The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory (Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought)

The Inclusion of the Other

Studies in Contemporary G e r m a n Social T h o u g h t (partial listing) T h o m a s McCarthy, g e n e r a l e d i t o r James Bohman, Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, and Democracy James Bohman and Matthias Lutz-Bachmann, editors, Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant's Cosmopolitan Ideal Craig Calhoun, editor, Habermas and the Public Sphere Maeve Cooke, Language and Reason: A Study of Habermas's Pragmatics Jiirgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy Jiirgen Habermas, Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics Jiirgen Habermas, On the Logic of the Social Sciences Jiirgen Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory Jiirgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action Jiirgen Habermas, The New Conservatism: Cultural Criticism and the Historians'Debate Jiirgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures Jiirgen Habermas, Philosophical-Political Profiles Jiirgen Habermas, Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays Jiirgen Habermas, On the Pragmatics of Communication Jiirgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society Jiirgen Habermas, editor, Observations on "The Spiritual Situation of the Age" Axel H o n n e t h , The Critique of Power: Reflective Stages in a Critical Social Theory Axel H o n n e t h , The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts Axel H o n n e t h and Hans Joas, editors, Communicative Action: Essays on Jiirgen Habermas's T h e Theory of Communicative Action Axel H o n n e t h , Thomas McCarthy, Claus Offe, and Albrecht Wellmer, editors, Cul­ tural-Political Interventions in the Unfinished Project of Enlightenment Axel Honneth, Thomas McCarthy, Claus Offe, and Albrecht Wellmer, editors, Philo­ sophical Interventions in the Unfinished Project of Enlightenment Maurizio Passerin d'Entreves and Seyla Benhabib, editors, Habermas and the Unfinished Project of Modernity: Critical Essays on The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity Ernst Tugendhat, Self-Consciousness and Self-Determination Albrecht Wellmer, Endgames: Essays and Lectures on the Irreconcilable Nature of Modernity Albrecht Wellmer, The Persistence of Modernity: Essays on Aesthetics, Ethics and Post­ modernism

The Inclusion of the Other Studies in Political Theory

e d i t e d by C i a r a n C r o n i n a n d P a b l o D e Greiff

T h e M I T Press, C a m b r i d g e , Massachusetts

This translation ©1998 Massachusetts Institute of Technology This work originally appeared in German u n d e r the title Die Einbeziehung desanderen. Studien zur politischen Theorie, ©1996 by Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, Germany. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from the publisher. This book was set in New Baskerville by Wellington Graphics and printed and b o u n d in the United States of America. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Habermas, Jiirgen. [Einbeziehung des Anderen. English.] T h e inclusion of the other : studies in political theory / Jiirgen Habermas : edited by Ciaran Cronin and Pablo De Greiff. p. cm. Translation of: Die Einbeziehung des Anderen. Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index.

ISBN 0-262-08267-5 (he) 0-262-58186-8 (pb) 1. Political science. 2. Liberalism. 3, State, The. 4. H u m a n rights. 5. Democracy. I. Cronin, Ciaran. II. De Greiff, Pablo. III. Title. JA68.H23 1998 320.51'3—dc21 98-21601 CIP 10 9 8 7 6

Contents

Editors' Introduction Translator's Note Preface

vii xxxiii xxxv

I H o w Rational Is the Authority o f the Ought? 1 A G e n e a l o g i c a l Analysis of t h e Cognitive C o n t e n t of

3

Morality II Political Liberalism: A D e b a t e with J o h n Rawls 2 R e c o n c i l i a t i o n t h r o u g h t h e P u b l i c Use of R e a s o n

49

3 " R e a s o n a b l e " versus " T r u e , " o r t h e Morality of Worldviews

75

III Is T h e r e a Future for the Nation-State? 4 T h e E u r o p e a n Nation-State: O n t h e Past a n d F u t u r e of Sovereignty a n d C i t i z e n s h i p

105

5 O n t h e R e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e N a t i o n , t h e R u l e of Law, a n d D e m o c r a c y

129

6 Does E u r o p e N e e d a Constitution? Response to Dieter G r i m m

155

Contents

IV H u m a n Rights: Global and Internal 7 K a n t ' s I d e a of P e r p e t u a l P e a c e : At T w o H u n d r e d Years' Historical R e m o v e

165

8 S t r u g g l e s for R e c o g n i t i o n i n t h e D e m o c r a t i c C o n s t i t u t i o n a l State

203

V What Is Meant by "Deliberative Politics"? 9 T h r e e N o r m a t i v e M o d e l s of D e m o c r a c y

239

10 O n t h e I n t e r n a l R e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e R u l e of Law and Democracy

253

Notes

265

Index

291

Editors' Introduction

T h e w i d e - r a n g i n g essays c o l l e c t e d in this v o l u m e p r o v i d e a n overview of J i i r g e n H a b e r m a s ' s w o r k i n political p h i l o s o p h y over t h e p a s t d e c a d e t o g e t h e r with a n u m b e r of i m p o r t a n t e l a b o r a t i o n s of its basic t h e m e s i n c o n n e c t i o n with c u r r e n t political d e b a t e s . O n e of t h e distinctive f e a t u r e s of this w o r k h a s b e e n its a p p r o a c h to t h e p r o b l e m of political legitimacy t h r o u g h a s u s t a i n e d reflection o n t h e d u a l l e g i t i m a t i n g a n d r e g u l a t i n g f u n c t i o n of m o d e r n legal systems. Es­ c h e w i n g t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y u t o p i a n i s m of t r a d i t i o n a l socialism while r e m a i n i n g t r u e to its e m a n c i p a t o r y a s p i r a t i o n s , H a b e r m a s h a s fo­ c u s e d o n t h e claim to legitimacy implicitly r a i s e d by t h e legal a n d political i n s t i t u t i o n s of t h e m o d e r n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state a n d h a s a s k e d h o w this claim c a n b e g r o u n d e d in a n a p p r o p r i a t e t h e o r y of d e m o c r a c y . E x t e n d i n g his d i s c o u r s e t h e o r y of n o r m a t i v e validity to t h e legal-political d o m a i n , h e d e f e n d s a p r o c e d u r a l i s t c o n c e p t i o n of deliberative d e m o c r a c y in w h i c h t h e b u r d e n of l e g i t i m a t i n g state p o w e r is b o r n e by i n f o r m a l a n d legally i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d p r o c e s s e s of political d e l i b e r a t i o n . Its g u i d i n g i n t u i t i o n is t h e r a d i c a l d e m o c r a t i c i d e a t h a t t h e legitimacy of political a u t h o r i t y c a n only b e s e c u r e d t h r o u g h b r o a d p o p u l a r p a r t i c i p a t i o n in political d e l i b e r a t i o n a n d d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g or, m o r e succinctly, t h a t t h e r e is a n i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e r u l e of law a n d p o p u l a r sovereignty. I n t h e p r e s e n t v o l u m e H a b e r m a s b r i n g s this discursive a n d p r o c e d u r a l i s t analysis of political legitimacy to b e a r o n s u c h u r g e n t c o n t e m p o r a r y issues as t h e e n d u r i n g legacy of t h e welfare state, t h e f u t u r e of t h e n a t i o n state, a n d t h e p r o s p e c t s for a g l o b a l politics of h u m a n rights. 1

viii Editors' Introduction

H a b e r m a s ' s political p h i l o s o p h y is m a r k e d by a d u a l focus t h a t m i r r o r s a duality i n h e r e n t in m o d e r n law itself. M o d e r n legal o r d e r s are d i s t i n g u i s h e d , o n t h e o n e h a n d , by t h e "facticity" of t h e i r e n a c t ­ m e n t a n d t h e i r e n f o r c e m e n t by t h e state (i.e., by t h e i r positive a n d coercive c h a r a c t e r ) a n d , o n t h e o t h e r , by t h e i r claim to "validity." T h u s a political p h i l o s o p h y t h a t a t t a c h e s c e n t r a l i m p o r t a n c e to t h e legal system m u s t a p p r o a c h t h e legal a n d political i n s t i t u t i o n s of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state s i m u l t a n e o u s l y f r o m two distinct t h o u g h i n t e r r e ­ l a t e d perspectives. I n t h e first p l a c e , it m u s t a d d r e s s t h e q u e s t i o n of legitimacy: W h a t is t h e g r o u n d of t h e validity of t h e principled of j u s t i c e t h a t f o r m t h e c o r e of m o d e r n d e m o c r a t i c c o n s t i t u t i o n s ? T h i s is, of c o u r s e , t h e c e n t r a l q u e s t i o n of m o d e r n political p h i l o s o p h y in b o t h t h e liberal a n d civic r e p u b l i c a n t r a d i t i o n s . H a b e r m a s ' s t h e o r y of political l e g i t i m a t i o n is d e e p l y i n d e b t e d to b o t h , b u t h e takes his i m m e d i a t e o r i e n t a t i o n f r o m a discursive analysis of q u e s t i o n s of n o r m a t i v e validity. H e first d e v e l o p e d this a p p r o a c h in his d i s c o u r s e t h e o r y of m o r a l i t y a n d n o w e x t e n d s it to t h e legal d o m a i n in a way t h a t is sensitive to t h e f o r m a l f e a t u r e s of legality t h a t set it a p a r t f r o m morality. T h i s g e n e r a l a p p r o a c h to n o r m a t i v e q u e s t i o n s is b a s e d o n t h e cognitivist p r e m i s e t h a t c e r t a i n k i n d s of a c t i o n n o r m s a d m i t of r e a s o n e d justification in p r a c t i c a l d i s c o u r s e a n d t h a t t h e i r validity c a n as a c o n s e q u e n c e b e e l u c i d a t e d by a n analysis of t h e f o r m s of a r g u m e n t a t i o n t h r o u g h w h i c h they a r e justified. 2

3

However, this n o r m a t i v e a p p r o a c h to law a n d politics is in n e e d of s u p p l e m e n t a t i o n by a n analysis of t h e f u n c t i o n a l c o n t r i b u t i o n t h a t positive legal o r d e r s m a k e to t h e stabilization a n d r e p r o d u c t i o n of m o d e r n societies. M o d e r n legal systems d e v e l o p e d in r e s p o n s e to t h e p r o b l e m s of social o r d e r c r e a t e d by a c c e l e r a t i n g p r o c e s s e s of m o d e r n i z a t i o n ; t h e f o r m a l f e a t u r e s of legality a r e d i c t a t e d by this regulative f u n c t i o n of m o d e r n law. Moreover, H a b e r m a s claims t h a t t h e s e two a p p r o a c h e s to law, t h e n o r m a t i v e a n d t h e f u n c t i o n a l , a r e i n s e p a r a b l e . T h e p r o b l e m of t h e basic p r i n c i p l e s of a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e m o c r a c y c a n n o t b e a d d r e s s e d in a b s t r a c t i o n f r o m t h e positive a n d coercive c h a r a c t e r of t h e legal m e d i u m in w h i c h they a r e to b e realized; a n d t h e s e f o r m a l f e a t u r e s of m o d e r n law a r e c o n d i t i o n e d by t h e p r o b l e m s of social i n t e g r a t i o n a n d r e p r o d u c t i o n to w h i c h m o d e r n legal o r d e r s r e s p o n d . It is crucial for t h e analyses of h u m a n

ix Editors' Introduction

r i g h t s a n d p o p u l a r sovereignty t h a t f o r m t h e c o r e of H a b e r m a s ' s t h e o r y of d e m o c r a c y t h a t t h e p a r a m e t e r s of t h e p r o b l e m t h e y a r e i n t e n d e d t o solve a r e laid d o w n by history. If, following H a b e r m a s , we a p p r o a c h t h e p r o b l e m of legitimacy by asking w h a t r i g h t s free a n d e q u a l c i t i z e n s h a v e to c o n f e r o n o n e a n o t h e r w h e n they delib­ e r a t e o n h o w t h e y c a n legitimately r e g u l a t e t h e i r c o m m o n life by m e a n s of law, t h e n t h e m e d i u m o r l a n g u a g e in w h i c h t h e y m u s t a n s w e r this q u e s t i o n is n o t s o m e t h i n g they a r e free to c h o o s e b u t is i m p o s e d by t h e c o n s t r a i n t s of t h e task they a r e t r y i n g to solve. T h e r e a r e n o f u n c t i o n a l alternatives to positive law as a basis for i n t e g r a t i n g societies of t h e m o d e r n type. It is n o t o u r a i m to offer a n exhaustive analysis of this w i d e - r a n g i n g t h e o r e t i c a l p r o j e c t h e r e . I n s t e a d , by way of i n t r o d u c t i o n we will o u t l i n e t h e r e l e v a n t f e a t u r e s of H a b e r m a s ' s d i s c o u r s e t h e o r y of n o r ­ mative legitimacy as t h e y b e a r o n his t h e o r y of legal r i g h t s (sec­ t i o n 1 ) , b e f o r e t u r n i n g t o his p r o c e d u r a l i s t c o n c e p t i o n of deliberative d e m o c r a c y (section 2 ) . We will t h e n c o n s i d e r t h e impli­ c a t i o n s of this p r o j e c t for t h e p r o b l e m s of t h e f u t u r e of t h e n a t i o n state, of a g l o b a l politics of h u m a n rights, a n d of c o r r e s p o n d i n g s u p r a n a t i o n a l political i n s t i t u t i o n s (section 3 ) . T h i s will p r o v i d e t h e b a c k g r o u n d for s o m e c o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s o n H a b e r m a s ' s c o n t r i b u ­ t i o n s to t h e d e b a t e s c u r r e n t l y r a g i n g o n m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m a n d t h e r i g h t s of c u l t u r a l m i n o r i t i e s (section 4 ) . 1

T h e Discourse T h e o r y o f Morality and Law

H a b e r m a s starts f r o m t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t in m o d e r n , pluralistic societies, social n o r m s c a n derive t h e i r validity only f r o m t h e r e a s o n a n d will of t h o s e w h o s e d e c i s i o n s a n d i n t e r a c t i o n s a r e s u p p o s e d to b e b o u n d by t h e m . H e s h a r e s this s t a r t i n g p o i n t with J o h n Rawls, w h o h a s e m p h a s i z e d t h a t d i s a g r e e m e n t over c o n c e p t i o n s of t h e g o o d a n d q u e s t i o n s of u l t i m a t e value is likely to b e a n e n d u r i n g f e a t u r e of pluralistic societies a n d c o u l d only b e o v e r c o m e t h r o u g h t h e repressive i m p o s i t i o n of o n e belief system. Yet t h e i r r e s p o n s e s to t h e c h a l l e n g e p o s e d by p l u r a l i s m differ in i m p o r t a n t ways. Rawls a r g u e s t h a t citizens c o m m i t t e d to different a n d i n c o m p a t i b l e "com­ prehensive doctrines" can nevertheless reach an "overlapping

X

Editors' Introduction

c o n s e n s u s " o n basic p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e w h i c h t h e y justify separately w i t h i n t h e i r o w n evaluative worldviews, a s s u m i n g t h a t they c a n d r a w o n c e r t a i n s h a r e d ideals of t h e p e r s o n , of society, a n d of p u b l i c r e a s o n r o o t e d in t h e t r a d i t i o n of W e s t e r n liberal d e m o c r a c y . H a b e r ­ m a s , by c o n t r a s t , t h i n k s t h a t t h e r e exists a m o r e universal basis for a g r e e m e n t o n general normative principles even a m o n g m e m b e r s of pluralistic societies w h o differ o n q u e s t i o n s of value a n d t h e g o o d life. T h i s c o n f i d e n c e is g r o u n d e d in t h e c e n t r a l r o l e his social t h e o r y a c c o r d s c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n — t h a t is, t h a t f o r m of social i n t e r a c ­ t i o n in w h i c h t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s act o n , o r t r y t o r e a c h , a s h a r e d u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e s i t u a t i o n — i n r e g u l a t i n g a n d r e p r o d u c i n g f o r m s of social life a n d t h e i d e n t i t i e s of social a c t o r s . A m o n g t h e t h i n g s o n w h i c h c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t o r s a r e c o m m i t t e d to r e a c h i n g a s h a r e d u n d e r s t a n d i n g a c c o r d i n g to this t h e o r y a r e t h e n o r m a t i v e a s s u m p t i o n s t h a t i n f o r m t h e i r actions; h e n c e t h e y a r e implicitly o r i e n t e d to practical a r g u m e n t a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g t h e validity of n o r m s as a m e a n s of resolving practical d i s a g r e e m e n t s . T h i s l e a d s H a b e r m a s t o suggest t h a t t h e g r o u n d s of t h e validity of n o r m s c a n b e e l u c i d a t e d t h r o u g h a n analysis of t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s t h a t speak­ ers u n a v o i d a b l y m a k e w h e n they e n g a g e in g o o d faith in p r a c t i c a l argumentation. I n d e e d h e argues that these unavoidable pragmatic p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of a r g u m e n t a t i o n e n t a i l a g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e of dis­ c o u r s e , ( D ) , w h i c h specifies t h e c o n d i t i o n s t h a t a n y valid social n o r m m u s t satisfy: ' J u s t t h o s e n o r m s a r e valid to w h i c h all possibly affected p e r s o n s c o u l d a g r e e as p a r t i c i p a n t s in r a t i o n a l d i s c o u r s e s . " 4

5

6

T h e d i s c o u r s e p r i n c i p l e f o r m s t h e c o r n e r s t o n e of a t h e o r y of b o t h m o r a l a n d legal validity w h i c h is i n t e n d e d to r e b u t n o n c o g n i t i v i s t skepticism c o n c e r n i n g t h e r a t i o n a l basis of m o r a l a n d legal n o r m s . T h e d i s c o u r s e t h e o r y h o l d s t h a t at least a c e r t a i n r a n g e of n o r m a t i v e q u e s t i o n s have g e n u i n e cognitive c o n J ^ t T T n " " p a r t i c u l a r , it claims t h a t p a r t i c i p a n t s in a n ideally inclusive p r a c t i c a l d i s c o u r s e c o u l d in p r i n c i p l e r e a c h a n u n c o e r c e d a g r e e m e n t o n t h e validity of t h e s e k i n d s of n o r m s o n t h e basis of r e a s o n s t h a t a r e a c c e p t a b l e to all. T h e idealizations to w h i c h this discursive a p p r o a c h a p p e a l s l e n d H a b e r mas's theory a d e m a n d i n g , counterfactual character: the principle of d i s c o u r s e p o i n t s to a n ideal p r o c e d u r e of discursive validation w h i c h f u n c t i o n s as a n o r m a t i v e s t a n d a r d a g a i n s t w h i c h existing c o n 7

xi . Editors' Introduction

d i t i o n s of d i s c o u r s e c a n b e criticized. A l t h o u g h t h e s e idealizations a r e u n d o u b t e d l y controversial, t h e suspicion t h a t t h e y a r e simply arbitrary, o r reflect a n idealistic c o n c e p t i o n of r e a s o n t h a t h a s little practical r e l e v a n c e , c a n b e allayed by n o t i n g t h a t t h e y a r e i n t e r n a l l y r e l a t e d to t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h a c t o r s f o r m a n d m a i n t a i n their identities a n d regulate their interactions. T h i s discursive analysis of n o r m a t i v e q u e s t i o n s allows for a s h a r p differentiation b e t w e e n m o r a l a n d l e g a l validity. T h e p r i n c i p l e of d i s c o u r s e e x p r e s s e s a g e n e r a l i d e a of impartiality t h a t finds different, t h o u g h c o m p l e m e n t a r y , e x p r e s s i o n s in m o r a l a n d legal n o r m s . H a b e r m a s ' s differentiation b e t w e e n law a n d m o r a l i t y c h a l l e n g e s t h e t r a d i t i o n a l a s s u m p t i o n t h a t m o r a l i t y r e p r e s e n t s a h i g h e r d o m a i n of value in w h i c h basic legal a n d political p r i n c i p l e s m u s t b e g r o u n d e d . W i t h t h e e m e r g e n c e of m o d e r n societies o r g a n i z e d a r o u n d a state a n d a positive legal o r d e r , t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e basis of political legitimacy u n d e r w e n t a p r o f o u n d t r a n s f o r m a t i o n : m o d e r n n a t u r a l law o r social c o n t r a c t t h e o r y b r o k e with t r a d i t i o n a l n a t u r a l law in a r g u i n g t h a t political a u t h o r i t y flows f r o m t h e will of t h o s e w h o a r e subject to it r a t h e r t h a n f r o m a divinely o r d a i n e d m o r a l o r d e r . Nev­ e r t h e l e s s , t h e a s s u m e d priority of m o r a l i t y over law c o n t i n u e d to play a c e n t r a l , if n o t always critically e x a m i n e d , r o l e i n b o t h t h e liberal a n d c o m m u n i t a r i a n t r a d i t i o n s of m o d e r n political t h o u g h t . W h e r e a s classical liberalism in t h e L o c k e a n t r a d i t i o n a c c o r d s p r i m a r y i m p o r ­ t a n c e to prepolitically g r o u n d e d r i g h t s of i n d i v i d u a l liberty, c o m m u ­ n i t a r i a n t h i n k e r s a p p e a l t o values r o o t e d in i n h e r i t e d n a t i o n a l , religiousj o r e t h n i c i d e n t i t i e s as t h e i n e s c a p a b l e b a c k g r o u n d a g a i n s t w h i c h all q u e s t i o n s of political j u s t i c e m u s t b e a n s w e r e d . Against b o t h t r a d i t i o n s , H a b e r m a s a r g u e s t h a t law a n d m o r a l i t y s t a n d in a c o m p l e m e n t a r y r e l a t i o n . T h e basic h u m a n r i g h t s e n s h r i n e d in m o d ­ e r n legal o r d e r s a r e essentially legal rights, n o t m o r a l r i g h t s t h a t a r e i m p o s e d as a n e x t e r n a l c o n s t r a i n t o n t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n - f o u n d i n g p r a c t i c e of t h e citizens, t h o u g h m o r a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s e n t e r i n t o t h e justification of basic rights. H a b e r m a s c o n s t r u e s m o r a l i t y in b r o a d l y K a n t i a n t e r m s as a system of d u t i e s g r o u n d e d in t h e u n c o n d i t i o n a l claim to r e s p e c t a n d c o n ­ s i d e r a t i o n of all p e r s o n s . M o r a l d u t i e s a r e b i n d i n g o n all b e ­ ings c a p a b l e of s p e e c h a n d a c t i o n a n d h e n c e h a v e u n r e s t r i c t e d o r 8

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universal s c o p e . However, t h e very n a t u r e of m o r a l i t y m e a n s t h a t it is l i m i t e d as a m e c h a n i s m for r e g u l a t i n g social i n t e r a c t i o n . T h e u n r e s t r i c t e d universality of m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s , t h e i r h i g h l y abstract, cognitive claim to validity, a n d t h e u n c o n d i t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r of t h e d u t i e s t h e y i m p o s e c r e a t e a rift b e t w e e n m o r a l j u d g m e n t a n d r e a s o n ­ ing, o n the o n e h a n d , a n d motivation, o n the other. Moral n o r m s p r o v i d e a g e n t s with w e a k cognitive motives g r o u n d e d in t h e knowl­ e d g e t h a t they h a v e n o g o o d r e a s o n to act o t h e r w i s e , b u t p r o v i d e t h e m with n o r a t i o n a l motives t o act accordingly. Moreover, t h e justification a n d a p p l i c a t i o n of m o r a l n o r m s calls for p r a c t i c a l dis­ courses whose highly exacting conditions can at best b e approxi­ m a t e d by real discourses. T h u s m o r a l n o r m s a r e u n s u i t a b l e for r e g u l a t i n g social i n t e r a c t i o n s b e t w e e n s t r a n g e r s w h e r e t h e p r a c t i c a l costs in t i m e a n d effort of establishing a n d m a i n t a i n i n g t h e r e l a t i o n s of m u t u a l t r u s t r e q u i r e d for practical discourses a r e t o o h i g h . As a m e c h a n i s m for r e g u l a t i n g i n t e r a c t i o n s b e t w e e n s t r a n g e r s , m o d e r n law h a s a n u m b e r of i m p o r t a n t s t r u c t u r a l a d v a n t a g e s over morality. M o d e r n legal systems s e c u r e a s p a c e of i n d i v i d u a l liberty in w h i c h citizens a r e free to p u r s u e t h e i r private p u r p o s e s by c o n f e r r i n g a c t i o n a b l e i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s o n all citizens: w h e r e a s in t h e m o r a l d o m a i n d u t i e s a r e p r i o r to r i g h t s a n d e n t i t l e m e n t s , in t h e legal d o m a i n i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s a r e p r i o r to d u t i e s in a c c o r d a n c e with t h e H o b b e s i a n p r i n c i p l e t h a t w h a t e v e r is n o t p r o h i b i t e d is p e r m i t t e d . I n a d d i t i o n , w h e r e a s m o r a l i t y m u s t rely o n t h e w e a k s a n c t i o n s of a guilty c o n s c i e n c e , t h e e n f o r c e m e n t of legal n o r m s is e n s u r e d by t h e p o l i c e a n d p e n a l p o w e r of t h e state. T h o u g h t h e c o n t e n t of basic legal n o r m s m a y s o m e t i m e s b e i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e f r o m t h a t of univer­ sal m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s , t h e fact t h a t legal n o r m s m u s t b e e n a c t e d a n d t h a t all legal n o r m s a r e in p r i n c i p l e subject to revision m e a n s t h a t t h e i r d o m a i n of a p p l i c a t i o n is l i m i t e d in t h e first i n s t a n c e to a p a r t i c u l a r j u r i s d i c t i o n a n d its citizenry. If we a r e t o d o j u s t i c e t o t h e distinctive m o d e of legitimacy of positive legal o r d e r s , H a b e r m a s a r g u e s , we s h o u l d b e g i n by a s k i n g w h a t basic r i g h t s free a n d e q u a l citizens m u s t c o n f e r o n o n e a n o t h e r if t h e y a r e to r e g u l a t e t h e i r c o m m o n life by m e a n s of positive law. O n c e t h e g o a l of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n - f o u n d i n g p r a c t i c e is a p p r o p r i a t e l y c h a r a c t e r i z e d , t h e f o r m a l f e a t u r e s of t h e m e d i u m in w h i c h it m u s t

xiii Editors' Introduction

b e a c c o m p l i s h e d — t h a t is, positive, coercive law—set strict limits o n t h e possible o u t c o m e s of t h e p r o c e d u r e . I n particular, since legal r i g h t s p r e s u p p o s e t h a t citizens h a v e t h e status of legal subjects, t h e citizens m u s t first c o n f e r o n o n e a n o t h e r c e r t a i n basic liberty rights w h i c h g u a r a n t e e t h e m this artificial status, i n c l u d i n g r i g h t s to t h e g r e a t e s t possible m e a s u r e of e q u a l i n d i v i d u a l liberties, r i g h t s of m e m b e r s h i p i n t h e political c o m m u n i t y , a n d r i g h t s g u a r a n t e e i n g i n d i v i d u a l legal p r o t e c t i o n . W i t h o u t t h e s e r i g h t s of private auton­ omy, w h i c h c r e a t e a s p a c e for citizens to p u r s u e t h e i r private e n d s free f r o m i n t e r f e r e n c e , m o r a l l y r e s p o n s i b l e a g e n t s c o u l d n o t r e a s o n ­ ably b e e x p e c t e d to s u b m i t t h e m s e l v e s voluntarily to a coercive legal o r d e r . B u t in a d d i t i o n t h e y m u s t g r a n t o n e a n o t h e r basic rights of political participation o r r i g h t s of public autonomy t h r o u g h w h i c h t h e laws t h a t give effect to all of t h e basic rights, i n c l u d i n g t h e political r i g h t s themselves, a r e f o r m u l a t e d a n d e n a c t e d . C o n t r a r y to classical liberalism, w h i c h treats liberty r i g h t s as p r e p o l i t i c a l e n d o w m e n t s a n d i n t e r p r e t s t h e m as n e g a t i v e r i g h t s of n o n i n t e r f e r e n c e , H a b e r m a s a r g u e s t h a t liberty r i g h t s c a n n o t b e i m p l e m e n t e d w i t h o u t b r o a d p o p u l a r p a r t i c i p a t i o n in t h e p r o c e s s e s of political o p i n i o n - f o r m a t i o n of a n inclusive p u b l i c s p h e r e , t h r o u g h w h i c h t h e citizens c a n influ­ e n c e t h e d e f i n i t i o n s of t h e i r n e e d s a n d i n t e r e s t s t h a t a r e e m b o d i e d in t h e l a w . V i e w e d f r o m this p e r s p e c t i v e , political r i g h t s c a n b e r e p r e s e n t e d as n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n s for t h e r e a l i z a t i o n of t h e ar­ tificial status of legal subject as b e a r e r of rights, b e c a u s e they r e g u ­ late t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f t h e liberty r i g h t s . However, t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n - p r i v a t e l a n d p u b l i c a u t o n o m y c a n also b e i n t e r p r e t e d in light of t h e c o n c e p t i o n of legitimacy e x p r e s s e d in t h e p r i n c i p l e of d i s c o u r s e . T h i s p r i n c i p l e stipulates t h a t laws derive t h e i r legitimacy f r o m t h e p r e s u m e d rationality of t h e d e c i s i o n s r e a c h e d t h r o u g h a p p r o p r i a t e l y r e g u l a t e d p r o c e d u r e s of d e l i b e r a t i o n ; t h u s t h e legiti­ m a c y of a legal o r d e r u l t i m a t e l y d e p e n d s o n t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n of t h e f o r m s of political c o m m u n i c a t i o n n e c e s s a r y for r a t i o n a l political will-formation, a n d t h e liberty r i g h t s c a n b e justified as n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n s for t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n of t h e cor­ r e s p o n d i n g f o r m s of political c o m m u n i c a t i o n . T h u s n e i t h e r t h e liberty r i g h t s n o r t h e political r i g h t s c a n b e a c c o r d e d priority b u t m u s t b e r e g a r d e d as co-original. T h e p r i n c i p l e of t h e essential 1 0

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i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e of private a n d p u b l i c a u t o n o m y or, alternatively, of t h e co-originality of t h e r u l e of law a n d p o p u l a r sovereignty, f o r m s t h e c o r n e r s t o n e of H a b e r m a s ' s p r o c e d u r a l i s t m o d e l of deliberative democracy. B u t b e f o r e t u r n i n g to this, we s h o u l d n o t e a n u m b e r of i m p o r t a n t f e a t u r e s of H a b e r m a s ' s t h e o r y of rights. I n t h e first p l a c e , it avoids t h e p r o b l e m s g e n e r a t e d by t h e fiction of t h e state of n a t u r e in social c o n t r a c t theory, p r o b l e m s t h a t a r g u a b l y still bedevil Rawls's device of t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n . H a b e r m a s n e e d n o t a p p e a l to controversial p r e p o l i t i c a l c o n c e p t i o n s of h u m a n n a t u r e a n d of practical r e a s o n , n o r n e e d h e a p p e a l to c o n c e p t i o n s g r o u n d e d i n specific constitu­ t i o n a l t r a d i t i o n s ; o n his a c c o u n t , t h e d e c i s i o n to f o u n d a political c o m m u n i t y is n o t itself in n e e d of n o r m a t i v e justification. T h e n a ­ t u r e of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n - f o u n d i n g task a n d t h e m e d i u m in w h i c h it is to b e a c c o m p l i s h e d n e e d only b e justified in f u n c t i o n a l t e r m s — t h a t is, in t e r m s of t h e regulative f u n c t i o n s of m o d e r n legal sys­ t e m s — a n d t h e n t h e g e n e r a l s h a p e of t h e t h e o r y of r i g h t s follows automatically, in c o n j u n c t i o n with t h e discursive a c c o u n t of n o r m a ­ tive validity. T h e n o r m a t i v e p r i n c i p l e o n t h e basis of w h i c h partici­ p a n t s m u s t d e c i d e w h i c h r i g h t s to g r a n t o n e a n o t h e r is n o t g r o u n d e d in t r a n s c e n d e n t ideals of r e a s o n a n d t h e p e r s o n b u t is i m p l i c i t in t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n a n d practical d i s c o u r s e . T h u s r i g h t s a r e n o t t r e a t e d as m o r a l givens w h i c h a r e i m p o s e d as a n e x t e r n a l c o n s t r a i n t o n t h e citizens' political d e l i b e r a t i o n s b u t a r e r e p r e s e n t e d as t h e r e s u l t of a p r o c e s s of c o n s t r u c t i o n , a n d h e n c e as a n e x p r e s s i o n of t h e r e a s o n a n d will of t h e citizens themselves. However, a l t h o u g h h e a r g u e s t h a t t h e t h e o r y of r i g h t s for t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state n e e d n o t d r a w o n c o n t r o v e r s i a l q u e s t i o n s of value a n d t h e h u m a n g o o d , H a b e r m a s d o e s n o t e x c l u d e e t h i c a l q u e s t i o n s f r o m t h e p u r v i e w of politics a l t o g e t h e r . Political q u e s ­ tions of w h a t values a n d ideals of t h e g o o d s h o u l d b e politically realized d o n o t a d m i t of r a t i o n a l r e s o l u t i o n in t h e u n r e s t r i c t e d sense of q u e s t i o n s of j u s t i c e b e c a u s e t h e y a r e i n s e p a r a b l e f r o m t h e c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n s a n d historical e x p e r i e n c e s t h a t s h a p e t h e i d e n t i t i e s of g r o u p s , a n d h e n c e c a n only b e a n s w e r e d w i t h i n t h e c o n t e x t of a n already constituted political c o m m u n i t y . T h i s d o e s n o t m e a n t h a t q u e s ­ t i o n s of t h e collective g o o d c a n n o t b e rationally d e b a t e d a n d re12

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Editors' Introduction

solved; b u t in pluralistic societies d e l i b e r a t i o n s a n d decisions c o n ­ c e r n i n g w h a t values a n d ideals of t h e g o o d s h o u l d b e politically i m p l e m e n t e d m u s t take p l a c e w i t h i n a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l f r a m e w o r k t h a t g u a r a n t e e s individual liberty a n d t h e r i g h t of m i n o r i t i e s to dissent f r o m t h e values of t h e majority c u l t u r e a n d t o cultivate t h e i r distinc­ tive i d e n t i t i e s . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , e a c h political c o m m u n i t y m u s t realize t h e system of basic r i g h t s w i t h i n a political c u l t u r e t h a t reflects s h a r e d t r a d i t i o n s a n d historical e x p e r i e n c e s , t h o u g h this political c u l t u r e m u s t n o t b e assimilated to t h e majority c u l t u r e . A f u r t h e r n o t e w o r t h y f e a t u r e of H a b e r m a s ' s a p p r o a c h , o n e with f a r - r e a c h i n g i m p l i c a t i o n s for issues of i n t e r n a t i o n a l j u s t i c e , is t h a t t h e h y p o t h e t i c a l p r o c e d u r e of a m u t u a l c o n f e r r i n g of r i g h t s c a n b e c o n c e i v e d as b e i n g p e r f o r m e d by g r o u p s of different scopes, r a n g i n g f r o m t h e local a n d t h e n a t i o n a l to t h e r e g i o n a l a n d t h e g l o b a l . W h i l e t h e basic h u m a n r i g h t s t h a t m u s t b e c o n f e r r e d in o r d e r to establish a l e g i t i m a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e g i m e a r e essentially t h e s a m e in e a c h case, t h e political i n s t i t u t i o n s r e q u i r e d for t h e i r i m p l e m e n ­ t a t i o n w o u l d h a v e to reflect t h e different s c o p e of t h e practical m a t t e r s to b e r e g u l a t e d a n d t h e different c o m p o s i t i o n of t h e p o p u ­ lations subject to t h e laws e n a c t e d . T h u s , as we shall see, H a b e r m a s ' s g e n e r a l t h e o r y of h u m a n r i g h t s p o i n t s to t h e possibility of a global political o r d e r in w h i c h sovereignty w o u l d b e divided a n d d i s p e r s e d a m o n g local, n a t i o n a l , a n d r e g i o n a l r e g i m e s , with a g l o b a l r e g i m e a s s u m i n g responsibility for t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of h u m a n r i g h t s at t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l level. -

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2

Public R e a s o n and Deliberative D e m o c r a c y

H a b e r m a s ' s t h e o r y of h u m a n r i g h t s a n d p o p u l a r sovereignty calls for t h e c r e a t i o n of political i n s t i t u t i o n s in w h i c h discursive p r o c e s s e s of o p i n i o n - a n d will-formation play a c e n t r a l r o l e . T h i s follows f r o m t h e radically p r o c e d u r a l i s t o r i e n t a t i o n of t h e d i s c o u r s e t h e o r y w h i c h places t h e w h o l e w e i g h t of political l e g i t i m a t i o n o n i n f o r m a l a n d legally i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d p r o c e d u r e s of o p i n i o n - a n d will-formation. O n this a c c o u n t , t h e legitimacy of legal n o r m s is a f u n c t i o n of t h e f o r m a l f e a t u r e s of p r o c e d u r e s of political d e l i b e r a t i o n a n d d e c i s i o n making which support the presumption that their outcomes are

xvi Editors' Introduction

r a t i o n a l . T h e r e s u l t i n g r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t t h e e n a c t m e n t of legal n o r m s b e tied to discursive p r o c e s s e s of r a t i o n a l political will-forma­ t i o n a p p l i e s in different ways to basic c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s a n d to e n a c t e d legal n o r m s a n d statutes. At t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l level, t h e p r i n c i p l e of p o p u l a r sovereignty r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e citizens m u s t b e a b l e to affirm t h e basic r i g h t s as o n e s t h e y w o u l d c o n f e r o n o n e a n o t h e r in a c o n s t i t u t i o n - f o u n d i n g p r a c t i c e . B e c a u s e in m o s t cases t h e citizens a r e b o r n i n t o a n already existing state a n d n e v e r actually p a r t i c i p a t e in s u c h a p r a c t i c e , t h e r e q u i r e m e n t of t h e i r v o l u n t a r y c o n s e n t m u s t b e given effect t h r o u g h p r o c e d u r e s by w h i c h existing c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s c a n b e c h a l l e n g e d a n d c h a n g e d if sufficient political will to d o so c a n b e m o b i l i z e d . I n t h e case of e n a c t e d laws, t h e p r i n c i p l e of p o p u l a r sovereignty r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e citizens s h o u l d play a n active r o l e in t h e e l a b o r a t i o n a n d d e f e n s e of t h e criteria in a c c o r d a n c e with w h i c h t h e basic r i g h t s a r e i m p l e m e n t e d , m o s t im­ p o r t a n t l y in s h a p i n g t h e definitions of t h e i r n e e d s a n d i n t e r e s t s w h i c h b e c o m e i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o law. I n n e i t h e r case c a n t h e c o n t e n t of legal n o r m s b e d e t e r m i n e d i n d e p e n d e n t l y of t h e p o p u l a r will as e x p r e s s e d in a critical p u b l i c o p i n i o n . T h u s t h e i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e r u l e of law a n d p o p u l a r sovereignty calls for a p r o c e d u r a l i s t m o d e l of deliberative d e m o c r a c y in w h i c h all political deci­ sion m a k i n g , f r o m c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a m e n d m e n t s to t h e d r a f t i n g a n d e n a c t m e n t of legislation, is b o u n d to discursive p r o c e s s e s of a politi­ cal p u b l i c s p h e r e . H a b e r m a s h a s specified t h e basic s h a p e t h a t political i n s t i t u t i o n s w o u l d have to take in o r d e r to realize this m o d e l of deliberative d e m o c r a c y It calls in t h e first p l a c e for a p u b l i c s p h e r e of i n f o r m a l political c o m m u n i c a t i o n w h o s e i n s t i t u t i o n a l basis is p r o v i d e d by t h e v o l u n t a r y associations of civil society a n d w h i c h d e p e n d s o n i n p u t s of e x p e r t i n f o r m a t i o n a n d o n o p e n access to t h e p r i n t a n d e l e c t r o n i c m e d i a . T h e i n f o r m a l c h a r a c t e r of p u b l i c political discussion, a n d t h e fact t h a t it m u s t b e r e s p o n s i v e to p r o b l e m s as t h e y arise i n t h e lifeworld of everyday i n t e r a c t i o n , m e a n t h a t t h e associations in w h i c h it is c o n d u c t e d c a n n o t b e directly r e g u l a t e d by law; however, t h e basic political r i g h t s g u a r a n t e e d by t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n , s u c h as f r e e d o m of association, f r e e d o m of s p e e c h , a n d f r e e d o m of c o n ­ science, a r e specifically d e s i g n e d to s e c u r e t h e b a c k g r o u n d c o n d i -

xvii Editors' Introduction

14

tions t h a t m a k e possible a flourishing civil s o c i e t y . T h e p u b l i c s p h e r e h a s as its c o m p l e m e n t t h e legally r e g u l a t e d g o v e r n m e n t s p h e r e c o m p o s e d of t h e legislative, j u d i c i a l , a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e b r a n c h e s . T h e specific tasks of e a c h of t h e s e b r a n c h e s call for a c o m p l e x division of l a b o r in w h i c h e a c h b r a n c h plays b o t h a n e n ­ a b l i n g a n d a l i m i t i n g r o l e vis-a-vis e a c h of t h e o t h e r s . F o r e x a m p l e , t h e p r o f e s s i o n a l j u d i c i a r y m u s t n o t p r e e m p t t h e political f u n c t i o n of t h e legislature by c r e a t i n g law; conversely, t h e i n s t i t u t i o n of j u d i c i a l review e n a b l e s t h e j u d i c i a r y to r e s t r a i n t h e legislature f r o m p r o g r a m ­ m i n g specific legal j u d g m e n t s by e n a c t i n g laws to t h a t e f f e c t . 15

W h i l e this m o d e l c o n f o r m s to t h e basic i n s t i t u t i o n a l a r r a n g e m e n t s of m o d e r n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e m o c r a c i e s , H a b e r m a s p r o v i d e s a n origi­ n a l r a t i o n a l e for t h e s e a r r a n g e m e n t s in t e r m s of t h e l e g i t i m a t i n g f u n c t i o n of p u b l i c r e a s o n . T h i s h e c o n s t r u e s in t e r m s of a m o d e l of t h e c i r c u l a t i o n of p o w e r : o n t h e i n p u t side, i n f l u e n c e g e n e r a t e d in t h e p u b l i c s p h e r e is t r a n s f o r m e d t h r o u g h t h e d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e ­ d u r e s of e l e c t i o n s a n d p a r l i a m e n t a r y o p i n i o n - a n d will-formation i n t o c o m m u n i c a t i v e power, w h i c h in t u r n is t r a n s f o r m e d t h r o u g h t h e legal p r o g r a m s a n d policies of p a r l i a m e n t a r y b o d i e s i n t o a d m i n ­ istrative p o w e r ; at t h e o u t p u t e n d , a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p r o g r a m s c r e a t e t h e n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n s for t h e e x i s t e n c e of civil society a n d its v o l u n t a r y associations, a n d h e n c e of a v i b r a n t political p u b l i c sphere. 1 6

H a b e r m a s claims t h a t this p r o c e d u r a l i s t m o d e l of deliberative d e m o c r a c y c a p t u r e s t h e p r i n c i p l e of t h e i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e of t h e r u l e of law a n d p o p u l a r sovereignty b e t t e r t h a n rival t h e o r e t i c a l p r o p o s ­ als. T h e rival p o s i t i o n t h a t is p e r h a p s closest to H a b e r m a s ' s is t h e political liberalism of Rawls, w h i c h is discussed at l e n g t h in t h e two essays t h a t c o m p r i s e P a r t II of this v o l u m e . I n t h e first, H a b e r m a s o u t l i n e s t h r e e basic criticisms of political liberalism: first, t h a t t h e devices of t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n a n d t h e veil of i g n o r a n c e d o n o t a d e q u a t e l y m o d e l t h e i d e a of impartiality t h a t i n f o r m s d e o n t o l o g i c a l c o n c e p t i o n s of j u s t i c e ; s e c o n d , t h a t t h e i d e a of a p u b l i c justification of a political c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e in t e r m s of a n " o v e r l a p p i n g con­ s e n s u s " is n o t c o m m e n s u r a t e with t h e e p i s t e m i c o r cognitive validity claim s u c h a t h e o r y m u s t raise if it is to claim legitimacy; a n d , t h i r d t h a t Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of t h e political i m p l i e s a rigid division

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b e t w e e n t h e p u b l i c a n d n o n p u b l i c i d e n t i t i e s of citizens w h i c h l e a d s h i m to a c c o r d t h e negative liberty r i g h t s priority over t h e r i g h t s of political p a r t i c i p a t i o n . I n a reply to this essay Rawls a r g u e d force­ fully t h a t H a b e r m a s ' s criticisms d i d n o t d o j u s t i c e to t h e c o m p l e x i t y of his p o s i t i o n , r e v e a l i n g in t h e p r o c e s s t h a t his p o s i t i o n is in s o m e r e s p e c t s closer to H a b e r m a s ' s t h a n t h e latter m a y h a v e a p p r e c i a t e d . However, i n t h e n e x t essay H a b e r m a s r e i t e r a t e s a n d f u r t h e r clarifies his basic criticisms. 17

18

P e r h a p s t h e key d i s a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n t h e m c o n c e r n s t h e a p p r o ­ p r i a t e n a t u r e a n d s c o p e of a p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n c e p t i o n of p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n t h a t w o u l d b e sufficient to g r o u n d a t h e o r y of j u s t i c e for a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e m o c r a c y . A l t h o u g h b o t h take a b r o a d l y c o n s t r u c tivist a p p r o a c h to practical r e a s o n — t h e y r e p r e s e n t p r i n c i p l e s of j u s ­ tice for a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e m o c r a c y as t h o s e t h a t citizens w o u l d a g r e e to as t h e r e s u l t of a n a p p r o p r i a t e p r o c e s s of reflection o r d e l i b e r a ­ t i o n — H a b e r m a s believes t h a t t h e c o n c e p t i o n of legitimacy implicit in m o d e r n d e m o c r a t i c c o n s t i t u t i o n s calls for a m o r e c o m p r e h e n s i v e t h e o r y of p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n t h a n Rawls allows. T h u s h e r e i t e r a t e s his a r g u m e n t t h a t Rawls's i d e a of r e a s o n a b l e o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s is n o t sufficient to g r o u n d t h e legitimacy of t h e basic c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s b e c a u s e it d o e s n o t allow for a s h a r e d p e r s p e c t i v e f r o m w h i c h t h e citizens c o u l d c o n v i n c e themselves of t h e validity of t h e p r i n c i p l e s for the same reasons. S u c h a p e r s p e c t i v e , h e a r g u e s , is implicit in t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s t h a t s p e a k e r s u n a v o i d a b l y m a k e w h e n they e n g a g e in practical a r g u m e n t a t i o n , so t h a t t h e a p p r o p r i a t e n o r m a t i v e p r i n c i p l e s c a n b e g r o u n d e d in a p u r e l y p r o c e d u r a l m a n ­ ner. Rawls, by c o n t r a s t , rejects this a p p r o a c h o n t h e g r o u n d s t h a t a political t h e o r y of j u s t i c e m u s t b e f r e e s t a n d i n g , a n d h e n c e c a n h a v e n o p a r t of t h e o r i e s of r e a s o n g r o u n d e d in c o m p r e h e n s i v e p h i l o ­ sophical d o c t r i n e s s u c h as H a b e r m a s ' s t h e o r y of c o m m u n i c a t i v e action. 19

20

T h e significance of t h e i r c o n t r a s t i n g a p p r o a c h e s to p r a c t i c a l rea­ son can b e b r o u g h t o u t by c o n s i d e r i n g t h e i r respective analyses of t h e legitimating function of t h e p u b l i c u s e of r e a s o n , a n i d e a t h a t is c e n t r a l to b o t h of t h e i r positions. It h a s e m e r g e d f r o m t h e i r ex­ c h a n g e t h a t p u b l i c r e a s o n u n d e r g o e s a p r o b l e m a t i c split in Rawls's political liberalism. I n t h e first p l a c e , t h e r e is t h e u n r e s t r i c t e d ex-

xix Editors' Introduction

c h a n g e of i d e a s in t h e " b a c k g r o u n d c u l t u r e of civil society" in w h i c h all p r a c t i c a l a n d t h e o r e t i c a l p r o p o s a l s a r e o p e n to d e b a t e ; h e r e p a r t i c i p a n t s a r e free to a p p e a l to w h a t e v e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s they find c o m p e l l i n g , i n c l u d i n g t h e i r o w n c o m p r e h e n s i v e views, i n a n a t t e m p t t o c o n v i n c e t h e i r fellows. T h i s is t h e f o r u m in w h i c h j u s t i c e as fairness a n d rival political c o n c e p t i o n s of j u s t i c e m u s t p r o v e t h e m ­ selves. However, a m u c h m o r e r e s t r i c t e d c o n c e p t i o n of p u b l i c r e a s o n i n f o r m s Rawls's i d e a of t h e "public justification" of a political con­ c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e by "political society" a n d t h e r e l a t e d n o t i o n of p u b l i c r e a s o n as a n ideal to w h i c h p a r t i c i p a n t s in p u b l i c political life s h o u l d c o n f o r m w h e n d e b a t i n g m a t t e r s of political c o n c e r n . I n p u b ­ lic justification of a s h a r e d political c o n c e p t i o n , r e a s o n a b l e citizens, w h o have a l r e a d y justified t h e political c o n c e p t i o n "privately" by e m b e d d i n g it i n t h e i r various c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e s , take a c c o u n t of the fact t h a t o t h e r s h a v e r e a s o n a b l e c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e s t h a t likewise e n d o r s e t h e political c o n c e p t i o n , t h o u g h for different rea­ sons. W h a t is g a i n e d by this " m u t u a l a c c o u n t i n g " a r e n o t f u r t h e r s u p p o r t i n g r e a s o n s for t h e political c o n c e p t i o n — s i n c e t h e e x p r e s s content of c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e s plays n o n o r m a t i v e r o l e in p u b l i c j u s t i f i c a t i o n — b u t a s h a r e d r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t different citizens e n ­ d o r s e t h e s a m e c o n c e p t i o n for different r e a s o n s t h a t m u s t b e r e ­ s p e c t e d . T h i s m u t u a l r e c o g n i t i o n finds e x p r e s s i o n in t h e i d e a l of p u b l i c r e a s o n a n d t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g political v i r t u e of civility: w h e n a d d r e s s i n g political issues, especially o n e s t h a t b e a r o n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l essentials, citizens, c a n d i d a t e s for office, officeholders, j u d g e s , a n d legislators m u s t .limit t h e m s e l v e s t o a d d u c i n g r e a s o n s t h a t t h e i r fel­ low citizens c o u l d r e a s o n a b l y a c c e p t a n d h e n c e m u s t refrain f r o m appealing to their own comprehensive doctrines. 21

H a b e r m a s is h i g h l y critical of this r e s t r i c t e d c o n c e p t i o n of p u b l i c r e a s o n . T h e c o n s e n s u s t h a t results f r o m p u b l i c justification as d e ­ p i c t e d by Rawls is n o t "rationally m o t i v a t e d " in a sense t h a t is c o n s o ­ n a n t with t h e d e o n t o l o g i c a l m e a n i n g of t h e basic p r i n c i p l e s of justice on which m o d e r n constitutional regimes are founded. T h e p r o b l e m is t h a t t h e o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s is n o t b a s e d o n s h a r e d r e a s o n s : citizens simply observe t h a t t h e i r fellows a c c e p t t h e political c o n c e p t i o n for t h e i r o w n r e a s o n s b u t c a n n o t j u d g e w h e t h e r this a c c e p t a n c e h a s a g e n u i n e r a t i o n a l basis. T h i s a t t e n u a t e d c o n c e p t i o n

XX

Editors' Introduction

of p u b l i c justification m e a n s t h a t Rawls m u s t restrict t h e validity claim publicly associated with t h e basic c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s to t h e w e a k claim t o " r e a s o n a b l e n e s s . " B u t this leaves h i m in t h e — f o r H a b e r m a s , h i g h l y p a r a d o x i c a l — p o s i t i o n of h o l d i n g t h a t publicly d e f e n s i b l e r e a s o n s c a n only s u p p o r t a w e a k claim to " r e a s o n a b l e ­ ness," w h e r e a s t h e private r e a s o n s m o b i l i z e d in d e f e n s e of c o m p r e ­ hensive d o c t r i n e s c a n g r o u n d t h e s t r o n g e r claim to " m o r a l t r u t h . " H a b e r m a s , by c o n t r a s t , h o l d s t h a t t h e values a n d ideals of t h e g o o d associated with religious a n d m e t a p h y s i c a l worldviews c a n n o t claim t h e universal validity of basic p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e , t h o u g h t h e y d o s h a p e t h e c u l t u r a l c o n t e x t w i t h i n w h i c h basic p r i n c i p l e s m u s t b e i n t e r p r e t e d a n d a p p l i e d . Moreover, h e a r g u e s t h a t a consistently p r o c e d u r a l i s t c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p u b l i c u s e of r e a s o n entails t h a t i n f o r m a l political discussion in civil society (i.e., in t h e "public s p h e r e " ) a n d p u b l i c d e l i b e r a t i o n b e a r i n g o n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l essentials in legislative a n d j u d i c i a l c o n t e x t s a r e subject to essentially t h e same r a t i o n a l c o n s t r a i n t s . I n b o t h cases t h e rationality of o u t c o m e s ideally s h o u l d b e solely a f u n c t i o n of t h e r e a s o n s a d d u c e d , t h e only differ­ e n c e b e i n g t h a t i n t h e p u b l i c s p h e r e t h e rationality of d e b a t e is a s s u r e d by a v i b r a n t political c u l t u r e t h a t facilitates o p e n participa­ tion, w h e r e a s i n t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y r e g u l a t e d g o v e r n m e n t a l s p h e r e it is a s s u r e d t h r o u g h legally p r e s c r i b e d p r o c e d u r e s of j u d i c i a l a n d p a r l i a m e n t a r y d e l i b e r a t i o n a n d d e c i s i o n m a k i n g d e s i g n e d to e n s u r e sufficient a p p r o x i m a t i o n to ideal c o n d i t i o n s of discursive o p e n n e s s u n d e r l i m i t a t i o n s of t i m e a n d i n f o r m a t i o n . O n this a c c o u n t , t h e legitimacy-conferring f u n c t i o n of political d e l i b e r a t i o n d o e s n o t h a v e to rely o n t h e civility of citizens, legislators, a n d j u r i s t s w h o voluntarily refrain f r o m a d d u c i n g r e a s o n s t h a t t h e y t h i n k w o u l d n o t b e a c c e p t a b l e to t h e i r fellow citizens; it c a n a n d m u s t b e left t o t h e p r o c e d u r a l c o n s t r a i n t s of discourses t h e m s e l v e s to d e t e r m i n e w h i c h r e a s o n s ultimately win o u t . A l t h o u g h it m u s t b e left to t h e r e a d e r to u n r a v e l t h e t h r e a d s of this i n t r i c a t e d e b a t e f u r t h e r , we w o u l d like to d r a w a t t e n t i o n to a d i v e r g e n c e b e t w e e n Rawls's a n d H a b e r m a s ' s a p p r o a c h e s t o issues of international justice, which has a bearing o n H a b e r m a s ' s b r o a d e r c o n c e r n s in this v o l u m e . Rawls's t h e o r y of j u s t i c e is t a i l o r e d f r o m t h e b e g i n n i n g to a view of t h e state as a m o r e o r less self-sufficient system 22

xxi Editors' Introduction

of social c o o p e r a t i o n t h a t is a s s u m e d to exist in p e r p e t u i t y ; h e n c e , it p r e s u p p o s e s t h e c o n c e p t i o n of t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e as e x e r c i s i n g exclu­ sive sovereignty over a t e r r i t o r y a n d p e o p l e e n s h r i n e d in m o d e r n i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. T h i s o r i e n t a t i o n is r e i n f o r c e d by Rawls's m o r e r e c e n t i d e a of a political c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e as o n e t h a t draws o n i d e a s l a t e n t in t h e political c u l t u r e of W e s t e r n liberal d e m o c r a c i e s . W h e n h e t u r n s to t h e q u e s t i o n of h o w liberal d e m o c r a c i e s s h o u l d b e h a v e t o w a r d n o n l i b e r a l r e g i m e s w h o s e political c u l t u r e s a r e n o t s t r u c t u r e d by s u c h liberal ideas, t h e p r i n c i p l e of t o l e r a t i o n itself dictates t h a t a liberal r e g i m e m u s t n o t insist unilaterally o n liberal s t a n d a r d s as t h e basis f o r j u d g i n g w h i c h r e g i m e s it s h o u l d r e c o g n i z e as l e g i t i m a t e . I n o t h e r w o r d s , Rawls is c o m p e l l e d t o apply m u c h w e a k e r s t a n d a r d s of political legitimacy to t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l d o m a i n , a n d his t h e o r y of i n t e r n a t i o n a l j u s t i c e , at least as c u r r e n t l y f o r m u ­ l a t e d , s e e m s t o allow for only l i m i t e d p r o t e c t i o n of t h e h u m a n r i g h t s of citizens of a u t h o r i t a r i a n s t a t e s . O n H a b e r m a s ' s a p p r o a c h t h e r e is n o s u c h t h e o r e t i c a l b r e a k b e ­ t w e e n t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of liberal p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e to t h e n a t i o n a l a n d to t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l d o m a i n s . R a t h e r t h a n a c c e p t i n g t h e frame­ w o r k of t r a d i t i o n a l i n t e r n a t i o n a l law w h i c h views states as t h e sole l e g i t i m a t e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h e i r citizens, H a b e r m a s advocates a m o d e l of cosmopolitan law w h i c h w o u l d s u p e r s e d e i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, c o n f e r a c t i o n a b l e legal r i g h t s directly o n individuals, a n d m a n d a t e t h e c r e a t i o n of s u p r a n a t i o n a l political a g e n c i e s a n d i n s t i t u t i o n s to e n ­ s u r e t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of h u m a n r i g h t s o n a g l o b a l scale. W h i l e nation-states w o u l d r e t a i n l i m i t e d sovereignty, t h e i r citizens w o u l d b e a b l e to a p p e a l to t h e coercive legal a u t h o r i t y of r e g i o n a l o r g l o b a l a g e n c i e s , a g a i n s t t h e i r o w n g o v e r n m e n t s if necessary. T h i s e x t e n s i o n of t h e t h e o r y of r i g h t s a n d p r o c e d u r a l d e m o c r a c y in a c o s m o p o l i t a n d i r e c t i o n raises far-reaching q u e s t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g t h e f u t u r e of t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e , to w h i c h we n o w t u r n . 23

3

T h e Future o f the Nation-State in an Era o f Globalization

T h e essays c o l l e c t e d in P a r t s III a n d IV of this v o l u m e r e p r e s e n t s o m e of H a b e r m a s ' s m o s t significant i n t e r v e n t i o n s in t h e o n g o i n g d e b a t e s a b o u t t h e n a t u r e a n d f u t u r e of t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e . I n c o n t r a s t

xxii Editors' Introduction

to m o s t a r g u m e n t s for c o s m o p o l i t a n i s m , however, H a b e r m a s ' s p o i n t of d e p a r t u r e is n e i t h e r a n attack o n t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e n o r a r e p u d i a ­ t i o n of n a t i o n a l i s m , b u t a n o r m a t i v e a n d e m p i r i c a l analysis of t h e i r successes as well as t h e i r l i m i t a t i o n s . Briefly, H a b e r m a s a r g u e s t h a t t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e e m e r g e d in r e s p o n s e to a d u a l crisis of l e g i t i m a t i o n a n d i n t e g r a t i o n t h a t a r o s e with t h e d e m i s e of t h e o l d E u r o p e a n f e u d a l o r d e r a n d d e e p e n e d with t h e a c c e l e r a t i o n of p r o c e s s e s of m o d e r n i z a t i o n . After t h e wars of r e l i g i o n a n d t h e e m e r g e n c e of c r e d a l p l u r a l i s m , a u t h o r i t y h a d to b e l e g i t i m a t e d in a secular fashion. M o d e r n i z a t i o n left in its wake isolated individuals a n d d i s l o c a t e d c o m m u n i t i e s . T h e a c h i e v e m e n t of t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e consists p r e ­ cisely in a d d r e s s i n g t h e p r o b l e m s of l e g i t i m a t i o n a n d i n t e g r a t i o n a t o n c e . By f o r m i n g states a n d i n c o r p o r a t i n g d e m o c r a t i c c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o c e d u r e s , c o m m u n i t i e s g a i n a m e a s u r e of legitimacy for t h e i r a u t h o r i t a t i v e political institutions. At t h e s a m e t i m e , it is precisely t h e (in m o s t cases d e l i b e r a t e ) a d o p t i o n of t h e i d e a of n a t i o n h o o d t h a t c r e a t e s b o n d s of m u t u a l solidarity b e t w e e n f o r m e r s t r a n g e r s a n d motivates t h e e x t e n s i o n of d e m o c r a t i c citizenship, t h e r e b y a d d r e s s ­ i n g t h e p r o b l e m of d i s i n t e g r a t i o n . 2 4

25

B u t if t h e i d e a of t h e n a t i o n was historically i m p o r t a n t in t h e f o r m a t i o n of d e m o c r a t i c a l l y o r d e r e d societies, for H a b e r m a s it s e e m s to h a v e outlived its usefulness, at least as traditionally c o n ­ ceived a n d e n s h r i n e d in i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. It is n o t j u s t t h a t t h e i n c r e a s i n g p l u r a l i s m a n d r e l e n t l e s s p r o c e s s e s of e c o n o m i c globaliza­ t i o n a r e r e n d e r i n g o b s o l e t e t h e n o t i o n of i n t e r n a l l y h o m o g e n e o u s a n d e x t e r n a l l y sovereign states; in a d d i t i o n a n i n h e r e n t t e n s i o n b e ­ t w e e n n a t i o n a l i s m a n d r e p u b l i c a n i s m is c o m i n g to a h e a d . W h e r e a s n a t i o n a l i t y d e p e n d s p r i m a r i l y o n ascriptive criteria s u c h as ethnicity, a c o m m o n l a n g u a g e , o r a s h a r e d history, r e p u b l i c a n i s m is f o u n d e d o n t h e ideals of v o l u n t a r y association a n d universal h u m a n r i g h t s . D e s p i t e t h e i m p o r t a n c e of t h e historical c o n v e r g e n c e of n a t i o n a l i t y a n d r e p u b l i c a n i s m in t h e f o r m a t i o n of t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e since t h e F r e n c h R e v o l u t i o n , H a b e r m a s a r g u e s , this was only a c o n t i n g e n t link: r e p u b l i c a n i s m is n e i t h e r c o n c e p t u a l l y n o r practically d e p e n d ­ e n t o n nationality, a n d t h e t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y in p a r t i c u l a r h a s p r o ­ v i d e d g r o t e s q u e e x a m p l e s of t h e d a n g e r s of e m p h a s i z i n g t h e relationship between ethnos a n d demos.

xxiii Editors' Introduction

H a b e r m a s ' s m a i n t a r g e t in this discussion is t h e p o s i t i o n t h a t r e g a r d s a culturally o r ethnically h o m o g e n e o u s p o p u l a t i o n as a n e c ­ essary c o n d i t i o n of t h e effective o p e r a t i o n of a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e m o c ­ r a c y . F o r H a b e r m a s , insisting o n this c o n d i t i o n i m p l i e s a failure to a c k n o w l e d g e t h e i m p o r t a n c e of legal i n s t i t u t i o n s in t h e f o r m a t i o n of n a t i o n a l i d e n t i t i e s . H e r e m i n d s u s t h a t m o d e r n c o n s c i o u s n e s s is n o t m e r e l y a r e s u l t of m e m b e r s h i p in p r e p o l i t i c a l a n c e s t r a l c o m m u ­ nities b a s e d o n k i n s h i p , b u t is a t least in p a r t a f u n c t i o n of politics, of t h e active e n j o y m e n t of t h e status of citizen w i t h i n a political community. 26

A t t e n t i o n to t h e r o l e of legal s t r u c t u r e s — a s o p p o s e d t o i n h e r i t e d loyalties—in t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n of n a t i o n a l i d e n t i t y h e l p s H a b e r m a s to m e e t o n e of t h e o b j e c t i o n s raised a g a i n s t s u p r a n a t i o n a l r e g i m e s s u c h as t h e E u r o p e a n U n i o n . A c c o r d i n g t o s o m e critics, in t h e a b s e n c e of a g e n u i n e s u p r a n a t i o n a l identity s u c h r e g i m e s suffer f r o m a n i r r e ­ solvable legitimacy deficit: t h e y will inevitably b e a n t i d e m o c r a t i c b o t h in o r i g i n a n d in o p e r a t i o n . H a b e r m a s , of c o u r s e , a c k n o w l e d g e s t h a t a E u r o p e a n i d e n t i t y will n o t c o m e a b o u t m e r e l y t h r o u g h legal fiat; b u t h e a r g u e s t h a t t h e genesis of s u c h a n identity d e p e n d s o n t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n of s u p r a n a t i o n a l d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e d u r e s . J u s t as t h e i d e n t i t y of t h e F r e n c h , for e x a m p l e , is b a s e d n o t m e r e l y o n a s h a r e d c u l t u r a l i d e n t i t y b u t also o n t h e s h a r e d legal-political institu­ t i o n s a n d p r a c t i c e s t h a t a r e p a r t of t h e legacy of t h e R e v o l u t i o n , t h e i d e n t i t y of E u r o p e a n s will b e at least in p a r t a f u n c t i o n of a legal f r a m e w o r k t h a t allows for t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of a g e n u i n e l y E u r o p e a n identity. H a b e r m a s ' s m o d e l h e r e is t h a t of t h e slow historical p r o c e s s t h r o u g h w h i c h , in t h e c o u r s e of t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y , i n h e r i t e d local a n d dynastic loyalties b e c a m e s u b o r d i n a t e d to t h e m o r e ab­ stract a n d legally m e d i a t e d political i d e n t i t y of citizens of p a r t i c u l a r nation-states. I n m o u n t i n g this a r g u m e n t , H a b e r m a s m a k e s u s e of a p a i r of r e l a t e d d i s t i n c t i o n s t h a t a r e b e c o m i n g i m p o r t a n t in discussions n o t j u s t a b o u t n a t i o n a l i s m b u t m o r e g e n e r a l l y a b o u t political justifica­ t i o n in m u l t i c u l t u r a l c o n t e x t s . H e distinguishes, o n t h e o n e h a n d , b e t w e e n a civic a n d a n ethnic sense of t h e n a t i o n , a n d o n t h e o t h e r , b e t w e e n a political and a majority c u l t u r e . T h e idea, of c o u r s e , is to restrict t h e object of politics so as to m a k e a g r e e m e n t m o r e feasible.

xxiv Editors' Introduction

Citizens d o n o t h a v e to a g r e e o n a m u t u a l l y a c c e p t a b l e set of c u l t u r a l p r a c t i c e s b u t m u s t c o m e t o a t o m o r e m o d e s t t h o u g h still d e m a n d ­ i n g a g r e e m e n t c o n c e r n i n g a b s t r a c t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s . As with n a t i o n a l identity w i t h i n pluralistic states, H a b e r m a s t h i n k s t h a t a s u p r a n a t i o n a l i d e n t i t y m i g h t evolve a r o u n d a n a g r e e m e n t a b o u t political p r i n c i p l e s a n d p r o c e d u r e s r a t h e r t h a n a b o u t c u l t u r e m o r e generally. T h e a g r e e m e n t in q u e s t i o n a m o u n t s to a n identification with basic c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s a n d p r a c t i c e s w h i c h H a b e r m a s ( a m o n g o t h e r s ) calls " c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p a t r i o t i s m . " As w i t h i n t h e na­ tion-state, i n h e r i t e d r e g i o n a l loyalties c o u l d b e s u b o r d i n a t e d t o , b u t n o t c o m p l e t e l y r e p l a c e d by, c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p a t r i o t i s m , so a similar p r o c e s s m i g h t take s h a p e at t h e s u p r a n a t i o n a l level, p r o v i d e d t h a t t h e different c o n s t i t u t i o n a l t r a d i t i o n s of t h e m e m b e r states e m b o d ­ i e d t h e s a m e set of basic r i g h t s . 27

B u t H a b e r m a s ' s i n t e r e s t in c o s m o p o l i t a n s t r u c t u r e s g o e s b e y o n d t h e a p p r o v i n g o b s e r v a t i o n t h a t t h e different r e p u b l i c a n t r a d i t i o n s c o n v e r g e o n t h e s a m e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s . After all, t h e classical system of states, u p to a n d i n c l u d i n g t h e L e a g u e of N a t i o n s , also i n c l u d e d a set of p r i n c i p l e s t h a t all m e m b e r c o u n t r i e s w e r e s u p p o s e d to f o l l o w . B u t t h a t system d i d n o t give a n y o n e t h e a u t h o r i t y to i n t e r v e n e in d e f e n s e of t h e s h a r e d p r i n c i p l e s . I n this r e s p e c t , H a b e r ­ m a s ' s c o s m o p o l i t a n i s m is m o r e d e m a n d i n g t h a n K a n t ' s i d e a of a f e d e r a t i o n of sovereign states, w h i c h is in s o m e ways r e f l e c t e d in t h e classical c o n c e p t i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l l a w . O n H a b e r m a s ' s view, t h e r e is a n i n c o n s i s t e n c y in K a n t ' s d u a l a s p i r a t i o n to p r e s e r v e t h e sovereignty of t h e associated states, o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d to m a i n ­ tain p e a c e in t h e l o n g r u n , o n t h e o t h e r . T h e t e n s i o n lies in t h e fact t h a t t h e p r o p o s e d federative s c h e m e exists only insofar, a n d as l o n g as, t h e m e m b e r states will to r e m a i n in it. However, if p e a c e is to b e p r o m o t e d , H a b e r m a s a r g u e s , states m u s t b e u n d e r t h e obligation to act in h a r m o n y with t h e p r i n c i p l e s of t h e f e d e r a t i o n . Although K a n t envisaged t h e possibility of a "universal f e d e r a l state" (Volkerstaat) "based u p o n e n f o r c e a b l e p u b l i c laws to w h i c h e a c h state m u s t s u b m i t , " in fact h e a d v o c a t e d a " f e d e r a t i o n of p e o p l e s " (Volkerbund), a m o r e m o d e s t s t r u c t u r e w h o s e a i m is n o t to c o n s t i t u t e a legal o r d e r to i n c r e a s e welfare a n d j u s t i c e , b u t r a t h e r only to f u r t h e r t h e a b o l i t i o n of w a r . T h i s v o l u n t a r y association d o e s n o t give rise to a n y a c t i o n a b l e rights, a n d h e n c e its p e r m a n e n c e r e m a i n s u n e x p l a i n e d . 28

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XXV

Editors' Introduction

Moreover, t h e c o n c e r n to leave i n t a c t t h e sovereignty of its m e m b e r states will, predictably, conflict with t h e n e e d to o b l i g a t e u n r u l y m e m b e r s to s u b o r d i n a t e t h e i r o w n raison d'etat so t h a t p e a c e m a y b e p e r p e t u a t e d . T h u s t h e r e is a n i n h e r e n t t e n s i o n in t h e d u a l a i m of e s t a b l i s h i n g a r e g i m e of e n f o r c e a b l e h u m a n rights, o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d of m a k i n g c o n s e n t t h e sole s o u r c e of o b l i g a t i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, o n t h e o t h e r . 3 3

A n a p p r o p r i a t e r e f o r m u l a t i o n of classical i n t e r n a t i o n a l law is in o r d e r , t h e n . T h e t h r u s t of H a b e r m a s ' s p r o p o s a l is t h a t r e p u b l i c a n i s m n e e d s to b e p r e s e r v e d at t h e s u p r a n a t i o n a l level if it is to survive at all. T h e n a t i o n - s t a t e suffers t h r e e sorts of weaknesses, w h i c h a r e unlikely to b e o v e r c o m e by t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e a l o n e . First, i n d i v i d u a l nation-states d o n o t h a v e t h e n e c e s s a r y r e s o u r c e s to d e a l with risks o n a g l o b a l scale, i n c l u d i n g ecological p r o b l e m s , e c o n o m i c i n e q u a l i ­ ties, t h e a r m s t r a d e , a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l c r i m e . S e c o n d , states a r e b e c o m i n g helpless in t h e face of t h e g l o b a l i z a t i o n o r d e n a t i o n a l i z a ­ t i o n of t h e e c o n o m y . It is n o t only t h e i n c r e a s e d m a g n i t u d e of t h e e c o n o m i c activity across n a t i o n a l b o r d e r s b u t also t h e r a p i d mobility of capital t h a t leads to t h e loss of a l a r g e m e a s u r e of i n d i v i d u a l states' c o n t r o l over t h e i r o w n e c o n o m i e s . T h i s w e a k n e s s is n o t m e r e l y a p r a g m a t i c m a t t e r b u t t h r e a t e n s to u n d e r m i n e t h e integrative a c h i e v e m e n t s of t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e . O n e of t h e d a n g e r s of t h e d e n a ­ t i o n a l i z a t i o n of e c o n o m i e s is a r a c e b e t w e e n several c o u n t r i e s to d i s m a n t l e t h e i r welfare systems in t h e s e a r c h for c o m p e t i t i v e advan­ tages. T h i s in t u r n w o u l d a c c e l e r a t e t h e f o r m a t i o n of u n d e r c l a s s e s even in d e v e l o p e d c o u n t r i e s , with t h r e e fateful c o n s e q u e n c e s : a n i n c r e a s i n g r e c o u r s e to repressive politics in a vain a t t e m p t to c o n t a i n t h e a n o m i c effects of a l a r g e u n d e r c l a s s ; t h e decay of t h e infrastruc­ t u r e of e x p a n d e d areas; a n d , as a c o n s e q u e n c e of t h e f o r e g o i n g , t h e collapse of t h e b o n d s of social solidarity a n d political legitimacy, two a c h i e v e m e n t s of t h e d e m o c r a t i c n a t i o n - s t a t e . Finally, t h e i n h e r e n t t e n s i o n b e t w e e n n a t i o n a l i s m a n d r e p u b l i c a n i s m m a k e s t h e sovereign state a less t h a n reliable g u a r a n t o r of t h e rights t h a t individuals a r e s u p p o s e d to h a v e q u a h u m a n b e i n g s , a n d n o t only as citizens of p a r t i c u l a r states. 34

S u p r a n a t i o n a l r e g i m e s , a c c o r d i n g to H a b e r m a s , a r e m o r e likely to s u c c e e d w h e r e sovereign states fail. F o r this r e a s o n , h e s u p p o r t s s u p r a n a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s with g r e a t e r executive a n d j u d i c i a l p o w e r s ,

xxvi Editors' Introduction

so l o n g as t h e s e i n s t i t u t i o n s a r e also m o r e d e m o c r a t i c t h a n p r e s e n t i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s . T h e a i m of t h e s e r e g i m e s is t o c o n s t i t u t e a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l legal o r d e r t h a t at t h e very least w o u l d b i n d indi­ vidual g o v e r n m e n t s to r e s p e c t t h e basic r i g h t s of t h e i r citizens, if n e c e s s a r y t h r o u g h t h e t h r e a t o r t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of s a n c t i o n s . W h i l e i n c r e a s e d j u d i c i a l a n d executive f u n c t i o n s w o u l d b e n e c e s s a r y to m a k e i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s effective in t h e p r o t e c t i o n of indi­ vidual rights, for this very r e a s o n t h e y w o u l d also h a v e to e m b o d y g r e a t e r d e m o c r a t i c o p e n n e s s in o r d e r t o p r e v e n t selective a n d u n f a i r uses of i n t e r n a t i o n a l force. T h e s a m e d e m o c r a t i c , c o s m o p o l i t a n o r i e n t a t i o n c a n b e s e e n in H a b e r m a s ' s p o s i t i o n o n t h e f u t u r e of E u r o p e . Critics allege t h a t t h e U n i o n suffers f r o m a serious " d e m o c r a t i c deficit" o n at least t h r e e g r o u n d s . First, t h e U n i o n rests o n i n t e r n a t i o n a l treaties, a s e e m ­ ingly shaky basis for i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d legal p r e c e d e n t s t h a t increas­ ingly play a federative r o l e . S e c o n d , critics aver t h a t s t r u c t u r a l i m p e d i m e n t s t o d e m o c r a c y s u c h as t h e i n c r e a s i n g p o w e r of t h e C o m m i s s i o n , t h e p o o r l y d e v e l o p e d d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e d u r e s of t h e C o u n c i l , a n d t h e relative s t r u c t u r a l u n i m p o r t a n c e of t h e Parlia­ m e n t , m a k e U n i o n d e c i s i o n s a p p e a r as i m p o s i t i o n s o n t h e p a r t of a b u r e a u c r a t i c b o d y t h a t h a s b e c o m e d a n g e r o u s l y a u t o n o m o u s . Even if m e m b e r states c o u l d " l e n d " t h e i r legitimacy to t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s of t h e U n i o n , over t i m e a d e m o c r a t i c g a p h a s allegedly o p e n e d u p , for t h e o v e r l o a d e d C o u n c i l h a s d e l e g a t e d d e c i s i o n s to t h e E u r o p e a n C o m m i s s i o n , w h o s e m e m b e r s a r e n o t a c c o u n t a b l e to t h e p a r t i c u l a r m e m b e r states b u t to t h e U n i o n itself. Finally, s o m e critics d i s p u t e t h e d e m o c r a t i c c h a r a c t e r of t h e U n i o n , asserting t h a t a s t r o n g e r U n i o n w o u l d h a v e a n even m o r e severe legitimacy deficit b e c a u s e of t h e n o n e x i s t e n c e of a E u r o p e a n p u b l i c . 3 5

3 6

37

38

3 9

H a b e r m a s ' s r e s p o n s e to t h e d e m o c r a t i c deficit of t h e U n i o n p a r ­ allels his suggestions c o n c e r n i n g t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s . H e d e f e n d s " [ n ] e w political i n s t i t u t i o n s s u c h as a E u r o p e a n P a r l i a m e n t with t h e usual powers, a g o v e r n m e n t f o r m e d o u t of t h e C o m m i s s i o n , a Sec­ o n d C h a m b e r r e p l a c i n g t h e C o u n c i l , a n d a E u r o p e a n C o u r t of Justice with e x p a n d e d c o m p e t e n c e s . " I n s h o r t , H a b e r m a s advo­ cates "a transition of t h e E u r o p e a n C o m m u n i t y to a d e m o c r a t i c a l l y constituted, federal s t a t e . " F o r h i m , t h e way to m a k e g o o d t h e 4 0

41

xxvii Editors' Introduction

d e m o c r a t i c deficit of t h e U n i o n is precisely to s t r e n g t h e n its political i n s t i t u t i o n s while giving it t h e c h a r a c t e r of a f e d e r a l g o v e r n m e n t . To t h o s e (like G r i m m ) w h o t h i n k t h a t a s t r o n g e r U n i o n w o u l d have a n even m o r e severe legitimacy deficit b e c a u s e of t h e n o n e x i s t e n c e of a n E u r o p e a n p u b l i c , H a b e r m a s offers t h e r e m i n d e r t h a t t h e identity of p e r s o n s as citizens is s h a p e d , at least in p a r t , by t h e legal a n d political i n s t i t u t i o n s w i t h i n w h i c h they c o n d u c t t h e i r lives. It is n o t u n r e a s o n a b l e , t h e n , to e x p e c t t h a t "the political i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t w o u l d b e c r e a t e d by a E u r o p e a n c o n s t i t u t i o n w o u l d h a v e a catalytic e f f e c t " — t h a t is, t h a t t h e y w o u l d c o n t r i b u t e to t h e f o r m a t i o n of a n a u t h e n t i c E u r o p e a n identity, w h i c h w o u l d i n t u r n p r o m o t e t h e d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n of E u r o p e a n institutions. 42

T h e s u g g e s t i o n s for i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m t h a t H a b e r ­ m a s offers a r e provocative, b u t t h e focus of his w o r k lies o n t h e n o r m a t i v e d i m e n s i o n of c o s m o p o l i t a n i s m . At this level, w h a t m a k e s his d e f e n s e of c o s m o p o l i t a n i s m p a r t i c u l a r l y c o m p e l l i n g is t h a t it follows f r o m a n a r g u m e n t t h a t seeks to r e c o n c i l e p a r t i c u l a r i s m a n d universalism, Sittlichkeit a n d Moralitat, by giving e a c h its d u e . T h e g u i d i n g i d e a is t h a t c o s m o p o l i t a n political i n s t i t u t i o n s c a n b e s e e n as t h e r e s u l t of t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e very s a m e h y p o t h e t i c a l c o n ­ s t r u c t in t e r m s of w h i c h h e e l u c i d a t e s t h e legitimacy of legal r i g h t s w i t h i n t h e n a t i o n state. J u s t as w i t h i n states r i g h t s a r e n e c e s s a r y in o r d e r to m e d i a t e social i n t e r a c t i o n s by m e a n s of laws, c e r t a i n r i g h t s b e c o m e n e c e s s a r y in o r d e r to achieve t h e s a m e g o a l w h e n t h e inter­ a c t i o n s t a k e p l a c e across n a t i o n a l b o r d e r s . Since for H a b e r m a s t h e l e g i t i m a t i o n of law r e q u i r e s sensitivity b o t h to t h e c o n c r e t e c o n t e x t of a p p l i c a t i o n a n d t o t h e universalistic t h r u s t of i m p a r t i a l r e a s o n , t h e universality of basic rights, far f r o m t h w a r t i n g t h e e x p r e s s i o n a n d d e v e l o p m e n t of c o n c r e t e f o r m s of life, actually p r o m o t e s t h e m , as will b e c o m e clear in t h e n e x t section. 4

Multiculturalism and the Rights o f Cultural Minorities

H a b e r m a s ' s discussion of m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m serves to illustrate t h e a d v a n t a g e s of his d i f f e r e n t i a t e d a p p r o a c h to m o r a l , legal, a n d politi­ cal issues a n d to t h e c o m p l e x r e l a t i o n s h i p s b e t w e e n t h e m . B o t h liberals a n d c o m m u n i t a r i a n s c h a r g e o n e a n o t h e r with insensitivity

xxviii Editors' Introduction

t o w a r d difference a n d h e n c e with difficulties in d e a l i n g with s o m e of t h e p r e s s i n g issues of c o n t e m p o r a r y i d e n t i t y politics. C o m m u n i ­ t a r i a n s c h a r g e t h a t t h e liberal e m p h a s i s o n e q u a l t r e a t m e n t a m o u n t s to "an a b s t r a c t leveling of distinctions, a leveling of b o t h c u l t u r a l a n d social d i f f e r e n c e s . " Liberals, in t u r n , claim t h a t m a n y of t h e c h a r ­ acteristic f e a t u r e s of c o m m u n i t a r i a n i s m l e a d to a n e x c l u s i o n of dif­ f e r e n c e . T h e s e i n c l u d e t h e c o m m u n i t a r i a n s ' willingness to g r a n t p r i m a c y to collective over individual r i g h t s a n d t h e i r c o n s t r u a l of r i g h t s as a n e x p r e s s i o n of values c o n t a i n e d in t h e t r a d i t i o n s of par­ ticular c o m m u n i t i e s . T h e s t r o n g link b e t w e e n t h e n o t i o n of collec­ tive i d e n t i t y a n d r i g h t s is particularly p r o b l e m a t i c in pluralistic societies, w h e r e conflicts inevitably arise c o n c e r n i n g t h e r i g h t s of m i n o r i t y g r o u p s w h o s e i d e n t i t i e s a n d t r a d i t i o n s differ f r o m t h o s e of t h e majority g r o u p . 43

T h e p e c u l i a r p o w e r a n d originality of H a b e r m a s ' s t h e o r y of politi­ cal l e g i t i m a t i o n consists in p a r t in its ability to d e a l with a b r o a d r a n g e of issues w i t h i n t h e f r a m e w o r k of a single u n i f i e d t h e o r y of h u m a n r i g h t s a n d of p o p u l a r sovereignty. However, it is n o t i m m e ­ diately e v i d e n t t h a t his a p p r o a c h is b e t t e r a b l e t o a c c o u n t for politi­ cally significant differences b e t w e e n e t h n i c , religious, a n d n a t i o n a l g r o u p s t h a n e i t h e r c o m m u n i t a r i a n i s m o r classical liberalism. F o r o n e t h i n g , t h e highly a b s t r a c t t h e o r i e s of h u m a n r i g h t s a n d of p o p u ­ lar sovereignty o n w h i c h h e p r o p o s e s to g r o u n d d e m o c r a c y at b o t h t h e n a t i o n a l a n d s u p r a n a t i o n a l levels s e e m to i g n o r e t h e c u l t u r a l values t h a t s h a p e t h e i d e n t i t i e s of g r o u p s . We shall c o n c l u d e with a few brief r e m a r k s o n t h e s e m a t t e r s . (1) T h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t e t h n i c a n d c u l t u r a l h o m o g e n e i t y a r e n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n s for t h e p r o p e r f u n c t i o n i n g of a d e m o c r a t i c c o m m u n i t y c r e a t e s obvious difficulties for justifying e q u a l t r e a t m e n t of m i n o r i t y g r o u p s . H a b e r m a s ' s d e f e n s e of t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n e t h n o s a n d d e m o s , as we saw a b o v e , is d i r e c t e d precisely against this a s s u m p t i o n , a n d this e n a b l e s h i m to a r g u e t h a t t h e r e is n o a p r i o r i r e a s o n why a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e m o c r a c y s h o u l d find itself c h a l l e n g e d by ever-increasing e t h n i c a n d c u l t u r a l p l u r a l i s m . Critics will p r e d i c t ­ ably c o m p l a i n t h a t this very a r g u m e n t u n d e r e s t i m a t e s t h e i m p o r ­ t a n c e of c u l t u r a l identities. T h e y will p o i n t o u t t h a t m o d e r n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e m o c r a c i e s e m e r g e d for t h e m o s t p a r t f r o m strug­ gles for s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n by g r o u p s w h o saw t h e i r political destiny

xxix Editors' Introduction

as a m a t t e r of cultivating p a r t i c u l a r f o r m s of life, c u s t o m s , a n d values t h a t d i s t i n g u i s h e d t h e m f r o m o t h e r n a t i o n a l g r o u p s . H a b e r m a s , by c o n t r a s t , s e e m s to t r e a t t h e q u e s t i o n of m e m b e r s h i p m e r e l y as a m a t t e r of historical c o n t i n g e n c y . Even critics w h o a c c e p t t h e c o n t i n g e n c y of political m e m b e r s h i p c o u l d a r g u e , however, t h a t t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n e t h n o s a n d de­ m o s c a n establish at b e s t t h e impermissibility of overt d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , b u t t h a t t h e m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m d e b a t e reveals precisely t h e t e n s i o n b e t w e e n t h e p r i n c i p l e of e q u a l t r e a t m e n t a n d t h e a i m of p r o t e c t i n g c u l t u r a l identity. H a b e r m a s ' s r e l a t e d d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n a s h a r e d political c u l t u r e a n d diverse s u b c u l t u r e s , w h i c h e m p h a s i z e s t h a t p o ­ litical i n t e g r a t i o n is a m a t t e r of a g r e e m e n t c o n c e r n i n g basic consti­ tutional principles a n d procedures rather than about concrete forms of life, m i g h t a d d fuel to t h e o b j e c t i o n t h a t h e is insufficiently a t t u n e d to t h e i m p o r t a n c e of c u l t u r e in politics, t h a t m e r e a g r e e ­ m e n t a b o u t a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l t r a d i t i o n , in isolation f r o m t h e sub­ s t a n c e of a thick ethical life, is unlikely to l e a d t o t h e legal p r o t e c t i o n of m i n o r i t y o r f o r m e r l y u n r e c o g n i z e d c o m m u n i t i e s . W h i l e t h e s e o b j e c t i o n s h a v e a c e r t a i n plausibility, H a b e r m a s ' s so­ cial t h e o r y p r o v i d e s h i m with t h e o r e t i c a l r e s o u r c e s to d e a l with t h e m . I n t h e first p l a c e , h e c a n d r a w o n a n a c c o u n t of identity-forma­ t i o n a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h i n d i v i d u a t i o n is a c h i e v e d only t h r o u g h p r o c ­ esses of s o c i a l i z a t i o n , Briefly, t h e i d e a is t h a t p e r s o n a l i d e n t i t y h a s a n i r r e d u c i b l y intersubjective basis b e c a u s e t h e a c q u i s i t i o n a n d m a i n t e n a n c e of a sense of self d e p e n d s u p o n t h e s t r u c t u r e s of reci­ p r o c i t y a n d r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t a r e b u i l t i n t o t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n . If i d e n t i t i e s a r e always a r t i c u l a t e d in a n d t h r o u g h p r o c e s s e s of socialization, t h e n p r o t e c t i n g t h e i d e n t i t i e s of individuals necessarily implies p r o t e c t i n g t h e c o n t e x t s of i n t e r a c t i o n in w h i c h t h e y d e f i n e w h o they a r e . B e c a u s e r e s p e c t for t h e integrity of individuals t h u s r e q u i r e s r e s p e c t for t h e c o n t e x t s in w h i c h t h e y f o r m a n d sustain t h e i r identities, H a b e r m a s is l e d to d e f e n d policies t h a t s u p p o r t e r s of m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m also e n d o r s e , s u c h as m u l t i c u l t u ­ ral e d u c a t i o n , g o v e r n m e n t a l s u p p o r t for t h e c u l t u r a l activities of m i n o r i t y g r o u p s , a n d t h e like. A l t h o u g h H a b e r m a s a n d his c o m m u n i t a r i a n o p p o n e n t s m a y s u p ­ p o r t s o m e of t h e s a m e policies, t h e y differ sharply in t h e justifica­ tions they offer for t h e m . T h u s C h a r l e s Taylor ultimately a p p e a l s to 44

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45

a controversial n o t i o n of g r o u p r i g h t s , w h e r e a s H a b e r m a s relies o n t h e n o t i o n of p e r s o n a l a u t o n o m y . F o r h i m , m u l t i c u l t u r a l policies n o t only sustain t h e c o n d i t i o n s for m a i n t a i n i n g i n d i v i d u a l a n d g r o u p identities, b u t also s e c u r e t h e c o n d i t i o n s for e x e r c i s i n g a u t o n o m o u s c h o i c e . T h e g o a l of s u c h policies is to allow citizens t o e n g a g e in t h e i r c u l t u r a l p r a c t i c e s w i t h o u t b e i n g p e n a l i z e d , t h a t is, w i t h o u t b e i n g d i s c r i m i n a t e d a g a i n s t for t h e i r c h o i c e s . H e n c e , w h a t e v e r p r o g r a m s a r e i n s t i t u t e d for t h e p r o t e c t i o n of c u l t u r a l c o n t e x t s , t h e y o u g h t to b e s u c h as to s e c u r e t h e possibility of m e a n i n g f u l c u l t u r a l c h o i c e s . To this e x t e n t H a b e r m a s ' s p r o p o s a l is mistrustful of essentialist m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m s t h a t a t t r i b u t e to t h e m e m b e r s of n a t i o n a l o r c u l t u r a l g r o u p s w h a t A n t h o n y A p p i a h h a s called "tightly s c r i p t e d i d e n t i t i e s , " Or t h a t e n g a g e in a t t e m p t s to d i c t a t e to individuals t h e n a t u r e o r i m p o r t a n c e of s u c h g r o u p m e m b e r s h i p s . I n a pluralistic c o n t e x t , b o t h collective a n d p e r s o n a l i d e n t i t i e s a r e to s o m e d e g r e e o p e n to c h o i c e . H a b e r m a s ' s p o s i t i o n o n m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m , t h e n , e n ­ d o r s e s difference, b u t it is also sensitive to t h e p o t e n t i a l t h r e a t s to p e r s o n a l a u t o n o m y e n t a i l e d by d e m a n d s for r e c o g n i z i n g g r o u p i d e n ­ tities. T h e oppressive p o t e n t i a l of t h e politics of r e c o g n i t i o n derives b o t h f r o m t h e d e s i r e t o d e f i n e w h a t c o u n t s as a n a u t h e n t i c manifes­ t a t i o n of c u l t u r a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n a n d f r o m t h e e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t par­ ticipants s h o u l d m a k e t h e i r m e m b e r s h i p in n a t i o n a l o r c u l t u r a l g r o u p s t h e c e n t r a l , d e f i n i n g f e a t u r e of t h e i r identities. 46

4 7

(2) A s e c o n d a s p e c t of H a b e r m a s ' s w o r k t h a t u n d e r g i r d s its sensi­ tivity to difference is its h i g h l y d i f f e r e n t i a t e d a p p r o a c h to t h e n a t u r e of legal-political discussions. Liberals h a v e traditionally t e n d e d to t r e a t political d i s c o u r s e as t h o u g h it w e r e all of a p i e c e a n d h e n c e have b e e n divided over w h e t h e r d e m o c r a t i c discussion o u g h t to b e c o n s t r u e d e i t h e r as p u r e l y strategic, a c o m p e t i t i o n a m o n g elites for t h e votes of t h e citizens ( S c h u m p e t e r , B o b b i o , Z o l o ) , o r as conversa­ tions t h a t s t a n d u n d e r t h e g e n e r a l r u l e s of m o r a l i t y a n d h e n c e r e q u i r e special sorts of c o n v e r s a t i o n a l c o n s t r a i n t s ( A c k e r m a n , Rawls). H a b e r m a s ' s a p p r o a c h is m o r e c o m p l e x . S t a r t i n g f r o m his distinction b e t w e e n p r a g m a t i c , ethical, a n d m o r a l uses of p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n , h e offers a n analysis of political d i s c o u r s e w h i c h u n d e r l i n e s the i m p o r t a n c e of ethical c o n c e r n s in t h e political d o m a i n . W h i l e the legitimacy of t h e law d e p e n d s o n p r o c e d u r e s d e s i g n e d t o e n s u r e 48

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Editors' Introduction

h a r m o n y b e t w e e n basic legal n o r m s a n d morality, for H a b e r m a s legal n o r m s differ f r o m m o r a l n o r m s in t h a t in a d d i t i o n to m o r a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , p r a g m a t i c a n d e t h i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , as well as p r o c ­ esses of c o m p r o m i s e f o r m a t i o n a n d b a r g a i n i n g , play a c r u c i a l r o l e in t h e justification of t h e f o r m e r . T h o u g h t h e historical d e v e l o p ­ m e n t s of m o d e r n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l t r a d i t i o n s e x h i b i t a n u n m i s t a k a b l e c o n v e r g e n c e o n universal h u m a n r i g h t s w h o s e basic c o n t e n t is m o r a l , n o n e t h e l e s s t h e citizens of e a c h political u n i t , in legislating for themselves, i n t e r p r e t t h e s e basic c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s in light of t h e i r o w n h i s t o r y a n d t h e i r o w n culturally specific values. I n o t h e r w o r d s , in a d d i t i o n t o e n s h r i n i n g universal m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s , a legal system is o n e of t h e p r i m e m e a n s by w h i c h a p e o p l e defines w h o they a r e a n d w h o t h e y w a n t to b e a n d t h e r e b y a r t i c u l a t e t h e i r distinctive c u l t u r a l identity. (3) H a b e r m a s ' s clarification of t h e essential i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n b e ­ t w e e n legal validity a n d d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e d u r e p u t s h i m in a s t r o n g p o s i t i o n i n d e b a t e s a b o u t m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m , for t h e i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n private a n d p u b l i c a u t o n o m y m e a n s t h a t t h e legitimacy of law is a f u n c t i o n n o t m e r e l y of t h e p r o t e c t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l liberties b u t also of t h e exercise of p a r t i c i p a t o r y r i g h t s . Feminists, in p a r t i c u ­ lar, h a v e insisted t h a t t h e r i g h t s of w o m e n c a n n o t b e p r o t e c t e d w h e n w o m e n a r e p r e v e n t e d f r o m a r t i c u l a t i n g t h e i r n e e d s , a n d t h a t this is so e v e n w h e r e i n s t i t u t i o n s have b e e n d e s i g n e d a n d b u d g e t s a l l o t t e d for t h e p u r p o s e of s u c h p r o t e c t i o n . I n criticizing welfare s c h e m e s t h a t l e a d t o t h e t r e a t m e n t of clients as passive r e c i p i e n t s of p u b l i c charity, t h e y have, e m p h a s i z e d t h e fragility of i n d i v i d u a l liberties w h e n t h e y a r e severed f r o m t h e p a r t i c i p a t i o n of t h o s e w h o s e n e e d s s t a n d in n e e d of p r o t e c t i o n . If p a r t i c i p a t i o n in t h e d e f i n i t i o n of n e e d s is w a n t i n g , welfare t u r n s i n t o a p e c u l i a r k i n d of charity t h a t is given c o n d i t i o n a l l y o n t h e r e c i p i e n t s ' a c c e p t a n c e of t h e a d m i n i s t r a ­ tive s u p e r v i s i o n of t h e i r lives. M o r e broadly, i n t h e d o m a i n of strug­ gles for r e c o g n i t i o n of differences, t h e a i m c a n n o t b e t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n f r o m a b o v e of p r o t e c t i o n s a n d benefits for p r e ­ viously d i s a d v a n t a g e d g r o u p s , b u t m u s t r a t h e r b e t h e realization of full d e m o c r a t i c d i a l o g u e in w h i c h e v e r y o n e affected h a s s o m e i n p u t i n t o t h e d e f i n i t i o n of n e e d s a n d i d e n t i t i e s a n d h o w t h e s e will b e p r o m o t e d o r h a m p e r e d by state a c t i o n . 49

xxxii Editors' Introduction

I n t h e e n d , c o n v e r s a t i o n s a b o u t m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m a d v a n c e only if p a r t i c i p a n t s a r e n o t f o r c e d to c h o o s e b e t w e e n a n o r m a t i v e l y w e a k c o n t e x t u a l i s m , o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d a context-insensitive universalism, o n t h e o t h e r . H e r e as e l s e w h e r e , r e l e v a n t d i s t i n c t i o n s d o m a k e a difference.

Translator's Note Ciaran Cronin

O f t h e essays c o l l e c t e d in this v o l u m e , I a m r e s p o n s i b l e for t h e t r a n s l a t i o n s of c h a p t e r s 1-5 a n d 7, t h o u g h J a m e s B o h m a n kindly s h o w e d m e a n early draft of his t r a n s l a t i o n of c h a p t e r 7. T h e r e m a i n ­ i n g t r a n s l a t i o n s a r e by o t h e r h a n d s , t h o u g h I h a v e m a d e s o m e revi­ sions to all of t h e m , as I h a v e to previously p u b l i s h e d versions of c h a p t e r s 1 a n d 2, to take a c c o u n t of final revisions of t h e G e r m a n texts a n d to e n s u r e a n a p p r o p r i a t e level of consistency b e t w e e n t h e essays. A s h o r t e r version of c h a p t e r 1 a p p e a r e d in Proceedings of the Aristo­ telian Society 96 ( 1 9 9 6 ) : 3 3 5 - 3 5 8 . C h a p t e r 6 was p u b l i s h e d u n d e r t h e title " R e m a r k s o n D i e t e r G r i m m ' s ' D o e s E u r o p e N e e d a Constitu­ t i o n , ' " t r a n s l a t e d by Iain L. F r a s e r a n d J o h n R M c C o r m i c k , in Euro­ pean Law Journal4 ( 3 ) , 1995: 3 0 3 - 3 0 7 . C h a p t e r 8 was t r a n s l a t e d by S h i e r r y W e b e r N i c h o l s e n a n d a p p e a r e d in C h a r l e s Taylor, Multicul­ turalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, e d i t e d by A m y G u t m a n n ( P r i n c e t o n University Press: P r i n c e t o n , NJ, 1 9 9 4 ) , p p . 1 0 7 - 1 4 8 ; it is r e p r i n t e d h e r e by p e r m i s s i o n of t h e p u b l i s h e r . A n earlier version of c h a p t e r 9 a p p e a r e d in Constellations 1 ( 1 ) : 1-10. C h a p t e r 10 was trans­ l a t e d by William R e h g a n d a p p e a r e d in European Journal of Philosophy 3 ( 1 ) : 12-20. In preparing my own translations I l e a r n e d something from each of t h e s e t r a n s l a t i o n s , a n d especially f r o m Bill R e h g ' s t r a n s l a t i o n of H a b e r m a s ' s Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, t o w h i c h this b o o k is a c o m p a n i o n v o l u m e . I

xxxiv Translator's Note

a m i n d e b t e d to P a b l o D e Greiff, Vic P e t e r s o n , a n d Bill R e h g for s u g g e s t i o n s o n various c h a p t e r s , a n d especially to J i i r g e n H a b e r m a s w h o w e n t t h r o u g h a c o m p l e t e draft a n d m a d e m a n y helpful sugges­ tions. I n a n u m b e r of p l a c e s h e h a s also revised t h e t e x t so t h a t t h e m e a n i n g is c l e a r e r t h a n it w o u l d h a v e b e e n in a m o r e literal translation.

Preface

T h e studies c o l l e c t e d in this v o l u m e w e r e w r i t t e n since t h e a p p e a r ­ a n c e of Faktizitdt und Geltungin 1 9 9 2 . T h e y a r e u n i t e d by a n i n t e r e s t in t h e q u e s t i o n of w h a t c o n c l u s i o n s c a n still b e d r a w n f r o m t h e universalistic c o n t e n t of r e p u b l i c a n p r i n c i p l e s , i n p a r t i c u l a r for plu­ ralistic societies in w h i c h m u l t i c u l t u r a l conflicts a r e b e c o m i n g m o r e a c u t e , for nation-states t h a t a r e c o a l e s c i n g i n t o s u p r a n a t i o n a l u n i t s , a n d for t h e citizens of a w o r l d society w h o h a v e b e e n d r a w n u n b e ­ k n o w n s t to t h e m s e l v e s i n t o a n i n v o l u n t a r y risk society. I n P a r t I, I d e f e n d t h e r a t i o n a l c o n t e n t of a m o r a l i t y b a s e d o n e q u a l r e s p e c t for e v e r y b o d y a n d o n t h e universal solidarity a n d responsibility of e a c h for all. P o s t m o d e r n suspicion of a n indiscrimi­ n a t e l y assimilating a n d h o m o g e n i z i n g universalism fails to g r a s p t h e m e a n i n g of this m o r a l i t y a n d i n t h e h e a t of c o n t r o v e r s y o b l i t e r a t e s t h e r e l a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e of o t h e r n e s s a n d d i f f e r e n c e t h a t universal­ ism, p r o p e r l y u n d e r s t o o d , precisely takes i n t o a c c o u n t . I n The Theory of Communicative Action I set f o r t h t h e basic c o n c e p t s i n s u c h a way t h a t t h e y reveal t h e possibility of c o n d i t i o n s of life t h a t e s c a p e t h e false o p p o j s i t i i m J ^ e n ^ " Gesellschaft" b e t w e e n " c o m m u n i t y " a n d "society." T h e c o u n t e r p a r t to this social-theoretical p r o g r a m in m o r a l a n d legal t h e o r y is a universalism t h a t is h i g h l y sensitive to differences. E q u a l r e s p e c t for everyone is n o t l i m i t e d to t h o s e w h o a r e like us; it e x t e n d s to t h e p e r s o n of t h e o t h e r in his o r h e r o t h e r n e s s . A n d solidarity with t h e o t h e r as one of us re­ fers to t h e flexibkj^'^of^^ substontive 1

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d e t e r m i n a t i o n s a n d e x t e n d s its p e r m e a b l e b o u n d a r i e s ever further. T h i s ( m ^ g r c o m r n u n r r y ^ c o n s t i t u t e s itself solely by way of t h e negative i d e a of a b o l i s h i n g d i s c r i m i n a t i o n a n d h a r m a n d of e x t e n d m ^ r e l a t i o n s of m u t u a l r e c o g n i t i o n t o i n c l u d e m a r g i n a l i z e d m e n a n d w o m e n . T h e c o m m u n i t y t h u s constructively o u d i n e d is n o t a collec­ tive t h a t w o u l d force its h o m o g e n i z e d m e m b e r s t o affirm its distinct­ iveness. H e r e i n c l u s i o n d o e s n o t imply l o c k i n g m e m b e r s i n t o a c o m m u n i t y t h a t closes itself off f r o m o t h e r s . T h e "inclusion of t h e o t h e r " m e a n s r a t h e r t h a t t h e b o u n d a r i e s of t h e c o m m u n i t y a r e o p e n for all, also j u i d jaostjesrjecially for t h o s e w h o a r e s t r a n g e r s to o n e an^^ — P a r t II c o n t a i n s a d e b a t e with J o h n Rawls w h i c h t o o k p l a c e at t h e invitation of t h e e d i t o r s a n d p u b l i s h e r s of The Journal of Philosophy. I n m y c o n t r i b u t i o n I a r g u e t h a t d i s c o u r s e t h e o r y is b e t t e r a b l e to c o n c e p t u a l i z e t h e m o r a l i n t u i t i o n s t h a t i n f o r m b o t h Rawls's a n d m y work. My reply also a t t e m p t s to clarify t h e differences b e t w e e n p o ­ litical liberalism a n d m y u n d e r s t a n d i n g of^Kantian r e p u b l i c a n i s m ) P a r t III a t t e m p t s to s h e d l i g h t o n a c o n t r o v e r s y t h a t h a s flared u p o n c e a g a i n in G e r m a n y since r e u n i f i c a t i o n . H e r e I take a s t e p fur­ t h e r a l i n e of a r g u m e n t I originally d e v e l o p e d in t h e essay "Citizen­ s h i p a n d N a t i o n a l Identity." T h e r o m a n t i c a l l y i n s p i r e d i d e a of t h e n a t i o n as a n ethnically b a s e d c o m m u n i t y of c u l t u r e a n d historical destiny t h a t m a y claim to exist as a n i n d e p e n d e n t state c o n t i n u e s to p r o v i d e s u p p o r t t o s u c h q u e s t i o n a b l e a t t i t u d e s as t h e a p p e a l t o a n a l l e g e d r i g h t of n a t i o n a l s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n , t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g h o s ­ tility t o w a r d m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m a n d a politics of h u m a n r i g h t s , a n d a distrust of t h e transfer of sovereignty r i g h t s t o s u p r a n a t i o n a l o r g a n i ­ zations. T h e d e f e n d e r s of t h e e t h n i c n a t i o n (Volksnation) o v e r l o o k t h e fact t h a t we c a n take as o u r g u i d e precisely t h e impressive his­ torical a c h i e v e m e n t s of t h e d e m o c r a t i c n a t i o n state a n d its r e p u b l i ­ c a n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s in d e a l i n g with t h e p r o b l e m s c u r r e n t l y p o s e d by t h e i n e x o r a b l e shift t o p o s t n a t i o n a l f o r m s of society. 2

P a r t IV deals with t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of h u m a n r i g h t s at b o t h t h e g l o b a l a n d t h e d o m e s t i c level. T h e b i c e n t e n n i a l of K a n t ' s essay o n perpetual peace is a suitable o c c a s i o n for revising his c o n c e p t i o n of c o s m o p o l i t a n law (Weltbiirgerrecht) in light of o u r s u b s e q u e n t histori­ cal e x p e r i e n c e s . T h e o n c e sovereign states h a v e l o n g since forfeited

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t h e p r e s u m p t i o n of i n n o c e n c e c o n f e r r e d o n t h e m by i n t e r n a t i o n a l law (Volkerrecht) a n d c a n n o l o n g e r a p p e a l to t h e p r i n c i p l e of n o n ­ i n t e r f e r e n c e i n t h e i r i n t e r n a l affairs. T h e c h a l l e n g e of m u l t i c u l t u r a l ­ ism is precisely a n a l o g o u s t o t h e q u e s t i o n of h u m a n i t a r i a n i n t e r v e n t i o n . H e r e t o o m i n o r i t i e s seek p r o t e c t i o n f r o m t h e i r o w n g o v e r n m e n t s . B u t in t h e case of m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m , d i s c r i m i n a t i o n takes p l a c e w i t h i n t h e f r a m e w o r k of a b r o a d l y l e g i t i m a t e constitu­ t i o n a l state a n d takes t h e m o r e s u b t l e f o r m of d o m i n a t i o n by a majority c u l t u r e t h a t h a s m e r g e d with t h e g e n e r a l political c u l t u r e . However, a g a i n s t C h a r l e s Taylor's c o m m u n i t a r i a n p r o p o s a l , I a r g u e t h a t a "politics of r e c o g n i t i o n , " w h i c h is s u p p o s e d t o e n s u r e t h e e q u a l r i g h t of different s u b c u l t u r e s a n d f o r m s of life to coexist w i t h i n a single r e p u b l i c a n polity, m u s t reject collective r i g h t s a n d survival g u a r a n t e e s . I n P a r t V, I review s o m e basic a s s u m p t i o n s of t h e discourset h e o r e t i c a l c o n c e p t i o n of d e m o c r a c y a n d t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state. I n particular, this u n d e r s t a n d i n g of deliberative politics allows a n ac­ c o u n t of t h e co-originality of p o p u l a r sovereignty a n d h u m a n rights.

How Rational Is the Authority of the Ought?

1 A Genealogical Analysis of the Cognitive Content * of Morality

i If m o r a l s t a t e m e n t s o r u t t e r a n c e s c a n b e justified, t h e n t h e y have a cognitive c o n t e n t . T h u s if we w a n t to d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r m o r a l i t y h a s a cognitive c o n t e n t we m u s t e x a m i n e w h a t it m e a n s to justify s o m e t h i n g morally. I n so d o i n g we m u s t d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n t h e theoretical q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r m o r a l u t t e r a n c e s i n d e e d e x p r e s s k n o w l e d g e a n d , if so, h o w t h e y c a n b e justified, a n d t h e p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l q u e s t i o n of w h a t cognitive m e a n i n g t h o s e w h o partici­ p a t e in m o r a l conflicts t h e m s e l v e s associate with t h e i r u t t e r a n c e s . I will u s e t h e t e r m " m o r a l justification" in t h e first i n s t a n c e in a descriptive m a n n e r t o refer t o t h e r u d i m e n t a r y p r a c t i c e of justifica­ t i o n w h i c h h a s its. p r o p e r p l a c e in t h e everyday i n t e r a c t i o n s of t h e lifeworld. I n everyday c o n t e x t s we m a k e s t a t e m e n t s t h r o u g h w h i c h we d e ­ m a n d c e r t a i n c o n d u c t of o t h e r s (i.e., h o l d t h e m to a n o b l i g a t i o n ) , c o m m i t ourselves to a c o u r s e of a c t i o n ( i n c u r a n o b l i g a t i o n ) , re­ p r o a c h ourselves o r o t h e r s , a d m i t mistakes, m a k e excuses, offer to m a k e a m e n d s , a n d so f o r t h . O n this first level, m o r a l u t t e r a n c e s serve t o c o o r d i n a t e t h e a c t i o n s of different a c t o r s i n a b i n d i n g o r o b l i g a t o r y fashion. " O b l i g a t i o n " p r e s u p p o s e s t h e intersubjective rec­ o g n i t i o n of m o r a l n o r m s o r c u s t o m a r y p r a c t i c e s t h a t lay d o w n for a c o m m u n i t y in a convincing mannerwhat ^actors a r e o b l i g e d to d o a n d w h a t t h e y c a n e x p e c t f r o m o n e a n o t h e r . "In a c o n v i n c i n g m a n n e r "

4 Chapter 1

m e a n s t h a t t h e m e m b e r s of a m o r a l c o m m u n i t y a p p e a l t o t h e s e n o r m s w h e n e v e r t h e c o o r d i n a t i o n of a c t i o n b r e a k s d o w n a n d p f e s e n t t h e m as p r i m a facie c o n v i n c i n g r e a s o n s for claims a n d critical p o s i t i o n s . M o r a l u t t e r a n c e s a r e m a d e a g a i n s t a b a c k g r o u n d of p o t e n ­ tial reasons o n w h i c h we c a n d r a w i n m o r a l d i s p u t e s . M o r a l r u l e s o p e r a t e i n a reflexive m a n n e r ; t h e i r p o w e r t o c o o r d i ­ n a t e a c t i o n is c o n f i r m e d o n two i n t e r c o n n e c t e d levels of i n t e r a c t i o n . O n t h e first level, t h e y r e g u l a t e social a c t i o n i m m e d ^ e l y j b y ^ i n d t h e m i l of a c t o r s a n d o r i e n t i n g it in a p a r t i c u l a r way; o n t h e s e c o n d level, t h e y g o v e r n t h e critical p o s i t i o n s a c t o r s a d o p t when, conflicts arise. T h e m o r a l i t y of a c o m m u n i t y n o t only lays d o w n h o w its m e m b e r s s h o u l d act; it also ( p r o v i d e s g r o u n d s : for t h e c o n s e n s u a l r e s o l u t i o n of r e l e v a n t conflicts. To t h e m o r a l l a n g u a g e g a m e b e l o n g d i s a g r e e m e n t s t h a t c a n b e resolved c o n v i n c i n g l y f r o m t h e p e r s p e c ­ tive of p a r t i c i p a n t s o n t h e basis of p o t e n t i a l justifications t h a t a r e equally accessible t o all. Sociologically s p e a k i n g , m o r a l o b l i g a t i o n s r e c o m m e n d t h e m s e l v e s by t h e i r i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n to t h e g e n t l e , p e r ­ suasive force of r e a s o n s as a n a l t e r n a t i v e to strategic, t h a t is, coercive o r m a n i p u l a t i v e , f o r m s of conflict r e s o l u t i o n . To p u t it a n o t h e r way, if m o r a l i t y d i d n o t possess a c r e d i b l e cognitive c o n t e n t for m e m b e r s of t h e corrmaimity, it w o u l d h a v e no^^\^^ge_Q^j^o}^v more costly f o r m s of a c t i o n c o o r d i n a t i o n ( s u c h as t h e u s e of d i r e c t force, o r t h e exercise of i n f l u e n c e t h r o u g h t h e t h r e a t of s a n c t i o n s o r t h e p r o m i s e of r e w a r d s ) . 9

W h e n we e x a m i n e m o r a l d i s a g r e e m e n t s , we m u s £ ^ c l u d £ ^ f f e c t i y e , r e a c t i o n s in t h e class of m o r a l u t t e r a n c e s . T h e key c o n c e p t of oblig a t i o n refers n o t only t o t h e c o n t e n t of m o r a l i n j u n c t i o n s b u t in a d d i t i o n t o t h e p e c u l i a r c h a r a c t e r of m o r a l validity (Sollgeltung) w h i c h is also r e f l e c t e d i n t h e feeling of b e i n g o b l i g a t e d . T h e critical a n d self-critical s t a n c e s we a d o p t t o w a r d t r a n s g r e s s i o n s find e x p r e s ­ sion in affective a t t i t u d e s : f r o m t h e t h i r d p e r s o n p e r s p e c t i v e , i n a b h o r r e n c e , i n d i g n a t i o n , a n d c o n t e m p t , f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of t h o s e affected, in feelings of violation o r r e s e n t m e n t t o w a r d s e c o n d p e r s o n s , a n d f r o m t h e first p e r s o n p e r s p e c t i v e , in s h a m e a n d g u i l t . To t h e s e c o r r e s p o n d t h e positive e m o t i o n a l r e a c t i o n s of a d m i r a t i o n , loyalty, g r a t i t u d e , etc. B e c a u s e t h e y e x p r e s s i m p l i c i t j u d g m e n t s , t h e s e feelings in w h i c h a c t o r s e x p r e s s t h e i r p r o a n d c o n a t t i t u d e s a r e 1

5 A Genealogical Analysis of the Cognitive Content of Morality

c o r r e l a t e d with evaluations. We j u d g e a c t i o n s a n d i n t e n t i o n s to b e " g o o d " o r "bad," w h e r e a s o u r t e r m s for virtues refer to p e r s o n a l qualities of a g e n t s . T h e claim t h a t m o r a l j u d g m e n t s a d m i t of justification also reveals itself in t h e s e m o r a l feelings a n d evaluations, for t h e y differ f r o m o t h e r feelings a n d evaluations i n . b e i n ^ j i i e d to o b l i g a t i o n s t h a t f u n c t i o n as r e a s o n s . We d o n o t r e g a r d t h e m as t h e ' e x p r e s s i o n of m e r e s e n t i m e n t s a n d p r e f e r e n c e s . F r o m t h e fact t h a t m o r a l n o r m s a r e "valid" for t h e m e m b e r s of a c o m m u n i t y it d o e s n o t follow, of c o u r s e , t h a t t h e y h a v e intrinsic cognitive c o n t e n t . A sociological o b s e r v e r m a y b e a b l e to d e s c r i b e a m o r a l l a n g u a g e g a m e as a social fact, a n d even to e x p l a i n why m e m b e r s a r e " c o n v i n c e d " of t h e i r m o r a l r u l e s , w i t h o u t h i m s e l f b e i n g in a p o s i t i o n t o give a p l a u s i b l e r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e i r r e a s o n s a n d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . B u t a p h i l o s o p h e r c a n n o t r e m a i n c o n t e n t with this. H e will p u r s u e t h e p h e n o m e n o l o g y of t h e r e l e v a n t m o r a l disagree­ m e n t s f u r t h e r i n o r d e r to c o m p r e h e n d w h a t m e m b e r s of t h e c o m ­ m u n i t y d o w h e n t h e y justify s o m e t h i n g m o r a l l y . O f c o u r s e , " c o m p r e h e n d " h e r e m e a n s s o m e t h i n g o t h e r t h a n simply " u n d e r g B £ t i g " u t t e r a n c e s . Reflective r e c o n s t r u c t i o n oTtKe everyday p r a c ­ tice of justification i n w h i c h we ourselves p a r t i c i p a t e as l a y p e r s o n s p e r m i t s r e c o n s t r u c t i v e t r a n s l a t i o n s t h a t foster critical u n d e r ­ s t a n d i n g . I n this m e t h o d o l o g i c a l a t t i t u d e t h e p h i l o s o p h e r e x t e n d s from within t h e p a r t i c i p a n t p e r s p e c t i v e b e y o n d t h e circle of immediate participants. j. T h e results of s u c h efforts c a n b e g a u g e d by e x a m i n i n g m o d e r n p r o g r a m s i n m o r a l p h i l o s o p h y . T h e s e t h e o r i e s differ in t h e i r d e g r e e s of h e r m e n e u t i c o p e n n e s s . T h e i r r e c o n s t r u c t i o n s of t h e cognitive c o n t e n t of o u r everyday m o r a l i n t u i t i o n s a r e m o r e o r less c o m p r e ­ h e n s i v e to t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e y a r e sensitive to t h e intuitive m o r a l , k n o w l e d g e of t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s . Strong noncognitivism tries to u n m a s k t h e p r e s u m e d cognitive con­ t e n t of m o r a l l a n g u a g e i n g e n e r a l as a n illusion. It a t t e m p t s to show t h a t b e h i n d t h e u t t e r a n c e s t h a t a p p e a r to p a r t i c i p a n t s as m o r a l j u d g m e n t s a n d stances t h a t a d m i t of justification, t h e r e l u r k m e r e feelings, a t t i t u d e s , a n d decisions. Utilitarianism, w h i c h traces t h e " b i n d i n g " force of (evaluative o r i e n t a t i o n s ^ a n d o b l i g a t i o n s b a c k to p r e f e r e n c e s , arrives at revisionist d e s c r i p t i o n s similar to t h o s e of 2

3

st

n

6 Chapter 1

n o n c o g n i t i v i s t views s u c h as emotivism (e.g., t h a t of S t e v e n s o n ) a n d d e c i s i o n i s m (e.g., t h a t of P o p p e r o r t h e early H a r e ) . B u t in c o n t r a s t with s t r o n g n o n c o g n i t i v i s m , u t i l i t a r i a n i s m r e p l a c e s t h e unreflective m o r a l s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of p a r t i c i p a n t s with a utility c a l c u l a t i o n u n d e r t a k e n f r o m a n o b s e r v e r ' s p o i n t of view a n d t h e r e b y p r o v i d e s a m o r a l - t h e o r e t i c a l justification of t h e m o r a l l a n g u a g e g a m e . I n this r e s p e c t t h e r e is a n affinity b e t w e e n u t i l i t a r i a n i s m a n d f o r m s of weak noncognitivism t h a t t a k e i n t o a c c o u n t t h e s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of m o r a l l y acting subjects, w h e t h e r by r e f e r e n c e t o m o r a l feelings (as in t h e t r a d i t i o n of Scottish m o r a l p h i l o s o p h y ) o r by r e f e r e n c e to a n o r i e n t a t i o n to a c c e p t e d n o r m s (as in H o b b e s i a n c o n t r a c t u a l i s m ) . However, t h e s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of ( m o r a l l y judging subjects) suc­ c u m b s to revision. O n s u c h a c c o u n t s , t h e s u p p o s e d l y objectively g r o u n d e d p o s i t i o n s a n d j u d g m e n t s of m o r a l l y j u d g i n g subjects i n fact m e r e l y e x p r e s s r a t i o n a l motives, b e t h e y feelings o r interests, justified in a p u r p o s i v e - r a t i o n a l m a n n e r . Weak cognitivism leaves i n t a c t t h e s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e every­ day p r a c t i c e of m o r a l justification to t h e e x t e n t t h a t it ascribes a n e p i s t e m i c status to " s t r o n g " evaluations. Reflection o n w h a t is " g o o d " for m e (or for us) all t h i n g s c o n s i d e r e d o r o n w h a t is " a u t h o r i t a t i v e " for m y ( o r for o u r ) consciously p u r s u e d life-plan o p e n s u p a f o r m of r a t i o n a l a s s e s s m e n t of evaluative o r i e n t a t i o n s (in t h e spirit of Aristotle o r K i e r k e g a a r d ) . W h a t in e a c h i n s t a n c e is valuable o r a u t h e n t i c forces itself u p o n us, so to speak, a n d differs f r o m m e r e p r e f e r e n c e s in its b i n d i n g character, t h a t is, in t h e fact t h a t it p o i n t s b e y o n d n e e d s a n d p r e f e r e n c e s . However, t h e intuitive u n d e r ­ s t a n d i n g of j u s t i c e u n d e r g o e s revision o n this view. F r o m t h e p e r ­ spective of e a c h individual's c o n c e p t i o n of t h e g o o d , j u s t i c e , w h i c h is t a i l o r e d t o i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s , a p p e a r s as j u s t o n e value a m o n g o t h e r s (however p r o n o u n c e d ) , n o t as a c o n t e x t - i n d e p e n d e n t s t a n d a r d of i m p a r t i a l j u d g m e n t . U Strong cognitivism seeks in a d d i t i o n to take a c c o u n t of t h e categori­ cal validity claim of m o r a l o b l i g a t i o n s . It a t t e m p t s t o r e c o n s t r u c t t h e cognitive c o n t e n t of t h e m o r a l l a n g u a g e g a m e across its full s c o p e . T h e K a n t i a n t r a d i t i o n , u n l i k e neo-Aristotelianism, is n o t j u s t c o n ­ c e r n e d with clarifying a p r a c t i c e of m o r a l justification t h a t u n f o l d s within t h e h o r i z o n of r e c e i v e d n o r m s , b u t seeks to justify a m o r a l

7 A Genealogical Analysis of the Cognitive Content of Morality

p o i n t of view f r o m w h i c h s u c h n o r m s c a n t h e m s e l v e s b e j u d g e d in a n i m p a r t i a l fashion. I n this t r a d i t i o n , m o r a l t h e o r y g r o u n d s t h e possibility of m o r a l justification by r e c o n s t r u c t i n g t h e p o i n t of view t h a t m e m b e r s of p o s t t r a d i t i o n a l _ s o c i e t i e s t h e m s e l v e s intuitively a d o p t w h e n t h e y find t h a t t h e y m u s t a p p e a l t o r e a s o n s t o justify p r o b l e m a t i c m o r a l n o r m s . B u t in c o n t r a s t with e m p i r i c i s t varieties of c o n t r a c t u a l i s m , this view h o l d s t h a t t h e s e r e a s o n s a r e n o t c o n c e i v e d as agent-relative motives, t h e r e b y leaving t h e e p i s t e m i c c o r e of m o r a l validity intact. I n w h a t follows I first d e s c r i b e t h e historical s i t u a t i o n in w h i c h m o r a l i t y loses its religious f o u n d a t i o n (II). T h i s d e s c r i p t i o n p r o v i d e s t h e b a c k g r o u n d for a g e n e a l o g i c a l e x p l o r a t i o n of t h e two variants of classical e m p i r i c i s m (III), two i n t e r e s t i n g a t t e m p t s to r e h a b i l i t a t e t h e e m p i r i c i s t p r o g r a m ( I V - V ) , a n d t h e two t r a d i t i o n s t h a t o r i g i n a t e with Aristotle (VI) a n d K a n t (VII), respectively. We a r e t h e n in a p o s i t i o n to e x a m i n e two systematic q u e s t i o n s : W h i c h m o r a l intui­ t i o n s a d m i t of r a t i o n a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n ? (VIII) a n d c a n t h e discourset h e o r e t i c a l s t a n d p o i n t itself b e justified? (IX)

T h e various a t t e m p t s t h a t h a v e b e e n m a d e to e x p l i c a t e t h e " m o r a l p o i n t of view" r e m i n d us that, after t h e b r e a k d o w n of a universally valid "catholic" worldview a n d with t h e s u b s e q u e n t t r a n s i t i o n to pluralistic societies, m o r a l c o m m a n d s c a n n o l o n g e r b e publicly justified f r o m f C t r a n s c e n d e n t G o d ' s eye p o i n t of view) F r o m this latter v a n t a g e p o i n t b e y o n d t h e w o r l d , t h e w o r l d c o u l d b e objectified as a^ w h o l e . T h e m o r a l p o i n t of view is s u p p o s e d to r e c o n s t r u c t this p e r s p e c t i v e w i t h i n t h e w o r l d itself, t h a t is, w i t h i n t h e b o u n d a r i e s of' ^our intersubjectively s h a r e d w o r l d , while p r e s e r v i n g t h e possibility of d i s t a n c i n g ourselves f r o m t h e w o r l d as a w h o l e , a n d h e n c e t h e u n i ­ versality of t h e w o r l d - e n c o m p a s s i n g viewpoint. T h i s shift in p e r s p e c ­ tive to a " t r a n s c e n d e n c e f r o m w i t h i n " raises t h e q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r t h e specific b i n d i n g force of n o r m s a n d values c a n b e g r o u n d e d in th^__subjective f r e e d o m a n d j J i e p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n of h u m a n b e i n g s f o r s a k e n by G o d — a n d , if so, h o w t h e p e c u l i a r a u t h o r i t y of t h e m o r a l o u g h t is t h e r e b y t r a n s f o r m e d . I n t h e secular societies of t h e West, 4

(

8 Chapter 1

everyday m o r a l i n t u i t i o n s a r e still s h a p e d by t h e n o r m a t i v e s u b s t a n c e of so to s p e a k d e c a p i t a t e d , legally privatized, jreligious t r a d i t i o n s , in p a r t i c u l a r by t h e c o n t e n t s of t h e H e b r e w m o r a l i t y of j u s t i c e i n t h e O l d T e s t a m e n t a n d t h e C h r i s t i a n ethics of love in t h e N e w Testa­ m e n t . T h e s e c o n t e n t s a r e t r a n s m i t t e d by p r o c e s s e s of socialization, t h o u g h often only implicitly a n d u n d e r different titles. T h u s a m o r a l p h i l o s o p h y t h a t views its task as o n e of r e c o n s t r u c t i n g everyday m o r a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s is faced with t h e c h a l l e n g e of e x a m i n i n g h o w m u c h of this s u b s t a n c e c a n b e rationally justified. T h e biblically t r a n s m i t t e d p r o p h e t i c d o c t r i n e s f u r n i s h e d i n t e r p r e ­ t a t i o n s a n d r e a s o n s t h a t i m b u e d m o r a l n o r m s with t h e p o w e r to g e n e r a t e p u b l i c a g r e e m e n t ; t h e y e x p l a i n e d why G o d ' s c o m m a n d s a r e n o t a r b i t r a r y i n j u n c t i o n s b u t c a n claim validity in a cognitive sense. L e t u s a s s u m e t h e r e is n o f u n c t i o n a l e q u i v a l e n t for m o r a l i t y u n d e r m o d e r n c o n d i t i o n s either, a n d h e n c e t h a t t h e m o r a l l a n g u a g e g a m e c a n n o t b e r e p l a c e d b y a _ s y s t e m of p u r e l y b e h a v i o r a l c o n t r o l s w h i c h a r e also s e e n as s u c h . T h e n t h e p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l l y a t t e s t e d cognitive validity of m o r a l j u d g m e n t s a n d p o s i t i o n s p o s e s t h e p r o b ­ l e m of w h e t h e r t h e p o w e r of a c c e p t e d values a n d n o r m s to g e n e r a t e r a t i o n a l a g r e e m e n t m a y n o t b e a f o r m of ( t r a n s c e n d e n t a l illusior^, o r w h e t h e r it c a n still b e justified even u n d e r p o s t m e t a p h y s i c a l c o n d i ­ tions. M o r a l p h i l o s o p h y d o e s n o t itself have to p r o v i d e t h e r e a s o n s a n d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s t h a t , in secularized societies, take t h e p l a c e of t h e (at least publicly) d e v a l u e d religious r e a s o n s a n d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s ; b u t it w o u l d h a v e to identify t h e k i n d s of r e a s o n s a n d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s t h a t c a n l e n d t h e m o r a l l a n g u a g e g a m e sufficient r a t i o n a l force even w i t h o u t t h e b a c k i n g of r e l i g i o n . W i t h r e g a r d to this g e n e a l o g i c a l p r o b l e m a t i c , I w o u l d like, first, to recall t h e m o n o t h e i s t i c f o u n d a t i o n of t h e validity of o u r m o r a l n o r m s (1) a n d , s e c o n d , to specify in g r e a t e r detail t h e c h a l l e n g e p o s e d by t h e m o d e r n historical situ­ ation (2). (1) T h e b i b l e g r o u n d s m o r a l c o m m a n d s in t h e r e v e a l e d w o r d of G o d . T h e s e c o m m a n d s a r e to b e o b e y e d u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y b e c a u s e they a r e b a c k e d by t h e a u t h o r i t y of a n o m n i p o t e n t G o d . B u t if t h a t w e r e t h e only s o u r c e of t h e i r authority, t h e i r validity w o u l d m e r e l y have t h e c h a r a c t e r of a "must" (Mussen), as a reflection of t h e u n ­ l i m i t e d p o w e r of a sovereign: G o d c a n c o m p e l o b e d i e n c e . B u t this

9 A Genealogical Analysis of the Cognitive Content of Morality

voluntaristic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n d o e s n o t yet e n d o w n o r m a t i v e validity with any cognitive significance. It first a c q u i r e s a cognitive m e a n i n g w h e n m o r a l c o m m a n d s a r e i n t e r p r e t e d as e x p r e s s i o n s of t h e will of a n all-knowing a n d c o m p l e t e l y just and loving G o d . M o r a l c o m m a n d s d o n o t s p r i n g f r o m t h e free c h o i c e of a n A l m i g h t y b u t a r e t h e e x p r e s s i o n s of t h e will of a n all-wise C r e a t o r a n d a n all-just a n d loving R e d e e m e r . We c a n distinguish two different o r d e r s of r e a s o n s for t h e r e s p e c t w o r t h i n e s s of t h e divine c o m m a n d s : m e t a p h y s i c a l (ontotheologisch) r e a s o n s g r o u n d e d in t h e o r d e r of c r e a t i o n a n d soteriological r e a s o n s r o o t e d in t h e (divinely o r d a i n e d ) h i s t o r y of salvation. Metaphysical justification a p p e a l s to a w o r l d o r d e r t h a t owes its e x i s t e n c e to t h e wise legislation of t h e Creator. It a c c o r d s h u m a n b e i n g s a n d t h e h u m a n c o m m u n i t y a privileged status w i t h i n c r e a t i o n a n d t h e r e b y e n d o w s t h e m with a "calling." C r e a t i o n i s t m e t a p h y s i c s gives c u r r e n c y to t h e c o n c e p t i o n of n a t u r a l law u n d e r l y i n g cosmologically g r o u n d e d e t h i c a l systems w h i c h is also familiar f r o m t h e i m p e r s o n a l worldviews of t h e Asiatic r e l i g i o n s a n d of G r e e k p h i l o s o ­ phy. O n s u c h e t h i c a l c o n c e p t i o n s , t h i n g s a r e essentially e n d o w e d with teleological significance. H u m a n b e i n g s a r e also p a r t of t h e o r d e r of B e i n g a n d c a n d e d u c e f r o m it w h a t t h e y a r e a n d w h a t t h e y o u g h t to b e . I n this way t h e r a t i o n a l c o n t e n t of m o r a l laws receives o n t o l o g i c a l c o n f i r m a t i o n f r o m t h e r a t i o n a l o r d e r of B e i n g as a w h o l e . T h e soteriological justification of m o r a l c o m m a n d s , by c o n t r a s t , a p p e a l s to t h e j u s t i c e a n d g o o d n e s s of a R e d e e m e r ; at t h e e n d of t i m e h e will fulfill his p r o m i s e of salvation w h i c h is c o n t i n g e n t o n o n e ' s l e a d i n g a m o r a l o r lawful life. H e is J u d g e a n d R e d e e m e r in o n e p e r s o n . I n l i g h t of his c o m m a n d s , G o d j u d g e s e a c h p e r s o n ' s life in a c c o r d a n c e with his j u s t d e s e r t s . H i s j u s t i c e e n s u r e s t h a t his j u d g ­ m e n t will b e c o n s o n a n t with t h e u n i q u e life h i s t o r y of e a c h individ­ ual, while at t h e s a m e t i m e his g o o d n e s s allows for h u m a n fallibility a n d for t h e sinfulness of h u m a n n a t u r e . M o r a l c o m m a n d s a c q u i r e a r a t i o n a l m e a n i n g b b t h f r o m t h e fact t h a t t h e y p o i n t t h e way to p e r s o n a l salvation a n d f r o m t h e fact t h a t t h e y a r e a p p l i e d in a n impartial manner. To b e s u r e , s p e a k i n g of " m o r a l c o m m a n d s " is m i s l e a d i n g in t h a t t h e p a t h to salvation is n o t p r e d e t e r m i n e d by a system of r u l e s b u t

10, Chapter 1

.

by a divinely a u t h o r i z e d way of life t h a t we a r e e n j o i n e d to e m u l a t e . T h i s is w h a t is m e a n t , for e x a m p l e , by a n imitatio Christi, t h a t is, by following in t h e footsteps of Christ. O t h e r w o r l d religions t o o , a n d even p h i l o s o p h y with its ideals of t h e wise m a n a n d t h e vita contemplativa, distill t h e m o r a l s u b s t a n c e of t h e i r d o c t r i n e s i n t o e x e m p l a r y f o r m s of life. T h i s m e a n s t h a t in religious-metaphysical worldviews, t h e just is still i n t e r w o v e n with specific c o n c e p t i o n s of t h e good life. H o w we s h o u l d t r e a t o t h e r s in i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s is laid d o w n by a m o d e l of t h e e x e m p l a r y life. F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e r e f e r e n c e to a p e r s o n a l G o d w h o sits in j u d g ­ m e n t o n t h e destiny of e a c h i n d i v i d u a l at t h e e n d of t i m e m a k e s possible a n i m p o r t a n t d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n two aspects of morality. Every p e r s o n h a s / a j F ^ first as ,a m e m b e r of t h e c o m m u n i t y of believers with w h o m G o d h a s e n ­ t e r e d i n t o a c o v e n a n t , a n d s e c o n d as a u n i q u e p e r s o n i n d i v i d u a t e d by his life h i s t o r y w h o c a n n o t allow h i m s e l f to b e r e p r e s e n t e d (vertreten) by a n y o n e else b e f o r e G o d . T h i s c o m m u n i c a t i o n s t r u c t u r e s h a p e s o n e ' s m o r a l r e l a t i o n — m e d i a t e d by G o d — t o o n e ' s n e i g h b o r u n d e r t h e aspects of solidarity a n d of justice ( h e r e u n d e r s t o o d in t h e n a r r o w s e n s e ) . As a m e m b e r of t h e universal c o m m u n i t y of believers, I a m b o u n d by solidarity to t h e o t h e r as m y fellow, a s ^ n e 6 f u s j as a n u n s u b s t i t u t a b l e (unvertretbar) individual; by c o n t r a s t , I owe t h e o t h e T ^ e q u a l r e s p e c t as ^^e^^^on^Sl^ p e r s o n s w h o , as u n i q u e individuals, e x p e c t to b e t r e a t e d justly. T h e "solidarity" g r o u n d e d in m e m b e r s h i p recalls t h e social b o n d t h a t u n i t e s all p e r s o n s : o n e p e r s o n s t a n d s in for t h e o t h e r . T h e u n c o m p r o m i s i n g e g a l i t a r i a n i s m of "justice," by c o n t r a s t , calls for sensitivity to t h e differences t h a t set e a c h individual a p a r t f r o m o t h e r s : e a c h p e r s o n d e m a n d s t h a t o t h e r s r e s p e c t h i m in his o t h e r n e s s . T h e Jhadaeo-Christian t r a d i t i o n rejraMsjsolida^ they p r o v i d e 5

two different perspectives o n t h e s a m e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s t r u c t u r e . (2) W i t h t h e t r a n s i t i o n to a p l u r a l i s m of worldviews i n m o d e r n society, r e l i g i o n a n d t h e e t h o s r o o t e d in it d i s i n t e g r a t e as a public basis of a morality s h a r e d by all. At a n y r a t e , t h e validity of universally binding m o r a l r u l e s c a n n o l o n g e r b e a c c o u n t e d for in t e r m s of reasons a n d interpretations that presuppose the existence a n d the a g e n c y of a t r a n s c e n d e n t C r e a t o r a n d R e d e e m e r . As a c o n s e q u e n c e , t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l validation of objectively r a t i o n a l m o r a l laws loses

11 A Genealogical Analysis of the Cognitive Content of Morality

its force, a n d with it t h e soteriological c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e i r j u s t a p p l i c a t i o n a n d t h e objectively d e s i r a b l e g o o d of salvation. M o r e ­ over, t h e d e v a l u a t i o n of m e t a p h y s i c a l c o n c e p t s ( a n d t h e c o r r e s p o n d ­ i n g c a t e g o r y of e x p l a n a t i o n s ) is also c o n n e c t e d with a d i s p l a c e m e n t of e p i s t e m i c a u t h o r i t y f r o m religious d o c t r i n e s t o t h e e m p i r i c a l scii e n c e s . W i t h t h e dissolution of m e t a p h y s i c a l c o n c e p t s of essences, t h e i n t e r n a l c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n assertoric s t a t e m e n t s a n d c o r r e s p o n d ­ i n g expressive, evaluative, a n d n o r m a t i v e s t a t e m e n t s also dissolves. ^ p i a t is "objectively r a t i o n a l " c a n b e justified only as l o n g as t h e j u s t a n d t h e g o o d a r e g r o u n d e d i n a n o r m a t i v e l y i m b u e d B e i n g itself; a n d w h a t is "objectively d e s i r a b l e " c a n b e justified only as l o n g as t h e teleology of t h e h i s t o r y of salvation g u a r a n t e e s t h e realization of t h e state of p e r f e c t j u s t i c e t h a t also involves ^ c o n c r e t e g o o d . I n this n e w situation, m o r a l p h i l o s o p h y d e p e n d s o n a j^gosF r n e t a p j ^ k a U e y e l ofjustification?] T h i s m e a n s i n t h e first p l a c e that, as r e g a r d s its m e t h o d , it m u s t r e n o u n c e t h e G o d ' s eye viewpoint; as r e g a r d s its c o n t e n t , it c a n n o l o n g e r a p p e a l t o t h e o r d e r of c r e a t i o n a n d sacred history; a n d , as regards its theoretical a p p r o a c h , it c a n n o t a p p e a l to {metaphysical c o n c e p t s of essence^tib^Fundercut t h e logi­ cal distinctions b e t w e e n different types of i l l o c u t i o n a r y u t t e r a n c e s . M o r a l p h i l o s o p h y m u s t justify t h e cognitive validity of m o r a l j u d g ­ m e n t s a n d p o s i t i o n s w i t h o u t drawing o n t h e s e r e s o u r c e s . F o u r r e s p o n s e s t o this situation strike m e as t o o i m p l a u s i b l e t o m e r i t f u r t h e r discussion: 6

• M o r a l realism a t t e m p t s t o r e h a b i l i t a t e t h e o n t o l o g i c a l justification of n o r m s a n d values with p o s t m e t a p h y s i c a l m e a n s . I t d e f e n d s t h e i d e a t h a t we c a n have cognitive access t o s o m e t h i n g i n t h e w o r l d t h a t h a s t h e p e c u l i a r p o w e r t o o r i e n t o u r desires a n d t o b i n d o u r wills. Since this n o r m a t i v e s o u r c e c a n n o l o n g e r b e e x p l a i n e d i n t e r m s of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n of t h e w o r l d as a w h o l e , t h e p r o b l e m shifts t o t h e e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l level: a m o d e of e x p e r i e n c e a n a l o g o u s t o p e r c e p ­ t i o n — a n intuitive g r a s p o r ideal i n t u i t i o n of y a l u g s — m u s t b e postu­ l a t e d as t h e basis of value j u d g m e n t s w h i c h a r e assimilated t o factual statements. 7

• W h i l e utilitarianism d o e s offer a p r i n c i p l e i n t e r m s of w h i c h m o r a l j u d g m e n t s c a n b e justified, its o r i e n t a t i o n t o t h e a n t i c i p a t e d ag­ g r e g a t e utility of a c o u r s e of a c t i o n d o e s n o t p e r m i t a n a d e q u a t e

12 Chapter 1

r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e m e a n i n g of n o r m a t i v i t y in g e n e r a l . I n p a r t i c u ­ lar, u t i l i t a r i a n i s m fails to g r a s p t h e individualistic m e a n i n g of a m o ­ rality b a s e d o n e q u a l r e s p e c t for e v e r y o n e . • As we have s e e n , m e t a e t h i c a l skepticism leads to revisionist d e ­ scriptions of t h e m o r a l l a n g u a g e g a m e t h a t lose t o u c h with t h e participants' self-understanding. They c a n n o t explain what they are t r y i n g to e x p l a i n , namely, everyday m o r a l practices, w h i c h w o u l d b r e a k d o w n if t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s t h o u g h t t h a t t h e i r m o r a l d i s p u t e s d i d n o t h a v e a n y cognitive c o n t e n t . 8

• M o r a l f u n c t i o n a l i s m is n o t traditionalistic in t h e sense t h a t it re­ verts to p r e m o d e r n m o d e s of justification. It invokes t h e a u t h o r i t y of u p r o o t e d religious t r a d i t i o n s for t h e i r positive effects in stabilizing m o r a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s . B u t a f u n c t i o n a l justification of m o r a l i t y u n d e r ­ t a k e n f r o m t h e o b s e r v e r p e r s p e c t i v e n o t only c a n n o t r e p l a c e t h e a u t h o r i t y of t h e r e a s o n s t h a t c o n v i n c e d believers; it u n i n t e n t i o n a l l y destroys t h e cognitive c o n t e n t of a religiously g r o u n d e d m o r a l i t y by t r e a t i n g t h e e p i s t e m i c a u t h o r i t y of belief as a mere social fact. 9

Ill T h e religious d o c t r i n e s of c r e a t i o n a n d t h e h i s t o r y of salvation p r o ­ v i d e d e p i s t e m i c r e a s o n s for believing t h a t divine c o m m a n d s d o n o t s p r i n g f r o m b l i n d a u t h o r i t y b u t a r e r a t i o n a l o r " t r u e . " If r e a s o n n o w withdraws f r o m t h e objective r e a l m of n a t u r e o r s a c r e d h i s t o r y i n t o t h e m i n d s of a c t i n g a n d j u d g i n g subjects, t h e "objectively r a t i o n a l " r e a s o n s for m o r a l j u d g m e n t a n d a c t i o n m u s t b e r e p l a c e d by "subjec­ tively r a t i o n a l " r e a s o n s . O n c e t h e religious f o u n d a t i o n h a s b e e n u n d e r m i n e d , t h e cognitive c o n t e n t of t h e m o r a l l a n g u a g e g a m e c a n h e n c e f o r t h b e r e c o n s t r u c t e d only o n t h e basis of t h e r e a s o n a n d t h e will of its p a r t i c i p a n t s . H e n c e "will" a n d " r e a s o n " also f o r m t h e basic c o n c e p t s of m o r a l t h e o r i e s t h a t set t h e m s e l v e s this task. W h e r e a s e m p i r i c i s m conceives of p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n as t h e faculty of d e t e r m i n ­ i n g o n e ' s c h o i c e (Willkur) by m a x i m s of p r u d e n c e , A r i s t o t e l i a n i s m a n d K a n t i a n i s m take a c c o u n t n o t only of r a t i o n a l motives b u t also of a will (Wille) t h a t is free to b i n d itself by insight. 1 0

E m p i r i c i s m identifies practical r e a s o n with i n s t r u m e n t a l r e a s o n . O n this view it is r a t i o n a l for a n a c t o r to act in o n e way a n d n o t in

13 A Genealogical Analysis of the Cognitive Content of Morality

a n o t h e r if t h e ( a n t i c i p a t e d ) r e s u l t of t h e a c t i o n is in his interest, satisfies h i m o r gives h i m p l e a s u r e . I n a p a r t i c u l a r situation s u c h r e a s o n s c a r r y w e i g h t for a p a r t i c u l a r a c t o r w h o h a s specific prefer­ e n c e s a n d goals. We call t h e s e r e a s o n s " p r a g m a t i c " o r p r e f e r e n t i a l b e c a u s e they^n2otiTOte^aycjdons a n d , u n l i k e e p i s t e m i c r e a s o n s , d o n o t immediately support j u d g m e n t s or opinions. They provide rational motives for a c t i o n s b u t n o t for convictions. However, t h e y "affect" t h e will only to t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e a c t o r a d o p t s a c o r r e s p o n d i n g r u l e of a c t i o n . T h i s is w h a t differentiates i n t e n t i o n a l a c t i o n f r o m s p o n t a ­ n e o u s l y m o t i v a t e d a c t i o n in g e n e r a l . A n " i n t e n t i o n " is also a dispo­ sition; b u t , in c o n t r a s t with "inclination," it only arises t h r o u g h f r e e d o m of will, t h a t is, i n v i r t u e of t h e fact t h a t t h e a c t o r a d o p t s a r u l e of a c t i o n . A n a c t o r acts rationally w h e n h e acts o n reasonsand k n o w s why h e follows a m a x i m . E m p i r i c i s m only takes a c c o u n t of p r a g m a t i c r e a s o n s , in o t h e r w o r d s , of t h e case in w h i c h a n a c t o r lets his will b e b o u n d (in K a n t ' s t e r m s ) to "rules of skill" o r "counsels of p r u d e n c e " by i n s t r u m e n t a l r e a s o n . I n this way h e obeys t h e p r i n c i p l e of i n s t r u m e n t a l rationality: " W h o e v e r wills t h e e n d , so far as r e a s o n h a s decisive i n f l u e n c e o n his a c t i o n , wills also t h e i n d i s p e n s a b l y n e c e s s a r y m e a n s to it t h a t lie in his p o w e r . " 11

T a k i n g this as t h e i r basis, t h e two classical e m p i r i c i s t p r o g r a m s a t t e m p t t o r e c o n s t r u c t a r a t i o n a l c o r e of morality. Scottish m o r a l p h i l o s o p h y takes m o r a l feelings as basic a n d conceives of m o r a l i t y as w h a t f o u n d s t h e b o n d s of solidarity t h a t u n i t e a c o m m u n i t y ( a ) . Social c o n t r a c t t h e o r y b e g i n s i m m e d i a t e l y with i n t e r e s t s a n d c o n ­ ceives of m o r a l i t y as w h a t e n s u r e s t h a t social i n t e r a c t i o n s r e g u l a t e d by n o r m s a r e j u s t ( b ) . B o t h t h e o r i e s u l t i m a t e l y r u n u p against t h e s a m e p r o b l e m : they c a n n o t e x p l a i n t h e o b l i g a t o r y c h a r a c t e r of m o r a l d u t i e s , w h i c h p o i n t s b e y o n d t h e b i n d i n g force of p r u d e n c e , in t e r m s of r a t i o n a l motives a l o n e . (a) M o r a l a t t i t u d e s e x p r e s s feelings of a p p r o v a l a n d d i s a p p r o v a l . H u m e u n d e r s t a n d s t h e s e as t h e typical s e n t i m e n t s of a t h i r d p e r s o n w h o j u d g e s actors from a benevolent distance. Consequently an a g r e e m e n t in m o r a l j u d g m e n t s c o n c e r n i n g a p e r s o n ' s c h a r a c t e r sig­ nifies a c o n v e r g e n c e of feelings. Even if a p p r o v a l a n d d i s a p p r o v a l e x p r e s s s y m p a t h y a n d a n t i p a t h y a n d h e n c e a r e e m o t i o n a l in n a t u r e , it is r a t i o n a l for a n o b s e r v e r t o r e a c t in this way. F o r we e s t e e m

14 Chapter 1

s o m e o n e as v i r t u o u s if h e shows h i m s e l f to b e useful a n d a g r e e a b l e to u s a n d o u r friends. Moreover, this display of s y m p a t h y fills t h e v i r t u o u s p e r s o n with p r i d e a n d satisfaction, w h e r e a s b l a m e p a i n s t h e o n e w h o is r e p r o a c h e d a n d o c c a s i o n s h i m d i s p l e a s u r e . T h u s t h e r e a r e p r a g m a t i c r e a s o n s even for altruistic a c t i o n : b e n e v o l e n c e t h a t m e e t s with t h e a p p r o v a l of o t h e r s gives satisfaction t o t h e useful a n d a g r e e a b l e p e r s o n himself. T h e s e affective dispositions p r o v i d e t h e basis u p o n w h i c h t h e socially integrative p o w e r of m u t u a l t r u s t c a n unfold. However, t h e s e p r a g m a t i c r e a s o n s for m o r a l a t t i t u d e s a n d a c t i o n s a r e c o n v i n c i n g only as l o n g as we t h i n k of i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s in small c o m m u n i t i e s b a s e d o n solidarity, s u c h as families a n d n e i g h ­ borhoods. Complex s o t i e j j e ^ s o l e l y by feelings like s ^ r p a t i h ^ j i i i d ^ t r u s t , w h i c h a r e g e a r e d to t h e local s p h e r e . A f o m F c o n d u c t t o w a r d s t r a n g e r s calls for "artificial" virtues, a b o v e all a disposition to j u s t i c e . I n t h e case of a b s t r a c t n e t w o r k s of a c t i o n , m e m b e r s of p r i m a r y r e f e r e n c e g r o u p s c a n n o l o n g e r rely o n t h e familiar r e c i p r o c i t i e s b e t w e e n p e r f o r m a n c e s a n d r e w a r d s a n d t h e r e b y lose t h e i r p r a g m a t i c r e a s o n s for b e n e v o l e n c e . Feelings of o b l i g a t i o n t h a t b r i d g e t h e d i s t a n c e b e t w e e n s t r a n g e r s a r e n o t "ra­ t i o n a l for m e " in t h e s a m e sense as a r e feelings of loyalty t o w a r d m e m b e r s of m y g r o u p o n w h o s e ^ c o o p e r a t i o n I c a n rely. Insofar as solidarity is t h e reverse side of j u s t i c e , t h e r e is n o t h i n g w r o n g in p r i n c i p l e with t h e a t t e m p t t o e x p l a i n t h e origin of m o r a l d u t i e s as t h e r e s u l t of t h e e x t e n s i o n of p r i m a r y g r o u p loyalties to ever larger/ g r o u p s (or in t e r m s of t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of p e r s o n a l t r u s t i n t o "system t r u s t " ) . B u t t h e validity of a n o r m a t i v e t h e o r y is n o t m e a s ­ u r e d by h o w it deals with q u e s t i o n s of m o r a l psychology b u t r a t h e r by h o w it a c c o u n t s for t h e n o r m a t i v e priority of d u t i e s . It s h o u l d e x p l a i n why, in cases of conflict b e t w e e n b e n e v o l e n t feelings a n d a n abstract r e q u i r e m e n t of j u s t i c e , it is r a t i o n a l for m e m b e r s of a g r o u p to subordinate t h e i r loyalty t o w a r d t h o s e t h e y k n o w p e r s o n a l l y to a solidarity with s t r a n g e r s . B u t feelings offer t o o n a r r o w a basis for t h e solidarity b e t w e e n m e m b e r s of a n i m p e r s o n a l c o m m u n i t y of m o r a l beings. 1 2

1 3

(b) Social c o n t r a c t t h e o r y overlooks t h e d i m e n s i o n of solidarity f r o m t h e o u t s e t by r e l a t i n g t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e n o r m a t i v e justifica\

15 A Genealogical Analysis of the Cognitive Content of Morality

t i o n of a system of j u s t i c e directly t o t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e individual, t h e r e b y shifting t h e focus of m o r a l i t y f r o m d u t i e s t o rights. T h e j u r i d i c a l c o n c e p t i o n of a n i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t (subjektive Recht) t o t h e legally p r o t e c t e d f r e e d o m t o p u r s u e o n e ' s i n t e r e s t s w i t h i n c e r t a i n d o m a i n s a c c o r d s with a strategy of justification t h a t o p e r a t e s with p r a g m a t i c r e a s o n s a n d is g e a r e d t o t h e q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r it is r a t i o n a l for t h e i n d i v i d u a l t o subject h i s will t o a system of r u l e s . YurthermoreTTRF'^meTalized n o t i o n of t h e c o n t r a c t d e r i v e d f r o m . private law, w h i c h g r o u n d s s u c h r i g h t s i n a symmeuTraTway, is well s u i t e d for t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f a social o r d e r b a s e d o n a g r e e m e n t . S u c h a n o r d e r is j u s t o r g o o d i n t h e m o r a l s e n s e w h e n it satisfies t h e i n t e r e s t s of its m e m b e r s equally. T h e social c o n t r a c t follows f r o m t h e i d e a t h a t e a c h c a n d i d a t e m u s t have a r a t i o n a l m o t i v e for c o n s e n t i n g of h i s o w n free will t o b e c o m e a m e m b e r a n d s u b j e c t i n g h i m s e l f t o t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g n o r m s a n d p r o c e d u r e s . T h u s t h e cognitive c o n ­ t e n t of w h a t m a k e s t h e o r d e r a m o r a l o r a j u s t o r d e r rests o n t h e a g g r e g a t e d c o n s e n t of all of t h e i n d i v i d u a l m e m b e r s a n d c a n b e e x p l a i n e d m o r e precisely i n t e r m s of t h e r a t i o n a l w e i g h i n g of g o o d s t h a t e a c h of t h e m p e r f o r m s i n l i g h t o f h i s o w n p r e f e r e n c e s . T h i s p r o g r a m is o p e n t o / t w o o b j e c t i o n ^ First, t h e assimilation of m o r a l q u e s t i o n s t o q u e s t i o n s of t h e political j u s t i c e of a n association of individuals u n d e r l a w h a s t h e d r a w b a c k t h a t e q u a l r e s p e c t for everybody, a n d h e n c e a universalistic morality, c a n n o t b e justified o n this basis. OtalyMh^ in rule-governed i n t e r a c t i o n with o n e a n o t h e r h a v e a r e a s o n t o a c c e p t r e c i p r o c a l o b l i g a t i o n s . T h u s .the s p h e r e of t h o s e p o s s e s i m g r i g h t s will e x t e n d only t o t h o s e f r o m w h o m r e c i p r o c a t i o n c a n b e e x p e c t e d b e c a u s e t h e y w a n t t o , o r h a v e t o , c o o p e r a t e . S e c o n d , H o b b e s i a n i s m wrestles i n vain with iJTf^Jarmliar problem of t h e f r e e j d d e r , w h o e n g a g e s i n a s h a r e d p r a c t i c e o n l y with t h e proviso t h a t h e c a n deviate f r o m t h e a g r e e d n o r m s w h e n it is t o h i s a d v a n t a g e . T h e free r i d e r p r o b l e m shows t h a t a n a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n i n t e r e s t e d p a r t i e s c a n n o t itself g r o u n d a n y obligations. T h i s p r o b l e m h a s l e d t o a n i n t e r e s t i n g c o m b i n a t i o n of t h e two e m p i r i c i s t strategies. A m e n t a l r e s e r v a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g formally r e c ­ o g n i z e d n o r m s is n o l o n g e r possible o n c e t r a n s g r e s s i o n s of n o r m s a r e p u n i s h e d n o t b y e x t e r n a l l y i m p o s e d s a n c t i o n s b u t i n s t e a d by t h e 1 4

16 Chapter 1

1 5

(iniemalizedsanctions)manifested in feelings of guilt o r s h a m e . B u t t h e p r o p o s e d e x p l a n a t i o n f o u n d e r s o n t h e rjrima facie difficulty of explainirig self-punishing feelings in a r a t i o n a l m a n n e r . O n e c a n n o t r a t i o n a l m o t i v e for "wishing to h a v e " i n n e r s a n c t i o n s of this k i n d . A p a r t f r o m a n y t h i n g else, t h e r e a r e c o n c e p t u a l r e a s o n s why it c a n n o t b e "rational for m e " to a c c e p t t h e p r o m p t i n g s of a b a d c o n s c i e n c e u n q u e s t i o n i n g l y a n d at t h e s a m e t i m e m a k e t h e m t h e object of p r a c t i c a l reflection, h e n c e n o n e t h e l e s s to q u e s t i o n t h e m . W h e n we act m o r a l l y we d o so b e c a u s e we take it to b e r i g h t o r g o o d a n d n o t b e c a u s e we w a n t to avoid i n n e r s a n c t i o n s . We call s a n c t i o n s " i n t e r n a l i z e d " w h e n we h a v e m a d e t h e m o u r o w n . B u t t h e p r o c e s s o f j g ^ i n g them o u r ^ e x p l a i n e d in a p u r p o s i v e 1 6

r a t i o n a l m a n n £ r ^ at a n y r a t e n o t f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of t h e p e r s o n affected: for h i m t h e rationality of a n a c t i o n is n o t simply its ability to m a k e a f u n c t i o n a l c o n t r i b u t i o n to t h e r e g u l a t i o n of t h e c o m m u ­ nity as a w h o l e . 1 7

I

T h e r e is n o m o r e a way b a c k f r o m t h e c o n t r a c t u a l i s t justification of a n o r m a t i v e o r d e r to i n t e r n a l i z e d feelings of d i s a p p r o b a t i o n t h a n t h e r e is a d i r e c t r o u t e f r o m m o r a l feelings of s y m p a t h y a n d r e j e c t i o n to t h e i n s t r u m e n t a l justification of d u t i e s . M o r a l feelings give e x p r e s ­ sion t o a t t i t u d e s t h a t imply m o r a l j u d g m e n t s ; a n d in d i s p u t e s over t h e validity of m o r a l j u d g m e n t s we d o n o t limit o u r a r g u m e n t s to p r a g m a t i c r e a s o n s o r p r e f e r e n c e s . Classical^empiricism j a i l s to^acc o u n t for t h i s j j h e j i o m e M reasons. It c a n n o t u l t i m a t e l y e x p l a i n t h e o b l i g a t o r y force of m o r a l n o r m s i n t e r m s of p r e f e r e n c e s . IV Two m o r e r e c e n t t h e o r e t i c a l a p p r o a c h e s , w h i c h r e m a i n c o m m i t t e d to e m p i r i c i s t a s s u m p t i o n s while a t t e m p t i n g to d o j u s t i c e to t h e p h e ­ n o m e n o l o g y of o b l i g a t o r y n o r m s , r e s p o n d t o this p r e d i c a m e n t of classical e m p i r i c i s m . W h e r e a s Allan G i b b a r d r e m a i n s closer to t h e expressivist a p p r o a c h of e x p l a i n i n g a social life b a s e d o n solidarity, E r n s t T u g e n d h a t r e m a i n s closer t o t h e c o n t r a c t u a l i s t a p p r o a c h of r e c o n s t r u c t i n g a social life b a s e d o n j u s t i c e . B u t b o t h start f r o m t h e s a m e i n t u i t i o n : viewed in t e r m s of f u n c t i o n , every m o r a l system

17 A Genealogical Analysis of the Cognitive Content of Morality

p r o v i d e s a s o l u t i o n to t h e p r o b l e m of among b e i n g s w h o a r e d e p e n d e n t o n social i n t e r a c t i o n . M o r a l conscious­ ness is t h e e x p r e s s i o n of t h e ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ t e ) d e m a n d s t h a t m e m b e r s of a c o o p e r a t i v e social g r o u p m a k e o n o n e a n o t h e r . M o r a l feelings r e g u ­ late t h e o b s e r v a n c e of t h e u n d e r l y i n g n o r m s . S h a m e a n d guilt a l e r t a p e r s o n t h a t h e , in T u g e n d h a t ' s w o r d s , h a s failed as a "cooperative m e m b e r " o r as a " g o o d social p a r t n e r . " G i b b a r d r e m a r k s of t h e s e feelings: " [ t h e y a r e ] tied genetically to p o o r c o o p e r a t i v e will—to a special way a social b e i n g c a n fail to b e a g o o d c a n d i d a t e for inclu­ sion in c o o p e r a t i v e s c h e m e s . " B o t h a u t h o r s seek to d e m o n s t r a t e t h e r a t i o n a l basis of t h e e m e r g e n c e o r t h e c h o i c e of m o r a l i t y in g e n e r a l , b u t also of a universalistic m o r a l i t y b a s e d o n r e a s o n (Vernunftmoral). W h e r e a s T u g e n d h a t sticks to t h e subjective p e r s p e c t i v e of p a r t i c i p a n t s , G i b b a r d takes t h e objectifying a p p r o a c h of func­ tional explanation. I n c o n t r a s t with Kant, w h o u n d e r s t a n d s n o r m s exclusively as m a x ­ ims of a c t i o n , G i b b a r d e x t e n d s t h e c o n c e p t of a n o r m to all k i n d s of s t a n d a r d s t h a t specify why it is r a t i o n a l to h o l d a n o p i n i o n , to e x p r e s s a feeling, o r to act in a c e r t a i n way. H a v i n g c e r t a i n o p i n i o n s c a n b e r a t i o n a l for m e in t h e s a m e way as c a n e x p r e s s i n g c e r t a i n feelings o r a c t i n g o n c e r t a i n i n t e n t i o n s . T h a t s o m e t h i n g is "rational for m e " m e a n s that^I h a v e j n ^ e ^ c e r ^ n j n p ^ ^ o w n in light of w h i c h it " m a k e s sense," o r is " a p p r o p r i a t e , " "plausible" o r simply "best," to believe, feel, o r d o s o m e t h i n g . G i b b a r d t h e n calls t h o s e n o r m s m o r a l t h a t lay d o w n for a c o m m u n i t y w h i c h classes of a c t i o n s m e r i t s p o n ­ t a n e o u s d i s a p p r o v a l . T h e y specify in w h i c h cases it is r a t i o n a l for t h e m e m b e r s to feel a s h a m e d o r guilty o r to r e s e n t t h e c o n d u c t of o t h e r s . G i b b a r d ' s inclusive u s e of t h e c o n c g s j ^ o f ^ ^ that, u n l i k e Kant, h e c a n n o t derive t h e Rationality of a c t i o n (in a c c o r d ­ a n c e with t h e a f o r e m e n t i o n e d p r i n c i p l e of p u r p o s i v e rationality) f r o m t h e a c t o r ' s r e a s o n s for b i n d i n g his__mll to this o r t h a t m a x i m . B u t if all r a t i o n a l motives refer to p r i o r s t a n d a r d s , it m a k e s n o sense to ask in t u r n why it was r a t i o n a l to i n t e r n a l i z e s u c h s t a n d a r d s in t h e first p l a c e . T h e fact t h a t s o m e o n e takes s o m e t h i n g to b e r a t i o n a l simply expresses t h e fact t h a t t h e s t a n d a r d s a u t h o r i z i n g this j u d g m e n t a r e his s t a n d a r d s . H e n c e G i b b a r d u n d e r s t a n d s rationality j u d g m e n t s , w h e t h e r m o r a l o r n o n m o r a l , as expressive s p e e c h acts. T h e y c a n n o t 18

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18 Chapter 1

b e t r u e o r false, b u t only t r u t h f u l o r u n t r u t h f u l . A n d t h e only war­ r a n t for t h e agent-relative b i n d i n g n e s s of m o r a l r u l e s is a truthfully expressed mental state. Given this "expressivist" a c c o u n t of normativity, G i b b a r d m a k e s two moves. First h e offers a n e v o l u t i o n a r y e x p l a n a t i o n of m o r a l n o r m s f r o m t h e o b s e r v e r ' s p e r s p e c t i v e a n d t h e n h e tries to m a k e sense of t h e biological "value" of m o r a l i t y f r o m t h e p a r t i c i p a n t ' s perspective, t h a t is, h e tries to t r a n s l a t e it f r o m t h e Jhej)jretical lan­ g u a g e of a '^biolqgyof i n t e r p e r s o n a l c o o r d i n a t i o n " i n t o t h e l a n g u a g e ofjpracticai d e l i b e r a t i o n . ~ A c c o r d i n g to t h e p r o p o s e d n e o - D a r w i n i a n e x p l a n a t i o n , m o r a l feelings s u c h as s h a m e , guilt, a n d r e s e n t m e n t d e v e l o p e d in t h e c o u r s e of t h e e v o l u t i o n of t h e h u m a n species as r e g u l a t o r y m e c h a ­ nisms to facilitate t h e c o o r d i n a t i o n of a c t i o n . T h e n o r m a t i v i t y of r u l e s in virtue of w h i c h it a p p e a r s r a t i o n a l to m e m b e r s of co­ o p e r a t i n g g r o u p s to have s u c h feelings, a n d h e n c e to d i s a p p r o v e of c o n d u c t t h a t deviates f r o m n o r m s a n d to offer o r t o e x p e c t c o r r e ­ s p o n d i n g excuses as r e p a r a t i o n for a failure i n c o o r d i n a t i o n , is n o t rationally intelligible to t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s themselves. B u t t h e a u t h o r ­ ity w h i c h simply manifests itself in t h e rationality j u d g m e n t s of t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s c a n b e explained f r o m t h e o b s e r v e r ' s p e r s p e c t i v e in t e r m s of t h e " r e p r o d u c t i v e v a l u e " of t h e i n t e r n a l i z e d n o r m s a n d t h e c o r r e ­ s p o n d i n g affective dispositions. T h a t t h e s e n o r m s a n d dispositions a r e a d v a n t a g e o u s f r o m a n e v o l u t i o n a r y p o i n t of view is s u p p o s e d to find e x p r e s s i o n in t h e i r subjectively c o n v i n c i n g character. O n this analysis, t h e p r o p e r task for p h i l o s o p h y is t o establish a p l a u s i b l e connectio^ t h e o b s e r v e r ancTwhat is 20

taEen^to ^£J^twmd^[^the p a r t i c i p a n t . T h i s p r o b l e m takes o n par­ ticular u r g e n c y when t h e a c t o r s n o l o n g e r rely o n i n t e r n a l i z e d n o r m s b u t e n g a g e i n o p e n d i s p u t e s over w h i c h n o r m s they s h o u l d a c c e p t as valid. L a n g u a g e f u n c t i o n s in any case as t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t m e d i u m for i n t e r p e r s o n a l c o o r d i n a t i o n . M o r a l j u d g m e n t s a n d p o s i t i o n s t h a t rest o n i n t e r n a l i z e d n o r m s find e x p r e s s i o n i n a n e m o t i o n a l l y c h a r g e d language. But when the normative background consensus breaks d o w n a n d n e w n o r m s have to b e w o r k e d o u t , a different f o r m of c o m m u n i c a t i o n is r e q u i r e d . T h e p a r t i c i p a n t s m u s t t h e n p u t t h e i r

19 A Genealogical Analysis of the Cognitive Content of Morality

t r u s t i n t h e o r i e n t i n g p o w e r of " n o r m a t i v e discourses": "I shall call this i n f l u e n c e normative governance. It is i n this g o v e r n a n c e of action, belief, a n d e m o t i o n t h a t w e m i g h t find a p l a c e for p h e n o m e n a t h a t c o n s t i t u t e a c c e p t a n c e of n o r m s , as o p p o s e d t o m e r e l y i n t e r n a l i z i n g t h e m . W h e n we w o r k o u t at a d i s t a n c e , in c o m m u n i t y , w h a t to d o o r t h i n k o r feel in a situation w e a r e discussing, we c o m e t o a c c e p t n o r m s for t h e s i t u a t i o n . " B u t it is n o t a l t o g e t h e r clear w h a t c o u l d s u p p o r t t h e " n o r m a t i v e g o v e r n a n c e " s u c h discourses a r e s u p p o s e d t o p r o v i d e . It c a n n o t b e g o o d r e a s o n s , b e c a u s e t h e y derive t h e i r rationally m o t i v a t i n g p o w e r f r o m i n t e r n a l i z e d s t a n d a r d s w h i c h m u s t b e a s s u m e d t o have for­ feited t h e i r a u t h o r i t y — o t h e r w i s e t h e r e w o u l d b e n o n e e d t o r e a c h an u n d e r s t a n d i n g in discourse. W h a t t h e participants must m a k e a n object of discussion c a n n o t s i m u l t a n e o u s l y f u n c t i o n as a s t a n d a r d i n t h e discussion. G i b b a r d c a n n o t r e p r e s e n t discursively a c h i e v e d a g r e e m e n t c o n c e r n i n g m o r a l n o r m s o n t h e m o d e l of t h e coopera-j tive s e a r c h for t h e t r u t h ; r a t h e r h e m u s t r e p r e s e n t it as a p r o c e s s ini w h i c h p a r t i c i p a n t s rhetorically influence o n e a n o t h e r . | 21

A p r o p o n e n t w h o w a n t s t o win a g r e e m e n t for a n o r m t h a t h e believes is w o r t h y of r e c o g n i t i o n c a n only truthfully e x p r e s s t h e subjective state i n w h i c h h e experiences t h e n o r m as b i n d i n g . If h e m a n a g e s to d o this i n a n a u t h e n t i c way h e c a n win over his inter­ l o c u t o r s by i n d u c i n g similar affective states i n t h e m . T h u s i n n o r m a ­ tive discourses^ r e a c h i n g ja r a t i o n a l a g r e e m e n t is r e p l a c e d by s o m e t h i n g like achieving a m u t u a l h a r n i o n i z a t ^ n ^ Inter­ estingly, t h e publicT^egalitarian, a n d n o n c o e r c i v e c o m m u n i c a t i v e c o n d i t i o n s of a Socratic d i a l o g u e a r e s u p p o s e d to b e m o s t c o n d u c i v e to t h e exercise of this k i n d of r h e t o r i c a l i n f l u e n c e . T h e "conversa­ tional d e m a n d s " g o v e r n i n g Socratic d i a l o g u e a r e of a p r a g m a t i c k i n d (with t h e e x c e p t i o n of t h e r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t c o n t r i b u t i o n s m u s t b e c o h e r e n t ) , T h e y a r e s u p p o s e d t o p r e v e n t t h e unjustified e x c l u s i o n of affected p a r t i e s a n d t h e a r b i t r a r y privileging of s p e a k e r s a n d t o p i c s — i n o t h e r w o r d s , u n e q u a l t r e a t m e n t ; t h e y a r e also s u p p o s e d to p r e c l u d e r e p r e s s i o n a n d m a n i p u l a t i o n a n d n o n r h e t o r i c a l f o r m s of i n f l u e n c e . T h e s e c o m m u n i c a t i o n c o n d i t i o n s a r e i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e f r o m t h e p r a g m a t i c p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of a c o o p e r a t i v e s e a r c h for t r u t h . So it is h a r d l y s u r p r i s i n g t h a t t h e n o r m s t h a t win a g r e e m e n t 2 2

2 3

20 Chapter 1

u n d e r t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s a r e ultimately i d e n t i c a l to a m o r a l i t y of e q u a l solidaristic responsibility for everybody. B u t we c a n n o t s p e a k of 'justification" h e r e b e c a u s e t h e discursive p r o c e s s is n o t g e a r e d to t h e m o b i l i z a t i o n of t h e b e t t e r r e a s o n s b u t to t h e effectiveness of t h e m o r e impressive e x p r e s s i o n s of feelings. As a result, G i b b a r d owes us a n e x p l a n a t i o n of why precisely d i e n ^ r j u s ^ X h a l ^ r o y e ^ t o b e t h e b e s t f r o m t h e f u n c t i o n a l p e r s p e c t i v e of t h e i r "survival v a l u e " for a p a r t i c u l a r species s h o u l d w m ^ g r £ e j [ n e n t u n d e r t h e p r a g m a t i c a l l y privileged c o n d i t i o n s of c o m m u n i c a t i o n : "In n o r m a t i v e discussion we a r e i n f l u e n c e d by e a c h other, b u t n o t only by e a c h o t h e r . M u t u a l i n f l u e n c e n u d g e s u s t o w a r d c o n s e n s u s , if all g o e s well, but not toward any consensus whatsoever.^Evolutionary c o n s i d e r a t i o n s suggest this: c o n s e n s u s m a y p r o m o t e biological fitness, but only the consensus of the right kind. T h e c o n s e n s u s m u s t b e m u t u a l l y f i t n e s s - e n h a n c i n g , a n d so to m o v e t o w a r d it we m u s t b e responsive to t h i n g s t h a t p r o m o t e o u r biological f i t n e s s . " G i b b a r d r e c o g n i z e s t h e p r o b l e m t h a t t h e results r e a c h e d f r o m t h e objective p e r s p e c t i v e of investigation m u s t b e m a d e c o n s i s t e n t with t h e results t h a t t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s in d i s c o u r s e a c c e p t as r a t i o n a l f r o m a n i n s i d e r ' s perspective. B u t o n e looks in vain for s u c h a n e x p l a n a t i o n . G i b b a r d fails to e x p l a i n why t h e i m p r o b a b l e c o m m u n i c a t i v e c o n d i t i o n s of n o r m a t i v e d i s c o u r s e s a r e "selective" in t h e s a m e sense, a n d why t l ^ ^ Q u j ^ p r o d u c e t h e s a m £ r e s u l t — t h a t is, a n i n c r e a s e in t h e p r o b a b i l i t y of collective survival—as d o t h e m e c h a n i s m s of n a t u r a l evolution. 24

25

E r n s t T u g e n d h a t avoids t h e p r o b l e m a t i c d e t o u r t h r o u g h a f u n c t i o n ­ alist e x p l a n a t i o n of morality. H e first d e s c r i b e s h o w m o r a l r u l e sys­ t e m s f u n c t i o n in general a n d w h a t motives we c o u l d h a v e to b e m o r a l at all ( a ) , a n d t h e n c o n s i d e r s what form of m o r a l i t y it w o u l d b e r a t i o n a l for u s to c h o o s e u n d e r p o s t m e t a p h y s i c a l c o n d i t i o n s ( b ) . (a) I n c o n t r a s t with classical c o n t r a c t u a l i s t n , T u g e n d h a t b e g i n s with a fulljOejiggd^ c o n c e p t of t h e ^ r n o r a l c o m m u n i t y . T h i s c o n c e p t iricludes t h e s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h o s e w h o feel themselves b o u n d by m o r a l r u l e s a n d h e n c e t h o s e w h o "have a c o n s c i e n c e , " e x p r e s s

21 A Genealogical Analysis of the Cognitive Content of Morality

m o r a l feelings, a r g u e a b o u t m o r a l j u d g m e n t s with r e a s o n s , a n d so f o r t h . M e m b e r s of t h e c o m m u n i t y t h i n k t h a t t h e y "know" w h a t is " g o o d " a n d "evil" in t h e c a t e g o r i c a l sense. H a v i n g o u t l i n e d this c o n c e p t i o n , T u g e n d h a t c o n s i d e r s w h e t h e r it is r a t i o n a l for a n y given c a n d i d a t e to e n t e r i n t o s u c h a m o r a l p r a c t i c e d e s c r i b e d as a whole, t h a t is, to b e c o m e a c o o p e r a t i n g m e m b e r of a m o r a l c o m m u n i t y as such: " T h a t we w a n t to b e l o n g to a m o r a l c o m m u n i t y at all . . . is u l t i m a t e l y a n act of o u r a u t o n o m y for w h i c h t h e r e c a n only b e g o o d motives, n o t r e a s o n s . " By " a u t o n o m y " T u g e n d h a t u n d e r s t a n d s only t h e capacity to act in a r u l e - g o v e r n e d m a n n e r f r o m r a t i o n a l motives. B u t t h e practical r e a s o n s h e g o e s o n to e n u m e r a t e g o b e y o n d t h e e m p i r i c i s t f r a m e w o r k of value-free c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of p r u d e n c e . F o r T u g e n d h a t adduces n o t p r e m o r a l interests b u t value-orientations w h i c h c o u l d only have d e v e l o p e d w i t h i n t h e c o n t e x t of a m o r a l l y c o n s t i t u t e d c o m m u n i t y . F o r e x a m p l e , it is r a t i o n a l for m e to e n t e r a m o r a l c o m m u n i t y b e c a u s e I p r e f e r t h e status of subject a n d ad­ d r e s s e e of r i g h t s a n d d u t i e s to t h e status of a n object to w h i c h r e c i p r o c a l i n s t r u m e n t a l i z a t i o n w o u l d r e d u c e m e ; o r b e c a u s e bal­ a n c e d f r i e n d s h i p s a r e b e t t e r for m e t h a n t h e s t r u c t u r a l isolation of a strategically a c t i n g subject; o r b e c a u s e I c a n e x p e r i e n c e t h e satis­ faction of b e i n g r e s p e c t e d by p e r s o n s w h o a r e w o r t h y of m o r a l r e s p e c t only as a m e m b e r of a m o r a l c o m m u n i t y a n d so f o r t h . 26

T h e preferences that T u g e n d h a t sp^ c o m m u r n t y a r e a l r e a d y infused with t h e values of s u c h a c o m m u n i t y ; tHey are c o n t i n g e n t o n pribr, in^ tions. At a n y r a t e - t h e s e motives d o n o t e x p l a i n h o w it c o u l d b e r a t i o n a l for a c t o r s who find themselves in a premoral condition a n d k n o w n o t h i n g else to m a k e t h e t r a n s i t i o n to a m o r a l c o n d i t i o n . S o m e o n e w h o arrives at r e a s o n s for his d e c i s i o n to p u r s u e a m o r a l life, r e a s o n s w h i c h c a n only r e s u l t f r o m reflection o n t h e p r i o r e x p e r i e n c e of t h e a d v a n t a g e s of m o r a l l y r e g u l a t e d i n t e r a c t i o n , h a s left b e h i n d t h e e g o c e n t r i c p e r s p e c t i v e of r a t i o n a l c h o i c e a n d takes his o r i e n t a t i o n i n s t e a d f r o m c o n c e p t i o n s of t h e g o o d life. H e o r i e n t s his p r a c t i c a l d e l i b e r a t i o n to t h e ethical q u e s t i o n of w h a t k i n d of life h e s h o u l d lead, w h o h e is a n d w a n t s t o b e , w h a t i n t h e l o n g r u n is " g o o d " for h i m all t h i n g s c o n s i d e r e d , etc. R e a s o n s t h a t c o u n t in l i g h t of t h e s e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s h a v e m o t i v a t i n g force only insofar as t h e y affect t h e

22 Chapter 1

identity a n d s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of a n a c t o r w h o h a s a l r e a d y b e e n f o r m e d by a m o r a l c o m m u n i t y . M a r t i n Seel also u n d e r s t a n d s ( a n d accepts) t h e a r g u m e n t in this sense. A l t h o u g h t h e h a p p i n e s s of a successful life d o e s n o t necessar­ ily consist in a m o r a l life, a subject w h o w a n t s to live a g o o d life h a s g o o d r e a s o n s for a c c e p t i n g m o r a l c o n d i t i o n s (of w h a t e v e r k i n d ) . It is a l r e a d y j : l e a r f r o m t h e ethical p e r s p e c t i v e t h a t it is n o t possible to l e a d a good life o u t s i d £ j a _ j j ^ ^ O f c o u r s e , t h a t only m e a n s t h a t " t h e r e a r e n e c e s s a r y a r e a s of o v e r l a p b e t w e e n a g o o d life a n d a m o r a l l y g o o d life, b u t n o t t h a t a g o o d life is only possible within the limits of a m o r a l l y g o o d l i f e . " B u t T u g e n d h a t is n o t so m u c h i n t e r e s t e d in t h e relation b e t w e e n t h e g o o d life a n d m o r a l i t y as in t h e ethical justification for b e i n g m o r a l . A n d this leads to a n u n a v o i d a b l e p a r a d o x if, like T u g e n d h a t , o n e rightly insists o n t h e difference b e t w e e n w h a t is g o o d for o n e s e l f a n d m o r a l c o n c e r n for t h e interests of o t h e r s : insofar as a n a c t o r only h a s r a t i o n a l motives for p r e f e r r i n g m o r a l to p r e m o r a l c o n d i t i o n s , h e u n d e r m i n e s t h e o b l i g a t o r y n a t u r e of t h e m o r a l e x p e c t a t i o n s w h o s e categorical valid­ ity h e s h o u l d r e c o g n i z e u n d e r t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s . 27

Seel r e c o g n i z e s t h a t " m o r a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n . . . t r a n s c e n d s t h o s e p r e f e r e n c e - b a s e d r e a s o n s we have for a c c e p t i n g t h e m o r a l p o i n t of view at all,"^ b u t h e d o e s n o t d r a w t h e c o r r e c t c o n c l u s i o n f r o m t h i s . T h e t h r u s t of a n ethical justification for b e i n g m o r a l is n o t t h a t s o m e o n e is m o t i v a t e d by p r e f e r e n c e - b a s e d r e a s o n s to " c o n f r o n t r e a s o n s of a c o m p l e t e l y different sort" b u t r a t h e r t h a t t h e m o r a l l a n g u a g e loses t h e illocutiraarj^fprce of u n c o n d i t i o n a l demaric[s~as s o o n as p a r t i c i p a t i o n in_ t h e mora^ entjgn^^ a r a t i o n a l chooser. If t h e a c t o r w h o assures himself of t h e s u p e r i o r i t y of a m o r a l way of life is t h e s a m e as t h e o n e w h o accepts s u c h c o n d i t i o n s o n t h e basis of this p r e f e r e n c e , his ethical justification c o n d i t i o n s t h e m o r a l l a n g u a g e g a m e as a w h o l e a n d c h a n g e s t h e c h a r a c t e r of t h e m o v e s t h a t a r e possible w i t h i n it. F o r a c t i n g m o r a l l y "out of r e s p e c t for t h e law" is i n c o m p a t i b l e with t h e ethical proviso of always e x a m i n i n ^ w h e t h e r t h e p r a c t i c e as a w h o l e also pays off f r o m t h e p e ^ ^ life p l a n . F o r c o n c e p t u a l re^asonsTThe^categorical m e a n i n g of m o r a l o b l i g a t i o n s c a n b e u p h e l d only as l o n g as a d d r e s s e e s a r e p r e v e n t e d f r o m step8

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23 A Genealogical Analysis of the Cognitive Content of Morality

p i n g o u t s i d e t h e m o r a l c o m m u n i t y , if only i n a virtual m a n n e r , i n o r d e r t o w e i g h t h e a d v a n t a g e s a n d d i s a d v a n t a g e s of m e m b e r s h i p f r o m t h e d i s t a n c e of t h e first p e r s o n p e r s p e c t i v e . N o r , conversely, is t h e r e a r o u t e f r o m ethical reflection t o t h e justification of morality. (b) Even if t h e e m p i r i c i s t d r e a m w e r e t o b e c o m e a reality, a n d reflection o n o n e ' s o w n interests w o u l d g e n e r a t e a rationally r e c o n s t r u c t a b l e d y n a m i c t h a t w o u l d p r o p e l o n e b e y o n d t h e p u r s u i t of t h o s e i n t e r e s t s in t h e d i r e c t i o n of u n c o n d i t i o n a l m o r a l c o n c e r n — even t h e n t h e essential p r o b l e m w o u l d n o t b e solved. Ethical r e a s o n s e x p l a i n a t m o s t why we s h o u l d e n g a g e i n s o m e j m O T ^ J a n ^ a g e ^ a m e 6 r otherTTiut n o t whicfiTone. T u g e n d h a t gives this p r o b l e m a g e n e a ­ logical c a s t T T a v i n g lost t h e t r a d i t i o n a l f o u n d a t i o n of t h e i r s h a r e d morality, t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s m u s t r e a c h a s h a r e d u n d e r s t a n d i n g of w h i c h specific m o r a l n o r m s they s h o u l d a d o p t . I n this p r o c e s s n o ­ b o d y c a n claim m o r e a u t h o r i t y t h a n a n y o n e else; all s t a n d p o i n t s f r o m w h i c h o n e c o u l d claim privileged access t o m o r a l t r u t h have lost t h e i r validity. T h e social c o n t r a c t c o u l d n o t p r o v i d e a satisfactory r e s p o n s e t o this c h a l l e n g e b e c a u s e a h a g r e e m e n t a m o n g c o n t r a c t i n g p a r t n e r s m o t i v a t e d by i n t e r e s t s c a n l e a d a t b e s t t o a n e x t e r n a l l y i m p o s e d social r e g u l a t i o n of c o n d u c t , b u t n o t t o a b i n d i n g , l e t a l o n e a universalistic, c o n c e p t i o n o f ( t h e T o m m ^ ^ Tugendhat's de­ s c r i p t i o n of t h e s t a r t i n g p o i n t is similar t o t h e o n e I have p r o p o s e d . T h e m e m b e r s of a m o r a l c o m m u n i t y a r e n o t t r y i n g t o replace m o r a l ­ ity with a social r e g u l a t i o n of b e h a v i o r t h a t is t o everybody's advan­ tage. T h e i r g o a l is n o t t o r e p l a c e t h e m o r a l l a n g u a g e g a m e as such, b u t only its religious f o u n d a t i o n . T h i s l i n e of t h o u g h t leads t o reflection o n t h e c o n d i t i o n s of c o m ­ m u n i c a t i v e a g r e e m e n t w h i c h , after r e l i g i o n a n d metaphysics, r e p r e ­ s e n t t h e only r e m a i n i n g r e s o u r c e o n w h i c h t h e justification of a m o r a l i t y of e q u a l r e s p e c t for e v e r y b o d y c a n draw: "If t h e g o o d is n o l o n g e r laid d o w n i n a t r a n s c e n d e n t m a n n e r , t h e only p r i n c i p l e of t h e g o o d s e e m s t o b e c o n s i d e r a t i o n for m e m b e r s of t h e c o m m u n i t y , w h o s e m e m b e r s h i p i n t u r n c a n n o l o n g e r b e limited, a n d h e n c e c o n s i d e r a t i o n for all o t h e r s — w h i c h m e a n s c o n s i d e r a t i o n for t h e i r wishes a n d interests. T o p u t it in t h e f o r m of a slogan: intersubjectivity t h u s u n d e r s t o o d takes t h e p l a c e of t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t p r e g i v e n . . . . Since t h e r e c i p r o c a l d e m a n d s . . . c o n s t i t u t e t h e f o r m of morality

24 Chapter 1

in g e n e r a l j o n e c a n also say: i n a s m u c h as t h e c o n t e n t t o w h i c h t h e d e m a n d s refer is n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n c o n s i d e r a t i o n for w h a t all w a n t , the content now fits the form."^ I n this way T u g e n d h a t derives t h e K a n t i a n p r i n c i p l e of universaliz a t i o n f r o m t h e symmetrical c o n d i t i o n s of t h e initial situation i n w h i c h t h e p a r t i e s , w h o h a v e b e e n s t r i p p e d of all privileges a n d as a r e s u l t a r e o n a n e q u a l footing, c o m e t o g e t h e r t o a g r e e o n basic n o r m s t h a t c a n b e rationally a c c e p t e d by all p a r t i c i p a n t s . However, h e fails t o r e c o g n i z e t h a t "rational acceptability" t h e r e b y t a k e s j o u a m e a n i n g d i f f e r e n t f r o m s o m e t h i n g ' s b e i n g "rational for m e . " If t h e r e is n o a u t h o r i t y for r e l a t i o n s of m o r a l r e c o g n i t i o n h i g h e r t h a n t h e g o o d will a n d i r m g h t of t h q s e j v h o c o m e t o a s h a r e d ^ ^ r e e m e n t concerning the rules t h a ^ a r e j t o ^ o v e r n livin^JogejJaer, t h e n 0

31

t h e s t a n d a r d f o r j u d g i n g t h e s e r u l e s m u s t b e d e r i v e d exclusively f r o m t h e s i t u a t i o n i n w h i c h p a r t i c i p a n t s seek t o convince o n e a n o t h e r of t h e i r beliefs a n d p r o p o s a l s . By e n t e r i n g i n t o a c o o p e r a t i v e c o m m u ­ nicative p r a c t i c e , t h e y a l r e a d y tacitly a c c e p t t h e c o n d i t i o n of symmet­ rical o r e q u a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n for e v e r y o n e ' s interests. B e c a u s e this p r a c t i c e only achieves its g o a l if e v e r y o n e is willing t o c o n v i n c e o t h e r s a n d t o b e c o n v i n c e d by t h e m , every serious p a r t i c i p a n t m u s t e x a m i n e w h a t is rationaLforJilm under the conditions of symmetrical a n d e q u a l c c ^ i d e r ^ i o n _ o f interests. B u t with t h e r e f e r e n c e ~to t h e possibility bf a n a g r e e m e n t r e a c h e d b y ^ ^ S q n ^ d i s c o u r s e ) (which i n Rawls's case is i m p o s e d by t h e s t r u c t u r e of t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n ) , p r a g m a t i c r e a s o n s take o n a n e p i s t e m i c m e a n i n g . I n this way we t r a n s c e n d t h e b o u n d a r i e s of i n s t r u m e n t a l r e a s o n . A p r i n c i p l e of universalization t h a t c a n n o t b e justified by a p p e a l t o e a c h individ­ ual's interests ( o r t o e a c h individual's c o n c e p t i o n of t h e g o o d ) serves as t h e g r o u n d of validity of r a t i o n a l morality. We c a n g a i n i n s i g h t into this p r i n c i p l e only t h r o u g h reflection o n t h e u n a v o i d a b l e c o n ­ ditions of i m p a r t i a l j u d g m e n t . W h i l e G i b b a r d analyzes t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s as p r a g m a t i c p r e s u p p o s i ­ t i o n s of n o r m a t i v e discourses, h e views t h e m solely f r o m t h e func­ tionalist p e r s p e c t i v e of t h e i r c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e c o o r d i n a t i o n of social a c t i o n . T u g e n d h a t , by c o n t r a s t , u p h o l d s t h e view t h a t t h e a c c e p t a n c e of m o r a l r u l e s m u s t b e justified f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s themselves; b u t h e t o o d e n i e s t h e e p i s t e m i c m e a n -

25 A Genealogical Analysis of the Cognitive Content of Morality

i n g t h a t this a c c e p t a n c e a s s u m e s u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s of discourse.

rational

VI W e a k n o n c o g n i t i v i s m a s s u m e s t h a t a n a c t o r ' s c h o i c e c a n b e affected by practical r e a s o n in j u s t o n e way, namely, t h r o u g h d e l i b e r a t i o n s t h a t a c c o r d with t h e p r i n c i p l e of i n s t r u m e n t a l rationality. If, by con­ trast, p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n is n o l o n g e r assimilated to i n s t r u m e n t a l rea­ son, t h e c o n s t e l l a t i o n of r e a s o n a n d will c h a n g e s , a n d h e n c e so d o e s t h e c o n c e p t of subjective f r e e d o m . F r e e d o m is n o l o n g e r e x h a u s t e d by t h e ability t o c h o o s e in a c c o r d a n c e with m a x i m s of p r u d e n c e b u t finds e x p r e s s i o n in t h e will's capacity to b i n d itself t h r o u g h insight. T h e significance of t h e t e r m "insight" h e r e is t h a t a d e c i s i o n c a n b e justified i n t e r m s of " e p i s t e m i c " r e a s o n s . Since e p i s t e m i c reasonsj g e n e r a l l y s u p p o r t t h e t r u t h of assertoric s t a t e m e n t s , t h e u s e of t h e e x p r e s s i o n " e p i s t e m i c " in p r a c t i c a l c o n t e x t s is in n e e d of e x p l a n a ­ t i o n . P r a g m a t i c r e a s o n s d e p e n d o n t h e p r e f e r e n c e s a n d p u r p o s e s of e a c h p a r t i c u l a r p e r s o n . O n l y t h e a g e n t himself, w h o k n o w s his o w n p r e f e r e n c e s a n d p u r p o s e s , h a s t h e final e p i s t e m i c a u t h o r i t y to j u d g e t h e s e "data." Practical reflection c a n l e a d t o ( m ^ g h t ^ o n l y w h e n it_ g o e s b e y o n d t h e subjective w o r l d to w h i c h t h e a c t o r h a s privileged access a n d p e r t a i n s to t h e c o n t e n t s of a n intersubjectively s h a r e d ^ social world. I n this way reflection o n s h a r e d e x p e r i e n c e s , practices, a n d f o r m s of life b r i n g s to a w a r e n e s s f | i n ^ ^ to w h i c h we d o n o t h a v e access simply t h r o u g h t h e e p i s t e m i c a u t h o r i t y of t h e first p e r s o n singular. B r i n g i n g to c o n s c i o u s n e s s something^lmplicitly k n o w n is n o t t h e s a m e as a c q u i r i n g e m p i r i c a l k n o w l e d g e . Scientific k n o w l e d g e is TOunTerrnTurti^^ achieved insight^ critically a p ­ p r o p r i a t e s a p r e t h e o r e t i c a l k n o w - h o w b y j T i a n n g it explicit, c o n t e x tualizing i t , j | r ^ Ethical insights r e s u l t f r o m t h e e x p l i c a t i o n of t h e k n o w - h o w t h a t c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y socialized individuals h a v e a c q u i r e d by g r o w i n g u p in a p a r t i c u l a r c u l t u r e . T h e m o s t ^ g e n e r a l e l e m e n t s of t h e practical k n o w l e d g e of a c u l t u r e h a v e b e c o m e s e d i m e n t e d in its evaluative v o c a b u l a r y a n d in its r u l e s for t h e u s e of n o r m a t i v e s e n t e n c e s . Actors d o n o t j u s t d e v e l o p 32

26 Chapter 1

c o n c e p t i o n s of t h e m s e l v e s a n d of t h e life t h e y w o u l d like to l e a d in g e n e r a l in l i g h t of t h e i r evaluatively c h a r g e d l a n g u a g e g a m e s ; they also discover attractive a n d repulsive f e a t u r e s of p a r t i c u l a r situations t h a t they c a n n o t u n d e r s t a n d w i t h o u t "seeing" h o w they ought to r e s p o n d to t h e m . B e c a u s e we h a v e intuitive k n o w l e d g e of w h a t is attractive a n d repulsive, r i g h t o r w r o n g , a n d in g e n e r a l of r e l e v a n c e , ^ t h e m o m e n t of i n s i g h t h e r e c a n b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m a c o r r e s p o n d ­ i n g disposition o r p r e f e r e n c e . It consists of a n intersubjectively - s h a r e d k n o w - h o w t h a t h a s g a i n e d a c c e p t a n c e in t h e lifeworld a n d h a s " p r o v e d " itself in p r a c t i c e . As t h e s h a r e d possession of a c u l t u r a l f o r m of life, it enjoys "objectivity" in v i r t u e of its social diffusion a n d a c c e p t a n c e . H e n c e t h e p r a c t i c a l reflection w h i c h critically a p p r o p r i ates this irrtuitive k n o w l e d g e r e q u i r e s a social p e r s p e c t i v e t h a t g o e s b e y o n d t h e first p e r s o n s i n g u l a r p e r s p e c t i v e of s o m e b o d y a c t i n g o n his p r e f e r e n c e s . 3 4

H e r e I w a n t t o d i s t i n g u i s h f r o m t h e o u t s e t b e t w e e n value-orientations (Wertorientierungen) a n d o b l i g a t i o n s (Verpflichtungeri). We j u d g e v a l u e - o r i e n t a t i o n s a n d t h e evaluative s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of p e r s o n s o r g r o u p s f r o m t h e ethical p o i n t of view, w h e r e a s we j u d g e d u t i e s , n o r m s , a n d categorical i m p e r a t i v e s f r o m t h e moral p o i n t of view. E t h i c a l g u e s t i o n s arise f r o m t h e first p e r s o n p e r s p e c t i v e , S e e n f r o m t h e first p e r s o n p l u r a l p o l r T F ^ F ^ S v ^ T h e y refer t o I T s r i a r e d e t h o s : w h a t is at issue is h o w we u n d e r s t a n d ourselves as m e m b e r s of o u r c o m m u n i t y , h o w we s h o u l d o r i e n t o u r lives, o r w h a t is b e s t for u s in the l o n g r u n a n d all t h i n g s c o n s i d e r e d . Similar q u e s t i o n s arise f r o m t h e first p e r s o n s i n g u l a r p e r s p e c t i v e : w h o I a m a n d w h o I w o u l d like to b e , o r h o w I s h o u l d l e a d m y life. S u c h existential c o n c e r n s differ f r o m c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of p r u d e n c e n o t j u s t in view of t h e e x t e n d e d h o r i z o n s i m p l i e d by t h e f o r m u l a of w h a t "in the long run and all things considered is b e s t for m e . " I n t h e s e q u e s t i o n s t h e first p e r s o n p e r s p e c ­ tive d o e s n o t i m p l y a n e g o c e n t r i c r e s t r i c t i o n to s h e e r p r e f e r e n c e s ; r a t h e r , it p o i n t s to a n individual life h i s t o r y t h a t is always a l r e a d y e m b e d d e d in intersubjectively s h a r e d t r a d i t i o n s a n d f o r m s of l i f e . T h e attractiveness of t h e values in light of w h i c h I u n d e r s t a n d myself a n d m y life c a n n o t b e e x p l a i n e d w i t h i n t h e limits of t h e w o r l d of subjective e x p e r i e n c e s to w h i c h I h a v e privileged access. F r o m t h e ethical p o i n t of view, m y p r e f e r e n c e s a n d goals a r e n o l o n g e r simply 35

27 A Genealogical Analysis of the Cognitive Content of Morality

36

given b u t a r e t h e m s e l v e s o p e n t o d i s c u s s i o n ; since t h e y d e p e n d o n my self-understanding, they can u n d e r g o reasoned change t h r o u g h reflection o n w h a t h a s intrinsic value for us w i t h i n t h e h o r i z o n of o u r s h a r e d social w o r l d . F r o m t h e ethical p o i n t of v i e w w e ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ c ^ ^ v ^ ^ a n ^ i ^ ^ ^ successful, o r better, n o t m i s s p e n t life, w h i c h arise i n t h e c o n t e x t of a particular, collective f o r m of life o r of a n individual life history. Practical r e f l e c t i o n takes t h e f o r m of a p r o c e s s of
H o w we c o n d u c t o u r lives is d e t e r m i n e d m o r e o r less by h o w we u n d e r s t a n d ourselves. T h u s ethical insights i n f l u e n c e h o w we o r i e n t o u r lives t h r o u g h t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of o u r s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g . As insights t h a t b i n d t h e will, t h e y i n f o r m a conscious p l a n of life in w h i c h t h e free will in t h e e t h i c a l sense manifests itself. A t t h e level of ethical r e a s o n i n g , t h e f r e e d o m to c h o o s e , in t h e sense of r a t i o n a l c h o i c e , is t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o t h e f r e e d o m t o d e c i d e u p o n a n a u t h e n t i c 38

life. ~~ : ~ However, t h e limits of t h e e t h i c a l p o i n t of view b e c o m e m a n i f e s t o n c e q u e s t i o n s of j u s t i c e arise: for f r o m this p e r s p e c t i v e j u s t i c e is r e d u c e d t o j u s t o n e value a m o n g o t h e r s . M o r a l o b l i g a t i o n s a p p e a r to b e m o r e i m p o r t a n t for o n e p e r s o n t h a n t h e y a r e for a n o t h e r a n d to h a v e m o r e w e i g h t i n o n e c o n t e x t t h a n i n a n o t h e r . W i t h i n t h e h o r i z o n of e t h i c a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s , it is certainly possible t o a c c o u n t for t h e s e m a n t i c difference b e t w e e n t h e attractive c h a r a c t e r of values a n d t h e b i n d i n g n e s s of m o r a l o b l i g a t i o n s by giving q u e s t i o n s of j u s t i c e a c e r t a i n priority over q u e s t i o n s of t h e g o o d life: "Ethical life itself is i m p o r t a n t , b u t it c a n see t h a t t h i n g s o t h e r t h a n itself a r e i m p o r t a n t . . . . T h e r e is o n e k i n d of ethical c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h a t di­ rectly c o n n e c t s i m p o r t a n c e a n d deliberative priority, a n d this is o b ­ l i g a t i o n . " B u t as l o n g as d u t i e s a r e viewed solely f r o m t h e ethical p o i n t of view, a n absolute priority of t h e r i g h t over t h e g o o d , w h i c h 39

28 Chapter 1

a l o n e w o u l d b e c o m m e n s u r a t e with t h e c a t e g o r i c a l validity of m o r a l d u t i e s , c a n n o t b e m a i n t a i n e d : " T h e s e k i n d s of o b l i g a t i o n s v e r y often c o m m a n d t h e h i g h e s t deliberative priority. . . . However, we c a r t also see h o w they n e e d n o t always c o m m a n d t h e h i g h e s t priority, even in ethically well-disposed a g e n t s . " As l o n g as justice is t r e a t e d as a n i n t e g r a l p a r t of a p a r t i c u l a r c o n c e p t i o n of t h e g o o d , t h e r e is n o groundTSf^^ in cases of conflict, d u t i e s c a n only 40

b e " t r u m p e d " by d u t i e s a n d r i g h t s by r i g h t s (as D w o r k i n p u t s i t ) . W i t h o u t t h e priority of t h e r i g h t over t h e g o o d o n e c a n n o t h a v e a n ethically n e u t r a l c o n c e p t i o n of justice. T h i s deficit w o u l d h a v e u n f o r t u n a t e c o n s e q u e n c e s for e q u a l t r e a t m e n t in pluralistic socie­ ties. F o r t h e e q u a l t r e a t m e n t of different individuals a n d g r o u p s , e a c h of w h i c h h a s its o w n individual o r collective identity, c o u l d only b e a s s u r e d by s t a n d a r d s t h a t a r e p a r t of a s h a r e d c o n c e p t i o n of t h e g o o d equally r e c o g n i z e d by all of t h e m . T h e s a m e c o n d i t i o n w o u l d h o l d m u t a t i s m u t a n d i s for t h e j u s t r e g u l a t i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l rela­ t i o n s b e t w e e n states, for c o s m o p o l i t a n r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n w o r l d citi­ zens, a n d for g l o b a l r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n c u l t u r e s . T h e i m p r o b a b i l i t y of this r e q u i r e m e n t of a globally s h a r e d c o n c e p t i o n of t h e g o o d shows why neo-Aristotelian a p p r o a c h e s fall s h o r t of t h e universalistic con-^ t e n t of a m o r a l i t y of e q u a l r e s p e c t a n d solidaristic responsibility for e v e r y o n e . F o r a n y a t t e m p t t o p r o j e c t a universally b i n d i n g collective g o o d o n w h i c h t h e solidarity of all h u m a n b e i n g s — i n c l u d i n g f u t u r e g e n e r a t i o n s — c o u l d b e f o u n d e d r u n s u p a g a i n s t a d i l e m m a : a sub­ stantive c o n c e p t i o n t h a t is still sufficiently i n f o r m a t i v e entails a n i n t o l e r a b l e f o r m of p a t e r n a l i s m (at least with r e g a r d to t h e h a p p i ­ ness of f u t u r e g e n e r a t i o n s ) ; b u t a n e m p t y c o n c e p t i o n t h a t abstracts f r o m all local c o n t e x t s u n d e r m i n e s ( t h e ) c o n c e p t of t h e g o o d . 4 1

To d o j u s t i c e to t h e presumptive i m p a r t i a l i t y j ) f irmraljiu^lgmejits a n d to t h e c a t e g o r i c a l validity claim of b i n d i n g n o r m s , we m u s t u n c o u p l e t h e h o r i z o n t a l p e r s p e c t i v e , in w h i c h i n t e r p e r s o n a l rela­ tions a r e r e g u l a t e d , f r o m t h e vertical p e r s p e c t i v e , of m y o r o u r o w n life-project, a n d t r e a t m o r a l q u e s t i o n s separately. T h e a b s t r a c t q u e s ­ t i o n of w h a t is equally in t h e i n t e r e s t of all goes beyond t h e c o n t e x t b o u n d e t h i c a l q u e s t i o n of w h a t is b e s t for m e o r us. N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e i n t u i t i o n t h a t issues of j u s t i c e r e s u l t f r o m a n idealizing e x t e n s i o n of t h e ethical p r o b l e m a t i c r e t a i n s a valid m e a n i n g .

29 A Genealogical Analysis/of the Cognitive Content of Morality

If we i n t e r p r e t j u s t i c e as w h a t is equally g o o d for all, t h e n t h e " g o o d " t h a t h a s b e e n e x t e n d e d step by s t e p to t h e "right" f o r m s a b r i d g e b e t w e e n j u s t i c e a n d solidarity. F o r universal j u s t i c e also re­ q u i r e s t h a t o n e p e r s o n s h o u l d take responsibility for a n o t h e r , a n d even t h a t e a c h p e r s o n s h o u l d s t a n d i n a n d a n s w e r for a s t r a n g e r w h o h a s f o r m e d his i d e n t i t y in c o m p l e t e l y different c i r c u m s t a n c e s a n d w h o u n d e r s t a n d s h i m s e l f in t e r m s of o t h e r t r a d i t i o n s . T h e r e m n a n t ^ o f t h e g o o d at t h e c o r e of t h e r i g h t r e m i n d s us t h a t m o r a l conscious­ ness d e p e n d s o n a p a r t i c u l a r s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of m o r a l p e r s o n s w h o r e c o g n i z e t h a t t h e y belong to t h e m o r a l c o m m u n i t y . All individu­ als w h o h a v e b e e n socialized i n t o a n y c o m m u n i c a t i v e f o r m o f l i f e at all b e l o n g to ( t M s T o m m T m i t ^ B e c a u s e socialized p e r s o n s c a n only stabilize t h e i r i d e n t i t i e s t h r o u g h r e l a t i o n s of r e c i p r o c a l r e c o g n i t i o n , t h e i r integrity is p a r t i c u l a r l y v u l n e r a b l e a n d they a r e c o n s e q u e n t l y in n e e d of special p r o t e c t i o n . T h e y m u s t b e a b l e t o a p p e a l to a s o u r c e of a u t h o r i t y b e y o n c ^ ^ — G . H . M e a d speaks in this c o n n e c t i o n of t h e "ever w i d e r c o m m u n i t y . " Every c o n c r e t e c o m ­ m u n i t y d e p e n d s o n t h e m o r a l c o n i m u n i t y as its " b e t t e r self," so to speak. As m e m b e r s of this c o m m u n i t y , individuals e x p e c t to b e t r e a t e d equally, while it is a s s u m e d at t h e s a m e t i m e t h a t e a c h j j e r s o n r e g a r d s every o t h e r p e r s o n a ^ ' o n e _ o f u s . " F r o m this p e r s p e c t i v e , ^solidarit^ is simply t h e reverse side of j u s t i c e . H e r e we m u s t avoid t h e m i s c o n c e p t i o n t h a t t h e r i g h t is r e l a t e d to t h e g o o d as f o r m is to c o n t e n t : " T h e f o r m a l c o n c e p t of t h e g o o d c o n s t i t u t e s t h e m a t e r i a l k e r n e l of a universalistic m o r a l i t y — i t is t h e object of m o r a l c o n c e r n . " T h i s c o n c e p t i o n betrays t h e selective vision of a liberalism t h a t r e d u c e s t h e r o l e of m o r a l i t y — a s t h o u g h it w e r e t h e s u m of n e g a t i v e liberty r i g h t s — t o t h e p r o t e c t i o n of t h e individual g o o d a n d t h e r e b y e r e c t s m o r a l i t y o n a n e t h i c a l f o u n d a ­ t i o n . I n t h a t case t h e w h e r e f o r e of m o r a l i t y — t h a t is, k n o w l e d g e of t h e " g o o d s a n d ills" t h a t a r e equally "at stake" for e v e r y b o d y in m o r a l conflicts—would h a v e to b e p r e s c r i b e d to m o r a l i t y as s o m e t h i n g given. T h e p a r t i c i p a n t s w o u l d h a v e to k n o w already, p r i o r to any m o r a l d e l i b e r a t i o n , w h a t is equally g o o d for all; a t t h e v e r y least t h e y w o u l d have to b o r r o w a c o n c e p t of t h e f o r m a l g o o d f r o m t h e p h i ­ l o s o p h e r . B u t n o b o d y c a n d e t e r m i n e directly f r o m t h e o b s e r v e r ' s p e r s p e c t i v e w h a t a n y p e r s o n s h o u l d r e g a r d as g o o d . T h e r e f e r e n c e 4 2

4 3

30 Chapter 1

to "any" p e r s o n m a s k s a n a b s t r a c t i o n t h a t o v e r b u r d e n s even t h e p h i l o s o p h e r . To b e s u r e , m o r a l i t y c a n b e u n d e r s t o o d as a p r o t e c t i v e m e c h a n i s m t h a t c o m p e n s a t e s for t h e i n t r i n s i c vulnerability of p e r ­ sons. B u t k n o w l e d g e of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l vulnerability of a b e i n g w h o c a n d e v e l o p a n i d e n t i t y only t h r o u g h e x t e r n a l i z i n g h i m s e l f in i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s , a n d w h o c a n stabilize it only in r e l a t i o n s of intersubjective r e c o g n i t i o n , derives f r o m a n intuitive familiarity with t h e g e n e r a l s t r u c t u r e s of o u r j c o m r m ^ of life as s u c h . It 44

is a d e e p l y r o o t e d g e n e r a l k n o w l e d g e of w h i c h we b e c o m e aware only in cases of clinical d e v i a n c e , t h r o u g h t h e a w a r e n e s s of t h o s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s in w h i c h t h e i d e n t i t y of socialized individuals is t h r e a t ­ e n e d . A p p e a l i n g to a k n o w l e d g e t h a t is s h a p e d by s u c h n e g a t i v e e x p e r i e n c e s d o e s n o t c o m m i t u s t o stating i n a positive way w h a t c o n s t i t u t e s a g o o d life in g e n e r a l . O n l y t h o s e affected c a n themselves clarify, f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of p a r t i c i p a n t s in practical d e l i b e r a t i o n , w h a t is equally g o o d for all. T h e g o o d t h a t is r e l e v a n t f r o i r i j j i e m o r a l p o i n t of view shows itself in e a c h p a r t i c u l a r case f r o m t h e e n l a r g e d first p e r s o n p l u r a l p e r s p e c t i v e of a c o m m u n i t y t h a t d o e s n o t e x c l u d e a n y b o d y T h e g o o d t h a t is s u b s u m e d by t h e j u s t is t h e very f o r m of a n intersubjectively s h a r e d e t h o s in g e n e r a l , a n d h e n c e it is t h e s t r u c t u r e of m e m b e r s h i p of a c o m m u n i t y , t h o u g h o n e t h a t h a s t h r o w n off t h e shackles of a n y e x c l u s i o n a r y c o m m u n i t y . T h i s c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n solidarity a n d j u s t i c e i n s p i r e d K a n t to e l u c i d a t e t h e p o i n t of view f r o m w h i c h q u e s t i o n s of j u s t i c e c a n b e j u d g e d impartially in t e r m s of t h e R o u s s e a u i a n m o d e l of self-legisla­ t i o n : " C o n s e q u e n t l y every r a t i o n a l b e i n g m u s t act as if by his m a x i m s h e w e r e at all t i m e s a legislative m e m b e r of t h e universal r e a l m of e n d s . " K a n t uses t h e t e r m " r e a l m of e n d s " to i n d i c a t e t h a t e a c h of its m e m b e r s r e g a r d s h i m s e l f a n d all o t h e r m e m b e r s n e v e r m e r e l y as m e a n s b u t always also as " e n d s in themselves." As a legislator, n o b o d y is s u b o r d i n a t e d to a n alien will; b u t at t h e s a m e t i m e every p e r s o n is subject a l o n g with e v e r y o n e else to t h e laws t h a t h e gives himself. By r e p l a c i n g t h e figure of t h e c o n t r a c t d e r i v e d f r o m private law with t h a t of r e p u b l i c a n legislation d e r i v e d f r o m p u b l i c law, K a n t c a n , in morality, combine in o n e a n d t h e s a m e p e r s o n t h e two r o l e s t h a t a r e s e p a r a t e d in law, t h a t of t h e citizen w h o p a r t i c i p a t e s in legislation a n d t h a t of t h e private legal p e r s o n w h o is subject to t h e law. T h e 4 5

31 A Genealogical Analysis of the Cognitive Content of Morality

m o r a l l y free p e r s o n m u s t b e a b l e to u n d e r s t a n d himself s i m u l t a n e ­ ously as t h e a u t h o r of m o r a l c o m m a n d s to w h i c h h e is subject as a d d r e s s e e . T h i s is possible only if h e d o e s n o t exercise t h e legislative c o m p e t e n c e , in w h i c h h e "participates," in a n a r b i t r a r y m a n n e r (as o n a positivistic c o n c e p t i o n of law) b u t r a t h e r i n a c c o r d a n c e with t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n of a political c o m m u n i t y w h o s e citizens g o v e r n t h e m ­ selves. A n d t h e r e only laws c a n h o l d sway t h a t c o u l d h a v e b e e n a g r e e d u p o n "by e a c h for all a n d by all for e a c h . " VII A law is valid i n t h e m o r a l sense w h e n it c o u l d b e a c c e p t e d by e v e r y b o d y f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of e a c h individual. B e c a u s e only " g e n e r a l " laws fulfill t h e c o n d i t i o n t h a t t h e y r e g u l a t e m a t t e r s in t h e e q u a l i n t e r e s t of all, p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n finds e x p r e s s i o n in t h e g e n e r alizability o r universalizability of t h e i n t e r e s t s e x p r e s s e d in t h e law. T h u s a p e r s o n takes t h e m o r a l p o i n t of view w h e n h e d e l i b e r a t e s like a d e m o c r a t i c legislator o n w h e t h e r t h e p r a c t i c e t h a t w o u l d result f r o m t h e g e n e r a l o b s e r v a n c e of a h y p o t h e t i c a l l y p r o p o s e d n o r m Ccoukljbe a c c e p t e d by all t h o s e possibly affected viewed as p o t e n t i a l co-legislators. E a c h p e r s o n p a r t i c i p a t e s in t h e r o l e o j c o ^ i s l a t o r in a cooperative e n t e r p r i s e a n d t h e r e b y a d o p t s a n intersubjectively ex­ t e n d e d p e r s p e c t i v e f r o m w h i c h it c a n b e d e t e r m i n e d w h e t h e r a c o n t r o v e r s i a l n o r m c a n c o u n t as g e n e r a l i z a b l e f r o m t h e p o i n t of view of e a c h p a r t i c i p a n t . P r a g m a t i c a n d ethical r e a s o n s , w h i c h r e t a i n t h e i r i n t e r n a l c o n n e c t i o n to t h e i n t e r e s t s a n d s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of i n d i v i d u a l p e r s o n s , also play a r o l e in t h e s e d e l i b e r a t i o n s ; b u t t h e s e agent-relative r e a s o n s n o l o n g e r count as r a t i o n a l motives a n d valueo r i e n t a t i o n s of individual p e r s o n s b u t as e p i s t e m i c c o n t r i b u t i o n s to a d i s c o u r s e in w h i c h n o r m s a r e e x a m i n e d with t h e a i m of r e a c h i n g a c o m m u n i c a t i v e a g r e e m e n t . B e c a u s e a legislative p r a c t i c e c a n only b e u n d e r t a k e n jointly, a m o n o l o g i c a l , e g o c e n t r i c o p e r a t i o n of t h e g e n e r a l i z a t i o n test in t h e m a n n e r of t h e G o l d e n R u l e will n o t suffice. M o r a l r e a s o n s b i n d t h e will i n a different way t h a n d o p r a g m a t i c a n d e t h i c a l r e a s o n s . O n c e t h e s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e will takes t h e f o r m of self-legislation, r e a s o n a n d t h e will c o m p l e t e l y interpenetrate. H e n c e K a n t calls only t h e a u t o n o m o u s , rationally d e t e r m i n e d will

32 Chapter 1

"free." O n l y s o m e o n e w h o lets his will b e d e t e r m i n e d by i n s i g h t i n t o w h a t all c o u l d will acts freely: "Only a r a t i o n a l b e i n g h a s t h e capacity of a c t i n g a c c o r d i n g to t h e conception of laws (i.e., a c c o r d i n g to p r i n ­ ciples) . T h i s capacity is t h e will. Since reason is r e q u i r e d for t h e d e r i v a t i o n of a c t i o n s f r o m laws, will is n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n practical r e a s o n . " To b e s u r e , every act of c h o i c e rests o n g r o u n d s of p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n ; b u t as l o n g as c o n t i n g e n t , subjective d e t e r m i n a t i o n s a r e still o p e r a t i v e a n d t h e will d o e s n o t act solely o n g r o u n d s of p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n , n o t every t r a c e of compulsion h a s b e e n e x p u n g e d , a n d t h e will is n o t yet truly free. 46

T h e n o r m a t i v i t y t h a t flows f r o m t h e will's capacity to b i n d itself as such d o e s n o t as yet h a v e a m o r a l m e a n i n g . W h e n a n a g e n t a d o p t s t e c h n i c a l r u l e s of skill o r p r a g m a t i c c o u n s e l s of p r u d e n c e , h e lets his c h o i c e b e g u i d e d by p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n , b u t t h e o p e r a t i v e r e a s o n s have d e t e r m i n i n g force only in r e l a t i o n to c o n t i n g e n t p r e f e r e n c e s a n d goals. T h i s h o l d s e v e n for e t h i c a l r e a s o n s , t h o u g h in a different way. T h e a u t h e n t i c k y o f v a l u e - c o m m i t m e n t s p o i n t s b e y o n d t h e subjectc e n t e r e d h o r i z o n of i n s t r u m e n t a l rationality. B u t s t r o n g evaluations a c q u i r e objective force for t h e will only in c o n n e c t i o n with c o n t i n ­ g e n t , t h o u g h intersubjectively s h a r e d , e x p e r i e n c e s , practices, a n d f o r m s of life. I n b o t h cases t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g i m p e r a t i v e s a n d rec­ o m m e n d a t i o n s c a n claim only c o n d i t i o n a l validity: t h e y h o l d u n d e r , t h e c o n d i t i o n of subjectively given i n t e r e s t s o r intersubjectively shared traditions. M o r a l o b l i g a t i o n s a c q u i r e a n u n c o n d i t i o n a l o r c a t e g o r i c a l validity only w h e n they p r o c e e d f r o m laws t h a t e m a n c i p a t e t h e will, assum­ i n g it c o m m i t s itself to t h e m , f r o m all c o n t i n g e n t d e t e r m i n a t i o n s a n d t h a t in a sense assimilate it to practical r e a s o n itself. F o r t h e c o n t i n g e n t goals, p r e f e r e n c e s , a n d v a l u e - o r i e n t a t i o n s t h a t o t h e r w i s e d e t e r m i n e t h e will f r o m w i t h o u t c a n t h e n b e s u b j e c t e d to critical e v a l u a t i o n in light of n o r m s t h a t a r e justified f r o m t h e m o r a l p o i n t of view. T h e h e t e r o n o m o u s will c a n also b e m o t i v a t e d by r e a s o n s to a d o p t m a x i m s ; b u t its c o m m i t m e n t r e m a i n s b o u n d to p r e e x i s t i n g interests a n d context-dependent value-orientations t h r o u g h prag­ m a t i c a n d e t h i c a l r e a s o n s . O n l y w h e n t h e f o r m e r a r e e x a m i n e d as to t h e i r compatibility with t h e i n t e r e s t s a n d values of all o t h e r s f r o m t h e m o r a l p o i n t of view h a s t h e will freed itself f r o m h e t e r o n o m y 4 7

33 A Genealogical Analysis of the Cognitive Content of Morality

T h e abstract opposition between a u t o n o m y a n d h e t e r o n o m y nar­ rows t h e t h e o r e t i c a l focus o n t o t h e i n d i v i d u a l subject. K a n t ' s t r a n ­ s c e n d e n t a l b a c k g r o u n d a s s u m p t i o n s l e a d h i m to ascribe t h e free will to a n intelligible E g o s i t u a t e d in t h e r e a l m of e n d s . T h u s h e o n c e a g a i n a t t r i b u t e s self-legislation, w h i c h in its o r i g i n a l political m e a n ­ i n g is a c o o p e r a t i v e u n d e r t a k i n g in w h i c h t h e i n d i v i d u a l m e r e l y " p a r t i c i p a t e s , " to t h e sole c o m p e t e n c e of t h e individual. It is n o a c c i d e n t t h a t t h e c a t e g o r i c a l i m p e r a t i v e is a d d r e s s e d to a s e c o n d o e r s o n s i n g u l a r a n d t h a t it c r e a t e s t h e i m p r e s s i o n t h a t e a c h individ­ u a l c o u l d u n d e r t a k e t h e r e q u i r e d test of n o r m s for h i m s e l f in foro interno. B u t in fact t h e reflexive a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e universalization test calls for a f o r m of d e l i b e r a t i o n in w h i c h e a c h p a r t i c i p a n t is c o m p e l l e d to a d o p t t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of all o t h e r s in o r d e r to e x a m i n e w h e t h e r , a n o r m c o u l d b e willed by all from the perspective of each person. T h i s is t h e s i t u a t i o n of a rational discourse o r i e n t e d to r e a c h i n g u n ­ d e r s t a n d i n g in w h i c h all t h o s e c o n c e r n e d p a r t i c i p a t e . T h i s i d e a of a discursively p r o d u c e d u n d e r s t a n d i n g a l s o j m p o s e s , a g r e a t e r b u r d e n of justification o n t h e i s o l a t e d _ j u d g i n g subj ect t h a n w o u l d a m o n o l o g i c a n y ^ a p p ^ l e d universalization test. K a n t m a y have b e e n so readily i n c l i n e d to f o r e s h o r t e n a n intersubjective c o n c e p t of a u t o n o m y in a n individualistic d i r e c t i o n b e ­ c a u s e h e failed to d i s t i n g u i s h ethical q u e s t i o n s sufficiently f r o m p r a g m a t i c q u e s t i o n s . A n y o n e w h o takes seriously q u e s t i o n s of ethical self-understanding r u n s u p against the s t u b b o r n cultural m e a n i n g of a n i n d i v i d u a l ' s o r a g r o u p ' s historically c h a n g i n g inter­ p r e t a t i o n s of t h e . w o r l d a n d of themselves. As a child of t h e eight­ e e n t h c e n t u r y K a n t still t h i n k s in a n u n h i s t o r i c a l way a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y o v e r l o o k s this layer of t r a d i t i o n s in w h i c h i d e n t i t i e s a r e f o r m e d . H e tacitly a s s u m e s t h a t in m a k i n g m o r a l j u d g m e n t s e a c h individual c a n p r o j e c t h i m s e l f sufficiently i n t o t h e situation of every­ o n e else through his own imagination. B u t w h e n t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s c a n n o l o n g e r rely o n a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l p r e u n d e r s t a n d i n g g r o u n d e d in m o r e o r less h o m o g e n e o u s c o n d i t i o n s of life a n d interests, t h e m o r a l p o i n t of view c a n only b e r e a l i z e d u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s of c o m m u n i c a t i o n ^ t h a t (ensure^ t h a t ^everyone tests t h e acceptability of a n o r m , i m p l e m e n t e d in a g e n e r a l p r a c t i c e , also f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of his o w n u n d e r s t a n d i n g of h i m s e l f a n d of t h e world. I n this way t h e 48

49

34 Chapter 1

c a t e g o r i c a l i m p e r a t i v e receives a d i s c o u r s e - t h e o r e t i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n in w h i c h its p l a c e is t a k e n by t h e d i s c o u r s e p r i n c i p l e ( D ) , a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h o n l y t h o s e n o r m s c a n claim validity t h a t c o u l d m e e t with t h e a g r e e m e n t of all t h o s e c o n c e r n e d in t h e i r capacity as partici­ p a n t s in a p r a c t i c a l d i s c o u r s e . I b e g a n with t h e q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r t h e cognitive c o n t e n t of a m o r a l i t y of e q u a l r e s p e c t a n d solidaristic responsibility for e v e r y b o d y c a n still b e justified after t h e collapse of its religious f o u n d a t i o n . I n c o n c l u s i o n , I w o u l d like t o e x a m i n e w h a t t h e intersubjectivistic in­ t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e c a t e g o r i c a l i m p e r a t i v e c a n c o n t r i b u t e t o answer­ i n g t h i s q u e s t i o n . H e r e we m u s t t r e a t two p r o b l e m s separately. First, we m u s t clarify h o w m u c h o f { & e o r i g i n a l mtuitiqn§)a d i s c o u r s e ethics salvages in t h e d i s e n c h a n t e d u n i v e r s e of p o s t m e t a p h y s i c a l justifica­ t i o n a n d in w h a t sense o n e c a n still s p e a k of t h e cognitive validity of m o r a l j u d g m e n t s a n d p o s i t i o n s (VIII). S e c o n d , t h e r e is t h e final q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r t h e c o n t e n t of a m o r a l i t y t h a t results f r o m t h e r a t i o n a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t r a d i t i o n a l , religious i n t u i t i o n s r e m a i n s b o u n d , in spite of its p r o c e d u r a l c h a r a c t e r , to its o r i g i n a l c o n t e x t (IX). 50

VIII W i t h t h e d e v a l u a t i o n of t h e e p i s t e m i c a u t h o r i t y of t h e G o d ' s eye view, m o r a l c o m m a n d s lose t h e i r religious as well as t h e i r m e t a p h y s i ­ cal f o u n d a t i o n . T h i s d e v e l o p m e n t also h a s i m p l i c a t i o n s for d i s c o u r s e ethics; it c a n n e i t h e r d e f e n d t h e full m o r a l c o n t e n t s of religious i n t u i t i o n s (1) n o r c a n it r e p r e s e n t t h e validity of m o r a l n o r m s in realist t e r m s ( 2 ) . (1) T h e fact t h a t m o r a l p r a c t i c e is n o l o n g e r tied to t h e individ­ u a l ' s e x p e c t a t i o n of salvation a n d a n e x e m p l a r y c o n d u c t of life t h r o u g h t h e p e r s o n of a r e d e m p t i v e G o d a n d t h e divine p l a n for salvation h a s two u n w e l c o m e c o n s e q u e n c e s . O n t h e o n e h a n d , m o r a l knowledge becomes detached from moral motivation, a n d o n the o t h e r , t h e c o n c e p t of m o r a l l y r i g h t a c t i o n b e c o m e s d i f f e r e n t i a t e d f r o m t h e c o n c e p t i o n of a g o o d o r godly life. D i s c o u r s e ethics c o r r e l a t e s ethical a n d m o r a l q u e s t i o n s with different f o r m s of a r g u m e n t a t i o n , namely, with discourses of self-

35 A Genealogical Analysis of the Cognitive Content of Morality

clarification a n d discourses of n o r m a t i v e justification ( a n d applica­ t i o n ) , respectively. B u t it d o e s n o t t h e r e b y r e d u c e m o r a l i t y to e q u a l t r e a t m e n t ; r a t h e r , it takes a c c o u n t of b o t h t h e aspects of j u s t i c e a n d t h a t of solidarity. A discursive a g r e e m e n t d e p e n d s s i m u l t a n e o u s l y o n t h e n o n s u b s t i t u t a b l e "yes" o r " n o " r e s p o n s e s of e a c h individual a n d o n o v e r c o m i n g j i h e e ^ c ^ n t o c ^ ^ r ^ p e c j ^ e , s o m e t h i n g t h a t all par­ ticipants a r e c o n s t r a i n e d to d o by a n a r g u m e n t a t i v e p r a c t i c e d e ­ s i g n e d t o p r o d u c e a g r e e m e n t of a n e p i s t e m i c k i n d . If t h e p r a g m a t i c f e a t u r e s of d i s c o u r s e m a k e possible a n insightful p r o c e s s of o p i n i o n a n d will-formation t h a t g u a r a n t e e s b o t h of t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s , t h e n t h e rationally m o t i v a t e d "yes" o r " n o " r e s p o n s e s c a n take t h e inter­ ests of e a c h individual i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n w i t h o u t b r e a k i n g | d i e j ^ o r social b o n d j t h a t joins all t h o s e w h o a r e o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g i n a transsubjective a t t i t u d e . However, u n c o u p l i n g m o r a l i t y f r o m q u e s t i o n s of t h e g o o d life l e a d s t o a m o t i v a t i o n a l deficit. B e c a u s e t h e r e is n o p r o f a n e substitute for t h e h o p e of p e r s o n a l salvation, we lose t h e s t r o n g e s t m o t i v e for < o b e y i n g m o r a l c o m m a n d s . D i s c o u r s e ethics intensifies t h e intellectualistic s e p a r a t i o n of m o r a l j u d g m e n t f r o m a c t i o n even f u r t h e r by l o c a t i n g t h e m o r a l p o i n t of view in r a t i o n a l d i s c o u r s e . T h e r e is n o d i r e c t r o u t e f r o m discursively a c h i e v e d c o n s e n s u s t o a c t i o n . Cer­ tainly, m o r a l j u d g m e n t s tell u s w h a t we s h o u l d d o , a n d g o o d r e a s o n s affect o u r will; this is s h o w n by t h e b a d c o n s c i e n c e t h a t " p l a g u e s " u s w h e n we act a g a i n s t o u r b e t t e r j u d g m e n t . B u t t h e p r o b l e m of weak­ n e s s of will also shows t h a t m o r a l i n s i g h t is b a s e d o n t h e w e a k force of e p i s t e m i c reaspns^ a n d , in c o n t r a s t with p r a g m a t i c r e a s o n s , d o e s n o t itself c o n s t i t u t e a r a t i o n a l m o t i v e . W h e n we k n o w w h a t it is m o r a l l y r i g h t for u s to d o , we k n o w t h a t t h e r e a r e n o g o o d (epistemic) r e a s o n s to act o t h e r w i s e . B u t t h a t d o e s n o t m e a n t h a t » o t h e r motives will n o t p r e v a i l . 51

W i t h t h e loss of its f o u n d a t i o n i n t h e religious p r o m i s e of salva­ t i o n , t h e m e a n i n g of n o r m a t i v e o b l i g a t i o n also c h a n g e s . T h e differ­ e n t i a t i o n b e t w e e n strict d u t i e s a n d less b i n d i n g values, b e t w e e n w h a t is m o r a l l y r i g h t a n d w h a t is ethically w o r t h striving for, a l r e a d y s h a r p ­ e n s m o r a l validity i n t o a n o r m a t i v i t y to w h i c h i m p a r t i a l j u d g m e n t a l o n e is a d e q u a t e . T h e shift i n p e r s p e c t i v e f r o m G o d to h u m a n b e i n g s h a s a f u r t h e r c o n s e q u e n c e . 'Validity" n o w signifies t h a t m o r a l

36 Chapter 1

n o r m s c o u l d win t h e a g r e e m e n t of all c o n c e r n e d , o n t h e c o n d i t i o n t h a t t h e y j o i n t l y e x a m i n e in p r a c t i c a l d i s c o u r s e w h e t h e r a c o r r e ­ s p o n d i n g p r a c t i c e is in t h e e q u a l i n t e r e s t of all. T h i s a g r e e m e n t e x p r e s s e s two t h i n g s : t h e fallible r e a s o n of deliberating: subjects w h o c o n v i n c e o n e a n o t h e r t h a t a h y p o t h e t i c a l l y i n t r o d u c e d n o r m is wor­ thy of b e i n g r e c o g n i z e d , a n d t h e f r e e d o m of legislating subjects w h o u n d e r s t a n d themselves as t h e a u t h o r s of t h e n o r m s to w h i c h they subject themselves as a d d r e s s e e s . T h e m o d e of validity of m o r a l n o r m s n o w b e a r s t h e traces b o t h of t h e fallibility of t h e d i s c o v e r i n g m i n d a n d of t h e creativity of t h e c o n s t r u c t i n g nrind. (2) T h e p r o b l e m of in w h i c h sense m o r a l j u d g m e n t s a n d a t t i t u d e s c a n claim validity reveals a n o t h e r a s p e c t w h e n we reflect o n t h e essentialist s t a t e m e n t s t h r o u g h w h i c h m o r a l c o m m a n d s w e r e p r e ­ viously justified in a m e t a p h y s i c a l f a s h i o n as e l e m e n t s of a rationally o r d e r e d world. As l o n g as t h e cognitive c o n t e n t of m o r a l i t y c o u l d b e e x p r e s s e d in assertoric s t a t e m e n t s , m o r a l j u d g m e n t s c o u l d b e viewed as t r u e o r false. B u t if m o r a l r e a l i s m c a n n o l o n g e r b e d e f e n d e d by a p p e a l i n g to a c r e a t i o n i s t m e t a p h y s i c s a n d to n a t u r a l law ( o r t h e i r s u r r o g a t e s ) , t h e validity of m o r a l s t a t e m e n t s c a n n o l o n g e r b e assimi­ l a t e d to t h e t r u t h of assertoric s t a t e m e n t s . T h e l a t t e r state h o w t h i n g s a r e i n t h e w o r l d ; t h e f o r m e r state w h a t we s h o u l d d o . If o n e a s s u m e s t h a t , in g e n e r a l , s e n t e n c e s c a n b e valid only in t h e sense of b e i n g " t r u e " o r "false" a n d f u r t h e r t h a t " t r u t h " is to b e u n d e r s t o o d as c o r r e s p o n d e n c e b e t w e e n s e n t e n c e s a n d facts, t h e n every validity claim t h a t is r a i s e d for a n o n d e s c r i p t i v e s e n t e n c e n e c ­ essarily a p p e a r s p r o b l e m a t i c . I n fact, m o d e r n m o r a l scepticism is b a s e d o n t h e thesis t h a t n o r m a t i v e s t a t e m e n t s c a n n o t b e t r u e o r false, a n d h e n c e c a n n o t b e justified, b e c a u s e t h e r e is n o m o r a l o r d e r , n o s u c h t h i n g s as m o r a l objects o r facts. O n this r e c e i v e d a c c o u n t , t h e c o n c e p t of the world as t h e totality of facts is c o n n e c t e d with a c o r r e s p o n d e n c e n o t i o n of truth a n d a s e m a n t i c c o n c e p t i o n of justification. I will very briefly discuss t h e s e q u e s t i o n a b l e p r e m i s e s in reverse o r d e r . 5 2

A s e n t e n c e o r p r o p o s i t i o n is justified o n t h e s e m a n t i c c o n c e p t i o n if it c a n b e d e r i v e d f r o m basic s e n t e n c e s a c c o r d i n g to valid r u l e s of i n f e r e n c e , w h e r e a class of basic s e n t e n c e s is d i s t i n g u i s h e d by specific (logical, e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l , o r psychological) criteria. B u t t h e f o u n d a -

37 A Genealogical Analysis of the Cognitive Content of Morality

tionalist a s s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e r e exists s u c h a class of basic s e n t e n c e s w h o s e t r u t h is i m m e d i a t e l y accessible to p e r c e p t i o n o r to i n t u i t i o n h a s n o t w i t h s t o o d linguistic a r g u m e n t s for t h e holistic c h a r a c t e r of l a n g u a g e a n d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n : every justification m u s c a t least proceed from a p r e - u n d e r s t o o d c o n t e x t o r b a c k g r o u n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g . T h i s failure of f o u n d a t i o n a l i s m r e c o m m e n d s a p r a g m a t i c c o n c e p t i o n of justification as a p u b l i c p r a c t i c e in w h i c h criticizable validity claims c a n b e d e f e n d e d with g o o d r e a s o n s . O f c o u r s e , t h e criteria of r a t i o n ­ ality t h a t d e t e r m i n e w h i c h r e a s o n s c o u n t as g o o d r e a s o n s c a n t h e m s e l v e s b e m a d e a m a t t e r for discussion. H e n c e p r o c e d u r a l c h a r ­ acteristics of t h e p r o c e s s of a r g u m e n t a t i o n itself m u s t ultimately b e a r t h e b u r d e n of e x p l a i n i n g why results a c h i e v e d in a p r o c e d u r a l l y c o r r e c t m a n n e r enjoy t h e p r e s u m p t i o n of validity. F o r e x a m p l e , t h e I c o m m u n i c a t i v e s t r u c t u r e of r a t i o n a l d i s c o u r s e c a n e n s u r e t h a t all r e l e v a n t c o n t r i b u t i o n s a r e h e a r d a n d t h a t t h e u n f o r c e d force of t h e b e t t e r a r g u m e n t a l o n e d e t e r m i n e s t h e "yes" o r " n o " r e s p o n s e s of t h e participants. 5 3

54

T h e p r a g m a t i c c o n c e p t i o n of justification o p e n s t h e way for a n e p i s t e m i c c o n c e p t of t r u t h t h a t o v e r c o m e s t h e well-known p r o b l e m s with t h e c o r r e s p o n d e n c e t h e o r y . T h e t r u t h p r e d i c a t e refers to t h e l a n g u a g e g a m e of justification, t h a t is, to t h e p u b l i c r e d e m p t i o n of validity claims. O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t r u t h c a n n o t b e idj^ntifi^d with justifiability o r w a r r a n t e d assertability. T h e " c a u t i o n a r y " u s e of t h e t r u t h p r e d i c a t e — r e g a r d l e s s of h o w well " p " is justified, it still m a y n o t b e t r u e — h i g h l i g h t s t h e difference in m e a n i n g b e t w e e n " t r u t h " as a n i r r e d u c i b l e - p r o p e r t y of s t a t e m e n t s a n d "rational acceptability" as a c o n t e x t - d e p e n d e n t p r o p e r t y of u t t e r a n c e s . T h i s difference c a n b e u n d e r s t o o d w i t h i n t h e h o r i z o n of possible justifications in t e r m s of t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n "justified in o u r c o n t e x t " a n d "justified in every c o n t e x t . " T h i s d i f f e r e n c e c a n b e c a s h e d o u t in t u r n t h r o u g h a (jyeak idealization) of o u r p r o c e s s e s of a r g u m e n t a t i o n , u n d e r s t o o d as c a p a b l e of b e i n g e x t e n d e d indefinitely over t i m e . W h e n we assert "p a n d t h e r e b y claim t r u t h for "p" we a c c e p t t h e ( ^ l i g a t i o n } t o d e f e n d "p" in a r g u m e n t a t i o n — i n full a w a r e n e s s of its fallibility—against all future objections. 5 5

n

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I n t h e p r e s e n t c o n t e x t I a m less i n t e r e s t e d i n t h e c o m p l e x r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t r u t h a n d justification t h a n in t h e possibility of c o n c e i v i n g

38 Chapter 1

;

_ _

1

^

t r u t h , p u r i f i e d of all c o n n o t a t i o n s of c o r r e s p o n d e n c e , as a special case of validity, where this general c o n c e p t of validity is i n t r o d u c e d i n c o n n e c t i o n with t h e discursive r e d e m p t i o n of validity c l a i m s . I n this way w e o p e n u p a c o n c e p t u a l s p a c e i n which t h e c o n c e p t of n o r m a t i v e , a n d i n p a r t i c u l a r m o r a l , validity c a n b e situated. T h e Tightness of m o r a l n o r m s ( o r of g e n e r a l n o r m a t i v e statements.) a n d of particular^jic^rrra^ based o n t h e m can then b e 57

u n d e r s t o o d as a n a l o g o u s t o t h e t r u t h of descriptive s t a t e m e n t s . W h a t u n i t e s t h e s e two c o n c e p t s of validity is t h e p r o c e d u r e of discursively r e d e e m i n g t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g validity claims. W h a t s e p a r a t e s t h e m is t h e fact t h a t t h e y refer, respectively, t o t h e social a n d t h e objective worlds. T h e social w o r l d , as t h e totality of legitimately o r d e r e d i n t e r p e r ­ s o n a l r e l a t i o n s , is accessible only f r o m t h e p a r t i c i p a n t ' s p e r s p e c t i v e ; it is intrinsically historical a n d h e n c e h a s , if y o u will, a n o n t o l o g i c a l c o n s t i t u t i o n different f r o m t h a t of t h e objective w o r l d w h i c h c a n b e d e s c r i b e d f r o m t h e o b s e r v e r ' s p e r s p e c t i v e . T h e social w o r l d is in­ extricably i n t e r w o v e n with t h e i n t e n t i o n s a n d beliefs, t h e p r a c t i c e s a n d l a n g u a g e s of its m e m b e r s . T h i s h o l d s i n a similar way for descrip­ tions of t h e objective w o r l d b u t n o t for this w o r l d itself. H e n c e t h e discursive r e d e m p t i o n of t r u t h claims h a s a different m e a n i n g f r o m t h a t of m o r a l validity claims: i n t h e f o r m e r case, discursive a g r e e ­ ment signifies t h a t t h e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s of a n assertoric p r o p o s i t i o n , i n t e r p r e t e d i n t e r m s of assertability c o n d i t i o n s , a r e fulfilled; i n t h e latter case, discursive a g r e e m e n t justifies t h e claim t h a t a n o r m is w o r t h y of r e c o g n i t i o n a n d t h e r e b y itself c o n t r i b u t e s t o t h e fulfi.il| m e n t of its c o n d i t i o n s of validity. W h e r e a s r a t i o n a l acceptability m e r e l y points to t h e t r u t h of assertoric p r o p o s i t i o n s , it m a k e s a con­ structive c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e validity of m o r a l n o r m s . T h e m o m e n t s of c o n s t r u c t i o n a n d discovery a r e i n t e r w o v e n i n m o r a l i n s i g h t dif­ ferently t h a n t h e y a r e i n t h e o r e t i c a l k n o w l e d g e .

N

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9

W h a t is n o t a t o u r disposal h e r e is t h e m o r a l j j o i n t of view t h a t i m p o s e s itself u p o n u s , n o t a n objective m o r a l o r d e r a s s u m e d t o exist i n d e p e n d e n t l y of o u r d e s c r i p t i o n s . It is n o t t h e social w o r l d as s u c h t h a t is n o t a t o u r disposal b u t t h e s t r u c t u r e a n d p r o c e d u r e of a [ p r o c e s s of a r g u m e n t a t i o n t h a t facilitates b o t h t h e p r o d u c t i o n a n d t h e discovery o i t n e n o r m s of w e l l - o r d e r e d i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s . c

A Genealogical Analysis of the Cognitive Content of Morality

T h e constructivist m e a n i n g of m o r a l j u d g m e n t s , u n d e r s t o o d o n t h e m o d e l of self-legislation, m u s t n o t b e f o r g o t t e n ; b u t it m u s t n o t o b l i t e r a t e t h e e p i s t e m i c m e a n i n g of m o r a l justifications e i t h e r . 59

IX Discourse ethics d e f e n d s a m o r a l i t y of e q u a l r e s p e c t a n d solidaristic responsibility for everybody. B u t it d o e s t h i s j n T T h e l T r s ^ t h r o u g h a r a t i o n a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e c o n t e n t s of a m o r a l tradi­ t i o n w h o s e religious f o u n d a t i o n s have b e e n u n d e r m i n e d . If t h e d i s c o u r s e - t h e o r e t i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e categorical i m p e r a t i v e re­ m a i n e d b o u n d to t h e t r a d i t i o n in w h i c h it o r i g i n a t e s , this g e n e a l o g y w o u l d r e p r e s e n t a n obstacle to t h e g o a l of d e m o n s t r a t i n g t h e cogni­ tive c o n t e n t of m o r a l j u d g m e n t s as such. T h u s it r e m a i n s to p r o v i d e a t h e o r e t i c a l justification of t h e m o r a l p o i n t of view itself. T h e d i s c o u r s e p r i n c i p l e p r o v i d e s a n answer to t h e p r e d i c a m e n t in w h i c h t h e m e m b e r s of any m o r a l c o m m u n i t y find themselves w h e n , in m a k i n g t h e t r a n s i t i o n to a m o d e r n , pluralistic society, t h e y find themselves faced w i t h ] t h e d i l e m m a ! t h a t t h o u g h they still a r g u e with r e a s o n s a b o u t m o r a l j u d g m e n t s a n d beliefs, t h e i r substantive back­ g r o u n d c o n s e n s u s o n t h e u n d e r l y i n g m o r a l n o r m s h a s b e e n shat­ t e r e d . T h e y find t h e m s e l v e s e m b r o i l e d in g l o b a l a n d d o m e s t i c practical conflicts in n e e d of r e g u l a t i o n t h a t t h e y c o n t i n u e to r e g a r d as m o r a l , a n d h e n c e as rationally resolvable, conflicts; b u t t h e i r s h a r e d e t h o s has"^Jsnrtegra^H] T h e following s c e n a r i o d o e s n o t d e p i c t a n " o r i g i n a l - p o s i t i o n " b u t fSTMeal-typical developmHit]that c o u l d have t a k e n p l a c e u n d e r r e a l c o n d i t i o n s . I p r o c e e d o n t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s d o n o t wish to resolve t h e i r conflicts t h r o u g h v i o l e n c e , o r even c o m p r o m i s e , b u t ^JJ^ t h e i r initial i m p u l s e is to e n g a g e in d e l i b e r a t i o n a n d w o r k o u t a s h a r e d ethical s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g o n a secular basis. B u t given t h e differentiated f o r m s of life characteristic of pluralistic societies, s u c h a n effort is d o o m e d to failure. T h e p a r t i c i p a n t s will s o o n realize jhatJhxLXritical a p p r o p r i a t i o n of t h e i r ^ s t r o n g evaluations leads to c o m p e t i n g c o n c e p t i o n s of j J i e g o o d . Let us assume th^t t f i e ^ r e m a i n resolved to e n g a g e in d e l i b e r a t i o n a n d n o t to fall b a c k o n a m e r e m o d u s vivendi as a substitute for t h e t h r e a t e n e d m o r a l way of life.

40 Chapter 1

I n t h e a b s e n c e of a substantive a g r e e m e n t o n p a r t i c u l a r n o r m s , t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s m u s t n o w rely o n j t h e ^ y n e u t r a r fact] t h a t e a c h of t h e m p a r t i c i p a t e s i n some c o m m u n i c a t i v e f o r m of life^which is s t r u c t u r e d by linguistically m e d i a t e d u n d e r s t a n d i n g . Since c o m m u n i c a t i v e p r o c e s s e s a n d f o r m s of life have c e r t a i n ^ r u c t u r a l f e a t u r e ^ i n c o m m o n , t h e y c o u l d ask t h e m s e l v e s w h e t h e r t h e s e fea­ t u r e s h a r b o r n o r m a t i v e c o n t e n t s t h a t c o u l d p r o v i d e a basis for s h a r e d o r i e n t a t i o n s . T a k i n g this as a clue, t h e o r i e s i n t h e t r a d i t i o n of H e g e l , H u m b o l d t , a n d G. H . M e a d h a v e s h o w n t h a t c o m m u n i c a tive a c t i o n s involve s h a r e d p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s a n d t h a t c o m m u n i c a t i v e f o r m s of life a r e i n t e r w o v e n with r e l a t i o n s of r e c i p r o c a l r e c o g n i t i o n , /r

?

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a n d t o this e x t e n t , b o t h h a v e a n o r m a t i v e c o n t e n t ^ T h e s e analyses d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t m o r a l i t y derives a g e n u i n e m e a n i n g , i n d e p e n d e n t of t h e various c o n c e p t i o n s of t h e j g o o d , f r o m t h e f o r m a n d p e r s p e c tival s t r u c t u r e o f ( { r ^ ^ socializatjog) T o b e s u r e , s t r u c t u r a l f e a t u r e s of c o m m u n i c a t i v e f o r m s of life a l o n e a r e n o t sufficient t o justify t h e claim t h a t m e m b e r s of a p a r ­ ticular historical c o m m u n i t y ought to t r a n s c e n d t h e i r particularistic v a l u e - o r i e n t a t i o n s a n d m a k e t h e t r a n s i t i o n t o t h e fully s y m m e t r i c a l i a n d inclusive r e l a t i o n s of a n e g a l i t a r i a n universalism. O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , a universalistic c o n c e p t i o n t h a t w a n t s t o avoid^fklse abstract i o n s y m u s t d r a w o n insights from t h e t h e o r y of c o m m u n i c a t i o n . F r o m t h e fact t l ^ j r j e r s o n s c a n only b e i n d i v i d u a t e d t h r o u g h j s o t i a l i z a t i o n it follows t h a t m o r a l c o n c e r n is o w e d equally to p e r s o n s b o t h l^ttTrrrgplacea as m e m b e r s of t h e c o m m u n i t y , a n d 61

62

h e n c e it ( c c ^ ^ treatment means e q u a l t r e a t m e n t ofnonelquS^ w h o a r e n o n e t h e l e s s aware of t h e i r i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e . M o r a l universalism m u s t n o t take i n t o a c c o u n t t h e a s p e c t of e q u a l i t y — t h e fact t h a t p e r s o n s as s u c h a r e e q u a l t o all o t h e r p e r s o n s — a t the expense of t h e a s p e c t of i n d i v i d u a l i t y — t h e fact t h a t as individuals t h e y a r e a t t h e s a m e t i m e absolutely differ­ e n t f r o m all o t h e r s . T h e e q u a l r e s p e c t for e v e r y o n e else d e m a n d e d by a m o r a l universalism sensitive t o difference t h u s takes t h e f o r m of a nonleveling a n d nonappropriating i n c l u s i o n of t h e ^ o t h e r in his^ sotherness. 6 3

B u t how c a n the t r a n s i t i o n t o a p o s t t r a d i t i o n a l m o r a l i t y as s u c h b e justified? T r a d i t i o n a l l y e s t a b l i s h e d o b l i g a t i o n s r o o t e d i n c o m m u n i c a -

41 A Genealogical Analysis of the Cognitive Content of Morality

tive a c t i o n d o n o t of themselves r e a c h b e y o n d t h e limits of t h e family, t h e t r i b e , t h e city, o r t h e n a t i o n . However, t h e reflexive f o r m of c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n b e h a v e s differently: a r g u m e n t a t i o n of its very n a t u r e p o i n t s b e y o n d all p a r t i c u l a r f o r m s of life. F o r i n t h e p r a g ­ m a t i c p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of r a t i o n a l d i s c o u r s e o r d e l i b e r a t i o n t h e n o r ­ mative c o n t e n t of t h e implicit a s s u m p t i o n s of c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n is generalized, abstracted, and freed from all limits—the p r a c t i c e of delib­ e r a t i o n is e x t e n d e d t o a n inclusive c o m m u n i t y t h a t d o e s n o t ^ n p r i n c i p l ^ e ^ c l u d e a n y subject c a p a b l e of s p e e c h a n d a c t i o n w h o c a n ^ m a k e ^ r e l ^ ^ n t ) c o n t r i b u t i o n s . T h i s i d e a p o i n t s t o a way o u t of t h e m o d e r n d i l e m m a , since t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s have lost t h e i r m e t a p h y s i c a l g u a r a n t e e s a n d m u s t so t o s p e a k derive t h e i r { ^ o r m a t i v e o r i e n t a t i o n s ^ ' f r o m themselves a l o n e . As we have s e e n , t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s c a n only d r a w o n t h o s e features ofj^QprrrrrK^^ t h e y a l r e a d y currently 6 4

s h a r e . Given t h e failure t o identifyja^ shaded g o o d , s u c h features s h r i n k to t h e ^ u n d ^ o f f o r m a l features of t h e p e r f q r m a t i v e l y s h a r e d situation of d e l i b e r a t i o n . T h e b o t t o m line is t h a t t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s have all ( k l r e a d ^ e n t e r e d i n t o t h e c o o p e r a t i v e e n t e r p r i s e of r a t i o n a l discourse. ~—— A l t h o u g h it is a r a t h e r m e a g e r basis for justification, t h e n e u t r a l c o n t e n t of this c o m m o n store m a y p r o v i d e a n o p p o r t u n i t y , given t h e p r e d i c a m e n t p o s e d by t h e p l u r a l i s m of worldviews. A p r o s p e c t of ' f i n d i n g a n e q u i v a l e n t for t h e t r a d i t i o n ^ , s u t o a n o r m a t i v e c o n s e n s u s w o u l d exist if the form of communication in w h i c h j o i n t practical d e l i b e r a t i o n takes p l a c e w e r e s u c h t h a t it m a k e s pos­ sible a j u s t i f i c a t i o n of m o r a l n o r m s c o n v i n c i n g t o all p a r t i c i p a n t s b e c a u s e of its impartiality. T h e missing ( " t r a n s c e n d e n t good") c a n b e r e p l a c e d i n a n " i m m a n e n t " fashion only by a p p e a l t o t h e intrinsic constiftitionjqf t h e practice of deliberation. F r o m h e r e , I suggest, |dirje^ stepsj l e a d t o a t h e o r e t i c a l justification of t h e m o r a l p o i n t of view. (a) If t h e p r a c t i c e of d e l i b e r a t i o n itself is r e g a r d e d as t h e only possible r e s o u r c e for a s t a n d p o i n t of i m p a r t i a l justification of m o r a l q u e s t i o n s , t h e n t h e a p p e a l to m o r a l c o n t e n t m u s t b e r e p l a c e d by t h e self-referential a p p e a l t o t h e f o r m of this p r a c t i c e . T h i s is precisely w h a t is c a p t u r e d by (D) O n l y t h o s e n o r m s c a n claim validity t h a t c o u l d m e e t with t h e a c c e p t a n c e of all c o n c e r n e d i n practical discourse.

42 Chapter 1

H e r e t h e " a c c e p t a n c e " (Zustimmung) a c h i e v e d u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s of r a t i o n a l d i s c o u r s e signifies a n a g r e e m e n t (Einverstandnis) motivated b y _ e p i s t e m i c r e a s o n s ; it s h o u l d n o t b e u n d e r s t o o d as a c o n t r a c t (Vereinbarung) t h a t is rationally m o t i v a t e d f r o m t h e e g o c e n t r i c p e r ­ spective of e a c h p a r t i c i p a n t . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e p r i n c i p l e of d i s c o u r s e leaves o p e n t h e type of a r g u m e n t a t i o n , a n d h e n c e t h e r o u t e , by w h i c h a discursive a g r e e m e n t c a n b e r e a c h e d . (D) d o e s n o t by itself state t h a t a justification of m o r a l n o r m s is possible w i t h o u t r e c o u r s e to a substantive b a c k g r o u n d c o n s e n s u s . (b) T h e h y p o t h e t i c a l l y i n t r o d u c e d p r i n c i p l e (D) specifies t h e c o n ­ d i t i o n t h a t valid n o r m s w o u l d fulfill if t h e y could b e justified. F o r t h e m o m e n t we a r e only a s s u m i n g t h a t t h e c o n c e p t of a m o r a l n o r m is clear. T h e p a r t i c i p a n t s also h a v e a n intuitive u n d e r s t a n d i n g of h o w o n e e n g a g e s in a r g u m e n t a t i o n . T h o u g h they a r e a s s u m e d only to b e familiar with t h e justification of descriptive s e n t e n c e s a n d n o t yet to k n o w w h e t h e r m o r a l validity claims c a n b e j u d g e d in a similar way, t h e y c a n f o r m a c o n c e p t i o n ( w i t h o u t p r e j u d g i n g t h e issue) of w h a t it would m e a n to justify a n o r m . B u t w h a t is still n e e d e d for t h e o p e r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of (D) is a r u l e of a r g u m e n t a t i o n specifying h o w m o r a l n o r m s c a n b e justified.

v

T h e p r i n c i p l e of universalization (U) is i n d e e d i n s p i r e d by ( D ) , b u t initially it is n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n a p r o p o s a l a r r i v e d at abductively. (U) A n o r m is valid w h e n t h e f o r e s e e a b l e c o n s e q u e n c e s a n d side effects of its g e n e r a l o b s e r v a n c e for t h e i n t e r e s t s a n d value-orienta­ tions of each individual c o u l d b e jointly a c c e p t e d by all c o n c e r n e d without coercion. T h r e e aspecj^pjf t l n ^ o r r n u l a t i o n a r e in n e e d of clarification. T h e p h r a s e ^ i n t e r e s t s a n d v a l u e - o r i e n t a t i o n s ^ / p o i n t s to t h e r o l e p l a y e d by t h e p r a g m a t i c a n d ethical r e a s o n s of t h e i n d i v i d u a l p a r t i c i p a n t s in practical d i s c o u r s e . T h e s e i n p u t s a r e d e s i g n e d to p r e v e n t t h e m a r g i n a l i z a t i o n of t h e s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d worldviews of p a r t i c u l a r individuals o r g r o u p s a n d , in g e n e r a l , to foster a h e r m e n e u t i c sensi­ tivity to a sufficiently b r o a d s p e c t r u m of c o n t r i b u t i o n s . S e c o n d , g e n ­ eralized r e c i p r o c a l perspective-taking ("of e a c h , " "jointly by all") r e q u i r e s n o t j u s t e m p a t h y for, b u t also i n t e r p r e t i v e i n t e r v e n t i o n i n t o , ^ t h e s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of p a r t i c i p a n t s w h o m u s t b e willing to revise

43 A Genealogical Analysis of the Cognitive Content of Morality /

t h e i r d e s c r i p t i o n s of t h e m s e l v e s a n d o t h e r s ( a n d t h e l a n g u a g e in w h i c h t h e y a r e f o r m u l a t e d ) . Finally, ftlie goal7of " u n c o e r c e d j o i n t a c c e p t a n c e " specifies t h e r e s p e c t in w h i c h t h e r e a s o n s p r e s e n t e d in dis^course cast off t h e i r agent-relative m e a n i n g a n d take o n a n e p i s t e m i c m e a n i n g f r o m t h e s t a n d p o i n t of s y m m e t r i c a l consideration. ^ (c) T h e p a r t i c i p a n t s t h e m s e l v e s will p e r h a p s b e satisfied with this (or a similar) r u l e of a r g u m e n t a t i o n as l o n g as it p r o v e s ( u s e M ) a n d d o e s n o t l e a d to c o u n t e r i n t u i t i v e results. It m u s t t u r n o u t t h a t a p r a c t i c e of justification c o n d u c t e d in this m a n n e r selects n o r m s t h a t a r e c a p a b l e of commanding...jiniyersal a g r e e m e n t — f o r e x a m p l e , nOTmsjexpr^ssing h u m a n rights. B u t f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of t h e m o r a l t h e o r i s t ) t h e r e still r e m a i n s o n e final justificatory step. We m a y a s s u m e t h a t t h e p r a c t i c e of d e l i b e r a t i o n a n d justification we call " a r g u m e n t a t i o n " is to b e f o u n d in all c u l t u r e s a n d societies (if n o t in i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d f o r m , t h e n at least as a n i n f o r m a l p r a c y tice) a n d t h a t t h e r e is n o fimctionally e q u i v a l e n t a l t e r n a t i v e t o this mode of^roblem solying^^ universality a n d n o n s u b s i t i tutibility of t h e p r a c t i c e of a r g u m e n t a t i o n , it w o u l d b e difficult tq^ dispute the neutrality o f ' t h e , discourse principle (D). But ethno­ c e n t r i c a s s u m p t i o n s , a n d h e n c e a specific c o n c e p t i o n of t h e g o o d t h a t is n o t s h a r e d by o t h e r c u l t u r e s , m a y h a v e i n s i n u a t e d t h e m ­ selves i n t o ( t h e a b d u c t i o n of (U}). T h e suspicion t h a t t h e u n d e r ­ s t a n d i n g of m o r a l i t y o p e r a t i o n a l i z e d in (U) reflects e u r o c e n t r i c p r e j u d i c e s c o u l d b e d i s p e l l e d t h r o u g h a n " i m m a n e n t " d e f e n s e of this a c c o u n t of the- m o r a l p o i n t of view, t h a t is, by a p p e a l i n g to k n o w l e d g e of w h a t it m e a n s t o e n g a g e in t h e p r a c t i c e of a r g u m e n ­ t a t i o n as s u c h . T h u s t h e discourse-eJ:hical m o d e l of j u s t i f i c a t i o n c o n ­ sists in t h e d e r i v a t i o n of t h e basic p r i n c i p l e (U) f r o m t h e implicit c o n t e n t of universal p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of a r g u m e n t a t i o n in c o n j u n c ­ tion with t h e c o n c e p t i o n of n o r m a t i v e justification i n g e n e r a l ex­ p r e s s e d in ( D ) . 6 5

T h i s is easy t o u n d e r s t a n d in a n intuitive way ( t h o u g h a n y a t t e m p t to p r o v i d e a ( f o r m ^ ) j u s t i f i c a t i o n w o u l d r e q u i r e involved discussions of t h e m e a n i n g a n d feasibility of " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a r g u m e n t s " ) . H e r e I will limit myself to t h e o b s e r v a t i o n t h a t we e n g a g e in argu­ m e n t a t i o n with t h e i n t e n t i o n of c o n v i n c i n g o n e a n o t h e r of t h e

6 6

44 Chapter 1

validity claims t h a t p r o p o n e n t s raise for t h e i r s t a t e m e n t s a n d a r e r e a d y to d e f e n d a g a i n s t o p p o n e n t s . T h e p r a c t i c £ ^ f ^ r g u m e n t a t i o n sets i n m o t i o n ^ a cooperative c o m p e t i t i o n for t h e b e t t e r a r g u m e n t , w h e r e t h e ^ r i e n t a t i o n to t h e g o a l of a c o m m u n i c a t r v d y T e a c r i e g agreement unites the participants from the outset^The assumption t r r a t l h e c o m p e t i t i o n c a n l e a d to "rationally a c c e p t a b l e , " h e n c e "con­ v i n c i n g , " results is b a s e d o n t h e r a t i o n a l j f o r c e of a r g u m e n t s . O f c o u r s e , w h a t c o u n t s as a g o o d o r a b a d a r g u m e n t c a n itself b e c o m e a t o p i c for discussion. T h u s t h e r a t i o n a l acceptability of a s t a t e m e n t u l t i m a t e l y rests o n r e a s o n s i n c o n j u n c t i o n j w i t h specific f e a t u r e s j r f t h e p r o c e s s of a r g u m e n t a t i o n itself. T h e ^ f o u r m o s M m r j o r t a n t y fea­ t u r e s a r e : (i) t h a t n o b o d y w h o c o u l d m a k e a r e l e v a n t c o n t r i b u t i o n m a y b e e x c l u d e d ; (ii) t h a t all p a r t i c i p a n t s a r e g r a n t e d a n e q u a l o p p o r t u n i t y to m a k e c o n t r i b u t i o n s ; (iii) t h a t t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s m u s t > m e a n w h a t t h e y say; a n d (iv) t h a t c o m m u n i c a t i o n m u s t b e f r e e d f r o m e x t e r n a l a n d i n t e r n a l c o e r c i o n so t h a t t h e "yes" o r " n o " stances t h a t p a r t i c i p a n t s a d o p t o n criticizable validity claims a r e m o t i v a t e d solely by t h e r a t i o n a l force of t h e b e t t e r r e a s o n s . If e v e r y o n e w h o e n g a g e s in a r g u m e n t a t i o n m u s t m a k e at least t h e s e p r a g m a t i c p r e ­ s u p p o s i t i o n s , t h e n in v i r t u e of (i) t h e p u b l i c c h a r a c t e r of practical discourses a n d t h e i n c l u s i o n of all c o n c e r n e d a n d (ii) t h e e q u a l c o m m u n i c a t i v e r i g h t s of all p a r t i c i p a n t s , only r e a s o n s t h a t give e q u a l w e i g h t to t h e i n t e r e s t s a n d evaluative o r i e n t a t i o n s of e v e r y b o d y c a n i n f l u e n c e t h e o u t c o m e of p r a c t i c a l discourses; a n d b e c a u s e of t h e a b s e n c e of (iii) d e c e p t i o n a n d (iv) c o e r c i o n , n o t h i n g b u t rea­ s o n s c a n tip t h e b a l a n c e in favor of t h e a c c e p t a n c e of a c o n t r o v e r ­ sial n o r m . Finally, o n t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t p a r t i c i p a n t s r e c i p r o ­ cally i m p u t e a n o r i e n t a t i o n to c o m m u n i c a t i v e a g r e e m e n t to o n e a n o t h e r , this " u n c o e r c e d " a c j c e p t a n c e j c a n _ o n l y o c c u r "jointly" o r collectively^ A g a i n s t t h e f r e q u e n t l y r a i s e d o b j e c t i o n t h a t this justification is c i r c u l a r 1 w o u l d n o t e t h a t t h e c o n t e n t of t h e universal p r e s u p p o s i ­ t i o n ^ o f j a r g u m e n t a t i o n is b y ^ n o ^ m e a n s " n o r m a t i v e " i n t h e m o r a l sense. F o r inclusivity only signifies t h a t access to d i s c o u r s e is u n r e ­ stricted; it d o e s n o t i m p l y t h e universality of b i n d i n g n o r m s of ac­ t i o n . T h e e q u a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of c o m m u n i c a t i v e f r e e d o m s a n d t h e r e q u i r e m e n t of t r u t h f u l n e s s in d i s c o u r s e h a v e t h e status of argumen6 7

45 A Genealogical Analysis of the Cognitive Content of Morality

tative duties a n d rights, n o t of moral d u t i e s a n d rights. So t o o , t h e a b s e n c e of c o e r c i o n refers toJ±iej3rocesj^^ f o l n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s outside of this p r a c t i c e . T h e s e constitutive r u l e s of t h e l a n g u a g e g a m e of a r g u m e n t a t i o n g o v e r n t h e e x c h a n g e of a r g u m e n t s a n d of "yes" o r " n o " r e s p o n s e s ; t h e y have t h e e p i s t e m i c forcejpf^nabling condrdons^for the j u s t i f i c a t i o n ^ o f ^ t ^ m e n t s b u t d o n o t h a v e a n y immediate practTcaT^ifects in m o t i v a t i n g a c t i o n s a n d i n t e r a c t i o n s o u t s i d e of d i s c o u r s e . T h e p o i n t of s u c h a justification of t h e m o r a l p o i n t of view is t h a t t h e n o r m a t i v e c o n t e n t of t h i s ^ p i ^ t e j n k ^ j a n g u a g e gamejl is transmit­ t e d o n l y by a r u l e of a r g u m e n t a t i o n t o t h e selection of n o r m s of action, w h i c h t o g e t h e r with t h e i r m o r a l validity claim p r o v i d e t h e i n p u t i n t o practical discourses. A m o r a l o b l i g a t i o n c a n n o t follow f r o m t h e so t o s p e a k t r a n s c e n d e n t a l c o n s t r a i n t of u n a v o i d a b l e pre­ s u p p o s i t i o n s of a r g u m e n t a t i o n a l o n e ; r a t h e r it a t t a c h e s to t h e spe­ cific objects of practical d i s c o u r s e , namely, t o t h e n o r m s introduced i n t o d i s c o u r s e t o w h i c h t h e r e a s o n s m o b i l i z e d in d e l i b e r a t i o n refer. I e m p h a s i z e this w h e n I specify t h a t (U) c a n b e r e n d e r e d plausible in connection with a (weak, h e n c e n o n p r e j u d i c i a l ) concept of normative justification. T h i s justification strategy, w h i c h I have h e r e m e r e l y s k e t c h e d , m u s t b e s u p p l e m e n t e d with g e n e a l o g i c a l a r g u m e n t s j d r a w i r u ^ r i ^ ^ ^ of m o d e r n i z a t i r ^ ^ b e r e n d e r e d p l a u s i b l e . With (U) we(feassure o u r s e l v e ^ irrja reflexive m a n n e r ) o f a r e s i d u a l n o r m a tive s u b s t a n c e w h i c h is p r e s e r v e d in p o s t t r a d i t i o n a l societies by t h e f o r m a l f e a t u r e s of a r g u m e n t a t i o n a n d a c t i o n o r i e n t e d to r e a c h i n g a s h a r e d u n d e r s t a n d i n g . T h i s isf^so) s h o w n by t h e p r o c e d u r e of estab­ lishing universal p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of a r g u m e n t a t i o n by d e m o n s t r a t ­ i n g p e r f o r m a t i v e self-contradictions, w h i c h I c a n n o t g o i n t o h e r e . T h e q u e s t i o n of t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of n o r m s arises as a n a d d i t i o n a l p r o b l e m . T h e p r i n c i p l e of a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s ] d e v e l o p e d by Klaus Gunt h e r first b r i n g s t h e j r n o r a l p o i n t j o f view to b e a r o n s i n g u l a r m o r a l j u d g m e n t s in a complete m a n n e r . T h e o u t c o m e of successful dis­ courses of justification a n d a p p l i c a t i o n sjigws t h a t practical questions a r e d i f f e r e n t i a t e d by t h e sharply d e f i n e d m o r a l p o i n t of view; m o r a ] q u e s t i o n s of w e l l - o r d e r e d i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s a r e s e p a r a t e d from p r a g m a t i c q u e s t i o n s of r a t i o n a l c h o i c e , o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d frorrj 68

6 9

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46 Chapter 1

e t h i c a l q u e s t i o n s of t h e g o o d o r n o t m i s s p e n t life o n t h e o t h e r . It h a s b e c o m e clear t o m e in r e t r o s p e c t t h a t (U) only o p e r a t i o n a l i z e d a m o r e c o m p r e h e n s i v e p r i n c i p l e of d i s c o u r s e with r e f e r e n c e to a p a r t i c u l a r subject m a t t e r , namely, m o r a l i t y . T h e p r i n c i p l e ^ of d i s c o u r s e c a n also b e o p e r a t i o n a l i z e d for o t h e r k i n d s of q u e s t i o n s , for e x a m p l e , for t h e d e l i b e r a t i o n s of political legislators o r for legal discourses. 71

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II Political Liberalism: A Debate with John Rawls

2

Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason

1

J o h n Rawls's A Theory ofJustice m a r k s a pivotal t u r n i n g p o i n t in t h e m o s t r e c e n t h i s t o r y of p r a c t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y , for h e r e s t o r e d l o n g s u p p r e s s e d m o r a l q u e s t i o n s to t h e status of serious objects of p h i l o ­ s o p h i c a l investigation. I m m a n u e l K a n t p o s e d t h e f u n d a m e n t a l q u e s ­ t i o n of m o r a l i t y in s u c h a way t h a t it a d m i t t e d a r a t i o n a l answer: we o u g h t to d o w h a t is equally g o o d for all p e r s o n s . W i t h o u t e s p o u s i n g t h e b a c k g r o u n d a s s u m p t i o n s of K a n t ' s t r a n s c e n d e n t a l p h i l o s o p h y , Rawls r e n e w e d this t h e o r e t i c a l a p p r o a c h with p a r t i c u l a r r e f e r e n c e to t h e issue of t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n of a j u s t society. I n o p p o s i t i o n to utili­ t a r i a n i s m a n d value skepticism h e p r o p o s e d a n intersubjectivist ver­ sion of K a n t ' s p r i n c i p l e of a u t o n o m y : we act a u t o n o m o u s l y w h e n we o b e y t h o s e laws t h a t c o u l d b e a c c e p t e d , b y all c o n c e r n e d o n t h e basis of a p u b l i c u s e of .their r e a s o n . M o r e recently, in Political Liberalism, in w h i c h Rawls h a s c o n c l u d e d a twenty-year p r o c e s s of e x t e n s i o n a n d revision of his t h e o r y of j u s t i c e , h e exploits this m o r a l c o n c e p t of a u t o n o m y as t h e key to e x p l a i n i n g t h e political a u t o n o m y of citizens of a d e m o c r a t i c society: " O u r exercise of political p o w e r is fully p r o p e r only w h e n it is e x e r c i s e d in a c c o r d a n c e with a c o n s t i t u t i o n , t h e essentials of w h i c h all citizens as free a n d e q u a l m a y b e r e a s o n ­ ably e x p e c t e d to e n d o r s e in t h e light of p r i n c i p l e s a n d ideals accept­ able to t h e i r c o m m o n h u m a n r e a s o n . " J u s t as previously h e t o o k a s t a n d a g a i n s t utilitarian p o s i t i o n s , h e n o w r e s p o n d s p r i m a r i l y to c o n t e x t u a l i s t p o s i t i o n s t h a t q u e s t i o n t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of a r e a s o n c o m m o n t o all h u m a n b e i n g s . 2

50 Chapter 2

B e c a u s e I a d m i r e this project, s h a r e its i n t e n t i o n s , a n d r e g a r d its essential results as c o r r e c t , t h e d i s s e n t I e x p r e s s h e r e will r e m a i n w i t h i n t h e b o u n d s of a family q u a r r e l . My d o u b t s a r e l i m i t e d t o w h e t h e r Rawls always b r i n g s to b e a r a g a i n s t his critics his i m p o r t a n t n o r m a t i v e i n t u i t i o n s in t h e i r m o s t c o m p e l l i n g f o r m . B u t first, let m e briefly o u t l i n e his p r o j e c t in its c u r r e n t state. Rawls offers a justification of t h e p r i n c i p l e s o n w h i c h a m o d e r n society m u s t b e c o n s t i t u t e d if it is to e n s u r e t h e fair c o o p e r a t i o n of its citizens as free a n d e q u a l p e r s o n s . H i s first step is to clarify t h e s t a n d p o i n t f r o m w h i c h fictional r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h e p e o p l e c o u l d answer this q u e s t i o n impartially. Rawls e x p l a i n s why t h e p a r t i e s in t h e so-called o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n w o u l d a g r e e o n two p r i n c i p l e s : first, o n t h e liberal p r i n c i p l e a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h e v e r y o n e is e n t i t l e d to a n e q u a l system of basic liberties, a n d , s e c o n d , o n a s u b o r d i n a t e p r i n c i p l e t h a t establishes e q u a l access t o p u b l i c offices a n d stipulates t h a t social i n e q u a l i t i e s a r e a c c e p t a b l e only w h e n t h e y a r e also to t h e a d v a n t a g e of t h e least privileged. I n a s e c o n d step, Rawls shows t h a t this c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e c a n e x p e c t t o m e e t with a g r e e m e n t u n d e r t h e c o n d i t i o n s of a pluralistic society w h i c h it itself p r o m o t e s . Politi­ cal liberalism, as a r e a s o n a b l e c o n s t r u c t i o n t h a t d o e s n o t raise a claim to t r u t h , is n e u t r a l t o w a r d conflicting worldviews* I n a t h i r d a n d final step, Rawls o u t l i n e s t h e basic r i g h t s a n d p r i n c i p l e s of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state t h a t c a n b e d e r i v e d f r o m t h e two p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e . T a k i n g t h e s e steps in s e q u e n c e , I will raise o b j e c t i o n s di­ r e c t e d n o t so m u c h against t h e p r o j e c t as s u c h b u t against c e r t a i n aspects of its e x e c u t i o n . I fear t h a t Rawls m a k e s c o n c e s s i o n s to o p p o s e d p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o s i t i o n s t h a t i m p a i r t h e c o g e n c y of his o w n project. My c r i t i q u e is a c o n s t r u c t i v e a n d i m m a n e n t o n e . First, I d o u b t w h e t h e r every a s p e c t of t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n is d e s i g n e d to clarify a n d s e c u r e t h e s t a n d p o i n t of i m p a r t i a l j u d g m e n t of d e o n t o l o g i c a l p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e ( I ) . F u r t h e r , I t h i n k t h a t Rawls s h o u l d m a k e a s h a r p e r d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n q u e s t i o n s of justification a n d q u e s t i o n s of a c c e p t a n c e ; h e s e e m s to w a n t to p u r c h a s e t h e n e u t r a l i t y of his c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e at t h e cost of forsaking its cognitive validity claim (II). T h e s e two t h e o r e t i c a l d e c i s i o n s r e s u l t in a c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state t h a t a c c o r d s liberal basic r i g h t s p r i m a c y

51 Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason

over t h e d e m o c r a t i c p r i n c i p l e of l e g i t i m a t i o n . Rawls t h e r e b y fails to achieve his g o a l of b r i n g i n g t h e liberties of t h e m o d e r n s i n t o h a r ­ m o n y with t h e liberties of t h e a n c i e n t s (III). I c o n c l u d e m y r e m a r k s with a thesis o n t h e s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of political p h i l o s o p h y : u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s of p o s t m e t a p h y s i c a l t h o u g h t , this s h o u l d b e m o d e s t , b u t n o t in t h e w r o n g way. T h e adversarial r o l e assigned m e by t h e e d i t o r s of t h e Journal of Philosophy c o m p e l s m e to h e i g h t e n tentative r e s e r v a t i o n s i n t o objec­ tions. T h i s intensification is justified by m y i n t e n t i o n , at o n c e friendly a n d provocative, of s e t t i n g t h e n o t easily surveyable argu­ m e n t s of a h i g h l y c o m p l e x a n d well t h o u g h t - o u t t h e o r y in m o t i o n in s u c h a way t h a t t h e latter c a n reveal its s t r e n g t h s . 3

I

T h e D e s i g n o f the Original Position

Rawls conceives of t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n as a situation in w h i c h rationally c h o o s i n g r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h e citizens a r e subject to t h e specific c o n s t r a i n t s t h a t g u a r a n t e e a n i m p a r t i a l j u d g m e n t of practi­ cal q u e s t i o n s . T h e c o n c e p t of full a u t o n o m y is r e s e r v e d for t h e citizens w h o a l r e a d y live u n d e r t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s of a w e l l - o r d e r e d society. F o r t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n , Rawls splits this c o n c e p t of political a u t o n o m y i n t o two e l e m e n t s : t h e m o r a l l y n e u t r a l characteristics of p a r t i e s w h o seek t h e i r r a t i o n a l a d v a n t a g e , o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d t h e m o r a l l y substantive s i t u a t i o n a l c o n s t r a i n t s u n d e r w h i c h t h o s e p a r t i e s c h o o s e p r i n c i p l e s for a system of fair c o o p e r a ­ tion, o n t h e o t h e r , - T h e s e n o r m a t i v e c o n s t r a i n t s p e r m i t t h e p a r t i e s to b e e n d o w e d with a m i n i m u m of p r o p e r t i e s , in particular, " t h e capacity for a c o n c e p t i o n of t h e g o o d ( a n d t h u s t o b e r a t i o n a l ) . " R e g a r d l e s s of w h e t h e r t h e p a r t i e s e n t e r t a i n exclusively p u r p o s i v e r a t i o n a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o r also a d d r e s s e t h i c a l q u e s t i o n s of p a r t i c u l a r p l a n s of life, t h e y always r e a c h t h e i r d e c i s i o n s in light of t h e i r valueo r i e n t a t i o n s ( t h a t is, f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of t h e g r o u p s of citizens they r e p r e s e n t ) . T h e y n e e d n o t r e g a r d m a t t e r s f r o m t h e m o r a l p o i n t of view, w h i c h w o u l d r e q u i r e t h e m to take a c c o u n t of w h a t is in t h e e q u a l i n t e r e s t of all, for this impartiality is e x a c t e d by a situation t h a t t h r o w s a veil of i g n o r a n c e over t h e m u t u a l l y d i s i n t e r e s t e d t h o u g h free a n d e q u a l p a r t i e s . B e c a u s e t h e latter d o n o t k n o w w h i c h 4

52 Chapter 2

p o s i t i o n s t h e y will o c c u p y in t h e society t h a t it is t h e i r task to o r d e r , t h e y find themselves c o n s t r a i n e d a l r e a d y by t h e i r self-interest to reflect o n w h a t is equally g o o d for all. T h i s c o n s t r u c t i o n of a n o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n t h a t frames t h e f r e e d o m of c h o i c e of r a t i o n a l a c t o r s in a r e a s o n a b l e fashion is e x p l a i n e d by Rawls's initial i n t e n t i o n of r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e t h e o r y of j u s t i c e as p a r t of t h e g e n e r a l t h e o r y of c h o i c e . Rawls originally p r o c e e d e d o n t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e r a n g e of o p t i o n s o p e n to rationally c h o o s i n g p a r t i e s only n e e d e d to b e l i m i t e d in a n a p p r o p r i a t e fashion in o r d e r to facilitate t h e d e r i v a t i o n of p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e f r o m t h e i r enlight­ e n e d self-interest. B u t h e s o o n realized t h a t t h e r e a s o n of a u t o n o ­ m o u s citizens c a n n o t b e r e d u c e d to r a t i o n a l c h o i c e c o n d i t i o n e d by subjective p r e f e r e n c e s . Yet even after t h e revision of t h e initial g o a l t h a t t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n was d e s i g n e d to achieve, h e h a s h e l d to t h e view t h a t t h e m e a n i n g of t h e m o r a l p o i n t of view c a n b e o p e r a t i o n ­ alized in this way. T h i s h a s s o m e u n f o r t u n a t e c o n s e q u e n c e s , t h r e e of w h i c h I w o u l d like to a d d r e s s in w h a t follows: (1) C a n t h e p a r t i e s in t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n c o m p r e h e n d t h e h i g h e s t - o r d e r i n t e r e s t s of t h e i r clients solely o n t h e basis of r a t i o n a l egoism? (2) C a n basic r i g h t s b e assimilated to p r i m a r y g o o d s ? (3) D o e s t h e veil of i g n o r a n c e g u a r ­ a n t e e t h e impartiality of j u d g m e n t ? 5

6

(1) Rawls c a n n o t consistently follow t h r o u g h o n his d e c i s i o n t h a t "fully" a u t o n o m o u s citizens a r e to b e r e p r e s e n t e d by p a r t i e s w h o lack this a u t o n o m y . Citizens a r e a s s u m e d t o b e m o r a l p e r s o n s w h o possess a sense of j u s t i c e a n d t h e capacity for t h e i r own c o n c e p t i o n of t h e g o o d , as well as a n i n t e r e s t in cultivating t h e s e dispositions in a r a t i o n a l m a n n e r . B u t in t h e case of t h e p a r t i e s in t h e o r i g i n a l posi­ tion, t h e s e r e a s o n a b l e characteristics of m o r a l p e r s o n s a r e substi­ t u t e d by t h e c o n s t r a i n t s of a r a t i o n a l d e s i g n . At t h e s a m e t i m e , however, t h e p a r t i e s a r e s u p p o s e d to b e a b l e to u n d e r s t a n d a n d take a d e q u a t e a c c o u n t of t h e " h i g h e s t - o r d e r i n t e r e s t s " of t h e citizens t h a t follow f r o m t h e s e very characteristics. F o r e x a m p l e , they m u s t take a c c o u n t of t h e fact t h a t a u t o n o m o u s citizens r e s p e c t t h e i n t e r e s t s of o t h e r s o n t h e basis of j u s t p r i n c i p l e s a n d n o t m e r e l y f r o m self-inter­ est, t h a t t h e y c a n b e o b l i g a t e d to loyalty, t h a t they c a n b e c o n v i n c e d of t h e legitimacy of existing a r r a n g e m e n t s a n d policies t h r o u g h t h e p u b l i c u s e of t h e i r r e a s o n , a n d so f o r t h . T h u s , t h e p a r t i e s a r e sup-

53 Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason

p o s e d b o t h to u n d e r s t a n d a n d take seriously t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s a n d c o n s e q u e n c e s of a n a u t o n o m y t h a t t h e y a r e t h e m s e l v e s d e n i e d . T h i s m a y still b e p l a u s i b l e for t h e advocacy of self-related i n t e r e s t s a n d c o n c e p t i o n s of t h e g o o d t h a t a r e n o t k n o w n in detail. B u t c a n t h e m e a n i n g of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of j u s t i c e r e m a i n u n a f f e c t e d by t h e p e r ­ spective of r a t i o n a l egoists? At a n y r a t e , t h e p a r t i e s a r e i n c a p a b l e of achieving, w i t h i n t h e b o u n d s set by t h e i r r a t i o n a l e g o i s m , t h e r e c i p ­ r o c a l p e r s p e c t i v e t a k i n g t h a t t h e citizens they r e p r e s e n t m u s t u n d e r ­ take w h e n t h e y o r i e n t t h e m s e l v e s in a j u s t m a n n e r to w h a t is equally g o o d for all: "in t h e i r r a t i o n a l d e l i b e r a t i o n s t h e p a r t i e s . . . r e c o g n i z e n o s t a n d p o i n t e x t e r n a l to t h e i r o w n p o i n t of view as r a t i o n a l r e p r e ­ sentatives" (PL 7 5 ) . B u t if, d e s p i t e this, t h e p a r t i e s a r e to u n d e r s t a n d t h e m e a n i n g of t h e d e o n t o l o g i c a l p r i n c i p l e s t h e y a r e s e e k i n g a n d to take sufficient a c c o u n t of t h e i r clients' i n t e r e s t s i n j u s t i c e , they m u s t b e e q u i p p e d with cognitive c o m p e t e n c e s t h a t e x t e n d f u r t h e r t h a n t h e capacities sufficient for rationally c h o o s i n g a c t o r s w h o a r e b l i n d to issues of j u s t i c e . O f c o u r s e , it is o p e n t o Rawls to modify t h e d e s i g n of t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n accordingly. A l r e a d y in A Theory of Justice h e qualified t h e rationality of t h e c o n t r a c t i n g p a r t n e r s in various ways. O n t h e o n e h a n d , they take n o i n t e r e s t in o n e a n o t h e r , c o n d u c t i n g themselves like players w h o "strive for as h i g h a n a b s o l u t e score as p o s s i b l e " (TJ 144). O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e y a r e e q u i p p e d with a "purely f o r m a l " sense of j u s t i c e , for t h e y a r e s u p p o s e d to k n o w t h a t t h e y will c o n f o r m to w h a t e v e r p r i n c i p l e s a r e a g r e e d u p o r r i n t h e i r f u t u r e r o l e as citizens living in a w e l l - o r d e r e d society (TJ 1 4 5 ) . T h i s c a n b e u n d e r s t o o d to m e a n t h a t t h e p a r t i e s i n t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n a r e at least c o g n i z a n t of t h e k i n d of b i n d i n g m u t u a l i t y t h a t will c h a r a c t e r i z e t h e life of t h e i r clients in t h e f u t u r e , a l t h o u g h t h e y t h e m s e l v e s m u s t for t h e p r e s e n t c o n d u c t t h e i r n e g o t i a t i o n s u n d e r different p r e m i s e s . S u c h stipula­ tions a r e perfectly admissible. My only q u e s t i o n is w h e t h e r , in b e i n g e x t e n d e d in this d i r e c t i o n , t h e d e s i g n loses its p o i n t by b e c o m i n g t o o far r e m o v e d f r o m t h e o r i g i n a l m o d e l . F o r as s o o n as t h e p a r t i e s step o u t s i d e t h e b o u n d a r i e s of t h e i r r a t i o n a l e g o i s m a n d a s s u m e even a d i s t a n t likeness to m o r a l p e r s o n s , t h e division of l a b o r b e ­ t w e e n t h e rationality of c h o i c e of subjects a n d a p p r o p r i a t e objective c o n s t r a i n t s is d e s t r o y e d , a division t h r o u g h w h i c h self-interested

54 Chapter 2

a g e n t s a r e n o n e t h e l e s s s u p p o s e d to arrive at m o r a l l y s o u n d deci­ sions. T h i s c o n s e q u e n c e m a y n o t have a n y g r e a t significance for t h e rest of t h e project; b u t it draws a t t e n t i o n to t h e c o n c e p t u a l c o n ­ straints i m p o s e d by t h e o r i g i n a l ( t h o u g h in t h e m e a n t i m e a b a n ­ d o n e d ) i n t e n t i o n to p r o v i d e a d e c i s i o n - t h e o r e t i c a l s o l u t i o n to T h o m a s H o b b e s ' s p r o b l e m . F o r a n o t h e r c o n s e q u e n c e of t h e r a t i o n a l c h o i c e f o r m a t of t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n is t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of basic g o o d s , a n d this d e t e r m i n a t i o n is i m p o r t a n t for t h e f u r t h e r d e v e l o p ­ m e n t of t h e t h e o r y . (2) F o r rationally c h o o s i n g a c t o r s b o u n d to t h e first p e r s o n p e r ­ spective, n o r m a t i v e issues of w h a t e v e r k i n d c a n b e r e p r e s e n t e d solely in t e r m s of i n t e r e s t s o r values t h a t a r e satisfied by g o o d s . G o o d s a r e w h a t we strive f o r — i n d e e d , w h a t is g o o d for us. C o r r e s p o n d i n g l y , Rawls i n t r o d u c e s " p r i m a r y g o o d s " as g e n e r a l i z e d m e a n s t h a t p e o p l e m a y n e e d in o r d e r to realize t h e i r p l a n s of life. A l t h o u g h t h e p a r t i e s k n o w t h a t s o m e of t h e s e p r i m a r y g o o d s a s s u m e t h e f o r m of r i g h t s for citizens of a w e l l - o r d e r e d society, in t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n t h e y t h e m s e l v e s c a n only d e s c r i b e r i g h t s as o n e c a t e g o r y of " g o o d s " a m o n g o t h e r s . F o r t h e m , t h e issue of p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e c a n only arise in t h e guise of t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e j u s t d i s t r i b u t i o n of p r i m a r y g o o d s . Rawls t h e r e b y a d o p t s a c o n c e p t of j u s t i c e t h a t is p r p p e r t o a n ethics of t h e g o o d , o n e m o r e c o n s i s t e n t with Aristotelian o r utilitar­ i a n a p p r o a c h e s t h a n with a t h e o r y of rights, s u c h as his o w n , t h a t p r o c e e d s f r o m t h e c o n c e p t of a u t o n o m y . Precisely b e c a u s e Rawls a d h e r e s to a c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e o n w h i c h t h e a u t o n o m y of citizens is c o n s t i t u t e d t h r o u g h r i g h t s , t h e p a r a d i g m of d i s t r i b u t i o n g e n e r a t e s difficulties for h i m . Rights c a n b e "enjoyed" only by b e i n g exercised. T h e y c a n n o t b e assimilated to distributive g o o d s w i t h o u t forfeiting t h e i r d e o n t o l o g i c a l m e a n i n g . A n e q u a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of r i g h t s results only if t h o s e w h o enjoy r i g h t s r e c o g n i z e o n e a n o t h e r as free a n d e q u a l . O f c o u r s e , t h e r e exist r i g h t s to a fair s h a r e of g o o d s o r o p p o r ­ tunities, b u t r i g h t s i n t h e first i n s t a n c e r e g u l a t e r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n actors: they c a n n o t b e "possessed" like t h i n g s . If I a m c o r r e c t , t h e c o n c e p t u a l c o n s t r a i n t s of t h e m o d e l of r a t i o n a l c h o i c e p r e c l u d e Rawls f r o m c o n s t r u i n g basic liberties f r o m t h e o u t s e t as basic r i g h t s a n d c o m p e l h i m to i n t e r p r e t t h e m as p r i m a r y g o o d s . T h i s l e a d s h i m to assimilate t h e d e o n t o l o g i c a l m e a n i n g of o b l i g a t o r y n o r m s to t h e teleological m e a n i n g of p r e f e r r e d v a l u e s . Rawls t h e r e b y b l u r s cer7

8

55 Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason

tain d i s t i n c t i o n s t h a t I shall briefly m e n t i o n in o r d e r to show h o w this limits his o p t i o n s in t h e f u r t h e r d e v e l o p m e n t of his project. N o r m s i n f o r m d e c i s i o n s as to w h a t o n e o u g h t to d o , values i n f o r m d e c i s i o n s as t o w h a t c o n d u c t is m o s t d e s i r a b l e . R e c o g n i z e d n o r m s impose equal a n d exceptionless obligations o n their addressees, while values e x p r e s s t h e preferability of g o o d s t h a t a r e striven for by p a r t i c u l a r g r o u p s . W h e r e a s n o r m s a r e o b s e r v e d in t h e sense of a fulfillment of g e n e r a l i z e d b e h a v i o r a l e x p e c t a t i o n s , values o r g o o d s c a n b e r e a l i z e d o r a c q u i r e d only by p u r p o s i v e a c t i o n . F u r t h e r m o r e , n o r m s raise a b i n a r y validity claim in v i r t u e of w h i c h t h e y a r e said to b e e i t h e r valid o r invalid: to o u g h t s t a t e m e n t s , as to assertoric s t a t e m e n t s , we c a n r e s p o n d o n l y with "yes" o r " n o " — o r refrain f r o m j u d g m e n t . Values, by c o n t r a s t , fix r e l a t i o n s of p r e f e r e n c e w h i c h sig­ nify t h a t c e r t a i n g o o d s a r e m o r e attractive t h a n o t h e r s : h e n c e , we c a n a s s e n t t o evaluative s t a t e m e n t s t o a g r e a t e r o r lesser d e g r e e . T h e o b l i g a t o r y force of n o r m s h a s t h e a b s o l u t e m e a n i n g of a n u n c o n d i ­ t i o n a l a n d universal duty: w h a t o n e o u g h t t o d o is w h a t is equally g o o d for all ( t h a t is, for all a d d r e s s e e s ) . T h e attractiveness of values reflects a n e v a l u a t i o n a n d a transitive o r d e r i n g of g o o d s t h a t h a s b e c o m e e s t a b l i s h e d in p a r t i c u l a r c u l t u r e s o r h a s b e e n a d o p t e d by p a r t i c u l a r g r o u p s : i m p o r t a n t evaluative d e c i s i o n s o r h i g h e r - o r d e r p r e f e r e n c e s e x p r e s s w h a t is g o o d for u s ( o r for m e ) , all t h i n g s c o n s i d e r e d . Finally, different n o r m s m u s t n o t c o n t r a d i c t e a c h o t h e r w h e n t h e y claim validity for t h e s a m e d o m a i n of a d d r e s s e e s ; t h e y m u s t s t a n d i n c o h e r e n t r e l a t i o n s to o n e a n o t h e r — i n o t h e r w o r d s , t h e y m u s t c o n s t i t u t e a system. Different values, by c o n t r a s t , c o m p e t e for priority; insofar as t h e y m e e t with intersubjective r e c o g n i t i o n w i t h i n a c u l t u r e o r g r o u p , they c o n s t i t u t e shifting c o n f i g u r a t i o n s f r a u g h t with t e n s i o n . T o s u m u p , n o r m s differ f r o m values, first, in t h e i r r e l a t i o n t o r u l e - g o v e r n e d as o p p o s e d to p u r p o s i v e a c t i o n ; sec­ o n d , in a b i n a r y as o p p o s e d t o a g r a d u a l c o d i n g of t h e respective validity claims; t h i r d , in t h e i r a b s o l u t e as o p p o s e d to relative b i n d i n g n e s s ; a n d last, in t h e criteria t h a t systems of n o r m s as o p p o s e d to systems of values m u s t satisfy. N e v e r t h e l e s s , Rawls wishes to d o j u s t i c e to t h e d e o n t o l o g i c a l intui­ t i o n t h a t finds e x p r e s s i o n in t h e s e distinctions; h e n c e , h e m u s t c o m ­ p e n s a t e for t h e leveling of t h e d e o n t o l o g i c a l d i m e n s i o n w h i c h h e — a s a c o n s e q u e n c e of t h e d e s i g n of t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n —

56 Chapter 2

initially a c c e p t s with t h e c o n c e p t of p r i m a r y g o o d s . So h e a c c o r d s t h e first p r i n c i p l e priority over t h e s e c o n d . A n a b s o l u t e priority of e q u a l liberties over t h e p r i m a r y g o o d s r e g u l a t e d by t h e s e c o n d p r i n ­ ciple is, however, difficult t o justify f r o m t h e first p e r s o n perspective in w h i c h we o r i e n t ourselves t o o u r o w n interests o r values. H . L. A. H a r t h a s d e v e l o p e d this p o i n t clearly i n his c r i t i q u e of Rawls. I n t e r ­ estingly, Rawls c a n m e e t this criticism only by b u i l d i n g a subsequent qualification i n t o t h e p r i m a r y g o o d s w h i c h s e c u r e s t h e m a r e l a t i o n to basic liberties as basic rights: h e a c k n o w l e d g e s as p r i m a r y g o o d s only t h o s e t h a t a r e e x p e d i e n t for t h e life p l a n s a n d t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e m o r a l faculties of citizens asjree and equal persons. Further­ m o r e , Rawls differentiates t h e p r i m a r y g o o d s t h a t a r e constitutive of t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l f r a m e w o r k of t h e w e l l - o r d e r e d society i n t h e m o r a l sense f r o m t h e r e m a i n d e r of t h e p r i m a r y g o o d s by i n c o r p o r a t i n g t h e guararrteMg^ofjhe "fair v a l u e " of liberty i n t o t h e first p r i n c i p l e . 9

10

11

This a d d i t i o n a l determination^ ^ presupposes a deorrjtolbgka^ contra­ dicts t h e p r i m a facie classification of r i g h t s as g o o d s . Since t h e fair valulFor^quaT liberties r e q u i r e s t h e a c t u a l availability of e q u a l o p ­ p o r t u n i t i e s t o exercise t h e s e rights, only rights, n o t g o o d s , c a n b e qualified in this m a n n e r . O n l y i n t h e case of rights c a n w e d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n legal c o m p e t e n c e a n d t h e a c t u a l o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o c h o o s e a n d t o act. O n l y b e t w e e n rights, o n t h e o n e side, a n d a c t u a l c h a n c e s to exercise rights, o n t h e other, c a n t h e r e exist a c h a s m t h a t is p r o b l e m a t i c f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of j u s t i c e ; s u c h a r u p t u r e c a n n o t

I

exist b e t w e e n t h e possession a n d e n j o y m e n t of g o o d s . It w o u l d b e e i t h e r r e d u n d a n t o r m e a n i n g l e s s t o s p e a k of t h e "fair v a l u e " of equally d i s t r i b u t e d g o o d s . T h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n legal a n d factual equality h a s n o a p p l i c a t i o n t o " g o o d s " for g r a m m a t i c a l r e a s o n s , to p u t it i n W i t t g e n s t e i n i a n t e r m s . B u t if t h e n o t i o n of p r i m a r y g o o d s is subject to c o r r e c t i o n in a s e c o n d step, we m a y ask w h e t h e r t h e first s t e p — t h e d e s i g n of t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n t h a t necessitates this c o n ­ c e p t i o n — i s a wise o n e . (3) T h e f o r e g o i n g reflections s h o w t h a t , for t h e p a r t i e s i n t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n , t h e capacity t o m a k e r a t i o n a l decisions is n o t sufficient to c o m p r e h e n d t h e h i g h e s t - o r d e r interests of t h e i r clients o r t o u n d e r s t a n d r i g h t s (in R o n a l d D w o r k i n ' s sense) as t r u m p s t h a t o v e r r i d e collective goals. B u t w h y t h e n a r e t h e p a r t i e s d e p r i v e d of 12

57 Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason

practical r e a s o n in t h e first p l a c e a n d s h r o u d e d in a n i m p e n e t r a b l e veil of i g n o r a n c e ? Rawls's g u i d i n g i n t u i t i o n is clear: t h e r o l e of t h e c a t e g o r i c a l i m p e r a t i v e is t a k e n over by a n intersubjectively a p p l i e d p r o c e d u r e w h i c h is e m b o d i e d in p a r t i c i p a t i o n c o n d i t i o n s s u c h as t h e equality of p a r t i e s a n d in situational f e a t u r e s s u c h as t h e veil of i g n o r a n c e . I n m y view, however, t h e p o t e n t i a l gains of this t u r n a r e dissipated precisely by t h e systematic d e p r i v a t i o n of i n f o r m a t i o n . My t h i r d q u e s t i o n reveals t h e p e r s p e c t i v e f r o m w h i c h I also p o s e t h e two p r e v i o u s q u e s t i o n s . I believe t h a t Rawls c o u l d avoid t h e difficulties associated with t h e d e s i g n of a n o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n if h e o p e r a t i o n a l ized t h e m o r a l p o i n t of view in a different way, namely, if h e k e p t t h e p r o c e d u r a l c o n c e p t i o n of p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n free of substantive c o n n o ­ t a t i o n s by d e v e l o p i n g it in a strictly p r o c e d u r a l m a n n e r . Kant's categorical imperative already goes b e y o n d the egocentric c h a r a c t e r of t h e G o l d e n Rule: "Do n o t d o u n t o o t h e r s w h a t y o u w o u l d n o t h a v e t h e m d o u n t o y o u . " W h e r e a s this r u l e calls for a universalization test f r o m t h e v i e w p o i n t of a given individual, t h e c a t e g o r i c a l i m p e r a t i v e r e q u i r e s t h a t all t h o s e possibly affected b e able to will a j u s t m a x i m as a g e n e r a l r u l e . B u t as l o n g as we apply this m o r e e x a c t i n g test in a m o n o l o g i c a l fashion, e a c h of u s still c o n s i d e r s privately w h a t all c o u l d will f r o m individually isolated p e r ­ spectives. T h i s is i n a d e q u a t e . F o r only w h e n t h e s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of e a c h individual reflects a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s , t h a t is, a universally valid view of t h e w o r l d , w o u l d w h a t f r o m m y p o i n t of view is equally g o o d for all actually b e i n t h e e q u a l i n t e r e s t of e a c h individual. B u t this c a n n o l o n g e r b e a s s u m e d u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s of social a n d i d e o l o g i c a l p l u r a l i s m . If we wish to p r e s e r v e t h e i n t u i t i o n u n d e r l y i n g t h e K a n t i a n universalization p r i n c i p l e , we c a n r e s p o n d to this fact of p l u r a l i s m in different ways. Rawls i m p o s e s a c o m m o n p e r s p e c t i v e o n t h e p a r t i e s in t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n t h r o u g h i n f o r m a ­ t i o n a l c o n s t r a i n t s a n d t h e r e b y n e u t r a l i z e s t h e multiplicity of p a r t i c u lar i n t e r p r e t i v e perspectives f r o m t h e o u t s e t . jGlsa^^ by c o n t r a s t , views t h e m o r a l p o i n t of view as e m b o d i e d in a n i n t e r s u b jective p r a x i s of a r g u m e n t a t i o n w h i c h e n j o i n s t h o s e involved to a n idealizing enlargement of t h e i r i n t e r p r e t i v e perspectives. D i s c o u r s e ethics rests o n t h e i n t u i t i o n t h a t t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e p r i n c i p l e of universalization, p r o p e r l y u n d e r s t o o d , c ^ U s J ^ r ^ a J c ^ t p r o c e s s of "irlear r o l e t a k i n g . " It i n t e r p r e t s this i d e a of G. H . M e a d

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1 3

| in t e r m s of a p r a g m a t i c t h e o r y of a r g u m e n t a t i o n . U n d e r t h e p r a g j m a t i c p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of a n inclusive a n d n o n c o e r c i v e r a t i o n a l dis| c o u r s e b e t w e e n free a n d e q u a l p a r t i c i p a n t s , e v e r y o n e is r e q u i r e d to take t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of e v e r y o n e else a n d t h u s t o p r o j e c t h e r s e l f i n t o t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g s of self a n d w o r l d of all o t h e r s ; f r o m this inter­ l o c k i n g of perspectives t h e r e e m e r g e s a n ideally e x t e n d e d "wej j e r s p e c t i v e " f r o m w h i c h all c a n test in c o m m o n w h e t h e r they wish to m a k e a controversial n o r m t h e basis of t h e i r s h a r e d p r a c t i c e ; a n d this s h o u l d i n c l u d e m u t u a l criticism of t h e a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s of t h e l a n g u a g e s in t e r m s of w h i c h situations a n d n e e d s a r e i n t e r p r e t e d . I n t h e c o u r s e of successively u n d e r t a k e n a b s t r a c t i o n s , t h e c o r e of g e n e r alizable i n t e r e s t s c a n t h e n e m e r g e step by s t e p . 1 4

T h i n g s a r e different w h e n t h e veil of i g n o r a n c e c o n s t r a i n s t h e field of vision of p a r t i e s in t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n from the beginning to t h e basic p r i n c i p l e s o n w h i c h p r e s u m p t i v e l y free a n d e q u a l citizens w o u l d a g r e e , n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e i r d i v e r g e n t u n d e r s t a n d i n g s of self a n d world. It is i m p o r t a n t to see t h a t with this initial a b s t r a c t i o n Rawls a c c e p t s a double b u r d e n of proof. T h e veil of i g n o r a n c e m u s t e x t e n d to all p a r t i c u l a r viewpoints a n d i n t e r e s t s t h a t c o u l d i m p a i r a n i m p a r t i a l j u d g m e n t ; at t h e s a m e t i m e , it m a y e x t e n d only to s u c h n o r m a t i v e m a t t e r s as c a n b e disqualified w i t h o u t furtlier a d o as c a n d i d a t e s for t h e c o m m o n g o o d to b e a c c e p t e d by free a n d e q u a l citizens. T h i s s e c o n d c o n d i t i o n places a d e m a n d o n t h e t h e o r y t h a t is difficult to m e e t , as is s h o w n by brief reflection. Following t h e justification of t h e p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e , t h e veil of i g n o r a n c e is g r a d u a l l y r a i s e d d u r i n g t h e successive steps of f r a m i n g t h e constitu­ tion, of legislation, a n d of a p p l y i n g law. Since t h e n e w i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t t h e r e b y s t r e a m s in m u s t h a r m o n i z e with t h e basic p r i n c i p l e s a l r e a d y s e l e c t e d u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s of i n f o r m a t i o n a l c o n s t r a i n t , u n ­ p l e a s a n t surprises m u s t b e avoided. If we a r e to e n s u r e t h a t n o d i s c r e p a n c i e s arise, we m u s t c o n s t r u c t t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n a l r e a d y with k n o w l e d g e , a n d even foresight, of all of t h e n o r m a t i v e c o n t e n t s t h a t c o u l d p o t e n t i a l l y n o u r i s h t h e s h a r e d s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of free a n d e q u a l citizens in t h e f u t u r e . I n o t h e r w o r d s , t h e t h e o r e t i c i a n himself w o u l d have to s h o u l d e r t h e b u r d e n of a n t i c i p a t i n g at least p a r t s of t h e i n f o r m a t i o n of w h i c h h e previously relieved t h e p a r t i e s in t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n ! T h e impartiality of j u d g m e n t w o u l d only b e

59 Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason

g u a r a n t e e d in t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n if t h e basic n o r m a t i v e c o n c e p t s e m p l o y e d in its c o n s t r u c t i o n — t h o s e of t h e politically a u t o n o m o u s citizen, of fair c o o p e r a t i o n , a n d of a w e l l - o r d e r e d society, in t h e specific sense Rawls a t t a c h e s to t h e s e t e r m s — c o u l d w i t h s t a n d revi­ sion in light of m o r a l l y significant f u t u r e e x p e r i e n c e s a n d l e a r n i n g processes. If s u c h a heavy b u r d e n of p r o o f is g e n e r a t e d by t h e d e p r i v a t i o n of i n f o r m a t i o n i m p o s e d o n t h e p a r t i e s in t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n by t h e veil of i g n o r a n c e , a c o n v e n i e n t r e s p o n s e w o u l d b e to l i g h t e n this b u r d e n by o p e r a t i o n a l i z i n g t h e m o r a l p o i n t of view in a different way. I h a v e in m i n d t h e m o r e o p e n p r o c e d u r e of a n a r g u m e n t a t i v e p r a x i s t h a t p r o c e e d s u n d e r t h e d e m a n d i n g p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of t h e "public u s e of r e a s o n " a n d d o e s n o t b r a c k e t t h e p l u r a l i s m of convic­ tions a n d worldviews f r o m t h e outset. T h i s p r o c e d u r e c a n b e expli­ c a t e d w i t h o u t r e c o u r s e to t h e substantive c o n c e p t s t h a t Rawls e m p l o y s in t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n . II

T h e Fact o f Pluralism and the Idea o f an Overlapping Consensus

Since his Dewey L e c t u r e s , "Kantian C o n s t r u c t i v i s m in M o r a l T h e ­ o r y , " Rawls h a s stressed t h e political c h a r a c t e r of j u s t i c e as fairness. T h i s shift is m o t i v a t e d by d i s q u i e t c o n c e r n i n g t h e fact of social a n d , a b o v e all, i d e o l o g i c a l p l u r a l i s m . I n discussing t h e veil of i g n o r a n c e , I h a v e a l r e a d y clarified t h e b u r d e n of p r o o f t h a t t h e t h e o r y of j u s t i c e takes u p o n itself with its initial t h e o r e t i c a l decisions. T h e decisive issue in t h e justification of t h e two h i g h e s t p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e is less t h e d e l i b e r a t i o n s in t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n t h a n t h e i n t u i t i o n s a n d basic c o n c e p t s t h a t g u i d e t h e d e s i g n of t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n itself. Rawls i n t r o d u c e s n o r m a t i v e c o n t e n t s i n t o t h e very p r o c e d u r e of justification, a b o v e all t h o s e i d e a s h e associates with t h e c o n c e p t of t h e m o r a l p e r s o n : t h e sense of fairness a n d t h e capacity for o n e ' s o w n c o n c e p t i o n of t h e g o o d . T h u s t h e c o n c e p t of t h e citizen as a m o r a l p e r s o n , w h i c h also u n d e r l i e s t h e c o n c e p t of t h e fair c o o p e r a ­ t i o n of politically a u t o n o m o u s citizens, s t a n d s in n e e d of* a prior justification. F u r t h e r , it n e e d s to b e s h o w n t h a t this c o n c e p t i o n is n e u t r a l t o w a r d conflicting worldviews a n d r e m a i n s u n c o n t r o v e r s i a l after t h e veil of i g n o r a n c e h a s b e e n lifted. T h i s e x p l a i n s Rawls's 15

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i n t e r e s t in a "political," as o p p o s e d to a m e t a p h y s i c a l , c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e . I s u s p e c t t h a t this t e r m i n o l o g y i n d i c a t e s a c e r t a i n u n c l a r i t y a b o u t t h e p r e c i s e c h a r a c t e r of w h a t is in n e e d of justification; f r o m this, in t u r n , t h e r e results a n indecisiveness as to h o w t h e validity claim of t h e t h e o r y itself s h o u l d b e u n d e r s t o o d . I will e x a m i n e w h e t h e r t h e o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s , o n w h i c h t h e t h e o r y of j u s t i c e d e p e n d s , plays a cognitive o r m e r e l y a n i n s t r u m e n t a l r o l e : w h e t h e r it p r i m a r i l y c o n t r i b u t e s t o t h e f u r t h e r justification of t h e t h e o r y o r w h e t h e r it serves, in light of t h e p r i o r justification of t h e t h e o r y , to e x p l i c a t e a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n of social stability ( 1 ) . C o n n e c t e d with this is t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e sense in w h i c h Rawls uses t h e p r e d i ­ cate " r e a s o n a b l e " : as a p r e d i c a t e for t h e validity of m o r a l j u d g m e n t s o r for t h e reflective a t t i t u d e of e n l i g h t e n e d t o l e r a n c e ( 2 ) . (1) I n o r d e r to p i n d o w n t h e u n d e r l y i n g n o r m a t i v e i d e a s , Rawls h a s r e c o u r s e to t h e so-called m e t h o d of reflective e q u i l i b r i u m . T h e p h i l o s o p h e r arrives at t h e basic c o n c e p t of t h e m o r a l p e r s o n a n d t h e a d j u n c t c o n c e p t s of t h e politically a u t o n o m o u s citizen, of fair c o o p ­ e r a t i o n , of t h e w e l l - o r d e r e d society, a n d so f o r t h , via a r a t i o n a l r e ­ c o n s t r u c t i o n of p r o v e n i n t u i t i o n s , t h a t is, i n t u i t i o n s actually found in t h e p r a c t i c e s a n d t r a d i t i o n s of a d e m o c r a t i c society. Reflective e q u i ­ l i b r i u m is a c h i e v e d at t h e m o m e n t w h e n t h e p h i l o s o p h e r h a s at­ t a i n e d t h e a s s u r a n c e t h a t t h o s e involved c a n n o l o n g e r reject with g o o d r e a s o n s i n t u i t i o n s r e c o n s t r u c t e d a n d clarified in this m a n n e r . T h e p r o c e d u r e of r a t i o n a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n a l r e a d y fulfills T h o m a s S c a n l o n ' s c r i t e r i o n of w h a t it is " n o t r e a s o n a b l e to reject." O f c o u r s e , Rawls d o e s n o t wish to limit h i m s e l f solely to t h e f u n d a m e n t a l n o r ­ mative convictions of a particular political c u l t u r e : even t h e p r e s e n t day Rawls, pace R i c h a r d Rorty, h a s n o t b e c o m e a c o n t e x t u a l i s t . H i s >. aim, as b e f o r e , is to r e c o n s t r u c t a s u b s t r a t u m of intuitive i d e a s l a t e n t in t h e political c u l t u r e of his society a n d its d e m o c r a t i c t r a d i t i o n s . B u t if e x p e r i e n c e s associated with a n incipiently successful institu­ t i o n a l i z a t i o n of p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e h a v e a l r e a d y b e c o m e sedim e n t e d in t h e existing political c u l t u r e — i n A m e r i c a n political c u l t u r e , for e x a m p l e — s u c h a r e c o n s t r u c t i v e a p p r o p r i a t i o n c a n ac­ c o m p l i s h m o r e t h a n m e r e l y t h e h e r m e n e u t i c clarification of a c o n ­ t i n g e n t t r a d i t i o n . T h e c o n c e p t of j u s t i c e worked out o n this basis m u s t n o n e t h e l e s s b e e x a m i n e d o n c e a g a i n as to w h e t h e r it c a n e x p e c t to

61 Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason

m e e t with a c c e p t a n c e i n a pluralistic society. H o w is this s e c o n d step r e l a t e d t o t h e first stage of justification of t h e two h i g h e s t p r i n c i p l e s a l r e a d y e x a m i n e d ? Is it even p r o p e r l y a s e c o n d step of justification ? A l r e a d y i n t h e final c h a p t e r s of A Theory ofJustice, Rawls a d d r e s s e s t h e issue of w h e t h e r a society c o n s t i t u t e d in a c c o r d a n c e with t h e p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e c o u l d stabilize itself: for e x a m p l e , w h e t h e r it c o u l d g e n e r a t e t h e functionally n e c e s s a r y m o t i v a t i o n s f r o m its o w n r e s o u r c e s t h r o u g h t h e r e q u i s i t e political socialization of its citizens (TJ 4 9 6 f f ) . I n view of t h e fact of social a n d i d e o l o g i c a l p l u r a l i s m w h i c h h e s u b s e q u e n t l y t o o k m o r e seriously, Rawls n o w w a n t s to e x a m i n e i n a similar way w h e t h e r t h e t h e o r e t i c a l c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e falls u n d e r t h e "art of t h e p o s s i b l e " a n d h e n c e is "practica­ b l e . " First of all, t h e c e n t r a l c o n c e p t of t h e p e r s o n o n w h i c h t h e t h e o r y u l t i m a t e l y rests m u s t b e sufficiently n e u t r a l t o b e a c c e p t a b l e f r o m t h e i n t e r p r e t i v e perspectives of different worldviews. H e n c e it m u s t b e s h o w n t h a t j u s t i c e as fairness c a n f o r m t h e basis of a n " o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s . " So far, so g o o d . W h a t b o t h e r s m e is Rawls's w o r k i n g a s s u m p t i o n t h a t s u c h a test of acceptability is of t h e s a m e k i n d as t h e test of consistency h e previously u n d e r t o o k with refer­ e n c e t o t h e w e l l - o r d e r e d society's p o t e n t i a l for self-stabilization. T h i s m e t h o d o l o g i c a l p a r a l l e l is p r o b l e m a t i c b e c a u s e t h e test can­ n o t b e u n d e r t a k e n in a n i m m a n e n t m a n n e r i n t h e case of accept­ ability; it is n o l o n g e r a m o v e w i t h i n t h e t h e o r y . T h e test of t h e n e u t r a l i t y of t h e basic n o r m a t i v e c o n c e p t s with r e s p e c t to conflicting worldviews n o w rests o n d i f f e r e n t p r e m i s e s : it is different f r o m a h y p o t h e t i c a l e x a m i n a t i o n of t h e capacity of a society, a l r e a d y o r g a n ­ ized in a c c o r d a n c e with p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e , t o r e p r o d u c e itself. Rawls h i m s e l f i n his p r e s e n t w o r k d i s t i n g u i s h e s b e t w e e n "two stages" o f t h e o r y - f o r m a t i o n . T h e p r i n c i p l e s justified a t t h e first stage m u s t b e e x p o s e d t o p u b l i c discussion a t t h e s e c o n d stage. O n l y w h e n t h e t h e o r e t i c a l d e s i g n is c o m p l e t e d c a n t h e fact of p l u r a l i s m b e b r o u g h t i n t o play a n d t h e a b s t r a c t i o n s of t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n r e v o k e d . T h e t h e o r y as a w h o l e m u s t b e s u b j e c t e d t o criticism by t h e citizens in t h e p u b l i c f o r u m of r e a s o n . I n this f o r u m it is n o l o n g e r t h e fictional citizens of a j u s t society a b o u t w h o m s t a t e m e n t s a r e m a d e within t h e t h e o r y b u t r e a l citizens of flesh a n d b l o o d . T h e t h e o r y , t h e r e f o r e , m u s t leave t h e o u t c o m e of s u c h a test of acceptability u n d e t e r m i n e d . 1 6

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F o r Rawls h a s in m i n d r e a l d i s c o u r s e s w h o s e o u t c o m e is o p e n : " W h a t if it t u r n s o u t t h a t t h e p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e as fairness c a n n o t g a i n t h e s u p p o r t of r e a s o n a b l e d o c t r i n e s , so t h a t t h e case for stability fails? . . . We s h o u l d h a v e to see w h e t h e r a c c e p t a b l e c h a n g e s in t h e p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e w o u l d achieve stability" (PL 6 5 - 6 6 ) . Clearly, t h e p h i l o s o p h e r c a n a t m o s t a t t e m p t to a n t i c i p a t e in reflection t h e di­ r e c t i o n of r e a l discourses as t h e y w o u l d p r o b a b l y u n f o l d u n d e r c o n ­ d i t i o n s of a pluralistic society. B u t s u c h a m o r e o r less realistic s i m u l a t i o n of r e a l d i s c o u r s e s c a n n o t b e i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o t h e t h e b r y in t h e s a m e way as c a n t h e d e r i v a t i o n of possibilities of self-stabiliza­ t i o n f r o m t h e u n d e r l y i n g p r e m i s e s of a j u s t society. F o r n o w t h e citizens t h e m s e l v e s d e b a t e a b o u t t h e p r e m i s e s d e v e l o p e d by t h e p a r t i e s in t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n . T h e m i s l e a d i n g parallel w o u l d b e of n o f u r t h e r c o n s e q u e n c e if it d i d n o t cast t h e " o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s " with w h i c h t h e p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e a r e s u p p o s e d to m e e t in t h e w r o n g light. B e c a u s e Rawls situates t h e " q u e s t i o n of stability" in t h e f o r e g r o u n d , t h e o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s m e r e l y expresses t h e f u n c t i o n a l c o n t r i b u t i o n t h a t t h e t h e ­ o r y of j u s t i c e c a n m a k e to t h e peaceful i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n of social c o o p e r a t i o n ; b u t in this t h e intrinsic value of a justified t h e o r y m u s t a l r e a d y b e p r e s u p p o s e d . F r o m this functionalist perspective, t h e q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r t h e t h e o r y c a n m e e t with p u b l i c a g r e e m e n t — t h a t is, f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of different worldviews in t h e f o r u m of t h e p u b l i c u s e of r e a s o n — w o u l d lose a n e p i s t e m i c m e a n i n g essential to t h e t h e o r y itself. T h e o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s w o u l d t h e n b e m e r e l y a n i n d e x of t h e utility, a n d n o l o n g e r a c o n f i r m a t i o n of t h e c o r r e c t n e s s of t h e t h e o r y ; it w o u l d n o l o n g e r b e of i n t e r e s t f r o m t h e p o i n t of view of acceptability, a n d h e n c e of validity, b u t only froni t h a t of a c c e p t a n c e , t h a t is, of s e c u r i n g social stability. If I u n d e r s t a n d Rawls correctly, however, h e d o e s n o t wish to d i s t i n g u i s h in this way b e t w e e n q u e s t i o n s of justification a n d q u e s t i o n s of stability. W h e n h e calls his c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e "political" his i n t e n t i o n a p p e a r s r a t h e r to b e to collapse t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n its justified acceptability a n d its a c t u a l a c c e p t a n c e : " [ T ] h e a i m of j u s t i c e as fairness as a political c o n c e p t i o n is practical, a n d n o t m e t a p h y s i c a l o r e p i s t e m o logical. T h a t is, it p r e s e n t s itself n o t as a c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e t h a t is t r u e , b u t o n e t h a t c a n s e r v e as a basis of i n f o r m e d a n d willing

63 Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason

political a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n citizens viewed as free a n d e q u a l persons." I n m y view, Rawls m u s t m a k e a s h a r p e r d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n accept­ ability a n d a c c e p t a n c e . A p u r e l y i n s t r u m e n t a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e t h e o r y is a l r e a d y i n v a l i d a t e d by t h e fact t h a t t h e citizens m u s t first b e convinced by t h e p r o p o s e d c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e b e f o r e s u c h a c o n s e n s u s c a n c o m e a b o u t . T h e c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e m u s t n o t b e political in t h e w r o n g sense a n d s h o u l d n o t m e r e l y l e a d to a m o d u s vivendi. T h e t h e o r y itself m u s t f u r n i s h t h e p r e m i s e s t h a t "we a n d o t h e r s r e c o g n i z e as t r u e , o r as r e a s o n a b l e for t h e p u r p o s e of r e a c h ­ i n g a w o r k i n g a g r e e m e n t o n t h e f u n d a m e n t a l s of political j u s t i c e . " B u t if Rawls r u l e s o u t a functionalist i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of j u s t i c e as fairness, h e m u s t allow s o m e epistemic r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e validity of his t h e o r y a n d t h e p r o s p e c t of its n e u t r a l i t y t o w a r d c o m p e t i n g worldviews b e i n g c o n f i r m e d i n p u b l i c discourses. T h e stabilizing effect of a n o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s w o u l d t h e n b e e x p l a i n e d i n cog­ nitive t e r m s , t h a t is, in t e r m s of t h e c o n f i r m a t i o n of t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t j u s t i c e as fairness is n e u t r a l t o w a r d " c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e s . " I d o n ' t m e a n to say t h a t Rawls a c c e p t s p r e m i s e s t h a t w o u l d p r e v e n t h i m f r o m d r a w i n g this c o n s e q u e n c e ; I m e a n only t h a t h e hesitates to assert it b e c a u s e h e associates with t h e c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n "political" t h e proviso t h a t t h e t h e o r y of j u s t i c e s h o u l d n o t b e b u r d e n e d with a n e p i s t e m i c claim a n d t h a t its a n t i c i p a t e d practical effect s h o u l d n o t b e m a d e c o n t i n g e n t o n t h e r a t i o n a l acceptability of its assertions. T h u s we h a v e r e a s o n to ask why Rawls d o e s riot t h i n k his t h e o r y a d m i t s of t r u t h a n d in what sense h e h e r e uses t h e p r e d i c a t e "reason­ a b l e " in p l a c e of t h e p r e d i c a t e " t r u e . " 17

18

(2) O n a w e a k i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , t h e claim t h a t a t h e o r y of j u s t i c e c a n n o t b e t r u e o r false h a s m e r e l y t h e u n p r o b l e m a t i c sense t h a t n o r m a t i v e s t a t e m e n t s d o n o t d e s c r i b e a n i n d e p e n d e n t o r d e r of m o r a l facts. O n a s t r o n g i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , this thesis h a s t h e value-skep­ tical sense t h a t b e h i n d t h e validity claim of n o r m a t i v e s t a t e m e n t s t h e r e l u r k s s o m e t h i n g p u r e l y subjective: feelings, desires, o r deci­ sions, e x p r e s s e d i n a g r a m m a t i c a l l y m i s l e a d i n g fashion. B u t for Rawls b o t h value skepticism a n d m o r a l r e a l i s m a r e equally u n a c c e p t a b l e . H e w a n t s to s e c u r e for n o r m a t i v e s t a t e m e n t s — a n d for ^he t h e o r y of j u s t i c e as a w h o l e — a f o r m of r a t i o n a l o b l i g a t i o n f o u n d e d o n justified

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intersubjective r e c o g n i t i o n , b u t w i t h o u t a c c o r d i n g t h e m a n e p i s t e m i c m e a n i n g . F o r this r e a s o n h e i n t r o d u c e s t h e p r e d i c a t e " r e a s o n a b l e " as a c o m p l e m e n t a r y c o n c e p t to " t r u e . " T h e difficulty h e r e is in specifying in w h a t sense t h e o n e is a " c o m p l e m e n t a r y c o n c e p t " to t h e o t h e r . Two a l t e r n a t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s suggest t h e m ­ selves. E i t h e r we u n d e r s t a n d " r e a s o n a b l e " in t h e sense of practical r e a s o n as s y n o n y m o u s with "morally t r u e , " t h a t is, as a validity c o n ­ c e p t a n a l o g o u s to t r u t h a n d o n t h e s a m e p l a n e as p r o p o s i t i o n a l t r u t h ; this r e a d i n g is s u p p o r t e d by at least o n e line of a r g u m e n t a t i o n ( a ) . O r we u n d e r s t a n d " r e a s o n a b l e " in m o r e o r less t h e s a m e sense as " t h o u g h t f u l n e s s " in d e a l i n g with d e b a t a b l e views w h o s e t r u t h is for t h e p r e s e n t u n d e c i d e d ; t h e n " r e a s o n a b l e " is e m p l o y e d as a higher-level p r e d i c a t e c o n c e r n e d m o r e with " r e a s o n a b l e disagree­ m e n t s , " a n d h e n c e with t h e fallibilistic o u t l o o k a n d civil d e m e a n o r of p e r s o n s , t h a n with t h e validity of t h e i r assertions. I n g e n e r a l , Rawls s e e m s to favor this latter r e a d i n g ( b ) . (a) Rawls first i n t r o d u c e s t h e " r e a s o n a b l e " as a p r o p e r t y of m o r a l p e r s o n s . P e o p l e c o u n t as r e a s o n a b l e w h o possess a s e n s e of j u s t i c e a n d t h u s a r e b o t h willing a n d a b l e to t a k e a c c o u n t of fair c o n d i t i o n s of c o o p e r a t i o n , b u t w h o a r e also aware of t h e fallibility of k n o w l e d g e and—-in r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e s e " b u r d e n s of r e a s o n " — a r # willing to justify t h e i r c o n c e p t i o n of political j u s t i c e publicly. By c o n t r a s t , p e r ­ sons act m e r e l y "rationally" as l o n g as t h e y a r e p r u d e n t l y g u i d e d by t h e i r c o n c e p t i o n of t h e g o o d . W h a t it m e a n s t o b e " r e a s o n a b l e " c a n i n d e e d b e e x p l i c a t e d in t e r m s of s u c h qualities of m o r a l p e r s o n s . B u t t h e c o n c e p t of a p e r s o n itself a l r e a d y p r e s u p p o s e s t h e c o n c e p t of p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n . 1 9

U l t i m a t e l y Rawls e x p l a i n s t h e m e a n i n g of p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n by ref­ e r e n c e to two d i m e n s i o n s : o n t h e o n e h a n d , t h e d e o n t o l o g i c a l di­ m e n s i o n of n o r m a t i v e validity (which I h e r e leave to o n e side as u n p r o b l e m a t i c ) a n d , o n t h e o t h e r , t h e p r a g m a t i c d i m e n s i o n of a p u b l i c s p h e r e a n d t h e p r o c e s s of p u b l i c r e a s o n i n g (which is of p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t in t h e p r e s e n t c o n t e x t ) . T h e p u b l i c u s e is in a sense i n s c r i b e d in r e a s o n . "Publicity" is t h e c o m m o n p e r s p e c t i v e f r o m w h i c h t h e citizens mutually c o n v i n c e o n e a n o t h e r of w h a t is j u s t a n d u n j u s t by t h e force of t h e b e t t e r a r g u m e n t . T h i s p e r s p e c t i v e of t h e p u b l i c u s e of r e a s o n , in w h i c h all p a r t i c i p a t e , first l e n d s m o r a l

65 R e c o n c i l i a t i o n t h r o u g h t h e P u b l i c U s e of R e a s o n

convictions t h e i r objectivity. Rawls calls valid n o r m a t i v e s t a t e m e n t s "objective" a n d h e e x p l a i n s "objectivity" in a p r o c e d u r a l m a n n e r with r e f e r e n c e to a p u b l i c u s e of r e a s o n t h a t satisfies c e r t a i n c o u n t e r f a c tual c o n d i t i o n s : "Political convictions (which a r e also, of c o u r s e , m o r a l convictions) a r e objective—actually f o u n d e d o n a n o r d e r of r e a s o n s — i f r e a s o n a b l e a n d r a t i o n a l p e r s o n s , w h o a r e sufficiently i n t e l l i g e n t a n d c o n s c i e n t i o u s in e x e r c i s i n g t h e i r p o w e r s of practical r e a s o n . . . w o u l d eventually e n d o r s e t h o s e convictions . . . p r o v i d e d t h a t t h e s e p e r s o n s k n o w t h e r e l e v a n t facts a n d h a v e sufficiently surveyed the g r o u n d s that bear o n the matter u n d e r conditions favorable to d u e r e f l e c t i o n " (PL 1 1 9 ) . Rawls d o e s a d d in this passage t h a t g r o u n d s a r e only specified as g o o d g r o u n d s in t h e light of a r e c o g n i z e d c o n c e p t of j u s t i c e ; b u t this c o n c e p t m u s t in t u r n m e e t with a g r e e m e n t u n d e r t h e s a m e ideal c o n d i t i o n s (PL 1 3 7 ) . H e n c e Rawls m u s t b e u n d e r s t o o d to m e a n t h a t , o n his view t o o , t h e p r o c e ­ d u r e of t h e p u b l i c u s e of r e a s o n ^remains t h e final c o u r t of a p p e a l for n o r m a t i v e s t a t e m e n t s . I n l i g h t of this reflection, it c o u l d b e said t h a t t h e p r e d i c a t e " r e a s o n a b l e " p o i n t s to t h e discursive r e d e m p t i o n of a validity claim. By a n a l o g y with a n o n s e m a n t i c c o n c e p t of t r u t h p u r i f i e d of all c o n n o t a t i o n s of c o r r e s p o n d e n c e , o n e c o u l d u n d e r s t a n d "reason­ a b l e " as a p r e d i c a t e for t h e validity of n o r m a t i v e s t a t e m e n t s . Clearly Rawls d o e s n o t w a n t to d r a w t h i s — i n m y view, c o r r e c t — c o n c l u s i o n ; o t h e r w i s e h e w o u l d h a v e to avoid t h e p e r p l e x i n g u s a g e a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h worldviews n e e d n o t b e t r u e even w h e n t h e y a r e r e a s o n a b l e , a n d vice versa. T h e p r o b l e m is n o t Rawls's r e j e c t i o n of m o r a l realism o r t h e c o n s e q u e n t r e j e c t i o n of a s e m a n t i c t r u t h p r e d i c a t e for n o r ­ mative s t a t e m e n t s , b u t t h e fact t h a t h e d o e s a t t a c h s u c h a t r u t h p r e d i c a t e to worldviews ( c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e s ) . H e t h e r e b y d e ­ n i e s h i m s e l f t h e possibility of e x p l o i t i n g t h e e p i s t e m i c c o n n o t a t i o n s of t h e e x p r e s s i o n " r e a s o n a b l e , " c o n n o t a t i o n s t h a t h e m u s t n e v e r t h e ­ less a t t r i b u t e to his o w n c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e if it is to b e a b l e to claim s o m e s o r t of n o r m a t i v e b i n d i n g force. (b) O n Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n , m e t a p h y s i c a l d o c t r i n e s a n d religious w o r l d - i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s a d m i t of t r u t h a n d falsity. As a c o n s e q u e n c e , a political c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e c o u l d only b e t r u e if it w e r e n o t m e r e l y c o m p a t i b l e with s u c h d o c t r i n e s b u t also derivable f r o m a t r u e 20

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d o c t r i n e . Yet f r o m t h e p o i n t of view of a political p h i l o s o p h y t h a t is n e u t r a l t o w a r d worldviews we c a n n o t d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r a n d w h e n this is t h e case. F r o m this secular viewpoint, t h e t r u t h claims of all r e a s o n a b l e worldviews h a v e e q u a l weight, w h e r e t h o s e worldviews c o u n t as " r e a s o n a b l e " t h a t c o m p e t e with o n e a n o t h e r in a reflexive a t t i t u d e , t h a t is, o n t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t o n e ' s o w n t r u t h claim c o u l d prevail in p u b l i c d i s c o u r s e in t h e l o n g r u n only t h r o u g h t h e force of b e t t e r r e a s o n s . " R e a s o n a b l e c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e s " a r e ultimately d i s t i n g u i s h e d by t h e i r r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e b u r d e n s of proof, w h i c h e n a b l e s g r o u p s with c o m p e t i n g i d e o l o g i e s to a c c e p t — f o r t h e t i m e b e i n g — a " r e a s o n a b l e d i s a g r e e m e n t " as t h e basis of t h e i r peaceful coexistence. Since d i s p u t e s c o n c e r n i n g m e t a p h y s i c a l a n d religious t r u t h s re­ m a i n u n r e s o l v e d u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s of e n d u r i n g p l u r a l i s m , only t h e r e a s o n a b l e n e s s of this k i n d of reflexive c o n s c i o u s n e s s c a n b e trans­ f e r r e d as a validity p r e d i c a t e to a political c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e c o m p a t i b l e with all r e a s o n a b l e d o c t r i n e s . By way of this t r a n s f e r e n c e , a r e a s o n a b l e c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e p r e s e r v e s a n o b l i q u e r e l a t i o n to a t r u t h claim p r o j e c t e d i n t o t h e f u t u r e . B u t it c a n n o t b e c e r t a i n t h a t o n e of t h e r e a s o n a b l e d o c t r i n e s f r o m w h i c h it is derivable is also t h e t r u e o n e . A political c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e is r e a s o n a b l e in t h e sense t h a t it c a n afford a k i n d of t o l e r a n c e t o w a r d n o t u n r e a s o n a b l e worldviews, in t h e sense a d v o c a t e d by Gottfried Lessing. W h a t r e m a i n s is a n act of faith in r e a s o n , " r e a s o n a b l e faith in t h e r e a l possibility of a j u s t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e g i m e . " T h i s view m a y a p p e a l to s o m e of o u r b e t t e r i n t u i t i o n s , b u t h o w c a n it b e h a r m o n i z e d with Rawls's r e a s o n s for a c c e p t i n g t h e priority of t h e r i g h t over t h e g o o d in t h e first place? Q u e s t i o n s of j u s t i c e o r m o r a l q u e s t i o n s a d m i t of justifiable an­ swers—justifiable in t h e sense of r a t i o n a l a c c e p t a b i l i t y — b e c a u s e they a r e c o n c e r n e d with w h a t , f r o m a n ideally e x p a n d e d perspective, is in t h e e q u a l i n t e r e s t of all. "Ethical" q u e s t i o n s , by c o n t r a s t , d o n o t a d m i t of s u c h i m p a r t i a l t r e a t m e n t b e c a u s e they refer to w h a t , f r o m t h e first p e r s o n p e r s p e c t i v e , is in t h e l o n g r u n g o o d for m e o r for u s — e v e n if this is n o t equally g o o d for all. Now, m e t a p h y s i c a l o r religious worldviews a r e at t h e very least p e r m e a t e d with answers to basic ethical q u e s t i o n s ; they a r t i c u l a t e in a n e x e m p l a r y fashion col­ lective i d e n t i t i e s a n d g u i d e individual p l a n s of life. H e n c e , world21

67 Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason

views a r e m e a s u r e d m o r e by t h e a u t h e n t i c i t y of t h e lifestyles t h e y s h a p e t h a n by t h e t r u t h of t h e s t a t e m e n t s they a d m i t . B e c a u s e s u c h d o c t r i n e s a r e " c o m p r e h e n s i v e " in precisely t h e s e n s e t h a t they offer i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of (the w o r l d as a w h ^ ^ t h e y c a n n o t m e r e l y b e u n ­ d e r s t o o d as a n o r d e r e d set of s t a t e m e n t s of fact; t h e i r c o n t e n t s c a n n o t b e e x p r e s s e d c o m p l e t e l y in s e n t e n c e s t h a t a d m i t of t r u t h a n d t h e y d o n o t f o r m a symbolic system t h a t c a n b e t r u e o r false as s u c h . So, at least, it a p p e a r s u n d e r t h e c o n d i t i o n s of p o s t m e t a p h y s i c a l t h i n k i n g in w h i c h j u s t i c e as fairness is to b e justified. B u t t h e n it is i m p o s s i b l e t o m a k e t h e validity of a c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e c o n t i n g e n t o n t h e t r u t h of a worldview, h o w e v e r " r e a s o n a b l e " it m a y b e . Rather, u n d e r t h e s e p r e m i s e s it m a k e s sense to analyze t h e different validity claims t h a t we associate, respectively, with descrip­ tive, evaluative, a n d n o r m a t i v e s t a t e m e n t s (of various kinds) i n d e ­ p e n d e n t l y of t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c c o m p l e x of validity claims t h a t a r e o b s c u r e l y fused t o g e t h e r in religious a n d m e t a p h y s i c a l i n t e r p r e t a ­ t i o n s of r e a l i t y . W h y d o e s Rawls n e v e r t h e l e s s t h i n k t h a t identity-stabilizing worldviews a d m i t of t r u t h ? A possible m o t i v e m i g h t b e t h e conviction t h a t a p r o f a n e , f r e e s t a n d i n g m o r a l i t y is u n t e n a b l e , t h a t m o r a l convictions m u s t b e e m b e d d e d in m e t a p h y s i c a l o r religious d o c t r i n e s . T h a t , at any r a t e , w o u l d c o h e r e with Rawls's way of p o s i n g t h e p r o b l e m of a n o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s : h e takes as his m o d e l t h a t political institu­ tionalization of f r e e d o m of belief a n d c o n s c i e n c e w h i c h b r o u g h t t h e religious civil wars of t h e m o d e r n p e r i o d to a n e n d . B u t c o u l d t h e religious conflicts h a v e b e e n b r o u g h t to a n e n d if t h e p r i n c i p l e of t o l e r a n c e a n d f r e e d o m of belief a n d c o n s c i e n c e h a d n o t b e e n a b l e to a p p e a l , with g o o d r e a s o n s , to a m o r a l validity independent of relig­ i o n a n d metaphysics? 22

Ill

Private and Public A u t o n o m y

T h e o b j e c t i o n s I r a i s e d in t h e first p a r t a g a i n s t t h e d e s i g n of t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n a n d in t h e s e c o n d against t h e assimilation of q u e s ­ tions of validity to t h o s e of a c c e p t a n c e p o i n t in t h e s a m e d i r e c t i o n . By subjecting rationally c h o o s i n g p a r t i e s to r e a s o n a b l e p r o c e d u r a l c o n s t r a i n t s , Rawls r e m a i n s d e p e n d e n t o n substantive n o r m a t i v e

68 Chapter 2

a s s u m p t i o n s ; at t h e s a m e t i m e , by t a i l o r i n g a universalistic t h e o r y of j u s t i c e to q u e s t i o n s of political stability t h r o u g h a n o v e r l a p p i n g c o n ­ sensus, h e c o m p r o m i s e s its e p i s t e m i c status. B o t h strategies a r e p u r ­ s u e d at t h e cost of a strict p r o c e d u r a l i s t p r o g r a m . I n c o n t r a s t with this a p p r o a c h , Rawls c o u l d satisfy m o r e elegantly t h e b u r d e n s of p r o o f h e i n c u r s with his s t r o n g a n d p r e s u m p t i v e l y n e u t r a l c o n c e p t of t h e m o r a l p e r s o n if h e d e v e l o p e d his substantive c o n c e p t s a n d a s s u m p t i o n s o u t of t h e p r o c e d u r e of t h e p u b l i c u s e of r e a s o n . Injcny^ vigw^_the m o r a l p o i n t of view is a l r e a d y j m p l i c i t in t h e socio-ontological c o n s t i t u t i o n of t h e r j u M i c j g ^ ^ tion, c o m p r i s i n g t h e cojnjjlex r e l a t i o n s of m u t u a l r e c o g n i t k m _ t h a t p a r t i c i p a n t s in r a t i o n a l d i s c o u r s e "must" a c c e p t (in t h e sense of w e a k t r a n s c e n d e n t a l necessity). Rawls believes t h a t a t h e o r y of j u s t i c e d e v e l o p e d in s u c h exclusively p r o c e d u r a l t e r m s c o u l d n o t b e "sufficiently s t r u c t u r e d . " Since I ^ s u b s c r i b e to a division o f j a b o r b e t w e e n m o r a l t h e o r y a n d t h e t h e o r y of a c t i o n , I d o n o t r e g a r d this as a serious r e s e r ^ i B o n r T R ^ c o n c e p t u a l s t r u c t u r i n g of t h e c o n t e x t s of i n t e r a c t i o n to w h i c h q u e s t i o n s of political j u s t i c e refer is n o t w i t h i n t h e p r o v i n c e of m o r a l t h e o r y . T o g e t h e r with t h e c o n t e n t of action-conflicts in n e e d of r e s o l u t i o n , a w h o l e c o n c e p t u a l f r a m e for n o r m a t i v e l y r e g u l a t e d i n t e r a c t i o n is f o r c e d u p o n u s — a n e t w o r k of c o n c e p t s in w h i c h p e r s o n s a n d i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s , a c t o r s a n d actions, n o r m - c o n f o r m i n j j _ ^ d ^ behavior, responsibility a n d a u t o n o m y , a n d even(intersubjectiveiy^ s t r u c t u r e d j n o r a l feejings)all find t h e i r p l a c e . E a c h of t h e s e c o n c e p t s d e s e r v e s a p r i o r analysis. If we t h e n take t h e c o n c e p t of p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n in t h e p r o c e d u r a l sense t h a t Rawls h i m s e l f i n t i m a t e s with his n o t i o n of t h e p u b l i c u s e of r e a s o n , we c o u l d say t h a t precisely t h o s e p r i n c i p l e s a r e valid t h a t m e e t with u n c o e r c e d intersubjective r e c o g n i t i o n u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s of r a t i o n a l d i s c o u r s e . It r e m a i n s as a further, a n d p r i m a r i l y e m p i r i c a l , q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r a n d w h e n s u c h valid p r i n c i p l e s e n s u r e political stability u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s of p l u r a l i s m . I n w h a t follows, I a m inter­ e s t e d in t h e e x e c u t i o n of t h e p r o c e d u r a l i s t p r o g r a m only with r e f e r e n c e to a n i m p l i c a t i o n it h a s for t h e e x p l a n a t i o n of t h e consti­ t u t i o n a l state. Liberals h a v e stressed t h e "liberties of t h e m o d e r n s " : liberty of belief a n d c o n s c i e n c e , t h e p r o t e c t i o n of life, p e r s o n a l liberty, a n d

69 Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason

p r o p e r t y — i n s u m , t h e c o r e of subjective private rights. R e p u b l i c a n ­ ism, by c o n t r a s t , h a s d e f e n d e d t h e "liberties of t h e a n c i e n t s " : t h e political r i g h t s of p a r t i c i p a t i o n a n d c o m m u n i c a t i o n t h a t m a k e pos­ sible t h e citizens' exercise of s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n . J e a n - J a c q u e s Rous­ s e a u a n d K a n t s h a r e d t h e a s p i r a t i o n of d e r i v i n g b o t h e l e m e n t s f r o m t h e s a m e r o o t , namely, f r o m m o r a l a n d political a u t o n o m y : t h e liberal r i g h t s m a y n e i t h e r b e m e r e l y foisted o n t h e p r a c t i c e of selfd e t e r m i n a t i o n as extrinsic c o n s t r a i n t s n o r b e m a d e m e r e l y i n s t r u ­ m e n t a l to its exercise. Rawls, t o o , subscribes to this i n t u i t i o n ; n e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e two-stage c h a r a c t e r of his t h e o r y g e n e r a t e s a p r i o r ­ ity of liberal r i g h t s t h a t d e m o t e s t h e d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e s s t o a n infe­ r i o r status. Rawls certainly p r o c e e d s f r o m t h e i d e a of political a u t o n o m y a n d m o d e l s it at t h e level of t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n : it is r e p r e s e n t e d by t h e i n t e r p l a y b e t w e e n t h e rationally c h o o s i n g p a r t i e s a n d t h e f r a m e w o r k c o n d i t i o n s t h a t g u a r a n t e e impartiality of j u d g m e n t . B u t this i d e a is b r o u g h t to b e a r only selectively at t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l level of t h e d e m o ­ cratic p r o c e d u r e for t h e political will-formation of free a n d e q u a l citizens f r o m w h i c h it is n o n e t h e l e s s b o r r o w e d . T h e f o r m of political a u t o n o m y g r a n t e d virtual e x i s t e n c e in t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n , a n d t h u s o n t h e first level of t h e o r y f o r m a t i o n , d o e s n o t fully u n f o l d in t h e h e a r t of t h e justly c o n s t i t u t e d society. F o r t h e h i g h e r t h e veil of i g n o r a n c e is r a i s e d a n d t h e m o r e Rawls's citizens t h e m s e l v e s take o n r e a l flesh a n d b l o o d , t h e m o r e d e e p l y they find t h e m s e l v e s subject to p r i n c i p l e s a n d n o r m s t h a t h a v e b e e n a n t i c i p a t e d in t h e o r y a n d have a l r e a d y b e c o m e i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d b e y o n d t h e i r c o n t r o l . I n this way, t h e t h e o r y d e p r i v e s t h e citizens of t o o m a n y of t h e insights t h a t t h e y w o u l d h a v e to assimilate a n e w in e a c h g e n e r a t i o n . F r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of t h e t h e o r y of j u s t i c e , t h e act of f o u n d i n g t h e d e m o c r a t i c c o n s t i t u t i o n c a n n o t b e r e p e a t e d u n d e r t h e institu­ t i o n a l c o n d i t i o n s of a n a l r e a d y c o n s t i t u t e d j u s t society, a n d t h e p r o c ­ ess of realizing t h e system of basic r i g h t s c a n n o t b e a s s u r e d o n a n o n g o i n g basis. It is n o t possible for t h e citizens to e x p e r i e n c e this p r o c e s s as o p e n a n d i n c o m p l e t e , as t h e shifting historical cir­ cumstances nonetheless d e m a n d . They c a n n o t reignite the radical d e m o c r a t i c e m b e r s of t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n in t h e civic life of t h e i r society, for f r o m t h e i r p e r s p e c t i v e all of t h e essential d i s c o u r s e s of

70 Chapter 2

legitimation have already taken place within the theory; a n d they find t h e results of t h e t h e o r y a l r e a d y s e d i m e n t e d in t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n . B e c a u s e t h e citizens c a n n o t conceive of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n as a project, t h e p u b l i c u s e of r e a s o n d o e s n o t actually h a v e t h e significance of a p r e s e n t exercise of political a u t o n o m y b u t m e r e l y p r o m o t e s t h e n o n v i o l e n t preservation of political stability. G r a n t e d , this r e a d i n g d o e s n o t reflect Rawls's i n t e n t i o n in f o r m u l a t i n g his t h e o r y , b u t if I a m c o r r e c t it u n c o v e r s o n e of its u n d e s i r e d c o n s e q u e n c e s . T h i s is s h o w n , for e x a m p l e , by t h e rigid b o u n d a r y b e t w e e n t h e political a n d t h e n o n p u b l i c i d e n t i t i e s of t h e citizens. A c c o r d i n g to Rawls, this b o u n d ­ a r y is set by basic liberal r i g h t s w h i c h c o n s t r a i n d e m o c r a t i c self-leg­ islation, a n d with it t h e s p h e r e of t h e political, from the beginning, t h a t is, p r i o r t o all political will-formation. 23

Rawls uses t h e t e r m "political" in a t h r e e f o l d sense. T h u s far we h a v e b e c o m e a c q u a i n t e d with t h e t h e o r e t i c a l m e a n i n g : a c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e is political a n d n o t m e t a p h y s i c a l w h e n it is n e u t r a l t o w a r d conflicting worldviews. F u r t h e r , Rawls uses t h e t e r m "political" in t h e u s u a l sense to classify m a t t e r s of p u b l i c i n t e r e s t , so t h a t political p h i l o s o p h y limits itself to t h e justification of t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l f r a m e ­ w o r k a n d t h e basic s t r u c t u r e of society. B o t h m e a n i n g s a r e u l t i m a t e l y c o m b i n e d in a n i n t e r e s t i n g way in Rawls's t r e a t m e n t of "political values." "Political" in this t h i r d sense c o n s t i t u t e s a f u n d b o t h for s h a r e d convictions of citizens a n d for t h e p u r p o s e of d e l i m i t i n g a n o b j e c t - d o m a i n . Rawls treats t h e political value s p h e r e , w h i c h is dis­ t i n g u i s h e d in m o d e r n societies f r o m o t h e r c u l t u r a l value s p h e r e s , as s o m e t h i n g given, a l m o s t in t h e m a n n e r of a n e o - K a n t i a n like M a x Weber. F o r only with r e f e r e n c e to political values, w h a t e v e r t h e y m a y b e , c a n h e split t h e m o r a l p e r s o n i n t o t h e p u b l i c identity of a citizen a n d t h e n o n p u b l i c i d e n t i t y of a private p e r s o n s h a p e d by his o r h e r i n d i v i d u a l c o n c e p t i o n of t h e g o o d . T h e s e two i d e n t i t i e s t h e n consti­ t u t e t h e r e f e r e n c e p o i n t s for two d o m a i n s , t h e o n e c o n s t i t u t e d by r i g h t s of political p a r t i c i p a t i o n a n d c o m m u n i c a t i o n , t h e o t h e r p r o ­ t e c t e d by basic liberal rights. T h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o t e c t i o n of t h e private s p h e r e in this way enjoys p r i o r i t y while t h e "role of t h e political liberties is . . . largely i n s t r u m e n t a l in p r e s e r v i n g t h e o t h e r l i b e r t i e s . " T h u s with r e f e r e n c e to t h e political value s p h e r e a p r e political d o m a i n of liberties is d e l i m i t e d w h i c h is w i t h d r a w n f r o m t h e r e a c h of d e m o c r a t i c self-legislation. 24

71 Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason

B u t s u c h a n a p r i o r i b o u n d a r y b e t w e e n private a n d p u b l i c a u t o n ­ o m y n o t o n l y c o n t r a d i c t s t h e r e p u b l i c a n i n t u i t i o n t h a t p o p u l a r sov­ e r e i g n t y a n d h u m a n r i g h t s a r e n o u r i s h e d by t h e s a m e r o o t ; it also conflicts with historical e x p e r i e n c e , a b o v e all with t h e fact t h a t t h e historically shifting b o u n d a r y b e t w e e n t h e private a n d p u b l i c s p h e r e s h a s always b e e n p r o b l e m a t i c f r o m a n o r m a t i v e p o i n t of v i e w . I n a d d i t i o n , t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e welfare state shows t h a t t h e b o u n d a r i e s b e t w e e n t h e private a n d p u b l i c a u t o n o m y of citizens are* in flux a n d t h a t s u c h differentiations m u s t b e s u b j e c t e d to t h e political will-formation of t h e citizens if t h e latter a r e to h a v e t h e o p p o r t u n i t y to p r e s s a legal claim to t h e "fair v a l u e " of t h e i r liberties. A t h e o r y of j u s t i c e c a n take b e t t e r a c c o u n t of this c i r c u m s t a n c e if it differentiates t h e "political" in a c c o r d a n c e with t h e c r i t e r i o n of "legal r e g u l a t i o n " ( m e n t i o n e d only in p a s s i n g by Rawls). It is ulti­ m a t e l y by m e a n s of positive a n d coercive law t h a t t h e life of a political c o m m u n i t y is legitimately r e g u l a t e d (PL 2 1 5 ) . T h e basic q u e s t i o n t h e n is: W h i c h r i g h t s m u s t free a n d e q u a l p e r s o n s m u t u a l l y a c c o r d o n e a n o t h e r if they wish to r e g u l a t e t h e i r c o e x i s t e n c e by t h e l e g i t i m a t e m e a n s of positive a n d coercive law? A c c o r d i n g to K a n t ' s c o n c e p t i o n of legality, coercive law e x t e n d s only to t h e e x t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n p e r s o n s a n d a d d r e s s e s t h e f r e e d o m of c h o i c e of subjects w h o a r e allowed t o follow t h e i r o w n c o n c e p t i o n of t h e g o o d . H e n c e m o d e r n law, o n t h e o n e h a n d , c o n s t i t u t e s t h e status of legal subjects in t e r m s of a c t i o n a b l e subjective liberties t h a t m a y b e e x e r c i s e d by e a c h a c c o r d i n g to h e r o w n p r e f e r e n c e s . Since it m u s t also b e possible to o b e y a legal o r d e r for m o r a l r e a s o n s , t h e status of private legal subjects is legitimately d e t e r m i n e d by t h e r i g h t to equal subjective l i b e r t i e s . As positive o r codified law, o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , this m e d i u m calls for a political legislator, w h e r e t h e legiti­ m a c y of legislation is a c c o u n t e d for by a d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e d u r e t h a t s e c u r e s t h e a u t o n o m y of t h e citizens. Citizens a r e politically a u t o n o ­ m o u s only if t h e y c a n view t h e m s e l v e s as t h e j o i n t a u t h o r s of t h e laws to w h i c h t h e y a r e subject as i n d i v i d u a l a d d r e s s e e s . T h e dialectical r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n private a n d p u b l i c a u t o n o m y b e ­ c o m e s clear in light of t h e fact t h a t t h e status of s u c h d e m o c r a t i c citizens e q u i p p e d with l a w m a k i n g c o m p e t e n c e s c a n b e institutional­ ized in t u r n only by m e a n s of coercive law. B u t b e c a u s e this law is d i r e c t e d to p e r s o n s w h o c o u l d n o t even a s s u m e t h e status of legal 25

26

72 Chapter 2

subjects w i t h o u t subjective private rights, private a n d p u b l i c a u t o n ­ o m y of citizens mutually p r e s u p p o s e e a c h o t h e r . As we h a v e s e e n , b o t h e l e m e n t s a r e a l r e a d y i n t e r w o v e n in t h e c o n c e p t of positive a n d coercive law: t h e r e c a n b e n o law at all w i t h o u t a c t i o n a b l e subjective liberties t h a t g u a r a n t e e t h e private a u t o n o m y of i n d i v i d u a l legal subjects, a n d n o l e g i t i m a t e law w i t h o u t collective d e m o c r a t i c law­ m a k i n g by citizens w h o , as free a n d e q u a l , a r e e n t i t l e d t o p a r t i c i p a t e in this p r o c e s s . O n c e t h e c o n c e p t of law h a s b e e n clarified in this way it b e c o m e s clear t h a t t h e n o r m a t i v e s u b s t a n c e of basic liberal r i g h t s is a l r e a d y c o n t a i n e d in t h e i n d i s p e n s a b l e m e d i u m for t h e legal i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n of t h e p u b l i c u s e of r e a s o n of sovereign citizens. T h e m a i n objects of f u r t h e r analysis a r e t h e n t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s a n d t h e p r o c e d u r e of a discursive p r o c e s s of o p i n ­ ion- a n d will-formation in w h i c h t h e p u b l i c u s e of r e a s o n is m a n i ­ fested. I c a n n o t discuss this a l t e r n a t i v e in g r e a t e r detail in t h e present context. 2 7

S u c h a p r o c e d u r a l m o r a l a n d legal t h e o r y is at t h e s a m e t i m e b o t h m o r e a n d less m o d e s t t h a n Rawls's t h e o r y . It is m o r e m o d e s t i n t h a t it focuses exclusively o n t h e p r o c e d u r a l aspects of t h e p u b l i c u s e of r e a s o n a n d derives t h e system of r i g h t s f r o m t h e i d e a of its legal i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n . It c a n leave m o r e q u e s t i o n s o p e n ^because it e n t r u s t s m o r e t o t h e process of r a t i o n a l o p i n i o n - a n d will-formation. P h i l o s o p h y s h o u l d e r s different t h e o r e t i c a l b u r d e n s when* as o n Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n , it claims to e l a b o r a t e t h e i d e a of a j u s t society, while t h e citizens t h e n u s e this i d e a as a p l a t f o r m f r o m w h i c h to j u d g e existing a r r a n g e m e n t s a n d policies. By c o n t r a s t , I p r o p o s e t h a t phi^^ clarification of t h e m o r a J p o i n t of view a n d j h g ^ r j r o c e d u r e of d e m o c r a t i c l ^ i t i m a t i p i y t o t h e analysis of t h e c o n d i t i o n s of r a t i o n a l discourses a n d n e g o t i a t i o n s . I n this m o r e mocTesFrole^ p h i l o s o p h y n e e d n o t p r o c e e d in a c o n s t r u c t i v e , b u t only in a reconstructive fashion. It leaves substantial q u e s t i o n s t h a t m u s t b e a n s w e r e c T h e r e a n d n o w to t h e m o r e o r less e n l i g h t e n e d e n g a g e m e n t of p a r t i c i p a n t s , w h i c h d o e s n o t m e a n t h a t p h i l o s o p h e r s m<^ p u b l i c d e b a t e , t h o u g h in t h e r o l e of B u t Rawls insists o n a m o d e s t y of a different k i n d . H e w a n t s to e x t e n d t h e " m e t h o d of a v o i d a n c e , " w h i c h is i n t e n d e d to l e a d to a n

73 R e c o n c i l i a t i o n t h r o u g h t h e P u b l i c U s e of R e a s o n

o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s o n q u e s t i o n s of political j u s t i c e , to t h e p h i l o ­ s o p h i c a l e n t e r p r i s e . H e h o p e s to d e v e l o p political p h i l o s o p h y i n t o a sharply f o c u s e d discipline a n d t h e r e b y avoid m o s t of t h e c o n t r o v e r ­ sial q u e s t i o n s of a m o r e g e n e r a l n a t u r e . T h i s a v o i d a n c e strategy c a n l e a d t o a n impressively self-contained theory, as we c a n see f r o m t h e w o n d e r f u l e x a m p l e b e f o r e us. B u t even Rawls c a n n o t d e v e l o p his t h e o r y in as " f r e e s t a n d i n g " a fashion as h e w o u l d like. As we have s e e n , his "political c o n s t r u c t i v i s m " draws h i m willy-nilly i n t o a dis­ p u t e c o n c e r n i n g c o n c e p t s of rationality a n d t r u t h . H i s c o n c e p t of t h e ^ p e r s o n as well^QverstepsJ±te b o u n d a r i e s o f j D q l i t ^ T h e s e a n d o t h e r p r e l i m i n a r y t h e o r e t i c a l d e c i s i o n s involve h i m in as m a n y l o n g - r u n n i n g a n d still u n r e s o l v e d d e b a t e s . T h e subject m a t t e r itself, it s e e m s to m e , m a k e s a p r e s u m p t u o u s e n c r o a c h m e n t o n n e i g h b o r i n g fields often u n a v o i d a b l e a n d at t i m e s even fruitful.

3 9

"Reasonable" versus "True/ or the Morality of Worldviews

i

J o h n Rawls claims t h a t his i d e a of 'justice as fairness" is a "freestand­ i n g " c o n c e p t i o n : it is s u p p o s e d to "move entirely w i t h i n t h e d o m a i n of t h e political" a n d "leave p h i l o s o p h y as it is." T h e g o a l a n d feasi­ bility of this strategy of a v o i d a n c e d e p e n d o n h o w we u n d e r s t a n d t h e t e r m "political." Rawls uses it in t h e first p l a c e to specify t h e object d o m a i n of a political t h e o r y t h a t deals with t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l f r a m e a n d basic s t r u c t u r e of a ( m o d e r n ) society. T h e c o n v e n t i o n a l e l e m e n t in t h e c h o i c e of basic c o n c e p t s is n e v e r b e y o n d controversy; b u t o n c e a t h e o r y d e m o n s t r a t e s its utility s u c h discussions lose t h e i r p o i n t . However, a s e c o n d a n d less trivial u s e of t h e t e r m — " p o l i t i c a l " in c o n t r a s t with "metaphysical"—leads to c o n t r o v e r s i e s t h a t c a n n o t b e so easily r e s o l v e d . 1

Rawls uses t h e t e r m "political" in c o n t r a s t with "metaphysical" to c h a r a c t e r i z e t h o s e c o n c e p t i o n s of j u s t i c e t h a t satisfy a n essential r e q u i r e m e n t of liberalism: n e u t r a l i t y t o w a r d c o m p e t i n g worldviews o r " c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e s . " W i t h t h e t e r m "political" Rawls h e r e associates a p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of neutrality: "it m e a n s t h a t we m u s t d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n h o w a political c o n c e p t i o n is p r e s e n t e d a n d its b e i n g p a r t of, o r derivable within, a c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c ­ t r i n e . " T h e k i n d of n e u t r a l i t y t h a t defines t h e "political" c h a r a c t e r of 'justice as fairness" is e x p l a i n e d by its b e i n g able to b e p r e s e n t e d as "freestanding." A n d this status is e x p l a i n e d in t u r n by o n e of t h e m o s t striking a s s u m p t i o n s of Rawls's t h e o r y : "I a s s u m e all citizens to affirm a c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e to w h i c h t h e political c o n c e p t i o n 2

76 Chapter 3

they a c c e p t is in s o m e way r e l a t e d . B u t a d i s t i n g u i s h i n g f e a t u r e of a political c o n c e p t i o n is t h a t it is . . . e x p o u n d e d a p a r t from, o r with­ o u t r e f e r e n c e to, a n y s u c h w i d e r b a c k g r o u n d . . . . [ T ] h e political c o n c e p t i o n is a m o d u l e . . . t h a t fits i n t o a n d c a n b e s u p p o r t e d by various r e a s o n a b l e c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e s t h a t e n d u r e in t h e so­ ciety r e g u l a t e d by it" (PL 12). I n this s e c o n d m e a n i n g , t h e t e r m "political" d o e s n o t refer to a specific subject m a t t e r b u t to t h e p e c u l i a r e p i s t e m i c status to w h i c h political c o n c e p t i o n s of j u s t i c e s h o u l d aspire: t h e y s h o u l d b e able to f o r m a c o h e r e n t p a r t of various c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e s . I n addi­ t i o n t h e y c a n b e justified only w i t h i n a c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e , a l t h o u g h they c a n b e c o n c e i v e d a n d " e x p o u n d e d " — t h a t is, i n t r o ­ d u c e d in a p l a u s i b l e m a n n e r — i n d e p e n d e n t l y of any worldview. Rawls's "political liberalism" also aspires to t h e status of a freestand­ i n g t h e o r y . Since this status itself r e q u i r e s e x p l a n a t i o n w i t h i n t h e t h e o r y , " f r e e s t a n d i n g " in this c o n t e x t h a s a d o u b l e r e f e r e n c e . O n t h e o n e h a n d , it specifies a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n of all c o n c e p t i o n s of j u s t i c e t h a t qualify as c a n d i d a t e s for i n c l u s i o n in a n " o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s . " At t h e s a m e t i m e t h e p r e d i c a t e " f r e e s t a n d i n g " is sup­ p o s e d to apply to t h e v e r y t h e o r y t h a t e x p l a i n s it: 'justice as fairness" is o n e of t h e m o s t p r o m i s i n g a m o n g t h o s e c a n d i d a t e s . T h i s selfr e f e r e n t i a l u s e of " f r e e s t a n d i n g " c a n b e u n d e r s t o o d as a political claim: Rawls a s s u m e s t h a t his o w n t h e o r y — u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s of "gen­ eral a n d w i d e reflective e q u i l i b r i u m " — p r o v i d e s a basis o n w h i c h t h e m e m b e r s of c o n t e m p o r a r y A m e r i c a n (or any o t h e r m o d e r n ) civil society c o u l d achieve a basic political a g r e e m e n t . 3

Less plausible, however, is Rawls's b u r d e n i n g of t h e self-referential u s e of " f r e e s t a n d i n g " with a f u r t h e r claim of a different, t h e o r e t i c a l k i n d . H e s e e m s to t h i n k t h a t a t h e o r y t h a t is f r e e s t a n d i n g in t h e political d o m a i n will b e f r e e s t a n d i n g in t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l d o m a i n as well a n d will steer clear of all c o n t r o v e r s i a l m e t a p h y s i c a l p r o b l e m s — "leaving p h i l o s o p h y as it is." B u t it is h a r d to see h o w Rawls c a n e x p l a i n t h e e p i s t e m i c status of a f r e e s t a n d i n g political c o n c e p t i o n , w i t h o u t t a k i n g a p o s i t i o n o n p h i l o s o p h i c a l q u e s t i o n s w h i c h , while n o t falling u n d e r t h e c a t e g o r y of t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l , n e v e r t h e l e s s r e a c h well b e y o n d t h e d o m a i n of t h e political. T h e t e r m "metaphysical" a c q u i r e s its special m e a n i n g w i t h i n t h e t h e o r y f r o m its o p p o s i t i o n to t h e t e r m "political." I n m o d e r n socie-

77 "Reasonable" versus "True"

ties a c o n s e n s u s o n p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e t h a t is n e u t r a l with r e s p e c t to worldviews, a n d h e n c e inclusive, is r e q u i r e d in view of religious a n d c u l t u r a l p l u r a l i s m . A t h e o r y t h a t a i m s even t o foster s u c h a c o n s e n s u s m u s t certainly b e "political a n d n o t m e t a p h y s i c a l " in this sense. B u t it d o e s n o t follow t h a t political t h e o r y c a n itself m o v e entirely w i t h i n t h e d o m a i n of t h e political (R 133) a n d s t e e r clear of s t u b b o r n p h i l o s o p h i c a l controversies. P h i l o s o p h y c a n m o v e b e y o n d t h e d o m a i n of t h e political in different d i r e c t i o n s . T h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l e n t e r p r i s e is ihstitutionally f r a m e d in t e r m s of a c o o p e r a t i v e s e a r c h for t h e t r u t h a n d is n o t necessarily i n t e r n a l l y r e l a t e d to m e t a p h y s i c s (as c o n c e i v e d in Political Liberalism). If t h e e x p l a n a t i o n of t h e e p i s t e m i c status of a f r e e s t a n d i n g c o n c e p t i o n involves u s in n o n p o litical q u e s t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g r e a s o n a n d t r u t h , this d o e s n o t n e c e s ­ sarily m e a n t h a t we m u s t e n g a g e with m e t a p h y s i c a l p r o b l e m s a n d controversies. T h e following investigation seeks to illustrate this p o i n t in a n i n d i r e c t , so to speak, p e r f o r m a t i v e way. It will a t t e m p t to clarify explicitly t h e e p i s t e m i c status of a f r e e s t a n d i n g c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e ( w h e r e " f r e e s t a n d i n g " is u n d e r s t o o d in a n u n p r o b l e m a t i c , political s e n s e ) . I w a n t to e x a m i n e h o w Rawls's division of l a b o r b e t w e e n t h e political a n d t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l , w h i c h is r e f l e c t e d in a p e c u l i a r d e ­ p e n d e n c e of t h e " r e a s o n a b l e " o n t h e " t r u e , " actually works. It is far f r o m o b v i o u s why publicly d e f e n s i b l e a n d a c t o r - i n d e p e n d e n t r e a s o n s s h o u l d only s u p p o r t t h e " r e a s o n a b l e n e s s " of a political c o n c e p t i o n , while n o n p u b l i c a n d actor-relative r e a s o n s s h o u l d b e sufficient to establish t h e s t r o n g a n d a u t o c h t h o n o u s claim to m o r a l " t r u t h . " Rawls's g e n e r o u s a n d d e t a i l e d reply to m y tentative r e m a r k s clarifies a m o n g o t h e r t h i n g s t h e "kinds of justification" t h a t a r e s u p p o s e d t o l e a d to a n o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s . I n t h e light of t h e s e e l u c i d a t i o n s I will a r g u e t h a t r e a s o n a b l e citizens c a n n o t b e e x p e c t e d to d e v e l o p a n o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s so l o n g as t h e y a r e p r e v e n t e d f r o m j o i n t l y a d o p t i n g a m o r a l p o i n t of view i n d e p e n d e n t of, a n d p r i o r to, t h e various p e r s p e c t i v e s they individually a d o p t f r o m w i t h i n e a c h of t h e i r c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e s . T h e n o t i o n of r e a s o n a b l e n e s s is e i t h e r so e t i o l a t e d t h a t it is t o o w e a k to c h a r a c t e r i z e t h e m o d e of validity of a n intersubjectively r e c o g n i z e d c o n c e p t i o n of political j u s t i c e , o r it is d e f i n e d in sufficiently s t r o n g t e r m s , in w h i c h case w h a t is practi­ cally r e a s o n a b l e is i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e f r o m w h a t is m o r a l l y r i g h t . I will 4

78 Chapter 3

try to show why Rawls c a n n o t u l t i m a t e l y avoid giving full w e i g h t t o r e q u i r e m e n t s of p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n t h a t constrain r a t i o n a l c o m p r e h e n ­ sive d o c t r i n e s r a t h e r t h a n m e r e l y reflect t h e i r felicitous o v e r l a p p i n g . Before I e n t e r medias in res I will c h a r a c t e r i z e t h e c h a l l e n g e of t h e m o d e r n c o n d i t i o n to w h i c h t h e o r i e s of j u s t i c e c a n n o t avoid r e s p o n d ­ i n g ( 1 ) . T h e n I will offer a necessarily b r i e f s k e t c h of t h e p h i l o s o p h i ­ cal m o v e f r o m H o b b e s to K a n t ( 2 ) , for this f o r m s t h e b a c k g r o u n d for Rawls's a l t e r n a t i v e a p p r o a c h ( 3 ) . I n t h e m a i n p a r t of t h e essay I will analyze t h e division of t h e b u r d e n s of justification b e t w e e n t h e " r e a s o n a b l e " c o n c e p t i o n s of j u s t i c e a n d t h e "morally t r u e " worldviews ( 4 ) , b e f o r e discussing difficulties t h a t this p o s e s for t h e justification of a n o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s ( 5 ) . Finally, I will offer a r g u m e n t s in s u p p o r t of a p r o c e d u r a l i s t c o n c e p t i o n of t h e "public u s e of r e a s o n " w h i c h is closer to K a n t ( 6 ) . If political j u s t i c e is u n d e r s t o o d i n this way, d e m o c r a t i c self-legislation a s s u m e s t h e posi­ t i o n o c c u p i e d by t h e negative liberties in Political Liberalism. W i t h this t h e a c c e n t shifts in favor of K a n t i a n R e p u b l i c a n i s m ( 7 ) . 5

1

T h e M o d e r n Condition

Political liberalism p r o v i d e s a r e s p o n s e to t h e c h a l l e n g e p o s e d by t h e fact of p l u r a l i s m . It is p r i m a r i l y c o n c e r n e d with t h e possibility of a c h i e v i n g a c o n s e n s u s o n political essentials w h i c h g r a n t s e q u a l free­ d o m s to all citizens w i t h o u t r e g a r d t o t h e i r c u l t u r a l h e r i t a g e , t h e i r religious convictions, o r t h e i r individual lifestyles. T h e r e q u i r e d c o n ­ sensus o n issues of political j u s t i c e c a n n o l o n g e r b e b a s e d o n a settled t r a d i t i o n a l e t h o s t h a t e n c o m p a s s e s t h e w h o l e of society. Yet m e m b e r s of m o d e r n societies still s h a r e t h e e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t t h e y c a n live t o g e t h e r u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s of fair a n d peaceful c o o p e r a t i o n . I n spite of t h e lack of a substantive c o n s e n s u s o n values r o o t e d in a socially a c c e p t e d worldview, they c o n t i n u e to a p p e a l to m o r a l c o n ­ victions a n d n o r m s t h a t e a c h of t h e m t h i n k s e v e r y o n e else s h o u l d a c c e p t . P e o p l e c o n t i n u e to d e b a t e m o r a l q u e s t i o n s with r e a s o n s t h e y t a k e t o b e c o m p e l l i n g , r e g a r d l e s s of w h e t h e r a m e r e m o d u s vivendi w o u l d b e sufficient for c o o p e r a t i o n . T h e y e n g a g e in m o r a l dis­ c o u r s e s in everyday life as well as in politics, m o s t especially in d i s p u t e s c o n c e r n i n g c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s . T h e s e discourses p e r -

79 "Reasonable" versus "True"

sist, e v e n t h o u g h it is n o t clear w h e t h e r m o r a l d i s p u t e s c a n still b e settled by a r g u m e n t s . Citizens tacitly a t t r i b u t e to e a c h o t h e r a m o r a l sense o r a sense of j u s t i c e o p e r a t i n g across t h e b o u n d a r i e s b e t w e e n different worldviews, while at t h e s a m e t i m e they l e a r n to t o l e r a t e t h e s e differences in o u t l o o k as s o u r c e s of r e a s o n a b l e ethical disagreements. Rawls r e s p o n d s to t h e s e f e a t u r e s of t h e m o d e r n c o n d i t i o n with a constructivist p r o p o s a l to d e v e l o p a sufficiently n e u t r a l c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e a r o u y d w h i c h a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n s e n s u s a m o n g citizens with different religious o r m e t a p h y s i c a l o u t l o o k s c a n crystallize. I n g e n e r a l , m o r a l p h i l o s o p h e r s a n d political t h e o r i s t s have felt t h a t t h e i r task is to p r o v i d e a c o n v i n c i n g substitute for t r a d i t i o n a l justifications of n o r m s a n d p r i n c i p l e s . I n t r a d i t i o n a l societies m o r a l ­ ity was a n i n t e g r a l c o m p o n e n t of o n t o l o g i c a l o r soteriological worldviews t h a t c o u l d c o m m a n d p u b l i c a c c e p t a n c e . M o r a l n o r m s a n d p r i n c i p l e s w e r e viewed as e l e m e n t s of a r a t i o n a l " o r d e r of t h i n g s " i m b u e d with value o r as p a r t of a n e x e m p l a r y way of life l e a d i n g to salvation. O f p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t in t h e p r e s e n t c o n t e x t is t h a t t h e s e "realistic" e x p l a n a t i o n s w e r e p r e s e n t e d in t h e assertoric m o d e of s t a t e m e n t s e x p r e s s i n g t r u t h claims. However, with t h e p u b l i c devalu­ a t i o n of religious o r m e t a p h y s i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n s a n d with t h e rise of t h e e p i s t e m i c a u t h o r i t y of t h e e m p i r i c a l sciences, n o r m a t i v e state­ m e n t s h a v e b e c o m e m o r e sharply d i f f e r e n t i a t e d f r o m descriptive s t a t e m e n t s , o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d f r o m value j u d g m e n t s a n d e x p r e s ­ sive u t t e r a n c e s o n t h e o t h e r . N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g o n e ' s p o s i t i o n o n t h e issue of "is" a n d " o u g h t , " with t h e t r a n s i t i o n t o m o d e r n i t y t h e "ob­ j e c t i v e " r e a s o n e m b o d i e d in n a t u r e o r s a c r e d h i s t o r y was d i s p l a c e d by t h e "subjective" r e a s o n of t h e h u m a n m i n d . W i t h this t h e r e a r o s e t h e q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r n o r m a t i v e s t a t e m e n t s r e t a i n a n y cognitive c o n t e n t a n d , if so, h o w t h e y c a n b e justified. T h i s q u e s t i o n p o s e s a p a r t i c u l a r c h a l l e n g e for t h o s e w h o (like Rawls a n d myself) reject b o t h m o r a l r e a l i s m a n d m o d e r n valueskepticism. T h e m u t u a l a t t r i b u t i o n of a capacity for m o r a l j u d g m e n t w h i c h w e o b s e r v e in everyday life calls for a k i n d of e x p l a n a t i o n t h a t d o e s n o t flady d e n y t h e r e a s o n a b l e c h a r a c t e r of m o r a l a r g u m e n t s . T h a t m o r a l d i s p u t e s persist says s o m e t h i n g a b o u t t h e u n d e r l y i n g s t r u c t u r e of a social life t h a t is s h o t t h r o u g h with trivial validity

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claims. T h e social i n t e g r a t i o n of everyday life d e p e n d s largely o n communicative practices oriented toward m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d b a s e d o n t h e r e c o g n i t i o n of fallible claims to validity. A g a i n s t this b a c k g r o u n d , t h e p r e m i s e with w h i c h H o b b e s s o u g h t to l e a d practical p h i l o s o p h y o u t of its d e a d e n d d o e s n o t a p p e a r especially plausible. H e w a n t e d to r e d u c e practical r e a s o n to instru­ m e n t a l r e a s o n . I n d e e d , to this very day t h e r e a r e s o p h i s t i c a t e d ap­ p r o a c h e s in t h e H o b b e s i a n c o n t r a c t u a l i s t t r a d i t i o n t h a t conceive of m o r a l r e a s o n s as r a t i o n a l motives a n d r e d u c e m o r a l j u d g m e n t to r a t i o n a l c h o i c e . T h e social c o n t r a c t is s u p p o s e d to p r o v i d e a p r o c e ­ d u r e for r e a c h i n g a g r e e m e n t b a s e d solely o n t h e e n l i g h t e n e d selfi n t e r e s t of t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s . T h e c o n t r a c t i n g p a r t i e s n e e d only c o n ­ sider w h e t h e r it is a d v a n t a g e o u s o r r a t i o n a l for t h e m in l i g h t of t h e i r desires a n d p r e f e r e n c e s t o a d o p t a r u l e of a c t i o n o r a system of s u c h r u l e s . B u t it is well k n o w n t h a t this strategy misses t h e specific obliga­ tory force of b i n d i n g n o r m s a n d valid m o r a l s t a t e m e n t s , as is s h o w n by t h e p r o b l e m of t h e free rider. I will simply cite in p a s s i n g T h o m a s S c a n l o n ' s a r g u m e n t a g a i n s t utilitarianism: " T h e r i g h t - m a k i n g force of a p e r s o n ' s desires is specified by w h a t m i g h t b e called a c o n c e p ­ t i o n of m o r a l l y l e g i t i m a t e interests. S u c h a c o n c e p t i o n is a p r o d u c t of m o r a l a r g u m e n t ; it is n o t given, as t h e n o t i o n of individual wellb e i n g m a y b e , simply by t h e i d e a of w h a t it is r a t i o n a l for a n individ­ u a l to d e s i r e . " B u t if t h e cognitive c o n t e n t of n o r m a t i v e s t a t e m e n t s c a n n o t b e e x p l a i n e d in t e r m s of i n s t r u m e n t a l rationality, to w h a t c o n c e p t i o n of practical r e a s o n m u s t we t h e n a p p e a l ? 6

7

2

From H o b b e s to Kant

H e r e we a r e faced with t h e a l t e r n a t i v e t h a t p r o v i d e d t h e decisive i m p u l s e for Rawls's t h e o r e t i c a l i n n o v a t i o n : we c a n e i t h e r follow t h e p a t h l e a d i n g f r o m H o b b e s to K a n t a n d d e v e l o p a n o t i o n of p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n t h a t in s o m e way p r e s e r v e s t h e cognitive c o n t e n t of m o r a l j t a t e m e n t s , o r we c a n fall b a c k o n c e a g a i n o n t h e ( " % r o n g " t r a d i t i o n s 2) a n d " c o m p r e h e n s i v e " d o c t r i n e s t h a t g r o u n d t h e t r u t h of t h e m o r a l c o n c e p t i o n s e m b e d d e d in t h e m . W h i c h e v e r r o u t e we take we e n ­ c o u n t e r obstacles. If we take t h e f o r m e r , we h a v e to d i s t i n g u i s h practical r e a s o n clearly f r o m t h e o r e t i c a l r e a s o n , b u t in s u c h a way

81 "Reasonable" versus "True"

that it does not completely lose its cognitive force; if we take the latter, we have to cope with the irreducible plurality of worldviews that are held to be true within each of the corresponding commu­ nities of believers, although everyone knows that only one of them can be true. _ —^ I n (the K a n t i a n tracEtio^ practical reason provides the perspective from which moral norms and principles can be judged in an impar­ tial manner. T h i s "moral point of view" has been explained in terms of various principles or procedures, be it the categorical imperative or G. H . M e a d ' s ideal role-taking, Scanlon's rule of argumentation or Rawls's construction of an original position that imposes suitable constraints on the rational choice of participants. E a c h of these different designs is intended to yield an agreement or an under­ standing that satisfies our intuitions concerning equal respect and mutual solidarity with everybody. Since the principles and norms selected in this way claim universal recognition, a procedurally cor­ rect agreement must be "rationally motivated" in an epistemic sense. T h e reasons that bear on the outcome must carry an epistemic weight and may not simply express what it is rational for a particular person to do in light of her existing preferences. O n e way to capture the epistemic character of practical delibera­ tions is through a precise description of how, from a moral point of view, individual interests that provide the i n p u t for deliberation in the form of rational motives change their role and meaning in the course of argumentation. I n practical discourses, only those interests "count" for the outcome that are presented as intersubjectively rec­ ognized values and hence are candidates for inclusion in the semantic content of valid norms. O n l y generalizable value-orientations, which all participants (and all those affected) can accept with good reasons as appropriate for regulating the subject matter at hand, and which can thereby acquire binding normative force, pass this threshold. A n "interest" can be described as a "value-orientation" when it is shared by other members of a community in similar situations. T h u s an interest only deserves consideration from the moral point of view once it is stripped of its intrinsic relation to a first person perspec­ tive. O n c e it is translated into an intersubjectively shared evaluative vocabulary, it is n o longer tied to contingent desires and preferences

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a n d c a n achieve, as a c a n d i d a t e for v a l u e - g e n e r a l i z a t i o n in m o r a l justification, t h e e p i s t e m i c status of a n a r g u m e n t . W h a t e n t e r s dis­ c o u r s e as a d e s i r e o r p r e f e r e n c e survives t h e g e n e r a l i z a t i o n test only u n d e r t h e d e s c r i p t i o n of a value t h a t a p p e a r s to b e g e n e r a l l y accept­ a b l e to all p a r t i c i p a n t s as a basis for r e g u l a t i n g t h e r e l e v a n t m a t t e r . L e t us a s s u m e t h a t p r a c t i c a l d e l i b e r a t i o n c a n b e analyzed as a f o r m of a r g u m e n t a t i o n different f r o m b o t h r a t i o n a l c h o i c e a n d factstating d i s c o u r s e . A p r a g m a t i c t h e o r y of a r g u m e n t a t i o n w o u l d t h e n p r o v i d e a suitable basis for d e v e l o p i n g a c o n c e p t i o n of p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n distinct f r o m b o t h i n s t r u m e n t a l a n d t h e o r e t i c a l r e a s o n . We w o u l d t h e r e b y p r e s e r v e a n e p i s t e m i c m e a n i n g for o u g h t s e n t e n c e s w i t h o u t assimilating t h e m t o assertoric s e n t e n c e s o r r e d u c i n g t h e i r validity to i n s t r u m e n t a l rationality. However, t h e analogy b e t w e e n t r u t h a n d n o r m a t i v e r i g h t n e s s t h a t r e m a i n s i n t a c t w o u l d certainly give rise to f u r t h e r q u e s t i o n s . We c o u l d n o m o r e avoid b e i n g d r a w n i n t o t h e familiar d e b a t e s c o n c e r n i n g s e m a n t i c a n d p r a g m a t i c c o n ­ c e p t i o n s of t r u t h a n d justification t h a n i n t o t h e discussions a b o u t t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n m e a n i n g a n d validity, t h e s t r u c t u r e a n d r o l e of a r g u m e n t s , t h e logic, p r o c e d u r e , a n d c o m m u n i c a t i v e s t r u c t u r e of a r g u m e n t a t i o n , a n d so f o r t h . We w o u l d h a v e to d e a l with t h e p r o b ­ l e m of t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e social w o r l d a n d t h e objective a n d subjective w o r l d s a n d w o u l d u n a v o i d a b l y b e d r a w n i n t o l o n g r u n n i n g d e b a t e s a b o u t rationality. H e n c e Rawls h a s g o o d r e a s o n s to try to avoid discussions of this k i n d — e v e n if o n e d o e s n o t classify t h e s e c o n t r o v e r s i e s i m m e d i a t e l y as "metaphysical." Q n t h e o t h e r h a n d , w h e t h e r t h e a v o i d a n c e strategy of m a k i n g a c l e a n s e p a r a t i o n of t h e political f r o m t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l c a n m e e t with success is a different q u e s t i o n . Rawls initially followed t h e straight­ f o r w a r d K a n t i a n strategy; in A Theory of Justice he set h i m s e l f t h e task of e x p l i c a t i n g t h e " m o r a l p o i n t of view" in t e r m s of t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n . However, t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of 'justice as fairness" was in­ f o r m e d by a c o n c e p t i o n of p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n e m b o d i e d in t h e two " h i g h e r capacities" of m o r a l p e r s o n s . Rawls d e v e l o p e d this "Kantian c o n s t r u c t i v i s m " f u r t h e r in t h e Dewey L e c t u r e s a n d this a p p r o a c h still leaves its traces in t h e t h i r d c h a p t e r of Political Liberalism. B u t this b o o k r e p r e s e n t s a shift to a n entirely n e w f r a m e w o r k w i t h i n w h i c h r e a s o n loses its c e n t r a l p o s i t i o n . Practical r e a s o n is r o b b e d of 8

83 "Reasonable" versus "True"

its m o r a l c o r e a n d is d e f l a t e d to a r e a s o n a b l e n e s s t h a t b e c o m e s d e p e n d e n t o n m o r a l t r u t h s justified o t h e r w i s e . T h e m o r a l validity of c o n c e p t i o n s of j u s t i c e is n o w n o l o n g e r g r o u n d e d in a universally b i n d i n g practical r e a s o n b u t in t h e lucky c o n v e r g e n c e of r e a s o n a b l e worldviews w h o s e m o r a l c o m p o n e n t s o v e r l a p to a sufficient d e g r e e . However, t h e r e m n a n t s of t h e o r i g i n a l c o n c e p t i o n c a n n o t b e seam­ lessly i n t e g r a t e d i n t o t h e c u r r e n t t h e o r y Two conflicting justification p r o g r a m s clash in Political Liberalism. T h e i d e a of t h e o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s involves a decisive w e a k e n i n g of t h e r a t i o n a l claim of t h e K a n t i a n c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e . I n w h a t follows, I will first o u t l i n e t h e n e w division of t h e b u r d e n s of justifica­ t i o n b e t w e e n t h e " r e a s o n a b l e n e s s " of political j u s t i c e a n d t h e " t r u t h " of worldviews a n d will t h e n e x a m i n e c e r t a i n i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s w h i c h suggest t h a t Rawls hesitates to s u b o r d i n a t e practical r e a s o n to t h e m o r a l i t y of worldviews to t h e e x t e n t called for by his favored alter­ native to K a n t i a n a p p r o a c h e s . 3

T h e Alternative to Kantian Proceduralism

A n o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s o c c u r s " w h e n all t h e r e a s o n a b l e m e m b e r s of political society c a r r y o u t a justification of t h e s h a r e d political c o n c e p t i o n by e m b e d d i n g it in t h e i r several r e a s o n a b l e c o m p r e h e n ­ sive views" (R 1 4 3 ) . T h u s Rawls advocates a division of l a b o r b e t w e e n t h e political a n d t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l t h a t l e a d s to a d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n what all citizens c a n a g r e e u p o n a n d the reasons for t h e i r individually a c c e p t i n g it as t r u e . T h i s c o n s t r u c t i o n p r e s u p p o s e s precisely two perspectives: e a c h citizen c o m b i n e s t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of a p a r t i c i p a n t < with t h a t of a n observer. O b s e r v e r s c a n d e s c r i b e w h a t h a p p e n s in t h e political r e a l m , for e x a m p l e , t h a t a n o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s h a s o c c u r r e d . T h e y c a n see t h a t this a g r e e m e n t is t h e r e s u l t of t h e successful o v e r l a p p i n g of t h e m o r a l c o m p o n e n t s of different relig­ ious o r m e t a p h y s i c a l worldviews a n d t h a t it c o n t r i b u t e s to t h e stabil­ ity of t h e c o m m u n i t y . B u t in t h e objectifying a t t i t u d e of o b s e r v e r s , citizens c a n n o t p e n e t r a t e e a c h o t h e r s ' worldviews a n d j u d g e t h e i r t r u t h c o n t e n t f r o m t h e i n t e r n a l p e r s p e c t i v e p e c u l i a r to e a c h . B o u n d by t h e c o n s t r a i n t s of factual d i s c o u r s e , t h e y c a n n o t take a s t a n d o n w h a t c o m m i t t e d p a r t i c i p a n t s claim to b e t r u e , r i g h t , a n d valuable

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f r o m t h e i r first p e r s o n perspectives. If citizens w a n t to raise claims a b o u t w h a t is m o r a l l y t r u e or, m o r e generally, a b o u t " c o n c e p t i o n s of w h a t is of value in h u m a n life" (PL 175), t h e y h a v e to shift to t h e p a r t i c i p a n t ' s p e r s p e c t i v e i n s c r i b e d in t h e i r o w n c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c ­ t r i n e . F o r thick c o m p r e h e n s i v e worldviews a r e t h e only s o u r c e of r e a s o n s for justifying m o r a l s t a t e m e n t s a n d value j u d g m e n t s . M o r a l r e a s o n s for a p r e s u m p t i v e l y s h a r e d c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e a r e by definition nonpublic. A citizen c a n c o n v i n c e h e r s e l f of t h e t r u t h of a c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e suitable for e v e r y b o d y only f r o m w i t h i n h e r o w n i n t e r p r e t i v e f r a m e w o r k . S u c h a c o n c e p t i o n d e m o n s t r a t e s its suitability to serve as a s h a r e d p l a t f o r m for a public justification of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l essen­ tials by t h e fact t h a t it m e e t s with t h e a g r e e m e n t of all p a r t i c i p a n t s o n t h e basis of nonpublic r e a s o n s . O n l y t h e lucky c o n v e r g e n c e of t h e differently m o t i v a t e d n o n p u b l i c r e a s o n s c a n g e n e r a t e t h e p u b l i c validity o r " r e a s o n a b l e n e s s " of t h e c o n t e n t of this " o v e r l a p p i n g con­ s e n s u s " t h a t e v e r y o n e accepts. A g r e e m e n t in c o n c l u s i o n s results f r o m p r e m i s e s r o o t e d in different o u t l o o k s . It is significant for t h e d e s i g n of t h e t h e o r y as a w h o l e t h a t t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s c a n only register this c o n v e r g e n c e as a social fact: " T h e e x p r e s s c o n t e n t s of t h e s e d o c t r i n e s h a v e n o n o r m a t i v e r o l e in p u b l i c justification" (R 144)^ At this stage Rawls d o e s n o t allow his citizens a t h i r d p e r s p e c t i v e in a d d i t i o n to t h a t of t h e o b s e r v e r a n d p a r t i c i p a n t s . Before a n o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n ­ sus is e s t a b l i s h e d t h e r e is n o p u b l i c , i n t e r s u b j e c t i v d y ^ s h a r e d p e r s p e c ­ tive f r o m w h i c h t h e citizens c o u l d m a k e ^ i n h e r e n t l y ) i m p a r t i a l j u d g m e n t s . T h e citizens a r e d e n i e d t h e " m o r a l p o i n t of view" f r o m w h i c h t h e y c o u l d d e v e l o p a n d justify a political c o n c e p t i o n in joint public deliberation. W h a t Rawls calls t h e "public u s e of r e a s o n " p r e s u p ­ p o s e s t h e s h a r e d p l a t f o r m of a n a l r e a d y a c h i e v e d political c o n s e n s u s o n f u n d a m e n t a l s . T h e citizens c a n avail t h e m s e l v e s of this p l a t f o r m only post festum, t h a t is, as a consequence of t h e e m e r g i n g "overlap" of t h e i r different b a c k g r o u n d convictions: "Only w h e n t h e r e is a rea­ s o n a b l e o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s c a n political society's political c o n U

c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e be publicly . . . j u s t i f i e d " (R 144, m y e m p h a s i s ) . T h e m o d e l for t h e c o m p l e m e n t a r y r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e political a n d t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l is p r o v i d e d by a d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e m o d e r n c o n d i t i o n f r o m a "believer's" p o i n t of view, t h a t is, f r o m t h e "meta-

85 "Reasonable" versus "True"

physical" side. T h e division of l a b o r b e t w e e n t h e political a n d t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l reflects t h e c o m p l e m e n t a r y r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n public ag­ nosticism a n d privatized r e l i g i o u s faith, b e t w e e n t h e c o l o r b l i n d n e s s of t h e n e u t r a l state t o w a r d r e l i g i o u s confessions a n d t h e i l l u m i n a t i n g force of worldviews t h a t c o m p e t e for t h e " T r u t h " in t h e e m p h a t i c sense. T h e m o r a l t r u t h s t h a t a r e still e m b e d d e d ir^ r e l i g i o u s o r m e t a p h y s i c a l worldviews s h a r e this s t r o n g claim t o t r u t h , w h e r e a s t h e fact of p l u r a l i s m reveals at t h e s a m e t i m e t h a t t h e c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e s n o l o n g e r a d m i t of p u b l i c justification. T h e i n g e n i o u s division of t h e b u r d e n s of justification relieves political p h i l o s o p h y of t h e t r o u b l i n g task of p r o v i d i n g a substitute for t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l justification of m o r a l t r u t h s . T h o u g h s t r u c k from t h e p u b l i c a g e n d a , t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l n e v e r t h e l e s s r e m a i n s t h e u l t i m a t e g r o u n d of t h e validity of w h a t is m o r a l l y r i g h t a n d ethically g o o d . Th£^rjolitical s p h e r e , by c o n t r a s t , is d e p r i v e d of a n y s o u r c e of validity of its o w n . T h e innovative i d e a of a n " o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s " p r e s e r v e s a n i n t e r n a l c o n n e c t i o n betwejejgLr^ m o r a l c o m p o n e n t s i of, worldviews, t h o u g h with t h e proviso t h a t this r e l a t i o n c a n o n l y b e g r a s p e d by t h e m o r a l i t y of worldviews a n d h e n c e r e m a i n s publicly inaccessible: "it is u p to e a c h c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e to say h o w its i d e a of t h e r e a s o n a b l e c o n n e c t s with its c o n c e p t of t r u t h " (PL 9 4 ) . T h e o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s rests o n t h e c o n v e r g i n g m o r a l s e g m e n t s of t h e d i v e r g i n g totalities of w h a t e a c h citizen h o l d s to b e t r u e . F r o m a n o b s e r v e r ' s p e r s p e c t i v e n o b o d y c a n k n o w w h i c h of t h e c o m p e t i n g belief systems, if any, is actually t r u e . Yet t h e t r u t h of any single o n e of t h e m w o u l d g u a r a n t e e t h a t "all t h e r e a s o n a b l e d o c t r i n e s yield t h e r i g h t c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e , e v e n t h o u g h t h e y d o n o t d o so for t h e r i g h t r e a s o n s as specified by t h e o n e t r u e d o c t r i n e " (PL 1 2 8 ) . Like H o b b e s , Rawls c o n c e n t r a t e s o n q u e s t i o n s of political j u s t i c e , and h e borrows from the Hobbesian tradition the idea that the sought-for p u b l i c a g r e e m e n t m u s t b e s u p p o r t e d by private, n o n p u b ­ lic r e a s o n s . B u t in c o n t r a s t with H o b b e s , for Rawls t h e r a t i o n a l acceptability of p r o p o s a l s t h a t a d m i t of a g r e e m e n t is n o w b a s e d n o t o n t h e c o m p l e m e n t a r y p r e f e r e n c e s of d i f f e r e n t p e r s o n s b u t o n t h e m o r a l s u b s t a n c e of different, t h o u g h c o n v e r g e n t , worldviews. Rawls shares w i t h t h e K a n t i a n t r a d i t i o n t h e i d e a of a m o r a l f o u n d a t i o n of

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political j u s t i c e . T h e m o r a l l y c o n v i n c i n g r e a s o n s s u p p o r t a c o n s e n s u s t h a t g o e s b e y o n d a m e r e m o d u s vivendi. B u t t h e s e r e a s o n s c a n n o t b e publicly i n s p e c t e d by e v e r y o n e i n c o m m o n , given t h a t t h e p u b l i c u s e of r e a s o n d e p e n d s o n a p l a t f o r m t h a t c a n only b e c o n s t r u c t e d o n t h e basis of n o n p u b l i c r e a s o n s . Like a c o m p r o m i s e , t h e overlap­ p i n g c o n s e n s u s rests o n t h e e a c h party's different r e a s o n s ; b u t u n l i k e a c o m p r o m i s e , t h e s e r e a s o n s a r e of a m o r a l k i n d . 4

A Third Perspective for the Reasonable

T h e i d e a of a n o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s calls for a n e x p l a n a t i o n of t h e t e r m " r e a s o n a b l e . " A l t h o u g h t h e a c c e p t a n c e of a f r e e s t a n d i n g c o n ­ c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e is parasitic o n c o m p l e m e n t a r y m e t a p h y s i c a l t r u t h s , this political c o n c e p t i o n is n e v e r t h e l e s s s u p p o s e d t o e x h i b i t a rea­ s o n a b l e n e s s t h a t adds t h e a s p e c t of p u b l i c r e c o g n i t i o n t o t h o s e idi­ osyncratic a n d m u t u a l l y n o n t r a n s p a r e n t t r u t h s . F r o m t h e p o i n t of view of validity, a n u n e a s y a s y m m e t r y prevails b e t w e e n t h e p u b l i c c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e t h a t raises a w e a k claim to r e a s o n a b l e n e s s a n d t h e n o n p u b l i c d o c t r i n e s with t h e i r s t r o n g claims to t r u t h . T h a t a p u b l i c c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e s h o u l d ultimately derive its m o r a l a u t h o r i t y f r o m n o n p u b l i c r e a s o n s is c o u n t e r i n t u i t i v e . A n y t h i n g valid s h o u l d also b e c a p a b l e of p u b l i c justification. Valid s t a t e m e n t s d e ­ serve t h e a c c e p t a n c e of e v e r y o n e for t h e s a m e r e a s o n s . T h e e x p r e s ­ sion " a g r e e m e n t " is a m b i g u o u s in this r e s p e c t . W h e r e a s p a r t i e s w h o n e g o t i a t e a c o m p r o m i s e m i g h t a c c e p t t h e r e s u l t for different rea­ sons, p a r t i c i p a n t s i n a r g u m e n t a t i o n m u s t r e a c h a rationally m o t i ­ v a t e d a g r e e m e n t , if at all, for t h e s a m e r e a s o n s . S u c h p r a c t i c e s of justification d e p e n d o n a jointly and publicly reached c o n s e n s u s . Even o u t s i d e of t h e political d o m a i n , a r g u m e n t s call for a p u b l i c u s e of r e a s o n (in a s e n s e ) . R a t i o n a l d i s c o u r s e s m e r e l y m a k e a t o p i c of w h a t f u n c t i o n s in everyday life as a r e s o u r c e for t h e b i n d i n g force of s p e e c h acts, namely, validity claims t h a t d e m a n d intersubjective r e c o g n i t i o n a n d offer t h e p r o s p e c t of p u b l i c justification w h e n t h e y a r e q u e s t i o n e d . T h e s a m e h o l d s for n o r m a t i v e validity claims. T h e p r a c t i c e of reason-giving in m o r a l d i s p u t e s w o u l d b r e a k d o w n if p a r t i c i p a n t s h a d to a s s u m e t h a t m o r a l j u d g m e n t s d e p e n d essentially o n p e r s o n a l b a c k g r o u n d beliefs a n d c o u l d n o l o n g e r c o u n t o n t h e

87 "Reasonable" versus "True"

9

a c c e p t a n c e of t h o s e w h o d o n o t s h a r e t h e s e beliefs. O f c o u r s e , this c a n n o t b e a p p l i e d i m m e d i a t e l y to politics, for political d i s p u t e s a r e of a m i x e d n a t u r e . B u t t h e m o r e t h e y focus o n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l essen­ tials a n d u n d e r l y i n g c o n c e p t i o n s of j u s t i c e , t h e m o r e t h e y resemble m o r a l discourses. Moreover, basic political q u e s t i o n s a r e l i n k e d to q u e s t i o n s of legal i m p l e m e n t a t i o n . A n d coercive r e g u l a t i o n s m a k e a basic political c o n s e n s u s a m o n g citizens absolutely necessary. T h e d e m a n d itself is n o t controversial, only how it is to b e fulfilled. T h e q u e s t i o n is w h e t h e r citizens c a n g r a s p s o m e t h i n g as r e a s o n a b l e if it is n o t o p e n to t h e m to a d o p t a t h i r d s t a n d p o i n t b e s i d e s t h a t of a n o b s e r v e r o r a p a r t i c i p a n t . C a n t h e plurality of r e a s o n s r o o t e d in worldviews, w h o s e n o n p u b l i c c h a r a c t e r is m u t u a l l y r e c o g n i z e d , l e a d to a c o n s e n s u s t h a t c a n serve as t h e basis for a p u b l i c u s e of r e a s o n for citizens of a political c o m m u n i t y ? I w o n d e r w h e t h e r Rawls c a n a c c o u n t for t h e possibility of a n o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s w i t h o u t tac­ itly a s s u m i n g s u c h a t h i r d p e r s p e c t i v e f r o m w h i c h "we," t h e citizens, c a n publicly e x a m i n e in c o m m o n w h a t is i n t h e e q u a l i n t e r e s t of everybody. T h e p e r s p e c t i v e of a n a d h e r e n t of a c o m m u n i t y of t r u e believers is different f r o m t h a t of a p a r t i c i p a n t in p u b l i c d i s c o u r s e . T h e exis­ tential resolve of a n i n a l i e n a b l e individual reflecting in t h e first p e r s o n s i n g u l a r o n h o w s h e s h o u l d live h e r life is q u i t e different f r o m t h e fallibilistic c o n s c i o u s n e s s of a citizen p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n p r o c ­ esses of political o p i n i o n - a n d will-formation. But, as we h a v e s e e n , Rawls c a n n o t conceive of t h e p r o c e s s of r e a c h i n g a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g o n a s h a r e d c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e in s u c h a way t h a t t h e citizens a d o p t a s h a r e d p e r s p e c t i v e . B e c a u s e s u c h a p e r s p e c t i v e is lacking, t h e c o n c e p t i o n t h a t e m e r g e s as " r e a s o n a b l e " m u s t fit i n t o t h e c o n t e x t of t h e different worldviews in e a c h case t a k e n t o b e t r u e by t h e c o r r e ­ s p o n d i n g p a r t i e s . B u t h o w c a n t h e fact t h a t t h e n o n p u b l i c t r u t h of religious o r m e t a p h y s i c a l d o c t r i n e s enjoys priority over t h e r e a s o n ­ a b l e n e s s of a political c o n c e p t i o n fail to affect t h e universalistic m e a n i n g of "reasonable"? Rawls i n t r o d u c e s t h e p r e d i c a t e " r e a s o n a b l e " in t h e following m a n ­ ner. Citizens w h o a r e willing a n d a b l e to live in a "well-ordered" society a r e r e a s o n a b l e ; as r e a s o n a b l e p e o p l e t h e y also h a v e r e a s o n ­ able views of t h e w o r l d as a w h o l e . If t h e e x p e c t e d c o n s e n s u s results

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f r o m r e a s o n a b l e c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e s , its c o n t e n t also c o u n t s as r e a s o n a b l e . H e n c e " r e a s o n a b l e " refers in t h e first i n s t a n c e to t h e a t t i t u d e of p e o p l e w h o a r e (a) willing to p r o p o s e , a g r e e u p o n , a n d a b i d e by fair t e r m s of social c o o p e r a t i o n b e t w e e n free a n d e q u a l citizens, a n d (b) c a p a b l e of r e c o g n i z i n g t h e b u r d e n s of a r g u m e n t a n d willing to a c c e p t t h e i r c o n s e q u e n c e s . T h e p r e d i c a t e is t h e n e x t e n d e d f r o m t h e attitudes to t h e beliefs of r e a s o n a b l e p e r s o n s / R e a ­ s o n a b l e worldviews r e i n f o r c e a n a t t i t u d e of t o l e r a n c e a m o n g t h e i r a d h e r e n t s b e c a u s e t h e y e x h i b i t a c e r t a i n reflexivity a n d a r e subject to c e r t a i n c o n s t r a i n t s with r e g a r d to t h e i r practical c o n s e q u e n c e s . A "reflexive" c o n s c i o u s n e s s results f r o m t h e fact t h a t a n e x p e c t a t i o n of r e a s o n a b l e d i s a g r e e m e n t exists b e t w e e n c o m p e t i n g d o c t r i n e s . A n d s u c h subjective belief systems c a n only c o m p e t e with o n e a n o t h e r o n fair t e r m s u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s of a p l u r a l i s m of worldviews if t h e i r a d h e r e n t s r e n o u n c e t h e u s e of political v i o l e n c e t o e n f o r c e t h e i r doctrines. I n t h e p r e s e n t c o n t e x t w h a t is of p r i m a r y i m p o r t a n c e is t h a t t h e r e a s o n a b l e n e s s a l o n e of citizens a n d worldviews, t h u s specified, by n o m e a n s r e q u i r e s t h e a d o p t i o n of t h e p e r s p e c t i v e f r o m w h i c h t h e f u n d a m e n t a l q u e s t i o n s of political j u s t i c e c o u l d b e j o i n t l y a n d p u b ­ licly discussed. T h e m o r a l p o i n t of view is n e i t h e r i m p l i e d by "rea­ s o n a b l e " a t t i t u d e s n o r is it m a d e possible by " r e a s o n a b l e " worldviews. S u c h a perspective is first o p e n e d u p w h e n a n o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s o n a c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e h a s e m e r g e d . However, Rawls c a n n o t avoid m a k i n g at least a n unofficial u s e of this t h i r d p e r s p e c t i v e even in t h e "basic case of p u b l i c justification" (R 1 4 4 ) . I h a v e t h e i m p r e s ­ sion t h a t h e is t o r n b e t w e e n t h e o r i g i n a l strategy p u r s u e d i n A Theory ofJustice, w h i c h r e l i e d m o r e heavily o n Kant, a n d t h e m o r e r e c e n t l y d e v e l o p e d a l t e r n a t i v e w h i c h is i n t e n d e d to take seriously t h e fact of p l u r a l i s m . H e r e t h e p h i l o s o p h e r a g a i n a d o p t s t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of i m p a r t i a l j u d g m e n t ; b u t this "professional" s t a n d p o i n t d o e s n o t cor­ r e s p o n d t o a m o r a l p o i n t of view t h a t citizens c o u l d s h a r e by t h e i r o w n lights. Rawls h a s in t h e m e a n t i m e a d d r e s s e d t h e p r o b l e m of t h e justifica­ t i o n of t h e o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s at g r e a t e r l e n g t h (R 142ff.). If we e x a m i n e closely t h e t h r e e k i n d s of justification h e lays o u t t h e r e we r u n u p a g a i n s t t h e i n t e r e s t i n g q u e s t i o n of h o w " r e a s o n a b l e " world-

89 "Reasonable" versus "True"

views c a n even b e i d e n t i f i e d as s u c h if s t a n d a r d s r o o t e d in a practical r e a s o n i n d e p e n d e n t of worldviews a r e n o t available. W i n n o w i n g o u t r e a s o n a b l e worldviews calls for " t h i n " n o r m a t i v e decisions w h i c h m u s t b e justifiable i n d e p e n d e n t l y of "thick" m e t a p h y s i c a l back­ ground assumptions. 5

T h e Last Stage o f Justification

A c c o r d i n g to Rawls, t h e justification of a political c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e m u s t b e s i t u a t e d i n "the p l a c e a m o n g citizens i n civil soci­ e t y — t h e v i e w p o i n t of y o u a n d m e . " H e r e every citizen starts f r o m t h e c o n t e x t of h e r own worldview a n d t h e m o r a l n o t i o n of j u s t i c e e m b e d d e d t h e r e i n , for t h e p a r t i c i p a n t ' s p e r s p e c t i v e is at first t h e only o n e available for n o r m a t i v e r e a s o n i n g . So to b e g i n with t h e r e is n o r e l e v a n t d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n t h e p o s i t i o n of t h e p h i l o s o p h e r a n d t h a t of any o t h e r citizen. W h e t h e r o r n o t s h e is a p h i l o s o p h e r , a r e a s o n a b l e p e r s o n will e m p l o y h e r sense of j u s t i c e to d e v e l o p a f r e e s t a n d i n g political c o n c e p t i o n w h i c h s h e h o p e s c a n b e a c c e p t e d by all r e a s o n a b l e p e r s o n s in t h e i r r o l e as free a n d e q u a l citizens. T h e first c o n s t r u c t i v e s t e p t h e n r e q u i r e s h e r to a b s t r a c t f r o m c o m p r e h e n ­ sive d o c t r i n e s . F o r t h e p u r p o s e s of this "pro tan to justification" t h e citizens m a y also c o n s i d e r various duly r e f l e c t e d u p o n a n d e l a b o ­ r a t e d p h i l o s o p h i c a l d o c t r i n e s . S u c h t h e o r i e s offer g u i d e l i n e s for t h e r e q u i r e d k i n d of a b s t r a c t i o n . F o r e x a m p l e , t h e "original p o s i t i o n " offers o n e s c h e m e for s u c h a universalization test: p r i n c i p l e s t h a t pass t h e test a p p e a r to b e a c c e p t a b l e t o e v e r y o n e . 1 0

B u t n o b o d y will b e a b l e to a b s t r a c t c o m p l e t e l y f r o m h e r o w n p r e u n d e r s t a n d i n g in a p p l y i n g t h e p r o c e d u r e . "You a n d I" c a n n o t p e r f o r m t h e test in a p r e s u p p o s i t i o n l e s s m a n n e r ; e a c h of u s m u s t u n d e r t a k e it f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e s h a p e d by h e r o w n b a c k g r o u n d beliefs. I n particular, b a c k g r o u n d a s s u m p t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g t h e politi­ cal s p h e r e a n d w h a t s h o u l d c o u n t as a m a t t e r of politics e n t e r in h e r e . H e n c e t h e r e c a n h a r d l y b e a n y s u r p r i s e at t h e n e x t stage w h e n e a c h citizen e m b e d s in h e r o w n c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e t h e c o n c e p t t h a t s e e m s p r o m i s i n g to her. T h e universalization test d o e s i n d e e d d e m a n d t h a t all r e a s o n a b l e citizens a b s t r a c t f r o m t h e specifics of t h e i r respective c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e s ; b u t this o p e r a t i o n of

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universalization m u s t n e v e r t h e l e s s b e c a r r i e d o u t a g a i n s t t h e back­ g r o u n d of t h e i r o w n c o n c e p t i o n s of t h e w o r l d . F o r n o b o d y c a n give u p h e r p a r t i c i p a n t ' s p e r s p e c t i v e w i t h o u t losing sight of t h e n o r m a ­ tive d i m e n s i o n as s u c h in t a k i n g o n t h e objectivating a t t i t u d e of a n observer. T h i s is why t h e universalization test f u n c t i o n s at t h e first stage in a way r o u g h l y similar to t h e G o l d e n R u l e : it filters o u t a n y t h i n g t h a t d o e s n o t a p p e a r from my viewpoint to qualify for e q u a l a c c e p t a n c e by all r e a s o n a b l e p e r s o n s . Precisely t h o s e p r i n c i p l e s a n d p r a c t i c e s a n d t h o s e r e g u l a t i o n s a n d i n s t i t u t i o n s pass t h e test w h i c h , a s s u m i n g t h a t t h e y c a n b e universally established, a r e in t h e e q u a l i n t e r e s t of eve­ r y b o d y given my understanding of the political sphere. I n this way t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e test is c o n d i t i o n e d by p r e c o n c e p t i o n s p e c u l i a r to m y c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e , for o t h e r w i s e t h e t h i r d stage of justifica­ t i o n — a n a l o g o u s to t h e m o v e f r o m t h e G o l d e n R u l e to t h e categori­ cal i m p e r a t i v e — w o u l d b e s u p e r f l u o u s . Rawls r e g a r d s this s t e p as n e c e s s a r y b e c a u s e "you a n d I" c a n n o t k n o w w h e t h e r we s u c c e e d e d in a b s t r a c t i n g f r o m every c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e w h e n , e a c h p r o ­ c e e d i n g f r o m her own b e s t u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e political s p h e r e , we s u b j e c t e d o u r n o r m a t i v e convictions to t h e c o n s t r a i n t s of t h e origi­ n a l p o s i t i o n . O n l y at t h e final stage, w h i c h Rawls calls t h e stage of "wide a n d g e n e r a l reflective e q u i l i b r i u m " (R 1 4 1 , n . 1 6 ) , d o w e t a k e t h e o t h e r citizens i n t o a c c o u n t : " r e a s o n a b l e citizens t a k e o n e an­ o t h e r i n t o a c c o u n t as h a v i n g r e a s o n a b l e c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e s t h a t e n d o r s e t h a t political c o n c e p t i o n " (R 1 4 3 ) . 11

T h i s step, w h i c h is s u p p o s e d to l e a d finally to a n o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s , c a n b e u n d e r s t o o d as t h e r a d i c a l i z a t i o n of a n as yet i n c o m p l e t e , still e g o c e n t r i c universalization p r o c e d u r e . O n l y a recur­ sive a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e p r o c e d u r e c a n yield t h e a n t i c i p a t e d result: all citizens, n o t j u s t y o u a n d I, have to d e c i d e , f r o m t h e i r o w n p e r s p e c ­ tives a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g s of t h e political w o r l d , w h e t h e r t h e r e is a p r o p o s a l t h a t c a n m e e t with universal a c c e p t a n c e . Rawls speaks of " m u t u a l a c c o u n t i n g ; " b u t w h a t is m e a n t is a m u t u a l observation t h r o u g h w h i c h p a r t i c i p a n t s establish w h e t h e r a n a g r e e m e n t o c c u r s . T h e c o n s e n s u s is a n e v e n t t h a t h a p p e n s : "Public justification happens w h e n all t h e r e a s o n a b l e m e m b e r s of political society c a r r y o u t a justification of t h e s h a r e d political c o n c e p t i o n by e m b e d d i n g it in

91 "Reasonable" versus "True"

t h e i r several r e a s o n a b l e c o m p r e h e n s i v e views" ( R 1 4 3 , m y e m p h a s i s ) . T h e t e r m s " p u b l i c " a n d " s h a r e d " a r e s o m e w h a t m i s l e a d i n g in this c o n t e x t . T h e o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s results f r o m everybody's decid­ i n g simultaneously, b u t e a c h individually a n d for herself, w h e t h e r t h e p r o p o s e d c o n c e p t i o n fits i n t o h e r o w n c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e . If it is t o work, e v e r y o n e m u s t a c c e p t t h e s a m e c o n c e p t i o n , t h o u g h e a c h for h e r o w n , n o n p u b l i c r e a s o n s , a n d e a c h m u s t at t h e s a m e t i m e satisfy h e r s e l f t h a t all o t h e r s also a c c e p t it: "the e x p r e s s c o n t e n t s of t h e s e d o c t r i n e s h a v e n o n o r m a t i v e r o l e in p u b l i c justification; citizens d o n o t l o o k i n t o t h e c o n t e n t of o t h e r s ' d o c t r i n e s . . . . Rather, they take i n t o a c c o u n t a n d give s o m e w e i g h t to only t h e f a c t — t h e e x i s t e n c e — o f t h e r e a s o n a b l e o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s i t s e l f (R 1 4 4 ) . H e n c e t h e o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s rests o n w h a t R a i n e r Forst h a s called a "private u s e of r e a s o n with public-political i n t e n t . " A g a i n , this d e s i g n of " t h r e e k i n d s " of justification lacks a p e r s p e c t i v e of i m p a r t i a l j u d g m e n t a n d a p u b l i c u s e of r e a s o n in t h e strict sense, which would n o t be contingent on the overlapping consensus but w o u l d b e s h a r e d from the beginning. Moreover, it is d o u b t f u l w h e t h e r " r e a s o n a b l e " citizens in t h e sense o u t l i n e d w o u l d ever r e a c h a n o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s if they c o u l d only c o n v i n c e t h e m s e l v e s f r o m w i t h i n t h e i r o w n i n d i v i d u a l c o m p r e ­ h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e s of t h e validity of a c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e . T h e p r o s p e c t of r e a c h i n g a c o n s e n s u s d e p e n d s essentially o n w h a t k i n d s of revisions a r e p e r m i t t e d at t h e last stage of a d e c e n t e r e d justifica­ t i o n . A pro tanto justified c o n c e p t i o n t h a t "you o r I" j u d g e to b e valid f r o m o u r respective p o i n t s of view m a y b e o v e r r i d d e n by t h e veto of o t h e r s " o n c e all values a r e tallied u p . " O u r c o n c e p t i o n m u s t b e revised b e f o r e it c a n b e e n d o r s e d by e v e r y o n e . T h e d i s a g r e e m e n t s t h a t m o t i v a t e s u c h a d a p t a t i o n s c o n c e r n in t h e first i n s t a n c e differ­ e n c e s in t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e political t h a t y o u o r I d i d n o t a n t i c i p a t e at t h e first o r s e c o n d stages. Following Rawls, I distinguish b e t w e e n t h r e e k i n d s of d i s a g r e e m e n t s : t h o s e c o n c e r n i n g (a) t h e d e f i n i t i o n of t h e d o m a i n of political m a t t e r s , (b) t h e r a n k i n g a n d r e a s o n a b l e b a l a n c i n g of political values, a n d finally a n d m o s t i m p o r ­ tantly (c) t h e priority of political over n o n p o l i t i c a l values. ( a ) - ( b ) Different i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of t h e p r i n c i p l e of t h e separa­ t i o n of c h u r c h a n d state, for e x a m p l e , t o u c h o n t h e e x t e n t a n d s c o p e 12

13

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of t h e political d o m a i n ; for t h e y l e a d to different n o r m a t i v e g u i d e ­ lines, in this case g u i d e l i n e s c o n c e r n i n g t h e status a n d t h e r o l e of religious c o m m u n i t i e s a n d o r g a n i z a t i o n s . O t h e r c o n t r o v e r s i e s c o n ­ c e r n t h e r a n k i n g of political values, for e x a m p l e , w h e t h e r o n e ac­ c o r d s intrinsic o r m e r e l y i n s t r u m e n t a l value to political p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n cases w h e r e political r i g h t s m u s t b e b a l a n c e d against negative liberties. T h e s e d i s p u t e s a r e n o r m a l l y settled by c o u r t s — i n t h e final i n s t a n c e by t h e F e d e r a l C o n s t i t u t i o n a l C o u r t — a n d h e n c e o n t h e basis of a n a l r e a d y a c c e p t e d c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e . T h i s is also h o w Rawls deals with s u c h issues. B u t in s o m e cases conflicts c a n b e so d e e p t h a t t h e differences in o p i n i o n p l a c e in q u e s t i o n t h e u n d e r l y ­ i n g political c o n s e n s u s . S u c h conflicts u n d e r m i n e t h e o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s itself. B u t we w o u l d like to t h i n k t h a t m o s t of t h e s e dis­ a g r e e m e n t s c a n b e resolved in a c o n s e n s u a l m a n n e r , if n e c e s s a r y by revising t h e c u r r e n t l y a c c e p t e d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s . Successful a d a p t a t i o n s of this type w o u l d c o n f i r m t h a t citizens c o u l d l e a r n f r o m o n e a n o t h e r at t h e t h i r d stage of justification, if only in a n i n d i r e c t way. T h e v e t o of o t h e r s c a n l e a d e a c h of u s to realize t h a t t h e c o n c e p t i o n s of j u s t i c e we initially p r o p o s e d w e r e n o t yet sufficiently decentered. 1 4

(c) T h e r e is a k i n d of conflict, however, t h a t h a s a n i m p a c t o n t h e d e f i n i t i o n of " r e a s o n a b l e " d o c t r i n e s . S u c h conflicts e x p o s e t h e c o n ­ c e p t of t h e " r e a s o n a b l e " itself to c o n t e s t a t i o n . T h e a b o r t i o n d e b a t e , o n a c e r t a i n d e s c r i p t i o n , is a case in p o i n t . Catholics, for e x a m p l e , w h o insist o n a g e n e r a l legal p r o h i b i t i o n , assert t h a t t h e i r r e l i g i o u s conviction c o n c e r n i n g t h e inviolability of life is m o r e i m p o r t a n t t h a n any political value in w h o s e n a m e o t h e r citizens u r g e t h e m to a c c e p t , say, a m o d e r a t e l y liberal r e g u l a t i o n . Rawls deals with this issue in passing, b u t h e shifts t h e conflict f r o m t h e level of t h e priority of political values to t h a t of a r e a s o n a b l e balancing of political values (PL 243f.). F o r h e p r e s u p p o s e s t h a t t h e p r i n c i p l e of t h e p u b l i c u s e of r e a s o n r e q u i r e s citizens to translate t h e i r ethical-existential views i n t o t h e l a n g u a g e of political j u s t i c e . B u t o n Rawls's o w n p r e m i s e s "public r e a s o n " c a n i m p o s e s u c h c o n s t r a i n t s o n citizens only if a c o n s e n s u s c o n c e r n i n g political essentials h a s a l r e a d y b e e n r e a c h e d . W h i l e a n o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s is still b e i n g w o r k e d o u t t h e r e is n o e q u i v a l e n t for t h e n e u t r a l a u t h o r i t y of a S u p r e m e C o u r t (which i n

93 "Reasonable" versus "True"

any case only u n d e r s t a n d s t h e l a n g u a g e of law). N o r is it possible at this stage to a p p e a l to t h e priority of t h e r i g h t over t h e g o o d , for this a g a i n p r e s u p p o s e s t h e priority of political over n o n p o l i t i c a l v a l u e s . N o w Rawls r e c o g n i z e s t h a t a n o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s is possible only a m o n g citizens w h o a s s u m e in cases of conflict t h a t political values o u t w e i g h all o t h e r values (PL 1 3 9 ) . B u t this d o e s n o t follow f r o m t h e " r e a s o n a b l e n e s s " of citizens a n d t h e i r convictions. Rawls simply as­ serts t h a t political values a r e "very g r e a t " o n e s (PL 139, 1 5 5 ) . Else­ w h e r e h e restricts h i m s e l f to t h e " h o p e " t h a t this priority will u l t i m a t e l y b e r e c o g n i z e d by a d h e r e n t s of r e a s o n a b l e c o m p r e h e n s i v e doctrines. 15

16

T h e s e c a u t i o u s f o r m u l a t i o n s suggest t h a t d e e p - s e a t e d conflicts of t h e t h i r d k i n d c o u l d only b e resolved if t h e t o l e r a n c e of r e a s o n a b l e citizens a n d t h e r e a s o n a b l e n e s s of t h e i r c o m p r e h e n s i v e views imply t h a t e v e r y o n e s h a r e s t h e s a m e view of t h e political w o r l d a n d t h a t political values h a v e priority. B u t s u c h a r a t i o n a l r e q u i r e m e n t d o e s n o t simply h i g h l i g h t qualities t h a t r e a s o n a b l e c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c ­ t r i n e s possess in a n y case; t h a t e x p e c t a t i o n of r e a s o n a b l e n e s s h a s to b e imposed o n t h e c o m p e t i n g worldviews. T h e priority of political values is a r e q u i r e m e n t of practical r e a s o n : t h e r e q u i r e m e n t of a f o r m of impartiality t h a t e l s e w h e r e finds e x p r e s s i o n in t h e m o r a l p o i n t of view. B u t t h e latter is n o t c o n t a i n e d in t h e c o n c e p t of t h e r e a s o n a b l e i n t r o d u c e d by Rawls. T h e a t t i t u d e of " r e a s o n a b l e " p e o p l e w h o wish to t r e a t e a c h o t h e r fairly while r e c o g n i z i n g t h a t they d o n o t a g r e e in t h e i r religious a n d m e t a p h y s i c a l convictions d o e s n o t i m p l y a m o r a l p o i n t of view s h a r e d by all, a n y m o r e t h a n d o e s t h e reflexivity a n d t h e r e n u n c i a t i o n of force of " r e a s o n a b l e " worldviews. Clearly a r e q u i r e m e n t of p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n to w h i c h c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e s m u s t submit if a n o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s is to b e possible c a n only b e justified by a p p e a l to a n e p i s t e m i c a u t h o r i t y t h a t is itself i n d e p e n d e n t of w o r l d v i e w s . 17

With practical reason liberated from d e p e n d e n c e o n the morality of c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e s , t h e i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e t r u e a n d t h e r e a s o n a b l e w o u l d also b e c o m e publicly accessible. T h i s c o n ­ n e c t i o n n e e d r e m a i n o p a q u e only as l o n g as t h e justification of a political c o n c e p t i o n c a n only b e g r a s p e d w i t h i n t h e c o n t e x t of a p a r t i c u l a r c o m p r e h e n s i v e view. However, this a p p r o a c h is t u r n e d o n

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its h e a d o n c e t h e priority of political values h a s to b e justified o n t h e basis of a c o n c e p t i o n of p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n t h a t first d e t e r m i n e s w h i c h c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e s c a n c o u n t as r e a s o n a b l e . 6

Philosophers and Citizens

T h e r e r e m a i n s a n u n r e s o l v e d t e n s i o n b e t w e e n t h e r e a s o n a b l e n e s s of a political c o n c e p t i o n a c c e p t a b l e to all citizens with r e a s o n a b l e c o m ­ p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e s a n d t h e t r u t h t h a t individuals ascribe t o this c o n c e p t i o n f r o m w i t h i n t h e i r respective c o m p r e h e n s i v e views. O n t h e o n e h a n d , t h e validity of t h e political c o n c e p t i o n u l t i m a t e l y d e p e n d s o n t h e validity-generating r e s o u r c e s of t h e d i f f e r e n t c o m ­ p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e s insofar as t h e y a r e r e a s o n a b l e ; o n t h e o t h e r , r e a s o n a b l e d o c t r i n e s m u s t in t u r n satisfy s t a n d a r d s p r e s c r i b e d to t h e m by p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n . W h a t m a k e s t h e m r e a s o n a b l e c a n n o t b e d e f i n e d by s t a n d a r d s i n t e r n a l to a n y o n e of t h e m . C a n Rawls g r o u n d t h e s e c o n s t r a i n t s in p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n w i t h o u t falling b a c k o n t h e K a n t i a n s t a n d p o i n t of A Theory of Justice, o r m u s t h e a b a n d o n t h e liberal device of t h e division of l a b o r b e t w e e n t h e political a n d t h e metaphysical? To b e s u r e , Rawls also takes t h e c o n s t r a i n t s of "public r e a s o n " — " t h e g e n e r a l o n e s of t h e o r e t i c a l a n d p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n " — i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n in Political Liberalism. B u t t h e y only t a k e effect o n c e "justice as fairness" h a s b e e n a c c e p t e d by t h e citizens; only t h e n c a n they d e t e r m i n e t h e priority of t h e r i g h t over t h e g o o d (PL 210) a n d t h e f o r m of t h e p u b l i c u s e of r e a s o n (PL 216ff.). B u t if t h e r e a s o n a b l e n e s s of c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e s finds e x p r e s ­ sion i n r e s t r i c t i o n s t h a t a r e n o t self-imposed, w h a t s h o u l d c o u n t as r e a s o n a b l e m u s t b e d e t e r m i n e d by a s t a n d a r d of impartiality t h a t is a l r e a d y o p e r a t i v e p r i o r to t h e e m e r g e n c e of a basic political a g r e e ­ m e n t . A Theory of Justice c l a i m e d validity in t h e n a m e of p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n ; it d i d n o t d e p e n d o n affirmation by r e a s o n a b l e c o m p r e h e n ­ sive d o c t r i n e s . O v e r t i m e Rawls c a m e to realize t h a t t h e basic d e s i g n of this theory, r a t h e r t h a n its c o n t e n t , failed to give sufficient w e i g h t to t h e "fact of r e a s o n a b l e p l u r a l i s m " (R 144, n . 2 1 ) . T h i s is why h e n o w p r e s e n t s t h e essential c o n t e n t of t h e o r i g i n a l t h e o r y as a first c o n s t r u c t i v e s t e p in n e e d of s u p p l e m e n t a t i o n . A f u r t h e r s t e p is s u p ­ p o s e d t o l e a d f r o m t h e a c a d e m i c a r e n a i n t o t h e political p u b l i c

95 "Reasonable" versus "True"

s p h e r e a n d allow t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l investigation to issue in a n actual a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n all citizens o n basic political q u e s t i o n s . T h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of t h e b u r d e n s of justification b e t w e e n t h e two steps is r e f l e c t e d in t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e r e a s o n a b l e a n d t h e t r u e . T h e citizens, n o t t h e p h i l o s o p h e r , a r e to h a v e t h e final w o r d . W h i l e Rawls d o e s n o t c o m p l e t e l y shift t h e b u r d e n of justification o n t o t h e rea­ s o n a b l e c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e s , they a r e t h e ultimate a r b i t e r s . F o r t h e t h e o r y w o u l d violate its o w n liberal spirit if it p r e j u d g e d t h e political will-formation of t h e citizens by a n t i c i p a t i n g its results: "stu­ d e n t s of p h i l o s o p h y take p a r t in f o r m u l a t i n g t h e s e i d e a s b u t always as citizens a m o n g o t h e r s " (R 1 7 5 ) . However, only a t h e o r y t h a t lays d o w n t h e c o m p l e t e d e s i g n of a w e l l - o r d e r e d society for t h e citizens c r e a t e s t h e d a n g e r of political p a t e r n a l i s m . Rawls d o e s n o t c o n s i d e r t h a t a consistently w o r k e d - o u t p r o c e d u r a l i s m c o u l d defuse t h e w h o l e issue of w h e t h e r p h i l o s o p h y u n d e r m i n e s t h e political a u t o n o m y of t h e c i t i z e n s . A t h e o r y t h a t restricts itself to clarifying t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h e legal institutionali­ z a t i o n of p r o c e d u r e s of d e m o c r a t i c self-legislation d o e s n o t p r e j u d g e t h e results t h a t t h e citizens t h e m s e l v e s m u s t first r e a c h w i t h i n a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l f r a m e w o r k s h a p e d by t h e s e p r o c e d u r e s . O n c e a postm e t a p h y s i c a l a u t h o r i t y i n d e p e n d e n t of c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e s is r e s t o r e d t o a p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n t h a t is e m b o d i e d in p r o c e s s e s r a t h e r t h a n in c o n t e n t s , it c a n n o t itself play a p a t e r n a l i s t i c r o l e . I favor this a p p r o a c h a n d t h e r e is at least s o m e s u p p o r t for it in Rawls. 18

B u t first let m e b r i n g t o g e t h e r t h e results of t h e discussion t h u s far. R e a s o n a b l e political c o n c e p t i o n s t h a t t a k e a c c o u n t of t h e p r i o r ­ ity of political values, a n d t h e r e b y also d e f i n e w h i c h religious a n d m e t a p h y s i c a l worldviews c a n c o u n t as r e a s o n a b l e , m u s t n o t only b e w o r k e d o u t b u t m u s t also b e accepted f r o m a n i m p a r t i a l s t a n d p o i n t . This standpoint transcends the participant's perspective, occupied by citizens w h o a r e c o n s t r a i n e d by t h e i r respective c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e s . H e n c e t h e citizens c a n h a v e t h e last w o r d only w h e n they a l r e a d y p a r t i c i p a t e in t h e " f o r m u l a t i o n of t h e s e i d e a s " f r o m a m o r e c o m p r e h e n s i v e , intersubjectively s h a r e d p e r s p e c t i v e , or, w h a t a m o u n t s to t h e s a m e t h i n g , f r o m t h e m o r a l p o i n t of view. T h e recursive universalization test t h a t Rawls r e s e r v e s for t h e t h i r d stage of justification w o u l d i n s t e a d b e c o m e a n i n t e g r a l c o m p o n e n t of a

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p r o c e s s of p u b l i c d e l i b e r a t i o n o n p r o p o s e d c o n c e p t i o n s of j u s t i c e c a p a b l e of c o m m a n d i n g p u b l i c a g r e e m e n t . T h e r a t i o n a l a c c e p t ­ ability of t h e o u t c o m e — b e it 'justice as fairness" o r s o m e o t h e r c o n c e p t i o n — w o u l d n o t b e e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e m u t u a l o b s e r v a t i o n of a n established c o n s e n s u s ; i n s t e a d a u t h o r i z i n g force w o u l d devolve to c o n d i t i o n s of d i s c o u r s e , f o r m a l f e a t u r e s of discursive p r o c e s s e s , w h i c h c o m p e l p a r t i c i p a n t s to a d o p t t h e s t a n d p o i n t of i m p a r t i a l judgment. We find a similar c o n c e p t i o n in Political Liberalism b u t at a different systematic l e v e l — t h a t of t h e professional e l a b o r a t i o n of a freestand­ i n g c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e . T h e p h i l o s o p h e r first p r o j e c t s a pro tanto justification of his c o n c e p t i o n a n d t h e n tests w h e t h e r t h e basic c o n ­ c e p t s of his t h e o r y — s u c h as t h o s e of t h e m o r a l p e r s o n , of t h e citizen as a m e m b e r of a n association of free a n d e q u a l p e r s o n s , a n d of society as a system of fair c o o p e r a t i o n — c o h e r e with t h e n o r m a t i v e b a c k g r o u n d i n t u i t i o n s t h a t a r e actually widely s h a r e d in t h e political t r a d i t i o n s of a d e m o c r a t i c society ( c o n c e i v e d as a " c o m p l e t e a n d closed social system"). B o t h of t h e s e o p e r a t i o n s , (a) t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of a c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e a n d (b) t h e reflexive testing of its c o n c e p ­ tual f o u n d a t i o n s , h a v e i n t e r e s t i n g i m p l i c a t i o n s for t h e r e l a t i o n b e ­ t w e e n t h e p h i l o s o p h e r a n d t h e citizens. (a) A p h i l o s o p h e r w h o , like Rawls, a d h e r e s to t h e p r i n c i p l e s of "political c o n s t r u c t i v i s m " c o m m i t s h i m s e l f to objectivity, t h a t is, h e a c c e p t s t h e "essentials of t h e objective p o i n t of view" a n d t h e "re­ q u i r e m e n t s of objectivity" (PL III, sections 5 - 7 ) . T h e s e a r e p r o c e ­ d u r a l f e a t u r e s of p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n : "it is by t h e r e a s o n a b l e t h a t we e n t e r t h e p u b l i c w o r l d of o t h e r s a n d s t a n d r e a d y t o p r o p o s e , o r a c c e p t , as t h e case m a y b e , r e a s o n a b l e p r i n c i p l e s to specify fair t e r m s of c o o p e r a t i o n . T h e s e p r i n c i p l e s issue f r o m a p r o c e d u r e of c o n s t r u c ­ t i o n t h a t e x p r e s s e s t h e p r i n c i p l e s of p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n . . . ." (PL 1 1 4 ) . T h u s t h e p h i l o s o p h e r o b s e r v e s s t a n d a r d s of rationality t h a t have a m o r a l - p r a c t i c a l c o n t e n t t h o u g h t h e y a r e i n d e p e n d e n t of a n y c o m ­ p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e . W h e t h e r t h e s e s t a n d a r d s at t h e s a m e t i m e im­ p o s e l i m i t a t i o n s o n t h e c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e s of r e a s o n a b l e citizens d e p e n d s o n h o w o n e u n d e r s t a n d s t h e p h i l o s o p h e r ' s task. S o m e t i m e s Rawls s e e m s to suggest t h a t his professionally w o r k e d - o u t p r o p o s a l s h o u l d have a structuring i n f l u e n c e o n t h e citizens' world-

97 "Reasonable" versus "True"

views. At a n y r a t e Rawls e x p r e s s e s t h e h o p e t h a t "in fact [ t h e p h i l o ­ s o p h i c a l offer] will h a v e t h e capacity to shape t h o s e d o c t r i n e s t o w a r d i t s e l f (R 145, m y e m p h a s i s ) . O n this c o n c e p t i o n t h e p h i l o s o p h e r w o u l d a d m i n i s t e r a n objective p o i n t of view to w h i c h t h e citizens have to adapt t h e i r c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e s . T h i s w o u l d i n d e e d involve only a p r o c e d u r a l p r e j u d g m e n t , n o t a substantive o n e ; b u t n o t even this r e a d i n g is fully c o m p a t i b l e with t h e e g a l i t a r i a n status of t h e p h i l o s o p h e r as o n e citizen a m o n g o t h e r s . (b) T h e m e t h o d of reflective e q u i l i b r i u m a c c o r d s t h e p h i l o s o p h e r a m o r e m o d e s t r o l e in any case by r e f e r r i n g h i m to t h e intersubjec­ tively s h a r e d b a c k g r o u n d k n o w l e d g e of a liberal political c u l t u r e . O f c o u r s e , this k n o w l e d g e c a n only serve as a c o n t r o l o n t h e c h o i c e of basic t h e o r e t i c a l c o n c e p t s if it h a s a l r e a d y b e e n s h a p e d by t h e p e r ­ spective of a n i m p a r t i a l j u d g m e n t of q u e s t i o n s of political j u s t i c e . O t h e r w i s e t h e p h i l o s o p h e r c o u l d l e a r n n o t h i n g f r o m t h e citizens a n d t h e i r political c o n v i c t i o n s . If t h e m e t h o d of reflective equilib­ r i u m is to g e t off t h e g r o u n d , p h i l o s o p h y m u s t "find" its o w n per­ spective a l r e a d y o p e r a t i n g in civil society. T h i s is n o t to i m p l y t h a t p h i l o s o p h y c o u l d rely o n t h e basic c o n s e n s u s w h i c h — a c c o r d i n g to t h e p r e m i s e s — a l r e a d y exists in liberal societies a n d t h e r e b y offers a p l a t f o r m for t h e p u b l i c u s e of r e a s o n (as institutionalized^ e.g., in t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o u r t ) . N o t every c u l t u r e t h a t calls itself liberal is in fact liberal. A h e r m e n e u t i c p h i l o s o p h y t h a t l i m i t e d itself to clari­ fying w h a t a l r e a d y exists w o u l d lose all critical f o r c e . P h i l o s o p h y s h o u l d n o t m e r e l y a c c e p t e s t a b l i s h e d convictions b u t m u s t also b e able t o judge t h e m by t h e s t a n d a r d s of a r a t i o n a l c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , it m a y n o t c o n s t r u c t s u c h a c o n c e p t i o n o u t of w h o l e c l o t h a n d h o l d it u p to a society as a n o r m . It m u s t avoid equally t h e u n c r i t i c a l affirmation of t h e status q u o a n d t h e a s s u m p t i o n of a p a t e r n a l i s t i c r o l e . It s h o u l d n e i t h e r simply a c c e p t e s t a b l i s h e d t r a d i t i o n s n o r c o n s t r u c t a d e t a i l e d d e s i g n for a wello r d e r e d society. 19

T h e m e t h o d of reflective e q u i l i b r i u m itself, p r o p e r l y u n d e r s t o o d , shows u s a way o u t of t h e d e a d e n d , b e c a u s e it calls for a critical a p p r o p r i a t i o n of t r a d i t i o n s . T h i s s u c c e e d s with t r a d i t i o n s t h a t c a n b e u n d e r s t o o d as t h e e x p r e s s i o n of l e a r n i n g processes. A p r i o r stand­ p o i n t of critical e v a l u a t i o n is n e c e s s a r y i n o r d e r to identify l e a r n i n g

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p r o c e s s e s as s u c h . P h i l o s o p h y finds s u c h a s t a n d p o i n t i n its aspira­ t i o n to objectivity a n d impartiality. B u t insofar as it draws o n p r o c e ­ d u r a l p r o p e r t i e s of p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n , it c a n find confirmation in a p e r s p e c t i v e t h a t it e n c o u n t e r s in society itself: by t h e m o r a l p o i n t of view f r o m w h i c h m o d e r n societies a r e criticized by t h e i r o w n social m o v e m e n t s . P h i l o s o p h y a d o p t s a n affirmative s t a n c e only t o w a r d t h e n e g a t o r y p o t e n t i a l e m b o d i e d in t h e social t e n d e n c i e s to u n s t i n t i n g self-criticism. 7

T h e Point o f Liberalism

If political j u s t i c e is c o n c e i v e d in this way, t h a t is, in p r o c e d u r a l t e r m s , t h e r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n t h e political a n d t h e m o r a l a n d b e t w e e n t h e m o r a l a n d t h e ethical a p p e a r in a different light. A political j u s t i c e t h a t s t a n d s o n its o w n m o r a l feet n o l o n g e r n e e d s t h e s u p p o r t of t h e t r u t h of religious o r m e t a p h y s i c a l c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e s . M o r a l s t a t e m e n t s c a n satisfy t h e c o n d i t i o n s of p o s t m e t a p h y s i c a l t h i n k i n g n o less t h a n descriptive s t a t e m e n t s , t h o u g h in a d i f f e r e n t way. T h a n k s to t h e m o r a l p o i n t of view, w h i c h also finds e x p r e s s i o n in w h a t Rawls calls "the p r o c e d u r a l r e q u i r e m e n t s for a p u b l i c u s e of r e a s o n " a n d " s t a n d a r d s of r e a s o n a b l e n e s s , " m o r a l j u d g i n e n t s g a i n i n d e p e n d e n c e f r o m m e t a p h y s i c a l c o n t e x t s . Like t h e t r u t h of d e s c r i p ­ tive s t a t e m e n t s , t h e Tightness of m o r a l s t a t e m e n t s c a n b e e x p l a i r i e d in t e r m s of t h e discursive r e d e m p t i o n of validity claims. (Of c o u r s e , even t o g e t h e r descriptive a n d m o r a l s t a t e m e n t s c a n n o t e x h a u s t t h e m e a n i n g of m e t a p h y s i c a l t r u t h s . ) Since m o r a l j u d g m e n t s a r e only c o n c e r n e d with q u e s t i o n s of j u s t i c e in g e n e r a l , q u e s t i o n s of political j u s t i c e m u s t b e specified in t e r m s of t h e m e d i u m of law. T h i s n e e d n o t c o n c e r n us further here. B u t o n c e m o r a l a n d political r e a s o n i n g d r a w o n a n i n d e p e n d e n t s o u r c e of validity, c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e s t a k e o n a different cog­ nitive r o l e . T h e y reveal t h e i r essentially ethical c o n t e n t a n d p r o v i d e t h e c o n t e x t for w h a t Rawls calls t h e "substantive c o n t e n t of c o m p r e ­ h e n s i v e c o n c e p t i o n s of t h e g o o d . " T h e s e "visions of t h e g o o d life" f o r m t h e c o r e of a n individual o r collective s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g . Ethi­ cal q u e s t i o n s a r e q u e s t i o n s of identity. T h e y h a v e a n existential sig­ nificance ^ n d t h e y d o a d m i t of r a t i o n a l criticism w i t h i n c e r t a i n

99 "Reasonable" versus "True"

limits. Ethical discourses o b e y s t a n d a r d s of h e r m e n e u t i c a l reflection o n w h a t "is g o o d " for m e o r for us, all t h i n g s c o n s i d e r e d . Ethical r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s claim a k i n d of validity distinct f r o m b o t h t r u t h a n d m o r a l r i g h t n e s s . T h e y a r e m e a s u r e d by t h e a u t h e n t i c i t y of t h e s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g s of individuals o r collectives t h a t w e r e f o r m e d in t h e c o n t e x t of life-histories o r intersubjectively s h a r e d t r a d i t i o n s . C o n s e q u e n t l y , e t h i c a l r e a s o n s a r e c o n t e x t - d e p e n d e n t in a specific way—they a r e " n o n p u b l i c " in t h e Rawlsian sense. To b e s u r e , we a c c e p t t h e u s u a l b u r d e n s of p r o o f a n d a r g u m e n t a t i v e o b l i g a t i o n s — in Rawls's t e r m s , " b u r d e n s of j u d g m e n t " — w i t h every s t a t e m e n t . B u t s t r o n g e v a l u a t i o n s a r e n o t m e r e l y subject to g e n e r a l r e s e r v a t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g fallibilism. We c a n n o t r e a s o n a b l y e x p e c t e t h i c a l d i s p u t e s over t h e value of c o m p e t i n g lifestyles a n d f o r m s of life t o l e a d to a n y t h i n g o t h e r t h a n r e a s o n a b l e d i s a g r e e m e n t s . By c o n t r a s t , we e x p e c t t h a t m o r a l q u e s t i o n s a n d q u e s t i o n s of political j u s t i c e a d m i t i n p r i n c i p l e of universally valid answers. K a n t i a n c o n c e p t i o n s claim n e u t r a l i t y vis-a-vis c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c ­ trines, t h a t is, a " f r e e s t a n d i n g " status in t h e sense of ethical, t h o u g h n o t of p h i l o s o p h i c a l , neutrality. O u r discussion of t h e e p i s t e m o l o g i cal u n d e r p i n n i n g s of Political Liberalism s h o u l d have m a d e clear t h a t Rawls c a n n o t avoid p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n t r o v e r s i e s either. T h e p r o b l e m ­ atic r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e r e a s o n a b l e a n d t h e t r u e calls for a n e x p l a n a t i o n t h a t raises q u e s t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g Rawls's strategy of a v o i d a n c e . T h e c o n c e p t of p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n c a n n o t b e d r a i n e d of m o r a l s u b s t a n c e a n d m o r a l i t y c a n n o t b e r e l e g a t e d to t h e b l a c k b o x of c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e s . I c a n n o t see a n y p l a u s i b l e a l t e r n a t i v e to t h e s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d K a n t i a n strategy. T h e r e s e e m s to b e n o way a r o u n d t h e e x p l a n a t i o n of t h e m o r a l p o i n t of view in t e r m s of a p r o c e d u r e t h a t claims to b e c o n t e x t - i n d e p e n d e n t . S u c h a p r o c e d u r e is by n o m e a n s free of n o r m a t i v e i m p l i c a t i o n s , as Rawls correctly e m p h a s i z e s (R I70ff.), for it is i n t e r t w i n e d with a c o n c e p t of a u t o n ­ o m y t h a t i n t e g r a t e s " r e a s o n " a n d "free will;" to that extent it c a n n o t b e n o r m a t i v e l y n e u t r a l . A n a u t o n o m o u s will is o n e t h a t is g u i d e d by p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n . F r e e d o m in g e n e r a l consists in t h e capacity to c h o o s e in a c c o r d a n c e with m a x i m s ; b u t a u t o n o m y is t h e self-binding of t h e will by m a x i m s we a d o p t o n t h e basis of insight. B e c a u s e it is m e d i a t e d by r e a s o n , a u t o n o m y is n o t j u s t o n e value a l o n g s i d e o t h e r s . 20

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T h i s e x p l a i n s why this n o r m a t i v e c o n t e n t d o e s n o t i m p a i r t h e n e u ­ trality of a p r o c e d u r e . A p r o c e d u r e t h a t o p e r a t i o n a l i z e s t h e m o r a l p o i n t of view of i m p a r t i a l j u d g m e n t is n e u t r a l with r e s p e c t to arbi­ t r a r y c o n s t e l l a t i o n s of values b u t n o t with r e s p e c t t o p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n itself. Rawls's c o n s t r u c t i o n of a n o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s shifts t h e a c c e n t f r o m t h e K a n t i a n c o n c e p t of a u t o n o m y to s o m e t h i n g like ethicalexistential s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n : a p e r s o n is free w h e n h e a c c e p t s a u t h o r s h i p for his o w n life. T h i s a p p r o a c h also h a s s o m e t h i n g to r e c o m m e n d it. T h e division of l a b o r b e t w e e n t h e political a n d t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l draws a t t e n t i o n to t h e e t h i c a l d i m e n s i o n n e g l e c t e d by Kant. Rawls salvages a v a l u a b l e i n s i g h t of H e g e l ' s c r i t i q u e of K a n t ; m o r a l n o r m s m a y n o t b e i m p o s e d in a n a b s t r a c t m a n n e r o n t h e life-histories of i n d i v i d u a l p e r s o n s , even if t h e s e n o r m s a p p e a l t o a practical r e a s o n all individuals have in c o m m o n o r to a universal sense of j u s t i c e . M o r a l c o m m a n d s m u s t b e internally r e l a t e d to t h e life-plans a n d lifestyles of affected p e r s o n s in a way they c a n g r a s p for themselves. 21

T h e different weights a c c o r d e d m o r a l f r e e d o m a n d ethicalexistential s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n p r o v i d e a n o c c a s i o n for a final r e m a r k . T h e differences in d e s i g n , if n o t in s u b s t a n c e , b e t w e e n t h e o r i e s of political j u s t i c e reveal differences in t h e u n d e r l y i n g i n t u i t i o n s t h a t inform them. Political o r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l liberalism starts f r o m t h e i n t u i t i o n t h a t t h e p e r s o n a n d h e r i n d i v i d u a l way of life m u s t b e p r o t e c t e d frorn t h e i n t r u s i o n of state p o w e r : "political liberalism allows . . . t h a t o u r political i n s t i t u t i o n s c o n t a i n sufficient s p a c e for w o r t h y ways of life, a n d t h a t in this sense o u r political society is j u s t a n d g o o d " (PL 2*10). C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e private a n d p u b l i c s p h e r e s takes o n f u n d a m e n t a l i m p o r t a n c e . It sets t h e s t a n d a r d s for t h e a u t h o r i t a t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of f r e e d o m : t h e legally g u a r a n t e e d free­ d o m of c h o i c e of private legal subjects c r e a t e s t h e free space for p u r s u i n g a p l a n of life i n f o r m e d by o n e ' s o w n c o n c e p t i o n of t h e g o o d . Rights a r e liberties, p r o t e c t i v e b a r r i e r s for private a u t o n o m y . At t h e h e a r t of this a p p r o a c h lies a c o n c e r n for t h e e q u a l f r e e d o m of every p e r s o n to l e a d a s e l f - d e t e r m i n e d , a u t h e n t i c life. F r o m this p e r s p e c t i v e t h e p u b l i c a u t o n o m y of citizens w h o p a r t i c i p a t e in t h e

101 "Reasonable" versus "True"

p r a c t i c e of political self-legislation is s u p p o s e d to m a k e possible t h e p e r s o n a l s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n of private p e r s o n s . W h i l e it m a y also h a v e a n intrinsic value for m a n y p e o p l e , p u b l i c a u t o n o m y a p p e a r s in t h e first i n s t a n c e as a m e a n s for realizing private a u t o n o m y . ( ^ K a r r t i a r i R e p u b l i c a n i s m as I u n d e r s t a n d it, starts f r o m a different i n t u i t i o n . N o b o d y c a n b e free at t h e e x p e n s e of a n y b o d y else's f r e e d o m . B e c a u s e persons^aFe i n d i v i d u a t e d only by way of socializa­ tion, t h e f r e e d o m of q n e ^ n c l i v i d u a l c a n n o t b e tied to t h e f r e e d o m of e v e r y o n e else in a p u r e l y n e g a t i v e way, t h r o u g h r e c i p r o c a l restrictions. Rather, c o r r e c t r e s t r i c t i o n s are_the_rejult^of a p r o c e s s of selflegislation c o n d u c t e d jointly. I n a n association of free a n d e q u a l p e r s o n s , all m e m b e r s m u s t b e a b l e t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e m s e l v e s as j o i n t a u t h o r s of laws to w h i c h t h e y feel t h e m s e l v e s b o u n d individually as a d d r e s s e e s . H e n c e t h e p u b l i c u s e of r e a s o n , legally i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d in t h e d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e s s , p r o v i d e s t h e key for g u a r a n t e e i n g e q u a l freedoms. Or^ejm^ ^ u s t bej embprliejian^tJie jpaedium of coerQye_and positive law, t h e f r e e d o m of t h e m o r a l p e r s o n splits i n t o t h e ' \ P ^ ^ ^ H J £ S 9 J E Y JP * , 9 " ¥ S J ^ Q j ^ d the^jprivate a u t o n o m y of ad­ d r e s s e e s of t h e lawy i n s u c h a way t h a t t h e y reciprocally p r e s u p p o s e o n e another. This complementary relationship between the public a n d t h e private d o e s n o t refer t o a n y t h i n g given o r n a t u r a l b u t is c o n c e p t u a l l y g e n e r a t e d by t h e very s t r u c t u r e of %he legal m e d i u m . H e n c e it is left to t h e d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e s s c o n t i n u a l l y t o d e f i n e a n d r e d e f i n e t h e p r e c a r i o u s b o u n d a r i e s b e t w e e n t h e private a n d t h e p u b l i c so as to s e c u r e e q u a l f r e e d o m s for all citizens in t h e f o r m of b o t h private a n d p u b l i c a u t o n o m y . <

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Ill Is There a Future for the Nation-State?

4

The European Nation-State: On the Past and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship

As even t h e n a m e of t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s reveals, w o r l d society t o d a y is c o m p o s e d politically of nation-states. T h e historical type of state that e m e r g e d from the French a n d American revolutions has a c h i e v e d g l o b a l d o m i n a n c e . T h i s fact is by n o m e a n s trivial. T h e classical nation-states in N o r t h e r n a n d W e s t e r n E u r o p e evolved w i t h i n t h e b o u n d a r i e s of existing t e r r i t o r i a l states. T h e y w e r e p a r t of t h e E u r o p e a n state system w h i c h a l r e a d y t o o k o n a r e c o g n i z ­ a b l e s h a p e with t h e P e a c e of W e s t p h a l i a of 1648. By c o n t r a s t , t h e " b e l a t e d " n a t i o n s — b e g i n n i n g with Italy a n d G e r m a n y — f o l l o w e d a different c o u r s e , o n e w h i c h was also typical for t h e f o r m a t i o n of nation-states in C e n t r a l a n d E a s t e r n E u r o p e ; h e r e t h e f o r m a t i o n of t h e state followed t h e trail b l a z e d by a n a n t i c i p a t o r y n a t i o n a l c o n ­ sciousness d i s s e m i n a t e d by p r o p a g a n d a . T h e difference b e t w e e n t h e s e two p a t h s (from state to n a t i o n vs. f r o m n a t i o n to state) is r e f l e c t e d in t h e b a c k g r o u n d s of t h e a c t o r s w h o f o r m e d t h e v a n g u a r d of n a t i o n a n d state b u i l d e r s . A l o n g t h e first p a t h , t h e s e w e r e lawyers, d i p l o m a t s , a n d m i l i t a r y officers w h o b e l o n g e d to t h e k i n g ' s a d m i n ­ istrative staff a n d t o g e t h e r c o n s t r u c t e d a "rational state b u r e a u c r a c y " (in M a x W e b e r ' s s e n s e ) ; a l o n g t h e s e c o n d , t h e y w e r e writers a n d h i s t o r i a n s , a n d scholars a n d intellectuals in g e n e r a l , w h o laid t h e g r o u n d w o r k for C a v o u r ' s a n d B i s m a r c k ' s s u b s e q u e n t d i p l o m a t i c a n d m i l i t a r y u n i f i c a t i o n of t h e state by p r o p a g a t i n g t h e m o r e o r less i m a g i n a r y u n i t y of t h e "cultural n a t i o n . " After t h e S e c o n d W o r l d War, a t h i r d g e n e r a t i o n of very different nation-states e m e r g e d f r o m

106 Chapter 4

t h e p r o c e s s of d e c o l o n i z a t i o n , p r i m a r i l y in Africa a n d Asia. O f t e n t h e s e states, w h i c h w e r e f o u n d e d w i t h i n t h e frontiers e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e f o r m e r c o l o n i a l r e g i m e s , a c q u i r e d sovereignty b e f o r e t h e im­ p o r t e d f o r m s of state o r g a n i z a t i o n c o u l d take r o o t in a n a t i o n a l i d e n t i t y t h a t t r a n s c e n d e d tribal differences. I n t h e s e cases, artificial states h a d t o b e first "filled" by n a t i o n s t h a t c o a l e s c e d only later. Finally, with t h e collapse of t h e Soviet E m p i r e , t h e t r e n d t o w a r d t h e f o r m a t i o n of i n d e p e n d e n t nation-states in E a s t e r n a n d S o u t h e r n E u r o p e h a s followed t h e p a t h of m o r e o r less v i o l e n t secessions; in t h e socially a n d e c o n o m i c a l l y p r e c a r i o u s situation in w h i c h t h e s e c o u n t r i e s f o u n d themselves, t h e o l d e t h n o n a t i o n a l slogans h a d t h e p o w e r to m o b i l i z e d i s t r a u g h t p o p u l a t i o n s for i n d e p e n d e n c e . T h u s t o d a y t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e h a s definitively s u p e r s e d e d o l d e r p o ­ litical f o r m a t i o n s . To b e s u r e , t h e classical city-states also h a d suc­ cessors in m o d e r n E u r o p e , for a c e r t a i n p e r i o d , in t h e cities of N o r t h e r n Italy a n d — i n t h e t e r r i t o r y of t h e o l d L o t h a r i n g i a (Lor­ r a i n e ) — i n t h e b e l t of cities o u t of w h i c h Switzerland a n d t h e N e t h ­ e r l a n d s e m e r g e d . T h e s t r u c t u r e s of t h e o l d e m p i r e s also r e e m e r g e d , first in t h e f o r m of t h e H o l y R o m a n E m p i r e a n d l a t e r in t h e multination-states of t h e Russian, O t t o m a n , a n d A u s t r o - H u n g a r i a n E m ­ pires. B u t in t h e m e a n t i m e t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e h a s d i s p l a c e d t h e s e r e m n a n t s of p r e m o d e r n states. We a r e at p r e s e n t witnessing t h e f u n d a m e n t a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of C h i n a , t h e last of t h e o l d e m p i r e s . 1

H e g e l t o o k t h e view t h a t every historical f o r m a t i o n is c o n d e m n e d to d e c l i n e o n c e it h a s r e a c h e d maturity. O n e n e e d n o t a c c e p t H e g e l ' s p h i l o s o p h y of h i s t o r y to r e c o g n i z e t h a t t h e t r i u m p h a l p r o c e s s i o n of t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e also h a s a n i r o n i c a l , obverse side. T h e n a t i o n - s t a t e at o n e t i m e r e p r e s e n t e d a c o g e n t r e s p o n s e to t h e historical chal­ l e n g e to find a f u n c t i o n a l e q u i v a l e n t for t h e early m o d e r n f o r m of social i n t e g r a t i o n w h i c h was in t h e p r o c e s s of d i s i n t e g r a t i n g . T o d a y we a r e c o n f r o n t i n g a n a n a l o g o u s c h a l l e n g e . T h e globalization of c o m m e r c e a n d c o m m u n i c a t i o n , of e c o n o m i c p r o d u c t i o n a n d finance, of t h e s p r e a d of t e c h n o l o g y a n d w e a p o n s , a n d a b o v e &11 of ecological a n d m i l i t a r y risks, p o s e s p r o b l e m s t h a t c a n n o l o n g e r b e solved w i t h i n t h e f r a m e w o r k of nation-states o r by t h e t r a d i t i o n a l m e t h o d of a g r e e m e n t s b e t w e e n sovereign states. If c u r r e n t t r e n d s c o n t i n u e , t h e progressive u n d e r m i n i n g of n a t i o n a l sovereignty will

107 The European Nation-State

necessitate t h e f o u n d i n g a n d e x p a n s i o n of political institutions o n t h e s u p r a n a t i o n a l level, a p r o c e s s w h o s e b e g i n n i n g s c a n already b e o b s e r v e d . I n E u r o p e , N o r t h A m e r i c a , a n d Asia, n e w f o r m s of o r g a n i ­ z a t i o n for c o n t i n e n t a l " r e g i m e s " a r e g r a d u a l l y e m e r g i n g above t h e level of t h e state, r e g i m e s w h i c h c o u l d o n e day p r o v i d e t h e r e q u i s i t e i n f r a s t r u c t u r e for t h e c u r r e n t l y r a t h e r inefficient U n i t e d N a t i o n s . T h i s u n p r e c e d e n t e d i n c r e a s e in a b s t r a c t i o n is m e r e l y t h e c o n t i n u ­ a t i o n of a p r o c e s s t h e first m a j o r e x a m p l e of w h i c h is t h e i n t e g r a t i o n a c h i e v e d by t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e . H e n c e I t h i n k t h a t we c a n take o u r o r i e n t a t i o n o n t h e p r e c a r i o u s p a t h t o w a r d p o s t n a t i o n a l societies f r o m t h e very historical m o d e l we a r e o n t h e p o i n t of s u p e r s e d i n g . First I w o u l d like to review t h e a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s of t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e by clarifying t h e c o n c e p t s "state" a n d " n a t i o n " (I) a n d e x p l a i n i n g t h e two p r o b l e m s to w h i c h t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e p r o v i d e d a s o l u t i o n (II). T h e n I will e x a m i n e t h e p o t e n t i a l for conflict b u i l t i n t o this f o r m of n a t i o n a l state, n a m e l y t h e t e n s i o n b e t w e e n r e p u b l i c a n i s m a n d na­ t i o n a l i s m (III). Finally, I w o u l d like to d e a l with two c u r r e n t chal­ l e n g e s t h a t o v e r b u r d e n t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e ' s capacity for a c t i o n : t h e d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of society a l o n g m u l t i c u l t u r a l lines (IV) a n d t h e p r o c ­ esses of g l o b a l i z a t i o n t h a t a r e u n d e r m i n i n g b o t h t h e i n t e r n a l (V) a n d t h e e x t e r n a l (VI) sovereignty of t h e existing nation-states. I

"State" and "Nation"

T h e "state" o n t h e m o d e r n c o n c e p t i o n is a legally d e f i n e d t e r m w h i c h refers, at t h e level of s u b s t a n c e , to a state p o w e r t h a t possesses b o t h i n t e r n a l a n d e x t e r n a l sovereignty, at t h e spatial level over a clearly d e l i m i t e d t e r r a i n ( t h e state t e r r i t o r y ) a n d at t h e social level over t h e totality of m e m b e r s ( t h e b o d y of citizens o r t h e p e o p l e ) . State p o w e r c o n s t i t u t e s itself in t h e f o r m s of positive law, a n d t h e p e o p l e is t h e b e a r e r of t h e legal o r d e r w h o s e j u r i s d i c t i o n is r e s t r i c t e d to t h e state territory. I n political u s a g e , t h e c o n c e p t s " n a t i o n " a n d " p e o p l e " have t h e s a m e e x t e n s i o n . B u t in a d d i t i o n to its legal defini­ tion, t h e t e r m " n a t i o n " h a s t h e c o n n o t a t i o n of a political c o m m u n i t y s h a p e d by c o m m o n d e s c e n t , o r at least by a c o m m o n l a n g u a g e , c u l t u r e , a n d history. A p e o p l e b e c o m e s a " n a t i o n " in this historical sense only in t h e c o n c r e t e f o r m of a p a r t i c u l a r f o r m of life. T h e two

108 Chapter 4

c o m p o n e n t s , w h i c h a r e y o k e d t o g e t h e r in s u c h c o n c e p t s as "nations t a t e " a n d " n a t i o n of citizens," c a n b e t r a c e d b a c k to two far-fromparallel p r o c e s s e s of historical d e v e l o p m e n t — t h e f o r m a t i o n of states o n t h e o n e h a n d ( 1 ) , a n d of n a t i o n s o n t h e o t h e r ( 2 ) . (1) T h e historical success of t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e is d u e in l a r g e p a r t to t h e a d v a n t a g e s of t h e m o d e r n state a p p a r a t u s as s u c h . Evidently, t h e t e r r i t o r i a l state, with its m o n o p o l y o n t h e l e g i t i m a t e u s e of v i o l e n c e a n d its d i f f e r e n t i a t e d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a p p a r a t u s financed by t a x a t i o n , was b e t t e r a b l e to c o p e with t h e f u n c t i o n a l i m p e r a t i v e s of social, c u l t u r a l , a n d , a b o v e all, e c o n o m i c m o d e r n i z a t i o n t h a n w e r e o l d e r political f o r m a t i o n s . F o r o u r p u r p o s e s it will suffice to recall t h e ideal-typical m o d e l w o r k e d o u t by M a r x a n d Weber. (a) T h e executive b r a n c h of t h e state w h i c h b e c a m e d e t a c h e d f r o m t h e royal h o u s e h o l d c o n s i s t e d of a functionally specialized b u r e a u c r a t i c o r g a n i z a t i o n w h i c h was r u n by legally t r a i n e d officials a n d w h i c h c o u l d d r a w o n t h e r e s e r v e force of a s t a n d i n g army, t h e p o l i c e , a n d t h e p e n a l system. T h e i m p o s i t i o n of "civil p e a c e " (Landfriederi) was t h e n e c e s s a r y p r e c o n d i t i o n for m o n o p o l i z i n g t h e s e le­ g i t i m a t e m e a n s of v i o l e n c e . A state is sovereign only if it c a n b o t h m a i n t a i n law a n d o r d e r i n t e r n a l l y a n d p r o t e c t its b o r d e r s a g a i n s t e x t e r n a l t h r e a t s . It m u s t b e c a p a b l e of prevailing over all c o m p e t i n g p o w e r s w i t h i n its b o r d e r s a n d of a s s e r t i n g itself in t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l a r e n a as a c o m p e t i t o r with e q u a l s t a n d i n g . T h e status of a subject of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law is c o n t i n g e n t u p o n a c h i e v i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e c o g ­ n i t i o n as a n " e q u a l " a n d " i n d e p e n d e n t " m e m b e r of t h e system of states. I n t e r n a l sovereignty p r e s u p p o s e s t h e ability to m a i n t a i n law a n d o r d e r , e x t e r n a l sovereignty t h e ability to assert o n e s e l f in t h e "anarchistic" c o m p e t i t i o n for p o w e r a m o n g states. (b) Even m o r e i m p o r t a n t for t h e m o d e r n i z a t i o n p r o c e s s is t h e s e p a r a t i o n of t h e state f r o m "civil society" (in H e g e l ' s sense of "burgerliche Gesellschaft"); h e n c e t h e f u n c t i o n a l specification of t h e state a p p a r a t u s . T h e m o d e r n state is b o t h a n a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a n d a taxb a s e d state, w h i c h m e a n s t h a t it limits itself to essentially a d m i n i s t r a ­ tive tasks. It leaves t h e p r o d u c t i v e tasks, w h i c h w e r e f o r m e r l y a c c o m p l i s h e d within the framework of political power, t o a m a r k e t e c o n o m y d i f f e r e n t i a t e d f r o m t h e state. To this e x t e n t , it s e c u r e s t h e " g e n e r a l c o n d i t i o n s of p r o d u c t i o n " ; h e n c e t h e legal f r a m e w o r k a n d

109 T h e E u r o p e a n Nation-State

i n f r a s t r u c t u r e t h a t a r e n e c e s s a r y for capitalistic c o m m o d i t y ex­ c h a n g e a n d for t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g o r g a n i z a t i o n of t h e l a b o r force. T h e financial n e e d s of t h e state a r e m e t by a privately g e n e r a t e d tax i n c o m e . T h e p r i c e t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e system pays for t h e benefits of this f u n c t i o n a l specialization is its d e p e n d e n c e o n t h e p e r f o r m a n c e of a n e c o n o m y r e g u l a t e d by m a r k e t s . A l t h o u g h m a r k e t s c a n b e e s t a b l i s h e d a n d r e g u l a t e d by political m e a n s , they o b e y a logic of t h e i r own t h a t e s c a p e s state c o n t r o l . T h e d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of t h e state f r o m t h e e c o n o m y is r e f l e c t e d in t h e d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n b e t w e e n p u b l i c a n d private law. Insofar as t h e m o d e r n state m a k e s u s e of positive law as a m e a n s of o r g a n i z a t i o n a n d i m p l e m e n t a t i o n , it b i n d s itself to a m e d i u m t h a t instantiates, t h r o u g h t h e c o n c e p t of law a n d t h e derivative c o n c e p t s of subjective r i g h t a n d of t h e legal p e r s o n (as t h e b e a r e r of r i g h t s ) , a n e w p r i n c i ­ p l e m a d e explicit by H o b b e s : w i t h i n a n o r d e r of m o d e r n law t h a t is set free f r o m i m m e d i a t e m o r a l e x p e c t a t i o n s ( t h o u g h only in c e r t a i n r e s p e c t s ) , t h e citizens a r e p e r m i t t e d t o d o a n y t h i n g t h a t is n o t p r o ­ h i b i t e d . R e g a r d l e s s of w h e t h e r state p o w e r h a s a l r e a d y b e e n d o m e s ­ ticated by t h e r u l e of law a n d t h e c r o w n h a s b e c o m e "subject t o t h e law," t h e state c a n n o t m a k e u s e of t h e m e d i u m of law w i t h o u t o r g a n ­ izing social i n t e r c o u r s e i n t h e s e p a r a t e s p h e r e of civil society in s u c h a way t h a t private p e r s o n s enjoy—at first u n e q u a l l y d i s t r i b u t e d — i n ­ dividual liberties. W i t h t h e s e p a r a t i o n of private f r o m p u b l i c law, t h e i n d i v i d u a l citizen, in h e r r o l e as "subject" ("Untertan" i n K a n t ' s ter­ m i n o l o g y ) , first a c q u i r e s at least a c o r e of private a u t o n o m y . (2) T o d a y we all live in n a t i o n a l societies t h a t owe t h e i r u n i t y to a n o r g a n i z a t i o n of this type. O f c o u r s e , s u c h states existed l o n g b e f o r e t h e r e w e r e " n a t i o n s " in t h e m o d e r n sense. State a n d n a t i o n h a v e fused i n t o t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e only since t h e r e v o l u t i o n s of t h e late e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y . B e f o r e I e x a m i n e t h e specific n a t u r e of this c o n n e c t i o n I w o u l d like to review, in a brief digression o n c o n c e p t u a l history, t h e g e n e s i s of t h e m o d e r n c o n s c i o u s n e s s t h a t u n d e r l i e s t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e citizen b o d y as a n a t i o n in s o m e t h i n g o t h e r t h a n a m e r e l y legal sense. I n t h e classical R o m a n u s a g e , " n a t i o " like " g e n s " f u n c t i o n s as a c o n t r a s t i n g c o n c e p t t o "civitas." N a t i o n s w e r e originally c o m m u n i t i e s of s h a r e d d e s c e n t w h i c h w e r e i n t e g r a t e d g e o g r a p h i c a l l y t h r o u g h 2

110 Chapter 4

s e t t l e m e n t s a n d n e i g h b o r h o o d s a n d culturally t h r o u g h t h e i r c o m ­ m o n l a n g u a g e , c u s t o m s , a n d t r a d i t i o n s ; b u t t h e y w e r e n o t yet inte­ g r a t e d politically t h r o u g h t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n a l f o r m of a state. T h i s r o o t m e a n i n g p e r s i s t e d t h r o u g h t h e M i d d l e Ages i n t o early m o d e r n times w h e n e v e r " n a t i o " a n d "lingua" w e r e t r e a t e d as e q u i v a l e n t . T h u s , for e x a m p l e , s t u d e n t s at m e d i e v a l universities w e r e divided i n t o " n a t i o n e s " a c c o r d i n g t o t h e i r c o u n t r y of o r i g i n . I n a n e r a of i n c r e a s i n g g e o g r a p h i c a l mobility, t h e c o n c e p t s e r v e d p r i m a r i l y as a m e a n s of i n t e r n a l differentiation of o r d e r s of k n i g h t s , of universities, m o n a s t e r i e s , ecclesiastical c o u n c i l s , m e r c h a n t s e t t l e m e n t s , etc. T h u s it h a p p e n e d t h a t a n a t i o n a l o r i g i n ascribed by others was f r o m t h e very b e g i n n i n g l i n k e d i n a c o n s p i c u o u s way with t h e n e g a t i v e d e m a r c a ­ t i o n of f o r e i g n e r s f r o m o n e ' s o w n p e o p l e . 3

A r o u n d this t i m e , t h e t e r m " n a t i o n " a c q u i r e d a m e a n i n g o p p o s e d to t h e n o n p o l i t i c a l u s a g e in a different c o n t e x t . T h e f e u d a l system of t h e o l d G e r m a n E m p i r e h a d b e e n s u p e r s e d e d by c o r p o r a t i v e states (Standestaaten) b a s e d o n c o n t r a c t s in w h i c h t h e k i n g o r e m ­ p e r o r , w h o s e p o w e r d e p e n d e d o n taxes a n d m i l i t a r y s u p p o r t , g r a n t e d t h e nobility, t h e C h u r c h , a n d t h e towns c e r t a i n privileges, a n d t h e r e w i t h l i m i t e d p a r t i c i p a t i o n in t h e exercise of political power. T h e s e r u l i n g estates, w h i c h m e t in " p a r l i a m e n t s " o r "diej:s," r e p r e ­ s e n t e d t h e c o u n t r y o r "the n a t i o n " vis-a-vis t h e c o u r t . As t h e " n a t i o n , " t h e aristocracy a c q u i r e d a political e x i s t e n c e t h a t was still d e n i e d t h e " p e o p l e " as t h e m a s s of t h e subjects. T h i s e x p l a i n s t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h e s l o g a n "the K i n g in P a r l i a m e n t " in E n g l a n d a n d , especially, of t h e identification of t h e " T h i r d E s t a t e " with t h e "na­ t i o n " in F r a n c e . T h e d e m o c r a t i c t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of t h e Adelsnation, t h e n a t i o n of t h e nobility, i n t o a Volksnation, t h e n a t i o n of t h e p e o p l e , w h i c h h a s b e e n in p r o g r e s s since t h e late e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y , p r e s u p p o s e s a d e e p t r a n s f o r m a t i o n in c o n s c i o u s n e s s i n s p i r e d by intellectuals, a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n first a c c o m p l i s h e d by t h e u r b a n , a n d a b o v e all for­ mally e d u c a t e d , m i d d l e classes b e f o r e it f o u n d a r e s o n a n c e in t h e w i d e r p o p u l a t i o n a n d g r a d u a l l y b r o u g h t a b o u t a political mobiliza­ t i o n of t h e masses. P o p u l a r n a t i o n a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s crystallized i n t o t h e " i m a g i n e d c o m m u n i t i e s " ( B e n e d i c t A n d e r s o n ) p r o p a g a t e d in n a t i o n a l histories, w h i c h b e c a m e t h e catalysts of a n e w f o r m of

Ill The European Nation-State

collective self-identification: " T h u s n a t i o n s a r o s e in t h e final d e c a d e s of t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y a n d in t h e c o u r s e of t h e n i n e t e e n t h cen­ t u r y . . .: c o n c e i v e d by a small n u m b e r of scholars, publicists, a n d poets—Volksnationen i n c o n c e p t b u t far f r o m it in reality." To t h e e x t e n t t h a t this i d e a t o o k r o o t , however, it b e c a m e a p p a r e n t that, with its t r a n s f o r m a t i o n f r o m t h e c o n c e p t of a n aristocratic n a t i o n i n t o t h a t of a n a t i o n of t h e p e o p l e , t h e political c o n c e p t h a d i n h e r ­ i t e d t h e p o w e r to g e n e r a t e stereotypes f r o m t h e older, p r e p o l i t i c a l c o n c e p t of t h e n a t i o n as a n i n d e x of d e s c e n t a n d o r i g i n . T h e positive s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of o n e ' s own n a t i o n n o w b e c a m e a n efficient m e c h a n i s m for r e p u d i a t i n g e v e r y t h i n g r e g a r d e d as f o r e i g n , for d e ­ v a l u i n g o t h e r n a t i o n s , a n d for e x c l u d i n g n a t i o n a l , e t h n i c , a n d relig­ i o u s m i n o r i t i e s , especially t h e Jews. I n E u r o p e n a t i o n a l i s m b e c a m e allied with a n t i s e m i t i s m , with disastrous c o n s e q u e n c e s . 4

II

T h e N e w F o r m o f Social Integration

i n t e r p r e t e d in l i g h t of t h e i r results, t h e c o m p l e x a n d l o n g - r u n n i n g p r o c e s s e s of t h e " i n v e n t i o n of t h e n a t i o n " (Schulze) p l a y e d t h e r o l e of a catalyst in t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of t h e early m o d e r n state i n t o a d e m o c r a t i c r e p u b l i c . P o p u l a r n a t i o n a l self-consciousness p r o v i d e d t h e c u l t u r a l b a c k g r o u n d a g a i n s t w h i c h "subjects" c o u l d b e c o m e p o ­ litically active "citizens." B e l o n g i n g to t h e " n a t i o n " m a d e possible for t h e first t i m e a r e l a t i o n of solidarity b e t w e e n p e r s o n s w h o h a d p r e ­ viously b e e n s t r a n g e r s t o o n e a n o t h e r . T h u s t h e a c h i e v e m e n t of t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e c o n s i s t e d in solving two p r o b l e m s at o n c e : it m a d e pos­ sible a n e w mode of legitimation b a s e d o n a new, m o r e a b s t r a c t f o r m of social integration. Briefly stated, t h e l e g i t i m a t i o n p r o b l e m r e s u l t e d f r o m t h e fact t h a t t h e p l u r a l i s m of worldviews t h a t followed t h e schism of t h e religious confessions g r a d u a l l y s t r i p p e d political a u t h o r i t y of its religious g r o u n d i n g in "divine r i g h t . " T h e secularized state n o w h a d to derive its l e g i t i m a t i o n f r o m different s o u r c e s . T h e s e c o n d p r o b l e m , t h a t of social i n t e g r a t i o n , was c o n n e c t e d , simplifying o n c e a g a i n , with ur­ b a n i z a t i o n a n d e c o n o m i c m o d e r n i z a t i o n , with t h e i n c r e a s i n g s c o p e a n d a c c e l e r a t i o n of t h e c i r c u l a t i o n of p e o p l e , g o o d s , a n d news. P o p u l a t i o n s b e c a m e u n m o o r e d f r o m t h e c o r p o r a t i v e social ties of

112 Chapter 4

early m o d e r n societies, t h e r e b y b e c o m i n g a t t h e s a m e t i m e b o t h g e o g r a p h i c a l l y m o b i l i z e d a n d isolated. T h e n a t i o n - s t a t e r e s p o n d e d to b o t h of t h e s e c h a l l e n g e s by politically m o b i l i z i n g its citizens. F o r t h e e m e r g i n g n a t i o n a l identity m a d e it possible to c o m b i n e a m o r e a b s t r a c t f o r m of social i n t e g r a t i o n with n e w s t r u c t u r e s of political d e c i s i o n m a k i n g . D e m o c r a t i c p a r t i c i p a t i o n , as it slowly b e c a m e es­ t a b l i s h e d , g e n e r a t e d a n e w level of legally m e d i a t e d solidarity via t h e status of citizenship while p r o v i d i n g t h e state with a secular s o u r c e of legitimation. O f c o u r s e , t h e r e was n o m o d e r n state t h a t h a d n o t d e f i n e d its social b o u n d a r i e s in t e r m s of citizenship r i g h t s . B u t b e ­ l o n g i n g to a p a r t i c u l a r state at first m e a n t n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n b e i n g subject to a state power. O n l y with t h e t r a n s i t i o n to t h e d e m o c r a t i c state was this ascriptive, o r g a n i z a t i o n a l m e m b e r s h i p t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o a n a c q u i r e d m e m b e r s h i p — b a s e d o n (at least implicit) c o n ­ s e n t — o f citizens w h o w e r e e x p e c t e d to p a r t i c i p a t e actively in t h e exercise of political power. However, we m u s t d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n t h e legal-political a n d t h e p r o p e r l y c u l t u r a l aspects of t h e n e w m e a n ­ i n g t h a t m e m b e r s h i p a c q u i r e d with t h e shift f r o m t h e status of a subject to t h a t of a citizen. As we h a v e s e e n , t h e two d e f i n i n g characteristics of t h e m o d e r n state w e r e t h e sovereignty of state p o w e r e m b o d i e d in t h e p r i n c e a n d t h e differentiation of t h e state f r o m society t h r o u g h w h i c h a c o r e of individual liberties was c o n f e r r e d (in a p a t e r n a l i s t i c m a n n e r ) o n t h e private citizens. W i t h t h e shift f r o m royal to p o p u l a r sovereignty, t h e r i g h t s of subjects w e r e t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o h u m a n r i g h t s a n d civil rights, t h a t is, i n t o basic liberal a n d political r i g h t s of citizens. Viewed as i d e a l types, t h e y g u a r a n t e e d political as well as private a u t o n o m y , a n d in p r i n c i p l e , even e q u a l political a u t o n o m y for e v e r y o n e . T h e d e m o c r a t i c c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state is, ideally s p e a k i n g , a v o l u n t a r y p o ­ litical o r d e r e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e p e o p l e t h e m s e l v e s a n d l e g i t i m a t e d by t h e i r free will-formation. A c c o r d i n g to R o u s s e a u a n d Kant, t h e ad­ d r e s s e e s of t h e law s h o u l d b e a b l e to c o n c e i v e of t h e m s e l v e s at t h e s a m e t i m e as its a u t h o r s . B u t s u c h a legal-political t r a n s f o r m a t i o n w o u l d h a v e l a c k e d driv­ i n g force, a n d formally e s t a b l i s h e d r e p u b l i c s w o u l d h a v e l a c k e d staying power, if a n a t i o n of m o r e o r less self-conscious citizens h a d n o t e m e r g e d f r o m a p e o p l e d e f i n e d by its subjection t o state power.

113 T h e E u r o p e a n Nation-State

T h i s political m o b i l i z a t i o n called for a n i d e a t h a t was vivid a n d p o w e r f u l e n o u g h to s h a p e p e o p l e ' s convictions a n d a p p e a l e d m o r e strongly to t h e i r h e a r t s a n d m i n d s t h a n t h e d r y ideas of p o p u l a r sovereignty a n d h u m a n rights. T h i s g a p was filled by t h e m o d e r n i d e a of t h e n a t i o n , w h i c h first i n s p i r e d in t h e i n h a b i t a n t s of state t e r r i t o r i e s a n a w a r e n e s s of t h e new, legally a n d politically m e d i a t e d f o r m of c o m m u n i t y . O n l y a n a t i o n a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s , crystallized a r o u n d t h e n o t i o n of a c o m m o n ancestry, l a n g u a g e , a n d history, only t h e c o n s c i o u s n e s s of b e l o n g i n g to "the s a m e " p e o p l e , m a k e s subjects i n t o citizens of a single political c o m m u n i t y — i n t o m e m b e r s w h o c a n feel r e s p o n s i b l e for one another. T h e n a t i o n o r t h e Volksgeist, t h e u n i q u e spirit of t h e p e o p l e — t h e first truly modern f o r m of col­ lective i d e n t i t y — p r o v i d e d t h e c u l t u r a l basis for t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state. As d e s c r i b e d by h i s t o r i a n s , this t h o r o u g h l y artificial fusion of o l d e r loyalties i n t o a n e w n a t i o n a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s , w h i c h was also s t e e r e d by b u r e a u c r a t i c i m p e r a t i v e s , is a l o n g , d r a w n - o u t p r o c e s s . T h i s leads to a d o u b l e c o d i n g of citizenship, with t h e r e s u l t t h a t t h e legal status d e f i n e d in t e r m s of civil r i g h t s also implies m e m b e r ­ s h i p in a culturally d e f i n e d c o m m u n i t y . W i t h o u t this c u l t u r a l inter­ p r e t a t i o n of political m e m b e r s h i p r i g h t s , t h e nation-state i n its e m e r g e n t p h a s e w o u l d scarcely h a v e h a d sufficient s t r e n g t h to estab­ lish a new, m o r e a b s t r a c t level of social i n t e g r a t i o n t h r o u g h t h e legal i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of d e m o c r a t i c citizenship. T h e c o u n t e r e x a m p l e of t h e U n i t e d States d o e s d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e c a n a s s u m e a n d m a i n t a i n a r e p u b l i c a n f o r m even w i t h o u t t h e s u p p o r t of s u c h a culturally h o m o g e n e o u s p o p u l a t i o n . However, in this case a civil r e l i g i o n r o o t e d in t h e majority c u l t u r e t o o k t h e p l a c e of n a t i o n a l i s m . T h u s far I h a v e f o c u s e d exclusively o n t h e achievements of t h e nation-state. But the connection between republicanism a n d nation­ alism also e n g e n d e r s d a n g e r o u s ambivalences. W i t h t h e rise of t h e nation-state, t h e m e a n i n g of state sovereignty also c h a n g e s , as we have s e e n . T h i s n o t only h a s a n i m p a c t o n t h e shift f r o m royal to p o p u l a r sovereignty; it also c h a n g e s t h e p e r c e p t i o n of e x t e r n a l sov­ ereignty. T h e i d e a of t h e n a t i o n is inextricably b o u n d u p with t h e Machiavellian will to self-assertion by w h i c h t h e c o n d u c t of sovereign states i n t h e a r e n a of t h e "great p o w e r s " h a d b e e n g u i d e d f r o m t h e b e g i n n i n g . N o w t h e strategic self-assertion of t h e m o d e r n state

114 Chapter 4

a g a i n s t e x t e r n a l e n e m i e s is t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o t h e existential selfa s s e r t i o n of "the n a t i o n . " W i t h this a t h i r d c o n c e p t of " f r e e d o m " is i n t r o d u c e d . T h e collective c o n c e p t of n a t i o n a l f r e e d o m c o m p e t e s with t h e two individualistic c o n c e p t s of f r e e d o m , t h a t of t h e private liberties of m e m b e r s of civil society a n d t h a t of t h e political a u t o n ­ o m y of citizens. M o r e i m p o r t a n t is t h e q u e s t i o n of how t h e f r e e d o m of t h e n a t i o n is to b e c o n s t r u e d : w h e t h e r o n a n a n a l o g y with t h e liberty of private p e r s o n s w h o differentiate t h e m s e l v e s f r o m , a n d c o m p e t e with, o n e a n o t h e r , o r o n t h e m o d e l of t h e c o o p e r a t i v e self-legislation of a u t o n o m o u s citizens. T h e m o d e l of p u b l i c a u t o n o m y takes p r e c e d e n c e if t h e n a t i o n is p r i m a r i l y c o n c e i v e d as a legally c o n s t i t u t e d entity, t h a t is, as a n a t i o n of citizens. T h e s e citizens m a y i n d e e d b e p a t r i o t s w h o u n d e r s t a n d a n d u p h o l d t h e i r c o n s t i t u t i o n as a n a c h i e v e m e n t in t h e c o n t e x t of t h e h i s t o r y of t h e i r c o u n t r y . B u t t h e y c o n s t r u e t h e f r e e d o m of t h e n a t i o n — f o l l o w i n g Kant-—in c o s m o p o l i t a n t e r m s , namely, as t h e a u t h o r i z a t i o n a n d o b l i g a t i o n to e n t e r i n t o c o o p e r a t i v e a g r e e m e n t s o r to establish a b a l a n c e of i n t e r e s t s with o t h e r n a t i o n s w i t h i n t h e f r a m e w o r k of a peaceful f e d e r a t i o n (Volkerbund). T h e n a t u r a l i s t i c c o n c e p t i o n of t h e n a t i o n as a p r e p o l i t i c a l entity, by c o n t r a s t , suggests a different i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h t h e f r e e d o m of t h e n a t i o n consists essentially in its ability to assert its i n d e p e n d e n c e by m i l i t a r y m e a n s if necessary. Like private p e r s o n s in t h e m a r k e t , p e o p l e s p u r s u e t h e i r respective i n t e r e s t s in t h e free-for-all of inter­ n a t i o n a l p o w e r politics. T h e t r a d i t i o n a l i m a g e of e x t e r n a l sover­ eignty is d r e s s e d u p in n a t i o n a l colors a n d in this guise a w a k e n s n e w energies. Ill

T h e Tension b e t w e e n Nationalism and Republicanism

I n c o n t r a s t to t h e r e p u b l i c a n f r e e d o m s of individuals, t h e i n d e ­ p e n d e n c e of o n e ' s n a t i o n , w h i c h m u s t if n e c e s s a r y b e d e f e n d e d with t h e " b l o o d of its sons," d e s i g n a t e s t h e p l a c e w h e r e t h e secularized state p r e s e r v e s a r e s i d u e of n o n s e c u l a r t r a n s c e n d e n c e . I n times of w a r t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e i m p o s e s o n its citizens t h e d u t y to risk t h e i r lives for t h e collective. Since t h e F r e n c h R e v o l u t i o n , g e n e r a l c o n s c r i p t i o n h a s g o n e h a n d - i n - h a n d with civil rights; t h e willingness to fight a n d

115 T h e E u r o p e a n Nation-State

die for o n e ' s c o u n t r y is s u p p o s e d to e x p r e s s b o t h n a t i o n a l conscious­ ness a n d r e p u b l i c a n v i r t u e . T h u s t h e i n s c r i p t i o n s of F r e n c h n a t i o n a l h i s t o r y reflect a d o u b l e m e m o r y - t r a c e : political m i l e s t o n e s in t h e fight for r e p u b l i c a n f r e e d o m a r e u n i t e d with t h e d e a t h - s y m b o l i s m of m e m o r i a l s for soldiers killed in a c t i o n . T h e n a t i o n is Janus-faced. W h e r e a s t h e v o l u n t a r y n a t i o n of citizens is t h e s o u r c e of d e m o c r a t i c l e g i t i m a t i o n , it is t h e i n h e r i t e d o r as­ c r i b e d n a t i o n f o u n d e d o n e t h n i c m e m b e r s h i p (diegeborene Nation der Volksgenossen) t h a t s e c u r e s social i n t e g r a t i o n . Staatsbilrger o r citizens c o n s t i t u t e t h e m s e l v e s as a political association of free a n d e q u a l p e r s o n s by t h e i r o w n initiative; Volksgenossen o r n a t i o n a l s a l r e a d y find themselves in a c o m m u n i t y s h a p e d by a s h a r e d l a n g u a g e a n d history. T h e t e n s i o n b e t w e e n t h e universalism of a n e g a l i t a r i a n legal c o m ­ m u n i t y a n d t h e p a r t i c u l a r i s m of a c o m m u n i t y u n i t e d by historical destiny is b u i l t i n t o t h e very c o n c e p t of t h e n a t i o n a l state. T h i s a m b i v a l e n c e r e m a i n s h a r m l e s s as l o n g as a c o s m o p o l i t a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e n a t i o n of citizens is a c c o r d e d priority over a n e t h n o c e n t r i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e n a t i o n as in a p e r m a n e n t state of war. O n l y a n o n n a t u r a l i s t i c c o n c e p t of t h e n a t i o n c a n b e c o m b i n e d seamlessly with t h e universalistic s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e d e m o ­ cratic c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state. T h e n t h e r e p u b l i c a n i d e a c a n take t h e l e a d in p e n e t r a t i n g socially i n t e g r a t i n g f o r m s of life a n d s t r u c t u r i n g t h e m in a c c o r d a n c e with universalistic p a t t e r n s . T h e n a t i o n - s t a t e owes its historical success to t h e fact t h a t it s u b s t i t u t e d r e l a t i o n s of solidarity b e t w e e n t h e citizens for t h e d i s i n t e g r a t i n g c o r p o r a t i v e ties of early m o d e r n society. B u t this r e p u b l i c a n a c h i e v e m e n t is e n d a n ­ g e r e d w h e n , conversely, t h e integrative force of t h e n a t i o n of citizens is t r a c e d b a c k to t h e p r e p o l i t i c a l fact of a q u a s i - n a t u r a l p e o p l e , t h a t is, t o s o m e t h i n g i n d e p e n d e n t of a n d p r i o r to t h e political o p i n i o n a n d will-formation of t h e citizens themselves. O f c o u r s e , m a n y rea­ sons c o u l d b e given for t h e l u r c h i n t o n a t i o n a l i s m . I will m e n t i o n j u s t two, o n e c o n c e p t u a l , t h e o t h e r e m p i r i c a l . T h e r e is a c o n c e p t u a l g a p in t h e legal c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e consti­ t u t i o n a l state, a g a p t h a t is t e m p t i n g to fill with a naturalistic c o n ­ c e p t i o n of t h e p e o p l e . O n e c a n n o t e x p l a i n in p u r e l y n o r m a t i v e t e r m s h o w t h e u n i v e r s e of t h o s e w h o c o m e t o g e t h e r to r e g u l a t e t h e i r c o m m o n life by m e a n s of positive law s h o u l d b e c o m p o s e d . F r o m a

116 Chapter 4

n o r m a t i v e p o i n t of view, t h e social b o u n d a r i e s of a n association of free a n d e q u a l c o n s o c i a t e s u n d e r law a r e perfectly c o n t i n g e n t . Since t h e v o l u n t a r i n e s s of t h e d e c i s i o n to e n g a g e in a law-giving p r a x i s is a fiction of t h e c o n t r a c t u a l i s t t r a d i t i o n , in t h e r e a l w o r l d w h o gains t h e p o w e r to d e f i n e t h e b o u n d a r i e s of a political c o m m u n i t y is settled by historical c h a n c e a n d t h e actual c o u r s e of e v e n t s — n o r ­ mally, by t h e a r b i t r a r y o u t c o m e s of wars o r civil wars. It is a t h e o r e t i ­ cal m i s t a k e with grave p r a c t i c a l c o n s e q u e n c e s , o n e d a t i n g b a c k to t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y , to a s s u m e t h a t this q u e s t i o n c a n also b e a n s w e r e d in n o r m a t i v e t e r m s with r e f e r e n c e to a "right to n a t i o n a l self-determination." 5

N a t i o n a l i s m h a s f o u n d its o w n s o l u t i o n to t h e p r o b l e m of b o u n d a ­ ries. W h i l e n a t i o n a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s itself m a y very well b e a n artifact, it projects t h e i m a g i n a r y reality of t h e n a t i o n as a n o r g a n i c d e v e l o p ­ m e n t w h i c h , in c o n t r a s t with t h e artificial o r d e r of e n a c t e d law a n d t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state, n e e d s n o justification b e y o n d its s h e e r e x i s t e n c e . F o r this r e a s o n , r e c o u r s e to t h e " o r g a n i c " n a t i o n c a n c o n c e a l t h e c o n t i n g e n c y of t h e historically m o r e o r less a r b i t r a r y b o u n d a r i e s of t h e political c o m m u n i t y a n d c a n l e n d t h e m a n a u r a of i m i t a t e d s u b s t a n c e a n d " i n h e r i t e d " legitimacy. T h e o t h e r r e a s o n for t h e l u r c h i n t o n a t i o n a l i s m is m o r e trivial. Precisely t h e artificiality of n a t i o n a l m y t h s , b o t h in t h e i r l e a r n e d origins a n d their dissemination t h r o u g h p r o p a g a n d a , makes nation­ alism intrinsically susceptible to m i s u s e by political elites. T h a t d o ­ m e s t i c conflicts c a n b e n e u t r a l i z e d by f o r e i g n m i l i t a r y successes repts o n a socio-psychological m e c h a n i s m t h a t g o v e r n m e n t s have r e p e a t ­ edly e x p l o i t e d . B u t h o w t h e class conflicts g e n e r a t e d by a c c e l e r a t e d capitalist i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n c a n b e d i v e r t e d was p r e f i g u r e d for a bel­ l i g e r e n t n a t i o n - s t a t e striving for w o r l d p r o m i n e n c e : t h e collective f r e e d o m of t h e n a t i o n c o u l d b e i n t e r p r e t e d in t e r m s of a n i m p e r i a l e x p a n s i o n of power. T h e h i s t o r y of E u r o p e a n i m p e r i a l i s m b e t w e e n 1871 a n d 1914, a n d t h e i n t e g r a l n a t i o n a l i s m of t h e t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y ( n o t to s p e a k of t h e racist policies of t h e Nazis), illustrate t h e sad fact t h a t t h e i d e a of t h e n a t i o n d i d n o t so m u c h r e i n f o r c e t h e loyalty of t h e p o p u l a t i o n to t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state b u t m o r e often s e r v e d as a n i n s t r u m e n t to m o b i l i z e t h e masses for political goals t h a t c a n scarcely b e r e c o n c i l e d with r e p u b l i c a n p r i n c i p l e s . 6

117 The European Nation-State

T h e lesson to b e l e a r n e d f r o m this sad h i s t o r y is obvious. T h e nation-state m u s t r e n o u n c e t h e a m b i v a l e n t p o t e n t i a l t h a t o n c e p r o ­ p e l l e d it. T h o u g h t h e n a t i o n a l state is t o d a y r u n n i n g u p against its limits, we c a n still l e a r n f r o m its e x a m p l e . I n its heyday, t h e n a t i o n state f o u n d e d a d o m a i n of political c o m m u n i c a t i o n t h a t m a d e it possible to a b s o r b t h e a d v a n c e s in a b s t r a c t i o n of societal m o d e r n ­ ization a n d to r e - e m b e d a p o p u l a t i o n u p r o o t e d f r o m t r a d i t i o n a l f o r m s of life in a n e x t e n d e d a n d r a t i o n a l i z e d lifeworld t h r o u g h t h e cultivation of n a t i o n a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s . It c o u l d play this integrative r o l e all t h e b e t t e r in t h a t d e m o c r a t i c citizenship was c o n n e c t e d with c u l t u r a l m e m b e r s h i p in t h e n a t i o n . Today, as t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e finds itself c h a l l e n g e d f r o m w i t h i n by t h e explosive p o t e n t i a l of multicul­ t u r a l i s m a n d f r o m w i t h o u t by t h e p r e s s u r e of globalization, t h e q u e s t i o n arises of w h e t h e r t h e r e exists a f u n c t i o n a l e q u i v a l e n t for t h e fusion of t h e n a t i o n of citizens with t h e e t h n i c n a t i o n . TV

T h e Unity o f Political Culture in the Multiplicity o f Subcultures

Originally, t h e suggestive u n i t y of a m o r e o r less h o m o g e n o u s n a t i o n c o u l d e n s u r e t h e c u l t u r a l e m b e d d i n g of a legally d e f i n e d c i t i z e n s h i p status. I n this c o n t e x t , d e m o c r a t i c c i t i z e n s h i p c o u l d f o r m t h e focal p o i n t of social ties of m u t u a l responsibility. B u t t o d a y we live in pluralistic societies t h a t a r e m o v i n g f u r t h e r a n d f u r t h e r away f r o m t h e m o d e l of a n a t i o n - s t a t e b a s e d o n a culturally h o m o g e n e o u s p o p u l a t i o n . T h e diversity of c u l t u r a l f o r m s of life, e t h n i c g r o u p s , religions, a n d worldviews is c o n s t a n t l y g r o w i n g . T h e r e is n o a l t e r n a ­ tive to this d e v e l o p m e n t , e x c e p t a t t h e n o r m a t i v e l y i n t o l e r a b l e cost of e t h n i c c l e a n s i n g . H e n c e r e p u b l i c a n i s m m u s t l e a r n to s t a n d o n its o w n feet. T h e c e n t r a l i d e a of r e p u b l i c a n i s m is t h a t t h e d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e s s c a n s e r v e a t t h e s a m e t i m e as a g u a r a n t o r for t h e social i n t e g r a t i o n of a n increasingly d i f f e r e n t i a t e d society. I n a society char­ a c t e r i z e d by c u l t u r a l a n d religious p l u r a l i s m , this task c a n n o t b e d i s p l a c e d f r o m t h e level of political will-formation a n d p u b l i c c o m ­ m u n i c a t i o n o n t o t h e s e e m i n g l y n a t u r a l s u b s t r a t e of a s u p p o s e d l y h o m o g e n e o u s n a t i o n . T h e latter w o u l d m e r e l y serve as a facade for a h e g e m o n i c majority c u l t u r e . F o r historical r e a s o n s , in m a n y c o u n ­ tries t h e majority c u l t u r e is fused with t h e g e n e r a l political c u l t u r e

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w h i c h claims to b e r e c o g n i z e d by all citizens r e g a r d l e s s of t h e i r c u l t u r a l b a c k g r o u n d . T h i s fusion m u s t b e dissolved if it is to b e possible for different cultural, e t h n i c , a n d religious f o r m s of life to coexist a n d i n t e r a c t o n e q u a l t e r m s w i t h i n the same political c o m m u ­ nity. T h e level of t h e s h a r e d political c u l t u r e m u s t b e u n c o u p l e d f r o m t h e level of s u b c u l t u r e s a n d t h e i r p r e p o l i t i c a l identities. O f c o u r s e , t h e claim to coexist with e q u a l r i g h t s is subject to t h e proviso t h a t t h e p r o t e c t e d faiths a n d p r a c t i c e s m u s t n o t c o n t r a d i c t t h e r e i g n ­ i n g c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s (as t h e y a r e i n t e r p r e t e d by t h e political culture). T h e political c u l t u r e of a c o u n t r y crystallizes a r o u n d its constitu­ t i o n . E a c h n a t i o n a l c u l t u r e d e v e l o p s a distinctive i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h o s e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s t h a t a r e equally e m b o d i e d in o t h e r r e p u b l i c a n c o n s t i t u t i o n s — s u c h as p o p u l a r sovereignty a n d h u m a n r i g h t s — i n light of its o w n n a t i o n a l history. A " c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p a t r i o t ­ i s m " b a s e d o n t h e s e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s c a n take t h e p l a c e originally o c c u p i e d by n a t i o n a l i s m . T h i s n o t i o n of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p a t r i o t i s m a p p e a r s to m a n y o b s e r v e r s to r e p r e s e n t t o o weak a b o n d to h o l d t o g e t h e r c o m p l e x societies. T h e q u e s t i o n t h e n b e c o m e s even m o r e u r g e n t : u n d e r w h a t c o n d i t i o n s c a n a liberal political c u l t u r e p r o v i d e a sufficient c u s h i o n to p r e v e n t a n a t i o n of citizens, w h i c h c a n n o l o n g e r rely o n e t h n i c associations, f r o m dissolving i n t o fragments? T o d a y this p r o b l e m h a s a r i s e n even for classical i m m i g r a n t c o u n ­ tries like t h e U n i t e d States. T h e political c u l t u r e of t h e U n i t e d States p r o v i d e s m o r e space t h a n o t h e r c o u n t r i e s for t h e peaceful coexis­ t e n c e of citizens f r o m widely d i v e r g e n t c u l t u r a l b a c k g r o u n d s ; it e n ­ ables e v e r y o n e to m a i n t a i n two i d e n t i t i e s simultaneously, to b e b o t h a m e m b e r a n d a s t r a n g e r in h e r o w n l a n d . B u t t h e rising tide of f u n d a m e n t a l i s m a n d even t e r r o r i s m (as witnessed by t h e O k l a h o m a b o m b i n g ) r e p r e s e n t a w a r n i n g signal t h a t even h e r e t h e safety n e t of a civil religion, w h i c h i n t e r p r e t s a n impressively c o n t i n u o u s c o n ­ stitutional h i s t o r y of m o r e t h a n two c e n t u r i e s , c o u l d b e t o r n a p a r t . My sense is t h a t m u l t i c u l t u r a l societies c a n b e h e l d t o g e t h e r by a political c u l t u r e , h o w e v e r m u c h it h a s p r o v e n itself, only if d e m o ­ cratic citizenship pays off n o t only in t e r m s of liberal i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s a n d r i g h t s of political p a r t i c i p a t i o n , b u t also in t h e e n j o y m e n t of social a n d c u l t u r a l rights. T h e citizens m u s t b e a b l e to e x p e r i e n c e

119 T h e E u r o p e a n Nation-State

the fair value of their rights also i n t h e f o r m of social security a n d t h e r e c i p r o c a l r e c o g n i t i o n of different c u l t u r a l f o r m s of life. D e m o c r a t i c citizenship c a n only realize its integrative p o t e n t i a l — t h a t is, it c a n only f o u n d solidarity b e t w e e n s t r a n g e r s — i f it p r o v e s itself as a m e c h a n i s m t h a t actually realizes t h e m a t e r i a l c o n d i t i o n s of p r e ­ f e r r e d f o r m s of life. T h i s p e r s p e c t i v e is s u g g e s t e d a t a n y r a t e by t h e type of welfare state t h a t d e v e l o p e d i n E u r o p e u n d e r t h e f a v o r a b l e — t h o u g h , of c o u r s e , n o l o n g e r o b t a i n i n g — c o n d i t i o n s of t h e p o s t w a r p e r i o d . After t h e h i a t u s of t h e S e c o n d W o r l d War, a n o v e r - h e a t e d n a t i o n a l i s m h a d e x h a u s t e d its r e s e r v e s of energy. U n d e r t h e u m b r e l l a of a n u c l e a r balance between the superpowers, the E u r o p e a n countries—and n o t j u s t t h e divided G e r m a n y — c o u l d n o t c o n d u c t a f o r e i g n policy of t h e i r o w n . T e r r i t o r i a l d i s p u t e s c e a s e d t o b e a n issue. I n t e r n a l social conflicts c o u l d n o t b e d i v e r t e d o u t w a r d b u t h a d t o b e d e a l t with i n a c c o r d a n c e with t h e p r i m a c y of d o m e s t i c politics. U n d e r t h e s e c o n ­ d i t i o n s it b e c a m e possible t o u n c o u p l e t h e universalistic u n d e r ­ s t a n d i n g of t h e d e m o c r a t i c c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state t o a l a r g e e x t e n t f r o m t h e i m p e r a t i v e s of a p o w e r politics g u i d e d by n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s a n d o r i e n t e d to g e o p o l i t i c a l goals. I n spite of a t h e n prevailing m o o d of g l o b a l civil w a r a n d a n t i c o m m u n i s t p r o p a g a n d a , t h e t r a d i t i o n a l link­ age of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state with t h e a m b i t i o n s of n a t i o n a l selfa s s e r t i o n was l o o s e n e d also t h r o u g h o u t t h e b r o a d e r p o p u l a t i o n . T h e t r e n d t o w a r d w h a t m i g h t b e t e r m e d a " p o s t n a t i o n a l " selfu n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e political c o m m u n i t y m a y h a v e b e e n m o r e p r o ­ n o u n c e d i n t h e f o r m e r F e d e r a l R e p u b l i c of G e r m a n y t h a n i n o t h e r E u r o p e a n states, given its p e c u l i a r situation a n d t h e fact t h a t it h a d , after all, b e e n d e p r i v e d of f u n d a m e n t a l sovereignty r i g h t s . B u t i n m o s t of t h e W e s t e r n a n d N o r t h e r n E u r o p e a n c o u n t r i e s , t h e welfarestate pacification of class a n t a g o n i s m s h a d given rise to a n e w situation. O v e r t i m e , social security systems w e r e i n s t i t u t e d a n d ex­ p a n d e d , r e f o r m s in a r e a s s u c h as s c h o o l i n g , t h e family, c r i m i n a l law a n d t h e p e n a l system, d a t a p r o t e c t i o n , etc., w e r e i m p l e m e n t e d , a n d policies of e q u a l o p p o r t u n i t y for w o m e n w e r e a t least i n i t i a t e d . W i t h i n a single g e n e r a t i o n t h e status of citizens, h o w e v e r i m p e r f e c t , was m a r k e d l y i m p r o v e d i n its legal a n d m a t e r i a l s u b s t a n c e . W h a t is i m p o r t a n t i n t h e p r e s e n t c o n t e x t is t h a t this m a d e t h e citizens

120 Chapter 4

themselves m o r e k e e n l y a w a r e of t h e priority of t h e issue of t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of basic r i g h t s — o f t h e priority t h a t t h e r e a l n a t i o n of citizens m u s t m a i n t a i n over t h e i m a g i n e d e t h n i c - c u l t u r a l n a t i o n . T h e system of r i g h t s was e x t e n d e d u n d e r t h e e c o n o m i c a l l y favor­ a b l e c o n d i t i o n s of a comparatively l o n g p e r i o d of e c o n o m i c g r o w t h . Each individual could c o m e to recognize a n d appreciate citizenship status as t h a t w h i c h links h e r with t h e o t h e r m e m b e r s of t h e political c o m m u n i t y a n d m a k e s h e r at t h e s a m e t i m e d e p e n d e n t u p o n a n d co-responsible for t h e m . It b e c a m e clear t o all t h a t private a n d p u b l i c a u t o n o m y p r e s u p p o s e o n e a n o t h e r in t h e circuit of r e p r o d u c ­ t i o n a n d i m p r o v e m e n t of t h e c o n d i t i o n s of p r e f e r r e d ways of life. At a n y r a t e , t h e citizens intuitively realized t h a t t h e y c o u l d s u c c e e d i n r e g u l a t i n g t h e i r private a u t o n o m y fairly only by m a k i n g a n a p p r o p r i ­ a t e u s e of t h e i r civic a u t o n o m y , a n d t h a t a n i n t a c t private s p h e r e is i n t u r n a n e c e s s a r y p r e c o n d i t i o n of s u c h political p a r t i c i p a t i o n T h e c o n s t i t u t i o n c o n f i r m e d itself as t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l f r a m e w o r k for a dialectic of legal a n d factual equality t h a t s i m u l t a n e o u s l y r e i n f o r c e s t h e private a n d t h e civic a u t o n o m y of t h e c i t i z e n s . 7

B u t this dialectic h a s in t h e i n t e r i m g r o u n d t o a h a l t q u i t e i n d e ­ p e n d e n t l y of local causes. If we a r e to e x p l a i n this fact, we m u s t t u r n o u r attention to the trends that are currently receiving attention u n d e r t h e h e a d i n g of "globalization." V

Limits o f the Nation-State: Restrictions o f Internal Sovereignty

T h e n a t i o n - s t a t e at o n e t i m e g u a r d e d its t e r r i t o r i a l a n d social b o u n d a r i e s with a zeal b o r d e r i n g o n t h e n e u r o t i c . T o d a y t h e s e d e ­ fenses h a v e l o n g since b e e n p e n e t r a t e d by i n e x o r a b l e t r a n s n a t i o n a l d e v e l o p m e n t s . A n t h o n y G i d d e n s d e f i n e s "globalization" as t h e in­ tensification of w o r l d w i d e r e l a t i o n s r e s u l t i n g in r e c i p r o c a l i n t e r c o n ­ n e c t i o n s b e t w e e n local h a p p e n i n g s a n d d i s t a n t e v e n t s . G l o b a l c o m m u n i c a t i o n takes p l a c e e i t h e r i n ( n a t u r a l languages^ (usually via e l e c t r o n i c m e d i a ) o r i n / ^ e c i a l code%)(principally, m o n e y a n d law). Since " c o m m u n i c a t i o n " h a s a d o u b l e m e a n i n g h e r e , t h e s e p r o c e s s e s give rise t o two o p p o s e d t e n d e n c i e s . O n t h e o n e h a n d t h e y p r o m o t e t h e e x p a n s i o n of a c t o r s ' c o n s c i o u s n e s s , o n t h e o t h e r t h e differentia­ t i o n , e x t e n s i o n , a n d i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n of systems, n e t w o r k s ( s u c h as m a r k e t s ) , o r o r g a n i z a t i o n s . W h e r e a s t h e g r o w t h of systems a n d n e t 8

121 The European Nation-State

works m u l t i p l i e s possible c o n t a c t s a n d e x c h a n g e s of i n f o r m a t i o n , it d o e s n o t l e a d p e r se to t h e e x p a n s i o n o f a n intersubjectively s h a r e d w o r l d a n d t o t h e discursive i n t e r w e a v i n g of c o n c e p t i o n s of rele­ v a n c e , t h e m e s , a n d c o n t r i b u t i o n s f r o m w h i c h political p u b l i c s p h e r e s arise. T h e c o n s c i o u s n e s s of p l a n n i n g , c o m m u n i c a t i n g , a n d a c t i n g subjects s e e m s to h a v e s i m u l t a n e o u s l y e x p a n d e d jugd^jragm e n t e d . T h e p u b l i c s p r o d u c e d by t h e i n t e r n e t r e m a i n closed off f r o m o n e a n o t h e r like g l o b a l villages. F o r t h e p r e s e n t it r e m a i n s unclear w h e t h e r an e x p a n d i n g public consciousness, t h o u g h cen­ t e r e d in t h e lifeworld, n e v e r t h e l e s s h a s t h e ability to s p a n systemically d i f f e r e n t i a t e d c o n t e x t s , o r w h e t h e r t h e systemic p r o c e s s e s , h a v i n g b e c o m e i n d e p e n d e n t , h a v e l o n g since s e v e r e d t h e i r ties with all c o n t e x t s p r o d u c e d by political c o m m u n i c a t i o n . T h e n a t i o n - s t a t e at o n e t i m e p r o v i d e d t h e f r a m e w o r k w i t h i n w h i c h t h e r e p u b l i c a n i d e a of a society t h a t consciously s h a p e s itself was a r t i c u l a t e d a n d even i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d to a c e r t a i n e x t e n t . Typical of t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e , as we h a v e s e e n , was a c o m p l e m e n t a r y r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n state a n d e c o n o m y o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d b e t w e e n d o m e s t i c politics a n d p o w e r struggles b e t w e e n states o n t h e o t h e r . O f c o u r s e , this s c h e m a only a p p l i e d u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s i n w h i c h n a t i o n a l politics c o u l d still e x e r t effective i n f l u e n c e o n t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g " n a t i o n a l e c o n o m y " (Volkswirtschafi). T h u s in t h e e r a of Keynesian e c o n o m i c policies, for e x a m p l e , g r o w t h d e p e n d e d o n factors t h a t w e r e by n o m e a n s o n l y favorable t o capital i n v e s t m e n t b u t also b e n e f i t e d t h e p o p u l a t i o n as a w h o l e — f a c t o r s s u c h a s t h e s t i m u l a t i o n of m a s s c o n ­ sumption ( u n d e r pressure from i n d e p e n d e n t trade unions) a n d i m p r o v e m e n t s in p r o d u c t i o n t e c h n i q u e s ( b a s e d o n i n d e p e n d e n t re­ s e a r c h ) w h i c h also l e d to t h e s h o r t e n i n g of t h e w o r k i n g day, o r s u c h as t h e t r a i n i n g of w o r k e r s w i t h i n t h e f r a m e w o r k of a n e x p a n d i n g e d u c a t i o n system (which i m p r o v e d t h e g e n e r a l level of e d u c a t i o n of t h e p o p u l a t i o n as a w h o l e ) , a n d so f o r t h . A t a n y r a t e , n a t i o n a l e c o n o m i e s p r o v i d e d a r a n g e of o p p o r t u n i t i e s for r e d i s t r i b u t i o n t h a t c o u l d b e e x p l o i t e d , t h r o u g h w a g e policies a n d — o n t h e side of t h e state—welfare a n d social policies, to satisfy t h e a s p i r a t i o n s of a d e ­ m a n d i n g a n d intelligent population. 9

A l t h o u g h c a p i t a l i s m f r o m its i n c e p t i o n was a g l o b a l d e v e l o p m e n t , t h e e c o n o m i c d y n a m i c was f o s t e r e d by t h e m o d e r n state system a n d in t u r n h a d t h e effect of r e i n f o r c i n g t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e . B u t t o d a y t h e s e

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two d e v e l o p m e n t s n o l o n g e r r e i n f o r c e o n e a n o t h e r . To b e s u r e , "the t e r r i t o r i a l r e s t r i c t i o n of capital n e v e r c o r r e s p o n d e d to its s t r u c t u r a l mobility. It was d u e r a t h e r to t h e p e c u l i a r historical c o n d i t i o n s of E u r o p e a n civil society." B u t t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s h a v e u n d e r g o n e a f u n d a m e n t a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n with t h e d e n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of e c o n o m i c p r o d u c t i o n . Nowadays all i n d u s t r i a l c o u n t r i e s a r e affected by t h e o r i e n t a t i o n of t h e i n v e s t m e n t strategies of ever m o r e e n t e r p r i s e s to globally i n t e r c o n n e c t e d financial and labor m a r k e t s . 10

T h e c u r r e n t d e b a t e s over e c o n o m i c c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s h i g h l i g h t t h e ever-widening g a p b e t w e e n t h e l i m i t e d r o o m for nation-states to m a n e u v e r a n d g l o b a l e c o n o m i c i m p e r a t i v e s t h a t a r e less a n d less susceptible to political i n f l u e n c e . T h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t variables a r e , first, t h e a c c e l e r a t e d d e v e l o p m e n t a n d diffusion of n e w productivitye n h a n c i n g t e c h n o l o g i e s a n d , s e c o n d , t h e s h a r p i n c r e a s e in t h e r e ­ serves of c o m p a r a t i v e l y c h e a p labor. T h e d r a m a t i c e m p l o y m e n t p r o b l e m s in t h e f o r m e r First W o r l d s t e m n o t f r o m classical i n t e r n a ­ t i o n a l t r a d e r e l a t i o n s b u t f r o m globally i n t e r c o n n e c t e d r e l a t i o n s of p r o d u c t i o n . Sovereign states c a n b e n e f i t f r o m t h e i r e c o n o m i c sys­ t e m s only as l o n g as " n a t i o n a l e c o n o m i e s " to w h i c h t h e i r i n t e r v e n ­ tionist policies a r e t a i l o r e d still exist. B u t with t h e r e c e n t t r e n d t o w a r d t h e d e n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of t h e e c o n o m y , n a t i o n a l .politics is g r a d u a l l y losing its i n f l u e n c e over t h e c o n d i t i o n s of p r o d u c t i o n u n ­ d e r w h i c h taxable i n c o m e a n d profits a r e g e n e r a t e d . G o v e r n m e n t s have less a n d less i n f l u e n c e over e n t e r p r i s e s t h a t o r i e n t t h e i r invest­ m e n t d e c i s i o n s w i t h i n a g l o b a l h o r i z o n . T h e y a r e c a u g h t in thed i l e m m a of h a v i n g t o avoid two equally u n r e a s o n a b l e r e a c t i o n s . A policy of p r o t e c t i o n i s t i c isolationism a n d t h e f o r m a t i o n of defensive cartels is h o p e l e s s ; b u t b a l a n c i n g t h e b u d g e t t h r o u g h c u t b a c k s in t h e d o m a i n of social policy is n o less d a n g e r o u s in view of its likely social consequences. T h e social c o n s e q u e n c e s of a n a b d i c a t i o n of politics, w h i c h tacitly a c c e p t s a c h r o n i c a l l y h i g h level of u n e m p l o y m e n t a n d t h e d i s m a n ­ tling of t h e welfare state as t h e p r i c e to b e p a i d for i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s , a r e a l r e a d y d i s c e r n i b l e in t h e O E C D c o u n t r i e s . T h e s o u r c e s of social solidarity a r e d r y i n g u p , with t h e r e s u l t t h a t social c o n d i t i o n s of t h e f o r m e r T h i r d W o r l d a r e b e c o m i n g c o m m o n p l a c e in t h e u r b a n c e n t e r s of t h e First W o r l d . T h e s e t r e n d s a r e crystallizing

123 The European Nation-State

in t h e p h e n o m e n o n of a n e w " u n d e r c l a s s . " U n d e r this m i s l e a d i n g s i n g u l a r t e r m sociologists u n i t e t h e diffuse varieties of m a r g i n a l i z e d g r o u p s w h o a r e to a l a r g e e x t e n t s e g m e n t e d off f r o m t h e rest of society. T h e u n d e r c l a s s c o m p r i s e s t h o s e p a u p e r i z e d g r o u p s w h o a r e left to f e n d for themselves, a l t h o u g h t h e y a r e n o l o n g e r in a p o s i t i o n to i m p r o v e t h e i r social lot t h r o u g h t h e i r own initiative. T h e y n o l o n g e r possess a n y v e t o power, a n y m o r e t h a n d o t h e i m p o v e r i s h e d r e g i o n s over t h e d e v e l o p e d r e g i o n s of t h e world. However, this k i n d of s e g m e n t a t i o n d o e s n o t m e a n t h a t f r a g m e n t e d societies c o u l d simply a b a n d o n p a r t of t h e i r p o p u l a t i o n to t h e i r fate without political consequences. I n t h e l o n g t e r m at least t h r e e c o n s e q u e n c e s a r e u n ­ a v o i d a b l e . A n u n d e r c l a s s p r o d u c e s social t e n s i o n s t h a t d i s c h a r g e i n aimless, self-destructive revolts a n d c a n only b e c o n t r o l l e d by r e p r e s ­ sive m e a n s , with t h e r e s u l t t h a t t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of p r i s o n s a n d t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n of i n t e r n a l security in g e n e r a l b e c o m e s a g r o w t h i n d u s ­ try. I n a d d i t i o n , social d e s t i t u t i o n a n d physical i m m i s e r a t i o n c a n n o t b e locally c o n t a i n e d ; t h e p o i s o n of t h e g h e t t o s infects t h e infrastruc­ t u r e of t h e i n n e r cities, even of w h o l e r e g i o n s , a n d p e n e t r a t e s t h e p o r e s of t h e society as a w h o l e . T h i s l e a d s finally t o a m o r a l e r o s i o n of t h e society, w h i c h inevitably u n d e r m i n e s t h e universalistic c o r e of a n y r e p u b l i c a n polity. F o r m a l l y c o r r e c t majority d e c i s i o n s t h a t m e r e l y reflect t h e status a n x i e t i e s a n d self-assertive reflexes of a m i d d l e class t h r e a t e n e d by t h e p r o s p e c t of social d e c l i n e u n d e r m i n e t h e legitimacy of t h e p r o c e d u r e s a n d i n s t i t u t i o n s of t h e d e m o c r a t i c c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state. I n this way t h e g r e a t a c h i e v e m e n t of t h e n a t i o n state in i n t e g r a t i n g society t h r o u g h t h e political p a r t i c i p a t i o n of its citizens is s q u a n d e r e d . W h i l e this s c e n a r i o is by n o m e a n s u n r e a l i s t i c , it illustrates j u s t o n e a m o n g several possible f u t u r e d e v e l o p m e n t s . T h e r e a r e n o laws of h i s t o r y i n t h e strict sense, a n d h u m a n b e i n g s , even w h o l e societies, a r e c a p a b l e of l e a r n i n g . A n a l t e r n a t i v e t o t h e a b d i c a t i o n of politics w o u l d b e if politics w e r e to follow t h e l e a d of t h e m a r k e t s by c o n s t r u c t i n g s u p r a n a t i o n a l political a g e n c i e s . E u r o p e i n t r a n s i t i o n t o w a r d t h e E u r o p e a n U n i o n p r o v i d e s a suitable e x a m p l e . U n f o r t u ­ nately, m o r e t h a n o n e lesson c a n b e d r a w n f r o m it. At p r e s e n t t h e E u r o p e a n states a r e l i n g e r i n g o n t h e t h r e s h o l d of a m o n e t a r y u n i o n w h i c h w o u l d r e q u i r e t h e n a t i o n a l g o v e r n m e n t s to r e n o u n c e t h e i r

124 Chapter 4

sovereignty in c u r r e n c y m a t t e r s . A d e n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of m o n e y a n d m o n e t a r y policy w o u l d necessitate a c o m m o n financial, e c o n o m i c , a n d social policy. Since t h e M a a s t r i c h t Treaty, o p p o s i t i o n h a s b e e n g r o w i n g in t h e m e m b e r states to a vertical e x p a n s i o n of t h e E u r o ­ p e a n U n i o n t h a t w o u l d c o n f e r essential characteristics of a state o n t h e U n i o n , t h e r e b y relativizing t h e sovereignty of t h e m e m b e r states. T h e n a t i o n - s t a t e , c o n s c i o u s of its historical a c h i e v e m e n t s , s t u b b o r n l y asserts its identity at t h e very m o m e n t w h e n it is b e i n g o v e r w h e l m e d , a n d its p o w e r e r o d e d , by p r o c e s s e s of globalization. F o r t h e p r e s e n t , a politics still o p e r a t i n g w i t h i n t h e f r a m e w o r k of t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e limits itself to a d a p t i n g its o w n society in t h e least costly way t o t h e systemic i m p e r a t i v e s a n d side-effects of a g l o b a l e c o n o m i c d y n a m i c t h a t o p e r a t e s largely free f r o m political c o n s t r a i n t s . B u t i n s t e a d it s h o u l d m a k e t h e h e r o i c effort to o v e r c o m e its o w n l i m i t a t i o n s a n d c o n s t r u c t political i n s t i t u t i o n s c a p a b l e of a c t i n g at t h e s u p r a n a t i o n a l level. Moreover, t h e latter w o u l d have to b e c o n n e c t e d to p r o c e s s e s of d e m o c r a t i c will-formation if t h e n o r m a t i v e h e r i t a g e of t h e d e m o ­ cratic c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state is to f u n c t i o n as a b r e a k o n t h e at p r e s e n t u n f e t t e r e d d y n a m i c of g l o b a l i z e d capitalist p r o d u c t i o n . VI

"Overcoming" the Nation-State: Abolition or Transformation?

Talk of o v e r c o m i n g t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e is a m b i g u o u s . O n o n e r e a d i n g — let u s call it t h e p o s t m o d e r n — t h e e n d of t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e also m a r k s t h e e n d of t h e p r o j e c t of civic a u t o n o m y , w h i c h , o n this view, h a s in any case hopelessly o v e r d r a w n its credit. A c c o r d i n g to t h e other, n o n d e f e a t i s t r e a d i n g , t h e p r o j e c t of a society t h a t is c a p a b l e of l e a r n i n g a n d of consciously s h a p i n g itself t h r o u g h its political will is still viable e v e n after t h e d e m i s e of a w o r l d of nation-states. T h e d i s p u t e c o n c e r n s t h e n o r m a t i v e s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e d e m o ­ cratic c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state. C a n we still identify with it in a n e r a of globalization o r m u s t we r e n o u n c e it as a c h e r i s h e d , t h o u g h o b s o ­ lete, relic of t h e o l d E u r o p e ? If n o t only t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e h a s r u n its c o u r s e b u t a l o n g with it all f o r m s of political i n t e g r a t i o n , t h e n i n d i v i d u a l citizens a r e a b a n d o n e d to a w o r l d of a n o n y m o u s l y i n t e r c o n n e c t e d n e t w o r k s in w h i c h t h e y m u s t c h o o s e b e t w e e n systemically g e n e r a t e d o p t i o n s in a c c o r d a n c e

125 The European Nation-State

with t h e i r p r e f e r e n c e s . I n this postpolitical w o r l d t h e m u l t i n a t i o n a l c o r p o r a t i o n b e c o m e s t h e m o d e l for all c o n d u c t . T h e i m p o t e n c e of a n o r m a t i v e l y g u i d e d politics in t h e face of a n increasingly i n d e ­ p e n d e n t g l o b a l e c o n o m i c system a p p e a r s , f r o m a systems-theoretical p e r s p e c t i v e at a n y r a t e , only as a special case of a m o r e g e n e r a l d e v e l o p m e n t . Its v a n i s h i n g p o i n t is a c o m p l e t e l y d e c e n t e r e d w o r l d society t h a t splinters i n t o a d i s o r d e r e d mass of s e l f - r e p r o d u c i n g a n d self-steering f u n c t i o n a l systems. Like H o b b e s i a n individuals in t h e state of n a t u r e , t h e s e systems f o r m e n v i r o n m e n t s for o n e a n o t h e r . T h e y n o l o n g e r s p e a k a c o m m o n l a n g u a g e . L a c k i n g a u n i v e r s e of intersubjectively s h a r e d m e a n i n g s , t h e y m e r e l y o b s e r v e o n e a n o t h e r a n d b e h a v e t o w a r d o n e a n o t h e r in a c c o r d a n c e with i m p e r a t i v e s of self-preservation. J. M. G u e h e n n o d e p i c t s this a n o n y m o u s w o r l d f r o m t h e p e r s p e c ­ tive of i n d i v i d u a l citizens w h o have b e c o m e d e t a c h e d f r o m t h e o b ­ solete solidarity of d e m o c r a t i c c o m m u n i t i e s a n d m u s t n o w o r i e n t themselves in t h e c h a o t i c b u s t l e of m u t u a l l y a d a p t i n g f u n c t i o n a l systems. T h e s e "new" h u m a n b e i n g s h a v e s l o u g h e d off t h e illusory s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of m o d e r n i t y . T h e n e o l i b e r a l i n s p i r a t i o n of this H e l l e n i s t i c vision is all t o o clear. T h e a u t o n o m y of t h e citizen is u n c e r e m o n i o u s l y s t r i p p e d of t h e m o r a l c o m p o n e n t s of d e m o c r a t i c s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n a n d p a r e d b a c k t o private a u t o n o m y : "Like t h e R o m a n citizen of t h e t i m e of Caracalla, t h e citizen of t h e i m p e r i a l a g e of t h e n e t w o r k s defines h i m s e l f less a n d less by his p a r t i c i p a t i o n in t h e exercise of sovereignty a n d m o r e a n d m o r e by t h e possibility h e h a s to act in a f r a m e w o r k in w h i c h t h e p r o c e d u r e s o b e y clear a n d p r e d i c t a b l e r u l e s . . . . It m a t t e r s little w h e t h e r a n o r m is i m p o s e d by a private e n t e r p r i s e o r by a c o m m i t t e e of b u r e a u c r a t s . It is n o l o n g e r t h e e x p r e s s i o n of sovereignty b u t simply s o m e t h i n g t h a t r e d u c e s u n c e r t a i n t i e s , a m e a n s of l o w e r i n g t h e cost of t r a n s a c t i o n s , of in­ c r e a s i n g t r a n s p a r e n c [ y ] . " T h r o u g h a p e r v e r s e play o n H e g e l ' s p o ­ l e m i c a g a i n s t t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e state {Not- und Verstandesstaat), t h e d e m o c r a t i c state is r e p l a c e d by a "state of law d e p r i v e d of all p h i l o ­ s o p h i c a l r e f e r e n c e to n a t u r a l law, r e d u c e d to a n e n s e m b l e of r u l e s with n o o t h e r basis t h a n t h e daily a d m i n i s t e r e d p r o o f of its s m o o t h f u n c t i o n i n g . " N o r m s t h a t a r e b o t h effective and r e s p o n s i v e to ex­ p e c t a t i o n s of p o p u l a r sovereignty a n d h u m a n r i g h t s a r e r e p l a c e d — n

12

126 Chapter 4

u n d e r t h e guise of a "logic of n e t w o r k s " — b y t h e invisible h a n d of s u p p o s e d l y s p o n t a n e o u s l y r e g u l a t e d p r o c e s s e s of t h e g l o b a l e c o n ­ omy. However, t h e s e m e c h a n i s m s w h i c h a r e insensitive to e x t e r n a l costs d o n o t exactly i n s p i r e c o n f i d e n c e . T h i s is t r u e at a n y r a t e of t h e two b e s t - k n o w n e x a m p l e s of global self-regulation. T h e " b a l a n c e of p o w e r s " o n w h i c h t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l system was b a s e d for t h r e e h u n d r e d years c o l l a p s e d s o m e t i m e b e t w e e n t h e First a n d S e c o n d W o r l d Wars, if n o t b e f o r e . W i t h o u t a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o u r t a n d a s u p r a n a t i o n a l s a n c t i o n i n g power, i n t e r n a t i o n a l law c o u l d n o t b e i n v o k e d a n d e n f o r c e d like state law. However, c o n v e n ­ t i o n a l m o r a l i t y a n d t h e "ethics" of dynastic r e l a t i o n s e n s u r e d a cer­ tain level of n o r m a t i v e r e g u l a t i o n of w a r f a r e . I n t h e t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y , total war h a s d e s t r o y e d even this weak n o r m a t i v e frame­ work. T h e a d v a n c e d state of w e a p o n s technology, t h e a r m s b u i l d - u p , a n d t h e s p r e a d of w e a p o n s of mass d e s t r u c t i o n have m a d e a b u n ­ d a n t l y clear t h e risks i n h e r e n t in this a n a r c h y of p o w e r s u n r e g u l a t e d by a n y invisible h a n d . T h e f o u n d i n g of t h e L e a g u e of N a t i o n s was t h e first a t t e m p t at least to d o m e s t i c a t e t h e u n p r e d i c t a b l e d y n a m i c of p o w e r r e l a t i o n s w i t h i n a collective security system. W i t h t h e f o u n ­ d a t i o n of t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s , a s e c o n d a t t e m p t was m a d e to set u p s u p r a n a t i o n a l political a g e n c i e s r e s p o n s i b l e for i n s t i t u t i n g p e a c e o n a g l o b a l scale. W i t h t h e e n d of t h e b i p o l a r b a l a n c e of t e r r o r , t h e p r o s p e c t of a "global d o m e s t i c politics" (C. F. v o n Weizsacker) s e e m s to have o p e n e d u p , in spite of all t h e set-backs in t h e field of i n t e r n a t i o n a l h u m a n r i g h t s a n d security policy. T h e failure of t h e a n a r c h i s t i c b a l a n c e of p o w e r h a s at least m a d e e v i d e n t t h e desirabil­ ity of political i n t e r v e n t i o n s a n d a r r a n g e m e n t s . 1 3

Similar o b s e r v a t i o n s h o l d t r u e for t h e o t h e r p r i m e e x a m p l e of s p o n t a n e o u s self-regulation. Obviously even t h e g l o b a l m a r k e t can­ n o t b e m a n a g e d exclusively by t h e W o r l d B a n k a n d t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l M o n e t a r y F u n d if t h e a s y m m e t r i c a l i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e b e t w e e n t h e O E C D c o u n t r i e s a n d t h e m a r g i n a l i z e d c o u n t r i e s t h a t h a v e n o t yet d e v e l o p e d self-sustaining e c o n o m i e s is ever to b e o v e r c o m e . T h e c o n c l u s i o n r e a c h e d by t h e r e c e n t U N g l o b a l s u m m i t o n social p r o b ­ l e m s in C o p e n h a g e n is u n s e t t l i n g . T h e r e is a lack of c o m p e t e n t a g e n c i e s at t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l level with t h e p o w e r to a g r e e o n t h e n e c e s s a r y a r r a n g e m e n t s , p r o c e d u r e s , a n d political f r a m e w o r k s . N o t

127 The European Nation-State

only t h e disparities b e t w e e n N o r t h a n d S o u t h call for s u c h c o o p e r a ­ t i o n b u t also t h e d r o p in s t a n d a r d s of living in t h e wealthy N o r t h Atlantic c o u n t r i e s , w h e r e social policies r e s t r i c t e d t o t h e nation-state a r e p o w e r l e s s to d e a l with t h e effects of lower wages o n globalized a n d rapidly e x p a n d i n g l a b o r m a r k e t s . T h e lack of s u p r a n a t i o n a l a g e n c i e s is especially a c u t e w h e n it c o m e s to d e a l i n g with t h e eco­ logical p r o b l e m s a d d r e s s e d f r o m a g l o b a l p e r s p e c t i v e at t h e E a r t h S u m m i t in Rio. A m o r e peaceful a n d j u s t political a n d e c o n o m i c w o r l d o r d e r is u n t h i n k a b l e w i t h o u t i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t a r e c a p a b l e of t a k i n g initiatives, a n d a b o v e all w i t h o u t a h a r m o n i z a t i o n between the continental regimes that are today just emerging, a n d w i t h o u t t h e k i n d of policies t h a t c o u l d only b e c a r r i e d o u t u n d e r p r e s s u r e f r o m a m o b i l i z e d g l o b a l civil society. T h i s l e n d s s u p p o r t to t h e c o m p e t i n g r e a d i n g a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h the nation-state should b e "transformed" rather than abolished. But c o u l d its n o r m a t i v e c o n t e n t also b e p r e s e r v e d ? T h e optimistic vision of s u p r a n a t i o n a l a g e n c i e s w h i c h w o u l d e m p o w e r t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s a n d its r e g i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s t o i n s t i t u t e a n e w political a n d eco­ n o m i c w o r l d o r d e r is c l o u d e d by t h e t r o u b l i n g q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r d e m o c r a t i c o p i n i o n - a n d will-formation c o u l d ever achieve a b i n d i n g force t h a t e x t e n d s b e y o n d t h e level of t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e .

On the Relation between the Nation, the Rule of Law, and Democracy

For Hans-Ulrich Wehler on his sixty-fifth birthday As in t h e p e r i o d of d e c o l o n i z a t i o n following t h e S e c o n d W o r l d War, t h e collapse of t h e Soviet e m p i r e h a s b e e n m a r k e d by a series of r a p i d dissociative state-formations. T h e D a y t o n a n d Paris p e a c e ac­ c o r d s m a r k t h e provisional e n d of successful secessions l e a d i n g to t h e f o u n d a t i o n of n e w nation-states o r to t h e r e s t o r a t i o n of states t h a t h a d b e e n d e s t r o y e d , h a d b e c o m e d e p e n d e n t , o r h a d b e e n di­ v i d e d u p . T h e s e , it w o u l d s e e m , a r e m e r e l y t h e m o s t m a n i f e s t symp­ t o m s of t h e e n d u r i n g vitality of a p h e n o m e n o n t h a t h a s b e e n largely f o r g o t t e n n o t j u s t by t h e social sciences: "With t h e collapse of i m p e ­ rial s p h e r e s of i n f l u e n c e , t h e w o r l d of states r e c o n s t i t u t e s itself w i t h i n t r a d i t i o n a l b o u n d a r i e s w h i c h a r e e x p l a i n e d in t e r m s of n a t i o n a l history." T o d a y t h e political f u t u r e s e e m s to b e l o n g o n c e a g a i n to t h e " h e r e d i t a r y p o w e r s " a m o n g w h i c h H e r m a n n Lixbbe n u m b e r s " r e j i g L o n ^ r ecclesiastical confessions o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d n a t i o n o n t h e o t h e r . " O t h e r a u t h o r s s p e a k of " e t h n o n a t i o n a l i s m " in o r d e r to u n d e r l i n e t h e u n c o n d i t i o n a l r e l a t i o n to t h e past, w h e t h e r in t h e physical sense of c o m m o n d e s c e n t o r in t h e b r o a d e r sense of a shared cultural inheritance. T e r m i n o l o g i e s a r e far f r o m i n n o c e n t ; t h e y imply a p a r t i c u l a r p o i n t of view. T h e n e o l o g i s m " e t h n o n a t i o n a l i s m " b l u r s t h e t r a d i t i o n a l dis­ tinction between "ethnos" a n d "demos." This expression empha­ sizes t h e p r o x i m i t y b e t w e e n a n " e t h n o s , " a p r e p o l i t i c a l c o m m u n i t y 1

2

130 Chapter 5

of s h a r e d d e s c e n t o r g a n i z e d a r o u n d k i n s h i p ties, o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d a n a t i o n c o n s t i t u t e d as a state t h a t at least aspires to political i n d e p e n d e n c e , o n t h e o t h e r . I n this way t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t e t h n i c c o m m u n i t i e s a r e m o r e " n a t u r a l " a n d evolutionarily " m o r e p r i m i t i v e " t h a n n a t i o n s is implicitly c o n t r a d i c t e d . T h e "we-conscioiisness," f o u n d e d o n a n i m a g i n e d b l o o d r e l a t i o n o r o n c u l t u r a l identity, of p e o p l e w h o s h a r e a belief i n a c o m m o n o r i g i n , identify o n e a n o t h e r as " m e m b e r s " of t h e s a m e c o m m u n i t y , a n d t h e r e b y set t h e m s e l v e s a p a r t f r o m t h e i r e n v i r o n m e n t , is s u p p o s e d to c o n s t i t u t e t h e common c o r e of e t h n i c and of n a t i o n a l social f o r m a t i o n s . I n view of this c o m m o n a l i t y , n a t i o n s w o u l d differ f r o m o t h e r e t h n i c c o m m u n i t i e s only i n t h e i r d e g r e e of c o m p l e x i t y a n d s c o p e : "It is t h e largest g r o u p t h a t c a n c o m m a n d a p e r s o n ' s loyalty b e c a u s e of felt k i n s h i p ties; it is, f r o m this p e r s p e c t i v e , t h e fully e x t e n d e d family." 3

4

T h i s e t h n o l o g i c a l c o n c e p t of t h e n a t i o n conflicts with t h e c o n c e p t as it is usually e m p l o y e d by h i s t o r i a n s . It glosses over t h e specific c o n n e c t i o n s t o t h e legal o r d e r ' j ^ ^ s ^ I ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ state, t o political h i s t o r i o g r a p h y , a n d to t h e d y n a m i c s of m a s s c o m n m m c a t i o n t o w h i c h t h e n a t i o n a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s t h a t a r o s e in E u r o p e i n t h e n i n e ­ t e e n t h c e n t u r y owes its reflexive a n d distinctively artificial c h a r a c t e r . If t h e n a t i o n a l , as previously t h e e t h n i c , c o m m u n i t y a p p e a r s f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of a generalized c o n s t r u c t i v i s m as a "believed" o r " i m a g i n e d c o m m o n a l i t y " (Max W e b e r ) , t h e " i n v e n t i o n of t h e e t h n i c n a t i o n (Volksnatiori)" ( H . Schulze) c a n b e given a surprisingly affir­ mative twist. As a specific m a n i f e s t a t i o n of a universal f o r m of social i n t e g r a t i o n , t h e q u a s i - n a t u r a l c h a r a c t e r of t h e n a t i o n o n c e a g a i n takes o n a n a l m o s t n a t u r a l a s p e c t e v e n for t h e scientist w h o a s s u m e s t h a t it is c o n s t r u c t e d . F o r o n c e we r e c o g n i z e t h a t t h e n a t i o n is m e r e l y a v a r i a n t of a social universal, t h e r e s u r g e n c e of t h e n a t i o n a l n o l o n g e r n e e d s to b e e x p l a i n e d . W h e n t h e p r e s u m p t i o n of n o r m a l i t y shifts in favor of e t h n o n a t i o n a l i s m it n o l o n g e r m a k e s any sense t o d e s c r i b e t h e conflicts t h a t t o d a y o n c e a g a i n c o m m a n d o u r a t t e n t i o n as s y m p t o m s of r e g r e s s i o n a n d a l i e n a t i o n in n e e d of e x p l a n a t i o n a n d to c o n c e i v e of t h e m , for e x a m p l e , as c o m p e n s a t i o n s for t h e loss of a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o w e r status o r as a t t e m p t s t o c o m e t o t e r m s with a c o n d i t i o n of social a n d e c o n o m i c d e p r i v a t i o n . 2

5

M o d e r n states w h i c h a r e functionally i n t e g r a t e d by m a r k e t a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p o w e r still d e l i m i t t h e m s e l v e s f r o m o n e a n o t h e r as

131 The Nation, the Rule of Law, and Democracy

" n a t i o n s " as t h e y always h a v e d o n e . B u t this says n o t h i n g a b o u t t h e specific c h a r a c t e r of n a t i o n a l s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g . It r e m a i n s a n e m ­ pirical q u e s t i o n w h e n a n d to w h a t e x t e n t m o d e r n p o p u l a t i o n s u n ­ d e r s t a n d t h e m s e l v e s as a n a t i o n b a s e d o n e t h n i c m e m b e r s h i p o r as a n a t i o n of citizens. T h i s d o u b l e c o d i n g h a s a b e a r i n g o n t h e issue of e x c l u s i o n a n d i n c l u s i o n . N a t i o n a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s vacillates in a p e c u l i a r fashion b e t w e e n m o r e extensive i n c l u s i o n a n d r e n e w e d exclusion. As a m o d e r n f o r m of c o n s c i o u s n e s s , n a t i o n a l i d e n t i t y is distin­ g u i s h e d o n t h e o n e h a n d by its t e n d e n c y to t r a n s c e n d particularistic, r e g i o n a l ties. I n n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y E u r o p e t h e n a t i o n f o u n d e d n e w b o n d s of solidarity b e t w e e n p e r s o n s w h o h a d previously b e e n strang­ ers to o n e a n o t h e r . T h i s universalistic t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of h e r e d i t a r y loyalties to village a n d family, locality a n d dynasty, is a difficult a n d in a n y case a p r o t r a c t e d p r o c e s s . Even in t h e classical nation-states of t h e West it d i d n o t e n c o m p a s s t h e w h o l e p o p u l a t i o n b e f o r e t h e b e g i n n i n g of t h e t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , it is n o a c c i d e n t t h a t this m o r e a b s t r a c t f o r m of i n t e g r a t i o n f o u n d e x p r e s ­ sion in t h e r e a d i n e s s to fight a n d in t h e spirit of self-sacrifice of military draftees w h o w e r e m o b i l i z e d a g a i n s t t h e " e n e m i e s of t h e f a t h e r l a n d . " I n a n e m e r g e n c y t h e solidarity of t h e citizens was sup­ p o s e d to p r o v e itself in t h e solidarity of t h o s e w h o risk t h e i r lives for p e o p l e a n d f a t h e r l a n d . O n t h e r o m a n t i c a l l y i n s p i r e d c o n c e p t of a p e o p l e w h o assert t h e i r e x i s t e n c e a n d distinctive identity in t h e s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t o t h e r n a t i o n s , t h e q u a s i - n a t u r a l m o m e n t of a n i m a g ­ i n e d c o m m u n i t y of s h a r e d l a n g u a g e a n d a n c e s t r y is fused with t h e c o n t i n g e n t m o m e n t of a narratively c o n s t r u c t e d c o m m u n i t y of s h a r e d destiny. B u t this n a t i o n a l identity r o o t e d in fictional pasts also p r e f i g u r e s t h e f u t u r e realization of r e p u b l i c a n liberty rights. 6

T h e J a n u s face of t h e n a t i o n , w h i c h o p e n s itself i n t e r n a l l y b u t s h u t s itself off f r o m t h e o u t s i d e , is a l r e a d y implicit in t h e a m b i v a l e n t m e a n i n g of t h e c o n c e p t of f r e e d o m . T h e particularistic f r e e d o m of a n e x t e r n a l l y a s s e r t e d collective n a t i o n a l i n d e p e n d e n c e s e e m s to b e m e r e l y t h e p r o t e c t i v e s h i e l d for t h e i n t e r n a l l y realized individual liberties of t h e c i t i z e n s — t h e i r private a u t o n o m y as m e m b e r s of civil society (Gesellschaftsbiirger) n o less t h a n t h e i r political a u t o n o m y as citizens (Staatsbiirger). T h e c o n c e p t u a l o p p o s i t i o n b e t w e e n a c o m ­ pulsory, ascriptive e t h n i c m e m b e r s h i p viewed as a n i n a l i e n a b l e

132 Chapter 5

p r o p e r t y , o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d a freely c h o s e n m e m b e r s h i p g u a r ­ a n t e e d by subjective r i g h t s in a v o l u n t a r y political c o m m u n i t y t h a t g r a n t s its citizens t h e o p t i o n of e m i g r a t i n g , o n t h e o t h e r , is dissolved in this s y n d r o m e . T h i s d o u b l e c o d i n g still i n s p i r e s c o m p e t i n g i n t e r ­ p r e t a t i o n s a n d c o n t r a d i c t o r y political d i a g n o s e s . \ T h e i d e a of t h e e d m i c n a t i o n suggests t h a t t h e j f e w ^ j of citizens m u s t b e r o o t e d in t h e ethnos of n a t i o n a l s (Volksgenossen) if it is t o stabilize itself ^ j y ^ ^ i t i c a l a n d ^ c j i ^ H e g ^ consociates. T h e b i n d i n g f o r c e of c i t i z e n s h i p is s u p p o s e d l y n o t a d e q u a t e t o this task. T h e loyalty of citizens h a s to b e a n c h o r e d in t h e quasin a t u r a l , historically fateful s e n s e of t o g e t h e r n e s s of t h e p e o p l e . T h e " a n o d y n e " a c a d e m i c i d e a of " c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p a t r i o t i s m " is n o substi­ t u t e for a " h e a l t h y n a t i o n a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s " : "This c o n c e p t (of consti­ t u t i o n a l p a t r i o t i s m ) h a n g s i n t h e air w i t h o u t s u p p o r t . . . . H e n c e a p p e a l to t h e n a t i o n . . . [ a n d ] to t h e e m o t i o n a l l y b i n d i n g wec o n s c i o u s n e s s it c o n t a i n s , is u n a v o i d a b l e . " S e e n f r o m a n o t h e r p e r ­ spective, however, t h e symbiotic r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n n a t i o n a l i s m a n d r e p u b l i c a n i s m reveals itself as m e r e l y a transitional, historical c o n ­ stellation. A n a t i o n a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s p r o p a g a t e d by intellectuals a n d s c h o l a r s t h a t slowly s p r e a d o u t w a r d f r o m t h e u r b a n b o u r g e o i s i e — a c o n s c i o u s n e s s t h a t crystallized a r o u n d t h e fiction of a c o m m o n an­ cestry, t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of a s h a r e d history, a n d a g r a m m a t i c a l l y s t a n d a r d i z e d w r i t t e n l a n g u a g e — d i d i n d e e d t r a n s f o r m subjects for t h e first t i m e i n t o politically a w a r e citizens w h o identify with t h e r e p u b l i c a n c o n s t i t u t i o n a n d its d e c l a r e d goals. B u t n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g 7

this catalyzing r o l e , n a t i o n a l i s m is not,.a.._necessary o r p e r m a n e n t p r e c o n d i t i o n ^a^d^p^crd^c^process. T h e progressive e x t e n s i o n of t h e status of c i t i z e n s h i p to t h e w h o l e p o p u l a t i o n d o e s n o t j u s t p r o ­ vide t h e state with a n e w s o u r c e of secular l e g i t i m a t i o n ; it also p r o d u c e s a n e w level of abstract, legally m e d i a t e d social i n t e g r a t i o n . B o t h i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s a s s u m e t h a t t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e was a r e s p o n s e to t h e p r o b l e m of t h e d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of a p o p u l a c e t h a t h a d b e c o m e u p r o o t e d f r o m t h e c o r p o r a t i v e social ties of early m o d e r n society. B u t t h e o n e side situates t h e s o l u t i o n to t h e p r o b l e m at t h e c u l t u r a l level, w h e r e a s t h e o t h e r looks for a s o l u t i o n at t h e level of d e m o ­ cratic p r o c e d u r e s a n d i n s t i t u t i o n s . Ernst-Wolfgang B o k e n f o r d e e m ­ phasizes t h e a s p e c t of collective identity: "A relative h o m o g e n i z a t i o n

133 The Nation, the Rule of Law, and Democracy

in a s h a r e d c u l t u r e is n e e d e d by way of c o m p e n s a t i o n . . . if t h e society w h i c h t e n d s t o b e c o m e a t o m i z e d is to b e r e u n i t e d i n t o a u n i t y c a p a b l e of c o n c e r t e d a c t i o n , in spite of b e i n g d i f f e r e n t i a t e d i n t o a multiplicity of p a r t s . T h i s task is p e r f o r m e d by t h e n a t i o n a n d its a t t e n d a n t n a t i o n a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s a l o n g with, a n d in succession to, religion . . . . T h u s the ultimate goal c a n n o t b e to overtake national identity a n d r e p l a c e it with s o m e t h i n g else, n o t even with a univer­ salism of h u m a n r i g h t s . " T h e o p p o s i n g view is b a s e d o n t h e convic­ t i o n t h a t t h e d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e s s itself c a n p r o v i d e t h e n e c e s s a r y guarantees for the soriaHnte 8

9

society. I n d e e d , in pluralistic societies this b u r d e n c a n n o t b e shifted f r o m t h e level of political will-formation a n d p u b l i c c o m m u n i c a t i o n o n t o t h e s e e m i n g l y n a t u r a l c u l t u r a l s u b s t r a t e of a s u p p o s e d l y h o m o ­ geneous people. From these premises Hans-Ulrich Wehler concludes t h a t "federal u n i o n s b o u n d t o g e t h e r by a sense of loyalty b a s e d p r i m a r i l y o n t h e a c h i e v e m e n t s of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a n d welfare states r e p r e s e n t a n i n c o m p a r a b l y m o r e attractive Utopian ideal t h a n t h e r e g r e s s i o n t o t h e s u p p o s e d n o r m a l i t y of t h e G e r m a n . . . n a t i o n state." 10

I a m n o t c o m p e t e n t t o e n g a g e in this d e b a t e at t h e level of historical a r g u m e n t s . I n s t e a d I a m i n t e r e s t e d in t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l m o d e l s of t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e n a t i o n , t h e r u l e of law, a n d d e m o c r a c y in t e r m s of w h i c h t h e conflict is f o u g h t o u t a t t h e n o r ­ mative level. J u r i s t s a n d political t h e o r i s t s i n t e r v e n e in t h e p u b l i c p r o c e s s e s of t h e s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of citizens with different, b u t n o less effective, m e a n s t h a n h i s t o r i a n s ; t h e y c a n e v e n i n f l u e n c e t h e d e c i s i o n s of t h e F e d e r a l C o n s t i t u t i o n a l C o u r t . O n t h e classical, late e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y c o n c e p t i o n , " n a t i o n " refers t o t h e p e o p l e w h o c o n s t i t u t e t h e m s e l v e s as a state by giving themselves a d e m o c r a t i c c o n s t i t u t i o n . O p p o s e d t o this view is t h e c o n c e p t i o n t h a t a r o s e in t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h p o p u l a r sovereignty p r e s u p ­ p o s e s a n a t i o n t h a t p r o j e c t s itself i n t o t h e p a s t as a n organically evolving entity in c o n t r a s t with t h e artificial o r d e r of positive law: " T h e ' p e o p l e / . . . w h i c h is t h e subject of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y in d e m o c r a c i e s , d o e s n o t first a c q u i r e its identity f r o m t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n t h a t it gives itself. T h i s i d e n t i t y is r a t h e r a p r e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , histori­ cal fact: t h o r o u g h l y c o n t i n g e n t , b u t n o t for t h a t r e a s o n a r b i t r a r y . . .

134 Chapter 5

it is u n a v o i d a b l e for t h o s e w h o find t h a t t h e y b e l o n g to a p a r t i c u l a r people." Carl S c h m i t t p l a y e d a n i m p o r t a n t r o l e in t h e h i s t o r y of this i d e a . I will b e g i n by c o n t r a s t i n g S c h m i t t ' s a c c o u n t of t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n n a t i o n , r u l e of law, a n d d e m o c r a c y with t h e classical conception (I). T h e s e a p p r o a c h e s have different c o n s e q u e n c e s for a n u m b e r of c u r r e n t , i n t e r c o n n e c t e d p r o b l e m s : t h e r i g h t of n a t i o n a l self-determi­ n a t i o n (II), e q u a l r i g h t s in m u l t i c u l t u r a l societies (III), t h e r i g h t of h u m a n i t a r i a n i n t e r v e n t i o n (IV), a n d t h e transfer of sovereign r i g h t s to s u p r a n a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s (V). T a k i n g t h e s e p r o b l e m s as m y g u i d e , I will a r g u e t h a t t h e e t h n o n a t i o n a l c o n c e p t i o n of p o p u l a r sovereignty is m i s g u i d e d . 1 1

I

Constitutional Constructions o f Popular Sovereignty

(1) I n his i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e W e i m a r c o n s t i t u t i o n , Carl S c h m i t t a c c o r d s a constructivist n o t i o n of e t h n o n a t i o n a l i s m a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l status. T h e W e i m a r R e p u b l i c s t o o d in t h e t r a d i t i o n of t h e r u l e of law—already e x e m p l i f i e d by c o n s t i t u t i o n a l m o n a r c h y — w h i c h is s u p ­ p o s e d to p r o t e c t t h e citizens f r o m t h e a b u s e of state p o w e r ; b u t for t h e first t i m e in G e r m a n h i s t o r y it c o m b i n e d t h e r u l e of law with t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l f o r m a n d t h e political c o n t e n t of d e m o c r a c y . T h i s s t a r t i n g p o i n t , w h i c h is p e c u l i a r to G e r m a n legal history, is r e f l e c t e d in t h e a r c h i t e c t o n i c of S c h m i t t ' s " c o n s t i t u t i o n a l t h e o r y . " T h e r e S c h m i t t m a k e s a strict d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e "legal" a n d t h e "po­ litical" c o m p o n e n t s of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a n d treats t h e " n a t i o n " as a h i n g e b e t w e e n t h e t r a d i t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s of t h e b o u r g e o i s constitu­ t i o n a l state a n d t h e d e m o c r a t i c p r i n c i p l e of t h e s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e p e o p l e . H e a r g u e s t h a t n a t i o n a l h o m o g e n e i t y is a n e c e s s a r y p r e c o n d i t i o n for t h e d e m o c r a t i c exercise of political a u t h o r i t y : "A d e m o c r a t i c state in w h i c h d e m o c r a c y is f o u n d e d o n t h e n a t i o n a l h o m o g e n e i t y of its citizens c o n f o r m s to t h e so-called n a t i o n a l i t y p r i n c i p l e a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h e a c h n a t i o n f o r m s a state a n d e a c h state a n a t i o n . " 1 2

W i t h this p r i n c i p l e , S c h m i t t a d o p t s t h e f o r m u l a t i o n of J o h a n n C a s p a r Bluntschli; h e also consciously aligns h i m s e l f with t h e p r i n c i ­ p l e s — a c c e p t e d by, b o t h W i l s o n a n d L e n i n — t h a t i n f o r m e d t h e E u r o -

135 T h e N a t i o n , t h e R u l e of Law, a n d D e m o c r a c y

p e a n p o s t w a r political o r d e r laid d o w n in t h e Versailles p e a c e settle­ m e n t . B u t t h e specific c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n is m o r e i m p o r t a n t t h a n historical a g r e e m e n t s . S c h m i t t conceives of t h e citizens' e q u a l politi­ cal p a r t i c i p a t i o n in political will-formation as a m a t t e r of a s p o n t a ­ n e o u s h a r m o n y b e t w e e n t h e e x p r e s s i o n s of will of m e m b e r s of a m o r e o r less h o m o g e n e o u s p e o p l e .

1 3

like-minded

Democracy must

take t h e f o r m of a n a t i o n a l d e m o c r a c y b e c a u s e t h e " s e l f of t h e s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e p e o p l e is c o n c e i v e d as a m a c r o s u b j e c t ca­ p a b l e of a c t i o n a n d b e c a u s e t h e e t h n i c n a t i o n s e e m s to b e t h e a p p r o p r i a t e e n t i t y to fill this c o n c e p t u a l g a p — i t is viewed as t h e q u a s i - n a t u r a l s u b s t r a t e of t h e state o r g a n i z a t i o n . T h i s collectivistic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e R o u s s e a u e a n m o d e l of self-legislation

preju­

dices all f u r t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . It is t r u e , t h a t d e m o c r a c y c a n only b e e x e r c i s e d as a j o i n t p r a c t i c e . B u t S c h m i t t d o e s n o t c o n s t r u e this c o m m o n a l i t y in t e r m s of t h e higher-level intersubjectivity of a discursive a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n citi­ z e n s w h o r e c i p r o c a l l y r e c o g n i z e o n e a n o t h e r as free a n d e q u a l ; i n s t e a d h e reifies it i n t o t h e homogeneity of m e m b e r s of a single p e o p l e . H e m a k e s t h e n o r m of e q u a l t r e a t m e n t c o n t i n g e n t o n t h e fact of a u n i f o r m n a t i o n a l o r i g i n : " D e m o c r a t i c equality is a substan­ tive equality. B e c a u s e all citizens s h a r e in this s u b s t a n c e , t h e y c a n b e t r e a t e d as e q u a l , t h e y h a v e e q u a l e l e c t o r a l a n d v o t i n g r i g h t s , e t c . "

1 4

T h i s substantialist u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e citizenry is r e l a t e d t o a n existentialist c o n c e p t i o n of t h e d e m o c r a t i c d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . S c h m i t t conceives of political will-formation as t h e collective selfa f f i r m a t i o n of a p e o p l e : " W h a t t h e p e o p l e w a n t is g o o d j u s t b e c a u s e the people want (it)."

1 5

S e v e r i n g d e m o c r a c y f r o m t h e r u l e of law

h e r e reveals a h i d d e n m e a n i n g : given t h a t t h e g u i d i n g pohtic^LMMh a s n o r a t i o n a l c o n t e n t b u t is e x h a u s t e d by t h e expressive c o n t e n t of a n a t u r a l i z e d Volksgeist, it d o e s n o t n e e d t o b e g e n e r a t e d t h r o u g h a p u b l i c discussion, p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n w h i c h is g u a r a n t e e d by civic rights. Aside f r o m a n y c o n s i d e r a t i o n of its r a t i o n a l i t y o r irrationality, t h e aujhenticity^of t h e p e o p l e / s j v i l l is a t t e s t e d exclusiveJjJ>jM^ s c h a r y ^ p r o c l a m a t i o n of t h e w i l L o f a n ^ ^ before

the self-determination

of t h e p e o p l e b e c o m e s

Even solidified

i n t o t h e c o m p e t e n c e s of state o r g a n s , it finds e x p r e s s i o n in t h e

136 Chapter 5

s p o n t a n e o u s "yes" a n d " n o " r e s p o n s e s of t h e p e o p l e t o p r e d e t e r ­ m i n e d alternatives: "Only t h e actually a s s e m b l e d p e o p l e is t h e p e o ­ p l e . . . a n d c a n p e r f o r m t h e activity t h a t specifically p e r t a i n s to this p e o p l e : it c a n a c c l a i m — i n o t h e r w o r d s , signal its a c c e p t a n c e o r r e j e c t i o n by a s i m p l e act of a c c l a m a t i o n . " T h e p r i n c i p l e of majority rule merely operationalizes the accord between individual expres­ sions of will: "all will t h e s a m e t h i n g . " T h i s c o n v e r g e n c e only b r i n g s to t h e fore t h e substantive a p r i o r i of a s h a r e d n a t i o n a l f o r m of life. T h e a p r i o r i p r e u n d e r s t a n d i n g is g r a n t e d by t h e substantive h o m o ­ g e n e i t y of n a t i o n a l s w h o set t h e m s e l v e s a p a r t as a s e p a r a t e n a t i o n f r o m all o t h e r s : " T h e d e m o c r a t i c c o n c e p t of equality is a political c o n c e p t t h a t is p r e d i c a t e d o n t h e possibility of d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n . H e n c e political d e m o c r a c y c a n n o t rest o n t h e u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d n e s s of all h u m a n b e i n g s b u t only o n m e m b e r s h i p of a p a r t i c u l a r p e o p l e . . . . T h u s t h e equality t h a t is essential to d e m o c r a c y applies only internally, n o t e x t e r n a l l y . " 16

17

I n this way, S c h m i t t sets u p a p o l e m i c a l c o n t r a s t b e t w e e n t h e " r ^ o p k , " ^ n ^ t h e operand, a n d a h u m a n i s t i c a l l y conceivecl " h u m a n 'it£con^ o n t h e o t h e r : " T h e c e n t r a l c o n c e p t of d e m o c r a c y is t h e p e o p l e , n o t h u m a n i t y . If d e m o c r a c y is i n d e e d a political f o r m , it c a n only b e a d e m o c r a c y of t h e p e o p l e , n o t of h u m a n i t y . " Insofar as t h e "idea off t h e equality of all h u m a n b e i n g s , " in t h e s e n s e of e q u a l c o n s i d e r a ­ t i o n of t h e interests of everybody, h a s a n y r e l e v a n c e for t h e consti­ t u t i o n , it finds e x p r e s s i o n in a r u l e of law t h a t a p p l i e s to private citizens. T h e m e a n i n g of h u m a n r i g h t s is e x h a u s t e d by t h e private e n j o y m e ^ ^ ^ ^ e ^ ^ f f ^ ^ ^ n i e s , w h e r e a s t h e exercise of political free­ d o m s by citizens is s u p p o s e d t o o b e y a c o m p l e t e l y different logic. T h e m e a n i n g of d e m o c r a t i c s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n b a s e d o n e t h n i c h o ­ m o g e n e i t y is n o t t h e political a u t o n o m y of i n d i v i d u a l citizens b u t r a t h e r n a t i o n a l i n d e p e n d e n c e — t h e self-assertion, self-affirmation, a n d self-realization of a n a t i o n in its specificity. T h i s n a t i o n m e d i a t e s b e t w e e n t h e r u l e of law a n d d e m o c r a c y : only t h e citizens, w h o have b e e n t r a n s f o r m e d f r o m private p e r s o n s i n t o m e m b e r s of a politically self-conscious n a t i o n , c a n p a r t i c i p a t e in d e m o c r a t i c r u l e . 18

(2) By u n c o u p l i n g t h e basic r i g h t s r e g u l a t i n g private i n t e r a c t i o n s w i t h i n civil society f r o m a substantialized "Volksdemokratie" ® in this 1

137 T h e N a t i o n , t h e R u l e o f Law, a n d D e m o c r a c y

way, S c h m i t t sets h i m s e l f in stark o p p o s i t i o n to a r e p u b l i c a n i s m g r o u n d e d i n social c o n t r a c t t h e o r y . O n this t r a d i t i o n , " p e o p l e " a n d " n a t i o n " a r e i n t e r c h a n g e a b l e c o n c e p t s for a citizenry t h a t is co-original with t h e political c o m m u n i t y . T h e p e o p l e w h o m a k e u p t h e state a r e viewed n o t as a p r e p o l i t i c a l d a t u m b u t as t h e p r o d u c t of t h e social c o n t r a c t . T h e p a r t i c i p a n t s f o r m a n association of free a n d e q u a l c o n s o c i a t e s u n d e r law t h r o u g h t h e i r j o i n t d e c i s i o n t o m a k e u s e of t h e i r o r i g i n a l r i g h t "to live u n d e r p u b l i c laws of free­ d o m . " T h e d e c i s i o n to live in political f r e e d o m is s y n o n y m o u s with t h e u n d e r t a k i n g to e n g a g e in a c o n s t i t u t i o n - f o u n d i n g praxis. I n c o n t r a s t with C a r l S c h m i t t ' s a c c o u n t , o n this c o n c e p t i o n p o p u l a r sovereignty a n d h u m a n rights, d e m o c r a c y a n d t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state, a r e c o n c e p t u a l l y i n t e r t w i n e d . F o r t h e initial d e c i s i o n t o e n g a g e in d e m o c r a t i c self-legislation c a n only b e c a r r i e d o u t by realizing t h e r i g h t s t h a t t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s m u s t m u t u a l l y g r a n t o n e a n o t h e r if they w a n t to legitimately r e g u l a t e t h e i r life in c o m m o n by m e a n s of positive law. T h i s calls in t u r n for a l e g i t i m a c y - g u a r a n t e e i n g p r o c e ­ d u r e of l a w m a k i n g t h a t gives p e r m a n e n t f o r m t o t h e f u r t h e r e l a b o ­ r a t i o n of t h e system of r i g h t s . Following t h e R o u s s e a u e a n f o r m u l a , in this p r o c e d u r e all m u s t r e a c h t h e s a m e d e c i s i o n s for all. T h u s t h e basic r i g h t s spring from t h e v e r y i d e a of t h e legal i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n of t h e p r o c e d u r e of d e m o c r a t i c self-legislation. 20

T h e i d e a of a p r o c e d u r a l , f u t u r e - o r i e n t e d p o p u l a r sovereignty a l o n g t h e s e lines r e n d e r s m e a n i n g l e s s t h e delnlEiH^l^ will-formation to t h e s u b s t a n t i v e . a p r i o r i of a past, prepolitically e s t a b l i s h e d c o n s e n s u s a m o n g h o m o g e n e o u s m e m b e r s of a n a t i o n : "Positive law is n o t l e g i t i m a t e b e c a u s e it c o r r e s p o n d s to substantive p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e b u t b e c a u s e it is e n a c t e d in a c c o r d a n c e with p r o c e d u r e s t h a t a r e formally j u s t , t h a t is, d e m o c r a t i c . T h a t all d e c i d e t h e s a m e t h i n g for all in t h e legislative p r o c e s s is a d e m a n d i n g n o r m a t i v e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t is n o l o n g e r d e f i n e d in a substantive m a n n e r b u t is i n t e n d e d to p r e v e n t a r b i t r a r y d e c i s i o n s a n d m i n i m i z e d o m i n a t i o n t h r o u g h t h e self-legislation of t h e a d d r e s s e e s of t h e law, t h r o u g h e q u a l p r o c e d u r a l positions, a n d t h r o u g h t h e universality of legal r e g u l a t i o n . " A p r i o r b a c k g r o u n d c o n s e n s u s b a s e d o n a h o m o ­ g e n e o u s c u l t u r e is n o t necessary, b e c a u s e d e m o c r a t i c a l l y s t r u c t u r e d o p i n i o n - a n d will-formation m a k e possible r a t i o n a l a g r e e m e n t even 21

138 Chapter 5

b e t w e e n s t r a n g e r s . B e c a u s e t h e d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e s s g u a r a n t e e s legiti­ m a c y in v i r t u e of its p r o c e d u r a l characteristics, it c a n if n e c e s s a r y b r i d g e g a p s in social i n t e g r a t i o n . Insofar as it s e c u r e s t h e fair value of i n d i v i d u a l liberties for all, it e n s u r e s t h a t t h e n e t w o r k of civic solidarity r e m a i n s intact. Criticism of this classical c o n c e p t i o n is p r i m a r i l y d i r e c t e d against its "liberalistic" i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . S c h m i t t d i s p u t e s t h e capacity of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state f o u n d e d o n d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e d u r e s to s e c u r e social i n t e g r a t i o n u n d e r t h e two h e a d i n g s t h a t i n f o r m e d H e g e l ' s c r i t i q u e of t h e " N o t - u n d Verstandesstaat" [literally, "state of necessity a n d of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g " ] of social c o n t r a c t t h e o r y a n d have b e e n t a k e n u p a g a i n by t h e " c o m m u n i t a r i a n s " in t h e i r c o n t r o v e r s y with " l i b e r a l s , " T h e p r i n c i p a l targets of this c r i t i q u e a r e t h e atomistic c o n c e p t i o n of t h e i n d i v i d u a l as a n " u n e n c u m b e r e d s e l f a n d t h e i n s t r u m e n t a l i s t c o n c e p t of political will-formation as a m a t t e r of a g g r e g a t i n g social interests. F r o m t h e p o i n t of view of t h e s e critics, t h e p a r t i e s t o t h e social c o n t r a c t a r e c o n c e i v e d as isolated, e n l i g h t ­ e n e d r a t i o n a l egoists w h o a r e n o t s h a p e d by c o m m o n t r a d i t i o n s a n d h e n c e d o n o t s h a r e any c u l t u r a l v a l u e - o r i e n t a t i o n s , a n d w h o s e ac­ t i o n s a r e n o t o r i e n t e d to r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g . Political willf o r m a t i o n o n this d e s c r i p t i o n m u s t take t h e f o r m of n e g o t i a t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g a m o d u s vivendi w i t h o u t a n y possibility of r e a c h i n g a m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g f r o m ethical o r m o r a l p o i n t s of view. I n d e e d , it is difficult to see h o w s u c h p a r t i e s c o u l d p r o d u c e a n i n t e r s u b j e c tively r e c o g n i z e d legal o r d e r t h a t c a n b e e x p e c t e d to forge a n a t i o n of citizens f r o m s t r a n g e r s — i n o t h e r w o r d s , g e n e r a t e civic solidarity b e t w e e n s t r a n g e r s . Against s u c h a H o b b e s i a n b a c k d r o p , t h e s h a r e d e t h n i c o r c u l t u r a l i n h e r i t a n c e of a m o r e o r less h o m o g e n e o u s p e o ­ p l e r e c o m m e n d s itself as t h e s o u r c e a n d g u a r a n t o r of t h e k i n d of n o r m a t i v e b o n d s to w h i c h possessive individualism is b l i n d . 22

However, t h e w e l l - f o u n d e d criticism of this e x t r e m e version of n a t u r a l law d o e s n o t apply to t h e intersubjectivistic u n d e r s t a n d i n g of p r o c e d u r a l p o p u l a r sovereignty, w h i c h is in a n y case m o r e c o n g e n i a l J to t h e r e p u b l i c a n t r a d i t i o n . O n this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , t h e p r a c t i c e of I d e l i b e r a t i o n b e t w e e n p a r t i c i p a n t s in c o m m u n i c a t i o n w h o w a n t to arrive at rationally m o t i v a t e d decisions takes t h e p l a c e of t h g j j r i v a t e I law m o d e l of a c o n t r a c t b e t w e e n m a r k e t players. Political o p i n i o n -

139 The Nation, the Rule of Law, and Democracy

a n d will-formation is n o t l i m i t e d to t h e f o r m a t i o n of c o m p r o m i s e s b u t also c o n f o r m s to t h e m o d e l of p u b l i c d i s c o u r s e s o r i e n t e d to t h e r a t i o n a l acceptability of r e g u l a t i o n s in t h e l i g h t of g e n e r a l i z e d inter­ ests, s h a r e d evaluative o r i e n t a t i o n s , a n d justified p r i n c i p l e s . T h i s n o n i n s t r u m e n t a l c o n c e p t i o n of politics is b a s e d o n t h e i d e a of t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y a c t i n g p e r s o n . N o r s h o u l d t h e a u t o n o m y of legal p e r s o n s b e c o n c e i v e d in t e r m s of self-ownership. T h e social c h a r a c ­ ter of n a t u r a l p e r s o n s is s u c h t h a t t h e y d e v e l o p i n t o individuals in t h e c o n t e x t of intersubjectively s h a r e d f o r m s of life a n d stabilize t h e i r i d e n t i t i e s t h r o u g h r e l a t i o n s of r e c i p r o c a l r e c o g n i t i o n . H e n c e , j d s o f r o m a j e g a l p o i n t of view, i n d i v i d u a l p e r s o n s c a n b e p r o t e c t e d jgnly by simultaneously p r o t e c t i n g t h e c o n t e x t i n jvhich.,,their, f o r m a t i o n p r o c e s s e s u n f ( r i d , j ^ t j s , only by a s s u r i n g t h e m s e l v e s access to s u p p o r t i v e i n t e r p e r s o n a f _ x e l a t i o n s . social n e t w p r k s , a n d c u l t u r a l f o r m s of life. A discursively i n s t i t u t e d p r o c e s s of legislation a n d political d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g t h a t k e e p s this in view m u s t take a c c o u n t of values a n d n o r m s as well as existing p r e f e r e n c e s . As s u c h , it is well qualified to fulfill t h e task of p r o v i d i n g a political substitute for p r o c e s s e s of i n t e g r a t i o n t h a t fail at o t h e r levels. F r o m t h e p o i n t of view of K a n t a n d of R o u s s e a u ( p r o p e r l y u n d e r ­ s t o o d ) , d e m o c r a t i c s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n d o e s n o t h a v e t h e collectivistic a n d at t h e s a m e t i m e exclusionary m e a n i n g of t h e assertion o f n a t i o n a l i n d e p e n d e n c e a n d of t h e r e a l i z a t i o n of a u n i q u e n a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r . Rather, it h a s t h e inclusive m e a n i n g of self-legislation w h i c h involves all citizens equally. It is inclusive in t h a t s u c h a politi­ cal o r d e r k e e p s itself o p e n to t h e e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n of t h o s e w h o suffer d i s c r i m i n a t i o n a n d to t h e integ^icm^ of t h e m a r g i n a l i z e d , b u t w i t h o u t imprisoning them iri..,the^miformity.of..a..homogenized e t h n i c c o m m u n i t y . I n this c o n n e c t i o n t h e p r i n c i p l e of v o l u n t a r i n e s s is cru­ cial; t h a t citizens b e l o n g to a state is a f u n c t i o n at least of t h e i r implicit a g r e e m e n t ) W h e r e a s t h e substantive u n d e r s t a n d i n g of p o p u ­ lar sovereignty a s s u m e s a n essential i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n "free­ d o m " a n d t h e external i n d e p e n d e n c e of a p e o p l e , t h e p r o c e d u r a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g c o n n e c t s sovereignty with t h e private a n d p u b l i c a u t o n o m y g r a n t e d e v e r y b o d y equally within a n association of free a n d e q u a l legal subjects. Given t h e c h a l l e n g e s t h a t c o n f r o n t us today, I w a n t to a r g u e , t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c c o u n t of r e p u b l i c a n i s m is 23

140 Chapter 5

m o r e a p p r o p r i a t e t h a n e i t h e r a n e t h n o n a t i o n a l o r even a c o m m u n i ­ t a r i a n c o n c e p t i o n of t h e n a t i o n , t h e r u l e of law, a n d d e m o c r a c y . II

O n the Meaning a n d Limits o f National Self-determination

T h e n a t i o n a l i t y p r i n c i p l e implies a r i g h t o f n a t i o n a l self-determina­ tion. A c c o r d i n g t o this p r i n c i p l e , every n a t i o n t h a t wishes t o g o v e r n itself h a s t h e r i g h t t o exist as a n i n d e p e n d e n t state. T h e e t h n o n a ­ t i o n a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g of p o p u l a r sovereignty s e e m s t o p r o v i d e a so­ l u t i o n t o a p r o b l e m t h a t r e p u b l i c a n i s m c a n n o t solve: H o w a r e we t o d e f i n e t h e totality of t h o s e t o w h o m citizens' r i g h t s s h o u l d legiti­ mately apply? K a n t ascribes t o every h u m a n b e i n g as s u c h t h e r i g h t t o h a v e r i g h t s a n d t o r e g u l a t e his life i n c o m m o n with o t h e r s i n s u c h a way t h a t e v e r y o n e c a n enjoy e q u a l liberties i n a c c o r d a n c e with p u b l i c , coer­ cive laws. B u t this d o e s n o t settle w h o m a y actually m a k e u s e o f this r i g h t with w h o m a n d w h e n ; n o r d o e s it settle w h o m a y u n i t e i n t o a s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g c o m m o n w e a l t h o n t h e basis of a social c o n t r a c t . T l e i ^ i e s t i o n of t h e legitimate composition oi t h e citizen b o d y r e m a i n s o p e n ^\o^^^eYaocr?i\ic s e l f ^ t o m i n a t i o n o n l y a f f e c t s tl^e m o d e of o r g a n i z a t i o n of t h e c o m m o n life of legal c o n s o c i a t e s i n g e n e r a l . O f c o u r s e , t h e self-legislation of a n a t i o n with a d e m o c r a t i c constitu­ t i o n c a n b e t r a c e d b a c k t o t h e d e c i s i o n of a f o u n d i n g g e n e r a t i o n t o give t h e m s e l v e s a c o n s t i t u t i o n ; b u t with this a c t t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s qualify.AemsefaesLonly retroactiveh as a sovereign p e o p l e (Staatsvolk). It is t h r o u g h t h e s h a r e d will t o f o u n d a state a n d , as a c o n s e q u e n c e of this r e s o l u t i o n , t h r o u g h t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n - f o u n d i n g p r a c t i c e itself t h a t t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s c o n s t i t u t e t h e m s e l v e s as a n a t i o n o f citizens. T h i s a p p r o a c h r e m a i n s u n p r o b l e m a t i c as l o n g as b o r d e r s a r e n o t in fact d i s p u t e d , as for e x a m p l e i n t h e F r e n c h o r e v e n t h e A m e r i c a n R e v o l u t i o n w h e n t h e citizens s t r u g g l e d for r e p u b l i c a n f r e e d o m s e i t h e r against t h e i r o w n g o v e r n m e n t , a n d h e n c e w i t h i n t h e b o u n d a ­ ries o f a n a l r e a d y existing state, o r a g a i n s t a c o l o n i a l p o w e r w h i c h h a d itself a l r e a d y d e f i n e d t h e b o u n d a r i e s of u n e q u a l t r e a t m e n t . B u t in o t h e r cases t h e circular a n s w e r t h a t t h e citizens c o n s t i t u t e t h e m ­ selves as a p e o p l e , a n d t h e r e b y d e l i m i t t h e m s e l v e s b o t h socially a n d territorially f r o m t h e i r e n v i r o n m e n t , is n o t sufficient: "To say t h a t all

141 The Nation, the Rule of Law, and Democracy

people . . . are entitled to the democratic process begs a prior ques­ tion. W h e n d o e s a collection of p e r s o n s c o n s t i t u t e a n e n t i t y — ' a p e o p l e ' — e n t i t l e d t o g o v e r n itself d e m o c r a t i c a l l y ? " I n t h e r e a l world, w h o in e a c h i n s t a n c e a c q u i r e s t h e p o w e r t o d e f i n e t h e dis­ p u t e d b o r d e r s of a state is settled by historical c o n t i n g e n c i e s , usually by t h e q u a s i - n a t u r a l o u t c o m e of v i o l e n t conflicts, wars, a n d civil wars. W 5 e r e a s ~ r e p u b l i c a n i s m r e i n f o r c e s o u r a w a r e n e s s of t h e c o n t i n g e n c y of t h e s e b o r d e r s , this c o n t i n g e n c y c a n b e d i s p e l l e d by a p p e a l to t h e i d e a of a g r o w n n a t i o n t h a t i m b u e s t h e b o r d e r s with t h e a u r a of i m i t a t e d substantiality a n d l e g i t i m a t e s t h e m t h r o u g h fictitious links with t h e past. N a t i o n a l i s m b r i d g e s t h e n o r m a t i v e g a p by a p p e a l i n g to a so-called r i g h t of n a t i o n a l s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n . 24

I n c o n t r a s t with social c o n t r a c t t h e o r y w h i c h g r o u n d s t h e legal o r d e r in r e l a t i o n s of m u t u a l r e c o g n i t i o n b e t w e e n i n d i v i d u a l citizens, Carl S c h m i t t s e e m s t o b e in a p o s i t i o n t o justify s u c h a collective r i g h t . F o r if d e m o c r a t i c s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n is u n d e r s t o o d o n t h e m o d e l of collective self-assertion a n d self-realization, n o single p e r ­ s o n c a n realize his f u n d a m e n t a l r i g h t t o e q u a l citizens' r i g h t s o u t s i d e t h e c o n t e x t of a n e t h n i c n a t i o n t h a t enjoys t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n a l i n d e ­ p e n d e n c e of a state. O n this view t h e collective r i g h t of every p e o p l e t o f o r m a n i n d e p e n d e n t state is a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n for t h e effec­ tive g u a r a n t e e of e q u a l i n d i v i d u a l rights. T h i s justification of t h e p r i n c i p l e of n a t i o n a l i t y also yields t h e possibility of e n d o w i n g t h e actual success of a n a t i o n a l i n d e p e n d e n c e m o v e m e n t with r e t r o s p e c ­ tive n o r m a t i v e force. A p a r t i c u l a r g r o u p of p e o p l e qualifies for t h e r i g h t of n a t i o n a l s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n by t h e fact t h a t it defines itself as a h o m o g e n e o u s p e o p l e and at t h e s a m e t i m e h a s t h e p o w e r to c o n t r o l t h e t e r r i t o r i a l b o u n d a r i e s t h a t derive f r o m s u c h ascriptive characteristics. O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e a s s u m p t i o n of a h o m o g e n e o u s p e o p l e contradicts the principle of voluntariness a n d has certain n o r m a tively u n d e s i r a b l e c o n s e q u e n c e s w h i c h S c h m i t t m a k e s n o a t t e m p t t o c o n c e a l : "A n a t i o n a l l y h o m o g e n e o u s state t h e n a p p e a r s n o r m a l ; a state t h a t lacks this h o m o g e n e i t y is a b n o r m a l , a t h r e a t to p e a c e . " T h e a s s u m p t i o n of a corrnpj^sq necessitates r e ­

2 5

pressive policies, w h e t h e r it b e t h e f o r c e d assimilation of alien ele­ m e n t s o r t h e p u r i f i c a t i o n of t h e p e o p l e t h r o u g h a p a r t h e i d a n d

142 Chapter 5

e t h n i c c l e a n s i n g , for, as S c h m i t t p u t s it, "a d e m o c r a t i c state (would) r o b itself of its s u b s t a n c e by consistently r e c o g n i z i n g t h e universal equality of h u m a n b e i n g s in t h e d o m a i n of p u b l i c life a n d of p u b l i c l a w . " I n a d d i t i o n to s u g g e s t i n g p r e v e n t i v e m e a s u r e s l i m i t i n g t h e a d m i s s i o n of aliens, S c h m i t t r e c o m m e n j i ^ t h e ^ p u l s i o n of h e t e r o g e n e o u s e l e m e n t s ^ of t h e p o p u l a t i o n " as well as t h e i r g e o g r a p h i c a l s e g r e g a t i o n , h e n c e t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of p r o t e c ­ t o r a t e s , c o l o n i e s , r e s e r v a t i o n s , h o m e l a n d s , etc. 26

Of course, the republican conception does n o t preclude ethnic c o m m u n i t i e s ' giving t h e m s e l v e s d e m o c r a t i c c o n s t i t u t i o n s a n d estab­ lishing t h e m s e l v e s as sovereign states so l o n g as this i n d e p e n d e n c e is l e g i t i m a t e d by t h e i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t of citizens to live in f r e e d o m u n d e r l^ws. B u t as a g e n e r a l r u l e nation-states d o n o t d e v e l o p p e a c e ­ fully f r o m s e p a r a t e p e o p l e s living in isolation; r a t h e r t h e y typically e n c r o a c h o n n e i g h b o r i n g r e g i o n s , tribes, s u b c u l t u r e s , a n d linguistic o r religious c o m m u n i t i e s . F o r t h e m o s t p a r t n e w nation-states e m e r g e at t h e e x p e n s e of assimilated, s u p p r e s s e d , o r m a r g i n a l i z e d " s u b a l t e r n " p e o p l e s . T h e f o r m a t i o n of nation-states u n d e r t h e b a n ­ n e r of e t h n o n a t i o n a l i s m h a s a l m o s t always b e e n a c c o m p a n i e d by b l o o d y p u r i f i c a t i o n rituals, a n d it h a s g e n e r a l l y e x p o s e d n e w m j n o r i ties to n e w waves of r e p r e s s i o n . I n late n i n e t e e n t h - and^ twentiethc e n t u r y E u r o p e it left i n its w a k e a h o r r i f i c legacy of e m i g r a t i o n a n d e x p u l s i o n , of f o r c e d r e s e t t l e m e n t , d i s e n f r a n c h i s e m e n t , a n d physical e x t e r m i n a t i o n , u p to a n d i n c l u d i n g g e n o c i d e . O f t e n e n o u g h t h e p e r s e c u t e d t h e m s e l v e s m u t a t e d i n t o p e r s e c u t o r s o n c e they suc­ c e e d e d in e m a n c i p a t i n g themselves. I n t h e prevailing p r a c t i c e c o n ­ c e r n i n g r e c o g n i t i o n in i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, t h e e m e r g e n c e of t h e n a t i o n a l i t y p r i n c i p l e c o i n c i d e d with a shift to t h e " p r i n c i p l e of effec­ tiveness" a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h every n e w g o v e r n m e n t — r e g a r d l e s s of its legitimacy—-can c o u n t o n r e c o g n i t i o n only if it s u c c e e d s in stabi­ lizing its sovereignty b o t h e x t e r n a l l y a n d internally. B u t as in t h e salient cases of c o l o n i a l i s m a n d d o m i n a t i o n by a f o r e i g n power, t h e injustices a g a i n s t which, l e g i t i m a t e resigtance. is d i r e c t e d d o n o t r e s u l t f r o m t h e violation of a s u p p o s e d collective r i g h t of n a t i o n a l s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n b u t f r o m t h e violation of t h e basic r i g h t s of individuals. T h e d e m a n d for s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n caiT only have as its i m m e d i a t e c o n t e n t t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of e q u a l civil

143 The Nation, the Rule of Law, and Democracy

rights. T h e a b o l i t i o n of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n against m i n o r i t i e s d o e s n o t p e r se call i n t o q u e s t i o n t h e t e r r i t o r i a l b o u n d a r i e s of a n u n j u s t r e g i m e . A d e m a n d to s e c e d e is l e g i t i m a t e only w h e n t h e c e n t r a l state p o w e r violates t h e r i g h t s of a p o r t i o n of t h e p o p u l a t i o n c o n c e n t r a t e d in a p a r t i c u l a r t e r r i t o r y ; in this case t h e d e m a n d for i n c l u s i o n c a n b e r e a l i z e d via n a t i o n a l i n d e p e n d e n c e . F r o m this s t a n d p o i n t , t h e i n d e p e n d e n c e of t h e U n i t e d States was a l r e a d y r e c o g n i z e d by S p a i n a n d F r a n c e in 1778. Since t h e d e f e c t i o n of t h e S p a n i s h c o l o n i e s in South a n d Central America, a n d contrary to the practice that pre­ vailed u n t i l t h a t t i m e , t h e view h a s g a i n e d g e n e r a l a c c e p t a n c e t h a t i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e c o g n i t i o n of a secession f r o m t h e m o t h e r c o u n t r y is p e r m i s s i b l e e v e n w i t h o u t t h e assent of t h e f o r m e r s o v e r e i g n . So l o n g as n a t i o n a l i n d e p e n d e n c e m o v e m e n t s a p p e a l to d e m o ­ cratic s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n in t h e r e p u b l i c a n sense, a secession ( o r t h e a n n e x a t i o n of a s e c e d e d p o r t i o n of a t e r r i t o r y by a n o t h e r state) c a n n o t b e j u s t i f i e d w i t h o u t t a k i n g a c c o u n t of t h e legitimacy of t h e status q u o . F o r so l o n g as all citizens enjoy e q u a l r i g h t s a n d n o b o d y suffers d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , t h e r e is n o c o m p e l l i n g n o r m a t i v e r e a s o n to s e c e d e f r o m t h e l a r g e r political c o m m u n i t y . U n d e r t h e s e c i r c u m ­ stances, issues of r e p r e s s i o n o r of "foreign d o m i n a t i o n " (Fremdherrschaft) w h i c h w o u l d give m i n o r i t i e s t h e r i g h t to s e c e d e c a n n o t arise. T h i s view fits t h e r e s o l u t i o n of t h e U N G e n e r a l Assembly w h i c h , in a c c o r d a n c e with t h e U N C h a r t e r , g u a r a n t e e s all p e o p l e s a r i g h t of s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n , b u t d o e s so w i t h o u t e m p l o y i n g t h e c o n c e p t "peo­ p l e " in t h e e t h n i c s e n s e . T h e r e s o l u t i o n rejects explicitly t h e r i g h t t o s e c e d e f r o m "states t h a t c o n d u c t t h e m s e l v e s in a c c o r d a n c e with t h e p r i n c i p l e s of e q u a l t r e a t m e n t a n d of t h e r i g h t of self-determina­ t i o n of p e o p l e s a n d t h e r e f o r e possess a g o v e r n m e n t w h i c h r e p r e ­ sents t h e w h o l e p e o p l e , w i t h o u t d i s c r i m i n a t i o n o n t h e basis of r a c e , religion or sex." 2 7

28

2 9

30

Ill

A M o d e l o f Inclusion Sensitive to Difference

To b e s u r e , t h e liberal i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of d e m o c r a t i c self-determina­ t i o n o b s c u r e s t h e p r o b l e m of " b o r n " m i n o r i t i e s , w h i c h c o m e s i n t o s h a r p e r focus f r o m t h e c o m m u n i t a r i a n p e r s p e c t i v e a n d f r o m t h e intersubjective p o i n t of view of d i s c o u r s e t h e o r y . T h e p r o b l e m also 31

32

144 Chapter 5

o c c u r s i n d e m o c r a t i c societies w h e n a politically d o m i n a n t , majority c u l t u r e i m p o s e s its way of life o n m i n o r i t i e s a n d t h e r e b y d e n i e s effective equality of r i g h t s to citizens f r o m o t h e r c u l t u r a l back­ g r o u n d s . T h i s p r o b l e m c o n c e r n s political issues t h a t b e a r o n t h e I ethical s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d t h e identity of citizens. I n t h e s e mat­ ters m i n o r i t i e s s h o u l d n o t b e simply o u t v o t e d by a majority. H e r e t h e p r i n c i p l e of majority r u l e r u n s u p a g a i n s t its limits as t h e c o n t i n g e n t c o m p o s i t i o n of t h e citizenry p r e j u d i c e s t h e o u t c o m e s of a s e e m i n g l y n e u t r a l p r o c e d u r e : " T h e majority p r i n c i p l e itself d e p e n d s o n p r i o r a s s u m p t i o n s a b o u t t h e u n i t : t h a t t h e u n i t w i t h i n w h i c h it is to o p e r a t e is itself l e g i t i m a t e a n d t h a t t h e m a t t e r s o n w h i c h it is e m p l o y e d p r o p e r l y fall w i t h i n t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h a t u n i t . I n o t h e r w o r d s , w h e t h e r t h e s c o p e a n d d o m a i n of majority r u l e a r e a p p r o p r i a t e in a p a r t i c u l a r u n i t d e p e n d s o n a s s u m p t i o n s t h a t t h e majority p r i n c i p l e itself c a n d o n o t h i n g to justify. T h e justification for t h e u n i t lies b e y o n d t h e r e a c h of t h e majority p r i n c i p l e a n d , for t h a t m a t t e r , mostly b e y o n d t h e r e a c h of d e m o c r a t i c t h e o r y itself." 33

T h e p r o b l e m of " b o r n " m i n o r i t i e s c a n b e e x p l a i n e d by t h e fact t h a t citizens, e v e n w h e n viewed as legal subjects, a r e n o t a b s t r a c t individuals w h o a r e c u t off f r o m t h e i r o r i g i n s . By i n t e r v e n i n g ^ in ethical-political issues, t h e law affects t h e integrity of t h e f o r m s of life in w h i c h e a c h p e r s o n ' s c o n d u c t of life is e m b e d d e d . I n a d d i t i o n to m o r a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , p r a g m a t i c d e l i b e r a t i o n s , a n d n e g o t i a b l e interests, this a s p e c t of t h e law b r i n g s strong evaluations i n t o play t h a t d e p e n d o n intersubjectively s h a r e d , b u t culturally specific, tradi­ tions. L e g a l o r d e r s as w h o l e s a r e also "ethically i m b u e d " in t h a t t h e y i n t e r p r e t t h e universalistic c o n t e n t of t h e s a m e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i n ­ ciples in d i f f e r e n t ways, namely, against t h e b a c k g r o u n d of t h e e x p e ­ r i e n c e s t h a t m a k e u p a n a t i o n a l h i s t o r y a n d in l i g h t of a historically prevailing t r a d i t i o n , c u l t u r e , a n d f o r m of life. O f t e n t h e r e g u l a t i o n of culturally sensitive m a t t e r s , s u c h as t h e official l a n g u a g e , t h e p u b l i c s c h o o l c u r r i c u l u m , t h e status of c h u r c h e s a n d religious c o m ­ m u n i t i e s , a n d t h e n o r m s of c r i m i n a l law (e.g., t h o s e r e g u l a t i n g a b o r t i o n ) , b u t also of less o b v i o u s m a t t e r s s u c h as t h e status of t h e family a n d marriage-like p a r t n e r s h i p s , t h e a c c e p t a n c e of security s t a n d a r d s , o r t h e d e m a r c a t i o n of t h e private f r o m t h e p u b l i c r e a l m , is m e r e l y a reflection of t h e ethical-political s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of a

145 T h e N a t i o n , t h e R u l e of Law, a n d D e m o c r a c y

majority c u l t u r e t h a t h a s a c h i e v e d d o m i n a n c e for c o n t i n g e n t , his­ torical r e a s o n s . S u c h implicitly o v e r w h e l m i n g r e g u l a t i o n s c a n also s p a r k a c u l t u r a l s t r u g g l e by d i s r e s p e c t e d m i n o r i t i e s against t h e m a ­ j o r i t y c u l t u r e e v e n w i t h i n a r e p u b l i c a n polity t h a t g u a r a n t e e s for­ mally e q u a l civil rights, as is s h o w n by n u m e r o u s e x a m p l e s s u c h as t h e F r a n c o p h o n e s in C a n a d a , t h e W a l l o o n s in B e l g i u m , a n d t h e B a s q u e s a n d C a t a l a n s in S p a i n . A n a t i o n of citizens is c o m p o s e d of p e r s o n s w h o , as a r e s u l t of socialization processes, also e m b o d y t h e f o r m s of life in w h i c h they f o r m e d t h e i r identities, even if as a d u l t s t h e y r e n o u n c e t h e t r a d i t i o n s in w h i c h t h e y w e r e b r o u g h t u p . I n virtue of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n of t h e i r character, p e r s o n s a r e so to s p e a k n o d a l p o i n t s j l n _ a n ^ a ^ r i p t i y e n e t w o r k of c u l t u r e s a n d t r a d i t i o n s . T h e c o n t i n g e n t c o m p o s i t i o n of t h e citizen b o d y — i n D a h l ' s t e r m i n o l o g y , t h e "political unit"-—also implicitly d e t e r m i n e s t h e ( j ^ i l ^ ^ y e ^ o r i z 1 ^ w i t h i n w h i c h c u l t u r a l conflicts a n d ethical-political d i s c o u r s e s of self-interpretation a r e p l a y e d o u t . T h i s evaluative h o r i z o n also c h a n g e s with shifts in t h e social c o m p o s i t i o n of t h e citizenry. F o r e x a m p l e , political q u e s t i o n s t h a t d e p e n d o n a culture-specific b a c k g r o u n d a r e n o t necessarily t r e a t e d differently after a secession, t h o u g h t h e o u t c o m e s of votes a r e different; n e w majorities a r e n o t always t h e r e s u l t of n e w arguments. . , O f c o u r s e , a m i n o r i t y t h a t suffers d i s c r i m i n a t i o n c a n achieve e q u a l r i g h t s t h r o u g h secession only o n t h e i m p r o b a b l e c o n d i t i o n t h a t its m e m b e r s are geographically concentrated. Otherwise the old prob­ lems merely recur u n d e r new banners. In general, discrimination c a n b e e l i m i n a t e d n o t t h r o u g h ..national i n d e p e n d e n c e b u t only througl^ is ^sufficiently sensitive to t h e c u l t u r a l....background- of individual a n d group-specific differences. T h e p r o b l e m of b o r n m i n o r i t i e s , e n d e m i c to all pluralistic societies, b e c o m e s m o r e a c u t e in m u l t i c u l t u r a l societies. B u t w h e n t h e l a t t e r a r e o r g a n i z e d as d e m o c r a t i c c o n s t i t u t i o n a l states, several different r o u t e s to t h e elusive g o a l of a " d i f f e r e n c e s ^ a r e at a n y r a t e available: federalist d e l e g a t i o n of p o w e r s , a functionally specified transfer o r d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of state c o m p e t e n c e s , a b o v e all g u a r a n t e e s of c u l t u r a l a u t o n o m y , group-specific rights, c o m p e n s a ­ t o r y policies, a n d o t h e r a r r a n g e m e n t s for effectively p r o t e c t i n g

146 Chapter 5

m i n o r i t i e s . I n this way t h e b o d y of citizens w h o p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e s s i n a p a r t i c u l a r t e r r i t o r y o r i n p a r t i c u l a r policy d o m a i n s c h a n g e s w i t h o u t affecting its p r i n c i p l e s . To b e s u r e , t h e c o e x i s t e n c e with e q u a l r i g h t s of different e t h n i c c o m m u n i t i e s , l a n g u a g e g r o u p s , religious faiths, a n d f o r m s of life s h o u l d n o t b e p u r c h a s e d at t h e cost of t h e f r a g m e n t a t i o n of society. T h e painful p r o c e s s of u n c o u p l i n g m u s t n o t r e n d t h e society asund e r jnjtoji^m^ulgDlicJtyj3f s u b c u l t u r e s closed off f r o m o n e a n o t h e r . O n t h e o n e h a n d , t h e majority c u l t u r e m u s t d e t a c h itself f r o m its fusion with t h e g e n e r a l political c u l t u r e i n w h i c h all citizens s h a r e equally; o t h e r w i s e it dictates t h e p a r a m e t e r s of political discourses f r o m t h e outset. As j u s t o n e p a r t , it m a y n o l o n g e r f o r m t h e facade of t h e w h o l e w i t h o u t p r e j u d i c i n g t h e d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e d u r e i n spe­ cific q u e s t i o n s of existential r e l e v a n c e for m i n o r i t i e s . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e b i n d i n g force of t h e c o n i m o n political c u l t u r e , w h i c h b e c o m e s progressively m o r e abstract as s u b c u l t u r e s r e d u c e it t o a c o m m o n denominator^ must remain ^ s t i ^ t o .prjsyemQhe

3 4

n a t i o n of c]tiz£ns.^ "Multiculturalism, while e n d o r s ­ i n g t h e p e r p e t u a t i o n of several c u l t u r a l g r o u p s i n a single political society, also r e q u i r e s t h e e x i s t e n c e of a c o m m o n c u l t u r e . . . . M e m ­ b e r s of all c u l t u r a l g r o u p s . . . will have t o a c q u i r e a c o m m o n politi­ cal l a n g u a g e a n d c o n v e n t i o n s of c o n d u c t t o b e a b l e t o p a r t i c i p a t e effectively i n t h e c o m p e t i t i o n for r e s o u r c e s a n d t h e p r o t e c t i o n of g r o u p as well as individual i n t e r e s t s i n a s h a r e d political a r e n a . " 3 5

IV Democracy a n d State Sovereignty: T h e Case o f Humanitarian Intervention T h e substantive a n d p r o c e d u r a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g s of d e m o c r a c y n o t only entail different c o n c e p t i o n s of n a t i o n a l s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n a n d m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m ; they also have different c o n s e q u e n c e s for t h e c o n ­ c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of state sovereignty. T h e state t h a t d e v e l o p e d i n m o d ­ e r n E u r o p e d e p e n d e d f r o m j h e b e g i n n i n g o n t h e r e s e r v e force of a s t a n d i n g army, t h e police^ a n d t h e p e n a l system, a n d j t e x e r c i s e d a m o n o p o l y over t h e legitimate m e a n s of v i o l e n c e . I n t e r n a l sover­ eignty meanT tKe 5nF67^ state, e x t e r n a l sovereignty t h e ability t o assert oneself i n t h e c o m p e t i t i o n a m o n g

147 T h e N a t i o n , t h e R u l e of Law, a n d D e m o c r a c y

t h e m a j o r p o w e r s (as this b e c a m e c o n s o l i d a t e d in t h e E u r o p e a n state system after t h e P e a c e of W e s t p h a l i a ) . F r o m this s t a n d p o i n t t h e p r o c e s s of d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n w h i c h was set in m o t i o n by t h e f o r m a t i o n of nation-states a p p e a r s as t h e transfer of sovereign p o w e r f r o m t h e p r i n c e to t h e p e o p l e . B u t this f o r m u l a lacks p r e c i s i o n in c o m p a r i s o n with t h e alternative t h a t c o n c e r n s u s h e r e . If d e m o c r a t i c s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n m e a n s t h e e q u a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n of free a n d e q u a l citizens in t h e p r o c e s s of d e c i s i o n m a k i n g a n d legis­ lation, t h e n d e m o c r a c y in t h e first p l a c e c h a n g e s ^ t h e j i a t u r e a n d m o d e of e x e r c i s i n g i n t e r n a l sovereignty. T h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state revolutionizes t h e basis o n w h i c h political r u l e is l e g i t i m a t e d . If, by c o n t r a s t , d e m o c r a t i c s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n m e a n s t h e collective self-as­ s e r t i o n a n d self-realization of a h o m o g e n e o u s p e o p l e , t h e issue of e x t e r n a l sovereignty m o v e s i n t o t h e f o r e g r o u n d . F o r t h e p r e s e r v a ­ t i o n of state p o w e r in t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l system t h e r e b y a c q u i r e s t h e a d d i t i o n a l significance t h a t a n a t i o n secures, t o g e t h e r with its exist­ e n c e , its u n i q u e c h a r a c t e r over a n d a g a i n s t o t h e r n a t i o n s . T h u s , in t h e first case, t h e c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n d e m o c r a c y a n d state sover­ eignty lays d o w n s t r i n g e n t c o n d i t i o n s for t h e legitimacy of t h e inter­ n a l o r d e r b u t leaves t h e q u e s t i o n of e x t e r n a l sovereignty o p e n ; in t h e s e c o n d case it i n t e r p r e t s t h e p l a c e of t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e in t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l a r e n a , b u t t h e only c r i t e r i o n of legitimacy it r e q u i r e s for t h e i n t e r n a l exercise of p o w e r is civil p e a c e , t h e m a i n t e n a n c e of "law a n d o r d e r . " T h e c o n c e p t i o n of sovereignty in classical i n t e r n a t i o n a l law entails a p r o h i b i t i o n o n i n t e r f e r e n c e in t h e i n t e r n a l affairs of a n i n t e r n a ­ tionally r e c o g n i z e d state. T h i s p r o h i b i t i o n of i n t e r v e n t i o n is i n d e e d r e a f f i r m e d by t h e U N C h a r t e r ; b u t f r o m t h e b e g i n n i n g it s t o o d in t e n s i o n with t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r o t e c t i o n of h u m a n rights. T h e e r o s i o n of t h e p r i n c i p l e of n o n i n t e r v e n t i o n in r e c e n t d e c a d e s h a s b e e n d u e p r i m a r i l y to t h e politics of h u m a n r i g h t s . It is h a r d l y s u r p r i s i n g t h a t S c h m i t t categorically r e p u d i ­ a t e d this d e v e l o p m e n t . H i s r e j e c t i o n of i n t e r v e n t i o n g r o u n d e d in a p p e a l s to h u m a n r i g h t s c a n a l r e a d y b e a c c o u n t e d for by his bellig­ e r e n t c o n c e p t i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s , i n d e e d of politics in g e n e r a l . It was n o t only t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of c r i m e s against h u m a n ­ ity after t h e S e c o n d W o r l d W a r t h a t elicited his scornful p r o t e s t . T h e 36

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c o n d e m n a t i o n of offensive w a r s h a d a l r e a d y s t r u c k h i m as i n c o m ­ p a t i b l e with t h e status a n d r a n g e of a c t i o n of n a t i o n s t h a t c a n assert t h e i r e x i s t e n c e a n d u n i q u e identity only in t h e a n t a g o n i s t i c r o l e of sovereign subjects of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. M i c h a e l Walzer, w h o c o u l d n o t b e f u r t h e r f r o m t h e m i l i t a n t ethn o n a t i o n a l i s m of a Schmitt, d e f e n d s a similar p o s i t i o n . W i t h o u t wishing to suggest false parallels, I w o u l d like t o e x a m i n e his c o m ­ munitarian reservations concerning humanitarian intervention, for t h e y t h r o w l i g h t o n t h e i n t e r n a l c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n c o n c e p t i o n s of d e m o c r a c y a n d t h e t r e a t m e n t of sovereignty rights. I n his b o o k o n j u s t w a r s , Walzer p r o c e e d s f r o m t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t a n y c o m ­ m u n i t y h a s a r i g h t of n a t i o n a l s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n if it possesses its o w n collective identity a n d , i n s p i r e d by a n a w a r e n e s s of its c u l t u r a l h e r i t a g e , h a s t h e will a n d d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o c a r v e o u t a state exist­ e n c e for itself a n d to assert its political i n d e p e n d e n c e . A g r o u p of p e o p l e enjoys t h e r i g h t of n a t i o n a l s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n if it s u c c e e d s in laying claim to it. 3 9

40

To b e s u r e , Walzer d o e s n o t u n d e r s t a n d t h e c a n d i d a t e for political i n d e p e n d e n c e as a n e t h n i c c o m m u n i t y of d e s c e n t b u t r a t h e r as a c u l t u r a l c o m m u n i t y of i n h e r i t a n c e . However, t h e historically evolv­ i n g c u l t u r a l n a t i o n , like t h e c o m m u n i t y of s h a r e d ancestry, is also u n d e r s t o o d as a p r e p o l i t i c a l entity t h a t h a s t h e r i g h t to p r e s e r v e its integrity in t h e f o r m of a sovereign state: " T h e i d e a of c o m m u n a l integrity derives its m o r a l a n d political force f r o m t h e r i g h t s of c o n t e m p o r a r y m e n a n d w o m e n to live as m e m b e r s of a historic c o m m u n i t y a n d to e x p r e s s t h e i r i n h e r i t e d c u l t u r e t h r o u g h political f o r m s w o r k e d o u t a m o n g t h e m s e l v e s . " Walzer also d e d u c e s t h r e e e x c e p t i o n s to t h e p r i n c i p l e of n o n i n t e r v e n t i o n f r o m this r i g h t of s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n . H e r e g a r d s i n t e r v e n t i o n s as p e r m i s s i b l e (a) to lend support to ajiational l i t o t h a t manifests t h e 41

identity of a n i n d e p e n d e n t c o m m u n i t y by t h e very act of resistance a n d (b) to d e f e n d t h e integrity of a pojijjcal c o m m u n i t y u n d e r attack w h e n it c a n only b e p r o t e c t e d by a n o p p o s i n g i n t e r v e n t i o n . Walzer also justifies t h e t h i r d e x c e p t i o n , n o t o n t h e basis of violations of h u m a n rights p e r se, b u t o n t h e g r o u n d s t h a t (c) in cases of enslave­ ment, j n a ^ a c £ e ^ o r ^ deprives its o w n citizens of t h e possibility of giving e x p r e s s i o n to t h e i r f o r m s of life a n d t h e r e b y of p r e s e r v i n g t h e i r collective identity.

149 T h e N a t i o n , t h e R u l e of Law, a n d D e m o c r a c y

T h e c o m m u n i t a r i a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of p o p u l a r sovereignty e m p h a ­ sizes t h e a s p e c t of e x t e r n a l sovereignty in s u c h a way t h a t t h e q u e s ­ tion of t h e legitimacy of t h e i n t e r n a l o r d e r gets p u s h e d i n t o t h e b a c k g r o u n d . T h e p o i n t of Walzer's reflections is t h a t a h u m a n i t a r i a n i n t e r v e n t i o n a g a i n s t violations of h u m a n r i g h t s by a d i c t a t o r i a l re­ g i m e c a n only b e justified w h e n t h e affected citizens t h e m s e l v e s take u p t h e c u d g e l s against political r e p r e s s i o n a n d , by a r e c o g n i z a b l e act of r e b e l l i o n , p r o v i d e c o n c r e t e p r o o f t h a t t h e g o v e r n m e n t is o p p o s e d to t h e t r u e a s p i r a t i o n s of t h e p e o p l e a n d t h r e a t e n s t h e integrity of t h e c o m m u n i t y . Accordingly, t h e legitimacy of a political o r d e r is m e a s u r e d in t h e first i n s t a n c e by t h e a c c o r d b e t w e e n t h e political l e a d e r s h i p a n d t h e c u l t u r a l f o r m of life t h a t is constitutive of t h e identity of t h e p e o p l e : "A state is l e g i t i m a t e o r n o t , d e p e n d i n g u p o n t h e 'fit' of g o v e r n m e n t a n d c o m m u n i t y , t h a t is, t h e d e g r e e to w h i c h t h e g o v e r n m e n t actually r e p r e s e n t s t h e political life of its p e o p l e . W h e n it d o e s n ' t d o t h a t , t h e p e o p l e h a v e a r i g h t to r e b e l . B u t if they a r e free to r e b e l t h e n they a r e also free n o t to r e b e l . . . b e c a u s e they still believe t h e g o v e r n m e n t to b e t o l e r a b l e , o r they a r e a c c u s t o m e d to it, o r they a r e p e r s o n a l l y loyal to its l e a d e r s . . . . A n y o n e c a n m a k e s u c h a r g u m e n t s , b u t only subjects o r citizens c a n act o n t h e m . " Walzer's critics p r o c e e d f r o m a different u n d e r s t a n d i n g of d e m o ­ cratic s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n ; they reject t h e view t h a t i n t e r n a l sover­ eignty is simply a m a t t e r of t h e e f f e c t i v e j g r e j ^ ^ O n this r e a d i n g t h e key to j u d g i n g t h e legitimacy of t h e i n t e r n a l o r d e r is n o t c o m m o n c u l t u r a l i n h e r i t a n c e b u t t h e r e a l i z a t i o n of civil rights: " T h e m e r e fact t h a t t h e m u l t i t u d e s h a r e s some form of c o m ­ m o n l i f e — c o m m o n t r a d i t i o n s , c u s t o m s , interests, history, institu­ tions, a n d b o u n d a r i e s — i s n o t sufficient to g e n e r a t e a g e n u i n e , i n d e p e n d e n t , l e g i t i m a t e political c o m m u n i t y . " T h e critics d i s p u t e t h e p r i n c i p l e of n o n i n t e r v e n t i o n a n d a d v o c a t e , as far as possible, t h e e x p a n s i o n of t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r o t e c t i o n of h u m a n rights. H e r e , of c o u r s e , t h a t a state is illegitimate a c c o r d i n g to the^stajridards of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state is not, a suffidmt condition, for i n t e r v e n i n g in its i n t e r n a l affairs. O t h e r w i s e t h e U N G e n e r a l Assembly w o u l d h a v e to b e c o m p o s e d a l o n g c o m p l e t e l y different lines. Walzer rightly p o i n t s o u t t h a t f r o m a m o r a l p o i n t of view every d e c i s i o n t o act o n b e h a l f of citizens of a n o t h e r c o u n t r y is d u b i o u s . P r o p o s a l s for a case-by-case t r e a t m e n t of i n t e r v e n t i o n also take i n t o a c c o u n t t h e limits a n d t h e 4 2

43

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e x t r e m e d a n g e r s of a politics of h u m a n r i g h t s . B u t t h e decisions a n d strategies of t h e w o r l d o r g a n i z a t i o n , a n d especially t h e i n t e r v e n ­ tions of forces c a r r y i n g o u t U N m a n d a t e s since 1989, i n d i c a t e t h e d i r e c t i o n a l o n g w h i c h i n t e r n a t i o n a l law (Volkerrecht) is g r a d u a l l y b e ­ i n g t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o a c o s m o p o l i t a n law (Weltbiirgerrecht) , T h e s e political a n d legal d e v e l o p m e n t s a r e r e a c t i o n s t o a n objec­ tively c h a n g e d situation. T h e u n p r e c e d e n t e d n a t u r e a n d scale of t h e g o v e r n m e n t criminality t h a t s p r e a d i n t h e wake of t h e t e c h n o l o g i ­ cally u n f e t t e r e d a n d ideologically u n r e s t r a i n e d S e c o n d W o r l d W a r m a k e s a m o c k e r y of t h e classical p r e s u m p t i o n of t h e i n n o c e n c e of t h e sovereign subjects of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. A p r e s c i e n t politics of p e a c e k e e p i n g m u s t take i n t o a c c o u n t t h e c o m p l e x social a n d politi­ cal causes of war. W h a t is u r g e n t l y n e e d e d a r e strategies d e s i g n e d to i n f l u e n c e — w h e r e possible, i n a n o n v i o l e n t m a n n e r — t h e i n t e r n a l o r d e r of formally sovereign states w h o s e goal is to foster self-sustain­ i n g e c o n o m i e s a n d t o l e r a b l e social c o n d i t i o n s , e q u a l d e m o c r a t i c p a r t i c i p a t i o n , t h e r u l e of law, a n d a c u l t u r e of t o l e r a n c e . S u c h inter­ v e n t i o n s i n s u p p o r t of i n t e r n a l d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n a r e , however, irrec­ o n c i l a b l e with a c o n c e p t i o n of d e m o c r a t i c s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t g r o u n d s a r i g h t of n a t i o n a l i n d e p e n d e n c e for t h e sake of t h e collec­ tive self-realization of a c u l t u r a l f o r m of life. 46

V

Only a Europe o f Fatherlands?

I n view of t h e subversive forces a n d i m p e r a t i v e s of t h e w o r l d m a r k e t a n d of t h e i n c r e a s i n g density of w o r l d w i d e n e t w o r k s of c o m m u n i c a ­ tion a n d c o m m e r c e , t h e e x t e r n a l sovereignty of states, h o w e v e r it m a y b e g r o u n d e d , is by n o w i n a n y case a n a n a c h r o n i s m . Also t h e i n c r e a s i n g global d a n g e r s w h i c h have l o n g since u n i t e d t h e n a t i o n s of t h e w o r l d unwittingly i n t o a n i n v o l u n t a r y risk society r e n d e r a practical necessity t h e c r e a t i o n of politically c o m p e t e n t organiza­ tions o n t h e s u p r a n a t i o n a l level. F o r t h e t i m e b e i n g thefeTs^aTackT of collective actors w h o c o u l d p u r s u e a " d o m e s t i c " politics o n a global scale a n d w o u l d have t h e p o w e r t o a g r e e o n t h e r e q u i s i t e p a r a m e t e r s , a r r a n g e m e n t s , a n d p r o c e d u r e s . Yet t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s have in t h e m e a n t i m e c o m p e l l e d nation-states t o u n i t e i n t o l a r g e r u n i t s . T h i s p r o c e s s gives rise t o d a n g e r o u s l e g i t i m a t i o n deficiencies,

151 The Nation, the Rule of Law, and Democracy

as is s h o w n by t h e e x a m p l e of t h e E u r o p e a n U n i o n . As n e w o r g a n i ­ zations e m e r g e even f u r t h e r r e m o v e d f r o m t h e political b a s e , s u c h as t h e Brussels b u r e a u c r a c y , t h e g a p b e t w e e n s e l f - p r o g r a m m i n g ad­ m i n i s t r a t i o n s a n d systemic n e t w o r k s , o n t h e o n e j i a n d , a n d d e m o cratic processes, o n t h e other, grows constantly. T h e helpless defensive r e a c t i o n s to t h e s e c h a l l e n g e s a g a i n d e m o n s t r a t e t h e i n a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s of a substantive c o n c e p t i o n of p o p u l a r sovereignty. A l t h o u g h t h e verdict of t h e F e d e r a l C o n s t i t u t i o n a l C o u r t of Ger­ m a n y c o n c e r n i n g t h e M a a s t r i c h t T r e a t y effectively ratifies t h e p r o ­ p o s e d e x p a n s i o n of t h e c o m p e t e n c e s of t h e E u r o p e a n U n i o n , t h e justification it p r o v i d e s reaffirms t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e p r i n c i p l e of d e m o c r a c y w o u l d b e u n a c c e p t a b l y " e m p t i e d of c o n t e n t " if t h e exercise of state f u n c t i o n s c o u l d n o t b e t i e d o n c e m o r e to a "rela­ tively h o m o g e n e o u s " citizen body. T h e C o u r t , w h i c h takes its o r i e n ­ t a t i o n f r o m H e r m a n n H e l l e r ( r a t h e r t h a n Carl S c h m i t t ) , a p p a r e n t l y wants to reject a n e t h n o n a t i o n a l i s t c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p e o p l e . Never­ theless, it takes t h e view t h a t a d e m o c r a t i c a l l y l e g i t i m a t e d state a u t h o r i t y m u s t flow f r o m a political will-formation t h r o u g h w h i c h a p e o p l e gives sufficient e x p r e s s i o n to its prepolitically given " n a t i o n a l identity." If a d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e s s is to take r o o t at all, it m u s t b e possible for t h e citizen b o d y to e x p r e s s legally "what u n i t e s t h e m socially a n d politically in a relatively h o m o g e n e o u s m a n n e r . " Given this basic a s s u m p t i o n , t h e C o u r t e x p l a i n s why t h e Maas­ t r i c h t Treaty will n o t f o u n d a E u r o p e a n f e d e r a l state i n t o w h i c h t h e F e d e r a l R e p u b l i c w o u l d b e s u b s u m e d , t h e r e b y s t r i p p i n g it of its s t a n d i n g as a subject of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law (with t h e r i g h t to c o n d u c t i n d e p e n d e n t j u d i c i a l , d o m e s t i c , a n d f o r e i g n policies, a n d to m a i n ­ tain its o w n d e f e n s e forces) . I n e s s e n c e t h e a r g u m e n t of t h e C o u r t a i m s t o p r o v e t h a t t h e treaty d o e s j i o ^ establish t h e s u p r e m e constit u t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y (^^^j^^^^^gfeasl, of a n i n d e p e n d e n t s u p r a n a ­ t i o n a l legal subject ( o n a n a n a l o g y with t h e U n i t e d States, for e x a m p l e ) . T h e "alliance of s t a t e s " is s u p p o s e d t o owe its existence only to t h e " a u t h o r i z a t i o n of states w h i c h remain sovereign": " T h e M a a s t r i c h t T r e a t y takes a c c o u n t of t h e i n d e p e n d e n c e a n d sover­ eignty of t h e m e m b e r states by o b l i g a t i n g t h e U n i o n to r e s p e c t t h e n a t i o n a l idejrtity^of its m e m b e r s t a t e s . " F o r m u l a t i o n s s u c h as t h e s e b e t r a y the^conceptual barriersj) t h a t t h e substantive c o n c e p t of p o p u l a r 4 7

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sovereignty e r e c t s to t h e transfer of sovereignty r i g h t s to s u p r a n a ­ t i o n a l b o d i e s . M o r e o v e r , t h e y l e a d to a s t o n i s h i n g c o n c l u s i o n s t h a t c a n n o t b e r e c o n c i l e d with earlier verdicts of t h e c o u r t o n t h e pri­ m a c y of E u r o p e a n C o m m u n i t y l a w . O n e w o u l d n o t b e m i s t a k e n if o n e d i s c e r n e d in t h e t e n o r of t h e C o u r t ' s justification a c e r t a i n level of a g r e e m e n t with t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t H e r m a n n L u b b e draws f r o m his p h i l i p p i c a g a i n s t t h e " U n i t e d States of E u r o p e ; " as h e c o n f i d e n t l y asserts i n t h e subtitle, this u n i o n is " n o t to b e " : " T h e legitimacy of t h e f u t u r e E u r o p e a n U n i o n . . . rests o n t h e s h a r e d i n t e r e s t s of its m e m b e r c o u n t r i e s , n o t o n t h e s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g will of a E u r o p e a n citizenry. A E u r o p e a n p e o p l e h a s n o political e x i s t e n c e a n d , while t h e r e is n o r e a s o n t o t h i n k t h a t a n e x p e r i e n c e of m u t u a l b e l o n g i n g a m o n g E u r o p e a n s a n a l o g o u s to t h a t w h i c h u n i t e s a p e o p l e is i n c o n c e i v a b l e , at t h e p r e s e n t t i m e t h e r e a r e n o f o r e s e e a b l e c i r c u m s t a n c e s u n d e r w h i c h a legitimacy-founding E u r o p e a n will c o u l d take s h a p e . " Against this skepticism o n e c o u l d p o i n t to t h e decisive historical e x p e r i e n c e s jthat u n d e n i a b l y u n i t e t h e E u r o p e a n g e o p l e s . F o r t h e c a t a s t r o p h e s of two w o r l d wars h a v e tough^^ nationalistic, e x c l u s i o n a r y , m e c h a n i s m s feed. W h y s h o u l d a sense of b e l o n g i n g t o g e t h e r culturally a n d politically n o t g r o w o u t of t h e s e e x p e r i e n c e s — e s p e c i a l l y against t h e r i c h b a c k g r o u n d of s h a r e d tradi­ t i o n s w h i c h have l o n g since a c h i e v e d world-historical significance, as well as o n t h e basis of t h e o v e r l a p p i n g i n t e r e s t s a n d d e n s e n e t w o r k s of c o m m u n i c a t i o n w h i c h have m o r e r e c e n t l y d e v e l o p e d in t h e d e c ­ a d e s of e c o n o m i c success of t h e E u r o p e a n C o m m u n i t y ? Clearly L u b b e ' s e u r o s k e p t i c i s m is m o t i v a t e d by t h e artificial d e m a n d for a m u t u a l b e l o n g i n g , " a n a l o g o u s to t h a t of a p e o p l e . " B u t t h e " h o m o ­ g e n e o u s p e o p l e , " w h i c h is a g a i n p r o v i n g a n i m p e d i m e n t to reflec­ tion, is t h e w r o n g analogy. 51

5 2

T h e conflict-ridden h i s t o r y of state f o r m a t i o n in t h e p o s t c o l o n i a l p e r i o d in Asia a n d especially in Africa d o e s n o t offer a c o n v i n c i n g c o u n t e r e x a m p l e . W h e n t h e erstwhile c o l o n i e s w e r e " g r a n t e d " i n d e ­ p e n d e n c e by t h e w i t h d r a w a l of t h e c o l o n i a l p o w e r s , t h e p r o b l e m was t h a t t h e s e artificial t e r r i t o r i e s a c h i e v e d e x t e r n a l sovereignty w i t h o u t already h a v i n g a n effective state p o w e r at t h e i r disposal. After t h e w i t h d r a w a l of t h e c o l o n i a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n t h e n e w g o v e r n m e n t s in

153 The Nation, the Rule of Law, and Democracy

m a n y i n s t a n c e s c o u l d assert t h e i r sovereignty i n t e r n a l l y only with g r e a t difficulty. N o r c o u l d this b e a c h i e v e d by m e a n s of r e p r e s s i o n : "The p r o b l e m was e v e r y w h e r e t o 'fill i n ' r e a d y - m a d e states with n a t i o n a l c o n t e n t . T h i s p o s e s t h e i n t e r e s t i n g q u e s t i o n , w h y postcolonial states h a d t o b e n a t i o n s . . . . N a t i o n - b u i l d i n g as d e v e l o p m e n t m e a n s t h e e x t e n s i o n of a n active sense of m e m b e r s h i p t o t h e e n t i r e p o p u l a c e , t h e s e c u r e a c c e p t a n c e of state authority, t h e r e d i s t r i b u t i o n of r e s o u r c e s t o f u r t h e r t h e equality of m e m b e r s , a n d t h e e x t e n s i o n of effective state o p e r a t i o n t o t h e p e r i p h e r y . " T h e c o n t i n u i n g tribal conflicts i n formally i n d e p e n d e n t p o s t c o l o n i a l states serve as a r e ­ m i n d e r t h a t n a t i o n s only arise o n c e t h e y have traversed t h e difficult road from e t h n i c a l l y j } ^ 53

oHlTalic^ solidarity a m o n g citizens w h o a r e stt angeTrsnto^ne anotherSln t h e West, this p r o c e s s of nation-state f o r m a t i o n , w h i c h i n t e r c o n n e c t s a n d m i x e s tribes a n d r e g i o n s , t o o k m o r e t h a n a century. T h i s p r o c e s s of i n t e g r a t i o n itself d e m o n s t r a t e s t h e t r u e f u n c t i o n a l r e q u i r e m e n t s for d e m o c r a t i c will-formation, namely, t h e c o m m u n i ­ cative circuits of a political p u b l i c s p h e r e t h a t d e v e l o p e d o u t of b o u r g e o i s associations a n d t h r o u g h t h e m e d i u m of t h e mass press. This enabled the same t h e m e s to acquire simultaneously t h e same r e l e v a n c e for a large p u b l i c t h a t r e m a i n e d a n o n y m o u s a n d t o s p u r citizens s e p a r a t e d by g r e a t d i s t a n c e s t o m a k e s p o n t a n e o u s c o n t r i b u ­ tions. T h i s p r o c e s s gives rise t o p u b l i c o p i n i o n s t h a t a g g r e g a t e t h e m e s a n d a t t i t u d e s t o t h e p o i n t w h e r e t h e y exercise political i n f l u e n c e . T h e c o r r e c t a n a l o g y is obvious: t h e initial i m p e t u s t o i n t e g r a t i o n i n t h e d i r e c t i o n of a p o s t n a t i o n a l society is n o t p r o v i d e d by t h e s u b s t r a t e of a s u p p o s e d " E u r o p e a n p e o p l e " b u t by t h e c o m ­ m u n i c a t i v e n e t w o r ^ o f a^uropeanrwifjle political p u b l i c s p h e r e e m ­ b e d d e d i n a s h a r e d political c u l t u r e . T h e latter is f o u n d e d onfa civjT Tociety\Torn^^ n o n g o v e r n m e n t a l organiza­ :

tions, a n d d t i z e n initiatives a n d m o y e m e n t s , a n d will b e o c c u p i e d by a r e n a s i n w h i c h t h e p o l i t i c a l partiej) c a n directly a d d r e s s t h e deci­ sions of E u r o p e a n i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d g o b e y o n d m e r e tactical alliance to f o r m a E u r o p e a n p a r t y s y s t e m . 54

6

Does Europe Need a Constitution? Response to Dieter Grimm

I basically a g r e e with D i e t e r G r i m m ' s d i a g n o s i s [of t h e c u r r e n t c o n ­ stitutional status of t h e E u r o p e a n U n i o n ] ^ h o w e v e r , a n analysis of its p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s l e a d s m e to d r a w a different political c o n c l u s i o n . T h e Diagnosis F r o m a constitutional perspective, o n e can discern a contradiction in t h e E u r o p e a n U n i o n ' s p r e s e n t situation. O n t h e o n e h a n d , t h e E U is a s u p r a n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n e s t a b U ^ ^ ties a n d w i t h o u t a c o n s t i t u t i o n of its own. I n this r e s p e c t it is n o t a state (in t h e m o d e r n sense of a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state c h a r a c t e r i z e d by a m o n o p o l y o n v i o l e n c e a n d a domestically a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y rec­ o g n i z e d sovereignty). O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , C o m m u n i t y i n s t i t u t i o n s create_Eur^ejin^aw__ that binds the m e m b e r states—thus the EU exercises a s u p r e m e a u t h o r i t y previously c l a i m e d only by individual states. F r o m this results t h e o f t - b e m o a n e d d e m o c r a t i c deficit. C o m ­ mission a n d C o u n c i l p r o n o u n c e m e n t s , as well as d e c i s i o n s by t h e E u r o p e a n C o u r t , a r e i n t e r v e n i n g ever m o r e p r o f o u n d l y i n t o t h e m e m b e r states' i n t e r n a l affairs. W i t h i n t h e f r a m e w o r k of t h e sover­ eignty r i g h t s c o n f e r r e d u p o n t h e U n i o n , t h e E u r o p e a n executive m a y e n f o r c e its p r o n o u n c e m e n t s over a n d a g a i n s t t h e o p p o s i t i o n of t h e n a t i o n a l g o v e r n m e n t s . At t h e s a m e t i m e , as l o n g as t h e E u r o p e a n P a r l i a m e n t is only e q u i p p e d with w e a k c o m p e t e n c e s , t h e s e p r o ­ n o u n c e m e n t s a n d e n a c t m e n t s lack d i r e c t d e m o c r a t i c l e g i t i m a t i o n .

156 Chapter 6

T h e executive i n s t i t u t i o n s of t h e c o m m u n i t y derive t h e i r legitimacy f r o m t h a t of t h e m e m b e r g o v e r n m e n t s . T h e y a r e n o t i n s t i t u t i o n s of a state t h a t is itself c o n s t i t u t e d by t h e act of will o n t h e p a r t of t h e u n i t e d citizens of E u r o p e . T h e E u r o p e a n p a s s p o r t d o e s n o t as yet c o n f e r r i g h t s constitutive for d e m o c r a t i c citizenship. Political Conclusion I n c o n t r a s t with t h e federalists w h o r e c o m m e n d a d e m o c r a t i c pat­ t e r n for t h e E U , G r i m m w a r n s a g a i n s t a n y f u r t h e r e r o s i o n of na­ t i o n a l c o m p e t e n c e s by E u r o p e a n law. T h e d e m o c r a t i c deficit w o u l d n o t b e effectively filled by a "statist s h o r t c u t " to t h e p r o b l e m , b u t r a t h e r d e e p e n e d . N e w political i n s t i t u t i o n s , s u c h as a E u r o p e a n P a r l i a m e n t with t h e u s u a l p o w e r s , a g o v e r n m e n t f o r m e d o u t of t h e Commission, a Second C h a m b e r replacing the Council, a n d a Euro­ p e a n C o u r t of J u s t i c e with e x p a n d e d c o m p e t e n c e s , in themselves offer n o s o l u t i o n s . If they a r e n o t filled with life, t h e y will i n s t e a d a c c e l e r a t e t h e t e n d e n c i e s t o w a r d a u t o n o m i z a t i o n of b u r e a u c r a t i z e d politics a l r e a d y a p p a r e n t w i t h i n t h e n a t i o n a l f r a m e w o r k s . T h e r e a l p r e r e q u i s i t e s for a E u r o p e a n - w i d e i n t e g r a t i o n of citizen will-forma­ t i o n have b e e n a b s e n t u p to now. C o n s t i t u t i o n a l e u r o s k e p t i c i s m t h u s a m o u n t s to t h e empirically b a s e d a r g u m e n t t h a t as l o n g as t h e r e is n o t a E u r o p e a n p e o p l e t h a t is sufficiently " h o m o g e n e o u s " to f o r m a d e m o c r a t i c will, t h e r e s h o u l d b e n o c o n s t i t u t i o n . T h e Discussion My reflections a r e d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t (1) t h e i n c o m p l e t e a c c o u n t of t h e alternatives a n d (2) t h e n o t entirely u n a m b i g u o u s n o r m a t i v e justification of t h e f u n c t i o n a l r e q u i r e m e n t s for d e m o c r a t i c willformation. (1) G r i m m p r e s e n t s u s with t h e u n w e l c o m e c o n s e q u e n c e s t h a t w o u l d r e s u l t f r o m t h e t r a n s i t i o n of t h e E u r o p e a n C o m m u n i t y to a d e m o c r a t i c a l l y c o n s t i t u t e d , f e d e r a l state s h o u l d t h e n e w i n s t i t u t i o n s n o t take r o o t . So l o n g as a E u r o p e a n - n e t w o r k e d civil society, a E u r o ­ p e a n - w i d e political p u b l i c s p h e r e , a n d a c o m m o n political c u l t u r e a r e lacking, t h e s u p r a n a t i o n a l d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s e s w o u l d b e c o m e in-

157 Does Europe Need a Constitution?

creasingly independent of the still nationally organized processes of opinion- and will-formation. This prognosis of the dangers involved strikes me as plausible. But what is the alternative? Grimm's preferred option seems to imply that the constitutional status quo can at least freeze the extant democratic deficit. Completely independently of constitutional innovations, however, this deficit expands day by.day because the economic and social dynam­ ics, even within the^ existing institutional framework., perpetuate the erosion of national powers A As Grimm himself acknowledges, "The democratic principle is valid for the member states whose own decision capabilities are however diminishing: de­ cisional capability is accruing to the European Community where the democracy principle is developing only weakly." But if the gap is steadily widening between the European authorities' expanding scope and the inadequate legitimation of the proliferating European regulations, then decisively adhering to an exclusively nation-state oriented mode of legitimation does not necessarily mean opting for the lesser evil. The federalists at least accept the foreseeable—and perhaps avoidable—risk of the autonomization of supranational or­ ganizations as a challenge. The euroskeptics have, from the start, acquiesced in the supposedly irresistible erosion of democratic sub­ stance so that they do not have to leave what appears to be the reliable shelter of the nation-state. In fact, the shelter is becoming increasingly less comfortable. The debates on national economic competitiveness and the international division of labor in which we are engaged make us aware of quite another gap—a gap^ between the nation state^s_increasingly limited maneuverability and the imperatives of modes ofjpmdiicliQn interwoven worldwide . ( f e d e T n ^ profit from their respective economies only as long as there are "national economies" that can still be influenced by political means. With the denationalization of the economy, especially of the financial markets and of industrial production itself, and above all with the globalization and rapid expansion of labor markets, national governments today are increas­ ingly compelled to accept permanently high unemployment and the marginalization of a growing minority for the sake of international competitiveness. If the welfare state is to be preserved at least in its :

158 Chapter 6

essentials a n d if t h e c r e a t i o n of a s e p a r a t e u n d e r c l a s s is to b e a v o i d e d , t h e n i n s t i t u t i o n s c a p a b l e of a c t i n g s u p r a n a t i o n a l l y m u s t b e f o r m e d . O n l y r e g i o n a l l y c o m p r e h e n d r e g i m e s like t h e E u r o p e a n C o m m u n i t y c a n still affect t h e g l o b a l system a l o n g t h e lines of a c o o r d i n a t e d w o r l d d o m e s t i c policy. I n G r i m m ' s a c c o u n t , t h e E U a p p e a r s as a n i n s t i t u t i o n to b e put up with, a n d with w h o s e a b s t r a c t i o n s we m u s t live. T h e r e a s o n s we s h o u l d want it politically a r e n o t p r e s e n t e d . I s u b m i t t h a t t h e g r e a t e r d a n g e r is p o s e d by t h e a u t o n o m i z a t i o n of g l o b a l i z e d n e t w o r k s a n d m a r k e t s w h i c h s i m u l t a n e o u s l y c o n t r i b u t e to<^he f r a g m e n t a t i o n of public^ c o n s c i o u s n e s s ^ If t h e s e systemic p r e s s u r e s a r e n o t m e t by politically c a p a b l e institutions, t h e r e will b e a r e s u r g e n c e of t h e c r i p p l i n g fatalism of t h e O l d E m p i r e s in t h e m i d s t of h i g h l y m o b i l e m o d e r n e c o n o m i e s . T h e decisive e l e m e n t s of this f u t u r e s c e n a r i o w o u l d b e t h e p o s t i n d u s t r i a l m i s e r y of t h e " s u r p l u s " p o p u l a t i o n p r o ­ d u c e d by t h e s u r p l u s society—the T h i r d W o r l d w i t h i n t h e First— a n d a n a c c o m p a n y i n g m o r a l e r o s i o n of political c o m m u n i t y . This f u t u r e - p r e s e n t w o u l d in r e t r o s p e c t see itself as t h e f u t u r e of a p a s t i l l u s i o n — t h e d e m o c r a t i c illusion a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h societies c o u l d still d e t e r m i n e t h e i r o w n destinies t h r o u g h political will a n d consciousness. (2) I h a v e n o t yet said a n y t h i n g a b o u t t h e ancillary p r o b l e m of s u p r a n a t i o n a l b o d i e s ' b e c o m i n g increasingly i n d e p e n d e n t , a p r o b ­ l e m t h a t G r i m m rightly e m p h a s i z e s . N a t u r a l l y any a s s e s s m e n t of t h e c h a n c e s for a E u r o p e a n - w i d e d e m o c r a c y d e p e n d s in t h e first p l a c e u p o n empirically g r o u n d e d a r g u m e n t s . B u t we first h a v e _ t o j d e t e r m i n e t h e f u n c t i o n a l requJTjgments; a n d for t h a t , t h e n o r m a t i v e p e r ­ spective in w h i c h t h e s e r e q u i r e m e n t s a r e justified is crucial. G r i m m rejects a E u r o p e a n c o n s t i t u t i o n " b e c a u s e t h e r e is as yet n o E u r o p e a n p e o p l e . " T h i s w o u l d s e e m at first sight to b e f o u n d e d u p o n t h e s a m e p r e m i s e t h a t i n f o r m e d t h e t e n o r of t h e G e r m a n C o n s t i t u t i o n a l C o u r t ' s M a a s t r i c h t j u d g m e n t — n a m e l y , t h e view t h a t t h e state's d e m o c r a t i c l e g i t i m a t i o n r e q u i r e s a c e r t a i n h o m o g e n e i t y of t h e citizenry. However, G r i m m i m m e d i a t e l y d i s t a n c e s h i m s e l f f r o m Carl S c h m i t t ' s c o n c e p t i o n of volkisch o r e t h n i c - c u l t u r a l h o m o ­ geneity: " T h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s for d e m o c r a c y a r e d e v e l o p e d h e r e n o t of t h e p e o p l e , b u t f r o m t h e society t h a t w a n t s to c o n s t i t u t e itself as

159 Does Europe Need a Constitution? x

a political u n i t . B u t this p r e s u m e s a collective identity, if it w a n t s to settle its conflicts w i t h o u t v i o l e n c e , a c c e p t majority r u l e , a n d p r a c t i c e solidarity." T h i s c o n c e p t i o n leaves o p e n t h e q u e s t i o n of h o w t h e called-for collective i d e n t i t y is to b e u n d e r s t o o d . I see t h e n u b of r e p u b l i c a n i s m in t h e fact t h a t t h e f o r m s a n ^ ^ c j ^ e j d m ^ s j o f t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state, t o g e t h e r with t h e d e m o c r a t i c m o d e of legitima­ t i o n , s i m u l t e n e o u i l y T o r g e a n e w level of social i n t e g r a t i o n . D e m o ­ cratic c i t i z e n s h i p establishes a n abstract, legally m e d i a t e d solidarity b e t w e e n s t r a n g e r s . T h i s f o r m of social i n t e g r a t i o n , w h i c h first e m e r g e s with t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e , is realized in t h e f o r m of a politically socializing communicative context. I n d e e d it d e p e n d s u p o n t h e satisfac­ t i o n of c e r t a i n i m p o r t a n t f u n c t i o n a l r e q u i r e m e n t s t h a t c a n n o t b e fulfilled simply by a d m i n i s t r a t i v e m e a n s . To t h e s e r e q u i r e m e n t s b e ­ l o n g c o n d i t i o n s in w h i c h a n etfakiaty of citizens c a n also d e v e l o p a n d b e r e p r o d u c e d c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y — b u t n o t a collective i d e n t i t y t h a t is independent of the democratic process itself a n d , as s u c h , exists p r i o r to t h a t p r o c e s s . W h a t u n i t e s a n a t i o n of citizens, as o p p o s e d to a Volksnation, is n o t s o m e p r i m o r d i a l s u b s t r a t e b u t r a t h e r a n intersubjectively s h a r e d c o n t e x t of possible m u t u a l understanding. It is t h e r e f o r e crucial in this c o n t e x t w h e t h e r o n e uses t h e t e r m " p e o p l e " in t h e juristically n e u t r a l sense of "state-constituting p e o ­ p l e , " o r w h e t h e r o n e associates t h e t e r m with n o t i o n s of i d e n t i t y of s o m e o t h e r k i n d . I n G r i m m ' s view t h e i d e n t i t y of a n a t i o n of citizens " n e e d n o t " b e " r o o t e d in e t h n i c o r i g i n , b u t m a y also h a v e o t h e r bases." I t h i n k o n t h e c o n t r a r y t h a t it must h a v e a n o t h e r basis if t h e d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e s s is finally to g u a r a n t e e t h e social i n t e g r a t i o n of a d i f f e r e n t i a t e d — a n d t o d a y increasingly differentiating—society. T h i s b u r d e n m u s t n o t b e shifted f r o m t h e levels of political will-formation to p r e s u m e d p r e p o l i t i c a l substrates, for t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state u n ­ d e r t a k e s t o foster social i n t e g r a t i o n if n e c e s s a r y in t h e legally ab­ stract f o r m of political p a r t i c i p a t i o n a n d t o s e c u r e t h e substantive status of c i t i z e n s h i p in d e m o c r a t i c ways. T h e e x a m p l e s of culturally a n d ideologically pluralistic societies only serve to e m p h a s i z e this n o r m a t i v e p o i n t . T h e m u l t i c u l t u r a l s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e n a t i o n s of citizens f o r m e d in classical c o u n t r i e s of i m m i g r a t i o n like t h e U S is m o r e instructive in this r e s p e c t t h a n t h a t d e r i v e d f r o m t h e

160 Chapter 6

culturally assimilationist F r e n c h m o d e l . If i n t h e s a m e d e m o c r a t i c political c o m m u n i t y various c u l t u r a l , religious, a n d e t h n i c f o r m s of life a r e to exist a m o n g a n d with e a c h o t h e r o n e q u a l t e r m s , t h e n t h e ^majority c u l t u r e ) m u s t b e c o m e s u f f ^ i e n d y d e t a d i g j f r o m its tradi­ tional, historically explicable fusion with the^olitical cultur^shared by all citizens. ^ " To b e s u r e , a politically c o n s t i t u t e d c o n t e x t of solidarity b e t w e e n citizens w h o , d e s p i t e r e m a i n i n g s t r a n g e r s to o n e a n o t h e r , a r e sup­ p o s e d to s t a n d u p for e a c h o t h e r is a c o m m u n i c a t i v e c o n t e x t involv­ ing demanding preconditions. O n this p o i n t t h e r e is n o d i s a g r e e m e n t . T h e c o r e is f o r m e d by a political p u b l i c s p h e r e w h i c h e n a b l e s citiz e n s t o take p o s i t i o n s at t h e ^ a m e t i m e ^ o n t h e ^ a m e topicsSof t h e <^same relevance^JTrnrp^blic s p h ^ e m u ^ t r i o t b e Reformed t n r o u g h e i t h e r e x t e r n a l 3r i n t e r n a l c o e r c i o n . It m u s t b e e m b e d d e d in t h e c o n t e x t of a f r e e d o m - v a l u i n g political c u l t u r e a n d b e s u p p o r t e d by a liberal associational s t r u c t u r e of a civil society. Socially r e l e v a n t e x p e r i e n c e f r o m still-intact private s p h e r e s m u s t flow i n t o s u c h a civil society so t h a t they m a y b e p r o c e s s e d t h e r e for p u b l i c t r e a t m e n t . Political p a r t i e s t h a t h a v e n o t b e c o m e i n t e g r a t e d i n t o t h e state a p ­ p a r a t u s m u s t r e m a i n r o o t e d in this c o m p l e x so t h a t t h e y c a n m e d i a t e b e t w e e n t h e s p h e r e s of i n f o r m a l p u b l i c c o m m u n i c a t i o n , o n t h e pne h a n d , a n d t h e institutionalized d e l i b e r a t i o n a n d d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g processes, o n t h e o t h e r . Accordingly, f r o m a n o r m a t i v e perspective t h e r e c a n .be_ n o E u r o p e a n f e d e r a l state w o r t h y of t h e title of a Euror^^ , integrated public sphgrejdte c o m m o n ^ p ^ t i c ^ c u l t u r e : a civil society e n c o m p a s s i n g i n t e r e s t associations, n o n g o v e r n m e n t a l or­ g a n i z a t i o n s , citizens' m o v e m e n t s , etc., a n d n a t u r a l l y a p a r t y system a p p r o p r i a t e t o a E u r o p e a n a r e n a . I n s h o r t , this entails[public c o m I n u n i c a t i o r i ] t h a t t r a n s c e n d s t h e b o u n d a r i e s of t h e t h u s far l i m i t e d national public spheres. Certainly, t h e a m b i t i o u s f u n c t i o n a l r e q u i r e m e n t of d e m o c r a t i c will-formation c a n scarcely b e sufficiently fulfilled within t h e p r e s e n t nation-state framework; this is all t h e m o r e t r u e for E u r o p e . Wha,t c o n c e r n s m e , however, is t h e perspective f r o m w h i c h t h e s e func­ t i o n a l p r e r e q u i s i t e s a r e n o r m a t i v e l y justified; for this n o r m a t i v e s t a n d p o i n t i n a c e r t a i n sense p r e j u d i c e s t h e empirical^ey^uajdon^of

161 Does Europe Need a Constitution?

t h e p r e s e n t difficulties. T h e s e m u s t , for t h e t i m e b e i n g , s e e m insu­ p e r a b l e if a p r e p o l i t i c a l collective i d e n t i t y is r e g a r d e d as necessary, as i n d e p e n d e n t c u l t u r a l s u b s t r a t e w h i c h is merely articulated in t h e fulfillment of t h e said f u n c t i o n a l r e q u i r e m e n t s . B u t a c o m m u n i c a t i v e u n d e r s t a n d i n g of d e m o c r a c y , o n e t h a t G r i m m also s e e m s t o favor, c a n n o l o n g e r rest u p o n s u c h a c o n c r e t i s t u n d e r s t a n d i n g of " t h e p e o p l e . " T h i s n o t i o n falsely p r o j e c t s h o m o g e n e i t y w h e r e in fact t h e r e is o n l y h e t e r o g e n e i t y . T h e ethical-political s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of citizens i n a d e m o c r a t i c c o m m u n i t y m u s t n o t b e t a k e n as a historical-cultural a p r i o r i t h a t m a k e s d e m o c r a t i c will-formation possible, b u t r a t h e r as t h e fluidc o n t e n t of a c i r c u l a t o r y p r o c e s s t h a t is g e n e r a t e d t h r o u g h d i e Jheggl i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n of citizens' c o m m u n i c a t i o n ^ T h i s is precisely h o w n a t i o n a l i d e n t i t i e s w e r e f o r m e d i n m o d e r n E u r o p e . T h e r e f o r e it is

to b e ej^£cj ej[^^ :

foaLwoj^dj^created

Gy a E u r o p e a n c o n s t i t u t i o n w o u l d have a catalytic effect. E u r o p e h a s b e e n i n t e g r a t i n g economically, socially, a n d administratively for s o m e t i m e a n d i n a d d i t i o n c a n b a s e itself o n a c o m m o n c u l t u r a l b a c k g r o u n d a n d t h e s h a r e d historical e x p e r i e n c e of h a v i n g h a p p i l y o v e r c o m e n a t i o n a l i s m . Given t h e political will, t h e r e is n o a p r i o r i r e a s o n it c a n n o t c r e a t e t h e pohtically n e c e s s a r y c o m m u n i c a t i v e c o n J e x t o n c e t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l basis for s u c h a c o n t e x t h a s b e e n laid d o w n . Even t h e r e q u i r e m e n t of a c o m m o n language-^-English as a s e c o n d first language-j—ought n o t b e a n i n s u r m o u n t a b l e obstacle given t h e existing level of f o r m a l s c h o o l i n g . E u r o p e a n i d e n t i t y can^ in a n y case m e a n n o t h i n g o t h e r t nation^divej^ity. A n d p e r h a p s G e r m a n federalism, as it d e v e l o p e d after Prussia was s h a t t e r e d a n d t h e confessional division o v e r c o m e , m i g h t n o t b e t h e worst m o d e l .

IV Human Rights: Global and Internal

7

Kant's Idea of Perpetual Peace: At Two Hundred Years Historical Remove 9

F o r Kant, t h e " p e r p e t u a l p e a c e " i n v o k e d by t h e A b b e St. P i e r r e is a n ideal t h a t s h o u l d l e n d t h e i d e a of a c o s m o p o l i t a n o r d e r attractive­ ness a n d intuitive force. W i t h this K a n t i n t r o d u c e s a t h i r d d i m e n s i o n i n t o his legal t h e o r y : c o s m o p o l i t a n law (das Recht der Weltburger), a n i n n o v a t i o n with far-reaching i m p l i c a t i o n s , takes its p l a c e a l o n g s i d e state law a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. T h e r e p u b l i c a n o r d e r of a d e m o ­ cratic state f o u n d e d o n h u m a n r i g h t s calls for s o m e t h i n g m o r e t h a n t h e w e a k r e g u l a t i o n of b e l l i g e r e n t i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s by i n t e r n a ­ t i o n a l law. Rather, t h e legal p r i n c i p l e s i m p l e m e n t e d w i t h i n single states s h o u l d l e a d u l t i m a t e l y to a g l o b a l legal o r d e r t h a t u n i t e s all p e o p l e s a n d a b o l i s h e s war: "All f o r m s of t h e state a r e b a s e d o n t h e i d e a of a c o n s t i t u t i o n w h i c h is c o m p a t i b l e with t h e n a t u r a l r i g h t s of m a n , so t h a t t h o s e w h o o b e y t h e law s h o u l d also act as a u n i f i e d b o d y of legislators. A n d if we a c c o r d i n g l y t h i n k of t h e c o m m o n w e a l t h i n t e r m s of c o n c e p t s of p u r e r e a s o n , it m a y b e called a P l a t o n i c ideal (respublica noumenon), w h i c h is n o t a n e m p t y f i g m e n t of t h e i m a g i n a ­ t i o n , b u t t h e e t e r n a l n o r m of all civil c o n s t i t u t i o n s whatsoever, a n d a m e a n s of e n d i n g all w a r s . " T h e c o n c l u s i o n — " e n d i n g all wars"—is s u r p r i s i n g . It p o i n t s to t h e fact t h a t t h e n o r m s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law t h a t r e g u l a t e w a r a n d p e a c e a r e only provisionally valid, t h a t is, they a r e valid only u n t i l t h e p r o c e s s of legal pacification for w h i c h K a n t p r e p a r e s t h e g r o u n d with his w o r k " P e r p e t u a l P e a c e " h a s b r o u g h t a b o u t a c o s m o p o l i t a n o r d e r a n d t h e r e b y a b o l i s h e d war. 1

166 Chapter 7

O f c o u r s e , K a n t d e v e l o p e d this i d e a w i t h i n t h e c o n c e p t u a l frame­ w o r k of social c o n t r a c t t h e o r y (Vernunftrecht) a n d against t h e back­ g r o u n d of t h e specific historical e x p e r i e n c e s of his t i m e . B o t h n o w s e p a r a t e u s f r o m K a n t . W i t h t h e u n d e s e r v e d h i n d s i g h t of later g e n ­ e r a t i o n s , we c a n n o w see t h a t his p r o p o s a l s a r e b e s e t with c o n c e p t u a l difficulties a n d t h a t t h e y a r e n o l o n g e r c o n s o n a n t with o u r historical e x p e r i e n c e s . H e n c e in t h e following I will first sketch t h e p r e m i s e s t h a t f o r m K a n t ' s s t a r t i n g p o i n t . T h e y affect all t h r e e steps of his a r g u m e n t : t h e d e f i n i t i o n of t h e goal, p e r p e t u a l p e a c e ; t h e d e s c r i p ­ t i o n of t h e a c t u a l project, t h e a p p r o p r i a t e legal f o r m of a f e d e r a t i o n of n a t i o n s ; a n d , finally, t h e s o l u t i o n in t h e p h i l o s o p h y of h i s t o r y to t h e p r o b l e m p o s e d by this project, t h e g r a d u a l realization of t h e i d e a of a c o s m o p o l i t a n o r d e r ( I ) . Following this, I will e x a m i n e h o w K a n t ' s i d e a s t a n d s u p in light of t h e historical e x p e r i e n c e of t h e last two h u n d r e d years (II) a n d h o w it m u s t b e r e f o r m u l a t e d in light of t h e c o n t e m p o r a r y g l o b a l situation (III). T h e p r e s e n t a l t e r n a t i v e to r e g r e s s i o n to t h e state of n a t u r e w h i c h h a s b e e n p r o p o s e d by legal scholars, political scientists, a n d p h i l o s o p h e r s , n a m e l y t h e i d e a of a cosmopolitan democracy, has provoked strong objections. But these o b j e c t i o n s to t h e universalism of c o s m o p o l i t a n law a n d a politics .of h u m a n r i g h t s lose t h e i r force o n c e we a p p r o p r i a t e l y differentiate b e t w e e n law a n d m o r a l i t y in t h e c o n c e p t of h u m a n r i g h t s (IV). T h i s d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n also p r o v i d e s t h e key to a m e t a c r i t i c i s m of Carl S c h m i t t ' s influential a r g u m e n t s a g a i n s t t h e h u m a n i s t i c f o u n d a t i o n of legal pacifism (V). 2

I K a n t defines t h e goal of t h e sought-for "lawful c o n d i t i o n " a m o n g p e o p l e s negatively, as t h e a b o l i t i o n of war: " t h e r e is to b e n o war;" t h e " h e i n o u s w a g i n g of w a r " m u s t c o m e to a n e n d . K a n t justifies t h e desirability of s u c h a p e a c e in r e f e r e n c e to t h e evils of t h e k i n d of w a r f a r e b e i n g w a g e d by t h e p r i n c e s of E u r o p e at t h a t t i m e with t h e aid of t h e i r m e r c e n a r y a r m i e s . K a n t d o e s n o t a c c o r d p r i m a r y i m p o r ­ t a n c e a m o n g t h e s e evils to t h e victims of war, b u t i n s t e a d to t h e "hor­ r o r s of v i o l e n c e " a n d t h e "devastation," a n d a b o v e all, to t h e p l u n ­ d e r i n g a n d i m p o v e r i s h m e n t of t h e c o u n t r y r e s u l t i n g f r o m t h e 3

167 Kant's Idea of Perpetual Peace

c o n s i d e r a b l e b u r d e n s of d e b t t h a t arise f r o m war, a n d h e m e n t i o n s as possible c o n s e q u e n c e s of war s u b j u g a t i o n , t h e loss of liberty, a n d foreign d o m i n a t i o n . I n a d d i t i o n , t h e r e is t h e c o r r u p t i o n of m o r a l s t h a t o c c u r s w h e n subjects a r e i n s t i g a t e d by t h e g o v e r n m e n t to c o m ­ m i t s u c h c r i m i n a l acts as spying a n d s p r e a d i n g false i n f o r m a t i o n o r to c o m m i t acts of t r e a c h e r y , for e x a m p l e , as s n i p e r s o r assassins. H e r e we e n c o u n t e r t h e p a n o r a m a of l i m i t e d war, w h i c h b e c a m e i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d as a l e g i t i m a t e m e a n s of solving conflicts via inter­ n a t i o n a l law in t h e system of t h e b a l a n c e of p o w e r s after t h e P e a c e of W e s t p h a l i a of 1648. T h e o u t c o m e of s u c h wars defines t h e state of p e a c e . A n d j u s t as a specific p e a c e treaty e n d s t h e evil of a p a r t i c u l a r war, so t h e p e a c e alliance is n o w s u p p o s e d to " p u t a n e n d to w a r forever" a n d abolish t h e evils of war as s u c h . T h i s is w h a t is m e a n t by " p e r p e t u a l p e a c e . " B u t t h e p e a c e in q u e s t i o n is as l i m i t e d as t h e w a r f r o m w h i c h it arises. K a n t h a d in m i n d local wars b e t w e e n i n d i v i d u a l states o r alliances; h e h a d n o i n k l i n g of w o r l d wars. H e was t h i n k i n g of wars b e t w e e n r e g i m e s a n d states, n o t yet of a n y t h i n g like e t h n i c a n d civil wars; of technically l i m i t e d wars t h a t still allowed for a d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n c o m b a t a n t s a n d t h e civilian p o p u l a t i o n , n o t yet of a n y t h i n g like g u e r r i l l a w a r f a r e a n d t e r r o r b o m b i n g ; of wars with politically d e f i n e d aims, n o t yet of ideologically m o t i v a t e d wars of a n n i h i l a t i o n a n d e x p u l s i o n . Given t h e p r e m i s e of local wars a n d l i m i t e d w a r f a r e , t h e n o r m a t i v e s c o p e of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law e x t e n d s only to r u l e s for t h e c o n d u c t of w a r a n d for t h e r e g u l a t i o n of p e a c e . T h e r i g h t "to g o to war," t h e so-called ius ad helium, w h i c h h a s p r i o r i t y over r i g h t "in w a r " a n d "after war," is, strictly s p e a k i n g , n o r i g h t at all, for it m e r e l y e x p r e s s e s t h e a r b i t r a r y f r e e d o m t h a t is a c c o r d e d t h e subjects of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law in t h e state of n a t u r e , t h a t is, in t h e lawless c o n d i ­ t i o n of t h e i r e x t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s . T h e only n o r m s of c r i m i n a l law t h a t c a n i n t e r v e n e in this lawless c o n d i t i o n r e l a t e to t h e c o n d u c t of war itself, a n d even t h e n t h e y a r e only e n f o r c e d by t h e c o u r t s of t h e states w a g i n g war. W a r c r i m e s a r e c r i m e s c o m m i t t e d in war. O n l y since wars h a v e b e c o m e u n l i m i t e d , a n d t h e c o n c e p t of p e a c e h a s u n d e r g o n e a c o r r e s p o n d i n g e x t e n s i o n , d o e s t h e i d e a arise t h a t war itself—in t h e f o r m of a w a r of a g g r e s s i o n — i s a c r i m e t h a t d e s e r v e s to b e o u t l a w e d a n d p u n i s h e d . B u t K a n t c o u l d n o t yet conceive of s u c h a c r i m e o/war. 4

5

168 Chapter 7

W h i l e p e r p e t u a l p e a c e is a n i m p o r t a n t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c f e a t u r e of a c o s m o p o l i t a n o r d e r , it is still only a s y m p t o m of t h e latter. K a n t m u s t still solve t h e problem of h o w s u c h a c o n d i t i o n s h o u l d b e c o n c e p t u a l ­ ized f r o m t h e p o i n t of view of law. H e m u s t specify w h a t differenti­ ates c o s m o p o l i t a n law f r o m classical i n t e r n a t i o n a l law—in o t h e r w o r d s , w h a t is specific to ius cosmopoliticum. W h e r e a s i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, like all law in t h e state of n a t u r e , is only provisionally valid, c o s m o p o l i t a n law w o u l d r e s e m b l e states a n c t i o n e d civil law in definitively b r i n g i n g t h e state of n a t u r e to a n e n d . T h e r e f o r e , w h e n d e s c r i b i n g t h e t r a n s i t i o n to t h e c o s m o p o l i t a n o r d e r , K a n t r e p e a t e d l y draws o n t h e a n a l o g y with t h e o r i g i n a l social c o n t r a c t , t h a t is, with t h a t exit f r o m t h e state of n a t u r e w h i c h estab­ lishes a p a r t i c u l a r state a n d m a k e s it possible for citizens to live in legally s e c u r e d f r e e d o m . J u s t as t h e social c o n t r a c t b r o u g h t t h e state of n a t u r e b e t w e e n self-reliant individuals t o a n e n d , so t o o t h e state of n a t u r e b e t w e e n b e l l i g e r e n t states s h o u l d c o m e to a n e n d . I n a n essay p u b l i s h e d two years p r i o r to " P e r p e t u a l P e a c e , " K a n t draws strict parallels b e t w e e n t h e s e two processes. H e r e , t o o , h e m e n t i o n s t h e d e s t r u c t i o n of welfare a n d t h e loss of f r e e d o m as t h e g r e a t e s t evils a n d t h e n c o n t i n u e s : "And t h e r e is n o possible way of c o u n t e r ­ a c t i n g this e x c e p t t h r o u g h t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n of a legal o r d e r a m o n g p e o p l e s [Volkerrecht], b a s e d u p o n e n f o r c e a b l e p u b l i c laws to w h i c h e a c h state m u s t s u b m i t (by a n a l o g y with t h e civil o r political legal o r d e r a m o n g i n d i v i d u a l h u m a n b e i n g s ) . F o r a p e r m a n e n t universal p e a c e by m e a n s of a so-called E u r o p e a n b a l a n c e of p o w e r is a p u r e i l l u s i o n . " K a n t speaks h e r e of a "universal state [Volkerstaat] to w h o s e p o w e r all t h e individual states w o u l d voluntarily s u b m i t . " B u t j u s t two years later K a n t carefully d i s t i n g u i s h e s b e t w e e n "a f e d e r a t i o n of n a t i o n s " (Volkerbund) a n d "a state of all p e o p l e s " (Volkerstaat). 6

T h e o r d e r h e n c e f o r t h d e s c r i b e d as " c o s m o p o l i t a n " is s u p p o s e d to differ f r o m a n i n t e r n a l legal o r d e r by v i r t u e of t h e fact t h a t states, u n l i k e i n d i v i d u a l citizens, d o n o t s u b m i t themselves to t h e p u b l i c coercive laws of a s u p e r o r d i n a t e p o w e r b u t r e t a i n t h e i r i n d e ­ p e n d e n c e . T h e envisaged f e d e r a t i o n of free states w h i c h r e n o u n c e war o n c e a n d for all in t h e i r e x t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s is s u p p o s e d to leave i n t a c t t h e sovereignty of its m e m b e r s . T h e p e r m a n e n t l y associated states p r e s e r v e t h e i r s u p r e m e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y a n d a r e n o t

169 Kant's Idea of Perpetual Peace

s u b s u m e d i n t o a w o r l d r e p u b l i c t h a t w o u l d b e e n d o w e d with all of the d i s t i n g u i s h i n g f e a t u r e s of a state. I n p l a c e of t h e "positive i d e a of a w o r l d r e p u b l i c " is p u t t h e "negative substitute of a . . . f e d e r a t i o n likely to p r e v e n t war." T h i s f e d e r a t i o n is s u p p o s e d t o p r o c e e d f r o m sovereign a g r e e m e n t s u n d e r i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, w h i c h a r e n o w n o l o n g e r u n d e r s t o o d o n t h e m o d e l of t h e social c o n t r a c t . F o r t h e s e treaties d o n o t establish any a c t i o n a b l e legal r i g h t s of t h e p a r t i e s against o n e a n o t h e r b u t o n l y u n i t e t h e m i n t o a p e r m a n e n t alliance, a n " e n d u r i n g a n d v o l u n t a r y association." T h u s this act of association i n t o a f e d e r a t i o n of n a t i o n s g o e s b e y o n d t h e weak b i n d i n g p o w e r of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law only in r e s p e c t of its " p e r m a n e n c e . " K a n t c o m p a r e s t h e f e d e r a t i o n of n a t i o n s to a " p e r m a n e n t c o n g r e s s of states." 7

8

T h e c o n t r a d i c t o r y c h a r a c t e r of this c o n s t r u c t i o n is readily a p p a r ­ ent. F o r in a n o t h e r passage K a n t asserts t h a t "By a congress is h e r e u n d e r s t o o d only a v o l u n t a r y coalition of different states w h i c h c a n b e dissolved at a n y t i m e , n o t a u n i o n (like t h a t of t h e A m e r i c a n states) w h i c h is b a s e d o n a c o n s t i t u t i o n . . . ." J u s t h o w t h e p e r m a n e n c e of this u n i o n , o n w h i c h a "civilized" r e s o l u t i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l conflict d e p e n d s , c a n b e g u a r a n t e e d w i t h o u t t h e legally b i n d i n g c h a r a c t e r of a n i n s t i t u t i o n a n a l o g o u s to a state c o n s t i t u t i o n K a n t n e v e r e x p l a i n s . O n t h e o n e h a n d , h e w a n t s to p r e s e r v e t h e sovereignty of its m e m ­ b e r s by m e a n s of t h e proviso t h a t they m a y dissolve t h e i r c o m p a c t ; this is w h a t suggests t h e c o m p a r i s o n with c o n g r e s s e s a n d v o l u n t a r y associations. O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e f e d e r a t i o n t h a t f o u n d s a p e r ­ m a n e n t p e a c e is s u p p o s e d to differ f r o m m e r e l y t r a n s i t o r y alliances in t h a t its m e m b e r s feel obligated to s u b o r d i n a t e t h e i r own raison d'etat to t h e j o i n t l y d e c l a r e d g o a l of " n o t resolving t h e i r d i s p u t e s by war, b u t by a p r o c e s s a n a l o g o u s to a c o u r t of law." W i t h o u t this e l e m e n t of o b l i g a t i o n , t h e p e a c e f u l c o n g r e s s of n a t i o n s c a n n o t b e c o m e "per­ m a n e n t , " n o r c a n its v o l u n t a r y association b e c o m e " e n d u r i n g ; " in­ stead, it r e m a i n s h o s t a g e to a n u n s t a b l e c o n s t e l l a t i o n of interests a n d will inevitably fall a p a r t , m u c h as t h e L e a g u e of N a t i o n s w o u l d years later. K a n t c a n n o t h a v e legal o b l i g a t i o n in m i n d h e r e , since h e d o e s n o t conceive of t h e f e d e r a t i o n of n a t i o n s as a n o r g a n i z a t i o n with c o m m o n i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t c o u l d a c q u i r e t h e characteristics of a state a n d t h e r e b y o b t a i n coercive authority. H e n c e h e m u s t rely exclu­ sively o n e a c h g o v e r n m e n t ' s o w n moral self-obligation. B u t s u c h t r u s t 9

170 Chapter 7

is scarcely r e c o n c i l a b l e with K a n t ' s o w n soberly realistic d e s c r i p t i o n s of t h e politics of his t i m e . K a n t is very m u c h aware of this p r o b l e m b u t n e v e r t h e l e s s glosses over it with a m e r e a p p e a l t o r e a s o n : "If (a) state says: T h e r e shall b e n o w a r b e t w e e n myself a n d o t h e r states, a l t h o u g h I d o n o t r e c o g ­ nize a n y s u p r e m e legislative p o w e r w h i c h c o u l d s e c u r e m y r i g h t s a n d w h o s e r i g h t s I s h o u l d in t u r n s e c u r e , ' it is i m p o s s i b l e to u n d e r s t a n d w h a t justification I c a n h a v e for p l a c i n g a n y c o n f i d e n c e in m y rights, u n l e s s I c a n rely o n s o m e substitute for t h e u n i o n of civil society i.e. o n a free f e d e r a t i o n . If t h e c o n c e p t of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r i g h t is to have a n y m e a n i n g at all, r e a s o n m u s t necessarily c o u p l e it with a federa­ t i o n of this k i n d . " However, this affirmation leaves o p e n t h e deci­ sive q u e s t i o n , namely, h o w t h e p e r m a n e n t self-obligation of states t h a t r e t a i n t h e i r sovereignty c a n b e e n s u r e d . N o t e t h a t this d o e s n o t yet c o n c e r n t h e e m p i r i c a l issue of h o w t h e i d e a c a n b e a p p r o x i ­ m a t e d , b u t r a t h e r h o w t h e i d e a itself is to b e c o n c e p t u a l i z e d . If t h e u n i o n of p e o p l e s is to b e a legal, r a t h e r t h a n a m o r a l , a r r a n g e m e n t , t h e n it m a y n o t lack a n y of t h o s e characteristics of a " g o o d political c o n s t i t u t i o n " t h a t K a n t e n u m e r a t e s a c o u p l e of p a g e s l a t e r — q u a l i t i e s of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n of a state t h a t d o e s n o t n e e d to rely o n "the g o p d m o r a l e d u c a t i o n " of its m e m b e r s , b u t ideally h a s t h e s t r e n g t h to foster s u c h a n e d u c a t i o n in t u r n . 10

Viewed historically, K a n t ' s r e t i c e n c e c o n c e r n i n g t h e p r o j e c t of a constitutionally organized c o m m u n i t y of n a t i o n s was certainly realistic. T h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state w h i c h h a d only r e c e n t l y e m e r g e d f r o m t h e A m e r i c a n a n d F r e n c h r e v o l u t i o n s was still t h e e x c e p t i o n r a t h e r t h a n t h e r u l e . T h e b a l a n c e of p o w e r s o p e r a t e d o n t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t only sovereign states c o u l d b e subjects of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. U n d e r t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s , e x t e r n a l sovereignty d e s i g n a t e s t h e capacity of a state to m a i n t a i n its i n d e p e n d e n c e a n d h e n c e t h e integrity of its b o r d e r s in t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l a r e n a , if n e c e s s a r y by m i l i t a r y force. I n t e r n a l sovereignty refers to its capacity, b a s e d o n t h e m o n o p o l y of t h e m e a n s of v i o l e n c e , to m a i n t a i n law a n d o r d e r in its o w n t e r r i t o r y by m e a n s of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p o w e r a n d positive law. R e a s o n of state is d e f i n e d in a c c o r d a n c e with t h e p r i n c i p l e s of a p o w e r politics, w h i c h i n c l u d e e n g a g e m e n t in p r u d e n t , l i m i t e d wars, w h e r e d o m e s t i c policy is s u b o r d i n a t e d to f o r e i g n policy. T h e clear s e p a r a t i o n b e -

171 Kant's Idea of Perpetual Peace

t w e e n f o r e i g n a n d d o m e s t i c policy rests o n a n a r r o w a n d politically sharply d e f i n e d c o n c e p t of p o w e r w h i c h is m e a s u r e d in t h e final analysis by t h e c o n t r o l over t h e r e s e r v e force of t h e m i l i t a r y a n d t h e police. As l o n g as this classical-modern w o r l d of nation-states defines t h e h o r i z o n of t h o u g h t , a n y c o n c e p t i o n of a c o s m o p o l i t a n c o n s t i t u t i o n t h a t d o e s n o t r e s p e c t t h e sovereignty of m e m b e r states necessarily s e e m s u n r e a l i s t i c . T h i s also e x p l a i n s why t h e possibility of a unifica­ t i o n of p e o p l e s u n d e r t h e h e g e m o n y of a p o w e r f u l state, w h i c h K a n t evokes with t h e i m a g e of a "universal m o n a r c h y , " d o e s n o t r e p r e ­ s e n t a viable alternative: o n t h e f o r e g o i n g p r e m i s e s , s u c h a r u l i n g p o w e r w o u l d inevitably b r i n g a b o u t "the m o s t fearful d e s p o t i s m . " B e c a u s e K a n t d o e s n o t t r a n s c e n d t h e h o r i z o n of his t i m e , it is of c o u r s e equally difficult for h i m to believe in any m o r a l m o t i v a t i o n for c r e a t i n g a n d m a i n t a i n i n g a f e d e r a t i o n b e t w e e n free states d e d i ­ c a t e d to p o w e r politics. K a n t s k e t c h e s as a s o l u t i o n to this p r o b l e m a p h i l o s o p h y of h i s t o r y with a c o s m o p o l i t a n p u r p o s e w h i c h is sup­ p o s e d to l e n d plausibility, t h r o u g h a h i d d e n " p u r p o s e of n a t u r e , " to t h e i m p r o b a b l e " a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n politics a n d morality." 11

12

II K a n t identifies t h r e e basic q u a s i - n a t u r a l t e n d e n c i e s t h a t c o m p l e m e n t r e a s o n a n d a r e s u p p o s e d to e x p l a i n why a f e d e r a t i o n of n a t i o n s c o u l d b e in t h e e n l i g h t e n e d self-interest of e a c h state: (1) t h e p e a c e ­ ful c h a r a c t e r of r e p u b l i c s , (2) t h e p o w e r of i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a d e to f o r g e a n association, a n d (3) t h e f u n c t i o n of t h e political p u b l i c s p h e r e . Reviewing t h e s e a r g u m e n t s in a historical light is instructive in two r e s p e c t s . O n t h e o n e h a n d t h e i r m a n i f e s t c o n t e n t h a s b e e n falsified by d e v e l o p m e n t s in t h e n i n e t e e n t h a n d t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r i e s . B u t o n t h e o t h e r h a n d t h e y d i r e c t o u r a t t e n t i o n to historical devel­ o p m e n t s t h a t e x h i b i t a dialectical t e n d e n c y . W h e r e a s t h e s e d e v e l o p ­ m e n t s reveal t h a t t h e p r e m i s e s o n w h i c h K a n t b a s e d his t h e o r y , s h a p e d as t h e y w e r e by c o n d i t i o n s as t h e y a p p e a r e d at t h e close of t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y , a r e n o l o n g e r valid, t h e y n e v e r t h e l e s s also s u p p o r t t h e claim t h a t a c o n c e p t i o n of c o s m o p o l i t a n law a p p r o p r i ­ ately r e f o r m u l a t e d for c o n t e m p o r a r y c o n d i t i o n s m i g h t well m e e t

172 Chapter 7

with a s u p p o r t i v e c o n s t e l l a t i o n of forces, d e p e n d i n g o n h o w we ourselves i n t e r p r e t t h e c h a n g e d c i r c u m s t a n c e s of t h e late t w e n t i e t h century. (1) K a n t ' s first a r g u m e n t claims t h a t i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s lose t h e i r b e l l i g e r e n t c h a r a c t e r t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e r e p u b l i c a n f o r m of g o v e r n m e n t prevails w i t h i n states, b e c a u s e it is in t h e i n t e r e s t of t h e p o p u l a t i o n s of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l states to c o m p e l t h e i r g o v e r n m e n t s to p u r s u e peaceful policies: "If . . . t h e c o n s e n t of t h e citizens is re­ q u i r e d to d e c i d e w h e t h e r o r n o t war is to b e d e c l a r e d , it is very n a t u r a l t h a t t h e y will have g r e a t h e s i t a t i o n in e m b a r k i n g o n so d a n g e r o u s a n e n t e r p r i s e . F o r this w o u l d m e a n calling d o w n o n t h e m s e l v e s all t h e m i s e r i e s of war. . . , " T h i s optimistic a s s u m p t i o n h a s b e e n r e f u t e d by t h e m o b i l i z i n g p o w e r of a n i d e a w h o s e ambiva­ l e n c e K a n t c o u l d n o t h a v e r e c o g n i z e d i n 1795, t h a t is, t h e i d e a of t h e n a t i o n . N a t i o n a l i s m was certainly a vehicle for t h e d e s i r e d trans­ f o r m a t i o n of s u b o r d i n a t e d subjects i n t o active citizens w h o identify with t h e i r state. However, it d i d n o t m a k e t h e n a t i o n a l state a n y m o r e peace-loving t h a n its p r e d e c e s s o r , t h e dynastic absolutist s t a t e . F o r f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of n a t i o n a l i s t m o v e m e n t s t h e classical selfassertion of t h e sovereign state takes o n t h e c o n n o t a t i o n s of n a t i o n a l i n d e p e n d e n c e . As a c o n s e q u e n c e t h e r e p u b l i c a n convictions of citi­ z e n s w e r e s u p p o s e d to p r o v e themselves in t h e i r willingness to fight a n d d i e for Volk a n d f a t h e r l a n d . K a n t justifiably r e g a r d e d t h e m e r c e ­ n a r y a r m i e s of his day as i n s t r u m e n t s for "the u s e of h u m a n b e i n g s as m e r e m a c h i n e s . . . in t h e h a n d s of s o m e o n e else" a n d called for t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of t h e citizen militia; b u t h e c o u l d n o t foresee t h a t t h e m a s s m o b i l i z a t i o n of r e c r u i t s i n f l a m e d by n a t i o n a l i s t passions w o u l d u s h e r in a n a g e of devastating, ideologically u n l i m i t e d wars of liberation. 13

14

At t h e s a m e t i m e , t h e i d e a t h a t a d e m o c r a t i c o r d e r t e n d s to foster n o n b e l l i g e r e n t c o n d u c t t o w a r d o t h e r states is n o t c o m p l e t e l y false. Historical a n d statistical r e s e a r c h shows t h a t , a l t h o u g h states with d e m o c r a t i c c o n s t i t u t i o n s d o n o t necessarily c o n d u c t fewer wars t h a n a u t h o r i t a r i a n r e g i m e s (of w h a t e v e r k i n d ) , t h e y a r e less likely to r e s o r t to force in t h e i r r e l a t i o n s with o n e a n o t h e r . T h i s finding c a n b e given a n i n t e r e s t i n g i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . To t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e u n i versalist v a l u e - o r i e n t a t i o n s of a p o p u l a t i o n a c c u s t o m e d to free insti15

173 Kant's Idea of Perpetual Peace

t u t i o n s also s h a p e f o r e i g n policy, a r e p u b l i c a n polity d o e s n o t b e h a v e m o r e p e a c e a b l y all told, b u t t h e wars it c o n d u c t s h a v e a different c h a r a c t e r . T h e f o r e i g n policy of t h e state c h a n g e s in t a n d e m with t h e m o t i v a t i o n of its citizenry. T h e d e p l o y m e n t of m i l i t a r y force is n o l o n g e r exclusively d e t e r m i n e d by a n essentially particularistic raison d'etat b u t also by t h e d e s i r e to foster t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l s p r e a d of n o n a u t h o r i t a r i a n states a n d g o v e r n m e n t s . B u t if value p r e f e r e n c e s t r a n s c e n d t h e p r e s e r v a t i o n of n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s to i n c l u d e t h e im­ p l e m e n t a t i o n of d e m o c r a c y a n d h u m a n rights, t h e n t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l b a l a n c e of p o w e r s o p e r a t e s u n d e r g o a change. (2) T h e s u b s e q u e n t h i s t o r y w h i c h we n o w l o o k b a c k o n h a s d e a l t in a similarly dialectical way with t h e s e c o n d a r g u m e n t . K a n t was m i s t a k e n a b o u t t h e i m m e d i a t e situation, b u t indirectly h e also t u r n s o u t to h a v e b e e n c o r r e c t . F o r K a n t d e t e c t e d in t h e g r o w i n g i n t e r d e ­ p e n d e n c e of societies g e n e r a t e d by t h e e x c h a n g e of i n f o r m a t i o n , p e r s o n s , a n d c o m m o d i t i e s , b u t especially by t h e e x p a n s i o n of t r a d e , a t e n d e n c y favorable to t h e p e a c e f u l u n i f i c a t i o n of p e o p l e s . T r a d e r e l a t i o n s e x p a n d e d in t h e early m o d e r n p e r i o d i n t o t h e d e n s e net­ w o r k of a w o r l d m a r k e t , w h i c h a c c o r d i n g to K a n t g r o u n d s a n i n t e r e s t in s e c u r i n g peaceful r e l a t i o n s t h r o u g h " m u t u a l self-interest": "For t h e spirit of commerce s o o n e r o r l a t e r takes h o l d of every p e o p l e , a n d it c a n n o t exist side by side with war. A n d of all t h e p o w e r s ( o r m e a n s ) a t t h e disposal of t h e p o w e r of t h e state, financial power c a n p r o b a b l y b e r e l i e d o n m o s t . T h u s states find t h e m s e l v e s c o m p e l l e d to p r o m o t e t h e n o b l e c a u s e of p e a c e . " However, K a n t h a d n o t yet l e a r n e d — a s H e g e l s o o n w o u l d f r o m his r e a d i n g of t h e E n g l i s h e c o n o m i s t s — t h a t capitalist d e v e l o p m e n t w o u l d l e a d to a conflict b e t w e e n social classes t h a t t h r e a t e n s in two ways t h e p e a c e a n d t h e p r e s u m p t i v e p e a c e f u l n e s s of politically liberal societies in particular. K a n t d i d n o t foresee t h a t t h e social t e n s i o n s t h a t initially intensify in t h e c o u r s e of a c c e l e r a t i n g capitalist i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n w o u l d b o t h e n c u m b e r d o ­ m e s t i c politics with class struggles a n d d i r e c t f o r e i g n policy i n t o t h e c h a n n e l s of v i o l e n t i m p e r i a l i s m . T h r o u g h o u t t h e n i n e t e e n t h a n d t h e first half of t h e t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r i e s , E u r o p e a n g o v e r n m e n t s r e p e a t ­ edly e x p l o i t e d t h e m o b i l i z i n g p o w e r of n a t i o n a l i s m t o deflect social conflicts o u t w a r d a n d to n e u t r a l i z e t h e m with f o r e i g n policy 1 6

1 7

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successes. It was only after t h e c a t a s t r o p h e s of t h e S e c o n d W o r l d W a r l e d to t h e d e p l e t i o n of t h e e n e r g i e s of i n t e g r a l n a t i o n a l i s m t h a t t h e class a n t a g o n i s m s w e r e successfully pacified by m e a n s of t h e welfare state. T h i s so a l t e r e d t h e i n t e r n a l situation of t h e i n d u s t r i a l i z e d n a t i o n s t h a t , at least in t h e O E C D s p h e r e , t h e g r o w i n g i n t e r d e p e n d e n c i e s b e t w e e n n a t i o n a l e c o n o m i e s l e d to t h e k i n d of " e c o n o m i z a t i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s " t h a t K a n t rightly h o p e d w o u l d h a v e a pacifying effect. Today, globally d i s p e r s e d m e d i a , n e t w o r k s , a n d systems in g e n e r a l necessitate increasingly d e n s e symbolic a n d social i n t e r r e l a t i o n s , w h i c h l e a d to t h e c o n s t a n t r e c i p r o c a l i n f l u e n c e of local a n d far d i s t a n t e v e n t s . T h e s e p r o c e s s e s of g l o b a l i z a t i o n h a v e r e n d e r e d c o m p l e x societies, with t h e i r d e l i c a t e t e c h n o l o g i c a l infra­ s t r u c t u r e s , ever m o r e v u l n e r a b l e . A l t h o u g h m i l i t a r y c o n f r o n t a t i o n s b e t w e e n t h e n u c l e a r s u p e r p o w e r s a r e b e c o m i n g increasingly u n ­ likely b e c a u s e of t h e h u g e risks involved, local conflicts with rela­ tively n u m e r o u s a n d h o r r i b l e casualties a r e b e c o m i n g ever m o r e f r e q u e n t . At t h e s a m e t i m e , globalization raises q u e s t i o n s a b o u t t h e f u n d a m e n t a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of classical i n t e r n a t i o n a l l a w — t h e sov­ e r e i g n t y of states a n d t h e s h a r p division b e t w e e n d o m e s t i c a n d for­ e i g n policy. -J • 19

20

N o n g o v e r n m e n t a l a c t o r s s u c h as m u l t i n a t i o n a l c o r p o r a t i o n s a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y influential private b a n k s u n d e r m i n e t h e f o r m a l sov­ e r e i g n t y of nation-states. T o d a y e a c h of t h e thirty largest c o r p o r a ­ t i o n s o p e r a t i n g o n a g l o b a l scale h a s a n a n n u a l t u r n o v e r g r e a t e r t h a n t h e gross d o m e s t i c p r o d u c t of n i n e t y c o u n t r i e s r e p r e s e n t e d in t h e U N . B u t even t h e g o v e r n m e n t s of t h e e c o n o m i c a l l y m o s t power­ ful c o u n t r i e s a r e k e e n l y a w a r e of t h e gulf t h a t is o p e n i n g u p b e t w e e n t h e limits of t h e r a n g e of a c t i o n of n a t i o n states a n d t h e i m p e r a t i v e s , n o t of w o r l d t r a d e , b u t of g l o b a l n e t w o r k s of p r o d u c t i v e r e l a t i o n s . Sovereign states c o u l d profit f r o m t h e i r e c o n o m i e s only as l o n g as t h e y f u n c t i o n e d as " n a t i o n a l e c o n o m i e s " over w h i c h t h e y c o u l d ex­ ercise i n f l u e n c e by political m e a n s . B u t with t h e d e n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of t h e e c o n o m y , in p a r t i c u l a r with t h e i n c r e a s i n g g l o b a l i n t e r c o n n e c ­ t i o n of financial m a r k e t s a n d i n d u s t r i a l p r o d u c t i o n itself, n a t i o n a l politics loses its c o n t r o l over t h e g e n e r a l c o n d i t i o n s of p r o d u c t i o n a n d with it any leverage for m a i n t a i n i n g its s t a n d a r d of living. 2 1

At t h e s a m e t i m e , t h e r e is a b l u r r i n g of t h e b o u n d a r i e s b e t w e e n d o m e s t i c a n d f o r e i g n policy t h a t a r e constitutive of state sovereignty.

175 K a n t ' s I d e a of P e r p e t u a l P e a c e

T h e classical i m a g e of p o w e r politics is b e i n g a l t e r e d n o t only by t h e a d d i t i o n a l n o r m a t i v e s t a n d p o i n t s of t h e politics of d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n a n d of h u m a n rights, b u t also by a p e c u l i a r diffusion of p o w e r itself. W i t h t h e g r o w i n g p r e s s u r e for c o o p e r a t i o n , m o r e o r less i n d i r e c t f o r m s of i n f l u e n c e a r e g a i n i n g i n c r e a s i n g i m p o r t a n c e — i n f l u e n c e o n t h e s t r u c t u r i n g of p e r c e i v e d situations, o n t h e f o r g i n g of c o n t a c t s o r t h e i n t e r r u p t i o n of flows of c o m m u n i c a t i o n , a n d o n t h e d e f i n i t i o n of a g e n d a s a n d p r o b l e m s . I n f l u e n c e o n t h e p a r a m e t e r s w i t h i n w h i c h o t h e r a c t o r s m a k e t h e i r d e c i s i o n s is often m o r e i m p o r t a n t t h a n t h e d i r e c t i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of o n e ' s o w n goals, t h e exercise of executive power, o r t h e t h r e a t of v i o l e n c e . "Soft p o w e r " displaces " h a r d p o w e r " a n d r o b s t h e subjects to w h o m K a n t ' s association of free states was t a i l o r e d of t h e very basis of t h e i r i n d e p e n d e n c e . (3) S o m e t h i n g similar h o l d s , in t u r n , for t h e t h i r d a r g u m e n t K a n t e m p l o y s to dispel t h e suspicion t h a t t h e p r o j e c t e d f e d e r a t i o n of n a t i o n s is a " m e r e c h i m e r a . " I n a r e p u b l i c a n polity, c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s b e c o m e t h e s t a n d a r d s by w h i c h policies m u s t a d m i t of b e i n g publicly assessed. S u c h r e g i m e s c a n n o t afford to "base t h e i r policies publicly o n o p p o r t u n i s t i c m a c h i n a t i o n s a l o n e , " even if they a r e only c o m p e l l e d to pay lip service to c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s . To this e x t e n t t h e political p u b l i c s p h e r e h a s a s u r v e i l l a n c e f u n c t i o n : it c a n p r e v e n t t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of "shady" policies t h a t a r e i n c o n ­ sistent with publicly d e f e n s i b l e m a x i m s by e x p o s i n g t h e m to p u b l i c criticism. O n K a n t ' s view, t h e p u b l i c s p h e r e c a n a c q u i r e a n a d d i ­ t i o n a l p r o g r a m m a t i c f u n c t i o n to t h e e x t e n t t h a t p h i l o s o p h e r s , in t h e i r capacity as "public t e a c h e r s of t h e law," c a n "freely a n d publicly discuss t h e m a x i m s of w a g i n g war a n d i n s t i t u t i n g p e a c e " a n d c a n c o n v i n c e t h e p u b l i c of citizens of t h e validity of t h e i r basic p r i n c i p l e s . K a n t surely h a d t h e e x a m p l e of F r e d e r i c k II a n d Voltaire in m i n d w h e n h e w r o t e this m o v i n g s e n t e n c e : "It is n o t t o b e e x p e c t e d t h a t k i n g s will p h i l o s o p h i z e o r t h a t p h i l o s o p h e r s will b e c o m e kings; n o r is it to b e d e s i r e d , however, since t h e possession of p o w e r inevitably c o r r u p t s t h e free j u d g m e n t of r e a s o n . Kings a n d sovereign p e o p l e s (i.e. t h o s e w h o g o v e r n t h e m s e l v e s by e g a l i t a r i a n laws) s h o u l d n o t , however, force t h e class of p h i l o s o p h e r s to d i s a p p e a r o r to r e m a i n silent, b u t s h o u l d allow t h e m to s p e a k publicly. T h i s is essential to b o t h i n o r d e r t h a t light m a y b e t h r o w n o n t h e i r affairs a n d . . . is beyond suspicion." 22

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As t h e a t h e i s m controversy involving F i c h t e w o u l d reveal j u s t a few years later, K a n t h a d every r e a s o n to fear c e n s o r s h i p . We m a y also forgive his t r u s t in t h e persuasive p o w e r of p h i l o s o p h y a n d in t h e integrity of p h i l o s o p h e r s ; historicist skepticism a b o u t r e a s o n is a p r o d u c t of t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y , a n d it was only in o u r c e n t u r y t h a t intellectuals c o m m i t t e d t h e u l t i m a t e betrayal. W h a t is m o r e i m p o r t a n t is t h a t K a n t still c o u n t e d o n t h e t r a n s p a r e n c y of a surveya b l e p u b l i c s p h e r e s h a p e d by l i t e r a r y m e a n s a n d o p e n to a r g u m e n t s a n d w h i c h is s u s t a i n e d by a p u b l i c c o m p o s e d of a relatively small s t r a t u m of e d u c a t e d citizens. H e c o u l d n o t foresee t h e s t r u c t u r a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of this b o u r g e o i s p u b l i c s p h e r e i n t o a semantically d e g e n e r a t e d p u b l i c s p h e r e d o m i n a t e d by t h e e l e c t r o n i c m a s s m e d i a a n d p e r v a d e d by i m a g e s a n d virtual realities. H e c o u l d scarcely i m a g i n e t h a t this m i l i e u of " c o n v e r s a t i o n a l " e n l i g h t e n m e n t c o u l d b e a d a p t e d b o t h to n o n v e r b a l i n d o c t r i n a t i o n a n d to d e c e p t i o n by means of l a n g u a g e . T h i s veil of i g n o r a n c e p r o b a b l y e x p l a i n s his b o l d , far-sighted an­ ticipation, w h o s e p r e s c i e n c e is only t o d a y b e c o m i n g a p p a r e n t , of a global p u b l i c s p h e r e . F o r s u c h a global p u b l i c s p h e r e is only b e g i n ­ n i n g to e m e r g e as a r e s u l t of g l o b a l c o m m u n i c a t i o n : " T h e p e o p l e s of t h e e a r t h (!) have t h u s e n t e r e d in v a r y i n g d e g r e e s i n t o a universal c o m m u n i t y , a n d it h a s d e v e l o p e d to t h e p o i n t w h e r e a violation of r i g h t s in one part of t h e w o r l d is felt everywhere. T h e i d e a of a c o s m o ­ p o l i t a n r i g h t is t h e r e f o r e n o t fantastical o r o v e r s t r a i n e d ; it is a n e c ­ essary c o m p l e m e n t to t h e u n w r i t t e n c o d e of political a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l right, t r a n s f o r m i n g it i n t o a universal r i g h t of h u m a n ­ ity. O n l y u n d e r this c o n d i t i o n [namely, t h a t of a f u n c t i o n i n g g l o b a l p u b l i c sphere—-J. H . ] c a n we flatter ourselves t h a t we a r e c o n t i n u a l l y advancing toward a perpetual p e a c e . " 2 5

T h e first events t h a t actually c a p t u r e d t h e a t t e n t i o n of t h e w o r l d p u b l i c s p h e r e a n d p o l a r i z e d o p i n i o n s o n a g l o b a l scale w e r e p r e s u m ­ ably t h e V i e t n a m W a r a n d t h e Gulf War. It was only v e r y r e c e n t l y t h a t t h e U N o r g a n i z e d in q u i c k succession a series of c o n f e r e n c e s o n g l o b a l issues of ecology (in Rio d e J a n e i r o ) , o n p r o b l e m s of p o p u l a ­ t i o n g r o w t h (in C a i r o ) , o n p o v e r t y (in C o p e n h a g e n ) , a n d o n g l o b a l w a r m i n g (in B e r l i n ) . T h e s e "global s u m m i t s " c a n b e i n t e r p r e t e d as so m a n y a t t e m p t s to b r i n g at least s o m e political p r e s s u r e to b e a r o n

177 K a n t ' s I d e a of P e r p e t u a l P e a c e

g o v e r n m e n t s simply by t h e m a t i z i n g p r o b l e m s i m p o r t a n t for h u m a n survival f o r t h e g l o b a l p u b l i c , t h a t is, by a n a p p e a l to w o r l d o p i n i o n . T o b e s u r e o n e s h o u l d n o t o v e r l o o k t h e fact t h a t this t e m p o r a r y , issue-specific p u b l i c a t t e n t i o n is still c h a n n e l e d t h r o u g h t h e estab­ l i s h e d s t r u c t u r e s of n a t i o n a l p u b l i c s p h e r e s . S u p p o r t i n g s t r u c t u r e s are n e e d e d to institute p e r m a n e n t c o m m u n i c a t i o n between geo­ graphically d i s t a n t p a r t i c i p a n t s w h o s i m u l t a n e o u s l y e x c h a n g e c o n t r i ­ b u t i o n s o n t h e s a m e t h e m e s with t h e s a m e r e l e v a n c e . I n this sense, t h e r e is n o t yet a g l o b a l p u b l i c s p h e r e , n o r even t h e u r g e n t l y n e e d e d E u r o p e a n p u b l i c s p h e r e . However, t h e c e n t r a l r o l e played by a n e w type of o r g a n i z a t i o n — n a m e l y , n o n g o v e r n m e n t a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s s u c h as G r e e n p e a c e o r A m n e s t y I n t e r n a t i o n a l — n o t only in t h e s e confer­ e n c e s b u t m o r e g e n e r a l l y in t h e c r e a t i o n a n d m o b i l i z a t i o n of trans­ n a t i o n a l p u b l i c s p h e r e s is at least a n i n d i c a t i o n of t h e g r o w i n g i m p a c t o n t h e p r e s s a n d m e d i a of a c t o r s w h o c o n f r o n t states f r o m w i t h i n t h e n e t w o r k of a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l civil s o c i e t y . T h e i m p o r t a n t r o l e t h a t K a n t rightly a c c o r d s publicity a n d t h e p u b l i c s p h e r e directs o u r a t t e n t i o n to t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e legal c o n s t i t u t i o n a n d t h e political c u l t u r e of a p o l i t y . F o r a liberal political c u l t u r e p r o v i d e s t h e soil in w h i c h t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s of free­ d o m p u t d o w n t h e i r r o o t s ; at t h e s a m e t i m e , it is t h e m e d i u m t h r o u g h w h i c h p r o g r e s s in t h e political e d u c a t i o n of a p o p u l a c e is r e a l i z e d . To b e s u r e , K a n t speaks of t h e g r o w t h of c u l t u r e t h a t leads to " g r e a t e r a g r e e m e n t over p r i n c i p l e s " ; h e also takes it t h a t t h e p u b l i c u s e of c o m m u n i c a t i v e f r e e d o m s translates i n t o p r o c e s s e s of e n l i g h t e n m e n t t h a t affect t h e a t t i t u d e s a n d m o d e s of t h o u g h t of t h e p o p u l a c e via political socialization. K a n t speaks in this c o n t e x t of "the s y m p a t h e t i c i n t e r e s t w h i c h t h e e n l i g h t e n e d m a n inevitably feels for a n y t h i n g g o o d w h i c h h e fully c o m p r e h e n d s . " However, t h e s e r e m a r k s d o n o t a s s u m e any systematic i m p o r t o n his t h e o r y , for t h e d i c h o t o m o u s c o n c e p t u a l f r a m e of t r a n s c e n d e n t a l p h i l o s o p h y sepa­ r a t e s t h e i n t e r n a l f r o m t h e e x t e r n a l , m o r a l i t y f r o m legality. I n par­ ticular, K a n t i g n o r e s t h e c o n t i n u u m t h a t a liberal political c u l t u r e establishes b e t w e e n t h e p r u d e n t p u r s u i t of o n e ' s interests, m o r a l insight, a n d c u s t o m ; h e i g n o r e s t h e c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n t r a d i t i o n o n t h e o n e h a n d a n d c r i t i q u e o n t h e o t h e r . T h e p r a c t i c e s of s u c h a c u l t u r e m e d i a t e b e t w e e n morality, law, a n d politics a n d p r o v i d e at 26

27

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t h e s a m e t i m e a suitable c o n t e x t for a p u b l i c s p h e r e t h a t fosters political l e a r n i n g p r o c e s s e s . H e n c e K a n t d i d n o t really n e e d to fall b a c k o n a m e t a p h y s i c a l p u r p o s e of n a t u r e in o r d e r to e x p l a i n h o w a "pathologically e n f o r c e d social u n i o n c a n b e t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o a moral whole." As t h e s e critical reflections i n d i c a t e , K a n t ' s i d e a of a c o s m o p o l i t a n o r d e r m u s t b e r e f o r m u l a t e d if it is n o t to lose t o u c h with a global situation t h a t h a s c h a n g e d f u n d a m e n t a l l y . T h e r e q u i s i t e revision of K a n t ' s basic c o n c e p t u a l f r a m e w o r k is m a d e easier by t h e fact t h a t t h e c o s m o p o l i t a n i d e a itself h a s n o t r e m a i n e d fixed: ever since P r e s i d e n t W i l s o n ' s initiative a n d t h e f o u n d i n g of t h e L e a g u e of N a t i o n s , it h a s b e e n r e p e a t e d l y t a k e n u p a n d i m p l e m e n t e d at political level. Since t h e e n d of t h e S e c o n d W o r l d War, t h e i d e a of p e r p e t u a l p e a c e h a s t a k e n o n a m o r e t a n g i b l e f o r m in t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s , d e c l a r a t i o n s , a n d policies of t h e U N (as well as t h o s e of o t h e r i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i ­ zations) . T h e c h a l l e n g e p o s e d by t h e u n p r e c e d e n t e d c a t a s t r o p h e s of t h e t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y h a s also given n e w i m p e t u s to K a n t ' s idea. A g a i n s t this s o m b e r b a c k g r o u n d , t h e W o r l d Spirit, as H e g e l w o u l d h a v e p u t it, h a s l u r c h e d f o r w a r d . 31

32

T h e First W o r l d W a r c o n f r o n t e d t h e E u r o p e a n societies-with t h e t e r r o r a n d h o r r o r s of a territorially a n d t e c h n o l o g i c a l l y u n l i m i t e d war, t h e S e c o n d W o r l d W a r with t h e mass c r i m e s of a n ideologically u n l i m i t e d war. B e h i n d t h e veil of t h e total w a r i n s t i g a t e d by Hitler, t h e b r e a k d o w n of civilization was so c o m p l e t e t h a t it u n l e a s h e d a w o r l d w i d e u p h e a v a l a n d facilitated t h e t r a n s i t i o n f r o m i n t e r n a t i o n a l law t o c o s m o p o l i t a n law. First, t h e o u t l a w i n g of w a r a l r e a d y p r o ­ c l a i m e d by t h e Briand-Kellogg P a c t of 1928 was t r a n s l a t e d i n t o p u n ­ ishable c r i m i n a l offenses by t h e N u r e m b e r g a n d Tokyo m i l i t a r y t r i b u n a l s . T h e s e offenses a r e n o l o n g e r l i m i t e d to c r i m e s c o m m i t t e d d u r i n g war, b u t i n c r i m i n a t e war itself as a c r i m e . H e n c e f o r t h t h e "crime of war" c a n b e p r o s e c u t e d . S e c o n d , c r i m i n a l law was e x t e n d e d to i n c l u d e "crimes against h u m a n i t y , " c r i m e s c a r r i e d o u t u n d e r t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s of state o r g a n s a n d with t h e assistance of c o u n t l e s s m e m b e r s of o r g a n i z a t i o n s , f u n c t i o n a r i e s , civil servants, b u s i n e s s m e n , a n d private individuals. W i t h t h e s e two i n n o v a t i o n s , t h e states as subjects of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law for t h e first t i m e lost t h e g e n e r a l p r e ­ s u m p t i o n of i n n o c e n c e of a n a s s u m e d state of n a t u r e .

179 Kant's Idea of Perpetual Peace

III A f u n d a m e n t a l c o n c e p t u a l revision of K a n t ' s p r o p o s a l m u s t focus o n t h r e e aspects: (1) t h e e x t e r n a l sovereignty of states a n d t h e a l t e r e d c h a r a c t e r of r e l a t i o n s a m o n g t h e m ; (2) t h e i n t e r n a l sovereignty of states a n d t h e n o r m a t i v e l i m i t a t i o n s of classical p o w e r politics; a n d (3) t h e stratification of w o r l d society a n d t h e g l o b a l i z a t i o n of d a n ­ gers t h a t necessitate a r e c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of w h a t is m e a n t by "peace." (1) K a n t ' s c o n c e p t of a p e r m a n e n t f e d e r a t i o n of n a t i o n s t h a t n o n e t h e l e s s r e s p e c t s t h e sovereignty of states is, as we h a v e s e e n , i n c o n s i s t e n t . C o s m o p o l i t a n law m u s t b e i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d in s u c h a way t h a t it is b i n d i n g o n t h e i n d i v i d u a l g o v e r n m e n t s . T h e c o m m u ­ nity of p e o p l e s m u s t b e a b l e to e n s u r e t h a t its m e m b e r s act at least in c o n f o r m i t y with t h e law t h r o u g h t h e t h r e a t of s a n c t i o n s . O n l y in this way will t h e u n s t a b l e system of states t h a t assert t h e i r sovereignty t h r o u g h m u t u a l t h r e a t s b e t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o a f e d e r a t i o n with c o m ­ m o n i n s t i t u t i o n s w h i c h a s s u m e state f u n c t i o n s , t h a t is, w h i c h legally r e g u l a t e t h e r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n its m e m b e r s a n d m o n i t o r t h e i r c o m ­ p l i a n c e with t h e s e r u l e s . T h e e x t e r n a l c h a r a c t e r of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n states t h a t f o r m e n v i r o n m e n t s for e a c h o t h e r is thereby transformed into a domestic relationship between the mem­ b e r s of a c o m m o n o r g a n i z a t i o n b a s e d o n a legal c o d e o r a constitu­ tion. T h i s is t h e significance of t h e U N C h a r t e r w h i c h (with t h e p r o h i b i t i o n of v i o l e n c e in Article 2.4) outlaws offensive wars a n d (in C h a p t e r VII) a u t h o r i z e s t h e Security C o u n c i l to u s e a p p r o p r i a t e m e a n s , a n d if n e c e s s a r y to initiate m i l i t a r y actions, w h e n e v e r "any t h r e a t to t h e p e a c e , b r e a c h of t h e p e a c e , o r act of a g g r e s s i o n " exists. At t h e s a m e t i m e , t h e U N is expressly f o r b i d d e n to i n t e r f e r e in t h e i n t e r n a l affairs of a state (Article 2.7). E a c h state r e t a i n s t h e r i g h t of military self-defense. I n D e c e m b e r 1 9 9 1 , t h e G e n e r a l Assembly o n c e a g a i n r e a f f i r m e d this p r i n c i p l e ( R e s o l u t i o n 4 6 / 1 8 2 ) : " T h e sover­ eignty, t e r r i t o r i a l integrity, a n d n a t i o n a l u n i t y of a state m u s t b e fully r e s p e c t e d in a c c o r d a n c e with t h e C h a r t e r of t h e U N . " W i t h t h e s e a m b i g u o u s r e g u l a t i o n s , w h i c h b o t h restrict a n d g u a r ­ a n t e e t h e sovereignty of individual states, t h e C h a r t e r shows itself to b e a r e s p o n s e to a t r a n s i t i o n a l situation. T h e U N d o e s n o t yet have 3 3

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its o w n m i l i t a r y forces; it d o e s n o t even have forces it c o u l d d e p l o y u n d e r its o w n c o m m a n d , let a l o n e h a v e a m o n o p o l y over t h e m e a n s of v i o l e n c e . F o r t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of its r e s o l u t i o n s it d e p e n d s o n t h e v o l u n t a r y c o o p e r a t i o n of its m e m b e r s w h o h a v e t h e c o m p e t e n c e to act. T h e lack of a p o w e r b a s e was s u p p o s e d to b e c o m p e n s a t e d for by t h e c r e a t i o n of t h e Security C o u n c i l , w h i c h b i n d s t h e m a j o r w o r l d p o w e r s to t h e w o r l d o r g a n i z a t i o n as p e r m a n e n t m e m b e r s with veto rights. As is well k n o w n , this a r r a n g e m e n t h a s l e d to d e c a d e s of s t a l e m a t e b e t w e e n t h e s u p e r p o w e r s . A n d w h e n t h e Security C o u n c i l d o e s t a k e t h e initiative, it uses its d i s c r e t i o n in a h i g h l y selective m a n n e r , c o m p l e t e l y d i s r e g a r d i n g t h e p r i n c i p l e of e q u a l t r e a t m e n t . T h i s p r o b l e m h a s g a i n e d r e n e w e d c u r r e n c y as a r e s u l t of t h e Gulf W a r . Even t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o u r t in t h e H a g u e possesses only a symbolic if n o t c o m p l e t e l y n e g l i g i b l e significance, as it only c o n v e n e s w h e n a suit is b r o u g h t a n d m o r e o v e r its j u d g m e n t s a r e n o t even b i n d i n g (as was s h o w n o n c e a g a i n in t h e case of N i c a r a g u a versus t h e U n i t e d States).

3 4

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Nowadays i n t e r n a t i o n a l security, at least in t h e r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n t h e n u c l e a r p o w e r s , is g u a r a n t e e d n o t by t h e n o r m a t i v e f r a m e w o r k of t h e U N b u t by a r m s r e d u c t i o n a g r e e m e n t s a n d above all by "security p a r t n e r s h i p s . " T h e s e bilateral treaties establish c o o r d i n a ­ tion mechanisms a n d inspections between the c o m p e t i n g power blocks, so t h a t a n o n n o r m a t i v e , p u r e l y purposively g r o u n d e d reli­ ability of e x p e c t a t i o n s is e s t a b l i s h e d t h r o u g h t r a n s p a r e n c y in p l a n ­ n i n g a n d t h e calculability of motives. (2) B e c a u s e K a n t r e g a r d e d t h e b o u n d s of n a t i o n a l sovereignty as inviolable, h e c o n c e i v e d of t h e c o s m o p o l i t a n c o m m u n i t y as a federa­ t i o n of states, n o t of w o r l d citizens. T h i s was i n c o n s i s t e n t in t h a t K a n t d e r i v e d every legal o r d e r , a n d n o t j u s t t h a t w i t h i n t h e state, f r o m t h e o r i g i n a l r i g h t t h a t a t t a c h e s to every p e r s o n " q u a h u m a n b e i n g . " Every individual h a s a r i g h t to e q u a l liberties u n d e r universal laws ("since e v e r y o n e d e c i d e s for e v e r y o n e a n d e a c h d e c i d e s for h i m ­ s e l f ' ) . T h i s f o u n d i n g of law i n g e n e r a l o n h u m a n r i g h t s privileges individuals as t h e b e a r e r s of r i g h t s a n d l e n d s all m o d e r n legal o r d e r s a n essentially individualistic c h a r a c t e r . B u t if K a n t h o l d s t h a t this g u a r a n t e e of f r e e d o m — " w h a t h u m a n b e i n g s o u g h t to d o by t h e laws of f r e e d o m " — i s t h e essential p u r p o s e of p e r p e t u a l p e a c e a n d is so 36

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181 Kant's Idea of Perpetual Peace

m o r e o v e r "in all t h r e e a r e a s of p u b l i c law—civil, i n t e r n a t i o n a l a n d c o s m o p o l i t a n law," t h e n h e m u s t n o t allow t h e a u t o n o m y of citizens to b e p r e e m p t e d even by t h e sovereignty of t h e i r states. T h e p o i n t of c o s m o p o l i t a n law is, r a t h e r , t h a t it bypasses t h e collective subjects of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law a n d directly establishes t h e legal status of t h e i n d i v i d u a l subjects by g r a n t i n g t h e m u n m e d i a t e d m e m b e r s h i p in t h e association of free a n d e q u a l w o r l d citizens. Carl S c h m i t t g r a s p e d this p o i n t a n d r e c o g n i z e d t h a t this c o n c e p t i o n im­ plies t h a t " e a c h i n d i v i d u a l is s i m u l t a n e o u s l y a w o r l d citizen (in t h e full j u r i d i c a l sense of t h e w o r d ) a n d a citizen of a s t a t e . " Since t h e s u p r e m e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y (Kompetenz-Kompetenz) n o w resides in t h e "world f e d e r a l state" a n d individuals a c q u i r e i m m e d i a t e legal s t a n d i n g in this i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o m m u n i t y , t h e individual state is t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o "a m e r e a g e n c y (Kompetenz) for individual h u m a n beings w h o assume double roles in their international a n d national f u n c t i o n s . " T h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t i m p l i c a t i o n of a f o r m of law t h a t bypasses t h e sovereignty of states is t h e p e r s o n a l liability of individu­ als for c r i m e s c o m m i t t e d in t h e c o u r s e of g o v e r n m e n t a n d m i l i t a r y service. C u r r e n t d e v e l o p m e n t s h a v e also o u t s t r i p p e d K a n t in this r e g a r d . B a s e d o n t h e A u g u s t 1941 N o r t h Atlantic C h a r t e r , t h e U N C h a r t e r of J u n e 1945 i m p o s e s o n its m e m b e r states a g e n e r a l o b l i g a t i o n to r e s p e c t a n d p r o m o t e h u m a n rights. T h e G e n e r a l Assembly specified t h e s e r i g h t s in a n e x e m p l a r y fashion in D e c e m b e r 1948 in its "Gen­ eral D e c l a r a t i o n of H u m a n R i g h t s " a n d h a s d e v e l o p e d t h e m f u r t h e r in t h e i n t e r i m in n u m e r o u s r e s o l u t i o n s . T h e U N d o e s n o t leave t h e p r o t e c t i o n of h u m a n r i g h t s solely u p to t h e nation-states; it h a s its o w n m e c h a n i s m s for e s t a b l i s h i n g t h a t h u m a n r i g h t s violations have occurred. T h e H u m a n Rights Commission has m o n i t o r i n g agencies a n d r e p o r t i n g p r o c e d u r e s for basic social, e c o n o m i c , a n d c u l t u r a l r i g h t s t h a t a r e subject to t h e "proviso of t h e possible;" in a d d i t i o n , for cases of civil a n d political r i g h t s it h a s set u p f o r m a l c o m p l a i n t p r o c e d u r e s . T h o u g h it is n o t universally r e c o g n i z e d by all s i g n a t o r y states, t h e i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t of a p p e a l , w h i c h gives i n d i v i d u a l citizens m e a n s of legal r e c o u r s e a g a i n s t t h e i r o w n g o v e r n m e n t s , is in t h e o r y of g r e a t e r significance t h a n states' r i g h t of a p p e a l . B u t u n t i l n o w t h e r e h a s existed n o s u p r a n a t i o n a l c r i m i n a l c o u r t t h a t c o u l d b r i n g 38

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c o n f i r m e d cases of h u m a n r i g h t s violations to trial a n d pass j u d g ­ m e n t o n t h e m . At t h e r e c e n t V i e n n a c o n f e r e n c e o n h u m a n r i g h t s it was n o t possible to win a g r e e m e n t even o n t h e p r o p o s a l to a p p o i n t a U N H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r for H u m a n Rights. A d h o c w a r c r i m e t r i b u n a l s o n t h e m o d e l of t h e N u r e m b e r g a n d Tokyo i n t e r n a t i o n a l m i l i t a r y t r i b u n a l s h a v e t h u s far r e m a i n e d t h e e x c e p t i o n . To b e s u r e , t h e U N G e n e r a l Assembly h a s r e c o g n i z e d t h e g u i d i n g p r i n c i ­ ples o n w h i c h t h e j u d g m e n t s of t h e s e t r i b u n a l s w e r e b a s e d as "prin­ ciples of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law." To this e x t e n t it is false to claim t h a t t h e trials of l e a d i n g Nazi m i l i t a r y figures, d i p l o m a t s , m i n i s t e r s , d o c t o r s , b a n k e r s , a n d i n d u s t r i a l l e a d e r s w e r e "once-off' o c c u r r e n c e s w i t h o u t t h e p o w e r to establish legal p r e c e d e n t s . 42

4 3

T h e w e a k link in t h e g l o b a l p r o t e c t i o n of h u m a n r i g h t s r e m a i n s t h e a b s e n c e of a n executive p o w e r t h a t c o u l d e n f o r c e t h e G e n e r a l D e c l a r a t i o n s of H u m a n Rights, if n e c e s s a r y by c u r t a i l i n g t h e sover­ e i g n p o w e r of nation-states. Since h u m a n r i g h t s w o u l d h a v e t o b e i m p l e m e n t e d in m a n y cases d e s p i t e t h e o p p o s i t i o n of n a t i o n a l gov­ e r n m e n t s , i n t e r n a t i o n a l law's p r o h i b i t i o n of i n t e r v e n t i o n is in n e e d of revision. W h e r e a f u n c t i o n i n g state p o w e r is n o t entirely a b s e n t , as in t h e case of Somalia, t h e w o r l d o r g a n i z a t i o n u n d e r t a k e s - a n i n t e r v e n t i o n only with t h e a g r e e m e n t of t h e g o v e r n m e n t s c o n ­ c e r n e d (as in L i b e r i a a n d in B o s n i a / C r o a t i a ) , However, d u r i n g t h e Gulf W a r t h e U N t o o k t h e first steps in a n e w d i r e c t i o n — i f n o t in its legal justification, t h e n at least d e facto—with R e s o l u t i o n 688 of April 1 9 9 1 . I n t h a t i n s t a n c e it a p p e a l e d to t h e r i g h t of i n t e r v e n t i o n w h i c h C h a p t e r VII of its C h a r t e r g r a n t s it in cases of "threats to i n t e r n a t i o n a l security;" in this sense, f r o m a j u r i d i c a l p o i n t of view t h e y d i d n o t i n t e r v e n e in "the i n t e r n a l affairs" of a sovereign state even in this case. B u t t h a t this is precisely w h a t t h e y in effect d i d was n o t lost o n t h e allies, w h e n t h e y i n s t i t u t e d no-fly z o n e s in I r a q i air space a n d d e p l o y e d g r o u n d t r o o p s i n n o r t h e r n I r a q to s e c u r e "safe h a v e n s " for K u r d i s h r e f u g e e s (which T u r k e y h a s in t h e i n t e r i m a b u s e d ) t o p r o t e c t m e m b e r s of a n a t i o n a l m i n o r i t y against t h e i r o w n s t a t e . T h e British F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r s p o k e o n this o c c a s i o n of a n " e x p a n s i o n of t h e limits of i n t e r n a t i o n a l a c t i o n . " 4 4

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(3) T h e basic c o n c e p t u a l revisions n e c e s s i t a t e d by c h a n g e s in t h e n a t u r e of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s a n d t h e n o r m a t i v e c u r t a i l m e n t of t h e r o o m for m a n e u v e r of sovereign states have i m p l i c a t i o n s for t h e

183 Kant's Idea of Perpetual Peace

c o n c e p t i o n of a f e d e r a t i o n of p e o p l e s a n d a c o s m o p o l i t a n o r d e r . T h e s e a r e r e f l e c t e d in p a r t in t h e d e m a n d i n g n o r m s t h a t a l r e a d y exist; b u t t h e r e is still a l a r g e d i s c r e p a n c y b e t w e e n t h e l e t t e r a n d t h e o b s e r v a n c e of t h e s e n o r m s . T h e c o n t e m p o r a r y w o r l d situation c a n b e u n d e r s t o o d at b e s t as a t r a n s i t i o n a l stage b e t w e e n i n t e r n a t i o n a l a n d c o s m o p o l i t a n law. B u t m a n y i n d i c a t i o n s s e e m to p o i n t i n s t e a d t o a r e g r e s s i o n to n a t i o n a l i s m . T h i s j u d g m e n t d e p e n d s in t h e first p l a c e o n h o w o n e assesses t h e d y n a m i c of " a c c o m m o d a t i n g " t r e n d s . We h a v e t r a c e d t h e dialectical u n f o l d i n g of t h e d e v e l o p m e n t s t h a t K a n t e x a m i n e d u n d e r t h e h e a d i n g s of t h e p e a c e f u l n e s s of r e p u b l i c s , t h e unifying p o w e r of global m a r k e t s , a n d t h e n o r m a t i v e p r e s s u r e of liberal p u b l i c s p h e r e s . T o d a y t h e s e t e n d e n c i e s a r e c o n f r o n t e d with a n u n f o r e s e e n c o n s t e l l a t i o n of c i r c u m s t a n c e s . K a n t e n v i s a g e d t h a t t h e association of free states w o u l d e x p a n d in s u c h a way t h a t m o r e a n d m o r e states w o u l d crystallize a r o u n d a c o r e of a n a v a n t g a r d e of peaceful r e p u b l i c s : "For if by g o o d f o r t u n e o n e p o w e r f u l a n d e n l i g h t e n e d n a t i o n c a n f o r m a r e p u b l i c . . . , this will p r o v i d e a focal p o i n t for a f e d e r a l association a m o n g o t h e r states . . . a n d t h e w h o l e will g r a d u a l l y s p r e a d f u r t h e r a n d f u r t h e r by a series of alliances of this k i n d . " But, as a m a t t e r of fact, t h e p r e s e n t w o r l d o r g a n i z a t i o n u n i t e s virtually all states u n d e r its roof, r e g a r d l e s s of w h e t h e r o r n o t they a l r e a d y h a v e r e p u b l i c a n c o n s t i t u t i o n s a n d re­ s p e c t h u m a n rights. W o r l d political u n i t y finds e x p r e s s i o n in t h e U N G e n e r a l Assembly in w h i c h all g o v e r n m e n t s have e q u a l r i g h t s of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . At t h e s a m e t i m e , t h e w o r l d o r g a n i z a t i o n abstracts n o t only f r o m t h e differences in legitimacy a m o n g its m e m b e r s w i t h i n t h e c o m m u n i t y of states, b u t also f r o m differences in t h e i r status w i t h i n a stratified w o r l d society. I s p e a k of a "world society" b e c a u s e c o m m u n i c a t i o n systems a n d m a r k e t s h a v e c r e a t e d a g l o b a l n e t w o r k ; at t h e s a m e t i m e , o n e m u s t s p e a k of a "stratified" w o r l d society b e c a u s e t h e m e c h a n i s m of t h e w o r l d m a r k e t c o u p l e s increas­ i n g p r o d u c t i v i t y with g r o w i n g i m p o v e r i s h m e n t a n d , m o r e generally, p r o c e s s e s of e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t with p r o c e s s e s of u n d e r d e v e l o p ­ m e n t . G l o b a l i z a t i o n splits t h e w o r l d in two a n d at t h e s a m e t i m e forces it to act cooperatively as a c o m m u n i t y of s h a r e d risks. 4 7

F r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of political science, t h e w o r l d since 1917 h a s d i s i n t e g r a t e d i n t o t h r e e w o r l d s . To b e s u r e , t h e symbols of t h e First, S e c o n d , a n d T h i r d W o r l d s have t a k e n o n a n e w m e a n i n g since

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1 9 8 9 . T h e Third World t o d a y consists of t e r r i t o r i e s w h e r e t h e state i n f r a s t r u c t u r e a n d m o n o p o l y of t h e m e a n s of v i o l e n c e a r e so weakly d e v e l o p e d (Somalia) o r h a v e d i s i n t e g r a t e d to s u c h a n e x t e n t ( t h e f o r m e r Yugoslavia), w h e r e t h e social t e n s i o n s a r e so e x t r e m e a n d t h e t h r e s h o l d of t o l e r a n c e of political c u l t u r e so low, t h a t i n d i r e c t vio­ l e n c e of a Mafia-like o r f u n d a m e n t a l i s t variety d i s r u p t s i n t e r n a l or­ der. T h e s e societies a r e t h r e a t e n e d by p r o c e s s e s of n a t i o n a l , e t h n i c , o r religious d i s i n t e g r a t i o n . I n fact, t h e vast majority of t h e wars t h a t have r a g e d in r e c e n t d e c a d e s , often u n n o t i c e d by t h e g l o b a l p u b l i c , w e r e civil wars. By c o n t r a s t , t h e Second World is s h a p e d by t h e legacy of p o w e r politics i n h e r i t e d f r o m O l d E u r o p e by t h e nation-states t h a t e m e r g e d f r o m d e c o l o n i z a t i o n . I n t e r n a l l y t h e s e states often seek to c o m p e n s a t e for instabilities t h r o u g h a u t h o r i t a r i a n c o n s t i t u t i o n s a n d in t h e i r f o r e i g n r e l a t i o n s obstinately insist o n sovereignty a n d n o n ­ i n t e r v e n t i o n (as, for e x a m p l e , in t h e Gulf r e g i o n ) . T h e y rely o n m i l i t a r y force a n d a r e g u i d e d exclusively by t h e logic of t h e b a l a n c e of power. O n l y t h e states of t h e First World c a n afford to h a r m o n i z e t h e i r n a t i o n a l interests to a c e r t a i n e x t e n t with t h e n o r m s t h a t d e f i n e t h e h a l f h e a r t e d c o s m o p o l i t a n a s p i r a t i o n s of t h e U N . R. C o o p e r lists as i n d i c a t o r s t h a t a state b e l o n g s to t h e First W o r l d t h e i n c r e a s i n g i r r e l e v a n c e of t e r r i t o r i a l d i s p u t e s a n d t h e t o l e r a n c e of i n t e r n a l p l u r a l i s m ; t h e m u t u a l cross-national exercise of i n f l u e n c e o n m a t t e r s t h a t h a v e traditionally c o u n t e d as d o m e s t i c c o n c e r n s a n d , m o r e generally, t h e i n c r e a s i n g fusion of d o m e s t i c a n d f o r e i g n policy; t h e sensitivity to t h e i n f l u e n c e of liberal p u b l i c s p h e r e s ; t h e r e n u n ­ ciation of m i l i t a r y force as a m e a n s of solving conflicts a n d t h e j u r i d i f i c a t i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s ; a n d , finally, t h e p r e f e r e n c e for p a r t n e r s h i p s t h a t b a s e security o n t h e t r a n s p a r e n c y a n d reliability of e x p e c t a t i o n s . T h e First W o r l d t h u s defines so t o s p e a k t h e m e r i d ­ ian of a p r e s e n t by w h i c h t h e political s i m u l t a n e i t y of e c o n o m i c a n d c u l t u r a l n o n s i m u l t a n e i t y is m e a s u r e d . Kant, w h o as a c h i l d of t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y still t h o u g h t unhistorically, i g n o r e d t h e s e facts a n d thereby overlooked the real abstraction that must be accom­ p l i s h e d by t h e c o m m u n i t y of n a t i o n s a n d t h a t t h e w o r l d o r g a n i z a t i o n m u s t take i n t o a c c o u n t in its policies. T h e politics of t h e U N c a n take a c c o u n t of this "real a b s t r a c t i o n " only if it w o r k s to o v e r c o m e existing social t e n s i o n s a n d e c o n o m i c

185 Kant's Idea of Perpetual Peace

i m b a l a n c e s . I n t u r n , this a i m c a n s u c c e e d only if, in spite of t h e stratification of w o r l d society, a c o n s e n s u s e m e r g e s in at least t h r e e areas: a s h a r e d historical c o n s c i o u s n e s s of t h e n o n s i m u l t a n e i t y of societies w h i c h a r e n e v e r t h e l e s s s i m u l t a n e o u s l y d e p e n d e n t o n a peaceful coexistence; a normative a g r e e m e n t c o n c e r n i n g h u m a n r i g h t s w h o s e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n at t h e m o m e n t is a m a t t e r of d i s p u t e b e t w e e n t h e West, o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d t h e Asians a n d Africans, o n t h e o t h e r ; a n d finally a s h a r e d c o n c e p t i o n of t h e d e s i r a b l e state of p e a c e . A p u r e l y n e g a t i v e c o n c e p t i o n of p e a c e was sufficient for K a n t ' s p u r p o s e s . T o d a y this is unsatisfactory n o t only b e c a u s e of t h e b r e a k d o w n of t h e limits o n t h e c o n d u c t of war, b u t a b o v e all b e c a u s e wars have social causes. A c c o r d i n g to a p r o p o s a l offered by D i e t e r a n d Eva S e n g h a s s , t h e c o m p l e x i t y of t h e causes of war calls for a c o n c e p t i o n of p e a c e as a process w h i c h u n f o l d s in a n o n v i o l e n t m a n n e r a n d w h i c h aims n o t m e r e l y to p r e v e n t v i o l e n c e b u t to satisfy t h e r e a l p r e c o n d i t i o n s for a p e a c e f u l c o e x i s t e n c e of g r o u p s a n d p e o p l e s . T h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of r e g u l a t i o n s s h o u l d n e i t h e r h a r m t h e e x i s t e n c e a n d self-respect of t h e m e m b e r s , n o r so i m p a i r vital i n t e r e s t s a n d j u s t i c e c o n c e r n s t h a t t h e p a r t i e s to t h e conflict e n d u p r e s o r t i n g t o v i o l e n c e w h e n t h e p r o c e ­ d u r a l possibilities have b e e n e x h a u s t e d . Policies t h a t take t h e i r ori­ e n t a t i o n f r o m s u c h a c o n c e p t of p e a c e will e m p l o y all m e a n s s h o r t of m i l i t a r y force, i n c l u d i n g h u m a n i t a r i a n i n t e r v e n t i o n , to i n f l u e n c e t h e i n t e r n a l affairs of formally sovereign states with t h e g o a l of p r o m o t i n g self-sustaining e c o n o m i e s a n d t o l e r a b l e social c o n d i t i o n s , d e m o c r a t i c p a r t i c i p a t i o n , t h e r u l e of law, a n d c u l t u r a l t o l e r a n c e . S u c h strategies of n o n v i o l e n t i n t e r v e n t i o n d e s i g n e d to p r o m o t e p r o c e s s e s of d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n rely o n t h e fact t h a t g l o b a l inter­ c o n n e c t i o n s h a v e r e n d e r e d all states d e p e n d e n t o n t h e i r e n v i r o n ­ m e n t s a n d h a v e m a d e t h e m sensitive to t h e "soft" p o w e r of indi­ r e c t i n f l u e n c e , u p to a n d i n c l u d i n g explicitly i m p o s e d e c o n o m i c sanctions. O f c o u r s e , with t h e i n c r e a s i n g c o m p l e x i t y of goals a n d t h e increas­ i n g costliness of strategies, t h e difficulties of i m p l e m e n t a t i o n also i n c r e a s e , w h i c h t e n d s to d i s s u a d e t h e l e a d i n g p o w e r s f r o m t a k i n g t h e initiative a n d b e a r i n g t h e costs. I w o u l d like to m e n t i o n j u s t f o u r variables t h a t a r e i m p o r t a n t in this r e g a r d : t h e c o m p o s i t i o n a n d t h e 4 9

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v o t i n g - r e g u l a t i o n s of t h e Security C o u n c i l w h o s e m e m b e r s have to act in c o n c e r t ; t h e political c u l t u r e of states w h o s e g o v e r n m e n t s c a n b e i n d u c e d to a d o p t s h o r t - t e r m "selfless" policies only if t h e y a r e subject to t h e n o r m a t i v e p r e s s u r e s e m a n a t i n g f r o m m o b i l i z e d p u b l i c s p h e r e s ; t h e f o r m a t i o n of r e g i o n a l r e g i m e s , w h i c h w o u l d for t h e first t i m e p r o v i d e t h e w o r l d o r g a n i z a t i o n with a n effective i n f r a s t r u c t u r e ; a n d , finally, t h e g e n t l e p r e s s u r e t o w a r d globally c o o r d i n a t e d a c t i o n e x e r t e d by t h e a w a r e n e s s of global d a n g e r s . T h e d a n g e r s a r e m a n i ­ fest: ecological i m b a l a n c e s , a s y m m e t r i e s in s t a n d a r d s of living a n d e c o n o m i c power, large-scale t e c h n o l o g i e s , t h e a r m s t r a d e (in par­ ticular, t h e s p r e a d of a t o m i c , biological, a n d c h e m i c a l w e a p o n s ) , t e r r o r i s m , d r u g - r e l a t e d criminality, a n d so f o r t h . T h o s e w h o d o n o t c o m p l e t e l y d e s p a i r of t h e l e a r n i n g capacity of t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l sys­ t e m h a v e t o r e s t t h e i r h o p e s o n t h e fact t h a t t h e globalization of t h e s e d a n g e r s h a s in fact l o n g since u n i t e d t h e w o r l d i n t o a n invol­ u n t a r y c o m m u n i t y of s h a r e d risks. IV T h e timely r e f o r m u l a t i o n of t h e K a n t i a n i d e a of a c o s m o p o l i t a n pacification of t h e state of n a t u r e b e t w e e n states h a s o n t h e o n e h a n d i n s p i r e d efforts to r e f o r m t h e U N a n d , m o r e generally, to e x p a n d s u p r a n a t i o n a l a g e n c i e s in t h e different r e g i o n s of t h e w o r l d . S u c h efforts a i m to i m p r o v e t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l f r a m e w o r k for a politics of h u m a n rights, w h i c h h a s m a d e h e a d w a y since t h e P r e s i d e n c y of J i m m y C a r t e r b u t h a s also suffered d e b i l i t a t i n g setbacks ( 1 ) . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e politics of h u m a n r i g h t s h a s m e t with s t r o n g o p p o ­ sition f r o m t h o s e w h o view t h e a t t e m p t to i m p l e m e n t h u m a n r i g h t s at t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l level as a self-destructive m o r a l i z a t i o n of politics. However, this criticism is often b a s e d o n a c o n f u s e d c o n c e p t i o n of h u m a n r i g h t s t h a t d o e s n o t differentiate sufficiently b e t w e e n t h e d i m e n s i o n s of politics, law, a n d m o r a l i t y ( 2 ) . (1) T h e " r h e t o r i c of universalism" a g a i n s t w h i c h this criticism is d i r e c t e d finds its b o l d e s t e x p r e s s i o n in p r o p o s a l s to e x t e n d t h e U N i n t o a " c o s m o p o l i t a n d e m o c r a c y . " T h e s e r e f o r m p r o p o s a l s focus o n t h r e e p o i n t s : t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a w o r l d p a r l i a m e n t , t h e c o n s t r u c ­ t i o n of a g l o b a l j u d i c i a l system, a n d t h e l o n g o v e r d u e r e o r g a n i z a t i o n of t h e Security C o u n c i l . 52

187 K a n t ' s I d e a of P e r p e t u a l P e a c e

T h e U N still e x h i b i t s f e a t u r e s of a " p e r m a n e n t c o n g r e s s of states." If it is to s h e d t h e c h a r a c t e r of a m e r e assembly of g o v e r n m e n t d e l e g a t i o n s , t h e G e n e r a l Assembly m u s t b e t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o a k i n d of u p p e r h o u s e a n d divide its c o m p e t e n c e s with a s e c o n d c h a m b e r . I n this p a r l i a m e n t , p e o p l e s w o u l d b e r e p r e s e n t e d as t h e totality of w o r l d citizens n o t by t h e i r g o v e r n m e n t s b u t by directly e l e c t e d r e p ­ resentatives. C o u n t r i e s t h a t refuse to p e r m i t d e p u t i e s to b e e l e c t e d by d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e d u r e s (giving special c o n s i d e r a t i o n to t h e i r na­ t i o n a l m i n o r i t i e s ) c o u l d b e r e p r e s e n t e d in t h e i n t e r i m by n o n g o v ­ e r n m e n t a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s a p p o i n t e d by t h e W o r l d P a r l i a m e n t itself as t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of o p p r e s s e d p o p u l a t i o n s . T h e W o r l d C o u r t in t h e H a g u e c u r r e n t l y lacks t h e a u t h o r i z a t i o n to initiate p r o s e c u t i o n s ; it c a n n o t m a k e b i n d i n g j u d g m e n t s a n d m u s t restrict itself to a r b i t r a t i o n f u n c t i o n s . Moreover, its j u r i s d i c t i o n is r e s t r i c t e d to r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n states; it d o e s n o t e x t e n d to conflicts b e t w e e n i n d i v i d u a l p e r s o n s o r b e t w e e n i n d i v i d u a l citizens a n d t h e i r g o v e r n m e n t s . I n all of t h e s e r e s p e c t s , t h e p o w e r s of t h e C o u r t w o u l d have to b e e x p a n d e d in a c c o r d a n c e with p r o p o s a l s a l r e a d y w o r k e d o u t by H a n s Kelsen a half c e n t u r y a g o . I n t e r n a t i o n a l c r i m i n a l c o u r t s , w h i c h u n t i l n o w h a v e only b e e n c o n v e n e d o n a n a d h o c basis for specific war c r i m e trials, w o u l d h a v e to b e i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d o n a p e r m a n e n t basis. T h e Security C o u n c i l was i n t e n d e d to c o u n t e r b a l a n c e t h e egalitar­ ian G e n e r a l Assembly; it is s u p p o s e d to reflect t h e d e facto r e l a t i o n s of p o w e r in t h e w o r l d . B u t s o m e five d e c a d e s later, this r e a s o n a b l e p r i n c i p l e n e e d s to b e a d a p t e d to t h e a l t e r e d g l o b a l situation, a n d t h e r e q u i s i t e a d a p t a t i o n s s h o u l d n o t b e l i m i t e d to e x t e n d i n g t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n to i n c l u d e o t h e r influential nation-states (for e x a m ­ p l e , m a k i n g G e r m a n y a n d J a p a n p e r m a n e n t m e m b e r s ) . I n s t e a d , it h a s b e e n p r o p o s e d t h a t a l o n g s i d e g l o b a l p o w e r s ( s u c h as t h e U n i t e d States), r e g i o n a l r e g i m e s ( s u c h as t h e E u r o p e a n U n i o n ) s h o u l d b e g r a n t e d privileged v o t i n g r i g h t s . I n a d d i t i o n , t h e r e q u i r e m e n t of u n a n i m i t y b e t w e e n t h e p e r m a n e n t m e m b e r s m u s t b e a b o l i s h e d in favor of a n a p p r o p r i a t e f o r m of qualified majority r u l e . I n s u m , t h e Security C o u n c i l c o u l d b e t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o a n executive b r a n c h c a p a b l e of i m p l e m e n t i n g policies o n t h e m o d e l of t h e C o u n c i l of Ministers of t h e E u r o p e a n U n i o n . Moreover, states will b e willing to a d a p t t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l f o r e i g n policy to t h e i m p e r a t i v e s of a w o r l d

5 3

5 4

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d o m e s t i c politics only if t h e w o r l d o r g a n i z a t i o n c a n d e p l o y m i l i t a r y forces u n d e r its o w n c o m m a n d a n d exercise p o l i c e f u n c t i o n s . T h e f b r e g o i n g reflections a r e c o n v e n t i o n a l in t a k i n g t h e i r o r i e n ­ t a t i o n f r o m t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c o m p o n e n t s of n a t i o n a l constitu­ tions. T h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of a p r o p e r l y clarified c o n c e p t i o n of c o s m o p o l i t a n law evidently calls for s o m e w h a t m o r e i n s t i t u t i o n a l i m a g i n a t i o n . I n a n y event, t h e m o r a l universalism t h a t i n f o r m e d Kant's proposals remains the authoritative normative intuition. How­ ever, a criticism h a s b e e n m a d e of this m o r a l - p r a c t i c a l self-unders t a n d i n g of m o d e r n i t y w h i c h h a s b e e n especially influential in G e r m a n y , b e g i n n i n g with H e g e l ' s criticisms of K a n t ' s m o r a l p h i l o s o ­ phy, a n d h a s left d e e p t r a c e s d o w n to t h e p r e s e n t . C a r l S c h m i t t gave this a r g u m e n t its m o s t incisive f o r m u l a t i o n a n d offered a justifica­ t i o n t h a t is in p a r t insightful, in p a r t c o n f u s e d . 5 5

S c h m i t t distills t h e s l o g a n " W h o e v e r speaks of ' h u m a n i t y ' is a liar" i n t o t h e striking f o r m u l a "Humanity, Bestiality." O n this view, "the d e c e p t i o n of h u m a n i s m " h a s its r o o t s i n t h e hypocrisy of a legal pacifism t h a t w a n t s to c o n d u c t 'just wars" u n d e r t h e b a n n e r of p e a c e a n d c o s m o p o l i t a n law: " W h e n a state fights its political e n e m y in t h e n a m e of h u m a n i t y , it is n o t a w a r for t h e sake of h u m a n i t y , b u t r a t h e r a war w h e r e i n a p a r t i c u l a r state seeks to u s u r p a universal coficept in its s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t its e n e m y , in t h e s a m e way t h a t o n e c a n m i s u s e p e a c e , j u s t i c e , p r o g r e s s , a n d civilization in o r d e r to claim t h e s e as o n e ' s o w n a n d t o d e n y t h e s a m e to t h e e n e m y . T h e c o n c e p t of h u m a n i t y is a n especially useful i d e o l o g i c a l i n s t r u m e n t . . , , " 56

S c h m i t t l a t e r e x t e n d s this a r g u m e n t , w h i c h in 1932 was still di­ r e c t e d a g a i n s t t h e U n i t e d States a n d t h e o t h e r victors of Versailles, to t h e a c t i o n s of t h e L e a g u e of N a t i o n s a n d t h e U N . T h e politics of a w o r l d o r g a n i z a t i o n t h a t takes its i n s p i r a t i o n f r o m K a n t ' s i d e a of p e r p e t u a l p e a c e a n d is d i r e c t e d to t h e c r e a t i o n of a c o s m o p o l i t a n o r d e r h e a r k e n s t o t h e s a m e logic, a c c o r d i n g to S c h m i t t : its pan-int e r v e n t i o n i s m w o u l d inevitably l e a d to a p a n - c r i m i n a l i z a t i o n , a n d h e n c e to t h e p e r v e r s i o n of t h e g o a l it is s u p p o s e d to serve. 57

(2) Before I e x a m i n e t h e specific c o n t e x t of t h e s e reflections, I w o u l d like to d e a l with t h e a r g u m e n t a t a g e n e r a l level a n d u n c o v e r its p r o b l e m a t i c c o r e . T h e two c r u c i a l s t a t e m e n t s a r e , first, t h a t t h e politics of h u m a n r i g h t s l e a d s to wars w h i c h u n d e r t h e guise of

189 Kant's Idea of Perpetual Peace

p o l i c e a c t i o n s take o n a m o r a l c h a r a c t e r ; a n d s e c o n d , t h a t this m o r a l i z a t i o n b r a n d s o p p o n e n t s as e n e m i e s , a n d t h e r e s u l t i n g crimi­ n a l i z a t i o n for t h e first t i m e gives i n h u m a n i t y a c o m p l e t e l y free h a n d : "We a r e familiar with t h e s e c r e t law b e h i n d this v o c a b u l a r y a n d k n o w t h a t t o d a y t h e m o s t t e r r i b l e wars a r e c o n d u c t e d in t h e n a m e of p e a c e a n d t h a t t h e worst i n h u m a n i t y is c o m m i t t e d in t h e n a n i e of h u m a n ­ ity." S c h m i t t justifies b o t h s t a t e m e n t s in t h e light of two f u r t h e r p r e m i s e s : (a) t h a t t h e politics of h u m a n r i g h t s i m p l e m e n t s n o r m s t h a t a r e p a r t of a universalistic morality; a n d (b) t h a t since m o r a l j u d g m e n t s a r e g o v e r n e d by t h e c o d e of " g o o d " a n d "evil," t h e m o r a l criticism of a n o p p o n e n t in war (or a political o p p o n e n t ) destroys t h e legally i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d r e s t r i c t i o n s o n m i l i t a r y conflicts ( o r o n political d i s p u t e s ) . W h e r e a s t h e first p r e m i s e is false, t h e s e c o n d p r e m i s e suggests a false a s s u m p t i o n in t h e c o n t e x t of a politics of h u m a n rights. (a) H u m a n r i g h t s in t h e m o d e r n sense c a n b e t r a c e d b a c k t o t h e V i r g i n i a Bill of Rights a n d t h e A m e r i c a n D e c l a r a t i o n of I n d e ­ p e n d e n c e of 1776 a n d t o t h e Declaration des droits de Vhomme et du citoyen of 1789. T h e s e d e c l a r a t i o n s w e r e i n s p i r e d by t h e political p h i l o s o p h y of m o d e r n n a t u r a l law, especially t h a t of L o c k e a n d R o u s s e a u . It is n o a c c i d e n t t h a t h u m a n r i g h t s first t a k e o n a c o n c r e t e f o r m in t h e c o n t e x t of t h e s e first c o n s t i t u t i o n s , specifically as basic r i g h t s t h a t a r e g u a r a n t e e d w i t h i n t h e f r a m e of a n a t i o n a l legal o r d e r . However, t h e y s e e m to h a v e a d o u b l e c h a r a c t e r : as c o n s t i t u t i o n a l n o r m s t h e y enjoy positive validity, b u t as r i g h t s possessed by e a c h p e r s o n q u a h u m a n b e i n g they a r e also a c c o r d e d a suprapositive validity. I n t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l discussion of h u m a n r i g h t s this a m b i g u i t y h a s provoked m u c h irritation. O n o n e conception, h u m a n rights are s u p p o s e d t o h a v e a status s o m e w h e r e b e t w e e n m o r a l a n d positive law; o n t h e o t h e r c o n c e p t i o n , t h e y c a n a s s u m e e i t h e r t h e f o r m of m o r a l o r of j u r i d i c a l rights, t h o u g h t h e i r c o n t e n t r e m a i n s i d e n t i c a l — t h a t is, t h e y c o n s t i t u t e "a law (Recht) valid (gultig) p r i o r to a n y state, t h o u g h n o t for t h a t r e a s o n a l r e a d y in force (geltend)." H u m a n r i g h t s a r e " n e i t h e r actually g r a n t e d o r d e n i e d , b u t a r e e i t h e r r e s p e c t e d o r d i s r e s p e c t e d . " T h e s e f o r m u l a s reflect a c e r t a i n p h i l o s o p h i c a l e m ­ b a r r a s s m e n t a n d suggest t h a t t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l legislator m e r e l y 58

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dresses u p m o r a l n o r m s , h o w e v e r t h e y a r e justified, in t h e f o r m of positive law. I n m y view, this a p p e a l to t h e classical d i s t i n c t i o n b e ­ t w e e n n a t u r a l a n d positive law sets t h e w r o n g p a r a m e t e r s for t h e d e b a t e . T h e c o n c e p t of h u m a n r i g h t s d o e s n o t h a v e its o r i g i n s in morality, b u t r a t h e r b e a r s t h e i m p r i n t of t h e m o d e r n c o n c e p t of i n d i v i d u a l liberties, h e n c e of a specifically j u r i d i c a l c o n c e p t . H u m a n r i g h t s a r e j u r i d i c a l by their very nature. W h a t l e n d s t h e m t h e a p p e a r ­ a n c e of m o r a l r i g h t s is n o t t h e i r c o n t e n t , a n d m o s t especially n o t t h e i r s t r u c t u r e , b u t r a t h e r t h e i r m o d e of validity, w h i c h p o i n t s b e ­ y o n d t h e legal o r d e r s of nation-states. T h e texts of historical c o n s t i t u t i o n s a p p e a l t o " i n n a t e " r i g h t s a n d often have t h e s o l e m n f o r m of " d e c l a r a t i o n s ; " b o t h f e a t u r e s a r e s u p p o s e d to d i s s u a d e us f r o m w h a t we w o u l d n o w call a positivist m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d e x p r e s s t h e fact t h a t h u m a n r i g h t s a r e " n o t at t h e disposal" of t h e l e g i s l a t o r . B u t this r h e t o r i c a l proviso c a n n o t p r e s e r v e h u m a n r i g h t s f r o m t h e fate of all positive law; they, t o o , c a n b e c h a n g e d o r b e s u s p e n d e d , for e x a m p l e , following a c h a n g e of r e g i m e s . O f c o u r s e , as a c o m p o n e n t of a d e m o c r a t i c legal o r d e r like t h e o t h e r legal n o r m s , t h e y enjoy "validity" in t h e d u a l sense t h a t t h e y a r e n o t only valid d e facto, a n d h e n c e a r e enforcecl by t h e s a n c t i o n i n g p o w e r of t h e state, b u t c a n also claim n o r m a t i v e legiti­ macy, t h a t is, they s h o u l d b e c a p a b l e of b e i n g rationally justified. B u t a p a r t f r o m this typical f e a t u r e , basic r i g h t s d o i n d e e d h a v e a r e m a r k ­ a b l e status r e g a r d i n g t h e i r justification. 61

As c o n s t i t u t i o n a l n o r m s , h u m a n r i g h t s enjoy a c e r t a i n privilege, w h i c h is m a n i f e s t e d in p a r t by t h e fact t h a t t h e y a r e constitutive for t h e legal o r d e r as a w h o l e a n d to this e x t e n t d e t e r m i n e a f r a m e w o r k w i t h i n w h i c h n o r m a l legislation m u s t b e c o n d u c t e d . B u t basic r i g h t s enjoy a privileged status even w i t h i n t h e e n s e m b l e of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l n o r m s . O n t h e o n e h a n d , liberal a n d social basic r i g h t s have t h e f o r m of g e n e r a l n o r m s a d d r e s s e d to citizens in t h e i r capacity as h u m a n b e i n g s ( n o t m e r e l y as m e m b e r s of a s t a t e ) . T h o u g h h u m a n r i g h t s a r e for t h e t i m e b e i n g only r e a l i z e d w i t h i n t h e f r a m e w o r k of a n a t i o n legal o r d e r , w i t h i n this s p h e r e of validity they g r o u n d r i g h t s for all p e r s o n s a n d n o t m e r e l y for citizens. T h e f u r t h e r n o r m a l legislation e x h a u s t s t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s of h u m a n r i g h t s , t h e m o r e t h e legal status of r e s i d e n t aliens c o m e s to r e s e m b l e t h a t of c i t i z e n s . It 62

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is this universal r a n g e of a p p l i c a t i o n , w h i c h refers to h u m a n b e i n g s as s u c h , t h a t basic r i g h t s s h a r e with m o r a l n o r m s . As is s h o w n by t h e r e c e n t c o n t r o v e r s y (in G e r m a n y ) over t h e v o t i n g r i g h t s of r e s i d e n t aliens, this also h o l d s in c e r t a i n r e s p e c t s for political rights. T h i s p o i n t s to a s e c o n d a n d e v e n m o r e i m p o r t a n t aspect. Basic r i g h t s a r e e q u i p p e d with a universal validity claim b e c a u s e they c a n b e justified exclusively f r o m t h e m o r a l p o i n t of view. Certainly, o t h e r legal n o r m s a r e also justified with t h e h e l p of m o r a l a r g u m e n t s , b u t in g e n e r a l f u r t h e r ethical-political a n d p r a g m a t i c c o n s i d e r a t i o n s play a r o l e in t h e i r justification, c o n s i d e r a t i o n s t h a t a r e i n s e p a r a b l e f r o m t h e con­ c r e t e f o r m of life of a historical legal c o m m u n i t y o r f r o m t h e c o n ­ c r e t e goals of p a r t i c u l a r policies. Basic rights, by c o n t r a s t , r e g u l a t e m a t t e r s of s u c h g e n e r a l i t y t h a t m o r a l a r g u m e n t s a r e sufficient for their justification. T h e s e a r g u m e n t s s h o w why t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of s u c h r u l e s is in t h e e q u a l i n t e r e s t of all p e r s o n s q u a p e r s o n s , a n d t h u s why they a r e equally g o o d for everybody. O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , this f o r m of justification by n o m e a n s r o b s t h e basic r i g h t s of t h e i r j u r i d i c a l c h a r a c t e r — i t d o e s n o t t u r n t h e m i n t o m o r a l n o r m s . L e g a l n o r m s — i n t h e m o d e r n sense of positive law— p r e s e r v e t h e i r legal f o r m , r e g a r d l e s s of t h e k i n d s of r e a s o n s o n t h e basis of w h i c h t h e i r claim to legitimacy c a n b e justified. F o r t h e y owe this c h a r a c t e r to t h e i r s t r u c t u r e , n o t to t h e i r c o n t e n t . Basic r i g h t s a r e a c t i o n a b l e i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s w h o s e m e a n i n g at least in p a r t is to free legal p e r s o n s in a carefully c i r c u m s c r i b e d m a n n e r f r o m t h e b i n d i n g force of m o r a l c o m m a n d s by c r e a t i n g d o m a i n s of legal c o n d u c t i n w h i c h a c t o r s c a n act i n a c c o r d a n c e with t h e i r o w n p r e f e r e n c e s . W h e r e a s m o r a l r i g h t s only derive f r o m d u t i e s t h a t b i n d t h e free will of a u t o n o m o u s p e r s o n s , legal e n t i t l e m e n t s to act in a c c o r d a n c e with o n e ' s p r e f e r e n c e s enjoy priority over legal d u t i e s , w h i c h in t u r n arise f r o m legal r e s t r i c t i o n s o n t h e s e i n d i v i d u a l l i b e r t i e s . 63

T h i s c o n c e p t u a l privileging of r i g h t s over d u t i e s follows f r o m t h e s t r u c t u r e of m o d e r n coercive law first e l a b o r a t e d by H o b b e s . H o b b e s i n i t i a t e d a shift in p e r s p e c t i v e away f r o m p r e m o d e r n law, w h i c h was still e l a b o r a t e d f r o m a religious o r m e t a p h y s i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e . I n c o n t r a s t to d e o n t o l o g i c a l m o r a l i t y w h i c h g r o u n d s d u t i e s , law serves t o p r o t e c t i n d i v i d u a l f r e e d o m of c h o i c e in a c c o r d a n c e with t h e p r i n c i p l e t h a t e v e r y t h i n g is p e r m i t t e d w h i c h is n o t explicitly

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f o r b i d d e n by g e n e r a l laws t h a t set limits to f r e e d o m . To b e s u r e , t h e g e n e r a l i t y of s u c h laws m u s t satisfy t h e m o r a l p o i n t of view if t h e individual rights derived from t h e m are to b e legitimate—liberties m u s t b e equally d i s t r i b u t e d a m o n g citizens. B u t t h e c o n c e p t of sub­ jective r i g h t t h a t c i r c u m s c r i b e s a d o m a i n of f r e e d o m of c h o i c e h a s s t r u c t u r a l c o n s e q u e n c e s for m o d e r n legal o r d e r s i n g e n e r a l . H e n c e K a n t conceives of law as "the s u m of t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h t h e c h o i c e of o n e c a n b e u n i t e d with t h e c h o i c e of a n o t h e r in a c c o r d ­ a n c e with a universal law of f r e e d o m . " A c c o r d i n g to Kant, all spe­ cial h u m a n rights a r e g r o u n d e d in t h e "single o r i g i n a l " r i g h t to e q u a l i n d i v i d u a l liberties: "Freedom ( i n d e p e n d e n c e f r o m b e i n g c o n ­ s t r a i n e d by a n o t h e r ' s c h o i c e ) , insofar as it c a n coexist with t h e f r e e d o m of e v e r y o n e else in a c c o r d a n c e with a universal law, is t h e only o r i g i n a l r i g h t b e l o n g i n g t o every m a n by v i r t u e of his humanity." 6 5

66

C o n s i s t e n t with this f o u n d a t i o n , h u m a n r i g h t s t a k e t h e i r p l a c e i n t h e D o c t r i n e of R i g h t a n d only t h e r e . Like o t h e r subjective r i g h t s , they—and they preeminently—have a moral content. But without p r e j u d i c e t o this c o n t e n t , h u m a n r i g h t s b e l o n g structurally to a positive a n d coercive legal o r d e r w h i c h f o u n d s a c t i o n a b l e individual legal claims. To this e x t e n t , it is p a r t of t h e m e a n i n g of h u m a r i r i g h t s t h a t t h e y claim t h e status of basic r i g h t s w h i c h a r e i m p l e m e n t e d w i t h i n t h e c o n t e x t of some existing legal o r d e r , b e it n a t i o n a l , inter­ n a t i o n a l , o r global. T h e e r r o n e o u s c o n f l a t i o n of h u m a n r i g h t s with m o r a l r i g h t s is s u g g e s t e d by t h e fact t h a t , in spite of t h e i r claim to universal validity, h u m a n r i g h t s h a v e t h u s far m a n a g e d to achieve a n u n a m b i g u o u s positive f o r m only w i t h i n t h e n a t i o n a l legal o r d e r s of d e m o c r a t i c states. Moreover, t h e y r e m a i n only a w e a k force in i n t e r ­ n a t i o n a l law a n d still await i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n w i t h i n t h e f r a m e w o r k of a c o s m o p o l i t a n o r d e r t h a t is only n o w b e g i n n i n g to take s h a p e . (b) B u t if t h e first p r e m i s e — t h a t h u m a n r i g h t s a r e in e s s e n c e m o r a l rights—is false, t h e n t h e first of S c h m i t t ' s two s t a t e m e n t s is also u n d e r c u t , t h a t is, his s t a t e m e n t t h a t t h e g l o b a l i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of h u m a n r i g h t s obeys a m o r a l logic a n d h e n c e w o u l d l e a d t o inter­ v e n t i o n s t h a t w o u l d b e m e r e l y thinly disguised p o l i c e a c t i o n s . At t h e s a m e t i m e , t h e s e c o n d s t a t e m e n t — t h a t a n i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t politics of h u m a n r i g h t s w o u l d inevitably d e g e n e r a t e i n t o a "struggle a g a i n s t

193 Kant's Idea of Perpetual Peace

evil"—comes u n d e r severe p r e s s u r e . At a n y r a t e , this s t a t e m e n t sug­ gests t h e false a s s u m p t i o n t h a t a classical i n t e r n a t i o n a l law t a i l o r e d to l i m i t e d wars w o u l d suffice to c h a n n e l m i l i t a r y conflicts in a "civi­ lized" d i r e c t i o n . Even if this a s s u m p t i o n w o u l d w i t h s t a n d e m p i r i c a l o b j e c t i o n s , t h e p o l i c e a c t i o n s of a politically c o m p e t e n t a n d d e m o ­ cratically l e g i t i m a t e d w o r l d o r g a n i z a t i o n w o u l d b e t t e r m e r i t t h e title of a "civil" r e g u l a t i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l conflicts t h a n w o u l d wars, h o w e v e r l i m i t e d . F o r t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a c o s m o p o l i t a n o r d e r m e a n s t h a t violations of h u m a n r i g h t s a r e n o l o n g e r j u d g e d a n d c o m b a t e d immediately f r o m t h e m o r a l p o i n t of view, b u t r a t h e r a r e p r o s e c u t e d , like c r i m i n a l a c t i o n s w i t h i n t h e f r a m e w o r k of a stateo r g a n i z e d legal o r d e r , in a c c o r d a n c e with i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d legal p r o ­ c e d u r e s . Precisely t h e j u r i d i f i c a t i o n of t h e state of n a t u r e a m o n g states p r e v e n t s a m o r a l de-differentiation of law a n d g u a r a n t e e s t h e a c c u s e d full legal p r o t e c t i o n , a n d h e n c e p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t u n m e d i a t e d m o r a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , even in t h e c u r r e n t l y r e l e v a n t cases of war crimes a n d crimes against h u m a n i t y . 67

V I w o u l d like to d e v e l o p this a r g u m e n t f u r t h e r t h r o u g h a m e t a c r i t i c a l e x a m i n a t i o n of C a r l S c h m i t t ' s o b j e c t i o n s . B u t first I m u s t say s o m e ­ t h i n g a b o u t t h e c o n t e x t of t h e s e o b j e c t i o n s , b e c a u s e t h e way S c h m i t t links t h e different levels of a r g u m e n t is n o t especially t r a n s p a r e n t . T h e criticism of a f o r m of c o s m o p o l i t a n law t h a t bypasses t h e sover­ eignty of i n d i v i d u a l states c o n c e r n e d S c h m i t t p r i m a r i l y in c o n n e c ­ t i o n with t h e " d i s c r i m i n a t o r y c o n c e p t i o n of w a r " — a s a w a r of aggression. T h i s s e e m s to l e n d his a r g u m e n t a sharply-defined legal focus. H e consistently attacks t h e p e n a l i z a t i o n of wars of a g g r e s s i o n i n s c r i b e d in t h e U N C h a r t e r a n d t h e a s c r i p t i o n of legal liability to i n d i v i d u a l p e r s o n s for a type of war c r i m e t h a t was u n k n o w n to t h a t classical i n t e r n a t i o n a l law t h a t h e l d sway u n t i l t h e First W o r l d War. B u t S c h m i t t weighs d o w n this legal a p p r o a c h , w h i c h is h a r m ­ less in itself, with political c o n s i d e r a t i o n s a n d m e t a p h y s i c a l argu­ m e n t s . H e n c e we m u s t first u n c o v e r t h e u n d e r l y i n g t h e o r y ( 1 ) , in o r d e r t o g e t a t t h e c r i t i q u e of m o r a l i t y t h a t f o r m s t h e c o r e of t h e a r g u m e n t (2).

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(1) T a k e n at face value, the juridical argument aims to civilize war through international law (a); and it is connected with a political argument whose sole concern seems to be to preserve the estab­ lished international order (b). (a) S c h m i t t does not reject the distinction between offensive and defensive wars for the pragmatic reason that it is difficult to operationalize. T h e juridical reason is rather that only a morally neutral concept of war, which also excludes personal responsibility for a penalized war, is consistent with the sovereignty of states as subjects of international law; for the ius ad helium—that is, the right to go to war for any reason whatsoever—is constitutive of the sovereignty of states. A t this stage in the argument, S c h m i t t is not as yet concerned with the supposedly disastrous consequences of moral universalism (as is made clear by the relevant text ), but rather with restrictions on how wars are conducted. O n l y the practice of noncondemnation of war can succeed in limiting military actions in war and provide protection against the evils of a total war, which S c h m i t t had already analyzed with admirable clarity before the S e c o n d W o r l d W a r . I n this way S c h m i t t presents his call for a return to the status quo ante of limited wars merely as a more realistic alternative to a cosmopolitan pacification of the state of nature between states; in comparison with the effort to "civilize" war in terms of classical international law, abolishing war altogether is a much more farreaching and, so it seems, Utopian goal. B u t there are good empirical reasons for doubting the "realism" of Schmitt's proposal as well. T h e bare appeal to international law, which developed out of the wars of religion as one of the great achievements of W e s t e r n rationalism, does not of itself show how the classical-modern world of the balance of powers can be reestablished as a practical matter. F o r interna­ tional law in its classical form has manifestly failed in the face of total wars. B e h i n d the territorial, technical, and ideological expansion of war there lurk momentous forces. T h e s e forces are still more likely to be tamed through the sanctions and interventions of an organ­ ized community of nations than through the legally ineffectual ap­ peal to sovereign governments to conduct themselves in a reasonable manner; a return to the classical system of international law would effectively restore complete freedom of action to the 68

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collective a c t o r s w h o w o u l d h a v e to r e f o r m t h e i r uncivilized c o n d u c t . T h i s w e a k n e s s in t h e a r g u m e n t is a first i n d i c a t i o n t h a t t h e j u r i d i c a l l i n e of a r g u m e n t is m e r e l y a facade b e h i n d w h i c h S c h m i t t c o n c e a l s c o n c e r n s of a different sort. After t h e S e c o n d W o r l d War, S c h m i t t c o u l d save t h e consistency of his legal a r g u m e n t only by c o n s i g n i n g t h e mass c r i m e s of t h e Nazi p e r i o d to a sui g e n e r i s c a t e g o r y in o r d e r t h e r e b y to p r e s e r v e at least t h e a p p e a r a n c e of m o r a l n e u t r a l i t y for w a r itself. I n 1945 in a brief p r e p a r e d for t h e N u r e m b e r g d e f e n d a n t F r i e d r i c h Flick, S c h m i t t consistently d i s t i n g u i s h e d b e t w e e n w a r c r i m e s a n d "atrocities" t h a t t r a n s c e n d h u m a n c o m p r e h e n s i o n "as c h a r a c t e r i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n s of a peculiarly i n h u m a n mentality": " T h e c o m m a n d of a s u p e r i o r c a n n o t justify o r e x c u s e s u c h o u t r a g e s . " T h a t S c h m i t t m a d e this d i s t i n c t i o n for p u r e l y tactical r e a s o n s in his r o l e as a lawyer e m e r g e s with b r u t a l clarity in t h e texts of his d i a r y of a few years later. It is clear f r o m this " G l o s s a r i u m " t h a t S c h m i t t n o t only w a n t e d t o see offensive w a r d e c r i m i n a l i z e d b u t also t h e b a r b a r o u s e x t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e Jews. H e asks, "Was it a ' c r i m e a g a i n s t h u m a n i t y ' ? Is t h e r e s u c h a t h i n g as a c r i m e a g a i n s t love?" a n d h e d o u b t s w h e t h e r s u c h " c r i m e s " c a n b e c o n s i d e r e d j u r i d i c a l m a t t e r s at all, b e c a u s e t h e "objects of p r o t e c t i o n a n d attack" of s u c h a c r i m e c a n n o t b e c i r c u m s c r i b e d with sufficient p r e c i s i o n : " G e n o c i d e , t h e m u r d e r of p e o p l e s — a t o u c h i n g c o n c e p t ; I h a v e e x p e r i e n c e d a n e x a m p l e of it myself: t h e e x t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e G e r m a n - P r u s s i a n civil service in 1 9 4 5 . " T h i s r a t h e r prickly u n ­ d e r s t a n d i n g of g e n o c i d e l e d S c h m i t t to t h e m o r e far-reaching c o n ­ clusion: " ' C r i m e s a g a i n s t h u m a n i t y ' is only t h e m o s t g e n e r a l of all g e n e r a l clauses for d e s t r o y i n g a n e n e m y . " I n a n o t h e r passage, S c h m i t t asserts: " T h e r e a r e c r i m e s against h u m a n i t y a n d c r i m e s for h u m a n i t y . C r i m e s against h u m a n i t y a r e c o m m i t t e d by t h e G e r m a n s . C r i m e s for h u m a n i t y a r e p e r p e t r a t e d o n t h e G e r m a n s . " H e r e a n o t h e r a r g u m e n t clearly e m e r g e s . T h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of c o s m o p o l i t a n law, with t h e c o n s e q u e n t d i s c r i m i n a t o r y c o n c e p t i o n of war, is n o t only c o n s i d e r e d as a false r e a c t i o n to t h e e v o l u t i o n t o w a r d total war, b u t r a t h e r as its c a u s e . Total w a r is s e e n as t h e c o n t e m p o ­ r a r y m a n i f e s t a t i o n of t h e "just w a r " t h a t necessarily issues f r o m a n i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t politics of h u m a n rights: " W h a t is decisive is t h a t t h e total c h a r a c t e r of war g o e s h a n d - i n - h a n d with its, claim to b e j u s t . " 70

7 1

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M o r a l universalism n o w a s s u m e s t h e r o l e of t h e e x p l a n a n d u m a n d t h e a r g u m e n t shifts f r o m t h e j u r i d i c a l t o t h e m o r a l level. S c h m i t t s e e m e d to have r e c o m m e n d e d t h e r e t u r n to classical i n t e r n a t i o n a l law in t h e first i n s t a n c e as a m e a n s of a v o i d i n g total war. B u t it is n o t even clear w h e t h e r h e r e g a r d e d t h e total e x t e n s i o n of war, h e n c e t h e i n h u m a n c o n d u c t of war, as t h e r e a l evil, o r w h e t h e r his m a i n fear was t h e d e v a l u a t i o n of war as s u c h . I n a n y case, in a c o r o l l a r y to The Concept of the Politicalwritten in 1938, S c h m i t t d e s c r i b e s t h e totalizing e x t e n s i o n of t h e c o n d u c t of w a r to n o n m i l i t a r y a r e a s in s u c h a way t h a t total w a r takes o n t h e m e r i t of e n h a n c i n g " n a t i o n a l h e a l t h " : " T h e step b e y o n d t h e p u r e l y m i l i t a r y r e p r e s e n t s n o t only a q u a n ­ titative e x p a n s i o n b u t a qualitative l e a p . F o r this r e a s o n it (i.e., total war) d o e s n o t b e t o k e n a n alleviation, b u t r a t h e r a n intensifica­ t i o n of hostility. T h e m e r e possibility of s u c h a n i n c r e a s e in i n t e n ­ sity m e a n s t h a t t h e c o n c e p t s of f r i e n d a n d foe b e c o m e political o n c e a g a i n a n d a r e f r e e d f r o m t h e s p h e r e of private a n d psychologi­ cal r h e t o r i c , even w h e r e t h e i r political c h a r a c t e r was c o m p l e t e l y attenuated." 73

(b) Since t h e r e is n o r e a s o n t h a t a n i n v e t e r a t e foe of pacifism s h o u l d b e overly c o n c e r n e d with t h e t a m i n g of totalized war, S c h m i t t ' s r e a l c o n c e r n m a y lie e l s e w h e r e , namely, in t h e p r e s e r v a ­ t i o n of a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r d e r in w h i c h wars c a n still b e w a g e d a n d conflicts resolved in this way. T h e p r a c t i c e of refusing to c o n d e m n w a r m a i n t a i n s t h e r e g u l a t o r y m e c h a n i s m of u n c o n s t r a i n e d n a t i o n a l self-assertion. F r o m this p o i n t of view, t h e evil to b e a v o i d e d is n o t total w a r b u t t h e d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of a s p h e r e of t h e political t h a t rests o n t h e classical division b e t w e e n d o m e s t i c a n d f o r e i g n policy. S c h m i t t rationalizes this in t e r m s of his o w n p e c u l i a r t h e o r y of t h e political. A c c o r d i n g t o this t h e o r y , a legally pacified d o m e s t i c policy m u s t b e s u p p l e m e n t e d by a b e l l i g e r e n t f o r e i g n policy l i c e n s e d by i n t e r n a t i o n a l law b e c a u s e t h e state, w h i c h enjoys a m o n o p o l y over t h e m e a n s of v i o l e n c e , c a n only u p h o l d law a n d o r d e r i n t h e face of t h e v i r u l e n t force of subversive d o m e s t i c e n e m i e s so l o n g as it p r e ­ serves a n d r e g e n e r a t e s its political s u b s t a n c e in t h e s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t e x t e r n a l e n e m i e s . T h i s s u b s t a n c e s u p p o s e d l y c a n only b e r e n e w e d in t h e willingness of a n a t i o n to kill a n d b e killed, since "the political" itself is essentially r e l a t e d to "the r e a l possibility of physical k i l l i n g . " 74

197 K a n t ' s I d e a of P e r p e t u a l P e a c e

T h e political is m a n i f e s t e d in t h e ability a n d t h e will of a p e o p l e to r e c o g n i z e t h e e n e m y a n d to assert itself in t h e face of "the n e g a t i o n of its o w n e x i s t e n c e " by "the o t h e r n e s s of t h e f o r e i g n . " T h e s e s c u r r i l o u s reflections o n "the e s s e n c e of t h e political" n e e d i n t e r e s t u s h e r e o n l y for t h e r o l e t h e y play in S c h m i t t ' s a r g u m e n t . A political existentialism t h a t i m b u e s t h e c o n c e p t of t h e political with vitalistic c o n n o t a t i o n s f o r m s t h e b a c k g r o u n d for t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e creativity of political p o w e r will b e t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o a destructive force o n c e it is b a r r e d f r o m t h e p r e d a t o r y i n t e r n a t i o n a l a r e n a of " c o n q u e r i n g v i o l e n c e . " T h e g l o b a l i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of h u m a n r i g h t s a n d d e m o c r a c y , w h i c h is d e s i g n e d to foster w o r l d p e a c e , w o u l d h a v e t h e u n i n t e n d e d effect of allowing w a r to g o b e y o n d t h e "formally j u s t " b o u n d s w i t h i n w h i c h it was h e l d by i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. W i t h o u t t h e safety valve of a d o m a i n in w h i c h it is given free r e i n , w a r will b e c o m e a u t o n o m o u s a n d o v e r w h e l m all s p h e r e s of civil life in m o d e r n society, a n d t h e r e b y d e s t r o y t h e c o m p l e x i t y of functionally d i f f e r e n t i a t e d societies. T h i s w a r n i n g a g a i n s t t h e c a t a s t r o p h i c c o n s e ­ q u e n c e s of a n a b o l i t i o n of w a r t h r o u g h legal pacification c a n only b e e x p l a i n e d by a m e t a p h y s i c s t h a t a p p e a l e d to t h e t h e n f a s h i o n a b l e b u t by n o w r a t h e r h a c k n e y e d a e s t h e t i c of "the s t o r m of steel." (2) O n e c a n certainly distill o n e specific a r g u m e n t o u t of this b e l l i g e r e n t Lebensphilosophie. A c c o r d i n g to S c h m i t t , b e h i n d t h e i d e o ­ logically g r o u n d e d "war a g a i n s t war," w h i c h t r a n s f o r m s t h e l i m i t e d military struggle between "organized national units" into an unlim­ i t e d p a r a m i l i t a r y civil war, lies t h e . universalism of t h a t h u m a n i s t m o r a l i t y d e v e l o p e d by Kant. It is clear t h a t S c h m i t t ' s r e a c t i o n t o U N p e a c e k e e p i n g a n d p e a c e ­ m a k i n g i n t e r v e n t i o n s w o u l d have b e e n n o different t h a n H a n s Mag­ n u s E n z e n s b e r g e r ' s : " T h e r h e t o r i c of universalism is specific to t h e West. Its p o s t u l a t e s a r e s u p p o s e d to h o l d in t h e s a m e way for all p e o p l e w i t h o u t e x c e p t i o n . Universalism k n o w s n o d i s t i n c t i o n of n e a r a n d far; it is u n c o n d i t i o n a l a n d abstract. . . . B u t since all of o u r possibilities of a c t i o n a r e finite, t h e g a p b e t w e e n claim a n d reality yawns ever wider. S o o n t h e t h r e s h o l d of objective hypocrisy is over­ s t e p p e d ; universalism t h e n reveals itself as a m o r a l t r a p . " T h u s it is allegedly t h e false a b s t r a c t i o n s of m o r a l h u m a n i s m t h a t p l u n g e u s i n t o self-delusion a n d m i s l e a d u s i n t o o v e r b u r d e n i n g ourselves in a 7 5

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hypocritical m a n n e r . T h e p r e s u m e d a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l limits over w h i c h s u c h a m o r a l i t y elevates itself a r e d e t e r m i n e d by E n z e n s b e r ger, following A r n o l d G e h l e n , in t e r m s of spatial p r o x i m i t y a n d social d i s t a n c e : a b e i n g w h i c h is h e w n f r o m s u c h c r o o k e d t i m b e r c a n f u n c t i o n m o r a l l y only in its i m m e d i a t e e n v i r o n m e n t . W h e n S c h m i t t s p e a k s of hypocrisy h e h a s i n s t e a d H e g e l ' s criticism of K a n t in m i n d . H e f u r n i s h e s his c o n t e m p t u o u s f o r m u l a " H u m a n ­ ity, Bestiality" with a n a m b i g u o u s c o m m e n t a r y , w h i c h at first g l a n c e m i g h t j u s t as well h a v e c o m e f r o m H o r k h e i m e r : "We say: t h e m a i n city c e m e t e r y a n d tactfully k e e p q u i e t a b o u t t h e s l a u g h t e r h o u s e . B u t s l a u g h t e r i n g is t a k e n for g r a n t e d ; a n d it w o u l d b e i n h u m a n e , even bestial, to u t t e r t h e w o r d ' s l a u g h t e r ' a l o u d . " T h i s a p h o r i s m is a m ­ b i g u o u s : it s e e m s at first sight to b e d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t t h e false, b e ­ c a u s e mystifying, a b s t r a c t i o n of P l a t o n i c g e n e r a l c o n c e p t s by w h i c h we all t o o often s u p p r e s s t h e reverse side of a civilization of victors, namely, t h e suffering of its m a r g i n a l i z e d victims. B u t this r e a d i n g , after t h e f a s h i o n of a c r i t i q u e of ideology, w o u l d r e q u i r e precisely t h e k i n d of e g a l i t a r i a n r e s p e c t a n d universal c o m p a s s i o n i n v o k e d by t h e m o r a l universalism S c h m i t t so v e h e m e n t l y o p p o s e s . W h a t his a n t i h u m a n i s m seeks to affirm ( a l o n g with Mussolini's a n d L e n i n ' s H e g e l ) is n o t t h e sacrificial l a m b , b u t r a t h e r s l a u g h t e r — H e g e l ' s s l a u g h t e r - b a n k of p e o p l e s , t h e " h o n o r of war"—for h e g o e s o n : " H u m a n i t y as s u c h c a n n o t wage war . . . . T h e c o n c e p t of h u m a n i t y e x c l u d e s t h e c o n c e p t of t h e e n e m y . " T h i s is S c h m i t t ' s a r g u m e n t : m o r a l h u m a n i s m d a n g e r o u s l y abstracts f r o m t h e n a t u r a l o r d e r of t h e political, t h e s u p p o s e d l y u n a v o i d a b l e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n f r i e n d a n d foe. B e c a u s e it s u b s u m e s "political" r e l a t i o n s u n d e r t h e c a t e g o r i e s of " g o o d " a n d "evil," it t u r n s t h e e n e m y i n t o "an i n h u m a n m o n s t e r t h a t m u s t n o t only b e r e p u l s e d b u t m u s t b e totally a n n i h i l a t e d . " A n d b e c a u s e t h e d i s c r i m i n a t o r y c o n c e p t of war c a n b e t r a c e d b a c k to t h e universalism of h u m a n rights, it is u l t i m a t e l y t h e i n f e c t i o n of inter­ n a t i o n a l law by m o r a l i t y t h a t e x p l a i n s t h e i n h u m a n i t y of m o d e r n wars a n d civil wars p e r p e t r a t e d "in t h e n a m e of h u m a n i t y . " 7 6

7 7

7 8

79

80

T h e r e c e p t i o n of this c r i t i q u e of m o r a l i t y h a s h a d baleful effects, q u i t e a p a r t f r o m t h e c o n t e x t in w h i c h S c h m i t t e m p l o y s it. F o r it fuses a c o r r e c t i n s i g h t with a fatal m i s t a k e w h i c h draws s u s t e n a n c e f r o m t h e friend-foe c o n c e p t i o n of t h e political. T h e k e r n e l of t r u t h is t h a t

199 Kant's Idea of Perpetual Peace

a n unmediated m o r a l i z a t i o n of law a n d politics d o e s in fact b r e a k t h r o u g h t h o s e p r o t e c t i v e z o n e s t h a t we w a n t to have s e c u r e d for legal p e r s o n s for g o o d , i n d e e d m o r a l , r e a s o n s . B u t it is a m i s t a k e to a s s u m e t h a t this m o r a l i z a t i o n c a n only b e p r e v e n t e d by k e e p i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l politics free f r o m law a n d t h e law free f r o m o r p u r g e d of morality. B o t h a s s u m p t i o n s a r e false given t h e p r e m i s e s of t h e r u l e of law a n d d e m o c r a c y : t h e i d e a of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state d e m a n d s t h a t t h e coercive force of t h e state b e c h a n n e l e d b o t h e x t e r n a l l y a n d i n t e r n a l l y t h r o u g h l e g i t i m a t e law; a n d t h e d e m o c r a t i c l e g i t i m a t i o n of law is i n t e n d e d to g u a r a n t e e t h a t law r e m a i n s in h a r m o n y with r e c o g n i z e d m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s . C o s m o p o l i t a n law is a logical c o n s e ­ q u e n c e of t h e i d e a of t h e constitutive r u l e of law. It establishes for t h e first t i m e a s y m m e t r y b e t w e e n t h e j u r i d i f i c a t i o n of social a n d political r e l a t i o n s b o t h w i t h i n a n d b e y o n d t h e state's b o r d e r s . S c h m i t t ' s m o s t r e v e a l i n g i n c o n s i s t e n c y is his insistence u p o n a n a s y m m e t r y b e t w e e n a pacified legal o r d e r in t h e d o m e s t i c s p h e r e a n d a b e l l i g e r e n t p o s t u r e in f o r e i g n r e l a t i o n s . Since h e also c o n ­ ceives of i n t e r n a l l y i m p o s e d civil p e a c e m e r e l y as a l a t e n t conflict b e t w e e n g o v e r n m e n t a l a u t h o r i t y a n d its r e p r e s s e d e n e m i e s , h e g r a n t s t h e wielders of state p o w e r t h e r i g h t to d e c l a r e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h e o p p o s i t i o n to b e i n t e r n a l e n e m i e s — a p r a c t i c e w h i c h h a s left its m a r k o n t h e F e d e r a l R e p u b l i c . I n c o n t r a s t with t h e constitu­ t i o n a l state, w h e r e i n d e p e n d e n t c o u r t s a n d t h e w h o l e b o d y of citi­ z e n s (in e x t r e m e cases, activated t h r o u g h civil d i s o b e d i e n c e ) d e c i d e sensitive q u e s t i o n s r e g a r d i n g u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l m e a s u r e s , S c h m i t t leaves it to t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e c u r r e n t r u l e r s to criminalize political o p p o n e n t s as o p p o n e n t s in a civil war. B e c a u s e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n ­ trols a r e l o o s e n e d in t h e s e m a r g i n a l a r e a s of i n t e r n a l affairs, p r e ­ cisely t h a t state of affairs results w h i c h S c h m i t t fears will follow f r o m t h e pacification of r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n states: t h e p e n e t r a t i o n of m o r a l c a t e g o r i e s i n t o a legally p r o t e c t e d z o n e of political a c t i o n a n d t h e t a r n i s h i n g of o p p o n e n t s as a g e n t s of evil. B u t t h e n it is i n c o n s i s t e n t to d e m a n d t h a t i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s s h o u l d r e m a i n i m m u n e f r o m r e g u l a t i o n s a n a l o g o u s to t h o s e of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state. 81

As a m a t t e r of fact, a n unmediated m o r a l i z a t i o n of politics w o u l d b e j u s t as h a r m f u l in t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l a r e n a as in t h e conflict between governments and their internal enemies—something that

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ironically S c h m i t t p e r m i t s , b e c a u s e h e locates t h e h a r m in t h e w r o n g p l a c e . B u t in b o t h cases t h e h a r m results solely f r o m t h e fact t h a t a legally p r o t e c t e d d o m a i n of political o r state a c t i o n is falsely c o d e d in two ways: first it is m o r a l i z e d , t h a t is, j u d g e d a c c o r d i n g to criteria of " g o o d " a n d "evil," a n d t h e n it is c r i m i n a l i z e d , h e n c e c o n d e m n e d in a c c o r d a n c e with criteria of "legal" a n d "illegal," w i t h o u t — a n d this is t h e decisive p o i n t t h a t S c h m i t t suppresses—-the legal p r e c o n d i ­ t i o n s of a n i m p a r t i a l j u d i c i a l a u t h o r i t y a n d a n e u t r a l system of crimi­ n a l p u n i s h m e n t in p l a c e . T h e h u m a n r i g h t s politics of a w o r l d organization b e c o m e s inverted into a h u m a n rights fundamentalism only w h e n it p r o v i d e s a m o r a l l e g i t i m a t i o n u n d e r t h e cover of a s h a m legal l e g i t i m a t i o n for a n i n t e r v e n t i o n w h i c h is in reality n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n a s t r u g g l e of o n e p a r t y against t h e o t h e r . I n s u c h cases, t h e w o r l d o r g a n i z a t i o n ( o r a n alliance a c t i n g in its n a m e ) e n g a g e s in d e c e p t i o n , b e c a u s e it passes off a m i l i t a r y conflict b e t w e e n two w a r r i n g p a r t i e s as a n e u t r a l p o l i c e m e a s u r e justified by e n f o r c e a b l e law a n d by t h e j u d g m e n t s of a c r i m i n a l c o u r t . "Morally justified a p p e a l s a r e in d a n g e r of t a k i n g o n f u n d a m e n t a l i s t f e a t u r e s w h e n t h e i r g o a l is n o t to i m p l e m e n t legal p r o c e d u r e s for [ e n a c t i n g as well as] a p p l y i n g a n d i m p l e m e n t i n g h u m a n rights, b u t i n s t e a d a r e a p ­ p l i e d directly to t h e i n t e r p r e t i v e s c h e m e by m e a n s of w h i c h a c c o u n t ­ ability for violations of h u m a n r i g h t s is d e t e r m i n e d , a n d w h e n t h e y a r e t h e sole basis for t h e d e m a n d e d s a n c t i o n s " (my i n t e r p o l a t i o n ) . 82

S c h m i t t d e f e n d s t h e f u r t h e r p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e j u r i d i f i c a t i o n of p o w e r politics b e y o n d t h e b o u n d a r i e s of a state, a n d h e n c e t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of h u m a n r i g h t s in a n a r e n a p r e ­ viously d o m i n a t e d by m i l i t a r y force, always and necessarily leads to s u c h h u m a n r i g h t s f u n d a m e n t a l i s m . T h i s assertion is ill f o u n d e d in t h a t it is b a s e d o n t h e false p r e m i s e t h a t h u m a n r i g h t s a r e m o r a l in n a t u r e a n d h e n c e t h a t t h e i r i m p l e m e n t a t i o n w o u l d imply a k i n d of m o r a l i z a t i o n . T h e p r o b l e m a t i c a s p e c t of t h e j u r i d i f i c a t i o n of inter­ n a t i o n a l affairs a l r e a d y m e n t i o n e d d o e s n o t r e s u l t f r o m t h e fact t h a t a c t i o n s previously u n d e r s t o o d as political a r e h e n c e f o r t h s u b s u m e d u n d e r legal c a t e g o r i e s . For, in c o n t r a s t with morality, t h e legal c o d e d o e s n o t r e q u i r e t h a t a c t i o n s b e s u b j e c t e d to a n i m m e d i a t e m o r a l e v a l u a t i o n in a c c o r d a n c e with criteria of " g o o d " a n d "evil." Klaus G i m t h e r clarifies t h e key p o i n t : " T h a t a political i n t e r p r e t a t i o n (in

201 Kant's Idea of Perpetual Peace

Carl S c h m i t t ' s sense) of violations of h u m a n r i g h t s is i n a d m i s s i b l e d o e s n o t m e a n t h a t a n u n m e d i a t e d m o r a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n c a n take its p l a c e . " H u m a n r i g h t s s h o u l d n o t b e c o n f u s e d with m o r a l rights. B u t n e i t h e r d o e s t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n law a n d m o r a l i t y w h i c h G i m t h e r u p h o l d s imply t h a t positive law h a s n o m o r a l c o n t e n t . T h r o u g h t h e d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e d u r e of political legislation, m o r a l a r g u m e n t s ( a m o n g o t h e r sorts) also flow i n t o t h e justification of e n a c t e d n o r m s a n d t h e r e b y i n t o law itself. As K a n t r e c o g n i z e d , law differs f r o m m o r a l i t y in t h e f o r m a l p r o p e r t i e s of legality. C e r t a i n aspects of c o n d u c t o p e n to m o r a l a s s e s s m e n t (for e x a m p l e , convic­ tions a n d motives) a r e p e r se e x e m p t e d f r o m legal r e g u l a t i o n . But, a b o v e all, t h e legal c o d e b i n d s t h e j u d g m e n t s a n d s a n c t i o n s of t h e p r o s e c u t i n g a g e n c i e s t o n a r r o w l y i n t e r p r e t e d , intersubjectively test­ a b l e c o n d i t i o n s of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o c e d u r e s , w h i c h a r e d e s i g n e d to p r o t e c t t h o s e a c c u s e d . W h e r e a s t h e m o r a l p e r s o n s t a n d s so to s p e a k n a k e d b e f o r e t h e i n n e r c o u r t of his o r h e r c o n s c i e n c e , t h e legal p e r s o n r e m a i n s w r a p p e d in t h e p r o t e c t i v e m a n t l e of—morally wellg r o u n d e d — i n d i v i d u a l liberties. T h e r e f o r e t h e c o r r e c t r e s p o n s e to t h e d a n g e r of a n u n m e d i a t e d m o r a l i z a t i o n of p o w e r politics is " n o t t h e d e m o r a l i z a t i o n of politics, b u t r a t h e r t h e d e m o c r a t i c t r a n s f o r m a ­ t i o n of m o r a l i t y i n t o a system of positive laws with legal p r o c e d u r e s for t h e i r a p p l i c a t i o n a n d i m p l e m e n t a t i o n . " H u m a n r i g h t s f u n d a ­ m e n t a l i s m is a v o i d e d n o t by r e n o u n c i n g t h e politics of h u m a n rights, b u t only t h r o u g h a c o s m o p o l i t a n t r a n s f o r r n a t i o r i ^ c f t h e state of n a t u r e a m o n g states i n t o a legal o r d e r . 83

85

8 _

Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State

M o d e r n c o n s t i t u t i o n s owe t h e i r e x i s t e n c e to a c o n c e p t i o n f o u n d in m o d e r n n a t u r a l law a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h citizens c o m e t o g e t h e r vol­ u n t a r i l y to f o r m a legal c o m m u n i t y of free a n d e q u a l c o n s o c i a t e s . T h e c o n s t i t u t i o n p u t s i n t o effect precisely t h o s e r i g h t s t h a t individu­ als m u s t g r a n t o n e a n o t h e r if t h e y w a n t to o r d e r t h e i r life t o g e t h e r legitimately by m e a n s of positive law. T h i s c o n c e p t i o n p r e s u p p o s e s t h e n o t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s (subjektive Rechte) a n d i n d i v i d u a l legal p e r s o n s as t h e b e a r e r s of r i g h t s . A l t h o u g h m o d e r n law establishes a basis for s t a t e - s a n c t i o n e d r e l a t i o n s of intersubjective r e c o g n i t i o n , t h e r i g h t s d e r i v e d f r o m t h e s e r e l a t i o n s p r o t e c t t h e v u l n e r a b l e integrity of legal subjects w h o a r e in every case individuals. I n t h e final analy­ sis it is a q u e s t i o n of p r o t e c t i n g t h e s e i n d i v i d u a l legal p e r s o n s , even if t h e integrity of t h e i n d i v i d u a l — i n law n o less t h a n in m o r a l i t y — d e p e n d s o n r e l a t i o n s of m u t u a l r e c o g n i t i o n r e m a i n i n g intact. C a n a t h e o r y of r i g h t s t h a t is so individualistically c o n s t r u c t e d d e a l a d e ­ q u a t e l y with struggles for r e c o g n i t i o n , in w h i c h w h a t s e e m s to b e at stake is t h e a r t i c u l a t i o n a n d assertion of collective identities? A c o n s t i t u t i o n c a n b e t h o u g h t of as a historical p r o j e c t t h a t e a c h g e n e r a t i o n of citizens c o n t i n u e s to p u r s u e . I n t h e d e m o c r a t i c consti­ t u t i o n a l state t h e exercise of political p o w e r is c o d e d in a d u a l m a n n e r : t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d h a n d l i n g of p r o b l e m s a n d t h e p r o c e ­ durally r e g u l a t e d m e d i a t i o n of i n t e r e s t s m u s t b e u n d e r s t a n d a b l e s i m u l t a n e o u s l y as actualizing a system of r i g h t s . B u t in t h e politi­ cal a r e n a t h o s e w h o e n c o u n t e r o n e a n o t h e r a r e collective a c t o r s 1

204 Chapter 8

c o n t e n d i n g a b o u t collective goals a n d t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of collective g o o d s . O n l y in t h e c o u r t r o o m a n d in legal d i s c o u r s e a r e r i g h t s a s s e r t e d a n d d e f e n d e d as a c t i o n a b l e i n d i v i d u a l rights, for w h i c h o n e c a n b r i n g suit. Existing law also h a s to b e i n t e r p r e t e d in n e w ways in different c o n t e x t s in view of c h a n g i n g n e e d s a n d interests. T h i s s t r u g g l e over t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a n d satisfaction of historically u n r e ­ d e e m e d claims is a s t r u g g l e for l e g i t i m a t e r i g h t s in w h i c h o n c e a g a i n collective a c t o r s a r e involved, c o m b a t i n g a lack of r e s p e c t for t h e i r dignity. I n this "struggle for r e c o g n i t i o n " p a r t i c i p a n t s voice collective e x p e r i e n c e s of violated integrity, as Axel H o n n e t h h a s s h o w n . C a n t h e s e p h e n o m e n a b e r e c o n c i l e d with a t h e o r y of r i g h t s t h a t is individualistically d e s i g n e d ? 2

T h e political a c h i e v e m e n t s of liberalism a n d social d e m o c r a c y t h a t a r e t h e p r o d u c t of t h e b o u r g e o i s e m a n c i p a t i o n m o v e m e n t s a n d t h e E u r o p e a n l a b o r m o v e m e n t suggest a n affirmative a n s w e r to this q u e s t i o n . B o t h a t t e m p t e d to o v e r c o m e t h e d i s e n f r a n c h i s e m e n t of u n d e r p r i v i l e g e d g r o u p s a n d with it t h e division of society i n t o social classes; b u t w h e r e liberal social r e f o r m c a m e i n t o play, t h e s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t t h e o p p r e s s i o n of collectivities w h o w e r e d e p r i v e d of e q u a l social o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o o k t h e f o r m of a s t r u g g l e for t h e social-welfarist universalization of civil r i g h t s . Since t h e b a n k r u p t c y of state socialism, this p e r s p e c t i v e h a s i n d e e d b e e n t h e only o n e r e m a i n i n g : t h e status of a d e p e n d e n t wage e a r n e r is to b e s u p p l e m e n t e d with r i g h t s to social a n d political p a r t i c i p a t i o n , a n d t h e m a s s of t h e p o p u ­ l a t i o n is t h e r e b y to b e given t h e o p p o r t u n i t y to live in realistic e x p e c t a t i o n of security, social j u s t i c e , a n d affluence. A m o r e equita­ b l e d i s t r i b u t i o n of collective g o o d s is to c o m p e n s a t e for t h e u n e q u a l c o n d i t i o n s of life in capitalist societies. T h i s a i m is t h o r o u g h l y c o m ­ p a t i b l e with t h e t h e o r y of rights, b e c a u s e t h e p r i m a r y g o o d s (in Rawls's sense) a r e e i t h e r d i s t r i b u t e d a m o n g individuals (like m o n e y , free t i m e , a n d services) o r u s e d by individuals (like t h e infrastruc­ t u r e s of t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , h e a l t h c a r e , a n d e d u c a t i o n ) a n d c a n t h u s take t h e f o r m of i n d i v i d u a l claims to benefits. At first g l a n c e , however, claims to t h e r e c o g n i t i o n of collective i d e n t i t i e s a n d to e q u a l r i g h t s for c u l t u r a l f o r m s of life a r e a different m a t t e r . Feminists, m i n o r i t i e s in m u l t i c u l t u r a l societies, p e o p l e s strug­ g l i n g for n a t i o n a l i n d e p e n d e n c e , a n d f o r m e r l y c o l o n i z e d r e g i o n s

205 Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic State

s u i n g for t h e equality of t h e i r c u l t u r e s o n t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l stage a r e all c u r r e n t l y fighting for s u c h claims. D o e s n o t t h e r e c o g n i t i o n of c u l t u r a l f o r m s of life a n d t r a d i t i o n s t h a t h a v e b e e n m a r g i n a l i z e d , w h e t h e r in t h e c o n t e x t of a majority c u l t u r e o r in a E u r o c e n t r i c g l o b a l society, r e q u i r e g u a r a n t e e s of status a n d survival—in o t h e r w o r d s , s o m e k i n d of collective r i g h t s t h a t s h a t t e r t h e o u t m o d e d s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e d e m o c r a t i c c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state, w h i c h is t a i l o r e d to i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s a n d in t h a t sense is "liberal"? C h a r l e s Taylor p r o v i d e s a c o m p l e x a n s w e r to this q u e s t i o n , a n a n s w e r t h a t a d v a n c e s t h e discussion significantly. As t h e c o m m e n ­ taries o n his essay p u b l i s h e d in t h e s a m e v o l u m e i n d i c a t e , his origi­ n a l i d e a s also i n s p i r e criticism. Taylor r e m a i n s a m b i g u o u s o n t h e decisive p o i n t . H e d i s t i n g u i s h e s two r e a d i n g s of t h e d e m o c r a t i c c o n ­ stitutional state, for w h i c h M i c h a e l Walzer p r o v i d e s t h e t e r m s Liber­ alism 1 a n d Liberalism 2. T h e s e d e s i g n a t i o n s suggest t h a t t h e s e c o n d r e a d i n g , w h i c h Taylor favors, m e r e l y c o r r e c t s a n i n a p p r o p r i a t e u n ­ d e r s t a n d i n g of liberal p r i n c i p l e s . O n closer e x a m i n a t i o n , however, Taylor's r e a d i n g attacks t h e p r i n c i p l e s themselves a n d calls i n t o ques­ t i o n t h e individualistic c o r e of t h e m o d e r n c o n c e p t i o n of f r e e d o m . 3

I

Taylor's "Politics o f Recognition"

Amy G u t m a n n makes the incontrovertible point that full public recognition as equal citizens may require two forms of respect: (1) respect for the unique identities of each individual, regardless of gender, race, or ethnicity, and (2) respect for those activities, practices, and ways of viewing the world that are particularly valued by, or associated with, mem­ bers of disadvantaged groups, including women, Asian-Americans, AfricanAmericans, Native Americans, and a multitude of other groups in the United States. 4

T h e s a m e t h i n g h o l d s , of c o u r s e , for Gastarbeiter [foreign w o r k e r s ] a n d o t h e r f o r e i g n e r s in G e r m a n y , for C r o a t s in Serbia, Russians in t h e U k r a i n e , a n d K u r d s in Turkey; for t h e disabled, h o m o s e x u a l s , a n d so o n . T h e d e m a n d for r e s p e c t is a i m e d n o t so m u c h at e q u a l ­ izing living c o n d i t i o n s as it is at p r o t e c t i n g t h e integrity of t h e t r a d i t i o n s a n d f o r m s of life in w h i c h m e m b e r s of g r o u p s t h a t h a v e b e e n d i s c r i m i n a t e d a g a i n s t c a n r e c o g n i z e themselves. Normally, of

206 Chapter 8

c o u r s e , t h e failure of c u l t u r a l r e c o g n i t i o n is c o n n e c t e d with gross social d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , a n d t h e two r e i n f o r c e e a c h o t h e r . T h e ques­ t i o n t h a t c o n c e r n s us h e r e is w h e t h e r t h e d e m a n d for r e s p e c t for o n e ' s c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n s follows f r o m t h e p r i n c i p l e of e q u a l r e s p e c t for e a c h individual, o r w h e t h e r , at least in s o m e cases, t h e s e two d e m a n d s will necessarily c o m e i n t o conflict with o n e a n o t h e r . Taylor p r o c e e d s o n t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e p r o t e c t i o n of collec­ tive i d e n t i t i e s c o m e s i n t o c o m p e t i t i o n with t h e r i g h t to e q u a l indi­ vidual liberties (subjektive Freiheiten)—Kant's o n e original h u m a n r i g h t — s o t h a t in t h e case of conflict a d e c i s i o n m u s t b e m a d e a b o u t w h i c h takes p r e c e d e n c e . T h e a r g u m e n t r u n s as follows: B e c a u s e t h e s e c o n d claim d i s t i n g u i s h e d by G u t m a n n r e q u i r e s c o n s i d e r a t i o n of precisely t h o s e p a r t i c u l a r i t i e s f r o m w h i c h t h e first claim s e e m s to abstract, t h e p r i n c i p l e of e q u a l r i g h t s h a s to b e p u t i n t o effect in two k i n d s of politics t h a t r u n c o u n t e r to o n e a n o t h e r — a politics of c o n s i d e r a t i o n of c u l t u r a l differences o n t h e o n e h a n d a n d a politics of universalization of i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s o n t h e o t h e r . T h e o n e is s u p p o s e d to c o m p e n s a t e for t h e p r i c e t h e o t h e r exacts with its e q u a l ­ izing universalism. Taylor spells o u t this o p p o s i t i o n — a n o p p o s i t i o n t h a t is falsely c o n s t r u e d , as I will try to s h o w — u s i n g t h e c o n c e p t s of t h e g o o d a n d t h e j u s t , d r a w n f r o m m o r a l t h e o r y . Liberals like Rawls a n d D w o r k i n call for a n ethically n e u t r a l legal o r d e r t h a t is s u p p o s e d to assure e v e r y o n e e q u a l o p p o r t u n i t y to p u r s u e his o r h e r o w n c o n c e p t i o n of t h e g o o d . I n c o n t r a s t , c o m m u n i t a r i a n s like Taylor a n d Walzer d i s p u t e t h e ethical n e u t r a l i t y of t h e law a n d t h u s c a n e x p e c t t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state, if n e e d b e , actively to a d v a n c e specific c o n ­ c e p t i o n s of t h e g o o d life. Taylor gives t h e e x a m p l e of t h e F r e n c h - s p e a k i n g m i n o r i t y t h a t f o r m s t h e majority in t h e C a n a d i a n p r o v i n c e of Q u e b e c . T h e fran­ c o p h o n e g r o u p claims t h e r i g h t for Q u e b e c to f o r m a "distinct society" w i t h i n t h e n a t i o n as a w h o l e . It w a n t s to s a f e g u a r d t h e integrity of its f o r m of life against t h e A n g l o - S a x o n majority c u l t u r e , a m o n g o t h e r t h i n g s by m e a n s of r e g u l a t i o n s t h a t f o r b i d i m m i g r a n t s a n d t h e F r e n c h - s p e a k i n g p o p u l a t i o n to s e n d t h e i r c h i l d r e n to E n g ­ lish-language schools, t h a t establish F r e n c h as t h e l a n g u a g e in w h i c h firms with m o r e t h a n fifty e m p l o y e e s will o p e r a t e , a n d t h a t in g e n ­ eral p r e s c r i b e F r e n c h as t h e l a n g u a g e of b u s i n e s s . A c c o r d i n g to

207 S t r u g g l e s for R e c o g n i t i o n i n t h e D e m o c r a t i c State

Taylor, a t h e o r y of r i g h t s of t h e first type w o u l d necessarily b e closed to collective goals of this k i n d : A society w i t h collective goals like Q u e b e c ' s violates this m o d e l . . . . O n this m o d e l , t h e r e is a d a n g e r o u s o v e r l o o k i n g of a n e s s e n t i a l b o u n d a r y in speak­ i n g of f u n d a m e n t a l r i g h t s t o t h i n g s like c o m m e r c i a l s i g n a g e i n t h e l a n g u a g e of o n e ' s c h o i c e . O n e h a s t o d i s t i n g u i s h t h e f u n d a m e n t a l liberties, t h o s e t h a t s h o u l d n e v e r b e i n f r i n g e d a n d t h e r e f o r e o u g h t t o b e unassailably e n ­ t r e n c h e d , o n o n e h a n d , f r o m privileges a n d i m m u n i t i e s t h a t a r e i m p o r t a n t , b u t t h a t c a n b e r e v o k e d o r r e s t r i c t e d for r e a s o n s of p u b l i c p o l i c y — a l t h o u g h o n e would n e e d a strong reason to d o this—on the other. 5

Taylor p r o p o s e s a n a l t e r n a t i v e m o d e l t h a t u n d e r c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s w o u l d p e r m i t basic r i g h t s to b e r e s t r i c t e d by g u a r a n t e e s of status a i m e d at p r o m o t i n g t h e survival of e n d a n g e r e d c u l t u r a l f o r m s of life a n d t h u s w o u l d p e r m i t policies t h a t "actively seek to create m e m b e r s of t h e c o m m u n i t y , for i n s t a n c e , in t h e i r a s s u r i n g t h a t f u t u r e g e n e r a ­ tions c o n t i n u e to identify as F r e n c h - s p e a k e r s . T h e r e is n o way t h a t t h e s e policies c o u l d b e s e e n as j u s t p r o v i d i n g a facility to a l r e a d y existing p e o p l e . " 6

Taylor m a k e s t h e case for his thesis of i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y by first p r e s e n t i n g t h e t h e o r y of r i g h t s t h r o u g h a selective r e a d i n g of Liber­ alism 1. H e d o e s n o t clearly d e f i n e e i t h e r t h e C a n a d i a n e x a m p l e o r t h e legal r e f e r e n c e of his p r o b l e m a t i c . Before I take u p t h e s e two p r o b l e m s , I w o u l d like to show t h a t w h e n p r o p e r l y u n d e r s t o o d t h e t h e o r y of r i g h t s is by n o m e a n s b l i n d to c u l t u r a l differences. Taylor u n d e r s t a n d s L i b e r a l i s m 1 as a t h e o r y a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h all legal c o n s o c i a t e s a r e g u a r a n t e e d e q u a l i n d i v i d u a l f r e e d o m s of c h o i c e a n d a c t i o n in t h e f o r m of basic r i g h t s . I n cases of conflict t h e c o u r t s d e c i d e w h o h a s w h i c h rights; t h u s t h e p r i n c i p l e of e q u a l r e s p e c t for e a c h p e r s o n h o l d s only i n t h e f o r m of a legally p r o t e c t e d a u t o n o m y t h a t every p e r s o n c a n u s e to realize his o r h e r p e r s o n a l life project. T h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e system of r i g h t s is p a t e r n a l i s t i c in t h a t it i g n o r e s half of t h e c o n c e p t of a u t o n o m y . It d o e s n o t take i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h a t t h o s e to w h o m t h e law is a d d r e s s e d c a n a c q u i r e a u t o n o m y (in t h e K a n t i a n sense) only t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t they c a n u n d e r s t a n d t h e m s e l v e s as t h e a u t h o r s of t h e laws to w h i c h they a r e subject as private legal p e r s o n s . L i b e r a l i s m 1 fails to r e c o g n i z e t h a t private a n d p u b l i c a u t o n o m y a r e co-original. It is n o t t h a t p u b l i c

208 Chapter 8

a u t o n o m y s u p p l e m e n t s a n d r e m a i n s e x t e r n a l to private a u t o n o m y b u t r a t h e r t h a t t h e r e is a n i n t e r n a l , t h a t is, c o n c e p t u a l l y n e c e s s a r y c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e two. F o r in t h e final analysis, private legal p e r s o n s c a n n o t even a t t a i n t h e e n j o y m e n t of e q u a l individual liber­ ties u n l e s s t h e y themselves, by j o i n t l y e x e r c i s i n g t h e i r a u t o n o m y as citizens, arrive at a clear u n d e r s t a n d i n g a b o u t w h a t i n t e r e s t s a n d c r i t e r i a a r e justified a n d in w h a t r e s p e c t s e q u a l t h i n g s will b e t r e a t e d equally a n d u n e q u a l t h i n g s u n e q u a l l y i n a n y p a r t i c u l a r case. B u t o n c e we take this internal c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n d e m o c r a c y a n d t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state seriously, it b e c o m e s clear t h a t t h e system of r i g h t s is b l i n d n e i t h e r t o u n e q u a l social c o n d i t i o n s n o r to c u l t u r a l differences. T h e c o l o r b l i n d n e s s of t h e selective r e a d i n g vanishes o n c e we r e c o g n i z e t h a t we ascribe to t h e b e a r e r s of i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s a n identity t h a t is c o n c e i v e d intersubjectively. P e r s o n s , i n c l u d i n g legal p e r s o n s , b e c o m e individualized only t h r o u g h a p r o c e s s of so­ cialization. A c o r r e c t l y u n d e r s t o o d t h e o r y of r i g h t s r e q u i r e s a poli­ tics of r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t p r o t e c t s t h e integrity of t h e i n d i v i d u a l in t h e life c o n t e x t s in w h i c h his o r h e r i d e n t i t y is f o r m e d . T h i s d o e s n o t r e q u i r e a n a l t e r n a t i v e m o d e l t h a t c o r r e c t s t h e individualistic d e s i g n of t h e system of r i g h t s t h r o u g h o t h e r n o r m a t i v e perspectives. All t h a t is r e q u i r e d is t h e c o n s i s t e n t actualization of t h e system of r i g h t s . T h e r e w o u l d b e little l i k e l i h o o d of this, of c o u r s e , w i t h o u t social m o v e m e n t s a n d political struggles. 7

I w o u l d like to show this with r e f e r e n c e to t h e h i s t o r y of f e m i n i s m , w h i c h h a s h a d to m a k e r e p e a t e d a t t e m p t s t o realize its legal a n d political goals in t h e face of s t r o n g r e s i s t a n c e . Like t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of law in W e s t e r n societies in g e n e r a l , t h e feminist politics of equality d u r i n g t h e p a s t h u n d r e d years follows a p a t t e r n t h a t c a n b e d e ­ s c r i b e d as a dialectic of de jure a n d de facto equality. Equality u n d e r t h e law g r a n t s f r e e d o m s of c h o i c e a n d a c t i o n t h a t c a n b e r e a l i z e d differently a n d t h u s d o n o t p r o m o t e a c t u a l equality in life c i r c u m ­ stances o r p o s i t i o n s of power. T h e factual p r e r e q u i s i t e s for t h e e q u a l o p p o r t u n i t y to m a k e u s e of equally d i s t r i b u t e d legal c o m p e t e n c e m u s t certainly b e fulfilled if t h e n o r m a t i v e m e a n i n g of legal equality is n o t to t u r n i n t o its o p p o s i t e . B u t t h e i n t e n d e d e q u a l i z a t i o n of a c t u a l life c i r c u m s t a n c e s a n d p o s i t i o n s of p o w e r s h o u l d n o t l e a d to normalizing i n t e r v e n t i o n s t h a t p e r c e p t i b l y restrict t h e capacities of

209 S t r u g g l e s for R e c o g n i t i o n i n t h e D e m o c r a t i c State

t h e p r e s u m e d beneficiaries to s h a p e t h e i r lives a u t o n o m o u s l y . As l o n g as policies a r e f o c u s e d o n s a f e g u a r d i n g private a u t o n o m y , while t h e i n t e r n a l c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e individual r i g h t s of private p e r s o n s a n d t h e p u b l i c a u t o n o m y of t h e citizens w h o p a r t i c i p a t e in m a k i n g t h e laws is o b s c u r e d f r o m view, t h e politics of r i g h t s will oscillate helplessly b e t w e e n t h e p o l e s of a liberal p a r a d i g m in t h e L o c k e a n sense a n d a n equally s h o r t s i g h t e d social-welfare p a r a d i g m . T h i s is t r u e of e q u a l t r e a t m e n t for m e n a n d w o m e n as w e l l . 8

Initially, t h e g o a l of t h e liberal policies was to d e t a c h t h e acquisition of status f r o m g e n d e r a n d to g u a r a n t e e w o m e n e q u a l o p p o r t u n i t y to c o m p e t e for j o b s , social s t a n d i n g , e d u c a t i o n , political power, a n d so o n , r e g a r d l e s s of t h e o u t c o m e s . B u t t h e f o r m a l equality t h a t was partially a c h i e v e d t h e r e b y only m a d e t h e de facto u n e q u a l t r e a t m e n t of w o m e n all t h e m o r e obvious. Social-welfare policies, especially in t h e a r e a s of social, labor, a n d family law, r e s p o n d e d t o this with special r e g u l a t i o n s r e g a r d i n g p r e g n a n c y , m o t h e r h o o d , a n d t h e social b u r ­ d e n s of divorce. Since t h e n , of c o u r s e , n o t only unfulfilled liberal d e m a n d s b u t also t h e a m b i v a l e n t c o n s e q u e n c e s of successfully im­ p l e m e n t e d social-welfare p r o g r a m s h a v e b e c o m e t h e object of femi­ nist criticism—-for e x a m p l e , t h e i n c r e a s e d e m p l o y m e n t risks t h a t w o m e n suffer as a r e s u l t of t h e s e c o m p e n s a t i o n s , t h e over-repre­ s e n t a t i o n of w o m e n in t h e lower w a g e b r a c k e t s , t h e p r o b l e m a t i c n o t i o n of "child welfare," t h e i n c r e a s i n g " f e m i n i z a t i o n " of poverty in g e n e r a l , a n d so o n . F r o m t h e legal p o i n t of view t h e r e is a s t r u c t u r a l basis for this reflexively p r o d u c e d d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , namely, t h e overg e n e r a l i z e d classifications of d i s a d v a n t a g e o u s situations a n d disad­ v a n t a g e d g r o u p s . T h e s e "false" classifications l e a d to " n o r m a l i z i n g " i n t e r v e n t i o n s i n t o t h e way p e o p l e l e a d t h e i r lives, with t h e r e s u l t t h a t t h e i n t e n d e d c o m p e n s a t i o n s t u r n i n t o n e w f o r m s of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n a n d i n s t e a d of b e i n g g u a r a n t e e d liberties p e o p l e a r e d e p r i v e d of f r e e d o m . I n t h e d o m a i n s of law t h a t f e m i n i s m is particularly c o n ­ c e r n e d with, social-welfare p a t e r n a l i s m is precisely t h a t , b e c a u s e leg­ islation a n d a d j u d i c a t i o n a r e o r i e n t e d to t r a d i t i o n a l p a t t e r n s of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a n d t h u s serve only to s t r e n g t h e n existing g e n d e r stereotypes. T h e classification of sex r o l e s a n d g e n d e r - d e p e n d e n t differences t o u c h e s f u n d a m e n t a l levels of a society's c u l t u r a l s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g .

210 Chapter 8

Radical f e m i n i s m is only n o w m a k i n g us aware of t h e fallible n a t u r e of this s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g , w h i c h is f u n d a m e n t a l l y d e b a t a b l e a n d in n e e d of revision. Radical f e m i n i s m rightly insists t h a t s u c h classifica­ tions, w h i c h i m b u e with political significance t h e differences in ex­ p e r i e n c e s a n d life c i r c u m s t a n c e s of specific g r o u p s of m e n a n d w o m e n with r e s p e c t to t h e e q u a l o p p o r t u n i t y to exercise i n d i v i d u a l liberties, m u s t b e clarified in t h e political p u b l i c s p h e r e , specifically in p u b l i c d e b a t e s a b o u t t h e a p p r o p r i a t e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of n e e d s . H e n c e this s t r u g g l e for equality for w o m e n is a p a r t i c u l a r l y g o o d illustration of t h e n e e d for a c h a n g e i n t h e p a r a d i g m a t i c u n d e r ­ s t a n d i n g of rights. T h e d e b a t e a b o u t w h e t h e r t h e a u t o n o m y of legal p e r s o n s is b e t t e r e n s u r e d t h r o u g h t h e i n d i v i d u a l f r e e d o m of private p e r s o n s to c o m p e t e o r t h r o u g h objectively g u a r a n t e e d claims to benefits for clients of welfare-state b u r e a u c r a c i e s is b e i n g r e p l a c e d by a p r o c e d u r a l i s t c o n c e p t i o n of r i g h t s a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h t h e d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e s s h a s to s a f e g u a r d b o t h private a n d p u b l i c a u t o n ­ o m y at t h e s a m e t i m e . T h e i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s t h a t a r e s u p p o s e d t o g u a r a n t e e w o m e n t h e a u t o n o m y t o s h a p e t h e i r private lives c a n n o t even b e a p p r o p r i a t e l y f o r m u l a t e d u n l e s s t h o s e affected a r t i c u l a t e a n d justify in p u b l i c discussion w h a t is r e l e v a n t t o e q u a l o r u n e q u a l t r e a t m e n t i n typical cases. S a f e g u a r d i n g t h e private a u t o n o m y of citizens with e q u a l r i g h t s m u s t g o h a n d in h a n d with activating t h e i r a u t o n o m y as citizens of t h e n a t i o n . 9

A "liberal" v e r s i o n of t h e system of r i g h t s t h a t fails to take this c o n n e c t i o n i n t o a c c o u n t will necessarily m i s c o n s t r u e t h e universal­ ism of basic r i g h t s as a n a b s t r a c t leveling of distinctions, a leveling of b o t h c u l t u r a l a n d social differences. T h e s e differences m u s t b e i n t e r p r e t e d in increasingly context-sensitive ways if t h e system of r i g h t s is to b e a c t u a l i z e d democratically. T h e p r o c e s s of universaliz­ i n g civil r i g h t s c o n t i n u e s to fuel t h e d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of t h e legal system, w h i c h c a n n o t e n s u r e t h e integrity of legal subjects w i t h o u t strict e q u a l t r e a t m e n t , d i r e c t e d by t h e citizens themselves, of t h e life c o n t e x t s t h a t s a f e g u a r d t h e i r identities. If t h e selective r e a d i n g of t h e t h e o r y of r i g h t s is c o r r e c t e d to i n c l u d e a d e m o c r a t i c u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e actualization of basic rights, t h e r e is n o n e e d to c o n t r a s t a t r u n c a t e d L i b e r a l i s m 1 with a m o d e l t h a t i n t r o d u c e s a n o t i o n of collective r i g h t s t h a t is alien to t h e system.

211 S t r u g g l e s for R e c o g n i t i o n i n t h e D e m o c r a t i c State

II Struggles for Recognition: T h e P h e n o m e n a and Levels o f Analysis F e m i n i s m , m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m , n a t i o n a l i s m , a n d t h e s t r u g g l e against t h e E u r o c e n t r i c h e r i t a g e of c o l o n i a l i s m a r e r e l a t e d p h e n o m e n a t h a t s h o u l d n o t b e c o n f u s e d with o n e a n o t h e r . T h e y a r e r e l a t e d i n t h a t w o m e n , ethnic a n d cultural minorities, a n d nations a n d cultures d e f e n d t h e m s e l v e s a g a i n s t o p p r e s s i o n , m a r g i n a l i z a t i o n , a n d disre­ s p e c t a n d t h e r e b y s t r u g g l e for t h e r e c o g n i t i o n of collective i d e n t i ­ ties, w h e t h e r in t h e c o n t e x t of a majority c u l t u r e o r w i t h i n t h e c o m m u n i t y of p e o p l e s . We a r e c o n c e r n e d h e r e with e m a n c i p a t i o n m o v e m e n t s w h o s e collective political goals a r e d e f i n e d p r i m a r i l y in c u l t u r a l t e r m s , even t h o u g h social a n d e c o n o m i c i n e q u a l i t i e s as well as political d e p e n d e n c i e s a r e always also involved. (a) F e m i n i s m is n o t , of c o u r s e , a m i n o r i t y c a u s e , b u t it is d i r e c t e d against a d o m i n a n t c u l t u r e t h a t i n t e r p r e t s t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p of t h e sexes in a n a s y m m e t r i c a l m a n n e r t h a t e x c l u d e s e q u a l r i g h t s . G e n d e r specific differences in life c i r c u m s t a n c e s a n d e x p e r i e n c e s d o n o t receive a d e q u a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n , e i t h e r legally o r informally. W o m e n ' s c u l t u r a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e m s e l v e s d o e s n o t receive d u e r e c o g n i t i o n , a n y m o r e t h a n d o e s t h e i r c o n t r i b u t i o n to t h e c o m m o n c u l t u r e ; given t h e p r e v a i l i n g definitions, w o m e n ' s n e e d s c a n n o t even b e a d e q u a t e l y a r t i c u l a t e d . T h u s t h e i r political s t r u g g l e for r e c o g n i ­ t i o n b e g i n s as a s t r u g g l e over t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of gender-specific a c h i e v e m e n t s a n d interests. Insofar as it is successful, it c h a n g e s t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e sexes a l o n g with t h e collective identity of w o m e n , t h e r e b y directly affecting m e n ' s u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e m ­ selves as well. T h e scale of values of t h e society as a w h o l e is u p for discussion; t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s of this p r o b l e m a t i z a t i o n e x t e n d i n t o c o r e private a r e a s a n d affect t h e e s t a b l i s h e d b o u n d a r i e s b e t w e e n t h e private a n d p u b l i c s p h e r e s as w e l l . 10

(b) T h e s t r u g g l e of o p p r e s s e d e t h n i c a n d c u l t u r a l m i n o r i t i e s for r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e i r collective i d e n t i t i e s is a different m a t t e r . Since t h e s e e m a n c i p a t i o n m o v e m e n t s also a i m at o v e r c o m i n g a n illegiti­ m a t e division of society, t h e majority c u l t u r e ' s u n d e r s t a n d i n g of itself c a n n o t r e m a i n u n t o u c h e d by t h e m . B u t f r o m t h e p o i n t of view of m e m b e r s of t h e majority c u l t u r e , t h e revised i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e

212 Chapter 8

a c h i e v e m e n t s a n d i n t e r e s t s of o t h e r s d o e s n o t necessarily alter t h e i r o w n r o l e in t h e s a m e way t h a t t h e r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n t h e sexes alters t h e r o l e of m e n . E m a n c i p a t i o n m o v e m e n t s in m u l t i c u l t u r a l societies a r e n o t a u n i ­ f o r m p h e n o m e n o n . T h e y p r e s e n t different c h a l l e n g e s d e p e n d i n g o n w h e t h e r t h e situation is o n e of e n d o g e n o u s m i n o r i t i e s b e c o m i n g a w a r e of t h e i r identity o r n e w m i n o r i t i e s arising t h r o u g h i m m i g r a ­ t i o n , a n d o n w h e t h e r t h e n a t i o n faced with t h e c h a l l e n g e h a s always u n d e r s t o o d itself to b e o p e n to i m m i g r a t i o n o n t h e basis of its h i s t o r y a n d political c u l t u r e o r w h e t h e r t h e n a t i o n a l self-under­ s t a n d i n g first n e e d s to b e adjusted to a c c o m m o d a t e t h e i n t e g r a t i o n of alien c u l t u r e s . T h e c h a l l e n g e b e c o m e s all t h e g r e a t e r t h e m o r e p r o f o u n d a r e t h e religious, racial, o r e t h n i c differences, o r t h e his­ torical-cultural d i s j u n c t i o n s to b e b r i d g e d . T h e c h a l l e n g e b e c o m e s all t h e m o r e painful t h e m o r e t h e t e n d e n c i e s to self-assertion take o n a f u n d a m e n t a l i s t a n d separatist c h a r a c t e r , w h e t h e r b e c a u s e e x p e ­ r i e n c e s of i m p o t e n c e l e a d t h e m i n o r i t y s t r u g g l i n g for r e c o g n i t i o n to take a regressive p o s i t i o n o r b e c a u s e t h e m i n o r i t y in q u e s t i o n h a s to u s e mass m o b i l i z a t i o n to a w a k e n c o n s c i o u s n e s s in o r d e r to a r t i c u l a t e a newly c o n s t r u c t e d identity. (c) T h e p o s i t i o n of e t h n i c a n d c u l t u r a l m i n o r i t i e s differs f r o m t h a t of p e o p l e s w h o see t h e m s e l v e s nationalistically, as ethnically a n d linguistically h o m o g e n e o u s g r o u p s against t h e b a c k g r o u n d of a c o m ­ m o n historical fate a n d w h o w a n t to p r o t e c t t h e i r identity n o t only as a n e t h n i c c o m m u n i t y b u t as a p e o p l e f o r m i n g a n a t i o n with t h e capacity for political a c t i o n . N a t i o n a l i s t m o v e m e n t s h a v e a l m o s t al­ ways m o d e l e d t h e m s e l v e s o n t h e r e p u b l i c a n n a t i o n - s t a t e t h a t e m e r g e d f r o m t h e F r e n c h R e v o l u t i o n . C o m p a r e d with t h e first g e n ­ e r a t i o n of nation-states, Italy a n d G e r m a n y w e r e " b e l a t e d n a t i o n s . " T h e p e r i o d of d e c o l o n i a l i z a t i o n after t h e S e c o n d W o r l d W a r r e p r e ­ sents yet a n o t h e r c o n t e x t . A n d t h e c o n s t e l l a t i o n s t h a t f o r m e d at t h e collapse of e m p i r e s like t h e O t t o m a n E m p i r e , t h e A u s t r o - H u n g a r i a n E m p i r e , o r t h e Soviet U n i o n w e r e different still. T h e situation of n a t i o n a l m i n o r i t i e s like t h e Basques, t h e K u r d s , o r t h e N o r t h e r n Irish, w h i c h e m e r g e d in t h e c o u r s e of t h e f o r m a t i o n of nation-states, is a g a i n different. A special case is t h e f o u n d i n g of t h e state of Israel, w h i c h e m e r g e d f r o m b o t h a n a t i o n a l - r e l i g i o u s m o v e m e n t a n d as a

213 S t r u g g l e s for R e c o g n i t i o n i n t h e D e m o c r a t i c State

r e s p o n s e t o t h e h o r r o r s of Auschwitz, in t h e British M a n d a t e of P a l e s t i n e c l a i m e d by A r a b s . (d) E u r o c e n t r i s m a n d t h e h e g e m o n y of W e s t e r n c u l t u r e a r e in t h e last analysis c a t c h w o r d s for a s t r u g g l e for r e c o g n i t i o n o n t h e inter­ n a t i o n a l level. T h e Gulf W a r m a d e u s aware of this. U n d e r t h e s h a d o w of a c o l o n i a l h i s t o r y t h a t is still vivid in p e o p l e ' s m i n d s , t h e allied i n t e r v e n t i o n was r e g a r d e d by religiously m o t i v a t e d masses a n d secularized intellectuals alike as a failure t o r e s p e c t t h e i d e n t i t y a n d a u t o n o m y of t h e Arabic-Islamic w o r l d . T h e historical r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e O c c i d e n t a n d t h e O r i e n t , a n d especially t h e r e l a t i o n ­ s h i p of t h e First to t h e f o r m e r T h i r d W o r l d , c o n t i n u e s t o b e a r t h e m a r k s of a d e n i a l of r e c o g n i t i o n . T h i s c u r s o r y classification of t h e p h e n o m e n a n e v e r t h e l e s s allows u s to p l a c e t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r u g g l e b e t w e e n t h e C a n a d i a n g o v e r n ­ m e n t a n d Q u e b e c o n t h e b o r d e r l i n e b e t w e e n (b) a n d (c). Below t h e t h r e s h o l d of a separatist m o v e m e n t to f o u n d t h e i r o w n state, t h e s t r u g g l e of t h e F r e n c h - s p e a k i n g m i n o r i t y is clearly o n e for r i g h t s t h a t w o u l d b e a c c o r d e d t h e m as a m a t t e r of c o u r s e if they w e r e to d e c l a r e t h e m s e l v e s a n i n d e p e n d e n t n a t i o n — a s Croatia, Slovenia, a n d Slovakia, t h e Baltic States, a n d G e o r g i a h a v e r e c e n t l y d o n e . B u t they a r e a s p i r i n g to b e c o m e a "state w i t h i n a state," s o m e t h i n g for w h i c h a b r o a d s p e c t r u m of f o r m s of federalist c o n s t r u c t i o n s is available, r a n g i n g f r o m a f e d e r a l state to a loose c o n f e d e r a t i o n . I n C a n a d a t h e d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of sovereign state p o w e r s is b o u n d u p with t h e q u e s t i o n of c u l t u r a l a u t o n o m y for a m i n o r i t y t h a t w o u l d like to b e c o m e a relative majority w i t h i n its o w n h o u s e . N e w m i n o r i t i e s w o u l d arise in t u r n , of c o u r s e , with a c h a n g e in t h e c o m p l e x i o n of t h e majority c u l t u r e . I n a d d i t i o n to d i s t i n g u i s h i n g t h e p h e n o m e n a c a t e g o r i z e d above, we n e e d to d i s t i n g u i s h different levels of t h e i r analysis. Taylor's r e m a r k s t o u c h o n at least t h r e e d i s c o u r s e s to w h i c h t h e s e p h e n o m ­ e n a h a v e given rise. (e) I n t h e d e b a t e a b o u t political c o r r e c t n e s s t h e s e p h e n o m e n a s e r v e d as a n o c c a s i o n for A m e r i c a n intellectuals to e n g a g e in a p r o c e s s of self-reflection a b o u t t h e status of m o d e r n i t y . N e i t h e r of t h e two p a r t i e s to t h e d e b a t e w a n t s to p u r s u e t h e p r o j e c t of m o d e r ­ nity o n its o w n t e r m s , as a p r o j e c t t h a t s h o u l d n o t b e a b a n d o n e d . 11

1 2

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W h a t t h e "radicals" see as a n e n c o u r a g i n g s t e p i n t o p o s t m o d e r n i t y a n d t o w a r d o v e r c o m i n g totalizing figures of t h o u g h t is, for t h e "tra­ ditionalists," t h e sign of a crisis t h a t c a n b e d e a l t with only t h r o u g h a r e t u r n to t h e classical t r a d i t i o n s of t h e West. We c a n leave this d e b a t e aside, since it c o n t r i b u t e s little to a n analysis of s t r u g g l e s for r e c o g n i t i o n in t h e d e m o c r a t i c c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state a n d virtually n o t h ­ i n g t o t h e i r political r e s o l u t i o n . 13

(f) T h e m o r e strictly philosophical discourses w h i c h take t h e s e p h e ­ n o m e n a as a p o i n t of d e p a r t u r e for d e s c r i b i n g g e n e r a l p r o b l e m s a r e o n a different level. T h e p h e n o m e n a a r e well s u i t e d to illustrate t h e difficulties of i n t e r c u l t u r a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g . T h e y i l l u m i n a t e t h e rela­ t i o n s h i p of m o r a l i t y t o ethical life (Sittlichkeit) a n d t h e i n t e r n a l c o n ­ n e c t i o n b e t w e e n m e a n i n g a n d validity, a n d t h e y p r o v i d e n e w fuel for t h e o l d q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r it is even possible to t r a n s c e n d t h e c o n t e x t of o u r o w n l a n g u a g e a n d c u l t u r e o r w h e t h e r all s t a n d a r d s of rationality r e m a i n b o u n d u p with specific worldviews a n d tradi­ tions. T h e o v e r w h e l m i n g e v i d e n c e of t h e f r a g m e n t a t i o n of m u l t i c u l ­ t u r a l societies a n d t h e B a b y l o n i a n c o n f u s i o n of t o n g u e s in a n overly c o m p l e x g l o b a l society s e e m s to i m p e l us t o w a r d holistic c o n c e p t i o n s of l a n g u a g e a n d c o n t e x t u a l i s t c o n c e p t i o n s of worldviews t h a t m a k e u s skeptical a b o u t universalist claims, w h e t h e r cognitive o r n o r m a ­ tive. T h e c o m p l e x a n d still u n s e t t l e d d e b a t e a b o u t rationality also h a s i m p l i c a t i o n s , of c o u r s e , for t h e c o n c e p t s of t h e g o o d a n d t h e j u s t with w h i c h we o p e r a t e w h e n we e x a m i n e t h e c o n d i t i o n s of a "politics of r e c o g n i t i o n . " B u t Taylor's p r o p o s a l itself h a s a different r e f e r e n c e , w h i c h lies at t h e level of law a n d politics. (g) T h e q u e s t i o n of t h e rights of o f f e n d e d a n d d i s r e s p e c t e d mi­ n o r i t i e s takes o n a legal sense w h e n it is p o s e d i n t h e s e t e r m s . Political decisions m u s t m a k e u s e of t h e r e g u l a t o r y f o r m of positive law if t h e y a r e to b e at all effective in c o m p l e x societies. I n t h e m e d i u m of law, however, we a r e d e a l i n g with a n artificial s t r u c t u r e with c e r t a i n n o r m a t i v e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s . M o d e r n law is formal in t h a t it rests o n t h e p r e m i s e t h a t a n y t h i n g t h a t is n o t explicitly f o r b i d d e n is p e r m i t t e d . It is individualistic in t h a t it m a k e s t h e i n d i v i d u a l p e r s o n t h e b e a r e r of r i g h t s . It is coercive in t h a t it is s a n c t i o n e d by t h e state a n d a p p l i e s only t o legal o r r u l e - c o n f o r m i n g b e h a v i o r — i t p e r m i t s t h e p r a c t i c e of r e l i g i o n b u t it c a n n o t p r e s c r i b e religious views. It is

215 S t r u g g l e s for R e c o g n i t i o n i n t h e D e m o c r a t i c State

positive law in t h a t it derives f r o m t h e (modifiable) decisions of a political legislature; a n d finally, it is procedurally enacted law in t h a t it is l e g i t i m a t e d by a d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e s s . Positive law r e q u i r e s p u r e l y legal behavior, b u t t h e law m u s t b e l e g i t i m a t e ; a l t h o u g h it d o e s n o t p r e s c r i b e t h e motives for o b e y i n g t h e law, it m u s t b e s u c h t h a t its a d d r e s s e e s c a n always o b e y it o u t of r e s p e c t for t h e law. A legal o r d e r is l e g i t i m a t e w h e n it safeguards t h e a u t o n o m y of all citizens t o a n e q u a l d e g r e e . T h e citizens a r e a u t o n o m o u s only if t h e a d d r e s s e e s of t h e law c a n also see t h e m s e l v e s as its a u t h o r s . A n d its a u t h o r s a r e free only as p a r t i c i p a n t s in legislative p r o c e s s e s t h a t a r e r e g u l a t e d in s u c h a way a n d take p l a c e in f o r m s of c o m m u n i c a t i o n s u c h t h a t e v e r y o n e c a n p r e s u m e t h a t t h e r e g u l a t i o n s e n a c t e d in t h a t way d e ­ serve g e n e r a l a n d rationally m o t i v a t e d assent. I n n o r m a t i v e t e r m s , t h e r e is n o s u c h t h i n g as a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state w i t h o u t d e m o c r a c y . Since, o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e s s itself h a s to b e legally institutionalized, t h e p r i n c i p l e of p o p u l a r sovereignty re­ quires those fundamental rights without which there can b e n o l e g i t i m a t e law at all: first a n d f o r e m o s t , t h e r i g h t to e q u a l individual f r e e d o m of c h o i c e a n d a c t i o n , w h i c h in t u r n p r e s u p p o s e s c o m p r e ­ h e n s i v e legal p r o t e c t i o n of individuals. As s o o n as we t r e a t a p r o b l e m as a legal p r o b l e m , we b r i n g i n t o play a c o n c e p t i o n of m o d e r n law t h a t forces u s — o n c o n c e p t u a l g r o u n d s a l o n e — t o o p e r a t e with t h e a r c h i t e c t o n i c s of t h e constitu­ t i o n a l state a n d its w e a l t h of p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s . T h i s h a s i m p l i c a t i o n s for t h e way we d e a l with t h e p r o b l e m of s e c u r i n g e q u a l legal r i g h t s a n d e q u a l r e c o g n i t i o n for g r o u p s t h a t a r e culturally d e f i n e d , t h a t is, collectivities t h a t a r e d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m o t h e r collectivities o n t h e basis of t r a d i t i o n , f o r m s of life, e t h n i c origins, a n d so o n — a n d w h o s e m e m b e r s w a n t to b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m all o t h e r collectivities in o r d e r to m a i n t a i n a n d d e v e l o p t h e i r identity. Ill

T h e P e r m e a t i o n o f the Constitutional State by Ethics

F r o m t h e p o i n t of view of legal t h e o r y , t h e p r i m a r y q u e s t i o n t h a t m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m raises is t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e ethical n e u t r a l i t y of law a n d politics. By "ethical" I m e a n all q u e s t i o n s t h a t r e l a t e to c o n c e p ­ tions of t h e g o o d life, o r a life t h a t is n o t m i s s p e n t . Ethical q u e s t i o n s

216 Chapter 8

c a n n o t b e e v a l u a t e d f r o m t h e " m o r a l p o i n t of view" of w h e t h e r s o m e t h i n g is "equally g o o d for e v e r y o n e ; " r a t h e r , i m p a r t i a l j u d g ­ m e n t of s u c h q u e s t i o n s is b a s e d o n s t r o n g evaluations a n d d e t e r ­ m i n e d by t h e s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d perspectival life-projects of p a r t i c u l a r g r o u p s , t h a t is, by w h a t is f r o m t h e i r p o i n t of view " g o o d for u s , " all t h i n g s c o n s i d e r e d . T h e first-person r e f e r e n c e , a n d h e n c e t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p to t h e identity of a g r o u p (or a n i n d i v i d u a l ) , is g r a m m a t i c a l l y i n s c r i b e d in e t h i c a l q u e s t i o n s . I will u s e t h e e x a m p l e of t h e C a n a d i a n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e b a t e to l o o k at t h e liberal d e m a n d for ethical n e u t r a l i t y of t h e law in r e l a t i o n to t h e ethical-political s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of a n a t i o n of citizens. T h e n e u t r a l i t y of t h e l a w — a n d of t h e d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e s s of e n ­ a c t i n g laws—is s o m e t i m e s u n d e r s t o o d to m e a n t h a t political q u e s ­ tions of a n ethical n a t u r e m u s t b e k e p t off t h e a g e n d a a n d o u t of t h e discussion by "gag r u l e s " b e c a u s e they a r e n o t susceptible to i m p a r t i a l legal r e g u l a t i o n . O n this view, in t h e sense of L i b e r a l i s m 1, t h e state is n o t to b e p e r m i t t e d t o p u r s u e a n y collective goals b e y o n d g u a r a n t e e i n g t h e p e r s o n a l f r e e d o m a n d t h e welfare a n d security of its citizens. T h e a l t e r n a t i v e m o d e l (in t h e sense of L i b e r a l i s m 2 ) , in c o n t r a s t , e x p e c t s t h e state to g u a r a n t e e t h e s e f u n d a m e n t a l r i g h t s in g e n e r a l b u t also b e y o n d t h a t to i n t e r v e n e o n b e h a l f of t h e survival a n d a d v a n c e m e n t of a "particular n a t i o n , c u l t u r e , r e l i g i o n , o r of a (limited) set of n a t i o n s , c u l t u r e s a n d r e l i g i o n s , " in M i c h a e l Walzer's f o r m u l a t i o n . Walzer r e g a r d s this m o d e l t o o as f u n d a m e n t a l ; it leaves r o o m , however, for citizens to c h o o s e to give priority t o i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s u n d e r c e r t a i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s . Walzer s h a r e s Taylor's p r e m i s e t h a t conflicts b e t w e e n t h e s e two f u n d a m e n t a l n o r m a t i v e o r i e n t a t i o n s a r e q u i t e possible a n d t h a t in s u c h cases only L i b e r a l i s m 2 p e r m i t s collective goals a n d i d e n t i t i e s t o b e given p r e c e d e n c e . Now, t h e t h e o r y of r i g h t s d o e s assert t h e a b s o l u t e p r e c e d e n c e of r i g h t s over collective g o o d s , so t h a t a r g u m e n t s a b o u t goals, as D w o r k i n shows, c a n only " t r u m p " claims b a s e d o n individual r i g h t s if t h e s e goals c a n in t u r n b e justified in t h e light of o t h e r r i g h t s t h a t take p r e c e d e n c e . B u t t h a t a l o n e is n o t sufficient t o s u p p o r t t h e c o m m u n i t a r i a n view, w h i c h Taylor a n d Walzer s h a r e , t h a t t h e system of r i g h t s is b l i n d to claims to t h e p r o t e c t i o n of c u l t u r a l f o r m s of life a n d collective i d e n ­ tities a n d is t h u s "leveling" a n d in n e e d of revision. 1 4

217 S t r u g g l e s for R e c o g n i t i o n i n t h e D e m o c r a t i c State

E a r l i e r I u s e d t h e e x a m p l e of t h e feminist politics of equality to m a k e a g e n e r a l p o i n t , namely, t h a t t h e d e m o c r a t i c e l a b o r a t i o n of a system of r i g h t s i n c o r p o r a t e s n o t only g e n e r a l political goals b u t also t h e collective goals t h a t a r e a r t i c u l a t e d in struggles for r e c o g n i t i o n . F o r in d i s t i n c t i o n to m o r a l n o r m s w h i c h r e g u l a t e possible i n t e r a c ­ tions b e t w e e n s p e a k i n g a n d a c t i n g subjects in g e n e r a l , legal n o r m s refer to t h e n e t w o r k of i n t e r a c t i o n s in a specific society. L e g a l n o r m s a r e d e r i v e d f r o m t h e d e c i s i o n s of a local l a w m a k i n g b o d y a n d apply w i t h i n a p a r t i c u l a r g e o g r a p h i c a l a r e a of t h e state to a socially delim­ i t e d collectivity of m e m b e r s of t h a t state. W i t h i n this well-defined s p h e r e of validity, legal n o r m s p u t t h e political decisions with w h i c h a society o r g a n i z e d as a state acts u p o n itself i n t o t h e f o r m of collec­ tively b i n d i n g p r o g r a m s . T o b e s u r e , c o n s i d e r a t i o n of collective goals is n o t p e r m i t t e d to dissolve t h e s t r u c t u r e of t h e law. It m a y n o t d e s t r o y t h e f o r m of t h e law as s u c h a n d t h e r e b y n e g a t e t h e differ­ e n c e b e t w e e n law a n d politics. B u t it is i n h e r e n t in t h e c o n c r e t e n a t u r e of t h e m a t t e r s to b e r e g u l a t e d t h a t in t h e m e d i u m of law—as o p p o s e d to morality—-the p r o c e s s of setting n o r m a t i v e r u l e s for m o d e s of b e h a v i o r is o p e n to i n f l u e n c e by t h e society's political goals. F o r this r e a s o n every legal system is also t h e e x p r e s s i o n of a p a r t i c u l a r f o r m of life a n d n o t m e r e l y a reflection of t h e universal c o n t e n t of basic rights. O f c o u r s e , legislative decisions m u s t b e u n ­ d e r s t o o d as actualizing t h e system of r i g h t s , a n d policies m u s t b e u n d e r s t o o d as a n e l a b o r a t i o n of t h a t system; b u t t h e m o r e c o n c r e t e t h e m a t t e r at h a n d , t h e m o r e t h e s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of a collectivity a n d its f o r m of life (as well as t h e b a l a n c e b e t w e e n c o m p e t i n g g r o u p interests a n d an informed choice between alternative ends a n d m e a n s ) a r e e x p r e s s e d in t h e acceptability of t h e way t h e m a t t e r is legally r e g u l a t e d . We see this in t h e b r o a d s p e c t r u m of r e a s o n s t h a t e n t e r i n t o t h e r a t i o n a l p r o c e s s by w h i c h t h e legislature's o p i n i o n a n d will a r e f o r m e d : n o t only m o r a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , p r a g m a t i c c o n s i d e r a ­ tions, a n d t h e results of fair n e g o t i a t i o n s , b u t e t h i c a l r e a s o n s as well e n t e r i n t o d e l i b e r a t i o n s a n d justifications of legislative decisions. To t h e e x t e n t to w h i c h t h e s h a p i n g of citizens' political o p i n i o n a n d will is o r i e n t e d to t h e i d e a of actualizing rights, it certainly c a n n o t , as t h e c o m m u n i t a r i a n s suggest, b e e q u a t e d with a p r o c e s s by w h i c h citizens r e a c h a g r e e m e n t a b o u t t h e i r ethical-political self-

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1 5

u n d e r s t a n d i n g . B u t t h e p r o c e s s of actualizing r i g h t s is i n d e e d e m ­ b e d d e d in c o n t e x t s t h a t r e q u i r e s u c h discourses as a n i m p o r t a n t c o m p o n e n t of politics—discussions a b o u t a s h a r e d c o n c e p t i o n of t h e g o o d a n d a d e s i r e d f o r m of life t h a t is a c k n o w l e d g e d t o b e a u t h e n t i c . I n s u c h discussions t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s clarify t h e way they w a n t to u n d e r s t a n d t h e m s e l v e s as citizens of a specific r e p u b l i c , as i n h a b i t a n t s of a specific r e g i o n , as h e i r s to a specific c u l t u r e , w h i c h t r a d i t i o n s they w a n t to p e r p e t u a t e a n d w h i c h t h e y w a n t to discon­ t i n u e , h o w t h e y w a n t t o d e a l with t h e i r history, with o n e a n o t h e r , with n a t u r e , a n d so o n . A n d of c o u r s e t h e c h o i c e of a n official l a n g u a g e o r a d e c i s i o n a b o u t t h e c u r r i c u l u m of p u b l i c schools affects t h e n a t i o n ' s ethical s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g . B e c a u s e ethical-political d e ­ cisions a r e a n u n a v o i d a b l e p a r t of politics, a n d b e c a u s e t h e i r legal r e g u l a t i o n e x p r e s s e s t h e collective i d e n t i t y of a n a t i o n of citizens, t h e y c a n s p a r k c u l t u r a l battles in w h i c h d i s r e s p e c t e d m i n o r i t i e s s t r u g g l e against a n insensitive majority c u l t u r e . W h a t sets off t h e battles is n o t t h e ethical n e u t r a l i t y of t h e legal o r d e r b u t r a t h e r t h e fact t h a t every legal c o m m u n i t y a n d every d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e s s for actualizing basic r i g h t s is inevitably p e r m e a t e d by ethics. We see e v i d e n c e of this, for i n s t a n c e , in t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l g u a r a n t e e s enjoyed by C h r i s t i a n c h u r c h e s in c o u n t r i e s like G e r m a n y — d e s p i t e f r e e d o m of r e l i g i o n — o r in t h e r e c e n t l y c h a l l e n g e d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l g u a r a n t e e of status a c c o r d e d t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l family b u t n o t to o t h e r m a r r i a g e ­ like a r r a n g e m e n t s . I n this c o n t e x t , it is of i n t e r e s t t h a t b o t h empirically a n d n o r m a tively s u c h ethical-political decisions d e p e n d o n t h e c o n t i n g e n t c o m ­ p o s i t i o n of t h e citizenry of t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e . T h e social m a k e u p of t h e p o p u l a t i o n of a state is t h e r e s u l t of historical c i r c u m s t a n c e s extrinsic to t h e system of r i g h t s a n d t h e p r i n c i p l e s of t h e constitu­ t i o n a l state. It d e t e r m i n e s t h e totality of p e r s o n s w h o live t o g e t h e r in a t e r r i t o r y a n d a r e b o u n d by t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n , t h a t is, by t h e d e c i s i o n of t h e f o u n d i n g f a t h e r s to o r d e r t h e i r life t o g e t h e r legiti­ m a t e l y by m e a n s of positive law; as d e s c e n d a n t s , citizens h a v e implic­ itly (or as n a t u r a l i z e d citizens even explicitly) a g r e e d to c o n t i n u e to p u r s u e a p r e e x i s t i n g c o n s t i t u t i o n a l project. T h r o u g h t h e i r socializa­ t i o n processes, however, t h e p e r s o n s of w h i c h a state is c o m p o s e d at any given t i m e also e m b o d y t h e c u l t u r a l f o r m s of life in w h i c h t h e y

219 Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic State

h a v e d e v e l o p e d t h e i r i d e n t i t y — e v e n if they h a v e in t h e m e a n t i m e b e c o m e d i s e n g a g e d f r o m t h e t r a d i t i o n s of t h e i r origins. P e r s o n s — o r better, t h e i r p e r s o n a l i t y s t r u c t u r e s — f o r m t h e n o d a l p o i n t s , as it w e r e , in a n ascriptive n e t w o r k of c u l t u r e s a n d t r a d i t i o n s , of i n t e r s u b ­ jectively s h a r e d c o n t e x t s of life a n d e x p e r i e n c e . A n d this n e t w o r k also f o r m s t h e h o r i z o n w i t h i n w h i c h t h e citizens of t h e n a t i o n , willingly o r n o t , c o n d u c t t h e ethical-political discourses i n w h i c h they a t t e m p t to r e a c h a g r e e m e n t o n t h e i r s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g . If t h e p o p u ­ l a t i o n of citizens as a w h o l e shifts, this h o r i z o n will c h a n g e as well; n e w d i s c o u r s e s will b e h e l d a b o u t t h e s a m e q u e s t i o n s , a n d n e w d e c i s i o n s will b e r e a c h e d . N a t i o n a l m i n o r i t i e s a r e at least intuitively aware of this, a n d it is a n i m p o r t a n t m o t i v e for d e m a n d i n g t h e i r o w n state, or, as in t h e unsuccessful M e e c h L a k e draft c o n s t i t u t i o n , for d e m a n d i n g to b e r e c o g n i z e d as a "distinct society." If t h e franco­ p h o n e m i n o r i t y in C a n a d a w e r e t o c o n s t i t u t e itself as a legal c o m ­ munity, it w o u l d f o r m o t h e r majorities o n i m p o r t a n t ethical-political q u e s t i o n s t h r o u g h t h e s a m e d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e s s e s a n d w o u l d arrive at r e g u l a t o r y d e c i s i o n s different f r o m t h e o n e s C a n a d i a n s as a w h o l e have hitherto reached. „ 16

As t h e h i s t o r y of t h e f o r m a t i o n of nation-states s h o w s , t h e crea­ t i o n of n e w n a t i o n a l b o u n d a r i e s gives rise t o n e w n a t i o n a l m i n o r i t i e s . T h e p r o b l e m d o e s n o t disappear, e x c e p t at t h e p r i c e of " e t h n i c c l e a n s i n g " — a p r i c e t h a t c a n n o t b e politically o r m o r a l l y justified. T h e d o u b l e - e d g e d n a t u r e of t h e "right" to n a t i o n a l self-determina­ t i o n is d e m o n s t r a t e d clearly in t h e c a s e of t h e K u r d s , w h o a r e s p r e a d across t h r e e different c o u n t r i e s , o r B o s n i a - H e r z o g o v i n a , w h e r e e t h ­ n i c g r o u p s a r e b a t t l i n g o n e a n o t h e r mercilessly. O n t h e o n e h a n d , a collectivity t h a t t h i n k s of itself as a c o m m u n i t y with its o w n identity attains a n e w level of r e c o g n i t i o n by t a k i n g t h e s t e p of b e c o m i n g a n a t i o n in its o w n r i g h t . It c a n n o t r e a c h this level as a p r e p o l i t i c a l linguistic a n d e t h n i c c o m m u n i t y , o r e v e n as a n i n c o r p o r a t e d o r f r a g m e n t e d "cultural n a t i o n . " T h e n e e d to b e r e c o g n i z e d as a na­ tion-state is intensified in t i m e s of crisis, w h e n t h e p o p u l a c e clings to t h e ascriptive signs of a regressively revitalized collective identity, as for i n s t a n c e after t h e d i s s o l u t i o n of t h e Soviet e m p i r e . T h i s k i n d of s u p p o r t offers d u b i o u s c o m p e n s a t i o n for w e l l - f o u n d e d fears a b o u t t h e f u t u r e a n d lack of social stability. O n t h e o t h e r h a n d ,

220 Chapter 8

n a t i o n a l i n d e p e n d e n c e is often to b e h a d only at t h e p r i c e of civil wars, n e w k i n d s of r e p r e s s i o n , o r e n s u i n g p r o b l e m s t h a t p e r p e t u a t e t h e initial conflicts with t h e signs reversed. T h e situation is d i f f e r e n t in C a n a d a , w h e r e r e a s o n a b l e efforts a r e b e i n g m a d e to find a federalist s o l u t i o n t h a t will leave t h e n a t i o n as a w h o l e i n t a c t b u t will t r y to s a f e g u a r d t h e c u l t u r a l a u t o n o m y of a p a r t of it by d e c e n t r a l i z i n g state p o w e r s . If t h e s e efforts s u c c e e d , t h e p o r t i o n of t h e citizenry t h a t p a r t i c i p a t e s in t h e d e m o c r a t i c p r o c ­ ess in specific a r e a s of policy will c h a n g e , b u t t h e p r i n c i p l e s of t h a t p r o c e s s will n o t . F o r t h e t h e o r y of r i g h t s in n o way forbids t h e citizens of a d e m o c r a t i c c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state t o assert a c o n c e p t i o n of t h e g o o d in t h e i r g e n e r a l legal o r d e r , a c o n c e p t i o n t h e y e i t h e r a l r e a d y s h a r e o r h a v e c o m e to a g r e e o n t h r o u g h political discussion. It d o e s , however, f o r b i d t h e m to privilege o n e f o r m of life at t h e e x p e n s e of o t h e r s w i t h i n t h e n a t i o n . I n f e d e r a l versions of t h e na­ tion-state this is t r u e at b o t h t h e f e d e r a l a n d t h e state levels. If I a m n o t m i s t a k e n , in C a n a d a t h e d e b a t e is n o t a b o u t this p r i n c i p l e of e q u a l r i g h t s b u t a b o u t t h e n a t u r e a n d e x t e n t of t h e state p o w e r s t h a t a r e to b e t r a n s f e r r e d to t h e P r o v i n c e of Q u e b e c . 1 7

IV

Equal Rights to Coexistence vs. the Preservation o f S p e c i e s

F e d e r a l i z a t i o n is a possible s o l u t i o n only w h e n m e m b e r s of d i f f e r e n t e t h n i c g r o u p s a n d c u l t u r a l lifeworlds live in m o r e o r less s e p a r a t e g e o g r a p h i c a l areas. I n m u l t i c u l t u r a l societies like t h e U n i t e d States this is n o t t h e case. N o r will it b e t h e case in c o u n t r i e s like G e r m a n y , w h e r e t h e e t h n i c c o m p o s i t i o n of t h e p o p u l a t i o n is c h a n g i n g u n d e r t h e p r e s s u r e of g l o b a l waves of m i g r a t i o n . Even if Q u e b e c w e r e to b e c o m e culturally a u t o n o m o u s , it w o u l d find itself in t h e s a m e situ­ a t i o n , h a v i n g m e r e l y t r a d e d a n E n g l i s h majority c u l t u r e for a F r e n c h o n e . L e t us a s s u m e for t h e sake of a r g u m e n t t h a t a well-functioning p u b l i c s p h e r e with o p e n c o m m u n i c a t i o n s t r u c t u r e s t h a t p e r m i t a n d p r o m o t e discussions o r i e n t e d to s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g exists in s u c h m u l t i c u l t u r a l societies a g a i n s t t h e b a c k g r o u n d of a liberal c u l t u r e a n d o n t h e basis of v o l u n t a r y associations. T h e n t h e d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e s s of actualizing e q u a l i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s c a n also e x t e n d to g u a r a n t e e i n g different e t h n i c g r o u p s a n d t h e i r c u l t u r a l f o r m s of life

221 S t r u g g l e s for R e c o g n i t i o n i n t h e D e m o c r a t i c State

e q u a l r i g h t s to c o e x i s t e n c e . T h i s d o e s n o t r e q u i r e special justifica­ t i o n o r a n a l t e r n a t i v e p r i n c i p l e . F o r f r o m a n o r m a t i v e p o i n t of view, t h e integrity of t h e individual legal p e r s o n c a n n o t b e g u a r a n t e e d w i t h o u t p r o t e c t i n g t h e intersubjectively s h a r e d e x p e r i e n c e s a n d life c o n t e x t s in w h i c h t h e p e r s o n h a s b e e n socialized a n d h a s f o r m e d his o r h e r identity. T h e i d e n t i t y of t h e i n d i v i d u a l is i n t e r w o v e n with collective i d e n t i t i e s a n d c a n b e stabilized only in a c u l t u r a l n e t w o r k t h a t c a n n o t b e a p p r o p r i a t e d as private p r o p e r t y a n y m o r e t h a n t h e m o t h e r t o n g u e itself c a n b e . H e n c e t h e individual r e m a i n s t h e b e a r e r of "rights to c u l t u r a l m e m b e r s h i p , " in Will Kymlicka's p h r a s e . B u t as t h e dialectic of legal a n d factual equality plays itself o u t , it gives rise to extensive g u a r a n t e e s of status, r i g h t s t o selfa d m i n i s t r a t i o n , i n f r a s t r u c t u r a l benefits, subsidies, a n d so o n . I n ar­ g u i n g for s u c h g u a r a n t e e s , e n d a n g e r e d i n d i g e n o u s c u l t u r e s c a n a d v a n c e special m o r a l r e a s o n s arising f r o m t h e h i s t o r y of a c o u n t r y t h a t h a s b e e n a p p r o p r i a t e d by t h e majority c u l t u r e . Similar argu­ m e n t s in favor of "reverse d i s c r i m i n a t i o n " c a n b e a d v a n c e d for t h e l o n g - s u p p r e s s e d a n d disavowed c u l t u r e s of f o r m e r slaves. 1 8

T h e s e a n d similar o b l i g a t i o n s arise f r o m legal claims a n d n o t f r o m a g e n e r a l a s s e s s m e n t of t h e value of t h e c u l t u r e in q u e s t i o n . Taylor's politics of r e c o g n i t i o n w o u l d b e s t a n d i n g o n shaky g r o u n d if it d e p e n d e d o n t h e " p r e s u m p t i o n of e q u a l v a l u e " of c u l t u r e s a n d t h e i r specific c o n t r i b u t i o n s to w o r l d civilization. T h e r i g h t to e q u a l r e s p e c t , w h i c h e v e r y o n e c a n d e m a n d in t h e life c o n t e x t s in w h i c h his o r h e r i d e n t i t y is f o r m e d as well as e l s e w h e r e , h a s n o t h i n g to d o with t h e p r e s u m e d e x c e l l e n c e of his o r h e r c u l t u r e of o r i g i n , t h a t is, with g e n e r a l l y v a l u e d a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s . S u s a n Wolf also e m p h a s i z e s this: A t least o n e of t h e s e r i o u s h a r m s t h a t a failure of r e c o g n i t i o n p e r p e t u a t e s h a s little t o d o w i t h t h e q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r t h e p e r s o n o r t h e c u l t u r e w h o g o e s u n r e c o g n i z e d h a s a n y t h i n g i m p o r t a n t to say t o all h u m a n b e i n g s . T h e n e e d to correct those harms, therefore, does n o t d e p e n d o n the presump­ tion o r t h e c o n f i r m a t i o n of t h e p r e s u m p t i o n t h a t a p a r t i c u l a r c u l t u r e is distinctively v a l u a b l e to p e o p l e o u t s i d e t h e c u l t u r e . 1 9

T h u s c o e x i s t e n c e with e q u a l r i g h t s for different e t h n i c g r o u p s a n d t h e i r c u l t u r a l f o r m s of life n e e d n o t b e s a f e g u a r d e d t h r o u g h t h e s o r t of collective r i g h t s t h a t w o u l d o v e r t a x a t h e o r y of r i g h t s t a i l o r e d to

222 Chapter 8

i n d i v i d u a l p e r s o n s . Even if s u c h g r o u p r i g h t s c o u l d b e g r a n t e d in a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e m o c r a c y , t h e y w o u l d b e n o t only u n n e c e s s a r y b u t q u e s t i o n a b l e f r o m a n o r m a t i v e p o i n t of view. F o r in t h e last analysis, t h e p r o t e c t i o n of f o r m s of life a n d t r a d i t i o n s in w h i c h i d e n t i t i e s a r e f o r m e d is s u p p o s e d to foster t h e r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e i r m e m b e r s ; it d o e s n o t r e p r e s e n t a k i n d of p r e s e r v a t i o n of species by a d m i n i s t r a ­ tive m e a n s . T h e ecological p e r s p e c t i v e o n species c o n s e r v a t i o n can­ n o t b e t r a n s f e r r e d to c u l t u r e s . C u l t u r a l h e r i t a g e s a n d t h e f o r m s of life a r t i c u l a t e d w i t h i n t h e m n o r m a l l y r e p r o d u c e themselves by c o n ­ v i n c i n g t h o s e w h o s e p e r s o n a l i t y s t r u c t u r e s t h e y s h a p e , t h a t is, by m o t i v a t i n g t h e m to a p p r o p r i a t e a n d c o n t i n u e t h e t r a d i t i o n s p r o d u c ­ tively. T h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state c a n m a k e this h e r m e n e u t i c achieve­ m e n t of t h e c u l t u r a l r e p r o d u c t i o n of w o r l d s possible, b u t it c a n n o t g u a r a n t e e it. F o r t o guarantee survival w o u l d necessarily r o b t h e m e m b e r s of t h e f r e e d o m to say yes o r n o , w h i c h n o w a d a y s is crucial if t h e y a r e to r e m a i n a b l e t o a p p r o p r i a t e a n d p r e s e r v e t h e i r c u l t u r a l h e r i t a g e . W h e n a c u l t u r e h a s b e c o m e reflexive, t h e only t r a d i t i o n s a n d f o r m s of life t h a t c a n sustain t h e m s e l v e s a r e t h o s e t h a t bind t h e i r m e m b e r s , while at t h e s a m e t i m e allowing m e m b e r s to subject t h e t r a d i t i o n s to critical e x a m i n a t i o n a n d leaving l a t e r g e n e r a t i o n s t h e option of l e a r n i n g f r o m o t h e r t r a d i t i o n s o r c o n v e r t i n g a n d setting o u t for o t h e r s h o r e s . T h i s is t r u e even of relatively closed sects like t h e Pennsylvania A m i s h . Even if we c o n s i d e r e d it a m e a n i n g f u l g o a l to p r o t e c t c u l t u r e s as t h o u g h they w e r e e n d a n g e r e d species, t h e h e r ­ m e n e u t i c c o n d i t i o n s n e c e s s a r y for t h e m to r e p r o d u c e themselves successfully w o u l d b e i n c o m p a t i b l e with t h e goal of " m a i n t a i n [ing] a n d c h e r i s h [ing] distinctness, n o t j u s t n o w b u t forever" (Taylor). 2 0

O n this p o i n t it h e l p s to recall t h e m a n y s u b c u l t u r e s a n d lifeworlds t h a t flourished in early m o d e r n E u r o p e with its o c c u p a t i o n a l stratifi­ c a t i o n , o r t h e f o r m s of life of r u r a l l a b o r e r s a n d t h e d e r a c i n a t e d , p r o l e t a r i a n i z e d u r b a n masses of t h e first p h a s e of i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n t h a t s u c c e e d e d t h e m . T h o s e f o r m s of life w e r e c a u g h t u p a n d c r u s h e d in t h e p r o c e s s of m o d e r n i z a t i o n , b u t by n o m e a n s d i d all of t h e m find t h e i r "Meister A n t o n " a n d have c o m m i t t e d m e m b e r s to d e f e n d t h e m a g a i n s t t h e alternatives p r e s e n t e d by t h e n e w era. F o r m s of life t h a t w e r e culturally v i b r a n t a n d attractive e n o u g h to s t i m u l a t e t h e will to self-assertion, like t h e u r b a n c u l t u r e of t h e

223 Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic State

n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y , w e r e able to p r e s e r v e s o m e of t h e i r features only t h r o u g h self-transformation. Even a majority c u l t u r e t h a t d o e s n o t c o n s i d e r itself t h r e a t e n e d p r e s e r v e s its vitality only t h r o u g h a n u n r e ­ s t r a i n e d revisionism, by s k e t c h i n g o u t alternatives to t h e status q u o o r by i n t e g r a t i n g alien i m p u l s e s — e v e n to t h e p o i n t of b r e a k i n g with its o w n t r a d i t i o n s . T h i s is especially t r u e of i m m i g r a n t c u l t u r e s , w h i c h initially d e f i n e t h e m s e l v e s s t u b b o r n l y in e t h n i c t e r m s a n d revive t r a d i t i o n a l e l e m e n t s u n d e r t h e assimilationist p r e s s u r e of t h e n e w e n v i r o n m e n t b u t t h e n quickly d e v e l o p a m o d e of life equally d i s t a n t f r o m b o t h assimilation a n d t r a d i t i o n . 21

I n m u l t i c u l t u r a l societies, t h e c o e x i s t e n c e of f o r m s of life with e q u a l r i g h t s m e a n s e n s u r i n g every citizen t h e o p p o r t u n i t y to g r o w u p w i t h i n t h e w o r l d of a c u l t u r a l h e r i t a g e a n d to have his o r h e r c h i l d r e n g r o w u p in it w i t h o u t suffering d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . It m e a n s t h e o p p o r t u n i t y to c o n f r o n t this ( a n d every o t h e r ) c u l t u r e a n d to p e r ­ p e t u a t e it in its c o n v e n t i o n a l f o r m o r to t r a n s f o r m it, as well as t h e o p p o r t u n i t y to t u r n away f r o m its c o m m a n d s with i n d i f f e r e n c e o r b r e a k with it self-critically a n d t h e n live s p u r r e d o n by h a v i n g m a d e a c o n s c i o u s b r e a k with t r a d i t i o n , o r even with a d i v i d e d identity. T h e a c c e l e r a t e d p a c e of c h a n g e in m o d e r n societies e x p l o d e s all station­ a r y f o r m s of life. C u l t u r e s survive only if they d r a w t h e s t r e n g t h to t r a n s f o r m t h e m s e l v e s f r o m criticism a n d secession. Legal g u a r a n t e e s c a n b e b a s e d only o n t h e fact t h a t w i t h i n his o r h e r o w n c u l t u r a l m i l i e u , e a c h p e r s o n r e t a i n s t h e possibility of r e g e n e r a t i n g this s t r e n g t h . A n d this i n t u r n d e v e l o p s n o t only by setting o n e s e l f a p a r t b u t at least as m u c h t h r o u g h e x c h a n g e s with s t r a n g e r s a n d t h i n g s alien. I n t h e m o d e r n e r a rigid f o r m s of life s u c c u m b to e n t r o p y . F u n d a ­ m e n t a l i s t m o v e m e n t s c a n b e u n d e r s t o o d as a n i r o n i c a t t e m p t to give o n e ' s o w n lifeworld ultrastability by restorative m e a n s . T h e i r o n y lies in t h e way t r a d i t i o n a l i s m m i s u n d e r s t a n d s itself. I n fact, it e m e r g e s f r o m t h e v o r t e x of social m o d e r n i z a t i o n even as it a p e s a s u b s t a n c e t h a t h a s a l r e a d y d i s i n t e g r a t e d . As a r e a c t i o n to t h e o v e r w h e l m i n g p u s h for m o d e r n i z a t i o n , f u n d a m e n t a l i s m is itself a t h o r o u g h l y m o d ­ e r n m o v e m e n t of r e n e w a l . N a t i o n a l i s m t o o c a n t u r n i n t o f u n d a m e n ­ talism, b u t it s h o u l d n o t b e c o n f u s e d with it. T h e n a t i o n a l i s m of t h e F r e n c h R e v o l u t i o n allied itself with t h e universalistic p r i n c i p l e s of

224 Chapter 8

t h e d e m o c r a t i c c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state; at t h a t t i m e n a t i o n a l i s m a n d r e p u b l i c a n i s m w e r e k i n d r e d spirits. O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , f u n d a m e n ­ talism afflicts n o t only societies t h a t a r e c o l l a p s i n g b u t even t h e e s t a b l i s h e d d e m o c r a c i e s of t h e West. All w o r l d r e l i g i o n s h a v e p r o ­ d u c e d t h e i r o w n f o r m s of f u n d a m e n t a l i s m , a l t h o u g h by n o m e a n s d o all s e c t a r i a n m o v e m e n t s display t h o s e traits. As t h e R u s h d i e case r e m i n d e d us, a f u n d a m e n t a l i s m t h a t l e a d s to a p r a c t i c e of i n t o l e r a n c e is i n c o m p a t i b l e with c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e m o c ­ racy. S u c h a p r a c t i c e is b a s e d o n religious o r h i s t o r i c o - p h i l o s o p h i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of t h e w o r l d t h a t claim exclusiveness for a privileged way of life. S u c h c o n c e p t i o n s lack a n a w a r e n e s s of t h e fallibility of t h e i r claims, as well as a r e s p e c t for t h e " b u r d e n s of r e a s o n " (Rawls). O f c o u r s e , religious convictions a n d g l o b a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of t h e w o r l d a r e n o t o b l i g e d to s u b s c r i b e to t h e k i n d of fallibilism t h a t c u r r e n t l y a c c o m p a n i e s h y p o t h e t i c a l k n o w l e d g e in t h e e x p e r i m e n t a l sciences. B u t f u n d a m e n t a l i s t worldviews a r e d o g m a t i c in a d i f f e r e n t sense: t h e y leave n o r o o m for reflection o n t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p with t h e o t h e r worldviews with w h i c h they s h a r e t h e s a m e u n i v e r s e of d i s c o u r s e a n d a g a i n s t w h o s e c o m p e t i n g validity claims t h e y c a n ad­ v a n c e t h e i r p o s i t i o n s only o n t h e basis of r e a s o n s . T h e y leave n o r o o m for " r e a s o n a b l e d i s a g r e e m e n t . " 22

I n c o n t r a s t with f u n d a m e n t a l i s t worldviews, t h e subjectivized "gods a n d d e m o n s " of t h e m o d e r n w o r l d a r e d i s t i n g u i s h e d by a reflexive a t t i t u d e t h a t d o e s m o r e t h a n allow for a m o d u s v i v e n d i — s o m e t h i n g t h a t c a n b e legally e n f o r c e d given r e l i g i o u s f r e e d o m . I n a spirit of t o l e r a n c e a la Lessing, t h e n o n f u n d a m e n t a l i s t worldviews t h a t Rawls c h a r a c t e r i z e s as " n o t u n r e a s o n a b l e c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c ­ t r i n e s " allow for a civilized d e b a t e b e t w e e n convictions, i n w h i c h o n e p a r t y c a n r e c o g n i z e t h e o t h e r p a r t i e s as c o - c o m b a t a n t s in t h e s e a r c h for a u t h e n t i c t r u t h s w i t h o u t sacrificing its o w n claims to validity. I n m u l t i c u l t u r a l societies t h e n a t i o n a l c o n s t i t u t i o n c a n toler­ ate only f o r m s of life a r t i c u l a t e d w i t h i n t h e m e d i u m of s u c h n o n f u n ­ d a m e n t a l i s t t r a d i t i o n s , b e c a u s e c o e x i s t e n c e with e q u a l r i g h t s for t h e s e f o r m s of life r e q u i r e s t h e m u t u a l r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e different c u l t u r a l m e m b e r s h i p s : all p e r s o n s m u s t also b e r e c o g n i z e d as m e m ­ b e r s of e t h i c a l c o m m u n i t i e s i n t e g r a t e d a r o u n d d i f f e r e n t c o n c e p t i o n s 23

225 S t r u g g l e s for R e c o g n i t i o n in t h e D e m o c r a t i c State

of t h e g o o d . H e n c e t h e ethical i n t e g r a t i o n of g r o u p s a n d s u b c u l t u r e s with t h e i r o w n collective i d e n t i t i e s m u s t b e u n c o u p l e d f r o m t h e a b s t r a c t political i n t e g r a t i o n t h a t i n c l u d e s all citizens equally. T h e political i n t e g r a t i o n of citizens e n s u r e s loyalty to t h e c o m m o n political c u l t u r e . T h e latter is r o o t e d in a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of consti­ t u t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of t h e n a t i o n ' s historical e x p e r i e n c e . To this e x t e n t t h a t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n c a n n o t b e ethically n e u t r a l . P e r h a p s o n e w o u l d d o b e t t e r to s p e a k of a c o m m o n horizon of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n w i t h i n w h i c h c u r r e n t issues give rise to p u b l i c d e b a t e s a b o u t t h e citizens' political s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g . T h e "histori­ a n s ' d e b a t e " i n 1 9 8 6 — 1 9 8 7 in G e r m a n y is a g o o d e x a m p l e of t h i s . B u t t h e d e b a t e s a r e always a b o u t t h e b e s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e s a m e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s a n d p r i n c i p l e s . T h e s e f o r m t h e fixed p o i n t of r e f e r e n c e for a n y c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p a t r i o t i s m t h a t situates t h e system of r i g h t s w i t h i n t h e historical c o n t e x t of a legal c o m m u n i t y . T h e y m u s t b e e n d u r i n g l y l i n k e d with t h e m o t i v a t i o n s a n d convictions of t h e citizens, for w i t h o u t s u c h a m o t i v a t i o n a l a n c h o r i n g t h e y c o u l d n o t b e c o m e t h e driving force b e h i n d t h e dynamically c o n c e i v e d p r o j e c t of p r o d u c i n g a n association of free a n d e q u a l individuals. H e n c e t h e s h a r e d political c u l t u r e in w h i c h citizens r e c o g n i z e t h e m s e l v e s as m e m b e r s of t h e i r polity is also p e r m e a t e d by ethics.

24

At t h e s a m e t i m e , t h e ethical s u b s t a n c e of a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p a t r i o t ­ ism c a n n o t d e t r a c t f r o m t h e legal system's n e u t r a l i t y vis-a-vis c o m m u ­ nities t h a t a r e ethically i n t e g r a t e d a t a subpolitical level. R a t h e r , it h a s to s h a r p e n sensitivity to t h e diversity a n d integrity of t h e differ­ e n t f o r m s of life c o e x i s t i n g w i t h i n a m u l t i c u l t u r a l society. It is crucial to m a i n t a i n t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e two levels of i n t e g r a t i o n . If they a r e c o l l a p s e d i n t o o n e level, t h e majority c u l t u r e will u s u r p state p r e r o g a t i v e s at t h e e x p e n s e of t h e e q u a l r i g h t s of o t h e r c u l t u r a l f o r m s of life a n d violate t h e i r claim to m u t u a l r e c o g n i t i o n . T h e n e u t r a l i t y of t h e law vis-a-vis i n t e r n a l ethical d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n s stems f r o m t h e fact t h a t in c o m p l e x societies t h e citizenry as a w h o l e c a n n o l o n g e r b e h e l d t o g e t h e r by a substantive c o n s e n s u s o n values b u t only by a c o n s e n s u s o n t h e p r o c e d u r e s for t h e l e g i t i m a t e e n a c t m e n t of laws a n d t h e l e g i t i m a t e exercise of power. Citizens w h o a r e politi­ cally i n t e g r a t e d in this way s h a r e t h e rationally b a s e d conviction t h a t

226 Chapter 8

u n r e s t r a i n e d f r e e d o m of c o m m u n i c a t i o n in t h e political p u b l i c s p h e r e , a d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e s s for settling conflicts, a n d t h e constitu­ t i o n a l c h a n n e l i n g of political p o w e r t o g e t h e r p r o v i d e a basis for c h e c k i n g illegitimate p o w e r a n d e n s u r i n g t h a t a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p o w e r is u s e d in t h e e q u a l i n t e r e s t of all. T h e universalism of legal p r i n c i ­ ples manifests itself in a p r o c e d u r a l c o n s e n s u s , w h i c h m u s t b e e m ­ b e d d e d t h r o u g h a k i n d of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p a t r i o t i s m in t h e c o n t e x t of a historically specific political c u l t u r e . V

Immigration, Citizenship, and National Identity

Legal e x p e r t s have t h e a d v a n t a g e of discussing n o r m a t i v e q u e s t i o n s in c o n n e c t i o n with cases to b e d e c i d e d . T h e i r t h i n k i n g is o r i e n t e d to a p p l i c a t i o n . P h i l o s o p h e r s avoid this decisionist p r e s s u r e ; as con^ t e m p o r a r i e s of classical i d e a s t h a t e x t e n d over m o r e t h a n two t h o u ­ s a n d years, they a r e n o t e m b a r r a s s e d t o c o n s i d e r t h e m s e l v e s p a r t i c i p a n t s in a c o n v e r s a t i o n t h a t will g o o n forever. H e n c e it is all t h e m o r e fascinating w h e n s o m e o n e like C h a r l e s Taylor a t t e m p t s to g r a s p his o w n t i m e s in i d e a s a n d to show t h e r e l e v a n c e of p h i l o s o p h i ­ cal insights to t h e p r e s s i n g political q u e s t i o n s of t h e day. H i s essay is a n e x a m p l e of this, as u n u s u a l as it is b r i l l i a n t — a l t h o u g h , o r r a t h e r b e c a u s e , h e d o e s n o t follow t h e f a s h i o n a b l e p a t h of a n " a p p l i e d ethics." After t h e u p h e a v a l s in C e n t r a l a n d E a s t e r n E u r o p e t h e r e h a s b e e n a n o t h e r t h e m e o n t h e a g e n d a of t h e day in G e r m a n y a n d in t h e E u r o p e a n C o m m u n i t y as a w h o l e : i m m i g r a t i o n . After a c o m p r e h e n ­ sive p r e s e n t a t i o n of this p r o b l e m , a D u t c h c o l l e a g u e arrives at t h e following u n a d o r n e d p r o g n o s i s : W e s t e r n E u r o p e a n c o u n t r i e s . . . will d o t h e i r u t m o s t t o p r e v e n t i m m i g r a ­ t i o n f r o m T h i r d W o r l d c o u n t r i e s . T o this e n d t h e y will g r a n t w o r k p e r m i t s to p e r s o n s w h o h a v e skills of i m m e d i a t e r e l e v a n c e t o t h e society i n fairly e x c e p t i o n a l cases o n l y ( s o c c e r players, software specialists f r o m t h e U S , s c h o l a r s f r o m I n d i a , e t c . ) . T h e y will c o m b i n e a v e r y restrictive e n t r y policy w i t h policies a i m e d a t d e a l i n g m o r e quickly a n d effectively with r e q u e s t s for asylum, a n d w i t h a p r a c t i c e of d e p o r t i n g w i t h o u t d e l a y t h o s e w h o s e r e q u e s t h a s b e e n d e n i e d . . . . T h e c o n c l u s i o n is, t h a t t h e y will individually a n d j o i n t l y u s e all means a t t h e i r d i s p o s a l to s t e m t h e t i d e . 2 5

227 S t r u g g l e s for R e c o g n i t i o n i n t h e D e m o c r a t i c State

T h i s d e s c r i p t i o n fits precisely t h e c o m p r o m i s e o n political asylum t h a t t h e g o v e r n m e n t a n d t h e o p p o s i t i o n in G e r m a n y m a d e t h e basis for a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c h a n g e in 1 9 9 3 . T h e r e is n o d o u b t t h a t t h e g r e a t majority of t h e p o p u l a t i o n w e l c o m e s this p o l i c y X e n o p h o b i a is wide­ s p r e a d t h e s e days in t h e E u r o p e a n C o m m u n i t y as well. It is m o r e m a r k e d in s o m e c o u n t r i e s t h a n in o t h e r s , b u t t h e a t t i t u d e s of t h e G e r m a n s d o n o t differ substantially f r o m t h o s e of t h e F r e n c h a n d t h e E n g l i s h . Taylor's e x a m p l e e n c o u r a g e s u s to see h o w a p h i l o ­ s o p h i c a l p o i n t of view c a n h e l p a n s w e r t h e q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r this policy of sealing ourselves off f r o m i m m i g r a t i o n is justified. I will b e g i n by discussing t h e q u e s t i o n i n t h e a b s t r a c t a n d t h e n reviewing t h e G e r m a n d e b a t e o n political asylum of 1 9 9 2 - 1 9 9 3 a n d its histori­ cal b a c k g r o u n d . I will t h e n o u t l i n e t h e alternatives t h a t w o u l d have to b e discussed in a p u b l i c d e b a t e — o n e t h a t h a s n o t yet b e e n o p e n l y c o n d u c t e d — a b o u t t h e ethical-political s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e e n ­ l a r g e d F e d e r a l R e p u b l i c of G e r m a n y . 26

A l t h o u g h m o d e r n law differs f r o m p o s t t r a d i t i o n a l m o r a l i t y by its specific f o r m a l characteristics, t h e system of r i g h t s a n d t h e p r i n c i p l e s of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state a r e in h a r m o n y with this m o r a l i t y by v i r t u e of t h e i r universalistic c o n t e n t . At t h e s a m e t i m e , as we h a v e s e e n , legal systems a r e "ethically p e r m e a t e d " in t h a t they reflect t h e politi­ cal will a n d t h e f o r m of life of a specific legal c o m m u n i t y . T h e U n i t e d States, w h o s e political c u l t u r e is s t a m p e d by a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l t r a d i t i o n t h a t is two h u n d r e d years old, is a clear e x a m p l e of this. B u t t h e j u r i d i f i e d e t h o s of a n a t i o n - s t a t e c a n n o t c o m e i n t o conflict with civil r i g h t s so l o n g as t h e political legislature is o r i e n t e d to c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s a n d t h u s to t h e i d e a of actualizing basic rights. T h e e t h i c a l s u b s t a n c e of a political i n t e g r a t i o n t h a t u n i t e s all t h e citizens of t h e n a t i o n m u s t r e m a i n " n e u t r a l " with r e s p e c t to t h e differences b e t w e e n t h e ethical-cultural c o m m u n i t i e s w i t h i n t h e na­ t i o n , e a c h of w h i c h is i n t e g r a t e d a r o u n d its o w n c o n c e p t i o n of t h e g o o d . T h e u n c o u p l i n g of t h e s e two levels of i n t e g r a t i o n notwith­ s t a n d i n g , a n a t i o n of citizens c a n sustain t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s of f r e e d o m only by d e v e l o p i n g a c e r t a i n m e a s u r e of loyalty to t h e i r o w n state, a loyalty t h a t c a n n o t b e legally e n f o r c e d . j. It is this ethical-political s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g o n t h e p a r t of t h e n a t i o n t h a t is affected by i m m i g r a t i o n ; for t h e influx of i m m i g r a n t s

228 Chapter 8

alters t h e c o m p o s i t i o n of t h e p o p u l a t i o n in ethical-cultural r e s p e c t s as well. T h u s t h e q u e s t i o n arises w h e t h e r t h e d e s i r e for i m m i g r a t i o n r u n s u p a g a i n s t limits in t h e r i g h t of a political c o m m u n i t y to m a i n ­ tain its political-cultural f o r m of life intact. A s s u m i n g t h a t t h e a u t o n o m o u s l y d e v e l o p e d state o r d e r is i n d e e d s h a p e d by ethics, d o e s t h e r i g h t to s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n n o t i n c l u d e t h e r i g h t of a n a t i o n to affirm its identity vis-a-vis i m m i g r a n t s w h o c o u l d give a different cast to this historically d e v e l o p e d political-cultural f o r m of life? F r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of t h e r e c i p i e n t society, t h e p r o b l e m of i m m i g r a t i o n raises t h e q u e s t i o n of l e g i t i m a t e c o n d i t i o n s of entry. I g n o r i n g t h e i n t e r m e d i a t e stages, we c a n focus o n t h e act of n a t u ­ ralization, with w h i c h a state c o n t r o l s t h e e x p a n s i o n of t h e political c o m m u n i t y d e f i n e d by t h e r i g h t s of citizenship. U n d e r w h a t c o n d i ­ t i o n s c a n t h e state d e n y citizenship to t h o s e w h o a d v a n c e a claim to n a t u r a l i z a t i o n ? Aside f r o m t h e u s u a l provisos (as a g a i n s t c r i m i n a l s ) , t h e m o s t r e l e v a n t q u e s t i o n i n o u r c o n t e x t is in w h a t r e s p e c t c a n a d e m o c r a t i c c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state d e m a n d t h a t i m m i g r a n t s assimilate in o r d e r to m a i n t a i n t h e integrity of its citizens' way of life. P h i l o ­ sophically, we c a n distinguish two levels of assimilation: 1. assent to t h e p r i n c i p l e s of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n w i t h i n t h e s c o p e of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n d e t e r m i n e d at a p a r t i c u l a r t i m e by t h e ethical-political s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e citizens a n d t h e political c u l t u r e of t h e c o u n t r y ; in o t h e r w o r d s , assimilation to t h e way in w h i c h t h e a u t o n ­ o m y of t h e citizens is i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d in t h e r e c i p i e n t society a n d t h e way t h e "public u s e of r e a s o n " is p r a c t i c e d t h e r e ; a n d 2. t h e f u r t h e r level of a willingness to b e c o m e a c c u l t u r a t e d , t h a t is, n o t only to c o n f o r m e x t e r n a l l y b u t to b e c o m e h a b i t u a t e d to t h e way of life, t h e p r a c t i c e s , a n d c u s t o m s of t h e local c u l t u r e across t h e i r full r a n g e . T h i s m e a n s a n assimilation t h a t p e n e t r a t e s to t h e level of ethical-cultural i n t e g r a t i o n a n d t h e r e b y h a s a d e e p e r i m p a c t o n t h e collective i d e n t i t y of t h e i m m i g r a n t s ' c u l t u r e of o r i g i n t h a n t h e political socialization r e q u i r e d u n d e r (1) a b o v e . T h e results of t h e i m m i g r a t i o n policy p r a c t i c e d in t h e U n i t e d States s u p p o r t a liberal i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t h a t exemplifies ( 1 ) , t h e w e a k e r e x p e c t a t i o n of assimilation l i m i t e d to political s o c i a l i z a t i o n .

27

229 S t r u g g l e s for R e c o g n i t i o n i n t h e D e m o c r a t i c State

A n e x a m p l e of (2) is p r o v i d e d by t h e P r u s s i a n policy o n i m m i g r a t i o n f r o m P o l a n d u n d e r Bismarck, w h i c h d e s p i t e variations was o r i e n t e d p r i m a r i l y to G e r m a n i z a t i o n . A d e m o c r a t i c c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state t h a t is s e r i o u s a b o u t u n c o u p l i n g t h e s e two levels of i n t e g r a t i o n c a n r e q u i r e of i m m i g r a n t s only t h e political socialization d e s c r i b e d in (1) a b o v e ( a n d practically speak­ i n g c a n e x p e c t to see it only in t h e s e c o n d g e n e r a t i o n ) . T h i s e n a b l e s it to p r e s e r v e t h e i d e n t i t y of t h e political c o m m u n i t y , w h i c h n o t h i n g , i n c l u d i n g i m m i g r a t i o n , is p e r m i t t e d to e n c r o a c h u p o n , since t h a t i d e n t i t y is f o u n d e d o n t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s a n c h o r e d in t h e political c u l t u r e a n d n o t o n t h e basic ethical o r i e n t a t i o n s of t h e c u l t u r a l f o r m of life p r e d o m i n a n t in t h a t c o u n t r y Accordingly, all t h a t n e e d s to b e e x p e c t e d of i m m i g r a n t s is t h e willingness to e n t e r i n t o t h e political c u l t u r e of t h e i r n e w h o m e l a n d , w i t h o u t h a v i n g t o give u p t h e c u l t u r a l f o r m of life of t h e i r o r i g i n s by d o i n g so. T h e r i g h t to d e m o c r a t i c s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n d o e s i n d e e d i n c l u d e t h e r i g h t of citizens to insist o n t h e inclusive c h a r a c t e r of t h e i r o w n political c u l t u r e ; it safeguards t h e society f r o m t h e d a n g e r of s e g m e n t a t i o n — f r o m t h e e x c l u s i o n of alien s u b c u l t u r e s a n d f r o m a separatist disin­ t e g r a t i o n i n t o u n r e l a t e d s u b c u l t u r e s . As I i n d i c a t e d above, political i n t e g r a t i o n d o e s n o t e x t e n d to f u n d a m e n t a l i s t i m m i g r a n t c u l t u r e s . B u t n e i t h e r d o e s it justify c o m p u l s o r y assimilation for t h e sake of t h e self-affirmation of t h e c u l t u r a l f o r m of life d o m i n a n t in t h e country. 28

29

T h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a l t e r n a t i v e h a s t h e i m p l i c a t i o n t h a t t h e legiti­ m a t e l y a s s e r t e d i d e n t i t y of t h e political c o m m u n i t y will by n o m e a n s b e p r e s e r v e d f r o m a l t e r a t i o n s indefinitely in t h e w a k e of waves of i m m i g r a t i o n . B e c a u s e i m m i g r a n t s c a n n o t b e c o m p e l l e d to s u r r e n d e r t h e i r o w n t r a d i t i o n s , as o t h e r f o r m s of life b e c o m e e s t a b l i s h e d t h e h o r i z o n w i t h i n w h i c h citizens h e n c e f o r t h i n t e r p r e t t h e i r c o m m o n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s m a y also e x p a n d . T h e n t h e m e c h a n i s m c o m e s i n t o play w h e r e b y a c h a n g e in t h e c u l t u r a l c o m p o s i t i o n of t h e active citizenry c h a n g e s t h e c o n t e x t to w h i c h t h e ethical-political s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e n a t i o n as a w h o l e refers: " P e o p l e live in c o m m u n i t i e s with b o n d s a n d b o u n d s , b u t t h e s e m a y b e of different k i n d s . I n a liberal society, t h e b o n d s a n d b o u n d s s h o u l d b e c o m p a t ­ ible with liberal p r i n c i p l e s . O p e n i m m i g r a t i o n w o u l d c h a n g e t h e

230 Chapter 8

c h a r a c t e r of t h e c o m m u n i t y , b u t it w o u l d n o t leave t h e c o m m u n i t y without any character." L e t m e n o w t u r n f r o m t h e q u e s t i o n of w h i c h c o n d i t i o n s a d e m o ­ cratic c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state m a y i m p o s e o n t h e r e c e p t i o n of i m m i ­ g r a n t s to a n o t h e r q u e s t i o n : W h o h a s t h e r i g h t t o i m m i g r a t e ? T h e r e a r e sufficient m o r a l g r o u n d s for a n i n d i v i d u a l legal claim to political asylum (in t h e sense of Article 16 of t h e G e r m a n Basic Law, w h i c h m u s t b e i n t e r p r e t e d with r e f e r e n c e to t h e p r o t e c t i o n of h u m a n dignity g u a r a n t e e d in Article 1 a n d in c o n n e c t i o n with t h e g u a r a n t e e of legal r e c o u r s e e s t a b l i s h e d in Article 1 9 ) . I d o n o t n e e d to g o i n t o t h e m h e r e . W h a t is i m p o r t a n t is t h e d e f i n i t i o n of a r e f u g e e . I n a c c o r d a n c e with Article 13 of t h e G e n e v a C o n v e n t i o n o n t h e Status of Refugees, s o m e o n e is c o n s i d e r e d to b e e n t i t l e d to asylum if h e is fleeing f r o m a c o u n t r y "where his life o r f r e e d o m w o u l d b e t h r e a t e n e d o n a c c o u n t of his r a c e , r e l i g i o n , nationality, m e m b e r s h i p of a p a r t i c u l a r social g r o u p o r political o p i n i o n . " I n light of r e c e n t e x p e r i e n c e , this d e f i n i t i o n n e e d s to b e e x t e n d e d to i n c l u d e t h e p r o t e c t i o n of w o m e n f r o m m a s s r a p e s . T h e r i g h t to t e m p o r a r y asylum for r e f u g e e s f r o m civil war r e g i o n s is also u n p r o b l e m a t i c . B u t since t h e discovery of A m e r i c a , a n d especially since t h e explosive i n c r e a s e in w o r l d w i d e i m m i g r a t i o n in t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n ­ tury, t h e g r e a t b u l k of t h o s e w a n t i n g to i m m i g r a t e h a s c o n s i s t e d of individuals i m m i g r a t i n g in o r d e r to w o r k as well as refugees f r o m p o v e r t y w h o w a n t to e s c a p e a m i s e r a b l e e x i s t e n c e in t h e i r h o m e l a n d . A n d so it is today. It is a g a i n s t this i m m i g r a t i o n f r o m t h e i m p o v e r ­ i s h e d r e g i o n s of t h e East a n d S o u t h t h a t a E u r o p e a n c h a u v i n i s m of affluence is n o w a r m i n g itself. 30

F r o m t h e m o r a l p o i n t of view we c a n n o t r e g a r d this p r o b l e m solely f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of t h e i n h a b i t a n t s of affluent a n d p e a c e f u l societies; we m u s t also take t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of t h o s e w h o c o m e to f o r e i g n c o n t i n e n t s s e e k i n g t h e i r well-being, t h a t is, a n e x i s t e n c e w o r t h y of h u m a n b e i n g s , r a t h e r t h a n p r o t e c t i o n f r o m political p e r ­ s e c u t i o n . T h e q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r a legal claim t o i m m i g r a t i o n exists over a n d a b o v e a moral claim is particularly r e l e v a n t in t h e c u r r e n t situation, w h e r e t h e n u m b e r of p e o p l e w a n t i n g to i m m i g r a t e m a n i ­ festly e x c e e d s t h e willingness to receive t h e m .

231 Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic State

O n e c a n cite g o o d g r o u n d s for a m o r a l claim. P e o p l e d o n o t n o r m a l l y leave t h e i r h o m e l a n d s e x c e p t u n d e r d i r e c i r c u m s t a n c e s ; as a r u l e t h e m e r e fact t h a t t h e y h a v e fled is sufficient e v i d e n c e of t h e i r n e e d for h e l p . A m o r a l o b l i g a t i o n t o p r o v i d e assistance arises i n p a r t i c u l a r f r o m t h e g r o w i n g i n t e r d e p e n d e n c i e s of a g l o b a l society t h a t h a s b e c o m e so e n m e s h e d t h r o u g h t h e capitalist w o r l d m a r k e t a n d electronic mass c o m m u n i c a t i o n s that the U N has assumed s o m e t h i n g like a n overall political responsibility for s a f e g u a r d i n g life o n t h e p l a n e t , as t h e r e c e n t e x a m p l e of S o m a l i a i n d i c a t e s . F u r t h e r , special d u t i e s a r e devolved u p o n t h e First W o r l d as a r e s u l t of t h e h i s t o r y of c o l o n i z a t i o n a n d t h e u p r o o t i n g of r e g i o n a l c u l t u r e s by t h e i n c u r s i o n of capitalist m o d e r n i z a t i o n . We s h o u l d also n o t e t h a t in t h e p e r i o d b e t w e e n 1800 a n d 1960 E u r o p e a n s w e r e d i s p r o p o r t i o n ­ ately r e p r e s e n t e d in i n t e r c o n t i n e n t a l m i g r a t o r y m o v e m e n t s , m a k i n g u p 80 p e r c e n t of t h o s e involved, a n d t h e y p r o f i t e d f r o m t h i s — t h a t is, t h e y i m p r o v e d t h e i r living c o n d i t i o n s in c o m p a r i s o n with o t h e r m i g r a n t s a n d with t h o s e of t h e i r c o m p a t r i o t s w h o d i d n o t e m i g r a t e . At t h e s a m e t i m e , t h e e x o d u s of t h e n i n e t e e n t h a n d early t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r i e s i m p r o v e d t h e e c o n o m i c situations in t h e c o u n t r i e s f r o m w h i c h t h e y fled, j u s t as decisively as did, conversely, t h e i m m i g r a t i o n to E u r o p e d u r i n g t h e r e c o n s t r u c t i o n p e r i o d following t h e S e c o n d W o r l d W a r . E i t h e r way, E u r o p e was t h e b e n e f i c i a r y of t h e s e s t r e a m s of m i g r a t i o n . T h e s e a n d o t h e r r e l a t e d r e a s o n s t h a t c o u l d b e given d o n o t , to b e s u r e , justify g u a r a n t e e i n g a c t i o n a b l e i n d i v i d u a l legal r i g h t s to im­ m i g r a t i o n b u t they d o justify a m o r a l o b l i g a t i o n t o h a v e a liberal i m m i g r a t i o n policy t h a t o p e n s o n e ' s o w n society t o i m m i g r a n t s a n d r e g u l a t e s t h e flow of i m m i g r a t i o n in r e l a t i o n to existing capacities. I n t h e defensive s l o g a n "the b o a t is full" o n e h e a r s a lack of willing­ ness t o take t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of t h e o t h e r s i d e — o f t h e " b o a t p e o p l e " in t h e i r rickety crafts, for e x a m p l e , t r y i n g to e s c a p e t h e t e r r o r in I n d o c h i n a . E u r o p e a n societies, s h r i n k i n g d e m o g r a p h i c a l l y a n d d e ­ p e n d e n t o n i m m i g r a t i o n if only for e c o n o m i c r e a s o n s , h a v e certainly n o t r e a c h e d t h e limits of t h e i r capacity t o a b s o r b i m m i g r a n t s . T h e m o r a l basis for a liberal i m m i g r a t i o n policy also gives rise to a n o b l i g a t i o n n o t t o limit i m m i g r a t i o n q u o t a s to t h e r e c i p i e n t c o u n t r y ' s e c o n o m i c n e e d s , t h a t is, n o t to "welcome (only) t e c h n i c a l e x p e r t i s e , " 31

232 Chapter 8

b u t i n s t e a d to establish q u o t a s in a c c o r d a n c e with criteria t h a t are a c c e p t a b l e f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of all p a r t i e s involved. VI

T h e Politics o f Asylum in a U n i t e d Germany

If o n e takes t h e s e p r i n c i p l e s as a p o i n t of d e p a r t u r e , t h e c o m p r o m i s e o n political asylum n e g o t i a t e d b e t w e e n t h e G e r m a n g o v e r n m e n t a n d t h e o p p o s i t i o n Social D e m o c r a t s , w h i c h was p u t i n t o effect in early 1993, c a n n o t b e justified in n o r m a t i v e t e r m s . W i t h o u t g o i n g i n t o detail, I will list t h e f o u r c e n t r a l flaws of t h e a g r e e m e n t a n d criticize t h e p r e m i s e s o n w h i c h they a r e b a s e d . (a) T h e r e g u l a t i o n s p r o v i d e d for by t h e a g r e e m e n t a r e l i m i t e d to political asylum, t h a t is, to m e a s u r e s d i r e c t e d against "abuses" of t h e r i g h t to asylum. T h e y i g n o r e t h e fact t h a t G e r m a n y n e e d s a n i m m i ­ g r a t i o n policy t h a t p r o v i d e s i m m i g r a n t s with o t h e r legal o p t i o n s as well. T h e p r o b l e m of i m m i g r a t i o n is falsely d e f i n e d i n a way t h a t h a s n u m e r o u s i m p l i c a t i o n s . A n y o n e w h o dissolves t h e c o n n e c t i o n b e ­ t w e e n t h e q u e s t i o n of political asylum a n d t h e q u e s t i o n of i m m i g r a ­ t i o n to e s c a p e p o v e r t y is implicitly d e c l a r i n g t h a t h e o r s h e w a n t s t o e v a d e E u r o p e ' s m o r a l o b l i g a t i o n to r e f u g e e s f r o m t h e i m p o v e r i s h e d r e g i o n s of t h e w o r l d a n d i n s t e a d tacitly t o l e r a t e s a flow of illegal i m m i g r a t i o n t h a t c a n always b e e x p l o i t e d as "abuse of asylum" for d o m e s t i c political p u r p o s e s . (b) P a r l i a m e n t ' s a d d i t i o n of Article 16a to t h e Basic Law, as a r e s u l t of t h e i n t e r p a r t y a g r e e m e n t of J a n u a r y 15, 1 9 9 3 , w e a k e n s t h e s u b s t a n c e of t h e individual legal r i g h t to political asylum b e c a u s e it allows refugees c o m i n g i n t o t h e c o u n t r y f r o m a so-called "safe T h i r d C o u n t r y " to b e d e p o r t e d w i t h o u t legal r e c o u r s e . T h i s shifts t h e b u r d e n of i m m i g r a t i o n to E a s t e r n E u r o p e , to o u r n e i g h b o r s P o l a n d , t h e C z e c h R e p u b l i c , Slovakia, H u n g a r y , a n d A u s t r i a — i n o t h e r w o r d s , to c o u n t r i e s t h a t a r e c u r r e n t l y ill p r e p a r e d to h a n d l e this p r o b l e m in a legally u n o b j e c t i o n a b l e way. I n a d d i t i o n , c u r t a i l i n g t h e g u a r a n ­ t e e of legal p r o t e c t i o n for refugees f r o m c o u n t r i e s d e f i n e d as "free of p e r s e c u t i o n " f r o m G e r m a n y ' s p o i n t of view is p r o b l e m a t i c . 3 2

(c) R a t h e r t h a n m a k i n g it easier for f o r e i g n e r s a l r e a d y r e s i d i n g in G e r m a n y , especially t h e Gastarbeiter [literally, g u e s t w o r k e r s ] w h o m we r e c r u i t e d , t o a c q u i r e citizenship, t h e asylum c o m p r o m i s e left t h e

233 S t r u g g l e s for R e c o g n i t i o n i n t h e D e m o c r a t i c State

n a t u r a l i z a t i o n laws u n c h a n g e d . T h e d u a l citizenship t h a t t h o s e f o r e i g n e r s u n d e r s t a n d a b l y p r e f e r is d e n i e d t h e m ; even c h i l d r e n b o r n to t h e m i n G e r m a n y d o n o t a u t o m a t i c a l l y receive t h e rights of citizenship. F o r e i g n e r s w h o a r e willing to r e n o u n c e t h e i r p r e v i o u s citizenship c a n b e n a t u r a l i z e d only after they h a v e b e e n living in G e r m a n y for at least fifteen years. I n c o n t r a s t , t h e so-called Volksdeutschen o r e t h n i c G e r m a n s — p r i m a r i l y Poles a n d Russians w h o c a n p r o v e G e r m a n a n c e s t r y — h a v e a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t to naturaliza­ tion. I n 1992, in a d d i t i o n to a p p r o x i m a t e l y 500,000 asylum seekers (of w h i c h 130,000 w e r e f r o m t h e civil war r e g i o n s of t h e f o r m e r Yugoslavia), 220,000 e t h n i c - G e r m a n i m m i g r a n t s w e r e a c c e p t e d i n t o G e r m a n y o n this basis. (d) T h e G e r m a n policy o n political asylum rests o n t h e r e p e a t e d l y r e a f f i r m e d p r e m i s e t h a t G e r m a n y is n o t a l a n d of i m m i g r a t i o n . T h i s c o n t r a d i c t s n o t only w h a t we all see in t h e streets a n d subways of o u r m e t r o p o l i s e s — t o d a y twenty-six p e r c e n t of t h e p o p u l a t i o n of Frank­ furt consists of f o r e i g n e r s — b u t also t h e historical facts. To b e s u r e , since t h e early n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y a l m o s t e i g h t m i l l i o n G e r m a n s h a v e e m i g r a t e d to t h e U n i t e d States a l o n e . B u t at t h e s a m e t i m e , m a j o r waves of i m m i g r a t i o n have o c c u r r e d over t h e last h u n d r e d years. By t h e First W o r l d War, 1.2 m i l l i o n i m m i g r a n t w o r k e r s h a d e n t e r e d t h e c o u n t r y , a n d 12 m i l l i o n "displaced p e r s o n s " w e r e left b e h i n d at t h e e n d of t h e S e c o n d W o r l d W a r — p r i m a r i l y f o r c e d l a b o r d e p o r t e d f r o m P o l a n d a n d t h e Soviet U n i o n . I n 1955, following t h e p a t h laid o u t by t h e Nazi policy of f o r c e d f o r e i g n labor, a n d d e s p i t e relatively h i g h u n e m p l o y m e n t in G e r m a n y , c a m e t h e o r g a n i z e d re­ c r u i t m e n t of a c h e a p , u n m a r r i e d m a l e w o r k f o r c e f r o m s o u t h e r n a n d s o u t h e a s t e r n E u r o p e . T h i s c o n t i n u e d u n t i l r e c r u i t m e n t c e a s e d in 1973. T o d a y t h e families a n d offspring of t h o s e Gastarbeiter w h o d i d n o t r e t u r n to t h e i r o w n c o u n t r i e s live in t h e p a r a d o x i c a l situation of i m m i g r a n t s with n o clear p r o s p e c t s for i m m i g r a t i o n — G e r m a n s with f o r e i g n p a s s p o r t s . T h e y f o r m t h e b u l k of t h e 8.2 p e r c e n t of t h e 1990 G e r m a n p o p u l a t i o n c o m p o s e d of f o r e i g n e r s living in G e r m a n y . W i t h o u t t h e m , t h e e c o n o m i c b o o m n o w c o m p a r a b l e only t o t h a t of J a p a n w o u l d n o t h a v e b e e n possible, a n d it is even h a r d e r to u n d e r ­ s t a n d t h e resistance to t h e full i n t e g r a t i o n of t h e s e f o r e i g n e r s w h e n o n e c o n s i d e r s t h a t by 1990 West G e r m a n y h a d i n t e g r a t e d 15 m i l l i o n 33

234 Chapter 8

refugees, i m m i g r a n t s , a n d f o r e i g n e r s w h o w e r e e i t h e r G e r m a n o r of G e r m a n d e s c e n t — t h u s also Neuburger, n e w citizens: "If a foreign p o p u l a t i o n of a b o u t 4.8 m i l l i o n is a d d e d , n e a r l y o n e - t h i r d of t h e West G e r m a n p o p u l a t i o n h a s r e s u l t e d f r o m i m m i g r a t i o n m o v e m e n t s since W o r l d W a r I I . " If t h e n o t i o n t h a t "we a r e n o t a l a n d of i m m i g r a t i o n " c o n t i n u e s to b e p u t f o r t h in t h e political p u b l i c s p h e r e in t h e face of this evi­ d e n c e , this i n d i c a t e s t h a t it is a m a n i f e s t a t i o n of a d e e p - s e a t e d m e n ­ tality—and t h a t a painful c h a n g e is n e c e s s a r y in t h e way we conceive of ourselves as a n a t i o n . It is n o a c c i d e n t t h a t o u r n a t u r a l i z a t i o n d e c i s i o n s a r e b a s e d o n t h e p r i n c i p l e of a n c e s t r y a n d n o t , as in o t h e r W e s t e r n n a t i o n s , o n t h e p r i n c i p l e of territoriality. T h e s h o r t c o m i n g s d e s c r i b e d a b o v e in t h e way G e r m a n y is d e a l i n g with t h e p r o b l e m of i m m i g r a t i o n m u s t b e u n d e r s t o o d a g a i n s t t h e historical b a c k g r o u n d of t h e G e r m a n s ' u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e m s e l v e s as a n a t i o n of Volksgenossen o r e t h n i c c o m r a d e s c e n t e r e d a r o u n d l a n g u a g e a n d cul­ t u r e . A n y o n e w h o is b o r n in F r a n c e is c o n s i d e r e d to b e F r e n c h a n d h o l d s t h e r i g h t s of a F r e n c h citizen. I n G e r m a n y , u n t i l t h e e n d of t h e S e c o n d W o r l d W a r fine distinctions w e r e still b e i n g m a d e b e ­ t w e e n Deutschen, o r citizens of G e r m a n d e s c e n t , Reichsdeutschen, o r G e r m a n citizens of n o n - G e r m a n d e s c e n t , a n d Volksdeutschen, o r indi­ viduals of G e r m a n d e s c e n t living i n o t h e r c o u n t r i e s . 3 4

In France national consciousness could develop within the frame­ w o r k of a t e r r i t o r i a l state, while i n G e r m a n y it was originally l i n k e d with t h e r o m a n t i c a l l y i n s p i r e d e d u c a t e d middle-class n o t i o n of a Kulturnation, a n a t i o n d e f i n e d by its c u l t u r e . T h i s i d e a r e p r e s e n t e d a n i m a g i n a r y u n i t y t h a t h a d to seek s u p p o r t in a s h a r e d l a n g u a g e , t r a d i t i o n , a n d a n c e s t r y in o r d e r to t r a n s c e n d t h e reality of t h e exist­ i n g small states in G e r m a n y . Still m o r e i m p o r t a n t was t h e fact t h a t t h e F r e n c h n a t i o n a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s c o u l d d e v e l o p in s t e p with t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of d e m o c r a t i c civil liberties a n d in t h e s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t t h e sovereignty of t h e F r e n c h king, w h e r e a s G e r m a n n a t i o n a l i s m a r o s e o u t of t h e s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t N a p o l e o n , t h u s a g a i n s t a n e x t e r n a l e n e m y , i n d e p e n d e n t l y of t h e b a t t l e for d e m o c r a t i c civil liberties a n d l o n g b e f o r e t h e kleindeutsche n a t i o n - s t a t e was i m p o s e d f r o m a b o v e . H a v i n g e m e r g e d f r o m a "war of l i b e r a t i o n " of this k i n d , n a t i o n a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s in G e r m a n y c o u l d b e l i n k e d with t h e p a t h o s of t h e

235 S t r u g g l e s for R e c o g n i t i o n i n t h e D e m o c r a t i c State

u n i q u e n e s s of its c u l t u r e a n d a n c e s t r y — a p a r t i c u l a r i s m t h a t h a s indelibly s t a m p e d t h e G e r m a n s ' s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g . T h e F e d e r a l R e p u b l i c of G e r m a n y t u r n e d away f r o m this Sonderbewufitsein o r sense of e x c e p t i o n a l n e s s after 1945, after t h e s h o c k of t h e collapse of civilization in t h e Nazi mass e x t e r m i n a t i o n s , a s h o c k it only g r a d u a l l y c a m e to t e r m s with. Loss of sovereignty a n d a m a r g i n a l p o s i t i o n in a p o l a r i z e d w o r l d r e i n f o r c e d this. R e u n i f i c a t i o n a n d t h e d i s s o l u t i o n of t h e Soviet U n i o n h a v e c h a n g e d this constel­ lation in a f u n d a m e n t a l way. H e n c e t h e r e a c t i o n s to t h e right-wing radicalism t h a t h a s flared u p a g a i n — a n d in thi§ c o n t e x t t h e d e c e p ­ tive d e b a t e o n asylum as well—raise t h e q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r t h e e n l a r g e d F e d e r a l R e p u b l i c will c o n t i n u e o n its p a t h t o w a r d a m o r e civilized politics o r w h e t h e r t h e o l d Sonderbewujitsein is b e i n g r e g e n ­ e r a t e d i n a different f o r m . T h i s q u e s t i o n is c o m p l i c a t e d by t h e fact t h a t t h e p r o c e s s of n a t i o n a l u n i f i c a t i o n was p u s h e d t h r o u g h a n d administratively m a n i p u l a t e d f r o m a b o v e a n d h a s set a false c o u r s e for t h e c o u n t r y i n this r e s p e c t as well. Discussion a n d clarification of t h e ethical-political s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e citizens of two G e r m a n states with widely d i v e r g e n t historical fates is u r g e n t l y n e e d e d b u t h a s n o t yet t a k e n p l a c e . T h e "accession" of n e w L a n d e r , o r f e d e r a l states—a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y d u b i o u s legal o p t i o n — p r e v e n t e d a consti­ t u t i o n a l d e b a t e , a n d p o s i t i o n s in t h e d e b a t e a b o u t t h e seat of t h e G e r m a n capital a r e skewed. I n t h e m e a n t i m e t h e citizens of t h e f o r m e r East G e r m a n y , h u m i l i a t e d in m a n y ways a n d d e p r i v e d of t h e i r s p o k e s p e r s o n s a n d a political p u b l i c s p h e r e of t h e i r own, have o t h e r p r o b l e m s to c o n t e n d with; in p l a c e of clearly a r t i c u l a t e d c o n t r i b u ­ tions to t h e d e b a t e t h e r e arise s m o l d e r i n g r e s e n t m e n t s . All r e p r e s s i o n p r o d u c e s s y m p t o m s . O n e c h a l l e n g e after a n o t h e r — f r o m t h e Gulf War, Maastricht, t h e civil war in Yugoslavia, t h e asylum issue a n d right-wing radicalism, to t h e d e p l o y m e n t of G e r m a n mili­ t a r y forces o u t s i d e t h e N A T O a r e a — a r o u s e s a sense of helplessness in t h e political p u b l i c s p h e r e a n d in a n i m m o b i l i z e d g o v e r n m e n t . T h e c h a n g e d c o n s t e l l a t i o n of p o w e r a n d a c h a n g e d d o m e s t i c situ­ a t i o n certainly d e m a n d n e w r e s p o n s e s . T h e q u e s t i o n is, with w h a t k i n d of c o n s c i o u s n e s s will G e r m a n y m a k e t h e a d a p t a t i o n s r e q u i r e d if it c o n t i n u e s its p a t t e r n of r e a c t i n g with a d h o c decisions a n d s u b l i m i n a l m o o d shifts?

236 Chapter 8

H i s t o r i a n s w h o d a s h off b o o k s with titles like "Back to History" a n d "Fear of P o w e r " offer u s a b a c k w a r d - l o o k i n g "farewell to t h e old F e d e r a l R e p u b l i c " t h a t p u r p o r t s to e x p o s e t h e r e c e n t l y c e l e b r a t e d success story of p o s t w a r G e r m a n d e m o c r a c y as a Sonderweg o r special p a t h of its own. T h e f o r m e r West G e r m a n y is said to h a v e e m b o d i e d t h e f o r c e d a b n o r m a l i t y of a d e f e a t e d a n d d i v i d e d n a t i o n , a n d now, h a v i n g r e c o v e r e d its n a t i o n a l g r e a t n e s s a n d sovereignty, it m u s t b e l e d o u t of its u t o p i a n i s m , with its obliviousness to power, a n d b a c k to t h e p a t h of self-conscious p r e e m i n e n c e in C e n t r a l E u r o p e , t h e p a t h of p o w e r politics m a r k e d o u t by Bismarck. T h i s c e l e b r a t i o n of t h e c a e s u r a of 1989 h i d e s t h e r e p e a t e d l y f r u s t r a t e d d e s i r e for n o r ­ m a l i z a t i o n of t h o s e w h o d i d n o t w a n t to a c c e p t t h e c a e s u r a of 1 9 4 5 . T h e y reject a n a l t e r n a t i v e t h a t d o e s n o t necessarily l e a d to different o p t i o n s at every t u r n in t h e s h o r t r u n b u t i n s t e a d o p e n s u p a n o t h e r p e r s p e c t i v e . I n this a l t e r n a t i v e view, t h e o r i e n t a t i o n of t h e o l d Fed­ e r a l R e p u b l i c t o t h e West r e p r e s e n t s n o t a s h r e w d b u t a t r a n s i t o r y f o r e i g n policy decision, a n d a b o v e all n o t solely a political d e c i s i o n , b u t r a t h e r a p r o f o u n d intellectual b r e a k with t h o s e specifically Ger­ m a n traditions that stamped the Wilhelminian Empire a n d contrib­ u t e d to t h e downfall of t h e W e i m a r R e p u b l i c . T h a t b r e a k set t h e stage for a shift in m e n t a l i t y t h a t affected b r o a d s e g m e n t s of t h e p u b l i c after t h e y o u t h revolt of 1968 u n d e r t h e favorable c o n d i t i o n s of a n affluent society, a shift t h a t m a d e it possible for d e m o c r a c y a n d t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state to take political a n d c u l t u r a l r o o t in G e r m a n soil for t h e first t i m e . T o d a y w h a t is at stake is a d a p t i n g G e r m a n y ' s political r o l e to n e w realities, w i t h o u t l e t t i n g t h e p r o c e s s of civilizing politics t h a t was u n d e r w a y u n t i l 1989 b e b r o k e n off u n d e r t h e p r e s s u r e of t h e e c o n o m i c a n d social p r o b l e m s of u n i f i c a t i o n , a n d w i t h o u t sacrificing t h e n o r m a t i v e a c h i e v e m e n t s of a n a t i o n a l selfu n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t is n o l o n g e r b a s e d o n ethnicity b u t f o u n d e d o n citizenship.

3 5

What is Meant by "Deliberative Politics"?

9 Three Normative Models of Democracy

I n w h a t follows I refer t o t h e i d e a l i z e d d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e "lib­ e r a l " a n d t h e " r e p u b l i c a n " u n d e r s t a n d i n g of p o l i t i c s — t e r m s w h i c h m a r k t h e fronts in t h e c u r r e n t d e b a t e in t h e U n i t e d States i n i t i a t e d by t h e so-called c o m m u n i t a r i a n s . D r a w i n g o n t h e w o r k of F r a n k M i c h e l m a n , I will b e g i n by d e s c r i b i n g t h e two polemically c o n t r a s t e d m o d e l s of d e m o c r a c y with specific r e f e r e n c e to t h e c o n c e p t of t h e citizen, t h e c o n c e p t of law, a n d t h e n a t u r e of p r o c e s s e s of political will-formation. I n t h e s e c o n d p a r t , b e g i n n i n g with a c r i t i q u e of t h e "ethical o v e r l o a d " of t h e r e p u b l i c a n m o d e l , I i n t r o d u c e a t h i r d , p r o c e d u r a l m o d e l of d e m o c r a c y for w h i c h I p r o p o s e t o r e s e r v e t h e t e r m "deliberative politics." I T h e crucial difference b e t w e e n liberalism a n d r e p u b l i c a n i s m c o n ­ sists in h o w t h e r o l e of t h e d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e s s is u n d e r s t o o d . A c c o r d ­ i n g t o t h e "liberal" view, this p r o c e s s a c c o m p l i s h e s t h e task of p r o g r a m m i n g t h e state in t h e i n t e r e s t of society, w h e r e t h e state is c o n c e i v e d as a n a p p a r a t u s of p u b l i c a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , a n d society is c o n c e i v e d as a system of m a r k e t - s t r u c t u r e d i n t e r a c t i o n s of private p e r s o n s a n d t h e i r labor. H e r e politics (in t h e sense of t h e citizens' political will-formation) h a s t h e f u n c t i o n of b u n d l i n g t o g e t h e r a n d b r i n g i n g t o b e a r private social i n t e r e s t s a g a i n s t a state a p p a r a t u s t h a t specializes in t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e e m p l o y m e n t of political p o w e r for collective goals.

240 Chapter 9

O n t h e r e p u b l i c a n view, politics is n o t e x h a u s t e d by this m e d i a t i n g f u n c t i o n b u t is constitutive for t h e socialization p r o c e s s as a w h o l e . Politics is c o n c e i v e d as t h e reflexive f o r m of substantial e t h i c a l life. It c o n s t i t u t e s t h e m e d i u m in w h i c h t h e m e m b e r s of q u a s i - n a t u r a l s o l i d a r y c o m m u n i t i e s b e c o m e aware of t h e i r d e p e n d e n c e o n o n e a n o t h e r a n d , a c t i n g with full d e l i b e r a t i o n as citizens, f u r t h e r s h a p e a n d d e v e l o p existing r e l a t i o n s of r e c i p r o c a l r e c o g n i t i o n i n t o a n association of free a n d e q u a l c o n s o c i a t e s u n d e r law. W i t h this, t h e liberal a r c h i t e c t o n i c of g o v e r n m e n t a n d society u n d e r g o e s a n i m p o r ­ t a n t c h a n g e . I n a d d i t i o n to t h e h i e r a r c h i c a l r e g u l a t o r y a p p a r a t u s of sovereign state a u t h o r i t y a n d t h e d e c e n t r a l i z e d r e g u l a t o r y m e c h a ­ n i s m of t h e m a r k e t — t h a t is, b e s i d e s a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p o w e r a n d selfinterest—solidarity a p p e a r s as a t h i r d s o u r c e of social i n t e g r a t i o n . T h i s h o r i z o n t a l political will-formation a i m e d at m u t u a l u n d e r ­ s t a n d i n g o r c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y a c h i e v e d c o n s e n s u s is e v e n s u p p o s e d to enjoy priority, b o t h i n a g e n e t i c a n d a n o r m a t i v e sense. A n a u t o n o ­ m o u s basis in civil society i n d e p e n d e n t of p u b l i c a d m i n i s t r a t i o n a n d m a r k e t - m e d i a t e d private c o m m e r c e is a s s u m e d as a p r e c o n d i t i o n for t h e p r a c t i c e of civic s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n . T h i s basis p r e v e n t s political c o m m u n i c a t i o n f r o m b e i n g swallowed u p by t h e g o v e r n m e n t a p p a ­ r a t u s o r assimilated to m a r k e t s t r u c t u r e s . T h u s , o n t h e r e p u b l i c a n c o n c e p t i o n , t h e political p u b l i c s p h e r e a n d its b a s e , civil society, a c q u i r e a strategic significance. T o g e t h e r they a r e s u p p o s e d t o se­ c u r e t h e integrative p o w e r a n d a u t o n o m y of t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e p r a c t i c e of t h e citizens. T h e u n c o u p l i n g of political c o m m u n i c a t i o n f r o m t h e e c o n o m y h a s as its c o u n t e r p a r t a c o u p l i n g of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p o w e r with t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e p o w e r g e n e r a t e d by political o p i n i o n a n d will-formation. 1

T h e s e two c o m p e t i n g c o n c e p t i o n s of politics h a v e different c o n ­ sequences. (a) I n t h e first p l a c e , t h e i r c o n c e p t s of t h e citizen differ. A c c o r d i n g to t h e liberal view, t h e citizen's status is d e t e r m i n e d p r i m a r i l y by t h e individual r i g h t s h e o r s h e h a s vis-a-vis t h e state a n d o t h e r citizens. As b e a r e r s of individual r i g h t s citizens enjoy t h e p r o t e c t i o n of t h e g o v e r n m e n t as l o n g as t h e y p u r s u e t h e i r private i n t e r e s t s w i t h i n t h e b o u n d a r i e s d r a w n by legal s t a t u t e s — a n d this i n c l u d e s p r o t e c t i o n against state i n t e r v e n t i o n s t h a t violate t h e legal p r o h i b i t i o n o n gov-

241 T h r e e N o r m a t i v e M o d e l s of D e m o c r a c y

e r n m e n t i n t e r f e r e n c e . I n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s a r e negative rights t h a t guar­ a n t e e a d o m a i n of f r e e d o m of c h o i c e w i t h i n w h i c h legal p e r s o n s a r e freed f r o m e x t e r n a l c o m p u l s i o n . Political r i g h t s h a v e t h e s a m e struc­ t u r e : t h e y afford citizens t h e o p p o r t u n i t y to assert t h e i r private in­ terests in s u c h a way t h a t , by m e a n s of e l e c t i o n s , t h e c o m p o s i t i o n of p a r l i a m e n t a r y b o d i e s , a n d t h e f o r m a t i o n of a g o v e r n m e n t , t h e s e interests a r e finally a g g r e g a t e d i n t o a political will t h a t c a n affect t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . I n this way t h e citizens in t h e i r political r o l e c a n d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r g o v e r n m e n t a l a u t h o r i t y is e x e r c i s e d in t h e inter­ est of t h e citizens as m e m b e r s of society. A c c o r d i n g to t h e r e p u b l i c a n view, t h e status of citizens is n o t d e t e r m i n e d by t h e m o d e l of negative liberties to w h i c h t h e s e citizens c a n lay claim as private p e r s o n s . Rather, political r i g h t s — p r e e m i ­ n e n t l y r i g h t s of political p a r t i c i p a t i o n a n d c o m m u n i c a t i o n — a r e positive liberties. T h e y d o n o t g u a r a n t e e f r e e d o m f r o m e x t e r n a l c o m p u l s i o n , b u t g u a r a n t e e i n s t e a d t h e possibility of p a r t i c i p a t i n g in a c o m m o n p r a c t i c e , t h r o u g h w h i c h t h e citizens c a n first m a k e t h e m ­ selves i n t o w h a t t h e y w a n t to be—politically r e s p o n s i b l e subjects of a c o m m u n i t y of free a n d e q u a l c i t i z e n s . To this e x t e n t , t h e political p r o c e s s d o e s n o t serve j u s t to k e e p g o v e r n m e n t activity u n d e r t h e s u r v e i l l a n c e of citizens w h o h a v e a l r e a d y a c q u i r e d a p r i o r social a u t o n o m y t h r o u g h t h e exercise of t h e i r private r i g h t s a n d p r e p o l i t i cal liberties. N o r d o e s it act only as a h i n g e b e t w e e n state a n d society, for d e m o c r a t i c g o v e r n m e n t a l a u t h o r i t y is by n o m e a n s a n o r i g i n a l authority. Rather, this a u t h o r i t y p r o c e e d s f r o m t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e p o w e r g e n e r a t e d by t h e citizens' p r a c t i c e of self-legislation, a n d it is l e g i t i m a t e d by t h e fact t h a t it p r o t e c t s this p r a c t i c e by institutional­ izing p u b l i c f r e e d o m . T h e state's raison d'etre d o e s n o t lie p r i m a r i l y in t h e p r o t e c t i o n of e q u a l i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s b u t in t h e g u a r a n t e e of a n inclusive p r o c e s s of o p i n i o n - a n d will-formation in w h i c h free a n d e q u a l citizens r e a c h a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g o n w h i c h goals a n d n o r m s lie in t h e e q u a l i n t e r e s t of all. I n this way t h e r e p u b l i c a n citizen is c r e d i t e d with m o r e t h a n a n exclusive c o n c e r n with his o r h e r private interests. (b) T h e p o l e m i c against t h e classical c o n c e p t of t h e legal p e r s o n as b e a r e r of i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s reveals a c o n t r o v e r s y a b o u t t h e c o n c e p t of law itself. W h e r e a s o n t h e liberal c o n c e p t i o n t h e p o i n t of a legal 2

3

4

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o r d e r is to m a k e it possible to d e t e r m i n e w h i c h individuals in e a c h case a r e e n t i t l e d t o w h i c h rights, o n t h e r e p u b l i c a n c o n c e p t i o n t h e s e "subjective" r i g h t s owe t h e i r e x i s t e n c e to a n "objective" legal o r d e r t h a t b o t h e n a b l e s a n d g u a r a n t e e s t h e integrity of a n a u t o n o m o u s life in c o m m o n b a s e d o n equality a n d m u t u a l r e s p e c t . O n t h e o n e view, t h e legal o r d e r is c o n c e i v e d in t e r m s of i n d i v i d u a l rights; o n t h e other, t h e i r objective legal c o n t e n t is given priority. To b e s u r e , this c o n c e p t u a l d i c h o t o m y d o e s n o t t o u c h o n t h e intersubjective c o n t e n t of r i g h t s t h a t d e m a n d r e c i p r o c a l r e s p e c t for r i g h t s a n d d u t i e s in s y m m e t r i c a l r e l a t i o n s of r e c o g n i t i o n . B u t t h e r e p u b l i c a n c o n c e p t at least p o i n t s in t h e d i r e c t i o n of a c o n c e p t of law t h a t a c c o r d s e q u a l w e i g h t t o b o t h t h e integrity of t h e individual a n d t h e integrity of t h e c o m m u n i t y in w h i c h p e r s o n s as b o t h indi­ viduals a n d m e m b e r s c a n first a c c o r d o n e a n o t h e r r e c i p r o c a l r e c o g ­ n i t i o n . It ties t h e legitimacy of t h e laws to t h e d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e d u r e by w h i c h t h e y a r e g e n e r a t e d a n d t h e r e b y p r e s e r v e s a n i n t e r n a l c o n ­ n e c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e citizens' p r a c t i c e of self-legislation a n d t h e i m p e r s o n a l sway of t h e law: For republicans, rights ultimately are nothing but determinations of prevail­ ing political will, while for liberals, some rights are always grounded in a "higher law" of transpolitical reason or revelation. . . . In a republican view, a community's objective, common good substantially consists in the success of its political endeavor to define, establish, effectuate, and sustain the set of rights (less tendentiously, laws) best suited to the conditions and mores of that community. Whereas in a contrasting liberal view, the higher-law rights provide the transactional structures and the curbs on power required so that pluralistic pursuit of diverse and conflicting interests may proceed as satis­ factorily as possible. 5

T h e r i g h t t o vote, i n t e r p r e t e d as a positive right, b e c o m e s t h e p a r a d i g m of r i g h t s as s u c h , n o t only b e c a u s e it is constitutive for political s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n , b u t b e c a u s e it shows h o w i n c l u s i o n in a c o m m u n i t y of e q u a l s is c o n n e c t e d with t h e i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t to m a k e a u t o n o m o u s c o n t r i b u t i o n s a n d take p e r s o n a l p o s i t i o n s o n issues: [T]he claim is that we all take an interest in each others' enfranchisement because (i) our choice lies between hanging together and hanging sepa­ rately; (ii) hanging together depends on reciprocal assurances to all of having one's vital interests heeded by others; and (iii) in the deeply plural-

243 T h r e e Normative Models of D e m o c r a c y

ized c o n d i t i o n s o f c o n t e m p o r a r y A m e r i c a n society, s u c h a s s u r a n c e s a r e n o t a t t a i n a b l e t h r o u g h v i r t u a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , b u t o n l y by m a i n t a i n i n g a t least t h e s e m b l a n c e of a politics i n w h i c h e v e r y o n e is c o n c e d e d a v o i c e . 6

T h i s s t r u c t u r e , r e a d off f r o m t h e political r i g h t s of p a r t i c i p a t i o n a n d c o m m u n i c a t i o n , is e x t e n d e d t o all r i g h t s via t h e legislative p r o c e s s c o n s t i t u t e d by political r i g h t s . Even t h e a u t h o r i z a t i o n g u a r a n t e e d by private law to p u r s u e private, freely c h o s e n goals s i m u l t a n e o u s l y i m p o s e s a n o b l i g a t i o n t o r e s p e c t t h e limits of strategic a c t i o n w h i c h a r e a g r e e d to b e in t h e e q u a l i n t e r e s t of all. (c) T h e d i f f e r e n t ways of c o n c e p t u a l i z i n g t h e r o l e of citizen a n d t h e law e x p r e s s a d e e p e r d i s a g r e e m e n t a b o u t t h e n a t u r e of t h e political p r o c e s s . O n t h e liberal view, politics is essentially a s t r u g g l e for p o s i t i o n s t h a t g r a n t access t o a d m i n i s t r a t i v e power. T h e political p r o c e s s of o p i n i o n - a n d will-formation in t h e p u b l i c s p h e r e a n d in p a r l i a m e n t is s h a p e d by t h e c o m p e t i t i o n of strategically a c t i n g col­ lectives t r y i n g to m a i n t a i n o r a c q u i r e p o s i t i o n s of power. Success is m e a s u r e d by t h e citizens' a p p r o v a l of p e r s o n s a n d p r o g r a m s , as q u a n t i f i e d by votes. I n t h e i r c h o i c e s at t h e polls, voters e x p r e s s t h e i r p r e f e r e n c e s . T h e i r votes h a v e t h e s a m e s t r u c t u r e as t h e c h o i c e s of p a r t i c i p a n t s in a m a r k e t , in t h a t t h e i r decisions license access to p o s i t i o n s of p o w e r t h a t political p a r t i e s fight over with a successo r i e n t e d a t t i t u d e similar to t h a t of players in t h e m a r k e t . T h e i n p u t of votes a n d t h e o u t p u t of p o w e r c o n f o r m to t h e s a m e p a t t e r n of strategic a c t i o n . A c c o r d i n g to t h e r e p u b l i c a n view, t h e political o p i n i o n - a n d will f o r m a t i o n in t h e p u b l i c s p h e r e a n d in p a r l i a m e n t d o e s n o t o b e y t h e s t r u c t u r e s of m a r k e t p r o c e s s e s b u t r a t h e r t h e o b s t i n a t e s t r u c t u r e s of a p u b l i c c o m m u n i c a t i o n o r i e n t e d to m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g . F o r politics as t h e citizens' p r a c t i c e of s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n , t h e p a r a d i g m is n o t t h e m a r k e t b u t d i a l o g u e . F r o m this p e r s p e c t i v e t h e r e is a s t r u c t u r a l difference b e t w e e n c o m m u n i c a t i v e power, w h i c h p r o c e e d s f r o m political c o m m u n i c a t i o n in t h e f o r m of discursively g e n e r a t e d majority decisions, a n d t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p o w e r possessed by t h e g o v e r n m e n t a l a p p a r a t u s . Even t h e p a r t i e s t h a t s t r u g g l e over access to p o s i t i o n s of g o v e r n m e n t a l p o w e r m u s t b e n d t h e m s e l v e s to t h e deliberative style a n d t h e s t u b b o r n c h a r a c t e r of political discourse:

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D e l i b e r a t i o n . . . refers t o a c e r t a i n a t t i t u d e t o w a r d social c o o p e r a t i o n , n a m e l y , t h a t of o p e n n e s s to p e r s u a s i o n by r e a s o n s r e f e r r i n g to t h e claims of o t h e r s as well as o n e ' s o w n . T h e d e l i b e r a t i v e m e d i u m is a g o o d faith ex­ c h a n g e of v i e w s — i n c l u d i n g p a r t i c i p a n t s ' r e p o r t s of t h e i r o w n u n d e r ­ s t a n d i n g of t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e vital i n t e r e s t s — . . . i n w h i c h a v o t e , if a n y v o t e is t a k e n , r e p r e s e n t s a p o o l i n g of j u d g m e n t s . 7

H e n c e t h e conflict of o p i n i o n s c o n d u c t e d in t h e political a r e n a h a s l e g i t i m a t i n g force n o t j u s t in t h e sense of a n a u t h o r i z a t i o n to o c c u p y p o s i t i o n s of p o w e r ; o n t h e c o n t r a r y , t h e o n g o i n g political d i s c o u r s e also h a s b i n d i n g force for t h e way in w h i c h political a u t h o r i t y is e x e r c i s e d . A d m i n i s t r a t i v e p o w e r c a n o n l y b e e x e r c i s e d o n t h e basis of policies a n d w i t h i n t h e limits laid d o w n by laws g e n e r a t e d by t h e democratic process. II So m u c h for t h e c o m p a r i s o n b e t w e e n t h e two m o d e l s of d e m o c r a c y t h a t c u r r e n t l y d o m i n a t e t h e discussion b e t w e e n t h e so-called c o m ­ m u n i t a r i a n s a n d liberals, a b o v e all in t h e U S . T h e r e p u b l i c a n m o d e l h a s a d v a n t a g e s a n d disadvantages. I n m y view it h a s t h e a d v a n t a g e t h a t it p r e s e r v e s t h e r a d i c a l d e m o c r a t i c m e a n i n g of a society t h a t o r g a n i z e s itself t h r o u g h t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y u n i t e d citizens a n d d o e s n o t t r a c e collective goals b a c k to "deals" m a d e b e t w e e n c o m ­ p e t i n g private i n t e r e s t s . Its d i s a d v a n t a g e , as I see it, is t h a t it is t o o idealistic in t h a t it m a k e s t h e d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e s s d e p e n d e n t o n t h e virtues of citizens d e v o t e d to t h e p u b l i c weal. F o r politics is n o t c o n c e r n e d in t h e first p l a c e with q u e s t i o n s of ethical self-under­ s t a n d i n g . T h e m i s t a k e of t h e r e p u b l i c a n view consists in a n e t h i c a l f o r e s h o r t e n i n g of political d i s c o u r s e . To b e s u r e , e t h i c a l d i s c o u r s e s a i m e d a t a c h i e v i n g a collective selfu n d e r s t a n d i n g — d i s c o u r s e s in w h i c h p a r t i c i p a n t s a t t e m p t to clarify h o w t h e y u n d e r s t a n d t h e m s e l v e s as m e m b e r s of a p a r t i c u l a r n a t i o n , as m e m b e r s of a c o m m u n i t y o r a state, as i n h a b i t a n t s of a r e g i o n , etc., w h i c h t r a d i t i o n s t h e y wish to cultivate, h o w t h e y s h o u l d t r e a t e a c h other, m i n o r i t i e s , a n d m a r g i n a l g r o u p s , in w h a t s o r t of society t h e y w a n t to live—constitute a n i m p o r t a n t p a r t of politics. B u t u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s of c u l t u r a l a n d social p l u r a l i s m , b e h i n d politically rele-

245 Three Normative Models of Democracy

v a n t goals t h e r e often lie i n t e r e s t s a n d v a l u e - o r i e n t a t i o n s t h a t a r e by n o m e a n s constitutive of t h e i d e n t i t y of t h e political c o m m u n i t y as a w h o l e , t h a t is, for t h e totality of a n intersubjectively s h a r e d f o r m of life. T h e s e i n t e r e s t s a n d v a l u e - o r i e n t a t i o n s , w h i c h conflict with o n e a n o t h e r w i t h i n t h e s a m e polity w i t h o u t a n y p r o s p e c t of c o n s e n ­ sual r e s o l u t i o n , n e e d to b e c o u n t e r b a l a n c e d in a way t h a t c a n n o t b e effected by e t h i c a l d i s c o u r s e , even t h o u g h t h e results of this n o n d i s cursive c o u n t e r b a l a n c i n g a r e subject to t h e proviso t h a t t h e y m u s t n o t violate t h e basic values of a c u l t u r e . T h e b a l a n c i n g of i n t e r e s t s takes t h e f o r m of r e a c h i n g a c o m p r o m i s e b e t w e e n p a r t i e s w h o rely o n t h e i r p o w e r a n d ability to s a n c t i o n . N e g o t i a t i o n s of this s o r t certainly p r e s u p p o s e a r e a d i n e s s to c o o p e r a t e , t h a t is, a willingness to a b i d e by t h e r u l e s a n d to arrive at results t h a t a r e a c c e p t a b l e to all p a r t i e s , t h o u g h for different r e a s o n s . B u t c o m p r o m i s e - f o r m a t i o n is n o t c o n d u c t e d in t h e f o r m of a r a t i o n a l d i s c o u r s e t h a t n e u t r a l i z e s p o w e r a n d e x c l u d e s strategic a c t i o n . However, t h e fairness of c o m ­ p r o m i s e s is m e a s u r e d by p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s a n d p r o c e d u r e s w h i c h for t h e i r p a r t a r e i n n e e d of r a t i o n a l , i n d e e d n o r m a t i v e , justification f r o m t h e s t a n d p o i n t of j u s t i c e . I n c o n t r a s t with e t h i c a l q u e s t i o n s , q u e s t i o n s of j u s t i c e a r e n o t by t h e i r v e r y n a t u r e tied to a p a r t i c u l a r collectivity. Politically e n a c t e d law, if it is to b e l e g i t i m a t e , m u s t b e at least in h a r m o n y with m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s t h a t claim a g e n e r a l validity t h a t e x t e n d s b e y o n d t h e limits of a n y c o n c r e t e legal c o m m u n i t y . T h e c o n c e p t of deliberative politics a c q u i r e s e m p i r i c a l r e l e v a n c e only w h e n we take i n t o a c c o u n t t h e multiplicity of f o r m s of c o m m u ­ n i c a t i o n in w h i c h a c o m m o n will is p r o d u c e d , t h a t is, n o t j u s t ethical self-clarification b u t also t h e b a l a n c i n g of i n t e r e s t s a n d c o m p r o m i s e , t h e p u r p o s i v e c h o i c e of m e a n s , m o r a l justification, a n d legal consis­ tency-testing. I n this p r o c e s s t h e two types of politics w h i c h Michelm a n d i s t i n g u i s h e s in a n ideal-typical f a s h i o n c a n i n t e r w e a v e a n d c o m p l e m e n t o n e a n o t h e r i n a r a t i o n a l m a n n e r . "Dialogical" a n d " i n s t r u m e n t a l " politics c a n interpenetrate in t h e m e d i u m of d e l i b e r a ­ t i o n if t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g f o r m s of c o m m u n i c a t i o n a r e sufficiently i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d . E v e r y t h i n g d e p e n d s o n t h e c o n d i t i o n s of c o m ­ munication a n d the p r o c e d u r e s that l e n d the institutionalized o p i n i o n - a n d will-formation t h e i r l e g i t i m a t i n g force. T h e t h i r d m o d e l of d e m o c r a c y , w h i c h I w o u l d like to p r o p o s e , relies precisely

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o n t h o s e c o n d i t i o n s of c o m m u n i c a t i o n u n d e r w h i c h t h e political p r o c e s s c a n b e p r e s u m e d to p r o d u c e r a t i o n a l results b e c a u s e it o p e r a t e s deliberatively at all levels. M a k i n g t h e p r o c e d u r a l i s t c o n c e p t i o n of deliberative politics t h e c o r n e r s t o n e of t h e t h e o r y of d e m o c r a c y results in differences b o t h f r o m t h e r e p u b l i c a n c o n c e p t i o n of t h e state as a n e t h i c a l c o m m u n i t y a n d f r o m t h e liberal c o n c e p t i o n of t h e state as t h e g u a r d i a n of a m a r k e t society. I n c o m p a r i n g t h e t h r e e m o d e l s , I take m y o r i e n t a t i o n f r o m t h a t d i m e n s i o n of politics w h i c h h a s b e e n o u r p r i m a r y con­ c e r n , namely, t h e d e m o c r a t i c o p i n i o n - a n d will-formation t h a t issue in p o p u l a r e l e c t i o n s a n d p a r l i a m e n t a r y d e c r e e s . A c c o r d i n g to t h e liberal view, t h e d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e s s takes p l a c e exclusively in t h e f o r m of c o m p r o m i s e s b e t w e e n c o m p e t i n g inter­ ests. F a i r n e s s is s u p p o s e d to b e g u a r a n t e e d by r u l e s of c o m p r o m i s e f o r m a t i o n t h a t r e g u l a t e t h e g e n e r a l a n d e q u a l r i g h t to vote, t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e c o m p o s i t i o n of p a r l i a m e n t a r y b o d i e s , t h e i r o r d e r of business, a n d so o n . S u c h r u l e s a r e u l t i m a t e l y justified in t e r m s of liberal basic r i g h t s . A c c o r d i n g to t h e r e p u b l i c a n view, by c o n t r a s t , d e m o c r a t i c will-formation is s u p p o s e d to take t h e f o r m of a n ethical d i s c o u r s e of s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g ; h e r e d e l i b e r a t i o n c a n rely for i t s c o n t e n t o n a culturally e s t a b l i s h e d b a c k g r o u n d c o n s e n s u s of t h e citizens, w h i c h is r e j u v e n a t e d t h r o u g h t h e ritualistic r e e n a c t m e n t o f a r e p u b l i c a n f o u n d i n g act. D i s c o u r s e t h e o r y takes e l e m e n t s f r o m b o t h sides a n d i n t e g r a t e s t h e m i n t o t h e c o n c e p t of a n i d e a l p r o c e ­ d u r e for d e l i b e r a t i o n a n d d e c i s i o n m a k i n g . Weaving t o g e t h e r n e g o ­ tiations a n d d i s c o u r s e s of s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d of j u s t i c e , this democratic procedure grounds the presumption that u n d e r such c o n d i t i o n s r e a s o n a b l e o r fair results a r e o b t a i n e d . A c c o r d i n g to this p r o c e d u r a l i s t view, practical r e a s o n w i t h d r a w s f r o m universal h u m a n r i g h t s o r f r o m t h e c o n c r e t e ethical life of a specific c o m m u n i t y i n t o t h e r u l e s of d i s c o u r s e a n d f o r m s of a r g u m e n t a t i o n t h a t derive t h e i r n o r m a t i v e c o n t e n t f r o m t h e validity-basis of a c t i o n o r i e n t e d to r e a c h ­ i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g , a n d u l t i m a t e l y f r o m t h e s t r u c t u r e of linguistic communication. 8

T h e s e d e s c r i p t i o n s of t h e s t r u c t u r e s of d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e s s set t h e stage for different n o r m a t i v e c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n s of state a n d society. T h e sole p r e s u p p o s i t i o n is a p u b l i c a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of t h e k i n d t h a t

247 T h r e e N o r m a t i v e M o d e l s of D e m o c r a c y

e m e r g e d i n t h e early m o d e r n p e r i o d t o g e t h e r with t h e E u r o p e a n state system a n d in f u n c t i o n a l i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n with a capitalist eco­ n o m i c system. A c c o r d i n g to t h e r e p u b l i c a n view, t h e citizens' politi­ cal o p i n i o n - a n d will-formation f o r m s t h e m e d i u m t h r o u g h w h i c h society c o n s t i t u t e s itself as a political w h o l e . Society is c e n t e r e d in t h e state; for i n t h e citizens' p r a c t i c e of political s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h e polity b e c o m e s c o n s c i o u s of itself as a totality a n d acts o n itself via t h e collective will of t h e citizens. D e m o c r a c y is s y n o n y m o u s with t h e political self-organization of society. T h i s leads to a p o l e m i c a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g of politics as d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t t h e state a p p a r a t u s . I n H a n n a h A r e n d t ' s political writings o n e c a n see t h e t h r u s t of r e p u b ­ lican a r g u m e n t s : in o p p o s i t i o n to t h e civic privatism of a depoliticized p o p u l a t i o n a n d in o p p o s i t i o n to t h e acquisition of l e g i t i m a t i o n t h r o u g h e n t r e n c h e d p a r t i e s , t h e political p u b l i c s p h e r e s h o u l d b e revitalized t o t h e p o i n t w h e r e a r e g e n e r a t e d citizenry c a n , i n t h e f o r m s of a d e c e n t r a l i z e d self-governance, ( o n c e a g a i n ) a p p r o p r i a t e t h e g o v e r n m e n t a l a u t h o r i t y t h a t h a s b e e n u s u r p e d by a self-regulat­ ing bureaucracy. A c c o r d i n g to t h e liberal view, this s e p a r a t i o n of t h e state a p p a r a t u s f r o m society c a n n o t b e e l i m i n a t e d b u t only b r i d g e d by t h e d e m o ­ cratic p r o c e s s . However, t h e w e a k n o r m a t i v e c o n n o t a t i o n s of a r e g u l a t e d b a l a n c i n g of p o w e r a n d i n t e r e s t s s t a n d s in n e e d of consti­ t u t i o n a l c h a n n e l i n g . T h e d e m o c r a t i c will-formation of self-interested citizens, c o n s t r u e d i n m i n i m a l i s t t e r m s , c o n s t i t u t e s j u s t o n e e l e m e n t w i t h i n a c o n s t i t u t i o n t h a t disciplines g o v e r n m e n t a l a u t h o r i t y t h r o u g h n o r m a t i v e c o n s t r a i n t s (suchuas basic rights, s e p a r a t i o n of p o w e r s , a n d legal r e g u l a t i o n of t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ) a n d forces it, t h r o u g h c o m p e t i t i o n b e t w e e n political p a r t i e s , o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d b e t w e e n g o v e r n m e n t a n d o p p o s i t i o n , o n t h e o t h e r , to t a k e a d e q u a t e a c c o u n t of c o m p e t i n g i n t e r e s t s a n d value o r i e n t a t i o n s . T h i s statec e n t e r e d u n d e r s t a n d i n g of politics d o e s n o t h a v e to rely o n t h e u n r e a l i s t i c a s s u m p t i o n of a citizenry c a p a b l e of a c t i n g collectively. Its focus is n o t so m u c h t h e i n p u t of a r a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l will-formation b u t t h e o u t p u t of successful a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s . T h e t h r u s t of liberal a r g u m e n t s is d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t t h e disruptive p o t e n ­ tial of a n a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p o w e r t h a t i n t e r f e r e s with t h e i n d e p e n d e n t social i n t e r a c t i o n s of private p e r s o n s . T h e liberal m o d e l h i n g e s n o t

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o n t h e d e m o c r a t i c s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n of d e l i b e r a t i n g citizens b u t o n t h e legal i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n of a n e c o n o m i c society t h a t is s u p p o s e d to g u a r a n t e e a n essentially n o n p o l i t i c a l c o m m o n g o o d t h r o u g h t h e satisfaction of t h e private a s p i r a t i o n s of p r o d u c t i v e citizens. D i s c o u r s e t h e o r y invests t h e d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e s s with n o r m a t i v e c o n n o t a t i o n s s t r o n g e r t h a n t h o s e of t h e liberal m o d e l b u t w e a k e r t h a n t h o s e of t h e r e p u b l i c a n m o d e l . O n c e a g a i n , it takes e l e m e n t s f r o m b o t h sides a n d fits t h e m t o g e t h e r in a n e w way. I n a g r e e m e n t with r e p u b l i c a n i s m , it gives c e n t e r stage to t h e p r o c e s s of political o p i n i o n - a n d will-formation, b u t w i t h o u t u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e consti­ t u t i o n as s o m e t h i n g s e c o n d a r y ; o n t h e c o n t r a r y , it conceives t h e basic p r i n c i p l e s of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state as a c o n s i s t e n t a n s w e r to t h e q u e s t i o n of h o w t h e d e m a n d i n g c o m m u n i c a t i v e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of a d e m o c r a t i c o p i n i o n - a n d will-formation c a n b e i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d . D i s c o u r s e t h e o r y d o e s n o t m a k e t h e success of deliberative politics d e p e n d o n a collectively a c t i n g citizenry b u t o n t h e institutionaliza­ t i o n of c o r r e s p o n d i n g p r o c e d u r e s . It n o l o n g e r o p e r a t e s with t h e c o n c e p t of a social w h o l e c e n t e r e d i n t h e state a n d c o n c e i v e d as a g o a l - o r i e n t e d subject writ l a r g e . B u t n e i t h e r d o e s it localize t h e w h o l e in a system of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l n o r m s m e c h a n i c a l l y r e g u l a t i n g t h e i n t e r p l a y of p o w e r s a n d i n t e r e s t s in a c c o r d a n c e with t h e m a r k e t m o d e l . D i s c o u r s e t h e o r y a l t o g e t h e r j e t t i s o n s t h e a s s u m p t i o n s of t h e p h i l o s o p h y of c o n s c i o u s n e s s , w h i c h invite us e i t h e r to ascribe t h e citizens' p r a c t i c e of s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n to o n e e n c o m p a s s i n g m a c r o subject o r t o apply t h e a n o n y m o u s r u l e of law to c o m p e t i n g individu­ als. T h e f o r m e r a p p r o a c h r e p r e s e n t s t h e citizenry as a collective a c t o r w h i c h reflects t h e w h o l e a n d acts for its sake; o n t h e latter, individual a c t o r s f u n c t i o n as d e p e n d e n t variables in systemic p r o c ­ esses t h a t u n f o l d blindly b e c a u s e n o consciously e x e c u t e d collective d e c i s i o n s a r e possible over a n d above i n d i v i d u a l acts of c h o i c e (ex­ c e p t in a p u r e l y m e t a p h o r i c a l s e n s e ) . D i s c o u r s e t h e o r y works i n s t e a d with t h e higher-level intersubjectivity of c o m m u n i c a t i o n p r o c e s s e s t h a t u n f o l d in t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d d e ­ l i b e r a t i o n s in p a r l i a m e n t a r y b o d i e s , o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d in t h e i n f o r m a l n e t w o r k s of t h e p u b l i c s p h e r e , o n t h e o t h e r . B o t h w i t h i n a n d o u t s i d e p a r l i a m e n t a r y b o d i e s g e a r e d to d e c i s i o n m a k i n g , t h e s e subjeetless m o d e s of c o m m u n i c a t i o n f o r m a r e n a s in w h i c h a m o r e

249 T h r e e N o r m a t i v e M o d e l s of D e m o c r a c y

o r less r a t i o n a l o p i n i o n - a n d will-formation c o n c e r n i n g issues a n d p r o b l e m s affecting society as a w h o l e c a n t a k e p l a c e . I n f o r m a l o p i n ­ i o n - f o r m a t i o n r e s u l t in i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d e l e c t i o n d e c i s i o n s a n d legis­ lative d e c r e e s t h r o u g h w h i c h c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y g e n e r a t e d p o w e r is t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o administratively utilizable power. As o n t h e liberal m o d e l , t h e b o u n d a r y b e t w e e n state a n d society is r e s p e c t e d ; b u t h e r e civil society, w h i c h p r o v i d e s t h e social u n d e r p i n n i n g of a u t o n o m o u s publics, is as distinct f r o m t h e e c o n o m i c system as it is f r o m t h e p u b l i c a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . T h i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g of d e m o c r a c y l e a d s to t h e n o r m a t i v e d e m a n d for a n e w b a l a n c e b e t w e e n t h e t h r e e r e s o u r c e s of m o n e y , a d m i n i s t r a t i v e power, a n d solidarity f r o m w h i c h m o d e r n societies m e e t t h e i r n e e d for i n t e g r a t i o n a n d r e g u l a t i o n . T h e n o r ­ mative i m p l i c a t i o n s a r e obvious: t h e integrative force of solidarity, w h i c h c a n n o l o n g e r b e d r a w n solely f r o m s o u r c e s of c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n , s h o u l d d e v e l o p t h r o u g h widely e x p a n d e d a u t o n o m o u s p u b ­ lic s p h e r e s as well as t h r o u g h legally i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d p r o c e d u r e s of d e m o c r a t i c d e l i b e r a t i o n a n d d e c i s i o n m a k i n g a n d g a i n sufficient s t r e n g t h t o h o l d its o w n against t h e o t h e r two social f o r c e s — m o n e y a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e power.

Ill T h i s view h a s i m p l i c a t i o n s for h o w o n e s h o u l d u n d e r s t a n d legitima­ t i o n a n d p o p u l a r sovereignty. O n t h e liberal view, d e m o c r a t i c willf o r m a t i o n h a s t h e exclusive f u n c t i o n of legitimating t h e exercise of political power. T h e o u t c o m e s of e l e c t i o n s license t h e a s s u m p t i o n of g o v e r n m e n t a l power, t h o u g h t h e g o v e r n m e n t m u s t justify t h e u s e of p o w e r to t h e p u b l i c a n d p a r l i a m e n t . O n t h e r e p u b l i c a n view, d e m o ­ cratic will-formation h a s t h e significantly s t r o n g e r f u n c t i o n of consti­ tuting society as a political c o m m u n i t y a n d k e e p i n g t h e m e m o r y of this f o u n d i n g act alive with e a c h n e w e l e c t i o n . T h e g o v e r n m e n t is n o t only e m p o w e r e d by t h e e l e c t o r a t e ' s c h o i c e b e t w e e n t e a m s of l e a d e r s to exercise a largely o p e n m a n d a t e , b u t is also b o u n d in a p r o g r a m m a t i c fashion to c a r r y o u t c e r t a i n policies. M o r e a c o m m i t ­ t e e t h a n a n o r g a n of t h e state, it is p a r t of a self-governing political c o m m u n i t y r a t h e r t h a n t h e h e a d of a s e p a r a t e g o v e r n m e n t a l a p p a ­ r a t u s . D i s c o u r s e t h e o r y , by c o n t r a s t , b r i n g s a t h i r d i d e a i n t o play: t h e

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p r o c e d u r e s a n d c o m m u n i c a t i v e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of d e m o c r a t i c o p i n ­ ion- a n d will-formation f u n c t i o n as t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t sluices for t h e discursive r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of t h e d e c i s i o n s of a g o v e r n m e n t a n d a n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n b o u n d by law a n d s t a t u t e . O n this view, rationali­ zation signifies m o r e t h a n m e r e l e g i t i m a t i o n b u t less t h a n t h e consti­ t u t i o n of political power. T h e p o w e r available to t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n c h a n g e s its g e n e r a l c h a r a c t e r o n c e it is b o u n d to a p r o c e s s of d e m o ­ cratic o p i n i o n - a n d will-formation t h a t d o e s n o t m e r e l y r e t r o s p e c ­ tively m o n i t o r t h e exercise of political p o w e r b u t also p r o g r a m s it in a c e r t a i n way. N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g this discursive r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n , only t h e political system itself c a n "act." It is a subsystem specialized for collectively b i n d i n g decisions, w h e r e a s t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e s t r u c t u r e s of t h e p u b l i c s p h e r e c o m p r i s e a far-flung n e t w o r k of s e n s o r s t h a t r e s p o n d to t h e p r e s s u r e of society-wide p r o b l e m s a n d s t i m u l a t e influential o p i n i o n s . T h e p u b l i c o p i n i o n w h i c h is w o r k e d u p via d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e d u r e s i n t o c o m m u n i c a t i v e p o w e r c a n n o t itself " r u l e " b u t c a n only c h a n n e l t h e u s e of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p o w e r in specific d i r e c t i o n s . T h e c o n c e p t of popular sovereignty stems f r o m t h e r e p u b l i c a n a p ­ p r o p r i a t i o n a n d r e v a l u a t i o n of t h e early m o d e r n n o t i o n of sover­ eignty originally associated with absolutist r e g i m e s . T h e state, w h i c h m o n o p o l i z e s t h e m e a n s of l e g i t i m a t e v i o l e n c e , is viewed as a c o n c e n ­ t r a t i o n of p o w e r w h i c h c a n o v e r w h e l m all o t h e r t e m p o r a l p o w e r s . R o u s s e a u t r a n s p o s e d this i d e a , w h i c h g o e s b a c k to B o d i n , to t h e will of t h e u n i t e d p e o p l e , fused it with t h e classical i d e a of t h e self-rule of free a n d e q u a l citizens, a n d s u b l i m a t e d it i n t o t h e m o d e r n c o n ­ c e p t of a u t o n o m y . D e s p i t e this n o r m a t i v e s u b l i m a t i o n , t h e c o n c e p t of sovereignty r e m a i n e d b o u n d to t h e n o t i o n of a n e m b o d i m e n t in t h e (at first actually physically a s s e m b l e d ) p e o p l e . A c c o r d i n g to t h e r e p u b l i c a n view, t h e at least p o t e n t i a l l y a s s e m b l e d p e o p l e a r e t h e b e a r e r s of a sovereignty t h a t c a n n o t in p r i n c i p l e b e d e l e g a t e d : in t h e i r capacity as sovereign, t h e p e o p l e c a n n o t let t h e m s e l v e s b e r e p r e s e n t e d by o t h e r s . C o n s t i t u t i o n a l p o w e r is f o u n d e d o n t h e citi­ z e n s ' p r a c t i c e of s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n , n o t o n t h a t of t h e i r r e p r e ­ sentatives. Against this, liberalism offers t h e m o r e realistic view t h a t , in t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state, t h e a u t h o r i t y e m a n a t i n g f r o m t h e p e o p l e is e x e r c i s e d only "by m e a n s of e l e c t i o n s a n d v o t i n g a n d by specific legislative, executive, a n d j u d i c i a l o r g a n s . " 9

251 Three Normative Models of Democracy

T h e s e two views e x h a u s t t h e alternatives only o n t h e d u b i o u s a s s u m p t i o n t h a t state a n d society m u s t b e c o n c e i v e d in t e r m s of a w h o l e a n d its p a r t s , w h e r e t h e w h o l e is c o n s t i t u t e d e i t h e r by a sovereign citizenry o r by a c o n s t i t u t i o n . By c o n t r a s t to t h e d i s c o u r s e t h e o r y of d e m o c r a c y c o r r e s p o n d s t h e i m a g e of a decentered society, t h o u g h with t h e political p u b l i c s p h e r e it sets a p a r t a n a r e n a for t h e d e t e c t i o n , identification, a n d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of p r o b l e m s affecting society as a w h o l e . If we a b a n d o n t h e c o n c e p t u a l f r a m e w o r k of t h e p h i l o s o p h y of t h e subject, sovereignty n e e d n e i t h e r b e c o n c e n t r a t e d in t h e p e o p l e in a concretistic m a n n e r n o r b a n i s h e d i n t o t h e a n o n y ­ m o u s a g e n c i e s e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n . T h e " s e l f of t h e self-organizing legal c o m m u n i t y d i s a p p e a r s in t h e subjectless f o r m s of c o m m u n i c a t i o n t h a t r e g u l a t e t h e flow of discursive o p i n i o n - a n d will-formation w h o s e fallible results enjoy t h e p r e s u m p t i o n of r a t i o n ­ ality. T h i s is n o t t o r e p u d i a t e t h e i n t u i t i o n associated with t h e i d e a of p o p u l a r sovereignty b u t r a t h e r to i n t e r p r e t it in intersubjective t e r m s . P o p u l a r sovereignty, even t h o u g h it h a s b e c o m e a n o n y m o u s , r e t r e a t s i n t o d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e d u r e s a n d t h e legal i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of t h e i r d e m a n d i n g c o m m u n i c a t i v e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s only to b e a b l e to m a k e itself felt as c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y g e n e r a t e d power. Strictly s p e a k i n g , this c o m m u n i c a t i v e p o w e r s p r i n g s f r o m t h e i n t e r a c t i o n s b e t w e e n legally i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d will-formation a n d culturally m o b i ­ lized p u b l i c s . T h e latter for t h e i r p a r t find a basis in t h e associations of a civil society distinct f r o m t h e state a n d t h e e c o n o m y alike. T h e n o r m a t i v e s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of deliberative politics d o e s in­ d e e d call for a discursive m o d e of socialization for t h e legal commu­ nity; b u t this m o d e d o e s n o t e x t e n d t o t h e w h o l e of t h e society in w h i c h t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y e s t a b l i s h e d political system is embedded. Even o n its o w n p r o c e d u r a l i s t s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g , deliberative poli­ tics r e m a i n s a c o m p o n e n t of a c o m p l e x society, w h i c h as a w h o l e resists t h e n o r m a t i v e a p p r o a c h of legal t h e o r y . I n this r e g a r d , t h e d i s c o u r s e - t h e o r e t i c r e a d i n g of d e m o c r a c y c o n n e c t s with a n objecti­ fying sociological a p p r o a c h t h a t r e g a r d s t h e political system n e i t h e r as t h e p e a k n o r t h e center, n o r even as t h e s t r u c t u r i n g m o d e l of society, b u t as j u s t one a c t i o n system a m o n g o t h e r s . B e c a u s e it p r o ­ vides a k i n d of surety for t h e s o l u t i o n of t h e social p r o b l e m s t h a t t h r e a t e n i n t e g r a t i o n , politics m u s t i n d e e d b e able to c o m m u n i c a t e ,

252 Chapter 9

via t h e m e d i u m of law, with all of t h e o t h e r legitimately o r d e r e d s p h e r e s of a c t i o n , h o w e v e r t h e s e m a y b e s t r u c t u r e d a n d s t e e r e d . B u t t h e political system r e m a i n s d e p e n d e n t o n o t h e r f u n c t i o n a l m e c h a ­ n i s m s , s u c h as t h e r e v e n u e - p r o d u c t i o n of t h e e c o n o m i c system, in m o r e t h a n j u s t a trivial sense; o n t h e c o n t r a r y , deliberative politics, w h e t h e r realized in t h e f o r m a l p r o c e d u r e s of i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d o p i n ­ ion- a n d will-formation o r only in t h e i n f o r m a l n e t w o r k s of t h e political p u b l i c s p h e r e , s t a n d s in a n i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n to t h e c o n t e x t s of a r a t i o n a l i z e d lifeworld t h a t m e e t s it halfway. Deliberatively filtered political c o m m u n i c a t i o n s a r e especially d e p e n d e n t o n t h e r e s o u r c e s of t h e l i f e w o r l d — o n a free a n d o p e n political c u l t u r e a n d a n e n l i g h t e n e d political socialization, a n d a b o v e all o n t h e initiatives of o p i n i o n - s h a p i n g associations. T h e s e r e s o u r c e s e m e r g e a n d r e g e n ­ e r a t e themselves s p o n t a n e o u s l y for t h e m o s t p a r t — a t a n y r a t e , t h e y c a n only with difficulty b e s u b j e c t e d to political c o n t r o l .

10 On the Internal Relation between the Rule of Law and Democracy

I n a c a d e m i a w e often m e n t i o n law a n d politics i n t h e s a m e b r e a t h , yet a t t h e s a m e t i m e w e a r e a c c u s t o m e d t o c o n s i d e r law, t h e r u l e of law, a n d d e m o c r a c y as subjects of different disciplines: j u r i s p r u ­ d e n c e deals with law, political s c i e n c e with d e m o c r a c y , ancTeach deals with t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state i n its o w n w a y — j u r i s p r u d e n c e in n o r m a t i v e t e r m s , political science f r o m a n e m p i r i c a l s t a n d p o i n t T h e scholarly division of laBor c o n t i n u e s t o o p e r a t e even w h e n legal scholars a t t e n d t o law a n d t h e r u l e of law, o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d will-formation i n t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state, o n t h e o t h e r ; o r w h e n social scientists, i n t h e r o l e of sociologists of law, e x a m i n e law a n d t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state a n d , i n t h e r o l e of political scientists, e x a m ­ i n e t h e d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e s s . T h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state a n d d e m o c r a c y a p p e a r t o u s as e n s e p a r a t e objects. T h e r e a r e g o o d r e a s o n s for this. B e c a u s e political r u l e is always e x e r c i s e d i n t h e f o r m of law, legal systems exist w h e r e political force h a s n o t yet b e e n d o m e s t i c a t e d by t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state. A n d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l states exist w h e r e t h e power to govern has n o t yet b e e n democratized. In short, there are legally o r d e r e d g o v e r n m e n t s w i t h o u t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , a n d t h e r e a r e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l states w i t h o u t d e m o c r a t i c constitutions. O f c o u r s e , t h e s e e m p i r i c a l g r o u n d s for a division of l a b o r i n t h e a c a d e m i c t r e a t m e n t of t h e two subjects by n o m e a n s imply that, c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state c o u l d exist

254 Chapter 10

I n this p a p e r I w a n t t o t r e a t several aspects of this i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e r u l e of law a n d d e m o c r a c y . T h i s r e l a t i o n results f r o m t h e c o n c e p t of m o d e r n law itself (section 1) as well as f r o m t h e fact t h a t positive law c a n n o l o n g e r d r a w its legitimacy f r o m a h i g h e r law (section 2 ) . M o d e r n law is l e g i t i m a t e d by t h e a u t o n o m y g u a r a n t e e d equally t o e a c h citizen, a n d in s u c h a way t h a t private a n d p u b l i c a u t o n o m y reciprocally p r e s u p p o s e e a c h o t h e r (section 3 ) . T h i s c o n ­ c e p t u a l i n t e r r e l a t i o n also m a k e s itself felt in t h e dialectic of legal a n d factual equality. It was this dialectic t h a t first elicited t h e socialwelfare p a r a d i g m of law as a r e s p o n s e t o t h e liberal u n d e r s t a n d i n g of law, a n d t o d a y this s a m e dialectic necessitates a p r o c e d u r a l i s t s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e m o c r a c y (section 4 ) . I n clos­ i n g I will e l u c i d a t e this p r o c e d u r a l i s t legal p a r a d i g m with t h e e x a m ­ p l e of t h e feminist politics of equality (section 5 ) . 1

Formal Properties o f M o d e r n Law

Since L o c k e , R o u s s e a u , a n d Kant, a c e r t a i n c o n c e p t of law h a s g r a d u ­ ally p r e v a i l e d n o t only in p h i l o s o p h i c a l t h o u g h t b u t in t h e constitu­ t i o n a l reality of W e s t e r n societies. T h i s c o n c e p t is s u p p o s e d to a c c o u n t s i m u l t a n e o u s l y for b o t h t h e positivity a n d t h e f r e e d o m - g u a r ­ a n t e e i n g c h a r a c t e r of c o e r c i b l e law. T h e positivity of l a w — t h e fact t h a t n o r m s b a c k e d by t h e t h r e a t of state s a n c t i o n s t e m f r o m t h e c h a n g e a b l e decisions of a political lawgiver—-is b o u n d u p with t h e d e m a n d for l e g i t i m a t i o n . A c c o r d i n g t o this d e m a n d , positively e n ­ a c t e d law s h o u l d g u a r a n t e e t h e a u t o n o m y of all legal p e r s o n s equally; a n d t h e d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e d u r e of legislation s h o u l d in t u r n satisfy this d e m a n d . I n this way, a n i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n is e s t a b l i s h e d b e t w e e n t h e coercibility a n d c h a n g e a b i l i t y of positive law o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d a m o d e of l a w m a k i n g t h a t e n g e n d e r s legitimacy o n t h e o t h e r . H e n c e f r o m a n o r m a t i v e p e r s p e c t i v e t h e r e is a c o n c e p t u a l o r i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n — a n d n o t simply a historically, a c c i d e n t a l relation—b e t w e e n law a n d d e m o c r a c y , b e t w e e n legal t h e o r y a n d d e m o c r a t i c theory. At first g l a n c e , t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of this i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n h a s t h e l o o k of a p h i l o s o p h i c a l trick. Yet, as a m a t t e r of fact, t h e r e l a t i o n is d e e p l y r o o t e d in t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of o u r everyday p r a c t i c e of law.

255 O n the Internal Relation between Law and Democracy

F o r in t h e m o d e of validity t h a t a t t a c h e s to law, t h e facticity of t h e state's legal e n f o r c e m e n t is i n t e r m e s h e d with t h e l e g i t i m a t i n g force of a legislative p r o c e d u r e t h a t claims to b e r a t i o n a l i n t h a t it g u a r a n ­ tees f r e e d o m . T h i s is s h o w n in t h e p e c u l i a r a m b i v a l e n c e with w h i c h t h e law p r e s e n t s itself to its a d d r e s s e e s a n d e x p e c t s t h e i r o b e d i e n c e : t h a t is, it leaves its a d d r e s s e e s free t o a p p r o a c h t h e law in e i t h e r of two ways. T h e y c a n e i t h e r c o n s i d e r n o r m s m e r e l y as factual con­ straints o n t h e i r f r e e d o m a n d take a strategic a p p r o a c h t o t h e calcu­ lable c o n s e q u e n c e s of possible rule-violations, o r t h e y c a n c o m p l y with legal statutes i n a p e r f o r m a t i v e a t t i t u d e , i n d e e d c o m p l y o u t of r e s p e c t for results of a c o m m o n will-formation t h a t claim legitimacy. K a n t a l r e a d y e x p r e s s e d this p o i n t with his c o n c e p t of "legality," w h i c h h i g h l i g h t e d t h e c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e s e two m o m e n t s with­ o u t w h i c h legal o b e d i e n c e c a n n o t b e r e a s o n a b l y e x p e c t e d : legal n o r m s m u s t b e f a s h i o n e d so t h a t they c a n b e viewed s i m u l t a n e o u s l y in two ways^ as coerciveItnd as laws of f r e e d o m . T h e s e two aspects b e l o n g t o o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of m o d e r n law: we* c o n s i d e r t h e validity of a legal n o r m as e q u i v a l e n t t o t h e e x p l a n a t i o n t h a t t h e state c a n s i m u l t a n e o u s l y g u a r a n t e e factual e n f o r c e m e n t a n d legitimate enact­ m e n t — t h u s it c a n g u a r a n t e e , o n t h e o n e h a n d , t h e legality of behav­ i o r i n t h e sense of average c o m p l i a n c e , w h i c h c a n if n e c e s s a r y b e c o m p e l l e d by s a n c t i o n s ; a n d , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e legitimacy of t h e r u l e itself, w h i c h m u s t always m a k e it possible to c o m p l y with t h e n o r m o u t of r e s p e c t for t h e law. O f c o u r s e , this i m m e d i a t e l y raises t h e q u e s t i o n of h o w t h e legiti­ m a c y of r u l e s s h o u l d b e g r o u n d e d w h e n t h e r u l e s i n q u e s t i o n c a n b e c h a n g e d a t a n y t i m e by t h e political legislator. C o n s t i t u t i o n a l n o r m s t o o a r e c h a n g e a b l e ; a n d even t h e basic n o r m s t h a t t h e c o n ­ stitution itself h a s d e c l a r e d n o n a m e n d a b l e s h a r e with all positive law t h e fate t h a t t h e y carl b e a b r o g a t e d , say, after a c h a n g e of r e g i m e . As l o n g as o n e was able t o fall b a c k o n a religiously o r metaphysically g r o u n d e d n a t u r a l law, t h e w h i r l p o o l of t e m p o r a l i t y e n v e l o p i n g posi­ tive law c o u l d b e h e l d i n c h e c k by morality. S i t u a t e d i n a h i e r a r c h y of law, t e m p o r a l i z e d positive law was s u p p o s e d t o r e m a i n subordinate to a n e t e r n a l l y valid m o r a l law, f r o m w h i c h it was to receive its lasting o r i e n t a t i o n s . B u t even aside f r o m t h e fact t h a t i n pluralistic societies s u c h i n t e g r a t i n g worldviews a n d collectively b i n d i n g c o m p r e h e n s i v e

i

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doctrines have in any case disintegrated, modern law, simply by virtue of its formal properties, resists the direct control of a posttraditional morality of conscience, which is, so to speak, all we have left. 2 T h e C o m p l e m e n t a r y Relation b e t w e e n Positive Law and A u t o n o m o u s Morality

M o d e r n legal systems are constructed on the basis of individual rights. S u c h rights have the character of releasing legal persons from moral obligations in a carefully circumscribed manner. By introduc­ ing rights that concede to agents the latitude to act according to personal preferences, modern law as a whole implements the prin­ ciple that whatever is not explicitly prohibited is permitted. W h e r e a s in morality an inherent symmetry exists between rights and duties, legal duties^are^ a £ M s e g u e r u ^ ^ ^ jordj^ro on individu^nbeTties. T h i s basic conceptual privileging^ is explained by the mod­ ern concepts of the "legal person" and of the "legal community." T h e moral universe, which is unlimited in social space and historical time, includes all natural persons with their complex life histories; morality itself extends to the protection of the integrity of fully individuated persons (Einzelner). By contrast, the legal community, which is always localized in space and time, protects the integrity of its members precisely insofar as they acquire the artificial status of rights bearers. F o r this reason, the relation between law a n d morality is more one of complementarity than of subordination. T h e same is true if one compares their relative scope. T h e matters tha^^ are at once both narrowerand^broader in scopejthan morally relevant concerns: narrower inasmuch as legal regulation has access only to external, that is, coercible, behavior, and broader inasmuch as law, as an organizational form of politics, pertains not only to the regulation of interpersonal conflicts but also to t h e pursuit of political goals and the implementation of policies. H e n c e legal regulations touch not only on moral questions in the narrow sense, but also on pragmatic and ethical questions, and on forming compromises among conflicting interests. Moreover, unlike the clearly delimited normative validity claimed by moral norms, the

257 O n t h e I n t e r n a l R e l a t i o n b e t w e e n Law a n d D e m o c r a c y

legitimacy c l a i m e d by legal n o r m s is b a s e d o n various sorts of r e a s o n s . T h e legislative p r a c t i c e of justification d e p e n d s o n a c o m p l e x n e t ­ w o r k of d i s c o u r s e s a n d b a r g a i n i n g , a n d n o t j u s t o n m o r a l d i s c o u r s e . T h e i d e a f r o m n a t u r a l law of a h i e r a r c h y of laws at different levels of dignity is m i s l e a d i n g . Law is b e t t e r u n d e r s t o o d as a f u n c t i o n a l c o m p l e m e n t to morality. As positively valid, legitimately e n a c t e d , a n d a c t i o n a b l e , law c a n relieve t h e m o r a l l y j u d g i n g a n d a c t i n g p e r s o n of t h e c o n s i d e r a b l e cognitive, m o t i v a t i o n a l , a n d o r g a n i z a t i o n a l de­ m a n d s of a m o r a l i t y b a s e d entirely o n i n d i v i d u a l c o n s c i e n c e . Law c a n c o m p e n s a t e for t h e w e a k n e s s e s of a h i g h l y d e m a n d i n g m o r a l i t y t h a t — i f we j u d g e f r o m its e m p i r i c a l r e s u l t s — p r o v i d e s only cognitively i n d e t e r m i n a t e a n d motivationally u n r e l i a b l e results. Naturally, this d o e s n o t absolve legislators a n d j u d g e s f r o m t h e c o n c e r n t h a t t h e law b e in h a r m o n y with morality. B u t legal r e g u l a t i o n s a r e t o o c o n c r e t e to b e Jegit^imated solely t h r o u g h t h e i r compatibility with m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s . F r o m w h a t , t h e n , c a n positive law b o r r o w its legiti­ macy, if n o t f r o m a s u p e r i o r m o r a l law? Like morality, law t o o is s u p p o s e d to p r o t e c t t h e a u t o n o m y of all p e r s o n s equally. Law t o o m u s t p r o v e its legitimacy u n d e r this a s p e c t of s e c u r i n g f r e e d o m . I n t e r e s t i n g l y e n o u g h , t h o u g h , t h e positive c h a r a c t e r of law forces a u t o n o m y to split u p in a p e c u l i a r way, w h i c h h a s n o p a r a l l e l in m o r a l i t y M o r a l s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n in K a n t ' s sense is a u n i f i e d c o n c e p t insofar as it d e m a n d s of e a c h p e r s o n , in propria persona, t h a t s h e o b e y j u s t t h o s e n o r m s t h a t s h e h e r s e l f posits a c c o r d ­ i n g to h e r o w n i m p a r t i a l j u d g m e n t , o r a c c o r d i n g to a j u d g m e n t r e a c h e d in c o m m o n with all o t h e r p e r s o n s . However, t h e b i n d i n g quality of legal n o r m s d o e s n o t s t e m solely f r o m p r o c e s s e s of o p i n ­ ion- a n d will-formation, b u t arises also f r o m t h e collectively b i n d i n g d e c i s i o n s o ^ a u A o r i t i e ^ ) w h o m a k e a n d apply law. T h i s c i r c u m s t a n c e m a k e s it c o n c e p t u a l l y n e c e s s a r y to d i s t i n g u i s h t h e r o l e of a u t h o r s w h o m a k e ( a n d adjudicate) law f r o m t h a t of a d d r e s s e e s w h o a r e subject to e s t a b l i s h e d law. T h e a u t o n o m y t h a t in t h e m o r a l d o m a i n * all of a p i e c e , so to speak, a p p e a r s in t h e legal d o m a i n only in t h e d u a l f o r m of private a n d p u b l i c a u t o n o m y . s

However, t h e s e two m o m e n t s m u s t t h e n b e m e d i a t e d i n s u c h a way t h a t t h e o n e f o r m of a u t o n o m y d o e s n o t d e t r a c t f r o m t h e o t h e r . E a c h f o r m of a u t o n o m y , t h e i n d i v i d u a l liberties of t h e subject of

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private law a n d t h e p u b l i c a u t o n o m y of t h e citizen, m a k e s t h e o t h e r f o r m possible. T h i s r e c i p r o c a l r e l a t i o n is e x p r e s s e d by t h e i d e a t h a t legal p e r s o n s c a n b e a u t o n o m o u s only insofar as t h e y c a n u n d e r ­ s t a n d themselves, in t h e exercise of t h e i r civic rights, as a u t h o r s of j u s t t h o s e rights w h i c h t h e y a r e s u p p o s e d t o o b e y as a d d r e s s e e s . 3

T h e Mediation o f Popular Sovereignty and H u m a n Rights

It is t h e r e f o r e n o t s u r p r i s i n g t h a t m o d e r n n a t u r a l law t h e o r i e s h a v e a n s w e r e d t h e l e g i t i m a t i o n q u e s t i o n by r e f e r r i n g , o n t h e o n e h a n d , to t h e p r i n c i p l e of popular sovereignty a n d , o n t h e other, t o t h e rule of law as g u a r a n t e e d by h u m a n rights. T h e ^ r i n e i p l e of p o p u l a r sover­ eignties e x p r e s s e d in r i g h t s o f , c o m m p i c a t i o n a n d ^ g a r t i d p a t i o n ^ t h a t s e c u r e t h e p u b l i c a u t o n o m y of citizens; the^rule of l a \ ^ i s ~ e x ^ p r e s s e d in t h o s e classical basic r i g h t s ^ A ^ ^ g u ^ ^ t e ^ L J j h e , private autonornjj^ t h e law is l e g i t i m a t e d as a n i n s t r u m e n t for t h e e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n of private a n d p u b l i c a u t o n o m y . T o b e sure, political p h i l o s o p h y h a s n e v e r really b e e n a b l e t o strike a b a l a n c e b e t w e e n p o p u l a r sovereignty a n d h u m a n rights, o r b e ­ t w e e n t h e " f r e e d o m of t h e a n c i e n t s " a n d t h e " f r e e d o m of t h e m o d ­ e r n s . " T h e political a u t o n o m y of citizens is s u p p o s e d t o b e e m b o d i e d in t h e self-organization of a c o m m u n i t y t h a t gives itself its laws t h r o u g h t h e sovereign will of t h e p e o p l e . T h e private a u t o n o m y of citizens, o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , is s u p p o s e d t o take t h e f o r m of basic r i g h t s t h a t g u a r a n t e e t h e a n o n y m o u s r u l e of law. O n c e t h e issue is set u p in this way, e i t h e r i d e a c a n b e u p h e l d only a t t h e e x p e n s e of t h e o t h e r . T h e intuitively p l a u s i b l e co-originality of b o t h i d e a s falls by t h e wayside. Republicanism, w h i c h g o e s b a c k to Aristotle a n d t h e political hu­ m a n i s m of t h e R e n a i s s a n c e , h a s always given t h e p u b l i c a u t o n o m y of citizens priority over t h e p r e p o l i t i c a l liberties of private p e r s o n s . Liberalism, w h i c h g o e s b a c k to J o h n L o c k e , h a s i n v o k e d t h e d a n g e r of tyrannical majorities a n d p o s t u l a t e d t h e priority of h u m a n rights. A c c o r d i n g t o r e p u b l i c a n i s m , h u m a n r i g h t s o w e d t h e i r legitimacy t o t h e ethical s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d sovereign s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n a c h i e v e d by a political c o m m u n i t y ; i n liberalism, s u c h r i g h t s w e r e s u p p o s e d t o p r o v i d e , f r o m t h e very start, l e g i t i m a t e b a r r i e r s t h a t

259 O n t h e I n t e r n a l R e l a t i o n b e t w e e n Law a n d D e m o c r a c y

p r e v e n t e d t h e sovereign will of t h e p e o p l e f r o m e n c r o a c h i n g o n inviolable s p h e r e s of i n d i v i d u a l f r e e d o m . I n t h e i r c o n c e p t s of t h e legal p e r s o n ' s a u t o n o m y , R o u s s e a u a n d K a n t certainly a i m e d to con­ ceive of sovereign will a n d practical r e a s o n as u n i f i e d in s u c h a way t h a t p o p u l a r sovereignty a n d h u m a n r i g h t s w o u l d reciprocally inter­ p r e t o n e a n o t h e r . B u t even t h e y failed to d o j u s t i c e t o t h e co-origi­ nality of t h e two ideas; R o u s s e a u suggests m o r e of a r e p u b l i c a n r e a d i n g , K a n t m o r e of a liberal o n e . T h e y m i s s e d t h e i n t u i t i o n they w a n t e d to a r t i c u l a t e : t h a t t h e i d e a of h u m a n rights, w h i c h is ex­ p r e s s e d in t h e r i g h t to e q u a l individual liberties, m u s t n e i t h e r b e m e r e l y i m p o s e d o n t h e sovereign legislator as a n e x t e r n a l b a r r i e r , n o r b e i n s t r u m e n t a l i z e d as a f u n c t i o n a l r e q u i s i t e for legislative goals. To e x p r e s s this i n t u i t i o n p r o p e r l y it h e l p s to view t h e d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e d u r e — w h i c h a l o n e p r o v i d e s l e g i t i m a t i n g force to t h e law­ m a k i n g p r o c e s s in t h e c o n t e x t of social a n d i d e o l o g i c a l p l u r a l i s m — from a discourse-theoretical standpoint. H e r e I assume a principle t h a t I c a n n o t discuss in detail, namely, t h a t ^J^S^i^^LS^L^SMB legitimacy only if all t h o s e possibly affected by it c o u l d c o n s e n t to it after p ^ t i c ^ ^ t i n ^ ^ Q ^ I i o n a l discourses. Now, if d i s c o u r s e s — a n d b a r g a i n i n g p r o c e s s e s as well, w h o s e fairness is b a s e d o n discursively g r o u n d e d procedures—represent the place where a reasonable po­ litical will c a n d e v e l o p , t h e n t h e p r e s u m p t i o n of reasonability, w h i c h t h e d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e d u r e is s u p p o s e d to g r o u n d ^ u l t i on an elaborate communicative a r r a n g e m e n t : the p r e s u m p t i o n de­ p e n d s o n The c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h o n e c a n legally institutionalize t h e f o r m s of c o m m u n i c a t i o n n e c e s s a r y for l e g i t i m a t e l a w m a k i n g . I n t h a t case, t h e d e s i r e d i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n h u m a n r i g h t s a n d p o p u l a r sovereignty consists in this: h u m a n r i g h t s themselves a r e w h a t satisfy t h e r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t a civic p r a c t i c e of t h e p u b l i c u s e of c o m m u n i c a t i v e f r e e d o m b e Tegairy I n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d . H u m a n rights, wfucTTmake t h e exercise of ""popular sovereignty legally possible, c a n n o t b e i m p o s e d o n this p r a c t i c e as a n e x t e r n a l c o n s t r a i n t . En­ a b l i n g c o n d i t i o n s m u s t n o t b e c o n f u s e d with s u c h c o n s t r a i n t s . Naturally, this anaIysTsls~at flrsT plauslBle only for t h o s e political civil rights, specifically t h e r i g h t s of c o m m u n i c a t i o n a n d participa­ tion, t h a t s a f e g u a r d t h e exercise of political a u t o n o m y . It is less p l a u s i b l e for t h e classical h u m a n r i g h t s t h a t g u a r a n t e e t h e citizens'

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private a u t o n o m y . H e r e we t h i n k in t h e first i n s t a n c e of t h e funda­ m e n t a l r i g h t to t h e g r e a t e s t possible d e g r e e of e q u a l individual liberties, t h o u g h also of basic rights t h a t c o n s t i t u t e m e m b e r s h i p status in a state a n d p r o v i d e t h e individual with c o m p r e h e n s i v e legal p r o t e c t i o n . T h e s e rights, w h i c h a r e m e a n t to g u a r a n t e e e v e r y o n e a n e q u a l o p p o r t u n i t y to p u r s u e his o r h e r private c o n c e p t i o n of t h e g o o d , have a n intrinsic value, o r at least t h e y a r e n o t r e d u c i b l e to t h e i r i n s t r u m e n t a l value for d e m o c r a t i c will-formation. We will d o j u s t i c e to t h e i n t u i t i o n t h a t t h e classical liberties a r e co-original with political r i g h t s only if we state m o r e precisely t h e thesis t h a t h u m a n r i g h t s legally e n a b l e t h e citizens' p r a c t i c e of s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n . I t u r n n o w to this m o r e precise s t a t e m e n t . 4

T h e Relation b e t w e e n Private and Public A u t o n o m y

H o w e v e r w e l l - g r o u n d e d h u m a n r i g h t s a r e , they m a y n o t b e p a t e r n a l istically foisted, as it w e r e , o n a sovereign. I n d e e d , t h e i d e a of citi­ z e n s ' legal a u t o n o m y d e m a n d s t h a t t h e a d d r e s s e e s of law b e able t o u n d e r s t a n d themselves at t h e s a m e t i m e as its a u t h o r s . It w o u l d c o n t r a d i c t this i d e a if t h e d e m o c r a t i c legislator w e r e to discover h u m a n rights as t h o u g h t h e y w e r e (preexisting) m o r a l facts t h a t o n e m e r e l y n e e d s to e n a c t as positive law. At t h e s a m e t i m e , o n e m u s t also n o t f o r g e t t h a t w h e n citizens o c c u p y t h e r o l e of co-legislators they a r e n o l o n g e r free to c h o o s e t h e m e d i u m in w h i c h a l o n e t h e y c a n realize t h e i r a u t o n o m y . T h e y p a r t i c i p a t e in legislation only as legal subjects; it is n o l o n g e r in t h e i r p o w e r to d e c i d e w h i c h l a n g u a g e they will m a k e iise of. T h e d e m o c r a t i c i d e a of j e l f - l e g i s l a t i o n must a c q u i r e its validityin_die]med^um of law i t ^ j f t

However, w h e n citizens j u d g e in t h e light of t h e d i s c o u r s e priricip l e w h e t h e r t h e law t h ^ m a k e is legitimate, t h e y d o so u n d e r c o m ­ m u n i c a t i v e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s t h a t m u s t themselves b e Teeally instit^ civil rights, a n d for s u c h institutionalization to occur, the;legal c o d e as s u c h m u s t b e available. B u t in o r d e r to establish this legal c o d e it is n e c e s s a r y to c r e a t e t h e status o F I e g a T p e T s o n i w h o as b e a r e r s of individual r i g h t s b e f o n g t o ^ v o l u ^ e f f e c t i v e l y claim t h e i r rights. T h e r e is n o law w i t h o u t t h e private a u t o n o m y of

261 O n t h e I n t e r n a l R e l a t i o n b e t w e e n Law a n d D e m o c r a c y

legal p e r s o n s in g e n e r a l . C o n s e q u e n t l y , w i t h o u t basic r i g h t s t h a t s e c u r e t h e private a u t o n o m y of citizens t h e r e is also n o m e d i u m for legally i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z i n g t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h t h e s e citizens, as citizens of a state, c a n m a k e u s e of t h e i r p u b l i c a u t o n o m y . T h u s private a n d p u b l i c a u t o n o m y m u t u a l l y p r e s u p p o s e e a c h o t h e r in s u c h a way t h a t n e i t h e r h u m a n r i g h t s n o r p o p u l a r sovereignty c a n claim p r i m a c y over its c o u n t e r p a r t . This m u t u a l presupposition expresses the intuition that, o n the o n e h a n d , citizens c a n m a k e a d e q u a t e u s e of t h e i r p u b l i c a u t o n o m y only if, o n t h e basis of t h e i r equally p r o t e c t e d private a u t o n o m y , they a r e sufficiently i n d e p e n d e n t ; b u t that, o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e y c a n arrive at a c o n s e n s u a l r e g u l a t i o n of t h e i r private a u t o n o m y only if they m a k e a d e q u a t e u s e of t h e i r political a u t o n o m y as e n f r a n c h i s e d citizens. T h e i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e r u l e of law a n d d e m o c r a c y h a s b e e n c o n c e a l e d l o n g e n o u g h by t h e c o m p e t i t i o n b e t w e e n t h e legal p a r a d i g m s t h a t h a v e b e e n d o m i n a n t u p to t h e p r e s e n t . T h e liberal legal p a r a d i g m r e c k o n s with a n e c o n o m i c society t h a t is institution­ alized t h r o u g h private law—above all t h r o u g h p r o p e r t y r i g h t s a n d c o n t r a c t u a l f r e e d o m — a n d left to t h e s p o n t a n e o u s w o r k i n g s of t h e m a r k e t . S u c h a "private law society" is t a i l o r e d to t h e a u t o n o m y of legal subjects w h o as m a r k e t p a r t i c i p a n t s m o r e o r less rationally p u r s u e t h e i r p e r s o n a l life-plans. T h i s m o d e l of society is associated with t h e n o r m a t i v e e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t social j u s t i c e c a n b e realized by g u a r a n t e e i n g s u c h a n e g a t i v e legal status, a n d t h u s solely by d e l i m ­ iting s p h e r e s of i n d i v i d u a l f r e e d o m . T h e w e l l - f o u n d e d c r i t i q u e of this s u p p o s i t i o n gave rise to t h e social welfare m o d e l . T h e o b j e c t i o n is obvious: if t h e free "capacity t o h a y e _ a n d j t c q u i r e " is s u p p o s e d j t o g u a r a n t e e social justice, t h e n a n ^ e ^ u a U exist. As a m a t t e r of fact, however, t h e g r o w i n g i n e q u a l i t i e s in eco­ n o m i c power, assets, a n d living c o n d i t i o n s have increasingly d e ­ stroyed t h e factual p r e c o n d i t i o n s for a n e q u a l o p p o r t u n i t y to m a k e ^ e f f e c t i v e u s e ) o f equally d i s t r i b u t e d legal p o w e r s . If t h e n o r m a t i v e c o n t e n t of legal equality is n o t to b e i n v e r t e d , t h e n two correctives a r e necessary. O n t h e o p e h a n d , existing normgjDjLpriYa^ ^ s u b s t a n t i v e l y specified, a n d o n t h e o t h e r , b a s i c ^ c ^ j i g h t s m u s t b e i n t r o d u c e d , r i g h t s t h a t g r o u n d claims to a m o r e j u s t d i s t r i b u t i o n

262 Chapter 10

of socially p r o d u c e d w e a l t h a n d t o m o r e effective p r o t e c t i o n against socially p r o d u c e d d a n g e r s . I n t h e m e a n t i m e , of c o u r s e , this materialization of law h a s in t u r n c r e a t e d t h e u n i n t e n d e d side efferts^jQlwelfare^paternalism. Clearly, efforts to c o m p e n s a t e for a c t u a l living c o n d i t i o n s a n d p o w e r posi­ t i o n s m u s t n o t l e a d t o " n o r m a l i z i n g " i n t e r v e n t i o n s of a sort t h a t o n c e a g a i n restrict t h e p r e s u m p t i v e b e n e f i c i a r i e s ' p u r s u i t of a n a u t o n o m o u s life-project. T h e f u r t h e r d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e dialectic of legal a n d factual equality h a s s h o w n t h a t b o t h legal p a r a d i g m s a r e equally c o m m i t t e d b a s e d o n i n d u s t r i a l capitalism. T h i s society is s u p p o s e d to f u n c t i o n in s u c h a way t h a t t h e e x p e c t a t i o n of social j u s t i c e c a n b e satisfied by s e c u r i n g e a c h individual's private p u r s u t of his o r h e r c o n c e p t i o n of t h e g o o d life. T h e only d i s p u t e b e t w e e n t h e two p a r a d i g m s c o n ­ c e r n s w h e t h e r private a u t o n o m y c a n b e g u a r a n t e e d directly by n e g a ­ tive liberties (Freiheitsrechte), o r w h e t h e r o n t h e c o n t r a r y t h e c o n d i t i o n s for private a u t o n o m y m u s t b e s e c u r e d t h r o u g h t h e p r o ­ vision of welfare e n t i t l e m e n t s . I n . b o t h cases, however, t h e i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n rjrivate a n d p u M d r o p s o u t of t h e picture. 5

A n Example: T h e Feminist Politics o f Equality

I n closing, I w a n t to e x a m i n e t h e feminist politics of equality to s h o w t h a t policies a n d legal strategies oscillate helplessly b e t w e e n t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l p a r a d i g m s as l o n g as they r e m a i n l i m i t e d to s e c u r i n g private a u t o n o m y a n d d i s r e g a r d h o w t h e individual r i g h t s of private p e r s o n s a r e r e l a t e d to t h e p u b l i c a u t o n o m y of citizens e n g a g e d i n l a w m a k i n g . For, in t h e final analysis, private legal subjects c a n n o t enjoy even e q u a l i n d i v i d u a l liberties if t h e y themselves d o n o t j o i n t l y exercise t h e i r civic a u t o n o m y in o r d e r to specify clearly w h i c h inter­ ests a n d s t a n d a r d s a r e justified, a n d to a g r e e o n t h e r e l e v a n t r e s p e c t s t h a t d e t e r m i n e w h e n like cases s h o u l d b e t r e a t e d alike a n d different cases differently. Initially, t h e goal of liberal policies was t o u n c o u p l e t h e a c q u i s i t i o n of status f r o m g e n d e r identity a n d to g u a r a n t e e to w o m e n e q u a l o p p o r t u n i t i e s i n t h e c o m p e t i t i o n for j o b s , social r e c o g n i t i o n , e d u c a -

263 On the Internal Relation between Law and Democracy

t i o n , political power, etc., r e g a r d l e s s of t h e o u t c o m e . However, t h e f o r m a l equality t h a t was partially a c h i e v e d m e r e l y m a d e m o r e obvi­ o u s t h e ways in w h i c h w o m e n w e r e in fact t r e a t e d unequally. Social welfare politics r e s p o n d e d , especially i n t h e a r e a s of social, labor, a n d family law, by p a s s i n g special r e g u l a t i o n s r e l a t i n g , for e x a m p l e , to p r e g n a n c y a n d c h i l d c a r e , o r to social h a r d s h i p in t h e case of divorce. I n t h e m e a n t i m e feminist c r i t i q u e h a s t a r g e t e d n o t only t h e u n r e d e e m e d d e m a n d s , b u t also t h e a m b i v a l e n t c o n s e q u e n c e s of successfully i m p l e m e n t e d welfare p r o g r a m s — f o r e x a m p l e , t h e h i g h e r risk of w o m e n losing t h e i r j o b s as a r e s u l t of c o m p e n s a t o r y r e g u l a t i o n s , t h e o v e r - r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of w o m e n in lower wage b r a c k ­ ets, t h e p r o b l e m a t i c issue of "what is in t h e c h i l d ' s b e s t i n t e r e s t s , " a n d in g e n e r a l t h e progressive f e m i n i z a t i o n of poverty. F r o m a legal s t a n d p o i n t , o n e r e a s o n for this reflexively g e n e r a t e d discrimina­ t i o n is f o u n d in t h e o v e r g e n e r a l i z e d classifications u s e d j t o label d i s a d v a n t a g e d situations a n d d i s a d v a n t a g e d g r o u p s of p e r s o n s , b e ­ c a u s e t h e s e "false" classifications l e a d to " n o r m a l i z i n g " i n t e r v e n t i o n s i n t o h o w p e o p l e c o n d u c t t h e i r lives, i n t e r v e n t i o n s t h a t t r a n s f o r m w h a t was i n t e n d e d as c o m p e n s a t i o n for d a m a g e s i n t o n e w f o r m s of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . T h u s i n s t e a d of g u a r a n t e e i n g liberty, s u c h overp r o t e c t i o n stifles it. I n a r e a s of law t h a t a r e of c o n c e r n to f e m i n i s m , welfare p a t e r n a l i s m takes o n a literal m e a n i n g to t h e e x t e n t t h a t legislation a n d a d j u d i c a t i o n a r e o r i e n t e d by t r a d i t i o n a l p a t t e r n s of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a n d t h u s serve t o b u t t r e s s existing s t e r e o t y p e s of sex­ u a l identity. T h e classification of gender-specific roles a n d differences t o u c h e s o n f u n d a m e n t a l levels of a society's c u l t u r a l s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g . Radical f e m i n i s m h a s only n o w m a d e u s aware of t h e fallible c h a r a c ­ t e r of this s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g , a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t is essentially c o n t e s t e d a n d in n e e d of revision. It rightly insists t h a t t h £ a p r ^ c ^ r i ate i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of n e e d s a n d criteria b e a m a t t e r of p u b l i c d e b a t e in t h e political p u b l i c s p h e r e . It is h e r e t h a t citizens m u s t clarify t h e aspects t h a t d e t e r m i n e whicfi differences b e t w e e n t h e e x p e r i e n c e s a n d living situations of (specific g r o u p s of) m e n a n d w o m e n a r e r e l e v a n t f o r a n e q u a l o p p o r t u n i t y t o exercise i n d i v i d u a l liberties. T h u s , this s t r u g g l e for the. e q u a l status of w o m e n is a particularly g o o d e x a m p l e of t h e n e e d for a c h a n g e of t h e legal p a r a d i g m .

264 Chapter 10

T h e d i s p u t e b e t w e e n t h e two r e c e i v e d p a r a d i g m s — w h e t h e r t h e a u t o n o m y of legal p e r s o n s is b e t t e r s e c u r e d t h r o u g h i n d i v i d u a l lib­ erties for private c o m p e t i t i o n o r t h r o u g h publicly g u a r a n t e e d enti­ t l e m e n t s for clients of welfare b u r e a u c r a c i e s — i s s u p e r s e d e d by a proceduralist conception of law. A c c o r d i n g to this c o n c e p t i o n , t h e d e m o ­ cratic p r o c e s s m u s t s e c u r e private a n d p u b l i c a u t o n o m y at t h e s a m e t i m e : t h e i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s t h a t a r e m e a n t to g u a r a n t e e to w o m e n t h e a u t o n o m y to p u r s u e t h e i r lives in t h e private s p h e r e c a n n o t even b e a d e q u a t e l y f o r m u l a t e d u n l e s s t h e affected p e r s o n s t h e m s e l v e s first a r t i c u l a t e a n d justify in p u b l i c d e b a t e t h o s e aspects t h a t a r e r e l e v a n t to e q u a l o r u n e q u a l t r e a t m e n t in typical cases. T h e private a u t o n o m y of equally e n t i t l e d citizens c a n b e s e c u r e d only insofar as citizens actively exercise t h e i r civic a u t o n o m y .

Notes

Editor's Introduction 1. It should be noted that "rule of law" generally translates the German term "Rechtsstaat," which literally means "constitutional state;" hence the relevant intuition can also be expressed as the claim that the_constitutional state is not possible without participatory democracy. This guiding intuition iiTHealtwith explicitly in chapters 9 and 10, which offer a succinct exposition of Habermas's political theory and hence are a suitable starting point for readers who are not familiar with his recent work. 2. This duality of "facticity" and "validity" is the central theme of Habermas's major work in legal and political philosophy, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, trans. W. Rehg (Cambridge, MA, 1996). 3. Habermas does not claim to develop a theory of justice for all possible h u m a n societies and is keenly aware that Western constitutional democracies emerged in response to contingent historical developments. At the same time, he rejects contextualist attempts to base the legitimacy of the constitutional state on supposedly "Western" values, on the grounds that the principles of justice enshrined in demo­ cratic constitutions can claim universal validity for m o d e r n societies. 4. Rawls takes this contextualist turn in Political Liberalism (New York, 1993; expanded pbk. ed., 1996). 5. T h e theory of communicative action holds that social actors are self-interpreting subjects who acquire and reproduce their identities through communicative interac­ tion; that action oriented to reaching understanding plays a more fundamental role than strategic action in the reproduction of socio-cultural forms of life; and that communicative actors implicitly or explicitly raise validity claims, including normative claims, that admit of reasoned justification in discourse. These ambitious claims are developed and defended at length by Habermas in The Theory of Communicative Action, 2 vols., trans. T. McCarthy (Boston, 1985/1987). 6. Cf. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, p. 107; also chapter 9, below, "Three Normative Models of Democracy," esp. pp. 248ff.

266 Notes

7. In chapter 1 below, "A Genealogical Analysis of the Cognitive Content of Morality," Habermas defends the strong cognitivist position that moral norms admit in princi­ ple of universal rational justification against a range of opposing philosophical posi­ tions that have been taken on the question of whether moral disputes admit of rational resolution. 8. Habermas's response to skepticism concerning the rational basis of the validity of norms mirrors a duality that characterizes his general approach to questions of normative justification: an internal reconstruction of the unavoidable pragmatic presuppositions of argumentation is complemented by an objectifying analysis of the role of communicative interaction in the reproduction of socio-cultural forms of life and of agents' identities. See Habermas, "Individuation through Socialization: O n George Herbert Mead's Theory of Subjectivity," in Postmetaphysical Thinking, trans. W. M. Hohengarten (Cambridge, MA, 1992), pp. 149-204. 9. The corresponding conception of validity is captured by a principle of universali­ zation which states that only those moral norms are valid that are such that all those affected by their general observance could freely accept their anticipated conse­ quences for the satisfaction of everyone's interests; see Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, trans. C. Lenhardt and S. Weber Nicholsen (Cambridge, MA, 1990), pp. 92-93. 10. Cf. Between Facts and Norms, p. 122: "These three categories of rights result simply from the application of the discourse principle to the medium of law as such, that is, to the conditions for the legal form of a horizontal association of free and equal persons." O n the justification of the system of basic rights as a whole see ibid., pp. 118-131. 11. Thus the nature of the constitution-founding practice means that autonomy in the legal-political domain splits into private and public autonomy in a way that has n o equivalent in the moral domain. O n this account, the distinction between private and public domains is an artifact of m o d e r n legal systems, not a prepolitical fact whose preservation is the main raison d'etre of the liberal state. 12. Habermas, following Kant, distinguishes between pragmatic, prudential, and moral dimensions of practical reason. Ethical questions or questions of what is good for me or for us have a different logic than do pragmatic questions of the appropriate means to certain practical ends and moral questions of what I or we ought to do. See Habermas, "On the Pragmatic, the Ethical, and the Moral Employments of Practical Reason," in Justification and Application, trans. C. Cronin (Cambridge, MA, 1993), p p . 1-17. 13. While any group of people can in principle come together to form a constitu­ tional regime—provided that an ongoing scheme of social cooperation between them is possible—this does n o t mean that any like-minded minority within an exist­ ing constitutional state has the right to form an independent state of its own. O n the contrary, Habermas takes a rather restrictive view of the right of secession because secessions generally create new minorities who do not necessarily consent to the new regime. Only when a minority suffers systematic discrimination against which its members have n o genuine legal recourse—in which case the existing regime is illegitimate because it systematically violates the rights of some of its subjects—can it claim a right to secede.

267 Notes

14. For example, Habermas's scheme is opposed to the increasing concentration of ownership of print and electronic media and the increasing subordination of such media to economic interests. Such developments tend to degrade public political discourse and u n d e r m i n e its legitimating function by restricting access to the media and making them susceptible to ideological exploitation. 15. For an extended discussion, see Between Facts and Norms, p p . 168ff. 16. See Between Facts and Norms, p p . 144-168, 34Iff. 17. These three interrelated lines of criticism are dealt with respectively in the three main sections of chapter 2, "Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason." 18. For Rawls's detailed responses and countercriticisms see his "Reply to Haber­ mas," TheJournal of Philosophy 92 (3), 1995: 132-180 (reprinted as an appendix to the paperback edition of Political Liberalism). 19. See chapter 3, below, "'Reasonable' vs. 'True' or the Morality of Worldviews," pp. 89ff. Habermas's description of this shared standpoint as the "moral point of view" is potentially misleading in light of the importance he attaches to the distinc­ tion between morality and legality in his political theory. This looseness in termin­ ology reflects the fact that the perspective from which citizens justify basic constitutional principles approximates in its abstractness and universality to the moral point of view. 20. See Rawls, "Reply to Habermas," p p . 138, 179. Rawls correctly argues that n o theory of justice can be purely procedural, in the sense of avoiding any appeal to substantive ideals, and that Haberrnas's discourse theory is n o exception in this regard. T h e important difference, however, is how they ground their respective substantive principles. Whereas Rawls appeals to normative ideas implicit in the political culture of liberal democracies, thereby restricting the scope of his theory, Habermas argues that a fully universal principle of normative validity can be grounded in certain normative presuppositions of speech and action that communi­ cative actors unavoidably make once they engage in practical argumentation. Thus the procedure of practical discourse itself, and n o t a comprehensive metaphysical conception of reason or the person, is the source of normative constraints. 21. See Rawls, "Reply to Habermas," p p . 139-141, 143-145. 22. For a discussion of some of the relevant issues see T. McCarthy, "Kantian Con­ structivism a n d Reconstructivism: Rawls and Habermas in Dialogue," Ethics 105 (1), 1994:44-63. 23. See J. Rawls, "The Law of Peoples," in S. Shute and S. Hurley, eds., On Human Rights: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures 1993 (New York, 1993). p p . 41-82. 24. See K. Polanyi's classic, The Great Transformation (Boston, 1944). 25. See especially chapter 4, below, "The European Nation-State: O n the Past and Future of Sovereignty a n d Citizenship," and chapter 5, below, "On the Relation between the Nation, the Rule of Law, and Democracy."

268 Notes

26. See C. Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, trans. G. Schwab (Chicago, 1996), and The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, trans. E. Kennedy (Cambridge, MA, 1985). 27. See, Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, chapter 3, part 3, and "The European Nation State," pp. 117ff. 28. See, e.g., D. P. Forsythe, The Internationalization of Human Rights (Lexington, MA, 1991). 29. See I. Kant, "Perpetual Peace: a Philosophical Sketch," in H. Reiss, ed., KantPolitical Writings, trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 93-130; Kant, Werkausgabe, Vol. XI, ed. W. Weischedel (Frankfurt am Main, 1968), pp. 195-251. 30. See chapter 7, "Kant's Idea of Perpetual Peace," pp. 169ff. 31. Kant, "On the Common Saying: 'This May be True in Theory, but it does not Apply in Practice," in Political Writings, p. 92; cf. Kant, WerkausgabeXl, pp. 171-172. 32. See Kant, "Perpetual Peace," esp. pp. 102-108; WerkausgabeXl, pp. 208-217. 33. See ch. 7, "Kant's Idea of Perpetual Peace," pp. 169ff. 34. See ch. 4, "The European Nation State," section V. 35. See D. Grimm, "Does Europe Need a Constitution?" European Law Journal 1 (3), 1995: 282-302. In the same issue, see also U. PreuB, "Problems of a Concept of European Identity," pp. 267-281 and J. Weiler, "Does Europe Need a Constitution? Reflections on Demos, Telos, and Ethos in the German Maastricht Decision," pp. 219-258. These papers are reprinted in P. Gowan and P. Anderson, eds., The Question of Europe (London, 1997). 36. As Grimm puts it, "The Treaties are n o t . . . a constitution in the full sense of the term. T h e difference lies in the reference back to the will of the Member States rather than to the people of the Union . . . The European public power is not one that derives from the people, but one mediated through States. Since the Treaties thus have not an internal but an external reference point, they are also not the expression of a society's self-determination as to the form and objectives of its political unity. Insofar as constitutions are concerned with the legitimation of rule by those subject to it, the Treaties thus fall short" (Grimm, "Does Europe Need a Constitution?" p. 291). 37. The European Union is built around four institutions: the Council of Ministers, the European Commission, the Parliament, and the European Court of Justice. T h e Commission is in charge of formulating policy, drafting legislation, preparing the budget of the Union, as well as implementing policies accepted by the Council and not vetoed by the Parliament. Part of its power derives from the fact that its drafts are the only basis for decisions in the Council. Commissioners are expected to be loyal to the Union, to which they swear an oath. (In this and the next three footnotes we will be following the papers collected in R. Keohane and S. Hoffman, eds., The New European Community, [Boulder, CO, 1991] and the very useful monograph by E. Eriksen, A. Follesdall, and R. Malnes, Europeanisation and Normative Political Theory. ARENA working paper 1/95 [Oslo, 1995].)

269 Notes

38. T h e Council of Ministers is the real decision-making body of the Union. It is made u p of representatives of the governments of all member states. Representatives in the Council stand in for the interests of their countries. Thus some commentators argue that the council is the main reason the European Union falls short of a federation. 39. T h e European Parliament is, arguably, the least developed of the Union's major institutions. Originally the Parliament's rights were limited to consultation and lim­ ited veto powers. It has slowly gained additional competences, including the right to ask the Commission for legislative initiatives over certain issues, and, most impor­ tantly, the right to do second and third readings of some legislative drafts before they are approved by the Council. Even with these enlarged powers, it should be clear that the Parliament is significantly weaker than a normal national Parliament. 40. That is, precisely what Grimm attacks; see chapter 6, below, "Does Europe Need a Constitution? Response to Dieter Grimm," p. 156. 41. Ibid. 42. Ibid., p. 161. 43. See chapter 8, below, "Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitu­ tional State," p. 210. 44. See "Struggles for Recognition," pp. 208, and "Individuation through Socializa­ tion," pp. 221ff. 45. See C. Taylor, "The Struggle for Recognition," in A. Gutmann, ed. Multicultural­ ism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, expanded edition (Princeton, NJ, 1994). 46. There is an important difference between equalizing the risks entailed by the different cultural choices made by different groups on the one hand, and, on the other, minimizing those risks. T h e latter is an attempt to guarantee through state action the survival of existing cultures. See Michael Walzer, "Comment," in Gutmann, ed., Multiculturalism, p p . 99-103. Habermas also argues against treating cultural groups as if they were species u n d e r the threat of extinction; see "Struggles for Recognition," section IV, pp. 220ff. 47. K A. Appiah, "Identity, Authenticity, Survival: Multicultural Societies and Social Reproduction," in Gutmann, ed, Multiculturalism, pp. 149-163. Identities are "tightly scripted" when they impose a narrow definition of what it means to be African-Ameri­ can, Quebecois, gay, etc., on those who accept these identifications or who are socially identified (e.g., by skin color or behavior) as belonging to the groups in question regardless of whether they choose to identify with them or not. 48. See Habermas, "On the Pragmatic, the Ethical, and the Moral Employments of Practical Reason." 49. Habermas's vigorous support of procedural democracy puts him at odds not only with those theorists who are skeptical about the effectiveness of democracy in advanc­ ing the goals of pluralism, but also with the increasing tendency in our political culture to juridify social issues, that is, to appeal to judges rather than to democratic legislative forums for the resolution of important social problems.

270 Notes

Preface 1. English translation: Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, trans. W. Rehg (Cambridge, MA, 1996). 2. Between Facts and Norms, p p . 491-515.

Chapter 1 1. P. F. Strawson, Freedom and Resentment (London, 1974). 2. H. L. A. Hart took this view when he traced the unity of legal systems back to basic rules that legitimate the whole corpus but do not admit of justification themselves. Like the rules of a language game, these "rules of recognition" are rooted in a practice that an observer can only register as a fact, whereas for the participants it has the status of a self-evident cultural commonplace which is accepted and assumed to be valid; see The Concept of Law, 2nd. ed. (Oxford, 1994). 3. See the impressive phenomenology of moral consciousness in L. Wingert, Gemeinsinn und Moral (Frankfurt am Main, 1993), ch. 3. 4. J. Habermas, 'Transcendence from Within, Transcendence in This World," in D. S. Browning and F. Schiissler-Fiorenza, eds., Habermas, Modernity, and Public Theol­ ogy (New York, 1992), p p . 226-250; also Th. M. Schmidt, "Immanente Transzendenz," in L. Hauser a n d E. Nordhofen, eds., Im Netz der Begriffe: Religionsphilosophische Analyzen (Freiburg, 1994), pp. 78-96. 5. O n 'justice" and "solidarity" see J. Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communica­ tive Action, trans. C. Lenhardt and S. Weber Nicholsen (Cambridge, MA, 1990), pp. 200ff. and 'Justice and Solidarity: O n the Discussion Concerning 'Stage 6,"' in T. Wren, ed., The Moral Domain (Cambridge, MA, 1990), p p . 244ff.; for a different account see L. Wingert, Gemeinsinn und Moral, pp. I79ff. 6. J. Habermas, Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays, trans. W. M. Hohengarten (Cambridge, MA, 1992). 7. For a critique of this view see J. L. Mackie, Ethics (New York, 1977), p p . 38ff. Today the balance of the argument has shifted in favor of realism. J. McDowell has devel­ oped the most subtle version of a value-ethic which starts from epistemological premises but is grounded in a philosophy of nature drawing on Plato and Aristotle, in Mind and World (Cambridge, MA, 1994), p. 82: "The ethical is a domain of rational requirements, which are there in any case, whether or n o t we are responsive to them. We are alerted to these demands by acquiring appropriate conceptual capacities. When a decent upbringing initiates us into the relevant way of thinking, our eyes are opened to the very existence of this tract of the space of reasons." McDowell makes the transition to objective idealism by assuming an organically based formation process (Bildungsprozefi), in light of which practical reason appears as a natural faculty that can claim objective validity: "Our Bildung actualizes some of the potentialities we are b o r n with; we do n o t have to suppose it introduces a nonanimal ingredient into our constitution. And although the structure of the space of reasons cannot be reconstructed out of facts about our involvement in the realm of law, it can be the

271 Notes

framework within which meaning comes into view only because our eyes can be opened to it by Bildung which is an element in the normal coming to maturity of the kind of animals we are. Meaning is not a mysterious gift from outside nature" (p. 88). McDowell frankly acknowledges the metaphysical claim of this conception, which I cannot go into in detail here: "The position is a naturalism of second nature, and I suggested that we can equally see it as a naturalized platonism. T h e idea is that the dictates of reason are there anyway, whether or n o t one's eyes are opened to them; that is what happens in a proper upbringing" (p. 91). 8. H. Lenk, "Kann die sprachanalytische Moralphilosophie neutral sein?" in M. Riedel, ed., Rehabilitierung der praktischen Philosophie, vol. II (Freiburg, 1974), pp. 405-422. 9. See E. Tugendhat, Vorlesungen uberEthik (Frankfurt am Main, 1993), p p . 199ff. 10. O n the opposition between objective and subjective reason, see M. Horkheimer, Critique of Instrumental Reason, trans. M. J. O'Connell et al. (New York, 1974); H. Schnadelbach, "Vernunft," in E. Martens, H. Schnadelbach, eds., Philosophie (Heidelberg, 1985), pp. 77-115. 11. Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. L. W. Beck (New York, 1990), p. 34 (Akad. ed., p. 417). 12. A..C. Baier, Moral Prejudices (Cambridge, MA, 1994), ch. 9, pp. 184ff. Instead of sympathy Baier goes back to the p h e n o m e n o n of childhood trust: " T r u s t . . . is letting other persons . . . take care of something the truster cares about, where such 'caring for' involves some exercise of discretionary powers" (p. 105). This has the advantage of allowing moral concern to be described, true to experience, as a multifaceted compensating mechanism, for dependency and vulnerability; but at the same time by transferring a model developed for asymmetrical parent-child relations to the sym­ metrical relations between adults, it has the disadvantage that it gives rise to the problem of trustworthiness and the abuse of trust (cf. chs. 6, 7, and 8). 13. Nor can the problem of affective ties to strangers be solved through a shift in focus from sympathy or trust to compassion. Although our capacity for empathetic identification with creatures capable of suffering undoubtedly extends farther than positive feelings toward people who are useful, agreeable, and trustworthy, compas­ sion cannot ground equajjrespect for others even, and especially, in their empathetically unbridgeable otherness. 14. Cf. Mackie, Ethics; also "Can There be a Right-based Moral Theory?" in J. Waldron, ed., Theories of Rights (Oxford, 1984), pp. 168-181. 15. E. Tugendhat, "Zum Begriff u n d zur Begriindung von Moral," in Phibsophische Aufsdtze (Frankfurt am Main, 1992), pp. 315-333. 16. E. Tugendhat, Vorlesungen uberEthik, p. 75. 17. J. Elster, The Cement of Society (Cambridge, 1989), Ch. 3. 18. E. Tugendhat, Vorlesungen uberEthik, pp. 29 and 91. 19. A. Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (Cambridge, MA, 1992), p. 296.

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20. Ibid., p. 84. 21. Ibid., pp. 72f. 22. Ibid., p. 193: "[A] speaker treats what he is saying as an objective matter of rationality if he can d e m a n d its acceptance by everybody. More precisely, the test is this: could he coherently make his demands, revealing their grounds, and still not browbeat his audience? What makes for browbeating in this test is a question of conversational inhibitions and embarrassments. . . . " 23. Ibid., p. 195 n. 2 refers to the theory of discourse. 24. Ibid., p. 223 (my emphasis). 25. Nor can this be achieved by the participants in discourse making the biological description their own; for such an objectifying self-description would either destroy the practical self-understanding of subjects capable of action or u n d e r g o a funda­ mental change in meaning with the switch from the observer's to the participant's perspective. 26. Tugendhat, Vorlesungen uberEthik, p. 29. 27. M. Seel, Versuch uber die Form des Glucks (Frankfurt am Main, 1995), p. 206. 28. Ibid., pp. 203f. 29. Ibid., p. 203: "It is true that the question 'Why be moral?' can still—indeed, can *~only—be answered by appealing to preferences, because moral conduct alone makes possible a form of social existence based on friendship and solidarity; but while this step may be motivated by preferences it commits us to modes of conduct that cannot be traced back to orientations grounded in preferences." 30. Tugendhat, Vorlesungen uber Ethik, p p . 87f. 31. This is even clearer in E. Tugendhat, "Gibt es eine m o d e r n e Moral?" in Zeitschrifl fur philosophische Forschung 50 (1996): 323-338. 32. B. Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, MA, 1985), ch. 8. 33. Rawls speaks in this connection of "reflective ^qijjlihriiirn." 34. McDowell rejects an objectivistic interpretation of these "salient features" of situations: "The relevant notion of salience cannot be understood except in terms of seeing something as a reason for acting which silences all others." 'Virtue and Reason," The Monist 62 (1979): p. 345. H e explains ethical insights in terms of the interaction between the way of life and self-understanding of individuals, on the one hand, and their evaluatively charged understanding of the particular situation, on the other. These analyses can still be understood—without embracing realism—in terms of a neo-Aristotelian ethics informed by Wittgenstein. 35. J. McDowell, "Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?" Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 5 (1978): 13-29.

273 Notes

36. Ch. Taylor, The Sources of the Self (Cambridge, MA, 1989). 37. Theories also raise a "higher-level" or more complex validity claim; they are not "true" or "false" in the same sense as the singular propositions that are derivable from them. 38. T h e existentialist sharpening of this decision into a radical choice fails to grasp the character of this freedom as an epistemically guided process. 39. Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, p p . 184f. 40. Ibid., p. 187. 41. M. Seel (Versuch ilber die Form des Gliicks) tries to develop such a formal concept of the good. But the idea_of.^formal delemiination of t h e good—distinct from morality in the Kantian sense—is a self-contradiction. Seel's attempt to explain the nature and conditions of the successful life cannot avoid privileging certain basic goods (security, health, freedom of movement), contents (work, interaction, play, and contemplation), and ends (self-determination that is responsive to external" impulses). These ideas reflect faUibje anjhropological assumptions and valuations, which are not only matters of dispute 5elwe<enaTfierent cufiureTBut remain contro­ versial, and for good reasons, in intercultural dialogue. A noncriterial understanding of such a projection of h u m a n potentialities has paternalistic implications, even when it is only offered as well-meaning advice: "What if someone does not want this good? We will tell her that she is rejecting what is best for her" (p. 189). T h e descriptive content of an anthropology of the good that goes beyond the analysis of the form of hermeneutic discourses of self-understanding in terms of a logic of argumentation remains b o u n d to its context of discovery in a specific way—as is shown by the example of Heidegger whose existential ontology betrays not only the jargon but also the political prejudices of its time to any attentive reader one or two generations later (cf. R. Wolin, The Politics of Being [New York, 1990]). 42. Seel, Versuch ilber die Form des Gliicks, p. 223. 43. R. Dworkin develops a similar approach in "Foundations of Liberal Equality," G. B. Peterson, ed., The Tanner Lectures on Human Values XI (Salt Lake City, 1990). 44. See n. 41 above. 45. Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, p. 55 (438). 46. Ibid., p. 29 (412) (translation modified). 47. C. Korsgaard misunderstands this point; see "The Sources of Normativity," The Tanner Lectures on Human Values XV (Salt Lake City, 1994), p p . 88ff. 48. Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, p. 52 (435). 49. T h e same holds true for Tugendhat (see above IV, 2). 50. J. Habermas, "Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of Philosophical Justifica­ tion," in Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, p. 66.

274 Notes

51. This is why, in important sectors of social life, the weak motivating force of morality must be supplemented by coercive positive law; cf. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, trans. W. Rehg (Cambridge, MA, 1996), pp. 104ff. 52. O n the following, cf. J. Heath, "Morality and Social Action" (Dissertation, North­ western University, 1995), pp. 86-102. 53. D. Davidson, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford, 1983). 54. Habermas, "An Excursus o n the Theory of Argumentation," in The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 1, trans. T. McCarthy (Cambridge, MA, 1984), p p . 22-42. 55. R. Rorty, "Pragmatism, Davidson, and Truth," in E. LePore, ed., Truth and Inter­ pretation (Oxford, 1981), pp. 333-353. 56. This reactive concept of "discursive redeemability," which is not oriented to ideal conditions [of complete iiistification]Jbut to^ pQlential^iibje^tions, is similar to the notion of 'superassertibility;" cf. C. Wright, Truth and Objectivity (Cambridge, MA, 1992), pp. 33ff. For a critique of my earlier conception of truth which was still influenced by Peirce, see A. Wellmer. The Persistence of Modernity, trans. D. Midgley (Cambridge, MA, 1991), pp. 160ff.; also Wingert, Gemeinsinn und Mora/, p p . 264ff. 57. For a pragmatist interpretation of the discourse-concept of truth, cf. J. Haber­ mas, "Rorty's Pragmatic Turn" (forthcoming). 58. This also explains why moral discourses of justification must be supplemented by discourses of application; cf. K Gunther, The Sense ofAppropriateness, trans. J. Farrell (Albany, NY, 1993); also J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, p. 109. 59. Cf. J. Rawls, "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory," The Journal of Philosophy 77 (9) (1980): 515-572, p. 519. 60. A. Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition, trans. J. Anderson (Cambridge, 1992); R. Forst, Kontexte der Gerechtigkeit (Frankfurt am Main, 1994). 61. JWingert, Gemeinsinn und Moral pp. 295ff.)Qn the perspective structure of action oriented to reaching"understanding see the title essay in Habermas, Moral Conscious­ ness and Communicative Action, pp. 116ff, especially pp. 133-141. 62. Wingert has rigorously explored the implications of this duality in Gemeinsinn und Moral. 63. For this reason, the condition of impartiality is not satisfied simply by the fact that an impartial j u d g e weighs the goods and harms that are at stake for "any" individual; for a different view see Tugendhat, Vorlesungen uberEthik, p. 353. 64. Cf. Seel, Versuch uber die Form des Glucks, p. 204. 65. Cf. K. Ott, "Wie begriindet man ein Diskussionsprinzip der Moral?" in Vom Begrunden zum Handeln (Tubingen, 1996), p p . 12-50. 66. Cf. M. Niquet, Transzendentale Argumente (Frankfurt am Main, 1991); "Nichthintergehbarkeit u n d Diskurs" (Habilitationsschrift, Frankfurt am Main, 1995).

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67. E. Tugendhat, Vorlesungen iiber Ethik (Frankfurt am Main, 1993), p p . 161ff. Tugendhat's criticism refers to a version of my argument which I revised already in the second [German] edition of Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, that is, in 1984 (!); cf. Habermas, Justification and Application, p . 179, n. 17. 68. This point is emphasized by W. Rehg in Insight and Solidarity (Berkeley, CA, 1994), pp. 65ffj cf. S. Benhabib, "Autonomy, Modernity a n d Community," in Situating the SelfJWew York, 1992), pp. 68-88. 69. K. O. Apel, "Die transzendentalpragmatische Begrundung der Kommunikationsethik," in Diskurs und Verantwortung (Frankfurt am Main, 1988), pp. 306-369. 70. See n. 57 above. 71. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, p p . 106ff. and "Postscript," (pp. 459ff). 72. See R. Alexy, Theorie der juristischen Argumentation (Frankfurt am Main, 1991); K. Baynes, The Normative Grounds of Social Criticism (Albany, NY, 1992); S. Benhabib, "Deliberative Rationality and Models of Democratic Legitimacy," Constellations 1 (1994): 26-52; and especially R. Forst, Kontexte der Gerechtigkeit.

Chapter 2 1. A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA, 1971) (hereafter TJ). 2. J o h n Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York, 1993) IV, section 1, p. 137 (hereafter PL). 3. In preparing this essay the following works were especially helpful: K. Baynes, The Normative Grounds of Social Criticism (Albany, NY, 1992); R. Forst, Kontexte der Gere­ chtigkeit (Frankfurt am Main, 1994). 4. Rawls, "The Basic Liberties and Their Priority," in S. McMurrin, ed., The Tanner Lectures on Human Values III (Salt Lake City, 1982), p . 16. 5. Rawls, 'Justice as Fairness: Political riot Metaphysical," Philosophy and Public Affairs 14 (1985): 223-251, p. 237 n. 20. 6. Thomas Scanlon also criticizes the traces of a decision-theoretical orientation, though from a different standpoint, in "Contractualism a n d Utilitarianism," in A. Sen and B. Williams, eds., Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge, 1982), p p . 123ff. 7. I. M. Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton, 1990), p . 25. 8. This objection is n o t based on the thesis of the primacy of duties over rights, as in O. O'Neill, Constructions of Reason (Cambridge, 1989), Ch. 12, pp. 206ff. 9. H. L. A. Hart, "Rawls O n Liberty and its Priority," in N. Daniels, ed., Reading Rawls (New York, 1975), pp. 230ff. 10. See W. Hinsch, "Einleitung" to Rawls, Die Idee des politischen Liberalismus (Frank­ furt am Main, 1992), p p . 38ff.

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11. Rawls, "The Basic Liberties and Their Priority," p p . 21ff. and 39ff. 12. See, e.g., Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, MA, 1977). 13. Cf. J. Habermas, Moral Consciousness, and Communicative Action, trans. C. Lenhardt and S. Weber Nicholsen (Cambridge, MA, 1990), and Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics, trans. C. Cronin (Cambridge, MA, 1993); on the location of discourse ethics in contemporary American discussions, see S. Benhabib, "In the Shadow of Aristotle and Hegel: Communicative Ethics and Current Controversies in Practical Philosophy," in Situating the Self (New York, 1992), p p . 23-67. See also D. Rasmussen, ed., Universalism vs. Communitarianism: Contemporary Debates in Ethics (Cambridge, MA, 1990). 14. Cf. W. Rehg, Insight and Solidarity: The Idea of a Discourse Ethics (Berkeley, forth­ coming) . 15. The Journal ofPhilosophy 78 (9) (1980): 515-572. 16. Rawls, "The Domain of the Political a n d Overlapping Consensus," New York University Law Review 64 (1988): 223-255, p. 246 17. 'Justice as Fairness: Political n o t Metaphysical," p . 230. 18. Rawls, "The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus," Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 7 (1987): 1-25, p . 6. 19. "What rational agents lack is the particular form of moral sensibility that under­ lies the desire to engage in fair cooperation as such, and to do so on terms that others as equals might reasonably be expected to endorse" (PL 51). 20. Cf. my reflections in Justification and Application, p p . 25ff. 21. Rawls, "The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus," p . 25. 22. Habermas, "Themes in Postmetaphysical Thinking," in Postmetaphysical Thinking, trans. W. M. Hohengarten (Cambridge, MA, 1992), p p . 28-53. 23. Cf. the Tanner Lectures, where h e writes at the e n d of section VII: "The idea is to incorporate into the basic structure of society an effective political procedure which mirrors in that structure the fair representation of persons achieved by the original position" (p. 45). 24. "The Basic Liberties and Their Priority," p . 13. 25. S. Benhabib, "Models of Public Space," in Situating the Self (New York, 1992), pp. 89-120. 26. This principle of Kantian legal theory is taken u p in Rawls's first principle. 27. Cf. "On the Internal Relation between the Rule of Law and Democracy," below pp. 256ff.

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Chapter 3 1. I am grateful to Rainer Forst, Thomas McCarthy, and Lutz Wingert for instructive criticism. 2. J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York, 1993), p . 12 (hereafter PL). 3. J. Rawls, "Reply to Habermas," The Journal of Philosophy 92 (3) (1995): 132-180, p. 141, n. 16 (hereafter R). [This essay, which contains Rawls's response to the criticisms raised in the previous essay in this volume, has been reprinted as an appendix to the paperback edition of Political Liberalism, pp. 372-434. Trans.] 4. See Rawls, "Reply to Habermas." 5. This is a further development of the objections oudined in the second part of the previous essay. 6. J. Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, trans. T. McCarthy, 2 vols. (Bos­ ton, 1984, 1987). See also my essay "Sprechakttheoretischen Erlauterungen zum Begriff der kommunikativen Rationalitat," Zeitschrift fur philosophische Vorschung 50 (1996): 65-91. 7. T. M. Scanlon, "Contractualism and Utilitarianism," in A. K. Sen and B. Williams, eds., Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge, 1982), p. 119. 8. J. Rawls, "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory," The Journal of Philosophy 77 (1980): 515-573; this approach is taken u p by R. Milo, "Contractarian Constructiv­ ism," The Journal of Philosophy 92 (1995): 181-204. 9. L. Wingert, Gemeinsinn und Moral (Frankfurt am Main, 1993), Pt. II, pp. 166ff. 10. I follow the sequence of "three kinds" of justification outlined by Rawls. This logical sequence should not be understood as a temporal sequence of stages but sketches the path along which any member of contemporary society can radicalize her stance on current questions of political justice. Once her criticism places in question the relevant underlying political consensus from the perspective of a com­ peting conception of justice, h e r defense of this alternative must follow the path of this logical genesis. 11. Cf. Habermas, "On the Pragmatic, the Ethical, and the Moral Employments of Practical Reason," in Justification and Application, trans. C. Cronin (Cambridge, MA, 1993), p p . 6f. 12. Forst, Kontexte der Gerechtigkeit (Frankfurt am Main, 1994), p . 159. 13. Ibid., p p . 152-161 and 72ff. 14. [That is, the German counterpart of the Supreme Court of the United States. Trans.]

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15. "The particular meaning of the priority of right is that comprehensive concep­ tions of the good are admissible . . . only if their pursuit conforms to the political conception of justice" (PL 176, n. 2). 16. "In this case [i.e., when an overlapping consensus is achieved], citizens embed their shared political conception in their reasonable comprehensive doctrines. T h e n we h o p e that citizens will j u d g e (by their comprehensive view) that political values are normally (though not always) ordered prior to, or outweigh, whatever nonpolitical values may conflict with them" (R 147). 17. I owe this argument to R. Forst, Kontexte der Gerechtigkeit. 18. I agree with Rawls's observations on procedural vs. substantive justice (R 170180); but his remarks do n o t capture the sense in which I use the expressions "procedure" and "procedural rationality" when I assert that a practice of argumenta­ tion instituted in a certain way tends to support the assumption that its results are rationally acceptable. 19. As does R. Rorty's contextualist reading of Rawls's theory; see "The Priority of Democracy to Politics," in R. Vaughn, ed., The Virginia Statute of Religious Freedom: Two Hundred Years After (Madison, Wis., 1988); also R. J. Bernstein, "One Step Forward, Two Steps Backwards: Rorty O n Liberal Democracy and Philosophy," Political Theory 15 (1987). 20. Of course I agree with Charles Larmore's suggestion in The Morals of Modernity, p. 216: "that our vision of the good life is the object of reasonable disagreement does not entail that we should withdraw our allegiance to it or regard it as henceforth a mere article of faith. . . . We should remember only that such reasons are n o t likely to be acceptable to other people, who are equally reasonable but have a different history of experience and reflection." Larmore evidently misunderstands my concep­ tion of the ethical use of practical reason; cf. Habermas, Justification and Application, pp. 1-17. 21. Forst, Kontexte der Gerechtigkeit, p. 283. 22. O n the internal relation between the rule of law and democracy, see below, ch. 10.

Chapter 4 1. M. R. Lepsius, "Der europaische Nationalstaat," in Interessen, Ideen und Institutionen (Opladen, 1990), pp. 256-269. 2. In his essay "On the Common Saying: T h i s May be True in Theory, But it Does Not Apply in Practice,'" Kant famously distinguished "the equality (of the individual) with everyone else as a subject" from the "freedom of the h u m a n being" and the "independence of the citizen;" Kant, Political Writings, ed. H. Reiss (Cambridge, 1991), p. 74. 3. "The model of nations made its entry into European history u n d e r the guise of asymmetrical contrasting concepts;" H. Miinkler, "Die Nation als Modell politischer Ordnung," Staatswissenschaft und Staatspraxis 5, 3 (1994), p. 381.

279 Notes

4. H. Schulze, Staat und Nation in der Europaischen Geschichte (Munich, 1994), p. 189. 5. This mistake was already made by the liberal constitutional theorist J o h a n n Caspar Bluntschli: "Every nation is called and therefore authorized to form a state. . . . Just as humanity is divided into a n u m b e r of nations, so should [!] the world be divided into just as many states. Each nation a state. Each state a national entity" (quoted in H. Schulze, Staat und Nation, p . 225). 6. Cf. H. Schulze, Staat und Nation, p. 243ff. 7. Cf. J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (Cambridge, MA, 1996), p p . 409ff. 8. A. Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Cambridge, 1990), p . 64; Beyond Left and Right (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 78ff. 9. I. Wallerstein, The Modern World System (New York, 1974). 10. Knieper, Nationale Souverdnitat (Frankfurt am Main, 1991), p . 85. 11. J. M. Guehenno, The End of the Nation-State, trans. V. Elliott (Minneapolis, 1995), p. 58. 12. Guehenno, The End of the Nation-State, p . 99. 13. Today probably ten countries possess nuclear weapons, more than twenty chemi­ cal weapons, a n d it is suspected that some Middle Eastern countries already possess bacteriological weapons; cf. E. O. Czempiel, Weltpolitik im Umbruch (Munich, 1993), p. 93.

Chapter 5 I. H. Liibbe, Abschied vom Superstaat (Berlin, 1994), p p . 33f. 2. Cf. M. R. Lepsius, "'Ethnos' u n d 'Demos,'" in Interessen, Ideen und Institutionen (Opladen, 1990), p p . 247-256; Demokratie in Deutschland (Gottingen, 1993). 3. Cf. C. Leggewie, "Ethnizitat, Nationalismus u n d multikulturelle Gesellschaft," in H. Berding, ed., Nationales Bewufitsein und kollektive Identitat (Frankfurt am Main, 1995), p . 54. 4. W. Connor, Ethnonationalism (Princeton, NJ, 1994), p. 202: "Our answer to that often asked question, 'What is a nation?', is that it is a group of people who feel they are ancestrally related." 5. Cf. H. Schulze, Staat und Nation in der Europaischen Geschichte (Munich, 1994). 6. See, e.g., P. Sahlins, Boundaries (Berkeley, CA, 1989). 7. W. Bockenforde, "Die Nation," Frankfurter Allegmeine Zeitung, September 30, 1995. 8. Bokenforde, "Die Nation."

280 Notes

9. J. Habermas, Die Normalitat einer Berliner Republik (Frankfurt am Main, 1995), p. 181. 10. H. Wehler, "Nationalismus u n d Nation in der deutschen Geschichte," in Berding, ed., Nationales Bewuftsein, pp. I74f. 11. Liibbe, Abschied vom Superstaat, pp. 38f. 12. C. Schmitt, Verfassungslehre (1928) (Berlin, 1983), p. 231. 13. Cf. I. Maus, "Rechtsgleichheit u n d gesellschaftliche Differenzierung bei Carl Schmitt," in Rechtstheorie undPoilitische Theorie im Industriekapitalismus (Munich, 1986), pp. 111-140. 14. Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, p. 228. 15. Ibid., p. 229. 16. Ibid., p. 243. 17. Ibid., p. 227. 18. Ibid., p. 234. 19. B. O. Bryde, "Die bundesrepublikanische Volksdemokratie als Irrweg der Demokratietheorie," Staatswissenschaften und Staatspraxis 5 (1994): 305-329. 20. Cf. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, trans. W. Rehg (Cambridge, MA, 1996), Ch. 3. 21. I. Mauss, "'Volk' u n d 'Nation' in Denken der Aufklarung," Blatter fur deutsche und international Politik b (1994), p. 604. 22. R. Forst, Kontexte der Gerechtigkeit (Frankfurt am Main, 1994), chs. 1 and 3. 23. Cf. Maus, Zur Aufklarung der Demokratietheorie (Frankfurt am Main, 1992). 24. R. A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven & London, 1989), p. 193. 25. Schmitt, Verfassungslehre, p. 231. 26. Ibid., p. 233. 27. T h e relevant issues of status were first definitively clarified for the European powers when the unilateral declaration of independence of the United Netherlands was recognized by Spain in the Peace of Westphalia of 1581. 28. J. A. Frowein, "Die Entwicklung der Anerkennung von Staaten u n d Regierungen im Volkerrecht," Der Staat 11 (1972): 145-159. 29. Article 1 of the h u m a n rights agreement of December 16, 1966, which is tailored to the era of peaceful decolonization after the Second World War, reads: "All peoples

281 Notes

have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development." 30. A. Verdross and B. Simma, Universelles Volkerrecht, 3rd ed. (Berlin, 1984), p. 318 (section 511). 31. Ch. Taylor, Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition (Princeton, 1992). 32. J. Habermas, "Struggles for Recognition in Constitutional States," this volume, pp. 219ff. 33. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics, p. 204. 34. Cf. H . J . Puhle, "Vom Biirgerrecht zum Gruppenrecht? Multikulturelle Politik in den USA," in: K. J. Baade, ed., Menschen ilber Grenzen (Herne, 1995), pp. 134-149. 35. J. Raz, "Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective," Dissent (Winter 1994): 67-79, p. 77. 36. R. Wolfrum, "Die Entwicklung des internationalen Menschenrechtsschutzes," Europa-Archiv 23 (1993): 681-690. 37. Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (1932) (Chicago, 1996). 38. Schmitt, Die Wendung zum diskriminierenden Kriegsbegriff (1938) (Berlin, 1988). 39. For a discussion of this aspect of Walzer's work see B. J a h n , "Humanitare Inter­ vention u n d der Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Volker," Politische Vierteljahresschrift 34 (1993): 567-587. 40. M. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (1977) (New York, 1992). 41. Walzer, "The Moral Standing of States," Philosophy and Public Affairs 9 (1980): 209-229, p. 211. 42. Ibid., p. 214. 43. G. Doppelt, "Walzer's Theory of Morality in International Relations," Philosophy and Public Affairs 8 (1978): 3-26, p. 19. 44. Cf. D. Senghaas, Wohin driftet die Welt? (Frankfurt am Main, 1994), p . 185. 45. Cf. K O. Nass, "Grenzen u n d Gefahren humanitarer Interventionen," EuropaArchiv 10 (1993): 279-288. 46. Cf. Ch. Greenwood, "Gibt es ein Recht auf humanitare Intervention?" EuropaArchiv 23 (1993): 93-106. 47. J u d g m e n t of the second senate of the Federal Constitutional Court of October 12th, 1993: 2 BvR 2134/92, 2BvR 2159/92, Europdische Grundrechte Zeitschrift 1993: 429-447, p . 438.

282 Notes

48. Cf. D. Murswiek, "Maastricht u n d der Pouvoir Constituant," Der Staat (1993): 161-190. 49. O n this deflationary concept see H. P. Ipsen, "Zehn Glossen zum MaastrichtUrteil," Europarecht 29 (1994): 20: "By introducing the concept 'alliance of states' [Staatenverbund] (the judgment) employs a terminology that is inappropriate because of its economic-technical connotations. It ignores unnecessarily the language of the European community and the other member states." [The German word "Verbund" means a cooperative alliance among commercial enterprises. Trans.] 50. Europaische Grundrechte Zeitschrift (1993), p. 439. 51. J. A. Frowein, "Das Maastricht-Urteil u n d die Grenzen der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit," Zeitschrift fur ausldndisches bffentliches Recht und Volkerrecht (1994): 1-16. 52. Liibbe, Abschied vom Superstaat, p. 100. 53. C. Joppke, Nation-Building after World War Two (European University Institute, Florence, 1996), p. 10. 54. The Federal Constitutional Court actually suggested this interpretation at one point in its justification of the Maastricht verdict: "Democracy . . . depends on the presence of certain prelegal preconditions, such as a peniiaiiejU conflicting social forces, interests, and ideas, in which political g o a l s j i r e ^ s o ^ l a r ^ e d ScF&ns^fojmed^ and in which a p u t ^ J ? J ^ ^ . . . Parties, associations, the press, ancTmeelectronic media are both the medium and a factor in this mediation process from which a European public opinion can take shape" {Europaische Grundrechte Zeitschrift (1993), pp. 437f.). The reference to the requirement of a common language which follows this statement is supposed to bridge the gap between this communication-theoretical understanding of democracy and the homogeneity of the citizenry which is elsewhere assumed to be necessary.

Chapter 6 1. See D. Grimm, "Does Europe Need a Constitution" in European Law Journal 1 (November 1995): 282-302.

Chapter 7 1. I. Kant, "The Contest of Faculties," in Kant's Political Writings (Cambridge, 1970), p. 187; WerkeXI (Frankfurt am Main, 1977), p. 364. 2. D. Held, Democracy and the Global Order (Cambridge, 1995). 3. In the "Conclusion" to Rechtslehre of The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. 8c ed. M. Gregor (Cambridge, 1996), p. 123; WerkeVm, p. 478. 4. Kant does indeed mention in his "Doctrine of Right" the "unjust enemy" whose "publicly expressed will (whether by word or deed) reveals a maxim by which, if it

283 Notes

were made a universal rule, any condition of peace among nations would be impos­ sible" {Metaphysics of Morals, section 60, p. 119; Werke VIII, p. 473); but the examples he gives, such as the violation of international treaties or the division of a conquered country (such as Poland in his own time), reveal the accidental character of this conception. A "punitive war" against unjust enemies remains an idea with n o real practical consequences so long as we assume that states have unlimited sovereignty. For such states could not recognize a judicial authority that impartially adjudicates transgressions of rules in international relations without jeopardizing their own sovereignty. Only victory and defeat can decide "who is in the right" (Political Writings, p. 96; Werke XI, p. 200). 5. Kant, Political Writings, p. 113; WerkeXL, p. 212. 6. Kant, "Theory and Practice," in Political Writings, p. 92 [translation modified]; WerkeXl, p. 172. 7. Kant, "Perpetual Peace," in Political Writings, p. 105; WerkeXl, p. 213. 8. In the "Doctrine of Right," Metaphysics of Morals, section 61, p. 119. 9. Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, p. 120 [translation modified]; Werke YIII, p. 475. 10. "Perpetual Peace," p. 104-105; WerkeXl, p. 212. 11. "Perpetual Peace," p. 113; WerkeXl, p. 225. 12. "Theory and Practice," p. 90; Werke XI, p. 169. 13. "Perpetual Peace," p. 100; Werke XI, pp. 205-206. 14. Cf. H. Schulze, Staat und Nation in der Europaischen Geschichte (Munchen, 1994). 15. See D. Archibugi and D. Held's "Introduction" to their collection Cosmopolitan Democracy (Cambridge, 1995), pp. lOff. 16. See "The Doctrine of Right," Metaphysics of Morals, section 62, p. 121. 17. "Perpetual Peace," 114; Werke XI, p. 226. 18. See G. Lukacs, The Young Hegel, trans. R. Livingstone (Cambridge, MA, 1976). 19. D. Senghaas, "Internationale Politik im Lichte ihrer strukturellen Dilemmata," in Wohin driftet die Welt? (Frankfurt am Main, 1994), pp. 121ff., p. 132. 20. This is Anthony Giddens's definition of globalization in The Consequences of Mod­ ernity (Cambridge, 1990), p. 64. 21. Cf. R. Knieper, Nationale Souverdnitdt (Frankfurt am Main, 1991). 22. J. S. Nye, "Soft Power," Foreign Policy 80 (1990): 153-171. 23. "Perpetual Peace," p. 121 [translation modified]; WerkeXI, p. 238.

284 Notes

24. "Perpetual Peace," p. 115 [translation modified]; WerkeXI, p. 228. 25. "Perpetual Peace," pp. 107-108; Werke, XI, pp. 216f. 26. O n the theme "Farewell to the world of nation-states!" see E. O. Czempiel, Weltpolitik im Umbruch (Mimchen, 1993), pp. 105ff. 27. See the essays by A. Wellmer and A. H o n n e t h in Gemeinschaft und Gerechtigkeit, ed. M. Brumlik and H. Brunkhorst (Frankfurt am Main, 1993), pp. I73ff and pp. 260ff. 28. See the title essay of my Die Normalitdt einer Berliner Republik (Munchen, 1995), pp. 165ff. 29. "Perpetual Peace," p. 114; WerkeXI, p. 226. 30. "Idea for a Universal History," in Political Writings, p. 51; "Idee zu einer Allgemeinen Geschichte," in Werke XI, pp. 46ff. 31. O n the idea of the people as a learning sovereign, see H. Brunkhorst, Demokratie undDifferenz (Frankfurt am Main, 1994), pp. 199ff. 32. "Idea for a Universal History," p. 45 [translation modified]; WerkeXI, p. 38. 33. J. Isensee defends a qualified prohibition on intervention "against the increasing tendency to deviate from the n o r m " in terms of the surprising notion of "basic rights for states" in "Weltpolizei fur Menschenrechten,"/wm&>c/^ Zeitung9 (1995): 421-430: "What is valid for the basic rights of individuals also holds mutatis mutandis for the 'basic rights' of states, especially for their sovereign equality, their self-determination as the supreme authority over persons and territory" (p. 424; see also p. 429). Draw­ ing an analogy between the sovereignty of states recognized by international law and the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of persons as legal subjects misses not only the fundamental importance of individual rights and the individualist orientation of m o d e r n legal orders; it also misses the specifically juridical meaning of h u m a n rights as the individual rights of citizens of a cosmopolitan order. 34. See the examples cited by Ch. Greenwood in, "Gibt es ein Recht auf humanitare Intervention?" Europa-Archiv 4 (1993): 93-106, p. 94. 35. See Habermas, The Past as Future (Lincoln, Nebraska, 1994), pp. 5-31. 36. "Theory and Practice," p. 77 [translation modified]; WerkeXI, p. 144. 37. See J. Habermas, "Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State," below pp. 214ff. 38. "Perpetual Peace," p. 112 [translation modified]; WerkeXI, p. 223. 39. In a discussion of a work by Georges Scelle, Precis de droit de gens Vols. I and II (Paris, 1932 8c 1934) in C. Schmitt, Die Wendung zum diskriminierenden Kriegsbegriff (1938) (Berlin, 1988), p. 16. 40. Schmitt, Kriegsbegriff, p. 19.

285 Notes

41. O n the Vienna conference on h u m a n rights, see R. Wolfrum, "Die des internationalen Menschenrechtsschutzes," Europa-Archiv 23 (1993): the status of disputed rights to solidarity, see W. Huber's article rechte/Menschenwurde," in Theobgische Realenzyklopadie, Vol. XXII York, 1992), pp. 577-602; also E. Riedel, "Menschenrechte der dritten Europaische Grundrechte Zeitschrift (1989): 9-21.

Entwicklung 681-690; on "Menschen(Berlin/New Dimension,"

42. In 1993 the Security Council established such a tribunal to prosecute war crimes and crimes against humanity in the former Yugoslavia. 43. As argued by H. Quaritsch in his postscript to C. Schmitt, Das internationalrechtliche Verbrechen des Angriffskrieges (1945) (Berlin, 1994), pp. 125-247; here pp. 236ff. 44. See the analyses and conclusions of Greenwood, "Gibt es ein Recht auf hu­ manitare Intervention?" 45. Greenwood comes to the following conclusion: "The idea that the UN could use the powers granted in its Charter to intervene in a state on humanitarian grounds now appears to be much more strongly established;" "Gibt es ein Recht auf hu­ manitare Intervention?" p. 104. 46. Quoted in Greenwood, "Gibt es ein Recht auf humanitare Intervention?" p. 96. 47. "Perpetual Peace," p. 104; WerkeXl, pp. 21 Iff. 48. See R. Cooper, "Gibt es eine neue Weltordnung?" Europa-Archiv 18 (1993): 5 0 9 516. 49. A reasonable framework for discussing h u m a n rights is proposed by T. Lindholm, "The Cross-Cultural Legitimacy of H u m a n Rights," Norwegian Institute of Human Rights, No. 3 (Oslo, 1990). 50. D. and E. Senghaas, "Si vis pacem, para pacem," Leviathan (1992): 230-247. 51. E. O. Czempiel has investigated these strategies in light of many different exam­ ples in "Internationale Politik u n d der Wandel von Regimen," in G. Schwarz, ed., Sonderheft der Zeitschrift fur Politik (Zurich, 1989), 55-75. 52. I am here following D. Archibugi, "From the United Nations to Cosmopolitan Democracy," in Archibugi and Held, Cosmopolitan Democracy, pp. 121-162. 53. [Here the author has in mind the bicameral parliamentary system typical of European states in which an u p p e r house (in Germany, the Bundesrat) exercises legislative competence in a division of labor with the house of representatives (the Bundestag). Trans.] 54. See H. Kelsen, Peace Through Law (Chapel Hill, 1944). 55. Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, trans. F. Lawrence (Cambridge, MA, 1987), p p . 336ff. 56. C. Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, trans. G. Schwab (Chicago, 1996), p. 54 [translation modified]. O n e finds the same argument in Isensee, "Weltpolizei fur

286 Notes

Menschenrechten," p . 429: "For as long as there have been interventions, they have served ideologies: religious ideologies in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, monarchical, Jacobin, a n d humanitarian principles, the socialist world revolution. Now h u m a n rights and democracy are the order of the day. In the long history of intervention, ideology has served to dissemble the power interests of the interveners and to invest their effectiveness with the aura of legitimacy." 57. Cf. Schmitt, Glossarium 1947-1951 (Berlin, 1991), p. 76. 58. Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen, (Berlin, 1963), p . 94. [This passage does n o t appear in the English translation. Trans.] 59. See S. Schute a n d S. Hurley, eds., On Human Rights (New York, 1993). 60. O. Hoffe, "Die Menschenrechte als Legitimation u n d kritischer MaBstab der Demokratie," in J. Schwardtlander (ed.), Menschenrechte und Demokratie (Strasbourg, 1981), p . 250; see also Hoffe, Political Justice, trans. J.C. Cohen (Cambridge, 1995). 61. S. Konig, Zur Begritndung der Menschenrechte: Hobbes-Locke-Kant (Freiburg, 1994), pp. 26ff. 62. T h e implications of the rights to political participation for h u m a n rights are such that everyone has at any rate the right to belong to one political community as a citizen. 63. See H u g o Bedau's analysis of the structure of h u m a n rights, which draws on H e n r y Shue's position, in "International H u m a n Rights," T Regan and D. van de Weer, eds., And Justice for All (Totowa, NJ, 1983), p . 279: "The emphasis on duties is meant to avoid leaving the defense of h u m a n rights in a vacuum, bereft of any moral significance for the specific conduct of others. But the duties are n o t intended to explain or generate rights; if anything, the rights are supposed to explain and generate the duties." 64. Cf. S. Konig, Zur Begrilndung der Menschenrechte, p p . 84ff. 65. Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, p . 24; Werke VLIl, p . 337. 66. Metaphysics of Morals, p. 30; WerkeVlll, 345. 67. O n the differentiation of the spheres of ethics, law, and morality, see R. Forst, Kontexte der Gerechtigkeit (Frankfurt am Main, 1994), p p . 131-142. 68. Cf. Schmitt, Das internationalrechtliche Verbrechen des Angriffskrieges. 69. In both The Concept of the Political and Die Wendung zur diskriminerenden Kriegsbegriff 70. Schmitt, Das internationalrechtliche Verbrechen, p . 19. 71. Schmitt, Glossarium, p p . 113, 265, 146, 282. 72. Schmitt, Die Wendung zur diskriminerenden Kriegsbegriff, p . 1.

287 Notes

73. Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen, p . 110. [This section is n o t included in the English translations. Trans.] 74. Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, p . 33. 75. H. M. Enzensberger, Aussichten auf den Burgerkrieg (Frankfurt am Main, 1993), pp. 73ff. See A. H o n n e t h , "Universalismus as moralische Falle?" Merkur 546/7 (1994): 867-883. Enzensberger n o t only bases his case on a highly selective description of the current international situation which completely ignores the surprising expan­ sion of constitutional regimes in Latin American, Africa, and Eastern Europe in the last twenty years (cf. Czempiel, Weltpolitik im Umbruch, p p . 107ff.). H e also casually transmutes the complex relationships between fundamentalist politics, on the one hand, and social deprivations and the absence of liberal traditions, on the other, into anthropological features. But precisely the expanded conception of peace points to preventive, nonviolent strategies and highlights the pragmatic limitations to which humanitarian interventions are subject, as is shown both by the example of Somalia and the different situation in the former Yugoslavia. For a case-based analysis of different types of interventions, see D. Senghaas, Wohin driftet die Welt?, p p . 185ff. 76. A. Gehlen, Moral und Hypermoral (Frankfurt am Main, 1969). 77. Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 259. 78. Ibid., p . 229; also The Concept of the Political, p . 63. 79. Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, p. 54. 80. Ibid., p . 36 [translation modified]. 81. See Habermas, Kleine Polilische Schriften I-IV (Frankfurt am Main, 1981), p p . 3 2 8 339. 82. K. Gimther, "Kampf gegen das Bose? Wider die ethische Aufrustung der Kriminalpolitik," Kritische Justiz 17 (1994): 135-157. 83. Ibid., p. 144. 84. Ibid., p . 144.

Chapter 8 1. Cf. J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, trans. W. Rehg (Cambridge, MA, 1996), chap. 3. 2. A. H o n n e t h , Struggles for Recognition, trans. J. Andersen (Cambridge, 1994). 3. Cf. Ch. Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," in Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, rev. ed., A. Gutmann, ed., (Princeton, 1994), pp. 25-73. 4. A. Gutmann, "Introduction," Multiculturalism, p . 8. 5. Cf. Taylor, in Multiculturalism, pp. 58-59.

288 Notes

6. Ibid. 7. J. Habermas, "Individuation through Socialization," in Postmetaphysical Thinking, trans. W. M. Hohengarten (Cambridge, MA, 1992), p p . 149-204. 8. D. L. Rhode, Justice and Gender (Cambridge, MA, 1989), Part 1. 9. Nancy Fraser, "Struggle over Needs," in Unruly Practices (Minneapolis, 1989), pp. 144-160. 10. S. Benhabib, Situating the Self (New York, 1992), Part 2. 11. P. Berman, ed., Debating PC. (New York, 1992); see also J. Searle, "Storm Over the University," in the same volume, pp. 85-123. 12. J. Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, trans. F. Lawrence (Cam­ bridge, MA, 1987). 13. As Gutmann remarks of the deconstructionist method, 'This reductionist argu­ ment about intellectual standards is often made on behalf of groups that are underrepresented in the university and disadvantaged in society, but it is hard to see how it can come to the aid of anyone. The argument is self-undermining, both logically and practically. By its internal logic, deconstructionism has nothing more to say for the view that intellectual standards are masks for the will to political power than that it too reflects the will to power of deconstructionists. But why then bother with intellectual life at all, which is not the fastest, surest, or even most satisfying path to political power, if it is political power that one is really after?" "Introduction," Multi­ culturalism, pp. 18-19. 14. R. Dworkin, Taking Bights Seriously (Cambridge, MA, 1977). 15. R. Beiner, Political Judgment (Chicago, 1994), p. 138. 16. P. Alter, Nationalism (New York, 1989). 17. This essay was written in early 1993. 18. W. Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford, 1991). 19. S. Wolf, "Comment," in Multiculturalism, p. 79. 20. Cf. the Supreme Court decision in Wisconsin v.Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 21. D. Cohn-Bendit and T. Schmid, Heimat Babylon (Hamburg, 1992), p p . 316ff. 22. J. Habermas, Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics, trans. C. Cronin (Cambridge, MA, 1993). 23. J. Rawls, ' T h e Idea of an Overlapping Consensus," Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 7 (1987): 1-25. 24. J. Habermas, The New Conservatism: Cultural Criticism and the Historians' Debate, trans. S. W. Nicholsen (Cambridge, MA, 1989).

289 Notes

25. D. J. van de Kaa, "European Migration at the End of History," European Review 1 (January 1993): 94. 26. E. Wiegand, "Auslanderfeindlichkeit in der Festung Europa. Einstellungen zu Fremden im europaischen Vergleich," Informationsdienst Soziale Indikatoren (ZUMA), no. 9 (1993): 1-4. 27. M. Walzer, "What Does It Mean to Be an American?" Social Research 57 (1990): 591-614. Walzer notes that the communitarian conception does n o t take account of the complex composition of a multicultural society (p. 613). 28. R. Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge, MA, 1992), pp. 128ff. 29. Cohn-Bendit and Schmid, Heimat Babylon, chap. 8. 30. J. H. Carens, "Aliens and Citizens," Review of Politics 49 (1987): 271; cf. also J. Habermas, "Citizenship and National Identity," in Between Facts and Norms, pp. 4 9 1 515. 31. R C. Emmer, "Intercontinental Migration," European Review 1 (January 1993): 67-74: "After 1800 the dramatic increase in the economic growth of Western Europe could only be maintained as an 'escape hatch.' T h e escape of sixty-one million Europeans after 1800 allowed the European economies to create such a mix of the factors of production as to allow for record economic growth and to avoid a situation in which economic growth was absorbed by an increase in population. After the Second World War, Europeans also benefitted from intercontinental migration since the colonial empires forced many colonial subjects to migrate to the metropolis. In this particular period there was n o danger of overpopulation . . . . Many of the colonial migrants coming to Europe had been well trained and they arrived at exactly the time when skilled labor was at a premium in rebuilding Europe's economy" (pp. 72f.). 32. With a justification that is outrageous from a constitutional point of view, on May 14, 1996 the second senate of the Federal Constitutional Court upheld the constitu­ tionality of the clause concerning "third countries" and the clause defining "safe countries of origin" laid down in the revised version of the Basic Law. This ruling subordinates the constitution to functional imperatives that call for p r o m p t expul­ sion of asylum seekers. As Heribert Prantl wrote (in the Suddeutschen Zeitung of May 14/15, 1996): "Quick expulsion is more important to the constitutional court . . . than the right to asylum, more important than h u m a n dignity, more important than the principle of due process." 33. K J. Bade, "Immigration and Integration in Germany since 1945," European Review 1 (January 1993): 75-79. 34. Bade, "Immigration and Integration," p. 77. 35. See the title essay in J. Habermas, Die Normalitdt einer Berliner Republik (Frankfurt am Main, 1995).

290 Notes

Chapter 9 1. Cf. H. Arendt, On Revolution (New York, 1965); On Violence (New York, 1970). 2. Cf. F. I. Michelman, "Political Truth and the Rule of Law," Tel Aviv University Studies in Law 8 (1988): 283: "The political society envisioned by bumper-sticker republicans is the society of private rights bearers, an association whose first principle is the protection of the lives, liberties, and estates of its individual members. In that society, the state is justified by the protection it gives to those prepolitical interests; the purpose of the constitution is to ensure that the state apparatus, the government, provides such protection for the people at large rather than serves the special interests of the governors or their patrons; the function of citizenship is to operate the constitution and thereby to motivate the governors to act according to that protective purpose; and the value to you of your political franchise—your right to vote and speak, to have your views heard and counted—is the handle it gives you on influencing the system so that it will adequately heed and protect your particular, prepolitical rights and other interests." 3. O n the distinction between positive and negative freedom see Ch. Taylor, "What is H u m a n Agency?" in Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers 1 (Cambridge, 1985), p p . 15-44. 4. Michelman, "Political Truth and the Rule of Law," p. 284: "In [the] civic constitu­ tional vision, political society is primarily the society not of rights bearers, but of citizens, an association whose first principle is the creation and provision of a public realm within which a people, together, argue and reason about the right terms of social coexistence, terms that they will set together and which they understand as comprising their common good. . . . Hence, the state is justified by its purpose of establishing and ordering the public sphere within which persons can achieve free­ dom in the sense of self-government by the exercise of reason in public dialogue." 5. Michelman, "Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional Argument: Voting Rights," Florida Law Review 41 (1989): 446f. (hereafter 'Voting Rights"). 6. Michelman, "Voting Rights," p. 484. 7. Michelman, "Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional Argument: T h e Case of Pornography Regulation," Tennessee Law Review 291 (1989): 293. 8. Cf. J. Habermas, "Popular Sovereignty as Procedure," in Between Facts and Norms, trans. W. Rehg (1996), pp. 463-490. 9. Cf. The Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, article 20, sec. 2.

Index

Anderson, Benedict, 110 Appropriateness, principle of, 45 Arendt, H a n n a h , 247 Argumentation, 38, 42-45 individual interests transformed in, 81 pragmatic theory of, 57-58, 82 public practice of, 68 Aristotle and Aristotelianism and rational assessment, 6 and Rawls, 54 and Republicanism, 258 on will and reason, 12 Asylum. See Political asylum Autonomous morality, and positive law, 256-258 Autonomy, 99 and law, 257-258 and popular sovereignty, 250 private and public, 131, 258, 259-262 and feminist politics of equality, 209, 262 in legal domain, 257, 258 and Liberalism 1, 207-208 in postpolitical world, 125 and postwar Europe, 120 and proceduralist conception of law, 264 and procedural popular sovereignty, 139 and Rawls, 67-72, 101 Balance of power, 126, 167, 168, 170, 184 Bluntschli, J o h a n n Caspar, 134 B o d i n j e a n , 250 Bokenforde, Ernst-Wolfgang, 132-133

Born minorities. See at Minorities Bosnia-Herzogovina/ Croatia ethnic conflict in, 219 intervention in, 182 Briand-Kellogg Pact (1928), 178 Canada decentralization in, 213 French-speaking minority in, 145, 2 0 6 207, 213, 219, 220 Meech Lake draft constitution for, 219 Carter, Jimmy, 186 Categorical imperative discourse-theoretical interpretation of, 33-34, 39 intersubjectivistic interpretation of, 34 and Rawls's original position, 57 Censorship, Kant on, 175-176 Citizen (ship) double coding of, 113, 131, 132 and immigration, 228 liberalism vs. republicanism on, 240241 Michelman on, 290n.4 vs. philosopher (Rawls), 94-98 as politically autonomous, 71 and solidarity through democratic process, 159-161 vs. subject, 112 Cognitivism, strong, 6-7 Cognitivism, weak, 6 Communication conditions, for Socratic dialogue, 19 Communicative account of republican­ ism, 139-140

292 Index

Communicative agreement, and moral justification, 23-24 Communicative context, for demo­ cratic citizenship, 159-161 Communicative form of life, 30, 39-41 Communicative freedom, 259 Communicative power, and republican view on governmental authority, 241,243 Communicative structure of rational discourse, 37 Communitarian view, 138, 143, 216, 217, 244. See also Republicanism Community, morality of, 4 Consciousness, philosophy of, 248 Constitutional patriotism, 118, 132, 225-226 Constitutional state, xxxvii and coercive force, 199 and democracy, 253 (see also Demo­ cratic constitutional state) jurisprudence and political science on, 253 nation as basis for, 113, 116 permeation of by ethics, 215-216 Contractualism. See Social contract Cooper, R., 184 Correspondence notion of truth, 36 Cosmopolitan democracy, 166, 186-188 Cosmopolitan idea, 178 Cosmopolitan law, xxxvi, 165, 168, 179, 181 and contemporary world situation, 171-172, 178, 183 and politics of h u m a n rights, 188 and Schmitt's analysis, 188, 193, 195, 199, 285-286n.56 Decentered society, 125, 251 Decisionism, 6 Deconstructionism, Gutmann on, 288n.l3 Deliberative politics, xxxvii, 239, 244, 245-246, 248, 251-252 Democracy and democratic process deliberative politics on, 246, 248, 2 5 1 252 and discourse theory, xxxvii, 248 and law, 253-254 and autonomous morality, 256-258 and democracy as legitimizing, 254255 and feminist politics of equality, 2 6 2 264

and h u m a n rights, 258-260 and private and public autonomy, 260-262, 264 liberalism vs. republicanism on, 2 3 9 244, 246-248 {see also Liberalism; Republicanism) and popular sovereignty, 251 and Schmitt, 134-137, 197 social integration through, 159 Democratic constitutional state, 112, 203 and marginalized cultural forms, 205 Schmitt on, 138 undermining of, 123 Dialogical politics, 245 Disagreements, three kinds of, 91-93 Discourse, normative, 19-20 Discourse-ethical model of justification, 43 Discourse ethics, 39, 57-58 on moral point of view, 33, 41-45, 57 and religious foundations, 34-36 and validity, 36-38 Discourse principle, 41 and categorical imperative, 33-34, 39 and legitimacy, 260 moral point of view justified through, 41-45 and pluralistic society, 39-41 questions for, 46 Discourse theory, 248-249, 249-250, 251 and democratic procedure, 259 and minorities, 143 Discrimination and multiculturalism, xxxvii reverse, 221 and secession, 143, 145 Dworkin, Ronald, 28, 56, 206, 216 Emotivism, 6 Empiricism and Gibbard, 16 and morality, 12-16 and Tugendhat, 16, 23 Enzensberger, Hans Magnus, 197-198 Epistemic reasons, 16, 25, 35 Equality democratic (Schmitt), 135, 136 feminist politics of, 208-209, 217, 2 6 2 264 legal and factual, 254, 262 and respect, 205 and rights vs. goods, 28

293 Index

Ethical insights, 25-26, 272n.34 Ethical point of view, 26-28. See also Moral point of view Ethical questions, 215-216 vs. questions of justice or morality, 66 and Rawls's theory, 98-99 Ethics constitutional state permeated by, 2 1 5 216 legal systems permeated by, 218, 227 political culture permeated by, 225 Ethnic cleansing, 141-142, 219. See also Genocide Ethnic nation, xxxvi Ethnonationalism, 129-130 and Schmitt's account, 134—138 and treatment of minorities, 142 Eurocentrism, 213 European Community, 152 and immigration, 226-227 European public sphere, 177 European Union, 123-124, 150-153, 155-161 and communicative context of social integration, 159-161 democratic deficit of, 155, 156, 157 and Security Council, 187 Evolution, and Gibbard on normative discourse, 18, 20 Federalism, German, 161 Federalization, 220 Feminism, 208-210, 211 radical, 210, 263 Feminist politics of equality, 208-209, 217, 262-264 Fichte, J. G., atheism controversy over, 176 First World, 184 Flick, Friedrich, 195 Forst, Rainer, 91 France, development of national con­ sciousness in, 234 Frederick II (king of Prussia), 175 Freedom. See also Liberties of the ancients and of the moderns, 258 Kant on, 192 national and individual, 114, 1 3 1 132 Free rider problem, and Hobbesianism, 15, 80 French-speaking population of Can­ ada, 145, 206-207, 213, 219, 220

Functionalist explanation of morality, 12 and Gibbard, 16-20 and Tugendhat, 16, 20 Fundamentalism, 223-224 and political integration, 229 Gehlen, Arnold, 198 Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft distinction, xxxv Genocide, 142, 195. See also Ethnic cleansing German federalism, as European model, 161 Germany adaptations needed by, 235-236 development of national conscious­ ness in, 234-235 "historians' debate" in, 225 and political asylum, 227, 230, 2 3 2 234, 289n.32 and voting rights for resident aliens, 191 Gibbard, Allan, 16, 17-20, 24 Giddens, Anthony, 120 "Global domestic politics," 126 Globalization, 106, 120-122, 124, 1 2 5 127, 157-158, 174, 183 Global public sphere, 176-177 God, and morality, 7-10 Golden Rule, 31, 90 Good(s), 273n.41 and right(s), 28-30, 56 Grimm, Dieter, 155, 156-157, 158, 159, 161 Guehenno, J. M., 125 Gulf War and Eurocentrism, 213 as expansion of limits, 182 and global public sphere, 176 and Security Council discretion, 180 Gimther, Klaus, 45, 200-201 Gutmann, Amy, 205, 206 Hare, R. M., 6 Hart, H. L. A., 56 Hegel, G. W. F , 40 and administrative state, 125 and capitalist development, 173 and history, 106 and Kant, 100, 188, 198 of Mussolini and Lenin, 198 and social contract theory, 138 and World Spirit, 178

294 Index

Heller, H e r m a n n , 151 Hobbes, Thomas, and Hobbesian view, 80 contractualism, 6 and free rider, 15 and m o d e r n law, 109 in path to Kant, 80-83 and Rawls, 54, 85 and rights over duties, 191 H o n n e t h , Axel, 204 Horkheimer, Max, 198 Humanitarian intervention, xxxvixxxvii, 146-150 H u m a n rights, 189-193. See also Rights ambiguity of, 189-190 and Kant on law, 180-181 origins of, 189 politics of, 166, 186-193, 201 and popular sovereignty, 112, 258-260 vs. prohibition on intervention, 147 and Schmitt, 136, 188-189, 192-193, 197, 198-199 and UN, 181-182, 285n.42 Humboldt, Wilhelm von, 40 H u m e , David, 13 Immigration, 226-232, 289n.31 and German politics of asylum, 227, 230, 232-234, 289n.32 and multicultural self-understanding, 159-160 Imperialism, European, 116, 172 Insights, ethical, 25-26, 272n.34 Instrumental politics, 245 International civil society, 177 International Court, 180 International law and "civilizing" of war (Schmitt), 194, 197 and contemporary world situation, 183 and globalization, 174 and Kant on cosmopolitan law, 165 Nuremberg and Tokyo trials as prece­ dent for, 182 sovereignty in, 147 state as subject of, 108, 178 transformation of to cosmopolitan law, 150 and war, 167, 178 International relations balance of power in, 126 and cosmopolitan law, 165 and Kant's federation of nations, 179 and priority of right over good, 28

International trade, and Kant on fed­ eration for peace, 171, 173-175 Intersubjectivistic understanding of pro­ cedural popular sovereignty, 1 3 8 139 Israel, founding of, 212-213 Justice, 10 and ethical point of view, 27-28 vs. ethical questions, 66, 245 and priority of right over good, 28 and solidarity, 10, 30, 40 Justice, Rawls's theory of. See Rawls, John Justification. See also Argumentation; Validity moral, 5 communicative agreement in, 23-24 discourse-ethical model of, 43 normative, 43, 45 pragmatic conception of, 37 in Rawls's theory, 77, 84-98 semantic conception of, 36-37 Kant, Immanuel, 6-7 alternative to proceduralism of, 83-86 and autonomy, 112, 259 categorical imperative of, 57 on coercive law, 71 and democratic self-determination, 139 on freedom, 192 and freedom of nation, 114 and Hegel, 100, 188, 198 humanist morality of, 197 and instrumental rationality, 13 and justice, 30 on law, 71, 192, 201, 254, 255 on liberties of ancients and moderns, 69 and morality as self-legislation, 30-33 on norms as maxims of action, 17 in path from Hobbes, 80-83 and perpetual peace, xxxvi, 165-171, 282-283n.4 and contemporary global situation, 179-186 historical experience of arguments for, 167, 171-178 and politics of h u m a n rights, 186-193 and Schmitt's critique, 188-189, 192201, 285-286n.56 and Rawls, 49, 85-86, 88, 100 and right(s), 140

295 Index

to equal individual liberties, 206 and universalization, 24 on will and reason, 12 "Kantian Constructivism in Moral The­ ory" (Rawls), 59, 82 Kantian Republicanism, 101 Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928), 178 Kelsen, Hans, 187 Kierkegaard, S0ren, 6 Kurds, 219 Kymlicka, Will, 221 Language, in Gibbard's theory, 18 Law and legal norms, 71-72, 191, 214^ 215, 217. See also Cosmopolitan law; International law; Natural law as coercive or as laws of freedom, 255 and culturally defined groups, 215 and democratic process, 253-254 and autonomous morality, 256-258 and democracy as legitimizing, 254— 255 and feminist politics of equality, 2 6 2 264 and h u m a n rights, 258-260 and private and public autonomy, 260-262, 264 ethical neutrality of, 215 as factual constraint and as perfor­ mative, 255 Kant on, 71, 192, 201, 254, 255 liberalism vs. republicanism on, 2 4 1 243 modern, 71, 214, 254-256 and morality, 201, 256-258 moralization of, 198-200 positive, 71, 254, 256-258 proceduralist conception of, 264 public vs. private, 109 League of Nations, 126, 169, 178, 188 Legal system, as ethically permeated, 218,227 Legitimation and legitimacy and discourse principle, 260 extension of citizenship for, 132 of legal norms, 256-257 and m o d e r n law, 254, 255 and nation-state, 111-112 and supernational units, 150-151 Walzer on, 149 Lenin, V. I., 134-135, 198 Lessing, Gottfried, 66 Liberalism, 258 and gender equality, 262-263

and morality, 29 neutrality of, 75 and pluralism, 78-79 political (Rawls), 76 political achievements of, 204 and private vs. public, 98-101 on role of democratic process, 239244, 246, 247-248, 249, 250 and Michelman on "bumper-sticker republicanism," 290n.2 Liberalism 1, 205, 207-208, 210, 216 Liberalism 2, 205, 216 Liberal legal paradigm, 261 Liberal political culture, 177-178 Liberia, intervention in, 182 Liberties. See also Freedom of the ancients, 69 of the moderns, 68-69 Locke, J o h n and h u m a n rights, 189 and law, 254 and liberalism, 258 Liibbe, H e r m a n n , 129, 152 Majority rule, and minorities, 144 Marriage, conventionalism in guaran­ tees for, 218 Marx, Karl, 108 Mead, G. H., 29, 40, 57-58, 81 Metaethical skepticism, 12 Michelman, Frank, 239, 245 Minorities and politics of recognition, 205-210 struggle for recognition of, 211-212 Minorities, born, and democratic selfdetermination, 143-146 Minorities, national, 219-220 Modern condition, 78-80 Modern constitutions, 203 Modernity, and political correctness de­ bate, 213-214 Modern law, 71, 214 formal properties of, 254-256 and individual rights, 256 Moral attitudes empiricist view of, 13-14 and pragmatic reasons or prefer­ ences, 16 Moral community, xxxvi, 29 Tugendhat on, 20-22, 23 Morality, xxxv as cognitive, 3 and affective attitudes, 4-5 and discourse principle, 39-46

296 Index

Morality (cont.) and empiricism, 12-16 and ethical insight, 25-26 and ethical point of view, 26-28 and Gibbard's approach, 16-20, 24 and Kant on self-legislation, 30-33 and loss of religious foundation, 7 12, 23, 34-36 m o d e r n moral programs on, 5-7 and moral rules, 4 and obligation, 3-4 and right-good relation, 28-30 and Tugendhat's approach, 16, 20-25 and validity of truth claims or moral claims, 36-38 vs. ethical questions, 66 functionalist explanation of, 12, 16-20 and individual life-histories, 100 and law, 201, 256-258 and liberalism, 29 Moral person freedom of, 101 in Rawls's theory, 59, 68 Moral point of view, 7, 31, 38, 39, 81. See also Obligation and application of norms, 45-46 discourse ethics on, 33, 41-45, 57 philosophy as clarification of, 72 and public practice of argumentation, 68 and Rawls's justification process, 95, 99 and Rawls's original position, 52, 57, 81,82 and social criticism, 98 Moral realism, 11, 36, 270-271n.7 Rawls's rejection of, 65, 79 Moral skepticism, 36 Moral universalism, 40 Multiculturalism, xxxvii and equality for individuals in diverse groups, 220-226 and ethical neutrality of law and poli­ tics, 215-216 and federalization, 220 and inclusion, 145-146 nation-state challenged by, 117 social and cultural rights as require­ ments i n , 1 1 8 Mussolini, Benito, and Hegel, 198 Nation (s) democratic constitution as basis vs. creation of, 133-134 and European union, 150-153

and humanitarian intervention, 146150 and minorities, 143-146 and national self-determination, 140143 and postcolonial Asian or African states, 152-153 and procedural popular sovereignty, 137-139 and Schmitt's account, 134-137 development of consciousness of, 109111 and "ethnonationalism," 129-130 formation of, 153 as social integration, 112-113 vs. state, 107-108 National identity, 130-131 Nationalism, 132 and antisemitism, 111 and fundamentalism, 223-224 and republicanism, 114-117, 132, 224 and right of self-determination, 141 and self-assertion, 172, 173-174 Nationalist movements, 212-213 Nationality principle, 134, 140, 141, 142 National minorities, 219. See also at Minorities National self-determination meaning and limits of, 140-143 right to, 116 Walzer on, 148 Nation-states, xxxvi abolition or transformation of, 124127 and ambivalence in freedom of na­ tion, 113-114 and ambivalence of nationalism vs. re­ publicanism, 114-117 challenges to, 106-107, 117, 157-158 double coding of citizenship in, 113, 131, 132 history of formation of, 105-106, 147, 153,219 restrictions of internal sovereignty in, 120-124 and Schmitt on democracy, 134-137 as solution to problems of legitima­ tion and integration, 111-113, 132133 and state vs. nation, 107-111 and subaltern peoples, 142 transformation of loyalties in, 131 unity of political culture in, 117-120

297 Index

Natural law in creationist metaphysics, 9 and h u m a n rights, 189 and legitimacy, 255 Nazis, racist policies of, 116 Noncognitivism, strong, 5-6 Noncognitivism, weak, 6, 25 Nongovernmental organizations, 177 Normative governance, Gibbard on, 19 Normative justification, and principle of universalization, 45 Normative statements, and Rawls, 63-64 Normativity, Gibbard's expressivist ac­ count of, 18 Norms, vs. values, 54-55 North Atlantic Charter, 181 Nuremberg trials, 178, 182 Obligation, 3-4. See also Morality and contractualist tradition, 80 vs. loyalties, 24 and norms vs. values, 54-55 vs. value-orientations, 26 Original position, in Rawls's theory, 5 1 59 Other, and universalism, xxxv-xxxvi Paternalism of Liberalism 1, 207 and Rawls's theory, 95 in substantive conception of good, 28 welfare, 262, 263 Patriotism, constitutional, 118, 132, 225-226 Peace, Senghasses' view of, 185 Peacekeeping, politics of, 150 Perpetual peace. See underKant, Immanuel Perspective-taking, reciprocal, 42 Philosophy, 77 Hobbes-to-Kant path in, 80-83 in Rawls's justification procedure, 9 4 98 task of, 18, 72 Philosophy of consciousness, 248 Pluralism and discourse principle, 39-41 as First World indicator, 184 and hidden interests, 244-245 and liberalism, 78-79 and nation-state, 117 and Rawls's theory, 59-61, 66, 68, 77, 85, 88, 94

and religion as basis of morality, 10 and social integration, 133 and universalization, 57 Political asylum, 227, 230 in Germany, 227, 230, 232-234, 289n.32 Political correctness, debate about, 213-214 Political culture and ethics, 225 and legal constitution, 177 in multicultural society, 146 and postnational Europe, 153, 282n.54 unity of, 117-120 Political liberalism. See Liberalism Political Liberalism (Rawls), 49, 77, 82, 83, 94, 96, 99. See also Rawls, J o h n Political process, liberal vs. republican view on, 243-244 Political public sphere. See Public sphere Politics of h u m a n rights, 166, 186-193, 201 Politics of peacekeeping, 150 Politics of recognition (Taylor), xxxvii, 205-210 and actualization of rights, 217-218 and equal rights to coexistence, 220226 and feminism, 209-211 (see also Femi­ nist politics of equality) and immigration, 226-232, 289n.31 and minorities, 211-212, 219-220 and nationalist movements, 212-213 and value of cultures, 221 Popper, K . R . , 6 Popular sovereignty, 250-251 and European Union, 151 and h u m a n rights, 112, 258-260 procedural, 137-139 Positive law, 71 and autonomous morality, 256-258 and legitimacy, 254 Postcolonial states, 152-153 Postmodernism, xxxv, 214 Postnational forms of society, xxxvi, 119 Postpolitical world, 124-125 Practical reason empiricist view of, 12-13 and Hobbes, 80 in Kantian tradition, 81 and pragmatic theory of argumenta­ tion, 82 Rawls on, 64, 82-83

298 Index

Pragmatic conception of justification, 37 Pragmatic theory of argumentation, 5 7 58, 82 Primary goods and liberal social reform, 204 in Rawls's theory, 54, 56 Principle of appropriateness, 45 Principle of universalization, 42-43, 45, 46, 57 Private autonomy. See under Autonomy "Private law society," 261 Proceduralist conception of law, 264 Procedural popular sovereignty, 137138 intersubjectivistic understanding of, 138-139 Public autonomy. See under Autonomy Public sphere and Arendt's view, 247 in decentered society, 251 and Kant on federation for peace, 171, 175-178 Michelman on, 290n.4 on republican understanding of poli­ tics, 240 Public use of reason and assimilation, 228 in Kantian Republicanism, 101 in Rawls's theory, 59, 64-65, 68, 94 and acceptance, 61 and basic liberal rights, 72 consensus assumed by, 84, 92 and nonpublic reasons, 86 political stability preserved by, 70 procedural requirements for, 98 and "reasonable," 92 Quebec, French-speaking majority of, 206-207, 213, 219, 220 Rational agreement, 19, 272n.22 Rationalization, 250 Rawls, J o h n , xxxvi, 49-50 and alternative to Kantian proceduralism, 83-86 avoidance strategy of, 72-73, 75, 99 and ethically neutral legal order, 206 and Hobbes-to-Kant path, 80-83 and liberalism on public vs. private, 98-101 and m o d e r n conditions, 79-80 and moral point of view, 52, 57, 81

and nonfundamentalist worldviews, 224 and original position, 51-59, 89 and overlapping consensus, 59-63, 67, 68, 77-78, 83-84, 86, 88-89, 91, 100 and acceptability vs. acceptance, 6 1 63 . and philosopher's vs. citizen's role, 94-98 points in critique of, 50-51 and political conception of justice, 5 9 60, 63, 65-66, 70, 75-77 and private or public autonomy, 6 7 72, 101 and rational agreement, 24 and "reasonable," 63-67, 86-89, 92, 93, 94 and right(s) vs. good(s), 56, 66, 93 Realism, moral, 11, 36, 270-271n.7 Rawls's rejection of, 65, 79 Reason, public use of. See Public use of reason "Reasonable," and Rawls's theory, 6 3 67, 86-89, 92, 93, 94 Reason in Rawls's outlook, 49, 82 and original position, 52 Reciprocal perspective-taking, 42 Recognition, politics of. See Politics of recognition Reflective equilibrium, of Rawls, 60, 76, 90, 97-98 Reflective reconstruction, and moral justification, 5 Republicanism (republican principles), 117, 258 and collective identity, 159 communicative account of, 139-140 and Kant on federation for peace, 172 Kantian, 101 and liberties, 69 and nationalism, 114-117, 132, 224 and national self-determination, 141, 142 and nation-state, xxxvi on role of democratic process, 2 3 9 244, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250 Schmitt in opposition to, 136-137 universalistic content of, xxxv Reverse discrimination, 221 Rights. See also H u m a n rights basic, 190-191, 258 to coexistence, 220-226 and equality for women, 210 vs. good(s), 28-30, 56

299 Index

Kant on, 140 on liberal vs. republican view, 241, 242-243 and m o d e r n constitutions, 203 and m o d e r n law, 256 as primary goods (Rawls), 54 and shift to popular sovereignty, 112 and social contract theory, 15 Rorty, Richard, 60 Rousseau, J e a n j a c q u e s and autonomy, 112, 69, 259 and democratic self-determination, 139 and h u m a n rights, 189 and law, 254 and popular sovereignty, 250 and Schmitt on democracy, 137 Rushdie, Salman, 224 St. Pierre, Abb, 165 Scanlon, Thomas, 60, 80, 81 Schmitt, Carl, 134-138 on cosmopolitan law, 181 and Federal Constitutional Court, 151 and Grimm, 158-159 on international humanitarianism, 188-189, 192-201 and intervention, 147-148 and right of national self-determina­ tion, 141-142 Schulze, H., I l l , 130 Scottish moral philosphy, 6, 13 Secession, justification of, 143> 145 Second World, 184 Seel, Martin, 22 Semantic conception of justification, 36-37 Senghass, Dieter and Eva, 185 Skepticism metaethical, 12 moral, 36 value-skepticism, 79 Social contract, 13, 14-15, 16, 23, 80 and Kant on cosmopolitan law, 168, 169 vs. Schmitt's account, 137-138 Social democracy, political achieve­ ments of, 204 Social integration. See also Solidarity communicative context of, 159-161 and nation-state,* 111-113 in pluralistic societies, 133 solidarity as, 240, 249

Social welfare model, and critique of liberal paradigm, 261 Social-welfare policies. See also Welfare state and equality for women, 209 and gender equality, 263 Social welfare state. See Welfare state Social world, 38 Socratic dialogue, 19 Solidarity, xxxv-xxxvi, 10. See also Social integration democratic participation as source of, 112,159-161 and justice, 10, 30, 40 and material conditions, 119 nation as source of, 111 as social integration, 240, 249 Somalia intervention in, 182, 231 as Third World, 184 Sovereignty and boundary between domestic and foreign policy, 174 external, 114, 146-147, 150, 179 and humanitarian intervention, 146150 internal, 146, 147, 170, 179 in international law, 147 limits of in nation-state, 120-124 popular, 112, 137-139, 250-251, 2 5 8 260 State. See also Constitutional state apparatus of, 108-109 arid European Union, 155 vs. nation, 107-108 and national identity, 130-131 in postcolonial Asia and Africa, 152 social makeup of, 218 sovereignty of, 146 Stevenson, C. L., 6 Strong cognitivism, 6 Strong noncognitivism, 5-6 Taylor, Charles, 205, 216, 226, 227. See also Politics of Recognition Theory of Communicative Action, The (Habermas), xxxv Theory of Justice, A (Rawls), 49, 53, 61, 82, 88, 94. See also Rawls, J o h n Third World, 183-184 Tokyo military tribunals, 178, 182 Truth cooperative search for, 19 correspondence notion of, 36

300 Index

Truth (cont.) and reasonableness (Rawls's theory), 63, 65-66, 67, 77, 95 in religious or metaphysical worldviews, 85 as validity, 36-37 Tugendhat, Ernst, 16, 17, 20-25 Underclass, 122-123, 158 United Nations, 105, 107, 126, 127, 178, 179-180 as "cosmopolitan democracy," 186-188 and First World, 184 General Assembly of, 149, 183, 187 overall safeguarding by, 231 and Schmitt's analysis, 188, 197 and war crimes, 285n.42 United Nations Charter, 179 and prohibition of intervention in, 147 and Schmitt, 193 on self-determination, 143 United States, 113 and ethical permeation of legal sys­ tem, 227 and immigration, 159-160, 228 as Maastricht Treaty analogy, 151 political culture of, 118 recognition of independence of, 143 and World Court (Nicaragua case), 180 Universalism, xxxv-xxxvi moral, 40 postmodern suspicion of, xxxv Universalization, principle of, 42-43, 45,46,57 Utilitarianism, 5-6, 11-12 and Rawls, 54 Scanlon's argument against, 80 Validity, 35-38 Value-orientations, 81 vs. obligations, 26 Values, vs. norms, 54-55 Value-skepticism, Rawls's rejection of, 79 Veil of ignorance, in Rawls's theory, 5 1 52, 57-59 Vienna conference on h u m a n rights, 182 Vietnam War, and global public sphere, 176 Voltaire, 175

Walzer, Michael, 148-149, 205, 216 War as crime, 167, 178 and Schmitt's analysis, 147-148, 188, 193, 194-196, 197-198 in Third World, 184 Weak cognitivism, 6 Weak noncognitivism, 6, 25 Weber, Max, 70, 105, 108, 130 Wehler, Hans-Ulrich, 129, 133 Weimar Republic, 134 Weizsacker, C. F. von, 126 Welfare paternalism, 262, 263 Welfare state. See also Social-welfare poli­ cies class antagonisms pacified by, 174 in postwar Europe, 119-120 and private vs. public autonomy, 71 and supranational institutions, 157158 Wilson, Woodrow, 134-135, 178 Wolf, Susan, 221 World Court, 187 Yugoslavia, former, 184, 285n.42