The Last Invasion of Canada: The Fenian Raids, 1866-1870 (Canadian War Museum Historical Publications, No 27)

The Last Invasion of Canada

Canadian War Museum Historical Publication No. 27

Canadian War Museum Historical Publications Series editor: Fred Gaffen Previous Titles in the Series [ 1 ] Canada and the First World War, by John Swettenham. Ottawa: Canadian War Museum, 1968, Bilingual. OUT OF PRINT. [2] D-Day, by John Swettenham. Ottawa: Canadian War Museum, 1969. Bilingual. OUT OF PRINT. [3] Canada and the First World War, by John Swettenham. Based on the Fiftieth Anniversary Armistice Display at the Canadian War Museum. Toronto: Ryerson, 1969. Published in paperback. McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1973. OUT OF PRINT. [4] Canadian Military Aircraft, byj. A. Griffin. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1969. Bilingual. OUT OF PRINT. 5. The Last War Drum: The North West Campaign of 1885, by Desmond Morton. Toronto: Hakkert, 1972. 6. The Evening of Chivalry, by John Swettenham. Ottawa: National Museums of Canada, 1972. French edition available. 7. Valiant Men: Canada's Victoria Cross and George Cross Winners, ed. by John Swettenham. Toronto: Hakkert, 1973. OUT OF PRINT. 8. Canada Invaded, 1775-1776, by George F.G. Stanley. Toronto: Hakkert, 1973. French edition available. 9. The Canadian General, Sir William Otter, by Desmond Morton. Toronto: Hakkert, 1974. Bilingual. OUT OF PRINT. 10. Silent Witnesses, by John Swettenham and Herbert F. Wood. Toronto: Hakkert, 1974. French edition available. 11. Broadcast from the Front: Canadian Radio Overseas in the Second World War, by A.E. Powley. Toronto: Hakkert, 1975. 12. Canada's Fighting Ships, by K.R. Macpherson. Toronto: Samuel Stevens Hakkert, 1975. OUT OF PRINT. 13. Canada's Nursing Sisters, by G.W.L. Nicholson. Toronto: Samuel Stevens Hakkert, 1975. Bilingual. OUT OF PRINT. 14. RCAF: Squadron Histories and Aircraft, 19241968, by Samuel Kostenuk and John Griffin. Toronto: Samuel Stevens Hakkert, 1975. Bilingual. OUT OF PRINT.

15. Canada's Guns: An Illustrated History of Artillery, by Leslie W.C.S. Barnes. Ottawa: National Museums of Canada, 1979. French edition available. 16. Military Uniforms in Canada 1665-1970, by Jack L. Summers and Rene Chartrand, and illustrated by R.J. Marrion. Ottawa: National Museums of Canada, 1981. French edition available. 17. Canada at Dieppe, by T. Murray Hunter. Ottawa: Balmuir, 1982. French edition available. 18. The War of 1812: Land Operations, by George F.G. Stanley. Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1983. French edition available. 19. 1944: The Canadians in Normandy, by Reginald H. Roy. Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1984. French edition available. 20. Redcoats and Patriotes: The Rebellions in Lower Canada, 1837-38, by Elinor Kyte Senior. Stittsville, Ont.: Canada's Wings, 1985. French edition available. 21. Sam Hughes: The Public Career of a Controversial Canadian, by Ronald G. Haycock. Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1986. 22. General Sir Arthur Currie: A Military Biography, by A.M.J. Hyatt. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987. 23. Volunteers and Redcoats - Rebels and Raiders: A Military History of the Rebellions in Upper Canada, by Mary Beacock Fryer. Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1987. 24. Guarding the Goldfields: The Story of the Yukon Field Force, ed. by Brereton Greenhous. Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1987. 25. Toil and Trouble: Military Expeditions to Red River, by George F.G. Stanley. Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1989. 26. Tangled Web: Canadian Infantry Accoutrements, 1885-1985, by J.L. Summers. Museum Restoration Service/ Canadian War Museum, 1991. For further information on these titles, please write to the Canadian War Museum, Ottawa, Canada K1A OM8.

— Hereward Senior —

The Last Invasion of Canada The Fenian Raids, 1866-1870

Dundurn Press

Toronto & Oxford 1991 in collaboration with the Canadian War Museum Canadian Museum of Civilization

Copyright © Canadian War Museum, 1991 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, except brief passages for purposes of review, without the prior permission of Dundurn Press Limited. Design and Production: JAQ Copy Editor: Michelle Maynes Printing and Binding: Gagne Printing Ltd., Louiseville, Quebec, Canada Dundurn Press wishes to acknowledge the generous assistance and ongoing support of The Canada Council, The Book Publishing Industry Development Programme of the Department of Communications and The Ontario Arts Council. Care has been taken to trace the ownership of copyright material used in the text, including the illustrations. The author and publisher welcome any information enabling them to rectify any reference or credit in subsequent editions. In the writing of this book the inferences drawn and the opinions expressed are those of the author himself, and the Canadian War Museum is in no way responsible for his presentation of the facts as stated. J. Kirk Howard, Publisher

Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data Senior, Hereward The last invasion of Canada Co-published by the Canadian War Museum and the Canadian Museum of Civilization. ISBN 1-55002-085-4 1. Canada - History - Fenian Invasions, 1866-1870. I. Canadian War Museum. II. Canadian Museum of Civilization. III. Title. FC480.F4S46 1991 F1032.S46 1991

Dundurn Press Limited 2181 Queen Street East Suite 301 Toronto, Canada M4E 1E5

97l.04'8

C91-094668-X

Dundurn Distribution 73 Lime Walk Headington Oxford, England OX3 7AD

— In memory of— Elinor Kyte Senior

We are a Fenian brotherhood, skilled in the arts of war, And we're going to fight for Ireland, the land that we adore. Many battles we have won, along with the boys in blue And we'll go and capture Canada, for we've nothing else to do.

— Captain John A. Macdonald,

Troublous Times in Canada: A History of the Fenian Raids of 1866 and 1870

— Contents —

Preface

9

1 The Military Tradition of the Irish Revolutionary Movement

11

2 The Military Institutions of the British North American Provinces

23

3 Preparations for the Fenian Raids

31

4 The Campobello Fiasco

45

5 Ridgeway

59

6 The Problem of Frontier Patrol

91

7 Operations on the Quebec Frontier

109

8 Preparations for the Fenian Raids of 1870 9 The Raids of 1870

131 147

10 The Raid against Manitoba

173

11 Conclusions

187

Abbreviations

192

Notes

193

Bibliography

211

Index

219

Border volunteers stand over a Fenian slain during the Battle ofEccles Hill, 1870.

— Preface —

THE FENIAN RAIDS ARE ONE of the many points where Irish, American and Canadian history meet. They provided folklore for the Irish, military history for the Canadians, and social and some diplomatic history for the Americans. This volume is concerned solely with the military aspects of the Fenian raids; in The Fenians and Canada, I dealt with the political dimension. This work provides details of military operations that could not easily fit into a volume devoted largely to politics. As the Fenians were scattered over the three continents of Europe, North America and Australia and flourished for nearly a generation, it is difficult to tell the entire story. Yet the military aspects of Fenianism in North America are of manageable proportions, even though they appear as a series of episodes rather than a single event. The literature on the Fenian raids is discussed in the introduction to the bibliography. In producing this work, I am greatly indebted to Fred Gaffen of the Canadian War Museum for his constant help in all aspects of preparing the manuscript. Professors George F. Stanley and Reginald Roy have vastly improved the quality of the text with their helpful suggestions, although only I am responsible for its shortcomings. Margaret Blevins, my sister-in-law, Jean Kyte, and my son-in-law Karl Stiefenhofer were helpful with the typing. I owe a good deal to Elizabeth Allen for her patience and efficiency in putting a draft on a word processor. Bruce Dolphin of the McGill University Archives has been of valuable assistance providing military details and pictures. Tim Locke and Elaine Burton have contributed much-appreciated skills in getting the manuscript —

g—

— The Last Invasion of Canada — into its final form. Gerald lies of Montreal has been of great help with pictures, and Bill Constable of the Directorate of History likewise with the maps. I would like to thank Elizabeth Hale of the David M. Stewart Museum, and the Brome County Historical Society. In addition, I thank the staffs of the Notman Collection at the McCord Museum of Canadian History, the National Archives of Canada, and the Rare Books and Special Collections Departments and the Lande Room of the McLennan Library at McGill University. Finally, I would like to acknowledge my indebtedness to my wife, Elinor Kyte Senior, a far greater military historian than myself, who died on 23 June 1989. Hereward Senior

— 10 —

—1—

The Military Tradition of the Irish Revolutionary Movement The wild geese are flighting. Heads to the storm as they faced it before. Where there are Irish, there's bound to be fighting and when there's no fighting, it's Ireland no more. — Rudyard Kipling, The Irish Guards

T

HE RAIDS AGAINST Canada gave the Fenian Brotherhood a place in Irish folklore. That, perhaps, was the unconscious purpose for which the organization was created. In terms of Irish military history, these operations were only a few among the many episodes in a long, bitter and sometimes bloody story. But they were more important to Canadians than to Irishmen, if only because they afforded a whole generation of Canadian militiamen a chance for active service and aroused in Canada a martial spirit when it was much needed. In purely military terms, the raids were a series of clashes between Irish veterans of the American Civil War, mobilized by a voluntary society, the Fenian Brotherhood, and volunteers, organized by the Canadian government. Although Imperial troops were still present in Canada, the main shock of the Fenian attacks was taken by Canadian militiamen, part-time soldiers who had acquired their training during a few hours' drill a week supplemented, in some cases, by a week or so in summer camp. Very few of these part-time officers or men had heard a shot fired in anger, but their battle— 11 —

— The Last Invasion of Canada —

hardened opponents lacked strong political support and orderly mobilization. Their political supporters could cheer them on but do little else for them once they were in the field. The Fenian raids were, therefore, little other than a test of stamina, for both the Canadian militia and the Fenians; both met the test according to their needs. The militia secured the frontier against major intrusions, while the Fenians, by a spectacular victory at Ridgeway, justified the existence of their organization in the eyes of their followers and convinced many North Americans, British and Yankee, that they were a force to be reckoned with. An understanding of the origin and nature of the Fenian threat to Canada must begin with an examination of the military traditions of the Irish overseas. Ireland began to export military talent very early in its history. The losers in tribal warfare, those who resisted the English conquest and those who resisted the Reformation, all had reason to take service in foreign armies. After the defeat of King James II in the Campaign of 1690, there was an exodus of Irish military talent into the armies of Catholic powers on the Continent, principally France and Spain, Catholics being no longer welcome in the British service. By degrees, the Irish military tradition was diffused among most of the armies of Europe, with Protestant Irish making up a large contingent in the British forces. Towards the end of the eighteenth century an effort to bring Catholic and Protestant together in a republican United Irish Society added a new dimension to the Irish military tradition that was to have consequences for the Irish in America.1 In Ireland itself there was both a conventional and a guerrilla military tradition. Many Irishmen were fond of uniforms and drill, and while revolution shook America, there emerged in Ireland a volunteer movement or Home Guard. This movement was armed by the government but supplied its own uniforms and remained under the control of the landlords and various private associations. Towards the end of the American Revolution it became politicized, won legislative independence for Ireland and then withered away. Two volunteer corps survived, one in Belfast and one in Dublin, both coming under the sway of radical nationalists who invited Catholics to join their ranks. — 12 —

— The Military Tradition —

At the same time several networks of secret societies took root among the peasantry, for instance the Catholic Defenders and Protestant "Orange Boys." These functioned as agricultural trade unions, employing terrorist tactics against landlords and against one another. As these secret societies included many former soldiers and engaged in secret drilling from time to time, it would seem that the Irish preferred conventional military organization but would accept guerrilla warfare as a second best. Most of the Irish immigrants to eighteenth-century America were Protestants, and it is not surprising that the American expedition against Montreal in 1775 was commanded by General Richard Montgomery, an Ulsterman and former British officer. The Catholic population in America, being fairly small, played a subordinate role in the Revolution. Even so, Catholics fought on both sides. Loyal Catholic Volunteers were organized during the siege of Boston, and Lord Rawdon's Corps, an Irish unit, paraded on 17 March 1779 in New York, while the city was still under British occupation. Incidentally, this demonstration marked the first St. Patrick's Day parade in New York.2 The United Irish Society was founded in Ireland in 1791 and soon expanded to America in an effort to link Irish and American republicanism. With the outbreak of war in Europe, the United Irish joined with agents of the French republic in efforts to draw the United States into war with Great Britain. These efforts antagonized the ruling Federalist administration in America, and it is no accident that the first American prosecuted under the Alien and Sedition Act was Matthew Lyon, an Irish Catholic from Vermont.8 During the same period, David McLane was executed in Quebec City on the charge of stirring up social unrest in the interest of Jacobin France.4 With the collapse of the uprising in 1798, the United Irish movement became a spent force in Ireland, but in the United States it lingered, stimulated by the arrival of republican exiles and the advent of the Jeffersonian administration. Great hopes were again aroused in the hearts of Irish republicans when the war with Britain broke out in 1812. The Hibernian Society and the Tammany Club pledged toasts to the memory of General — 13 —

— The Last Invasion of Canada — Montgomery, and the editor of the New York Shamrock wrote that Ireland's wrongs would be avenged on the plains of Canada. Irishmen were urged to prove their loyalty to America by enlisting in the American forces, and those who were not yet citizens were reminded that they would have to register as aliens.5 The support of what soon became an unpopular war aroused resentment among conservative Americans and there was some talk of limiting the rights of naturalized citizens, but the Irish were only a minor irritant because their numbers were as yet insignificant. The massive Irish immigration that began with the end of the wars in Europe in 1815 and reached a climax during the famine years of the mid-1840s brought few revolutionaries to America. Under the influence of a Catholic revival and the personality of Daniel O'Connell, the Irish were content to create non-revolutionary societies that carried on agitation in the cause of Irish nationalism. This had important consequences for Canada. During the period of the Canadian rebellions and raids along the frontier from 1837 to 1840 there were no active Irish conspiratorial organizations in Ireland or the United States. Daniel O'Connell, who supported the Melbourne government then in power in England, opposed the Canadian rebellions as a matter of course. Moreover, the years leading up to the Canadian rebellions had been difficult for the growing Irish population in the new world. A rising tide of anti-Catholic nativism and nationalist agitation resulted in the burning of an Ursuline Convent near Boston in 1834.6 In Canada, both the French Canadian Patriotes and the Upper Canadian Reformers supported a head tax on immigrants and denounced pauper immigration. It is not surprising that Orangemen and Catholics united to support the government party in the Upper Canadian election of 1836, and filled the ranks of the militia in both provinces the following year when rebellion broke out.7 Some Irishmen, such as E.B. O'Callaghan, did support the Patriote cause and went into exile, and others, like E.A. Theller, carried on raids over the Canadian frontier, under the sponsorship of Hunters' Lodges.8 William Lyon Mackenzie courted Irish support, but without much success, while the

— 14 —

— The Military Tradition —

Hunters' Lodges were based upon a strongly Protestant, abolitionist and temperance-minded section of the American population.9 They welcomed Irish recruits into their military organization, but they could not easily cooperate whole-heartedly with Irish immigrant political organizations. Some efforts apparently were made to bring the Hunters and the O'Connellite Repeal Association together, as was reported by Father T.A. Pulby of the Parish of Patterson, New Jersey, in 1841.10 However, the Hunters, like the Fenians some thirty years later, blamed the American president - in this case, John Tyler - for interfering with their raids. As a whole, the Irish were interested in conciliating the authorities. In Canada they evinced pride in helping to put down rebellions, and even the Canadian Fenians insisted that the main burden of counter-revolution had been carried out by them.11 During the raids by the Hunters' Lodges, the American armed forces were small, the veterans of 1812 were overage, and the only people prepared for adventure were native Indians, settlers and frontiersmen. Their attitude had changed by the time of the Mexican War of 1846-48, a triumph for Manifest Destiny that coincided roughly with the revival of republicanism in Ireland. The Mexican War created thousands of veterans in the United States, many of them Irish, who could not be immediately reabsorbed into civilian life. Of the 4,000 American troops who crossed the Mexican frontier in 1846, nearly a quarter were Irish. Relations with their predominantly Protestant officers were poor, Roman Catholic padres were few, and there were complaints about compulsory Protestant church parades.12 Many responded to appeals that reminded them that Mexico was a Catholic power and to offers of 320 acres of Mexican soil to those who deserted and enlisted in the Mexican forces. Several hundred joined the Mexican-sponsored San Patricio brigade which turned out to be one of the most effective units in the Mexican army. The Patricios included in their ranks some excellent gunners who gave a good account of themselves in the early battles in the north and in the defence of Mexico City. In the final actions, eighty San Patricios were taken prisoner by the Americans, who hanged fifty-four and — 15 —

— The Last Invasion of Canada —

flogged another twenty-six, who were then branded with the letter D, for deserter, on their right cheeks.18 This treatment of the San Patricios aroused much resentment among Irish Americans, adding fuel to the indignation caused by the rising tide of nativist agitation, which crystallized in the founding of the Know-Nothing party in the mid-1850s. Irish Americans were beginning to acquire grievances against American society, later expounded by Thomas D'Arcy McGee, which were immediate, and independent of their historic quarrel with Great Britain. Nevertheless, Irish American nationalists felt the need to treat America as the promised land and their inclination to do so was greatly enhanced by the revival of republicanism in Ireland. This gave them common ground with their fellow Americans, affording the Catholic Irish the argument that Great Britain was the common enemy of Irishmen and Americans alike. Until his death in 1847, Daniel O'Connell maintained a policy of legal agitation that commanded the support of nearly all Irishmen. But in the last years of his life, O'Connell found himself challenged by a group of intellectuals who adopted the name Young Ireland. With the success of revolution in France in February 1848, they came under the influence of the republican revival in Europe and made plans for an uprising in Ireland. Amateur conspirators at best, their efforts fizzled out in a series of small encounters with Crown forces, with virtually no bloodshed. By July 1848 the revolutionary movement in Ireland had failed, but it lasted long enough to capture the imagination of Irish Americans. When John Mitchel arrived in the United States in the spring of 1848 as an emissary of the Irish Republic, $40,000 was collected at public meetings and veterans of the Mexican War offered to serve the cause.14 An Irish Republican Union sprang to life in the United States, and Lord Elgin, the governor general of Canada, received reports "that a secret combination of Irish in Montreal is on foot and bound together by oath having designs inimical to the government, that the number enrolled is at least 17,000, and that they look to the acquisition of arms and gun powder on St. Helen's Island."15 — 16 —

— The Military Tradition —

The numbers stated were unlikely, but even a handful was capable of creating a disturbance in Montreal, and the arrival in the city of Michael Thomas O'Connor, a delegate from the New York Irish Republican Union, suggested some substance to reports of such machinations. Placards appeared announcing a public meeting on 6 July 1848, calling on all friends of Ireland to attend. As it turned out, the conclave drew a crowd of a few hundred, which was soon dispersed by a downpour of rain. Lord Elgin decided not to take legal action against O'Connor because there was insufficient evidence for an indictment.16 Yet the fact that a meeting was held in Montreal made it possible to claim, at a public meeting in New York, that 6,000 had attended the Montreal event. Speaking as an authority on Canadian affairs, O'Connor declared, "It was not generally known that the late Canadian revolution [1837] was put down by the Irish." He further stated, "The Lion of England's whelp should be lashed - Canada be invaded - She herself loudly demands it." His listeners were reminded that much of the English garrison in Canada was Irish, and O'Connor assured them that "not 3,000 of the 10,000 British regulars in Canada would fight" for England.17 Elgin had been told that there were plans to mobilize 700,000 or 800,000 men under an American general recently returned from Mexico, and that 50,000 were ready to march. He did not dismiss the rumours completely, but wrote that the military would deal with "all Yankee and Irish marauders notwithstanding the swagger of the cutthroats from Mexico."18 These were times of depression and unrest, which in Montreal led to the burning of the Parliament Building and to the Annexation Manifesto of 1849; but the Irish republicans in the United States formed no links with internal discontent in Canada. D'Arcy McGee, then a republican exile in New York, encouraged Canadians to take advantage of England's difficulties to secure independence. He wrote, "Canada never had a better opportunity, India is involved with the Sikhs, Ireland is thoroughly desperate."19 Irish Canadians were encouraged to make friends with French Canadians and Indians yet not attempt to lead them into revolution but to await Canadian initiatives. Neither at this time nor later did Irish republicans — 17 —

— The Last Invasion of Canada — analyze the feeling of Canadians towards the Empire. They merely assumed that those living under British rule were its natural enemies. For the time being the substance of the invasion threat against Canada amounted to little more than a series of headlines in the Irish American press and a number of public meetings. Irish republicanism remained dormant until the Crimean War, but the presence of exiles ensured the existence of a republican-oriented press in America. D'Arcy McGee noted that twenty-five to thirty American militia companies were dominated by the Irish and estimated about 50,000 Irish Americans with military training.20 Among the older Irish corps was the Columbian Company of Artillery in Boston, which does not appear to have been under nationalist control. Yet the Irish Republican Union, transformed into the 9th Regiment (later known as the Fighting Sixty-Ninth), plainly emerged as an armed force under Irish nationalist control.21 For his part, McGee encouraged all Irishmen to acquire military training and study military science, noting that the military arts stood high among the republican virtues. A feeling existed among European republicans at this time that they formed an informal international brotherhood, and that established republics had an obligation to encourage republican movements wherever they arose. This feeling was not general among Americans, but it could not be ignored by those politicians who might suffer or profit by the immigrant vote. After all, had the American Revolution itself not grown out of a movement of constitutional protest, which in turn had created conventional armed forces? But times had changed. In the mid-nineteenth century, continental revolutionaries now looked upon the British government as the potential ally of liberal nationalism and on Britain as a place of refuge and base of operations. They were, consequently, embarrassed by the anglophobia of the Irish nationalists. The unique character of Irish republicanism became manifest with the outbreak of the Crimean War in 1854. Most continental revolutionaries, including Karl Marx, supported allied efforts, especially as the Russians had put down the Hungarian revolution

— 18 —

— The Military Tradition —

and were regarded as the arch-enemies of revolution. Moreover, as Louis Napoleon championed the cause of western as opposed to orthodox Christianity in the Near East, the Vatican also supported the war effort. In spite of all this, John Mitchel, the editor of the New York Citizen, opened negotiations with the Russian consul in New York to secure support for the landing of an Irish American force in Ireland. Strategic difficulties involved in evading the ships of the Royal Navy were put aside. Mitchel founded the Irishman's Civil and Military Republican Union, which drilled regularly in preparation for the projected landing. The sudden collapse of Mitchel's fortunes after a quarrel with Bishop Hughes of New York and his departure for Tennessee put an end to this Republican Union. Yet it was soon replaced by the Emmet Monument Society, named for Robert Emmet, the leader of a brief Irish rising in 1803, who had said that he wanted no monument "save a Free Ireland." This group included in its active leadership John O'Mahony and Michael Doheny. A third institution, the Emigrant Aid Society based in Boston, intended to support emigration from the United States to Ireland for those Irishmen prepared to return and liberate their country. The Emigrant Aid Society anticipated the Fenians by holding a convention, but none of these organizations survived the end of the Crimean War.22 Although these groups had no contact with Ireland they expected to land a force of 2,000 men and 10,000 guns, counting on a spontaneous rising to come to their aid. When the hope of naval support from Russia ended with the close of the Crimean War, John O'Mahony, Michael Doheny, John Roche and Olin Byrne decided that further activities in the United States could not be justified unless an underground organization in Ireland was created. Accordingly they sent a message to James Stephens, a former associate of O'Mahony and a minor figure in the rising of 1848, inviting him to found an Irish revolutionary movement and promising American financial aid as well as the help of trained officers.28 Stephens spent a great deal of time on the Continent studying secret society methods and thought of himself as a professional revolutionary. As his purpose was to lead an uprising — 19 —

— The Last Invasion of Canada —

in Ireland, he was consistently opposed to all operations directed against Canada. Stephens accepted the invitation, and in Dublin on 17 March 1858 founded the Irish Republican Brotherhood. O'Mahony became his nominal American deputy and, early in 1859, decided to call the American branch of the society the Fenian Brotherhood. Being a Celtic scholar, O'Mahony drew on his knowledge of Celtic folklore and took the name "Fenian" from Fianna, the ancient Irish tribal militia.24 From the beginning there were differences between the American and Irish Fenian movements. After his initial tour of organization in Ireland, Stephens complained that he had secured only £40 from the American organization, whereas his personal visit to the United States in the autumn of 1858 yielded £600. Mutual distrust led Stephens to accuse O'Mahony of withholding funds collected for the Irish movement, while O'Mahony had doubts about the size and efficiency of Stephens's organization in Ireland.25 It was money that Stephens needed, for he had sufficient numbers of former British soldiers to train his Irish recruits. In 1859, during the brief Anglo-French crisis, Stephens spent some time in Paris hoping to secure help from Napoleon III.26 Stephens's operations were secret. Yet O'Mahony, whose purpose was to raise money and organize military clubs, had to operate openly, although the name and nature of his organization were not immediately made known to the public. He listed in the Phoenix, a paper under Fenian control, some forty military clubs said to be linked with the Brotherhood. These went by a variety of names, such as Corcoran's Irish Legion, O'Mahony's Guard and the Phoenix Brigade. Some of them undoubtedly held regular drills and most paraded from time to time.27 It is unlikely that more than 4,000 men were involved at any given moment, but most of the Irish American community was aware of their existence and inclined to approve of their purpose. Drilling was a popular social pastime, and the idea that its ultimate purpose was the liberation of Ireland lent an air of romance to weekly exercises. Those who participated in them might, with some credibility, claim the prestige offered to those training for active — 20 —

— The Military Tradition —

service. It is impossible to say how far O'Mahony believed in the promise he made to Stephens to provide 5,000 disciplined men and supply 50,000 muskets for an Irish rising.28 Some plausible figure had to be selected if the enterprise was to be taken seriously. For his part, Stephens, who had merely appointed a number of local officers to swear in an undetermined number of recruits, must have realized that for the moment he could not have made effective use of such aid if it had been sent. As it stood in 1860, the Fenian Brotherhood posed no threat to anyone. The political fortunes of the Fenians, if not their military potential, were vastly improved by a remarkable transatlantic demonstration in 1861. An Irishman, Terence Bellew McManus, had been exiled to Australia for his part in the rising of 1848. From there he escaped to California, where he enjoyed some prominence as a resident Irish nationalist, but never joined the Fenians. On his death in 1861, the Californian Fenians decided to send his body back to Ireland, holding a succession of memorial services at suitable places across America. This effort captured the imagination of the Irish everywhere. Even Archbishop Hughes, who was no friend of the Fenians, felt it best to say a Requiem Mass for McManus in St. Patrick's Cathedral in New York.29 Paul Cull en, archbishop of Dublin, was not prepared to support the demonstration in any manner and refused to permit clergy under his jurisdiction to say Mass for McManus. Yet Father Patrick Lavelle, a nationalist priest under the jurisdiction of Archbishop MacHale of Tuam, presided at a Mass that marked the burial of McManus, while most of Dublin turned out to watch the seven-mile-long funeral procession.80 This Fenian triumph was a peaceful demonstration, in spite of the revolutionary purposes of the organization. Yet it gave the Fenians, according to Stephens's testimony, control over Dublin crowds. Henceforth, he boasted that the Irish constitutionalist who, like The O'Donoghue, sought to continue the tradition of Daniel O'Connell, could hold meetings only with the consent of the Fenians.31 At the same time it provided the American Fenians with what appeared to be evidence that they were associated with a powerful society enjoying the support of the Irish people. — 21 —

— The Last Invasion of Canada — Recruiting and money-raising prospects in the United States thus were good, but they were not great enough to create a body of trained men capable of giving effective support to an Irish rising or of posing a serious threat to Canada. It was the American Civil War, which at first dissolved the Fenian military organization into the forces of the contending armies, that was to provide a formidable force of trained men.

— 22 —

— 2—

The Military Institutions of the British North American Provinces The people of Canada feel that should war come, it would be produced by no act of theirs. — Sessional Papers, 1863 (No. 115)

T

IE STATE OF the Canadian militia and the strength of the Imperial garrison, the two pillars of Canadian defence, tended to ebb and flow with wars and rumours of wars. Both French Canadian and Loyalist settlers had strong military traditions, and a considerable proportion of the British and Irish immigrants who flooded into the British American provinces after 1815 had seen military service. Former soldiers were encouraged to settle in the colonies where their pensions, when they had them, along with other military expenditures, provided a subsidy to the colonial economy. Under the existing militia laws all men between the ages of eighteen and sixty were liable for military sendee, with clergy, Quakers and a few others excepted. The male population was enrolled in militia regiments, which held annual parades. Officers were appointed for their social influence rather than their military talents. This sedentary militia, as it was called, could not take to the field except in a temporary or local emergency, as it would deprive society of its labour force. It provided a useful inventory of manpower and a base for training volunteers. If volunteers proved

— 23 —

— The Last Invasion of Canada —

insufficient, men could be called up by ballot. When the dangers appeared to be both serious and prolonged, there was recourse to raising fencible regiments, regulars eligible for service in North America for the duration of an emergency. Such formations were usually called fencibles after similar corps first raised in Scotland, and sometimes referred to as colonial corps. Improvised local volunteers and British regulars met the emergency posed by the Rebellions of 1837, but during the subsequent raids across the frontier by the Hunters' Lodges, fulltime local troops were raised to patrol the border. By 1839 they numbered 21,000, about three times the size of the American regular army. Two of these corps, the Provincial Cavalry, which patrolled the southern frontier of Lower Canada, and the Coloured Company, which patrolled the Welland Canal, survived until 1849.1 Apart from fencibles and part-time volunteers, some use was made of conscription. In 1803, 1,200 men were called up for twenty-eight days' service in Lower Canada. Again during the Chesapeake-Leopard affair in 1807-08, one fifth of the militia was called out. In Upper Canada, a few months before the outbreak of the War of 1812, General Brock called for volunteers from the sedentary militia to form "flank companies." When volunteers proved insufficient, the flank company quota could be filled by ballot. In Lower Canada during the War of 1812 men were drawn from the sedentary militia for short periods of training in what was known as the Select Embodied Militia.2 After the 1812 war only a few volunteer units continued to meet and drill, but there were numerous regimental militia bands in existence. Much the same conditions prevailed after the Rebellions of 1837, when most of the hastily raised part-time volunteers ceased to hold regular drills. Meanwhile in the Maritimes, the government of New Brunswick found the uprising in Lower Canada and tensions along the Maine frontier sufficiently alarming to authorize the enrolment of 1,200 men in 1839. At the same time the Nova Scotia Legislature called for the mobilization of 8,000 militia out of a total of 25,000 to support New Brunswick if the need arose.8 There was then some precedent — 24 —

— The Military Institutions —

Officers commanding Montreal volunteers, 1860.

for mutual support among the provinces in the face of an internal or external threat. Until the Oregon crisis of 1845 there was no effort at militia reform in spite of the steady reduction in the Imperial garrison in North America. Yet, because reducing the garrison introduced the problem of guarding fortresses and military stores, it was decided to raise a colonial corps in 1840 from among discharged veterans and men in regiments about to leave Canada. This unit, designated the Royal Canadian Rifles, was available for service only in North America. It reached a strength of 1,100, sending in 1861 a detachment of 100 to serve in the Red River settlement, and remained in existence throughout the period of the Fenian Raids, being disbanded in 1871.4 Like the regulars raised for service in the colonies, the Royal Canadian Rifles were on the Imperial budget. Militia reform presented special difficulties because the funds for militia had to be voted by provincial legislatures. — 25 —

— The Last Invasion of Canada —

Reform to some degree came at last in 1846 with an act that divided the sedentary militia into two classes: one between ages eighteen and forty, to form the front line, another between forty and sixty to form a reserve. From the militia it was hoped to raise a force of 30,000 — volunteers if possible, by ballot if necessary. Volunteer corps of infantry, cavalry and artillery were authorized, but they were expected to organize and finance themselves. Many were indeed able to provide their own arms, probably because 11,116 weapons of the 46,222 distributed in 1837 had never been returned to the stores.5 A few useful corps came into existence at this time, including a battalion based on the Montreal Fire Brigade commanded by Col. James Ferrier,6 but the Militia Act of 1846 "to provide for the better defence of this province" left Canada without an effective volunteer militia. In December 1853 Francis Hincks, a leading figure in the United Provinces government, recommended confidentially to the governor general, Lord Elgin, that Britain should announce its intentions of withdrawing the Imperial garrison and turning over its land and military stores to Canadian control. At the same time Hincks warned Elgin's military secretary that it was "obviously most important that no Canadian should be supposed to have suggested any measure that would increase our burthens."7 Effective militia reform came at last with the outbreak of the Crimean War in 1854, the same year that the Irish Republican Union and the Emmet Monument Society began preparations for a seaborne invasion of Ireland. It was these volunteer militia, raised at this time with some later adjustments, that bore the brunt of the Fenian raids. The new Canadian militia modelled itself on volunteer corps already in existence in the United States. For instance, Montrealers applauded the drill and appearance of the Beninger Guards, a New York militia company that visited the city twice in 1854.8 Organized as military clubs, such American units gave men the chance to drill in congenial company and to buy their own uniforms. Within the limits of Canadian finance, companies raised in a similar manner might meet Canada's needs. Under the new Militia Act of 1855, authorization was given for raising 5,000 active part-time volunteers. These would comprise — 26 —

— The Military Institutions —

Lt. James Hanson, 1st Prince of Wales Regiment, 1862.

sixteen troops of cavalry, seven field batteries, five foot companies of artillery and fifty companies of infantry. Apart from this, 50,000 smooth-bore muskets (already obsolete compared with the new Model 1853 Enfield rifle carried by British regulars) were to be acquired with 100 rounds each for the use of the sedentary militia, and another 50,000 were to be kept in provincial arsenals. There were 22,000 weapons in Imperial stores, but the provincial legislatures refused to vote funds for their purchase.9 There would be no difficulty in finding arms for the volunteer militiamen who, under the terms of the act, would undertake twenty days of training a year, of which ten days would be continuous. Pay during the training was a dollar a day for privates, $2.10 for captains. Uniforms, purchased at the expense of the recruit, ran around $24 in Toronto and as high as $70 in — 27 —

— The Last Invasion of Canada — Montreal.10 The Montreal militia was apparently being drawn from a more affluent section of society. In 1854, drills for the sedentary militia in Montreal made a proud showing, with French Canadian units coming off slightly better than their English counterparts. The largest unit, the llth Battalion, a mixed bag of French and English, mustered about 500 men.11 These volunteers were intended as support for the regulars, for no higher organization than the company existed. When the militia went to camp for ten consecutive days, regular officers did the training and the British commissariat provided supplies. As volunteers exceeded the authorized quota, they were divided into Class A, the paid militia, and Class B, the unpaid militia. Class A had an establishment of 4,565, organized in sixteen troops of cavalry, seven field batteries of artillery and thirty-four rifle companies. Class B's establishment was 1,500, composed of six troops of cavalry and seventeen rifle companies. By 1858 Class A was recruited beyond its establishment, having 4,724 men while Class B had merely 560. The sedentary militia continued as a paper organization, but the annual parades were suspended between 1856 and 1864. In 1858 there were 394 organized battalions with 275,000 on the list.12 In 1859 the militia budget was cut, reducing the number of Class A corps and causing some discontent. Yet an important step was taken in grouping the Independent Companies into battalions, the first such battalion of the Canadian militia being organized in Montreal in 1859 and the following year designated the Prince of Wales Regiment of Volunteer Rifles. It is now the Canadian Grenadier Guards.15 In 1860 the second regiment was organized in Toronto, later taking the name of the Queen's Own Rifles, and by 1863 the number of volunteer battalions had reached twenty-two.14 Thus by the outbreak of the American Civil War in 1861, the volunteers in Canada comprised a network of corps including infantry, cavalry and artillery, which possessed some substance in numbers for all its innocence of real combat. Militia developments in the Maritime provinces did not follow quite the same pattern. Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island had no common frontier with the United States. There were no

— 28 —

— The Military Institutions —

Lt.-Col. Bernard Devlin, commanding officer, 1st Prince of Wales Regiment, 1862-66.

convenient invasion routes like the Richelieu Valley and the Niagara Peninsula, or the Maine-New Brunswick frontier. The sedentary militia was much the same in the Maritimes as in the Canadas. Nova Scotia in 1861 counted about 85,000, of which 58,000 were between the ages of eighteen and forty-five. Efforts begun in 1859 to organize a volunteer militia by 1861 bore fruit with about 1,500 men, organized into thirty companies.15 The sedentary militia in New Brunswick numbered about 60,000, of whom 47,000 were under age forty-five. The enrolled militia numbered only 32,400, organized on paper as one regiment of cavalry, one of artillery and thirty-four regiments of infantry. Volunteers, linked to the militia to form a trained nucleus for the militia battalions, formed fifty such companies, — 29 —

— The Last Invasion of Canada —

thirty-one of them uniformed, some 1,400 men in all, having at their disposal 3,000 rifles supplied from Imperial stores.16 Maritime volunteers drew no pay, but they were provided with cloth for uniforms and ammunition for target practice. As in the Canadas, British regulars supplied drill instruction. Volunteering, introduced in Prince Edward Island in 1859, found encouragement in that 1,000 rifles were supplied by the Crown along with some field guns and ammunition.17 Hence, while the Maritime militia was not as highly developed as the volunteers in the Canadas, it could be more easily reinforced from Great Britain and could move by sea. With the outbreak of the Civil War, all British American provinces suddenly found themselves faced with the challenge of coexisting peacefully with a neighbor transforming itself into one of the greatest military powers in the world.

— 30 —

— 3—

Preparations for die Fenian Raids

The Fenian Movement was started not in Ireland but in New York —John Devoy, Recollections of an Irish Rebel

F

I IVE MONTHS AFTER the April 1861 outbreak of civil war in the United States, Fenians in Dublin ostentatiously laid TeI *p rence McManus to rest, pleased at the international furor raised by the prolonged obsequies. They experienced even more pleasure a week later when the U.S.S. San Jacinto stopped the British mail steamer Trent on the high seas, and in a high-handed fashion removed two Confederate agents en route to Europe. The press in the northern states applauded the act vigorously, while Fenians confidently looked forward to the outbreak of war between the United States and Great Britain. In such a war Canada would obviously become the principal scene of military operations, and the key to Canadian defence was Montreal. In 1861 there were but 2,263 regulars in the Canadas and another 2,037 in the Maritimes. Montreal was garrisoned by 373 men of the Royal Canadian Rifles and a battery of artillery. Militia returns showed a force of only 751 of all ranks in a city of 91,169. * Britain responded promptly to the crisis. Between 12 December 1861 and 2 January 1862,11,000 troops were rushed across the Atlantic,2 an impressive achievement that left no doubt about the — 31 —

— The Last Invasion of Canada —

determination of Britain to defend its North American provinces. Yet the only possible answer to an immediate threat of invasion was the Canadian militia. Here, too, the response was immediate and enthusiastic. A wave of patriotism swept the Canadian provinces. Absentees returned to regular drills in the volunteer companies whose ranks were swollen by new recruits. A Ministry of Militia Affairs was created, headed by John A. Macdonald, who was also the attorney general of Canada West. Macdonald found himself busy as applications to join the volunteer corps flooded the new ministry, and arms and equipment were transferred from Imperial to Canadian control.8 Canadians experienced a milder version of the war fever that afflicted their neighbours to the south. In Montreal, the Prince of Wales Regiment paraded 600 strong, including two companies of Irish and two of French Canadians, under Lt.-Col. Thomas Wily. A new regiment, the Victoria Rifles, when it reached the strength of 200, was divided into companies and placed under command of Lt.-Col. William Osborne Smith. Provision was made for a Scottish rifle battalion, which ultimately evolved into the Black Watch of Canada. A third battery of artillery was raised along with two companies of engineers. Napoleon Duvernay, the editor of La Minerve, formed a company of 500 French Canadians, and Police Magistrate Charles J. Coursol, already a major of volunteer cavalry, organized 1,000 Chasseurs canadiens.4 This spontaneous action on the part of the citizens of Montreal was supported by government measures. A militia general order of 20 December 1861 called for one company of 75 men from each battalion of sedentary militia to be formed for active service. Only those volunteering to serve would be accepted. Plans were made to embody a total of 38,000 for active service if the crisis continued.5 War seemed so probable towards the end of December that the Roman Catholic bishop of Montreal, Ignace Bourget, in a pastoral letter dated 2 January 1862, called for volunteers to come forward and place themselves at the disposal of the government.6 French Canadian battalions of militia began to parade at full strength. There were proposals for the organization — 32 —

— Preparations for the Fenian Raids —

of a Montreal Marine Corps, and suggestions that the local Mohawk Indians be organized in a volunteer unit.7 It is against this background that Fenianism made its first appearance in the Irish Canadian community. Volunteering presented a special problem for the Irish of strong nationalist sympathies. At the outbreak of the American Civil War, Irish Americans had swelled the ranks of both the Union and Confederate forces. Irish were already fighting Irish in the republic, but most Irish Canadians, including their most eminent literary representative, Thomas D'Arcy McGee, strongly supported the northern cause. Though McGee had a brother serving in Corcoran's Brigade, an Irish unit commanded by an American Fenian, he himself had come to Montreal in 1857, having rejected republicanism. For McGee, sitting in the Assembly for a Montreal constituency, the position of the Irish Canadians was clear. They lived in Canada and therefore had an obligation to defend the country. On 23 December 1861 a meeting was called by the St. Patrick's Society for the purpose of raising an Irish Canadian volunteer corps. McGee explained to the assembled members of the society that it was particularly necessary for Irish Canadians to demonstrate their willingness to defend Canada because the Irish in the United States assumed that Canada was held in some kind of bondage. He declared, "There is no land since the Irish race found its place in history where the Irish name and honour are so much respected as in Canada."8 When McGee urged the need to raise volunteers there were cries of "not under the British Flag." The disruption soon reached a point where McGee threatened to dictate his address to the press reporters present, but in the end a resolution passed calling for the raising of an Irish battalion. The commotion had been the work of a party of Vermont Fenians, working in conjunction with some members of the Prince of Wales Regiment along with Owen J. Devlin, brother of the prominent Montreal criminal lawyer, Bernard Devlin. D'Arcy McGee accordingly wrote a letter to the Montreal Herald, signed "Civius Canadierisus," in which he claimed the disruption of the meeting to be the work of the Fenian Brother— 33 —

— The Last Invasion of Canada —

hood.9 The Fenians indeed found a measure of local support but not enough to prevent such a gathering from passing resolutions calling for an Irish volunteer battalion. Yet, as it turned out, the Fenians made their point. The disorder at the meeting convinced authorities that it would be unwise to raise an Irish battalion. To avoid embarrassment the government decreed that battalions based on national communities would not be permitted. For the sake of consistency, the offer of the Scots to raise a battalion was thus for the time being also rejected. Irish companies could be raised and would be welcome within regular militia battalions.10 The Irish henceforth would contribute to the defence of Canada but would not, as McGee had hoped they would, demonstrate their loyalty as a community by raising a battalion of their own. It is significant that no effort was made to raise an Irish battalion in Toronto at this time. The volunteers who came forward during the Trent crisis of 1861-62 were essentially those who later repelled the Fenian raids of 1866 and 1870. But once the earlier crisis passed the militia shrank to its original size and plans for further expansion were abandoned. Nonetheless, the Trent affair made it clear that Britain would defend Canada, and it aroused a martial spirit among Canadians that could serve as a warning to those contemplating future raids across the frontier. Meanwhile, in 1862 the Canadian government, seeking to institutionalize this martial spirit, made a somewhat belated effort to prepare a report on defence. A bill based on this report was then introduced in the Assembly calling for an active force of 50,000 militia. These were to be divided into volunteers, regulars and reserve. The volunteers, based on the cities, would train at their convenience. Regulars selected by ballot from the countryside would train for twenty-eight days, paid at the rate of fifty cents a day.11 The bill was defeated 61 to 44. The most the Assembly would accept was an amendment to the 1855 act, which authorized payment of fifty cents a day for twelve days of training each year for a force not exceeding 10,000 men.12 The defeat of the Militia Bill led to the resignation of the government of George-Etienne Cartier and John A. Macdonald, — 34 —

— Preparations for the Fenian Raids —

and the advent of the administration of John Sandfield Macdonald and L.V. Sicotte. The new government introduced two militia bills. As in the rejected bill, service battalions of the sedentary militia would be called out by ballot for a maximum of six days of training. Two schools of instruction were established, one in Canada East and one in Canada West, for the purpose of training militia officers. Those so trained would be examined by a board of officers before receiving their commissions. Militia officers would still be outranked by regulars and, within the militia, volunteer officers would outrank those of sedentary militia. Up to 35,000 volunteers might be trained under this system.18 This represented some improvement over the system of 1855, but it still fell far short of British estimates of the needs of Canadian defence stated in a report submitted in September 1862. The United States had demonstrated its capacity to raise and equip an enormous number of troops. Moreover, the republic possessed a "formidable fleet adapted to Lake warfare." To meet this danger, the Canadian militia, hitherto regarded as an auxiliary to the regulars, would have to become the Canadian front line of defence. Henceforth, the regulars would act in a supporting role.14 The enrolled militia showed a strength of 236,427 out of a population of about 2.5 million. In the view of British military authorities, Canada should be divided into five militia districts, with a total organized militia strength of 65,000, another 65,000 in reserve and still another 30,000 to allow for casualties, coming to a total of 160,000.15 Actual volunteer militia strength was 14,219, one-third coming from the Montreal district.16 These 14,000 or so volunteers were drawn from that section of the population that enjoyed military exercises for their own sake. Given a crisis that made volunteering fashionable, another 20,000 might come forward. Beyond that, conscription of some kind would be required. As the excitement generated by the Trent affair subsided, militia numbers returned to their normal limits and the Imperial garrison was reduced. The Prince of Wales Regiment, which paraded at a strength of 800 early in 1862, showed only 183 on parade the following year.17 The crisis produced a great deal of — 35 —

— The Last Invasion of Canada —

thought and paperwork which would be useful during the Fenian raids, but effected no fully satisfactory improvement of the system introduced in 1855. Indeed, to some no reform seemed necessary for a time as the Civil War was straining American resources to the limit. Conscription, introduced in the United States during the summer of 1863, set off a three-day riot in New York City in which the Irish Americans played a leading part. The Irish generally had volunteered generously but a few were "Copperheads" opposed to the war. Still more were "War Democrats" who supported the war but opposed the Republican administration. For all its initial promise, the Civil War for a time proved a source of some dismay to the Fenian leadership. Their unpaid amateur military league could not compete with the recruiting efforts of the Union, while compatriots in the South had no hesitation in joining the Confederate forces.18 The Boston Pilot noted, "The few enemies the 69th will encounter will, in all probabilities, be Irishmen, some of them relatives, all of them friends."19 The prospect of war with Britain and British North America was one thing; the reality of inter-Irish bloodshed was quite another. By degrees the Fenian leaders came to understand that the struggle was a vast battle school that would educate a generation of Irish Americans, North and South, in the arts of war. A few prominent Fenians personally participated. O'Mahony raised a unit, which took the name of O'Mahony Guards, he himself commanding it as colonel.20 It chiefly served to guard prisoners of war, but Michael Corcoran, one of the founding fathers of the Fenians, a former colonel of the 69th, organized a fighting brigade. Corcoran's Brigade, in which D'Arcy McGee's brother served, soon became one of the famous corps of the Federal army.21 It was virtually a Fenian force, as political propaganda was tolerated in Irish units as long as they were kept up to strength and fought well. The Irish Americans in uniform soon provided a vast recruiting ground for the Fenian Brotherhood. Yet until the end of the war was in sight, nothing could be done except to — 36 —

— Preparations for the Fenian Raids —

administer the oath to members and hold occasional discussions. As a political force, the Fenians lay dormant throughout the winter of 1862-63. While O'Mahoriy commanded his Guards, James Stephens, head of the Irish movement, married, acquired a farm and rested on his oars. In 1859 Edward O'Meagher Condon came to Toronto from New York, founded a circle of some sixty Fenians, and soon departed.22 Among those who joined in Toronto was Michael Murphy, a cooper by trade, who became a tavern owner. Murphy took over the circle in 1860 and used Fenian support to keep control of the 600-man Hibernian Benevolent Society.28 Founded in Toronto after a riot between Catholics and Orangemen on 17 March 1858, this society's stated purpose was to protect Catholics from Orangemen. Hence it could justify drills and other military exercises on the grounds that they were necessary for the protection of the Irish Catholic community.24 The secret purpose of such exercises could not be revolution in Canada, but to prepare members to take part in an uprising in Ireland at some future date. There was a large element of make-believe about this. A small detachment of partly trained Canadian volunteers would have little to add to the thousands of already fully trained Fenians in the contending forces in the United States. The real function of the drilling in Toronto was to give those who participated in it a sense of playing a part in Irish politics. Yet as a conventional society, the Hibernians were quite successful. A newspaper, the Irish Canadian, was established in 1863, and during the same year the Hibernians earned the praises of Bishop John Joseph Lynch of Toronto for resuming St. Patrick's Day parades, which had been suspended since 1858.25 Patrick Boyle, editor of the Irish Canadian, took the line of the Constitutional Nationalists of Ireland, stressing attachment to the Crown and advocating a Canadian style of government for the land of his birth. The ambiguities of such a public attitude for those previously committed to revolution came to the surface with the revival of the American Fenian organization. This revival was marked by the Fenian Convention in Chicago on 3 November 1863. The con— 37 —

— The Last Invasion of Canada —

vention, attended by eighty-two delegates, represented twelve Northern states and the Union armies of the Potomac, the Cumberland and the Tennessee. The Canadian Fenians, unwilling to be left out of such a gala occasion, sent delegates from Montreal, Quebec City and Hamilton, and it seems likely, but cannot be established, that Michael Murphy attended with several of his associates as delegates from Toronto.26 In the course of the proceedings O'Mahony, until then in theory subordinate to James Stephens, proclaimed himself an equal and the sole head of the American Fenians. War with Britain was declared to be the duty of the United States, and it was announced that Fenians were prepared to proceed to British territory by the shortest route, presumably the Canadian frontier. In the course of the convention the Irish church hierarchy found itself denounced for influencing the American Catholic bishops to take a stand against Fenianism.27 For the next three years the Toronto Fenians, particularly Patrick Boyle, sought to reconcile loyalty to Canada with support of the Fenians who were openly advocating an uprising in Ireland. This politically sensitive exercise transpired in the face of ridicule in the Liberal Globe, edited by George Brown, the Orange Leader, and the Catholic Canadian Freeman, edited by D'Arcy McGee's friend George Moylan.28 A Montreal branch of the Hibernian Benevolent Society came to the surface on St. Patrick's Day 1864. At a dinner attended by 100, in contrast to the 2,000 who attended the official St. Patrick's Society celebration, the Hibernians made up for want of numbers with the ardour of republican songs and speeches. They were, in turn, denounced by D'Arcy McGee, but the matter was soon forgotten.29 More serious trouble occurred the same year in Toronto on 5 November, Guy Fawkes Day. As there had been serious riots in Belfast on 12 July, Murphy believed, or pretended to believe, that the Toronto Orangemen would offer provocation on 5 November. The probable intention behind his subsequent course was to demonstrate the efficiency of his organization and to raise the morale of his followers. Close to midnight, when all Orangemen — 38 —

— Preparations for the Fenian Raids —

had gone home after their indoor Guy Fawkes celebration, Murphy staged an armed demonstration of 400 masked Hibernians. They mobilized at Queen's Park, then divided into several columns, marched about until two in the morning, fired several random shots and dispersed.80 No harm was meant, but it was a dangerous folly that brought to the surface latent antagonism to Roman Catholics, an antagonism fully exploited by George Brown's Globe and the Leader. Rumours that Catholic churches served as Fenian arsenals reached as far as Nova Scotia. The climax came in mid-December 1864, when Protestant crowds gathered north and west of Toronto in response to rumours of a Fenian uprising, and nine companies of militia volunteered for active service.81 The editors of the Globe and Leader, frightened by the effect of their alarmist editorials, called off the campaign. During this crisis, Catholic clergy and journalists, including D'Arcy McGee, united to deny the existence of the Canadian Fenian movement.82 Murphy read the signs of the times and accepted Bishop Lynch's request not to hold a St. Patrick's Day parade on 17 March 1865.88 Meanwhile, the growing power of the American Fenian movement was evident at a second convention, in Cincinnati, Ohio, in January 1865. Attended by 348 delegates, including two from Canada, it represented 273 local circles of Fenian enthusiasts, an increase of 210 over the Chicago convention. James Stephens, who visited Chicago in January 1864 to attend a Fenian Fair, declared that there must be an uprising in 1865. Given these events, Murphy experienced difficulty keeping up the pretence that the Toronto Hibernian Society was merely a conventional voluntary organization. As a gesture towards the declared revolutionary purpose of the American Fenians, Murphy invited James "Red" McDermott, a young friend of O'Mahony's, to address a Toronto meeting on "Republicanism."84 A week later the Irish Canadian called for "annexation to the American Republic on fitting terms and in due season." Confederation of the British provinces was dismissed as impossible because the Americans would not tolerate a monarchy on this continent.85 While a few small Confederate forces remained in the field until June in such peripheral areas as New Mexico, and the — 39 —

— The Last Invasion of Canada —

commerce raider Shenandoah did not lower the Stars and Bars until November in Liverpool, England, in April 1865 the American Civil War effectively came to an end. Tens of thousands of Irish American veterans, many already Fenians, found themselves released from the contending armies. Some undoubtedly felt the need of another war. Far more merely needed a social organization in which the atmosphere of wartime comradeship could be maintained until they were relocated in civilian life. The Fenian Brotherhood could thereby perform a useful social service, but in the course of doing so, would have to justify its stated intentions and indulge in military adventures. Apart from the veterans who had seen active service, there were many, particularly in women's organizations, who had provided auxiliary services for the troops. They, too, could continue the wartime excitement by collecting money, providing clothing and rendering other aid to the Brotherhood. Men and money would be available in abundance, but they would have to be used before the veterans were assimilated into civil life. James Stephens understood this, but he also realized that any force directed against Canada would deprive him of part of his anticipated support for an Irish rising. With this in mind he announced that the Fenians on both sides of the Atlantic must launch an uprising in Ireland in 1865 or dissolve.36 This gave the initiative to the followers of an "Ireland First" policy, led by O'Mahony, against those of William R. Roberts, who favoured an attack upon Canada. Stephens's move prevented a schism at the first postwar Fenian Convention, held in Philadelphia in September 1865. At the convention, attended by 600 delegates, O'Mahony was reelected president. But both factions of the Fenians had already been granted interviews with President Andrew Johnson, during which they raised the question of American attitudes towards the seizure of Canadian territory. The president replied that he would recognize accomplished facts.37 Roberts interpreted this as a promise of belligerent status for Fenian personnel, and even O'Mahony's supporter, B. Doran Killian, was prepared to consider a raid against Canada a useful diversion.38 Yet when news reached the convention that the Fenian leaders in Ireland were under — 40 —

— Preparations for the Fenian Raids —

arrest and the Fenian paper, The Irish People, had been suppressed, it was assumed that the Irish uprising was under way. For the moment Canadian projects were put aside. All the same, the Roberts wing now managed to limit O'Mahony's power. According to the new constitution, the key to power in the Fenian Convention resided in the lower house. It elected a president and an upper house or senate of fifteen members. In imitation of the U.S. congressional system, the vice president of the Brotherhood would preside over the senate and all members of the president's cabinet would require senatorial approval. Roberts, with a strong lower house following, was elected to the senate, where his followers were in the majority.89 At the time of the convention the Fenian treasury held $70,000, but more was needed; the first thought of the Brotherhood was to improve their finances by issuing Fenian bonds to be redeemed after the establishment of an Irish republic.40 Merchants dealing with the Irish Americans at any level would be required to purchase such bonds; they would refuse at their peril. Meanwhile, the Fenians acquired for their headquarters the Moffat mansion on Union Square in New York, at a rent of $1,000 a month. Serious tension between the two wings of Fenianism began when the senate refused to confirm the appointment of the proCD'Mahony B. Doran Killian as treasurer. Given this decision, the acting treasurer, O'Rourke, continued to function and expenditures required the approval of both men. Killian exerted his authority by refusing to honour purchases of military stores made by Gen. T.W. Sweeny, the Fenian secretary of war, which were obviously intended for use against Canada. Meanwhile both factions had accepted Patrick Keenan as their financial agent for a bond issue. Keenan, who apparently leaned towards the Roberts wing, took offence at Killian's refusal to support Sweeny and refused to let the bonds be issued in his own name. O'Mahony sought to cut the Gordian knot by appealing to James Stephens, who by now held no formal office in the American organization. As a result, Stephens granted O'Mahony permission to issue bonds in his own name. When the bonds came — 41 —

— The Last Invasion of Canada —

out, Roberts called a meeting of the senate and denounced O'Mahony's action as unconstitutional. O'Ma-hony in turn decried as irregular the session of the senate called by Roberts. Henceforth, the movement was divided into two factions: the O'Mahony wing committed to an uprising in Ireland, and the Roberts wing intent on invading Canada.41 For a while it was possible to mistake the measures taken in Ireland in 1865 on the initiative of the Crown against the Irish underground as the consequence of an uprising. Habeas corpus was suspended. Stephens was arrested. (He subsequently escaped.) But the illusion of rebellion vanished with the snows of winter. There was to be no general rising in 1865-66 and O'Mahony faced the prospect of the initiative passing to the Roberts wing. Meanwhile in Canada, Michael Murphy and his Hibernians succeeded in creating a minor crisis of their own. Speeches by Roberts and T.W. Sweeny threatening to invade Canada were well publicized, and Murphy's protests that the threats were not made in earnest and that he disapproved of violence were simply not believed. Moreover, Murphy blundered badly when he decided to resume Fenian parades on St. Patrick's Day. There was justice in his complaint that while he suspended the parade of 17 March 1865, the Orangemen failed to make a similar gesture on 12 July. However, he did not anticipate the excitement that activities of the Roberts wing would arouse, and he became alarmed when he encountered rumours to the effect that an invasion on 17 March 1866 would be coordinated with a rising in Toronto.42 The government took this threat so seriously that 10,000 volunteers were called out to protect the frontier. These volunteers were directed primarily against an external threat; the existence and nature of an internal danger could be determined only by intelligence work. To this end a Canadian intelligence service was already in being, originally organized to deal with the problem of Confederate sympathizers in Canada conducting operations against the American Federal government. Such activities reached a climax in October 1864, when a party of escaped Confederate prisoners of war based in Montreal raided the town of St. Albans, Vermont, killing one man, wounding — 42 —

— Preparations for the Fenian Raids —

another and taking more than $200,000 from three banks.48 Henceforth, two detective forces were organized, one under the control of Charles Coursol, a police magistrate in Montreal, the other under Gilbert McMicken, a police magistrate at Sarnia. As it turned out, the greater burden fell on McMicken, who maintained two agents at Sarnia, two at Goderich, one at Fort Erie and one at Clifton. Agents were also stationed in Cincinnati and Chicago.44 The British consul at New York, Edward Archibald, regularly collected Fenian-related information, which he sent to the British minister at Washington, Sir Frederick Bruce, who in turn forwarded it to Canada. The British consul at Buffalo, H.W. Hemans, on the other hand, reported directly to the Canadian government. Further, D'Arcy McGee induced John A. Macdonald to send R.N. Scott, a special agent, to New York to investigate the Fenians.45 Apart from this, a mass of information and misinformation came from well-meaning British subjects in the United States. The problem was not too little "intelligence," but that most of it was rumour and opinion. In the face of a perceived external threat, the militia could be called out, as was the case in 1866, and kept in the field for a while, thus getting useful military training. Measures against an internal threat required precise information for arrests on suspicion would create legal and political complications. McMicken resolved this difficulty by employing Patrick Nolan, a former Hibernian, as an agent. Nolan, after investigation, was able to assure authorities that the Toronto Hibernians numbered 650 and that not half of them were Fenians. McMicken concluded that there were no plans for insurrection; the only real danger was that Murphy's parade might result in a full-scale clash between the Orangemen and Hibernians in the streets.46 Murphy insisted on his right to parade, and no one in authority was personally prepared to ban the demonstration outright. Bishop Lynch of Toronto issued a strong declaration against Fenians, but instead of forbidding Catholics to parade, he asked the governor general, Lord Monck, to ban the activity on his own authority. Monck refused to act. As no one would take responsibility, McMicken visited Murphy on 16 March and found the — 43 —

— The Last Invasion of Canada —

Hibernian chief thoroughly alarmed by the consequence of his own audacity but still unwilling to back down. He was, however, willing to suppress all insignia and slogans likely to give offence to Orangemen. In return, McMicken had the militia called out, which included most of the more aggressive Orangemen, and kept them in barracks the greater part of St. Patrick's Day. As double insurance, he remained in the vicinity of the parade, accompanied by the former Orange grand master, Ogle Gowan. There was no trouble, and Murphy, in addressing the Hibernians, praised not only Canada but the men who ran the government. Then he resumed his role of chief revolutionary by declaring that there were 100,000 Irishmen in Canada prepared to take part in the coming uprising in their former homeland.47

— 44 —

— 4—

The Campobello Fiasco

Nous avons dejd appele Vattention sur cette remarquable coincidence: la declaration Killian, qu 'it savait parfaitement calculee pour aider les Unionistes. — Le Pays, 22 May 1866

OR THE MORE imaginative Fenians with a sense of humour, Campobello Island, lying in the mouth of Passamaquoddy Bay in New Brunswick, had at least a name to recommend it as a theatre of operations for their more warlike gestures. Meeting in solemn conclave on St. Patrick's Day 1866, the Central Committee of the O'Mahony wing adopted a Canadian project of their own, the seizure of this tiny island that was later to become more famous as the summer home of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt. The project, proposed by B. Doran Killian as a diversion, was designed to prevent British troops in North America from being rushed to Ireland, where the main Fenian uprising was to take place. As the island lay opposite Eastport, Maine, and was clearly British territory, the Fenians looked upon it as an easy target that would result in belligerent status for the conquerors.1 In faraway Toronto, the Fenian chief, Michael Murphy, was that same day praising Canadian institutions, unaware of the New York decision to invade the country. Yet he would feel bound by the decision, as would the inner circle of the Toronto Fenians. Moreover, as Fenian secrets were usually leaked to the press,

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rumours of the projected raid reached the Maritimes, which had already suffered a mild bout of "Fenian fever" at the same time as Murphy had held his nocturnal demonstration in Toronto on 5 November 1864. At that time, the grand chaplain of the Orange Lodge in Nova Scotia, the Reverend D.F. Hutchinson, as editor of the Burning Bush, warned his readers that 12,000 Fenians were prepared to rise. As Fenian fever increased in intensity, the Roman Catholic archbishop of Nova Scotia announced his opposition to the Fenians and denied specifically that churches were being used as arsenals.2 As early as 25 December 1864, the lieutenant-governor of New Brunswick, Arthur Hamilton Gordon, received an anonymous warning about Fenian plots against the province.8 A second round of Fenian fever occurred in late 1865, when news of Killian's first proposal reached New Brunswick from different quarters. The colonial secretary in England, Edward Cardwell, expressed concern to Gordon on 11 November. Three days later Sir John Michel, commander of the British forces with headquarters in Montreal, quoted D'Arcy McGee as saying that Saint John would bear watching. These fears were reiterated on 2 December by Sir Frederick Bruce, the British minister in Washington, who likewise issued warnings of Fenian designs against the province. The St. Croix Courier, published in the border town of St. Stephen, suggested that New Brunswickers should be on their guard.4 In the face of these reports, Gordon felt it imperative to visit the border towns of St. Stephen, St. Andrews and Woodstock in late December 1865. Urging caution as well as calm, Gordon recommended the formation of local Home Guards. He noted that the Americans were prepared to help keep order on the border and that the mayor of Calais, Maine, opposite St. Stephen, had offered sympathy and assistance.6 In contrast to the relative calm on the border was the panic in New Brunswick's largest city, Saint John, prompted by clashes between the Orange and Green. Though Gordon saw no reason to believe that the city was in danger, there was a run on the local banks, and cannon were mounted in positions overlooking the harbour on the martello tower. The lieutenant-governor did — 46 —

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express anxiety about the possibility of renewed conflicts between the Orange and the Green and encouraged the formation of a "Catholic Loyal Association."6 Yet all this public excitement had no real foundation. The British consul at New York, Edward Archibald, sent detectives to investigate, and reported on 20 December 1865, that "visits to Portland, Eastport, Lewiston, Calais and Bangor" revealed no evidence of dangerous Fenian activity.7 Killian's first scheme for a raid on Campobello was dropped because O'Mahony's wing of the Fenians continued to lend support to James Stephens's policy of an uprising in Ireland and nowhere else. Yet if mere rumour could provoke an instant reaction in New Brunswick, Killian might well have had doubts about the arguments he used when he introduced his project a second time in March 1866. Killian argued that antiConfederation sentiment in New Brunswick would weaken the province's will to resist. In support of this view, he cited the defeat of Samuel Leonard Tilley, the pro-Confederation premier, in the election of 1865, as well as the adamant anti-Confederation stance of Timothy W. Anglin, editor of the Saint John Morning Freeman. Killian's views were seconded by Patrick A. Sinnott, a native of New Brunswick, who might on those grounds claim some insight into provincial public opinion.8 The conception on which Killian's project was based was borrowed from the Roberts wing of Fenianism. As Roberts himself put it: "We must have some place to raise a flag, build ships, and issue letters of marque."9 With the episode of the Confederate commerce raider Alabama in mind, the Fenians hoped to seize and hold a bit of British territory that would become the headquarters of the Irish republic. In their view, this would put the Fenians in the same position as the Confederacy during the Civil War. They could then claim belligerent status and give authorization to Fenian commerce raiders preying on British shipping, vessels that otherwise would be classed as pirates. Unless they secured belligerent status, Fenian vessels could not act without breaking the law, including the neutrality laws of the United States. Legally speaking, they were outlaws in the ordinary sense, who could be — 48 —

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tried in the ordinary courts of law for waging war without a licence. Killian had been part of a Fenian delegation to President Andrew Johnson with whom they raised this question. When queried about his reaction to a possible seizure of Canadian territory, Johnson, as previously indicated, replied that he would recognize "accomplished facts." For politicians partly dependent on the Irish vote, it was the best way of evading the issue. For the Fenians, it enabled them to tell their followers that they might expect the benevolent neutrality of the United States government. Whatever the Fenians thought privately, this interpretation was sufficient for their purposes. If Killian's scheme was to succeed, it needed the advantage of surprise. This would be difficult to achieve because rumours, which the mere discussion of the project had set on foot, had alerted authorities and caused alarm along the New Brunswick border. The only hope of the Fenians was that a state of alarm could not be kept up indefinitely. If rumours were not followed by overt threats of invasion, complacency would return. However, there could be no chance of such complacency because O'Mahony's confidant, Red McDermott, sold Fenian secrets to British Consul Archibald. Thus the renewed project of invasion was well known to British authorities as soon as it was afoot, and they in turn informed the United States government.10 Meanwhile, the Fenian false alarms of 1865 had prepared the border population to meet a danger that would soon be real. Almost everything that could be done was done. At St. Andrews two volunteer companies were organized that with a Home Guard gave the New Brunswickers there a force of 160 men. The volunteer companies were composed of able-bodied men of military age; the Home Guard included anyone who cared to join. At Woodstock, Lieutenant-Colonel Baird mustered 302 men. In Saint John, the volunteer battalion numbered 578, supported by a volunteer artillery unit of 300.11 As a display of force, numbers were useful, quite apart from the quality of the force, because raiders would seek to attack undefended areas. One curious aspect of the Fenians was that they seemed to have no intelligence — 49 —

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service. Their plans were based on rumours and unsound assumptions about the state of public opinion in New Brunswick. Perhaps this served their interests best because it was essential to morale that they believe their own propaganda. As the Fenians could not move men armed with Springfield rifles to the frontier, the arms and men had to arrive separately. Some 500 weapons were sent to Eastport, Maine, in the schooner Ocean Spray, a former Confederate vessel that had been put up for sale at the end of the Civil War. This vessel made port on 17 April 1866 with arms consigned to Lt.-Col. James Kerrigan, an associate of Killian.12 Some 1,000 Fenians came in small contingents. Little effort was made to conceal their military character; most wore bits and pieces of uniform and nearly all carried either knives or revolvers. About 300 concentrated in Eastport and the rest in smaller towns along the St. Croix River.18 The problem was to get men and arms together without running afoul of American authorities. In this respect, the Fenians benefited by the reluctance of American politicians to take responsibility. The Americans had no doubt that the arms should be seized, but, with congressional elections on the way, the Irish vote was an important consideration. Secretary of State W.H. Seward informed Attorney General James Speed that trouble on the border was expected and that prompt action would be taken. The crisis came on 17 April, when the naval officer on the spot, Commander Cooper of the U.S.S. Winooski, informed the secretary of the navy, Gideon Welles, that the Ocean Spray was at Eastport and asked for instructions. Five minutes later, Col. F.W. Seward, a son of the secretary of state, arrived at Eastport and urged that the Ocean Spray be held. According to Welles's diary, the secretary of war, Edwin Stanton, had already been informed but had declined to act because Gen. George Meade, the victor of Gettysburg, was on his way to Eastport.14 Stanton hesitated "to send an order by telegraph for that would apprise the Fenians of his [Meade's] coming" and suggested that the navy take action. Welles noted: "These men are very chary about disturbing the Fenians . . . I said that I was content to leave the subject with Cooper till to-morrow."15 A day's grace might have been sufficient for the Fenians to land the arms, — 50 —

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but the secretary of the treasury, Hugh McCullough, sent instructions to the collector of customs at Eastport to hold the vessel until further orders. As it turned out, 7 of the 129 cases of arms were stolen before General Meade appeared two days later and removed the remainder to the local garrison depot.16 Meanwhile, Killian had been conducting his Eastport operations like a political campaign. His purpose seemed to be to make the Fenians appear formidable and to keep them busy to sustain their morale. He hired a public meeting house, Truscott Hall, which served as Fenian headquarters, and chartered three schooners, presumably to transport his forces to Campobello when the moment was opportune. Coincident with the arrival of the Fenians was the appearance of an "Address to the Citizens of New Brunswick," presented as the work of a republican committee in Saint John. The address proclaimed: Republican institutions have become a necessity to the peace and prosperity of your Province. English policy, represented in the obnoxious project of Confederation, is making its last efforts to bind you in effete forms of Monarchism. Annexation to the United States is not, necessarily, the only means of escape. Independence for the present is the best one, and will assure you of the supreme and sole management of your affairs. Mercenary bayonets cannot - shall not prevent you asserting this independence if you desire it. Signify your wishes and you become the founders of a Free State, untrammelled by Royalty, unchecked by Misrule, and certain to secure all the lost benefits of Reciprocity.l7

This manifesto, issued just before the arrival of Killian at Eastport, was probably the work of Fenian circles in Bangor, Eastport and Portland, who in any case were appealing to an imaginary public.18 Gordon wrote that after a careful investigation, he was certain that no Fenian circle existed in New Brunswick. The only substantial support for the Fenians in British North America was Michael Murphy's circle in Toronto. Murphy had protested his loyalty to Canada on 17 March 1866, and he could do so — 51 —

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sincerely because up to that time O'Mahony had no plans to attack Canada. Yet Murphy seems to have had few qualms of conscience when, at the end of March, he received a telegram in cipher directing him to join in the projected raid on Campobello. He was instructed to "get twenty single men ready for orders by Tuesday, choose drilled and temperance men if you can, pack equipments and ammunition ready for expressing where directed men to follow/'19 The telegram was sent to Patrick Cullen, an employee of the Canadian Savings Bank in Toronto. It was intercepted, easily deciphered, and a watch was put on Cullen. This telegram, probably sent by Killian, was Murphy's summons to bring a contingent to the Fenian forces gathering on the Maine-New Brunswick frontier. Murphy and several other Hibernians were watched; he, along with half a dozen or so followers, was seen to board a train for Montreal on 9 April. The leader of the Canadian government, John A. Macdonald, realized he had no adequate grounds to arrest Murphy, so he simply ordered Col. William Ermatinger, the chief of frontier detectives, to have the Fenian party shadowed when it reached Montreal. At the same time A.T. Gait and GeorgeEtienne Carrier received news of Murphy's venture from an independent source, and Carrier ordered the mayor of Cornwall to arrest Murphy and his party in that city.20 Mayor W. Cox Allen called out the city's entire volunteer force, 200 in all. Rumour had it that two companies of the Toronto garrison had gone over to the Fenians and had seized a train heading for Cornwall. In fact, there were two companies of volunteers on the scene returning from frontier service. When the train reached Cornwall, they were ordered to create a disturbance to provide a pretext for surrounding the train with troops. Murphy and his companions noticed nothing unusual until Allen, accompanied by a file of troops, placed them under arrest. In the midst of the excitement created in Cornwall by the precipitous arrests of these Toronto Fenians, the Crown prosecutor, Jacob Farrand Pringle, found himself in an Alice-in-Wonderland situation. Murphy had been arrested before he committed any crime. When Pringle pointed this out to Allen, the mayor pro— 52 —

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tested to Macdonald that he had acted on instructions of cabinet ministers Gait and Carder. There was no way out - the prosecution would have to act. Meanwhile, the presence of Fenian prisoners was deemed to create a security problem, and a company of each of the Victoria Rifles, the Royal Scots and the Royal Light Infantry were sent from Montreal to Cornwall.21 This helped calm public opinion at a time when the preparations of the Roberts wing of Fenians, continuing along the Canadian frontier, posed a real threat to river towns like Cornwall. Local authorities did not realize that Murphy had no connection with the Fenian preparations on the south bank of the St. Lawrence River. Thus Murphy, a minor figure in Toronto Irish politics, became a subject of discussion in the Canadian cabinet. With a following of seven men, he had induced the Canadian government to send two companies of militia and one of regulars from Montreal to Cornwall. In his own eyes he had failed, but his spectacular arrest gave the gathering of 1,000 Fenians on the Maine-New Brunswick frontier the appearance of a conspiracy of continental proportions. As it turned out, Murphy was the only casualty of the Campobello fiasco. Murphy was arrested on 10 April, seven days before the arrival of arms on the Ocean Spray at Eastport. As the telegram to Murphy suggests, some efforts were made by the Fenian leadership to pick sober and reliable men for the raid. There were no conspicuous incidents of drunkenness at Eastport, and the Fenians seem to have paid their bills, at least during their early residence. Some feeling was expressed that the Fenian threat was a just retribution on the Maritimes for the aid and comfort they had given the Confederates during the Civil War. Reports in the Saint John papers that the more respectable sections of the Maine population were alarmed by the presence of sinister-looking men were inspired by wishful thinking. The St. Croix Courier described Killian as a fine-looking portly fellow and his second-in-command, Patrick A. Sinnott, as a pleasant-looking man of dark complexion, cultivating a beard and a moustache. Red McDermott, the informer, was found to be "lacking in brains and experience," while the rank and file was made up of "rough-looking fellows."22 — 53 —

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Caught between an increasing concentration of Crown forces on the frontier and the American authorities waiting for a chance to bring charges against him or his followers, Killian did the only thing he could do. He made demonstrations along the frontier without pushing them to the point where they would violate American neutrality laws or give undue offence to the American population along the border. Drills were held along the banks of the St. Croix. On one occasion two boatloads of Fenians embarked a mile below St. Stephen, but withdrew when the alarm was raised along the New Brunswick bank. On another occasion, the fire alarm was rung at Calais and shots were fired.23 On 14 April, a party of Fenians, possibly acting without Killian's knowledge, landed on Indian Island, a small island near Campobello, where they threatened the customs guard and stole a Union Jack. This caused a minor panic, which drove a number of St. Stephen families to take refuge in Calais, while the Fenian press treated the incident as a major military operation.24 By 18 April the propaganda reached a climax with a public meeting, held while the fate of the arms on the Ocean Spray was still in doubt. About a thousand gathered in St. Croix Hall at Calais, where Killian and Sinnott sought to compensate for their evident weakness by threatening the Crown forces with the power of the United States. All intentions of invading New Brunswick were disclaimed, but they declared that the United States, which opposed Maximilian's government in Mexico, would not tolerate a monarchical confederation in Canada. Furthermore, Killian and Sinnott declared that the Fenian Convention would remain in session until the matter of confederation of the British provinces was settled and that it was the duty of the Fenians to wreck it.25 All this was grist to the Confederation mill and led Timothy Anglin, editor of the anti-Confederation Saint John Morning Freeman, to comment that if Killian was in the pay of the Canadians "and Mr. D'Arcy McGee wrote his speech for him, he could have rendered no greater service to Confederation."26 In Montreal, the anti-Confederation Le Pays, organ of the Parti Rouge, similarly noted, "Nous avons deja appele 1'attention sur cette remarquable coincidence: la declaration Killian, qu'il savait parfaitement — 54 —

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calculee pour aider les Unionistes, declaration pour laquelle, nous n'en doutons pas, il etait paye par le parti canadien."27 ("We have already called attention to this remarkable coincidence: the Killian declaration, perfectly calculated to aid the Unionists, for which, we have no doubt, he was paid by the Canadian party.") Killian had badly miscalculated the effects of his gesture towards the anti-Confederationists, but his immediate purpose was to assert the importance of his own operation. He faced 5,000 regulars, militia and Home Guard, forming a chain of posts along the St. Croix, and a formidable array of warships in support.28 The American authorities were about to seize the arms stored in the Ocean Spray. Thus Killian was in no position "to continue politics by other means." Yet the bravado of the Fenians paid off. Lieutenant-Governor Gordon wrote to the colonial secretary on 18 April that he believed the Fenians along the frontier might number 2,000, armed with revolvers, knives and some breech-loading Spencer rifles. Maj.-Gen. Sir Hastings Doyle was prepared to withdraw from St. Andrews and St. Stephen and to strike the Fenians as they moved towards Saint John. However, no movement of Crown forces was made because Gordon pointed out that the moral effect of abandoning the border towns to the Fenians would be disastrous.29 Yet Killian probably had no precise idea of the strength of his own forces. The British consul at Eastport, Robert Kerr, estimated that there were 400 Fenians at Calais, perhaps another 400 at Eastport and another 200 scattered about Lubec, Pembroke and Robbinston in Maine.80 This force could hardly concentrate 500 at one point and face a drilled militia and Home Guard, numbering 160 at St. Andrews and 200 at St. Stephen. Both points could easily be reinforced, and Killian was under the watchful eye of American authorities. The Fenians had come prepared to seize and hold the island of Campobello, which they presumed to be undefended. They had no intentions of launching a formal invasion, especially before they were properly armed. As a military threat, the Fenians were overestimated, but it was not so much a question of defence as a question of preventing mischief. Therefore, the numbers — 55 —

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mobilized against the Fenians were not excessive. About 5,000 regulars and militia - a ratio of five to one, lower than the ratio in Indian warfare and most anti-guerrilla operations, which was about seven to one. As the Fenian objective was known to be Campobello, much of the defence had to be naval. Several small vessels and H.M.S. Pylades were off Campobello before the Fenians arrived in strength, but these ships could not prevent the raid on Indian Island. Yet it was the arrival on 17 April of the 81-gun H.M.S. Duncan, carrying 700 regular troops, that really closed the door to Fenian enterprise.81 These troops embarked at Halifax amid a wave of patriotic enthusiasm, which marked a swing in public opinion in Nova Scotia towards Confederation. Militiamen were drilling all over the province, as far afield as the tiny fishing village of Gabarus on Cape Breton Island.32 American military authorities swung into action on 19 April. General Meade seized the arms from the Ocean Spray and issued a stern warning to the Fenians that the neutrality laws would be enforced. Meade then moved to St. Andrews to visit his old friend the British commander Sir Hastings Doyle, and over a friendly bottle they rightly concluded that the Campobello project was over.83 Small groups of Fenians lingered on, looking for a chance to make a final gesture. This took the form of a second raid on Indian Island on 22 April, when two boatloads of Fenians from the Ocean Spray managed to burn down a customs warehouse and three stores before they were dispersed by the arrival of sailors from H.M.S. Pylades. The few shots exchanged in this encounter were the only warlike gestures of the whole affair.84 Yet the capacity of the Fenians for mischief was not yet spent. Shortly after the second Indian Island raid, a body of Fenians, some fifty in number, leased the schooner Two Friends at $10 a day, and headed for Lubec, Maine, about two miles east of Eastport. When the captain of the schooner noticed that they were carrying cases of firearms, he refused to carry out their orders, whereupon the Fenians committed an act of piracy by forcing him to obey at pistol point. Once in New Brunswick waters, they were chased by a British warship and escaped back to Maine. On safely reaching —

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Eastport, they dispersed, highly pleased with their exploit.35 This marked the end of the Campobello project. Disgruntled Fenians returned by various routes to New York, where they forced O'Mahony to provide pay for them from the Fenian treasury. All this cost the Fenians some $40,000;S6 for the government of New Brunswick the cost was closer to $150,000. The cost of the Royal Navy and the regulars was borne by the British government, but is difficult to estimate, as the ships and men were permanently in service. Whatever the price, it was well worth it from the point of view of the Confederationist party. Sir Charles Tupper, premier of Nova Scotia, was able to get the Legislative Assembly to approve Confederation finally, and the champion of Confederation in New Brunswick, Leonard Tilley, was able to win an election in May of 1866. O'Mahony, who had had misgivings about the Campobello enterprise, was deposed as leader of his faction within the Fenian movement. Killian, who had proposed the project, was accused and convicted of being a Canadian agent and expelled from the movement. No evidence beyond the fact that the attempt had served Confederation interests could be found against him. A scapegoat had to be found to explain failure, but Killian had done the best he could with the resources at hand. The attempt to land a Fenian force at Campobello was folly, but there are times when revolutionary movements have to attempt the impossible or disintegrate. Apart from this, Killian's failure would serve the interests of Roberts's wing of the Fenians, who were preparing a more serious invasion of central Canada. After Campobello, Canadians were prepared to relax and dismiss the Fenians as stage revolutionaries.

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Ridgeway

For if the trumpet give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself to the battle1?

— I Corinthians 14:8

. IE BATTLE OF Ridgeway was hailed by some Fenians (curiously forgetting Castle Bar in 1798) as the first Irish victory since Fontenay in 1745, when the Irish Brigade of the French Army broke the Coldstream Guards. It was all of that and at the same time the first test of the reorganized Canadian Volunteer Militia on the field of battle. There were no Imperial troops present and the militia served under the command of its own officers. In essence, Ridgeway represented a contest between amateurs and professionals in which the amateurs made a good beginning but lost their way in the fog of war. First, the Fenians enjoyed strategic surprise, catching the Canadian system of defence off balance. For this the Fenians owed much to the atmosphere of complacency that settled on British and Canadian officials after the Campobello fiasco. Although not intended as such, Campobello was, in effect, a psychological feint, which served to convince Canadian and British authorities that Fenianism was mere "sound and fury" - exactly what the too optimistic D'Arcy McGee and his allies at the Toronto Canadian Freeman had been saying, and what

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John A. Macdonald, the viceroy (Lord Monck) and most Canadians were likewise sanguine enough to believe. A surfeit of sound and fury was congenial to their notions of "stage Irishmen," given more to abuse and threats than real fighting. John A. Macdonald and the Canadian decision makers took the Fenian threats seriously in March 1866, and called out 10,000 men. In retrospect the concentration of such a large force off Campobello seemed out of proportion to the danger. Such action could not be repeated in response to every Fenian gesture of defiance. What Macdonald and most of his associates and informers ignored was that the Campobello threat had been real. The Fenians were quite capable of walking through open doors. With Home Guards patrolling, supported by militia, regulars and warships, there were no openings along the Maine-New Brunswick border. But in June 1866 most of the Canada East and Canada West frontier was wide open and there were no troops at all within twenty-five miles of the point where the Fenians eventually crossed the Niagara River. At the same time little importance was attached to the divisions between O'Mahony and the Roberts-Sweeny faction. O'Mahony's improvised efforts were the result of a sudden decision on 17 March. The Roberts-Sweeny faction had been making more studied preparations since February. A mood of complacency affected all levels of the Canadian government, from Gilbert McMicken, who controlled a force of detectives based in Sarnia, to John A. Macdonald himself. McMicken, the individual in the best position to know, wrote to Macdonald to inform him of reports from his agent, Charles Clarke, who had seen cases of rifles unloaded at Ogdensburg, New York, presumably for an attempt to rescue Michael Murphy from the Cornwall jail. In McMicken's view this was of no importance, as he did "not conceive it within the bounds of reasonable probability that Sweeny [would] attempt any demonstrations upon Canada now."1 After McMicken, the best person in a position to know was H.W. Hemans, the British consul in Buffalo. Two days after — 60 —

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McMicken's report, Hernans prematurely declared Fenianisrn virtually dead. "The exposure of the O'Mahony faction and the opposition of the Stephens must go far together to paralyse if not actually kill the Sweeny faction also."2 This was speculation, but on the strength of it he held that the possibility of a raid could hardly justify the maintenance of a costly detective force. Yet Macdonald was not quite prepared to relax and ordered McMicken to keep a special watch on the Welland Canal. On 26 May, Hemans had information on the projected attack and reported that the deputy marshal in Buffalo had just been shown that an attack against Canada was meditated and that he had taken every authorized means to prevent such an enterprise. Yet to enable the American government to seize Fenian arms, evidence was needed; hence a Canadian spy must be sent to infiltrate the Fenians. As matters stood, the U.S. district attorney refused to seize the arms on the grounds that it was better to let the "wild and absurd project die a natural death" rather than give the Fenians the chance to blame American authorities for their failure.3 McMicken's agent, Elan Tupper, reported two days later from Fort Erie, "Everything about Buffalo and this place seems quite at ease." Many former Fenians were fully employed, "not half so many of them loitering about."4 The following day McMicken wrote to Macdonald, "In the matter of Buffalo, I have things constantly and tolerably well under supervision."5 The first hint of serious trouble came on 29 May from McMicken's agent, John McLaughlin, who reported that there were "many strange military men" in Buffalo. On the following day Hemans, now thoroughly alarmed, wired McMicken that "this town is full of Fenians."6 Still another agent reported 400 Fenians on the move from Cleveland, Ohio, to Buffalo. This rumour was enhanced by a report on 31 May that a further 600 Fenians had started from Cleveland for Buffalo.7 The complacency of the Canadian government at last began to evaporate quickly. Some time before, Macdonald had written that "the row between Stephens and Sweeny put an end to the whole affair but the Fenians must be watched."8 He now, on the last day of May, wired McMicken, "If you have any direct news send a duplicate in all — 61 —

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cases to General Napier," commanding the British and militia forces in Canada West. At the same time, D'Arcy McGee wired that all ministers were leaving for Ottawa that night.9 McMicken had nothing to report save that another 300 Fenians had arrived in Buffalo.10 The government braced for the attack, but there had been so much crying wolf where the Fenians were concerned that the necessary step of sending men immediately to the frontier failed to materialize. The first telegram with definite invasion news was sent on 1 June by detective Charles Clarke from Welland, to the effect that "at 5:30 a.m. 1,500 Fenians landed at Fort Erie."11 Though tardy and inaccurate with numbers, this news removed any lingering doubts that the American Irish meant business. Meanwhile the Roberts wing of the Fenians, preparing an invasion since their Plattsburg Convention in February, possessed as their secretary of war not a politician like Killian but a professional soldier, T.W. Sweeny. Born in County Cork in 1820, Sweeny arrived in the United States in 1832, enlisted in the U.S. Army during the Mexican War and gained the rank of second lieutenant. He served in Indian campaigns and in the course of the Civil War achieved promotion to brigadier-general. After he first became Fenian secretary of war, he was dismissed from the American service on grounds of absence without leave, but after 1866 he resumed his commission and retired in 1870. During twenty years of service, Sweeny proved to be a good regimental officer. Yet he was miscast as Fenian secretary of war, a role in which he had to deal with the political problems of warfare. Throughout his time in office he thought and acted as though he were conducting an invasion with conventional forces. His experience as a fighter of Indians was useful, but he did not fully understand that as the organizer of a series of filibustering raids he was now in the position of the Indians. His first need was for a plan, and this plan had to be presented in historical and political context. This he attempted to do without much regard for Canadian history or the contemporary political scene. He assured his followers of the Roberts faction that all the French Canadians had been neutral not only during the American — 62 —

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invasion of 1775 but also in 1812. Sweeny insisted that the French Canadians were hostile to the British garrisons and would welcome the Fenians as liberators. In Canada West, he declared, the garrisons were so scattered that even the Orangemen would not be able to give them effective assistance.12 His reasoning was very much like that of William Lyon Mackenzie in 1837 when he told his followers that the garrisons in Lower Canada were fully occupied by the Patriote rising, that in neither of the Canadas could the British be reinforced because of the frozen St. Lawrence, and that there was a friendly republic to the south.13 Sweeny and Mackenzie ignored the existence of the Canadian militia and the ease with which military enthusiasm could be aroused. There was indeed less excuse for Sweeny's mistake than Mackenzie's because the strength of the volunteer Canadian militia had been building up since the Trent affair. Moreover, in 1866 the Canadian public - English and French - missed the martial spirit and excitement enjoyed by their southern neighbours. Their delight at the prospect of demonstrating loyalty to Crown and country is manifested in the words of an improvised marching song, put to an American tune popular with the Union forces: Tramp, tramp, tramp, the boys are marching Cheer up, let the Fenians come, And beneath the Union Jack We will drive the rabble back And we'll fight for our beloved Canadian home. Sweeny's neglect of the Canadian militia in his analysis was not deliberate, but it served his purposes. In any military briefing it is good for morale to stress the weakness of the enemy. On the other hand, his original invasion plans were made without much regard for Fenian resources. He deemed he would require 10,000 men with 200 rounds of ammunition per man, which was reasonable, and three batteries of artillery with 500 rounds per gun, which was not. The attack would be launched in winter when the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence were frozen, otherwise 20,000 men would be — 63 —

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required. Fenian bonds would be sold to raise $450,000, the amount required for the campaign.14 Sweeny undoubtedly underestimated the rigours of the Canadian winter, and, as he came to realize, there could be no question of a winter campaign. Yet whatever the season, after Campobello it was necessary to assert Fenian credibility. It did not suffice to blame the fiasco on the follies of O'Mahony. Fenianism was being denounced as a racket and unless vindicated quickly, Fenian bonds would become unmarketable. While he preferred more preparation, at a meeting held on 17 April Sweeny reluctantly accepted the need for immediate action. No artillery could be purchased. There was only $100,000 in the treasury, but it was easier to secure men in May than in September.15 As a guide to action, Sweeny's grand strategy was a slight improvement over his political appreciation of Canada. There would be a series of regional offensives, two directed against Canada West, which were designed to draw Crown forces west of Toronto, thus uncovering Montreal. The western or left wing of the Fenians, based in Chicago and Milwaukee, would proceed by hired boat via Lakes Huron and Michigan, land near Stratford and move towards London in Canada West. This offensive was to be supported by the Fenian centre, based in Detroit and Cleveland. The Detroit force would concentrate at Port Stanley and land at Port Colborne to take Paris, Guelph and Hamilton. Faced with these amphibious assaults, Canadian forces must presumably move west of Toronto, leaving Fenians concentrated along the St. Lawrence and in Vermont free to threaten Montreal. The ultimate purpose of the move against Montreal was not to take the city but to give the Fenians an opportunity to set up a government in exile in Quebec's Eastern Townships. The thrust at Montreal would be carried out by Brig.-Gen. M.C. Murphy and Fenian cavalry coming up both sides of the Richelieu River, seizing or cutting off the garrisons at Isle-auxNoix, St.-Jean and Chambly, and would attempt to take or damage the Victoria Bridge. Meanwhile, Canadian Fenians were expected to destroy the bridge at Ste.-Anne-de-Bellevue and carry out diversions against Quebec City. The area between the Richelieu — 64 —

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and Yamaska rivers was to be held at all costs, and Sherbrooke was selected as the capital of the Irish Republic in exile. Sweeny offered to submit the plan to any board of U.S. generals selected by the Fenian Brotherhood, or to adopt any alternative scheme they might suggest.16 The plan as such might well have met with professional approval but was made for the use of forces of a magnitude that did not exist. Yet a plan of some kind was needed. This one had the merit of giving the Fenians a sense of being stronger than they were and being a part of a large operation. A true soldier works with the materials at hand, and Sweeny made the best of those available. Men could be moved by rail, but transporting horses was expensive and difficult. Any mounted force the Fenians employed would have to acquire American horses from points near the frontier, or seize Canadian horses after crossing the border. Even if artillery had been purchased, trained horses would have been needed to move guns. If a mounted force was to be used at all it would most feasibly be along the Vermont-New York frontier, a point recognized by Sweeny when he assigned cavalry to this area.17 Sweeny's plan was designed to make the best possible use of his widely dispersed troops. Those based in Milwaukee and Chicago could not be easily moved to the Vermont area or even Buffalo and therefore had to be directed at objects farther west. His General Staff was composed of nine men, with Col. C. Carroll Tevis as chief of staff. It included a chief of engineers and a chief of ordnance.18 His principal links with the local Fenian regiments were the inspector-generals of states. A regiment was in effect a military club that met regularly for drills under officers elected by its members and was officially recognized by the Fenian high command. Sweeny's first task was to concentrate arms and ammunition at key points along the frontier accessible by rail. The regiments would have to move without arms, by means of public transport, and find accommodation in restaurants, hotels and taverns, or in the homes of Fenian sympathizers. Boarding houses kept by Irishwomen were well suited to the Fenian purpose. Arms could be — 65 —

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distributed only at the eleventh hour if trouble was to be avoided with American authorities. Fenians from Louisiana, Tennessee, Kentucky, Ohio and Indiana were ordered to concentrate in Cleveland, Sandusky City and Toledo, Ohio, and at Erie, Pennsylvania. Those from western Pennsylvania and western New York aimed to gather at Buffalo. The Illinois, Missouri, Kansas, Wisconsin, Iowa and Michigan men would move to Chicago and Milwaukee; New York, New Jersey,Virginia, Maryland and District of Columbia regiments were to concentrate at Potsdam Junction and Malone, New York. The New Englanders would go to St. Albans, Vermont.19 Any attack on Canada in the Great Lakes region must entail the use of water transport, and hiring boats was difficult. This proved fatal to the western wing of the invasion force, as neither the Michigan railways nor boat companies would carry them. In any case only 1,500 of the expected 3,000 turned up in Chicago. However, the rumours set in motion during the course of May by the western Fenians were widely publicized in the American and Canadian press, and caused some confusion in Canada, thus boosting Fenian morale. Cleveland had been considered a good jumping-off point for a lake-borne assault because boats were supposed to be available for 4,000 or 5,000 men. As often happens with military plans, things quickly went wrong. When Lt.-Col. John O'Neill with the 13th Tennessee Regiment and Lt.-Col. Owen Starr with the 17th Kentucky Regiment arrived in Cleveland on 29 May, Gen. W.F. Lynch, who was supposed to lead them, failed to appear. Local papers reported that they arrived by the midnight train, about 3,000 in number, aged fifteen to fifty, officers in uniform carrying swords, men in civilian dress, with here and there a blue cap or tunic. This motley crowd paraded by the tracks, broke up into squads of twenty and proceeded to prearranged quarters, probably among Fenian sympathizers; another fifty arrived around nine the following morning.20 As Lynch, who was responsible for providing the boats at Cleveland, could not be found, O'Neill and Starr were immediately ordered to Buffalo by Captain Hines, the assistant adjutant-general. They were then ordered to proceed with an — 66 —

— Ridgeway —

An artist's conception of the Battle of Ridgeway. In the real battle the men did not fight in close order commanded by mounted officers.

attack. John O'Neill, as the senior lieutenant-colonel, found himself in command. He was a less conventional soldier, fourteen years younger than Sweeny. Born in 1834, O'Neill came to the United States in 1848 and enlisted in the U.S. Army in 1857. After serving in the Mormon War of 1858-59, he deserted and went to California. There he re-enlisted and on the outbreak of the Civil War was promoted to sergeant and received his commission in 1862. Finding promotion slow, he accepted command of a coloured company with the rank of captain. He left the army in 1864 to work as a land claims agent in Tennessee and joined the Fenian Brotherhood. Arriving at Buffalo on 30 May, O'Neill made his headquarters in Townshend Hall, where the Fenians held nightly meetings. Fenian arms were stored at the warehouse of an auctioneer, — 67 —

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Patrick O'Day. Alexander McLeod, a Canadian informer, reported 1,000 stands of arms kept there in February, which seemed to have been part of a consignment purchased at the Budenburg Arsenal in Philadelphia. Of these, 620 had already been sent to Chicago and only 20 to Cleveland.21 Buffalo was the obvious base for an attack on Canada, as it had a large Irish population. Several thousand Fenians lodging about would be less conspicuous than the thousand or so sent to Maine during the attack at Campobello. Accommodations could be had for $3 a week and canal boats hired for $25 a day with tugs available to pull them.22 An alarmed U.S. district attorney, W.A. Dart, wired the mayors of Toronto and Hamilton that there were 1,500 Fenians in Buffalo and more expected. At the same time he instructed the collector of customs at Buffalo Creek that "until further directed you will not clear any vessel from your post out of office hours and you will not permit any vessel to depart without inspecting her cargo." Notice appeared on 31 May that no vessel would be cleared between 4 p.m. and 9 a.m.23 This action reinforced the Canadian mood of complacency. The Globe noted that Sweeny was obviously planning a move against Canada, but the Canadian and American authorities were alerted.24 When O'Neill and Starr arrived, their troop train stopped a mile outside Buffalo, contingents of Fenians broke up into companies of fifty and each proceeded to quarters allotted to it. In the evening they assembled at Townshend Hall, then around midnight broke up and went to their lodgings. On the night of 31 May they again assembled but dispersed earlier. By 10 p.m. rumours were spread that they were to depart for Sandusky, Ohio, by the midnight train. As they left the meeting they walked about the city in small groups to confuse observers and reassembled half a mile below Buffalo on the Black River Road. Among those they did not elude was McMicken's detective, John McLaughlin, who went from Townshend Hall to the O'Day warehouse and observed nine wagons being loaded with boxes he correctly presumed to be arms and ammunition.25 McLaughlin shadowed the Fenians the night of the invasion. He estimated that they took about 1,200 weapons across the — 68 —

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Niagara River, their total numbers being between 850 and 900 men.26 The Fenian units that crossed were the 13th Tennessee Regiment commanded by O'Neill, the 17th Kentucky by Starr, the 18th Ohio by John Grace, the 7th Buffalo by John Haye, and a detachment from Indiana. For their numbers, the Fenians were well supplied with senior officers.27 Once outside Buffalo the Fenians, still without arms, marched three miles along the Black River Road to Pratt's iron furnace dock. There they boarded canal boats towed by two tugs, which took them across the Niagara, a distance of about a mile. They landed at the lower ferry dock near Frenchman's Corner, a mile north of Fort Erie, a small Canadian village of about 600. Arms were distributed in mid-passage. Most Fenians wore belts and ammunition pouches over their civilian clothes, but some retained bits and pieces of Union and Confederate uniforms. Most officers wore uniforms of the Federal forces. The Fenians carried muzzleloading .58-calibre Springfield rifles and bayonets purchased from U.S. war surplus. Subsequent reports that some were armed with repeating rifles came entirely from Canadian militiamen, who were impressed by the rapidity and intensity of Fenian fire power.28 About 3:30 a.m. on 1 June, the first contingent stepped on to the Canadian shore amid loud cheers. They raised the green flag of the 17th Kentucky Regiment, which, like all flags carried by Fenian regiments, bore a golden sunburst and regimental number. The Fenians were at last on British territory. To understand the campaign that reached its climax in the Battle of Ridgeway, it is necessary to see that Fort Erie formed the apex of a small peninsula between the Niagara River and Lake Erie. Railway lines running along the river bank and lakeshore met at the village station. Three small rivers ran east, emptying into the Niagara. The Welland River entered the Niagara River at Chippawa, the scene of a battle during the War of 1812, not far from Navy Island where Mackenzie had established his republic in 1838. Black Creek entered the river about eight miles above Chippawa, and a short distance to the south Frenchman Creek ran into the Niagara just below the point where the Fenians came ashore. — 69 —

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O'Neill's obvious objective was the Welland Canal, thirteen miles west of where he landed. He did not comprehend his goal as such, probably because he did not see himself as a raider but as part of a larger operation. Therefore he simply occupied Fort Erie, cut the telegraph wires and set fire to a railway bridge that linked Fort Erie with Port Colborne. Having no commissariat, O'Neill demanded breakfast for his troops, which was provided after the reeve called a town meeting. He was unable to seize wagons or railway rolling stock because alarmed area residents had hitched them to a locomotive and pulled them out of town. At the same time, local farmers drove their livestock into the woods.29 Having fed them, O'Neill moved his main body to a point near his landing and ordered his men to entrench at Newbiggin's farm. This occupied most of their time while O'Neill awaited reinforcements from the U.S. Extra arms had been moved across in anticipation of new recruits, but few arrived. Meanwhile, horses were at last secured and mounted scouts set out in all directions. Those sent towards Chippawa encountered a party of mounted farmers, fired on them, and reported that they had dispersed Canadian cavalry. O'Neill's scouts carried proclamations drawn up by Sweeny that assured Canadians that the invading forces had no quarrel with the people of these provinces, that their blows should be directed only against the power of England. Irishmen in Canada were summoned to the colours while the friends of "Ireland, of freedom, and humanity" were offered "the honest grasp of friendship" which Frenchmen and Americans but not English and Scots were also invited to take.80 O'Neill was not easily misled by rumours, and his scouts soon brought in reliable information of Canadian forces gathering at Chippawa and Port Colborne. As reinforcements were not arriving in numbers, there was no point in remaining near the landing point. By 3 a.m., 2 June, O'Neill had definite news about the Port Colborne force. He broke camp and marched along a back road on the south side of Black Creek that intercepts the Lime Ridge Road, a highway that ran diagonally from the Niagara River to Ridgeway.81

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Officials of the Welland Railway and the engine Milwaukee which conveyed volunteers from St. Catharines to Port Colborne, Ontario, c. 1866.

Meanwhile, Hemans had telegraphed Canadian authorities and alarm bells and bugles were calling out the militia. As in March, companies turned out over-strength as volunteers crowded into the armouries. Men wanted to rush to the frontier, and those who could not be absorbed in militia units were formed into Home Guards. First thoughts were for the Welland Canal, where men of the 19th Lincoln Regiment under Lt.-Col. J.G. Currie had turned out and improvised Home Guards were present. Yet there were initially no Canadian forces within at least twenty miles of O'Neill's landing place, and the first day of June passed without battle.82 In Ottawa, Governor General Lord Monck signed Order No. 1 calling out sixty-seven militia units in Upper Canada and sixteen in the lower province. By some oversight no cavalry were called, leaving the first troops that took to the field without effective means of reconnaissance. This mistake was repaired the following day, 2 June, when Order No. 2 called up twelve units in Upper Canada and ten in Lower Canada, including six troops of horse. Foremost among these was Maj. George Taylor Denison's

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Governor General's Body Guards, based in Toronto, the first cavalry to see active service. On the same day thirty-one new companies were formed in Upper Canada and twenty in Lower Canada.88 Except in larger cities like Montreal, Toronto and Hamilton, the company remained the effective unit. Therefore, of the 20,000 men who turned out few had been paraded at battalion strength. Militia companies on the frontier were useful in guarding key points, but a field force had to be instantly created by means of the Hamilton and Toronto militia, from whatever British regulars were available and from forces in the vicinity of the Welland Canal. After calling out his men as titular head of the militia, the governor general turned over command to Lt.-Gen. Sir John Michel, commander of British troops in both Canadas. The effective commander of operations against O'Neill was Maj.-Gen. George Napier, commander of British troops in Canada West. His first concern was for the security of the Welland Canal, which runs between Port Colborne on Lake Erie and St. Catharines on Lake Ontario, a distance of twenty-six miles. On the side closest to the frontier a railway ran along the canal, which on the Lake Ontario side extended beyond St. Catharines to Port Dalhousie. Port Colborne is about nineteen miles from Fort Erie. To secure the canal, Napier sent orders to Col. George Peacocke, a British officer, to gather a brigade of regulars and militia at St. Catharines, and a second brigade composed of militia was to join up at Port Colborne. By this means both ends of the canal would be protected.84 The Port Colborne force was to be made up of the 13th Battalion, Volunteer Militia Infantry of Hamilton, the 2nd Battalion, Queen's Own Rifles of Toronto and two independent companies - the Caledonia Rifles and the York Rifles. The Queen's Own fielded ten of its thirteen companies, including No. 9 from University College, No. 8 from Trinity, No. 10 (the Highland Company) and No. 5, the latter armed with lever-action Spencer repeating rifles. These companies averaged about forty men. The .52-calibre Spencer rifle held seven rounds of — 72 —

Fenian raids into the Niagara Penindusls,1-3june 1866

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ammunition in a magazine in the butt. With the Union forces it had shown its worth at Franklin, Gettysburg and elsewhere, over 60,000 being manufactured in the United States. Yet in inexperienced hands the Spencer proved a doubtful asset; Andrew Mclntosh, an ensign in No. 5 Company, reported, Our company No. 5 had their Enfield rifles taken away from them while crossing the lake and the Spencer seven shooter repeating rifles given in exchange — and with only twenty-eight rounds of ammunition and no more to get. I think it was a great mistake. We knew our Enfield Rifles, but knew nothing about these others, and a very poor thing they turned out to be at any distance over two hundred yards.35

The other companies carried standard British service-issue muzzle-loading Enfields, .577 calibre. All wore the green tunics of rifle regiments. Fully equipped, they carried a greatcoat and forty rounds of ammunition. Most had water bottles, but only a few had haversacks. Maj. Charles Gillmor, who commanded the Queen's Own at Ridgeway, testified that "they were as a rule partly drilled, some men undrilled. Recruits were joining every week and all the available men drilled and undrilled were in the field." Gillmor further stated that half the regiment had never fired a shot in training and half were under twenty. The regiment was placed under the command of Lt.-Col. J.S. Dennis, brigade major of Military District No. 6, who held a first class certificate given by the board that examined volunteer officers. Yet as brigade major his experience consisted largely of paperwork, and he lacked previous association with the Queen's Own.86 The red-coated Hamilton regiment, the 13th, had been organized by Lt.-Col. Alfred Booker, who had joined the Hamilton Field Battery in 1855 at the time of the reorganization of the militia. He, too, possessed a first class certificate, and in 1857 had been placed in charge of the Hamilton militia. Booker enjoyed long experience with the militia but had never commanded a brigade or heard a shot fired in anger. His adjutant, Capt. John Henery, formerly a sergeant-major of the Coldstream Guards, had — 74 —

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served four years with the 13th. At the inquiry held after the battle he testified that all but one man in the light company were drilled men, that the whole unit had fired blank cartridges in training and that 180 of the 265 in the six companies that took to the field had fired live ammunition. About 150 were under twenty.37 The Queen's Own embarked from Toronto at 6:30 on the morning of 1 June in the steamer City of Toronto. They landed at Port Dalhousie and arrived by rail at Port Colborne by noon. Lieutenant-Colonel Dennis sent on scouts who discovered that the Fenians were in the vicinity of Fort Erie. He then billeted his men at Port Colborne, where the cooperation of the local inhabitants was gladly given in most but not all cases. As Andrew Mclntosh put it, "We were hungry and some of the men began to forage - how natural this comes to a hungry soldier. Our junior Sergeant got hold of a red herring whether honestly or not I cannot say."38 Booker's regiment, having been hastily assembled, was sent home for breakfast and did not entrain until 9:30 a.m. It then proceeded to Paris by way of Dunnville, picking up the two independent companies, 95 all told, which increased the force to 360 men. On arriving at Dunnville, Booker secured billets for his men and food from the reeve, and settled in to await orders. While at dinner he received a telegram from Colonel Peacocke to proceed to Port Colborne. The troops again entrained and arrived at their destination at 11 p.m. As the Queen's Own had taken the best billets, the men of the 13th slept on the train, dining on biscuits and crusts of bread. A local baker promised to have fresh bread ready by 3 a.m., and spirits remained high.39 Meanwhile, the forces under Peacocke's direct command prepared to assemble at St. Catharines. Peacocke, a regular officer of long experience, had never commanded in action. In peacetime, administration is of first importance and administrators drift into command. Peacocke's forces consisted of three companies of the 47th Foot - a British regular regiment - and a battery of Royal Artillery, which proceeded by train from Toronto to Hamilton, where they picked up 200 men of the 16th and another regular unit, and thence on to St. Catharines. There — 75 —

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Peacocke received the news, sparked by the movement of O'Neill's patrols, that the Fenians were marching on Chippawa. On consulting his "dime map" provided by the post office, he concluded that they intended to destroy the bridges over the Welland River, thus inhibiting movements towards Fort Erie from the north. With this in mind, he called out two more companies of the British 47th Foot and the militia regiment, the 10th Royals, from Toronto. He then moved on to Chippawa, taking with him a local unit, the 19th Lincoln Regiment, and a battery of garrison artillery from St. Catharines. The British regulars were fully equipped, each carrying a sixty-pound kit and rations of meat and biscuits. The militia, being without tents or blankets, slept under the stars at Chippawa. No effort was made to provide local food, as at Port Colborne. The second Toronto contingent arrived in the early hours of the morning.40 By the night of 1 June Peacocke received word that O'Neill was encamped at Newbiggin's farm and not moving towards Chippawa. After a glance at his map, he decided to unite with the forces at Port Colborne. He chose to rendezvous at Stevensville, a small town about fifteen miles by road from Chippawa and about five miles from Ridgeway railway station on the line between Port Colborne and Fort Erie. Peacocke planned to start at 6 a.m. and arrive by 11 a.m. He sent a telegram to Booker telling him that Capt. C.S. Akers of the Royal Engineers would arrive to explain the plan to him at 1:30 a.m., 2 June. At the same time Booker was told to arm a ferry boat to protect the Niagara River.41 Akers arrived promptly and explained Peacocke's plan, but before his arrival, Booker and Dennis had information that induced Dennis to propose an alternative plan. At 10 p.m. Richard Graham, the customs officer at Fort Erie, had arrived and reported that the Fenians were encamped near Black Creek, numbering about 450, and drinking heavily. This information was partly confirmed by Charles Clarke, one of McMicken's detectives, sent by Dennis to find the Fenians. By way of a disguise Clarke exchanged his clothes for those of a local inhabitant. He acquired a horse and managed to get into the Fenian camp and talk to one of their senior officers. Clarke returned by 12:30 a.m. and — 76 —

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Volunteers in camp, Thorold, c. 1866.

reported the location of the 450 Fenians, but in his later written report said nothing of their drinking.42 Peacocke was already aware that the Fenians were at Black Creek, and Clarke's information, when received, was already several hours late. The general impression conveyed by Graham, if not by Clarke, was that the Fenians were not formidable and might be defeated by energetic action. Booker and Akers hesitated about tampering with orders, but Dennis, whose self-confidence exceeded his discretion, insisted on a change of plan. He finally persuaded Booker to send a telegram to Peacocke offering the new information and requesting permission to proceed by rail to Fort Erie and suggesting that Peacocke proceed down the river road to close in on O'Neill.43 Meanwhile, following Peacocke's instructions, Booker secured the tug W. T. Robb for the purpose of patrolling the Niagara. Assuming the logic of his argument to be self-evident and that Peacocke would agree, Dennis boarded the Robb and sailed towards Fort Erie without waiting for Peacocke's reply. Shortly — 77 —

— The Last Invasion of Canada — after the Robb departed a telegram arrived from Peacocke with orders to proceed with the original plan.44 On the morning of 2 June O'Neill, the Fenian commander who was marching to intercept the weaker of the two columns confronting him, knew what he was doing. Booker, the Canadian militia commander, was doing what he was told, and Peacocke, the British regular officer, was doing what he thought was right. Dennis, another militia officer, was attempting to follow a plan that was never put into effect. Understandably, things went wrong. As the Canadian forces were without cavalry, the "fog of war" was of an unusual density. Booker had only one horse, his own. Another horse remained on the train. The Fenians mounted men on farmers' horses to act as scouts, and so had Peacocke at Chippawa. Booker made no move to do so, probably because he still believed the Fenians were at Newbiggin's farm. He dismissed warnings from locals that they were close at hand but took the precaution of ordering his men to load with ball cartridges. The troops left their field coats behind, and as there were no wagons immediately available, surplus supplies were shipped back by train to Port Colborne.45 In the words of Booker, "After a little delay, I requested Major Gillmor (as the Queen's Own was the senior battalion) to take the lead of the column as one of his companies was armed with Spencer repeating rifles, that it should form the advance guard." 46 The York Rifles followed under Capt. Robert H. Davis, then the 13th under Maj. James Skinner, and finally the Caledonia Rifles under Capt. W. Jackson brought up the rear. The unit arrived without percussion caps for their Enfields, which had to be supplied from the stores of the 13th. Each company had three officers - a captain, a lieutenant and an ensign. The 13th had no staff except the adjutant, Capt. John Henery, but the Queen's Own possessed a staff of five including W.D. Otter, a future lieutenant-general in the permanent militia, who acted as adjutant. The column marched off shortly after 7 a.m., with Booker riding at the centre of the column, conspicuous in his scarlet tunic.47 Meanwhile O'Neill, after breaking camp at dawn, had marched by a back road that intercepted the Lime Ridge Road. As — 78 —

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its name suggests, this road lay along a ridge about thirty to forty feet high, half a mile wide at the point where the battle took place. It ran diagonally from the Niagara River at a point just below Black Creek to Ridgeway. Forests flanked the Lime Ridge Road at a distance of about 1,000 yards on each side. O'Neill's mounted scouts brought him news of the Canadian presence. When his column reached the point where the road from Stevensville runs into the Lime Ridge Road, O'Neill heard the whistle of Booker's locomotive and the sound of bugles, and he ordered his men to throw up breast works. They would have time to do so, as Booker was still three miles away. At the same time, O'Neill sent forward advance guards, probably about 150 strong, to occupy the orchards in front of his position. The advance guards moved forward to the Bertie Road, which lay parallel to the railway and intercepted the Lime Ridge Road about half a mile below O'Neill's main entrenchment. The Fenians made a barricade out of zigzag fences by taking the logs from the north side of the fence and transferring them to the south. This barricade extended along the Bertie Road for about 200 feet on the west side and about 400 on the east. A few hundred feet below the barricade, there were orchards on each side of the Lime Ridge Road. These were occupied by Fenian pickets, as was another clump of trees just southwest of these orchards a half mile below the road. Running parallel to the Bertie Road was the Garrison Road, about two and a half miles from the Ridgeway station.48 The action began around 8 a.m. when Ensign Alexander Muir (future author of "The Maple Leaf Forever") of the 10th Highland Company of Toronto, Queen's Own Rifles, noticed the Fenian pickets in the orchards. He reported, After proceeding about two and a half miles I perceived a number of horses (between twelve and fifteen in number) loose in an open field near the corner of a bush about three quarters of a mile in front of the left side of the road. These having attracted my attention I also perceived a number of men flitting among the trees near the horses. I cried out, "I see three Fenians — there are the Fenians." My discovery was made known to Colonel Booker

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— The Last Invasion of Canada — who perhaps from hearing the cry came upon me. I was to the left hand from many of the Highland company, the rear company of the battalion.49

The colonel halted the column, examined the trees with field glasses and sent the leading No. 5 Company forward as skirmishers. On sighting the enemy the skirmishers signalled by waving their shakos on the ends of their rifles, at which moment Muir remembered, "a bullet came whistling from the direction of the orchard. This was the first shot, and came close to Captain Gardner and myself." Firing at individuals at over 100 yards was, except for proficient marksmen, an unprofitable exercise, although firing at columns of men at several hundred yards made sense. Few casualties were sustained during this early exchange of fire at long range. Capt. John Gardner of the Highland Company moved on and off the battlefield without losing a man.50 When the firing began in earnest, Booker sent out Nos. 1 and 2 Companies of the Queen's Own to deploy on his left, with No. 8 and the Trinity College Company and No. 7 in support. They moved into wheat fields enclosed by fences and were visible to the Fenian pickets in the orchards and along the Bertie Road, who immediately perceived a threat to the flank. No. 5 Company was already on the right side of the Ridge Road, No. 2 Company being sent to extend the line into the orchard and beyond to the edge of the forest. No. 3 Company was placed behind No. 5 and 6 behind No. 2. The remaining Queen's Own companies drew up near the road just to the right of a house at the crossroads known as Smugglers' Inn.51 The independent rifle companies and the 13th Militia from Hamilton held back below the Garrison Road in reserve.52 But they did not wait long for action. According to Colonel Booker, The Queen's Own as skirmishers and support, slowly advanced pushing back the enemy. We were gradually changing our point right to left when Major Gillmor wished me to relieve the Queen's Own and send the reserve as his men were falling short — 80 —

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Ridgeway —

No. 5 Company, the Queen's Own Rifles, 1866. This was the only company of Canadian volunteers at Eidgeway, Ontario, armed with Spencer repeating rifles.

of ammunition and that one company, No. 5 had no ammunition for their Spencer rifles.53

To this Booker agreed, ordering the York Rifles and the redcoated 13th Hamilton to deploy and relieve the Queen's Own. As Alexander Muir put it, "We continued advancing and firing for some distance, perhaps three hundred yards at a time, when the orders came for the Queen's Own to fall back on its supports. We had been under fire three quarters of an hour."54 Muir's time sense was different from that of Major Skinner, who claimed that "about ten minutes elapsed from the time the first shot was fired until some men of the Queen's Own came in and we were ordered — 81 —

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to relieve the skirmishers. At the same time, Ensign Malcolm McEachren was carried to the rear."55 McEachren of No. 5 Company was the first Canadian killed in action. The 13th advanced in apparent good order towards the Queen's Own. They impressed Booker, who later recounted, "Major Skinner commanded the 13th Battalion throughout with great gallantry. The movement was admirably executed. The York Rifles were on the left and No. 1 Company on the right of the line."56 Yet the relief of the Queen's Own was not carried out quite as smoothly as Booker suggests. Ensign McLean of No. 6 Company, on the right, stated, Our company, on getting into skirmish line, immediately advanced and fired as we doubled over two fields - a company of the 13th came up in extended order in our rear. They did not relieve us. They were 50 to 60 yards in the rear of us. One or two officers and two or three men came up to the line of skirmishers and my men complained to me that those men of the 13th behind us would shoot them as they were firing over the heads of my company. I got up and asked them if they had come to relieve us but got no answer. I turned around to my men and said, "Boys, peg away, they are not going to help us."57

Apart from McLean's No. 6 Company the skirmishers of the 13th were successful in carrying out the relief of the Queen's Own. They continued to advance, driving the Fenian pickets out of the orchards and reaching the line of the Bertie Road. So far, Booker had every reason to be satisfied with the engagement. The Queen's Own, with the exception of No. 6 Company, were now in reserve, while the 13th Hamilton and the York Rifles continued to drive in the Fenian advance guard. At this point the tide of battle began to shift, as Fenian resistance stiffened. Looking through his field glasses Booker observed Fenians entering the woods on the east side of the Ridge Road. He became anxious about his right, and the Highland Company (No. 10) was sent forward from the reserves to search the woods. — 82 —

— Ridgeway —

Shortly after this he received two disconcerting telegrams from Peacocke: one that he could not start before 7:30 a.m., the other a warning to look out for "obstacles."58 It was evident that Peacocke was still far from Stevensville and there would be no help from him and his militia and regulars. Meanwhile, the Highland Company pushed through the woods on the right. In the words of Alexander Muir, After passing through a bush we came to a wheat field on the opposite side of which we found the Fenians posted opposite our front and to our right. We commenced firing upon the enemy as soon as we saw them and they began to retreat. They were about 200 yards from us. We fired for some time, until ordered to advance and we leaped over the fence and entered the wheat field. We fired from the wheat field for some time. After entering the wheat field I saw the thirteenth battalion on my left, below me in skirmishing order, advancing towards the enemy.59

As the battle reached its climax the confusion and conflict increased. O'Neill had no way of telling whether he was contending with regulars or militia, or indeed of accurately knowing the strength of the forces opposed to him. Moreover, the Canadian left extended far beyond his right flank. He nevertheless resolved on a counter-attack. Ensign McLean of the Queen's Own later reported: [I] saw Fenians advancing down the road. They were pushing forward their skirmishers and were advancing as I thought in a heavy column of companies. They continued their advance and we received an order to retire.60

At this time, Muir, clearing the woods with the Highland Company, was in a position to watch the action. He reported that while the 13th Hamilton was advancing, I distinctly saw the enemy retreating a long distance before them towards a bush in the rear. Suddenly they seemed to rally and — 83 —

— The Last Invasion of Canada — came down upon the line of the 13th yelling. At this moment I saw a wavering in the line of the 13th. The Fenians advanced in a loose manner but in great strength; then the 13th retreated at the double, but I did not hear the "retire" sounded for that purpose.61

The Highland Company supported the 13th with long-range fire, until Sergeant Bains, who was in a more elevated position, called out, "Retire." It would seem that the Canadian line was already under pressure and that some companies were wavering before their forces were thrown into confusion by an untoward incident. Some of the skirmishers noticed mounted officers urging the Fenian column forward and precipitately raised the shout of "Cavalry, look out for cavalry." Booker took the alarm seriously. He gave the reserve companies of the Queen's Own, Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5 and 8, the fatal order to form square to repel horsemen. Private Robert Maum of the 13th Hamilton, who was acting as medical assistant, heard the cry of "cavalry" and the order to form square. He stated : "I threw myself under the bayonets of the front face of the square. This square was composed of the Queen's Own, and the colour party of the 13th was still with them. A company of the 13th came up steadily 'double,' most of them at 'the trail' but some of them at 'the slope' and passing between the right face of the square formed in the rear of the Queen's Own."62 When it became apparent that no cavalry threat existed, Booker gave the order to reform column. The assault came from the enemy infantry, not their horse, which Booker soon recognized: "At this crisis the fire of the enemy came heavily to our right flank as well as into the front and the rear of our forces in advance. I saw nothing to justify the impression that we were attacked by cavalry." 6S McLean's testimony suggests that his Queen's Own company was falling back before the order to square was given. We retired as skirmishers usually do in closing on their supports. We came out, but found no support to close upon and reached the open space where there was a large body of men formed into — 84 —

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The Battle of Ridgeway, 2 June 1866.

square. After reaching this open space I heard the cry of "cavalry" but saw none. I heard a cheer from our square, and from some cause the rear of the square seemed to dissolve and turn down the road.64

Captain Gardner, returning from the woods, saw "the column in the road standing in the form of three sides of a square and a number of men standing loosely around. Some of the men had their bayonets fixed and some not."65 In any case, the order to form square started the confusion that would shortly turn to panic. As previously stated, Booker, realizing at last that there was no Fenian cavalry, gave the order to reform column. He was doing — 85 —

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this, he related, "with the view of deploying when to my surprise I found the rear of the reserves which now formed part of the square and we were moving down the road."66 Booker's force was beginning to disintegrate, but most of the skirmishers were still in line. His position was not yet hopeless when Major Gillmor reported the Fenians advancing in mass. "I then ordered the retire. But the confusion had become panic. The 13th did all that it could do. It was the last to retreat."67 It was a case of order, counter-order and disorder. Orders were given by bugle call, and the order to form square and to reform column caused some confusion among the hard-pressed skirmishers. The order to retire brought them in on a disintegrating square and their only recourse was to join the confusion. There were two exceptions to this - the Highland Company of the Queen's Own on the far right of the line and the York Rifles, both of which were in good positions to see this phase of battle. Capt. Robert H. Davis of the Highland Company reported: When within about 500 yards of the enemy, we commenced firing. We crossed two fields on the other side of the crossroad called the Garrison Road. When I had formed my men by a fence to give them a direct fire into the enemy and heard a bugle call which my Sergeant said was "the retire." He said it was a mistake, that it was "the advance" which was meant. In a few minutes "the advance" was sounded and I took my company over the fence ... When about half way across the field "the retire" was again sounded, followed by "the double." I looked along the line of skirmishers and saw them firing and retiring and a few running. We retired then, the men firing occasionally.68

Rev. David Inglis, a Presbyterian minister present as padre for the Queen's Own, standing on a pile of rocks near the Garrison Road, watched the advance of the 13th Hamilton with the York Rifles on their left. He observed that the Fenian fire was slackening on the left but strong on the right, where most of the Canadian force was concentrated. He then glanced towards the road as the bugle sounded, noticing that — 86 —

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The funeral of Canadian volunteers kitted in a skirmish with the Fenians, 1866.

it produced much confusion amongst the men. They were looking about them, very much as though they knew not what to do. After a short interval another bugle sounded — then men in the reserve by command formed a square - it was not a perfect square. This was followed by another bugle call, and word of command. Then came a fourth bugle call. The effect was that the whole line of skirmishers and those in support of them, as well as those in the road near me, made a motion to turn around. At this moment a small number of men (about 25 or 30) broke from the ranks and ran down the road. These men were all dressed in green. Immediately behind those that were running came from six to eight in red coats. The skirmishers and supporters were all retiring.69

The officers, all of whom seemed to have kept their heads, did what they could to rally the men. Yet it was too much to ask partly — 87 —

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trained men to retire in good order while under fire. Booker mounted his horse, ordering the bugler of the Queen's Own to sound the halt several times. Only two companies remained in fair order, the York Rifles, which had come in from the extreme left, and the 10th Highland Company, Queen's Own Rifles, which had come from the extreme right. These, rallied by captains Davis and Gardner, formed a rear guard, which retreated while firing at the advancing Fenians. The rest was chaos. In Booker's words, I entreated them to rally and implored them to halt, but without effect. If I could form at Ridgeway I might regain order. I there found Lieutenant Arthur of the Queen's Own and other officers attempting to rally and form companies. I called for "Covers" for the men to form. I was answered that the men could not find their officers. I then ordered the men to fall in and show a good spirit. The attempt was made but without success and I ordered the retreat upon Port Colborne, toward which place many had previously turned their step.70 The battle was over. The defeated militia withdrew, reaching their destination at 3 p.m., ten hours after their departure by rail. Reinforcements rushed to meet them at Port Colborne. But the Fenians were not inclined to pursue. Nonetheless, as he no longer felt adequate to the task, Booker asked that a regular officer be sent to take over his command. Of the 840 Canadians in action, 10 were killed, 9 from the Queen's Own and one from the 13th Hamilton. There were 37 wounded, 21 from the Queen's Own, 15 from the 13th and one from the York Rifles. Four of the Queen's Own and two of the 13th Hamilton Battalion were taken prisoner. The reason for the higher losses of the Queen's Own was that they were under heavy fire while forming a square and attempting to reform column. Fenian casualties were estimated at ten dead and "several" wounded.71 For an engagement that lasted nearly two hours, 7:30 a.m. to 9:30 a.m., casualties were light on both sides. But it was not casualties that determined the outcome. As in any conflict — 88 —

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TheElora volunteer rifle company on parade, 1866.

between amateur and professional forces, the amateurs can hold their own for a while by offering a bold front, but when they begin to make mistakes the game is over. Although evenly matched in numbers, the Fenians being trained men were bound to have the better of the fire fight, as they could load and fire their muzzle-loaders faster than untrained personnel. Marksmanship would not be an important factor when firing at targets 200 to 500 yards distant, unless the fire was directed against men in square or formed in columns. It seems that the mere sight of Fenians massing for counter-attack had a disconcerting effect on the Canadian skirmishers. Given this and the intensity of Fenian fire, the militia in the centre were predisposed towards retreat. The bugle did the rest.

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— 6—

The Problem of Frontier Patrol

We had only 55 men and three officers to patrol a frontier of twenty-five miles. — George Taylor Denison9

Soldiering in Canada

T^

h

I ^ AVING WON A victory that would pass into Irish I m republican folklore, John O'Neill felt that he had no M J choice but to fall back on Fort Erie. He still believed that he was acting as part of a larger operation and that he would receive reinforcements from Buffalo, which would enable him to deal with Colonel Peacocke's column then marching on Stevensville. While O'Neill moved back to Fort Erie, Lieutenant-Colonel Dennis sailed in the same direction on the tug W. T. Robb towards what he expected would be a rendezvous with Booker's force. The Robb also carried its owner, Capt. Lauchlan McCallum, and his command, consisting of the Dunnville Naval Brigade, a force of three officers and forty-three men without uniforms but armed with Enfields. At Port Colborne this contingent was reinforced by the Welland Canal Field Battery, which ironically had no artillery guns but consisted of three officers and fifty-nine men armed with short Model 1861 Enfield rifles and sword bayonets. Capt. C.S. Akers of the Royal Engineers, who had brought the message from Peacocke, was also aboard.1 — 91 —

— The Last Invasion of Canada — The Robb left Port Colborne on what proved to be a beautiful second of June day. It sailed around the small peninsula that separated Port Colborne from Fort Erie. Near the entrance to the Niagara River, the Robb encountered an armed American revenue cutter tug, the Harrison, sent out by Captain Bryson of the U.S.S. Michigan. Dennis was informed by the officer in command of the Harrison that the Fenians had left Newbiggin's farm and marched down the river road. In spite of this information, Dennis took the precaution of ordering all men below, leaving an officer in civilian clothes on deck as the Robb sailed past Fort Erie and the site of the first Fenian encampment from which they had departed at nine o'clock the previous evening. The tug sailed on some nine miles to Black Creek, near the second Fenian encampment, deserted since 3 a.m. Returning to Fort Erie, Dennis saw no trace of Booker, who, according to Dennis's plan, was to meet him there at 8 a.m.2 He concluded, correctly, that his scheme had not been accepted and for want of something better to do decided to round up Fenian pickets and stragglers. With this in mind he put the Welland Field Battery ashore and divided it into two sections of about twenty-five men each. Captain Akers, moving one detachment about a mile and a half inland and sweeping north, scoured the back roads for stray Fenians. At the same time Captain King moved the other half of the battery along the river bank, for the same purpose.3 The Robb, getting ahead of its shore party, returned to Black Creek and there sent a message to Peacocke informing him that the Fenians had left their second position. This news reached the rear of his column but not the colonel himself, who was riding on ahead. The Robb then went upstream two miles and took the artillerymen-cum-infantry and their Fenian prisoners aboard, and sailed back to Fort Erie. There it was decided to put the prisoners ashore in charge of the Welland Field Battery and sail back to Port Colborne for further instructions. Captain King, the battery commander, protested that his sixty-two men could not secure the eighty-nine prisoners, but Dennis brushed the argument aside, as a good many of the Fenians in question had been arrested and brought in by local civilians. Arrangements were being made for billeting the Wellands when rumours reached Dennis that a large

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Fenian raid on Fort Erie, 2June 1866.

force of Fenians (O'Neill's, coming from Ridgeway, though it is doubtful that Dennis as yet knew such particulars) was approaching. Dennis at once re-embarked the Wellands; but then as the Fenian advance guard appeared, changed his mind and put his men ashore, resolved to make a fight of it.4 The town of Fort Erie consisted of a line of houses facing the main street, which ran along the waterfront. At the south end of the village the main street intersected the Garrison Road. The Fenians' advance guard under Colonel Bailey turned in the main street and opened fire on the small force under Dennis at a distance of 200 yards. The Canadians drove the Fenians back with a steady volley. The most forward of Fenian officers, Colonel Bailey, mounted on a horse, rallied his men for a second attempt, which again was driven back when Bailey was mortally wounded. By this time, O'Neill's main force had sent out a line of — 93 —

— The Last Invasion of Canada — skirmishers who occupied the high ground above the village. Seeing that his right flank was turned, Dennis ordered a retreat. Telling each man to save himself as best he could, he and two of the Welland battery took refuge in the house of a Mr. Thomas.5 Captain King similarly ordered his men to break and take cover. He gathered together a small band behind a pile of cord wood on the wharf, and there made a stand. King was severely wounded and ultimately lost a leg. His men resisted for twenty minutes; then, being out of ammunition, they were forced to capitulate.6 By this time the Robb, with the Dunnville Naval Brigade still aboard, had cast off and was moving downstream. The main body of Canadians continued to retreat down the street, taking cover and firing as they went. A party of thirty, on reaching the end of the line of houses, took refuge in a substantial dwelling owned by George Lewis and held off the Fenians until out of ammunition. The house, being made of clapboard and plaster, was riddled with bullets, but no Canadians were hit. Their stand at the Lewis house enabled Captain McCallum and seventeen men to continue their retreat down the road, where they were picked up by the Robb!7 After rescuing the McCallum party, the Robb turned upstream, keeping close to the American shore. For three-quarters of a mile it ran the gauntlet of Fenian fire before an audience of American spectators who lined up along the bank of the river. The pilot house, the main target, was hit several times, but there were no casualties. The Robb reached Port Colborne at 6:30 p.m., bringing in its prisoners and news of a second defeat.8 While the Battle of Ridgeway was in progress, Peacocke's column laboriously made its way towards Stevensville. Peacocke, cautious and being without cavalry, was dependent on news brought to him by civilian mounted scouts provided by Kirkpatrick, reeve of Chippawa. Having decided to rendezvous with Booker at Stevensville, he had to settle on a route. He rejected suggestions that he take his men by rail as far as Black Creek, for fear of a Fenian ambush. Peacocke also decided against taking the Sodom road, which ran diagonally from Chippawa to Stevensville, a distance of seven

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miles, because he feared that it was not suitable for moving artillery. He thus chose the long way around, a march along the winding river road to a point above Black Creek, and then struck westward into the interior towards Stevensville, a distance of ten miles.9 The Battle of Ridgeway had been fought in the early hours of the morning, when the combatants did not suffer the heat of the day. Peacocke's march, which began at 7 a.m., turned out to be a disaster. Within two hours the warmly clad men were falling out from exhaustion. Canadian militiamen, many being without water bottles, stopped to drink at wayside streams, but the British regulars with their sixty pounds of equipment suffered even more. Near noon, when the straggling column reached the village of New Germany, just short of Stevensville, Peacocke had no choice but to call a halt. By this time he had news of the encounter at Ridgeway and Booker's retreat. He allowed his men to rest in the shade during the warm hours of the afternoon. At 4 p.m., when he received news that O'Neill was falling back from Ridgeway, Peacocke decided to move. By 5:30, at which time Peacocke's forces were prepared to move off, they were finally joined by cavalry - Major Denison's troop of the Governor General's Body Guard, fifty-five men in all.10 Denison's troop had been called out at 3p.m., ljune, with orders to proceed to the front the next morning. By daybreak he had mustered his men on the Toronto Exhibition Grounds and at 8 a.m., 2 June, they embarked on the City of Toronto and arrived at Port Dalhousie at 11:30 a.m. just as Peacocke reached New Germany. The men and the horses were entrained on the Welland Canal Railway, detrained at Port Robinson, midway between the lakes, and rode to Chippawa at the gallop. There they halted for an hour to rest the horses and then took the Sodom road to New Germany.11 On reporting to Peacocke, Denison ordered his troop to ride on ahead of the column. This they did for a distance of nine miles, at which point the forest, which had been about 600 yards from the road, narrowed to form a defile. Advancing to within 200 yards of the woods, Denison noted a body of men, who were identified — 95 —

— The Last Invasion of Canada — as Fenian pickets. The pickets, seeing the approach of the Canadians, promptly retreated towards Fort Erie, some two and a half miles away. But Peacocke, acting on Denison's advice, halted the column and deployed his advance companies in skirmishing order. Darkness was not far away, and a local inhabitant warned that there was a broken bridge ahead.12 That night Peacocke's men slept in the open without fires as though they were in the presence of the enemy, as indeed they had reason to believe. In the earliest hours of the morning Peacocke received misinformation that two or three thousand Fenians had been sent over from Buffalo. At the same time, Lieutenant-Colonel Dennis made his way to Peacocke's headquarters and reported the defeat at Fort Erie. Under the circumstances, it seemed best to wait for expected reinforcements. Nevertheless, the men were awakened at 4:30 a.m., 3 June, breakfast being provided by beef and bread brought in by wagon during the night. Meat served well enough roasted over fires on the ends of rifle ramrods, but there was no means of making tea. While breakfast was still in progress, Lt.-Col. John Hillyard Cameron rode into camp and informed Peacocke that the main body of Fenians had left Canada but some stragglers remained in the road ahead.15 Peacocke sounded the "Assembly," sent Denison ahead with the cavalry and ordered his artillery battery to the fore of the column. They moved forward shortly after 5 a.m. To sweep the country for stragglers, Peacocke deployed his men, placing British regulars ahead with the 47th on the right and the 16th on the left, leaving the 10th Royals of the Toronto militia in support. As they moved forward two loyal farmers who had armed themselves with abandoned Fenian rifles were mistaken for Fenians and shot while climbing a fence. One later died of wounds. Some fifty Fenian stragglers were taken prisoner in the course of dragging the woods.14 As Denison rode ahead, he received more well-intentioned but partly misleading reports from local inhabitants. He was told the Fenians were rallying at the "old Fort," a point just south of the town, and that heavy reinforcements were coming from Buffalo.

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As he arrived with his cavalry at the Niagara River, Denison sighted an anchored barge full of Fenians apparently waiting to cross. He at once sent a message to Peacocke, who halted his advance. Puzzled by the presence of the Fenians on the stationary barge, Denison acquired a boat and made contact with Captain Bryson of the U.S.S. Michigan. Bryson explained that the barge contained retreating Fenians intercepted by the American navy some distance from the shore. The Fenians thus appeared to be set for a descent on the Canadian shore. Within fifteen minutes, Peacocke was informed and resumed his advance. At 6 a.m. Denison's troop galloped into Fort Erie, to be welcomed as liberators by the townspeople, and freed Canadian prisoners taken from the Robb contingent.15 After his second victory at Fort Erie, O'Neill indeed gathered his forces at the "old Fort" about a half a mile south of the town. A fringe of pickets and scouts covered the countryside so there would be no danger of surprise attack. There was time for a council of war, but the prospects were grim. Peacocke's column was closing in and plainly it would be heavily reinforced. Throughout Canada East and Canada West, some 22,000 militia were in arms by 3 June and rail communications to the Niagara Peninsula were excellent. About 3,000 regulars and militia including artillery and cavalry, commanded by regular officers, were within a few hours' march of Fort Erie. Yet several thousand Fenians still waited in the Buffalo area; more than the American authorities could effectively control. There were resources sufficient for one more battle. Personally, O'Neill was still prepared to fight, but the morale of his remaining 700 men sank hourly. They had eaten supper but gathered no food for breakfast. Foraging for food would be hazardous in the face of an approaching enemy. The choice seemed to be between a sacrificial Alamo-style defence of the "old Fort" or some other entrenched position, and retreat. It is not surprising that O'Neill was overruled and the Fenians in the "old Fort" chose the less heroic course.16 At midnight two barges towed by tugs and carrying 500 Fenian reinforcements were ordered to return and disembark on the — 97 —

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American side. The men in charge of the barges were then told to return and pick up O'Neill and his men. This was done. The barges arrived at Fort Erie by 1 a.m., 3 June. One hour later, when they were recrossing the river, they were intercepted by an armed tug, the Harrison, chartered by the Americans. The tug signalled the U.S.S. Michigan, and Captain Bryson gave orders for O'Neill and the other Fenian officers to be taken aboard his ship. The rank and file were left in the barges, then towed to Black Rock and anchored there facing the Canadian shores. It was these barges loaded with withdrawing Fenians that were mistaken by Denison for Fenian reinforcements prepared to enter Canadian waters.l7 The Fenian threat in the Niagara area was at an end, but on the morning of 3 June this was not apparent to Canadian authorities. Peacocke was moving in from the west; the militia defeated at Ridgeway were still at Port Colborne. From the north a new force, concentrated at Black Creek under Lt.-Col. R.W. Lowry, prepared to descend on Fort Erie. Lowry, a regular officer, was accompanied by Col. Garnet Wolseley, the future field marshal, then serving in Canada as assistant quartermaster. Lowry had been ordered to proceed to Toronto by 2 p.m., 2 June, gather what forces he could and join Peacocke in the field. At Toronto, Lowry accordingly picked up a battery of Royal Artillery and went on to Oakville. There he was joined by a rifle company and learned that detachments of the 16th Regiment and the 60th Royal Rifles, whom he expected to meet at Oakville, had moved on. Lowry then took his party to Clifton, on the Niagara below Chippawa, where he was joined by a provisional battalion made up of independent companies and the men of the 16th and 60th, whom he had missed at Oakville. This force then moved by rail to Black Creek, which Lowry assumed was on the edge of Fenian-occupied territory. With Lowry thus occupied, Lt.-Col. John Hillyard Cameron took a pilot engine along the railway as far as Frenchman Creek. He returned to Black Creek and reported the tracks clear of Fenians, whereupon Lowry again entrained his forces, arriving at Frenchman Creek, about two miles from Fort Erie, at 8 a.m. to be greeted by Denison's troopers, already in occupation of the town. — 98 —

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Shortly after this Peacocke, consistently late, swept in with his troops from the west18 Back at Port Colborne, the veterans of Ridgeway were reinforced by the 7th Battalion of London Volunteers and four companies of the Oxford Rifles. There they rested and were soon ready to move once more against the enemy, but their commander, Lt.-Col. Alfred Booker, suffered a loss of self-confidence. A hostile journalist, Alexander Somerville, insisted that Booker was in a state of collapse, a view apparently shared by some of his officers.19 He was later cleared of misconduct at a Court of Inquiry, but he clearly felt his own incapacity to command, as he asked to be replaced by a regular officer. Booker later explained that he merely wished to be relieved as brigade commander and intended to resume his role as commander of the 13th Battalion from Hamilton. But he was removed from all responsibilities and, as no other regular officer was present, Captain Akers of the Royal Engineers was appointed acting brigadier. The militia officers present, including several majors, anticipating imminent renewal of combat, were happy to serve under Akers, but the danger was over.20 In any case, Akers almost immediately received orders to leave the 13th Battalion at Port Colborne and proceed with the Queen's Own and the rest of his men to Fort Erie. He arrived there on the afternoon of 3 June, bringing the total force in the vicinity of Fort Erie to 3,000.21 As things stood, this force seemed barely sufficient to deter the Fenians in Buffalo from further adventures, as there were still over 5,000 Fenians in the area. Much depended on what the American authorities were willing or able to do.22 There would be no presidential proclamation against the Fenians until 6 June, but the American authorities were energetic in enforcing existing neutrality laws. Maj.-Gen. George Meade, who had dispersed the Fenians at Eastport, was in command of the American military in the southwestern New York State border area. On 3 June he ordered Gen. William Barry, the officer in charge in Buffalo, "Use the forces at your command to preserve the neutrality by preventing the crossing of armed bodies, by cutting off reinforcements or supplies, by seizing all arms, — 99 —

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munitions etc. which you have reason to believe are destined to be used unlawfully."23 Barry's command comprised a mere thirteen companies, less than 800 men, but it proved sufficient. The return of O'Neill's men seems to have shaken Fenian morale. Apart from that, the inhabitants of Buffalo, like those of Eastport some months before, were weary of the Fenian presence. Even Fenian sympathizers were appalled at the prospect of keeping their indigent guests indefinitely. It remained for the U.S. government to provide a way out. This was done by an offer of free transportation to their homes for those Fenians willing to a sign a parole. Under terms of the parole they were required to "abandon [their] expedition against Canada, desist from any violation of the neutrality laws of the United States and return immediately to [their] respective homes." By 15 June this strategy had accomplished the removal of some 2,000 Fenians to their homes with about another 2,000 remaining in Buffalo.24 To ease the anxieties of Lieutenant-Colonel Lowry, now the senior officer in command of the local Canadian forces, Captain Bryson invited him to come aboard the U.S.S. Michigan for a conference with H.W. Hemans, the British consul in Buffalo, and M. Dane, the U.S. attorney general. Lowry took along Garnet Wolseley and two other regular officers. In the course of the conference the Americans outlined the measures they had taken and convinced Lowry that there was no immediate danger of a renewal of raids in the Fort Erie area. Throughout the Niagara campaign the Canadians had lost twelve killed and forty wounded. Fenian casualties are estimated at eighteen killed, twenty-four wounded.25 Put to the test, the militia lost two battles but all the same imposed a strategic defeat on the Fenians, forcing O'Neill to withdraw from Canada. Yet the Fenians hoped to turn disappointment in the Niagara peninsula into a political victory. Two days after O'Neill's retreat from Canadian soil, Roberts, in his capacity of president of his faction of the Fenians, issued a proclamation calling on Irish Americans to rally to the Fenian — 100 —

— The Problem of Frontier Patrol —

colours: "Onward is the order, and let Ireland and victory be the watchword. Pay no attention to what seems defeat; everything is working gloriously and if you but discharge your duty to your native land our final triumph is certain."26 O'Neill, as the victor of Ridgeway, was promoted to brigadiergeneral and a recruiting office was opened at Tammany Hall. While the American federal government proved sensitive to British diplomatic pressure, the state and local governments thought in terms of the Irish vote. Heavy concentrations of Fenians already existed in Vermont and along the New York frontier between Lake Champlain and Lake Ontario. These could easily be reinforced by rail from the larger cities, and in all the U.S. Great Lakes ports Fenians awaited shipping, which, if found, might enable the Fenian leaders to carry out Sweeny's original plan: an amphibious descent on Canadian shores with the purpose of seizing London and Stratford. In the aftermath of Ridgeway and Fort Erie, Fenian security seems to have tightened. At least it was impossible to get precise information of Fenian plans, and the utility of such intelligence would have been of doubtful value as their various assembled groups tended to act rather independently of one another. It consequently became necessary to close as many doors as possible by a judicious distribution of Canadian military resources. Altogether there were about 10,000 Fenians along the frontier and 22,000 troops to guard the border against them. Time was to work against the Fenians; the American authorities were well prepared to take measures against them, and the atmosphere of enthusiasm Roberts was able to generate would give way to reality.27 Meanwhile, all vital points on the border needed defence. These included the Niagara frontier and the Welland Canal, but the force assembled there on 3 June could more profitably be employed elsewhere. Since the most immediate threat seemed to be along the upper St. Lawrence, this was the first area to be reinforced. General Meade, who had handled the Fenians at Campobello, arrived in Buffalo on 3 June. As previously stated, it was then — 101 —

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decided to parole the 700 Fenians on the barges off Black Rock, on the condition that they return to their homes. O'Neill and his officers were released on bail. This merely relieved the American authorities of the need to guard the Fenians, but it was greeted by the Brotherhood as a sign that U.S. policy was changing. The 2,000 Fenians who remained at Buffalo cheered the U.S. decision at a public meeting on 5 June.28 A battery of Royal Artillery and 200 men of the 47th Regiment arrived by train in Kingston at 7 p.m., 3 June. To guard against a possible seaborne attack directed against London and Stratford, 200 men of the 60th and the London volunteer battalion were dispatched to those locales by rail at 10:30 p.m., 4 June. On the following day at 1 p.m. the Queen's Own and the York and the Caledonia rifle companies, accompanied by Colonel Wolseley, went to Stratford. The 13th Hamilton Battalion remained at Port Colborne to protect the entrance to the Welland Canal. Clifton, a key point on the Niagara River, became the responsibility of a provisional battalion made up of independent companies. Two other independent companies covered Chippawa. In all, including troops remaining in Fort Erie, there were now 2,000 regulars and militia in the Niagara area, supported by six field guns.29 The city of Toronto, being both a militia and a rail centre, constituted the obvious base of operations for defence of points in Canada west of Kingston. Various companies of infantry moved from the surrounding countryside to support the garrisons of the Linden district. These included a troop of cavalry and a battery of artillery from nearby Cobourg. The Toronto garrison thus held a pool of reserves from which a field force could be improvised within a few hours and sent by rail or water to any threatened point.30 Within the city a martial spirit prevailed that equalled anything that existed in the United States during the Civil War. Great enthusiasm was aroused by the arrival of fifty-seven Canadian residents of Chicago, who were greeted by Mayor Metcalfe of Toronto, and addressed by George Brown, the redoubtable editor of the Globe, on the morning of 6 June. They were taken into — 102 —

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service and, as they did not fit the established militia system, were designated No. 7 Company of Volunteers for Canada. Offers of service came from Canadians in New York, but the governor general deemed them unnecessary.81 Rumours of a Fenian flotilla on the Lakes urged the improvisation of a naval force. Canada could ultimately draw on the resources of the Royal Navy ships at Quebec City, but the danger was immediate. As things stood, the only serious check on possible Fenian marine enterprise was the U.S.S. Michigan and U.S. revenue cutters on the Lakes. The Americans, taking their responsibilities conscientiously, chartered a number of tugs, which, as we have seen, did good service on the Niagara River.82 Canada's forces on the Lakes were limited to a naval militia consisting of several naval brigades. These corps were made up of lake sailors armed with rifles and partly drilled. They possessed no vessels of their own but could charter ships. The first move towards creating a marine force was to put the Dunnville Naval Brigade aboard the W. T. Robb and send it to patrol the Niagara River. Next in importance was the need to get armed ships to patrol the Windsor area. There Fenians in Detroit could, if they found shipping, cross the straits as easily as O'Neill's men had crossed the Niagara River. To meet this danger the government chartered the steamer Rescue and placed it in the charge of the Toronto Naval Brigade. This body, sixty-three in number, was commanded by Capt. F.M. McMaster, assisted by Midshipman E.B. VanKoughnet, a Toronto boy who happened to be on leave from H.M.S. Aurora anchored at Quebec City.88 The naval brigade took over the Rescue on 3 June, loaded sixtyseven tons of coal, and with some difficulty mounted a 32-pounder cannon on the main deck so that it could be fired in all directions. They sailed on 4 June and on the following day encountered what appeared to be a Fenian ship. It proved to be the U.S. revenue cutter Fessenden, which in turn mistook the Rescue for part of the mythical Fenian flotilla reputed to be off Port Stanley. The Rescue sprang a leak, forcing the crew to man the pumps. Then there was trouble with the 32-pounder which was really too large for the — 103 —

— The Last Invasion of Canada —

ship. Nevertheless, the Rescue arrived safely in Windsor on the evening of 6 June. A Canadian presence had been established in the western regions of the Great Lakes.84 To the north, the steamer Wabanowas chartered and armed to patrol Lake Huron's Georgian Bay area. Back on the Niagara frontier the W.T. Robb gained boiler plate armour. Its bulwarks were reinforced by heavy planking, and a 9-pounder and a 12pounder howitzer were installed, to be manned by the St. Catharines Garrison Artillery Battery.35 All this was done by the crews of amateur volunteers, but professionals were on their way. A contingent of ninety seamen and twenty marines from H.M.S. Aurora were sent west along with seven officers. Another Lake steamer, the American-owned Michigan, chartered in the Windsor area, came under the command of Lieutenant Heron, R.N., while the senior naval officer, Lieutenant Farlie, R.N., took over the Rescue from McMaster and the Toronto Naval Brigade. The Michigan was then armed and the Rescue rearmed with more suitable 9- and 12-pounder guns. Captain McMaster and his crew returned to Toronto and began to fit out the steamer Magnet. But, the emergency being over, they were thanked for their service and disbanded on 10 June before they could put to sea.86 With the Great Lakes patrolled and the province west of Toronto effectively garrisoned, there remained the problem of patrolling the upper St. Lawrence and defending the key towns. A system of defence was set up along the river running between Kingston and Montreal, with Frescott and Brockville within the orbit of Kingston, and Cornwall linked to Montreal. Ottawa and district provided a reserve of militia that could support the river towns. Along the upper St. Lawrence the population possessed a strong military and United Empire Loyalist tradition, sharing memories of 1812 and of Hunters' Lodges raids in the aftermath of 1837. Volunteers were plentiful and there was an abundance of competent officers.87 Patrol of the waters around Kingston fell to the chartered steamer Watertown, commanded by Lieutenant French, R.N. The river towns near the city were garrisoned by regulars, already — 104 —

— The Problem of Frontier Patrol —

reinforced by troops from Niagara. Kingston itself raised a pool of militia, which could be sent quickly to points along the river as the need arose. This force consisted of the 14th Battalion of Rifles, assigned to Cornwall on 3 June, leaving behind the Kingston Field Battery, the 1st Frontenac Troop of Horse and two independent infantry companies, one from Garden Island, the other from Portsmouth. The entire force consisted of 460 regulars and 1,370 volunteers.88 Prescott was heavily garrisoned by three companies of the Prince Consort's Own (regulars), a wing of the 25th King's Own Borderers (regulars), the 18th militia battalion from Hawkesbury, the 15th militia battalion from Belleville, two militia companies from Ottawa, and one each from Pakenham and Fitzroy. Further, two guns arrived from the Ottawa Field Battery, and old Fort Wellington mounted three batteries of garrison artillery. Brockville's defence amounted to a composite militia battalion consisting of companies of the Brockville Rifles, Gananoque Rifles, Brockville Infantry and Perth Infantry, about 300 in all. The river between Brockville and Gananoque was patrolled by the gunboat St. Andrew, commanded by Lt. Spencer Smith, R.N., and manned by Royal Navy personnel. Ottawa, while in no immediate danger, kept under arms several militia companies including the Civil Service Rifles, Bell's Corners Infantry and Major Ross's artillery company.39 Cornwall presented a special problem. As the Quebec Mercury put it, "The possession of Cornwall is a prize worth striving for whoever holds the canal and railways holds the key to communication between the two parts of the country."40 Apart from this, Michael Murphy and his friends, seized on 10 April at the time of the Campobello troubles, were held prisoner there. Opposite Cornwall in Massena, New York, the Fenian secretary of war, T.W. Sweeny, contemplated an attack, drawing on the Fenians assembled at Malone, New York, eighteen miles southeast of Cornwall. Cornwall boasted three volunteer companies. Attendance had been falling off, for only the first was at full strength in 1865, and in that year Cornwall's troop of cavalry disbanded. The town's — 105 —

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population numbered about 2,000, some 600 of whom were Irish. The mayor, W. Cox Allen, was an Orangeman and a lieutenant in No. 2 Company. Militia morale revived quickly on 14 March when rumours that Fenians were crossing the ice led to the ringing of town bells. The militia turned out full strength and offers of service came in from the surrounding county. Murphy's arrest in April spurred the movement of three companies from Montreal to Cornwall.41 The town was too important to be left to its own resources, and its three companies could not easily be reinforced. The same day that Ridgeway was fought, a public meeting was held to facilitate cooperation with the military. The three volunteer companies were immediately sent to patrol ten miles of the river front, while help again came from Montreal as the 30th Regiment (regulars) arrived on 3 June. Naval defence was meanwhile provided by the tug Royal, manned by sixty sailors of H.M.S. Pylades, which had encountered the Fenians off Campobello. On the next day a section of the 25th King's Own Borderers, elements of the 47th Regiment (regulars) and a battery of Royal Artillery were dispatched from Montreal, while the 14th volunteers arrived from Kingston. The llth Argenteuil Rangers came in support, as did two companies of Ottawa volunteers accompanied by two guns of volunteer artillery. This Cornwall body, 2,000 in all, was soon organized in two brigades under Lt.-Col. T.H. Pakenham, a regular officer.42 While the gates to Cornwall were thus being effectively locked within forty-eight hours of O'Neill's invasion on the Niagara, the Fenians still gathered on the American side of the St. Lawrence. They had, at least momentarily, some reason to be optimistic. The New York Herald declared that "they have shown that upon anything like equal terms the Canadian volunteers are no match for them,"43 and despite British pressure on Washington there was still no presidential proclamation. Perhaps 1,000 Fenians awaited events along the New York frontier between Lake Champlain and Lake Ontario. Reports in Montreal papers suggested a decline in Fenian morale, but there was an abundance of senior officers present, and Sweeny himself arrived by train at Malone, New York, with 200 reinforcements on 4 June. Nothing could be done along — 106 —

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Fenian raids of 1866 and 1870 into Quebec.

the river with the Canadians in position, however, and with General Meade travelling on the same train as Sweeny, right behind the Fenian secretary of war. Meade, who got off the train at Ogdensburg, had given orders to the U.S. marshal at Watertown to seize two carloads of Fenian arms bound for Malone. But the Fenians were in no mood to respect American authority. The arms were lightly guarded, and the Fenians repossessed them on the evening of 4 June, seized the express train, attached the cars to it and headed for Malone.44 Such defiant episodes strengthened the case of the British ambassador in Washington, who was putting pressure on the U.S. government to take action. Edwin Stanton, the U.S. secretary of war, sought the advice of General Grant who, without hesitation, recommended the arrest of Sweeny. Meanwhile, General Meade continued his seizure of Fenian arms and ammunition. At last, on 6 June, President Andrew Johnson issued a proclamation against the Fenians. By 6 June the threat along the upper St. Lawrence was at an end. The Fenians could no longer cherish illusions about the — 107 —

— The Last Invasion of Canada — benevolent neutrality of the American government. But they did not play by U.S. rules. It would take time before the authorities could seize all the arms stored along the frontier, and recruits still arrived by train from Boston and New York City. Sweeny, seeing that an attempt along the St. Lawrence was hopeless, moved towards Vermont.

— 108 —

— 7—

Operations on the Quebec Frontier

We were five hundred Fenians, who never knew a fear while we followed our brave leader, whose name was General Spears.

— Fenian marching song, 1866

A

XjLCCORDING TO THE original Fenian plan, the attacks on I/ ^ Canada West were feints designed to draw Crown forces r m, away from Montreal. They were to be combined with a feint against Montreal, intended to hold the attention of Canadian forces while the Fenians seized Sherbrooke, the intended seat of an Irish government in exile. The attack in the east would be carried out by troops drawn from New York and New England. Their supplies would be concentrated at key points on the frontier by Fenian organizations at and near St. Albans, Vermont, and Mai one, New York.1 The Quebec frontier had been a scene of military operations from the time of the early struggle between the French and the Iroquois. In those days the Richelieu River and Lake Champlain formed the natural highway for such endeavours. With the advent of the railway, the picture altered. Movement would be by rail, and the river became more of a barrier than a means of transport. Fenian forces could be moved by train to St. Albans and Malone, where they would group at camps prepared by local agents and be supplied with arms already stored near the frontier. — 109 —

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Once equipped, Fenian soldiers were to cross the frontier in two columns separated by the Richelieu River, and to converge on St.-Jean, Quebec.2 None of this planning anticipated using water transport. Sending Fenian contingents to St. Albans and Malone presented no great difficulty, but they could not be moved in large numbers without inviting action by U.S. authorities. Also, a problem arose keeping the various Fenian contingents together and sustaining their morale after arrival. After all, the recruits would come expecting action. After several days of inaction and no pay, the recruits might tend to drift away. For the moment, the news of Ridgeway stimulated the Fenians' eagerness for battle. The question was, how were the Fenian leaders to maintain the enthusiasm of their men? The Fenian commander on the Vermont side was Brig.-Gen. Samuel B. Spears, a regular officer and West Point graduate.3 He acted under the overall direction of Fenian Secretary of War T.W. Sweeny, who commanded all forces west of Lake Champlain. How many men this involved is difficult to ascertain. Certainly the tendency of the political wing was to overestimate the strength of the Fenian armed forces. Spears was promised seventeen regiments of infantry and five of cavalry.4 If turned out at full strength, this would have involved no fewer than 12,000 men. It should have been obvious to him that the various Fenian clubs could not concentrate and otherwise maintain in the field more than 2,000 men, and then not for more than a week. Hence Spears was handed a good excuse for doing nothing had he cared to use it as an alibi for failure. As it turned out, Spears, by his own estimate, never had more than 1,000 effective men under his command, but there were probably about 2,000 who arrived and spent some time in the Vermont area.5 Yet once over the frontier, the very presence of Fenians on "British soil" should have brought reinforcements from Boston and New York. Spears had little or no prospect of seizing Sherbrooke, but with luck and initiative he might have managed another Ridgeway. Guerrilla warfare was out of the question, if only because neither Spears nor his largely urban-dwelling ex-soldiers had any experience of this specialized and arduous military craft, which — 110 —

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required a sustained effort from a secure base. As the American authorities were likely going to close the frontier, no such base could be provided. Moreover, there existed the precedent of the Hunters' Lodges, whose attempted raids across the frontier during 1838-40 soon incurred the hostility of the local American population.6 A speedy victory was therefore essential for propaganda purposes. It was the most Spears could expect. His one advantage lay in the absurdity of the entire venture. The belated presidential proclamation had been issued on 6 June, and American authorities were already seizing Fenian arms stored along the New York frontier. By the same token Canadian forces stood-to on the alert. The invasion of Canada East was really over before it began. Governor General Lord Monck was right when he wrote to Colonial Secretary Cardwell on 8 June: "All real danger was at an end, unless the Fenians assembled on the frontier should betake themselves of plunder, which I do not anticipate."7 To Lord Monck this but stated common sense, but Fenian pride demanded some kind of face-saving gesture, however futile, to justify the money collected and the time spent gathering forces on the frontier. Even as Monck was writing, Spears gathered what forces he could and crossed the border. Meanwhile, the Canadian authorities closed as many doors as possible. Montreal served as the base of operations for Canadian forces operating on either side of the Richelieu and for those defending the upper St. Lawrence as far west as Cornwall. St.-Jean on the Richelieu River represented a convenient advanced point north of the frontier. South of St.-Jean there was a small post, garrisoned by the Royal Canadian Rifles, at Fort Lennox, Isle-auxNoix. The paper strength of the Montreal Militia amounted to 3,000, of whom at least 2,000 in a city of 70,000 might be put in the field at any one time. To this could be added some 2,000 British regulars of the Montreal garrison.8 These numbers were more than adequate to deal with any force the Fenians could field, but like the Fenians, the militia could not be kept permanently under arms. Even moving regulars to the frontier, where there were no barracks except at Fort — 111 —

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Lennox, involved hardship and expense. In the immediate border area the militia tradition was strong ever since the War of 1812 and the subsequent raids of the Hunters' Lodges in 1838-39. Here were to be found a number of independent companies capable of mounting an advance guard where the danger could sometimes be measured in yards rather than miles.9 During the St. Patrick's Day alarm of 1866 the system of defence had been tested. The Montreal Brigade of Militia mustered on 10 March and paraded again two days later. On 13 March, the Chasseurs canadiens and the independent companies from Varennes, Vercheres, Ste.-Therese and Terrebonne moved towards the frontier, while two companies of the Victoria Rifles went to Lachine, and another company of the latter unit journeyed to Cornwall, accompanied by the 5th Royal Light Infantry. The Hochelaga Light Infantry was sent to Isle-aux-Noix. Stanstead, where the railway crossed the frontier east of Lake Memphremagog, was garrisoned by an artillery battery from Montreal. These troops remained on guard until the end of April, in which time the danger of invasion had passed.10 On 1 June, when the second call for mobilization went out, the defence system was reactivated. As Sweeny moved along the south bank of the St. Lawrence, where there was a large concentration of Fenians, Cornwall seemed to be his objective, but St.Jean was again reinforced as a precaution. The reinforcements were drawn from companies from four militia regiments, the Prince of Wales, the Victoria Rifles, the Royal Infantry and Chasseurs canadiens. These were mustered on 2 June, followed shortly afterwards by the regular 25th King's Own Borderers, and brought the St-Jean garrison up to 1,180 regulars, 980 militia and ten field guns. Two batteries of the Montreal Garrison Artillery went on to Isle-aux-Noix, and four companies of regulars to Chambly. The Richelieu route was thus effectively closed to the Irish adventurers, but the concentration of Fenians at Malone continued to pose a threat to Canada by way of Trout River and the Chateauguay Valley. To meet this danger the remaining strength of the Prince of Wales Regiment (eight companies) and the Victoria Rifles (five — 112 —

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Military review, Champ de Mars, Montreal, c. 1866.

companies) were sent to Lachine,11 then ferried to Caughnawaga and conveyed by the Grand Trunk Railway south to Hemmingford close to the frontier, but some distance from Huntingdon. They arrived at 11 p.m. on Saturday, 2 June. Here elements of the local 51st Hemmingford Battalion were already on guard. They made camp near the railway, and on 4 June the infantry was reinforced by Major Stevenson's battery of artillery and the No. 1 troop of Montreal Cavalry. These forces were now in a position to move either east or west to meet an invasion threat, but this would be a matter of marching.12 For the moment the inhabitants of Huntingdon County, who lived along the northern frontier of the United States, would have to provide their own defence. When the news of the Fenian — 113 —

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occupation of Fort Erie arrived, six local companies were called out. Of these, the Richelieu, Havelock and Hemmingford companies were placed under Maj. Frank Bond of the Prince of Wales Rifles. In the west, the town of Huntingdon at the juncture of the Trout and Chateauguay rivers became the base of operations with Lieutenant-Colonel Brown in command.18 By 8 June the threat of invasion was clear, as the Montreal Witness reported a total of 1,000 Fenians in and around Malone. On the same day the 7th Fusiliers, 1,000 strong, arrived from Quebec City, and two more gunboats, manned by sailors of H.M.S. Pylades, patrolled the St. Lawrence above the Victoria Bridge.14 The frontier people, fearing that the local volunteers were spread too thin and the Montreal forces likely to be late, offered their services as Home Guards. Sixty farmers at Herdman's Corners and another group at Ormstown came forward, but there were no arms and there existed no legal provision for enlisting these personnel.15 On 4 June, Monday, it was decided to move four companies of the Victoria Rifles and four volunteer companies from Montreal to the town of Huntingdon. Seventy wagons carrying six men each were provided for the task. The rains of the previous day had turned the country roads to mud, and the men rode slowly in discomfort behind a cavalry escort and a line of skirmishers, often within half a mile of the frontier, half expecting a Fenian ambush.16 Alexander Gourdey of No. 5 Company, Victoria Rifles, wrote, "Arrived safe in Huntingdon at 7 p.m., 5 June wet and tired, people very glad to see us, out in crowds in the rain."17 On the following day, Lt.-Col. Bernard Devlin was ordered to march the Prince of Wales Regiment along with Major Stevenson's battery and a cavalry detachment from Hemmingford to Huntingdon. For Devlin's men the day began at 3 a.m., when they were assembled in front of Johnson's Hotel. Dr. F.W. Campbell of the volunteers wrote, "It had rained heavily till one o'clock on the morning of the 6th (Wednesday), and half-past two saw the dawn breaking with a heavy clouded sky, and a hot, suffocating air, not a breath of wind stirring . . . the roads were simply awful, literally ankle deep in mud."18 The volunteers received no breakfast when they arrived at Havelock at 7 a.m., only rumours that the Victoria — 114 —

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Sergeant J.T. Henderson, Victoria Rifles, 1866.

Rifles had been wiped out on their journey from Montreal to Huntingdon. On the strength of these rumours, the locals began hiding their valuables, moving their families into the interior and even, in some cases, seeking refuge on the American side of the frontier.19 Yet wagons were provided to the volunteers at Havelock and rumours of the disaster were dispelled when they reached the village of Franklin, where food awaited them. From there, the cavalry and artillery proceeded to Ormstown some miles north of Huntingdon on the Chateauguay River, while the Prince of Wales Regiment proceeded to Huntingdon.20 Morale was sustained but discontent was extreme. Private S.O. Shorter of the Victoria Rifles wrote, "We are lying in the mud around the camp-fire. We have been half starved since we came here. My feet are wet, and I have not another pair of socks. If I had, I could not put them on, for if I took off my boots I could not get them on again/'21 — 115 —

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By 6 June, the defenders of the frontier were in place but were in no condition to remain so indefinitely. On that day, farmers from the surrounding county converged on Huntingdon and under the direction of Captain Kennedy of the Royal Engineers began digging a ditch and constructing breast-works across the road leading to the frontier. They worked through the rainy weather, the barrier being completed on 8 June.22 At Ormstown, the Prince of Wales Regiment turned out in response to a false alarm for a four-mile march to Anderson at 1 p.m. Dr. Campbell wrote, "The men had become practically bootless." To remedy this, they usurped a supply of boots intended for the Victoria Rifles. "These ill-fitted boots stuck in the clay, and many were drawn off the men's feet. In this way, many men lost their boots, and continued the journey in their stockings."23 Thanks to the efforts of the Montreal Relief Committee and the Young Men's Christian Association, who brought parcels and clothing, conditions improved somewhat, and the men would remain in the Huntingdon area until 16 June, a week after all the danger had subsided.24 As previously recounted, Gen. George Meade, after arriving at Ogdensburg on 4 June, began seizing Fenian stores of munitions. Supplies were thus taken into custody in New York State at Watertown, Malone, Potsdam Junction and Rouses Point. Seeing that nothing could be done in New York after the presidential proclamation of 6 June, Sweeny went to St. Albans, Vermont, to take command of the only force still in being. The real danger then was on the Vermont frontier.25 Arrangements for defence of the frontier east of the Richelieu were, to say the least, casual. No regulars were sent, and the defence of Missisquoi County was left to a force of 200 men, made up of independent companies, under Capt. C.W. Carter, a regular officer. Two companies, the St.-Armand Company under Capt. Peter Smith, and the Frelighsburg Company under Leonard Tittemore, were literally defending their own home ground. They were supported by a Granby Company under a Captain Miller and a Waterloo Company under Capt. F.L. Fourdrinier.26 These 200 men had less formal training than the urban militia, which had — 116 —

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Officers at Durham (Ormstown), 1866.

fought at Ridgeway, but it might have been presumed that there were a number of experienced hunters among them. Yet many contemporary reports state that few militiamen had fired rifles. Only one company had mastered the rudiments of drill. Placing these men under a regular officer seemed to be a means of insurance against the hasty decisions of some inexperienced local commander. Even so, a local man might have done well. Carter's appointment was a disaster. He vastly overestimated the numbers of the Fenians, misunderstood their intentions and too readily accepted rumours as facts. In the end, he came close to achieving another Ridgeway without even fighting a battle. From the beginning to the end, he acted as though he was conducting a formal military operation.27 — 117 —

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There was, perhaps, some excuse for overestimating the Fenian numbers. The Montreal Gazette reported on 8 June: The Fenians between Newport on Lake Memphremagog and Malone numbered not less than five thousand men. They are encamped at various places within a few miles of the frontier in squads of various sizes. They are more or less armed. The force between St. Armand and St. Albans is not less than twelve hundred men. The reinforcements are arriving at St. Albans on every train, not less than four hundred having arrived there yesterday. Among the Fenian force on this frontier is a cavalry regiment eight hundred strong. The men are fully supplied with saddles, bridles, sabres and pistols. They are without horses, which they intend to obtain by raids on border farms.28

This estimate of Fenian strength, based on rumour and careless eyewitness reports, ignored the continual desertions, the interference of American authorities and the difficulty of concentrating the scattered Fenian units at a single point. The inhabitants of St.-Armand were kept informed of Fenian movement by S.N. Hunter, a resident of Sheldon, Vermont.29 On the afternoon of 4 June, Carter received reports from Hunter and others that some 1,500 Fenians were preparing to move towards the Canadian frontier. Carter then sent James Keenan to investigate. Keenan reported that the Fenians numbered about 2,000, most of them armed with rifles, and that they had been involved in a dispute with an American militia captain. Further, they had left their camps at Highgate and were moving towards Fairfield, Vermont.30 There was no cause for panic, as Fairfield was already a point of Fenian concentration. None of the St.-Armand locals anticipated an immediate attack. Yet Carter decided on a retreat, perhaps fearing a threat to his flank. When his officers, particularly Captain Smith of St.-Armand Company and Captain Fourdrinier of Waterloo, remonstrated, Carter declared he was commanding an outpost. He had orders not to engage the enemy, so his obvious course was to withdraw.31 — 118 —

— Operations on the Quebec Frontier —

With Ridgeway in mind, and ostensibly faced with odds of ten to one, Carter followed the dictates of conventional wisdom. In similar circumstances Sir Hastings Doyle was earlier prepared to fall back from the New Brunswick frontier until overruled by Lieutenant-Governor Gordon.82 The local militia officers, obviously, appreciated the fact that withdrawal would destroy the confidence of the border population in their defenders and that, in consequence, there would be a flight of civilians from the frontier, thus opening the road to the interior to the invaders. There was no way of judging Fenian morale, yet the successful resistance by a handful of Home Guards to the Fenian threat at Eccles Hill in 1870 suggests that the Fenians would be disinclined to press home a frontal attack on a defended position. Making allowance for Carter's caution, it still seems strange that he would order a retreat without further reconnaissance. Even modest military knowledge would suggest that the mere presence of forces on the frontier would act, at least temporarily, as a better deterrent than an uncontested withdrawal. Carter first planned a retreat to Moore's Corner, a railway station just north of St.-Armand. Here, a cavalry patrol under Captain Des Rivieres was left behind to cover the retreat, but inexperienced and nervous cavalry proved worse than nothing.88 Something similar occurred in Niagara when the mounted scouts sent out by the reeve of Chippawa brought in little more than rumours.84 It would seem that Des Rivieres and his men suffered even worse anxiety by being left behind in the face of an anticipated enemy advance. Shortly after the militia departed, Des Rivieres sighted a mounted man and two men on foot. As it turned out, they were farmers coming into town for news, but Des Rivieres, looking for Fenians, assumed they were the advance guard of an approaching column.35 Without further investigation he and his men galloped off to Moore's Corner, shouting "The Fenians are coming!" and continued at the gallop to Stanbridge Station, spreading panic among civilians as they went. At Stanbridge they tore up some rails, declaring that the Fenians had seized a passenger train.36 Carter, taking Des Rivieres's information at face value, — 119 —

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ordered his men to fall back on St.-Alexandre. This march was described by Thomas R. Roberts to his friend Brown Chamberlin, the editor of the Montreal Gazette: Captains Smith, Fourdrinier, Tittemore had been under arms and without sleep since Friday night (1 June) and Captain Miller and his company since Saturday night (2 June). It had been raining and the roads were heavy. The men were raw troops unused to marching and heavy burdened ... Captain Carter and Lieutenant Johnson had horses and rode. Keenan and others proposed to stop the eight o'clock train and put the boys aboard, but were refused. The men (who are your own and my St. Armand boys and sons of the men of '37) and who were leaving their homes and wives and children unprotected and besides did not believe in the expediency or necessity of the movement were furious. Some of them threw away greatcoats and knapsacks, some gave up from sheer exhaustion and had to be carried away.37

This relatively short trek of fifteen miles ended at 2 a.m., 5 June, at the St.-Alexandre train station. Panic spread more widely in the countryside as homes, barns and stores were abandoned.38 Yet it was not until 7 June, two days after the retreat, that General Spears crossed the frontier near Franklin, Vermont.39 At Fort Erie, the population had been taken by surprise, with no chance to flee. This enabled O'Neill to requisition food from the local authorities. Spears moved into a countryside where empty houses, barns and stores were an invitation to loot. He could not easily control his hungry men. Moreover, O'Neill's men had the Niagara River between them and the sanctuary of the American frontier. The bulk of Spears's forces were kept within a mile of the border with pickets extended four or five miles into the interior. Recrossing into the U.S.A. was, for most of his men, a mere twenty minutes' walk. It was easy to loot and run. Spears had arrived at St. Albans on 31 May and found that most of his arms had been seized by U.S. authorities, although 300 buried rifles were secure for the moment. Yet there was no — 120 —

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ammunition, and none could be purchased locally. To add to his difficulties, a U.S. marshal supported by three companies of artillery was in the vicinity. As Spears put it, "In all, about 400 men are here without supplies, commissary stores or anything but good comfortable clothing. Most of the men are without money or means."40 To improve his lot, Spears proceeded to move at once, and "beg, borrow or take such ammunition as can be found," at the same time avoiding U.S. troops as much as possible.41 Such was the unserviceable condition of Spears's force when Sweeny arrived at St. Albans. But that was not the end of Fenian difficulties. In Sweeny's words, "I was arrested in St. Albans at midnight on the 6th June together with Colonel John Mechan, my Chief of Staff, just as I had completed my arrangement to cross the frontier with my command at daylight the next morning." However, there was consolation in the fact that "General Spears being absent purchasing provisions for the troops eluded the vigilance of United States officers."42 Sweeny was held on $20,000 bail, which he was unable to provide. Several days later he was released from jail, on condition that he remain at St. Albans.43 Spears left St. Albans at 3 a.m., 7 June, arriving at Franklin at 8:30 a.m., where he found General Mahon doing his best to control a force of 700 hungry Fenians clamouring to be led over the frontier. At 10 a.m. the same day, Spears marched them "cheering" over the border. But, Mahon wrote, "the cry was still hunger. I had but one alternative - foraging parties were sent out and plenty of meat was obtained."44 That the Canadians for the most part had fled, leaving their houses and barns empty, ensured that foraging would degenerate into looting. Yet Fenian officers, many of whom had professional military training, did what they could to act as a conventional army of occupation. The local doctor was issued a pass signed by the Fenian surgeon K. Kelly and counter-signed by Lt.-Col. Timothy O'Connor, the senior Fenian officer at St.-Armand, permitting him to move about freely on his medical calls.45 Spears made his headquarters at the home of a farmer named Eccles and raised the green flag at the summit of Pigeon Hill. The main body of Fenian infantry never moved more than a mile from — 121 —

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the frontier. Detachments were sent out to Cook's Corners, StArmand, Frelighsburg and Stanbridge. Spears earlier reported in a letter to Sweeny that he had 250 Springfield muskets and 13,000 corresponding Springfield cartridges, as well as 300 heterogeneous carbines, for which there was no ammunition. He gave his strength as not exceeding 1,000 men. "Many go home, but those who stay are anxious to advance." The army chest, however, was empty. Spears had only $20.15 left.46 Yet at 10:30 a.m. on 8 June, Spears addressed an optimistic note to Sweeny's chief of staff, Mechan, just released on bail. He noted that "patriotic Irishmen here [in Canada] in easy circumstances" were giving him all the information in their power. They all said, "Advance beyond our homes and we will join you."47 He also quoted a report from Captain O'Hara, sent with a small party to Frelighsburg, who claimed to have surprised pickets and scattered a party of Canadians, killing several horses and wounding many of their best men. This "engagement" resulted in the seizure of a Union Jack from a Canadian Customs House. The flag was later paraded in New York City as a trophy of war.48 As there were no Canadian reports of casualties this "victory" resembled the seizure of a Union Jack at Campobello, not to be regarded seriously as a military engagement. Spears reported: Frelighsburg is now in my hands, also Pigeon Hill, St. Armand, and other valuable points . . . I have twelve men mounted and hope to have by retreat twelve more. My commissary stores arrived; were issued; also fresh beef. Give me men, arms and ammunition and I will submit my command will live sumptuously off the country. I shall require no more stores from the contractor at St. Albans and all I have received have been paid for.49

Spears requested livery stable men to act as dispatch riders and announced that his men were in excellent spirits, "but the fact that the Canada Militia [is] being ordered out makes some uneasy." A postscript to this dispatch mentions that 400 Canadian volunteers arrived at Smith's Corners at 8 a.m. that Monday.50 — 122 —

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On receiving news of Carter's retreat, the commander of the forces, Sir John Michel, moved his headquarters to St.-Jean on the morning of 5 June. The 25th Regiment and a wing of the 30th (all regulars) were sent to St.-Jean the following day. The Chasseurs canadiens were mobilized at the same time and moved to La Prairie, where they were addressed by their commander, Police Magistrate C.J. Coursol, but not sent forward to St.Jean until 9 June. Michel now had considerable field forces at his disposal; yet his first concern was not battle but the security of his communication by canal and rail. A wing of the 25th Regiment accordingly was deployed at Richmond to protect the railway junction, while Charles J. Brydges, general manger of the Grand Trunk Railway, conferred with officials of the New York and Vermont governments and the American railways to ensure against the Fenians seizing a train.51 Michel's next move, which did anticipate imminent combat, was to send a wing of the 25th Regiment, 400 men in all, to StAlexandre to support Carter's 200 disgruntled volunteers. At the same time the 7th Royal Fusiliers and the Hochelaga Volunteers Artillery went to Farnham, twenty miles west of Pigeon Hill.62 If Michel had marched his contingent at St.-Alexandre a distance of fifteen miles to St.-Armand on 6June, Spears would in all likelihood never have crossed the frontier. Yet peacetime soldiers tend to think as administrators. Michel had no cavalry, so he preferred to delay his move until Friday night, 8 June, when Crown forces began their delayed march on St.-Armand, arriving next morning to find the Fenians gone. Back in Montreal, troops were still boarding trains for the frontier. A detachment of the Prince Consort's Own Rifles Brigade and the Royal Guides troop of cavalry entrained for St.Jean, while the Scots Royal Light Infantry went to Hemmingford.68 The Royal Guides, forty in number, were in essence the Montreal Hunt Club in uniform. Designated the Governor General's Body Guard in 1863, they were commanded by Capt. D. Lome MacDougall. On reaching St.Jean they proceeded on to the frontier, arriving in time to be the only unit that really saw action.54

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The high spirits noticeable in Spears's dispatch on the morning of 8 June ebbed away the afternoon of the following day. News brought by mounted scouts of the approaching Canadian forces seems to have demoralized Spears and his men. There was evidently no thought of tearing up rails to slow down the Crown forces or fighting a rear guard action. Instead, a gloomy council of war transpired at Pigeon Hill. It included General Mahon and Col. Timothy O'Connor, much like that attended a week previously by O'Neill at the "Old Fort" near Fort Erie. There was less cause for alarm, for O'Neill's men could not retreat without crossing the Niagara River. At Pigeon Hill a token resistance was possible, and was briefly contemplated as a crude barricade was set up near the frontier. But this time no O'Neill advocated suicidal resistance and all agreed there was no alternative but to retreat. Spears had just cause for complaint. He had been promised 12,000 men, with sufficient supplies. He arrived to find 200 and within a week gathered 1,000, purchased ammunition and supplies, and crossed the frontier with partly armed personnel. True, the mere fact that he raised the Fenian flag on British soil was a stimulus to recruiting in Boston and New York. Men would continue to arrive at St. Albans more or less ready for battle, but the Crown forces were only a few hours away, with the Americans closing the frontier.55 Many of his men experienced the demoralization of looting, and thought only of getting back across the frontier with their small acquisitions taken from civilians whom they could in no honourable sense consider their enemy. There were sufficient excuses for retreat and further action would involve casualties. At 9:30 a.m. on Saturday, 9 June, what remained of the right wing of the Fenian army fell in and marched towards the frontier. As they went many discharged their remaining ammunition. Others threw away their rifles, but most carried their blankets, clothing and looted household articles. At the border they were met by U.S. troops, who disarmed those still carrying weapons and placed the officers under arrest. By evening most of the men were on trains leaving St. Albans and the officers released on bail.56

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The camp of the 1st Prince of Wales Regiment at Durham (Ormstown), 1866.

Although the main body of 1,000 or so found sanctuary in Vermont without incident, some 200 still lingered in the vicinity of Pigeon Hill as the British and Canadian troops approached. These first rallied behind an improvised barricade. The Crown forces prepared for a formal engagement as the infantry moved in from the north and half a battery of Armstrong guns unlimbered on Pigeon Hill. Seeing that resistance was hopeless, the remaining Fenians fled towards the frontier. At that point, the Royal Troop of Guides charged with drawn sabres. In the words of a trooper of the Guides, As we neared them our Captain ordered a charge telling us to use only the flat of our swords, and in a minute or two we were among them slashing right and left. I saw fellows tumbling head over heels as they were struck. Quite a number of the Fenians emptied their guns, and I heard the zip, zip of bullets about my head. In this running fight we reached the boundary line. There a company of U.S. regulars was stationed and as fast as a Fenian tumbled over the line he was seized and disarmed.57

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The Fenians fired a few wild shots, but no casualties resulted on either side. Sixteen prisoners were taken. There had been no casualties as far as the military was concerned. Yet while the troops remained at the frontier, a small tragedy did occur. An elderly lady of a United Empire Loyalist family, Margaret Vincent, who lived near Eccles Hill with her sister, went out after dark to fetch some water. A picket of the Royal Fusiliers saw a figure moving ahead of them on the road. Their summons to halt frightened her and she began to run. The seven men of the picket fired a volley, which killed her instantly. A small marble tablet marks the spot where she fell.58 With the charge at Pigeon Hill, the raids of 1866 were over, but there were some odds and ends to clear up. Habeas corpus had been suspended as of 1 June, and Fenian fever had resulted in a number of arrests of individuals who were probably not Fenians and in no way connected with the attempted invasion. John A. Macdonald felt it necessary to send a circular to all county attorneys stating, "No arrest should be made on mere suspicion, nor without information on oath stating specific facts to establish a prima facie case of treason." Habeas corpus and bail, he stated, should be granted, but "the government retains the right to enforce provisions of the Act suspending Habeas corpus wherever it thinks proper."59 Apart from this there was the question of compensation for the relatives of the deceased and wounded. As Macdonald commented, "The volunteers and Militia are taken from a class generally superior to that which forms the great mass of the British Army. Are in fact from all ranks of life, and as a body receive higher wages or compensation for their services in civil life than the British soldier would do under similar circumstances."60 He recommended that 50 percent be added to the compensation ordinarily given to a British soldier. Then there was the matter of the number of men under arms along the frontier. On 15 June Macdonald wrote to the Executive Council: "As all apprehensions of a recurrence of Fenian Raids seem to have passed away for the time being, and as the gallant volunteers on active service are suffering much from their absence from their homes and — 126 —

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The welcome address to volunteers returningfrom the Fenian raids, Champ de Mars, Montreal, 1866.

vocations - the force can without any hazard to the safety of the province be greatly reduced."61 On 16 June it was decided to reduce the volunteers to 2,500, and on 23 June they were all recalled and disbanded. Great celebrations ensued at Montreal, Toronto and other places. In his official thanks to the volunteers, Sir John Michel cautioned them: "Though the late attack on the province has proved a failure the organization by means of which it was attempted still exists." He added, "The volunteer forces generally will continue at all convenient times to perfect themselves in drill and discipline, so that they may be able successfully to repel any future aggression that may be attempted."62 The governor general in his report to the colonial secretary made reference to the admirable behaviour of the Canadian militia and paid specific attention to the adjutant-general of militia, Col. P.L. MacDougall: "This officer has not yet been a year in Canada but so admirable is the system of organization which he — 127 —

— The Last Invasion of Canada — has established that he is able within a few hours to assemble men on any given point over a line of more than 1,000 miles, masses of volunteers who at the time the order was given were scattered over the country pursuing ordinary vocations."68 The adjutant-general himself described the Fenians as "invaluable though involuntary benefactors of Canada by uniting all classes, and by the opportunity afforded of testing its military organization, they have given the province a proud consciousness of strength."64 Yet praise was not universal. Many rifles issued to the Prince of Wales Regiment and other Montreal volunteers lacked ramrods and had broken nipples, making it impossible to use percussion caps. These weapons, and some whose barrels had not been cleaned inside, could not be fired. Farther west, the want of haversacks and water bottles in the Toronto militia proved a serious handicap in the field.65 The militia were prepared for parades rather than for battle. This, according to their view, was putting first things first, as parades were their routine activity, and the prestige of each unit depended on smartness in public drill and marching. It was difficult to believe in the arduous reality of action before it was experienced. The conduct of the high command was undistinguished. No adequate maps were prepared of the areas that had been scenes of combat in 1812-14 and in the late 1830s, and where the militia had been concentrated during the "false alarms." More difficult to understand is the failure to call out the cavalry and send them to the frontier immediately. Cavalry could have saved Booker from defeat at Ridgeway. Although it arrived in time for the skirmish at Pigeon Hill, it was, as in the Toronto instance, sent too late. Further, there is the question of why Booker, a militia officer with no experience beyond regimental duties, at Ridgeway found himself uncomfortably in charge of a brigade composed entirely of volunteers, when regular officers and regular units were available. Moreover, in the east the town of St.-Armand, linked to Montreal by railway and an obvious target for a Fenian invasion, could easily have been garrisoned by a force of regulars or at least some companies of Montreal militia. As a result of Carter's cata-

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strophe, the local population lost confidence in the ability of the government to protect them and decided to organize a home guard for their own defence. With the raids over, the Fenians could bask in the glories of Ridgeway. They would no longer be dismissed merely as barroom braggarts collecting money from impoverished immigrants under false pretences. The militia could take pride in the defence of the frontier. The regulars had been there in a supporting role, but the actual fighting at Ridgeway and Fort Erie and the charge of the Royal Montreal Guides had been the work of the militia, led by militia officers.

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— 8—

Preparations for the Fenian Raids of 1870

By uniting all classes, and by the opportunity afforded of testing its military organization, they have given the province a proud consciousness of strength.

—Adjutant-General MacDougall Report, 1866

T

-IE RAIDS OF 1870 were the least effective of the Fenian attempts against Canada. The effort four years earlier at Campobello had the most far-reaching effects, as it induced New Brunswick and Nova Scotia to enter Confederation, while operations in Canada East and Canada West brought about a martial spirit similar to that which swept the United States at the outbreak of the Civil War. Because the campaign was of short duration, there was no time for disenchantment. Yet the raids of 1866 were clearly unfinished business, as the Brotherhood declared by warlike preparations. Ridgeway established the reputation of Lt.-Col. John O'Neill, who was soon promoted to inspector-general of the Fenian forces. As the obvious leader for future forays against Canada, he became a leading figure in Fenian politics, but he had limited talents as a politician. There was still a Fenian faction that looked towards revolt in Ireland, but after an attempt at insurrection there in 1867, Canada again became the prime target. Whether in Ireland or along the Canadian frontier, Fenian efforts were always short affairs. The Brotherhood would make elaborate preparations, — 131 —

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attack, experience a greater or lesser degree of failure, and then take several years to build up for another effort. They were strangers to the secret of successful guerrilla warfare, that of keeping the opponents off balance by a continuous series of small incidents. However, their threats and perpetual preparation made it impossible for the Canadian government to relax its vigilance on the frontier. Between 1866 and 1870 the Canadian volunteers were kept in a constant state of alert in well-founded anticipation of action. Fenian morale found sustenance in the re-enactment of the Battle of Ridgeway at picnics and other outings where red-coated "British troops" would be routed by green-jacketed Irish patriots. A placard dated 13 June 1866 circulated in Milwaukee stated that the redcoats had been defeated twice.1 Money would be collected, arms purchased, drills continued, and an infinite number of plans prepared and discussed at Fenian congresses. Though taken seriously in a military sense by those who made them, such plans were also in effect part of a fund-raising campaign, for they could be offered as proof that the Brotherhood was in earnest. Fenianism became an aspect of Irish American culture, and attending meetings where belligerent anglophobes indulged their rhetoric became an habitual recreation. These gatherings acquired added prestige by the frequent presence of American politicians, who could not ignore the Irish vote. Some indeed, like congressmen Nathaniel P. Banks and Benjamin Butler, saw Fenianism as an instrument of Manifest Destiny and hoped the acquisition of Alaska in 1867 might be followed shortly by the acquisition of Canada, or at least the largely empty Hudson's Bay Territory.2 Fenianism was still alive, but its human resources were withering away as Civil War veterans found a secure place in civilian life. Canadian federation was a mortal blow to Manifest Destiny. The honours gained at Ridgeway would not last forever, although they were sufficient to sustain a military reputation and attract young men seeking glory who had missed the Civil War. In 1866 the Fenian General Sweeny had been the supreme commander and secretary of war in the Roberts faction. As such he acted technically as a subordinate to the civil head, William — 132 —

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Roberts. After Ridgeway, O'Neill's prestige and his difficulties in getting along with politicians made it inevitable that he should become the political head and president of his own faction. This created a schism among those Fenians concerned with the invasion of Canada, and Fenianism generally lost the sense of cohesion it had possessed in 1866.8 O'Neill thus had to draw on more limited resources, and as military and civil head of his own movement, found his authority challenged by various factions among his own followers. Apart from this, the Irish leader was a heavy drinker, careless in financial matters, and his chief lieutenant and confidant, Henri Le Caron, was an undercover British agent. Le Caron, whose real name was Thomas Billis Beach, was born in England. For reasons best explained by a passion for a clandestine existence, he gave his name as Le Caron and his nationality as French when he joined the Northern forces at the outbreak of the Civil War. His energy and daring won him a promotion to lieutenant, and at the end of the war he married and settled in Nashville, Tennessee. Subsequently, he cultivated the acquaintance of John O'Neill, who also settled in Nashville, and learned from him about the Fenian Brotherhood. In a series of letters to his father in England, based partly on information provided by O'Neill and partly on his own research, Le Caron outlined the plans of the Fenian Brotherhood. These letters were shown to his father's member of Parliament and ultimately reached the Home Office in London. Le Caron was then called to England, where in 1868 he officially became a secret agent and was sent back to infiltrate the Fenian movement. He was also put in touch with Gilbert McMicken, head of the western branch of the Canadian detective force engaged in Fenian surveillance.4 By this time John A. Macdonald was employing three sets of agents: those controlled by McMicken; a similar body operated by Police Magistrate C.J. Coursol in Montreal; and a special force controlled by Lt.-Col. Edward Ermatinger. These forces worked independently of one another, so that Coursol's men, for instance, sent long reports on the activities of Le Caron, whom they believed to be a genuine O'Neill supporter.5 — 133 —

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Volunteers pose far the camera, c. 1870.

Organized Fenians inside Canada ceased to be a problem with the departure of Michael Murphy to the U.S. after his escape from jail in Cornwall in September 1866, but there were miscellaneous Fenian sympathizers in Montreal capable of trouble. D'Arcy McGee, as an articulate enemy of Fenianism, naturally made himself their target. During the first federal election of the Dominion of Canada in 1868, they disrupted his meetings and managed to deprive him of much of the Irish vote. McGee replied by exposing their influence in the supposedly non-political St. Patrick's Society, whereupon threats of assassination followed. The actual assassination in Ottawa was probably the work of a small group that included James Whelan, who had been stalking McGee for some time. Whelan, convicted of the murder of McGee, confessed before his execution that he had been present at the killing, but it is not certain he fired the fatal pistol shot. His guilt in — 134 —

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law, however, remains clear.6 McGee's funeral in Montreal was virtually an anti-Fenian demonstration on the part of the local Irish community. Moreover, although the Irish Americans apparently had nothing to do with the deed, Le Caron reported that the assassination damaged the cause of the Fenians in the United States.7 Apart from McGee's assassination, Fenianism kept its prominence before the Canadian public because of the trial of prisoners taken in 1866. John A. Macdonald would have been happy to release them all, but Canadian public opinion demanded some gesture of reprisal. Legally they were outlaws because they had waged war without belligerent status. Some, being born in Ireland, were considered British subjects because Britain did not recognize the naturalization process. Such individuals additionally faced a capital sentence for treason, however they might fare on the illegal warfare charge. Many were released on various pretexts, some were given prison sentences, and a few were condemned to death. There was no question of execution being carried out, or full sentences being served, but the naturalization question was damaging to relations with the United States, whose government provided counsel for the Fenians.8 The release of the prisoners was further delayed on account of the Fenian revival inspired by O'Neill in 1868 and fully reported by Le Caron. Prime Minister Macdonald became aware of Le Caron's existence when he received a letter from McMicken dated 8 June that reported contact with the agent. Agreement followed that Le Caron, who was already getting $60 monthly from the Fenians plus $7 a day expenses, would receive $150 a month from the Canadian government.9 At that time Macdonald was inundated with reports of Fenian activity and offers of service from Canadian residents in the United States. Le Caron, being a novice as a secret agent, added to Macdonald's anxieties by exaggerating Fenian strength and taking at face value the pledges of support O'Neill received from Chicago and other places. Le Caron assumed that an attack would take place before the 1868 presidential election. So, too, did several other agents whom McMicken employed. Yet by 11 October Le — 135 —

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A Victoria Rifles composite photo, 1870.

Caron was able to report that the invasion was postponed to the next spring.10 The same month, he incautiously inquired about the addresses of Fenian sympathizers in Montreal. Word of this came to a leading U.S. Fenian, John Roche, who accused Le Caron of being a British agent. Le Caron, now a major in the Fenian forces, offered to resign, but his resignation was refused, and he won a vote of confidence despite his near exposure.11 On 24 November O'Neill's wing of the Fenians held a convention in Philadelphia, attended by 400 delegates (including three Canadian informers) representing 180 of the Brotherhood's circles. Some 2,000 armed Fenians paraded in uniform as the convention announced the projected invasion of Canada in 1869. Yet the Fenian difficulty remained the lack of funds. They had collected $101,000 and spent $95,000 on current expenses including Le Caron's salary.12 Clearly there was little likelihood of an expedition in the spring or the summer. All the more so as the Fenians continued to — 136 —

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quarrel among themselves. But by July Macdonald again received reports from McMicken that his agent, Le Caron, expected an imminent raid. Le Caron, who as O'Neill's lieutenant was distributing arms and munitions in the area of Malone, New York, kept in touch with McMicken through John C. Rose, a Canadian agent who followed Le Caron about, staying in the same hotels. This was noticed by G.J. Mannix, a local Fenian leader who concluded that Rose was a Crown agent shadowing Le Caron. Mannix gave orders that Rose be beaten and robbed and reported the matter to Le Caron.18 Once again, Le Caron escaped detection. At the end of the year O'Neill was still unable to launch an attack and was in financial difficulties. The manner in which he spent Fenian money was questioned as prodigal by Professor Brophy, the Fenian treasurer. O'Neill explained his difficulties to Le Caron, who advanced him the much needed $364.14 By the spring of 1870 it was evident that the Fenians had learned little from their experience of 1866. Like Sweeny before him, O'Neill continued to make plans for an invasion of Canada with conventional forces, without the backing of a conventional government. These various plans were duly reported to Ottawa; they could hardly be kept secret, for they were the raison d'etre for money raising. It was impractical to combine propaganda with adequate security measures. Apart from that, the personal animosities of leaders and the need for self-justification made selfexamination or even fair-minded criticism difficult. O'Neill, as the civil and military chief of his faction, was intolerant of any criticism of his conduct in 1866 and resented any comments damaging to his image. His failure in 1866 he attributed to U.S. government intervention. In a similar manner Fenian set-backs in Ireland were attributed to clerical hostility underlined early in 1870 by a Vatican condemnation of the Fenian Brotherhood.15 Hitherto the Church had been content to give a general warning against secret societies. Yet if the Fenians had learned nothing from 1866, the Canadians had learned a good deal. There were indeed recriminations among the military, noticeably in Colonel Denison's — 137 —

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criticisms of Lieutenant-Colonel Dennis after the Fort Erie disaster. But the disputes among Canada's defenders were monitored by a stable political authority, which, if not wise, was at least independent of the contending parties.16 The first lesson of 1866 was that volunteering was popular. The authorized quota of 25,000 had been exceeded. Even after the danger passed, local committees were offering to form new units. As the Imperial garrison was scheduled soon to withdraw, it was a comfort to know that the volunteers were a viable force.17 Fenian pressure on the Maritimes also provided a stimulus to volunteering, and the volunteering system enjoyed considerable popularity in British North America, becoming the basic feature of post-Confederation Canada. George-Etienne Cartier, John A. Macdonald's Quebec colleague, became the country's first minister of militia in 1867. The authorized strength of Canada's defence force was to be 40,000 men, with a reserve including all able-bodied men between eighteen and sixty; the latter were, in effect, the old sedentary militia. As it turned out, the volunteers numbered 37,170. On the provincial level, the breakdown was as follows:18 Volunteers Nova Scotia New Brunswick Quebec Ontario

928

1,789 12,637 21,816

With the excitement of the 1866 raids over, attendance at militia parades tended to fall off, but recruiting of Papal Zouaves to defend Rome against Garibaldi's nationalist forces kept interest in military affairs alive in French Canada. Undoubtedly, the most important of Canada's military reforms at this time was the amalgamation of independent companies into a battalion structure. In 1866 there had been 53 such companies in Canada West, of which 27 were actually called up during the troubles. Under the new system, battalions formed from these companies — 138 —

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were to be grouped with regulars to form brigades, which, in theory, would consist of 500 regulars, 1,000 militia, with supporting batteries of artillery, and of cavalry. The brigades were to be commanded by regular officers and staffed by an engineer officer, a commissary and staff, a mounted provost sergeant and two cavalry assistants. Provision was also made for an intelligence section.19 Under this system a number of battalions came into existence in the regions of Quebec that were to receive the shock of the Fenian Raids of 1870. These were, principally, the 60th Missisquoi Battalion, the 51st Hemmingford Rangers Battalion, the 52nd Brome and Prince Albert Volunteers and the Beauharnois 64th Voltigeurs canadien.20 Although close to the frontier, it would, however, take some time for these rural volunteer battalions to mobilize because their personnel had to be called in to local assembly points from the remote regions. A Montreal battalion could, by contrast, be mobilized in a few hours and entrained for the frontier before the rural companies could form themselves into a battalion or sometimes even gather at company strength. The retreat from St.-Armand, which caused the flight of civilians from the frontier in 1866, had undermined the confidence of the border people in the capacity of the government to protect them. Aware that there were still Fenians nearby in Franklin, Vermont, the inhabitants of Pigeon Hill took it upon themselves to mount night patrols along the frontier after the troops departed.21 In August, Charles Hawks and others petitioned the government requesting that a volunteer company be placed on the frontier to ensure their security. John A. Macdonald turned the petition over to the military authorities, but no action ensued,22 the rationale being that maintaining a permanent garrison at one point on the frontier would only close one door and would lead to similar demands from other threatened points. The budget could not carry the expense, and, in any event, the immediate danger was over. Seeing that they would receive no help from the government, two substantial inhabitants of the border area, Asa Westover and Andrew Ten Eyck, both of Loyalist descent, decided to establish — 139 —

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Officers of the Royal Artillery, Hochelaga 1870.

their own Home Guard without government assistance. Initially sixteen men were recruited, each furnishing his own arms and ammunition. However, Westover and another volunteer, James Pell, soon visited the United States to purchase what were deemed suitable weapons. They selected the Ballard rifle, a breech-loading single shot with a heavy 30-inch barrel, known for its accuracy. This group met occasionally, more for rifle practice than drill, until signs of a renewed Fenian effort appeared in 1868, at which time Westover and Ten Eyck selected Eccles Hill as the point to be defended in an emergency. New recruits raised the strength of the company to twenty-five, but it remained a civilian association with a president and a vice president. Among the recruits was S.N. Hunter, who had provided information in 1866 and had now settled in Lagrange, Quebec. Hunter established links with residents of Fairfield, Vermont, a Fenian centre, thus providing the local Home Guard with an intelligence service. The purchase of the Ballard rifle was indicative of a new revolution in warfare: the shift from muzzle-loading to breechloading weapons. Armed with a breech-loader a man could not only fire faster but might kneel behind cover or lie prone. The Spencer rifle had been used at Ridgeway by a company of the — 140 —

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Queen's Own, but purchase of new rifles for general re-equipment would be expensive, and the government's solution was the conversion of muzzle-loaders by altering the mechanism of the Enfield, hence the adoption of the Snider-Enfield hybrid.23 On 15 September 1866 John A. Macdonald wrote to Lord Monck that the volunteers were losing confidence in their muzzleloading weapons but that no supply of converted Enfields could be provided until the following spring.24 At the same time the Fenians were similarly acquiring breech-loaders and even set up their own plant for converting Union war-surplus Springfields to the new system.25 British regulars and Canadian volunteers would face technology equal to their own; the only ones with a slight tactical advantage were the Missisquoi Home Guard because of the

Officers of 1st Prince of Wales Regiment, 1870.

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— The Last Invasion of Canada — reputed superior accuracy of their Ballard rifles, but as a practical matter the difference would be marginal or immaterial in most combat situations. While Le Caron and other British and Canadian agents were watching the Fenians, a crisis was emerging in the North West. In 1869 the Metis people, with good reason, wanted some guarantees of their political rights before accepting the westward extension of Canadian authority. Louis Riel took the leadership of this movement of discontent, proclaming a provisional government in the Red River territories with the support of a strong proportion of local inhabitants, including almost 400 experienced buffalo hunters. In response, Ottawa decided that any assertion of Canadian sovereignty in the Red River settlement would have to be supported by the military.26 In March 1870 Gen. Sir James Lindsay replaced Sir John Michel as commander of the forces in British North America. His first task was to prepare an expeditionary force of militia and regulars to move to the North West. It was decided to send 373 regulars of the 60th Rifles, a detachment of engineers, a detatchment of the Royal Artillery plus units of other services and two battalions of Canadian militia. One of these was to be recruited in Ontario, with a strength of 373 men, and one in Quebec, numbering 389. Col. Garnet Wolseley assumed overall command, with Lt.-Col. S.P. Jarvis in charge of the Ontario battalion and Lt.-Col. Louis Casault commanding that from Quebec. Although recruits would be drawn largely from the volunteer militia, the existing battalions were to continue to meet and drill, minus the men who went west.27 The Fenian Brotherhood understandably hoped to exploit the rebellion in the North West but had little understanding of local politics. There was nevertheless a Fenian representative in the west, William O'Donoghue, a candidate for the priesthood who had taken minor orders at St. Boniface College in the Red River territory but was released from his vows. He declared himself to be a Fenian, opened a correspondence with Fenians in New York and at the same time became a member of Louis Riel's provisional government.28 Riel fled to the United States, and there

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was no fighting when the Canadian forces arrived at Red River later in 1870, but an uneasy situation remained, with O'Donoghue trying to effect a liaison between Louis Riel and the Fenians.29 Meanwhile, with the opening of the new year of 1870 the Canadian government still had the problem of dealing with intelligence reports that made it clear that the Fenians were storing arms along the frontier with avowed intentions of invading Canada. One recourse was to put pressure on the U.S. government to seize Fenian stores of arms. Although the new administration of President Grant had less patience with the Fenians than the Johnson administration, there were still legal difficulties in seizing guns that had yet to be employed for illegal purposes. It was also evident that some caches of arms would escape detection and that the Fenians would find a means of replacing confiscated weapons. Consequently the temptation existed to let the Fenian conspiracy come to a head in one form or another in the hope that more failure would put an end to the threat. Sir Edward Thornton, the British ambassador in Washington, inclined to this view, and so did the governor general, Sir John Young. Early in 1870 Young told the colonial secretary, Lord Granville, "We know exactly the spots where arms are stored but there are all sorts of difficulties in the way of seizure. The arms are placed in small quantities, some buried, some in garrets, some in groceries and whiskey houses. "so He quoted McMicken's preference "to let the raid take place in small quantities so as to give the raiders a lesson which will not be easily forgotten."31 John A. Macdonald found such a policy tempting but too adventurous. He concluded late in March: It would be better for Canada to have a Fenian invasion begun and ended at once, instead of being threatened year by year. Still I do not think that the Canadian government or Mr. Thornton would be justified if they received positive intelligence of an intended invasion, in not taking preventive measures. Should we withhold such intelligence [from the United States government] and allow matters to take their course, England could not hold the United States responsible for any disastrous consequences.32 — 143 —

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Given the situation in Manitoba, the general growing pains of Confederation and his need to show results for the funds collected, O'Neill decided that he must strike whatever the cost in the spring of 1870. As his senate, which represented those donating money, was likely to oppose the attack, O'Neill resolved to call a congress of his followers for 19 April and then launch an invasion before the congress met.88 This was duly reported by Le Caron and others. Macdonald, taking these accounts seriously, asked Parliament to suspend habeas corpus on 10 April. A partial mobilization of militia was ordered, and some fifteen companies of militia including volunteers were called to Montreal.84 On 23 April, L.O. Daniel, editor of L'Opinion publique, taking pride in the appearance of the French Canadian volunteers, wrote that the "French Canadians have not lost the military spirit of their ancestors, and that the flag under which they fight can count on their bravery and their loyalty."85 It proved to be yet another false alarm. The government early in the spring of 1870 had again cried wolf and the Fenians failed to appear. Militiamen left their occupations to take up arms; money apparently had been fruitlessly spent. The enthusiasm of the militia and public represented a wasting asset, while the opposition press was already suggesting that these alarms were designed to divert public opinion from real issues that could embarrass the Macdonald administration. It would have been good political warfare for O'Neill to dull the Canadian responses by repeating false alarms, but his plans were made in earnest, and delays had a demoralizing effect on his own forces. O'Neill was unable to strike before the announced date of his congress because of a revolt of his senate, who took matters out of his hands. They soon discovered his intentions and headed him off by calling a congress of their own on 11 April in Chicago, where O'Neill had little influence. The heart of the matter was the dispute between the non-salaried senators, who wanted to keep down expenses, and the salaried officials. O'Neill, with a salary of $2,000 a year, was a prime target.86 O'Neill met this threat by calling a rival congress in New York, where his control was strong. Representatives of the Chicago — 144 —

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congress were banned at the New York one because they would not support an immediate attack with the resources at hand. Fifty-four delegates met in New York, based largely on the circles from New York and Philadelphia. There, O'Neill was reelected president and a senate of nine was elected, which included four from New York, one from Massachusetts, one from the South and three from the western states. Without the support of the Chicago Fenians, O'Neill would have to confine his attacks to the Quebec frontier. According to military committee reports, munitions were more than adequate for the endeavour: 23,300 stands of arms of all kinds, 118,000 rounds of breech-loading ammunition and 3,500 rounds for muzzle-loaders.37 Six thousand volunteers were supposedly ready to take the field. Further afield there was talk of sending Le Caron to effect a liaison with Louis Riel, but as he now held the rank of brigadier-general and title of adjutant-general, Le Caron was in effect O'Neill's chief of staff. It was therefore decided that Le Caron was indispensable in the East.38 With a taste for historic occasions, O'Neill selected 24 May, the Queen's birthday, as the date for his proposed invasion. Four years previously, Sweeny on 18 May 1866 "instructed General Tevis to make no movement until after the 25th, as the Queen's Birthday fell on the 24th and all the troops in Canada would be on parade that day."39 O'Neill apparently had forgotten these words of wisdom and chose the best of possible days from the Canadian point of view. Le Caron made certain that Ottawa would be informed of the date,40 and the Canadian government moreover no longer had the problem of carrying on preparations while keeping its knowledge of Fenian plans secret. There would be no difficulty in disguising a militia mobilization as a celebration of the Queen's birthday. Apart from the unfortunate choice for his "D-Day," O'Neill made the best of his limited opportunities and resources. He was the only possible leader and would have to act quickly, for fellow Fenian personal enemies were undermining his credibility. Fenianism in its existing form would have to end with a bang or a whimper, and a bang, even if a small one, was the lesser evil. — 145 —

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— 9—

The Raids of 1870

Everything that can go wrong will go wrong. — Murphy's Law

I OHN O'NEILL'S RESOURCES were adequate for a final limited I effort against Canada. An abundance of arms and munitions • was stored along the frontier, and his claims to have 6,000 r men were not much exaggerated. What was required was good organization and luck. Occupation of Canadian soil for any length of time was out of the question. A second Ridgeway would be difficult, but all that was needed was an engagement with Canadian forces in which the Fenians made a respectable showing. Victory would be useful, but a defeat that could be presented in heroic colours would do just as well. Organization was not an easy matter. His men would have to be called from their regular occupations, then entrained for Malone, New York, and St. Albans, Vermont. There they would have to be fed and housed in special camps, provided for in hotels or in the residences of sympathizers. Contingents would have to be accepted in whatever state of preparedness they arrived in. Officers commanding various detachments were often strangers to one another, and there was no time to shake down the forces into manageable units. It would be necessary to gather an ad hoc force and throw it across the frontier.

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O'Neill's intention was less ambitious than Sweeny's plan of 1866, but it was still designed for conventional forces. His objective was St.Jean, Quebec, a garrison town easily reinforced by rail from Montreal. The only unconventional aspect of his scheme was a project for having Col. JJ. Donnelly seize a train with 500 men and run into St.-Jean. No effort was made to put this rail-borne adventure into effect. Another neglected dimension consisted of a plan to send 200 Fenians by way of Island Pond to capture Richmond, a railway centre. These abandoned options aside, the workable part of the plan involved a two-pronged attack. One Fenian force of 1,200 based in St. Albans would cross the frontier at Eccles Hill, several miles east of the St.-Armand railway station, close to Pigeon Hill where the Fenians had made their headquarters in 1866. A second Fenianforce, based in Malone west of the Chateauguay River, was to cross the frontier at Holbrook Corners where the Trout River flowed into Quebec.1 As neither Eccles Hill nor Holbrook Corners was directly connected by rail with Montreal, this choice of objectives made a certain amount of sense for hit-and-run raids. But it made little sense if the point was to take St.Jean, which was supposed to be the objective of the Fenian attack. To confuse the Canadian authorities, the Fenians intended to gather forces at Buffalo and Detroit, while their presence at Malone would in itself pose a threat to Cornwall and the towns along the St. Lawrence. As noted previously, there was even a project for sending Le Caron, who was believed to be French, to the Red River to contact Louis Riel. The forces mobilized at Chicago and Detroit were drawn from centres too far away to reinforce the operations along the Quebec frontier, yet their mere presence in the proximity of the Niagara and Windsor corridors would force Canadians to call out militia to guard the frontier. By so doing the propaganda value of the raids would be vastly increased. On the other hand, troops called out to protect the Ontario frontier were drawn from local sources, which could not conveniently be sent to the areas where the real raids were intended. Moreover, Louis Riel's purpose was to negotiate with the Canadians, not to fight them, and there was to be no fighting when Sir Garnet Wolseley's forces arrived at Red River.2 — 148 —

Battle of Eccles Hill, 25 May 1870

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Home Guard "Red Sash " defenders ofEccks Hill, with their Ballard sporting rifles, 1870.

After 1866, O'Neill must have understood instinctively that large plans were for propaganda purposes, partly to confuse the enemy, but mostly to sustain the morale of his own forces. There was a need to make a few hundred men on the Quebec frontier think that they were merely a fragment of a much larger operation. The only thing that really mattered was to get across the border and fight a creditable battle. Victory would be useful but not essential; defeat could be blamed on the American government. The only thing that could not be explained would be a fiasco like Campobello or Pigeon Hill. O'Neill should have realized that it would take time, perhaps several days, using regular train service, to get 1,000 men to St. Albans. He nevertheless had reason to be disappointed when a mere 100 men had arrived by his D-Day, 24 May.3 About this he could do nothing. Yet he seems to have done nothing, and had nothing done for him, to develop an intelligence service. He had been well served in that respect in 1866 by local sympathizers in the Niagara peninsula. Local sympathizers in Vermont had distributed stores of arms at key points on the frontier. They must have had contacts across the line and could have sent out agents to — 150-

— The Raids of 1870 — observe Canadian movements. Perhaps some efforts were made, but no one told O'Neill that Asa Westover's Missisquoi Home Guards were concealed and covering the very point, Eccles Hill, where O'Neill expected to march his forces across the frontier. O'Neill was much like a gambler who jumped into a strange and difficult situation. Assuredly, he was a professional gambler, but one who ultimately trusted to luck. O'Neill's first thought was for the discipline of his forces, and with this in mind he issued an order for commanders of all regiments, companies and detachments to hold their respective commands in readiness to move at a moment's notice . . . Officers and men must avoid the use of uniforms or any insignia that would distinguish them ... Officers must not be recognized by military title and officers or men must not speak of Fenian matters en route . . . Take no man who is a loafer or a habitual drunkard ... Take no man who had not seen service or who has not sufficient character to ensure his good behaviour en route in the presence of the enemy.4

The Eccles Hill camp of the 60th Battalion, which played a major part in the Fenian raid of 25 May 1870, Missisquoi, Quebec.

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The Fenians set up camp at Hubbard's farm, a half mile from Franklin, Vermont, where O'Neill made his headquarters. Franklin itself was ten miles from the frontier. While O' Neill was settling in, the Canadian authorities, acting on Le Caron's information, informed Washington of the projected attack. President Grant, being more secure in office than Johnson in 1866, had no hesitation in acting. A proclamation against Fenianism was issued on 24 May, and five companies of U.S. troops were ordered to Rouses Point.6 O'Neill could no longer act without breaking the laws of the United States, but this disturbed him less than the weakness of force at his disposal. His first thought was to cross the frontier at night, as he had at Fort Erie, but on being assured of reinforcements, he postponed the attack until the next day. By that time, the planned incursion was public knowledge, and farmers from the surrounding countryside began arriving in wagons to view the battle. As O'Neill's troops and wagons moved towards the frontier, U.S. Marshal George P. Foster, who arrived on the scene, told O'Neill that he would have to keep the road clear.6 He also read the presidential proclamation against Fenianism, but the proclamation, without the backing of U.S. troops, was brushed aside by O'Neill with some unpleasant comments about the president. Foster then proceeded across the border to warn Canadian authorities.7 By this time no warnings were required - police agents had provided detailed reports, inaccurate numerically, but otherwise faithful accounts of the Fenian intentions. CJ. Coursol, the police magistrate at Montreal, knew that the moves against Buffalo were a feint and that the two serious attacks would be based on St. Albans and Malone.8 Le Caron's reports differed from others only in being more authoritative, for they came from O'Neill's chief lieutenant. Washington had been fully informed, but there remained the question of what Canada would do in its own defence. If it had been a matter of preventive action, the dispatch of a few hundred troops by rail to St.-Armand would have been sufficient to discourage what turned out to be a half-hearted effort. But in spite of previous hesitation the raid was permitted to come to a head. — 152 —

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Home Guard "Red Sashes" with a breech-loading field piece captured from the Fenians at Eccles Hill, 1870.

Priorities as always were the protection of key points, particularly railway and canals. The well-oiled machinery of defence now went into operation. The militia of Brockville and Prescott were called out at 2 p.m. on 24 May. Capt. F.T. Atcherly, deputy adjutant-general of Military District 4, arrived at Cornwall on the night of 24 May with the Iroquois Garrison Artillery Battery, accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel Bergen, commanding the 59th Artillery. These battalions were called out and reinforced by a half battery of the Ottawa Field Artillery, two guns and twentythree horses. From the town of L'Original in the Ottawa Valley, the 18th Militia Battalion arrived in wagons. Cornwall, hence, was well defended and Brockville received another battalion, the 41st. At the same time a detachment of artillery and sharpshooters was put aboard the steamer Prince Albert to patrol the river.9 While it was known that the Fenians had no plans to attack these points, the presence of a large Fenian force in Ogdensburg

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was a sufficient reason for keeping the river frontier well guarded. 750 men guarded Prescott, the point most likely to be assaulted. The U.S. gunboat Michigan cruised along the shores of Lake Erie on guard against the Fenians in Buffalo attempting any nautical adventures, but no American firm was prepared to lease them barges and tugs. On the land side 1,159 men from local forces and volunteers from Toronto, Hamilton and Brantford guarded the Niagara frontier. Several hundred militia guarded Sarnia, and an equal number held Windsor.10 All this was useful training for the volunteers, great for public spirits, and useful as a warning to the Fenians, who could change their plans without notice and would be tempted to walk through open doors. Yet the only real threat was on the Quebec frontier. Here the new system of mixed regulars and militia, with the amalgamation of independent companies into militia battalions, would be tested. On 24 May the Montreal militia turned out for the usual celebration of the Queen's birthday. The celebration was dampened by the weather, but troops were kept under arms and after several hours were informed of the Fenian threat and told to be prepared to move.11 All militia stood to arms, but the Montreal troop of cavalry and one company from each of the Montreal Garrison Artillery, the Prince of Wales Regiment, the Victoria Rifles, the 5th Royals (now the Black Watch) and the 6th Hochelaga Light Infantry were selected for frontier service. They were dismissed for a quick meal and told to report back in an hour. At 6 p.m. they marched to the Grand Trunk Station and arrived at St.Jean three hours later. There they were met by a detachment of the Richelieu Light Infantry.12 It was decided to send the company of the Montreal Garrison Artillery fifteen miles up the river to support a small detachment of the Royal Canadian Rifles at Isle-aux-Noix. The service companies of the Prince of Wales, the Royals and the Hochelaga Light Infantry were billeted in St.Jean. The rest, about ninety in all, remained on the train; of these a picket of the Richelieu Light Infantry was left at Desrivieres station and the rest went to Stanbridge East, the scene of the debacle of 1866, detraining at — 154 —

— The Raids of 1870— midnight. From there they marched seven miles to the town of Stanbridge, arriving at 3 a.m.13 Meanwhile, the militia of the frontier counties had been summoned. The 52nd Battalion received orders on the evening of 24 May to concentrate companies from Waterloo, Settlers' Flats and Sweetsburg at Dunham. The battalion paraded at noon the next day, then marched to Eccles Hill, the point of danger. The 60th Missisquoi Battalion, called out at the same time but accustomed to false alarms, took their time: only forty had reported for duty on the morning of 25 May; however, their commanding officer, Lt.-Col. Brown Chamberlin, member of Parliament for Missisquoi County and editor of the Montreal Gazette, was on hand to lead them.14 All these forces were under the command of Lt.-Col. Osborne Smith, a former regular officer who had been appointed deputy adjutant-general of the militia.15 By the evening of 24 May preparations were made to close all open doors. Yet they could not be closed too soon, lest the Fenians be frightened away. Eccles Hill, the obvious Fenian objective, would have to be left unguarded. However, plans went forward. Lt.-Gen. James Lindsay, general officer commanding, had put MacDougall's scheme of field brigades into operation. Regulars would remain in support, while the militia would take the first shock of Fenian invasion. Cavalry and artillery and, if possible, engineers would be attached to the brigades, which resembled a modern-day task force. One modification of the plan was to leave greater initiative to the militia officers. As in 1866, the first move was to send the service companies from leading Montreal regiments - the Prince of Wales, the Victoria Rifles, the Royals and the Hochelaga Light Infantry - to St-Jean. They would be accompanied by a troop of the Montreal cavalry and a battery of artillery.16 Had it not been for Asa Westover and his private company of Home Guards, the Fenians might have held Canadian soil, at least for a while. After the alarms of 1870, the Home Guard adopted a more military style, and Westover was elected captain, R.L. Galer lieutenant, and James Galer ensign. A red woollen scarf was worn over the right shoulder for identification. S.N. Hunter, who while

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— The Last Invasion of Canada — a resident of Vermont had provided useful information in 1866, now resided at St. Georges, Quebec. He joined the company and took over the role of intelligence officer, having established connections in Fairfield, Vermont. Through these contacts he learned at 2 p.m. on 23 May that there could be movement on the following Monday.17 Accompanied by James Westover, presumably a relative of the captain, Hunter drove across the line but found nothing suspicious until he arrived at Franklin, Vermont. There they found the town in a state of excitement. Friends from nearby told them that they had passed several loads of Fenians arms, which had probably come from Fenian stores at Fairfield. Meanwhile, Capt. Asa Westover received independent confirmation that arms were stored under a shed at the Sheldon Hotel and that some light loads had passed along the road. These reports were taken to the government agent at Frelighsburg, who sent two messages, one to Lt.-Col. Osborne Smith, the area commander, and one to Lt.-Col. Brown Chamberlin, between 2 and 3 a.m. on 24 May. As the attack was imminent and there was no immediate prospect of government aid, Captain Westover decided to call out his forces and occupy Eccles Hill.18 Eccles Hill is part of a chain of mountains extending from northern Vermont into Quebec. It stands north of the boundary, to the west of a road leading from Franklin, Vermont, to Cook's Corners in Canada. Just before the frontier on the Vermont side was a small bridge that covered a stream running between Eccles Hill and a prominence in the U.S. There were several houses along the road on both sides of the border, that on the Vermont side closest to the frontier being the dwelling of Alva Rykert. Eccles Hill is a natural fortress with a partly wooded slope, with rocks and bushes providing cover. Men placed at the foot of the hill would have a clear view of the frontier. Those on the crest would have their field of fire obstructed by the trees and bushes. The Home Guard gathered at Cook's Corners, ten miles from the frontier. By 8 a.m. on the what proved to be a rainy 24th of May morning, some fifteen were assembled. Hunter was sent across the frontier again to get more precise news about Fenian movements. He discovered that although arms were being

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The engagement at Cook's Comers - skirmishers opening fire (Canadian Illustrated News, Vol. 1, 1870).

brought to Franklin by teamsters hired by the Fenians, there were, as yet, no men to receive them. Arms were still being brought in from Fairfield, but there were more teamsters about than Fenians.19 From questioning his acquaintances in Franklin, Hunter learned that the enemy intended to cross the frontier as soon as sufficient numbers had arrived. Hunter estimated that about twenty loads of arms had been unloaded at Hubbard's farm, close to the frontier. Many wagons went back to secure more arms from the various places where they were stored. Others proceeded to St. Albans to pick up troops coming in by rail. Hunter brought this news to Pattison, the government agent at Frelighsburg, where he discovered that Chamberlin and Osborne Smith had telegraphed that his reports were not credible. This was the only answer that could be given by authorities who wanted to keep secret their plans for meeting the well-advertised threat. To the Home Guard it appeared that they had been abandoned and were on their own. — 157-

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The time was then 12 noon, some six hours before the first troops would leave Montreal.20 Captain Westover and his friend Hunter decided not to tell their men that apparently no help was on the way, but by this time the inhabitants of Cook's Corners were already burying their valuables and leaving town. However, the family of Wellington Toof remained to provide hot meals for the Home Guard before they started for Eccles Hill. By the afternoon the road to Franklin was again opened and two Missisquoi emissaries, H.N. Whitman and G. Baker, were sent to request that the authorities of the town of Franklin seize the Fenian arms. When told they had no power to do so, the Canadians offered the assistance of the Home Guard. As a private organization it could, in theory, be employed by the town of Franklin in a police operation, but the offer of help was declined.21 At sundown it was decided to send part of Westover's force home and leave a picket of twelve men to form a night watch on Eccles Hill.22 Things looked up at 9 p.m., when Westover received news of a telegram sent by Lieutenant-Colonel Chamberlin to his uncle at Frelighsburg. This telegram, sent at 3 p.m., stated, "Westover and Red Scarf men should occupy old Fenian positions at once and if possible pester the flank of any party crossing. I go to Stanbridge on the next train. "2S This vote of confidence and promise of help did much to raise the morale of those keeping their lonely vigil on Eccles Hill. While on guard they halted two travellers, Frank Johnson and Clark Barney, who reported that the Fenian force, thought to be advancing, was in fact retiring to their camp. This reflected O'Neill's decision to abandon his plan for a night attack. At about 3 a.m., 25 May, the Home Guard halted a wagon driven by two men, who on being challenged gave the Fenian password, "Winooski," and said they were on their way to report to General O'Neill. They were promptly arrested and sent to Cook's Corners, where a company of Missisquoi Volunteers was assembling.24 On receiving the prisoners, the volunteer adjutant at Cook's Corners gave orders to have the Home Guard fight and fall back to — 158 —

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The grave of the first Fenian killed at Cook's Corners (Canadian Illustrated News, Vol. 1,1870).

Kraus Bridge, which crossed the Pike River on the road from Cook's Corners to Stanbridge. By this time Lieutenant-Colonel Chamberlin was already at Stanbridge, five miles from Cook's Corners, assembling his men.25 Meanwhile, detachments of volunteer militia were moving directly to Eccles Hill. Twenty-one men of No. 4 Company, Dunham Volunteers, arrived at 4 a.m. Some hours later another twenty Missisquoi Volunteers arrived from Stanbridge. Finally, at 10 a.m., Chamberlin and Osborne Smith arrived, accompanied by Captain Gascoyne. There were thus by then some thirty-seven Home Guards, forty Dunham and Missisquoi Volunteers, two senior militia officers and a regular in position at Eccles Hill. Smith ordered a picket of twelve men to nearby Pigeon Hill and then, accompanied by Gascoyne, departed for Cook's Corners to bring up reinforcements. At the same time part of the Home Guard went to a nearby farm for dinner, reducing the force in place to forty-one.26 — 159 —

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It was at this time that U.S. Marshal Foster crossed the frontier to inform the Canadians of the impending attack. He explained that U.S. troops were on their way and neutrality laws would be enforced when they arrived. At the same time he delivered a message from General O'Neill saying that the Fenians would observe all the rules of civilized warfare. Ghamberlin, now in command, said that he could receive no messages from the Fenians, as they were mere pirates and mauraders. These conversations had barely finished when the Fenian column appeared, marching down the road towards the frontier. Foster then drove back past the advancing column. It was about 11 a.m.27 O'Neill, based in Franklin, was three miles from the frontier, and as his forces arrived they were sent to Hubbard's farm, halfway to the border. They had a small breech-loading 3pounder cannon. According to O'Neill's own report, he launched his invasion with 200 men. Before the day was over some 400 Fenians would see action, and the total in the St. Albans area was about 800.28 It is difficult to see what O'Neill had in mind as he approached the frontier. He was aware of the proximity of Canadian forces because he sent a message to them by the way of U.S. Marshal Foster. Yet no enemy was visible, and Eccles Hill was a thousand yards from the frontier. O'Neill marched his men in columns of four with fixed bayonets, halted them within a thousand yards of the boundary, and made a short speech telling his men that they were "the advanced guard of the Irish American army for the liberation of Ireland from the Yoke of our oppressors." He added, "For your own country you may now enter that of the enemy - the eyes of your country are upon your forward march."29 The Vermont company of Fenians took the lead under command of Captain Croman, who made a short speech in reply to O'Neill's address. It was more like the prologue to a play than to a battle. Yet O'Neill had some sense of the enemy's presence, for he kept a reserve behind the crest of the hill and halted the main body at Rykert's farm. The advance guard crossed the bridge at the double, still in columns of four. When the last man crossed the — 160 —

— The Raids of 1870— line, the Canadians opened fire, killing the sentry, John Rowe, who had joined the advance, and wounding Croman.80 The Fenians at once replied, scattered and took cover. In the course of so doing, a second Fenian was killed and some wounded. Casualties were light, but the advance guard was pinned down, and no immediate effort was made to make use of the Fenian cannon.81 All casualties were probably inflicted by the Home Guard, who were concealed at the foot of the hill, using their accurate and familiar Ballard rifles. The Volunteers, posted farther away at the crest of the hill with Snider-Enfields, added to the volume of fire. As it was, the Home Guards were some 400 yards from the road where the Fenians crossed the frontier. At that range, after troops had scattered to take cover, there was little chance of numerous casualties on either side. A fire fight ensued for some minutes until the obvious waste of ammunition caused both sides to ease off. Lt.-Col. Osborne Smith and Captain Gascoyne were riding towards Stanbridge Station when they were overtaken by a messenger bringing news of the Fenian attack. Osborne Smith turned about at once, while Gascoyne rode on to Stanbridge to bring up the reinforcements. Osborne Smith arrived galloping across Eccles Hill in full view of the Fenians amid cheers of the Volunteers and Home Guard. Having done so, he could do nothing more but observe the intermittent exchange of shots, which went on for another three hours. His only command was to order a picket of ten men, which, on hearing gunfire, rushed in from its point on Pigeon Hill to return the fire and guard the rear of the Canadian position.82 O'Neill on his part observed the opening of the action from the attic window of Rykert's home. After watching his men fall back and take cover, he was driven outdoors by Rykert. Once outside, O'Neill sought to rally his men, assuring them that they faced nothing but a handful of militia. This made no impression on them, as the red coats worn by the Volunteers convinced them that they were opposed by regulars. At a loss for what to do next, O'Neill took shelter behind a woodpile, where, after a few

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minutes, he was discovered and arrested by U.S. Marshal Foster and his assistant. O'Neill, apparently disheartened, had submitted to expulsion from Rykert's dwelling and made no resistance to arrest, subsequently being taken in a carriage past his own men in Franklin. He was then placed in jail in St. Albans. The Fenian command next fell to Patrick O'Brien Riley, who took charge under the name of General G. Dwyer. It was then 1 p.m.83 Meanwhile, Gascoyne reached Stanbridge, where he found the Victoria Rifles, some ninety in all, sitting down to enjoy dinner. The assembly was sounded and the Vies and a troop of Montreal cavalry were prepared to move within a few minutes; sixty rounds of ammunition were issued to each man. The Vies and a small detachment of the 60th that was present boarded a miscellaneous collection of wagons and set off at a trot for the scene of action. The troop of cavalry followed. On arrival, the infantry left the wagons at the foot of Eccles Hill and ran to take up a position on the crest of the hill. The cavalry picketed their horses in a hollow behind the summit of Eccles Hill and awaited further orders.34 Shortly after this the Fenians displayed a white flag and a number of women appeared around the Fenian positions. Osborne Smith refused to recognize the Fenian flag of truce, fearing that in doing so he would grant them belligerent status. The Home Guard, who were not concerned with such matters, left their positions and started towards the frontier line. They met "General Dwyer," now in charge of the Fenians, who asked for time to remove dead and wounded. On being told that Smith would have no dealing with him, Dwyer gave the Home Guard ten minutes to regain their positions.35 Firing was resumed, but to little purpose, and by 4 p.m. Canadians were leaving in relays for meals, which was for some the great event of the day. Around 4:30 the Canadians perceived movement on the brow of the opposite hill that heralded the arrival of 100 Fenian reinforcements under Major Moore of the 4th New York Irish. At the same time Fenians pinned down at the foot of the hill, about eighty in number, opened a brisk fire on Canadian positions. But Moore was no more successful than O'Neill in urging the Fenians forward.36 — 162 —

— The Raids of 1870 — About 6 p.m. Fenian morale began to sag, and small groups began to fall back on Franklin Centre. At the same time word was brought to Smith that there was a Fenian field piece in the woods on his right. Given the sagging Fenian morale on his front and the threat to his right, Smith decided to order a general advance to clear the woods and take the gun. Twelve Victoria Rifles were to remain at the crest of the hill to provide covering fire. The 60th Missisquoi Volunteers would advance down the hill through the brushwood to take the gun, and the Home Guard would advance down the road.57 The Vies were ordered to hold their fire while the 60th and the Home Guard moved forward. Taken by surprise at the sudden move, the Fenians at first opened a spirited fire, but the range was long and there was cover along the way. The Canadians, using their Ballards and breech-loading Sniders, fired as they advanced. After suffering seven casualties, the Fenians fell back. All of them including the wounded got across the frontier.88 The only Fenian taken was the body of John Rowe, who had been killed earlier in the day. His uniform was later sent to Prince Arthur, who was serving with the Rifle Brigade in Canada. The small cannon, which the Fenians managed to fire several times, also became a trophy of war.59 The battle was over. On the Fenian side John Rowe and one other had been killed and Captain Croman died of wounds. The number of Fenians wounded is unrecorded but probably did not exceed ten. There were no Canadian casualties. The Victoria Rifles, Missisquoi Volunteers, and Montreal cavalry troop received their baptism of fire, but the real heroes were the Home Guard. Had Asa Westover and his small band not moved to take up their positions, O'Neill might well have seized Eccles Hill and held it for a day or two, re-enacting the events of 1866. Against raids of this kind a small group of riflemen fighting on their own ground were effective. Yet Asa Westover's contingent had no counterpart on the west side of the Richelieu, where the Fenians were concentrating at Malone. The eastern half of the two-pronged Fenian assault failed on 25 May. O'Neill was under arrest by nightfall; forty-five men of the

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5th U.S. Infantry Regiment were on hand to prevent further crossings. Yet Brig.-Gen. S.P. Spears, who had led the Pigeon Hill raid in 1866, arrived at St. Albans on 26 May and pleaded with Le Caron for 400 guns to attempt another crossing. Le Caron easily found an excuse for denying Spears the arms.40 Further attack in the St. Albans area was impossible, but news of the action, as in 1866, had induced hesitant Fenians to entrain for the frontier. There were in fact one set of half-hearted Fenians leaving for home and another set arriving eager for the fray. For those Fenians in Vermont who still wanted to fight, it was a simple matter to board a train for Malone. There Fenians were gathering for a movement against Huntingdon, Quebec. Prospects were good because there were no U.S. troops at Malone and no Home Guard at Huntingdon. There had been no trouble in that area in 1866 and consequently no counterpart of Asa Westover and his men. Yet the facts were the same. It would take time for the troops to arrive from Montreal and when they arrived at Hemmingford Station there would still be a march to Huntingdon, then camp would be pitched within ten miles or so of the frontier, leaving those in the immediate border area in danger of confrontation by the Fenians. As most able-bodied young men were in the militia, they would join their battalions when called. This meant that only the older men could be available for immediate local defence. With this in mind, Mayor Shanks of the town of Huntingdon decided to improvise a Home Guard of married men and those not attached to the volunteers. Shanks was commander of the Home Guard, with a Mr. Delany as his deputy. It was suggested that all work be suspended for forty-eight hours, and some citizens joined the volunteers in patrolling the roads.41 Of the volunteers in the threatened area, there were the 50th Battalion numbering 279 and the 51st Hemmingford Rangers, 345 all ranks. As in the Missisquoi area it would take some time for these battalions to mobilize, so they would not be ready much before the troops arrived by train from Montreal.42 At the same time as Brown Chamberlin left Montreal to take over the Missisquoi Volunteers, Lt.-Col. Archibald McEachern was ordered to Huntingdon to take — 164 —

— The Raids of1870-

Stampede of the Fenians through Trout River village, Canadian Illustrated News, Vol. I 1870.

over the 51st battalion. There he recruited a corps of twenty young men familiar with the country to act as observers along the border and visit the Fenian camp near Malone.43 This was the way things stood when a small party of Fenians crossed the border on 26 May and cut the telegraph wires at Holbrook Corners, where the Trout River flowed across the frontier. At the same time a Fenian party advanced as far as Hendersonville (Kensington), eight miles from Huntingdon. These incidents, combined with rumours that Fenians were concentrating at Malone, caused some alarm. As no reinforcements had arrived from Montreal, Lieutenant-Colonel McEachern decided to fall back on Port Lewis on Lake St. Francis.44 Huntingdon is on the Chateauguay River eight miles from the border. With its grist mill and sawmill it provided a market town for local farmers. It had no rail connections with Montreal and was linked with Port Lewis on Lake St. Francis by a plank road that ran, in part, across a swamp. At Port Lewis a traveller might hope to catch the steamer de Salaberry for Montreal, or take a ferry to

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Goteau Landing and board the Grand Trunk Line between Toronto and Montreal. By the time McEachern decided to retreat, the 69th Regiment of regulars was already well on its way to Huntingdon. It had left Quebec City on 20 May and from Coteau Landing was ferried across to Port Lewis. The battalion intelligence officer, Lt. William Bulter, rode ahead to Huntingdon, where he found the 50th Borderers preparing to fall back on Port Lewis. Lieutenant-Colonel McEachern immediately agreed to stay when assured by Bulter that the 69th was on its way.45 The regulars arrived at midnight, and the following evening they were reinforced by the Montreal Garrison Artillery and a detachment of Montreal Engineers. By 26 May there were 1,030 troops in Huntingdon, including the Huntingdon Borderers (225), the 69th Regiment (45), the Montreal Garrison (275) and the Montreal Engineers (88) .^ Colonel Bagot commanded the entire force, LieutenantColonel McEachern the Borderers, and Major Smith the 69th. Lieutenant-Colonel McKay commanded the artillery and Major Kennely the Engineers.47 The obvious place for the Fenians to cross the frontier was near the border town of Holbrook Corners, on the west side of Trout River, or near the village of Hendersonville on the east side. With that in mind, Colonel Bagot set his column in motion on the road that ran along Trout River. Given their difficulties, the Fenians could not be expected to do well. It is remarkable that they functioned at all. O'Neill, the political head and military chief of the Fenians, was in custody. They were acting in defiance of a presidential proclamation that would be enforced as soon as U.S. troops reached Malone. Rumours that the Americans would arrive on the evening of 26 May argued for immediate action, although such arrival never occurred.48 As Fenians were coming in small detachments from St. Albans, from New York City, Buffalo and Odgensburg, it is impossible to be precise about their number. Two thousand or so may have passed through Malone, yet on 25 May there were only about 250. The arrival of another 230 on the night of 26 May brought their — 166 —

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Camp of the 69th Regiment at Hinchinbrook (Canadian Illustrated News, Vol. 1, 1870).

strength up to over 450. The reports of wagons moving arms, barrels of pork and biscuits along country roads near the border indicated that there were sufficient supplies to sustain a small raid.49 The local Fenian commander was Gen. J.H. Gleason until 26 May, when he was replaced by Col. Owen Starr, who had been O'NeiU's lieutenant during the Niagara campaign. As Starr was a man of energy and daring, a change of command on the eve of battle may have been an alternative to no action at all.50 What Starr planned to do was to move a short distance into Canadian territory, take up a defensible position with a secure line of retreat, and await reinforcements. With the small forces at hand it was clearly impossible to do more. Fenians were pouring into Malone with the arrival of each train, so reinforcements were to be

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expected. Moreover, the mere presence of Fenians on "British soil" would mean movement from Boston and New York, and if reinforcements failed to arrive it was in theory possible to fight a rearguard action before retreating over the frontier. The flaw in his plan was the shaky character of Fenian morale.51 Meanwhile, J.C. Bruce, who lived near the frontier, visited the Fenian force near the village of Trout River on 25 May. He was detained for several hours but managed to escape, bringing back the news that there were at least 250 rifles and several boxes of ammunition in the Fenian camp.52 After this, there could be no doubt about Fenian intentions and the point at which they would cross the border. It was merely a matter of getting there on time. At 4 a.m. on 27 May, Bulter, accompanied by several scouts recruited by McEachern, rode ahead of the troops towards the frontier. Bulter approached the village of Hinchinbrook at 6 a.m. and was told by villagers that there was a Fenian camp just over the border about a mile and a half away. As Bulter rode down the road, he noticed Trout River a little to his left and that about three-quarters of a mile beyond the town "a large hops field crossed the road. The hops were already in bales, offering good cover for the height of a man."58 Taking advantage of this cover, he cautiously approached the boundary line. At first he saw nothing but a few houses and some early riser moving about. "Suddenly a body of men marching in column of four began to wheel out from a cross road about five hundred yards on the right side. They came straight for the frontier - the sun bright on the unbrowned barrels of their rifles."54 He judged the men to be two or three hundred in number. Bulter and his party cantered back to a bend in the road. As he was not certain the Fenians had crossed the frontier, Bulter walked his horse back around the bend, and there saw that the enemy were indeed on the Canadian side. He was now in full view of the Fenians, and they opened fire on him, but the distance was a safe 300 yards.55 By this time Colonel Bagot's column was well under way. One company of the 69th had been left in Huntingdon, where it was joined by the 51st Battalion, Hemmingford Rangers, and by 100 — 168 —

— The Raids of 1870—

The Battle of Trout River (Canadian Illustrated News, Vol. 1, 1870.)

men of the Beauharnois 64th Voltigeurs canadiens. It was understood that when the Montreal Field Artillery arrived from Port Lewis, the company of the 64th would march to the frontier. After firing a few shots at Bulter, the Fenians advanced half a mile into Canadian territory. There at 7:15 they built a breastwork between the farms of John Donnelly and Patrick Solon, running from Trout River across the river road to the woods. The barricade was three feet high and composed of rails taken from nearby fences. About 140 yards in length, it was a formidable bit of field engineering, easily defended by men with breech-loading rifles but not likely to survive artillery fire. It stood on a slight rise of ground with a clear field of fire for 320 yards.56 The small village of Holbrook Corners stood on the Canadian side of the barricade, one mile from the frontier. It was there that Bulter halted to await the arrival of Crown forces and made a sketch of the Fenian position. Colonel Bagot's column arrived at

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8:40 a.m., while the Fenians were still engaged in building their breastwork.57 Although they must have had local contacts, the Fenians apparently did no intelligence work and were surprised by the sudden appearance of Crown forces.58 Ten minutes before his arrival, Colonel Bagot received Bulter's message that the Fenians had crossed the line and thrown up breastworks. Bagot at once ordered Captain Rose's garrison artillery along a concession road to guard against a Fenian movement on his right flank, while the main body moved on to Holbrook Corners. There they paused briefly in view of the enemy, as Bagot examined the Fenians' position through a glass. This "brigade" or task force that Bagot commanded followed the pattern laid down by Sir John Michel - that is, a combined force of regulars and militia with the latter in front. He deployed the seven companies of the Borderers with three on the left of the road and four on the right. Two companies of the garrison artillery were ordered to cross the river by a bridge some miles back and proceed along the left bank of the river. The regulars supported the centre and remained in echelon along the road. Within ten minutes of sighting the enemy the Borderers went into action. As they advanced across the open but uneven ground, crossing fences as they went, the companies on the right opened fire. Those on the left held their fire until they reached the home of Mr. Holbrook, possibly to avoid damage to his property. Then they, too, opened fire.59 The Fenian pickets posted 100 yards in advance of the barricade fell back to the main position. Firing at a range of several hundred yards could have no effect on entrenched Fenians but helped relieve the nerves of the advancing militia, who had never been in action before. At about 400 yards the Fenians delivered a steady volley, which rained harmlessly over the heads of the militia without shaking their morale. An irregular volley followed. Then the Fenians began to retire.60 There was no reason why they could not have held the barricade. The troops advancing in the open were less numerous than themselves and their flanks were secure. But the Fenians, like the militia, tended to fire much — 170 —

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No. 1 Company, 3rd Battalion, Victoria Rifles, returning from Fenian raids, 1870.

too soon, a sign of bad nerves. When their fire had no visible effect on the advancing militia, their resolve seemed to give way altogether and they sought to take full advantage of their secure line of retreat. A few shots delivered from cover at 50 to 100 yards would have inflicted casualties, which would have driven the Borderers either to retreat or to ground. The sight of the Fenians in flight gave a great stimulus to the Borderers, who leaped the barricade and drove on half a mile to the border. Fenian casualties included one killed, Dennis Duggan; one wounded, Michael McCann; and one prisoner, John Moore. One Borderer was grazed on the forehead, the only Canadian casualty in 1870.61 The encounter had lasted thirty minutes and the total time spent by the Fenians on Canadian soil was about ninety minutes. Retreating Fenians encountered reinforcements moving towards the border, but the newcomers found those retreating abandoning rifles, knapsacks and provisions. There would be no return over the border, but the Fenians still in Malone had not given up. There were only a handful of U.S troops at Malone, and on the evening of 27 May some 300 Fenian reinforcements arrived from the west. By this time there were perhaps 1,300 Fenians around Malone, slightly more than the Canadian forces at Holbrook Corners. A public meeting was held at which General Gleason and Father John McMahon, who had been taken prisoner — 171 —

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in 1866 and was later released, urged further action. But the folly of such a course was evident.62 Any further action would involve casualties and, without any prospect of victory, to incur further casualties would be sheer madness. On the evening of 27 May, General Meade, the nemesis of the Fenian movement, arrived and the next day arrested General Gleason.68 This time the federal government refused to pay the Fenians' fare home, but the railways offered half price and Irish voluntary organizations, including Tammany Hall, came to the rescue.64 The plans drawn by Michel after the raid of 1866 had worked reasonably well. As intended, the militia had done nearly all of the fighting. French Canadian militia had turned out and the Beauharnois 64th Voltigeurs canadiens had served in support,65 but the only militiamen who really saw action were the Dunham and Missisquoi Volunteers, the Missisquoi Home Guards, the Vies and the Huntingdon Borderers. The militia had clearly borne the brunt of the raid. The camp at Holbrook Corners was broken up on 30 May. On the following day there was a review at Huntingdon, when the Huntingdon Borderers were addressed by Prince Arthur, who was then serving in Canada with the Rifle Brigade. That evening the Montreal militia arrived home at 7 p.m. and marched through cheering crowds to their drill halls. From thence they returned to their residences, having been on active service for ten days.66

— 172 —

— 10 —

The Raid against Manitoba

Cut off from the land that bore us Betrayed by the land we find Where the brightest have gone before us And the dullest remain behind. — Bartholomew Dowling, Revels

T

HE FINAL FENIAN raid against Canada was much like the first. It was a fiasco in which there were no casualties, but was sufficiently threatening to cause some anxiety and concern on the part of the Canadian and American authorities. In one sense it was not a Fenian enterprise at all, being organized and inspired by William O'Donoghue, who acted without the endorsement of the Fenian Brotherhood but secured the support of General O'Neill. O'Donoghue was a former novice who left the church to join Louis Riel and in 1869 became the treasurer of his provisional government. Riel was impressed by O'Donoghue's dynamic personalty and capacity for leadership, but distrusted him as a possible rival. Moreover, Riel understood that O'Donoghue was less interested in the welfare of the Metis than in striking a blow against the British Empire.1 Riel's quarrel was not with Britain but the "Canadian Party" in the Red River area. He had been reluctant to quarrel with Canada, and on the approach of Canadian forces from the east in 1870 he made an eleventh-hour attempt to come to terms with Ottawa. — 173 —

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The difficulty was that he had carried out the execution of an Ontario Orangeman, Thomas Scott, after a drumhead courtmartial, and Ontario was demanding vengeance. What Riel wanted was an amnesty for those involved in the execution of Scott and a substantial land grant for the Metis, who were uncertain about their claim to lands they occupied. Bishop Tache had given assurance that Ottawa would provide the amnesty and the land.2 Yet in view of Scott's execution Ottawa did not care to risk the wrath of Orange Ontario by granting an amnesty. The government sought to evade the issue by declaring that only the Queen had the power to grant an amnesty. This meant, in effect, the Colonial Office, but the British government did not wish to become involved in Canadian affairs.8 Under the circumstances Louis Riel, Ambroise Lepine and William O'Donoghue thought it was best to await the amnesty on the American side of the frontier. There was a crisis on 13 September 1870, when Elzear Goulet, thought to be one of Scott's executioners, plunged into the river while being pursued by members of the Canadian Party, including former militiamen. Goulet was pelted by stones and drowned.4 Two days later, a meeting was held at St. Norbert, attended by Riel, Lepine and O'Donoghue, at the residence of Father Ritchot, who served as a mediator betwen the Metis and the government. Efforts had been made by Lt.-Gov. A.G. Archibald to bring those responsible for Goulet's death to justice, but there still were no arrests.5 It was decided to draw up a "Memorial and Petition of the Peoples of Rupert's Land and the North West Territories of British North America" and send it to Ulysses S. Grant, president of the United States. O'Donoghue wanted to make it a plea for intervention and annexation, but Riel would have none of this. Alternatively, it was decided to send a petition to the president asking him to use his influence with the Queen to secure redress of the grievances of the Metis. The statement of grievances included charges that the Canadian government had failed to keep its promise of amnesty. O'Donoghue was designated to take the petition to Washington.6 Shortly after this, he secured the support of Alex Ramsey, the senator from Minnesota, and Ignatius Donnelly, a prominent — 174 —

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annexationist with good connections in Washington, D.C. At this time O'Donoghue and Kiel had their final quarrel and were not to meet again.7 O'Donoghue now felt free to modify the wording of the "Memorial and Petition," eliminating references to the Queen, requesting Grant to investigate the conditions in the Red River area and calling for annexation.8 While en route to Washington, O'Donoghue was able to get favourable publicity in the St. Paul press, where there was a nucleus of annexationists. Once in Washington he managed to get a hearing before the U.S. Senate, but a resolution introduced by Senator Zachariah Chandler calling for the president to negotiate with the "people of Winnipeg" was killed in committee. O'Donoghue's greatest triumph was an interview with the president who received him politely.9 Grant said he would like to have more information about grievances but offered no encouragement. The president had apparently received information from James W. Taylor, an erstwhile annexationist, who had been appointed U.S. consul at Winnipeg and who explained the alterations to the "Petition." O'Donoghue then turned to his last court of appeal, the Council of the Fenian Brotherhood. He managed to win over General O'Neill, who, after his release from prison, was made a member of the council. O'Neill was ready for new adventures, but the council had had enough of raids and was not impressed by either O'Donoghue's interview with the president or his story about the Metis being ready to rebel at the first sign of assistance. They had talked to President Johnson and invented stories of this kind themselves.10 O'Donoghue returned to the west and then went back to New York, where he found that O'Neill was again prepared to approach the Fenian council. When the council still refused support, O'Neill secured an agreement whereby he would resign from its membership and make no attempt to use the resources of the Fenian organization. In return the council promised not to denounce the project for a raid against the Canadian West. Under these conditions the project became a private venture of O'Neill and O'Donoghue, the purpose being to spark a rising of the Metis, — 175 —

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The Fenian raid on Manitoba, 1871.

176 —

— The Raid against Manitoba —

besiege Fort Garry in the name of the People of Rupert's Land and request annexation to the United States. O'Neill would have to raise money by public meetings and recruit his force in the Minnesota area, counting on the prestige of his name, O'Donoghue's influence among the Metis and American interest in annexation. The prospects were not bright, but O'Neill and O'Donoghue had some circumstances in their favour. There was the very real discontent of the Metis, which would continue as long as they were harassed by the Canadian Party. At the same time the rough and ready labour force of the Northern Pacific Railway included many Irishmen who were Civil War veterans. Most of these men would be laid off in the fall and consequently be attracted by the prospects of a military adventure. Finally there were experienced Fenian officers like O'Neill himself, anxious to regain the limelight by some kind of active service.11 Among this last category, he recruited Gen. JJ. Donnelly and a Col. Thomas Curley, who joined O'Neill in his journey west. Along the way he called upon his old friend Henri Le Caron, who promptly wrote to Gilbert McMicken in Ottawa but did not join in the expedition. The Canadian government was well informed of Fenian intentions, but it was impossible to tell whether they would be transformed into deeds, because the Fenians themselves did not know.12 Meanwhile, the Red River settlements had become the Province of Manitoba. Its first lieutenant-governor was A.G. Archibald. He took over a province with a population of 11,903, of which 9,480 were Metis. Of the white population, only 300 were classed as Canadian, most of the others being recorded in the census as British or Irish. There were 69 Americans.13 On arriving in the fall of 1870, Archibald took up the cause of the Metis and soon found himself in bitter conflict with the Canadian Party. This proved his main preoccupation, and it was not until the summer of 1871 that he began to worry about the Fenians. He then reflected that he had only seventy-five active militia in his service. There was a police force of some twenty men under a Capt. F. Villiers, who seem to have worn a splendid uniform but were otherwise not very effective. The white popu— 177 —

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lation included a large contingent of recently disbanded militia who had accepted land grants. They might if called on supply 200 men, but there was no organized militia.14 The military potential of Manitoba resided in the Metis population, who were for the most part experienced hunters, familiar with the countryside. If the Metis rose, the province would be in their hands, and even if they remained neutral, it would be difficult to find enough men to patrol the frontier. In spite of their meagre resources, O'Neill and O'Donoghue were touching a sensitive point in the fabric of Canada's hold on Manitoba. Being aware of Fenian capacity for idle threats, Archibald was wary of being taken in by mere sound and fury. On 31 August a customs officer on the frontier reported that the Metis were delaying the cutting of their hay because they feared that Fenian marauders would carry it away. Archibald was not unduly alarmed but requested that John A. Macdonald send an agent from Ottawa to the town of Fort Pembina, just across the American boundary.15 Communications between Fort Garry and Ottawa were by telegraph from St. Paul, Minnesota, or by regular mail. Couriers were usually dispatched to St. Paul, and telegrams concerning the Fenians were sent in code. Archibald felt reassured when Bishop Tache told him that there was no danger "although O'Donoghue does what he can to create the belief that a movement is going on."16 Two reports sent by McMicken to Ottawa at this time reported a Fenian revival in New York, and another sent by Le Caron that noted O'Neill was going west offered little comfort. More substantial information arrived from Father Ritchot, who had attended a meeting addressed by O'Neill in St. Paul. Ritchot reported that O'Neill and several of his officers had visited his hotel to ask how the Fenians would be received by the Metis. Ritchot told them that they were welcome as settlers but would be resisted as raiders. Ritchot was convinced that a raid of some kind would be attempted.17 Now thoroughly alarmed, Archibald wrote to Macdonald: I cannot count upon much, if any, aid from French half-breeds. They have not, I believe, any sympathy with the Fenian — 178 —

— The Raid against Manitoba — movement, but on the other hand, the bitter denunciation of the extreme English representation by the Liberal here and the Globe in Toronto, have aroused the worst feeling in them, and they would probably not be very sorry to see trouble.18

Archibald saw the danger of O'Neill and O'Donoghue recruiting unemployed railway workers, but he considered that there would be sufficient warning if any considerable body of men moved towards the frontier. In the face of an overt threat, the lieutenant-governor could call out volunteers. In the absence of such a threat, he could only wait and see. Taylor, the U.S. consul at Winnipeg, was in a better position to act. He had already told the president that O'Donoghue had no support among the Metis, and he was determined to prevent O'Donoghue from creating a serious incident. While Archibald was voicing his fears to John A. Macdonald, Taylor telegraphed Gen. William T. Sherman, commander of the U.S. Army: "Danger of inroads into Manitoba for pillage under pretext of Fenian invasion. I urge patrol on the frontier for the next three months by at least one hundred mounted men."19 No immediate action was taken in Washington but Capt. Lloyd Wheaton, who held the rank of brevet (acting) colonel while in charge of troops around Pembina, was alerted and prepared to act. While these events were in progress, Gilbert McMicken, head of the Dominion police, had been made commissioner of Crown lands in Manitoba and was on his way west. He arrived at St. Paul on 27 September and noted that O'Neill had recently left that city and that he had 150 breech-loading Springfield rifles and about forty-seven men. Moving on to Fort Abercrombie ten days later, he met Bishop Tache going east. Tactic had spoken with O'Donoghue and O'Neill and warned that he could not answer for the half-breeds because of the conduct of the volunteers. McMicken wanted the bishop to return to Fort Garry with him, but Tache went his way.20 On this occasion McMicken estimated the Fenian strength at forty-one, led by two officers. They had two wagons, two barrels of — 179 —

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The Fenian invasion of Manitoba, in twelve tableaux.

pork and three of hardtack. McMicken, who seemed anxious to accuse the Metis, reported that a man called Bodkin, an officer of U.S. revenue detectives, had organized a company of twenty-seven half-breeds and claimed to have the support of Bishop Tache. By 2 October Archibald was writing that it was "no longer possible to doubt preparations for invasion are in the making" but he had little precise information. He dismissed reports that the Fenians had 2,000 men but noted that "if every man could be depended upon" he could not raise 2,000 men in the province: "We have no militia organization here to put into operation. You should appoint Major Irvine Deputy-Adjutant-General pro tern, to enable him to call out the Militia, and you should send up immediately one military officer of experience." Archibald also requested the dispatch of 200 regulars or well-trained militia via the Lakes. He ended with a postscript that his latest reports suggested that there were 150 Fenians at Pembina.21 At the time Archibald was writing this report, McMicken was still making his way towards Fort Garry. From fear of — 180 —

— The Raid Against Manitoba — being intercepted by Fenians he left most of his money and luggage behind and sought to disguise himself by trimming his beard and acquiring a new hat. One of his stage drivers was a Fenian sympathizer, and McMicken claimed that a well-mounted rider who accompanied the stage for a time was identified as O'Donoghue.22 By October Archibald had no doubts that there would be a raid. After he consulted with Father Ritchot, it was agreed that the Metis would receive a temporary immunity from arrest for former offences, which would enable Ritchot to use his influence to secure support from them. On the third, Archibald issued a proclamation calling all loyal men to present themselves for enrolment in the militia. A thousand responded from the English parishes, but Louis Riel was unable to procure an immediate response from the French.25 On the sixth Major Irvine organized a force made up of service companies at Fort Garry, two militia companies recruited in Winnipeg and "a company of Canadians and half-breed French" under Capt. Louis de Plainval. This force of about 200 was able to move off towards the frontier within two hours. McMicken, who had arrived at Fort Garry on 4 October, noted that the weather was rainy and cold and that movement was difficult in the Red River mud.24 These men might secure the frontier, but the future tranquillity of the province required a positive response from the Metis. McMicken was to insist that they were playing a wait-and-see game, but there is no evidence of this.25 Given the legitimate discontent of the Metis, everything depended upon the attitudes of their leaders and particularly of Riel. In spite of McMicken and the anxiety of Archibald there was never any doubt about Riel's support of the government. On 23 September he told Bishop Tache, "Be sure there is not the least danger that I or any of my friends join the Fenians."26 RieFs position was clear. He would use his influence in support of the government, but as there was no amnesty, he wanted some assurance from Archibald that he would not be arrested while doing so.

— 181 —

— The Last Invasion of Canada —

A meeting of eleven Metis leaders attended by Father Ritchot was held on 28 September. It was resolved that the government was not fulfilling its pledges towards the Metis and showed no signs of keeping them. In spite of this, there would be no communication with O'Donoghue. Riel moved that they return to their parishes and get them to express their satisfaction with the Manitoba Bill.27 On the night of 3 October a messenger arrived from O'Donoghue, and two prominent Metis, Andre Nault and Baptiste Lepine, ignored the previous resolution and made contact with him. A meeting was called the next day. At this gathering a message was read from the two errant leaders saying that they went to see what O'Donoghue wanted and to find out whether he was weak or strong.28 Further meetings on the fourth and fifth raised the question of the Governor's Proclamation, and all save one of the thirteen present favoured support of the government, the dissident favouring neutrality. Still another meeting was held on 6 October, where Nault and Lepine reported that the Hudson's Bay post at North Pembina had been seized by O'Donoghue on the previous night. He wanted Metis support for a Declaration of Independence, which he was preparing. O'Donoghue claimed that he had money and could put five men in the field for every one from central Canada. This time only six including Riel gave unconditional support for the government. The others would return to the parishes and let them decide. By the next day, 7 October, all parishes declared for the government. In the evening Archibald was informed that "(1) being subjects of Her Majesty Queen Vic-toria, we believe it is our duty to obey her, (2) that having received, through her representative, orders to meet to fight the Fenians, we do so and are resolved to follow the order which competent authorities shall give."29 Even if their assistance was not essential to the defence of the frontier, Archibald feared that if the Metis failed to turn out, all hope of reconciliation with the English would be gone. Louis Riel had been granted temporary immunity from arrest at Father Ritchot's request, a request McMicken thought reasonable.30 — 182 —

— The Raid against Manitoba — By the end of 5 October, Archibald had done all that he could do, and had to wait on events. At ten in the evening he received news that a Hudson's Bay Company frontier post had been "taken at seven yesterday morning by about 70 Fenians - about 25 American half breeds were of the party." They remained till noon, "when American troops moved over the frontier to disperse them."51 The best account of what happened was given by courier George W. Webster, who was carrying dispatches to St. Paul for Archibald. On the eve of the raid he stopped at Pembina and called on Captain Wheaton, the American officer in command of the frontier fort at Pembina. Wheaton had no information on Fenian activities. Webster then spent the night at the residence of A.B. Douglas, the Canadian customs officer. At seven the next morning O'Neill seized the Customs House. Douglas, Webster and the clerk were arrested and marched to the Fenian command post about half a mile over the U.S. frontier. Webster wrote that there was a Fenian force of about thirty men with General O'Neill and Colonel Curley and Donnelly and O'Donoghue — they were armed with Springfield rifles converted to breech loaders, none of them wore uniforms. About nine o'clock the Fenians had at least twenty prisoners as they stopped all those who were not connected with them. One of the prisoners was an American citizen and as he demanded his liberation on that ground, O'Donoghue was afraid to detain him .. . Mr. Douglas and I had previously instructed him what to do, and as soon as he got out of rifle shot of the Fenians he ran all the way to the U.S. military post and informed Captain Wheaton of the circumstances.82

Wheaton was determined to put an end to the mischief before it got out of hand. He put thirty men in two wagons and came down at the gallop. Just short of the Customs House he halted the wagons and his men moved in, in skirmishing order. Douglas and Webster were rescued and were able to watch the end of the operation through a telescope from the upper windows of the Customs House.

— 183 —

— The Last Invasion of Canada — O'Neill and his men had seized the Hudson's Bay post and were looting the stores. Wheaton sent a sergeant ahead on horseback to ask O'Neill what his intentions were. The sergeant was arrested by the Fenian pickets and paraded before General O'Neill. While this was being done, one of the sentries ran into the post shouting, "American forces are coming." This apparently broke the morale of the Fenians, who scattered in all directions. By the time O'Neill, Donnelly and Curley got out the door half of their men were gone. Wheaton took up the pursuit, capturing O'Neill, Curley and Donnelly along with ten others. O'Donoghue, who was the last to leave the fort, managed to escape. According to Webster, the Fenians left 300 stands of arms and 7,000 rounds of ammunition, which Wheaton took to the post along with the prisoners.33 Later in the day, O'Donoghue was seized by loyal Metis and turned over to the American authorities. There could really be no question of the Fenians being convicted by American courts, but their leaders were taken into custody.34 Webster reported that in response to reports of continued movement in the St. Joseph area, Wheaton sent a small force to investigate.35 The American authorities had the situation in hand, and Archibald ordered the militia marching towards the frontier to return to Fort Garry, where they were disbanded. Throughout the incident the Americans had taken all the effective action. Taylor had warned Washington that there would be trouble and Wheaton acted when trouble appeared. Keeping the Fenians from using U.S. territory as a base was an American responsibility, which on this occasion was accepted and gave Ottawa no cause for complaint. Archibald throughout was more worried about the attitude of the Metis than the military threat posed by the Fenians. This anxiety vanished when he received news of their support on the seventh, and on the next day he crossed the Red River to meet 200 Metis assembled on the east bank. After being received by a feu de joie he shook hands with the Metis leaders, including Louis Riel.36 The "raid" against Manitoba was over. In 1875, O'Donoghue was to insist that it was not a Fenian Raid but a continuation of the

— 184 —

— The Raid against Manitoba —

Canadian volunteers monument, Queen's Park.

— 185 —

— The Last Invasion of Canada —

Metis rebellion of 1870. Yet apart from the Metis resident in Minnesota whom he recruited there were none involved. The release of the Fenians by American authorities was a cause of some anxiety. In his address of 13 October Archibald thought it useful to remark, "The raid for the moment is over. If renewed it will not be renewed immediately. If the Fenians were men activated by ordinary reason, it would never be renewed. But they are not."87 Archibald did not understand that all the Fenians were interested in was taking home some fragments of glory, to add to Irish folklore. The declared aims of the raids were a pretext for battle. After Pembina it was clear that no "fragments" were to be had, and there were no more raids.

— 186 —

— 11 —

Conclusions

T

HE FENIAN RAIDS PROVIDED BRITISH North Americans with an external threat that induced the Maritimes to join

Confederation, and with a much needed military experience. On their part, the Fenians were able to justify their existence through military action and win a place in Irish folklore

by their victory at Ridgeway. For the United States, the raids were a problem, with politicians anxious to conciliate the Irish vote and officials determined to enforce the neutrality laws. On the whole, the Fenians were decent enemies, with considerable professional pride and a touch of chivalry. Many of the Fenian rank and file must have belonged to agrarian secret societies and been involved in quasi-guerrilla actions against Irish landlords. Yet they were led by professional soldiers, who sought to wage conventional war. Guerrilla warfare, if attempted, would have limited results, for the U.S. authorities were prepared to act on the first overt violation of neutrality laws. The plan of taking and holding a bit of Canadian territory had no chance of success, but a plan of some kind was needed. It would appear that the Fenian leaders, like T.W. Sweeny, believed their plans possible — 187 —

— The Last Invasion of Canada —

given the resources they demanded from the Fenian Congress. Yet they should have understood that demands for 10,000 or more men fully equipped were beyond the resources of the Brotherhood. Given the nature of the Fenian organization and the fact that individual Fenians could not hope to sustain themselves from their own resources for more than a few days, Fenians would constantly be arriving and departing from any point where they were mobilized. It would therefore be impossible to gather much more than 1,000 men at a single place at a particular time. The Canadian militia could mobilize up to 15,000 men and keep them in the field for several weeks. Yet they had a large area to patrol, and as they were part-time soldiers the militia could not be kept in the field indefinitely. The greatest asset of the militia was its zeal; therefore, the false alarms of March 1866 did much to dampen the enthusiasm of the militia and the public. Like the Fenians the Canadian militia felt the need of military action to justify its existence. Even a defeat like Ridgeway provided a justification for their preparations and parades. The Fenian effort before Campobello was ill conceived and not surprisingly an ignominious failure. Killian's idea of an effort against Campobello was known to the Maritime military command long before it was adopted by O'Mahony. Once adopted, the information provided by Red McDermott alerted Canadian and British authorities. As a result of this, the Fenian mobilization around Eastport was matched by preparations on the New Brunswick side of the frontier and American authorities were informed and prepared to act. In spite of this, if the Fenians had been led by a smuggler with piratical tendencies or even a naval officer, they might have redeemed their enterprise by a spectacular coup. As it turned out, Killian was a talker with no noticeable military talents, and his attempts to appeal to anti-Confederation sentiment in the Maritimes backfired. The raids on Indian Island were probably carried out without his knowledge, and only served to provide the American authorities with legal arguments for dispersing the assembled Fenians. The efforts of the Roberts wing of Fenians were better — 188 —

— Conclusions —

planned, better led and helped by the relaxed mood of Canadian authorities that followed the Campobello fiasco. The Canadian politicians, British diplomats and even Canadian secret agents underestimated the Fenians. They were prepared to dismiss them as stage Irishmen, given to talk and drink rather than action. In this they were encouraged by American authorities, who were inclined to share this view and who were anxious to avoid trouble. The Fenians consequently gained the essential element of surprise on 2 June 1866. Had a Canadian armed vessel of any dimension been patrolling the Niagara River, O'Neill's enterprise would have failed or never been attempted. Once on Canadian soil, O'Neill seemed to have been fed intelligence from local Fenian sympathizers and from his mounted scouts. He acted wisely in moving against the weaker Canadian column and redeemed the Fenian cause by defeating it. As Denison pointed out, if the cavalry had been mobilized on the first day instead of the second, and taken the field immediately, things would have gone better. However, there was not much time to think. The fact that Booker's force at Ridgeway was composed exclusively of militia and commanded by an officer who had never previously commanded a brigade was not according to plan. Officers with less experience have won battles on occasions, and Booker came close to being a great Canadian hero. O'Neill was impressed by the steadiness of the militia at the opening of the engagement and contemplated withdrawing. Yet there were some signs of wavering even before the fateful order to form square, and a blunder of some kind was an inherent probability in an amateur force led by an amateur. O'Neill took instant advantage of confusion in the Canadian ranks. The adventures of Dennis on the W. T. Robb were less excusable than the defeat at Ridgeway. Dennis was a dangerous man, bold, plausible and inexperienced, who attempted to give directions from a subordinate position. He acted initially on misleading information, assumed Peacocke would fall in with his plan, then at Fort Erie hopelessly misjudged the strength of his enemy. After Ridgeway, the Canadian mobilization proceeded with reasonable efficiency, and nearly all points of possible invasion — 189 —

— The Last Invasion of Canada — were covered. There was some hardship among the troops because they were equipped for parades rather than for taking the field, but with civilian aid they were able to perform their duties. The trouble on the Quebec frontier in 1866 seems to have been caused by the conscientious but misguided orders of Captain Carter, a regular officer. In this case it was a matter of putting an unimaginative professional soldier in a position where some political understanding was needed. Carter had no knowledge of local affairs and refused to listen to militia officers. Apart from that he made no serious effort to gather intelligence on his own, and ended by retreating before imaginary attack, thus opening the door for a real one. The Fenian commander, Brigadier-General Spears, judging by his reports, seems to have been a good military bureaucrat who kept a sharp eye on supplies. He commanded in circumstances where a dashing regimental officer was needed. He moved across an undefendable frontier, remained on Canadian soil for fortyeight hours and retreated without attempting even a token resistance at Pigeon Hill. Given the victory of Ridgeway, a second Fenian effort was bound to be attempted, and its obvious leader would be O'Neill. Yet time was working against the Fenians; the Civil War veterans were finding a place in civilian life. O'Neill, the only possible leader of a renewed invasion, was a poor politician; hence factionalism, always a problem with the Fenians, reached epidemic proportion. Finally he selected for his chief adviser Henri Le Caron, a British agent. Le Caron was not the servant of an omnipotent intelligence service, but an individual who volunteered his services. Like Kim Philby later, he seemed to have had a passion for a double existence. The one asset O'Neill enjoyed was the enthusiasm of younger Fenians who had missed the war and who hoped to partake in the possible glories of a second Ridgeway. As these men had no experience of real warfare, they had no advantage over the Canadian militia, except that they were still led by officers who had seen a great deal of active service. The Canadian militia was far more efficient in 1870 than it

— 190 —

— Conclusions —

had been in 1866. Companies had been amalgamated into battalions and plans for mobilization worked out. The greatest deficiency of the Canadian command was that they could not respond to repeated false alarms without losing face. Because of this, it was decided that the Fenian movement would be allowed to come to a head. This meant that no doors could be closed until the eleventh hour. Consequently Eccles Hill, the obvious point of attack, could not be garrisoned. The gap was filled by the Missisquoi Home Guards, who were well equipped for the occasion. In the course of the day's battle, it became apparent that the Fenians of 1870 lacked the spark of Ridgeway. Early in the battle, O'Neill lost control of his men and was arrested by American authorities. The Fenians remained in position, but there was not much fight left in them. It was much the same on the other side of the Richelieu River, where the Fenians in the Huntingdon area abandoned their barricade at Trout River without a serious show of resistance. The final Fenian effort against the Red River settlement was entirely the work of O'Donoghue. As he had quarrelled with Louis Riel, he had no hope of arousing a second rebellion of the Metis, which was his intention. By acquiring the services of O'Neill, he lent prestige to his enterprise, but O'Neill brought with him little more than his name. Yet the handful of men O'Donoghue and O'Neill collected was still capable of mischief. It was necessary to call out the militia, and the late response of the Metis was a cause of some anxiety. If the Americans had not intervened promptly, there might have been an Eccles Hill level of engagement, but hardly a second Ridgeway. By 1871, Fenians were a spent force, and the fragments of what once had been a formidable organization gave up the idea of invading Canada. The raids, because of Ridgeway, added a note of tragedy and dignity to the Fenian movement and raised it above the level of comic opera. For Canada the raids did a great deal. Apart from helping cement federation and improving the quality of the militia, the raids aroused a martial spirit among Canadians that could be enjoyed without the cost of war. On the whole, the Fenian raids provided satisfaction to the contending parties, a circumstance rare in war and unique in history. — 191 —

— Abbreviations —

CM Canadian Magazine CHR CHAR OH

Canadian Historical Review Canadian Historical Association Report Ontario History

NAG National Archives of Canada PAO Public Archives of Ontario

— 192 —

— Notes

—

CHAPTERl 1. H. Senior, The Fenians and Canada (Toronto, 1987), pp. 1—4. 2. S.D. Morrison, The Oxford History of the American People (New York, 1965), p. 236. 3. W.A. Robinson, "Matthew Lyon," in Dictionary of American Biography (New York, 1933), Vol. 11, pp. 532-34. 4. Claude Galarneau, "David McLane," Dictionary of Canadian Biography (Toronto and Quebec, 1979), Vol. 4, p. 501. 5. Shamrock and Hibernian Chronicle, New York, 30 May, 4 July, 19 September, 1812. 6. L. Whitney, The Burning of the Convent (Boston, 1877), cited in R.A. Billington, The Protestant Crusade (Gloucester, Mass.,1963), pp. 68-76. 7. Hereward Senior, "Ogle Gowan and the Immigration Question," Ontario History (OH) 4 (1974): 197-98. 8. Oscar A. Kinchen, The Rise of the Patriot Hunters (New York, 1956), pp. 11-27; E.A. Theller, Canada, 1837-38 (Philadelphia, 1841), pp. 212-14. 9. Kinchen, pp. 55-59. 10. T.A. Pulby to M.S. Bartlett, 10 October 1841, cited in Kinchen, p. 122. 11. Irish Canadian, Toronto, 25 March 1863. 12. Billington, pp. 232-39. 13. Morrison, p. 16. 14. Senior, The Fenians and Canada, p. 27. 15. Elgin to Grey, 16 August 1848, in Sir Arthur Doughty, ed., The Elgin-Grey Papers (Ottawa, 1937), Vol. 1, p. 225. 16. Ibid. 17. New York Herald, reprinted in Pilot, Montreal, 29 August 1848; PAO Mackenzie Lindsay Papers, clipping no. 3,001, taken from Mackenzie's Volunteer, 29 July 1848.

— 193 —

— The Last Invasion of Canada — 18. 19.

Elgin to Grey, 16 November 1848, in Doughty, Vol. 1, p. 257. Isabel Skelton, The Life and Times of Thomas D'Arcy McGee (Gardenvale, N.Y, 1925), p. 178. 20. T. D'Arcy McGee, A History of the Irish Settlements in North America from the Earliest Period to the Census of 1850 (Boston, 1855), pp. 191-92. 21. John Devoy, Recollection of an Irish Rebel (New York, 1929), reprinted in Shannon, Ireland, 1969, pp. 266-68. 22. William D'Arcy, The Fenian Movement in the United States, 1858-86 (New York, 1947), pp. 6-10. 23. Joseph Denieffe, Personal Narrative of the Irish Revolutionary Brotherhood (New York, 1906), p. 3. 24. D'Arcy, pp. 11-14. 25. Desmond Ryan, The Fenian Chief: A Biography of James Stephens (Dublin, 1967), pp. 140-60. 26. Ryan, pp. 232-33. 27. D'Arcy, pp. 16, 28. 28. Ibid., p. 18 29. Ibid., pp. 18-20. 30. Denieffe, p. 71. 31. John O'Leary, Recollections of Fenians andFenianism (London, 1896), reprinted in Shannon, Ireland, 1964, p. 172; Stephens to O'Mahony, 7 April 1862, cited in D'Arcy, pp. 16-21.

CHAPTERS 1. Elinor Kyte Senior, "The Provincial Cavalry in Lower Canada, 1837-50," CHR 57 (March 1976): 22-25. 2. J. Mackay Hitsman, Safeguarding Canada, 1763—1871 (Toronto, 1968), p. 81. 3. C.F. Hamilton, "Defence, 1812-1912," in Canada and Its Provinces, edited by A. Shortt and A.G. Doughty (Toronto, 1914-17), Vol. 3, pp. 390-91. 4. Hitsman, pp. 155, 161, 213; see also G.F.G. Stanley, Canada's Soldiers (Toronto, 1974), p. 296. 5. Statutes of Canada, 1846. An act to repeal certain laws therein mentioned to provide for the better defence of this province and to regulate the militia thereof, 9 June 1846, pp. 775-93; see also J. Matt to Lt.-Col. Robert Bruce, 13 April 1854, AG8/C803/75, NAG. 6. E.K. Senior, Roots of the Canadian Army: Montreal District (Montreal, 1981), p. 19. — 194 —

— Notes — 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17.

Draft of memorandum, Hincks to R. Bruce, 10 December 1853, ME24/B68, NAG. Montreal Transcript, 15 August 1854. Hamilton, p. 396. Ibid., p. 399. E.K. Senior, pp. 12-13. Hamilton, pp. 398, 399. E.K. Senior, p. 13; Regiments and Corps of the Canadian Army (Ottawa, 1964), Vol. 1, p. 120. Stanley, pp. 213, 214. Hamilton, p. 413. Ibid., p. 418. Ibid., p. 419.

CHAPTERS 1. Troop Returns, January 1861, W.0.17/1565, NAG. 2. J. Mackay Hitsman, Safeguarding Canada, 1763—1871 (Toronto, 1968), p. 192. 3. E.K. Senior, The Roots of the Canadian Army: Montreal District (Montreal, 1981), p. 53. 4. Pilot, Montreal, 11,14, 16, 19 December 1861; see also Regiments and Corps of the Canadian Army (Ottawa, 1964), Vol. 1, p. 131. 5. Sessional Papers, No. 17, Province of Canada, 1862-63. 6. Pilot, Montreal, 6 January 1862. 7. E.K. Senior, pp. 46-47. 8. Thomas D'Arcy McGee, "An account of the attempts to establish Fenianism in Montreal, a memoir," Gazette, Montreal, 17 August 1867. 9. H. Senior, The Fenians and Canada (Toronto, 1978), p. 55. 10. E.K. Senior, p. 49. 11. Report of the Commission appointed. . . for the better organization of the Department of the Adjutant-General, 1862, MG 26A/99, NAG; see also La Minerve, Montreal, 22 May 1862. 12. E.K. Senior, p. 64. 13. Statutes of Canada, 1863, An Act respecting the Militia, pp. 23-24. 14. Report of the commission appointed to consider the defence of the Province of Canada, RG8/G19/XXI/2, NAG. 15. Ibid. 16. C.F. Hamilton, "Defence, 1812-1912," in Canada and Its Provinces, edited by A. Shortt and A.G. Doughty (Toronto, 1914-17), Vol. 7, p. 402.

— 195 —

— The Last Invasion of Canada — 17. 18.

19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47.

E.K. Senior, p. 67. Irish-American, New York, 1 February 1865; O'Mahony address to senate from congress, cited in W.M. D'Arcy, The Fenian Movement in the United States (Washington, B.C., 1947), p. 21. Boston Pilot, cited in D'Arcy, p. 28. D'Arcy, p. 28. H. Senior, p. 54. D'Arcy, p. 202. H. Senior, p. 81. Canadian Freeman, Toronto, 17 August 1865. Ibid., 20 March 1862. Globe, Toronto, 16 December 1864, in D'Arcy, pp. 36-37. D'Arcy, pp. 38-39. Globe, Toronto, 18 March 1864; Canadian Freeman, Toronto, 21 March, 7 April 1864. Canadian Freeman, Toronto, 21 March 1864. Globe, Toronto, 7, 9 November 1864; Leader, Toronto, 8, 9 November 1864. Leader, Toronto, 16 December 1864. Gazette, Montreal, 12 January 1865. Irish Canadian, Toronto, 8 February 1865. E.M. Archibald to Lt.-Gen. Sir John Michel, 20 December 1865, RG7/G101, NAG; Globe, 18 March 1865. Irish Canadian, Toronto, 29 March 1865. H. Senior, p. 78. Brian Jenkins, The Fenians and Anglo-American Relations (Ithaca, N.Y., 1969), pp. 134-35. H. Senior, p. 83. Ibid., p. 81. D'Arcy, p. 181. H. Senior, p. 81. C.P. Stacey, "A Fenian Interlude: The Story of Michael Murphy," CHR15 (1934), p. 143. Smith to Monck, 2 October 1865, Sessional Papers, No. 75, Canada, 1869, pp. 117-18. Sessional Papers, No. 75, Canada, 1869, p. 674; H. Senior, pp. 95-96. P.C. Berton (Nolan) to McMicken, 31 December 1865, MG26A/ 237, NAG. Stacey, p. 143. Canadian Freeman, Toronto, 17 March 1866; Irish Canadian, Toronto, 21 March 1866.

— 196 —

— Notes — CHAPTER4 1. Boston Pilot, 19 May 1866. 2. H. Senior, Orangeism: The Canadian Phase (Toronto, 1972), p. 65. 3. Harold A. Davis, "The Fenian Raid on New Brunswick," CHR 36 (1955): 317. 4. St. Croix Courier, 9 December 1865. 5. Gordon to Cardwell, 18 December 1865, MCI 1 /Bl 235, NAG. 6. Ibid.; see also Davis, p. 324. 7. Saint John Telegraph, 24 April 1866; Davis, p. 324. 8. Davis, pp. 323-24. 9. W.M. D'Arcy, The Fenian Movement in the United States (Washington, D.C., 1947), p. 112. 10. Archibald to Monck, 11 April 1866, MG27/1B1 A755, NAG; Gordon to Cardwell, 26 March 1866, MC11/B1236, NAG. 11. Gordon to Cardwell, 12 March 1866, MCI 1 /Bl 236, NAG. 12. D'Arcy, p. 138. 13. St. Croix Courier, 14, 18 April 1866. 14. Brian Jenkins, The Fenians and Anglo-American Relations During Reconstruction (Ithaca, N.Y., 1969), pp. 134-45. 15. Diary of Gideon Welles, Vol. 2, p. 486, cited in Davis, p. 327. 16. Eastport Sentinel, 25 April 1866, cited in Davis, p. 326. 17. Davis, p. 322. 18. Gordon to Cardwell, 25 March 1866, MCI 1 /Bl 236, NAG. 19. C.P. Stacey, "A Fenian Interlude: The Story of Michael Murphy," C/flU5(1934),p. 146. 20. E.K. Senior, From Royal Township to Industrial City: Cornwall, 17841984 (Belleville, 1983), pp. 214-15. 21. Ibid. 22. St. Croix Courier, 14 April 1866. 23. Ibid. 24. E. Clark to British Consul at Portland, Maine, 15 April 1866, C2779, Vol. 164, NAG; Gordon to Cardwell, 20 April 1866, RG8/B1236, NAG; St. Croix Courier, 14 April 1866. 25. Morning Star, Saint John, 23 April 1866, reprinted from Eastport Sentinel, 2 April 1866, cited in Davis, pp. 328-29. 26. P.B. Waite, Life and Times of Confederation (Toronto, 1962), p. 273. 27. Le Pays, Montreal, 22 May 1866. 28. Gordon to Cardwell, 15 April 1866, MC8/B1236, NAG. 29. Gordon to Cardwell, 18 April 1866, MC11/B1236, NAG. 30. Robert Kerr to Doyle, 23 May 1866, KG8/C1692, NAC. 31. Gordon to Cardwell, 20 April 1866, RG8/B1236, NAC.

— 197 —

— The Last Invasion of Canada — 32. 33. 34. 35. 36.

Elva E.Jackson, Cape Breton and theJackson Kith and Kin (Windsor, N.S., 1935), pp. 144-45; RG911, Vol. 37, NAG. Gordon to Cardwell, 5 May 1866, MCI 1 /Bl236, NAG. H. Hutton to Lt.-Col. Inikes, 23 April 1866, RG8/C1672, NAG. Keith to Gordon, 2 May 1866, RG8/C2719, Vol. 155, NAG. D'Arcy, p. 139.

CHAPTERS 1. McMicken to Macdonald, 17 May 1866, MG26A/Vol. 25, NAG. 2. Hemans to Macdonald, 19 May 1866, MG26A/Vol. 25, NAG. 3. Hemans to Macdonald, 26 May 1866, MG26A/Vol. 25, NAG. 4. Elan Tupper to McMicken, 24 May 1866, MG26A/Vol. 25, NAG. 5. McMicken to Macdonald, 24 May 1866, MG26A/Vol. 25, NAG. 6. J. McLaughlin to McMicken, 29 May 1866; Hemans to McMicken, 30 May 1866, MG26A/Vol. 25, NAG. 7. W.C. Chewett, The Fenian Raid on Fort Erie (Toronto, 1866), p. 27. 8. Macdonald to Duncan MacKay, Letter Book 9, p. 234, MG26A, NAG. 9. Macdonald to McMicken, 31 May 1866, MG26A/Vol. 25, NAG; D'Arcy McGee to Macdonald, MG26A/Vol. 25, NAG. 10. McMicken to Macdonald, MG26A/Vol. 25, NAG. 11. Clarke to McMicken, 31 May 1866, MG26A/Vol. 25, NAG. 12. Official Report of General Sweeny, September 1866, cited in Joseph Denieffe, A Personal Narrative of the Irish Revolutionary Brotherhood (New York, 1906), pp. 255-56. 13. Gerald Craig, Upper Canada: The Formative Years (Toronto, 1963), p. 250. 14. Denieffe, p. 270. 15. W.M. D'Arcy, The Fenian Movement in the United States, 1858-1886 (Washington, D.C., 1947), p. 146. 16. Mabel Walker, The Fenian Movement (Colorado Springs, 1969), pp. 90-91; D'Arcy, pp. 154-59. 17. D'Arcy, p. 155. 18. Ibid., pp. 101-2; for a complete list of Fenian staff see Chewett, p. 22. 19. D'Arcy, pp. 155-57. 20. Chewett, p. 27. 21. Alexander McLeod to Macdonald, 19 March 1866, MG26A/232, NAG. 22. McLeod to Macdonald, 119 March 1866, MG26A/232, NAG; D'Arcy, pp. 147,159. — 198 —

— Notes — 23. 24. 25. 26.

27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36.

37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49.

Chewett, pp. 29-30. Globe, Toronto, 3 May 1866. J. McLaughlin to McMicken, 31 May 1866, MG26A/232, NAG; see also Chewett, pp. 30-31. McLaughlin to McMicken, 31 May 1866, MG26A/232, NAG; see also Capt. John A. Macdonald, Troublous Times in Canada (Toronto, 1910), pp. 28-29. Macdonald, Troublous Times, pp. 28-29. Chewett, p. 31. George Taylor Denison, History of the Fenian Raid on Fort Erie: With a Brief Account of the Battle ofRidgeway (Toronto, 1866), pp. 19-20. Chewett, p. 31. Denison, pp. 66-67. Hemans to McMicken, 1 June 1860, MG26A/232, NAG; Denison, p. 22; Macdonald, Troublous Times, pp. 28-29. Macdonald, Troublous Times, pp. 34-36. Denison, pp. 22-23. Narrative of Andrew Mclntosh, p. 3, MG29E/108, NAG. "Proceedings of the Court of Inquiry held at Hamilton, Tuesday, 3 July 1866," testimony of Maj. Charles Gillmor, appendix in Macdonald, Troublous Times, pp. 22S-24. Capt. John Henery's testimony, in Macdonald, Troublous Times, pp. 225-26. Narrative of Andrew Mclntosh, in Macdonald, Troublous Times, p. 2. Lt.-Col. A. Booker testimony, in Macdonald, Troublous Times, pp. 199-200. Macdonald, Troublous Times, pp. 44—45. Booker's testimony, in Macdonald, Troublous Times, pp. 200-201. Stephen Beatty, The Fenian Raid of 1866 with Lt.-Col. Stoughton Dennis (St. Catharines, Ont., 1910), pp. 18-19. Charles Clarke to McMicken, 2 June 1866, MG26A/232, NAG. Booker's testimony in Macdonald, Troublous Times, p. 202. Ibid., pp. 202-3. Ibid., p. 203. For a semi-official account of the battle, see Durie to MacDougall, 30 June 1866, RE8/lC8/Vol. 8, NAG. Denison, p. 42; A. Somerville, Narrative of the Fenian Invasion of Canada (Hamilton, 1866), pp. 18-19. Chewett, p. 58. Alexander Muir's testimony, in Macdonald, Troublous Times, pp. 214-16.

— 199 —

— The Last Invasion of Canada — 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71.

Ibid. Capt. John Gardner's testimony, in Macdonald, Troublous Times, pp. 234-36. Booker's testimony, in Macdonald, Troublous Times, pp. 203-4. Ibid. Muir's testimony, in Macdonald, Troublous Times, p. 215. Testimony of Maj. James A. Skinner, in Macdonald, Troublous Times, p. 227. Booker's testimony, in Macdonald, Troublous Times, p. 203. Testimony of Ensign T.A. McLean, in Macdonald, Troublous Times, p. 237. Booker's testimony, in Macdonald, Troublous Times, p. 204. Muir's testimony, in Macdonald, Troublous Times, p. 216. McLean's testimony, in Macdonald, Troublous Times, p. 238. Muir's testimony, in Macdonald, Troublous Times, p. 217. Private Robert Maum's testimony, in Macdonald, Troublous Times, p. 221. Booker's testimony, in Macdonald, Troublous Times, p. 205. McLean's testimony, in Macdonald, Troublous Times, p. 238. Gardner's testimony, in Macdonald, Troublous Times, p. 236. Booker's testimony, in Macdonald, Troublous Times, p. 205. Ibid. Capt. Robert H. Davis's testimony, in Macdonald, Troublous Times, pp. 232-34. Rev. David Inglis's testimony, in Macdonald, Troublous Times, pp. 240-41. Booker's testimony, in Macdonald, Troublous Times, p. 205. A full list of Canadian casualties can be found in Macdonald, Troublous Times, pp. 62-63. Estimates of Fenian casualties can be found in the Globe, Toronto, 5 June 1866; the most reliable estimate is probably in D'Arcy, p. 161.

CHAPTERS 1. Stephen Beatty, The Fenian Raid of 2866 with Lt.-Col. Stoughton Dennis (St. Catharines, Ont., 1910), pp. 20-21. Beatty, a corporal in the Welland Field Battery, was present during the cruise of the Robb. See also A. Somerville, Narrative of the Fenian Invasion of Canada (Hamilton, 1866), pp. 10&-7. 2. Beatty, pp. 21-22; Somerville, pp. 106-7. 3. Beatty, pp. 24-25. 4. Ibid., p. 25.

— 200 —

— Notes — 5. 6. 7.

8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34.

Ibid., pp. 25-27; W.C. Chewett, The Fenian Raid on Fort Erie (Toronto, 1866), pp. 51-55. George Taylor Denison, History of the Fenian Raid on Fort Erie: With a Brief Account of the Battle ofRidgeway (Toronto, 1866), pp. 60-62. Anonymous account by a member of the Welland Field Battery, quoted in Capt. John A. Macdonald, Troublous Times in Canada (Toronto, 1910), pp. 74-75. Macdonald, Troublous Times, p. 70. Denison, pp. 49-51. Col. George Peacocke, report to Maj.-Gen. George Napier, 4June 1866, cited in Denison, pp. 76-79. Macdonald, Troublous Times, pp. 78-79. Denison, pp. 52-54. Ibid., pp. 55-56. Peacocke report, in Denison, p. 79; Macdonald, Troublous Times, p. 81. Denison, pp. 71-72. Express, Buffalo, cited in Chewett, pp. 66-68. Ibid. Col. R.W. Lowry to Maj.-Gen. George Napier, 4 June 1866, cited in Chewett, pp. 81-82. Chewett, pp. 109-12; Somerville, p. 101. Chewett, pp. 109-12; Somerville, p. 101. Akers to Napier, 7 June 1866, cited in Denison, p. 86. Chewett, p. 69. Gen. George G. Meade to Brevet Major-General Barry, 3 June 1866, cited in Macdonald, Troublous Times, p. 92. Macdonald, Troublous Times, pp. 92-93. Lowry to Napier, 4 June 1866, cited in Chewett, p. 82. W.M. D'Arcy, The Fenian Movement in the United States (Washington, D.C., 1947), p. 65. Ibid., pp. 167-68. Ibid., p. 99. Lowry to Napier, 4 June 1866, cited in Chewett, pp. 82-83; Denison, pp. 82-83. Macdonald, Troublous Times, pp. 35-36. Chewett, pp. 36-40; John A. Macdonald to McMicken, 5 June 1866, MG26A/237, reel 1663, NAG. Capt. A.M. Horsey to MacDougall, 30 June 1866, RG9/168/Vol. 8, NAC; see also Macdonald, Troublous Times, p. 8. McMicken to MacDougall, 5 June 1866, MG26A/237, NAC. Macdonald, Troublous Times, p. 102.

— 201 —

— The Last Invasion of Canada — 35. 36.

37. 38. 39. 40.

41. 42. 43. 44.

Ibid. Ibid., p. 103. For details about the hiring and purchase of these vessels, see Gunboats 1866, RG9, Vol. 8, NAC; therein contract for the Michigan, John Prugden to MacDougall, 1 July 1866. Macdonald, Troublous Times, p. 103. Ibid., p. 106. Ibid., p. 107. Quebec Mercury, 5 June 1866; Brig.-Gen. T.W. Sweeny's Report to Pittsburgh Convention, February 1866, appendix to Joseph Denieffe, A Personal Narrative of the Irish Revolutionary Brotherhood (New York, 1906), p. 270. E.K. Senior, From Royal Township to Industrial City: Cornwall, 17841984 (Belleville, 1983), pp. 214-15. Ibid., p. 213. New York Herald, 3 June 1866; D'Arcy, p. 163. Macdonald, Troublous Times, pp. 116,164.

CHAPTER7 1. Instruction to Brig.-Gen. S.P. Spears, 24 May 1866, in Joseph Denieffe, A Personal Narrative of the Irish Revolutionary Brotherhood (New York, 1906), p. 28. 2. W.M. D'Arcy, The Fenian Movement in the United States (Washington, D.C., 1947), p. 157. 3. Montreal Daily Witness, 8 June 1866. 4. Orders to Spears, 24 May 1866, in Denieffe, p. 245. 5. Orders to Sweeny, 1 June 1866, in Denieffe, p. 251. 6. E.K. Senior, "The Presence of French Canadians in American Towns Bordering Lower Canada, 1837-38," Lifelines 4, no. 2 (1987): p. 26. 7. Monck to Cardwell, 8 June 1866, Sessional Papers, No. 75, Canada, 1869, p. 141. 8. Francis Wayland Campbell, The Fenian Invasions of Canada of 1866 and 1870 and the operations of the Montreal Brigade in connection therewith (Montreal, 1904), p. 8; Troop Returns, 1 December 1865, W/ 017/1569, NAC. 9. Quebec Mercury, 6 June 1866; Capt. John A. Macdonald, Troublous Times in Canada (Toronto, 1910), p. 111. 10. Campbell, pp. 12-13. 11. La Minerve, Montreal, 2 June 1866; Gazette, Montreal, 6 June 1866. The Canadian artist John Hammond was out with the Victoria Rifles in 1866, known locally as "The Ladies' Pets." He wrote a — 202 —

— Notes —

12. 13.

14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27.

28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34.

pamphlet about his experiences. His platoon was commanded by Ensign W.H. Stanley. The Victoria Rifles suffered several casualties from wet and exposure. See G.F.G. Stanley, 'John Hammond, Painter for the G.P.R.," in The C.P.R. West: The Iron Road and the making of a Nation, edited by Hugh A. Dempsey (Vancouver and Toronto, 1984), p. 210. Campbell, pp. 18-19; Osborne Smith to MacDougall, 6 June 1866, RG9/IC8/Vol. 8, NAG. Robert McGee, The Fenian Raids on the Huntingdon Frontier, 1866 and 1870 (Huntingdon, 1967), p. 9; George Brown to Osborne Smith, 1 June 1866, RG9/IC8/Vol. 8, NAG. Montreal Daily Witness, 8 June 1866. McGee, p. 9. Ibid.; Osborne Smith to George Brown, 7june 1866, RC&/IC8/ Vol. 8, NAG. Alexander Gourdey's account, cited in McGee, p. 11. Campbell, p. 18. Ibid., p. 17. McGee, p. 12. Shorter, cited in Campbell, p. 22. McGee, p. 14. Campbell, p. 20. McGee, p. 16. D'Arcy, p. 164; Mabel Walker, TheFenian Movement (Colorado Springs, 1969), pp. 99-100. Quebec Mercury, 6 June 1866. Roberts to Chamberlin, 5 June 1866, Chamberlin Papers, MG24/ B19/11/147, NAG; Capt. C.W. Garth Report, Sessional Papers, No. 4, Province of Canada, 1866, addenda to Adjutant-General's Report, p. 10; Maj.-Gen. Landry's Report, Sessional Papers, No. 4, Province of Canada, 1866, pp. 6—7. Gazette, Montreal, 8 June 1866. Missisquoi County Historical Society, TheFenian Raids, 1866-1870 (Stanbridge East, 1967), pp. 35-36. Roberts to Chamberlin, 5 June 1866, Chamberlin Papers, MG24/ B19/11/147,NAC. Ibid. Gordon to Cardwell, 15 April 1866, RG8/B1236, NAG. Roberts to Chamberlin, 5 June 1866, Chamberlin Papers, MG24/ B19/11/147,NAC. George Taylor Denison, History of the Fenian Raid on Fort Erie: With

— 203 —

— The Last Invasion of Canada —

35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58.

59. 60. 61. 62.

a Brief Account of the Battle ofRidgeway (Toronto, 1866), pp. 49-51. Roberts to Chamberlin, 5 June 1866, Chamberlin Papers, MG24/ B19/11/147,NAC. Ibid. Ibid. Missisquoi County Historical Society, pp. 8, 36. Spears to Sweeny, 7 June 1866, in Denieffe, p. 250. Spears to Sweeny, 2 June 1866, in Denieffe, p. 250. Ibid. Sweeny's official report, in Denieffe, p. 261. Hulberties to MacDougall, 8 June 1866, MG26A/58A, NAG. Spears to Sweeny, 7 June 1866, in Denieffe, pp. 252-53. Missisquoi County Historical Society, p. 9. Spears to Sweeny, 7 June 1866, in Denieffe, p. 251. Spears to Mechan, 8 June 1866, in Denieffe, p. 252. Ibid.; see also Missisquoi County Historical Society, p. 10. Spears to Mechan, 8 June 1866, in Denieffe, p. 252. Ibid. Stuart to Coursol, 7 June 1866, RG9/168/Vol. 8, NAG. Campbell, p. 24. Ibid., pp. 18-20. E.K. Senior, The Roots of the Canadian Army: Montreal District (Montreal, 1981), p. 87. D'Arcy, pp. 166-68. Capt. John A. Macdonald, Troublous Times in Canada: A History of theFenian Raids of 1866 and 1870 (Toronto, 1910), p. 112. Cited in W.S. Neidhardt, Fenianism in North America (University Park, 1975), p. 80. Missisquoi County Historical Society, pp. 10-11. This unfortunate event was matched by a more heroic occurrence with a happier outcome some miles to the north, but also in the Eastern Townships. At Danville, on 9 June 1866, Private Timothy O'Hea of the British army's 1st Battalion, Rifle Brigade, at great risk to his life, put out a fire in an ammunition car on a military train. For this he was awarded the Victoria Cross, the only one ever won on Canadian soil. Circular, 26 June 1866, Letter Book 10, MG26A, NAG. Macdonald to Cardwell, 18 August 1866, Sessional Papers, No. 75, Canada, 1869, pp. 156-57. Sir John Michel address to militia, cited in Macdonald, Troublous Times, p. 130. Report on State of Militia, Sessional Papers, No. 4, Province of

— 204 —

— Notes —

63. 64. 65.

Canada, 1866, p. 7. Monck to Cardwell, 14June 1869, Sessional Papers, No. 75, Canada, 1869, p. 7. Report on Militia, Sessional Papers, No. 4, Province of Canada, 1866, p. 7. Campbell, pp. 20-21; Report on Militia, Sessional Papers, No. 4, Province of Canada, 1866, pp. 2—3.

CHAPTERS 1. Macdonald Papers, MG26A/58A, NAC. 2. New York Herald, 14 March 1867, cited in W.M. D'Arcy, The Fenian Movement (Washington, D.C., 1947), pp. 23-36. 3. D'Arcy, pp. 79-80. 4. H. Senior, "Thomas Billis Beach," in Dictionary of Canadian Biography (Toronto 1989), Vol. 12, pp. 68-69. 5. CJ. Coursol to Macdonald, April 1870, MG26A/244, NAC; Henri Le Caron, Twenty-Five Years in the Secret Service (London, 1892), pp. 60-70; D'Arcy, pp. 334-36. 6. H. Senior, The Fenians and Canada (Toronto, 1978), pp. 128-30. 7. H. Senior, "Quebec and the Fenians," CHR48 (1967): 42. 8. W.S. Neidhardt, Fenianism in North America (University Park, 1975), pp. 93-108. 9. McMicken to Macdonald, 8 June 1866, MG26A/241, NAC. 10. McMicken to Macdonald, 13 October 1868, MG26A/241, NAC. 11. Le Caron, pp. 70-71. 12. Seventh National Congress of the Fenian Brotherhood: Proceedings of the Senate and House of Representatives of the Fenian Brotherhood in Joint Convention (New York, 1868), pp. 19-20. 13. Le Caron, p. 75. 14. Ibid., p. 78. 15. Acta Sanctae Sedis, cited in D'Arcy, p. 329. 16. G.T. Denison, Soldiering in Canada (Toronto, 1901), pp. 32-33; Proceeding of Court of Inquiry to investigate case of Dennis, cited in Capt. John A. Macdonald, Troublous Times in Canada: A History oftheFenian Raids of 1866and 1870 (Toronto, 1910), pp. 252-53. 17. Addenda to Report of the State of the Militia, 16 July 1866, Sessional Papers, No. 4, Province of Canada, 1866, pp. 6-7. 18. Militia Report, Sessional Papers, No. 10, Canada, 1869, p. 3. 19. Ibid., pp. 116-17; Michel to Home Guards, 7 September 1866, RG8/C1286/96-13, NAC.

— 205 —

— The Last Invasion of Canada — 20.

21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40.

G.F.G. Stanley, Canada's Soldiers, 1604-1954 (Toronto, 1974), pp. 234-36; see also Militia Report, Sessional Papers, No. 8, Canada, 1870, pp. 2, 38. Missisquoi County Historical Society, The Fenian Raids, 1866-1870 (Stanbridge East, 1967), pp. 38-40. Macdonald to MacDougall, 24 August 1866, RG91 C/Vol. 234, NAG. Missisquoi County Historical Society, pp. 38-40. Macdonald to Monck, 15 September 1866, MG26A/513, NAG. Macdonald to Coursol, 31 June 1868, MG26A/514, NAG. Stanley, pp. 326-40. Ibid., p. 237; see also E.K. Senior, The Roots of the Canadian Army: Montreal District, 1846-1870 (Montreal, 1981), p. 97. McMicken to Macdonald, 13 December 1866, MG26A/243A, NAG. McMicken to Macdonald, 24 December 1866, MG26A/244, NAG. Young to Granville, 10 February 1870, G3, Vol. 8, NAG. Ibid. Macdonald to Young, 28 March 1870, MG26A/517, NAG. Mabel Walker, The Fenian Movement (Colorado Springs, 1969), p. 183. E.K. Senior, p. 99. L'Opinionpublique, Montreal, 23 April 1870. Walker, pp. 183-84; D'Arcy, p. 347. Walker, p. 185; D'Arcy, pp. 347-48. McMicken to Macdonald, 26 April 1870, MG26A/245, NAG. Joseph Denieffe, A Personal Narrative of the Irish Revolutionary Brotherhood (New York, 1906), p. 257. H. Bernard to McMicken, 23 May 1879, MG26A, NAG.

CHAPTER9 1. Mabel Walker, The Fenian Movement (Colorado Springs, 1969), p. 186; W.M. D'Arcy, The Fenian Movement in the United States (Washington, D.C., 1947), p. 350. 2. G.F.G. Stanley, Canada's Soldiers, 1604-1954 (Toronto, 1974), p. 239. 3. Official Report of Gen. John O'Neill, President oftheFenian Brotherhood (New York, 1870), p. 187. 4. H. Le Caron, Twenty-Five Years in the Secret Service (London, 1892), pp. 84-85.

— 206 —

— Notes — 5. 6.

Walker, p. 187. Ibid.; Capt. John A. Macdonald, Troublous Times in Canada: A History of the Fenian Raids of 1866 and 1870 (Toronto, 1910), p. 168. 7. Missisquoi County Historical Society, The Fenian Raids, 1866-1870 (Stanbridge East, 1967), p. 61. 8. Coursol to Bernard, 24 May 1870; McMicken to Bernard, 23 May 1870, MG26A/245, NAG. 9. Report of Adjutant-General, Sessional Papers, No. 7, Canada, 1871, pp. 1-3, 6-7, 28. 10. Macdonald, Troublous Times, pp. 73-75. 11. F.W. Campbell, The Fenian Invasions of Canada of 1866 and 1870 (Montreal, 1904), p. 33. 12. Ibid. 13. Le Pays, Montreal, 25 May 1866; E.K. Senior, The Roots of the Canadian Army: Montreal District (Montreal, 1981), p. 102. 14. Campbell, p. 35. 15. Report of Lt.-Col. Osborne Smith, 9 June 1870, Sessional Papers, No. 7, Canada, 1871, p. 78. 16. E.K. Senior, p. 101. 17. Reporters of the Montreal Daily Witness, A Brief Account of the Fenian Raid on the Missisquoi Frontier (Montreal, 1871), p. 10. 18. Ibid., pp. 11-15. 19. Missisquoi County Historical Society, p. 150. 20. Ibid., p. 50. 21. Ibid., p. 51. 22. Reporters, p. 16; Missisquoi County Historical Society, p. 52. 23. Report of Lt.-Col. Chamberlin to Adjutant-General, 28 May 1870, Sessional Papers, No. 7, Canada, 1871, pp. 71-72. 24. Reporters, pp. 19-20. 25. Ibid., pp. 19-21. 26. Chamberlin, p. 72. 27. Campbell, p. 39. 28. Offical Report of Gen. John O'Neill, p. 15. 29. Ibid., p. 40. 30. Chamberlin, p, 72. 31. Campbell, p. 40. 32. Ibid., p. 41. 33. Missisquoi County Historical Society, p. 64. This account states that O'Neill was wearing civilian clothes at the time of his arrest. 34. Report of Osborne Smith, p. 74.

— 207 —

— The Last Invasion of Canada — 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66.

Campbell, p. 42. Ibid. Osborne Smith, pp. 75-76. Campbell, p. 43; Osborne Smith, pp. 74-75. Walker, p. 187. Robert McGee, The Fenian Raids on the Huntingdon Frontier, 1866 and 1870 (Huntingdon, 1967), p. 36. Lindsay to Cardwell, 3 June 1870, RG8/C 1287/435, NAC. E.K. Senior, p. 102. McGee, p. 35. Ibid., pp. 36-37. Reporters, pp. 40-41. Campbell, p. 52. Ibid. McGee, p. 35. Reporters, pp. 40—41. Ibid. Ibid. McGee, p. 36. Lt. Bulter's Diary, cited in McGee, p. 39. Ibid. Reporters, pp. 42-43. Campbell, pp. 47-48. McGee, pp. 40-41. Ibid. Reporters, p. 53. Ibid., pp. 42-43; McGee, p. 49. Campbell, p. 50. La Minerve, Montreal, 31 May 1870. Campbell, p. 51. McGee, p. 53. D'Arcy, p. 356. Adjutant-General of Militia Annual Report, Sessional Papers, No. 7, Canada, 1871, p. 38.

CHAPTER 10 1. G.F.G. Stanley, Toil and Trouble: Military Expeditions to Red River (Toronto, 1989), pp. 208-22; J.P. Pritchett, "The Origins of the so-called Fenian Raid against Manitoba in 1871," CHR10 (1929): 32. 2. House of Commons Debates, 12 February 1875, p. 100. — 208 —

— Notes — 3. 4.

Ibid., pp. 107-9. Stanley (p. 191) quotes eyewitness account in J.F. Tennant, Rough Times, 1870-1920 (Winnipeg, 1920), pp. 66-67. 5. Stanley, pp. 191-92; see also Pritchett, p. 25. 6. Pritchett, p. 31. 7. Globe, Toronto, 18 April 1870. 8. Pritchett, p. 33. 9. Ibid. 10. Ibid., pp. 36-37. 11. Archibald to Macdonald, 10 September 1871, MG26A/61 A, NAG. 12. McMicken to Macdonald, 9 September 1871, enclosures, MG26A/ 61A, NAG. 13. Chester Martin, "The Political History of Manitoba," in Canada audits Provinces, edited by A. Shortt and A.G. Doughty (Toronto, 1914), Vol. 19, p. 9. 14. Archibald to Macdonald, 31 August 1871, MG26A/61A, NAG; see also McMicken to Macdonald, 5 October 1871, MG26A/61A, NAG. 15. Archibald to Macdonald, 3 September 1871, MG26A/61A, NAG. For detailed explanation of relations between Ottawa and Fort Garry, see Stanley, pp. 205-8. 16. Stanley, pp. 205-8. 17. Archibald to Macdonald, 15 September 1871, MG26A/61A, NAG. 18. Ibid. 19. Archibald to Macdonald, 11 September 1871, enclosed in J. Taylor to T. Sherman, MG26A/61A, NAG. 20. McMicken to Macdonald, 27 September 1871, MG26A/61A, NAG. For detailed narrative see Stanley, pp. 206-7. 21. Archibald to Macdonald, 2 October 1871, MG26A/61 A, NAG. 22. McMicken to Macdonald, 5 October 1871, MG26A/61A, NAG. McMicken wrote an account of his adventures in the Manitoba Gazette, Winnipeg, 13 October 1871. 23. Archibald to Macdonald, 3-4 October 1871, MG26A/61A, NAG. See also McMicken to Macdonald, 5 October 1871, MG26A/61A, NAG. 24. Address of Lt.-Gov. A.G. Archibald to people of Manitoba, Manitoba Gazette, 13 October 1871; McMicken to Macdonald, 5 October 187l,MG26A/61A,NAC. 25. McMicken to Macdonald, 5 October 1871, MG26A/61 A, NAG. 26. A.H. Tremaudan, "Louis Riel and the Fenian Raid of 1871," CHR 4 (1923): 135. 27. Ibid., pp. 133-35. 28. Ibid., pp. 135-36. — 209 —

— The Last Invasion of Canada — 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37.

Ibid., pp. 138-44. Archibald to Macdonald, 9 October 1871; McMicken to Macdonald, 5 October 1871, MG26A/61A, NAG. Archibald to Macdonald, 4 October 1871; postscript, 5 October 1871, MG26A/61A, NAG. Webster to Macdonald, 12 Ocotber 1871, MG26A/61A, NAG. Ibid. Archibald address to people of Manitoba, Manitoba Gazette, Winnipeg, 13 October 1871. Webster to Macdonald, 12 October 1871, MG26A/61A, NAG. Archibald to Macdonald, 9 October 1871, MG26A/61 A, NAG. Archibald address to people of Manitoba, Manitoba Gazette, Winnipeg, 13 October 1871.

— 210 —

— Bibliography —

THE LITERATURE ON FENIANS AND their Canadian opponents is extensive, but the essence of its military aspects can be found in the Macdonald Papers and military records at the National Archives of Canada listed in the Bibliography. Apart from that, there is useful correspondence in the Sessional Papers of the Province of Canada and of the Dominion. The appendix of James Denieffe's A Personal Narrative of the Irish Revolutionary Brotherhood includes a good deal of the most important correspondence of the Fenian high command. Newspapers, and contemporary accounts based on newspapers, particularly those of C.W. Chewett, Alexander Somerville and Francis Wayland Campbell, are most useful. Newspapers, however, are usually inaccurate about numbers engaged. General studies concerned with Fenianism, such as those of William D'Arcy, Mabel Walker and my own previous work, deal primarily with its political aspects. W.S. Neidhardt's Fenianism in North America is also primarily political but gives a fair amount of attention to the battlefields. Capt. John A. Macdonald's Troublous Times in Canada, published in 1910, is the only work dealing exclusively and comprehensively with the military aspects of Fenianism. It is a good, somewhat rambling account based largely on printed government sources. Of recent works, Mary Beacock Fryer's chapter on Ridgeway in the book Battkjields of Canada gives a sound, concise account of that battle. An up-to-date account of the Fenian raid on Manitoba is given in G.F.G. Stanley, Toil and Trouble: Military Expeditions to Red River. — 211 —

— The Last Invasion of Canada — Pictures that give artists' impressions of battle are sometimes misleading. One purporting to deal with Ridgeway shows Canadians facing Fenians at short range, each side commanded by a number of mounted officers. The only Canadian mounted officer was Lieutenant-Colonel Booker. The bibliography includes only works that throw light on the Fenian raids.

PRIMARY SOURCES Manuscripts National Archives of Canada: John A. Macdonald Papers (MG26A/5662); Brown Chamberlin Papers (MG24/B19); Edward Mortimer Archibald Papers; Governor General's Office, Numbered Files (7792, RG 7, G-21, Vol. 403); Memoirs of Lt.-Col. Thomas Wiley (MG24/B19); Narrative of Andrew Mclntosh (MG29E/108); Records of the Provincial Secretary's Office, Canada West ( RG 5, Cl, vols. 863 and 869). Troop Returns, War Office 17; Public Archives of Ontario: McKenzie-Lindsey Papers; Colonial Office Original Correspondence (CO 537, Vol. 98, microfilm reel B-813).

PRINTED SOURCES Province of Canada Parliamentary Debates, 1866-67 (excerpts published in the contemporary newspapers have been microfilmed by the Canadian Library Association). Parliamentary Debates on the Subject of Confederation of the British North American Provinces, 3rd sess., Eighth Provincial Parliament of Canada, Quebec, 1865. Sessional Papers, 1864-68, vols. 23-27. Dominion of Canada Parliamentary Debates, 1867-75 Sessional Papers, 1867-72, vols. 1-5

NEWSPAPERS Eastport (Maine) Sentinel', Boston Pilot; Irish-American (New York); Shamrock and Hibernian Chronicle (New York); The New York Herald; The Halifax Morning Chronicle; The Morning Star (Saint John); The Huntingdon

— 212 —

— Bibliography — (Quebec) Canadian Gleaner; UOpinion publique (Montreal); La Minerve (Montreal); LePays (Montreal); LeJournal de Quebec; The London (Ontario) Free Press; The Pilot (Montreal); The Montreal Transcript; The Montreal Daily Witness; The Gazette (Montreal); The Quebec Gazette; The Quebec Morning Chronicle; The Quebec Mercury; The Saint John (New Brunswick) Morning Telegraph; The Morning Freeman (Saint John); The St. Croix (New Brunswick) Courier; The Globe (Toronto); The Irish Canadian (Toronto); The Leader (Toronto); The Canadian Freeman (Toronto); Manitoba Gazette (Winnipeg).

CONTEMPORARY PRINTED SOURCES: MEMOIRS, DIARIES AND CORRESPONDENCE Archibald, EJ. Life and Letters of Sir Edward Mortimer Archibald. Toronto, 1924. Beale, H.K., ed. Diary of Gideon Welles, 1861-1869.3vols. New York, 1960. Beatty, Stephen. The Fenian Raid of 1866 with Lt. Col. Stoughton Dennis. St. Catharines, Ont., 1910. Campbell, Francis Wayland. The Fenian Invasions of Canada of 1866 and 1870 and the operations of the Montreal Brigade in connection therewith. Montreal, 1904. Chewett, W.C. The Fenian Raid on Fort Erie. Toronto, 1866. Denieffe, J. A Personal Narrative of the Irish Revolutionary Brotherhood. New York, 1906. (In its lengthy appendix are numerous letters from important Fenian leaders including Sweeny, Stephens and O'Mahony.) Denison, G.T. History of the Fenian Raid on Fort Erie: With a Brief Account of the Battle of Ridgeway. Toronto, 1866. (The appendix contains the "Official Reports" of such participants as Peacocke, Booker, Dennis and Akers.) . Soldiering in Canada: Recollections and Experiences. Toronto, 1901. Devoy,J. Recollections of an Irish Rebel. Reprint. Shannon, 1969. Doughty, Sir Arthur, ed. The Elgin-Grey Papers. Vol. 7. Ottawa, 1937. Le Caron, Henri. Twenty-Five Years in the Secret Service: The Recollections of a Spy. London, 1892. Macdonald, J.A. Troublous Times in Canada: A History of the Fenian Raids of 1866 and 1870. Toronto, 1910. (The appendix includes Booker's "Court of Inquiry.") McGee, T. D'Arcy. Speeches and Addresses. London, 1865. . The Irish Position in British and Republican North America. Montreal, 1866.

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— The Last Invasion of Canada — . A History of the Irish Settlements in North America from the Earliest Period until the Census of 1855. Boston, 1855. McMicken, G. The Abortive Fenian Raid on Manitoba. Winnipeg, 1888. Meade, G., ed. The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade. 2 vols. New York, 1915. Monck, F.E.O. My Canadian Leaves: An Account of a Visit to Canada in 186465. London, 1891. Morton, W.L., ed. Monck Letters and Journals, 1863-1868. Toronto,1970. O'Leary, J. Recollections of Fenians and Fenianism. 2 vols. London, 1896. O'Neill, J. Official Report of Gen. John O'Neill, President of the Fenian Brotherhood. New York, 1870. Reporters of the Montreal Daily Witness. A Brief Account of the Fenian Raids on the Missisquoi Frontier: 1866 and 1870. Montreal, 1871. Seventh National Congress of the Fenian Brotherhood: Proceedings of the Senate and House of Representatives of the Fenian Brotherhood in Joint Convention. New York, 1868. Somerville, A. Narrative of the Fenian Invasion of Canada. Hamilton, 1866. Sweeny, T.W. "Official Report of General Thomas W. Sweeny, Secretary of War, Fenian Brotherhood, and Commander-in-Chief of the Irish Republican Army." Journal of the American Irish Historical Society 23 (1924) :194-203. TennantJ.F. Rough Times, 1870-1920: A Souvenir of the 50th Anniversary of the fled River Expedition and the Formation of the Province of Manitoba. Winnipeg, 1920. Theller, E.A. Canada, 1837-38. Philadelphia, 1841.

SECONDARY MATERIAL Books Bernard, W.T. The Queen's Own Rifles of Canada, 1860-1960: One Hundred Years of Canada. Don Mills, Ont. 1960. Billington, R.A. The Protestant Crusade. Gloucester, Mass., 1963. Brown, T.N. Irish-American Nationalism, 1870-1890. Philadelphia and New York, 1966. Callahan, J.M. American Foreign Policy in Canadian Relations. New York, 1937. Campbell, M.F. Niagara: Hinge of the Golden Arc. Toronto, 1958. Careless, J.M.S. Brown of the Globe. 2 vols. Toronto, 1959, 1963. Craig, Gerald M. Upper Canada: The Formative Years, 1784-1841. Toronto, 1963. Crawford, M., and K. Armstrong. The Fenians. Toronto, 1970.

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— Bibliography — Creighton, D.G.John A. Macdonald. 2 vols. Toronto, 1952, 1955. D'Arcy, W.M. The Fenian Movement in the United States, 1858-1886. Washington, B.C., 1947. Fryer, Mary Beacock. "The Battle of Ridgeway, 1866." In Battlefields of Canada. Toronto, 1986. Gluek, A.C. Minnesota and the Manifest Destiny of the Canadian Northwest: A Study of Canadian-American Relations. Toronto, 1965. Hamilton, C.F. "Defence 1812-1912," in Canada and Its Provinces, edited by A. Shortt and A.G. Doughty, Vol 7. Toronto, 1914-17. Hitsman,J.M. Safeguarding Canada, 1763-1871. Toronto, 1968. Jackson, Elva E. Cape Breton and the Jackson Kith and Kin. Windsor, N.S., 1935. Jenkins, B. Fenians and Anglo-American Relations during Reconstruction. Ithaca, N.Y., and London, 1969. Kinchen, O.A. The Rise of the Patriot Hunters. New York, 1956. Martin, Chester. "The Political History of Manitoba." In Canada and Its Provinces, edited by A. Shortt and A.G. Doughty. Vol. 19. Toronto, 1914-17. McGee, R. The Fenian Raids on the Huntingdon Frontier^ 1866 and 1870. Huntingdon, Que., 1967. Missisquoi County Historical Society. The Fenian Raids, 1866-1870. Stanbridge East, Que., 1967. Morrison, S.O. The Oxford History of the American People. New York, 1965. Morton, W.L. The Critical Years: The Union of British North America, 18571873. Toronto, 1964. Neidhardt, W.S. Fenianism in North America. University Park, 1975. O'Broin, L. Fenian Fever: An Anglo-American Dilemma. New York, 1971. O'Driscoll, R., and L. Reynolds, eds. The Untold Story: The Irish in Canada. Toronto, 1988. Phelan,J. The Ardent Exile. Toronto, 1951. Robinson, W.A. "Matthew Lyon." In Dictionary of American Biography. Vol. 11, pp. 532-34. New York, 1933. Roche, J.P. Sentenced to Life. New York, 1974. Ryan, D. The Fenian Chief: A Biography of James Stephens. Dublin and Sidney, 1967. Senior, E.K. The Roots of the Canadian Army: Montreal District, 1846-1870. Montreal, 1981. . An Imperial Garrison in its Colonial Setting: British Regulars in Montreal. Montreal, 1981. . From Royal Township to Industrial City: Cornwall, 1784-1984. Belleville, 1983.

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— The Last Invasion of Canada — Senior, H. Orangeism: The Canadian Phase. Toronto, 1972. . The Fenians and Canada. Toronto, 1978. Skelton, Isabel. The Life and Times of Thomas D'Arcy McGee. Gardenvale, N.Y., 1925. Slattery, T.P. The Assassination of D'Arcy McGee. Toronto and New York, 1968. . They Got to Find Me Guilty Yet. Toronto, 1972. Stacey, G.P. Canada and the British Army, 1846-1871: A Study in the Practice of Responsible Government. Toronto, 1963. Stanley, G.F.G. Canada's Soldiers, 1604-1954: The Military History of an Unmilitary People, 3rd ed. Toronto, 1974. . 'John Hammond, Painter for the C.P.R." In The C.P.R West: The Iron Road and the Making of a Nation, edited by Hugh A. Dempsey Vancouver and Toronto, 1984. . Toil and Trouble: Military Expeditions to Red River. Toronto, 1989. Waite, P.B. The Life and Times of Confederation, 1864-1867. Toronto, 1962. Walker, M. The Fenian Movement. Colorado Springs, 1969. Winks, R.W. Canada and the United States: Civil War Years. Baltimore, 1960. Articles, Theses and Reference Books Ascher, E. "Number One Company, Niagara." Niagara Historical Society 27 (1915): 60-73. Brusher, J.S. "The Fenian Invasions of Canada." Ph.D. dissertation, St. Louis University, 1943. Cameron, J.A. "Fenian Times in Nova Scotia." Collections of the Nova Scotia Historical Society 37 (1970): 103-52. Cooper, J.A. "The Fenian Raid of 1866." CM10 (1897): 41-55. Coyle, J.G. "General Michael Corcoran." Journal of the American Irish Historical Society 13 (1920): 109-26. Cumberland, B. "The Fenian Raid of 1866 and Events on the Frontier." Proceedings and Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada, 3rd ser. 4 (1910): 85-108. Curran, C. "The Spy Behind the Speaker's Chair." History Today 18 (1968): 745-54. Dafoe, J.W. "The Fenian Invasion of Quebec, 1866." CM 10 (1898): 33947. Davis, H.A. "The Fenian Raid on New Brunswick." CHR 36 (1955): 31634. Donovan, H. "Fenian Memories in Northern New York." Journal of the American Irish Historical Society 28 (1929/30): 148-52. Ellis, P.B. "The Battle of Ridgeway, 2 June 1866." Irish Sword 16 (1984/ 86): 245-67

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— Bibliography — Galarneau, C. "David McLane." In Dictionary of Canadian Biography. Vol. 4, p. 501 Toronto and Quebec, 1979. Hamilton, C.F. "The Canadian Militia: The Fenian Raids." Canadian Defence Quarterly § (1929): 344-53. Hunter, C. "Reminiscences of the Fenian Raid." Niagara Historical Society 20 (1911): 3-22. Jenkins, B. "The British Government, Sir John A. Macdonald and the Fenian Claims." CHR49 (1968): 142-59. Johnson, R.P. "The Fenian Invasion of 1871." Historical and Scientific Society of Manitoba, ser. Ill, no. 7 (1952): 30-39. Landon, F. "The American Civil War and Canadian Federation." Proceedings and Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada, 3rd. ser. 21 (1927): 55-56. Langan, M. "General John O'Neill, Soldier, Fenian, and Leader of Irish Catholic Colonization in America" M.A. dissertation, Notre Dame University, 1937. Larmour, R. "Personal Reminiscences of the Fenian Raid of June, 1866." CM 10 (1898): 228-31. Luvaas, J. "General Sir Patrick Macdougall: The American Civil War and Defence of Canada." Canadian Historical Association Report (CHAR), 1962, 44-54. Lyne, D.C. "The Irish in the Province of Canada in the Decade Leading to Confederation, 1850-1867." M.A. dissertation, McGill University, 1962. Macdougall, P. "Canada: The Fenian Raid and the Colonial Office." Blackwood's Magazine 108 (1870): 493-508. Neidhardt, W.S. "The Fenian Brotherhood and Southwestern Ontario." M.A. dissertation, University of Western Ontario, 1967. . "The Fenian Brotherhood and Western Ontario: The Final Years." OH 60 (1968): 149-61. . "The Abortive Fenian Uprising in Canada West: A Document Study." OH61 (1969): 74-76. . "The American Government and the Fenian Brotherhood: A Study in Mutual Political Opportunism." O//64 (1972): 27-44. . "The Fenian Brotherhood and Its Role in Canadian History." The York Pioneer, 1972, 2-13. . "We've Nothing Else to Do: The Fenian Invasion of Canada, 1866." Canada: An Historical Magazine I, no.2 (1973): 1-19. . "The Fenian Trials in the Province of Canada, 1866-1867." O//66 (1974): 23-36. Pritchett, J.P. "The Origins of the so-called Fenian Raid on Manitoba in 1871." CHRW (1929): 23-42.

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— The Last Invasion of Canada — Quealy, F.M. "The Fenian Invasion of Canada West." O//53 (1961): 3766. Senior, Elinor Kyte. "The Provincial Cavalry in Lower Canada, 1837-50." CHR, March 1976, pp. 1-24. Senior, H. "Quebec and the Fenians." CHR48 (1967): 26-44. . "Ogle Gowan, Orangeism, and the Immigrant Question 18301833." OH4 (1974): 193-210. . "Thomas Billis Beach." In Dictionary of Canadian Biography. Vol. 12. Toronto, 1990 Stacey, C.P. "Fenianism and the Rise of National Feeling in Canada at the Time of Confederation." CHR 12 (1931): 238-61. . "The Garrison of Fort Wellington: A Military Dispute During the Fenian Troubles." CHR14 (1933): 161-76. . "A Fenian Interlude: The Story of Michael Murphy." CHR 15 (1934): 133-54. . "British Military Policy in Canada in the Era of Federation." CHAR, 1934,120-29. . "The Fenian Troubles and Canadian Military Development, 1865-1871." CHAR, 1935, 26-35. . "Britain's Withdrawal from North America, 1864-1871." CHR 36 (1955): 185-98. Stanley, G.F.G. "LTnvasion fenienne au Manitoba." La Revue d'Histoire de rAmeriquefrancaisel7 (1963-64): 258-68.

Sweeny, W.M. "Brigadier-General Thomas W. Sweeny, United States Army." Journal of the American Irish Historical Society 27 (1928): 25772. Tremaudan, A.H. "Louis Riel and the Fenian Raid of 1871." CHR 4 (1923): 132-44. Vesey, H. "When New Brunswick Suffered Invasion." Dalhousie Review 19 (1939/40): 197-204. Vroom, J. "The Fenians on the St. Croix." CM 10 (1898): 411-13. Wheeler, A.E. "Reminiscences of the Fenian Raids of '66." York Pioneer and Historical Society Annual Report, 1912, 17-19.

— 218 —

— Index — Akers, Capt. C.S., 76, 77, 91, 92, 99 Alabama, C.S.S., 48 Alien and Sedition Act (U.S.), 13 Allen, W. Cox, 52, 106 Anglin, Timothy, W., 48, 54 Annexation Manifesto (1849), 17 Anti-Catholic agitation, 14, 16 Archibald, Lt.-Gov. A.G., 174, 177184, 186 Archibald, Edward, 43, 48,, 49 Arthur, H.R.H. Prince, 163, 172 Atcherly, Capt. F.T., 153 Aurora, H.M.S., 103 Bagot, Col., 166, 168, 169, 170 Bailey, Col., 93 Baird, Lt.-CoL, 49 Ballard rifle, 140, 142,150, 161, 163 Bangor, Me., 48, 51 Barry, Gen. William, 99-100 Beach, Thomas Billis. See Le Caron, Henri Beauharnois Voltigeurs canadiens (64th), 139, 169,172 Belleville Militia Battalion (15th), 105 Bertie Road, 79, 80, 82 Black Creek, 76, 92, 94, 95, 98 Black Watch Regiment (Royal Light Infantry of Montreal), 32, 154 Bond, Maj. Frank, 114 Booker, Lt.-Col. Alfred, 74-88 passim, 91, 92, 94, 99, 128 Bourget, Bishop Ignace, 32 Boyle, Patrick, 37, 38 Brantford, Ont. (Canada West), 154 Brock, Gen. Sir Isaac, 24

Brockville, Ont. (Canada West), 104, 153 Brockville Rifles, 105 Brydges, CharlesJ., 123 Brown, George, 38, 102 Bruce, Sir Frederick, 43, 46 Bryson, Capt., 92, 97, 98,100 Budenburg Arsenal, Philadelphia, 68 Buffalo, N.Y,60, 62, 66-69, 91, 9697,99-100,148,152,166 Buffalo Regiment (7th), 69 Bulter, Lt. William, 166, 168, 169, 170 Calais, Me., 46, 48, 54 Caledonia Rifles, 72, 78, 80, 102 Cameron, Lt.-Col. John Hillyard, 96,98 Campbell, Francis Wayland, 114, 116 Campobello Island, N.B., Chapt. 4 passim, 188, 198 Canadian Freeman, (Toronto newspaper), 38, 59 Canadian Party, Red River, 173, 174, 177 Cape Breton Island, 56 Cardwell, Edward, 46, 111 Carter, Capt. C.W., 116-120, 123, 190 Cartier, George-Etienne, 34, 52, 138 Casault, Lt.-Col. Louis, 142 Catholic Loyal Association, 48 Chamberlin, Brown, 120, 155-160, 164 Chasseurs canadiens, 112, 123 Chateauguay River, 114, 115, 148, 165

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— The Last Invasion of Canada — Chateauguay Valley, 112 Chesapeake-Leopard affair, 24 Chicago, 111., 37, 64-67, 102, 144145, 148 Chippawa, Ont. (Canada West), 69, 70, 76, 78, 94, 95, 98, 102, 119 City of Toronto (Steamer), 75, 95 Civil Service Rifles, 105 Clarke, Charles, 60, 62, 76-77 Cleveland, Oh., 61, 64, 66, 68 Clifton, Ont. (Canada West), 43, 102 Cobourg, Ont. (Canada West), 102 Coloured Company, 24 Columbian Company of Artillery, 18 Condon, Edward O'Meagher, 37 Confederation, 48, 51, 54-57 passim, 131,187, 188 Cook's Corners, Que. (Canada East). See also Eccles Hill, 122,156,157,158, 159,159 "Copperheads", 36 Corcoran's Brigade, 20, 33, 36 Cornwall, Ont. (Canada West), 52, 53, 105-106, 112, 153 Coursol, CharlesJ., 32, 43, 123, 133, 152 Crimean War, 18,19 Croman, Capt., 160, 161, 163 Cullen, Patrick, 52 Curley, Col. Thomas, 177, 183,184 Currie, Lt.-Col. J.G., 71 Daniel, L.O., 144 Dart, W.A., 68 Davis, Capt. Robert H., 78, 86 DeSalaberry (Steamer), 165 Denison, Maj. George Taylor, 71, 95-98 passim, 137, 189 Dennis, Lt.-Col. J.S., 74-78 passim, 91-94 passim, 96, 138,189 Des Rivieres, Capt., 119 Detroit, Mich., 64, 103 Devlin, Lt.-Col. Bernard, 29, 33, 114

Devlin, Owen J., 33 Doheny, Michael, 19 Donnelly, Ignatius, 174 Donnelly, Col.J.J., 148, 177, 183, 184 Donnelly, John, 169 Douglas, A.B., 183 Doyle, Maj.-Gen. Sir Hastings, 55, 56,119 Duncan, H.M.S., 56 Dunham Volunteers (No. 4 Co.), 159, 172 Dunnville, Ont. (Canada West), 75 Dunnville Naval Brigade, 91, 94, 103 Durham, Que. (Canada East), 117, 125 Duvernay, Napoleon, 32 Eastport, Me., 45, 50, 53, 55,188 Eccles Hill Battle. See also Cook's Corners, 149,150, Chapt. 9 passim, 191 Elgin, Gov.-Gen. Lord, 16, 17 Elora Rifle Company, 89 Emigrant Aid Society, 19 Emmet Monument Society, 19, 26 Emmet, Robert, 19 Enfield rifle, 27, 74, 78, 91,141, 161 Ermatinger, Lt.-Col. Edward, 133 Ermatinger, Col. William, 52 Fairfield, Vt., 140, 156,157 Farlie, Lt. R.N., 104 Fenian conventions, 37-38, 39, 40, 41 Ferrier, Col. James, 26 Fessenden, U.S.S., 103 Fort Erie, Ont. (Canada West), 43, 69,91,92,93,93,97, 99,124,189 Fort Garry, Man., 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 184 Fort Lennox, Que. (Canada East), 111

— 220 —

— Index • Fort Wellington, 105 Foster, Marshal George P., 152, 160, 162 Fourdrinier, Capt. F.L., 116, 118, 120 Franklin, Vt., 121, 139,152, 156, 160 Frelighsburg, Que. (Canada East), 122, 157, 158 Frenchman Creek, Ont. (Canada West), 69, 98 Galer, Ens. James, 155 Gait, A.T., 52 Gananoque Rifles, 105 Gardner, Capt. John, 80, 85 Garrison Road, 79, 80, 86 Georgian Bay, Ont. (Canada West), 104 Gillmor, Maj. Charles, 74, 78, 80, 86 Gleason, Gen.J.H., 167, 171,172 Globe (Toronto newspaper), 38, 39, 68,179 Goderich, Ont. (Canada West), 43 Gordon, Lt.-Gov. Arthur Hamilton, 46, 51, 55, 119 Goulet, Elzar, 174 Gourdey, Alexander, 114 Governor General's Body Guard, 72,95,123 Gowan, Ogle, 44 Grace, John, 69 Graham, Richard, 76, 77 Grand Trunk Railway, 113, 123, 166 Grant, Pres. Ulysses S., 107,174, 175 Guelph, Ont. (Canada West), 64 Guy Fawkes Day, 38 Habeas corpus, 42, 126, 144 Hamilton, Ont. (Canada West), 68, 72, 75, 154 Hamilton militia (13th Battalion), 72-88 passim, 99, 102

Hanson, Lt. James, 27 Harrison (Tugboat), 92, 98 Havelock, Que. (Canada East), 115 Hawks, Charles, 139 Haye, John, 69 Hemans, H.W., 43, 60-61, 71,100 Hemmingford, Que. (Canada East), 113, 114,123,164 Hemmingford Rangers (51st), 113, 139,164,168 Henderson, Sgt. J.T., 115 Henery, Capt. John, 74-75, 78 Herald (Montreal newspaper), 33 Hibernian Benevolent Society, 37, 38, 39, 42, 43-44 Hinchbrook, Que. (Canada East), 167 Hincks, Francis, 26 Hochelaga, 140 Hochelaga Light Infantry (6th), 112, 154, 155 Holbrook Corners, Que. (Canada East), 148, 165,166,169, 170,171,172 Hubbard'sfarm, Vt., 157, 160 Hudson's Bay Company, 182, 183, 184 Hughes, Bishop John, 19, 21 Hunter, S.N., 118, 140, 155-157 Hunters' Lodges, 14-16, 104, 111 Huntingdon, Que. (Canada East), 113-116 passim, 164, 166, 168, 172,191 Huntingdon Borderers (50th), 166,170,171 Hutchinson, Rev'd D.F., 46 Immigration, Irish, 13 Indian Island, N.B., 56, 188 Inglis, Rev'd David, 86-87 Intelligence gathering. See also Le Caron, Henri; by British/ Canadian authorities, 4243,48,52,61,68-69, 71, 76-77,133,139, 143; by Fenians, 49-50, 70,170

— 221 —

— The Last Invasion of Canada — Irish Brigade (French Army), 59 Irish Canadian (Toronto newspaper), 37, 39 The Irish People (Fenian paper), 41 Irish rebellion (1798), 13 Irish Republican Brotherhood, 20 Irish Republican Union, 16-17, 18, 26 Irish revolutionary military tradition, Chapt. 1 Irish volunteer movement, 12 Iroquois Garrison Artillery, 153 Isle-aux-Noix, Que. (Canada East), 111, 112 Jackson, Capt. W., 78 James II, King, 112 Jarvis, Lt.-Col. S.P., 142 Johnson, Pres. Andrew, 40, 49, 107, 175 Keenan, James, 118,120 Keenan, Patrick, 41 Kelly, K, 121 Kentucky Regiment (17th), 66, 69 Kerr, Robert, 55 Kerrigan, Lt.-Col. James, 50 Killian, B. Doran, 40, 41; and Campobello, Chapt. 4 passim, 188 King, Capt., 92, 94 King's Own Borderers (25th), 105, 106, 112 Kingston, Ont. (Canada West), 102,104,105,106 Kingston Field Battery, 105 Lachine, Que. (Canada East), 112 Lavalle, Father Patrick, 21 Le Caron, Henri (Thomas Billis Beach), 133, 135, 136,137, 144, 145; and raids of 1870, 148, 152,164; raid against Manitoba, 177, 178, 190 Leader (Toronto newspaper), 38, 39

LePays (Montreal newspaper), 54 Lepine, Ambroise, 174 Lepine, Baptiste, 182 Lewis, George, 94* Lewiston, Me., 48 Lime Ridge Road, 70, 78, 79 Lincoln Regiment (19th), 71, 76 Linden district, Ont. (Canada West), 102 Line Regiments (regular): Prince Consort's Own Rifles (Rifle Brigade), 105, 107, 163, 172; Regiment of the Line (16th), 96; Regiment of the Line (25th), 123; Regiment of the Line (47th), 76, 96, 102, 106; Royal Fusiliers (7th), 114, 123; Royal Rifles (60th), 98, 142 Lindsay, Gen. Sir James, 142, 155 London, Ont. (Canada West), 64, 101, 102 London Volunteers Battalion (7th), 99 L 'Opinion publique (Montreal newspaper), 144 L'Original, Ont. (Canada West), 153 Louis Napoleon, 19 Lowry, Lt.-Col. R.W., 98, 100 Loyal Catholic Volunteers, 13 Lubec, Me., 55, 56 Lynch, Bishop John Joseph, 37, 39, 43 Lynch, Gen. W.F., 66 Lyon, Matthew, 13 Macdonald, John A., 32, 34, 43, 126; and Campobello, 52; and Ridgeway, 60, 61; and preparations for raids of 1870,133,141,143-144; and raid against Manitoba, 178, 179 Macdonald, John Sandfield, 35

— 222 —

— Index — MacDougall, Capt. D. Lome, 123 MacDougall, Col. P.L., 127 Mackenzie, William Lyon, 14, 63 Magnet (Steamer), 104 Malone, N.Y., 105,106; and operations on Quebec frontier, 109, 110, 112, 114, 116; and raids of 1870,137, 147, 148,152,163, 165, 166,167,171 Manitoba, Chapt. 10 passim, 176, 180 Manitoba Bill, 182 Manifest Destiny, 15 Mannix, G.J., 137 Maum, Pte. Robert, 84 McCallum, Capt. Lauchlan, 91, 94 McCullough, Hugh, 51 McDermott, James "Red", 39, 49, 53, 188 McEachern, Lt.-Col. Archibald, 164, 165, 166, 168 McEachren, Malcolm, 82 McGee, Thomas D'Arcy, 17,18, 33, 38, 39, 43, 46, 59, 62, 134-135 Mclntosh, Andrew, 74, 75 McLane, David, 13 McLaughlin, John, 61, 68 McLeod, Alexander, 68 McMahon, Father John, 171 McManus, Terence Bellew, 21, 31 McMaster, Capt. F.M.,103, 104 McMicken, Gilbert, 43-44, 60-62; and preparations for raids of 1870, 133, 135, 137,143; and raid against Manitoba, 177-179, 180,181, 182 Meade, Maj. Gen. George, 50, 51, 56,99,101,107,116,172 Michel, Gen. Sir John, 46, 72, 123, 127,142,170,172 Michigan, U.S.S., 92, 97, 98, 100, 103-104,154 Militia Acts (1846, 1855), 26, 34 Miller, Capt. 116, 120

Missisquoi Battalion (60th), 139, 141; and raids of 1870 151, 158,159,163, 172,191 Mitchel, John, 16, 19 Moffat mansion, 41 Mohawk Indians, 33 Monck, Lord, 43, 60, 71, 111, 127, 141 Montgomery, Gen. Richard, 13, 14 Montreal, Que. (Canada East), 1617, 31-33, 64, 106, 136; and operations on Quebec frontier, 112, 113,114,127, 128 Montreal Cavalry, 113, 163 Montreal Garrison Artillery, 112, 154, 166 Montreal Witness (newspaper), 114 Moore, John, 171 Morning Freeman (St. John N.B., newspaper), 48, 54 Moylan, George, 38 Muir, Ensign Alexander, 79, 81, 83 Murphy, Brig.-Gen. M.C., 64 Murphy, Michael, 37, 38, 39, 42, 43-44, 45; and Campobello, 51-53,60, 105,134 Napier, Maj .-Gen. George, 72 Nativism, American, 14, 16 Nault, Andre, 182 Navy Island, Ont. (Canada West), 69 New York Irish (4th), 162 New York Regiment (9th, later "Fighting 69th"), 18 Newbiggin's farm, 70, 76, 78, 92 Niagara River, 60, 69, 98, 102 Nolan, Patrick, 43 O'Callaghan, E.B., 14 Ocean Spray (Schooner), 50, 53, 55, 56 O'Connell, Daniel, 14, 16, 21 O'Connellite Repeal Association, 15

— 223 —

— The Last Invasion of Canada — O'Connor, Michael Thomas, 17 O'Connor, Lt.-Col. Timothy, 121, 124 O'Day, Patrick, 68 O'Donoghue, The, 21 O'Donoghue, William, 142-143, 191; and raid on Manitoba, 173,174,175,177,178, 179, 181,182,184 Ogdensburg, N.Y., 60,107, 166 O'Hea, Pte. Timothy, 204n Ohio Regiment (18th), 69 O'MahonyJohn, 19, 20, 21, 57, 60, 45,188; and preparations for raids, 36, 38, 40, 41,42 O'Mahony's Guard, 20, 36 O'Neill, Lt.-Col. John, and Ridgeway, 66-70, 76-79, 83, 189, 190,191; 91-102 passim, 120,124; and preparations for raids of 1870, 131, 133, 135, 137, 144, 145; and raids of 1870, 147,150,151,152,158, 160-163 passim, 166; and raid on Manitoba, 175, 177, 178, 179, 183, 184; Orangemen, 13, 14, 37, 42, 38, 4344,63,106,174 Ormstown, Que. (Canada East), 114,115 Ottawa, Ont. (Canada West), 104, 105, 178, 184 Ottawa Field Artillery, 105, 153 Otter, Capt. W.D., 78 Oxford Rifles, 99 Pakenham, Lt.-Col. T.H., 106 Papal Zouaves, 138 Paris, Ont. (Canada West), 64 Patriotes, 14, 63

Peacocke, Col. George, 189; and Ridgeway, 72, 75-78, 83; and problem of frontier patrol, 91, 92, 94-98 passim Pell, James, 140

Pembina, N.D., 178, 180, 182, 183, 186 Phoenix Brigade, 20 Pigeon Hill, Que. (Canada East), 139, 190; and operations on Quebec frontier, 121,123126 passim, 128; and raids of 1870,148,159, 161 Port Colborne, Ont. (Canada West), 64, 70, 72, 75, 76, 88, 91,92,99 Port Stanley, Ont. (Canada West), 64, 103 Portland, Me., 48 Prescott, Ont. (Canada West), 153, 154 Prince of Wales Regiment, 27, 28, 29, 32, 33, 35,141; and operations on Quebec frontier, 112, 114-116, 125, 128; and raids of 1870, 154, 155 Pringle, Jacob Farrand, 52 Provincial Cavalry, 24 Pulby, Father T.A., 15 Pylades, H.M.S., 56, 106, 114 Quebec, 107, 190; Chapt. 7 passim, Chapt. 9 passim Queen's Birthday (Victoria Day), 145, 154, 156 Queen's Own Rifles, 28, 72-88 passim, 81, 99, 102 Ramsey, Alex, 174 Rebellions of 1837-1838, 24 Red River settlement, 142, 177, 191 Rescue (Canadian flotilla), 103, 104 Richelieu Light Infantry, 154 Ridgeway, Battle of, 67, 85, 147, 187-190; Chapt. 5 passim Kiel, Louis, 142-143, 148,173, 174, 175,181,182,184 Riley, Patrick O'Brien, 162 Rising of 1848 (Ireland), 16, 19

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- Index — Ritchot, Father Noel, 174, 178,182 Robbinston, Me., 55 Roberts, William R., 62, 100-101, 188-189; and Campobello, 40, 41, 42, 48 Roche, John, 19, 136 Rose, John C. 137 Rowe, John, 161, 163 Royal Artillery, 75, 98, 102, 106, 140, 142 Royal Canadian Rifles, 25, 31, 111, 154, 155 Royal Light Infantry (5th Royals), 53,112 Royal Navy, 19,103 Rykert, Alva, 156,160,161, 162 St. Albans, Vt., 42; and operations on Quebec frontier, 109, 110, 116, 118, 120-122 passim, 124; and raids of 1870, 147,148, 150,152,157,160,162,164 St. Andrews, N.B., 46, 49, 55 St. Armand, Que. (Canada East),

118,119,121,122,123, 128, 139,152 St. Croix Courier (newspaper), 46, 53 St. Jean, Que. (Canada East), 110112 passim, 123,148,152, 154, 155 St. Norbert, Man., 155 St. Patrick's Day, 13, 38, 42, 45,112 St. Patrick's Society, 33,134 Sanjadnto, U.S.S., 31 San Patricio Brigade, 15-16 Sarnia, Ont. (Canada West), 43, 154 Scott, R.N., 43 Scott, Thomas, 174 Sedentary militia, 23, 26, 28, 29, 32,35 Select Embodied Militia, 24 Seward, W.H., 50 Sheldon, Vt., 118

Sherbrooke, Que. (Canada East), 65,109,110 Sherman, William T., 179 Shorter, Pte. S.O., 115 Sicotte, L.V., 35 Sinnott, Patrick A., 48, 53, 54 Skinner, Maj. James, 78, 81, 82 Smith, Capt. Peter, 116, 118, 120 Smith, Lt.-Col. William Osborne, 32; and raids of 1870, 155157 passim, 159, 161-163 passim Snider-Enfield rifle, 161, 163 Somerville, Alexander, 99 Spears, Brig.-Gen. Samuel B., 164, 190; and operations on the Quebec frontier, 110, 111, 120-124 passim Speed, James, 50 Spencer rifle, 55, 72-74, 78, 81 Springfield rifle, 50, 69,122,141, 179, 183 Stan ton, Edwin, 50, 107 Starr, Lt.-Col. Owen, 66, 68, 69, 167 Stephens, James, 19-20, 21, 37-42 passim Stephensville, Ont. (Canada West), 76,91,94,95 Stratford, Ont. (Canada West), 64, 101, 102 Sweeny, Gen. T.W., 41, 42, 132, 145, 187; and Ridgeway, 60, 62-65; and the problem of frontier patrol, 101,105108; and operations on the Quebec frontier, 110,112,116,121,122 Tache, Bishop Alexander, 174, 178, 179, 180, 181 Tammany Hall, 13, 101, 172 Taylor, Jam es W., 175, 179 Ten Eyck, Andrew, 139, 140 Tennessee Regiment (13th), 66, 69 Tevis, Col. C. Carroll, 65, 145

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— The Last Invasion of Canada — Theller, E.A., 14 Thornton, Sir Edward, 143 Tilley, Samuel Leonard, 48, 57 Tittemore, Capt. Leonard, 116, 120 Toof, Wellington, 158 Toronto, Ont. (Canada West), and Ridgeway, 64, 68, 72, 75, 76, 79; and problem of frontier patrol, 95, 96, 98, 102, 104 Toronto Naval Brigade, 103,104 Townshend Hall, 67, 68 Trent affair (1861-1862), 31, 34, 35, 63 Trout River, Que. (Canada East), 165,166,168,169,169, 191 Tupper, Sir Charles, 57 Tupper, Elan, 61

156, 158, 163 Wheaton, Capt. Lloyd, 179, 183, 184 Wiley, Lt.-Col. Thomas, 32 Windsor, Ont. (Canada West), 103, 154 Wolseley, Col. Garnet, 98, 100, 102, 142,148 W.T. Robb (Tugboat), 91, 92, 94, 97,103,104, 189 York Rifles, 72, 78, 81, 82, 86, 88, 102 Young, Sir John, 143 Young Ireland, 16 Zouaves, Papal, 138

United Empire Loyalists, 23,104, 126, 139 United Irish Society, 12,13 United States Army, 5th Infantry Regiment, 164 VanKoughnet, E.B., 103 Vatican, 19,137 Victoria, Queen, 174,175,182 Victoria Day, 145,154,155, 156 Victoria Volunteer Rifles of Montreal, 32, 53; and operations on Quebec frontier, 112, 114-115,115, 116; and raids of 1870,154, 155,162,163,171,172 Villiers, Capt. F., 177 Vincent, Margaret, 126 Wabano (Steamer), 104 War of 1812,13-14, 24, 69,104 Webster, George W., 183,184 Welland Canal Field Battery, 91, 92,94 Westover, Asa, 139,140, 151,155,

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