, '.}& lightens muskets, 37 his organization, 39, 40 his cavalry organization, 41 speeds up cavalry 41, 52 his artillery, 42 lightens guns, 42, 43 introduces uniforms, 48 orihis method of ginates brigade, 50 originates mobility, battle, 54, 55 55 decreases train, 57 introduces prayers and strict promotion, 58 his regulations, 58 a clever engineer, 60 his " Instructions," 60 birth of, 66; as a child, 67 growing qualities, 67 his education, 67 his tutors, 68 his studies, 68, 69 enters army, 69 his favorite studies, 69, 70 his first glimpse of war, 70 declared of age, 70 his first command, 70; his clever ruse, 70; his first campaign, 70, 71 ascends throne, 73 his war with Denmark, 74 et serj. ; his novel method, 74 nearly drowned, 75 his success at Waxholm, 75 makes peace, 76 his loveaffairs, 76 his war with Russia, 77, 78 invades Ingria, 77 gains reputation, 78 his peace with Russia, 78 travels, his truce with Poland, 79 8U his love for Countess Brahe. 80 organizes finances his morality, 80 and troops, 81 invades Livonia, 82 ; captures Riga, 83 marches through Courland, 83 conquers truce, 83 ; compels Danzig to neutrality, 84 his work his support at home, 85 his in Thirty Years' War, 87, 88 views on German struggle, 101 ; his proposes to help military plan, 102 Protestants, 1 03 aids Stralsund, 1 12 et seq. ; his ideal, 113; determines to enter Germany, 114, 136; sails for Dwina, 117; defeats Poles twice, 118; his victory at Walhof, 119; ;

Field fortifications, 61.

Freiburg, 447, 448

leather,

;

43.

operations at, 458

829,

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

Fronde, wars of the, 519 ; ended, 534. Fuensaldegna, Count, 541 et seq. Fuentes, Count, 453, 456. Fugger, 244, 288. Furstenberg, 244, 324.

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

Gall&s, 321, 322, 345, 365, 371, 381, 441.

Galwav, Lord, 811. Gardie de la, 68, 76, 153. Garz, 170, 187 Gassion, 452.

;

;

et seq.

;

George William, elector of Brandenburg, 121, 193, 195, 2 Gien, operation of, 525. Gosiecovvski, 118. Grammont, 458, 479

17.

et seq.,

484.

;

INDEX. 119; his blunt talk his plans, Erandeuburg-, 121 121; besieges Danzig', 122; revicthis reverses uals Mewe, 12o, 124 sails for Pillau,

to

;

;

rejoins army, 126; captures Prussian forces, 12(j; wounded at Danzig, 126 too ven•while

absent,

12()

;

;

again wounded, 127 not well storms Wormditt, 128 naval enplaced at Danzig, 121) gagement near Danzig, 131 victory near Danzig, loo raises siege of Danzig, 13o too little known of his excluded from Conbattles, 133 appealed to by Germany, gfress, 136 136 fails in IStuhm operation, 138 wins his victory at Nogat, 138 six years' truce from Poland, 139 end, Polish wars 140; his trainhis ing in, 141 his improvements in, 141 his motives in entering Geroutlook in Germany, 143, 150 many, 146 et seq. ; demands on France, 149 his high tone, 149 his plans, 151, 152 issues no declarasails from Sweden, tion of war, 155 lands in Germany, 157 156, 157 turesome. 127

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

reconnoitres,

1(>0

and Wollin, 160

;

clears

Usedoni

captures Stettin, his conquests, 162, 163; his position, 165 captured, 164 166 extends his conquests, 166 extends his occupation. 166 et seq. moves on Mecklenburg, 173; receives no German help, 174; his five column plan, 177 his caution, 180 defeats Savelli. 180 manoeuvres near Stettin, 184 ; his councils of war, 18.5 attacks Garz, 187 storms Greifenhagen, 189 defeats Schaumberg, 190 forces neutrality on Brandenburg, 193 camps at Biirwalde, 193 his gain so far, 194 makes treaty with France, 195 his treaty with Magdeburg', 198 moves on Demmin, 202 captures Loitz, 204 captures Demmin, 204 his strongline, 205 contemplates winter-quarters, 205 moves on Frankfort, 210 captures Ciistrin, 211; storms Frankfort, 212 his audacity, 212 captures Landsberg, 213 his plans, 214 plans ;

fortifies

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

relief of

;

Magdeburg, 216

starts for his road barred, 218. 220, 224 ; retires, 230 his position on the Spree-Havel, 231 ; forces Brandenburg to his plan, 235 receives reinforcements, 237 ; hLs bastion, 238 marches on Elbe, 238 crosses, 239 ;

Elbe, 218

;

;

;

;

;

857

almost disheartened, 240; attacks Tilly's cavalry parties, 240 defeats Tilly at Werben, 242 his position safe, 243 on the Havel, 246 advances towards Saxony, 250 makes treaty with Saxony, 251 crosses the Elbe, 251 advances on TLlly, 2-53; wins at Breitenfeld, 260 the Protestant hero, 270 what he had gained, 273 et seq. ; his approaches to Wallen stein, 275 what route ? 276 rejects suggested march on \"ienna, 2*7 his plans, 278, 279 criticised, 280, 281 heads for the Main, 282 new strategic position, 282 his forces at Erf urt<>283 captures Wiirzburg, 285 storms Maiienbiu-g, 285 new treaties, 286 moves down the Main, 290; captures places down to Frankfort, 291 attempts to assassinate, 293 crosses Rhine, 294 captures Mainz, 294 levies contributions, 295 fortifies Mainz, 295 drives Spaniards away from Main, 296 forces, 299 et seq. ; holds court at Mainz, 301 might have become king of Germany, 302 had entirely changed affairs, 303 his situation, 305; too many detachments, 306 moves against Tilly, 308 enters Niirnberg, 310 crosses Danube, 310-312 his chances on the Lech, 314 reconnoitres, 315 throws bridge over Lech, 316; forces Lech, 316; does not pursue, 317; moves up to Augsburg, 318 advances on Ingolstadt, 319 besieges Ingolstadt, moves on Munich, 320 his 320 honesty misconstrued, 326 politics turn against him, 329 labors with John George, 329-33 starts for Saxony, 332 not sufficiently concentrated, 332 too late to prevent junction of enemies, 333 his uncertainty as to action, 334 its cause, 335 his forces, 336 fidelity to Niirnberg, 337 intrenches Niirnberg, 338 cautious, 341 offers battle, 343, 3.52, 354, 361 orders in his lieutenants, 348 his plans for Oxenstiern, 349 roads open to his reinforcements, 3-50; his reinforcements join, 351; captures Fiirth, 355 determines to attack Wallenstein, 355 storms Alte Veste, 356 criticised for his attack, 358 negotiations with Wallenstein, 359; breaks the deadlock, 361 frank acknowledgment, 363 moves to Swabia, 365 contemplates ;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

1

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

,

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

INDEX.

858

movement down Danube, 366 and on Constance, 866 compared to Wal;

;

373 his plans, 376 dang-er his relations with to his base, 376 other nations, 376 marches north, 377 urges John George to action, 380 his council of war, 382 enerlenstein,

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

getic,

383

decides on battle, 3S5

;

Ireton, 428. Ironsides, 422, 425.

;

Jesuits, 90, 113, 122, 133.

John George, Elector

of Saxony, 90, refuses Gustavus passage, 219 blamed for disaster to Magdeburg, 230; his Third Party,

248;

gence, 399

et

;

;

;

;

will, 399 quick temper, 399; piety, 399; poetry, 399; his character, 400 justice, 400; his intimates, 400 busy habits, 401 opinion of his opponents, 401 courage, 401, 402 his method, 402 his work in Thirty Years' War, 402-406 as opposed to Wallenstein, 406 his ;

;

;

;

;

;

;

his position at Liitzen, 396 et seq. his tactical purpose at Liitzen, 392 his slow manoeuvring, 392 killed, 394 too little known about him, intelli398 his appearance, 399 ;

317

92, 96, 195,

treats with Gustavus, 251; joins hiin with his army, 252 ; urges battle, 252; 277, 303, 321,326; his

treachery, 329 seq.

;

Wal-

;

makes peace with Ferdi-

ence, 379 nand, 419.

;

Jolin,

negotiates with

;

.330 ; his vacillation, 365 faithless, 372 his indiffer-

lenstein,

King, 65.

;

;

;

;

;

alternating boldness and caution, 407 his councils of war, 408 his decisiveness, 408 ; his broad method, 408 his vigor, 409 the secret of his successes, 410 his work made toward civilization, 410 father of the miodern art of war, 411; his lieutenants' failure emphasizes his method, 440 his clear-cut purpose, 486; his method, 517; imitated, 576 unintelligently so, 579 chief of his era, 581 his influence on battles, 733 compared to Charles XII., 842 a pati-iot, 848. ;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

Kagg, 161,

167.

Kara, Mustapha, 646 et seq., 829, Kirchheim, operation near, 502. Klissow, battle

of, 838.

Knight, his value, 6 at Hastings, 6 had no art, 6 irresistible on good ground, 6 useless on poor, 6 unreliable, 8 dismounted, 16. ;

;

;

;

;

;

Kniijhausen, 161, 182, 203, 207, 361, 381, 391.

Koniezpolski, breaks siege of Danzig, 125 127, 129 operates against Danzig, 132 defeated near Danzig, 132 ;

;

;

135, 137.

Konigsberg, 121.

Kosen

defile, 379, 381.

;

Gustavus Vasa, 63, 64.

La

Halberd, Swiss, Hamilton, 237. Hand gun, 18.

La FeuiUade,

Fert^, 454 et seq., 528 et seq., 548 554, 556. 738, 760. Landsberg, 190, 193; captured, 213. et seq.,

11.

Hesse, prince of, in Italy, 760 et seq. Hesse-Cassel, invaded by Tilly, 244. Hocquincourt, .524 et seq., 557. Holeke, 345, 349, 365, 371, 414. Holland, invasion of by France, 582 seq.

;

Landsknecht, 14. Lauenburg, 183. Lech, the, 314. Legion, degenerates, 2 et

peculiar terrain, 588.

Horn, Field-Marshal Gustavus, 82, 173, 182, 185, 201, 290, 293, 306, 368, 414, 417.

207-209, 231, 261, 307, 318, 323, 324,

Infantry, loses caste, 4 Gothic in Italy, 5 Teutons used, 5 reappears, 10 reasserts itself, 1 1 16tli century tactics, 22; in 17tli century, 35; ;

;

;

;

;

Swedish, how armed, 36 how it fired, 52 Turenne complains of French, 465 improvement in arms of, 570. ;

;

;

Ingolstadt, 319, 320.

;

relies

on mis-

siles, 3.

Leipsic, convention of, 196, 2.34 captured by Tilly, 250 the plain of, 258 captured by Wallenstein, 375. Lens, battle of, 515, 516. Lesczinski, Stanislaus, 839. Leslie, at Dunbar, 433. Leslie, Colonel, 134, 158, 161. ;

;

;

Levenhaupt, 824 et seq. Leyden, 491, 495, 565. Lille, siege of, 784 et seq. ; first convoy reaches, 785 lines opened, 786 French attempt at relief, 787 met by allies, 788; heavy fighting at, 788, 789 Boufflers surrenders town, 789 losses at, 789. ;

;

;

;

;

INDEX. Logistics of Thirty Years' War, 513. Loitz, 203. Longbow, English, 10, 14, 1.5. Lorraine, Charles of, at Vienna, 646 et seq. ; in battle of Vienna, 652. Lorraine, duke of, 287, 295, 327, 469 et seq., 495, 527 et seq., 532, 607, 621, 643. Lottuni, Count, 695, 781, 799 et seq. Louis XIV., 519, 527, 553, 557, 568, 582 et seq., 588, 643, 644, 654, 659, 669, 672, 699, 737, 790, 792. Louvois, 588 his system, 656. Liibeek, peace of, 136. Liineburg, 367, 370, 380. Liitheranism, 89. Latter, battle of, 108. Liitzen, vicinity of, 378; strength of uncertain records of, armies, 384 387 description of terrain, 388 position of armies at, 388 et seq. ; the course of the battle, 392 et seq. ; a Swedish victory, 396. Luxemburg, Duke of, 589, 600; at Fleurus, 657 at Steenkirke, 660 at Neerwinden, 663 his death, 665. Luzzara, battle of, 689. ;

;

;

;

;

;

;

859

Manoeuvring, supplants battles, 31 slow, 575 highly considered, 580. Mansfeld, Count, 95-99, 105, 107, 108. Maradas, 371. Marches, how conducted, 24, 54, 573. Marlborough, Duke of, early services, 692 et seq. ; in the Netherlands, 694 restrained by Dutch deputies, 695 moves into Germany, 710 not an exceptional march, 711 meets Euoperates with Prince gene, 712 Louis, 712, 713 assault on the Schellenberg, 714 et seq. ; devastates Bavaria, 717; joins Eugene, 719; joint forces, 719 they decide on battle, 723 his record as a general, 730, 736 his plan to invade France, 74() breaks retires from Moselle, 747 through Dyle lines, 748 at Ramillies, 750 et seq. ; operates against Vendome, 769 manoeuvres against Vendorae, 771 et seq.; marches on Oudenarde, 773 et seq. ; success of desires to invade his strategy, 782 at held back, 783 France, 782 Lille, 785 et seq. ; relieves Brussels, Flanders, opposes Villars in 791 793 reconnoitres, 794 and Eugene and Eugene adat Tournay, 795 vance on Mons, 796 turn Villars' line, 796 at Malplaquet, 799 et seq. ; his brilliant career at an end, 808 compared with Eugene, 809 at Douay, 818 et seq. ; advances with Eugene on Arras, 820 with Eugene captures Bethune, St. Venant and Aire, 820, 821 invests and takes Bouchain, 822 influences Charles ;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

:

;

;

;

;

;

blockaded, 197; treaty with Gustavus, 198 Gustavus' 216 et seq ; siege of, plans as to, 213, 221 et seq.; disagreements within, 221, 222; its defenses, 221 et st-q. ; storming of outworks, 223 Tilly Falkenberg withdraws arrives, 223 within walls, 224 Gustavus cannot suburbs leveled, 225 reach, 225 treats with Tilly negotiates, 225 Tilly, 2^6 et seq. ; stormed, 227; plundered, 228 burned, 228, 297. Mainz, siege of, 291 et seq. ; Gustavus' court at, 301. Malchin, 204. Malplaquet, terrain of, 798 et seq. battle of, 799 et seq- ; Marlborough and Eiigene reconnoitre, 799 Vilplan of lars heavily intrenches, 8U0 the battle, 801 Schulemberg attacks, 803 Lottum attacks. 803 both thrown back, 804 the Prince of Orange assaults, 804 defeated with heavy loss, 804 Eugene pushes back Villars, 805 Withers attacks Villars' left, 805 Villars weakens his centre, 805 Marlborough pushes in Orkney, 805 Orange again assaults, 806 Boufflers' fine retreat, 806 immense losses, 807 without

Magdeburg,

170, 171

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

result, 808.

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

XII., 841. Marsaglia, battle of, 666. Marsin, 479 et seq., 705, 707, 721

;

at

Blenheim, 725 et seq., 760. Marston Moor, 425. Maurice of Nassau, his improvements. 21, 34.

Maximilian, 90 made elector, 98 his ideal, 113; rewarded, 114; 302,310; appeals to retires from Rain, 317 Wallenstein, 319 retires to RatisAVallenstein, of bon, 320; afraid 33i) starts to join Wallenstein, 332 joins Wallenstein, 342. Mazarin, 445, 519, 527 et seq., 530. Mazeppa, 844 et seq. Mecklenburg, 172 dukes reinstated, ;

;

;

;

;

;

;

236.

Melos, Field-Marshal, 451. Mercenary, favored, 8 ; dangers

of.

INDEX.

860

Mercy, Field-Marshal, 447, 458, 460 et seq., 470 et seq., 479 et seq. Mergentheiiu, operations at, 468 et seq. battle of, 478 et seq. Mewe, operation at, 12o et seq. Monroe, 166, 182. Mons, besieged by Marlborough and Eugene, 71*7. Montecuculi, 175, 324, 509, 589 early moves life and services, 592, 593 on the Main, 593 evades Turenne, 59(') crosses Main, 597 joins Prince marches on Rhine, of Orange, 600 633 et seq. ; moves on Philipsburg, 636 crosses llhine, 637 recrosses, 637 moves back of Rench, 639 turned out of his position, 64 645. Morgarten, horsemen destroyed at, 6 Swiss victory at, 11, 12. Morner, 68. ;

;

;

;

;

ough sends Overkirk to turn French 779; Marlborough and Eugene envelop enemy, 780 French right,

;

781

defeated,

781 Marlborough pursues next day, 781. ;

losses,

;

Outpost service, 575. Overkirk, 695, 747. Oxenstiern, Axel, 68 prime minister, 73; 127, 152, 159, 166, 169, 178 j advises march on Vienna, 276 281, ;

;

308, 323, 348, 352, 361, 366, 367, 375, 377, 413, 439.

;

;

;

;

1

,

;

Mortar,

9, 44.

Munich, 321, 331. Musketeer, appears, 20 how armed, 35 position in line, 50. ;

;

Palatinate, devastation of, 616 succession war, 644 et seq. Pappenheim defeats Lauenburg, 183, blockades Magdeburg, 197, 196 209 attacks Magdeburg, 223 his activity at Magdeburg, 225 et seq. ;

;

;

;

storms Magdeburg, 227 retires from Elbe, 239; at Breitenfeld, 260 et in seq. ; separates from Tilly, 288 Westphalia, 296, 367-369 et seq.; marches towards Wallenstein, 375, ordered 378 sent to Halle, 381 back, 384 killed, 395. Pasewalk, 169. Passau, convention of, 89. Pay, of troops, 55, 56. Peterborough, Lord, 811. Peter the Great, his character, 832 besieges Narva, 834 invades Poland, 842 retires before Charles, 843 buys peace at Pruth, 847. Philipsburg captured, 465. ;

;

;

Narva, battle

of,

835

et seq. ;

losses at,

836.

Naseby, battle of, 428 et seq. Naiimburg, 379. Navy, Swedish, 62. Neerwinden, battle of, 663. Netherlands, develop engineering, 26. Nidda, operation on, 499 et seq. Non-combatants, 60. Nordlingen, 412 et seq. ; battle of, 417 et seq., 475 et seq. Niirnberg,293, 297, 298, 336 et seq. ; its defenses, 339, 340 its troops, 340 ;

small operations near, 34(5 et seq. forces in ana famine begins, 347 famine grows, 354 about, 354 famine in, 360, 377 relieved, 362. Nymwegen, peace of, 643. ;

;

;

Orange, William of, made stadtholder, 587 inundates Holland, 588 joins at Senef, 603 et Montecuculi, 600 ;

;

;

.seq., 660, 663, 667, 670. Organization, uncertainty as to, 51. manoeuvres in Orleans, duke of, 760 front of Eugene, 762, 813. ;

Ormond, Lord, commands English on the defensive, 823.

775 et seq. ; Burgundy hesitates, 776 Vendome deCadogan seizes sires to attack, 776 Eyne, 776 French right attacks too Eugene and Marlborough late, 777 throw back attack, 779 Marlbor-

Oudenarde, battle

of,

;

;

;

;

Piccolomini, 345, 392, 414, 495, 511, 512. Pike, Swiss, 10. Pikeman, Swiss, 11-13; how armed, 35 position in line, 50. ;

Plunder, main object,

7.

Poitiers, 15.

Pomerania, 161 Porticus,

et seq.

()0.

Prayer, 58. Preston Pans, 430. Priests' Alley, 280

et seq.

Prisoners, ill-treated, 25, 60.

Protestantism, its extent in 17th cenproscribed, 115. tury, 89 Protestant Union, 91. ;

Pultowa, battle Pultusk, 839.

of,

845

et seq.

Punishments, in Swedish army, 58. Pursuit, rare, 24, 575 31. ;

;

;

Quarters, 57.

;

;

;

Rain, 314. Ramillies, positions at, 751,752; Marl-

861

INDEX. feints on 753 attacks Villeroi's breaks it, 755 Villeroi right, 754 results losses at, 756 retires, 755

borough advances on, 753 Villeroi's left,

;

I

;

;

;

;

^

;

;

j

of, 75tj

;

Rank and Ransoms

Villeroi relieved, 756. command begins, 24.

arise, 25, 00.

size of,

38

Stahremberg at Almanza, 812 reaches, 813; defeats French near marches on MaSaragossa, 814

way

officers of, 38.

;

;

;

845, 846.

Spandau, 217, 235. Spanish succession, war of the, 670. Spanish sword and buckler, 14.

Ribnitz, 175. Richelieu, Cardinal, 115, 140, 148,195, takes up the 275, 302, 323, 326

Sparre, 346, 360. Spinola, 95-97. Squadron, organization and officers of,

;

412

43i).

;

Riga, siege of, 82, 83. Rocroy, battle of, 451

seq.; losses

et

Rohan, duke

41.

Stadtlohn, battle of, 99. Staffarda, battle of, 658.

457. of, 514.

Rosen, General, 470 et seq., 505. Rostock, 173, 176, 236, 297. at Edgehill, 423 Rupert, Prince, 421 at Marston Moor, 426; at Naseby, ;

;

Stahremberg, at Vienna, 647 et seq. ; in Italy, 698; his splendid march, 699; in Italy, 738; in Spain, 8l3 et seq.

Antoine, battle of, 530. Steenkiike, battle of, 660 et seq, Sternskjold, 128. Stettin, 162 et seq., 176, 181. Stralsund, defies Wallenstein, 111 siege of, 112, 113; 174. Strategy, none in Middle Ages, 5 unnecessary to ancients, 30. Styrum, Marshal, 704. Swabia, overrun, 321; country people St.

428.

Ryswick, Peace

of, 667.

Sapieha, 118. Savelli, 161, 169, 180, 203, 204. Schaumberg, 181, 187, 189, 203. Scheldt, fortified by French, 790 ; allies break through, 791. Schellenberg, assault on the, 714; losses at, 716; not justifiable, 716.

Schools in Swedish army, 59. Schulemberg, General, 801 et seq. Schulenburg, General, 837, 841. Schweinfurt, 284. Senef battle of, 602 et seq. ; losses ,

606. Sieges,

8

of,

;

hostile, 321. first to

King, 65

;

at,

deposed, 69 ;

;

war, 85 appears near Danzig, 122 weak conduct at Mewe, 124 imagrees to six years' placable, 193 ;

;

;

;

truce, 139.

Gustavus' plans as Sinsheim, battle of, 608 et Silesia,

608 et seq. Marshal, 454.

to, 213,

seq.

;

;

;

;

;

;

plots against Sweden, 79 truce with, 79 at Danzig, 84 his reasons for ;

;

;

;

course of, 579.

Sigismund,

make National Army, her method, 32, 33 condition of, condition of, in her wars, 72 72 1630, 149 preparations in, 153. Swedish army, 47 et seq. ; recruitment cost distribution of, 155 of, 154 31

castles, 8 advanced, 578

26, 61;

;

Sweden,

from feudal

arose

method

at,

815;

arrives,

coast, 816.

Rhinegrave, the, 135, 137, 138.

Sirot,

Vendome

815;

Stahremberg retires from Madrid, 815 Vendome beats him at Brihuega. 815; Stahremberg retires to

Rewards, <J0. Rhenskjold, General, 836, 841, 842,

at,

;

drid,

Regulations, (Swedish, 58. Reserves, found useful, 54.

reins,

;

;

Rations, how supplied, 25, 57. Ratisbon, 178. Reconnoitring, rare, 7.

Regiment,

Skytte, John, 68, 159. Sobieski, John, 645 et seq. ; reaches attacks enemy, (j51 Vienna, 650 behavior of emperor to, 654. Soldier of Fortune, 32. Spain, operations in, 810 et seq. ; allies take Madrid, 811 Berwick retakes Madrid, 812; Berwick defeats Gal-

214.

of, 155.

Swedish peasantry, 66. Swedish soldier well clad, not uniformed, 48 his national dress, 49 how clad and armed, 48 et seq ; well what he learned in behaved, 78 ;

;

;

how recruited, Polish wars, 142 154 cost of, 155 how set up, 255 revels in Franconia, 298. Swiss pike, 10 tactics, 11, 12. ;

;

;

;

;

losses to 16th century, 24 necesTactics, minor for solsary to ancients, 30

up

;

;

INDEX.

862

39; old Spanish, 254; new Swedish, 255 of Breitenfeld, 254, diers,

;

255. Tallaid, Field-Marshal, his charge, 706 707, 717, 721 ;

;

bayonet at Blen-

;

heim, 725 et seq. Tangermiinde, 2oy. Taupadel, 346, 369. Teuifel, 165. ;

;

;

91

its

of,

license in, 93, 97, 103, 116, 170,

;

transferred to Weser, 98 Danish period, 101; no method, 116; condition in 1630, 145 et seq. ; noted generals of, 274 how carried on after Gustavus' death, 413 et seq. in 1633 and in following years, 414 ;

;

;

;

French phase

of,

438

et seq.

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

moves 287 Maximilian ;

after Breitenfeld, 286, south of Main, 288 interferes with, 289

commendably

active,

289

attacks turns against ;

Niirnberg, 293, 297 Horn, 307 captures Bamberg, 308 retires, 309 his position on the Lech, 312; resists Swedish passage, 316; wounded to death, 316. ;

;

;

;

Tokoly, 047

;

:

;

;

shal,

445

;

raid into

Black Forest,

moves on Freiburg, 447 fails at Freiburg, 449 reconnoitres with Cond^, 459 di\ades forces, 460 rejoins Cond^,4()l attacks again, 462 captures Philipsburg, 465 captures Mainz and other towns, 466 friendship for Cond^, 467 in winter-quarters, 469 ; crosses Rhine, 469 out446

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

Thnrn, Count, 92, 94. Tiefenbach, 247. Tilly, 95; victor at White Hill, 96; his campaign in Baden, 98 beats Mausfeld, 99, 105; follows Christian, 108; beats Christian, 108; moves into Holstein, 109 155, 178 in command, 196 at Franlifort and ixianceuvres Landsberg', 199, 200 against Gustavus, 203 et seq. ; aims at Neu-Brandenburg, 206, 207 capmarches on Magdetures it, 208 burg, 209 his method, 216 his proceedings at Magdeburg, 225 et seq. ; his treachery at Magdeburg, 227 weak after Magdeburg, 232 moves on Hesse-Cassel, 233, 237 his character, 233 his reinforcements, 233 attacks Werreturns to Elbe, 240 ben camp, 241 defeated, 242; reinforcements, 244 moves on Leijisic, 248 captures Leipsic, 250 his intentions, 257, 258 defeated at Breitenfeld, 259 et seq. ; based on the 276

;

;

Thiiringervvald, 283, 378.

Fthine,

;

;

Traytor, 60. Triple Alliance, 583. Turenne, Marshal, his youth, 440 his early gallantry, 441 his early campaigns, 441 in Italy, 442 what he had learned, 443 his lack of opportunity, 444 an exceptional pattern, 444 his first army as field-mar;

Thirty Years' War, causes, 87 phases, 88 beginning motif, 88

248

Tournay, siege of, by Marlborough and Eugene, 795. Train, 24 essential to transport war material, 31 decreased by Gustavus, 57 immense, 576.

et seq.

Tollense, 168. Torstenson, Field - Marshal Leonard, 82, 203, 396, 4;;9. Tott, Ike, 236, 271, 281, 297, 306, 368, 370.

;

;

flanks enemy, 470

moves

;

to

Mer-

gentheim, 471 defeated at Mergentheim, 473 skillfully retires to Hesse, 474 frankly acknowledges defeat, 474 gets reinforcements and drives enemy back, 475 manceuvi-es agamst Mercy, 476 Turenne at Allerheim, 479 et seq. ; retires to Philipsburg, 485 captures Trier, hampered by Mazarin, 498, 486 504 joins Wrangel, 498 turns enemy on the Nidda, 499 moves into Swabia, 500 takes Rain, 501 turns enemy at Kirchheim, 502 invades Bavaria, 503 detaches Bavaria from emperor, 504 suppresses mutiny, 505 defeats enemy at Zuraarshausen, 508 moves on Rain, 510 crosses Lech, 510 crosses Isar, 511 reaches the Inn, 511 devastates Bavaria, 511; retires behind Lech, 512; his conduct reviewed, 513 flies to Holland, 519 joins Spaniards and inhis operations vades France, 521 on the Aisne, 521, 522 defeated at Champ Blanc, 523 returns to France, 524 commands armv of the court, 524 checks Cond4 at Gien, 525, 526 besieges Etampes, 526, 527 forces Lorraine out of France, 528 operates near Paris, 529 et seq. ; at St. Antoine, 5:!0 et seq. ; at Corbeil, 532, 533 recaptures Paris, 533 on the Somme, 536 his manoeuvres against Cond^, 537, 538 compared to Cond^, at539, 567 moves on Arras, 542 tacks the lines of Arras, 543, 545; ;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

INDEX. manoeuvres Cond^ out of position on 546 et seq. ; his misunderstanding with Cond^, 547 mauceuvres on northern border of France, 547, 548 besieges Valenciennes, 548 moves elasticity under defeat, 551 blockades on Dunkirk, 554, 558 takes St. Venant, Cambray. 554 attacks and Mardyk, 557 550 Cond^ and the Spaniards, 5G;5 his victory at the Dunes, 5(34 captures Dunkirk, 506 his capture of many towns, 507 overruns Flanders, 583 plans invasion of Holland, 585 invades Holland, 580 operates against Great Elector and Montecuculi, 590, 591; raauceuvres on Main against Montecuculi, 594 et seq. ; advances towards Nlirnberg-, 596, 597 ; retires to Aschaffenburg, 599 ; at Sinsheim. 608 et seq. ; manoeuvres on the Rliine, 615 et seq. ; at Entzheim, 618 et seq. ; his letter to the king, 618 advances on Entzheim, 619; attacks enemy, 020 conducts winter campaign, 026 et seq. ; his winter turning - manojuvre, 627 et seq. ; attacks enemy, 628 et seq. wins victory at Tiirkheim, 6o0 et seq. ; drives enemy out of Alsatia, 631 et seq. ; compared to other generals, 632 manoeuvres against Montecuculi on Rhine, 634 e< seq. ; crosses Rhine, 635, 637 mauceuvi-es in front of Strasburg, 038 operations on Rench, 639, 640 forces Montecuculi -to battle, 641 ; estimate of his charkScheldt,

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

8G3

Adda, 739 and at Casano, 741 ; great credit due him, 744 attacks Eugene's army, 759 in the Netherlands, 770 et seq. ; manoeuvres against Marlborough, 771 tt seq. ; seizes Ghent, 772 seeks to fight Marlborough, 774 held back by Biu-gundy, 775 mantBuvres before Bruges and Ostende, 790 in Spain, 815 et seq. ;

;

;

;

;

;

;

Victories, indicisive, 31.

Victualing,

method

of, 25, 57, 576.

Viemia, a marcli on 276 the siege of, 045 et si-q. ; defenses of, 647 battle of, 052 losses at, 054. Villars, early services, 700 his foray in Baden, 701 operates with Bavaria, 703 et seq. ; manoeuvres against Prince of Baden, 7( >5 740, 747 defends northern France. 793 his lines, 794 his lines turned, 790 advances on Marlborough and Eugene, 797 reaches Malplaquet, 798 fortifies, his numbers, 798 798 at Malplaquet, 799 et seq. ; checks Eugene and Marlborough in advance on Arras, 820 his strong lines, 820 captures Denain and breaks Eugene's position, 820 operates on Rhine, 828. Villeroi, 665 in Italy, 079 defeated at Chiari, 682; captured, 685, 717; captures Huy, 740 his lines on the Dyle, 748 broken thi-ough, 749 at Ramillies, 750 et seq. '.*

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

acter, 641, 042.

;

764

;

battle,

104 early history, 105 hismilitarv method, 100 beats Mansfeld, 107;" follows him, 107; moves into Jutland, 110 opposition to him, 110 his ideas. 110, 11 1 baffled at Stralsund, 113; his ideal, 113 his success, 114 his failure before Stralsund, 134; 155; displaced, 179 indiscipline of his troops, 179 Tilly's failure, his gain, 274 his approaches to Gustavus; 274, 319; 321 et se(i. ; his terms to emperor, 327 placed in command. ;!28 i-aises an army, 328 its indiscii)line, 328 marches into Bohemia, 330 negotiates with John George, 3;!0 moves to Eger, 330 plundei-s in Saxony, 331 on Gustavus' communications, 336 follows to Niirnberg, 340, 342 over-cautious, 341 declines to fight, 343 his camp, 343 merely blockades Niirnberg, 344 criticism on 78, 130, 135, 144

Turin, battle of, 757 tion of, 763

Walhof, battle of, 119. WaUenstein, his ojjinion of Gustavus,

descripFrench fight defensive et seq. ;

Eugene

ably selects

points of

attack, 765 beats the French, 766 discussion of battle, 706 et seq. Tiirkheim operation, 027 et seq. ; battle of, 630 et seq. ;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

Uniforms, 48 introduced, 571. Utrecht, Peace of, 828. ;

;

;

Valenciennes, siege of, 549 Vasas, the, (33 et seq.

et seq.

;

;

Vauban, 578, 695, 784. Vendome, duke of, early services, 086 in Italy, 680 outflanks Eugene, ;

687 689

crosses

;

;

Po, 688

compared

to

;

at Luzzara,

Eugene, 091

against Stahremberg, 698

737

et seq. ;

;

;

in Italy,

checks Eugene on the

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

/ INDEX.

864

345 his officers, 345 his 345 does not attack Guslethtavus' reinfofcenients, 351 refuses battle, 354 deargic, 352 fends his position, 357 leaves Niirnberg, 362 his letter to emperor, 362 moves on iSaxony, 364 et st q. ; disregards Giistavus' movements, 368 enters ISaxony, 369 thrusts at Guscompared tavus' weak point, 372 his general plan, to Gustavus, 374 374 attacks Leipsic, 375 his council of war, 382 inert, 382 his strategic situation, 383 could have had better position at LUtzen, 390 retreats to Bohemia, 396, 414 his last campaign weak, 415 assassinated, this, 344,

;

;

position,

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

;

415.

Werben camp,

;

;

;

;

287, 291, 302, 306, 369. William of Orange, 34. William of Weimar, 297,

369

323,

Hill, battle of, 96.

et seq.

Women

173, 236, 297.

with army,

Woods, fighting

.59.

in the, 472.

Worcester, 434 et seq. Wrangel, Field-Marshal Gustavus, 82, operates 135, 137, 153, 439, 440 with Turenne, 497 et seq. ; continues to operate with Turenne, 507 et seq. Wiirtemberg, 324. Wiirzburg, 285. ;

Zenta campaign, 672 et seq. Zisca wagonburg, 16, 17. Zumarshausen, operation at, 508.

\i)\'fAU)\^

\\\

349,

et seq.

Wismar,

239.

Werth, John de, 473 et seq., 479 Westphalia, Peace of, 512, 517.

White

William III., 659 at Steenkirke, 661 at Neerwinden, 663 667, 670. William of Hesse, assists Gustavus, 234, 246 defies Tilly, 234, 237 282,

'^\

1?'

LIST OF DATES.

A. D.

B vttle

of Battle of

3J8 ]-^° l^J^ 1^1» circa l^-U

Morgarten

•

Passau Convention Peace of Augsburg of Sweden king Eric XIV. John UI. king of Sweden of Sweden king Sigismnnd, Dec. Gustavus Adolphus born of Sweden king Charles IX. Donauworth put to the ban Prote.stant Union formed Catholic League formed Matthias seizes Bohemian throne Gustavus' first campaign Gustavus ascends throne Matthias elected emperor Gustavus' Danish campaign Peace of Knarod Gustavus begins army organization Gustavus' Russian campaign Peace of Stolbowa Ferdinand elected king of Bohemia of

Storm

•

15:25

— —

.

nm

Iw7

of Stuhmsdorf Prepafrations for war Leslie takes Riigen

Truce

}008 lOOJ Ibll

IJ;!-

1012 o}^ f 1015 lojo l*;!"

•

.

manoeuvres

in

Treaty with France

Demmin movement Capture of Demmin

Baden May-June, 1622

Mansfield and Brunswick defeated on A.ug. We.ser Christian of Denmark undertakes war. Treaty with Stralsund June, Gustavus lands at the Dwina July-Aug. Livonia reduced .

Two

battles at Riga Courland reduced

Walhof

Wallensteiu defeats Mansfeld

I

1(.25

1620 April, 10.0 6,

19, 1029 Spring, 1629 27, 1629 July 16, 1629 Aug. 1629

Winter, 1629-16.^

Jan. 18,

Jan. 23, Jan. and Feb. Feb. 15,

.

Ciistrin surrenders Storm of Frankfort

!

Fall, 10'_5

Jan.

May

1630 1630 1630 1630 1630 1630

1630 1630 l(i30

1630 1630 1G30 1630

1630 1630 1630 1630 1631 1631 1631 1631 1631 1631 1631

March 2, Capture of Colberg Feb. and March, Leipsic Convention March 23, 1631 Neu-Braudenhurg massacre

1

1623 102o 1625 102o

Summer. 1025

16'£J 1627 1028

June

Tilly reaches Frankfort 1

1627

July 24, 1628 May 22, 1629

March and April, Gustavus sets sail for German" .June 9, July 4, Lands at Usedom .July, Takes Usedom ana WoUiu July 20, Takes Stettin August, begins Colberg of Siege Capture of coast towns July and August, August 28, Savelli besieges Tollense August, garri.soned Magdeburg Ang.-Sept. Advance on Mecklenburg Sept. Gustavus 27, taken by Ribnitz Nov. Congress of Ratisbou ends Nov. W.vUenstein succeeds Tilly Gustavus defeats Savelli at Demniin Nov. Nov. 11, Battle of Schievelbein Nov. Ratzburg Battle of Dec. 26, Capture of Garz Feb. and Jan. Camp Barwalde

1

•

Fall, 1627 Fall, 1627

Danzig

Edict of Restitution issued Sweden determines on war Operation at Stuhm Victory at the Nogat

War

—

off

Wormditt

Peace of Lvibeck

•

lb' loj

of

^Kl"^' 1027 May, VrVr May-June, 1627

Wmter, Baltic treaty vvitli Denmark Tilly invades Holstein WaUenstein defeats Cliristian Sprmg, Defeat of Koniezpolski WaUenstein defeated at Stralsund

l^?15o» 1500 1568 l&a^ 19, loJi

•

Battle of

Naval battle

li-^ 1523

1017 1 018 begins 1019 Ferdinand II. elected emperor king elected Palatinate Frederick of the ?619 of Bohemia Maximilian of Bavaria joins Ferdinand lOiO Nov. 8, 1620 Battle of the White Hill 1019-1620 / Gustavus travels in Germany Polish War Aug. 1621 Defeat of Radziwill .Sept. War. 16, 1021 Polish Capture of Riga Polish War Livonia captured Sept.-Dec. 1621 l^^l Palatinate reduced June, 1022 Danzig agrees to neutrality Tilly's

Battle of Lutter Swedish reverses Gustavus arrives at Danzig Gustavus twice wounded

1-|15

—

Aug. 1020 Aug. 27, 1626

Relief of Me we by Gustavus

J^^^ J^^o J^O" IdSi

of Cr6cy of Poitiers Field artillery .... of Rosabeck of Agincourt Zisca of Deutsch Brod Gustavus I. Vasa, king of Sweden circa Swedish National Army begun

—

Siege of Danzig begins

• •

•

Gunpowder introduced Battle of Laupeu

Thirty Years'

July, 1G26 July, 1626

10J;°

Binnockburn

Battle Battle Battle Battle Battle

June, 1626 by Gustavus Konigsberg and Prussian towns taken

Pillau taken

Battle of Adrianople Battle of Hastings Battle of Falkirk

!

I

.

.

March

31, 16,31

April 3, April 16, Landsberg falls Siege of Magdeburg .. Sept. 1630, to May, Pappeuheim captures outer forts of city April 9, Falkeuberg retires within walls April 30,

1631 1631 1631 1631 1631

LIST OF DATES. A. D.

May Suburbs burned Storm and burning of Magdeburg May

4,

June, marches on Hesse-Cassel June 25, Capture of Greitswalde of Mecklenburg restored. .July 5, July 10, Capture of Tangermiinde Camp at Werben July- Aug. Burgstall combat Aug. 1, Tilly

Gustavus

Werben

fortifies

Aug. Aug.

7, 8,

1631 1631 1631 1631 1631 1631 1631 1631

Havel-Spree line

Aug. Tilly moves on Hesse-Cassel. ..End Aug. Till}' moves on Saxony Early Sept. Gustavus' treaty with Saxony .. Sept. 10, Armies join at Diiben Sept. 15, Tilly captures Leipslc Sept. 16, Battle of Breitenfeld Sept. 17, Gustavus heads for Thuringia. .Sept. 27, Gustavus at Erfurt Oct. 2, March through Thiiringerwald Oct. 8, Wlirzburg captured Oct. 15, Marienburg captured Oct. 17, Gustavus defeats duke of Lorraine .

.

Nov. 2, Saxons move to Prague Early Nov. Gustavus starts down the Main Nov. 10, Frankfort surrenders Nov. 28, Tilly attacks Niirnberg Dec. 4, Mainz surrenders Dec. 22, Winter-quarters in Mainz Dec. 1631, to March,

1631 1631

1631 1631 1631 1631 1631 1631 1631 1631 1631 1631

1631 1631 1631 1631 1631 1631

1632 Jan. 1632 Wallenstein reappears Feb. 1632 Wallenstein invades Bohemia End Feb. 1632 Tilly captures Bamberg March 15, 1632 Gustavus joins Horn March 31, 1632 Gustavus enters Niirnberg .April 5, 1632 Guotavns takes Donauworth . .

WaUensteiu

""efinitely in

.

command April, 1632 April 15, 1632

,

of the ^ecn April Gustavus takes Augsburg Gustavus moves on Ingolstadt

The crossing

20, 1632

April 29, 1C32

Siege of Ingolstadt

May, 1632 May 10, 1632 Gustavus takes Munich May 18, 1032 Wallenstein takes Prague Gustavus reduces Swabia and Bavaria May-June, 1632 June 12, 1632 Gustavus starts north June 18, 1632 Gustavus at Furth Wallenstein and Maximilian join June 24, 1632

End

of April, beginning of

Gustavus at Hersebruck

June 17-July July Gustavus reaches Niirnberg

1, 1632 3, 1632 .July 1632 Niirnberg. reaches 13, Wallenstein Wallenstein fails in a surprise.. July 15, 1632 Niirnberg Starving match at July-Aug. 1632 Wallenstein captures Lichtenau Aug. 6, 1632 Aug. 9, 1632 Gti.stavus captures convoy Oxenstiern arrives with reinforcements Aug. 23, 1632 Gustavus offers Wallenstein battle Aug. 31, 1632 Gustavus attacks the Alte Veste Sept. 3, 1632 Sept. 17, 1632 Formal cliallenge to battle Sept. 19, 1632 Gustavus leaves Niirnberg Wallenstein leaves Niirnberg. Sept. 21, 1032 .

.

Gustavus on the Danube Early Oct. Wallenstein starts for Saxony Oct. 15, Gustavus starts for Saxony Oct. 18, Wallenstein takes Leipsic Nov. 2. Gustavus at Erfurt Early Nov. Gustavus crosse Saale Nov. 9, .

.

Dukes

Tilly defeated at Tilly retires

1631

20, 1G31

Battle of Liitzen

.

— Gustavus' death

Nov.

1632 163",

1P32 i632 1032 1632

1632 1633 1633 1633 Wallenstein assassinated Feb. 25, 1634 Battle of Nordliugen Sept. 16, 1634 Duke of Rohan in the Valteline 1635-1637 16,

Bernard operates on the Danube Horn operates in Swabia Wallenstein operates on the Oder

Ban^r and Bernard command Swedish

army 1634-1641 Torstensou commands Swedish army 1041-1642 Cromwell begins " Ironsides " discipline Winter, 1642 Battle of Edgehill Oct. 23, 1042 Battle of Grantham May, 1643 Battle of Rocroy May 19, 1643 Battle of Gainsborough July, 1643 Battle of Winceby Oct. 1643 Turenne takes command of French army Dec. 1643 Turenne's raid into Swabia May, 1644

Turenne's failure at Freiburg June, Battle of Marston Moor July 2, Battle of Freiburg Aug. 3-9, Capture of Philipsburg Sept. 12, Capture of Mainz and other places

" New Model " array voted Turenne crosses Rhine Battle of Mergentheim Battle of Naseby Cond^ joins French army Battle of Allerheim

Cromwell at Bristol Nidda operation

Memmiugen operation Cond<5 at Dunkirk Cromwell at Basing House Bavaria deserts Ferdinand Condi5 in Catalonia Zumarshausen operation Cond(5 takes Ypres Turenne on the Ixm Battle of Preston Pans Battle of Lens Peace of Westphalia Capture of Drogheda

Sept.-Dec. 1644 Feb. 1645 April, 1045 May 5, 1045 June 14, 1045 July 5, 1045 Aug. 5, 1045 Sept. 10-11, 1046 June, 1646 Oct. 1646 Sept.-Oct. 1646 Oct. 14, 1646 March, 1647 1647 May, 1648 May, 1648 July? lG-18

Aug. 1648 Fall, 1648 Oct. 24, 1648 Sept. 12, 1649

Wexford and C lonmell Battle of Dunbar Condi5 imprisoned by Mazarin Turenne invades France Battle of Champ Blanc Battle of Worcester Turenne arrayed against Conde Blt^neau affair Siege of ;fetampes Battle of St. Antoine Turenne protects the court

Winter, 1649 Sept. 3, 1650 1650 1650 Dec. 1650 Sept. 3, 1651 1652 March, 1652 Spring, 1652 July 5, 1652

Summer and Operation at Villeneuve

St.

1644 1644 1644 1644

Fall, 1652

Georges Oct. 1652

Summer, 1053 Campaign on the Somme Aug. 24, 1654 Relief of Arras by Turenne Relief of Valenciennes by Cond(5 July

10, 16.50

1657 Campaign on border of Holland Turenne takes Dunkirk May and June, 1658

LIST OF DATES. Battle of the

Dunes

Jl. d. 14, 1G58 29, ItJSS

June June

Capture of Bergen Peace of tlie Pyrenees

1C59 Jan. 1008

Triple Alliance Peace of Aachen

May, 1G68

French invade Holland William of Orange placed

Spring, 1G72 in

command Aug. 1G72

Turenne operates against Great Elector Fall, 1672 and Moutecuculi Turenne and Moutecuculi on the Main

Summer, 1G73 June Aug.

Battle of Sinsheim Battle of Senef Battle of Eutzheim

IG, 1G74 11, 1G74 Oct. 4, 1674

Nov.-Dec. 1G74 Jan.

5,

June-July, Turenne's last campaign July 26, Turenne's death Peace of Nymwegen Relief of Vienna by Sobieski.. .Sept. 12, June 30, Battle of Fleurus Battle of the Boyne July 1, May, Battle of Cape La Hogue Battle of Steenkirk July 24, Battle of Neerwinden July 29, Battle of Marsaglia

Oct.

4,

Peace of Ryswick Charles XII. invades Zeeland Peter the Great at Narva

Sept. 30,

Battle of Narva Eugene and Catiuat in Italy

Nov.

June, Oct. 29,

1675 1G75 1G75 1679 1G83 1690 1690 1692 1 692 1G93 1G95 1697 1700 1700 1700

April-May, 1701 Battle of Riga

July, 1701

Charles XII. overruns Courland and Lithuania 1701 Marlborough commander-in-chief in Holland 1702 Villeroi

and Vendome

in

1702

Italy

Operation of Mantua Charles XII. captures Battle of Klissow Battle of Luzzara

Warsaw

May, 1702 May, 1702 July, 1702

Aug.

3,

1702

1703 in Holland against Stahremberg in Italy 1703 Feb. 1703 Villars' Baden raid May, 1703 Battle of Pultusk 1703 Peter founds St. Petersburg Villars' manoeuvres against Louis of Summer and Fall, 1703 Baden Marlborough and Eugene on the Danube 1704

Marlborough

Vendome

D.

1704 1704 1701 1704

1704 1704 1704 1704 1705 1705

Schulemberg's famous retreat Eugene and Vendome in Italy Archduke Charles in Spain Marlborough on the Moselle and in Hol1705 land Feb. 1706 Battle of Frauenstadt May 23, 1706 Battle of Ramillies

Galway takes Madrid

Turenne's turning manoeuvre Battle of Tiirkheim

Eugene against

A..

—

Gibraltar taken War in Spain begins July 2, Assault on the Schellenberg Aug. 13, Battle of Blenheim Peter takes Nar\'a Stanislaus Lesczijiski elected king of Poland Sept. Augustus recaptures Warsaw Schulemberg defeated at Punitz

June, Battle of Turin Sept. 7, Charles XII invades Saxony Charles XII. dictates peace at Leipsic. .

.

Marlborough in Holland Eugene at Toulon Battle of Almanza

Spring,

Allies forced back to Catalonia Fall, Charles XII. returns to Poland Sept. Jan. Charles XII. at Grodno Charles XII. at the Beresina June, July 11, Battle of Ouudenarde

Oct.

Siege of Lille

170R 1706 1706 1706 1707 1707 1707 1707 1707 1708 1708 1708 1708

Charles XII. marches to the Ukraine Fall, 1708

Fortress

War

1708-1709 Spring, 1709 May, 1709

Villars' lines Siege of Poltowa

1709 1709 1709 1709 Battle of Malplacquet 1710 Siege of Douay 1710 Stahremberg and Vendome in Spain July, 1710 Siege of Bethune 1710 Siege of Aire and St. Venant 1711 Capture of Bouchain 1711 Peter buy.s peace on the Pruth 1712 English on the defensive Summer, 1712 Siege of Quesnoy by Eugene Siege of Landrecies by Eugene Summer, 1712 Villars raises siege of Landrecies July 24, 1712 1713 Villars and Eugene on the Rhine 1714 Charles XII. returns to Sweden 1717 Belgi'ade of Victory 1718 Death of Charles XII

Battle of Poltowa Siege of Tournay

July

8,

July, Sept. 4, Sept. 11, Spring,

Advance on Mons

.

.

.

/

GREAT CAPTAINS. A COURSE OF SIX LECTURES SJiowinathe Infiuence on the Art of War of the Campaigns of Alexande Hannibal, Ccesar, Gustavus Adolj^hus, Fred',"

erick,

and Kapoleon.

8vo,

219

pp., %2.00.

By THEODORE AYRAlTL^L^DODGE, Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel United States

Armyr

These Lectures were delivered before the Lowell Institute

in Boston.

conciseness and sharpness of these pictures make them very effecand we know not where else to find in anything like the same compass tive, accounts of the eminent commanders here considered which convey an N. Y. Tribune. equally complete and intelligible conception of them.

The

—

They

become as real to the reader as if Plutarch American veteran. In producing this effect Boston Herald. almost alone among modern historical studies.

(the great captains)

were his guide instead of an the book

is

—

The best informed can hardly rise from a perusal of his pages without a sense of having gained wonderfully in the clearness of his vision of facts with which he has perhaps long been familiar.

The book can study

it

profession.

— Boston Advertiser.

at the same time no officer is delightful reading for laymen without getting a clearer insight into the higher branches of his

— London

;

Graphic.

Instead of long-drawn commentaries, he interjects pithy remarks and critUnited Service Magaicisms which at times approach ihe epigrammatic.

—

zine.

A most entertaining and instructive description of the character, work tution.

of the six great captains of history.

— Journal

life,

and

Military Service Insti-

\

ALEXANDER. A

History of the Origin and Growth of the Art of War, from the Earliest Times to the Battle of Ipsus, B. c. 301 with a detailed account of the Cami^aigns of the Great Macedonian. With 237 Charts, Maijs, Plans of Battles and Tactical Manceuvres, Cuts of Armor, Uniforms, Siege Devices, and Portraits. 8vo, ;

two volumes

in one, pp. xxiv, 692, $5.00.

By THEODORE AYRAULT DODGE, Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel United State-

^^^„

Dodge has made it clear 5- ,, ,, ... , , ^, '" *°^ well-written book that there was for at least one more «^-.udy of the Macedonian, great and that new light could be throw.' -' "P^n his achievements by examining- them from a nnlitarv point of ' The observations of Colonel Dodge on many points - v'lew. of military N. Y. Tribune. P '' .-J science are pregnant and weighty. Colonel

.

.

.

room

—

Dodge points out with great skill what Alexander was as a great and what he did for the art of war. This book is of the deepest to those who wish to fully comprehend how Alexander conquered

^Olonel captain, interest

—

Boston Herald. cannot name an author who can describe a battle so clearly and simply, make the object of manoeuvres so plain, the reason of defeat or victory Boston Advertiser. so clearly understood. He has certainly made the story more intelligible than did his less military predecessors, not only by his admirable and abundant maps and plans, but by the clear and carefid narration of the military transactions. Philathe world.

We

—

—

delphia America?!.

Colonel Dodge follows Alexander with critical analysis, and in a style specially suited to the needs of the modern reader. Dial (Chicago).

— —

A book of much interest to the matter York).

.

.

.

ordinary reader from the freshness of its Christian Union (New which invites jjerusal from the outset.

It is the first work which has treated the subject in such perfect detail and with such a profusion of aids to the reader in the Avay of maps and illustrations.

— Boston

Transcript.

American scholarship has reason

to be proud of this successful inauguraChicago Evening Journal. tion of Colonel Dodge's great undertaking.

—

The

author's work, modest, clear, entertaining, and full of information, deserves cordial recognition from scholars and warm praise from critics. Hartford Courant. Creditable to the unfaltering industry as well as to the sagacity of its accomplished author. Boston Beacon. The style, which is clear and interesting, flows on with a certain vividness which carries one along with it to the very last page without weariness or disappointment. N. Y. Critic.

—

—

—

Nothing apparently has escaped his research ern travel.

— Christian

in ancient records or

mod-

Hegister.

Colonel Dodge writes out of so fresh an interest in his subject that he is sure to find interested readers. Atlantic Monthly. Colonel Dodge has the excellent faculty of making things clear in no mean degree. London Saturday Review.

—

—

A

work of immense research and labor and prepared with unusual intelBrooklyn Standard- Union. ligence and ability. The book represents an amount of research and labor really enormous.

—

—

Hoston Courier. author's accounts of Alexander's campaigns are vivid, picturesque,

The

—

Book Buyer. In every respect creditable to the industry and scholarship of the author. Magazine of American History. conspicuous feature of the book is the historian's perfect fairness. -^ Public Opinion. Inter-Ocean. It is plain, clear history, with frequent pithy criticisms. Providence Journal. remarkablj^ interesting as well as valuable book. Philadelphia Ledger. well-digested and admirably classified work.

and entertaining.

—

A

A A

—

The

clearest tale

of military history

Grocer.

The book

—

we have ever

—

read.

— American

— Journal of Mil. Service — Minneapolis Tribune.

interesting on every page.

is

Vivid, picturesque, and entertaining.

Inst.

HANNIBAL. A

History of the Art of

down

War among

the Carthaginians and

Romans,

with a detailed account of the Second Punic War! With 227 Charts, Maps, Plans of Battles and Tactical Manoeuvres, Cuts of Armor, Weapons, and Unito the Battle of Pydua, 168 b. c.

forms.

8vo,

two volumes

;

in one, pp. xviii, 684, $5.00.

By THEODORE AYRAULT DODGE, Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel United States Army. Especial praise is due to the chapter on crossing the Alps general summing up of Hannibal's character and career. mend themselves to the critic from the first word to the

.

.

.

.

and

.

.

to the

They com-

last.

— London

Athenamm.

Having once begun, the reader does not wish until

—

he closes the cover on the

The .V.

last page.

result of exhaustive research

Y.

to lay

down

the volume

— Journal of Mil. Service

and enthusiastic interest

Inst.

in the subject.

Critic.

Dodge marshals the evidence and fills out the story with whatever authentic material has survived, and thus gives local color and increased interest to the whole. N. Y. Nation. Colonel Dodge has brought to his task a very thorough preparation and equipment. The accounts of Hannibal's battles and sieges and marches are clear and spirited. N. Y. Tribune. The book is an example of how life can be infused into apparently exhausted classical themes by fresh study and vigorous presentation. ProvColonel

.

.

.

.

.

.

—

—

idence Journal.

Colonel Dodge's views are carefully considered and liis opinions are presented with clearness and force. N. Y. Journal. Although a careful historian, the author is also a graceful and forcible writer, with the true soldier's faculty of expressing himself concisely. .V. Y. Herald.

—

—

An interesting' feature is the diligence with which Colonel Dodge has collected all the anecdotes likely to throw light on Hannibal's personal charPhiladelphia Book News. acter. So clear tliat the reader who knows little about military matters finds Boston (Courier. himself carried forward insensibly, and deeply absorbed. An invaluable addition to the history of Rome. It settles many -/exed Dial. questions, and sheds light on many obscure problems. Colonel Dodge can tell a story with spirit, and he has a sound conception London Saturday Review. of the value of evidence. patient and careful Certain qualities of merit are plainly evidenced, investigation of tlie authorities, and a balance of judgment as to conflicting Christian Union. statements. the work inThe style is strong and vigorous, often epigrammatical Christian Register. dicates care and research. The biographer is gifted with lively powers of conception and execution. Philadelphia Ledger. Hannibal is a superb piece of portraiture. volume substantially new in its study of this master in the art of war. Army and Navy Journal. The most masterful history of the art of war among the Carthaginians and Romans that has yet commanded the exertions of any writer. Brooklyn Times. Vigorous and precise without being overloaded with irrelevant detail.

—

—

—

—

—

—

.

—

.

.

—

A

—

.

.

— —

.

Boston Gazette. It is as if you were a looker-on while Hannibal is maintaining himself in Boston Herald. a hostile country. No romance can be more fascinating than this remarkable biography. Boston Transcript. Hartford The story is told with admirable clearness and directness.

—

—

— The author has gone to work in the true way of investigation. — Chicago Journal. repays over and over again a careful perusal. — American Grocer. A clearer and better account than can be found elsewhere. — U. S. Cavalry Association Journal. to his task. — San Francisco Weekly. The author particularly Louis Republican. The author entitled to special attention. — The author shows himself an impartial judge. — Springfield Republican. — Boston Beacon. an acute Colonel Dodge The outcome of careful and exhaustive study. — N. Y. Sun. A trustworthy and spirited history. — Philadelphia Press. Courant.

It

fitted

is

St.

is

critic.

is

CAESAR. A

History of the Art of War among the Komaus, from Punic War dovFn to the Fall of the Roman Empire With tailed account of the Gallic and Civil Wars. Maps, Plans of Battles and Tactical MancEuvres, and

;

8vo,

two volumes

the Second

with a de275 Charts, other Cuts.

in one, pp. xix, 792, $5.00.

By THEODORE AYRAULT DODGE, Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel United States Army.

The thorough knowledge of his subject shown by the interesting manner in which he presents his array

author, the forcible of facts, and above all his evident indefatigability as a worker, cannot fail to excite the admiration of his readers. N. Y. Critic.

and

—

The

distinguishing characteristic of this excellent series

is

the extraordi-

nary care the author has taken to make each volume approximately, as nearly as is permitted to fallible humanity, the standard of absolute accuracy.

— Public Opinion.

One charm

of Colonel Dodge's Great Captains Series is the absolute frankness with which he makes known his estimates of the campaigns and the N. Y. Times. character of his heroes.

—

The duced

portrait of Csesar has often been drawn, but Colonel Dodge has reproit in singularly lifelike lines and colors. N. Y. Sun.

—

The work

add

Dodge's reputation as a clear and on the whole unprejudiced writer concerning topics which appear to possess peculwill

iar difficulties.

—

to Colonol

iV. 1'. Independent.

monument of from technicalities as to make The work

is

patient labor, and so clear in style and free

a

—

it a popular work. American Grocer. Colonel Dodge's Great Captains, when complete, will be an enduring monument of conscientious study and industry. Magazine of A merican History. Again we have to praise the author's unwearied perseverance in tramping London Athenceum. over sites of battles.

—

—

Richness of resource, vividness of portraiture, and candid impartiality lend to this work a fascination which holds a sustained interest. Minn.

—

Tribune.

The author has added to his reputation as a military historian in the Brooklyn Eagle. present work. It is as if we were with Csssar himself and looked on as a disinterested observer. Boston Herald.

—

—

Colonel Dodge's series has already taken established rank among English histories of ancient wars. N. Y. Nation. Colonel Dodge has given facts in which the ordinary scholar and reader will find unusual pleasure. N. Y. Herald. model of clear description and critical military analysis. Boston .

.

.

—

—

—

A

Transcript.

A

wonderful amount of caref id, painstaking research.

— Boston

Adver-

tiser.

We

commend the whole series, judging the volumes to come by those we have, to all students. Dial (Chicago). Colonel Dodge convinces us that he understands the business of war. London Saturday Review. The military student owes a debt of gratitude to Colonel Dodge. Miliitary Service List. JournalAll students of the subject will want to possess the volume. Hartford Courant.

—

—

—

—

No

little

point escapes the

Argus eyes

Colonel

Dodge

is

— Philadelphia old story. — N. Y.

of the historian.

Ledger.

well fitted to give freshness to the

Evening Post.

A vivid picture of the great game of war. — Providence Journal.

— N. Y. Herald. — Boston Beacon. Singular clearness and accuracy. — Boston Courier. One of the most profoundly interesting of books. — Philadelphia Press. His criticisms are most valuable. — Boston Traveler. Colonel Dodge has certainly fulfilled

A historian

of broad views

and

all expectations.

logical opinions.

RIDERS OF MANY LANDS. Profusely illustrated by Remington, and from photographs of Oriental subjects. 8vo, pp. 486, $4.00.

By THEODORE AYRAULT DODGE, Brevet Lieutenant- Colonel United States Army.

A book

that will gladden the heart of every lover of horses.

— Boston

Herald.

A volume

of rare and exceptional interest, full of information, modestly diffidently conveyed, written by a man who is not only a past master of his subject, but who shows in every line that he is possessed of that fine

and

—

—

which alone can create perfect sympathy bethat sacred fire N. Y. Tribune. tween a high-bred gentleman and his equine counterpart. The reader who has a grain of humor in him no bigger than a pinch of N. Y. Evening Post. snuff will find endless entertauiment in it. His style is picturesque and breezy he has opinions and he does not hesitate to express them. Boston Advertiser. Every style of riding which deserves to be called a' style is sympathetfeeling

—

—

;

—

ically estimated.

— Boston

Traveler.

and it contains a variety of information with regard to horsemanship and the horse which could not possibly be found elsewhere. Boston Beacon. Colonel Dodge is more than an enthusiastic lover of dogs and horses he Portland Pressis a most genial and clever writer. It is fortunate that so fair-minded and cosmopolitan a critic of equitation has arisen as Colonel Dodge. Springfield Bepublican. To an uidiniited knowledge of the horse and the art of horsemanship the New Haven Register. author adds vast experience as a traveler. What Colonel Dodge does not know about horses and how to ride them Providence Journal. could be put in very few words. It is one of those delightful books in a conventional world which comes N. Y. Nation. upon us not once in a decade. It is a book which all who love horses or the fields and the open air will N. Y. Independerit. take up with delight. The writer passes in review the riders, horses, and the methods and eqiiipments of about every people vmder the sun, chatting with the charm of an Commercial Advertiser. accomplished raconteur. Riders are discussed with the science of one who knows everything about Philadelphia Item. a horse that is worth knowing. Colonel Dodge has studied riders from the saddle, and has observed Detroit Free Press. things, women, customs, and costumes. Colonel Dodge's claim to know something about horses is amply and pleasantly maintained in nearly fourscore delightfully written chapters. New Orleans Times-Democrat. Readers will insist on finding out for themselves the good things in this excellent work. Boston Herald. charming volume it is with its lively text, full of interest and anecdote. It is intensely readable,

—

—

;

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

A

— Army and Navy Journal. Colonel Dodge's latest itary Service Inst.

work

is

of distinct military value.

— Journal Md-

A

series of charinin/,iy written chapters, in a breezy, unconventional style.

— Boston

Transcript

—

A delightful feature

of Colonel Dodge's hook is its S3rmpathetie tone. Boston Courier. Boston book every one interested in equitation will desire to possess.

—

A

Gazette.

His obsei'vations on horses and men in many lands are sensible, intelligent, Portland Argus. and bright. He writes with an energy that carries his readers with him. N. Y. Mad and Express. OutMarked in every paragraph with the knowledge of the specialist.

—

—

—

look.

A book that will gladden the heart

of every lover of horses.

— Brooklyn

Times.

Colonel

and deep.

Dodge

is

an adept whose knowledge of horseflesh

— Philadelphia North American.

is

both wide

—

It will appeal strongly and favorably to every lover of a manly spirit. Philadelphia Press. Opinions that are heartily outspoken a breezy, broad-chested way of Philadelphia Record. saying things. charm of sprightliness which holds the reader's attention throughout. Philadelphia Bulletin. Every horse lover will delight in Colonel Dodge's intelligent and sympaI'hiladelphia Telegraph. thetic demonstration of his subject. ;

—

—

A

—

man was

and riders it is Colonel Dodge. Nothing bearing on the equestrianism of the various peoples has escaped qualified to write of horses Washington Star.

If ever a

—

—

Rochester Herald. the colonel does not know about the horse and his gaits is not worth knowing. Buffalo Commercial. Christian The discourse is easy and free from cant or technicality. Advocate. LouisVivid glances of life with opinions that are heartily outspoken. ville Courier-Journal. Gen. The most magnificent tribute ever paid to the combined horse. Castleman, President Society of Saddle-Horse Breeders. his notice.

What

—

—

— —

— Chicago Times. — Boston Common-

Combines to an unusual degree interest, use, and beauty. Sound horse lore is dispensed all through the book. wealth.

— Boston Commercial — Marked by the enthusiasm of a genuine horseman. Boston Journal. Will delight those who love a good anecdote or a good horse. — Zion's Herald. Contains a vast amount of curious information. — Portland Advertiser. Both instructive and extremely entertaining. — Hartford Courant. The collection one of rare value and most entertaining quality. — Book Buyer. An exceptionally attractive book. — N. Y. A delightful and most instructive book. — N. Y. Press. Bright, sparkling, and abounding in sage observations. — Christian — N. Y. Rider and Driver. A volume of surpassing He

writes of a subject of which he

is

easUy master.

Btdletin.

is

Critic.

_

chattj",

Intelligencer.

interest.

—

Episcopal Recorder. breezy anc^ outspoken book. Colonel Dodge is a judg'e of horseflesh. Philadelphia Ledger. Philadelphia Times. Lots of entertainment. Presbyterian. breezy, off-hand way quite refreshing.

Colonel Dodg-e writes ex cathedra.

A

—

—

A

—

Colonel Dodge has studied the horse and horseman everywhere. Albany Journal. One of the choicest holiday books of the year. Buffalo Courier. Full of interest. Toledo Blade.

—

—

—

Colonel Dodge's style is easy and vivid. Cincinnati Commercial Gazette. Colonel Dodge is thoroughly qualified to speak from experience. Cleveland Plain Dealer. Louisville Post. One of the most entertaining books of the day. Abounding in anecdote and comment. Chicago Journal. Inter-Ocean. Will not only entertain but instruct equestrians.

—

— — — Colonel Dodge master of his theme. — Dial. — Chicago Interior. A feast of reason and a flow of His style animated, his pen graphic, and his knowledge of — Chicago Saturday Evening Herald. is

soul.

is

infinite.

From Russia

to Africa,

from Japan

to Westchester County.

leans Picayune.

An An

authority which

it is

safe to follow.

—

the subject

— New Or-

— San Francisco Bulletin.

expert judge of horseflesh. San Francisco Post. Leaves no part of the world untouched. San Francisco News Dealer. Colonel Dodge clearly speaks as one having authority on horses, saddles, months, and manners. Breeders'' Gazette.

—

—

ENGLISH NOTICES. Colonel

judgment.

writes with wide knowledge, keen sympathy, and trained London Times.

Dodge

—

One of the best books on horses and their riders with which we have met. London Athenceum. London SaturColonel Dodge is an exceedingly agreeable companion.

—

—

day Review. I am inclined to think no living Sporting and Dramatic News.

man

is

a more profound authority.

The book displays a knowledge of the ever-fascinating subject which London Sketch. nothing less than bewildering. London World. Very well done.

—

—

— is

CAMPAIGN OF

C. Mapt

"With four large It is

not easy to say which part of this booh

Nation.

We do not hesitate to pronounce it one of the Southern Histi books that we have ever seen.

—

BIRD'S-EYE VIEW CIVIL WAF

A

"With four large

Maps and 8vo.

forty-o.

$3.00

It is all that could be desired ; gives perhaps a cl accurate outline, than any other available record.

The book is

written in a spirit of impartiality and r who led the

the merits and defects of the generals

— Army and Navy yournal.

PATROCLUS CHAT Illustrated

AND PEN IN THE SAD

with fourteen Phototypes

of the

8vo, gilt top, half-roan.

E

$3.00

The same, with fourteen Drawings by Grey Park Instantaneous Photographs. 16mo. $1.25 Colonel Dodge's book is liberalizing. to all lovers of horses, and to

mended

The

spirit

of a sportsman pervades

it

It all

may be both warmly and sat. who ride. — Atlantic Monthly.

throughout.

— The

Field (London).

iorsville TATES Army. .00. ed), showing the natural

and

and the positions of the various different periods of the conflict.

artificial

federal

OTICES. cribution to scientific military criticism, and it is letailed history of the most anomalous of the miliute, accurate, and fair exposition of the strategy ingularly graphic account of a battle which for sed by any affair in ancient or modern times. censured both Northern and Southern writers for -or and ill-temper in treating of events of the war, fd in praise of this author's admirable spirit. From only in his statements of fact, but equally in his laracter of officers and the conduct of troops on either ness of the Union cause is implicit but it does not in sincerity and devotion of the Southerners. His admithe soldierly qualities, and the heroic spirit of the nion is enthusiastic; but he manifests a generous r the character and genius of Lee, Jackson and Stuart, New York , and spirit of the Confederate veterans." ;

t

The book is best, for it is all good. . . clear military head, who seems to have his subject. The student of military history will find •al reader will find it interesting in the extreme."

)art of this

.

man with a

on to the history of the war, and deserves a hearty •erous contributions to the history of the war."

.one" fith

—

— Literary World.

conspicuous fairness,

lounce it one of the ablest, uthern Historical Papers.

fidelity,

fairest,

and success."

and most valuable

is entitled to the thanks of military readers." ion.

— Atlanta Constitution. — Providence Press. .aightforward account." — Cincinnati

—

— Journal

J."

'vel."

Gazette.

one his work with judgment unusually impartial, and Philadephia Times. .ge."

—

ability

ne attention of readers by the careful study which it presents of movement, and by the apparent purpose to be just to all concerned." It.

*d soldiers jf ij

who

participated in the campaign will be interested in

American history as weH."

all Booksellers.

— Pittsburgh

it,

bat

Telegraph.

Sent, prepaid, on receipt of the price, by the Publishers,

lOUGHTON, MIFFLIN AND COMPANY.

A

VIEW

BIRD'S-EYE OF

OTJK CIVIL WAK. Br

THEODORE AYRAULT DODGE, United States Army. One Volume, Octavo, with four Mapa and Thirty-eight Battle-Plans. ^3.00. In one volume, in easy chaptere, and bo illnstrated by battle-charts and maps that the layman as readily follows the current of events as the soldier, Colonel Dodge has given us a concise and entirely impartial history of the war; and by casting aside unimportant detail, one which is comprehensive and full of suggestiveness. The object, conduct, and results of each larger campaign are critically explained, and the salient qualities of every army commander of North and South are vividly portrayed. The strategic and tactical manoeuvres are clearly pointed out, but in so simple

manner

as not to confuse the non-military reader. Marginal dates and accurate statistics of numbers engaged or lost on either side make it a valuable work of reference. An original glossary of military terms used, and a copious index, complete the volume. The book is necessary to every American library, and is especially recommended for higher schools. It is the only history of the war in one volume which c^ be relied on to give an entirely impartial, accurate, and easUy understood narrative of the great

a

struggle.

" The author

well equipped for his work, which he has executed with conscienis written in a spirit of impartiality and of just discrimina. tion concerning the merits and defects of the generals who led the armies of the North and South." Army and Kavy Journal. tious fidelity.

is

The book

—

"

It is really

— 2ifew

an important popular work,— popular, that

is to

say, in the

good sense."

York Times.

" In a word, his book is a model of good taste and intelligence. placed in every school library." Boston Advertiser.

—

The book should b«

" The style is simple and clear, the tone elevated and fair, the conception of military operations comprehensive, and the criticisms on them judicious. The book is evidently as much the work of an experienced soldier as of a well-informed author."

—

Nation.

We

" were prepared to find a well-written, calm, and unusually fair book; we have not been disappointed, and we do not hesitate to commend the book most warmly as the work of an able, painstaking soldier, who has honestly endeavored to ascertain and frankly to tell the truth about the war." Southern Historical Papers. .

.

.

—

"A

remarkably

and readable history, suited to the wants of the adult civilian reader. The comments upon strategy, tactics, and the characteristics of prominent generals, although terse, are always weighty and suggestive. Its most conspicuous merit

clear, concise,

is its

clearness."

— J^^ew

To?'k Tribune.

" A. very useful and attractive volume. The material of the work well serves to consolidate and orient the knowledge of what was done in the Great Rebellion, and of those who did it." Journal Military Service Institution. " The object has been admirably attained. Col. Dodge's short, crisp sentences, and his pen-pictures, done with a free hand, make the volume very interesting reading. The work is thoroughly done, and as fair as it is able." Jfanhaitan.

—

For

sale by Booksellers.

Sent, postpaid, on receipt

of the price, by

the Publiahera,

HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN AND COMPANY.

PATROOLUS AND PENELOPE: A CHAT IN THE SADDLE.

^^MM'ii

From

the Instantaueous Photograph of Patroclus and Owner.

BY

THEODORE AYRAULT DODGE, BREVET LIEUTBNANT-OOLONEL UNITED STATES ARMY (KBTIRED LIST) AUTHOR OP " THE CAMPAIGN OF cnANCELLORSVILLE," " A BIHD'S-EYE VIEW OP THE CIVIL WAR," ETC., ETC. ;

,

;_.

.L.lFORN'A

,

.

.

ANjHUES

THE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

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•

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