The Importance of Neglect in Policy-Making (Governance and Public Management)

IIAS Series: Governance and Public Management International Institute of Administrative Sciences (IIAS)

The International Institute of Administrative Sciences is an international association with scientific purpose based in Brussels. As a non-governmental international organisation its activities are centred on the study of public administration and on providing a forum in which comparative studies – including both practical experiences and theoretical analyses of experts in public administration from all cultures – are presented and discussed. The Institute is interested in all questions related to contemporary public administration at national and international levels. Website: www.iias-iisa.org Governance and Public Management Series Series edited by: Gérard Timsit, Emeritus Professor, University of Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne; Wim van de Donk, Tilburg University, The Netherlands Series Editorial Committee: Gérard Timsit, IIAS Publications Director Rolet Loretan, IIAS Director General Wim van de Donk, Member and Series Editor Michiel De Vries, Member Christopher Pollitt, Member, IRAS Editor in Chief Fabienne Maron, IIAS Scientific Administrator and Publications Coordinator The Governance and Public Management series, published in conjunction with the International Institute of Administrative Sciences (IIAS), brings the best research in public administration and management to a global audience. Encouraging a diversity of approaches and perspectives, the series reflects the Institute’s commitment to a neutral and objective voice, grounded in the exigency of fact. How is governance conducted now? How could it be done better? What defines the law of administration and the management of public affairs, and can their implementation be enhanced? Such questions lie behind the Institute’s core value of accountability: those who exercise authority must account for its use – to those on whose behalf they act.

Governance and Public Management series Titles in the series include: Eberhard Bohne THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION Institutional Development and Reform Michiel S. De Vries THE IMPORTANCE OF NEGLECT IN POLICY–MAKING Michiel S. De Vries, P. S. Reddy, M. Shamsul Haque (editors) IMPROVING LOCAL GOVERNMENT Outcomes of Comparative Research Wouter Van Dooren and Steven Van de Walle (editors) PERFORMANCE INFORMATION IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR

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The Importance of Neglect in Policy-Making Michiel S. De Vries Professor of Public Administration, Radboud University Nijmegen, The Netherlands

© Michiel S. de Vries 2010 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6–10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2010 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave®and Macmillan®are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN 978–0–230–24290–6

hardback

This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. 10 19

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Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Antony Rowe, Chippenham and Eastbourne

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For Lies, Linda, Liza and Machteld

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Contents Figures and Tables Foreword 1

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Explaining and Predicting the Nature of Policy Change 1.1. Introduction 1.2. The explanation of policy change 1.2.1. Policy change 1.2.2. Explanations for policy change 1.2.3. The next question about policy change 1.2.4. The way forward to a preliminary answer 1.3. Preliminary notions and assumptions 1.3.1. Dilemmas in public policy 1.3.2. The need to focus 1.3.3. Distinguishing periods 1.3.4. A flexible starting point 1.3.5. A fixed order in consecutive focus 1.4. Conclusions

1 1 5 5 6 15 16 17 18 20 22 23 25 27

The Idea of Policy Generations 2.1. Introduction 2.2. The socio-genesis of the theory 2.2.1. Policy generations arising out of sociological theory 2.2.2. Policy generations arising from economic theories 2.2.3. Policy generations arising from cultural theories 2.3. Combining the theories and the idea of policy generations 2.3.1. Three axioms 2.3.2. Two hypotheses about policy change 2.4. Conclusions

29 29 31

Changing Relative Attention 3.1. Introduction 3.2. A note on the terminology 3.3. Shifts in attention in OECD countries between 1945 and 2000

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Contents

3.3.1. 3.3.2. 3.3.3. 3.3.4.

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Societal reconstruction just after the war The planners of the 1950s The era of democracy The emerging dominance of efficiency in the 1980s 3.3.5. The prudent return of government in the 1990s 3.4. An in-depth analysis of developments in the Netherlands 3.4.1. The reactive missionaries of the 1940s 3.4.2. The caring technocrats between 1950 and 1963 3.4.3. The polarized spenders between 1964 and 1977 3.4.4. The efficient managers between 1978 and 1990 3.4.5. The new missionaries between 1990 and 2000 3.5. Conclusions

51 57 59

Generations of Policy Instruments 4.1. Introduction 4.2. Policy instruments within the policy-making process 4.3. A typology of policy instruments 4.4. Shifts in the use of policy instruments in OECD countries 4.4.1. Shifts in juridical instruments 4.4.2. Shifts in economic instruments 4.4.3. Shifts in organizational instruments 4.4.4. Shifts in communicative instruments 4.5. An in-depth analysis of developments in the Netherlands 4.5.1. Policy instruments from 1950 onwards 4.5.2. Policy instruments from 1963 onwards 4.5.3. Policy instruments from 1982 onwards 4.5.4. Policy instruments from 1994 onwards 4.6. Conclusions

93 93

The Changing Roles of Societal Groups 5.1. Introduction 5.2. Four interactive policy designs

60 61 63 64 69 74 80 85 91

95 97 104 104 106 107 109 109 110 111 112 116 118 120 120 121

Contents

Institutional changes regarding the role of societal groups 5.4. Illustrations of the four models in OECD countries 5.4.1. The governability model: citizens as target groups 5.4.2. The pluralist model: societal actors as interest groups 5.4.3. The public management model: societal actors as clients 5.4.4. The governance model: societal actors as partners 5.5. An in-depth analysis of developments in the Netherlands 5.5.1. The hierarchical 1950s 5.5.2. The ‘democratization’ era 5.5.3. Improving service delivery: the citizen as a client 5.5.4. Towards a partnership 5.6. Conclusions

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A Model of Fundamental Policy Change and a Final Test 6.1. Introduction 6.2. The research 6.3. The findings in light of the theory 6.3.1. The impact of previous policies 6.3.2. The impact of macro-level factors 6.3.3. The impact of meso-level factors 6.3.4. The impact of micro-level factors 6.4. A final test: developments after 2000 6.4.1. The success of preceding policies 6.4.2. The focus of previous policies 6.4.3. New problems and threats 6.4.4. The changing perception of urgent neglected problems 6.4.5. Elite replacement 6.4.6. Changing emphasis in the new policies 6.4.7. Toward a new policy generation 6.5. Finally

References Index

124 126 127 129 133 135 137 138 142 147 150 155 158 158 160 162 162 165 167 168 170 170 171 172 175 176 177 177 181 184 195

Figures and Tables Figures Figure 2.1

The functions of action systems according to Parsons Figure 2.2 The dynamics of relative attention for efficiency Figure 3.1 Relative attention given to planning Figure 3.2 Relative attention given to democracy Figure 3.3 Relative attention given to efficiency Figure 3.4 Relative attention given to governmental authority Figure 3.5 Attention given to corporatism Figure 3.6 Attention given to welfare Figure 3.7 Attention given to democracy Figure 3.8 Attention given to efficiency Figure 3.9 Attention given to governmental authority Figure 4.1 The restrictions on choosing among policy instruments Figure 4.2 Four generations of policy instrument dominance Figure 4.3 Social insurance coverage within first EU members Figure 4.4 Governmental outlays Figure 4.5 Growth in new laws regulating behaviour Figure 4.6 Growth in regulations concerning financial transfers Figure 4.7 Government service employment Figure 4.8 Wages and salaries in the collective sector Figure 4.9 Growth of regulations concerning efficiency Figure 4.10 Dropped regulatory legislation Figure 4.11 Regulations dropped Figure 4.12 Growth in new regulations concerning consultation

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Tables Table 1.1 Table 1.2 Table 2.1

Dilemmas in public policy-making Sequence of dominant values in public policies Assumptions underlying the relative attention paradigm x

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Figures and Tables

Table 4.1 Instruments used out of internal orientation Table 5.1 Four types of interaction between government and societal groups Table 5.2 Indicators for different models of interactive policy-making Table 6.1 Characteristics of policy generations

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Foreword This book is about the explanation and prediction of the nature of change in public policy. It argues that what is neglected at present is likely to become dominant in the policies of the near future. This is the importance of neglect. This idea derives from economic, sociological and cultural theories and is applied to the changes in public policies in OECD countries from 1945 to 2002, with an intensive case-study of developments in the Netherlands up to 2007. Such longitudinal case studies are time-consuming and therefore rare, but the timeframe is necessary to corroborate the two central theses in this book. The first thesis is ‘the core of a fundamental policy change is always concerned with a shift of attention toward those (aspects) of problems that were the most chronically neglected in the previous policy’. That such change is simultaneously visible in all policy areas within a country forms the basis for my second thesis. This results in the idea of policy generations. Such policy generations adhere to one central value which is increasingly visible in the new policies in all policy areas. At the end of such a policy generation, the basic value dominates all policy areas. I argue that coherent and converging changes around core-values are visible in the policy goals, the use of specific policy instruments and the role of societal groups in the policy process. Hence, I expect that ‘with the birth of a new policy generation, a convergence towards meeting the dominant value of that generation will be noticeable in the new policies in all policy areas’. The two theses are empirically tested against the longitudinal case study. In analysing this case, many interesting facts and opinions came up about the developments occurring in this epoch. This alone made the study worthwhile. What made it fascinating, however, was that the more one examines the vast literature on policy developments, which is itself not based on the two theses, the more one becomes convinced that the theses are important in explaining and predicting the direction of policy change. This case study is about such changes in Europe, but the theory claims wider ramifications and might well explain policy change elsewhere. Although such analyses must be left for subsequent research, this book will reflect on the possibilities. In Chapter 1 I argue that scholars have come a long way in explaining policy change. Recent investigations have identified many factors xii

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and characteristics of actors that explain why fundamental policy change occurs and when it is likely to occur. However, we are still unable to predict the direction that the nature of the change goes. In this introductory chapter, I argue that research into this question is a feasible next step in the process of trying to understand policy change. Furthermore, I argue that in order to explain and predict the nature of policy change, one should not only investigate what is prioritized, but especially seek out what is neglected. We should not only analyse the contents of preceding policies, but rather, we should analyse the noncontents thereof. This chapter also addresses the normative implications of the theory (originally published as a conference paper for the Conference on Public Administration in the 21st Century in Macau in January 2004). In Chapter 2 I present the formal theory on policy change and the crucial role of neglect. The chapter addresses the socio-genesis of the theory from economic, sociological and cultural theories. It presents the axioms underlying the theory and the hypothesis derived from these axioms. What is crucial is that the means available to policy-makers are always less than needed in order to balance different demands. Therefore, one cannot address all demands placed on public policy-making simultaneously; instead, some aspects have to be emphasized while others are neglected. The central hypothesis is about identifying periods in which, irrespective of the policy field, the newly developed policies all emphasize the same aspect, that is, the one neglected most before. This makes it possible to discuss policy generations. (An adapted version of De Vries, 1999, first published in the Dutch journal Beleidswetenschap) I analyse the dynamics in policy goals from 1950 to 2000 in Chapter 3. The theory on policy generations is illustrated by analysing the development in public policies in the period between 1945 and 2000. Five policy generations are distinguished. The reactive missionaries just after the Second World War; the caring technocrats between 1951 and 1963; the polarized spenders between 1963 and 1980, the efficient managers from 1982 until 1994, and the new missionaries from 1994 on. I argue that each generation indeed emphasized one aspect of policy-making and neglected the other functions. Although each of the policy generations was successful in accomplishing what they intended to accomplish, they were severely criticized for neglecting what became dominant in the subsequent period. (An adapted version of De Vries, 2000) In Chapter 4 I examine the dynamics in the use of different policy instruments. This chapter argues that the five policy generations

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can also be found when looking at this aspect of policy-making. First, four basic policy instruments are described and discussed. These are judicial, economic, organizational and communicative instruments. I show that the dominant use of each of the four changes periodically and simultaneously with the goals distinguished in the previous chapter. Unlike the previous chapter, the data presented here are not based on literature review, but on a quantitative content analysis of the policy instruments used by the policy generations. (Adapted from De Vries, 2002) In Chapter 5 I analyse the development of public participation. The role of societal actors in policy-making processes changes periodically and simultaneously with the periodic change of policy goals and policy instruments. This chapter first distinguishes four types of interactive policy-making based on two dimensions. These dimensions concern the (dis)parity of power between policy-makers and societal groups, and the congruence or antagonism in interests between policy-makers and societal groups. On the basis of these dimensions, four roles for societal actors are distinguished, namely as target groups, as interest groups, as clients and as partners. I argue that these four roles became dominant in a successive manner between 1945 and 2000 thereby making it possible to distinguish policy generations in this respect as well. (Adapted from De Vries, 2005.) The final chapter contains a reflection on the theory and on the findings in the previous chapters and a comparison between them and the theory as presented in Chapter 2. I argue that the findings fit the theory and corroborate the hypotheses. Furthermore, I present a model with a specification of the factors deemed important in understanding fundamental policy change. Subsequently, I apply this model to the developments taking place in Europe and in the Netherlands after 2000. I argue that a sixth post-war policy generation can be identified which aims at long-term effectiveness, as predicted by the theory. I conclude this chapter by addressing still unanswered questions. The previous publications on which the chapters are based demonstrate that the contents were judged by anonymous referees. These referees made valuable comments, improving the contents of the previous articles and – in this book – the chapters. I wish to express my gratitude to them although their anonymity prevents me from mentioning their names. I also would like to thank the many generations of master’s students at Radboud University who read this text even when it was not

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yet finalised. The discussions with these students improved the text greatly. Furthermore, I wish to thank Julie Raadschelders for transforming the text into decent English, and simultaneously giving her comments on parts of the text that were still lacking clarity. Last but not least, the production of a book out of the numerous articles was made possible by a replacement grant by the NWO (Dutch Organization for Scientific Research) under grant number 450-04-002, correspondence number 2006/09870/MaGW, which the author received in 2004 and was able to use in the first half of 2006. Of course, as always, all this cooperation is no guarantee for the correctness of what is written. Neither is it an excuse for mistakes, folly and gaffes. The responsibility for everything this book lies solely with the author. Nijmegen, September 2009

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1 Explaining and Predicting the Nature of Policy Change

1.1 Introduction The social sciences are unable to predict, so it is always said. They lack the theories and the rigour of replicate data gathering and analysis. This limits them to descriptions and explanations that are often ad hoc and rarely enduring. This book argues that we should continue trying to develop valid theories and conduct thorough research in that direction because it might ultimately allow us to explain and predict the nature of policy change. Such research would pose a welcome alternative to the often ad hoc explanations of policy change. An example might illustrate the point. When the policies of many nation-states changed at the beginning of the 21st century, many scholars sought the cause in the unexpected events of 2001 and 2002. Many argued that the changes were due to the 9/11 terrorist attack on the twin towers in New York and the Pentagon. These came to explain everything. That the explanatory power of such events is sometimes overemphasized became clear to me in the autumn of 2002. When on a flight from Philadelphia to Phoenix, I observed a passenger who had rented earphones, but whose video had failed. He complained about it to the flight attendant. The latter responded rather bluntly. Had the passenger not heard about 9/11 and the stress it inflicted on staff and did he not have any empathy for the new situation? And no, he would not get a refund. It was not surprising that the passenger backed off and apologized for the complaint, not in the least because all the other passengers looked at him as if he had committed a mortal sin. 1

2 The Importance of Neglect in Policy-Making

The same changes that took place in the USA were also visible outside that country. Similar policy changes were seen Latin America, Europe and Asia. Everywhere we now see more surveillance, more expenditure on behalf of public safety, an enduring war against terrorism and a return of state intervention in all areas. According to observers, all these changes can be attributed to 9/11 or to similar events in other countries. In the Netherlands, in addition to the events of 9/11, the murder of Pim Fortuyn, an outspoken, homosexual, right-wing politician, in 2002 was seen as the main event leading to subsequent policy changes. In the UK, Spain and Indonesia, major terrorist attacks also occurred and all policy changes can best be interpreted within that framework. Or can they? Just after 9/11, a British policy adviser within the civil service was reported as sending an email to all the members of the cabinet with the message: ‘If you have policy plans which are in any way disputable, this is the time to make them public. Nobody will notice. Everybody is occupied with the attack.’ If this story is true, it is not only evidence of amoral behaviour, but also indicative of the fact that perhaps major events and crises are not the sole causes of policy change, but opportunities used by clever policy entrepreneurs to change policies in an already desired direction and to make the change much more easily. The policy change itself was already underway, but it needed a window of opportunity to materialize. The events in this conception are just catalysts speeding up and easing the way for an already ongoing process. The more important implication is that, although terrible events can perhaps not (yet) be predicted, the direction of the change in policies can. This book argues that we have come a long way in explaining policy change, but that so far we have failed to take the next step and to explain and predict its direction. It proposes a theory that does precisely that. I make this proposal in spite of the knowledge that many social science scholars dispute that anyone is able to predict the occurrence of policy change in general, and the direction of policy change in particular. They argue that this would need complete information, which is impossible, so we should not even try. There is, however, a disconnect in such arguments. While people are more than willing to trace all current behaviour back to a preceding extraordinary event, or to use well-developed theories to explain social behaviour, they

Explaining and Predicting the Nature of Policy Change

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are nevertheless reluctant to make predictions about their and others’ behaviour based on the same theories. Explaining after the fact is, of course, much easier and includes a greater degree of certainty than predicting beforehand, but the question is whether one should indeed be so reluctant to make predictions. If the explanations were valid, the behaviour could also have been predicted beforehand. That is what this book is all about. Utilizing the many theories of policy change and giving just a slight turn to them, I develop and illustrate a theory that explains and predicts the nature of policy change. This is not a prediction based on a theory of the impact of incidents or crises, but a prediction based on empirical research and framed within a formalized theory, partly based on the extensive research already produced on explaining policy change. This theory attempts to explain and predict the evolving goals of, the instruments used in, and the role of societal actors involved in public policy processes. This theory is based not only on the present-day theories of policy change, but also on long-forgotten theories, for instance, that of Zvi Namenwirth developed in the 1970s (Namenwirth, 1973; Namenwirth and Lasswell, 1970; Namenwirth and Weber, 1987). He predicted the nature of the changes occurring in the 1970s with regard to the democratization boom, those occurring in the 1980s concerning the boom of what later was called New Public Management, and the changes taking place in the first decade of the new millennium, in which the dominant way to solve problems is increasingly sought in policies which have to be effective in the long run. Namenwirth was not a Nostradamus, for whom it may have been sufficient to look at the stars. Nor was he as beautiful as the classic Cassandra and therefore worthy of receiving the gift from the gods of making prophesies. Nevertheless, for a considerable time, the predictions based on his theory were just as likely as the classic prophesies of Cassandra to be doubted. However, the predictions came true, but by that time, Namenwirth had passed away, and his theory was rarely mentioned. This was unfortunate because Namenwirth’s predictions were based in part on thorough, long-term content analysis of the speeches of consecutive US presidents from 1815 onwards. In those speeches, he noted words used and concepts emphasized during certain time-spans. He noted that the same words and concepts did not occur in subsequent periods. However, after approximately 50 years,

4 The Importance of Neglect in Policy-Making

the previously noted words and issues returned in the speeches of quite different presidents. Because his analysis covered more than 150 years, he could distinguish three complete cycles of 50 years in which certain terms and issues became emphasized, then neglected and then stressed again. This induced him to develop his ideas about cultural dynamics, the subject of his major book on the subject, The Dynamics of Culture (Namenwirth and Weber, 1987). This book follows up on his theory, and combines it with current theories on policy change. This is done mainly because it is rare that one sees scholars make valid predictions, especially predictions that are based on rather vague concepts such as culture and cultural dynamics. When this happens, one becomes curious. This book arose out of curiosity. In this book, I investigate the implications of cultural dynamics for the explanation of policy change. The assumption is that if something such as cultural dynamics is seen in the wording of consecutive political speeches, then one could expect that these dynamics are also reflected in concrete policies. Hence, the question becomes whether certain aspects are emphasized in policy-making processes, whether other aspects are simultaneously neglected, and whether this might explain the direction of policy change. I argue that this is indeed the case when one combines the theory of cultural dynamics with the economic theory of scarcity and the sociological theory of structural functionalism. Together, these theories result in the central hypothesis of this book, namely that every policymaking process is characterized by prioritization and neglect. The specific focus and the enduring neglect of temporarily less important things results on the one hand in success. The problems prioritized in policies are adequately dealt with. On the other hand, the neglect of certain aspects of problems results in the increased severity of those neglected aspects in the future. This situation forces policy-makers to change priorities periodically in order to focus on those previously neglected aspects. The message of this book is that policy change is not something that depends on crucial events, happens overnight, is impossible to foresee and is only to be explained afterwards. The message is that the time of policy change as well as its direction can be predicted long before it actually takes place, just by looking at which aspects have been prioritized and especially which aspects have been neglected.

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1.2 The explanation of policy change This book does not present the first theory on policy change. In the past two decades, scholars in policy studies have come a long way in explaining why policies tend to change. Nor will it be the final book on policy change. Many theories have preceded it and one may expect many to follow. This introductory chapter concisely describes those existing theories on policy change which explain why and when policy change occurs. Together, the theories give a pretty good answer to the question of how policies change. Later in this book, I use these theories in such a way that we no longer view them as rival theories, but as partial theories which, within a new framework, together contribute to the understanding of the nature of policy change. 1.2.1 Policy change What happens when a policy changes? Sometimes it is just a minor change. Examples are street lights that are moved in order to light a previously dark and dangerous alley, or placing speed bumps to reduce traffic speed near schools. Other examples of relatively minor policy changes are the adaptation of pensions or social security to an inflation index. Somewhat more fundamental change is seen when more or less money is provided to a public library, or when a new anti-discrimination law comes into effect. Still more fundamental examples include changes in the objectives of a foreign policy from, for instance, reactive to proactive or pre-emptive action, as it is called nowadays. Other substantive changes might involve the introduction of market mechanisms in the health sector or the downsizing of the administrative apparatus. This book deals with this latter type of change. Many labels have come to the fore to distinguish this more fundamental policy change from incremental or minor change. Is has been described as root change (Lindblom, 1959), radical change, revolutionary change, punctuations between times of equilibrium (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993, 1996), societal transformation, paradigm change (Kuhn, 1962), structural change, second order change, major policy shift, and double loop learning (Argyris, 1999). Although most authors use their own specific terminology, what definitions and indicators to measure structural change have in

6 The Importance of Neglect in Policy-Making

common is that they address not just one particular element of a policy change, but that there is a combination of crucial elements in the policy that takes a substantially different direction than previously. It involves the contents of policy with regard to financial, regulatory, managerial and distributive structures. It also involves the ideas behind the policies, that is, the policy theory, with its causal, final and normative assumptions about causes, goals, effects and their desirability. Such policy change also refers to the priorities and concrete objectives of policies, to the policy instruments used and the implementation thereof. Furthermore, the change is related to the actors involved and their role in the development of decision-making on and implementation of the policy. Finally, such fundamental change refers to the changes in the organizational structures and institutional framework in which the policy is embedded. Here we define fundamental policy change as the change in ideas, assumptions, priorities and goals, together with the shift in the dominant use of policy instruments and the changing roles of societal actors and policy-makers in the policy process. This is primarily to make the point that these aspects of policy change can be explained and predicted. Such change can perhaps also be seen in many other aspects of policies that are not considered here. 1.2.2 Explanations for policy change From a simple point of view, one would expect that policy change is dependent on the effectiveness of existing policies, that is, the match between the contents of that policy and the nature of the policy problem. The classic theory about policy change assumes that policies follow problems. When the nature or the severity of policy problems change, so does, or so should, the policy addressing those problems. When there is economic stagnation, more attention will be devoted to dealing with rising unemployment and the need for economic growth, and new policies addressing these new problems would be expected to follow. When the number of traffic accidents rises, so will the investment in policies aimed at reducing this problem. This idea assumes that policies change because the prevailing policies are not, or are no longer, effective and efficient. When a policy fails to achieve its goals, or is ineffective, politicians and policymakers will try to replace it with more effective and efficient policies. Sometimes they look elsewhere for more effective policies and copy

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the most effective ones they come across. This process of policy diffusion in processes of policy change is the basis of an interesting theory (Walker, 1969) that policies that evolve and are successful in a certain place are copied elsewhere and thus supplant existing policies. However, we also know that the process of policy change is rarely as simple as this classic view presents it. Factors on the macro-, mesoand micro-levels often pose barriers that cannot easily be overcome, or pose opportunities for change. This problem is addressed in pathdependency theories, among others. These theories state that there are factors outside the immediate policy area that have to be taken into consideration in order to explain why policies fail to change when one would expect them to change. First, there are macro-level factors. Long-existing structures, constitutional rules, habits, traditions and the like prevent policies from changing drastically. Institutional resilience is not easily broken and therefore, fundamental change is not easily accomplished. Macro-level factors can also be used to to explain change, especially in the long term. Max Weber, for instance, investigated the influence of the emerging protestant ethic in Europe in previous centuries, the rationalization of society, and the increasing centrality of the bureaucracy in society. Without even trying to be comprehensive, one can also think of Durkheim’s theory distinguishing between organic and mechanical solidarity and the consequences of long-term shifts from one to the other. And then there is Marx’s theory on class conflict as the moving force of large-scale (revolutionary) change and Lenin’s modification of it, putting the (political) party at the vanguard of change. Alfred Weber later posited cultural factors as the driving force of change (Weber, 1960). Nowadays, in the same tradition, macro-level factors such as globalization, post-industrialism, postmodernism, informatization and deterritorialization are used to explain policy changes. These modernday theories argue that because of the increasing interconnectedness between states in terms of movements of people and capital, direct foreign investment and trade, nation-states have had to adjust their policies. These changes might be in the direction of defensive policies such as trade barriers and protectionism, through which they try to make themselves more independent from the outside world, in the form of offensive policies, such as lowering taxes, labour market reforms and deregulation, by which they try to gain a favourable position in the

8 The Importance of Neglect in Policy-Making

new world order, or in the form of international cooperation, such as treaties, by which they try to diminish the most serious side-effects of globalization, informatization and deterrritorialization. The common characteristic of macro-level theories is their emphasis on the context in which policy content is developed. Policies are developed within a dynamic context which imposes changing boundary conditions on the degree to which policy options are and become (un)feasible. Different contexts make for different policies, so it is said. These theories present a point at which they predict that policies will change when the circumstances change. Often policy change can be explained by changing boundary conditions, variance in the urgency of problems and the changing macro conditions surrounding them. At the macro-level, one can point to the political, societal, cultural and economic boundary conditions for policies in a certain period and determine what is possible, feasible and desired and what presents a datum for each policy area. The first macro-level factor concerns the political determination of policies. The political party in government is dominant in determining the priorities for new policies. It restricts the issues to be prioritized. Such political parties are representative of certain values. In multi-party systems, such as in many OECD countries, political parties can be distinguished by the fundamental values they pursue. In generalized terms, right-wing parties especially favour cost efficiency and allocative efficiency, social democrats pursue equity-value, left-wing liberals are especially known for their emphasis on democratic procedures, and Christian Democrats stress the corporatist allocation of values and services. One can point to issue-ownership (Budge and Farlie, 1983). When two or three of these parties form a coalition government, they determine the emphasis for the years to come and policies are expected to change accordingly. This might explain why similar shifts in orientation are seen in different policy areas at the same time. A second macro-level factor is economic development. Economic crises and upheavals determine, in part, the attention paid to the allocative and cost efficiency of public policies and hence the emphasis on the input, throughput, output or outcome side of policies. One can also refer to the impact of economic cycles as proposed, for instance, by Kondratieff in his ‘K-cycles’. On the other side there are micro-level factors. These emphasize the role of individuals and theories on these factors also have a

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long tradition. In ancient Sumeria important individuals were called ‘elders’, in Greek society there were ‘strategists’, in the middle ages there were emperors, kings and princes. Later they became known as bureaucrats, politicians, public officials and policy-makers. Nowadays we call them policy brokers (Sabatier, 1987; Sabatier and JenkinsSmith, 1993), policy champions (Roberts and King, 1996), leaders (’t Hart, 2004), or policy entrepreneurs (Kingdon, 1984). In ancient Greece, the virtues of the political leader were the most important explanatory factor of the stability and change of the city-state. Thucydides saw courage as the prime virtue; Plato thought the leader had to possess wisdom and had to be a philosopher; and Aristotle emphasized the need for ethical behaviour. In the middle ages the most important characteristic for a leader was that he had to be a devoted follower of the (Catholic) Church. Machiavelli added sound strategic insight to the necessary features; a ‘prince’ should know how to operate in accordance to both his own interests and the interests of the city or country he governed. After the Renaissance, reason and education came to be indispensable characteristics for leaders. How little ideas have changed can be seen in the recent literature. Leadership still is seen as one of the crucial factors explaining stability and change. Nowadays, leaders have to be SMART – that is, their policies should be Simple, Moral, Accountable, Responsive and Transparent (see Kliksberg, 2000). An important point in this respect is that policy change is sometimes seen as a result of the succession of policy-makers. Policies are developed, formulated and communicated by a certain generation in corroboration with a specific generation of business leaders and directors of societal (non-profit) organizations. Influential positions are mostly occupied by people who have grown up in the same era, share similar experiences and hence have similar world views (Mannheim, 1952[1928]: 292; Van den Broek, 1996: 17). A person, in this view, is not only a member of society, but also – or foremost – a member of a specific generation (Van den Broek, 1996: 15). Such age-related differences and their impact on political-cultural change were discussed more recently by Eckstein (1988) and Inglehart (1990). The basic idea is that: Political generations function as match makers between differential political socialization and change in political culture. The

10 The Importance of Neglect in Policy-Making

occurrence of change in political culture leads to the expectation that recently socialized cohorts acquired different patterns of political orientation and behaviour than their elders. In turn, these initially divergent political orientations may gradually become more common among the members of a polity’s population through the mechanism of cohort replacement (Van den Broek, 1996: 5). This individual factor is still assumed to be very important in explaining stability and change. A common thread in theories about leaders is that they assume that individuals can and do make a difference. These theories emphasize that policies are, in essence, choices made by individual actors. These theories predict that when crucial actors enter or leave the policy arena, policy change may well ensue. Conversely, policy change can often be traced back to the succession of policy-makers in crucial positions. The third group of factors traces changes back to characteristics at the meso-level. The most important contribution of these kinds of theories is that they are capable of explaining long-term stability together with occasional change. These factors are, among other things, able to predict that policy change is not a continuous process, but is a process that takes at least a decade or so. The meso-level factors take into account, among other things, the features of interest groups, political parties, organizations, (inter)organizational structure and organizational behaviour. Changes in recruitment, reorganization or a change in organizational culture can lead to a change in policies developed by that organization. Organizational change therefore induces policy change. The notion that policy change occurs because of the efforts of social movements, interest groups and political parties who push their own preferences in a system in which power is dispersed over different groups is a classic idea within the theory of pluralism. According to this theory, it is the conflict between such groups, the changes in their power relations and the fluidity of coalitions that account for the changing relative positions of preferences and interests, which in turn account for policy change. A famous work in this tradition is the study of New Haven by Robert Dahl (1961), who argued that power was dispersed among different people and groups in that city. He was, however, not the first in this theoreitcal tradition. In 1914, the French theorist Léon Duguit contested the idea that state sovereignty is the

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only important sovereignty (Duguit, 1914). The numerous groups within society, with their own specific preferences and interests, are just as important. The conflict among such groups, their power base and their efforts to create a so-called ‘mobilization of bias’ determines to a large degree the possibility of placing issues high on the policy agenda and thus changing the direction of policies. In 1960, Schattschneider argued that ‘the contagiousness of conflict, the elasticity of its scope and the fluidity of the involvement of people are the X factors in politics’ (Schattschneider, 1960: 3), He pointed out that conflicts compete with one another (65), and emphasized the role of numerous interest groups with their preferences conflicting over attention and the important role of political parties who are the main actors able to restrict the scope of conflicts. As Schattschneider explains, we want a lot, but it all depends on what we want most and the outcome is not determined merely by what people want but by their priorities (68). He further suggests that the dominance of issues is related to their intensity and visibility, and the capacity to blot out other issues. An important factor is the fact that some issues are able to relate themselves easily to clusters of parallel cleavages in the same general dimension. Some issues gain dominance because of those features and are the result of joint efforts by interest groups and political parties. As long as such a coalition remains stable, there is agreement about priorities which can be seen in the resulting policies. According to Schattschneider, a process of displacement of conflicts involves reformed alliances, destroyed or abandoned alignments and the transmutation of one conflict into another. This turns all alignments inside out (74). In the late 1960s, the theory of pluralism, under the influence of Marxist theory, transformed into plural elitism theory (Lowi, 1969) in which it was argued that power is not equally dispersed over interest groups, but rather that the power structure varies by issue area, and depending on whether policies are intended to be regulatory, distributive or redistributive, then pluralism, plural elitism or class conflict dominates. Pluralist theory would explain the stability of policies by the existence of so-called ‘iron triangles’, for example, of interest groups capturing the administration and forcing it to follow their politics, It would explain policy change by the emergence of general interest group coalitions, or issue networks, prioritizing new issues and thus inducing reform cycles, involving what is called high politics (Heclo, 1978). In neo-pluralism (Wilson, 1980, 1984; McFarland,

12 The Importance of Neglect in Policy-Making

1987), the role of so-called ‘power triads’, that is, economic producers, countervailing powers and relatively autonomous state agencies, is crucial. In this model, the outcomes of policies depend on whether conflict or cooperation within this triad dominates, the professionalism in agencies, the nature of the conflict, and the strength of the power base of those involved in the power triad. Neo-pluralism does not assume that there is a balance of power between interest groups or within the power triad, or that all interests are taken equally into account. This depends on the interest groups’ success in mobilization and in the formation of countervailing power groups; countervailing because business interests and business power are assumed to be the dominant forces for the direction of policies. A rather different theory focuses on consensus as the driving force for policy change (Wildavsky, 1982; Coyle and Wildavsky, 1987). Wildavsky postulates that a fundamental policy change becomes probable if the dominant political ideologies (he calls them ‘cultures’) meet and point to a collective integrative solution that contributes to the realization of their preferences. He characterizes these cultures as hierarchical collectivism, competitive individualism and egalitarian collectivism (see also Roberts and King, 1996: 234–5). In Dutch relations, these cultures are represented in the Christian Democratic, Liberal and Social Democratic political parties, respectively. The theory of change by consensus postulates that if all three cultures desire the same policy change, such change becomes probable. According to Wildavsky, such an accord is not due to a congruence of arguments. While the reasons for desiring the same kind of policy change can vary significantly among those involved, the end result for all cultures/parties is the same; this is called radical change by consensus. The meso-level also involves institutions and institutional arrangements and constraints in a broader sense, that is, the rules, traditions and characteristics of policy arenas. Such rules can be seen as a shared understanding of what actions are required, prohibited or permitted. Because many of these rules are relatively stable, and changes therein difficult and costly to accomplish, policies tend to be stable and difficult to change. One can think of entry and exit rules in a policy arena, rules regarding the positions in the arena, information rules, payoff rules and rules including norms of behaviour. From political science, we have theories noting the crucial role of political coalitions and changes therein for explaining policy change (Wildavsky, 1982)

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and the impact of regimes and regime change. More recently, theories have been developed that depart from a long-term perspective, such as path-dependency theory (Krasner, 1988), the punctuated equilibrium model (Jones and Baumgartner, 2005) and the advocacy coalition theory (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). Institutional reasoning also involves policy subsystems and advocacy coalitions that are a composition of people from various governmental and private organizations that share a set of normative and causal beliefs and engage in a non-trivial degree of coordinated activity over time (Sabatier, 1999: 120). The beliefs consist of a deep core, involving ontological and normative beliefs, policy core beliefs, including normative commitments and causal perceptions across an entire policy domain or subsystem, and secondary aspects which comprise narrower beliefs concerning the seriousness of the problem, the relative importance of various causal factors, policy preferences, the design of specific institutions, and the evaluations of various actors’ performance. According to Sabatier, the core of the belief system is highly stable. Change and learning only takes place on the basis of solid empirical evidence and/or in cases where there is an intermediate level of informed conflict. Furthermore, Sabatier distinguishes a number of relatively stable parameters, for instance, the basic attributes of the problem area, the distribution of natural resources, underlying values, the social structure and the basic constitutional structure. These features of the context determine the constraints and resources of subsystem actors and are the reason that processes of policy change often last for a decade or more. The same conclusion regarding the duration of processes of policy change is reached by Baumgartner and Jones (2009; Jones and Baumgartner 2005). They also seek the explanation of enduring stability in the institutional structure. According to them, the separation of institutions, overlapping jurisdictions, and relatively open access to mobilizations create a dynamic that usually works against any impetus for change, but occasionally reinforces it (see also Sabatier, 1999: 99). Institutions are conservatively designed to resist many efforts at change. Budgets, for instance, tend only to change incrementally and only change more fundamentally if there are simultaneous endogenous and exogenous factors that induce change. Over time, this results in periods of long-term stability (equilibrium) and incidental change (punctuations). Such change is only possible when

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there are macro-political changes, changing preferences, heightened attention in the media and changing issue definitions (Jones, 1994: 183). The environment in which policies exist constitutes a third mesolevel factor. Events and developments occurring outside the direct polity might well explain changes within the polity. First, policymakers tend to borrow solutions for problems from each other. It is what DiMaggio and Powell (1983) called ‘mimesis’. Policies developed in one area (housing, infrastructure) tend to become popular in quite different areas (welfare, health), irrespective of the differences between the fields. This can be seen in the popularity of monitoring in the 1990s and governance practices at the beginning of the new millennium. No matter what the specifics of different problems were, good governance seemed to be the answer to every problem. The use of experts, the existence of organizations giving policy advice, and contacts between departments increase the probability of ideas being borrowed. This can be seen at the municipal level, where policy plans are sometimes copied and the name of the municipality is the only thing changed before the plan is adopted by another municipality. We also see it at the regional level, and even at the national level, where governments commission research into the developments of policies in a certain area implemented by other countries in order to learn from them and adapt. The European integration process further facilitates this by providing the necessary information, setting the boundary conditions every policy has to conform to, and establishing the goals and objectives for specific policy developments. In policy diffusion models, the explanation of policy convergence is also a central theme (Walker, 1969). These models explain how one policy-maker borrows policies from another policy-maker. Based on research into such processes among American states, it seems that the successful policies, especially, are copied. Sometimes this can be a complete programme, but the process can also involve the use of novel instruments such as monitoring, impact assessments, covenants, implementation practices, maintenance and prominence polices. According to Walker, actors tend to copy the policies of others that appear to be effective or promising. This is explained by pressure from above, public and media pressure, and compliance to national programmes. And it is, of course, rational to adopt policies that have been demonstrated to be successful. Current research is focused upon

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explaining how such copying takes place. Is this process random, or are there specific factors explaining differences in diffusion processes? One can distinguish, for instance, between innovators, eager to follow new trends, and laggards, hesitant to adopt new approaches. The process may also be influenced by mutual interactions between policy-makers, promoted by institutions designed to encourage such interaction. Physical distance (or proximity) may play a role, as well as the common membership of organizations. Often facilities exist to promote the diffusion of ideas. One can think of training courses, congresses, conferences and study groups. When a local official has to write a new plan, it is standard to consult the branch organization to see whether any such policies have already been developed elsewhere. Some public institutes even commercialize their policies be contracting out their policy-makers to other municipalities, provinces or countries. Such provisions encourage policy convergence. At the national level, the co-coordinating roles of finance departments or ministries and the office of the prime minister can induce policy diffusion, as can intergovernmental institutes. All in all, we have come a long way towards explaining when and why policies change and have now a pretty good idea of the factors that may induce such change. Although every theory in itself contains problems and is continually elaborated and modified, together they give us sufficient means to predict the chances of a policy changing; certainly ex post facto we are able to explain why and when change has taken place. 1.2.3 The next question about policy change The enormous effort by all the scholars mentioned in the previous section results in a new question. If we know what induces change, is it possible to tell something about the contents of policies and to explain and possibly predict the direction of content? Many scholars would say this is impossible because we have learned that in order to predict we need complete information and that is impossible to obtain. However, that requirement is only made when one uses the word ‘prediction’. In the case of explanation, one is satisfied with the scholarly principle of economics, or elegance, which implies that one tries to explain as much as possible with as few variables as possible. When we think we have a good idea about how change occurs, would it be possible to predict beforehand when policy change becomes probable?

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This is what we expect from policy entrepreneurs who are expected to react adequately to the opening of so-called policy windows. Would it also be helpful to them, but also to our understanding, if we were able to predict which new policy options will be the most probable given the existing and previous policies? This book suggests that this is not only desirable, but given the knowledge already gathered by the theories and research on policy change, also possible. It suggests that an adequate analysis of the contents of the policies of today can present a fairly good idea of the probable contents of the policies that will dominate the scene tomorrow. We know by now that policies are meant to solve problems and that if problems change, the policies are expected to follow, but they do not always follow; that the urgency of problems varies through time, due to developments in the context, and that this makes periodic policy change necessary. We have learned from Baumgartner and Jones that policies are about choices about goals and are means-based on priorities. If priorities change, so do the policies based thereon. Since Wildavsky, we know that a consensus among elites is needed to make policy change possible, which makes such change difficult; but we also know that policies tend to follow successful policies developed elsewhere (Walker, 1969). We know that institutions, rules and traditions, and path dependencies matter, which means that fundamental policy change is not something that happens frequently (Ostrom, 1986, 1990), and that policy change may, therefore, take a decade or more because there are both various opinions, beliefs and belief systems with (very stable) core values and secondary values involved. But we also know that there are advocacy coalitions, policy champions and policy entrepreneurs that strive for change, which makes policy change desirable, at least for some of the actors involved, and that learning does take place, if not with regard to the core values, then at least regarding the secondary values (Sabatier, 1993). 1.2.4 The way forward to a preliminary answer In order to give a preliminary answer to the question presented above, we need to combine the existing theories on policy change, formalize them in a model and formulate hypotheses. I do this in the next chapter. I argue that such a combination of theories does not have to result in numerous variables and factors. In fact, the opposite is true. I suggest that the determinate factors for the nature of future

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policies do not lie in the contents of existing or past policies, but the factors lie especially in what is left out. The factors given above induce the probability of change, but the factors that are neglected, that is, not prioritized, determine the nature of that change. The contents of future policies can be predicted by analysing in which areas the current elites failed to reach a consensus, by analysing the side-effects of the existing institutions and institutional rules, by investigating the core values of belief systems that are not currently dominant, and by observing the consequences of the one-sidedness of paths taken previously. After the model is presented, it is argued that the model does deliver on its promises. In chapters 2 to 4, fundamental policy changes are analysed, first for OECD countries in general and for the Netherlands in particular, by way of an intensive case-study of the development of Dutch policies since the Second World War. This is framed within the developments that took place in OECD countries in general. The more general analysis results in the hypothesis that the theory is applicable for many countries. Chapter 3 addresses the changing policy goals. It argues that these goals change periodically and do so in accordance with the model. The following chapter does the same for policy instruments, and in Chapter 5 I investigate the changing role of societal actors in the policy-making process. Together, these chapters provide the basis for arguing that fundamental policy change is about changing the dominant goals, instruments and actors, which is nothing new in itself (Kingdon, 1984; Hall, 1993). What is new, however, is that the changes occur periodically and simultaneously and can be explained by what was neglected in the preceding policies. This is the ‘importance of neglect’. Furthermore, the chapters argue that the same changes in the same direction take place nearly simultaneously in very different policy areas. The final chapter presents the research model in the light of the findings. In it, I call for extended research to determine whether these conclusions can be corroborated or falsified by investigating in depth the policy changes that have taken place in other countries.

1.3 Preliminary notions and assumptions Before the theory is formalized and tested against the cases, I will explain the basic assumptions and notions supporting it.

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1.3.1 Dilemmas in public policy The first necessary assumption or notion is that governments are faced with a number of dilemmas. This might be seen as one of the fundamental differences between the public and private sector. It is one of the essential elements of policies and the functions of governments. When asked, public administration scholars, administrators and politicians reply that the public sector is distinctive in that it has to weigh multiple interests and balance them. To be balanced is the most important quality of public policy (see Raadschelders, 2003). This brings us to the essentials of policies and the functions of governments. Based on sociological theory (Parsons and Smelzer, 1957), it is assumed that every social system has to fulfil four functions in order to survive. First, it has to adapt to its environment; second, it has to have some degree of goal-achievement; third, it has to take care of a certain level of integration within the social subsystem; and fourth, it has to address the latent structural problems in society. This is known as the ‘AGIL scheme’. Based on this theory, one can translate these functions into demands on public policy-making processes. First, such policies have to achieve the goals for which they were developed. Public policies can be seen as answers to societal problems, and the least one would expect is that they remove, resolve or regulate these problems. If the problem of increased criminal behaviour results in a policy, it is expected that this policy at least reduces the problem. This is the problem of goalachievement in the short term. In the long term, such policies have to be effective in addressing and eliminating the latent underlying causes of delinquency. Furthermore, in the long term the policy can have side-effects, and it would be preferable if the policy-makers anticipate these effects. Third, public policies have to provide an efficient solution to the problems addressed. The policies have to be adapted to the boundary conditions and the financial limitations imposed on them. Fourth, the public should be involved in public policy processes. Among other reasons, democratic policy processes are necessary in order to legitimize policies, to increase the available information and to increase the probability that policies are feasible and rational. Although it seems self-evident that public policies have to satisfy these demands and, in as far as they pose dilemmas, try to balance these demands, the implicit consequence is that the day-to-day practice this approach often results in half-hearted policies that are

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insufficient in every respect. This happens because the four system requirements are often mutually incompatible. Robert Michels (1962[1915]), for instance, pointed out in his ‘iron law’ that democracy and large-scale organization are incompatible (see also EtzioniHalévy, 1985). Any large organization is faced with coordination problems that can be solved only by creating a bureaucracy, which is hierarchically organized to achieve efficiency and that recognizes that decisions cannot be made by large numbers of people in an efficient manner. In his famous book The Administrative State (1948), Dwight Waldo similarly posed that a basic dilemma exists with regard to the reconciliation of efficiency and democracy. According to Waldo, up to that time, scholars in public administration had accepted efficiency as their central principle, and viewed democratic processes to be the realm of political science. Waldo argued, however, that the emphasis on efficiency is itself political. This is the case in part because democracy is often at odds with efficiency. The problem for public administration is reconciling values such as democracy, equity and consensus with the demands of authority needed to increase efficiency. This implied a crucial question, namely how to construct a theory that accommodates the hierarchical and authoritarian nature of the bureaucracy and the seemingly contradictory egalitarian inefficient ideals of democracy (Frederickson and Smith, 2003: 48). A similar dilemma, posed by Max Weber, in his classic Politik als Beruf (1988[1919]) relates to the reconciliation of the need of goalachievement in the short run and effectiveness in the long run. Where politicians are often said to have a short-term view based on the electoral cycle and their desire to be re-elected, the bureaucracy is expected to have a long-term perspective because they stay in office for life and have to look beyond the next elections. The two perspectives are often incompatible, implying that effectiveness in the long run can only be achieved at the expense of short-term goal achievement and vice versa. If you want it all today, you get into trouble tomorrow. And when you want to arrange things effectively in the long run, you cannot demand quick results. These are only two of the many dilemmas. Many dilemmas are also crosscutting, as shown in Table 1.1. The aim of long-term effectiveness is also incompatible with democracy, and efficiency is often incompatible with goal achievement. Stressing efficiency does not only involve

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Table 1.1

Dilemmas in public policy-making

Results-oriented Process-oriented

Political perspective

Administrative perspective

Short-term goal achievement Democratic procedures

Long-term effectiveness Efficiency

the aim to achieve the maximum of goals with a given amount of means, it can, and in practice does, often imply that reduced means and lowered goals are a way to achieve a fixed or lowered goal with diminished resources (maximizing allocative efficiency). This can be seen, for instance, in the dominance of the New Public Management approach and the subsequent retreat of government. When the aim for efficiency is put into practice in this latter meaning, and the goals are limited in order to reduce the utilization of diminished resources even further, this emphasis on efficiency comes at the expense of goal achievement as such. As to the dilemma of balancing effectiveness and democracy, one can point at the features of long-term effectiveness, often achieved by standardizing, and the authoritative enshrining of developments in the long term, which is often incompatible with the varying and changing moods, desires and needs of and among citizens. Seen from this perspective, governments are faced with four demands, which are difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile. The dilemmas result from the incompatibly of administrative and political predilections in terms of process design and desired results. 1.3.2 The need to focus If the four functions are indeed dilemmas, the only way to reconcile them is through waiting. Time is the crucial factor. If a goal cannot all be achieved at once, it has to be achieved step by step. Although at first sight the need to balance different values seems to be an adequate recommendation, the implicit implication is that these interests have to be balanced simultaneously. This book disputes this implication. Given the restricted means that governments have at their disposal and the impossibility of satisfying all demands at the same time, the alternative is to satisfy the multitude of demands one after another.

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The succession of single-sided policies will result in successful policies in the long run. I argue on the basis of a longitudinal analysis that this is exactly what successful policy-makers do. Their policies are single-sided, focusing on one of the four demands. It is the necessary and pragmatic answer to the dilemma of the incompatibility of the functions. The alternative of constantly weighing every aspect, cost and benefit at the same time will necessarily fail. The laws of economic scarcity dictate that the means available are always less than the resources needed to develop all-embracing solutions for serious problems. Recently, this problem of inadequate resources has become even more severe because of tendencies at the macro-level towards globalization and the dominance of neo-liberal ideology. These tendencies urged many governments to lower taxes and to downsize their bureaucracy in order to attract international investment. This reduced the available means, in terms of money and personnel, even further. However, the remaining public managers and policy-makers are still expected to provide answers to persistent societal and organizational needs. The most important advantage of such sequential optimization is that it avoids the ADHD symptoms characterizing some governments. In psychological research ADHD is characterized by a combination of restlessness, an inability to complete tasks, whimsical or chaotic behaviour, overspending, distraction, absent-mindedness, despair, malfunctioning, problems with listening, daydreaming, lacking overview, co-ordination problems, being high-pressured and jumpy, showing inferior performance, and fuzziness, The same phenomena can be seen in public organizations (Hogwood and Peters, 1985). This ‘illness’ is especially evident when countries experience many severe problems and the pressure to improve all those things at the same time. For instance, developing countries are sometimes faced with failing health services, lack of decent housing, insufficient education and widespread poverty, without having sufficient financial means to tackle the combination of scarce resources and abundant problems. This often impels governments to take on more than they can handle. On top of this, these countries often lack the necessary institutions and properly functioning administrative systems to act adequately (World Bank, 2002). When approaching international organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF for assistance, these governments are urged in the direction of so-called good governance.

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They are told to adapt in order to fulfill all the modern principles of accountability, responsiveness and transparency, to balance their budgets and at the same time to tackle all their societal problems. Together, the limited resources and the abundance of problems and recommendations often result in conflicting demands put on governments and the impossibility of fulfilling them all. This is all the more problematic because, as I argue, the OECD countries themselves did not follow this path. Although the problems in OECD countries were almost as urgent as they are nowadays in the developing countries, their governments did not try to solve them all at once. In the following chapters, I argue that they recovered from the severe poverty they experienced just after the Second World War and became the most affluent countries of the world in 2000 by taking the alternative route. They developed step by step, by tackling one problem at a time, focusing on a few problems and temporarily neglecting the others. I argue that this focus and the subsequently single-sided policies resulted in the achievement of the emphasized goals on the short term, effectiveness in the long term, efficiency and democracy. 1.3.3 Distinguishing periods To say that public policies have to be single-sided, that governments can focus and that corrections take place periodically in which demands from the administration and politics make for successful policies, implies that periods can be distinguished in which such a focus is evident – perhaps in all policy areas. Irrespective of the policy area, such as tax policies, housing policies or health policies, to name only three, we expect to see the same focus dominating the new policies in all these fields during certain periods of time. These time-frames are called ‘policy generations’. That such similarities are evident in new policies to be developed in all policy areas is part of the argument and can be explained by the many factors presented in the existing literature on policy change. One argument, suggested by the policy diffusion theory, is that policies, and especially successful policies, tend to be copied by other policy-makers and organizations. The theory of and research into so-called policy diffusion (Walker, 1969; Sabatier, 1999) show how certain solutions disperse over states and over policy areas. Sometimes such policy diffusion takes place randomly; sometimes geographical, personal or political factors are

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influential (Sabatier, 1999). In other cases, new policy ideas at the national level trickle down to each and every policy field. The research into periods in which different policy areas follow similar routes is partly a quest for the dominant factors behind such policy diffusion. Several factors accelerating such mimesis have already been identified. There are factors at the macro-level, such as cultural dynamics, the economic climate and political developments, pressuring governments to change their focus. At the meso-level, one can think of departmental/organizational developments, learning processes, the role of (international) conferences, and interactions between policymakers, that promote the same solutions in specific periods. At the micro-level, the appearance of so-called policy champions or frontrunners might be important. These are influential actors, sometimes associated with universities, who know how to get attention for neglected problems. One can also think of the role of experts who act as standard-setters (Jacobsson, 2000). We also need to consider the influence of public opinion and (mass) protest, voiced in demonstrations, parliamentary elections or the media. Parliamentary elections might also induce regular succession and enhance flexibility, because of the rejuvenation and cohort replacement of decision-makers.

1.3.4 A flexible starting point The argument is that balancing different values sequentially is the more promising option compared to balancing those values simultaneously. The question that arises is whether there is a specific order in the prioritization and what value has to be addressed first. As to the latter question, I have no answer. This might well vary over different countries and in different situations. From the theories on macro-level factors, we know the answer to this question is contingent on the specific situation at hand. It depends on the urgency of the different problems, which in turn are determined by the neglect thereof or external circumstances. For instance, after a war or other events that create extreme shortages or the destruction of facilities and infrastructure, or after a period in which government retreated from society for a long period, thereby neglecting solutions for new and pressing problems, the urgency of those problems are likely to induce short-term reconstruction policies. In the case of the Europe just after the Second World War, this was indeed the way governments

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proceeded. The present-day situation in large parts of Africa might call for a similar path to be taken. If in a country, however, short-term goal-achievement was the dominant value for a long period of time and when it succeeded in resolving the most severe problems, it is likely that policy-makers will start reflecting on the outcomes of that value and move their horizon to further in the future. One may recognize the problems resulting from the quick fix, ad hoc policies dominant in the previous period and start to plan for long-term solutions. This may well be the case in Europe in the first decade of the new millennium. The problems caused by the aging of its societies, the problems of large cities and the necessity of rethinking the welfare state, all conceived to be long-term problems, induce its governments to develop and initiate new policies. These actions seem be aimed toward policies in which, for instance, the abundant use of social welfare is diminished by restricting social security programmes and removing costly regulations, but with numerous exceptions for people in special circumstances, that is, standardizing and reorganizing the state in order to be viable in the long run. When a country has experienced prolonged policies stressing longterm planning, and then comes face to face with the limits of long-term planning, an obvious next step might be to emphasize processes of democratization, because inherent in such long-range planning is often a process of standardization based on technical expertise, in which variations between societal groups are neglected. In other words, such ‘technocratic’ periods are likely to be in need of correction in the direction of more democratic processes. The difficult situation in formerly communist countries in the 1980s and in Indonesia in the 1990s might well be explained by their rigidity, which made it impossible to change the emphasis from continuous planning to creating democratic policy processes. When democratization processes have dominated the political scene for a long time, it is likely that attention to efficiency would have been increasingly neglected, thus creating the need to make the democratic character of policy processes secondary to the administrative need for increasing efficiency. This shift could be seen in the Western world at the end of the 1970s and especially during the 1980s. The severe financial situation that resulted in part from the dominant idea in the 1970s that the sky was the limit urged governments in all developed countries to withdraw and to concentrate on their core activities.

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Therefore, the answer to the question of where to focus depends on the severity of the problems, which is a function of the protracted neglect of problems in the past, which, in turn, may well be different for various (groups of) countries. 1.3.5 A fixed order in consecutive focus This flexible starting point does not imply, however, that the consecutive order for following the demands is also flexible. Empirical analyses of the development of foci in the speeches of politicians during the period 1815–1965 (Namenwirth, 1973) and comparative analysis of policy processes in the European Union as a whole, which will be presented in the next chapters, suggest that a specific order of attention can be expected. From these studies, the recurring order seems to be that short-term goal achievement is the first demand addressed. When this goal is achieved, after about 10–12 years, the attention shifts to more emphasis on long-term planning. The dilemma of the relationship between the two has been explained above. It seems that emphasizing short-term goal achievement is not achieved at the expense of efficiency or democracy as much as it is achieved at the expense of reducing the latent long-term problems in society. The policies aimed at short-term goal-achievement are often somewhat ad hoc; they are output-oriented and not well thought through, and they result in negative side-effects that were not foreseen initially. It is a quick fix, often resulting in rapidly changing policies, following the adage that if there is a problem today, we will provide the solution tomorrow, forgetting that this might result in a new problem the day after. Although this may be effective in getting things done at the beginning, criticism will mount when this continues for too long. In our distinction, the resulting shift is, first of all, a shift from a politics-centered, results-oriented approach to an administrative correction thereof, which removes the inherent drawbacks. Subsequently, it seems to be the inherent side-effect of long-term planning that it is based on expertise, with the economic, organizational and technical experts behaving especially as standard-setters (Jacobson, 2000). The resulting administrative standardization, with the aim of structuring the policies, will seem very effective at the beginning because it removes the disadvantages or ill-effects that had become so visible at the end of the previous period. However, over time the standardization is likely to result in a one-dimensionality

26 The Importance of Neglect in Policy-Making

Table 1.2 policies

Sequence of dominant values in public

Dominant goal

Focus on

Short-term goal achievement Long-term planning Participation and democracy Efficiency

results/output results/outcomes process/openness process/input-output

that becomes increasingly restrictive in a multidimensional society. The increasingly narrow boundaries within which people have to behave call for more variation, freedom and ‘democracy‘ after some time. While the drawbacks of the dominance of standardization in the period at hand are increasingly and more urgently felt, the previous period in which ad hoc policies dominated and which resulted in the drawbacks also remains fresh in the mind. But there will not be a return to short-term goal achievement either. It becomes an additional area of neglect. It is not the most pressing problem at the time, nor is it the problem that has been neglected the longest. Instead, the correction comes from other spheres in terms of politics and administration, this time from politics. The need to replace the dominance of experts and administrative criteria by political actors is increasingly felt. Furthermore, there is a shift from a predilection towards outcomes to a quest to alter the policy process. This concerns how policy processes are designed and the extent to which people are allowed to influence and participate in those processes. The inherent side-effect of stressing democracy is that it is most likely to be achieved at the expense of efficient processes and outcomes. Waldo (1948) once called democracy the least efficient system. When the democratic features of policy processes are predominant, it is likely that they also become costly and have to be corrected after some time by a tendency toward efficiency. A system going for ever more democracy is likely to get into financial problems. After some time, it can no longer afford this inefficiency and is bound to shift its attention to the efficiency of its policies. This focus on efficiency may have the expected effects at first, for instance, by stressing optimal outcomes given fixed resources. When this is achieved, however, the idea of new policies focused on

Explaining and Predicting the Nature of Policy Change

27

efficiency can translate into a desire to try to achieve fixed results with minimum investment. After all, that is where the surplus value of efficiency can be found when policies are already cost-efficient. This implies that the only additive pay-off can be found in reducing investments, even though they are already cost-efficient, in order to achieve allocative efficiency. This focus, in turn, results in a neglect of societal problems and an internal orientation towards increasing efficiency by reducing available resources. After a long period of emphasizing efficiency, it becomes likely that the problems that have been neglected once again become pressing. Because the added value of more efficiency measures dwindles after it has been stressed for a long time, it is probable that that the emphasis on efficiency is then replaced by prudent steps to develop new policies to address the most urgent problems (shortterm goal achievement). The administrative emphasis on efficiency is corrected again by a political response aimed at goal achievement. Hence, we expect a fixed order in the aspects that are stressed and how the dilemmas are dealt with. This process continues successively from goal achievement, through long-term planning, to an emphasis on democracy and then on to efficiency. This is summarized in Table 1.2.

1.4 Conclusions This first chapter has argued that explaining and predicting the nature of policy change is not impossible, but it is a necessary and feasible next step in policy analysis. Departing from existing theories on policy change, the explanation is sought in the non-contents of existing policies. I argued that policies are necessarily single-sided, and they are focused on part of the problem while neglecting other parts. It is this neglect that induces policy change by way of sequential optimization. Although this still needs further investigation, the idea of selective attention could have more than only empirical and theoretical value; it might also be interesting from a normative point of view. Sequential optimization implies focus and flexibility, which might be much more efficient, effective, democratic and capable of achieving more goals than trying to accomplish all these dimensions of policies simultaneously. It releases governments from the strain caused by the impossibility of getting it all at once, and makes successful policies (in terms of the single-sided goals) more feasible. Second, it avoids

28 The Importance of Neglect in Policy-Making

the consequences of the dilemmas arising from the multiple demands placed on policies. Trying to balance the dilemmas in order to achieve an optimum outcome in all four often results in half-hearted policies resulting in insufficient results in every respect. One might compare this with a student who is faced with multiple tasks, assignments and exams and lacks the time to properly prepare for all of them in time. It might be wise to concentrate on part of the tasks in order to fulfill these with good results. A student who keeps on dividing his/her concentration among subjects is also more likely to fail in all of them. If the student is a genius, (s)he might try to accomplish it all simultaneously and succeed. When returning to governments, however, we wonder how many governments are made up of geniuses. Given the theoretical and pragmatic limitations that face governments, it is preferable to pursue sequential optimizing. I argued that such single-sided policies present a pragmatic answer to the theoretical problem raised by classic scholars in political science and public administration, namely that many demands placed on the policy-making process pose dilemmas. Maximizing one may be achieved at the expense of maximizing another equally important feature of public policies. Four such conflicting demands were distinguished, namely short-term goal achievement, long-term effectiveness, democratic processes and efficiency. These demands were based on two dimensions, namely demands from the administration and from politics, and demands related to results of policies and to the policy process. In theory, public policies should seek a balance between these demands. However, this analysis suggests that it might be less awkward to try to balance them sequentially instead of simultaneously. When we incorporate the time dimension, it is possible to develop policies that through time are able to conform to each of the demands, although every period is characterized by the protracted neglect of at least one of the demands. Furthermore, I argued that there are several forces motivating governments to focus and to be flexible: forces at the macro, meso and micro-levels. Nevertheless, there are also forces that induce some governments to fail in this respect and induce them to attempt everything simultaneously or that make them rigid instead of flexible. According to normative analysis, the probability of success for such governments is less than it is for those governments that do focus and are flexible.

2 The Idea of Policy Generations

2.1 Introduction The argument in the previous chapter was that the idea of well-balanced public policies does not comprise an adequate representation of real policy processes and the changes therein. In practice, policies do not change because the actors involved try to balance the different demands such policies face. Rather, the emphasis on one aspect will be continually replaced by emphasis on another aspect. Furthermore, the dominance of the priority of each of the demands follows a fixed sequence through time independent of the policy area involved. At one moment, the policy-makers will address only short-term goal achievement, then long-term effectiveness, subsequently the policy process, and after that efficiency. As such the theory fits within the theories on policy change as described in the first chapter. The theory acknowledges the existence of conflicts, or the battle over priorities, as crucial in pluralist theory, as described by Schattschneider (1960), and that policies involve choices over goals and priorities, as aptly discussed by Baumgartner and Jones (1996; Jones and Baumgartner 2005). This chapter first argues that the changes in the emphasis and dominance of the demands come about simultaneously within every policy area. This allows us to talk about policy generations. Each policy generation is is distinct from preceding and succeeding ones because of the dominant opinion about the specific criterion with which the new policies first and foremost have to comply. We distinguish the generation of trouble-shooters that predominantly proceeds according 29

30 The Importance of Neglect in Policy-Making

to the maxim ‘You have a problem today. We have the solution tomorrow’. In their opinion, a policy is adequate if it poses a quick solution for the most urgent problems. Next, there is the generation of caring technocrats, whose leading principle is to search for coherent structural solutions in the long run. For them the prime idea of an adequate policy is that it provides fundamental solutions for structural and latent problems. Third, there is the generation of politicized spenders, who deem a policy to be especially correct if it takes into account the wishes and demands of all those involved. Finally there is the generation of efficient managers who prefer those policies that engender as few costs as possible; ‘The fewer costs involved the better the policy’ is their adage. Second, the theory outlined below postulates that policy generations and policy change have a fixed and cyclical course. As such this theory fits in a tradition of economists such as Kondratieff with his 50-year cycles of growth and recession, Skowronek’s study on American presidency (1988), Schlesinger’s cycles on alternating periods of reform and conservatism (1986), Truman’s wave theory on group mobilization (1951), Huntington’s theory on cycles of content and discontent with American government (1977), Hirschman’s theory on shifting involvements (1982) and McFarland’s theory on interest group cycles and critical pluralism (1987, 2004, 2007). What is unique about the theory on policy generations is that it claims to be able to predict the sequence in which the four policy generations succeed one another. Furthermore, the theory predicts a recurring pattern to this succession. When the four generations have all gone through their lifespan, the cycle repeats itself. The advantage of this theory, if it is corroborated, is that one is able to predict the emphasis in policy-making in the subsequent period and one can anticipate such changes. This theory postulates that all one has to know is which aspects of policy-making and current policies are most emphasized at present and which features are neglected the most and for the longest period. Emphasis and neglect go hand in hand. Nevertheless, in theories on the policy process, there has been very little attention paid to neglect. In this book, neglect is the central concept. Policy change is viewed as being induced by neglect. The longer something has been neglected, the greater are the odds that it be considered important in new policy agendas.

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31

2.2 The socio-genesis of the theory The theory on policy generations did not come out of the blue. In addition to its source in theories on policy change, as discussed in Chapter 1, it also is the outgrowth of three theories from other scientific disciplines; first, the functional theory on systems of social action by sociologist Talcott Parsons (Parsons, 1969); second, the economic theory of scarcity as described in any basic text in economics (such as Gill, 1973); and third, the relative attention paradigm in which cultural dynamics are central, as developed by Namenwirth (Namenwirth, 1973, 1987). In functional theory, on the one hand there is the idea that policies, or general systems of social action, have to comply with different demands, that is, to perform varying functions in order to survive. Parsons’ theory specifies those functions. Mainstream economic theory postulates that this ideal is impossible because of scarcity and therefore choices have to be made. The relative attention paradigm points out how this dilemma results in cultural dynamics and a cyclical sequence of attention and neglect. The theory of policy generations combines these ideas in a positive theory on policy change – positive in its classic philosophical meaning, that is, based on formal theory and corroborated by empirical research, logically consistent, explanatory of policy change, based on as few axioms as possible, resulting in a rigorous hypothesis that reduces the alternative possibilities of what might happen as much as possible, and thus making itself vulnerable to the possibility of falsification (cf. Popper, 1959; Nagel, 1961; Sabatier, 1999). 2.2.1 Policy generations arising out of sociological theory One of the assumptions in my theory is that every public policy has to satisfy a limited number of demands. One answer to the question regarding the nature of these demands was provided by the sociologist Talcott Parsons (1969), whose theory Namenwirth later used to interpret his findings on cultural dynamics. Parsons postulated that every social system has to fulfil four fundamental functions in order to survive. In his theory of action, it is fundamental that an actor is involved, that the action is goal-oriented, that it implicates a situation that is distinct from the situation the actor wishes for and that the action implies the realization of that desired situation, bounded

32 The Importance of Neglect in Policy-Making

Normative

Latent pattern maintenance: cultural subsystem

Boundaryrelated

Integration: social subsystem

2

1

3

4

Adaptation: economic subsystem

Substancerelated

Goal attainment: political subsystem

Instrumental Figure 2.1 The functions of action systems according to Parsons

by the possibilities and restraints of the situation at hand (Parsons and Smelzer, 1957: 44).∗ His more abstract theory about the four functions of social systems is based on these relatively straightforward axioms, and he further posits that behaviour is shaped by normative, instrumental, boundary and substantial factors. This resulted in the well-known ‘AGIL’ scheme in which he distinguishes four corresponding system functions (Adaptation, Goal attainment, Integration, Latent pattern maintenance). This is represented in Figure 2.1. According to Parsons the four quadrants present the four system functions that have to be satisfied by a system in order to react to developments in four subsystems. These are shown in quadrant 1–4 as, respectively, the social, cultural, economic and political subsystems. In the social subsystem, integration problems are the prime challenge. Integration problems relate to the harmonization and coordination of the attributes and actions of its constituent units, in the first instance human individuals, though for certain purposes collectivities may be treated as actors (Parsons, 1969: 35). The subsystem

∗

It is somewhat problematic that Parsons uses different dimensions and categories in his books. The scheme used here is derived from Parsons (1969).

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33

comprises social relations, the solidarity or polarization of or within societal groups and the problems created by distinct roles and their differentiation from opposite interests. One can bring about integration by ‘the interpenetrating between the social and personality systems’, ‘the mobilization of influence’ (349), and processual mechanisms. In the cultural subsystem the most important issues are loyalty, the institutionalization of values, and the linkage between different obligations when these seem to clash. The answer to such problems is to bring a general and coherent value pattern into being (42). Pattern maintenance causes conflicting loyalties to coalesce and commitments to become univocal. The number of behavioural options within different roles is limited by a striving for a commitment to a set of coherent values. This can be enforced through legislation and the judiciary, the police, the military, and through emphasizing religious prescriptions or secular enforcement of binding agreements. Pattern maintenance implies the development of commitment to the system by preventing the system from collapsing from centrifugal forces (45). In the economic subsystem, the key issue is the system’s survival in a threatening environment, especially in relation to problems of adaptation and whether the organization of the system is up to providing the necessary answers to new developments. Parsons talks about adaptive upgrading as ‘a process by which more generalized resources are made available to social units so that their functioning can be freed from some of the restrictions of previous conditions’ (56). Developments within social systems can result in a misfit between the organization of the system and requirements raised by external developments. Either the costs of the current manner of organization become too high, or the boundary conditions become too restrictive. Only through a reorganization, that is, a functional differentiation, can the situation be improved. Finally, power is the important factor within the political subsystem. Power can be defined as the capacity to achieve collective goals, to mobilize resources, and make binding decisions relating to the system as a whole. It concerns the authority and legitimacy of politicians and political organizations and their ability to get policies accepted, to be empowered to intervene in society and to secure the support needed to advance collective goals (207). Goal-attainment can only be fulfilled by attaining authority.

34 The Importance of Neglect in Policy-Making

The relevance of this theory lies in Parsons’ presumption that social systems have to pay attention simultaneously to all problems within all subsystems, although he recognizes that this is not always possible and that emphasizing one function may be detrimental to the attention paid to other functions. His preference for such simultaneous attention derives from his idea that problems should be avoided and is based on his core emphasis on the preservation of the stability of systems. When a problem is neglected, this is bound to result in trouble within the neglected subsystem. Parsons puts it as follows: This paradigm analyses any action system in terms of the following four functional categories: (1) that concerned with the maintenance of the highest ‘governing’ or controlling patterns of the system; (2) the internal integration of the system; (3) its orientation to the attainment of goals in relation to its environment; (4) its more generalized adaptation to the broad conditions of the environment (Parsons, 1969: 8). Although Parsons’ theory has been widely criticized and debated, many scholars still implicitly refer to his four system functions. They are central to Easton’s general systems theory (1965), where the more abstract conceptions of ‘input’, ‘process’, ‘output’ and ‘outcomes’ reflect Parsons’ ‘adaptation’, ‘integration’, ‘goal attainment’ and ‘latent pattern maintenance’. Current theories emphasize the same terms when judging public policies, namely costs or efficiency, the policy process and the network of actors involved, goal achievement in the short run and effectiveness in the long run. In these conceptions, public policies are generally seen to have to achieve goals and to be effective in the long run; their processes should also be democratic and efficient. 2.2.2 Policy generations arising from economic theories The second theory influencing the theory on policy generations comes from the economic theory of scarcity. Whereas Parsons’ sociological theory postulated that the social system should be able to satisfy four functions, in terms of the economic system such satisfaction is impossible, because the means that it has for providing all the

The Idea of Policy Generations

35

material wants of its citizens are limited. Human desires for material goods generally exceed the volume of goods that can be made available for satisfying these desires (see Gill, 1973: 14). In the context of public policies, the concept of scarcity is fundamental because it postulates that one cannot do everything at the same time, that is, the demand for public policies at any time outstrips the capacity of the economy to supply them. The principle of economic scarcity therefore implies that choices are necessary, especially choices based on preferences of individuals, in this case policy-makers. Therefore some problems will be dealt with while others will be neglected and, just as in the general economy of goods and services, only partial satisfaction will result. Furthermore, the law of diminishing returns will apply to those policies that are implemented. As we add more of a variable factor to a given quantity of fixed factors, the marginal product of the variable factor will eventually begin to diminish (Gill, 1973: 416), and the marginal utility of adding more of the same will diminish further over time. (The marginal utility of a commodity is defined as the addition to the total utility (or satisfaction) we receive from receiving one additional unit of the commodity [433]). At the same time, those problems that are being neglected will become more severe and urgent. This results in the need to be flexible. The single-sided emphasis on certain policies has to change periodically in order to deal with the problems that have been previously neglected. As Figure 2.2 shows, the emphasis on, for instance, efficiency can initially show a vast improvement in the perceived quality of the policies which itself increases the perceived need for more measures to increase efficiency. However, when the single-sided attention continues, additional positive effects will diminish and additional action will be less and less effective; continued measures may even become counterproductive because they may become more costly than any improvements that are produced. On the other hand, the development in the dashed line in the figure indicates the increased utility of some attention being given to hitherto neglected problems. This results in the diminishing additional utility of a continuing emphasis on existing problems and an increasing need for more attention to be given to neglected areas. This growing gap is the reason why flexibility is needed. At a certain point, attention needs to shift to those areas that are most neglected.

36 The Importance of Neglect in Policy-Making

The utililty of additional attention

6 4 2 0 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

⫺2 ⫺4 ⫺6 Years since efficiency became an issue Neglect in other areas Attention to efficiency

Figure 2.2 The dynamics of relative attention for efficiency

Given the law of diminishing returns, therefore, shifts in policy emphasis can be expected when more resources than can be economically justified are invested in a certain policy area. This is known as the ‘overinvestment theory’. In economics, there are various illustrations of this concept; mistakes by entrepreneurs who increase their capital stock too much during an economic upsurge (Wicksel, 1896) or by bankers who exceed their limits in providing credit; the consequences of inevitable delays in adaptation mechanisms (Schumpeter, 1950); or the consequences of government actions causing increases or contractions in the money supply that do not match productivity growth (Friedman, 1968). Responses to these problems can lead to conjunctural changes which, in the economy as a whole, can be directed towards bringing about a new equilibrium or recovery from recession or depression. This economic theory explains why not everything can be done simultaneously, why choices have to be made and why periodic shifts in attention are necessary. The theory is relevant because it postulates a precondition for policy change – namely, a combination of overinvestment and diminishing returns. Such a change would be expected to result in a shift of emphasis, and change in the central features of production, consumption and values over time. Of course,

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37

depending on the policy area, this shift in preferences can take place at different moments and economic theory does not address this issue. The cultural theory to be presented in the next section sets out to explain why such shifts occur at a certain time and in a given order. 2.2.3 Policy generations arising from cultural theories A conundrum arises from the discussion of the previous two theories – how is it possible to satisfy all four demands crucial for the functioning of every social system in the light of the economic scarcity that apparently makes this impossible. The answer is to focus and to be flexible. But this creates further dilemmas: What should be the duration of such focus and can one predict when it becomes necessary for attention to be shifted? Or, how long can a problem be neglected before it becomes urgent and necessary to deal with it? Namenwirth’s theory (1973; Namenwirth and Lasswell, 1970; Namenwirth and Weber, 1987) outlines how societies have dealt with this problem. He analysed the pattern of attention that different problems received from American politicians in the period 1815–1970 and found striking regularities. He also found that the attention given to certain issues showed a cyclical trend. Certain problems were addressed and emphasized during a period of approximately 12 years while others were hardly addressed in this same period. After such a period, the rarely addressed problems became dominant and the problems that had earlier received so much attention came to be neglected. On the basis of his content analysis of political speeches, Namenwirth posited that four periods constituted one cycle which, after 48 to 50 years, started again from the beginning. Problems dominant 50 years before then came to be emphasized again. He called this process ‘a turning wheel of time’. From his observation Namenwirth postulated that, because of economic scarcity, governments lack the resources to address each of the problems society faces simultaneously and continuously. This prevents the balancing of competing values. From this he developed the elegant hypothesis that governments always shift attention in phases. In one period, they focus on one problem while neglecting the other three; the subsequent period sees governments devoting much attention to the problem (of the remaining three) that was most neglected in the preceding period: ‘. . . [A]ttention devoted to one problem leads to increased tension over

38 The Importance of Neglect in Policy-Making

neglected problems. Tension is reduced by shifting attention and resources to neglected problems’ (Namenwirth and Weber, 1987: 113). Governments, then, lack the resources to focus simultaneously and continuously on each of these problems. It is more efficient to proceed in phases. Phase movement is an efficient problem-solving process. […] societies have but a finite supply of those resources necessary for adaptive problem solving. Although some resources will always be devoted to each problem, devoting more than average resources to one problem at a time is more effective and efficient than equal allocations. Irrespective of the particular phase sequence, the likelihood that a system will survive is increased by efficient and effective utilization of social, cultural and material resources (Namenwirth and Weber, 1987: 113). Namenwirth calls this the relative attention paradigm; its assumptions are presented in Table 2.1. This so-called relative attention paradigm is characterized by the fact that four political/cultural values dominate sequentially. These values are: the goals and tasks of government on the basis of consensus (mission, goal-attainment); long-term planning (planning, latency problems); the renewal of cultural patterns regarding the integration and coordination of society as a whole and power conflicts (integration problems, democratization, in which the problem of interaction between sectors is dealt with); and concern for prosperity (adaptation to given economic or cultural developments, internal orientation and efficiency), after which attention shifts (back) to the (re)formulation of a new mission of government (goal-attainment). Namenwirth speaks of a turning ‘wheel of time’. At every quarter, a new aspect becomes dominant. For instance, at some point there is much attention given to the mission and authority of government. The accent lies on the will and decisiveness needed to carry out tasks which government deems to be crucial in the short term. Conflict is subordinate to cooperation, respect and the power doctrine deemed necessary to achieve this goal. Government spares no effort to achieve its main objectives. According to Namenwirth, this was the case in the second half of the 1940s, and as early as 1973 he predicted that this would be the case again in the 1990s.

The Idea of Policy Generations

Table 2.1 • • • • •

• • • • •

39

Assumptions underlying the relative attention paradigm

Collectivities, such as a society, pursue both short-term and long-term goals; These goals are part of culture: they are periodically reassessed and modified; Culture functions as short- and long-term memory; it is the repository of accumulated learning and knowledge; Some knowledge and learning pertain to problems encountered in the pursuit of goals; Knowledge about recurrent events is stored in structures of varying sizes, internal complexity and abstractness, including scripts, themes, dilemmas, precedents, ideologies and other idea and knowledge systems; Collectivities have limited amounts of energy that can be devoted to problem solving in the pursuit of goals; Collective attention is an active process that directs and focuses energy towards particular problems; Attention is generally zero-sum: attention devoted to one problem requires that less attention be devoted to other problems; Collective perception is not determined by the intrinsic nature of events, but rather by cultural dynamics; Therefore, specific dilemmas or themes invoked by collectivities to interpret events reflect the state of culture rather than the state of the social or physical environment.

Source: Namenwirth and Weber, 1987: 17–18.

Latency problems, long-run problems, are neglected during this period. Critics would say that it is characterized by ad hoc policymaking. The reaction to this comes in the next period, in which the latent problems are addressed on the basis of planning. The planning phase is also necessary to arrange institutions in such a way that the governmental mission is feasible in the long run (according to Namenwirth, the late 1950s and 1960s may have been characterized by an emphasis on this value). Planning, however, often results in uniformity, fixed procedures and standardization. This implies that in a ‘planning’ period, there is little room for different interests, conflicts and variation. This shortcoming is reasserted in the third quarter, in which the lack of awareness of differences between societal groups is finally overcome and replaced by a welter of diverse expressions. This is the

40 The Importance of Neglect in Policy-Making

time of participation, democratization, and ‘something for everybody’. In Namenwirth’s words, power conflict starts to dominate the agenda. By stressing the democratization aspect, however, one loses sight of efficiency. When inefficiency becomes a pressing problem, the wheel moves into a fourth quarter in which the dominant values stress prosperity by efficiency and an emphasis on the survival of society, that is, the organization. Regardless of the mission of government or its external functions, efficiency, cutbacks, downsizing and internal reorganization of the apparatus are given first priority (1930s, 1980s). At the same time, the dominance of these values results in the neglect of external functions and tasks. This period therefore also results in its own backlash, a reformulation of the mission and an emphasis on the external functions of the organization or political system. In this theory Namenwirth follows philosophers such as Mill and Mannheim. Mill wrote in A System of Logic in 1842 (Mill 2002[1842]) that: ‘The proximate cause of every state of society is the state of society immediately preceding it.’ According to Mannheim: ‘Members of a generation only participate in a temporally limited section of that process’ (Mannheim, 1952: 292). As a result, society finds itself in a ‘continuous rejuvenation and the cultural heritage is constantly being transmitted’ (Van den Broek, 1996: 17).

2.3 Combining the theories and the idea of policy generations The three theories result in an explanation of changes in thought and cultural dynamics. The next step is to see whether an application of these theories to actual policies and policy change has any explanatory power. This seems to make sense because from sociological theory we have an idea about the functional demands of public policy as an action-system. These can easily be characterized as basic demands for an adequate policy, that is, efficiency (adaptation), interaction (integration), goal achievement and effectiveness (latency problems) or, in more general and abstract terms, attention to aspects related to input, process, output and outcomes. From economic theory and the concept of scarcity, we have the idea that one cannot fulfil all these demands simultaneously. This

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41

is also something public policies are accustomed to. The budgetary process is important because choices are made about the problems tackled and because there is never enough money to tackle all problems simultaneously. From the theory of diminishing returns, it follows that maintaining an emphasis on one and the same aspect makes increasingly less sense. This is also seen in public policies where the efficiency measures and reorganizations from the 1980s met increasing resistance and seemed less advantageous in the 1990s. The theory of cultural dynamics presents the obvious solution, namely the phase-wise shifting of attention. This informs us about the sequence in which each function gets more or less attention in societies as a whole. Whether this is seen in public policies is the main subject of this research. The idea is that this relative attention paradigm can be extended by combining the idea of periodical changes in the dominant political culture with the idea of policy change. If the changes in the political culture are reflected in changes in actual policies, it might be possible to speak of policy generations. As described above, policy generations are periods in which new policies in different areas converge in order to meet the same new demand as a reaction to the previous period in which this feature was mainly neglected. Policy generations are distinguished by fundamentally different policies and therefore are the label under which fundamental policy change is described. Although one cannot provide an exact definition of fundamental policy change, its meaning can be elucidated by distinguishing it from policy refinement. In the latter case, through feedback and learning, a policy is adjusted and improved without changing the goals, instruments and/or the policy actors. When a fundamental policy change takes place, all three of these change. Refinement is the incremental, fragmental change within the existing framework. For instance, within the goal of interactive policy-making, refinement would defined as investigating how it should be designed and improved. A fundamental change puts the goal of interactive policy-making aside and emphasizes a new goal, for instance, efficiency, regardless of its implications for the interactive aspects of policy-making. Hence, the efficiency of policies replaces interactive policy-making as the main criterion for judging policies. With this criterion, the evolving policies can be refined until they are optimal given this criterion. The

42 The Importance of Neglect in Policy-Making

same goes for the optimization of interactive policy-making – trying to develop sustainable policies that are effective in the long run – and trouble-shooting – attempting to remove the most urgent problems in the short run. A refinement implies that the policies are improved increasingly in order to meet the dominant criterion, while a fundamental policy change implies that the emphasis is shifted from one to another criterion and to the main policy goals, the usage of policy instruments and the actors most directly involved in policy change.

2.3.1 Three axioms Crucial to the idea of policy generations is the notion that public policies can never be perfect. Given limited means and the dilemmas that are present, it is impossible to bring such policies to perfection by refining current policies. This paradigm is based on three axioms. The first concerns the impossibility of making a policy perfect in all its aspects and is based on the economic theory of scarcity. Axiom 1

The means available for developing an adequate policy are always less than the means necessary for developing an adequate policy.

This implies that policies always fall short in some area because paying simultaneous attention to all aspects related to adequate policymaking is, in the long run, neither feasible nor affordable and because the different demands cannot be optimized simultaneously. Choices are therefore mandatory. The first choice is between trying to find a balance and trying to accomplish the impossible, that is, trying to answer all demands simultaneously. Given the first axiom, this necessarily results in incomplete and half-hearted policies. The second option is to prioritize one thing and neglect others, which is what we expect policy-makers will do. This axiom is important because it shows that policy-making involves the relative weighing of aspects to be emphasized and neglected – it encompasses the fundamental dilemma giving rise to the theory developed here. Irrespective of the features of a policy or its success in reaching its goals, therefore, it will also create problems, namely those it previously neglected.

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The second axiom presents the impetus for policy change and is derived from Namenwirth’s cultural theory. Axiom 2

A fundamental policy change takes place whenever the dominant policy actors discover an urgent problem in the current policies which cannot be removed by refining the current policy but only by developing a new policy.

The explanation of policy change is directly related to the comparison of the features of current policies with those of new policies. It is not related to changes in the policy problem, although these can also contribute to policy change. Even when societal problems are stable, policies can change fundamentally. At certain moments – to be specified below – policy-makers re-assess the emphasized and neglected aspects in their policies and come to differing conclusions from those of their earlier assessments. The second axiom suggests that fundamental policy change is always a reaction to the neglect apparent in previous policies. It is caused by the impossibility of continuing to neglect these aspects, in combination with the redundancy of persisting with those aspects emphasized at present. The theory predicts a policy change in terms of a shift in attention. The third axiom concerns the urgency of policy changes and is derived from Talcott Parsons’ sociological theory. Axiom 3

The longer an aspect of adequate policy-making is respectively neglected, the stronger is the pressure to pay respectively less attention to this aspect.

This axiom postulates that the probability that policies aim at removing a specific problem is directly related to the length of time that this problem was neglected. It is a necessary supposition because it has predictive value regarding the direction of policy change. On the one hand, neglect can increase the size of the problem; on the other hand, it can increase the sense of urgency. One can compare it to the maintenance of a house. When attention to maintenance is absent, the actual or perceived condition of the house can deteriorate, and annoyance over the failing upkeep can grow, irrespective of the actual situation.

44 The Importance of Neglect in Policy-Making

This axiom therefore assumes that a sense of urgency over longneglected problems will grow and that this will increase the probability that they will be tackled in new policies.

2.3.2 Two hypotheses about policy change Together the three axioms result in the hypothesis that successful policy actors will always choose the second option given in the discussion of the first axiom, that is, they will prioritize and neglect. Governments do this on the basis of their perception of what were the most important problems in previous policies. The reason for this is that it is more effective and more efficient to act this way than it is to follow half-hearted policies that try to accomplish everything. The resulting hypothesis reads as follows: Hypothesis 1

The core of a fundamental policy change is always concerned with a shift of attention toward those (aspects of) problems that were the most chronically neglected in the previous policy.

This first hypothesis predicts the direction of policy change in general. The theory of policy generations postulates a more specific direction, namely that such fundamental policy change takes place at approximately the same moment in every policy area. Hence, periods – policy generations – can be recognized in which the emphasis on reducing costs can be seen in every policy area and other periods can be identified in which stressing process, output or outcomes is central. In such periods, policies are especially judged for the degree to which they comply with these core criteria. The resulting hypothesis reads as follows: Hypothesis 2

When a new policy generation is born, a convergence towards achieving the dominant value of that generation will be evident in the new policies in all policy areas.

The goals, instruments and roles of actors are fundamentally changed at the start of a new period compared to the previous period. During the new period, a refinement takes place in order to comply optimally with the core criterion of the policies proposed. This goes

The Idea of Policy Generations

45

on until a new fundamental policy change takes place and the criterion changes again. That is, it continues until the birth of yet another policy generation.

2.4 Conclusions This chapter presented the formal theory of policy generations. Policy generations may be described as periods in which new policies in different areas converge in order to meet the same new demand as a reaction to the previous period in which this feature was mainly neglected. Three axioms were formulated as well as two hypotheses based thereon. The axioms are: 1. The means available for developing an adequate policy are always less than the means necessary for developing an adequate policy. 2. A fundamental policy change takes place whenever the dominant policy actors discover an urgent problem in the current policies which cannot be removed by refining the current policy, but only by developing a new policy. 3. The longer an aspect of adequate policy-making is respectively neglected, the stronger is the the pressure to pay respectively less attention to this aspect. The two hypotheses derived are first, that the core of a fundamental policy change is always concerned with a change of attention toward those (aspects) of problems that were the most chronically neglected in the previous policy. Second, it is expected that with the birth of a new policy generation, a convergence towards meeting the dominant value of that generation will be noticeable in the new policies in all policy areas. The theory aims to explain policy convergence (focus) and change (flexibility) and presents an explanatory model that enables understanding of when, why and in which direction fundamental policy change will occur. Whether this theory can stand the empirical test is investigated in the next chapters. There I analyse the dynamics in the goals set, policy instruments used and the actors involved in policy-making processes in OECD countries in general and in the Netherlands since the Second World War in particular. The question is whether convergence

46 The Importance of Neglect in Policy-Making

and changes in the practice of policy-making are evident, whether the policy generations can be distinguished and whether the theoretical expectations are corroborated. The next three chapters set out to answer those questions. Three factors crucial to policy-making are indicative for the existence of policy generations: • the dynamics of policy goals; • the changing use of policy instruments; • the changing role of different groups of actors in policy processes.

These factors are derived from the analysis on policy change presented in the first chapter as well as from general theories on policy development and analysis (Dunn, 1982; Parsons, 1995). The nature of policy-making lies in its objectives. Scarce means are not just invested for their own sake, but in order to accomplish something. It is expected that this ‘something’ changes cyclically. Investigating whether policy goals are dynamic is crucial because it directly relates to the established priorities or – as suggested by pluralist theory – which preferences and conflicts are addressed and which are not. According to this theory, the dynamics of policy goals are expected to behave in the sequence described above and are expected to exhibit an emphasis on only one of the four goals while neglecting the remaining three. These four goals are: achieving short-term goals; being effective in the long term; achieving results demonstrating integration; and demonstrating efficiency, that is, optimal performance in terms of outputs, outcomes, process and input. Whether a sequence of alternating focus and neglect on these objectives can indeed be found, and whether the sequence is found in the order as specified, is investigated in the next chapter. Chapter 3 addresses whether the shifting of goals and the evolution of the focus of policies conform to the expectations presented in Hypothesis 1 and whether these shifts that are visible in different policy areas conform to the expectations presented in Hypothesis 2. Setting specific goals is one thing. As Edelman (1964), among others, has argued, many things occurring in policy-making can be seen as symbolic, and symbols can easily be confused with substance. Political elites manipulate public opinion by creating political forums which give the impression that some problem is being dealt with, or some policy is being followed, when this is not the case (McFarland,

The Idea of Policy Generations

47

1987: 132). Therefore it is crucial to examine whether the changes in policy objectives as stated in white papers, policy documents, speeches and the like are followed up with actual investment, new laws and regulations, and the implementation of policy instruments such as grants and subsidies, communication and the establishment of new organizations (cf. Hood, 2006; Vedung, 1998). Furthermore, there is the question of whether we can demonstrate that the existence of shifts in the dominant use of different policy instruments conforms to the expectations in the policy generation theory and whether these shifts are in themselves indicative for these expectations. Chapter 4 will examine the changing use of policy instruments and especially the changing functions of law. Again it will be investigated whether such shifts occur and whether they occur simultaneously in different policy areas. In Chapter 5, I analyse the changing role of societal groups in the policy process. On the one hand, this investigation is necessary in order to judge whether the emergence of new policy generations can be explained by the shifting alliances between interest groups, as suggested by pluralist theory, and whether, in a similar way, alternating policy-makers is as important as the micro-level factors mentioned in Chapter 1 suggest. On the other hand, analysis is needed to investigate whether the dominant role of societal groups might not only be explanatory for but inherent to and indicative of a certain policy generation. The chapter argues that one can distinguish between different roles for societal groups vis-à-vis policy-makers, such as societal groups as target groups, as interest groups, as clients and as partners, and that shifts in role that conform to our expectations can also be seen in the dominance of these roles during different periods. Together, these three chapters illustrate the theory. They are not to be viewed as a final test for the hypotheses. Space and time limitations result in a partial analysis. Ultimately, the analysis can be made more rigorous by expanding it to a comparative analysis over several countries. As will be demonstrated, the case studies are so labour-intensive because of the time-frame (50 years) and the number of policy areas covered that it is impossible to be exhaustive or to conduct thorough comparisons of developments internationally. The contents of the chapters should be seen as empirically based argumentation and illustration of the argument that neglect does matter and that it can be seen as an important factor in explaining and even predicting the direction of

48 The Importance of Neglect in Policy-Making

policy change. Given the scope of the theory, it might not even be possible to test it using the classic method. It would require too much data and too extensive an analysis of given data. Therefore, the subsequent chapters will present only contributory evidence of policy generations found in different countries. It will provide ample evidence that the developments in one country – the Netherlands – do indeed conform to the expectations as described in the two hypotheses and, overall, provide convincing evidence that the theory holds. It can only be hoped that this finding will trigger readers to investigate whether the same trends and developments are apparent in other countries. The finding that neglect is important in explaining the direction of policy change does not discount the value of all other factors relevant to explaining why or when policy change becomes probable, as mentioned in Chapter 1. My objective is to add one factor – neglect – that I judge to be a very strong determinant for the expected contents of new policies. All theories until now have emphasized the importance of preferences and mobilization of bias. It is my opinion that it might also be fruitful to look at the explanatory value of the other side, that is, the inevitable neglect of what is not prioritized.

3 Changing Relative Attention

3.1 Introduction The theory presented in the previous chapter will be illustrated in this chapter as well as in the next two chapters. These chapters argue that one can distinguish five policy generations since the Second World War. In this chapter, the policy goals as formulated by the subsequent national governments in Europe are central. First, I discuss the terminology. Second, I describe whether the expected change in relative attention can be traced in OECD countries in general. Subsequently I present an in-depth analysis of such changes in one country, the Netherlands. I delve into the contents of the goals as formulated at the beginning of each period, the degree of goal achievement at the end of these periods and the shifts in goals in between different periods.

3.2 A note on the terminology As argued in the previous chapters, the expectation is that policy-makers address the four themes consecutively instead of simultaneously. An initial problem is that the terminology contains some ambiguity. Goal achievement, long-term planning, democratization and efficiency as such are ambiguous terms with multiple meanings. With regard to planning, at least four different meanings can be distinguished (Van den Heuvel, 1994): technical or project planning at an operational level; historical-political planning in which planning is related to control; system-functional planning emphasizing the 49

50 The Importance of Neglect in Policy-Making

goal-means relations; and institutional planning, in which planning is done by organizations and institutions being themselves simultaneously the object of planning. In this book, planning is interpreted as strategic planning, that which aims at designing society for the long term and at providing a solution for structural latent problems, an example of which is the policies of the 1950s to design the welfare state. In terms of Parsons’ structural functionalist theory, it relates to ‘latent pattern maintenance’ and in relation to Eason’s system model to the ‘outcomes’ of the authoritative allocation of values and services. In policy terms, and therefore in this text, it is associated with effectiveness in the long term. The same goes for ‘efficiency’. This term can also be defined in multiple ways. There is cost efficiency, or the achievement of a maximum output given fixed means. A second form is allocative efficiency, that is, the idea that output as such can be reduced, for instance, in order to prevent overproduction; in this conception, even though the outputmeans relation might be efficient, one might question whether the volume of the output is too large. In this context, we can refer to the discussions that took place at the beginning of the 1990s about the core business of government; even though public sector activities were considered cost-efficient, it was questioned whether they were efficient regarding allocation and there were even arguments over whether service provision by the public sector should be done at all. In terms of Parsons’ theory, this relates to the adaptive upgrading of the steering of a social system, and in terms of Easton’s conception, it relates to the reduction of output. In terms of policy and therefore in this text, efficiency is defined as in the second meaning – allocative efficiency. With regard to democracy, participation and interactive policymaking, several interpretations are also possible. The most obvious meaning is that there is interaction between policy-makers and the public. Policy-makers can discuss their intentions with interest groups before the decisions are made in order to reconcile opposite interests. In this case, one speaks of direct democracy and influence of the ‘citoyen’ in the policy process. When a government authoritatively tells citizens what they are allowed and forbidden to do, however, there is still interaction between them. When government views its citizens as clients, this is also regarded as interactive policy-making, and when government sees societal organizations as partners with

Changing Relative Attention 51

whom it wants to accomplish something that is mutually beneficial, this too is interactive policy-making. Nonetheless, the underlying values, namely power (dis)parity and the assumption of congruence or antagonism in interests, are very different and therefore so are the various meanings of interactive policy-making (see Chapter 5). Hence, the terms in themselves do not always have the same implication or application in the policy process. The same problems occur with the concept of goal achievement. One can interpret this concept in many ways. Along with Namenwirth (1973), I interpret goal achievement in terms of output-orientation – that is, the concentration on the direct, short-term goals of policies – and not on outcomes. Therefore, fixed ordering is expected only in a specific form of materializing the different aspects. This form was presented in Table 1.2.

3.3 Shifts in attention in OECD countries between 1945 and 2000 This section addresses the question of whether periods of sequential relative attention can be seen in OECD countries in the post-war era. 3.3.1 Societal reconstruction just after the war Immediately after the Second World War, when a large part of Europe was destroyed, many European countries needed to rebuild their societies and needed to do so quickly. Short-term ‘production objectives’ rather than long-term ‘programme objectives’ values were central to the policy process in these countries. The policies were wholly devoted to the immediate alleviation of urgent problems and to the lack of financial means to do so. This was the case because the war had cost more money than the nations could afford. It was necessary to do what was possible immediately, instead of working on long-term plans. The planning of long-term objectives or adapting production to the needs of the population was given low priority. Although opponents pointed from the beginning to the side-effects of such short-term policy-making, inadequate planning, and the indifference towards long-term side-effects that followed hasty procedures, the dominant view was that quality was identical to quantity.

52 The Importance of Neglect in Policy-Making

Society had to be rebuilt, and everything that got built was by definition seen as increasing social welfare. Reducing immediate shortages by means of ad hoc policies was the principle. The absence of a long-term perspective was not only a consequence of limited means. The end of the war also resulted in irreconcilable discussions about the preferred role of the state vis-à-vis the market. Of course such discussions in themselves are always present, but what was specific to the immediate post-war period was that the discussions nearly paralyzed the countries involved, resulting in the establishment of unstable interim governments, numerous changes in governmental coalitions and the impossibility of looking beyond the immediate horizon. This was, for instance, the case in Germany. The four powers that occupied it after the defeat of the Nazi regime had very different plans for the country. The Soviets dismantled plants and shipped them to their own country. The French were reluctant to agree to the establishment of a centralized German state, while the British and Americans opted for a united Germany. It was only in 1948 that it became clear that no consensus could be reached about Germany’s future. This was also the case within Germany. As Conradt tells us: ‘Most Germans were not concerned with the future of the nation, or with their own responsibility or guilt relative to Nazism, much less with politics. Their immediate concern was physical survival: food, clothing, and shelter’ (2001: 14). The same was true for the second defeated country, Italy, with heated debates breaking out between communists, socialists, Christian Democrats and liberals about the desired degree of government intervention and steering. The core debate was between neo-liberals and those favouring Keynesian intervention policies (Sassoon, 1997: 18). In Italy, the discussion was centred on the question of whether to privatize the state-owned industries (especially banking, shipyards and steel) and whether to open up the economy. A sign of the country’s deep division was the fact that between 1945 and 1950 there were five different coalition governments. The discussions were similar in the victorious countries. In France the first government after the war opted for the establishment of a welfare-oriented republic (Safran, 1998: 9) but they could not reach consensus about the structure of the state that could accomplish this. The communists and socialists favoured a strong unicameral

Changing Relative Attention 53

legislature and a weak executive, whereas the Popular Republican Movement (MRP) around De Gaulle was convinced such a structure was doomed to failure. In 1946 a referendum was called and 96 per cent of the voters asked for a new constitution and to restrict the powers of the new Assembly only to the writing of the constitution. That this constitution was the result of a dominance of thinking in terms of short-term goal achievement is evident in the resulting Fourth Republic, which lasted until 1958. In the 12 years of its existence, there were 26 governments; their policies were characterized by socalled ‘immobilism’, that is, an inability to make decisions, or rather a choice between making decisions and staying in power. Coalitions never lasted for more than a year and their members were mainly occupied with securing their own political futures; the system was characterized by a fragmented party system with a relatively substantial share of power held by the parties of the extreme left and right. As, for instance, the French politician Michel Debré noted: ‘the Fourth Republic contained many structural weaknesses that were not conducive to any long-term stability and effectiveness in government’ (Debré, n.d.). In Britain, the war had led the country to near bankruptcy. Some estimate that a quarter of the country’s wealth had been spent on defeating Hitler (Jeffreys, 1998). Furthermore, the country, like so many others in Europe, had to be rebuilt. The immediate post-war years, under the leadership of Labour Prime Minister Clement Attlee, are known as the years of reconstruction. Unlike other countries, however, there are few signs that Britain opted for short-term policies. There were several reasons for this. Ad hoc policies on national problems had already dominated during the war, when as deputy Prime Minister the socialist Attlee had to take short-term domestic measures under the harsh circumstances of the war, while Prime Minister Churchill, a Conservative, took care of international politics and the war against the Nazis. Britain had already had years of short-term policies. Second, during the war moves were made in Britain for the establishment of the welfare state, based on the so-called Beveridge Plan. It included a provision for social insurance – such as unemployment benefits, pensions, a national health service, children’s allowances, marriage grants, maternity benefits, disability funds – and it formulated the assumptions, methods and principles of social

54 The Importance of Neglect in Policy-Making

insurance, the population classes to which insurance applied and the basis for need. It was this plan that the Labour Party – although Beveridge was not a member of this party – wanted to implement after the war. Politically, the electoral system in Britain is such that parties do not form coalitions and do not face strong pressures to compromise. It is basically a two-party system in which the winner takes all. Just after the war that winner was Attlee, who was free to implement the measures set out in the manifesto of the Labour Party. In the five years he remained in office, his Labour government nationalized the Bank of England, cables and wireless, civil aviation, rail and road transport, and the electricity, gas, steel and coal industries. These policies were made possible because Britain received a loan from the United States in 1946 and was the first to benefit from the European Recovery Fund (Marshall Plan) in 1948. One million new houses were built, which were, in contrast to those built under the Tory government in the 1930s, mainly council houses and not houses for private sale. The National Health Service, with health care free at the point of use, was also introduced. However, Britain also could not easily overcome the problems caused by the war, so it also had to take ad hoc measures. In 1947 there was a serious fuel shortage, resulting in the so-called ‘winter crisis’. In the same year it became clear that the American loan received in 1946 came with strings attached, namely a ‘convertibility clause’ which intensified Britain’s balance-of-payments problem with the affluent USA, which in turn led to a devaluation of the pound. In 1948 there was still food rationing, with long queues at shops providing food of dubious quality, and in 1950 the NHS became nearly unaffordable because of its popularity. Although the Labour government stayed in office until 1951, welfare expenditure was tightened and the idea of socialist planning was downplayed. Of course, there was also the strong opposition of the Conservative Party and especially its leader Winston Churchill. In response to a colleague who told him that the Labour government had to be seen as a blessing in disguise, he replied that the blessing was really well disguised. And when another colleague told him that Clement Attlee was a modest man, he replied: ‘Mr Attlee is a very modest man. Indeed he has much to be modest about.’ However, Churchill was much more interested in foreign affairs than in domestic problems. This

Changing Relative Attention 55

made political conflict relatively less heated than in other European countries. It was not only in the large countries that short-term policies predominated. As the Finnish Ministry of Social Affairs reveals on its website: ‘The post-war period in the history of the Ministry of Social Affairs began by reconstruction work.’ The Ministry was responsible for helping those who had suffered in war or were disabled. Some of the most significant family policy reforms, such as child allowances and loans for starting a family, were carried out in the 1940s. Maternity grants and the guidance centre network were also developed. It was not until the 1950s, however, that structural measures were taken: ‘The building of the welfare state began properly in the 1950s. The Social Assistance Act changed the policy from poor relief into social assistance. The National Pensions Act of the same year can be considered the most important social improvement of the decade. The employment pension system was developed simultaneously’ (see www.stm.fi/Resource.phx/eng/orgis/history.htx). In Belgium, the defeat of the Nazis also resulted in many discussions between the political parties. A major issue was the return of King Leopold III, who had been accused of collaboration with the Germans. This issue divided the country between Wallonia and the socialists on the one hand and the Flemish population and the Christian Democrats on the other hand and nearly brought the country to the brink of civil war. The issue was resolved in 1951 when the King abdicated in favour of his 20-year-old son, Boudewijn. Furthermore, the discussions mentioned above not only occurred in countries that were involved in the war but also in those countries that had remained neutral, such as Sweden and Switzerland. In those countries, neutrality was seriously debated. Post-war developments can also be analysed in a more structural way, based on so-called manifesto data. Such data indicate the relative attention given by political parties in their political manifestos, and are available for a large number of OECD countries and cover a large number of issues. We selected only the manifestos published by established parties, such as Social Democrats, Liberals, Christian Democrats or Conservatives. Furthermore, we selected only those countries which had not experienced extreme regime change or war (the two conditions mentioned by Namenwirth as events that might disturb the ‘wheel of time’) during the whole period, therefore excluding

56 The Importance of Neglect in Policy-Making

Greece, Spain, Portugal, and Israel. The data show that although the attention given by each of these groups varies according to political ideology, periods can still be distinguished in which all parties pay relatively greater attention to the same problems. This can be explained by the fact that they all emerged from a similar situation, namely the end of the Second World War, in which large parts of most countries were destroyed and had to be rebuilt or reconstructed. Just after the war and the defeat of the Nazi Germany, Italy and Japan, and under the new perceived threat of the Soviet Union, much attention was devoted by all political parties to social harmony and free enterprise. The party manifestos of these years reflect greater attention given to the development of free enterprise vis-à-vis the state. In all countries except Austria and Denmark, where the difference with later periods is absent, this issue attracts huge attention compared to later periods. Furthermore, the countries had to be rebuilt and this required the joint effort of everybody, and the communist threat had to be countered by giving free enterprises the space they needed to recover and start production. The substantial attention paid to social harmony compared to later periods can be seen especially in Denmark, Norway, Finland, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Germany, Britain, the USA, Australia and New Zealand. It is not seen in countries less affected by the war, such as Sweden, Iceland, Canada and Ireland. In conclusion, this analysis of the period just after the Second World War indicates that in many European countries, the same issues were dominant. The shared point of departure for many countries was a situation of major devastation, meagre finances and the need for speedy reconstruction. However, with the common enemy – the Nazis – defeated, the debates among political parties about the role of the state vis-à-vis the market became very intense. In many countries, this debate was not concluded before 1950. Hence, between 1945 and 1950, there were no structural policies resulting in sustainable outcomes. Even in France, where a sustainable solution was sought in the Fourth Republic, or in Britain, which was leading in the establishment of the welfare state under the Attlee Labour government, many of the solutions pursued in the 1940s did not prove to be sustainable. This can be explained by the ad hoc policies characterizing this period – interim governments, emergency laws, temporary decrees and, especially, quick-fix solutions, building and reconstructing society as

Changing Relative Attention 57

quickly as possible with little concern about the long-term problems that would be created. 3.3.2 The planners of the 1950s The reaction came in the early 1950s when it became clear to most interested parties that the rapid reconstruction with minimal funding had perhaps been penny-wise but was turning out to be pound foolish. In nearly every policy area, the idea that developments had to be planned began to dominate. The idea also arose that quality had to be judged on the basis of welfare and security criteria. By means of laws, regulations and procedures, a welfare state had to be developed based on the general idea that the quality of life increased if public welfare was secured from the cradle to the grave. In this period, the dominant view was that primary responsibility for this lay with national government. Government was responsible for a coordinated and planned welfare state. Because the development of the welfare state has been well described elsewhere (see Van Kersbergen, 1995; Pierson, 1994, 1996; Esping Andersen, 1990; for Italy, Sassoon, 1997; for Germany, Conradt, 2001; for France, Safran, 1997) and an in-depth analysis in one country is presented in the next section, here I analyse whether the developments towards one element of the welfare state in the 1950s, namely long-term planning, are also reflected in the party manifestos. The figures are drawn from the manifesto data established by Volkens and Hearl (1990). (In the European manifesto research programme the attention political parties give to certain issues in their manifestos is coded. The data set comprises many Western nationstates.) Volkens and Hearl define ‘attention to planning’ as being ‘Favorable mentions of long-standing economic planning of a consultative or indicative nature, and need for government to create such a plan’. Figures on the relative attention given to this issue are shown in Figure 3.1. The figure shows that the attention given to planning was especially abundant in the second half of the 1950s and the first half of the 1960s. Although some parties (the denominational parties, for instance) devoted considerable attention to the matter over the whole period, the 1950s and 1960s are characterized by the attention this issue received from all of the major political parties until 1963. During this period, attention was focused on long-term planning issues,

58 The Importance of Neglect in Policy-Making

Relative political attention 0.5 Mean attention 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 46

48

52

56

59

63

67

71

77

81

86

89

94

Year Figure 3.1 Relative attention given to planning Source: Manifesto data (Volkens and Hearl, 1990).

such as attention to economic planning, centralization, a controlled economy, economic orthodoxy, and corporatism. More specifically, there was much attention given to welfare and the development of infrastructure and agriculture. The welfare state was established and governments wanted to be able to steer economic and societal developments in the long term. This shift in attention was most clearly seen in Germany, Britain and Ireland. The growing attention to welfare was especially visible in Sweden, Norway, Denmark, France, Italy, Germany and Switzerland, Britain, the USA and Japan. In summary, the 1950s were characterized by an emphasis on building the welfare state and finding sustainable solutions, that is, solutions that work in the long term. In most countries the debate on the role of government vis-à-vis the market was concluded. Although the subsequent arrangements that were sought varied over different countries and different types of welfare states were established, the common theme is that welfare states were established and that welfare for the people was secured from the cradle to the grave. In my theory, this period can be seen as a direct reaction to the developments before 1950 in which short-term reconstruction after the war was central and in which attention to long-term planning was almost completely lacking.

Changing Relative Attention 59

10

Relative attention % Democracy

8 6 4 2 0 1948 1953 1958 1963 1958 1973 1978 1983 1988 1992 Year Figure 3.2 Relative attention given to democracy Source: As for Figure 3.1

3.3.3 The era of democracy The reaction to this emphasis came during the second half of the 1960s. The idea that planning only seemed possible at the expense of societal and individual diversity became increasingly dominant. As different interests and interest groups manifested themselves in society, a general feeling arose that there was too much ‘boring uniformity’. The dominant topics now became quality of life in relation to democratization and fairness in the redistribution of goods and services. Since it was held that every individual has his or her own preferences and that his or her quality of life is enhanced when government adapts its policies towards these differences, the new maxim became ‘variation’. Costs, quantities, formalities and standardization were seen as cons rather than pros. This shift from planning to democratization, as predicted by the relative attention paradigm, is apparent in the manifestos of the political parties. The data are again taken from the European Manifesto Research Project (Volkens and Hearl, 1990; Volkens, 1992) in which attention to democracy is defined as ‘favorable mentions of democracy as a method or goal in national and other organizations; involvement of all citizens in decision-making, as well as generalized support for the manifesto country’s democracy’ (Volkens, 1992: 57). Figure 3.2 shows an increase in concern for democracy in the late 1960s and 1970s and a decreasing concern in the 1980s.

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Although this issue had always received a relatively large amount of attention from the social-democratic (labour) parties, the 1970s were distinguished by a concern for democracy which became a serious issue for all major political parties. The reaction expected in the 1960s is indeed seen in the manifesto data, with growing attention given by political parties to democracy, culture and social justice. Only in Luxembourg and Switzerland is this shift not evident in the party manifestos, and manifestos from the USA, Britain and Canada lag somewhat behind in the attention they give to these issues. This is, however, not indicative of the absence of any democratization movement in these countries, as it was in these countries that the many protests and demonstrations started in the 1960s. However, it seemed the issues involved never became electoral issues. Again, we see that the main goals and values changed in the sociopolitical context, in this case towards more attention to democracy, and that this was reflected in the policy-making process. 3.3.4 The emerging dominance of efficiency in the 1980s According to the relative attention paradigm, all this ought inevitably to result in a counter-reaction, and this indeed came about in the 1980s. The money involved in grants and promoting diversity and variation had skyrocketed and it became a widely accepted idea that the welfare state was overstressed. Moreover, soaring governmental deficits made it impossible for governments to help out any further. Therefore, at the end of the 1970s and especially in the 1980s, the winds changed once again. The Keynesian assumption that government expenditures should increase in times of economic crisis seemed not to work during the period of stagflation (stagnation combined with inflation) and this theory was gradually replaced by monetarist theory as propagated by Milton Friedman and the Chicago school. In this view, government should retreat as much as possible and efficiency should be the dominant value. Such efficiency can only be achieved by the free market. It resulted in the ‘Washington consensus’ in 1982, large reorganizations within the public sector, and a growing dominance of ideas about downsizing the public sector, deregulation, decentralization, privatization, marketization and introducing market elements within the public sector. The changing mood was reflected in the manifestos of political parties irrespective of whether they were on the left or right of the

Changing Relative Attention 61

10

Relative attention % Efficiency

8 6 4 2 0 1948

1953

1958

1963

1958 1973 Year

1978

1983

1988

1992

Figure 3.3 Relative attention given to efficiency Source: As for Figure 3.1

political spectrum. As predicted by the theory, the 1980s were indeed characterized by an emphasis on efficiency and process orientation instead of effectiveness and goal orientation. In the 1980s the trend was towards less democracy and increased governmental efficiency. This point of view was also reflected in the percentage of political parties’ manifestos devoted to governmental efficiency. In the European Manifesto Research Project, this item is defined as being the ‘[n]eed for efficiency and economy in government and administration; cutting down civil service; improving governmental procedures; general appeal to make the process of government and administration cheaper and more effective’ (Volkens, 1992: 58). Figure 3.3 shows the rising concern for this problem shown by all political parties in the 1980s. This figure reveals that the call for more efficiency had been voiced in the 1970s, together with the appeal for more democracy, and although it was subordinate to the latter during this decade, it became dominant during the following 12 years. 3.3.5 The prudent return of government in the 1990s The relative attention paradigm predicts that after the efficiency period, a period dominated by a new sense of mission (goal attainment) in politics will emerge, with matching attention paid to

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10

Relative attention % Authority

8 6 4 2 0 1948

1953

1958

1963

1958 1973 Year

1978

1983

1988

Figure 3.4 Relative attention given to governmental authority Source: As for Figure 3.1

governmental authority and a debate on the fundamental tasks of government because of the neglect of these notions and traditional values in the previous period. Focusing attention only on optimizing efficiency results in the neglect of solving societal problems that, after some time, will become urgent. Theoretically, one expects that more emphasis on a steering role for government would be called for again. The increased attention given to government authority, political administrative relations and traditional values by political parties in the period between 1994 and 2000 was indeed seen in most OECD countries, and especially in Germany, Austria, Britain, Ireland, the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Luxembourg, Iceland, Denmark and Sweden. (We counted a country if there was a sharp increase in attention visible in two out of the three issues mentioned.) The trend became apparent earlier in Norway and Finland. The figures are indicative of the signs in the first half of the 1990s of a revival of ‘restructuring policies’ and a new mission. The policies were especially relevant for social security, but they can also be seen in housing policy. There is also evidence of much attention being given to restructuring the policy process itself, which, according to those involved, ought to be characterized by will and decisiveness. Interpreting the figures, we see that the mission-orientation of public administration, under the authority of the political leaders, became

Changing Relative Attention 63

dominant again in the 1990s. These developments are shown in Figure 3.4, which shows the beginning of a reaction to the efficiency boom of the 1980s. According to the politicians of this period, focusing only on the market and downsizing government did injustice to the boundary conditions which necessarily have to be set by government. The call for governmental involvement, decisiveness and authority was heard once again. The instruments were especially aimed at reducing the most serious problems in housing policy. The strong increase in attention given to governmental authority in the 1990s is congruent with Namenwirth’s 1973 prediction, that is, that the significance of this issue would reach its height around 1994. Summarizing, this section has argued that in many OECD countries the dominant values and the problems receiving relatively greater attention from those politically responsible reflected the shifts predicted in the relative attention paradigm. While this is a corroboration of the theory, it is only the beginning of the argument that policy generations exist because this analysis is rather general. The next section will provide an in-depth analysis of the changing relative attention in one small European country, the Netherlands.

3.4 An in-depth analysis of developments in the Netherlands Since the Second World War, the Netherlands has developed into one of the most prosperous of nation-states. This is remarkable because just after the war, the country was almost completely destroyed. One third of the capital stock and a quarter of the housing stock were devastated; accommodation was lacking for one of every four families; the public debt was 23 billion guilders; the railways had lost nearly all of their infrastructure; Rotterdam’s harbour was shattered; the shipping fleet was devastated; and the population had to live on a diet of only 400–600 calories a person a day. At the turn of the millennium, 55 years later, the Netherlands is one of the most prosperous countries in the world, in the top ten of the world in both trade and national income and with economic growth figures exceeding those of most OECD countries. I argue that respective Dutch governments, consciously or unconsciously, opted for an efficient and effective solution by choosing to

64 The Importance of Neglect in Policy-Making

achieve one goal at a time instead of trying to accomplish everything at once – in other words, they applied focus. (One goal, of course, does not imply that Dutch governments did not set many different operational objectives for the different policy areas. As will be argued below, however, these different objectives were subservient to achieving the overarching goal.) To a large degree Dutch governments altered goals when previous ones had been achieved and turned the focus to other problems that had been previously neglected and were becoming urgent – that is, they pursued flexibility. I further argue that success in the Netherlands can be explained because this focus remained the leitmotiv for new policies in all policy areas until the target was reached, irrespective of changes in governmental coalitions and from right-wing to left-wing cabinets. The whole institutional setting, the formal and informal rules of the game – such as the establishment and influence of different groups of actors and organizations, the kind of policy instruments that were dominant, the kind of arguments accepted as valid or invalid and the criteria for judging new policies – converged in order to contribute to achieving the main goal and to making it clear that this goal dominated the development of new public policies until the goal was achieved. In terms of flexibility, formulating a main target implies the neglect of other possible targets. When the target is reached, it becomes necessary to devote energy to those targets previously neglected the most. I argue that although it was not always easy to make these changes, the subsequent institutional settings were sufficiently flexible to adapt to changing conditions and to the demands of new policy generations. 3.4.1 The reactive missionaries of the 1940s If there is one period which cannot be seen as a reaction to the previous one, it is the short time-span following the end of the war. With the defeat of the Third Reich, the Netherlands was liberated but also devastated. At this time, the Netherlands was indeed a ‘poor’ country. The members of the government had been in exile for the previous five years and when they returned, the first question to be answered was what the nature of the future Dutch state should be, what its mission should be and how this should be institutionalized. What should be the nature of the Dutch nation-state after five years of Fascist occupation? During the war, several discussions had already taken place.

Changing Relative Attention 65

During the war, many prominent pre-war politicians were held hostage together in a detention camp in a former seminary near Sint-Michielsgestel, in the North Brabant province. Their discussions resulted in the shared opinion that socialism linked together with personalism, and that cooperation between state and economy was crucial. After the war, they agreed, the Dutch state should take a steering and co-coordinating position and the establishment of a national board for business should limit the ambitions of public organizations. The members of the government, in exile in London during the war, came to rather different conclusions. Following the ideas of Sir William Beveridge, they opted for a government which would take care of the population from the cradle to the grave. They also came into contact with Keynes’s ideas about governmental intervention, and positive attitudes towards counter-conjunctural expenditures were widely shared among this group after the war. This group agreed with the idea that governmental interventions were at least desirable and preferably structural in nature. After the war, dissension about the mission of government resulted in at least four groups forming: those favouring renewal; Christian parties favouring restoration of the pre-war arrangements; communists favouring a strong steering state; and reactionary forces favouring a military state (Fortuyn, 1981: 219). At first, those favouring a military state seemed to hold the winning hand. At the end of the war, only the southern part of the Netherlands was freed; the northern part was still occupied, so the government in exile could not return. This gave the military the opportunity to take the lead in ruling the liberated southern part. They did not want a return to parliamentary democracy; instead they desired a strong decisive government unhindered by so-called procedural delays. Some even favoured a military dictatorship. This was necessary, according to them, because the population was degenerate and displaced, lacked morals and suffered, some even said, from mental decay. It was therefore understandable that the population was not consulted. They had to be kept passive in the eyes of the elite. This debate about the mission of government and the shared idea that one had to be decisive and achieve short-term goals in order to solve the most serious problems resulted in a period in which an image of decisiveness was created. An interim cabinet was developed with a temporary parliament, with fewer powers than before and without

66 The Importance of Neglect in Policy-Making

elections, because the elite perceived this period as a time of transition in which the struggle for life had a higher priority than elections. The first official government was a national cabinet strongly influenced by socialists and Catholics and with the adage ‘Recovery and Renewal’. This cabinet was later characterized by some as ‘halfhearted’ (Maas and Clerx, 1996). On the one hand, politicians opted for governmental intervention; on the other hand, they favoured private initiative. They also favoured long-term socio-economic planning while accepting the impossibility of it in the circumstances, and only implementing short-term emergency policies. This became visible in slogans such as ‘temporary steered economic developments’ and ongoing discussions about the pros and cons of governmental interference. It resulted in ad hoc policy-making – emergency measures, temporary decisions and catastrophic politics. In the period just after the war, public policies can be characterized as reactive and short-term. They consisted, for instance, of subsidizing primary staples such as bread, milk, cheese and meat. There was a general ban on travel and only limited railway transport. The government prohibited increasing rents and lowered the profit margins on products (Hoek, 1979: 290). Under the guise of practical politics, special courts of justice and urgency programmes were established (social affairs minister Willem Drees, in Hoek, 1979: 143). As one of those involved stated afterwards: ‘Between 1945 and 1950, we lived too much in the train of thought of solving the crisis, instead of steering the scarcity’ (P. Verloren van Themaat, in Hoek, 1979: 242). ‘The quick material recovery required practical politics. There was no time for principle or ethical discussions’ (Von der Dunk, 1986a: 16) This implied that the socialists found little support for their idea of long-term planning, support for which did not become significant until the following period. Laws and regulations were absent and only temporary measures were taken, without looking at the long-term effects. In neighbouring countries, the chaotic situation in the Netherlands was noted and the country was criticized for its lack of democracy because the first post-war elections had not yet taken place. The second and third post-war cabinets also lacked coherent policies and suffered from endless unresolved discussions about the desired

Changing Relative Attention 67

Corporatism 9 VVD

PvdA

8

KVP/CDA

7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 46 48 52 56 59 63 67 71 72 77 81 82 86 89 94 98 Year Figure 3.5

Attention given to corporatism

The emphasis on the mission is also visible in the attention given in the manifestos of political parties to corporatism during the 1940s. The figure shows that the three major political parties (Social Democrats/PvdA; Liberals/VVD and Christian Democrats/KVP and later CDA) all made numerous statements about the mutual role of government, business and labour unions within society. The data were collected by Volkens and Hearl (1990) and later by Budge et al. (2001) and the number of statements political parties make about a certain topic was measured. What is noticeable for the 1940s in the Netherlands is the huge attention given to corporatism by the three most important parties. Corporatism is defined by Volkens and Hearl as: ’Favourable mentions of the need for the collaboration of employers and trade union organizations in overall economic planning and direction through the medium of tri-partite bodies of government, employers, and trade unions’ (Volkens and Hearl, 1990: 59). It is directly related to discussions about the role and mission of government in society.

68 The Importance of Neglect in Policy-Making

relation between the private and public sectors. This discourse and the ad hoc policies lasted until 1948 when some consensus about the role of government was finally reached. It was decided that the government should guarantee that every citizen be entitled to social security, but that government should have no central role in social-economic affairs. The minister of economic affairs of that time stated that the government should facilitate private initiatives and co-operate with them in order to achieve economic growth. The central idea became that government should invest in infrastructure, minimize regulations constraining business, create stable labour relations, promote a stable position for the Netherlands in the world economy and promote and ensure that capital investors and entrepreneurs received ample rewards. Until 1950, no governmental institutions were created to induce or support anything like long-term planning. What we have observed in the 1940s accords with the expectations of policy generations theory. First, we see a discussion (and resolution) of the mission of the government. Second, in almost every policy area, we see ad hoc, temporary policies based on the necessity of the situation created by the devastation of the war. These ad hoc policies created the impression of decisiveness. Scholars such as Maas and Clerkx (1996), who did extensive research into this period, conclude that while many problems were tackled in this period, none were solved. Temporary solutions were, according to these authors, implemented in the areas of education, where only war damage was removed and very few regulations were instituted; in the salaries of teachers, which lacked consistency and only the relation between public and special education seemed to be issues; in the area of internal affairs, where the position of the provinces and municipalities remained unresolved; and in the area of housing where houses were temporarily divided in order to house more families; and in infrastructure where long-term policies were absent because damage recovery was the priority. The evaluation of this period has, of course, another side. On the one hand, the ad hoc policies were necessary because of the difficult situation facing the Netherlands. Physically devastated and lacking the economic resources to recover quickly from this situation brought about these policies, which from every other point of view may be seen as incoherent, short-sighted, inefficient and elitist. On the other hand, the policies resulted in their own outcome.

Changing Relative Attention 69

3.4.2 The caring technocrats between 1950 and 1963 The transition to a new period in which ad hoc policies were increasingly abandoned and replaced by long-term strategic planning came about in 1948 with a coalition cabinet of social democrats, Catholics and, in a minor position, the Liberals, under the leadership of Prime Minister Willem Drees of the social-democratic Dutch Labour Party (PvdA). Drees would remain in power until 1958. This decade of continuity in Dutch politics gave the Netherlands its reputation as a stable democracy ruled by accommodation-politics (Lijphart, 1968). During this era, the country was governed by co-operating elites of stable pillars, who de-politicized those issues that divided the parties, who were always looking for technocratic solutions and who opted for a corporatist system in which business, government and labour unions could cooperate, in order to achieve long-term economic prosperity. It was during this period that institutions were established with the explicit goal of establishing long-term planning. The first institutions to reflect this mission of a steering government were the Socio-Economic Council in 1950 and the Council for Agrarian Affairs in 1954. With the establishment of the Socio-Economic Council, the policies were a reflection of the compromise between Catholics, who favoured corporatism and subsidiarity, and the socialist idea of governmental planning (Van Kersbergen, 1995: 93). The state penetrated society relatively quickly (Von der Dunk, 1986a: 15), and the role of the state became a facilitating and steering one instead of a directing one. Some refer to the government of those days as one that emphasized a form of elastic steering and mediation between conflicts (ibid.). As one of the ministers wrote in his memoirs: ‘The government opted for global intervention in strategic matters as opposed to detailed intervention on many points’ (Jelle Zijlstra, in Puchinger, 1978: 46). Governmental policies were increasingly determined by senior civil servants and advisory committees. Their influence was gradually strengthened. Meetings of the Council of Ministers became inconceivable without the contribution of a series of advisers. The president of the central bank, the managing director of the central planning bureau, the president-director of the economic and military aid programme, the secretary general of the department of economic affairs, the director general of prices, the director of the Central Planning Bureau, the state adviser for finance and the chairman of the Central Economic Commission (CEC) and the director of the Socio-Economic

70 The Importance of Neglect in Policy-Making

Council were all regularly present at meetings of the Council of Ministers. A member of the Council of Ministers could hardly ignore their advice (Maas and Clerx, 1996: 788). The Department of Justice, for instance, became increasingly influenced by the judicial professionals. The impact of this institutionalization of expertise is evident in how the ‘objective’ advice de-politicized political issues. ‘A network of governmental institutions led by experts was thrown out over the country and the governmental planners enhanced the authority of the ministers over the parliament’ (Von der Dunk, 1986a: 15). It resulted in the formulation of policy goals that were carefully calculated in terms of their consequences by the mathematicians. The emerging policies can be seen as an about-face from the previous period. Temporary and emergency measures were replaced by laws having a much more structural impact. It resulted in a cascade of legislation. In 1948, 207 bills were approved, and in 1949, another 250. In 1950, some even made a plea against too many new laws. The shift to long-term planning is visible in nearly all policies. In industrial policies, for instance, the tax law was adapted in such a way that it would stimulate structural investments. By law, it was decreed that 30 per cent of all industrial investments could be tax-deductible in one year, thus giving an advance on investments of about 15 per cent. The venture tax was abolished and pre-war investments could be revalued tax-free. Subsidies or increases in public expenditures were not used; instead investment was stimulated by legislation. A rigid policy on wages ensured that wage increases lagged behind productivity increases. Government promoted professional training, and attendance at technical schools and industrial schools in daytime as well as in the evenings. By further advancing refresher courses, the technical knowledge of the workforce increased. Furthermore, the government stimulated foreign direct investment and foreign participation in Dutch industry in order to increase technical knowhow and promote investments. It simplified the permit process, started an active acquisition campaign and broadened standards for the approval of investments. In subsequent years, this active national public policy resulted in an economic growth rate that exceeded those of neighbouring countries, with an average 5 per cent growth per annum (Brakel, 1954: 116–17). In social policies, the Dutch government also aimed at longterm goals. The welfare state evolved, and Beveridge’s idea of social

Changing Relative Attention 71

insurance from the cradle to the grave materialized. The government was more active in financing the educational and health systems. The Department of Social Welfare was founded in 1952. Laws on unemployment benefits (1952), old-age insurance (1956), widows’ and orphans’ pensions (1956), legislation on family allowance (1962), a national health service (1964), social assistance (1965) and the disabled (1967) all originated in the 1950s. In housing policies, structural long-term strategies became dominant. Legislation was passed on building standards (1951), building uniformity (1954) and building codes (1956) and there was a housing act (1960) and a law on national monuments (1961). The dominant idea was regulating, through law, the building developments and development plans based on a general long-term vision, and steered at the national level in order to create propitious conditions for long-term developments. Since the Netherlands is a small country with scarce space, the national government was viewed as the prime actor for steering and directing the development of scarce lands and coordinating spatial planning. Rohde has written about a preoccupation of parliament during this time with the legislative side of spatial planning (Rohde, 1984: 90). Thus, an era in which long-term planning was a central focus in national policy-making developed. What was dominant in this era was a kind of policy-making in which technocrats had the final say, in which the basic criterion for policy-making was that the policies were well thought out, their long-term impacts calculated and that they conformed to the demands of the technocratic planners (Van Kersbergen, 1995: 91). The five central policy goals that all governmental policy-making had to meet were formulated by the Socio-Economic Council and would last until the middle of the 1960s. These were the achievement of full employment, economic growth, moderate income distribution, budgetary balance and price stability (Daalder and Cramer, 1988: 144). Long-range plans were adopted in nearly all policy areas, and eight industrial development plans aimed at long-term structural investment were designed. Rationalization, standardization and uniformity were viewed as the main goals for creating prosperity. Based on a corporatist idea, national government, along with the elites of the different pillars, business leaders and the trade unions were responsible for creating a society with continuous economic growth and increased social security.

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The above illustrates that the national policies in the period from 1951 to 1963 can indeed be seen as the opposite of those in the previous period. All of the temporary and emergency bills of the immediate post-war period were gradually replaced by structural measures based on legislation. This can be explained in part by the improved situation in the country at the end of the 1940s. As one minister later said: ‘below the surface, the situation had improved.’ When reading the Queen’s speech for the first Drees cabinet in 1951, one can see the concern, but also the opportunities. Economically, the situation quickly improved (Tromp, 1995: 106). Furthermore, the United States had launched the European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan) from which the Dutch profited after 1949. In other words, by the end of the 1940s, it seems that the basic problems were solved or about to be solved and that the reactive short-term emergency policies of the 1940s were no longer necessary. Such policies were increasingly seen as counterproductive and were therefore replaced by more long-term policies. The 1948–1952 period can be seen as a time of transition in which long-term planning slowly replaced shortsighted policies. This can be explained partly by the personal characteristics of the members of the cabinet of the time. The first Drees cabinet consisted of individuals of various generations. It was a combination of young and old, of political career ministers and modern managerial ministers (Maas and Clerx, 1996, part C: 779). Some were area specialists and others were generalists. The subsequent coalitions during the 1950s became increasingly populated by people born at the beginning of the century. This generation grew up during the roaring twenties, and experienced two world wars. Increasingly, the elite consisted of people who replaced the politicians who had been active before and during the Second World War, and the policies were increasingly made by those who became active politicians after the Second World War. Just after the end of the war, half of all parliamentarians were new (Van den Berg, 1983: 204). Gradually, as they gained experience and status, these young politicians became influential in the 1950s. Again, the national goals were more than achieved by the end of the period. The long-term policies resulted in unprecedented annual economic growth of, on average, 5 per cent as well as the development of the welfare state; these had been the main issues for all the major political parties.

Changing Relative Attention 73

Welfare 25 PvdA

VVD

KVP/CDA

20 15 10 5 0 46 48 52 56 59 63 67 71 72 77 81 82 86 89 94 98 Year

Figure 3.6

Attention given to welfare

That the emphasis was again one-sided can be seen in the party manifestos of this era. Again we refer to the manifesto data gathered by Volkens and Hearl (1990). Here the attention given by the three major political parties to the issue of welfarestate expansion is central. This is defined as ’favourable mentions of the need to introduce, maintain or expand any social service or social security scheme; support for social services such as health service or social housing’ (Volkens and Hearl, 1990: 62). In Figure 3.6, the substantial attention paid to this issue is especially apparent during the 1950s. The figure shows that the issue of developing the welfare state was especially important for the Christian Democrats, but it was also an important issue for the Liberals and Social Democrats until the second half of the 1960s. Full employment was achieved at the beginning of the 1960s, as was price stability, moderate income growth, and a balanced national budget. But, as in the previous period, policy-makers began to ask what the ‘cost’ had been to achieve these goals. The population still had very little influence on a policy process that was dominated by technocrats. Extra-parliamentary actions were absent, and the idea of disturbing societal order or resisting it, for instance through strikes, was taboo.

74 The Importance of Neglect in Policy-Making

Even parliament itself had little influence since policies were proposed by the cabinet, and one did not dare to oppose those plans. The second drawback of the implemented policies and the predominance of legislation was that it resulted in uniformity and standardization, and a myth that everyone was equal – not only before the law. The policies were even more elitist than those in previous years and the lack of public participation, the neglect of this issue of pluriformity of the population, and an emphasis on keeping the population docile had to inspire a reaction. 3.4.3 The polarized spenders between 1964 and 1977 The first crack in this stable and economically prosperous foundation came about during the second half of the 1950s. The political elites in the Netherlands started to polarize, parliament became more critical of government and the population slowly became less docile. The lack of attention paid to the plurality of the population and the less tangible aspects of welfare gradually received more attention. In 1959, the Queen’s speech first addressed the moral and spiritual elevation of the people, which was possible now that the material foundations were laid (van Dero, 1986a: 22). In the USA, John F. Kennedy had come to power and created a worldwide image of a new generation; all kinds of democratization processes emerged in all Western countries. In the Netherlands in 1961, protests against the atomic bomb mobilized part of the population. In 1960, an illegal radio network broadcast from a ship outside the 12-mile zone, thus defying the authorities. In 1962, the first protest by a farmer opposing national agricultural policies was broadcast on national television. The acceptance and respect for authorities, which was previously brought about by a complex of societal organizations ordered around pillars, also diminished because of their lack of ideological resilience (Daalder, 1990: 231). Furthermore, family relations changed as a consequence of decreasing family size, increasing mobility and the rising educational levels of children compared to their parents. Economic growth made thriftiness seem outdated and, last but not least, Dutch society lost some of its classic anchors, illustrated by the diminished influence of the churches and religion generally. In other words, as in other countries, it was a period of participation, politicization and democratization (Daalder, 1990: 241). In 1963, Prime Minister Joop den Uyl, a prominent member of the Social Democrats, wrote a widely discussed essay on the quality of life

Changing Relative Attention 75

in which he argued that, although material welfare had been achieved, society had failed to bring about the development of social justice and the harmonious development of the individual. The plea was that government had to expand its activities in order to adapt to the changing circumstances and to fill the void of societal provisions in health, personal and social development, recreation and culture. What came about was an era in which the previous policies of longrange planning, standardization and uniformity were replaced by a growing consensus on a national policy in which the non-tangible aspects of the quality of life were stressed and pluriformity was encouraged. The transition can be dated to the cabinet of Prime Minister Victor Marijnen (1963 to 1965). In this coalition, supported by the labour unions, wages increased by 17 per cent, pensions and child support increased, national insurance for special health care was issued, a pension for the disabled was introduced and the minimum wage was raised. When this cabinet came into power, the baton was passed (Puchinger, 1978). The concerted action of the elites of the different parties and pillars came to an end. From 1963 until 1977, only one coalition government would last its whole term of four years, and even that coalition faced some serious crises. None of the remaining governmental coalitions was able to last the full term. They fell over a number of conflicts on tangible and non-tangible affairs, such as media, budgetary deficits and land policy. The number of political parties increased, and the five major parties that had dominated Dutch politics and represented the classic pillars in the Netherlands in the previous period – especially the Catholic party – lost a substantial number of their voters. New parties such as the pacifist party, the Democrats, the Farmers party and the Radical party were able to enter parliament and together were able to gain over 13 per cent of the votes in 1967 and even 16.5 per cent in 1972. The Communist party also started winning votes again, increasing its share from 2.8 per cent in 1963 to 4.5 per cent in 1972. These are all indicators that the political arena was becoming increasingly polarized. In the policy-making of subsequent Dutch governments, this was reflected in the increase in income transfers from government to households, which was five times higher in 1973 than in 1963; the value of governmental subsidies, which was eight times as much in 1973 as in 1963; and an increasing budgetary deficit and an increasing role of government in society as seen by its increasing share of

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the gross national product. Its goal, formulated in the beginning of the 1960s, namely more attention to the welfare and moral elevation of the population, was reflected in the increasing number of students in higher education, especially in the social sciences. The number of students in those fields quadrupled from about 12,000 in 1960 to over 50,000 in 1971. While technical education dominated the previous period, now more students were being trained in social studies. Government promoted this higher education by increasing the amount of and enlarging the access to financial aid. In the health sector, the number of institutions for the mentally handicapped was quadrupled in ten years, the number of nursing homes doubled, and the number of beds in those homes tripled. In infrastructure, mobility increased dramatically, with the number of passenger cars tripling between 1963 and 1973, resulting in increased government spending on roads and highways. In the housing sector, the end of thriftiness was evidenced by the increased square footage of newly built houses, the improved quality thereof – for example, increasingly containing a bath – the increased number of private houses built with governmental subsidies and the variety of houses built with governmental subsidies – row houses as well as detached houses. In the area of culture and recreation, there was a comparable growth in governmental investment. The net investment for culture grew from 313 million guilders in 1963 to 1421 million guilders in 1971. Based on figures from the Central Bureau for Statistics, libraries, youth work, job corps programmes, subsidies for arts, museums, recreation areas, sport accommodations and the protection of monuments all received four to ten times more grant money from government in 1972 compared to 1963. In non-tangible issues, another feature was crucial for this period, namely the increasing demand by (part of) the population to enhance the democratic process and to make the policy process more open. Different interests had to be represented in politics and in the policy process. Around 1965, three cabinet coalitions fell and were re-formed without new elections; in other words voters had no influence whatsoever on the makeup of government. This resulted in the establishment of a new political party, the Democrats ’66. Pleas for institutionalizing public participation were heard. First, the universities had to be democratized, then business enterprises had to be democratized and the civil service had to be democratized. Works councils were

Changing Relative Attention 77

established as were participation procedures, and in all areas, a socialegalitarian ethos appeared in which the only decisions considered ‘good’ were the ones discussed at length by all stakeholders in the form of commissions, steering groups and advisory groups. All interest groups had to have their say, had to be allowed to participate in discussions and everyone tried to remove objections or at least compensate for them. Advisory councils were booming and it is striking that membership in councils in this period was not so much a question of expertise, as it was in the 1950s, but of representing those interests which were not yet present among the other members of an advisory board. The middle-level elites of the political parties gained influence. Their advice was especially sought in non-profit sectors such as social security, housing, welfare, health and education. In recruiting civil servants, partisanship became a matter of increasing importance and slowly but steadily the advisory boards of the cabinet became valued for their political instead of professional advice. Bureaucrats gradually began taking political positions and the classic distinction between the neutral bureaucrat and the politician faded. As a consequence of democratizing the bureaucracy, the size of the administrative apparatus exploded until the end of the 1970s, doubling from 74,000 civil servants in 1963 to about 156,400 in 1980. This growth was especially visible within the departments of education, culture, recreation and social welfare, and infrastructure. These developments towards increased governmental transfers, a politicized arena and less elitism through public participation and public inquiry procedures reached their apotheosis when the Social Democrats came to power in 1973 in the Den Uyl cabinet. This cabinet is the defining illustration of this period. Its formation took 164 days, the longest since the Second World War (and was only exceeded in length by the 1977 formation), and illustrated the extent of political antagonism. It was characterized by polarization between the coalition partners from the beginning and was dominated by a prime minister who talked, discussed and fought from early in the morning until late in the evening to remove any opposition to his proposals. It was, furthermore, a cabinet in which the socialist prime minister was personally able to squeeze large sums of money into the budget on behalf of the poor (Bootsma and Breedveld, 1999: 34). Lastly, the policy plans were characteristic of the period. The creed was the spread of knowledge, income and power to all groups in the

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population. Enhancing the chances for the poor to earn a good education and levelling incomes by progressive taxes and subsidies were important policies. This cabinet also proposed plans to increase the influence of workers in business enterprises by creating independent works councils and profit sharing. By levying industrial investment in regions where unemployment was low and subsidizing investments in regions where unemployment was high, by implementing policies against speculators and trying to regulate the financial system, the cabinet tried to get a grip on business enterprises. By continuing subsidies in all policy areas and implementing public inquiry procedures, it was also responsive to a wide range of different political interests. As such, this cabinet was the final representative of a period in which the main goal was to elevate the people by enhancing democracy, increasing intangible welfare, and developing policies in which various interests received equal treatment. How can we explain the evolution of this policy generation? First of all, it can be seen as a reaction to the policies developed in the previous period. The reconstruction was nearly complete at the beginning of the 1960s. The previously set goals had been achieved and this created the possibility for a new era. Second, the Netherlands benefited from the discovery of a natural gas reserve in 1959 that exceeded all expectations. As in 1949 with the European Recovery Program, this gas reserve gave the economy a strong impetus and the government a substantial amount of additional cash since 50 per cent of the yields went directly to government. Suddenly, the Netherlands became a rich country. Third, the change coincided with an international upheaval of demands for democratization and against uniformity, elitism and a docile and passive population. Dutch policy-making rode the international tides, in which the same criticism was uttered against the elitist, uniform and materialist policy-making so characteristic of the previous period. Fourth, it can be explained by a new generation of leading politicians. In 1956, as in 1946, a large number of members of parliament were replaced. These junior members of the late 1950s became influential during the 1960s. Also striking is the fact that all prime ministers in the 1963–1977 period were of the same generation, all born between 1915 and 1920 (Puchinger, 1984). They all grew up during the 1920s and all had the same experience. An elite replacement took place in which the caring technocrats of the

Changing Relative Attention 79

1950s were replaced by the polarized spenders of the 1960s and 1970s.

Democracy 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 46 48 52 56 59 63 67 71 72 77 81 82 86 89 94 98 Year PvdA Figure 3.7

VVD

KVP/CDA

Attention given to democracy

This shift is also seen within the manifestos of the political parties. The data are again taken from the European Manifesto Research Project (Volkens and Hearl, 1990; Volkens, 1992) in which attention to democracy is defined as ’favourable mentions of democracy as a method or goal in national and other organizations; involvement of all citizens in decision-making, as well as generalized support for the manifesto country’s democracy’ (Volkens, 1992: 57). Figure 3.7 shows the increase of concern for democracy in the late 1960s and 1970s and a decreasing concern in the 1980s. Although this problem had always received a relatively large amount of attention from the social-democratic (labour) parties, the 1970s are distinguished by a concern for democracy that became an issue of major concern to all major political parties. We see, again, that in the socio-political context, the main goals and values changed, in this case towards more attention to democracy, and that this was reflected in the policy-making process.

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All in all, the goals set at the beginning of the 1960s were more than achieved in 1977. Not without costs, of course. The respective governments had successfully tried to increase quality of life and public participation within the policy process, but had ignored the notion that policies should also be efficient. That subject had hardly been an issue during this period. Most thought that the sky was the limit, but in the end government was too big and economic growth had been taken for granted instead of considered something to be stimulated continuously. The budgetary deficit was out of control, business enterprises no longer invested, unemployment grew and the economy slowly stagnated. This is the other side of the success story of this period. In 1973, the Arab oil boycott hit the Netherlands hard, and with a stagnating (inter)national economy, the transition economy of the Netherlands, which was primarily dependent on trade, shrunk even more rapidly than economies in neighbouring countries. 3.4.4 The efficient managers between 1978 and 1990 While the socialist cabinet was the apotheosis of an era of spending and polarized governments, it also marked the beginning of a new period in which efficiency became the magic word. In 1975, this process started prudently with a proposal by the Minister of Finance to restrict the growth of the public sector to only one per cent of the national income. Nevertheless, the budgetary deficit continued to grow until 1982, from 3 per cent in 1977 to 9 per cent in 1982. It was not easy to make policies more restrictive and a second oil crisis in 1979 did not help the situation. The two cabinets under the Catholic Prime Minister Dries van Agt, which succeeded the socialist cabinet, made numerous proposals for reducing the deficit, but because of internal dissension and heavy opposition in parliament, they failed. Nevertheless, the second half of the 1970s can be viewed as a transition period in which the political mood slowly changed. The first plans to reduce the role of national government, for instance, by promoting decentralization, appeared during this transition period, and they were steadily promoted in more policy areas. They were aimed at reorganizing the fixed payments to municipalities and combining these into ‘less expensive’ general payments.

Changing Relative Attention 81

Efficiency 14 PvdA

12

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10 8 6 4 2 0 46 48 52 56 59 63 67 71 72 77 81 82 86 89 94 98 Year Figure 3.8

Attention given to efficiency

The issue of efficiency is also one of the variables incorporated in the European Manifesto Research Project. This item is defined as being the ’Need for efficiency and economy in government and administration; cutting down civil service; improving governmental procedures; general appeal to make the process of government and administration cheaper and more effective’ (Volkens, 1992: 58). Figure 3.8 shows the rising concern for this problem shown by all political parties in the 1980s. This chart reveals that the call for more efficiency had already been voiced in the 1970s, together with the appeal for increased democracy, and although it was subordinate to the latter during this decade, it became dominant during the following 12 years.

Until 1982, these changes came about very slowly (Sociaal Cultureel Planbureau, 1998: 201), but in that year – with its high public expenditures, huge unemployment and economic stagnation – the managers who stressed efficiency gained influence. Reports and

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diagnoses of the situation, by the central planning bureau, the scientific council for government policy, and a state commission led by a prominent industrialist (the Wagner Commission), pointed at one and the same moment to the need for far-reaching reductions in governmental expenses. Out of the serious economic situation, the employers’ organizations and the trade unions reached a consensus on income policy, the famous ‘Wassenaar agreement’, in which the unions relinquished wage increases and the employers agreed on shortening the work week in order to share the available work among more people. The new government under Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers saw this agreement as an opportunity to freeze wages for civil servants, and to freeze, and at a later stage lower, the minimum wage and social benefits. The three subsequent cabinets under this prime minister opted for reducing social benefits; promoting economic recovery by improving the competitive position of Dutch business enterprises; increasing employment without raising the costs thereof; reducing the influence of government in society in favour of the market by minimizing governmental outlays, and reducing the subsidies that had expanded during the previous period (Sociaal Cultureel Planbureau, 1998: 100). The wages of civil servants were further reduced and new recruitment of national civil servants was temporarily halted in order to reduce the size of the bureaucratic apparatus. In the first two cabinets under Lubbers, the internal orientation and retreat of national government took shape in five great operations, namely decentralization, deregulation, privatization, reorganization of national government and reconsideration of policies. In the third cabinet under this leader, this new policy generation reached it apotheosis in the so-called ‘great efficiency operation’. By then the adaptation to the efficiency goal had been implemented in nearly all policy sectors. Social security benefits were reduced and the social security apparatus was repeatedly reorganized. In education, where more students than ever were attending higher professional education and universities, stricter selection procedures were put into place during this period. Education stipends were lowered. Lecture fees went up and the maximum study length was shortened in order to discourage young people from attending university and to shift the payment for higher education from government to students. Furthermore, measures were taken to prevent the piling of training by individual students, for instance, from lower professional training, through

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medium and higher professional education to academic training. This policy generation was indeed the first to stabilize the costs of education in general. As in the previous periods, this period saw its most popular education sector become schools for business administration and economics, replacing previously popular subjects such as sociology, political science and social studies. Scholars in economics and public administration, as well as organizational consultants, took over the influence on governmental affairs from social scientists. They increasingly acted as external consultants steering the ongoing departmental reorganizations aimed at achieving increased efficiency. At the end of this period, the number of consulting agencies increased to about 5000 for a total population of slightly more than 15 million. In health care, government tried to reduce costs by closing down and merging a number of hospitals and by decreasing the number of hospital beds as well as the number of patient days. Despite these measures, however, a rise in costs, which still doubled from 1975 to 1985, could not be prevented in this area. In the social housing sector, the amount of rental subsidies was decreased; the number of houses built without governmental subsidies increased from 3 per cent in 1982 to about 58 per cent in 1994. At the same time, the number of rental houses, always built on the basis of governmental grants, decreased from 72 per cent in 1982 to 30 per cent in 1994. The 12 years of more or less stable cabinet coalitions under the Christian Democrat Lubbers reflected a new policy generation. Every policy area had to adapt to the cutbacks and every governmental department had to reorganize and to function more efficiently. It was a clear reaction to the previous policy generation in which the issue of efficiency was neglected in favour of the goal of increasing the quality of life. The political polarization of the 1960s and 1970s was replaced by managerial, businesslike thinking and action. In the 1980s, the trend was towards less democracy and increased governmental efficiency. This point of view was also reflected in the percentage of political parties’ manifestos devoted to governmental efficiency (see Figure 3.8). As mentioned above, the era of cutting costs reached its apotheosis during the third Lubbers cabinet, which was paradoxically a coalition with the Social Democrats. This cabinet proposed the ‘strictest budgets since Drees’. Besides heavy cutbacks, it also reduced social

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benefits for the unemployed and, more importantly, changed the law on the disabled in order to reduce their generous social benefits. In the words of the Prime Minister, it was the ultimate operation to make the welfare state ‘healthy’ again. The appearance of this new policy generation can again be explained by the changing economic circumstances. As mentioned earlier, the international economic crisis and the two oil crises in the 1970s hit the transition economy of the Netherlands very hard. Second, the public policies on investment by business enterprises of the previous period did little to stimulate new investment; in fact, they discouraged it. The generous policies on the minimum wage and youth wages were also counterproductive in this respect. Therefore, the baton had to be passed once again. As in previous periods, success and goal achievement – by successfully increasing the quality of life – had its drawbacks in other areas, this time in the economic sphere. The reaction was strengthened by the new generation of leading politicians born at the end of the 1930s. Between the two elections in 1971–2, parliament again underwent a strong rejuvenation and these politicians became senior members at the beginning of the 1980s. The new generation is especially reflected in the person and background of the Prime Minister. Ruud Lubbers was born in 1939, and was educated as a modern economist. He started his career as a manager in his family’s engineering firm and with this business experience he entered politics in 1973 as a junior minister (of economics) in the socialist cabinet (Steinmetz, 2000). Third, the policies of this new generation were, like those of previous ones, congruent with developments taking place in other countries. Similar regulatory mechanisms to those applied in the Netherlands can be found in other European countries. In Germany, Austria, the Scandinavian countries and Britain (under Margaret Thatcher), the retreat of government, decentralization, privatization, results steering and adapting to the market also became parts of a dominant policy regime in the 1980s (Naschold, 1997: 45; Lane, 1997; De Vries, 1999). The shift towards a market orientation was not just a national but a global phenomenon, just as in the previous period democratization processes had also been an international phenomenon.

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3.4.5 The new missionaries between 1990 and 2000 At the end of the 1980s, the economic situation in the Netherlands slowly started improving. Industrial investment was growing again and the governmental deficit was stabilized. The multitude of efficiency operations, reorganizations and the retreat of government, through the discharge of personnel and the disposal of expensive policies, went hand in hand with a slow upsurge of the economy. But it also went hand in hand with a neglect of the positive role of government. ‘The less government the better’ seemed to be the adage, but this also meant that a range of social problems were not handled adequately. The position of youth, the elderly, the unemployed and the poor, as well as policy problems such as pollution, traffic, crime, health, urban socio-economic problems and the necessity of providing for adequate infrastructure to keep up with technological innovations, slowly changed the mood. The retreat of government that marked the previous period also appeared to have its drawbacks. What we see in the 1990s is the emergence of a new policy generation based on the prudent return of government. This first became apparent in the early 1990s in discussions about mission and the core business of government, and it was also a time when many business enterprises changed their focus and began to publish their individual mission statements. The core questions for many businesses became: What should we do in the next five years?; Where should we concentrate?; What parts of our business do we want to develop and what parts do we want to dispose of? The same soon happened in government, where in several tiers discussions about core functions were initiated. At first, these revolved around the areas where further efficiency had to be achieved, but slowly these changed into discussions about areas where an expansion of the role of government was desirable. Everywhere in the world, there was a return to the original conception of the welfare state, in which the state limits its tasks to its most essential function (Aquina, 1993: 127). But it resulted in the opposite, namely a new impetuousness of government and business. The idea appeared that for survival, efficiency was not enough. Problems became serious in, for instance, the education sector where teachers were hard to find, or in the health

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sector where waiting lists increased. In the judicial system, the convicted could not be put in jail because there were not enough places. In the transport sector, the number of traffic jams increased. And in

Governmental authority 14 PvdA

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10 8 6 4 2 0 46 48 52 56 59 63 67 71 72 77 81 82 86 89 94 98 Year Figure 3.9

Attention given to governmental authority

Figure 3.9 presents a quantitative interpretation that the emphasis in the final period (the 1990s) was on the mission of government. This is seen in the widespread discussions about the desired role of the public compared to the private sector in steering societal developments in the party manifestos. The data are again derived from the manifestos of political parties and the attention they give to, in this case, governmental authority. The definition of this variable is: ‘Favourable mentions of strong government, including government stability; manifesto party’s competence to govern and/or other party’s lack of such competence’ (Volkens and Hearl, 1990: 58). The figure shows the return of the discussion of the role of politics and government in societal developments. The rise in attention is seen in all major parties, although especially within the Social Democratic and Liberal parties.

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the police sector, police recruits were hard to find. The idea developed that one might expect more than just an internal reorientation or reorganization, especially from government – which in the Netherlands was still absorbing about a quarter of the gross national product. The manifestos of the political parties in 1993 represented the end of the third cabinet under Lubbers as the end of an era. The elections of 1994 would have to form the disjunction. The dominance of efficiency, partly influenced by management gurus, was slowly replaced by more vague concepts such as culture, learning to learn, intuition, human resources and the growing popularity of holistic management (Metze, 1999: 153–4). At first, government did not translate this new orientation into the incorporation of new public tasks, but rather into the creation of boundary conditions and guaranteeing that others in society, especially business, indeed weighed their own profit against societal costs (ibid.). In the Queen’s speech of 1990, the Dutch government first called for social and administrative renewal. Town renewal and restructuring city districts were the means chosen for social renewal, and increasing transparency of government and improving the relations between government and citizens became those pursued for administrative renewal. This resulted in the adage ‘creating a responsible society’ in which government supported developments aimed towards making citizens independent. In 1994, Prime Minister Wim Kok reintroduced the need for the ‘primacy of politics’, and this became visible in several departments. The ministers of justice and internal affairs intervened personally in the infighting between their departments. The responsibility for the police, in their eyes, had to become a ministerial responsibility. The minister of justice wanted more political control of prosecutors. The Prime Minister himself was said to be transformed from just the managing executive he was in the previous coalition as a minister of finance, to a Prime Minister who was firm in taking control. In the defence department, the minister tried to control his generals, and the minister of agriculture demanded a quite different approach from his senior civil servants. This new approach in relations between political leaders and their administration resulted in numerous conflicts on both sides. Unlike in the previous period, this time the chief executives had to give in, were

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transferred or had to resign. The minister of environmental affairs presented herself as a ‘minister with a mission’. The minister of finance allowed only minimal increases in government expenditure, but only after many debates with other ministers, in which they had to convince him that the problems were really pressing. This resulted in ad hoc policies: a couple of million guilders for the police and a couple of million guilders for the health sector. The strict financial strictures resulted in departmental policies that created other problems by solving just one urgent problem because funds for new policies had to be found within departmental budgets. With this restriction, notions such as societal acceptance and accountability became the main criteria for evaluating public policies. Hence, one saw the appearance of new policy instruments, including monitoring, impact assessments, temporary agreements between government and business, and the seeking of win-win situations. There was, in general, a return of governmental interference, but because the means were lacking, there was both greater dependence on compliance by target groups and more effort to achieve acceptance among those target groups. Creating this acceptance required, especially, communication skills and these gradually grew in importance. ‘Communicative policy’ became the magic phrase of the 1990s. It consisted of promoting an external orientation in government, co-production, interactive policy-making, and increased transparency. In such processes, communication advisers supported governmental agencies. Practically all public organizations had their own communications department. The influence of communications consultants gradually replaced that of the organization managers of the 1980s. As in the previous periods, young people seemed to see the changing developments very clearly. In their education, they increasingly opted for courses and studies in which communication formed a central part of the curriculum. In the 1990s, a number of communication courses were initiated at the higher professional and university levels and all welcomed hundreds of new students each year. In the area of privatization, the criterion of efficiency was gradually replaced by the criterion of feasibility. The new view resulted in a return of governmental interference only in those areas where it was accepted or where it was absolutely needed because the problems had become so urgent.

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A small growth of public expenditure could be seen in the areas of public safety, police and prisons. There was also growth in expenditure on improvements to infrastructure since this was vital to attracting business. Nevertheless, the prudence with which this was developed resulted in the kind of ad hoc, short-term policies that characterized the end of the 1940s, although following quite a different mission. This was seen in a number of areas, like the policies on the return of illegal refugees, the merging of municipalities, the creation of independent agencies and the restructuring of the implementation of social welfare (see Herweijer, 2000). Only the most pressing problems were tackled and the lack of integration of policies became one of the most criticized aspects of policy-making. Because the idea was that public policies had to vary for different target groups, and government was only one – and not even a dominant – actor within policy networks, coherent and consistent public policies were rare. These developments gave rise to the idea that decisions made today can change tomorrow depending on the circumstances. This was seen in many policy areas, for instance in health policies, where attempts to steer the use of prescription medicines by introducing individual financial contributions were once again abandoned in the second half of the 1990s because government had tried to influence choices where citizens had no choice (Lako, 2002, 2004). Regarding work-related sickness and disability, in 1993 the Dutch government introduced a law differentiating premiums to be paid by firms. In 1996 this was replaced by a law that compelled firms to pay 70 per cent of the wages during the first year of sickness. In 1998, this was again replaced by a new law that compelled firms to pay disability insurance. Laws seemed to tumble over one another without being thought through (Nelissen et al., 2000). In education, new ideas for the contents of secondary education developed and resulted in substantial changes. However, within a year, new problems arose and politicians were eager to change the format once again. In infrastructure, decisions about expanding the national airport were continuously adapted, as were decisions regarding new roads and new rail lines. One interpretation is that the developments in the 1990s undermined the position of government in relation to societal groups even further. Seen from a historical perspective, and in light of the relative attention paradigm, these developments can be interpreted as the

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beginning of a gradual return of government. In the 1980s, government and politics were judged pejoratively and their role was seen as inferior to market forces (see Brandsen, 2001; Helderman et al., 2005). In the 1990s this changed. Where administrators in the 1980s could say to politicians ‘we have reached agreement among our colleagues and with the target group, so please accept and sign the proposal’, after which the politicians agreed, the politicians in the 1990s increasingly vetoed such outcomes and took their own stance. One problem stemming from the 1980s was the negative image of politicians. In the 1990s this was improved by stressing their decisiveness, an image promoted with the help of communication consultants (after a first year in which her decisiveness was questioned, one minister was even ordered by her colleagues to hire two communication advisers). A re-evaluation of the position and function of government in society was in the pipeline and debates over the limits of the public and private spheres were increasingly heard. Problems of quality of life, created in the previous period through neglect, became pressing. In the educational system, for instance, restrictions on the length of study, which since 1993 even applied to secondary schools as well as higher education, were lifted again in 1997 since they were seen as disadvantageous for children in the lower echelons of education. Repeated reports on the problematic position of the poor resulted in adaptations to the social security system, this time in the direction of more individualization by creating an extra allowance for singles and the young and for day-care centres. New developments, like globalization, resulted in new problems, such as dual-use trade issues, international organized crime and money laundering, which required policies that could not be legislated for without involving public institutions (Reinicke, 1998). Theoretically, answers to questions about the role and function of government were presented in influential theories on neo-liberal economics, the ‘third way’ and reinventing government. In the Netherlands, the main development in the 1990s was that the contents of national public policies became increasingly dependent on the approval of such policies at the European level. Even the main goals of public policies were determined outside the Netherlands. The new mission of government in the 1990s was determined in cooperation with other EU members, illustrated by the treaties of Amsterdam and Maastricht. In these treaties, the mission was changed

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into a primarily monetary one. Whatever any government in the EU does, it must not result in a budget deficit beyond the limit set in Brussels, and it should preferably result in a decrease of the deficit. Although the effects of the EU on different policy areas is not yet clearly visible, it follows from the theory presented above that we expect policies to converge in the years to come. At the beginning of 2000, the goals set in the 1990s seemed to have been achieved. The Dutch economy was booming, the budget deficit had disappeared and, for this argument, it is important to note that the monetary target set at the beginning of the 1990s was achieved by the end of that decade. At the end of the twentieth century, the Netherlands was among the richest countries in the world, and there seemed to be no other population as satisfied as the Dutch. International economic growth was especially profitable for the Dutch economy, which is still heavily dependent on trade – substantial investments were made in improving the necessary infrastructure to support it.

3.5 Conclusions This chapter argued that the policy changes visible in Europe in general and the Netherlands in particular between 1945 and 2000, and especially the goal-setting in that process, corroborated the theory on policy generations in which neglect-induced policy change is central. Policy change is visible in the succession of policy generations, each of which emphasized those values that were neglected most by the preceding generation. The comparative analysis of OECD countries gave indications of the existence of such policy generations in general, although the trends in a minor number of countries deviated from the general trend. The case study showed that policy generations have existed in the Netherlands over the past 55 years and indicated that they were successful because they were able to achieve the main target set at the beginning of the period and steer policies in different areas towards achieving those goals. The policy generations distinguished were those of the reactive missionaries just after the Second World War, the technocratic planners of the 1950s and early 1960s, the polarized spenders of the 1960s and first half of the 1970s, the efficient managers of the 1980s and the new missionaries of the 1990s.

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One might raise at least two objections to the above analysis. The first is that the analysis is too benevolent towards policy developments over the 55 years under discussion. The secret of success was not that the goals were achieved, but that the policies were all single-sided and unbalanced; one also has to look at the costs of such success. Balancing a policy in order to simultaneously accomplish short-term objectives, long-term effectiveness, a democratic policy process and efficiency was not evident and therefore the policy process in all five periods has to be severely criticized. This indeed is the other side of the coin. Every policy resulted in its own drawbacks since it neglected three of the four aspects to which an adequate policy has to conform. That is why I explicitly refuse to say anything about the quality of the policies. I define success in terms of achieving what one set out to accomplish. Therefore, by this standard the policy generations were successful. The deficit in quality of the policies is however a strong explanatory factor for the shifting demands to which new policy generations responded and in reaction to which shifts in policies occurred. The second objection to the analysis might be that the policy examples given to illustrate the features of each policy generation are not representative of the actual policies, but were chosen to make the point instead of critically testing the theory. Partly this is a consequence of the structure of this chapter and the point I want to make. I opted for an approach that illustrates the substance of each period by giving elucidating examples of what occurred during a period in different policy areas. An alternative approach would have been to present a huge number of graphs and statistics on each of the policy areas. That could have resulted in a more verifiable description of tendencies. Such an analysis is presented in the next chapter. There, the changing modes in the use of policy instruments are the central concern. The changes and applicability of the theory on policy generations will be argued through the use of descriptive statistics.

4 Generations of Policy Instruments

4.1 Introduction As argued in the previous chapter, the goals set in the public sector change periodically. This is understandable since it is expected, according to the theory, that one cannot give all societal problems maximum attention at the same time and therefore must neglect some problems and prioritize others. The central hypothesis is that the neglect of the same aspects in the policy-making process is evidenced simultaneously in different policy areas, and that it is the urgency of problems that arises out of this neglect that induces more fundamental changes characterizing successive policy generations. A central point in this chapter is the argument that the choices made among policy instruments, as well as the kind of lawmaking, is expected to shift periodically, that is, simultaneous with the shifts in goals. I argue in this chapter that such changes are indeed visible. In order to make this argument, I address the following questions. • Which policy instruments can be distinguished on the basis of the

literature on this subject? Which options can governments choose among? • Which presuppositions constitute the choice among different policy instruments? What are the merits of each of these policy instruments? What are their advantages and drawbacks? • Is it possible to view these policy instruments as equal in value with the choice among them entirely dependent on the weighing of the pros and cons? 93

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• Are shifts in the dominance of particular types of policy instru-

ments visible in the practice of public policy-making in the Netherlands (and possibly other OECD countries) in the past 50 years? • Do these shifts correspond with the shifts that are supposed to occur based on the idea of policy generations, and what do they predict regarding governance? In this chapter, long-term developments in the use of policy instruments, with special attention given to public policy-making, are a key notion. First, it is necessary to sketch the position of policy instruments within the policy-making process. We depart from recent publications in the field of public administration that focus on this question. Research into the use of instruments and changes therein belongs to one of the most discussed topics in public administration nowadays (see in the Netherlands, among others, Iedema and Van der Ven, 1995; De Bruijn and Ten Heuvelhof, 1991; Van den Heuvel, 1998, and internationally, Vedung, 1998; Linder and Peters, 1989; Hood, 2006). In order to make my point, it is necessary to theoretically justify the idea that the application of policy instruments is not just a matter of matching means to a specific end, but it is also dependent on economic, cultural and political circumstances. I suggest that the circumstances under which the instruments are seen as adequate and the presuppositions underlying each type of instrument are as decisive in choosing among them as the degree to which these instruments contribute to the achievement of policy goals. Second, I give a brief overview of the available range of policy instruments and briefly discuss their merits. The reason for making this point is to clarify that opting for one particular policy instrument instead of another is not to be seen as something wise or unwise. Instead, it should be seen as the result of a specific weighing of the pros and cons of the different types of policy instruments. I argue that such choices cannot be viewed in terms of knowledge, learning processes, rationality, thoughtfulness or sensibility because none of the different types of instrument distinguishes itself as being inherently more effective or efficient. All of the instruments have their merits and drawbacks. The point is that the different policy instruments are, as such, equal in value. Therefore, choosing among them is primarily a question of preferences, which may occur in a cyclical manner.

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Subsequently, I discuss the actual use of policy instruments in OECD countries. I show that although the specific instruments vary, the basic ideas behind the instruments are congruent during specific periods and reflect the expectations derived from the relative attention paradigm. I follow up this general cross-country analysis with an in-depth analysis of the policy instruments that consecutively were dominant in one country, the Netherlands, over 55 years. I use empirical data to argue that the popularity of policy instruments is time-bound and that the dominance of policy instruments shifts periodically. I also argue in this section that the popularity of legal, economic and communicative instruments, such as policy goals, evolves in a cyclical way. Finally, I delve into the problem of whether the sequence in the dominance of the policy instruments conforms to the idea of policy generations. The question is whether the dominance in the use of laws and regulations, economic instruments and communicative instruments fits the peculiarities of the goals in a certain period.

4.2 Policy instruments within the policy-making process Policy-making can be seen as an answer to a problem. The nature, extent and urgency of a societal problem related to other problems determine whether a policy problem reaches the public and political agenda and whether a solution will be sought. Defining a policy problem is, however, far from easy and often a political process in itself, especially in case of controversial problems. Imagine, for instance, the closing of an industrial plant (Rochefort and Cobb, 1996). One can define the problem in many ways. For instance, in terms the company’s survival, in the closing event itself, or in terms of consequences in terms of the needs of workers and the community. Often, many actors are involved, each having their own interests and perceptions of the problem. They differ in questions about ‘why’, ‘how’, ‘what’, ‘when’, ‘by whom’, ‘for whom’ and so on. This illustrates the difficulty in arriving at an adequately structured problem, for which goals and objectives have to be formulated. The same happens in national policy-making. Goal-setting is primarily a matter of culture, development and the pressing nature of previously neglected problems. To achieve such goals, and to ensure that the goals are more than just symbols, one has

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Policy goals Nature of the problem

Discretion for choosing an instrument

Socio-cultural boundaries Socio-economic boundaries

Figure 4.1 The restrictions on choosing among policy instruments

to put policy instruments into effect. The possibilities are numerous, as we will see in the next section. Choosing among these instruments is crucial for the effectiveness of a policy, that is, the degree to which goals are met. However, as with the goals themselves, choices about the instruments are not only made on the basis of the formulated goals. They are at least to the same degree determined by the dominant rationales of the actors concerned. An explanation of the choices made cannot easily be given because different rationales exist in time and between actors. Furthermore, the possible choices are always limited by the boundary conditions: political and societal feasibility, social and psychological factors. Ultimately, these boundary conditions are determined by the political, economic and cultural context. This does not mean that policy instruments cannot be put into effect when they, for instance, do not fit the cultural context or do not satisfy the boundary conditions. Such a friction can, however, have negative effects on the extent to which such instruments are feasible. The embedding of policy instruments is illustrated in Figure 4.1. I argue that the deployment of policy instruments is not an independent phase in the policy-making process, but a choice embedded by the actors involved, the stakeholders, the societal, political and economic developments on the one hand and the objectives of the policy on the other hand. The latter implies that instruments

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used in one area cannot simply be also used for other problems or for achieving rather different goals. The former implies that there are developments outside a specific policy process, limiting the choices and resulting in exactly the opposite expectation, namely that instruments developed in one policy field can be and are translated to other policy fields as well. It also implies that some instruments are not expedient within the boundary conditions, although they are necessary for achieving the goals and objectives.

4.3 A typology of policy instruments Which types of instruments can be distinguished and what are their merits? That is the question this section addresses. The classic distinction between policy instruments is between regulations, incentives and transfer of information, that is, the legal stick, the economic carrot and the communicative sermon (see Etzioni, 1975; BemelmansVidec, 1998). Hood has discussed the ideas behind policy instruments and argues that the institutional setting is also an important aspect (Hood, 1991, 2006). The distinction between instruments described below follows this literature, and it serves to enhance the notion that the four categories can be implemented in different ways. They are not to be seen as specific types of instrument, but as instruments that can be deployed in very different ways and in different combinations. Legal instruments consist of laws, rules, instructions, resolutions, ordinances, jurisprudence and treaties and evolve basically from the supposition that humans are political animals who lay down norms and values in formalized rules in which it is determined what one is allowed to do and what not. When the norms are violated, one may or may not be confronted with sanctions. Legal steering belongs to the classic policy instruments and is perceived as the most powerful one of them. Legal instruments arise from an idea that the target group is unwilling to otherwise comply and that opposite interests exist between government and the target groups. Furthermore, laws are uniform. Everybody is equal before the law. Hence such instruments result in uniformity. Economic instruments consist of subsidies, premiums, levies and depart from the view of utilitarian actors, the ‘homo economicus’ who weighs alternatives based on costs and benefits, and the pros and cons of his behaviour. Such instruments result in making desirable

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behaviour more financially attractive and undesirable behaviour more costly. In communicative instruments the policy-maker tries, through means such as advice, counselling and information transfer, to change the behaviour of business and citizens. Sometimes it is suggested that this kind of instrument is based on the ideal of the Enlightenment, in which bad, flawed and stupid behaviour is judged to be due to a lack of reason, which can be countered by increasing the knowledge of the target group. The presupposition is also that behaviour is a result of culturally determined factors and is limited by attitudes, opinions and images. The reasons for using this instrument are, first of all, that it is a relatively cheap way of policy-making. Second, it can be justified by the idea that governments cannot solve societal problems on their own and that there is a joint responsibility between government and the governed in which communication is crucial. Many unjustified myths surround the three-part distinction. The first one is that legal, economic and communicative instruments can be distinguished on the basis of the degree of their repressive character, legal instruments being more repressive while communicative instruments are more liberating. It is important to note that all three types can be put into use in a liberating as well as a repressive manner. Within communicative instruments, one might construct a scale from advice to dialogue, consultation, and education on the one hand to propaganda, indoctrination and manipulation on the other. With regard to economic instruments, one might distinguish subsidies, premiums and compensations on the one hand and levies and fiscal penalties on the other. Legal instruments may be divided between contracts, codification, private law and orders, injunctions, modification and public law (Van der Doelen in Bressers et al., 1993: 129). It is also not true that some instruments are only disadvantageous and have to be dismissed out of hand, while others have only positive effects. Every instrument has potential advantages and disadvantages. Legal instruments presuppose that the target group is unwilling to change its behaviour without rules and assumes opposing interests, which is debatable. They presuppose adversity. Furthermore, there are maintenance problems and compliance problems. Laws also assume uniformity, regulate what behaviour is not allowed and apply to all citizens. Everyone is equal before the law. Last but not least, lawmaking results in a peculiar type of ethics. Certain things are not

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allowed because they are against the law, while other things are allowed because they stay within its boundaries. This is sometimes seen as an inferior kind of morality compared to the development of norms by citizens themselves, who might be able to be educated in order to internalize and raise their behavioural standards. The critical legal studies movement that emerged in the USA asserted, for instance, that the legal process can be threatening, inaccessible and exorbitant – especially for the least powerful people in society: ‘It is more likely to sustain domination than to equalize power’ (Auerbach, 1983: vii) Economic instruments, and especially subsidies, are known for their ‘gift-effect’. Actors already inclined to adapt their behaviour receive a gift in the form of a subsidy, while those who are unwilling to change will not alter their behaviour merely on the basis of such an incentive. Behaviour is much more structural than the champions of economic instruments want us to believe. General arrangements suffer from this side-effect to a larger degree than differentiated subsidies. Furthermore, the use of subsidies sometimes results in the so-called ‘Matthew effect’: ‘He who has, shall be given’, or in other words, the greater proportion of subsidies goes to those groups who least need them. This does not automatically imply that economic incentives are ineffective. Depending on the extent to which the subsidizer and the target group conform in their interests and objectives, a subsidy can be an effective instrument for pushing a target group in the desired direction (Herweijer, 1994: 43). The drawbacks of communicative instruments are especially located in their timing; their effects are often only apparent in the long term. Putting such instruments into effect implies that one is (temporarily, but often for several years) content with a situation that is far from optimal. The cons of subsidies (gift and Matthew effects) are also present in communicative instruments, and are known as the ‘knowledge-gap dilemma’ and the ‘counselling paradox’. These two theses suppose that advice, counselling and information transfer especially enhance the knowledge of those whose knowledge is already relatively broad and that the gap between the haves and have nots (in knowledge terms) is increased by the deployment of communicative instruments. Other disadvantages of such instruments are that their effectiveness is limited because they presuppose too much trust (Iedema, 1995: 149); that they are ineffective if they are not

100 The Importance of Neglect in Policy-Making

accompanied by legal and economic instruments; and that they can only be put into effect under specific conditions that are dependent on the phase in the policy process, the nature of the problem and the characteristics of the target group. Communicative instruments are also based on the expectation that the interests of the target group and the government can be brought into line. This latter assumption is regarded as their greatest disadvantage. It is considered naive to expect a target group, having its own interests, to change its behaviour purely as a result of communication. The third myth about the three instruments is that one has to choose among them. While the three-part distinction is a distinction that is generally accepted, it is rarely seen in its purest form in practice. Sanctions in laws and regulations often have an economic nature, for instance, fines. Economic instruments are often based on and formalized in laws and rules. Furthermore, both types have to be made known, and without information transfer (communication) one cannot expect compliance. In practice, therefore, we often see a mixture of instruments. The nature of the mixture and the emphasis on legal, economic or communicative aspects is expected to vary over time and policy area. An optimal mixture may be easy to put into words, but may be difficult to realize in practice. One of the main points in current research in the field of policy instruments is the fine-tuning of the instruments. Under what circumstances should a particular mixture of instruments be put into effect? The fourth myth about the threefold distinction of policy instruments is that it provides an exhaustive list of the instruments available to policy-makers. Although the three types do comprise the bulk of instruments, there are policy instruments that are not covered by the three labels, the most important being organizational instruments. The idea behind this type of instrument is that one can improve a situation or resolve a problem by arranging things in a different way. In public administration one can think of departmental reorganization, but also of decentralization and privatization on the one hand and centralization and nationalization on the other. The assumption behind these instruments is that problems are mainly due to faults in the institutional structure. Reorganization, the changing of the rules of the game, is then expected to provide a solution for those problems. The organizational structure might be out of date, too complex, too large to control, or parts of it might act too independently,

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have become too small, or not be competitive enough and so on. Although such reasoning is in itself sensible, this instrument also has drawbacks. In particular, one can question the assumption that an external problem can be resolved by taking internal measures. The final problem with the distinction between policy instruments is their compatibility. Within each type, variants exist that give the policy instruments quite different features. In terms of our distinguishing features of policy generations, one might ask, for instance, if the instruments should be seen as structural, once-only solutions or as temporary or iterative in character? To illustrate the difference, the building of a police station is a once-only event, whereas the employment of police officers is iterative in character. Laws are made for the long term and are, as such, once-only events. Subsidies, grants and communication can often be seen as iterative instruments, to be applied more or less continuously. But how do we define a covenant between government and a branch organization in which an agreement is reached over the reduction of waste materials over the next five years? It is no longer a once-only legal instrument but comes closer to being an iterative instrument. The same goes for communication, which is often seen as an iterative instrument. An obvious exception is the publishing of a law in the Gazette. It is both a form of communication and a once-only event. Even reorganizations, which are in themselves once-only events, appeared in the 1980s more as iterative instruments. Similar problems also appear in economic instruments such as benefits, subsidies and grants. They have to be grounded in a statutory arrangement, which is a once-only event. However, their intention is to make the implementation of an iterative policy possible. The same problem arises when we want to classify the policy instruments into internally and externally oriented management and policy tools. To illustrate this difference, one can imagine the difference between internal and external communication, the flows of information needed for control and those intended to bring about changes in behaviour. An illustration would be the difference between monitoring smoking and starting an anti-smoking campaign. In the area of regulative instruments, there is a similar difference between making laws, which regulate the behaviour of all citizens, and developing a company policy that only employees are obliged to follow. The expectation from the theory on policy generations is that

102 The Importance of Neglect in Policy-Making

the instruments succeed one another along these two dimensions in a specific order. The policies in the post-war period are expected to show shifts from a dominance of more internally oriented, iterative instruments in the period immediately following the war to more externally oriented, once-only instruments in the second generation. Subsequently we expect a shift towards more externally oriented, iterative instruments during the third policy generation, and a dominance of more internally oriented once-only instruments in the fourth period. Because of the cyclical nature of the theory, subsequently a shift towards the first type is expected next. The four distinctive generations in the use of policy instruments are shown in Figure 4.2. In this section, I argue that opting for one particular policy instrument instead of another is not merely a mathematical problem of matching means to an end. The four defined types of instruments and their variants all have merits and drawbacks. Choosing among them – if necessary – can be seen as the outcome of specific preferences, in which the pros and cons are balanced against each other. The point is that the different policy instruments are indeed equal in value. This is an important conclusion for this argument because it supports the expectation that the use of instruments might be timebound. If the instruments could be distinguished on their inherent merits, policy learning might result in abandoning those instruments that are mainly disadvantageous and a gradual dominance of the most advantageous policy instruments. This is not to say that the use of specific instruments itself does not result in any improvement. The subsidy, regulation, information and organization instruments can be implemented adequately or inadequately and learning processes might improve the degree to which their use is effective and efficient. The a priori preference for one of the four, however, might vary over different policy generations. The second conclusion derived from the above is that such an endeavour is not simply a matter of counting the number of laws, the number of campaigns and the number of economic instruments because they can be used in quite different ways and with quite different intentions. The two dimensions I use to distinguish policy generations are illustrative. The extent to which the use of policy instruments is once-only or iterative, and whether they primarily

Much attention to internal communication and hierarchical communication as means for control External communication as an independent policy instrument Swift changes and many adaptations in existing laws Covenants, temporary decrees Much attention to the use of available financial means to solve the most urgent problems. Money is ad hoc distributed by squeaking system Much attention to the hierarchical aspects of organization Responsibility and authority

Communication as interaction, information exchange, to clarify conflicts of interest Communication supportive for iterative economic policy instruments Very few laws to structure society, but many regulations, which are necessary to ground the application of economic instruments Economic instruments are used to invest in new institutions to support the iterative use thereof in order to support the needs and wishes of citizens Hardly any attention to organizational aspects

Internal orientation

External orientation Little attention to communication Communication is used only to organize things more efficiently Deregulation, abandoning ‘superfluous laws’ Economic instruments used to reorganize Reorganization as an independent instrument Much attention to the efficiency of the internal organization

Communication as a once-only instrument supportive for other policy instruments Communication not an independent instrument General laws for structuring the society Laws as independent policy instruments Economic instruments to build societal institutions not used in an iterative way Attention for building new societal organizations

Structural use of instruments

Four generations of policy instrument dominance

103

Figure 4.2

Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to University of South Florida - PalgraveConnect 2011-05-31

Iterative use of policy instruments

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address the position of the policy actors or that of the target groups, varies within the defined types of instruments. In the next section, I address the development of policy instruments in these dimensions. First, I address developments in Europe as a whole. Then I present an in-depth analysis that addresses developments in the Netherlands with regard to the use of juridical, economic and communicative instruments.

4.4 Shifts in the use of policy instruments in OECD countries In order to make a robust argument for the existence of a policy generation, the policy instruments have to change in a direction that is congruent with changing goals and objectives, that is, with those goals and objectives receiving the most attention in the political arena. We can state in advance that government’s implementation of policy instruments is changing continuously within all policy fields. While in previous decades, juridical and economic instruments dominated, currently so-called modern instruments are now becoming more popular. Also, as a consequence of trends in the early 1990s toward decentralization and deregulation, governments seem to do little more than stimulate, facilitate and monitor. This section contemplates some developments in government’s use of policy instruments. I first present an overview of the available range of policy instruments and briefly discuss their merits. I then explore the question of what instruments can be adequately deployed. Before doing this, the policy instruments have to be positioned within the policy-making process. I depart from recent publications in the field of public administration regarding this question. The classic distinction between policy instruments is between regulations, incentives and transfer of information: the juridical stick, the economic carrot and the communicative sermon. 4.4.1 Shifts in juridical instruments The juridical instruments consist of laws, rules, instructions, resolutions, ordinances, jurisprudence and treaties and evolve basically from the supposition that humans are political animals who lay down norms and values in formalized rules that determine what one is allowed to do and what not. When the norms are violated, there

Generations of Policy Instruments 105

may or may not be sanctions. Juridical steering is one of the classic policy instruments, and is perceived as the most powerful of them. In Europe, the juridical steering mechanism was the dominant instrument in the 1950s and 1960s. Governments used laws and regulations to plan and steer societal developments based on a central vision of what society should look like. The keywords were standardization and uniformity. Juridical instruments are based on the idea that the target group is otherwise unwilling to comply and that the interests of government and the target groups are opposed. Furthermore, laws are uniform; everyone is equal before the law. Hence such instruments result in uniformity. This predominance of legislation and juridical instruments is, for instance, demonstrated by Peter Flora who is one of the few scholars who has researched the extension of legislation and the rise of the welfare state. He points to sharp increases in legislation in the 1910–20 and 1950–60 periods (Flora, 1984). The first period where I looked for indicators of the dominant use of policy instruments runs from 1950 to 1963. This period can, as the previous chapter argued for goal formulation, be characterized as the period in which uniformity, long-term social planning and an external orientation of government were the central ideas (the era of the so-called ‘caring technocrats’). Based on Figure 4.2 and the discussion in the previous section, one might expect that in this period lawmaking was an especially common policy instrument. Whether this is indeed the case, however, is not so easily determined. The scarce data on this subject present numerous difficulties. Nevertheless I found two indicators that reflect my point. First is the measurement proposed by Flora, who looks at the development of social insurance legislation and indeed observes a more than average growth in such legislation in two periods, namely between 1910 and 1920 and between 1950 and 1960. After both periods, the growth stagnates once again (Flora, 1984: 56). A visual representation showing the growth in social insurance coverage for the six original members of the EU, and especially the increasing uniformity of the legislation for a growing proportion of the population, is presented in Figure 4.3. Since the late 1960s, but especially since the 1980s, juridical instruments have been getting into trouble. Juridical instruments assume that the target group is unwilling to change its behaviour without rules and assumes an opposition of interests, which is an incorrect

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106 The Importance of Neglect in Policy-Making

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Figure 4.3 Social insurance coverage within first EU members

assumption according to critics. Furthermore, there are maintenance and compliance problems. Last but not least, laws assume uniformity. Such criticisms of juridical instruments lay behind the deregulation, decentralization and withdrawal of government of the 1980s. 4.4.2 Shifts in economic instruments Economic instruments consist of subsidies, premiums, levies and the like and are based on the notion of of the utilitarian actor, ‘homo economicus’, who weighs up alternative behaviours based on costs and benefits. Such instruments aim to make desirable behaviour more attractive and undesirable behaviour more costly. The economic steering model, based on this idea, was dominant in the 1970s. Subsidies, premiums and taxes were used to ensure that the conduct of business, organizations and citizens changed in such a way that, first, personal desires and needs were considered and second, undesirable behaviour, inequality and injustice were eliminated (or lessened) by steering behaviour in a specific direction. The primary advantage of such instruments is that they can be varied for different target groups. This may well be one of the main reasons why this type of policy instrument became so popular after years of legislation. One indicator to illustrate the development of the use of economic policy

Generations of Policy Instruments 107

75 70 65 Percentages

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Figure 4.4 Governmental outlays

instruments in the 1970s is the growth of total governmental outlays (OECD, 1993; Naschold, 1997). The figures for some European countries are presented in Figure 4.4. 4.4.3 Shifts in organizational instruments One characteristic of the 1980s (1982 to 1993) was the diminishing use of both the instruments already mentioned. In this period, both juridical and economic steering instruments were on the retreat as a consequence of the then prevailing policy generation. There were attempts to minimize and decrease governmental steering by juridical and economic instruments, and the disadvantages of the latter type of instrument, especially, were emphasized. One of these disadvantages, especially with subsidies, was their ‘gift effect’. Actors who were already inclined to change their behaviour received a gift in the form of a subsidy while those unwilling to change might still refuse to alter their behaviour on the basis of such an incentive.

108 The Importance of Neglect in Policy-Making

Table 4.1

Instruments used out of internal orientation

Regulatory Britain mechanisms 1980–93

Denmark Netherlands

Primary Markets regulatory Privatization mechanisms

Devolution Results Decentralization steering

Rule steering

Secondary Competitive regulatory instruments mechanisms

Competitive Competitive instruments instruments Results steering

Competitive instruments

Tertiary Results regulatory steering mechanisms

Privatization

Governance Private-sector Devolution type market regime regime

Sweden Finland Norway

Germany Austria

Decentralization Privatization Privatization Results-steering Rules-steering regime regime

Source: Naschold, 1997: 45.

Behaviour is much more structural than the champions of economic instruments want us to believe. General arrangements suffer from this side-effect to a larger degree than do differentiated subsidies. Furthermore, the use of subsidies sometimes results in the so called ‘Matthew effect’ – ‘He who has, shall be given’; the major part of subsidies tends to go to those groups who least need them, or whose behaviour they are not intended to alter. This does not automatically imply that economic incentives are ineffective. Depending on the extent to which the subsidizer and the target group conform in their interests and objectives, a subsidy can be a more effective instrument for steering the target group in the right direction (Herweijer, 1994: 43). The dominant form of steering in the 1980s in most European OECD countries consisted of deregulation, privatization and the use of competitive instruments (see Table 4.1). By 1985, most European OECD countries had seen a reversal in the trend of increasing governmental outlays (see Figure 4.4). Market mechanisms began to dominate and government withdrew. The orientation became increasingly internal – modernization of public management, devolution of governmental powers and the use of market-like, competitive instruments such as planned competition between public firms. In these years, no organization escaped reorganization. Setting efficiency as the main goal resulted in the flattening and downsizing

Generations of Policy Instruments 109

of organizations in general and of public administration in particular. Organizations and their members had to become more flexible, transparent and professional. If anything has persisted from the 1980s, it is the amount of attention still paid to organization and to the reduction of input (costs, employees) through reorganization. 4.4.4 Shifts in communicative instruments Since the early 1990s, it has become evident that an internal orientation aimed mainly at achieving the highest degree of efficiency within the organization also has its drawbacks. Societal problems, such as poverty, crumbling infrastructure, problems of inclusion and exclusion, the battle against crime and policies aimed at reducing environmental pollution were neglected in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In the 1990s, we witnessed a tentative return of the notion of government as an institution capable of influencing societal developments. The type of policy instruments used were, however, fiscally prudent. They mainly consisted of a range of communicative instruments – advice, counselling and information transfer – by which government tried to change the behaviour of business and citizens. It has been suggested that this kind of instrument is based on beliefs from the Enlightenment, in which bad, flawed and stupid behaviour was judged to be due to a lack of reason, and that it could be countered by increasing the knowledge of the target group. There was also the assumption that behaviour was a result of culturally determined factors and limited by attitudes, opinions and images. While this type of instrument has become popular again recently, this kind of ‘cheap’ policy-making has been used in all periods. The difference is that in earlier periods it was supported by legal and financial instruments. In the absence of the latter, communicative steering has become an independent instrument. One might say that it is only because of the withdrawal of the juridical and economic instruments in the 1980s that communicative steering was seen as a way out in the 1990s, as a possible means of regaining some public influence over societal developments.

4.5 An in-depth analysis of developments in the Netherlands As in the previous chapter, this chapter continues with an in-depth analysis of the use of policy instruments in one European country, the

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110 The Importance of Neglect in Policy-Making

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Netherlands. Based on similar figures, mainly derived from secondary analyses of data provided by the Central Statistical Bureau (CBS), the Social-Cultural Planning Office (SCP), the OECD and scientific publications on the subject, I will present further arguments to illustrate the cyclical character of the development in the use of policy instruments. 4.5.1 Policy instruments from 1950 onwards Similar findings can be found in the legislative process regarding social housing policies in the Netherlands. The 1950s was a period in which numerous building code regulations were implemented. However, the question relevant for policy generations is whether these observations are characteristic only for the 1950s. Are laws as an independent instrument that prescribe and restrict behaviour and tell people their duties unique to this period? Although it was difficult to find valid data on this subject, Figure 4.5 shows the development of laws and regulations about prescriptions, restrictions and duties. The data were assembled from a databank on laws and regulations (Kluwer, 2000). The figures indicate that the early 1950s can indeed be seen as a period in which laws were used as independent instruments in order to achieve the most uniform outcomes possible. There are two peaks in the growth of such regulations, namely at the beginning of the 1950s and in the early 1990s. This conforms

Generations of Policy Instruments 111

to my predictions. It seems that this use of laws can be pinned to two points in time, thus indicating its relevance for two policy generations. The figure also shows a decrease or much lower growth rates in the periods in between. It seems that after the beginning of the 1960s, Dutch policy-makers were less inclined to use laws in order to regulate behaviour. In this section, I evaluate regulations as if they are all equal. While this is a disputable choice, their degree of importance has no bearing on the research at hand. I evaluate their content, that is, the subject they cover, for instance, regulations prescribing or restricting behaviour, regulations on financial transfers, or consultations. Furthermore, I use a formula that would normally mitigate changes over periods and would tend in itself towards ‘zero’ change. This is a conservative approach in the sense that it provides a lower boundary for changes in the use of policy instruments. When sudden changes are found during certain periods, these may be seen as the lower boundaries of such trends. In this case, I can be relatively certain that such upheavals are real and not an artefact of the method used. (As the marker for change during a period, I use the number of new regulations during that five-year period minus the number of new regulations during the previous period, and divide by the total number of regulations effectively in use. Since this denominator tends to increase as long as changes are above zero, this tends to figures approaching zero or at least showing a declining trend. When a slow decline is seen, this is an artefact of the method. Given this conservatism in measurement, there is a real although underestimated change when an upheaval is seen). 4.5.2 Policy instruments from 1963 onwards Theoretically one would expect the subsequent policy generation to steer on the basis of financial instruments instead of steering by creating uniformity and laws as did the caring technocrats. Financial instruments have to have a legal foundation, so one would expect an increase in the number of regulations regarding financial transfers. Whether this is the case is shown in Figure 4.6 in which the growth in such regulations over time can be seen. Here we see a clear upheaval at the beginning of the 1960s of regulations designed to provide a legal foundation for financial transfers. What is also evident is that these kinds of regulations can be pinned to the period in which the use of laws to independently regulate

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112 The Importance of Neglect in Policy-Making

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Figure 4.6 Growth in regulations concerning financial transfers

behaviour diminishes (Figure 4.5 above). During the first half of the 1960s, this inclination to regulate behaviour by forbidding or prescribing it by law was supplanted by a sharp increase in those regulations that provided the legal basis for using financial instruments. That these regulations were effective is shown by the increase in governmental outlays since the 1960s and the decline again in the 1980s (Centraal Planbureau, 2000: 34). Income transfers increased dramatically until the late 1970s. During this time, government seemed to prefer steering society through financial instruments rather than through legal prescription and restrictions. Expenditures on subsidies, social insurance and investment in new institutions (hospitals, schools, recreation and culture) were predominant in this period. Several other indicators for this expanding role of government in society exist and have been presented by other scholars. The growth can be found in the increasing number of implementation agencies, that is, quangos. The growth of quangos in this period goes hand in hand with the number of departmental units at national ministries (Van Thiel, 2000). Van Thiel also shows that a simultaneous growth of quangocracy and bureaucracy is visible from 1960 to 1980 and that this growth is much larger than the trend in the previous and subsequent periods. 4.5.3 Policy instruments from 1982 onwards In reaction to the polarized spenders (1963–76), the subsequent policy generation, the efficient managers, is expected to stress structural policies for increasing efficiency. Because the use of financial transfers is

Generations of Policy Instruments 113

Netherlands EC

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Figure 4.7 Government service employment

more than the government can afford at a certain point, one expects a reaction in the subsequent period. This is not a typically Dutch phenomenon because it occurred all over the Western hemisphere. It was a time when governments looked inside themselves and tried to reverse the trend of spending increasing amounts of money. The result was a preponderance of governmental reorganization. Naschold, for instance, gave an overview of popular regulatory mechanisms in Western Europe (Nashold, 1997). We can see a preponderance of policy instruments designed to reorganize the governmental apparatus itself. Most current researchers see the 1980s as the beginning of the retreat of government (Lane, 1996). My own figures indicate a rather different development. Dutch government reorganized itself, but hardly retreated. The decrease in public expenditures was achieved first and foremost by downsizing the governmental apparatus and freezing investment, but not by decreasing income and capital transfers. Figures 4.7 and 4.8 also show that the instruments that became popular reflect this tendency towards an internal orientation and more efficiency. This can be seen in expenditures on wages in the public sector and also in the reorganization of national departments. The number of departmental units decreased at the national level (see among others Van Thiel, 2000: 21; Van der Meer and Roborgh, 1993; Carasso et al., 1994). After a diminishing growth rate from 1975 onwards, the annual growth rate of government service employment

114 The Importance of Neglect in Policy-Making

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Figure 4.9 Growth of regulations concerning efficiency

was negative for the first time in the 1984–89 period. The remaining public officials had to bear the cost of the internal orientation of government. Their salaries no longer followed market sector trends and wages decreased. The dominant tendency of the 1980s is also evident in the use of laws and regulations. I examine two indicators here; first, the growth in the number of regulations concerned with efficiency, and second, the degree to which new laws replaced old ones, that is, the number of regulations dropped. The development in the first indicator is given in Figure 4.9. This figure shows that after a decline during the 1960s, the number of regulations concerning efficiency increased from the second half of the 1970s until the beginning of the 1990s. In the early 1990s, the number of regulations peaked. After that, the trend towards achieving more efficiency seems to have been abandoned once again.

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As to deregulation, the use of abandoning rules and regulations is typical of the second half of the 1980s. Figures 4.10 and 4.11 present the figures in which the number of abandoned regulatory and financial laws dropped can be seen. Both processes reach their height at the end of the 1980s. In both figures, the deregulation that provided a legal basis for financial transfers, consultation and efficiency, as well as for the direct deregulation of behaviour by deleting regulations, is evident in the second half of the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s. All in all, the 1980s can be characterized by governments’ emphasis on an internal orientation; this is reflected in their use of policy

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instruments. The government-society relationship stabilized, at least until the end of the 1980s. Income transfers remained unchanged. The national government tried to achieve its goals by reorganizing, especially downsizing, and making the bureaucratic process more efficient. It also stopped investing in society. As shown in Figure 4.5 above, public investments decreased and even fell below the level of the early 1960s.

4.5.4 Policy instruments from 1994 onwards In the 1990s, a new type of steering seemed to emerge that reflected the dual nature of government-society relations. While government wanted things done and problems solved, it wanted societal actors to solve these problems themselves. The congruence between the previously mentioned three types of policy instruments (legal, economic and communicative instruments) is that they all function as a means of achieving a goal established by a central actor. They all originate from the perspective of government. In recent years, however, many have come to believe that policy-making does not actually work this way in practice; actors are not steered so easily, and we refer instead to self-steering and network steering. Both concepts – self-steering and network steering – have consequences for how a government operates, the direction of its influence – direct or indirect – and on expectations about the effectiveness of classic instruments. Top-down steering based on classic instruments is now considered ineffective and costly. But what might be expected from a government if it is limited in its possibilities for influencing organizations and individuals? One consequence of both concepts is that the perspective of steering changes. Instead of taking governmental objectives as the starting point, steering begins with the potentialities and perspective of the target group. This implies that government must seek out those interests that can be brought into congruence with its own interests. One does not search for opposing interests, but for a solution that is profitable for both parties, the so-called ‘win-win’ situation. The dominant assumption is that what seems feasible for all stakeholders can be accomplished more effectively than those things that are optimal for only one party but are resisted by the other parties. The emphasis is on steering at the right level, which explains the

Percentual growth compared to existing regulations

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Period Figure 4.12 Growth in new regulations concerning consultation

decentralization tendency in the Netherlands. Because problems are not uniform throughout the country and the steering level determines effectiveness, the responsibility for many policy fields was decentralized. Furthermore, there was substantial deregulation as well as the creation of many public-private partnerships. Policies were not only implemented in cooperation with the target groups, but new policies of cooperation were developed. The keywords of the time were coproduction, partnership and contracts. The actual emphasis on this kind of policy instruments began in the late 1980s. The question is whether this was also reflected in new regulations that came into effect in the 1990s. Figure 4.12 demonstrates that this was in fact the case. In the first half of the 1990s, we witnessed a new development – a diminishing deregulation process and a slow return of government. This new steering proved to be prudent. Government especially wanted to steer through using communication and consultation. This is demonstrated in the sharp increase in the number of laws and regulations that set out rules for consultation in the 1990s. The growth was especially evident in the first half of the 1990s, but was still visible in the second half since the percentage growth was still above zero. This trend conformed to the image the Dutch government wanted to establish, namely that of ‘Dutch polder politics’ in which everything was negotiated and accomplished by reaching an agreement between government and the relevant private partners.

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The new trend was also evident in another type of regulation of societal developments, the ‘covenant’, a mutual agreement between government and specific societal actors. Covenants are temporary and they specify benchmarks to be met after a specified number of years. This instrument was first used in environmental policies, but in the second half of the 1990s it became popular in other sectors such as education, agriculture, juvenile behaviour and administrative reform. This is a further indication of the domination of the communication instrument in this period, since the main feature of covenants is that they are based on mutual consent. (The parties agree to have achieved some objective within a given period, typically five years.) As a method of regulation they are much more prudent than lawmaking and, as such, fit in with the general idea of this distinctive policy generation.

4.6 Conclusions In this chapter, I discussed the developments in the use of policy instruments in Europe as a whole and presented a more in-depth look at policy instruments used by the Dutch government. In examining the context and position of policy instruments within the policymaking process, I argued that the effectiveness of policy instruments is not only dependent on its relation with policy goals and problems, but it is also dependent on the degree to which it fits the dominant rationality, the key arguments and the boundary conditions. Subsequently, I discussed four types of policy instruments: juridical, economic, communicative and organizational instruments. I argued that while all four can be effective and compatible, they each have have known side-effects. This explains why it is possible to distinguish the dominance of each in a certain period and why this dominance changes in a cyclical way. Furthermore, I argued that the use of different policy instruments varies over time and that these changes conform to what one would expect in the light of policy generations theory. Although this search is far from complete and the validity of the indicators used here can be disputed, the trends based on a conservative use of the data as well as an analysis of the trends discerned on the basis of these indicators result in auspicious outcomes for the theory.

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The implementation of policy instruments by government seems to change periodically. In previous decades, juridical, economic, organizational and communicative instruments alternated in dominance as independent tools for steering developments in society. Moreover, the popularity of each shifted in conformity with the shifting goals of government mentioned in the previous chapter.

5 The Changing Roles of Societal Groups

5.1 Introduction In the previous two chapters, I argued that policy goals and instruments change periodically and simultaneously. This chapter assesses longitudinal developments in the measures taken by political elites to shape relations between the public sector and societal groups in policy processes. As in the previous chapter, I first present a concise overview of the general developments in Europe and follow up with an in-depth case study. The analysis, which begins in the early 1950s and continues until 2002, distinguishes four periods with four distinct forms of such relations. The basic research question is whether it is possible to identify the main differences between the four kinds of relationship and whether the underlying dynamics can be traced. Based on these chapters, it is possible to distinguish a period spanning from approximately 1951 to 1963, in which long-term goals and standardization dominated all policy areas; one from 1963 to 1980, in which the political aspects and integrative function of policy processes were dominant; a period from 1982 to 1994, in which efficiency was stressed; and a period from 1994 to 2000 in which short-term goal achievement was deemed to be most important. Boundary years connecting the periods can be pinpointed because of major events occurring simultaneously in those years, for example, the outcomes of parliamentary elections, economic developments, political crises in the preceding years, and new political leaders. Notwithstanding the existence of those important years, it is important to note that the underlying trends indicating shifts run 120

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more smoothly. Sometimes the actual shift in the design of policy processes is visible years earlier. In this chapter I argue that the periods in question differ not only with regard to the dominance of specific policy goals and the use of policy instruments, but also with regard to the dominant type of relationship between policy-makers and the public in general. I first distinguish four modes of interactive policy-making processes and propose indicators for their assessment. Subsequently, I present extreme examples of the four models in an international context and situate the models within a time frame. I then investigate whether periods can be distinguished in which each of these four models was dominant in the Netherlands. Finally, I try to establish whether it is the single-sidedness of such modes and the neglect of features of other modes of interaction that induced the shifts between periods. This chapter does not proceed through a quantitative analysis like the former ones, but rather tries to assess whether the development of new methods shaping relations between policy-makers and the public in the four periods under consideration reflects the four models. This assessment is based on a literature study, as well as on data from statistical offices and the OECD that illustrate the development of the new measures taken in each period. One reason for not doing a quantitative analysis is that the information would be difficult if not impossible to obtain for the whole period. Furthermore, many studies have already been conducted of the different periods and the specific relation between government and societal actors during one or two of them (Kruyt, 1959; Thurlings, 1971; Von der Dunk, 1986a; Kennedy, 1995; Lane, 1996; Schuyt, 2000; Kickert, 1993; Delsen, 2002). This chapter draws on that academic work which was not based on the ‘relative attention paradigm’ used here. An assessment of the whole era, covering roughly five decades, is expected to improve our understanding of the subject and especially of the shifts that occurred, even though the approach selected here does not enable us to provide detailed information for each period as such.

5.2 Four interactive policy designs In order to do this, the previous findings on policy generations have to be translated into four policy designs. These policy designs are distinguished by the dominance of congruence or antagonism of interests

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between policy-makers and societal groups, and the extent to which relations are hierarchical or horizontal. This results in four ideal types of interactive policy-making in the Weberian sense of theoretical constructs. Our policy types are based on two theoretical dimensions deemed crucial for distinguishing modes of interactive policy-making. These types are not expected to be found in their purest form in reality, but are primarily used to frame and distinguish trends towards one or another type. They are also empirical types, in the sense that shifts through time in the nature of the types are expected to occur simultaneously with trends emphasizing a specific kind of goal and the use of specific policy instruments, as described in the previous chapters. In practice, all kinds of mixed forms might be visible, although the relative attention paradigm does not anticipate such mixtures. In the first type of policy design, Model A, societal groups are treated as target groups. The policy-makers are dominant and fear that without their interference, the population might act in undesirable ways. Policies are intended to make undesirable behaviour less likely and are based on the assumption that this should be the prime goal of a given policy because of the view that order and stability cannot be maintained without a government that is firmly in control and tells people what to do and what not to do. It is because of the basic assumption Table 5.1

Four types of interaction between government and societal groups

(Dis)parity of power and authority Hierarchical

Horizontal

Perceived Interests Antagonism Societal groups as target groups A

Societal groups as interest groups B

Prime concern is to steer societal developments hierarchically

Prime concern is the resolution of conflicting interests among societal groups

Governability model

Pluralist model

Congruence Societal groups as clients C

Societal groups as partners D

Prime concern is to provide services

Prime concern is the role of government next to other actors in structuring society

Public management model

Governance model

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that people might behave undesirably (related to crime, health, education, safety, labour relations, housing, and so on), that a presumed antagonism between policy-makers and population forms the point of departure in the policy-making process. Given the powers of politicians and bureaucratic policy-makers, the participation of societal groups is minimal. Policies are directed towards steering and standardizing the behaviour of the latter and not at obtaining consensus. The major problem is that of governability. Model B differs from Model A in that it does not seek the solution in unilateral decisions imposed on societal groups. It acknowledges that there are differences and that negotiation and compromise are necessary for resolving those differences. The model still departs from antagonistic interests, but relations between policy-makers and societal groups are less hierarchical and more horizontal. The latter try to influence policy-making processes and are involved in these processes. The dominant view is that one has to deliberate and allow different societal groups to participate before decisions can be made in order to minimize the possibly of disadvantageous impacts on different societal groups or to compensate for them. The model is based on the recognition of citizens’ rights. In political theory, one might call this the pluralist model. In Model C, the dominant discourse is that the interests of policymakers and societal groups are congruent. Citizens as well as policymakers want quick, effective, efficient and well-planned service delivery by the public sector. In this model, the public sector is presented as a service provider and citizens as clients. Underlying this model is the relationship between the two. It is, in fact, a hierarchical relationship because it is the service provider and not the client – especially in cases of monopolistic service provision, as in the public sector – who decides on the services provided – or not provided, in the case of cutbacks – and how services will or will not be provided. This is partly based on the needs and wants of the client as perceived by the service provider, but it based at least as much on the financial and organizational feasibility of services as well. A client might not be satisfied with the service delivery, in which case it is in the interests of both parties to improve service delivery and to provide opportunities for voicing complaints. It is, however, the service provider, and not the client, who makes the final decision by weighing up the returns of improved service delivery against the costs involved. This model is reflected in theories on public management (Hood, 1991).

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Finally, Model D is characterized by an emphasis on the congruence of interests and equivalency in mutual relations. It is not the question of how government steers society that dominates the discourse, but of how societal developments are structured and what role government has in relation to other groups in structuring those developments. It is what is nowadays called ‘governance’, that is, it includes all organizations and institutions involved in the structuring of society – including governmental as well as non-governmental actors and independent agencies – without any single one of them being dominant (Raadschelders, 2003: 4). This is a key concept in contemporary analyses of policy networks (Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan, 1997). The expectation based on the relative attention paradigm is that the four models apply consecutively, in the order in which they have been discussed here. More precisely, Model A, the governability model, is expected to be dominant throughout the 1950s until the first half of the 1960s; Model B, the pluralist model, is assumed to be ascendant in the subsequent period from approximately 1963 to the early 1980s; Model C, the public management model, is emphasized from the early 1980s to 1994; and Model D, the governance model, follows. In the relative attention paradigm, shifts from the dominance of one model to that of another are explained by the diminishing returns of the specific policy model that was dominant in the previous period, and by neglect, resulting in increased dissatisfaction with existing arrangements. I therefore focus on the increasing dominance of the policy models and the situation at the time when shifts can be identified.

5.3 Institutional changes regarding the role of societal groups Clear indicators are required to distinguish periods in which a specific type of interactive policy-making is visible. Based on previous research by the public management department (Puma) of the OECD, I investigate the procedural, informational, consultative, institutional and restructuring measures taken within each period (OECD, 1987b; note that this publication did not take into account our fourth policy design, which came to the fore only after 1990). Together, these indicators point to the dominance of one of the four policy designs. Table 5.2 shows how each of these measures is expected to vary for each of the four policy designs.

Indicators for different models of interactive policy-making Societal groups as target groups

Societal groups as interest groups

Societal groups as clients

Societal groups as partners

Procedural measures

Extensive regulation Maintenance by sanctions.

Registration.

Simplification of regulation, deregulation, language improvement, redesign of forms, cutting red tape. Staff training to enhance efficiency. Polls on client satisfaction Advertising, brochures, guides, public relations. Advice, surveys, focus groups.

Negotiated agreements instead of laws. Self regulation.

Information measures

Regulation to insure democratization. Laws on work councils. Public inquiry procedures. Constitutional rights, freedom of press and so on. Freedom of information. Hearings, public meetings, community outreach, committees, forums, referenda. Information as a right for societal groups.

Sociographic and demographic research. Information as means of government control. Consultative measures

Institutional measures Restructuring measures

In order to get more insight into effectiveness of policies, the need for new regulations, and control. National statistical and planning agencies. Standardization.

Information as communication service.

In order to confront different interests.

In order to get feedback from consumers with a view to improving services.

Work councils. Appeal courts, tribunals. Democratization.

Ombudsmen. Special commissions. Deregulation, one-stop shop system.

Deliberation. Joint project teams, lobbying, negotiation. Information as means for mutual understanding. In order to know where interests meet and a win-win situation can be created. Consultative bodies. National boards. Privatization. Public-private partnerships.

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Table 5.2

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Procedural measures concern the content of the legal actions taken by government to steer societal developments. Do the instruments developed in a specific period consist mainly of extensive regulation by law, in which penalizing undesirable behaviour is the central objective, or are meta-regulations developed to regulate the interactive process? Are such regulations primarily aimed at improving service delivery or at achieving agreements between the public and private sectors? Information measures concern the content of informationgathering by leading politicians and government in general. What kind of information is deemed important and what goals does it serve? Consultative measures concern processes relative to the question of whom the government wants to listen to. What is the prime goal of these measures and what new measures are taken to achieve that goal? Is it to enhance government’s insight into societal developments, to confront different interests, to get feedback on the quality of service delivery, or to establish win-win situations, profitable for both the public and private sectors? Institutional measures concern the establishment of new organizations by government and the goals of those organizations. What kinds of organization are established? Are they expected to gather standardized statistical information, to structure interaction, to settle complaints about service delivery, or to facilitate negotiating processes? Restructuring measures concern the main outcomes of the actions government aims at. Is the outcome decreased variation (standardization), increased public involvement, changed administrative arrangements, or increased cooperation between the public and private sectors? This indicator is important for the argument that shifts occur when a specific outcome was successfully achieved and the neglect of other outcomes becomes a pressing issue.

5.4 Illustrations of the four models in OECD countries To sketch four ideal-typical models is one thing. To trace them in the practice of policy-making is something quite different. This section gives examples of the most characteristic manifestations of the four forms of government-citizen relations. The most extreme form of the government type is without doubt to be found in the USA in the 1950s. Especially in the first half of that decade, McCarthyism

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provides a model that conforms to the government type in its purest form. The most extreme examples of the interest-group model can be found from the first half of the 1960s onwards in continental Europe, with peaks in Italy and in France in 1968. The ultimate attempt to change relations between government and citizens to primarily being one between service provider and clients can be traced in the Commonwealth countries, with the changes induced by the Thatcher government in the UK as the extreme example. The governance principle found its extreme implementation in the Netherlands under the name of the ‘Polder model’, in which deliberation, consultation and partnership-building were pursued. However, because the next section gives an in-depth case study of the Netherlands during the whole period between 1945 and 2000, I concentrate the description of the different forms on governance in the OECD as a whole. This latter remark already points to the conviction that the four periods of specific government-society relations can be detected in many if not all developed countries. 5.4.1 The governability model: citizens as target groups At the end of the Second World War, everyone was expected to cooperate in rebuilding society. At Yalta, Europe had been divided between two spheres of influence and because communists had fought the Nazis together with the allied forces, in the first years after the war they were seen as reliable partners. In some Western countries, members of communist parties even acquired ministerial posts in government. These friendly attitudes changed quickly with the outbreak of the Cold War, the ideological struggle between the capitalist, free-market economies led by the USA and the communist, centrally planned economies led by the Soviet Union. This had serious impacts on domestic policies, and shaped the governability model in which societal groups are predominantly seen as target groups. In the USA this model developed in an extreme form. Under the supervision of Wisconsin Senator Joseph McCarthy, a kind of witch-hunt aimed at countering the potential threat communists could pose from within the country. As the FBI website still notes about that period: ‘Counteracting the Communist threat became a paramount focus of government at all levels, as well as in the private

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sector’ (www.fbi.gov/libref/historic/history/postwar.htm). This policy started as early as 1947 when the Taft-Hartley Act was introduced. This law enabled the President to stop strikes and was aimed at preventing communist supporters in organized labour from using general strikes as a means to overthrow the government. There was fear that something similar would happen to that which had occurred in France and Italy. In 1950, this law was followed by the Internal Security Act that required all communists to register themselves as such. In 1952 this was followed by the McCarran-Walter Act which set strict quota restrictions and allowed officials to deport suspected communist sympathizers. In fact, such practices had started much earlier. In the late 1940s, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) began rounding up foreign-born communists and labour leaders for deportation and detaining them without bail. As Ellen Schrecker says: ‘During the late 1940s and 1950s, almost every agency became involved in the anti-Communist crusade’ (Schrecker, 1994: 25). From the State Department and Congress to the Post Office and the Supreme Court, federal bureaucrats, politicians and judges struggled with the issues of domestic communism as they debated and implemented policies to deal with it. In addition to anti-communist legislation, later laws on civil rights extended the authority of the FBI. Through federal legislation, Congress permitted the FBI to fight civil rights violations, racketeering and gambling. These new laws included the Civil Rights Acts of 1960 and 1964; the 1961 Crimes aboard Aircraft Act; an expanded Federal Fugitive Act; and the Sports Bribery Act of 1964. These were procedural measures aimed at extensive regulation of target groups and control of their activity through ‘severe’ sanctions. As to information measures, within the so-called loyalty security programme, FBI investigations into the background of governmental and non-governmental employees led to an increase in the number of FBI agents from 3500 in 1956 to approximately 7000 in 1962. Their investigations resulted in blacklists. When a citizen was put on such a list, he/she found it nearly impossible to find a decent job. Furthermore, there were the so-called ‘red channel’ publications which published lists of names of individuals and organizations suspected of being communists. Being on such a list could ruin one’s career. Because of the growing anti-communist hysteria in the early 1950s created by McCarthyism, many Americans began looking over their

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shoulders wondering whether there were communists in their midst. Some people exploited the fear of communism to further their own personal interests. Other Americans, fearing that someone would point the finger at them, charged others with being communists. If you could prove that someone else was a communist, no one would point the accusing finger at you. As a result, Americans from all social strata were accused of being communists, including the Girl Scouts, rock and roll musicians, librarians, teachers and university professors, members of feminist and black civil rights movements and many others. Once fired, the accused could rarely find other suitable jobs. Hundreds of elementary and high school teachers and university professors, as well as social workers in welfare agencies and journalists, lost their jobs. In this period, one can see how information was primarily gathered for registration and as a means of government control. As to the institutionalization of these policies, several institutions were set up to support and execute the policies: these included the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee (SISS), formed in 1950, the House Un-American Activities Committee (1938–75) and the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (1952). Between 1949 and 1954, 109 investigations were carried out by these and other committees of Congress. Joseph McCarthy headed the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations in 1953 and 1954, using it for a number of his communist-hunting investigations. There were also many anti-communist committees, panels and ‘loyalty review boards’ in federal, state and local government, as well as many private agencies that carried out investigations for small and large companies concerned about possible communists in their workforce. The whole operation was aimed at disciplining and restructuring a society under the pretext of the external threat posed by communists. This period in American history is an extreme example of the governability model. However, it was not only in the USA that such policies emerged. Similar trends were apparent in Europe. 5.4.2 The pluralist model: societal actors as interest groups The pluralist model was dominant in the next period. One could take any democratic country in the OECD as an example to illustrate the

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period between roughly 1963 and 1977 in which the then dominant view of citizen as ‘citoyen’ and of societal groups as interest groups emerged. Indicators of the dominance of the pluralist model included student revolts, the increased influence of trade unions, the increase in the number of mass demonstrations over political issues such as Vietnam, Franco and repression by the Greek colonels, as well as strikes and protests over material issues such as wages and working conditions. Broader manifestations included political polarization, and the tendency to promote public participation and to consider the different interests of societal groups in policy-making processes. The extreme form of this model can be found in what has been called the high sixties, and has been very well documented by Arthur Marwick, among others. He points to similar political, cultural, economic and social changes in the USA, England, France and Italy (Marwick, 1998; see also Kogan, 1983; Ginsborg, 1990; Kennedy, 1995; Passerini, 2004; Della Porta and Tarrow, 1986; Eckstein, 1988). The policies of the 1950s and the relative increase in economic affluence have been mentioned as facilitators of these radical changes. Demographically, the increase in birthrates just after the Second World War resulted in the sheer number of teenagers in the 1960s exceeding all previous periods. These teenagers had also more money to spend (Marwick, 1998: 42). In France in 1959, for example, there were 543 children for every 1000 adults. Other facilitating influences included policy champions such as John F. Kennedy and Martin Luther King in the USA and, in Europe, Pope John XXIII and the Vatican II reforms. The Kennedy administration (1961–3) was perceived as symbolizing the will to change. It launched an ambitious civil rights programme. With the succession of the more conservative Pope John XXII by the far more liberal Pope John XXIII in 1958, hopes were raised for a more enlightened Catholicism (ibid.: 34). In 1960, the British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan made his ‘Wind of Change’ speech to the South African Parliament in Cape Town, setting out his government’s policy of gradual decolonization. The spread of mass media made all these new developments known all over the Western world very quickly. Among teenagers, it all resulted in a lack of deep commitment to adult values and roles, the emergence of what was called a counterculture, and scepticism about the value of long-term career planning. Ideologically, there were international developments to struggle

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against, such as the Vietnam war, the French presence in Algeria, Italian support for the invasion of Lebanon by the British and Americans, British colonial politics, the Cold War and the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. In both Britain and Italy, there were political swings towards liberal-left governments and in France there were more liberal policies championed by the so-called ‘Enarques’, a new generation of civil servants who had been trained at the Ecole Nationale d’Administration (ENA). In many nations, the trade unions altered the industrial and social scene by organizing mass strikes, such as those among automotive and metalworkers in Italy in 1962. In 1967–70 – the so-called high sixties – all of this culminated in students, workers, leftist political parties and trade unions joining together in action, with students occupying universities, workers striking, and mass demonstrations, processions and assemblies. It was a culmination of growing antagonism and political polarization, evidenced by strikes and student activism directed against the industrial establishment and authoritarian government. It not only happened in Western countries, but also in Czechoslovakia (the 1968 ‘Prague Spring’) and Japan. This was the environment in which the pluralist model flourished. It can be seen in the extension of regulation to ensure democratization as well as in the laws on human rights and diversity, public inquiry procedures, constitutional rights, freedom of the press, and so on. It is also evident in the emphasis on freedom of information, and the extension of the right to information for societal groups, the organization of hearings, public meetings, committees, forums, referenda aiming for community outreach and in the extension of social security programmes. It was also manifest in the USA in the early 1960s in the Kennedy administration’s emphasis on civil rights and the prevention of discrimination on the grounds of race, religion or sex. In 1962, Kennedy signed the Social Service Amendments into law, increasing the support by the states for job training, placement and counselling for those on public assistance (Marwick, 1998: 26) It was evident again one year later when President Kennedy issued ‘the White House Special Message on Civil Rights’ backing up through federal funds the rights to vote and to education, the extension and expansion of the Civil Rights Commission, and the prevention of employment discrimination. In 1965 it was again clearly apparent in President Lyndon B. Johnson’s

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‘Great Society’ programme of social and economic reform, which resulted in the Voting Rights Act, later the Community Action Plans, and, in 1968, in the Fair Housing Act and Affirmative Action Plans that introduced positive discrimination for non-white males and quotas for university admissions and state employment. In Britain such a change can also be seen the early 1960s when the Conservative government altered the system of flat-rate contributions to national insurance to a scheme in which higher-income employees paid more than their lower-income colleagues in return for an additional earnings-related pension. In 1960, birth control pills become available through the National Health Service after their availability was backed by the health minister, Enoch Powell. In 1965 the Labour government introduced the Redundancy Payments Act, which introduced the right to statutory redundancy pay for the first time, which was followed in 1966 by the Ministry of Social Security Act: these both followed the trend towards redistribution on behalf of the poorest and least protected. As for civil rights, in 1965 capital punishment was suspended and later abolished permanently; in 1965 the Race Relations Act outlawed public racial discrimination; in 1967 the Abortion Reform Bill was introduced as well as the Sexual Offences Act, which decriminalized male homosexuality; in 1968 the Theatres Act ended the Lord Chamberlain’s censorship of the theatre; in 1969 the voting age was lowered to 18 years. All these examples are characteristic of a period in which pluralism and a commitment to political and social equality had become paramount values. In Italy in the early 1960s, reforms were planned but not adopted. This was partly due to political polarization among Communist, Socialist and Christian Democrat parties and their inability to form stable coalitions and thereby make any decisions. However, even Italy could not escape from the developments taking place elsewhere. Some even claim that the events that occurred there were more extreme than in other countries. Perhaps because of the absence of concrete reforms, Italy was one of the first countries where a revolutionary atmosphere became tangible. The student strikes in Trento in November 1967, then in Milan and Turin, followed by Genoa and Naples in December 1967 and Florence in January and Pisa in February 1968 occurred even before the May 1968 événements in Paris that erupted in student revolts, strikes and the occupation of the Sorbonne (Marwick, 1998: 586ff). In Italy the protests and demonstrations continued

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and became more violent when the working class joined in constant marches and picketing and in the general strikes in November 1968 and February–May 1969. They resulted in reforms that reflected those in many other countries. A programme called national democratic programming emerged; a comprehensive body of labour legislation, the Statuto dei Lavoratori, passed parliament in 1970, which established employee participation, employee councils and the right to protection in dangerous jobs as well as the right to appeal to the courts against unfair dismissal (Ginsborg, 1990: 328); and laws were passed on divorce, housing reform, the establishment of fair-rents system for tenants in state-owned housing, the establishment of regional governments induced by arguments for democratization, and the institution of referenda, all within one year (see also Kogan, 1983: 242ff). Developments in other countries show similar trends in this period. One can point to Belgium, France and Germany, where student revolts and labour strikes were equally visible. What is important for my argument that the high sixties form the most extreme example of the pluralist model is the fact that the formation of democratic institutions during that period conform to the model set out in Table 5.2. 5.4.3 The public management model: societal actors as clients The 1980s can be seen as the period in which the concept of societal groups as customers or clients was dominant. There are many indicators supporting this observation. First, there were policy champions such as the American President Ronald Reagan and the British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. They both wanted a distinction between policy and service delivery and stressed the importance of a customer focus in public service delivery. In their view, this implied the reorganizing, that is, downsizing, of government based on the idea that government should act like the free market, and that customers should be able to exercise choice, as well as have the right to the swift and efficient delivery of services. Based on theories such as public choice and monetarism, as opposed to Keynesian policies, they stressed the need to improve public management instead of public administration. In the UK it resulted, for instance, in a number reforms aimed at better public service delivery; at first primarily to achieve more efficiency and ultimately to become

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more customer-focused. In 1979, the so-called Efficiency Scrutinies were introduced, aimed at reducing the scale of the public sector by questioning and redefining the role of the state. This involved privatization and a focus on efficiency and economy in management. This was followed in 1982 by the Financial Management Initiative within the Civil Service. It required public managers to take more responsibility for planning and managing their budgets and outputs. In 1984, local governments were required to comply with Compulsory Competitive Tendering in their service delivery. In 1988 this was followed by the Next Steps report for the Efficiency Unit. Thatcher therefore was a champion of restructuring public management in order to improve service delivery. The culmination of these policies came in 1991 with the launch of the Citizens Charter, designed to improve public services by introducing standards of service, measuring goal achievement and encouraging more responsiveness to service users (see www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/civilservice/rsUK.pdf). The Reagan and Thatcher policies were followed elsewhere in Europe and the developed world. The emphasis on citizens as consumers/clients was apparent in a number of developments. Many countries that did not already have an ombudsman established or modified an ombudsman function in the 1980s and 1990s (Norway, 1980; Ireland, 1980; Netherlands, 1981; Austria, 1982; Spain, 1981; Italy 1991; Sweden, 1986; Poland, 1987; and the USA in various years at the state level). In 1987 the OECD published its report Administration as Service: The Public as Client, which recognized this trend all over the world (OECD, 1987a). In this report the OECD sums up what the economically developed countries were doing to improve their service delivery. It starts by quoting the Norwegian long-term plan of 1986: ‘The public administration must respond to the public’s rights, wishes and needs’ (ibid.: 5), and presents an overview of what was being done in this respect in its member states. In defining ‘clients’, it covered more than citizens (it also included enterprises), recognized that the citizen is a taxpayer and that ‘citizen’ is a more active word than ‘customer’ or ‘user’, and asserted that in relation to government reform, ‘the client is king’ (ibid.: 10–11). The resulting policies were based on public opinion surveys, meeting clients’ needs, ensuring access and encouraging active participation; unlike in the previous period when participation was seen as a challenge to policies, now it was intended to improve

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administrative procedures, ensure communication and feedback, and make implementation coherent and clear. Compared to the previous model, the measures were much more pragmatic and less ideological. The policies resulted in downsizing government, less regulation, more marketization, and the creation of one-stop shops and walk-in centres, where clients could get information, leaflets and brochures (ibid.: 59). It was all about rethinking organization from front office to back office, recruiting and training contact staff, introducing performance standards and changing public administration into a service delivery system that works as a servant of the people. All of the points shown in the relevant section of Table 5.2 were introduced in one form or another in OECD countries. Other accounts of the results of these new policies in various countries, such as Hong Kong, New Zealand, Australia, France, Sweden and the UK, are often included under the topic of public sector reform and can be found in many books and articles on the subject (for comparative analyses see Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000/2004 or Lane, 1997; see also Pollitt, Birchall and Putman, 1998; Cheung, 1992; Alford, 2002; Brown, Ryan and Parker, 2000).

5.4.4 The governance model: societal actors as partners At the beginning of the 1990s, a new model emerged. The terms under which it is known vary. Some call it neo-managerialism (Terry, 1998), others the post-bureaucratic paradigm (Aucoin, 1990; Barzelay, 1992), and still others New Public Management (Hood, 1991), market-based public administration (Lan and Rosenbloom, 1992), entrepreneurial government (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992) or, in business literature, Total Quality Management. Two common themes in all of these models is their rejection of traditional public administration and an emphasis that there is more than just efficiency at stake. They stress the importance of outputs as well as inputs, and they emphasize the importance of flexibility, accountability, competition, marketization, performance measurement, but above all customer focus. As Osborne and Gaebler state in their classic book Reinventing Government (1992), government should not just be efficient, but catalytic, that is, delegating responsibilities, community-owned, competitive, mission-driven, goal- and result-oriented, customer-driven and market-oriented, enterprising,

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anticipatory and decentralized. The emphasis is not on service delivery for the client, but on service delivery together with the client – a term that was quickly altered to partner. And during the 1990s, a model slowly emerged that we identified as the governance model, which included societal groups as partners. The focus was no longer on the efficiency of service delivery, but on agreements between governments and societal groups, deliberation, negotiation, information exchange, creating win-win situations and public-private partnerships. In this model, information exchange between partners was emphasized in order to understand others’ positions and to investigate where interests meet and where win-win situations might be possible. This trend is reflected in the 2001 OECD publication Citizens as Partners, which stresses the importance of information exchange – that is, transparency and accountability – to the achievement of better public policy, greater trust in government, stronger democracy and meeting citizens’ expectations. They suggest institution building, transparency and disseminating information in an active and timely manner as essential elements. The OECD advocates the introduction of consultation procedures, consultative referenda, impact assessments, automatic legal review, ongoing consulting (such as meeting hours for decision-makers), citizens’ panels, advisory committees, citizen juries, consensus conferences, evaluations, joint working groups, open working groups, participatory vision or scenario development, citizen fora and dialogue processes (OECD, 2001: 60ff). On the one hand the model is much broader in scope than the customer model, but on the other hand it is more superficial. It resulted in a reconceptualization of public choice theory; as Self describes it: A basic goal of public choice writers was to empower consumers by giving them a wider choice of services. The intention is to stimulate competition, and to reduce the powers of bureaucrats to act as gate keepers, controlling the allocation of services in a paternalistic or authoritarian manner. Public providers would no longer have a monopoly position, but would have to compete for clients with each other and preferably with private providers as well (Self, 1993: 129). Many governments introduced this new model. Public-private partnerships were especially visible in infrastructure projects (railways,

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subways and highways) in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK and the USA. They emerged in international organizations working together with non-governmental organizations in technical assistance projects such as: the introduction of no-till cultivation among smallholders by a consortium of public and private entities in Brazil; private delivery of publicly developed sorghum and millet hybrids for dry-land farmers in India; and public-private partnerships to develop and market insect-resistant maize seed coatings for farmers in less-favoured lands in Kenya.∗ Some governments made it the crux of their mission. In 1992, Jeff Kennett became the leader of the Victorian state government in Australia for the Liberal party. Afterwards, he said that this resulted in: Every domain and activity of government being examined to determine whether it is efficient, effective, high quality and meets the genuine needs of Victorians. We look at the way it is delivered – whether in fact the Government should be the manager or provider in a particular area, or if it is better that we set the guidelines and farm its operations out to the private sector or the community itself (Kennett, 1995: 1). Although this governance model has been adopted in part by many countries, it will be argued in the next section that the most illustrative example of this model can be found in the Netherlands in the 1990s when it became renowned for its so-called ‘polder model’. In order to understand the crux of this model, representatives from many countries came to the Netherlands and the model was recommended by the Dutch Prime Minister in many countries.

5.5 An in-depth analysis of developments in the Netherlands Before presenting the implementation of this polder model, I provide an in-depth account of the developments in the Netherlands since 1945 regarding state-citizen relations.

∗

See, for instance the website for the International Food Policy Research Institute on public-private parnerships, at: www.ifpri.org/themes/ppp/ppp.asp

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5.5.1 The hierarchical 1950s Societal developments in the Netherlands after the Second World War are well documented. The literature on Dutch pillarization, which expanded until approximately the beginning of the 1960s, is extensive (see Lijphart, 1968; Kruyt, 1959; Thurlings, 1971; Pennings, 1991). Pillarization was a system in which a plural society was organized along ideological and religious lines. All organizations were pillar-bound, being accessible exclusively to Catholics, Protestants, Socialists or Liberals, and closed to members of the other pillars. What is important for understanding this period, yet it is often neglected, is the fact that pillarization in the 1950s was partly based on fear. At the end of the 1940s, a major debate took place in the government about the lack of morals in society, problems caused by adolescents, and the general lack of trust in society. It resulted in extensive sociographic research into the state of the nation and possibilities for containing the dangers of an ill-disposed population and especially the depravity of youth (Tromp, 1995: 171). Although scholars differ in their opinions as to whether pillarization was a deliberately planned process, this response to the fear of instability was an extension of a system which had already existed along party lines before the war. The argument that this pillarized system and the strong dividing lines within it were created by elites has been put by Steiniger (1975), Scholten (1980) and Stuurman (1983), among others. The ultimate consequence of this system was a nearly complete organization of society along ideological/religious lines. The separation between the Catholic, Protestant and secular pillars, as well as homogeneity within the pillars, increased rapidly. Institutionalization of the pillars was particularly striking along Catholic and Protestant lines. At the end of the 1950s, 80 to 90 per cent of Catholics sent their children to Catholic schools, were members of Catholic trade unions, voted for Catholic parties, read a Catholic newspaper and were members of a Catholic broadcasting station. Furthermore, the political leaders were often the editors-in-chief of their pillar-bound newspapers (Thurlings, 1971). This organizational institutionalization along ideological lines was strong in education, socialization, youth clubs and charitable work (Pennings, 1991: 102). Marriage, social contacts, financial assistance and economic relations also took place primarily within the pillars. The pillars constituted a system of strong social

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control of a divided population by the elites (Van Doorn, 1956). The fact that members obtained information from the elite belonging to the same religious/ideological community contributed to identity building and, as Lijphart puts it, an inherent propensity to be adherent, loyal and obedient to the demands of the elites (Lijphart, 1968: 136). The institutionalization of pillarization reached its zenith in the early 1960s. It resulted in a stable society characterized by a politically passive population (seen, for instance, in the stable outcomes of parliamentary, provincial and local council elections). In terms of social capital, it was nevertheless a very active population and one that enjoyed the increase in wealth and care provided by the political and religious elites. These, in turn, were relatively certain of the support of their constituencies. The pillars provided a stable foundation and power base for the elites and an instrument to control the behaviour of the masses and to prevent them from acting in such a way as to destabilize society. By means of rules for organization, registration, an effective way of dealing with information and communication, and public subsidies, the elites were able to initiate, react and imitate in order to induce a self-reinforcing and expanding process of pillarization (Pennings, 1991: 112). The elites also contributed to the stability of the plural society by de-politicizing important issues. This was done, for instance, through a large number of technocratic advisory boards and experts who determined the political agenda by communicating their common interpretation of reality. As mentioned in Chapter 3, meetings of the council of ministers became inconceivable without the contribution of a series of such advisers. The president of the central bank, the managing director of the Central Planning Bureau, the president-director of the economic and military aid programme, the secretary general of the Department of Economic Affairs, the director general of prices, the state adviser for finance, the chairman of the Central Economic Commission (CEC) and the director of the Socio-Economic Council were all regularly present at meetings of the council of ministers. A member of the council of ministers could therefore hardly disregard their advice (Maas and Clerkx, 1996: 788). Some have called this development the mathematization of society (Alberts, 1998), causing a change in mentality in this period by which the paralyzing effects of conflict between existing contrasting

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ideologies could be neutralized or mitigated. Alberts talks about a predominantly rational, intellectual and calculated mentality (ibid.: 452). The basic motive was to establish a scientific base in order to formulate a principle that would transcend the direct interests of the different societal groups. Techniques such as operational research and econometrics flourished and, … mathematics […] supported the characteristic fading of political conflicts because it enforced a common interpretation of reality in terms of mathematical deductive logic. The perspective of planning, control, steering and command, and an evolving welfare state, demanded a perspective of society and its problems in mathematical structures and quantitative relations […] and because reality was seen as knowable, controllable and steerable within a scientific structure unrelated to political visions, the political differences could shrivel into irrelevant appendages which, in mathematical terms, were trivial (ibid.: 449). There was a high level of trust in the carefully conceived plans of experts. Because this added to the de-politicization of consociational democracy, the predominant view was that policies had to constitute a proportional fair distribution over the pillars, and had to have a scientific rationale. If these criteria were contradictory, the policy was likely to be postponed or further de-politicized in order to avoid conflict between the elites. Some scholars talk about the ‘ideological hypothermia’ of the period, in which ideologies were suppressed and replaced by something called the ‘general interest’ (Schuyt, 2000: 70). The combination of apprehension and quantification resulted in the pursuit of a specific kind of planning, that is, planning as a political activity based on social and economic science (Alberts, 1998: 40–2). Hence, the government covered the new policy areas with a range of committees and commissioned research, advisory boards and consultants, always accompanied by experts guided by their scientific approach (ibid.: 444). New institutions were founded, such as the Socio-Economic Council, the Central Planning Bureau, or the Department of Social Welfare. Equally popular were the yearly industrialization reports and the establishment of scientific boards, foundations and associations – examples include the Institute for Professional Care, Advice and Information, the Construction

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Centre, the Quality Service Centre for Industry, the Study Centre for Administrative Automation, the Mathematical Centre, the National Technological Organization, and the Foundation for the Enhancement of Productivity – as well as the development of market research and opinion poll bureaus, including the Dutch Statistical Organization and the National Institute for Opinion Polls (NIPO). A network of government institutions led by experts spread over the country and government planners enhanced the authority of ministers over parliament (Von der Dunk, 1986a: 15). These experts encountered one another through the pillars on the basis of mutual respect and technical know-how (Alberts, 1998: 445). The impact of this institutionalization of expertise is evident in the fact that the ‘objective’ advice resulted in the de-politicization of political issues. Even in administration, the number of economists bringing in technical, quantitative and supposedly more objective knowledge exceeded the number of lawyers, who had previously been dominant in the national administration (Bemelmans-Videc, 1984) The result was the formulation of policy goals for which the likely consequences were carefully calculated by mathematicians and economists. The dominant kind of policy-making was one in which technocrats had the final say, in which the basic criterion was wellplanned policies with calculated long-term impacts that conformed to the demands of the technocratic planners (Van Kersbergen, 1995: 91). There were no extra-parliamentary actions, and any social disturbance or resistance, for instance by strikes, was taboo. Even parliament itself had little influence since policies were proposed by the cabinet and no one dared to oppose those plans (Maas and Clerkx, 1996). The second consequence of the implemented policies and the predominance of legislation was uniformity and standardization based on the idea that everyone was equal. Consensus-seeking and moderate behaviour on the part of the elites determined the outcomes of policies. The rules were relatively simple: de-politicize, compromise and consider minority positions before making decisions (Lijphart, 1968). Based on stable support for the different political parties, it was possible and necessary, in the eyes of the elites, to see citizens as subjects of the policies. In this period, neither politicians nor scientists sought regular contact with the population or communicated their plans to them. Politicians acted solely on behalf of their own constituency and their superiors (Schuyt, 2000: 411). The idea of a government telling the

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people how to live was rejected; that aspect was taken care of by the pillarized private sector. After the German occupation, such communication was considered inappropriate because it was considered that a government should not interfere with culture or propaganda (Schuyt, 2000). The fact that one could not do entirely without such communication is evident in what was communicated, namely the progress in living conditions compared to the war years a decade earlier, and of course the content of new laws to which everyone had to adhere. Policies on culture show how far-reaching this system was. With a conservative and paternalistic-religious undertone, the government emphasized the registration and control of consumption, even with regard to the spread of culture (Schuyt, 2000: 408). It acted as gatekeeper in order to control which artists, painters, musicians and film-makers could use the platforms. Political leaders from different pillars were convinced that government – that is, the experts advising government – should take an active role in the planning of culture, science and technology (Knulst, 1993). The nature of the indicators, and especially their combination in this period, fit Model A, the governability model. As for procedural measures in this period, the rules of consociational democracy with a dominant role for political elites prevailed. The emphasis on policies based on scientific and especially macro-economic models, as well as the initiation of extensive sociographic research and documentation, point to a specific kind of information measure typical of the governability model. Consultative measures are characterized by the increasing influence of scientists and especially economists and economic institutes on government policy. Institutional measures were taken through the creation of new economic and sociographic expertise centres. Finally, the restructuring measures show a period with an increasing impact from the pillarization process and an attempt to control individual behaviour and standardize societal developments – with an oblivious population. 5.5.2 The ‘democratization’ era At the beginning of the 1960s, all of these stabilizing policies had accomplished their goals. There had been consistent economic growth throughout the preceding years, the pillars had made the pluralistic population politically stable, and the welfare state was well on

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the way to being established. Seeing these accomplishments, several politicians from the various pillars began stress a new phase, namely personal development. The Social Democratic leader wrote an appealing chapter about quality of life in which he stressed the necessity of equal opportunities for individuals to develop their personality within the community (Den Uyl, 1963). Catholic bishops published a number of manuscripts stressing the independence and maturity of Catholic organizations, for which guidance from the Catholic Church was no longer necessary (Kennedy, 1995: 95). The parliamentary elections in 1963 showed major shifts for the first time (De Hond, 1986: 62). The protesting Farmers Party and the Pacifist Socialist Party, established in the late 1950s, won their first parliamentary seats in 1963. Swing voters, who in the Netherlands had rarely been seen, gained increasing influence in the political arena. Between 1963 and 1967, three different coalitions succeeded one another in rapid succession. New political parties emerged, such as the Democratic Socialists in 1966, who obtained 4.5 per cent of the votes in that year, nearly 7 per cent in 1971 and 11 per cent in 1981. These were the early stages of the new era. Beginning in 1963, the stability and predictability of the elections slowly but steadily diminished and the degree to which Catholics voted for the Catholic party and non-religious workers voted for the Social Democratic party diminished as well (De Hond, 1986: 63). In the eight years between 1963 and 1972, the Catholic party lost nearly half of its following, and all Christian parties together lost more than 17.9 per cent. The percentage of votes for the Social Democrats fluctuated between 23 per cent in 1967 and 33.8 per cent in 1977. In comparison, the electoral outcomes in the previous period had been much more stable, with between 28.7 per cent and 31.7 per cent of votes for the Catholic party and between 25.6 per cent and 30.3 per cent of votes for the Social Democrats in the period between 1946 and 1959. Even the Catholic leaders and the Catholic Church as such, under Pope John XXIII, began organizing meetings in which democratization within the Church was the main topic (Thurlings, 1971). The time was considered ripe for entering a new era characterized by the development of the less material side of welfare, later to be characterized by Inglehart as ‘post-materialistic values’ (Inglehart, 1971). The sociological and political emancipation of the population was emphasized. The first small demonstrations were seen in the early

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1960s. These developed into more massive events from 1964 onwards. Protests and revolts against authority, an unintended side-effect of the objective to enhance intangible welfare, quickly led to the need to control and institutionalize these processes. In 1965, Prime Minister Joseph Cals called intangible welfare a crucial part of the mission of his coalition. It did not take long to establish a Ministry of Culture, Recreation and Societal Work as an institutional measure to steer the new developments. Societal work, along with the number of community and socio-cultural training centres, increased. Libraries, youth work, job corps programmes, subsidies for the arts, museums, recreation areas, sports accommodation and the protection of monuments all received four to ten times as much in grants from government in 1971 as they had in 1963 (based on figures over various years from the Central Bureau of Statistics). Although the political elites could not have foreseen these consequences of the process of increasing the intangible welfare of their population, it was nevertheless a process initiated by them. They were unanimous in their goal of personal development, stressing the non-material aspects of the welfare state, and worked hard toward institutionalizing the process. This was also seen within government, where policy-making positions were increasingly assumed by social scientists who had graduated in political science and sociology (Bemelmans-Videc, 1984). One major policy-maker remarked that by 1962–3, sociologists had entered government and were criticizing the economic models on which planning in the previous decade had been based. The economists, who had gradually entered into leading positions from the early 1950s, were now slowly but definitely being replaced by individuals with less economic interest and more feeling for societal developments (Bemelmans-Videc, 1984: 441ff). The developments were also institutionalized in laws, such as that on works councils in the 1970s, and in the growth of social work and community work. As in the early 1950s, when the Central Planning Bureau (Centraal Planbureau: CPB) was established as a reflection of the dominant economic mood of the time, the late 1960s saw increasing attention paid to the need for social planning. This was to be achieved through the establishment of the Scientific Council for Government Policies and, in 1973, the establishment of the Social Cultural Planning Office (Sociaal Cultureel Planbureau: SCP). One of its objectives was to register the degree to which the population

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participated politically and how that participation developed. Just as the technocratic tendencies of the 1950s resulted in the creation of various economic offices, the establishment of these sociologically oriented offices also was an indicator of tendencies of the times. Their objectives were, however, somewhat different. The Social Cultural Planning Office was intended to provide the government with information about socio-cultural developments in society, the welfare of people and their opinions about it, and in-depth, longitudinal studies. Whereas the CPB was created in the 1950s for economic analyses, the SCP was established in the 1970s in order to conduct sociological analyses. The goal was to institutionalize a science for policy in order to regulate what was called ‘emerging societal activation’. The underlying idea was that lack of relevant information could adversely affect democratic decision-making processes, which could then lead to emotional decisions based on pressure group activity instead of rational decisions from that part of the population with satisfactory insights (Commission Wolff 1970: 8). The political elites were increasingly confronted with a politicized society, societal unrest and mass political participation. These developments called for new policy processes and institutions to be established in order to control this societal activism. During this period the dominant design of policy-making increasingly conformed to Model B, the pluralist model (as shown on Table 5.2). Political polarization increased as the conflicts between political parties grew, resulting in several political crises. Only one cabinet in the period between 1963 and 1982 was able to stay in power for the full four-year term. In Dutch society the number of workers involved in strikes and the number of labour disputes reached its peak in 1980, while the number of working days lost due to strikes was at its highest in 1983 (Central Office of Statistics: CBS: several annual editions). Survey data indicate that it was during this period that the greatest variance existed in voters’ left/right positions on the political scale – an indication of the huge political differences at play (Sociaal Cultureel Planbureau, 1998). Furthermore, the number of swing voters increased, resulting in unexpected election outcomes. The institutionalization of this process, at first intended to increase public awareness and to enhance the development of personal talents and abilities, became increasingly indicative of an attempt to contain the societal forces that had been unleashed. The establishment of a

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new ministry, a new social cultural planning office, the extension of social work, libraries, youth work, job corps programmes, subsidies for the arts, museums, recreation areas and sports accommodation reflected the shift in attention from an economic towards a more socio-cultural approach. The fact that the democratization process became increasingly institutionalized in special offices, arrangements, laws and regulations was yet another indication. The procedural measures taken by policy-makers were increasingly based on sociological knowledge instead of economic expertise. Information measures emphasized social, and especially interactive, planning models. They were not based on economic developments, but rather on discussion, consultation, negotiation and deliberation with specific societal groups. The goal was to confront different interests and to mitigate the negative consequences that policies might have for certain groups by compensating those groups. Institutional measures were reflected in the growing numbers of university students who enrolled in social science departments, and the initiation of extensive sociological research by the Social Cultural Planning Office. The restructuring measures were no longer aimed at standardization, but at finding a way to deal with the variance in opinion and the bottlenecks in decision-making processes. Policy processes were aimed at minimizing opposition and, at the same time, controlling complex policy processes. In contrast to the previous period, this was not done by imposing some law or regulation on the population, nor was the problem managed by de-politicizing it and seeking expert opinion. In this period the solution was mainly sought through consultation and deliberation with societal groups and democratization of the policy process. Although relations between government and societal groups never became totally horizontal, the former could not develop policies without such consultation and deliberation, and therefore had to approach the representatives of societal groups in a much less hierarchical way than before. At the beginning of the 1980s, developments had accomplished the original objectives as defined by the political elites in the early 1960s, although at that time they could hardly have imagined what the proposed development of personal talents and abilities would imply. When demonstrations were held against the deployment of US cruise missiles in the early 1980s, almost one million people joined the protests and over 2.5 million signed a petition. This event was the zenith of the democratization era.

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5.5.3 Improving service delivery: the citizen as a client This event also marked the end of that era because new problems had emerged in the meantime. In the early 1980s, the economic crisis hit the Netherlands hard. The profitability of Dutch companies reached its lowest point in the early 1980s (Delsen, 2002: 28). Reports and diagnoses of the situation, by the Central Planning Bureau, the scientific council for government policy, and a state commission led by the industrialist G. A. Wagner, simultaneously pointed to the need for farreaching reductions in governmental expenditures. Representatives of employers’ organizations and trade unions reached consensus on income policy. In the ‘Wassenaar Agreement’, negotiated in the city of Wassenaar in 1982, the parties agreed that the disastrous economic situation, the negative outlook on future economic prospects, increasing unemployment, government deficits and the high inflation rate should result in regulated wages, redistributed work hours and a serious focus on youth unemployment. In addition to these events, two other events made 1982 a watershed between two periods. First, in 1982 the institution of the ombudsman was introduced in the Netherlands. It was intended to be an independent institution for the resolution of citizens’ complaints about the government. The ombudsman law stated that there was an increasing need for a special service to investigate ‘how government behaved in its relation to its citizens’. Second, a new government coalition came to the fore, between Christian Democrats and the (conservative) Liberal party. This coalition was possible partly because the political polarization of the previous era had got out of hand. The 1981–2 coalition between Social Democrats and Christian Democrats had lasted less than a year, due to ideological and personal conflicts. The conflict model eventually became detrimental to economic development. On the basis of the Wassenaar Agreement of 1982, the government took a step backwards by reducing its own role in steering society (Delsen, 2002: 186). The new government interpreted the agreement between the representatives of employers and trade unions as an opportunity to freeze civil servants’ wages, and later, at a lower level, minimum wages and social benefits. The three subsequent cabinets under the same premier opted for: reducing social benefits; encouraging economic recovery by improving the competitive position of Dutch business enterprises; increasing employment without raising employment costs;

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and, finally, reducing the influence of government in society in favour of the market by minimizing governmental outlays and reducing subsidies which had expanded during the previous period (Sociaal Cultureel Planbureau, 1998: 100). In order to reduce conflict and create some cohesion again, the emphasis was placed on the reorganization of the internal governmental structure. The new goals were: less bureaucracy, more deregulation, more decentralization, more efficiency, economic development, shorter working hours, better service delivery and one-stop shops, a return to the core business, and no-nonsense, flexible and tailor-made policies. Nobody could disagree with this at the time, although 20 years later it is evident that there were hidden side-effects in terms of increasing inequality between the so-called insiders and outsiders (Delsen, 2002: 186). The concepts that increasingly dominated political discourse also became central in the science of public and business administration and in organization studies. Given the economic developments and the reaction from government, it is no wonder that the central advisory position of social scientists and community workers was gradually replaced by the increasing influence of individuals from public and business administration. They occupied the new advisory boards when government started to concentrate on the so-called ‘great operations’, that is, decentralization, deregulation, privatization, and reconsideration and reorganization of the civil service (Sociaal Cultureel Planbureau, 1992: 480). The developments imply the end of ideology-based interaction, that is, conflicts between government and interest groups, and the beginning of a period in which government concentrated on its core tasks, that is, public-service delivery through a downsized governmental apparatus. Public-service delivery by private or privatized organizations was preferred because competition was deemed a necessary condition for better quality and greater efficiency, and the monopoly position of the public sector was seen as an impediment to such improvements. Decentralization was also promoted by pointing to improvements in service delivery when the responsible authorities were closer to the citizens. Changes in policy-making processes were reflected in the changing language. Policies slowly but definitively became ‘products’ and the citizens ‘clients’. As in other client-service delivery systems, the

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government began measuring clients’ preferences through surveys, ‘omnibus research’, complaint regulations, hearings and focus groups. On the basis of such research, city halls changed into one-stop shops with generalist front-office managers supported by an efficient and specialized back office. The message was that the public did not want political antagonism but high-level service delivery by a ‘smart’ public sector. The fact that hierarchical relations were simultaneously restored is seen in the policies regarding social security, including cutbacks, scholarships, the downsizing of community centres, the abolition of several subsidies, cutbacks in health care, and the termination of several university programmes. Government concentrated on the administrative side and increasingly abandoned its public activities. As an illustration, in social housing the number of houses built with government subsidies shrunk from 82 per cent in 1982 to 30 per cent in 1994. Notwithstanding societal protests, the government pursued these plans without many problems. The policies reached an apotheosis under the third coalition led by the same prime minister as when the ‘great efficiency operation’ was launched. By then, nearly every policy area was penetrated by the overarching goal of increased efficiency. As to the participation of the public in policy-making processes, from 1985 onwards the municipalities were obliged to establish public inquiry procedures that formalized how citizens were allowed to have input, how their opinions were to be reported, and how complaints were handled. It was the finishing touch to the formal institutionalization and encapsulation of participation. Of note was the simultaneous decline in the number of people saying they participated in public inquiries – from 17 per cent in 1980 to 11 per cent in 1986 (Sociaal Cultureel Planbureau, 1986: 400). A decay in interest movements became apparent and attention shifted to the opening hours of city halls, the time it took the administration to answer requests from citizens, and the waiting lists at city halls. This era can increasingly be characterized in terms of Model C, the public management model. Trends in the procedural, institutional, consultative and information measures are all indicative of the establishment of a specific relation between the government that concentrated on its role as a service provider that treated the population as clients. Both had the same interest, namely better service delivery. Institutional measures were taken not only at the national level but

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also at local levels through the establishment of local ombudsmen, and ombuds-commissions to control the quality of service delivery of local government. Institutional measures also involved the tendency toward privatization, deregulation, decentralization and the abolition of subsidies. Stress on the need for increased efficiency characterized the new role of government with regard to societal groups. In relation to consultative measures, individuals with a background in public and business administration partly replaced social scientists and community workers. The government coalition was advised by the captains of industry, and its slogan was ‘follow the market’. Restructuring measures reflected a trend toward decentralization, deregulation and one-stop-shop systems (Kickert, 1993). Once again, the Netherlands was not unique in this shift in attention. In 1990, the OECD reported on common trends found in all OECD countries. These trends were: client-orientation; resultorientation; human resource management; increasing importance of performance indicators; information technology; auditing; monitoring; and evaluation (Kickert, 1993: 20). These were part of a global trend towards New Public Management in which hands-on professional management, standards and performance measures, output controls, disaggregation of units, competition, private-sector-style management and discipline and parsimony were the watchwords (Hood, 1991).

5.5.4 Towards a partnership A critical report by the Dutch National Audit Office in 1994 and the outcomes of the political elections in which the Christian Democrats lost their central position to the Social Democrats changed the mood again. In the third cabinet under the same Prime Minister, Ruud Lubbers, politicians lost interest in issues related to efficiency, especially in the newly formed parliament in 1994 (Sociaal Cultureel Planbureau, 1998: 480). The National Audit Office report concluded that privatization in the preceding years lacked the minimally necessary forms of transparency, supervision and inspection in more than half of cases, making democratic control nearly impossible (Lane, 1996: 173). Once again, the result was a reaction, the start of which can be pinpointed to 1994. The Christian Democratic Party lost much of its following and the only possible coalition was one that excluded

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them. The new coalition agreement abandoned the idea of a government retreat and tried to find a new equilibrium in relations between the public sector and society. The reduction in public spending was translated into a stabilizing policy and the Minister of Finance set a new norm involving a strict separation of revenues and expenditures. Increasing revenues were to be used for the reduction of budget deficits, and extra spending by departments was to be financed by cutbacks elsewhere in the same department. Those ministers wanting new policies had to find the finances themselves. For the most part, the budgets for each policy area were fixed. This implied that one could only solve a problem by creating a problem somewhere else. The ministers opted, however, for other solutions. First, they consisted of telling society that it should take part of the responsibility itself, summed up in the adage of creating a ‘responsible society’ in which government supported developments to make citizens independent. The second solution was to try to find financing for public investments in private business, for instance for highways, railways, or for the creation of new business areas, but also in relation to core functions of government such as extended police protection (Koppenjan, 2003). Increasingly, public-private partnerships were created, with governmental agencies developing plans that were advantageous for business, and business financing part of these investments. The consequence was an increased interdependence between the public and private sectors. They needed one another in order to achieve common goals. The argument that the private sector was willing to contribute to large infrastructure investments was often good enough to get controversial plans – such as building the tracks for the highspeed and freight trains from Rotterdam to Germany – through the cabinet and parliament. The general idea developed that the Dutch government did not want to impose its will upon societal groups. This was found, for instance, in the increasing use of ‘covenants’ or negotiated agreements. In these covenants, the public and private sectors negotiated what was to be achieved in the following five years and published that agreement. Instead of making laws and regulations, they increasingly opted for this instrument. It was an alternative that was deemed superior because of its emphasis on social responsibility, voluntarism, win-win situations, and its presumed effectiveness in lowering costs and increasing effectiveness (Bastmeijer, 1994).

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With the same objective, the use of ex-ante licences for business was replaced by general rules. As a result of this policy, the number of firms required to hold an individual environmental licence fell from around 100,000 to 80,000 in the second half of the 1990s (OECD, 1999: 23). At the same time, regulatory reform was initiated, including Regulatory Impact Assessments. This was an instrument to evaluate regulations by assessing the burdens they put on societal groups. As for consultative measures, the government created the Van Lunteren Commission in 1994 to assess administrative burdens. In 1996, this resulted in the target of reducing such burdens, first by 10 per cent and later by 25 per cent. Information measures included business surveys as part of the measurement of the administrative burden. The increase in information measures, accompanied by the increase in sections of the law requiring consultation and deliberation with stakeholders, pointed to the fact that the new developments were noticeable in all sectors, from the environmental sector – where covenants were made with industry and agriculture in order to reduce pollution in the long run, in exchange for grants for research and development – to the tax system – in which business was increasingly allowed to bargain over taxes to be paid. Given financial restrictions, such aspects as societal acceptance and justifiability became the main criteria for judging new public policies. Hence there appeared such new policy instruments as monitoring, permitting policies (which nevertheless did not ignore sanctions for business or individuals who failed to meet all of the legal requirements) and, in general, the seeking of win-win situations. Even deviant behaviour was often tolerated because government did not dare to steer hierarchically; it preferred to come to an agreement about future behaviour rather than condemning past and present behaviour. These policies were not restricted to relations with business. Many examples of such processes are now described in the literature (De Bruijn and Ten Heuvelhof, 1999; Edelenbos and Monnikhof, 1998; Kickert et al., 1997; Brandsen, 2001). In relations with the public at large, the point of departure was also the point of congruence of interests and the means most likely to make the expected consensus more explicit were pursued. Participation was defended by outlining its potential function of creating profits for all participants. The surplus value of legitimizing policies was emphasized. It was not public participation based on conflicts of interest, but negotiation based on

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congruent interests. Changes in the conception of public participation can be seen in the derogatory manner that people in the 1990s referred to public participation based on conflicting interests, which they deemed to be an obstacle to effective policy-making. As a report of the Scientific Office on Governmental Policy put it: ‘The numerous ways to appeal against any small aspect of projects result in objections coming up again and again at different agencies; even if they have already been turned down elsewhere they come up again and again at different agencies. Although an appeal does not usually result in an adjournment, it does delay the process’ (WRR, 1994: 72). Participation based on conflicting interests is something the Dutch government found rather arduous. This was also reflected in new definitions of participation, such as: ‘participation is the goal-oriented examination of possibilities to profit by an investment of manifold societal involvement’ (Van Houten and Von Meijenfeldt, 1996: 14). The participant is seen as a partner, as a ‘responsible co-producer of societal surplus’ (ibid.) as opposed to a stakeholder motivated by his own interests on the agenda, as was the central feature of the definitions of participation in the 1970s (Jolles, 1974). In general, there was a return of governmental interference but, because of reduced (financial) means, the public sector became dependent on the compliance of the target groups and had to strive for acceptance among them. Creating this acceptance required communications skills and these gradually increased in importance. ‘Communicative policy’ became the magic word of the 1990s. It consisted of promoting an external orientation in government, and claiming that policies were based on co-production and extensive deliberation (see Brandsen and Pestoff, 2006; Brandsen and Van Hout, 2006; Pestoff, Osborne and Brandsen, 2006). It made it necessary to appoint communications advisers to support governmental agencies. At the end of this era, there was hardly a public organization remaining without a special communications department, or a politician without a media and communications adviser. The period after 1994 can increasingly be characterized in terms of Model D, the governance model. Government did not want to impose its will on society, but negotiated with societal groups in order to achieve those things the ‘partners’ could agree on, in order to make compliance easier and reduce the burdens of such negotiated steering.

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Communication and deliberation based on congruent interests and on parity instead of hierarchy became the dominant policy design in new policy development. Parity was seen in the use of negotiated agreements, the lack of sanctions, ‘enabling’ polices and, in general, the reluctance to impose the government’s will on societal groups. Institutionally, it was seen in the appointment of public commissions to investigate the problems underlying these practices. The main procedural measures were regulatory impact assessment and the use of negotiated agreements (covenants). Experiments were run on the basis of so-called co-production, that is, deliberation among policymakers and representatives of societal organizations, especially at the beginning of policy-making processes. Attempts to abolish the developments that had taken place in the previous periods were equally important in this period. The government tried to reduce the impact of the Socio-Economic Council and to avoid the obligation to request its advice because antagonistic interests between representatives of business and trade unions were still present in the Council. New procedures for speeding up policy processes were established with the passing of emergency laws to shorten lengthy decision-making processes plagued by conflicting interests. The main criticism of previous arrangements was that participatory procedures resulted in very tedious decision-making processes. As the OECD notes on the Netherlands, despite the widespread use of public consultation in the Netherlands [in the years before], its consultation program is relatively less open to all interested parties, and gives regulators more discretion about when and how to consult, potentially reducing transparency and raising the risk of undue access by special interests (OECD, 1999: 19). At the beginning of 2000, the Dutch economy was booming once again, and there seemed to be no nation as satisfied as the Dutch (Sociaal Culturaal Planbureau, 2000). However, deliberations among groups of people who appeared to be in basic agreement neglected the basic conflicts inherent in social life. Furthermore, the tensions involved in treating citizens as partners, and in emphasizing enhanced legitimacy of programmes and policies as the specific goal of interactive processes, were too often neglected. As pointed out in

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Berry et al. (1993) and Hanna and Folke (1996), societal groups that did not show basic support for the proposals were easily denied access. Singleton (2000) argued that in such circumstances, the general interest can easily be set aside infavour of the profit of partial interests. It has furthermore been argued that, as a result, these interactive policy processes are likely not to fit ‘good’ practices in policy-making (Ophuls and Boyan, 1992). At the beginning of the new millennium, the Dutch government believed that the population was as complacent and satisfied with its achievements as they were themselves. However, in reality a latent anger existed among the population about a government that did not take care of law and order and was too lenient on delinquents. At the end of 2001, this latent dissatisfaction among the population gained a voice in the populist leader Pim Fortuyn, and electoral support for his ideas in 2002 marked the beginning of a change in priorities again. This is seen, for instance, in the recent zero-tolerance policies of the police, or the renewed attention paid to the maintenance and application of laws. The attitude towards government also changed; it was now perceived to be lax in controlling hazardous practices by enterprises. When the Netherlands faced two serious crises, one after a fireworks factory exploded in the centre of a city, and the other after a discotheque burned to the ground because of a lack of government control, such critical views gained even more currency. Furthermore, as one Dutch scholar observed, the policies on public-private partnerships themselves had drawbacks. ‘Co-operation early in the policy process often results in processes without obligations […] No one feels committed to making these processes a success and therefore they often fail’ (Koppenjan, 2003: 119). The darker side of public-private partnerships became visible when, in 2002, a parliamentary commission reported on the widespread fraud and corruption in the building industry, which had bribed and overcharged national, regional and local governments for many years (Commission Vos, 2002).

5.6 Conclusions This chapter has investigated developments in interactive policymaking and the role of societal actors in policy-making processes. Four different models of interactive policy-making were distinguished, based on two dimensions, namely congruent versus antagonistic

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interests, and (dis)parity of power. This is partly, but not entirely, an ideal-type model since each new type is always toned down by the legacy of the previous period and by critical undercurrents prefiguring the beginning of a subsequent period. It is also partly empirical modelling, indicating the elites’ pursuit of the establishment of a specific kind of relation between themselves and societal groups. In a more general longitudinal analysis of the dominance of these models in policy-making processes in Europe and an in-depth analysis of such developments in the Netherlands, I argued that the four models are not simultaneously dominant throughout the period under investigation. Instead, they became dominant one after another. The analysis began with the early 1950s, when policy-makers perceived a gap between the visible and desirable behaviour of the population and therefore between different interests. Policy-makers saw the population mainly as a subject to be steered. Interaction was based on policies intended to correct the behaviour of the target group on the basis of a hierarchical relationship. In the following era, interest groups came to the fore and were taken seriously. The influence of interest groups based on ideological differences and dwindling hierarchical relations became crucial. I argued that in the 1980s, a new model became dominant. In this model, the role of citizens was mainly that of clients, and government’s role was that of a service provider. The underlying assumption was that both had the same interests, namely the improvement of service provision. The final decade of the century witnessed a government that increasingly viewed societal groups as partners, especially business leaders but to some extent also the population at large. This was seen in the increasing use of negotiated agreements instead of laws and regulations, in tolerance towards deviant behaviour, and in the search for win-win situations. The in-depth analysis suggests that more than one type of relation existed in each period. The Dutch government did not only provide services in the 1980s, nor did it only steer hierarchically in the 1950s. However, that is not the point of this chapter. I argued here that the dominance of specific types of interaction between policy-makers and societal groups can be pinpointed to fixed periods, and that these periods overlap with the periods in which new goals were formulated and which are characterized by the dominance of specific policy instruments. New developments are framed within that dominant

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type, the policy agenda is determined by that model, and policy outcomes are judged in terms of its specific criteria. Furthermore, I argued that sequential dominance was evident in the procedural, information, institutional, consultative and restructuring measures taken by the Dutch government. The other models of interaction were not wholly absent, but they were neglected. This neglect explains, in part, the shifts from one dominant model to another. When one stresses harmony and congruence of interests too much for too long and neglects potential conflicts of interest, the neglected side is bound to become pressing and to turn into a determining factor of interaction in the subsequent period. The same goes for hierarchy and horizontal relations. Stressing the hierarchy in a relation neglects possible cooperative efforts appropriate for achieving a common goal or reducing potential drawbacks in policy proposals. On the other hand, when hierarchy is neglected, the fact that in every society there is undesirable behaviour that needs to be monitored, controlled, steered and punished is also neglected. Other factors of change should also be considered in addition to neglect, which is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for change. The next chapter addresses these factors, namely the impact of, for instance, economic developments, of regular cohort replacement, and of developments in other countries.

6 A Model of Fundamental Policy Change and a Final Test

6.1 Introduction This book is about the explanation and prediction of the nature of fundamental policy change. In previous chapters, I argued that the concept of policy generations is a useful concept. My arguments suggest that policy generations exist and that the concept has explanatory and predictive power for the nature of policy change. I argued that we have come a long way in explaining when policy change is likely to occur and why this is so. Based on that knowledge, I tried to move the discussion forward by proposing a model that explains and predicts the direction that such change takes. Based on sociological, cultural and economic theories, this book presents two hypotheses that help us determine which direction policy change is likely to take. First, the theory tells us that we cannot have it all at once. Scarcity requires us to choose what to do and what not to do; this in turn implies that when one activity is emphasized, another is bound to be neglected. Second, the theory suggests that every social system requires continuous and sufficient attention to be paid to four values: problem-solving; considering short-term goal achievement; long-term effectiveness; and solving integration problems – and to implement each value in an efficient way. Furthermore, if one neglects one of these four values for too long, the urgency of that value will increase. Third, according to the theory, if problems cannot all be solved simultaneously, one has to proceed sequentially, solving one problem after another. 158

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The resulting hypothesis expects policy change to head in the direction that has been neglected longest. The second hypothesis tells us that such policy change is visible in all established policy areas – that is, those areas that can be identified and result in public policies for at least 12 years – at approximately the same time and going in the same direction. This is the importance of neglect. In order to predict where policies are going, we need to investigate which problem was neglected most in the preceding period. This most-neglected problem is then likely to become the problem in most urgent need of attention in the subsequent period. Subsequently, I conducted in-depth research on long-term policy change in the Netherlands between the end of the Second World War and the start of the new millennium, and framed it within this hypothesis. This research distinguished five periods, each defined by its own characteristics in terms of major policy goals, dominance of policy instruments used to achieve these goals and the role of different stakeholders in the policy-making process. The results of that study corroborate the hypotheses, justify that the hypotheses are worthy of wider investigation, and illustrate how such research can be conducted. In this concluding chapter, I review and reflect on the steps taken. I start with an overview of the research and proceed with an interpretation of the research within the theoretical framework. Many will wonder why this research ends in 2000. For many observers, the crucial question with regard to developments taking place in the Netherlands is how to explain what is going on at present. One can witness a drastic change in policies since the beginning of this millennium. Two things are most prominent and striking to outsiders: first, the tolerance for which the Netherlands was known for ages seems to be diminishing rapidly. This is especially evident in increasing intolerance towards Islamic refugees, their clothing, schools, media and mosques, indeed towards their presence itself. Second, the reputation for hospitality for which the Dutch were known is fading. We can witness decreasing opportunities for asylum-seekers to enter and stay in the Netherlands, and harsher policies designed to return refugees to their home countries. Third, the outcomes of the national elections in 2002 and 2006, in which profound changes in

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electoral opinions were apparent, resulted in the Netherlands losing its reputation as a politically stable country. Many observers suggest that there has been a fundamental change in Dutch society from being tolerant and liberal towards being intolerant and conservative. They wrestle with the question of how this can be explained. Most observers answer it by pointing to the impact of two political murders: that of the populist leader Pim Fortuyn on 6 May 2002 by a leftist radical, and the killing of the controversial film-maker and publicist Theo van Gogh on 2 November 2004 by an Islamic fundamentalist. Their reasoning emphasizes the emotional shock that went through society, the doubts about interracial integration, and the aversion towards the lack of political transparency and what was generally labelled ‘old politics’ as a result of these events. However, such explanations are similar to the explanations this book started with in the first chapter. They are indicative of the kind of ad hoc explanations that were previously rejected because they disregarded the long-term developments that might offer a more valid explanation. In the third part of this chapter the question of how to explain what is happening in the Netherlands in the first decade of the 21st century is framed within the theory on policy generations. This presents the final test in this book for the hypotheses given above.

6.2 The research The analysis in Chapter 3 of the dynamics in Dutch policy goals in the 1945–2000 period showed that five periods are observable. In these periods, the successive dominant values behind the newly developed policies were: short-term goal achievement – seen in the quick reconstruction of the devastated society just after the Second World War; long-term effectiveness – seen in the construction of the welfare state in the 1950s; integration – seen in the dominance of democratization and the goal of self-development in the late 1960s and 1970s; efficiency – seen in the reorganizations and withdrawal of government in the 1980s; and, once again, short-term goal-achievement – seen in the ad hoc policies of the 1990s. Furthermore, it was shown that these periods overlap the periods that Namenwirth distinguished in 1973. The theory pinpoints fundamental policy changes in 1951 and in 1963 and predicts the

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upsurge of the policy of efficiency from 1982 onwards, as well as the prudent return of government as the central actor steering societal developments from 1994 onwards. In Chapter 4, I argued that these dynamics in goal-setting are also reflected in the usage of policy instruments. By distinguishing four basic types of instruments, I argued that that the dominant use of the instruments follows the same pattern as the policy goals. This is not only evident in the successive use of juridical, economic, organizational and communicative instruments, but also in the different ways new legal instruments were developed. In the 1950s, they were specially designed to dictate what was allowed and not allowed, what entitlements were and what was forbidden. In that period, they had a standardizing effect. In the democratization era, juridical instruments were used to give the economic instruments – subsidies and levies – a legal basis and make citizen participation in the policy process possible. In the 1980s, they were used to support the goal of efficiency, and seen, for instance, in deregulation. And in the 1990s, laws and regulations seemed designed to support the communicative activities typical of the ad hoc policies of that era. In Chapter 5, I argued that these periods were also characterized by a specific view among policy-makers about the role of societal groups. In the 1950s, societal groups were viewed as subjects and target groups whose behaviour had to be steered and controlled. In the 1960s and 1970s, the self-fulfilment of the ‘citoyen’ – whose interests often collided with those of policy-makers – had to be encouraged through widespread participation and consideration. And in the 1980s, they were clients, whose interests were expected to correspond with those of the policy-makers because of their common desire for good service delivery. Changes were evident again in the next period when societal groups were seen as partners and the concept of governance replaced the previous concepts. In all chapters, it was also possible to demonstrate that at the end of each period the attention given to one specific aim was successful and that the instruments utilized were spread widely among various policy areas. Furthermore, I tried to demonstrate that the end of each period was also marked by a strong feeling of neglect of those aspects of policy-making that became central in the next period. This corroborates the first hypothesis in Section 2.3.2. The case study indicates that it indeed seems to be the case that the core of a fundamental policy change

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is always concerned with a shift of attention toward those (aspects) of problems that were the most chronically neglected in the previous policy. It seems that no policy area escapes this underlying fundamental value change, which makes possible the use of the concept of policy generations. All of the areas analysed – taxation, economic policy, social housing, and education, welfare and health policies – seem to show the same trends in approximately the same period (see Helderman, 2007). Although I did not conduct a systematic analysis of innovative policy areas and policy areas lagging behind, I can say that the dominant value of a period penetrated all these areas by the end of the period under study. This supports our second hypothesis, also given in Section 2.3.2: When a new policy generation is born, it will be evident in the new policies in all policy areas. Table 6.1 presents the main characteristics of the five policy generations which emerged in the Netherlands after the Second World War. I distinguish the trouble-shooters, emerging just after the end of the war, who reconstructed society; the caring technocrats, appearing in the 1950s, who built the foundations for the emerging welfare state. In the second half of the 1960s and in the 1970s, there was the increasing dominance of the polarized spenders, who were replaced in the 1980s by the efficient managers. In the 1990s the trouble-shooters pop up again because the managers of the preceding period forgot that societal problems become urgent if nothing is done about them while concentrating on balancing the budget.

6.3 The findings in light of the theory The longitudinal case study also provides insight into the explanatory factors behind the policy changes that occurred from period to period. The factors at the macro, meso and micro levels that are supposed to affect policy change, as mentioned in Chapter 1, as well as the impact of the success and failure of previous policies, can now be specified. 6.3.1 The impact of previous policies The single-sided success of previous policies, in combination with the problems these created through neglect, seems to be the most important factor influencing the emergence of policy generations.

Characteristics of policy generations

Generations

Trouble-shooters

Caring technocrats

Polarized spenders

Efficient managers

Characteristics Period (approximate) Emphasis in terms of: Systems theory Sociological theory Cultural theory Policy development

Until 1949/1994–2001

1950–62/2002–14?

1963–80

1981–93

Output Goal achievement Decisiveness/authority Ad hoc solutions

Outcomes Latent pattern maintenance Long-term planning Standardization

Process Integration Democracy Public participation

Input Adaptation Efficiency Reorganization

Actual policy goal

Reconstruct society

Build the welfare state

Personal self-fulfillment

Smaller public sector

Focus

Short-term results

Long-term results

Inclusion in process

Minimizing costs

Policy instruments Juridical Economic

Temporary decrees Solve urgent problems

Prescribing behaviour Stimulate investment

Instrumental to subsidies Enable variety

Organizational

Minimal

Social planning agencies

Communication

For mutual understanding

Economic planning agencies As means of control

Deregulation Reduce public investments Reorganization

To clarify conflicts

To organize efficiently

Role of societal actors Role of power

Partner Horizontal relations

Subject Hierarchical relations

‘Citoyen’ Horizontal relations

Role of interests

Congruent

Antagonistic

Antagonistic

Client Hierarchical relations Congruent

Neglected most

Long-term effects

Variety

Cost efficiency

Societal problems

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Table 6.1

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It resulted in increasing attention being paid to what was neglected and diminishing attention to what was achieved previously. All of the policy generations were successful in accomplishing their originally stated objectives. This success came at a cost. This cost became more pressing the more and longer it was neglected. It resulted in new problems and new interpretations of already existing problems. The idea that each administration should balance the four values – short-term goal achievement, long-term effectiveness, a democratic policy-making process and efficiency – is therefore not an adequate description of how governments run their affairs in practice. Experts in policy studies, public administration or political science may advocate that government should do it all and should do it all now, but like spoiled children who are never satisfied, what they want is impossible. It is impossible because of the boundary conditions that public policies face. These include the practical problem of scarcity and the theoretical problem of dilemmas of choice between values. Trying to balance the four values simultaneously is likely to result in half-hearted policies, overspending, chaotic behaviour, malfunctioning and inferior performance. If we look at governments’ actual behaviour, we see that they have not tried to balance the values simultaneously, but sequentially. Each individual policy is single-sided, but over a period of approximately 50 years, they have added up to a balanced total. Every individual policy focuses on one aspect and neglects others, but changes over successive periods result in an overall balance over time. Such flexibility is induced by the neglect that creates criticism and public protest. Such criticism is, however, not the result of the failure of the public sector but, on the contrary, of its success. Because of the success of previous policies, additional investments in these policies become increasingly superfluous because of diminishing returns on investment and because of fatigue. Flexible governments will move investment toward the inevitably neglected values. The idea of policy generations is an ambitious theory. It aims to predict the nature and direction of policy change because it aspires to an overall explanation of the policy change process. According to this theory, policy change is neglect-induced. Because by necessity, policymakers have to choose on the basis of their preferences and therefore at the same time have to neglect other values that might contribute to the quality of a policy-making process, criticism becomes inevitable.

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Neglected values become more pressing in time and even more so when they are neglected for too long. Then a reaction is bound to come about, that is, a reaction in which the previously neglected values will become prioritized. A major consequence of this approach is that it suggests that a specific form of policy-making lasts only for a limited period because it is single-sided and neglects other important aspects contributing to the quality of policies. This is contrary to the idea that one can make predictions about future developments by extrapolating from current tendencies. 6.3.2 The impact of macro-level factors Macro-level factors, for instance, economic developments, do seem to have had an accelerating effect on the shifts from one period to another. The shift from the short-term developments after the Second World War towards the emphasis on long-term developments in the 1950s was made possible in part by the money the Netherlands received under the Marshall Plan. The shift from the second to the third model in the early 1960s was made possible in part because of the discovery of a huge gas reserve in 1959 that made excessive spending in the subsequent period possible. The oil crises of 1973 and 1979 and the economic stagflation of the early 1980s intensified the need for increased efficiency and accelerated the shift to the fourth period. The economic growth in the second half of the 1990s made a cautious return of governmental activity in the 1990s possible. Namenwirth (1973) referred to the impact of economic cycles, such as those suggested by Kondratieff, and regardless of whether that theory is correct, it is important to recognize that economic circumstances are equally binding for every policy area. When there is a depression, all policy areas suffer. One may or may not agree over the strength of the impact of economic developments on the possibilities of public policy-making, but one cannot deny that free-market enterprises both create problems and often provide the technological means to solve them (such as in the field of pollution). Furthermore, to a large extent, economic growth determines both the conditions under which governments have to act and the financial means available to implement their policies. Some evidence can also be presented that addresses the political determination of policies and policy change.

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In this view, policy change emerges from the results of elections and resulting changes within the government coalition. The evidence for the importance of this factor can especially be found in the varying results of parliamentary elections during transition periods. From the late 1940s to the beginning of the 1960s, the Social Democrats won the parliamentary elections three times in a row. In the early 1960s, we see protest parties entering the parliament, and at the beginning of the 1980s, the right-wing liberals experienced a landslide victory. In the 1990s, at the start of the third period, the left-wing liberals won elections, and at the beginning of the new millennium, the Populist party led by Pim Fortuyn produced a completely different parliament. The question is, of course, what is causing what. Election results can be seen as the consequence of discontent over the neglect of specific policies. However, in their outcome, that is, a new government coalition, the results of elections appear to be less important. Whether there is a coalition between Christian Democrats and Social Democrats, or between Christian Democrats and the right-wing liberals, or between Social Democrats and the right-wing liberals, or even whether the leftwing liberals are part of the governmental coalition, does not seem to be determinative of the birth of new policy generations. In almost any period we described as a policy generation there was a range of governmental coalitions, from predominantly right-wing to purely left-wing, as well as various mixtures of the two. An explanation for this is that the contents of public policies will change only when the dominant ideology in government changes. Although in some policy areas, the nature of the governmental coalition is decisive, for instance in intangible areas such as abortion, euthanasia and referenda, public policies related to the social-economic area are not linked directly to the nature of the governmental coalition. It is not the case that governmental coalitions that include the Social Democrats result in more redistributive policies or increased public spending than more conservative party coalitions. Some scholars have referred to this as the paradox of Dutch politics; that laws resulting in the largest increase in public expenditure, such as those relating to social security and youth minimum wages, came about when the right-wing parties were part of the governmental coalition. Conversely, the largest retrenchments in public expenditures, for instance, the great efficiency operation in the early 1990s, came about when the Social Democrats were part of the governmental

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coalition. Accordingly, there seems to be evidence in our case studies for the existence of policy change by consensus instead of policy change by conflict (see Wildavski, 1982; Coyle and Wildavski, 1987). Although political parties possess their own issues to which they devote much attention all of the time, the figures in Chapter 3 suggest that periods can be distinguished in which those issues are also advocated by other parties. In the Netherlands in the 1950s, the issue was the development of the welfare state. This was replaced in the second half of the 1960s by the democratization boom, which had mainly been promoted by the Social Democrats before that time. In that period, we saw growing attention paid by all parties to the values of democratization – diversity, self-development and participation. This, in turn, was replaced by a similarly common emphasis on efficiency in the 1980s and a growing shared concern for political authority in the 1990s. 6.3.3 The impact of meso-level factors Another explanation for policy change presented in Chapter 1 is that meso-level factors induce change. Sabatier suggests that policy-makers learn of the failure and success of previous policies and the increase in knowledge results in policy change. This theory postulates that policies change because the actors involved learn from their past experiences and adapt their policies accordingly. Policy actors may learn from new developments, through the transmission and retention of knowledge, previous policies, their failures and their successes. In our theory, such learning is especially evident within periods. At those moments, policy-makers learn how to optimize the dominant criterion. They learn how to make policies more effective in the long term, how to make policies more democratic or efficient, or how to improve goal achievement. With regard to explaining the nature of fundamental policy change, it is hard to interpret this in terms of learning. Perhaps it is better to speak about responsiveness and adaptation. Policy-makers do seem to learn from their environment. If they see that new policies have been developed and successfully implemented in other areas, they tend to copy these policies in their own area. This conforms to theories on mimesis and policy diffusion. Developments in other countries are also influential. Developments within Dutch society were not unique and often reflected policies already developed in

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other countries. The rise of the welfare state in the 1950s, the democratization boom in the 1960s and 1970s, the retreat of government and the rise of what is called the managerial state in the 1980s and early 1990s, and the debate about state-market relations and publicprivate partnerships in the 1990s were apparent in other countries before they became popular in the Netherlands. The third theory mentioned in Chapter 1, the pluralist point of view that policy change is enforced by the mobilization of bias by interest groups and social movements, is partly corroborated. In Chapter 4, it was found that interest groups had a varying impact through the subsequent periods. Only in one period (the late 1960s and 1970s) were such societal groups determinative in the policy-making process. In the other periods, the dominant role of societal groups was as target groups, consumer groups or partners in public-private partnerships. Therefore, this research suggests that the impact of interest groups on policy processes should not be viewed as explanatory for policy change and the emergence of policy generations, but rather as a feature of such generations. An important factor inducing policy change is changes in the public mood. The pluralist view is supported by the finding that at the end of each period, we see public protests and growing criticism of the dominant practices in the previous period. These protests occur not because of the failure of such practices, but perhaps because of their success. The need to continue on the same path diminishes, and the public wants government to tackle the neglected problems. This was seen in the early 1960s in the growing number of demonstrations and unrest among the population; at the end of the 1970s, with the concerns uttered by captains of industry; in the early 1990s when demands for more governmental involvement in a range of societal problems were heard; and in the early years of the new millennium, when people appeared to be much less satisfied with the dominance of permissive policies and ‘polder politics’. Election results showed that the population no longer supported the governmental coalition, which itself was complacent about its achievements in the previous period. 6.3.4 The impact of micro-level factors At the micro-level, we see change and new recruitment and, at the same time, the exit of individuals. A new policy generation comes together with new policy-makers. The policy change we witness can

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be seen as the result of the accession of policy-makers who have grown up in the same era, share similar experiences and hence have similar world views (Mannheim, 1952: 292; Van den Broek, 1996: 17). Regular cohort replacement of policy-makers seems to be a contributing factor to change. They periodically change the rules of the game with new institutional, restructuring, consultative and informational measures. In the Netherlands the regular succession induced by the outcomes of parliamentary elections enhanced flexibility. In the early 1960s, we see the end of pillar-bound voting and an increasing number of swing voters. In the early 1980s, we see electoral change that resulted from the polarization between Social Democrats and Christian Democrats in previous years; this made the coalition between Christian Democrats and the conservative Liberal party possible. The 1994 elections saw defeat for the Christian Democrats, making the ‘purple cabinet’ of Social Democrats and conservative and progressive liberals possible. In 2002 the continuation of this coalition was likewise made impossible by negative election results. The replacement of elites and policy-makers, which does not happen overnight, might account for the brief periods between policy generations in which it is difficult for government to reposition itself because it is clear that continuing on the same path is problematic, even though there is no general consensus on how to proceed. The parity between generations of policy-makers that include older and newer members with opposing views of what is required might inhibit swift transition from one to another policy generation. Political consensus comes about only when the majority of the older policy-makers have left and the new generation becomes dominant. What these generations of policy-makers have in common is that they tend to respond similarly to their shared fears, and over the periods differ because each separate generation of policy-makers has its own interpretation of what should be feared. The content of this study reveals that fear of uncontrolled and unwanted developments on the part of the elites is an important factor and probably a more significant one than responsiveness to shifting societal demands. In the early 1950s, it was the fear of an amoral society; in the early 1960s it was the fear of uncontrolled anti-hierarchical societal actions; at the beginning of the 1980s it was the fear of a bankrupt society; in the 1990s it was the fear of the financial inability to provide an adequate response to the needs existing in society and to adapt society to new international

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developments. At that stage, the idea became increasingly dominant that government and society could no longer allow deviations from the law by accepting risks regarding safety in factories and threats from crime and terrorism.

6.4 A final test: developments after 2000 As stated in the introduction to this chapter, the ultimate test for the theory is applying it to developments taking place in the Netherlands at the moment. Both foreign and Dutch observers tell us that since 2001 the political and societal situation has changed drastically. Although such remarks are congruent with our theory, they are not sufficient to corroborate it. In order to understand the policies from 2000 onwards, the theory first suggests looking back at the preceding policies. The first questions to be answered in this regard are whether the preceding policies were indeed single-sided and successful, and whether the neglected aspects of policy-making and problems were increasingly perceived as urgent. In order to answer these questions, I follow the model presented in Table 6.1, and I analyse the policies of the coalition governments under Prime Minister Wim Kok, who was in office from 1994 until 2002. The second question is whether these developments resulted in the appearance of a new policy generation and, if so, whether that new policy generation has the characteristics one would expect it to have in light of the theory. In order to answer these questions, I test the current policies against the characteristics presented in Table 6.1. Because the analysis concerns the present and the recent past, it cannot be as elaborate as the analyses presented in the preceding chapters. It is necessarily incomplete since the present policy generation – if it exists – is in the middle of its period. 6.4.1 The success of preceding policies It seems that the preceding ‘purple coalition’ of ‘blue’ conservatives and liberals and ‘red’ Social Democrats had indeed achieved its goals at the turn of the millennium. In 1994, the adage was ‘work, work and work’ because of high unemployment. This goal was clearly achieved because by the turn of the

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millennium the economic situation in the Netherlands was characterized by a shortage of labour. The number of jobs had increased by 450,000, which is significant given the Dutch population of 16 million. The second goal was balancing the annual national budget so as not to further increase the deficit. This goal was also achieved. The Minister of Finance was quite buoyant at the beginning of 2001. This goal achievement was also notable in the Queen’s annual speeches, delivered at the opening of Parliament on the third Tuesday in September: they outline government policy for the coming year, reveal budget plans and summarise the general health of the Dutch economy. In 1994, the speech outlined an economic situation that was probably somewhat improving; in 1996, the situation was ‘encouraging’; in 1997, it was ‘relatively positive’; in 1998, ‘more and more positive’; in 1999, ‘very positive’; and in 2000, the speech said the Netherlands was experiencing ‘a period of economic prosperity’. Foreign direct investment in the Netherlands, representing huge amounts of capital, was partly responsible for this economic growth. This FDI was due in part to the good press the Netherlands received from major international publications such as The Economist and The Times, as well as specialist financial journals and agencies such as the British Economist Intelligence Unit and the OECD, who constantly reported that the best investment climate was to be found in the Netherlands. The Prime Minister was repeatedly invited by the leaders of the USA and UK to explain the ‘Dutch miracle’ and the underlying ‘polder model’, in which everything could be negotiated. The Dutch population also became increasingly optimistic. At the turn of the millennium, the Social Cultural Planning Bureau depicted the Dutch as the happiest people on earth (Sociaal Cultureel Planbureau, 2000).

6.4.2 The focus of previous policies Although the previous government had been successful in achieving its goals, its policies can also be said to have been single-sided, with a focus on financial stability and increasing employment through economic growth. Also visible was a growing urgency in all of those policy areas that were neglected, indicated by, for example, the serious shortage of teachers, long waiting lists in health care, increasing traffic congestion (even outside rush hours), the persistent poverty

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rate of 15 per cent, and a growing crime rate, especially with regard to high-volume or petty crime. As to the last problem, during the purple coalition the emphasis had been on fighting organized crime, drug trafficking, people trafficking and dual-use trade. It became increasingly obvious that the previous government’s decision to throw more money at problems had failed to improve the situation in these policy areas. Providing more funding, available because of economic prosperity, did not produce more teachers, or shorten the waiting lists in hospitals. These were structural problems, in need of structural solutions. Furthermore, there were neglected problems regarding immigration and controlling the increasing number of refugees coming into the Netherlands seeking asylum. The waiting lists for receiving notice as to whether they could stay often took longer than five, or even ten, years and the number of refugees waiting for judgements was growing. It was also shown through several reports that these new minorities were not integrating into Dutch society, but this was a problem that was taboo for most politicians. In other policy areas, notably agriculture, environment and infrastructure, it became clear that the short-term negotiations in so-called covenants were much less effective than previously expected. 6.4.3 New problems and threats Therefore, meeting the initial goals did not translate into solving all of the problems. The policies had been as single-sided as those of previous generations, and the population became aware of these problems through a couple of severe threats that had occurred. First, in 2000, a fireworks company in the centre of Enschede, a provincial city in the east of the country, exploded causing several deaths and the devastation of a quarter of the city. Subsequent investigations pointed to a lack of oversight by local, provincial and national governments. Because the mantra of the times had been that business should be facilitated instead of controlled, tons of dangerous fireworks had been stored without anyone checking whether this was in accordance with regulations. The national ombudsman who conducted the investigation pleaded for a cultural revolution in thinking about the role of government in society. In his words, one might and should expect more from government; especially that it would steer and control developments more strongly.

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A similar incident occurred on New Year’s Eve 2001 in the tourist village of Volendam near Amsterdam. A bar burned down when unsafe Christmas decorations caught fire. Several young people died, and even more were injured for life. Again the cause was found in the neglect by government in enforcing health and safety regulations at the bar. These two events signalled the end of the political period in which small misdemeanors were permitted and everything conformed to the idea of facilitating instead of controlling. The idea that business should only be facilitated, and that rules are often redundant and do not have to be upheld, came under sudden and severe scrutiny. A third threat did not occur in the Netherlands, but still had a significant impact on the general mood in all OECD countries, including the Netherlands. This was the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in New York on September 11, 2001. The consequence in the Netherlands was the appearance of a more high-profile attitude among the population calling for harsh actions against Muslims. In previous years, the country was known for its tolerance and hospitality. After 9/11, the mood dramatically changed into one that supported stopping immigration from Muslim countries. This was mainly directed toward Turkish and Moroccan minorities. One Dutch politician took advantage of this mood; the flamboyant homosexual Pim Fortuyn. Even before 9/11, he had portrayed Muslims as having an obtuse culture and as a threat to Western society. He wanted a ban on asylum-seekers and immigrants from outside Europe, and after 9/11 he found many a willing ear among the population. His political party won local elections in Rotterdam at the beginning of 2002. Coming out of nowhere, he won 35 per cent of the votes. The outcomes of these elections were indicative of the latent discontent among the population. All this relates to the next problem occurring in the Netherlands, that is, the murder of Pim Fortuyn in early May 2002, just two weeks before the parliamentary elections. The uproar this caused was previously unknown in Holland – arson, riots, protest demonstrations and a funeral attended by thousands of people and covered live on television. The result was that his party (List Pim Fortuyn: LPF), with him still on the ballot after his death, got one sixth of the seats, a remarkable result for a political party coming out of the blue.

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Because of this result and the unrest within the population, the LPF could not be denied access to the new coalition. However, neither the party nor the coalition lasted for long. Because of internal disputes within the party and personal quarrels among its representatives in government, the coalition government fell one year later. In addition to the large crises, there were a number of other issues that changed policies in the Netherlands. Preceding policies, denounced by some as ‘quick-fix’ policies, were also increasingly criticized, resulting in small crises within these policy areas. For instance, in 2003 it became public knowledge that the tax office had made a deal with the inhabitants of a gypsy encampment at Vinkenslag in the south of Holland. This agreement had since 1990 permitted these individuals to pay a lower tax rate (around 3 per cent) than the average Dutch citizen (on average 25–35 per cent). The deal came about because of the difficulty in controlling business done within gypsy encampments and the expectation that such control would cost more than it would bring in. However, it became clear in 2003 that this deal and the lack of control were being abused by the sometimes criminal gypsies. The minister immediately cancelled the deal and forbade the tax office to make any further deals, be it with individuals, local businesses, multinationals or anyone else. It ended a period in which, following the polder model, everything, including taxes, seemed negotiable. Another major problem occurred in the construction business in 2003. Despite strict regulations, it was proven by records that an accountant had taken when leaving a big construction company that cartels existed and that tenders were prearranged among building contractors. This resulted in contracts being signed for construction works that were far above real costs. This so-called ‘building fraud’ finished off any lingering belief that business could be trusted. At first sight, the problems seem varying in character. However, all these problems had a common impact on the basic idea about the role of societal groups in the policy-making process. The inherent trust between policy-makers and societal groups and the idea that the latter could be seen as ‘partners’, with congruent interests with government, could no longer be sustained. Business groups, individuals, minorities and voters alike all lost part of their trust. This implied a radical disillusion with the assumptions underlying the famous polder model, resulting in the widespread feeling that government had neglected

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steering those groups for too long and that mechanisms had to be found to control societal groups. 6.4.4 The changing perception of urgent neglected problems Policy successes, new pressing problems and the abundance of threats acted as catalysts in bringing about a perception of the urgency of the problems that had been neglected. Among the population, opinions about the urgency of social problems changed. While employment was mentioned as the biggest problem by 64 per cent of the populace in 1995, only 21 per cent mentioned it in 2000 (Sociaal Cultureel Planbureau, 2000). In contrast, the level of concern about problems relating to guardianship, hospitals and old age increased from 65 per cent in 1995 to 88 per cent in 2000. The same can be said for concerns about education. Also noteworthy was the criticism that developed near the end of 2001 that the preceding coalitions had failed to make long-term, sustainable policies. Even Prime Minister Kok acknowledged this failure. During the autumn of 2001, long-term planning was revived and the first so-called long-term explorations appeared. This new mood was promoted by international developments. In the international sphere, the new buzzword was sustainability. Good governance and good policies had not only to solve acute problems, but were also increasingly required to be effective in the long run. This new way of thinking stressed the importance of strong public institutions and a steering government. The secretary general of the UN stated: Weak states are one of the main impediments to effective governance today; at national and international levels alike. For the good of their own people and for the sake of our common aims, we must help to strengthen the capacity of those states to govern, not to undermine them further . . . Notwithstanding the international turmoil that is often associated with globalization, there exists no other entity that competes with or can substitute for the state (Annan, 2000). One of its representatives, Guido Bertucci, argued the following in relation to policy goals for the years to come: ‘Institutional reforms must be home grown, demand and government-driven, carefully

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thought out and mutually consistent’ (United Nations, 2001: 13). In 2002, the World Bank published its annual report, entitled Institutions for Markets, which also stressed the importance of strong and effective public institutions for sustainable development. As it said in 2002: ‘Markets work only if they have rules, enforcement mechanisms, and organizations promoting market transactions . . . Where do such market institutions come from? States or communities can build them’ (World Bank, 2002: 1).

6.4.5 Elite replacement The parliamentary elections of 2002 revealed huge shifts in support for the major parties; leaders of all the major parties left office. Jan Peter Balkenende, born in 1956, became the new leader of the Christian Democratic Party in 2001 after an internal party conflict, and after the 2002 elections he became Prime Minister. He was the first of his generation to take a leading role in policy-making. Wouter Bos, born in 1963, became the leader of the Social Democratic Party in 2003. After the substantial defeat of the Social Democrats in 2002, the previous party leader, Ad Melkert, was temporarily replaced by a Jeltje van Nieuwenhoven, a woman of his generation. But one year later, just before the new elections resulting from the fall of the coalition, Bos was elected party leader. In the conservative party, the VVD, the old party leader, Hans Dijkstal, was also forced to step down after the defeat in the 2002 elections. He was initially replaced by the popular Gerrit Zalm, the former long-serving minister of finance, but before the 2006 elections, Mark Rutte, born in 1967, became leader. The leaders of the smaller parties at the centre of Dutch politics, which were eligible for participation in a government coalition, namely the leader of the liberal democrats (D66) the leader of the Green party, and the leader of the Christian Union, were also replaced at the beginning of this millennium. Inside D66, several replacements took place until 2003 when Alexander Pechtold, born in 1965, became party leader. The transition of leadership inside the Christian Union (Christenunie) took place in 2001 when André Rouvoet, born in 1962, became party leader. The change of leadership of the Green party took place just before the elections of 2003, when Femke Halsema, born in 1966, became party leader.

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The leaders of the political parties were not the only ones replaced. Parliament, consisting of 150 members, received 90 new members between 2002 and 2003. Most of the politicians who had been dominant in the previous era left the political arena. This caused some senior politicians to worry about a loss of ‘collective memory’ within parliament. Within a couple of years, leadership in all of the centrist political parties transferred from individuals belonging to the protest generation, born between 1945 and 1955, to individuals belonging to what is called ‘the lost generation’, born between 1956 and 1968. 6.4.6 Changing emphasis in the new policies Above, I argued that the indicators mentioned as determinative for the emergence of a new policy generation (see Table 6.1) were visible in the first years after 2000. The proof of the pudding is, however, in the eating. Did the resulting policies change in the predicted direction? Below I argue that this was indeed the case. The model as presented in Table 6.1 predicts the new goals would be those directed towards an emphasis on outcomes instead of output; towards a steering role of government with a keen eye on long-term planning instead of a quick fix; on standardization; and on laying the foundations for the building of a new kind of welfare state, in which long-term results are more important than immediate goal achievement. With regard to policy instruments, the theory predicts more policies directed towards control and prescription of behaviour. With regard to the role of societal groups, it predicts that they will be viewed increasingly as subjects whose behaviour is to be controlled, and preferably standardized, because otherwise they might exhibit unwanted, costly and even hazardous behaviour. 6.4.7 Toward a new policy generation As to the goals set by the Dutch government that came into office in 2002, several changes are evident when compared to the goals of the previous purple coalition. In presenting its plans to the parliament, the coalition emphasized developing three kinds of new policies. First, as to the focus, the new coalition emphasized the long-run effectiveness of public policies. At first, its wording concentrated on ‘new long-standing policies’ (Queen’s Speech, 2002). The following year, the keyword was ‘perspective’; two years later, the emphasis was

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on the ‘generations to come’; and at the end of its term, the coalition reflected on the need for public policies to lay the foundations for the future. New policies would be judged on their effectiveness. For instance, with regard to juvenile delinquency, the basic argument for new policies would be the effectiveness of proposed policies. Research was conducted into the effectiveness of existing policies with regard to upholding the law, resulting in the white paper Upholding with Effect, which was published in 2006 (Ministerie van Jusititie, 2006). In 2006, we saw the maturation of this focus. In September of that year, the Prime Minister laid out the philosophy underlying the policies of his coalition cabinet before an academic audience at the opening of the academic year (Balkenende, 2006). His views look toward 2050, as he says himself. Referring to Thomas Malthus, Paul Kennedy’s book Preparing for the 21st Century, British studies on the effectiveness of public policies, and The Times in saying that ‘Governments overestimate their influence and impact in the short-term and underestimate it in the long term’, the Dutch leader wanted to ‘look through the short term and wants politics to focus on the long term’. To quote him again: ‘Let’s try to forget about quick solutions and the issues of the day, which only increase uncertainty … The challenge is to give direction and space for developments in the long run.’ According to Balkenende, this should be reflected in policies on inflation, social security, work, education, housing, health care and societal cohesion. Referring to the polder model in which compromise and establishing win-win situations was the central objective, he stated that compromise should not interfere with solutions for structural problems (Balkenende, 2006). This could be idle talk, but it is not. There is a real change in emphasis taking place, and the members of the cabinet always communicate the same message. Policies are developed in order to lay the foundations for making the Netherlands a robust and healthy welfare state in the future. All new policies, such as those in the health sector and in social security, are argued with reference to their long-term effects, which results in what are called structural solutions. For instance, for productivity to grow in the future, government has to invest in education, knowledge and innovation. Every department, no matter what the specifics of their policy area, has started making long-term plans. The first policy to undergo structural change is finance policy. While the main goal in the previous period was achieving a balanced

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budget – a short-term goal – the current goal is to wipe out the national debt in 25 years, which is indeed a long-term goal. To quote again, the government states that ‘such budgeting is done out of the recognition that not all problems can be solved in the short term’ (Ministerie van Algemene Zaken, 2003). Second, new policy instruments are representative of the new policy generation. Covenants, popular in the previous period, are increasingly criticized for their ineffectiveness. The coalition opts for structural reform and especially institutional reform in soft-policy sectors like health care, social security, social housing and pensions. Structural reforms are also planned regarding intergovernmental relations and, just like the 1950s, the first industrial plans have appeared again, as have a number of laws, and strategies for making new laws, prescribing and forbidding behaviour. Although it is still too early to judge all of these plans and policies, analysing them results in the conclusion that they have one thing in common. That is the removal of ‘redundancies’. The new regulations and laws are first and foremost meant to streamline, simplify and standardize the collective part of regulations in the soft sector. If someone wants more security or care, he or she is allowed the individual choice of paying individually for better and more costly cover. The Prime Minister is also eager to start off a debate about shared values in society. He wants to strengthen the norms and values in society. His adage is to improve decency, respectability, responsibility, manners and morals in human relations. In order to achieve this, all kinds of measures have been introduced that are in conformity with the idea of societal groups as subjects who will exhibit unwanted behaviour if they are not controlled from above. In the new policies, societal groups are no longer partners, clients or interest groups; they are primarily subjects whose behaviour has to be controlled, steered and, if necessary, modified. This is evident, for instance, in zero-tolerance policies of the police, or the renewed attention given to law enforcement in general. A mere glance at the number of things that Dutch politicians now want to forbid leads us to characterize this as a disciplining of society. The proposed measures include forbidding the Koran, corporal punishment, smoking in coffee shops (that is, those where drugs are sold), traditional light bulbs, advertisements offering loans, sweets, pornography and sex-dates, outlawing the selling of alcoholic drinks by supermarkets

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(and raising the age to buy alcohol from 16 to 18 years), online poker, nativity scenes with live animals, the use of mobile phones in schools, smoking in cars when children are present, using iPods on bicycles, church bells ringing early in the morning, violent computer games, large shopping bags, the use of animals in the circus, and pimps. Of course not all of these restrictions will be made into law, but it is important to note that after years of being rather tolerant of misdemeanors, there is a new trend visible in which the population is no longer seen as a cooperative partner, but is perceived as a target group whose behaviour has to be controlled. Furthermore, there is stronger emphasis on enforcement. There will be zero tolerance for misdemeanors. The first Queen’s speech of the 2007 coalition stated that: ‘Everybody should show respect for one another’s way of living, for public officials and for those who care for the public cause.’ In 2005, a broad initiative on societal cohesion was initiated with the goal of increasing societal commitment, cohesion, consensus, connectivity and unity. It proposed plans regarding work, entrepreneurship, education, neighbourhood associations, sports, public safety and the position of minorities in society. In its 2007 report, the Dutch Council of State, the supreme advisory body and administrative court, wrote that there was an urgent need to rebuild the legitimacy of the democratic state and the rule of law, and it called for reflection on the crucial role of those institutions that neither belong to the state nor to the market; institutions that the council views as the glue within a society with very strong centrifugal forces. The report implies a thorough political debate about structural issues concerning the public interest (Raad van State, 2007: 24ff). Within the departments, the long-term perspective is visible in many policy areas, with some of the questions currently asked including: What should the Western metropolis look like in 2040?, and; What are the long-term consequences of climate change? The most notable policies in this regard are visible in policies regarding the integration of ethnic minorities. These are not only expected to integrate, but preferably to assimilate. Islamic customs and habits are no longer tolerated, and the regulation and control of mosques and Islamic youth has intensified. Furthermore, a so-called inurement course has been introduced. Every member of an ethnic minority from outside the EU is obliged to take the course in order to learn about Dutch habits, history and language. All of these measures are based

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on the idea that societal groups will show undesirable behaviour if they are not controlled. The Dutch population does not seem to oppose such policies. They want government to take care of them (Sociaal Cultureel Planbureau, 2006) and do not want to be bothered by procedures for public participation, co-production or any new ways of involving the public in policy-making processes. Since 2005 there has really been a new society in the making.

6.5 Finally The above at least suggests that generational shifts within public policies continue to move at the predicted time and in the predicted direction. Although we are still in the middle of what we would call the sixth post-war policy generation and many new policies have yet to unfold, one can witness the foundations of new policies aimed at providing structural and sustainable solutions for pressing problems. This gives further support to the theory on policy generations because the latest policies provide a sixth correct prediction about the nature of public policies and their periodic shifts. As the theory was developed in the 1970s, half of these predictions were made before the shifts actually took place. There is, of course, the question of whether the empirical tests as presented in this and the previous chapters are satisfactory. When one develops a theory and tests it, there is always the risk of bias regarding the findings, selection and interpretation of facts. It is difficult to deny that corroborating outcomes are partly due to the degree the author was persuaded by the correctness of his own theory. Therefore, independent tests are necessary. Such testing requires that the theory has to be convincing, or at least plausible. It is hoped that this plausibility has been convincingly argued. However, many questions remain that can have direct or indirect consequences for the theory. For instance, will the hypotheses hold when they are tested against developments in policy areas with a shorter life cycle or for which the initial policies were designed at a later stage. This concerns, for instance, policies on gender relations, IT or immigration policies. The question is whether the same generations are as visible as they were in the policy areas which were not of public concern during the whole period. Do such policies follow the

182 The Importance of Neglect in Policy-Making

‘zeitgeist’ and emphasize what is dominant in the period or do they start by emphasizing short-term goal achievement, lag behind the other policies and develop asynchronously? Second, does the theory imply recommendations for policymakers? It might be argued that the phase-wise shift in attention results in better policies. In the long run, this might be apparent in short-term goal achievement, long-term effectiveness, participation and efficiency. When the whole cycle has been run, are the resulting policies superior in all of these aspects, compared to policies that tried to balance the four aspects simultaneously? In the first chapter, I made an analogy with a student faced with many exams and lacking time to prepare for them. I argued that the student who focuses and shifts attention in a phase-wise manner does a better job in the long run, or at least runs fewer risks of failing all tests, than the student who tries to prepare for all exams simultaneously, even though there is not enough time to do so. When looking at the developments in the Netherlands, the success of phase-wise shifts in attention is also visible. The country has developed quickly since 1945. It initially belonged among the poorer countries, barely able to provide sufficient nutrition to its population. At the end of the research period, in 2000, it was counted among the wealthiest of nations, its democratic character almost undisputed and was seen as a country in which things ran efficiently and effectively. One case study is, of course, not enough to make a general statement about the advantages of single-sided policies, but this implication should not be rejected beforehand. Perhaps smart governments are indeed those governments that do not try to tackle every problem at once. The resources for this option are insufficient and competing demands often pose irreconcilable dilemmas – between the democratic features of the policy process and efficiency, between short-term goal achievement and long-term effectiveness, between emphasizing efficiency and achieving policy goals, and between emphasizing long-term effectiveness and being responsive to different interests. These reasons provide a strong theoretical argument for governments to follow the relative attention paradigm that allows them to focus and to be flexible. Flexibility is needed because, in the practice of day-to-day policy-making, side-effects occur. One such side-effect is the criticism such single-sided policies are bound to encounter. This criticism does not, however, imply that

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the policies were failures. On the contrary, the thesis that fundamental policy change is induced by neglect demands the existence of societal groups that point to those deficiencies. In the Netherlands, this kind of criticism was especially visible at moments when the existing policies proved to be successful in achieving their goals. At the end of such periods, societal groups induced the government to shift attention to those areas which had been most neglected. It might even be concluded that such criticism is the consequence of being successful. Other side-effects might be visible in the day-to-day practice of policy-making when the policies are intended to be single-sided. Such side-effects might be unforeseen by the theory, and it is therefore unclear whether the idea of policy generations can have more universal implications. The preliminary hypothesis for further research postulates that this is the case. It suggests that public policies intended to balance all demands and dilemmas are generally inferior to policies intended to balance these demands sequentially. This also implies that adequate public policies are necessarily a single-sided answer to a problem and thus also the cause of new problems, that is, those that have been temporarily neglected. This is why periodic and cyclical policy change is visible, and that is the importance of neglect.

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Index Berry, J. K. 154, 184 Bootsma, Peter 77, 184 boundary conditions 8, 18, 33, 87, 96, 97, 118, 164 Boyan, A. S. 155, 190 Brakel, W. 70, 185 Brandsen, T. 90, 152, 153, 185, 191 Breedveld, Willem 77, 184 Bressers, J. Th. 98, 185 Brown, K. 135, 185, 188 Brunsson, N. 185, 188 Budge, L. 8, 67, 185 budgetary deficit 75, 80 bureaucracy 7, 19, 21, 77, 112, 148 bureaucratic apparatus 82

accountability 22, 88, 135, 136 ad hoc policies 24, 26, 52, 56, 68, 69, 160, 161 adaptation 5, 33, 34, 36, 38, 40, 82, 167 ADHD symptoms 21 administrative burdens 152 administrative reform 118 administrators 18, 90 advisory boards 77, 139, 140 advisory committees 69, 136 advisory councils 77 Africa 24 AGIL scheme 18, 32 Alberts, G. 139, 140, 141, 184 Alford, J. 135, 184 allocative efficiency 8, 20, 27, 50 Amsterdam 90, 173, 184, 186, 187, 189, 190, 191, 192, 194 antagonistic 123, 154, 155 Aquina, H. J. 85, 184 Argyris, C. 5, 184 assumptions 6, 17, 31, 38, 53, 174 atomic bomb 74 Aucoin, F. 135, 184 Auerbach, J. S. 99, 184 authority 19, 33, 38, 62, 63, 70, 86, 103, 122, 128, 141, 144, 163, 167 axiom, 42, 43, 44

Carasso, L. C. 113, 185 caring technocrats 69, 79, 105, 111, 162 Catholic bishops 143 Catholic Church 143 Catholic party (Netherlands) 75, 143 Catholics 66, 69, 138, 143 CEC (Central Economic Commission) 69, 139 Centraal Planbureau 112, 144, 185 central bank 69, 139 Central Statistical Bureau (CBS) 110 changing functions of law 47 Cheung, A. B. L. 135, 185 Christian Democrats 8, 67, 73, 147, 150, 166, 169 Christian parties (Netherlands) 143 citizens 20, 35, 50, 59, 79, 87, 89, 98, 99, 101, 103, 106, 109, 123, 127, 134, 136, 141, 147, 148, 149, 151, 154, 156 ‘citoyen’ 50, 130, 161

balance 12, 18, 20, 22, 28, 29, 42, 54, 71, 164, 182, 183 Barzelay, M. 135, 184 Bastmeijer, C. J. 151, 184 Baumgartner, F. R. 5, 13, 16, 29, 184, 188 Bemelmans-Videc, M-L. 141, 144, 184, 193 Berg, J. Th. 73, 184 195

196 Index

civil servants 77, 82, 87, 131, 147 client/s 123, 125, 134, 136, 147, 148, 150 Cobb, R. W. 95, 191 cohort replacement 10, 23, 157, 169 command 140 commission/s 14, 82, 147, 155 Commission Vos 155, 185 Commission Wolff 145, 185 communication 47, 88, 90, 98, 100, 101, 103, 117, 118, 125, 135, 139, 142 communication consultants 90 communicative (policies) 88, 95, 97, 98, 99, 100, 104, 109, 116, 118, 119, 161 communists 52, 65, 127, 128, 129 competition 108, 135, 136, 148, 150 congruent/congruence 12, 51, 63, 84, 95, 104, 116, 121, 123, 124, 152, 153, 154, 155, 157, 170, 174 Conradt, D. P. 52, 57, 185 consensus 12, 16, 17, 19, 38, 52, 60, 68, 75, 82, 123, 136, 147, 152, 167, 169, 180 consociational democracy 142 consultation 98, 115, 117, 127, 136, 146, 152, 154 consultative measures 150, 152 consumers 125, 134, 136 co-production 88, 117, 153, 154, 181 core business 50, 148 corporatism 58, 66, 67, 69 cost-efficient/cy 27, 50 covenants 14, 118, 151, 152, 154 Coyle, D. 12, 167, 185 Cramer, N. 71, 185 cultural dynamics 4, 23, 31, 39, 40, 41 cultural subsystem 32, 33

culture 4, 10, 39, 60, 75, 76, 77, 87, 95, 112, 142, 173 cutbacks 40, 83, 123, 149, 151 cyclical nature of the theory 102 Daalder, H. 71, 74, 185, 186 Dahl, R. 10, 186 De Bruijn 94, 186 De Hond, M. 143, 186 De Vries, M. S. 84, 186 decisiveness 38, 62, 63, 65, 68, 90 definition 41, 52, 86 deliberation 127, 136, 146, 152, 153, 154 Della Porta, D. 130, 186 Delsen, L. 121, 147, 148, 186 democracy 19, 20, 22, 25, 26, 27, 50, 59, 60, 61, 65, 67, 69, 78, 79, 81, 83, 136, 140 democratic processes 19, 24, 28 demonstrations 23, 60, 130, 131, 132, 143, 146, 168, 173 Den Uyl, J. M. 77, 143, 184, 186 Department of Economic Affairs 69 Department of Social Welfare 71 departmental units 113 deregulation 7, 60, 82, 104, 106, 108, 115, 117, 125, 148, 150, 161 diffusion 7, 15, 22 dilemma/s 19, 20, 21, 25, 31, 42, 99 downsizing 5, 40, 60, 63, 108, 113, 116, 133, 135, 149 drawbacks 25, 26, 84, 85, 92, 93, 94, 99, 101, 102, 109, 155, 157 Drees, W. 67, 69, 72, 83, 185, 186, 189 Easton, D. 34, 50, 186 Eckstein, H. 9, 130, 186 econometrics 140 economic climate 23 economic crisis 8, 84, 147 economic growth 63, 68, 70, 71, 73, 80, 91, 165, 171

Index

economic subsystem 33 economists 30, 141, 142, 144 Edelenbos, J. 152, 186 Edelman, M. 46, 187 education 9, 21, 68, 77, 78, 82, 83, 85, 88, 89, 90, 98, 118, 123, 131, 138, 162, 175, 178, 180 effectiveness 6, 19, 20, 22, 34, 40, 50, 53, 61, 96, 99, 116, 117, 118, 125, 151, 177, 178, 182 efficiency 8, 19, 20, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 34, 35, 36, 38, 40, 41, 46, 49, 50, 60, 61, 62, 63, 80, 81, 82, 83, 85, 87, 88, 92, 103, 108, 109, 112, 113, 114, 115, 120, 125, 133, 134, 135, 136, 148, 149, 150, 160, 161, 163, 164, 165, 167, 182 efficient managers 30, 80, 91, 112, 162 elastic steering 69 elites 16, 17, 46, 69, 71, 74, 75, 77, 120, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 144, 145, 146, 156, 169 elitist/m 68, 74, 78 emancipation 143 equity 8, 19 Esping Andersen, G. 57, 187 Etzioni, A. 19, 97, 187 EU/European Union 25, 90, 91, 105, 106, 180 Europe 2, 7, 23, 24, 49, 51, 53, 91, 104, 105, 113, 118, 120, 127, 129, 130, 134, 156, 173, 186, 187 European integration 14 European Recovery Program, 72, 78 experts 14, 23, 25, 26, 70, 139, 140, 141, 142 external functions 40

Farlie, D. J. 8, 185 Farmers party 75 financial 6, 18, 21, 24, 26, 51, 76, 78, 88, 89, 103, 109, 111, 112,

197

115, 123, 138, 152, 153, 165, 169, 171 financial means 51, 103, 165 financial transfers 111, 112, 115 fixed procedures 39 flexibility 23, 27, 35, 45, 64, 135, 164, 169 flexible/flexibility 23, 25, 28, 35, 37, 64, 109, 148, 182 Flora, P. 105, 187 focus 4, 20, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, 37, 38, 45, 46, 64, 71, 85, 94, 124, 125, 127, 133, 134, 135, 136, 147, 149, 171, 177, 178, 182 focus groups 125, 149 Folke, C. 155, 187 former communist countries 24 Fortuyn, P. 2, 65, 155, 160, 166, 173, 187 Frederickson, H. G. 19, 187 Friedman, M. 36, 60, 187 functional theory 31 fundamental functions 31 fundamental policy change 5, 6, 12, 17, 41, 43, 44, 45, 158, 160, 161, 167, 183 Gaebler, T. 135, 190 gap 35, 99, 156 gatekeeper 142 generation 9, 29, 30, 40, 44, 45, 73, 74, 78, 84, 91, 102, 112, 131, 169, 176, 177, 179 generation of leading politicians 78 Gill, R. T. 31, 35, 187 Ginsborg, P. 130, 133, 187 goal achievement 18, 24, 25, 29, 40, 160 goal attainment 34, 38 governability 123, 124, 127, 129, 142 governability model 124, 127, 142 governance 14, 21, 94, 124, 127, 135, 136, 137, 153, 161, 175

198 Index

governance model 124, 135, 136, 137, 153 great efficiency operation 149, 166 half-hearted policies 28, 42, 44, 164 Hall, P. 17, 186, 187 Hanna, S. S. 155, 187 health/health care 5, 14, 21, 22, 53, 54, 71, 73, 75, 76, 77, 83, 85, 88, 89, 123, 132, 149, 162, 171, 173, 178, 179 Heclo, H. 11, 187 Helderman, J. K. 90, 162, 187 Herweijer, M. 89, 99, 108, 187 hierarchical 12, 19, 103, 122, 123, 138, 146, 149, 156, 169 higher education 76, 82, 90 Hirschman, A. O. 30, 187 Hoek, J. S. 66, 67, 187 Hogwood, B. W. 21, 187 holistic management 87 homo economicus 97, 106 Hood, C. 47, 94, 97, 123, 135, 150, 187, 188 Hoogerwerf, A. 188 housing policies 22, 71, 110 Huntington, S. P. 30, 188 hypothesis 4, 17, 31, 37, 44, 93, 159, 161, 162, 183 ideal types 122 Iedema, R. A. 94, 99, 188 impact assessments 14, 88, 136 in government 8, 52, 53, 61, 76, 81, 85, 88, 104, 112, 136, 147, 153, 166 in public service 133 income transfers 75 indicators 5, 75, 105, 112, 114, 118, 121, 124, 133, 142, 150, 177 Indonesia 2, 24 industrial investments 70 inefficient/cy 19, 68

information 2, 12, 14, 15, 18, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 109, 121, 125, 126, 128, 129, 131, 135, 136, 139, 142, 145, 149, 150, 152, 157 infrastructure 14, 23, 58, 63, 68, 76, 77, 85, 89, 91, 109, 136, 151, 172 Inglehart, R. 9, 143, 188 innovators 15 input 8, 26, 34, 40, 46, 109, 149 institutional effects 6, 12, 13, 17, 28, 48, 50, 64, 92, 97, 100, 119, 124, 144, 149, 157, 169, 179, 183 integration 18, 32, 33, 34, 38, 40, 46, 89, 158, 160, 180, 192 interactive policy-making 50, 155 interest groups 10, 11, 12, 47, 50, 59, 77, 122, 125, 129, 130, 148, 156, 168, 179 internal orientation 27, 82, 108, 109, 113, 114, 115 iterative 101, 102, 103 Jacobsson, B. 23, 185, 188 Jeffreys, K. 53, 188 job corps programmes 76, 144 Jolles, H. M. 153, 188 Jones, B. D. 5, 13, 14, 16, 29, 184, 188 K-cycles (Kondratieff) 8 Kennedy, J. C. 74, 121, 130, 131, 143, 178, 188 Kickert, W. J. M. 121, 124, 150, 152, 188 King, P. J. 9, 12, 55, 130, 187, 191 Kingdon, J. W. 9, 17, 188 Kluwer 110, 186, 188 knowledge gap 99 Knulst, W. 142, 189 Kogan, N. 130, 133, 189 Kok, W. 87, 170, 175, 191 Kondratieff cycles 8, 30, 165

Index

Koppenjan, J. 124, 151, 155, 188, 189 Krasner, S. 13, 189 Kruyt, J. P. 121, 138, 189 Kuhn, T. S. 5, 189 labour unions 67, 69, 75 lack of morals 138 of trust 138 laggards 15 Lako, C. J. 89, 189 Lane, J. E. 84, 113, 121, 135, 150, 189 Lasswell, H. D. 3, 37, 190 latency problems 38, 40 law of diminishing returns 35, 36 learning processes 23, 94, 102 left/right positions 145 left-wing liberals 166 legislation 33, 70, 71, 72, 74, 105, 106, 115, 128, 133, 141 legitimacy 33, 154, 180 Liberals (Netherlands) 55, 67, 69, 73, 138 libraries 76, 146 Lijphart, A. 69, 138, 139, 141, 189 Lindblom, Ch. E. 5, 189 Linder, S. H. 94, 189 long-term effectiveness 19, 20, 28, 29, 92, 158, 160, 164, 182 long-term perspective 13, 19, 52, 180 Lowi, Th M. Jr 11, 189 Lubbers, R. 82, 83, 84, 86, 150, 192 Maas, P. F. 66, 68, 70, 72, 139, 141, 189 Maastricht 90, 185 macro-level 7, 8, 23, 165 managers 21, 81, 88, 134, 149, 162, 163 Mannheim, K. 9, 40, 169, 189 marginal utility 35 market orientation 84 Martin, B. 130, 190, 192, 194

199

Marwick, A. 130, 131, 132, 190 matchmakers 9 mathematicians 70, 141 McFarland, A. S. 12, 30, 46, 190 media 14, 23, 75, 130, 153, 159 mental decay 65 mentally handicapped 76 meso-level 10, 23, 167 Metze, M. 87, 190 millennium 3, 14, 24, 63, 155, 159, 166, 168, 170, 171, 176, 184 mimesis 14, 23, 167 Minister of Environmental Affairs 88 Minister of Finance 87, 88, 176 mission 38, 39, 40, 61, 62, 64, 65, 67, 68, 69, 85, 86, 88, 89, 90, 135, 137, 144 missionaries 85, 91 money laundering 90 monitoring 14, 88, 101, 150, 152 monuments, national 71, 76, 144 multi-party systems 8 municipalities 15, 68, 80, 89, 149 museums 76, 144, 146 myth 74, 100

Nagel, E. 31, 190 Namenwirth, J. Z. 3, 4, 25, 31, 37, 38, 39, 40, 43, 51, 55, 63, 160, 165, 190 Naschold, F. 84, 107, 108, 113, 190 negative side-effects 25 negotiated agreements 151, 154 negotiated steering 153 Nelissen, N. 89, 190 network steering 116 New Public Management 20 NIPO (National Institute for Opinion Polls) 141 non-profit sector 77 normative factors/assumptions/beliefs 6, 13, 27, 28, 32

200 Index

OECD 17, 22, 45, 49, 51, 55, 62, 63, 91, 94, 95, 104, 107, 108, 110, 121, 124, 126, 127, 129, 134, 135, 136, 150, 152, 154, 171, 173, 188, 189, 190 oil boycott (1973) 80 ombudsman 134, 147, 172 one-stop-shop system 125, 135, 149 operational research 140 Ophuls, W. 155, 190 Osborne, D. 135, 153, 190, 191 Ostrom, E. 16, 191 outcomes 12, 24, 26, 34, 40, 44, 46, 50, 51, 56, 90, 110, 118, 120, 126, 139, 141, 143, 145, 150, 157, 159, 169, 173, 177, 181 output 8, 25, 26, 34, 40, 44, 50, 51, 150, 177 output-orientation 51 overinvestment theory 36 Pacifist Socialist Party 143 paradigm 5, 31, 34, 38, 39, 41, 42, 59, 60, 61, 63, 89, 95, 121, 122, 124, 135, 182 parity of power 122, 156 Parker, R. 135, 185 parliament 65, 70, 71, 74, 75, 78, 80, 84, 133, 141, 150, 151, 166, 177 Parsons, T. 18, 31, 32, 33, 34, 43, 46, 50, 191 participation 40, 50, 70, 74, 77, 123, 133, 134, 145, 149, 152, 153, 161, 163, 167, 176, 182 partisanship 77 partners 77, 117, 127, 136, 153, 168, 174, 179 Passerini, L. 130, 191 paternalistic-religious policy 142 Pennings, P. J. M. 138, 139, 191 Pierson, P. 57, 191 planning 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 38, 39, 48, 49, 50, 51, 54, 57, 58, 59, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 75, 92,

119, 125, 130, 134, 140, 142, 144, 146, 157, 163, 175, 177, 183 planning agencies 125, 163 plural society 138, 139 pluralist model 123, 124, 129, 130, 131, 133, 145 plurality 74 pluriformity 74, 75 polder politics 117, 168 police 33, 86, 87, 88, 89, 101, 151, 155, 179 policy advice 14 policy convergence 14, 45 policy diffusion 14, 15, 22, 23, 167 policy goals 17, 42, 46, 49, 70, 71, 94, 118, 120, 121, 141, 159, 160, 161, 175 policy instruments 6, 17, 42, 45, 46, 47, 64, 88, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 109, 110, 111, 113, 116, 117, 118, 119, 121, 122, 152, 161, 177, 179 policy networks 124 policy refinement 41 political agenda 139 political culture 9, 10, 41 political parties 8, 10, 11, 12, 55, 56, 57, 59, 60, 61, 62, 67, 73, 77, 79, 81, 83, 86, 131, 141, 143, 145, 167, 177 political subsystem 32, 33 ‘Politik als Beruf’ (M. Weber) 194 Pollitt, C. 135, 191 Popper, K. 31, 191 post-materialistic values 143 power conflict 38, 40 practical politics 67 primacy of politics 87 prime minister 15, 77, 78, 82, 137, 149 procedural 65, 124, 128, 142, 146, 149, 154, 157 procedural measures 126 professional training 70, 82

Index

prosperity by efficiency 40 protest 23, 74, 164, 166, 173, 177 Protestants 138 provinces 15, 68 public debt 63 public expenditures 70, 81, 113, 166 public inquiry procedures 77, 78 public institutes 15 public management 3, 108, 123, 124, 133, 134, 135, 149, 150 public participation 74, 76, 77, 80, 130, 153, 181 public sector 18, 50, 60, 68, 80, 93, 113, 120, 123, 134, 135, 148, 151, 153, 164 Puchinger, G. 69, 75, 78, 191 Putman, K. 135, 191 quality of life 57, 59, 74, 75, 80, 143 quangos 112 Raadschelders, J. C. N. 18, 124, 185, 191 Radical party 75 railways 63, 136, 151 reactive missionaries 64, 91 recreation 75, 76, 77, 112, 144, 146 recruitment 10, 82, 168 registration 129, 139, 142 regulations 24, 47, 57, 67, 68, 95, 97, 100, 103, 104, 105, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 117, 125, 126, 146, 149, 151, 152, 156, 161, 172, 173, 174, 179 Reinicke, W. H. 90, 191 rejuvenation 23, 40, 84 religion 74, 131 responsibility 103 restricted means 20 restructuring measures 126 results steering 84 retreat 20, 60, 82, 84, 85, 107, 113, 151, 168

201

return of government 61, 85, 88, 90, 153, 161, 165 Rist, R. C. 184, 193 Roberts, N. C. 9, 12, 191 Roborgh, L. J. 113, 193 Rochefort, D. A. 95, 191 Rohde, W. 71, 191 Rosenbloom, D. H. 135, 189 Ryan, N. 135, 185 Sabatier, P. A. 9, 13, 16, 22, 23, 31, 167, 191, 192 Safran, W. 52, 57, 192 sanctions 97, 105, 125, 128, 152, 154 Sassoon, D. 52, 57, 192 scarcity 4, 21, 31, 34, 35, 37, 40, 42, 67, 164 Schattschneider, E. E. 11, 29, 192 Schlesinger, A, M. 30, 192 Scholten, I. 138, 192 Schrecker, E. 128, 192 Schumpeter, J. 36, 192 Schuyt, C. J. M. 121, 140, 141, 142, 192 second oil crisis (1979) 80 self-steering 116 service delivery 123, 126, 133, 134, 135, 136, 147, 148, 149, 150 short-term goal achievement 19, 25, 26, 28, 53, 158, 160, 164, 182 side-effects 8, 17, 18, 51, 118, 148, 183 Singleton, S. 155, 192 Sint-Michielsgestel 65 Skowronek, S. 30, 192 social and administrative renewal 87 social capital 139 social control 139 Social Cultural Planning Office (Sociaal Cultureel Planbureau) 146 Socio-Economic Council 71, 140, 154

202 Index

social housing 73, 83, 149, 162, 179 social planning 105, 144 social responsibility 151 social security 5, 24, 62, 68, 73, 77, 82, 90, 131, 149, 166, 178, 179 social studies 76, 83 social subsystem 18, 32 social welfare 24, 52, 77, 89 Socialists 138, 143 societal acceptance 88, 152 societal activism 145 societal groups 24, 33, 39, 47, 89, 120, 122, 123, 124, 125, 127, 130, 131, 136, 140, 146, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 161, 168, 174, 175, 177, 179, 181, 183 societal problems 18, 22, 27, 43, 62, 93, 98, 162, 168 societal protests 149 socio-economic problems 85 sociographic research 142 sociologists 144 standard-setters 23, 25 steering 50, 52, 62, 65, 67, 69, 71, 77, 83, 86, 97, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 111, 112, 116, 117, 119, 123, 140, 147, 161, 175, 177 Steiniger, R. 138, 192 Steinmetz, B. 84, 192 strikes 73, 128, 130, 131, 132, 133, 141, 145 Stuurman, S. 138, 193 subsidiarity 69 subsidies 47, 75, 76, 78, 82, 83, 97, 98, 99, 101, 106, 107, 108, 112, 139, 144, 146, 148, 149, 150, 161, 163, 187 substantial 32, 53, 56, 73, 75, 78, 89, 91, 117, 176 success 4, 12, 28, 42, 64, 80, 84, 92, 155, 162, 164, 167, 168, 170, 182 surveys 125, 134, 149, 152

target group/s 47, 88, 89, 90, 97, 98, 99, 100, 104, 105, 106, 108, 109, 116, 117, 122, 125, 127, 128, 153, 156, 161, 180 Tarrow, S. 130, 186 tax 22, 70, 152, 174 technical education 76 technical schools 70 technocratic 24, 69, 71, 91, 139, 141, 145 technocratic planners 71, 141 temporary decrees 56, 103 Ten Heuvelhof, E. F. 94, 152 Terry, Larry D. 135, 193 theory of diminishing returns 41 theory on policy generations 30, 31, 34, 101, 160, 181 Third Reich 64 Thurlings, J. M. G. 121, 138, 143, 193 transition period 80, 166 transparency 22, 87, 88, 136, 150, 154, 160 Tromp, C. 72, 138, 193 trouble-shooters 29, 162 Truman, D. B. 30, 193 Twaalfhoven, P. 193 typology of policy instruments 97 unemployment 6, 53, 71, 78, 80, 81, 147, 170 uniformity 39, 59, 71, 74, 75, 78, 97, 98, 105, 106, 111, 141 universities 23, 76, 82, 131 Van den Broek, A. 9, 10, 40, 169, 193 Van den Heuvel, J. H. J. 49, 94, 193 Van der Meer, F. M. 113, 193 Van Doorn, J. A. A. 139, 193 Van Kersbergen, K. 57, 69, 71, 141, 193 Van Thiel, S. 112, 113, 193 variety 76, 163 Vedung, E. 47, 94, 184, 193 venture tax 70

Index

Volkens, A. 57, 59, 61, 67, 73, 79, 81, 87, 185, 193 voluntarism 151 wages 70, 75, 82, 84, 89, 113, 114, 130, 147, 166 Waldo, D. 19, 26, 194 Walker, J. L. 7, 14, 16, 22, 194 Wassenaar agreement 82 Weber, M. 3, 4, 7, 19, 37, 38, 39, 190, 194 welfare state 24, 53, 55, 56, 57, 58, 60, 70, 73, 84, 85, 105, 142, 144, 160, 162, 163, 167, 168, 177, 178

203

Wildavsky, A. 12, 16, 185, 194 win-win situation 88, 126, 136, 151, 152, 156, 178 works councils 78, 144 World Bank 21, 176, 194 WRR (Scientific Office for Government Policy) 153, 194 youth work

76, 144, 146

zeitgeist 182 zero-tolerance policies

155, 179