The Korean War: An Exhaustive Chronology

1 The Korean War

ALSO

BY

BUD HANNINGS

Forts of the United States: An Historical Dictionary, 16th through 19th Centuries (McFarland, 2006)

The Korean War An Exhaustive Chronolog y BUD HANNINGS Foreword by General P. X. Kelley, 28th Commandant, USMC (Ret.)

Volume 1 (foreword; preface; prologue; acronyms and abbreviations; January 5, 1950–September 22, 1950)

McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers Jefferson, North Carolina, and London

Volume 1 LIBRARY

OF

CONGRESS CATALOGUING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA

Hannings, Bud. The Korean war : an exhaustive chronology / Bud Hannings ; foreword by General P.X. Kelley, 28th Commandant, USMC (Ret.). p. cm. Includes index. 3 volume set— ISBN-13: 978-0-7864-2814-4 illustrated case binding : 50# alkaline paper 1. Korean War, 1950–1953 — Chronology. 2. Korean War, 1950–1953. 3. Korean War, 1950–1953 — United States — Chronology. 4. United Nations — Armed Forces — Korea — Chronology. I. Title. DS918.H336 2007 951.904'20202 — dc22 2007010570 British Library cataloguing data are available ©2007 Bud Hannings. All rights reserved No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying or recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. On the cover: Situation Map of Korea, November 25, 1950; Elements of Eighth Army retire from Sunch’on and move south towards P’yongyang, December 2, 1950 Manufactured in the United States of America

McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers Box 611, Jefferson, North Carolina 28640 www.mcfarlandpub.com

Contents • Volume 1 • Foreword, by General P. X. Kelley, 28th Commandant, USMC (Ret.) 1 Preface

3

Prologue: The Prelude to War

7

Acronyms and Abbreviations

15

Chronology: January 5, 1950– September 22, 1950 23

• Volume 2 • Chronology: September 23, 1950– November 12, 1951 403

• Volume 3 • Chronology: November 13, 1951– September 6, 1953 803 Appendices 1. Eighth Army, Order of Battle 2. Major Combat Events

975

981

3. United Nations Command, Senior Military Commanders 4. U.S. Air Force Commanders

985

5. Medal of Honor Recipients

988

v

983

Contents

vi 6. Major U.S. Air Force Units

994

7. U.S. Marine Units

997

8. U.S. Naval Vessels

999

9. U.S. Naval Air Units

1002

10. Carrier-Based and Non–Carrier-Based Squadrons 11. U.S. Naval Vessels Sunk or Damaged in Action 12. Numbers of U.S. Navy and Corps Personnel Killed and Wounded Marine 13. U.S. Aces of the Korean War 14. U.S. Army Command Strength 15. U.S. Army Battle Casualties 16. Foreign Nation Forces Bibliography

1021

General Index

1025

Military Units Index

1016

1018

1069

1009

1013

1014 1017

1003

Foreword by General P. X. Kelley, 28th Commandant, USMC (Ret.) A desperate withdrawal quickly followed the initial invasion as the friendly forces pulled back from the 38th Parallel towards Pusan. The U.S. Marines arrived there during early August to bolster the U.S. Eighth Army as it battled for survival. Soon after, during September, as part of the strategic plan to conduct an amphibious assault against Inchon, the U.S. Eighth Army initiated its breakout from the Pusan Perimeter. The book chronicles the perilous landing of the U.S. Marines at Inchon on 15 September, the subsequent drive to recapture Seoul, and the simultaneous advance of the U.S. Eighth Army as it moved to join the U.S. X Corps. From there, the book chronicles the U.S. X Corps as the cruel Korean winter set in, as if synchronized with the crossing of the Yalu River by the Chinese armies. Of particular significance is the fierce and difficult combat under the worst possible weather conditions after the U.S. Marines became surrounded by hordes of Chinese at the Chosin Reservoir. During their movement to Hungnam, the reader is reminded of Admiral Chester Nimitz’s famous comment during the World War II Battle of Iwo Jima, “Uncommon valor was a common virtue.” Throughout this spectacular three-volume work, the reader will encounter the setbacks, the triumphs, and the agonies of the fighting men on the ground, moving from foxhole to

Bud Hannings has done a masterful job in providing current and future generations with what can accurately be called the most complete and authoritative chronology ever compiled about the Korean War. All who read it will understand and fully comprehend why those who endured this most difficult confiict chafe when the war is referred to as a “Police Action.” The Korean War: An Exhaustive Chronolog y is a superbly and skillfully written compendium of the often-called “Forgotten War.” It tells of the extreme hardships and privations suffered by the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines on the ground, in the air and at sea as they struggle to stem the tide of a seemingly unstoppable enemy. This is not a book on grand strategy. Rather, its primary focus is on the extraordinary achievements of small units and individuals. The confiict began on June 25, 1950, when without warning tens of thousands of North Koreans surged over the border into South Korea and only one American soldier stood in their way as they attacked towards Seoul. This chronology begins when a scant American Task Force is sent to Korea from nearby Japan to become the first U.S. unit to engage the enemy. It then chronicles the other units that follow from Japan and the United States, as well as from other countries that participated under the fiag of the United Nations.

1

Foreword by General P. X. Kelley foxhole, rice paddy to rice paddy and hill to hill. Readers may better understand the thrill of being in the cockpit of a Corsair being catapulted from the deck of a U.S. Navy carrier or the clamor in the turret of a naval gun. They can also crawl alongside a dirty infantryman, the “Queen of Battle,” during a tortuous advance against an enemy machine gun or invincible tank. Eventually, readers will join in the negotiations at Panmunjom during the final days of the confiict when the repatriated United Nations forces arrive at Freedom Village. Readers can then close the cover with the knowledge that those who served in Korea upheld the highest traditions of the American fighting men, while accomplishing a dual set

2 of noble achievements — the containment of Communism and the sharing of one of their most cherished possessions: freedom. No one who reads this book will ever think of the Korean War as the “Forgotten War.” And no one will ever forget the sacrifices that were borne by Americans and their counterparts from the United Nations. The Americans who served in the Korean War, like those who came before them and those that followed, all have additional bonds: the instinctive nature of their privilege to defend their country and their fiag and their determination to share their valor in the defense of others seeking freedom from tyranny.

Preface ingly never-ending clashes that ranged from direct assaults to ambushes. It is possible to follow an infantry division or regiment on a daily basis (with regard to combat) from the early days of the confiict until the final shots were fired on 27 July 1953. All activity initiated by Eighth Army, X Corps, the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade (later 1st Marine Division) and the ROKs Corps is depicted. Although the primary coverage points to the U.S. forces, the book simultaneously tracks the entire U.N. ground force. Fifty-three nations joined the struggle against the Communist aggression in Korea, but the heaviest burden was carried by the Americans. Fifteen additional nations committed combat troops; of those, Turkey and Great Britain were the only countries to field more than one battalion. South Korean forces included sixteen infantry divisions. In contrast, the Chinese Communists funneled thousands of troops into Korea to swell the ranks of the North Korean forces. Later, toward the end of 1950, several hundred thousand Chinese troops unexpectedly and openly joined the fight. In the meantime, although it was not made public, Soviet pilots were often the opponents of American aviators during the frequent clashes in the skies over Korea. The book does not confine itself to the infantry troops. All units are detailed, including accompanying artillery, armor and other support contingents, including airborne forces. The book also concentrates on the smaller

The purpose of this book is to provide a detailed account of the combat actions of the Korean War for serious students of history and for those with an interest in the U.S. military. The book aims to provide an accurate and factual depiction of the everyday occurrences from the minor engagements to the major battles that were fought by ground, air and naval forces. Prior to the beginning of the chronology is a prologue, “The Prelude to War,” a brief overview of the situation in the Pacific with regard to Korea and Japan at the termination of World War II. This section displays the early intent of the Kremlin to dominate in Asia by first gaining control of Korea. At the same time, it summarizes the ongoing crisis in Europe and the Mideast during the same time period, to give the reader a wide view of the Kremlin’s intentions. In Europe the Soviets boldly made their moves, but in the Pacific, their operations remained clandestine. Showing the buildup to the war, the chronology begins in January 1950. From the invasion of South Korea on 25 June 1950, it covers the activities of the U.S. Army and the United States Marines on a daily basis. It documents the formidable efforts of the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy to hold the line while the American ground forces were preparing to react to the massive invasion across the 38th Parallel by the Communists against the newly created Republic of South Korea. The book provides an easily accessible route to both the major battles and the seem-

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Preface contingents and the actions of individual soldiers, sailors and Marines. One hundred and thirty-one men who served during the war in Korea received the Medal of Honor. Of those, ninety-four made the ultimate sacrifice. The actions of those individuals, with rare exception, are detailed in the book on the date of the action. One of the recipients, Tibor Rubin, whose period of eligibility for the award encompassed 1950–1953 did not receive his award until 23 September 2005, when it was presented by President George W. Bush. The book also closely follows the naval blockade of Korea and the air war against enemy targets in North Korea, as well as the close-air support missions. In conjunction with the comprehensive coverage, an overview of the war summarizes the confiict, highlights the various engagements and follows the see-saw battles that dominated the first six months of the war and the bloody months of combat that followed. Within the summary, the dates of the respective actions are listed, which provides the researcher or reader with a direct route to the identical action in the book, where the incident or action is covered in more detail. Hardships and dangers the ground troops faced can be found in almost every paragraph. The constant warfare raged from the east coast to the west coast and from Pusan to the south by the sea to the Yalu River in the north at the border with Manchuria. There was no easy ground in Korea, nor did the troops get to enjoy many fair skies. U.S. troops spent three Christmases in Korea and usually they were fighting in torrential heat during the monsoon season, when the roads became fiooded and the bridges were washed out. Or, they were heavily engaged along icy slopes and primitive frozen mountain roads in weather that dropped way below zero. The enemy, a formidable foe, faced the same elements, but they more easily adapted to it. Some of the names of major battles that were seared into the minds of those who served are Oman, Kum River, Naktong Bulge, In-

4 chon, Chosin Reservoir, Koto-ri, Hamhung and Bloody Ridge. Others included Heartbreak Ridge, the Punch Bowl, Bunker Hill, Vegas Cities, the Hook and Pork Chop Hill. Each was a colossal confiagration that can never be fully described by a single pen or by a thousand. Nonetheless, whether it was a major battle or a minor skirmish in Korea, it was most probably under grueling circumstances. During 1951, the strategy on winning the war changed dramatically. Eighth Army received orders to cancel all offensives and take a defensive posture. The orders arrived in conjunction with the decision not to fight for complete victory. Nonetheless, permission was still granted to conduct strong patrols. While the confiict changed to a contest for the hills, and later towards the end of the year, descended into stalemate, the confrontations did not become less ruthless. The book continues with comprehensive coverage of the respective units until the culmination of the war. The text does not place any emphasis on the political elements of the war, but it does contain information regarding the strategy in Washington and the differences between General MacArthur and the president as well as the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Nor does the book provide an in-depth study of the strategies mapped out by the High Command, but it does provide an overview of the U.N. strategy as well as that of the Communists. Researching the facts contained herein was challenging because of the enormous depth and breadth of the confiict. However, thanks to the meticulous records of the armed forces, including the official volumes done by the respective services and the individual military historical centers, Leatherneck magazine and Infantry magazine, as well as other distinguished works on the Korean War (listed in the bibliography), the endeavor was not tedious. The author was not faced with the problem of discerning fact from fiction and for that I am sincerely grateful to all of our armed forces. All photographs are from the United

5 States Air Force, United States Army, United States Marine Corps, United States Navy, Department of Defense and the National Archives. It should be noted that the records of the Communist forces — including the Chinese, North Koreans and Soviets — were unavailable. Consequently, the references to their activity and casualties were accumulated from the records of the U.S. armed forces. The most difficult part of the prolonged project was how to capture the full picture of the war and condense

Preface it. With that in mind, the project was undertaken and completed to the best of my ability. I hope that the book will be considered a fair and accurate portrayal of the war. The book was purposely written in the present tense to give an immediate feel for the tribulations endured by the troops on the battlefields of the harsh Korean terrain for a period of three years, two months and two days. When the confiict ended on 27 July 1953, the troops knew they were not going to spend their fourth straight Christmas on a Korean field of battle.

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Prologue: The Prelude to War them, but to no avail. It remained a Japanese possession and it was kept as a police state. During 1943 at the Cairo Conference, the Allies, including the Russians, proclaimed that Korea would become a free nation at the appropriate time. On 16 August 1945, Josef Stalin demanded that the Soviets be permitted to deploy occupational troops in Japanese territory in the northern sector of Hokkaido; however, President Truman immediately refused the request. While the Russians continued to circumvent the U.S. to find a way into Japan, American armed forces began to occupy the country. A vanguard arrived in Japan on 28 August. On 7 September 1945, British, French, Soviet and U.S. forces paraded in Berlin in honor of V-J Day. The grand parade was nearly cancelled due to the obstinacy of the Russians, who demanded to be first in the parade line. Nevertheless, it became the final combined parade. Soon after, the Communists began to openly attempt to instigate trouble, not only in Germany and Europe, but in other countries, including Greece, Iran, Turkey, the Philippines and Korea. On 8 September, the U.S. 24th Corps (6th, 7th and 40th Infantry Divisions), commanded by Major General John R. Hodge, was ordered to Korea. Hodge became the commander of U.S. Army forces in Korea. He discovered upon his arrival that the Russians

Korea, known as the Hermit Kingdom, played no major part in the confiagration known as World War II; however, it was to become the foundation of the Communists’ plan to bring Asia under the total domination of Moscow. While the Allies confronted the postwar situation in Europe, Stalin — in addition to complicating matters at every turn in Europe — devoted much time to launching longterm plans to test the mettle of the free world in Korea. During mid–July 1945, President Harry Truman arrived in Berlin to attend the Potsdam Conference. At the time, Russia had not yet declared war against Japan and the conference did not focus on Asia. On 12 August 1945, shortly after the U.S. dropped two atomic bombs on Japan, the Soviets declared war on Japan. Russian troops were immediately dispatched from Manchuria into Korea, initiating the first signal of Russian intentions. The Russians portended that the presence of their troops was to facilitate the surrender of Japanese troops, but there had been no official agreement between Russia and the U.S. to bisect Korea. Korea, until the 20th century, had been an independent nation, nestled between China, Russia and Japan. During 1910, the Japanese annexed it for future colonization and as a catapult for entry into Asia. After the conclusion of World War I, the Korean people had thought the great nations would find compassion for

7

Prologue had halted at the 38th Parallel as agreed, alleviating the tension for the occupation force. The U.S. troops began to accept the surrender of Japanese troops below the 38th Parallel. On 9 September 1945, the Japanese at Seoul officially relinquished their control over Korea to the U.S. 7th Division. By mid–November 1945, it was determined that the anticipated 25,000-man Korean police force should be bolstered by a Korean national defense force. The Korean Air Force was to amount to one transport squadron and two fighter squadrons. In addition, the combined strength of the Korean Navy and Coast Guard would stand at 4,500 troops. The findings were sent to Washington. Later during a meeting in Moscow (between the U.S. and the Soviets), it was agreed to form a provisional government for all of Korea. In the meantime, the U.S. continued to shrink its armed forces in the Pacific and in Europe, while the Soviets continued to build their strength. The Soviets maintained a relatively low profile with regard to Korea, but not Europe, nor the Mideast. Russia tested the U.S. in Berlin during March of 1946 by moving into the U.S. zone and removing railroad tracks. Meanwhile, the Soviets still resisted removing their troops from Iran. It was during that same period that Winston Churchill, speaking at a college conference in the U.S., described the situation in Eastern Europe and coined the phrase “Iron Curtain.” By May of 1946, the joint United States– USSR Commission, which had been authorized during the Moscow Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the U.S. and the Soviet Union for the purpose of bringing about a unified Korea, made no progress. During 1947, the commission returned to the table, but still no progress was made. Consequently, the U.S. took the question of Korean independence and unification to the United Nations, rather than waste more time with the Russians. The U.N. discussed the issue in September 1947. In March 1947, the conference of Foreign

8 Ministers convened in Moscow. During the same month, President Truman, concerned with the spread of Communism, proclaimed what became known as the Truman Doctrine. The Truman Doctrine made it emphatically clear that the U.S. would oppose Communism and its expansion plans, wherever it became necessary. Truman later stated that his speech was “America’s answer to the surge of Communist tyranny.” By spring of 1947, the situation in Korea remained fiuid, the tensions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union had not lessened, and still there was no progress on unification. Meanwhile, the Soviets raised the stakes in Europe by seizing control of Hungary. By summer, the Soviets attempted to gain power in Greece. The city of Berlin became a powder keg. In September 1947 the Korean people received a disturbing bit of news when it became known that the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent a letter concerning Korea to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, informing him that there was little U.S. strategic interest there. The letter also offered the opinion that there was no need to continue maintaining the “present troops and bases in Korea.” The United Nations in October 1947 adopted in principle a resolution drafted by the U.S. that called for the establishment of a temporary commission to oversee elections in Korea. However, the Soviet Union refused to cooperate. The Russians barred U.N. representatives from entering its controlled portion of Korea. Nonetheless, during February 1948, it was decided that the elections would be held in May. General Douglas MacArthur informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that in his opinion, a South Korean army was not feasible. He said the U.S. forces in Korea were unable to provide sufficient protection. He suggested that the Constabulary be increased to 50,000 men. Meanwhile, the North Koreans made an aggressive move. On 8 February 1948, the communists announced that the North Korean provisional

9 government had established the Korean People’s Army. The Russians initiated their withdrawal from Korea during February 1948; however, many advisors remained behind. In addition, the Russians left tanks and aircraft behind. By spring of 1948, the condition of the U.S. armed forces was quite poor. The Soviets, aware of the deterioration of the American military, had been steadily raising the stakes in Europe, while continuing their meddling in Asia. During April 1948, Truman again reiterated his displeasure with the Russians and with the French. The French had been unable to sustain their zone in Berlin by themselves and concluded that they would join with the Americans and British. Truman was aware of Soviet intentions in Korea and Japan, but the priority had become Europe. Subsequent to the problems in Berlin, Truman stated: “For the first year after the war, the British and Americans made every effort to make a joint control succeed. The Russians, however, with a good assist from the French, defeated these efforts.” On 10 May 1948, free elections were held in Korea, but the citizens of North Korea were forbidden from participating. About 95 percent of the eligible populace in South Korea voted and elected a National Assembly. Soon after, on the 31st, the newly elected representatives gathered in Seoul and elected Syngman Rhee, a staunch anticommunist, as president for a fouryear term. The election process worked well, despite the Communists’ attempts to disrupt the historical event. By that time, the South Koreans were nearly on their own. By mid–1949, the only U.S. troops in the country were advisors and their numbers barely reached 500 men. To make the situation more tenuous, by the end of the summer the U.S. eliminated Korea as a defense responsibility for General MacArthur. The troops in Korea at that time were placed under the jurisdiction of John J. Muccio, the U.S. ambassador to Korea, as part of the U.S. plan for a total pull-out, leaving a supposedly solid country to govern itself.

Prologue During the summer of 1948 there were no outward signs of violence by the Communists in Asia, but Europe continued to reach the brink of disaster. The Russians, prevented from landing troops in Japan and unable to totally halt the spread of democracy in Korea, tightened the noose in Berlin by initiating a blockade during June 1948. The U.S. and Britain stood determined to thwart the Russians by starting an airlift. The French, although part of the Allied force in Berlin, had no transport planes and played no part in the operation. By 25 June, C47s began to arrive in Berlin with food and supplies. The planes continued the operation nonstop, 24 hours a day to maintain the city and prevent the people from starving until the Russians finally relented and lifted the blockade. On 15 August 1948, Syngman Rhee was inaugurated president of South Korea. His inauguration brought about the end of U.S. occupation in Korea. The U.S. began to transfer its authority to the new government. The South Koreans began to call the Constabulary the National Defense Army, but the term was not acknowledged by the United States. During the transitional period, the U.S. agreed to maintain the training of the Constabulary forces and the Korean Coast Guard. The American advisors were to be reassigned to the Overstrength Detachment, Headquarters, USAFIK, to be reorganized as a Provisional Military Advisory Group (PMAG). On 26 August, John J. Muccio, recently appointed special assistant to Korea by President Truman, established a U.S. diplomatic mission in the capital. Muccio also retained the rank of ambassador, with authorization by the president to negotiate the impending withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea. The phase-out began on 15 September. By October 1948, more trouble began to brew. Members of the Constabulary ignited an insurrection. On 19 October, the S.K. 14th Regiment, under orders to quash the turmoil, received U.S. rifies; however, the unit contained some Communist NCOs. The unit had been

Prologue ordered to the island of Chej-do to assist forces already there. The unit was ordered to move out before the rifies were distributed to prevent the Communists from getting them. The Communist NCOs instigated mutiny. The rebels seized Yosu and imprisoned some loyalists. The progress of the insurrection was halted by the 21st and by the 25th it was eliminated. The newly created Republic of South Korea was officially recognized by the U.S. on 1 January 1949. Shortly thereafter, on 15 January, the U.S. 24th Corps left Korea for Japan, where it would disband. The remaining units were to depart during March. During that same month, the Soviets agreed to supply and arm six North Korean infantry divisions and three mechanized contingents. In addition, the Soviets committed to equip eight battalions of Constabulary troops who were to operate near the 38th Parallel and they committed to deliver 100 Soviet fighter planes, thirty light and medium bombers and twenty reconnaissance planes. As the Russians equipped and trained the North Koreans, the activity was relatively quiet. Although the U.S. was in the process of withdrawing its troops from Korea and had signed an agreement with the South Koreans, the U.N. Security Council decided during March 1949, that the U.S.— rather than the U.N.— should pay the expenses of arming the present force of 65,000 men. At the time, sufficient equipment to arm 50,000 troops had been, or was about to be, transferred from the Americans to the South Koreans. The U.N. also decided that the U.S. should supply some ships and equipment, valued at about one million dollars, to the Korean Coast Guard. And the U.N., not the U.S. Congress, also decided that legislative action should be forthcoming to get permanent financial aid for Korea from a U.S. assistance program for free nations. That legislation emerged and was signed into law by President Truman in October 1949. Despite the obvious Soviet build-up in Europe and the intelligence that indicated So-

10 viet intent to dominate Asia, too, the U.S. continued to thin its fighting forces. Towards the latter part of March, President Truman appointed Louis A. Johnson, a lawyer, as secretary of defense. Johnson was conspicuously no friend of the U.S. armed forces and he was an obvious adversary to the Marine Corps and Navy. Johnson intended to help eliminate both branches of the service. Johnson believed that amphibious invasions were extinct following the close of World War II and he was convinced the Air Force could replace the U.S. Navy. Back in the States, the armed forces were not faring too well with the politicians. On 23 April 1949, the U.S. Navy received a startling surprise as Secretary of Defense Johnson aborted a $188 million project that cost the Navy its anticipated super-carrier, the USS United States. Johnson’s action severely hindered the Navy’s postwar aviation plans and he nearly killed off Marine aviation with the same blow. Although there were many concerns about Soviet expansion, there were no thoughts of how the U.S. Navy and the Marine Corps would be the last chance to keep the U.S. from being driven from Korea the following year. Only intervention by Congressman Carl Vinson saved Marine Corps aviation. Inter-service rivalry by that time had reached a dangerous level. Meanwhile, the Kremlin continued to maintain the blockade of West Berlin, but the city continued to receive food and supplies by air delivery without interruption. The Russians also ignited activity in North Korea to incite trouble in Asia. On 3 May 1949, North Korean Communist troops launched a raid in the vicinity of Kaesong in the Republic of South Korea. This clash was followed by hundreds of similar skirmishes during the next six months. Many of the exchanges were minor, but both sides sustained high casualties. The Communists also initiated guerrilla activity in South Korea. While the tension continued to build in Korea, the Soviets began to lessen tension in Berlin. On 4 May, the Russians agreed to lift the blockade, ending the futile attempt to starve the West

11 Berliners. The blockade officially terminated on 12 May 1949. By June 1949, more evidence emerged regarding the Kremlin’s activities in Korea and the entry of the Communist Chinese. A clandestine operation run by General MacArthur’s headquarters in Japan discovered information about Chinese fiying into Pyongyang under the pretense of being war refugees. Other intelligence verified that the North Koreans and the Chinese Communists were controlled by the Kremlin. About 2,000 reports fiowed into headquarters in Tokyo and from there they were forwarded to the States. The intelligence also validated the inability of Syngman Rhee to meet a Communist attack, primarily because of the lack of planes and tanks. The South Koreans’ armor consisted of some half-tracks and scout cars and their air force encompassed only a few planes. On 1 July 1949, the Provisional Advisory Group, earlier organized to assist the South Korean Armed Forces, became the official connection between the U.S. and Korea following the departure of USAFIK. It became the U.S. military advisory group to the Republic of Korea, known as KMAG. The members of KMAG, coming under the American Diplomatic Mission, received diplomatic immunity. The newly formed South Korean units had to contend with the numerous actions initiated by the North Korean regular forces and with the evergrowing guerrilla units. The KMAG advisors also supported the S.K. Coast Guard, which had about ninety vessels, of which only forty were seaworthy. Consequently, the S.K. Coast guard was outclassed by the smugglers and pirates who maintained their exploits with little interruption. The North Korean Communists opened a strong attack against the South Korean Ongjin Peninsula during August 1949. The incursion began strongly and brought severe fighting, but the South Koreans were able to prevail. The Communists were driven back beyond the 38th Parallel. Later, on 1 September, intelligence reports forwarded from Far East

Prologue Command to Washington indicated that since the previous June, one Chinese division had trickled into North Korea from Antung, Manchuria. In conjunction, the Chinese on 21 September announced the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, with the capital in Beijing (a name restored from the Chinese Nationalists’ Peiping), under the wing of the Soviets. The Communist republic was first led by Mao Tse-tung. During February of 1950, the Chinese and Soviets fastened the bond further by signing a friendship pact in Moscow. Soon after, on the 23rd, President Truman announced to the nation that the Soviet Union had detonated an atomic bomb. Back in Washington, D.C., the House Armed Services Committee held hearings on 19 October that focused on the possibility of the extinction of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps. One witness, General Omar Bradley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, read his statement, which unraveled like a tirade rather than an objective viewpoint. Bradley concluded his statement with a prophecy: “I also predict that large scale amphibious operations will never occur again.” On 27 October, Admiral Louis E. Denfeld (chief of naval operations), who had appeared as a witness during the House hearings to defend the role of the Navy, was fired by Defense Secretary Johnson. On 8 December, General Headquarters Intelligence in Japan received a report from its agents in Korea. The information included the number of North Korean divisions, which stood between four and eight, bolstered by separate brigades. Their aircraft were documented as Soviet-made and included 60 to 70 planes. They also had about 35 to 40 Soviet T-34 tanks. Headquarters was also informed that the winter would prevent any hostilities, but that during April and May of 1950, Communist action was very possible. The situation in Asia at the beginning of 1950 remained poor. The occupation troops still based in Japan had fallen far from their effectiveness during World War II. On 5 January

Prologue 1950, President Truman proclaimed that the United States would not initiate, either directly or indirectly, any military action to intercede on behalf of the Nationalist Chinese under Chiang Kai-shek on Formosa. Within a week, the situation in the Far East became more confusing. Korea was placed on the chopping block when the secretary of state proclaimed that the U.S. would act to defend Japan, the Philippines and Okinawa. Korea was eliminated from the protection of U.S. forces, which in turn signaled to the Russians that Korea was an easy target for Communist expansion. On the 20th, more alarming information reached Far East Command from the operatives in Korea. The intelligence suggested a Communist invasion of South Korea would be launched during either March or April of 1950. The report, which was forwarded to Washington, detailed the movement of the North Korean forces and of the continual arrivals of new Chinese units. Nonetheless, the signs of imminent danger failed to push the U.S. towards defending South Korea. By 1 March 1950, the House of Representatives’ Armed Services Committee issued a report that publicized its 1949 investigations. It recommended that important air warfare roles should be given to the Navy and Marine Corps and it urged increased combined training. The demise of the Navy and Marine Corps was shelved. During April, in response to a request from General MacArthur for instructors (U.S. Navy and Marine Corps) to train the U.S. Army troops in amphibious warfare, the Marine Corps was eager to accommodate MacArthur, particularly because of the recent stinging remarks by General Bradley. In the meantime, the clouds of war were stirring in Korea. By mid–April, the Communists ordered all North Koreans living within three miles of the 38th Parallel to abandon their homes. Soon after, North Korean troops and guerrillas occupied the empty living quarters. The activity was picked up by MacArthur’s op-

12 erators in Korea, turned in to headquarters and from there forwarded to Washington. By May of 1950, it became even clearer that the reaches of Communism had been causing havoc around the globe. Secretary of State Dean Acheson, while in Paris, announced that the U.S. was going to provide military aid to Cambodia, France, Laos and Vietnam to bolster the respective struggles against the rebels in French Indochina, who had been described as Communists. There was no mention of aid for South Korea, which left the message that Korea was on its own. The Communists essentially signaled their intentions on 8 June, when the newspapers in Pyongyang, North Korea, published a manifesto claiming that a parliament would be elected during August and that a meeting was scheduled to convene in Seoul on the 15th of August. On 15 June, the KMAG announced the grim circumstances and stated that because of a lack of equipment the South Korean armed forces could withstand an enemy invasion no longer than fifteen days. By the 23rd, following an upsurge in incursions, one KMAG advisor, Lt. Colonel Thomas McPhail, became convinced that an attack was imminent. He based his conclusions on intelligence gathered while engaging guerrillas. McPhail’s intelligence had discovered fresh infantry units, camoufiaged tanks and antiaircraft batteries, all deployed within striking distance of the South Korean positions below the 38th Parallel. Lt. Colonel McPhail convinced General Kim, the S.K. 6th Division commander, to cancel all weekend leaves and to ensure that all defensive fortifications were fully manned at their positions that guarded the approaches to Chunchon. McPhail forwarded the intelligence to headquarters, but still, the information did not sound any alarms. Things remained quiet along the 38th Parallel on 24 June. The tranquility provided the enemy with additional opportunities to finalize preparations for the invasion scheduled to commence on the following day. The South Koreans had four divisions and one regiment

13 positioned to react to hostilities if they developed, but of those, only four regiments and one battalion were deployed near the front below the 38th Parallel. The bulk of the forces were

Prologue based to the rear. To add to the crisis, many of the troops and KMAG advisors were on weekend liberty on the morning of the 25th when the colossal offensive began.

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Acronyms and Abbreviations This list is not all-inclusive, but it includes the military terms most commonly used during the Korean War period, as well as other standard abbreviations and acronyms.

ADCOM— Air (later, Aerospace) Defense Command (see also, ADC) ADM— Admiral Admin— Administration AdmO— Administration Order Adv Tn— Advanced Trainer ADVON— Advanced Echelon AE— Ammunition Ship AE— Aviation Electrician’s Mate (USN) AEF— American Expeditionary Force AEMS— Armament and Electronics Maintenance Squadron AerialDel Plat— Aerial Delivery Platoon AETC— Air Education and Training Command AEW— Airborne Early Warning AF— Aviation Photographer’s Mate (USN) AF— Air Force AF— Store Ship AFA— Armored Field Artillery AFB— Air Force Base AFFE— Army Forces Far East AFCON— Air Force–controlled AFHRA— Air Force Historical Research Agency AFLC— Air Force Logistics Command Afid— Airfield AFMC— Air Force Materiel Command AFOUA—Air Force Outstanding Unit Award AFRC— Air Force Reserve Command AFRES— Air Force Reserve AFRTC— Air Force Reserve Training Center AFS— Air Force Station AFSC— Air Force Systems Command AFSOC—Air Force Special Operations Command

AA— Airman Apprentice (USN) AAA— Antiaircraft artillery AAB— Army Air Base AAC— Alaskan Air Command AAF— Army Air Forces AAFld— Army Air Field AB— Air Base AB–Aviation Boatswain’s Mate (USN) ABCCC— Airborne Battlefield Command Control and Communication ABG— Air Base Group Abn— Airborne AbnRCT— Airborne Regimental Combat Team ABW— Air Base Wing AC— Air Controlman AC— Symbol following some photo negative numbers, denoting a black and white negative AC&CS— Airborne Command and Control Squadron ACC— Air Combat Command ACE— Accelerated Co-Pilot Enrichment Program AcofS— Assistant Chief of Staff ACW— Air Control Wing AD— Aviation Machinist Mate (USN) AD— Douglas “Skyraider”: single-engine attack plane (USA) AD— Destroyer Tender ADC— Air Defense Command (see also ADCOM) ADC— Assistant Division Commander ADCOM— Advance Command and Liaison Group

15

Acronyms and Abbreviations AFSPC— Air Force Space Command AG— Aerographer’s Mate (USN) AGC— Amphibious Command Ship (Amphibious Force Flagship) AGO— Office of the Adjutant General AH— Hospital Ship AIA— Air Intelligence Agency Air DelPlat— Air Delivery Platoon AirO— Air Officer AirSptSec— Air Support Section AK— Aviation Storekeeper (USN) AK— Cargo Ship AKA— Assault (Attack) Cargo Ship AKL— Light Cargo Ship AKS— Stores Issue Ship AL— Aviation Electronic (USN) ALCE— Airlift Control Element ALCM— Air Launched Cruise Missile ALCS— Airborne Launch Control System AM— Aviation Structural Mechanic (USN) AM— Minesweeper AMC— Air Mobility Command AMIK— American Mission in Korea AMS— Auxiliary Motor Minesweeper or Minesweeper, Small AMPH Trac Bn— Amphibious Tractor Battalion AMPH TrkBn— Truck Battalion AMW— Air Mobility Wing AN— Airman (USN) ANG— Air National Guard ANGB— Air National Guard Base ANGLICO— Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company AO— Aviation Ordnance Man (USN) AO— Oiler AOG— Gasoline Tanker AP— Transport APA— Attack Transport APD— High Speed Transport Aprt— Airport ARADCOM— Army Air Defense Command ARB— Air Reserve Base ARFC— Air Reserve Flying Center ARG— Repair Ship-Internal Combustion Engine ARH— Repair Ship-Heavy Hull Damage ARL— Repair Ship–Landing Craft ARMDAmphBn— Armored Amphibious Battalion ARS— Salvage Vessel ART— Air Reserve Technician ARW— Air Refueling Wing

16 AS— Air Station ASCOM— Army Service Command ASP— Ammunition Supply Point Asst— Assistant AT— Antitank AT— Aviation Electronics Technician (AT) ATAR— Anti-tank Aircraft Rockets ATC— Air Training Command [1946–1993] (later, AETC); Air Transport Command [1942–1948] ATF— Ocean Tug–Fleet ATIS— Allied Translator and Interpreter Section ATTF— Alaska Tanker Task Force AU— Attack Model of Vought F4U “Corsair” Aux— Auxiliary AV— Seaplane Tender AVP— Seaplane Tender, Small AW— Automatic Weapons AW— Airlift Wing AWADS— Adverse Weather Aerial Delivery System B-26— Douglas “Invader”: twin-engine light bomber (USA) B-29— Boeing “Superfortress”: four-engine bomber (USA) BAR— Browning Automatic Rifie BB— Battleship Bchmstr Unit— Beachmaster Unit BCT— Battalion Combat Team BIRD DOG— Search and Rescue BLT— Battalion Landing Team BM— Boatswain’s Mate (USN) BMEWS— Ballistic Missile Early Warning System Bn— Battalion BomCom— Bomber Command Brig— Brigade Brig— Brigadier Brig Gen— Brigadier General BRIGGEN— Brigadier General BT— Boilerman (USN) Btry— Battery BuMed— Bureau of Medicine BW— Bombardment/Bomb Wing C-47/R4D— Douglas “Skytrain”: twin-engine transport plane CA— Heavy Cruiser CAP— Combat Air Patrol CAS— Close-Air Support Capt— Captain CBI— China-Burma-India Theater

17 CCF— Chinese Communist Forces (Korean War) CCTS— Combat Crew Training Squadron CCTW— Combat Crew Training Wing CDR— Commander CENTAF— Central Air Force CG— Commanding General CIC— Counter-Intelligence Corps (USA) CINCFE— Commander-in-Chief, Far East CINCLANT— Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic CINCPAC— Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Command CINCPACAF— Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Air Forces CINCPACFLT— Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet CINCSAC— Commander-in-Chief, Strategic Air Command CINCUNC— Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command CINCUSAFE— Commander-in-Chief, United States Air Forces in Europe CL— Light Cruiser CLAA— Light Antiaircraft Cruiser CMC— Commandant of the Marine Corps CNO— Chief of Naval Operations CO— Commanding Officer CO— Company COB— Collocated Operating Base Col— Colonel COMAirSupGrp— Commander Air Support Group ComCarCom— Combat Cargo Command COMCARDIV— Commander, Carrier Division Comd— Command COMFAIRJAP— Commander, Fleet Air Wing Japan ComFltAir Wing— Commander Fleet Air Wing COMNAGFE— Commander Naval Air Group Far East COMNAVFE— Commander, Naval Forces Far East COMNAVMARIANAS— Commander, Naval Forces Marianas COMO— Commodore ComPacFlt— Commander Pacific Fleet COMPHIBGRUONE— Commander Amphibious Group One COMPHIBPAC— Commander, Amphibious Forces Pacific COMSEVENTHFLT— Commander, Seventh Fleet

Acronyms and Abbreviations COMUNBLOCKANDCORTFOR— Commander, United Nations Blockading and Escort Force CONAD— Continental Air Defense Command CONLUS— Continental United States CONUS— Continental United States COS— Combined Operations Section CP— Command Post CPV— Chinese People’s Volunteers CPX— Command Post Exchange CR— Command Report C/S— Chief of Staff CS— Commissaryman (USN) CSG— Combat Service Group CSG— Combat Support Group CSUSA— Chief of Staff, U.S. Army CT— Communication Technician (USN) CTC— Civil Transport Corps CTE— Commander Task Element CTF— Commander Task Force CTG— Commander Task Group CTS— Combat Training Squadron CV— Aircraft Carrier CVA— Attack Aircraft Carrier CVE— Aircraft Carrier Escort CVG— Carrier Air Group CVL— Aircraft Carrier Light CZ— Canal Zone (in Panama) DAF— Department of the Air Force DC— Damage Controlman (USN) DD— Destroyer DDE— Destroyer Escort DDER— Radar Picket Destroyer Escort DDR— Radar Picket Destroyer DESDIV— Destroyer Division Det— Detachment DEW— Distant Early Warning DF— Disposition Form DFSC— Symbol denoting color photographic number DIS— Daily Intelligence Summary Div— Division DMS–Destroyer Minesweeper DMZ— Demilitarized Zone DOD— Department of Defense DOW— Died of Wounds DPRK— Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) DRU— Direct Reporting Unit DT— Dental Technician (USN) DUC— Distinguished Unit Citation

Acronyms and Abbreviations DUKW— Amphibious Truck dy— Duty EAME— European-African-Middle Eastern ECIDE (U)— East Coast Island Defense Element (Unit) ECM— Electronic Countermeasures EM— Electrician’s Mate (USN) EMB Off— Embarkation Officer EngrBn— Engineer Battalion EngrPortConst Co— Engineer Port Construction Company (USA) EngrSpecBrig— Engineer Special Brigade (USA) ENS— Ensign Electronic Technician (USN) ETO— European Theater of Operations ETTF— European Tanker Task Force EUSAK— Eighth U.S. Army in Korea ERC— Enlisted Reserve Corps F2H— McDonnell “Banshee”: single-engine jet fighter (US) F2H-2P— Douglas “Skyknight”: twin-engine jet fighter (US) F3D— Douglas “Skyknight”: single-engine jet fighter (US) F3D-2— Douglas “Skyknight”: two-engine jet fighter (US) F4U— Chance Vought “Corsair”: single-engine fighter (US) F4U-5N— Chance Vought “Corsair” single engine night fighter F-51— North American “Mustang”: singleengine fighter (US) F7F-3N— Grumman “Tigercat” twin-engine night fighter F9F— Grumman “Panther”: single-engine jet fighter (US) F-80— Lockheed “Shooting Star”: single-engine jet fighter (US) F-86— North American “Sabre”: single-engine jet fighter (US) FA— Field artillery FA— Fireman (USN) FABn— Field Artillery Battalion FAC— Forward Air Control (controller) FBG— Fighter Bomber Group FAF— Fifth Air Force (later named PACAF) FAFIK— Fifth Air Force in Korea FASRon— Fleet Air Service Squadron FBHL— Force Beachhead Line FC— Fire Controlman FEAF— Far Eastern Air Forces FEAM Com— Far East Materiel Command

18 FEC— Far East Command FECOM— Far East Command FES— Far Eastern Squadron FICON— Fighter-Interceptor Carrier, Reconnaissance FL— Flight Leader Fld— Field FMF— Fleet Marine Force FMFLant— Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic FMFPac— Fleet Marine Force, Pacific FMS— Field Maintenance Squadron FN— Fireman (USN) FO— Forward Observer (artillery) FOA— Field Operating Agency FS— Fighter Squadron FSA— Fire Support Arms FSA— Fire Support Area FSCC— Fire Support Coordination Center Ft— Fort FT— Fire Control Technician FTW— Flying Training Wing Fum & BathPlat— Fumigation and Bath Platoon FW— Fighter Wing G-1— Personnel section of divisional or higher staff G-2— Intelligence section of divisional or higher staff G-3— Operations and training section of divisional or higher staff G-4— Logistics section of divisional or higher staff GCI— Ground Control Intercept Gen— General GHQ— General Headquarters GHQAF— General Headquarters Air Force GHQFEC— General Headquarters, Far East Command GLCM— Ground Launched Cruise Missile GM— Gunner’s Mate (USN) GO— General Order HA— Hospitalman Apprentice H&d— Harassing and Interdiction HE— High Explosive Hedron— Headquarters Squadrn HF— High Frequency Radio HM— Hospital Corpsman (USN) HMS— Her Majesty’s Ship HMAS— Her Majesty’s Australian Ship HMCS— Her Majesty’s Canadian Ship HMNZS— Her Majesty’s New Zealand Ship

19 HMR— Marine Helicopter Transport Squadron HN— Hospitalman (USN) HO3S-1— Sikorsky Helicopter HQ— Headquarters HqBn— Headquarters Battalion HqCo— Headquarters Company HQMC— Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps HqSq— Headquarters Squadron HRS-1— Sikorsky Single Engine Helicopter H & S Co— Headquarters and Service Company HTL-4— Bell Two-Place Helicopter I&R— Intelligence and Reconnaissance IBC— Iceland Base Command ICBM— Intercontinental Ballistic Missile ICM— Intercontinental Missile (i.e. the Snark) Inf Div— Infantry Division Intl— International IRBM— Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile IW— Intelligence Wing JANIS— Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Service (Studies) JCS— Joint Chiefs of Staff JIC— Joint Intelligence Committee JLC— Japan Logistical Command JML— Small Minesweeper, ex–Japanese JMS— Japanese Minesweeper Jnl— Journal JOC— Joint Operations Center JOG— Joint Operations Center JSPOG— Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group JSSC— Joint Strategic Survey Committee JTF— Joint Task Force KATUSA— Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army KCOMC— Korean Communication Zone (Also KComZ) KIA— Killed in Action K/KE— Symbols denoting photo color negative number KMAG— U.S. Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea KMC— Korean Marine Corps KMCRCT— Korean Marine Corps Regimental Combat Regiment KPR— Kimpo Provisional Regiment KTACS—Korean Tactical Air Control System KVA— Korean Volunteer Army LANTIRN— Low Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared System for Night LCDR— Lieutenant Commander

Acronyms and Abbreviations LCM— Landing Craft, Mechanized LCOL (also Lt. Col)–Lieutenant Colonel LCVP— Landing Craft, Vehicle and Personnel LG— Landing Ground LGB— Laser Guided Bomb Ln— Liaison LSD— Land Ship, Dock LSI(L)— Landing Ship, Infantry (Large) LSM— Landing Ship Medium LSMR— Landing Ship, Medium Rocket LST— Landing Ship, Tank LSTH— Landing Ship, Tank Casualty Evacuation LSU— Landing Ship, Utility 1LT— First Lieutenant 2LT— Second Lieutenant Lt— Lieutenant Lt Col (also LCOL)— Lieutenant Colonel LTGen— Lieutenant General LTJG— Lieutenant ( Junior Grade) LVT— Landing Vehicle, Tracked LVT(A)— Landing Vehicle, Tracked (Armored) M4A3E8— Flame Tank, Medium M45— Medium Tank MAC— Military Airlift Command (earlier called MATS) MAC— Military Armistice Commission MAG— Marine Aircraft Group Maj— Major Maj Gen— Major General MAJCOM— Major Command MAJCON— Major Command Controlled Mar— Marine (s) MASH— Mobile Army Surgical Hospital MASRT— Marine Air Support Radar Team MATS— Military Air Transport Service (later called MAC) MAW— Marine Air Wing MAW— Military Airlift Wing MBP— Main Battle Position MDL— Military Demarcation Line MDW— Medical Wing ME— Metalsmith (USN) MedAmb— CoMedical Ambulance Company, USA MedBn— Medical Battalion Memo— Memorandum MGCIS— Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron MIA— Missing in Action MiG— Soviet Fighter Aircraft

Acronyms and Abbreviations MILSTAR— Military Strategic and Tactical Relay MISD— Military Intelligence Service Detachment (USA) MLR— Main Line of Resistance MM— Machinist’s Mate (USN) MMS— Munitions Maintenance Squadron MN— Mineman (USN) MOH— Medal of Honor MOS— Military Occupational Speciality Mosquito— North American AT-6 “Texan” Trainer, Single Engine Plane used as Airborne FAC and Target Spotting MP— Military Police MPCo— Military Police Company MPQ— Ground Radar Controlled Bombing MS— Manuscript Msg— Message MSR— Main supply route MSTS— Military Sea Transport Service MT— Motor Transport MTACS— Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron MTBn— Motor Transport Battalion MTO— Mediterranean Theater of Operations MUC— Meritorious Unit Commendation Muni— Municipal MW— Missile Wing NAF— Numbered Air Force NAS— Naval Air Station NASA— National Aeronautics and Space Administration NATO— North Atlantic Treaty Organization NavBchGru— Naval Beach Group NAVFE— Naval Forces, Far East NAVSTAR— Navigational Satellite Timing and Ranging NCAS— Night Close-Air Support NCO— Noncommissioned officer NEACP— National Emergency Airborne Command Post NGF— Naval Gun Fire NK— North Korea (n) NKA— North Korean Army NKPA— North Korean People’s Army NORAD— North American Air Defense Command NOTS— Naval Ordnance Test Station NPRJ— National Police Reserve of Japan NSC— National Security Council NUC— Navy Unit Commendation OCAC— Office of the Chief of the Air Corps

20 OCAFF— Office, Chief of Army Field Forces OCMH— Office, Chief of Military History OE-1— Cessna Single-Engine Light Observation Plane Off— Officer OG— Operations Group OL— Operating Location OMS— Organizational Maintenance Squadron ONI— Office of Naval Intelligence OOB— Order of Battle OP— Observation Post OPLR— Outpost Line of Resistance Opn— Operation Opno— Operation Order OpnPlan— Operation Plan ORC— Organized Reserve Corps ORDAmmCo— Ordnance Ammunition Company (USA) OrdBn— Ordnance Battalion OSA— Office of the Secretary of the Army OSI— Office of Strategic Intelligence OY— Consolidated Vultee Light Observation Plane PACAF— Pacific Air Forces (earlier called FEAF) PACCS— Post-attack Command and Control System PB4Y— Consolidated “Privateer”: four-engine patrol plane (USA) PBM— Martin “Mariner”: twin-engine fiying boat (USA) PC— Submarine Chaser PCE— Escort Amphibious Control Vessel PF— Frigate PH— Photographer’s Mate (USN) PhibGru— Amphibious Group PhibTraPacTraining— Command Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet PHILCOM— Philippines Command PLA— People’s Liberation Army Plat— Platoon PMAG— Provisional Military Advisory Group PO-2— Polikarpov: light night bomber biplane (Soviet) POW— Prisoner of War PR— Parachute Rigger (USN) Prov— Provisional PUC— Presidential Unit Citation QM— Quartermaster R4D— Douglass Transport (Navy and Marine designation of C-47) R5D— Douglas Four-Engine Transport (Navy and Marine designation of C-54)

21 RAAF— Royal Australian Air Force Rad— Radio RADM— Rear Admiral RAF— Royal Air Force (of Great Britain) R & D— Research and Development RB-26— Douglas “Invader”: twin-engine reconnaissance plane (USA) RCM— Electronic-countermeasure reconnaissance RcnCo— Reconnaissance Company RCT— Regimental Combat Team RD— Radarman (USN) Recon— Reconnaissance Reinf— Reinforced RESCAP— Rescue Combat Air Patrol RktBn— Rocket Battalion RM— Radioman RM— Royal Marines ROK— Republic of Korea (South Korea) ROKA— Republic of Korea Army ROKN— Republic of Korea Navy ROPE— Code name for aircraft decoy system Rpt— Report RQW— Rescue Wing RS— Reconnaissance Squadron RTAFB— Royal Thai(land) Air Force Base RTNAfid— Royal Thai(land) Navy Airfield RTU— Replacement Training Unit RW— Reconnaissance Wing RYCOM— Ryukyus Command SA— Seaman Apprentice SAC— Strategic Air Command SAC— Supporting Arms Center SAGE— Semi-automatic Ground Environment SANACC— State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee SAR— Special Action Report SCAB— Ship Control of Aircraft Bombing SCAJAP— Supreme Commander Allied Powers, Japan SCAP— Supreme Commander, Allied Powers SD— Steward (USN) SEA— Southeast Asia Sec— Section SecDef— Secretary of Defense SecNav— Secretary of the Navy ServBn— Service Battalion SFCP— Spotting Fire Command Post Sgd— Signed SGS— Secretary of the General Staff Sh— Ship’s Serviceman

Acronyms and Abbreviations SigBn— Signal Battalion SigRepCo— Signal Repair Company SK— Storekeeper (USN) SMS— Strategic Missile Squadron SMW— Strategic Missile Wing SMSMarine— Supply Squadron SN— Seaman SO— Sonarman (USN) SOA— Separate Operating Agency SOP— Standard Operating Procedure SOS— Special Operations Squadron SOW— Special Operations Wing SP— Shore Party SPBn— Shore Party Battalion SpOpnsCo— Special Operations Company (USA) SPTW— Support Wing SPW— Space Wing (prior to 1994 [see also SW]) SRAM— Short Range Attack Missile SRS— Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron SRW— Strategic Reconnaissance Wing Sta— Station SW— Strategic Wing prior to 1994; afterwards Space Wing SWA— Southwest Asia T/D— Table of Distribution T/O— Table of Organization TAC— Tactical Air Command TAC— Tactical Air Coordinator TacAir— Tactical Air TACC— Tactical Air Control Center TACP— Tactical Air Control Party TACRON— Tactical Air Control Squadron TAD— Tactical Air Direction TADC— Tactical Air Direction Center TAO— Tactical Air Observer T-AP— Transport Operated by MSTS TAR— Tactical Air Request TARCAP— Tactical Air Reconaissance Combat Air Patrol TAS— Tactical Airlift Squadron TASS— Tactical Air Support Squadron TAW— Tactical Airlift Wing TBM— General Motors “Avenger” Torpedo Bomber TCG— Troop Carrier Group TCVE— Military Sea Transportation Service Aircraft Ferry TCW— Troop Carrier Wing TE— Task Element TEWS— Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron

Acronyms and Abbreviations TF— Task Force TFS— Tactical Fighter Squadron TFTG— Tactical Fighter Training Group TFTS— Tactical Fighter Training Squadron TFTW— Tactical Fighter Training Wing TFW— Tactical Fighter Wing TG— Task Group TH— Territory of Hawaii TkBn— Tank Battalion TM— Torpedoman’s Mate (USN) TMW— Tactical Missile Wing Tng— Training T/O— Table of Organization TO & E— Table of Organization and Equipment TOT— Time on Target TRK— Truck TRS— Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron TRW— Tactical Reconnaissance Wing prior to 1992; Training Wing after 1993 TTS— Tactical Training Squadron TU— Task Unit TUSLOG— The United States Logistics Group TW— Test Wing UDT— Underwater Demolition Team UF— Unit of Fire UN— United Nations UNC— United Nations Command UNCOK— United Nations Commission in Korea UNCURK— United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea unkn— unknown US— United States (of America) USA— United States Army USAF— United States Air Force USAFA— United States Air Force Academy USAFE— United States Air Forces in Europe USAFIK— United States Army Forces in Korea USAMGIK— United States Army Military Government in Korea

22 USAR— U.S. Army Reserve USARPAC— United States Army, Pacific USCG— U.S. Coast Guard USMC— United States Marine Corps USMCR— United States Marine Corps Reserve USMILAT— U.S. Military Attaché USMA— U.S. Military Academy (West Point) USN— United States Navy USNAS— United States Naval Air Station USSTAF— United States Strategic Air Forces USSR— Union of Soviet Socialist Republics VA— Navy Attack Squadron VA— Veterans Administration VADM— Vice Admiral VFNavy— Fighter Squadron VHB— Very Heavy Bombardment VIP— Very Important Person(s) VNAF— Vietnamese Air Force (Republic of Vietnam or South Vietnam) VMF— Marine Fighter Squadron VMF(N)— Marine Night Fighter Squadron VMO— Marine Observation Type Aircraft (Squadron) VMR— Marine Transport Type Aircraft VMJ— Marine Photographic Squadron VT— Shell Equipped with Proximity Fuse WD— War Department WD— War Diary WG— Wing WESPAC— Western Pacific WIA— Wounded in Action WP— White Phosphorus Shell Yak-9— Yakovlev “Frank”: single-engine fighter (Soviet) Yak-18— Yakovlev: single-engine trainer (Soviet) YMS— Motor Minesweeper YN— Yeoman YTB— Harbor Tug, Big YW— District Barge ZI— Zone of Interior

THE CHRONOLOGY

1950 January 1950

An association known as IPR (Institute of Pacific Relations), since as early as the mid–1930s, according to the Internal Security Subcommittee of the U.S. Senate, has been dominated by pro–Communist and pro–Soviet sympathies. Also, the Reece committee, called to investigate tax-exempt foundations, notes: “Nor does the point need to be labored that the loss of China to the Communists may have been the most tragic event in our [U.S.] history, and one to which the foundation-supported Institute of Pacific Relations heavily contributed.” IPR is a private organization, branched in ten separate countries and composed of ten separate national councils, with its main Headquarters in New York. Wall Street plays a principal part in the success of IPR: its primary contributors include the Carnegie and Rockefeller foundations, funded by the Morgans and the Rockefellers. Also, Chase National Bank, National City Bank, Standard Oil, International Telephone and Telegraph and International General Electric contribute; contributions poured heavily into IPR, apparently due to the connection between them and the banking interests of the Rockefellers and the Morgans. As the U.S. nears entrance into the Korean Conflict, the Rhodes Conspiracy theory again surfaces (secret society to spread British upper-class lifestyle); the Round Table Groups extend their organization; in New York, according to Professor Carroll Quigley, the front for the organization is the Council on Foreign Relations, which in turn is a front for J.P. Morgan and Company. Quigley, later (1960s) acknowledges the conspiracy, stating: “There is a conspiracy, and I should know because I am closely connected to it.” Quigley, in his book proclaims: “This network which we may identify as round table groups has no aversion to cooperating with the Communists, or any other groups, and frequently does so.”

Negotiations between the South Korean Army and the National Police, brokered by KMAG (U.S. military advisory group to the Republic of Korea) advisors, have brought about a plan to train about 10,000 policemen for combat. The blueprint calls for twenty-two police battalions, each composed of 112 men. Initially, more than 100 police officers are sent to the Korean Army Infantry School to become familiarized with tactics and subsequently become military officers. The plan never really gets off the ground due to the lack of funding. By May, only one battalion is genuinely mustered for the field. Colonel Harold Krohn, KMAG advisor to the National Police, in a report dated June 15, states that no combat police battalions had been placed in the field prior to that month. The Army has great difficulty getting its units to receive training, as the Communists guerrillas maintain their activity, keeping the Army busy.

January 5 In the United States: President Truman proclaims that the United States will not initiate, either directly or indirectly, any Military action to intercede on behalf of the Nationalist Chinese under Chiang Kai-shek on Formosa. Chiang Kai-shek and his top aides fled from the mainland to Formosa during December, along with many of the nationalist troops. A Chinese Communist attack against the island stronghold is anticipated. Within a week, the situation in the Far East becomes more confusing when the secretary of state proclaims that the U.S. would act to defend Japan, the Philippines and Okinawa, eliminating Korea from the protection of U.S. forces. Nevertheless, the KMAG advisors continue to train the South Koreans. — In Guam: The Fleet Marine Force is removed from Guam. It returns to California. The final elements depart on 25 April. — In Japan: An intelligence report comes into Gen23

March 10, 1950 eral Headquarters indicating that the Communists in North Korea will launch an invasion of South Korea during March or April; it further defines the movement of the 3rd North Korean Division into the western sector of the 38th Parallel, the deployment of the 2nd North Korean Division to the south and continued arrivals of Chinese troops. These facts and the increasing size of the border Constabulary force point to military action. The reports are forwarded to Washington by the Far East Command, but the U.S. has shown little interest in defending Korea.

March 10

In Japan: Another intelligence report from Korea predicts a North Korean invasion as early as spring but undoubtedly by the fall, then pins it down: “Latest reports received that the North Korean P.A. [People’s Army] will invade South Korea in June.” MacArthur, again forwards the information to Washington. Korea is not under the responsibility of MacArthur, rather the State Department, and the few troops (500 advisors) still in Korea report to the American ambassador. The training of police combat battalions remains well behind schedule. About mid–March, the South Korean Army puts out a second memo intended to get all contingents through a thirteen-week training schedule (battalion) by June 1 and the regimental phase by the end of June.

March 15 In the United States: Congress approves a request for additional $10,970,000 in aid to Korea in response to a request from General William Roberts and Ambassador Muccio made in December 1949. Because of a priority position assigned to Korea by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the bulk of requested equipment is not available in the war-reserve stocks and must be procured from commercial sources, which delays delivery. By June 25, the day the Communists invade South Korea, about $1,000 worth of supplies have been delivered and about $300,000 in Signal Corps equipment and spare parts are in transit. According to testimony given later during Congressional hearings, one KMAG officer stated that prior to the outbreak of hostilities, only about $250 worth of wire had been received in Korea. These developments greatly concern the KMAG advisors. April 1950

In Japan: In response to a recent request from General MacArthur for the Navy and Marine Corps to provide amphibious training for the Army troops in Japan, a Marine instruction team commanded by Col. Edward Forney arrives. The Marines jump at the opportunity to accommodate General MacArthur, especially considering General Bradley’s predicted demise of the corps. Subsequently, a small amphibious force and support elements, including aviation personnel, join the instructors in Japan.

April 5

The Seventh Fleet, commanded by Admiral Struble and based in the Philippines, is off the shores of Korea. Planes attached to Air Group 5 (top jettrained unit in the Pacific), zoom from the Valley Forge

24 and fly a parade formation over Inchon and Seoul, then several days later the jets repeat the ceremonial flight over Hong Kong. The Seventh Fleet comes under the jurisdiction of Admiral Radford, not General MacArthur.

April 15

In Japan: General Headquarters receives another of its intelligence documents; this one verifies that the Communists directed the evacuation of all civilians living within three miles of the 38th Parallel. Soon after evacuation, the memo advises, North Korean troops and guerrillas took over the empty living quarters. This information is dispatched to Washington.

May 9

In China: The Communist Chinese government announces it will release two American aviators that it has held since 19 October 1948, when their plane was forced down in Manchuria. The two men, Master Sergeant Elmer C. Bender, U.S. Marine Corps, and William C. Smith, U.S. Navy (electrician’s mate), state upon their release that they had to admit to espionage to get their release.

May 25 In Japan: Activity in North Korea is accelerating, according to an intelligence dispatch from operatives in Korea. The message discloses recent inspection of all Army units and it identifies seven different divisions. The message also reiterates its previously dispatched information concerning the infusion of Chinese troops. General Headquarters is informed about the compulsory service in the North Korean Armed Forces, confirming that between 100,000 and 150,000 youths have been inducted. General MacArthur and the Far East Command still have no authority over Korea or Formosa, as they have been the wards of the State Department. Nonetheless, MacArthur’s G-2 instinctively had formed a small and inconspicuous intelligence unit; Korean Liaison Office (KLO). Seemingly, the information contained in the nearly 2,000 messages forwarded to Washington had been disregarded. Within one month, a heavy price will be paid for the inattention. The South Korean Armed Forces are composed of ten divisions; however in direct opposition to MacArthur, the Koreans had been trained for Constabulary duty, not front line combat. In contrast, the North Koreans were well trained and their guns were pointed toward South Korea. Kaesong, which had been attacked by Communists in August 1949, is again raided during May 1950. Late May In the U.S. Far East Command: Extensive fleet exercises occur in the waters between the Philippine Islands and Korea, including warships of the Seventh Fleet and many of Vice Admiral Charles Turner Joy’s command (General MacArthur’s Naval commander). The operation takes place as ships are turning over, affording extra vessels. The Seventh Fleet, upon completion of the maneuvers, is scheduled to arrive back in Manila by the 4th of July, pay a subsequent visit to Hong Kong and stop in Japan during the summer.

25

June 1950

In the United States: U.S. Army strength is officially listed at 591,000, although its authorized strength is capped at 630,000. It is composed of ten combat divisions, nine separate regimental combat teams and the postwar Constabulary (Germany), which is approximate to one division. Of these, four divisions are deployed in Japan: the 7th (Honshu — northern sector), 24th (Kyushu), 25th (Honshu—southern sector) and the 1st Cavalry (Infantry), deployed in the Kanto Plain within the central sector of Honshu. Only the 1st Cavalry (Infantry) is at full strength. Although the division in Europe comprises a full complement, the remaining combat units are below full strength, including the battalion composition standing at two per regiment, rather than three. Artillery units are similarly reduced in size and equipment; firing batteries are depleted from three to two. Other exceptions are the 24th Regiment, 25th Division, which has a full complement of three battalions, and the 159th Field Artillery Battalion, which is composed of three firing batteries. In essence, American combat units stand at about 70 percent of full strength. To add to the concern, the tank units are using the light M24 tank. Available equipment for the U.S. Army qualifies as near archaic and has been exposed to extensive use during World War II. These figures contrast sharply to the 89 divisions that comprised the U.S. Army during 1945. During June, the U.S. Navy, comprised of 377,000 troops and 670 vessels (active), has nearly one-third of its vessels in the Pacific under the command of Admiral Arthur W. Radford, with 20 percent of this force stationed in the Far East at Tokyo, under the command of Vice Admiral Charles Turner Joy. Joy’s staff is composed of 29 officers. In addition, the U.S. Navy has about 4,300 operational aircraft of all types. The warships operating close to Japan are: Amphibious Force, under Rear Admiral J.H. Doyle—USS Arikara (ATT 98), USS Cavalier (APA 37), USS Mt. McKinley (AGC 7), USS Union (AKA 106) and the LST 611; Support Force, under Rear Admiral J. M. Higgins — Cruiser USS Juneau, Destroyers USS Colett, Dehaven, Mansfield and Swenson; and Auxiliary Motor Minesweepers — USS Chatterer, Kite, Mocking Bird, Osprey, Partridge and the Red Head. Since the initial days of occupation, their principal activity has been to patrol the waters of the Tsushima Strait to prevent smugglers from operating between Korea and Japan, and to patrol the waters off the Ryukyus to eliminate the Chinese pirate vessels (in southwest Japan, between Taiwan and Japan). The island chain, composed of Amami Islands (part of Kagoshima prefecture), the Okinawa Islands, and the Sakishima Islands, separates the East China Sea from the Philippine Sea. Other duties include displaying the U.S. colors at Japanese ports and maintaining training exercises to keep the fleet ready while holding vigil. Also, the Seventh Fleet, commanded by Vice Admiral Stru-

June 15, 1950 ble, is dispersed between Hong Kong, Sangley Point and Subic Bay (Philippines); it is composed of two carriers and eight destroyers and has fundamentally practiced its peacetime mission, spending a great amount of time displaying the U.S. flag in the various ports of the Orient. Seventh Fleet vessels are: the Carriers USS Rochester (CA) and USS Valley Forge (CV), the Destroyers USS Brush, USS Eversole, USS Fletcher, USS Maddox, USS S.N. Moore, USS Radford, USS Shelton and the USS Taussig. The Marine Corps’ is basically domiciled in the United States, with its 1st Marine Division at Camp Pendleton (West Coast) and the 2nd Marine Division stationed at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, except for one battalion, which is in the Mediterranean with the fleet. Neither Marine division is at full strength. The journey by sea from the U.S. West Coast to Pusan, Korea, varies in time. Personnel make the trip in about sixteen days; however, travel time is much greater for the ships transporting heavy equipment and supplies. Also, at the beginning of June, the U.S. Air Force is composed of 48 Groups (Air Wings). Far East Air Forces (FEAF), the biggest contingent outside the continental U.S., is commanded by General George Stratemeyer and is composed of nine groups, outfitted with approximately 350 operational planes. Air Force fighter strength stands at 18 squadrons and troop strength stands at about 33,625 (officers and enlisted), although its authorized strength is 39,975. Total aircraft for FEAF is listed at 1,172, but the figure includes many in storage or being salvaged. The Military Air Transport Service, Pacific Division, operating between the U.S. and the Far East, is composed of about 60 four-engine transports, supplemented by MATS C-74s and C-97s. The planes shuttle between the States and Hawaii. This force will quadruple after the outbreak of war in Korea. The U.S. Reserve Forces total more than two and one-half million men, with the majority of the troops being in the National Guard and Organized Reserve Corps. The National Guard is composed of 325,000 troops and twenty-seven divisions, none at full strength. The Organized Reserve Corps stands at 186,000 troops, most of whom serve with combat support units and service contingents. In addition, the ROTC (Reserve Officer Training Corps) is composed of 219,000 students enrolled either in high school or college.

June 2

In the United States: The Naval Academy graduating class at Annapolis is composed of 690 midshipmen; forty-eight of these accept commissions in the Marine Corps.

June 15 The ongoing program to combat-train the South Korean police battalions and army units remains behind schedule. The bulk of the contingents have not completed the courses, but by this time, all Korean troops have fired their rifles for qualification. In conjunction, some police battalions replace S.K. Army units to handle internal security, which permits army

June 18, 1950 battalions to return to their bases to receive training. Schedules for the completion of training are again raised, and pushed back from June to July 31 for battalion courses and the end of October for regimental training. All the while, Korean leadership qualities have been below standard and slow coming. In related activity, KMAG reports that the Korean Coast Guard stands at only about 70 percent of capacity. It contains 105 vessels, but only 58 are serviceable and the number includes fishing vessels. There has been movement toward detaching the Coast Guard advisors and reassigning them under the State Department as a cost-cutting plan. KMAG stipulates that regardless of which department controls the expenses, the advisors are still quite necessary. In addition, the U.S. is in the process of reducing U.S. Army operations in Korea during fiscal 1951. The Korean Air Force contains ten Harvard trainers and consists of twelve operable liaison planes. KMAG makes it known that because of the current situation, including the condition of the armed forces and lack of operational equipment and supplies, the South Koreans will be able to mount only a defensive operation. If hostilities occur it is thought the South Koreans can hold no longer than fifteen days. KMAG also makes it clear that “Korea is threatened with the same disaster that befell China.” Simply put, KMAG sounds the alarm that the Communists could overrun Korea if they choose to ignite hostilities. The North Koreans have been on an escalating warfooting, supported by the Russians who have bolstered the North’s capabilities since the close of World War II. Several thousand North Koreans have received training in the Soviet Union and the Soviets have contributed large numbers of advisors and training instructors to assist the build-up. In addition, the North Koreans have received from the Russians great numbers of equipment, including artillery, fighter planes and tanks. In other activity, General William Roberts departs Korea. Colonel Sterling Wright, the chief of staff, assumes command of KMAG until Major Frank Keating arrives from the States. However, Keating chooses to retire rather than move to Korea. In the interim, Colonel Wright is instructed to remain until another replacement for Keating arrives. Lt. Colonel Carl Sturies has temporary control of the advisory group. Colonel Wright is scheduled to depart Korea to attend the Industrial College of the Armed Forces in the United States. — In the United States: At Quantico, Va., combat demonstrations are exhibited for President Truman to show him why the Marine Corps should receive a larger share of the budget. The Marines showcase an assault landing launched from carrier-based helicopters to spotlight the speed with which troops and their supplies can be ferried from the sea to targets behind enemy lines. The president expresses no desire to pass the buck and, in a touch of sarcasm, places his hand on a howitzer, implying that he puts his confidence in it.

26

June 18 In the Philippines: Admiral Struble, having been in the Philippines several days to confer with Louis Johnson, secretary of defense, and General Bradley, chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, departs Manila for Pearl Harbor to speak with Admiral Arthur Radford. The discussions in Manila focus primarily on the potential dangers that could prompt trouble in Japan, Indochina and even Formosa. Another topic is the cauldron simmering in the Philippines with the Huks, but Korea is not discussed, although it comes under the umbrella of the Seventh Fleet. General Bradley and Louis Johnson, during their stay in the Far East, also visit Japan. From Hawaii, Struble heads for the States for a conference with Admiral Forrest Sherman before attending his daughter’s wedding. In his absence, Rear Admiral J. M. Hoskins, commanding officer of Carrier Division 3, assumes temporary command of Seventh Fleet. June 23

Lt. Colonel Thomas McPhail, KMAG advisor to the Republic of Korea (ROK) 6th Division, has become concerned about possible enemy incursions. McPhail bases his conclusions on various missions his intelligence units have executed. Recent reconnaissance missions have uncovered new enemy infantry units, camouflaged tanks and antiaircraft batteries, all within striking distance of the South Korean positions below the 38th Parallel. Lt. Colonel McPhail convinces General Kim, the S.K. 6th Division commander, to cancel all weekend leaves and to ensure that all defensive fortifications are totally manned. The 6th S.K. Division guards the approaches to Chunchon, which during the past several weeks, has received its baptism under fire, while engaging enemy guerrillas who had crossed the border between Chunchon and Kangnung. The intelligence has been forwarded by McPhail to his superior officers, but there is still no thought of an enemy invasion. Meanwhile, other S.K. units, on either flank of the 6th Division, are unprepared and less trained as the weekend of the 23rd approaches.

June 24

There is no suspicion of an invasion by North Korea. Four South Korean divisions and one regiment are deployed defensively to react to hostilities, but only four regiments and one battalion are posted near the front lines below the 38th Parallel. The remainder are stationed to the rear. Many of the South Koreans and the KMAG advisors are on weekend liberty when the invasion occurs.

June 25–June 28

THE INVASION OF SOUTH KOREA At 0400 on June 25, the sudden roar of artillery and mortars, accompanied by the shriek of bugles and clanging armor, jolts the South Koreans and their American advisors into a hellish war. Blackened skies are illuminated by crimson streaks of unrelenting fire along the 38th Parallel, across the entire peninsula. The North Korean I Corps strikes southward with feverish pitch. It pounds against the Ongjin peninsula and the other border areas on the east, as they press toward Chunchon. After the initial

27 shock, South Korean units of the 17th Regiment return fire, but it is insufficient to halt the attack. Units of the N.K. II Corps stream across the border, ravaging everything in their path as they pounce on South Korean positions near Chunchon and Hongch’on, farther east. The blistering attack is not totally synchronized. Some of the staggered fire commences as late as 0500. Nonetheless, much of the potent firepower far outdistances anything in the South Korean arsenal. The flying terror creates a great deal of panic and confusion south of the border. North Korea, which has become an armed fortress through the support of the Kremlin, has quietly placed about seven infantry divisions and one armored division close to the 38th Parallel. Slightly to the rear are thousands of reinforcements. Subsequent to the invasion, the North Koreans will claim that they had reacted to a South Korean incursion and had ordered a counterattack, but on June 8, more than two weeks prior to the opening of hostilities, newspapers in Pyongyang (North Korea) proclaimed through a manifesto that a parliament would be elected during early August. In conjunction, a meeting is scheduled to convene in Seoul on August 15, making it clear that the Communists anticipated total control of Korea by mid–August. The postwar strategy of the Soviets (Bolsheviks) to gain power by cunning use of its satellites and fellow travelers has been unfolding according to plan. While the strategic eyes of the U.S. are focused on Europe, a tranquil and rainy Sunday morning is transformed into a cauldron of horror as about 90,000 crack North Korean troops, many trained in the Soviet Union, burst across the 38th Parallel, spearheaded by Soviet-made tanks. Swarms of screaming troops, foliage sprouting from their uniforms and helmets, attack and scorch the earth. The advance is effortless at many of the selected targets, as the South Koreans lack planes, tanks, and antitank weapons, which compels many of them to retreat in disarray. Synchronized unopposed air attacks also occur. Seoul, the embattled capital of South Korea, and Kimpo Airfield are struck by several air raids before day’s end. The ugly combination of air, ground and armor attacks wreaks havoc on soldiers and civilians alike. Crushed and burning buildings are commonplace. Throngs of bewildered civilians flee in absolute fright under the echo of guns. Trembling children are scattered about the line of retreat. Some children are dead, others are huddled in fear, adding to the gloom. The initial fighting during the contest is lopsided. Later, one South Korean who was there described the defense and likened it to “throwing eggs at a rock.” Observations after the fact reveal many South Korean dead who are piled in irregular layers and others, merely tossed in singular lines, lying prone in unnatural positions, their hands tied behind their backs.

June 25, 1950 Meanwhile, the American advisors, meager in number (fewer than 500), are unable to provide any genuine assistance. No U.S. combat troops are in Korea. Few aircraft remain and none of those are available to the South Koreans. The dilemma of the Americans is seriously compounded because few of the South Korean troops speak English. Once the North Koreans infiltrate, it is impossible to distinguish friend from foe. It becomes increasingly apparent that the United States is ill-prepared to immediately halt the Sovietbacked North Korean invaders and unprepared to neutralize Communist aggression in the Far East. However, at the moment, word of the invasion has not yet reached Washington. Incursions along the border have been frequently occurring for many months; therefore, the U.S. Embassy initially assumes it is just another pesky provocation. This conclusion is shattered at 1100, when North Korean Premier Kim Il Sung proclaims over the radio that a full-scale invasion had been launched. As the juggernaut begins moving west to east, the isolated Ongjin peninsula, bound on three sides by water and on the north by the 38th Parallel, is struck solidly by the N.K. I Corps. At about 0400, Ongjin, which covers about 26 air miles of mountainous terrain along the 38th Parallel, is pounded by artillery of the 14th Regiment, 6th North Korean Division and the Constabulary troops of the 3rd Brigade. These fierce artillery attacks are followed about onehalf hour later by ground forces. Swiftly, the beleaguered undermanned 17th Regiment (ROK), commanded by Colonel Paik. In Yup, and its five American advisors are imperiled. One battered battalion is wiped out. The remainder of the regiment is compelled to withdraw toward the sea. There is one ferry crossing, located on the eastern side of the peninsula, from where the boats travel across Haeju Bay to the mainland. Emergency calls from Ongjin are picked up in Seoul at 0600. By 0900, another desperate plea filters into headquarters. The message urgently requests air evacuation. Two American pilots flying L-5 planes depart Seoul and extricate the American advisors. Meanwhile, previously laid-out evacuation plans are set in motion to salvage the battered regiment. Three LSTs (landing ship tanks) answer the call and rescue the survivors on the following day. Farther east, across the water from the Ongjin peninsula, lies Kaesong. It is about two miles south of the 38th Parallel. The town is defended by two battalions of the 12th Regiment, 1st S.K. Division, which are deployed slightly north of the town. Another battalion is strung out about 20 miles to the west at Yonan. Meanwhile, the 13th Regiment holds positions east of Kaesong, near the Imjin River at Korangp’o-ri. Also, the 11th Regiment (reserve) and headquarters are deployed further south at Suisak, slightly north of Seoul. At approximately 0500, the 13th and 15th Regiments, N.K. 6th Division, crash

June 25, 1950

28

A Douglas C-54 military transport plane hit during a raid on Kimpo Airfield by North Korean planes on 28 June. across the border in a two-pronged move. Many troops spring from Songaksan (Hill 475), which spreads along the 38th Parallel above Kaesong. Another contingent, about regimental strength, arrives by train, using tracks that had been secretly re-laid north of the 38th Parallel just prior to the invasion. The sole American advisor at the 38th Parallel at the onset of the invasion is Captain Joseph R. Darrigo, who is awakened by the sounds of guns. Immediately he rushes into Kaesong, where he spots the enemy troops as they bounce from the rail cars. There is little time to react when the one-sided fight erupts. By 0930, Kaesong falls along with Yonan. The defenders are decimated. Only two companies of the S.K. 12th Regiment escape death or capture. Darrigo makes it safely to Munsan-ni. In conjunction, at daybreak in Seoul, Colonel Rockwell, USA, is contacted by S.K. Colonel Paik, who informs him of the invasion. Paik then phones headquarters at Suisak and orders the 11th Regiment and other contingents to rush to Munsan-ni-Korangp’o-ri and reinforce the 13th Regiment at the Imjin River Bridge, the predetermined spot to form a strong defense line. With great rapidity, the 13th Regiment reaches its destination and becomes engaged in fierce fighting for several days against elements of the N.K. 1st Division and its supporting tanks. Lacking antitank equipment, courageous yet reckless volunteers of the 13th Regiment affix explosives to themselves and individually charge the enemy

armor. Others board the tanks and attempt to drop grenades down the hatch. These and other types of suicidal actions near the Imjin Bridge knock out several tanks, but after the quick loss of about ninety men, few others volunteer. The Imjin River bridge at Munsan-ni is to be blown as soon as the 12th Regiment is safely across, but with the enemy on the heels of the regiment, the plan fails, and the bridge is seized intact. Enemy control of the key bridge creates additional problems for the weary defenders; however, despite the overwhelming enemy superiority, the S.K. 1st Division holds the line at Korangp’o-ri nearly three days before it withdraws to the Han River to escape envelopment and slaughter by the enemy units in the Uijongbu Corridor. Adding to the dreary plight of the S.K. 1st Division, American planes inadvertently attack them on the 28th. The aircraft, under orders to destroy enemy columns and decimate “organized troops north of the Han River,” strike the retreating unit with rockets and machine gun fire, causing heavy casualties. In a most unusual display of morale boosting, Colonel Paik, speaking to his men after the accidental raid, states: “You did not think the Americans would help us. Now you know better.” While the multi-pronged assault unwinds, the eye of the blistering attack moves full-throttle down the Uijongbu Corridor. Units of the N.K. 105th Armored Brigade smash into contingents of the S.K. 7th Division, commanded by Brigadier General Yu

29 Jai Hyung. The 1st Regiment, which is deployed along the 38th Parallel, feels the sting. During the initial fighting, which erupts about 0530, the 1st Regiment takes severe losses. Tanks of the N.K. 105th Armored Brigade support the 3rd and 4th N.K. Divisions as they penetrate toward Seoul. About 40 tanks of the 107th Tank Regiment, followed by the N.K. 4th Division, spring from positions near Yonch’on. They advance along the western road and drive toward Tongduch’on-ni and hammer the S.K. 3rd Regiment. One enemy unit, the 16th N.K. Regiment, sustains heavy losses before the South Koreans lose the town toward the end of the day. Synchronized with the 4th Division, the N.K. 3rd Division, bolstered by about 40 tanks of the 109th Tank Regiment, smash their way down the eastern route. They grind along the P’och’on Road (Kumhwa-Uijongbu-Seoul Road), which is defended by the S.K. 9th Regiment. As the enemy rumbles down the two separate highways which join at Uijongbu, the overmatched South Koreans take high casualties, prompting an ROK officer to send an emergency call to Seoul for reinforcements as early as 0830. He states that all available forces had been committed. The dual dagger of the enemy pushes forward. The N.K. 3rd Division reaches the steps of P’och’on, but pulls back during the night. On the morning of the 26th, the town is taken without opposition, which permits the 3rd Division to immediately drive toward Uijongbu. The S.K. Army High Command in Seoul reacts shortly after 0930 on the 25th. It sends reserve forces north to launch a counterattack in the Uijongbu Corridor. The first troops to begin rushing north are contingents of the 2nd S.K. Division at Taejon, commanded by General Lee Hyung Koon. At 1430, some American advisors, elements of the 5th Regiment and Division Headquarters move by rail from Taejon toward Seoul. Other KMAG advisors with the S.K. 2nd Division are scattered at other locations, such as Anjung-ni, Ch’ongju and Yongju. These advisors also rush to Seoul. At about darkness, contingents of the S.K. 5th Division depart Kwangju in southwest Korea heading north, and troops of the S.K. 3rd Division advance from Taegu, ninety miles below Seoul. Initially, the S.K. 3rd Division has little knowledge of the unfolding invasion. Its Commander, Colonel Yu Sung Yul, and the senior KMAG advisor, Lt. Colonel Rollins Emmerich, are in Chinju, attending a conference. They learn of the attack during their return to Taegu. By the time Emmerich arrives back at Taegu, at about 1800, elements of the S.K. 3rd Division and three KMAG advisors are en route to Seoul. Like the other American advisors, those in Taegu are unsure of what their role has become with the opening of hostilities. Meanwhile, back in the United States, during a specially called session of the U.N. General Assembly on the 25th, the North Koreans are directed to halt their aggression and return across the 38th Par-

June 25, 1950 allel, but the directive is ignored. Two days later, on the 27th, President Truman commits air and naval forces to aid the South Koreans. Soon after, at the request of General MacArthur, U.S. ground troops are on their way to Korea. Ironically, many in the U.S. thought the infantry and the amphibious forces had been rendered obsolete by the creation of the atomic bomb. But it is the infantry which gets the call to arms as the U.S. goes to war under the auspices of the United Nations. This is called a “police action.” Across the 38th Parallel, The N.K. 2nd Division (II Corps) moves from H’wachon, just above the border, to replace Constabulary troops, then attack Chunchon, a primary road junction near the border along the Pukhan River. The division anticipates an effortless early morning victory. The N.K. 7th Division advances from Inje toward Hongch’on, several miles farther south. To their surprise, the ROK 6th Division stands ready for the fight. No weekend passes had been handed out, and the unit is at full strength. The N.K. 2nd Division’s 6th Regiment winds down the river road, and the 4th Regiment moves over Peacock Mountain, both expecting to converge for victory at Chunchon. But determined resistance greets the advance. Heavily fortified concrete pillboxes scattered atop the crest of a towering hill just north of the town foil the plot. The 2nd Division’s incessant accurate fire delays the enemy timetable and scores well against the N.K. 6th Regiment. South Korean resistance is resolute, which forces the North Koreans to change strategy. On the 25th, the N.K. 7th Division en route to Hongch’on is ordered to pivot and reinforce the 2nd Division on the 25th. The farthest point of battle from the Ongjin peninsula is the east coast, where the remaining North Korean troops are staged in the vicinity of the Taebaek Mountains, near Inje. Their mission is to secure the eastern mountains. The N.K. 5th Division and the 766th Independent Unit, bolstered by guerrilla contingents, are perched for the border crossing. Facing the enemy is the S.K. 8th Division, which is deployed in a near vertical line. Its 10th Regiment guards the border. Headquarters stands at Kangnung, about 15 miles south of the border. The 21st Regiment is garrisoned 25 miles further south at Samch’ok, but when the invasion commences at about 0500, most of its troops are scattered throughout the Taebaek Mountains eradicating Communist guerrillas. Six KMAG advisors, including Major Gerald E. Larsen, the chief advisor, are at headquarters in Kangnung with the 10th Regiment when the invasion begins. Major George Kessler is at Scamch’ok. The 10th Regiment becomes heavily engaged with elements of the N.K. 5th Division and the 766th Independent Unit. Enemy guerrillas execute amphibious landings above and below Samch’ok, defended by the S.K. 21st Regiment. In concert, two battalions of the N.K. 766th Independent Unit debark near

June 25, 1950 Kangnung. Again, overpowering Communist force makes the South Korean positions untenable. Fighting remains heavy throughout the day, but previously prepared withdrawal plans are being quickly activated. Elements of the 21st Regiment rush antitank guns to the water’s edge near Samch’ok and commence fire against some offshore vessels. The South Koreans sink two vessels; the remainder departs the area. Up to this point, Major Kessler and the advisors at Samch’ok remain unaware that the incursion is part of a full-scale invasion. On the following day, the S.K. 10th Regiment continues buying priceless time at the border, while the remainder of the 8th Division prepares to evacuate Kangnung and head south for Pusan. Fighting across the peninsula on the 26th remains ferocious, but enemy tanks ensure continued success. South Koreans, having only antipersonnel mines in their arsenal, remain disadvantaged. The diverted N.K. 7th Division reaches Chunchon during the evening of the 26th, adding its tanks to the battle, but the S.K. 6th Division still inflicts punishment upon the enemy. The bitter combat rages continually into the 27th, but relentless enemy pressure finally collapses both flanks of the defenders. At this crucial point, orders arrive that instruct the beleaguered S.K. 6th Division to withdraw farther south. Subsequent to a South Korean pull-back on the 28th, the 2nd and 7th N.K. Divisions, led by nine tanks, enter a charred Chunchon. Nonetheless, for this prize, the North Koreans have paid a high price. Their 2nd Division sustains about 40 percent casualties and the 6th Regiment incurs more than 50 percent casualties. The N.K. 7th Division sustains moderate casualties. In addition, the North Koreans lose about 16 self-propelled guns (SU 76-mm) and other assorted weapons. The seizure of Chunchon opens the way for the 7th Division to resume its trek toward Hongch’on. In conjunction, the N.K. 2nd Division marches directly toward Seoul. On the 26th, in the S.K. 7th Division sector north of Uijongbu, General Yu Jai Hyung launches a solid counterattack against the N.K. 4th Division, but the inflicted losses are not severe enough to halt the advance. Inaccurate battle reports claim the destruction of 58 enemy tanks and the capture of 1,580 North Korean troops, greatly confusing South Korean strategy. In conjunction, General Lee fails to order two available battalions of the S.K. 2nd Division to attack. Consequently, the South Korean counterattack is weakened. General Lee, convinced an attack would be futile, keeps his command in defensive positions along the P’och’on Road, about two miles northeast of Uijongbu. At 0800 (26th), North Koreans encroach their positions. Initially they are met with artillery and small arms fire. The accompanying tanks take the hits, but the shells bounce off harmlessly. Subsequent to a short pause, the armor blows through the South Korean defenses and rolls into Uijongbu. In the

30 wake, the N.K. 7th Regiment barges into the two battalions of the S.K. 2nd Division, and shreds its ranks. Faced with total envelopment, the survivors make it to the nearby hills. The collapse of the S.K. 2nd Division forces the S.K. 7th Division to abort its attack, which had been advancing up the western road. The 7th retires to more tenable positions below Uijongbu. As the invaders deepen their penetration, the South Koreans’ plight deteriorates drastically. In retrospect, the decision by General Chae, S.K. chief of staff, to delegate responsibility to the 2nd Division to hold the P’och’on Road proves to be a mortal wound. The 2nd Division had been unable to field a full division for the task. The night of the 26th causes more apprehension for the South Koreans, whose forces are being pounded at every point. In Seoul, the government considers evacuation, but a heated debate in the General Assembly concludes with a decision to remain in the capital. Nonetheless, without informing the American advisors (KMAG), S.K. Army Headquarters departs the beleaguered city on the morning of the 27th, heading for Yongdungp’o, about five miles farther south. Also, at about 0900, Ambassador Muccio and his staff move to Suwon. Colonel Wright and KMAG move to Sihung-ni and persuade General Chae to return to Seoul. Chae’s headquarters arrives back in Seoul about 1800, but by this time, the original confidence of those in the capital has vanished, being replaced by an aura of bewilderment. Colonel Wright had received several messages from General MacArthur, urging him to “repair to your former locations. Momentous decisions are in the offing. Be of good cheer.” Another message from MacArthur informs Wright that MacArthur will be placed in command of all troops in Korea. Meanwhile, the surviving South Korean units are still being wracked by the relentless enemy advances. The S.K. 1st Division is endangered at Korangp’o-ri, as the 3rd and 4th N.K. Divisions, moving from Uijongbu, close on it in coordination with the N.K. 1st Division, which is driving from their immediate eastern flank. Also, the remaining operational units of the 2nd, 5th and Capital (Palace Guard) Divisions and the 7th S.K. Division are engaged in separate and uncoordinated delaying actions. Combined, they are still unable to forestall the tenacious enemy advance toward Seoul. As the North Koreans gallop south, President Syngman Rhee continues to plead for help from the United Nations. Some of the South Korean units fight bravely, but most have been trained only for Constabulary duty. Many of them retreat in disorganized fashion to escape the surging Soviet-made T34 tanks, the ring of automatic weapons and the menacing sting of the burp guns. As the Republic of Korea forces hurriedly retire, huge, irregular columns of civilians, most transporting colossal loads upon their backs, flee south from their homes near

31 the 38th Parallel. This unanticipated activity clogs the paths and roads, which are now under constant strafing by Soviet-made aircraft. In addition, great numbers of ROK forces have abandoned the military and changed into peasant clothes to blend into the panicstricken civilian flight. But there is no sanctuary in Seoul. The government prepares for evacuation to forestall total defeat. By the 27th, it becomes inevitable that the ROK forces cannot hold the capital. The Communists, taking advantage of the expanding confusion, dispatch planes, which deposit leaflets to entice the populace to surrender. This is in coordination with a radio broadcast by N.K. Field Marshal Choe Yong Gun, who also requests surrender. The pleas for capitulation are ignored; however, most of the precautionary plans to meet any pending threat are never implemented. Roadblocks are fabricated, but left unguarded. The bridges are not blown and, with few exceptions, the fabricated obstacles are not covered by defensive fire. Consequently, the rampaging North Koreans face an unobstructed path to Seoul. One small contingent from the ROK Engineering School, led by Lt. Colonel Oum Hung Sup, strikes four approaching enemy tanks at the Uijongbu-Seoul Road at a mined bridge. But by nightfall, at about 1930, the N.K. 9th Regiment, 3rd Division, reaches the outskirts of the embattled city. This penetration is beaten back, but later, at 2300, an infantry platoon, bolstered by one tank, cranks into the northeast section of the city. It enters the Secret Gardens at Chang-Duk Palace. This infiltration too, is met and destroyed as Korean police eliminate or chase off the troops and decimate the tank. Nevertheless, the real onslaught is close behind. By midnight, the American advisors and the North Korean officers are discussing the Han River bridge. General Chae states that he has not ordered the bridge destroyed. It is determined that no order will be given until the enemy tanks are directly on the street of ROK Army Headquarters. Soon after midnight (27th–28th), General Chae is apparently placed in a jeep and driven over the bridge out of the city, leaving dissension behind. Major George Sedberry (KMAG) attempts to convince the ROK deputy chief of staff, General Kim Paik II, to refrain from blowing the bridge until troops and equipment can be evacuated. In addition, the vice minister of defense, according to General Kim, directed the bridge be blown at 0130, further complicating the crisis. Immediately upon being informed of the impending demolition, General Lee Hyung Koon, commanding officer, 2nd S.K. Division, urges General Chang Kuk to halt the order until he can extricate his command. Reluctantly, the general agrees, but the roads are jammed, slowing his motorcade. As Chang reaches a point about 150 yards from the span at 0215, he is greeted with a thunderous roar and a gargantuan blast of fire and debris. The two spans of the Han River bridge and

June 25, 1950 three companion railroad bridges are simultaneously detonated. The consequences are grave; many military personnel and civilians are obliterated in the horrific explosion. Several KMAG officers had safely crossed the span, beating the catastrophe by about five minutes. Still on the north side of the span, only a few feet from the blown portion, several American war correspondents — Keys Beech, Burton Crane and Frank Gibney — stare through their shattered windshield at a truck directly in front of them that had been lost with all its troops on board. Subsequently, a board of inquiry meets to place the blame for the incident. It results in a military court martial for the ROK senior engineer, who is summarily executed. The verdict remains under debate today. Some believe the order had been given by General Chae and others set blame on the vice minister of defense, neither of whom had been charged. Stronger arguments support the case against the latter. In the capital, the early morning hours of the 28th are gloomy. Remaining KMAG officers successfully seek exit routes and cross the Han River at 0600, but the majority of the South Korean Army contingents and their equipment remain trapped. Some scattered units attempt to hold the enemy back, while the others cross the river, without most of their heavy equipment and transports. The N.K. 3rd Division attempts to enter the city, but it hits fierce resistance offered by a small, heroic contingent of South Koreans who hold until about noon. Eventually, elements of the N.K. 16th Regiment, 4th Division, break into the capital. Another band of ROK troops holds a Spartan line on South Mountain, within the city. These gallant men resist throughout the day until the last man is wiped out. However, Communist control of the city occurs by midday, and the conquering troops are received by a tumultuous welcome by fifth columnists and exuberant college-age students. Meanwhile, surviving ROK troops attempt to reform on the south side of the Han River. At the time of invasion, the South Korean defenders numbered about 98,000 troops. Now, four days later, the South Koreans assess the situation and assume they have depleted their force by about 75 percent. Commanding officers can account for only about 22,000 troops (south of the Han River) by the end of the month. Later, more stragglers limp into headquarters and favorable reports filter in concerning the 6th and 8th S.K. Divisions. The news pumps the numbers back to about 54,000. Incredibly, 44,000 troops are killed, wounded or missing in the first week of combat. Many of these losses are directly attributed to the premature destruction of the Han River Bridge. Before, during and subsequent to the entry of Seoul, the North Koreans exhibit a barbaric nature that greatly overshadows the atrocities of the Japanese during World War II. U.S. Congressional clamoring to demobilize the

June 25, 1950 military has been progressing since the close of World War II. This movement has jeopardized America’s ability to defend itself or those nations it has promised to defend. But when President Truman is informed of the disaster, about seven hours after the ignition of the conflict, he moves quickly. President Truman returns to the Blair House, his temporary house in D.C., from his home in Independence, Missouri. He urges the United Nations to take immediate action. Now, as South Korea’s defenses are collapsing under the Iron Canopy of the North Koreans, Washington must reverse its position and remobilize. At present, the U.S. Armed Forces are in wretched fighting condition unbecoming a superpower. Of the ten active U.S. Army Divisions, only the 1st Division stands at full strength, and it is in Europe staring down the Soviets. There are four weakened Eighth Army Divisions in Japan; however, none are battle-tried and most of the men are inexperienced. The Marine Corps has been deflated from nearly 500,000 at the conclusion of World War II to a dangerous level of fewer than 75,000 men. In conjunction, the Air Force and Navy, both under-strength, will be called upon to fill the gap while the ground forces begin to mobilize. It is the Air Force which forestalls total defeat. Ironically, the U.S. Navy will need the services of a tremendous number of Japanese seamen to meet the threat. A predetermined evacuation plan (Operation CRULLER) begins to extricate endangered Americans and some personnel from other nations. The evacuees board the Reinholt and embark for Japan on the 27th. Others are airlifted from Kimpo Airfield on the 26th by Fifth Air Force planes, which dispatch C-46s, C47s and C-54s to handle the emergency. Meanwhile, after the fall of Seoul, General MacArthur is flown to the front on the 29th. MacArthur gets a first-hand observation of the nightmare. As MacArthur focuses on the chaos, he devises a plan to reverse the impending rout, an amphibious landing at Inchon. MacArthur, not surprisingly, remains resolute as he peers through the grueling action near the destroyed Han River bridge, and witnesses the muddled masses of retreating South Korean troops. The first U.S. ground troops to arrive in Korea will be composed of elements of the 24th Division, commanded by Major General William Dean, the previous military governor of South Korea. Ironically, General Dean had been readying his return to the United States and bidding goodbye to friends as he departed church services in Japan on the 25th. It was then that he received the news that he was not yet going home. The post duty officer informed him of the invasion. General Dean realizes that his weakened division is deployed all across Japan and begins to reel them in for deployment in Korea, less than 150 miles away. On June 30, General Dean informs Colonel Charles (Brad) Smith that he will command the first

32 troops in Korea and that Dean will follow soon after. Colonel Smith is to lead Task Force Smith into Pusan and drive north to delay the North Koreans until the balance of the 24th Division and other reinforcements can be rushed to support them. Task Force Smith will fly to Pusan, then by convoy advance to Taejon and attempt to hold. Colonel Smith is becoming adapted to being suddenly awakened with orders. On December 7, 1941, the colonel was awakened and directed to command an infantry contingent at Oahu, Hawaii. Task Force Smith, composed of about 400 infantry troops and an artillery unit, reaches positions near Osan on July 5. Smith’s task force becomes the first contingent of U.S. troops to clash with the Communists in North Korea. The engagement is a costly one for the young Americans who expect to quickly extinguish the fighting. They barely escape total slaughter. Their carbines and obsolete antitank weapons are way overmatched. Some troops break under the pressure, but more stand and fight, making the ultimate sacrifice to buy time for MacArthur’s warriors. Many of the young men of Task Force Smith are captured and butchered by the North Koreans. General MacArthur is chosen to command the United Nations forces on July 8. He will confer with other military leaders and be informed that the 1st Marine Division is available. The Marines (seasoned veterans) begin to arrive from Camp Pendleton at Pusan during early August. The swaggering entrance of 5,000 Marines perks up the besieged defenders to the point of angering some of the beleaguered Army troops. Nonetheless, their self-confidence becomes contagious. and inspires the others to break the siege. Meanwhile, General Walton Walker’s command must hold the line at the Pusan Perimeter or be driven into the sea. His forces meet the challenge, and the Communists realize that their quest for easy victory has been snatched from them by the strengthened forces. For the duration of the conflict, Communist aircraft of both the Chinese and Russians receive sanctuary in China, which prevents American and other Allied pilots from destroying them. Initially, back in America, the citizens have no knowledge that about seventy-five percent of the Communists’ air missions are clandestinely flown by Russian pilots. The government knows this; however, due to fear that the American people would demand retaliation against the Soviet Union, which could provoke another war in Europe, it is not discussed publicly. Nevertheless, the American pilots in Korea are aware of their principal foe. While the opposing ground forces continue to battle for the won-again lost-again barren bloodsoaked hills, the casualties continue to climb. Fiftythree nations join the struggle against the Communist aggression, but it is the American fighting men who assume the brunt of the task. Only fifteen ad-

33 ditional nations commit combat troops. Turkey and Great Britain are the only nations to field more than the strength of a battalion. South Korean forces compose sixteen infantry divisions. In contrast, the Chinese Communists funnel thousands of troops into the ranks of the North Koreans, and toward the end of 1950, several hundred thousand Chinese troops openly join the fight. The protracted struggle contains all the elements of man’s inhumanity to man and enunciates the equally powerful hope of men to remain free, regardless of the sacrifices.

June 25

North Korean armed forces invade South Korea. Since the beginning of June, the North Koreans have offered two suggestions for the unification of Korea, but neither is acceptable to the South Korean Government. In addition, the U.S. has been in the process of diminishing its aid to the new republic, and repeatedly, the U.S. has publicly stated that Korea is not within its protective zone. Actually, the U.S. has laid out clear instructions on what the policy is for KMAG advisors, with one exception. The U.S. has not issued instructions on what they should do once hostilities begin. KMAG now faces a dilemma and the ambassador has no specific instructions. Ambassador Muccio suggests that the entire mission, including the advisors, could converge on the embassy in Seoul if the Communists take the city and diplomatic immunity could be claimed, but KMAG declines the suggestion. South Korean President Rhee and his government are preparing to evacuate Seoul by mid-day, although the U.S. ambassador suggests that they stay to forestall panic. Rhee then explains during the late-night meeting at the Ducksoo Palace that if the Communists seize the city and the government officials, the cause will be lost and all resistance will collapse. Seoul is overrun by Communists on the 28th. After a series of communications between Syngman Rhee and U.S. officials, Washington authorizes General MacArthur to rush military supplies to South Korea. The shipments moving to Korea by sea sail by several routes: from Yokohama the distance is 900 miles, but this route can be shortened by about 235 miles if passage is through the Bungo-Suido Strait; from Sasebo, 130 miles; from Moji, 123 miles; from Kobe, 361 miles; and the distance by sea from Fukuoka to Pusan is about 110 miles. The port of Pusan is the jewel of Korea, and it is capable of handling the heavy tonnage expected to begin arriving to support the U.N. cause. More than 24 deepwater vessels can simultaneously be docked with about 14 LSTs side-by-side unloading their cargoes on the beach. Unloading becomes the easiest of the tasks; most transportation in Korea along the 22,000 miles of primitive roads has been by oxcart. In contrast, the railroad system had been well built by the Japanese, and these rails carry the heaviest burden for the United Nations forces. Once it is determined that the invasion is full-scale, the KMAG advisors suggest that the South Koreans immediately initiate the previously fabricated defense

June 25, 1950 plan, which calls for the evacuation of the Ongjin Peninsula and the redeployment of all units west of the Imjin River to the south bank of the river. In addition the plan directs that all reserve divisions posted in the south prepare to attack north upon orders. Major General Chae Byong Duk, South Korean chief of staff, concurs with the advice of KMAG, and he directs that all Divisions be informed. In related activity, Ambassador Muccio dispatches Commander John Seifert, Naval attaché to Inchon, to find a suitable vessel to transport the American civilians to Japan; he chooses the best of the lot, a Norwegian ship, the Reinholt. After unloading its cargo of fertilizer, the ship is prepared to receive the evacuees. Early on the 26th, Muccio activates Operation CRULLER to execute the rescue of U.S. civilians. A South Korean patrol boat (PC 701) encounters and engages a North Korean vessel, which is armed and transporting about 600 Communist troops off Pusan. The North Korean steamer is destroyed in what becomes the first naval surface action of the conflict. In Air Force activity, apparently, the North Koreans feel confident that there will be no intervention by the U.S. to save South Korea. Communist aircraft strike several times without opposition, and damage facilities at the Kimpo Airfield. A U.S. C-54 transport plane on the ground is also damaged. A contingent of U.S. fighter planes (8th Fighter Group) operating off the coast of South Korea is fired upon at about 1700, by a North Korean naval contingent. Also, the North Korean Air Force, according to U.S. estimates prior to the invasion, stands at 21 IL bombers and 33 Yak fighters. The enemy aircraft are domiciled at four bases: Pyongyang, Sinanju, Sinuiju and Wonsan. —In the United States: Warren Austin, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, announces the North Korean Communist invasion of the Republic of South Korea: “At 4 o’clock in the morning Sunday, June 25th, Korean time (1926, June 24th, Washington time), armed forces from North Korea commenced an unprovoked assault against the territory of the Republic of Korea.... This wholly illegal and unprovoked attack by the Korean north forces ... constitutes a breach of the peace and an act of aggression.... It would appear from the nature of the attack and the manner in which it was launched that it constitutes an all-out offensive against the Republic of Korea.” In response, a U.N. resolution emerges from a special session: “Noting with grave concern the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea, the Security Council determines that this action constitutes a breach of the peace.” The U.S. Ambassador to South Korea, John J. Muccio, had informed the U.S. of the invasion. At the time, it was still June 24, U.S. time. The U.N. response calls for an immediate withdrawal by the North Koreans to the 38th Parallel in synchronization with an immediate halt to the hostile actions. The resolution also calls on all members “to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving

June 26, 1950 assistance to the North Korean authorities.” The primary antagonist, the Soviet Union, is absent from the meeting, having boycotted the sessions since January 10, 1950, in protest of Red China being denied a seat as the bona fide representative of China. This Soviet miscalculation eliminates the Communist veto and permits the U.N. to take action. The resolution receives an abstention from the representative from Yugoslavia, another Communist-dominated nation, but nine yes votes are cast. The nations voting yes are China, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, France, Great Britain, India, Norway and the United States. There are no U.S. combat troops in Korea. Also, the total inundation of Soviet propaganda had prevented the U.S. government from properly equipping the South Korean Armed Forces to defend themselves. In addition to the U.S. Army and U.S. Naval strength at dangerously low levels, there are no Marine Corps forces of any consequences in the Far East. In fact, due to the Truman Administration’s postwar policy, there are few active duty Marines in the United States. Later, when Truman’s attempts to disband the Marine Corps subside as the call goes out for Marines to be sent to Korea, the Marines’ actions in Korea put the idea of disbanding the corps to rest. — In Japan: Official word of the North Korean invasion of South Korea is dispatched from Korea at 0925 by the U.S. Embassy, but neither General MacArthur nor his general headquarters receive orders concerning the crisis at the 38th Parallel. Instructions, however, do arrive to evacuate the Americans from Korea. By about midnight, Brigadier General Edwin K. Wright has instructed all units necessary to initiate the evacuation to stand ready. The operation gets underway at 0100 on the 26th. A plan of action for such an occurrence had been distributed on July 1, 1949. Also, Colonel William H.S. Wright receives permission from Ambassador Muccio to evacuate KMAG personnel from Korea, except for 33 men who are to remain with ROK headquarters. Soon after, President Truman informs MacArthur that he will be in command of the operation in Korea. Amphibious Group 1, commanded by Admiral Doyle, is en route from Tokyo to Chigasaki Beach to execute a practice amphibious landing. Navy and Marine specialists will oversee a landing by the 35th Regiment on the following day. In other activity, subsequent to emergency talks between Ambassador Muccio and Syngman Rhee, the former requests that MacArthur supply additional ammunition to ensure that the South Koreans are able to meet the crisis. — In the U.S. Far East Command: Major General Earle E. Partridge, commander, Fifth Air Force, directs his wing commanders to make preparations to evacuate U.S. citizens from South Korea. Also, the Twentieth Air Force orders two squadrons of 51 Fighter Interceptor Wings to go on air defense alert in Japan.

June 26

The U.S. Air Force begins to airlift American civilians from Korea. It initiates flights between

34 Kimpo Airfield outside of Seoul and Itazuke Airfield in Kyushu, Japan. The Air Force utilizes SB-17 planes to provide cover during the rescue operation. American dependents are also transported from Seoul to Inchon for evacuation to Japan. Slightly after midnight (25th– 26th), Ambassador Muccio activates the evacuation plans. Armed Forces Radio station WVTP, which has been broadcasting constant updates, instructs all women and children to speed to Camp Sobinggo to receive transportation to Inchon, where they will board the vessel Reinholt. By about 1800, on the 26th, more than 700 passengers are aboard the ship, which usually carries no more than twelve passengers. The Reinholt is escorted to Japan by the USS Mansfield (DD 728) and USS Dehaven (DD 727). Other Americans at Taegu and Taejon join those in Pusan and depart aboard the vessel Pioneer Dale. Air Force planes based in Japan fly continual escort and surveillance flights throughout the day to ensure safety. Additional flights transport ammunition and supplies from Japan to the embattled South Koreans. In related activity, Colonel Wright returns to KMAG headquarters from Japan. He is briefed on the deteriorating circumstances and as the situation becomes more grave, he prepares orders that direct KMAG personnel to move farther south to positions between Seoul and Pusan, from where they can be quickly evacuated if the situation warrants. Clear instructions dictating further action by KMAG are not forthcoming from Washington, but the U.S. is definitely reversing its position concerning its intent to defend Korea. Word arrives from the secretary of state through the Far East Command that all KMAG advisors are to stay with their respective Korean units as long as it remains feasible and the units are operating in a combat mode. By the latter part of the 26th, Ambassador Muccio requests military planes from Japan to evacuate non-essential personnel from the mission. Soon after, following strong suggestions from his staff, Colonel Wright directs all nonessential KMAG personnel to depart by truck for Suwon, from where they will be airlifted to Japan. Colonel Wright retains thirty-three officers and enlisted men to remain with him to assist the South Koreans. Wright further orders that if the KMAG face imminent capture, they are to break for the embassy and seek diplomatic immunity with Muccio’s party. — In the U.S. Far East Command: With the unexpected outbreak of hostilities ongoing in Korea, the logistical problems are monumental. The Pacific Coast will serve as origin point for the Military Air Transport Service en route to Tokyo. Three separate routes will be utilized. The first is Great Circle, with flights originating at McChord Air Force Base, Tacoma, Washington, with Tokyo its destination, via Anchorage, Alaska, and Shemya, Aleutian Islands, covering a distance of about 5,688 miles and 30 to 33 flying hours. A second route originates at Travis Air Force Base, near San Francisco, by way of Honolulu and Wake Island, a distance of about 6,718 miles to Tokyo and 34 flying hours. The third route is by way of Southern California via Hon-

35 olulu, Johnston, Kwajalein and Guam, requiring 40 hours of flying time to cover the distance of 8,000 miles. Throughout the month of July, an accelerating number of flights transport more than 100 tons of supplies per day. Subsequent to the delivery of supplies to Japan, they are forwarded to Korea, basically from Ashiya Airbase, supplemented by the airfields at Brady and Itazuke. At present, due to U.S. government sentiment that there had been no danger of trouble in Korea, there are no C-Rations there and almost none in Japan. Those rations initially arriving in Korea, including the C-Rations and B-Rations, are the ultimate in leftovers, having been around since the close of World War II. Age doesn’t affect the taste, and the ground troops who consume them seemingly never forget them. Also, in Washington, a scheduled policy meeting is canceled, which prompts the commandant of the Marine Corps, Clifford B. Cates, to make an extemporaneous entry on his wall calendar: “SecNav’s policy meeting called off. Nuts.” General Cates is anxious to commit his Marines to the war. In other activity, President Truman and his advisors meet in the Blair House to assess the situation in Korea, but intelligence is still minimal. Talk of committing U.S. ground troops is considered, but the ramifications are great and it will take more time; therefore, word is sent to MacArthur that the use of ground troops is not authorized. In conjunction, the U.S. does not have many ground troops prepared for mobilization in the Far East. Nevertheless, the consensus seems to be that Infantry will be required soon. In Naval activity, the 7th Fleet departs the Philippines heading north to Korea. — In Japan: President Truman authorizes General MacArthur to dispatch a military survey group to Korea to assess the situation. On the following day, Brigadier General John H. Church and twelve other staff officers

June 27, 1950 and enlisted men depart for Korea. Amphibious Group 1 conducts the 35th Regiment’s practice landing as scheduled at Chigasaki Bay. Another landing is scheduled for the following day. It gets underway, but the hostilities in Korea cause its premature cancellation. Orders come in recalling the air support, and shortly thereafter, the destroyers are directed to withdraw. Also, Far East Air Forces receive C-47s from various points in the Far East in exchange for C-54s. The C-47s provide the Air Force with the ability to land on smaller airstrips. June 27–September 15, 1950 FIRST DESIGNATED CAMPAIGN: THE U.N. DEFENSIVE

June 27

In response to orders from President Truman (see In the United States, this entry), General MacArthur, from his headquarters in Tokyo, speeds a contingent of technical specialists to Korea where he establishes General Headquarters Advanced Command and Liaison Group (ADCOM), commanded by General John H. Church. General Church departs Haneda Airfield and arrives at Itazuke at 0600. Church expects to depart for Seoul, but new instructions arrive that direct him to reroute to Suwon, because of the deteriorating situation in the capital. Church’s entourage arrives at Suwon by air at about 1900. Headquarters is established in Suwon at the Experimental Agriculture Building. MacArthur arrives on the 29th to survey the battle area. In other activity, the government officials of the Republic evacuate Seoul as the North Koreans sweep south, and reach Taejon, but soon after, the South Koreans are forced to jump back farther to Taegu and from there, to the last stop, Pusan. U.S. Embassy officials

Troops loading supplies and ammunition aboard planes in Japan for use by the ROK forces in Korea.

June 27, 1950 also begin to exit in haste, slightly after 0900. Muccio, just prior to his evacuation, reports to MacArthur that the Armed Forces Radio Station is being destroyed to prevent use by the enemy. South Korean Army officials also depart without informing KMAG. When informed, Colonel Sterling Wright and his staff rush to Sihung to intercept the ROKs and convince them to

President Harry S Truman, after making the decision to support the Republic of South Korea.

36 return to the capital. During the trip, Wright receives a radio message from MacArthur which informs him that the Joint Chiefs of Staff has ordered MacArthur to assume control of all U.S. troops in Korea, including KMAG. While conferring with the South Koreans in Sihung, another radio message from MacArthur is received by Wright. It instructs him “to be of good cheer.” MacArthur also tells Colonel Wright that big decisions by the U.S. are about to unfold. This news persuades the South Korean headquarters personnel, including the chief of staff, to return, but the stay is short-lived. The South Koreans again evacuate on the following morning, without notifying the Americans. Finally, the exhausting efforts of Wright conclude. He attempts to halt the evacuation of the remaining KMAG personnel at Suwon, previously scheduled to depart for Japan, and succeeds in stopping about thirty men. They are ordered to return to Seoul. Meanwhile, the swarming hordes of North Koreans allow little time to dispose of critical records in the U.S. Embassy, which causes severe complications. Some secret documents are burned on the roof; however, unclassified personnel records will be seized and subsequent purges held. In addition, when the North Koreans enter the city on the following day, they bring cases of documents containing the names of scores of South Koreans considered anticommunist. People, tied together, are led into the streets, and after a quick kangaroo trial, by what is known as People’s Court, many innocent victims are executed. When an accusation is made and the sentence given, the onlookers are asked if anyone wants to speak on their behalf. None do, aware that they would then be shot, too. According to CIA reports, more than half of the students in Seoul support the North Koreans and great numbers of them have voluntarily joined the Communist Army. Also, many who remain in Seoul greet the invaders with enthusiasm. But many more reject the aggressors and wait in hopes of MacArthur and the U.S. arriving to save them. The U.S. fleet moves to blockade North Korea, but President Truman also intends to ensure that the Nationalist Chinese under Chiang Kai-shek on Formosa are unable to initiate raids against the Chinese mainland and possibly provoke China to enter the conflict. In Air Force activity, Americans and some other foreign nationals continue to be evacuated from Kimpo and Suwon Airfields, but the pace is accelerated as the danger increases. During the activity at the airfields, three North Korean planes attack four American escort fighter planes. The three enemy planes are blown from the sky. Four additional enemy aircraft are destroyed in dog fights later in the day. The first shot by the Air Force in the war is fired by Major James W. Little, commander, 339th FAWS. In addition, Lt. William G. Hudson, 68th FAWS, with Lieutenant Carl Fraser as his radar observer, emerge as the victors in the first aerial victory of the war. The seven enemy planes shot down had been achieved by six pilots. Another of the pilots to score a victory is Lieutenant Robert H. Dewald, 35th

37

June 27, 1950

Top: U.S. destroyers in mothballs at San Diego following the termination of World War II. The Korean War brings some of the ships back to activate service. Bottom: KMAG advisors during the withdrawal from Seoul on 27 June. The American advisors are en route to Kimpo airfield about eighteen miles distant.

June 27, 1950

38

Top: A patient in a litter arrives in Japan from Korea aboard the SS Reinholt during the withdrawal of Americans from Korea. Bottom: Two soldiers chat with one of the younger Americans being evacuated from Korea. Fighter Bomber Squadron, 8th Fighter Bomber Group. Also, B-26s, operating from Japan, execute a night attack against enemy targets; however, the raids are not successful, due to inclement weather. In other activity, the 8th Fighter-Bomber Wing (FBW) establishes a composite unit of U.S. Air Force

and South Korean airmen at Taegu Airfield. The pilots will fly F-51D Mustangs. The air evacuation safely transports 718 Americans to Japan, and another 809 Americans are transported by sea ( June 26–29). In all, 2,001 people are evacuated. Word arrives in Taegu from Ambassador Muccio that the KMAG advisors are to separate from the S.K. 3rd Division and move south

39 to Pusan; the families of the advisors had been evacuated earlier. In Naval activity, Rear Admiral Hoskins orders the Seventh Fleet to leave Hong Kong and Subic Bay for Sasebo, but en route, orders arrive from Admiral Joy that divert the fleet to Okinawa, which will place it in close proximity to Korea and Formosa, yet a safer distance from the Chinese and Soviet Air Forces. Meanwhile, the USS Juneau and the Destroyer USS DeHaven are directed to sweep the coastal waters south of the 38th Parallel and intercept any hostile landings. The USS Sergeant Keathley departs Yokohama with a capacity load of ammunition and supplies, including twelve 105-mm howitzers; the ship is escorted by the USS Juneau and DeHaven to Pusan. — In the United States: President Truman sends word to the United Nations, reference their resolution of the 25th, that the Northern aggressors have not heeded the order to halt hostilities, but rather have chosen to press the attack. The president notes the Security Council’s plea for all members to aid the U.N.’s effort to mandate compliance, then clearly emphasizes America’s intent: “I have ordered United States air and sea forces to give the Korean government troops cover and air support. The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that Communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war.” Also, President Truman directs the U.S. Seventh Fleet to ensure the safety of Formosa by deploying in such fashion to forbid a Communist invasion. In addition, U.N. Ambassador Warren Austin presents a letter to the Security Council that underscores the North Korean intent to “completely disregard and flout the decision of the security council....” The United Nations Security Council goes into another special session, which results in a second resolution: “The Security Council recommends that the members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea (South) as may be necessary, to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area.” (On the 26th, Washington time, a teleconference between Washington and Tokyo had transpired, and resulted in the issuance of orders to evacuate civilians and dependents from Korea. In a separate message, the Pacific Fleet is directed to prepare additional ships to move to the Western Pacific.) The Soviets again are absent from the U.N. session, continuing their protest pattern since the beginning of January. In their absence, they are unable to veto the resolution. Although the United Nations falls short of declaring war, the intent is clear and the action is called “Police Action.” The nation of Yugoslavia votes no. Egypt and India abstain, but the latter joins the action two days later. The precedent-setting resolution passes with the votes of China, Cuba, Ecuador, France, Great Britain, Norway and the United States.

June 28 At about 0100, KMAG personnel attempt to inform Colonel William H.S. Wright that the South Korean Army Headquarters is again evacuating Seoul,

June 28, 1950 but he is inaccessible, as the past few days have left him sleepless and his aide refuses to wake him. A second trip to headquarters by Lt. Colonel Lewis Vieman proves fruitful, but as the two men are about to confer, conversation becomes almost unnecessary as the Han River bridge blows, and their focus centers on the immensity of the situation. The bridge was not to be destroyed until the enemy secured the capital and all South Korean troops had been evacuated to the south bank of the Han. This disaster cripples the evacuation process, needlessly kills hundreds of people on the bridge and traps S.K. units in the city. Panic and confusion run rampant. Colonel William Wright attempts to move the Americans out of Seoul by convoy; however, the alternate bridges are also blown. Eventually, Lt. Colonel Lee Chi Yep offers to assist the Americans. He commandeers a ferry by shooting one boatman through his clothing. The startled riverman quickly moves his huge raft to shore. Most Americans cross safely at about 0800, but the original fifty vehicles are left behind. From the south bank of the Han, the main contingent walks fifteen exhausting miles along a primitive trail to Anyang-ni, where they are greeted by an advance party. Colonel Lee Chi Yep, the enterprising South Korean who procured the raft, accompanies the Americans during the long walk. En route, Colonel Chi Yep commandeers a jeep and speeds ahead and procures vehicles to transport the party to Suwon. In the meantime, Colonel Wright, two officers and three enlisted men remain on the north bank in Seoul to locate a safe crossing for the command jeep, which contains the radio, their only means of communicating with Japan. Before dawn, the small party is able to board another raft, which also accommodates the jeep. Wright’s party makes it to Suwon to join the main group there. Also, the capital falls; North Korean tanks, followed by Infantry, enter Seoul. North Korean Colonel Han Se Gon later relates that one of his gunners had run up the flag of the People’s Republic of Korea, and they watched it flutter bravely. In Air Force activity, fighting in the region remains extremely heavy on the ground. At Suwon, Communist planes bomb the airfield. One plane, a C-54, is destroyed on the ground. Also, General Church, subsequent to his initial observations while at Suwon, informs General MacArthur that only by an infusion of U.S. ground troops can the original boundary in Korea be restored. First reports that filter into headquarters during the invasion cause grave concern about the plight of some Americans (KMAG), but by the end of the month, all are accounted for and only three casualties have struck their ranks, all minor wounds. In other activity, C-54s and C-47s evacuate the last of 851 U.S. citizens who are flown out of Korea. Also, U.S. planes bomb enemy positions in Seoul. In Pusan, the situation remains confusing, too. The KMAG Advisors to the S.K. 3rd Division arrive from Taegu after a tedious journey begun on the previous day. The small column nudges southward through endless rows of frantic South Korean civilians and then en-

June 28, 1950

40

Situation in Korea, June 28, 1950.

41 counters a nasty rainstorm which stalls the group. The Americans abandon their mud-trapped vehicles outside Pusan and walk the remainder of the route. Once in Pusan, Colonel Emmerich’s party spots South Koreans who are raiding the American compound to steal food, equipment, furniture and about anything else they can get. The newly arrived Americans begin firing over the heads of the Koreans and the pirating ceases. Colonel Emmerich is informed by Captain Gerald Putnam, advisor to the S.K. 23rd Regiment, that the American dependents had departed Pusan on the previous day aboard the Pioneer Dale. He is also told that another vessel, the Letitia Lykes, remains in port with members of the American Mission and some KMAG advisors. The KMAG advisors are sent for and ordered to return to Emmerich’s Headquarters. Later, Emmerich makes radio contact with the Far East Command in Japan and speaks with Brigadier General George Back to get instructions. Unfortunately, Headquarters in Japan, like Emmerich, has little knowledge of the crisis; General Back inquires if Emmerich has any first hand information about the situation in Seoul. Emmerich is instructed to wait for orders. Meanwhile, Headquarters in Japan will maintain constant contact with Pusan to try and keep abreast of the crisis. Colonel Emmerich, totally unaware of KMAG’s predicament in Seoul, establishes a Provisional Military Advisory Group, Headquarters, Pusan, Korea, and as the senior officer, he creates a small staff and designates himself commanding officer. In Naval activity, the USS Juneau (CLAA 119), off the east coast of Korea, bombards enemy targets in the vicinity of Samchock, in what becomes the initial major naval surface fire support operation of the conflict. — In the United States: The commandant of the Marine Corps, General Cates, meets with Admiral Forest P. Sherman, chief of Naval Operations, and recommends that the Fleet Marine Force be committed to Korea. Soon after, on the 30th, General Cates attends the secretary of the navy’s conference. The discussions include the possibility and probability of committing Marines to Korea. —In Japan: In Air Force activity, at 0600, a C-54 takes off from Tachikawa Airfield near Tokyo, transporting 105-mm ammunition to Suwon to supplement the ammunition transported the previous day from Japan by ship. By mid-afternoon, additional aircraft depart with nearly 120 additional tons of ammunition. The planes that run supplies and B-26 light bombers are provided protection by F-80s based at Itazuke. An Air Force reconnaissance plane (RF-80-A), piloted by Lieutenant Lt. Bryce Poe II, initiates a mission to acquire photographs of the vanguard of the North Korean invasion forces. Poe flies the initial reconnaissance mission by a jet. Also, the 3rd Bombardment Group dispatches more than 20 B-26s, which launch the Air Force’s first air strikes of the conflict. The planes attack the rails at Munsan and other rail traffic in the sector between Seoul and the border with North Korea. One of the planes is hit and damaged by anti-aircraft fire. It

June 29, 1950 crashes while returning to Japan and all aboard are killed. In other activity, other planes, B-29s attached to the 19th Bombardment Group, depart their base on Okinawa and attack targets that include rail bridges and vehicles in the initial medium bomber attacks of the conflict. Bad weather over Japan limits Fifth Air Force sorties, but eighteen fighters execute close air support and interdiction missions. In Naval activity, the vessel Cardinal O’Connell, her hulls crammed with ammunition from the Ikego Ammunition Depot, departs Japan for Korea, escorted by the destroyers Collett and Mansfield, to further augment the South Korean cause. Also, British Admiral Sir Patrick Brind informs Admiral Joy that the Royal Navy will commit Task Group 96.8 (British Rear Admiral W.G. Andrewes), which includes the carrier HMS Triumph, cruiser HMS Belfast and the destroyers HMS Consort and Cossock. The British warships enjoin the Seventh Fleet at Buckner Bay, Okinawa. The other British vessels, which include the frigates HMS Alacrity, HMS Black Swan and HMS Hart, as well as the cruiser HMS Jamaica, swell the ranks of the blockade force. In addition, Australia and New Zealand commit warships, which also join the naval blockade of North Korea. On the following day, the Allied Naval Force is transferred to the operational control of General MacArthur. In other naval activity, the U.S. Navy forms an antisubmarine warfare (ASW) patrol off Sasebo. It operates only until 1 July 1950.

June 29

General MacArthur and fourteen additional staff members depart Japan at 0610 for Suwon aboard the Bataan, an unarmed aircraft. The Bataan, after a hazardous flight that includes a close encounter with a Russian Yak fighter, lands safely on a dwarfed airstrip amidst a wrecked C-54. American fighters close in and quickly drive the Communist plane away. At about 0800, while in flight, MacArthur has a message dispatched to Lt. General George Stratemeyer’s second in command. The message to General Partridge, dictated by Stratemeyer: “Stratemeyer to Partridge: Take out North Korean airfield immediately. No publicity. Macarthur approves.” Communist planes are bombing the retreating South Koreans and have also plastered the airfield at Suwon, just prior to MacArthur’s arrival. Once aground, the Bataan is flown back to Tokyo out of harm’s way, but Lt. Colonel Anthony Story, MacArthur’s pilot, returns to Suwon at 1715 to pick up the general. While in Korea, MacArthur moves right to the front to assess the ongoing tragedy. His jeep drives past the mystified and bewildered civilians as they flee for safety, and he passes the South Koreans that are in retreat. At the Han River, MacArthur clearly perceives the disaster at hand when he observes a routed South Korean Army in disorganized retreat. Some other officers see things differently, observing that many units had retired with discipline. One demoralized Korean officer remarks to a friend: “We can’t fight them without equipment,” giving credence to their inability to hold

June 29, 1950 the line. Many of the South Koreans have fought bravely, but the match is one-sided. General MacArthur, standing in the midst of the death and destruction and under enemy fire, scrutinizes the final rear guard actions at the Han River, while simultaneously collecting even incidental information to assist him in what would have to be a miraculous extrication from defeat. First impressions of the MacArthur party convince them that only the contingents of the South Korean 1st and 7th Divisions contain enough men and equipment to resist effectively. Nevertheless, units of the S.K. 5th Division hold in Yongdungp’o, and to the west, Inchon is held by the Capital Division. Additional S.K. troops of the 2nd Division regroup at the junction of the Han and Pukhan Rivers. Meanwhile, the S.K. 6th Division, following its gallant three-day stand, continues its retreat toward Wonju in the center of the peninsula. The ROK 8th Division also retreats. The 23rd Regiment, 3rd S.K. Division, moves north from Pusan toward Ulchin, about sixty-five miles above Pohang-dong, to intercept an anticipated North Korean drive down the east coastal highway. MacArthur thinks not with despair, but of victory, and in less than thirty minutes he conceives his plan. Although his sparse occupation troops are overwhelmingly outnumbered, MacArthur has devised a strategy to use them to give the impression of strength to buy time and receive reinforcements. He will direct an orderly retreat to gain more tentative positions and permit the disillusioned ROK troops to regain their confidence. Meanwhile, the swiftness of the North Korean advance forces the South Koreans to continue to make many mistakes, one of which included the premature demolition of the Han River bridge. During this brief period at the river, MacArthur realizes that the power of the North Korean thrust might propel them to the last stop, Pusan. He devises a plan to launch an amphibious invasion behind the enemy lines at Inchon, from which point he can recapture Seoul and isolate the Communists troops between there and Pusan. The plan will be poorly received by Washington, but his persistence will prevail. Later in the day — subsequent to meeting with President Rhee, Ambassador John Muccio and General John Church — General MacArthur returns to Tokyo to mobilize his forces. MacArthur’s concludes about the future of Korea, during his initial visit to the front, that “air and naval action alone could not be decisive, and that nothing short of the intervention of U.S. ground forces could give assurance of stopping the Communists and of later regaining the ground.” The first U.S. ground troops arrive in Korea at Suwon. Detachment X, composed of less than thirtyfive men, has also brought four M55 machine guns of the 507th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion. Slightly after 1600, the unit engages four attacking enemy planes. One is destroyed and another is thought to have been destroyed. Another air raid occurs about 2000. As the day progresses, contingents of the N.K. 6th Division,

42 which had breached the Han River west of Seoul on the previous day, seize control of Kimpo Airfield. In addition, the N.K. 3rd and 4th Divisions in Seoul prepare to bolt the river in force, following the cessation of a heavy artillery bombardment of South Korean positions. The N.K. 1st Division trails the 3rd and 4th Divisions, but later it pivots and moves toward Ichon and Umsong on the first primary road east of the SeoulPusan highway. In the meantime, Colonel Emmerich continues to maintain contact with headquarters in Japan. Members of Emmerich’s staff forward weather reports to the Air Force at Itazuke to aid the success of its missions. Meanwhile, additional KMAG advisors who were with the S.K. 6th and 8th Divisions at Wonju arrive at Pusan bringing the KMAG forces there to twenty-two officers and 34 enlisted men. Two missionaries and six civilians of the ECA are also with Emmerich. The newly established Provisional KMAG becomes active. It dispatches one team composed of six men to Taejon and another detachment of two officers is sent to rejoin the S.K. 3rd Division at Taegu. Emmerich’s command also dispatches some communications personnel to the Coast Guard Base at Chinhae. In Air Force activity, Fifth Air Force executes 172 sorties in support of the S.K. forces. This level of support is maintained during the coming days. On this day, B-26s attack bridges, and Fifth Air Force F-80s patrol above the Han River, while F-82s, attached to the 86th FAWS, initiate the first napalm air strike of the conflict. In the skies, Air Force planes of the 35th and 80th Fighter Bomber Squadrons (FBS) operating near Suwon encounter and engage North Korean aircraft that are attacking Suwon’s airfield. Five enemy planes are eliminated from the North Korean Air Force. One of the enemy planes is destroyed by Lieutenant Richard J. Burns (35th Fighter Bomber Squadron, 8th Fighter Bomber Group). Burns, piloting an F-51 Mustang, downs an IL-10. In addition, other aircraft, 8 B-29s attached to the 19th Bomber Group, pound Kimpo airfield, which had been seized by the Communists. The B-29s also hit the rail depot at Seoul. Subsequent to completing the mission, the B-29s head back to Okinawa, but en route, enemy aircraft intercept the group. Another pilot, Lieutenant Roy W. Marsh, 80th Fighter Bomber Squadron (8th Fighter Bomber Group), flying an F-80C, knocks out an IL-10 which closes on Seoul at an elevation of 1,200 feet. Marsh engages the plane near Uijongbu. The bombers return safely; however, one of the attacking planes is shot down by the gunners to rack up the initial kill of an enemy plane by a B-29 gunner. In yet other activity, subsequent to authorization by MacArthur to select targets in North Korea, 18 planes (3rd Bomber Group B-26s) attached to Fifth Air Force, strike Heijo Airfield on the outskirts of Pyongyang, and report the destruction of about 25 planes on the field. In other activity, a pack of three enemy planes close against Lieutenant Harry T. Sandlin (80th Fighter Bomber Squadron, 8th Fighter Bomber Group) near

43 Suwon. Sandlin outmaneuvers the trio and places his F51 Mustang to the rear of an LA-7, dispenses about 800 rounds of machine gun fire and downs the enemy aircraft. In Naval activity, the cruiser USS Juneau commences the first U.S. Naval surface vessel bombardment of the conflict. Operating off the east coast of Korea, it bombards suspected enemy positions in the vicinity of Kangnung–Samch’ok, where N.K. guerrillas and the elements of the Communist 766th Independent Unit had landed on the 25th. — In the United States: Major General L.L. Lemnitzer pens a memorandum to the secretary of defense that contains a consensus of the thoughts of the military leaders at the time of the invasion. It states that there had been knowledge of the North Korean ability to attack South Korea. But he emphasizes that every other country bordering the Soviet Union possesses the same capabilities and that no intelligence agency had considered Korea as “a point of attack.” In other activity, Secretary of State Dean Acheson is informed by the Australian ambassador that two Australian warships and the 77th Royal Australian Fighter Squadron (all presently based in Japan) will join the U.S. forces. Additional naval forces are committed by Canada, Netherlands and New Zealand. Also, the only nation to offer ground troops is Nationalist China, but their proposal to dispatch 33,000 troops is shortcircuited by MacArthur on the following day. MacArthur claims that the Nationalist contingent is untrained and lacks motor transport and artillery. There is speculation that Washington prefers to keep the Nationalist Chinese out of the conflict to avoid the possibility of inciting the Communist Chinese. In other activity, General Eisenhower visits the Pentagon ( June 28, Washington time) to meet with General Omar Bradley, but Bradley is confined to bed, suffering from a stomach virus. Eisenhower speaks with Generals Matt Ridgway, Joseph Collins and Wade Haislip. Apparently Eisenhower is stunned to discover the unpreparedness of the U.S. Army and the nonchalant attitudes concerning the Korean crisis. Eisenhower strongly urges initial mobilization of sufficient force to meet the threat, including the bolstering of the forces in Europe and the use of the atom bomb, if necessary. Eisenhower is in town for a scheduled physical examination, but he seemingly writes a few prescriptions for the Army while there. Ike also makes note that he would prefer a younger General in command, an obvious referral to MacArthur. Nonetheless, showing empathy towards MacArthur’s plight, Eisenhower also states that the restrictions that confine MacArthur’s responsive actions to the area below the 38th Parallel should be lifted. — In Japan: By today, the U.S. Air Force has transferred many of its aircraft from distant bases to Ashiya and Itazuke Airbases to ensure they are capable of striking the battle sectors in Korea. Also, the 19th Bombardment Group, Twentieth Air Force, relocates from Guam to Kadena Airfield on Okinawa. And, the 8th

June 30, 1950 Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron (TRS), based at Yokota, initiates photographic reconnaissance missions with its RB-29 aircraft to gain intelligence regarding airfields in North Korea. In other activity, the 21st Troop Carrier Squadron (TCS) arrives at Tachikawa Air Force Base from Clark AFB in the Philippines to begin operations from Japan.

June 30

Using the umbrella coverage of artillery and tank fire, the 8th Regiment, 3rd N.K. Division, moves from Seoul to the south bank of the Han River. Many troops cross on foot while others swim. Others are ferried across on wooden boats, which are also utilized to transport trucks. The advance, once across the river, stalls as the regiment reforms. The pause prevents a quick move against Yongdungp’o, the conduit for the primary rail and road routes heading south. In response to the enemy penetration, General Church directs S.K. Chief of Staff General Chae to mount a counterattack and strike the enemy at the riverbank. But the interdicting North Korean fire frustrates the effort. With continuing reports expressing the deterioration of the South Korean resistance, Lt. General Chung II Kwon arrives in Korea from Japan to relieve General Chae. At about 1600, General Church, using the radio, hurries another urgent message to Tokyo, relating more grim details of the lopsided struggle. Soon after, he dashes twelve miles south to Osan, from where he can speak to Tokyo directly by telephone. While speaking to MacArthur’s chief of staff, General Edward Almond, General Church is informed that U.S. ground troops have been committed to the cause, which gives him some temporary hope. Church is instructed to hold Suwon’s airstrip for another day to receive the reinforcements, and he responds in the affirmative that it will be held. However, in Church’s short absence, more confusion has compounded the dilemma. False information, relayed by a U.S. plane, that a North Korean column moving from the east was nearing Suwon, is given to S.K. Generals Chung and Chae. The erroneous information causes bedlam when they return to Suwon from the Han River with the distressing news. Following this event, an unexplained glaring red flare shoots into the air from a point near the railroad station, located about 500 yards from a command post. KMAG personnel at the post react with contrasting opinions, and neither General Church nor Colonel William Wright is on location. Discussion on the unfolding activity reaches no concrete conclusion; however, initially it is decided by an on-site ADCOM officer to evacuate the town and form a perimeter around the airfield. In turn, the decision and ongoing undisciplined activity have confounded the Korean officers. During the ensuing moments, some ADCOM people, assuming Suwon is being surrounded, begin destroying their equipment with thermite grenades. Meanwhile, at the airfield, a defensive perimeter is about to be established, but lacking direction, the officers abort the plan and prepare to retire south to Taejon. An astonished General Church, having re-

June 30, 1950 turned from Osan, encounters the convoy while it sits to await the call to move out toward Taejon. Church immediately orders the convoy to return to Suwon. General Church, already fuming over the disruption at the airfield, sees his patience pushed to the brink when he returns to town and finds his headquarters and most of the valuable signal equipment destroyed. Realizing that holding the airfield is no longer feasible, General Church, drenched from the torrential rain and apparently fatigued from the overtaxing day, orders the convoy to withdraw to Osan, where he can reopen communications with Tokyo. Following a brief conversation between Church and General Almond, it is agreed that the ADCOM personnel would head for Taejon. In conjunction, S.K. Army Headquarters remains in Suwon. The expected reinforcements are diverted to Pusan. In the meantime, other N.K. units prepare to launch a strong crossing of the Han on the following day. In other activity, an advance group of U.S. officers, led by Lt. Colonel Lewis A. Hunt, arrives in Korea to begin organizing the logistical operations in Pusan. In Air Force activity, The 77th Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) Squadron arrives in Korea. Later, the Australian squadron will be attached to Fifth Air Force. While evacuations are ongoing at Suwon, the Air Force initiates modifications at another field, Kumhae Airfield, located slightly more than ten miles northwest of Pusan. Also, near Suwon, Lieutenant John B. Thomas, 36th Fighter Bomber Squadron, 8th Fighter Bomber Group, engages an enemy Yak-9 type aircraft. Thomas, flying an F-80, prevails and the Yak plummets in flames to the ground. Also, Fifth Air Force tactical air control contingents arrive at Suwon. In other activity, planes (B-26s), attached to the 3rd Bombing Group, attack enemy positions in the vicinity of Seoul, while B-29s also pound enemy targets near Seoul, at locations north of the Han River. — In the United States: General Lawton Collins (Army chief of staff ) receives a message from MacArthur (near midnight June 29, Washington time); he informs Frank Pace, Secretary of the Army, of MacArthur’s request for a regimental combat team to be committed near the Han River, far from Pusan. MacArthur’s request enunciates the necessity of American troops to stem the tide and retake the surrendered terrain. He states, “To continue to utilize the forces of our air and navy without an effective ground element cannot be decisive.” Following an early morning conversation with Pace, President Truman authorizes the use of the combat team, and later in the day, the president informs officials of the State and Defense departments that he is authorizing the dispatch of two divisions from Japan. He also states that he has ordered the implementation of a naval blockade of North Korea. Truman makes the U.S. position public during the afternoon. During this talk with the press the president emphasizes that the U.S. is not at war; the conflict is dubbed a “police action.” General Collins calls the other chiefs of staff at about 0530 and informs them of the decision to send ground

44 troops to Korea. They are miffed, but no formal protest is ever made. U.N. Ambassador Warren Austin speaks to the Security Council of the General Assembly, informing them of the U.S. initiatives (in response to U.N. resolutions of June 25 and 27) to curtail the hostilities in Korea. The strength of the U.S. Marine Corps stands at 74,279 men. The 1st Marine Division (reinforced), stationed at Camp Pendleton, California, contains 641 officers and 7,148 enlisted men. Due to the intolerable situation in Korea, the 1st Provisional Brigade will drain the weakened division further; however, by September 15, 26,000 Marines will bulge the 1st Marine Division, as calls go out and Marines (active and reserve) converge on Pendleton from points all across the country. More Marines will be drawn from the Mediterranean Fleet. It is a feat unparalleled in military history. The 1st Marine Division will have no time allotted for a rehearsal landing prior to the invasion of Inchon. — In Japan: General MacArthur is informed by Washington (directive 6-29-50) that he is to deploy U.S. Army forces in South Korea to keep communications and other important functions operating properly, to deploy additional troops to maintain control of a port and airfield in the vicinity of Pusan-Chinhae, and to commit air and naval forces against North Korean military targets, without encroaching against the Soviet Union or Manchuria (Communist China). The instructions from the president also stipulate that a dual blockade is to be initiated, whereby the Communists are prevented from attacking Formosa and the Formosans are similarly restrained from opening hostilities against the mainland. MacArthur is also informed that he is receiving operational control of the U.S. 7th Fleet. However, the directive, approved by the president, stipulates that MacArthur is not to retaliate against the Soviet Union if they directly intervene in the aggression, which places the American forces at a great disadvantage and possible jeopardy if they are fired upon and are forbidden to retaliate. MacArthur directs General Walton Walker to move the 24th Division to Korea. In turn, General Walker briefs General William F. Dean, commanding officer, 24th Division, on his orders. General Dean, according to the instructions, will command all U.S. Army forces in Korea. Dean is to transport his Division Headquarters and one infantry regiment to Pusan by air. The heavy equipment, including artillery, tanks, ammunition and food, are to be shipped to Korea by sea. Ultimately, the plans filter down to the man who will lead the task force, Lt. Colonel Charles B. Smith, who is awakened from his sleep and ordered to speed to the command post. Smith is ordered to take his battalion (minus Companies A and B) to Itazuke Air Base, where he will meet General Kean and receive further instructions. By 0300 on the 1st, the task force is on the highway on a 75 mile journey during a driving rain. The convoy reaches its destination slightly after 0800. In other activity, General Stratemeyer, convinced of the need for more air power, requests additional planes

45 to supplement his force. The appeal calls for twentythree B-29s, 164 F-80Cs, sixty-four F-51s, twentyone C-54s and twenty-one F-82s. The Air Force’s downsizing after World War II creates problems that will continue for the duration of the war. The Air Force responds but no F-80s are available for Far East Air Forces. Substitutes are instead sent, 150 F-51 Mustangs. Also, Stratemeyer pulls 50 dusty F-51s out of his storage bin for added punch. The F-51 proves better suited for the rugged conditions of the Korean airfields and it covers more range than the F-80s.

July 1 The North Koreans continue their southward drive. From Seoul, the N.K. 5th Regiment, 4th Division, held in reserve since the invasion began, pushes its 3rd Battalion across the Han River at 0400. The remainder of the division follows and ignites a fierce contest for Yongdungp’o that lasts until July 3. The South Koreans raise solid resistance and inflict heavy casualties upon the attackers. Nevertheless, by 0800 on July 3, the North Koreans seize control of the town and force the South Koreans to retreat. The enemy sustains 227 dead, 1,822 wounded and 107 men missing, while capturing the prize. As the hotly contested battle ensues, the N.K. 3rd Division also fords the Han. In other activity, the ADCOM convoy reaches Taejon. General Church establishes a new command post. Colonel Wright dispatches five of his KMAG officers to Suwon to assist the South Koreans there. The Eighth Army Operation Order calls for an initial delaying force, comprised of two rifle companies, reinforced by two platoons of 4.2 inch mortars and one platoon of 75mm recoilless rifles. The remainder of the 24th Division follows by sea. From Pusan, trains will transport the task force to P’yongt’aek, and from there, the troops advance to Osan, where they encounter overpowering resistance on July 5. The task force is composed of mostly green troops, but they are full of confidence and expect to quickly terminate the hostilities. In the central corridor of Korea, the South Korean 6th Division continues to fight effective delaying actions against the N.K. 7th Division, which has sustained about 400 casualties and several destroyed T-34 tanks, between Chunch’on and Hongch’on. The enemy advances slowly, marching from Hongch’on, through the mountainous terrain toward Wonju, a strategic rail and highway center. Here, too, elements of the S.K. 6th Division forge stiff resistance to further frustrate the N.K. commanding officer, Maj. Gen. Chon U. The sluggish advance apparently handicaps the time schedule of the North Korean main command, which replaces Chon U, on about the 4th of July, one day before the capitulation of Wonju. In conjunction, the N.K. 7th Division becomes the 12th N.K. Division to differentiate it from a new division that is activated and designated the 7th N.K. Division. Also, during the early part of July, MacArthur focuses on his plan to launch an amphibious landing behind the enemy lines, at Inchon. He will direct Admiral James T. Doyle to

July 1, 1950 make the proper preparations and study all the complexities of initiating the invasion. Doyle diligently executes his orders and subsequently informs MacArthur on the findings of his staff: “Our research listed every known geographical and naval handicap—Inchon had ’em all.” — In Okinawa: Vice Admiral A. D. Struble’s Striking Force (TF-77) departs Buckner Bay and steams toward Korea’s west coast. The naval force is composed of three components: a Screening Group, TG77.2, commanded by Captain C. W. Parker, USN, consisting of eight U.S. and two British destroyers; a Support Force, TG77.1, commanded by British Rear Admiral W.G. Andrewes, consisting of the Cruisers USS Rochester and HMS Belfast; and the Carrier Group TG77.4, commanded by Rear Admiral J. M. Hoskins, USN, composed of the USS Valley Forge and the HMS Triumph. While the convoy moves north, conditions on the Korean peninsula continue to deteriorate, prompting several dispatches to reach the fleet, essentially informing it to maintain the attack beyond the first day. The orders also specify that particular attention should be given to the railroads near Kumchon, Sariwon and Sinanju to disrupt the enemy’s supply line. — In the United States: There are no outward signs, but the White House and the military are concerned about the United States’ capability to handle a major Soviet threat. — In Japan: Task Force Smith, with 406 of its 440man strength, departs Japan for Korea. The task force is not designated TF Smith until several months later. Some elements had arrived at Pusan on the previous day. The unit is composed of the 1st Battalion, 21st Regiment, Rifle Companies B and C, both at less than full strength but each with six 2.36-inch bazooka teams and four 60-mm mortars; a recoilless rifle platoon (composite), less two of its four guns; one-half of a headquarters company; and four 4.2 inch mortars, two of which have not been airlifted. Six transport planes, attached to the 374th TCW, move the troops to Pusan from Korea. The first plane lifts off at 0845, but upon arrival at Pusan, it and the second plane, which is transporting Colonel C.B. Smith, are both compelled to return to Japan because of a thick fog that hovers over the runway. At about 1100, the Pusan airstrip receives the first of many flights. Colonel Charles B. Smith arrives on the tenth flight. Transport vehicles wait at the runway to carry the force seventeen miles to Pusan, where crowds anxiously await their arrival. Once there, the people greet the troops with a tumultuous welcome that includes banners and huge smiles. When the troop trains depart for Taejon at 2000, a South Korean band plays a spirited send-off. In other activity, the 34th Regiment begins boarding a ship during the night. It will embark Pusan on the night of the 2nd. The remainder of the 21st Regiment, except Companies A and D, embarks from Sasebo on July 3. Companies A and D travel separately by ship from Moji. In yet other activity, the Far East Command instructs the Eighth Army to take responsibility for total logis-

July 2, 1950

46

A contingent of Task Force Smith boards a C-54 transport in Japan on 1 July. The troops are the first U.S. combat troops to arrive in Korea. tical support of the U.S. and all other Allied forces operating in Korea, including the South Korean forces. The logistical responsibilities are assumed by Eighth Army Rear, which remains in Yokohama. This responsibility is transferred to Japan Logistical Command during August 1950. — In Hawaii: General Lemuel Shepherd, USMC, Commanding General FMF Pacific, arrives at Hawaii from the United States. General Shepherd is en route to the Far East, anticipating the arrival of Marines. Coincidentally, today General MacArthur requests a Marine Brigade to assist Eighth Army in Korea. Also, the U.S. Navy forms Task Force Yoke, which is composed of vessels that assemble on the West Coast and at Pearl Harbor. The naval task force is to be commanded by Rear Admiral Walter F. Boone.

July 2 Task Force Smith’s train pulls into Taejon at 0800. Soon after, Colonel Charles B. Smith is escorted by Colonel LeRoy Lutes to General Church’s headquarters where a meeting is ongoing between the general and several other U.S. and South Korean officers. General Church welcomes Colonel C.B. Smith and gives him a quick update that details where the task force is needed by referring to the spot on the map. General Church, as is the case with most of the American command, remains convinced that the invasion will be rebuffed. He tells Smith: “We have a little action up here. All we need is some men up here [pointing to the spot] who won’t run when they see tanks.” Colonel Smith reflects no apprehension. He has much

confidence in his officers, one-third of whom have seen combat in either the Atlantic or Pacific during World War II. Smith feels equally confident about his troops, although many are green; however, he is totally unaware of the enemy’s strength and the supporting tanks. Task Force Smith moves to the rest area, but Colonel Smith and several officers move out and travel north about eighty miles along harsh roads to Osan. Smith’s entourage passes innumerable Republic of Korea troops and civilians as they move south. The uncomfortable trip appears profitable, as Lt. Colonel Smith discovers what he believes is a perfect defensive position about three miles north of Osan. The selected site, a ragged ridge of hills that run north, intersects the road at right angles. Its point reaches a height of 300 feet and affords an excellent view of approaching traffic. In addition, the task force positions will control both the railroad and highway. During the reconnaissance mission, enemy planes pass over without detecting the Americans. Smith and his party return to Taejon after dark. Orders arrive that instruct Smith to move his force by rail to Ansong and P’yongt’aek, the former 20 miles southeast of Osan and the latter 15 miles south of the town. Again the troop train rolls north. Colonel Smith remains at P’yongt’aek, separated by about twelve miles from the other half of his force. He establishes headquarters along the main road. In other activity, General Dean reaches Korea by plane, but due to the darkness, his pilot is unable to locate the airstrip at Taejon. They return to Japan. On the following day, General Dean hitches a ride with

47 Captain Ben Tufts, the recently appointed liaison officer between the press and the army. Tuft’s pilot is familiar with Taejon and despite a dense fog, he lands at about 1030. While at General Church’s headquarters, General Dean receives word that he will command all U.S. Army troops in Korea, effective 0001 July 4. These Americans will face more than human enemies; the other foes, the weather and terrain, are equally severe. The Korean battlefields in summer frequently experience temperatures of more than 100 degrees, and the land is inundated with precipitous hills that bear sparse foliage. When the sun is not blazing, it is usually raining heavily. The elements extract nearly as many casualties due to exhaustion as those inflicted by the enemy during the early days of the war. Salt tablets are a necessity and heat exhaustion is commonplace. Central Mountain area: The S.K. 6th Division engages the N.K. 7th Division near Wonju. The stiff resistance hinders the enemy’s advance. In Air Force activity, at Pusan, the tremendous weight of the Air Force C-54s takes a heavy toll on the airfield. The Air Force is forced to cancel the flights of the C-54s until reinforcing steel plates arrive to support the runways. In the meantime, the Air Force uses C-47s to transport the troops and equipment; the smaller planes handle a maximum of eighteen troops. In Naval activity, the official U.N. blockade doesn’t begin until July 4. Nevertheless, at daybreak, a few naval guardians appear to scatter four N.K. torpedo boats that are escorting ten converted trawlers to Chumunjin. As the USS Juneau and two accompanying Royal Navy vessels alter course to attack the flotilla, the enemy PT boats move to strike first. This hostile en-

July 2, 1950 counter, which becomes the first naval engagement of the conflict, is brief and deadly. The PT boats receive the volley. Two PTs immediately sink, and the remaining two speed out of harm’s way. Soon after, additional salvos arc toward the flotilla. Seven enemy trawlers sink and the remaining two escape behind a breakwater. Also, an American LST delivers more reinforcements from Japan to Korea. Elements of the 52nd Field Artillery Battalion, commanded by Lt. Colonel Miller O. Perry, debark at Pusan. On the following day, this contingent moves north by train to augment Task Force Smith. In addition, contingents of the 34th Infantry Regiment, commanded by Colonel Jay Lovless, starts to arrive by sea at Pusan. On the following day, two LSTs arrive, transporting supplies and equipment. In other Naval activity, the Sergeant Keathley, an ammunition vessel, arrives at Pusan from Japan. The KMAG personnel, which had earlier evacuated Suwon and Pusan, debark. Upon arrival, they join with KMAG in Pusan under Colonel Emmerich. Later, most move by train to Taejon. A critical shortage of all types of vehicles exists within KMAG since the evacuation of Seoul; 48 vehicles, including jeeps, ambulances and trucks, are loaded aboard flatcars and forwarded under guard to Taegu. —In Hawaii: General Lemuel Shepherd arrives at Pearl Harbor to assume his new position as commander, Fleet Marine Force Pacific. Soon after his arrival in Honolulu, Shepherd receives a waiting message from the commandant that alerts him of the probability of Marines going to Korea. Before noon, General Shepherd meets with Admiral Radford. — In Japan: U.S. Ambassador William Sebald con-

Elements of the U.S. 24th Division board a ship in Japan on 2 July. The troops are en route to Korea.

July 3, 1950 fers with General Almond and subsequently with General MacArthur,\ to discuss a message received from the Chinese Nationalist Mission in Tokyo. Chiang Kaishek offers to commit three combat divisions to fight with the other U.N. troops. The offer is forwarded to Washington, where it is rejected. There is tremendous concern that Nationalist Chinese participation would precipitate the entry of Communist China and additionally, the Chinese lack armor, artillery, vehicles and sufficient ammunition. However, subsequent ground units that are committed by other countries arrive in the theater without arms and some even without uniforms. Most of the arms the Chinese Nationalists had received from the U.S. were confiscated by the Communists when Chiang Kai-shek’s forces were driven to Formosa. In other activity, General MacArthur dispatches a message to Washington that accepts the commitment of Marines to the Korean Theater. He requests that they be dispatched immediately. Back in the States, Admiral Sherman, subsequent to authorization by President Truman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, directs Admiral Radford to transport the Marine units to the Far East. There are presently no Marine units of any consequence in the Far East. The 1st Marine Provisional Brigade will be the first American contingent to depart the U.S. to participate in the Korean conflict. In concert with the massive endeavor to reel in the manpower, the logistics of gathering sufficient equipment for the Marine Brigade presents a Herculean task: an enormous time constraint coupled with finding dependable operational vehicles and weapons. The veteran vehicles of the Pacific Campaign, referred to as antiques by many, are recalled from their sanctuary at the colossal USMC supply depot in the vast desert area at Barstow, California. Once the “mothballs” are swept off, the regalvanized iron chariots move to Camp Pendleton and El Toro. Amphibian tractors, DUKWs, trucks and jeeps, most still brandishing the scars of the Pacific Campaign, roll toward the coast along the highways and rails to meet the deadline. At the conclusion of World War II, much of the U.S. equipment was abandoned, never to be returned to the States. However, the Marines salvaged everything they could, even if it might have belonged to another branch of the armed services. It has been said that a lot of the equipment that arrived at California received new paint because some appeared more gray than green. The Marines do receive some new equipment, such as their allotment of the new 3.5 rocket launchers and some vehicles. Nonetheless, the veteran vehicles overwhelmingly surpass the number of veterans designated to drive them.

July 3 Specialists in air-to-ground communications arrive in Taejon. These two Fifth Air Force Tactical Air Control contingents greatly enhance the U.N. support of ground troops. In the process, much of the inadvertent bombing and strafing of South Korean forces during these first days of the war ceases. Today, four Royal Australian Air Force Mustangs mistakenly

48 bomb and strafe a nine-boxcar ammunition train that has paused in P’yongt’aek, to await orders to head north. The Australian pilots make six passes and devastate the train, the station and a large section of the town; many civilian casualties are sustained. Additionally, the ammunition continues to explode throughout the night. Also, thirty trucks are destroyed and about 200 ROK troops are killed. In another tragic incident, the town of Suwon and a passing South Korean convoy are each accidentally struck by friendly aircraft fire. Return fire knocks out one of the planes. The pilot makes an emergency landing at Suwon Airfield and to his surprise, is captured by the friendly KMAG and ROK forces there. General Church contacts FEAF and pleads that the Air Force confine their strikes to positions north of the Han River bridge. In other activity, the U.S. 52nd Artillery Battalion arrives in Taejon. General Church orders it to move by train to P’yongt’aek to join Task Force Smith, but due to the accidental damage at the railroad station, the reinforcements move to Songhwan-ni, and from there they drive six miles to arrive at P’yongt’aek before daybreak on the 4th. At Wonju, vicious fighting continues between contingents of the S.K. 6th Division and the N.K. 7th Division. In other activity, Yongdungp’o falls to the North Korean 4th Division. During the morning, the first enemy tanks cross the Han River via a repaired railroad bridge to join the infantry. In conjunction, the N.K. 6th Division continues to advance; elements nudge against Inchon. After dark, six tanks, trailed by an infantry battalion, roll into the strategic port city. In Naval activity, the carriers of the 7th Fleet, supported by British carriers, initiate operations off the west coast of North Korea in conjunction with orders issued by the commander of Naval Forces Far East on 30 June. The carriers USS Valley Forge and the HMS Triumph launch planes against enemy airfields on the west coast in the vicinity of Pyongyang-Chinnamp’o. These aircraft, attached to Admiral Struble’s 7th Fleet carriers, initiate their first air attack of the war. At 0600, sixteen F4U Corsairs (VF-54), commanded by Lt. Commander D.K. English, and twelve AD Skyraiders (VA-55), commanded by Lt. Commander N.D. Hodson, shoot from the decks of the Valley Forge; the former each carry eight 5-inch rockets, and the latter each carry six 100-pound and two 500-pound bombs. Both groups close on the airfield at Pyongyang. Subsequently, the F9F2 Panther jets, also aboard the Valley Forge, catapult into the sky and quickly climb higher before overtaking the slower propeller craft. The jets zap the target before the enemy planes can get off the ground, initiating the U.S. Navy’s first jet combat attack. Although the weather is poor, the skies are clear on the first pass and three aircraft are destroyed. On the second pass, the Panthers decimate two more enemy aircraft. Meanwhile, ammunition storage areas are ablaze when the Corsairs and Skyraiders that follow the jets converge on the target. Their dives account for a direct

49

July 3, 1950

Panther jets prepare to take off from a carrier to strike enemy targets in Korea. hit on the fuel storage area, the total annihilation of the three hangars and complete destruction of the runways. North Korean return fire is totally inadequate. No hits are sustained by any of the attacking aircraft. Later in the day, the planes strike again. The air strikes pummel the rail center in Pyongyang and the

bridges that span the Taedong River. Fifteen locomotives are devastated, ten others sustain damage and large numbers of boxcars are decimated; however, the bridge remains intact. — In the United States: The Joint Chiefs of Staff meet in Washington, D.C., to discuss strategy. One of

July 3, 1950 the topics is the possible commitment of Marines to Korea. General Cates, commandant, Marine Corps, is permitted to attend only this part of the meeting. The joint chiefs are: General Bradley, chairman; General Lawton Collins, Army chief of staff; Admiral Sherman, chief of Naval Operations; and General Hoyt Vandenberg, Air Force chief of staff. The commandant of the Marine Corps jots down a note of historical importance on his wall calendar: “Attended JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff ] meeting. Orders for employment of FMF approved.” The apparent movement of the corps had already been in the works. On July 1st, Admiral Forest Sherman inquired of Admiral Radford the time involved to transport either a Marine Battalion Landing Team or a Marine Regimental Combat Team (RCT) from the West Coast to Korea. On the 2nd, Radford responds, informing Sherman that a landing team could be loaded in four days and embarked in six days. He also states that an RCT could be loaded in six days and be prepared to sail in ten days. Admiral C. Turner Joy makes it known that a Marine RCT could be dispatched to the Pacific if General MacArthur would want it. MacArthur had accepted the offer immediately and so stated in his message on July 2nd, which

50 requested the immediate presence of the Marine RCT and its supporting aircraft. Nonetheless, there is still much reluctance on the part of the joint chiefs to commit the Marines, and there are additional efforts by General Vandenberg to cancel out Marine aviation units, but to no avail. In other activity, Major Vincent J. Gottschalk, USMC, is appointed commanding officer, VMO-6, the 1st Marine Provisional Brigade’s Air Observation Squadron. The squadron will be composed of eight fixed wing aircraft (light observation planes) and seven rotary wing aircraft (helicopters), the latter being brought in from Quantico, Virginia. Gottschalk is directed to have his outfit ready to embark on the 11th. It becomes an extraordinary challenge that requires an immense effort and some ingenuity, peculiar to the corps, to accomplish the mission. The helicopters and accompanying personnel will not arrive at El Toro until two days before shipping out. The fixed wing aircraft personnel number eight pilots and thirty-three enlisted Marines. — In Japan: General MacArthur dispatches a message to Washington just after midnight ( July 2–3), with regard to his instructions to implement a naval blockade of North Korea. He lays out a pragmatic plan that

An AD Skyraider takes off from a carrier to support ground troops. The plane is carrying more than 4,000 pounds of bombs and rockets.

51

July 3, 1950

Top: Planes aboard the USS Valley Forge prepare for launch to strike enemy targets in North Korea. Bottom: U.S. bombers strike the railroad bridges at Seoul. Two of three are hit. The third is destroyed by TNT.

July 4, 1950 he considers mandatory to effectively enforce the blockade. Geographically, the alignment of warships must isolate the eastern ports of Ch’ongjin, Najin and Wonsan, while simultaneously they cap the sea lanes off the west coast ports of Anju, Chinnamp’o, Inchon and Sonch’on. Due to presidential restrictions, which explicitly forbid action or reaction to the Soviet Union, Najin, Ch’ongjin and Sonch’on are left unmolested. This non-action keeps U.N. warships a safe distance from the Soviet Union and Manchuria. However, it grants the Communists several lanes that are guaranteed safe passage. MacArthur notifies Washington that all available ships will be at their assigned stations on the 4th. Also, General MacArthur, aware that available ammunition is useless against tanks, requests that the newly perfected 3.5 rocket launcher be sped to Korea. Production of this weapon’s ammunition had begun about fifteen days before the outbreak of hostilities in Korea. The initial shipment of 3.5 rocket launchers is flown from Travis Air Base, California, on July 8 and it arrives on the 10th. By July 12, the rocket launchers reach Taejon. Immediately thereafter, particular men of the 24th Division are indoctrinated on the proper use of this weapon. This new antitank weapon is constructed of aluminum, weighs 15 pounds, and stretches five feet in length. The rocket launcher is has a smooth bore and an open tube that is capable of launching an eight and one-half pound, 23 inch long shell. The U.S. Eighth Army is in dire need of a weapon that can penetrate the armor of the Russian-built tanks. This new shell is expected to destroy any tank encountered. In other activity, the Far East Air Force establishes a Joint Operations Center on Kyushu at Itazuke Air Base to better control the fighter planes that operate over Korea.

July 4

Twenty-two additional officers are named general and special staff officers of USAFIK. The officer selections are basically drawn from ADCOM, but some KMAG officers are chosen. Most KMAG officers who had returned to Japan after the Communist invasion arrived back in Korea aboard the Sergeant Keathley on July 2. Also, Brigadier General Crump Garvin and some of his staff arrive in Pusan to establish Pusan Base Command, which is activated this day. On the 13th of July, it will be renamed Pusan Logistical Command. The U.N. Naval blockade of portions of North Korea becomes effective this day. In other activity, the North Korean 3rd and 4th Divisions, with Yongdungp’o under their belt and tanks by their side, reinitiate their southern drive. The columns move down the major rail-highway route. At about 0600, the 5th Regiment, N.K. 4th Division, takes the point. It drives feverishly down Suwon Road and covers half the distance between Yongdungp’o and Suwon by 1200. Infantry, augmented by eleven tanks, move into Anyang-ni. Meanwhile, South Koreans who are fleeing on foot and in trucks from Suwon to P’yongt’aek cause the route to become heavily clogged.

52 The traffic jams last throughout the night. During the day, enemy tanks overpower a delaying force attached to the S.K. 5th Regiment, 2nd Division, operating between Anyang-ni and Suwon. The Republic of Korea unit, lacking much equipment, is crushed by the armor, then overrun by infantry. During the daylong skirmishes, U.S. and Australian Air Force planes attempt to aid the ROK forces near Osan, but on several occasions they mistakenly strike ROK troops and inflict more casualties. The South Koreans, unable to neutralize the enemy advance, pull out of Suwon before dark, and by midnight, the town is taken by the N.K. 4th Division. Meanwhile, Lt. Colonel Brad Smith pulls his separated command into P’yongt’aek. It is bolstered by a contingent of the 52nd Artillery Battalion, which had come in from Japan by sea. The unit is composed of one-half section of headquarters and service batteries and the complete complement of Battery A, comprised of 108 men and 73 vehicles. In other activity, Colonel Brad Smith and a small party, including Colonel Miller O. Perry, return to the Osan vicinity and decide on definite positions for the U.S. artillery. As they travel, they pass ROK troops setting the bridges for possible detonation. Also, in Taejon, Generals Dean and Church confer with General Barth, acting commanding general of the 24th Division Artillery. Brigadier General Henry J.D. Meyer, the divisional artillery commander, is en route back from the States. General Dean sends General Barth to P’yongt’aek, with orders for Colonel Brad Smith to deploy at “those good positions near Osan you told General Church about.” Just after midnight, Task Force Smith moves out of P’yongt’aek, after working out some unexpected problems with transportation. A scarcity of North Korean drivers suddenly develops when word arrives that the convoy will move north. Without hesitation and unwilling to listen to persuasion, the North Koreans vanish into the darkness as fast as their GI boots can carry them. Unperturbed, the Americans jump into the drivers’ seats and head north, only to encounter more difficulty. Driving under blackout conditions, they encounter several unexpected obstacles, primarily ROK forces and North Korean civilians heading south. As the task force continues along the clogged road, the Americans attempt to convince the South Korean demolition troops who are setting charges on the bridges to stop because the Americans require use of the spans. One particular group of South Koreans, apparently unimpressed with the American request, refuses to discontinue their operation. General Barth picks up the crates of dynamite and heaves them into the river to terminate the problem. Meanwhile, the efforts of the South Korean 6th Division to hold Wonju and fend off the N.K. 7th Division begins to falter, due to overpowering enemy strength. Wonju is abandoned by the following day. At Pusan, the 34th Regiment, which had arrived on July 2, moves north by rail. The 1st Battalion departs at about daylight and arrives at P’yongt’aek about 0500 ( July 5). The remainder of the regiment follows later. Colonel Ayres arrives with the 1st Battalion.

53 In other activity, Colonel Emmerich departs Pusan for Taegu to join the other KMAG personnel there and establish a small base of operations. In the East Coast sector, the North Korean 5th Division continues to advance along the coastal road without opposition. Its 11th Regiment, which temporarily has been on a separate trek, has been traveling for eight days along an inland route, which passes through P’yongch’ang and Yongwol. On or about this day, the N.K. 11th Regiment encounters a contingent of the S.K. 8th Division at Ch’unyang. The South Koreans are attempting to withdraw inland to help defend the Tanyang area. After the hard-fought skirmish, the N.K. 11th Regiment swings east to join the division at Ulchin, on or near the 10th of July. The N.K. 5th Division incurs about 1,800 casualties during this journey through the nasty mountain terrain. In Naval activity, Corsairs from the Valley Forge destroy ten locomotives and one bridge, while the Skyraiders eliminate some small vessels in a nearby river. Enemy fire damages four Skyraiders, but all planes return to the Valley Forge. One plane attempts a crash landing and destroys three planes and damages six others in the process. The two days of raids destroy eleven enemy planes and inflict damage to one other. — In the United States: Lt. General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., commanding officer, Fleet Marine Force Pacific, and Colonel Victor Krulak (later commandant), a G-3 staff officer, receive orders to proceed from Pearl Harbor to Japan to meet with General MacArthur. General Shepherd, prior to his departure, requests that the 5th Marines’ rifle companies each receive a third platoon before shipping out to Korea, and on the fol-

July 4, 1950 lowing day, Admiral Sherman approves the request. The additional firepower is welcome, but unfortunately there is insufficient time to add a third company to each of the battalions, which are operating with only two companies per peacetime requirements. The 1st Marine Brigade, scheduled to embark in one week, initiates round-the-clock activity at Camp Pendleton and its neighboring base, El Toro, which domiciles the air components of the brigade. Telegrams are sizzling the wires, informing Marines stationed at posts scattered throughout the nation to report to Pendleton and El Toro. Included in this gathering of warriors are the first helicopter pilots of the U.S. Armed Forces to be established as a unit, destined for overseas combat duty. — In Japan: Far East Command holds another meeting. Representatives of the Army, Navy and Air Force attend, with General Almond presiding. Brigadier General William S. Fellers, USMC, commanding general, Troop Training Unit (TTU), Amphibious Training Command, Pacific Fleet, and Colonel Edward Forney, USMC, commanding officer, Mobile Training Team Able, are summoned to the meeting. Forney has been in Japan since Spring to instruct U.S. Army troops on amphibious warfare. Admiral Doyle and his staff, aboard the USS McKinley, have also been instructed to fly to Tokyo to attend this meeting. Doyle is under temporary orders to assist in the formulation of plans for a 1st Cavalry Division amphibious landing “somewhere in Korea,” possibly Kunsan, but MacArthur seems intent on the target being Inchon. General MacArthur informs his chief of staff, General Almond, to prepare for an amphibious invasion behind enemy

U.S. and British planes strike enemy targets at Pyongyang on 4 July.

July 4, 1950

54

Top: A contingent of U.S. soldiers tries to grab a little rest along a road during early July. Bottom: U.S. troops pause along a road in the vicinity of Suwon. An M1 rifle leans against a radio (SCR 300) on the left forefront. Two .30-caliber Browning machine guns can be seen next to the soldier in the forefront. lines in Korea; but, due to a drastic shortage of trained amphibious assault troops, an absolute decision cannot be reached. The Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group, led by Brigadier General Edwin K. Wright, is presently

working on a plan that calls for one Marine Regimental Combat Team and a U.S. Army assault force to land at Inchon in coordination with a frontal attack by the 24th and 25th Divisions. MacArthur suggests that the 1st Cavalry Division, commanded by General Hobart

55 H. Gay, comprise the Army assault force. In conjunction, PhibGru One, Admiral Doyle’s amphibious group, and Training Team Able, led by Colonel Edward Forney, are given responsibility for training the force. Forney, on the following day (5th), becomes the G-5 (plans) specialist assigned to assist the cavalry with the operation, dubbed BLUE HEARTS, which is tentatively scheduled for July 22. In other activity, General William Dean assumes command of all U.S. Army forces in Japan. He appoints General Church his deputy commander. Also, General MacArthur orders that a base command be established in Pusan. It will be commanded by Brigadier General Crump Garvin. — In Okinawa: The 29th Regiment, composed of only two under-strength battalions, receives about 400 draftees from the United States.

July 5 THE BATTLE OF OSAN Task Force Smith, composed of 540 men, is a blend of seasoned veterans who had seen duty in either the Atlantic or Pacific theaters during World War II, and a heftier proportion of untried troops from the post-war era. Colonel Brad Smith’s force moves confidently to intercept and halt the advancing hordes of Communist North Koreans. Task Force Smith, the first American contingent to face Communist troops in the Korean conflict (war), completes the last miles of its trek to plug the dike. After the tedious journey from P’yongt’aek, Smith’s convoy reaches its designated positions north of Osan at about 0300. The troops debark and immediately begin to deploy and plant the artillery to meet the anticipated enemy thrust. Despite an annoying and incessant penetrating downpour, the operation, designed to foil the enemy and ensure its failure, unfolds methodically, according to the planned strategy of Colonel Smith. Task Force Smith expects to firmly hold the line and extinguish the threat. Two platoons of Company B spread out in positions that force them to squat uncomfortably in the irritable dampness to fortify their line of defense east of the long, winding Osan-Suwon Road. The remaining platoon digs in along the west side of the road, atop an elevated knob. Nearby, a 75mm recoilless rifle with its barrel pointing north is perched on the eastern fringe of the highway. In addition, 4.2 inch mortars are deployed on the south (reverse) slope of the rugged ridge, several hundred yards away and directly to the rear of Company B. Slightly behind B Company stand three agile platoons of Company C. One platoon stretches solidly along a slim ridge that trails south on the west side of the railroad tracks. It provides a refused right flank. The other two platoons hold their positions east of the tracks, and another 75-mm recoilless rifle peers north from its location just west of the tracks. The infantry gets some additional muscle when four 2.36 bazookas and four .50-caliber machine guns are dispersed among the lines, manned by volunteer crews from headquarters and service batteries personnel. Four 105-mm howitzers are planted about 2,000

July 5, 1950 yards to the rear of the infantry. Each howitzer has been towed individually by two jeeps, the only vehicles capable of maneuvering the primitive, slim dirt path. The big guns are neatly scattered amidst a cluster of houses that stand between saturated rice paddies to the front and shallow hills to the rear. A fifth howitzer is improvised for use as an antitank weapon. It is plugged in about halfway between the infantry line and the main battery site. The artillery contingents have about 1,200 rounds of ammunition on site and several additional truckloads are concealed in the houses. However, HEAT ammo, that which will be required to neutralize the Russian-made tanks, incredibly, is missing, except for a mere six rounds. When the ammunition was loaded in Japan, only 18 rounds of HEAT ammo were on hand, six of which were allotted to A Company. The ability of the less potent HE ammunition becomes the primary unknown factor. The weapons have been test fired and stand ready, but there is no way of knowing if they can kill the tanks. However, as the first glimpse of daylight arrives on this dreary rain-drenched terrain, the defenders sense that the answer to this and numerous other questions would soon be obvious. But for now, the 540 Americans, acting as vanguard for the U.N., bide their time, awaiting the inevitable approach of the enemy whose strength and numbers remain a mystery. The Americans lack tanks, and due to the inclement weather, there will also be no aircraft to bolster the positions. And all the South Korean troops in the area had by this time retreated south. From his position atop the ridge, Colonel Smith stares toward Suwon, which is surprisingly visible despite being eight miles to the north. Shortly after 0700, Smith spots activity on the highway just outside of the town, but it is not quite identifiable. By 0730, the movement proves to be an advancing column of enemy tanks, trailed by infantry. The Communists, unaware of the Americans, are marching toward Osan, situated between Seoul and Chonan, to crush the South Korean troops. Meanwhile, General Barth returns to the artillery sector, but he has no knowledge yet of the imminent encounter with the North Koreans. A forward artillery observer tracks the advancing T34 tanks. At about 0800, he requests artillery fire. At approximately 0816, the U.S. Army fires its first artillery salvo of the war. Initially, Gun 2 launches two shells, and follows with a string of fire from the adjoining pieces. The shells arc toward the enemy armor, which is closing from 4,000 yards, but within two thousand yards of the vulnerable infantry. While the howitzers search for more precise fire, the observer, by use of his phone, helps stabilize their accuracy by fixing the range. An avalanche of shells pounds the approaching tanks, but to the amazement of the onlooking U.S. infantry, the tanks continue to advance, unharmed by the storm of artillery fire. The howitzers maintain their fire, but the tanks continue to advance unharmed. The infantry become temporarily mesmerized while they watch shells that strike tanks and seem unable to even dent the paint.

July 5, 1950 It is a startling revelation to the stunned Americans, who believed they could easily overmatch the advancing enemy. Some expected to be back in Japan to attend an upcoming weekend regimental party. Now, these seemingly invincible tanks encroach the infantry-held ridges. Many other tanks trail the vanguard. It becomes increasingly apparent that the lack of antitank mines means that Task Force Smith faces imminent disaster. Meanwhile, the menacing armor roll forward, unimpeded by obstacles and U.S. presence. The eight tanks advance in challenging fashion. In single file, the armor drives directly down the road closing toward a range of 700 yards. Meanwhile, Colonel Smith has prudently ordered his recoilless rifle teams to resist firing until the tanks breach the 700-yard mark. Suddenly, in unison, the two 75-mm guns, deployed on opposite sides of the highway, commence firing. The raging storm of fire descends precisely on the column and scores ferocious direct hits that inflict no damage. The tanks push forward and scoff at the incessant barrage of incoming shells. The T-34s commence a blistering enfilade. Menacing 85-mm cannon and 7.62mm machine gun shells lambaste the saddle of the ridge. The violent bombardment squeezes the positions of the infantry and rips the ground asunder with a myriad of relentless fire. The attack implants instant apprehension in their hearts. The odds against the men of U.S. Task Force Smith increase greatly as their positions become more perilous. Some might consider them a modern modified version of the men who participated in the legendary Charge of the Light Brigade. Most certainly, they find themselves greatly outnumbered near a valley of death in a far-away land. But it is the propensity of the individual G.I. to excel under pressure that will forestall annihilation. The first wave of muddy tanks prepares to roll through the infantry. They stand close enough for an American to peer down the turrets when the bazookas spring into action. One adventurous 2nd Lieutenant, Ollie D. Connor, waits anxiously as the point tanks pass his personal rut along the east side of the road. Then he bolts from his prone position and snaps off 22 consecutive rockets to strike the rear of the armor, its most fragile location. Apparently, the shells inflict no damage; rather they glance off the rear to the astonishment of the onlookers. Unmolested, the unflappable tanks resume their drive through the pass. It is possible that some bazooka fire has scored damage, but the tanks maintain their advance. Within minutes, two lead tanks clear the pass and are quickly met by fire from the howitzer, which had been out front with the infantry and in possession of the six rounds of HEAT ammunition. Both tanks sustain damage, which forces them to pull off the road to permit the trailing tanks to pass. Two North Koreans flee their burning tank by jumping out with their hands in the air. Soon after, another tanker emerges from the inferno, but he comes out fighting. The enemy soldier fires his burp gun toward a nearby machine gun position and kills the unidentified assistant gunner, whom

56 history will record as the first American fighting man to die during the Korean War. U.S. return fire kills the three North Koreans. In the meantime, the remaining tanks resume the attack, but the Americans have expended their effective HEAT ammunition, all six rounds. This assures the galloping T-34s a free pass to Osan. In the meantime, General Barth returns to P’yongt’aek to forewarn the reinforcements of the 34th Regiment that the enemy tanks are likely to break through the first line of defense and most probably will strike their positions. While the remaining six lead tanks crash forward, the remainder advance in intervals of four to a group, adding the raw firepower of 24 additional tanks. It is an awesome sight to the dug-in infantry, but surprisingly, the tanks ignore the foot soldiers and plow forward. The armor leaves the fate of Task Force Smith to the approaching N.K. 4th Division. The final tank passes the infantry at about 0900. About 20 men of Task Force Smith have been killed or wounded. The infantry had earlier predicted that the tanks would not pass and gave the artillerymen the assurance: “Don’t worry....” Now, there is little time for worry. It is time to fight for survival, or surely Task Force Smith and the artillerymen face annihilation. To make the critical situation even more grave, the first of the roving steel monsters chew up the telephone wire that had been strung along the road to keep communications open between the advance infantry and the laid-back artillery units. This bad luck is further compounded by the incessant, dismal cloudburst that seriously interferes with radio transmissions. The radio operators struggle to keep their superior officers informed of the conditions on the battlefield. All radio communication ceases at about 1100, when the saturated radios completely fail. By this time, the artillery contingents require neither radios nor phones to inform them of the location of the enemy tanks. The turrets are nearly down their throats. Suddenly, the clanking armor roars into action and commences firing into suspected U.S. positions, but the enemy misses the mark. The concealed positions of the artillery remain unscathed. Nevertheless, if the turrets were elephant trunks, the Americans could toss peanuts to them. The tanks continue to press forward. Artillery shells pound the approaching armor, again to no avail, except that the fire extracts wariness from the enemy. They surge forward but with a touch of caution. Upon reaching a point about 500 yards from the firing battery, the tanks pause, as if to seek refuge, but then in an instant, as if recoiled, they spring forward. Throwing the momentary caution to the wind in an effort to evade a direct hit, the armor, with their hatches closed and their guns firing, run the gauntlet in record time. All the while, the enemy has been unable to discover the exact positions of the artillery, which gives the Americans a slight reprieve. The tank fire still inflicts no harm. Meanwhile, U.S. guns, bolstered by three accompanying bazooka teams, commence fire. From a distance of

57 150 to 300 yards, the gunners score repeated hits but inflict no serious damage. Two other bazooka teams, led by Colonel M. Perry and Sergeant Edwin Eversole, rush to support the artillerymen as soon as they learn of the breakthrough. Both men reach the artillery positions just before the tanks arrive. But Perry and Eversole get snagged in a rice paddy between the howitzers and the tanks. The lead tank fires and severs a telephone pole, which topples toward Eversole. He reacts in time and rolls into a drainage ditch to barely escape death. During the skirmish, bazooka fire strikes the third tank in the column and damages its tracks. Exerting little effort, the remaining armor passes the stalled tank and continues the advance. The four overworked and undernourished howitzers remain in operational condition. Colonel Perry and an interpreter move toward the paralyzed tank to persuade its crew to surrender, but no response is forthcoming. Perry decides to violently evict the tenants. He orders the howitzers to fire. Three quick pumps from the guns and two North Koreans pop out of the hatch and run to a culvert for cover. A squad moves out and an exchange occurs. The two North Koreans perish. Colonel Perry becomes wounded by small arms fire during the action. Despite a leg wound, and aware of the imminent arrival of more tanks, he refuses evacuation and continues to command. Shortly thereafter, the deadly parade appears. A long chain of tanks noisily clanks down the road. Moving turret-to-tail like a band of mechanical elephants, they probe and penetrate deeply. No intervals appear in the line of defiant armor as the ordeal begins to accelerate to a more dangerous plateau. For Task Force Smith, despite the lopsided odds, discipline has been the order

July 5, 1950 of the day, but the enemy’s overwhelming superiority soon changes the tempo. The armor crashes forward and provokes disorganization, confusion and with some, the lack of a will to return fire. Unquestionably, some troops run for the rear; however, most stand firmly and fight. As the second wave of tanks comes into range, troops are spotted aboard them. By this point, the anxiety of the defenders dissipates and is replaced by a shrill fear that causes some over-stressed artillerymen to abandon their weapons and begin to “take off.” One of the remaining troops described these men as “shy about helping.” The test of leadership stands naked along a small, charred parcel of barren earth that has already reclaimed a few proud Americans. No bland gray monuments mark the spot in their honor. But it can never be erased from the minds of the men who are there, for they surely received more than their fair share of hell in the boondocks. Instinctively, the officers revert to dragging the ammunition to the guns and shoving the shells irreverently into the barrels. The senior NCOs (noncommissioned officers) then resume the fire in an attempt to halt the onslaught. The new gunners hardly miss a beat during the unexpected interruption. The sterling example of the officers, such as Colonel Perry and Lieutenant Dwain L. Scott, beams with magnetism and soon thereafter, the men begin to return to their duty stations. Both Perry and Scott receive the Silver Star for their heroism and leadership. Amazingly, the tanks are content to continue their advance and expend very little ammunition against the artillery positions. However, the enemy fire does set one building ablaze and it detonates a small supply

An enemy self-propelled gun after being destroyed by U.S. fire.

July 5, 1950 depot that contains about 300 artillery shells. The tanks whiz by and the artillery continues to pound it with streams of fire. Despite the heavy barrage, only one tank sustains damage. Its tracks are severed when it passes directly in front of an artillery piece. Although the tanks escape much harm, the troops riding on them do not fare so well. The ring of shells that harmlessly bounce around and off the tanks rakes the enemy infantrymen, who brave the fire by riding on the outside of the scrambling vehicles. Most are blown off the armor by the sizzling cannon fire, but some remain aboard. As the tanks scramble down the road, some still transport dead infantrymen that are either sprawled in unnatural suspension or slung over the sides. Many others, catapulted from the speeding armor, lie dead along the highway. It is a shocking and gruesome sight even for the troops of Task Force Smith. The final tank passes through the artillery positions at about 1015. The column closes against Osan, but it has four fewer tanks to commit and another three T-34s are hindered by damages. The enemy has inflicted about twenty casualties to the U.S. infantry, and the latest exchange has caused three artillery casualties, including Colonel Perry. In addition, the North Koreans have destroyed one howitzer and inflicted damage to one other. Back on the ridges, while the tanks rumble toward Osan, the worst is not over. For the stunned infantrymen that are fastened to the ridges, it is just a mysterious lull, prior to another drastic ordeal. Silence descends upon the ridges soon after the final tank crashes through their positions. In the wake of the enemy armor, the survivors peer across the bloodied perimeter to see the bodies of men who only moments ago had been their friends. The grisly scene escalates the aura of gloom. Other than an occasional pounding of a spade or the crackle of an ammunition-can being checked, there is little unnecessary noise. Raindrops break the utter silence and seemingly fall in cadence with the racing hearts of the sentinels who prepare for the next waves of the enemy. Despite the momentary lull of the conspicuous sounds of battle, the tension rings resoundingly. The tanks, which had easily broken through the artillery, had stunned the defenders, but the officers retained confidence in the ability of the infantrymen in the hills and expected them to halt the attack. Nevertheless, they also have a new and stark understanding of the enemy they face. Before embarkation from Japan, the message conveyed to Task Force Smith was that they would be participating in a police action. Now they are praying that they have enough police. The first signal of the imminence of more combat appears about one hour after the encounter with the tanks, when Colonel Smith discovers another huge flurry of motion occurring just outside of Suwon. The soggy Suwon-Osan Road begins to swell with large amounts of troops and vehicles that are heading south. Task Force Smith, called “an arrogant display of

58 strength” by General MacArthur, was intended to display American resolve and deter further aggression by the North Koreans. The task force had accepted the responsibility honorably, and up to now it had been able to retain its confidence. But as the enemy movement comes into clearer focus, it becomes evident that the positions are untenable. Smith’s artillery is of little value. Most of the guns lack proper ammunition. And there is no available air support. The enemy column is spearheaded by three tanks. The file flows like boiling lava and moves in an irregular uninterrupted line. The massive convoy is composed of countless trucks and an incalculable number of troops who march with indifference to a saturating rain. Colonel Smith ponders the awesome sight and prepares to react. The colossal column takes about one hour to close within 1,000 yards of Smith’s defenses. He estimates it to be six miles long. Undeterred by the overwhelming odds, Task Force Smith digs in at the pass to meet and engage the enemy. The surviving artillery commences firing once the column reaches a point about 1,000 yards from the perimeter, but soon after, communications again cease, complicating what is already a Herculean task. Initially, the tanks advance unmolested, but soon encounter heavy opposition. Mortars and machine guns plaster the iron monsters and score much higher success rates than the previous encounter against with the first wave of tanks. Direct hits strike the lead trucks and ignite tumultuous explosions. The gunners then increase their rate of fire and yet more trucks are set afire; still, the tanks press forward. Meanwhile, the truckers flee from their splattered vehicles and dive for the trenches. Farther back, other troops jump from their unharmed vehicles and spread out. Some scurry from their trucks to less hazardous positions and await orders to attack. Other enemy infantrymen advance toward the finger ridge. They deploy in concert with some contingents that maneuver to execute a double envelopment, designed to trap and annihilate the isolated Americans. Meanwhile, the U.S. maintains a solid wall of fire that forbids frontal advance. Temporarily, the North Koreans project no desire to strike the nimble flanks. By 1230, heavy numbers of enemy troops control a hill on the west side of the highway, which provides them with a tremendous advantage over a Company B, platoon, deployed on a nearby knob. The endangered unit is quickly ordered to withdraw to the east side of the highway. A feverish exchange of fire erupts as the Americans attempt to hold the fragile line. Task Force Smith also must contend with overpowering enemy forces that dominate the hills above its right flank. In the midst of this marathon of death, while enemy machine guns on the right flank pummel the perimeter, the task force attempts to distribute additional ammunition among the troops. During this vicious exchange, communication between the artillery and infantry remains inoperable. Adding to the dire circumstances, weather becomes nastier. The elements eradicate any

59 possibility of potent air strikes. Rapidly, the situation deteriorates further and few options remain. The enemy closes the noose tightly. Contingents drive against both flanks in synchronization with another powerful force that hammers against the rear door of the beleaguered Americans. By 1430, Colonel Smith orders a disciplined withdrawal that is destined to be extremely risky. The troops pull back in “leap-frog” motion. This is a difficult procedure under normal battle conditions, but Task Force Smith is saddled with an extraordinary amount of disadvantages, including a rapidly depleting ammunition supply that nears total exhaustion. Because of severed communications, Colonel Perry and the artillery units remain stranded about one mile to the rear. The choices are few: retreat or die. Still, they must move back without becoming reacquainted with the enemy tanks that also lurk in the rear. The task force withdraws, reluctantly leaving its dead and some wounded behind. Between twenty-five to thirty severely wounded troops are left at the ridge to the compassion of the new and yet unknown enemy. Those with lesser wounds retire with the various units, but along the dogged retreat, intense enemy fire causes separations. Consequently more wounded fall behind, unable to complete the horrid trip. During the harsh retreat, the survivors are forced to abandon the recoilless rifles, mortars and machine guns. Along the routes of escape, the enemy pours tenacious fire into the ranks. At times, quarters are so close that machine gun and burp gun fire strike them from point-blank range. Initially, when orders to retreat spread through the ranks, one platoon of Company B does receive the word to fall back. Company C leads, trailed by the medics and battalion headquarters. Company B provides cover fire for the pull-back and it is the last to evacuate the hills. In concert with B Company’s withdrawal, Colonel Smith darts through the rice paddies and heads west to hook up with Perry and inform him of the withdrawal. Once Smith encounters Perry, the artillerymen quickly initiate their retreat, but before they move back, the troops disarm the five remaining operable howitzers and carry the breech locks and aiming circles with them. After a harrowing march though unfamiliar terrain, the artillerymen reach the fringes of Osan without incident. Surprisingly, the trucks remain in place, exactly where they had been parked. The vehicles have sustained several machine gun bullet holes, but they are operable. Without hesitation, the convoy moves toward Ansong by way of an alternate route that shadows the southern tip of Osan. The contingent expects this route to be free of enemy armor. The convoy barely escapes disaster when it nears a suspicious bend in the road. The lead jeep, transporting Colonels Smith and Perry, wisely takes the curve cautiously. To their amazement, three enemy tanks have paused in their path. The crews of the tanks are relaxed during an apparent cigarette break. Had the tankers been non-smokers, it might have been quite hazardous to the health of the tattered survivors.

July 5, 1950 The bad omen of more enemy tanks prompts quick reflexes and pulsating hearts. The truck drivers make an instant U-turn and head toward the northern portion of Osan to search for a less volatile route. The small but conspicuous convoy still proudly bears U.S. insignias as it rolls along the northern edge of town and swerves onto a dirt path that leads east, on a gamble that it will feed into a road to Ansong. Along the circuitous route, the convoy spots some ragged infantry stragglers and hoists them aboard. About 100 troops hitch a ride and happily enter Ansong after sunset. There have been fiercer battles, bigger wars and more gruesome casualties throughout the history of the U.S. Army than the battle fought on this day by a relatively small band of men. But these warriors exhibited great valor and courage against an overwhelming enemy force. On the following morning ( July 6), Colonel Smith and his survivors move to Ch’onan. After an accurate count, it is determined that his contingent now amounts to only 185 men. Soon after, Company C arrives. Captain Dashmer accounts for 65 men in his party. Other survivors filter back to safety at Ch’onan, Taejon and P’yongt’aek during the next few days. It is later determined that the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment losses (missing) amount to five officers and 148 enlisted men, including 65 men in Company B, which sustains the highest casualties, and 34 troops of C Company. The artillery contingent’s losses as of July 7 are 26 enlisted men and five officers. The North Korean 4th Division losses are placed at 42 killed and about 85 wounded, including some slight casualties at P’yongt’aek on the 6th. More American reinforcements are en route to Korea, but a dilemma remains. The first blow-out had been lopsided and the Americans paid an expensive price for the hours it bought. The aftermath of the battle proves the efficiency of the enemy and the deficiencies of the weaponry of the Americans, who nearly became cannon fodder. In contrast, the North Koreans are well-trained and better equipped than the Americans. In Japan, the U.S. 24th Division has 17 obsolete M-24 tanks, but only twelve are operational. Also, the medium Pershing tank is capable of equalizing the Russian-made tanks, but the 92 Pershings are in Japan, held in storage and supposedly not serviceable. The Eighth Army Ordnance section jumps into action and saves the endangered Pershings from the scrap heap by putting them in usable condition in a Herculean salvage operation. The immediate challenge for the U.S. is to reverse its ongoing dismemberment of the U.S. military, and to move rapidly to properly equip and support the troops that must follow Task Force Smith’s beleaguered survivors. Many of the men of Task Force Smith who had been captured during the first day of combat had been immediately executed. Subsequently, North Korean Lieutenant Pak Huyunk (later brigadier general) describes, without remorse, a segment of the barbaric activity:

July 5, 1950 “When we charged the Americans they were too frightened to resist. They threw down their guns, held up their hands and begged for mercy. We didn’t shoot those who were begging for their lives, but we ruthlessly shot those who were resisting. After the battle we rested and had a meal. Dead Americans were lying all over the place with their mouths open. There was a man in our Ninth Squad, a real joker, who said ‘look the Americans are still hungry, even though they are dead. Here have some earth.’ He then shoved a handful of dirt into each mouth. Everyone was amused.” One can only wonder how many of the “hungry dead” were the wounded who couldn’t finish the journey. In other activity, Colonel Lovless, commanding officer, 34th Regiment, meets with General Dean in Taejon. Dean suggests that Lovless deploy his 3rd Battalion (commanded by Colonel David H. Smith) at Ansong, about 12 miles east of P’yongt’aek, if it is feasible. Dean also instructs Lovless to establish regimental headquarters at Songhwan-ni, about six miles south of P’yongt’aek. Lovless becomes disturbed by what he considers a dangerous and unnecessary division of his command. He requests permission to commit his regiment as one solid unit. Nevertheless, Lovless loses the spirited debate with General Dean, and both requests are carried out. Headquarters is established this day. Ansong and P’yongt’aek, separated by about eleven miles, are vital positions along the two main highways, which head south between the Yellow Sea and the West Central Mountains. These towns must be held to ensure that the western sector of Korea is not easily overrun, but Lovless encounters additional problems. The regiment’s radios are unable to communicate from point to point. The 1st Battalion, 34th Regiment (commanded by Colonel Ayres), is without battle experience and it lacks tanks. Artillery and antitank weaponry are too few in number and too ill-equipped to realistically deter a strong advance for a prolonged period of time. The 1st Battalion, nonetheless, deploys at P’yongt’aek, slightly south of TF Smith at Osan. However, there are no communications between Ayres’ command and that of Colonel Brad Smith (TF Smith). Subsequently, Colonel Ayres, in an interview with Lacy Barnett, states that General Dean had suggested that he “go as far north as possible, preferably to P’yongt’aek.” Ayres further states that “General Dean did not inform him that the P’yongt’aek position was an important one to hold.” Colonel Ayres then relates that “as far as he was concerned on 5 and 6 July, Asan Bay was a tourist attraction.” Dean had spoken to Ayres in Taejon, prior to the arrival of Lovless. Also, the recently arrived 63rd FABn, commanded by Colonel Robert Dawson, is under orders to head north to bolster the 34th Regiment, but it encounters difficulty while unloading equipment. The project becomes delayed and in addition, there is no transportation immediately available. Meanwhile, the 3rd Battalion, 21st Regiment, and the regimental commander, Colonel Richard W. Stephens, remain in Pusan in search of northbound transportation. In other activity, General Barth returns to P’y-

60 ongt’aek and anticipates reinforcements from the 34th Regiment. Upon his arrival, Barth locates Colonel Ayres, recently appointed commanding officer, 1st Battalion, 34th Regiment. After conferring with Ayres, Barth requests that bazooka squads be sent north to intercept the advancing tanks. Shortly thereafter, a detachment (I and R Platoon) led by Lieutenant Charles Payne and an infantry contingent led by Lieutenant William Caldwell III hustle north. The contingent sights tank tracks near Sojong. Not long after, a horseriding South Korean trooper pulls alongside and warns the Americans about approaching tanks. He suggests that they withdraw, but the convoy intends to intercept, rather than evade, the enemy. It moves north cautiously and after advancing about one mile, the tank is located. It is halted near the railroad tracks outside of Sojong-ni, which is about five miles south of Osan. At 1600, a bellicose encounter erupts when the GIs open fire, but inflict no damage to the tank. Enemy machine gun fire pounds the Americans and kills Private Kenneth Shadrick. The positions soon become untenable and the bazooka teams retreat, but they bring Shadrick’s body out with them. Upon the group’s return to P’yongt’aek, the distressing news is reported to both Colonel Harold Ayres and General Barth. After sunset, General Dean arrives at P’yongt’aek and he, too, is briefed, but there is still no information on Task Force Smith’s fate. Dean returns to Taejon possessing no obvious solution with which to halt the attack. And, similarly to those at Osan, no air cover is available. Subsequent to Dean’s departure, several of Smith’s survivors stumble into P’yongt’aek. The stories are so overstated that it appears as if Task Force Smith has been annihilated. Colonel Perry arrives early on the 6th, and he provides more accurate information. Nonetheless, preparations are made to withdraw from P’yongt’aek. Actually, Colonel Smith had arrived safely at Ansong and then he had stopped at Colonel Lovless’ command post at Songhwan, prior to departing for Chonan, but General Dean never checks with Colonel Lovless. Meanwhile, the 1st North Korean Division continues to trail the N.K. 2nd Division south toward Umsong. At Ichon, situated south of Seoul and west of the Han River, an enemy regiment (2nd N.K. Division) engages South Korean troops and hits unexpected stiff resistance. The North Korean unit sustains heavy casualties and becomes isolated. Nearby, to the northwest along the Yongin Road, another enemy regiment sustains high casualties after it encounters rigid resistance by South Korean forces. Following these difficult actions, the N.K. 1st Division swivels southeast and heads toward Ch’ungju. The N.K. 2nd Division continues to press south toward Ch’unch’on and Ch’onju. The 2nd N.K. Division pays heavily during this advance. It is to join the N.K. 3rd and 4th Divisions for a probable massive attack against Taejon. Meanwhile, in the central mountainous area, the N.K. 7th Division, re-designated the N.K. 12th Division, seizes Wonju. Following its capture, the division

61

July 5, 1950

Top: A U.S. Army soldier operates a switchboard in the field. Bottom: At Pusan, a touch of innocence in a war-torn nation. This group of South Korean Boy Scouts had their picture taken by a U.S. Navy photographer who paused with the boys while en route to the front.

July 6, 1950 divides its force, dispatching some contingents south toward Ch’ungju and others southeast toward Chech’on. In reaction, the weary S.K. 6th Division maintains its delaying tactics, and attempts to forestall the loss of the Ch’ungju corridor. The S.K. 8th Division is en route from the east coast to form a perimeter line in the Tanyang corridor. By the 12th, despite the vigorous attempts to hold, both Chech’on and Ch’ungju are seized by the surging N.K. 12th Division, which then tightens its grip around Tanyang. Also, the Far East Air Forces Joint Operations Center transfers from Japan to Taejon. Circumstances compel the center to relocate to Taegu on July 14. In Naval activity, The U.S. navy establishes Service Squadron 3, to become the primary logistics unit of the 7th Fleet effective 7 July. Also, the U.S. Navy initiates President Truman’s directive to establish a blockade of the Korean coasts. In Marine activity, Fleet Marine Force Pacific at Hawaii directs the 1st Marine Division to establish the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade. The brigade is formed by Marines from the East and West Coasts. — In the United States: The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, commanded by Brigadier General Thomas J. Cushman, is formed at El Toro, California. It will bolster the 1st Marine Provisional Brigade. — In Okinawa: The 1st and 3rd Battalions, 29th Regiment, receive word to prepare to ship out to Korea; neither unit is trained for battle, but they are informed that training will be provided upon arrival in Japan. Both battalions embark for Japan on July 21.

July 6 The North Korean Army continues to advance. General Barth departs P’yongt’aek at 0130. He reaches Songhwan-ni about six miles farther south about 0230. Once there, Barth instructs Colonel Ayres to hold until the positions become untenable. The 1st Battalion, 34th Regiment, blows the bridge just north of P’yongt’aek at 0300. Prior to dawn, General Barth moves to Ch’onan. He locates reinforcements from Headquarters Company, 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, and contingents of Companies A and D, which had not embarked on 1 July with Task Force Smith. Immediately, Barth deploys the contingents defensively about two miles south of Ch’onan. Soon after, Barth moves to Songhwan-ni to inspect the defenses there. Meanwhile, back at the river, a saturating rain intertwined with a miserable fog taunts the troops as daylight arrives. The men of the 1st Battalion squat in their waterlogged foxholes, and they attempt to consume their cold, bland C-rations while they await the imminent arrival of the enemy. Shortly thereafter, an unusual gurgling noise is heard. A quick glance across the river causes instant deliberation as the silhouette of tanks and some enemy infantry comes into view as they encroach the battered bridge. Some troops become prematurely heartened, convinced that remnants of Task Force Smith are approaching; however, others vividly recall that the Americans had no tanks. The speculation ends. Thirteen tanks, followed by in-

62 fantry, prepare to bolt the river. A brisk exchange of fire erupts. One enemy truck is destroyed, but the bazooka fire is inadequate. Captain Osburn receives orders from Colonel Ayres to withdraw Company A from the western side of the road. Osburn is directed to retain one platoon to the rear to afford cover fire during the pull-back. Soon after, Company B is ordered to abandon the east side of the highway. In the meantime, enemy infantry begins fording the river as it moves to envelop the Americans. Making matters worse, enemy fire had previously knocked out the mortar observer. Having no guidance, the mortars are ineffective. Back at Songhwan-ni, where Colonel Smith and about 86 men had already passed through, General Barth arrives to confer with Colonel Lovless. Barth informs Ayres of the orders from Dean, instructing Barth to give orders to the regiment. Lovless is not especially overjoyed with the situation. Barth discusses the deployment of the 1st Battalion and then he directs Colonel Ayres to regroup the regiment near Ch’onan. In addition, Barth instructs Ayres to direct his 3rd Battalion (minus L Company) to abandon Ansong and move to Ch’onan. Company L (regimental reserve), which is outside of P’yongt’aek, is ordered to provide rear cover fire for the 1st Battalion while it pulls out of its river positions. The orders are not carried out; Company L moves directly to Ch’onan. Due to the distance between Ansong, P’yongt’aek and Songhwan-ni, there is no radio communication. The radios cannot hold the range, and the land wires, which had been laid between the latter two towns, have been ripped out and cut by retreating South Korean civilians and troops who use the wire to fasten their packs. Messages between P’yongt’aek, Songhwan-ni and Ansong are transferred by messengers, but these runners are outdistanced by the emerging events, and they arrive at their destinations with outdated news. The embattled 1st Battalion, 34th Regiment, is forced to begin its retreat before noon. The first contingents to depart the river positions arrive at Ch’onan during the afternoon. The remaining units of the battalion pull into Ch’onan during the evening and deploy defensively, near the newly arrived contingents of the 21st Regiment. Much equipment and clothing is abandoned along the route and left for the North Koreans. Near Ch’onan and Osan, the South Koreans’ situation is similar. The ROKs are crammed aboard southbound trains. At Taejon, General Dean is consistently updated by telephone on the unraveling sequence of events at P’yongt’aek. Dean arrives at Ch’onan after dark. He convenes a heated meeting with Colonel Lovless and other officers to determine who authorized a withdrawal. Colonel Ayres, without referring to his orders from General Barth (who stands by in stony silence), takes responsibility. An infuriated Dean considers his option of sending the regiment back, then countermands himself, due to the threat of a night ambush. However, Dean orders the 3rd Battalion, 34th Regiment, to move a company north at daybreak.

63 — In Air Force activity, B-29s launch the initial strategic air attacks of the war when 9 bombers attack the Rising Sun oil refinery at Wonsan and another target, a chemical plant at Hungnam. Meanwhile, other planes (B-26s) pound advancing enemy columns. After-action reports indicate the destruction of 6 to 10 tanks by the B-26s. — In the United States: The Joint Chiefs of Staff instruct General MacArthur to provide his estimate of the necessary amount of personnel needed to sweep the North Korean troops out of South Korea. On the following day, MacArthur responds, stating that between four to four and one-half complete infantry divisions, one regimental combat team composed of airborne troops, and three tank battalions bolstered by support artillery would be required. Additionally, MacArthur claims he will require 40,000 reinforcements to execute the operation without placing Japan in peril. In other activity, Major General Hobart R. Gay is informed by MacArthur that his 1st Cavalry Division is to be the battering ram that will storm Inchon. The cavalry landing is expected to trap the enemy between it and the Eighth Army and ROK troops. But much of the initial information on the progress of the ROK Army has been erroneous and highly exaggerated. And the battle-readiness of Eighth Army is terribly poor, making the situation graver than anticipated. In conjunction, the U.S. has been totally surprised by the skillfulness of the advancing North Korean People’s Army. Additionally, large numbers of the 1st Cavalry’s proficient noncoms (about 750) have been pulled from its ranks to round out the anemic 24th and 25th Divisions. Ultimately, this meeting between MacArthur and General Gay becomes irrelevant. The bad conditions in Korea continue to deteriorate, which mandates that the 1st Cavalry must be committed to Pusan to prop up the perimeter. — In Japan: By today, it becomes common knowledge that General MacArthur intends to deploy the U.S. Eighth Army in Korea, with General Walker assuming operational control of the campaign. In conjunction, General Walker calls Colonel William Collier in Kobe, and requests that he come to Yokohama on the following day to discuss the crisis in Korea.

July 7

General Walton Walker arrives from Japan to confer with General Dean. General Barth departs Ch’onan for Taejon. In other activity, at 0810, Company L, 34th Regiment, moves north from deserted Ch’onan to intercept the advancing North Korean 4th Division. General Dean also orders a battalion to head north. At about 1030, the 3rd Battalion moves north to bolster Company L. General Dean’s order: “To CO 34th Inf. Move one Bn. fwd with minimum transportation. Gain contact and be prepared to fight delaying action back to recent position. PD air reports no enemy armor south of river.” As the 3rd Battalion advances, a steady flood of civilians is moving south. Some are walking and others are on horseback. Colonel Lovless notices heavy

July 7, 1950 military movement in the hills to the west. Lovless, who inquires of his interpreter whether they are North or South Koreans, is told that they are South Koreans on the run. At about 1300, while the intelligence and reconnaissance platoon is at the point, the enemy is spotted in the heights, but they vanish from sight. The advance continues, but with caution, because sporadically, the enemy reappears. Along the route, an artillery officer informs Colonel Lovless and an accompanying officer, Colonel Robert Martin, that he has only one gun. It is deployed about three miles from Ch’onan, from where it can shell the area to the front of Company L. In the meantime, about five miles north of Ch’onan, with the small force more or less sucked in, a moderate dose of enemy small-arms fire and mortars strike positions near the point platoon, barring advance. Within a short while (1600), a liaison plane arrives overhead to bring the contingent up to date and make the earlier intelligence obsolete. The plane drops this message: “To CO 34th Infantry, 1600 7 July. Proceed with greatest caution. Large number of troops on your east and west flanks. Near Ansong, lots of tanks (40–50) and trucks. Myang-Myon large concentration of troops. Songhwan-ni large concentration of troops trying to flank your unit; signed Dean.” The alarming, but not totally unexpected, news prompts Colonels Lovless and Martin to head for the 1st Battalion’s Command Post to inform Colonel Ayres. At the CP, they encounter General Church and General Pearson Menoher (assistant division commander, 24th Division). Church delivers an order from Dean to Lovless, which relieves him of command and instructs him to turn his 34th Regiment over to Colonel Martin. The change of command occurs at 1800. General Dean had previously requested that Colonel Martin, an old and trusted friend, be transferred to his command. Dean and Martin served together with the 44th Division during World War II. In turn, Colonel Lovless had been in command of the 34th for a very short period of time and the unit, not known for being a crack outfit, had not turned around soon enough to suit the high command. In the meantime, Major Dunn arrives at the Command Post and informs Colonel Lovless that Lt. Colonel David Smith’s 1st Battalion is pulling back from its excellent defensive positions. Lovless quickly explains that he has been relieved and tells Dunn to speak with Colonel Martin. Dunn is ordered by Martin to return and restore order within the 3rd Battalion. Meanwhile, the ground troops are becoming more endangered. Major Dunn (34th Infantry S-3) moves from 1st Battalion command post to the forward positions of the 3rd Battalion. He arrives in time to observe the unit digging in defensively north of Ch’onan. While in conversation with Lt. Colonel David H. Smith, 1st Battalion Commander, the I and R platoon leader drives up in a dilapidated jeep. As he jumps from the vehicle, the bullet holes in his clothing and canteen tell the story before he can open his mouth. His platoon had been ambushed by a force of 40 enemy troops at a tiny

July 7, 1950

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U.S. artillery (camouflaged 105-mm howitzer M2A1) deployed near Ch’onan on 7 July. village about one mile from headquarters. Three men had been left behind. Major Dunn takes a rifle company detachment to rescue the isolated troops, but soon after, Major Boone Seegars (Battalion S-3) arrives from the vicinity of the ambush. He informs Dunn that the men have been reunited. Major Dunn aborts the rescue attempt and orders a defensive posture.

Enemy fire from the west bank commences against Dunn’s unit. The Americans return fire, but the enemy is too distant. In a flash, the situation deteriorates. While Dunn attempts to calm the nearby troops, friendly fire strikes near their positions and causes pandemonium. Dunn reacts to quell the fire, but when he reaches the 3rd Battalion positions, the men are abandoning their designated areas. Dunn is placed in com-

Opposite top: A camouflaged U.S. Army truck at Ch’onan on 7 July. A .50-caliber M2 HB Browning machine gun is mounted on the vehicle, but barely visible due to the rice straw. Opposite bottom: A closer view of the two soldiers manning the Browning machine gun (M2 HB) atop the camouflaged truck at Ch’onan on 7 July.

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July 7, 1950

July 7, 1950 mand and he pushes the men northward. Two jeeps transporting Majors Dunn and Seegars and two company commanders push forward. At a point about one mile from where Dunn wants the 3rd Battalion to reoccupy the terrain, the North Koreans spring another ambush. Point-blank range fire pounds the vehicles. Dunn and Seegars both are seriously wounded. One unarmed officer runs to the rear as he explains he is going for help. Meanwhile, an artery in Dunn’s head bleeds profusely. Major Seegars succumbs during the night; his body is recovered sometime in November. At the first sounds of fire, the trailing rifle company hits the ground and returns fire; however, the unit makes no attempt to rescue the wounded, nor is an advance ordered by any officers on scene. Moments later, an officer repeatedly yells “fall back,” leaving the men in the two advance jeeps to an unknown fate. The 3rd Battalion’s withdrawal in the face of combat against a much lesser force and its abandonment of wounded men on the field is subsequently described by Major Dunn, who remains a prisoner of war for 38 months, as “nauseating.” In addition, Dunn notes that the

66

enemy force of about 40 men was alone. The main body had been about two hours outside the village. The 3rd Battalion, in its haste to retreat, also abandons equipment, including mortars. Upon arrival at Ch’onan the unit is badly disorganized. Colonel Martin takes a headquarters company north to reclaim the lost equipment, while Lt. Colonel David H. Smith, positioned south of Ch’onan, is directed to move into Ch’onan and defend it. The redeployment of the disoriented 3rd Battalion at Ch’onan is complete by about 1700, with contingents stretched along the railroad tracks west of town and others dispersed along the northern fringes of Ch’onan. The first encounter with the Communists occurs on the western side of town during the first part of evening. Shortly thereafter, a column of tanks and infantry approaches the eastern defenses. The latter is met by fire from a contingent of the 63rd Field Artillery Battalion, which had recently been deployed south of Ch’onan to bolster the 34th Regiment. Two tanks are reported destroyed by the combination of white phosphorous and HE ammunition. Still, this contingent penetrates the town before midnight, and entraps about 80 men, including Colonel Martin. The fighting dangerously depletes the U.S. ammunition. Word reaches General Dean about the critical lack of supplies and of the precarious situation of Martin and the other isolated men. Skirmishing continues throughout the night as the N.K. 16th and 18th Regiments, supported by tanks of the 105th Armored Division, increase the pressure. Before noon on this day, a train transporting Colonel Stephens and elements of his 21st Regiment arrives in Taejon. Within one hour, the unit heads north to Choch’iwon to bolster the 34th Regiment and to keep the supply route clear. Meanwhile, discipline at Choch’iwon is loose. The supplies for the various units have become mixed up and another problem has emerged. Guards must ride the locomotives because many South Korean engineers are frightened. At the slightest hint of trouble the engineers attempt to move south with the trains and supplies they have yet to unload. Colonel Stephens deploys the 3rd Battalion, 21st Regiment, six miles north of Choch’iwon. Another contingent, composed of Companies A and D, 1st Battalion, returns from Chonan and deploys about one mile farther north at Chonui, along a ridge just east of town. These positions are about three miles below the fork where the Kongju Road splits from the principal highway and about twelve miles from Ch’onan. — In the United States: The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, commanded by A U.S. soldier checks the fuse on a mine in the vicinity of Brigadier General Edward A. Craig, is Ch’onan. activated at Camp Pendleton; the unit is

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July 7, 1950

Top: U.S. troops prepare powder charges in vicinity of Ch’onan. Bottom: U.S. troops load ammunition into a 105-mm howitzer in vicinity of Ch’onan. composed of the 5th Marines, the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines and Marine Aircraft Group 33 (MAG-33). The latter includes three squadrons and is commanded by Brigadier General Thomas H. Cushman. The brigade begins boarding the warships on the 12th. On

the 14th, the convoy sails for Korea. The three squadrons of MAG 33 are: VMF-214, 29 officers, 157 enlisted men and 24 F4U4B planes; VMF-323, 29 officers, 157 enlisted men and 24 F4U4B planes; and VMF(N)-513, 15 officers, 98 enlisted men and 12

July 8, 1950 F4U5N planes. The helicopter contingent, VMO-6, commanded by Major Vincent Gottschalk, will be composed of 15 officers, 63 enlisted men, eight light observation planes and four HO3S-1 Sikorsky 2-place helicopters. Seven pilots, 30 enlisted men and the four Sikorsky helicopters will be detached from HMX-1 (Quantico) on July 8, from where they will proceed to El Toro, California, to join the brigade. Also, Company A, 1st Marine Tank Battalion, is activated for service with the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade. The unit, acutely familiar with the M4A3 medium tank, equipped with the 75-mm gun or a 105mm howitzer, will be supplied with Pershing M-26 tanks, which are equipped with 90-mm guns. The tankers receive scant time to acquaint themselves with the Pershings. Captain Gearl M. English, the commanding officer, finagles in order to get his Marines one day of practice in the field. Each gunner and loader is restricted to a meager two rounds. The tanks’ 90mm guns are then silenced until the tanks engage the enemy in Korea. Support battalions of the brigade are also scaled down. Company A, 1st Motor Transport Battalion, is composed of six officers and 107 enlisted men. Company A, 1st Engineer Battalion (reinforced), is composed of eight officers and 209 enlisted men. — In the United Nations Security Council: The United Nations Security Council passes its third resolution concerning Communist aggression in the Republic of Korea, recommending that “all members providing military forces and other assistance make such forces ... available to a unified command ... and requests the United States to designate the commander of such forces.” The resolution also directs the unified command to fly the United Nations flag “concurrently with the flags of the various nations participating.” President Truman desires a requisite for victory and by the following day, his choice of commander is given to the United Nations. — In Hawaii: General Lemuel Shepherd, USMC, and his G-3, Colonel Victor H. Krulak, subsequent to the activation of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, depart Hawaii by air for Japan. — In Japan: General MacArthur orders General Dean (in Korea) to provide protection for the 35th Fighter Group, USAF, commanded by Colonel Robert Witty at Yonil, where an airbase is being established. MacArthur is aware that the N.K. 5th Division is moving down the coast road toward Pohang-dong, five miles north of Yonil. Dean dispatches the 3rd Battalion, 19th Regiment, from Taegu and some additional force from other locations to fill the gap. In other activity, Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker directs Colonel William Collier to proceed to Korea as soon as possible and establish Eighth Army headquarters there. Walker explains that he is flying to Korea on this day, but he will return on the 8th. Also, General MacArthur is diligently formulating plans to ensure that the Communists are unable to cause disruptions in Japan. With the encouragement of MacArthur, the Japanese government decreases the activities of the Communists,

68 which diminishes the possibility of massive disruptions within the country. The Japanese, who favor the actions of the U.S. and the U.N. against the North Koreans, contribute much unheralded support.

July 8 Colonel Collier arrives by plane at Ashiya Airbase in Pusan. Then, after a short flight to Taejon, he locates General Dean near the front lines. After some discussion, Taejon is ruled out as a location for Eighth Army Headquarters. Collier, familiar with Korea, selects less crowded Taegu. At Taejon, General Dean receives word at about 0220 that Colonel Martin has escaped from Ch’onan, raising his spirits; however, sometime before daybreak, Martin returns to the besieged town. During the ongoing fighting, the supply line had been reopened. One ammunition truck moves back to the village and spots a column of about five tanks and some infantry driving from the northwest, along a previously mined dirt road. The enemy passes without incident. Enemy penetration occurs about 0600 and intense exchanges of fire erupt. One man, Private Leotis Heater, lobs five grenades at a tank, setting it ablaze. During the vicious fighting, two rifle companies become isolated. Colonel Martin continues to rally his men. He commandeers a bazooka. Assisted by Sergeant Jerry Christenson, he prepares to blast an approaching tank, but it swirls its turret toward the bazooka team. The opposing weapons fire at approximately the same time and the tank fire severs Martin’s body in half. The power of the explosion also pops one of Christenson’s eyes from its socket. Amazingly, he is able to replace his eye in the socket. Christenson, who succumbs in December 1950, becomes a POW with Major Dunn at P’yongyang. Colonel Martin’s actions under fire earn him the first Distinguished Service Cross of the conflict; however, it is a posthumous award. An aidman in the medical collections station, Corporal (later Major) Lacy Barnett, attests that there were no remains of Colonel Martin to be returned to Graves Registration, but according to Barnett, “Colonel Martin’s watch and billfold were recovered.” Also, Barnett states that Colonel Martin’s daughter does have the “blood-soaked order signed by General Dean, appointing him as CO, 34th Infantry on July 7th.” As more enemy troops and tanks enter Ch’onan, the fate of the 3rd Battalion becomes grim. Between 0800 and 1000, the survivors depart. Later in the day it is determined that 175 men escape. Many officers of regimental headquarters had been unable to escape. The ill-fated battalion loses nearly all its mortars, machine guns and rifles prior to moving south. Before the day is out, North Korean radio proclaims the capture of sixty men. The commanding officer, 3rd Battalion, Lt. Colonel David Smith, is exhausted and is transferred out within a couple of days on the 9th. The artillery units head farther south, but the 1st Battalion still holds south of Ch’onan.

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July 8, 1950

U.S. troops depart a hillside position in the vicinity of Ch’onan on 8 July. In other activity, General Walker arrives in Taejon during the morning to confer with General Dean to find a solution and buy more time until Walker can transfer the Eighth Army from Japan. Both Dean and Walker, observing from a nearby hill, watch the 3rd Battalion in action at Ch’onan.

Upon being informed of Colonel Martin’s death, General Dean places Colonel Wadlington in command of the 34th Regiment and orders him to pull back toward the Kum River. In conjunction, Lt. Colonel Ayres’ 1st Battalion is deployed near Ch’onan, but after consulting with Generals Dean and Walker, Ayres is also

July 8, 1950 ordered to pull back toward the Kum River. The complexities of the withdrawal are many. Slightly south of Ch’onan, the road divides and later converges on Taejon, making the defense of both routes mandatory. The 21st Infantry is to move along the main Choch’iwon Road and execute a delaying action while it retires parallel to the rail line. The 34th Regiment is to follow the Kongju Road due south toward the Kum River. The 24th Regiment heads south during the late afternoon. Meanwhile, contingents of the North Korean 3rd Division begin to arrive at Ch’onan to augment the N.K. 4th Division. These enemy components deploy east of the town. Throughout the day, Dean’s orders emphasize the necessity of fighting delaying actions to support the withdrawal. Later, he issues an operational order that reaffirms his earlier demands: “Hold Kum River Line at all costs. Maximum repeat maximum delay will be effected.” One battery of 155-mm howitzers (11th Field Artillery Bn.) and a contingent of M24 light tanks (78th Heavy Tank Battalion) advance to Choch’iwon to support the 21st Regiment. Also, the 3rd Engineering Combat Battalion bolsters the 34th Regiment. It establishes roadblocks in front of Kongju and contingents wire the Kum River bridges for possible demolition. The 21st gets a hefty order from General Dean. It is directed to hold Choch’iwon and simultaneously guard the left flank of Ch’ongju to afford the South Korean forces time to withdraw. The task will be difficult because no reinforcements will be available for at least four days. The 21st and 34th Regiments are directed to hold the river line until totally untenable, and only then they are to cross to the south bank of the Kum to make the final stand. The fate of Taejon lies in the balance. Meanwhile, the South Koreans activate Headquarters I Corps at Ch’ongju. It is composed of the Capital and the 1st Divisions. KMAG documents also show the S.K. 2nd Division operating under I Corps during July, but other records will reveal that the 2nd Division had been rendered unsuited for combat during the first week of the war. During November 1950, a new ROK 2nd Division is established. Nearly all early South Korean records fail to survive the conflict. In other activity, General Dean dispatches a critical message to General MacArthur in Japan that informs him of the inadequacy of the 2.36 rocket launchers, which have proven to be totally ineffective against enemy tanks. Dean’s urgent request also includes antitank mines. He presses MacArthur to have these items rushed to Korea from the States. Central Mountain area: Below Wonju, planes detect long columns of enemy armor, vehicles and infantry that are driving south in an apparent effort to expand the envelopment of ROK troops and sever the primary north-south communication line in the Taejon area. Eastern Coastal area: The 3rd Battalion, 19th Regiment, arrives at Pohang-dong from Taegu. It is to hold the line against the N.K. 5th Division. An antiaircraft

70 unit will arrive on the following day, and heavy engineering equipment is en route via LSTs to speed the work at Yonil Airfield. In other activity, General Kean arrives from Japan at Taejon to meet with General Dean. Kean’s 25th Division will begin arriving in two days. In Air Force activity, Two airmen, Lieutenant Oliver Duerksen and Lieutenant Frank Chermak, operating in radio-equipped jeeps and acting as forward air controllers, direct the initial direct air to ground attacks during the Korean War. In Naval activity, Commander Michael J.L. Luosey assumes command of the diminutive South Korean (ROK) Navy. — In the United States: General MacArthur is chosen by President Truman to command the United Nations troops in South Korea. The general’s task is to be blocked with obstacles. Primarily, the U.S. Armed Forces in the Far East are deeply under-strength and untrained for such an undertaking. The U.S. has been undergoing a continuous depletion of men and equipment, and the training of troops in Japan has been poor at best. Weaponry is also dangerously low, due to the inauspicious practice of mass demobilization after the war. Also, the plan to land the 1st Cavalry Division at Inchon is canceled on this day, due to the continuing deterioration of the situation in Korea. Meanwhile, the Soviets have been steadily fortifying their war machinery, including stockpiling all Japanese equipment captured by them during their previous several-day war against a beaten Japan during August 1945. MacArthur faces some other critical problems. As commander of the United Nation Forces, he is compelled to report his plans and actions to the United Nations. Coincidentally, the Soviet Union representative in the U.N. receives all this information. Also, U.S. planes are forbidden from crossing the Yalu River in pursuit of enemy aircraft. This practice permits enemy planes to strike U.N. positions, then retire across the Yalu River to the sanctuary of Manchuria. During America’s War Between the States, General Robert E. Lee would tell his commanders to read the northern newspapers to become informed about what the Union forces intended to do. In this case, the North Koreans need simply to read their copies of the United Nations’ secret memos, smuggled to them by the Soviets. MacArthur learns this lesson quickly and eliminates some of the problem. In other activity, General MacArthur authorizes Japan, through its prime minister, Shigeru Yoshida, to establish a national police reserve of 75,000 men. He also authorizes the Maritime Safety Board to increase its force to 8,000 men. With the draining of U.S. troops from Japan for the Korean crisis, more strength is required to safeguard the welfare of Japan against aggressors from outside nations and from a potential Communist threat from within Japan. Ambassador Sebald later notes that the Japanese forces looked genuinely G.I. from their uniforms to

71 their equipment. He relates his experience while visiting a training camp: “Only when I saw the soldiers eating with chop sticks did I fully realize that these were indeed, soldiers of another Japanese generation....” Also, Far East Air Forces establishes a Provisional Bomber Command, based at Yokota, Japan. Major General Emmett O’Donnell, Jr., is appointed as commander.

July 9, 1950

July 9

Effective 1300, Eighth Army Headquarters Korea is established at Taegu. Chonan and vicinity have been abandoned by the fatigued U.S. troops who are pulling back toward Taejon, under heavy Communist pressure. The enemy tanks keep rolling south. In the midst of the chaotic fighting, the bewildered civilians are fleeing in absolute panic, often under the guns of

U.S. Army engineers prepare to blow a bridge to slow the North Korean advance toward Taejon and Taegu.

July 9, 1950

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Top: U.S. troops deployed with a 4.2-inch chemical mortar (M2). Bottom: South Korean troops (ROKs) man an 81-mm mortar (M1).

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July 9, 1950

Eighth Army 105-mm howitzers are positioned south of Ch’onan, firing at enemy positions. North Korean planes. However, a combination of U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, Marines and Australian Air Force planes has been clearing the skies. By the following day, the Russian Yak fighters, flown by the North Koreans, will have been thoroughly thrashed, giving the Allies total air supremacy. It is the air forces that contain the enemy and buy precious time for the Americans to regroup and reinforce as they are being shoved back to Pusan and the sea. At Choch’iwon, the 3rd Battalion, 21st Regiment, commanded by Lt. Colonel Carl Jensen, is dug in north of the town. And a composite battalion is deployed south and east of Chonui, along a low ridge about 500 yards east of the town and a steep hill about 800 yards south of the town. At Chonui, engineers detonate the approach bridges. Eleven tanks, supplemented by about 200 to 300 infantry, close against Chonui by midafternoon. Planes and artillery intercept the column and inflict damage and casualties. Reports indicate five tanks ablaze. As the infantry penetrates Chonui, bazookas and artillery fire greet them to slow the progress of the enemy, which is moving house-tohouse. East of Chonui, planes pound another advancing convoy composed of about 200 vehicles. Reports from the air indicate about 100 vehicles destroyed. The night passes slowly as the beleaguered defenders, using the illumination from the aging fires in Chonui, keep a cautious vigil. Enemy patrols nudge against their positions.

At Chinch’on, the South Korean Capital Division and some police spring an effective ambush against one battalion of the N.K. 2nd Division. The South Koreans capture four artillery pieces and 27 vehicles. The stunned North Koreans then launch a strong counterattack that ignites several days of bitter fighting. The ROK force, subsequent to the fall of Ch’onan and Chonui on their west flank, abandons its positions on the 11th, permitting the N.K. 2nd Division to enter Chinch’on. In other activity, Lt. Colonel David Smith is evacuated for two or three days of rest. The exhaustion is totally physical, due to lack of sleep, but things get messed up in Taejon. The medical report specifies that Smith should not be placed under the psychiatric department. Nevertheless, the medical personnel in Taejon place Smith on a plane to Tokyo and when he arrives there, someone discovers “exhaustion” on his record and sends him to the psychiatric hospital in Tokyo. The error becomes embarrassing, and Colonel D. Smith is quickly discharged and sent to Camp Drake to await a new assignment. Smith eventually retires after thirty years of honorable service in the Army. — In the United States: According to reports, the ground troops of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, which is preparing to embark for Korea, stands at 266 officers and 4,503 enlisted men: the two largest contingents are the 5th Marines and the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines. The 5th Marines comprises 113 officers and 2,068 enlisted men. The 1st Battalion (reinforced) 11th

July 10, 1950 Marines is composed of 37 officers and 455 enlisted men. In addition, the air component comprises 192 officers and 1,358 enlisted men, which swells the brigade to a total of 458 officers and 5,861 enlisted men, for a total of 6,319 troops. Nonetheless, with the arrival of the additional rifle companies (requested by General Shepherd) and some extra support personnel, the brigade’s final number as it departs will be 6,534 troops. — In Japan: General MacArthur updates the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the situation in South Korea. The dispatch from MacArthur informs them of the fighting efficiency of the enemy ground troops and of the superior quality of their equipment: “This force more and more assumes the aspect of a combination of Soviet leadership and technical guidance with Chinese Communist ground elements. While it serves under the flag of North Korea, it can no longer be considered as an indigenous N.K. military effort.” MacArthur commits part of his B-29 Superfortress contingent to the war effort. In other activity, General Shepherd, commanding officer Fleet Marine Force Pacific, and Colonel Krulak, USMC, arrive in Tokyo from Pearl Harbor.

July 10

Colonel Stephens, having spent the night at the forward positions (21st Regiment) near Chonui, is on hand for the anticipated arrival of the enemy. The composite battalion, 21st Infantry, is composed of a combination of about 500 personnel drawn from Companies A and D, and Companies B and C. These units that arrived at Pusan too late to move out with Task Force Smith hold the ground that overlooks the highway and railroad. There is another hill to the west on the left flank, but due to the unavailability of troops, the left flank remains undefended. East of Chonui, pea soup fog keeps the troops deployed on the ridge from seeing the road. Despite no visible signs of the enemy, it becomes apparent at about 0555 that they are close. Nearby, Korean voices flow in from the left. Soon after, an enemy soldier whistles a signal that triggers random American fire. Colonel Stephens orders the men to cease firing blindly. By 0700, enemy mortars pour fire upon the ridge, preceding an attack, which places most of its strength against the far left portion of the ridge against Company A, commanded by Lieutenant Ray Bixler. U.S. mortar fire is called upon to strike the valley between the two American positions to hold the enemy at bay. In the meantime, a large contingent of North Koreans circumvents the battalion’s right flank and drives against the mortar positions. This attack is synchronized with tanks, which had advanced unobserved from Chonui under the dense fog cover. The tanks rumble past the infantry, which can hear but not see them. At about 0800, the fog lifts, and four enemy tanks are fully visible as they penetrate the village. Others had made it to the Americans’ rear to enjoin enemy infantry, which had breached the right flank. The tank fire originating in the rear causes more concern. In the midst of the

74 combat, all communication between Colonel Stephens and the mortarmen is severed. The mortars fall silent, leaving only artillery to assist. There is some American tank participation near Chonui during the morning, but this, the initiation of U.S. tank action in Korea, is unimpressive. Meanwhile, at about 0900, additional enemy infantrymen bolt toward the Americans, but artillery fire repels the attack and inflicts heavy casualties. Although the infantry is turned back, tanks batter the American positions with machine gun fire. Then at about 1100, the left portion of the hill, held by Bixler’s men, is struck by intense small arms fire. Lieutenant Bixler, aware the North Koreans are closing fast, contacts Colonel Stephens at 1125. The next seven minutes move at a furious pace. After explaining that his unit has taken severe casualties, Bixler requests permission to withdraw before he is overrun. He receives a response instructing him to hold on. “Relief is on the way.” Within minutes, thanks to the lifting fog, two jet planes stream overhead. The tanks are attacked, but no damage is sustained. The enemy infantry on Bixler’s immediate left is stung hard with strafing, keeping the enemy ground troops harnessed and grasping for cover. Meanwhile, the survivors of the mortar and recoilless rifle units make it back to the ridge to support the beleaguered infantry. The planes expend their ammunition and are forced to depart, leaving the infantry vulnerable. During this contest, some men holding the right sector of the ridge begin to desert their positions, and more follow suit later. In addition, U.S. communications become increasingly poor, as the tanks again have ripped the strung land wires. The forward artillery observer’s radio goes dead, and the silence gives the artillerymen the impression that the 21st Regiment has been overrun. Friendly fire commences at 1132. It strikes the ridge feverishly, but it is still being held by the dwindling American force on the left sector of the ridge. Colonel Stephens dashes 100 yards to his jeep, grabs the radio and calls for the regimental artillery to cease fire, but to no avail. Stephens receives a report from Bixler at 1135, informing him that most of his unit have become casualties, and more desperately, Bixler states that his command is surrounded. No further reports are forthcoming. Bixler’s positions are overrun and most of those remaining alive are killed in their foxholes. As the fateful news about Bixler’s command spreads, the right flank begins to collapse. One man screams: “Everybody on the right flank is taking off.” It is not an exaggeration. Colonel Stephens glances to the right flank and sees the stampede to the rear. He attempts to halt the retreat. One man, Corporal Richard Okada, a Nisei from Hawaii, corrals a few men, but the attempt is futile. Those few surviving men who refuse to abandon their positions and choose to stand and fight become terribly imperiled. Colonel Stephens orders a withdrawal at 1205. The pull-back is near fatal, because two more jets appear and mistake the Americans for North Koreans. The aircraft inadvertently strafe the Americans as they cross a rice paddy. Luckily, there are

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An enemy tank, captured during the fighting on 10 July. no casualties, and Stephens gets the troops back to the American lines. U.S. casualties at this action near Chonui: A Company sustains 27 wounded and 30 missing; D Company sustains three killed and eight wounded. The Heavy Mortar Company sustains fourteen casualties and six of

these men are discovered later in the day, when the ridge is recaptured. Each man has his hands tied behind his back and a bullet hole in the back of his head. One of the men, a jeep driver, escapes while the other six surrender. The 3rd Battalion, 21st Regiment, commanded by

July 10, 1950 Colonel Delbert Pryor, is ordered to counterattack toward Chonui, but the assault does not commence. Pryor is relieved of command and replaced by Colonel Carl Jensen. Subsequent to Colonel Stephens’ return to friendly lines, he orders Colonel Jensen’s 3rd Battalion to mount a counterattack and regain the lost terrain at Chonui. The aggressive attack, supported by several tanks, regains the ridge and reclaims the bodies of the massacred Americans. However, the tanks are less than battle-ready. Lacking the proper lubricating oil, the guns had not yet been fired. Two of the U.S. tanks are lost when the guns fire and the turrets are blown off. One enemy tank is damaged during the confrontation. In conjunction, the 3rd Battalion lacks the strength to reclaim the hill defended by Bixler and his men. Ten troops of A and D Companies who chose not to pull back during the friendly artillery fire are rescued at their post. At about 2045, General Dean contacts Colonel Stephens and gives him an option: “If you consider it necessary, withdraw to your next delaying position prior to dawn.” General Dean reiterates the importance of holding Choch’iwon to forestall the collapse of the South Korean main supply route. By 2200, General Dean contacts a regimental officer and authorizes a pull-back to positions four miles to the rear and two miles north of Choch’iwon, with the stipulation “hold in your new position and fight like hell. I expect you to hold it all day tomorrow.” Colonel Jensen and his exhausted 3rd Battalion pull back toward their original positions just before midnight, bringing out most of the equipment that had been abandoned earlier. The troops have to do some housecleaning before they can get some sleep. In their absence, North Korean troops have become squatters, occupying some of the foxholes. After one hour of unexpected combat, the Communists are driven out. The troops attempt to rest; however, daybreak approaches and with it, more enemy tanks and troops. In conjunction, Major Heritage, the 24th Division’s surgeon, notes in the division historical report that Captain Duerk, the 21st Regiment’s surgeon (at 1605, 10 July), “requests 1,500 units of benzedrine or hexedrine because of the fact that an entire unit has slept through an enemy attack. There wasn’t any on hand so Captain Duerk was notified of this fact.” Also, Task Force Smith, with its new replacements, is en route from Taejon to rejoin the 21st Regiment. Central Mountain area: Several N.K. Divisions continue to drive toward Taegu. The S.K. 8th Division, previously unable to penetrate enemy resistance, has been rerouted from scattered positions in Pohangdong, Yongch’on and Taegu vicinity to Tanyang by rail. The unit debarks the train near the upper south bank of the Han River and deploys to defend the YongjuAndong corridor. Also, elements of the 25th Infantry Division begin landing in Korea when the 27th Regiment (Wolf hound) debarks at Pusan. It is commanded by Lt. Colonel John H. “Mike” Michaelis. Initially, the 27th Regiment is dispatched to the vicinity of Uisong,

76 about 35 miles north of Taegu. After a short stay there, it is redeployed in Andong. Eastern Coastal area: the N.K. 11th Regiment, having moved along its inland route for over a week, rejoins its parent 5th Division at Ulchin. In the meantime, a huge number of specially trained North Korean civilians have been transported by sea to Ulchin for the purpose of establishing a Communist civil government within this eastern province. In addition, the 766th Independent Infantry, upon its arrival at Ulchin, is detached from the N.K. 5th Division. Its mission, according to information from POWs, is to subdivide into small groups, move west into the mountains and then sweep south to disrupt South Korean communications between Taegu and Pusan. Meanwhile, since the S.K. 8th Division moved inland, the only unit remaining to block the enemy advance along the coastal road is the 23rd Regiment, 3rd S.K. Division. The regiment, commanded by Colonel “Tiger Kim” Chong Won, has been skirmishing with guerrillas since early July in the vicinity of P’yonghaeri and Ulchin. Today the N.K. 5th Division approaches P’yonghae-ri and is met with heavy resistance, igniting a string of bloody battles along the coastal road. The Communists press to capture Yongdok and gain domination of the northern approaches to Pohang-dong. Colonel Kim Chong Won requests reinforcements, and Colonel Emmerich (KMAG 3rd S.K. Division) concurs. He presses the Republic of Korea Army to dispatch the required manpower. The 1st Separate Battalion and the Yongdungp’o Separate Battalion move by railcars to join the ROK 23rd Regiment. Both units, numbering about 1,500 men, are equipped with Japanese rifles and carbines. At the S.K. 3rd Division’s positions, about 50 miles farther south at Pohang-dong, some ROK troops are spotted moving toward the rear. Colonel Emmerich and South Korean officers order the contingents back to Yongdok. It is the strategy of the South Koreans and the U.S. military to defend this portion of Korea, by holding the Mun’gyong and Tanyang passes of the Han-Naktong watershed. In other activity, a plane arrives at Taejon from Travis Air Force Base, California. It delivers instructors to train and familiarize the troops with the new 3.5 rocket launcher. The first delivery of the rocket launchers arrives two days later. In yet other activity, elements of the 25th Infantry Division, commanded by Major General William B. Kean, begin to arrive in Korea on this day. The 27th Regiment debarks at Pusan. Initially, the 27th Regiment, commanded by Lt. Colonel John H. Michaelis, will be dispatched thirty-five miles north of Taegu in the vicinity of Uisong. Also, the North Korean II Corps Commander, Major General Kim Kwang Hyop, is demoted to corps chief of staff. He is replaced by Lt. General Kim Mu Chong, who is expected to get the II Corps to move more quickly. In Air Force Activity, F-80 aircraft, sweeping the area for targets, swoop down through the heavy skies about

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Slaughtered GIs. U.S. troops captured by the Communists are recovered by the Americans. Each man has his hands tied behind his back and had been shot. This is not an uncommon practice of the North Koreans. 25 miles north of P’yongt’aek. Visibility is sufficient to give them an eagle’s view of a huge column of vehicles that have stalled at a blown bridge. The pilots inform headquarters, and within minutes of the transmission, every available plane of the U.S. Fifth Air Force speeds toward the bonanza. The giant-sized air strike, comprising B-26s, F-80s and F-82s, plasters the column and inflicts heavy damage. Aerial observers report the decimation of huge numbers of enemy troops and the destruction of 38 tanks, 117 trucks and seven half-tracs. The figure is considered exaggerated. However, the inflated figures are nonetheless, unintentional, caused by the circumstances under which the planes are operating. This raid and the one unleashed against the enemy on the afteroon of the 9th near Chonui are considered to have caused the most destruction to enemy armor of any individual engagement of the war. The longterm effects of the raid become apparent immediately.

Following these attacks, the North Koreans halt daylight movement of their vehicles, choosing to camouflage them until darkness. The enemy troops also remain inconspicuous until after dark. The North Koreans then advance along secondary roads when possible and hide many supplies in railroad tunnels, out of harm’s way. In conjunction, Fifth Air Force on this day initiates the use of T-6 trainer aircraft to handle forward air control missions, because liaison airplanes lack the speed to evade enemy aircraft. In Naval activity, the ongoing naval blockade of North Korean ports is expanded to include Wonsan and Chinnampo. In yet other activity, the commander of the Pacific Fleet is directed to embark Task Force Yoke as soon as it is fully prepared. — In the United States: The Department of the Army informs General MacArthur in Japan that the U.S. is preparing to expedite the delivery of three

July 11, 1950 medium tank battalions to Korea to neutralize the Russian T-34 tanks in the service of the North Korean Armed Forces. The 6th (M-46), 70th (M-26 and M4A3) and the 73rd (M-26) Tank Battalions embark from San Francisco on July 23 and arrive by sea in Korea on 7 August. Other armor reinforcements will follow. General Ridgway, handling the hectic day-to-day operations in the Pentagon (during the absence of Collins), places all pertinent units on alert for imminent deployment in the Far East. The outfits include an airborne RCT, 11th Airborne, several tank battalions, additional artillery units and combat engineers. The U.S. Armed Forces are too few in number to properly handle the crisis, but the political climate mandates opposition to activating the reserves. Meanwhile, the General Reserve is being depleted, and if a large-scale confrontation erupts in some other part of the world, such as Europe, the U.S. is unprepared to properly react. Ironically, it is thought that the reserves would require much training to prepare for combat, but the available regular forces have not been overtrained. In other activity, at the urging of President Truman, Generals Joseph Collins and Hoyt Vandenberg, Army and Air Force chiefs of staff respectively, depart for Japan and subsequently to Korea to gather first-hand reports on the situation. — In Japan: General MacArthur is informed that the 2nd Infantry Division (Ft. Lewis, Tacoma, Washington) and some other supporting units (antiaircraft artillery and armor) are about to embark for Korea. MacArthur sends word to Washington that he would prefer the 2nd Division be at full strength. He also puts emphasis on speeding the other troops he had previously requested. In other activity, Admiral Richard Ruble, commanding officer, Carrier Division 15, and his staff arrive in Tokyo by air. Ruble reports to Admiral Joy. Ruble had been stationed in San Diego, and his assigned task up to the outbreak of hostilities had been antisubmarine warfare (hunter-killer) operations, but on the 12th of July he officially receives additional responsibilities. Another conference is held at MacArthur’s Headquarters. Admiral Doyle’s suggestion of a troop landing at Pohang-dong is accepted by members of General MacArthur’s and Admiral Joy’s respective staffs. Initially, the proposed landing site had been on the west coast at Inchon, but the swift disintegration of the South Korean forces during the early days of the hostilities cancels this option. By the following day, a special reconnaissance team is airlifted to Pohang to reconnoiter the area. Presently, Pohang-dong, about seventy miles north of Pusan, is in no immediate danger, despite the dynamic advance of the enemy. The Spartan actions of the slim forces of the 24th Division and supporting air and sea forces, including the sure-pointed naval surface fire of the cruisers and destroyers under the command of Rear Admiral John M. Higgins, have forestalled even greater successes of the enemy.

78 The proposed amphibious invasion of Korea (BLUEis aborted due to the failure of the U.S. and South Korean troops to repulse the southern attack of the enemy. However, planning for a similar type operation continues, headed by General Edwin K. Wright, MacArthur’s assistant chief of staff (G-3). The responsibility falls to Wright’s Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group. A deputy, Colonel Donald H. Galloway, is in direct command of the JSPOG. A blueprint of the amphibious strategy will be offered on July 23. During the conference, a casual conversation between General MacArthur and General Shepherd instigates a momentous historical event. MacArthur begins discussing the accomplishments of the 1st Marine Division when it was under his authority during the New Britain campaign in 1943–44. Continuing, MacArthur says that if he had the 1st Marine Division in Japan he would employ it as his landing force for the Inchon operation. The tone moves from casual exchange to a more serious discussion between MacArthur and Shepherd, who had been the assistant divisional commander of the 1st Marine Division during the New Britain operation. Shepherd suggests that MacArthur request that the 1st Marine Division be assigned to him. MacArthur, with a genuine excitement, asks if it could be ready to launch an invasion by the 15th of September. Shepherd responds in the affirmative, then bolsters his enthusiastic boast by noting that the division is under his command and he would take personal responsibility to ensure its readiness, minus the infantry regiment and other Marines of the brigade. Of course, General Shepherd does not give General MacArthur the full story. Thanks to the gutting of the armed forces and the activation of the Marine brigade, the 1st Marine Division presently contains fewer troops than one regimental combat team, giving the Marines a full scale nightmare to bring the division to full strength and have it ready for an assault in 67 days. MacArthur requests the 1st Marine Division on this day. MacArthur, with regard to the Inchon invasion, is on record stating that the invasion will succeed, and he adds, “But I must have the Marines.” Shepherd prepares to call out the Marines, including the reserves, but first, Congress and President Truman must authorize the rebuilding of what they dismantled. MacArthur’s request for the 1st Marine Division is expeditiously dispatched to Washington. HEARTS)

July 11 The men of the 3rd Battalion, 21st Regiment, having hardly closed their eyes following the previous day’s furious fighting, are back in combat-ready positions, and they face another dense fog. At 0630, again the clanking noise of tanks can be heard. The rumble of armor approaches from the opposite side of a minefield. Meanwhile, Task Force Smith (B and C Companies) has arrived from Taejon with 205 replacements. It rejoins the 21st Regiment about two miles north of Choch’iwon and will be in place by 0730. In conjunction, Companies B and C have re-supplied at

79 Choch’iwon. This hook-up of the four companies places Lt. Colonel Brad Smith’s 1st Battalion together for the first time since the task force was initially formed. At the 3rd Battalion’s positions, four enemy tanks breach the minefield just after 0630 with a massive thrust. As the menacing tanks burst toward the battalion, enemy mortars commence fire. The shells strike the perimeter with pinpoint accuracy. The communications center is wiped out and the ammunition depot sustains a deadly blow. Apparently, the enemy had mapped out the entire 3rd Battalion area while it temporarily occupied the ground on the previous day. While the tanks and mortars inflict severe casualties on the 3rd Battalion, the enemy infantry (3rd N.K. Division) strikes against both flanks with 1,000 troops. The American defenders, having lost their command post, their ammunition and communications as well as their deployment position intelligence, are gravely threatened. The North Koreans have also established roadblocks behind 3rd Battalion, 21st Regiment’s lines, which prevents any chance of getting more ammunition. Desperate fighting continues for several hours against insurmountable odds. Nevertheless, the 3rd Battalion resists tenaciously. Heavy machine gun fire rips viciously into K Company’s command post. In this instance, return fire is anemic, but sufficient. Private Paul R. Spear single-

July 11, 1950 handedly charges the enemy position with his entire arsenal, his pistol. Spear lunges into the position, but his weapon is empty. He improvises and uses his pistol as a short pipe. The free-swinging infantryman drives the enemy from the position; however, Spear becomes severely wounded by enemy fire. The hectic morning phases out with another North Korean rout. The 3rd Battalion, which sustains 60 percent casualties, is overrun. Those who are able begin to withdraw toward Choch’iwon to avoid annihilation. About ninety percent of these are weaponless. The attack had been so thoroughly organized and swift that many of the survivors are also shoeless and without canteens. Helmets are considered a luxury. Escape is again an arduous task. During the retreat, Colonel Jensen and his S-2 officer, Lieutenant Leon J. Jacques, are cut down while trying to wade across a creek to the rear of their former command post. Other officers, including Captain O’Dean T. Cox, commanding officer, Company L, are missing in action. Some men are unwilling to continue the march due to exhaustion from their two days of incessant fighting. They choose to remain along the road. The eight officers and 142 troops avoid death or capture and reform as a provisional company, comprising three rifle platoons and a heavy weapons company. Statistics for the battalion improve slightly by July 15 when more

A General Chaffee light tank (M24) in action during mid–July.

July 12, 1950 stragglers enter U.S. lines, bringing total strength to 322 men. On July 10, the first day of this battle, the unit strength had been 667 men. The 3rd Battalion had also lost supplies, equivalent of that required to supply two rifle battalions with weapons and clothing for nearly 1,000 men. By nightfall, the grim reports of the fate of the 3rd Battalion, 21st Regiment, reach General Dean. Using his limited resources, he continues to find a solution to halt the onslaught in front of Choch’iwon and save the South Korean Main Supply Route. Another Spartan outfit, Company A, 3rd Engineer Combat Battalion, is rushed into extra duty. The men are ordered to establish every imaginable type of obstacle they can create to hold the sagging line. These engineers must also prepare to afford cover-fire if the 21st Regiment is compelled to withdraw. Earlier in the day, Dean had ordered the 13th Field Artillery Battalion and the 19th Infantry Regiment to speed from Pohang-dong and Taegu, respectively, to bolster the line at Taejon. While the N.K. 3rd Division pounds the 3rd Battalion, 21st Regiment, its 1st Battalion, about two miles away in front of Choch’iwon, has mysteriously remained unmolested. Nonetheless, the 1st Battalion realizes its positions are in jeopardy. Its lack of combat accelerates the anxiety as the troops await the imminent enemy arrival, expected prior to dawn on the 12th. Also, along the Konju Road, the 1st Battalion, 34th Regiment, which is deployed to cover the withdrawal of the 34th Regiment, engages contingents of the N.K. 4th Division. Four Light M-24 tanks, attached to the 78th Tank Battalion, support the fight; however, enemy firepower quickly neutralizes the fly-weight tanks. During an impromptu rescue operation, one tank speeds to save survivors from a jeep that had been ambushed by infiltrators. En route the tank is destroyed by infantry close-range fire. Two other tanks are decimated by enemy artillery fire. Nonetheless, the effective rearguard actions of Ayres’ 1st Battalion and some supporting artillery help the regiment reach the Kum River with only a few additional casualties. The 3rd Battalion, commanded by Major Newton Lantron, reaches Taejon. The survivors are regrouped as a composite company and moved to Konju. The remainder of the regiment crosses the Kum River on the following day. Meanwhile, during the night, a contingent of the 34th Regiment’s I&R Platoon captures a scout from the N.K. 16th Regiment, 4th Division. The prisoner, seized north of the Kum River, opposite Konju, reveals that his regiment’s objective is Konju. At Chinch’on, the S.K. Capital Division and its supporting police contingent are forced to pull out. Facing envelopment due to the collapse of their western flank by the enemy seizure of Ch’onan and Chonui, the troops of the Capital Division evacuate their positions. The bloodied N.K. 2nd Division takes the town. Its commanding officer disregards the high casualties and exhausted condition of his troops. The division, without pause, drives toward the headquarters of the South Korean I Corps at Ch’ongju. It is met there by heavy artillery fire from

80 the guns of some determined South Koreans. The effective barrage halts the N.K. 2nd Division at the steps of the town. The division sustains about 800 additional casualties. The artillery continues to plaster the enemy until the following day. On the 12th, Choch’iwon, about 12 miles west of Ch’ongju, is relinquished by contingents of the U.S. 24th Division. This forces the South Koreans at Ch’ongju to withdraw. The town is abandoned to the N.K. 2nd Division. Also, the 24th Regiment, 25th Division, commanded by Colonel Horton V. White, arrives in Korea. It is the only regiment is the U.S. Eighth Army that contains three battalions. Meanwhile, the 27th Regiment transfers from Usiong to Andong. Eastern Coastal area: The 23rd S.K. Regiment reacts to enormous enemy pressure from the N.K. 5th Division. Its command post is moved back into Yongdok. The S.K. 3rd Division has orders to hold it. In other activity, the North Koreans initiate the use of prisoners of war (POWs) for their propaganda strategy. In Seoul, Captain Ambrose H. Nugent, 52nd Field Artillery Battalion, under Communist duress, speaks in English over the radio. Nugent reads from a prepared text composed of about 1,000 words. Although most Koreans cannot understand a word he is saying, the North Koreans get good mileage from the incident. A Communist interpreter translates for the Koreans. In other activity, Captain Vincent Robinson, USMC, Lt. Commander Jack Lowentrout and Lt. JG George Atcheson III, attached to Amphibious Group One, and selected members of the First Cavalry’s Division’s staff arrive in Pohang-dong from Tokyo. They gather intelligence during their two-day stay to assure a safe landing and to seek an area to deploy the cavalry. Also, the N.K. 6th Division, trailing the N.K. 3rd and 4th Divisions south after the seizure of Seoul, reacts to recent new orders from the N.K. Army headquarters. It departs the Ch’onan area, and advances toward the west coast from where it will thrust a sturdy spear into the side of Eighth Army. The N.K. Sixth Division, subsequent to shifting off the main highway, conceals its positions. U.S. intelligence is unable to discover its location for about two weeks. In the United States: President Truman authorizes the Marine Corps to expand to two wartime strength divisions. The corps had been drastically reduced following the close of World War II. Each division will consist of about 23,000 men. The chief of naval operations authorizes the activation of ships from the reserve fleet.

July 12 By this date, the Communists occupy about one-half of South Korea. Four U.S. battalions have withdrawn across the Kum River, which had been the primary line of defense above Taejon. As dawn arrives at Choch’iwon, the uneasy men of the 1st Battalion, 21st Regiment, are afforded little time to ponder the weather or gripe about terrible cold chow. They are disinterested in everything except survival. The 21st Regimental War Diary notes that four tanks join the 1st

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U.S. Marines (1st Provisional Brigade) board an attack transport in San Diego. A convoy transporting the Marines to Korea embarks on 12 July. Battalion at 0730, but the unit is unspecified. In conjunction, the War Diary of the 24th Division notes that Company A, 71st Heavy Tank Battalion (1st Cavalry), arrives at Taejon on this day. It deploys at the airstrip, with orders to execute reconnaissance missions “south of the Kum River between Kongju and Taepyong-ni.” The unit’s eighteen tanks are assigned to the 24th Division. Meanwhile, the North Korean 3rd Division, which passes the N.K. 4th Division, will spring the attack. The 4th Division will retrace its steps from Chonui and plunge down the Konju Road to chase the retreating 34th Regiment. A quick glance from the positions of C Company, 21st Regiment, detects an enemy patrol while it probes near the perimeter. Additional and heavier concentrations of enemy forces are then discovered by others who sight hostile troops operating on both flanks of the battalion. Soon after, at 0930, enemy artillery commences a hefty bombardment. Sheets of enemy artillery shells, synchronized with a powerful attack by a battalion strength unit, pound the American positions. The infantry contingent, composed of about 2,000 troops, propels a crushing blow into the fragile left flank. Colonel Stephens, aware that his force is primarily com-

posed of green and untried replacements, attempts to repel the attack, but again lacking air cover, sufficient men and weapons, the battle is futile. By noon, for the third day in a row, nearly dubbing the hour as the witching hour, overpowering enemy force is again able to execute envelopment tactics destined to wipe out an American force. General Dean receives another message in a long string of grim reports. Stephens enunciates the desperation of the regiment in his report: “Am surrounded. 1st battalion left giving way. Having nothing left to establish intermediate delaying position am forced to withdraw to river line. I have issued instructions to withdraw.” Colonel Smith, having become accustomed to extricating his survivors from the North Korean hordes since the disaster at Osan on the 5th, again exudes confidence to retain the discipline and morale of his strained troops (1st Battalion). Enemy pressure continues to press forward as the withdrawal is initiated. The embattled infantry companies begin their move to the rear one company at a time in an effort to reach the trucks. All the while, artillery shells ring the area; one barrage strikes against the regimental command post on the fringe of Choch’iwon. Nonetheless, the mandated retreat to more tenable positions on the south

July 12, 1950

82

Top: During the night of the 12th-13th, engineers blow the bridges across the Kum River at Konju and Taep’yong-ni. Bottom: A view of the bridge across the Kum River at Konju and Taep’yong-ni after the smoke clears.

83 bank of the Kum River, under the circumstances, is totally organized. The 1st Battalion redeploys by about 1550 near a highway bridge which spans the river at Taep’yong-ni. All units reach the new defensive line by about 1600, although some isolated small groups are still filtering into the lines at 2100. The prognosis for the regiment is hazy at best. About 325 men, including able and walking wounded troops of the 1st and 3rd Battalions, persist in defying the odds by remaining at another soon to be besieged post to buy more precious time while the South Korean troops continue to flee. While the ROKs abscond, 64 men of the 3rd Battalion and about 261 troops of the 1st Battalion attempt to hold. These survivors of 21st Regiment have fought a valiant three-day delaying action between Chonui and Choch’iwon against two crack North Korean divisions. While the massive enemy blows are being launched against the 21st Regiment, the 1st Battalion, 34th Regiment, holds positions on the Konju Road to protect the regiment’s retreat. Engagements are fought at the road against elements of the N.K. 4th Division, which had diverted from the main road and taken the right fork to drive toward Kongju. The survivors of the 34th Regiment and the 63rd Field Artillery Battalion ford the Kum River with the final contingents of infantry and Colonel Ayres, 1st Battalion commander. The crossing is completed by dusk. Orders from General Dean are delivered to Colonel Ayres, who is directed to maintain a small outpost on the north bank of the river, then “blow the main bridge, only when the enemy starts to cross.” In conjunction, Colonel Wadlington directs Company L to hold the bridge and secure the area for 600 yards to the front. During the night of the 12th–13th, engineers blow the bridges across the Kum River at Konju and Taep’yong-ni. The railroad span at Sinch’on will be blown on the 15th. During this same period, the 24th Reconnaissance Company guts all flat-bottomed boats it can locate for a distance that stretches 16 miles below Konju. In concert, General Menoher, assistant commander, 24th Division, orders identical action to be taken against all similar boats between Konju and the railroad station east of the town along the arc of the river. With the ongoing thrashing of the 24th Division, General Walker requests immediate help. He instructs his chief of staff, Colonel Landrum, to contact General Almond in Tokyo in an attempt to get the two battalions in Okinawa. On the following day, General MacArthur instructs the Okinawa Command to embark the particular battalions to Korea. In other activity, the 19th Regiment reaches the south bank of the Kum River. It relieves the 21st Infantry on the following day. Central Mountain area: The N. K. 12th Division (previously 7th Division) drives through the eastern (second) mountain corridor closing from north of Tanyang. It encroaches the S.K. 8th Division, which has just withdrawn from its east coast positions to es-

July 12, 1950 tablish a new line. Advance contingents of the N.K. 12th Division cross the Han River. Earlier, the S.K 8th Division, upon hitting the stiff resistance, failed to break through, prompting the unit to take a prolonged circuitous route to its designated area. In addition, the N.K. 15th Division (advancing through the first mountain corridor), which had followed the 7th Division to Wonju, departs there. It heads west through Yoju, then it pivots southward where it had previously engaged South Korean troops at Changhowon-ni. On this day the division moves into Koesan, about 18 miles northwest of Mun’gyong. Meanwhile, the 1st N.K. Division (moving through the 1st mountain corridor), which had diverted from its northwest advance, moves south from Ch’ungju and butts against contingents of the S.K. 6th Division just north of Mun’gyong. Vicious battles continue to ensue between these opponents for domination of the Mun’gyong pass and plateau. General Dean orders General Kean, commanding officer, 25th Division, to deploy his force where it can halt the enemy advance below Ch’ungju; however, Kean is to keep one battalion at Yonil Airfield to defend it. General Kean is also to mandate one regiment (24th) to remain at Kumch’on in reserve, poised to speed to Taejon or Ch’ungju, whichever requires the support first. Eastern Coastal area: Heavy fighting continues near P’yonghae-ri, as the S.K. 23rd Regiment continues to engage the N.K. 5th Division. On or about the following day, North Korean troops seize P’yonghae-ri and prepare to move against Yongdok. Subsequent to entering the town, the 10th Regiment, 5th N.K. Division will peel off and head west into the mountains to seize Chinbo. From there, the 10th Regiment will be poised to strike Yongdok from the rear, thus setting the stage for the imminent and first major combat on the east coast. In other activity, the 24th Regiment, 25th Division, arrives in Pusan. On the following day, the 35th Regiment, 25th Division, begins coming ashore at Pusan. By the 15th, the entire division is ashore. General Kean establishes his command post at Yongch’on, about halfway between Taegu and Pohangdong. In Air Force Activity, the 92nd Bomber Group launches its initial mission from its airbase in Japan to strike enemy marshaling yards at enemy-held Seoul. Communist fighter planes are able to down two of the bombers, one B-29 and one B-26, and one other craft, an L-4. The losses provide the enemy with their first victory in the skies. — In the United States: On the West Coast, the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade begins boarding ships that will transport them to Korea via Japan; it will be the final publicized embarkation of troops for the duration of the war in Korea. Between today and the 14th, Task Group 53.7 embarks San Diego for Korea; it travels under strict radio silence. The vessels transporting the ground troops are the LSDs USS Fort Marion, USS Gunston Hall, the

July 13, 1950 AKAs USS Alshain and Whiteside and the APAs USS Clymer, USS Henrico and USS Pickaway. The vessels Fort Marion and Gunston Hall (designated Task Unit 53.7.3) also depart today. Marine Aircraft Group 33 is ordered to embark on the transports USS Acherenar, Anderson and the carrier USS Badoeng Strait. Due to the chronic shortage of ships, the Marine Brigade departs lacking about one-third of its motor transport. In other activity, Lt. Colonel Welborn G. Dolvin, USA, receives verbal orders that he is to depart for Korea to command the 89th Medium Tank Battalion, which is hurriedly being established. Dolvin and more than 150 troops of the 2nd Armored Division embark for Japan from the West Coast on the 17th. — In Japan: At Yokohama, elements of the 1st Cavalry Division begin boarding ships, but the initial strategy to launch an amphibious landing at Inchon has been scrapped because of the ongoing fast-paced enemy advance. It has already swept south of the Han River, bulldozing the U.S. 24th Division as it advanced. The cavalry continues the boarding process until the 14th. On the 15th, the command ship (Task Force 90) USS Mount McKinley and the remaining vessels embark for the east coast of Korea. In other activity, Admiral Ruble is temporarily appointed commander, Naval Air Japan. Ruble will be responsible for providing logistical support to all naval aircraft and every Marine air squadron in the Korean Theater. Four Military Air Transport Service planes, transporting 58 3.5-inch rocket launchers (bazookas) and shaped charges arrive in Japan from the United States to the jubilation of the military, which remains in dire need of the latest weapon designed to destroy enemy tanks.

July 13 Lt. General Walton H. Walker, commanding officer, Eighth Army, assumes control of all ground forces in Korea effective 0001. He establishes headquarters in Taegu. In conjunction, the ROK transfers its headquarters from Taejon to Taegu. To Walker’s dismay, he has too few troops and he lacks the necessary equipment to stop the North Korean hordes at the steps of Taejon. The beleaguered 24th Division will be forced to retreat further. General Walker immediately initiates priority tactical objectives. The 24th Division, stretched along the south bank of the Kum River, must defend the Kongju-Taejon vicinity and hold the line there. The 25th Division is ordered to bolster the South Koreans’ effort in the central mountains. The 25th is also directed to deploy contingents to defend Yonil Airfield and the port town of Pohang-dong. At the 24th Division line along the Kum River, intelligence has placed the opposition at about two enemy divisions, supported by about 50 tanks. The advancing ground force is composed of contingents of the N.K. 3rd and 4th Divisions. Each division moves to envelop Taejon. The 24th Division, scattered along the south bank of the Kum River, is expected to halt the advance. The

84 34th and 19th Regiments form a shallow crescent on the left and right respectively and to the far left, the 24th Reconnaissance Company is deployed in several groups to guard the key river crossings below Konju. Also, the 21st Regiment, subsequent to being relieved by the 19th Regiment, deploys defensively in reserve southeast of Taejon. The battered 24th Division, composed of about only 7,400 troops, including artillery personnel, holds the perimeter. At 0440, the steel-supported bridge in the forefront of Kongju is blown, which forms a moat that separates the 3rd Battalion, 34th Regiment, from the enemy. Slightly after daybreak, a squad of North Koreans establishes a machine gun position on the opposing bank. During the early afternoon, the enemy machine gun positions initiate sporadic firing. The in-place communications of the endangered regiment remains consistent; it is less than poor, and again, the only sure way to transmit information is by messenger. The regiment’s 3rd Battalion, supported by the 63rd Field Artillery Battalion, holds staggered positions on the high ground overlooking the Kongju-Nonsan Road. The enemy launches no major attacks during this day prior to dusk, but still, the 3rd Battalion, commanded by Colonel Wadlington, incurs severe problems as its S-2 and S-3 officers come down with battle fatigue. Both officers are evacuated. Later, after dark, K Company, composed of about 40 men, is rendered unsuitable for combat due to mental and physical ailments. It is evacuated to Taejon for further disposition. Subsequent to the non-battle loss of K Company, responsibility for holding the Kum River line to the front of Kongju is relegated to two weakened rifle units, Company I and Company L, on the right and left respectively. No friendly troops are deployed to their left and there is about a two-mile gap between them and the 19th Regiment to their right. In other activity, the 35th Regiment, 25th Division, commanded by Colonel Henry G. Fisher, begins to arrive in Korea. Some contingents debark at Pusan during the next several days. Also, the 27th Division, at Uisong, is directed by Eighth Army to move out and redeploy at Andong. It is to form a defensive line behind the defending South Korean troops. Also, the N.K. 6th Division, which has been moving inconspicuously toward the west coast, pivots at Yesan, then moves south across the lower Kum River in two separate columns against Kunsan. East Coast sector: At Yongdok, Colonel Rollins Emmerich’s unit (KMAG), attached to the S.K. 3rd Division, dispatches a detonation plan to Eighth Army. It specifies the details for blowing the bridges and the coastal road at Yongdok. In contrast, the enemy has plans to demolish a strategic bridge near An’gang’ni (between Taegu and Pohang-dong) and the plan incorporates the detonation of both ends of the Ch’ongdo railroad tunnel (between Taegu and Pusan). These combined actions would clearly devastate the supply

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July 13 , 1950

U.S. troops en route to positions in the hills south of the Kum River. routes of the U.S.–South Korean front-line troops. Two platoons of ROK troops and two U.S. officers rush to the tunnel to forestall its destruction. In other activity, General Church and his staff (ADCOM) are instructed by Tokyo to return to Japan; however, communication and intelligence personnel remain with Eighth Army while their services are still required. Also, the small reconnaissance team departs Pohang-dong for Japan, having successfully concluded that it contains a suitable landing site for the 1st Cavalry Division. In its favor is a one-track railway line that stretches west into Taegu, and from there it leads northwest into Taejon. The cavalry will have access to quick movement by rail of combat troops into the battle zone (Central front). In Air Force activity, Wonsan, a key port city along the east coast of North Korea, is the first recipient of a heavy strategic bombing mission by the Far East Air Force. The city is also a strategic communication center that acts as a conduit during the initial portion of the war. The bulk of equipment supplied to the North Koreans by the Russians moves through the city. The port there is linked by train with Vladivostok, Siberia. In other activity, Air Force planes attached to the 92nd Bombardment Group at Yokota, Japan, and the 22nd Bombardment Group at Kadena, Okinawa, drop 400 tons of bombs on Wonsan. — In the Pacific Ocean: The USS Fort Marion, one of the two advance vessels that departed California on the previous day, suffers an accident. The vessel, which is transporting Company A, 1st Marine Tank Battal-

ion, and the 1st Marine Amphibious Tractor Company, is beset by an accidental flooding of the deck well, which causes five feet of water to rise amidst the new Pershing M-26 tanks. Fourteen tanks are damaged before the pumps can flush out the water. The accidental flood also destroys 300 90-mm projectiles (already in short supply) and 5,000 rounds of .30-caliber ammunition. Urgent dispatches are sent back to Marine headquarters to inform staff of the brigade’s misfortune. Quick action is taken. Captain English, commanding officer, Company A, 1st Tank Battalion, is reassured that replacement tanks would be requisitioned at once and forwarded as soon as possible. English is ordered to discard the damaged ammunition. In the meantime, while preparations are being made to transport the new armor, it is determined that twelve of the tanks can be repaired at sea. The remaining two tanks, with the acquisition of parts, can be fixed upon arrival at Japan. The Marines consider the tanks paramount for their anticipated success against the menacing Russian T-34 tanks. The replacement ammunition is loaded aboard one of the other vessels in the main convoy and four additional tanks are to be included in the first resupply convoy. — In Japan: General MacArthur orders General Stratemeyer to commit the Far East Air Force’s B-26s and B-29s in a copious effort to halt the North Korean advance. In other activity, Generals Joseph Collins and Hoyt Vandenberg arrive in Tokyo to confer with General

July 13, 1950

86

Top: A group of U.S. infantry makes use of a captured North Korean jeep. Bottom: U.S. troops examine a captured armored car. MacArthur and other general officers, including Generals Walker and Almond, and Admiral Radford, commander, Pacific Fleet. MacArthur presses for maximum support to defeat the North Koreans, but the JCS mirror the opinions of the Truman Administration and it becomes apparent that no blank check is being drawn.

Subsequent to the meeting in Tokyo, General Collins and General Vandenberg travel by air with General Walker to Taegu, Korea, to confer with General Dean regarding the deteriorating situation in his 25th Division zone. Collins and Vandenberg return to Japan after the meeting.

87

July 14 The sober darkness combines with another nasty rainfall along the entire U.S. perimeter at the Kum River Line. These conditions temporarily eclipse the approach of the enemy, but soon after dawn, the grumble of rolling tanks echoes across the river. At about 0600, Company I, 34th Regiment, feels the sting of hostile fire. Shells, probably attributed to tank fire, pound its area, while other synchronized fire is hurled toward the positions of L Company. However, the shells near L Company explode prematurely and high in the sky, inflicting no damage. Subsequent to the enemy barrage, L Company scouts discover an enemy contingent composed of about thirty men that are crossing the Kum River about two miles below their positions. Within a couple of hours, about 500 North Koreans ford the river to threaten the south bank positions of the American force. A liaison plane attached to the 63rd Field Artillery Battalion is sent aloft. It, too, spots enemy movement, which apparently is the same two barges spotted by L Company. Although the information is dispatched to an artillery unit, a decision is made to permit the barges free passage in hopes of catching more lucrative targets. East of Kongju, one platoon of the 11th Field Artillery Battalion commences firing at the advancing enemy ground troops. At about the same time, enemy fighter planes appear and chase the liaison plane. The artillery fire then ceases. In conjunction, a third battery is attached to the 11th Field Artillery Battalion to become the first artillery battalion in Korea to contain a full complement of three batteries. Meanwhile, the North Koreans continue to thump Company L (34th Regiment, 3rd Battalion), with effective artillery and mortar fire. Lieutenant Stith, commander, Company L, attempts to locate his supporting mortar and machine gun units, but the effort is futile. Stith, convinced his company’s positions are untenable, orders a pull-back without requesting permission. Company L abandons its positions in the heights above the south bank of the Kum River. Lieutenant Stith then moves to locate 3rd Battalion headquarters. After a sustained effort, Stith encounters headquarters outside of Nonsan. When the battalion commander is informed of the withdrawal of Company L, Lt. Stith is immediately relieved of command and informed by the battalion commander (Major Lantron) that he might be receiving a court martial. Colonel Wadlington had been ordered to move his 34th Regiment south to the vicinity of Nonsan, but later, during the afternoon, General Dean orders Wadlington to pull the 34th Regiment from the Kum River Line before daylight on the 15th. The withdrawal begins, pursuant to orders, at 0100. In the meantime, the North Koreans have begun fording the Kum River. They intentionally bypass the two rifle companies (prior to retreat of L Company) and quietly drive toward the rear artillery positions. Seemingly, the North Koreans have complete knowledge of the location of the 63rd Field Artillery Battalion,

July 14, 1950 commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Robert H. Dawson, which is deployed about three miles south of the Kum River outside of Samyo. Due to poor communications, the U.S. artillerymen are unaware of the withdrawal of Company L, but some communications have been active between the artillerymen and the 34th Regimental Headquarters. Following another dreary night of rain, the weather had brightened during daylight. At about 1330, a forward position of the artillery discovers an approaching enemy force and instantly reports the activity. Orders arrive directing the men “not to fire unless fired upon.” The hesitation is deadly. The troops manning the machine gun position are quickly overrun, and the North Koreans use the captured gun to slice into the ranks of Headquarters Battery. In concert, enemy mortar fire hits Headquarters Battery with pinpoint accuracy, which verifies that enemy intelligence had advance knowledge of the location of the guns. Decimating fire crushes the command post and inflicts injuries to medical personnel. The barrage simultaneously bludgeons the communications truck, which severs radio communications. The startling attack also strikes an ammunition truck, which adds to the dilemma of Headquarters Battery. As the enemy closes the noose tighter, a ring of fire whacks the Fire Direction Center, making escape from the building extremely dangerous. Both doors, front and rear, are plastered viciously. Nonetheless, the troops inside escape and make their way to the positions of Battery B, which has not yet come under attack. During this hasty retreat, Major William E. Dressler (battalion commander), who had replaced Lt. Colonel Dawson (evacuated due to illness) on the 13th, and Corporal Edward L. McCall are not among the escapees. About two and one-half years later, American troops discover their bodies in a single foxhole. While this vicious attack is underway, Battery A also faces a ground assault, which appears to be synchronized with the attack against Headquarters Battery. The defenders of Battery A hold a fragile line about 250 yards north of Headquarters Battery. They come under assault when a contingent of about 100 screaming North Koreans (16th Regiment) sprints from a hill located west of the outpost. The artillerymen pound the attackers with small arms fire and halt the attack. The enemy troops charge back up the hill, but the reprieve is short lasting. The enemy had only changed direction, and soon after, they charge down yet another hill and reach the road. Battery A comes under fire from a range of about 150 yards. Supporting mortar fire also blasts Battery A, and causes the majority of the men to abandon their positions. The evacuation again leaves a few Americans remaining under horrendous fire while they attempt to halt the horde of attackers. One man, Corporal Lawrence A. Ray, supported by several other steadfast soldiers, pours fire into the enemy. Lawrence becomes twice wounded while overtaxing his BAR. While some Americans stand rigidly under fire, the

July 14, 1950 others head for safer quarters. Lawrence, still firing his weapon, is struck by a mortar fragment that knocks him into temporary unconsciousness. When he wakes up, his options are few. He struggles to a nearby ditch and stumbles into fifteen men of his unit, all of whom are weaponless. Corporal Lawrence and the others in the ditch escape south, but unfortunately, many who stood and fought are lost. Along the line of retreat they locate the body of Captain Lundel M. Sutherland, Battery A commander. Meanwhile, with the destruction of Headquarters Battery and Battery A, which loses its five operational guns, another powerful thrust is unfolding against Battery B. Again, the enemy, about 400 strong, has emerged behind the battery lines from where they deploy machine guns. At about 1415, a wild and confusing exchange occurs as the North Korean guns rake the area. Two U.S. machine guns, positioned outside the defense area but now within enemy lines, answer the fire. Enemy mortar shells join the battle pounding Battery B, which loses a communications jeep and two 105mm howitzers. Suddenly, a contingent of South Korean cavalry gallops past Battery B and charges toward the North Koreans, but the action fails to halt the enemy fire. The results of the charge go unknown due the confusion of the day’s events. By 1500, orders are issued to move back, but the road is permeated with enemy fire, which compels the artillerymen to desert their guns, but before abandoning the weapons, the firing locks and sights are removed to render the guns useless. This thunderous assault lasts less than two hours, but the 63rd Artillery Battalion loses ten 105-mm howitzers, about 60 to 80 vehicles and much of their ammunition. The survivors make their way back to Service Headquarters, the sole unit to escape attack. As word spreads about the disastrous encounter, Service Battery prepares to retreat. A few straggling survivors hitch rides in their trucks for the fifteen-mile trip south to Nonsan. Others file into Nonsan during the night and into the following day. A total of 125 enlisted men and 11 officers are reported missing in action subsequent to the deadly encounter. At about 1500, word of the fate of the artillery battalion reaches Colonel Wadlington, acting regimental commander, 34th Infantry, at his headquarters. Acting on previous orders from General Dean, Wadlington orders the 1st Battalion under Colonel Ayres to execute an attack to extricate the besieged battalion. Then it is to push the enemy west to forestall an attack against Taejon. Slightly after 1700, the 1st Battalion advances on an uneventful three-mile march. Suddenly, machine gun fire rakes their ranks as they approach the previously held artillery positions. Carbine fire joins the machine guns and the advance stalls. As dusk settles over the area, the 1st Battalion, ordered to retire if the mission could not be completed by darkness, returns to Nonsan. The Communists, having successfully forged the Kum River, drive toward Taejon. The shallow river per-

88 mits the tanks to easily cross. The swiftness of the advance nearly totally envelops the 24th Division’s positions at Taejon, a strategic town that contains a primary communications center. Taejon also stands at the point of a highway that winds through the mountain passes toward Pusan. The city also contains a double track railroad line that follows a parallel route to the harbor at Pusan. With this latest enemy success, the 19th Regiment, with its left flank now naked, stands against the enemy. In conjunction, I Company, 34th Infantry, had come under shelling attacks during the day, but no enemy ground attacks are launched. However, the unit becomes isolated. At about 2130, Lieutenant Hicks moves Company I over the mountains east and southeast of Kongju to rejoin its parent 34th Regiment. Before daybreak on the following day, the threatened 34th Regiment redeploys slightly east of Nonsan and braces for an attack. General Dean orders Colonel Stephens to prepare the 21st Regiment, poised east of Taejon, to move to support the 34th Regiment. Back in the 19th Regimental area, eight miles north of Taejon, the regiment, commanded by Colonel Meloy, extends from its positions east of the railroad. The perimeter follows the serpentine river line west and halts about three miles outside of Kongju. The irregular river line zig-zags, forcing the two battalion units to defend about 30 land miles. The primary defensive line is concentrated along the Seoul-Pusan Road, where it crosses the Kum River (200–300 yards wide) at Taep’yong-ni. First Battalion headquarters (Lt. Col. Otho T. Winstead) is located in the village of Palsan, about two miles south of the Kum. Company E, 1st Battalion, is deployed on the high ground overlooking the Kum River railroad crossing at Sinch’on. The railroad crossing is actually in the area of ROK responsibility. Heading west from this high ground, there is about a two-mile gap that separates Company E, 1st Battalion, from Company C; the latter is deployed about three miles east of Taep’yong-ni along three northern finger ridges of Hill 200. Another gap (1,000 yards) in the line exists between C Company and Company A, which is strung out along the Kum, downstream and to the rear of a huge dike west of the highway. Joining Company A at the dike is a platoon of Company B, 1st Battalion, but the remainder of the company is sprinkled along the high ground, which nudges down toward the river. Responsibility for the regiment continues west for another five air-miles, but there simply are not sufficient troops to adequately handle the task. A small outpost, about two miles west, is manned by one platoon of Company G, 2nd Battalion, but there are few other defenses. The final three miles of the regimental perimeter are held by about 70 men of the I&R Platoon, an artillery battery, and one platoon of engineers. The 2nd Battalion, commanded by Lt. Colonel Thomas McGrail, with two of its rifle companies, is held in reserve behind the 1st Battalion. The 1st Battalion is bolstered by two batteries of the 52nd Field Artillery Battalion, com-

89 manded by Lt. Colonel Miller Perry. These guns are deployed at Tumanni, three miles south of the river. Four other batteries are deployed farther south to augment the 19th Regiment. Two pieces are from the 11th Field Artillery Battalion and two are from the 13th Field Artillery Battalion (commanded by Lt. Colonel Charles W. Stratton). Enemy fire begins to strike the 19th Regiment at 1300. Despite air strikes during the day, the enemy remains well positioned, opposite the 19th Infantry, and it is poised to make a solid assault. However, the line holds throughout the day and no major crossings to the south bank occur. And those of lesser strength are repulsed. The news is not necessarily good, as information filters into headquarters concerning the defeat of the 34th Regiment at Konju. This distressing information seems to coincide with the disintegration of the left flank. The imperiled 19th Regiment prepares for the worst. Apparently, there is much misunderstanding among units. Although the rumors are widely spread that the 34th Regiment collapsed, according to the 24th Infantry War Diary, a collapse of the 34th Regiment did not occur. The diary (132400K July to 142400K July) states, “It is believed that this enemy force infiltrated across the Kum River to the west during the night and remained hidden in the hills until a force of 600 to 800 men, with plenty of mortars and machine guns, had assembled. The force then debouched from the hills and struck the 63rd FABn without warning. With most of its artillery lost and a large enemy force building up to even greater size to its rear, the 34th RCT was given permission to withdraw to the south under cover of darkness, commencing after midnight.” Central Mountain area: the N.K. 12th Division seizes a Han River crossing at Tanyang and afterwards, it institutes a fight to capture Tanyang Pass from the S.K. 8th Division. As the battles unfold, the S.K. 8th Division is compelled to abandon its positions. By the middle of July, the North Korean forces are breaching the Taebaek Mountain passes heading into the upper Naktong River Valley. East Coast area: the N.K. 5th Division, which had crossed the 38th Parallel on the 25th of June, has driven south over the mountains. It has moved without opposition and now encroaches Yongdok. As the enemy advances, the ROK forces begin to fold, offering little opposition. Two tunnels, two bridges and two passes, all located between Yonghae and Yongdok and each greatly needed by the enemy, are blown to slow their progress. Powerful surface guns of the U.S. Navy are committed. The huge ships move close, then blast the cliffs that overlook the coastal highway. The thunderous bombardment creates instant landslides that add more obstacles along the enemy’s path. At Yongdok, S.K. Brigadier General Lee Chu Sik, commanding general, 3rd ROK Division, proclaims that he wants to redeploy his forces south of Yongdok. He also intends to transfer his division command post to Pohang-dong, but Colonel Emmerich immediately nixes this idea. Emmerich forcefully contends that the

July 14, 1950 east coast road must be held at all costs. Although the S.K. 3rd Division is isolated from the remainder of the operational S.K. Army, replenishment of supplies and ammunition has continued by shuttling bulky fishing boats between there and Pusan. Also, it is anticipated that supplies soon will be rolling in from Pohang-dong on rail cars. The operation at Yongdok is also augmented by the South Koreans’ harsh methods of acquiring recruits and supply-bearers. The latter are used to lug immense loads (A-frames) on their backs to move supplies over the mountains. Within two days, elements of the N.K. 5th Division are poised to strike and seize Yongdok. In other activity, the South Korean Army activates its II Corps, composed of the S.K. 3rd, 6th and 8th Divisions and the 23rd Regiment; headquarters will be in Hamch’ang. The II Corps assumes responsibility for South Korean operations in the eastern mountain area and when possible, the coastal sector, defended by the S. K. 23rd Regiment. At Taegu, the South Korean Army establishes the 1st Replacement Training Center, which is to accept and train replacement troops within a ten-day schedule, passing 1,000 troops through each class. In Air Force activity, the 35th Fighter Interceptor Group (FIG) arrives at Pohang from Japan. The 35th becomes the initial U.S. Air Force fighter group to deploy in South Korea. It will operate from K-3, a recently completed airfield. Also, the 6132nd Tactical Air Control Squadron is activated at Taegu. Colonel Joseph D. Lee, USAF, is appointed commanding officer. The unit is to provide forward, ground-based air control for aircraft flying close-air missions in support of ground forces. In addition, a Fifth Air Force–Eighth Army Joint Operations Center is activated at Taegu. —In the United States: The final elements of the convoy assigned to transport the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade to Korea depart San Diego. This is the final troop deployment from the United States to be publicized for the duration of the war in Korea. Ironically, it is also the first measurable contingent of U.S. troops to depart the States and enter combat in Korea. The Marine commandant, Clifton B. Cates, stands proudly near the docks, as he has done for the past three days, to bid farewell to his Marines. Although it is apparent to the commandant that the majority of the privates and PFCs are much too young to have served during World War II, it is equally obvious to his trained eye that the majority of the company commanders, platoon leaders and the NCOs are molded from the “old breed,” from Guadalcanal, Saipan, Tinian, Tarawa, Pelelieu, Iwo and Okinawa. The “old breed” that had battled the Japanese will ensure that the new breed upholds the traditions of the corps. General Cates snaps off a mighty salute as the troops pass. During the final send off, he speaks to his Marines: “You boys clean this thing up in a couple of months, or I’ll be over to see you.”

July 15, 1950 Soon after its departure, the transport USS Henrico becomes crippled. It is inflicted with a major mechanical malfunction while passing San Clemente Island. Temporarily, the vessel is rendered unfit to sail. The 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Landing Team, and the regimental commander, Lt. Colonel Murray, and his staff are aboard. Colonel Murray and his staff transfer to the USS Pickaway, but the 1st Battalion, comprising about one-third of the brigade’s combat troops, returns to port aboard the limping vessel. No other ships are available to transport the Marines. They are compelled to wait impatiently for the repairs to be completed. The Marines are confined to the vessel, except for some training on the docks, to prevent any possible security leaks. The unfortunate gutting of the U.S. Armed Forces, subsequent to the close of World War II, has become even more obvious. The Pickaway makes two attempts to embark, but on both occasions the vessel is forced to return for additional repairs. Finally, on its third attempt, the ship sails west, moving under the Golden Gate Bridge on its solo cruise toward Japan. In other activity, General Cates directs the activation of the First Replacement Draft (800 officers and enlisted men). Their departure is scheduled for August 10. This augments General Edward Craig’s mission in the event that the hostilities in Korea mandate a premature entrance of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade. —In Japan: General MacArthur, recently appointed commander-in-chief of the United Nations Forces, is given a U.N. flag by U.S. Army chief of staff General J. Lawton Collins during a historic ceremony atop the Dai Ichi building. This is the first United Nations command. General headquarters convenes daily ( July through mid–September) to keep abreast of the Korean hostilities during these first perplexing months. Those who attend include Major General Willoughby (Intelligence G-2), Brigadier General H.E. Eastwood (Logistics), Brigadier General E.K. Wright (Operations) and representatives of the Air Force and Navy. Ambassador Sebald frequently attends these meetings. In other activity, at Yokohama, the 1st Cavalry Division begins its loading operations for the landing at Pohang-dong. The cavalry expects to arrive in time to forestall its loss to the enemy. Preparations during the previous week have been hectic, due to the acute shortage of amphibious shipping. Nevertheless, the U.S. Navy comes through with two AKAs, six LSUs, two MSTS transports and sixteen LSTs. In addition, LCMs and LCVPs are on hand. Also, Admiral Joy, the commander of Naval Forces Far East authorizes attacks against any unidentified submarines if the action is in self-defense or if it is evident that the unidentified vessel is preparing to take action against U.S. forces. In other activity, Fifth Air Force establishes an advance headquarters at Itazuke Air Force Base.

July 15

At 0600, the remnant 21st Regiment, 24th Division, departs the Taejon airstrip. It moves east to-

90 ward Okch’on to establish a defensive position in the heights to protect the rear of the 24th Division. General Dean has expressed concern that the North Koreans might romp through the South Korean lines east of Taejon, which also prompts him to redeploy the 21st Regiment. The total regimental strength, including a provisional group of 466 men, stands at about 1,100 troops. The 1st Battalion is composed of 517 men and the 3rd Battalion stands at a mere 132 troops. Upon completion of the eight-mile march, the 21st Regiment spreads out. Its command post remains in Okch’on. The line then extends to dominate the road that leads from the Kum River ferry to the Seoul-Pusan Highway. Also, a battery of the 11th Field Artillery Battalion accompanies the 21st Regiment. Engineers wire the nearby railroad and highway tunnels for demolition. Meanwhile, at about 0700 along the Kum River Line, the North Koreans begin to ford the river near the 19th Regiment’s far left positions. The I&R Platoon streams a steady flow of machine gun fire into the ranks and planes arrive to offer assistance. The combination turns the enemy back. However, farther down the river in the 34th Regimental sector, another enemy crossing takes place. Slight skirmishing occurs when the I&R Platoon probes to establish contact with the 34th Regiment. Most of the 19th Regiment’s reserve (about 65 percent) is pushed up to help support the deficient left flank. It, too, is thinly manned by only one machine gun platoon from G Company and a contingent of 81mm mortars attached to H Company. The left flank is further bolstered by two Quad-50s attached to the 26th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion and two light tanks. These reserve troops are commanded by Lt. Colonel Thomas McGrail, commanding officer, 2nd Battalion, 19th Regiment. Still in reserve is Company F. While General Dean continues to search for solutions to hold back the advancing enemy, the North Korean 3rd Division makes plans to launch a powerful thrust. Before the sun sets, an N.K. T-34 tank swings around a bend in the road on the opposite side of the river. Quick communication between a member of Company B and the company commander sounds the alarm, but during the conversation, eight more tanks are spotted. The tanks commence firing, but without accuracy. Two friendly planes arrive to assist the 3rd Platoon. Several tanks that had begun the barrage seek refuge in the woods. The sole tank that remains on the road is set afire by the aircraft. The planes remain overhead until dark, but after their departure, the North Koreans roll trucks crammed with troops up to the bank of the river. Soon after, new air strikes and formidable mortar and artillery barrages strike the enemy positions on the north flank of the river. Many of the huts are set afire, giving the black sky a crimson glow. The North Koreans attempt to cross in small groups and they sustain heavy casualties, but some troops make it to the south bank by swimming under cover fire afforded by their tanks. Farther up the Kum River, at Hill 200, Company C

91 repels the enemy three separate times, but friendly fire inadvertently knocks out two of its 60-mm mortars and cripples its other one. Corporal Tabor modifies a mortar, then while holding the tube in his hand, he cranks out over 300 rounds. This type of adamant resistance by the 19th Regiment forbids all crossing attempts. Undeterred, the enemy still prepares for a massive assault. East Coast area: The North Korean 5th Division continues prodding toward Yongdok. In Air Force activity, at Taegu, the 51st Fighter Squadron (Provisional) initiates its initial combat mission for F-51 Mustangs in Korea. In other activity, Fifth Air Force issues an operation order that assigns “Mosquito” call signs to airborne controllers using T-6 planes. The T-6 aircraft become known as Mosquito planes. — In the United States: General Shepherd instructs General Harry Liversedge, acting commanding general, 1st Marine Division, to increase the training and workday for the troops of the division. Coincidentally, General MacArthur places his second request for a warstrength Marine division for his plan to invade Inchon, Korea. In other activity, Generals Collins and Vandenberg arrive back in the States (14th Washington time) from the Far East; President Truman, the other JCS and Louis Johnson are brought up to date. — In Japan: A U.S. Army band gives the Navy a

July 15, 1950 proper send-off, enthusiastically playing “Anchors Aweigh” as the warships of Task Force 90, commanded by Rear Admiral Doyle, embark for Korea. Doyle is aboard the USS McKinley, which will transport the 1st Cavalry Division to Pohang-dong. Thanks to the postwar actions of Congress, the gutted Navy is unable to easily carry out the mission. Two previous military sea transportation vessels, the USS Oglethorpe (AKA-100) and the USS Titania, have been hurried to Yokosuka, Japan, to be altered for handling boat skids. Other urgently needed but unavailable equipment is quickly manufactured. Even with the zealous effort to outfit the fleet, there has been another and more desperate crisis. The U.S. Navy lacks sufficient personnel to man the ships and has been forced to commandeer personnel from the amphibious base at Coronado, California. The improvised fleet had been fabricated by reactivating six former Japanese LSUs to augment the AKAs, which have also been given a hurried transfusion and face-lift to ensure a method of landing the troops. The fleet departs to rendezvous with the Tractor Group, but it is still unclear whether General Hobart Gay’s 1st Cavalry will land unopposed. It reaches Pohang on the 18th. In conjunction, naval aircraft of Admiral John M. Hoskins’ Carrier Group are on call to provide air support if necessary. In other activity, the Far East Command notifies Major Tony Raibl (executive officer, 3rd Bn., 29th Infantry Regiment) that the regiment, based on Okinawa,

U.S. armorers load .50-caliber machine gun ammunition belts into the wing of an F-51 Mustang.

July 15, 1950

92

Top: A ground crew loads an F-51 Mustang with fragmentation bombs. Bottom: A U.S. Gun Motor Carriage (M15A1) moves to positions along the Kum River on July 15. It carries one 37-mm gun (M1A2) and two .50-caliber (M2 HB) flexible machine guns. should prepare for embarkment to Korea. Recent plans for the 29th Regiment included about six weeks of combat training, but the deteriorating situation in Korea scraps the preparation. The 29th Regiment, as is the case with most others in Korea, will be composed of just two battalions. Headquarters remains on Okinawa to form a base for another regiment, which will be formed to assume responsibility for the defense of the island. The 1st and 3rd Battalions, 29th Regiment, are

the first of the eleven infantry battalions initially requested by MacArthur to bolster the effort to turn back the Communists in Korea. In other activity, General MacArthur, in an effort to decrease the huge numbers of airlifts from Korea to Japan, suggests supplementing the effort by use of the Japanese railroads and sea ferries. MacArthur’s headquarters contacts Eighth Army, suggesting the implementation of daily ferry service. They originate in the

93 Hakata-Moji area of Japan and move to Pusan, fed by a conveyor belt of rails that funnel express trains from the Tokyo-Yokohama vicinity, which essentially is a modified version of the famed World War II Red Ball express. The first train will depart Yokohama on July 23.

July 16 (See also, BATTLE OF THE KUM RIVER, this entry.) In the Kum River area, the 24th Division sector, 21st Regimental zone, a message arrives at 0500 from Division G-3. It directs the 21st Regiment to dispatch one platoon of tanks from Company A, 71st Tank Battalion, to the positions of the 19th Regiment north of Taejon, but the tanks do not advance. In conjunction, the G-3 Periodic Operations Report Number 11, 24th Infantry Division notes that Company A, 71st Tank Battalion (1st Cavalry Division), is attached to the 19th Regiment. The report also stipulates that there is no change with Company A, 78th Tank Battalion (24th Division), on July 16; the 71st Bn. tanks bolster the 24th Division tanks. East Coast area: The North Koreans begin flooding into the area near Yongdok, but rather than offer serious opposition, the South Korean 23rd Regiment, which holds positions in front of the imperiled town, gives way and begins rushing south. The KMAG advisors become perplexed as they become aware that the critical situation that confronts them may become insurmountable. A message of inquiry from Eighth Army Headquarters is received by Colonel Emmerich, who dispatches a stark response, informing headquarters that about 75 percent of the S.K. 23rd Regiment has absconded, fleeing south. The message says: “Advisors threatening and shooting in the air trying to get them [23rd S.K. Regiment] assembled. Commanding general (lee chu sik) forming a straggler line. If straggler line is successful we may be able to reorganize and reestablish the line. If this fails I am afraid that the whole thing will develop in complete disintegration.” In other activity, thirty B-29s attached to Far East Air Force attack the enemy railroad yards at Seoul. During the raid the railroad bridge that spans the Han River, which has survived several previous air raids, is finally destroyed. Also, the 40th Fighter-Interceptor Squadron (35th Group), USAF, transfers from its base at Ashiya, Japan, to Yonil Airfield, located in the eastern corridor below the Naktong River. A contingent of U.S. planes detects a column of enemy armor in the vicinity of Choch’iwon and takes it under attack. One plane, flown by Lieutenant Donald B. Russell, is hit and severely damaged by antiaircraft fire during the first strafing run. His plane loses its left wing tip and the tip tank and his plane’s flaps also become damaged. Nevertheless, Russell, at great risk to his life, continues the attack and knocks out one tank with a rocket and on successive passes, he damages one other tank and destroys several vehicles. Afterwards, he nurses the plane back to the base and is compelled to make an emergency landing without flaps in total darkness. Russell receives a Silver Star for his tremendous heroism on this flight.

July 16, 1950 BATTLE OF THE KUM RIVER In the 19th Regiment, 24th Division sector along the Kum River, the enemy strikes early. During the predawn hours, at about 0300, a flash of brilliance bursts in the air as a flare is shot from a passing North Korean plane. This brief illumination signals the attack. The north bank of the Kum roars with violent sounds of artillery, and in cadence, swarms of North Koreans initiate the crossing using many methods, including rafting and swimming. The massive assault is met by blistering fire; however, again the Americans are too under-strength and their communications become confusing. As the 1st Battalion attempts to dilute enemy strength with return fire, signals get crossed. At the main crossing site, a contingent of the 11th Field Artillery Battalion pivots the guns toward the wrong location and the requested flares do not appear. The mistake is deadly. The 1st Battalion’s 1st Platoon, C Company, commanded by Lt. Thomas Maher, feels the first heavy thud. Enemy troops that have penetrated a large hole between C and E Companies at about 0400 initiate a furious attack. During the brutal combat, Lieutenant Maher is called by Lieutenant Henry McGill and asked to check on the situation; Maher responds: “We’re doing fine.” And then, in less than a minute, a shot from a burp gun slays Maher. It is the beginning of the end. C Company, which has thrown back several attacks during the night, is unable to repulse this fourth thrust. Their positions are quickly overrun, and only about thirteen men escape. They don’t retreat, but rather hold steady on the middle finger of Hill 200. Meanwhile, the North Koreans have begun to deeply pierce the lines to initiate envelopment of the 1st Battalion. They launch a series of attacks coordinated with heavy infiltration to the rear. Company B, deployed to the right, also comes under attack. An enemy force composed of 300 to 400 men has crossed the river prior to daybreak. By first light of day, additional separate groups, composed of about 30 men each, are spotted as they bolt across the river, wading through shoulderhigh water with their weapons extended over their heads. It becomes apparent to Captain Monroe Anderson that once across the river, most of the North Koreans, their uniforms adorned with bushes and shrubs, conceal themselves in the hills, while others bypass Company B. Soon after, North Koreans are crossing all along the regimental front, imperiling the entire line. By 0630, unyielding enemy pressure forces the 1st Battalion to begin pulling back. Artillery and mortar fire fails to break up the attack, and the expected air cover is absent. Colonel Winstead, 1st Battalion Commander, informs Colonel Meloy of his predicament. Winstead’s command post and the positions of the Heavy Mortar Company sustain severe fire, but the enemy surge jeopardizes the entire battalion. The Communists overrun a Company B platoon, which is deployed behind the dike. About 15 survivors of the decimated platoon make it to safety. In conjunction, a portion of Company A is also leveled as the North Koreans plow

July 16, 1950 through the rice paddies and advance to capture the heights at Kadong-ni. Colonels Meloy and Winstead attempt to mount a counterattack with their remaining force. One tank, one Quad-50 antiaircraft artillery half-trac and an array of troops that includes cooks and clerks mount a desperate but successful counterattack. By 0900 the Americans drive the enemy from the high ground at Kadongni. During the bloody struggle, the 1st Battalion Executive Officer, Major John Cook, the Battalion S1, Captain Alan Hackett and the Battalion S-3, Wayne B. Macomber, are killed. Despite the lack of air support, the 19th Regiment prevails; General Dean is informed that as he requested, it can retain its positions until dark. However, another unexpected entity enters the battlefield strategy. Although the 19th Regiment is confident it can hold the line, it becomes evident that Colonel Meloy has no troops to defend his infiltrated rear against the North Koreans who had earlier bypassed Company B and Company F at the Kum. By now, these Communists have established formidable roadblocks at a sharp turn along the primary road about three miles behind the lines near Tuman-Ni. Urgent calls are placed for the airstrikes that had been promised on the previous day. The enemy takes great advantage of the battered 19th Regiment. A small American force attempts to procure additional ammunition for the weary 1st Battalion, but it is halted by the obstacle. Lieutenant Robert Nash, leading the contingent, is instructed by Colonel Meloy to head back and direct Colonel McGrail to commit Company G and Company H, 2nd Battalion, to attack and demolish the roadblock. En route, enemy fire destroys Nash’s jeep. Undaunted, he eventually walks into the 13th Field Artillery Battalion positions, gets another jeep and then speeds to Sangwang-ni to give Colonel McGrail his new orders. While this unexpected setback is unraveling, additional enemy troops begin to pummel the 19th Regiment’s artillery, which increases the urgency of reinforcements. Horrendous stress pushes the beleaguered 1st Battalion to the brink of endurance. Colonel Perry, commanding officer of the 52nd Field Artillery Battalion, peers westward from his command post that stands outside of Tuman-ni. He detects a prolonged line of enemy troops, clothed in white and about two miles distant in the mountains. These enemy troops scamper over one ridge, then disappear over another ridge to the south. Colonel Perry orders Battery A to commence firing on the moving column. Simultaneously, he informs the 13th Field Artillery Battalion, which is deployed below his positions, that North Koreans are encroaching his lines. Events begin to rapidly change. While the 13th Field Artillery Battalion prepares for the attack, a portion of the enemy force tails off and advances against Company B, 52nd Field Artillery Battalion. The morning lingers like a plague, and the necessary airpower and additional ammunition are unavailable. Since dawn,

94 only six friendly aircraft have sortied over the front. More urgent pleas for airstrikes go unanswered. However, one platoon of tanks (Company A, 71st Tank Battalion) is en route from the 21st Regiment’s positions to bolster the beleaguered 19th Regiment and the 52nd FABn. A furious exchange, beginning with American artillery fire, erupts between Company B, 52nd Field Artillery Battalion and the North Koreans. During the first enemy salvo, the battery commander and his first sergeant are both slain; and about five other top people are badly wounded. The executive officer, Lieutenant William Steele, assumes command. He continues to direct the fire while he regroups his command. In conjunction with this skirmish, another improvised group of soldiers that includes medical personnel is mobilized to initiate a counterattack in synchronization with artillery fire of Company B to crush the enemy’s flank. The combined effort succeeds and this enemy attack is thwarted. The North Koreans retire southward and head toward the hills. However, the situation continues to become more grave for the 19th Regiment. Its only escape route from the battlefield is blocked. As the hours pass, the enemy continues to fortify the roadblock and the nearby hills to gain domination of the entire area. In addition to the imperiled 19th Regiment, the positions of the 11th and 13th Field Artillery Battalions (both deployed farther south) are barraged from inaccurate long range small arms fire, signaling yet another alarm. The vehicles that had been halted at the roadblock are increasing in numbers. Colonel Meloy arrives there with Major Edward Logan (Regimental S-3), only to discover chaos and a definite lack of discipline. The Americans return fire, but the enemy positions remain concealed, causing the fire to be wasted. Meloy attempts to rally the men and initiate an attack to secure the hills, but he becomes wounded. Command of the Kum River Line is then assumed by Colonel Winstead (1st Battalion Commander). Time flashes by at a furious pace, and the battle-weary troops must contend with yet another enemy, the temperature, which surges to more than 100 degrees. By about 1300, General Dean is informed of the ongoing crisis, including the wounding of Colonel Meloy. Dean informs Major Logan that reinforcements will arrive to destroy the roadblock. However, Dean specifies that Logan must hold until about 1530, the estimated time of arrival of the fresh troops. Following the conversation between Dean and Logan, enemy fire destroys the communications vehicle, ceasing all communications. Soon after, Colonel Winstead directs Logan to form an assault group at the roadblock and attempt to reduce it. Logan is ordered to dispatch a messenger to establish contact with the advancing reinforcements. Colonel Winstead then begins to move back to the positions of the 1st Battalion at the river. By about 1330, he orders it to pull back. During his return to the Kum

95 River, Winstead is slain. The withdrawal is overtaxing, as the men of the 19th Regiment are not accustomed to the steep hills, the high humidity and the summer sun over Korea. Many of the men from Company C are reluctant to move from their foxholes on Hill 200 because of an ongoing ferocious enemy artillery attack that has the company pinned down. One soldier, Corporal Jack Arawaka, becomes seriously wounded when his machine gun blows up in his face, costing him most of his sight and all of his hearing. Arawaka, undaunted by his horrendous wounds, clasps a BAR and fiercely resists the enemy advance. Corporal Arawaka never leaves the hill. During the withdrawal, Company C discovers dead enemy soldiers scattered along a rice paddy ditch. The bodies are partially covered with water. One corpse still firmly clutches a grenade as Lt. Augustus Orr is passing. Suddenly, Orr spots an air bubble, then he sees the corpse open his eyes. Orr quickly liquidates the bornagain soldier. The Americans ensure that the rest of the North Koreans in the paddy are truly deceased, and then they resume their desperate journey. When Company C reaches the road, it encounters a contingent of enemy troops, but the Communists turn and head back toward the bridge rather than initiate a skirmish. Companies A and B, also heading south, are barely visible in the forward distance as C Company also moves south along the highway. Along the way, about six enemy machine guns, manned on the hill east of Palsan-ni, commence firing on Company C. The enfilade disrupts the disciplined withdrawal. The blistering fire stuns the unit and causes the troops to disperse haphazardly. The survivors break south, some forming small groups and others moving individually. The wounded have trouble escaping, but as usual brave corpsmen remain behind, rendering aid and sacrificing their own safety. Company B moves along the west side of the highway as it pulls back under the protection of F Company, but while providing this cover, Company F is struck at its left rear and left flank. In the meantime, the crisis at the roadblock heightens as more vehicles arrive to lengthen the line of stalled trucks. All the while, the enemy fire from the overlooking heights becomes more incessant. Some officers mount attacks to destroy the enemy positions containing automatic weapons, but all fail miserably. The two available light tanks at the roadblock are unable to locate the exact positions of the enemy guns because they are using smokeless powder. Nevertheless, the tanks commence fire in hopes of striking the concealed positions, but to no avail. While attempts are in progress to silence the guns in the high ground, four F-51s appear overhead. The planes pound the hill and create a new problem for the attacking American troops. During one of the assaults by a 50-man contingent, the leader, Lieutenant Lloyd Smith, and one other officer suddenly find themselves alone after advancing about three hundred feet. Lacking the remainder of the assault unit, the two officers move back down the hill toward their positions at the

July 16, 1950 roadblock. In the meantime, heavy enemy fire continues to pulverize the area near the U.S. vehicles. Most of the soldiers remain in the ditches to avoid being shot. As the dreadful day continues, other means of penetrating the roadblock continue, all scoring little success. Repeated attempts are made to move the crippled vehicles, but this only results in more casualties. Consequently, each time the vehicles begin to move, the enemy fire rains upon them. Supporting air strikes also fail to terminate the enemy machine gun fire. Orders go out to Company F, which has been held in reserve, to attack and break through the roadblock; however, its circumstances are also bleak since it is under siege and totally surrounded. By 1430, Major Logan places Captain Edgar Fenstermacher in command of the troops at the roadblock while he leads about twenty men east, then south to find a circuitous route around the blockage. After a harrowing two-hour trek, the contingent encounters the 13th Field Artillery Battalion, which has already begun moving farther south. Shortly thereafter, Major Logan confers with General Dean. Meanwhile, 2nd Lt. Robert Nash completes his eventful journey to Colonel McGrail’s command and from there, he speeds to Taejon airstrip to receive permission from General Menoher, assistant division commander, to commandeer vehicles to transport Companies G and H to support the 19th Regiment at the Kum River. During the swiftly changing events, General Dean instructs Major Logan to continue moving south to establish a new line of defense west of the Taejon airstrip and he also orders Colonel McGrail to lead the reinforcements to help stall the attacking North Koreans at the Kum. In the meantime, five jeeps, each containing wounded men that had breached the roadblock, race through the perimeter of the 13th Field Artillery. While running the gauntlet under sheets of fire, the wounded are each wounded again at least one time. The convoy, led by Lt. Colonel Homer Chandler, who sustains a leg wound, continues racing south, while Colonel McGrail moves forward with the relief force, bolstered by two light tanks and four antiaircraft vehicles, each crammed with troops. The advance is short-lived. After traveling about one mile, the reinforcements round a sharp curve that places the relief convoy about 300 to 400 yards from the final curve prior to reaching the roadblock. Without warning, enemy fire, seemingly from all directions, pounds the vehicles and inflicts a startling and crushing blow. The U.S. antiaircraft vehicles return fire to no avail. All four vehicles are destroyed. The majority of the infantry bolts from the vehicles to seek refuge in nearby ditches. The two surviving light tanks commence firing and blast the suspected enemy positions. By 1600, having expended all their ammunition, both tanks head south. The casualty rate becomes extremely high: personnel in the vehicles either wounded or killed stand at 90 percent. Back behind the roadblock, the entrapped survivors remain unaware of the rescue attempts. Undaunted,

July 16, 1950 they continue to search for a way to break through. Finally, at about 1800, amidst the burning debris, several officers decide to ram the barricade with a tank to get Colonel Meloy (wounded) to safety where he can receive medical help. Subsequent to four attempts, the charging tank plows the burning vehicles and other incinerated obstacles out of the center of the road to create sufficient space to break out. The roaring tank, trailed by about twenty trucks, darts through the enfilade just before another hurricane of enemy fire again forbids passage. During the hurried trip south, the tank that permitted the breakthrough stalls and it is transporting Colonel Meloy. All the other vehicles refuse to stop and give assistance. These retreating vehicles express no concern for their fellow troops nor their wounded commanding officer, nor the tankers that made the breakthrough possible. However, a contingent of Captain Michael Barszcz’s troops provide protection for Meloy and soon after, the 2nd Battalion gets him to safety. About one hour later, at 1900, the 500 entrapped men receive orders from Captain Fenstermacher to prepare to walk out. They are directed to head east subsequent to destroying all 100 vehicles. During this activity, Fenstermacher is slain when he sustains a shot in the neck. Not all the defending troops have regrouped at the roadblock; rather, many have scattered individually and in small groups, retreating east toward Taejon. Meanwhile, as the ambush of the relief force under McGrail is taking place, Company H is rushing to the scene. Company G, near Kongju, is still halted, awaiting transportation to the roadblock. At the same time, the I&R Platoon is diligently destroying the road at Kongju to create obstacles in the path of the expected enemy advance. Soon after, at Yusong, Company G, commanded by Capt. Barszcz, arrives and receives instructions from General Menoher to fall out and deploy on the river bank to resist some expected tanks, but this order is changed and G Company is directed to head for the roadblock. While rushing to the front, a retreating truck transporting a military policeman on the front fender causes a false alarm as the policeman screams, “Tanks! Tanks!” The truck keeps racing south, but Capt. Barszcz places his jeep across the road to block it, then he deploys his men to attack the tanks. However, the alarm had been false. After the unnecessary waste of time, Company G advances on foot and after a short walk, the unit encounters General Dean. He instructs Barszcz to advance and establish contact with the enemy, then launch an attack to demolish the roadblock. The advance continues, however, without results, just additional casualties. G Company reaches a point about two miles south of Tuman-ni and six miles north of Yusong, still about one-half mile from the enemy positions, when it comes under long range fire. The unit drives forward and ascends a hill to approach the enemy to their left. The troops reach the summit at sundown and establish fortified positions, but soon af-

96 terward orders reach them instructing them to withdraw. This withdrawal terminates the effort to break the roadblock and rescue the trapped contingents. While Company G pulls back toward Yusong, it comes upon the stalled tank, Colonel Meloy and some other wounded men. An officer returns with a vehicle. The wounded, including Meloy, who had been abandoned earlier by the others in their convoy, are sped to Yusong. As the enduring day comes to a close, the battered survivors cling to hope, but again the valiant efforts of the majority are shortchanged by the callous actions of a minority. About one hour before midnight, the final survivors at the roadblock are heading east toward the hills. The ascent is tough, and many of the wounded (about 30 men) are being carried on litters by able-bodied troops. During the climb many of the litter bearers vanish, abandoning the wounded. And those who reach the crest with the seriously wounded maintain that the injured can be carried no farther. Captain Linton J. Buttrey, medical officer, and the regimental chaplain, Herman G. Felhoelter, decide to remain with the wounded from this group. Chaplain Felhoelter then advises Captain Buttrey to escape as the two men realize that the enemy is extremely close to their defenseless positions. Buttrey departs and sustains a serious wound as he gets away. Soon after, the North Koreans pounce on the wounded men. Sergeant James W. Haskins, Headquarters Company, observes the slaughter though his binoculars. While the chaplain is praying over the wounded, the enemy massacres him and all of the wounded Americans. By the following day, survivors of the 19th Regiment begin to reach Taejon and Yusong. The grueling contest has cost the regiment heavily, but Companies G and E remain operable. Company E, deployed at the railroad bridge on the east flank, has not yet come under attack. Of the regiment’s 900 men at the beginning of the battle, only 434 are reported on the roster in Taejon on the 17th. Company C sustains 122 casualties out of 171 men. The Regimental Headquarters Company suffers 57 casualties out of a strength of 191 men. The 1st Battalion, composed of 785 men, sustains a 43 percent casualty rate (338 men). The 2nd Battalion sustains lesser casualties, 86 troops out of 777 men. Also, the 52nd Field Artillery Battalion, composed of 393 men, sustains 53 casualties. The 19th Regiment in its entirety, including artillery components, suffers 19 percent casualties (650 men). During the afternoon of the 17th, following its devastating defeat, the 19th Regiment moves to Yongdong to be reequipped and await replacement troops. The North Korean 3rd Division had failed repeatedly to permanently penetrate the frontal positions of the 19th Regiment during the day, except for the positions of Company C on Hill 200; the defenders successfully repelled the attacks or drove them back by counterattack. Nonetheless, the enemy’s attack again over-

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Yongdong, located southeast of Taejon. U.S. contingents prepare for action against the enemy that controls the hills there. The town is abandoned on 26 July. whelmed the American units by penetration and envelopment, although no enemy tanks had been committed south of the Kum River during this engagement. By now, the N.K. 3rd and 4th Divisions have crossed the Kum River, and they are closing on Taejon. In conjunction, the N.K. 2nd Division, which had been hitting stiff ROK resistance, is unable to join the other divisions in time for the fight for Taejon. The Americans continue to withdraw to their next designated delaying positions, much closer to Taejon. Shortly after sunset, the 34th Regiment pulls back from its positions near Nonsan. It moves south about twenty miles, where it redeploys several miles west of Taejon with responsibility for the immediate area north and west of the city. However, the 34th Infantry, like the other two regiments of the 24th Division, has been seriously weakened and is able to muster only about one battalion to defend its perimeter. Responsibility for the area was to have been shared with the 19th Infantry, but the 19th is now rendered ineffective for battle. Colonel Charles Beauchamp arrives from Japan to

assume command of the 34th Regiment, replacing Colonel Martin (killed on July 8). Also, all 24th Division artillery units, except the 105-mm howitzers of the 11th Field Artillery Battalion, are merged into a composite battalion and ordered to spread out to defend the Taejon airfield. Colonel Meloy and Colonel Chandler both receive medical attention in a hospital. —In the United States: The Advance Echelon of the 1st Marine Air Wing departs the West Coast by air for Japan. Brigadier Generals Edward A. Craig, commanding officer, 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, and Thomas J. Cushman, his chief of staff, and several staff members are aboard the transport plane. The entourage stops at Pearl Harbor to confer with General Shepherd, USMC, and subsequently Admiral Radford, prior to pushing to the Far East. During the brief meetings in Hawaii, General Craig reiterates his sharp concerns about inadequate amounts of equipment and a crucial shortage of replacement troops for the Marine ranks, which already are dangerously thin. Following the conferences, the plane departs, arriving in Japan on the 19th.

July 17, 1950

July 17

General Walton H. Walker, subsequent to instructions from General MacArthur, assumes command of all Republic of Korea ground troops. South Korean President Syngman Rhee has requested this action, but there is nothing in writing to this effect. As the conflict progresses, U.N. command of ROK forces occasionally becomes a strained endeavor. Later in the day, General Walker is presented a United Nations flag from a representative of the U.N. The flag is hung at Eighth Army Headquarters. At Taejon, General Dean concentrates on trying to establish a solid line in front of the town. Dean and two other officers remain at Taejon, but the remainder of Headquarters, 24th Division, departs by rail to Yongdong. By mid-afternoon, the 34th Regiment is in place in front of Taejon, but the other two regiments expected to share responsibility are unavailable. Again, the defenses are implemented for the purpose of slowing the enemy, not halting the attack. The key to success depends on the arrival of sufficient numbers of reinforcements. In other activity, the 24th Division Operations Instructions No. 7 at Taejon (0900) dictates changes with attached tanks: “Company A, 71st Tank Battalion, 1st platoon relieved from attachment 19th RCT and reverts to company control.” It is attached to 21st Regiment. Also, the instructions order the 24th Division tanks, Company A, 78th Tank Battalion, to move to Yongdong by rail. East Coast area: the North Koreans easily seize Yongdok as the undisciplined S.K. 23rd Regiment collapses. Eighth Army, stunned by the lightning quick capture of the town, reacts immediately. The 159th Field Artillery Battalion, the first artillery unit brought into the area to support the South Koreans, initiates its mission during the afternoon by pounding enemy positions. In conjunction, the South Koreans regroup and prepare to mount a counterattack on the following day to regain the lost terrain. The contest for control of Yongdok bounces back and forth until finally on the 2nd of August, the South Koreans terminate the battle and gain control of the town. In other activity, forty-seven B-29s attack Hungnam along the northeast coast of North Korea; the primary target is the Chosin Nitrogen Plant there. A group of 3 B-29s accidentally bomb friendly civilians in Andong.

July 18

A shipment of 3,000 antitank mines arrives in Pusan from Japan; Japanese factories have been manufacturing these mines since the beginning of July to aid the U.N. cause. Also, the fleet transporting the 1st Cavalry Division arrives off Pohang-dong on the southeast coast of Korea at 0558. The flotilla moves without incident into Yongil Bay and the landing occurs without opposition. With the good news at hand, Admiral Doyle informs the Seventh Fleet planes that their services would not be required to cover the ground troops. Admiral Struble then orders the Seventh Fleet to proceed north into the Sea of Japan to implement the

98 air strikes that have been scheduled subsequent to covering the landing. Carrier based planes attack and devastate North Korean airfields, railroads, factories and an oil refinery at Wonsan. And, the planes strike targets at Hamhung, Hungnam and Numpyong. The raids continue into the following day. One naval plane is lost (on the 19th) during the missions. It is the initial naval plane that is lost during the conflict. Meanwhile, the fleet’s (CTF 90) signal is raised: “Land the Landing Force.” The administrative (Plan B — unopposed) landing gets a rousing approval from Commander Noel, Admiral Doyle’s planning officer, as the beaches are not considered suitable against opposition, and especially because now a sinister typhoon, dubbed “Helene,” is arriving. The first contingent of troops (8th Cavalry Regiment) debark slightly after 0600 and are greeted by Lt. General Walton H. Walker. At 0630, the smiling general welcomes the 5th Cavalry. Soon after, the landing is temporarily aborted, thanks to Helene (“Grace” in Marine records), the rampaging typhoon. The 7th Cavalry Regiment and the 82nd Field Artillery Battalion become temporary sailors, a tedious task for ground troops untrained for conquering seasickness. Despite the nasty storm, by midnight the LSTs unload about 60 percent of their cargoes; the Mount McKinley, Oglethorpe, Titania and the Union are totally unloaded. A total of 10,027 troops debark and 2,022 vehicles plus 2,729 tons of supplies are unloaded. The inclement weather also suspends the unloading of supplies at Pusan, which dangerously depletes Eighth Army’s rations. Meanwhile, back at Pohang-dong, trains stand ready to shuttle the cavalrymen north to the battle zone. Some armored units of the 1st Cavalry Division flow ashore within the first twenty-four hours. Before one week passes, they engage Communist forces on the Taegu-Pusan Highway. At Taejon, General Dean prepares to abandon the city on the following day. In conjunction, Colonel Stephens’ 21st Regiment is at Okch’on. Engineers with the regiment work east of Taejon, wiring the tunnels for demolition. However, General Walker, following a stop at General Gay’s positions at Pohang, arrives at Taejon Airstrip during the morning and plans change. By day’s end, evacuation plans are aborted. Walker, having acquired a detailed report of all available troops and of those reinforcements en route, decides to hold Taejon with the 24th Division and ROK troops, bolstered by the 1st Cavalry, which deploys around Okch’on and south of Taejon along the Kumsan Road. Walker’s strategy calls for halting the North Koreans between Taejon and Taegu. General Walker is convinced that if the North Koreans compel a withdrawal beyond the Naktong River, the U.S.–ROK troops can hold there until a bolstered Eighth Army can initiate an offensive. Ultimately, Dean is informed by General Walker that the 24th Division must hold Taejon for 48 hours. Consequently, this extends Dean’s plan by 24 hours. In accordance with Walker’s wishes, Dean readjusts his strategy. He goes to

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A U.S. Army contingent loads into a landing craft July 18 off Pohang-dong on the Korean east coast. the 24th Division command post at Yongdong and orders the 2nd Battalion, 19th Regiment, to return from there to Taejon. In conjunction, Battery B, 13th Field Artillery Battalion, is directed to depart its positions at Okch’on and redeploy at the Taejon airstrip. Also, the Reconnaissance Company (attached to the division) at Kumsan is transferred to control of the 34th Regiment

to afford the regiment more immediate information concerning its southern flank. However on the 19th, the new regimental commander, Colonel Beauchamp, orders it to move to Taejon. When the reconnaissance company abandons Kumsan, the southern flank becomes defenseless and without eyes, giving the enemy great advantage.

July 18, 1950

100

Top: Landing craft head for the beach in vicinity of Pohang-dong. LSTs are on the left. Bottom: A U.S. infantry contingent (1st Cavalry Division) lands at Pohang-dong. General Dean, unaware of the movement of the Reconnaissance Company, confers with Colonel Stephens and informs him that the 21st Regiment should remain along the Taejon-Okch’on Road and in the hills northwest of Taejon, between it and Okch’on to keep the enemy from breaking through ROK lines. The 21st Infantry, however, is directed to dispatch frequent patrols

into Taejon. In conjunction, the combination of tanks, including the 24th Division’s Company A, 78th Tank Battalion, and those of the 1st Cavalry, Company A, 71st Tank Battalion, gives the 24th Division added strength; the latter includes six officers and 122 enlisted men. In other activity, the N.K. 2nd Division departs

101 Ch’ongju to hook up with the N.K. 3rd and 4th Divisions to bolster the attack to seize Taejon. The 2nd Division has sustained severe casualties along its march and is unable to reach the objective on time. In still other activity, General John H. Church is promoted to major general. East Coast area: Elements of the South Korean 3rd Division form to attack and regain Yongdok. U.S. planes converge over enemy positions at Yongdok at 0545 and deposit enormous amounts of menacing firepower on the North Koreans. This blow is followed by a huge barrage launched by the naval surface guns of the fleet. The enemy receives no interlude. At 0600, the light cruiser Juneau blasts two star shells into the sky to signal the attack. The South Koreans, their numbers swelled by reinforcements, race forward under the umbrella coverage of the massive naval guns. The exhaustive sprint carries them to positions from where their small-arms weapons become effective. Other naval guns, firing in concert with the ground troops’ support fire, pound the enemy’s rear. The combined thrust compels the North Koreans to evacuate and regroup about three miles north of the town. Although the South Koreans take the objective, it is lost again on the following day. Contingents of the N.K. 5th Division counterattack and push the South Koreans back out of the Yongdok. Determined to revenge their loss, the South Koreans open another attack on the 21st, which opens a new segment of the roller coaster ride for domination of the area. The bulk of the ground fighting is at close quarters, causing gruesome results. In the meantime, more warships arrive and the tenacity of the naval vessel’s surface guns accelerates in concert with the aircraft. The planes and naval vessels give a repeat performance over Yongdok and deliver an early wake-up call to the occupants. The destroyers USS Higbee, DeHaven, Mansfield, and Swenson and the HMS Belfast, a British cruiser, are offshore. The incessant barrage, when enjoined by artillery and mortar fire, peels the skin from the earth and ignites raging fires that torch the arid battle zone. Fierce combat propels the South Koreans back into the coveted town; however, the enemy, despite the enfilade of U.N. air and naval support, takes advantage of its own artillery support and retakes the lost ground by dusk. By day’s end, the entire area, including the hills, stands stark naked. The terrain stretching from Kanggu-dong through Yongdok and several miles beyond is denuded of vegetation. The landscape is cluttered with clusters of mangled corpses. Every tiny village in the vicinity has been decimated. Although the North Koreans recapture Yongdok, the naval armada remains offshore to keep them under check for a while. Aircraft continue to dominate the skies. From dawn to dusk, planes deliver a steady stream of ravaging fire to restrict the enemy’s movement. On occasion, contingents emerge from the burning rubble of Yongdok and attempt to maneuver through the mountains to circle

July 18, 1950 the ROK forces, but they become conspicuous targets and sustain heavy losses. Today, it is estimated that effective fire, initiating solely from the Juneau (according to observers), accounts for the deaths of about 400 North Korean troops. Several days later, on the 24th, according to information from captured prisoners, about 800 North Koreans are killed after getting snagged, immobilized and annihilated by the combined power of planes attacking from the west in synchronization with the naval surface guns that lambaste the grid area from the east. The struggle for control of the town decreases slightly while the N.K. 5th Division regroups and the South Koreans receive reinforcements. But several more fiercely contested battles occur. The reformed S.K. 22nd Regiment and contingents of the ROK Naval Combat Team arrive to bolster the assault force. Also, U.S. forces have been deployed to the rear of the S.K. 23rd Regiment, near Pohang-dong. On the 23rd, the U.S. 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, deployed behind the S.K. 23rd Regiment and restricted by orders to support the ROK forces with “fire only,” discovers a problem; the men of Company C, deployed on Hill 181 (Round Top), stare spellbound as the North Koreans and South Koreans badger each other on the southern fringes of Yongdok. The Americans must refrain from giving assistance. The directed passiveness pays no dividends as the North Koreans await darkness and surround Hill 181, but no enemy attack is mounted during the night. In another instance on the 23rd, an 81-mm mortar platoon attached to Company D becomes encircled by North Korean troops, but they are driven back. On the 24th, the S.K. 23rd Regiment again recaptures Yongdok; using a preconceived strategy it takes the objective, then pulls out to form a strong night perimeter. During the action, the U.S. 21st Regiment relieves the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, and takes responsibility for guarding the rear of the ROK forces at Yongdok. Later, the N.K. 5th Division moves into Yongdok and is greeted by more overpowering air strikes and naval surface vessel bombardments. Despite the gargantuan strikes that inflict heavy casualties, the enemy retains its tenacity. Nonetheless, the S.K. 3rd Division is determined to gain absolute victory, although initially the commanding general, Lee Chu Sik, had only reluctantly agreed to renew the attack. The big push, scheduled for July 27, commences on time. At 0830, the artillery in cadence with the navy’s long guns announces the attack and initiate a thunderous bombardment. Swarms of aircraft join the attack and enunciate the intentions of the South Koreans. The ROKs fearlessly attack and hammer the North Koreans. In turn, the Communists batter the South Koreans, dealing out equal punishment. The slugfest ensues nearly without pause. The fate of Yongdok is finally decided on the 2nd of August, when a victorious S.K. 3rd Division routs the enemy and chases them north. This victory culminates the first effective holding

July 19, 1950 action against the enemy since the outbreak of hostilities. Victory had been tilted to the South Koreans because of the tremendously effective methods and firepower of the aircraft and ships. Also, the terrain did not permit the Communists to unfold their usual envelopment tactics. West Coast area: The unopposed N.K. 6th Division continues to move south along the west coast; it encroaches Kunsan, which possesses a port. In Naval activity, seven planes (VF-51), led by Commander A.D. Pollock from the Valley Forge, take off during the morning and swoop up the northeast coast beyond Wonsan, where they locate an operable oil refinery that has survived three previous bombing raids. During the latter part of the afternoon (1700), twentyone aircraft are launched from the Valley Forge. Ten F4U Corsairs, equipped with two rockets each and ample supplies of 20-mm ammunition, led by Lt. Commander W.R. Pittman (VF-53), and eleven AD Skyraiders, each carrying two rockets (high velocity) and one 500 pound bomb, augmented by one 1,000 pound bomb, led by Lt. Commander N.D. Hodson (VA-55), execute the mission. The thunderous chain of explosions, columns of swirling flames and mountains of smoke attest to its success. The refinery is reduced to ruins, but when the planes are 60 miles away, returning to the Valley Forge, the smoke-filled sky remains in view. The Chosin Oil Refinery, capable of producing 1,700,000 barrels of oil a year, is rendered useless. Ironically, according to the Key West Agreement (1948), the Chosin Refinery should have come under “strategic warfare,” a target for the Air Force rather than the Navy. (See also East Coast area, this date.) — In the United States: Major General Oliver P. Smith, USMC, who had been commissioned a second lieutenant during World War I and later served in the Pacific during World War II, departs Washington, D.C., to assume command of the 1st Marine Division; Brigadier General Harry B. Liversedge is temporary commanding officer of the division. General Smith succeeds Major General Graves B. Erskine, who is assigned to the State Department for a secret mission in Southeast Asia. July 19–20 1950 THE BATTLE OF TAEJON At 0730, the North Koreans attack to topple the city, which is defended by about 4,000 men of the U.S. 24th Division. Six enemy planes strike the positions of the 21st Regiment. The airstrike damages a railroad slightly northwest of Okch’on, but before noon, engineers (3rd Platoon, Company B) repair it to permit resumption of two-way traffic. Taejon airstrip is also struck. During the attack, the planes drop statements that had been coerced from several captured American officers and three noncommissioned officers. Outside of Taejon, near Yusong, at least two enemy Yaks are blown from the sky by troops of Battery A, 26th Antiaircraft Battalion. The ground attack is launched by elements of the N.K. 4th Divi-

102 sion. Its 16th and 18th Regiments, lacking both tanks and artillery, drive from the south and west. The stunning maneuver envelops the city and simultaneously permits the North Koreans to erect a formidable roadblock east of Taejon, along the Okch’on Road. The exact routes of the enemy’s movement are not available, but speculation attributes the enemy descent upon Taejon as having come through the mountains from the Nonsan-Taejon Road and by forced march from Nonsan along the highway from Kumsan. Later, other evidence provides proof that at least a portion of the envelopment force had moved through Kumsan. Although no T-34 tanks accompany the 16th and 18th N.K. Regiments, some tanks (107th Tank Regiment, 105th N.K. Armored Division) attached to the 4th N.K. Division since the initial invasion across the 38th Parallel break into the city during the morning. Later, during the afternoon, additional tanks (203rd Tank Regiment) attached to the N.K. 3rd Division penetrate the city limits. Meanwhile, U.S. Air Force planes scour the skies in search of enemy positions near the Kum River. The aircraft plaster suspected locations west and southwest of Taejon, but again, the North Koreans are undeterred. They unleash their assault. In the meantime, General Dean is heading for Yongdong. En route, at about 1000, while pausing at Okch’on, he decides to return to Taejon to recheck the defending positions of the 34th Regiment at the front entrance of the city. At about the same time, the 24th Reconnaissance Battalion arrives at Taejon and it is immediately directed to dispatch one platoon, composed of 39 men, southwest along the Nonsan Road. At 1030, when the unit reaches a point about three miles west of the Kap-ch’on River, near the positions of L Company, 34th Regiment, the enemy springs an ugly ambush. The platoon gets snagged in a deadly cross-fire by elements of the N.K. 4th Division (probably contingents of the N.K. 5th Regiment). The platoon pivots quickly, then sprints to the east bank of the river to join a contingent of L Company. Soon after, the balance of L Company arrives to support a roadblock on the Nonsan Road. The enemy buildup for the attack has been huge. During the morning, Taejon airstrip is pounded by artillery that has escaped harm by U.S. air strikes. The rain of fire against the airstrip and the perimeter of the 34th Regiment originates from the north and northwest and remains incessant throughout the day. It reaches proportions that rival bombardments of World War II. By the time General Dean arrives back at Taejon, the enemy attack is operating at full throttle. He rushes to the roadblock to direct the battle. By 1300, Colonel McGrail’s 2nd Battalion, 19th Regiment, arrives in Taejon; it too speeds directly to the L Company roadblock, which nears collapse due

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Top: U.S. soldiers in action on 20 July in the vicinity of Taejon. The weapon is a 3.5-inch rocket launcher (super bazooka). It is capable of destroying the previously invincible T-34 tank. Bottom: A 3.5-inch rocket launcher (M20) team in action during the fighting at Taejon. The weapon weighs 15 pounds and is composed of two parts for easy handling and transporting. to enormous enemy pressure. Meanwhile, General Dean coordinates the fire of two U.S. tanks to forestall disaster until McGrail arrives. Contingents of the N.K. 3rd Division bolster the N.K. 5th Regiment (4th Division) and provide a heavy punch to bolster the frontal assault. The vicious sting of the

enemy also pounds the 19th Regiment, particularly Company F, deployed on the left perimeter of Taejon. During the afternoon, it becomes more evident that the enemy is poised to launch a major ground attack against the beleaguered and slimly numbered

July 19, 1950 group of Americans. Colonels Ayres and Beauchamp discuss a night withdrawal. Beauchamp tells Ayres that Taejon can be held for an additional 24 hours, and he has so informed General Dean. The Communists maintain momentum throughout the day, but the roadblock holds. As the tedious ordeal continues, darkness, accompanied by sporadic rainfall, settles over the battlefield. The rain, a byproduct caused by a typhoon that had spared the immediate area, eradicates the choking dust that has been swirling around all day. Enemy infiltrators use the elements to their advantage. They discover a large hole separating the 1st Battalion, 34th Regiment, and the 19th Infantry’s Company F (2nd Battalion) and penetrate with impunity. The darkness and temporary tranquility do little to reassure the defenders, and the utter silence raises the edginess of most of the troops that are scattered in front of Taejon. All anticipate a major night assault. Nearly all of the 1st Battalion’s vehicles have been moved into the city to prevent capture if the forward positions are overrun. The artillery, which had been deployed at the airstrip to bolster the 34th Regiment, has been pulled back and redeployed on the southern fringes of the city. Not surprisingly, at about 2200, the peculiar silence is crushed when the clanking noise of approaching tanks is detected along the right flank of the 1st Battalion, 34th Regiment. The roar of the T-34s signals imminent battle. A patrol dispatched to probe the strength of the enemy movement vanishes without trace. Colonel Ayres confers with Colonel Beauchamp and again suggests a pull-back, but no withdrawal plans are implemented. Intertwined with the mysterious loss of the patrol, more foreboding sounds are picked up along the Kumsan Road, about six miles south of Taejon. This discovery clearly indicates more enemy infiltration. Again, the information is transmitted to the 34th Regimental Command Post. A nine-man patrol, composed of troops of the 24th Reconnaissance Company, led by Lieutenant George Kristanoff, is dispatched to probe the strength of the enemy. The patrol moves cautiously down the Kumsan Highway and encounters an impassable roadblock. In an instant, the enemy commences firing and inflicts yet another disaster on the Americans. All four jeeps in the convoy are decimated and the bodies of the troops are scattered along the roadway. A report regarding the ambush reaches Taejon at about 0200 (20 July). The news that the jeep had been ambushed is considered only an isolated incident, rather than a major enemy infiltration. Dean is not informed of the roadblock. At about 0300, a security patrol, composed of one platoon, ventures down the road to inspect its defenses. It, too, halts abruptly at the roadblock. Shortly thereafter, the enemy increases the pressure. The North Koreans quickly destroy the advance observation post of the 1st Battalion, 34th Reg-

104 iment; then by use of the usual envelopment tactics, they plow through key battalion defenses. Simultaneously, enemy armor and infantry strike a powerful blow against the right flank. Other units spring from the north and they also hammer the right flank. The defenders’ positions are becoming untenable, and to make matters worse, the enemy armor is closing fast. The 1st Battalion command post comes under severe attack by 0400. Colonel Ayres is unable to raise communications with his front-line troops as enemy tanks begin to bang against the door. Infantry bazooka teams, deployed to guard the road approaches, initiate an abandonment of their positions, and the rifle companies expend only sparse amounts of ammunition before they pull back. Having few remaining options, Colonel Ayres orders the command post to pull back. Before the first light of dawn, about 200 troops led by Major Leland Dunham begin to march out of the Yudung valley heading south. Ayres follows shortly thereafter. Later, about three miles south of Taejon, Major Dunham is mortally wounded near the Kumsan Road. Several others in his party are less seriously wounded. Those who are able head west toward Masuri. Meanwhile, Taejon jumps with activity as additional information arrives from the front lines. Then, suddenly, communications are severed between Colonel Beauchamp and the 1st Battalion. Patrols are sent to inspect the wire and make repairs, but the troops are unable to complete the task because the enemy has gained control of the road, nearly to the airfield. Colonel Beauchamp, still unconvinced of the enemy’s deep penetration, ventures forward in a jeep to verify the reports. He reaches the junction of the Seoul Highway and Nonsan Road, about onehalf mile outside the town. Here, he receives firsthand verification when his jeep encounters an enemy tank that pummels his vehicle with machine gun fire. The jeep is set afire, but Beauchamp sustains only a superficial wound. Undaunted and apparently greatly aggravated, he crawls several hundred yards, locates a bazooka team and prepares to take on the tank. The imminent encounter holds a surprise for the mighty T-34 tanks. New ammunition, recently perfected after about five years of experimentation, has arrived in Korea and it is about to confront the near impenetrable enemy armor. Beauchamp disregards his wound and returns to the road junction with the bazooka team and high hopes that the initial test of the weapon will be a huge success. Soon after, the bazooka fires upon the tank and the results are immediately known, to the jubilation of the Americans. The T-34 is quickly reduced to burning scrap and its startled crew is captured. Two additional enemy tanks arrive on scene and they, too, are introduced to the new bazookas. Both are blown away. Nonetheless, the destruction of the three tanks is not enough to halt the ground attacks. Back at Taejon,

105 word of the destruction of the tanks fails to reach the commanders. Meanwhile, due to the fear of being enveloped, the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, moves into the mountains instead of heading for Taejon. With the seizure of more ground, the enemy is able to direct more confusion; using a captured jeep radio, the North Koreans plant false information concerning the condition of the 1st Battalion, 34th Regiment. In conjunction, the gap between the 2nd Battalion, 19th Regiment, and the 1st Battalion, 34th Regiment, begins to dangerously widen. The 3rd Battalion, 34th Regiment, mounts an attack to seal the hole. Company K and a contingent of M Company advances; however, an enemy battalion and six T34 tanks disperse the attackers. During these blazing contests, SFC Robert E. Dare attempts to get the besieged troops of the advance platoon to safety. Despite the nasty opposition, the U.S. 3rd Battalion (34th Regiment) troops make it back to their starting point, but SFC Dare sacrifices his life to ensure the safety of his buddies. For his gallantry under fire, Dare receives the Distinguished Service Cross posthumously. Earlier, at 0131, an entry is posted in the 21st Regiment War Diary that about 200 guerrillas had infiltrated behind the lines of the 34th Regiment, but it is not known if this information had been passed on to General Dean or Colonel Beauchamp. Within the city, General Dean is awakened by small-arms fire at 0530. Slightly thereafter, an enemy tank rolls by the 34th Regimental Headquarters. Dean, supported by two bazooka teams, chases the tank as it heads out of town. The hunting trip is unsuccessful, but when the tank reenters the city, it is destroyed by a howitzer. Dean and his group miss two other tanks; however, by 0900, four of the five tanks that penetrate Taejon are decimated by American fire. Later, at about 1400, Dean’s contingent finally bags a tank. Dean, a squad of the 3rd Engineering Combat Battalion, and Lieutenant Arthur Clarke take credit for the kill. Clarke relates: “I remained by the corner of the building in front of the tank to use my Molotov cocktail on it if it began to move. The first round (fired from second story) hit the tank and the occupants began to scream and moan. The second round quieted most of the screaming and the third made it all quiet.” General Dean, attempting to inspire his troops to become tank killers, remarks: “I got me a tank.” Meanwhile, east of the airstrip, the 3rd Battalion, 34th Regiment, commanded by Major Lantron, remains unmolested throughout the morning, except for sporadic artillery and mortar fire. At about 0930, Major Lantron, without explanation, departs the command post and vanishes. In his absence, Colonel Wadlington orders Captain Jack E. Smith to assume command of the 3rd Battalion (34th Regiment). Subsequently, it is determined that Major Lantron had been captured by the North Koreans.

July 19, 1950 In the 19th Regimental sector, the 2nd Battalion has sustained penetration along the Nonsan Road throughout the night, but some reports on the deteriorating situation there have been erroneous. The battalion has not been overrun. Company F buckles under the enormous pressure and pulls back by about dawn, but Company E stands firmly at the bridge. Major Dunham guides the 1st Battalion (34th Regiment) and the 34th Infantry Headquarters Group south by maneuvering behind the lines of Company F, 19th Regiment. A smaller contingent led by Colonel Ayres trails the larger group. Slightly after daybreak, while Dunham and Ayres are retiring, fierce fighting continues between Company F and the enemy, but F Company is compelled to abandon the hill to the west. Dunham’s contingent heads south toward the hills. Colonel Ayres’ unit encounters heavy enemy fire at the bridge over the Yudung River, but it avoids getting trapped and joins Dunham in the heights south of Taejon. By about noon, Ayres turns over command of his 150-man 1st Battalion to Major Dunham and instructs him to redeploy three miles south of Taejon along the Kumsan Road to guard the rear of the city. Ayres and a small group depart separately and are soon struck by enemy fire. Only four men, including Ayres, escape. Wilson Fielder, a Time magazine correspondent, is killed and his body is discovered several months later. Ayres and the three other survivors evade nearby enemy contingents until nightfall, then escape to safety. Meanwhile, Second Lieutenant Robert L. Herbert (G Company, 19th Regiment), upon orders from Colonel McGrail, leads his 2nd Platoon toward Taejon to clear the road. En route he encounters and commandeers a rifle company (B Company, 34th Regiment) and a bazooka team. Soon after, the contingent meets up with Lieutenant Little and a reinforced squad that is protecting the fork in the road. During this enduring morning of confusion, enemy pressure forces more miscalculations. Colonel McGrail, at his 2nd Battalion, 34th Regiment command post east of the Yudung bridge, had dispatched Lieutenant Herbert to Taejon. By then, more distressing reports filter into headquarters. Word reaches McGrail his Company F has been forced to withdraw. McGrail also learns that the 1st Battalion has been shoved back. Captain Montesclaros volunteers to go to regimental headquarters in Taejon and he is soon surprised to find the road open when he meets Lieutenant Herbert at the roadblock. Montesclaros enters headquarters and informs General Dean about the positions of the 2nd Battalion, 19th Regiment, and he requests orders to carry back to Colonel McGrail. Dean tells him, while patting him on the back, “My boy, I am not running the show, Beauchamp is.” Dean then instructs him to go to Colonel Beauchamp, commanding officer, 34th Regiment. Beauchamp dispatches Montesclaros with orders that direct McGrail to bring

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Top: U.S. soldiers man a machine gun (.30-caliber Browning light M1919A6) position in the vicinity of Taejon. Bottom: U.S. troops are deployed in the vicinity of Taejon with a .50-caliber Browning machine gun (M2 HB). the 2nd Battalion back to the city, but upon his return to battalion headquarters, Montesclaros discovers it abandoned. McGrail had attempted to relocate his command post on a hill south of the road, but even that fails. McGrail orders E Company to pull back, but then his radio becomes inoperable and enemy troops converge on his positions.

In the meantime, McGrail’s force heads for the mountains instead of Taejon, unaware of the orders instructing him to head for the city. Unable to locate McGrail, despite a one-hour search, Montesclaros returns toward Taejon. He encounters Company E, which reports it had been overrun and forced to climb the hills. Montesclaros then looks north and

107 spots a large enemy contingent that is less than two miles from Taejon. He chooses to join Company E, rather than return to Taejon. As noon approaches, no units of the 19th Regiment are in place west of Taejon. The last unit positioned close to the besieged city, Company G, pulls out by 1300. Its 3rd Platoon protects the rear and is scheduled to depart after the weapons section, but the latter requests that it be the final unit to withdraw. The mortar men choose to fight first and expend their mortars before moving back. This command, composed of eighteen enlisted men and the one officer, is lost to the enemy. The situation in the city continues to deteriorate. Persistent enemy penetration causes more complications as the day drags out. Snipers ring shots in all directions. At the 2nd Battalion, 19th Regimental compound, enemy tanks commence firing. The barrage kills some troops and detonates an ammunition vehicle. Following this, the tanks speed away and begin blasting other targets. Subsequent to the departure of the enemy armor, bazookas are located. The bazooka fire attempts to eliminate the snipers, but during the operation, the fire ignites many of the poorly constructed dwellings. Within a short time, much of the city is in flames. Meanwhile, enemy tanks return on scene and commence incessant fire. Point-blank fire knocks out two jeeps at the medical company’s headquarters; both vehicles are crammed with troops and all but two men are killed. The two survivors are wounded, and one of these lies in the street, unable to move. The crew of one of the Communist tanks spots the wounded man. Soon after, the tank advances and drives right over the soldier, crushing him. Eventually, two of the three tanks are destroyed and the third one takes a wicked hit that severs its turret, but it escapes. During its first day of use, the new 3.5 rocket launcher destroys a total of eight T-34 tanks. Two others are destroyed by artillery fire. In addition, the U.S. Fifth Air Force destroys at least five tanks. Finally, the T-34 meets a formidable adversary. These 3.5 rocket launchers prevent the enemy tanks from causing panic in the city of Taejon. Back at the roadblock with Lieutenant Herbert, the enemy is closing fast from the northwest. Herbert requests that the howitzers be repositioned to meet the threat, but the artillery officer refuses to redirect the fire without authorization. Herbert contacts the battalion operations officer, but his request is denied. The artillery is pointed in three different directions, but not toward the attacking enemy. In contrast, unrestrained enemy mortars and artillery begin to bellow. The barrages kill several defenders at the roadblock. New orders arrive instructing Herbert to hold the line until reinforcements arrive to evacuate the artillery. About fifty men led by Lieutenant William Wygal rush to the scene to bolster Herbert’s

July 19, 1950 cause. Eventually, Herbert is ordered to join the evacuation. In conjunction, the artillerymen abandon their howitzers. A counterattack is ordered to retrieve them. Nonetheless, it becomes apparent that Taejon will fall. General Dean and Colonel Beauchamp, still unaware that their lines of defense outside the city have been uprooted, discuss evacuation plans during lunch (C-Rations). At about 1400, in an effort to save the vehicles, Dean advises a daylight abandonment of the city. By 1500, the 34th Regiment’s 3rd Battalion heads the march, trailed by the artillery, the medical company, 34th Regimental Command Group and the 2nd Battalion, 19th Regiment. The 1st Battalion, 19th Regiment, holds the rear. However, the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 34th and 19th Regiments respectively, never receive the word because the runners cannot locate their positions. Apparently, General Dean and Colonel Beauchamp have no knowledge that the word to evacuate does not reach the two battalions. When the convoy initiates its departure, Colonel Beauchamp takes a jeep and moves to the southeastern fringes of the city where he discovers four U.S. light tanks (24th Reconnaissance Company). Immediately, he directs them to defend the Okch’on Road exit and the southeastern tip of the city. As Beauchamp moves back into the city, he notices that the tanks are abandoning their positions. Beauchamp makes an abrupt U-turn and catches them, but simultaneously he comes under small-arms fire. Beauchamp bolts from the jeep and takes two of the tanks to form a temporary line of defense. The armor moves to a strategic pass about three miles south of Taejon to permit a safe withdrawal. Several anti-aircraft half-tracs join the barricade. From his vantage point at the pass, Beauchamp spots an incoming locomotive that is being held up at an approach tunnel by enemy fire. The train, originating in Iwon’ni, is attempting to retrieve a ten-car ammunition train that was previously abandoned by a Korean crew. Beauchamp contacts 21st Regimental headquarters to report the incident, and he is told by General Menoher to come to Okch’on to give a “detailed report” on the situation; Beauchamp also informs General Menoher and Colonel Stephens of the unfolding disaster east of the city. Meanwhile, the 21st Regiment has not been dispatched to support the 34th and 19th Regiments at Taejon, because until now, Stephens claims that he had no prior knowledge of the disaster in Taejon. At this time, the 21st Regiment remains in the heights at Okch’on and it cannot arrive in time to reinforce the city. Menoher and Stephens are informed about the deadly roadblock at Taejon, and this, too, had been unknown by the patrols that had been dispatched from headquarters to probe the highway. In the meantime, Captain Hatfield, who had dispatched the earlier train from Taejon, continues to hold at the station to protect the ammunition train,

July 19, 1950 but the anticipated locomotive never arrives with the armed train to evacuate the ammunition. Hatfield steadfastly guards the ammunition until he is slain at the rail yard. The train is blown by U.S. aircraft on the following day to prevent its capture. At about 1700, General Dean, during the unexplained absence of Colonel Beauchamp at Okch’on, orders Col. Wadlington to depart with the convoy. The lead portion of the 34th Regimental convoy, the 3rd Battalion and some artillery safely pass through the tunnel, but then the trap-door closes as the enemy severs the escape route from the city and isolates the remainder of the 34th RCT. Meanwhile, heavy skirmishing occurs near the rail yards. North Korean infantry overrun an artillery battery. In response, Dean orders a counterattack. Elements of the 3rd Battalion, commanded by Major McDaniel and supported by the guns of Company L, recapture the lost equipment. In the meantime, Captain Jack Smith, upon orders from Major William McDaniel, deploys a contingent of Company L, 3rd Battalion, to cover the withdrawal, while the remainder of the battalion joins the convoy. Due to the serious shortage of tractor drivers, some of the recaptured guns are left behind, but they are inoperable. Other guns are towed to safety. At an undetermined time during the battle for Taejon, Major McDaniel is captured and summarily executed by his captors. The stalled convoy adds to the dilemma in Taejon. Dean takes measures to clear the destroyed vehicles to reopen the passage. He places an urgent call to the 24th Division headquarters to request armor to clear the eastern exit from Taejon. All the while, enemy troops continue to converge on the city. The stand of L Company gains more importance as throngs of North Koreans stampede out of the airfield. Dean tells Captain Jack Smith that he must hold for forty-five minutes to provide just enough time for the convoy to escape. Immediately thereafter, Smith and L Company are to pull back with great haste. During the evacuation, the city becomes totally engulfed in flames. Shells burst in the staging areas, boosting casualties. Meanwhile, more snipers have infiltrated the city to further hinder the evacuation. Nevertheless, by about 1800, the principal convoy takes off. Subsequent to its departure, Captain Jack Smith and L Company (34th Regiment) make a hasty and disciplined withdrawal. They travel out of Taejon in trucks and come under tenacious fire as they move. Smith attempts to follow the route of the convoy via the Okch’on Road, but complications develop. Colonel Wadlington expects to lead the convoy, but in an effort to get to the point of the column, his jeep takes a circuitous route. The journey is hair-raising and includes several harrowing and life threatening experiences. The ride unexpectedly terminates with the intentional destruction of the jeep, which gets caught on a dead-end street and

108 under heavy enemy fire. Wadlington’s group then initiates a long climb up the mountain. In the meantime, as expected, the convoy rolls out under a rain of sniper fire. One vehicle goes out of control and plows into a building, nearly trapping the rest of the column from passing. More confusion occurs. A segment of the beginning of the convoy takes a wrong turn and terminates its journey on the same dead end that netted Wadlington. About fifty vehicles are abandoned and about 150 troops, led by several officers, make for the hills on foot. As the night progresses, this group becomes scattered and many lose their bearings. Some of the troops reach U.S. lines on the following morning and others straggle into the perimeter on the 22nd. However, many of the troops vanish. During the anguishing withdrawal, the remainder of the convoy continues to move in the right direction, but the city becomes even more of an inferno. There is scarce breathing room between the vehicles and the burning buildings that consume both sides of the streets. General Dean rushes to the front of the convoy and barely misses the turn for the Okch’on Road. Raging fires prevent Dean’s jeep and an accompanying vehicle from reversing direction. Both vehicles must take the Kumsan Road. Along the road, Dean and his party halt to pick up several wounded Americans. The two vehicles then continue, but shortly thereafter, they encounter an enemy roadblock and become the recipients of a storm of fire. Lieutenant Clark is wounded during the ambush. The Americans avoid a calamity by reaching the bank of the Taejon River, where they conceal themselves until darkness. Later, they cross to the west bank and disappear into the hills near Nangwol. General Dean moves back down the mountain at about midnight to fetch water for the wounded; however, he never rejoins the group and word of his whereabouts remains unknown for several years. (See also, July 21, 1950.) Meanwhile, the main convoy continues down the Okch’on Road until it is hammered by enemy mortar fire that pulverizes the lead vehicle to create an impassable blockage. Instantly, an armored vehicle pushes the disabled vehicle to the side, but another salvo of blistering fire takes out the Amtrac and kills the driver. This is followed by deadly machine gun fire that rakes the line of stalled vehicles. Instinctively, the troops bolt from the endangered vehicles, only to find themselves in equally devastating circumstances. Lurking North Korean soldiers rise from the nearby rice paddies and unleash another firestorm. Burp guns rip through the ranks. As the mortar fire strikes the column, one soldier, SFC Joseph Szito, grabs a 60-mm mortar and begins pounding an enemy position just slightly up a hill south of the Okch’on Road. Next Szito commandeers an 81-mm mortar; he fires about thirty smoke shells to afford the Americans an opportunity to push the disabled burning Amtrac off the road.

109 Few volunteers venture out on the road to remove the obstacle, increasing the severity of the ordeal. At about this time, the enemy inundates the shattered column with another thunderclap of fire, which quickly ignites several more vehicles at the front of the convoy. With sparse recourse available, the survivors torch the remaining vehicles, then begin to head on foot into the mountains. Soon after, the next section of the convoy reaches the stalled convoy. Bedlam occurs as these men are

July 19, 1950 also forced to abandon their vehicles under sheets of withering fire. They scatter for safety and in one particular area encompassing about fifty square yards, about 250 soldiers are crammed together, most praying for the sun to set. Soon after darkness, 2nd Lieutenant Ralph Boyd and a few men attempt to clear the road and search for some operable vehicles. After a Herculean effort and thanks to the assistance of an artillery prime mover, a passage is cleared. The small contingent of troops and its six vehicles resume the

In the Eighth Army rear area near Taejon, troops stand by for orders to move up to the front. One soldier grabs a catnap in a shelter half. His M1 rifle is leaning against a tree.

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U.S. troops maintain a forward command post. The soldier using a field telephone has a modified M1 (sniper’s rifle, .30-caliber MIC) close by against his left shoulder. retreat. They are ordered to remain silent and they receive explicit instructions not to return enemy fire. The convoy soon gets attacked. A sudden burst of enemy machine gun fire slices into their thinning ranks. Lieutenant Boyd sustains a superficial wound, but he loses consciousness when he is thrown from

the vehicle. When he regains consciousness, he discovers that he has been left behind; despite his wound, he sprints two and one-half miles and reaches the lines of the 21st Regiment. Back at Okch’on, Colonel Beauchamp had arrived from the pass and informed General Menoher about

111 the North Korean roadblock. It is unclear why the patrols of the 21st Regiment have not informed Menoher or Colonel Stephens. Beauchamp, under orders from Menoher, leads five light tanks (released from 21st Regiment) from Okch’on en route to the roadblock. He collects a contingent of about sixty men attached to I Company, 34th Regiment. At about darkness, the rescue team advances to positions just short of the pass and at that point one of the tanks strikes a mine. At about the same time, a well-camouflaged enemy soldier, using an electrical switch, detonates a whole pattern of strung mines. The reinforcements are then struck by more blistering fire. Undeterred, the riflemen advance toward the blocked pass and the highway tunnel. Several troops actually reach the tunnel; however, within two hours, they expend their ammunition and are compelled to return to Okch’on without seizing the objective. About 500 enemy troops are deployed on each flank along the evacuation route. Estimates of enemy troop strength to the immediate front of the 34th Regiment stand at about 2,500 to 3,000 North Koreans. The losses at Taejon are extremely heavy. Colonel Beauchamp gazes at the devastation near the tunnel and easily spots the scattered corpses of the heroic engineers. Beauchamp had earlier ordered them to defend the pass. Some of the engineers had escaped. The two tanks and the antiaircraft vehicles are evacuated. Nonetheless, the extensive roadblock, which extends from about two miles east of Taejon along the Okch’on Road outside of the village of Chojon and stretches from there to the first highway and rail tunnels east of Taejon, remains a gauntlet of devastating fire throughout the night. Company L, 3rd Battalion, 24th Regiment, which had fought the rear-action to cover the withdrawal, moves at a furious pace, but it, too, misses the turn at the Okch’on Road and heads directly down the Kumsan Road. The column passes a steady line of abandoned and burning vehicles as Captain Jack Smith attempts to lead his contingent through several enemy roadblocks. Using the services of about 150 men, including approximately fifty wounded, Smith breaks through several minor blockages and then overcomes a final obstacle just before dusk. Eventually, Smith reaches Chinju, not far from the southern tip of Korea. A hospital train rushes to Chinju from Pusan. Captain Smith leaves the wounded at Pusan, then he departs for Taegu to rejoin the 3rd Battalion survivors who had made it out of Taejon. While the incessant combat ensues east of Taejon, the 21st Regiment, deployed a mere three to four miles away, remains unscathed. The positions held by the 21st Regiment at Okch’on and the official statements by Colonel Stephens concerning the activity of the 21st Regiment during the day (20th) seem to add confusion to the unfolding events. Colonel Stephens makes it clear that he had dispatched motorized patrols, pursuant to earlier orders from Gen-

July 19, 1950 eral Dean, along the highway between Okch’on and Taejon to keep the highway open for evacuation. Stephens states that the patrols operated until dusk (20th). Ironically, the North Korean roadblock had been established during the afternoon, closing the road and making it unlikely that the patrols could have reached Taejon without encountering the roadblock. In addition, at this time of the year, darkness rolls in about 2100. Colonel Stephens states that it was subsequent to darkness when he first discovered that the enemy had established the roadblock at Taejon and it was at that time that he was informed that the troops in Taejon were being thrashed. The available medical supplies of the 1st Battalion, 21st Regiment, save the lives of many of the wounded survivors as they wander into the 21st Regimental perimeter and receive assistance at the first aid center near Okch’on. The wounded are so numerous that all medical supplies are expended. Stragglers continue moving through the hills and mountains for several days. Many survivors eventually filter into the 24th Division positions about 20 miles farther east, near Yongdong on the 22nd and 23rd of July; Colonel Wadlington reaches there on the 22nd. Several instances of extraordinary bravery occur during the abandonment of Taejon. In one instance, as the engineers of Company C, 3rd Engineer Combat Battalion, attempt to extricate themselves from the besieged city, Pvt. Charles Zimmerman exhibits extraordinary valor. Despite being wounded eleven times, including one wound from a mortar fragment, he escapes death when his jeep is destroyed by enemy fire and then he wipes out five enemy soldiers and destroys two machine guns to preserve the lives of the other members of his contingent. Zimmerman receives the Silver Star for his gallantry under fire. Another example of selfless courage is that of Sergeant George Libby, Company C, 3rd Engineer Combat Battalion. When the truck that is transporting him crashes through an enemy barricade, enemy fire strikes it and kills or wounds everyone except him; Libby halts an M-5 artillery tractor as it moves to crash through the roadblock. He carries the nearby wounded and places them on the vehicle and then rides on the outside of it to return fire. The tractor continues through the menacing fire and makes frequent stops along the route to pick up additional wounded. Sergeant Libby becomes seriously wounded, but he continues to hold his position on the vehicle. Upon reaching a second roadblock, he is again struck by enemy fire. The wounds are mortal, and Libby fades into unconsciousness before bleeding to death. But Libby’s heroism saves the lives of the others; they reach friendly lines. Sergeant Libby is posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor. Darkness finally blankets the area, but the bloodshed continues as the survivors still attempt to escape the fiery meat-grinder. Meanwhile, back at the positions of the 21st Regiment, Colonel Stephens and General Menoher realize that the North Koreans

July 19, 1950 are preparing to overrun their positions. Stephens requests permission to pull back from Okch’on and establish a delaying action; he believes that if they stay in Okch’on, the unit might be annihilated. By midnight (20th–21st), General Menoher departs for Yongdong, and Colonel Stephens makes preparations to evacuate. Before dawn (21st), engineers blow the tunnels north of Okch’on, but the detonations only partially seal the tunnels and only slow the enemy.

112 At daybreak (21 July), it becomes evident that the North Koreans have funneled through the tunnel and are unfolding an envelopment tactic destined to isolate the 21st Regiment. Heavy exchanges of fire occur on the 21st Regiment’s west flank, which prompts Stephens to order the withdrawal of his regiment and the 52nd Field Artillery Battalion from their positions at Okch’on. In an effort to buy some time for the South Korean forces, which are deployed east of the Kum River, engineers detonate the final

U.S. soldiers (Eighth Army) are in position near the Kum River in the vicinity of Taejon. The two troops are manning a heavy machine gun (M1917A1).

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July 19, 1950

A U.S. soldier shares a defensive position with an ROK soldier at Taejon. The American is using a .30caliber Browning automatic rifle (M1919A2). bridge across the Kum at about 1100. The Americans successfully pull back twenty miles to their prearranged positions, less than five miles northwest of Yongdong. Here, along a highway that stretches southwest to Kumsan, they establish and fortify a new line of defense that includes a roadblock. In addition to the capture of Taejon, the North Korean forces also seize Iris and Nonsan. Once again, the 24th Division has purchased precious time for the U.N. cause; however, the price is exorbitant. When the survivors of the 24th Division finally regroup during the next several days, it is determined that the division has sustained a 30 percent casualty rate. Of nearly 4,000 troops engaged against the enemy, 1,150 casualties are sustained. Two hundred and twenty-eight are wounded, 48 are slain and 874 troops are listed as missing in action; the majority of the latter are presumed dead. Company L (34th Regiment) sustains 107 casualties from their force of 155 men while fighting a delaying action at Taejon. Also, the equipment losses at Taejon are extremely high. Only 35 regimental vehicles escape the wrath of the enemy. Of 34 trucks assigned to the 24th Quartermaster Company, four remain unscathed.

July 19 President Syngman Rhee, despite the dire circumstances, remains confident. He proclaims that his South Korean forces would unify all of Korea by

advancing to the Manchurian border. Presently, the U.S. and other U.N. forces are simultaneously concerned with keeping from being pushed back to Pusan, while attempting to shove the Communists back across the 38th Parallel. In other activity, contingents of the 1st Cavalry Division, ashore since the previous day, move to the front; the 5th Cavalry heads toward the Taejon vicinity. On the following day, the 8th Cavalry moves by vehicle and by rail to Yongdong; both regiments will be under the command of the division artillery commander, Brigadier General Charles D. Palmer. The Eighth Army War Diary, G-3 section, July 19, states: “1st Cavalry Division ordered to concentrate in Taegu-YongdongKumchon area.” The day’s diary also stipulates that effective July 20, Company A, 71st Heavy Tank Battalion, is to be detached from the 24th Division, reverting to control of the 1st Cavalry Division, its parent division. Also, there is some confusion as to the exact destination of the 1st Cavalry and its schedule to relieve the 24th Division. Much has been written stating that the 1st Cavalry is to relieve the 24th Division at Taejon; but the Eighth Army War Diary, G-3 section, for today states that the 1st Cavalry is “ordered to concentrate in Taegu-Yongdong-Kumchon area.” The diary further stipulates that the 1st Cavalry should be “prepared to relieve the 24th Division on Army Order.” East Coast area: A contingent (one of the two

July 19, 1950 advancing columns) of the N.K. 6th Division seizes Kunsan without incident. Soon after, both enemy columns converge on Ch’onju, about thirty miles southeast of the prize. Effortlessly, they eliminate the defending contingent of S.K. Police. On the 20th (approximate departure date), the N.K. 6th Division drives east toward the fragile left flank of Eighth Army. On the 23rd, the N. K. 6th Division splits its three regiments at Kwangju, but all converge on Sunch’on about the 25th. In Air Force activity, a contingent of Fifth Air Force F-80s engage and destroy three enemy Yaks in the skies over Taegon. In other activity, a contingent of 7 F-80s attached to the 8th Fighter-Bomber Group (FBG), led by Lt. Colonel William T. Samways, attacks an enemy airstrip near Pyongyang and destroys 15 planes that are parked on the field. Lieutenant Ralph A. Ellis (36th Fighter Bomber Squadron, 8th Fighter Bomber Group), piloting an F-80, attacks the airfield at Pyongyang and destroys two parked fighters, both single-engine planes, type unknown. Lieutenant Roy W. Marsh receives credit for destroying two of the aircraft. Also, a patrol attached to the 36th Fighter Bomber Squadron (8th Fighter Bomber Group) led by Lieutenant Robert D. McKee intercepts a Communist force of Yaks in the vicinity of Taejon. McKee downs one of the four planes at about 0800. Also, Lieutenant Robert A. Walsh (80th Fighter Bomber Squadron, 8th Fighter Bomber Group), flying an F-80, spots concealed aircraft

114 at Pomgyang. He strafes the airfield and destroys two planes at about 1500. — In the United States: President Truman, reacting to the expanding crisis in Korea, requests that Congress appropriate ten billion dollars for the purpose of rearming the U.S. Armed Forces, which had rapidly been disarmed at the conclusion of World War II. Truman, upon the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also activates the Organized Marine Corps Reserve. In turn, General Clifton B. Cates, Marine commandant, informs the Marine Reserve of its impending call to active duty. Beginning on the following day and continuing until the 4th of August, in response to the Korean crisis, the entire complement of 47,000 men and women of the Marine Ground Force Reserve is called up and placed on active duty. Marine aviators are not included in the activation process. — In the Pacific Ocean: The USS Henrico (subsequent to repairs) trails the main convoy, sailing alone from the States toward Japan. The vessel encounters some unexpected danger during its second night at sea. Radar detects two “unidentified Submarines” that are closing toward the ship. This prompts the sound of general quarters and the trailing noise of sailors rushing to their posts. With battle stations ready, the pitchdark sea is scanned for possible enemy contact, but according to American intelligence, no North Korean warships remain afloat. Following about one hour of uneasiness, the alleged hostile bleeps on the radar screen

U.S. sailor Hospitalman Philip A. Barome, USN, shares C rations with Korean child.

115 vanish, releasing the tension. Subsequent to the strange encounter, the Henrico continues toward the Far East without further incident. — In Japan: The Forward Echelon 1st MAW lands at Haneda airport, near Tokyo; General Craig heads directly for Admiral Joy’s (Craig’s Naval superior officer) headquarters. Following this meeting, Craig and his staff confer with Army Generals Edward Almond and Edwin Wright to give them the details concerning the particulars on the Marine brigade’s air-ground team. Also, Generals Craig and Cushman are escorted into MacArthur’s office for a cordial and candid meeting. MacArthur takes great pains to alleviate any pressure. He quickly jokes about what he calls “unfounded rumors” that he had been prejudiced against the Marines during World War II and proclaims that he “had always held the greatest admiration for the Corps.” MacArthur is completely briefed on the Marine brigade and its capabilities, despite its frail numbers. MacArthur is stunned to learn that the brigade is at peacetime strength with only two rifle platoons per company and only four guns to each battery as opposed to six guns. The revelation that each Marine company contains 50 fewer men than specified in the Marine war tables had been a complete surprise to MacArthur. Nonetheless, MacArthur is delighted to know the Marines are en route to lessen this burden. Subsequently, General MacArthur requests that the Marine brigade be immediately upgraded to wartime strength, and again he requests that the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorize and provide one complete war strength Marine division, including its normal contingent of air support, for duty in Korea. The Marine generals are jubilant to learn from MacArthur that the brigade is to remain in Japan under the operational control of Admiral Joy, rather than Eighth Army. The stipulation guarantees the Marines the freedom to make ready for the anticipated amphibious invasion. In other activity, Lt. Colonel Tom Dolvin, commanding officer of the newly created 89th Medium Tank Battalion, arrives in Tokyo. Seventy additional troops join the unit to increase its strength to about 225 men. The 89th Medium Tank Battalion embarks to Korea by sea on July 24.

July 20

(See also July 19–20 THE BATTLE OF TAEThe North Koreans overrun Taejon and push the 24th Division back. North Korean tanks lead the infantry through the defenses. During the withdrawal, General Dean remains behind with the rear echelon troops to reassure them and instill confidence. These under-strength units fight bravely, but their weapons, carbines and obsolete bazookas, are outclassed against tanks. General Dean becomes listed as missing in action. Because of his heroic actions and superlative leadership at Taejon, Dean becomes a recipient of the Medal of Honor. Later, his name turns up on a POW list. At Okch’on, General Menoher and Colonel Stephens JON)

July 20, 1950 review the various details of the day’s events. The conversation results in Stephens believing that his 21st Regiment, 24th Division is in danger of being isolated by the North Koreans. Stephens requests authority to fight a delaying action while withdrawing, rather than attempting to stand and fight. Menoher replies affirmatively and informs Stephens that it is up to his discretion as to the time to pull back and how to accomplish the withdrawal successfully. At about midnight (20th–21st), General Menoher departs for Yongdong. Meanwhile, additional American reinforcements continue to arrive in Korea. The fall of Taejon opens a giant hole on the U.N.’s west flank. Communist units are quick to exploit the inefficiencies and follow their victory with another offensive. They commence a four-pronged attack toward Pusan. Also, the 1st Cavalry Division (Infantry), commanded by Major General Hobart R. Gray, advances to deploy on the U.N. right flank and replace ROK forces there. The 25th Division, commanded by General William B. Kean, drives toward a point about 50 miles northeast of Taejon to hold the line, regroup the ROK troops and block the Communists before they reach Taegu. In conjunction with the buildup, contingents of the 29th Regimental Combat Team move into Korea from Okinawa about a week after the 1st Cavalry. The combat team lands on the west shores, then moves to positions near Chinju about 50 miles outside of Pusan. These reinforcements, which are fully in place by the end of July, forge a greater line of defense for General Walton Walker to forestall defeat or annihilation. During the last two weeks in July, Communist troops seize the entire area between Mokp’o and Sunchon, and then they swivel eastward to obliterate everything between them and Pusan. But, MacArthur’s men have other plans. The orders of the day from General Walker become “Stand and fight or die.” General Dean describes the war effort with apparent reference to the limitless numbers of enemy troops: “Trying to stop the Gooks is like trying to stop rainwater with a fish net.” Also, Advance Headquarters, Fifth Air Force, becomes operational in Taegu. In conjunction, forward contingents cooperate with the ground troops. These teams consist of a forward air controller, radio operator and radio repairman; the latter doubles as a jeep driver. Six of these forward groups combine with the 24th Division during the first days of the conflict. The Fifth Air Force uses trainer aircraft (T-6s) to locate enemy targets; they often remain behind their lines until the arrival of fighter planes; these planes are dubbed Mosquitos. Each Mosquito plane carries a Very High Frequency (VHF) radio that enables the crew to communicate with Tactical Air Control Teams on the ground and simultaneously with the fighters in the sky. In addition, the Mosquitos also carry an SCR-300 radio which gives them contact with the ground troops. During the observation flights, advancing enemy contingents are discovered south of the Kum River

July 20, 1950 moving toward the west coast, but when the information is forwarded to Intelligence, the units are considered to be components of the N.K. 4th Division. Subsequent reports flowing from Far East Command to Washington attribute these recently detected N.K. 6th Division units to the N.K. 4th Division. General MacArthur interprets this misinformation as a sign that North Korean Headquarters is assuming that the U.N. forces are corralled in the area northeast of the Kum River. Central Mountain area: The ROK I Corps, which had defended the right flank of the U.S. 24th Division during the early part of July, is now under strength due to a high rate of casualties and deserters. Combined efforts by U.S. and South Korean officers to reorganize and make the unit battle-ready have proceeded haphazardly. Subsequent to the engagements east of the Seoul-Taejon Highway, the S.K. 1st, 2nd and Capital Divisions are now each composed of between 3,000 and 3,500 troops and possess a total of eleven guns, split between the three remaining artillery batteries. The I Corps also possesses about thirty 81-mm mortars, none of which have sights. The dilemma will be acted upon on the 24th, when the South Korean Army reorganizes. General Walker, concerned about the ability of the ROK forces to repulse the advancing enemy forces at the Mun’gyong Plateau, has issued instructions to the U.S. 25th Division to focus on Sanju to back up the ROK forces defending the Mun’gyong Plateau; Walker expects this action to safeguard the central mountain corridors. At Sangju, conditions are atrocious, as panicstricken refugees are flooding into and through the town. The roads become jammed and compound the problem, but even more critically, the streams of retreating ROK troops further complicate the predicament. Contingents of the 24th Regiment, 25th Division, the first Negro regiment to arrive in Korea, ventures into the vicinity of Yech’on. Elements of the 3rd Battalion unsuccessfully attack an enemy-held ridge on the fringe of the town. In the meantime, K Company, 3rd Battalion, 24th Regiment, led by Lieutenant Jasper Johnson, advances, apparently without incident and enters the town during the day. The failed attempt to capture the ridge prompts Lieutenant Johnson to request permission to pull out of Yech’on before nightfall. He receives an affirmative response. By the following morning, Colonel Henry G. Fisher, commanding officer of the 35th Regiment, is informed that the North Koreans have driven the 3rd Battalion, 24th Regiment, from Yech’on. Instinctively, Fisher races from Hamch’ang toward Yech’on to evaluate the situation. He locates the 3rd Battalion west of the town and it is unharmed. Colonel Fisher attempts to get a reasonable explanation and clarification from the battalion commander, but none is forthcoming. Colonel Fisher and his anxious entourage race five miles and enter an uninhabited Yech’on, which is consumed by flames ignited by U.S. Artillery fire. It is undetermined whether North Korean troops occupied Yech’on on the 20th.

116 A well-recognized journalist, Tom Lambert, accompanies Colonel Fisher on the trip to Yech’on. Subsequently he has a two-page article titled “Battle of Yech’on” published in a magazine, but the story which suggests a great victory by the Negro regiment prompts a pointed response from Colonel Fisher: “If his [Lambert’s] are the facts, then I wasn’t there.” In Air Force activity, Fifth Air Force planes support the fighting in Taejon, but they are unable to halt the enemy from seizing the city. In related activity, a contingent of FOs engages enemy aircraft and two enemy planes are downed. — In the United States: The commandant of the Marine Corps (General Cates) assumes that the JCS will eventually authorize the expansion of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade and agree to upgrade the 1st Marine Division to wartime strength. He phones Admiral Sherman, CNO, and offers plans ABLE and BAKER, two recently created procedures that detail the blueprint for the buildup of the two units. At present the entire corps is comprised of a mere 74,279 officers and enlisted men: operating forces, 40,364; supporting establishment (administrative and supply personnel), 24,592; special assignment, 3,871; non-available hospitalized personnel, confined personnel or personnel en route, 5,492. However, Cates’ emergency request to activate the Marine aviation units is refused by the JCS. In the meantime, MacArthur has already agreed that Marine air squadrons will cover the infantry. The press in the U.S. begins to cover the perceived intentional slight of the Marine Corps. In other activity, General Collins and Admiral Sherman depart the U.S. by plane to meet with General MacArthur in Japan. — In Japan: Marine Generals Edward Craig and Thomas Cushman, domiciled at General Headquarters Tokyo, meet with General Stratemeyer, USAF. They discuss the Marine brigade and clarify General MacArthur’s decision to keep the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade unaltered; Marine air dominates the discussion and by the conclusion of the meeting, Stratemeyer makes it emphatically clear that MAG 33 will remain available to support the Marine ground troops for the duration. In other activity, General MacArthur decides on Inchon as the site for the amphibious invasion, but he deliberates for a long time with Generals Almond and Wright on the alternatives. The blueprint for the operation, dubbed Operation CHROMITE, will be distributed to General Headquarters on the 23rd. — In Okinawa: The USS Walker arrives at Naha, Okinawa, transporting about 400 replacement troops; the recruits disembark quickly and are permitted to carry with them only their toilet articles. Without realizing what is occurring, they are hustled to the battalion sectors and given instant assignments to companies prior to receiving their field equipment and weapons. Nearly without pause, the troops are shuttled back to the dock area from where they will

117 embark to Korea on the following day. It is not a harassment drill. Along with the remainder of the 29th Regiment, the unseasoned troops are scheduled to move to the front lines in Korea. However, the regiment is supposed to receive training near Pusan before being thrown into the fighting.

July 21

Troops of the 21st Regiment, 24th Division, spot an enemy contingent on their west flank. The threatening force, listed as battalion-sized, closes from a distance of two miles. Colonel Stephens orders the 21st Regiment to abandon its positions east of Taejon and at Okch’on. At about 1100, the 21st and the 52nd Field Artillery Battalion move toward the southern edge of Korea. After traveling about twenty miles along the highway that heads southwest, between Yongdong to Kumsan, the 21st Regiment establishes a roadblock about four miles northwest of Yongdong. On the previous night, during the retreat from Taejon, General Dean had gone back down a mountain to fetch water for the wounded in his party. He never returned to the group, due to a fall that rendered him unconscious. The remainder of the party, after a prolonged wait for Dean, moves on toward Yongdong. Meanwhile, General Dean regains consciousness only to find that he has a severe head wound and a broken shoulder. Although it is thought that General Dean had been killed or captured, there is no news of his fate. He roves around the mountains concealed from the enemy for thirty-six days while trying to reach American lines. It is a futile attempt. The laborious trek drains his strength and he loses about sixty pounds. Finally, on the 25th of August, he is captured about 35 miles south of Taejon. Central Mountain area: The S.K. 8th Division attempts to retain control of the area encompassing An-

July 21, 1950 dong and the upper Naktong River crossing there. It engages the approaching N.K. 12th Division, which is supported by about thirty Soviet T-34 tanks. The elite N.K. 12th Division is composed of seasoned troops, most of whom have served during the Chinese wars. The enemy had earlier crossed the upper Han River at Tanyang en route to Andong. The S.K. forces launch the attack and plow into the enemy at a point between Yongju and Andong. This ignites a vicious string of severe actions which last until the end of the month. The N.K. 12th Division, at about this time, receives new orders from N.K. II Corps instructing it “to capture Pohang-dong by 26 July.” Even without the stiff opposition offered by the ROK, the task is difficult, if not insurmountable. The objective is about 75 air-miles away, and to reach it by foot, the North Koreans must trudge over the beastly mountains beyond Andong. The routes of passage are primitive paths, unaccessible except by foot or oxcart. The N.K. 12th Division reinitiates daylight movement, which exposes its troops to air attack. In other activity, the S.K. 18th Regiment, Capital Division, assumes responsibility for the defense of Yech’on. It relieves the 3rd Battalion, U.S. 24th Regiment. The Capital Division will engage the N.K. 8th Division in a series of skirmishes that last until the end of July. Meanwhile, the 25th Division concentrates on holding Sangju. To guarantee its safety, General Kean’s force must hold the strategic road that runs across the Mun’gyong plateau, then through Hamch’ang into Sangju. The 25th Division also must hold the other primary road, which leans farther west as it moves over the plateau, then over the mountains converging on Sangju from the east. The enemy attacks the 25th Division on the following day. The inclement weather prevents aerial observance flights that would otherwise

The Communist offensive continues to pressure Eighth Army. This is the scene of a burning village between Yech’on and Andong on 21 July.

July 22, 1950 chart the progress of the advancing N.K. 6th Division, which is being mistaken as elements of the N.K. 4th Division. General Walker’s command is aware of the enemy movement toward southwestern Korea. Intelligence attempts to dispatch an armored reconnaissance patrol to probe the area, but there are no available personnel. Fairer skies return to the area on July 23. — In Japan: Initially, when General MacArthur had accepted the commitment of Marines for duty in Korea, it had been proposed to base the ground forces in Sasebo and the air units at Kobe Air Field, separating the units by about 400 miles. General Craig, USMC, aware of the impending burden, has recently requested that the troops be garrisoned together near Kobe in order to continue training. He is so confident that the request will be affirmed that he directs Generals Craig and Cushman to depart Tokyo and inspect the areas. The two generals and their accompanying staff return to Tokyo on the 23rd. —In Okinawa: The 1st and 3rd Battalions, 29th Infantry Regiment, commanded by Lt. Colonel Wesley C. Wilson and Lt. Colonel Harold W. Mott, respectively, embark for Korea during a torrential rainstorm aboard the vessels Fentriss and Takasago Maru. The ships arrive at Pusan on the 24th. Due to circumstances, the scheduled training in Japan is canceled and soon after their arrival in Korea, the units ship out for the front lines.

July 22

More 24th Division stragglers from the battle of Taejon reach Yongdong. Its relief, the 1st Cavalry Division, is less than full strength, despite picking up more than 1,400 replacements (including about 100 men who had been residing in the stockade) prior to departing Japan. Each regiment is composed of two battalions rather than the necessary three, and each artillery battalion is composed of only two batteries. Also, only one tank company, composed of light M24s, is with the division. At 1200, the 1st Cavalry Division assumes responsibility for the front line positions of the Yongdong perimeter (Taejon-Taegu corridor), relieving the battered 24th Division. Following seventeen days of vicious combat against two seasoned North Korean divisions, the strength of the 24th Division has been reduced to 8,660 troops. At Yongdong, the 8th Cavalry Regiment replaces the 21st Regiment, 24th Division. With the whereabouts of General Dean still unknown, since his disappearance during the evacuation of Taejon, General John H. Church is directed by Eighth Army to take command of the 24th Division. The 24th Division had been plagued by enormous disadvantages during the initial combat against the enemy, including but not limited to the total lack of coherent communications, atrocious lack of proper equipment and ammunition, obsolete maps and improper discipline, all fueled by erroneous and ludicrous rumors. The troops had also been ill-trained for the extraordinary ordeal which had been thrust upon them. At Taegu, General Walker emphatically cautions General Gay that Yongdong must be held. Walker also

118 reminds Gay that no friendly troops bolster his rear, but that the cavalry must keep the highway open to ensure replenishment of ammunition. According to Walker, the ammunition will be the substance of life for the cavalry, taking priority even over food. After the short meeting with General Walker, General Gay departs for Yongdong, where he becomes involved in a controversial meeting with a representative of Eighth Army, Colonel Allan D. MacLean (G-3 Section). Colonel MacLean had instructed General Palmer to split the 8th Cavalry, deploying its two battalions on opposing sides of the Kum River. The 1st Battalion is to be posted about two miles southwest of Yongdong to protect a key position, the Taejon-Taegu Road, and the 2nd Battalion is to deploy south of the river and about four miles northwest of the town to guard the Chosan-ni-Muju-Kumsan Road. The strategy seems suicidal to General Palmer and to General Gay; to them it is obvious that the divided force will resemble the 7th Cavalry at the Little Big Horn. Gay, astonished by MacLean’s order, flatly tells him that he will not comply with the order until Eighth Army instructs him by telephone to do so. After a short interlude, Eighth Army is on the phone with General Gay and subsequent to confirmation, the orders issued by the colonel stand. Reluctantly, the 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry, moves northwest and the 2nd Battalion heads southwest. Both units realize that once the battle commences, neither can support the other. The 5th Cavalry Regiment is placed east of Yongdong in the heights. Palmer’s plan, with which Gay concurs, had been to spread the 1st Cavalry on a string of hills east of Yongdong, whereby the units would be able to support each other. In addition, the withdrawing 24th Division could retire through a strong line of cover. Also today, Major Raibl arrives at Taegu, intent on arranging suitable combat training for the 29th Regiment. A curt conversation between Raibl and the Eighth Army Asst. G-3, Colonel Allan D. MacLean, proves fruitless, as the latter appears preoccupied, unconcerned about the unpreparedness of the anticipated arrivals. In fairness, Raibl is not yet aware of the crucial situation of the entire Eighth Army’s precarious position. Subsequently, an empathetic General Walker listens attentively to Raibl, but ultimately, the conclusion remains the same. There is no time to spare. Raibl departs Taegu with the impression that the 29th will get about a three-day reprieve at Pusan to procure equipment and test their weapons prior to facing the enemy. In other activity, while it prepares to cross the Kum River to join the fight, the N.K. 2nd Division receives word that Taejon has fallen. The 2nd Division has been lagging behind the other enemy divisions that fought at Taejon. With news of the victory, the N.K. 2nd Division bypasses Taejon and advances southeast toward Poun. Also, the N. K. 3rd Division marches out of Taejon, driving toward Taegu. Central mountain area: Northwest of Sangju, an ROK battalion holds positions on the north side of an

119 over-swollen stream. An arbitrary decision by Brigadier General Vennard Wilson, Asst. 25th Division Commander, has placed Company F, 2nd Battalion, 35th Regiment, in a precarious spot at the core of the ROK battalion, ostensibly to furnish the South Koreans some added confidence. But F Company is untested and the move is vehemently contested by Colonel Fisher and the battalion commander, Lt. Colonel John Wilkins. Behind the ROK troops, but on the north side of the stream, stands the remainder of the U.S. 35th Regiment’s 2nd Battalion. It is bolstered by a contingent of tanks from the 79th Tank Battalion and by Battery A, 90th Field Artillery, which stands ready at a formidable obstacle along the primary road near the town. But, as usual, events do not unfold according to expectations. The weather is nasty and the ongoing deluge has bulged the stream, transforming it into an unyielding and rampaging foe. The water’s current is so strong that huge rocks and assorted debris tumble down the channel. From their positions south of the stream, the troops of the 2nd Battalion, 35th Regiment, are dispersed along a hill, situated south of Mun’gyong and northwest of Hamch’ang. They keep vigil in case of an enemy breakthrough. Back on the south side of the stream, Company F, deployed with the South Koreans, receives its baptism under fire as it becomes the center of attention. The North Koreans launch an attack against the ROK lines, but the ROK troops retreat, surely exposing the untried Americans. In a swift motion, the enemy begins to envelop the isolated company. Its positions are bombarded from the rear and the sides, creating pandemonium. The casualty list soars. An unsophisticated but deliberate attempt to evacuate the walking wounded is mounted. Three men, two officers and a noncom, execute an impetuous, but nonetheless heroic, mission to stave off disaster. Each man wraps himself with two twisted coils of telephone wire, then attempts to reach the opposing bank and tie down a line. The efforts are futile against the wild currents. The volunteers are haphazardly bashed about and tossed downstream until finally, they get back to the identical bank from which they started, about 100 yards away. The enemy continues to pound away, but aid is en route to the imperiled command. The turrets of a platoon of U.S. tanks (A Company, 79th Tank Bn.), positioned on the north bank, begin to bellow. Their roar instills hope for the trapped command. Swirling shells land amidst the prancing enemy. The gunners exhibit excellent marksmanship that forestalls disaster and prevents encirclement. The protective umbrella of cover fire continues to hold the enemy at bay. Essentially it suspends their resiliency and brings the attack to a screeching halt. The prodigious efforts of the tanks enable the survivors of Company F to extricate themselves. Company losses total 6 men killed, 10 wounded and 21 missing in action. Without incident, the 2nd Battalion, 35th Regiment remains in the heights overlooking the north bank throughout the day. Later, on the 23rd, Company F receives new orders.

July 22, 1950 In other activity, the 2nd Battalion, U.S. 24th Regiment, operating with contingents of the S.K. 17th Regiment in an area about 20 miles northwest of Sangju, encounters unexpected opposition. While ascending into the mountains, Company E is at the point on a primitive road that leads through an ominous canyon with huge and steep climbing mountain walls. The 24th Regiment, which sustained a difficult time under fire during its entry into combat, is again stunned when several enemy automatic weapons and a couple of mortars commence firing. Company E hits the dirt quickly and the troops spread out on both sides of the road, disregarding, for one reason or another, a South Korean officer’s advice to spread out to the left and right in an effort to evade the enemy fire and regroup to envelop the resistance. The pinned-down troops become targets for enemy riflemen, who enjoin the action, but there is little or no return fire as both Company E and Company F mount an irregular retreat out of the gorge. Word of the ambush reaches the regimental commander, Colonel Horton White. He immediately speeds toward the gorge to end the panic and restore discipline. But along the way White encounters the bewildered 2nd Battalion, still moving in the opposite direction. After a while, Horton is able to restore order within the ranks, but there is no movement to terminate the resistance. On the 23rd, South Korean troops move in to engage the enemy positions. By this day, the 27th Regiment, 25th Division, again rerouted, arrives at Hwanggan and receives the task to relieve the battle-weary retreating ROK troops along the Poun road. In Naval activity, planes from the USS Valley Forge strike Haeju and damage a bridge used for both vehicular and rail traffic. Additionally, the raids destroy six enemy locomotives. More than half of the railcars in a 33-car train are blown up. — In the United States: The JCS have been deliberating over General MacArthur’s request for a wartime strength Marine division for use in Korea, without results. Initially, MacArthur had received a response informing him that his request could not be fulfilled any earlier than late fall “without unacceptable weakening [of ] the Fleet Marine Force Atlantic.” The message ignites an immediate and more urgent response from MacArthur: “There can be no demand for its [Marine division’s] Potential use elsewhere that can equal the urgency of the immediate battle mission contemplated for it.” This day, having read MacArthur’s most recent request, the JCS inform MacArthur that they are reexamining the possibility of providing the Marine division, and they request confirmation of the status of the Marine brigade (until Sept. 10th), which is en route. MacArthur responds by informing the JCS that the Marine brigade will remain in Japan under Admiral Joy for participation in the anticipated invasion unless the ongoing operations in Korea deteriorate. MacArthur also states that a definitive date for the

July 23, 1950 amphibious invasion cannot be ascertained at present. He implies that it must not be delayed or the advantage will be lost and the alternative will be a frontal attack.

July 23

A group of survivors from Taejon, which had initially included General Dean and was led by Lieutenant Arthur M. Clarke, reaches the friendly lines of the 1st Cavalry at Yongdong. The Cavalry is also greeted by some unwelcome visitors, as advance contingents of the N.K. 3rd Division close toward the perimeter. The 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regiment, initiates its use of the 3.5 rocket launcher. Soon after, it reports that three approaching T-34 tanks had been met, engaged and terminated northwest of the town. Meanwhile, as the 1st Battalion repels a direct frontal assault, contingents of the N.K. 7th and 9th Regiments drive to positions southwest of Yongdong and establish a roadblock to the rear of the 8th Cavalry Regiment, essentially isolating it. On the following day, attempts are made to demolish the roadblock. In other activity, with the arrival of good weather, General Walker requests that the Fifth Air Force order armed reconnaissance sorties over the Kwangju-Nonsan area in southwest Korea to verify a fresh intelligence report of enemy movement. The flights uncover an ongoing drive toward the rear of the west (left) flank of Eighth Army. In conjunction, the Intelligence (G-2) predicts the arrival of the estimated division at the area near Anui-Chinju line in the Chiri Mountains by July 25. Air reconnaissance reports concur and the information proves accurate. In other activity, the N.K. 4th Division, having rested and acquired about 1,000 untested replacements, departs Taejon, heading south along the Kumsan Road to join the N.K. 6th Division in its effort to collapse the Eighth Army’s left flank. It will pause in Kumsan to acquire another 1,000 replacement troops (who have received several days’ training), departing there on about the 25th. Also, the Second and Third Echelons of the fleet, subsequent to delay due to weather, begin unloading their cargoes at Pohang-dong; the former is composed of three APs, six LSTs and four Japanese freighters and the latter is composed of six LSTs. The debarkation of the 1st Cavalry and its equipment is completed by the 29th. In conjunction, on the 30th, CTF 90 reports that ComPhibGru One has completed the operation and no ships remain at the objective. The landing at Pohang-dong receives scant coverage in the U.S. newspapers, because it was unopposed; however, it has actually been a tremendous accomplishment, combining Navy-Marine tactics and Army enthusiasm at a crucial period. General Gay’s 1st Cavalry Division is desperately required to halt the enemy, especially since the beleaguered 24th Division had relinquished Taejon on the 20th. Central Mountain area: Five enemy tanks ford a river and close toward Hamch’ang, by way of the primary road. The N.K. armor has a luckless day as it

120 comes into range of the guns of the 90th Field Artillery Battalion, commanded by James V. Sanden. The artillery is part of the force supporting the 2nd Battalion, 35th Regiment. Four of the advancing tanks are decimated, but the sole surviving tank evades destruction by returning to the opposite bank. Soon after, it too is destroyed by roving U.S. planes. In other activity, the 2nd Battalion, 35th Regiment, is ordered to pull back from the heights and redeploy about five miles north of Sangju. Later, circumstances dictate that the 2nd Battalion again move. It relocates to a new position about two miles from Sangju, and then on the 30th, the wandering battalion is directed to redeploy south of the town. In the sector northwest of Sangju, where the ROKs and 24th U.S. Regiment had been ambushed on the previous day, contingents of the S.K. 17th Regiment climb the mountain walls and overpower the North Koreans who had sprung the ambush. About thirty enemy troops, apparently guerrillas, are captured along with one mortar and two light machine guns. The South Korean 17th Regiment remains in the hills for about two additional days and gains slight progress against the enemy, but then it withdraws and returns to Sangju. With the absence of the ROK 17th Regiment, the U.S. 24th Regiment is the sole unit that remains to protect the western approach to Sangju against the N.K. 15th Division. The western front becomes anything but quiet as the regiment remains prone to hysteria during the majority of its missions west of Sangju. According to the testimony of battalion and regimental officers, the abandonment of weapons and positions is a frequent occurrence for the duration of the month. At times, more equipment is left behind than that which is brought back; in one instance, a contested hill is deserted, but when the enemy occupies it, they discover fifteen machine guns (three .50-caliber and twelve .30-caliber), eleven mortars (eight 60-mm and three 81-mm), 102 rifles and four 3.5 rocket launchers. The 24th is plagued with men heading for the rear, whereby they unnecessarily place the lives of the men who remain at their duty posts in great risk. While occupying one mountain, Company L initiates the operation with four officers and 105 enlisted men and sustains some casualties, but including these and those evacuated for different reasons (1 officer and 17 enlisted), the unit becomes skeletonized as troops mysteriously vanish. Within a few days, a relief column moves up the mountain. And, the 24th Regiment, all seventeen men still in their foxholes, begin the descent. Surprisingly, when the gallant seventeen reach the base of the mountain, their numbers have increased by one officer and thirty-five enlisted men. L Company begins the descent with 88 troops unaccounted for; now the number of missing personnel stands at 52. Also, the 27th Regiment, commanded by Colonel Michaelis, enters the fray. The 1st Battalion, led by Lt. Colonel Gilbert J. Check, departs Hwanggan and moves to establish a roadblock to halt the N.K. 2nd

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A U.S. 2 1/2-ton truck with a machine gun mounted upon it engages the enemy. Nearby infantry troops remain under protective cover behind a fence during the exchange. Division. At 1700, the unit takes responsibility for the sector, subsequent to the ROK force passing through its lines. During the evening, the unit digs in defensively outside of Sangyong-ni, but south of Poun. After an unsuccessful talk with some South Korean troops in an attempt to determine the strength and location of the enemy, a 30-man contingent from Company A, 27th Regiment led by Lieutenant John Buckley, ventures off in the darkness to reconnoiter. The detachment encounters an enemy column that is advancing south. Promptly, Buckley’s troops peel off and take positions in the hills on both sides of the road. As the enemy column (probably a spearhead of a larger force) moves into close range, the patrol commences firing and the column halts and then returns to Poun. The patrol, having sustained six men missing, returns to regimental lines at 0400 (24th). West Coast area: The N.K. 6th Division continues its advance against minimal opposition raised by some S.K. Police, several hundred scattered survivors of the S.K. 7th Division and a small amount of S.K. Marines. The North Koreans are heading toward the anemic left flank of Eighth Army, which is being pressed toward Pusan. From Kwangju, the 14th N.K. Regiment drives south to Posong, while the 13th N.K. Regiment moves southwest to the coastal town of Mokp’o. In conjunction, the 15th N.K. Regiment moves southeast through Sunch’on to the southern coastal town of Yosu. Lack of stiff opposition greatly aids the under-equipped enemy division, which is forced to subsist on meager rations due to its atrocious supply system. In Air Force activity, the 6132d Tactical Air Control Group (Provisional) establishes a Tactical Air Control Center adjacent to the Joint Operations Center at Taegu, South Korea.

— In the United States: General Cates receives authorization to mobilize the Marine Aviation Reserve. The Marine Organized Aviation Reserve, composed of 30 VMF Squadrons and 12 GCI Squadrons, is directed to order six VMF Squadrons and three GCI (Ground Control Intercept) Squadrons to report to El Toro, California, to bolster the 1st Marine Air Wing and bring it up to war strength. MAG-33 of 1st MAW has been dispatched to the Far East, prompting the action. — In Hawaii: The 5th Regimental Combat Team, commanded by Colonel Godwin Ordway, embarks Hawaii by sea for Korea. Many of the troops are Hawaiians and there are some men who served during World War II in the American-Japanese (Nisei) units. The unit arrives at Pusan on July 31. Also, 14 M-26 Pershing tanks and the 555th Field Artillery Battalion, nicknamed the Triple Nickel Battalion, accompany the combat team. — In Japan: General MacArthur makes it known that the U.N. forces, while prosecuting the war, will embrace the provisions of the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention. In conjunction, Syngman Rhee, the president of South Korea, accepts the same provisions for the Republic of Korea. At 1730, a meeting concerning the Inchon operation convenes at MacArthur’s headquarters. Representatives of the Army and Navy are in attendance, including Generals Collins (Army chief of staff ), Almond, Hickey and Wright, and Admirals Sherman, Doyle, Joy and Struble. Admiral Doyle, speaking on behalf of the Navy, references the selection of Inchon: “The operation is not impossible, but I do not recommend it.” Following the naval presentation, MacArthur, who had remained silent except for a few select questions, reverts to his persuasiveness. Through the process of elimination, he

July 23, 1950

122

A U.S. Navy Corsair (creating vapor circles) takes off of the USS Boxer. Part of a rescue helicopter can be seen at top right. Helicopters remain in the air during operations in the event a rescue becomes necessary. knocks out Kunsan, the site favored by Sherman and Collins. Eventually, after speaking for about forty-five minutes, MacArthur, hell-bent on an Inchon landing, closes with his usual flair, noting: “The Navy has never turned me down yet, and I know it will not now.” MacArthur prevails, although additional attempts to sway him continue. In conjunction, an alternate landing site at Posung-myon, opposite Osan and thirty miles south of Inchon, is suggested by Doyle. On the following day, General Lemuel Shepherd, Jr., USMC, reiterates the suggestion of Admiral Doyle, nonetheless unsuccessfully. The blueprint for Operation CHROMITE is made available to General Headquarters.

The ambitious plan offers alternative landing sites for the invasion of Korea: (1) Plan 100-B, Inchon (west coast); (2) Plan 100-C, Kunsan (west coast); (3) Plan 100-D, vicinity of Chumunjin (east coast). The featured plan is B, in synchronization with an Eighth Army attack. MacArthur apprises the Department of the Army that he has scheduled an amphibious landing, composed of the 5th Marines and the 2nd Infantry Division, for mid–September to be sprung against the enemy behind his lines. However, enemy successes will alter these plans. In other activity, the USS Boxer arrives off Japan, transporting 145 urgently needed F-51 Mustangs (procured

123 from National Guard air squadrons) to bolster the Far Eastern Air Force’s efforts in Korea. The Boxer has completed the voyage from Alameda in eight days and about seven hours. Air Force records, differing from Navy records, show the Boxer arriving on 22 July. In other activity, the initial Red Ball Express train departs Yokohama for Sasebo at 1330 and arrives at its destination with priority cargo in slightly more than thirty hours; from there, the cargo is forwarded to Pusan by ferry, completing the total mission in about 50 hours. Shortly thereafter, on the 25th, the trains depart on a daily basis; they pull out of Yokohama at 2330 with tentative arrival at Sasebo scheduled for 0542, two days later. The final part of the journey, following the cargo’s transfer from the railcars to the ferry, is scheduled to depart for Pusan at 1330 (on a daily basis) for arrival at Pusan at 0400 on the following day. Also, the Marine entourage that had gone to Itami airfield to examine the area returns to Tokyo and proposes a blueprint for the deployment of the 1st Brigade and the 1st Marine Division near there; MacArthur’s staff concurs. Two days later, the Marine officers again return to Itaki.

July 24 The North Koreans capture Chinan, Kwangju, Mokp’o and Yonju. The naval base at Mokp’o on the southwestern coast is seized by elements of the N.K. Sixth Division, who had fooled both the U.S. and South Koreans by marching south only during the darkened hours; it had been thought that only small guerrilla units had been involved. During the day, U.S. Naval Air Reconnaissance flights had spotted huge unidentified troop movements throughout southwestern Korea and immediately passed the crucial information on to their mother ships. With the unexpected arrival of yet another North Korean Division, the fate of the already threatened Eighth Army becomes more questionable. The bad news reaches General Walker at Eighth Army Headquarters, and it becomes apparent that the enemy is only about 150 miles from Pusan, advancing against minimal opposition. Without hesitation, Walker contacts Tokyo, requesting immediate close-air support to impede the advance and forestall encirclement of the U.N. forces. This urgent plea re-illuminates the difference in thinking between the Air Force’s definition of close-air support and the contrasting concept that had been perfected between the Navy and Marines during World War II. The method devised by the Air Force is not yet prepared for implementation; however, the Navy is ready to move into action. General Jarred Crabb, USAF, contacts Rear Admiral A.K. Morehouse, Admiral Joy’s chief of staff, requesting the Navy’s assistance. Morehouse, despite his reluctance to act because of the lack of sufficiently skilled ground-to-air control parties on the front lines, realizes that the Navy must act. The answer comes forth from Admiral Struble within 58 minutes: affirmative. Struble informs Eighth Army that the planes will be airborne as soon as their ammunition is replenished and

July 24, 1950 the ongoing refueling operation is completed. Admiral Joy communicates with Admiral Struble concerning the urgency of the situation and the dangers involved: “The calculated risk of damage to friendly forces must be accepted. The ground situation is so critical that commencement of operations on 25th is highly desirable.” General Walker also orders the 24th Division to speed south to intercept the enveloping force. At noon, General Church, commanding the 24th in the absence of General Dean, is called to Walker’s headquarters to discuss the critical development emerging near the undefended left flank of Eighth Army. The 24th Division, Walker explains, must cover the protracted area stretching between Chinju to positions close to Kumch’on; this is no simple task, considering that the two specified locations stand about 65 air-miles apart on opposite sides of the rugged Chiri Mountains. The order comes down following just one day of the division being placed on the reserve roster to permit resupply of equipment and replacement of its many casualties. The beleaguered 24th Division lacks about 60 to 70 percent of the equipment necessary to operate, and its three regiments each remain composed of only two weakened battalions, rather than the normal full strength of three battalions. Nonetheless, just prior to midnight (24th–25th), the 19th Regiment departs for Chinju from Kumch’on. By the following day, reports of enemy movement in southwest Korea flood headquarters, giving the Eighth Army the impression that the N.K. 4th Division is scattered across nearly 3,500 square miles of the southwestern portion of Korea. In other activity, the South Korean (ROK) Army reorganizes, forming two corps (I and II) and five divisions; the battered S.K. 2nd Division is dismantled and its remaining troops are transferred to the S.K. 1st Division; the I Corps, operating in the Taebaek Mountain area, is composed of the Capital and 8th S.K. Divisions; II Corps is composed of the 1st and 6th S.K. Divisions. The other S.K. division, the 3rd, will be directly controlled by South Korean Army due to its remote and virtually isolated positions on the east coast, too distant for effective I Corps control. The South Korean forces (II Corps) adjoin the U.S. troops to the west and stretch east through the central mountains, linking with the I Corps at Andong (until August 1), then Sangju to the east coast, which is defended by the S.K. 3rd Division. Also, the advance group of the Air Force is designated Fifth Air Force in Korea. Central Mountain area: Elements of the S.K. 6th Division engage the N.K. 1st Division in a vicious battle in the mountains over Hamch’ang, resulting in the destruction of seven Soviet T-34 tanks. Also, the U.S. 25th Division, as of today, assumes responsibility for the area stretching west from Sangju to the Seoul-Taegu Road; this releases the ROK 1st and 2nd Division components to swivel from Sangju and head north and east respectively to the Hamch’ang front. Near the village of Sangyong-ni, the 27th U.S.

July 24, 1950 Regiment braces for an enemy attack. A patrol that had gone out the previous night returns at 0400; it had detected an imminent enemy approach. The weather remains unkind to the defenders. Slightly after dawn, a thick fog permeates the area, giving added advantage to the N.K. 2nd Division, which launches its assault at 0630 and moves swiftly under the mist. At the forward point, two rifle companies are entrenched along shallow ridges on both sides of the road, but the enemy nudges too close before it is discovered. But then the

124 barrels roar and the accompanying T-34s score. The tank fire rips into the riflemen whose return fire is sufficient to only halt the infantry. The tanks remain unscathed and press forward toward battalion headquarters, with their machine guns and cannon blazing. Action is heavy throughout the area. While the riflemen stall the enemy infantry, additional tanks swerve around the bend, plow over the observation post of Company B on the right side of the road, and then drive toward the 1st Battalion lines. The 1st contingent

Eighth Army engineers set explosives on a bridge to prepare it for demolition if the North Koreans threaten the positions.

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July 24, 1950

A U.S. tank (Chaffee M24) pauses in a South Korean village in the vicinity of Yech’on on 24 July. of armor effortlessly penetrates the perimeter and commences firing on the battalion command post, which lies behind Company B’s positions. During the shoot out, several U.S. vehicles are destroyed and the medical officer is killed. Return fire is quickly mounted. The commanding officer of Company A Captain Weston commandeers a bazooka, and from extremely close range, he kills an attacking tank; however, the tank fire from close range costs Weston the loss of his hearing and one nearby soldier is killed. Weston refuses to leave the battle area, but later he is ordered to the rear by Colonel Check to receive aid. In reaction to the five additional tanks that have entered the action, Colonel Check requests air strikes and

through some fortuitous luck, three F-80 jets appear overhead. In an instant, following rapid dives, three of the tanks are wiped out by the planes’ rockets. The fast-paced battle lasts throughout the day with the hills being lost and regained repeatedly. By day’s end, two more T-34 tanks are destroyed, leaving only two others. The heights have changed occupants three times, but the Americans, fearful of envelopment during the night, prepare to pull back. The 1st Battalion breaks off the fighting and moves back, passing through the 2nd Battalion lines, apparently unnoticed by the North Koreans. The North Koreans launch a large assault against the abandoned positions on the following morning.

July 25, 1950 In the 1st Cavalry Division sector, near Yongdong, the North Korean forces, following another extremely successful infiltration operation (enhanced by posing as refugees), squeeze the noose tighter around the cavalry. The enemy uses some cunning methods to fool the unsuspecting Americans, including using women who appear pregnant, but in fact are simply bulging because of concealed radios that are being used to report U.S. positions. On this day, one woman is scrutinized closely and her phony pregnancy is aborted as a soldier removes the radio. Meanwhile, southwest of Yongdong, U.S. tanks repeatedly rush the strangling roadblock to displace it. Four separate attacks fail to budge it and the 8th Cavalry remains isolated. During one of the attacks, the 2nd Battalion commanding officer, Lt. Colonel Eugene Field, is wounded. Another spirited attack to clear the rear of the besieged 2nd Battalion is launched by the 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment, supported by the 16th Reconnaissance Company, but it too falters. By now both the 1st and 2nd Battalions (8th Cavalry) are in great jeopardy and the support units as well. The massive enemy infiltration threatens both the 99th and the 61st Field Artillery Battalions, which have combined their resources to bolster the 2nd Battalion. Both units come under equally severe attacks, which threaten their ability to provide full-powered support fire. In synchronization with the ongoing assaults against the 2nd Battalion, southwest of Yongdong, the 1st Battalion, precariously perched northwest of the town, sustains ferocious attacks. But with unbridled support fire from Battery A, 92nd Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, and the 77th Field Artillery Battalion, the North Koreans are repelled temporarily. East Coast area: The 1st and 3rd Battalions, 29th Regiment, arrive at Pusan and upon debarkation, they receive their waiting orders: proceed immediately to Chinju to become attached to the 19th Regiment, 24th Division. This obviously eliminates any training for the green troops. In Air Force activity, Fifth Air Force moves its advanced headquarters from Japan to Taegu in an effort to smooth communications between it and Eighth Army. The headquarters is established close to the headquarters of Eighth Army. — In Japan: Today, General Almond, who has been chief of staff of the Far East Command since February 18, 1949, subsequent to his position as deputy chief of staff to General MacArthur (Nov. ’46–Feb. ’49), is also appointed chief of staff, U.N. Command. In other activity, Escort Element (CTE 96.50), commanded by British Captain A.D.H. Jay and composed of the HMS Black Swan (PF), HMS Hart (PF), and the HMS Shoalhaven (PF), is established by Naval Forces Far East.

July 25

Starting at midnight (24th–25th), warships of the Seventh Fleet swing out from the west coast of Korea, heading toward the east coast to provide

126 close-air support for the endangered Eighth Army and ROK ground troops. By 0800, the thunderous roar of the planes’ engines breaks the morning silence as the aircraft spring from the deck of the Valley Forge. Within about twenty minutes, the naval aviators soar directly above the battleground and fly hoops over Taeju to announce their presence to the JOC ( Joint Army–Air Force Center). Operating within the bounds of over-stressed communication channels and the deficient numbers of “Mosquito” plane controllers, the pilots join the fight. Due to the difficulty in pronouncing the names of the Korean towns and villages, the navy has its work cut out for the day. Adding to the Herculean operation, while the carrier aircraft attempts to communicate with the L-5 liaison plane (spotter-observation), other planes arrive. F-80 jets, based in Japan, speed overhead searching for targets. The naval Corsairs and Skyraiders, subsequent to attempting to open communications with the ground, move farther west without the availability of accurate maps. Nevertheless, the planes scour the area for enemy movement. Several pilots dump their bombs in the sea just prior to returning to the carrier. During the initial mission, the British carrier Triumph picks up the slack by running the bulk of combat air patrols in their absence, essentially freeing every available plane on the Valley Forge for the mission. Later in the day, Admiral Struble reports by dispatch on the first close-air support mission over Korea: “The results of the morning sweeps and strikes were very minor due to a dearth of targets. No Rolling stock seen, only a few donkey carts plus men in rice paddies.... Seven trucks strafed did not burn. Four trucks strafed and burned. Will continue afternoon strikes, but under above conditions, the prospects appear poor. Consider it mandatory that proper communications be arranged....” At Kumsan, the N.K. 4th Division reinitiates its southward march to join the N.K. 6th Division. The tank regiment, which had accompanied it since the first day of the invasion, lags behind at Kumsan and remains in place awaiting the N.K. 4th Division to cross the Naktong River. In the 1st Cavalry Division sector, at Yongdong, the 1st Cavalry’s divided positions have become untenable. The overwhelming results of the enemy infiltration force a withdrawal. The 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry, still isolated southwest of Yongdong, has had little if any sleep overnight as it works tirelessly to forestall defeat. During the early morning hours, hair-raising friendly artillery nearly singes the ears of the men of the 2nd Battalion as shells zoom over the heads of the defenders into the enemy positions. Several men are wounded. In concert with the blazing guns of the artillery, at 0430, the desperate 2nd Battalion launches a breakout assault, which cracks a slim hole in the roadblock. A continuing surge of unconscious energy from the exhausted troops shoves the lead contingents through the gap, but unrelenting enemy fire plugs the leak before the

127 entire battalion can extricate itself. Seven of the eleven tanks fail to break out, and although most of the imperiled battalion escapes, the rear of the column anchored by the tanks, Company F, 8th Cavalry, and the 16th Reconnaissance Company are trapped. During the breakout attempt, the 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry, joins the fight to help save the besieged 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry; but one of its contingents, Company F, 5th Cavalry, inadvertently moves to the wrong hill and walks into a totally unexpected storm of enemy fire which decimates the company. Only 26 men escape. Meanwhile, the men still trapped behind the roadblock discount any possibility of rescue. They abandon their equipment, including the tanks, and disperse into the hills. After a two-day jaunt through the heights, 219 men (composed primarily of Company F, 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry) reach friendly lines (total casualties 1st Cavalry Division today — 275). The North Korean pressure against the 1st Battalion northwest of Yongdong is less destructive. The two batteries of the 77th Field Artillery Battalion, commanded by Lt. Colonel William A. Harris, and the heavy mortar company lay an elaborate field of cover fire, and Lt. Colonel Robert Kane’s 1st Battalion executes a disciplined withdrawal. Nonetheless, the enemy is slowed, but not halted, by the sheets of fire. The advance continues and closes against the heavy mortar company. As the North Koreans inch too close to the mortarmen, they dispose of their mortars and escape by transforming themselves into infantrymen and fighting their way out. By nightfall, Yongdong is on the plate for the North Koreans. The first enemy contingents enter at about 2000. In yet another instance, the combined ploy of frontal attack in synchronization with infiltration and a rear envelopment attack gains the North Koreans another stepping stone toward Pusan. Expecting a night counterattack against the eastern side of Yongdong to be launched by the 1st Cavalry Division, the N.K. 3rd Division establishes a defensive posture. The capture of Yongdong, according to information obtained from prisoners, has cost the N.K. 3rd Division about 2,000 casualties, brought about primarily by artillery fire. This leaves the enemy 3rd Division with a strength of approximately 5,000 troops, the equivalent of half its original strength. In the 27th Regiment sector, bright and early, as suspected by Colonels Check and Michaelis, the North Koreans execute another splendid envelopment tactic. Two unleashed battalions drive to swarm upon and destroy the 1st Battalion. The assault, executed flawlessly, unfolds a superb double envelopment, but much to their surprise, the North Koreans have surrounded thin air, and they now stand directly to the front of the guns of the waiting 2nd Battalion, commanded by Major Gordon E. Murch. A heavy concentration of killing fire is laid down, slicing in to the enemy ranks. The combination of tanks, mortars and various other weapons of the 2nd Battalion hand the two enemy bat-

July 25, 1950 talions a grievous thrashing. These stunned North Koreans mount a hasty and disoriented retreat, but as usual more troops advance, and by mid-afternoon the 27th Regiment is being set up for envelopment. About an hour before midnight, amid the ongoing heavy fighting, Colonel Michaelis orders the regiment to move toward Hwanggan and deploy on higher ground. By midnight, the troops begin to move out, despite brutal fighting on the right flank. The eight tanks of Company A, 79th Tank Bn., and Company F cover the withdrawal. The tanks, upon direction by Major Murch, converge on line and peer north. From their positions, the tankers pummel enemy ground troops that are spotted moving down the road. By the following day, some reinforcements arrive to augment the 27th Regiment. Meanwhile, the 7th Cavalry Regiment’s Headquarters and its 2nd Battalion, which had moved from Pohang-dong to positions west of Kumch’on during the fighting at Yongdong, have been apprehensive since their arrival. The staff lacks experience and the troops are green. Following the skirmishes of the nearby 27th Regiment, unsubstantiated information arrives and adds to the foreboding mood of the men of the 7th Cavalry. But most of the news that flows into their area concerning North Korean progress has been through the rumor tunnels several times over, so it reaches them with tremendous magnification. Nonetheless, the 7th Cavalry contingents believe a report that flies in slightly after midnight. Alarming news arrives relating that the North Koreans had punched a big hole through the 27th Regiment lines along the Poun Road and they are advancing swiftly. Almost without hesitation 7th Cavalry Headquarters signals all personnel to withdraw. During the pandemonium, the 2nd Battalion impetuously departs, leaving enormous amounts of equipment and ammunition at their abandoned positions. The “bug out,” as these charges to the rear are dubbed, causes many cavalrymen of the 2nd Battalion to vanish. Subsequent to daybreak, some poised platoon sergeants and an entourage of truck drivers and their vehicles trace their steps back and recover an abundance of weaponry, including fourteen machine guns, six 60mm mortars, seven BARs, and 120 M1 rifles. In addition, nine radios are recovered. Later, 119 men of the 2nd Battalion are still unaccounted for at the end of the day (26th). In the West Coast sector, the commanding officer, Colonel Ned D. Moore, 19th Regiment, 24th Division, arrives at Chinju about 0600, followed later by the 2nd Battalion and Headquarters, which arrive at about 1500. The 1st Battalion, 19th Regiment, trails the leading elements, but deploys to their rear along the Kumchon Road, north of Chinju. Company A spreads out defensively at Anui to guard a road approach from the west, while the remainder of 1st Battalion moves farther south to positions slightly east of Hamyang at Umyong-ni (on some antiquated maps it is referred to as Sanggam and on others Hwasan).

July 25, 1950 By now, Eighth Army at Taegu has been informed by intelligence reports that the enemy has troops in Mokp’o, at least ten tanks and about 500 men. Other reports detail the presence of about 800 infantry and some tanks at Kurye. About 500 enemy infantry engage S.K. Police at Hadong. Meanwhile, during the afternoon, the 1st and 3rd Battalions, 29th Regiment, arrive at Chinju; their weapons, including rifles (not zeroed), mortars and machine guns have not been fired. Later, after dark, Colonel Ned Moore (commanding officer, 19th Regiment) directs Colonel Mott to lead his 3rd Battalion, 29th Regiment to capture Hadong, thirty-five miles southwest of Chinju, where S.K. police attempt to hold a strategic road intersection that protects the western approach to Chinju. South Korean Major General Chae Byong Duk offers and receives permission to accompany Colonel Mott in an advisory capacity as well as interpreter during the mission. The unit is told to be prepared to depart at 2230, but the departure takes place about 0030; the unit expects to reach Hadong prior to dawn on the 26th. In Taegu, Eighth Army continues to absorb the enormous pressure of the advancing enemy. The Americans and the South Koreans are each being pushed back, endangering headquarters. In other activity, Brigadier General Francis W. Farrell is appointed chief of KMAG. Initially he had arrived in Korea to command an artillery unit. Farrell succeeds Colonel W.H. Sterling Wright, who departs for the U.S. on August 4 to attend a special school. Wright’s participation with KMAG began during August 1948. Wright had been scheduled to leave earlier, but the unexpected invasion postponed his departure. In Air Force activity, Lieutenant Upell, an Airborne Fighter Controller, flying a T-6 to coordinate air power, observes enemy and armor on the move in the vicinity of Yongdong. Upell calls for F-80s, but upon their arrival, Upell is informed that the pilots cannot differentiate between friend and foe on the ground due to

128 the darkness. In a dangerous maneuver, Upell and his observer (Lieutenant Franklyn C. Winters) decide to turn on their lights to guide the F-80s to the targets. Suddenly in the pitch darkness, the T-6s lights start to beam and Upell’s radio blares a message to follow his plane. Upell dives low to an elevation of only several hundred feet and cruises above and through a strom of fire from rifles, machine guns and mortars. The F-80s follow the beam and dot the T’s. Afterwards, Upell remains overhead and directs the friendly ground fire. All planes return to their respective bases without harm. — In the United States: The JCS has apparently digested the repeated requests of General MacArthur for a war-time strength Marine division for use in Korea; the Pentagon orders the Marine Corps to expand the 1st Marine Division to war strength (Plan BAKER). Major General Oliver P. Smith assumes command of the 1st Marine Division; he receives instructions from the commandant to bring the division to war strength, minus one regiment, and be prepared to embark for Korea between the 10th and 15th of August. Much easier said than done. Smith has a mere two weeks to round up the troops, many of whom are scattered around the country. In addition, an entire regiment, the 7th Marines, is to be added, which makes the procurement of equipment and supplies a colossal task. On August 10, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will authorize the third regiment for the 1st Marine Division, calling for the activation of the 7th Marines at that time. In conjunction, the chief of naval operations authorizes the reduction of the stateside Marine security forces by fifty percent, thereby permitting an additional 3,630 regular Marines to join the 1st Marine Division. — In Japan: Marine Generals Craig and Cushman (and some staff ) depart Tokyo for Itami Airfield, expecting to re-inspect the area due to the imminent arrival of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade. Meanwhile, a massive enemy threat continues to build against Pusan. The North Korean offensive, poised to strike toward Pusan from the north, gains the southwestern

A U.S. Army contingent engages an advancing enemy force. The jeep is delivering ammunition to the line.

129

July 26, 1950

phones Tokyo and speaks to General Almond, requesting authority to relocate Eighth Army Headquarters from Taegu to Pusan to ensure the survival of the Army communication equipment, a prerequisite for continuing the struggle against the enemy. Almond, offering his opinion, informs Walker that the intended move would carry bad ramifications for the morale of the various U.S. and ROK units; however, he does agree to inform MacArthur of the request. Following the conversation with Walker, General Almond confers with MacArthur, passing on the information and suggesting that MacArthur go to Korea on the following day to give the crucial matter personal attention. MacArthur, after deliberating for some time, advises General Almond to have his plane, the Bataan, readied for departure. In other activity, Marine Generals A U.S. soldier, using a Radio SCR 300, communicates with a for- Craig and Cushman arrive by air at ward mortar position. Taegu from Japan at 1400 and quickly grasp the criticalness of the situation. The airstrip at Taegu is portion of the peninsula and gives the Communists rough at best and there are few defending troops as well more advantage, as they are now positioned to strike as a minimum amount of planes there when the genfrom two separate directions, evoking a new crisis along erals arrive. General Craig reports to General Walker. the perimeter. General Headquarters dispatches an Soon after, a briefing is given by Colonel Landrum to emergency message recalling Craig’s transport plane, all Marine officers, updating them on the situation as which is about twenty minutes from Tokyo, stressing best as possible. The defensive line is deteriorating so that it is imperative. quickly that headquarters is not thoroughly positive Soon after his return, General Craig is briefed at about much of the ongoing fighting. The Marines are headquarters. General Edwin K. Wright (Far East informed that there is no specific sector assigned to Command G-3) informs Craig that all available troops them because of the uncertainty of the situation as the will be required to confront the advancing enemy and outnumbered American troops are being slowly pushed that General MacArthur has authorized the commitback. Nonetheless, the instructions are explicit in that ment of the Marine brigade. Colonel Edward W. the Marines are expected to be ready to move to any Snedeker, USMC, chief of staff of the brigade, is inpoint subsequent to debarkation and on instant notice. structed by dispatch to move the brigade to Korea. Aboard the convoy, it is common conversation In conjunction, the convoy transporting the 1st Proamong the Marines that they might not arrive in Korea visional Marine Brigade receives new orders directing in time to go on the offense. There is concern that they it to immediately change course for Korea. The convoy will debark only in time to flank and protect a general arrives off Korea on August 2. The Marines go ashore evacuation. Also, General Walker provides his plane to at Pusan on the following day. However, the vessels permit General Craig, Colonel Joseph Stewart (Brigade transporting MAG-33 continue toward Japan. Later, at G-3) and Lt. Colonel Arthur A. Chidester (Brigade G1700, Generals Craig and Cushman depart for Korea, 4) to inspect the combat zone, presently considered all making a stop at Itami to make some alternative adground still controlled by U.N. troops. During the exjustments. On the following day, the Marine generals cursion, Pusan and its harbor are inspected and while fly to Fukuoka, where they transfer to a smaller plane there, Craig confers with Brigadier General Crump that is adaptable to the primitive airfields of Korea. Garvin concerning the imminent arrival of the Marine brigade. July 26 Eighth Army, still expecting to take the Subsequent to departing Pusan, the Marine team, offensive, issues an operational directive signifying that through aerial observation, determines that it would Army will deploy at predetermined positions to intermeet the requirements of an acceptable base for VMOcept and engage the enemy while it simultaneously ma6 and the Marine Air Support Control unit if it beneuvers to secure its front lines and prepares to launch comes essential. Before closing the busy day, General an offensive (date to be set later). General Walker tele-

July 26, 1950 Walker’s pilot, possessing an astute knowledge of the area, swings farther west and gives General Craig and his entourage a pointed look at Masan, Chinju and the Naktong River, any of which might become the mission of the Marine brigade. Central Mountain area: Contingents of the N.K. 15th Division, having conquered the mountain passes, move from the west along a secondary road toward Sangju, which is defended by the U.S. 24th Regiment. The regiment has its entire complement of three battalions deployed near the road about ten miles outside of Sangju, and it is supported by the guns of the 64th and 159th Field Artillery Battalions and one additional battery of the 90th Field Artillery Battalion. In the Hwanggan area, the 27th Regiment, U.S. 25th Division, holds at its new positions in the heights outside of the village. The 27th Regiment had been forced back from the vicinity of Sangyong-ni by pressure from the N.K. 2nd Division. Some relief of the extraordinary pressure occurs as the 1st Battalion, 35th Regiment, arrives to cover positions on the right flank, but a gap still exists on the left flank between the 27th Regiment’s most distant unit stretching west, Company C, 1st Battalion. Its nearest friendly force is the 1st Cavalry Division’s 7th Cavalry Regiment. The enemy exploits the hole on the following day. At Yongdong, a contingent of N.K. 3rd Division troops, with a vanguard of four T-34 tanks, launches a night attack against the 5th Cavalry Regiment, which is deployed east of the town. The enemy, anticipating a heavy concentration of mines in their path, uses a modified cold-hearted tactic, one that had frequently been implemented by the Soviets during World War II. The North Koreans forcefully push human mine detectors (civilian refugees) ahead of the attack force to open a clear path for the tanks and the troops. Nonetheless, prior to daybreak, the cavalrymen repel the assaults. However, the larger part of the enemy’s plan unfolds southwest of the town. The N.K. 3rd Division’s 7th Regiment moves out of the town, heading southwest along the Muju Road. It intends to execute a wide flanking movement against Kumchon by swinging through Chirye. Attentive patrols of the 5th Cavalry detect the wily envelopment as it winds around the regimental left flank. The discovery creates two additional problems for General Gay — the depth of the tenacity of his troops on the left flank and the amount of strength remaining in the weary 27th Regiment on his right flank. Fortunately, the left flank holds firmly, terminating the enemy attacks prior to daybreak. Secondly, the 27th Regiment also holds, thereby purchasing more desperate time. General Gay, however, decides that to remain in place, his 5th Cavalry would be encircled and isolated from Taegu; therefore, Gay plans to pull back to positions near Kumchon, where he is confident the ground is extremely suitable for a strong defense. The withdrawal is initiated on July 29, subsequent to the pull-back of the 27th Regiment through its perimeter, and it is well timed. In conjunction, Eighth

130 Army, concerned about the strength of the enemy flanking movement, adds reinforcements to the cavalry, attaching the 3rd Battalion, 21st Infantry (24th Division). East Coast area: The North Koreans and ROK forces are still engaged for control of Yongdok. The South Koreans are preparing for a major counterattack on the 27th to seize the town. On this day, after dark, roving squads of South Koreans capture seventeen enemy machine guns, but only eight prisoners are netted. Also, Colonel Chong Won “Tiger” Kim, commander of the S.K. 23rd Regiment, is causing additional strain on the KMAG advisors due to his methods of disciplining his troops; today, he has one of his officers (a first lieutenant) executed with a single shot to the head because the officer’s unit had been encircled by enemy troops for a few days. This and other similar tactics of “Tiger” Kim cause the KMAG advisers to have him relieved; he will be replaced by the commanding officer, ROK 1st Separate Battalion. The USS Valley Forge launches planes to destroy enemy targets, but again the results are poor, according to Navy standards. Some aircraft locate targets, but most of the heavy loads of bombs are dropped to permit the planes to return to their carriers. A contingent of ten F4Us, led by Lt. Commander Pittman, nets five trucks, and another group, composed of seven F4Us (VF-53), knocks out two trucks. Also, a contingent of four Skyraiders snags one truck, while also inflicting damage to a railroad bridge and strafing an enemyinfiltrated village. The aircraft return to the carrier, but inclement weather moves into the area, prompting the fleet to return to the west coast of Korea. Meanwhile, both the Army and Air Force attempt to coordinate with the Navy to eliminate the poor communications. The Navy also prioritizes solutions on its own; Admiral Hoskins, staff members of the Valley Forge and of the British warship the Triumph meet, resulting in the British offering to commit a radio jeep and two officers, both trained in ground-to-air communications. But, on the 29th, the HMS Triumph is detached from the U.S. task force and reassigned to the British task group, preventing the offer from being implemented. Also, with reference to the naval operation (closeair support), Admiral Joy communicates with Admiral Sherman, informing him that the operation was disappointing. Joy attaches a contingent of an ANGLICO (Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company) to his command to help expedite the training of Army–Air Force personnel. Joy also contacts Generals MacArthur and Stratemeyer, offering the expertise of these specialists to train Army–Air Force personnel immediately. In other activity, Hadong and Yosu fall to the North Koreans. Also, the combined strength of the South Korean Army (ROK), including the infusion of new recruits, stands at 85,871 men; its total assigned strength is 94,570 men. West Coast area: General Church establishes his

131 headquarters at Hyopch’on, which is construed to be a point central to the huge area to be defended by the 24th Division; it lies approximately 25 miles north of Chinju and 15 miles southeast of Koch’ang, where the 34th Regiment, commanded by Col. Charles Beauchamp, will deploy. The 34th Regiment departs its positions north of Taegu in the Kunwi-Uisong vicinity and moves to Koch’ang. The 29th Regiment’s 3rd Battalion (attached to the 19th Regiment), which had departed Chinju slightly after midnight (25th–26th), heads south down the highway through Konyang, accompanied by South Korean guides. At Konyang the battalion swings north, taking a secondary road to bypass an impassable stream. It is a tedious trek, as the Battalion devotes most of the night navigating the slim road, while constantly pulling vehicles out of the adjacent rice paddies. By daylight, the force is moving north toward Hadong when it encounters a speeding southbound truck that is transporting 15 to 20 seriously wounded South Koreans. The Koreans inform Colonel Mott that they are the sole survivors of a group of about 400 militiamen who had fought at Hadong the night of the 25th. The 3rd Battalion (29th Regiment) continues to Wonjon via the primary road, then halts to establish a security line. Lacking radio communications with the 19th Regiment Headquarters at Chinju, Major Raibl heads back there by jeep to inform Colonel Moore of the tale of the South Koreans and to request permission to draw a line north of Chinju to guard the Hadong Road, west of Chinju. However, Moore instructs him to inform Colonel Mott to continue the mission to seize Hadong. After lunch, Raibl, still convinced that the 3rd Battalion cannot succeed, returns to Wonjon with the orders to proceed. The 3rd Battalion halts its advance at dusk upon reaching Hoenghch’on, near a sharp mountain road curve about three miles from the objective. A desperately needed radio jeep arrives with an Air Force captain and a tactical air control party; however, en route, the radio becomes inoperable, preventing the team from communicating with Chinju to guide the air strikes that are anticipated for the following morning. — In the United States: The SS Luxembourg Victory leaves San Francisco for Korea; among its cargo are eighty medium tanks to bolster Eighth Army. Additional tanks are also being rushed to the Korean battlefront. In other activity, a messenger from Washington arrives at Camp Pendleton informing General Oliver Smith that his 1st Marine Division will be composed of four classes of personnel: (1) Brigade units to be united with the division in the Far East; (2) Elements of the 2nd Marine Division (East Coast); (3) Regular personnel from various posts and stations; and (4) Troops from the Marine Corps Reserve who meet minimum combat experience requirements, to meet final deficiencies. — In Japan: The 7th Infantry Division is relieved of all occupation duties, and it receives orders from

July 27, 1950 FEC to prepare for embarkation to Korea; however, the division is drastically short of personnel. During July, 140 officers and 1,500 NCOs and enlisted men have been transferred to the 24th and 25th Divisions to bolster their strength. As of the following day, 27 July, the 7th Division remains more than 9,000 men short, lacking 290 officers, 126 warrant officers and 8,701 enlisted men.

July 27

At about 1000, General MacArthur and a small entourage of officers, including his chief of staff, Major General Edward Almond, arrive at Taegu from Haneda airfield in Japan. Having been informed of the arrival the previous night by General Almond, General Walker and several officers are waiting at the runway. Following the ride to Eighth Army Headquarters, General MacArthur and General Walker (with only General Almond in attendance) confer for about ninety minutes, during which time Walker’s request to transfer his headquarters to Pusan is never mentioned. However, MacArthur enunciates the importance of Eighth Army holding its ground, in such fashion that the tone in no way reprimands Walker, but he still gets his point across that there can be no more withdrawals. Later, following lunch, MacArthur states to some of the members of Army staff that Korea would not be evacuated and that there would be no Korean Dunkerque (Dunkirk). In other activity, subsequent to a TBS (talk between ships) conversation between Vice Admiral Struble, commander 7th Fleet, and Rear Admiral Hoskins (USS Valley Forge), the latter sends a personal representative to the Joint Operations Center in Korea, intending to throw more Navy assistance into the defense of the Pusan perimeter; Lt. Commander C.H. Gates (CAG5) departs the Valley Forge, arriving in Korea to initiate direct communications between JOC and the fleet. Gates is able to illustrate the differences in the maps used by the Navy and those used by the Army and Air Force. The maps employed by the Navy (World Aeronautical Charts) impede progress as no specific target can be detected, but rather only general areas. The Air Force is utilizing grid-coded maps. The pilot of the Mosquito aircraft must locate the target on the grid map and then convert the information by use of latitude and longitude before passing the information on to the carrier pilots, permitting the Navy to complete the mission. Central Mountain area: The North Korean forces (primarily N.K. 1st Division), having complete control of the entire Mun’gyong divide, funnel contingents into the upper Naktong Valley onto the main road near Hamch’ang; from here, at the southern base of the plateau, the attack will originate from north of Sangju. In conjunction, another North Korean force is thumping along the secondary road and will be poised to strike from the west. Also, the S.K. 1st Division reports the decimation of four Soviet T-34 tanks and the seizure of one operational tank on the Hamch’ang front, where the unit deployed, subsequent to being relieved from their

July 27, 1950 positions northwest of Sangju by the U.S. 24th Regiment, 25th Division. In other activity, the N.K. 2nd Division applies more pressure against the beleaguered 27th Regiment, U.S. 25th Division. With ravaging speed they attack, penetrating deeply through the existing gap on the left flank of the 1st Battalion. Gruesome fighting erupts, causing heavy casualties. Company C struggles immensely to retain control of the crest of a hill, losing it then regaining it three separate times. Company C sustains more than 60 casualties, dangerously draining its manpower to about 60 exhausted men. Nearby, Company B sustains about fifteen casualties. However, the enemy fails to rout the regiment. Overwhelming pressure on the following day will compel a withdrawal. West Coast area: At about 0845 the 3rd Battalion, 29th Regiment, advances from Hoengch’on-ni to assault Hadong. The vanguard, composed of L Company and a heavy weapons platoon, reaches positions about 1,000 yards from the crest of the Hadong Pass when a small contingent of enemy troops is detected moving down the pass toward the U.S. force. The heavy weapons platoon commences fire from both its 75-mm recoilless rifles, but the enemy is unharmed as the shells pass way over their line of advance. The enemy dashes back through the pass, and in turn, Captain Sharra dispatches L Company to seize the pass. By 0930, Sharra receives instructions to dig in and await the impending air strike against Hadong, which is to commence at 0945. The balance of the command moves to the pass; Company L deploys two platoons on the left side of the pass and one platoon on the right. K Company is ascending to higher ground slightly north of L Company. Soon after, a column of unidentified troops is spotted advancing toward the pass, apparently unaware of the Americans’ presence. Meanwhile, the U.S. troops hold their fire to allow time for identification. When they reach a distance of about 100 yards, General Chae Byong Duk yells in Korean, requesting them to identify themselves, but the response never comes as the troops dive for the sides of the road. As U.S. machine guns commence firing, enemy fire, seemingly well registered for the pass, lays a thundering blast, knocking out vehicles and the tactical air control jeep. Mortars pound the vehicle area while enemy machine guns and various small arms, originating in the heights to the north, rake the pass with additional killing fire, devastating the 3rd Battalion staff. The first volley of machine gun fire slays S.K. General Chae instantly when he is struck in the head. Major Raibl is also hit, but he tumbles down an incline, evading further wounds. The battalion commander, Colonel Mott, is also hit. Meanwhile, two pairs of planes pass over the area, but apparently unable to contact the air control party, the planes depart without making a strike, leaving the 3rd Battalion to defend itself. Major Raibl receives another wound and Colonel Mott, having sustained a mild wound, attempts to help unload an ammunition truck,

132 but a heavy box accidentally falls on Mott’s foot, breaking it. He finds refuge in a foxhole dug by another soldier and for a while, his whereabouts are unknown. In the meantime, heavy fighting occurs at the positions of L Company, which comes under blistering fire from enemy guns above it. The 1st Platoon, led by 2nd Lt. J. Morrissey, is attacked by a contingent of enemy troops that had wedged between L Company and K Company. Close combat occurs and L Company beats back an attack against its foxholes, but two men in the foxholes are bayoneted. Support fire by the 2nd Platoon, led by Captain Sharra, pours in from the south side of the pass, lending tremendous assistance to Company L, which holds firm on both sides of the road against the enemy. It is estimated that the North Koreans sustained heavy casualties themselves while attacking through open ground. Captain John R. Flynn, at the initiation of the fight, had moved back to accelerate the advance of contingents still moving up. Upon encountering K Company and elements of the heavy weapons company, Flynn orders a platoon of K Company to attack toward the crest of the hill. Afterwards, Flynn locates I Company and orders Lieutenant Makarounis to lead it forward to close the gap between L Company and K Company. Captain Flynn also has the available wounded placed on trucks, which speed them to Chinju; Major Raibl, among the returning wounded, informs Colonel Moore upon his return that the fighting at Hadong is going well for the Americans and the troops should win the battle. At about noon, 2nd Lieutenant Ernest Philips (L Company) informs Captain Sharra, commanding officer, L Company, that Colonel Mott has been located. Soon after, Colonel Mott instructs Sharra to assume command of the 3rd Battalion and extricate it. Sharra dispatches messengers to inform the three platoons of L Company to converge on the road at the base of the pass. Word never reaches the 1st Platoon led by Lt. Morrissey on the north side of the pass. By mid-afternoon, trucks loaded with the troops of L Company are returning to Chinju. En route they encounter advancing reinforcements, Battery B, 13th Field Artillery Battalion, which turns around and heads for Chinju, abandoning four trucks and one 105-mm howitzer that had been stranded in rice paddies. Eventually, despite the poor communications, Colonel Mott gets a radio message through to Captain Flynn, who had returned to the pass, instructing him to order Lieutenant Morrissey to retire. Flynn moves to a higher point and yells the instructions to Morrissey, who is still standing his ground to the right of the pass with a mere twelve men, including two wounded (Morrissey and one other man). After descending the hill, Morrissey gets them into a truck and it departs for Chinju. Unfortunately, when Flynn jumps into his jeep, it doesn’t start, prompting him to begin walking. He soon locates many men from I Company in a rice paddy. Right behind them is a strong enemy force closing against them. Suddenly a burst of machine gun fire

133 befalls the group as they flee toward a stream. The crossing is precarious and many men drown in the 20foot-deep water. Captain Flynn is among those who succeed in crossing the stream. After reaching a valley less than two miles away, he encounters another group of American soldiers, numbering about 60 to 70. During a short pause, enemy fire again rains on them, scattering the men in all directions. Flynn and his small entourage of about ten men enter friendly lines of the 19th Regiment on the following day. Another group composed of 97 men, led by Sergeant Applegate (I Company), escape by heading south to the coast, where they are picked up by a Korean fishing boat about five miles south of Hadong. The fishing boat transfers them to an S.K. patrol boat, which transports them to Pusan. Among those killed during this action are Captain Joseph K. Donahue, CO, K Company, and Captain Hugh P. Milleson, CO, M Company. Lieutenant Makarounis, who led I Co. into the gap at the pass, is captured, but later, during October of this year, he escapes. The unidentified U.S. Air Force captain with the air control team who had fought bravely all day as a rifleman in action at the pass with Lieutenant Morrissey is either killed or missing. Back at Chinju, during the morning, Captain Barszcz, leading G Company, 19th Infantry, moves out on a motorized patrol (78 men) probing fourteen miles northeast of Hadong without incident. The convoy returns to the Hadong-Chinju Road outside the village of Sigum, about twelve miles east of Hadong, and encounters one officer with about 50 battered troops, most of whom were clothed only in their shorts and boots. The only weapons with the stragglers are an unfired M1 rifle and one .45-caliber pistol. The troops justify their appearance and lack of weapons by stating that they had been forced to move through rice paddies and swim a river. Captain Barszcz relieves them of their arsenal and has two trucks take them to Chinju. In the event that additional stragglers might approach, G Company establishes a protective roadblock along the road and keeps it manned until 0400 on the 28th, when a staff officer of the 2nd Battalion, 19th Regiment, Captain Montesclaros, arrives with withdrawal orders and a convoy of trucks to transport G Company to a new position about four miles from Chinju in some nearby hills. General Church receives the bad news about Hadong later, during the night, overriding earlier reports that the 3rd Battalion, 29th Regiment had been doing well. A count of able-bodied men of the 3rd Battalion, including some with slight wounds, amounts to 354 officers and men. Subsequent to the return of additional stragglers, the unofficial casualty count becomes two killed, 52 wounded and 349 missing. The 3rd Battalion also loses its entire complement of crew-served weapons (rocket launchers, machine guns and grenade launchers), its communications equipment, about thirty vehicles and nearly all its rifles and other small arms. During the latter part of September, when the Amer-

July 27, 1950 icans regain the terrain at Hadong, they discover the corpses of 313 American soldiers; most are located in the rice paddies and along the river. On the 28th, the 3rd Battalion, 29th Infantry Regiment, reorganizes. All surviving personnel are attached to K and L Companies, both to be reassigned on the 29th of July. In other activity, the 1st Battalion, 29th Regiment (attached to 19th Regiment), commanded by Colonel Wesley Wilson, is ordered by Colonel Ned Moore to depart Chinju and advance north to relieve Colonel Rhea’s 1st Battalion, 19th Regiment, near Anui. Colonel Wilson is also directed to instruct Rhea to return to Chinju. During the first part of the afternoon, the relief occurs at Umyong-ni; however, Wilson’s command has no armor, artillery or air support, and a mortar platoon of 4.2 mortars is equipped with only two rounds of white phosphorous shells. To make matters worse, Colonel Wilson has no communications with Colonel Moore’s Regimental Command Post at Chinju, 35 miles away, compelling Wilson to dispatch messengers. First Lieutenant John C. Hughes, B Company, 1st Battalion, 29th Regiment, accompanied by Colonel Rhea, moves toward Anui to relieve A Company, 1st Battalion, 19th Regiment, discovering it in heated combat with the enemy. Rhea, expecting the engagement to terminate in short order, departs for Umyong-ni to rejoin the balance of the regiment. He leaves directions for Company A to report there as soon as possible. Company A is unable to return as the enemy severs the road; reconnaissance teams inform Rhea of the news and he departs for Chinju at dusk. Meanwhile, Colonel Wilson speeds two separate teams to contact nearby units. Two jeeps, with 2nd Lieutenant Frank Iwanczyk in the first, roll north toward Koch’ang to reach the 34th Regiment, while 1st Lieutenant Sam Holliday heads for Hamyang to establish a link with the S.K. troops there. Along the route to Koch’ang, Lt. Iwanczyk’s jeep is far in front of the second vehicle due to the overwhelming dust. About one mile north of the intersection, a concealed enemy machine gun ambushes the lead jeep, killing all four occupants and hurling them from the vehicle. The trailing jeep halts abruptly and its occupants dive for cover, without returning fire. Suddenly enemy troops are moving closer, having passed the bodies and the first jeep; then the shouting begins and the North Koreans charge toward the Americans. One man, Private Sidney Talley, bolts from the dirt and begins firing at the advancing enemy, killing two and inspiring his buddies to do likewise or die. The others commence firing and the North Koreans turn back. Unhesitatingly, the survivors turn the jeep around and inform the men at battalion headquarters of the roadblock. While the ambush is in progress, Lieutenant Holliday returns to Umyong from Hamyang, where he made contact with the South Korean force of less than 600 ROK 7th Division troops and about 150 S.K. Marines. Holliday then departs Umyong-ni with three additional men heading toward Anui, but the enemy also

July 28, 1950 ambushes his vehicle less than three miles from the town. One man is wounded and the jeep is demolished, but Lieutenant Holliday is able to provide cover fire with a BAR, and the three men withdraw with Holliday trailing close behind. At about 1600, A Company, 19th Regiment, is finally relieved. It departs for Chinju, but within about one mile from Anui, Company A encounters a skirmish between South Koreans and Communists. Enemy fire destroys six of the Company A vehicles. Rather than rejoining the 29th Regiment that had relieved it, it destroys the balance of its vehicles and abandons its heavy equipment before marching through the hills, reaching the 34th Regiment at Koch’ang on the following day (64 Americans and 60 South Koreans arrive). Back at Anui, the North Koreans (elements of the N.K. 4th Division) begin pounding Company B, 29th Regiment subsequent to its relief of Company A, 19th Regiment. The enemy attempts to envelop Lieutenant John C. Hughes’ command and by dark, attacks are coming from three sides, compelling Hughes to withdraw into Anui, from where he intends to get his unit across the upper Nam and redeployed in the heights east of the town. The bolt across the river ends soon after it begins; eighteen men, including two officers, make it across, but incessant enemy fire halts the escape. Heavy fighting develops within Anui, lasting until about midnight as the isolated men of Company B fight for their survival, then break it off to attempt escape through the hills. Those who make it straggle into the lines of the 34th Regiment. Meanwhile, the balance of the 1st Battalion, with Colonel Wilson at Umyong-ni, know that the contingent at Anui is under attack; but Wilson, lacking communications, is unaware of the plight of isolated B Company. Twice attempts are made to bolster B Company, but both attempts fail due to the roadblocks. Also, a patrol of the 34th Regiment, dispatched from Koch’ang by Colonel Beauchamp, stretches to positions from where the fighting at Anui is observed. Upon receiving the report, Colonel Beauchamp braces for an anticipated assault against Koch’ang. In Naval activity, CTF 90 is ordered to initiate raids against selected targets on the east coast of North Korea. The naval action is to include specialized ground troops (underwater demolition teams and Marine reconnaissance troops). In conjunction, the ground troops land at Pohang on 30 July to conduct the raids. — In the United States: Congress passes legislation authorizing President Truman to extend by one year the enlistments of all troops in the U.S. Armed Forces, whose enlistments are to expire before July 9, 1951. The legislation covers regulars and reserves. — In Japan: The FEAF blueprint to intercept and impede the constant flow of enemy troops and supplies pouring into South Korea by rail is ready today. The strategy is to eliminate rail connections with North Korea by taking out the railroad bridges in North Korea at P’yongyang, which is slightly northeast of Chin-

134 nampo, along the east coast. The marshaling yard at Pyongyang and those at Hamhung and Wonsan, also on the east coast, are targeted. The rail bridges over the Han River in the vicinity of enemy-held Seoul will further cut the bloodline of the enemy. By the following day, Far East Air Forces transmits a compilation of specific rail targets to Far East Bomber Command. Soon after, on the 31st, bomber command receives a list of the selected highways included in the interdiction operation. On August 3 the Navy and the Fifth Air Force each receive their priority list of specified targets; they will coordinate the attacks that occur south of the 38th Parallel, using the Han River as the dividing line between Fifth Air Force and the FEAF bombers.

July 28

The commanding officer of the N.K. 3rd Division, General Lee Yong Ho, issues an order signed by the North Korean commander-in-chief, Kim Chaek, and the commanding officer of general staff, Kang Kon, which calls for an end to the killing of soldiers who can be captured. The order stipulates that troops who surrender will be treated as POWs and that specialists (Cultural Section) will be responsible for carrying out the orders. Nonetheless, the enemy at times pays little attention to the command, and atrocities continue to occur by certain commands. Meanwhile, at Sunchon, Major General Pang, the commanding officer, N.K. 6th Division, issues a statement of purpose and inspiration to his troops: “Comrades, the enemy is demoralized. The task given to us is the liberation of Masan and Chinju and the annihilation of the remnants of the enemy. We have liberated Mokpu, Kwangju and Yosu and have thereby accelerated the liberation of all Korea. However, the liberation of Chinju and Masan means the final battle to cut off the windpipe of the enemy. Comrades, this glorious task has fallen to our division! Men of the 6th division, let us annihilate the enemy and distinguish ourselves.” The N.K. 83rd Motorcycle Regiment, part of the 105th Armored Division until it became a separate unit in June 1950, has been attached to the N.K. 6th Division to augment the attack toward Pusan. Central Mountain area: The key confrontation that determines the fate of Andong begins as the ROK 8th Division, augmented by contingents of the Capital Division, engages elements of the N.K. 12th Division. There has been heavy fighting between the two opposing forces since the 21st, and each has sustained heavy losses. The North Koreans have been constantly wracked by air attacks that have drained their strength considerably, but not sufficiently to halt the advance. Nonetheless, with their tank force dwindling, the North Koreans advance relentlessly against the badly bruised ROK troops. Savage fighting remains incessant until finally on August 1, the South Koreans are forced to withdraw, giving the enemy control of Andong. In the area near Hwanggan, the 27th Regiment lines are penetrated by elements of the N.K. 2nd Division, placing the regiment in untenable positions, perfectly poised for envelopment. Company C pulls back from

135 the western edge of the perimeter, while Colonel Michaelis speeds into Hwanggan to request permission to lead his command through the lines of the 1st Cavalry. While conferring with General Gay, Michaelis waits as Gay phones Eighth Army and relays the information to Colonel Landrum (chief of staff ). Interjecting, Gay then asks Landrum whether the 1st Cavalry should attack to break the enemy pressure or would headquarters prefer that the 27th retire through his lines. Soon after, General Gay receives an answer. Colonel

July 28, 1950 Landrum calls back, instructing Gay to inform Colonel Michaelis to pull out and move through the 1st Cavalry lines to Kumch’on. The 27th Regiment, 25th Division, departs before dawn the next day and then reverts to Army Reserve at Waegwan, but only for one day, as the regiment is rushed from there to bolster the 19th Regiment under Colonel Rhea at Chinju Pass. Also, the Communists seize Chirye, Hamch’ang and Koch’ang. West Coast area: The contingents of the North

An Eighth Army contingent on the advance.

July 28, 1950 Korean 4th Division swing south from Anui to strike the U.N. positions at Hamyang and Umyong-ni, defended by ROK forces and U.S. forces respectively. East of the Nam River, the 1st Battalion, 29th Regiment, under Colonel Wilson contains the enemy throughout the day, repulsing the approaching enemy with mortar fire; however, the enemy easily succeeds in an envelopment movement, using side trails to come in from behind. Wilson, upon receiving information that his command at Umyong-ni is nearly trapped, begins a chain of disciplined withdrawals after dark, which places the 1st Battalion near Sanch’on by the 30th. Meanwhile, at Hamyang, west of the Nam River, the remaining fragments of the ROK 7th Division and an accompaniment of green S.K. Marines come under severe attack. Pressure from the enemy pushes the ROK troops toward collapse, but a tenacious counterattack by the South Korean Marines plows through the enemy, reaching its flank and saving the day. The North Koreans retreat north. Prisoners are seized, and information extracted from them gives Colonel Wilson the first indication of the defeat of Company B on the previous day at Anui. In conjunction with the withdrawal of Wilson’s command, the South Koreans move back through the lines of the 1st Battalion, 29th Regiment, and head for Chinju. At Koch’ang, the 34th Regiment is expecting a heavy assault against it. At a forward roadblock along the Kumch’on Road, about four miles north of the town, a reinforced platoon of I Company holds the line, with the heavy mortar company standing slightly behind it at the northern tip of the town. The western approach to Kumch’on is guarded by the 3rd Battalion, which is deployed about two miles outside the town in the high ground overlooking the Anui Road and the eastern approach. The Hyopch’on Road is blocked by the 1st Battalion, which is also deployed about two miles from the entrance. About two miles southeast of Kumch’on, five 105-mm howitzers of Battery A, 13th Field Artillery, stand ready. Advance spotters discover a huge enemy column backing up west of the town along the Anui Road, where the 34th had blocked the road. Upon receiving instructions, the 105s commence firing, bearing down on the stalled enemy until the sun sets. At nightfall, Beauchamp closes his taut arc, pulling in both battalions to form a more compact defense. Soon after, Beauchamp reports to General Church at 24th Division headquarters at Hyopch’on. He informs Church of the imminent enemy attack and explains that the 3rd Battalion will pull back to previously designated positions about three miles southeast of Kumch’on, but Church insists that the town be held. Beauchamp telephones his headquarters, halting the withdrawal, and subsequently returns there, arriving about 0300 (29th), finding the area silent. But not for long: within one hour, a strong two-pronged assault hits the 34th with devastating effect. One force quietly circles the town on the north, then thrusts south across the Hyopch’on Road, east of Koch’ang, plowing

136 into the 1st Battalion positions there. The 1st Battalion repels the attack, but it withdraws without explanation or orders toward the alternate positions, three miles east of the town. Colonel Beauchamp intercepts the troops and halts the unauthorized retreat. Meanwhile, the other enemy force, attacking from the north, envelops Company I, isolating it at the forward roadblock north of Kumch’on, because the 3rd Battalion, also without orders, abandons its positions in the high ground. The 3rd Battalion, using the early morning darkness as cover, rushes into Koch’ang. The enemy fire is fierce but due to darkness mainly misdirected, causing the 3rd Battalion nominal casualties; however, the abandoned Company I is essentially wiped out, its members either killed or captured. Bedlam also occurs at the artillery positions southeast of the town. Some enemy small arms fire originates from a ridge east of the artillery (Battery A, 13th Field Artillery), but the troops react as if under a regimental assault. An astounded battalion executive officer, Major Cheek, is awakened by the fire, but by the time he sprints to the road, he is met by the battery executive officer, who exclaims: “The enemy has overrun the artillery.” Continuing excitedly, he proclaims that the troops “had taken off ” despite his orders to man the foxholes. He then tells Major Cheek that at the first sounds of the enemy fire, a screaming soldier was proclaiming, “run for your life,” initiating the confusion which prompted the artillerymen and the two supporting infantry squads to run away. A composed Major Cheek takes measures to terminate the uncontrolled firing of the nearby troops and to bring about order. Cheek demands that all the prime movers be driven back to the howitzers; the drivers and twelve artillerymen return. Three riflemen and a BAR man provide cover fire, while the prime movers take the howitzers in tow. The four-man detachment streams shells into the obstinate ridge and neutralizes the enemy fire which had caused the panic. Major Cheek and his twelve-man contingent rescue the five howitzers and ammunition and withdraw east, having escaped harm by the attackers, which had numbered about six or seven enemy troops from the N.K. 4th Division (probably attached to the N.K. 18th Regiment). Meanwhile, the defenders of Chinju are expecting an enemy assault. Air reconnaissance flights verify heavy enemy movement, including tanks in and near Hadong. Additional surveillance missions will occur on the following day. Also, Colonel Rhea arrives at Chinju with the 1st Battalion, 19th Regiment, subsequent to its withdrawal from Anui. In conjunction, Company A had not escaped. The 1st Battalion (19th Regiment), composed of about 200 riflemen, is then directed to take up positions along the coast from Hadong and establish a blocking position at a secondary road leading from there to Chinju. Also during the morning, the 2nd Battalion, 19th Regiment (Colonel McGrail) establishes its line slightly west of the Nam River in the heights overlooking the

137 Chinju-Hadong Road. Various contingents of South Korean troops are within and around Chinju as well as the survivors of the 3rd Battalion, U.S. 29th Regiment (from Hadong).

July 29

General MacArthur, constantly appraising the situation of the raging battlelines, is still intent on using the Chinese Oriental psychology of reversing the obvious to his advantage. He maintains his desire to convince his superiors that an amphibious landing behind the enemy lines would break the back of the invaders; his motto of “meeting force with maximun counter-force” is presently impossible, despite the infusion of reinforcements, including small contingents of U.S. tanks. It is the U.S. Air Force that is applying its maximum effort available to stave off total defeat of the outnumbered U.S. and ROK Infantry contingents. B-29 Superfortresses, attached to the Far East Command (Major General Emmett O’Donnell), have been pounding enemy strategic targets above the 38th Parallel and have begun to include heavy bombing raids to sweep the enemy-infested ridges and mountains from which enemy ground units are blasting the Americans. In conjunction, Air Force and Navy Fighters as well as the Australian Air Force continue their sorties to buy more time for the struggling ground forces. The Air Force, Naval and Marine pilots hold the key to success. Without air support, the ground forces will be decimated. The aircraft in Korea are the modern version of the Old West cavalry, arriving in the nick of time, but they no longer carry sabres, they fly them.

July 29, 1950 In other activity, General Walker goes to the 1st Cavalry command post at Kumch’on, where he confers with General Gay and enunciates his dissatisfaction with the recent actions of 1st Cavalry in combat against the enemy. Walker further states that he expects no more withdrawals. In turn, General Gay explains to Walker that, although he could not attest to the absolute necessity of the pull-backs, his primary concern was losing communications and apparently risking isolation. Also, General Walker, apparently eliminating the earlier withdrawal plans of Eighth Army (on the 26th), issues his new instructions to Eight Army, shortened by the press to “stand or die.” Of course, there is much more substance in his talk to the men at the command post of the 25th Division at Sangju. Walker, making this speech subsequent to his meeting two days previous with General MacArthur, at which time MacArthur pressed for a rigid stand, mentions the impending arrival of Army and Marine Corps reinforcements. He also proclaims that the U.S. must mount counterattacks to jolt the enemy off balance, while emphasizing that there is “no line behind us to which we can retreat.” Continuing, Walker, using words similar to those spoken by MacArthur, states that there will be no Dunkirk nor Bataan, claiming that a withdrawal to Pusan would be “one of the greatest butcheries in history. We must fight until the end.... We will fight as a team. If some of us must die, we will die fighting together. I want everybody to understand that we are going to hold this line. We are going to win.”

A B-29 Superfortress on the runway in Japan gets prepared for a raid against enemy positions in Korea.

July 29, 1950

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A USAF flight engineer aboard a B-29. This order on the surface makes it clear that the forces will stand in front of the Naktong River. However, during early August, Eighth Army is compelled to pull back again, clouding the issue of Walker’s widespread and controversial order. General Walker gives similar talks to the other divisional commanders under his command. (The quotes of Walker are from written notes taken during the talk to officers of the 25th Division.) On the 31st, the 25th Division pulls back to a new line (withdrawal) about three miles east of Sangju and in a separate incident, troops of the 1st Cavalry will also pull back. General Walker is also concerned with the enemy movements coming from the west. He informs General Church (24th Division) that the ROK 17th Regiment, composed of 2,000 men (presently considered the elite of the South Korean forces), is to bolster the 24th at the Naktong River. Walker also tells Church that the 1st Battalion, 21st Regiment, has been transferred from its positions in the vicinity of Pohangdong–Yongdok to Hyopch’on to shore up the rear of the 34th Regiment. The 21st Regiment deploys west of the town and the ROK contingent (17th Regiment) will arrive early on the 30th. Central Mountain area: The N.K. 15th Division

continues closing from the west toward Sangju, engaging contingents of the 24th U.S. Regiment as it plods forward. Today, the luckless 24th Regiment receives severe incoming mortar fire, which inflicts 60 casualties on the 1st Battalion and apparently causes a delayed anxiety attack on the remainder of the men of the 1st Battalion. Colonel Horton White directs the unit to establish a night perimeter, which seemingly creates a night fight that had apparently been festering since the mortar attacks. The 1st Battalion, still jittery, begins executing the order, then suddenly and without explanation, the battalion vacates its positions, leaving Colonel Horton White in an embarrassing, but more importantly, a very dangerous, position. The flimsy front lines, subsequent to the frenzied massive disappearance of the troops, reduces the 1st Battalion complement to one man: Colonel White. White retains his composure and takes solace in the fact that the artillerymen (Battery of 159th Field Artillery Bn.) and the men of the 77th Combat Engineering Bn. remain at their positions at the front. Meanwhile, the North Koreans continue to advance and are engaged by the supporting artillery. Colonel White is compelled to regroup his lost battalion, while the guns expend about 3,000 rounds of ammunition. The exhausted artillerymen succeed, preventing the North Koreans from overrunning the one-man battalion. Understandably, an irritated regimental adjutant (S-3), Major John R. Woodridge, has established a roadblock one-half mile west of Sangju during these waning days of July, but its purpose is not to defend the town. Woodridge has ordered that every vehicle rolling east be stopped and searched to snag any stray troops. The peculiar operation evolves as a prosperous sting operation by the time it is terminated on July 31. In the area near Hwanggan, the 27th Regiment has withdrawn to positions near Kumch’on, but during the afternoon, Colonel Mike Michaelis receives new instructions ordering him to relocate his regiment to positions closer to Taegu. He is to head for Waegwan on the Naktong River to become Army Reserve, rather than returning to the 25th Division. During its five days ( July 24–28) of engaging the N.K. 2nd Division along the road from Poun to Hwanggan, the 27th Regiment sustains 53 men killed, 221 wounded and 49 missing. Estimated losses for the opposing North Korean 2nd Division and its support fire, during the same period of combat against the 7th, range as high as 3,000 casualties. After the withdrawal of the 27th Regiment (through the lines of the 1st Cavalry Division), the 1st Cavalry Division moves to its predetermined positions near

139 Kumch’on, about thirty air miles northwest of Taegu. The 7th Cavalry stays at its lines near Hwanggan until the 5th and 8th Cavalry Regiments move back. At the new positions, the 5th Cavalry deploys on a new line southwest of Chirye to block the road there. The 8th Cavalry redeploys north of Chirye, along the Sangju Road and upon its arrival, the 7th Cavalry digs in along the Kumch’on Road about six miles northwest of Kumchon. Another roadblock is established on the Chirye Road, near Hawan-ni, about ten miles southwest of Kumch’on, by the 3rd Battalion, 21st Regiment (recently attached to 1st Cavalry Division). In the meantime, the N.K. 7th Regiment, 3rd Division, is moving from Yongdong toward Chirye, guaranteeing a confrontation. Sometime after daybreak, a platoon-sized patrol (16th Reconnaissance Company) moves southwest through Chirye, but before noon, a detachment of Korean police, operating near the town, informs Lt. Lester Lauer (leader of an earlier patrol) that they have discovered enemy troops within Chirye. Lauer, now strung out in front of Chirye and possibly cut off, forwards the intelligence to his company headquarters. The commanding officer, Captain Charles Harvey, leading another platoon and fourteen South Korean police, rushes to help ensure Lauer’s safety. The platoon encounters several inattentive N.K. soldiers on the fringes of Chirye and they are quickly eliminated. Meanwhile, only sporadic small arms fire harasses the advance platoon, permitting a quick hook-up by noon. But as the combined detachments return toward Kumch’on, moving through the northern sector of Chirye, they encounter a roadblock from which enemy fire rakes their ranks. The platoon’s point, a trusty M39 vehicle, plows into the debris, gouging a hole, but as quickly as the second vehicle, a jeep, can breech the gap, enemy machine gun fire destroys the next trailing vehicle, sealing the road and with it the sole exit heading north out of Chirye. Americans race to the southern tip of town, escaping the clutches of a closing force of about three hundred North Koreans, maneuvering to circle the platoons. From their new positions, three mortars thrust their shells into the lines of the advancing enemy, only to be outgunned by heavier enemy return fire. Captain Harvey receives a wound to his hand, orders his men to pull out, and then gets a fatal wound to his jugular vein. One mortarman, Corporal Harry D. Mitchell, despite four separate wounds, refuses to abandon his weapon. Although losing blood rapidly, Mitchell remains with his blazing mortar until it runs out of ammunition. The survivors, three officers and 41 enlisted men, discard their equipment and bolt for the hills, where they endure a sleepless night-long march, reaching the sanctuary of the 1st Cavalry lines on the 30th, culminating a 35-mile trek. Casualties for the 16th Reconnaissance patrol at Chirye amount to two men killed, three men wounded and eleven men missing. West Coast area: Advance contingents of the N.K. 4th Division move south from Anui to strike against

July 29, 1950 Colonel Wilson’s 1st Battalion, 29th Regiment, and supporting ROK troops at Umyong-ni and Hamyang respectively. In other activity, K Company, 3rd Battalion, 29th Infantry, is attached to the 2nd Battalion, 19th Regiment, 24th Division, at Chinju. In conjunction, L Company, 3rd Battalion, 29th Regiment, is attached to the 1st Battalion, 19th Regiment, stationed about two miles south of Chinju. At Koch’ang, the N.K. 4th Division maintains its pressure against the 34th Regiment (24th Division), which is retreating east, but it retains its artillery at Koch’ang because of the destroyed bridges along the route to the Naktong River. As the withdrawal continues, U.S. engineers and infantrymen detonate all bridges as they move along the Hyopch’on Road. In addition, from a point about three miles southeast of Koch’ang, they scatter explosives throughout the adjacent cliffs (for a distance of about ten miles), creating landslides to further hinder the North Korean pursuers. At Chinju, an enemy column led by three motorcycles encroaches the positions of Company F, 2nd Battalion, the advance unit of the battalion, which is blocking the Chinju-Hadong Road about six miles southwest of Chinju. Some inaccurate artillery fire is thrown at the advancing enemy, but without causing any pause. For unexplained reasons an available automatic weapon remains unfired as the company contingent heads back toward the battalion positions about four miles from Chinju and to the west of the Nam River. Meanwhile, planes move in and attack the column, bringing it to a momentary halt. On the following day, the North Koreans mount a flanking movement that maneuvers north of the 2nd Battalion (19th Regiment) and severs the road heading northwest from Chinju to the lines of the 1st Battalion (19th Regiment). —In the United States: An Air Force plane is loaded with 200 newly developed 5-inch “shaped charge” rockets at the Navy’s California Ordnance Test Station in Inyokern, California, and it then departs for the Far East. These are the first of this type rocket delivered to the Navy for its fighter planes in Korea. — In Japan: The continuing success of the enemy in Korea interrupts General MacArthur’s plans for an amphibious invasion (CHROMITE) at Inchon. MacArthur sends a reluctant dispatch to the chiefs of staff in Washington: “In Korea, the hopes that I had entertained to hold out the 1st Marine Division (Brigade) and the 2nd Infantry Division for the enveloping counter blow have not been fulfilled and it will be necessary to commit these units to Korea on the south line rather than ... their subsequent commitment along a separate axis in mid September.... I now plan to commit my sole reserve in Japan, the 7th infantry Division, as soon as it can be brought to an approximate combat strength.” In other activity, the French contingent of the U.N. Naval Force arrives at Sasebo; the La Grandière, an elderly frigate, enters port to participate with what is transforming into a giant-sized fleet. The French ship will depart Sasebo on September 6, escorting the slower moving vessels toward Inchon.

July 30, 1950

July 30

General Walker, in an attempt to loosen the slack on his statement perceived as “stand or die,” places a more positive and less fatal addendum on the situation. He exudes an air of confidence, stating that the United States forces presently in Korea would hold “until reinforcements arrive,” then underscores his remarks by stating that “ultimate victory will be ours.” Walker then reiterates that the fighting in Korea “had reached a critical point,” having given a similar response to a question posed by a New York Times reporter several days earlier. The South Korean government has established fiftyeight camps for refugees, most in the Pusan-Taegu vicinity. Estimates place the number of refugees moving into ROK territory between the June 25 invasion and July 15 at 380,000. From then to today, about 25,000 more arrive per day. These refugees and the untold numbers of infiltrating enemy troops among them cause severe problems for the American forces and the U.N. command. In other activity, including the aircraft that arrived on the USS Boxer on July 23, the Far East Air Force is composed of 626 F-80s and 264 F-51s. Of the combined total of 890 planes, only 525 are assigned to units and prepared for battle. Also, Fifth Air Force B-29s begin bombing the Hungnam area, which contains a huge array of chemical facilities. The missions continue until September 30 and deposit more than 1,700 tons of bombs there against targets that include Najin, situated about seventeen miles below the Siberian border. The port of Najin is used as an unloading point for military equipment, supplies and ammunition dispatched into North Korea from the Russians out of the port of Vladivostok, a little more than 100 air miles away. In other activity, the N.K. 7th Division, which had been activated on July 3 and is composed of about 4,000 troops of the 7th Border Constabulary Brigade and 2,000 recruits, receives additional men. Towards the latter part of July the 7th Division receives an artillery regiment and on this day, 2,000 South Koreans (pressed into service) join the division. On August 1, the division, about 10,000 strong, departs Seoul for southwestern Korea. Also, General Craig, having been informed by Eighth Army on the previous day that the U.N. left flank is folding, confers with General Walker and Air Force General Partridge to finalize the initial mission of the Marines. Walker informs Craig that the Marines will be immediately sent to the southwest perimeter and that their movement will not be encumbered by Eighth Army. In addition, General Partridge informs Craig that if the Marine planes are initially unavailable, Air Force aircraft will provide support for the brigade. After this final meeting with Walker and Partridge, the Marine contingent departs Taegu by jeep for Pusan to await the arrival of the brigade. In Taegu, Eighth Army Headquarters is desperately seeking to buy some precious time. Later during the evening in Pusan, Marine staff officers discuss the possibilities of MAG-33

140 arriving in time to provide air cover for the imminent action of the Marine brigade. Colonel Joseph Stewart, surprisingly, is able to make contact by phone with Colonel Weir (Gen. Cushman’s chief of staff ) at Itami Air Base in Japan. He requests that Weir deliver the helicopters and air support contingents via LSTs to Pusan as soon as they unload in Japan. General Craig is informed that the Marine brigade’s replacement troops, rather than being transported directly to Pusan, would be delayed, as the Marines would be formed at Camp Pendleton and subsequently moved to Korea with the 1st Marine Division. Craig, aware of the dire necessity of replacement troops, relentlessly presses the issue and demands that the replacements and the third rifle companies be sent directly to Pusan. Central Mountain area: The U.S. 35th Regiment, 25th Division, receives new orders directing it to pull back and draw a new line of defense about eight miles south of Sangju in a cluster of hills that overlook the Kumch’on Road. Continual redeployment of the 35th Regiment has been mandated by the instability of the area and the string of collapses on the battlefront around it. In total, the regiment — upon orders, not by enemy immediate pressure — has withdrawn about 30 miles in less than twelve days. Meanwhile, Sangju is becoming more imperiled as the advancing N.K. 15th Division, although slowed by incessant artillery bombardments, continues to advance against the U.S. 24th Division, which is deployed west of the town, but near collapse. The 34th Regiment, having been pushed from Koch’ang, is spread out defensively along the road to Hyopch’on, near Sanje-ri on the Naktong River. The 21st Regiment (minus Company C and the 3rd Battalion), 24th Division, fords the Naktong River and deploys to the rear of the 34th Regiment. In conjunction, ROK troops (17th Regiment) filter into the area and deploy to the right (north) of the 34th in the heights. By today, although there have been no major battles fought between the 24th Regiment and the enemy, the regiment has pulled back to within three miles of Sangju and deploys on the sole remaining high ground in front of Sangju. Its battle readiness is under serious question. In a desperate effort to shore up the western approach to Sangju, General Kean orders the 1st Battalion, 35th Regiment, to speed to the western approach of the town and establish an additional line of defense, directly to the rear of the 24th Regiment to ensure some insulation if the 24th Regiment collapses again. The North Koreans strike the 24th Infantry on the following day. Central Mountain–West Coast area: In the 1st Cavalry sector, General Gay, keenly apprised of the enveloping move by the N.K. 3rd Division against his command, directs a considerable force to Chirye to neutralize the enemy. The 3rd Battalion, 21st Regiment (minus Company C, still at Yongdok on the east coast) attached to 1st Cavalry Division, the 5th Cavalry Regiment and the 99th Field Artillery Battalion speed to the town, but the enemy is already dispersed about the

141 nearby hills. This places the Americans under the enemy artillery units in the heights. At Chinju, the situation is deteriorating and in fact, the refugees here pose a special problem as they express hostility toward the Americans and appear quite benevolent to the enemy cause. The enemy initiates a predawn flanking move, working around the north (right) flank of the 2nd Battalion, 19th Regiment. It succeeds in blocking the road leading from the town to the 1st Battalion, 29th Regiment. From the positions of G Company (29th Regiment), west of Chinju across the Nam River, Captain Barszcz observes a strong enemy force estimated at 800 troops passing his front line. G Company attempts to halt the advance, but its fire is insufficient. Calls for air reconnaissance are placed, but the weather is not good. One plane arrives overhead, but the enemy troops lie prone in their camouflage (uniforms speckled with brush), blending into the terrain and undetectable from the air. A short burst of artillery fire commences, but it too lacks a punch, due to grave shortages. About twenty rounds are fired. Inclement weather continues, preventing any further air observation flights over the lines. The 19th Regiment’s Companies E and F during the afternoon move back across the Nam River, establishing a new perimeter about two miles west of Chinju. This movement is followed by G Company (29th Regiment), which pulls back to the east bank of the Nam River slightly before dark and holds a defensive line there to intercept any enemy infiltrators and prevent them from entering the town by moving between the river and the road. According to the regimental report for June 30, the 19th Regiment is composed of only 1,895 troops, including 300 men in the 1st Battalion and 290 troops in the 2nd Battalion; Colonel Ned Moore relates that the 19th Regiment, including new replacements, consists of 1,544 men. About 600 replacements arrive on this day to augment the 19th Regiment and the 13th Field Artillery Battalion, the latter receiving 100 troops. Nonetheless, the defense of Chinju remains in serious doubt as the enemy closes. In addition to the 19th Regiment, the endangered town is defended by Task Force Min (remaining men of the S.K. 7th Division, redesignated TF Min), which arrives from Hamyang with its complement of about 1,249 troops today to bolster the recently arrived 3rd Battalion (396 troops), 29th Regiment, which is attached to the 19th Regiment. At about 1600, the replacement troops begin departing the regimental command post in Chinju to their designated units on the front lines, which are already engaged with the enemy. It is a dangerous mission, against the better judgment of several of the officers, despite their dire need for added strength. Of the 500 men assigned to the 19th Regiment, about 300 equally divided between the 1st and 2nd Battalions are assigned to the rifle companies, and as predicted, deaths occur prior to the men being logged on the roster. Sunset brings added problems to the area as well as the fresh troops. The North Koreans kill about five men

July 30, 1950 (out of the 60 troops) as they advance toward Company G, stationed along the east bank of the Nam. The enemy continues to creep closer, preparing to launch a night attack. At dusk from 1st Battalion positions in the heights south of Chinju, Colonel Rhea observes the enemy blatantly advancing across open ground. But he is barred from commencing fire due to an anticipated South Korean Marine attack, planned to swing right across their front. The attack never occurs. Consequently, the enemy gains several hours of uncontested movement to strangle the 1st Battalion. But when the N.K. 15th Regiment, supported by mortars and selfpropelled weapons, pound against the 1st Battalion along the Sach’on-Chinju Road near the intersecting road leading east to Masan, it is handily repelled. Unable to penetrate, the enemy retires, apparently heading northwest. Also, infiltrators penetrate G Company lines, but those spotted are killed. Lacking communication lines with regimental headquarters, Captain Barszcz is unable to inform them of the situation, including the friendly artillery that is falling too close for comfort. In the meantime, enemy forces have sliced the road, preventing Company G from moving to join the other rifle companies in the heights west of Chinju. By about midnight, Barszcz gets his command across the road, but they conceal themselves in the brush to avoid capture. While waiting to depart the area, G Company sits dangerously close to several enemy tanks accompanied by infantry moving toward Chinju, ensuring another long night. Prior to dawn, radio contact is made with headquarters and Company G is ordered to Chinju to join the 19th Regiment there. At 0215 (31st), enemy artillery breaks the silence, pulverizing the American positions. After a sustained bombardment of 45 minutes, shrill whistles signal the infantry to charge. Company F, 19th Regiment, is the first to feel the sting of battle as hordes of infantry assault its positions. With little regard for the incoming fire, the North Koreans press forward. Company F begins to topple, then total collapse occurs at about 0500. The men of F Company evacuate their hill positions, with one platoon heading down the slopes toward their supporting heavy weapons company and another racing toward Company E, but the enemy is on their heels. Some of the guns of a heavy weapons platoon commence firing into the intertwined ranks of the Americans and North Koreans as they descend the slope, but the guns silence and the elemenets of the heavy weapons company withdraw back into Chinju. The North Koreans keep advancing. By dawn (31st), the elements of Companies E and F, still operational as fighting units, also withdraw toward Chinju. Meanwhile, Captain Barszcz, Company G, 19th Regiment, is taking a circuitous route to rejoin Colonel Moore at Chinju, which is near capitulation. The unit moves north then east, scooping up stragglers and wounded men from Companies E, F and H as it moves. By break of day, Company G, which had sustained 40 casualties while manning its isolated positions, brings

July 31, 1950 out half of them, including ten men on litters, and it is about three miles northeast east of Chinju. The 1st Battalion, 19th Regiment, which had fought off strong attacks below the Nam River south of Chinju, acting upon orders from Colonel Ned Moore, departs the area heading down the Masan Road toward Chinju Pass. Colonel Rhea is directed to make the tenmile trek and establish a roadblock at the pass. The 1st Battalion arrives at the pass before dark (31st) without incident and immediately establishes a defensive line. In other activity, Colonel Michaelis, commanding officer, 27th Regiment at Waegwan, receives instructions from Eighth Army to immediately head for Changnyong, the new 24th Division command post (relocated from Hyopch’on), and report to General Church. Michaelis, accompanied by his operations and training officer, Captain Earl Buchanan, departs after directing his executive officer, Major Arthur Farthing, to assemble the regiment and follow. Michaelson arrives at Changnyong on the following day.

July 31

General Walker, while preparing to move his forces to the Pusan perimeter, continues to focus on the U.S. troops’ apparent lackadaisical attitude toward his orders to maintain contact with the enemy. Walker reiterates the instructions and on the 2nd of August, the situation then compels him to enunciate it again, more pointedly, to his divisional officers. In other activity, Chinju falls to North Korean Communists, placing them about 50 miles from the beleaguered bastion of Pusan. A battalion of the 29th Regimental Combat Team had pushed toward the embattled town, but it is ambushed several miles outside of Hadong. Fierce and heroic combat ensues, but the outnumbered unit is severely thrashed, taking extremely heavy casualties. Desperate decisions must be made to prevent the fall of Pusan. Circumstances are grave. General Walker, keenly aware of the condition of the exhausted 24th Division under General John H. Church, orders it to hold in place near Chinju. The 34th Regiment pulls out of its positions and redeploys behind the 21st Regiment. General Church directs Colonel Stephens to assume command of both regiments. Also, Stephens redeploys the ROK 17th Regiment, placing one battalion on each flank of the U.S. troops and the third is kept in reserve. In other activity, General Craig, USMC, and Lt. Colonel Joseph Stewart (G-3) take a jeep and drive southwest to reconnoiter the ground, previously observed from the air, to which the Marine brigade is likely to be committed. Upon his return, Craig is informed by Eighth Army that the 5th Regimental Combat Team, recently arrived from Hawaii, is to be attached to the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, giving Craig two regiments. Elements (Company A) of the 89th Medium Tank Battalion arrive from Japan by sea at Pusan. The commanding officer, Colonel Dolvin, arrives by air and meets the troops on the dock. From Pusan, Dolvin’s contingent departs for Masan and joins the U.S. troops there on the following day.

142 Central Mountain area: Near Sangju, the North Koreans surge forward, unleashing probing strikes against the 24th Regiment, prompting the folding of a forward outpost. First Lt. Leon A. Gilbert, A Company commander, and about fifteen other defenders make a hurried retreat to the regiment and upon their return, Colonel H. White and several more officers of high rank order Gilbert to return to his post, but he declines, responding that he “is scared.” In his place, a noncommissioned officer leads the men back to their positions. The regiment holds its line throughout the day. After dark, the 24th Regiment makes a disciplined withdrawal, moving through Sangju, covered by the 1st Battalion, 35th Regiment (25th Division), which had just recently arrived to shore up the rear. In other activity, Major Woolridge’s unorthodox roadblock is lifted today; on each day during its operation, about 75 men attempting to smuggle themselves into Sangju are snagged, and on the final day of the sting (30th), 150 men are rejoined with their outfits. Following eleven days on the line against the advancing enemy, primarily the N.K. 15th Division, the 24th Regiment has sustained a total of 27 men killed, 293 wounded and 3 men missing. In contrast, the North Korean 15th Division, according to information acquired from captured enemy troops, sustained severe losses from a combination of the air strikes. The incessant artillery bombardments and mortars as the enemy drives against the ROK and U.S. 24th Regiment allegedly deplete their strength by about half (5,000 men) by July 31. The N.K. 13th Division, which had bypassed Hamch’ang, encounters only a few minor skirmishes with elements of the 2nd Battalion, 35th Regiment, and various ROK contingents, resulting in extremely light casualties. Also, the balance of the 25th Division is ordered to initiate an immediate forced march to bolster the 24th Division and ensure that the Communists don’t penetrate any farther. On the following day the 25th Division, deployed near Sangju, receives new orders. In addition, the 1st Cavalry Division must contain the enemy on both the central and northwestern fronts. The cavalry becomes engaged in bloody combat around Kumch’on, but again the overwhelming numbers of enemy troops push them back. By daybreak, a detachment of enemy troops infiltrates the 8th Engineer Combat Battalion’s command post, slaying four troops, including the battalion executive officer. In conjunction, 6 others are wounded. Close by, about 1,000 yards away, lies the command post of the 1st Cavalry Division. The enemy launches an attack against the positions of the 7th Cavalry, northwest of Kumch’on, but it is interrupted by intense fire originating from U.S. ground forces and planes. The combination inflicts great punishment, including the immediate destruction of thirteen enemy tanks caught crossing open space and a slower death for six additional tanks put to flames. Nearby at Chirye, the N.K. 8th Regiment, 3rd N.K. Division, arrives to augment the N.K. 7th Regiment. Enemy artillery perched in the heights overlooking the town unleashes

143 heavy shelling, making the American positions untenable, thereby prodding them to evacuate quickly. It had originally been estimated that between 90,000 and 130,000 crack North Korean troops had invaded South Korea, and today, General MacArthur announces that the estimated number of Communist casualties stands at more than 30,000. In the N.K. 3rd Division, which has been engaged in heavy combat with the 1st Cavalry Division, numbers have dwindled from about 7,000 men to 5,000 during the ten days it has been pushing the 1st Cavalry from Yongdong. During the same period of time, the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division sustains 78 killed, 419 wounded and 419 missing. In the West Coast Sector, east of Chinju, the 1st Battalion, 19th Regiment, remains at the Chinju Pass. Artillery support will arrive later in the day. At Chinju, Colonel Moore prepares to evacuate just after daybreak; the enemy strikes aggressively against the western fringes of the town and hostile small arms fire is clattering at a rapid pace. Six enemy armored vehicles pierce the thin shield, entering the town. The armor begins plastering U.S. positions while trailing infantry, including snipers, quickly add to the dilemma, but the troops under Colonel Moore retain their composure. The withdrawal of the 19th Regiment remains orderly. The U.S. heavy equipment—the 13th Field Artillery Battalion (minus Battery A) and Battery B, 11th Field Artillery Battalion — begin heading east by 0640. In conjunction, trains heading east have been salvaging the 19th Regiment’s supplies (25 rail cars total). The last of five such rail convoys departs at 0745, sent off by Major Jack Emery (S-4). The command post staff departs at 0800, moving to new positions at Chiryongni, about one mile beyond the Much’on-ni–Masan Road fork and about twelve air miles east of Chinju. The journey is hampered by obstacles, including the destruction of the primary bridge span over the Nam River at the southern tip of Chinju and the alternate routes clogged with refugees. Although the greater part of the 19th Regiment has departed Chinju and ROK sources account for the capture of Chinju at 0900, one defiant U.S. contingent remains — three M-26 Pershing tanks, led by Lieutenant Sam Fowler. The tanks, not committed to the defense of Chinju, had been waiting for new fan belts to solve an ongoing problem. Fowler is under orders to destroy the tanks, but he and his twelve crewmen are holding tight, hoping for a train with flatcars, which never shows. The engine passes through Masan, but is unable to depart Chungam-ni. Slightly after noon, a South Korean soldier passes the rail yard, noting that the town contains only several S.K. troops. He suggests to the Americans that they move out. Soon after, an AP correspondent, William Moore, urges Lieutenant Fowler to glance north at an approaching unidentified column moving along the tracks. After a South Korean trooper calls for identification, an interpreter is no longer necessary. The contingent is North Korean. The tankers commence firing, spreading a steady stream of machine gun shells

July 31, 1950 into the enemy ranks, thinning the platoon. But a burst of return rifle fire wounds Fowler. Still determined to keep the Pershings, the troops place Fowler in a tank and drive east toward Masan. About two miles down the highway, they encounter a destroyed bridge and are forced to abandon the tanks. As the tanks are being destroyed, a concealed enemy contingent posted near the bridge suddenly commences firing. One man, Master Sergeant Shrader, having reached an operable tank, unleashes its .30-caliber machine gun to cut the odds. The enemy ambush has devastated the small contingent of Americans. Shrader ceases firing his machine gun and nudges the tank close to one of the others, quickly picking up six men and then heading back toward Chinju. Along the way, the surviving tank overheats (bad fanbelt) at a bridge over the Nam River. The seven occupants dart through the nearby bamboo, eventually reaching the sanctuary of the 25th Division lines west of Masan. Some of the original contingent had been killed at the bridge and others are killed or captured attempting to flee to safety. One captured soldier later relates that he saw several bodies floating in the water. He recognized one as Lieutenant Fowler and another as William Moore, the Associated Press correspondent. The first three Pershing tanks (M-26 Medium) to enter Korea and the first three to go down in combat leave a valiant legacy from the courage of their crews at Chinju. Early estimates of the enemy troops that seize control of the town are 2,000, but a subsequent report that arrives from a Korean source toward the end of the night numbers the force at approximately 4,000. As the evacuation is unfolding, 24th Division Headquarters is buzzing. Air strikes throughout the day torch Chinju, igniting ravaging fires. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion (19th Regiment) heads along the road north of the Nam, regrouping at Uiryong during the night, while the 3rd Battalion (29th Regiment) and the artillery evacuate north of the Nam River and cross to the south bank at Uiryong, then reorganize at Komamni (Saga). After a short while, an aircraft dispatched by General Church passes overhead and drops a succinct order to the artillery: return to the Chinju vicinity. Colonel Rhea’s 1st Battalion, 19th Regiment, holding the pass, is pleased to see the eight 155-mm howitzers (11th Field Artillery, Battery B) and Battery (13th Field Artillery) five 105mm howitzers roll up to the pass from the east. East of Chinju Pass lies the village of Much’on, where the Masan Road forks, churning around Sobuk-san, a steep mountain mass. One route swings south through Kogan-ni and Chindong-ni and the other veers north, twisting through Chungam-ni and Komam-ni, entering Masan from the south and north respectively. The northern spur is selected by Colonel Moore as the location for his regimental command post, which is established about one mile east of Muchon-ni. At Sanch’ong, the 1st Battalion, 29th Regiment, remains unaware of the fate of Chinju, other than the trucks transporting food on the previous day had not

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yet returned. As the morning begins to fade, the townspeople begin to vanish, sending a visual message of urgency to Colonel Wesley Wilson. He rushes south to a 1st Battalion roadblock at Tansong, about ten air miles from Chinju. Lieutenant Griffin, a platoon commander, informs Colonel Wilson that about 700 refugees have passed the roadblock, relating that enemy troops are soon to follow, ending his suspicions about Chinju. Wilson orders that drivers move the heavy vehicles at Sanch’ong to Tansong, then move east through a primitive mountain road toward Uiryong. The trip becomes another arduous adventure, as the route is large enough to handle jeeps but not huge vehicles. With some swift improvisation by Wilson’s troops and by South Koreans, every vehicle, except one that collapsed crossing a fabricated bridge and had to be abandoned, reaches Chungam-ni. At about 1800, about one hour into the march from Sanch’on, an observation plane passes the column, depositing a startling message: “Yesterday, you were ordered to report to the concentration area of Haman.” The message continues: “What are you doing here?” Haman lies about thirty air miles away, but Wilson’s route is via primitive mountain roads, and he, of course, never received word on the previous day to move out. Nonetheless, still en route to Tamsong, a South Korean naval lieutenant, moving with the flood of refugees, presents himself to Colonel Wilson. He shows Wilson a map detailing the approximate location of the pursuing enemy, stating: “The Reds are just seven miles behind us and will get here tonight.”

Convinced of the accuracy of the information and the imminence of the danger, Wilson, after a discussion with his staff, decides to move across the mountains to reach Haman. The several wounded members of the battalion are placed in the jeeps between the mass of mortars, machine guns and radios. All personal effects of the troops are disposed of before heading into the mountains. By about 0200 (Aug. 1), the column reaches Masan-ni at the final north-south road by which the Communist forces from Chinju could intercept the 1st Battalion, bringing a sigh of relief for the weary troops. A well-needed pause is taken. Soon after, the troops and the large numbers of refugees who have joined the Americans prepare to move out. The march resumes at 0600 (August 1), but it does not last long. Soon after crossing a stream, the exhausted troops continue moving east and are greeted by Major Arnold, who had taken the 1st Battalion vehicles to safety on the previous day. The 1st Battalion boards the vehicles and gets chauffeured to Haman. In other activity, Colonel Michaelis arrives at the 24th Division positions in Changnyong, but General Church, to whom he is to report, has gone to Chungni. General Menoher, assistant division commander, directs Michaelis to proceed and meet General Church at the village of Changnyong, which lies about four miles northeast of Masan. In the meantime, the 27th Regiment is on the march, moving toward Chinju Pass. Colonel Michaelis meets with General Church and they are joined by Colonel Moore (19th Regiment), who is transported to the railroad station meeting place from his

A U.S. Chaffee light tank pauses to replenish its ammunition.

145 command post near Chinju Pass by a divisional courier. Moore arrives prior to midnight ( July 31-Aug. 1). Circumstances of the time preclude a clear accounting of the precise orders received by Michaelis and Moore from General Church, as no written notes are taken. Apparently, Colonel Michaelis is to deploy his 27th Regiment at the Chinju Pass along the northern spur of the Masan Road, a few miles west of Chungamni, and Colonel Moore is to retain his 1st Battalion, 19th Regiment, led by Colonel Rhea, in place at Chinju Pass. Subsequent to the conference, Colonel Michaelis remains in Chung-ni until his rain-drenched regiment arrives at about 0300. Then after ordering the regiment to continue to Chungam-ni where it is to fortify the high ground, Michaelis and several officers head for another pass, located southwest of Chungam-ni, arriving there just after dawn. Meanwhile, Colonel Moore departs for Much’on-ni. In other activity, the 5th Regimental Combat Team, with a full complement of three battalions, arrives at Pusan to bolster Eighth Army, bringing with it the 555th Field Artillery Battalion and a contingent of Pershing M-26 tanks. Upon arrival at Pusan, the 5th RCT is ordered to move to Masan on the southwest flank of the Eighth Army. Advance contingents arrive the following night and the remainder of the regiment arrives by August 2. The 5th RCT, initially, was to be attached to the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, but it is to be attached to the 25th Division and reverts to Eighth Army reserve. In addition, the 9th Regiment, 2nd Infantry Division, arrives in Pusan. Its 2nd Battalion, the first contingent of U.S. troops to embark for Korea from the States, left Tacoma, Washington, on July 17. The 9th Regiment, commanded by Colonel John G. Hill, is supported by the 15th Field Artillery Battalion. It departs for Kyongsan about ten miles south of Taegu and upon arrival reverts to Army reserve. Pusan: Since the 2nd of July, more than 300,000 tons of equipment and supplies have been unloaded from vessels at Pusan harbor. During the latter half of July, 230 ships have arrived and 214 have re-embarked. In conjunction, the ports of Ulsan and Surong are utilized for the unloading of items requiring special precautions such as ammunition and petroleum products, which are transferred from ships to barges, tankers and LCMs. This tremendous infusion of seaborne supplies alleviates somewhat the burden on the Air Force, which has been hard pressed to maintain incessant priority flights between the States and Japan and Korea. However, some items, such as the recently developed 3.5inch rockets, continue to be airlifted to Korea at a rate of about 900 units per day during August. July has not been a good month for the South Korean rail system. On July 2, slightly more than 1,400 miles of rails came under domination of U.N. troops, but the numbers deplete rapidly toward the end of the month. At this time, the U.N. forces control about 431 miles of tracks, as the North Koreans aggressively move south toward Pusan.

July 31, 1950 Nonetheless, the U.S. soldiers of Eighth Army transportation work tirelessly during July to untangle the chaotic rail system, attempting to move troops and supplies north while simultaneously evacuating troops and guiding the precious hospital trains, bearing the wounded, to safety. Two thousand five hundred and eighty-one wounded troops are evacuated from the battlefront on

A tank commander, out of uniform, peers upward from his camouflaged position in search of enemy movement.

July 31, 1950 38 trains. During the same period, 71 trains transport troops to the battlefront. As of the beginning of August, the northbound trains would not proceed beyond Pohang-dong and Taegu, but in reaction to the enemy threat against the Eighth Army west flank, trains are sped daily to bolster the troops in the vicinity of Masan. The battle casualties for the U.S. Army from arrival in Korea through July 31 stand at 1,884 killed, 2,695 wounded, 523 missing and 901 assumed captured. More than half of the total losses are incurred by the 24th Division (first to enter Korea); about 80 percent of these casualties occur during the last half of July. The South Korean casualty figures are not totally known. Genuine estimates place them at about 70,000, including killed, wounded and missing. Although many of the South Korean units had retreated in a disoriented fashion, many others were inflicting great punishment on the enemy in the mountains. North Korean casualties, according to estimates by the Intelligence Section of MacArthur’s Headquarters, are placed at about 31,000. The Department of the Army lists enemy casualties for the same time period at 37,500. Both estimates are based on information from captured prisoners and seized documents, but the more accurate number is probably closer to 58,000; the low estimates by the Americans are due partly to their underestimation of the ROK operations against the North Koreans. These figures on enemy battle casualties are considered more accurate than those compiled by the U.N. representatives. — In Japan: General MacArthur’s first report on the Korean situation is filed with the State Department. His message states that the beginning phase of the campaign has concluded. He further states that although the undermanned South Korean (ROK) positions had been initially “shattered,” the swift deployment of Eighth Army units had stemmed the tide, denying the North Koreans victory. General MacArthur pays high praise to the fighting men under him, giving them full credit for the superlative effort to derail the North Korean onslaught. MacArthur includes American and U.N. intentions: “Over a broad front involving continuous local struggles, there are bound to be ups and downs, losses as well as successes. Our casualties despite overwhelming odds have been relatively light. Our strength will continually increase ... we are now in Korea in force, and with God’s help we are here to stay until the constitutional authority of the republic is fully restored.” There is concern in the U.S. that the Russians might use the Korean diversion by their puppet forces to attempt to seize Japan or to enlarge the ongoing problems in Europe. U.S. strategy does not alter easily. As with World War II, Europe remains the priority and the Pacific is again a remote stepchild. Ambassador Sebald subsequently notes that during the end of July, a member of his diplomatic staff returned from Korea and reported that the morale of the U.S. troops at Taegu was very low. He claimed, “The men failed to understand why they were involved in such a dirty war and

146 usually considered it better tactics to withdraw, rather than stand and fight.” The term usually used for the action of these particular troops who would not fight is called “bugging out.” In many instances the troops stood with obsolete weapons against hordes of enemy troops until it was no longer possible to halt the enemy. This general statement is unfair to the great majority of U.S. troops who withstood the odds with a genuine shield of valor while shedding their blood, and many other courageous troops who sacrificed their lives to buy time for the U.S. to bring in reinforcements and turn the tide. The frequent retreating by American troops is about to cease. Pusan will be defended with fervor, pitting guts and glory against overwhelming odds. In other activity, Marine reservists are reporting to Camp Pendleton and other contingents are departing Camp Lejeune for Pendleton; the 13th Infantry Company (Los Angeles), 12th Amphibian Tractor Company (San Francisco) and the 3rd Engineer Company (Phoenix) arrive today, and for the immediate future, Marines will be reporting 24 hours a day. From today until March 31, 1951, the Volunteer Reserve will provide 51,942 of the 84,821 reservists on active duty. Of these 99 percent of the officers and 77.5 percent of the enlisted men are veterans of World War II. The JCS order the chief of naval operations to bring the 2nd Marine Division up to war strength (easier said than done) and to add two Marine tactical air squadrons, bringing the strength to eighteen squadrons. The tireless efforts of General Cates, combined with the persistence of MacArthur and the unwavering vocal support of the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Congressman Vinson, have won out, gaining the employment of the Marine aviators for Korea. In other activity, General MacArthur, based on information given him by staff during mid–July, informs the Department of the Army that South Korea is able to mount no more than four divisions and that he will equip the Korean forces based on that number. MacArthur does stipulate that some heavy equipment will be withheld. In contrast, General Walker and Ambassador Muccio both believe that the U.S. should arm many more South Koreans. In a rare about-face, by the following week MacArthur changes his stance and informs Walker that he should increase the figure of armed Koreans to a point. The carrier USS Badoeng Strait, commanded by Captain Arnold McKechnie, arrives at Kobe, bringing with it 70 F4Us, six HO3S helicopters and eight light observation planes. In conjunction, the carrier Sicily stops at Guam en route to disembark Antisubmarine Squadron 21 at Agana Airfield, but it then joins the Badoeng Strait at Koebe. Its commanding officer, Captain John Thach, is designated commanding officer CTE 96.23, composed of the Sicily, USS Kyes (DD-787) and Doyle (DMS-34). Captain Thach is ordered to rush to the support of the Pusan Perimeter and by the following day, the Sicily is steaming toward Korea. As of this day, the Far East Air Forces have flown a

147 total of 8,600 sorties in support of the conflict in Korea: 57 during the two strategic bombing missions; 1,600 combined cargo and reconnaissance; 2,550 close interdiction and 4,300 sorties in close support (ground forces) missions. In other activity, the portion of Task Group 53.7 transporting the forward echelon of the 1st Marine Air Wing arrives at Kobe during the afternoon. Within about three hours, the troops have completely debarked and an LST is standing by to transport the Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron Two and the ground troops of VMO-6. The LST embarks for Pusan on the following day, arriving on the 4th. In the meantime, the unloading process continues and the troops assemble the helicopters and the light observation planes of VMO6, and to the astonishment of the observing Japanese, the aircraft take off from the streets and move to Itami to receive their pre-combat inspections prior to being ferried to Korea. — In Formosa: General MacArthur arrives on Formosa to meet with Chiang Kai-shek in Taipei. The meeting occurs without sanction from Washington and causes discontent in the State Department and the White House. MacArthur gives some details of the conference through a statement: “My visit to Formosa has been primarily for the purpose of making a short reconnaissance of the potential of its defense against possible attack....” Speculation emerges after the meeting concerning why MacArthur had not taken Ambassador Sebald along for the conference. Soon after, Secretary of State Dean Acheson contacts Ambassador Sebald and directs him to request more details, but the response is not one the State Department likes. MacArthur essentially cloaks the talks under the term “military” and says that his military conversations were no concern of the State Department.

August 1

The N.K. 7th Division departs Seoul, but its artillery remains in the area; the force crosses the Han River moving through Taejon and arrives at Chinju about August 15. Central Mountain area: The ROK 8th Division loses the battle for Andong to the N.K. 12th Division. During the brutal fighting for the strategic river town, the North Koreans claim 1,500 ROK troops killed and 1,500 captured (proclaimed on a radio broadcast August 3 that is transmitted to Japan and heard there), and many vehicles. North Korean casualties are also extremely high and include the divisional commander, General Kim Mu Chong. Captured N.K. prisoners relate that one outfit, the 31st N.K. Regiment, sustained 600 troops killed and it is also reported that the air attacks wiped out about 600 enemy troops. In addition, eleven of the initial thirty enemy tanks have been destroyed. Also, a battalion of the N.K. 12th Division’s artillery had expended its entire supply of ammunition, compelling it to turn back and head for Tanyang. In other activity, by dawn the 25th Division is relocating to new positions south of Sangju; however, it receives new instructions at about 1300. Eighth Army

August 1, 1950 orders the 25th Division to prepare to move to Samnangjin, along the Naktong River, from where it can intercept the enemy as it drives east, while simultaneously planning to attack westward. However, this depletion of U.S. troops from the Central Front adds to the burden of Eighth Army there. The expanding enemy pressure, coupled with the redeployment of the 25th Division, mandates that Eighth Army pull back across the Naktong River. West Coast area: The 27th Regiment, 25th Division, prepares to dig in at the Notch, southwest of Chungam-ni, based on information gathered while reconnoitering the area. But following a conversation with the acting regimental S-3, Captain Elliott Cutler (after daybreak), Colonel Michaelis senses that the 19th Regiment, 24th Division, is about to withdraw from its positions in the pass, thereby exposing the Much’on-ni Road at its fork, giving the North Koreans easy access to the southern route to Masan. The North Koreans keep pressing and overpower the 19th Regiment. A flurry of activity occurs. Michaelis heads for the command post of the 13th Field Artillery west of Chungam-ni, from where he contacts Colonel Moore by phone at his command post, east of Much’on-ni. According to Colonel Michaelis, later attested to by Major Jack J. Kron (executive officer of 13th Field Artillery), Moore informs Michaelis that the Masan Road fork positions are untenable. Continuing, according to Michaelis, Colonel Moore relates that the 19th Regiment is withdrawing to the Notch. Concerned, Michaelis then tells Colonel Moore that the 19th should, upon falling back, prepare to defend the northern route to Masan at the Notch (Chungam-ni). This is to allow the 27th Regiment to move through Masan and guard the southern route at Chindong-ni, lest the North Korean forces advance unchallenged along the southern road through Masan, enabling the enemy to strike a killing blow against the Eighth Army. Colonel Moore, according to Colonel Michaelis, agrees with the strategy; however, later, Colonel Moore cannot recall the phone conversation. Major Kron attests to Michaelis’ story concerning the phone conversation. By noon, having unsuccessfully tried to contact division and Eighth Army, the 27th Regiment reverses direction and moves to Chindong-ni. En route, while passing through Masan, Colonel Michaelis encounters the new command post of the 25th Division. After another unsuccessful attempt to contact General Church by phone, Michaelis gets through to Eighth Army Headquarters, informing Colonel Landrum of the situation; Landrum agrees with Michaelis and authorizes the move to block the south road to Masan. In turn, Landrum notifies General Walker when he arrives back at headquarters and General Church is then informed. Church soon arrives at Michaelis’ positions and meets with him in front of the village, instructing Michaelis to deploy one battalion in the hills near the low pass, exactly where they are speaking. The 2nd Battalion, 27th Regiment, commanded by Lt. Colonel Murch, gets the task. Company E deploys in front of

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Korea situation 1 August 1950.

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August 1, 1950

An Eighth Army unit at port prepares to move out. The lead vehicle in the convoy is a 3/4 ton 4 by 4 weapons carrier. Other vehicles on the right are 2 1/2-ton trucks. Pongam-ni, taking the point about ten miles west of Chindong-ni, and the remainder of the battalion stands about seven miles west of the town. The 1st Battalion, 27th Regiment, commanded by Colonel Check, which is assigned to attack on the following morning, bivouacs to the rear of the 2nd Battalion for the night. Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion, 19th Regiment, on the northern road, upon orders from Colonel Moore, has pulled back non-stop from its positions at the pass to the Notch, arriving there about 1400. Colonel Rhea, the commanding officer, remains at the pass with an armored car (M-20), offering protection for the with-

drawal. During the delay, enemy troops approach in a U.S. jeep, but its two occupants expire after a short burst of small arms fire and the jeep is repossessed, joining the rear guard when it departs for the Notch. Without an opportunity for rest, Colonel Rhea is directed to reconnoiter the heights below the Notch, prior to deploying the 1st Battalion. During the evening, his troops deploy on the Notch, assuming responsibility for it and the heights to the northwest (right). The 1st Battalion’s deployment permits the 2nd Battalion, 19th Regiment, commanded by Colonel McGrail, which had already arrived at the Notch,

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Top: Marine reinforcements prepare to depart by plane for Korea. Bottom: The USS Philippine Sea, which had only arrived back in the U.S. on 10 June, embarks for Korea. While sailors jam her decks, one navy wife watches as the vessel leaves port. The carrier arrives off Korea on 1 August.

151 subsequent to its withdrawal from Chinju, to move to the northern base of the pass, becoming regimental reserve. Also, during the latter part of the afternoon, the 29th Infantry’s 1st Battalion, commanded by Colonel Wilson, approaches Chungam-ni. The 29th will receive orders at 2000 directing it to join the reconnaissance attack on the following day. In conjunction, South Korean troops (TF Min) are entrusted responsibility for the high ground southeast (left) of the Notch, but Colonel Min’s force deploys too far to the east, creating a devastating gap of more than one mile between it and the 19th Regiment at the Notch, which remains undiscovered until it is too late. Prior to departing the area, General Church schedules a heavy reconnaissance mission for the following day that will involve elements of the 27th and 19th Regiments; each is to advance west from their positions and then converge at the Masan Road fork at Much’onni. During the evening, the troops of the 19th and 27th Regiments at Chungam-ni and Chindong-ni respectively exude jubilation when a platoon of medium Sherman tanks (Company A, 89th Medium Tank Battalion) arrive at each location in time to join the scheduled attack on the following morning. In other activity, the North Koreans strike at the flanks of Colonel Stephens’ force (21st and 34th Regiments, 24th Division). The ROK troops under S.K. Colonel Kim, deployed on both flanks, effectively repel the assaults. North Korea: On or about this day, the Soviets convince the North Koreans to lay minefields at various locations (east and west coasts) in North and South Korea to hinder any possible U.N. amphibious invasions, but the operation never rolls full steam. Pusan Perimeter: The South Korean National Police are by now given total responsibility for guarding all the railroad tunnels and bridges; contingents of varying sizes are posted at each remaining bridge and tunnel. In other activity, at Taegu, four South Korean officers and 133 S.K. policemen volunteer to operate with the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, commanded by Colonel Clainos. These policemen will participate with the cavalry in the fighting at Triangulation Hill, beginning on August 10. Later, more South Korean troops will enjoin U.S. divisions. Also, the 2nd Infantry Division lands at Pusan. In Air Force activity, the 6147th Tactical Control Squadron, Airborne, is established at Taegu. Also, 46 B-29s attached to the 22d and 92d Bombardment Groups attack the Chosin Nitrogen Fertilizer Factory at Hungnam. In Naval activity, The USS Philippine Sea, commanded by Captain W.K. Goodney, which had arrived in San Diego, California, subsequent to duty as an Atlantic Fleet Carrier on June 10, 1950, arrives off Korea. Following the unexpected outbreak of hostilities, the Philippine Sea, expected to relieve the Valley Forge during October 1950, had been rushed to the area ( July

August 2, 1950 5) to augment the U.S. air power. In conjunction, CAG-11, commanded by Commander R.C. Vogel, USN, had been ordered to depart prior to the ship’s embarkment. The air contingent takes a crash course in Hawaii, becoming more familiar with its jet planes before moving on to Korea. In other activity, Eighth Army issues an operational directive confirming the various verbal orders previously circulated among the units concerning the planned withdrawal across the Naktong River. The directive clarifies the points of redeployment along the primary defensive lines of the Pusan Perimeter. Also, the USS Badoeng Strait, unable to unload its aircraft at Kobe, which lacks proper harbor facilities, remains offshore, but forty-four of its Marine planes take off and head for Itami Airfield, where they receive a pre-combat check. On the following day, the remaining twenty-six planes arrive at Itami from the carrier. Also, Naval Forces Far East directs the USS Sicily (CVE 118) and the USS Badoeng Strait (CVE 116) and its accompanying vessels to provide close-air support to the U.N. troops on the ground in Korea. Guam: Guam, claimed by the U.S. during 1898, then lost during the initial portion of World War II and recaptured in 1944, comes under civil rule; it will be overseen by the Department of the Interior.

August 2 Western-Central area: From their positions on Masan Road forks, the U.S. 19th and 27th Regiments prepare to launch their respective reconnaissance attacks toward Chinju along their designated spurs of the Masan Road to locate the enemy (N.K. 6th Division) and converge at Much’on-ni where the Masan Road forks. The 1st Battalion, 27th Regiment, commanded by Lt. Colonel Gilbert Check, and its supporting artillery, Battery A, 8th Field Artillery Battalion, shove off early. Spearheaded by four Sherman tanks, each transporting a portion of one platoon of infantry, the column moves out of Chingong-ni at 0400, probing west along the southern fork of the Masan Road, advancing toward Much’on-ni. The 19th Regiment, in coordination with the 27th Regiment, launches its arm of the attack from Chungam-ni, committing the 1st Battalion, 29th Regiment (attached to the 19th Regiment), commanded by Lt. Colonel Wesley Wilson. Wilson’s command heads west along the northern fork slightly after daybreak at 0615. Five Sherman tanks take the point, trailed by four M-4 armored cars, each transporting five men of C Company. A convoy of 22 trucks transporting the infantry and a complement of several jeeps rolls out smoothly, trailing the armor. However, the two separate attacking units encounter totally different levels of opposition subsequent to departure. During the previous night, an unintentional wide gap had opened on the left flank of the 19th Regiment, between it and the ROK forces, which have strayed too far to the left, permitting enemy infiltrators to ease undetected through the lines east of the Notch. These

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troops, primarily snipers, creep in to the rear of some American troops, eliminating five soldiers by shooting them in the back of the head. Another contingent of enemy infiltrators had silently penetrated through the lines west of the Notch during the previous night and afterwards they establish positions to spring an ambush. Company B, 19th Infantry, following an exhausting several days, ascends the western hill of the Notch during the night of August 1, but pauses before reaching the top, bivouacking there. During the pre-dawn hours, while the men of Company B are still asleep, other enemy intruders strike against them swiftly and silently, stabbing several men, including the company commander, with bayonets, and afterward force the remainder of the unit from the hill. These incidents unsettle the area early and occur without the knowledge of the two attack groups. At the north fork, the first column to move out, the 1st Battalion 27th Regiment under Colonel Check, advances effortlessly before meeting the enemy, but that is not the case with the 1st Battalion, 29th Regiment, when it moves out on the southern fork. Along the northern fork, the 27th Regiment contingent moves without incident for several miles until scouts at the point, in advance of the lead platoon, stumble upon a slumbering platoon of enemy troops, apparently in a deep sleep that prevents them from hearing even the rumble of the approaching tanks. The startled North Koreans leap to their feet, toss their blankets and expeditiously begin to sprint to safety. In unison, the U.S.

infantrymen and the tanks commence firing. The enemy platoon is wiped out, except for two soldiers who are quickly captured. The column resumes its advance against some emerging resistance confined to snipers and an occasional enemy patrol. Around noon it reaches the Much’on-ni fork, where it surprises another contingent of enemy troops, including a recently arrived truck convoy laden with equipment, ammunition and various supplies including food and medicine. The startled truck drivers are able to get some of the vehicles turned, and they speed back toward Chinju, abandoning about ten of the vehicles during the hasty evacuation. A group of F-81 planes swarming nearby spots the enemy convoy as it is reversing direction on the summit of the pass. The pilots attack and subsequently report that Colonel Check’s unannounced appearance at the fork provided the planes with an abundance of good targets, as many other enemy vehicles in the area got caught in the open after heading back to Chinju. Nonetheless, more enemy resistance is building as Check’s column moves beyond the fork, still anticipating a hook-up with Wilson’s column. At this time, Colonel Check has no way of knowing that the bulk of the enemy, for which these supplies have arrived, has moved parallel to the south fork toward Masan. But Check decides to return his trucks, other than those required for his artillery, to headquarters, rather than risk losing them. It is becoming obvious that the resistance is building and Colonel Check is convinced that if he encounters stiff opposition, his group can more easily fight

Pohang-dong, South Korea, August 1950.

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Marines aboard the USS Pickaway arrive in Korea. its way out without the encumbrance of extra vehicles. The advance continues, with the infantry trailing the tanks, toward the base of the Chinju Pass. Meanwhile, Colonel Wilson’s 1st Battalion, 29th Regiment, which began moving at 0615, is not making much progress. The tip of the column advances to its point of departure, the Notch, at about 0715, passing through the defensive positions of the 1st Battalion, 19th Regiment. Soon after, the regiment enters an unexpected hornets’ nest. Colonel Rhea’s battalion, dispersed defensively throughout the hills at the Notch, is engaged in an ongoing battle with the enemy. The complex situation becomes compounded as the convoy rolls by, totally unexpected by Colonel Rhea. The reconnaissance platoon, moving along the south fork below the 1st Battalion, 19th Regiment, need not probe further. It inadvertently rams into the enemy attack as it unfolds. Enemy fire brings the armor to a temporary halt soon after it passes the crest of the Notch and begins descending the south slope, but most of the convoy has yet to ascend the incline to the summit. Nonetheless, Colonel Wilson, upon hearing the gunfire, bolts from his jeep, which is toward the latter part of the column, and sprints toward the peak of the hill where he meets Colonel Rhea, who offers some advice to Wilson: “You better be careful — that ground down by the pond is enemy territory. My men were fighting with them when your tanks came by.” While Colonel Wilson is still in the high ground, the tanks resume the advance prudently and encounter enemy infantrymen who are creeping up the gully adjacent to the road about 100 yards down the south slope. The Shermans swivel their turrets and respond with rapid machine gun fire, while continuing to advance cautiously. The effort prompts some of the enemy troops to scatter for the thicket, but several menacing

machine guns and mortar crews remain unscathed. The tank at the point, advancing more than 400 yards down the slope without closing its hatch, sustains a murderous blow from a single mortar round which kills the entire crew. By this time about thirteen vehicles have begun the descent. Immediately following the loss of the lead tank, a shell from an antitank weapon strikes one of the trailing trucks, setting it ablaze and bringing the stunned column to yet another halt. Immediately, the troops begin jumping from the stalled vehicles, but three enemy heavy machine guns, entrenched about 200 yards down the south slope, are streaming shells into their ranks, especially the 1st Platoon of Company C. As the other soldiers in the stalled vehicles bolt to expected safety in the gullies, they instead encounter waiting enemy troops, igniting close-quartered fighting. Those Americans captured during these first moments of battle are used as human shields. The North Koreans prod the Americans up the slope like lambs for slaughter after first roping their hands together. Colonel Wilson, still in the heights slightly southwest of the Notch, observes the debacle, again caused by poor communications; Colonel Rhea, defending the Notch with his battalion, had no previous knowledge of the reconnaissance attack until the tanks passed into his lines. A written order from the previous day detailing the attack never reached him. Colonel Wilson, intent on salvaging the battle, remains conspicuously in harm’s way while restoring calm and regrouping his troops west of the Notch. He orders the 62-man contingent of Company B, 29th Regiment, to deploy alongside the 1st Battalion, 19th Regiment. As the enemy fire continues to rain on the U.S. troops, now scattered all about, the locations of the enemy machine guns are discovered. Recoilless rifle teams get a focused

August 2, 1950 bead on them and terminate their fire by either destroying the guns or forcing the gunners to escape the heat of fire. However, the recoilless rifle team, positioned west of the Notch, sustains a deadly incoming round that kills three crewmen. The lone survivor, Sergeant Evert E. “Moose” Hoffman, refuses to relent. Despite the tragic loss of his three buddies, he remains tenaciously at his gun, spewing shells toward the enemy throughout the remainder of the day. Other similar individual acts of courage also emerge during the melee as the fighting extends from the road up both slopes. Meanwhile, Colonel Ned Moore, at the initial stage of the engagement, moves to the west side of the Notch, remaining at the 1st Battalion 19th Regiment Command Post there to control the defensive operations. The elements of the 1st Battalion (Company B, 29th Infantry), directed by Col. Wilson to spread out within the positions of the 1st Battalion, 19th Infantry, on the west side of the Notch, become entwined and their positions are precariously perched. The infiltrators, which had earlier driven Company B from the west slope, enjoy uninhibited maneuverability to lay down numerous crossfires, slicing into several units. This savage enfilade, striking from the rear and flank, inflicts near paralysis on the west slope; Company C, 29th Regiment, still staggered by the death of many of the men of its 1st Platoon, lost when the convoy stalled, manages to advance to a spur from where it springs a powerful attack, terminating the deadly enemy fire by driving the North Koreans from the hill. Twelve men of Company C lose their lives during the attack, but it appears possible, according to Colonel Wilson, that erroneous friendly fire from the American positions cost as many as six of the deaths. The grim fighting on the west side of the Notch tails off toward the afternoon, while the North Koreans disengage their frontal assault to set the stage for their preferred killing blow, envelopment from the flanks. Later during the lull, Company A, 19th Infantry, ventures down the road toward the immobilized vehicles, exterminating several enemy troops who had remained in the vicinity. The contingent advances about 100 yards past the destroyed lead tank and establishes a roadblock, in coordination with other troops that scour the area, salvaging vehicles and recovering the dead and wounded. The remaining troops of Company A, 29th Regiment, move out to comb the forward ridge abutting the pass to purge the enemy. In the meantime, tenacious fighting continues on the east side of the Notch. Back near Much’on-ni, the 1st Battalion, 27th Regiment, which has passed the road fork junction, continues heading west, but it begins encountering more enemy strength as it pushes toward the Chinju Pass. On the east side of Notch, the Americans receive an equal share of fierce enemy fire and fare no better than their counterparts on the west side. The existing gap between the ROK troops and the 19th Regiment increases the danger and fuels the confusion as fierce com-

154 bat ensues in the high ground throughout the day. During the afternoon, enemy mortar barrages score hard, inflicting additional casualties. At one point, the ROK troops are hit by enemy and friendly fire, pushing them from their positions. Hastily, they move east through the valley toward Chungam-ni to preserve their unit from decimation. Colonel Moore, observing the area from his vantage point at the battalion command post, spots an unidentified group of troops moving east along the railroad tracks. He directs Captain Elliott Cutler (Regimental S-3) to order elements of the 2nd Battalion, 19th Regiment (reserve force), to speed through the valley and intercept the force. The column is intercepted, but it is Colonel Min’s troops (Task Force Min) attempting to escape from untenable positions. The 3rd Battalion, 29th Infantry (attached to 19th Regiment) had been deployed near the ROK troops and later, Company B, 29th Infantry (attached to 19th Regiment) advanced to the hills to help stem the rising enemy tide. Soon after, Communist forces spring from a railroad tunnel to the immediate front of Company B. It holds the line rigidly, and in the process receives rapid support from Company F, 19th Regiment, which commences a rousing counterattack, bashing into the advancing enemy and hurling them back in retreat. At Chinju Pass, the enemy is positioned strongly with elements of the N.K. 6th Division. At the base, infantry, including snipers, are scattered strategically amidst the shallow hills to forestall any advance elements that might approach. These contingents are braced by antitank weapons, anticipating a lucrative afternoon. Colonel Check’s column encroaches the entrance to the pass, his tanks transporting infantry at the point. Abruptly, the tanks come under a volley of fire. Snipers to the north of the column deliver a series of shots that nearly singe the ears of the infantry. The troops atop the tanks unhesitatingly jump toward the rear of the armor to afford themselves cover from where they can return fire. Additional incoming fire originating from antitank weapons takes out the second tank in line, killing its gunner. To the immediate rear of the knocked out tank, Lieutenant Herman Norrell, the tank platoon leader, witnesses the devastating blow and simultaneously spots the positions of the perpetrators: three antitank guns, entrenched about 75 yards away to the right of the column. Before Norrell can retaliate, additional shells from the same point of the initial fire pummel his tank, striking it three times and setting it afire. As Norrell leaps from the burning inferno, raking machine gun fire and shrapnel inflict wounds upon him. Spontaneously, the Americans are returning fire and in quick time, the artillerymen face off with the 76mm antitank weapons. After a short engagement, the enemy guns become mute. Meanwhile, the infantry lunges from its positions and seizes the enemy guns. A large gathering of dead N.K. troops is also sprawled about the area, and there are some others who give a poor performance of feigning death.

155 Colonel Check, having no contact with battalion headquarters since his departure, had previously sent messengers back to Colonel Michaelis to inform him of the situation; however, the Communists had sealed the road in the rear. The messengers never reach Chindong-ni. Colonel Check remains out of communication with headquarters, but his command is still energized, ready to fight its way forward. During the blazing burst of initial fire, seven additional tankers had been wounded. Check requests volunteers to operate the two bruised tanks. Obligingly, bulldozer operators receive a dynamic crash course on driving a tank, and several volunteer riflemen assume their temporary duty as tank machine gunners. Soon after, the advance resumes with its full complement of four tanks. Steadily but slowly, they gain several hundred tough yards. Then at about 1700 or shortly thereafter, a friendly aircraft appears overhead, depositing an uninspiring update for Colonel Check from Col. Michaelis. The note is short but obviously to the point. “Return Road Cut behind you.... Lead with tanks if possible. Will give you artillery support when within range.” The 1st Battalion breaks off its ongoing fight with the enemy and initiates a return trek toward its friendly artillery. The two damaged tanks will not start. After being towed by the two fully operational tanks, the two contentious ones move out, leading the column, and the others hold the rear, trailing the artillery and mortar vehicles. The column receives an air umbrella for added insulation. Planes follow overhead until dusk. However, the endeavor does not begin smoothly, as enemy gunners bring the column under fire as it moves out. The U.S. infantry, walking astride the vehicles but nudging the ridges along the road, returns fire vociferously. The column, still beyond the Much’on-ni Road fork as the sun begins setting, prompts Colonel Check to collect his troops and board them on the vehicles to preclude disaster. The column continues fighting as it moves and there is some apprehension about the enemy strength at the fork. The crammed vehicles, resembling overcrowded armored ferries, race through what might become a sea of fire, but sporadically they pause momentarily, enabling the infantry to spring from the vehicles when necessary to eliminate enemy machine guns posted along the route. Eventually, the weary troops reach the protective fire of the 8th Field Artillery Battalion’s 155-mm howitzers, which rivet both sides of the road with their version of an iron picket fence. At about midnight (Aug. 2-3), subsequent to spending a protracted day with elements of the N.K. 6th Division, Colonel Check’s battalion reaches Chindongni, having sustained thirty casualties during the arduous mission; but it has extracted a high toll from its opponent while avoiding checkmate. Also, during the day, while the 1st Battalion is slugging along the south fork of the Masan Road, an enemy contingent estimated at about one battalion moves in behind the column and attacks Company E’s positions at Pongam-ni. The company had remained behind to

August 2, 1950 defend the departure line. The 2nd Battalion rushes reinforcements to the scene to support E Company. The reinforcements arrive on a timely basis and support besieged Company E while it successfully fights its way back to Kogan-ni, three miles to the east. In the meantime, another enemy contingent pounces on one Platoon of Company A, 65th Engineer Combat Battalion, which is posted along the Kosong-Sachon Road, south of Chindong-ni. The overwhelmed unit sustains tremendous losses, and the bulk of its equipment is decimated. Yet other enemy contingents encroach the positions of the 8th Field Artillery at Chindong-ni during the afternoon bringing it under fire. The 1st Battalion is noticeably absent, apparently giving the North Koreans the impression that the 27th regimental headquarters, lacking infantry, will be an easy seizure. An attack to overrun the village is launched on the following morning. In other activity, an advance contingent of the 25th Division departs Poksong-dong for Samnangjin, but en route, all elements of the division are rerouted to Masan, subsequent to a conference between General Walker and General Kean at Taegu. The diverted 25th Division moves along the primary supply route, maneuvering through a steady stream of opposing traffic heading north to the central front, giving Army G-3 operations officers a nightmare. The logistics of keeping the unbroken chain of supplies moving north while trying to maintain an efficient path weaving south requires every available G-3 officer to ensure success. During the entire journey, officers are posted at every suspected point of gridlock congestion, and others must ensure that the expected trains are on location at Waegwan, from where the division is to be transported by rail to Masan. The advance elements of the 25th Division command post arrive by convoy at Masan at 2115, concluding a day-long drive. Meanwhile, the equipment of the 25th Division is loaded aboard railcars throughout the night (Aug. 2–3). The troops begin to depart at about 0600, trailed by the equipment trains. General Walker, aware that he has dangerously trimmed his central front defenses, expects to get away with the gamble and ensure the southwest front in the process. Southwestern sector: The 34th and 21st Regiments, 24th Division, receive orders from Eighth Army to cross the Naktong River. Soon after the orders are received, Colonel Stephens dispatches the 34th Regiment to the vicinity of Yongsan. Meanwhile, the 21st Regiment and the accompanying South Korean troops hold their positions on the opposite side of the bank, holding the enemy at bay. During the evening, engineers destroy the Naktong River bridge that links Ch’ogye with Changnyong, the location of 24th Division headquarters. The 21st Regiment departs during the night with its final elements moving across the other bridge (Koryong-Taegu), twenty air miles north, at about 0045 on the 3rd, trailed by the 14th Engineering Combat Battalion within a couple of hours later.

August 2, 1950 Colonel Stephens remains behind with the S.K. 17th Regiment during its rear guard duty, departing with it at about 0630 (Aug. 3). At its positions above the 24th Division, the 1st Cavalry also receives orders from Eighth Army to move to the east side of the Naktong River. The cavalry, deployed in the Chirye-Kumch’on vicinity, begins withdrawing to Waegwan, completing

156 the operation by dusk on August 3. The 5th Cavalry Regiment, last of the main contingents to cross the river, encounters a stiff skirmish with the enemy. One battalion is nearly wiped out. In other activity, to the north and east of Waegwan, the South Koreans are initiating movement in concert with the U.S., withdrawing across the Naktong,

Top: Shortly after debarking at Pusan on 2 August, the U.S. Marines hold in place at a railway station awaiting orders to move northward. Bottom: The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade arrives in Pusan on 2 August.

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U.S. troops examine Pershing medium tanks that have been loaded on rail flatcars to make them secure for transit. encountering some severe opposition. The N.K. 12th Division engages the S.K. 8th Division around Andong, and the S.K. 1st Division encounters fierce resistance north of the Naktong River. Pusan: The USS Henrico, having completed the voyage across the Pacific alone, finally makes visual contact with the convoy in the Tsushima Straits during the morning hours. The convoy transporting the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade arrives off Pusan during the evening, with the leading vessel entering the harbor slightly after 1700. Soon after, as the ship creeps toward the dock, the Marines on deck are serenaded with a “tinny and tonedeaf ” version of the “Marine Hymn,” played by a South Korean band. Some of the U.S. Army troops along the dock and the Marines aboard ship trade their usual sardonic salutations, with some of the seasoned antagonists (on both sides) visibly pleased that the encounter verifies the continuance of the tradition. As dusk arrives, the dock area becomes over-animated as man and machine begin a flurry of bustling activity lasting

throughout the night, guaranteeing little or no sleep. Amidst the clanking of the cranes and the roaring of the engines, some giant searchlights focus on supply areas, while the Marine brigade’s troops debark and attempt to receive their equipment, food and ammunition. Combined, 9,400 tons of brigade supplies are unloaded, the greatest portion thereof relinquished to the Army Quartermaster section in Pusan and absorbed into the general pool. Four officers and 100 enlisted men of the Combat Service Detachment, under Major Thomas J. O’Mahoney, USMC, are designated rear echelon and will be based in Pusan to handle administrative and logistical duties. Meanwhile, General Craig orders a briefing at 2100 aboard the USS Clymer, for brigade staff, Lt. Colonel Raymond Murray, commanding officer, 5th Marines, battalion commanders and personnel from supporting units. At present, the Marines know they are heading west, but the specific mission is still unknown. Eventually, at 2325, General Craig is informed by Colonel Landrum that the Marine Brigade, as ordered by

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An Eighth Army artillery unit fortifies a position for a 105-mm howitzer. General Walker, would proceed to Changwon and revert to Eighth Army reserve. Early on the following morning, the Marines return to their ships to receive a hot and hearty breakfast prior to moving out. Also, elements of the 5th Regimental Combat Team debark at Pusan; the 2nd Battalion, commanded by Lt. Colonel John Throckmorton, moves to Chindong-ni and spreads out on a spine of high ground descending from Sobuk-san, less than two miles west of the town. Hill 342 (Yaban-san and Fox Hill), the highest point of elevation occupied by the 2nd Battalion, is covered by one platoon of Company G. At this point, the 2nd Battalion is poised to support the 27th Regiment. Posted to its (5th RCT) immediate front at Kogan-ni is the 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry. The ridge on which Throckmorton’s command is deployed stretches northwest to even higher ground for a distance of about three miles until it terminates at Sobuk-san (Hill 738), thought to be occupied by elements of the N.K. 6th Division. In Air Force activity, the 374 Troop Carrier Group (TCG), in response to urgent requests from Eighth Army, undertakes a massive operation to transport supplies and equipment from Ashiya to Korea. About 300,000 pounds are moved by air in a 24-hour period, a record setting operation. — In the United States: At Fort Bragg, history repeats itself. The I Corps is activated, with General Coulter as its commanding officer. Ironically, the I Corps and the IX Corps had both been essential parts of Eighth Army in Japan until the Truman Administra-

tion and Congress’ military cutbacks reduced the ranks of the armed services. A small group of staff officers and General Coulter will embark by air for Korea on August 13. The remainder of the staff will arrive in Korea on September 6. The IX Corps will be activated on August 10. The I Corps previously had its headquarters in Kyoto (24th and 25th Divisions). The IX Corps had its headquarters in Sendai (1st Cavalry and 7th Infantry Divisions). — In Japan: Four helicopters and four light observation planes (VMO-6) depart Itami for Pusan, Korea. The additional four light observation planes of VMO6 remain in Japan to be used for parts when necessary. Two of the helicopters, the remainder of VMO-6 and Air Support Section move to Chinhae to operate from its airfield. The additional two helicopters fly to Changwon to support the ground operations there. In conjunction, the Air Support Section (MTACS-2) begins establishing communications with the carriers USS Sicily and Badoeng Strait. By August 5, the air-ground operation is prepared.

August 3 General Walker, having earlier in the day repeated his previous orders to “maintain contact with the enemy,” places more emphasis on his intent during the afternoon with yet another directive: “Daily counterattacks will be made by all units.... Commanders will take immediate action to insure that these and previous instructions to this effect are carried out without delay.” Continuing, Walker directs: “Counterattack is a decisive ELM (element) of the defense.”

159 Western Coastal area: In the 25th Division sector, the 27th Regiment’s headquarters remains at Chindong-ni, a small town sitting along the south coastal road (dirt) where mountain tributaries extending from the north converge on the Korean Strait. Although elements of the

August 3, 1950 regiment had been strongly tested on the previous day, the area has enjoyed a fairly quiet night — maybe too calm. The tranquil mood is short lasting. Unbeknownst to the sleeping men of the 27th Regiment, one battalion of the ever-cunning enemy is closing toward their

A tank crew loads 76-mm shells into a Sherman medium tank M4A3 at a depot at the rear. The tank had been there for repair before returning to the front.

August 3, 1950 positions with the intent of establishing a roadblock. With a hushed motion, the enemy unit moves east of the north-south road along a rough ridge that ends abruptly at a towering cliff that extends high atop the indented command post, a schoolhouse which is precariously tucked under the jagged ridge. From here, the coiled elements of the 14th Regiment, N.K. 6th Division, prepare to spring into action. The operations of the mission are controlled from Sobuk-san, north of the objective. The regiment’s other two battalions had swung away from the unit farther east to assume positions and establish additional roadblocks nearer to Masan. In the schoolyard, adjacent to the command post, lay the restful howitzers of Company A (11th Field Artillery Bn.); in close proximity, the weapons of the 8th Field Artillery Battalion stand ready. It had been the 8th Artillery Bn. that had provided a powerful and protracted iron umbrella to guide the 1st Battalion as it sprinted home along the south fork road on the previous night. Dispersed in the same area is the exhausted 1st Battalion, 35th Regiment, under Colonel Check, which had sprawled out near the command post immediately upon returning from its adventurous reconnaissance patrol. Guards have been posted around the perimeter throughout the night to ensure against intruders. But ostensibly, some of the guards had become derelict, endangering the command by sleeping at their post. In addition, several sentinels at other outposts assume that the troops observed in the shadows are friendly ROK soldiers, known to be posted nearby. The conduct of some of the troops on the graveyard watch thrusts the regiment into a gruesome contest for survival. While the officers of the 35th Regimental staff are just completing breakfast in the command post, the surprise attack is launched. Enemy small arms fire, intended to signal the attack, concentrates on the command post. Synchronized with the initial fire, the enemy charges from their positions on the east ridge, but the first troops to descend from the heights are U.S. soldiers, some of whom complete the trek without their boots. Unquestionably, the suddenness of the attack causes disorganization; however, Colonels Michaelis and Check, bolstered by no-nonsense NCOs, set about transforming the turmoil into a disciplined defense. During this endeavor, some troops are jerked from their prone positions under some stationary jeeps and trucks and propped into fighting positions. The fighting on the east hill ensues heavily until around 1300. During the remainder of the day, the North Koreans utilize regular civilian telephones, affording the U.S. signalmen (and S.K. interpreters) the opportunity to continually intercept and eavesdrop on the conversations as they are diverted through the regimental switchboard. The North Koreans are themselves startled subsequent to commencing the attack, as they quickly encounter infantry they had not anticipated. Company

160 A, 1st Battalion, 27th Regiment convincingly bolts toward the enemy-occupied hill east of the command post, driving confidently up the slope. Two enemy machine gun crews, manning positions on the summit, assert their tenacity, pouring fire toward advancing Company A. The ascending troops advance undaunted, seizing more tenable terrain from where their sharpshooters, using M1 rifles, wipe out both machine gun crews, terminating the enemy machine gun fire. The commanding officer of A Company, Captain Logan Weston, who led the attack, receives a wound in the leg. Weston declines evacuation and instead gets some treatment by a medic before he resumes his participation in the slugfest. Afterwards, Weston becomes wounded two more times while leading his command to seize the high ground. Once the crest is taken, the supporting guns of the recoilless rifles and the mortars begin sending some heavy metal into the positions of the North Koreans. The new occupants of the summit easily locate some of the enemy positions. The coordinates are given to the artillerymen and after some range adjustments, the North Koreans are serenaded by the howitzers with salvos of white phosphorus shells. The 1st Battalion handily repulses the attack. The commanding officer of the North Koreans, determined to take Chindong-ni, commits a new force to overcome the defenders by diverting one of the other battalions, scheduled to operate closer to Masan. A contingent estimated to be at minimum battalion strength races south from the direction of Haman. As the convoy reaches a point about 1,000 yards away, it comes to a halt to unload the reinforcements. The activity is spotted by Lt. Colonel August Terry Jr., who coincidentally is the commanding officer of the 8th Field Artillery Battalion, self-designated chairman of the welcoming committee. In cadence with the quick step of the troops as they excitedly exit the vehicles, the howitzers roar, accelerating the pace. Rather than attack, the enemy reinforcements advance hurriedly toward the hills. The threat evaporates. Colonel Check’s 1st Battalion, 27th Regiment, which had been exhausted, somehow reaches down for a powerful second wind to beat back the attack and retain the regimental perimeter intact. The successful defense of Chindong-ni, attributed in great part to the 1st Battalion, 27th Regiment’s surprise appearance, creates additional problems for the North Koreans. Of the additional two battalions that had broken away from the force committed against Chindong-ni, one had to be reattached to reinforce the failed attack. Also, the 15th Regiment, N.K. 6th Division, poised for an attack against Masan, cancels the assault because of the unsuccessful attack at Chindongni. Nevertheless, its troops penetrate the heights southwest of Masan. Since the inception of fighting against American troops on July 27 at Hadong, the N.K. 6th Division, which has moved at a swift pace, has sustained massive casualties, depleting its strength by about one-half. Subsequent to the intensely fought

161 battles around the Notch, the enemy pauses to prepare for the next step toward seizing Masan. Meanwhile, the U.N. forces prepare to further fortify their defenses along the left flank of Eighth Army, which is forming the new defensive line, the Pusan Perimeter. In the 5th Regimental Combat Team’s sector, at Hill 342 (Fox Hill) behind the positions of the 27th Regiment, an enemy contingent attacks during the morning, dislodging the platoon, which had been occupying the crest. Later during the night, Company F mounts a fierce counterattack that regains the ground. Company F holds the hill until relieved by the 5th Marines. However, the 2nd Battalion, 5th Regimental Combat Team, again comes under assault on the night of the 6th, the eve of the scheduled start of the U.S. offensive. In other activity, the 25th Division completes its move from Waegwan to Masan in an unprecedented time of 36 hours. General Walker relates that the 150-mile “history breaking maneuver” was responsible for the successful defense of Pusan. However, he also noted that it could not have happened if the North Koreans had launched a full attack against the Kumch’on front while the 25th Division was navigating the lone highway through Kumch’on. In other activity, General Craig, USMC, and Lt. Colonel Stewart, USMC, arrive from Pusan at Masan by helicopter to confer with Generals Walker, Kean and Barth in response to a request of Craig. General Walker agrees to provide the Marine brigade with South Korean Army recruits to be utilized as scouts, interpreters and rear guards. General Walker orders General Craig to have the brigade ready for combat subsequent to the evening of the 5th. In the 24th Division sector, following the successful overnight crossing of the Naktong by the 21st and 34th Regiments and the ROK troops (17th Regiment), elements of the 3rd Engineer Combat Battalion attempt to detonate the Koryong-Taegu bridge at 0715, but it remains standing. It is successfully blown later during the night. Also, west of Masan, at the Chungam-ni Notch, the 35th Regiment, 25th Division, relieves the 19th Regiment, 24th Division. The 19th Regiment departs heading northeast toward Changnyong to divisional headquarters, arriving there on the 4th. The 19th Regiment, which has been in Korea for less than 25 days, is experiencing severe supply problems, including massive shortages of hand grenades and mortar shells, but in addition there is a near total absence of uniforms. In addition, the regiment has lost about onethird of its 2 1/2-ton trucks and one-half of its 3/4-ton trucks; it still possesses a mere 20 percent of its 1/4-ton trucks. Also, the 1st Cavalry Division relocates to the east side of the Naktong River. The rear guard of the 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry, which had been manning positions southwest of the Waegwan Bridges along the Songju Road to hinder the enemy advance, is to advance across the bridge just prior to its demolition, but

August 3, 1950 it becomes impossible to halt the unending line of refugees attempting to cross with the cavalry. General Gay, who had retained sole responsibility for ordering the destruction of the Waegwan Road and railroad bridges, is faced with a dilemma. Each time the cavalry contingent moves onto the span, the refugees are there, preventing its destruction. Finally after several unsuccessful attempts to clear the bridge, the cavalry is told to head back to the west side and block the refugees and then upon signal to dash across to the east bank. This tactic also fails, as the civilians also begin running. Ultimately, at about sundown, General Gay, convinced that he has no more alternatives, orders the bridges blown. The reluctant decision costs the lives of several hundred refugees who are on the bridge when it collapses. Pusan: At 0600, the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade heads by truck and rail for Masan, where it is placed in Eighth Army reserve. Thanks to the cooperation between the Army and Marine General Chidester, fifty additional trucks and accompanying Army drivers transport elements of the Marine Brigade. The tanks, heavy equipment and vehicles over 2 1/2-ton capacity are moved by flat cars. The 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, commanded by Lt. Colonel George Newton, arrives at the Changwon area at about 1400 and deploys defensively about one mile outside (west) of town, along the Changwon-Masan Road, to afford protection for the remainder of the Marine Brigade. The vanguard is the first to experience the memorable trip along the slim and primitive serpentine roads, which provide the Marines incessant bumps and jolts combined with the constant gush of dust launched to the rear by the rolling tires of the trucks. The Marines, plastered with the grayish grime of dust, arrive at their destination resembling galloping gray ghosts. The Marines traveling by rail in antiquated trains containing tiny and uncomfortable wooden seats encounter an equally unusual ride, as the train is constantly stopping suddenly without cause. The trip is further punctuated by the agonizing scent emerging from the rice paddies that have been inundated with fertilizer. Craig had received orders to establish positions in Changwon, but heavy enemy activity about six miles away west of Masan convinces him to establish positions outside of the town. By 1600, all combat and support contingents except one platoon of tanks arrive in the vicinity of Changwon; the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, establishes positions in the heights to the left of the Changwon-Masan Road, relieving the 1st Battalion, which then extends its line deeper along the high ridge on the right flank. The 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines, commanded by Lt. Colonel Harold Roise, deploys on a strategic hill amidst a large rice paddy (south of the MSR) extending between the town and the 3rd Battalion. General Craig establishes his command post in a small hollow sheltered by some small hills on the fringes of Changwon. The command post is defended by the engineer company and headquarters components; tank platoons and the

August 3, 1950 artillery of Colonel Ransom Wood’s artillery battalion are also scattered within the perimeter. At about 2200 there is some premature activity — a rifle shot is fired against an invisible enemy, creating nervousness among many of the untried troops who believe the command post is under assault. The clanging of rifle shot increases as the triggers are pulled in reaction to the swaying of bushes in the darkness, which are mistaken as enemy figures. By about midnight two machine guns join the wasteful duel near the command post; however, the nervousness has spread to the positions of the 5th Marines, causing more problems. One man in the 2nd Battalion is shot and in the 1st Battalion sector, two casualties occur, one in a mixup during a challenge and another when a weapon fires accidentally. Eventually, by about 0300, following some colorful expletives by the irritated NCOs, the green troops are persuaded that they have been firing at thin air. At dawn on the 4th, General Craig, subsequent to a restless night, calls in the particular leaders from where the majority of firing occurred and lays down the law, proclaiming that such activity will not be tolerated; it doesn’t reoccur. Following the peculiar but predictable incident near the command post on the night of the 3rd, the remaining time at Changwon is tranquil except for one incident concerning some enemy encroachment on the 4th; seven unidentified people (using radios) are detected on the crest of a mountain, spotting the positions of the Marines. One platoon speeds toward its location to eliminate the problem, but the enemy troops escape. Nonetheless, it is another learning process for the Marines. The steep climb in the Korean heat causes casualties. Marine helicopters move to the crest, setting a combat precedent by delivering water and rations to the troops there; then the choppers evacuate those troops suffering with the most severe cases of heat prostration, initiating the first air evacuation of Marine casualties in Korea. The Marine Brigade is attached to the U.S. 25th Division on August 6. Initially, there is some animosity between those soldiers already in Korea and the new

162 Marine arrivals for several reasons, including the belief by some that the Marines always receive too much press coverage. Another cause of the discontent is the manner in which the Marines have come ashore with their usual haughtiness and conspicuously brash “esprit de corps.” The Marine Brigade is enduring the same hardships as its counterparts in the Army, including grave shortages of manpower; the 1st Provisional Brigade’s three battalions of the 5th Marines are composed of just two rifle companies each, rather than the necessary three; one heavy weapons company is also attached. However, the bulk of its officers and about 65 percent of the noncommissioned officers enter Korea having gained their combat experience in the Pacific, against the Japanese. This painfully gathered expertise will pay grand dividends at the front lines. The inter-service dispute between the troops in the field will dissipate once the Marines enter the fight and prove their mettle. The perceived condescending attitude of the Marines by the soldiers is transformed to respect, and the “attitude” of the Marines gradually becomes contagious as the two services galvanize to thwart the foe. When the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade departs Pusan, the troops carry their weapons, ammunition, pack and rations, enabling extra mobility. In Air Force activity, the 18th FBG establishes headquarters in Taegu to enlarge the F-51 operations In addition, SA-16 amphibious rescue planes initiate operations off the coast of Korea this day. The SA-16 planes have the capacity to discover and retrieve downed U.S. pilots. In Naval activity, Navy and Marine commanders have determined that VMF 214 and VMF 323 will be operating off carriers to ensure maximum operating ability. Today, subsequent to one day of brush-up flights, VMF 214, commanded by Lt. Colonel Walter Lischeid, arrives from Japan on the USS Sicily. At 1630, the carrier is armed and refueled and the first Marine offensive action of the conflict is initiated as fighter planes ascend from the carrier and strike Chinju and Sinban-ni, first with rockets and incendiary-bombs, followed by strafing runs, introducing the corps to the enemy.

Two U.S. Sherman M-26 tanks hold positions in front of a destroyed South Korean village.

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A Sherman medium tank (M4A1) with a dozer attachment. Meanwhile, two other planes depart the carrier Sicily for Taegu to afford the aviators a briefing on the overall situation in Korea. Admiral Ruble is aboard the Badoeng Strait, having been relieved as commander, Naval Air Japan. His Task Group 96.8, Carrier Division 15,

is reunited about one month after leaving San Diego. The Badoeng Strait is escorted by the USS Endicott (DMS-35), commanded by Commander John C. Jolly, and the USS Taussig (DD-746), commanded by Commander William C. Meyer; the Sicily is escorted by the

August 4, 1950 USS Kyes (DD-787), commanded by Commander Fran M. Christiansen, and the USS Doyle (DMS-34), commanded by Commander Charles H. Momsen, Jr. — In the United States: The final nine GCI squadrons of the Marine Organized Aviation Reserve receive orders to report to El Toro to bolster the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, commanded by Major General Field Harris. Also, Fleet Marine Force Pacific orders the 1st Marine Division to dispatch ten officers and 290 enlisted men, by airlift, to join the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade in the Far East. The contingent is to depart Camp Pendleton on the 9th by MATS planes. However, the departure occurs on the 14th, when the troops depart by rail for San Francisco and are transported by aircraft from there. —In Japan: A meeting convenes in Tokyo, bringing together staff officers of Far Eastern Air Forces (FEAF) and Commander, Naval Forces Far East (COMNAVFE) in an effort to enhance the Navy’s close air support operation in support of the ground troops in Korea. The gathering occurs while the fleet is moored at Sasebo, but Admiral Struble is absent due to a separate meeting with General MacArthur in Formosa. An understanding is reached whereby the Seventh Fleet’s first priority will be close-air support, but carrier actions come under control of Fifth Air Force and will be provided only when requested by Fifth Air Force in Korea (FAFIK) and following the subsequent approval of COMNAVFE. Under other circumstances, the carriers are unrestrained and will operate in other areas of Korea to destroy selected targets of their choosing. Second priority targets will be those selected south of the 38th Parallel, and the third priority will be those of the B29 long-range bombers. Admiral Joy, who had not agreed with the informal agreement, invalidates parts thereof on August 24. Subsequent to his return from Formosa, Admiral Struble orders Seventh Fleet Base of Operations to embark from Okinawa to Sasebo, Japan, bringing it closer to Korea, thereby providing the carriers more time to strike the enemy before moving out to replenish ammunition and supplies.

August 4

Pusan Perimeter: General Walker’s Eighth Army and the ROK forces, having been convincingly pushed back across the Naktong River by the North Koreans, draw the final line, which forms southwest of Masan and moves north to pass in front of Miryang. From there, it arcs around Taegu and curves east to the front of Yongchon, then beyond to the sea. The perimeter encompasses an area of about 100 miles north to south and about 50 miles east to west, with a rectangular contour. The defensive line is also referred to as the Naktong Line. The U.N. forces holding the line from east to west are U.S. 25th Division (Masan), U.S. 24th Division (Miryang) and the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division (Taegu). Each division holds responsibility for a line that extends between 20 and 40 miles. Also, the ROK forces that link with the 1st Cavalry northeast of Taegu ex-

164 tend northeast through the mountainous terrain. These units are the S.K. 1st, 6th, 8th, Capital and 3rd Divisions. For the first time since their arrival in Korea, the U.S. troops have established a solid line in conjunction with the South Korean troops. This gives the U.S. the luxury of having friendly troops on either side and some reinforcements to the rear. The Pusan Perimeter is ostensibly permanent and its defenders seem prepared to hold. In other activity, General Church, 24th Division commander, issues an order to his troops that is similar to that given by the other commanders: “Defensive and alternate positions must be prepared, routes reconnoitered, intensive patrolling at night, communications perfected and each individual know his job. There will be no withdrawal nor need there be any if each and every one contributes his share to the preparation and, if attacked, has the will to fight it out here. Every soldier will under all circumstances retain his weapon, ammunition, and his entrenching tool. Without these he ceases to be a soldier capable of defending himself. Many of our losses have been occasioned by failure to dig a foxhole when the time permitted.” A Herculean effort that includes some ingenious mechanical transplant operations in Japan on the battered relic tanks of the Pacific Island campaigns bears fruit. The 8072nd Medium Tank Battalion (minus Company A, already in Korea) arrives in Pusan on the 7th. The Provisional Tank Battalion is attached to the 89th Medium Tank Battalion. In other activity, General Walker and his staff continue to discuss a series of two offensives to be launched by Eighth Army. The first attack, scheduled to begin between August 5 and August 10, will drive toward Masan-Chinju. It is to be followed by a more powerful thrust on or about the 15th that will retrace the steps of the N.K. 6th Division and drive west to Yosu, then swerve north toward the Kum River. However, there is concern that there are too few troops available for such a large undertaking; therefore it is decided that Eighth Army reserves will launch a counterattack toward Chinju to release some pressure from the Taegu vicinity. Following the meeting, Walker requests that Fifth Air Force commit its primary strength to isolate the battlefront and decimate the suspected enemy troop locations on the southwest flank, between the Nam River and Masan. He also requests that the air attacks occur from the night of the 5th through the 6th. In conjunction, FEAF initiates the bombing of strategic bridges in North Korea. On the west side of the Naktong at Hyopch’on, the N.K. 4th Division, commanded by Major General Lee Kwon Mu, prepares to cross the river and strike the 34th Regiment, which holds the southern sector of the 24th Division perimeter. Farther north, other enemy elements ford the river to assault the 21st Regiment. General Church has ordered all civilians to evacuate the area that stretches five miles east behind the 24th Division lines. Church, thoroughly convinced that the Communist infiltrators

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A vehicular bridge (left) and rail bridge near Waegwan span the Naktong River. Both are destroyed by the Americans after they cross it during Eighth Army withdrawal in early August. are indistinguishable from the South Koreans, makes it clear that civilians spotted behind the American lines might be shot on sight. Church enunciates: “If we are going to hold here, we cannot have any enemy behind us.” In the 1st Marine Provisional Brigade zone, helicopters attached to VMO-6 commanded by Major Vincent J. Gottschalk initiate the first air evacuation of wounded Marines in the conflict. Pusan Perimeter, Central Front, Taegu: The 1st Cavalry Division, similarly to the 24th Division, bears responsibility for a huge front along the perimeter. It links with the 24th Division to the south. Throughout the night (4th-5th), elements of the N.K. 13th Division cross the Naktong River. In Air Force activity, Far East Air Force initiates Interdiction Campaign No. 1. A group of B-29 bombers strikes bridges in Communist North Korea at points above the 38th Parallel. In Naval activity, Marine planes (VMF214) from the carrier USS Sicily fly twentyone sorties in the vicinity of Chinju and Sachon to alleviate pressure against the southern flank of Eighth Army. The key targets are railroads and bridges. — In the United States: W. Averell Harriman, White House national security advisor,

Two U.S. soldiers work on a communications line at forward outpost in vicinity of Naktong River on 4 August.

August 5, 1950 departs the U.S. for Tokyo to confer with General MacArthur on behalf of President Truman. The JCS dispatch General Matthew Ridgway and General Lauris Norstad, Air Force deputy chief of staff for operations, to accompany Harriman. — In Japan: General MacArthur issues a formal report to the Department of the Army that places total U.N. troop strength in Korea (as of this day) at 141,808; and of this number, ROK forces stand at about 82,570. The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade and the Far East Air Force personnel stand at 4,713 and 4,051 respectively; 107 miscellaneous personnel are included. These figures do not include the U.S. Navy personnel or the Marine Corps aviation personnel stationed on the carriers. The combined 92,000 U.N. combat forces in South Korea appear to outnumber the enemy combat troops, estimated to be 70,000. In other activity, General MacArthur relieves KMAG of its charge to advise the S.K. Coast Guard. He delegates the responsibility to U.S. Commander Naval Forces, FEC.

August 5 The carriers USS Valley Forge and the USS Philippine Sea converge on Korean waters within striking range of the battle areas, but the divergence of communication systems continues to plague the operation. Each vessel dispatches liaison pilots to Taegu to coordinate ground-to-air communications. These pilots bolster the Mosquito planes, but one pilot from each carrier must return to his nest each day to update the ground situation. Initially, the pilots are obliged to control only naval attacks, but it immediately becomes imperative that the carrier controller planes must manage everything in their respective areas; the front lines are partitioned into four sectors. Five dive bombers (AD Skyraiders) from the Valley Forge inflict heavy casualties on the enemy near Korysong. On the 6th, Lt. Commander Hodson again leads his squadron and repeats the success, and in addition, the strike decimates an enemy supply depot. Four other Skyraiders, led by Lieutenant B.G. Jackson, also from the Valley Forge, destroy several vehicles near Kumch’on. Complications develop during the missions when F80 aircraft, dispatched from Japan, take preference because of their flight distance and fuel capacity, which restricts them to about five minutes over the target. This necessitates that the carrier planes, transporting heavy bomb loads, waste time and fuel by circling the area for naught while the F-51s from Japan drop their loads on the predetermined naval targets. During one particular raid, planes attached to 67th Fighter Bomber Squadron Group strike concealed enemy positions near Hamchang. Return fire strikes Major Louis Sebille’s aircraft, but despite the heavy damage he refuses to abandon his plane. He maintains the attack and dives directly into the enemy fire and crashes upon the enemy batteries. Sebille posthumously receives the Medal of Honor, the first awarded to a member of the U.S. Air Force.

166 In other Air Force activity, an Air Force rescue plane (SA-16) succeeds during its initial mission to save a downed naval pilot who crashed off the coast of Korea. The mission had been led by Captain Charles E. Shroder, USAF. In Naval activity, the carrier USS Sicily races into the Yellow Sea and catapults its Marine planes (VMF-214) to strike Inchon, Seoul and Mokp’o. The raids pound the airfields, harbor areas, bridges, railroads, factories and warehouses. Also, VMF-323, commanded by Major Arnold Lund, USMC, departs Itami for the carrier Badoeng Strait. The other Marine squadron, VMF(N)-513, assigned to Fifth Air Force, will fly at night and operate from a land base at Itazuke. Meanwhile, on the ground in Korea, Eighth Army moves closer to extinction. On the 8th, MacArthur directs all air units to concentrate on close-air support for the ground troops to forestall disaster. Pusan Perimeter, Naktong Bulge: The 24th Division holds positions designed to guard the lower Naktong. It is deployed at the convergence of the Nam and Naktong Rivers and stretches north along the latter for about thirty-four miles (16 air miles). The 34th Regiment, commanded by Colonel Beauchamp, holds the southern portion west of Yongsan, about six miles east of the river. The 21st Regiment is deployed along the northern perimeter west of Changnyong and it is bolstered by elements of the S.K. 17th Regiment. General Church expects the attack to strike his most fortified point, the northern portion of his perimeter, when they cross the Naktong, because of the area’s lack of good roads. Instead, the Communists launch their initial assault crossing of the Naktong west of the Andong Mountains against the southern perimeter to seize Yongsan. Suddenly, at midnight (5th-6th), the skies above the Naktong River in the southern portion of the 24th Division sector become brilliantly illuminated as multicolor flares catapult from the N.K. 4th Division positions on the west bank. On the signal, the 3rd Battalion, 16th Regiment, and possibly contingents of the 1st Battalion cross at about the same time. The North Koreans have studied the American perimeter and they pick a secure crossing site to leisurely ford the river, west of Yongsan and slightly more than three miles south of Pugong-ni at the Ohang Ferry, where the water is about neck high. Some troops remove their uniforms and carry them atop their heads to keep them dry. Others transport their weapons and clothing on scanty rafts. Upon reaching the east bank of the river at the northern fringe of the bulge, the troops dress, then ignite the attack toward Yongsan. The assault troops move through an existing two-mile wide hole that separates Companies I and L, 3rd Battalion, 34th Regiment. In synchronization, another enemy contingent bolts across the river in the sector defended by the 21st Regiment; however, it becomes entangled in a mine field. The North Koreans attempt to extricate themselves with a prudent advance, until they receive a

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August 5, 1950

A Lockheed F-80 Shooting Star takes off from Japan en route to Korea. The plane passes over farmers working in a rice paddy. combined barrage of U.S. artillery and machine gun fire that forces them to retreat across the river in total disarray. The 3rd Battalion, 34th Regiment, commanded by Lt. Colonel Gines Perez, defends a front line that extends about 15,000 yards (nine miles), which exceeds by 5,000 yards the amount of terrain that was expected to be covered by an entire U.S. division during World War II. The front, interrupted by two valleys that each point to giant hill masses, is blanketed with ragged hills that at some points from the banks of the river reach elevations of 600 feet. One valley entrance is at the Ohang Ferry, and the other lies about four miles farther south

at the bottom of the bulge. It is here that the 3rd Battalion is strung out along the high ground above the river; 4.2-inch mortars are positioned about one mile to its rear in the gulch between the hills east of the ferry crossing. This perimeter, too, has deficiencies. In addition to the colossal gap that exists between Companies I and L, another undefended area that stretches west for about three miles separates Company L and Company K; the latter is deployed at the pinnacle of the bulge where the river dramatically curves. Rather than strike the two rifle companies, the enemy chooses to drive southeast directly through the gap to attack Yongsan. Colonel Perez, unable to contact

August 5, 1950

168

Top: An F-80 Shooting Star damaged in action makes a safe landing at a base in Korea. Bottom: Following the emergency landing, the pilot of the F-80 walks away uninjured. by radio either Colonel Beauchamp or Colonel Ayres, the 1st Battalion commander, dispatches messengers to sound the alarm. But they fail to reach headquarters to deliver the messages. Meanwhile, the North Koreans press forward and run over the mortar positions in the valley, but in the interim, the battalion command post at nearby Soesil is alerted to the danger. Most of these troops pull back safely. Colonel Perez, 3rd Battalion commander, heads for the reserve 1st Battalion positions about three miles farther back along the Yongsan Road to inform Ayres of the severity of the attack. By now the division is fully cognizant of the enemy penetration, but the exact strength is still being calculated. The available resources to thwart it are spread thinly. And with the departure of headquarters, 3rd Battalion, the positions of Battery B, 13th Field Artillery Battalion along the northwestern base of Obong-ni Ridge, become imperiled. At 0520, the 34th Regimental commander, Colonel Beauchamp, informs General Church that the enemy has penetrated his center and that the darkness hinders a clear evaluation of the impending peril. Beauchamp

also tells Church that the reserve 1st Battalion under Colonel Ayres is being committed to the battle. By 0830, on the 6th, Battery B hears nearby smallarms fire, indicating the imminent presence of North Koreans. In the meantime, the 1st Battalion attempts to launch a counterattack to throw the enemy back; however, enemy fire against Battery B intensifies. At 1030, the besieged battery withdraws, but it brings one howitzer, four 2-ton trucks and three smaller vehicles out with it; four howitzers and nine vehicles are abandoned. In addition, Battery B sustains two men killed, six wounded and six more missing. After the sun rises, U.S. planes and ground artillery flex their muscles. They strike enemy crossing sites at the Naktong and forbid the enemy reinforcements from crossing until dusk. In addition to the planes, twentynine Howitzers bolster the 24th Division; twelve 155mm and seventeen 105s spread their fire along more than thirty miles of the divisional front at the Naktong. The 1st Battalion, 34th Regiment, launches its attack during the bombardments, but initially, only one company encounters the enemy. A jeep transporting

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August 5, 1950

F-80 Shooting Stars attack an enemy village. Rising smoke can be seen following direct hits on vehicles. Colonel Ayres and two staff officers moves to the point to gather intelligence to improve the execution of the attack, while trucks transporting Company C also rush to the front. Companies A and B and the weapons company trail on foot. Ayres’ jeep reaches the 3rd Battalion command post, which appears unmolested. The three officers look over the terrain to find the most suitable

positions, but there is little time to prepare. Just as the forward elements arrive, a storm of enemy fire descends from the hills that overlook the abandoned command post. The troops of Company C bolt from the vehicles and immediately attack to seize the heights. Captain Clyde Akridge, the commanding officer, leads the

August 5, 1950

170

Two U.S. soldiers with a North Korean POW pose for a picture (5 August). assault, but he is repeatedly wounded by the withering fire. Following his third wound he is evacuated. During the bitter fighting, Colonel Ayres joins some mortarmen in a gully slightly to the rear and from there he directs return fire against the enemy positions. But here,

too, disaster strikes when incessant fire pummels the area. The mortarmen react heroically and remain at their posts until they exhaust their supply of 60-mm shells. During this fierce exchange, the mortar sergeant

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August 5, 1950

Top: U.S. Eighth Army troops erect a bunker to hold a communications switchboard. Bottom: A twoman team in a vehicle maintains coordinated radio contact for artillery units. stands boldly in full view of the enemy while he directs the fire, until a barrage of machine gun fire nearly slices him in half. Colonel Ayres decides to attempt to reach Companies A and B to direct their actions and salvage the battle. Ayres and several men from his staff run the

gauntlet, and they, too, come under fierce fire as they race through a rice paddy. Two men in the party become wounded, but all reach the slanting hills of Obong-ni Ridge, which has not yet been gained by the enemy. They maneuver around the rear of the recently abandoned

August 5, 1950 positions of Battery B 13th Field Artillery Battalion to discover that Companies A and B have not yet arrived. In the meantime, the positions of Company C become untenable. The enemy accelerates its fire and begins to shred the ranks of the beleaguered company. The dry creek bed from which they are returning fire becomes filled with American blood. Most of the men are either dead or grievously wounded. During these brief but deadly moments, two other officers attempt to break across the rice paddy. Shortly thereafter, more men follow and attempt to reach a grist mill that lies south of the road. The survivors take refuge in the mill, from where they thwart repeated enemy attempts to overrun their positions; enemy troops advance close, but none penetrate the building. Nevertheless, these besieged survivors continue to come under a seething small-arms attack. The enemy fire remains so tenacious and of such magnitude that they are compelled to pile the bodies of their dead buddies against the fragile walls to absorb the shells while they await rescue. Here, too, disaster strikes. Companies A and B, the latter in the lead, advance prudently. The troops at the point discover an enemy contingent that is attempting to pull back. Ten of the contingent are eliminated. Following the encounter, the two units reinitiate the advance against some opposition. Company A moves along the left side of the road and Company B, along the right side. The columns are bolstered by two antiaircraft vehicles. Enemy fire originating on Cloverleaf Hill (Hill 165) hammers Company B and knocks out the trailing antitank vehicle and its four machine guns, stalling the advance. Company A, which receives less severe fire, pushes ahead. It passes the vacated artillery positions and reaches the previous positions of Company C, but it is unaware that Americans hold the grist mill. An accompanying tank commences close-range fire to support attacking elements of Company A. The men of the assault unit storm the building and to their great surprise, they discover the Company C’s survivors rather than the enemy. The inadvertent friendly fire inflicts casualties; one man is killed and several others are wounded. Captain Alfonso, commanding officer, Company A, orders his men to place the wounded aboard the vehicles that had earlier been used by Company C to attempt evacuation, and he directs his men to bring out the dead. The convoy, accompanied by a lead tank, comes under fire as it withdraws, but most vehicles make it back to battalion lines. One man, Lieutenant Payne, is thought to be dead; however, he had only been knocked unconscious by the concussion of the friendly tank fire. Later when he regains consciousness, he tells of the incident that occurred. During the rescue, he hears one of the rescuers saying, as they place him in the truck: “Payne is dead as a mackerel.” Payne then slips back into unconsciousness, but en route to safety, the vehicle transporting him comes under enemy fire, which forced it into a gully. Payne is revived by the shock of the crash and somehow, he manages to walk and crawl to safety. Once the trucks

172 depart with the wounded, Company A reinitiates its attack. Companies K and L, 3rd Battalion, remain in place, while the 1st Battalion attacks, but other 3rd Battalion units that hold the right flank begin to evacuate their defenses. These units are not under any attack, yet without orders, they retreat. Company I, deployed on the hill atop the Naktong, moves northeast toward the 21st Regiment’s lines. Soon after, they are followed by the heavy weapons company. Then, Company A, 26th Antiaircraft Automatic Weapons Battalion, and a mortar platoon also abandon their positions. General Church is informed of these pull-backs by men of the 21st Regiment. Immediately, he orders Colonel Beauchamp, 34th Regimental commander, to intercept these troops and relieve the company commanders. Colonel Beauchamp dispatches his executive officer, Colonel Wadlington, to halt the retreat. He catches the withdrawing units and redirects them to the west, but he marches with them to ensure they resume their prior positions by the river. In conjunction, General Church dispatches the 24th Division Reconnaissance Company to the positions that had been abandoned by Company I. Church instructs the unit to block the Naktong River–Changnyong Road. Later, the Reconnaissance Company and I Company attack an enemy-held hill outside the village of Pugong-ni, but it fails. Heavy enemy fire from the heights inflicts serious casualties on the attacking units. During the morning (6th), General Church concludes that the majority of North Koreans that infiltrated east of the river have been confined to the bulge of the Naktong area. He had previously believed that the enemy would strike the northern sector of his lines. Church orders the 19th Regiment, 24th Division, to attack west to cover the northern flank of the 34th Regiment. The risk proves fruitful, as the regiment converges on an enemy group composed of about 300 troops and catches them off guard in a village near Ohang Hill about one mile east of the river. The 19th Regiment, commanded by Colonel Ned Moore, takes the advantage and swiftly swings into action to terminate the threat. The regiment wipes out nearly the entire North Korean contingent. Meanwhile, Company A, 1st Battalion, 19th Regiment, resumes its advance to the river. Company B, earlier stalled by enemy fire, establishes positions on Cloverleaf Hill. Although the North Koreans had occupied portions of Cloverleaf Hill as they moved east, it becomes evident that they have not yet maneuvered south of the Yongsan-Naktong Road. Consequently, the high ground at Obong-ni Ridge still remains free of the enemy. Company A reaches a contingent of Company L at its original positions along the Naktong River at about 2000, but the combined force amounts to less than 100 men. After establishing night positions, Company A makes use of a forward artillery spotter’s radio to reestablish contact with the 1st Battalion. At daybreak on the 7th, Captain Alfonso discovers that enemy troops have secured the ridge to the right

173 of his positions. He requests artillery fire to eliminate the threat. Alfonso dispatches a squad to investigate the effects of the artillery, but enemy fire drives it back. After dusk on the first day of battle for the bulge, the enemy gets more reinforcements across the river to make it clear that their positions will not easily be eliminated. The fighting fails to terminate with the setting sun; however, the enemy encounters tough opposition. Although some units have been thumped and several others have abandoned their positions, most stand steadfastly, thus preventing acute panic from spreading through the lines. Before dawn on the 7th, the S.K. 17th Regiment, scheduled to move out and reform with the ROK Army, is repeatedly struck as the enemy attempts to cross the river on the right flank. Nevertheless, the South Koreans repel each attack, prior to their relief by Task Force Hyzer on the morning of the 7th. Meanwhile, during the night of the 6th, General Church makes preparations to maintain the momentum. He orders the 19th and 34th Regiments to reinitiate the counterattack on the 7th. In the 25th Division sector, Marine officers General Craig and Lt. Colonel Stewart arrive in Masan to attend a final conference with Generals Walker and Kean to discuss the imminent U.N. offensive. Walker enunciates his disappointment about the inability of Eighth Army to halt the enemy up to now. He states with equal passion that no more ground is to be surrendered, and he reiterates his “stand or die” policy. Following the meeting, Craig and Stewart hop back into the helicopter, piloted by Lieutenant Gustave Lueddeke, and within several minutes, Craig joins Colonel Murray at his 5th Marines’ command post to brief him on the plan of attack against Sachon and Chinju. Pusan Perimeter, Eastern Corridor: The N.K. 3rd Division and the S.K. 5th Division have been heavily engaged around Yongdok, with domination of the area swinging back and forth. On this day, the North Koreans launch a tenacious assault and push the defenders from the town. They are driven south to Hill 181. Eighth Army reacts quickly; the KMAG advisor to the S.K. 3rd Division, Lt. Colonel Rollins Emmerich, receives a private dispatch from General Walker that emphasizes the imperativeness of regaining the lost ground. A counterattack is being scheduled for the following day, but in the meantime, the enemy maintains great pressure on the South Korean positions on Hill 181. In the S.K. 1st Division sector, the N.K. 13th Division continues to ferry its troops across the Naktong River at a point about forty air-miles northwest of Taegu at Naktong-ni. Elements of the 21st N.K. Regiment are spotted. Aircraft arrive to strafe the troops while they are still in the water. South Korean artillery and mortars also plaster the crossing site. The combined artillery barrages and air strikes continue to hammer the enemy after they reach the south bank of the river. Later, during the night, the N.K. 19th Regiment moves across the river in the same spot. The unit is able to wade across, but its vehicles and heavy weapons are left behind. Also, the N.K. 15th Division, advancing

August 6, 1950 south of the N.K. 13th Division, receives about 1,500 replacement troops while in Kumch’on, which lifts its strength to about 6,500 troops. In other activity, the U.S. 23rd Regiment arrives in Korea from the United States; it departs for Taegu.

August 6

Pusan Perimeter, Naktong Bulge: (See also August 5, 1950) The 1st Battalion, 34th Regiment, mounts a counterattack in the Naktong River area to assist the 3rd Battalion contingents that have been under attack since midnight of the 5th-6th. The 1st Battalion is composed of twenty officers and 471 enlisted men. The U.S. forces hold most of their ground. Their supply route that moves up from Yongsan has not been cut by the enemy and the road beyond the village remains open, which permits reinforcements to arrive from Miryang if necessary. Also, General Church forms Task Force Hyzer, which is composed of the 3rd Engineer Combat Battalion (minus Company A), the 78th Tank Battalion (minus its tanks) and the Reconnaissance Company (24th Division). The task force is needed to fill a gap created by Eighth Army orders that call for the release of the ROK 17th Regiment (TF Min) from the 24th Division, which reverts back to the South Korean Army. In other activity, the 1st Battalion, 9th Regiment, 2nd Division, arrives at Changnyong and is soon after attached to the 24th Division. Heavy fighting continues in this sector until the 19th of August, while U.S. troops engage the N.K. 4th Division. Much of the gruesome combat centers around the strategic positions of Cloverleaf (Hill 165) and Obong-ni Ridge. Southwest Pusan Perimeter: Eighth Army issues the operational order to launch the offensive toward Chinju at 0630 on the following day (August 7). Major General William Kean, 25th Division commander, will lead the contingent, designated Task Force Kean. In conjunction, the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade is attached to the 25th Division. The 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, commanded by Lt. Colonel Robert Taplett, and the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines (Artillery), depart Changwon at 1040 and arrive at Chindong-ni before 1230. The 2nd Platoon, 75-mm recoilless gun, and the 3rd Platoon and company engineers accompany the infantry. The other units arrive later in the day. By about 1600, Taplett orders the artillery and mortar units to fire for registration on the northern approaches to Chindong-ni. Initially, the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, comes under the jurisdiction of Colonel Michaelis, 27th Regiment, USA, but upon arrival of a second Marine battalion, command passes to General Craig, USMC. The main assault force, Task Force Kean, is composed of the 25th Division (minus the 27th Regiment and the 8th Field Artillery Bn., both of which are relieved today at the front and placed in Army reserve), the 5th Regimental Combat Team and the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade. The 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, relieves the 2nd Battalion, 27th Regiment on and in the vicinity of Hill 255, situated about one

August 6, 1950

174

Top: U.S. troops are deployed with a 105-mm howitzer near Naktong River on 6 August. Bottom: A bunker holding a 4.2-inch M2 chemical mortar and crew, photographed August 5. The bunker, constructed with logs, rice straw and other items, is near the Naktong River. and one-half miles outside of Chindong-ni on the west side of the north-south road. The 3rd Battalion 5th Marines command post is established on the first step of the hill, slightly above on the second rise. Company H, commanded by Captain Joseph Fegan, facing north, deploys defensively. Soon after, Fegan requests permission to move to higher ground, about 500

yards from the closest battalion unit, but the request is denied. Taplett wishes to keep the battalion closely tied to ensure blockage of the main supply route (MSR) approaches. The 2nd Platoon, Company H, spreads out beyond Chindong-ni in the heights east of the MSR to intercept any infiltrators that encroach from the mountains southeast of the road or from the sea.

175 Company G, 5th Marines commanded by Lieutenant Robert Bohn, deploys its 2nd and 3rd Platoons on nearby Hill 99, located on the opposite side of the valley and slightly west of Hill 255. The 1st Platoon, Company G, led by 2nd Lieutenant John Cahill, deploys about 600 yards from Chindong-ni at the base of Hill 255 to guard the Haman Road. The 1st Platoon is reinforced by the Recoilless Gun Platoon. Toward evening, the 27th Regiment and the 2nd Battalion, 5th Regimental Combat Team, stand along the front west of Chindong-ni, with the former close to the road and the latter spread amid the heights to the north. Later, the remainder of the 5th Regimental Combat Team assumes the positions of the forward 27th Regimental troops in conjunction with the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, which relieves the 1st Battalion, 27th Regiment, and assumes its reserve positions. Also, the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines, is set to relieve the 2nd Battalion, 5th Regimental Combat Team, on the high ground north of the highway on the 7th. Eighth Army Intelligence estimates the opposing force (N.K. 6th Division) to be about 7,500 troops, but it actually stands at approximately 6,000 men. However, unbeknownst to the U.S., the 83rd N.K. Motorized Regiment had joined the division, making the troop estimate accurate. In other activity, elements of the N.K. 6th Division attack the 2nd Battalion, 35th Regiment, about three miles west of Chungam-ni. The assault drives one company from its lines, but a strong counterattack regains the lost terrain. The 35th Regiment had been preparing to attack on the following day. The N.K. 6th Division has occupied a series of tunnels and mine shafts that permeate the western slopes of Sobuk-san. The enemy troops utilize the concealed positions for underground quarters and supply depots. These cavernous areas aid the North Koreans during their month-long (August) siege against Masan. In other activity, the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, commanded by Lt. Col. Robert Taplett, continues to fortify its positions on Hill 255, while other Marine units continue to arrive in the sector. Just after midnight (6th-7th), Taplett receives an urgent call from Colonel Michaelis, who relays orders from General Kean. The order from Kean directs the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, to speed one reinforced platoon to support a beleaguered contingent of the 5th Regimental Combat Team, Company F, which is under attack on the slope of Hill 342. An enemy contingent has pushed out one platoon, which had been deployed on a small ridge under the crest. The enemy gain places them on excellent ground from where they can effortlessly observe activity at the command posts of both the 5th Regimental Combat Team and the 5th Marines, causing complications for the imminent U.S. offensive. Taplett explains that he cannot spare one platoon, having only six, but Michaelis informs him that General Kean says that Hill 342 (Yaban-san) must be held at all hazards. Fifty-two Marines from Company G’s 1st Platoon are assigned the task. The platoon is reinforced

August 6, 1950 with a machine gun squad and an SCR-300 operator. Lieutenant Cahill leads the contingent to Colonel Michaelis’ CP, south of Hill 99, near a bridge and from there to the command post of the 2nd Battalion, 5th RCT, located slightly north of the road on the eastern fringe of Hill 342. Cahill’s Platoon, ordered to relieve Company F, 5th RCT, departs the CP with a guide. Due to the pitchblack darkness, the guide takes the wrong route and causes a delay. Still in friendly terrain, the Marine platoon is then beset by more misfortune as it advances toward the end of the valley that lies between the two elongated spurs of Hill 342. At about 0500, after gaining only three miles, rifle fire suddenly strikes the column. Two Marines become wounded. The guide, puzzled by the fire from within friendly lines, suggests that the column await dawn before ascending the slope. Soon after, it is determined that the incoming fire had originated from troops of the 2nd Battalion, 5th RCT, who had been unaware of the Marines’ presence in the sector. The troops that had opened fire erroneously assumed the Marines had been an advancing enemy force. The mission to take the hill resumes on the 7th. Meanwhile, to the left of the 35th Regiment, the 24th Regiment undertakes the task of securing the area of mountain mass that separates the paths of the 35th Regiment and the 5th Regimental Combat Team, both of which will participate in the upcoming offensive. The 24th Regiment incurs problems at its positions near Haman. West of the town, a contingent of North Koreans springs an ambush upon Company L, but the attack also disperses Company I and creates bedlam as troops flee haphazardly. During the unruly retreat, one officer alleges that his own command bowled him over three separate times as they sprinted to the rear. Nonetheless, the entire line doesn’t concede its ground. One soldier, PFC William Thompson, attached to the Heavy Weapons Company, chooses to stand and fight. Thompson places a machine gun in position and delivers sheets of fire against the charging enemy. He holds without relinquishing even one yard, despite being pummeled by enemy fire and grenades. Thompson’s relentless actions temporarily contain the attacking force, as its fire concentrates on him. Thompson becomes wounded by grenade fragments and then by small arms fire, but still he refuses to abandon his weapon. Finally, an enemy grenade strikes a mortal blow. PFC Thompson, Company M, 24th Regiment, receives the Medal of Honor posthumously for his uncompromising courage in the face of the enemy. Also, Colonel Horton White is relieved as commander of the 24th Regiment, subsequent to today’s actions by the regiment. White is replaced by Colonel Arthur Champney. Pusan Perimeter, Central Front, Taegu: The 1st Cavalry Division is spread over a wide area; from its farthest point, Waegwan, the 5th, 8th and 7th Cavalry Regiments are strung (north to south). The cavalry links with the 24th Division positions along the Naktong Bulge to the south and with the S.K. 1st Division

August 6, 1950 to the north. The 7th and 8th Cavalry Regiments each protect a 10,000-yard area, but the 5th Cavalry’s zone comprises 14,000 yards at Waegwan. The cavalry’s artillery positions are about 7,000 yards to the rear and spaced at about 6,000 to 7,000 yards apart, which weakens the batteries’ positions because of the enor-

176 mous distance between them. Nevertheless, two batteries are able to combine their power. Today, north of the 1st Cavalry Division’s 5th Cavalry positions at Waegwan, the N.K. 1st Division initiates its crossing of the Naktong in a sector defended by the S.K. 6th Division. The Communists complete

A gun crew aboard a carrier observes a Corsair (Vought F4U), which is armed with rockets as it takes off.

177 the crossing by August 8. About 2,500 replacement troops join the enemy division, some at Hamch’ang and the balance later. In other activity, the third and final regiment of the N.K. 13th Division, the 23rd, fords the Naktong during the night of the 6th-7th using rafts. Two artillery battalions also cross with the 23rd Regiment. The N.K. 13th Division operation has been unfolding in a distant and thinly defended area of the S.K. 1st Division. Nonetheless, South Korean pressure keeps the enemy somewhat subdued and compels the Communist forces to seek positions in the mountains. Once it regroups in the mountains east of the Naktong, a night attack is launched that breaks through the South Korean lines. Within a week, the enemy division reaches the area about fifteen miles north of Taegu, where it converges with the N.K. 1st Division. Meanwhile, south of the N.K. 13th Division, the N.K. 15th Division begins to advance toward the Naktong. Its 45th Regiment heads northeast. Pusan Perimeter, Eastern Corridor: South of Yongdok, intense close-quartered fighting continues to ensue on Hill 181. Each side lies within grenade range of the other. The congested battlefield remains under observation from the S.K. 3rd Division command post while the night attack plan is being worked out. To regain Yongdok, the South Koreans must first rid Hill 181 of the enemy. The South Koreans prepare to jump from

August 6, 1950 their positions on Hill 181 at about 1900. At 1930, U.S. planes attack the enemy positions. The aircraft launch rockets and deliver both napalm and bombs for a fifteen-minute duration to soften resistance. Immediately following the cessation of the air strikes, naval surface vessel guns combine with artillery units to further pound the enemy. Then at 2000, the 22nd and 23rd S.K. Regiments advance. Both drive straight toward the heights and following a tenacious exchange, they secure the hill. Throughout the night, the North Koreans unsuccessfully attempt to reconquer the hill. While the two sides pound each other, one enemy mortar shell lands in close proximity to the S.K. Command Post. Colonel Emmerich sends a runner to inspect the area and evaluate the damage. He discovers several dead soldiers near the command post, but there is no indication of the whereabouts of General Chu Sik Lee, the commanding general, nor any of his staff. KMAG advisors Colonel Emmerich and Major Harold Slater begin a search, but even with the assistance of flashlights, they too are unable to find the general. South Korean troops join in the search, and eventually General Lee is found, safely tucked in a hillside bunker. Colonel Emmerich directs the general to gather his staff and head back to the command post. On the following day, Emmerich arranges for the general’s relief of command. The contest for the hill resumes on the following

The Australian destroyer Bataan (foreground) screens the carrier USS Bataan.

August 7, 1950 day. Also, the S.K. 1st Separate Battalion and the Yongdungp’o Battalion are dissolved and absorbed into the 22nd and 23rd Regiments. In Naval activity, Naval Forces Far East establishes Fleet Air Wing 6, which assumes operational control of the U.S. and British patrol squadrons based in Japan. Also, planes from the Sicily again strike the areas around Inchon, Seoul and Mokp’o, to pound enemy facilities and troop concentrations. Also, Marine planes (VMF323), armed with 20-mm cannon, five-inch rockets and 500 pound bombs, catapult from the USS Badoeng Strait to fly support missions for Eighth Army. The F4U Corsairs fly thirty sorties. The planes, led by Major Arnold A. Lund and Major Roger F. Steinkraus, hit targets along the Namgang River at points west of Chinju. The missions are the first sorties flown in combat in Korea from the Badoeng Strait. — In Japan: Major General Clark L. Ruffner arrives in Japan from the United States. Ruffner begins working with the plans for the amphibious invasion of Korea by the 8th. Subsequently, he is appointed X Corps chief of staff upon its activation. In other activity, W. Averell Harriman and his entourage, including Generals Lauris (Larry) Norstad and Matthew Ridgway, arrive in Tokyo to meet with General MacArthur. Harriman’s party attends the morning briefing of the GHQ and then has lunch with the MacArthurs at the U.S. Embassy. Later, during the afternoon, while Harriman is again conferring with MacArthur, Generals Ridgway and Norstad meet with General Almond and other GHQ staff members. Much of the conversation between Harriman and MacArthur focuses on the two Chinas, Communist and Formosa. Also, General Stratemeyer begins to counter the enemy’s new tactic of transporting its supplies only by night. He orders reconnaissance flights to intercept these convoys. Before the end of August, the planes augment their missions by dropping flares. B-29s drop M-26 parachute flares (World War II leftovers) over suspected enemy routes from altitudes of about 10,000 feet. Trailing B-26s observe the flares as they burst at about 6,000 feet, then strike any discovered targets. However, many of these aged flares fail to operate.

August 7–August 15 1950

Southwest Pusan Perimeter: In the U.N.’s first offensive (BLOODY GULCH), Task Force Kean launches its offensive, but the N.K. 6th Division initiates its attack almost simultaneously, which guarantees a donnybrook. Anticipated U.S. air strikes are canceled due to a dense fog that carpets the coastal area in the vicinity of Chindong-ni. Nonetheless, lacking air support, the assault goes off. At 0700 U.S. artillery commences a powerful barrage to signal the advance. Once the guns become silent, from right to left, the 35th Regiment jumps off from its positions at the Notch to drive from the northeast. In synchronization, the 5th Regimental Combat Team pushes up the center. It heads due west along the secondary inland road. Soon

178 after, the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, on the left flank, grinds along the south coastal road. The artillery ceases fire at 0720. The 2nd Battalion, 35th Regiment, poised about three miles west of Chungami at the Notch, jumps off and immediately runs into stiff opposition mounted by about 500 North Korean troops supported by self-propelled guns. Fierce fighting ensues there for about five hours. Meanwhile, on the right flank, slightly west of Chindong-ni, the 1st Battalion, 5th Regimental Combat Team, pushes out. It encounters no opposition as it proceeds to the road junction, but once there, it commits a costly error. Rather than pursuing its straight course due west, the contingent veers left at the junction, thereby leaving one of its objectives, the strategic hill that sits northwest of the intersection, unmanned. The remainder of the 5th Regimental Combat Team and the 5th Marine Regiment, each trailing the 1st Battalion, 5th RCT, continue their advance, expecting cover fire from the 1st Battalion on the dominating hill. Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion, 5th RCT, advances about three miles along the wrong route and reaches a hill mass south of the road fork; this places its line of advance on the road previously designated to the 5th Marines. Heavy opposition greatly hinders the advancement of the 5th RCT for about two days. Back with Lt. Colonel John Wilkins’ 2nd Battalion, 35th Regiment, at the center of the advance, the combat continues at a furious pace as both sides hammer each other. The Americas receive some welcome air support toward the latter part of the fivehour battle, which propels them to victory and gives them possession of the pass and the heights to the north. With the ground secured, the 35th Regiment continues west, less encumbered by the enemy. It reaches positions near the Much’on-ni road fork by dark. Near Pansong, the 35th overruns an enemy command post and seizes Russian-made radios (large capacity) and other headquarters supplies and reports. The advance also captures four trucks, each loaded with ammunition and weapons. The 35th Regiment, commanded by Colonel Fisher, also slays about 350 enemy troops and destroys two tanks, five anti-tank guns and one self-propelled gun. The 35th Regiment then holds in place through the night. On the following morning, it advances to the heights just to the front of the road fork. In the meantime, to the rear of the departure point of the 35th Regiment, in the sector expected to be swept by the 24th Regiment, the situation remains poor, caused by the rout of the contingents of the 3rd Battalion, 24th Regiment, on the previous day. The 3rd Battalion commander, Lt. Colonel Samuel Pierce, and another officer locate the battalion in Haman, about four miles to the rear. The inability of the 24th Regiment to secure Sobuk-san keeps the Americans in the dark concerning enemy troop

179

August 7, 1950

Top: U.S. Navy helicopter (Sikorsky R-5) departs a carrier off the coast of Korea to be prepared to rescue a pilot if necessary. Helicopter crews remain airborne during carrier plane missions. Bottom: A U.S. Navy maintenance crew on the flight deck of a carrier examines a Panther jet prior to a mission. strength in the area behind TF Kean. This failure also enables the Communist forces to get behind American lines and disrupt the supply convoys, attempting to reach the front. On the left flank, some contingents of the 5th Marines have been heavily engaged since the previ-

ous night, supporting the 5th RCT commanded by Colonel Ordway on Hill 342. As dawn breaks on the 7th, the Marine platoon from Company G (3rd Battalion, 5th Marines), led by 2nd Lieutenant John Cahill, resumes its ascent up the rugged hill, advancing toward the crest. The troops pause while

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180

Top: A U.S. soldier attaches a battery to a sniperscope M2. The weapon, a carbine rifle (.30-caliber), is for use during night fighting. Bottom: U.S. aircraft carriers (Essex Class) at anchor in Japan. The carrier on the left shows F-80 Sabre jets on its deck. A landing craft is in the foreground.

181 Lieutenant Cahill and Sergeant Lee Buettner move to the crest under enemy fire as they attempt to locate the isolated soldiers. This emerges as the first action between the enemy and the Marines. Thirty-seven Marines reach the peak, but eight Marines are wounded and three are killed. While the Marines are regrouping on the reverse slope, the North Koreans pound the area with a massive amount of fire, which prompts some soldiers to abandon the perimeter; but quick and decisive actions by an Eighth Army lieutenant halts the stampede. The troops then re-inhabit their foxholes. Soon after, Cahill’s Marines are dispersed around the perimeter to share positions with the soldiers in the foxholes. The unusual mix produces excellent results, as the assorted Army and Marine infantrymen are each determined to exemplify the high standards of their units. Two additional Marines are instantly killed while being led to their positions on the crest. More reinforcements are rushed to the hill. At 1100, the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines, led by Lt. Colonel Harold Roise (subsequent to the departure of the attacking 1st Battalion, 5th RCT USMC), advances to relieve Colonel Throckmorton’s beleaguered 2nd Battalion, 5th RCT, on the ridge, but it encounters an immediate obstacle. North Korean troops who had infiltrated the ridge during the night have wedged themselves between the Marines and the 2nd Battalion, 5th RCT. In the meantime, the enemy places a curtain of troops around Hill 342, further endangering the small command at the top of it. At 1200, the Marines and soldiers on the summit are unexpectedly pummeled with a devastating, unending string of enemy rifle and machine gun fire that slams across the confined perimeter. Terrorizing mortar fire joins the ensemble of flying death. In coordination with the blazing enemy fire, the approach slope is permeated with huge numbers of creeping enemy troops who are attempting to remain concealed. No one on the summit moves from his position while the enemy horde approaches; rather, the isolated troops commence firing with equal tenacity, determined to halt the attack and retain the crest. However, the defenders are rapidly diminishing their ammunition. Cahill uses his SCR-300 radio to contact Army artillery units to help neutralize the enemy mortars. Following the urgent request for assistance, the guns of the artillery fire effectively on suspected enemy mortar outposts. Nonetheless, the mortars are not silenced. Cahill’s Marine platoon and the elements of the 5th RCT maintain control of the summit, but the ammunition level reaches a critical point, and the Army’s water supply is rapidly vanishing. Cahill calls for an air drop to rectify the problem. A large Air Force R4D transport plane passes over and drops supplies and ammunition, but only one package is recovered. The remainder falls into enemy held terrain. The sole retrieved package contains only carbine shells and is of no value to the cause.

August 7, 1950 Two additional attempts are made by the more maneuverable OY-2s from Marine Squadron VMO6. The VMO-6 squadron confiscates every available water can in the unit to donate to the desperate troops on the crest. The third attempt succeeds and pinpoints the mark to deliver the supplies, but again misfortune strikes. Each of the water cans explodes upon impact. The additional Marine reinforcements (2nd Battalion, 5th Marines) advance, but en route, they encounter the enemy that had infiltrated during the previous night. A vicious battle ignites. The Marines, still unadjusted to the scorching heat of Korea, move in to slug it out with the enemy in close-quarters as the temperature soars to about 112 degrees. The draining weather and accompanying enemy fire halt the progress of the Marines, who sustain more casualties (about thirty Marines) to the elements than to the opposition. The 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines establishes contact with the isolated command on the following day, but first, it re-initiates more ferocious fighting along the slopes. Slightly before daybreak on the 8th, the North Koreans storm Hill 342, but it holds. Company D, 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines, drives to the summit to relieve the Army contingent and Cahill’s platoon from Company G, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines. Cahill’s platoon and the army elements evacuate the crest. Six Marines under Cahill have been killed and twelve wounded. Meanwhile, Company D is struck with a storm of fire; 2nd Lt. Wallace Reid is killed and Captain John Finn, while attempting to retrieve Reid’s body, receives two serious wounds. First Lieutenant Robert Hanifin, Jr., assumes command as the North Koreans mount another attack to seize the crest. Hanifin falters as heat exhaustion causes him to collapse. But in his place, Master Sergeant Harold Reeves and Second Lieutenant Leroy Wirth take over the unit and the attack is repelled. Company D, 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines, holds the hill. It sustains eight Marines killed and twenty-eight wounded. On the 9th of August, the summit of Hill 342 is given to the 24th Regiment, USA. Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, which had begun relieving the 27th Regiment, USA, on the previous night, completes the exercise at 1120. At this time, General Edward Craig, USMC, commanding officer of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, assumes command over all troops on the Chindong-ni front. The action occurs due to orders issued by General Kean, who has become especially irritated by the ongoing confusion on the field. To add to the dilemma, friendly tanks inadvertently sever Army communications when their treads rip through telephone lines that are stretched openly on the ground. Upon relief by the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines, on Hill 342 (Fox Hill), Colonel Throckmorton’s weakened 2nd Battalion, 5th RCT, proceeds toward

August 7, 1950 the dominant hill northwest of Chindong-ni to secure it. The 1st Battalion, 5th RCT, had accidentally bypassed it on the previous day. The 2nd Battalion contains only two effective companies following its week-long duty on Hill 342. The assault to seize the hill fails, due partially to ineffective supporting artillery fire. Later in the afternoon, a fuming General Kean arrives at the 2nd Battalion, 5th RCT, positions. Kean makes his point by ignoring Colonel Ordway (regimental commander, 5th RCT), while speaking to Colonel Throckmorton, who is standing close by: “I want that hill tonight.” After the encounter with General Kean, three tanks are rolled into position to provide cover fire in concert with the deployment of 4.2-inch and 81-mm mortars. Companies E and G, despite their weariness, launch a successful but strenuous night attack to seize the hill. The troops are victorious; however, by dusk on the 8th, they are also on the brink of total exhaustion. Since the commencement of the U.S. westward offensive on the 7th, the din of battle has not been confined to the area west of Chindong-ni. During the night of the 6th-7th, North Korean contingents move eastward and nudge around the fringes of Chindong-ni. They occupy Hill 255, which controls the road from there to Masan, essentially endangering the supply route. Meanwhile, the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines and contingents of the 2nd Battalion, 24th Regiment, bolstered by air strikes, batter the newly enemy-occupied hill, but without success. The Marines and soldiers also commit tanks, mortars and ample dosages of artillery shells, but still, the entrenched North Koreans hold Hill 255 with resolute determination. The 159th Field Artillery Battalion’s Companies B and C jointly propel about 1,600 shells into the roadblock, and additional fire power is also called upon. The 555th Artillery Battalion, at the request of the 5th Marines on site, pours its fire upon the enemy obstruction. Captain Joseph Fegan, commander of H Company, commits the 1st Platoon, led by Lieutenant John Williams. The platoon advances until halted by a storm of machine gun fire and an abundance of thrown grenades originating about thirty yards away. Williams is ordered to pull his unit back and the 3rd Platoon is directed to charge the positions, but the 3rd Platoon, apparently stunned by the thrashing received by the 1st Platoon, fails to advance into the ring of fire. Captain Fegan bolts into action. He leads the attack; two Marines, Tech Sergeant Ray Morgan and PFC Donald Terrio, hit the enemy’s right flank with tenacious swiftness and knock out two enemy machine guns. Another team hits the left flank and rakes it with BAR fire. Corporal Melvin James, leading the assault against the left flank, extricates six Marines who had been wounded during the fierce action. The attack is bloody, but the 3rd Platoon an-

182 nihilates the defenders. Sgt. Edward Barrett, wounded twice, is taken to safety by Captain Fegan. The enemy withstands the brutal punishment for two days, but by the morning of the 9th, the combined thrust of contingents of the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, and two battalions of the 24th Regiment, causes the enemy to falter. Temperatures soaring well over 100 degrees further aggravates the situation. Undaunted, the Marines and the soldiers apply more pressure. The battle for Hill 255 ends successfully for the Americans. Company H, 5th Marines, advances during the morning of the 8th and dislodges the enemy from the high ground. Elements of the 24th Regiment hook up with the Marines on Hill 255, and shortly after 1200, the roadblock is eliminated. The 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines receives the heaviest opposition. It sustains about 70 casualties during the final day; however, again, about one-half are caused by heat exhaustion. In contrast, the Americans count 120 enemy dead and estimate total enemy casualties at 600. Task Force Kean had initiated its offensive early on the 7th with expectations of stunning the enemy, but instead had itself been startled as it rammed into the unexpected enemy attack. Unlike U.S. Intelligence during World War II, the U.S. operations in Korea have no OSS-type units behind the lines to feed information and confound the enemy. Lacking critical information and strategic tactics, major gaps remain constant concerning details on enemy intentions and troop movements. Despite incessant pleas for operations of this type, Washington never authorizes them, keeping the U.N. troops at a disadvantage. And it is assumed that all U.N. information forwarded to the United Nations is discreetly being forwarded instantaneously to the Soviet Union. Despite the poor intelligence and the seemingly perpetual confusion, by the 9th, TF Kean bulldozes through the maze of the initial enemy opposition and prepares to jump-start the center and southern spears of the attack. The 5th Marines moves to the positions of the 1st Battalion, 5th RCT, at the hill along the coastal road. Upon relief, the 1st Battalion, 5th RCT, retraces its steps to the road junction west of Chindong-ni and begins to advance along the proper road to rejoin the regiment. The 5th Marines initiates a fast paced advance down the coastal road. On the 9th, subsequent to the seizure of Hill 255, the 5th Marines quickens its pace as it moves under the wings of eagles: the carriers USS Badoeng Strait and Sicily each have their eagles soaring overhead to scour the area in front of the advancing troops. Targets are located and in the blink of an eye, Corsairs attached to the 1st Marine Air Wing descend rapidly to deliver stunning overdoses of close-air support that eradicate the threats. Usually, weather permitting, about 6 Corsairs remain in close proximity to the Marine ground troops

183 during daylight hours. The Marine pilots mother General Craig’s ground troops as they drive forward. In the lead, the 1st Battalion, commanded by Lt. Colonel Newton, takes Hill 308 and secures the strategic road junction at Tosan. Then, the 2nd Battalion, led by Lt. Colonel Harold Roise, sprints to the point to spearhead the advance toward Kosong. En route the 2nd Battalion encounters an enemy ambush at Taedabok Pass, less than ten miles from Kosong. To ensure progress, the 3rd Battalion, led by Lieutenant Robert Taplett, pivots to take a calculated shortcut to bounce ahead of the 2nd Battalion. However, a probing patrol led by Major Morgan McNeely ventures too far out front and vanishes around a bend. The Communists spring an ambush that shreds the jeep and nearly decimates the six-man patrol. Company G then rounds the bend and spots the destroyed jeep and the six Marines who are helplessly sprawled on the ground. Three of the Marines are dead and the other three are grievously wounded. Colonel McNeely (mortally wounded) is dragged to safety by Lieutenant Westerman, but he, too, becomes wounded in the process. The remainder of the advance patrol cannot be extricated until the following day (10th). The Marines continue to eliminate the opposition along the coastal road. By the 11th, the resistance in the high ground at the constricted Taedabok Pass is totally silenced. Two Sherman tanks take the point, trailed by Company H. The column starts a nine-mile march to Kosong. It encounters enemy opposition in the high ground along the approach, but the resistance is rooted out and the advance resumes. As the leading 3rd Battalion encroaches the objective, supporting artillery of the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, begins to plaster the area near a road junction west of the town to adjust its fire. Through some good fortune, some of the artillery shells fall among concealed enemy vehicles. Thanks to the reaction of the North Koreans, a bonanza results. Believing their positions have been zeroed in, the enemy force (83rd Motorized Regiment, 105th N.K. Division) hurriedly boards the vehicles to evacuate the area and rush toward Sachon to escape what they think is grid fire. The ensuing clouds of dust bring a clear focus to a band of four Marine Corsairs from the carrier Badoeng Strait that arrive over the Marine column. The planes catch the enemy column as it flees. The four Corsairs dive and attack the convoy from extremely low altitude. They zoom over the column of nearly 200 exposed vehicles and strafe the entire line, creating instant disorientation. A huge multiple vehicle accident occurs. While some trucks crash into one another, others attempt to get off the road to evade the incoming fire. Consequently, troops bolt for cover, but the motorcyclists that are dispersed between the vehicles get trapped in the massive pile up.

August 7, 1950 Meanwhile, the airborne quartet swings around to unleash another attack. During the planes’ second low-level pass, enemy ground troops return fire and hit two of the aircraft. One plane, piloted by Captain Vivian Moses, crashes in a nearby rice paddy. Captain Moses, knocked unconscious upon impact, drowns. The other crippled plane makes an emergency landing. By this time, about forty vehicles have been destroyed, and the surprised enemy motorized regiment is going to get stung by another attack. A few more Marines in Corsairs arrive overhead, and they are joined by a group of swarming Air Force F-51s. The heat gets turned up considerably. The aircraft easily follow the path of the crunched convoy and dose out more deadly fire to the blistering attack. Wild explosions occur as the Corsairs strike ammunition trucks, causing more panic. The vehicles that survive the ordeal hobble toward Sachon. Later, during the afternoon, the 5th Marines reaches the rubble of the convoy; 24 jeeps, 31 trucks and 45 motorcycles lie wasted. The estimate of enemy casualties is 200. The Marines push past the smoldering convoy and reach a point about four miles west of Kosong, where they rest for the night. In concert, the 5th Marines sweeps along the coastal road, and the 5th Regimental Combat Team has renewed its advance up the center, moving toward Much’on-ni. On the 10th, the Army’s 5th Regimental Combat Team approaches Pongam-ni, a dingy village of about twenty primitive mud huts with thatched roofs, situated east of the pass near a junction of the primary east-west road. Another tiny village, Taejong-ni, also east of the pass, sits several hundred yards away. Enemy fortifications north of the town, including Tundok, have been attacked by naval planes, but the area in front of Pongam-ni holds concentrations of enemy troops that had not been discovered by the air observation sorties. The enemy lurks in the heights on the north side of the road that will be used by the 1st Battalion, RCT5, as it attacks on the right. The 2nd Battalion, commanded by Colonel Throckmorton, operating on the left, drives along the south side of the highway. The 1st Battalion, under Lt. Col. John P. Jones, comes under fire by the enemy in the northern heights, but the unit reaches Pongam-ni and establishes its command post there. The 3rd Battalion, 5th RCT, also advances west, and on the following day (11th), it pushes forward to the Much’on-ni Road fork to hook up with the awaiting 35th Regiment to launch a scheduled combined thrust toward Chinju Pass. The 3rd Battalion’s departure from Pongam-ni strips the Headquarters 5th RCT and Battery C, 555th Field Artillery Battalion, positions (east of the village) of all infantry support. Beyond the village road junction, about 400 yards to the northeast and on the northern side of the eastwest road, lies an ominous hill that lacks foliage. It

August 7, 1950 is the western terminus of a protracted enemyoccupied ridge that straddles the highway. Companies B and C, 1st Battalion, 5th RCT, occupy the eastern sector of this ridge, but the enemy controls the remainder and it intends to dominate the pass. West of the road junction, two additional ridges that shadow a 300-yard-wide valley converge about 1,000

184 yards from the villages. The 2nd Battalion, 5th Regimental Combat Team deploys on the southern sector of both of these ridges; Company E remains in Pongam-ni. The east-west road leads out of the western edge of Pongam-ni and hugs the base of the southern ridge as it ascends radically from the valley. The

U.S. troops pass a destroyed enemy tank. One of the soldiers carries a flamethrower (M2–2), which is capable of using liquid fuel or thickened fuel.

185 highway then threads the pass at the point where the northern and more elevated ridge adjoins the southern ridge. And another valley lies north of Pongamni. A dirt path from the northern exit of the town moves through the valley to Sobuk-san, from where a stream flows south and enters an eastward flowing stream at the western edge of Pongam-ni. In support of the mission, the artillerymen disperse in and around the villages of Pongam-ni and Taejong-ni, north of the east-west road; Battery C, 555th Artillery Battalion, places its guns near the rear eastern positions of the Headquarters, 5th Regimental Combat Team. Battery A, 555th Field Artillery Battalion, deploys under a peculiar (to the area) concrete bridge that spans the southern flowing stream near its convergence with the eastern flowing stream; Battery B establishes positions at the tip of the village, astride the stream and Headquarters Battery deploys within the village. In conjunction, at Pongam-ni, on the opposite (west) side of the southern flowing stream, the 90th Field Artillery Battalion (minus one battery) establishes its positions. After dark on the 10th, the North Koreans mount vicious attacks against the Americans. The artillery units and 1st Battalion, 5th RCT, remain embattled throughout the night, and they continue the battle straight through the daylight hours of the 11th. The command post of the 2nd Battalion, west of Pongam-ni, is also besieged, but Colonel Throckmorton speeds word to the village calling for support from Company E. With the help of the reinforcements, the positions are held and the enemy is driven back. During the unwieldy fighting, communication is lost between Battery A and its parent unit, the 555th Field Artillery Battalion. The battalion commander, Lt. Colonel John Daly, and Colonel John P. Jones, 1st Battalion commander, accompanied by infantry troops, attempt to reach the embattled positions, but both Daly and Jones become wounded. Colonel Jones’ wound is debilitating. Colonel Daly assumes temporary command of the 1st Battalion. In concert with the attacks at Pongam-ni, the units east of the village receive fierce attacks, but despite the lack of infantry, Headquarters 5th RCT and Battery C, 555th Field Artillery, hold the enemy at bay. During the morning of the 11th, planes arrive to throw their weight into the battle. The North Koreans are driven back into the high ground. Throughout the day, enemy snipers and an array of small enemy detachments maintain pressure on the main supply route out of Chindong-ni, but these are neutralized by several tanks and an assault gun that ride shotgun with the supply convoys as they move to the forward positions of the 5th RCT. By afternoon (11th), the 5th RCT, commanded by Colonel Godwin Ordway, is prepared to push through the pass west of the village and continue the advance toward Chinju. But Colonel Ordway is convinced that the convoy, including the artillery, must

August 7, 1950 move after dark to ensure success. Later, General Kean instructs Colonel Ordway to push the force west as soon as possible, and he also informs Ordway that one battalion of the 24th Regiment is rushing to Pongam-ni to cover his right flank. Colonel Ordway senses a potential disaster. He protests the daylight movement. Following a prolonged telephone conversation between Kean and Ordway, Kean relents and grants permission for the regimental combat team to move after dusk. In conjunction, but unbeknownst to Colonel Ordway, General Kean had received instructions from Eighth Army to prepare to release the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade and the 5th Regimental Combat Team upon orders from Army. Kean, who has also been directed by Army to seize and defend the Chinju Pass, has been instructed to dispatch Task Force Min to Taegu, from where it can be transferred to the South Korean Army. At Pongam-ni, the evacuation of Colonel Jones is arranged. At 1400, Lt. Colonel T.B. Roelofs (former battalion commander), the Regimental S-2, arrives to assume command of the 1st Battalion. Roelofs is directed to seize control of the ridge west of Pongamni. The objective controls the pass through which the combat team must advance. Company B moves from its positions on the ridge to the valley in preparation for the assault. Toward evening, the 1st Battalion, supported by artillery units of the 2nd Battalion, mounts its attack to clear the objective. Company C drives west along the north ridge to hook up with B Company, which is assigned the primary task of assaulting the hill on the right, which dominates the terrain north of the pass. Company B secures the ground north of the pass before dark. However, during the morning hours the enemy strikes back ferociously. Subsequent to the seizure of the ground north of the pass, the 1st Battalion, 5th RCT, establishes a command post about 300 yards west of Pongam-ni. While the 5th Regimental Combat Team prepares its advance, one platoon of Company A, 1st Battalion, supported by a contingent of tanks, remains in place north of the village along the Tundok Road. The balance of Company A relieves the 2nd Battalion, which is to spearhead the advance. The 2nd Battalion, under Colonel Throckmorton, Battery C, 555th Field Artillery Battalion, and the vehicles begin to form on the road at about 2100. But countermanding orders arrive for Colonel Ordway, creating a dilemma. Despite the earlier agreement between Ordway and General Kean to move out after dark, the new orders (from General Kean) call for the immediate movement of the 2nd Battalion and one battery of artillery. In addition, to the dismay of Ordway, the remainder of the unit is to remain in place until daylight. Colonel Ordway, still convinced that a daylight move could mean slaughter, attempts but fails to make contact with General Kean at division headquarters.

August 7, 1950 Assuming that Army and the divisional commanders have information that he lacks, Ordway carries out the order and cancels movement of the balance of the combat team. In the meantime, Battery C, Headquarters Battery and the 2nd Battalion are heading west, and they have already moved beyond the top of the pass. Ordway attempts to reach the vanguard by radio, but once it moved over the top of the pass, radio contact was impossible. The 2nd Battalion encounters and overcomes some opposition before it completes a five-mile westward advance to Taejong-ni, where it bivouacs until morning and expects the main body to join it. Meanwhile, back at Pongam-ni, another tortuous night unfolds at midnight (11th-12th). The departure of the 2nd Battalion and artillery elements weakens the 5th Regimental Combat Team, but it is not expecting an immediate attack. Nonetheless, the enemy expresses no empathy as it prepares a night assault. The 1st Battalion remains north of the road, and the remaining elements of the 555th Field Artillery Battalion are to its rear, dispersed within the two villages. Slightly east, beyond the villages, the regimental headquarters and the 159th Field Artillery Battalion are dispersed. The tranquility of the new day is shattered abruptly slightly after 0100 on the 12th. Company C, 1st Battalion, which had earlier supported the assault to clear the northern ridge, comes under a tenacious attack. The besieged unit loses communications with battalion, but the thunderous sounds of the guns alert the 1st Battalion to the danger. Frantic attempts are made to establish radio contact, but without results. A chain of reactions begins to emerge as the 13th Regiment, N.K. 6th Division, unleashes its power. Meanwhile a U.S. contingent is dispatched to lay new communication wire, and messengers are sped to the troubled area to establish contact and report on the situation. Colonel Roelofs, the 1st Battalion commander, contacts Colonel Ordway and details the ensuing fight. Roelofs further explains the gravity of the situation on the northern ridge. Colonel Ordway, feeling obliged to obey the divisional orders, declines Roelofs’ plea to extricate the artillery and vehicles by pushing them through the pass to safety. Once the conversation ends, Colonel Roelofs departs his command post, bolts to his jeep and, accompanied by two staff officers, races east toward Pongam-ni. The party passes elements of the regiment that are forming the convoy along the road, while apparently awaiting orders to roll west. When Roelofs reaches the bridge that spans the south-flowing stream at the western edge of Pongam-ni, he encounters officers of the 555th Artillery Battalion, who also appear ready for orders to evacuate. After passing by, Roelofs’ entourage turns north to take the Tundok Road, a dirt path. Soon after, they come upon Company A, 1st Battalion, and several tanks that are posted nearby to guard the

186 crossroads and the rear artillery. The troops of Company A inform Roelofs that the sounds of small arms fire and grenades have been heard in the vicinity of Company C, but that no other enemy activity is apparent. Actually, Company C is being overpowered by the enemy and fighting for its survival as it is ruggedly shoved off the ridge. The ordeal becomes hellish. The 2nd Battalion, unaware of the unfolding tragedy, advances. Meanwhile, the promised 24th Regiment is nowhere in sight. Colonel Roelofs rushes back to the command post, but his hopes of receiving good news about the fate of C Company are quickly dashed. The runners have returned, but they were unable to locate the stranded company. To make matters worse, the troops that had been dispatched to lay new wires between the command post and Company C have vanished. In addition, during Roelofs’ absence, observers had noticed enemy flares shooting up from C Company’s location. The dawn of August 12 is getting closer, but the arrival of sunlight is not expected to make the situation any better. The artillerymen still lack infantry protection. The infantrymen north of the village are also imperiled and no reinforcements have reached the beleaguered command. During these final but nonetheless perplexing predawn hours, Colonel Roelofs again persists in getting Colonel Ordway to get the combat team on the road before the enemy closes the noose and traps the command in the valley. After repeated failed attempts to receive permission from General Kean to move out before daylight, Colonel Ordway remains convinced that the enemy is taking the high ground above Pongam-ni. He issues the order to abandon the area. At about 0400 the convoy rolls west. The supply trucks take the lead, trailed by the artillery. The convoy is under the protection of the 1st Battalion, which brings up the rear. If all goes well, the supply trains should clear the pass in less than one-half hour, with time to spare before the sun rises. But, immediately, a quagmire develops along the road. The traffic creeps forward by less than quantum leaps, gaining only several feet between stops. As the sluggish column passes the 1st Battalion command post, a contingent of medical vehicles attempts to merge with the column. One ambulance becomes bogged down in a gully and paralyzes the entire column, as the darkness is slipping away to dawn. The ambulance is towed from the ditch and the column then begins to move at a slightly quicker pace, but the sun begins to rise. The enemy that holds the high ground begins to pop shells into the column. Colonel Ordway’s vehicle proceeds over the top of the pass just after daybreak and attempts to speed up the column, but to no avail. He then attempts to clear the road to permit the artillery to extricate itself from the valley, but no shoulder space is available. As Col. Ordway clears the top of the pass, another

187 snafu develops. The platoon from Company A and its contingent of tanks that had been ordered to guard the northern approach of Pongam-ni and the artillery there is spotted moving toward the tip of the pass. Colonel Roelofs stops the unit and inquires as to why it had deserted its positions; one officer claims that he was ordered to pull out. The validity of the explanation is never determined, but nonetheless, the artillery now stands naked in the village. Attempts to return the unit to its positions are initiated, but the idea is scrapped because it is thought that the reversal will probably cause another and larger traffic jam. While he attempts to keep the vehicles rolling at a steady pace through the pass, Roelofs observes the unfolding disaster back at Pongam-ni. Horrendous firing commences and North Koreans plow into the valley to strike the artillery positions from three separate directions. Enemy armor delivers massive blows against the vehicular traffic and the village, causing pandemonium. One truck is blown to oblivion as it crosses the bridge that spans the south stream. The huge explosion propels a wall of fire that snarls bridge traffic. The troops with the convoy dive for protection, but the merciless attack continues at closequarters. The tanks and self-propelled guns bellow from nearly point blank range. The exposed howitzers of the 555th Field Artillery Battalion attempt to engage the armor, but the effort is futile and the guns of the 90th Field Artillery fare poorly because the armor penetrates under the range of the guns. Despite maximum effort, the 155s cannot be lowered sufficiently to hit the encroaching armor. However, the artillerymen choose not to capitulate, but rather to improvise and assume the role of infantry to supplement the few guns that remain operational. Farther west, the forward elements of the column complete a five-mile trek and reach the 2nd Battalion positions at Taejong-ni, but the rear elements are undergoing a ruthless ordeal. The platoon’s abandonment of its positions at the roadblock north of the village permits enemy armor to move in without meeting any resistance. These enemy gains grant them positions from which they can strike with total surprise from extremely close range at a time of their choosing. At Taejong-ni, Colonel Ordway arrives at the positions of the 2nd Battalion; 5th RCT, where he meets with the forward elements of the convoy and directs them to continue moving until they find a suitable assembly area. Ordway expects this to help keep the road open for the remainder of the convoy. Additional troops reach the area and one of the officers informs Ordway of the ongoing slaughter of the artillerymen at Pongam-ni. Ordway then heads back to the beleaguered village. En route he encounters Colonel Roelofs’ weary 1st Battalion, which is moving west. Colonel Ordway, in an attempt to salvage the command, directs the 2nd Battalion to rush

August 7, 1950 back toward Pongam-ni to establish a rear-guard action to protect the balance of the regiment. The valley is quickly becoming known as “Bloody Gulch” as the savagery of the enemy power is reaching full throttle. The swiftness of the enemy infantry is in cadence with the repeated direct hits of the armor. The artillery positions of the 555th are pummeled, but three of the 105s continue to return fire until about 0900. The 90th Field Artillery Battalion (stationed west of the south-flowing stream) had earlier sustained two direct hits on its 155-mm howitzers and remains under constant small-arms fire that pours in from the ridge just north of the besieged road. The effectiveness of the enemy fire is overwhelming, and the lopsided struggle approaches total massacre. Once the sun comes up, Corsairs from the carriers arrive. Undaunted by lack of communication with the embattled ground troops, the Marine pilots modify their low level attack by following the arc of the tracer shells toward the enemy positions. Even this powerful strafing and rocket barrage fail to halt the North Koreans. The crewmen of the 4.2inch mortar contingent are struck with blistering fire that inflicts serious casualties. The mortarmen must halt the return fire to seek temporary refuge. Other segments of the remnants of the artillery command are being squeezed between the proverbial rocks. Unequivocally, it is the individual courage of the beleaguered troops that forestalls total disaster. Some additional help arrives in the form of Air Force F-51s, which effectively strafe the enemy positions to bolster the perimeter. The 5th RCT Team’s contingent of heavy machine guns is dug in strongly and not easily dislodged. Menacing return fire impedes the enemy on the ridge, while the remnant convoy elements continue their desperate attempt to clear the pass. Meanwhile, an enemy machine gun, positioned to the rear and slightly south of the road, begins firing for range, but some quick action by a U.S. truck driver takes out and kills the machine gunner before he scores any damage. The pressure of the enemy fire is becoming unbearable in the valley. Individual acts of courage continue to hold back the onslaught. West of the southern stream at the positions of the 90th Field Artillery Battalion, the predawn assault had also arrived with a thunderous roar. Two of the howitzers are blown up and the fires ignite some ammunition trucks of Company A. Nonetheless, the transformed artillerymen refuse to budge. Making good use of their foxholes, the newly christened infantrymen of the 90th Field Artillery Battalion handle the machine guns and rifles as if they were sharpshooters, to convincingly repulse the North Korean attack against their perimeter. One resilient soldier, PFC William Baumgartner, commandeers a machine gun mounted on a truck. Singlehandedly he pours fire upon the advancing enemy until an incoming round scores a direct hit

August 7, 1950 that destroys his weapon. Baumgartner escapes death, but he loses consciousness and drops from the vehicle. When he revives, Baumgartner assumes the position of rifleman and rejoins the fight to hold the perimeter. This, too, is futile, as no reinforcements are yet on scene. By 0900 on the 12th, it becomes apparent that the artillery positions of the 90th Field Artillery are doomed. Slightly east, the enemy has also plowed into the lines of Battery B, 159th Field Artillery Battalion, but this predawn strike consists of less velocity and tails off at about 0800. Nonetheless, its bite is deadly. Several trucks laden with gasoline and ammunition are blown and still others remain nearby to jeopardize the unit. Several fearless drivers bolt to the surviving trucks and recklessly speed the rolling ammunition and gasoline vehicles from the area. Few vehicles in the sector east of the bridge at Pongamni survive the enemy barrages. Back at the pass, Colonel Roelofs continues his dogged attempt to extricate the survivors from the nightmarish gulch, which is becoming an amphitheater of death and destruction. Roelofs has no way of communicating with the survivors at Pongam-ni. He relies solely on information from the men who are moving along the road toward the top of the ill-fated pass. By now, some reinforcements are en route, but it is too late. The melee becomes even more gruesome as the enemy draws the noose tightly. Planes continue to strafe the attackers, while the able survivors of the 90th Field Artillery Battalion band together. Some provide cover fire while others place the wounded on the few vehicles still able to escape from the valley. The 90th Field Artillery Battalion sustains ten dead, 60 wounded and about thirty men missing. The 555th Field Artillery, which had been swamped by the enemy at about 0900, is ravaged; it loses eight 105-mm howitzers, and on the following day (13th), eighty percent of its troops are absent from duty. The infantry ranks have also been decimated. By this time, most of those able to escape the horror of the gulch have done so. Colonel Roelofs is briefed on the debacle at the village by an artillery officer who is moving west with several other stragglers. The officer informs Roelofs that the survivors are escaping by whatever means possible, but he relates that all remaining vehicles are destroyed. Roelofs decides to make one last effort before writing off the trapped men. He leads a small contingent back toward the village. Meanwhile, the final elements of the 1st Battalion, 5th RCT, accompanied by three tanks approach the tip of the pass. Roelofs, who had been unaware of any armor being in the village, is surprised to see the armor. One of the tanks is directed to pull over and wait in place, while the others continue moving west through the pass. Company A still has elements at the pass and Company B remains engaged in the hills north of it. Company C, which had been struck

188 by the initial thrust of the attack, is now composed of only twenty-three troops, who will straggle into the 1st Battalion positions while Roelofs is en route to the village. The 4.2-inch mortar platoon and the heavy machine gun platoon, which had peppered the enemyheld ridge to the north, are each ordered to move west. Meanwhile, Colonel Roelofs moves closer to the village and he encounters the final vehicle moving west, a jeep driven by Chaplain Francis A. Kapica. The chaplain informs Colonel Roelofs that he has recovered every wounded man he could locate, convincing Roelofs that his probe into the village is useless. Both vehicles then return to the pass, where Roelofs boards the waiting tank as it begins to head west. The remnants of the 5th Regimental Combat Team move over the rim with Company A at the point, trailed by the survivors of Company C, which had originally comprised 180 troops. Company B disengages from battle on the ridge and withdraws by platoon under cover of fire supplied by the three tanks, which form the rear of the column behind Company B. This, the final contingent, departs at about 1000. There has been much activity in conjunction with the tragedy at Pongam-ni and the surrounding area, but no action taken had brought any relief to the men at the village. The 2nd Battalion is in motion and will arrive at the pass during the morning. However, the battle has subsided and only a few stragglers move into the battalion positions near the pass. No troops reach 2nd Battalion positions subsequent to noon. Colonel Throckmorton, believing that the North Koreans are maneuvering to attack the regimental command post at Pongam-ni, requests and receives permission to return there at 1500. His return is timely, as an enemy attack will occur on the following day. Other reinforcements are also to be rushed to the area. General Barth, after an unsuccessful attempt to reach the embattled troops at the pass, informs General Kean of the crisis. General Kean immediately orders the 24th Regiment to dispatch its 3rd Battalion, with instructions to attack through the hills and get to Pongam-ni; Kean also contacts General Craig, USMC, and orders him to send a contingent of reinforcements (5th Marines) to reopen the middle road to the rear of the 5th RCT (USA). In the meantime, the 5th Marines, having bivouacked about four miles west of Kosong during the night of the 11th-12th, gets an early start on the 12th. The 1st Battalion moves in front of the 3rd Battalion, then pushes forward toward Chinju. It advances about eleven miles without incident and reaches a point less than five miles short of Sach’on by 1200. At about this time, word reaches the 5th Marines instructing Lt. Colonel George Newton to send the 3rd Battalion to aid the artillerymen of the 5th RCT at Pongam-ni. By about 1300, the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, is speeding toward Pongam-ni.

189 The Marines are presently involved with the enemy near Kosong, but the 3rd Battalion detaches itself, reverses direction and arrives within three miles of Pongam-ni by 1400. While the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, rushes to support the 5th RCT, the other Marine units continue to move toward the sounds of the guns. Advance elements of the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, reach Changchon (Changallon) at about 1300, not quite expecting an ambush, but the hills are infested with the enemy and the coiled trap is about to be sprung. Concealed at the village are units of the 2nd Battalion, N.K. 6th Division, and contingents of the 83rd N.K. Motorized Regiment. The enemy, which felt the deadly sting of the Marines and their accompanying aircraft on the previous day, is apparently too anxious to waste the Marines. In haste, they commence fire on the lead jeeps of Company B’s reconnaissance platoon, which alerts the entire command. Additional enemy fire also strikes the main body of Company B, igniting heavy fighting. The Marines react instinctively. Pershing tanks rush to the front. Captain Tobin, B Company commander, speeds the 3rd Platoon forward to take out the enemy, entrenched on the hills that had fired upon the reconnaissance jeeps. In synchronization, Company A attacks a hill to the right. Marine pilots that are overhead to cover the advance immediately dive their Corsairs toward the hills and unleash tenacious fire that riddles the enemy machine gun emplacements. And then in a flash, the planes spot an enemy convoy that is scurrying from the area and streaming hurriedly toward Sach’on. The aircraft pounce upon the convoy. Meanwhile, Company A attacks to the right while Company B peels off to the left and charges the enemy entrenched in the hills there. At a frenzied pace, the Marines charge the hills and take the fight to the North Koreans. On the hill to the north, the 3rd Platoon enjoys initial success and secures the hill, but the enemy regroups on the reverse slope and mounts a stiff counterattack that begins to shove the Marines back off the ridge. The 3rd Platoon gives ground, but then after losing about half the hill, it holds firmly. The hill to the left is seized by Company B and to the right Hill 202 falls to Company A, at 1700 and 2000 respectively. Exhausted after the day-long fighting, the Marines, lacking food and water, sack out to get some rest. The Marines sustain three killed and 13 wounded. The North Koreans prepare to ignite another donnybrook while the Marines are sleeping. Back at Pongam-ni, the 24th Regiment, which had been promised by General Kean on the previous day (11th), never arrives. On this day the 3rd Battalion, 24th Regiment, moves toward Pongam-ni, but en route it encounters an enemy force composed of about two companies. The 24th Regiment’s two attacking companies, composed of a combined strength of more than two hundred troops, receive

August 7, 1950 some sparse incoming mortar fire, but it apparently mortifies the troops. The two companies are soon reduced to about fifty percent of strength. The situation deteriorates rapidly. By day’s end the 3rd Battalion sustains a total of ten casualties and three of these are officers. Lt. Colonel John Corley, who assumed command August 9, is an exceptional commanding officer with much experience during World War II. Corley’s regiment continues the attack toward the besieged 3rd Battalion, 24th Regiment, but on the following day (13th), each of the two attacking companies are composed of less than platoon strength, consisting of 20 and 35 troops. The disappearance of these troops is not related to casualties, but rather massive dereliction of duty. Ultimately, the 24th Regimental attack comes to a halt less than three miles from the lost positions of the artillery. Other attempts to get reinforcements to the area on the 12th also fall short. A platoon of the 72nd Engineer Combat Battalion sets out to secure the blocked road, but it too is ambushed. The mission fails. Meanwhile, the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, reaches Kogan-ni by about 1600. To the dismay of the enemy, the Corsairs from the carriers, which have been adeptly covering the Marine advance, are also back on the scene. Marine artillery units deliver large quantities of potent howitzer shells into the enemy positions. The massive barrage, combined with the low-level attacks of the Corsairs, proclaims the arrival of the 5th Marines, which launches a dogged attack. By dusk, the heights east of Pongam-ni and north of the road are tucked under the wings of the 5th Marines. On the morning of the 13th, the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, launches another strong attack to attempt rescue of any remaining survivors of the Triple Nickel (555th) Field Artillery Battalion. The attack gains another ridge by 1000, and still the Marines have incurred no casualties, but before the attack is completed, new orders arrive, aborting the mission prematurely. At this point, the Marines are virtually operating on two separate fronts; their regimental components are separated by about twenty-five rough miles. The practical introduction of a new war machine, the multi-use helicopter, greatly eases the command problems. General Craig utilizes the new craft to swing back and forth quickly to issue orders and maintain strict control of his divided command. At about midnight (12th-13th), Lt. Colonel Newton is ordered to depart Changchon and return the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 5th Marines, to Chindong-ni, in an apparent response to another trouble spot along the Pusan Perimeter. The Marines who first encountered the Communists on August 7 have now driven the North Korean 6th Division back about 22 miles. However, the withdrawal is more complicated than the Marines would prefer, partly because of an apparent deadly mistake on Hill 202. At Changchon on the 13th, the North Koreans

August 7, 1950 commence a predawn attack against Company B’s positions on Hill 202, catching some of the Marines off guard. The two-pronged assault strikes the flank and the front of the night-perimeter at 0445. Evidently, some of the sentries on the left flank had fallen asleep, permitting the charging North Koreans to startle the unsuspecting defenders and seize two machine guns in the process. Gruesome fighting occurs as the 3rd Platoon attempts to neutralize the attack, which now includes fire from their own guns. Lt. Colonel Newton instructs the 3rd Platoon to hold on, as he proclaims that help is on the way. Artillery fire is thrown against the attackers with tremendous effectiveness. The Marines unleash some 3.5 rocket launchers and at dawn and the two captured guns are silenced. While the 3rd Platoon survivors hold their flank, Newton reels in the 1st and 2nd Platoons to form one rigid line. Incessant fighting continues for about one hour, but the combined tenacity and effective return fire offered by the Marines finally drive the enemy back to the bottom of the hill. Subsequent to the withdrawal of the North Koreans, Newton is ordered to pull out immediately and converge on the road for the trip back to Chindongni. Twelve Marines are killed, eighteen are wounded and eight men are missing. Captain John Tobin, USMC, requests permission to send a detachment to bring out the bodies of the eight missing Marines, but the request is denied on the grounds that the regiment is behind schedule and must speed to Chindong-ni. The Marines are shattered by the unexpected decision to leave their dead

190 buddies behind. Nonetheless, the painful march proceeds as the 1st and 2nd Battalions move out. Tanks and engineers cover the rear. Meanwhile, the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, having gained the heights overlooking the seized positions of the artillery on the previous day, commences an attack on the 13th to attempt rescue of any surviving men of the 555th FAB who might still be near the bridge over the southern stream at Pongam-ni. A helicopter transporting Colonel Murray attempts to convey word that help is on the way, but enemy fire prevents him from getting close. The assaulting Marines advance to the hill overtop the objective, but the only troops they observe are enemy. The 3rd Battalion sets up for the attack. In the meantime, orders arrive that bar further movement and instruct the battalion to move to Masan and rejoin the regiment. It is never determined whether troops of the artillery battalion had been at the bridge. Farther west, at Much’on-ni, the 35th Regiment and 3rd Battalion, 5th RCT, advance from the road fork to Chinju Pass, and except for several patrols, the force halts there. During the afternoon (13th), the contingent begins to move east to return to U.S. lines. The troops are exhausted. Along the return route, military police are scheduled to guide the column to particular areas of assembly, but confusion abounds and during the night, the contingent winds up in a dry streambed near Chindong-ni. Finally, as daylight arrives on the 14th, the various troops that are scattered about are able to identify one another. At Taejong-ni, the 2nd Battalion, 5th RCT, under Colonel Throckmorton, intercepts and beats back

A Pershing M26 medium tank is in position at Naktong River to thwart enemy crossing.

191 an enemy attack during the morning. After the encounter it boards trucks, moves to the road fork and from there heads east to Masan. By the following day, Task Force Kean is back at its starting point. The Chinju Pass had not been seized as expected. But, Eighth Army does achieve some success. The western offensive puts a large indentation in the N.K. 6th Division, preventing it from overrunning the western flank, and the support provided by the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade is a boost to U.S. forces. Troops of Eighth Army begin to hold the line during the crucial days to follow. Later, General Matthew Ridgway, USA, pays eloquent tribute to the Marines and their tanks, noting that their armor was up to the task against the enemy T-34s: “This force saved the day in the South and stopped the enemy column in its tracks.” Ridgway also notes that the U.S. planes could not stop the advance because of the enemy resorting to night marches. Task Force Kean will be disbanded on August 16; it has inflicted serious casualties upon the enemy, but the operation also costs heavy U.S. casualties. Subsequent to the week’s fighting and the dissolution of Task Force Kean, the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade departs Chindong-ni on August 15 and moves north by trains to Miryang to come under the jurisdiction of General Church’s 24th Division. The brigade is scheduled to participate in the Battle of the Naktong, the final natural barrier in front of the Pusan Perimeter. In conjunction, the 5th Regimental Combat Team, the 24th Regiment and the 35th Regiment will deploy along the 25th Division’s line on the southwest perimeter. The N.K. 6th Division deploys defensively in the mountains west of Masan and faces the 25th Division. — In the United States: Eighty thousand volunteer Marine Corps reservists (every reservist in the country) receive word of imminent activation. The increase will bring the corps up to a strength of 200,000. About 50,000 will be on active duty by October 31.

August 7

Three medium tank battalions arrive from the U.S. at Pusan and on the following day, they debark. The 6th Medium Tank Battalion reverts to Eighth Army reserve near Taegu and the 7th Tank Battalion enjoins the 1st Cavalry Division. The 73rd Tank Battalion will be dispersed among various sectors of the Pusan Perimeter. Company A will deploy at Ulsan to protect the primary eastern supply road; Company B is assigned as support for Task Force Bradley at Kirye and Kyongju. In addition, the 27th Regiment will be augmented by Company C to bolster its efforts north of Taegu. Also, Generals Ridgway and Norstad and Averell Harriman fly into Taegu from Japan to confer with General Walker. General Ridgway is not impressed with the condition of Eighth Army, its staff or its commanding general; Ridgway turns in a stinging report to the JCS. In other activity at Taegu, the 822d Engi-

August 7, 1950 neer Aviation Battalion, USAF, completes the initial phase of construction on a new runway, designed to increase Air Force operations there. Southwest Pusan Perimeter: (See also, August 7–August 15, 1950) In the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines sector near Chindong-ni, the area around Colonel Taplett’s command post near Hill 255 is struck by some enemy shelling between 0100 and 0300, but otherwise the night is fairly quiet. At about 0600, Taplett receives word from Lieutenant Cahill’s platoon informing him of the situation and of the casualties incurred while attempting to reach the crest of Hill 342. At dawn, the reinforced platoon, Company G, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, resumes its climb; it ascends the high ground that hooks Hill 342 with its eastern knob. Afterward, the platoon swings over slightly to enable an advance against the summit from the southeast. The burning sun and ghastly heat drain the Marines’ stamina. Water discipline vanishes in an attempt to quench an intolerable thirst. At times, an advance of only a few feet is lost again as the men stumble back down the slope. Following the exhaustion of the meager water supply, some Marines slip into unconsciousness. Others are consumed with excruciating, buckling pain. Nonetheless, despite the irregular formation of the advancing platoon, the NCOs encourage the advance. Cahill and Sergeant Lee Buettner bolt ahead of the pack to contact the besieged army unit. As they reach a point about seventy-five yards from the crest, enemy fire rips into the two-man detachment. This is the initial enemy fire upon the Marines in Korea. Cahill orders Buettner to lay back and lead the platoon up a draw while he sprints through the daunting fire to reach the crest. At 0830, Cahill meets the company commander. Both men scrutinize the perimeter and the three hard-hit platoons. The company commander explains that the mortars had been sent down to the base of the hill, because they attracted excessive enemy fire that rendered them ineffective. Meanwhile, Marine reinforcements arrive at the peak, having sustained 1 man killed and six wounded, including Sergeant Robert Robinson, the platoon sergeant, and Sergeant Thomas Blackmon, the platoon guide. Blackmon has sustained a mortal wound, but he insists upon reaching the crest to join Cahill. Some additional Marines that have sustained heat prostration and one that suffers a nervous condition remain farther down the slope. Meanwhile, at 0200, the large convoy transporting the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines, commanded by Lt. Colonel Harold Roise, moves from Changwon to Chindong-ni and arrives there at about 0500. The vehicular traffic initially becomes congested and soon after, it totally bogs down near Hill 255 as vehicles attempt to turn around in a school yard. Enemy mortars and artillery fire begin shelling the area while the Marines are debarking the trucks. Colonel Murray (CO, 5th Marines), his own vehicle among those halted north of Chindong-ni along the MSR, instructs Roise

August 7, 1950

192

rick’s 3rd Platoon, Company A engineers finish setting the initial Marine minefield. It stretches across Haman Road one-half mile in front of Chindong-ni. Also, General Craig arrives by helicopter at Chindong-ni slightly after 0700 during an enemy bombardment of the area. Craig immediately establishes phone contact with the 5th RCT to maintain communications with the unit’s progress at Tosan, which has a direct connection with the Marine brigade’s scheduled assault. Craig receives command of all troops in the area of Chindong-ni. At 1120, he moves to the front to see firsthand the progress of the 5th RCT. It becomes clear that enemy resistance is nominal, but progress is stymied because the MSR that extends from Sangnyong at the foundation of Hill 342’s spurs to the strategic junction at Tosan is crammed with equipment, troops and vehicles. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines, which has just begun the ascent to occupy Hill 255, receives new orders. The Marines had been ordered to dispatch a battalion to advance to Hill 342, relieve Cahill’s 1st Platoon, 3rd Battalion, and the 2nd Battalion, 5th RCT, then capture the balance of the hill. A ground crew loads .50-caliber ammunition aboard an F-80 Shoot- The task is given to Roise’s 2nd ing Star jet. Battalion. The 2nd Battalion, having slept none during the night, sets out toward Hill 342. At the to keep the trucks moving despite the shelling. Roise replies that excessive mud in the schoolyard is stalling road junction, where the Eighth Army guide had met the convoy, not the enemy shelling. Lieutenant Cahill during the previous night, Roise Eventually, when the convoy enters Chindong-ni, splits his command. He sends Company D, comColonel Murray directs the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines, manded by Captain John Finn, up the north fork to to deploy on a stretch of Hill 255 above Company H’s seize the eastern spur and the hill; Company E, now (3rd Bn.) positions. Murray also directs the 1st Battalled by Lieutenant William Sweeney, is ordered to move ion, 5th Marines, to relieve Company G, 3rd Battalion, around the rear of Sangnyong and capture the western on Hill 99, which releases it to augment Colonel Taspur of Hill 342. plett’s perimeter on the lower portion of Hill 255. SubMajor Morgan McNeely, 2nd Battalion S-3, and sequent to relief, Bohn’s contingent redeploys on the Captain Finn move ahead by jeep to Taepyong at the eastern base of the hill. Finn is informed that Comopposite side of the valley along the lower slopes of Hill 255 to face Haman Road. Enemy snipers spend the pany D is to relieve a unit of the 5th RCT in the heights night ringing the perimeter with shells. above some thatched huts, and he is told that the ascent would be uncontested by organized resistance. In the Colonel Taplett’s 3rd Battalion area in Chindongni remains relatively quiet after dawn. However, Capmeantime, the torrid heat of mid-afternoon begins to tain Fegan (Company H) and Lieutenant Bohn (Comseriously affect the overtired troops of Company D. pany G), positioned on Hills 255 and 99 respectively, When the column arrives at the base of the hill, it is do on occasion call in artillery fire to intercept enemy immediately greeted with heavy enemy rifle and mamovement along the northern approaches to Chindongchine gun fire that originates in the village of Tokkongni. In related activity, 2nd Lieutenant Lawrence Herni on the opposite side of the valley and from the

193 heights above the road. This unexpected fire quickly dissipates the notion of an easy ascent. Simultaneously, Captain Finn orders his Marines to disperse into the rice paddies just off the road while he calls for his platoon leaders. Finn directs that the enemy fire from the village be disregarded in order to concentrate on seizing the hill. The 1st Platoon, led by 2nd Lieutenant Arthur Oakley, drives to take the right flank and advances up the southern slope of Hill 342, while the 2nd Platoon, led by 2nd Lieutenant Wallace Reid, passes through Taepyong-ni and ascends the hill at its linkage with the spur. On the left flank, the 3rd Platoon, under 2nd Lt. Edward Emmelman, advances directly toward the crest of the spur. Company D, against sporadic resistance, reaches the spur, but five casualties are inflicted by enemy fire. Nonetheless, a more powerful enemy, the excruciating heat, takes a severe toll. Twelve Marines fall totally unconscious and the remainder hangs on the brink of complete exhaustion. Finn establishes his command post in the heights above the village of Taepyong-ni, along with the accompanying mortars. During the early evening and without rest, Finn leads the three rifle platoons toward the summit to reach Cahill’s platoon and the 5th RCT. The platoons reach positions several hundred yards from the crest, and then Finn contacts Colonel Roise to report on the condition of his men. During the pause, Lieutenant Arthur Oakley, 1st Platoon, moves forward and greets the defenders on the crest. Cahill and the Army company commander descend the slope with Oakley to confer with Captain Finn. The Army officer urges Finn to suspend the climb until dawn. He assures Finn that his soldiers and Cahill’s Marines can undoubtedly hold the summit until then. Captain Finn informs Colonel Roise of the meeting and Roise then permits Company D to hold in place and relieve the troops on the summit at dawn. The mission of Company E goes off with less enemy resistance, but equally nasty weather, as it advances. Along the route to take the western spur of Hill 342, the enemy strikes with futile long-range machine gun fire. The column reaches the halfway point on the ridge at dusk, and then concentrates on establishing a night perimeter. In the 1st Bn. (reinforced), 11th Marines sector around Chindong-ni, Lt. Colonel Ransom Wood’s batteries had exchanged shells with the enemy on the previous night; they expended 87 rounds in support of the 5th Marines. By this day, the enemy fire has registered on the artillery positions. During the pre-dawn hours (7th), one Marine battery receives a direct hit from an enemy 102mm shell that destroys one 105-mm howitzer and kills two Marines; eight others are wounded. The incident becomes another lesson for the Marines. Subsequent to this tragedy, the Marine artillerymen require no prodding to dig ammunition pits, foxholes and gun pits. Pusan Perimeter, Naktong Bulge: During darkness (6th-7th), elements of the N.K. 4th Division continue to cross the Naktong River in the 24th Division sector

August 7, 1950 to bolster the other forces that have already penetrated east of the river. During the morning of the 7th, the 19th Regiment and Company B, 1st Battalion, 34th Regiment, re-initiate the attack to eliminate the enemy threat. The supply road that leads to the front remains open, but still the units face a critical shortage of rations and water as they advance against tenacious resistance. Air strikes are requested, but when the planes arrive to bolster the attack, they inadvertently pummel the 19th Regiment, which exasperates the ground troops. The combination of lack of food and water and the scorching heat promises little success. The mistaken air strikes guarantee failure. Meanwhile, Company B drives forward and contacts troops of the heavy mortar company who had earlier disappeared from their positions near Obong-ni Ridge during the morning of the 6th. Soon after the recovery of these troops, B Company pulls back. The enemy maintains its pressure and gains a tight hold on Obongni Ridge, and on Cloverleaf Hill, slightly north of the pass. Cloverleaf Hill received its name because it resembles a four leaf clover, but it has not yet proved to be a good luck charm for the Americans. From these two vantage points, the enemy is able to easily observe the Americans’ main supply route, which runs from Yongsan about five miles down the road. Obong-ni Ridge, slightly lower than Cloverleaf, lies south of the pass. It extends mildly southeast for about one and one-half miles, but is saddled with a chain of knobs that ascend 300 to 500 feet over the rice paddies that are along its foundation. In Company A’s (34th Regiment) sector above the Naktong, the enemy still holds positions that threaten to dislodge Colonel Alfonso’s command. Planes attempt to drop food and supplies during the afternoon, but nearly half of the shipment misses the mark and afterwards, the contingent sustains casualties from enemy fire while gathering the supplies. Nonetheless, the company holds its ground. During the night of the 7th, more North Koreans move across the river to fortify the high ground at the pass to further ensure control of the east-west road. It is estimated that about two additional Communist battalions arrive. In other activity, General Walker orders the 9th Regiment, 2nd Division, recently attached to the 24th Division, to report to General Church. Colonel Hill’s 9th RCT will arrive at division headquarters at 0830 on the following day. Pusan Perimeter, Central Front, Taegu: The N.K. 15th Division’s 45th Regiment moves through Sonsan, then crosses the Naktong southeast of it. Aircraft strike the moving column. Once across the river, the enemy regiment advances into the mountains and drives toward Taegu. Initially, it encounters no resistance. After dark during the night of the 7th-8th, the N.K. 48th and 50th Regiments cross the river at two separate ferry crossings, both located north of Waegwan, between it and Indong. About two battalions cross at the upper ferry site about six miles north of Waegwan under the cover fire of tanks posted on the western bank. The

August 8, 1950 vehicles and armor also make their crossing here by using an underwater bridge. Hill 201 and Hill 306, both on the east bank of the river, opposite the upper ferry site, are secured by elements of the enemy 15th Division, prior to its units moving into the hills to initiate a seven-mile eastward advance to Tabu-dong. Meanwhile, the ROK troops attempt to forestall the enemy advance. Eighth Army works at a feverish pace to bolster the South Koreans if the enemy makes a solid breakthrough toward Taegu. Pusan Perimeter, Eastern Corridor: In the area near Yongdok, heavy skirmishing continues between the S.K. 3rd Division and the N.K. 5th Division. Colonel Emmerich, KMAG advisor to the S.K. 3rd Division, receives another urgent message from General Walker. The dispatch underscores the strategic value of the 520-foot bridge that spans the Osip-ch’on River south of Yong-dok, at Kanggu-dong. Walker explicitly orders the bridge held without fail. A squad of engineers from the 24th Division has been overseeing the demolitions there, but it is recalled to Taegu. Korean troops receive the responsibility. The South Koreans are ordered to hold the bridge; with orders that it is to be destroyed only upon specific orders from KMAG advisor Major Britton. In Air Force activity, U.S. Air Force B-29s attack P’yongyang. The raids inflict heavy damage to the rail yards, and an arsenal is nearly totally decimated. Planes also strike the Chosin Petroleum facility at the port town of Wonsan. The complex produces more than ninety percent of the N.K. petroleum products. New air raids occur on the 9th and 10th that completely destroy it. The raids are carried out by the 98th Bomber Group, its first raids since its recent arrival in Japan. In other activity, the 39th Fighter Squadron, USAF, arrives at Yonil Airfield.

August 8

Southwestern Pusan Perimeter: (See also, August 7-15, 1950.) General Craig, USMC, holds temporary command of all units in the vicinity of the Masan-Chinju axis, including the Army operations along the front and those to the rear of TF Kean. Craig orders the 5th RCT to maintain its drive to seize Tosan to permit the Marine units to advance on the road to Sach’on. In the 5th RCT zone, the regiment resumes its push toward the objective, against even stronger resistance than it had encountered on the previous day. The 5th RCT makes some progress from its departure point near Singi, but it is hindered by the narrowness of the main supply route and the huge traffic jams along it. In addition, the advance is further slowed due to tenacious fighting above it on Hills 255 and 342. In the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines zone, the 1st Battalion lacks a definitive objective, but it is to drive down the south fork of the Tosan junction, in accordance with the attack strategy of TF Kean. Newton’s 1st Battalion descends from its positions on Hill 99 on schedule at 0600, but the unit gets bogged down due to the giant traffic jam on the bridges along the main supply

194 route directly under Hill 99. The immobilized army vehicles clog the road and Eighth Army ground troops overwhelm the area, compelling the Marines to remain in place. General Craig orders Colonel Newton to suspend the advance until the snafu is cleared. Meanwhile, Company B, 1st Battalion, commanded by Captain Tobin, is ordered to return to the heights from where it had come while the 1st Battalion awaits (three miles from its departure point) orders to move. Eventually, the crammed road is opened and word arrives for the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, to begin its drive. Colonel Newton, walking in advance of the column, arrives at the command post of the 5th RCT, about one and one-half miles ahead, perched on a small slope between the villages of Singi and Oryong. He is informed by the Army regimental commander, Colonel Godwin Ordway, that troops of the 5th RCT have been dispersed into the heights that surround Tosan. Newton is also informed that the rice paddies separating the command post (CP) from the hill are inundated with enemy troops, which in effect have isolated the companies in the high ground. As Newton and Ordway confer, the leading contingents of the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, catch up with Newton, but again the battalion stalls. At about the same time, a soggy and disgruntled Army staff sergeant reaches the area and confirms the news. He informs the officers that the troops south of the road junction near Hill 308 are engaged in a severe fire fight. The sergeant adds that he crawled almost the entire distance back to headquarters to evade the ferocious enemy machine gun fire covering the huge rice paddy between the CP and the hill. Meanwhile, General Kean spots Lt. Colonel Murray, CO, 5th Marines, as his vehicle passes while en route from Chindong-ni to the front; Kean halts Murray and orders him to execute relief of the 1st Battalion, 5th RCT. The 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, withdraws to the fringes of Sangnyong to an assembly area under the western spur of Hill 342. While at the assembly area, Colonel Murray receives instructions to relieve the 1st Battalion, 5th RCT, at its positions southwest of Tosan at midnight August 8, and then the Marines are to terminate the resistance. The orders specify that the relief force is to be at the 5th RCT CP by 2300, where it will be joined by guides who will lead the contingent to Hill 308. The Marine relief force arrives at the command post at 2200, but no guides are there. And the Marines find that the Army troops (1st, Bn. 5th RCT) are prematurely withdrawing from the hill. Nonetheless, the Marines move through Singi and continue heading west until they halt at the main supply route, about one-half mile southwest of Tosan, where they encounter soldiers heading down a small path leading from the hill to the supply route. Colonel Newton is informed that his Marines should use the identical trail to reach the hill, but they must pause until the soldiers pass, which slows the march. Just after midnight, the Marine column reinitiates

195 its advance with two South Korean civilian guides who had arrived belatedly. The Marines are unfamiliar with the terrain; they apply caution as they plod along the grimy dike, hoping to avoid a misstep that would catapult them into the stench and filth of the rice paddy. The anxious trek along the slim and slippery 1,200yard trail is arduous. The column advances in single file without incident until it reaches Hill 308. The rear elements of the battalion finally arrive on the hill at dawn on the 9th. At Hill 342, the soldiers (5th RCT) and Marines (3rd Bn., 5th Marines) are struck slightly before dawn with a flurry of short-range rifle and machine gun fire. The fire is delivered from close-range by a contingent of enemy troops who have silently crept through the darkness to reach positions near the crest. The Marines and soldiers aggressively return fire, and they further liven things up by tossing grenades down the slopes. The sting of the attack is blunted, but one group encroaches near enough to spring an attack against the northeastern edge of the triangular defense. The penetration ignites immediate heated hand-tohand combat. The North Koreans make no headway; rather they are harshly pushed back down the ragged slope. One Marine and several soldiers are wounded and one Marine is slain by a combination of bayonet and gunshot wounds. At sunrise, Company D, under Captain Finn, departs its positions under the crest. The three platoons move side by side and ascend the southern slope against minimal resistance, but once they reach the peak, they come under fierce fire. North Koreans, holding positions on the northern half of the hill, saturate the summit with fire. Nevertheless, Company D executes the relief and takes responsibility for the crest. Cahill’s Platoon and the remnants of the 5th RCT contingent descend the crest, battered but victorious. The North Korean units operating against Hill 342 are contingents of the 13th and 15th Regiments, N.K. 6th Division (according to documents recovered from bodies of dead enemy troops). The estimated strength against Hill 342 (Yaban-san) is between 500 and 600 men. Lieutenant Cahill’s 1st Platoon (Company G), 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, sustains six men killed and twelve wounded during the battle. Company D, 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines, attempts to tighten the positions on the crest of Hill 342, but the Communist troops that remain clustered on the upper slopes maintain a steady stream of fire. During the final climb and the fight, which continues to ensue beyond the relief operation, Company D sustains casualties, including the deaths of Lieutenants Oakley and Reid. Captain Finn braves the fire to recover Reid’s body by crawling forward, but enemy rounds also strike him to inflict a severe head wound and a wound to the shoulder. Finn, temporarily nearly blind and approaching unconsciousness, crawls back to the lines to receive medical aid. Later, while he is being taken down the hill for more medical attention, Finn encounters Lieutenant Hanifin, who is moving

August 8, 1950 up the slope. Captain Finn tells Hanifin that he is now in command of D Company. Once at the crest, Hanifin quickly regroups his new command, with little time to spare. The North Koreans afford the exhausted Marines no rest; rather they launch another assault to seize the summit, but it is repulsed and the enemy sustains heavy casualties. Company D sustains 6 men killed and twenty-five wounded. At about 1130, while the struggle for the crest (Hill 342) subsides, Lieutenant Hanifin receives a call from Colonel Roise. As the conversation begins, Roise gets a quick picture: Hanifin collapses from heat exhaustion. The problem of command is quickly rectified. Master Sergeant Harold Reeves (nearly 30 years service) assumes temporary command of Company D’s three rifle platoons, and 2nd Lieutenant Leroy Wirth, a forward observer for the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, assumes temporary command of the supporting units, including the planes of MAG-33 that circle above the positions. Soon after, Captain Andrew Zimmer (regimental asst. S-3) is appointed new commanding officer of Company D. This is the final major threat against Hill 342, but Zimmer’s unit incurs some additional casualties, most occurring while attempts are made to reel in supplies that miss the mark when airdropped. While the contest continues on Hill 342, Major Walter Gall, CO, 2nd Battalion Weapons Company, dispatches a small patrol to destroy the machine gun positions in Tokkong-ni, which initially had been ignored by Company D. The patrol sustains three casualties, but it does not quiet the guns. First Lieutenant Ira T. Carr then turns the 81-mm guns toward the village and commences a powerful barrage, which terminates the guns of Tokkong-ni. In related activity, the 2nd Battalion, 24th Regiment, USA, is scheduled to relieve the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines, at Hill 342, but it is held up near Chindongni. Company E, 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines, operating on the western spur of Hill 342, advances several hundred yards and establishes positions there. Meanwhile, at 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines zone, troops of Company G deployed on Hill 255 have been harassed by snipers throughout the night, but at dawn, four enemy troops are spotted within 100 yards of the Marines’ positions. All four troops die suddenly. Also, slightly after dawn on Hill 255, Marines of Company H peer down the Haman Road and observe a column of troops that are casually ascending the slope and moving toward a high peak beyond the plateau. Initially, the Marines believe that the troops are ROKs and take no action. Captain Fegan observes the troops positioning themselves and he orders his troops to stand ready, and with no time to spare. The unidentified troops commence firing, ending the mystery. It is enemy fire. The attack is part of the major enemy offensive and it interferes with TF Kean’s jump-off. By seizing the high ground there, the enemy is able to sever the Masan-Chindong-ni portion of the main supply route,

August 8, 1950 which hinders the ground troops from receiving supplies and reinforcements. In related activity, word of the plight of the 2nd Battalion, 24th Regiment, north of Chindong-ni reaches Colonel Taplett. Once informed of the enemy on the peak, he directs Captain Fegan to commit Company H, 5th Marines, to exterminate the enemy position. Artillery preparatory fire and coordinated air strikes fail to dislodge the enemy. While the troops are safely huddled within the natural protective shield of the rocky crag, Second Lieutenant John O. Williams’ 1st Platoon moves toward the peak under cover fire of the remainder of the company. Williams’ platoon reaches a point within thirty yards of the objective, but heavy machine gun fire grids the area and a huge amount of grenades are tossed down the slope, halting progress. An attempt is made to shift the attack toward the enemy’s left flank. One fire team advances to positions just under the enemy, but it is repulsed. Lieutenant Williams is ordered to pull back to regroup. In the meantime, the 3rd Platoon is ordered by Fegan to move through the positions of the 1st Platoon and continue the assault, but it ignores the order and fails to advance. Sensing that the 3rd Platoon had merely been stunned by the failure of the 1st Platoon, he moves quickly to restore confidence by taking personal command of the 3rd Platoon and of the attack. With Fegan in command, the 3rd Platoon advances in wedge formation, maneuvering while under continuous heavy fire. Staff Sgt. John Wheatley, Sergeant Edward Barrett and several others become wounded; Barrett, debilitated by two wounds and lying in open ground, is carried to safety by Fegan. Meanwhile, the platoon gnaws forward and then, with a sudden thrust, the Marines lunge onto the peak. One contingent, led by Corporal Melvin James, strikes from the left flank, while another attack, stimulated by the spirited actions of Tech. Sergeant Ray Morgan and PFC Donald Terrio, plow into the enemy’s right flank. Morgan and Terrio had each destroyed a separate enemy machine gun and its crews. At this point, the contest becomes bloodier as the Marines encounter an enemy force that desires a fight to the death. The Marines oblige and move from foxhole to foxhole until the crest falls and the annihilation is complete. Company H then moves north about 200 yards where the heights terminate with a perpendicular drop. The three platoons pause there and gaze across the chasm toward Hill 255, awaiting orders. In the meantime, the North Koreans continue to lay artillery and mortar fire on the captured positions. Company H sustains 6 men killed and 32 wounded during the attack. Colonel Taplett directs Company H to hold in place for the night. Marine artillery and planes from MAG-33 support Company H during its bivouac. The mortar platoon of the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, and the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, keep their mortars firing throughout the night of August 8-9. The

196 shells carpet the entire battalion front with an iron belt to keep the enemy sedated. In related activity, during Company H’s attack, Company G on Hill 255 observes enemy reinforcements as they travel along Haman Road, north of Hill 99. The column traces the steps of the contingent that had attempted to strike earlier at dawn. Bolstered by its supporting units that provide effective interdiction fire, the enemy column halts abruptly and its surviving troops disperse hurriedly as they sprint back toward their original positions. Pusan Perimeter, Naktong Bulge: The 9th RCT (2nd Division, attached to 24th Division), having departed Changnyong at 0130, arrives at 24th Division headquarters at 0830. Its commanding officer, Colonel John Hill, reports to General Church and he receives orders to begin an immediate attack. Initially, it is to commence no later than 1500, but the two men agree to delay it for one hour. The 9th RCT is exhausted from its night march from Pusan. Some elements of the 9th Regiment relieve Company B at its positions on Cloverleaf Hill (Hill 165) and others relieve the contingent of the heavy mortar company, which is improvising as riflemen at positions south of the road near Obong-ni Ridge. At 1645, the 9th Regiment, supported by the guns of the 15th FABn, attacks. The 2nd Battalion, led by Colonel John Londahl, strikes against Cloverleaf to the right, while the 1st Battalion, commanded by Colonel Fred Harrison, drives against Obong-ni Ridge on the left. Both contingents make some progress to gain ground before dark, but neither secures its entire objective. The devilish heat combined with inexperience of the attacking units adds to the frustration of the attack. At day’s end, the Naktong River remains out of reach. In the meantime, the North Koreans regroup and retake the ground on Obong-ni Ridge during the night. The 9th Regiment’s 2nd Battalion incurs heavy casualties among its officers, and on the following day, officer casualties again rise. While the 9th Regiment attempts to destroy the enemy in the bulge, Colonel John Hill is informed that the North Koreans are toiling at night to complete a bridge across the river. Its surface will lie about one foot under water, obscuring its view from the air. Meanwhile, farther south, other enemy forces are slashing through the positions of the 34th Regiment, which anchor the division’s left flank. Nevertheless, in the 34th Regimental sector, Company A, still jeopardized by enemy forces controlling the heights to its right, continues to hold its ground. At dawn, six boats transporting reinforcements across the river are spotted from the positions of Company A. The enemy contingent, composed of about 60 to 65 troops, causes some alarm, prompting the placing of a call requesting air strikes. In the meantime, the enemy reaches positions about 1,000 yards from the Americans. The North Koreans are greeted with fire from a heavy machine gun that prompts them to scatter along the banks of the

197 Naktong. At about the same time, the planes arrive to strafe the enemy as they scatter. The North Koreans, however, still continue to press Company A throughout the day, and their tactics include preliminary mortar fire to adjust their range. Company A is convinced that the short bursts of mortar fire are merely a prelude to a night attack. Company A and the supporting elements of Company L discover enemy troops who appear to be moving toward their positions. The units report the situation to headquarters and by 2300, they receive permission to pull off the hill. The evacuation occurs just in the nick of time. A powerful enemy barrage is unleashed against the positions just as the troops withdraw to safety, but again, in the heat and confusion of the battle, costly errors are made. One platoon fails to follow the road leading south to U.S. lines. It heads north toward the enemy-held positions at the northern end of Obong-ni Ridge. The platoon incurs severe casualties. The balance of the contingent, including the elements of Company L, eventually arrives at the 1st Battalion perimeter east of Obong-ni during the daylight hours of the 9th. The commitment of Colonel Hill’s troops (9th RCT) prevents any strong reinforcement of the 34th Regiment. During the night (8th-9th), General Church remains determined to regain the center ground at the Naktong. The 9th RCT is ordered to reinitiate the attack, but all the while, the enemy gathers momentum on the left against the 34th Regiment. Pusan Perimeter, Central Front, Taegu: The N.K. 1st Division, which began crossing the Naktong between Hamch’ang and Sangju on the 6th, completes its crossing. It advances toward Kunwi against stiff opposition raised by the S.K. 6th Division. The enemy division has received additional replacement troops, but many lack weapons. The N.K. 15th Division, operating south of the N.K. 1st and 13th Divisions, had secured Hills 201 and 346 on the previous day. On this day, the S.K. 1st Division launches attacks and clears both hills, but the enemy is not forced back across the Naktong. Rather, it vanishes deeper into the mountains that lead east. These crossings have already caused serious concern in Taegu, but more critical decisions must be made. Two more enemy divisions, the 3rd and 10th, are both prepared to bolt the river and strike against the 1st Cavalry Division. Pusan Perimeter, Eastern Corridor: The North Koreans continue to drive south against the eastern flank of the Pusan Perimeter, which is defended by the South Koreans. Three enemy divisions and one independent regiment are closing. The N.K. 12th Division maneuvers through the mountains southeast of Andong en route to Pohang-dong, while the N.K. 8th Division advances down the Uisong Road toward Yongch’on. The N.K. 5th Division moves down the coastal road. Some infantry contingents of the N.K. 5th Division have been circumventing the S.K. 3rd Division by infiltrating through the mountains. In addition, another unit, the 766th Independent Regiment,

August 8, 1950 has swung off the coastal road to drive southwest toward the villages of Kigye and An’gang-ni. At Yong-dok, fighting continues between the N.K. 5th Division and the S.K. 3rd Division. Today, the 6131st Fighter Wing is established at Pohang. Contrasting events begin to occur as the enemy steps up its southern drive. As the Air Force is adding strength, the aviation engineers receive orders to have their heavy equipment moved out of the base and transferred to a more stable area, to avoid possible destruction by enemy fire. In Air Force activity, the USAF 18th FBG abandons its base at Taegu and relocates at Ashiya, Japan, due to the enemy threat against the area. In other activty, the 307th Bomber Group, recently arrived in Okinawa, executes its initial mission of the war. — In the United States: The vessels that will transport the 1st Marine Division to the Far East begin to load today in San Diego. The operation is completed by the 22nd. Ninety stevedore crews are requested for the huge task, but only fifty-four crews are raised. The following vessels will handle the principal body of the 1st Marine Division: LSM 419; LST 845; USS Noble and USS President Jackson (assault transports); USS General Buckner, USS General Weigel, USS Marine Phoenix, USS General Meigs and USS General Butner (transports); and the cargo vessels SS African Patriot, SS Alma Victory, SS American Press, SS American Victory, SS Belgian Victory, SS Dolly Thurman, SS Green Bay Victory, SS Noonday, SS South Wind, and the SS Twin Falls Victory. — In Japan: General MacArthur orders all available air support, including Seventh Fleet carriers, to focus their efforts on interdiction and close-air support missions until the 17th. The intent is to shore up Eighth Army while maintaining incessant pressure against the North Korean advance toward Pusan. Also, Lt. General Stratemeyer directs Major General Partridge to increase the amount of night flights to fifty per night to increase the odds of spotting enemy columns that might be moving supplies. In other activity, General MacArthur again meets with Averell Harriman and Generals Ridgway and Norstad. MacArthur exudes confidence concerning victory over the Communists in Korea, and he gives Harriman’s entourage the specifics on what he requires to bring forth a successful conclusion of the conflict. Included in the necessities are the infusion of troops from other Allied nations and the speedy arrival of the U.S. 3rd Division in Japan to afford protection, if the Russians should decide to attack there. The Korean crisis has required the commitment of the 7th Division (Inchon), thereby stripping Japan of its U.S. defensive force. Harriman and his entourage return to the States today convinced that MacArthur’s plan to invade Inchon will succeed. MacArthur has apparently convinced them that the Chinese will not invade Formosa; however, he adds his caveat that if the Communists do attack Formosa, he will take command there and deliver

August 9, 1950 them a “crushing defeat.” Also, the trip has created some quiet concerns about the leadership ability of General Walker. En route back to the States, Harriman and Norstad confer and they decide that General Ridgway should replace Walker. Ridgway believes that Walker should be replaced subsequent to his holding the line at the Pusan Perimeter, but Ridgway makes it clear that he is not seeking the job.

198

which encounters only sniper fire during the climb. The summit is secured at 1200. The weary battalion sustains many victims from the heat. About one-half of Companies A and B become sick. Troops are sent to find water to help alleviate the problem. In the meantime, new orders arrive from Colonel Murray that direct the weary contingent to descend the hill and reinitiate the attack by driving toward Paedun-ni. Colonel Newton instructs Companies A August 9 Southwest Pusan Perimeter: In the 1st and B to temporarily remain on the crest while he orBattalion, 5th Marines zone, dawn arrives just as the ganizes the advance column using headquarters and trailing contingents of the battalion complete the nightweapons troops. long journey from the 5th RCT command post near Newton, reaching the low ground northwest of the Singi. Colonel Murray orders the 1st Battalion to conhill, inspects his Japanese map and it displays only one tinue the attack and secure Hill 308. The tired Marines of the two roads that lead to Paedun-ni from Oso-ri, a move out advancing southwest, ascending 1,000 feet village about 600 yards south of Tosan. However, from the base and 2,000 yards south. Company B, Colonel Murray’s map depicts the two roads; the southcommanded by Captain Tobin, spearheads the attack, ern road is ragged and the western road is smooth, but Murray’s map wrongly identifies the rough route as improved. He instructs Newton to use the supposed improved road. The column proceeds beyond Taesil and then it encounters mines scattered about the road. Company A engineers rush to the area from Chindong-ni and remove the obstacles, which are found to be U.S. antitank mines that probably fell off an army vehicle. At about the same time, Colonel Murray arrives on the scene, and still using his mis-marked map, he informs Newton that his column is on the wrong road. Newton is told to turn the column on the narrow road and return to the intersection, compounding the errors. The vehicles and baffled troops reach the intersection back at Oso-ri, but the column stalls. General Craig arrives and he becomes extremely unhappy with the confusion. Eventually, the column begins advancing on the southern route, which curves around the base of Hill 308, and by this time it is joined by Companies A and B. About one mile out, the advance elements encounter a lone enemy machine gun position entrenched in a hut about mid-point on A soldier enjoys lunch on 9 August, while another seems to be taking a nap. the curve. The position is

199 destroyed by ground troops, accompanied by a rocket launcher. The column reinitiates its advance, and without incident, it reaches a 400-feet pass leading between Hills 308 and 190. As dusk approaches, the battalion is ordered to establish defensive night positions at a point about two miles south of the Tosan departure point. Meanwhile, General Craig prepares a night attack for the brigade, based in part on his assumption that the

August 9, 1950 lack of opposition against the advance of the 1st Battalion is a signal that the enemy is not expecting a fight. Craig orders the 5th Marines to seize Paedun-ni prior to dawn on the 10th. In the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines sector, the Communists have sustained severe casualties while unsuccessfully attempting to seize Hill 342 from Company D. The area is now tranquil except for some ineffectual

An Army field kitchen is in a sea of mud.

August 9, 1950 long-range machine gun and antitank fire during the morning hours. The bulk of the enemy force is retiring northward. Company D, having sustained eight men killed and twenty-eight wounded during the contest for the hill, is relieved during the afternoon by the 2nd Battalion, 24th Regiment. Estimates vary as to the number of enemy dead, purported to be troops of the N.K. 13th and 15th Regiments, N.K. 6th Division, according to papers discovered among the bodies. Lieutenant Cahill, Company D, estimates 150 enemy killed, and he notes on his report that the figure is “conservative.” The 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines, establishes the number of enemy killed at 400 subsequent to its battle. The actual count of enemy dead, inflicted by Army and Marine troops and supporting units, according to Marine records, “probably lies somewhere between the two figures.” In other activity, at 0825, Marine artillery and planes lambaste North Korean positions on Hill 255 to loosen resistance for Company H, 3rd Battalion. The Marine aircraft deliver the first close-support dosage of napalm during the conflict. The supporting artillery fire and the powerful strike by the Marine planes bring huge dividends. Less than five minutes before Captain Fegan’s troops throw the final punch to knock out the enemy positions, word is received from an airborne tactical air coordinator that the preparatory strikes have rendered the objective benign. Fegan’s troops sprint the remaining distance to the peak against inconsequential resistance and discover only the remains of two decimated machine guns and a few enemy dead. The strategy introduced to terminate the enemy threat to the main supply route had included a Marine drive along Hill 255 to grid line 1350 and a coordinated attack north of the borderline by Army units pushing from Masan. At 1125, Company H, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, makes visual contact with approaching elements of the 24th Regiment. The Marine 3rd Battalion sustains 16 killed and 36 wounded while clearing the MSR, and the majority of casualties occur in Fegan’s Company H, reducing its effectiveness by 25 percent. In other activity, General Craig, USMC, relinquishes his control of all troops in the area at 1700. The road junction is secure, permitting both the Army and Marine units to resume progress toward the objective. The 2nd Battalion, subsequent to its relief on Hill 342 by the 24th Regiment, moves from Sangnyong-ni to Hill 308, arriving there at 2100. At 0010 on August 10, the battalion heads south toward the new MSR to participate in the night assault against Paedun-ni. Fifteen minutes later, it moves through the lines of the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, at a pass between Hills 190 and 308. The 3rd Battalion remains in its sector to execute some security details until relieved by U.S. Army units. Afterwards, the 3rd Battalion joins the brigade on the following morning. Also, the three batteries (four guns each) of the 1st Bn. (reinforced), 5th Marines, which had relieved the 8th Field Artillery Battalion at Chindong-ni on August 6, has played a vital support

200 role for much of the ground fighting between the 7th and 9th. In addition, the observation planes of VMO6 have enhanced the artillery’s success by their effective target spotting with emphasis on enemy mortar positions. The crews of the batteries of the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, quickly adjust to the perplexing combat around Chindong-ni. The batteries form an arc to intercept any threat, singular or plural and regardless of the direction it comes from. Usually, one battery peers north while two others face east and west. Later, Colonel Wood, referring to the experience gained, offers his opinion: “I think that this is one of the most important lessons we learned in fighting infiltrating troops. Artillery must be able and always prepared to fire in any direction on a moment’s notice.” Pusan Perimeter, Naktong Bulge: In the 9th Regimental sector, strong fire fights ensue as the contest for Cloverleaf and Obong-ni continues, but neither side gains the advantage and both sides sustain heavy casualties. Heavy fighting also rages along the Naktong in the 24th Division sector as the N.K. 4th Division pounds against the perimeter. The forward observation post of Company K, 3rd Battalion, 34th Regiment, posted at the southern tip of battalion positions, is overrun, but the remainder of the perimeter is firmly held. The outnumbered troops receive orders to remain in place and give no ground. In the meantime, Company A, 1st Battalion, and elements of Company L, 3rd Battalion, 34th Regiment, arrive at the 1st Battalion lines. Company L will be reformed on the following day and rushed back to reinforce K Company. The North Korean gains compel the 24th Division to evacuate its command post at Changnyong and reestablish it at Kyungyo, nearly fifteen miles to the rear. An irritated General Walker arrives by air. He exchanges some heated words with General Church, who is already under great stress. Church then orders a divisional attack to commence at about 1700. The three participating regiments are held together by Band-Aids and rubber bands, too overextended and too exhausted to mount a fierce assault. The attack receives support from aircraft and artillery (11th, 13th and 15th FABns) when it commences, but the 9th RCT is burdened with the weight of the assault. The weakened 19th and 34th Regiments are unable to advance. The commander of the 2nd Battalion, 9th RCT, Colonel Fred Harrison, loses one leg during the day’s action and he is evacuated; Colonel Joseph A. Walker, the battalion executive officer, assumes command. The opposing sides will each launch attacks on the following day. Pusan Perimeter, Central Front, Taegu: The N.K. 1st and 13th Divisions continue their advance toward Taegu. The N.K. 15th Division continues to move through the mountains east of Hills 201 and 346 heading for Tabu-dong, about fifteen miles north of Taegu. The three enemy divisions are each operating against South Korean defenses located west of the cavalry positions at Waegwan. And on this day, additional enemy

201 units cross the river near the 1st Cavalry defenses. At about 0300, the 7th Regiment, 3rd N.K. Division, walks across the Naktong at a point near Noch’on, two miles south of the Waegwan Bridge. Some 5th Cavalrymen spot the enemy movement and inform artillery, which has preset its guns for the crossing site. The N.K. 7th Regiment is greeted with bursting flares that expose it, but most troops safely make it to the hills. Enemy soldier Choe Song Hwan’s diary, extracted after his capture on the 12th, denotes the early morning’s activities: “Gradually advanced toward the river. Enemy shelling is fierce. Arrived at the river. The terrible enemy (U.S.) has sent up flares ... the noise is ringing in my ears. Have already crossed the river. Occupied a hill....” About 45 minutes before daylight, it becomes apparent that Hill 268 has been occupied when a reconnaissance detachment of the 5th Cavalry observes the penetration. The trailing 8th and 9th Regiments attempt to cross the river farther south, but by now, all the guns and the mortars of the 5th Cavalry Regiment are poised to fire. Suddenly, star shells and brightly illuminated flares burst overhead, giving the water an iridescent glow. The encompassing enfilade inflicts heavy casualties on the stunned regiments, which are helplessly strung out in the water. Very few men of the N.K. 8th and 9th Regiments safely execute the crossing. They are forced to return to the east bank and suspend their Naktong crossing until the following night. At dawn, ambiguous reports of the enemy crossings in the 5th Cavalry zone reach General Gay at his headquarters in Taegu. Unwilling to act impulsively, Gay attempts to acquire more detailed specifics on the breakthrough. In the meantime, he orders the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry (reserve), commanded by Lt. Colonel Peter D. Clainos, to go on imminent alert, and he summons 1st Lieutenant Harry A. Buckley, acting S-2, 5th Cavalry, who is supposed to have on-scene information concerning the penetration. Shortly thereafter, Buckley arrives at divisional headquarters and he clears up all doubts. Buckley’s report states: “Approximately 45 minutes before daylight, I observed enemy forces moving up the ridge line just northwest of Hill 268. The enemy were moving in dog trot in groups of four. Every fourth man carried an automatic weapon, either a light machine gun or a burp gun.... In my opinion and I counted them carefully, the enemy was in strength of a reinforced battalion, approximately 750 men.” Lt. Buckley says to General Gay: “General, I am not a very excitable person and I know what I saw, when I saw it, where I was when I saw it and where the enemy was going.” General Walker arrives to question Gay on how he intends to handle the newest crisis. Gay and Walker agree that the crossing in the 5th Cavalry area might be a feint to cover a larger crossing farther to the left. General Gay makes preparations to clear Hill 268 (Triangulation Hill) of the enemy. The guns of the 61st FAB begin to plaster the strategic objective, which dominates both a segment of the key Korean north-south

August 9, 1950 highway and the double-track railroad line (PusanSeoul-Harbin, Manchuria), which glides around its base. The north-south road has been utilized since ancient times, and Hill 268, ten air-miles northwest of Taegu and three miles from Waegwan, is vital for U.S. lines of communications in the area. The 1st Battalion gets its marching orders at 0930. It departs Taegu supported by five tanks of Company A, 71st Heavy Tank Battalion, and advances to the objective, Hill 268. The hill is inundated with high dense brush and a scattering of trees that attain a height of eight to ten feet, affording the enemy natural camouflage positions. The artillery launches a pre-attack barrage at 1200. Upon its cessation, the 1st Battalion attacks, but coordination between the artillerymen and the infantry is less than smooth, further complicating the arduous attack, which rages under blazing heat. Many of the soldiers fall prey to heat prostration. Consequently, the assault falters. Another attempt to dislodge the N.K. 3rd Division occurs on the following day. Pusan Perimeter, Eastern Corridor: The S.K. 8th Division catches the advancing N.K. 8th Division by surprise on the Uisong-Yongch’on Road near Uisong and inflicts heavy casualties (about 700) on the enemy’s 3rd Regiment. During the heated exchange, some South Koreans are deployed in a shallow valley near a bridge to protect an antitank minefield. As an enemy column approaches the bridge, one tank strikes a mine. Almost instantaneously a second tank detonates a mine. And then the guns begin blazing. Three additional enemy tanks and one self propelled 76-mm gun reach the road blockage. Drivers attempt to reverse their vehicles. At about the same time, a group of F-51 fighters arrive overhead and begin to dive for the kill. The pilots deposit napalm and rockets, which decimate all six vehicles. Meanwhile, the N.K. 2nd Regiment rushes to aid the beleaguered 3rd Regiment, but it, too, incurs severe casualties before it finally regains the ground previously lost to the ROK forces. The valiant stand by the South Koreans hurts the enemy badly, forcing the N.K. 8th Division to suspend its march against Yongch’on for one week. Farther east, the N.K. 12th Division, which carries the honorary title “Andong Division,” continues its march through the mountains southeast of Andong en route to seize Pohang-dong. The 12th Division has diminished its strength by returning its 2nd Battalion’s (artillery regiment) full complement of artillery pieces to Tanyang, due to lack of ammunition. Sporadic reports filter into Eighth Army headquarters during August concerning the guerrilla units that have been moving through the mountains in the S.K. 3rd Division sector, but today, it receives information detailing the presence of a large enemy regular army force that has been detected northwest of Pohang-dong. The columns are moving toward the U.S. Air Force Base at Yonil Airfield, jeopardizing it and the coastal road. The S.K. 3rd Division is deployed along the coastal road about twenty miles in front of Pohang-dong; however,

August 10, 1950 the enemy moves freely through the mountains as there are no units forming a line of defense there. Elements of the S.K. 25th Regiment arrive in Kigye from Taegu, and at once, they are committed. The 1st and 2nd Battalions drive north from the village to hook up with the 3rd S.K. Division forces located south of Yongdok. The two battalions advance less than three miles when they are struck by a counterattack and shoved back beyond the starting point to an area about southeast of the village. Meanwhile, in the S.K. 3rd Division sector, the commanding officer, S.K. 22nd Regiment, directs the troops at the Kanggu-dong bridge to destroy it. Despite no orders from the KMAG advisor, Major Britton, the bridge collapses into the river at 0530, and the action isolates about 350 troops north of the Osipch’on. Again, premature anxiety increases the burden of the S.K. forces and gives the enemy the advantage. The S.K. 3rd Division is compelled to withdraw the divisional command post to Changsadong during the afternoon, negating two weeks of gallant fighting against the enemy. The stranded troops attempt to cross the Osip-ch’on, an inlet of the Sea of Japan, but many perish in its deep waters. The division chief of staff, incensed by the destruction of the bridge, informs the S.K. Army that the officer in question must be relieved immediately or he would be summoned to a court martial and be executed by a firing squad. The officer is relieved of duty at once. However, the action does little to aid the beleaguered S.K. 3rd Division. The North Koreans press the attack and increase the infiltration of the lines. By the following day, the 3rd Division will be encircled. — In the United States: The 1st Marine Division issues Operation Order No. 1-50, which authorizes the embarkation of the division (minus the brigade and one RCT) to the Far East, with orders to report to the CinCFE upon arrival. By today, Camp Pendleton contains 17,162 Marines who have arrived from across the country, and they are eligible for transfer to the 1st Marine Division.

August 10 Planes from the USS Philippine Sea attack enemy targets. During one raid, an enemy barracks is damaged. The USS Valley Forge also catapults its planes to strike enemy targets. One contingent, composed of four F4Us commanded by Lieutenant Clarence E. Smith, coordinates with a Mosquito plane near Chinju and successfully blows a bridge near the village. Following further instructions from the Mosquito plane, the aircraft head north of the village and locate concealed vehicles and an oil depot. Lightning fast passes and accurate rocket and machine gun fire decimate the area. In other activity, General Partridge, commander, Far East Air Forces, gripes that his planes are being underutilized by Eighth Army concerning the transfer of supplies from Japan to Korea. In reaction, Eighth Army decreases its Red Ball Express cargo and expands its airlift operation. The Red Ball Express, initiated on July

202 23, is operating well and is much less expensive. Nonetheless, by August 15, the land-sea mode is sharply reduced to a schedule of operating twice a week. Equipment transfers will be augmented by the Air Force. Regardless of the method of transporting the equipment from Japan, once in Korea, Eighth Army expedites the supplies to the specified areas. Since about the beginning of August, the Army has been using Korean civilians (carrying A-frames) to transport supplies into the mountains to the front lines. The civilian transporters are less expensive for the Army than using pack animals. Through the cooperation of the ROK Army, the civilians are allotted to the U.S. units. About 500 unskilled men, including laborers and transporters, are hired per division. Southwest Pusan Perimeter: In the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade sector, the brigade had been released from its mop-up operations in the area around Chindong-ni at 1600 on the previous night, making the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines, available for the proposed night attack against Paedun-ni. At 0115, the 2nd Battalion advances through the positions of the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines. The overtired contingent treks through the darkness supported by spearheading tanks, and it arrives near the objective without incident at about 0500. But a mishap occurs as the point tank of Lieutenant William Pomeroy’s platoon inadvertently smashes into a concrete bridge and becomes jammed, forbidding passage. Unable to extricate the M-26, the trailing tank attempts to take a circuitous route adjacent to the bridge, but mid-stream, it loses a track and stalls the column for two more hours. In the meantime, South Korean laborers build a makeshift bypass to provide passage for the lighter vehicles that are attached to the attack group. Heavy equipment is brought up to fabricate a crossing for the remainder of the tanks and the other heavy vehicles. The 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines, arrives at Paedon-ni at 0800 and discovers it unoccupied. By 0930, the column is back on the road heading toward Kosong, but many of the heavier vehicles still struggle for progress at the stream. The hold-up impedes Murray’s plan to ferry the troops by truck. The column advances, lacking air and artillery support, but it expects only minimal resistance. During the eight-mile march, General Craig arrives overhead in his helicopter. After it sets down, Craig expresses his displeasure with the tardiness of the advance. He orders Murray to speed up the march. Four jeeps and five 2 1/2 ton trucks are procured. They roar to the head of the column to load the advance troops: the 1st and 2nd Platoons, Company D, an assault squad, the 60-mm mortars and one machine gun section, which become the vanguard. The advance unit is to occupy the town and establish a defense strategy while it awaits the arrival of the main body. Still lacking air cover and artillery support, the forward elements advance along the road, heading toward the unfamiliar and elevated narrow 1,000 foot Taedabok Pass, two and one-half miles southwest of Paedun-ni. From the pass, the column must still

203 venture around a dangerously tight curve near the village of Pugok. It veers left as it nudges the base of a huge hill that dominates the entire pass. The convoy moves through the pass without incident, providing some added confidence that the final leg of the journey might remain uncontested. Then suddenly, at 1500, the first jeep of the reconnaissance unit pulls into position nearly parallel to the village of Pugok. At about the same time, it is struck by an ambush. Concealed machine guns unleash a swift hurricane of fire that catapults down from the ominous hill to riddle the troops of Company D. The Marines scurry for cover, but as they bolt from the vehicles, a shell from an antitank gun swoops down with a thunderous roar and scores a direct hit on one of the lead jeeps. The small detachment then moves back to join the remainder of the company. Captain Zimmer considers his options, then he directs his 1st Platoon to maneuver to the right side of the road, then climb to positions about half way through the pass to secure the high ground there. Zimmer hopes the action will help neutralize the enemy fire until the full strength of the battalion arrives. The ground troops move swiftly and reach the assigned positions without resistance. They immediately establish positions and return fire. By this time, Company B has eliminated several small groups of the enemy posted on both sides of the road at the entrance to the pass and arrives to join the fire fight. In the meantime, Zimmer discovers the position of the menacing antitank gun. Mortar fire then pulverizes it, but in the process, the mortar ammunition becomes exhausted. Zimmer postpones any further advance until the brigade’s heavy guns arrive. At 1630, two tanks pull up. They promptly return fire and the powerful blasts of their 90-mm shells pummel the enemy positions. Marine aircraft also arrive to further augment the battalion. The combined strength apparently convinces the North Koreans to scatter. With the elimination of the enemy’s advance positions, the drive resumes, but other enemy troops lurk nearby. During the interruption, the 3rd Battalion, led by Colonel Taplett, arrives at Paedun-ni from Chindongni and joins the column. Colonel Murray directs Taplett to prepare to run his 3rd Battalion through the 2nd Battalion positions and maintain the attack. The 3rd Battalion advances to the pass to reach positions just behind the 2nd Battalion, which had moved by foot. Colonel Murray and Colonel Taplett, unable to locate Colonel Roise (2nd Battalion commander), move to the high ground to scrutinize the terrain and attempt to locate the enemy positions. Kosong, about five miles distant, is clearly visible from their vantage point, but the precise positions of the enemy cannot be determined. Nonetheless, the 3rd Battalion launches the attack; some elements (Company G) have already crossed the departure line and are poised to strike at the hill, precisely at the bend in the road. However, the uncertainty of the location of the entrenched enemy continues to raise concern; Major McNeely (S-3) and a small

August 10, 1950 detachment volunteer to advance in a jeep to gain the needed intelligence. At 1730, the party jumps off, but almost immediately, Colonel Taplett, from his observation post in the heights on the left side of the road, spots danger awaiting the patrol. Urgently he radios word to Lieutenant Bohn, instructing him to halt the jeep, but it is too late. The speeding vehicle takes the curve and as the patrol disappears around the bend, the foreboding sounds of heavy enemy small-arms and machine gun fire reverberate alarmingly, signaling the probability of fateful news. Company G bolts forward to reach the beleaguered patrol. Westerman’s platoon takes the point with Lieutenant Duncan’s platoon trailing, but the fierce ring of fire halts progress. Desperately trying to reach McNeeley’s detachment, Lieutenant Bohn orders Duncan’s platoon to sweep wide to the right, then open the throttle. Despite heavy incoming fire, the gutsy envelopment succeeds. Duncan’s command swoops onto the summit and violently evicts the enemy occupants. Westerman’s platoon follows shortly thereafter. Once on the summit, Westerman glances down; he discovers the grim sight of McNeeley’s ravaged jeep. Close by, the five Marines lay utterly still, under and to the immediate rear of the decimated jeep. He disregards furious fire, sprints to the ambushed detachment and drags McNeely, who is mortally wounded, back to the lines. Two killed and two severely wounded men remain near the jeep. Intense enemy fire becomes impenetrable and bars additional rescue attempts. Meanwhile, Company G resumes its attack and immediately comes under a wall of relentless fire that originates from two concealed enemy machine guns at the remote end of the curve. Company H bolsters the attack force; it pushes on the left side of the road and captures the hill opposite Bohn’s Company G. Nonetheless, the enemy machine guns continue their deadly fire until finally, just before dark, they are permanently silenced. Colonel Murray, at 2015, orders the 3rd Battalion to establish night defenses to ensure the retention of the two captured hills. An anguishing decision is reached concerning the fate of the two surviving men. Convinced that the enemy has planned a night ambush, the mission is postponed until dawn. With the exception of some sporadic rifle fire along the 700-yard front of the 3rd Battalion, the night of the 9th-10th remains peaceful. In accordance with the orders of General Craig, the attack is to be reinitiated at dawn on the following day. Pusan Perimeter, Naktong Bulge: The Americans still hold some strong positions along the Naktong in the 24th Division sector, but the North Koreans have secured much strategic ground, including the establishment of a roadblock below the town of Yongsan, which severs the division’s MSR from the south. The positions of Companies K and L, 34th Regiment, above the Naktong are becoming isolated, but they continue to hold. Today, the Communists launch another vicious assault to destroy the 9th RCT, but in turn the

August 10, 1950 men of Colonel Hill’s RCT commence an attack that leads to a colossal head-on collision. The 2nd Battalion, 9th Regiment, lacks many officers due to the severe heat and ongoing brutalizing combat. Colonel Rhea, the commanding officer, had been evacuated due to heat exhaustion on the previous day. Company F is the sole 9th RCT rifle company that still has more than one officer. This engagement takes another heavy toll on the regiment and it is forced to give ground. The North Koreans reclaim all the terrain that it had previously lost on Cloverleaf (Hill 165). But to the north, the 19th Regiment’s 2nd Battalion fights an equally fierce but more successful battle in the rugged slopes. Stiff opposition is overcome and the 2nd Battalion seizes a few hills, including the strategic Ohang Hill; however, the losses are grave and the battalion completes the day’s combat with only about 100 able riflemen remaining. Although the Americans take Ohang Hill, the enemy holds positions to the south of it, and the 19th Regiment is unable to make further progress. The battle at the Naktong Bulge takes on a different light as the Americans gradually become adapted to the extreme weather, and the boys, most of whom arrived green, are standing firm during their baptisms under fire, refusing to retreat under pressure. General Church makes more adjustments in his battle plans. He places all units in the bulge area under the command of Colonel John G. Hill (9th RCT) and he directs Hill to launch another attack on the 11th. The varied units under Hill’s command are designated Task Force Hill, composed of the 24th Division’s 19th and 34th Regiments, the 1st Battalion, 21st Regiment, and the 9th Regiment (minus 3rd Battalion), 2nd Division. In addition, all supporting units, including artillery, come under the command of Colonel Hill. The casualty list has hugely diminished the strength of the combined units. The 2nd Battalion, 19th Regiment’s three rifle companies combined contain fewer than 100 men. Company F stands at 25, Company E, 30 troops and Company D, the strongest of the three, stands at about 40 men. While the officers design the strategy for the attack scheduled for the following morning, the enemy continues to get reinforcements across the Naktong. An underwater bridge the enemy has been constructing is completed during the darkened hours of the 10th, and prior to dawn on the following day, by use of the bridge and rafts, the enemy also crosses about twelve pieces of artillery, some mortars and vehicles. The 1st Battalion (less Company C), 21st Regiment, commanded by Colonel Charles Smith, is committed, because the enemy has yet to threaten the 25th Division’s northern (right) sector guarded by Stephens’ 21st Regiment. General Church is also bargaining heavily to have General Walker release the 27th Regiment under Colonel Michaelis to join the imminent battle. Pusan Perimeter, Central Front, Taegu: At Hill 268 (Triangulation Hill), the enemy still retains a firm hold at dawn, but the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry Reg-

204 iment, prepares to renew its attack to seize the hill. U.S. artillery launches resounding blows against the slopes, and it is also struck by aircraft to dent the resistance and create some panic among the defenders. However, during the morning, the North Koreans maintain their own destructive firing, and they find time to establish ambush sites along the road. Three officers, including the assistant division commander and a few military police, run into an ambush along the Waegwan Road at Hill 268. Most of the party becomes wounded. Later in the day, General Gay and an aide are engrossed in conversation with the 1st Battalion executive officers and several other troops along the same road in the same vicinity. During the gathering, effective mortar fire rings the area, and one direct hit wounds or kills everyone in the group except General Gay and his aide. An infuriated General Gay speeds five tanks forward to positions along the road from which they can pour their concentrated fire upon the reverse slope. The tanks proceed without delay, and soon after, the turrets bellow and strike a jackpot. The enemy had bolted to the reverse slope to evade the murderous artillery fire. The tanks pour incessant fire into the hill and the enemy is caught in the frying pan as they jump from their positions. To return to the opposing slope, they face the artillery, and to remain on the reverse slope, they face annihilation by tank fire. In the meantime, in coordination with the artillery, the ground troops of the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, assault the summit. They claim total domination of the hill by 1600. The seizure permits the artillery to change gears and swivel its guns westward to again catch the fleeing enemy. The air sizzles with the hissing of artillery shells that pound the route of retreat. In one instance, during the enfilade, the 61st FAB commences a white phosphorous barrage that saturates a village that conceals a great many fleeing troops. Later, when U.S. soldiers enter the village, they discover about 200 enemy troops, all deceased. By nightfall on the 10th, the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, reverts back to Eighth Army reserve. Elements of the 5th Cavalry Regiment move into the area to reduce the remnant resistance on Hill 268 and the immediate area. About 300 enemy troops of the 7th N.K. Regiment escape and re-cross the Naktong, but about 700 of their comrades have been killed, wounded, or captured. The once powerful N.K. 3rd Division, which had entered Seoul triumphantly, has been humbled. The N.K. 3rd Division had also whipped the 19th Regiment at Taejon, and in cooperation with the N.K. 4th Division, it had pushed the 1st Cavalry from Yongdong. The remnants of the regiment rejoin their battered parent division on about the 12th of August, but with its strength zapped to about 2,500 troops, the N.K. 3rd Division is placed in reserve until replacements can be added. Once again, as prisoners are questioned, it is determined that the majority of casualties had been inflicted by the artillery. Pusan Perimeter, Eastern Corridor: In the S.K. 3rd Division sector in Changsa-dong, the situation has

205 deteriorated tremendously during the last 24 hours. The N.K. 5th Division has swept around the South Koreans and severed the coastal highway below Hunghae, about five miles above Pohang-dong. Eighth Army establishes Task Force Pohang to counteract the new and rapidly developing threat in the eastern corridor. The components comprise the tested S.K. 17th Regiment and several untried units, including the S.K. 25th Regiment, the S.K. 1st Anti-guerrilla Battalion, the S.K. Pohang Marine Battalion and Battery C, U.S. 18th FAB. Also, the S.K. 26th Regiment, activated on the 11th, will speed east to An’gang-ni to join the task force. General Walker, in an attempt to forestall panic and hold the discipline of the S.K. 3rd Division, orders Colonel Emmerich to come to Yonil Airfield; Emmerich contacts the cruiser USS Helena and requests a helicopter for the trip. General Walker confers with Emmerich, General Partridge and Brigadier General Francis Farrell, the chief of KMAG. During the meeting, Colonel Emmerich is directed to instruct the S.K. 3rd Division to hold its perimeter at Changsa-dong and to

August 10, 1950 intercept and repel any N.K. advance. Emmerich is further informed that if the stance falters, enemy artillery and tanks could continue down the coastal road to threaten Yonil Airfield. After the conference, Emmerich returns to the S.K. lines and gives the new commanding officer, Brigadier General Kim Suk Won, the orders. No American troops are dispatched to support the stand, as there is still poor intelligence. Eighth Army remains unaware of the heavy numbers of enemy troops that have infiltrated through the mountains. While Emmerich is returning to his area, General Walker departs for Taegu and at 1735 he dispatches a messenger to Kyong-san with orders for Major General Lawrence Keiser, commanding officer, 2nd Division. Keiser is directed to speed the remainder of the 9th Regiment to Yonil Airfield. The Command Group and the 3rd Battalion, 9th Regiment (minus Company K), moves out after dusk for Yonil and Pohang-dong. The column moves along the primary road through Kyongju, and it arrives at the airfield just before midnight. Company K moves separately, but it does not enjoy an uneventful journey. At

An American tank is halted in a hole in the road. Troops work to bring it back into the operation. A helicopter in the background prepares to take off.

August 10, 1950

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A Sherman medium tank fires upon targets near a North Korean–held village. about 0120 on the 11th, the convoy transporting Company K and four vehicles of Battery C, 15th FAB, reaches a point about ten miles north of Kyongju and one mile east of An’gang-ni. It is here that the highway bends abruptly while passing through the Hyongsan-gang Valley toward Pohangdong. The lead vehicle vanishes around the curve, while the other vehicles trail. A waiting enemy ambush team, thought to be composed of elements of the 766th Independent Regiment, commences fire on the point vehicle and strikes the driver. The truck swerves out of control and creates an impassable blockage across the slim road, which is carved between a river and the base of a precipitous mountain. The unexpected ambush and the instant quagmire along the road breed confusion. The troops that are able attempt to return to Kyongju. Two officers and 120 enlisted men escape and make it back to the village. Word of the disaster reaches General Joseph Bradley, the commanding officer of TF Bradley. He dispatches Company I to rescue the trapped convoy. The reinforcements speed from Yonil back toward An’gang-ni, but the enemy also springs an ambush on it at a point west of Pohang-dong. A second team of reinforcements, composed of two M-16 vehicles, each transporting four .50-caliber machine guns, roars to the site. The majority of Company I manages to return to Yonil during the day (11th), but 25 troops fail to return. Company K sustains 7 dead and 40 wounded, and its accompanying Battery C, 15th FAB, loses about 25 men. In addition, during the day’s heated activities, four U.S. fighters from Yonil are shot down by enemy machine gun and small-arms fire.

In Air Force activity, the Air Force launches 46 B29s, attached to the 22d, 92d, and 98th Bomber Groups to strike targets in North Korea, including rails and an oil refinery at Wonsan. — In the United States: The Joint Chiefs of Staff authorize a third regiment for the 1st Marine Division; the 7th Marines are activated with orders to sail for the Far East by September 3. The Marine Corps orders a battalion serving in the Mediterranean with the Sixth Fleet to join the 1st Marine Division in the Far East. Also on this day the 1st Marine Division leaves San Diego for Korea. The operation is completed by 19 August. About one-third of the ships required to transport the amphibious force to Korea will be Japanese vessels manned by Japanese sailors, due to the lack of American vessels. Previously, many of the Japanese vessels were U.S. ships. Some are permeated with an atrocious smell due to hauling fish. The odor causes many of the troops to become sick during the journey. In other activity, the IX Corps, commanded by Major General Frank W. Milburn, is activated by the U.S. Army at Fort Sheridan, Illinois. The IX Corps has no troops assigned to it other than staff. General Milburn and a small entourage of officers will depart the U.S. for Korea on September 5. — In Japan: General MacArthur issues a statement to respond to the speculative news stories streaming out of Tokyo concerning Ambassador Sebald being left out of a recent meeting with Chiang Kai-shek. MacArthur reiterates that the meeting was of a military nature, which did not require the ambassador. MacArthur also reprimands what he calls the anonymous sources that he claims are “10,000 miles away

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Top: U.S. Army troops erect barbed wire obstacles to slow an enemy advance. Bottom: An oil refinery at Wonsan is struck by U.S. planes on 10 August. from the actual events.” He states, “This visit has been maliciously misrepresented to the public by those who invariably in the past have propagandized a policy of defeatism and appeasement in the Pacific....”

In other activity, General MacArthur, having received authorization from the Department of the Army, directs General Walker to enlarge the South Korean Army to a realistic number.

August 11, 1950

August 11

As an added precaution to ensure the safety of Pusan, General Walker has recently received instructions from General MacArthur concerning a particular second line of defense to be drawn closer to Pusan. MacArthur wants it established in the event that the enemy is not halted at the Naktong. On this day, General Walker directs Brigadier General Garrison Davidson to draw plans. Davidson, an engineer, studies the selected terrain and suggests that the line be drawn tighter to Pusan, because of more tenable defensive ground. Rather than modify MacArthur’s plan, the original lines are drawn. Brigadier General Crump Garvin and the 2nd Logistical Command at Pusan, begin work on what becomes the Davidson Line. It originates eight miles north of Ulsan on the east coast at Sodong-ni and spreads west through the heights to a spot northeast of Miryang. Continuing, the line sweeps down a ridge east of Muan-ni and then it swerves south crossing the Naktong and terminates in the heights northeast of Masan. The complications of forming a defensive line vary from location to location, and this one is no different. Davidson prefers to strip the front area of houses to give the defenders a finer line of fire against the approaching enemy, but the idea is discarded by General Walker. On September 1, General Davidson reports to the divisional headquarters of the 24th Division to assume the position of assistant division commander, but work on the line continues in his absence. Southwest Pusan Perimeter: In the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade sector, during the early morning hours a thick fog creeps into the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines’ perimeter while Company G prepares to attack. It will advance from its recently captured positions in the high ground beyond Pugok to strike Kosong. In the meantime, at the first glimpse of dawn, amidst the thick fog, a Communist contingent composed of about one platoon strikes against Company G. The attempt to evict the Marines and retake the crest ignites a wild close-in struggle, but the Marines resort to their bayonets and bare knuckles to eliminate the threat. The donnybrook intensifies as the enemy troops lunge toward the outpost of Lieutenant Bohn, which stands midway along the line. The Marines tighten the defense and sharpen their throwing arms, then they toss grenades into the midst of the attackers while fending off enemy grenades. Suddenly, one of the enemy grenades explodes and wounds Bohn, but it is not debilitating. He retains control of the troops. Meanwhile, Sergeant Charles Kurtz, standing next to Bohn, ignores incoming grenades and the whizzing burst of burp gun fire while he communicates with the support units to get some assistance. Instantly, mortar fire arrives to squelch the attack. The timely arrival of 60-mm mortars sedates the enemy. Then the ground troops charge and culminate the thirty minutes of fury by shoving the surviving enemy troops down the slope. The men of Company G also reach and rescue the two surviving members of Major McNeeley’s patrol.

208 Following the skirmish, the brigade re-initiates its attack toward Kosong. The 3rd Battalion acts as vanguard. The column advances quickly, with the 3rd Platoon (Lt. John Counselman), Company G, at the point, but it comes to a screeching halt about one mile out when the terrain to its front appears peculiar. The forward elements of the 3rd Platoon (led by Corporal Raymond Giaquinto) are accompanied by flank guards that lurk astride the halted vehicles. Instinctively, the guards sprint forward on their respective sides of the MSR and form a lethal loop around the suspicious ground, which harbors a machine gun and five enemy troops. Corporal Giaquinto’s contingent creates a threepronged terminator force, which springs a vicious and swift charge. The fleeting strike eliminates five defenders, and the perched machine gun never gets off a round. Soon after, the forward elements eliminate another trio of enemy obstacles by combining direct assaults and envelopment tactics. By 1000, the lead components of the brigade arrive at a bridge north of the objective. Prior to crashing into Kosong, the 3rd Battalion enlists the guns of the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, by requesting a preparatory bombardment to soften the resistance. Slightly before noon, the 105s roar. Streams of arcing shells initiate a demolition derby. The barrage blows some buildings into instantaneous debris and splinters, much of which swirls into the sky. The bombardment inspires the occupying forces of the N.K. 83rd Motorcycle Regiment to evacuate. While the 105s maintain a steady string of deadly fire, about 100 enemy vehicles begin their escape, but the retreating regiment receives no reprieve. The illfated convoy scoots through the flying dust and rubble, escaping the town only to encounter more firepower. TACP had requested air support, and as the convoy exits the town, four Marine aircraft appear in the skies directly above it. The planes had just catapulted from the USS Badoeng Strait in response to a call for a searchand-destroy mission beyond the town. The imminent bonanza is totally unanticipated by the brigade, but nonetheless greatly appreciated. The VMF-323 planes, led by Major Lund, are a terrifying omen for the contingents of the motorcycle regiment. The Corsairs swoop down to their usual dangerously low level, and then trigger a relentless strafing run that rivets the entire column. The convoy, without choice, screeches to a halt, causing a chain reaction pileup and a chaotic situation. The vehicles either smash into each other or careen wildly into the gutters astride the road. The enemy troops bolt for cover away from the burning vehicles. The ravaging Corsairs of Major Arnold Lund continue to spew fire into the enemy. The planes pummel specific targets with rockets and 20-mm shells, to the consternation of the beleaguered enemy. However, the North Koreans resist as best they can. Return small-arms fire damages two of the aircraft, which compels the distressed pilots to attempt emergency landings. Captain Vivian Moses, who had been shot down and

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An enemy captive grabs a cigarette break while two troops stand guard over him. rescued unharmed by a helicopter from behind the enemy’s lines on the previous day, is again shot down. He attempts to land his disabled plane in enemy territory. Upon impact, Moses is thrown from the cockpit and he loses consciousness. He drowns in the rice paddy within minutes, before a rescuing helicopter arrives to save him. Captain Moses becomes the first fatality of VMF-323 and the first Marine Corps aviator to be killed during the Korean War. Moses was the nephew of Major General Emile P. Moses. The other downed pilot, Lieutenant Doyle Cole, ditches his plane in the sea. Luckily, General Craig passes over in his helicopter to inspect the area; Craig operates the helicopter’s hoist and pulls Cole to safety. Meanwhile, additional planes from VMF-323 arrive to relieve the initial attack force. This second wave of Marine Corsairs is bolstered by Air Force F-51s that join the hunt dubbed “the Kosong Turkey Shoot.” Following the decimation of the enemy convoy, the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines attacks Kosong; Company H leaps through Company G’s positions along the MSR and enters Kosong against light opposition. Captain Fegan neutralizes the defenders with one rifle platoon and two supporting tanks. Fegan then pivots to the right and drives south toward Sachon while his other two platoons maintain their southern movement toward a hill in front of Sunam-dong. In the meantime, Lieutenant Bohn’s Company G, 3rd Battalion, passes through the area just west of the Kosong to assault Hill 88, defended by about 100 Communist troops. Along the route of advance, Company G encounters an obstinate enemy pocket. The obsta-

cle is eliminated, but several casualties are sustained. Company H, awaiting orders, is poised to strike Hill 88; while standing by, the ground troops see planes from MAG-33 soar overhead and rock the summit with a blazing attack in coordination with the guns of the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines. Upon cessation of the air and artillery strikes, Company H advances, and to its surprise, against an enemy that has vanished. The hill is secured at 1330. While Companies G and H clear their respective areas of responsibility, General Craig arrives in Kosong. He witnesses a brief duel; a small detachment of enemy snipers is perched in and about the school house adjoining the school yard where Colonel Taplett is establishing his battalion command post. Unexpectedly, some threatening but ineffective shots ring out. In spontaneous response, sniper teams of Taplett’s 3rd Battalion snap into action. Following the resounding crackle of shells fired by sharpshooters, the enemy snipers suddenly expire. The 3rd Battalion is ordered by General Craig to abort any additional action around Kosong and at once to turn its attention toward Sachon. Company G descends Hill 88, which affords a reprieve for any North Korean troops that remain in the heights above Sunam-dong. Company H assembles on the western fringe of the town and prepares to spearhead the attack. Meanwhile, an ambulance speeds toward the area where the casualties from the earlier skirmish at Hill 88 are waiting, but after it cruises through the positions of Company H, it misses a southward turn. Inadvertently the medics continue toward Sachon. The

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U.S. Sherman tanks pause while infantry moves around a bend along a serpentine road. ambulance races directly into the sights of two enemy antitank guns entrenched on the blind side of a curve in the road. The medical jeep, conspicuously marked, is decimated when it rounds the bend. The driver, Corpsman William Anderson, is killed by the barrage and two other troops are catapulted from the wreckage. Captain Fegan, Company H, moves to the curve, bringing two M-26 tanks with him. Sergeant Johnnie Cottrel swivels the turret of his tank toward the obsta-

cles, then he unleashes three 90-mm rounds that obliterate the final enemy blocking position and clear the route to Sachon. Along the way, the ground troops acquire a special attitude toward VMF-323 and the Air Force F-51s that have cluttered the road with smoldering enemy vehicles, left in the wake of the retreat from Kosong. Momentarily, the Marines pause and stand in awe of the massive damage inflicted by the aircraft. The

211 abandoned enemy vehicles have become bizarre contortions of scrap metal. However, some of the enemy vehicles, including jeeps and motorcycles with sidecars, remain unscathed and in mint condition. A quick inspection determines that Lend-Lease to the Russians during World War II is again haunting American troops. The captured Communist jeeps are manufactured in Russia and their Ford-type engines are quite familiar to the Marines. The normally stern NCOs crack a smile and allow troop discipline to dissipate while they fool around, as if in an amusement park back in the States. The Marines drive the smacking new motorcycles and the equally fresh Russian jeeps around VMF323’s recently created obstacle course. The savored moments are quickly over, and the brigade resumes the attack. The 3rd Battalion remains out front, trailed by the 2nd Battalion, but the entire column retains the umbrella support of VMF-323 and the much-appreciated light observation planes that sprout off optimistic reports on the enemy’s movement. The reports indicate a rapid retirement toward Sachon, with the Marines on their heels. By 1800, after advancing several miles, the lead M-26 tanks and elements of Company H approach a concealed enemy machine gun nest that lurks lazily in a valley to the left. Unexpectedly, the machine gun fire rakes the advance troops and wounds three Marines. The tanks move up to extinguish the threat. They uncork their .50-caliber machine guns and destroy the nest and its crew. At this time, the column halts for the night. Colonel Taplett’s 3rd Battalion spreads out and occupies two hills, both slightly north of the road. Because an amphibious operation had been considered possible during the advance that followed the capture of Kosong, the LST QO119 is nearby. It is operated by Team No. 1, Company A, 1st Shore Party Battalion, and it has been shadowing the column. The vessel is anchored off the fishing village of Tanghong-ni. The LST also doubles as a hospital vessel for the brigade. Under the circumstances, which include extreme heat as well as battle casualties, Company C, 1st Medical Battalion, receives little rest. Pusan Perimeter, Naktong Bulge: The N.K. 4th Division, which had begun crossing the Naktong on August 5, has now supplemented its arsenal by transporting artillery and possibly some tanks across the river during the previous night. The artillery is deployed near Kogong-ni, about one mile behind the enemy positions on the ridge and Cloverleaf, from where it can shell Yongsan. The steady flow of reinforcements has enabled the North Koreans to infiltrate further and to begin to circumvent the U.S. positions at Cloverleaf and Obongni Ridge; a formidable force stands to the rear of the U.S. lines. Task Force Hill launches its attack, but it hits strong opposition. The 1st Battalion, 21st Regiment, is dislodged by enemy contingents of the N.K. 4th Division before it steps off. And the 9th RCT and the 19th Regiment both fail to progress beyond their jump-off points. The enemy’s infusion of artillery

August 11, 1950 makes the situation worse. By afternoon, orders arrive directing TF Hill to abort the assault, dig in defensively and hold the line. Reinforcements rush to the 24th Division sector to bolster Task Force Hill against the superior numbered force. As of the night of the 11th, the entire N.K. 4th Division will have crossed to the east side of the Naktong. Meanwhile, as the main battle ensues without restraint, other enemy contingents slither toward a detachment of Company K, 3rd Battalion, 34th Regiment, which is deployed at a bridge along the southern portion of the perimeter. The North Koreans take the squad by complete surprise and eliminate it. The enemy also secures the strategic bridge at Namji-ri. The seizure of this Naktong River bridge severs the Yongsan-Masan Road and prevents any further movement of vehicles between the lines of the 24th and 25th Divisions. Future trips must be by circuitous routes. A contingent of the 24th Division reconnaissance company encounters an enemy force south of Yongsan and its patrol is aborted. East of Yongsan, the enemy infiltration hinders the flow of traffic between Miryang and Yongsan. Concealed snipers are deployed along the route, and as the day unfolds, the North Koreans also establish a roadblock. Prior to dawn on the 12th, the blockage is stretched to within three miles of the town. All the while, feverish combat continues for domination of Cloverleaf and Obong-ni Ridge to the front of Yongsan. The 2nd Battalion, 27th Regiment (reserve status), is at Masan on the southwest portion of the Pusan Perimeter. General Walker orders it to drive north and bolt the Naktong at Namji-ri, where the North Koreans have seized the bridge. Immediately thereafter, the battalion springs northward, zig-zagging through the onslaught of refugees who are fleeing south along the crammed highway. Along the route, a refugee cart gets knocked over, and its cargo is discovered to be concealed weapons for North Koreans. The infiltrators number about twelve troops. They attempt to run away, but instant reaction by Colonel Gordon Murch’s troops cuts eight of them down as they speed through a rice paddy. After the interruption, the 2nd Battalion, 27th Regiment, continues its northward march and encounters about two hundred Communist troops near Iryuongni, about two miles short of the objective. Brisk fighting develops and the enemy scatters, thanks in part to the guns of Lt. Colonel August Terry’s 8th FABn. Following the skirmish, the 2nd Battalion advances to the bridge and crosses to the north side. By midnight (11th-12th) it establishes defensive positions. Due to the dogged resistance encountered by the 2nd Battalion, 27th Regiment, General Walker directs Colonel Stephens to commit the 3rd Battalion, commanded by Colonel George DeChow. In other activity, General Church orders the 14th Engineer Combat Battalion to head for Yongsan to bolster the defenses there. Suddenly, although the signs have been visible for some time, General Church focuses

August 11, 1950 his attention to the rear rather than the offensive actions at the Naktong. The North Koreans have permeated the rear and the consequences are devastating to the 24th Division, which is gasping for breath. Pusan Perimeter, Central Front, Taegu: In the 1st Cavalry Division sector, the 1st Cavalry Division continues to mop up around Hill 268. In contrast, the N.K. 3rd Division attempts to put the pieces together, since the molestation of its 7th Regiment and the repulse of the 8th and 9th Regiments at the Naktong on the night of the August 9. Both engagements cost the enemy heavily. In other activity, the N.K. 10th Division received orders on the previous day to attack across the Naktong, near Tuksong-dong. The units congregate in the area near Koryyong preparing to move across the river after dark. Once across, the division is to swing east to sever the primary Taegu-Pusan supply road. However, the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division, in anticipation of such a move, has taken some precautions. Riflemen and machine gunners are scattered in excellent defensive positions in the hills near the damaged bridge. In addition, the artillerymen and mortar teams have preregistered the crossing site to assure effective fire. Eighth Army strategy intentionally leaves a damaged bridge, sturdy enough to handle only infantry, to lure the enemy into the trap. The N.K. 3rd Division was expected to join the untested N.K. 10th Division, but the 3rd’s surprising defeat makes the combined attack impossible. On the night of the 10th, the commanding officer of the N.K. 25th Regiment still expects support from the mighty 3rd Division “to destroy the enemy [U.S.] in Taegu City in coordination with the 3rd Infantry Division [N.K.].” Nonetheless, the N.K. 10th Division begins its night excursion late on the 11th. The N.K. 25th Regiment advances on the north flank near the battered bridge. The N.K. 29th Regiment crosses farther south, about three to five miles west of Hyongp’ung, and the 2nd Battalion crosses uneventfully at three separate ferry crossings. The 2nd Battalion deploys on Hill 265, a spur of Hill 409. The 1st and 3rd Battalions follow and occupy Hill 409. During the crossing, the 1st Battalion sustains about 20 to 30 lost to drowning in a rapid current. During the morning of the 12th, it is a contingent of this regiment that ambushes a 21st U.S. Regiment patrol during the Battle of Naktong Bulge. On the north flank, the N.K. 25th Division will initiate its crossing at 0300 on August 12. Also, on the 11th, at 0515, a North Korean guerrilla contingent (about 100 men) that has infiltrated the Pusan Perimeter springs a surprise attack against a radio relay station located on Hill 915, less than 10 miles south of Taegu. Seventy S.K. police defending the VHF station and its American operators are driven off. The Americans sustain two killed, two wounded and three men missing. During the day, S.K. police move back to the area, but the enemy has vanished. Pusan Perimeter, Eastern Corridor: The N.K.

212 766th Independent Regiment, which earlier split away from the N.K. 5th Division near Yongdok, has moved discreetly through the mountains to emerge behind Pohang-dong, but a detachment remains at the site of the Company K, 9th Regiment, ambush. On this day, the enemy contingent is caught at the site of the ambush by aerial observance. While plans are in the making to eliminate the threat, a tank company with the 9th Regiment is intercepted as it pauses at Kyongju to await the completion of repairs on a damaged bridge; Walker directs the tanks to advance to Yonil Airfield. Other orders are received by the S.K. 17th Regiment releasing it from TF Pohang and ordering it to move from An’gang-ni to Yonil. A KMAG advisor to the S.K. Regiment, Captain Darrigo, leads an armored patrol from An’gang-ni to Pohang-dong and the Yonil Airfield; Darrigo rides in the lead tank to guide the patrol to the scene of the ambush near Tongnam-ni. Meanwhile, TF Pohang launches a morning attack that drives north from An’gang-ni, but it encounters stiff opposition just after jump-off. The resistance, thought to be forward contingents of the N.K. 12th Division, pushes the task force back. The Capital Division also is compelled to give ground. Fighter pilots from Yonil fly desperate missions to neutralize the threat, but the enemy pressure remains strong. During one heated and lopsided firefight, two entire Companies of the S.K. 25th Regiment are wiped out. One pilot relates the circumstances of the agonizing day: “I barely had my wheels up before I started my strafing runs.” Some enemy patrols reach positions only three miles south of Pohang-dong; the initial troops may have entered the town on the 10th. About 300 troops of the N.K. 766th Independent Regiment and the N.K. 5th Division move into the town on this day and temporarily seize the railroad station. Planes and naval surface vessels pummel the positions and drive the Communists back into the hills, relegating the empty town to a no man’s land. Both sides send patrols into it during the darkened hours, but neither holds a trump card to claim it as a prize. Meanwhile, the armored patrol, led by Captain Darrigo, continues its mission and reaches the curve in the road where Company K, 9th Regiment, had been ambushed. The enemy waits to spring yet another surprise. The tanks roll closer, expecting to avenge the ambush, but before the armor begins to pump its iron, four screeching F-51 fighters swing overhead and begin to spread their killing power amidst the concealed enemy positions. The enfilade from the sky prompts the enemy to abandon their holes to search for sanctuary; however, Darrigo’s armored platoon catches the troops as they reveal their positions. The enemy is sprayed with incessant machine gun fire that inflicts heavy casualties. In one instance, a group of about seventy enemy troops are snagged on bare terrain. With the expiration of the roadblock, the armored patrol advances and arrives at Yonil Airfield about 2030. Captain Darrigo, the guide, is especially pleased with the success of the mission. He had been the sole

213 American officer on the 38th Parallel when the North Koreans began their invasion. The patrol delivers the first tanks to the airfield. The treaded battlewagons deploy to stiffen the perimeter. Throughout the night, the enemy in the heights south and west of the field catapult fire toward the airstrip. The barrages disrupt sleep, but the long-range guns continually miss the mark. As a precaution, all aircraft have departed Yonil for the night, but they return on the morning of the 12th. In related activity, S.K. Colonel Kim Hi Chun’s S.K. 17th Regiment will drive to Yonil from An’gang-ni on the 12th to further bolster the airfield. In Air Force activity, on this day the Air Force begins transporting trucks in C-19 Flying Boxcars from Tachikawa Air Base to Taegu. In Naval activity, the HMS Warrior (CVL) and HMS Ocean (CVL) arrive to join with the U.S. and British naval forces already operating in Korean waters. — In the United States: President Truman authorizes the transfer of the 3rd Infantry Division from general reserve to the Far East, but he stipulates that it is to be deployed only in Japan to replace the 7th Division and he emphasizes that it is not to be committed in Korea. In conjunction, the much-depleted U.S. 3rd Division is in terrible shape. — In Japan: General MacArthur instructs General Walker (in Korea) to bolster the 7th Division by using South Korean troops. More than 8,600 South Korean civilians will arrive in Japan from Korea to join the division before it begins the Inchon operation. Most of the Koreans are unable to converse in English, giving the NCOs additional problems. The South Korean recruits are dispersed among the rifle companies and the artillery batteries, which necessitates the implementation of the buddy system. Back in the States, the Army races to meet the leadership challenge. Fortunately, by the time of the Inchon Invasion, sufficient numbers of skilled and seasoned NCOs and officers from Fort Benning’s Infantry and Artillery Schools arrive to raise the caliber of the 7th Division to a higher degree of readiness than initially expected.

August 12 Southwest Pusan Perimeter: In the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade area, General Craig establishes his command post at Kosong at 0800. At 1130, General Kean, commanding general, 25th Division, contacts Craig by phone and instructs him to rush a reinforced battalion to the rear to support the 24th Regiment at Chindong-ni, where the enemy has severed the MSR and captured artillery pieces. Craig dispatches the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, by 1300. By 1400, he ponders the risk, considering that his brigade is down to two battalions and Sachon must still be taken. Meanwhile, at 0630, there is a change of the guard as the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, commanded by Lt. Colonel George Newton, eases through the positions of the 3rd Battalion to attack and secure Sachon. The column is spearheaded by a 15-man contingent of the reconnaissance company. It is an unsettling march

August 12, 1950 through an eerie tranquilness that exhibits no visible signs of the enemy. The circumstances raise some grave concern for the seasoned veterans, who recall similar experiences from World War II. The advance continues uncontested for more than four hours. Nevertheless, the tension continues to increase. The vanguard gains eleven miles and approaches Sachon, but still, the mysterious and somber bone-chilling silence signals imminent danger. The recon point men, led by Captain Kenneth Houghton, approach a suspicious curve about four miles from the objective at about noon. Company B, 1st Battalion, trails closely behind; its 1st Platoon is on the point, nosing just ahead of two tanks. The 2nd and 3rd platoons follow, trailed by a caboose of three additional tanks and the remainder of the battalion. At about 1200, the restless vanguard swings around the foreboding curve that leads into Changchon, an innocent-looking village of thatched huts. In a flash, the uncanny aura is penetrated and the queer silence ends. The Marines spot two enemy soldiers and take them under fire to ignite a huge powder keg. The hills on both sides of the road are infested with enemy troops, poised to snarl the entire column by permitting it to move within range before snapping the lethal trap. But the early detection of the enemy prematurely trips the wire. The hills become electrified as clanging machine guns lay down an enfilade that sprays the Marines from both flanks and from the front. The reconnaissance troops return fire, while awaiting reinforcements. Meanwhile, the artillery contingents begin to establish positions, but their immediate help is unavailable. Captain Tobin speeds the 1st Platoon to bolster the recon troops. Three Marines become casualties in the process. Then some heavier persuaders advance. Three tanks move out, trailed by the 2nd Platoon to further augment the point troops. The tanks confine their movement to the road to avoid becoming bogged down in the soggy ground, but still they provide additional shields of formidable armor for the infantry. Nonetheless, the enemy fire increases. The 3rd Platoon and headquarters troops, still to the rear, also come under severe fire from Hill 250 on the right side of the road. Colonel Newton calls in air support to deliver some killing power on Hill 250. Corsairs arrive and oblige by pounding the slope. Following cessation of the air strike, Lieutenant Cowling leads his 3rd Platoon to seize the heights. Company A rushes a rifle company and one machine gun section to assist Company B’s 3rd Platoon. Colonel Newton directs the reinforcements from Able Company to secure Hill 301, which also lies to the right of the road. While the 1st Battalion engages the enemy, the 2nd Battalion deploys to protect the remainder of the brigade’s column. In the meantime, the Corsairs expend much of their fuel, and Colonel Newton is informed that two of the planes will be available for only five additional minutes. Newton suggests that the Corsairs sweep the road between Sachon and Changchon

August 12, 1950 in search of prey. The planes zoom above the road and catch another enemy convoy. The five remaining minutes of fuel is sufficient to kill some of the enemy. Following the deadly strafing runs, the small enemy convoy resembles a scale-model replica of the iron rubble outside of Kosong, complete with swirling smoke and twisted metal. While the planes, artillery and mortar units plaster Hill 301, the advancing 3rd Platoon, Company B, gets caught in a cross-fire by surviving enemy machine guns and small-arms fire. It is compelled to withdraw. One man is killed and two are wounded. Nearby, reinforcements from Company A seize Hill 301 without incident, but other hellish fighting continues without pause. The 3rd Platoon, Company B, moves to Hill 301 and Captain Stephens leads the balance of his Company A to take the heights on the right side of the road. However, heavy enemy resistance remains on Hill 250. Marine artillerymen begin pumping iron, catapulting 113 rounds into it. And the stubborn hill is further saturated by another air strike by Marine Corsairs. The hostile machine gun fire on Hill 250 is terminated, and Company B’s right flank is secured. Still, the left flank of B Company is ripe with vicious fire, as the 1st and 2nd Platoons maintain their positions in the gutters along the road. The platoons return fire while awaiting relief by the big guns. The Marine artillery flexes its muscle in synchronization with the free-swinging Corsairs, which deliver three additional strikes. The incessant pounding eliminates the enemy positions one at a time. The 1st and 2nd Platoons bolt from the gutters and join the attack. The ground troops dart across a rice paddy to complete the destruction of the enemy on the hill. Nearby, Lieutenant Taylor detects an enemy contingent of thirty-nine troops as they advance along the reverse slope toward the summit of Hill 202. Sergeant F.J. Lischeski rushes forward with a squad to ensure that the enemy receives a warm greeting. The troops disperse along the rim of the ridge, and Lischeski then cautions them to hold their fire until they get close. The Marines stare impatiently as the enemy climbs the rugged hill. When they reach a point about 75 yards from the crest, the Marine riflemen fire in unison. The entire enemy unit is wiped out, except for one officer who succumbs en route to the command post. Dusk then settles over the area and Company B is able to complete its movement to the heights on the left side of the highway to establish a night perimeter. Marine losses during the skirmishing are 3 killed and 13 wounded. The 1st Battalion expects to resume the attack to take Sachon on the 13th, but new orders arrive at midnight (12th-13th) that direct the battalion to form for movement to reinforce Eighth Army units in another area. The decision does not sit well with the Marines, who are anxious to finish the job, having been convinced that their swift advance has broken the back of the enemy opposition in the vicinity of Sachon. The brigade withdrawal order reads, “Following brigade rapid advance from Chindong-ni to Sachon-ni in

214 which the brigade attacked, overcame and pursued the enemy, the 25th Infantry Division has directed the withdrawal of this brigade in order to hold a defensive position and mop up enemy resistance in the zone of action of elements of the 25th Division.” Subsequently, it becomes known that the decision to pull back the Marines was based on the enemy’s penetration of the Naktong. This had compelled Eighth Army to redeploy the Marines to prepare to launch a counterattack. Meanwhile, in the 24th Regiment sector, shortly after 1330, Lt. Colonel Stewart and Lt. Colonel Taplett arrive by helicopter to meet a liaison officer at a bridge specified by General Kean; however, the army jeep scheduled to meet them is not in the area. While landing, the Marines spot a camouflaged army tank and inquire of the crew about the jeep, but they have no knowledge. The two Marine officers check out the area where the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, will be arriving. Eventually, they find a line and reach the 25th Division CP by phone, whereby they are instructed to determine how to eliminate the enemy in the area. Taplett and Stewart are also directed to establish security for the remaining artillery unit (one Battery 159th FAB, attached to 25th Division). Colonels Stewart and Taplett also survey the terrain from the helicopter, and then they make a quick sweep over the MSR to locate the advancing 3rd Battalion. After returning, Stewart and Taplett meet Colonel John Daly, CO, 555th FAB, who informs them that on the previous night, Battery C of his outfit and two additional batteries of the 90th FAB had been overwhelmed by the enemy, rendering them destroyed as fighting units. Colonel Daly gives the Marine officers the approximate positions of the enemy, and in fact, he enhances their strategy by relaying the criticalness of the defenses. It is decided to seize two dominant ridges lying along the MSR. But the full picture remains unclear as the day unfolds. The Marines, engaged in an attack at Changchon, had been ordered to move 25 miles to the rear to seize a ridge that was supposed to be secure. At about the time the objectives are selected, the 3rd Battalion arrives by vehicle. Colonel Taplett is supposed to report to General Barth, ADC, 25th Division, upon his arrival, but the general is still en route. Taplett decides to immediately launch the attack. He concludes that if he waits for the general, it would be too dark to initiate an attack. Without orders, Colonel Daly provides the attacking Marines with a fifteen-minute preparatory artillery barrage, and Taplett procures a squad of Corsairs that carry partial bomb loads, including napalm. Army intelligence estimates place the number of enemy troops in the area between 2,000 and 2,500. Following the artillery bombardment and the air strikes, Company H leads the attack. It encounters only minimal resistance, and the ridge falls without any casualties. Only one enemy casualty is discovered; he had apparently succumbed while fighting a rear-action during the withdrawal. General Barth arrives at 1900 to assume overall command; he asks Taplett when his

215 Marines would be prepared to launch the attack. Taplett responds that the first objective had already been secured. General Barth congratulates Colonel Taplett on his quick action and he concurs with the rest of the attack plan, which calls for the seizure of the next ridge on the following morning. Later, Battery C, 11th Marines, arrives to bolster the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, and General Barth further strengthens the unit by committing three army tanks and several M-44 armored personnel carriers to the assault. Colonel Taplett and his Marines are pleased with the cooperation of the Army and particularly with General Barth. Pusan Perimeter, Naktong Bulge: East of Yongsan, the enemy again ambushes conspicuously marked U.S. ambulances. Before daylight, Colonel Hill is informed that a few ambulances and several trucks had been attacked. Despite the shortages of manpower at Cloverleaf, Colonel Hill orders Company F, 9th Regiment, to move from there and destroy the road blockage. The unit is accompanied by a mortar platoon and the mission is supplemented as guns of the 15th Field Artillery Battalion are adjusted and fired toward the trouble spot along the road. Nevertheless, the roadblock remains operational into the following day, and the enemy continues to increase the pressure to strangle Yongsan, which is close to being encircled. General Walker again arrives by air. He confers with General Church, CO, 24th Division, and he discovers no change for the better. But the three battered regiments their respective sectors maintain their attempt to forestall a massive breakthrough. Walker is well aware that the 27th Regiment, 25th Division, is en route from the south, but its two attacking battalions are hindered by throngs of civilians who clog the route of advance and stall the rescue operation. Walker, in yet another desperate maneuver, orders General Keiser (2nd Division) to dispatch one battalion of the 23rd Regiment to augment the 24th Division. Colonel Paul Freeman, commander of the 23rd Regiment, directs his 1st Battalion, commanded by Colonel Claire Hutchin, to execute the mission beginning August 13. Also, during the effort to subdue the enemy’s eastward advance and to preserve Yongsan, the 27th Regiment, 25th Division, is attached to Church’s 24th Division. A conglomeration of U.S. Army troops ranging from cooks and clerks to reconnaissance troops is fabricated into a 135-man outfit and placed under the command of Captain George Hafemen, headquarters company commander. The improvised unit speeds from Miryang to plug the passage along the Yongsan-Miryang Road, just outside Simgong-ni at the pass. The modified riflemen accompanied by two tanks reach the destination and soon become engaged in a bitter skirmish. Hafemen’s team repels repeated enemy attacks, thanks in part to the support of armored cars that shuttle water, food and ammunition from Miryang. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion, 27th Regiment, which had re-secured the bridge over the Naktong at

August 12, 1950 Namji-ri, is back on the assault. It advances north and engages heavily fortified enemy troops who are armed with mortars and machine guns as well as the usual small arms. The 2nd Battalion attacks and a day-long struggle ensues. Aided by the added punch of supporting aircraft, the 2nd Battalion convincingly pushes the enemy from their positions. About 100 enemy troops are killed, but the number of wounded is indeterminable. In addition, twelve machine guns and several antitank “Buffalo Rifles” are included with the cache of abandoned equipment. On the following day, the 2nd Battalion, under Colonel Murch, resumes its northward drive to clear the sector south of Yongsan. The ongoing fighting remains heavy and neither side receives the advantage. The North Koreans have not been thrown back across the Naktong, and in turn, they have been unable to take Yongsan. Meanwhile, the publicized prediction by the North Korean leader that all of Korea would be united under their Communist banner by August 15 seems much less probable now. Pusan Perimeter, Central Front, Taegu: In the 1st Cavalry Division sector, the N.K. 10th Division had begun crossing the Naktong on the previous night. At 0300 this day, its 25th Regiment starts to cross the river about fourteen miles southwest of Taegu, near the damaged bridge. The area is defended by the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, commanded by Lt. Colonel Gilman A. Huff. In addition, the battalion is bolstered by the preregistered guns of the 77th Field Artillery Battalion, commanded by Lt. Colonel William A. Harris. The artillery guards the crossing site and the Koryong-Taegu Road. About 300 to 400 enemy troops cross and advance to the village of Wich’on-dong by about dawn. The contingent is apparently en route to secure the heights east of Yongp’o, from where it can provide cover fire for the main body of the division, which is scheduled to follow. At the village, Company H, 7th Cavalry, intercepts the advance guard and a grueling battle erupts. The Communists and Company H become locked in a tight-fisted, close-quartered struggle. The enemy unleashes a tenacious attack that includes automatic weapons and grenades. The initial enemy thrust blows a hole into the advance positions of the cavalry. The situation at first appears grave, as the enemy lunges farther and shreds the mortar positions and the heavy machine gun emplacements. However, the gargantuan guns of the artillery accelerate their powerful barrage, and at about the same time, planes arrive to deliver more destructive fire. The combined deadly fire quickly diminishes the strength of the attack and gives the cavalry new momentum. By 0900, the 2nd Battalion has halted the advance in its tracks and it has revoked the enemy’s progress. With the blazing artillery at their backs and the attacking planes overhead, the 2nd Battalion shoves the enemy backward and chases them through Yongp’o. The remnant enemy survivors scatter and attempt to retrace their steps back to the bridge and beyond to the safety of their lines.

August 13, 1950 Although the cavalry has turned back the initial attack, it realizes that it must still brace for the primary attack, which will begin during the morning hours of the 14. In other activity, a group of sailors (Underwater Demolition Team) and Marines (Amphibious Scouts, Reconnaissance Company, 1st Marine Division) debark the USS Horace A. Bass south of Inchon to execute a special operation. The troops, without sustaining any casualties, launch several raids between this day and the 16th. The team wrecks three tunnels and destroys two bridges. Following the mission, the unit is retrieved by the Navy. In Air Force activity, a large group of B-29s bomb the port of Rashin in the northeastern sector of North Korea in the vicinity of the border with the Soviet Union. — In the Mediterranean: The contingent of the 6th Marines, FMFLant, serving with the Sixth Fleet, is ordered to Korea. The command post aboard the USS Yellowstone receives urgent special orders from the chief of naval operations that direct the 6th Marines to embark for the Far East. Additional contingents will embark from San Diego. The orders circumvent the commandant Marine Corps and Sixth Fleet, due to the compelling circumstances in Korea; however, the commandant, General Cates, is with Admiral Sherman while the orders are being drawn. The 6th Marines embark on the USS Bexar, which will arrive in Suda Bay on the evening of August 14. The unit will mold the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines, 1st Marine Division, due to be activated on August 17. Neither the men nor the officers are aware of the still secret plans to invade Inchon; they believe the unit will be committed as an amphibious assault team of a U.S. task force. — In Japan: General MacArthur issues CINCFE Operation Plan 100-B. The plan lists the Inchon-Seoul vicinity as the target for the amphibious invasion force. In three days, MacArthur will establish headquarters for the operation.

August 13

Southwest Pusan Perimeter: The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, acting upon orders from the 25th Division, prepares to withdraw from the vicinity of Changchon and Sachon. The individual units are informed of the departure at 0400 (OP Order 1050). Stretched left to right along Hill 202 are the 3rd, 1st and 2nd Platoons, Company B, 1st Battalion. The formation is tight and the men remain alert. Meanwhile, silently, the enemy has crept forward to infiltrate and assume concealed positions, poised for a pre-dawn assault. At 0450, enemy machine gun fire breaks the calm. With instant response, Marine 60mm mortar illuminating shells streak skyward and expose an enemy concentration on the right flank, near the 2nd Platoon, but this incursion is a ruse to take the focus off the primary assault. It commences at 0455, when three enemy flares are propelled into the sky, two red and one green. They ignite a furious night attack

216 against the left flank. The enemy hurls a powerful assault against the 3rd Platoon and the machine gun section; the latter is annihilated, except for two Marines. With the absence of communications, confusion emerges. The radios had been destroyed earlier while the men were crossing rice paddies and trudging through the mud. Now their phones are inoperable, probably due to severed wires. In the midst of the feverish battle, two runners attempt to reach the besieged contingents, but both are cut down by enemy fire. The fighting continues to intensify and at close quarters. Shots and grenades are rapidly exchanged during the battle, and the enemy captures two machine guns and turns its fire on the Marines. In the meantime, a third messenger breaches the fire and reaches the left flank. He directs the survivors to pull back and reform with the 1st Platoon, but the captured machine guns hinder this action. The gruesome exchange draws more blood and without reprieve, but the survivors hold. Finally, with a hint of daylight, the 3.5" rocket launchers destroy the two captured machine guns. But the situation doesn’t automatically get better. Enemy fire in turn knocks out the radio of the artillery’s forward observer, and then the mortars on the left flank expend their ammunition. At this point the enemy pivots to divide and conquer. They drive a sharp wedge between the 1st and 2nd Platoons, but raking return fire inflicts severe casualties. At 0630, Company B is ordered to disengage and descend to the command post to join the battalion. Meanwhile, Captain Tobin tries using the radios of Company A to get support from artillery and mortar fire to buy time while he reforms for attack. The 1st and 3rd Platoons are ordered to converge on the 2nd Platoon positions on the right flank. At about the same time, the enemy withdraws toward the lower sections of the contested hill. In the interim, the enemy small-arms fire subsides, but mortars continue to sprinkle the area. By 0815, using stiff discipline, the individual units have descended the hill. Almost in cadence, a group of soaring Corsairs arrives; the planes deliver a mighty blow that culminates the action and effectively tranquilizes the enemy fire. The struggle on Hill 202 takes the lives of 12 Marines and wounds 18 others. Also, 8 Marines are missing in action. Prior to the descent, Captain Tobin had requested permission to launch a final attack to regain the missing troops, but his request is denied on the basis that the withdrawal is behind schedule. Tobin had been convinced that a final attack would regain the lost ground in about one hour and they could reclaim their dead. The denial of permission to retrieve their dead buddies is not well received by the Marines. The brigade moves out, with its engineers and armor protecting the rear. When the ground is retaken during September, the bodies of seven Marines are discovered. Much later, during November of 1953, the final missing Marine on Hill 202 is declared dead. The engineers are ordered to lay mines and demolish some bridges and culverts. In one instance, the

217 engineers of the 1st Platoon, Company A, 1st Engineer Bn., lay a minefield on a road that leads from Samchonpo toward the right flank of the brigade. The mission is accomplished. However, Lieutenant Nicholas Canzonna, the platoon leader, discovers to his embarrassment that about one-half of the mines had contained the wrong type fuses, which renders them impotent. Apparently, it didn’t matter, as the enemy chose not to approach them. In the 25th Division sector, 24th Regiment zone, the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, reinitiates its attack to seize the ridges that dominate the MSR, and it encounters only slight resistance. By 1000, the two attacking rifle companies own the real estate on both ridgelines and the price is right. No casualties are incurred. However, no enemy casualties are inflicted, which adds more mystery to the episode of returning 25 miles to attack the ridge. Nonetheless, the mission of the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, affords the 25th Division an opportunity to extricate survivors of the trapped artillery units that had previously been overrun. The cunning enemy still permeates the area. Lt. Colonel Murray, CO, 5th Marines, arrives over a trapped contingent of survivors from the 555th FAB and he attempts to deliver a message, but his helicopter nearly falls prey to a waiting ambush. The helicopter escapes damage or worse by a thin line and by the excellent skill of the pilot. In related activity, Colonel Taplett prepares to launch another assault to finish his mission by recapturing the lost artillery pieces, but the brigade receives new orders to withdraw and the mission is left undone. The artillery pieces are not regained; rather, air strikes are called in to demolish them, subsequent to the relief of the Marine Brigade. Pusan Perimeter, Naktong Bulge: In the 24th Division sector, the 2nd Battalion, 27th Regiment, continues its northward drive, but this day, the 3rd Battalion, commanded by Colonel DeChow, enters the battle to add extra thrust to the mission. Meanwhile, more U.S. reinforcements rush from Miryang to the Naktong area. The 23rd Regiment, 2nd Division, commanded by Colonel Paul Freeman, arrives at Miryang. One battalion immediately races west toward Yongsan to bolster the attack at the bulge. The untried 1st Battalion, led by executive officer Colonel Cesidio Barberis, attacks and falls prey to the beastly elements. It sustains more punishment from the weather than from the enemy. Eight casualties are incurred due to heat exhaustion, and one casualty is inflicted by the enemy during the trek to Yongsan. At about noon, a plane is dispatched to transport Colonel Hill (commander, 9th RCT and TF Hill) back to 24th Division headquarters to meet with General Walker at the command post. During the afternoon conference, Colonel Hill responds affirmatively to a question by General Walker. Hill states that his task force is capable of the mission and that it will destroy the North Korean roadblock on the Yongsan-Masan Road before dusk.

August 13, 1950 To the south, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 27th Regiment, under Colonels Murch and DeChow respectively, advance doggedly. Both units disregard the harsh heat and converge on the high ground east and north of Yongsan. The 2nd Battalion encounters the friendly faces of the men with Task Force Hill. By nightfall, the threat by the North Korean forces that had breached U.S. lines and penetrated east and south of Yongsan is eradicated. In addition, the 27th Regiment recaptures two U.S. 105-mm howitzers and two enemy guns. Nevertheless, ferocious fighting continues to ensue at Cloverleaf, Obong-ni Ridge and the area north of the pass. Task Force Hill, despite its battle-weariness and under-strength numbers, prepares to strike these enemy strong points on the 14th. Colonel Hill anticipates air and artillery support. In related activity, some U.S. units, such as Company K and Company L, 3rd Battalion, 34th Regiment, still hold risky positions in the far southern section of the 24th Division perimeter, but Colonel John Hill recalls these isolated units. At 0200 on the 14th, word arrives and these units descend from the heights over the Naktong; they revert to reserve and deploy to the rear of the 1st Battalion. In other activity, the enemy has gotten additional elements across the Naktong in the 1st Cavalry area just north of the 24th Division sector. In response, General Walker expands the 24th Divisional zone to handle the threat. The 24th Division receives easier road access to the affected area. Apparently, two enemy battalions have occupied a mountain (Hill 409) just outside Hyongp’ung, and additional enemy troops continue to arrive. Later, information describes these troops as elements of the N.K. 29th Regiment, 10th Division. During the night of the 13th, General Church directs Colonel John Hill to mount a full-scale attack against Hill 409 on the 14th. Colonels Beauchamp (34th Regiment), Colonel Ned Moore (19th Regiment) and Colonel Brad Smith (1st Battalion, 21st Regiment) meet with Hill to discuss strategy. The individual commanders and each of their units are exhausted and battleweary, but the assault will go off on schedule. The stress begins to show more vividly when Colonel Hill, during a separate conversation, orders Col. Barberis of the hearty 900-man 1st Battalion, 23rd Regiment, to form for the battle. Barberis declines, informing Hill that he is under the control of General Church. The direct intervention of Church settles the disagreement; Barberis is directed to hold his positions on the main road and await new orders. Subsequently, the 1st Battalion, 23rd Regiment is ordered north to bolster Stephens’ 21st Regiment and Task Force Hyzer. Pusan Perimeter, Central Front, Taegu: At Hill 268, elements of the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, comb the area and discover the severity of the loss it had inflicted upon the N.K. 7th Regiment when troops confiscate documents, questions prisoners and counts the enemy dead, which numbers between 300 and 400 troops. According to information received from prisoners of the battered regiment, about 700 of

August 13, 1950 the 1,000-man contingent had become casualties. In contrast, the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, sustained fourteen troops killed and 48 men wounded during the battle of August 9-10 south of Waegwan. The North Korean 10th Division makes preparations to launch another attack across the Naktong, following the failure of its attempt to gain ground on the previous day. Pusan Perimeter, Eastern Corridor: Above Yonil Airfield, the S.K. 3rd Division, isolated since the 10th near Pohang-dong, continues to forestall annihilation, but the N.K. 5th Division increases the intensity of the battle. The South Koreans desperately pull in their lines to brace for final charge. The cruiser USS Helena and 3 U.S. destroyers remain offshore. Two helicopters from the Helena shuttle medical supplies for the wounded. Using the strategic eyes of the tactical air control party and the artillery spotters, Fifth Air Force aircraft fly valuable support missions, and the long reaching naval guns also provide some robust insulation. Effective fire flows into the crucial areas in front of the diminishing perimeter, whenever and wherever it is required, giving hope to the besieged division. However, the enemy does not relent. The S.K. 3rd Division command post is pushed about four miles south from Changsa-dong to the village of Toksong-ni, along the Sea of Japan. Also, the South Koreans transfer 313 wounded troops to an LST at Changsa-dong, but when it attempts to

218 move into Toksong-ni, the vessel hits some rocks that tear a gash in its hull. The wounded must be removed and placed aboard another LST, but the operation is precarious because of choppy high seas. Eighty-six of the most wounded are placed in amphibious vehicles (DUKWs) and taken to an offshore South Korean hospital ship. Following the mishap, the LST embarks for Pusan. By the 15th, the 3rd S.K. Division will be ordered to evacuate. At Yonil, U.S. infantry and some armor remain at the airfield; however, without consultation with Eighth Army, the FEAF evacuates its planes. Belatedly, at about 1600, General MacArthur receives a United Press report (filed at 1320) that details the abandonment. The wire report states that a representative of the U.S. Air Force had announced that the Pohang airstrip was being abandoned, and it mentions that the enemy is placing fire upon it. Apparently, Colonel Robert Witty, commanding officer of Air Force units at Yonil, suggested the evacuation of planes, and General Partridge, commanding officer, Fifth Air Force, concurred. The telephone lines between Tokyo and Korea begin to hum. MacArthur’s headquarters telephones Eighth Army to question the validity of the report, and it is quickly confirmed by subordinate officers that there was no discussion concerning the evacuation between the Army and the Air Force at Yonil. Furthermore, Eighth Army states that the airfield had not been under

The oil refinery at Wonsan subsequent to its attack by U.S. planes (B-29s). The strategic facility burned for several days.

219 any mortar fire. In addition, MacArthur’s headquarters is told that the reports concerning enemy machine gun fire were “greatly exaggerated.” The telephone conversation between General Roderick R. Allen, deputy chief of staff, ROK Army, and Colonel William A. Collier, which occurred at 1600, also verifies that Army units still hold the airfield and that no “effective enemy fire” had struck the field. As the F-51s take off, the airstrip is free even of potholes. The incident does little to create harmony between the two services. MacArthur, more than slightly perturbed, sends word to FEAF that the planes should not return to Japan. He makes it emphatically clear that the airfield will be held. Nonetheless, the 45 Fighters (two squadrons) land at Tsuiki Air Base on Kyushu. In conjunction, the heavy equipment that was ordered evacuated from Yonil on the 8th is transported to the sea and transferred to LSTs. The Fifth Air Force personnel will also pull out, departing on the following day. The North Koreans proclaim the total liberation of Pohang-dong as great numbers of the N.K. 12th Division, which have advanced from Kigye, occupy the town. Actually, some troops entered the town as early as the 10th or 11th. U.S. planes and naval surface vessels heavily bombard the town, prompting the 1st Regiment to evacuate quickly. The entire N.K. 12th Division moves out and redeploys in the hills to the west and southwest of the town. The 2nd Regiment places its 2nd and 3rd Battalions in the high ground six miles to the southwest, within striking range of Yonil. The N.K. 5th Division arrives in the hills north of Pohang-dong. This day, the S.K. 17th Regiment is attached to the Capital Division; backed by U.S. tanks and artillery of Task Force Bradley. The 17th Regiment advances against the enemy that holds the hills north of Pohangdong. Also, Task Force Pohang drives from An’gang-ni to clear the enemy between it and Kigye. Both sides sustain heavy casualties during the heated contests.

August 14

Pusan Perimeter, Naktong Bulge: Task Force Hill reinitiates the attack against Cloverleaf and Obong-ni Ridge, following after the previous day’s fighting to successfully terminate the enemy threat east and north of Yongsan. During the predawn hours, a storm system arrives to deliver a drenching rain and ominous clouds. The inclement weather cancels the preliminary air strikes, but the remaining 24th Division artillery lays down a short burst of fire. Most of the guns are posted west of Yongsan under the command of Lieutenant Charles Stratton, commanding officer, 13th FAB. Following a ten-minute barrage, two battalions of the 9th RCT assault the objective, but each battalion lacks about one-third of its strength. The attack advances north of the road and then up the hills of Cloverleaf. In conjunction, Company B, 34th Regiment, strikes south of the road against the N.K. 16th Regiment on Obong-ni Ridge to execute a holding action. The slopes of Cloverleaf, also held by elements of the N.K. 16th and 18th Regiments, begin to transform into a ghastly

August 14, 1950 garden of death. The 2nd and 1st Battalions, 9th RCT on the left and right respectively, become locked in a close-quarter duel. The battle swings from attack to defense as the enemy lunges forward to dislodge the Americans from the heights, and then the Americans mount counterattacks. The wild, free-swinging struggle for the slopes inflicts heavy casualties on both sides. By the end of the first hour of combat, the 1st Battalion (599 troops), under Colonel Londahl, sustains 60 men killed or wounded in the quest to gain the four-leafed hill, with its stem leading north. To the north, the attacking 19th Regiment, commanded by Colonel Ned Moore, meets rigid resistance by the N.K. 5th Regiment, which prevents any progress. Meanwhile, at Obong-ni, the holding action gains prosperous ground and nearly seizes the crest; however, fierce enemy resistance builds. Company B, 34th Regiment, is compelled to withdraw by about 0800. Back on Cloverleaf, the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 9th RCT, claw their way toward the summit and claim ground, but at dusk the dogged effort is still unable to gain domination. With impunity, the North Koreans use the darkness to infiltrate the perimeter. The intrusion incites more close-quartered combat. Throughout the night, the two sides exchange grenades, and much hand-to-hand fighting also ensues. During the night of the 14th, the North Koreans also suddenly strike against the 1st Battalion, 21st Regiment, which is bivouacked south of Obong-ni. The night raid inflicts serious casualties, but it also envelops the command, compelling Colonel Hill, at 0300 (15th), to direct Colonel Charles B. Smith to fight his way out. Prior to dawn, Smith’s beleaguered regiment plows through the trap, and it reestablishes defensive positions along the southern tip of the main line of battle. In other activity, the 27th Regiment, 25th Division, is detached from the 24th Division subsequent to its duty in the southern portion of the Naktong Bulge. Eighth Army, on the following day, orders the 27th Regiment, led by Colonel Michaelis, to move to Kyongsan. Pusan Perimeter, Central Front, Taegu: In the 1st Cavalry Division sector, at about dawn, the enemy 10th Division launches its second and major attempt to cross the Naktong. Contingents ford the river between Tuksong-dong and Yongp’o. They advance toward Yongp’o, the farthest point reached on the previous day, before being routed. Troops in the advance outposts acknowledge problems at about 0520, when the silence in the rice paddies and pea pods ends. Muffled noises emerge as the terrain begins to rustle with the shrill voices of the enemy. Word is quickly passed back to the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry and to division headquarters, setting the stage for another donnybrook. The main enemy assault is augmented by tank fire and artillery barrages that originate on the west side of the river. In the meantime, General Gay instructs the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry (reserve unit), to prepare to move

August 14, 1950 out. The North Koreans push about 500 troops to Yongp’o, and in about fifteen minutes, the force stands about one mile east of the crossing site at the partially damaged bridge. This places the enemy precariously close to the 2nd Battalion’s perimeter near Wich’ondong. Heavy skirmishing erupts, but the cavalry is not caught off guard. The battle takes on a grim tone as the bitter, close-quartered fighting is bloody and relentless. The attacking soldiers are apparently operating on extra adrenaline, having received a message from their leader, Kim Il Sung. He attempts to inspire his troops by informing them that their crossing of the Naktong will carry them to victory. He closes his message: “Young men! Let us protect our glorious pride by completely annihilating the enemy!” Nonetheless, the 7th Cavalry, having previously had its pride dented near Yongdong, is ready for revenge. By 0800, the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, which had fought on Hill 268 on August 9-10, is already crammed on its vehicles when it receives orders to roll to Yongp’o to bolster the 2nd Battalion. Meanwhile, as both sides hammer each other, more enemy reinforcements gather on the west side of the Naktong. While they prepare to bolt across the river at Panjang and at Tuksong-dong, planes arrive overhead. They bomb and strafe the troop concentrations to interrupt the jump-off. The air strike is bolstered by the 77th Field Artillery Battalion, which arcs nearly 1,900 rounds so quickly that the overworked guns become damaged. While the aircraft and artillery plaster the enemy, the cavalry pours its fire into the battle. The enemy troops, which participate in the second crossing and make it to the east bank, advance about one and one-half miles beyond the damaged bridge. But here, the enemy comes to an abrupt halt at the village of Samuni-dong, when they encounter impenetrable fire. The combined power of all the available infantry weapons and the supporting artillery jolts the enemy. Some troops spin around and attempt to evade destruction by retiring to the river. The spine of the enemy bridgehead at Yongp’o begins to crumble, and the 7th Cavalry senses the kill. Huge numbers of enemy troops attempt to get back to the west side of the Naktong by noon, and their pace quickens as the heat rises on their tails. The 7th Cavalry pursues with relentless tenacity. Artillery spotters with a propensity to devour enemy ranks adjust the range for the guns, and a repeat performance unfolds. The withdrawing enemy to the front of the cavalry positions is then raked with more mortar and artillery fire that ravages 25th and 27th N.K. Regiments, which are caught in the patches and paddies respectively. By dark, the dauntless efforts of the 7th Cavalry cause the enemy bridgehead at Yongp’o to vanish. Of the 1,700 participating enemy troops of the 25th and 27th N.K. Regiments, 7th Cavalry estimates that 1,500 had been slain. Company G, 2nd Battalion, which sustains 2 killed and 4 wounded, counts the bodies of 125

220 enemy troops in its zone. Another unit, Company H, 2nd Battalion, reports (two days later) that the number of dead to its front in the paddies had not been totaled, but that 267 dead enemy troops discovered behind its lines had already been buried. The N.K. 10th Division, after only two days of initiation into combat, has been devastated, according to information ascertained from prisoners. The division sustained about 2,500 total casualties in its futile attempt to dislodge the cavalry and move against Taegu. In the 1st Calvary sector, farther north at the extreme tip, another battle develops near Waegwan at Hill 303, where the cavalry’s perimeter edges against the S.K. 1st Division, which has its base at the northern fringe of Waegwan, near the roads that run southeast into Taegu and northeast toward Tabu-dong. The hill mass stretches southeast to northeast to form an oval configuration slightly more than two miles in length, with its west slope slipping into the east bank of the river. The position affords its defenders a perfect vantage point to observe the town and the network of roads running through it. In addition, Hill 303 dominates the main Seoul-Pusan Railroad and vehicular bridges there. The hill, considered the bulwark of the 1st Cavalry’s right flank, is manned by only one company: Company G, 5th Cavalry, supported by mortarmen of Company H. It has become known that for several days, the enemy has been massing on the west bank of the river about six miles north of Waegwan, opposite the lines of the S.K. 1st Division. During the early morning hours, an enemy force of regimental strength fords the river by use of a second underwater bridge, but upon crossing, it moves south rather than dispersing to the mountains. One contingent drives toward Hill 303 and brings Company G under small-arms fire by the end of morning. The North Koreans make no massive attack to seize the hill this day, but the area bursts with skirmishes on the following day. Pusan Perimeter, Eastern Corridor: The evacuation of Yonil by Fifth Air Force continues; however, the airfield is still not under attack. Meanwhile, Eighth Army remains at the field with some tanks posted along the perimeter. Fifth Air Force personnel depart on LSTs. The Air Force leaves large supplies of petroleum products and aviation fuel, but by this day, even the bombs have been removed. The 3rd Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment, commanded by Colonel D.M. McMains, garrisons the base until September 14, when it is relieved by the S.K. 3rd Division. In the meantime, planes land to refuel and the airstrip remains accessible for disabled aircraft so that they might avoid chancing a long flight or be forced to ditch. In other activity, acting upon orders from Eighth Army, the S.K. Capital Division moves from its positions near Andong to the vicinity of An’gang-ni–Kigye; it deploys east of the S.K. 8th Division. Also, the S.K. I Corps establishes headquarters at the town of Yongch’on. In the 1st Marine Brigade zone, Brigadier General Edward A. Craig is directed to move expeditiously to

221 Miryang from the vicinity of Chinju. The Marines are ordered to halt the Communists at the Naktong to preserve the line. — In Japan: Tensions continue to build between Washington and Tokyo. MacArthur receives a succinct directive from Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall, which mandates that no authorization of a Nationalist Chinese attack against the mainland be given. Marshall states no action should be taken by the Allies that might precipitate World War III. The terse message from General Marshall receives a quick response from MacArthur. Marshall is told that MacArthur completely understands President Truman’s decision of June 27 “to protect the Chinese Communist mainland.” In other activity, General MacArthur calls General Stratemeyer to his headquarters in Tokyo to discuss missions for the Far East Air Forces. MacArthur wants him to use the Air Force to saturate the North Korean positions that threaten the perimeter of Pusan. Stratemeyer and Major General Emmett O’Donnell, commanding officer, Far East Bomber Command, discuss the possibilities. General O’Donnell informs Stratemeyer that the Air Force could carpet a three by five mile area. MacArthur’s personnel decide on an area north of Waegwan and west of the Naktong. The decision discounts General Gay’s requests to also strike northeast of the town. Gay’s request is denied because it is thought that casualties could occur within the ranks of the cavalry and the S.K. 1st Division. The date scheduled for the attack is August 16, and the estimated enemy strength in the selected target area includes four divisions and several armored regiments totaling about 40,000 enemy troops.

August 15

Southwest Pusan Perimeter: General Walker orders the U.S. 25th Division, subsequent to the detachment of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade from Task Force Kean, to deploy west of Masan along the southern flank of the perimeter. The redeployment places it east of Chinju in the most defensible terrain below Chinju Pass. The terrain west of Chindong-ni, the left flank of the division, is guarded by Throckmorton’s 5th Regimental Combat Team. It spreads out northward in front of the Chindong-ni coastal road to Fox Hill (Yaban-san), but from there, a dangerous hole exists between it and the 24th Regiment, which holds the division’s central zone. This gap causes General Kean distress. Colonel Throckmorton dispatches a contingent of about 100 South Korean troops and several U.S. officers to plug the hole. When the troops reach the designated objective, Sobuk-san, they find that the 2,000-foot ridge is already occupied by an enemy force that had arrived during the first week of August. Sobuk-san is one of two strategic ridges that dominate this area west of Masan and it affords an excellent set of vantage points to guard the Komam-ni (Saga)-Haman-Chindong-ni Road. The enemy on Sobuk-san forbids any advance

August 15, 1950 and forces the South Koreans to withdraw. General Kean then directs the 5th RCT to seize the ridge; however, the initial delay in occupying the ridge makes this mission unfeasible. In the 25th Division sector, the 2nd Battalion, 24th Regiment, begins to redeploy west of Masan. It disengages with the enemy at Obong-san and moves slightly west to Battle Mountain (Hill 665). The 2nd Battalion spreads out there and on a ridge west of Haman; later it is bolstered by the 3rd Battalion. Battle Mountain (Hill 665) assumes several descriptive aliases, including some printable ones: Old Baldy, Bloody Knob and Napalm Hill. Between Battle Mountain and P’il-bong, the ridge line slims down to mold a stony ridge dubbed Rocky Crags, and north of Battle Mountain, there is more infamous ground that abruptly declines and forms two extended subsidiary ridges of the Sobuk-san mountain mass. The eastern ridge is nicknamed Green Peak. The 24th Regiment deploys on the east side of Battle Mountain, opposite the enemy-held western slope. Meanwhile, the 35th Regiment, led by Colonel Fisher, takes the northern extension of the 25th Division’s perimeter. The defense line links with the 24th Division sector. It covers the Sibidang–Komam-ni vicinity and stretches north for about 26,000 yards to the bank of the Nam River, and from there, it leads east along the water to its confluence with the Naktong River. The sector immediately west of Komam-ni is manned by the 1st Battalion under Lt. Colonel Bernard Teeter. The 2nd Battalion, led by Major Robert Woolfolk, disperses along the Nam. The 3rd Battalion stands in reserve at Chirwon, along the Masan-Chinju Road, from where it can be propelled to a trouble spot in either battalion zone. The MasanChinju Highway, the Nam River corridor, and the railroad lines fall within the zone of the 35th Regiment. The 25th Division completes its deployment by this day. In contrast, the N.K. 6th Division is establishing defensive positions west of Masan, while it forms for an attack to crush the U.N. southwest perimeter. Strung from south to north, the N.K. 14th, 15th and 13th Regiments face the U.S. 25th Division. The Communists have been pressing South Koreans into their ranks to fill out their regiments, but these recent conscriptors, having been scooped up in the vicinity of Seoul, are mostly reluctant warriors. By today, about 2,000 of these replacement troops are funneled into the N.K. 6th Division. At Chinju, the untried recruits are issued grenades, but they receive no weapons. Rather, they are instructed to procure their weapons and ammunition by initiating scavenger hunts on the battlefield to retrieve weapons from their dead and wounded comrades. By the 21st, the N.K. 6th Division receives about 2,500 additional South Korean replacement troops, expanding its strength to about 8,500 troops. In other activity, Communist reinforcements arrive in southwestern Korea from Seoul to bolster the N.K. 6th Division. Elements of the N.K. 7th Division (1st

August 15, 1950 and 3rd Regiments) arrive at Chinju and the port town of Yosu is occupied by the 2nd Regiment. Pusan Perimeter, Naktong Bulge: The weather hovering over the lower Naktong remains terrible, and the cloud-filled skies cancel all air support for the troops of Task Force Hill. Nevertheless, it attacks to rid Cloverleaf and the Obong-ni Ridge vicinity of resistance. Task Force Hill advances, but obstinate resistance holds it at bay. Both sides sustain more heavy casualties. In one raucous engagement on Obong-ni, elements of the 34th Regiment attack the enemy on a small knoll. One platoon from A Company, composed of 35 men, dashes across a slim saddle and encroaches the enemy positions on the reverse slope to ignite a ferocious battle. Grenades are tossed from close range and rifle fire is rapidly exchanged from distances of 25 to 30 feet. The two sides bloody each other terribly, and within one hour, 25 men of the original platoon are wounded or killed. As the survivors, including eleven able troops, begin to withdraw from the brutal firefight, PFC Edward O. Cleaborn apparently becomes angered by the tenacious enemy fire. He lags behind, hoping to get off another round, but before he pulls the trigger, an enemy shell kills him. The ten surviving troops move back, transporting nine wounded men with them. Before the wounded can be treated by Medics, three of them die. The situation remains grave. Not only has the enemy rebuffed Task Force Hill, but TF Hill is extremely hard pressed to hold its lines. Its strength is diminished and it lacks reinforcements. A decision made jointly by General Church and Colonel Hill changes the tone of battle from offense to defense to preserve the remaining ground. However, Eighth Army, which up to now has been unwilling to believe that the entire N.K. 4th Division had crossed the Naktong, is finally convinced. Eighth Army agrees to throw more weight into the battle to achieve victory. Before noon, General Walker arrives at General Church’s headquarters with a conspicuous belligerent attitude and tells General Church: “I am going to give you the Marine Brigade. I want this situation cleaned up and quick.” At about noon, Walker returns to Taegu to firm up his plan to reinforce the 24th Division. Within one hour, Walker dispatches Colonel William Collier to Miryang to inform General Craig of the plan. The 1st Marine Provisional Brigade had been in Masan subsequent to its recently concluded participation with Task Force Kean along the southwestern perimeter, and it is just setting up its bivouac. Nevertheless, the Marines break camp and move to Yongsan, having at least enjoyed their first hot meal since arriving in Korea. The 1st Marine Provisional Brigade is attached to the 24th Division. General Church, CO, 24th Division and General Craig, Marine brigade commander, confer on strategy. It is decided that the entire 24th Division (reinforced) will launch a counterattack against the enemy bridgehead at 0800 on August 17. The

222 attached 1st Provisional Marine Brigade will attack the North Korean positions east of the Naktong. Pusan Perimeter, Central Front, Taegu: In the 1st Cavalry Division sector, 5th Cavalry zone near Hill 303, about fifty enemy troops supported by two tanks advance south, trailed by another contingent. The predawn movement is observed by Company G. Soon after, nearby Company F comes under attack. Fearing encirclement, Company F withdraws south. By 0830, the area around Hill 303 becomes untenable; Company G and its supporting mortar platoon from Company H are surrounded. The commanding officer of Company G informs the mortar platoon leader by phone that a contingent of about sixty South Korean troops are rushing to assist. Soon after, just after breakfast, elements of a Korean unit are observed moving up the slope. The mortarmen, thinking it is the reinforcements, send out a patrol. It is greeted with automatic weapons fire. Despite the fire, the platoon leader remains convinced that the approaching troops are friendly. He gives no order to fire. Suddenly, it is too late, as the Communists are on both sides of their foxholes and at arms length. While burp guns are jabbed into the sides of the Americans, they are plucked from their foxholes and seized. U.S. reinforcements, unaware of the capitulation, rush to their aid, but enemy fire halts the column, composed of Company B, 5th Cavalry, and some supporting tanks. In the meantime, Company G manages to hold the hill throughout the day against a force estimated to be building to a battalion, comprising about 700 troops. As the struggle for Hill 303 continues, confusion builds within portions of the 5th Cavalry, but both the 1st and 2nd Battalions still prepare to rescue isolated G Company and its supporting mortarmen from Company H. The captured men of Company H, however, are taken from the hill and placed in a nearby orchard where they are tied and bound by contingents of the 4th Company, 2nd Battalion, 206th Regiment, N.K. 105th Armored Division, and some elements of the N.K. 3rd Division. On the following day, the U.S. prisoners are transferred to several different places, but the Americans remain unaware of their fate. In other activity, twenty-one T-34 replacement tanks arrive to strengthen the enemy attack against Taegu. The armor is parceled out to the various divisions. Also, the South Korean Army establishes another training center, the Ground General School, located at Tongnae in the vicinity of Pusan. It will accept its first class on August 23, and its primary function is to train replacement first lieutenants for the S.K. Infantry at a rate of about 250 men per week. Pusan Perimeter, Eastern Corridor: The North Koreans maintain a ruthless attack against the S.K. 3rd Division, and its perimeter at Toksong-ni is becoming untenable. Eighth Army orders its evacuation by sea to Kuryongp’o-ni, farther south in the Yonil Bay. It will then relieve contingents of the Capital Division at their lines south of Pohang-dong. In other activity, the S.K. Capital Division and Task

223 Force Pohang heavily engage the enemy in the vicinity of An’gang-ni–Kigye for several days. — In the United States: Every male Marine Corps reservist with the rank of private to sergeant is ordered to active duty. — In Japan: General MacArthur, alarmed by high casualty rates in the U.S. divisions operating in Korea, directs General Walker to initiate the merging of South Korean soldiers into U.S. units. The instructions dictate that each U.S. company and battery be augmented by 100 South Korean troops. This transfer of troops will affect each of the four U.S. divisions already in Korea and the U.S. 7th Division, which is still in Japan. The South Koreans are to remain under the jurisdiction of the South Korean Army and receive their pay from it, but the troops will be accommodated with U.S. rations. The projected amount of South Korean troops to be integrated into the U.S. units is about 30,000 to 40,000 men. Some U.S. contingents have already included South Koreans within their ranks on an unofficial basis. In other activity, headquarters is established by MacArthur for the impending amphibious operation; to retain secrecy, the group is selected from GHQ FEC staff and it will be designated Special Planning Staff, GHQ.

August 16

The USS Philippine Sea launches planes that pummel nine separate enemy held villages and several groves. The raids, carried out by eight Skyraiders and eight F4Us, also damage a pair of enemy trucks. Additional planes attached to the USS Valley Forge raid other enemy concentrations. Five AD Skyraiders hit one village inflicting damage, and they also destroy nine vehicles and damage three additional trucks. Another group, composed of four F4Us, attacks four villages in the vicinity of Taegu and strikes a supply depot and gasoline dump, setting both afire. In other activity, the 72nd Tank Battalion, an organic unit of the 2nd Infantry Division, arrives at Pusan from the United States. The arrival of the newest tanks further bolsters the division’s armor, which already comprises two regimental tank companies (6th Medium Tank Bn.). Southwest Pusan Perimeter: In the 25th Division sector, a group of S.K. police sent by General Kean arrives at the 24th Regiment positions; Colonel Champney, the regimental commander, orders it to deploy in an existing gap at P’il-bong, between the 5th RCT and the lines of the 24th Regiment. On the 18th, the Communists launch an attack against the 24th Regiment. Pusan Perimeter, Naktong Bulge: At Obong-ni and Cloverleaf, the close-quartered fighting continues to rage. The exhausted men of Task Force Hill eagerly await reinforcements. The enemy makes progress in the 9th RCT zone on Cloverleaf, killing some of the defenders in their foxholes, then setting up positions in the captured ground. At Ohang Hill, vicious combat erupts. The enemy uses its usual envelopment tactics to surround the 19th and 34th Regiments, but

August 16, 1950 through some tough resistance and persistence, the two endangered regiments evade encirclement. In the newly expanded 24th Division area at Hill 409 near Hyongp’ung, orders for the division arrive slightly after midnight (15th-16th) to mount an attack. The enemy could have moved from the hill and caused tremendous damage at the already strained American positions at the bulge, but the N.K. Regiment remains fixed. To thwart any attempt by the Communists to drive south from the hill, reinforcements (1st Battalion, 23rd Regiment) arrive to fortify the 24th Division. Also, the carriers Badoeng Strait and Sicily move to positions from which their planes can support the attack. General Church intends to launch a coordinated assault, committing the Marines against Obong-ni Ridge and the 9th RCT against Cloverleaf. General Craig, using his helicopter, scouts the battlefield. Later, Craig drops in at the 9th RCT command post to meet with Colonel John Hill. Colonel Murray also arrives at the front to discuss the attack strategy with Hill. While there, Murray notes the thinning lines of the battle-weary troops on both Hill 125 and Observation Hill, following their five days of tough fighting. Murray also trains his eyes on the terrain that will become his battleground, and then he focuses on the low ground that could entrap both his 5th Marines and the 9th RCT if they are simultaneously caught in the open. Murray concludes that only one unit should jump off first, and he reasons that his objective, Obong-ni, is the closest. Murray suggests that if agreeable, the Marines would attack at 0800, under cover fire from the 9th RCT. Then according to the plan, the 9th will advance with Marine cover fire. Colonel Hill concurs. Meanwhile, complications are developing on the eve of the attack. General Church had assured General Craig that 145 Eighth Army vehicles would be available to facilitate the movement of the brigade. The trucks should enable Murray to speed one battalion to Observation Hill while the remaining two battalions set to attack. However, only forty-three trucks are available at Miryang. This upsets the schedule and wastes valuable energy and time, as many of the troops must now walk. At 1900, the 3rd Battalion boards the trucks and moves to the 5th Marines command post about 3,000 yards behind the front lines. From there, they march to Cloverleaf and relieve the 34th Regiment. Responsibility for the area south of the MSR passes to Colonel Taplett at 0445 on August 17. The 2nd Battalion advances the old fashioned way, by foot, and reaches positions near Cloverleaf at 0130. The lack of trucks also makes the 3rd Battalion’s trek to the front run way behind schedule, causing it to arrive at the assembly area later than expected. One thing remains certain; there is little sleep for the Marines prior to the scheduled assault. As usual, there is scant intelligence on the opposing forces, but it is assumed that Obong-ni Ridge is strongly defended and that the next objective, Hill 207, will be difficult to seize. Furthermore, giant Hill 311, the third objective, is also deemed potent.

August 16, 1950 At this point General Craig is unaware of the agreement between Colonel Hill and Colonel Murray concerning the method of attack, but conversations just prior to the assault clarify the situation. Craig asks Murray to explain his tactical plan and he is informed that the 5th Marines will attack in columns of battalions. The 2nd Battalion will seize Obong-ni, and be followed by the 1st Battalion, which will pass through the 2nd and secure Hill 207. The 3rd Battalion will seize the third and final objective, Hill 311. General Craig concurs with Murray’s plan. Also, the N.K. 2nd Division reminds its troops of the order that forbids the shooting of POWs. A memo issued through its Cultural Section says: “Some of us are still slaughtering enemy troops that come to surrender. Therefore, the responsibility of teaching the soldiers to take prisoners of war and to treat them kindly rests on the political section of each unit.” Another massacre unfolds at the Central Front on Hill 303 as the reminder is issued. Pusan Perimeter, Central Front , Taegu: In Air Force activity, 98 B-29 Superfortresses attempt to annihilate about 40,000 enemy troops suspected of staging north of Waegwan. The planes pulverize the area north of Taegu. At 1158, the first squadrons of the five bombing groups, based in Okinawa and Japan, arrive over the designated areas. By the time the final run is completed, the 19th, 22nd, 92nd, 98th and 307th Bomber Groups unleash nearly 1,000 tons of 500–1000 pound bombs on the target sites.

224 General O’Donnell, who remains airborne for more than two hours, witnesses the colossal air strikes. He reports that during the strikes, no enemy activity could be detected from the air. Subsequent patrols from the 1st Cavalry sector also are unable to gather any intelligence on the success of the raids. One patrol is halted at the Naktong River by enemy fire. Another crosses the river, but additional strong enemy fire pushes it back. Intelligence later received from prisoners alleges that the enemy units suspected of being in the area had already crossed the river before the initiation of the air strikes. The results of the Air Force’s heavy strike remains unavailable. But following the massive bombing mission, the enemy artillery that had been firing from that area slacks off dramatically. In other Air Force activity, the advanced Fifth Air Force headquarters relocates from Taegu to Pusan. On the following day, the North Koreans initiate a heavy assault along the Taegu Front. In other activity, during the past twenty-four hours, the enemy has seized ground on Hill 303, but Company G, 5th Cavalry, still maintains its isolated positions there. The condition of the supporting mortarmen remains questionable, but critical at best. The tanks support Company B, which mounts another attack to relieve the besieged command on the hill, but again the enemy repulses it, despite additional support fire from the guns of the 61st FAB and several howitzers of Battery B, 82nd FAB. Waegwan, sitting amidst the blazing combat, becomes a no man’s land.

U.S. Army bivouac area on 16 August 1950. There are 3.5-inch and 2.36-inch rocket launchers on right and a 4.2-inch M2 chemical mortar on left.

225 The 5th Cavalry’s commander, Colonel Marcel Crombez, becomes infuriated with the 2nd Battalion commander’s progress. The officer has apparently allowed control of the units to slip away from him to the point that he is unaware of their locations. Crombez relieves the officer of command. Another officer assumes command and then he resumes the attack. Nonetheless, the enemy repels all forward movement. After dark, Company G eludes capture and destruction. It escapes through the enemy lines to safety, but the mortarmen of Company H remain in place, unable to break out. On the following day, a new attack is launched to seize the obstinate hill. In the meantime, while the enemy attempts to break through the cavalry, it also launches persistent assaults against the adjoining S.K. 1st Division, commanded by Major General Paik Sun Yup, in the rugged mountains northeast of the cavalry. The S.K. 1st Division’s 13th Regiment is strung along the river. Its 11th and 12th Regiments, deployed deeper in the mountains, engage the enemy east of the Naktong at Suam-san and Yuhak-san, west and northwest of Tabu-dong respectively. The North Koreans, despite coming under heavy artillery fire that includes direct hits, maintains an underwater bridge near Hills 201 and 346, about six miles north of Waegwan. The combined enemy pressure within the zones of the cavalry and the ROK 1st Division places Taegu in a more precarious position. Two enemy tanks penetrate the S.K. 1st Division lines during the day at Tabu-dong, but their progress is quickly halted by ROK bazooka teams, which eliminate both. In an effort to bolster the tottering city, which is bulging with ever-increasing numbers of refugees, causing its population to soar from 300,000 to 700,000, a contingent of 750 S.K. police is posted along its fringes. The refugee population still conceals countless numbers of North Korean enemy troops, regular and irregular, and they remain indistinguishable from the South Koreans. In other activity, the 27th Regiment, 25th Division, arrives at Kyongsan and reverts to Army reserve. But Colonel Michaelis is immediately ordered to dispatch reconnaissance patrols north, northwest and west of the town. Meanwhile, Michaelis is to remain prepared to move out if the enemy is detected. Pusan Perimeter, Eastern Corridor: At Toksongni during the night of the 16th-17th, the drastically shrinking perimeter of the S.K. 3rd Division becomes electrified. The 3rd Division has ably held off the enemy along the coastal road, permitting other inland contingents to pull back, but now, it is forced to begin backing toward the sea. Meanwhile, the heavy guns of the naval surface vessels of Rear Admiral Hartman’s TG 96.51 rivet an iron picket fence to the immediate front of the division, preventing hordes of Communists from overrunning their point of departure. While the U.S. Navy attempts to confine the enemy to prone positions with accompanying lack of sleep, the troops of the S.K. 22nd and 23rd

August 16, 1950 Regiments and the attached contingent of National Police begin boarding LSTs, taking all their equipment and weapons with them. The evacuation is totally successful, and at 0700 the final vessel embarks, moving out with the remaining troops and equipment, none of which is lost to the enemy. After daylight on the 17th, planes of the Fifth Air Force carpet the beach area to the immediate front of the evacuees with a monstrous blanket of impenetrable fire, forbidding advance to the water by the enemy. In the meantime, the floating convoy, formidably escorted by the USS Helena and a few destroyers (Destroyer Squadron 11), arrives at Kuryongp’o-ni at 1030. The ground troops debark immediately. Orders await the S.K. 3rd Division instructing it to advance on the following day to the positions of the Capital Division, south of Pohang-dong. Meanwhile, the S.K. Capital Division and Task Force Pohang each maintain pressure against the enemy. By the following day, the North Koreans are shoved from the vicinity of the Kyongju corridor near An’gang-ni and pushed north of the Taegu-Pohang Road. In other activity, the 23rd Regiment, 2nd U.S. Division, is en route to Kyongju to bolster the forces there. Also, South Korean troops leave Pusan for Japan to be attached to the badly diminished U.S. 7th Division, which had been heavily stripped of its ranks to fill the 1st Cavalry and the 24th and 25th Infantry Divisions. The contingent comprising 313 South Korean recruits arrives in Japan on August 18. —In the Mediterranean: A battalion of Marines departs Crete for the Far East. The vessels USS Bexar and Montague, transporting the troops and cargo respectively, sail from Suda Bay and then through the Suez Canal. The Marine contingent arrives at Pusan to join the 7th Marines as its 3rd Battalion on September 9. The sea movement remains under stiff security and makes only one stop en route, at Celon for six hours, to take on fuel. Other contingents of the 6th Marines are being prepared to join the 7th Marines, although the official activation of the 7th Marines does not occur until the 17th. The scheduled departure date for the U.S. contingent is September 3, but the unit will ship out on September 1. — In the United States: The advance group of the 1st Marine Division departs the West Coast at 1400 by air for Japan. The contingent includes 12 officers and 6 enlisted men who are to initiate planning for the invasion of Inchon. General Smith remains at Camp Pendleton for two additional days. In other activity, the remaining elements of the 1st Marine Air Wing at El Toro receive orders to move to the Far East. One unit is Wing Headquarters Squadron 1. The other is MAG-12, composed of Headquarters Squadron 12, Service Squadron 12, VMF-212, VMF 312, VMF(N)-542 and the rear echelon of VMF(N)-5113. Embarkation by sea begins on August 24.

August 17, 1950

August 17

MacArthur’s directive calling for extensive air support for the U.N. ground troops terminates this day. The carriers that have been alternating two days in action and one day off for replenishing their supplies will continue to make air strikes. Subsequent to the activities of the carriers during this operation and during the fleet’s return to Sasebo, Admiral Struble remarks: “A temporary lull in the ground fighting had been reached.” The results of the carrier close-air support had been disappointing because the power of strength at hand could not be fully utilized. Rear Admiral E.C. Ewen, commanding officer of Task Force 77, remarks: “A continuation of the present method of providing close-air support is both wasteful and ineffective.” Admiral Hoskins comments: “The simple fact was that there were too few trained control parties on the ground, too few ‘Mosquito’ planes in the air, and too little equipment to handle the numbers of aircraft over the battline [battleline].” Southwest Pusan Perimeter: Some contingents of the N.K. 7th Division, which arrived at Chinju about August 15, push to T’ongyong, dislodge the South Korean police and occupy the town, giving the enemy positions at the southern point of Korea. Soon after on the 19th, U.S. naval vessels move offshore and bombard the town in conjunction with an amphibious landing by ROK Marines. The infusion of the N.K. 7th Division into the area has taken place to bolster the N.K. 6th Division and to protect its rear against invasion by U.S. forces. By this day, the North Koreans have nudged closer to the U.S. 25th Division’s perimeter, giving them the opportunity to initiate attacks to test the mettle of the American lines. The Communists continue these actions persistently until the end of August, but they confine the majority of these heavy patrols, ranging to strengths of up to one battalion, to the high ground in the mountains west of Haman. The combat points are concentrated around Battle Mountain and the two ridges, P’il-bong and Sobuk-san, the area comprising the northernmost sector defended by the 35th Regiment and the central zone manned by the 24th Regiment. The enemy jumps off early today. At 0300, North Korean artillery commences a barrage that strikes the 35th Regiment’s 1st Battalion Command Post at Komam-ni. Within one hour, the enemy ground troops charge the perimeter to initiate a five-day battle for control of the terrain two miles west of the town on the southern spurs of Sibidang. The contested ground is held by Colonel Teeter’s 1st Battalion. The attack is met by some flares and by illuminated mortar and artillery shells; however, the supply of these illuminating shells is becoming scarce. Before dawn, Company A is forced to give ground. A mortar position is overwhelmed and two platoons are driven back, but soon after dawn, Company B launches a counterattack and recaptures the lost ground. Pusan Perimeter, Naktong Bulge: FIRST BATTLE OF THE NAKTONG BULGE During the predawn hours

226 (0130), the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines, commanded by Lt. Colonel Harold Roise, completes its march from Miryang and moves to its assembly area near Cloverleaf. While the Marines of the 2nd Battalion await the signal to attack, they are able to fix their eyes on six ominous knobs (Hills 102, 109, 117, 143, 147 and 153) protruding from the jagged ridge. At one particular spot, conspicuous by its crimson color, the ridge is parted at about its mid-point by a huge gash created by a previous landslide. The cut is the marker that forms the boundary separating Company D and Company E, which operate on the right and left respectively. At 0725, under clear skies, the artillery commences firing for range, but the shells fall ineffectively, due either to poor registration fire on the previous day or because of mistakes by the observers. A scheduled coordinating air strike is delayed. Eighteen Marine Corsairs arrive to slam the ridge, but not until 0740, fifteen minutes late, cutting their striking time in half, thereby permitting only one pass before the ground troops jump off. At 0800, the four rifle companies of the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines, begin the advance simultaneously. They cross the valley moving toward what is to be called No Name Ridge. Soon after, the tanks of Company A, 1st Tank Battalion, move to positions from where they can support the attack throughout the day by plastering enemy positions with their 90-mm shells and machine gun fire. Company D operates on the right and Company E operates on the left. Company D, led by Captain Zimmer, traveling on the right, traverses the road-cut below the spur and moves onto the exposed ground between Observation Hill and Hill 125. The 2nd Platoon, led by Sergeant Sidney Dickerson, deploys as reserve near the southern spur of Hill 125. Captain Zimmer establishes his command post there. The 3rd Platoon, led by Lieutenant Michael Shinka, nudges into the foul scented rice paddy, trailed by the 1st Platoon and a rocket launcher section. The rocket launcher detachment tails off and establishes positions near the road to guard the main supply route. Then about halfway through the paddy, the 1st Platoon, led by Sergeant T. Albert Crowson, increases the pace and swings over to the right, all the while receiving no resistance. The 1st Platoon catches up with the 3rd and then both units advance abreast. To the left of Company D, Company E, commanded by Lieutenant Sweeney, attacks simultaneously. The 1st and 2nd Platoons plod into the rice paddy with its near-indelible stink, moving from their positions on the southern parcel of Observation Hill. Disregarding the official boundary separating his company from Company D, the attacking contingents of Sweeney’s command concentrate their drive toward the village of Obong-ni, which sits immediately beneath Hills 143 and 147. Similarly to the advance of Company D, the resistance against Company B is limited to a few harmless shots. Nevertheless, the atmosphere is spooky and a transparent veil of danger appears to be suspended unnaturally above the battalion, waiting to drop its

227 virulent storm. However, once the company reaches the base of the slope, the situation changes. The prolonged silence is shattered and the agonizing apprehension dissipates during a rapid-paced series of events that suddenly unfold, beginning with a burst of fire against the 2nd Platoon, Company D, held in reserve on Hill 125. In the meantime, the four attacking platoons of Companies D and E maintain their cautious advances toward the objective, anticipating a cloudburst of enemy fire with each and every dogged step. While Company D’s 1st Platoon moves up the draw to the right of the spur of Hill 102, the 3rd Platoon, advancing on the left, drives through a gully advancing toward the first objective. And then, enemy fire changes the tone of the attack. The 2nd Platoon, Company D, providing cover fire for the attacking units from its positions on Hill 125, is struck by long-range machine gun fire, much of which is incoming from Obong-ni and originating simultaneously from the area of Hills 117 and 143. This fierce fire inflicts the first two casualties on Company D. The echo of the fire encroaches the 2nd Battalion attack force like a distant storm and the rifle companies realize that beyond the thunder lurks the deadly lightning. Meanwhile, the 1st and 3rd Platoons have ascended nearly halfway up the slope, on the right side of the reddish gash. Then without warning, incessant bolts of enemy fire descend upon the slope. About twelve machine guns of the N.K. 18th Regiment unleash interdiction fire upon the advancing troops, and this massive display is joined by enemy mortar fire. The gushing thrust of unending streams of shells impedes but does not halt the ascent. The 1st and 3rd Platoons gnaw forward, exhibiting contempt toward the enemy fire. Meanwhile, the North Koreans also express resolute determination. They increase the pressure by pouring more punishing fire upon the Marines, which delays the 3rd Platoon’s exiting from the gully. At about the same time, enemy machine guns focus on the 1st Platoon and inflict severe casualties against it, bringing the advance to a standstill. The layers of fire become impenetrable. Undaunted, the casualty-weakened 3rd Platoon, Company D, led by Lieutenant Michael Shinka, reinitiates its ascent to seize the summit of Hill 109 at 1000, but the advance is precarious, as the men are forced to move entirely on naked ground. At the onset, the Marines are beset with a whirlwind of automatic weapons fire supplemented with an avalanche of grenades. Nevertheless, twenty troops reach the crest, but they are intercepted by a North Korean surge. Enemy troops emerge from their foxholes, located just over the reverse slope. Then, more enemy grenades are launched toward the Marines. During the heated contest, five more Marines become casualties, bringing Shinka’s strength down to fifteen men. The 3rd Platoon is then compelled to descend the slope, shadowed by the pounding of the enemy fire from the crest and by the ever-increasing

August 17, 1950 machine gun and mortar fire originating on the still unmolested enemy positions on Hills 117 and 143. The platoon is struck by more menacing fire, originating at enemy positions in the areas north and south of Hills 102 and 109. Meanwhile, the beleaguered 1st Platoon remains stalled and under heavy fire at its positions on the right. Captain Zimmer resorts to committing his slim reserve, the 2nd Platoon, led by Sergeant Dickerson. Zimmer quickly decides that passing the 2nd Platoon through the gully used by the 3rd Platoon would be fruitless and expensive. He directs Dickerson to attack through the draw, where the 1st Platoon remains stuck. Initially, Dickerson traces the route of the 3rd Platoon, sloshing through the rice paddy while inhaling the raunchy stench and absorbing the human fertilizer that clings to the fatigues, to the further consternation of the troops. Soon after, the 2nd Platoon arrives at the draw and encounters the 3rd Platoon, which is regrouping, following its futile attack toward the crest of Hill 109. At that point, Dickerson’s platoon sprints over the spur of Hill 102. Instantaneously, both of his flanks are saturated with rings of heavy fire. Shells arc into the right from the heights north of Tugok, in cadence with more intense fire streaming in from Hills 117 and 143, each on the left side of the MSR. All the while, Captain Zimmer scans the battlefield. He notices the enemy positions beyond Tugok, then he deduces the reasons for the severe casualties being incurred by the 1st Platoon, which is trapped along the northern approaches to the objective, No Name Ridge. To Zimmer, it becomes apparent that the enemy is striking its rear and flank from entrenched positions within the zone of the 9th RCT. Zimmer takes measures intended to terminate the withering, slaughtering fire. He calls for the 2nd Battalion to redirect its guns and commence an artillery barrage, but the request receives no response. The task is then given to the artillery of the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines. Immediately, the guns roar, but they then suddenly quiet as the fire rings too close to the 9th RCT. Captain Zimmer then directs his 60-mm mortars to try taking out the enemy positions, but that too fails; the shells fall way short. To meet the non-stop initiative of Shinka’s 3rd Platoon, the North Koreans attempt to shove a heavy machine gun into place on a saddle between the two northernmost peaks. Marine fire forces it back. The process is repeated, but again effective Marine fire turns the enemy gunners back. Tenaciously, the enemy pulls the machine gun back into a position a third time, but it has little effect on who will control the hill. Captain Zimmer has procured the services of a 75-mm recoilless rifle. While the enemy crew is placing the machine gun on the saddle, a lone shot is fired by the 75-mm gun. It scores, and instantly the machine gun and its crew are eliminated. By this time, Company E emerges from the rice paddy, filthy but unscathed, while its counterpart, Company D, remains embattled on the right. Company E’s

August 17, 1950 rifle components continue moving toward the village of Obong-ni, encountering bitter fire. Lieutenant Sweeney’s 1st and 2nd Platoons drive directly toward the inferno. The 2nd Platoon begins lagging, then it loses its forward thrust and becomes spiritless. Meanwhile, the 1st Platoon, led by Lieutenant Nickolas Arkadis, presses forward. Disregarding the menacing flying steel, the troops zoom into the village, and without pause, they zip through it and exit in front of the nameless slope. The 1st Platoon then is greeted by new and more concentrated fire. Enemy machine gun crews, entrenched on Hills 147 and 153, pound the flanks with jackhammer speed. Lieutenant Sweeney has the operation under observation from his command post and attempts to supply artillery support to aid his beleaguered troops. The attempt fails, as the forward observer is unable to communicate with the artillery. Sweeney then tries to contact the mortar section, but this, too, is unsuccessful. Sweeney becomes desperate and chances severe improvisation. He commits his reserve to tackle the sinister obstacles. The 2nd Platoon, Company E, races to the spur to the left of the village and grinds forward, moving toward positions from which fire can be established to lessen the pressure on the attacking platoons. The gamble pays off. Lieutenant Rodger Eddy’s platoon lays effective fire on Hills 147 and 153. At about the same time, more enemy fire begins pouring into Company E from enemy positions south of Obong-ni on the lower slopes of the ridge. Instinctively, Sweeney utilizes the scant remainder of his reserves to forestall any threat against his positions. The mortar section and Sweeney’s headquarters troops are directed to deploy in the valley to intercept the enemy at a point where they can block the southern approach through a rice paddy. Leaving his executive officer, Lieutenant Paul Uffelman, to lead the troops covering the flank, Sweeney speeds to the positions of the 1st and 2nd Platoons and discovers the latter’s situation chaotic and leaderless. But Sweeney’s 1st Platoon, bolstered by strong support fire from the 81-mm mortars of the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines, has gained ground and advanced nearly to the summit. Then the attack stalls, as friendly artillery fire falls short of target and blisters their skirmish line with white phosphorous. Soon after the friendly bombardment ceases, elements of Company E again surge toward the summit, but as they begin to converge upon it, new orders arrive directing the unit to pull back to safer positions due to an imminent air strike. The order is instantly obeyed; however, the Corsairs arrive so swiftly that some Company E troops are still within twentyfive yards of the peak. At about 1100, the planes from the carriers arrive on the scene, but an acute shortage of fuel tanks prevents the aircraft from carrying napalm. The enemy positions are plastered with another cogent air strike. Nevertheless, some enemy troops withstand the assault by hugging the ground in their foxholes on the reverse slope.

228 After the air strikes, the Marines, holding positions about midway on the slope, reinitiate their assault. Company D, to the right of the gash, and Company E, to the left, advance. During the aerial bombardment, the 3rd Platoon, Company E, which had moved forward to provide cover fire and neutralize the enemy fire coming from Hills 147 and 153, withdraws about 100 yards, but this permits the enemy to reinitiate its fire. Heavy machine gun fire from both peaks hammers the riflemen of Company E at their positions on the slope, thereby preventing the resumption of its attack to gain the crest. The 3rd Platoon (Company D), fifteen men strong, musters the stamina to re-climb the slope, and despite the raging fire, it overwhelms the defenders and gains the crest. An enemy contingent composed of about one squad counterattacks from its positions on the reverse slope, only to be slain by Marine riflemen. The crest of Hill 109 now belongs to the Marines, all nine of them. And their ammunition is nearly depleted, with no resupply in sight. From their vantage points above Hill 109, on Hill 143, the enemy increases the fire on the left flank of Lieutenant Shinka’s small contingent. Hill 207 to their front is also enemy-controlled and it rains shells on the crest, subjecting the beleaguered contingent to ruthless punishing fire. Shinka contacts Captain Zimmer, briefs him on the casualties and explains the stark consequences of the biting enemy fire. Soon after, Corsairs from MAG-33 reappear and deliver some white phosphorous shells upon Hill 143, lessening but not eliminating the enemy fire. The newly won positions appear untenable, prompting Shinka to order his men off the crest, with orders bring out the wounded and the weapons. The remnants of Company D’s 3rd Platoon abandon the crest and redeploy about halfway down the slope, but Shinka’s force has been reduced to six able bodied men. Soon after, Shinka, unable to shake his concern, decides to return to the crest in case any wounded have been inadvertently abandoned. Reaching the scorched summit, he creeps over the evacuated positions and then discovers PFC George Hric, who is still alive and lying prone between two dead Marines. A dangerous rescue then unfolds. As Shinka later relates the incident: “As I grabbed him under the arms and pulled him from the foxhole, a bullet shattered my chin. Blood ran into my throat and I couldn’t breathe. I tossed a grenade at a gook crawling up the slope, didn’t wait for it to explode, turned and reached under the Marine’s arms and dragged him as far as the military crest.” At that point, Shinka again is struck; a bullet spears into his right arm and the momentum violently spins him around, causing him to tip over and flip down the hill. Remarkably, Lieutenant Shinka recovers and makes it back to his lines. By noon, the combined casualties of the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines, rise to 23 dead and 119 wounded, nearly all attributed to Companies D and E during the savage fighting for the hill. And it is becoming increasingly apparent

229 that the lack of a third rifle company in the battalion is hindering the progress of the operation and unnecessarily increasing the casualties. Yet, the persistent attacks have obviously cut deeply into the enemy defenders, exhibited by the numerous scattered bodies of the N.K. 4th Division and its demolished equipment. Nonetheless, the 2nd Battalion, like nearly every other unit in Korea, is under-strength and unable to propel reserves into the battle. Its six bloodied rifle companies are too depleted to complete the conquest of the ridge. Subsequent to its grueling seven-hour battle for the ridge, the 2nd Battalion’s able-bodied riflemen stand at fewer than 100, mandating the commitment of Colonel Newton’s 1st Battalion. Meanwhile, General Craig becomes troubled by the noticeable inactivity within the zone of the 9th RCT, which has permitted the enemy from their position at Tugok to maintain heavy pressure against the right flank of his Marine Brigade. Upon inquiring why there has been no timely assault, Craig is informed of the previous agreement reached between Colonel Murray (CO, 5th Marines) and Colonel Hill (CO, 9th RCT), whereby the 9th RCT would postpone its attack and afford cover fire until the Marines seize the first objective. Craig then orders Tugok to be bombarded. Colonel Murray becomes apprehensive because up to this point, no cover fire has come forth. He attempts to contact Colonel Hill and request that the 9th RCT begin its attack, but there is a delay in getting the message through, prompting Murray to concentrate on his dilemma. With few alternatives remaining, at about 1300, Murray directs Colonel Newton to pass his 1st Battalion through the lines of the 2nd Battalion and resume the attack to vanquish the enemy on Obong-ni Ridge. While the 1st Battalion moves toward its assembly point, additional planes from MAG-33 again streak overhead to revisit the over-baked ridge. While the Corsairs carpet the enemy positions, the guns of the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, and some Able Company tanks join the fight. In the midst of transferring responsibility for the attack, Colonel Murray, commanding officer, 5th Marines, is speaking on the radio with Captain Zimmer, Company D, 2nd Battalion. While Zimmer is briefing Murray on the situation in his area, heavy enemy machine gun fire pours into Zimmer’s outpost. Zimmer is hit and severely wounded, as are several other nearby Marines. Zimmer struggles, but by painful crawling, he reaches his company command post on the opposite slope of the spur and places Lieutenant R.T. Hanifin in command. Zimmer heads back to battalion lines for medical treatment while Company D prepares to withdraw to Observation Hill, its portion of the battle ended for now. The 1st Battalion sets up its command post right next to that of the 2nd Battalion, to the rear of the road cut. The 1st Battalion, 5th Marines weapons company, deploys behind the CP. Also, Colonel Newton establishes the 1st Battalion outpost close to Colonel Roise’s 2nd Battalion outpost on Observation Hill. In con-

August 17, 1950 junction, Colonel Hill’s 9th RCT will simultaneously launch its attack against Cloverleaf. At 1600, following a towering artillery barrage that includes time-on-target air bursts that wreak havoc over the entire slope of Cloverleaf, the 9th RCT commences its attack. And in synchronization, the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, presses forward to complete the destruction of the enemy on Obong-ni Ridge. The effective artillery shelling of Cloverleaf demoralizes the enemy defenders, enabling the 2nd Battalion, 9th Regiment, to charge aggressively. This forces the surviving North Koreans to hurriedly flee down the reverse slope. Implementing quick action, the 2nd Battalion, 9th RCT, secures Cloverleaf and prepares to use its weaponry to augment the advance against Obong-ni, where the Marines experience resolute resistance. While the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, presses its attack, Marine artillery pounds enemy positions on the forward and reverse slopes of Obong-ni Ridge. Marine aircraft deliver equally stunning blows against it. Meanwhile, a detachment of tanks moves forward and pours its 90-mm shells and machine gun fire into the target areas to support the ground Marines. But still the enemy continues to exhibit enormous resiliency. During the tedious day-long fighting, the tanks eliminate a minimum of twelve enemy antitank guns and some automatic weapons. Enemy return fire pounds the four U.S. tanks and scores twenty-three hits. One tank is struck by three direct hits. Surprisingly, the damage is minimal and only one crewman is wounded, superficially. In the meantime, Captain Tobin’s Company B, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, passes through the lines of the 2nd Battalion. Its 1st Platoon, led by Lieutenant Schryver, pushes toward Hill 102, while the 2nd Platoon, led by Lieutenant Taylor, makes exceptional progress as it plows up the gully, driving toward the saddle between Hill 102 and Hill 109. Still in reserve, the 3rd Platoon and some machine guns deploy on Observation Hill. The machine guns spread out along the forward slopes to bolster the attack. Tobin, also on Observation Hill, notes the platoons’ headway while he confers with his executive officer, Captain Fenton. At that time, enemy machine gun fire rakes the area, wounding Tobin. Subsequent to getting Captain Tobin evacuated for medical aid, Fenton assumes command of Company B and speeds to the ridge where, by now, the 1st and 2nd Platoons are stalled by heavy fire. The 1st Platoon is way up the slope and the 2nd is positioned well below the mid-point. The 2nd Platoon is struck by enfilade fire and its ranks are being shredded from fire originating on Hills 109, 117, and 143. Lieutenant Taylor sustains a mortal wound. Captain Fenton is with the 2nd Platoon and aware that both units are stalled. Fenton orders the 3rd Platoon into the fight. Meanwhile, Lieutenant Schryver concludes that the nemesis of his 1st Platoon’s advance is the menacing fire coming from Tugok. He requests and receives assistance from the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines Weapons Company.

August 17, 1950

230

Top: A U.S. Army tractor (earth moving crawler) clears ground for an airstrip to handle light aircraft. Bottom: A U.S. Army Motor Carriage M19 with twin 40-mm guns operates near Yongsan during August. Soon after, the village becomes the recipient of incessant 81-mm mortar shells. While the deadly Marine fire descends upon the village, the 1st Platoon eases to the western spur overlooking the MSR, and from there, it outflanks the enemy and strikes viciously. The 1st Platoon converges on Hill 102 and secures it at 1710. In the meantime, while the 1st Platoon drives from the south, some blazing machine gun fire of Company B continues to drill the summits of Hills 117 and 143. This

surge permits the 2nd Platoon to shoot the draw, and within fifteen minutes it secures Hill 109 (at 1725). At 1500, while Company B, 1st Battalion, launches its attack through the lines of Company D, 2nd Battalion, the 1st Battalion’s Company A attacks through the positions of Sweeney’s Company E, 2nd Battalion. Company A scampers through the rank rice paddy and moves beyond to the near incinerated slopes. The 1st and 2nd Platoons, each accompanied by a machine gun

231 section, advance, while battle-weary and drawn Company E, 2nd Battalion, moves back to Observation Hill. At first, the advance meets only nominal opposition, permitting the 1st and 2nd Platoons to easily pass the midway point, sustaining little more than sporadic sniper fire from the forward slopes and from the summit of Obong-ni Ridge. But then, the North Koreans spring to action, and in an instant, the seemingly benign summit is transformed into a multi-tongued serpent. Seething streams of fire permeate the paths of advance and slice ruthlessly into the ranks of the 1st and 2nd Platoons. The 1st Platoon gets snagged between Hills 109 and 117, and the 2nd Platoon becomes snarled between Hills 117 and 143. Both platoons are dangerously strung out and the intensity of the fire staggers the grueling advance. Marines on Observation Hill watch in anguish as their buddies become imperiled, despite the copious bombardment that has pulverized enemy positions on Hills 117 and 143. Lieutenant Robert Sebilan, leading the 1st Platoon through the gully, disregards the wall of fire. He pushes his platoon forward. Sebilan, soon after, receives a debilitating blow when his leg is shattered. Sergeant Orval McMullen assumes command and the platoon again drives forward, reaching the saddle above the gully about the same time Company B gains Hill 109. However, there is no advance to the south toward Hill 117. Another wall of enemy fire bars progress. The 2nd Platoon, Company A, led by Lieutenant Thomas Johnston, is also paralyzed by withering enemy fire as it advances to the left of the 1st Platoon. Johnston, incensed by the machine gun fire that is cutting his platoon to pieces, defiantly jumps up and bolts forward, singlehandedly charging the enemy positions, but he is felled when he reaches the base of the summit. Sergeant Frank Lawson assumes command and he attempts to lead the dwindling 2nd Platoon forward against more aggravating fire. The platoon is quickly reduced to about one squad. The recently committed 3rd Platoon moves forward from its positions on Observation Hill. Led by Lieutenant George Fox, it moves through the rice paddy. An enemy mortar barrage strikes the advancing platoon before it can emerge from the rice paddy, killing one man. Nevertheless, the platoon advances, reaches Obong-ni Ridge and then begins to climb, collecting some remnants of the 1st and 2nd Platoons as it grinds toward the crest. As with the previous assaults, the unit passes the mid-point before hitting impenetrable fire. Two attempts to break through are stymied by the vicious fire. Meanwhile, Captain Stevens arrives at the foundation of the ridge, where he is able to spot the 1st and 2nd Platoons, but not the 3rd. There is no radio communication between Stevens and the troops on the slope. And at dusk, Hills 117 and 143 still belong to the enemy. In addition to the attacks by the 9th RCT and the 5th Marines, other attacks by the 19th and 34th Regiments, operating on the 24th Division right, begin during late

August 17, 1950 afternoon after numerous holdups. These attacks prove costly, particularly to L Company, 34th Regiment, which sustains heavy casualties, many caused by enemy fire striking from the rear. But with persistence the two regiments seize their objectives to the north, and by darkness, Ohang Hill is taken by the 19th Regiment. The 1st Battalion, 21st Regiment, to the southeast, maintains its blocking position without challenge. Also, the 9th RCT has cleared Tugok and Finger Ridge against nominal resistance. On the following day, Marines will uncover the maimed bodies of thirty U.S. soldiers at a medical station that had been overrun during the previous week; the troops show conspicuous signs of torture that occurred prior to their execution. In the meantime, the Marines begin to establish night positions on Hills 102 and 109, but apparently the enemy isn’t ready to pause. At 2000, troops of Company B, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, on Hill 102 glance to the west and spot four T-34 tanks rumbling down the MSR. Trailed by infantry, the armor heads for the pass between Obong-ni and Cloverleaf. From their vantage points on Hill 102, the Marines appear intrigued by the arrogant T-34s as they encroach the pass. The enemy tanks have yet to encounter the Marine Pershings, which have been supporting the ground attacks throughout the day, but the encounter is imminent. A radioman with B Company grabs a radio and informs battalion headquarters of the approaching intruders. Within a short time, the M-26 Pershings refuel and get equipped with 90-mm armor-piercing shells, then race to the pass. At about the same time, several soaring Corsairs detect the enemy armor. The planes immediately attack the column, destroy the trailing tank and scatter the enemy infantry. The remaining three tanks continue the advance and pass beyond Finger and Obong-ni Ridges to encroach the curve near Hill 125. The Marines on Hill 125 rush two 3.5-inch rocket launcher teams to positions near the curve on the MSR to await the enemy armor. They are accompanied by the 1st 75-mm Recoilless Rifle Platoon, which is deployed on nearby Observation Hill. The three Pershing tanks (M-26s) continue to race forward, transporting some heavier fireworks. The T-34s announce their presence by the clouds of dust that ascend from the road as they crank forward. The Marines wait for the armor to round the bend. When the lead tank is sighted, a bazooka is prepared for fire. When it reaches a point about 100 yards away, a shot rings out and it clips the tank’s treads. The crippled T-34 continues to advance with its guns blazing. In an instant, the tank is struck by a second scorching blow from the bazooka. At about the same time, it sustains a massive hit from a recoilless rifle; the shell blows a hole in the tank’s hull. But still, the tank refuses to die. Its movement becomes erratic as it haphazardly swings around the curve, firing blindly as it rumbles along, unaware of new lurking danger. Standing in the path is Sergeant Cecil R. Fuller’s Pershing tank, which

August 17, 1950 quickly fires two shots that kill the T-34. One enemy soldier survives the explosion and he escapes the blazing tank, but he is immediately cut down by Marine riflemen. By now, the second T-34 takes the deadly curve and it is instantly hit by an assault squad from Company A. It, too, manages to hobble forward, but one track is dragging. The handicap is soon eliminated. Before it gets too far it is clobbered by a rocket, fired by a detachment of the 1st Battalion, and then it is pounded by recoilless rifles. The mugged tank limps to a halt directly behind the first dead tank, but its 85-mm gun continues to fire wildly into the wind. In the meantime, another Pershing tank arrives to keep Sergeant Fuller company on the skimpy firing line, giving the impression that the tanks are metallic Siamese twins. By now, the third Russian-made T-34 swings around the bend and into the sights of the waiting Marine tanks. Both Pershings commence firing and pump out six 90-mm shells that stagger the T-34. The decimated tank maintains its ability to fire, which prompts both Pershings to increase the dosage. The T34 sustains seven additional hits. And in the meantime, a white phosphorous shell launched by a 1st Battalion rocket team scores a peculiar direct hit with a bank shot. One of the enemy crewmen attempts to escape the iron coffin. He opens the hatch while the phosphorous shell is en route and as it opens, the shell hits it and bounces down into the turret, igniting an inferno just before the Pershings’ seven rounds arrive to blow through the turret and create a violent explosion. The legend of the sterling invincibility of the Russian tanks is evolving as a myth. The final T-34 charges around the bend, only to greeted by the rubble of the two that preceded it. After an abrupt halt, the lone operational enemy tank is quickly transformed into burning scrap metal. The combined power of the two Pershings, the rocket launchers and the grizzly recoilless rifles unleashes an onslaught of decimating fire that concludes the lop-sided encounter. The rattled T-34 trembles under the shock, then explodes. In the first encounter between the Marines’ Pershings and the Russian-made T-34s, the Pershings eliminate the foe in less than ten minutes. With the threat of the tanks terminated, the Marines resume establishing their night perimeter, including the ample distribution of trip-flares in preparation for an anticipated night attack. At the same time, artillery units maintain fire along suspected enemy approach routes leading toward Cloverleaf and Obong-ni, to hinder the advance of any reinforcements. While the battlefield activity subsides on the slope, the medics and ambulances, overworked for the entire day, become more animated in the race to save lives. During the incessant contest, casualties continue to be carried non-stop from the slopes, ensuring that Lieutenants Bentley Nelson and Chester Klein (battalion medical officers) and their corpsmen receive no rest. So taxing is the crisis that all ambulances in the rear, including sixteen Eighth Army vehicles, are comman-

232 deered to transport the wounded. Also, the light observation planes of VMO-6 transfer the more seriously wounded to the ships offshore. Soon after the tank encounter, at about 2030, Captain Stevens, commanding officer, Company A, 1st Battalion, makes contact with his 1st Platoon, which is straddled between Hills 109 and 117 and next to Company B. Stevens is informed that a 100-yard gap separates it from the 2nd and 3rd Platoons. Stevens meets with the platoon leaders at the base of the ridge and they discuss continuing the assault; however, with the imminence of darkness and the diminished supply of ammunition, food and water, the platoon leaders contend that their exhausted troops should not attack. Stevens and the platoon leaders agree that a large enemy attack might be following right behind the destroyed armor, and their attack should be postponed. Captain Stevens informs Colonel Newton, the 1st Battalion commander, of the situation and Newton then instructs Stevens to discontinue the attack and bind together with Fenton’s Company B to hold the perimeter for the night. Fenton’s Company B, composed of 195 troops, tightens up as its 1st and 2nd Platoons dig in defensively on the forward slopes of Hills 102 and 109, while its machine guns on the summits exchange fire with the North Koreans on Hill 117. The 3rd Platoon reverts to reserve. Also, Company A, composed of 185 men, shifts farther right from its positions below Hills 117 and 143 to link more closely with Company B. The 1st Platoon is the furthermost unit on the left of Company A’s front, which extends left from the southern part of Hill 109. The 1st Platoon extends right to the middle of the saddle toward Hill 117. From there the 2nd Platoon’s perimeter line curves downward to the spur underneath enemy controlled Hill 117, where it enjoins what is virtually the perpendicular line of the 3rd Platoon (left flank) that extends up and down the spur of Hill 117. Theoretically, the brigade’s line is completed by the 1st Battalion’s Headquarters Company, which is to stretch across the rice paddy extending from Observation Hill to Company A, but the severe casualties incurred by Headquarters Company prevent the hook up, leaving the 3rd Platoon strung out precariously. Nevertheless, Colonel Murray, 5th Marines, upon arriving back at his command post near Yongsan, remains confident despite the tactical problems. He realizes his forces are powerfully concentrated within their restricted area and that the reserve 2nd and 3rd Battalions on Observation and Cloverleaf, respectively, can easily mount a strong support attack if the enemy strikes during the night. Most of the Marines attempt to get some rest, but about 25 percent remain on guard and at the ready. Although the units prepare for an anticipated enemy night assault, elements of the 24th Division have intercepted an enemy radio message that details chronic shortages of ammunition in the area of the Naktong Bulge, and they have also intercepted a related request that would authorize the North Koreans to withdraw back across the river.

233 Meanwhile, on Obong-ni Ridge just before 2200, the screaming rattle of incoming mortar fire and its violent explosions are heard, followed by a devastating direct hit inflicted by four white phosphorus shells that land dead center within the entrenched positions of Company A. Eighteen men, nearly the entire contin-

August 17, 1950 gent in the gully, become casualties and its 60-mm mortars are destroyed. On the fringe of the impacting shells, several men of the 3rd Platoon are also wounded, including Captain George C. Fox, platoon leader. Subsequent to the contest and the capture of enemy equipment, it is determined that the enemy had

U.S. troops advance past a destroyed enemy tank. Some carry 3.5-inch rocket launchers. The soldier on the right in the foreground carries rockets. Two South Korean laborers transport a casualty to rear to receive medical attention.

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Supplies are dropped to isolated troops. The drop marks are located in a rice paddy. possession of a captured U.S. Army radio (SCR-300) and its frequency setting was that used by the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, giving the enemy an added advantage during this battle. The next several hours pass with unnatural tranquility, except for some sporadic fire originating from enemy positions south of the Marine perimeter. An at-

tack by the 1st Battalion is scheduled for 0700, but in the interim, the enemy night attack is still expected. And at 0230 it arrives — with a bang. As expected, the Communists launch their attack, hoping to catch the Marines on Obong-ni off guard. Initially, the Marines on Hill 117 detect enemy movement and in synchronization, North Korean machine

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Crew of M15A prepares to move out in the vicinity of Yongsan. The M15A, like the M19, was designed as an antiaircraft weapon. guns on the summit commence firing into Company A’s positions. A luminous green flare consumes the night sky as the North Koreans charge from their concealed positions on Hill 117 against the positions of Company A, commanded by Captain John Stevens. Simultaneously, an assault strikes Company B at its positions on Hill 109. Two enemy platoons driving west head up the gully against Fenton’s main defenses, while a diversionary attack is launched by one squad attacking from the gully west of the saddle between Hills 102 and 109. Company B remains solid and the attack falters. However, some enemy troops penetrate by evading Marines in foxholes and striking the command post on Hill 109. They are met by mortarmen, rocket launcher crewmen and clerks who encounter and annihilate the infiltrators. Meanwhile, brilliant artificial daylight is created by the burst of 81-mm illuminating mortar shells that expose the enemy attack and offer the Americans a panoramic view and a lesson on the enemy tactics. The North Koreans bolt noisily from the ground, lobbing grenades as they sprint forward, firing their automatic weapons toward the flank and to the front. It is noted that the attacking units travel only short distances, then they drop prone to the ground to permit trailing squads to leap forward and repeat the process, continuing the strategy for the duration of the attack. The killing grounds appear more gruesome because of the colossal flares. The enemy pressure succeeds in isolating the remnant 2nd Platoon of Company A, but

the greatly outnumbered platoon resists tenaciously for about one-half hour of deadly close-quartered fighting. Tech Sergeant Lawson, who had replaced Lieutenant Johnston as 2nd Platoon leader earlier in the day, is wounded three times during the struggle, but he refuses evacuation, choosing instead to lead and inspire his troops to fight on. Finally, the 2nd Platoon is overwhelmed, but the enemy misses the opportunity of gushing through the gap in large numbers. Nonetheless, the North Koreans splinter the two companies as they press toward the command post of Stevens’ Company A, to the immediate rear of the overwhelmed 2nd Platoon. The attackers, bolstered by heavy submachine gun fire and grenades, shove Stevens and his headquarters down the gully, toward the saddle south of Hill 109. This in turn opens the left flank of his 1st Platoon, compelling it to pull back toward the southern face of Hill 109. Captain Fenton, informed of the enemy seizure of the saddle south of Hill 109, begins to further tighten his left flank by pulling it in tightly toward his 3rd Platoon, which is deployed on the reverse slope. This maneuver forms a configuration similar to that of a football at this portion of the defenses, and it enables Company B to fend off enemy pressure that is driving from the south. Following about one hour of furious battle, the enemy is driven back. Marine artillery fire lends support to the riflemen of Company A in their effort to hold off the enemy thrust.

August 17, 1950 The 3rd Platoon, deployed on the left along the spur below Hill 117, remains unscathed, except for some brief exchanges with enemy infantry during the attack. Lieutenant Fox reforms his 3rd Platoon and stretches its perimeter to afford more protection, utilizing some few surviving troops of the 2nd Platoon. By 0400, Captain Stevens is momentarily out of touch with his company; however, the situation is not critical. Stevens balances his center near the bottom of the draw. One Company A officer, Lieutenant Fred Eubanks, singlehandedly charges up the gully against the enemy. Soon after, he is joined by another officer, Lieutenant Francis Muetzel, who was assumed dead during the initial enemy penetration against the 2nd Platoon. The machine gun officer had only been knocked out. His timely recovery is a welcome addition for Eubanks. Both then advance together, hacking their way through the enemy lines to safely reach the Marine zones. During the struggle, Tech. Sergeant Paul Hodge, disregarding his wounds, enables Stevens to make contact with Lieutenant Fox (3rd Platoon) prior to dawn and the loose ends are tied, setting up the attack. In the meantime, Colonel Newton’s request to have the artillery barrage the enemy positions has been answered so powerfully that the 11th Marines are asked to hold back a few rounds to support the brigade attack, still scheduled to jump off in several hours, at 0700. Newton retorts that if the battalion does not continue to receive maximum artillery support, the brigade would be attacking for the purpose of regaining Objective One at 0700. The incessant bombardment continues and it is bolstered by the 2nd Battalion’s total complement of 81-mm mortar ammunition, which greatly increases the killing power of Newton’s mortarmen. The bitter night attack had started with both Marine companies being numerically weak, and at its conclusion, the 1st Battalion is victorious but further drained. At dawn, while the surviving remnants of the enemy are retiring back to their lines, machine guns still entrenched on Hill 117 rattle off some shots at the Marines. Company A is down to 90 able men and Company B has incurred 85 casualties, thinning its ranks to 110 troops, but B Company still commands Hills 102 and 109. With the arrival of daylight, the 5th Marines, having repelled the North Korean onslaught, prepare to mount the scheduled attack to clear Hill 117, where the enemy had withdrawn after being rebuffed by the Marines. The 1st Battalion reorganizes and Company A prepares to conclude yesterday’s task by taking the hill. At 0700, after conferring with Colonel Newton, Stevens orders the 3rd Platoon to strike. The skies remain clear on the 18th, giving the Marines the added power of close-air support as well as artillery support. The Marines (1st Bn., 5th Marines) drive south toward the hill, crossing the saddle effortlessly, but as the troops begin to ascend the slope, enemy machine guns string a ghastly wall of fire across the line of advance. One Marine BARman, PFC Harold Twedt, eliminates two of the machine guns, but enemy fire kills him.

236 About fifty yards farther up the slope, another machine gun position stalls the advance by laying sheets of fire. The Marines are hung high on the slope. An urgent call for an air strike is dispatched and soon afterward the tactical air coordinator, Lt. Colonel Norman Anderson, obliges with Corsairs overhead. Anderson fires a colorful smoke rocket to identify the location of the target and Major Arnold Lund (VMF-323) directs his section leader, Captain John P. Kelley, to destroy the menacing obstacle. Kelley’s Corsair zooms overhead, then dives toward a belly-scraping level, nearly shaving the heads of the troops of the 3rd Platoon, before unleashing his 500-pound parcel of that destroys all four machine guns. The impact jolts the Marines on the ground, and one BARman is inadvertently killed by the blast. At about the point of detonation, while the smoke and debris are still hovering above the charred earth, the Marines charge from their positions and secure the hill. Upon reaching the enemy gun emplacement it becomes evident that Captain Kelley had hit the bull’s-eye with his bomb, scoring a massive direct hit. Within five minutes of the appearance of the Corsair, the Marines sprint to the summit, claiming Hill 117, and soon after, they are joined by Orval McMullen’s 1st Platoon, which has driven from Hill 109, prompting the enemy to flee from the crest and the reverse slope under heavy fire from the new occupants. With the crest of Hill 117 in their pocket, the men of Company A, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, swing toward the south to sweep the crest. Twenty Marines attack and seize Hill 143 against light resistance. Immediately, Stevens requests permission from Newton to continue the attack and he receives this response: “Affirmative.” Soon after, the 3rd Platoon, Company A, attacks and overruns Hill 147. Many of the enemy defenders flee their positions. Some choose to stand and fight for the crest, and they are annihilated. The victors scour the summit and detect a disciplined enemy column composed of about 150 troops descending the western slope and about halfway to the base. Suddenly, Marine fire commences from the crest and the neatly moving columns-of-four begin to unravel. The jewel of Obong-ni, Hill 153, with its towering peak, still remains to be taken, and it is expected that the North Koreans will resist tenaciously. Company A’s 3rd Platoon drives expeditiously to the crest, encountering discarded equipment and weapons and some enemy corpses. The Marines search the area and the slopes for the vanishing enemy, and they discover an unusual sight on the reverse slope when the spot some scrub pines that harbor hostile tree-huggers. The Marines observe the bushes unnaturally moving down the hill and react. Some of the enemy are slain, but their pace is so quick that many of the fleeing bushes escape. While the 1st and 2nd Platoons, Company A, concentrate on the middle peaks, the 3rd Platoon sweeps the southern stretches below Hill 153, encountering no

237 opposition. The 1st Platoon’s engineers sweep through the swamps south of Hill 153, securing it and the left flank of the 3rd Platoon by establishing a solid minefield that stretches from the southern summit downward to the valley and eastward from there across the swamp. In the meantime, Colonel Taplett’s 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, which had received warning orders at midnight (17th-18th) to continue its attack, is preparing to jump from its assembly area. Artillery fire and mortars converge on the objective and air strikes plaster the hill to loosen resistance. Colonel Taplett establishes his observation post on the northern portion of Obong-ni. Companies G and H, with support fire from the 9th Regiment, USA, on Cloverleaf, jump off from the northern edge of Obong-ni and drive toward Hill 207. (In some U.S. Army references this hill is noted as 206). At about 1000, Fenton’s Company H contingent breaks from the main supply route and moves onto some open ground between Obong-ni and Finger Ridges. From there, it drives up the eastern spur, while the trailing Company G, under Bohn, pivots to the right and from the opposite side of a deep gully charges up the western spur. While the attacking troops ascend the slopes, watchful tanks of the 3rd Platoon, Company A, spot an enemy platoon working the flank. The M-26s open fire from a range of 300 yards, shattering the attack, killing many and scattering the remainder. The tanks maintain their cover fire to the front and flanks, enabling the ground troops to continue the climb. As Company H’s 1st Platoon encroaches the summit, a few of the defenders rise from their foxholes and toss grenades at the attacking Marines. Instinctively, everyone hits the deck and remains prone until the grenades detonate. Then with a sudden burst, the final lap is run, catching the defenders off guard. Most defenders head down the reverse slope, but some remain to resist; all are quickly killed. Meanwhile, Company G, driving on the right, swings in over the western portion of the objective and quickly eradicates the few remaining enemy troops, culminating the conquest of Hill 207 (Objective Two) at 1237. The N.K. 4th Division begins to crumble. Contingents are speeding from the slopes of Hill 207. Some bee-line for Hill 311 on the opposite side of the MSR, and others flee toward the Naktong River. The disciplined enemy division is in disorganized flight, lacking its usual cover of darkness. The exposed North Koreans offer an abundance of killing opportunities for the artillerymen and the Marine Corsairs. Planes of MAG-33 obliterate the assumed position of the command post of the N.K. 18th Regiment on a crest south of Hill 207. The attack delivers thunderous bolts of flaming steel and short circuits the enemy communications. In the meantime, other Corsairs alternate as they spray the banks of the Naktong and assault the hundreds of fleeing enemy troops with more steel.

August 17, 1950 The murderous thunderclap increases its intensity. At about 1200, when information concerning the enemy retreat across the Naktong is transmitted, the artillery hones in on the Naktong River crossings, in concert with aircraft that strafe the roads and paths on the western slopes, slicing the enemy ranks there. The enemy troops become caught on naked ground as they try to reach the river. While the enemy is being shredded on the banks by the Corsairs, the artillery is adjusted to place interdiction fire on each of the river crossings, greatly increasing the fatalities and casualties on the beleaguered Communist Division. The guns of the artillery are adjusted for effectiveness on target and modified by supplementing the barrage with “adjusted air bursts” and “quick fuse” shells to ensure a greater killing area. The time-delayed shells spring deadly surprises on the enemy troops who attempt escape by swimming under water. When they come up for air they are greeted with clusters of exploding shell fragments overhead. Colonel Taplett, not to be outdone, concentrates his supporting tanks, mortars and machine guns on the enemy, including those caught in the valley and upon Hills 207 and 311. Taplett requests permission to continue the assault, but he is directed to hold in place while the brigade completes the annihilation operation at the river. Following the seizure of Hill 206 at 1530, Companies G and H begin departing the summit, meeting at the base the 1st Platoon, Company A, 1st Tank Bn., commanded by Lieutenant Pomeroy. From there, with the security of the tanks, the 3rd Battalion slants slightly northwest and crosses the valley toward the final ridge in front of the Naktong, Hill 311 (Objective Three). Meanwhile, the North Koreans are receiving a thorough thrashing, and most are attempting to withdraw across the Naktong. Nevertheless, those enemy troops still remaining on Hill 311 are pounded by a heavy preparatory bombardment. MAG-33 aircraft coat the peak with napalm, while the big guns of the artillery, 74-mm recoilless rifles and mortars whack the high slopes with thundering blasts. The massive fire power obstructs free flight by the enemy, while the assault at the Naktong remains in progress. The once resolute resistance of the N.K. 4th Division has been shattered by the Marines and its remnants are scattering under the overwhelming pressure. The planes hammer from the sky in conjunction with the blazing action of the ground troops. The enemy hunters become the prey, but at some points, the North Koreans still mount formidable opposition. In conjunction with the Marine assault, the 19th and 34th Regiments, operating on the right flank of the 24th Division, continue their advance into the bulge. Before dusk, Hill 223 is seized by the 19th Regiment and Hill 240 is secured by the 34th Regiment. Meanwhile, the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marine Companies G and H, drive up parallel spurs and close on the summit. Enemy fire rips into Company H when it climbs to within about 200 yards shy of the crest. The

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U.S. soldiers fire a 60-mm mortar M2 at the enemy in the vicinity of the Naktong River during late August. stiff resistance is raised by a lone platoon, but the attack stalls and the machine guns are of no value due to thick brush. Company G overpowers light resistance and advances to the southern tip of the crest at 1730. Soon after, it pivots and drives north, only to stall as it encounters fierce fire from the identical enemy platoon that has stymied Company H. Lieutenant Bohn dis-

patches the 1st Platoon, Company G, under Cahill to the west to envelop the enemy to the left. The maneuver works and the obstacle is eliminated, but then the North Koreans on the forward slopes raise heavy resistance and close-quartered fighting ensues between them and Company H. During the pitched battle on the slopes, Captain

239 Fegan becomes wounded, totally halting the progress of Company H. In conjunction, due to imminent darkness, Lieutenant Bohn recalls his over-extended 1st Platoon and receives a report from its leader, Lieutenant Cahill, himself wounded, that the platoon’s casualties amount to two killed and eight wounded. Subsequent to the day’s fierce combat, which culminates with the capture of the majority of Hill 311, Colonel Taplett orders his 3rd Battalion to establish a night perimeter. The remnant resistance on the crest is scheduled for destruction on the following morning (19th). Sunset on the 18th sets a somber note for the N.K. 4th Division, which has been decisively defeated, giving the North Korean Army its first major setback since the outbreak of hostilities. The 81-mm mortars of the 3rd Battalion bellow at 0610, signaling the demise of Hill 311, the third and final objective of the Marine brigade. Company H, seemingly moving on the tailwinds of the mortar fire, advances rapidly, popping over abandoned enemy entrenchments to reach the northern portion of the hill without interruption. Objective Three is Marine terrain by 0645, culminating the mission of the brigade. The 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, holds Obong-ni Ridge, the 2nd controls Hill 207, where it deployed on the previous day, and now the 3rd Battalion holds the commanding heights in the Naktong Bulge. The Marine price: 66 dead, 278 wounded and one missing in action. On the morning of the 19th, elements of the 34th Regiment and contingents of the 5th Marines converge on the Naktong, essentially terminating the battle of the Naktong Bulge. Patrols scout the river area during the afternoon and discover no enemy troops. Subsequent information extracted from prisoners verifies that most survivors of the initial attacking force had withdrawn across the Naktong during the night (18th19th). Although no contact is made with the enemy and its exact losses are unknown, it is increasingly clear that the enemy had sustained grave casualties. The 24th Division buries more than 1,200 Communist troops. Additional information gained from prisoners claims that the remnant force of the decimated 4th N.K. Division had been reduced to 3,500 men. Coincidentally, the defeated division receives word from North Korean Army Headquarters today that it has been designated (by army order) a “Guard Division,” for recognition of its excellent achievements during the battle of Taejon in July. The North Koreans lose face with the destruction of the supposed crack 4th Division. In an attempt to regain the momentum to capture Pusan and throw the Americans back into the sea, the North Koreans remove the 2nd and 9th Divisions from the Taegu front to succeed the battered 4th N.K. Division. Simultaneously, the Communists build up the N.K. 6th Division, which has also taken a beating at Chinju. The unexpected redeployment of the N.K. 2nd and 9th Divisions is a blessing for General Walker’s Eighth Army, as the strategy inadvertently bolsters Walker’s diminishing force at Taegu. Following the battle at Obong-ni, detachments from

August 17, 1950 Marine ordnance units begin collecting the enemy’s abandoned and destroyed heavy weapons. Detachments scoop up 34 artillery pieces, more than half of them positioned adjacent to the Yongsan–Naktong River Road. Other weapons captured (including destroyed and abandoned) include eight antitank rifles, 25 light machine guns, eighteen heavy machine guns and 63 submachine guns; countries of origin for these weapons are Russia and the USA. The U.S. forces also confiscate large quantities of grenades and ammunition as they mop up along the Naktong. With the victorious conclusion of the fighting in the bulge, Eighth Army releases the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade from the 24th Division. The Marines move to an assembly area outside of Changwon, east of Masan, reverting to Eighth Army reserve until its services are again needed during early September. Pusan Perimeter, Central Front, Taegu: Enemyheld Hill 303 comes under attack during the predawn hours, as the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 5th Cavalry Regiment, supported by tanks and artillery, charge the enemy positions. The Americans encounter resolute resistance, including intense mortar fire that halts the advance at the fringe of Waegwan, the base of the southern slope. The artillery units catapult steady streams of fire into the enemy positions without success, prompting the 5th Cavalry to request some heavier assistance from division. First Cavalry Division headquarters informs 5th Cavalry that the Air Force is scheduled to carpet the hill at 1400. The 5th Cavalry is not disappointed. At precisely 1400, the planes arrive overhead and begin whacking the hill, charring it with napalm and rockets. Simultaneously, large pockets of open ground are created by the thunderous shuddering impact of the descending layers of bombs, intertwined with the arcing artillery shells that have joined the fire of the aircraft to further frazzle the nerves of the surviving defenders on the sizzling slopes. By 1530, the combined air strikes and the artillery barrages have cut a steady path for the infantry by clearing the hill of all living members of the defenders. The U.S. infantry charges up the hill expecting a tenacious fight, but it encounters no opposition and easily regains complete control by about 1630, when sixty troops from Companies E and F take the summit. About 200 enemy dead are noticed as the ground troops pass by en route to the summit, and it is estimated that about 500 additional enemy troops had been wounded on the hill by the artillery air strikes. But the enemy dead are not the sole corpses on the ravaged battlefield. The fate of the mortarmen of Company H is no longer a mystery. Twenty-six U.S. troops, each with his hands fastened by rope or wire behind his back, lay dead. The twenty-six American soldiers lie prone, riddled with bloody holes from rampant burp gun fire. Later information discloses that while the U.S. attack is underway this day, the captives, taken during the predawn hours of the 15th, are ordered slaughtered by a North Korean officer.

August 18, 1950 During the afternoon nightmarish news hits the regiment. Scouts bring in one of the few survivors, Private Roy Manring, who had wounds in both legs and one arm but dragged himself down the hill into the line of advance by the reinforcements. Lieutenant Paul Kelly leads the I&R Platoon to the site and captures two North Korean troops who had been involved with the slaughter. Several mortarmen, including Corporal James Rudd (three wounds), who had been captured and scheduled for execution, evade death by absorbing their wounds, then seeking insulation by crawling under the bodies of the dead. Fighting continues near the hill for the remainder of the day. Later, during some night fighting, enemy antitank weapons knock out two tanks of the 70th Tank Battalion. On the following day when U.S. troops arrive at the scene, they discover six bodies, and each of the deceased tankers had been captured before being summarily executed. In other activity, a short but devastating enemy artillery barrage strikes Taegu, raising the level of anxiety with just seven shells. The harassing fire destroys one railroad engine, damages the roundhouse at the railroad station and kills one civilian. Eight other civilians are wounded. The incident promotes exaggerated reaction, as later in the day, the Korean Provincial Government orders the city evacuated. The president of the Republic of Korea, Syngman Rhee, hurriedly transfers his floating capital to Pusan. The new unfolding chain of events is creating more difficulties for hard-pressed Eighth Army. Military traffic could become totally paralyzed by the swarming refugees, and the morale of the defending troops is plummeting as the newest confusion begins to compound the crisis. Eighth Army (coordinator for protection of lines of communications) halts the evacuation. The enemy will shell the town twice more between today and the 20th. Near Taegu, the 27th Regimental Headquarters moves out of Kyongsan with a reinforced battalion to relocate at a point across the Kumho River along the Tabudong–Sanju Road, about three miles north of Taegu. The battalion dispatched by the 27th Regiment is to intercept any enemy movement heading south along the road. Information has been received from the South Koreans that an enemy regiment accompanied by six tanks has moved into Kumhwa, a little village two miles north of Tabu-dong. The 1st Battalion advances with a heavy mortar company platoon and the 8th FAB (minus Battery B). By dark, the entire regiment will be north of Taegu (along Tabu-dong road), supported by Company C, 73rd Tank Battalion. On the following day, the 37th FAB, minus its Battery A, arrives to further augment the 27th Regiment’s supporting artillery. Meanwhile, the S.K. 1st Division remains embroiled with elements of the N.K. 13th Division in the high ground around Yuhak-san for about one week, attempting to prevent the Communists from breaching the Tabu-dong corridor and reaching Taegu. But this day, despite the severe casualties it has incurred during the week’s fighting (about 1,500 casualties), the North

240 Koreans penetrate and by the following day they encroach Tabu-dong. Pusan Perimeter, Eastern Corridor: The South Koreans progress well against heavy opposition in the vicinity of An’gang-ni–Kigye, and they convincingly force the North Koreans to surrender ground. By dawn, the 23rd Regiment, U.S. 2nd Division, arrives at Kyongju to bolster the lines there. Intense fighting continues throughout the day, and by nightfall, the N.K. 766th Independent Regiment, fearful of total encirclement, withdraws into the mountains north of Kigye. The N.K. 12th Division receives a thrashing as well, coming under thunderous bombardment from the U.S. naval surface vessels and by lightning-quick strikes from the support planes while they attempt to fend off the aggressiveness of the South Korean ground troops. At about 2000, the N.K. 12th Division issues orders for all its contingents to pull back to Top’yong-dong. While en route, heavy casualties are incurred, forcing the 12th Division to reorganize on the 19th. Subsequent reports from POWs indicate that the average enemy battalion is composed of no more that 250 men as of August 17. — In North Korea: North Korean Premier Kim Il Sung (born Kim Song-ju) had earlier predicted the ouster of the U.S. and the unification of Korea, subsequent to the destruction of the South Korean resistance by August 15. But now Kim Il Sung is compelled to modify his schedule. He proclaims a new order by radio broadcast, again calling for the eviction of the Americans and the destruction of South Korea by the end of August. Kim Il Sung further states that his Communist forces should “destroy the South Korean and United States [troops] to the last man.” — In the United States: The 7th Marines, pursuant to authority by the JCS, is activated at Camp Pendleton, California. Colonel Homer L. Litzenberg is appointed commander of the regiment. The catalyst of the regiment is the 6th Marines (less two battalions), which had arrived at Pendleton from Camp Lejeune on the previous day. The 3rd Battalion, 6th Marines, 2nd Marine Division, is stationed in the Mediterranean, but it receives orders to proceed to Japan to join the 7th Marines, 1st Marine Division. Other units utilized to form the 7th Marines include 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines; Company D, 1st Tank Bn.; Company D, 1st Engineer Bn.; Company C, 1st Shore Party Bn. (including two Shore Party Communications Teams attached to Signal Company, Signal Bn.); Company D, 1st Motor Transport Bn.; and Company E, 1st Medical Bn.

August 18 Southwest Pusan Perimeter: Elements of the N.K. 6th Division launch another morning assault against Colonel Fisher’s 35th Regiment, 25th Division, at Sibidang, again pushing Company A from its sector, but the lost ground is then regained by a counterattack. Two companies of S.K. Police arrive to bolster the right flank of Company A, and the artillery of the 64th Field Artillery Battalion,

241 commanded by Lt. Colonel Arthur Logan, and its attached Battery C, 90th Field Artillery Battalion, also give support to Companies A and B during these skirmishes. To the south of the 35th’s positions, the North Koreans initiate a morning assault against the 24th Regiment. The attack strikes strongly against Company E, 2nd Battalion, posted on the northern spinal ridge of Battle Mountain. The enemy gains some ground, dislodging portions of the company and killing its commanding officer. During the day’s skirmishing on Battle Mountain, Lt. Colonel George R. Cole, commanding officer, 2nd Battalion, 24th Regiment, is replaced by Lt. Colonel Paul F. Roberts. In the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade area, patrols from each battalion scrutinize their areas of responsibility to eliminate any snipers or lagging enemy stragglers. One mop up patrol discovers three concealed 122-mm howitzers deployed in a column and positioned whereby they could fire over one another from their camouflaged area in the brush on a hill near the Naktong River. The find is a bonanza of intelligence, as the Marines have never before encountered enemy guns deployed in this fashion. General Craig believes that these undisturbed howitzers are the guns that had been striking the Marine positions until the final bell of the battle. Pusan Perimeter, Central Front, Taegu: The 37th Field Artillery Battalion elements arrive from Kyongju–Pohang-dong at the 27th Regiment’s lines along the Tabu-dong road, above Taegu. The N.K. 13th Division, which had forced its way into the Tabu-dong corridor, reaches positions slightly north of Tabu-dong. West of this activity, at Yuhak-san, the N.K. 15th Division is also engaging contingents of the S.K. 1st Division, but up to this point, the combat has been confined to minor skirmishes. The North Korean Army Command, determined to take Taegu, redirects its 15th Division from the area northwest of Tabu-dong to positions eastward along the Yongch’on front, where the N.K. 8th Division has been repelled near the lateral Taegu corridor. The division departs for its newly designated area on about the 20th. Also, the N.K. 1st Division operating east (left) of the N.K. 13th Division is directed to advance to positions that parallel the 13th Division to form for a combined assault against Taegu through the Tabu-dong corridor. In the meantime, Eighth Army orders Colonel Michaelis to attack to help regroup the S.K. lines at Sokchok about four miles north of Tabu-dong; the 27th Regiment, supported by M-26 tanks of Company C, 73rd Tank Battalion, and the artillery of the 37th FAB, is to drive north along the Sangju-Taegu Road in conjunction with the S.K. 1st Division, which is to simultaneously assault the enemy positions in the hills on both sides of the highway. During the afternoon, the convoy, spearheaded by tanks, roars out of Tabu-dong moving north. The advancing troops are able to observe the ensuing fighting in the hills between the South Koreans and the enemy

August 18, 1950 as they roll toward the line of departure. At a designated spot, the vehicles halt, and the ground troops jump to the road. The 1st and 2nd Battalions deploy on the left and right of the highway. At 1300, the 1st and 2nd Battalions, led by Colonels Check and Murch respectively, cross the line of departure and advance into the ongoing fighting by sweeping the lower hills against nominal opposition. This permits them to keep pace with the tanks, which are purposely advancing at a sluggish pace to afford the infantry an abundance of cover fire. The tankers deliver a steady line of fire toward the high ground, drilling the slopes with steel. The sounds of the impacting shells reverberate like percussion instruments in a deep well, with the echoes bouncing back and forth through the valley below. While the 27th Regiment continues its advance, the S.K. 1st Division contingents in the higher ground are encountering stiff resistance, forcing the attack to be suspended. The 1st and 2nd Battalions, 27th Regiment, establish a perimeter slightly north of Soi-ri, a tiny village dwarfed even more by the huge slopes that abut it. The S.K. units retain their positions in the heights above both sides of the road. The U.S. perimeter is spiked to the front of the Infantry with two tanks in the stream and two more on the road. The line is further bolstered by six bazooka teams dispersed in the same vicinity. The perimeter is anchored in the rear by artillery and six additional tanks, which are held in reserve to provide some extra comfort for the 27th Regiment, which is anticipating yet another unenchanted evening with the enemy. In the 1st Battalion sector on the left, Company C takes the point in the high ground with Company A to its rear. Company B, straddled to the right, stretches out in front of A Company and extends across a streambed and the valley to the road. To the right of the road, the 2nd Battalion’s Company E deploys along and to the east of the road, aligned with Company F to its right. In conjunction, Company G deploys on a hill to the rear of Company F, completing the regiment’s night perimeter. All units await an attack to emerge in the hills and along the valley road. Soon after dark, the 27th Regiment is serenaded with mortar and artillery barrages, followed by the usual enemy flares, signaling the enemy night assault that transforms the valley into a combustion chamber. Enemy armor leads the attack. The armor had apparently remained concealed during the day at Sinjumak, a dinky village slightly more than one mile to the front of the 27th’s lines beyond a fork of the Sangju and Kunwi Roads. The village of Sinjumak, nestled behind the hills on the left (Sangju road) fork, is protected from artillery by the hills. Nonetheless, the two enemy tanks and a self-propelled gun venture from their sanctuary into the range of the U.S. guns, trailed by infantry, some moving by truck and others by foot. As the roving enemy armor probes for the American positions, the second tank and the self-propelled gun shatter the night silence, blasting shells toward Company F’s sector, but the firing is inaccurate.

August 18, 1950 The lead tank moves innocently, its guns still silent as if searching for a target. The armor continues its advance and closes prudently but confidently until the waiting guns of the Americans begin to bellow. The 8th Field Artillery begins limbering up in cadence with the bazookas from Company F. Their combined performance makes the enemy jittery. The lead tank is swiftly struck by two bazooka shells, but neither detonate. Nonetheless, the duds convince the crew to abandon the tank. At about the same time, the second tank is decimated by bazooka fire. The ensuing interdictory barrage from the 8th Field Artillery, directed by an astute artillery observer, Lieutenant Lewis Millett, knocks out the self-propelled gun and two enemy trucks. The endeavor kills or wounds an estimated 100 enemy troops. Iron-nerved Millet conducted his artillery orchestra while the enemy tank reached a position fifty yards from his foxhole. Several additional tanks advance to the area, but upon observing the decimation to their front, they each quickly reverse direction and retire. Lacking armor, the enemy infantry assault evaporates rather quickly. By 0030 (19th), the valley becomes tranquil for a while. The persistent North Koreans launch a milder attack at about 0230, but it, too, sizzles as the guns of the 8th Field Artillery, supplemented by mortar fire, soon prompt the enemy to disengage and disperse. The 27th Regiment is a quick-study unit and it notices that the North Koreans always introduce green flares to pinpoint their primary area of attack. An abundant supply of green flares is procured post-haste by the 27th Regiment, adding new dimensions to the future night attacks. The Americans also ring the valley road with mines,

242 which slow the tanks. When the enemy infantry arrives to dislodge the land mines, the skies are instantly illuminated with brilliant bursting flares that provide added guidance to the preregistered mortars and artillery shells, which strike up a deadly chorus for the stalled enemy. The North Koreans mount six more successive night attacks in what becomes “The Battle of the Bowling Alley.” In other activity, General Walker, acting upon the recent direction from General MacArthur, requests permission to activate five new South Korean divisions, all to be fully equipped and each composed of 10,500 troops. Walker wants to activate one new division per month beginning in September. General MacArthur agrees with the new force, but due to the critical shortages of equipment, he holds back Walker’s authority. MacArthur insists that the new S.K. divisions have only equipment arriving from the U.S. The present strength of the South Korean Army is approximately 84,800 troops. Pusan Perimeter, Eastern Corridor: The North Korean 12th Division and the 766th Independent Regiment continue to recoil in the hills in the vicinity of Top’yong-dong and Pohang-dong, following hard and bitter fighting with the South Korean forces. The North Korean force has lacked adequate supplies since about August 12. One captured North Korean officer details the 12th Division’s frustration, claiming it is due to moving beyond Andong and through the mountains there without artillery to support them in Pohangdong. The captive officer also cites critical shortages of food. Another captured prisoner, a sergeant with the N.K. 1st Regiment’s 2nd Battalion, informs his interrogators that his battalion, composed of 630 troops,

U.S. tanks (medium M4A3 in foreground and medium M-26 in background) fire at enemy targets in the vicinity of Yongsan on 18 August.

243 contained only twenty troops as of August 18. It appears as if the North Koreans have been thwarted along the eastern perimeter, but the calm remains temporary. By early September, the North Koreans are poised for more powerful attacks against the entire Pusan Perimeter. —In the United States: The second echelon of planners (1st Marine Division) leaves Camp Pendleton for Japan; General O.P. Smith departs with the entourage. In conjunction, the 1st Marine Division command post at Pendleton is closed in coordination with the departure of the commanding general; however, a few thousand Marines (rear echelon) remain there under the command of General Alfred H. Noble. In other activity, the Marine Corps lowers the term of enlistment to three years from its norm of four years. — In Japan: The first contingent of South Korean troops who are to be filtered into the U.S. 7th Division arrive in Japan. The final contingent arrives by the 24th, giving the U.S. 7th Division a total of 8,625 Korean troops, including officers and men. It is a complicated set up that doesn’t work out too well due to many things, including a language barrier, insufficient training and a much different culture and set of loyalties. Some of the troops who arrive are particularly young and still carrying their schoolbooks; many of these new recruits have been scooped up in Taegu and Pusan.

August 19 Southwest Pusan Perimeter: U.S. Naval Forces bombard the enemy positions at recently seized T’ongyong in support of an ROK amphibious invasion; with the support of the U.S. Navy fire, the S.K. Marines take the town. The North Koreans lose about 350 troops during this action, splitting their force by about 50 percent. The survivors withdraw to Chinju. In the U.S. 25th Division sector, the North Koreans continue to slim the ranks of the 1st Battalion, 35th Regiment, but Lt. Colonel Bernard Teeter’s men hold firmly with the support of artillery, which cranks out about 200 rounds an hour during the night of the 19th20th. To reinforce Company A, the South Korean police on the flank and Company B reinforcements rush to the scene. Company C, 35th Regiment, and Company A, 29th Regiment, speed to positions along the Komam-ni Road on the morning of the 20th. In the 24th Regiment sector at Battle Mountain, the enemy again mounts a morning attack. Company C, 1st Battalion, quickly dislodges itself and hurriedly descends the slope. In the confusion of the battle, many of the newly arrived South Korean police on P’il-bong also desert their positions in the face of the enemy attack. About forty troops of Company C, 1st Battalion, are collected by officers and ordered back to their positions. The enemy takes its usual advantage, and by day’s end, an indeterminable number of N.K. troops infiltrate the hole, which now extends about one mile north from P’il-bong. This enables them to get traction for the next assault. The deserting troops who seem to vanish on the slope have no easy task to get to the base of the moun-

August 19, 1950 tain. It takes several tedious hours to descend the precipitous eastern slope, which has only foot paths at best, and at certain points the climbing or descending is normally accomplished with the help of ropes, carefully extended along the side of the path. With each new penetration, the enemy expends more time severing the communication lines of the 24th Regiment, causing the wire repairmen to work tirelessly to fix the breaks. Alternate ways of communicating with the commands on the mountain are strenuous. An average trip by messenger from the base of the mountain to the defenders and back consumes nearly eight hours. The 25th Division, in addition to being heavily involved with the enemy, is hampered by its efforts to help the South Korean police scrutinize the legions of refugees, who have been flooding the area between the Nam River and Chindong-ni. Since about August 12, more than 50,000 refugees have been moved out of the sector. This is not an isolated incident. The 25th Division, since August 1, has moved about 120,000 refugees from its zone. In the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade sector, General Craig, USMC, moves by helicopter to meet with General Church at 24th Division Headquarters. While there, Craig is informed that the Marine Brigade is released from the 24th Division and it will revert to Eighth Army reserve. Pusan Perimeter, Central Front, Taegu: Subsequent to the attacks by the North Koreans against the lines of the 27th Regiment during the previous night into the early morning hours, the S.K. 1st Division launches counterattacks against the enemy in the higher ground between Tabu-dong and the village of Ch’ong’yong-dong at the fork of the Sangju and Kunwi Roads. The S.K. 11th and 13th Regiments mount the attacks and make some progress. In the meantime, General Walker orders the S.K. 10th Regiment (reserve) to move to the Taegu front to fortify a weakened hole between the S.K. 1st and 6th Divisions. The U.S. 23rd Regiment, 2nd Division, is ordered to advance to bolster the positions of the 8th and 37th Field Artillery positions about eight miles north of Taegu. Also, the “Rock of the Marne” Regiment, the 38th Infantry, commanded by Colonel George Peploe, arrives at Pusan. It will proceed to Miryang to join its parent 2nd Division. Inchon vicinity: the South Korean Navy has recently initiated some small-scale raids against enemy territory in coordination with the ongoing evacuation of isolated South Korean troops. Today, the South Korean vessel PC-703 debarks troops on Yonghung-do, but the enemy has not yet arrived there and the civilians are loyal South Koreans. A small contingent of troops is deployed on the island, which is less than fifteen miles south of Inchon. The PC-703 then departs and forwards the intelligence to Tokyo. Soon after, a reconnaissance detachment, led by Lieutenant Clark, USN, arrives to take advantage of the strategic island. In Air Force activity, the enemy continues its free movement across the Han River at Seoul. The two

August 19, 1950

244

U.S. Army positions on a hillside near the Naktong River (background) on 19 August. The troops use camouflage shelter halves atop the foxholes. pontoon bridges constructed after the Communist seizure of the city are intact. In addition, the railroad bridge west of Seoul remains operational and one additional railroad bridge is under construction. Air Force planes have bombed the bridge west of the city for nearly one month without bringing about its demise. On this day, the obstinate steel span is again struck.

Nine B-29s of the 19th Bomber Group deposit more than fifty tons of 1,000-pound bombs on the bridge without destroying it. Soon afterward, carrier-based planes attack the bridge and score eight direct hits that finally collapse the span. However, the pontoon bridges remain active, and the North Koreans continue to repair them at night until late August.

245

August 19, 1950

An American patrol moves from its hill positions toward another hill near Naktong River about 18–19 August. In other Air Force activity, General Partridge transfers the Joint Operations Center to Pusan after concluding that Taegu is being threatened by the Communists. In Naval activity, the USS Philippine Sea again launches planes to hit enemy targets in support of the

ground troops. Ten F4Us and eight AD Skyraiders, assisted by a Mosquito aircraft, attack various enemy troop concentrations and supply depots along the Naktong River in the area between the front lines and Hypoch’on. The effective use of incendiary bombs ignites many explosions and fires that prompt the enemy

August 20, 1950 troops to bolt from their positions. They flee onto open fields, giving the pilots productive strafing runs. During the attacks, at least two enemy trucks are destroyed and several additional vehicles sustain damage. Estimates of enemy casualties stand at about 30 killed and an equal number wounded. Two enemy command cars race to the sanctuary of a warehouse and gain a temporary reprieve. Soon after, direct hits strike the building and the warehouse and its occupants are transformed into burning timbers. — In Japan: General MacArthur, in an effort to strengthen the ground forces in Korea, requests that Washington provide sufficient troops to form two corps headquarters, and he further asks that the corps be designated I and IX Corps. In other activity, Eighth Army Rear takes action to find replacement troops for the Korean Theater where the U.S. units have sustained heavy casualties since entering the fight against the Communists in early July. Operation FLUSHOUT is initiated; it mandates that every unit in Japan must contribute troops to help fill the ranks, and by September 6, the Eighth Army in Korea will receive an additional 229 officers and 2,201 enlisted men.

August 20

The 1st Marine Provisional Brigade and the U.S. 24th Division, by this date, eradicate a Communist bridgehead across the Naktong in the vicinity of Changnyoung southwest of Taegu. Also, the South Korean Army (through a dispatch) states that its forces, since August 17, have killed 3,800 North Koreans and captured 181 men. The memorandum also states that 20 artillery pieces, eleven light mortars, twenty-one 82-mm mortars and 160 machine guns have been seized, and more than 550 U.S. M1 rifles and nearly 400 Japanese rifles have also been captured. Apparently, during the end of July, after the enemy had captured more American weapons from ROK units, the troops of the N.K. 12th Division began exchanging their Japanese 99 rifles for U.S. M1s and carbines. Southwest Pusan Perimeter: Skirmishing continues between elements of the N.K. 6th Division and the 35th Regiment at Sibidang; a sizable contingent of North Korean troops, en route to attack the positions of the 35th Regiment, is observed by Colonel Fisher, who quickly requests artillery fire and air attacks to subdue the force. Planes arrive to complement the artillery and the combined firepower inflicts heavy casualties on the attacking force, slicing it from about 700 to 350 men. In the 24th Regiment sector, the North Koreans attack the apparently fragile perimeter of the 24th Regiment, instigating more panic as the troops again react poorly and desert their positions. One platoon of Company E, except eight troops who stay at their posts, runs from the enemy. At Company C’s lines, many more flee, jeopardizing the lives of the commanding officer and about twenty-five courageous troops who choose to do their duty and remain in their foxholes. Com-

246 pany C’s small force holds the crest of Battle Mountain, but the deserters cause more harm than the enemy. When their fleeting descent is complete, rumors, transmitted as fact, paint a dreary picture as a rationalization for the hasty abandonment of the mountain. It is falsely reported that the positions of Company C had been overrun, and that its commanding officer had been killed. Assuming the information received by the deserters to be true, the supporting artillery of the 159th Field Artillery Battalion and some mortar fire are called upon to saturate the enemy. To augment this firepower, air strikes are requested. Soon after, a bewildered Company C commander and the 25 troops still holding the grim summit are lambasteed by a cyclone of friendly fire, including 38 sorties flown by fighter bombers that coat the crest with crimson napalm, rockets, fragmentation bombs and the usual punishment by strafing. After holding the contested peak for twenty gruesome hours, the remainder of C Company is driven from the summit by friendly fire, prompted by the loose tongues of those who had run away. Meanwhile, on the left flank, ROK troops capture a regimental commander (N.K. 15th Regiment) during the skirmishing there, and through some fortuitous luck, he is carrying some valuable documents on his person. It is impossible to question him because several minutes after capture, he attempts to flee and is felled by fire. The enemy also drives the S.K. police from their positions at P’il-bong on the regiment’s left flank during the day’s combat, adding stress to the 24th Division at Sobuk-san. Colonel Throckmorton receives orders from General Kean to form an attack force from his 5th RCT for an assault against Sobuk-san on the following day. Pusan Perimeter, Central Front, Taegu: The front keeps a quiet profile during daylight hours; however, U.S. planes fly repeated sorties to strike the enemy positions and at times, the pilots create some emotional minutes. The planes’ machine gun fire skims the perimeter and sometimes creases the individual unit identification banners. Some friendly but unwelcome expended .50-caliber shell cartridges fall into the foxholes. Then, at 1700, the North Koreans commence a barrage of 120-mm mortar fire that strikes in the vicinity of the heavy weapons company perimeter. Subsequent to the shelling, enemy tanks, flanked by infantry, initiate another night attack. The brightly shining moon contributes nicely to the U.S. cause. It exposes silhouettes of the enemy armor as the tanks plow down the shadowy valley, attempting to continue the advance despite the U.S. artillery and mortar fire pounding the route. The 27th Regiment restrains its riflemen and machine gunners until the enemy advances to within 150 yards of the night perimeter. At that point, with little fanfare, the waiting ground troops fire in unison, frying the area of advance. The combined thrust of the firepower halts the attack.

247 The 27th Regiment attempts to get some rest, and on the morning of the 21st, a strong patrol composed of two infantry platoons advances to analyze the results of the night’s action. The patrol, seeing several white flags to their front, move out with caution. It encounters some isolated resistance and it receives some incoming artillery, but still, it proceeds about one mile up the road. Along the route, five crippled enemy tanks, each destroyed by thermite grenades, adorn the highway. Farther up the highway, the troops stumble upon another destroyed enemy tank that had been abandoned in a schoolyard. In addition, the patrol discovers many dead enemy troops, two destroyed self-propelled guns and a decimated 120-mm mortar. In other activity, enemy artillery shells Taegu for the final time. General Walker arrives at the Taegu front and he seems pleased with the situation, claiming that the enemy fire has diminished greatly and that Taegu “is saved.” But the city remains jeopardized, as the enemy still has not been completely stopped at the Naktong. Six battalions of South Korean police are brought into the area to bolster the 750 men already there. The police are dispersed to guard the strategic tunnels within the Pusan Perimeter that carry the rail and vehicular traffic maintaining the city’s bloodline. In other activity, a Communist using the name Seoul City Sue has been taking to the airwaves to broadcast propaganda. Members of the 588th Military Police had reported hearing her as early as August 10. Also, at Pusan, the South Korean Army establishes the 2nd Replacement Training Center, which will train replacement troops during a ten-day class. The continuing process eventually graduates about 500 troops each day. The U.S. divisions begin receiving S.K. recruits on this day. The infusion continues daily until the latter part of August, when it drops down to about twice a week, concluding with each division scheduled to receive about 8,300 S.K. troops, most of whom receive a total of five days’ training. The “buddy system” is employed, encouraging an American soldier to bear responsibility for training his counterpart, but this doesn’t work too well. Two regiments of the 25th Division implement the practice, but the other regiment maintains separate platoons led by U.S. officers and NCOs. The 24th Division places the South Koreans in separate platoons commanded by Korean officers and NCOs, with the units being attached to U.S. units. Eventually, it appears that the best utilization of the South Koreans is for them to be banded as a unit with U.S. officers. The South Koreans will be engaged in scouting, patrolling and security missions. Also, as U.S. replacements become available, the U.S. units begin to filter out the South Koreans. By winter (1950–1951), the buddy system vanishes without fanfare. Also on this day, Eighth Army directs that the 24th Division be relieved at its positions along the Naktong by the U.S. 2nd Division. The relief will be completed by August 24. At North Korean Front Headquarters in Kumchon, the

August 21, 1950 operational order calling for a major attack by the N.K. I Corps is issued and the scheduled day for the assault is August 31. The N.K. II Corps is scheduled to launch its attack against the perimeter on September 2. — In Great Britain: The British War Office proclaims that Great Britain is immediately dispatching two complete infantry battalions, presently in Hong Kong, to the Korean Theater. The contingents embark for Korea on August 25. — In Japan: Admiral Joy, with the authorization of General MacArthur, issues orders establishing Joint Task Force 7, which will execute the invasion of Inchon. The task force commander is Admiral Struble (commander of Seventh Fleet). Basically, it is the Seventh Fleet, modified to extend its authority over all the armed services. The fleet is composed of six primary task forces. Other countries’ Navies participate; they are Australia, Canada, France, Great Britain, Japan, New Zealand and some merchant vessels. This unorthodox move to establish a joint task force places a Naval commander (Struble) over Air Force activity or inactivity, thereby ensuring that the Marine and Naval planes will conduct the operation as they did during World War II, rather than using the Air Force’s air-ground support system. The Naval and Marine planes will be unable to handle the Pusan Perimeter due to the Inchon operations. This responsibility will be handled by the U.S. Air Force.

August 21

Southwest Pusan Perimeter: Contingents of the N.K. 6th Division maintain their attempt to collapse the positions of the 35th Regiment, 25th Division, at Sibidang. An attack will be launched during the early morning hours of the following day. In the 24th Division sector, the 1st Battalion, 5th RCT (minus Company A), supported by artillery, launches an attack to secure Sobuk-san and after overcoming some nominal resistance, the objective is seized by noon. With the elements of the 5th RCT holding the summit of Sobuk-san, the enemy reverts to a punishing barrage of menacing mortar fire. Following its loss of the terrain, the enemy lunges forward with a night counterattack, which drives the 1st Battalion back from the mountain. Conversely, the irritated 1st Battalion regroups and re-initiate its attack on the following day. In the 24th Division zone, north of the 25th Division sector, an attack is launched to retake Battle Mountain, which Company C had been forced to relinquish on the previous day. In another series of madhat incidents, artillery fire and air strikes precede the assault of the 24th Regiment contingents. Despite the excruciating heat and the obstinate steep slopes, the challenge is met. Company L conquers the summit of Battle Mountain by about noon. Nonetheless, the elastic enemy is undaunted and begins to pound the positions with mortar fire throughout the afternoon. While Company L is unsuccessfully trying to galvanize its hold on the summit, some unexpected North Koreans emerge from their bunkers on the west slope of Battle Mountain and slip into the perimeter.

August 21, 1950 Without warning, the enemy opens fire and a deadly grenade is tossed into the foxhole of a platoon leader, causing pandemonium. The startling sound of the gunfire ignites yet another inglorious charge down the slopes, as the other two platoons self-evict and begin a descent posthaste, followed soon after by contingents of E Company. Strong efforts are taken to regroup Companies L and I on the precarious east slopes of Battle Mountain. The guns of the enemy have reclaimed the crest with minimal effort. The 2nd Battalion executive officer, Major Horace Donaho, later attests to the strenuous regrouping effort. A counterattack is then mounted. With the heavy support of air strikes combined with the firepower of tanks, artillery and mortar fire, the flip side of the mountain again erupts in a storm of thunderous fire. Companies L and I ascend toward the peak, nudging forward with some progress, but the assault is brought to a halt at midnight to await dawn. In the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade sector, at 1300, General Craig arrives at the Marine brigade’s new quarters outside of Masan, dubbed the “Bean Patch.” Following the establishment of his command post, Craig reports to General Kean, 25th Division commanding officer, who has responsibility for the area. The conversation between the two generals includes enemy penetration. General Kean informs Craig that the Marines might be required to lend support if the enemy makes additional gains. The conquest of Obong-ni has drained the already slim numbers of the ground troops. While General Craig has repeatedly requested reinforcement and replacement troops, they have not yet arrived from the States. While at the Bean Patch, Craig requests volunteers from other Marine units to fill the gap. Headquarters personnel, engineers, shore party troops and others — all having had experience with a rifle — swarm to the call. More men volunteer than the number required. Pusan Perimeter, Central Front, Taegu: The 27th Regiment, anticipating another enemy night attack, awaits darkness, then places conspicuous rows of mines about 250 yards in front of the perimeter. The mines, strewn sloppily and in excellent view of an advancing enemy, lay atop the earth. But closer to the lines, the regiment diligently establishes strings of trip flares about 100 yards back and 150 yards to its front, dangling the flares irregularly across the road and the stream bed to provide the enemy some illumination. The troops also trim the area near the trip flares with an abundance of neatly buried anti-personnel and antitank mines. The troops of Company C hold forward positions on the left side of the road while they await the North Korean armor. As the night winds down, the show is about to begin. Company C detects the sounds of the clanking armor, and then informs headquarters and the artillery sections. While this enemy column drives along the road, other troops attached to the 1st Regiment, N.K. 1st Division, avoid the engagement and infiltrate through the heights, skirting around the left flank of the 27th Regiment.

248 The Communist unit reaches positions about nine miles outside of Taegu and six miles behind the 27th Regiment. Within seconds after the enemy column is detected, a friendly artillery gun catapults an illuminating shell that brightens the sky and underscores the precise positions and numbers of the armor. A quick tally by the company commander of Company C identifies 19 advancing vehicles, including nine T-34 tanks and several self-propelled guns. Accompanying infantry drives along both sides of the highway in conjunction with other enemy contingents that are prowling higher in the hills to strike against the S.K. units there. As the enemy continues its advance, U.S. artillery and mortars pound the route of advance. Of the artillery and mortar participants, Company F expends nearly 400 mortar rounds, while Battery B, 8th Field Artillery Battalion, propels 1,661 105-mm shells during the five-hour duel in the darkness. In the meantime, the ground troops sheepishly hold their fire and the Pershing tanks linger menacingly in the murky shadows to guarantee no interlude during the wild shoot-out. The enemy tiptoes through the first minefield, and effortlessly continues the advance until the hidden minefield is encountered. Suddenly, as enemy troops try to dislodge themselves from the death grid along the road, the regimental machine guns begin to roar. The devastating enfilade strikes deeply into the North Korean ranks. Meanwhile, enemy tanks continue driving forward, moving boldly toward the 27th Regiment. The enemy tank fire soars through the valley, but most shells land harmlessly behind the U.S. infantry positions. The sounds of the incessant firing on the slopes and in the diminutive valley create an eerie aura on the battlefield, but the enemy armor continues its advance. Then, as the clanking armor gets too close for comfort, the stalwart Pershings bead in on the enemy tanks and unleash their harnessed power. The sudden burst further stuns the enemy. The lead tank is destroyed when it reaches a point about 125 yards in front of the Pershings, and then an agile bazooka team from Company F quickly takes out the third vehicle in the column, a self-propelled gun, tossing the column out of kilter. The second vehicle, itself paralyzed by bazooka fire, is deserted by its crew. The enfilade continues as the American tanks and artillerymen pound the enemy. The blazing combat transforms the valley into a shooting gallery. Seven additional enemy tanks are blown away, as well as three more self-propelled guns, an array of personnel carriers and some trucks. In the meantime, while the 27th Regiment is repelling the enemy along the road, the S.K. 1st Division units fare well on the slopes, but the enemy pressure continues to build against the battle-weary ROKs. Nonetheless, their fierce resistance is a major contribution to the success of the U.S. 27th Regiment, for without the South Koreans protecting the heights, the battle might have ended differently. As the din of battle subsides, it becomes apparent

249

August 21, 1950

Top: U.S. Amy chow line, August 1950. Bottom: A Pershing M-26 provides a ride to ground troops near the Naktong River. that the enemy has sustained severe losses. New patrols, mounted at daylight on the 22nd, confirm the colossal punishment inflicted upon the N.K. 13th Division elements and the accompanying armor that had entered the valley. One patrol strolls past the shredded metal and

counts the legions of enemy dead, concluding that they had sustained about 1,300 total casualties and losing the entire column of vehicles. The patrol also seizes eleven prisoners, including N.K. Major Kim Song Jun, commanding officer, 19th

August 22, 1950 N.K. Regiment. The captured officer informs the Americans that about seventy-five percent of their force had been lost and he places some of the blame for the losses on the N.K. 19th Regiment, accusing it of incompetence. Other information gained from the officer centers around the failure of the 19th Regiment to coordinate its actions with the balance of the division during the fight. The commanding general of the 13th Division, refusing to accept any blame on his part, also jumps all over the commanding officer of the supporting artillery regiment. The officer, Lt. Col. Chong Pong Uk, doesn’t take kindly to the criticism and on the following morning, he detaches himself from the Communist Army and walks into the perimeter of the S.K. 1st Division, brandishing a prominent white flag. The men of the U.S. 27th Regiment’s Company F, mesmerized at times by the unfolding scenes of battle, had compared the shells zooming down the valley to bowling balls streaming down an alley, giving birth to the name Battle of the Bowling Alley. In Naval activity, the Valley Forge (CV 45) and Philippine Sea (CV 47), carriers of Task Force 77, launch raids against Pyongyang. The planes establish a new one-day record after executing 202 sorties. — In Japan: General MacArthur requests authorization from the Department of the Army (by radio) for permission to activate Headquarters X Corps; subsequent to approval, MacArthur activates it on August 26.

August 22 With the initiation of U.S. forces against the Communist forces, Eighth Army as of this day has sustained the loss of 20 medium tanks to enemy fire. But the U.S. has greatly increased the number of tanks in the Korean Theater. Six medium tank battalions, averaging about 69 tanks each, have debarked at Korea during August. They join four regimental tank companies, plus about thirty light tanks in the field, giving the U.S. a large armored advantage over the enemy by September. Southwest Pusan Perimeter: Prior to dawn, and lacking artillery and mortar preparatory fire, the North Koreans launch a large attack against the perimeter of the 25th Division. The enemy troops sever the barbed wire and penetrate the 35th Regiment’s 1st Battalion zone to ignite a grueling close-quartered fight. The assault dislodges some elements of the 1st Battalion, but subsequent to several hours of bitter combat, at 0700, Company A counterattacks, and it drives the enemy back and re-secures the area. On the following day, the North Koreans, who have sustained heavy casualties during the futile attempt to overrun the 35th Regiment, retire from the area. In the 24th Division sector, the 1st Battalion, 5th RCT, which had won and then lost control of Subok-san on the previous day, mounts an attack at noon to retake the mountain. After a vicious five-hour contest, Company B gains the summit, prompting General Kean to recreate the boundary line separating the 24th Regi-

250 ment and the 5th RCT. Kean gives responsibility for the captured crest to the 24th Regiment. Afterward, the 5th RCT attempts to regroup, but the enemy mounts repetitive night attacks and catapults mortar fire against its positions, preventing Companies A and B from linking together to form a galvanized perimeter. Also, with the enemy deeply entrenched in the rocky crags that flow from Sobuk-san northward toward P’ilbong, the adjacent contingents of the 24th Regiment are barred from advancing to link up with the 5th RCT’s Company B, 1st Battalion. Meanwhile, the up-again-down-again struggle on Battle Mountain is reinitiated at dawn by elements of the 24th Regiment. Advancing under the cover fire of Company I, Company L moves out, heading toward the crest of Old Baldy (Battle Mountain). The attacking unit makes sluggish progress despite minimal resistance. One contingent, led by Lieutenant Gerald Alexander, inches ahead only two hundred yards in one hour, although no enemy fire interferes with the climb. According to Alexander, when his group finally reaches its target area, several enemy grenades are lobbed into its midst, inflicting six casualties and prompting the balance of the contingent to head back down the slope. At a point about 100 yards to the rear, Alexander orders the troops to return to their positions, but his orders are brashly disregarded. Not one trooper obeys the order. Lieutenant Alexander and one BARman ascend by themselves, and they discover that Battle Mountain’s crest is unoccupied. Soon after, the balance of the command arrives. Nonetheless, life at the top is short lasting. Within several hours, the enemy, which has recoiled on the west slope, sends a small force around the right flank to probe the strength on the summit. The maneuver succeeds and gains more than expected as Company L abandons the summit and withdraws to the lines of Company I at the base of the mountain. The struggle for the mountain resumes again on August 23. In the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade sector, the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, is ordered to Chindong-ni to bolster the 25th Division. The brigade receives orders from Eighth Army to be prepared to launch a counterattack in support of the 25th Division; however, this proves unnecessary. The Marines, while adjusting to their new environs, dispatch patrols to the rear of the 25th Division to root out infiltrators. These patrols receive hot meals compliments of the helicopters of VMO-6. Also, the Marines’ bivouac area lacks tents, providing the brigade an opportunity to sleep in the open with an unobstructed view of the stars, when it isn’t raining. In other activity, the brigade receives a message from the Commandant, General Clifton B. Cates: “I am very proud of the performance of your air-ground team. Keep on hitting them, front flanks, rear and topside! Well done!” Pusan Perimeter, Central Front, Taegu: Following another hard night of fighting, the 27th Regiment, 25th Division, sends out patrols and prepares for

251 another expected assault. Meanwhile, the North Korean contingents that had previously infiltrated the 27th’s lines take up positions about nine miles north of Taegu. They begin to harass the main supply route from there to a point stretching five miles farther north. The enemy penetration causes some friction between the 27th Regiment and the South Korean 1st Division, as Colonel Michaelis informs Eighth Army that his left flank, manned by the South Koreans, had folded and that the South Koreans were not fighting. The report infuriates S.K. General Paik, who challenges the American commander’s statement. Eighth Army dispatches KMAG officers to verify Michaelis’ insinuations, but upon inspection, all ROK contingents are in their designated areas. This is subsequently confirmed by Brigadier General William C. Bullock, Asst. G-3, Eighth Army. General Paik suggests that his troops cover the valley with all the supporting artillery and tanks and that the 27th Regiment exchanges places with his troops and takes over the high ground to fight the North Koreans there. During this particular struggle in the valley and mountains, the South Koreans had come down from their positions during the day to acquire food or to bathe in the stream, but all made the return trip to their positions, aided by U.S. artillery as they fought their way back. At about 1000, Colonel Chong Pong Uk, commanding officer of the N.K. 13th Division Artillery Regiment, strolls into the lines of the S.K. 1st Division and surrenders. Chong, the highest ranking officer to become a captive of the U.S., aids the Americans by pinpointing the location and number of his old outfit’s concealed artillery (seven 122-mm howitzers and thirteen 76-mm guns). The identified area, an orchard in a shallow valley less than five miles north of Taegu, is struck by aircraft and artillery fire. In other activity, different units of the same group of North Korean troops who had penetrated the 27th Regiment lines during the previous night now strike the positions of the 2nd Battalion, 23rd Regiment, which had deployed to defend the supporting artillery of the 27th Regiment. North Korean infantry lodge themselves between the positions of the 23rd and 27th Regiments, while other contingents circumvent the east flank of the 23rd Regiment’s forward unit, the 2nd Battalion. At 1605, the enemy commences a heavy bombardment that strikes the 8th Artillery Battalion’s positions near headquarters. Less than one-half hour later, the enemy guns score two direct hits on the Fire Direction Center, wiping out the center and killing four officers and two noncoms. Lacking further direction from headquarters, the battalion’s individual batteries control their own fire. The enemy fire also strikes the 37th Field Artillery Battalion. At 1640, the 23rd’s regimental commander, Colonel Paul Freeman, notifies Eighth Army of the situation. Consequently, U.S. Air Force and Navy planes, bolstered by Australian aircraft, swoop in and pound the enemy-held ridge east of the highway and other suspected enemy positions in a nearby valley beyond the ridge.

August 22, 1950 After dusk, General Walker detaches the 23rd Regiment (minus 1st Battalion) from the 1st Cavalry Division, then orders it to destroy the North Koreans in the hills above the main highway and along the road. Still obsessed with gaining a victory, the enemy mounts another night assault, but the attempt is feeble. It is easily repulsed by the 27th Regiment. In addition, during the night, the 2nd Battalion, 23rd Regiment, throws back several enemy counterattacks. The activity interrupts preparations for an attack on the morning of the 23rd, but the 2nd Battalion still moves out at daybreak. Inchon vicinity: A contingent of sailors and Marines, UDT and Marine Amphibious Scouts of the 1st Reconnaissance Company, 1st Marine Division, secretly lands in the vicinity of Posung-Myon, about twenty miles south of Inchon. It collects valuable intelligence on the landing areas. The reconnaissance team remains there until the 25th, then returns to the USS Horace A. Bass (APD-124), which takes the troops back to friendly lines. The gathered intelligence is handed over to top brass on August 25. General Shepherd uses the findings to take one last shot at convincing MacArthur to permit the landing to occur at Posung-Myon. MacArthur declines the suggestion, holding firm with Inchon. In Air Force activity, Chinese antiaircraft gunners across the Yalu River in Manchuria take planes (RB29s) on a photographic reconnaissance mission under fire. The planes are unharmed. It is the first time U.S. planes come under fire from the Chinese Communists. — In the United States: The operation to load the 1st Marine Division’s vessels destined for the Far East, which had begun on August 8, is completed today. — In Japan: General Oliver P. Smith, 23 officers, and 12 enlisted men of the 1st Marine Division arrive at Haneda Airfield; they are met by Admiral Doyle. Later, Smith is driven to the USS Mount McKinley, which is docked at Tokyo harbor; the Marines establish an advance command post on it. General Smith is advised of the tentative date and hour of the invasion of Inchon. Up to now, Smith had been unaware of the details. The entire Inchon operation plan and its execution are concluded in a record breaking twenty-three days, a feat that may stand for the rest of time. Actually, fewer than 23 days remain, as many of the warships must embark port by September 10. Also, at 1730, General O.P. Smith meets General Almond for the first time, and the encounter is educational for both. The two men emulate mutual respect, but there is a definite clash between personalities that will linger for the duration. Subsequent to his conference with Almond, Smith meets with General MacArthur in a relaxed atmosphere. MacArthur lights his pipe and reassures Smith that despite the hazards, the war could be won at Inchon within thirty days. MacArthur proclaims that the Marines will prevail at Inchon and in so doing, they could win the war. Also, the 1st Marine Division troops and the staff of the 7th Marines begin arriving on August 28 and complete the debarkation by September 6.

August 23, 1950

August 23 Southwest Pusan Perimeter: At the mountain of many names—Battle Mountain, Hill 665, Old Baldy, Bloody Knob and Napalm Hill — the day begins with plans to retake the hill. It is an arduous trek to the summit and the reverse course is equally awkward, especially for the wounded. In order to get a wounded trooper back from the slope to the base, it requires six men to bear the stretcher, a medic to administer assistance along the way, and frequently, riflemen become necessary to cover the evacuation and fend off snipers. Even then, the hours it takes to reach the base of the mountain causes some of the wounded to succumb before they can get to medical areas. Today, the 24th Regiment receives some heavy assistance as the 81-mm mortars and 4.2-inch mortars hone in on the enemy-held western slopes of the mountain. Meanwhile, Companies L and I launch an attack that is bolstered by the arrival of South Korean police reinforcements. The assault succeeds and the combined force recaptures the crest. Company L gives a report of its strength on the mountaintop. The report informs battalion headquarters that Company L now has only seventeen men in foxholes. Subsequent to its relief, L Company descends the mountain and about halfway down the slope, it becomes infused with thirty-one additional troops. By morning of the 24th, Company L’s strength bounces back to more than 100 troops. Later, the commanding officer of the 3rd Battalion, 24th Regiment, Colonel John T. Corley, gives his testimony concerning the action on Battle Mountain: “Companies of my battalion dwindle to platoon size when engaged with the enemy. My chain of command stops at the company level. If this unit is to continue to fight as a battalion, it is recommended that the T/O

252 (Tables of Organization) of officers be doubled. One officer must lead and the other must drive.” In the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade sector, General Craig meets with General J. Lawton Collins, chief of staff, USA, and General Kean, CO, 25th Division. General Collins requests that Craig prepare a memorandum to detail the Marine strategy used to destroy the North Korean T-34 (Russian made) tanks. In other activity, the Marines are treated to an evening of entertainment, provided by South Korean girls playing Korean instruments and singing Western songs with the help of some English speaking refugees from Seoul University. Following the show, General Craig speaks to his Marines to relay his great thanks for their efforts on the battlefield. He notes that POWs of the N.K. 4th Division had informed G-2 interrogators that they preferred “to steer clear of the Americans in the yellow leggings.” Pusan Perimeter, Central Front, Taegu: At dawn, acting on orders received from General Walker on the previous night, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 23rd Regiment, 2nd Division, commence their attacks against the enemy positions. The 2nd Battalion secures the heights above the road and the 3rd Battalion combs the hills east of the road, scouring a three-mile area. The activity cleanses the terrain on the flanks and to the rear of Michaelis’ 27th Regiment, 25th Division. But by about 1335, Eighth Army is informed by Colonel Michaelis that the enemy had shattered the highway to his front and they had laid mines to delay the U.S. 27th Regiment’s advance while the N.K. 13th Division pulls back from the area. Nonetheless, many enemy stragglers remain behind the U.S. lines, ensuring a heavy mop up operation.

General O.P. Smith, commanding officer, 1st Marine Division, confers with Admiral Doyle (Amphibious Group 1) aboard the USS Rochester.

253 While the 23rd Regiment, 2nd Division, had been on the offensive, about 100 undiscovered North Korean troops spring up like weeds behind the forward perimeter of the 27th Regiment, igniting a fierce skirmish slightly before noon. The enemy at first startles the defenders from Company K, 27th Regiment, and the 1st Platoon of Company C, 65th Engineer Combat Battalion. Initially, some contingents are pushed back; however, the troops exhibit resiliency and bounce back with fervor to deliver a jackhammer punch. The enemy scatters, but it sustains fifty killed during the failed attack. In other activity, the Fifth Air Force has continued to increase its numbers of Mosquito T-6 aircraft and by this day, twenty-nine aircraft are operating as coordinators in conjunction with the air strikes. In other activity, Russian T-34 tanks arrive at P’yongyang on or about this day to fill the needs of the 16th and 17th N.K. Armored Brigades; the former receives forty-three new tanks and the latter, forty. The enemy brigades depart the town by rail during the night to join the other elements facing the Pusan Perimeter. These tanks have been manufactured in Russia and shipped into Korea by way of Manchuria. These newly arriving tanks are instantly manned by experienced crews. Each brigade is divided into two battalions, with each battalion being subdivided into four separate tank companies. In Air Force activity, planes attached to the 19th Bomber Group, using antiquated equipment (Razon), attack enemy positions west of P’yongyang, but for the most part, the equipment fails to properly guide the bombs. However, one of the bombs does strike the target, a railroad bridge. — In the United States: Replacement Marines, composed of ten officers and 300 enlisted men, bound for the 1st Provisional Brigade in Korea, depart bases in Hawaii and Guam by airlift. These Marines are replaced by identical numbers of non-combat Marines whom are flown from Camp Pendleton. In conjunction, Fleet Marine Force Pacific, on two separate occasions, repeats the process and airlifts additional Marines (20 officers and 590 enlisted men) to Korea as replacements for the Marine Brigade and to form third companies of the 5th Marines’ Battalions. — In Japan: The Far East Command, endeavoring to bring the 7th Division up to strength for commitment to Korea, begins attaching all arriving infantry replacement troops (for FEC duty) to the division. This practice continues until September 3. In addition, from this day until September 8, all replacement artillery troops are also attached to the 7th Division. Similarly, General MacArthur uses the identical strategy to acquire troops for X Corps. MacArthur siphons arriving Eighth Army replacement troops and places them in X Corps to further augment the Inchon Operation. In other activity, Major General Clark L. Ruffner, USA, conducts a staff meeting in Tokyo. Ruffner, chief of staff of the upcoming X Corps, mentions during the meeting that subsequent to the capture of Inchon, the 1st Marine Division is to ford the Han River and seize

August 24, 1950 Seoul. General Smith, USMC, is in attendance and he is surprised to hear the information, considering that the X Corps lacks the necessary equipment and material to bridge the Han River. Later at another meeting with General MacArthur and other top ranking U.S. officers, it becomes obvious that MacArthur will prevail and Inchon will remain the objective. Nevertheless, Admiral Doyle makes a final attempt to emphasize all the dangers involved with Inchon. His presentation consumes about one and one-half hours, and he concludes his remarks by addressing MacArthur with this: “The best I can say is that Inchon is not impossible.” MacArthur, having listened to all the reasons for choosing an alternate to Inchon, begins to dominate the meeting. He speaks for about forty-five minutes and explains why the target must be Inchon. On occasion, he pauses to enjoy his pipe. MacArthur concludes his presentation with a profound sentence that summarizes his vision: “We shall land at Inchon and I shall crush them.” The final sentence of the last meeting concerning the invasion of Inchon is intended to be a prophecy. Now it is up to the Marines. Generals Almond, Collins, Stratemeyer, Hickey and Edwin Wright are in attendance. Also, Admirals Doyle, Joy, Radford, and Struble and Marine Generals Lemuel Shepherd and O.P. Smith attend the briefing.

August 24

Major General Pang Ho San, commanding general, N.K. 6th Division, issues a directive intended to further accelerate the morale of his troops. He proclaims that the division’s mission is to “liberate Masan and Pusan within a few days.” He then emphasizes the battle lessons learned, particularly from the Chinju fighting. He also makes it clear that all attacks should be commenced after dark, with daylight hours being utilized for preparation. Pang also states that prior to dawn, the troops should fight only at close quarters to ensure that at dawn the U.S. aircraft could not distinguish friend from foe, thereby preventing excessive North Korean casualties. The N.K. 6th Division will participate in the major offensive scheduled to begin in September. Southwest Pusan Perimeter: The U.S. 2nd Division, commanded by Major General Lawrence Keiser, concludes its relief of General Church’s 24th Division. Keiser assumes responsibility for the area at 1800. The weary 24th Division has been zapped of a great deal of its strength, which now stands at about 10,500 troops. It will requires about 8,000 replacement troops to bring about a genuine war-time strength for the 24th Division. Also, the 24th Division’s 19th Regiment and the 11th Field Artillery Battalion are enjoined with the 2nd Division for use as a reserve unit. Pusan Perimeter, Central Front, Taegu: The front remains basically quiet throughout the day as the N.K. 13th Division recoils. However, the American and South Korean troops maintain an aggressive defense posture and continue to clean out the enemy from their concealed positions behind the lines. The Americans suffer casualties as an Eighth Army tank recovery team advances to an area that had been mined, in an effort

August 25, 1950 to recover a deserted but operational enemy T-34 tank. The coveted tank stalls at the beginning of the minefield. As the U.S. tank tows the T-34 forward, a sudden and unexpected explosion occurs. The T-34 had been stopped over an area where mines had been tossed under some lightly packed dirt. When the tank is pulled forward, a mine detonates, wounding twelve troops who are standing in the immediate area and heavily damaging the tank. In other activity, the N.K. 13th Division and the 1st Regiment, N.K. 1st Division, each sustain severe losses, the latter having been reduced to about 400 troops during the fighting. General Walker is convinced that the area north of Taegu has been wrested from the enemy, thus preserving the city. Consequently, the 27th Regiment receives orders to depart the valley and redeploy at Masan (once relieved by the S.K. 1st Division) with its parent 25th Division to bolster Eighth Army’s southwestern flank. — In the United States: Marine Air Squadron VMF-312 and the rear echelon of VMF(N)-542 embark aboard the USS Sitkoh Bay. The Marines and their planes sail from the West Coast for the Far East. Other units of the 1st Marine Air Wing based at El Toro depart on August 27, and the final contingents depart on September 1. — In Japan: Admiral Joy dispatches a memorandum to General MacArthur in an attempt to alter the priority of the carriers at sea and have their power concentrated where it can be most constructive: “North Korea contains a multiplicity of very lucrative and profitable targets which are well suited for carrier strikes, whereas, in [South Korea], targets are few and well hidden. After 25 August, I strongly recommend that Task Force 77 be employed north of the 38th parallel.” Nevertheless, on the following day, another urgent call for naval assistance is requested by Fifth Air Force to strike south of the boundary. In other activity, Japan Logistical Command ( JLC) is established by General MacArthur. It will relieve Eighth Army Rear of its responsibilities with regard to camps, posts and stations. The new organization will also bear responsibility for the logistical support of the ground forces operating in Korea. Some specific units, such as the Marines, will be exempted from this command.

August 25 Intelligence determines that the North Koreans are preparing to launch a major offensive to cross the Naktong River and crush the Naktong defense perimeter. Fifth Air Force flashes an imperative request calling for additional U. S. Navy close air strikes to disrupt the enemy’s timetable. General Dean, who had been separated from his command during the battle at Taejon during the previous month, is captured on this day while in a house with about fifteen Koreans. The North Koreans maintain secrecy with Dean’s imprisonment and he is not transferred even to the Chinese. At one point during the war, Dean is the only American held by the North Koreans, all others having been handed over to Chinese.

254 Southwest Pusan Perimeter: Task Force Baker — commanded by Lt. Colonel George R. Cole and composed of Company C, one platoon of Company E, 24th Regiment, 25th Division, and a contingent of South Korean police—continues to hold Battle Mountain since its recapture on the 23rd. Beginning today and continuing to August 26, the enemy mounts several unsuccessful attacks to dislodge the defenders, who receive some steady support from planes. In one instance, an exposed enemy contingent comprising about 100 troops is spotted as it advances along a spinal ridge of Battle Mountain that stretches from Tundok on the western slope area. A detachment of Air Force planes attack the column and deliver a deluge of fire, including napalm bombs. The criss-cross strafing decimates the enemy force, permitting very few to escape the fury. While Task Force Baker assumes responsibility for Battle Mountain, the 3rd Battalion (minus Company C), 24th Regiment, relieves the 1st Battalion at its positions in the Battle Mountain–P’il-bong vicinity. Meanwhile, the battle remains heated in the zone of the 5th RCT. Company C is struck by a determined force just before midnight (25th-26th). Sergeant Melvin Handrich moves from his entrenched position and takes a defensive position way out front to direct the mortar and artillery fire. Handrich, despite lack of sleep, remains at this dangerous post for eight hours to attempt to halt the enemy force, composed of about 150 troops. The North Koreans reinitiate the attack on the morning of the 26th, and again they encounter the indomitable Sergeant Handrich, who refuses to budge. During the pinnacle of the attack, Handrich is suddenly standing in full view of the enemy while he fires his weapon and simultaneously directs the artillery and mortars. While glancing back toward his company, he notices some men of Company C giving the appearance of abandoning their positions. Instinctively, Handrich dashes through the storm of enemy fire and prevents a stampede; however, while he is leading his men and inspiring them to continue the fight, enemy fire rips into him and inflicts a serious wound. Undaunted, he disregards medical attention, restores calm within the unit, and moves back to the point to resume his oneman forward outpost position. Handrich’s position is later overrun and he becomes mortally wounded. When the ground is later re-secured, about seventy enemy dead are discovered in the vicinity of Handrich’s post. He is awarded the Medal of Honor posthumously for his extraordinary courage in the face of the enemy. In the 2nd Division sector, north of the 25th Division, Colonel John G. Hill, commanding officer 9th Regiment, decides to launch a combat patrol based on intelligence gathered from recent forays to the west side of the Naktong River. The operation, undertaken by one company, is coded Operation MANCHU. Its purpose is to destroy the command post of the N.K. 9th Division, which is located about two miles west of the Naktong. Actually, Task Force Manchu has come about by Eighth Army’s directives to all units to begin active

255 patrolling. The operation will commence on August 31. Pusan Perimeter, Central Front, Taegu: The persistent North Koreans let midnight (24th-25th) pass quietly, but soon afterward, the Bowling Alley again comes alive with its usual enemy night attack. The somber valley becomes consumed with unfurled fury. Several tanks, acting as vanguard, roll forward, flanked by about two companies of infantry, but the small column and the accompanying ground troops lack the power to penetrate the 27th Regiment’s defenses. The supporting U.S. artillery, upon orders, commences firing along with the 27th Regiment. The ravaging barrage is ill-received by the advancing enemy. The attack is stopped in its tracks and the North Koreans lose two more T-34s, bringing their total tank losses during the fighting in the valley (18th-25th) to thirteen. For the enemy, the Bowling Alley is a harrowing experience that also costs them five self-propelled guns and eighteen trucks. At 1800, the 27th Regiment’s relief by the S.K. 1st Division begins, and by 0345 on the following morning, the operation is complete. The 27th Regiment departs the vicinity of Taegu at 0800 on the 26th. Some contingents move by train and others are transported overland by vehicles. Nonetheless, the relief of the 27th Regiment is not totally uneventful. As the operation begins, enemy fire kills the 2nd Battalion’s S-3 officer and a South Korean battalion commander. When Colonel Check’s 1st Battalion and Colonel Murch’s 2nd Battalion arrive at Masan, it becomes clear that their reputation for being tenacious fighters in the Bowling Alley has preceded them. The final contingents arrive by 2030, on August 31. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the U.S. 23rd Regiment remain at the Bowling Alley north of Taegu to augment the S.K. 1st Division. In its entirety, the battle for the Bowling Alley had been a well-coordinated affair. The S.K. 1st Division fought courageously and successfully defended the high ground, tilting the advantage to the U.S. troops in the valley. The Air Force also contributed some stupendous performances and kept the enemy tightly fastened to the earth during the daylight hours. And after dark, the awesome tanks, the snorting guns of the artillery and the heavy breathing mortars had supported the 23rd and 27th Regiments, which had steadily held the lanes in the giant Bowling Alley in the valley. — In the United States: Two transport vessels, carrying the 65th Regiment, 3rd Infantry Division, embarks from Puerto Rico for Korea. The convoy will arrive off Korea on September 22 and the troops will debark on the 23rd. The other two regiments, the 7th and the 15th, will embark from the States beginning on August 30. — In Hong Kong: The British 27th Infantry Brigade Headquarters, the 1st Battalion of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders Regiment, and the 1st Battalion of the Middlesex Regiment, commanded by British Brigadier Basil A. Coad, board ship to the music of

August 26, 1950 their traditional bagpipes, then depart for Korea aboard five vessels, including the carrier HMS Unicorn. The convoy arrives at Pusan on 29 August. — In Japan: Admiral Struble, commanding officer, Joint Task Force Seven, has been at sea during the various conferences in Tokyo, but he returns to Sasebo this day to learn that he will command the Inchon invasion. Struble quickly gathers some of his staff from the USS Rochester, and then they depart by plane for Tokyo to oversee the final planning for the invasion.

August 26 Southwest Pusan Perimeter: In the 5th RCT zone, south of P’il-bong, fighting remains heavy. In other activity, the U.S. 24th Division makes some further adjustments after a meeting between Generals Walker and Church. The troops of the 34th Regiment and their equipment are divided between the 19th and 21st Regiments, the former having already been attached to the 2nd Division. The 34th Regiment remains on the 2nd Division roster, but only on paper, and the status of the 63rd FAB becomes identical, as its complement is transferred and infused into the newly established Batteries C of the 11th, 13th and 52nd Field Artillery Battalions. The artillery transfers occur effective this day, while the infantry transfer becomes effective August 31. Pusan Perimeter, Eastern Corridor: The U.S. 1st Cavalry Division receives three battalions (from the U.S.), bringing each regiment to three battalions and all at full strength. The 3rd Battalion, 7th Regiment, 3rd Infantry Division (Fort Devens, Mass.), becomes the 3rd Battalion, 8th Cavalry, commanded by Lt. Colonel Harold K. Johnson. The 2nd Battalion, 30th Regiment, 3rd Division (Fort Benning, Georgia), is transformed into the 3rd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, commanded by Lt. Colonel James H. Lynch. An additional battalion, raised from the 14th Regiment (Camp Carson, Colorado), becomes the 3rd Battalion, 5th Cavalry, commanded by Lt. Colonel Edgar Treacy. In addition, three provisional artillery batteries arrive to provide a third battery for each artillery battalion of the 1st Cavalry Division. — In Japan: General MacArthur, chief of the United Nations Command, makes some additional changes within his military organizations. The U.S. Far East Air Forces and the U.S. Naval Forces Far East are officially attached to the United Nations Command. In other activity, MacArthur issues GHC FEC General Order 24, officially activating X Corps (Eighth Army). In conjunction, all units presently in Japan and those en route, including the 1st Marine Division, are designated X Corps reserve. MacArthur, having previously selected General Almond (apparently during mid–August) to command X Corps, makes it official on this day. General Almond also is to retain his position as chief of staff (FEC), primarily because MacArthur anticipates a startling quick victory subsequent to the invasion of Inchon, and he foresees a speedy return by Almond to his previous position.

August 27, 1950 The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not share MacArthur’s enthusiasm nor his confidence concerning the Inchon operation. The designated X Corps’ chief of staff is Major General Clark L. Ruffner, who during World War II was chief of staff, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, headquartered in Hawaii. The primary components (ground troops) of the X Corps are the 1st Marine Division and the U.S. 7th Infantry Division, the former en route and the latter being brought to wartime strength in Japan. Almond expresses surprise with MacArthur’s selection. In Air Force activity, the 47th and 48th Troop Carrier Squadrons (Provisional) are established by Fifth Air Force. The planes (C-46s) are pulled into Japan from all across the Far East. From the base at Tachikawa, the aircraft will focus on airlifts for the upcoming offensive in Korea. Also, Far East Air Forces forms the 1st Troop Carrier Task Force (Provisional), which becomes a primary part of the recently established Combat Cargo Command (Provisional). The task force will operate from the base at Ashiya and it will be commanded by Major General William H. Tunner, USAF, who brings an enormous amount of experience to the outfit; in World War II he was known as the designer of the airlift over the “Hump” and afterwards, the Berlin Airlift during the early days of the Cold War (1948–1949).

August 27

In Air Force activity, Far East Air Forces, determined to discover a solution to the ongoing problem of knocking out the two pontoon bridges over the Han River at Seoul, deploy a new and successful tactic. Orders are given to Bombing Command to drop delayed action bombs at the spans to cause sudden and unexpected havoc when they detonate after dark, while the enemy troops are busily engaged in repairing the bridges. The effectiveness of these raids is evident and they apparently cause casualties among the repair teams to soar. When the city of Seoul is recaptured during September, the two spans are still uncompleted. In other activity, two pilots flying USAF Mustangs execute a mission to attack an airstrip near Sinuiju; however, the planes inadvertently stray into China and strike an airfield there. In yet other activity, 24 B-29s bomb an enemy iron and steel facility in the vicinity of Kyomipo. Southwest Pusan Perimeter: In the 25th Division sector, the 3rd Battalion, 24th Regiment, commanded by Colonel Corley, completes its relief of the 1st Battalion at P’il-bong on Battle Mountain. In the meantime, Task Force Baker maintains the security of the crest of Battle Mountain. In the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade sector near Masan, the Marines receive no liberty while at the Bean Patch, but their morale remains very good. Their spirits are raised by mail from home and from some beer rations that arrive from Pusan. A generous offer of breweries in the States to supply free beer to the troops in Korea erupts into a sea of controversy between groups with opposing views on the subject, none of whom are

256 fighting in Korea. Nonetheless, the free beer soon ceases. Pusan Perimeter, Eastern Corridor: The boundary line between the 1st Cavalry and ROK units is being shifted by General Walker, who is convinced that the present line in the vicinity of the Sangju-Taegu Road is militarily unsound. The new line tilts southeast beginning at a point two miles southeast of Ka-san and extending below and east of Taegu. The revamping of the boundary line gives the 1st Cavalry Division responsibility for the Sangju-Taegu Road and the previous positions of the S.K. 1st Division. In conjunction, the eastward movement of the 1st Cavalry is compensated by the U.S. 2nd Division, which now extends north to the 1st Cavalry sector. In other activity, the North Korean II Corps makes preparations to spring its attack on September 2, but the N.K. 12th Division, still mending from the mauling it took in the vicinity of Pohang-dong and Kigye, launches an attack against the ROK Capital Division, ending speculation that the enemy had been subdued in its area. At 0400, the S.K. 17th Regiment, deployed north of Kigye, is hit unexpectedly and hard, forcing one company to fall back. The enemy thrust then forces the entire 17th Regiment to give ground. The 18th Regiment, to the right, loses the protection on its flank and also pulls back. The 17th Regiment relinquishes Kigye to the enemy, and the Capital Division is then compelled to retire to positions about three miles south of the Kigye Valley. The unfolding development in the Capital Division zone creates major problems for Eighth Army, and the rapidity of the surrender of ground imperils the entire Pusan Perimeter. General Walker orders the 24th Division to rush a regiment to the trouble zone and he also directs Major General John B. Coulter (recently arrived in Korea) to head for the area to collect accurate information. Coulter and his chief of staff, Colonel Andrew Tychsen, immediately depart by air for Kyongju. In the meantime, Walker appoints Coulter as deputy commander, Eighth Army, and instructs him to assume command of the S.K. I Corps, the U.S. 21st Regiment, the 3rd Battalion, 9th Regiment and the 73rd Medium Tank Battalion (minus Company C). These various units under General Coulter become Task Force Jackson. Under Coulter’s command, there will be no interlude. A flurry of activity begins during the anxious morning of the 27th. The 21st Regiment under Colonel Stephens is stopped en route to positions north of Taegu, and it is ordered by General Walker to reverse directions and speed to Kyongju. Stephens turns the regiment and it departs Taegu by 1000, and arrives at its destination during the afternoon. The 3rd Battalion, 21st Regiment, is immediately ordered to move north to An’gang-ni and deploy to the rear of the S.K. Capital Division. The 2nd Battalion will arrive on August 31 and be placed in TF reserve at An’gang-ni.

257 General Coulter plans to launch an attack on the following day. In the meantime, the North Koreans dislodge the S.K. 17th Regiment from its positions on a ridge north of the curve of the Kigye Valley during a successful night attack. The South Koreans retake the ground on the following afternoon (28th), only to lose it again after dark. Simultaneously, the N.K. 5th Division infiltrates the lines of the S.K. 3rd Division southwest of Pohang-dong. A contingent of twelve Marines arrives in Saigon, South Vietnam, from Seoul, Korea, to protect the American legation there and other American interests. — In the United States: The USS Cape Esperance leaves the West Coast and steams toward the Far East, transporting units of the 1st Marine Air Wing, VMF212 and VMF(N)-542.

August 28 Fifth Air Force B-29s lambaste Songjin, an industrial area of metal working factories in North Korea. Southwest Pusan Perimeter: In the 25th Division sector, 24th Regiment zone, a North Korean contingent composed of about two companies launches an early morning attack that penetrates between the positions of Company C, posted on Old Baldy, and Company I, 3rd Battalion, at its positions on Battle Mountain. Then, after dusk, the enemy begins popping mortar fire into the perimeter of C Company, some of it apparently well-aimed toward the command post to fray some nerves. A detachment of enemy troops maneuvers to the rear of the company and attacks at 0245 (29th), overwhelming the defenders and seizing the command post of Company C on Old Baldy. Some of the troops desert their positions, igniting another crisis for the defenders who remain to fight. During the unfolding skirmish, the enemy sends some of its troops toward Company E’s positions, dislodging some of these defenders; however, the Air Force arrives after daybreak and lends some strong assistance to the beleaguered troops who attempt to forestall defeat of their diminished command. On the enemy side (west) of the Naktong, N.K. General Pak Kyo Sam, commanding officer, N.K. 9th Division, issues an operational order to his troops that pertains to their participation in the upcoming general offensive. It directs them “to outflank and destroy the enemy by capturing the Miryang and Samnangjin in areas, thereby cutting off his [Eighth Army] route of withdrawal between Taegu and Pusan.” The attack of the N.K. 9th Division, scheduled to commence the night of August 31–September 1, is expected to strike the U.S. 24th Division, but apparently the enemy fails to discover that on the eve of the offensive, the 24th Division is relieved at the Naktong by the U.S. 2nd Division. Pusan Perimeter, Central Front, Taegu: The previous floods of enemy units banging against Eighth Army positions along the Pusan Perimeter have often forced the splintering of divisional contingents. Now the desperate rushing of key units to plug gaps or re-

August 28, 1950 inforce beleaguered elements of other divisions happens less often. This permits Eighth Army to attempt retrieval of the scattered units to reattach them with their parent units. On this day, the 23rd Regiment is directed to depart the Taegu vicinity and head back to Miryang along the southwestern perimeter to rejoin its parent 2nd Division. Two days later, on August 30, the 27th Regiment is directed to return to Masan to rejoin its 25th Division. Pusan Perimeter, Eastern Corridor: The 7th and 8th Cavalry Regiments, 1st Cavalry Division, are directed by General Gay to deploy north of Taegu in the mountains in the sector that has been guarded by the S.K. 1st Division. The 7th and 8th Cavalry Regiments deploy in the west and east sectors respectively. The redeployment of the involved units will be concluded by August 30. In the Pohang-dong–Kigye area, General Coulter, with headquarters at Kyongju, is forced to postpone the attack of Task Force Jackson against the N.K. 12th Division because the South Korean contingent is unprepared. The ROK commander of the S.K. I Corps informs Coulter that his troops cannot launch their part of the attack due to “too many enemy, too many casualties, troops too tired.” Meanwhile, Colonel Emmerich, KMAG advisor, aware that the N.K. 5th Division is encroaching the positions of the S.K. 3rd Division at Pohang-dong, informs General Kim Suk Won that he should order his S.K. 3rd Division to commence a counterattack, but General Kim rejects the idea. — In Japan: General MacArthur receives a dispatch from the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the invasion of Inchon. The message gives their approval, with restrictions, such as mentioning an amphibious invasion either at Inchon, assuming the defenses are weak there, or at another beach south of Inchon if one can be found. The message continues, using Kunsan as a possible landing area. Nevertheless, MacArthur remains intent on striking Inchon. The joint chiefs expect a response from MacArthur, but it is not forthcoming. They send another dispatch September 5 that presses him for a reply. In other activity, X Corps Intelligence section calculates that Seoul is defended by about 5,000 troops and Inchon by about 1,000. In addition, the estimate of enemy troops at Kimpo Airfield is about 500. During the first week of September, intelligence estimates of enemy troops in the Seoul-Inchon area remain similar, except that soldiers are swung from Seoul to Inchon, building the forces there and reducing the strength at Seoul. Subsequent information, gathered by X Corps G-2, keeps the estimates of enemy defenders at the same levels right up to D-Day. X Corps deduces that the enemy’s ability to quickly reinforce the target area is minimum; however, several other factors enter the equation. Enemy movement traveling south from Manchuria has been detected from the air, but the surveillance has not determined whether it is supplies or reinforcements. It has been documented

August 29, 1950

258

Chow line on the front lines, 28 August. One soldier intends to eat in the shade. that the Chinese Communists have bolstered their troops along the Manchurian border; however, there is no proof that the Chinese have begun to move across it. Another concern of Far East Command is the possibility that the forces mounted against the Pusan Perimeter might be diverted and thrown into the Inchon area. One thing favoring the landing at Inchon is the fact that the North Korean Navy is essentially extinct, except for five divisions of patrol vessels, four of which

are corralled on the east coast at Wonsan and the final unit at Chinnamp’o on the west coast, which also is penned up tightly. The North Korean Air Force, estimated to contain about nineteen antiquated Russian planes, also poses no threat to the massive fleet. And, between this day and D-Day, the Allied aircraft continue to pound suspected N.K. airfields.

August 29

Southwest Pusan Perimeter: In the 25th Division sector at Battle Mountain, isolated

259 Company C receives some strong artillery fire support that pounds the enemy positions and keeps reinforcements from reaching the crest and overrunning the beleaguered contingent on Old Baldy. In addition, while the artillery delivers sheets of fire to keep the enemy advance stalled, planes dispense immense amounts of fire to help thwart the North Koreans. The planes also deliver ammunition and supplies to C Company. The North Korean contingents, which had seized the positions of Company E during the night of the 28th-29th, are hit by incessant barrages throughout the day. After dark, Company E commences a counterattack that recaptures the ground it had surrendered earlier. However, the enemy is not ready to quit. At about 2300, the North Koreans mount a night counterattack against Company C, 24th Regiment which easily penetrates the left flank. Troops manning the flank bolt from their foxholes and begin to sprint, yelling as they run: “They have broken through.” Only seventeen troops, including several wounded, remain at the command post with Captain Corcoran, but they lack the strength and numbers to retake the crest, which the North Koreans have again reclaimed. After sunrise on the 30th, the Air Force is back on the scene to once again inundate Battle Mountain with fire. The charred crest is also blitzed by a steady stream of artillery, mortar and tank fire, and the powerful combination apparently does the trick. A wounded trooper makes his way down the mountain and informs headquarters that the bulk of the enemy has evacuated the crest and taken refuge west of the summit on some wooded ridges to better conceal themselves. Soon after, at 1100, another counterattack is mounted by Company B, which jumps off under cover fire. The attack is brisk and the crest is retaken within two hours. Later Captain Corcoran gives testimony that fire discipline in his command was very poor. Corcoran adds that his troops “would fire at targets out of range until they had exhausted their ammunition and at night would fire when there were no targets.” Within his entire Company C, Corcoran counted twenty-five as soldiers and said that those twenty-five carried the remainder of the company. In the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade sector, eightyseven Marines receive Purple Hearts at a ceremony attended by S.K. President Syngman Rhee. After the ceremony, Rhee speaks to the troops, offering his thanks and congratulations for their actions. Also, Rhee informs General Craig that he would like to present an award to every man in the Marine brigade. Later, the brigade receives an S.K. Presidential Unit citation. Pusan Perimeter, Central Front, Taegu: The 1st Cavalry Division takes responsibility for the S.K. 1st Division zone north of Taegu. The I&R Platoon is dispatched to the crest of Hill 902, known as Ka-san, a walled city; however, the fortress is not really walled. The I&R Platoon reaches the top and encounters 156 S.K. troops. General Gay has attempted to get the area released from his authority, claiming that the 1st Cavalry is al-

August 29, 1950 ready too extended across a 35-mile front. The question concerning responsibility will become moot in several days, after the enemy seizes the hill. Pusan Perimeter, Eastern Corridor: The 3rd Battalion, 23rd Regiment, moves into the southern zone of the 1st Cavalry Division, relieving the 7th Cavalry, which then relieves the S.K. 13th Regiment and some elements of the S.K. 12th Regiment at their positions east of the Sangju-Taegu Road. In conjunction, the 3rd Battalion, 23rd Regiment, which Eighth Army attaches to the 1st Cavalry Division, assumes responsibility for the vacated positions of the 7th Cavalry. A plan to push the U.S. 2nd Division farther to the north is scrapped because of the difficulty of bringing in supplies, thereby keeping the boundary between it and the 1st Cavalry Division at its present location. In other activity, S.K. General Kim Suk Won, because of the approaching N.K. 5th Division, informs Colonel Emmerich that he is moving the headquarters of the S.K. 3rd Division out of Pohang-dong, only to be told by Emmerich that the KMAG advisors will remain. General Kim Suk Won then counteracts his order and the general also remains. In related activity, General Coulter had ordered Colonel Stephens to commit a contingent of his 21st Regiment to intercept and destroy the enemy force that had infiltrated the S.K. 3rd Division area. Stephens dispatches Company B, 21st Regiment, and one platoon of tanks (73rd Medium Tank Battalion). The tanks and infantry bolt from the southwest fringe of Pohangdong and drive northwest, advancing about one and one-half miles. Trailing South Korean troops occupy the gained ground, and the U.S. contingent returns to the town. Later, during the night, the South Koreans retire, compelling the Americans to again advance on the 30th. In other activity, the S.K. Capital Division, augmented by U.S. artillery fire and American tanks, attacks and seizes Kigye, then repulses several counterattacks to hold control of the town until the morning of the 30th, when the enemy initiates another attack and retakes it. The U.S. escalates its air attacks in the vicinity of Kigye, and U.S. naval surface vessels pound enemy positions near Hunghae. One cruiser and two destroyers sling a steady stream of fire into the area about five miles north of Pohang-dong, where the N.K. 5th Division is forming for its attack. The naval surface fire, in support of the S.K. 3rd Division, propels about 1,500 5-inch shells toward Hunghae between this day and August 30. In other activity, in response to a request from General MacArthur, KMAG is detached from the Department of the Army and attached to Far East Command. — In the United States: In response to a recent suggestion by Congressman Gordon L. McDonough that the commandant of the Marine Corps be appointed as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. President Truman fires back a letter stating that the Marines are only “the Navy’s police force.” Truman tosses another zinger: “They have a propaganda machine that is almost equal

August 30, 1950 to Stalin’s.” Within a week, the nasty sentiments become public and an embarrassed President Truman apologizes. — In Japan: General MacArthur, unable to attend the National Convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars due to what has presently been termed “a police action,” sends a message to the attending members: “I am happy to report [to his fellow troops during former wars] that their successors now engaging the enemy along our battle lines in Korea are exemplifying that same high standard of high devotion, fortitude and valor, which characterized their own march to victory when they themselves engaged in combat in the field ... toward victory, however difficult the road, they are giving an account of themselves which should make every American heart beat with pride and infinite satisfaction.” MacArthur also frames some choice words to convince the VFW members to hold the torch to ensure that defeatism at home cannot overcome the valor of the cause, thereby endangering the United States: “To pursue any other course would be to turn over the fruits of our Pacific victory to a potential enemy. It would shift any future battle area 5,000 miles eastward to the coasts of the American continent, our own home coast. It would completely expose ourselves and our homes and friends to the lustful thrusts of those who stand for slavery against liberty, for atheism as against God.” In other activity, the 1st Marine Division begins landing at Kobe and completes the debarkation on September 3. Sleeping quarters are crammed, but two transport vessels are used as floating barracks. This provides a lucrative labor force of Marines to handle the cargo.

August 30

In Air Force activity, eight Air Force Fighter Squadrons are flying support missions over Korea, about the maximum number that can be supported by the airbases in Kyushu, Japan. The divisions, operating along the Pusan Perimeter during the month of August, each receive equal proportions of planes, about forty sorties per day. One distinctive and distinguished airman, Major Dean E. Hess, seemingly spends more time in the air than on the ground. Hess has the unique position of being an instructor for South Korean pilots and he acquires the reputation of being “the one man air force of the South Korean Army,” but he is officially grounded by the end of August, subsequent to flying 95 combat missions during July and August. B-29s execute a mission designed to illuminate the area over the Han River to attempt to reveal a pontoon bridge and pave the way for B-26s to eliminate it; however, the flares fail to locate the bridge. The planes, instead, attack the regular bridge there. Southwest Pusan Perimeter: The 24th Division’s 34th Regiment, which began its arrival into Korea on the 3rd of July with a complement of about 2,000 troops, has been transformed into a paper regiment. Of the original contingent, only 184 troops remain.

260 The remainder have either been killed, wounded or are missing in action. The casualty figures for the 34th Regiment for the period July 3 through August 23 is 98 killed, 569 wounded, 773 missing in action and 274 casualties from non-battle circumstances. As per orders of the 26th, the troops of the 34th Regiment are officially integrated with the division’s 19th and 21st Regiments on this day. Its 1st Battalion becomes the 3rd Battalion, 19th Regiment, and the 3rd Battalion becomes the 2nd Battalion, 21st Regiment. Colonel Beauchamp, the 34th Regiment’s commanding officer, is transferred back to his previous regiment, the 32nd Infantry, 7th Division. With these actions, General Walker transfers the 5th Regimental Combat Team, composed of about 3,500 troops, to the 24th Division to bolster it as a third regiment. The 6th Medium Tank Battalion, composed of about 650 troops, will also augment the 24th Division, but another 4,000 troops will be required to bring the division to full strength. In other activity, the 25th Division is manning a front extending nearly thirty miles, with its command post at Masan. From the Namji-ri bridge at the Naktong, the line extends west along the heights south of the Naktong, to the river’s junction with the Nam River, and from there, the line turns southwest to the Sobuk-san mountain mass at the point where the mountain slims down at the extreme northernmost point. The serpentine line then winds south to Sibidang-san (Hill 276) and across the Chinju-Masan Road to the coastal road at Chindong-ni. Colonel Throckmorton’s 5th Regiment holds the southern part of the line, which runs north from the coastal road at Chindong-ni to the southern spur of Sobuk-san, with the command post at Chindong-ni. South Korean Marines stretch south from Chindongni to the coast. Adjoining the 5th Regiment, the 24th Regiment, commanded by Colonel Champney, forms the line northward through the high ground west of Haman and south of the Chinju-Masan Road, and it includes P’il-bong (Hill 743) and Battle Mountain (Hill 665). The northern portion of the 25th Divisional line, stretching from the north side of the highway to the Namji-ri bridge, is held by Colonel Fisher’s 35th Regiment. The steel bridge span is guarded by the 1st platoon of Company F, and it is located in a part of the perimeter along the Naktong that includes a huge three-mile hole that separates the 1st Platoon on the east from the remainder of the company on the west. The command post of the 35th Regiment is located between the towns of Chirwon and Chungni, east of the main road. North of the 25th Division, the 2nd Division replaces the 24th Division, and then it prepares to meet a North Korean attack. The enemy is unaware that the 2nd has relieved the 24th Division. Pusan Perimeter, Central Front, Taegu: The 714th Transportation Railway Operating Battalion arrives in Korea this day, and it begins taking responsibility for

261 shuttling supplies along the 500 miles of the remaining rail lines within the friendly lines. The runs originate in Pusan and fan out to various divisional rail depots, from where items can be transported by trucks to the regimental front lines. Pusan Perimeter, Eastern Corridor: The recently arrived 3rd Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment, assumes responsibility for the zone (encompassing 14,000 yards) guarded by the 8th Cavalry Regiment. The 8th Cavalry then moves out to relieve the remaining elements of the S.K. 12th Regiment and the entire S.K. 13th Regiment, 1st S.K. Division. With the addition of the 3rd Battalion, 5th Cavalry, and the new area of responsibility, the 5th Cavalry perimeter stretches its front to a length of 32,000 yards. By 1300, the redeployment of the 1st Cavalry Division, ordered by General Walker on the 28th, is complete. — In the United States: Two regiments of the 3rd Infantry Division, the 7th and 15th, leave San Francisco en route to Japan. From there they will move to Korea to join the 65th Regiment. The 3rd Division will join the X Corps. The convoy will arrive at Moji, Japan, and the final contingent will debark by September 16. — In Japan: A dispatch from General Oliver P. Smith, commanding officer, 1st Marine Division, is received by X Corps, the recently activated tactical organization formed specifically for the Inchon operation. The message stipulates the need for the brigade to be released from Eighth Army on September 1 to enable it to participate with the 1st Marine Division’s invasion of Inchon. Eighth Army is reluctant to release the Marine Brigade; however, General Smith eventually prevails, and pursuant to orders by General MacArthur, the brigade is to be released to the 1st Marine Division on September 4. General Walker, speaking with General Almond, makes it perfectly clear that he requires the 5th Marines: “If I lose the 5th Marine Regiment, I will not be responsible for the safety of the front.” General Almond, commanding officer of the X Corps, is convinced that the corps can accomplish its mission without the 5th Marines and he supports Walker. In the meantime, the enemy launches a fierce attack on September 1 and MacArthur countermands his order to release the 5th Marines. Further deliberations in Tokyo on September 3 terminate the debate on the fate of the Marines. Admiral C. Turner Joy, commander, Naval Forces Far East, issues Operation Plan 108-50 delegating the seizure of Inchon by amphibious assault to JTF-7. X Corps is part of JTF-7. Also, X Corps’ Operation Order No. 1 (dated August 28) is received by the 1st Marine Division this day. Admirals Struble and Doyle and Marine General O.P. Smith have been holding meetings for several days. On this day, Struble holds a conference on Inchon with Admirals Andrewes, Higgins and Ruble and Captain Austin.

August 31

The North Koreans diligently prepare to launch another powerful attack against the Pusan

August 31, 1950 Perimeter by striking it at all points, from the west to the east coasts, in an effort to destroy all the resistance. Thirteen enemy infantry divisions, one armored division and two armored brigades have been assembled to decimate the Pusan Perimeter. The North Korean Front Headquarters at Kumch’on has been directing the attacks against the perimeter. General Kim Chaek has been commanding headquarters and he continues to do so through September. N.K. Lt. General Kang Kon is Kim Chaek’s chief of staff. The N.K. I Corps, commanded by Lt. General Kim Ung, is responsible for the western portion of the enemy perimeter, which stretches south from Waegwan to the Korea Strait. The N.K. II Corps, with headquarters at Mun’gyong, bears responsibility for the eastern half of the enemy perimeter, which stretches from positions north of Taegu to the east coast. The N.K. I Corps units, deployed south to north, are the 6th, 7th, 9th, 4th, 2nd and 10th N.K. Infantry Divisions, and these are augmented by contingents of the N.K. 105th Armored Division. The newest arrival, the 16th Armored Brigade with its contingent of new T-34 tanks, also bolsters the force. The 7th N.K. Division has not yet been committed to battle, except for a skirmish by two battalions against S.K. Marines at T’ong-yong. The N.K. 9th Infantry Division is also being committed to its initial battles. The N.K. II Corps units, strung from west to east (northwest of Taegu are: 3rd, 13th, 1st, 8th, 15th, 12th and 5th Infantry Divisions, bolstered by the 17th Armored Brigade and contingents of the 105th N.K. Armored Division. Only the 17th Armored Brigade is a new arrival with the corps. The North Koreans have amassed about 98,000 troops for the scheduled massive assault, but approximately one third of this force is totally untested. Many of these untested troops have been scooped up in the vicinity of Seoul after its capture and reluctantly pressed into service for the Communist cause. The N.K. I Corps is scheduled to attack at 2330 on August 31 and the N.K. II Corps is to commence its attacks on September 2 at 1800. Southwest Pusan Perimeter: The North Koreans have not been able to crush the defenses of the U.S. 25th Division in the vicinity of Sobuk-san at Battle Mountain and P’il-bong. Nevertheless, the U.S. and supporting South Korean troops have been unable to claim victory, and both sides sustained heavy casualties. Reports vary on the number of times Old Baldy had been won and lost. On some days between the 15th and this day, the summit exchanged occupants between the 24th Regiment and the North Koreans three times within twenty-four hours. One sergeant’s tally has the objective changing hands nineteen times. In the area of Sobuk-san, south of Battle Mountain and P’il-bong, the 5th RCT has also faced consistent combat, especially during the final week in August, and although the enemy is prevented from making a breakthrough, the fighting here remains a stalemate. In the 25th Division sector, at its left center, the 2nd Battalion, 24th Regiment, under Lt. Colonel Paul

August 31, 1950 Roberts, is holding the summit of the second ridge west of Haman, from where it can observe a secondary road that runs east from enemy-held Chungam-ni (enemy held). From there, the ridge swings through the 2nd Battalion zone about one mile west of Masan in a pass. During the afternoon, Company G, 24th Regiment, discovers a large enemy troop contingent moving toward the ridge from about one mile to its front. The information is passed on and later, at about dusk, two separate air strikes pound the area. Despite the air attacks, the enemy continues to advance and slightly before midnight (Aug. 31-Sept. 1), the North Koreans commence an attack that strikes Company F along the Chungam-ni–Haman Road on the north side of the pass. The South Korean troops holding positions in the pass pull up stakes and withdraw to the south side of the pass to the positions of Company G. The struggle continues throughout the night, and the North Koreans capture a 75-mm recoilless rifle as they enter the pass. The gun is whipped into action against both the Americans and the South Koreans. Two U.S. tanks are destroyed by the captured weapon. In addition, the enemy overwhelms an 81-mm mortar position at the east end of the pass, further diminishing the firepower of the defenders. Company E, 24th Regiment, posted farther up the hill, is also hit by the enemy at midnight and more complications then rapidly develop. The commanding officer, Lieutenant Charles Ellis, rushes to the left flank to find the 3rd Platoon making a hurried evacuation. Attempting to pull the outfit together, Ellis warns the platoon leader that he might be shot if he doesn’t return to his position, and Ellis enunciates the threat by firing a shell between his legs for effect. Then, Ellis is forced to speed to the right flank, as the platoon deployed there is also beginning to pull out. Eventually, as the night progresses and the men vanish, Company E is whittled down to twelve men, including Ellis. Some of the troops who flee to avoid facing the enemy are killed when they run through the minefield they had previously laid. Lieutenant Charles Ellis and the remnants of Company E remain at their positions. In the 35th Regimental sector, along the Nam River, north of the 24th Regiment, the North Koreans initiate a powerful campaign to crush the regimental line there and further shatter the 25th Division’s defenses. The enemy begins pumping fire into the positions of Company G, 2nd Battalion, at about 2330. The first catapulted shells arrive from a self-propelled gun from its position across the river. These are soon followed by artillery fire, which initially strikes the positions near the Namji River and then expands westward to ring the entire perimeter of the 35th Regiment for one-half hour. While the 35th Regiment is reckoning with the shelling, its Companies F and G, 2nd Battalion (Lt. Colonel John L. Wilkins), come under a severe attack. A reinforced regiment, N.K. 7th Division, uses the artillery as an umbrella to ford the Nam and whack the

262 two companies. In synchronization with this assault, more enemy troops cross the river north of Komam-ni near the point that separates the 2nd Battalion’s river line from the 1st Battalion’s lines in the hills, which extend from the Nam to Sibidang and beyond to the ChinjuMasan Road. The area of the alternate crossing is defended by about 300 South Korean police who are straddled in the lowlands between the 1st and 2nd Battalions. The police are to hold the line until reinforcements can be rushed to their aid. However, the enemy surge quickly topples the South Koreans, who disperse at the first sounds of battle, allowing the enemy easy access for infiltration. In conjunction, the 3rd Battalion is being held in reserve to the rear of Komam-ni, enabling Colonel Fisher to commit it wherever it is needed. By 0030 (September 1), the enemy attackers breach the low ground and fan out. Some contingents move left to strangle Company G, while other contingents pivot to the right to take out Company C, which is deployed west of the Komam-ni Road; however, rather than attack toward the Komam-ni Road fork, the North Koreans swing east and infiltrate the hills to the rear of the 2nd Battalion. In the 1st Battalion perimeter, Company B, holding Sibidang-san, 1,200 feet above the Masan Road about two miles west of Masan, feels the lethal sting of the enemy shelling, which strikes its positions about 2330 and lasts until midnight. Like the 2nd Battalion, it attempts to prepare for an attack while still coping with the menacing barrage. Meanwhile, two battalions of the N.K. 13th Regiment, 6th Division, pound against the door and reach positions within 150 yards of Company B’s defenses. The first assault fizzles as the attackers get snarled in a minefield. Below Sibidang, enemy armor and antitank guns advance along the road toward Koman-ni, ensuring more gruesome combat. While the terrific fire is being exchanged on the summit, slightly after midnight (Aug. 31–Sept. 1), a U.S. tank posted on the road below roars into action and knocks out an approaching T-34 tank, while a nearby bazooka team devastates several 45-mm antitank guns and one self-propelled gun. Meanwhile, back on the summit at Sibidang-san, Company B holds firmly and gives no ground as it maintains a steady stream of fire into the attackers, repelling the repeated assaults. Improvisation becomes the order of the day to retain the line. Company C, 1st Battalion, sprints up the slope in about forty-five record setting minutes to replenish the ammunition for beleaguered but confident Company B, which has been compelled to strip its machine guns’ ammunition belts to keep the rifles firing. As darkness fades and the frenzied pace of the enemy attack recedes, the view from the top of Sibidang-san is breathtaking for Company B, which has held with resolute tenacity. The entire area is consumed with abandoned enemy weapons, including three heavy machine guns and thirty light machine guns. The enemy, although rebuffed all along the line, has

263 been able to dislodge the advance platoon of Company G, and during the night-long fighting, about 3,000 enemy troops have infiltrated to positions behind the 35th Regiment. The farthest point of advance to the east reaches terrain slightly south of Chirwon in the heights above the north-south highway. Meanwhile, with the arrival of dawn, Colonel Fisher’s 35th Regiment wastes no time. Headquarters troops of Company C, bolstered by tanks, rush to secure the road to Sibidang-san and replenish the ammunition of Company B’s 2nd Platoon. The effort proves extremely valuable. The exhausted platoon, with the influx of fresh ammo, absorbs the shock of the final attack and it returns incessant withering fire that shreds the attackers, killing seventy-seven while capturing twenty-one. The commanding officer of the N.K. 13th Regiment had been killed during one of the earlier attacks against the crest. In the U.S. 2nd Division sector, the North Koreans breach the Naktong in force, and by the following day, the force succeeds in dividing the American units. The 9th Regiment holds the southern portion of the zone, which is on the right flank of the 35th Regiment (25th Division). The 23rd Regiment holds the line to the right of the 9th Regiment. Farther north, the 38th Infantry is deployed. The enemy has made some progress with infiltration through the 20,000-yard perimeter of the 9th Regiment recently, but the forward detachments accept these incursions as ordinary patrol activity. The rifle companies of the 9th Regiment, assigned to manning the forward river line positions, control only the strategic peaks and hills, since Eighth Army has scaled down the manpower in the bulge area, where heavy fighting had occurred during early August. Each of these positions contains large frontages between 3,000 and 4,000 feet. These observation points are only to monitor enemy activity. Company A stands on a fortified finger ridge just above the confluence of the Nam and Naktong Rivers. The ridge ends on Hill 94 at the Kihang Ferry crossing, and it also overlooks the river road that runs west from Namji-ri, adjacent to the Naktong and across the southern edge of the ridge where it crosses to the western bank of the river, near the ferry crossing. Company B is deployed on the summit of Hill 209. Elements of Company A, bolstered by two tanks (Company A, 72nd Tank Bn.), and two antitank vehicles (Battery D, 82nd FAB), establish a roadblock close to the tiny village of Agok at the base of Hill 94. During the night, orders arrive calling for Company A to pull up from its ridge positions and reform along the river below the ridge line, but as the exchange of positions is occurring, an eerie fog is overtaking the area, adding extra edginess to the situation by 2000. Company C is deployed to the right of Company A. By 2200, the enemy commences some mortar firing, but within fifteen minutes, the positions of Company A receive stiff incoming fire from heavy mortars. The enemy activity continues to accelerate and by 2230, as the dreary fog suddenly lifts, enemy contingents of the

August 31, 1950 N.K. 9th Division are spotted as they attempt to complete the laying of a bridge to cross the river. An astute tanker, Sergeant Ernest Kouma, anchored about forty yards from the ferry, bolts to his .50-caliber machine gun after instructing his gunner to use the .90-mm cannon to sever the bridge. In conjunction, the other tank and the two antitank vehicles begin to pour fire toward the bridge and the span falls. The U.S. firing continues and most of the supporting pontoon barges, which have broken loose, are also destroyed. But, even this ferocious activity does not permanently halt the Communists. Within one-half hour another short burst of fire reheats the contest. The North Koreans, having crossed the Naktong in strength, charge with the accompaniment of blaring whistles and bright green flares. The firefight ensuing north of the tanks quickly subsides; however, more recent orders come into the roadblock by field phone instructing the two Company A rifle squads to rejoin the company, which is returning to its original positions on the finger ridge. The Company A commander, Lieutenant Adam Rodriguez, has decided that he must move his command post due to the severity of the attack. In the meantime, while enemy contingents are striking the 1st Platoon of Company A, the 2nd Platoon, also near Agok but slightly north, does not come under assault. Yet, Company C, to the right of the 2nd Platoon, Company A, is struck hard and overrun. The men of Company C offer some resistance, but of short duration, before the troops break for safety. Two soldiers from Company C arrive at the defenses of the 2nd Platoon and inform its commander, Lieutenant Fern, of the fate of their unit. The 2nd Platoon encounters some enemy resistance as it climbs the ridge, but it is nominal. The platoon completes the trek and establishes a night perimeter. Meanwhile, as the roadblock at Agok is being dismantled, an infantryman at the outpost yells, “We are moving out tankers.” Immediately following the departure of the infantry, Sergeant Kouma observes seven troops donning American uniforms with the “Indianhead” insignia of the 2nd Division. They are racing from the recently abandoned command post at the roadblock and heading toward his tank. Kouma initially assumes they are South Koreans, attached to the 9th Regiment. Three of these troops board his tank, then excitedly and in good English, they inform him that Company A has been overrun. Continuing, these troops inform Kouma that most of the troops have been either killed or captured. As the conversation continues, Kouma remains on top of the tank rechecking his gun while listening. And then, in a flash, the troops expose themselves as the enemy. On cue, the three enemy troops pull the pins from their grenades and bolt from the tank. While they toss grenades upon the tank, other enemy fire, originating in some high ground about 150 yards to the right of the tankers, begins to hammer the area. Instinctively, Kouma dives into the tank and with a record setting closing of the hatch, the Americans pump out some re-

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A 105-mm howitzer crew prepares to fire upon enemy positions. turn fire. Nonetheless, the enemy retains their cunningness as the tenacious firefight develops. Instantly, more enemy troops move against the tanks. The detachment that encroaches the Quad-50 is well versed on the password, permitting the enemy to effortlessly overrun it. One crewman escapes, but the others are killed. The other antitank vehicle sustains some wounded, but it safely pulls away, leaving the two tanks to fight

it out alone, and fight they do. Sergeant Kouma, wounded twice, refuses to relent. Both tanks pivot and tear out from beneath the cliffs, searching for open ground to level the playing field. They find positions giving them a killing field of 200 yards, revolving on a 360-degree angle. The enemy attacks repeatedly, but the side-by-side stance of the tanks slices the enemy and repulses all attacks. However, as the night stretches out

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South Korean troops (ROKs) hold in place in a rice paddy. further, the tank led by SFC Berry develops engine trouble. At 0130, Berry informs Kouma that his engine is overheating badly and that he is going to withdraw. He makes it to a point about one mile to the rear, but the engine becomes engulfed in flames, forcing him to abandon his tank. Meanwhile, Kouma remains in place and confounds the attackers, who are unable to take him out. Finally, at daybreak, the enemy ceases its attacks, and by 0730, Sergeant Kouma rolls toward friendly lines, but not uneventfully. His tank fires toward the enemy positions along the route as the tank speeds home. In conjunction, the 2nd Division will report on September 2 that 110 troops of Company C, which had scattered after being overrun, have returned to the divisional lines. The 2nd Division area is further consumed with fighting and the enemy crossings have inadvertently crossed up an expected attack. The 9th Regiment’s Task Force Manchu, composed of Company E (regiment reserve) and one light machine gun section from Company H, is scheduled to cross the Naktong at the Paekchin Ferry. The task force is to execute a surprise attack against the N.K. 9th Division’s command post, which stands about two miles from the west bank. Companies D and H are designated as support units, and each will supply one section of heavy machine guns, one section of 75-mm recoilless rifles, one section of 81-mm mortars and one platoon of 4.2-inch mortars. The proposed attack, planned on August 25, begins to unfold at sundown when the various compo-

nents begin the preparations, but unexpected developments occur. The 1st Platoon, 2nd Engineer Combat Battalion, which is to transport the task force across the river in assault boats, and Company E (TF Manchu) remain near Yongsan. Meanwhile, the support troops of Companies D and H, led by Lieutenants Charles Caldwell and Edward Schmitt respectively, move to the base of Hill 209 within the perimeter of Company B, 9th Regiment, to establish their positions and deploy the weapons. From these positions, the Paekchin Ferry is easily observed. There are great expectations for the success of this night assault and Colonel Hill, the commanding officer, 9th Regiment, and his S-3 accompany the mortar platoon. By 2100, Lieutenants Schmitt and Caldwell have taken their section leaders to the positions on the hill where they want the weapons deployed. While the supporting units of Task Force Manchu are readying for the crossing, elements of Company B, holding the crest, begin to hear unusual noises coming from the water just below their positions. Visibility is not too good, and the dimming twilight hours do little to enhance vision. Nonetheless, an exerted effort with their field glasses reaveals the faint signs of a huge enemy force fording the river. The troops spotted are part of the enemy’s general offensive and will surely cause bedlam. Actually, elements of the N.K. 9th Division had begun crossing the river at about 2130 to reach positions from which an attack will be launched following the cessation of the artillery bombardment. While the support troops of Company D and H are

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Artillery is moved through mud en route to firing positions in vicinity of Taegu. involved with establishing their positions, the enemy makes it across the river and strikes a stunning blow, killing or capturing nearly all. Colonel Hill and several other troops escape from harm just before midnight and make it to friendly lines. Meanwhile, the first heavy weapons bearers detachment, already en route to the crest, makes it safely and remains there without incident throughout the night. At 2355, Operation MANCHU is terminated without ever getting started. Along the remainder of the perimeter, the North Koreans pour into the area of the 9th Regiment. Company B, holding the summit of Hill 209, will be attacked early on September 1. In the 23rd Regimental zone, north of the 9th Regiment, the situation is also serious. Its 3rd Battalion has been attached to the 1st Cavalry Division, and the perimeter stretches across a 16,000-yard front of unfamiliar ground along the Naktong, which includes two roads leading from the river to Changnyong. The 23rd Regiment, commanded by Colonel Paul Freeman — which has just relieved the 3rd Battalion, 38th Regiment, a few days prior — sparingly deploys its 1st Battalion, commanded by Lt. Colonel Claire Hutchin, Jr., in the hills. The 2nd Battalion, commanded by Lt. Colonel James Edwards, spreads out eight miles to the rear, guarding both roads. During the afternoon, the enemy presence is conspicuous on the opposite side of the Naktong, north of Pugong-ni. Enemy troops in large numbers move freely about the rice paddies. The 42 defenders of Company B’s 2nd Platoon, scattered on seven different hills, observe the activity with great curiosity. Toward dusk, the activity becomes more brisk. The sun is in the last

stages of fading beyond the horizon when Lieutenant Glasgow and the men in the 1st Squad spot huge numbers of torch-carrying men moving toward the river. Soon after, a forward artillery observer who estimates the number at 2,000 sends word back to regimental headquarters. Consequently, an artillery bombardment begins, but despite some torches being quickly extinguished, the undeterred enemy troops keep advancing toward the river. The enemy initiates its artillery barrage at 2100, in synchronization with the troops who ford the Naktong and then silently advance up the slopes. After the enemy barrage subsides at 2300, the sky becomes illuminated with a green flare. This signals the attack, which strikes all along the 1st Battalion, 23rd Regiment’s outposts on the various hills. Shortly after the flare diminishes, enemy grenades are tossed into Lieutenant Glasgow’s positions (with the 1st Squad, 2nd Platoon). At about the same time, hard close-quartered fighting begins; however, the slimly numbered Americans are unable to hold for long. The enemy drives them from the hill, but the fighting continues into the morning of September 1. In the 38th Regimental zone: West of Hyongp’ung, a heavy concentration of the N.K. 10th Division is deployed on Hill 409. The remainder of the division is dispersed as the northernmost extremity of the N.K. I Corps and it is expected to support the enemy thrust to destroy the American–South Korean lines along the Naktong River. After dark, large numbers of the enemy descend Hill 409 and press toward the far right flank of the U.S. 2nd Division to strike against the 23rd Regiment’s positions. Hyongp’ung is defended by C Company.

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Top: A destroyed enemy tank in the vicinity of Waegwan during late August. Bottom: Radar equipment in tow by tractors (13-ton high-speed M5s) arrive at rendezvous site in a river bed.

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U.S. soldiers posted in the vicinity of Yongsan with a .30-caliber machine gun observe a wounded trooper being brought back for medical aid during late August. The fighting around Hyongp’ung and Hill 409 continues for weeks, but strangely, the N.K. 10th Division fails to genuinely bolster the I Corps’ attacks by supporting the N.K. 2nd Division efforts, inadvertently aiding Eighth Army’s cause. Pusan Perimeter, Eastern Corridor: Kigye, recaptured by the North Koreans at dawn on the 30th, comes under heavy air attack by U.S. naval planes. South Korean troops later report the discovery of large numbers

of dead enemy troops, apparently killed by the air strike delivered by thirty-eight planes. Also at Pusan, the Joint (Army–Air Force) Operation Center sends out another urgent request for naval close-air support, reacting to the initiation of a massive enemy offensive against the Naktong defense perimeter. In other activity, although it is ahead of schedule and not in synchronization with the plans of General Walker, the South Korean Army has reactivated the

269 ROK 7th Division, which is to be composed of a minimum of one battalion per regiment (3rd, 5th and 8th Regiments). Task Force Min is vanishing as an S.K. unit. It will be transformed into the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 5th Regiment, S.K. 7th Division. Also, battle casualties during August within the four U.S. Divisions fighting in Korea thus far have been severe. The 1st Cavalry Division sustains 1,503 casualties, the 24th Division 1,941, the 25th Division 1,800 and the 2nd Division’s 9th RCT suffers 827 casualties. All divisions share an equally high rate of non-battle casualties, especially from heat prostration. The South Korean Army suffers many more battle casualties than the American units. At present, Walker has three U.S. regiments in reserve. The 25th Regiment arrives at Masan this day and is scheduled to relieve the 5th RCT, which will rejoin its parent 24th Division at Taegu. The 19th Regiment, 24th Division, is at Kyongsan southeast of Taegu. The 5th Marines, 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, is at Changwon, about six miles northeast of Masan. Eighth Army also has the British 27th Infantry Brigade, composed of two battalions; however, it is still not totally equipped. In Air Force activity, B-29s of Fifth Air Force strike a heavy blow against Chinnamp’o, an industrial area in North Korea with aluminum and magnesium factories. With August closing out, the combined Naval–Air Force air strikes have impaired, but not halted, the movement of enemy supply lines. The North Koreans manage to continue moving supply trains and trucks, but at a reduced rate. Also, the movement of enemy artillery has diminished greatly during August, but tanks and heavy weapons remain a crucial priority, along with fuel, and they continue to flow. In contrast, food becomes a lesser priority and by this day, the majority of North Korean units on the front lines receive the ramifications. Lack of rations impedes their ability to fight with vitality. In Naval activity, in response to an urgent request from the Joint (Army–Air Force) Operation Center at Pusan, Admiral Ewen, commander Task Force 77, recalls every airborne aircraft engaged in bombing runs over the Seoul-Inchon area. While the planes are returning to their carriers, the fleet changes course on the run and steams southeast to intercept the enemy and provide close-air support along the Naktong Perimeter. The aircraft already on board are speedily refitted with proper armaments and those returning to ships will be altered upon their return. The crucial message received by the fleet at 1101 is answered while the fleet is en route to the battle area: “The fleet’s close air support will start at 1430. First strike will be 12 Skyraiders each with three 1000-pound bombs. Also, 16 Corsairs, each with one 1,000-pound bomb plus four rockets and full cannon ammo. Second similar flight follows at 1530.” The message continues: “More coming.” And it does, on the following day. Also, U.S. naval surface vessels continue to bombard Hunghae to disable the N.K. 5th Division, which is forming there to attack the Pusan Perimeter.

September 1, 1950 — In Japan: The carrier USS Badoeng Strait, commanded by Captain Arnold McKechnie, arrives at Kobe, bringing with it 70 F4Us, 6 HO3S helicopters and eight light observation planes. The carrier USS Sicily had stopped at Guam en route to disembark Antisubmarine Squadron 21 at Agana Airfield; however, it joins the Badoeng Strait at Kobe. Its commanding officer, Captain John Thach, USN, is designated CTE 96.23, composed of the USS Sicily, USS Kyes (DD787) and USS Doyle (DMS-34). Captain Thach is ordered to rush to the support of the Pusan Perimeter and by the following day, the Sicily is steaming toward Korea.

September 1 The U.S. Navy continues its preparations for the invasion of Inchon. Discreetly, Lieutenant Eugene Clark, USN, a member of MacArthur’s JSPOG staff, is being sent to reconnoiter Yonghungdo, a tiny strategic island perched at the mouth of the channel, about fifteen sea miles southwest of Inchon. The clandestine mission is dubbed Operation TRUDY JACKSON. The HMS Charity, having transported Clark from Sasebo on the previous night, rendezvous with the South Korean patrol vessel PC-703. Clark, two interpreters and a small entourage of several other men, apparently U.S. Army Intelligence, transfer to the Korean vessel. U.S. Marines and British Marines accompany Clark aboard the Charity on the voyage from Sasebo. Once debarked, Clark, who brings ample ammunition, 30 cases of C-Rations and 200 pounds of rice, is quickly able to befriend the native Koreans (about 300–400 friendly Koreans). Clark organizes about 150 of them between the ages of 14 and 18 as his personal OSS unit. He dispatches them repeatedly into Inchon to measure the depth of the water and spy on the enemy, counting their numbers and identifying their positions. Clark also utilizes the Koreans to organize a defense of Yonghung-do, which is close to enemy-held Taebu-do, from which the enemy can walk during low tide. The mission is extremely successful and includes a naval victory of sorts. During the dangerous mission, the inevitable occurs as North Koreans move toward Yonghung-do in boats protected by a sampan gunship. Clark and a crew of three Koreans engages the unusual flotilla with a slow chugging sampan, outfitted with a .50-caliber machine gun. The sea joust erupts on September 8, when the enemy sampan gunboat fires its attached 37-mm tank gun, expending several rounds and showcasing poor marksmanship. Clark’s crew commences firing and their machine gun fire decimates the enemy sampan, sinking it. Clark continues firing and sinks one of the accompanying boats. Three of the eighteen enemy occupants are captured. Clark reports the incident, and on the following day (9th), the destroyer USS Hanson and some aircraft arrive to bombard Taebu-do. Meanwhile, Clark continues the primary mission of gaining intelligence and transmitting it to friendly

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A U.S. infantry contingent moving in search of enemy troops. vessels operating off Korea. In addition, during one of the nights on the island, Clark rows a boat straight into Inchon to test the density of the muck, and when the tide rolls out, he walks into the mud up to his waist. Concluding that landing troops would be futile, he dispatches the following message: “Inchon not suitable for landing either troops or vehicles across the mud.” Despite his daily reports of intelligence and a growing danger to his life, Clark refuses continuous efforts to evacuate him. Cognizant of his fate if caught, he carries one grenade to ensure the North Koreans don’t capture him. During this unsung heroic action, Clark also manages to repair a light beacon on Palmi Island, which the enemy had previously put out of operation without destroying it. Undaunted, the daily reports from Clark continue to flow, but finally he is compelled to evacuate hastily on the 14th, when a large contingent of enemy troops storm Yonghung-do. Clark escapes harm and flees to the temporary sanctuary of the repaired beacon light (Palmi-do), but the North Koreans slaughter about fifty Korean men and women on Yonghungdo. At about midnight (14th-15th), Clark abandons the island and is retrieved by the Navy. Other sources of information also contribute to the intelligence gathering of the U.S. forces, including Warrant Officer W.R. Miller, USA (Second Transportation Medium, Yokohama). Miller is temporarily assigned commander of Amphibious Group One because of his experience with Inchon’s tides and the unloading problems at the port. In addition, an Air Force officer, Colonel Richard W. Philbrick, and two civilians, Donald Graves and Amron Katz, have been dispatched from the States. They measure the varying height of the In-

chon seawalls, subsequent to inspection of aerial photographs taken by RF-80 jet aircraft from a distance of 200 feet during various stages of the tides. In other activity, Eighth Army realizes early that the enemy attacks on the previous day had been the forerunner of the tremendous enemy offensive unfolding in the southern part of the perimeter. In reaction, General Walker keeps a feverish pace, beginning with requesting Air Force assistance at 0900. He calls for massive strikes to corner off the battleground by bombing slightly in front of the 2nd Division boundary, which stretches along the Naktong from Toksong-dong southward. He also requests simultaneous raids to be launched as deeply as 10 to 15 miles west of the Naktong. Upon receiving Eighth Army’s urgent request, the Air Force Far East Command seeks some additional power from the Navy. NAVFE contacts the Seventh Fleet, which is striking the area near Inchon and Seoul, and directs it to disengage and speed its aircraft south to hit new targets. Meanwhile, General Walker, holding limited reserves (three under-strength regiments), ponders which units to juggle to reinforce the stand. The available units are the 27th Regiment, 25th Division, the 19th Regiment, 24th Division, and the 5th Marines. Each contingent receives orders to stand by and be prepared to move out at any minute. At 1045, Eighth Army informs the 25th Division that the 27th Regiment is to prepare for possible movement to the 2nd Division sector farther north. Even the possibility of losing the regiment is considered grave news for the beleaguered 25th Division.

271 At 1100, Walker, having decided that the most critical area is the Naktong Bulge (2nd Division sector), orders the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade to dispatch the 5th Marines to the bulge in order to halt the North Koreans outside of Miryang. The 5th Marines receive the warning order at 1109 and confirmation orders arrive at 1215, instructing the regiment to move forward at 1330. The Marines advance from Changwon about six miles northeast of Masan. In conjunction, the Marines had received an alert at 0810 to prepare for movement, but the destination at that time was not forthcoming. By 1800, General Craig has his command post established at Miryang and advance units are there to assist the Marine brigade. The 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, released from the 25th Division, is among the advance units. Craig’s Marine brigade will come under the operational control of the 2nd Division. Before day’s end, at 2230, General Craig is informed by Eighth Army that the brigade is to move out at dawn and deploy to the rear of the 9th Infantry, 2nd Division, south of Yongsan. Southwest Pusan Perimeter: During the last week in August and the first week in September, the North Korean 6th Division receives another 3,000 conscripted South Koreans, which increases its strength to more than 11,000 troops. Since mid–August, the Communists have pressed about 7,500 South Koreans into the N.K. 6th Division. In other activity, Eighth Army Intelligence Section estimates (on the 30th of August) that the combined strength of the twelve N.K. Infantry Divisions, known to be operating against Eighth Army, hold a combined effective strength of about 82,500 troops, but the U.S. and South Korean forces have been steadily increased during August, and now the enemy is outnumbered. In addition, the North Korean replacement troops are frequently pressed into service without weapons. The numerical advantage and the welcome addition of additional U.S. tanks and artillery further swell the strength of the Pusan Perimeter. With the line now extending from the southwest coast to the east coast, the enemy is stripped of one of its most deadly tactics, the envelopment, forcing them to win ground the old-fashioned way: direct frontal assault. Eighth Army believes it can withstand the attacks and hold the Pusan Perimeter, while awaiting even more reinforcements. In the 25th Division sector, at Masan, it becomes apparent that the enemy thrust is threatening the 25th Division perimeter, prompting General Walker to fly to Masan to confer with General Kean. While discussing the criticalness of the situation, Kean requests authority to commit the balance of the 27th Regiment, which arrived at Masan the night of August 31. But Walker, who has already granted permission for the use of the 1st Battalion of the 27th, denies the request. In conjunction, the 1st Battalion, commanded by Colonel Check, which had been advised of its mission early in the morning, moves out of Masan and arrives at the command post of the 24th Division in Haman

September 1, 1950 at 1000. The 1st Battalion, 35th Regiment reinforced, is supported by the 27th Regiment’s 1st Platoon, Heavy Mortar Company, Battery A, 8th FAB, and one platoon of tanks, Company B, 89th Tank Battalion. Upon its arrival, Colonel Check’s command is attached to the 24th Division. Slightly later, despite General Walker’s denial of permission to commit another battalion, Kean intuitively senses the need for the additional firepower. He orders Colonel Murch to lead his 2nd Battalion, 27th Regiment, in support of the 35th Regiment and the divisional artillery that are under attack. When the details are provided to General Walker concerning General Kean’s decision to commit the 2nd Battalion, he concurs with the strategy. West of Haman, fighting that had begun the previous night continues to ensue, but the enemy (N.K. 6th and 7th Divisions) does not strike against the 3rd Battalion, 24th Regiment, posted north of the 2nd Battalion, nor against the 5th Regiment, except for some light probing skirmishes, seemingly used as a diversion. The enemy also implements sporadic application of artillery and mortar fire. Contingents of the N.K. 6th Division make rapid progress against the 2nd Battalion, 24th Regiment, by romping through the lines, killing and wounding large numbers of troops and overrunning the battalion command post in the process. During the early morning hours, the North Koreans close against Haman and have it nearly surrounded. Colonel Roberts directs an officer to take a detachment of the dwindling battalion to establish a roadblock on the southern fringe of the town. The lieutenant following his orders directs a hefty amount of nearby troops to move out and hold the blockade, but a mere eight troops obey the order, eliminating the 2nd Battalion as an effective unit to help stem the rising tide. With the sudden and unexpected enemy gains, Colonel Champney attempts to restore the Regimental line; he orders the 1st Battalion, deployed several miles south of Haman, to launch a counterattack, scheduled to commence at 0730. By 0400, the situation at Haman becomes more grievous. The town is consumed by a collage of fireballs. Colonel Champney shifts the command post to a spot two miles northeast of the town, seeking safer terrain along the new engineer road in a shallow valley. North of Haman, another enemy contingent strikes the positions of Battery C, 159th Field Artillery Battalion, about one mile outside of town. Two tanks of the 89th Tank Battalion throw their hefty weight into the battle and buy enough time for the artillerymen to put the howitzers under tow and get them heading east through Haman to safety. West of Haman, as daylight emerges, Company G, 2nd Battalion, 24th Regiment, south of the pass, resembles little more than a squad. Lieutenant Houston McMurray discovers that only eight men from his platoon and seven South Koreans remain with him out of 69 troops who had been on second ridge west of Haman the previous night. The shortage of defenders doesn’t affect the enemy.

September 1, 1950 They attack at daybreak by punching through a barbed wire barricade that had been protected by BARmen who had abandoned the position, thereby permitting easy passage. The remaining small defending force is quickly overwhelmed after a shower of grenades and a barrage of vicious burp gun fire. Also, the eleven troops of Company E who chose to remain on the ridge with Lieutenant Ellis find themselves encircled by a deadly ring of fire. Several troops attempt to break out; however, enemy guns quickly kill them. Ellis and the remaining troops hold their ground tightly, then defiantly and successfully withstand further vicious attacks for two days. Following the daring stand, the beleaguered detachment moves south and farther up the mountain to join the 3rd Battalion. During the dangerous escape, Ellis spots a wounded trooper lying helplessly in a minefield and he successfully extricates the soldier. Some forward troops of the 3rd Battalion, 24th Regiment, manning an outpost in the high ground on the right flank, had observed more than 500 N.K. troops moving toward Haman. By dawn on September 1, it is apparent that about eight hundred Communist troops are flowing into the town. As ordered earlier by Colonel Champney, the 1st Battalion, 24th Regiment, commanded by Colonel Roberts, advances from its positions along the Chindong-ni Road. Roberts has infused the 1st Battalion with the available stragglers of the 2nd Battalion (40 troops). The slightly reinforced 1st Battalion drives toward the enemy, but the engagement is brief, as the 1st Battalion breaks under fire. It disperses into the heights about two miles east of Haman, causing more problems. The failure to hold and fight collapses the line there and permits nearly two enemy regiments to effortlessly gallop through the three-mile-wide Haman gap. The commander of Company F, 24th Regiment, claims that his company held fast on the battalion’s right sector, with two platoons on the line and one in reserve. Company F holds through the night but takes high casualties, and on the following day it makes a disciplined northward march to the lines of the 35th Regiment to inform the officers there that their left flank is exposed. Company F then moves to Haman to deploy defensively and await the reorganization of the 2nd Battalion, 24th Regiment. At 1000, Colonel Check’s 1st Battalion, 27th Regiment, arrives at Colonel Champney’s headquarters near Haman amidst a sea of confusion and chaos, which includes a total lack of discipline within the ranks of the 2nd Battalion, 24th Regiment. Haphazardly, the troops of the 24th Regiment attempt to move to the rear, but the effort creates a quagmire on the roads that impedes the ability of the 1st Battalion, 27th Regiment, to react to the enemy breakthrough. The fiasco actually prevents any action by the 1st Battalion, 27th Regiment, for about six hours. Vehicles of every description are moving to the rear, and many additional troops are departing by foot, their pace frequently accelerated by the

272 nearby thuds of exploding enemy mortar shells, which otherwise score no damage. Colonel Check takes notice of the fact that the desperate attempts of Colonel Champney to restore order among the retreating troops of the 24th Regiment and of the equally fast-paced retiring South Korean troops fall on deaf ears. None of the units are reorganized as fighting units. Sergeant Jack Riley, 25th MP Company, attempts to clear the road while troops—some without boots, many without rifles and yet others without helmets — are bolting from the mountain. Riley attempts to halt the stream of deserters, stopping a few. At that point, he orders all officers and noncoms to halt their flight, but none heed the call, prompting Riley to forcibly stop one man, a first sergeant. Irritated by the actions of the retreating troops, Riley, his carbine still cocked, asks those he has stopped why they are reluctant to stand and fight with the battalion. Amidst their sarcastic laughter he is told: “We didn’t see any MPs on the hill.” The 2nd Battalion, 24th Regiment, continues its “bug out” until it reaches the rear of the newly arrived 27th Regiment. The disoriented battalion then begins to reform at about 1600, but its force has diminished to between 150 and 200 troops. In the meantime, Colonel Champney receives orders from General Kean at 1445 directing him to initiate an immediate counterattack to re-establish the lines of the 24th Regiment. In conjunction, planes, including squadrons from the carriers Philippine Sea and the Valley Forge, augment the attack while their mother ships race toward the area from their positions 200 miles distant. In addition to inflicting damage, the air strikes confine and harass the enemy, keeping the Communists off balance throughout the day. The aircraft prevent the North Koreans from regrouping to capitalize on their gains. Fourteen Corsairs from the Valley Forge arrive to give aid, but there are no targets for their large bomb loads. The planes circle for 45 minutes, awaiting a target for their 1,000-pound bombs. Meanwhile, the controller calls in F-51s to strafe the area. Eventually, the Corsairs receive orders to hit five separate villages near Kaepyodong and each target is struck and destroyed, along with a supply depot. Soon after, additional planes strike Haman in support of the ground troops, while others level a ridge just west of the town, while still other planes strike Chugam-ni. Sixteen jets also join the fight. Eight are launched at 1615 to augment the ground troops with close-air support and another eight are launched at 1745, striking targets along the Naktong. At the same time, the Philippine Sea launches its planes and the skies become more crowded. Eight F4Us and six ADs arrive on the scene, but they cannot locate an air controller to coordinate with them, forcing the pilots to discover their own targets. Some enemy troop concentrations are struck and the raids partially destroy a bridge. A second strike force is catapulted from the Philippine Sea at 1430, but again, there is no coordination

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Three soldiers in the field get some hot food. with an air controller. Following these attacks, two additional contingents of jets arrive, but again, there is no contact between the pilots and air controllers. Consequently, neither group fires any shots. At 1630, Colonel Check’s 1st Battalion, 27th Regiment — after air strikes lasting thirty minutes and a fifteen minute artillery bombardment against Haman and the nearby enemy dominated ridges — begins to drive west to regain the ground earlier abandoned by the 24th Regiment without a fight. The welcome addition of one platoon of tanks from Company A, 79th Tank Battalion, supplements the punching power of Check’s

attack. Eight tanks (transporting infantry) lead the charge. The vanguard comes under fierce enemy fire, originating from the ridge on the western part of Haman, but despite the raging streams of green tracer fire, the attack remains relentless and presses forward. The infantry sustains heavy casualties, and the enemy also knocks out one of the tanks. Undaunted, Colonel Check’s 1st Battalion gnaws forward toward the enemy-infested ridge, gaining ground one yard at a time. By 1825, the first obstinate ridge, lying about 500 yards west of Haman, falls to the Americans. Without

September 1, 1950 pause, the 1st Battalion, 27th Regiment, inches further, exterminating more of the enemy. In less than two hours it regains about one-half of the prior battle lines on the higher elevated ridge beyond its assigned objective. To get a breather, Check’s 1st Battalion digs in defensively for the night at its newly won positions, two hundred yards below the summit of the balance of the enemy-held ridge, about one mile west of Haman. Uncharacteristically, the North Koreans fail to launch a night assault against Check’s perimeter and the Americans get some sleep. In addition, strangely, the North Koreans illuminate the skies above their entrenched positions with flares. In other activity, the 24th Regiment has not participated in the fight to regain the ground it surrendered, but nonetheless, the North Koreans bombard its rear positions with mortar fire throughout the night, forcing Colonel Champney to move his command post even farther to the rear. Also in the 25th Division sector, south of the 2nd Division, the 35th Regiment is deployed north of Haman on the divisional right flank. Prior to dawn, contingents of the N.K. 7th Division ford the Nam River, then pivot left to establish a bridgehead on the Nam and dislodge the Americans in the heights overlooking the river. Company G, 2nd Battalion, 35th Regiment, entrenched on the northern part of the gap, is struck initially; however, other enemy units bypass Company G to hammer Company F to the north at the Namji-ri bridge and some units head south to destroy Company E, positioned about two miles downstream of Company G. By 0300, the 3rd Platoon, Heavy Mortar Company, is pushed from its hill. The mortarmen move quickly to Hill 179 and enjoin Company G’s 2nd Platoon there. By daylight, the 25th Division has retained all its terrain on the right flank, except the low ground stretching between the Nam River and Komam-ni, which had been evacuated by two companies of ROK police at midnight. After dawn, Company K, supported by tanks, counterattacks and regains some of the terrain previously lost by the ROK police. In the meantime, the North Koreans have infiltrated heavily during the night, reaching positions behind the lines of the 35th Regiment, extending as far as six miles east of Komam-ni near Chirwon-ni and Chung-ni. The N.K. 6th Division, meanwhile, is to drive east along the primary Chinju–Komam-ni highway to destroy the 1st Battalion, 35th Regiment. The N.K. 7th Division is to concentrate its force on the 2nd Battalion, 35th Infantry’s positions by advancing south to sever the Chirwon Road, which leads directly to the Namji-ri bridge. From there, the N.K. 7th Division is to press through Chirwon and advance toward the primary Masan highway. The North Koreans mount savage attacks against the 1st Battalion on Sibidang-san, but the contingent holds tight, surrendering no ground. Bolstered within its small perimeter with additional supporting weaponry and further augmented by total encirclement by barbed wire, trip flares and some con-

274 cealed booby-traps, the besieged 1st Battalion maintains command of the terrain. In conjunction, the 1st Battalion has the luxury of having all the approach routes to its positions gridded, permitting the troops to call in deadly effective support fire. Meanwhile, in the 2nd Battalion area, engineers launch a drive up the Chirwon Road (alternate route), but by the afternoon, enemy resistance halts its progress way short of Chirwon. In the meantime, additional enemy contingents continue to cross the Nam River during the daylight hours. These units, while crossing, are easily detected from the air. The 64th Field Artillery Battalion receives the exact positions of the force, which equals about four companies. The artillerymen bombard the area with proximity (VT) fuze fire and inflict severe casualties, estimated to be about 75 percent of the Communist force. Soon after, soaring aircraft spot the stragglers and begin effective strafing runs, inflicting further devastation. Later in the day, another huge group of enemy troops is spotted from the air. The artillery again commences firing and inflicts about 200 additional casualties. Back at the right flank, Company F holds resolutely at the Namji-ri bridge, and by the following day, about one enemy battalion will be lost in the futile attempt to take the bridge. Colonel Fisher’s 35th Regiment becomes surrounded as the day progresses, but he remains undaunted and intends to hold the perimeter. During the day’s earlier fighting, Company G had taken the brunt of the attack. While the mortarmen are being evicted from their positions and forced to combine with the 2nd Platoon, the 3rd Platoon, Company G, also nears extinction. The enemy encroaches its positions along the Nam River, about four miles from its confluence with the Naktong River. The exchange of fire is vicious and brisk as the enemy knot tightens. Captain LeRoy Majeske orders identification banners to be laid out to distinguish Company G’s positions, and he daringly requests air strikes to blast the North Koreans to the front; however, the arrival of the aircraft is belated and the enemy, by 1145, is nearly at hand’s length from the defenders on the crest. Slightly after the attackers reach the identification banners, Captain Majeskie is slain. Despite the close proximity of the enemy, Lieutenant George Roach, having assumed command after Majeskie’s death, again requests the nail-splitting air strikes. Meanwhile, the North Koreans bolt to the crest and commandeer foxholes within the positions of the besieged company. Finally, the planes arrive and pummel the opposite slope, which is controlled by the enemy, terminating the attack, but not the infiltrators. Closequartered fighting ensues and grenades and bayonets become the arbitrators of the struggle. The defenders of Company G fight valiantly, but their numbers decrease rapidly. The bloody contest continues during the afternoon. One of the flying grenades costs Lieutenant Roach his life. SFC Junius Poovey assumes command. But, despite the iron-resistance and the incessant

275 heroism, including the actions of men like Corporal Hideo Hashimoto, the overwhelming enemy strength takes its toll. Hashimoto disregards the enemy fire and crawls to within ten feet of the enemy-held foxholes to lob grenades. As the heated contests drags on, the platoon’s slim positions become totally untenable. By 1800, twenty-nine troops remain alive, but seventeen are wounded, leaving Sergeant Poovey only twelve able-bodied troops to forestall disaster. Nearly out of ammunition, he requests and receives permission to withdraw. Using cover of darkness and the synchronized arrival of U.S. tanks, the survivors (including three men on stretchers) evacuate their positions and reach the main perimeter on Hill 179 about 2330. In the 2nd Division sector, the tenacious fighting of the previous night continues with more brutal intensity, including fierce combat in the hills on each side of Company B, 9th Regiment (Hill 209). An equally ferocious battle continues on Hill 211, situated about one and one-half miles to the rear of the river. In one incident during the feverish struggle near Yongsan, the enemy overruns the advance elements of Company E, 9th Regiment. Because of the superior enemy numbers, orders come in to withdraw from the high ground, but some units are surrounded and unable to move. From close-range, a grenade is tossed into the mortar section of Company E before it can extricate itself. PFC David M. Smith yells frantic warnings to the other five endangered men with him, and then he blankets the grenade with his body to spare the others. Smith receives the Medal of Honor posthumously for his selfless sacrifice. Meanwhile, Company B still holds the summit of Hill 209. Although unscathed during the initial enemy crossing of the Naktong, Company B now becomes seriously threatened and the crest of Hill 209 is at great risk. At 0200, contingents of the N.K. 9th Division, which had inflicted severe casualties to other contingents of the 9th Regiment on the previous night, arrive tumultuously at the base of the hill. Following the blare of a shrill whistle, the enemy advances up the hill and proceeds to inflict heavy casualties upon Company B and drive it from its fortifications. The regimental chaplain, Captain Lewis Sheen, is able to lead some of the troops to safety. They arrive at friendly lines on September 4. An isolated contingent of TF Manchu (Companies D and H, and Heavy Weapons Platoon personnel), which had been on the slope under Company B, is not discovered by the enemy and remains on the hill throughout the night (Aug. 31-Sept. 1) without incident. Upon daylight, the isolated advance contingent of TF Manchu faces a perilous predicament due to the unanticipated loss of Hill 209 by Company B. From its positions on a southern knoll, it becomes evident that the advance unit is surrounded. Communications with the 9th Regiment’s 1st Battalion had been established on the night of August 31 by Lieutenant Schmitt. At the time, Schmitt, had been informed that help

September 1, 1950 would arrive on September 1. Nonetheless, it is easier said than to actually get the reinforcements to the isolated contingent. The enemy contingents holding ground above and below the remnants of the disbanded task force discover the trapped Americans. They launch an attack at 1400; however, the small band raises tenacious resistance and repels the assault. After sunset, more attacks are launched, but again the Americans under Schmitt hold steadfastly. They repulse the enemy and retain the small knob. Afterwards, the troops prepare to fend off even more attacks, anticipated on the following day. Meanwhile, Company A, 9th Regiment, which was driven from Agok on the previous night, observes the enemy from its precarious positions on the ridge line. It becomes apparent that Company A, led by Lt. Rodriguez, is also facing certain encirclement. Lieutenant Fern, 2nd Platoon Leader, dispatches a patrol into Agok to reclaim some abandoned supplies. A brief firefight erupts that costs two casualties, but the patrol obtains the supplies and it eliminates 3 enemy troops. Closer to noon, Rodriguez orders a squad equipped with a light machine gun crew to deploy on the southern edge of the ridge to engage some enemy troops that have crossed the Naktong. En route to the position, the squad encounters ten dead enemy troops, and nearby lays a badly wounded Negro soldier who had taken them out. The wounded soldier is rushed to the rear for medical aid, but he succumbs later in the day. Continuing on the mission, the squad reaches its destination and discovers a group of North Korean troops who have taken positions in a house. Without delay, the information is rushed to Lieutenant Fern. Soon after, through the direction of a forward artillery observer, the area is pummeled with proximity fuze fire. The enemy contingent also receives steady doses of machine gun fire from the squad and by one other machine gun, which is posted on the opposite side of the Naktong in the 25th Division sector. The startled occupants dash from the house and sprint toward the river, inundated with crashing shells. The fierce barrage kills or wounds about 300 of the enemy. Company A becomes the recipient of some of the airdropped supplies, but much of it is never secured. During the day, beleaguered Company A stops several banzai assaults. During this brash fighting, PFC Luther H. Story commandeers a machine gun from a wounded gunner and pours effective fire into a large enemy force that is crossing the river. Story’s actions kill or wound about 100 enemy troops, but more keep coming and the imperiled unit is now nearly surrounded. By dark, Rodriguez is ordered to withdraw eastward by moving along the summit of the ridge. Luther Story, although wounded, insists on covering the withdrawal. When an enemy vehicle approaches, he bolts to the road and begins tossing grenades until all are expended. Undaunted, he continues gathering more grenades from his buddies and maintains his bulwark stance. Story, well aware of his debilitating wounds,

September 1, 1950 refuses to depart with the company. When last seen, Story was still firing incessantly at the approaching hordes of North Koreans. He received the Medal of Honor posthumously for his extraordinary heroism and leadership under fire. An enemy force of about 400 troops is encountered by the spearheading 2nd Platoon as it descends toward the base of the eastern tip. This compels Lieutenant Rodriguez (Company A, 9th Regiment) to reverse direction and head back up the slopes, using Fern’s 2nd Platoon to protect the wounded and cover the rear. But again, disaster looms in the darkness. Enemy troops commence firing on Company A just about the time the lagging 2nd Platoon reaches the base of the ridge. The severe fire also halts any further advance by Fern’s 2nd Platoon, which becomes pinned down. Fern directs a ten-man detachment under Sergeant Herbert Freeman to take the wounded back into the ravine. A few remnants of the advanced contingent of Company A arrive and they detail the fighting and explain to Fern that a large enemy force had intercepted Rodriguez. Lieutenant Rodriguez and nearly all the troops with him are killed. In the 23rd Regiment zone, Company C, 1st Battalion, commanded by Captain Cyril Bartholdi, holds precarious positions along the primary Pugongni–Changnyong Road, but the previous night’s (Aug. 30) fighting had not affected it. However, at 0300 this day, the North Koreans pulverize the unit, nearly annihilating it. Captain Bartholdi and most of the company are wiped out. Initially, only seven soldiers appear to have survived, but several days later, when the other remnants appear, the Company C survivors amount to nineteen troops. The unrelenting thrust of the enemy endangers the entire 1st Battalion. Except for bludgeoned Company C, Lt. Colonel Hutchins is able to gather most of the battalion and successfully make it to his command post near the northern road that leads to Changnyong on the northern outskirts of Lake U-p’o. Colonel Freeman, immediately upon being informed of the dilemma of his 1st Battalion, secures Companies F and G from 2nd Division reserve and he commits both. Company F moves on the southern road toward Pugong-ni, but it is unable to reach Company C. Major Lloyd Jensen (executive officer, 2nd Battalion), moving with Company F, gathers some C Company stragglers and soon after, Company F captures some ground in the heights outside of Ponch’o-ri above Lake Sanorho. The unit digs in there to form a defensive line. This captured terrain becomes the main defense line of the 23rd Regiment. In the meantime, the enemy also ignites more fighting to increase the pressure against the 2nd Division. At the strategic pass between Cloverleaf and Obongni, the scene of the first fighting of the Naktong Bulge, skirmishing develops at 0230 when a tank attached to Company A, 72nd Tank Battalion, destroys an N.K. Soviet made T-34 tank at the village of Tugok (Morisil). At 0300, Company E, originally intended to be the at-

276 tack force of TF Manchu until the enemy offensive of the previous night forced cancellation of the attack, is called upon to form a desperate blocking line about six miles in front of Yongsan at the strategic pass. Company E is the sole reserve unit of the 9th Regiment. The efforts of Company E to halt the enemy are futile. It rushes west, but east of the pass, the enemy springs a deadly ambush that inflicts severe casualties and prevents any chance of the unit preserving the pass. The commanding officer of Company B is among those killed. The North Koreans take control of much of Cloverleaf and Obong-ni Ridge before daylight on September 1, giving them the strategic high ground between the Naktong River and Yongsan. The 2nd Division is then forced to defend the town on poor ground to the immediate front in the shallow hills there. At Muan-ni, along the Miryang Road, about seven air-miles from Yongsan, activity at 2nd Division headquarters is vigorous. At 0810, General Keiser calls Eighth Army informing General Walker of the gravity of the situation, explaining that the most severe enemy infiltration has occurred in the U.S. 9th Regiment’s zone. As the morning wears on tediously, the enemy (N.K. 2nd and 9th Divisions) pressure presents a grim outlook. Units holding the various front lines become separated, lose communications and are in danger of expending their supplies and ammunition. Light aircraft, operating with divisional artillery, make fourteen frantic air drops to resupply the imperiled front line troops, but the 9th and 23rd Regiments are undisciplined, with some companies unaccounted for in their entirety. Meanwhile, the enemy cracks a massive gap that extends about six miles wide and eight miles deep directly through the center of the 2nd Division lines. The progress of the enemy in the 2nd Division sector is easily measurable before noon. Grave decisions must be made. General Keiser, aware that the North Koreans have advanced to the north-south ChangnyongYongsan Road and splintered the division positions by the massive breakthrough, forms two separate commands. The southern section command, composed of the 9th Regiment, 2nd Engineer Combat Battalion, the greatest part of the 72nd Tank Battalion and some miscellaneous units, becomes Task Force Bradley, commanded by Brigadier General Joseph S. Bradley, the assistant 2nd Division commander. The northern force, composed of the 23rd and 38th Regiments and nearly all of the division’s artillery (37th FABn, Battery C, 503rd FAB, Batteries A, B, and C, 82nd AAA AW Bn SP), becomes Task Force Haynes, commanded by Brigadier General Loyal M. Haynes. Meanwhile, the 1st and 2nd Regiments of the N.K. 9th Division pour across the Naktong, the former on the north and the latter on the south. Elements begin closing on Yongsan and forward contingents move into the hills west of the town by afternoon. Although the 3rd Regiment of the N.K. 9th Division remains in Inchon, there is other support, including two tank battalions, one antiaircraft battalion of the 16th Armored

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A U.S. Marine posted outside a demolished building fires his sniper’s rifle (M1903A4 .30-caliber). A destroyed bridge is in the background. Brigade, one battalion of the N.K. 4th Division artillery and one N.K. I Corps 76-mm artillery battalion. In addition, the untried N.K. 4th Division, composed mainly of green and weaponless troops, fords the river behind the 9th Division units. It is cause for great alarm, as Yongsan is slimly defended by some sparse ground troops, engineers and a scattering of artillery.

At Yongsan, General Keiser attaches the 2nd Engineer Combat Bn. to the 9th Regiment to bolster the remnants of Company E, 9th Regiment. In addition, the 2nd Division Reconnaissance Company and the 72nd Tank Bn. are also in close proximity, south of the town. Company A, 2nd Engineer Bn., commanded by Captain Frank M. Reed, heads west toward the southern

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U.S. troops are accompanied by tanks on the advance as they pass a damaged bridge, September 1950. side of the Yongsan-Naktong River Road to complement Company D, 2nd Engineer Bn., which is deployed along the north side of the road, giving the engineers positions amidst the low hills northwest of Yongsan. Meanwhile, the North Koreans continue to press forward. About 300 enemy troops engage Company A, 2nd Engineering Battalion, at a point about two miles west of Yongsan, setting off a grueling three-hour duel. The 82nd Field Artillery Bn. bolsters this action. Company D, 2nd Engineer Battalion, concerned about its questionable positions, receives permission from Brigadier General Bradley to redeploy south of the town on a hill with the dual advantages of dominating the town and the exit highway leading to Miryang. Subsequent to the heavy skirmishing with the enemy, Company A, 2nd Engineer Combat Bn., withdraws and takes positions along the road to the rear of Company D and opposite Company C, 2nd Engineer Combat Battalion. Other enemy contingents advancing from the south strike toward Yongsan, igniting more heavy combat. A contingent of tanks attached to the 72nd Tank Battalion and the 2nd Division Reconnaissance Company meet this threat. Severe mortar fire begins ripping into the reconnaissance troops in synchronization with incessant enemy machine gun fire. One soldier, Sergeant Charles Turner, guides his section into a firm defensive position to thwart the huge assault, but he then notices the brunt of the attack is moving against the tanks, about 100 yards distant. Turner recklessly sprints from his entrenched position to commandeer an exposed machine gun on top of one of the tanks, from which he initiates a one-man assault force.

Despite a hurricane of overwhelming enemy fire, Turner continues to trade shots without flinching. While the fearless sergeant dishes out 75-mm machine gun shells, he becomes seriously wounded, but still, Turner refuses to vacate his exposed position, choosing to carry the fight and inspire his men. The enemy fire continues to pummel the area. Turner’s gun mount is struck three times, while the tank is constantly rung with fire that inflicts more than fifty hits. Turner maintains a steady rain of devastating fire upon the enemy positions, until finally a burst of fire slays him at the gun. Turner obliterates seven enemy machine gun nests before he succumbs and in addition, his unit is able to regroup and mount a successful counterattack. Sergeant Turner receives the Medal of Honor posthumously, for his extraordinary heroism under fire. During the night, enemy contingents composed of about one battalion, bolstered by some tanks, skirt over the low land to move around the town and enter Yongsan from the south. Once there, the enemy prepares to move against Miryang. In the 23rd Regimental sector, north of the 9th Regiment, enemy progress continues through the night. By daylight this day, the 1st Battalion has been shoved three miles west of its original positions along the Naktong, and the unit is now isolated. Things begin to deteriorate further. About 400 enemy troops overwhelm the 1st Battalion command post, forcing Colonel Freeman to reestablish it about 600 yards farther back. At this newest line, about five miles northwest of Changnyong, regimental staff officers, various other units of the 23rd Regiment, the 23rd Regimental Headquarters and Headquarters Company engage the

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An adventurous journey by truck carries troops across a damaged bridge held up by sandbags. enemy there with enormous fervor. For three bristling hours the opponents exchange vicious blows, but the 23rd Regiment beats the North Koreans back, due in great part to the outstanding leadership of Captain Niles McIntyre (Headquarters Company). The 2nd Battalion, 38th Regiment, is ordered to drive south, hook up with the 23rd Regiment and bolster its defensive position west of Changnyong, but the enemy is already holding much of the ground on the ridges overlooking the road. Actually, North Korean units have reached Hill 284, immediately above the 38th Regimental command post. In the meantime, the 1st Battalion, 23rd Regiment, receives orders to withdraw, but Colonel Hutchin’s battalion faces the enemy to its rear. At 1400, Hutchin speeds a patrol to determine if the road to the rear is clear. He is soon informed that about one enemy battalion is deployed at the nearby mountain pass, making a successful withdrawal improbable. During the evening, Hutchin requests and receives permission to stand and fight. The 1st Battalion is subsidized by air drops delivered by C-47s, which permit the isolated contingent to maintain its perimeter for three grueling days. During the morning, the 2nd Division commits the 3rd Battalion, 38th Regiment, ordering it to attack west from positions near Mosan-ni at the command post of the 23rd Regiment and to secure the road from there to the isolated 1st Battalion. Also, elements of Company F, 2nd Battalion, deployed on a strategic ridge near Am-dong, come under a fierce attack that includes artillery and mortar fire. The platoon leader, 1st Lieutenant Frederick F. Henry, moves to steady the stunned platoon members. He moves from his foxhole to restore order and after directing his troops to maintain fire against the attackers, he moves out farther to try to stem the tide. As the ammunition depletes, Henry orders the pla-

toon to withdraw, but he remains alone to cover the pull back. Lieutenant Henry’s action saves the platoon from further harm; however, his singlehanded stand lasts only until his ammunition is expended. The main body is by this time prepared to throw back the assault, but Henry’s position is overrun, subsequent to his destruction of about 50 enemy troops. He is awarded the Medal of Honor posthumously for his tremendous leadership in the face of the enemy and his selfless sacrifice above and beyond the call of duty. Pusan Perimeter, Central Front, Taegu: The 1st Cavalry Division receives orders from General Walker to launch an attack with the option of driving north or northwest to draw attention and to siphon some of the large enemy force that has congregated to the south. Initially, the attack is supposed to head north, but General Gay confers with his staff and they decide to attack northwestwardly against Hill 518. The hill, which has recently come into the 1st Cavalry sector, will be struck by the 7th Cavalry Regiment, augmented by two rifle companies of the 3rd Battalion, 8th Cavalry. The attack is set to begin the next day. Pusan Perimeter, Eastern Corridor: U.S. observation planes spot large numbers of enemy troops advancing southward through the mountains in the vicinity of Pohang-dong and Kigye. In the mountainous area straddled between the east sector and the Taegu sector to the west, the S.K. 6th and 8th Divisions are deployed defensively to halt any enemy force attempting to advance south. This day, as part of the unfolding general assault, the N.K. 8th Division is poised to strike toward Hayang by running over the S.K. 6th Division. Farther east, the N.K. 15th Division is mounting an assault to overrun the S.K. 8th Division and seize Yongch’on. The primary objective of the two-pronged assault is to cut the Taegu–Pohang-dong corridor road, while also gaining Hayang, twelve air miles from Taegu

September 2, 1950 and Yongju, the latter, about 20 air miles from Taegu. The contest between the enemy and the ROK troops remains heavy for nearly two weeks. — In the United States: Congress passes the Defense Production Act authorizing President Truman to control wages and prices, as well as control distribution of scarce commodities and ration items that are in short supply. President Truman, in a radio address, announces he is increasing the U.S. Armed Forces from one and one-half million to about three million. In other activity, El Toro becomes quieter as the final elements of the 1st Marine Air Wing embark for the Far East aboard the USS General Morton; Major General Field Harris, commanding officer 1st MAW, had departed El Toro by air on the previous day. — In Japan: In response to the enemy offensive launched this day in Korea, General MacArthur cancels his previous order releasing the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade to the 1st Marine Division. MacArthur wants to permit its use to neutralize the attack. Most brigade equipment is already at Pusan waiting to be shipped to Japan. In conjunction, Colonel Edward Forney, USMC, the newly appointed deputy chief of staff, X Corps, suggests to General Oliver Smith, USMC, that he accept the 32nd Regiment, USA, in place of the 5th Marines. Smith declines because the 32nd Regiment is untrained in amphibious invasions. General Smith remains adamant concerning the return of the 5th Marines. A meeting will be held on September 3 to reach a solution. In other activity, the docks in Kobe, Sasebo and Yokohama are highly active as naval personnel scurry to complete the final phase of preparations for the Inchon invasion. The Gunfire Support Group, comprising the majority of the escort vessels and the command ships, are at Sasebo. The 1st Marine Division, minus the 5th Marines (embarking from Pusan), will board its vessels at Kobe, and the 7th Infantry Division will embark from Yokohama. The assault troops have been debarking in Japan since the closing days of August, and there is little time before the big shove-off. To remain on schedule and reach Inchon on the 15th, the LSTs must depart Kobe on September 10, and the transports and cargo vessels have to embark Yokohama by the 12th. — In the Mediterranean: The 3rd Battalion, 6th Marines, embarks for the Far East to supplement the Marine forces in Korea.

September 2 Southwest Pusan Perimeter: In the 25th Division sector, the 35th Regiment maintains its grasp, north of Haman. On Hill 179, Company G, 2nd Battalion, repulses the enemy’s heated attempts to annihilate it. In accordance with General Kean’s order of the previous day, the 2nd Battalion, 27th Regiment, commanded by Colonel Murch, launches an attack at 1700. The battalion springs forward from the vicinity of Chung-ni to bolster the 35th Regiment. The trek over the mountainous terrain (Kuhe-ri Ferry Road) under a pitch black sky is arduous, but combined with

280 ferocious enemy resistance, the unit is compelled to advance more slowly. It is unable to reach the embattled 35th Regiment near Hill 179 until the following afternoon. Subsequent to the departure of the 2nd Battalion, 27th Regiment, the command post of the 24th Regiment, 25th Division, is attacked by a contingent of North Koreans who had penetrated behind the lines. In reaction, General Kean orders the 3rd Battalion, 27th Regiment, to move out and eliminate the enemy infiltrators. The 3rd Battalion, 27th Regiment, commanded by Lt. Colonel George H. DeChow, is actually the 3rd Battalion, 29th Regiment, until September 10, when it becomes the former. DeChow’s command will initiate its assault on the following day. Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion, 27th Regiment, commanded by Colonel Check, had initiated a counterattack on the previous day to reclaim the ground surrendered by the 24th Regiment. It has spent the night on the seized ground upon a ridge about one mile west of Haman. At daybreak the North Koreans lunge against the 1st Battalion, using a soupy fog to obscure their advance, but the Americans steadily pour fire into the attackers. Aircraft arrive and deliver lethal dosages of napalm, incinerating large numbers of the North Koreans and increasing the odds for the 1st Battalion. Finally, at about noon, the struggle ends victoriously for Check’s 1st Battalion; it has recovered all of all ground previously lost by the 24th Regiment. The 1st Battalion also recaptures the 24th’s intact crew-operated weapons. The warriors of the 27th Regiment move into the foxholes that had been abruptly vacated two nights earlier by the 24th Regiment. Check’s troops get a short breather and prepare for the next enemy attack. In related activity, enemy contingents penetrate the positions of the 159th Field Artillery near the Nam River (northernmost sector of the 25th Division), but the artillerymen handily repulse the assault. Also, the day-long support of aircraft has inflicted enormous punishment on the enemy. The 25th Division sector is the recipient of 135 sorties, which account for many enemy casualties, the decimation of several enemy tanks, some artillery pieces and the violent destruction of three villages, each concealing ammunition depots. In the 2nd Division sector near Agok, the 2nd Platoon, Company A, 9th Regiment (surviving unit of Company A) attempts to break for friendly lines before daybreak. Lieutenant Fern dispatches a messenger to the rear to inform Sergeant Herbert Freeman to bring up the wounded and rejoin the platoon, but Freeman’s contingent cannot be located. Fern moves out under the umbrella of a dense fog and heads toward Yongsan. The 2nd Platoon arrives above the town at about noon, while a fierce battle is in progress, and moves into the lines of the 72nd Tank Battalion, just outside Yongsan. Meanwhile, the lost detachment of Sergeant Freeman remains behind enemy lines for five days, but the entire detachment, including the wounded, re-enters U.S. lines. The small band had re-climbed the crest on the night of August 31 to escape harm. However, the

281 remnant troops of TF Manchu are still stranded on a southern knoll on Hill 209, having withstood severe attacks against its small, but rigid, perimeter since the previous day. At dawn, the beleaguered command, led by Lieutenant Schmitt, easily spots large numbers of dead enemy troops to the front of the perimeter; however, ammunition and supplies, especially grenades, are becoming scarce. At 0900, a keen eyed sergeant, Travis Watkins, detects two enemy troops about fifty yards from the perimeter. Watkins takes quick action and eliminates both, and then he bolts from the line to confiscate their weapons and grenades. During this dangerous advance, three other enemy troops who are concealed about twenty yards away open fire on Watkins, who returns fire, killing all. The resilient sergeant returns to the perimeter with the weapons and ammo of the five enemy troops. In the process, he also takes the time to bring back the insignia from the uniforms. Soon after, six more enemy soldiers venture very close to the perimeter and firmly entrench themselves, then lob grenades toward a machine gun position 25 yards away. Once again, Watkins, now suffering from a head wound, springs into action with his rifle. Standing conspicuously, Watkins ferociously engages the enemy. While he is singlehandedly engaging the Communists with his rifle, the enemy has opened fire on him with a deadly machine gun. Shells rip into his left side, snapping his back and causing instant paralysis from the waist down. Despite the menacing wounds and incalculable pain, Watkins takes out all six enemy troops before collapsing back into his foxhole. The sergeant’s maneuverability has been severed, but there is no lack of courage. Confidently, Watkins assumes the role of cheerleader and he inspires the desperate command to continue the fight. Watkins refuses his share of the remaining rations, claiming that he doesn’t deserve food because he is no longer able to engage the enemy. Meanwhile, no reinforcements arrive to rescue the men on the desolate Hill

September 2, 1950 209. Later in the day, a liaison plane attempts to drop supplies into the cramped perimeter, but threading the needle in this case is too difficult, and the supplies hit the slopes within the lines of the North Koreans. Undaunted, another attempt is made to drop supplies during the evening, but it, too, misses the mark. Nevertheless, Lt. Schmitt and several troops recover some rations, ammunition and grenades, and then they spot a small bonanza consisting of twenty-one airdelivered cans of beer. In the meantime, the enemy coerces an American prisoner to march up the hill and deliver an ultimatum: “You have one hour to surrender or be blown to pieces.” Schmitt scorns the warning and his troops tighten the line. In less than one hour, enemy machine guns deployed atop the embattled contingent commence firing. A heavy dose of antitank fire, followed shortly thereafter by mortar fire originating on a higher ridge to the east, strikes Schmitt’s positions on Hill 209. The command, however, holds. As the enemy guns silence in cadence with the setting sun, the dwindling number of determined defenders prepare for the suspected night attacks. And they come on schedule. During these pressing hours, more heroics occur. PFC Joseph Ouellette, Company H, 9th Regiment, braves the fire to retrieve ammunition and weapons from the nearby enemy dead. He also attempts to retrieve some air-dropped water cans. Ouellette makes it to the water cans, but all have been cracked open and are empty. His subsequent trip to retrieve ammunition is successful, but not until he encounters and kills an enemy soldier in close-quartered fighting. On the following day (September 3), when the enemy repeatedly attacks the perimeter, Ouellette comes under constant grenade bombardment, chasing him from his foxhole six times. He jumps from the foxhole and returns fire while standing totally exposed. His extraordinary courage under fire costs Ouellette his life. OuelletteHe receives the Medal of Honor posthumously. As this day fades, the fighting on Hill 209 closes in

U.S. tank and infantry in action against enemy during September.

September 2, 1950 fury, but despite the Americans’ numbers having been cut in half, they defy the heavy odds and retain the hill. Nonetheless, the situation for the following day remains grave. No reinforcements arrive and there is no water, and nearly all the ammunition has been expended. In addition, the list of wounded climbs steadily, but only one medic, with the scantiest of supplies, is with the detachment. Lieutenant Schmitt is wounded but able to continue in command. Meanwhile, the area around Yongsan is becoming an inferno due to the infusion of enemy troops that moved into the town on the previous night. At about 0300, sentries (Company D, 2nd Engineer Combat Battalion) detect a long column of people donned in white clothing moving through Yonsan toward the blockage east of the town. Word of the unidentified crowd is immediately passed on to Company A, which prepares for any eventuality. Requests for identification are answered by a barrage of fire, terminating the early morning mystery. The engineers react promptly, and another day of vicious fighting is underway. With the arrival of dawn, the North Koreans attempt to commit reinforcements into the blazing battle, but Lieutenant Lee Beahler’s Company D, which had taken positions on the dominating hill above Yongsan on the previous day, retains its hold and unleashes a relentless blanket of fire. Without pause, the engineers and their supporting tanks manifest resolute resistance, despite the lack of artillery and mortar support fire. Company D improvises, combining the firepower of its nine older 2.36-inch rocket launchers and nine recently arrived 3.5-inch new model bazookas to shred the advancing enemy infantry. Intertwined with the menacing bazooka fire, eight machine guns and tank fire further decimate the attackers. Many North Koreans who escape this enfilade and the avenging tanks are cut to pieces by the effective fire of the riflemen. Those who advance even closer are greeted by a savage barrage of grenades. By about 1100, the blood-bath fighting on the fringes of Yongsan and on the slope of the hill south of it subsides. Temporarily, the enemy’s attempt to burst forward and drive east toward Miryang is thwarted, and their ranks are now greatly diminished. Enormous amounts of enemy dead are splattered over the landscape, in and near large quantities of destroyed enemy equipment. The tankmen of Companies A and B, 72nd Tank Battalion, the combat engineers and the 2nd Division Reconnaissance Company have bought some additional time for Eighth Army, but at a terrific price. Company A, 2nd Engineer Battalion, sustains 12 troops killed and 18 wounded. Lieutenant Beahler is the only officer of Company D who is neither wounded nor killed. In the meantime, Colonel Hill, commanding officer, 9th Regiment, begins regrouping about 800 troops of the 9th Regiment who have withdrawn east from their river line perimeter. The troops include Companies E and F, which had been bypassed by the primary enemy advance across the Naktong. During the afternoon, the

282 reorganized 2nd Battalion, 9th Regiment, and some supporting tanks advance through the positions of Company A, 2nd Combat Engineer Battalion, then commence a counterattack. The inclusion of the 2nd Battalion tilts the scales and by 1500, Yongsan is resecured. However, some enemy tanks remain in the area. Two bazooka teams (Company A, 2nd Engineer Bn.) join the battle and eliminate three T-34s, located and engaged slightly west of Yongsan. Additional enemy tanks are decimated by other ground units and by arriving planes. In essence, the North Koreans have been intercepted, engaged and routed at Yongsan. By dusk, the enemy is moving west heading into the hills. Following the retirement of the enemy, the 2nd Battalion, 9th Regiment, and Company A, 2nd Engineer Combat Battalion, spread out about one mile beyond Yonsan, the former to the northwest and the latter to the west. General Walker arrives at the 2nd Division front at about noon and he makes his position clear: he demands a “stand or die defense.” At 1315, Walker attaches the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade to the 2nd Division. In conjunction, Walker orders every available unit of the 2nd Division, including the recently arrived Marines, to destroy the enemy east of the Naktong and retake the river line. Also, Eighth Army directs the 24th Division Headquarters and the 19th Regiment to pick up and head for Susanni, situated about 15 miles east of the junction of the Nam and Naktong Rivers and about eight air miles south of Miryang. From those positions, the units can be sped into the 2nd or 25th Division sector, depending upon the need. In the 23rd Regimental sector, at Changnyong, the villagers begin evacuating the town about 1300, sending a clear message that the enemy is close by. Shortly afterward, Major Jack Young and Captain Harry H. White, holding positions with their small force of about 300 South Korean police, decide to evacuate when they detect two separate enemy contingents approaching from the northwest and southwest respectively. The contingent retires eastward to fade into the hills there. Later, during the night, the enemy troops occupy Changnyong. Meanwhile, communications have ceased between the northern force (TF Haynes) and the more southern units, the 9th Regiment and the 2nd Division Headquarters, prompting General Haynes to dispatch three tanks to Yongsan in an effort to reopen the communications. However, the task is difficult and costly for Company C, 72nd Tank Battalion. Two tanks are lost while fighting their way along the Yongsan Road. Nonetheless, Captain Manes R. Dew’s tank completes the trek and appraises General Joseph Bradley of the situation in TF Haynes zone. In the 38th Regiment sector, north of the 23rd Regiment, the enemy retains its grasp on Hill 284, threatening the regiment’s command post. Colonel Peploe’s command is dispersed widely. The 2nd Battalion moves south to join elements of the 23rd Regiment and the 3rd Battalion advances along the Yongsan Road to rescue the

283 isolated 1st Battalion, 23rd Regiment, near Changnyong. The extreme right flank of the 38th Regimental zone is held by the 1st Battalion. During the night of the 2nd-3rd, enemy attacks force Company C, 1st Battalion, to evacuate Hyongp’ung. For the following two weeks, the town is under domination of the enemy or falls into the “no man’s land” category. The area north and east of the town and Hill 409 is mountainous terrain that also is classified as “no man’s land” for the first weeks of September, due basically to the fact that no genuine U.N. defenses are entrenched there. Farther north, about four miles distant, the Yongp’o bridge that spans the Naktong and serves as the dividing point between the 1st Cavalry and the 2nd Division is guarded by the 3rd Battalion, 23rd Regiment (attached 1st Cavalry Division). The cavalry battalion will be relieved by a British contingent in several days. The 3rd Battalion, 38th Regiment which had departed on the previous day, reaches the 1st Battalion, 23rd Regiment, having successfully overcome the enemy obstacles. Major Everett Stewart, battalion executive officer and acting commander, gets some forward contingents to Colonel Hutchins by 1700. During the night, the North Koreans attack the 3rd Battalion’s positions on Hill 209 north of the road and directly across from Hutchin’s positions at the pass. One company is dislodged, but otherwise the line holds. In other activity, a crucial meeting is held at the 2nd Division command post during the afternoon to consider strategy for an attack. Colonel William A. Collier, Eighth Army deputy chief of staff, and General Keiser, commanding officer, 2nd Division, attend. Brigadier General Edward Craig and Major Frank R. Stewart, both of the Marine Corps, are also there. A decision is made that an attack will be launched on the following day. In the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines, arrives at its blocking positions on the highway heading into Yongsan at 0630, with the balance of the brigade moving to its assembly areas throughout the day. General Craig arrives at 2nd Division headquarters at 0830 to discuss the brigade’s commitment. Following the meeting, Craig surveys the area by helicopter. At 1430, Craig returns to 2nd Division headquarters and is briefed by General Keiser on the deteriorating circumstances. Keiser urges Craig to initiate a large-scale assault during the afternoon, but Craig, pointing out the variables that prevent such an attack: the late hour, lack of air cover due to nasty weather and, most importantly, too many of his troops are still en route to their assembly sectors. General Craig requests that rather than launching a wide frontal attack, Keiser specify particular objectives for the brigade. General Keiser concurs. At 1900, Colonel Hill, upon his return to the 9th Regimental command post east of Yongsan, confers with Colonel Murray, 5th Marines, and informs him that the Marine departure line for the impending attack is secure. The various attack units begin to prepare and take their positions.

September 2, 1950 Company A, 2nd Combat Engineer Battalion, encounters strong enemy resistance during the night and it is prevented from reaching the high ground that is scheduled to be part of the departure line for the Marines. In conjunction, when the Marines launch their attack at 0800 on September 3 driving west, the 9th Regiment, USA, and its supporting units will attack northwest to establish contact with the 23rd Regiment. The 2nd Engineer Combat Battalion and some other supporting units will attack south of the Marines in support of their left flank, to re-establish contact with the 25th Division. Pusan Perimeter, Central Front, Taegu: North Korean Major Kim Song Jun, the operations and training officer of the N.K. 19th Regiment, 13th Division, surrenders. Kim Song Jun tells his captors that the North Koreans will launch a major offensive against the Pusan Perimeter at sunset. In other activity, the scheduled attack against Hill 518 (Suam-san) by the 1st Cavalry commences slightly after 1000, subsequent to preparatory artillery bombardment and a savage thirty-seven minute air strike against it and another target, Hill 346. The 7th Cavalry attack is supported by the 77th FABn, Battery A, 61st FABn, and Batteries B and C, 9th FABn. Additional support comes from a contingent of Battery B, 82nd FABn. The air strikes and the artillery are insufficient to diminish the resistance of the enemy and the ground attack quickly falters. In conjunction, the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, guards the left flank of the attacking 1st Battalion, and the untested 3rd Battalion holds ground to the rear of the 2nd Battalion in an existing hole between the 2nd Battalion and Hill 518. The terrain along which the attack advances is tight, forcing the 1st Battalion to spoon its troops forward directly into the range of the unmolested machine guns and mortars still deeply entrenched on the slopes of Hill 518. Unable to spread out, the attacking contingents become condensed from regimental capacity to about the size of a squad, severely diluting their offensive power. Enemy fire originating from the northeast on nearby Hill 490 is also pouring into the slim ranks of the advance troops, preventing them from reaching the summit. During this afternoon, the 1st Battalion aborts the attack, descends the hill and then advances against Hill 490. The North Koreans also retain this hill throughout the day. In the 8th Cavalry sector at the Bowling Alley, north of Taegu, the N.K. 13th Division launches a lightning-quick raid during the night, striking the regiment that is deployed to defend the Sanju Road. The 2nd Battalion, positioned on Hill 448 two miles north of Tabu-dong and west of the Bowling Alley, takes the brunt of the assault. The battalion is overwhelmed and easily pushed back. To the right, along the perimeter, Company E is unmolested, but nonetheless the unit becomes isolated and is forced to escape by a circuitous route. This unit will be committed to support a contingent of engineers when an attack is launched against Hill 755 on September 4.

September 3, 1950 Meanwhile, the 3rd Battalion establishes blocking positions, but here, too, the enemy penetrates. At about 0200 (Sept. 3), enemy infantry, bolstered by two tanks, pound against Company I, which is dug in along the road just north of Tabu-dong. The beleaguered company of the 3rd Battalion holds off the enemy attack, but it sustains heavy casualties in the process. The mauled 2nd Battalion moves back through the positions of the 3rd Battalion, which has reformed slightly south of Tabu-dong. The vicious fighting continues through the following day. In the mountainous area between the eastern sector and the Taegu sector, the N.K. 8th Division (II Corps) commences its attack toward Hayang, but progress is not forthcoming. The S.K. 6th Division mounts rigid and resolute resistance. Operating on the next road to the east, the N.K. 15th Division, considerably drained of its strength and operating with three regiments totaling only about 3,500 troops, launches its attack and drives against the S.K. 8th Division. The enemy division advances to Yongch’on by the 5th. Pusan Perimeter, Eastern Corridor: At Hill 99, located to the front of the S.K. 23rd Regiment, 3rd Division, north of Pohang-dong, enemy reinforcements from the N.K. 5th Division (N.K. II Corps) continue to move in and reinforce the contingents already there. Attempts by the S.K. 3rd Division to reduce the opposition have failed repeatedly, despite assistance by U.S. artillery, naval surface vessel fire and additional support from air strikes. The South Koreans sustain heavy casualties. This day, the U.S. 21st Regiment launches its attack to bolster the South Korean attempt to seize Hill 99. Departing from Pohang-dong, the 21st Regiment drives northwest, making slight progress at best, and in some places, no advancement is accomplished despite the accompaniment of one platoon of tanks (6th Tank Battalion), which shepherds the attack along the valley road between Hunghae and Pohang-dong. The hill, designated for capture by Company K, is retained by the enemy. The vicious fighting for control of the hill takes a high toll. By 1525, Company K stands at about thirtyfive men, due in part to the deluge of grenades thrust upon the attacking company. In addition, the tank platoon loses two tanks, one getting snagged in a minefield and the other lost after losing a track. By dark, the North Koreans are able to infiltrate and drive a wedge about three miles east of Kigye between the S.K. Capital and S.K. 3rd Divisions. In other activity, it is determined that the enemy is grouping for an attack, to be launched from the areas north and northwest of Kigye. An estimated 2,500 North Koreans have infiltrated between the S.K. Capital Division’s 17th and 18th Regiments. In Air Force activity, during an encounter with MiGs on this day, Captain Ralph D. Gibson, 335th FighterInterceptor Squadron, 4th Fighter-Interceptor Group, acquires two kills. Both MiGs go down near Sinanju, Korea, about 1245. Gibson later becomes an ace. Also,

284 Captain Richard S. Johns, 335th Fighter-Interceptor Squadron, 4th Fighter-Interceptor Group, knocks down a MiG during an encounter near Anju. — In Japan: At about 0935, Major General Doyle Hickey (deputy chief of staff, Far East Command) receives a telephone call from General Walker informing him about the situation along the perimeter. Walker specifies that the most severe threat is occurring in the terrain between the U.S. 2nd and 25th Divisions in the southwestern sector. Walker, who has already dispatched the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade toward Yongsan, wants to make sure MacArthur approves of its use before he commits it, and he is reassured by Hickey that General MacArthur has consented. This news relieves Walker, who had told General Hickey that he was of the opinion the line could not be restored at Yongsan unless he commited the Marines. In other activity, the fleet at Kobe, composed of about fifty vessels and the 1st Marine Division, receives some bad news concerning the imminent arrival of an unwelcome guest, Typhoon Jane. The storm is due to whack the port on the following day. All loading operations are suspended for thirty-six hours.

September 3

Southwest Pusan Perimeter: In the 25th Division sector, the 1st Battalion, 35th Regiment, still controls a confined perimeter on Sibidang, the extreme western position of the U.N. forces; however, the enemy has gained control of the terrain to its rear, including the primary supply road. On this day, at 0100, the North Koreans strike tenaciously at the defenses on Sibidang-ni, but the 1st Battalion and its supporting artillery units again deal out punishing blows. During the fierce contest, about fifty enemy troops penetrate the lines of Battery A, 64th Field Artillery Battalion, commanded by Captain Andrew Anderson. The enemy assault runs over two protective machine gun positions of the artillery, reaching the guns at 0300, but the artillerymen react rapidly, engaging the attackers in gruesome close-quartered hand-to-hand combat. Nearby, Battery C, 90th Field Artillery Battalion, throws its weight into the battle, providing an iron shield for the besieged Battery A, which forbids the entry of enemy reinforcements and permits Captain Andrew Anderson’s troops to continue the fight. Several guns are temporarily seized by the enemy, but they are soon regained. When the battle subsides at about sunrise, the enemy has been repelled and at great loss; 143 enemy dead are counted in the immediate front of the positions, and from this figure the 1st Battalion estimates total enemy casualties at about 500 troops. In conjunction, Battery A sustains 7 troops killed and 12 men wounded. During these first days of September, the guns (105s) of five batteries of the 64th and 159th FABns and Battery C, 90th FABn, supplement the 25th Division with 36 guns. The artillerymen claim the loss of more than 1,800 enemy troops in defense of the Nam River lines of the 25th Division sector. The striking power of the U.S. Air Force has played

285 a key role, as reported by General Kean, speaking on September 3: “The close air support rendered by Fifth Air Force again saved this division [25th] as they have many times before.” In November, General Walker says of the Air Force assistance: “I will gladly lay my cards on the table and state that if it had not been for the air support that we received from the Fifth Air Force we would not have been able to stay in Korea.” In other activity, Company G, 2nd Battalion, 35th Regiment, maintains its hold on Hill 179. The 2nd Battalion, 27th Regiment, which had commenced its attack to support the 35th Regiment on the previous day, fights to within 1,000 yards of the initial defensive positions of Company G, 35th Regiment. The point is reached at about 1300. Subsequently, the infantry, augmented by air strikes, armor and artillery fire, gnaws ahead and drives a lethal wedge into the enemy positions. By 1800, the front line perimeter is restored and in the process, large quantities of previously abandoned Company G equipment is reclaimed. Colonel Murch’s 2nd Battalion, 27th Regiment, retains control of the recaptured ground throughout the night of September 3–4, but on the following day, the battalion is directed to launch an attack to the rear to secure the western tip of the battalion zone, thereby opening the alternate supply route. The huge enemy penetration to the rear of the 25th Division lines has unquestionably tested the mettle of the division and its individual units, many of which are coerced into operating as self-sustaining contingents, relying on air drops and sporadic arrivals of armor while the elements of the 27th Regiment are advancing to their aid. The various isolated battalions, companies and platoons meet the test; however, more than 3,000 North Koreans (behind the lines) push them to the brink. During the horrendous skirmishes, evacuation of the wounded remains a grueling task. Attempts to resupply the beleaguered division exemplify courage and heroism. Nonetheless, the enemy manages to create much confusion while masterminding more abominable atrocities. In one instance, tanks spearheading a column of vehicles transporting hot food toward stranded Company G, 35th Regiment, encounter fierce resistance less than two miles from the objective. The tanks roar forward, sustaining no losses. But the enemy fire compels the majority of the mess vehicles to turn back. One segment of the column braves the fire and speeds forward to rejoin the tanks. Some of these troops are captured and tortured. One trooper remains concealed in a haystack, but another, his buddy, is not so lucky, and as the survivor relates, the anguished soldier proclaims: “You might as well kill me now.” The Communists execute him. Later, the body of the tortured American is discovered. His captors had severed his fingers and inflicted him with castration. Other dead Americans are also recovered when the enemy is driven from the 25th Division area. The enemy, prior to executing them, tied their hands and amputated their feet. Others had their tongues cut out of their mouths.

September 3, 1950 In other activity, the 3rd Battalion, 27th Regiment (3rd Bn. 29th Reg.), operating west of the “Horseshoe,” encounters several hundred enemy troops near the positions of the artillery and engages them during the morning hours. The battalion launches its attack at 1500. Colonel DeChow’s troops drive forward to reinforce the rear of the 24th Regiment by seizing control of the high ground, which overlooks the Horseshoe portion of the Masan Road, less than five miles east of Komam-ni. The advance, supported with only one piece of artillery, becomes arduous and soon after jumpoff, the force is intercepted by an enemy contingent comprised of more than 1,000 troops. The 3rd Battalion is struck hard by a fierce counterattack that inflicts heavy casualties, including thirteen officers. Planes bolster the attack by hindering the enemy thrust and more tanks arrive to lessen the brunt of the enemy counterattack. During one of the skirmishes, Lieutenant Elwood F. James, Company K commander, is killed while leading an assault. With the arrival of the air power and the reinforcing tanks, the 3rd Battalion overcomes the tenacious resistance and seizes the objective, and from these heights, the attack toward the 24th Regimental command post is scheduled to resume on the morning of the 4th. However, on the following morning, Colonel DeChow receives new orders of attack. At Masan, the situation is also critical, as the Communists have successfully nurtured a network of sympathizers and agents, enabling the North Koreans to easily receive reports on conditions within the town. While the fighting ensues, some enemy units are being engaged within a few miles from Masan. About four miles from Masan, at Changwon, an enemy contingent composed of about fifty guerrillas executes a surprise night raid, capturing a diminutive detachment of five Americans and two South Koreans at a radio relay station. Their tent on the crest of a hill is overtaken swiftly. The guerrillas confiscate the weapons and the various documents in the tent. The lone woman in the enemy unit, brandishing a Tommy gun, assumes the role of assassin and riddles the seven U.N. captives with shells, but two of the Americans survive. At the recovered positions of the 24th Regiment, several miles west of Haman, Colonel Check’s victorious 1st Battalion, 27th Regiment, is severely tested during the early morning hours. The North Koreans descend on the perimeter with great fervor, intending to dislodge the Americans, but the battalion is perched for the anticipated assault and unleashes some hefty firepower of its own. Some of the enemy troops strike at the battalion’s rear, but after a few improvisations the rear is blanketed with a ring of fire. Tanks are thrown into the battle and for some extra kick, mortars and artillery fire are catapulted toward the enemy, thinning their ranks considerably. Some precision coordination between the battalion command post and soaring aircraft provides a killing blow with meticulous timing that shatters the force of the assault. The pinpointed air strike assures victory for Check’s troops on

September 3, 1950 the ridge and delivers excruciating pain to the North Koreans. According to information acquired from a captured North Korean, four battalions had engaged Colonel Check’s 1st Battalion during the two-day contest (2nd3rd) and of these, about 1,000 enemy troops had been lost. The 1st Battalion, 27th Regiment, will be relieved on the following day. In the 2nd Division sector, 23rd Regiment zone, on Hill 209, it has been another abominable night for the remnant troops of TF Manchu, with no signs of improvement. Although daylight brings relief from infantry assaults, the devastating machine gun fire and mortars continue to ring the area, increasing the number of dead and wounded. The limp, bloodied bodies of expired Americans consume the hellish perimeter and the rapidly rising temperatures increase the stench as the third day progresses toward the fourth night. Still no reinforcements are en route to rescue the battleweary contingent and the repeated requests for air strikes and artillery support by Lieutenant Schmitt have gone unanswered, leaving the surrounded troops to fend for themselves. The enemy machine gun fire becomes more effective and upon the sighting of any American movement, grid-fire consumes the perimeter. Meanwhile, the devastating fire has mauled and destroyed the radio equipment, severing all communications with the other units. However, there is no lack of spirit, nor is there any slacking off of the galvanized heroism. Sergeant Watkins, paralyzed during the previous day’s gruesome fighting, continues to inspire the others to fight hard. Lieutenant Schmitt, also badly wounded, retains his boldness throughout the ordeal, until one of the deadly mortar shells scores a direct hit, killing him. Another of the conspicuous heroes, Sergeant Ouellette, makes the ultimate sacrifice while dodging grenades and attempting to fight off the enemy at extremely close range. Lieutenant Raymond McDoniel (platoon leader, Company D) assumes command after the death of Lieutenant Schmitt, and he provides equally proficient leadership that enables the forgotten command to forestall total annihilation. According to later accounts by participants, about twenty stiff attacks are thrown back. Some comfort is delivered during the night of September 3 when the usually pesky rain arrives, prompting immediate reaction. McDoniel plops two blankets in the open to absorb the falling water, and the remainder of the defenders shed their crusty uniforms to simulate McDoniel’s activity. The blankets collect enough water to swell a five-gallon water can and the uniforms provide water for the individual canteens. As darkness permeates the hill, the ill-equipped and greatly outnumbered remnants of TF Manchu continue to repel the enemy while attempting to evade the flying steel, exhibiting resolute determination. By the following morning (Sept. 4), the besieged troops have taken extremely heavy casualties (about fifty percent), including the loss of three of their five officers: Lt. Schmitt (Company H), Lt. Paul Kremser

286 (Company H) and Lt. Edmund Lilly, III (Company B). Meanwhile, at 0300, the 38th Regimental command post is besieged by about 400 enemy troops who spring an assault from their positions on Hill 284. Colonel Peploe utilizes all his available officers and every enlisted man in the vicinity to make up for his shortage of combat troops. Peploe also involves the artillerymen, mortarmen and tankers to forestall disaster. The grueling struggle continues until the 5th of September. Peploe’s repeated requests for planes to bomb the attacking enemy are refused, because the enemy and U.S. positions are too closely intertwined. However, some planes arrive to launch rockets and strafe the enemy positions with machine gun fire. In other activity, the 3rd Battalion, 38th Infantry, led by Major Stewart, having repulsed attacks on the previous night, remains at Hill 209, along with the nearby 1st Battalion, 23rd Regiment, which had been totally isolated until the arrival of Major Stewart’s command. Pusan Perimeter, Naktong Bulge: SECOND BATTLE OF NAKTONG BULGE Word has it that the Marines will again be facing the N.K. 4th Division, which had been decimated by the brigade during August. Its survivors and new recruits are moving behind the N.K. 9th Division. The 5th Marines begins to move forward at 0300 to form for its attack, but enemy resistance hinders the operation. At 0450, the 2nd Battalion’s trucks halt at a point about 800 yards from Yongsan to unload the troops. Soon after, the column marches into the town, encountering sniper fire. The battalion silences the resistance and moves through the town, reaching the road junction at its western end by 0630. Still, about 1,000 yards from its line of departure, the 2nd Battalion, under Colonel Roise, again comes under fire, originating from its right front. Roise advances an additional 500 yards and to his amazement, he discovers that the lines of the supporting 9th Infantry there had folded. To the left of the road, Roise spots a U.S. Army tank contingent posted to the rear of the small hill he has reached. To the front, Roise spots four tanks, two demolished and two abandoned. Beyond them lie two decimated enemy T-34s. To the right of the highway, there is also a distressing view. An earlier attack launched by the North Korean 9th Division at dawn has pushed back the Eighth Army contingents posted at the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, departure line. Meanwhile, General Craig and an accompanying officer land to the rear of Yongsan. They move by jeep to reach the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines CP, and discover that the battalion is somewhat off line. The 1st Battalion realigns itself as much as possible in the darkness. Eventually, the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 5th Marines, are in their respective assembly area, which is a long north-south ridgeline directly south of Myongni and about one thousand yards west of Yongsan, the 1st Bn. south of Yongsan and the 2nd Bn. north of it. The 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, deploys southwest of

287 Yongsan to guard the approaches from that direction. In conjunction, the 2nd Platoon, Company A, 1st Marine Tank Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Robert Winter, will push down the MSR from its positions about 500 yards west of Yongsan. Meanwhile, guarding the line of departure, Eighth Army contingents are deployed in the hills just west of Yongsan. Company G, 9th Regiment, is spread north of the highway leading west through Kogan-ni to the Naktong River. Company A, 2nd Engineer Combat Battalion, is dispersed southward across the road and Company F, 9th Regiment, holds the ground to the rear of the engineers. One unit, Company A, 2nd Engineer Battalion, has not reached its destination due to heavy enemy resistance on the previous night. At dawn, Company A, 2nd Engineers, led by Captain Frank Reed, commences an assault to seize the heights designated as part of the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines’ line of departure. Braving fierce enemy fire, the company ascends to within 100 yards of the crest. Captain Reed nears the top, but he is greeted by an enemy grenade. He snatches it and tosses it away from his troops, but he is wounded in the process. Meanwhile, the enemy continues to resist feverishly. Marine tank fire joins the fight to supplement the power of the ground troops and they seize the hill. However, enemy penetration is driving the 9th Regiment, USA, back. At 0645, Colonel Roise directs Marine tanks to speed forward and cover the 9th Regiment withdrawal from the heights in the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, zone. In addition, Marine tanks (2nd Platoon) led by Lieutenant Robert Winter move to positions adjacent to the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines’ command post and from there, they begin pouring support fire to aid the 9th Regiment. At 0700, the 2nd Battalion’s Companies D and E strike along the Yongsan–Myong-ni Road to clear the brigades’ right flank. In synchronization, while the final troops of the 9th RCT pull back from the 1st Battalion’s departure line, Colonel Roise orders artillery, mortars, machine guns, tanks and air strikes to pound the vacated ridgeline to the left front. Despite the huge bombardment, enemy fire still rings down on Company E, 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines, as it secures some hills below Myong-ni. On the previous day, these hills had been selected as the departure line for the 2nd Battalion, but they are now incorporated as part of Objective Number One. At 0800, Captain Samuel Jaskilka reports to Colonel Roise, confirming that Company E’s mission has concluded successfully. Roise then directs Company D to drive through Myong-ni and secure the hill slightly northwest of the village. By now the Eighth Army’s armor, posted at the southern part of the hill near the MSR, joins the Marine tanks. The 1st Platoon, Company A, 1st Engineer Battalion, also comes on scene, resulting in a massive display of firepower that instantly halts the progress of the N.K. 9th Division, but not its return fire. General Craig’s command post comes under wild fire, which wounds several men, including Lieu-

September 3, 1950 tenant Winter, who receives a neck wound. Another Marine who offers first aid to Winter is also wounded. Winter, wounded but not without his priorities and sense of humor, offers General Craig a bottle of whiskey that had somehow found its way into Winter’s tank. Two Navy chaplains, Lt. Commander Otto Sporrer and Lieutenant Bernard Hickey, approach the hill to comfort the wounded and they, too, are greeted by enemy machine gun fire, which thankfully misses all parties. Chaplain Sporrer quips: “Its lucky they’re poor shots.” At 0855, the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, initiates its attack from below Chukchon-ni, but the formation to the south is off course. Companies A and B quickly adjust by swinging northwest, with the former under Captain Stevens on the right and the latter under Captain Fenton advancing on the left. Each drives toward the enemy-held heights, about 1,000 yards distant. As the 1st Battalion advances through the rice paddy, enemy fire from the ridge strikes from long distance, causing some casualties. But U.S. return fire, including artillery and mortars, pounds the enemy positions. In addition, an Eighth Army tank destroyer posted on the hill south of Chukchon-ni bolsters Company A with its heavy reaching arm. The attack also receives support from planes and at one point, enemy resistance originating in a village at the base of the objective is terminated by the combined firepower of the tank destroyer and Marine recoilless rifles. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion is operating to the south. The 1st, 2nd and 3rd Platoons are spread out from right to left, the 3rd Platoon trailing slightly to guard the exposed left flank. While the Marines advance, they encounter stragglers from Eighth Army units, some of whom have been separated for as much as three days. Nearly all are wounded and none have weapons. While the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, moves to secure its objective, the 2nd Battalion, commanded by Colonel Roise, secures the 1st Battalion’s right flank, when its Company D secures Myong-ni, terminating the resistance there and then eliminating the resistance on the hill northwest of the village. But the enemy on Hill 117 situated to the immediate front of the 2nd Battalion, north of the main supply route and about 500 yards west of Myong-ni, brings Company D under machine gun and mortar fire. Colonel Roise is informed of the situation and actions to rectify the problem will be initiated just after noon in coordination with the 1st Battalion’s activity on the opposite side of the MSR. At 1100, Colonel Newton (CO 1st Bn.) is in contact with Captains Stevens and Fenton, Companies A and B, respectively, and both officers inform the battalion commander that the units are prepared to assault the ridge. At about that time, Newton orders the ridge bombarded by 81-mm mortars to neutralize the North Korean machine guns. In the meantime, the 2nd Platoon under Lieutenant Muetzel is stalled at a steep rise that leads to the crest. The 1st Platoon swings over to the right while the

September 3, 1950 3rd Platoon forms to the left. Upon cessation of the preparatory fire, Muetzel bolts to the front of his men, from where he yells the order “Attack!” Company A leaps forward, apparently screaming with enough volume to startle the enemy defenders and convince them to abandon their positions on the forward slope and speed toward the summit. This gives the Marines a needed pause. The riflemen and BARmen almost leisurely set up and begin popping shells into the enemy as they flee, killing most. When the remnants vanish over the peak, the Marines reinitiate their climb, securing the hill (first objective) within several minutes at about 1200. After seizing the first objective, the 1st Battalion begins evacuating its wounded and getting re-supplied while it prepares to move against its next objective. In the meantime, some unwelcome enemy fire from the reverse slope strikes the summit, wounding several men. Colonel Newton calls in air support and soon after, Corsairs arrive, plundering the enemy positions and prompting a post haste abandonment of the north slope. The North Koreans break for Hill 117, across the MSR, but Newton calls in artillery fire that catches the fleeing enemy in stride, effectively thinning their ranks as the slope and road become inundated with enemy dead and abandoned or destroyed equipment. However, many more escape to bolster Hill 117. As the two Marine infantry battalions engage their respective enemy contingents, the 2nd Platoon of tanks is still advancing down the road, encountering fierce resistance. At one point, enemy antitank weapons take the armor under fire and the unit incurs casualties as Marines open their hatches to scan the ground for concealed positions. Lieutenant Winter becomes wounded and Lieutenant John S. Carson takes command, but he is immediately struck by instantly fatal enemy machine gun fire. As the nasty morning fighting continues, the tanks rumble forward and unexpectedly stumble upon several T-34 tanks, igniting a concise but decisive duel. All three enemy tanks are demolished by 90-mm shells. Following the quick demise of the T-34s, the Marine tanks concentrate on a newfound abundance of targets, including antitank weapons and machine guns, as well as fast approaching reinforcements and rapidly retreating advance troops. The 3rd Platoon of tanks, led by Lieutenant Sweet, arrives at about noon to expedite the rout. The combined firepower of the M-26 tanks ensures more destruction for the Communists. One tank from the 2nd Platoon pokes its turret toward a suspected position of a concealed antitank weapon and commences firing, blowing another T-34 into oblivion. As the afternoon begins to unfold, another T-34 becomes a lucrative target. Its crew abandons the tank just prior to its destruction as it stands idle on the left side of the MSR. In the meantime, Lieutenant H.J. Smith, the recently appointed commanding officer, Company D, 2nd Battalion, remains in contact with Colonel Roise, updating him on the situation on the ridge northwest of

288 Myong-ni. When Roise is informed of the ongoing rout of the enemy on the ridge across the MSR and the flight of its defenders, he directs Lieutenant Smith to spring from the captured ridge and drive southwest to intercept the retreating enemy before they reach Hill 117. Driving from the north, Company D advances through the rice paddy and encircles the objective. In conjunction, Company E, 2nd Battalion, commanded by Captain Jaskilka, is unable to advance from the positions it gained during the morning due to the continuing enemy fire from the high ridge in the 1st Battalion (Company B) zone. Nonetheless, Company E supports the attack of Company D by pouring cover fire into Hill 117, in coordination with a platoon of 75mm recoilless rifles that deploy to the right of Company E. Return fire from the Communists emerges from a camouflaged T-34 tank, resulting in the death of two Marines of the recoilless rifle platoon and the wounding of seven others. Company D, 2nd Battalion, advances against nominal resistance, securing a hold on a spur of Hill 117, then it pivots south and moves toward the crest. Meanwhile, the throngs of enemy troops who abandoned the slope in the 1st Battalion sector greatly increase the numbers on Hill 117, placing Lieutenant Smith’s company in serious trouble. The isolated unit is strung out about 500 yards beyond the nearest contingent of the 2nd Battalion and it comes under severe fire, including mortars, automatic weapons and artillery. Resistance on Hill 117, now defended by about two enemy battalions, staggers Company D and places the newly won ground of the battalion in doubt as casualties soar. The afternoon brings with it a shift in the grueling combat. As the enemy resistance subsides in the 1st Battalion zone, it accelerates in the 2nd Battalion sector. At the 1st Battalion’s positions on Objective One and following its resupply, Colonel Newton orders it to seize Objective Two. Company A’s objective is Hill 91, which is linked to its present positions on the right by an extremely slim and dangerously jagged ridge, guaranteeing a laborious advance. The objective lies to the front, beyond a 200 yard valley. Company B’s portion of the objective is the connecting ridgeline of its earlier gained ground. The ridge runs parallel with the MSR for about 1,000 yards and contains four prominent peaks. Prior to launching the attack, the troops of both companies peer toward their respective objectives in awe of the crushing preparatory fire, which includes the massive guns of the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines, and the circling aircraft of MAG-33. The devastating bombardment further fractures the enemy resistance in the 1st Battalion zone, prompting additional throngs of Communist troops to flee their positions. The good news for the 1st Battalion is not necessarily terrific tidings for the 2nd Battalion. The retreating enemy troops dart to the area under attack by Roise’s 2nd Battalion, compounding the problem there. During the afternoon, the 9th Regiment, USA, drives forward, clearing the area north of the 5th Marines’ attack zone.

289 At 1510, the 1st Battalion jumps off, gaining the momentum at once. Fenton’s Company B sweeps across the ridge during its 1,000-yard jaunt, and it advances speedily. Fenton contacts Colonel Roise (2nd Battalion), telling him to expect an influx of enemy troops who are hastily sprinting toward his lines. Company B’s objective, a peak lying directly across the road from Hill 117, falls within about one hour. Simultaneously, Company A, led by Captain Stevens, moves to seize its objective, using its machine guns and 1st Platoon to provide cover fire. The 2nd Platoon launches a frontal assault, but only as a ruse. While the enemy anticipates being struck by Lieutenant Muetzel’s platoon, the 3rd Platoon, under Captain Fox, has worked its way south to strike the main blow against Hill 91 by assaulting the enemy’s right flank. But several strategy flaws develop during the tedious march. The 3rd Platoon’s envelopment maneuver remains undiscovered by the enemy while it nudges toward the right flank by keeping close to the banks of a rice paddy. However, Captain Fox, unaware of when the artillery barrage will cease, holds his squads back from the assault line to ensure additional safety. Upon cessation of the bombardment, the stunned enemy springs back into position, and Fox’s caution allows the enemy sufficient time to prepare for the attack. The 3rd Platoon advances too far up the slope as it emerges from the draw and finds itself an easy target of enemy grenades and machine gun fire. The three squads of the 3rd Platoon are split by an iron seam. Two squads remain pinned on the left side of the draw and the other is totally stymied on the right. By now, the North Koreans pour fire upon the stalled platoon, inflicting casualties, including a debilitating wound incurred by Captain Fox. Sergeant George Bolkow assumes command of the platoon and moves it forward. Extemporaneously, Corporal Virgil Henderson stimulates the 3rd Platoon. He defiantly leads his 3rd squad toward the rear of one obstinate machine gun, and with sudden swiftness, the menacing obstacle is demolished. During the attack, an enemy bullet wickedly whips into Henderson’s jaw. In the meantime, Corporal Raymond Stevens’s squad, stalled on the right, maneuvers around the enemy’s left flank to add pressure to the lethal vise. Meanwhile, the 2nd Platoon receives word over its SCR radio that Fox has been wounded, prompting instinctive action on its part. Lieutenant Muetzel, erroneously convinced that the 3rd Platoon has been permanently stalled, requests and receives