Handbook of the History of Logic Volume 8 The Many Valued and Nonmonotonic Turn in Logic
Handbook of the History of Logic Volume 8 The Many Valued and Nonmonotonic Turn in Logic
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Handbook of the History of Logic
Volume 8
The Many Valued and
Nonmonotonic Turn in Logic
Edited by Dov M. Gabbay Department of Computer Science
King’s College London
Strand, London, WC2R 2LS, UK
and
John Woods Philosophy Department
University of British Columbia
Vancouver, BC Canada, V6T 1Z1
and
Department of Computer Science
King’s College London
Strand, London, WC2R 2LS, UK
and
Department of Philosophy
University of Lethbridge
Lethbridge, Alberta, Canada, T1K 3M4
AMSTERDAM • BOSTON • HEIDELBERG • LONDON • NEW YORK • OXFORD
PARIS • SAN DIEGO • SAN FRANCISCO • SINGAPORE • SYDNEY • TOKYO
North-Holland is an imprint of Elsevier
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CONTENTS Preface
vii
List of Authors
xi
Many-valued Logic and its Philosophy Grzegorz Malinowski
13
Preservationism: A Short History Bryson Brown
95
Paraconsistency and Dialetheism Graham Priest
129
The History of Quantum Logic Maria Luisa Dalla Chiara, Roberto Giuntini and Miklos R´ edei
205
Logics of Vagueness Dominic Hyde
285
Fuzzy-set Based Logics — An History-oriented Presentation of their Main Developments
Didier Dubois, Francesc Esteva, Llu´ıs Godo and Henri Prade
325
Nonmonotonic Logics: A Preferential Approach Karl Schlechta
451
Default Logic Grigoris Antoniou and Kewen Wang
517
Nonmonotonic Reasoning Alexander Bochman
557
Free Logics Carl J. Posy
633
Index
681
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PREFACE
From its inception nearly 2500 years ago, logic has taken a dominant interest in the notion of logical consequence. It is widely agreed that there exists a basic con ception of deductive consequence, which Aristotle called “necessitation”, in which sentences or sets of sentences serve as inputs, generating output-sentences in a truth-preserving way. What is not widely agreed is that truth-preserving neces sitation is the sole relation of consequence, or the only form of it that merits the serious interest of logicians. Aristotle himself introduces a further — and, for his interests, the more important — idea of syllogistic consequence. Syllogistic conse quence is a restriction of necessitation, got by imposing further conditions which, among other things, require that syllogisms not have redundant premisses. This is clearly a constraint on inputs, and it is easy to see that it has the effect of making syllogistic consequence strongly non-monotonic. For if an argument is a syllogism, then the result of adding new sentences to its premisses cannot itself be a syllo gism. Aristotle also imposed constraints on the outputs of syllogistic consequence. Syllogisms are required to have only single propositions as conclusions. The question of the constraints it may be desirable or necessary to impose on a stripped down, merely truth-preserving deduction relation brings into conver gence the two main themes of the present volume of the Handbook of the History of Logic. Twentieth and twenty-first century logic is well-stocked with affirmative answers to this question. Many valued logicians gravitate to the idea that a re alistic characterization of consequence requires the admissibility of inputs which, owing to vagueness, temporal or quantum indeterminacy, or reference-failure, can not be considered classically bivalent. Consider the sentence “The present king of France”. On the many valued approach, the non-existence of the present king of France denies the sentence a referent, which in turn denies it a classical truth value. In classical logic, such sentences may not be admitted to the consequence relation. In many valued systems, the admissibility of such sentences is secured by the postulation of one of more additional truth values. Free logics offer an interesting alternative to many valued treatments of reference-failure. Instead of allowing many-valued sentences as inputs, free logicians retain the classical truth values while restricting output. In particular, the quantifier introduction rule F a ∃x(F x) fails when F a is guilty of reference failure. In a variation of free logic, the necessity to multiply truth values is also averted, provided we are pre pared to add to the logic’s standard domain of discourse a non-standard domain, in which singular terms such as “the present king of France” pick up a referent, notwithstanding that they lack a referent in the standard domain. Either way,
viii
Preface
whether the many valued way or the free logic way, something has to be added if sentences such as these are to be admitted to the consequence relation. Either an additional truth value must be introduced or an additional domain of discourse. Many valued logics are non-bivalent. This generates a problem for classical va lidity. An argument is valid classically if and only if there is no valuation making its premisses true and its conclusion false. So any argument containing at least one non-bivalent sentence — whether in basic systems such as K3 or in quantum logics or vagueness logics — is trivially valid classically. Accordingly, many valued consequence has to be contrived so as to avert these promiscuous validities. Many valued logics also impose constraints on outputs. In classical logic, the Law of Ex cluded Middle is a logical truth, hence is a consequence of any sentence whatever. But since in virtually all systems of many valued logic Excluded Middle is not a logical truth, it is not output for every input. Non-monotonic logicians, like Aristotle before them, are constrainers of inputs; and often they lay restrictions on outputs as well. The leading intuition of nonmonotonic logics is that there exist consequence relations in which reasonably drawn conclusions from a given set of premisses can be upset by the addition of new information, and that such consequence relations should be taken seriously by logicians. Default logics are a standard affirmative response to this intuition. When the conclusion drawn from some given premisses is a “default”, then it obtains provisionally and only in the absence of information to the contrary. Since indications to the contrary might subsequently present themselves in the form of new information, such consequences are non-monotonic. There are also many valued approaches in which it seems appropriate or nec essary directly to constrain the consequence relation itself. Dialetheic logics are a case in point. Dialetheic logics are systems in which selected sentences are allowed to be both true and false at once. Such sentences, while true, aren’t true only, since they are also false, hence not false only. Accordingly being both true and false is a third truth value, which makes dialetheic systems many valued. If conse quence were allowed to operate classically in these logics, then any input carrying the third truth value would have every sentence whatever as output. To avert this explosion, consequence has to be a paraconsistent relation, that is, one that does not generate this unfettered output. Accordingly, dialetheic logic is also a paraconsistent logic. The converse does not hold, however. There are paraconsistent logics that muffle the explosiveness of classical consequence without the necessity to posit true contradictions. A dominant move in paraconsistent circles is to con strain explosiveness by restricting the application of the output rule, Disjunctive Syllogism, when inputs contain inconsistencies, whether deemed true or not. A further development — also a many valued one — are fuzzy logics, which are purpose-built to accommodate vague sentences both as inputs to and outputs of the consequence relation. The founding insight of these logics is not that vague sentences require additional truth values, but that the classical truth and falsity will do provided that we allow the values of sentences to be degrees (or slices) of them. So seen, “Harry is bald” might be either true or false, or neither; and if
Preface
ix
neither, it might be somewhat true, or true to degree n, where n is fairly high; or more false than true, or false to degree m, where m is higher than any degree to which the sentence is true. The ten chapters of The Many Valued and Non-Monotonic Turn in Logic are designed to give readers a detailed, expert and up-to-date appreciation of the character and importance of the main expression of the volume’s twin themes. Once again the Editors are deeply and most gratefully in the debt of the vol ume’s very able authors. The Editors also warmly thank the following persons: Professor John Beatty, Acting Head of the Philosophy Department, and Pro fessor Nancy Gallini, Dean of the Faculty of Arts, at the University of British Columbia; Professor Michael Stingl, Chair of the Philosophy Department, and Professor Christopher Nicol, Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Science, at the Uni versity of Lethbridge; Professor Andrew Jones, Head of the Computer Science Department at King’s College London; Jane Spurr, Publications Administrator in London; Carol Woods, Production Associate in Vancouver and our valued col leagues at Elsevier, Senior Publisher, Arjen Sevenster, and his successor Donna Weerd-Wilson, and Production Associate, Andy Deelen. Dov M. Gabbay King’s College London John Woods University of British Columbia and King’s College London and University of Lethbridge
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CONTRIBUTORS Grigoris Antoniou
Institute of Computer Science, FORTH, PO Box 1385, 71110 Heraklion, Crete,
Greece.
[email protected]
Bryson Brown
Department of Philosophy, University of Lethbridge, 4401 University Drive Leth
bridge, Alberta T1K 3M4, Canada.
[email protected]
Alexander Bochman
Department of Computer Science, Holon Institute of Technology, Holon, Israel.
[email protected]
Maria Luisa Dalla Chiara
Departimento di Filosofia, Universita’ de Firenze, Via Bolognese 52, I-50139 Firenze,
Italy.
dallachiara@unifi.it
Didier Dubois
Universit´e Paul Sabatier, IRIT, 118 Route de Narbonne, 31062 Toulouse Cedex
09, France.
[email protected]
Roberto Giuntini
Dipartimento di Scienze Pedagogiche e Filosofiche, Universita’ di Cagliari, Via Is
Mirrionis 1, I-09123 Cagliari, Italy.
[email protected]
Lluis Godo
o en Intellig`encia Artificial (IIIA), - Consejo Superior de In
Institut d’Investigaci´ vestigaciones Cient´ıficas (CSIC) - 08193 Bellaterra, Spain.
[email protected]
Dominic Hyde
School of History Philosophy Religion and Classics, University of Queensland,
Brisbane, Queensland, 4072, Australia.
[email protected]
Grzegorz Malinowski
Department of Logic, University of Lodz, Poland.
[email protected]
xii
Contributors
Carl J. Posy
Department of Philosophy, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Mt. Scopus, Jerusalem
91905, Israel.
[email protected]
Henri Prade
Universit´e Paul Sabatier, IRIT, 118 Route de Narbonne, 31062 Toulouse Cedex
09, France.
[email protected]
Graham Priest
Philosophy Department, The University of Melbourne, Victoria 3010, Australia;
and Department of Philosophy, University of St Andrews, St Andrews,KY16 9AL,
Scotland.
[email protected]
Miklos R´edei
Department of History and Philosophy of Science, Faculty of Natural Sciences,
Lorand Eotvos University, Budapest, Hungary.
[email protected]
Karl Schlechta
Laboratoire d’Informatique de Marseille, UMR 6166, CNRS and Universit´e de
Provence, CMI, 39 rue Joliot-Curie, F-13453 Marseille Cedex 13, France.
[email protected], karl.schlechta:web.de
Kewen Wang
School of Information and Communication Technology, Griffith University, Bris
bane, QLD 4111 , Australia.
k.wang@griffith.edu.au
MANY-VALUED LOGIC AND ITS
PHILOSOPHY
Grzegorz Malinowski
INTRODUCTION The assumption stating that every propositions may be ascribed to exactly one of the two logical values, truth or falsity, called the principle of bivalence constitutes the basis for the classical logic.It determines both the subject matter and the scope of applicability of the classical logic. The principle is expressed together through the law of the excluded middle, p∨¬p and the principle of contradiction, ¬(p∧¬p). Given the classical understanding of the logical connectives, the above laws may be read, respectively, as stating that of the two propositions p and ¬p: at least one is true and at least one is false. The most natural and straightforward step beyond the two-valued logic is the introduction of more logical values, rejecting simultaneously the principle of biva lence. The indirect ways consist in revision of the “bunch” of sentence connectives, mostly after having questioned some classical laws concerning them. Then some non-truth-functional connectives are introduced into the language and the propo sitional logic is primal. The multiple-valued truth-tables constitute the basis of the first method, whereas in the other case they are procured as tools for the pro cedures of decidability of logical theorems. In either case, the extensional matrix semantics is based on revised “multiple-valued” truth-functionality. The chapter is devoted to the most important systems of many-valued logic and the vital philosophical and metalogical problems of many-valuedness. Its first aim is to give a historical account of the most important systems of many-valued logic and their development. In particular, to overview the original motivations and characteristic properties. The second aim of the proposal is to subscribe to a discussion on many-valuedness at all. Accordingly, some known, albeit the most justified, approaches to many-valuedness are recalled and, further to that, the author’s own approach to the problem of many-valuedness based on the inferential theory of (structural) propositional logics is presented.
Handbook of the History of Logic. Volume 8 Dov M. Gabbay and John Woods (Editors) © 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
14
Grzegorz Malinowski
The last two Sections, “Recent developments” and “Applications”, complement the general part of the text and introduce the Reader into more special topics. Monographs, expository papers on several issues concerning many-valuedness and suggested further readings are in Bibliography marked by an aterisk *. 1 WAYS OF MANY VALUES The question when a logic is many-valued is uneasy and non-trivial. To start with we outline an early history of the subject and recall some important justifica tions, interpretations and explanations of many logical values. We focus on future contingents, paradoxes and probability.
Early history The roots of many-valued logics can be traced back to Aristotle (4th century BC). In Chapter IX of De Interpretatione Aristotle considers the timely honoured sentence “There will be a sea-battle tomorrow”, which cannot be evaluated from the point of view of truth and falsity. The battle-sentence falls in a wide category of future contingents sentences, which refer to the future not necessary, or not actually determined, events. The Philosopher from Stagira suggests the existence of the “third” logical status of propositions. The prehistory of many-valued logic falls on the Middle Ages. However, an eval uation to what extent the approaches by Duns Scotus (c. 1266–1308), William Ockham (1285–1347) and Peter de Rivo (1420–1499) submitted to the topic is fairly uneasy. Mostly, since their studies were limited to the topics following Thomas Aquinas’ discussion of future contingents and divine foreknowledge. Ac cordingly, they were concerned with the modality and to the consequentia. More serious attempts to create non-classical logical constructions, three-valued mainly, appeared only on the turn of the XIXth century: they were due to Hugh MacColl, Charles S. Peirce, Nicolai A. Vasil’ev. In most cases the division of the totality of propositions into three categories was supported by some considera tions dealing with some modal or temporal concepts. Eventually, some criteria of the distinction were applied and the propositions mostly were grouped as either “affirmative”, “negative” or “indifferent”. Philosophical motivations for many-valuedness may roughly be classified as on tological and epistemic. First of them focus on the nature of objects and facts, while the others refer the knowledge status of actual propositions. The “Era of many-valuedness” was finally inaugurated in 1920 by L � ukasiewicz and Post, cf. L � ukasiewicz [1920], Post [1920]. The thoroughly successful formulations of manyvalued logical constructions were possible in the result of an adaptation of the truth-table method applied to the classical logic by Frege in 1879, Peirce in 1885 � ukasiewicz and Post method of and others. The impetus thus given bore the L logical algebras and matrices. Apparently different proposals of the two scholars had quite different supports.
Many-valued Logic and its Philosophy
15
The distinguishing feature of many-valued logics is that some of their connec tives are non-truth-functional with respect to truth and falsity, what means that their properties cannot be fully described by two logical values. On the other hand, all connectives of a many-valued logic proper display a kind of generalized “truth-functionality”, i.e. an extensionality with respect to actual values of the logic in question. The non-truth functionality, due to the traditional extension–intension oppo sition, has also been identified as intensionality. This distinction played some important role on extended justification for the construction of several systems of logic, which either did not have any direct explanation in terms of unorthodox logical values or did not accept anything but the truth-falsity universe. Then, using the axiomatic method, some non-classical constructions formalizing inten sional, and thus non-truth-functional, connectives appeared in the 1930s. First, the Lewis modal logics and the intuitionistic logic codifying the principles of a significant trend in the philosophy of mathematics initiated by Brouwer in 1907.
Future contingents The Aristotelian sea-battle sentence has been referred to and reproduced on sev � ukasiewicz eral occasions throughout the entire XXth century. The first was L analysing the sentence “I shall be in Warsaw at noon on 21 December of the next year.” The Polish philosopher argues that at the moment of the utterance this sen tence is neither true nor false, since otherwise would get fatalist conclusions about necessity or impossibility of the contingent future events. In the seminal paper � ukasiewicz considers the three values: 0, 1 and 2. ojwarto´sciowej”1 L “O logice tr´ While 0 and 1 are the classical values of the falsity and truth, the additional value 2 is a value of future contingent sentences and is interpreted as “possibility” or � ukasiewicz changed the notation, putting 1/2 instead of “indeterminacy”. Soon, L 2, and suggested that the natural “ordering” of the three values had reflected his philosophical intuitions concerning prepositional connectives better. And, slightly later, in 1938, when Gonseth urged to remark incompatibility of this way of inter � ukasiewicz preting the third value with other principles of the three-valued logic, L also quitted his “possibilistic” explanation of the intermediary logical value. Gon � ukasiewicz interpretation neglects the seth’s argument discovers that the original L mutual dependence of “possible” propositions and it runs as follows: consider two propositions α and ¬α. Whenever α is undetermined, so is ¬α and then, the con junction α ∧ ¬α is undetermined. This, however, contradicts the intuition since, independently of α’s content, α ∧ ¬α is false. The approach referring to future contingents has been discussed by further — we shall come back again to the problem, as soon as we have at hand all necessary knowledge concerning the propositional connectives. 1L � ukasiewicz
[1920].
16
Grzegorz Malinowski
Paradoxes The famous 1907 Russell’s re-discovery of the Liar paradox troubled the scientific community. The kernel of the semantic paradox, known already in antiquity, is the self-reference, which leads to absurd. Thus, e.g. when one says “I am now speaking falsely” yields that what she says is true if, and only if, she speaks falsely. The re-discovery version is set-theoretical. The Russell set “of all sets that are not their own elements”, Z = {x : x ∈ x}, put the Cantor’s set theory into question and inflicted a serious logical problem. Accepting Z in the set theory founded on the classical logic and substituting it for x in the formula we get an inconsistent equivalence Z∈Z≡Z∈ Z.
(∗)
So, is we insist on retaining Z, the sole possibility would be to change the underlying logic. Actually, this attitude was a strong argument in favour of manyvalued logics: the formula (*) ceases to be antinomy even in the simplest, threevalued L � ukasiewicz logic. Still, however, the original version of the Liar paradox inspired Bochvar [1938] and led him to the conception of three-valued logic based on the division of propositions into sensible and senseless, and then “mapping” it into a two-level formal language. A proposition is meaningful if it is either true or false, all other sentences are considered as meaningless or paradoxical. The propositional language of Bochvar logic has two levels, which correspond to the object language and to the metalanguage. The both levels have their own connectives being counterparts of standard connectives. The whole approach has been mainly directed towards solving paradoxes emerging with the classical logic and set theory based on it.
Many-valuedness and probability L � ukasiewicz, still before 1918, invented a theory of logical probability. The dif ferentiating feature of logical probability is that it refers to propositions and not � ukasiewicz [1913]. The conception was based on the assumption that to events, L there is a function P r ranging over the set of propositions of a given standard propositional language, with values from the real interval [0,1] satisfying the con ditions: P r(p ∨ ¬p) = 1, P r(p ∨ q) = P r(p) + P r(q) for p and q mutually exclusive (P r(p ∧ q) = 0) and such that P r(p) = P r(q) for any two logically equivalent p and q. If the logical value v(p) is then identified with the measure of probability P r(p) then for P r(p) = 1/2 we would get /2 ∨ 1/2 = P r(p ∨ ¬p) = 1 and 1/2 ∨ 1/2 = P r(p ∨ p) = P r(p) = 1/2 .
1
Many-valued Logic and its Philosophy
17
Consequently, logical probability must not be identified with logical values of many-valued logic. The reason is that probabilistic intensionality is incompati ble with logical extensionality. The logical probability has been later considered by several scholars. The con tinuators of the line exerted much effort to create unsuccessfully a many-valued logic within which logical probability could find a satisfactory interpretation, see e.g. Zawirski [1934a; 1934b], Reichenbach [1935]. Many years later, Giles [1975] got satisfactory results concerning relation probability — logical values.2 It may be interesting to learn that the early, somewhat naive, probabilistic approach bore the first intuition of non-classical logical values. L � ukasiewicz [1913] classified as undefinite the propositions with free nominal variables ranging over finite domains. He assigned to them fractions indicating the proportions between the number of actual variable values verifying a proposition and the number of all possible values of that variable. The “logical” values thus introduced are relative: they depend on the set of individuals actually evaluated. So, for example, the value of the proposition ‘x2 − 1 = 0’ amounts to 1/2 in the set {−1, 0} and to 2/3 in the set {−1, 0, 1}. Obviously enough, infinite sets of individuals are not admitted � ukasiewicz’s suggestion cannot be seriously taken within and this implies that L the theory of probability. 2
THE THREE-VALUED L � UKASIEWICZ LOGIC
The actual introduction of a third logical value next to truth and falsity, was � ukasiewicz, a co-originator of the preceded by thorough philosophical studies. L Lvov-Warsaw philosophical school,3 was concerned with the problems of induction � ukasiewicz and the theory of probability. Especially, while dealing with the latter L [1913] extricated himself from the “embarrassing” principle of contradiction. Still more direct influence on L � ukasiewicz’s thinking had the discourse in the Lvov-Warsaw school about freedom and creativity. Kotarbi´ nski [1913] suggested the need of revising the two-valued logic that seemed to interfere with the free � ukasiewicz, a fierce follower of indeterminism, finally dom of human thinking. L introduced the third logical value to be assigned to non-determined propositions; specifically, to propositions describing casual future events, i.e. future contingents. The entirely organized system, following the scheme of CP C, of propositional logic had as its aim to solve, among others, several questions concerning modality and paradoxes of set-theory.
The third logical value The first remarks about the three-valued propositional calculus can be found in the Farewell Lecture given in the Assembly Hall of Warsaw University on the 2 Giles considered subjective probability and translated its degrees into logical values of the � ukasiewicz logic in a fairly sophisticated way. infinite L 3 See Wole´ nski [1989].
18
Grzegorz Malinowski
7th March, 1918. Next came the paper “O logice tr´ ojwarto´sciowej” [�Lukasiewicz, 1920]. It brings an outline of the negation-implication version of the propositional calculus, whose semantics is based on three values: 0, 1 and, additionally 1/2 .4 At � ukasiewicz interpreted the third logical value 1/2 as “possibility” or the early stage L “indeterminacy”. Following intuitions of these concepts, he extended the classical interpretation of negation and implication in the following tables:5 α 0 1 /2 1
¬α 1 1 /2 0
→ 0 1 /2 1
0 1 1 /2 0
1
/2 1 1 1 /2
1 1 1 1
The other connectives of disjunction, conjunction and equivalence were (later) introduced through the sequence of the following definitions: α ∨ β =df (α → β) → β α ∧ β =df ¬(¬α ∨ ¬β) α ≡ β =df (α → β) ∧ (β → α). Their tables are as follows: ∨ 0 1 /2 1
0 0 1 /2 1
1
/2 /2 1 /2 1 1
≡ 0 1 /2 1
∧ 0 1 /2 1
1 1 1 1 0 1 1 /2 0
1
/2 /2 1 1 /2 1
0 0 0 0
1
/2 0 1 /2 1 /2
1 0 1 /2 1
1 0 1 /2 1
A valuation v in the three-valued logic is any function from the set of formu las F or to {0, 1/2 , 1}, v : F or → {0, 1/2 , 1}, compatible with the above tables. A tautology is a formula which under any v takes on the designated value 1. � ukasiewicz differs from TAUT. The set L � 3 of tautologies of three-valued logic of L So, for instance, neither the law of the excluded middle, nor the principle of con � 3 . To see this, it suffices to assign 1/2 for p: any such valuation also tradiction is in L 1 associates /2 with EM and CP . The thorough-going refutation of these two laws was intended, in L � ukasiewicz’s opinion, to codify the principles of indeterminism. 4 In
L � ukasiewicz [1920] the notation is different: 2 appears instead of 1/2 . truth-tables of binary connectives ∗ are viewed as follows: the value of α is placed in the first vertical line, the value of β in the first horizontal line and the value of α ∗ β at the intersection of the two lines. 5 The
Many-valued Logic and its Philosophy
19
Another property of new semantics is that some classically inconsistent formulas � 3 . One of such formulas: are no more contradictory in L p ≡ ¬p,
(∗)
is connected with the Russell paradox since the equivalence Z∈Z≡Z∈ Z, is a substitution of (*). Accordingly, Russell paradox ceases to be antinomy in L � 3: putting 1/2 for p makes the formula (*) true and therefore it is non-contradictory
Modality, axiomatization and interpretation Another L � ukasiewicz’s intention was to formalize the modal functors: of possibil ity M and necessity L. L � ukasiewicz postulated preservation of the consistency of middle ages’ intuitive theorems on modal propositions. Being aware of impossibil ity of expressing these functors in the truth-functional classical logic L � ukasiewicz took the three-valued logic as base. In 1921 Tarski produced simple definitions, � ukasiewicz’s using negation and implication, of the two connectives meeting the L requirements:6 x 0 1 /2 1
Mx 0 1 1
x 0 1 /2 1
Lx 0 0
1
M α =df ¬α → α Lα =df ¬M ¬α = ¬(α → ¬α)
Using M, L and other L � ukasiewicz connectives we get third modal connective “it is contingent that”or, “it is modally indifferent”, distinguishing the intermediate logical value α 0 1 /2 1
Iα 0 1 0
Iα = M α ∧ ¬Lα
Applying I allows the formulation within L � 3 , of counterparts of the law of the excluded middle and the principle of contradiction: p ∨ Ip ∨ ¬p ¬(p ∧ ¬Ip ∧ ¬p) 6 See
L � ukasiewicz [1930].
20
Grzegorz Malinowski
rendering altogether that L � ukasiewicz’s logic is three-valued. In spite of the promising combination of trivalence and modality the full elabo ration of modal logic on the basis of the three-valued logic never succeeded (with the mere exception of algebraic constructions of Moisil — see Section 6), which was the result of the further L � ukasiewicz’s investigations on modal sentences (see L � ukasiewicz [1930]). Many years after L � ukasiewicz comes back to the idea of construction of pluri-valued modal system and he exhibits a four-valued logic of possibility and necessity, L � ukasiewicz [1953]. L � 3 through the law of excluded fourth and the extended contradiction principle, expresses its three-valuedness. However, it is limited since not all connectives de scribed by {0, 1/2 , 1}-tables are definable through formulas. One important example is the constant connective T , such that T x = 1/2 for any x ∈ {0, 1/2 , 1}. The axiomatization of L � 3 due to Wajsberg [1931] is the first known axioma tization of a system of many-valued logic. Accepting the rules M P and SU B Wajsberg axiom system for (¬, →)-version of L � ukasiewicz’s three-valued proposi tional calculus is as follows: W1. W2. W3. W4.
p → (q → p) (p → q) → ((q → r) → (p → r)) (¬p → ¬q) → (q → p) ((p → ¬p) → p) → p.
� ukasiewicz con The result obviously applies to the whole L � 3 since the other L nectives are definable using those of negation and implication. S�lupecki [1936] enriched the set of primitives by T and adding to W1–W4: W5. W6.
T p → ¬T p ¬T p → T p
got an axiom system for the functionally complete three-valued logic, compare Section 4.
An intuitive interpretation In view of existing difficulties, see Section 1, S�lupecki [1964] undertook another � ukasiewicz’s logic. S�lupecki points out a definite attempt to interpret intuitively L language to describe the property of events determination in three-valued man � ukasiewicz’s truth-tables. The language has a set S comprising ner reconciling L propositions about events, which contain simple (atomic) propositions and com pound ones formed by means of disjunction (∨), conjunction (∧) and negation (¬) connectives. S�lupecki supposes the set of events Z described by propositions of S to be closed under the operations of union (∪), meet (or, intersection) (∩) and complementation (−) and, furthermore, the structure Z = (Z, ∪, ∩, −) to be a Boolean algebra. There is a causality relation → on Z (“f1 → f2 ” reads: the event f1 is a cause of the event f2 ”) providing the assumption that
Many-valued Logic and its Philosophy
(P1) (P2) (P3) (P4)
21
f → f1 ∪ f2 iff f → f1 or f → f2 .
f1 and f → f2 . f → f1 ∩ f2 iff f → If f → f1 for some f , then f + → −f1 for no f + .
f .
If f1 → f , then f1 ∩ f2 →
for any f, f1 , f2 ∈ Z. For the purpose of defining the property of determination, he then singles out a set of past and present events hereafter denoted by symbols: g, g1 , g2 . . ., and puts D(f ) D(f )
= df = df
there is a g ∈ Z such that g →
f ,
not D(f ) and not D(−f )
The intended meaning of D(f ) is that f is (at the present moment)determined, and D(f ) that f is (at the present moment) not determined . The relation ∗ between propositions in S and events in Z of describability (“p∗f ” reads: p describes (event) f ) has to satisfy the conditions: p ∨ p1 ∗ f ∪ f1 whenever p ∗ f and p1 ∗ f1 p ∧ p1 ∗ f ∩ f1 whenever p ∗ f and p1 ∗ f1 when p ∗ f, then ¬p ∗ −f .
(∗)
for any p, p1 ∈ S. In the end, S�lupecki defines the three properties 1(α), 0(α) and 1 /2 (α) : 1(α) = p is true, 0(α) = α is false, 1/2 (α) = α has the “third” logical value, as follows: (DT)
if α ∗ f, then {1(α) iff D(f )} if α ∗ f, then {0(α) iff D(−f )} if α ∗ f, then {1/2 (α) iff D(f )}.
Using (P1)–(P4) and (∗), it is easy to check that for x ∈ {0, 1/2 , 1} x(p ∨ q) = x(p) ∨ x(q)
x(p ∧ q) = x(p) ∧ (q)
x(¬p) = ¬x(p),
where ∨, ∧ and ¬ appearing on the right-hand side are the connectives of the three-valued L � ukasiewicz’s logic. Thus, (DT) to some extent justifies the L � ukasie wicz interpretation of logical values with reference to the property of determina tion. S�lupecki’s interpretation omits the implication connective. Admittedly, S�lupecki extends it onto the language with modal connectives M and L and in thus enriched � ukasiewicz is definable. However, the interpretation language the implication of L of the implication obtained is fairly unintuitive. On the other hand, more profound analysis of the whole construction reveals that the assumption concerning Z has to be weakened: Nowak [1988] proved the formal correctness of the interpretation exclusively when Z is de Morgan lattice and not a Boolean algebra. This result shows that the three-valued logic can thus be interpreted as a set of propositions
22
Grzegorz Malinowski
describing events which form a non-classical algebra. (DT) implies then that the � ukasiewicz, 1/2 , is assigned to propositions concerning non-boolean, third value of L undetermined events. Some time later, in 1922, L � ukasiewicz extended his three-valued construction onto further sets of values and defined important family of finite and infite valued logics, see Section 6.
3
THREE-VALUED LOGICS OF KLEENE AND BOCHVAR
Kleene [1938; 1952] is the author of two systems of propositional and predicate logic motivated by indeterminacy of some propositions at a certain stage of investi gation. Inspired by the studies of the foundations of mathematics and the theory of recursion Kleene aimed at getting tools that render the analysis of partially defined predicates possible. To be aware of a necessity of such logic(s) let us consider a simple example of such a predicate, the mathematical property P defined by the equivalence P (x)
1 ≤ 1/x ≤ 2,
if and only if
Where x is a variable ranging over the set of real numbers. It is apparent that due to the properties of division for x = 0 the propositional function P (x) is undetermined. More precisely, we then have that if 1 /2 ≤ a ≤ 1
true undetermined if a = 0
Proposition P (a) is false otherwise. The starting point of Kleene’s [1938] construction consists in considering also the propositions whose logical value of truth (t) or falsity (f) is undefined, unde termined by means of accessible algorithms, or not essential for actual considera tion. The third logical value of undefiniteness (u) is reserved for this category of propositions. Kleene’s counterparts of the standard connectives are defined by the following tables: α f u t
¬α t u f ∧ f u t
→ f u t f f f f
u f u u
f t u f t f u t
u t u u
∨ f u t
t t t t ≡ f u t
f t u f
f f u t u u u u
u u u t t f u t
t t t t
Many-valued Logic and its Philosophy
23
One may easily notice that as in L � ukasiewicz logic the connectives’ behaviour towards the classical logical values t and f remains unchanged. However, now also mutual definability of α → β and ¬α ∨ β is saved. Kleene takes t as the only distinguished value and, in consequence, obtains that no formula is a tautology — it follows from the fact that any valuation which assigns u to every propositional variable also assigns u to any formula. It is striking that so “conservative” extension of the two-valued logic rejects all classical tautologies, even such as p ∨ ¬p and p → p. An accurate and compatible interpretation of Kleene’s connectives was given by K¨ orner [1966]. K¨ orner defined the notion of an inexact class of a given non-empty domain A generated by a partial definition D(P ) of a property P of elements of A as a three-valued “characteristic function” XP : A → {−1, 0, +1}: −1 when P (a) according to D(P ) is false
0 when P (a) is D(P )-undecidable
XP (a) = +1 when P (a) according to D(P ) is true. Any family of inexact classes of a given domain A is a de Morgan lattice, the algebraic operations ∪, ∩ and −: (X ∪ Y )(a) = max{X(a), Y (a)} (X ∩ Y )(a) = min{X(a), Y (a)} (−X)(a) = −X(a). being counterparts of the Kleene connectives. K¨orner’s ideas have been recently revitalized in the rough sets theory of Pawlak [1991] and the approximation logic based on it, see e.g. Rasiowa [1991]. In 1952 in his monograph Introduction to metamathematics Kleene refers to the connectives of his 1938 logic as strong and introduces another set of weak connectives: retaining the negation and equivalence he defines the three others by the tables → f u t
f t u f
u u u u
t t u t
∨ f u t
f f u t
u u u u
t t u t
∧ f u t
f f u f
u u u u
t f u t
The novel truth-tables are to describe the employment of logical connectives in respect of those arithmetical propositional functions whose decidability depends on the effective recursive procedures. They are constituted according to the rule of saying that any single appearance of u results in the whole context taking u. The original arithmetic motivation states that indeterminacy occurring at any stage of computation makes the entire procedure undetermined.
24
Grzegorz Malinowski
Bochvar As we alredy mentioned, Bochvar [1938] three-valued logic has been directed to wards solving paradoxes emerging with the classical logic and set theory based on it. The propositional language of Bochvar logic has two levels, internal and exter nal, which correspond to the object language and to metalanguage. The both levels have their own connectives: the counterparts of negation, implication, disjunction, conjunction and equivalence. The two planes of Bochvar construction correspond to Kleene weak logic (internal) and to classical logic (external), respectively. The internal connectives are conservative generalizations of the classical ones and will be denoted here as ¬, →, ∨, ∧ and ≡. The external connectives express the rela tions between logical values of propositions and incorporate the expressions “... is true” and “... is false”. They are here marked as starred connectives and understand in the following way: external external external external external
negation: implication: disjunction: conjunction: equivalence:
¬∗ α α →∗ β α ∨∗ β α ∧∗ β α ≡∗ β
‘α is false’ ‘if α is true then β is true’ ‘α is true or β is true’ ‘α is true and β is true’ ‘α is true iff β is true’.
The truth tables of internal connectives have been compiled according to the rule which is a rejoinder of the Kleene’s principle: “every compound proposition including at least one meaningless component is meaningless, in other cases its value is determined classically”. One may then easily conclude that the internal Bochvar connectives coincide with the weak connectives of Kleene. Therefore, we will adopt the previous notation for logical values with u being now the value “meaningless” and will refer the Reader to the last Section. The truth-table de scription of the second collection of Bochvar connectives is the following: α f u t
¬∗ α t t f ∧∗ f u t
→∗ f u t f f f f
u f f f
f t t f
u t t f t f f t
∨∗ f u t
t t t t ≡∗ f u t
f t t f
f f f t u t t f
u f f t
t t t t
t f f t
An important property of Bochvar construction, making it more natural, is a compatibility of two levels. The passage from the internal to external level is assured by the external assertion “α is true”, A∗. Below we show the truth-table of this connective and the intuitively justified definitions of external connectives:
Many-valued Logic and its Philosophy
25
Bochvar takes t as the designated value and thus gets the weak Kleene logic on the internal level. So, Bochvar’s internal logic does not have tautologies. Finally, the external logic is the classical logic: the truth tables of all external connectives ‘identify’ the values u and f, whereas the behaviour of these connectives with regard to f and t is standard.
A logic of nonsense Bochvar idea has been undertaken by several authors, who aimed at construing other systems appropriate for dealing with vagueness or nonsense, the latter some times called nonsense-logic. So, in his monograph “The logic of nonsense” Halld´en [1949] rediscovers Bochvar logic for these purposes. Halld´en adopts three logic values: falsity (f), truth (t) and “meaningless” (u). As the policy accepted for compound propositions and thus the connectives of negation and conjunction is just like the Bochvar’s, the truth tables of these connectives are exactly the same as in Bochvar internal logic.7 The system, however, differs from the latter. First, it has a new one-argument connective + serving to express meaningfulness of propo sitions. Thus if α is meaningless, then +α is false. Otherwise, +α is true. Second, Halld´en distinguishes two logical values u and t. Therefore, a formula is valid if it never takes f. In consequence, the set of valid formulas not containing + coincides with the set of tautologies of CP C. The construction, however, differs from the classical logic by its inference properties. The logic of nonsense restricts heavily rules of inference, among them the rule of Modus Ponens: in general q does not follow from the two premises: p → q and p. To see that it suffices consider a valuation for which p is meaningless and q is false. Under such valuation q is not designated, while the premises as meaningless are both designated. Halld´en provides a readable axiomatization of his logic. To this aim, he intro duces the connectives of implication (→) and equivalence (≡) accepting standard classical definitions and two standard inference rules M P and SU B H1. (¬p → p) → p H2. p → (¬p → q) H3. (p → q) → ((q → r) → (p → r)) H4. +p ≡ +¬p H5. +(p ∧ q) ≡ +p ∧ +q H6. p → +p In the framework, it is also easy to define a dual to + connective putting: −α =df ¬ + α. Thus, as +α corresponds to “α is meaningful”, −α stands for “α is meaningless”. Further elaboration of Halld´en’s approach is made by Aqvist [1962] and Seger berg [1965]. Departing from the problems arising with normative sentences Aqvist � ukasiewicz created the calculus, which may be considered as a minor variant of L three-valued logic, or the fragment of Kleene strong logic. The three primitives 7 Coincidence with Bochvar is striking. However, Halld´ en work is independent and original, compare e.g. Williamson [1994].
26
Grzegorz Malinowski
are: negation (¬), disjunction (∨) and a special connective # . Their tables use the three values: f, u, t (in our notation). The intended meaning of f and t is standard and the only designated is “t”. The tables of negation and disjunction � ukasiewicz threeare much the same, modulo notation, as the truth-tables of L valued connectives. # is defined as follows: #(f ) = #(u) = f and #(t) = t and � ukasiewicz “necessity” operator L. coincides with the L In view of philosophical application of his formal approach Aqvist defines three “characteristic” functors of the system: F α =df #¬α,
Lα =df # ∨ F α,
M α =df ¬Lα,
whose reading is: “α is false” (F α), “α is meaningful” (Lα) and “α is meaningless” (M α). Two attempts of generalization of Bochvar’s approach onto n-valued case (n > 3) are worth mentioning. The first is due to Rescher [1975], who, rather hastily, transplanted the idea onto the finite and the infinite case. The second, by Finn and Grigolia [1980], stemmed from algebraic description of the Bochvar threevalued logic. Finn and Grigolia employed the algebraic counterparts of Rosser and Turquette’s j — operators as “graded” assertions. 4
LOGIC ALGEBRAS, MATRICES AND STRUCTURALITY
The methodology of propositional calculi and algebraic approach to classical and non-classical logics are highly efficient tools of logical investigation of several prob lems concerning the many-valuedness; cf. [W´ojcicki, 1988; Rasiowa, 1974] and more recent books by Czelakowski [2001] and Dunn and Hardegree [2001]. Our short presentation of the is limited to concepts used further in the Chapter.
Logic algebras A propositional language is viewed as an algebra of formulae L = (F or, F1 , . . . , Fm ), freely generated by the sets of propositional variables V ar = {p, q, r, . . .} and the finitary operations F1 , . . . , Fm on For playing the role of connectives. Accordingly, any interpretation structure A for L is an algebra A = (A, f1 , . . . , fm ). similar to it.8 Furthermore, rightly assumed property of the language’s free gen eration, implies that any mapping s : V ar → A, uniquely extends to the homo morphism hs : L → A, hs ∈ Hom(L, A). 8 See
[Suszko, 1957].
Many-valued Logic and its Philosophy
27
The most employed is the standard language of the classical logic Lk = (F or, ¬, →, ∨, ∧, ≡), with the connectives of negation, implication, disjunction, conjunction and equiv alence. In turn, the two-element algebra of the classical logic has the form A2 = ({0, 1}, ¬, →, ∨, ∧, ≡), here the same symbols ¬, →, ∨, ∧, ≡ as for connectives denote corresponding op erations on the set {0, 1} of “two values” 0 and 1 representing falsity and truth, respectively. A logic algebra is functionally complete when all finitary operations on its uni verse are definable by use of its original operations. That functional completeness is a property of the classical logic was proved by Post [1921]. In terminology just adopted we may equivalently say that the algebra A2 is functionally complete. Where n ≥ 2 is a given natural number, let us put En = {1, 2, . . . , n} and by Un denote any algebra of the form: Un = (En , f1 , . . . , fm ), f1 , . . . , fm being finitary operations on En . Un will be called functionally complete if every finitary mapping f : Enk → En (k ≥ 0, k finite)9 can be represented as a composition of the operations f1 , . . . , fm . Post [1921] reduced the complexity of the problem to small number of connec tives. If we require that for some finite m any k-argument operation on En , where k ≤ m, is definable then Un is functionally complete for m variables. That logical property warrants definability of all at most m-argument connectives. [Post (1921)]. If Un is functionally complete for m variables, where m ≥ 2, then is also functionally complete for m+1 variables and hence also functionally complete. Note that the last theorem reduces the functional completeness of A2 to the definability of all 4 unary and 16 binary connectives. In turn, it is easy to show that the connectives of the standard language define all twenty. Post himself provided several other small collections to do the same and there is also known a “minimalist” reduction of classical connectives to a single one, the so-called Sheffer’s stroke. Getting the functional completeness of n element algebras was another motivation for building many-valued logic. Post was the first to give such an algebra generating two functions: the one-argument cyclic rotation (negation) and the two-argument maximum function (disjunction). In the present notation they look like 1 if x = n x ∨ y = max(x, y). ¬n x = i + 1 if x = i = n 9 The
0-ary operations are constants, i.e. elements of En .
28
Grzegorz Malinowski
Every Post algebra Pn = (En , ¬n , ∨) is functionally complete, Post (1921). Obviously, P2 = (E2 , ¬2 , ∨) is the (¬, ∨) reduct of the algebra A2 . The functional completeness of the n-valued logic algebras is a matter of con sequence since the propositional logics founded on such algebras are logics of all possible extensional n-valued connectives (truth functional when n = 2) and, for every n, they, in a sense, are unique. Since functional completeness is a scarcely frequent property several criteria have been formulated which might help to de termine its presence or not. [S�lupecki (1939a)]. An n-valued algebra Un (n ≥ 0, n finite) is functionally com plete if and only if in Un there are definable: (i) all one-argument operations on En (ii) at least one two-argument operation f (x, y) whose range consists of all values i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. [Picard (1935)]. Un is functionally complete whenever the functions H, R, S in Section 5 are definable in it. Using S�lupecki’s criterion we may easily establish the functional incomplete ness of all already considered three-valued logics excepting the Post logic. For � ukasiewicz three-valued logic L � 3 it suffices to remark that the one-argument the L constant function T : T x = 1/2 for any x ∈ {0,1/2 , 1} is not definable in terms of the basic connectives. To check that consider any compound function of oneargument and assume that x ∈ {0, 1}, note that due to the tables of the primitive connectives the output value must not be equal 1/2 . On the other hand the same � 3 leads to the func criterion implies that adding T to the stock of functions of L tionally complete logic algebra, S�lupecki [1936]. In the sequel we shall also deal with some known infinite logical constructions. Anticipating possible questions we inform that infinite logic algebras in principle are functionally incomplete. This is due to the fact that the set of possible functions of any algebra of this kind is uncountably infinite, while using a finite number of original operations one may define at most a countable family of functions.
Matrices The classical semantics of truth-valuations distinguishes 1, i.e. the logical value of truth, which corresponds to a specified kind of propositions. In a more general framework, interpretation structures equipped with a distinguished subset of ele ments corresponding to propositions of a specified kind are necessary. These are logical matrices. A pair
Many-valued Logic and its Philosophy
29
M = (A, D), with A being an algebra similar to a language L and D ⊆ A, a subset of A, will be thus referred to as a matrix for L. Elements of D will be called designated (or, distinguished ) elements of M . The set of formulae which take designated values only: E(M ) = {α ∈ F or : hα ∈ D for any h ∈ Hom(L, A)} is called the content of M . The relation |=M ⊆ 2F or × F or is said to be a matrix consequence of M provided that for any X ⊆ F or, α ∈ F or X |=M α if and only if for every h ∈ Hom(L, A)(hα ∈ D whenever hX ⊆ D). The content of a matrix is a counterpart of the set of tautologies and E(M ) = {α : ∅ |=M α}. The entailment |=M is a natural generalization of the classical consequence. In the terminology just adopted, the classical matrix has the form M2 = ({0, 1}, ¬, →, ∨, ∧, ≡, {1}), and the classical consequence relation is characterized as follows: X |=2 α if and only if for every h ∈ Hom(L, A2 ) (hα = 1 if hX ⊆ {1}). Notice that the set of tautologies is the content of M2 and it consists of formulas, which are “consequences” of the empty set, T AU T = E(M2 ) = {α : ∅ |=2 α}. The so-called deduction theorem for the classical logic expressed in terms of |=2 says now that for any set of formulas X and α, β ∈ F or, (ded2 )
X, α |=2 β if and only if X |=2 α → β.
To see how the framework of matrices works for three-valued logic of L � ukasiewicz � 3: let us consider the matrix of L M3 = ({0, 1/2 , 1}, ¬, →, ∨, ∧, ≡, {1}), with the connectives set by the tables in Section 2. The following deduction theorem (ded3 )
X, α |=3 β if and only if X |=3 α → (α → β),
expresses the mutual relation between the consequence and the implication.The left to right direction is essential. To see why the antecedent appears twice it suffices to consider a valuation h, sending all formulas from X into {1} and such that hα = 1/2 , hβ = 0. Accordingly, the classical counterpart of (ded3 ), (ded2 )
X, α |=3 β if and only if X |=3 α → β,
for exactly the same reasons fails.
30
Grzegorz Malinowski
Structural consequence and logics With every |=M there may be uniquely associated an operation CnM : 2For → 2For such that α ∈ CnM (X) if and only if X |=M α. Wherein K is a class (a set) of matrices for a given language L, the relation |=K is to be identified with the set-theoretical meet of {|=M : M ∈ K}. Consequently, CnK = {CnM : M ∈ K} i.e. for any X ⊆ For CnK (X) = {CnM (X) : M ∈ K}. CnM and CnK are special examples of the consequence operations considered in the general theory of deductive systems originated with Tarski (1936). A mapping C : 2For → 2For will be referred to as a consequence operation of the language L if and only if any X, Y ⊆ For (T0) X ⊆ C(X) (T1) C(C(X)) = C(X) (T2) C(X) ⊆ C(Y ) whenever X ⊆ Y . If, moreover, for any substitution e ∈ End(L) (S)
eC(X) ⊆ C(eX),
we shall say that C is structural. It is easy to prove that each matrix consequence operation CnM is structural. Conversely, each structural consequence C of L and any set of formulas X deter mine together a matrix LX = (L, C(X)) called a Lindenbaum matrix. The class of all Lindenbaum matrices of a given consequence C of L, LC = {(L, C(X)) : X ⊆ For} will be referred to as Lindenbaum bundle. Since the substitutions (i.e. endomor phisms) of the language L take the role of valuations one may easily show that any structural consequence operation C is uniquely determined by its Lindenbaum bundle: C = CnLC and ultimately that [W´ ojcicki (1970)] For every structural consequence operation there is a class K of matrices such that C = CnK . An arbitrary consequence C may be conceived as a rule composed of all pairs (X, α) where α ∈ C(X). Rules of the form (∅, α) are called axiomatic and their consequents axioms. A rule R is structural if (X, α) ∈ R implies (eX, eα) ∈ R, any substitution e ∈ End(L). Structural rules may be generated by some “generic”
Many-valued Logic and its Philosophy
31
pairs (X, α), one in particular. Modus Ponens (the Detachment Rule), M P , is a structural rule determined by the single pair: {p → q, p}/q and is represented through the following schema: ϕ → ψ, ϕ / ψ. Let X be a set of formulas and R a set of rules of inference. Then, X is R-closed iff for every α ∈ F or, Y ⊆ X, (Y, α) ∈ R implies α ∈ X. The operation CnR defined for every X ⊆ For by CnR (X) = {Y ⊆ For : X ⊆ Y, Y being R-closed} proves to be a consequence (structural if R is structural). Every R such that C = CnR is referred to as a base of C. In the case when R splits into the set of axiomatic rules RA and non-axiomatic rules RI i.e. R = RA ∪ RI , we may, putting A = {α : (∅, α) ∈ RA }, represent CnR as Cn(A, RI ) where Cn(A, RI ) (X) =
{Y : A ∪ X ⊆ Y and Y is RI -closed}.
A standard way of formalization of propositional logics (L, C) with implication consists in defining C as Cn(A, M P ) or Cn(A, {SU B, M P }) , where SU B is the sub stitution rule, SU B = {ϕ/eϕ : e ∈ End(L)}. In standard cases the implication is supposed to satisfy the Deduction Theorem: β ∈ C(X, α) if and only if α → β ∈ C(X)
(Ded)
Theory of logical matrices is a theory of models of propositional calculi and, from certain point of view, may be treated as a fragment of the algebraic systems theory, see Czelakowski [2001]. 5
POST LOGICS
As an outcome of the research on the classical logic Post [1920; 1921] construed a family of finite-valued propositional systems. The inspirations comprised Principia Mathematica of Whitehead and Russell (1910), the method of truth tables and Post’s own results concerning functional completeness of the classical logic.
Post n-element algebras Following Principia Mathematica Post takes negation (¬) and disjunction (∨) as primitives. For any natural n ≥ 2 a linearly ordered set Pn = {t1 , t2 , . . . , tn }, tn < tj iff i < j, is the set of values. Finally, the operations corresponding to connectives are: unary rotation (or cyclic negation) ¬ and binary disjunction ∨ defined by
32
Grzegorz Malinowski
¬ti =
ti+1 ti
if i = n if i = n
ti ∨ tj = timax {i,j} .
For a given n ≥ 2, these equations define n-element tables of negation and dis junction. Thus, e.g. for n = 5 tables are following:
x t1 t2 t3 t4 t5
¬x t2 t3 t4 t5 t1
∨ t1 t2 t3 t4 t5
t1 t1 t2 t3 t4 t5
t2 t2 t2 t3 t4 t5
t3 t3 t3 t3 t4 t5
t4 t4 t4 t4 t4 t5
t5 t5 t5 t5 t5 t5
It is easy to see that for n = 2 Post logic coincides with the negation-disjunction version of the classical logic: when P2 = {t1 , t2 } is identified with {0, 1}, the Post negation and disjunction are isomorphic variants of the classical connectives.10 The relation to CP C breaks for n > 2. In all these case the table of negation is not compatible with its classical counterpart. To see this remark that due to the disjunction t1 always corresponds to 0 and tn to 1. And, even if ¬tn = t1 , ¬t1 equals t2 and is not tn . Accordingly, the n-valued Post algebra Pn = ({t1 , t2 , . . . , tn }, ¬, ∨) either coincides with the negation-disjunction algebra of CP C(n = 2), or the latter algebra is not a subalgebra of it (n > 2). Post considers the “biggest” value tn as distinguished. Accordingly, among the laws of Post n-valued logics (n > 2) the counterparts of some significant tautologies of the classical logic like the n-valued law of the excluded middle: p ∨ ¬p ∨ ¬¬p ∨ . . . ¬¬ . . . ¬p. (n−1)times
appear. Contrary to that, an application of classical definitional patters of other standard connectives like conjunction, implication and equivalence leads to very strange results. Thus e.g. the definition of conjunction using de Morgan law, α ∧ β = ¬(¬α ∨ ¬β), results in getting the non-associative connective ∧. The source of these unexpected properties is, manifestly, the rotate character of Post negation. 10 It is worth to recall that this set of connectives permits to define all other classical connectives and thus warrants functional completeness of underlying algebra and logic.
Many-valued Logic and its Philosophy
33
The most important property of Post algebras is their functional completeness: by means of the two primitive functions, every finite-argument function on Pn can be defined. In particular, then, also the constant functions and hence the “logical values” t1 , t2 , . . . , tn . Getting functional completeness was one of the prime aims of the author.11
Semantic interpretation The construction, apparently algebraic, was eventually provided with an interest ing semantic interpretation. Post suggests to see the elements of Pn as objects corresponding to (n − 1)-tuples P = (p1 , p2 , . . . , pn−1 ) of ordinary two-valued propositions p1 , p2 , . . . , pn−1 subject to the condition that true propositions are listed before the false. Next, (¬) ¬P if formed by replacing the first false element by its denial, but if there is no false element in P , then all are to be denied, in which case ¬P is a sequence of false propositions. (∨) When P = (p1 , p2 , . . . , pn−1 ) and Q = (q1 , q2 , . . . , qn−1 ), then P ∨ Q = (p1 ∨ q1 , p2 ∨ q2 , . . . , pn−1 ∨ qn−1 ). The mapping i : E n−1 → Pn , of the set of tuples E n−1 onto Pn : i(P ) = ti iff P contains exactly (i − 1) true propositions establishes an isomorphism between (E n−1 , ∨, ¬) and the Post algebra Pn . The ex emplary universe E 4 corresponding to the case of five-valued Post logic, considered before, consists of the following 4-tuples: (0, 0, 0, 0) (1, 0, 0, 0) (1, 1, 0, 0) (1, 1, 1, 0) (1, 1, 1, 1)
t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 .
This interpretation of logic values and its algebra shows, among others, that the values in different Post logics should be understood differently. Post [1921] also defined a family of purely implicative n−valued logics. The family is fairly extensive and it covers implications designed by other authors, e.g. L � ukasiewicz and G¨ odel. The novelty of this proposal was that Post designated many logical values at a time. That possibility, which seems quite natural, was ignored by other originators of many-valued logics. 11 Compare
[Post, 1921] in Ssection 4.
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Grzegorz Malinowski
The problem of axiomatization The original (¬, ∨) systems of Post’s logic are not axiomatized so far. However, the problem of their axiomatizability has been for years a foregone matter; hence S�lupecki [1939b] has constructed the largest possible class of functionally complete finite logics and gave a general method of their axiomatization. From this it evidently follows that also Post logics are axiomatizable albeit the problem of providing axioms for their original version still remains open. S�lupecki matrix Snk (n being a given natural number, 1 ≤ k ≤ n) is of the form: Snk = ({1, 2, . . . , n}, →, R, S, {1, 2, . . . , k}). where → is a binary (implication), and R, S unary operations defined in the fol lowing way: y if 1 ≤ x ≤ k x→y= , 1 if k < x ≤ n x + 1 if 1 ≤ x ≤ n − 1 R(x) = , 1 if x = n
2 if x = 1
1 if x = 2 S(x) = . x if 3 ≤ x ≤ n Functional completeness12 of each of these matrices results from Picard’s criterion: R and S are two of the Picard’s functions, in order to define the third, it suffices to put: 1 if x = 2 Hx = (x → R(x → x)) → Sx for k = 1, then Hx = 2
x if x = Hx = R(x → x) → x
for k > 1,
then
Hx =
1 if x = k k.
x if x =
S�lupecki produced an effective proof of axiomatizability of E(Snk ) (any pair (n, k) as above) giving a long list of axioms formulated in terms of implication and special one-argument connectives defined through the superpositions of R, S, and H. The chief line of approach here is to make capital of the standard character of implication,13 which can be classically axiomatized, using MP (the Detachment � ukasiewicz’s Rule). S�lupecki extends M P onto the whole language, taking the L formula: ((p → q) → r)) → ((r → p) → (s → p)) as the only axiom for implication and provides an inductive, combinatorial completeness proof. 12 A
finite matrix is functionally complete when its algebra has that property.
Section 7.
13 Compare
Many-valued Logic and its Philosophy
35
Algebraic interpretations The history of algebras corresponding to Post logics was quite different and it even established the current notion of n-valued Post logic. First, Rosenbloom [1942] de fined a Post algebra of order n (n ≥ 2) using the Post rotation (¬) and disjunction (∨) and some other auxiliary functions. Then, the concept has undergone several modifications, see Dwinger [1977]. The most important was the lattice-theoretical characterization by Epstein [1960]. Epstein presented Post algebra of order n as a distributive “chain based” lattice with involution and Boolean-valued endomor phisms. The concept thus presented has been very close to the- Moisil’s n-valued L � ukasiewicz algebra — the main difference is that Post algebras are additionally equipped with the set of constants. The history turned when Rousseau (1969) ob served that any Post algebra of order n is a pseudo-Boolean, or Heyting, algebra (see [Rasiowa, 1974]). Consequently, Rousseau proposed a definition of Post alge bra using a new binary operation of relative pseudo-complement →, a counterpart of an implication. Thus, a Post algebra of order n (n ≥ 2) is a structure (P, 1, →, ∪, ∩, ¬, D1 , D2 , ..., Dn−1 , e0 , e1 , ..., en−1 ) where 1, e0 , e1 , ..., en−1 are zero-argument operations (constants), ¬, D1 , D2 , ..., Dn−1 are one-argument operations and ∪, ∩ are two-argument operations, such that (p0 ) (P, 1, →, ∪, ∩, ¬) is a pseudo-Boolean algebra, see Rasiowa [1974], and for x, y ∈ P , the following equations hold: (p1 ) (p2 ) (p3 ) (p4 ) (p5 ) (p6 ) (p7 ) (p8 )
Dk (x ∪ y) = Dk (x) ∪ Dk (y) Dk (x ∩ y) = Dk (x) ∩ Dk (y) Dk (x → y) = (D1 (x) → D1 (y)) ∩ (D2 (x) → D2 (y)) ∩ ... ∩ (Dk (x) → Dk (y)) Dk (¬x) = ¬D1 (x) Dk (Dj (x)) = Dj (x) Dk (ej ) = 1 if k ≤ j and Dk (ej ) = ¬1 if k > j x = (D1 (x) ∩ e1 ) ∪ (D2 (x) ∩ e2 ) ∪ ... ∪ (Dn−1 (x) ∩ en−1 ) D1 (x) ∪ ¬D1 (x) = 1.
Among them, (p7 ) is of a special importance since it assures uniform monotonic representation of elements of Post algebra of order n in terms of constants and Boolean elements. This, in other terms, means that the algebra based on the chain e0 , e1 , ..., en−1 and that every Post algebra is determined by its Boolean part. The property apparently reflects the original Post’s interpretation of his n logical values. Intense investigation of L � ukasiewicz and Post algebras were motivated by their actual and expected applications, see Section 16. It is worth of mentioning that the redefinition of Post algebras in terms of pseudo-Boolean chain based lattices led to a new definition of n-valued Post logics and their generalization onto infinite cases.
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Grzegorz Malinowski
6 L � UKASIEWICZ LOGICS In 1922 L � ukasiewicz generalized his three-valued logic and defined the family of � ukasiewicz n-valued matrix many-valued logics, both finite and infinite-valued.14 L has the form Mn = (Ln , ¬, →, ∨, ∧, ≡, {1}), where {0, 1/n−1 , 2/n−1 , . . . , 1} {s/w : 0 ≤ s ≤ w, s, w ∈ N and w = 0} Ln = [0, 1]
if n ∈ N, n ≥ 2 if n = ℵ0 if n = ℵ1 .
and the functions are defined on Ln as follows: ¬x = 1 − x x → y = min(1, 1 − x + y) (ii) x ∨ y = (x → y) → y = max(x, y)
x ∧ y = ¬(¬x ∨ ¬y) = min(x, y)
x ≡ y = (x → y) ∧ (y → x) = 1 − |x − y|. (i)
The introduction of new many-valued logics was not supported by any separate argumentation. L � ukasiewicz merely underlined, that the generalization was correct since for n = 3 one gets exactly the matrix of his 1920 three-valued logic. The � ukasiewicz logics have nice properties, future history will, however, show that L which locate them among the most important logical constructions. First, the L � ukasiewicz matrix M2 coincides with the matrix of the classical logic. � ukasiewicz connectives A2 And, since the set {0, 1} is closed with respect to all L is a subalgebra of any algebra (Ln , ¬, →, ∨, ∧, ≡) and M2 is a submatrix of Mn . � ukasiewicz propositional calculi are included in the Therefore all tautologies of L T AU T : E(Mn ) ⊆ E(M2 ) = T AU T. Next, the relations between the contents of finite matrices are established by the following Lindenbaum condition:15 For finite n, m ∈ N , E(Mn ) ⊆ E(Mm ) iff m − 1 is a divisor of n − 1. The proof of the last property may be based on the “submatrix” properties � ukasiewicz (see above). Using the same of the family of the finite matrices of L argument one may also prove the counterpart of Lindenbaum’s condition. for matrix consequence relations |=n of Mn : For finite n, m ∈ N, |=n ⊆ |=m iff m − 1 is a divisor of n − 1. 14 See 15 See
[�Lukasiewicz, 1970, p. 140].
(�Lukasiewicz and Tarski [1930]).
Many-valued Logic and its Philosophy
37
It may be proved that the infinite L � ukasiewicz matrices have a common content equal to the intersection of the contents of all finite matrices: E(Mℵ0 ) = E(Mℵ1 ) = {E(Mn ) : n ≥ 2, n ∈ N }. L � ukasiewicz n-valued logics L � n are not functionally complete. All what was established for n = 3 applies for each finite n. First, no constant except 0 and 1 is definable in (Ln , ¬, →, ∨, ∧, ≡). Second, adding the constants to the stock of connectives makes this algebra functionally complete. And, since Mn is one generated, either by 1/n−1 or by n−2/n−1 , also adding only one of them do the job as well. McNaughton [1951] proved an ingenious definability criterion, both � ukasiewicz’s logic finite and infinite, which shows the mathematical beauty of L constructions.
Axiomatizability A proof that finite matrices are axiomatizable was given in L � ukasiewicz and Tarski [1930]. However, the problem of formulation of a concrete axiom system fo finite L � ukasiewicz logics for n > 3 remains open till 1952. Rosser and Turquette [1952] are the authors of a general method of axiomatization of n-valued logics with con nectives satisfying the so-called standard conditions. The method can be applied, � n since such connectives are either primitive or definable in among others, to L L � ukasiewicz finite matrices. Hence, for every n an axiomatization of L � ukasiewicz’s n-valued propositional calculus can be obtained. The axiomatization, however, be comes very complicated due to the high generality of the method given by Rosser and Turquette. In [1930] L � ukasiewicz conjectured that his ℵ0 -valued logic was axiomatizable (�Lukasiewicz and Tarski [1930]) and that the axiomatization of the infinite-valued propositional calculus together with M P and SU B was the following: L1. L2. L3. L4. L5.
p → (q → p) (p → q) → ((q → r) → (p → r)) ((p → q) → q) → ((q → p) → p) (¬p → ¬q) → (q → p) ((p → q) → (q → p)) → (q → p).
Due to L � ukasiewicz16 this hypothesis was confirmed by Wajsberg in [1931]. Next comes the reduction of the axiom set: Meredith [1958] and Chang [1958a] independently showed that axiom L5 is dependent on the others. There are two main accessible completeness proofs of L1–L4 (with M P and SU B): based on syntactic methods and linear inequalities by Rose and Rosser [1958], and purely algebraic — by Chang [1959]. Chang’s proof is based on properties of M V algebras, algebraic counterparts � ukasiewicz logic, defined and studied in Chang [1958b].17 of the infinite-valued L 16 L � ukasiewicz 17 MV
[1970, p. 144]; no publication on the topic by Wajsberg exists.
algebras are presented in the sequel.
38
Grzegorz Malinowski
The key role in the approach have additional binary connectives + and ·. The two connectives directly correspond to the main algebraic operations of M V algebras are defined by α + β =df ¬α → β and α · β =df ¬(α → ¬β). Several axiomatizations for finite-valued L � ukasiewicz logics (n > 3) were ob tained by way of extension of the axiom system L1–L4. Grigolia [1977] employs multiplying use of the connectives + and ·. Let kα will be a replacement of the formula α + α + ... + α (k times) and αk a replacement of the formula α · α · ... · α (k times). Given a finite n > 3, Grigolia’s axiom system for L � n consists of the schemes of L1–L4 and Ln 5. Ln 6.
nα → (n − 1)α (n − 1)((¬α)j + (α · (j − 1)α)),
where 1 < j < n − 1 and j does not divide n − 1. Tokarz [1974] extension of L1–L4 is based on the characteristic functions of the set Ln in [0, 1] and the properties of the consequence relation of Mℵ0 . The axiom � ukasiewicz logic, including n = 2 (i.e. CP C), results set for a given n-valued L from L1–L4 by adding a single special “disjunctive” axiom p ∨ ¬p ∨ δn1 (p) ∨ . . . ∨ δnn−2 (p), where, for any k, 1 ≤ k ≤ n − 1, the corresponding algebraic operation δnk (x) is � ukasiewicz the “characteristic function” of the logical value k/n−1 in the infinite L matrix Mℵ0 . Another axiomatization of finite L � ukasiewicz logics, offered by Tuziak (1988), is formulated in the standard propositional language, using the sequences of ascend ing implications defined inductively by: p →0 q = q, p →k+1 q = p → (p →k q). The axiom set for n-valued L � ukasiewicz logic consists of ten formulas taken from the Hilbert-Bernays axiomatization of CP C and the following two “specific” ax ioms: T1.
(p →n q) → (p →n−1 q)
T2.
(p ≡ (p →s−2 ¬p)) →n−1 p for any 2 ≤ s ≤ n − 1 such that s is not a divisor of n − 1.
Algebraic interpretations The first attempts to obtain algebras corresponding to finite L � ukasiewicz logics, due to Moisil, are dated back to the 1940’s.18 Moisil algebras are bounded dis tributive lattices with involution and Boolean-valued endomorphisms. A structure 18 See
Moisil [1972].
Many-valued Logic and its Philosophy
39
(A, ∪, ∩, N, s1 , s2 , ..., sn−1 , 0, 1) is an n-valued L � ukasiewicz algebra19 provided that M1. (A, ∪, ∩) is a distributive lattice with 0 and 1. M2. N is an involution of A, i.e. N N x = x, and N (x ∪ y) = N (x) ∩ N (y), N (x ∩ y) = N (x) ∪ N (y). M3. sk ’s are endomorphisms of (A, ∪, ∩), i.e. for any k ∈ {1, 2, ..., n − 1}: sk (x ∪ y) = sk(x) ∪ sk (y) and sk (x ∩ y) = sk (x) ∩ sk (y), such that (i)
sk (x) ≤ sk+1 (x)
(ii) sk (st (x)) = st (x) (iii) sk (N (x)) = N sn−k (x) (iv) N sk (x) ∪ sk (x) = 1, N sk (x) ∩ sk (x) = 0 (v) If sk (x)) = sk (y) for every k, then x = y. The simplest finite n-valued L � ukasiewicz algebra is the linearly ordered algebra � ukasiewicz matrix of n-valued L (Ln , ∨, ∧, ¬, s1 , s2 , ..., sn−1 , 0, 1), with the one-argument functions s1 , s2 , ..., sn−1 defined by: 0 when 1 ≤ k ≤ n − j − 1
sk (j/n−1 ) = 1 when n − j − 1 < k ≤ n − 1.
The definability of sk functions is warranted by the McNaughton test; the “effec tive” definitions using L � ukasiewicz ¬ and → were given by Sucho´ n [1974]. Since for n ≥ 5, the L � ukasiewicz implication was not definable in n-valued Moisil algebras, Cignoli [1980] enlarged the set of basic operations with additional binary operators satisfying some simple equations. The resulting structures, called proper n-valued L � ukasiewicz algebras, proved to be real counterparts of L � ukasiewicz finite-valued logics, see Cignoli [1982]. In view of getting algebraic completeness proof of the infinite-valued L � ukasiewicz logic Chang [1958b] introduced the concept of M V algebra. An algebra A = (A, +, ·, −, 0, 1), where + and · are binary operations, − is a unary operation, 0 = 1, and ∪ and ∩ are binary operations defined by 19 Moisil
used this name.
40
Grzegorz Malinowski
x ∪ y = x : y− + y
x ∩ y = (x + y − ) : y
is an M V algebra if the following conditions are satisfied: C1. C2. C3. C4. C5. C6. C7. C9. C10. C11.
x+y =y+x x + (y + z) = (x + y) + z x + x− = 1 x+1=1 x+0=x (x + y)− = x− · y − (x− )− = x x∪y =y∪x x ∪ (y ∪ z) = (x ∪ y) ∪ z x + (y ∩ z) = (x + y) ∩ (x + z)
C1∗. C2∗. C3∗. C4∗. C5∗. C6∗. C8. C9∗. C10∗. C11∗.
x·y =y·x x · (y · z) = (x · y) · z x · x− = 0 x·0=0 x·1=x (x · y)− = x− + y − 0− = 1 x∩y =y∩x x ∩ (y ∩ z) = (x ∩ y) ∩ z x · (y ∪ z) = (x · y) ∪ (x · z).
The simplest example of the M V algebra is an arbitrary L � ukasiewicz matrix, the operations + and · are defined as above and ∪, ∩, − are the connectives of disjunction, conjunction and negation, respectively. An adaptation of M V � ukasiewicz logics was made in 1973 by R. Grigolia. An M V algebras to finite L algebra A is an M Vn algebra (n ≥ 2) provided that it satisfies additionally C12.
(n − 1)x + x = (n − 1)x
C12∗.
xn−1 · x = xn−1
and for n > 3: C13. C13∗.
{(jx) · (x− + ((j − 1)x)− )}n−1 = 0 (n − 1){xj + (x− · (xj−1 )− )} = 1
where 1 < j < n − 1 and j does not divide n − 1, see Grigolia (1977). All above algebras are conservative generalizations of Boolean algebras. Every Moisil algebra and every M V algebra has a Boolean subalgebra. {sk (x) : x ∈ A, � ukasiewicz algebra. 1 ≤ k ≤ n} is the set of all Boolean elements of a n-valued L The set {x ∈ A : x + x = x} = {x ∈ A : x · x = x} is the set of Boolean elements of an M V algebra A. Moisil and Chang developed representation theory of their algebras. Chang’s idea of associating to any M V algebra a totally ordered abelian � ukasiewicz group was the crucial point of the algebraic completeness proof of L axioms for infinte-valued logic, see Chang [1959].20 A group-theoretic flavour of M V algebras and their other mathematical prop erties attracted attention of many scholars. Several algebraic structures related to the original Chang’s algebras have been investigated and applied to logic. Among recent works it would be worth to note two new proofs of the completeness of L � ukasiewicz axioms: by Cignoli [1993], using the representation of free l-groups and by Panti [1995], using tools of the algebraic geometry. Cignoli et al. [1999] is 20 The original proof for the infinite case is non-constructive. Mundici [1994] gave a constructive proof of it.
Many-valued Logic and its Philosophy
41
a good source of results and studies of infinite-valued L � ukasiewicz logic and MV algebras.
7 STANDARD AXIOMATIZATION The problem of Hilbert-style axiomatization of many-valued logics rested open still many years after the inventory constructions. The 1930s brought mere syntactic characterizations of some systems of three-valued logic including Wajsberg’s ax � ukasiewicz logic, see L � ukasiewicz [1930]. In their iomatization of the three-valued L seminal analysis Rosser and Turquette [1952] set the conditions that make finitely many-valued logics resemble to the CP C and hence simplify the problem of the syntactic formalization.
Standard conditions The first semantical steps of the analysis resolve the principle of interpretation of propositional languages in matrices of the form Mn,k = (Un , Dk ), where Un = (En , f1 , . . . , fm ), En = {1, 2, . . . , n}, Dk = {1, 2, . . . , k}, n ≥ 2 is a natural number and 1 ≤ k < n. The authors assume that the natural number ordering conveys decreasing degree of truth. So, 1 always refers to “truth” and n takes the role of falsity. Next come the conditions concerning propositional connectives, which in Mn,k have to represent negation (¬), implication (→), disjunction (∨), conjunction (∧), equivalence (≡) and special one-argument connectives j1 , . . . , jn . Assume that the same symbols are used to denote the corresponding functions of Un and that a given Mn,k is the interpretation structure. Then we say that the respective connectives satisfy the standard conditions if for any x, y ∈ En and i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} ¬x ∈ Dk x → y ∈ Dk x ∨ y ∈ Dk x ∧ y ∈ Dk x ≡ y ∈ Dk ji (x) ∈ Dk
if if if if if if
and and and and and and
only only only only only only
if if if if if if
x ∈ Dk x ∈ Dk and y ∈ Dk x ∈ Dk or y ∈ Dk x ∈ Dk and y ∈ Dk either x, y ∈ Dk or x, y ∈ Dk x = i.
Any matrix Mn,k having standard connectives as primitive or definable is called standard. When only some of them are present we will use the term “Q-standard”, where Q is a subset of the set of all standard connectives. All Post and all finite L � ukasiewicz matrices are standard. The first case is easy. Post matrices are based on functionally complete algebras, see Section 5, and thus any possible connective is definable. A given n-valued L � ukasiewicz matrix may be
42
Grzegorz Malinowski
isomorphically transformed onto a matrix of the form Mn,1 : the isomorphism is es tablished by the mapping f (x) = n−(n−1) of the set {0,1/n−1 ,2/n−1 , . . . ,n−2 /n−1 , 1} onto {1, 2, . . . , n}. Notice that the mapping inverses the ordering. Accordingly, now the smallest element 1 is the designated value, whereas n corresponds to 0. A moment’s reflection shows that original L � ukasiewicz disjunction and conjunction satisfy standard conditions. In turn, the other required connectives are definable in Mn . Thus, x ⇒ y =df x → (x → . . . → (x → y)),
x ≈ y =df (x ⇒ y) ∧ (y ⇒ x)
(n−1)times
define the standard implication and equivalence (→ appearing on the right is the original L � ukasiewicz connective). The definability of js, ji (x) = 1 iff x = i follows easily from the McNaugthon criterion; see also Rosser and Turquette [1952]. Rosser and Turquette positively solved the problem of axiomatizability of known � ukasiewicz and Post logics. systems of many-valued logic, including n-valued L Actually, any logic determined by a {→, j1 , j2 , . . . , jn } — standard matrix Mn,k is axiomatizable by means of the rule M P and SU B and the following set of axioms: A1. A2. A3. A4. A5. A6. A7.
(α → (β → α)) (α → (β → γ)) → (β → (α → γ)) (α → β) → ((β → γ) → (α → γ)) (ji (α) → (ji (α) → β)) → (ji (α) → β) (jn (α) → β) → ((jn−1 (α) → β) → (. . . → ((j1 (α) → β) → β) . . .)) ji (α) → α for i = 1, 2, . . . , k ji(r) (αr ) → (ji(r−1) (αr−1 ) → (. . . → (ji(1) (α1 ) → jf (F (α1 , . . . , αr ))) . . .)) where f = f (i(1), . . . , i(r));
symbols f and F used in A7 represent, respectively, an arbitrary function of the matrix Mn,k and a propositional connective associated with it; Rosser and Tur quette [1952]. The axiom system A1–A7 consists of two parts. The first part, A1–A3, de scribes the properties of pure classical implication: in particular, due to them the deduction theorem (ded2 ) holds, cf. Section 4. The axioms of the second group, (A4)–(A7), bridge the semantic and syntactic properties of connectives. Check ing the soundness of the axioms is easy and it heavily bases on the procedures known from the classical logic. The completeness proof, however, requires much calculation quite a complicated induction. Rosser and Turquette’s approach to many-valued logics weights heavily on fur ther research of the topic. Especially, it yields that the two-valued logic is, to some degree, sufficient for the developments of many-valued logic. In turn, an expansion of techniques of the classical logic by the authors suggested further formalizations of the both, finite and infinite-valued logics. One example is the partial normal forms’ representation of formulas of a given finite-valued standard logic, mainly used in Many-valued logics for developing the quantification theory.
Many-valued Logic and its Philosophy
43
Partial normal forms The r-th (1 ≤ r ≤ n) partial normal form of a formula is a specification in terms of two-valued logic of the conditions under which the given formula takes the truth value r. To built this form we need any standard disjunction and conjunction con nectives and js. The r-th partial normal form Nr (α) of a formula α = α(p1 , . . . , ps ) is the disjunction of all conjunctions of the form: j1r (p1 ) ∧ j2r (p2 ) ∧ . . . ∧ jsr (ps ), where 1r , 2r , . . . , sr is a sequence of logical values such that v(α) = r for any valuation v meeting the requirement: v(pi ) = ir . The “specification” may also be considered as a formula of an external language comprising the connectives of the classical connectives of negation, disjunction and conjunction. Rosser and Turquette used the disjunctive-conjunctive forms, but extending the notions onto the conjunctive-disjunctive forms is immediate. Consider e.g. the simple three-valued L � ukasiewicz implication p → q, which in the notation just adopted has the following truth table: → 1 2 3
1 1 1 1
2 2 1 1
3 3 2 1
Let the superscript 1, 2 or 3 by a propositional variable denote that it takes a respective value. Thus e.g. p1 reads “p takes the value 1”, p2 reads “p takes the value 2”, and p3 reads “p takes the value 3”.Then the first partial normal form of p → q is the DC formula: q 1 ∨ (q 2 ∧ p2 ) ∨ (q 2 ∧ p3 ) ∨ (q 3 ∧ p3 ), its second partial normal form: (q 2 ∧ p1 ) ∨ (q 3 ∧ p2 ) and, finally, the third partial normal form of p → q is: q 3 ∧ p1 . So, the complete set of the above partial normal forms of formula is an equivalent to its truth table. Obviously, such a description of properties of formulas is external with respect to the system.21 It is interesting to note that in some cases the connectives are definable in standard logics to do the same effect. The next step is to ask for further classical connectives, including negation and implication. That 21 Such
was the approach by Bochvar, see Section 5.
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Grzegorz Malinowski
question and possible consequences of a positive answer to it will be discussed later. The fact that the partial normal form’s method extends onto quantifiers opens an important door. First, an adaptation of the method to the first-order language led Rosser and Turquette to a formalization to a class of many-valued predicate calculi. On the other hand, the tool proved to be useful in investigation of natural deduction formalisations of finite-valued logics. An appropriate generalisation of the notion of normal form enables to construct rules of the sequent and tableaux systems directly from the finite element truth tables of their connectives. More over, as Zach [1993] explains, the partial normal forms provide a relationship between clause translation rules, sequent calculus introduction rule, and a natural deduction rule for a given connective. Many-valued logics as constructed through matrices are extensional with respect to their values. This property of the bunch of connectives may be identified as a generalized multiple-valued truth-functionality.
8
BACKGROUND TO PROOF THEORY
The studies of formal proofs, inaugurated by Gentzen [1934], now form a steady branch of logical investigations. Gentzen’s sequents and natural deduction22 for the classical and intuitionistic logic have been adapted soon to other non-classical systems, including the finite many-valued propositional and predicate calculi.
Sequents A sequent is an item of the form Γ ⇒ ∆, where Γ and ∆ are finite sequences, or multisets, of formulas. The sequent means that the conjunction of all formulas of Γ entails the disjunction of all formulas of ∆, in symbols ∧Γ ∨∆. In the classical case, the entailment, due to the deduction theorem, is equivalent to ∧Γ ⇒ ∨∆. Accordingly, the sequent receives a truth-functional interpretation: for any valuation, if all the formulas in Γ are true, then at least one formula in ∆ is not false. A version of the calculus using only sequents having a single formula in the place of ∆ was also used by Gentzen to formalize intuitionistic logic. In oter [1955] provided a direct generalisation of the classical sequent the end, Schr¨ approach onto the many-valued case. A natural, truth-functional approach to sequent formalisation of finite manyvalued logics is due to Rousseau [1967].23 Given a finite n ≥ 2, n-valued sequent Γ is an n-tuple Γ1 | Γ 2 | . . . | Γ n 22 Independently, Ja´ skowski [1934] presented a handy natural deduction system for the classical, intuitionistic and some version of free logic. 23 Takahashi [1967; 1970] gave a similar formalisation, see e.g. Bolc and Borowik [2003].
Many-valued Logic and its Philosophy
45
of finite sequences of formulas. Then, Γ is interpreted as true under a given interpretation if and only if at least one Γi , i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} has a formula, which takes the value i. Thus, the components Γ1 , Γ2 , . . . , Γn of Γ correspond to logical values of a logic under consideration. It is obvious that for n = 2 one gets the counterpart of the standard notion of a sequent Γ1 | Γ2 with the usual truth-falsity interpretation. The base of the construction of finite-valued sequent calculus is the expression of the n-valued truth-functionality by assumption that for any formula α, the sequent α | α | ... | α is an axiom. Next to that, there are the weakening rules for every place i, Γ1 | . . . | Γi | . . . | Γn Γ 1 | . . . | Γi , α | . . . | Γn and (i, j) cut rules Γ 1 | . . . | Γi , α | . . . | Γn ∆1 | . . . | ∆j , α | . . . | ∆n Γ1 , ∆1 | . . . | Γn , ∆n for every i = j, i, j ∈ 1, 2, . . . , n. The last and the hardest step consists in stating the admissible introduction rules for the connectives and, later,24 for quantifiers. Any F -introduction rule at the position i for a connective F of (finite) arity r, has the following form: Γ11 , ∆11 | . . . | Γ1n , ∆1n . . . Γj1 , ∆j1 | . . . | Γjn , ∆jn , Γ1 | . . . | Γi , F (α1 , . . . , αr ) | . . . | Γn where Γ1 = Γ11 ∪ . . . ∪ Γj1 , . . . , Γn = Γ1n ∪ . . . ∪ Γjn and, ∆1n , . . . , ∆jn are subsets of {α1 , . . . , αr }. To get an exhausting description of the connective in the sequents setting, one has to establish the rules for all positions, i.e. the original values of the logic. That may be done using conjunctive-disjunctive partial normal forms. However, a formula of a given many-valued logic may have several specific partial CD forms. This implies that the result of establishing the rules is not unique. Once, we have such a description for the connective, we may write the introduction rules of it, taking as the premises the set of sequents reflecting disjuncts, which have positioned the components at the corresponding places. To give an example, we stay with the L � ukasiewicz three-valued implication con sidered in Section 2 expressed as in Section 7. One may verify, that the following formulas are the CD partial normal forms of p → q: 24 See
Section 9.
46
Grzegorz Malinowski
(p3 ∨ p2 ∨ q 1 ) ∧ (p3 ∨ q 2 ∨ q 1 ) (p2 ∨ p1 ) ∧ (p2 ∨ q 2 ) ∧ (p1 ∨ q 3 ) p1 ∧ q 3
(the first; value 1) (the second; value 2) (the third; value 3).
Accordingly, we get the following three introduction rules for the L � ukasiewicz implication: Γ1 , q | Γ 2 , p | Γ3 , p Γ 1 , q | Γ 2 , q | Γ 3 , p Γ1 , p → q | Γ2 | Γ3 Γ1 , p | Γ 2 , p | Γ 3
(I →; 1)
Γ1 | Γ2 , p, q | Γ3 Γ1 , p | Γ2 | Γ3 , q Γ1 | Γ2 , p → q | Γ3
Γ1 , p | Γ 2 | Γ 3 Γ 1 | Γ 2 | Γ 3 , q Γ 1 | Γ2 | Γ3 , p → q
(I →; 2)
(I →; 3).
These rules, together with the rules for the negation connective on the set {1, 2, 3} assure a sequent formalisation of the three-valued propositional L � ukasiewicz logic. To finish with, we remark that the following introduction rules follow di rectly from the table of negation: Γ1 , p | Γ2 | Γ3 Γ1 | Γ2 | Γ3 , ¬p
Γ 1 | Γ2 , p | Γ3 Γ1 | Γ2 , ¬p | Γ3
Γ1 | Γ2 | Γ3 , p . Γ1 , ¬p | Γ2 | Γ3
Tableaux method The tableaux method raised by Beth [1955] is a refutation procedure, which proved to be useful not only as the proof procedure but also as a model search device. Beth was motivated by semantic concerns, what found its expression in the early terminology, when the most proper way of speaking about the procedure referred to it as to semantic tableaux, cf. Smullyan [1968]. The core of the method is putting a question on whether a given formula is valid or not or, equivalently, whether it is falsifiable. To show that a formula α is valid one begins with some expression intended to assert that α is not valid. Due to the already established tradition the “expression” is composed of a sign displaying the polarisation — the assertion of the truth or falsity — and a current formula, for the classical logic the most popular are two sets of signs: {T, F } and {+, −}, then the signed formulas are: T α, F α and +α, −α, respectively. Next, a set of elimination rules reducing signed formulas to simpler signed formulas, is given. In general, the procedure branches and at its final stage further productive application of the rules is impossible. A branch is closed if it contains two opposite signed formulas, i.e. T α, F α (or +α, −α), otherwise the branch is open. The former outcome locally denies the starting assumption on non validity — the integral deny is when all branches are closed, the latter gives a hint how to built a falsifying model. In case of classical logic there is a straightforward duality between the tableaux and sequents: any sequent system without cut may be reversed into the tableaux: the
Many-valued Logic and its Philosophy
47
elimination rules result as reversing the introduction rules for sequents, see e.g. D’Agostino [1999]. The signed tableaux systems for finitely many-valued logics were first given by Sucho´ n [1974] and Surma [1974]. The both authors presented their systems for � ukasiewicz propositional logics using the modal operators of the finite n-valued L Moisil algebras25 to play the role of signs. Further elaboration of the method is due to Surma [1984]. Carnielli [1987; 1991] developed the idea and established a “systematisation of finite many-valued logics through the method of tableaux”.26 Since some time, the research is dominated with issues concerning the automation. One of recently important issues is using sets of signs instead signs, see H¨ahnle [1993] as well as as specified versions of sequents with meta connectives, H¨ahnle [1999]. Early approaches to many-valued tableaux systems resemble the sequents of Rousseau. However, contrary to the sequential calculi, which are grounded on the introduction rules, the tableaux use elimination rules. In particular approaches the signs are either simulated by the connectives definable within the logic, they are possibly the values of the logical matrix or the elements of an external struc ture. The sequential format for tableaux is particularly useful and in eligible cases the tableaux rules of elimination may be received as reverse of the introduction � ukasiewicz connectives of negation and rules. Thus, e.g. for the three-valued L implication, one may have the following rules: Γ1 , p → q | Γ2 | Γ3 Γ 1 , q | Γ2 , p | Γ3 , p Γ1 , q | Γ2 , q | Γ3 , p Γ 1 , p | Γ2 , p | Γ3
Γ1 | Γ2 , p → q | Γ3 Γ1 | Γ2 , p, q | Γ3
(→ E; 1)
Γ 1 , p | Γ2 | Γ3 , q
Γ1 | Γ2 | Γ3 , p → q Γ 1 , p | Γ2 | Γ3 Γ 1 | Γ2 | Γ3 , q
(→ E; 2)
(→ E; 3).
Further to that other elimination rules may be established, using appropriately the partial normal forms. It should be said, however, that — in general — the partial normal forms are not unique, and due to that property one may get different sets of elimination rules for a given connective. See Baaz et al. [1993].
Natural deduction and resolution Resolution is still among the main tools of Automated Reasoning. Recently, also the natural deduction becomes more and more acknowledged device in that con text. The both, natural deduction and the resolution, are relatives of sequents 25 See
Section 6. is the title of the first Carnielli’s paper. It should be added that the characterisation was also extended onto quantifiers. 26 This
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Grzegorz Malinowski
and, to a certain degree, are sequent expressible.27 Below, we shortly comment on them. The method of natural deduction is a special formalization, which establishes relations between premises and a set of conclusions. It operates with both kind of rules for all logical constants: rules of introduction and rules of elimination. Moreover, the set of conclusions may, in particular cases, consist of one formula. The history of natural deduction approach to many-valued logics is not very long. Probably the first paper on the topic is Becchio and Pabion [1977], who gave � ukasiewicz logic. Essentially a system of natural deduction for the three-valued L new systems using sequents are discussed in Baaz et al. [1993] and Zach [1993]. The common feature of all systems of this kind is the property of conserving some logical values. Obviously, the most popular option is to save one logical value corresponding to the truth. On the other hand, the choice of many logic values at once, or a subset of the set of all values, of the logic at work, is also worth consideration. Resolution is a refutation method organized on clauses i.e finite disjunctions of literals. A literal is a propositional variable (positive literal) or the negation of a propositional variable (negative literal). The procedure starts with a set of clauses and the refutation ends with an empty clause. It operates with a single resolution rule, which is a form of the cut rule. The earliest articles on resolution in many-valued logics are due to Or�lowska [1967] and Morgan [1976]. The pioneering works and their ancestrals have been based on special normal forms with multiple-valued literals, which used special unary connectives. The most recent outcome of investigation is an algebraic the ory of resolution proof deductive proof systems developed by Stachniak [1996]. The key idea on which the theory is based is that the refutational deductive proof systems based on a non-clausal resolution become finite algebraic structures, the so-called resolution algebras. In turn, the particular interpretation of the resolution principle shows it as the rule of consistency verification defined relative to an ap propriate propositional logic. The verification uses special formulas, the so-called verifiers “witnessing” the consistency of sets of formulas. In the classical case verifiers coincide with the formulas defining two standard truth values. The pro cess of selecting verifiers for resolution counterparts of non-classical proof systems usually goes beyond the search for defining truth values. Thus, e.g. the resolution counterparts of three-valued and five-valued L � ukasiewicz logics have, respectively, six and nine verifiers.28 What makes the last approach specially interesting from the point of view of many-valuedness is that the interpretation of the resolution � ukasiewicz, Tarski as principle is rooted in the logical tradition of Le´sniewski, L well as Couturat, Post and Schr¨ oder.29 Accordingly, it seems very interesting that in the counterparts of functionally complete systems of (finite) many-valued logic verifiers coincide with formulas defining logical values. 27 Consult
D’Agostino [1999].
[1996, pp. 181 and 187].
29 See Stachniak [1996, p. xii].
28 Stachniak
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49
9 QUANTIFIERS IN MANY-VALUED LOGIC Rosser and Turquette [1952] extended the method of partial normal forms onto formulas with quantifiers and developed a general theory of quantification for a class of finitely many-valued logics.
Ordinary and generalized quantifiers They started from the intuition permitting to treat ordinary quantifiers as func tions on the set of pairs (x, F ), where x is a nominal variable and F a formula, with values in the set of formulae. A generalized quantifier of this type is any formula of the form: Q(x1 , x2 , ..., xm , F1 , F2 , ..., Ft ), where x1 , x2 , ..., xm are nominal variables and F1 , F2 , ..., Ft formulae built from predicates, nominal and propositional variables, and connectives. The intended meaning of Qi functions in n-valued logic is determined with the help of inter pretations assigning to formulae values from the set {1, 2, ..., n}. Operating on the links between formulae stated by means of connectives of basic logic enables the construction of non-classical quantifiers. The theory of representations al lows any generalized quantifier to be expressed by means of ordinary quantifiers. Standard n-valued predicate calculi with generalized quantifiers are axiomatizable using special “partial normal forms”. Many-valued predicate calculi are, however, usually built along the classical pattern. In that case a first-order language with two standard quantifiers: general ∀ and existential ∃ is considered. In general, the starting point is the substitutional conception of quantifiers according to which ∀ and ∃ are (infinite) generalizations of conjunction and disjunction, respectively. Accordingly, for a finite domain U = {a1 , a2 , ..., an }, the commutative and associative connectives of conjunction (∧) and disjunction (∨): ∀xF (x) ≡U F (a1 ) ∧ F (a2 ) ∧ ... ∧ F (an ) ∃xF (x) ≡U F (a1 ) ∨ F (a2 ) ∨ ... ∨ F (an ), (≡U means the equivalence of the formulae at any interpretation in U, a1 , a2 , ..., an being nominal constants ascribed to the objects of the domain). In finite-valued logical calculi constructed upon linear matrices, quantifiers are defined ‘directly’ through algebraic functions related the above-mentioned connectives. Thus, e.g. � ukasiewicz and Post logics, for any interpretation f in a domain U for finite L f (∀xF (x)) = min{f (F (a)) : a ∈ U } f (∃xF (x)) = max{f (F (a)) : a ∈ U }. For other calculi semantic description of quantifiers may vary. Thus, for example, the clauses defining quantifiers in the first-order Bochvar logic should be following:
50
Grzegorz Malinowski
t u f (∀xF (x)) = f f u f (∃xF (x)) = t
when f (F (a)) = t for every a ∈ U when f (F (a)) = u for some a ∈ U otherwise when f (F (a)) = f for every a ∈ U when f (F (a)) = u for some a ∈ U otherwise.
Axiomatic systems of many-valued predicate logics are extensions of axiom sys tems of the ground propositional calculi in the similar way as for the classical logic, cf. Rasiowa and Sikorski [1963] and Rasiowa [1974]. Proofs of completeness for for finitely-valued calculi do not, in general, create difficulties. Eventually, the axiomatizability of several calculi of this kind may be assured by the Rosser and Turquette’s method extending the standard approach to quantifiers, see above.
Distribution quantifiers Attempts to adopt the matrix method for the first order finite-valued logics led to the concept of distribution quantifiers. The semantics of any such operator is defined with mapping from distributions to truth values: their “matrix” counter parts are functions from sets of logical values to logical values. The very idea has been covered by a general framework of Mostowski [1957] and for the finite-valued logics was developed by Carnielli [1987; 1991]. An advantage of the distribution approach is that an appropriate description of a quantifier directly yields the elim ination rule for the corresponding tableau proof system. Thus, for example for the three-valued L � ukasiewicz logic presented as in Section 7, the standard quantifiers ∀ and ∃ may be defined in terms of distribution in the following way: 3 if 3 ∈ X 2 if 2 ∈ X and 3 ∈ X d∀ (X) = 1 if X = {1}, 3 if X = {3} 2 if 2 ∈ X and 1 ∈ X d∃ (X) = 1 if 1 ∈ X. 1 −1 The counter images of the two functions, d− ∀ and d∃ would be perhaps more displaying:
d−1 ∀ (3) = {{3}, {2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}, {1, 3}} 1 d− ∀ (2) = {{2}, {1, 2}} −1 d∀ (1) = {{1}}
d−1 ∃ (3) = {{3}} 1 d− ∃ (2) = {{2}, {2, 3}}
−1 d∃ (1) = {{1}, {1, 2}, {1, 2, 3}, {1, 3}}.
From the last description the tableaux elimination rules stem directly. Some ex amples will follow:
Many-valued Logic and its Philosophy
1∀xF (x) , t is any term; 1F (t)
2∀xF (x) , c1 , c2 , c3 are new constants. 2F (c1 ) 1F (c2 ) 2F (c3 )
3∃xF (x) , t is any term; 3F (t)
2∃xF (x) , c1 , c2 , c3 are new constants. 2F (c1 ) 2F (c2 ) 3F (c3 )
51
Quantifiers and infinite-valued logic Introducing quantifiers to logics with infinitely many values in the semantical plane may be problematic. Thus, e.g. applying the before mentioned procedure to the � ukasiewicz logic is impossible since in the case when U is infinite it may ℵ0 -valued L happen that the set {f (F (a)) : a ∈ U } does not contain the least or the greatest element and therefore min and max functions cannot be used in the definition. In � ukasiewicz logic, the interpretations of quantifiers are turn, in the the ℵ1 -valued L introduced provided that for any interpretation in a non-empty domain U f (∀xF (x)) = inf {f (F (a)) : a ∈ U } f (∃xF (x)) = sup{f (F (a)) : a ∈ U }, see Mostowski [1961]. However, it appeared that ℵ1 -valued predicate calculus thus obtained is not axiomatizable, Scarpelini [1962]. The investigations of other scholars complete, to some extent, the Scarpelini’s result characterizing sets of valid formulas30 in terms of recursive countability RC:31 Rutledge [1959] showed that the set of valid formulas of ℵ1 -valued monadic predicate calculus is RC. Hay [1963] proved that for any valid formula α of this calculus there exists a finite m > 0 such that mα is derivable from some “sound” axiomatics. Finally, a general result � ukasiewicz’s matrix of Mostowski [1961] implies that the set of formulas valid in L with the designated set (r, 1], 0 < r ≤ 1, is axiomatizable — the proof of Mostowski is not effective and the author provides no axiomatics. The adduced works allow, as we think, to estimate the complexity and subtlety of the problem. In this connection it is also worthwhile mentioning that the greatest hopes for proving completeness of ℵ1 -valued predicate calculus were combined with the algebraic method and MV algebras (see Section 6 and Belluce and Chang [1963]). The experience gathered while attempting to constitute such a proof finally yielded in the form of interpretation theory of the first-order language with values in compact Hausdorff spaces, the so-called continuous model theory in Chang and Keisler [1966]. 30 I.e. 31 See
formulas true at any interpretation.
e.g. [Kleene, 1952].
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Grzegorz Malinowski
10
¨ INTUITIONISM AND GODEL’S MATRICES
Intuitionism constitutes a constructivistic trend in the studies of the foundations of mathematics. Its sources are found in some elements of the philosophy of Kant who perceived the base of mathematics in an a priori intuition of time and space and who emphasized the role of construction in justifying the existence of mathematical objects. The history of the intuitionistic conception is excessively rich and has links with so eminent mathematicians as L. Kronecker, H. Poincar´e, E. Borel, H. Lebesgue to mention only few of them. The systematic and mature development of the intuitionistic ideas initiated in 1907 is a life-work of L. E. J.Brouwer (see [Heyting, 1966]).
Postulates and axioms One of the main assumptions of intuitionism is the postulate of effectiveness of ex istential mathematical theorems: a proposition concerning the existence of math ematical objects can be accepted only when we are able to provide a method of construction of those objects. Proposed by Heyting [1930] the interpretation of logical constants and quantifiers allowed to formulate an axiomatization of intu itionistic logic generally acknowledged as adequate. According to this interpreta tion the validity of any proposition is identified with its provability, and proofs of compound propositions are composed of the proofs of simpler ones. Proof of
is a construction
α∧β α∨β α→β ¬ α ∃xΦ(x) ∀xΦ(x)
consisting of a proof of α and a proof of β; choosing one of the propositions α, β and laying down a proof of it; transferring any proof of α onto the proof of β and verifying that results of it are proofs of β indeed; equivalent to a proof of α → 0, where 0 is an absurd sentence (falsum);
choosing an object a and laying down
a proof of Φ(a);
which to every object a of a given domain assigns a proof of Φ(a) and subsequently verifies it.
Heyting [1930] presents the intuitionistic propositional calculus as a system INT based on the axioms:
Many-valued Logic and its Philosophy
(H1) (H2) (H3) (H4) (H5) (H6) (H7) (H8) (H9) (H10) (H11)
53
p → (p ∧ p)
(p ∧ q) → (q ∧ p)
(p → q) → ((p ∧ r) → (q ∧ r))
((p → q) ∧ (q → r)) → (p → r)
q → (p → q) (p ∧ (p → q)) → q
p → (p ∨ q)
(p ∨ q) → (q ∨ p)
((p → r) ∧ (q → r)) → ((p ∨ q) → r)
¬p → (p → q)
((p → q) ∧ (p → ¬q)) → ¬p
and the rules M P and SU B. The “soundness” of INT axiomatics can be demon strated through the above-mentioned interpretation of logical constants in terms of proof. It is readily checked that all the laws of the intuitionistic propositional calculus are classical tautologies. Notwithstanding, INT differs from CPC, which can be shown applying the following three-element Heyting matrix: H3 = ({0,1/2 , 1}, ¬, →, ∨, ∧, {1}), � ukasiewicz matrix while ¬ and → are charac in which ∨ and ∧ are defined as in L terized by the tables: α 0 1 /2 1
¬α 1 0@ 0
→ 0 1 /2 1
0 1 0@ 0
1
/2 1 1 1 /2
1 1 1 1
which differ from L � ukasiewicz tables in two places marked by @ , where according � ukasiewicz the value is 1/2 . to L INT ⊆ E(H3 ) since axioms (H1)–(H11) pertain to E(H3 ) and E(H3 ) is closed under the rules M P and SU B. Subsequently, such laws of the classical logic as p ∨ ¬p,
¬¬p → p,
(¬p → p) → p
are not tautologies of the matrix H3 : it suffices to consider any valuation h such that h(p) = 1/2 . It is also noteworthy that the strengthening of Heyting axiom system with the law of the excluded middle leads to the classical logic. The problems of relations between the intuitionistic and classical propositional calculi were given much attention, the so-called intermediate logics (intermediate between the intuitionistic and classical logics) were intensely studied (see e.g. the papers by Kabzi´ nski and Krajewski in: Marciszewski [1987] — the calculus determined by Heyting matrix can serve as an example of such a logic. The weakening of INT resulting from the omission of (H10) leads to the system of minimal logic (consult Johansson [1936]), closer to intuitionism than Heyting calculus.
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Grzegorz Malinowski
G¨odel matrices G¨ odel [1932] showed that INT cannot be described by a finite matrix and, in consequence, by a finite set of finite matrices. G¨odel’s reasoning consists in the construction of a sequence of matrices approximating INT, and next in pointing out, on the base of the matrices of that sequence, a suitable set of formulas outside odel matrix (n ≥ 2, n finite) is of the form: INT: n-valued G¨ Gn = ({0, 1/n−1 , . . . , where ¬x =
1 0
n−2
if x = 0 , if x = 0
x→y=
/n−1 , 1}, ¬, →, ∨, ∧, {1}),
1 y
if x ≤ y , if x > y
x ∨ y = max(x, y), x ∧ y = min(x, y).
Notice that G2 = M2 , G3 = H3 . The tables of negation and implication in G4 are the following: α 0 1 /3 2 /3 1
¬α 1 0 0 0
→ 0 1 /3 2 /3 1
0 1 0 0 0
1
/3 1 1 1 /3 1 /3
2
/3 1 1 1 2 /3
1 1 1 1 1
In turn, each G¨ odel matrix Gn is a submatrix of Gn+1 - check that the mapping h from the set of values of Gn+1 onto Gn defined as h(i/n ) = /i n−1 for 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1 and h(1) = 1 is a homomorphism of two matrices. Accordingly, INT ⊆| E(Gn−1 ) ⊆| . . . ⊆| E(G3 ) ⊆| E(G2 ) = TAU T . Let, further, ≡ be the connective of equivalence defined customarily; for any for mulas α, β, α ≡ β =df (α → β) ∧ (β → α). Then, α ≡ α ∈ INT and the functions of matrices Gn corresponding to ≡ are described by 1 when x = y x≡y= min(x, y) when x = y. Consider the sequence {di } (i ∈ N ) of formulas: (di )
(p1 ≡ p2 ) ∨ (p1 ≡ p3 ) ∨ . . . ∨ (p1 ≡ pi ) ∨ (p2 ≡ p3 ) ∨ (p2 ≡ p4 ) ∨ . . . . . . ∨ (p2 ≡ pi ) ∨ . . . ∨ (pi−2 ≡ pi−1 ) ∨ (pi−2 ≡ pi ) ∨ (pi−1 ≡ pi ).
E(Gn ) if i ≤ n and thus d2 , d3 , . . ., As everyone is quick to notice, di ∈ INT. The proof of the nonexistence of a finite matrix (weakly) adequate dn , . . . ∈ to INT can be viewed as follows: If INT = E(M ) for some M -element matrix M = (A, I), then v(α ≡ α) ∈ I for any valuation v. Then, by extensionality, for arbitrary formulas α, β (o)
v(α) = v(β) implies
v(α ≡ β) ∈ I.
Many-valued Logic and its Philosophy
55
Now, consider a formula dk where k > m. Since the number of propositional variables of this formula exceeds the cardinality of the matrix M , then for every pk1 , pk2 ∈ V ar(dk ) there is a v such that v(pk1 ) = v(pk2 ) and, in view of (o), v(pk1 ≡ pk2 ) ∈ I. Applying the fact that (H7) ∈ E(M ), v(dk ) ∈ I can be proved. Thus dk ∈ E(M ). A contradiction. Keeping the original definitions of G¨ odel’s connectives one may define an infinitevalued logic. Thus, taking the set of all rational numbers from the real interval odel’s matrix Gℵ0 . It follows, that INT ⊆ [0,1], we get the denumerable G¨ | E(Gℵ0 ; Dummett [1959] showed that the system of propositional logic thus received is axiomatizable: it may be obtained from INT by adjoining the formula (H12)
(p → q) ∨ (q → p)
to the axiom system (H1)–(H11), the rules of inference remain unchanged.
More on adequacy An infinite class of finite matrices, adequate for INT, was introduced by Ja´skowski [1936]. Ja´skowski’s sequence of matrices begins with the classical matrix and its succeeding terms are made out of the preceding ones by means of special operation G; an account and detailed proof of the completeness theorem can be found in Surma [1971]. Of our interest are investigations by Beth [1956] concentrated upon the ques tion what is “intuitionistically true tautology” and upon getting general method of finding “intuitionistic proofs” of the property. What appears to call for special attention is a topological interpretation provided by Tarski [1938]: here, proposi tional variables are associated with open sets val(p) of a fixed topological space (X, I) (I is an interior operation) and next this mapping extends onto all formulas thus setting: val(α ∨ β) = val(α) ∪ val(β) val(α ∧ β) = val(α) ∩ val(β) val(α → β) = I{(X − val(α)) ∪ val(β)} val(¬α) = I{X − val(α)}. If α ∈ INT, then val(α) = X. Conversely, if val(α) = X for any space X and for any valuation val, then α ∈ INT. Tarski’s interpretation inaugurated the character ization of the intuitionistic logic in lattice-theory terms i.e. pseudo-Boolean, called also Heyting (or Brouwer), algebras; see Rasiowa and Sikorski [1963]. Curiously enough, in practice almost all non-classical logical constructions, many-valued in cluding, are expressible by means of pseudo-Boolean algebras (compare Section 5).
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11
ON BIVALENT DESCRIPTIONS
In the 1970s the investigations of logical formalizations bore several descriptions of many-valued constructions in terms of zero-one valuations. The interpretations associated with these descriptions shed new light on the problem of logical many valuedness. Below, we discuss two different ways of expression of many-valued logics: one establishing logical two-valuedness of structural consequence relations as a result of division of sets of logical valued into distinguished and undistin guished values (see Section 7) and the other, in which replacement of more logical values by more valuations goes on a par with neglecting the role of the said division.
Suszko’s thesis and beyond Suszko [1977] calls attention to the referential character of homomorphisms associ ating to propositions their (possible) semantic correlates. Subsequently, he opposes them to logical valuations being zero–one valued functions defined on For. Given a propositional language L and matrix M = (A, D) for L, the set of valuations T VM is defined as: T VM = {th : h ∈ Hom(L, A)},
where th (α) =
1 if h(α) ∈ D 0 if h(α) ∈ D.
h2 does not imply Notice that card(T VM ) ≤ card(Hom(L, A) (in general, h1 = th2 !). Notice, moreover, that that th1 = X |=M α
if and only if
for every t ∈ T VM t(α) = 1 whenever t(X) ⊆ {1}.
The definition of logical valuations can be simply repeated with respect to any structural consequence operation C (or, equivalently, for any relation C associ ated with C) since for each such C there is a class matrices K having the property that C = {CnM : M ∈ K}, see [Wojcicki, 1970], in Section 4. Thus, each (structural) propositional logic (L, C) can be determined by a class of logical valuations of the language L or, in other words, it is logically two-valued, Suszko [1977]. The justification of Suszko’s thesis that states logical two-valuedness of an im portant family of logics lacks the description of valuations (i.e. elements of T VC ) for an arbitrary relation C . Moreover, it seems, that giving a general method for the recursive description of these valuations not knowing precisely the structure of the class K of matrices adequate for C is hardly possible. At the same time, however, even for simple relations of inference the conditions defining valuations
Many-valued Logic and its Philosophy
57
are illegible. An example of a relatively easily definable set of logical valuations � ukasiewicz logic is LV3 , the class adequate for (→, ¬)-version of the three-valued L [Suszko, 1975]. LV3 is the set of all functions t : For → {0, 1} such that for any α, β, γ ∈ For the following conditions are satisfied: (0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
either t(γ) = 0 or t(¬γ) = 0 t(α → β) = 1 whenever t(β) = 1 if t(α) = 1 and t(β) = 0, then t(α → β) = 0 if t(α) = t(β) and t(¬α) = t(¬β), then t(α → β) = 1 if t(α) = t(β) = 0 and t(¬α) = t(¬β), then t(α → β) = t(¬α) if t(¬α) = 0, then t(¬¬α) = t(α) if t(α) = 1 and t(β) = 0, then t(¬(α → β)) = t(¬β) if t(α) = t(¬α) = t(β) and t(¬β) = 1, then t(¬(α → β) = 0
Usually, the degree of complexity of the many-valued logics description increases with the the quantity of values. In some cases, however, it can be simplified by the application of extra connectives “identifying” original matrix values. Such a use of j-operators of Rosser and Turquette made possible to get e.g. a uniform � ukasiewicz logics, Malinowski [1977]. description of logical valuations for finite L The logical valuation procedure forms a part of a broader semantical programme related to the conception of so-called non-Fregean logics [Suszko, 1972]. Accord ing to Suszko there are situations which play the role of semantic correlates of propositions. Logical valuations, on their side, are nothing more than character istic functions of the sets of formulas being counterimages of the sets of positive situations, i.e. of those which obtain, under homomorphisms settling the interpre � ukasiewicz logic (n tation. Following Suszko, it can be said that the n-valued L � ukasiewicz finite) is a two-valued logic of n situations s1 , s2 , . . . , sn denoted by L as 0,1/n−1 , . . . , 1, respectively. Obviously then 0 and 1 must not be identified with the logical values of falsity and truth. In the literature one may find other, more or less justified, claims that any logic has a two-valued semantics. One of them, by Kotas and da Costa, deserves special attention. Kotas and da Costa [1980] proved independently from Suszko, that any logic C given by axioms and rules of inference C = (Σ, ). Given any such logic, a function ν : For → {0, 1} is called a (two-valued) valorization associated with C, when the following conditions are satisfied: (1) If α ∈ Σ, then ν(α) = 1, (2) If all premisses of an application of a rule of inference from have value 1, then the conclusion has also value 1, (3) there exists at least one formula α ∈ Σ, such that ν(α) = 0. The completeness of the inference c of C with respect to the inference relation |=c the class of all C -valorizations is standard: the valorizations are characteristic functions of saturated, or relatively maximal, sets of formulas: a set X of formulas
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Grzegorz Malinowski
is α − saturated if X c α and for every β ∈ X, X ∪ {α} c α. Accordingly, a α-saturated set X defines a valorization ν such that ν(X) ⊆ {1} and ν(α) = {0}. The method of valorizations was used by Kotas and da Costa for getting seman tic two-valued description for the system C1 of the paraconsistent propositional logic.32 Batens [1980] developed a device simplifying and automating the process of getting descriptions of classes of valorizations corresponding to a set of axiom and rules of inference. Next to that Batens also invented the so-called n-tuple semantics “bridging two-valued and many-valued semantic systems”, see Batens [1982].
Scott valuations Scott [1973; 1974] regards the division of the set of values on designated and undesignated as unnatural. And, replacing more values by more valuations, Scott endeavours to bestow more intuitive character upon many-valued constructions. The valuations are bivalent functions and they generate a partition of the set of propositions of a given language into types corresponding to the original logical values. Scott considers only finite classes of valuations and he assumes that (many valued) logics are determined by single matrices. The above two papers comprise merely an outline of a general method and its exemplification within n-valued L � ukasiewicz logics. Let For be the set of formulas of a given propositional language L and V = {v0 , v1 , . . . , vn−1 } (n ≥ 1) a finite set of valuations: the elements of V are (for the moment) arbitrary functions vi : For → {t, f}, with t denoting truth and f falsity. By a type of propositions of L with respect to V we mean an arbitrary set Zβ of the form: Zβ = {α ∈ F or : vi (α) = vi (β) for any i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n − 1}}. It is easily seen that using an n-element set of valuations one can induce maximally thus, for example, two-element set {w0 , w1 } of valuations 2n types: (see the table beside) defines four types: Z1 , Z2 , Z3 , Z4 . The confining of the valuations di w0 w1 minishes the number of types. The set of valu Z f f 1 ations just considered will define at most three f t Z 2 types Z1 , Z2 , Z4 when we require that w0 (α) ≤ t f Z3 w1 (α) for every α ∈ For, two types: Z2 , Z3 when t t Z 4 w1 (α) for every α ∈ For and Z1 , Z4 under w0 (α) = the condition that w0 = w1 . The types are counterparts of logical values: Scott [1973] refers to them as “indexes”. The above example shows that a given valency < 2n can be received on several ways. Which of these reductions should be taken into account, it depends 32 Paraconsisitent logics challenge the principle ex falso quodlibet. A logic is paraconsistent iff its consequence relation is not explosive, i.e. it is not true that {α, ¬α} |= β, see e.g. da Costa [1974].
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59
on the properties of propositional connectives that, on their side, are type-valued operations i.e. mappings of sequences of types into types. An accurately-aimed choice of the limiting conditions leads to a relatively simple characterization of the connectives under consideration. Applying the above method, Scott gets a description of the implicative system � ukasiewicz logic through the (n − 1)-element set of valuations of n-valued L V L∗n = {v0 , v1 , . . . , vn−2 } such that for any i, j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n − 1} and α ∈ For∗ , For∗ being used to denote set of formulas of the language L∗ comprising negation ¬ and implication → connectives, (mon)
whenever
vi (α) = t
and i ≤ j, then
vj (α) = t
and, moreover, v0 (α1 ) = f and vn−2 (α2 ) = t for some α1 , α2 ∈ For∗ . The table be low shows that the set V L∗n determines n types Z0 , Z1 , . . . , Zn−1 of propositions: Z0 Z1 Z2 . . . Zn−2 Zn−1
v0 t f f . . . f f
v1 t t f . . . f f
v2 t t t . . . f f
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
vn−3 t t t . . . f f
vn−2 t t t . . . t f.
The function f (Zi ) = n − i − 1 / n − 1 is 1 − 1 order-reversing mapping of the set of types onto the universe of the L � ukasiewicz matrix Mn : Z0 corresponds to 1 while Zn−1 to 0 in the matrix, compare Section 6. The negation and the implication connectives are characterized in the following way: Zi → Zj = Zmax(0,j−i) , ¬Zi = Zn−i−1 . Accordingly, for any k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n − 2}, (¬)
vk (¬α) = t if and only if vn−i−1 (α) = t
(→)
vk (α → β) = t
if and only if i + k ≤ j, vi (α) = t and vj (β) = t.
Simple calculation shows that the set of all formulas of L∗ true under an arbitrary valuation vi ∈ V L∗n is just the content of Mn∗ , the (¬, →)-reduct of L � ukasiewicz matrix Mn (n finite!): E(Mn∗ ) = {α ∈ For∗ : vi (α) = t for i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n − 2}}. ∗
Simultaneously, however, the consequence relation |=∗n ⊆ 2For → For∗ ; X |=∗n α
if and only if
vi (α) = t whenever vi (X) ⊆ {t}
for any vi ∈ V L∗n ,
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Grzegorz Malinowski
does not coincide with |=n (reduced to the language L∗ ) — to verify this it suffices to check e.g. that {α → β, α} |=∗n β, while clearly {α → β, α} |=n β. |=∗n is called a conditional assertion. Whether and how it can be extended onto the whole language L is evident. Scott suggests that the equalities of the form “vi (α) = t”, for i ∈ {0, . . . , n − 2}, should be read as “(the statement) α is true to within the degree i”. Consequently, he assumes that the numbers in the range 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 2 stand for degrees of error in deviation from the truth. Degree 0 is the strongest and corresponds to “perfect” truth or no error: all the tautologies of L � ukasiewicz logic are schemas of � ukasiewicz implication the statements having 0 as their degree of error. Besides, L may conveniently be explained in these terms: assuming i + j ≤ n − 2 we get that vi (α → β) = t and vj (α) = t yield vi+j (β) = t. Thus, making use of propositions α → β, one may express the amount of shift of error between the degree of hypothesis to that of the conclusion as being the measure of error of the whole implication. An example accommodated from the Euclidean geometry justifies the construction: Where a, b, c . . . are points of the plane, let the metalinguistic statement “|a − b|” denote the distance between a and b. Let S be a propositional language having the set For of formulas consisting of all formulas made up from atomic formulas “a = b” (possibly others) by the use of the connective → (and possibly others such as “∨” and “∧”). Let us define the set of valuations Vε = {v0 , v1 , . . . , vn−2 } (n ≥ 2) for S putting vi (“a = b”) = t if and only if |a − b| ≤ i and assuming that → satisfies (i). Let, finally, |=ε ⊆ 2For → For be the conse quence relation determined in S by Vε , i.e. X |=ε α
if and only if vi (α) = t whenever for any vi ∈ Vε .
vi (X) ⊆ {t}
Depending on the choice of a unit distance, the relationship between a and b is one of “imperfect” equality and as such it is not transitive. The conditional assertion (P1)
{“a = b”, “b = c”} |=ε “a = c”
fails in general, while for any a, b, c it is true that (P2)
“a = b”|=ε “b = c → a = c”.
Hence, the use of the L � ukasiewicz implication permits to formulate a weakened version of the law of transitivity: (P2). 12
INTERPRETATION AND JUSTIFICATION
While some scholars of the philosophical foundation of logic criticised manyvalued constructions, the others tried to find convincing justifications for many valuedness. The most essential in the two categories were arguments concerning
Many-valued Logic and its Philosophy
61
L � ukasiewicz logics and the problem of the justified interpretation of non-orthodox logical values at all. Below we overview and discuss some for and against multi plying logical values.
Three-valued L ukasiewicz logic L � ukasiewicz [1920] explanation of the logical value 1/2 resorting to “future contin gents” and a “posibility” or undetermination of the 0-1 status of propositions was criticized on several occasions. As we have already mentioned, the first blow was inflicted by Gonseth, who in 1938 noticed — see Gonseth [1941], that the formal characterization of the connectives in L � ukasiewicz logic is incompatible with the suggested ways of interpreting the third logical value. The argumentation of Gon seth is sound and straightforward: Whenever α is undetermined, so is ¬α and then α ∧ ¬α is undetermined. That contradicts our intuition since, independently � ukasiewicz interpreta of α’s content, α ∧ ¬α is false. The upshot discovers that L tion neglect the mutual dependence of some “possible” propositions. Haack [1978] � ukasiewicz’s way of avoiding the fatalist conclusion derived from the analyses L assumption that the contingent statement “I shall be in Warsaw at noon on 21 December of the next year” is either true or false in advance of the event. She remarks that this way of rejecting bivalence is wrong, since it depends on a modal fallacy of arguing from “It is necessary that (if a, then b)” to “If a, then it is necessary that b”. Urquhart [1986] sees the third logical value as the set {0,1} of two “poten tial” classical values of a future contingent sentence and defines the implication as getting all possible values of implication. Thus, the implication having 0 as antecedent takes always value 1, the implication from 1 to {0,1} takes {0,1} and the implication from {0,1} to {0,1} has the value {0,1}. → 0 1 /2 1
0 1 1 /2 0
1
/2 1 1 /2 1 /2
1 1 1 1
The last point is inconsistent with the L � ukasiewicz stipulation, since the output � ukasiewicz table is of 1/2 → 1/2 had to be 1. Therefore, Urquhart claims, the L wrong. It may be of interest that the connective get by Urquhart is the Kleene strong implication. Reichenbach [1944] argued that adoption of three-valued logic would provide a solution to some problems raised by quantum mechanics. For the purpose of avoiding of “causal anomalies”, Reichenbach presents an extended version of the L � ukasiewicz logic, adding further negation and implication connectives. He refers to the third logical value as “indeterminate” and assigns it to anomalous state ments of quantum mechanics. The weak point of Reichenbach’s proposal is that as “indeterminate” are also classified certain laws, such as e.g. the principle of energy.
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Grzegorz Malinowski
Temporal interpretation Urquhart [1973] provides a very interesting interpretation of values of finite values propositional logics. He takes the set Sn = {0, 1, . . . , n − 2} and considers the relation between numbers and formulas: ⊆ Sn × For. Urquhart generally assumes that (Tr)
If x α
x ≤ y ∈ Sn , then
and
y α.
and adopts to particular logics thus specifying n, the language, and providing recursive conditions which establish the meaning of connectives. Accordingly, in each of the cases considered we have to do with some Kripke-style semantics: Kn = (Sn , ≤, ). A formula α is Kn -true iff it is true at the point 0, i.e. provided that 0 α. Kn is a semantics of the system determined by a given matrix M when that set of all Kn -true formulas is equal to the content of M i.e. when E(M ) = {α ∈ F or : 0 a}. Urquhart provides the semantics for n-valued logics of L � ukasiewicz and Post, � ukasiewicz calculi has to satisfy and for the three-valued Bochvar’s system. For L the conditions: xα→β x ¬α xα∨β xα∧β xα≡β
iff iff iff iff iff
y α yields x + y β whenever (n − 2) − x α x α or x β x α and x β x α → β and x β → α.
x + y ∈ Sn
It is not hard to notice that it is possible to “translate” the Scott’s valuations33 in V L∗ to the instances of can be made according to the equivalence: i α if and only if vi (α) = t. The semantics for (¬, ∨)-variant of Post propositional logic is established through the conditions: x ¬α
iff
xα∨β
iff
y α for no y ∈ Sn or there is a such that y < x and y α x α or x β.
y ∈ Sn
To “reference points” x ∈ Sn , several meanings may be attached. For L � uka siewicz and Post logics Urquhart suggests a temporal interpretation: 0 being the present moment, x = 0 a future moment, then “x α” reads “α being true at 33 See
Section 11.
Many-valued Logic and its Philosophy
63
(the moment) x”. It is worthnoting that the assumption (Tr) guarantees that any proposition true at x is also true at every moment y future to x. That obviously means that in the framework elaborated, propositions are treated as temporally definitive units and, as such, they must not contain any occasional, time-depending expressions (such as e.g. “now”, “today” etc.). It may be appropriate, perhaps, to add that even the very originators of many-valued logics while using occasional words in the examples, they usually have in mind temporally-definite marks of reference. Under the above interpretation L � ukasiewicz implication α → β is true at x if and only if the truth of α at y yields β being true at x + y i.e. at the future moment y time-units distant from x. On its turn, L � ukasiewicz negation ¬α is true at x if and only if α is false at (n − 2) − x, i.e. at the moment back to n − 2 (the last in Sn ) of x time-units. Urquhart suggests that such a way of understanding exhibits the sources of difficulties in getting a plainly intuitive interpretation of many-valued L � ukasiewicz logics, and he claims that the “natural” connectives of implication and negation should rather satisfy the conditions: xα→β
iff
x ¬α
iff
for any y ∈ Sn (y β whenever x ≤ y y α for no y ∈ Sn .
and
y α),
Urquhart’s interpretation of Post logics is, as easily seen, entirely compatible with the original interpretation envisaged by Post himself.
Set theory and many-valued logic Russell’s paradox34 leads to a more general question, namely, whether in the set theory there can be adopted the Comprehension Axiom : (AC) The propositions of the form ∃x∀y(y ∈ x ≡ Φ(y)), where Φ(y) is a formula containing y, are true. The presence of (AC) signifies that every formula defines a certain set or, more concisely, that for any property a set of objects bearing that property can be chosen. The discovery of Russell excludes the acceptance of (AC) in the set theory based on the classical logic. Hence, the only method allowing to construct set theory preserving the Comprehension Principle is to change its logic. The suggestion of Bochvar may be obviously conceived as a step in this direction. However, it can hardly be accepted as satisfactory; though it enables to classify some formu las (the formula defining Russell set included) as senseless still, simultaneously, it commits to a very embarrassing, distinction between two categories of propo sitions. Next, as it soon turned out, the three-valued and, more generally, all 34 See
Section 1.
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Grzegorz Malinowski
finite-valued L � ukasiewicz’s logics cannot seriously be taken into consideration ei ther. Moh Shaw-Kwei [1954] provided the following method of construction of “undesirable” sets in Ln : F or a given finite n ≥ 2 we put Zn = {x : x ∈ x →n p}.35 The set Zn being antinomial since the following absorption rule α →n β (absn )
α →n−1 β
is a rule of Ln (equivalently, (α →n β) → (α →n−1 β) ∈ E(Mn )). The assumption Zn ∈ Zn implies that Zn ∈ Zn →n p. Thus, after (n − 1)-ary application of (absn ) we get Zn ∈ Zn → p and, finally, as a result of the detachment (i.e. application of M P ), p. � ukasiewicz logics As absorption rules (absn ) are not the rules of infinite-valued L much attention was given to the possibility of foundation of set theory with (AC) on these logics. Skolem [1957] put forward a hypothesis that the proposition � ukasiewicz logic (or, more accurately, in the (AC) was consistent36 in ℵ1 -valued L predicate calculus with the predicate ∈). Up till now Skolem’s hypothesis was only partly supported. Using advanced proof theory techniques and applying Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem (for n-dimensional cube) Skolem showed that the set of formulas of the form (s1)
∀x1 . . . ∀xn ∃y∀t(t ∈ y ≡ U (t, y, x1 , . . . , xn )),
with U (t, y, x1 , . . . , xn ) being a formula containing no quantifiers wherein free vari � ukasiewicz ables are at the outmost t, y and x1 , . . . , xn , is consistent is ℵ1 -valued L logic.37 The result of Skolem, having applied his method of proof, was expanded by Chang and Fenstad. Chang [1963] showed that the assumption of the absence of quantifiers in formulas U (t, y, x1 , . . . , xn ) can be removed under the condition that bound variables in U appear in atomic formulas u ∈ w only on the second position. Chang also proved that in Lℵ1 any formula (c)
∃x∀y(y ∈ x ≡ Φ(y)),
(compare (AC)) where Φ(y) is a formula with one free variable y, is consistent. Fenstad [1964] obtained a similar result in this direction: he showed that the set 35 p stands for any formula inconsistent in L ; α →n β is an “ascending” implication n α → (α → (. . . → (α → β) . . .)) with n − 1 antecedents α. 36 α is consistent in the Predicate Calculus iff there exists an interpretation f (f ) such that D f (α) = 1. In L � ukasiewicz logic the concept of interpretation is defined according to the pattern of Section 6 applied in Lℵ1 . 37 The set X of closed (i.e. having no free variables) formulas is consistent iff three exists an interpretation f sending all formulas of X into true propositions i.e. such that f (X) ⊆ {1}.
Many-valued Logic and its Philosophy
65
of Skolem’s formulas is consistent (in ℵ1 -valued logic) under the assumption that free variable t takes only the place of w in atomic formulas u ∈ w. All this shows that the question of unlimited consistency of the Comprehension Axiom in many-valued logics still remains open. And, it obviously leaves the room for making several suppositions. For example, it can seem unnatural that Skolem attached the problem directly in Lℵ1 and not in the logic of countably many values. It should immediately be noticed that the endeavours to get a consistency proof of (AC) in Lℵ0 would have be connected with working out of a new method: Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem for the set of rational numbers of the interval [0,1] does not hold. In relation to the problems discussed a recent result by H´ajek et al. [2000] on the ajek shows the Liar paradox and the theory of dequotation should be mentioned. H´ consistency of the theory of arithmetic with the truth predicate over the infinite L � ukasiewicz predicate logic. To this aim, he considers the axiom of dequotation (DA) ϕ ≡ T r(ϕ), where T r is a unary predicate of truth, in the language of Peano arithmetic PA extended with T r, and ϕ is the G¨odel number of ϕ. As known, adding (DA) to the axioms of PA founded on the classical logic leads to the contradiction, since one may construct the formula α such that α ≡ ¬T r(α) and thus to prove α ≡ ¬α. Taking into account the fact that the last formula is � ukasiewicz logic H´ajek showed, that when formalized in the not inconsistent in L L � ukasiewicz predicate logic PA + DA is consistent. The proof of the claim uses the nonstandard models of the structure N of natural numbers with zero, successor, ajek constructs a formula, that over N behaves as addition and multiplication. H´ a formula saying “I am at least a little false”.
13
MODES OF MANY-VALUEDNESS
There are two main approaches to logic. One related to the notion of valid or tauto logical formulas and the other, which uses the consequence relation. Depending on the choice, we may therefore speak about two different kinds of many-valuedness. Taking this into account, we get rid on the problem of possible formulation of the status of many-valuedness. Next to the two notions, we introduce the third concept of inferential many-valuedness stemming from a natural generalization of the standard consequence relation.
Two kinds of many-valuedness A system of logic determined by a matrix M for the standard language Lk is tau tologically many-valued, whenever E(M ) does not coincide with the set of classical TAUT. The 1918 L � ukasiewicz example of such tautologies TAUT, i.e. if E(M ) = a matrix is M3 = ({0, 1/2 , 1}, ¬, →, ∨, ∧, ↔, {1})
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Grzegorz Malinowski
where ¬x = 1 − x, x → y = min(1, 1 − x + y) etc. It is, however, fairly simple to construct a matrix for Lk operating on {0, 1/2 , 1}, whose content is T AU T and, thus, defining two-valued logic. Note that to this aim it suffices to enlarge the set of the distinguished values adding 1/2 . Thus, the matrix M3∗ = ({0, 1/2 , 1}, ¬, →, ∨, ∧, ↔), {1/2 , 1}) defines the tautologically two-valued logic. When a logic is understood as a consequence relation |=M then it is many-valued, or c-many-valued, if |=M is different from the classical consequence relation |=2 . Since E(M ) = {α ∈ F or : ∅ |=M α}, every tautologically many-valued logic is also c-many-valued. Notice, that still the L � ukasiewicz logic may serve as an example: |=2 This, however, cannot be reversed. There are few examples of logics, |=3 = which are tautologically two-valued, but are c-many-valued. Consider e.g. the matrix M for Lk for which the connectives are defined by the following truth tables: x 0 t 1
¬x 1 1 0 ∧ 0 t 1
→ 0 t 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 t 0 0 0
t 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
∨ 0 t 1
1 1 1 1 ≡ 0 t 1
0 1 1 0
0 0 0 1 t 1 1 0
t 0 0 1
1 1 1 1
1 0 0 1
Note, that E(M ) = TAUT, but |=M = |=M2 — since the rule of Modus Ponens fails for |=M , i.e. {α → β, α} |=M β does not hold. The above distinction between the two notions of many-valuedness is particu larly important, when the set of tautologies of a given logic is empty. We face this situation with Kleene and Bochvar logics. The matrix of the weak Kleene (internal Bochvar) logic is K3 = ({f, u, t}, ¬, →, ∨, ∧, ≡, {t}), with the first set of operations. As it was already stated, this logic is nontautological, E(K3 ) = ∅. However, Kleene logic is non-trivial since the conse quence |=K 3 consists of some special rules of the classical logic: 38 X |=K 3 α if and only if X |=2 α and V ar(α) ⊆ V ar(X).
for any classically consistent X ⊆ F or, i.e. such that h(X) ⊆ {1} for some interpretation h ∈ Hom(L, A2 ). 38 V
ar(α), V ar(X) are the sets of variables appearing in α and all formulas in X, respectively.
Many-valued Logic and its Philosophy
67
Multiple-element models of two-valued logic The use of logical matrices is undoubtedly the most natural way of achieving may-valuednes i.e. the consequence relation different from |=2 . We have already discussed two cases of getting a genuine logic of this kind. However, taking a multiple-element matrix as a base for the logical construction does not guarantee its many-valuedness. And, on the other hand, there are different kinds of that property. Consider, for instance, the matrix W3 = ({0, t, 1}, ¬, →, ∨, ∧, ≡, {t, 1}), x 0 t 1
→ 0 t 1
¬x 1 0 0 ∧ 0 t 1
0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 t 0 t t
t t t t 1 0 t 1
∨ 0 t 1
1 1 t 1 ≡ 0 t 1
0 1 0 0
0 0 t 1 t 0 t t
t t t 1
1 1 1 1
1 0 t 1
Notice, that with every h ∈ Hom(L, W3 ) the valuation h∗ ∈ Hom(L, M2 ) corresponds in a one-to-one way such that hα ∈ {t, 1} iff h∗ α = 1. Therefore, |=W = |=M2 and W3 is nothing more then a three-valued model of the two-valued logic.39 The last, somewhat striking, case is when a multiple-element matrix retains all classical tautologies, i.e. its content coincides with TAUT, but its consequence relation differs from the classical by some rules of inference. The matrix K3∗ = ({f, u, t}, ¬, →, ∨, ∧, ≡, {u, t}), being like the Kleene-Bochvar matrix K3 but having two elements u and t des ignated has this property. Its consequence operation |=∗3 falsifies M P , since the inference {p → q, p} |=∗3 q does not hold.
Inferential many-valuedness Suszko [1977] stated that any matrix consequence, and, therefore every structural consequence relation,40 may be described using 0-1 valuations and thus that every logic is logically two-valued. The idea that shifted logical values over the set of matrix values refers to the division of matrix universe into two subsets of desig nated and undesignated elements and use the characteristic functions of the set of 39 Similar n-element models (any n ≥ 2) of the classical logic may be provided using matrices having standard connectives described in Section 7. 40 See Section 11.
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designated elements D as logical valuations. A question whether many-valuedness of that kind is possible at all, led Malinowski [1990] to the next mode of logi cal many-valuedness, more precisely the three-valuedness, being a property of a natural consequence-like approach. The departure is a division of the matrix universe into three subsets of: rejected elements, accepted elements and all other elements. On such grounds it was pos sible to define the relation being a formal counterpart of reasoning admitting rules of inference which from non-rejected assumptions lead to accepted conclusions, see Malinowski [1990]. The relation was then called, somewhat inaccurately, a q-consequence. In the sequel, we shall use the term inference instead. An inference matrix for L is a triple M ∗ = (A, D∗ , D), where D∗ , D are disjoint subsets of rejected and accepted elements, respectively. |=M ∗ is said to be a matrix inference of M ∗ if for any X ⊆ F or, α ∈ F or: X |=M ∗ α iff for every h ∈ Hom(L, A)(hα ∈ D whenever hX ∩ D∗ = ∅). According to this, α is inferred from the set of premises X, whenever it is the case that if all premises are not rejected then α is accepted. Thus, the logical inference runs from non-rejected premises to the accepted conclusions. There are non-trivial reasons for which considering such inference relations is but a theoret ical enterprise, see Malinowski [1990; 1998]. Obviously, with each relation |=M ∗ one may associate the operation W nM ∗ : 2For → 2For putting W nM ∗ (X) = {α : X |=M ∗ α}. Notice that when D∗ ∪ D = A, W nM ∗ coincides with the consequence CnM determined by the matrix M = (A, D). In other cases the two operations dif fer from each other - too see this consider any inference matrix of the form ({e1 , e2 , e3 }, f1 , f2 , ..., fn , {e1 }, {e3 }). The inferential framework just introduced is a natural generalization of the standard one. So, when D∗ ∪ D = A, all concepts reduce to their standard coun terparts. The inference |=M ∗ coincides with the matrix consequence |=M , since D∗ and D are complementary. Accordingly, the inference becomes the relation of consequence. A It is easy to observe that for any inference matrix M ∗ for which D∗ ∪ D = no class TV of functions t : F or → {0, 1} exists such that for all X ⊆ F or and α ∈ F or, X |=M ∗ α iff for each t ∈ TV, (t(X) ⊆ {1} implies tα = 1). Thus, some “proper” W nM ∗ are not logically two-valued in the sense of Suszko. Now, for every h ∈ Hom(L, A) we define a three-valued function kh : F or → {0, 1/2 , 1} putting
Many-valued Logic and its Philosophy
1 1 /2 kh (α) = 0
69
if h(α) ∈ D if h(α) ∈ A − (D∗ ∪ D) if h(α) ∈ D∗ .
Given an inference matrix M ∗ for L let KVM ∗ = {kh : h ∈ Hom(L, A)}, X |=M ∗ α iff for every kh ∈ KVM ∗ if kh (X) ⊆ {1/2 , 1}, then Kh (α) = 1, This is a kind of a three-valued description of |=M ∗ . Notice that KVM ∗ reduces to T VM and KVM ∗ to T VM and |=M ∗ to |=M when D∗ ∪ D = A. In Malinowski[1990] an inference operation of which W nM ∗ is a prototype was introduced and studied. An operation W : 2For → 2For is an inference operation 41 provided that for every X, Y ⊆ For (W1) (W2)
W (X ∪ W (X)) = W (X)
W (X) ⊆ W (Y ) whenever
X ⊆ Y .
W is called structural if for any substitution e ∈ End(L) (S)
eW (X) ⊆ W (eX).
Where M ∗ is any inference matrix, W nM ∗ is structural. In turn, all Linden baum’s tools may be adopted to structural inference operations W to exactly the same effect. Thus, the bundle of Lindenbaum’s inference matrices WX = ( For , For − (X ∪ W (X)) , W (X)) may be used to prove, cf. Malinowski [1990], that for every structural inference operation W there is a class K of inferential matrices such that W nK (X) = {W nM ∗ (X) : M ∗ ∈ K}. We conclude that each structural logic (L, W ) is logically two- or three-valued. A generalization of the inferential approach onto more values seems technically possible. It also seems, however, that a natural explanation of such an inferential device might be much more difficult to get, see Malinowski [2002].
Towards many-valuedness inference Inferential three-valuedness discussed above is entirely consistent with the common understanding of logical system as a set of formulas closed under substitutions, usually defined as a content of a logical matrix: For any inferential matrix M ∗ = (A, D∗ , D) and a corresponding matrix M = (A, D), W nM ∗ (Ø) = CnM (Ø) = E(M ) 41 Originally
it was called a quasi consequence or a q-consequence.
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This means that any logical system may equally well be extended to two-valued logic (L, CnM ) or to a three-valued logic (L, W nM ∗ ). Then, obviously, depending on the quality and cardinality of M the two extensions may define different logics. Perhaps the most striking is that even CPC i.e. the content of two-element matrix M2 can also be extended to the three-valued inference. The inference matrix M2∗ = (A2 , Ø, {1}) determines the operation W nM2∗ such that W nM2∗ (Ø) = E(M2 ) = TAUT. It would be in order to add, that the “inferential” part of this logic is, ia some sense, uninteresting since the class of non-axiomatic rules comprises only sequents X/α, where α is a tautology, α ∈ TAUT. The question on how the three-valued inference is characterized deductively, i.e. through the set of rules and appropriate conception of proof leads to interesting results. First, the proper notion of proof for the inference operation is the weakest possible when we retain the usual notion of a rule.42 To give an idea let us mention that it differs essentially from the standard proof in exactly one point: the repetition rule (rep) {α/α : α ∈ F or} is no longer unrestictedly accepted as the postulate that each premisse (or assumption) in the proof is automatically accepted as a conclusion (one of subsequent steps in the proof). Notice that the presence of the repetition rule is but an immediate consequence of the methodological Tarski postulate (T0) and not by a separate declaration i.e. it is not given as a rule per se. Note that this is no more true for the inference relation. The absence of (rep) in the general framework makes room for several modifica tions of inference and getting an infinitely many inferences which are still weaker than the consequence operation having the same system of theorems (tautologies) as its base. These may be received simply by adding only some instances of the rule. Thus, for instance, if W (Ø) is non-empty, for α ∈ W (Ø) α ∈ W (α). That is due to the fact that then at least { α/α : α ∈ W (Ø)} is a rule of W . Perhaps then, a slightly better way of providing a workable framework for ob taining logical many-valuedness would be to change the concept of a rule of infer ence.
14
FUZZY SETS AND FUZZY LOGICS
Everyday reasonings operate on imprecise concepts and are supported by approx imate inferences. That makes the possibility of applying the apparatus of the classical logic to formalize them very limited. Among special tools extending the formalization power of the standard approach are fuzzy sets theory and fuzzy log ics. Our aim now is to account for one of the most interesting but simultaneously most controversial conceptions inspired by logical many-valuedness. 42 See
Malinowski [1990].
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Fuzzy sets Zadeh [1965] defines a fuzzy set A of a given domain U as an abstract object characterized by generalized characteristic function UA with values in the real set [0,1]: UA : U → [0, 1]. The values of UA are interpreted as degrees of membership of elements of U to the fuzzy set A. The extreme values of this function, 0 and 1, denote respectively: not belonging to A and entire membership to A. Limiting the scope of UA to {0, 1} results in an “ordinary” characteristic function and in this each “classical” set is a special case of a fuzzy set. Fuzzy sets are an instrument of modelling inexact predicates appearing in nat ural languages. Thus, for example the property of “being much greater than 1” defined on the set of real positives R+ can be assigned to a fuzzy set W with a non-decreasing characteristic function R+ → [0, 1] which meets the conditions like: RW (0) = 0, RW (1) = 0, RW (5) = 0.01, RW (100) = 0.95, RW (500) = 1 etc. Certainly, in the above example only values RW (0), RW (1) unquestionable and the selection of other values is somehow arbitrary. In the family F (U ) of fuzzy (sub)sets of a given domain the relation of inclusion reflexes the order between the reals: A⊆B
if and only if UA (x) ≤ UB (x)
for any a ∈ U ,
and the counterparts of the operations of complement (−), union (∪) and inter section (∩) are set by: U−A (x) = 1 − UA (x)
UA∪B (x) = max{UA (x), UB (x)}
UA∩B (x) = min{UA (x), UB (x)}.
Bellman and Giertz [1973] showed that UA∪B and UA∩B are the unique nondecreasing continuous functions warranting both the compatibility of the con struction with the standard algebra of sets and the fact that (F (U ), ∪, ∩, −) is a de Morgan lattice if and only if U−A is defined as above. It is in order to notice that, in spite of the naturalness of the proposal, several studies admit as (more) helpful, fuzzy sets algebras defined otherwise.43 The values of generalized characteristic functions may be identified with log ical values of propositions of the form “x ∈ X”, where ∈ is a “generalized” settheoretical predicate. Subsequently, using logical constants of a base logic one may set the inclusion and the operation s of fuzzy set algebra as: A ⊆ B =df ∀x(x ∈ A → x ∈ B) −A = {x : ¬(x ∈ A)} A ∪ B = {x : x ∈ A ∨ x ∈ B} A ∩ B = {x : x ∈ A ∧ x ∈ B}. 43 See
e.g. Zadeh [1976].
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For Zadeh’s algebra the choice of a base logic is to great extent prejudiced: it (this logic) must be based on ℵ1 -element matrix, wherein negation is expressed by the function 1 − p, disjunction and conjunction, respectively by: max{p, q} and min{p, q}, and the universal quantifier as the greatest lower bound (inf ). The function of implication is not uniquely determined. However, evidently it should meet the requirement: (.)
If p → q = 1, then
p ≤ q.
Though L � ukasiewicz’s implication and, consequently, his ℵ1 -valued logic, have been the most intensely applied, similar connectives of other logics have been also taken into account. The commonly shared belief among scholars working on fuzziness, both theoreticians and practicians, is that only a concrete application of fuzzy sets algebra can decide about the final form of the base logic (see Gaines [1976a]).
Reasoning and inexact predicates In the initial applications of fuzzy sets theory much attention was focused on the analysis of reasoning using inexact predicates, standard propositional connec tives and quantifiers. Remarkably susceptible of experiment there appeared to be paradoxes, whose “successful” analysis consolidated the motivational layer of the conception of fuzziness. This account yielded the first understanding of the term “fuzzy logic” as a certain class of many-valued logics with uncountably many values, with L � ukasiewicz logic in the foreground. Goguen’s [1969] analysis of the classical paradox of a bald man may serve as an example. Intuitively, we would be ready to accept the two following propositions: (z1) (z2)
A man with 20.000 hairs on his head is not bald A man who has one hair less than somebody who is not bald is not bald as well.
So, applying the Detachment Rule 20.000 times, we shall get the conclusion that a man with no hair is not bald either. Naturally, the paradox stems from (z2) and more specifically from inexactness of the predicate “bald” or, equivalently, “not-bald”. The paradox will vanish when logical value of the proposition “A man with n hair is not bald” is identified with the degree of membership of a man with n hair to a fuzzy set “not-bald”, since then (z2) would have logical value less � ukasiewicz than 1, say 1 − ε, where ε > 0. If, for instance, in basic logic we use L implication then as result of 20.000 derivations we will obtain a proposition of the logical value amounting to 1 − 20.000ε, thus practically false. The development of fuzzy sets theory has surpassed all expectations. For its use there were adopted almost all important concepts of set theory, topology, algebra and probability calculus. It is remarkable that these were the applica tions in Computer Science and steering theory that gave an impetus to the most
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extensive development of the theory: they have confirmed the usefulness of the unconventional methodology worked out by means of fuzzy set conception (see e.g. Gottwald [1981]).
Fuzzy logic proper Zadeh’s [1975] fuzzy logic is a method of modelling of imprecise reasoning oper ating on imprecise concepts and rules of approximate reasoning. Its construction conveyed the belief that thinking in terms of fuzzy sets is a typical feature of hu man perception. The examples of reasoning whose analysis might be possible due to fuzzy logic are such “inferences” as: Putin is very healthy Healthy men live a very long time
Bill likes women that are tall and wicked Monica is not very tall but very wicked
Putin will live a very long time
Bill will probably like Monica.
Fuzzy logic seeks to formulate several rules of approximate inference. For this purpose it attempts to formalize colloquial linguistic usage of certain “hedges” applied to imprecise concepts such as “very”, “more or less”, “too” etc. Zadeh’s logic is a two-level semantical construction allowing the fuzzines of predicates, their hedges and logical values. Its central elements are: (1) Denumerable set T V of linguistic logical values generated by its element “true” with the help of the hedge “very” and logical connectives. (2) Hedges of predicates and logical values, “very” being a special one. (3) The procedure of linguistic approximation compensating the lack of closure of the (object) language and the closure of the set T V onto logical connectives. Fuzzy logic is based on ordinary ℵ1 -valued logic with the connectives ¬, →,∨, ∧, ≡ and values in [0,1]. It identifies predicates with fuzzy subsets of a given universe and logical values with fuzzy subsets of the set of [0,1]. The most frequently used � ukasiewicz Lℵ1 (see and discussed is the “fundamental” system FL obtained on L Bellman and Zadeh [1977]). We shall confine our further considerations to some aspects of this construction. It is assumed that the set T V of linguistic logical values of FL is the set of the form: T V = { true, false, not true, not false, very true, more or less true, rather true, not very true, not very false, . . .}
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Grzegorz Malinowski
where “true” is a fixed fuzzy subset of [0,1], “very” a fixed hedge, and all other elements are defined through “true”, “very” and (operations determined by) L � uka siewicz’s connectives. Obviously, the “names” of all logical values are conventional labels and their proper meanings follow from characteristic functions. Hedges are one-argument operations sending fuzzy sets to fuzzy sets. The most basic (a primitive) is a hedge reflecting the adverb “very“ and denoted as g. Zadeh [1972] supposes (g)
UgA (x) = (UA (x))2
and suggests that other hedges should be defined as superpositions of g and con nectives of the basic logic. The most important “derived” operator d is described as follows: (d)
UdA (x) = (UA (x))0,5 .
Zadeh urges that “more or less” is a linguistic counterpart of d. In the relevant literature g and d are called standard hedges and expressibility by their use has become a definability hedge criterion. The procedure of linguistic approximation stems from the lack of closure of T V under logical connectives. More specifically, if Utrue is a characteristic function of the value labelled “true” then, of course, all other elements of that set are thereby specified. Thus, for example the initial values of T V are defined by the following functions: Uf alse (x) Unot true (x) Uvery true (x) Umore or less true (x)
= = = =
Utrue (1 − x) 1 − Utrue (x) (Utrue (x))2 (Utrue (x))0,5 ,
(x ranges over the set of values of the base logic, x ∈ [0, 1]). Consequently, all linguistic logical values depend on the (subjective) introduction of the meaning of “true”. Zadeh calls this feature a localization and the elements of T V , local values. Thereby received, as a result of localization, the systems of FL are called local logics. For those logics there is the common way of defining logical connectives; it consists in identifying them with the operations of the algebra of fuzzy (subsets) of [0,1] and thus, in a sense, with connectives of the base logic. A linguistic approximation is a heuristic procedure assigning to any propositions linguistic logical values. For obvious reasons it is impossible to specify even a general principle of that procedure; what can said is merely that in a concrete application of a fuzzy logic it consists in searching for the closest value from T V 0 for a statement. As it has been already mentioned, fuzzy logic aims at formulating the rules of approximate reasoning (or inference). Basic as well standard rule of that kind is the Compositional Rule of Inference
Many-valued Logic and its Philosophy
u1 is F u1 and u2 are G
u1 and u2 are F u2 and u3 are G
u2 is LA{F ∗ G}
u1 and u3 are LA{F ∗ G}
75
where u1 and u2 are objects, F and G predicates (properties or relations) and ∗ an operation of relational composition, in the former case ∗ is defined as follows: UF ∗G (u2 ) = supx (UF (x) ∧ UG (x, u2 )), and LA{F ∗ G} is a linguistic approximation to the (unary) fuzzy relation F ∗ G. The following is an exemplification of the first scheme: a is small number a and b are approximately equal b is more or less small number In more complicated rules, the premisses are compound statements of several de grees of complexity e.g. if u1 is F , then u2 is G, and may be quantified by fuzzy quantifiers i.e. expressions like most, many, several, few etc. In the end, the for mulation of other rules, like e.g.the Rule of Compositional Modus Ponens special operations on fuzzy sets has to be used. In practical application of fuzzy inference rules the first set consists in assign ing fuzzy predicates fuzzy subsets of a given universe; in the case of (non-unary) relations, fuzzy subsets of relevant Cartesian products of their domains. This procedure, often referred to as fuzzy restriction, obviously exceeds logic. Notwith standing, within the scope of a logic it is possible to formulate general principles of restriction resulting from the peculiarity of formal devices. Zadeh’s “fuzzy” conception has found its place among accepted methods of Artificial Intelligence. It holds its ground due to reliable applications as e.g. in medical diagnosis, see Turner [1984].
15
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Algebraic and metamathematical studies of the infinite-valed L � ukasiewicz logic, see Cignoli et al. [1999], are among the most important issues of recent investigations. Somewhat related to these studies are activities and concerning “t-norm” based ajek [1998] fuzzy logics and delineating a class of propositional logics, called by H´ logics (in a narrow) sense. Further to this, at least two topics somewhat connected to the sciences of information should be mentioned: the lattices of truth and information, invented by Belnap [1977] and Ginsberg [1987], and the automatic deduction problems.
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Truth functional fuzzy logics The influence of fuzzy set theory initiated the study of a class of systems of many-valued logics, whose semantics is based on the real interval [0,1]. Several comparisons between the systems serving as a base for particular constructions directed the scholar’s attention to, possibly idempotent, strong conjunctions con nectives, whose corresponding truth functions were associative, commutative, nondecreasing and have 1 as its neutral (unit) element. Such functions were called t-norms. Accordingly, a binary function ∗ on [0,1] is a t-norm (triangular norm) if for any x, y, z ∈ [0, 1] x ∗ (y ∗ z) = (x ∗ y) ∗ z x∗y =y∗x if x ≤ y, then x ∗ z ≤ y ∗ z x ∗ 1 = x. Connectives corresponding to t-norms are conjunctions. Further to this one may also define t-conorms which serve as truth functions of disjunctions and, possibly do relate the two functions using appropriate function of negation. In Section 6 we � ukasiewicz already had examples of both, the t-norm (the function min(x, y) of L � ukasiewicz disjunction). conjunction) and t-conorm (the function max(x, y) of L H´ajek’s [1998] is the main study of fuzzy logics in the narrow sense. More precisely, the study of logics defined by continuous t-norms (a t-norm is continuous is considered in the mathematical terms is continuous as a mapping). Among the important continuous t-norms are the following: L � ukasiewicz t-norm x ∗ y = max(0, x + y − 1),
G¨ odel t-norm x ∗ y = min(x, y),
product t-norm x ∗ y = x·y ;
it may be of interest that all these functions have been used in numerous applica tions of fuzzy set theory as well as fuzzy logics (compare Section 14). The connectives defined through the continuous t-norm conjunctions (continuity with respect to the left argument is sufficient) are special. Accordingly, there is algebraically nice procedure relating them with implications, which have having good metalogical properties. Any such implication → is defined as residuum of a given t-norm ∗, i.e. x → y = max{ x : x ∗ z ≤ y}. H´ajek introduces the basic fuzzy propositional logic, BL-logic, as the logic of continuous t-norms on [0,1]. The language of BL comprises the connectives of conjunction &, implication → and the constant ⊥ of falsity. The semantics of BL is established by the function of t-norm, all other functions corresponding to the connectives are derived. A formula is a BL tautology if and only if under each valuation of propositional variables compatible with the functions of connectives ajek’s [1998] axiom system adequate for BL logic is the it takes the value 1. H´ following:
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(H1) (α → β)→ ((β → γ) → (α → γ) (H2) (α & β) → α) (H3) (α & β) →(β & α) (H4) (α & (α → β))→(β & (β → α) (H5a) (α →(β → γ)) → ((α & β ) → γ) (H5b) ((α & β)→ γ)→ (α →(β → γ )) (H6) ((α → β) → γ)→ (((β → α) → γ) → γ) (H7) ⊥ → α . Any system of propositional logic determined by a t-norm in the way indicated may be received as a strengthening of BL. For instance, L � ukasiewicz, G¨ odel and product logics result form BL by addition of one axiom schema marked by the first letter of its name: (�L) ¬¬α → α (G) α → (α & β) (P) ¬¬α → ((α → (α & β)) → (β & ¬¬β)). BL extends to the basic fuzzy predicate logic in a standard way. H´ ajek [1998] shows interesting features of t-norm based predicate calculi, see also H´ajek and others [2001], Montagna [2000].
Tableaux and sets of signs Tableaux are among valuable tools for automated deduction, see Bolc, Borowik [2003], the area of interest of scholars working in logic programming, automated software development and verification. That explains still big interest in exploring and developing the tableaux methods in many-valued logic. H¨ahnle [1993] improved essentially the multiple-valued proving based on the standard tableaux for finite-valued logic. The solution, which has to decrease re dundancy of tableaux systems uses truth value sets of signs as prefixes instead ahnle, let us start with the Surma-Carnielli method of refuta signs. Following H¨ � ukasiewicz logic. tion illustrated with an example anchored in the three-valued L The tableaux rules mirror entries of the truth-tables of the connectives. Thus, for the disjunction ∨ characterized by the max function i ∨ j = max(i, j), the disjunctive formula signed with 1/2 , the rule emerges simply from the entry on the table described by the formula /2 (ϕ ∨ ψ) iff (1/2 ϕ and 0ψ) or (1/2 ϕ and 1/2 ψ) or (0ϕ and 1/2 ψ)
1
and it has the following form: /2 (ϕ ∨ ψ) 1 /2 ϕ 0ϕ 1 1 /2 ψ /2 ψ .
1 1
/2 ϕ 0ψ
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Grzegorz Malinowski
As usual the vertical line signifies branching. It is obvious that in general the in crease of logical value increases both the number of rules and the size of branching. Given a propositional logic L defined by a finite matrix M = (AM , D) , where AM = (AM , f1 , . . . , fr ), the algebra of signs for L is defined as an algebra AS = (S, f1 , . . . , fr ) similar to AM with the operations defined as mappings from finite sequences of elements of S into sets of signs: f1 (S1 , . . . , Sm ) = {fi (j1 , . . . , jm )|jk ∈ Sk , 1 ≤ k ≤ m}. Any algebra AS defines a semantics of L in terms of truth values sets correspond ing to the members of S. Thus, for a formula ϕ = F (ϕ1 , . . . , ϕm ) two related interpretations f and f of F in A and AS are associated. The definition of an L−tableau rule,44 specifies the conditions ensuring all expected properties, that is, soundness, completeness, and some minimizing requirements, expressed in terms of linear subtrees called extensions. A collection of extensions is a conclusion of a tableau rule when it satisfies four conditions which relate possible functions of the matrix with extensions and homomorphisms from the language L into the algebra of signs AS . The properties, which the class of homomorphisms associated to a given logic must satisfy, imply a kind of minimality of a number of extensions as well as exhaustiveness of the covering of the truth tables of the connectives. A minimal set of homomorphisms associated to a connective immediately leads to a tableau rule. For the disjunction {1/2 }(ϕ ∨ ψ) in the three-valued logic already considered, this set of homomorphisms has two elements h1 and h2 : h1 (ϕ) = {1/2 }, h1 (ψ) = {0,1/2 } h2 (ϕ) = {0,1/2 }, h2 (ψ) = {1/2 }. This, in turn, yields the following rule: {1/2 }(ϕ ∨ ψ) {0, /2 }ϕ {1/2 }ϕ 1 {0, 1/2 }ψ . { /2 }ψ 1
The new paradigm requires some further changes in the conceptual environment. To provide them all one should collect and consider all possible queries or, at least, reduce them to a small set. H¨ahnle is aware of that, and he gives a definition of a contradiction set of signed formulas. A signed formula for which no rule is defined is self-contradictory. Such is {1/2 }Iϕ : no rule for Iϕ exists since I ranges over � 3 are {1/2 }Lϕ, the set {0,1}. Further examples of self-contradictory formulas in L 1 { /2 }M ϕ and {0, 1}T ϕ. A full tableau system for the propositional part p of the three-valued logic L �3 presented in H¨ ahnle [1993] employs the following set of signs: {{0, }, {1/2 }, {1}, {0, 1/2 }, {1/2 , 1}} 44 See
H¨ ahnle [1993, p. 34].
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79
and the set of rules consisting of schemes such as (1) for every set in the family � 3 . We show how the sets of signs work just specified and for every connective of L � 3 tableau proof of validity of the formula on the example45 which presents the L ¬p ⊃ (∼ p ∧ ¬p) with two L � 3 -definable connectives: ∼ i = 0 if i = 1, ∼ i = 1 otherwise; i ⊃ j = j if i = 1, i ⊃ j = 1 otherwise. (1) [−] {0, 1/2 }(¬p ⊃ (∼ p ∧ ¬p)) | (2) [1] {1}¬p | (3) [1] {0, 1/2 }(∼ p ∧ ¬p) | (4) [2] {0}p (5) [3] {0, 1/2 } ∼ p (6) [5] {1}p closed with (4,6)
|
(7) [3] {0, 1/2 }¬p (8) [7] {1/2 , 1}p closed with (4,8)
Lattices of truth and information Belnap [1977; 1977a] defined a four-valued logic, primarily designed for solving some problems of relevant logics. However, the logic and its generalization oc curred also important for automated reasoning, Artificial Intelligence and Com puter Science applications. The original motivation is based on the idea, that the data, which are used by the computer or another inferential device, including a human being, may be inconsistent. Accordingly, given a state of affairs S, the data base may not contain any information concerning it, or it may contain contain the both: information that S obtains and that S does not obtain. The Belnap’s logic has to handle that situation and its set of epistemic values B4 consists of four elements: f (falsity), t (truth), ⊥ (undetermined) and (overdetermined): B4 = { ⊥ f , t , }. Two lattice orderings on B4 are possible: the knowledge ordering ≤ k , which has ⊥ as the minimal and as the maximal elements, and the truth ordering ≤ t having f as the minimal and t as the maximal elements. Both orderings may be represented in the following way: 45 Example
4.9 in H¨ ahnle [1993]; all tableaux rules are on pages 38 and 39.
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Grzegorz Malinowski
knowledge �
�� � � �t f� � � �
�
� �
⊥
�
truth
The last figure shows two lattices: the knowledge lattice, showed directly and the truth lattice, which results if if the diamond is rotated counterclockwise and the axes change their menings. The two lattices are similar, though they are applicable in different situations. The knowledge lattice is useful for relevant logics and to paraconsistency — Belnap employs the matrix having it as universe with and t as two distinguished elements. The truth lattice suits better for computer science applications — in this case it is natural to take t as the only designated element. Considering two partial orderings of B4 simultaneously was the major intuition behind the concept of bilattice, an ingenious generalization of the Belnap’s setting, see Ginsberg [1987; 1988]. The main idea was to get arbitrary set of values with two partial orders forming two lattices related as in B4. A bilattice is a structure ( B, ≤ t , ≤ k , − ) such that: (1) (B, ≤t ) and (B, ≤k ) are complete lattices (2) x ≤t y implies that −y ≤t −x for all x, y ∈ B (3) x ≤k y implies that −x ≤k −y for all x, y ∈ B (4) − − x = x for all x ∈ B In the next figure we have an example of the bilattice having nine elements. Arieli and Avron [1994; 1996] introduced the concept of logical bilattice. Logical bilattice is a pair (B,F ), where B is a bilattice and F is a prime bifilter on B , i.e. a prime filter with respect to ≤ k and a prime filter with respect to ≤ t . The investigations of bilattices went into at least two directions: algebraic and logical — see e.g. Avron [1996]. Fitting introduced the notion of interlaced bilattice: a bilattice is interlaced if the lattice operations of inf and sup defined by the two orders are monotone with respect to both, the ≤ k and ≤ t . One of the most important results concerning bilattices is the characterisation of the class logical bilattices in terms of B4. Avron [1998] showed that B4 plays similar role among bilattices as the two-element Boolean algebra in the class of all Boolean algebras.
Many-valued Logic and its Philosophy
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knowledge � (1, 1) �� � � 1 (1/2 , 1)� � (1, /2 ) � �
�� � � � � �� (0, 1) � (1/2 , 1/2 ) � (1, 0)
�� � �
� �
� � �� � �
1 (0, 1/2 )� � ( /2 , 0) � � �� (0, 0) � truth
16
APPLICATIONS
Projections of the expected applications always constituted a distinguished moti vation for many-valued logical constructions. Some these conceptions, as e.g. in L � ukasiewicz, were to be a philosophical revolution. And, though it is quite uneasy to say whether and to what extent these expectations came actually to vain there are some concrete applications of many-valued logics and algebras to philosophical logic and to such practical areas as the switching theory and Computer Science. Below we present some examples.
Independence of axioms The logical method of testing axioms independence using algebras and matrices � ukasiewicz. To demonstrate that an axiom system is is credited to Bernays and L independent one singles out a property, mostly validity, which is common to all axioms besides of one chosen and is inherited, via accepted rules of inference, by all theorems of the systems. The procedure being repeated as many times as there is the number of axioms in the system. The application of the method can be illustrated by the following example: Consider (¬, →)-system of the classical propositional calculus originating with L � ukasiewicz. Its axioms are:
82
Grzegorz Malinowski
(A1) (A2) (A3)
(¬p → p) → p p → (¬p → q) (p → q) → ((q → r) → (p → r)),
and the rules M P and SU B. Let now M(A1) = ({0, 1}, ¬1 , →, {1}) ,
M(A2) = ({0, 1}, ¬2 , →, {1})
be matrices wherein the implication connective → is determined classically (by the well-known truth table), ¬1 (0) = ¬1 (1) = 0 and ¬2 (0) = ¬2 (1) = 1. Moreover let M(A3) = ({0, 1/2 , 1}, ¬, →, {1}) be a matrix with the connectives defined by the tables:
α 0 1 /2 1
¬α 1 1 /2 1
→ 0 1 /2 1
0 1 1 0
1
/2 1 0 0
1 1 1 1
It is readily seen that E(M(A1) ), E(M(A2) ) and E(M(A3) ) are closed under (M P ) and (SU B) and that (1) (2) (3)
A1 ∈ E(M(A1) ), A1 ∈ E(M(A2) ), A1 ∈ E(M(A3) ),
A2 ∈ E(M(A1) ) A2 ∈ E(M(A2) ) A2 ∈ E(M(A3) )
and and and
A3 ∈ E(M(A1) ), A3 ∈ E(M(A2) ), A3 ∈ E(M(A3) ).
Therefore the axiomatics (A1)–(A3) is independent. The application of the method described is not limited to the logical calculi. The proofs of independence in set theory through the use of matrices built on the base of Boolean algebras were presented by Scott and Solovay [1969].
Formalization of intensional functions L � o´s [1948] showed that, under some reasonable assumptions, the formalization of functions of the kind “John believes that p” or, more accurately, “John asserts, that p” naturally leads to many-valued interpretation of the belief-operators within the scope of the system of the classical logic. All propositions “John asserts, that p” are clearly substitutions of the schema “x asserts, that p”, whose formal counterpart is a function Lxp, assigning logical value to each couple (name, proposition). L � o´s gives the following axioms for his system in an appropriate language L:
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83
Lxp ≡ ¬Lx(¬p) Lx(Ai), where (Ai), i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, is the ith axiom
� ukasiewicz
of (¬, →)-system of CPC of L Lx(p → q) → (Lxp → Lxq)
(∀x)Lxp → p LxLxp ≡ Lxp
(L1) (L2i) (L3) (L4) (L5)
and accepts the rules: MP, the substitution rule and generalization. The intuitions captured by the author are justified: so, e.g. (L3) expresses the fact that everyone uses MP : asserting a conditional statement and its antecedent commits one to assert the consequent. (L4) says that a sentence acknowledged by everyone is a theorem of the system. The operators Lx, Ly, . . . are certainly not the only intensional functions of the system considered. What is more, the closed formulas of the language define intensional propositional functions i.e. connectives; here the case is the function S: Sα =df ∃x∃y(Lxα ∧ Ly(¬α)), which can be interpreted as “it is questionable, that α”. Intuitively, the definition conveys the thought that saying “it is debatable that α” means to say “two people exist such that one asserts α, and the other asserts not-α”. Any interpretation of the system of L-operators starts with the selection of a definite range of nominal variables and a proposition set. In the simplest case of two persons A and B who do not agree in all the issues the set of propositions Z is divided into four classes, denoted as: 0, 1/3 , 2/3 , 1. The first class, 0, con tains propositions which are acknowledged by neither person, the second class, 1/3 , propositions which A acknowledges and B does not, the third class, 2/3 , propo sitions which B acknowledges and A does not. Finally, the forth class, 1, all propositions acknowledged by A and B i.e. all logical theorems and perhaps other propositions acknowledged by both men. Identifying the acceptance of a proposi tion α by a person s with the formula Lsα we get a truth-table assigning to classes 0, 1/3 , 2/3 , 1 the pairs of logical values of truth (t) and falsity (f). In turn, making use of truth-tables for t and f we get the characterization of implication, negation and the connective S by means of the tables whose elements are the symbols of the four considered classes of propositions.46 L 0 1 /3 2 /3 1
A f t f t
B f f t t
α 0 1 /3 2 /3 1
¬α 1 2 /3 1 /3 0
Sα 0 1 1 0
→ 0 1 /3 2 /3 1
0 1 2 /3 1 /3 0
1
/3 1 1 1 /3 1 /3
2
/3 1 2 /3 1 2 /3
1 1 1 1 1
46 0,1/ ,2/ , 1 are identified with pairs (x, y), where x, y ∈ {f, t}, defined by the table for L. 3 3 The connectives are defined just as in the product of matrices i.e. ¬(x, y) = (¬x, ¬y) and (x1 , y1 ) → (x2 , y2 ) = (x1 → x2 , y1 → y2 ).
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Grzegorz Malinowski
L � o´s suggests that the objects 0, 1/3 , 2/3 , 1 may be treated as logical values. He further considers the matrix I4 = ({0, 1/3 , 2/3 1}, ¬, →, {1}) showing that E(I4) = TAU T {¬, →} (the set of classical (¬, →)-tautologies), and hence that many-valuedness of this system has but formal character. The shifting of L � o´s interpretation onto the cases with more persons is straight forward, and it results in next formally many-valued versions of CPC (described by matrices with more than four elements).
Many-valued algebras and switching theory Soon after the successful applications of the classical logic, Boolean algebras and other algebraic structures (e.g. groups) in switching theory, in the 1950s, the schol ars centered the interests on the possibility of the use of many-valued logic algebras for similar purposes (see e.g. Epstein, Frieder and Rine [1974]). These interests brought about the birth of several techniques of the analysis and synthesis of elec tronic circuits and relays based (mainly) on Moisil and Post algebras (see Rine [1977]). Below, we confine ourselves to some remarks justifying the purposefulness of using many-valued algebras in switching and relay circuits theory. The most elementary composite of the traditional electronic circuit is a mechanical contact opening and closing some fragment of an electrical network. The switch over of contacts is affected mechanically or electromechanically (i.e. using relays). And, among the contacts of a given network one may find such pairs of contacts which according to the technical assumptions have to change their positions into comple mentary simultaneously. The simplest example of such situation is the gear of two oppositely oriented contacts x1 and x2 positioned in parallel branches of a circuit (see Fig. 1): x1 is normally closed while x2 normally open. When considering the ideal model of the circuit one assumes x1
x2 Fig. 1
x1 •��◦ •��◦ •��◦
(1/2 )
x2 •��◦ •��◦
(0)
•��◦
(1)
Fig. 2
that both contacts react momentarily to an affection and thus stroking, as shown at Fig. 2, from the state (1) to (0). Practically, however, it may happen that x1 will open still before x2 would be closed and, consequently, contrary to the technical presumptions the gear during a time moment will be open. That is just the
Many-valued Logic and its Philosophy
85
reason for such a modelling in which the third state (1/2 ) (see Fig. 2) is considered; the table bez x1 x2 forehand characterizes the “real” switch-function 1 1 1 1 as a function of states and contact (1 inside the /2 0 1 table denotes normal contact’s state and 0 its de0 0 0 nial). On the other hand, one also may read the table treating x1 and x2 as (one-argument) functions of states i.e. of z, and their values as states as well putting: x1 = s1 (z), x2 = s2 (z) . Let us no tice that then s1 and s2 are Moisil’s operations on {0, 1/2 , 1} . Subsequently, to describe any network built of the contacts x1 , x2 and their complements x1, x2 one should define binary operations ∪ and ∩ corresponding to two pos sible types of connections and unary operation N such that xi = N xi (i = 1, 2) and that N N z = z for z ∈ {0, 1/2 , 1} . It appears that the most accurate ways of introducing these operations leads to the three-valued Moisil algebra on {0, 1/2 , 1} : ({0, 1/2 , 1}, ∪, ∩, N, s1 , s2 ). A generalization of the outlined construction onto the case of any number of contacts similarly results in n-valued algebras. The algebraic treatment of switch ing devices aims at providing several techniques of the analysis, the synthesis and the minimalization of multiplex networks. The most important advantage of the many-valued approach is the possibility of elimination of possible switching dis turbance through the algebraic synthesis of the networks, see e.g. Moisil [1966]. Application of many-valued algebras is not limited to binary contacts. Investi gations concerning multi-stable contacts and switches have also been undertaken. However, according to difficulties with technical realizations of devices working on voltage-mode and the progress of technology of binary highly integrated circuits these activities are not very common. Still, however, many-valued constructions attract attention of engineers. Thus, for instance, multiple values may be useful for describing transistors. Hayes [1986], H¨ahnle and Kernig [1993] give an example of such modelling M OS transistors. Due to a degradation of signals, a M OS transistor has different signal levels at source and terminals. It occurs that the natural way of modelling leads to a seven-valued , ⊥), whose values are organized in a form of a lattice logic N = (F, T, F, T, , �� � �
� T
F� � � �
� � �
� � � � � T F� � � � � �� ⊥
86
Grzegorz Malinowski
where the values represent respectively: F and T — full strength signals, F and — values which represent two modes of faulty nodes, T — degraded signals, , 47 and ⊥ — “no signal”). The reader interested in the current state of investigation in this field is advised to consult “Computer”, IEEE Computer Society monthly as well as the yearly editions of this influential American organization “Proceedings of the MultipleValued Symposia”.
Many-valuedness in Computer Science The full scale hardware realizations of ternary computers were successfully com pleted at least twice: in 1958 the arithmetical SETUN in USSR and in 1973 logico arithmetical TERNAC in USA. However, just the first emulation of TERNAC proved that both the speed and price are on the order of magnitude of the speed and price of binary computers. Since further experiments also showed the neces sity of complication of programming languages, more attention has been directed towards the using many-valued algebras for synthesis and construction of hardware devices working with 2n voltage levels (n ≥ 2), especially memories (see Epstein, Frieder and Rine [1974], Bauer et al. [1995]). Post algebras found an important application in the systematization of the oretical research concerning programs and higher level programming languages which contain instructions branching programs, such as e.g. CASE, SELECT etc. The application of these instructions considerably simplifies programs thus making them more readible. In turn, the structure reconstruction of a branched program naturally leads to Post algebra of an order n. The typical CASE (or SELECT ) situation is that in which one the (sub)programs P 1, . . . , P n should be performed according to whether conditions W 1 or . . . or W n are satisfied. Then, the con stant functions of Post algebra, e1 , . . . , en , may be interpreted as devices which keep track of which of W 1, . . . , W n are true. The most powerful tool of the contemporary methodology of programming languages, algorithmic logic (see Salwicki [1970]) is formulated in the language containing operators which represent composition, branching and iteration op erations on programs. The systems of this logic contain expressions represent ing programs and formulas describing properties of these programs. Rasiowa’s ω + -valued extension of algorithmic logic is not only fully adapted to arbitrary “wide” branching programs but it also constitutes a starting point for other more advanced logical constructions (see Rasiowa [1977]). Its semantics is based on Post algebras of order ω + defined similarly as Post algebras of order n in Rousseau version: the simplest algebra of that kind is of the following form: Pω = ({e0 , . . . , eω }, ∪, ∩, →, −, {Dk }k<ω , {ei }0≤i≤ω ) (0, 1, . . . , ω are ordi nal numbers), where: −eω = e0 < e1 < . . . < eω , ei ∪ ek = emax (i, k) , ei ∩ ek = emin (i, k) , ei → ek = eω when i ≤ k, ei → ek = ek when i > k, −ei = e0 for 47 See
also H¨ ahnle [1993].
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i = 0, −e0 = eω , Di (ek ) = eω if i ≤ k and Di (ek ) = e0 otherwise (compare Section 5). Algorithmic logic is among the main predecessors of the recent outcome of com puting theory called dynamic logic, see e.g. Harel [1984]. The term dynamic logic is the generic name given to logical systems appropriate for reasoning about changes from one state to another, which ultimately may also represent programs. Though it is grounded in features of programming and program verification, dynamic logic borrowed heavily from modal logic and has its autonomous philosophical impor tance. Many-valued semantics founded on several algebraic structures have been widely used in logic programming. The framework for applications of bilattices in seman tics of logic programming is discussed in Fitting [1991].
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PRESERVATIONISM: A SHORT HISTORY
Bryson Brown Preservationism is a general approach to understanding consequence relations. Preservationist consequence relations dispense with the usual assumption that the semantic and syntactic properties preserved by consequence must be truth (or satisfiability) and consistency. Instead, this family of consequence relations draws on other semantic and syntactic features of premise sets, conclusion sets and even of consequence relations themselves. Preserving those features across extensions of sets of sentences, or a range of cases, provides new accounts of consequence. The central idea was proposed by R. E. Jennings and P. K. Schotch in a series of papers that appeared in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Since then, they, their students and colleagues have developed a wide range of new consequence relations, as well as some new readings of familiar consequence relations. In general, an interesting preservable property of premise sets will be preserved under some but not all extensions of the premise set. Philosophically, it will be a property we think of as “good” for a set to have — but what this comes to is not very constraining: What we require is not ideal goodness (something which lurks behind the conventional attachment to ‘truth-preservation’), but only a modest, comparative sort of goodness. Here two slogans, coined by Schotch and Jennings (respectively), fit nicely: Hippocrates: Don’t make things worse. Making do: Find something you like about your premises, and pre serve it. Properties dual to such premise-set properties make good candidates for preserv able properties of conclusion sets. Interesting new consequence relations also result when we insist that a truth-preserving consequence relation be preserved across a range of premise and conclusion sets based on given premise and conclusion sets. We begin with an account of the familiar classical consequence relation, empha sizing its preservational character. The main early motivation for preservationism emerges from this account: The need for a consequence relation that deals more constructively with inconsistent premises. The rest of the story will present, in rough chronological order, the main preservationist systems and what is known (and not yet known) about them.
Handbook of the History of Logic. Volume 8 Dov M. Gabbay and John Woods (Editors) © 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1
SOME OBSERVATIONS ABOUT THE CLASSICAL VIEW OF CONSEQUENCE
We will say that a set Γ is consistent if and only if it is impossible to derive a sentence and its negation from Γ; Γ is satisfiable if and only if some allowed valuation assigns a designated value (usually read as a form of ‘truth’, indicating the correctness of an assertive commitment) to every sentence in Γ. A set is maximally consistent if it is consistent and adding any sentence to it would produce an inconsistent set. Similarly, a set is maximally satisfiable if it is satisfiable and no proper superset is satisfiable. The standard view of consequence relations results from a straightforward account of semantic and syntactic consequence relations ( and ): guarantees the preservation of truth, while preserves consistency. This can also be expressed (without appeal to the notion of a ‘guarantee’) by saying that preserves the satisfiability of all satisfiable extensions of Γ, and that preserves the consistency of all consistent extensions of Γ. Formally, 1. Γ α iff ∀Γ [(Γ ⊇ Γ&Γ is satisfiable) → Γ , α is satisfiable]. 2. Γ α iff ∀Γ [(Γ ⊇ Γ&Γ is consistent) → Γ , α is consistent].1 In English, if Γ extends Γ satisfiably or consistently, then every consequence of Γ must satisfiably or consistently extend Γ . This leads to an interesting observa tion: We can say that closing under these consequence relations begs no questions, construing question begging as treating sentences as part of the commitments that go with having accepted Γ, despite their being incompatible with some acceptable extensions of Γ. Conclusions that are incompatible with acceptable extensions of a premise set clearly go beyond the commitments that come with accepting those premises.2 Given the soundness and completeness of our system of derivation, 1 and 2 are simply alternative definitions of the same consequence relation, represented in the standard way as a set of ordered pairs of sets of sentences and individual sentences. The principle point here concerns the implications of this picture of consequence for the consequences of unsatisfiable or inconsistent premise sets. Both unsatisfiability and inconsistency are preserved when we form supersets. So if Γ is unsatisfiable 1 Here we’re using the notational convention that Γ, α = Γ ∪ {α}. We could also present 3 and 4 in slightly different form:
3 .
Γ � α iff ∀Γ [(Γ is a maximal satisfiable extension of Γ) → α ∈ Γ ].
4 .
Γ α iff ∀Γ [(Γ is a maximal consistent extension of Γ) → α ∈ Γ ].
However, both these formulations leave aside the issue of extension — and to our way of thinking, the notion of a consequence relation is very tightly linked to the idea of ‘acceptable’ extensions of sets of sentences. Of course we can re-capture this notion by appeal to extensions which are subsets of such maximal extensions. So the two versions will be distinct only if we have non-standard notions of unsatisfiability and inconsistency that are not always preserved under supersets. 2 Of course, those interested in induction and ampliative reasoning in general may balk at defining acceptability in terms of satisfiability or consistency alone — so they may still dispute Hume’s characterization of induction as question-begging.
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or inconsistent, Γ has no satisfiable or consistent extensions. This implies that for an unsatisfiable or inconsistent premise set Γ, every sentence trivially preserves the satisfiability of every satisfiable extension of Γ; for such a Γ clauses 1 and 2 are satisfied for every α. Thus every sentence is a consequence of an unsatisfiable or inconsistent set. This trivialization of the consequences of unsatisfiable and inconsistent premise sets is deeply rooted in the standard account of consequence relations. Interest in paraconsistent consequence relations began with the recognition that, though this is all clear and perfectly correct as far as it goes, trivialization of these premise sets is also very unhelpful. In the course of events, we sometimes do end up with inconsistent sets of commitments. Classical logic’s response is to demand that we find another set of premises to work with. Though this seems to be good advice, it does not provide enough guidance, that is, it does not tell us how to do what it demands. Once we have arrived at inconsistent commitments, we need insight into those commitments to help us see how to improve on them. Classical logic simply tells us that our commitments are trivial, leaving behind neither an account of the content of conflicting commitments that could help us reflect on where and how we have gone wrong, nor any way of muddling through in the meanwhile. The classicists’ main response has been to interrogate the premises involved separately, on suspicion. Sometimes this is helpful. But sometimes the bona fides of each premise look perfectly sound, even though their collective consequences make it clear that something has gone wrong. As a simple example, consider a large collection of measurements, collectively inconsistent but each carefully made. No individual result need stand out as suspicious here, and repeating the measurements (if this is possible) is likely to produce yet another inconsistent set of results. Another sort of case arises when we develop formal theories: Simple sets of axioms each of which seems to express a clear, if informal, intuition that we want to capture often turn out to be inconsistent. Giving one or more up undermines the application that motivated the construction of the formal system in the first place. If we could find a constructive way of faute de mieux reasoning with inconsistent measurements and axioms, the results might be illuminating. But classical logic won’t allow it.
Paraconsistency A consequence relation that copes constructively with such sets of commitments must go beyond preserving the classical notions of truth or consistency. We say that a consequence relation Rp is minimally paraconsistent 3 iff this trivialization 3 The definition of ‘paraconsistent’, meaning either beyond or near consistent, remains con tested territory. Some, following da Costa, demand that a paraconsistent logic not have the law of non-contradiction, ¬(p ∧ ¬p), as a theorem. But most now focus on non-trivialization. The divide within this group separates those who insist on non-trivialization of contradictions, i.e. the failure of p ∧ ¬p α, for some α, and those who insist more weakly only on the non-trivialization of some inconsistent premise sets.
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fails for Rp , i.e. iff for some classically unsatisfiable or inconsistent set of sentences Rp . There are two main strategies for Γ, there is a sentence α such that Γ, α ∈ producing such a consequence relation, based on different ways of changing clauses 1 and 2.
Strategy A: New accounts of “truth” and “consistency” This is the road most traveled in paraconsistent logic. Its practitioners include di aletheists, who defend a radical account of truth according to which some contra dictions are in fact true. But they also include more conservative figures who take the new semantic values they propose for sentences to express epistemic commit ment, or some other status more modest than truth, tout court. On our taxonomy, any paraconsistent semantics that provides non-trivial assignments of designated values to the members of some classically unsatisfiable sets of sentences falls into this group (the difference between the dialetheists and the rest being a matter of interpretation, rather than a substantive difference of formal approach). This approach retains the standard assumption that whenever α is not a semantic con sequence of Γ for a consequence relation R, this is because the proposed semantics provides a valuation V such that for all γ ∈ Γ, V (γ) ∈ {v : v is designated} and V (α) ∈ {v : v is designated}. While truth is the standard reading of a designated value, philosophers have not always interpreted the designated values of a formal semantics as forms of truth. For instance, in “How a Computer Should Think,” Belnap reads the values of Dunn’s four-valued logic epistemically, as “told true”, “told false”, “told both” and “told neither”. However, even when we keep this interpretational latitude in mind, this semantic approach to consequence relations remains formally constraining. It focuses our attention on the assignment of values to sentences and the distinction between designated and undesignated values. The resulting consequence relations insist that Γ α holds if and only if α is assigned a designated value in every valuation assigning designated values to all the members of Γ. The implications of this account are explored in a very general guise in Scott [1974]. Scott considers the properties of a consequence relation determined by a set of ‘allowed’ valuations from the sentences of a language L, defined as functions from sentences of L into {0,1}, where Γ α ⇔ ∀V ∈ allowed valuations: ∀γ ∈ Γ, V (γ) = 1 ⇒ V (α) = 1. All three of transitivity, monotonicity and reflexivity must hold for any such conse quence relation, and any consequence relation obeying these rules can be captured by such a set of allowed valuations. But there are interesting forms of consequence relation that do not fit this pattern. And some consequence relations that do fit the pattern can also be captured (and illuminated) by a different approach.
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Strategy B: Preservationist Paraconsistency The preservationist approach has been less widely pursued. But it has some ad vantages over the first. The main idea is contained in our two opening slogans, Schotch’s Hippocratic principle and Jennings’ suggestion that we learn to make do. There are many properties whose preservation will constrain the acceptable extensions of sets of sentences. Whether we think of them as measures of how bad our premise set is, or of how good it is, they allow us to distinguish good extensions from bad, and thereby allow us to go on distinguishing consequences from nonconsequences even when our premise sets are logically imperfect. More radically, we can also consider dispensing with extensions in favour of a more general pic ture, in which we replace the set of allowed valuations with a function from sets of sentences to allowed valuations. The intersection of the sentences assigned ‘1’ by the valuations acceptable relative to Γ then determines Γ’s consequences. Insisting that the valuations acceptable relative to Γ assign ‘1’ to an extension of Γ forces reflexivity and transitivity on the consequence relation, while this generalization allows for consequence relations that are not monotonic, transitive or reflexive: Reflexivity obviously fails, when at least one of the allowed valuations relative to Γ fails to assign ‘1’ to a member of Γ. Transitivity fails in a somewhat subtler way: If some valuation acceptable relative to Γ assigns ‘0’ to β, while every valuation acceptable relative to Γ assigns ‘1’ to α and every valuation acceptable relative to Γ, α assigns ‘1’ to β, then β will fail to be a consequence of Γ even though β is a consequence of Γ,α and α is a consequence of β. This case is odd, indeed, but the formal account just given allows for it, as d’Entremont [1983] made clear. And there is something valuable in this, even if our proposals don’t exploit this possibility: By making room for these outr´e possibilities, we can illuminate the dif ference between systems that allow them and systems that don’t. Further, just as conditional forms of monotonicity apply to some preservationist logics, conditional forms of these properties, ensuring that reflexivity and transitivity hold except in certain ugly circumstances, provide more ways of coping when our premises do get ugly. For example, we might choose to ‘write out’ any contradictory sentences in a premise set Γ by refusing to assign them the value ‘1’ in the valuations allowed relative to Γ, while retaining reflexivity for all other sentences. From the classical point of view, there is nothing worse than an inconsistent, unsatisfiable set of sentences. Classical logic preserves satisfiability or consistency only; once these are lost nothing remains that a dogmatically classical logician cares to preserve. But this is short-sighted, narrow-minded, or both. Some other features of premise sets are worth preserving. Non-triviality is the most obvious example, but we will encounter several examples of specific preservable properties that can persist and be systematically preserved by a system of inference even in premise sets that are unsatisfiable and inconsistent. Beginning with a set of sentences that merely includes p and ¬p and applying our consequence relation to obtain the set of all sentences makes things worse by any reasonable measure: It takes us from a set that we could reasonably use to
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represent someone’s (inconsistent) beliefs, or the contents of an interesting but in consistent theory, to the set of all sentences in the language, a set that is completely useless as a representation of either. Applying a non-paraconsistent consequence relation to inconsistent premise sets clearly violates Schotch’s Hippocratic advice on dealing with bad situations. And this implies that we have good reason to take up Jennings’ positive suggestion: We should seek other virtues that such premise sets can still possess, and ways to reason with them that respect those virtues. The preservationist alternative widens the options before us. It liberates conse quence relations from the tyranny of designated values. It does not demand that we find a way to assign a designated value to the premises of a rejected consequence while assigning a non-designated value to the conclusion. We can assign values to sentences just as classical logicians do,4 so long as we also recognize other features worth preserving. If some inconsistent/unsatisfiable sets possess these features and the features are not preserved by every extension of these sets, then the resulting consequence relation will be a paraconsistent one.
2 ORIGIN MYTH Preservationism developed out of work on deontic logic, begun roughly in 1975 by Raymond E. Jennings and Peter K. Schotch. But, like many innovative ideas, it arose from work aimed at other concerns. At the time, Jennings had recently been to New Zealand on a research trip to extend earlier work on the logic of preference and utilitarianism that he had done while working on his MA at Queen’s University. Jennings remarks that he found New Zealand ‘just like England before the war — the war of 1812, that is’. But he also found it a wonderful place to be as he worked on his ‘utilitarian semantics’. Wellington was friendly and accessible, and Jennings learned a lot of modal logic from both Rob Goldblatt and Max Cresswell. On his return from New Zealand, Jennings made a trip to Dalhousie University to visit Steven Burns, an old friend from student days at Queen’s. As the local logician, Peter Schotch was recruited to act as host. Jennings stayed with Schotch for about 5 days as the two worked through a list of 38 Henkin-style completeness proofs for various systems of modal logic. The next summer Jennings took a teaching appointment at Dalhousie and worked with Schotch on plans for a book on modal logic. Their aim was to update and refine the material in Hughes and Cresswell’s book in the light of Segerberg’s work on frame theory; they hoped to make the result ‘a little more readable’ than Segerberg. As they worked on their Primer on Modal Logic (only partly finished during that summer’s work), Jennings was also pursuing issues in deontic logic. One day he came into Schotch’s office and exclaimed that normal modal logic doesn’t work. His complaint was that it collapses distinctions that they both considered important. This collapse was particularly clear in the light of Segerberg’s topological semantics 4 Though,
of course, we need not!
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for modal logic, [Segerberg, 1972], which defines a modal frame as an ordered pair, U, R, with U a set and R a non-empty binary relation on U . Each element of U determines a valuation on the modal language, with the modal operator having the truth condition: u α ⇔ ∀u : Ruu :u α. This class of modal frames is characterized by the following principles:5 K:
α ∧ β → (α ∧ β)
RM:
α → β ⇒ α → β
RN:
α ⇒ α
The following two equivalences are inescapable for any such logic: α → ♦α ⇔ (α → ♦α) p → ♦p ⇔ ¬⊥
But despite their equivalence in any normal modal logic, these pairs of statements are intuitively distinct, at least when read deontically: That ‘ought implies can’ seems distinct from ‘It’s not the case that it ought to be the case that the false’. Similarly, that ‘If it ought to be that it ought to be that α, then it ought to be permitted that α’ seems distinct from ‘It ought to be that, if it ought to be that α, then it is permitted that α’. Schotch and Jennings began to consider how to change the semantics so as to distinguish these principles. The obvious targets (as constraints on normal modal frames) were: 1. The requirement that the set of points in the frame be non-empty. 2. The central role of the binary ‘accessibility’ relation defined on the points. Pursuing empty frames seemed both odd and unhelpful, so Schotch and Jennings decided to explore changes to the relation. The only restriction normal modal logic imposes on the relation is that it must be binary, so the obvious alternative was to consider relations of higher ‘arity’.6 Beginning with a ternary relation treated as a function from worlds to ‘accessible’ world-pairs, they proposed a simple truth condition for ‘α’: M M M u α ⇔ ∀xy : uRxy →x α or y α.
Right away it was clear that on this semantics, α, β (α∧β). The first question they turned to was how to get 5 It can also be characterized by the elegant single rule, R� : Γ α ⇒ �[Γ] �α, where �[Γ] is the result of placing a ‘�’ in front of each element of Γ. 6 The possibility of multiple binary relations was also explored.
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α ∧ β → (α ∧ β)
K:
back again in this semantic context. Requiring ∀x, y : ∃uuRxy → x = y is close enough (though not quite exactly right, since this approach to collapsing the ternary semantics into a binary semantics doesn’t correspond strictly to K). The second question was, what corresponds to modal aggregation in this context? The next day, Jennings pointed out that K2 :
α ∧ β ∧ γ ((α ∧ β) ∨ (α ∧ γ) ∨ (β ∧ γ))
holds in ternary frames, on pigeon-hole grounds. Similarly, the rule Kn−1 : α1 ∧ . . . ∧ αn (αi ∧ αj ), 1 ≤ i = j ≤ n7 holds in n-ary frames in general. Suspecting that these rules might constitute the general modal aggregation rules for these ‘diagonal’ n-ary frames, Schotch and Jennings began a long effort to provide a completeness proof for them. As the end of summer school approached, they found themselves still stuck on the completeness proof for the logic based on K2 . Both went on working on the completeness problem over the fall and winter, and work on the project continued during summer school in 1976 at Simon Fraser University. As this project continued, Schotch and Jennings also began to reflect on this new consequence relation and its implications for more traditional ideas about consequence. The upshot was a growing appreciation of the limits imposed by the central role generally granted truth in the semantics of logical consequence, and the possibility of casting wider logical nets. Preservationism was born. Since then, it has developed along several main lines, as well as contributing to a number of smaller investigations. Here we will focus on three main lines of preservationist research, commenting on some of the other projects along the way.
Weak Aggregation As we’ve already seen, preservationism began with weakly aggregative modal logics and the ‘forcing’ consequence relation. In this section we continue the story of these logics and some important results that have emerged from work on them. In the summer of 1976, Schotch recalled work he had done in the algebra of modal logic at while at the University of Waterloo. Dennis Higgs, an algebraist there, had introduced Schotch to Tarski and Jonson’s [1951], “Boolean Algebra with Operators”, which included consideration of n-ary frames: A ternary frame corresponds to a binary operator in Tarski and Jonson’s approach, and in general, an n-ary frame corresponds to an n − 1-ary operator. Higgs had encouraged Schotch to work on modal logic from this point of view. At the following NSRCC conference hosted by Steve Thomason, Jennings and Schotch discussed this work with Kit Fine, Krister Segerberg and Rob Goldblatt, 7 Called
(∨).
‘cockroach intro’ (∧∨-intro) for its combination of conjunction (∧) and disjunction
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as well as (someone??) working on applications to computing and dynamic logics. Goldblatt had considered binary operators with a temporal reading of ♦: first this, and then that; he had done a Henkin completeness proof for that system. David Johnston, then a student of Jennings’, successfully applied this approach of Goldblatt’s to n-ary frames in general in his M.A. thesis [1976]. Still, like Schotch and Jennings, he didn’t manage to produce a completeness proof for the diagonal fragment corresponding to Schotch and Jennings’ truth condition for .8 Schotch and Jennings continued to pursue a completeness proof for the diagonal fragment in the summer of 1976. It was clear that the issue was closely connected to (n − 1)-ary partitions of premise sets: pigeon-hole argument established the soundness of Kn−1 for an n-ary frame relation, but a proof of completeness eluded them. While they were struggling with the proof, Max Cresswell passed through and encouraged them to keep at it, remarking that the same thing had happened to him before. After some time, they felt that the K2 case (for ternary frames) was proven. Jim Freeman organized a CPA workshop at which they planned to present the proof. Storrs McCall, Hughes Leblanc and Danny Daniels were there, on a very hot (40◦ ) day. Halfway through lunch Ray asked Peter, “Isn’t this a coun terexample?” Working through it again, Schotch anxious and excited (even manic, he says) and Jennings sleepy in the heat, they arrived at the notion of replacing the K2 rule with an appeal to a new consequence relation, the consequences that survive the n-ary partitions of a premise set. This consequence relation, written Γ[ α, holds if and only every n-partition of Γ includes a cell that classically proves α. With this notion of consequence in place of K2 , completeness for their diagonal modal logics could be proven straightforwardly. At the 1978 SEP meetings in Pittsburgh, this novel ‘forcing’ relation and aggre gation principles took the stage together, with Bill Harper, Teddy Seidenfeld and Bas van Fraassen among the audience. Chellas pointed out that Scott’s elegant rule for normal modal logic: Γα (Γ) α could be used to capture the diagonal n-ary modal logics Schotch and Jennings had formulated: Simply put the new forcing consequence relation in place of ‘’ in Scotts’ rule, and the diagonal n-ary modal logic would result. Barbara Partee pointed out that this consequence relation would allow non-trivial reasoning from inconsistent data. Earlier at the meeting, R. Wolf had read a paper, titled “Studies in Paraconsistent Logic I,” about work with Newton da Costa — this paper might have been the source of Partee’s suggestion. Partee’s intervention marked the first time that Schotch and Jennings heard the word ‘paraconsistency’. 8 This problem, which continued to be a central concern for Schotch, Jennings and their co workers, can be found (in what may be its first appearance in the literature) in Prior’s work on tense operators, where he defined the following pair of operators:
�u α · β ⇔ ∃xy : uRxy&(�x α∧ �y β) � α β ⇔ ∀xy : uRxy ⇒ (�x α∨ �y β) The ‘�α’ operator of the diagonal fragment of n-ary modal logic can be defined as α α.
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Perhaps unsurprisingly, the reception for Wolf’s paper may not have been en tirely positive: Schotch reports a ‘fierce scowl’ on Rich Thomason’s face during the presentation, though he adds that this might not have indicated a negative response to the paper. At any rate, following the conference Schotch and Jennings went off to pursue more work on paraconsistency.9 The result was a series of papers by Schotch, Jennings and Johnston on paraconsistency and new ideas for consequence relations that appeared between 1979 and the mid-80’s. In 1979, in the IEEE annual conference proceedings, Schotch and Jennings presented their new measure of (departure from) consistency in a paper titled “Multiple Valued Consistency”. In Schotch and Jennings [1980], the links between modality and consequence were explored, paralleling Scott’s rule for the base modal logic K with the forcing rule for the Kn modal logics. Another topic in Schotch and Jennings’ investigations at the time grew out of the study of n-ary relations (where n > 2) that their semantic interest in these modal logics led them to. The theory of binary relations has dominated mathematical exploration of relations — even ternary and quaternary relations rarely come to the fore there. Special names are used to characterize particular families of binary relations: reflexive, binary, transitive, symmetric, Euclidean, serial, etc. But names for particular families of ternary relations are hard to find — as are explorations of any correspondence between the standard families of binary relations and relations of higher ‘arity’. While binary relations play important roles in our understanding of the modal logic of binary frames, there were many interesting questions to ask about the parallel cases (if any) for ternary and higher arity frames. D.K. Johnston took a special interest in these issues at the time. But the central target of preservationist work in this period was the forcing relation, its semantics and axiomatization. In the early 80’s Schotch and Jennings contributed “On Detonating” to a volume on paraconsistency being edited by Graham Priest and Richard Sylvan. This paper presented a multiple-conclusion version of forcing, with weakened aggregation used to treat both inconsistency on the left and the failure of consistent deniability on the right. The volume finally emerged in 1989 as [Priest et al., 1989].10 The issues pursued in this period include the completeness question, the axiomatization of forcing, frame correspondence issues, and the 1st order definability of frame conditions providing semantics for extensions of the base diagonal n-ary modal logics formulated in terms of the forcing relation. It was during this time that Schotch and Jennings’ exploration of 9 On the way home, Jennings found a pen on the plane that he went on to use in the course of writing five new papers. 10 Schotch and Jennings’ sense of urgency to get these early results published was justified — in 1980 David Lewis first presented “Logic for Equivocators” (published in 1984 in Nous); he subsequently inquired about exactly when Schotch and Jennings had first published their ideas. On finding they had published first, he later referred to their work for ‘technical details’ as an illustration of his own more conservative approach to paraconsistency. In fact, at least as I see it, Lewis’ motives in his [1984] suggest something closer to the ambiguity-based preservationist approach to Priest’s LP, first proposed in [Brown, 1999].
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the semantics of forcing first provided a completeness proof for an axiomatization of forcing — however, the proof was so tangled and difficult to follow that Schotch and Jennings never published it. But several notions that emerged from that work played important roles in subsequent developments.
Coverings and level functions In Jennings and Schotch [1984], the forcing consequence relation arises from a definition of levels of incoherence, reflecting a formally tractable sense in which things can be made worse, as we extend a given premise set. As we’ve seen, the n-forcing relation can be invoked to axiomatize the modal logic of n + 1-ary frames, where a sentence α is an n-consequence of a set of formulae, Γ, if and only if α follows from some cell in every n-partition of Γ. The definition of levels of incoherence generalizes on this, providing the base for a new consequence relation that takes full advantage of the possibility of applying a range of stronger or weaker principles of aggregation to our premises. Level functions are defined very generally at first: With Γ a set of sentences of a propositional language L not including ⊥, 0. ∀Γ, (Γ) ≤ ω 1. (∅) = 0 2. ∀Γ ∈ 2At , (Γ) = 1 3. ∀Γ ⊆ {α| α}, Γ) = 0 4. If Γ ⊆ Γ then (Γ) ≤ (Γ ) 5. If (Γ) = n and level(Γ ) = m then (Γ ∪ Γ ) ≤ (n + m) The level function central to the forcing relation is most generally characterized in terms of coverings rather than partitions: Covering An indexed family of sets of sentences, A = ∅, Ai , 1 ≤ i ≤ ξ covers a set Γ, if and only if, for every γ ∈ Γ, ∃A ∈ A : A γ. The level of incoherence of Γ is then defined as:
(Γ) = Min ξ such that ∃A: A = ∅, A1 . . .Aξ , A covers Γ and ∀A ∈ A, A ⊥, if this limit exists.
(Γ) = ∞, otherwise. For example, ({α ∨ ¬α}) = 0 since the null set covers this set (and the same goes for every theorem, as 3 above requires). ({α, ¬α}) = 2, since the family: ∅, {α}, {α} is a consistent cover of {α, ¬α}, while no smaller family can consistently cover this set. Finally, ({α ∧ ¬α}) = ∞; this, of course, is the assigned ‘level’
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of any set including a contradiction, and is added to our definition to extend the level function to all of 2L . But for any property P of sets of sentences, which is not preserved (in general) in supersets, we can define corresponding notions of covering and level that measure how far a given set departs from having the property. Further, as was first shown in [d’Entremont, 1983], if the initial property is compact, so is the corresponding level property.
Level-respecting consequence With the notion of a level of incoherence in hand, we can now define a new conse quence relation which preserves levels in the same way that classical logic preserves consistency (which amounts to preserving levels 0 and 1). Where ξ = (Γ), Γ[ α if and only if, ∀A : ∅, Ai : 1 ≤ i ≤ ξ ∧ A covers Γ ⇒ ∃A ∈ A : Aα As Schotch has observed, this consequence relation is interesting not just be cause of its subtle approach to aggregation, but also because, while it can be axiomatized and so proofs involving it can be conducted mechanically, which rules are correctly applicable to a given premise set depend on the set’s level. Because level is a generalization of consistency, we cannot, in general, finitely establish the level of an infinite premise set. This implies that while the rules for reasoning in accord with this notion of consequence are mechanically applicable and the con sequence relation is compact, we cannot mechanically decide which rules are the right ones to apply to any given premise set. The potential implications of such rules for foundational studies have yet to be explored.
Traces The central concept in the semantics of forcing is that of an n-trace. T is an n-trace on a set Γ if and only if T is a set of sets such that some member of T is covered (i.e. is a subset of some cell) in each n-partition of Γ. So, where Tn (Γ) is the set of n-traces on Γ and Πn is the set of n-partitions of Γ, T ∈ Tn (Γ) ⇔ ∀π ∈ Πn (Γ), ∃τ ∈ T, p ∈ π : τ ⊆ π. A (left) formulated n-trace on a set of sentences is a disjunction of the conjunc tions of the sentences in each element of the trace. Then every consequence that ‘survives’ the n-partitions of a set of sentences is implied by some such formulated trace on the set: By definition, such consequences are implied by some cell in every partition. So one trace implying such a consequence, α, is the set of all such cells, i.e. the set including a cell proving α chosen from every n-partition: Every such partition covers at least one member of this trace, and every member of the trace implies the consequence in question. Therefore the set of n-traces on the premise set captures the aggregative force of n-partitioning a premise set, and a proof that
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a rule is sufficient to produce the n-traces will (when combined with rules sufficient to obtain the consequences of all singleton premises) be a completeness proof for forcing. Schotch and Jennings [1989] extends these ideas to a multiple-conclusion version of forcing, dualizing their weakening of aggregation on the left with a symmetrical weakening of aggregation on the right. In classical multiple-conclusion logics, any conclusion set at least one of whose members must be true is trivial, that is, it follows validly from any premise set. This trivialization of right-sets that cannot be consistently denied is the dual image of the classical trivialization of inconsistent sets on the left. In multiple-conclusion forcing, coverings of the conclusion set sufficient to divide it into consistently deniable cells are added to the coverings of the premise set already familiar from single conclusion forcing. Like premise sets, conclusion sets are assigned a (right-) level, defined as the least cardinality of a non-trivial covering of the conclusion set. A covering is non-trivial iff none of its members is classically trivial. Conclusion sets under multiple-conclusion forcing can be thought of as closed not under disjunction (which trivializes a conclusion set if at least one of its members must be true), but under 2/n + 1R , an operation forming the conjunction of pairwise disjunctions amongst any n + 1 members. Here the notion of a right-formulated n-trace comes in. Rather than a dis junction of conjunctions, a right-formulated trace is a conjunction of disjunctions. Any premise sentence that forces a conclusion set of level n must classically imply some right-formulated n-trace on the set. We can see this just by considering a special case in the definition of forcing. We define singleton-on-the-left forcing as follows: A singleton premise γ forces a conclusion set ∆ of level n if and only if some member of every n-covering of ∆ is a classical consequence of γ. But, just as for singleton conclusion forcing, all we need do to find a right-formulated trace that γ classically implies is to place each such member of the n-partitions into our n-trace, and form the conjunction of its disjunctions. Ex hypothesi, each of the disjunctions is implied by γ. Therefore their conjunction is as well.
Multiple Conclusion Forcing In multiple conclusion forcing, we say that Γ[ ∆ holds if and only if for every
(Γ) covering of Γ, A, and every (∆) covering of ∆, B, there is some pair of cells, a, b, a ∈ A and b ∈ B, such that a b; more formally: Γ[ ∆ iff ∀A = ∅, a1 , . . .ai |1 ≤ i ≤ (Γ)&∀γ ∈ Γ, ∃i : ai γ&∀i, ai ∅, ai , ∀B = ∅, b1 , . . .bj |1 ≤ j ≤ (∆)∀δ ∈ ∆, ∃ai : δ|ai &∀i, ∅ ∃ak ∈ A, bl ∈ B, ak bl A simple system of rules for multiple-conclusion forcing takes the form:
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Γ[ α, α β, β[ ∆
Γ[ ∆
α∈Γ β∈∆ Ref: Γ[ α β[ ∆ Γ[ ∆, α1 . . . Γ[ ∆, αn+1 2/n + 1(L) : Γ[ ∆, (αi ∧ αj ), 1 ≤ i = j ≤n+1 Γ, α1 [ ∆, . . . , Γ, αn+1 [ ∆
2/n + 1(R) Γ, (αi ∨ αj )[ ∆, 1 ≤ i = j ≤n+1 Γ, α[ ∆, Γ[ α, ∆ Trans: Γ[ ∆
i. Pres : ii. iii. iv. v.
where n = (Γ) where n = (∆)
It turns out that whenever every n-covering of a premise set and every n covering of a conclusion set are such that one cell of the first classically implies one cell of the second, there is a singleton forced by the premise set and forcing the conclusion set. This singleton bridge principle, the main lemma of the completeness proof for multiple-conclusion forcing, was not established until 2001; the proof appears in Brown, “Refining Preservation”, presented at the 2003 meetings of the Society for Exact Philosophy.
Hypergraphs A student of Jennings, David Wagner, was the first to point out an important link between traces and graph-theory. A graph can be represented as a set of pairs, representing the edges of the graph. A hypergraph is defined as a set of sets; each element of the hypergraph is called an edge of the hypergraph A hypergraph can be (properly) n-coloured if and only if one of n colours can be assigned to each of its atoms in a way that leaves none of its elements monochrome. Thus what Scotch and Jennings had called an n-trace is a familiar mathematical object, a non-n-colourable hypergraph. Further, the aggregation rule for the Kn modal logics, j ≤n+1 2/n + 1 : α1 , . . .αn+1 / (αi ∧ αj ), 1 ≤ i = corresponds to the smallest non-n-colourable hypergraph, the complete graph on n+1 vertices. Completeness The first published solution to the completeness problem for single-conclusion forc ing was discovered by Brown in the winter of 1991. Having worked on the problem on and off since 1988, Brown was on sabbatical at the Center for Philosophy of Science in Pittsburgh. There he learned that Belnap and Massey had noticed an important role for the 2/n + 1 aggregation principles so central to forcing in their exploration of just how completely classical semantics determined the classi cal consequence relation (see [Belnap and Massey, 1990]). Brown returned to the problem with a new approach: his aim was to show that 2/n + 1 would suffice to
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prove a contradiction from any n-inconsistent set of premises. The key step in the final proof was an induction on the cardinality of the premise set; a simple appeal to ∨-elimination (correct for singleton forcing) together with the monotonicity of n-forcing led to the result. A version of this proof was published in [Brown, 1993b], a collection of papers published in honour of Ray Jennings, on the occasion of his 50th birthday. A more formal presentation, showing completeness for Schotch and Jennings’ Kn modal logics, appeared in [Apostoli and Brown, 1995]. A further generalization of this work appears in a technical report by Paul Wong [1997], in which the completeness proof presented in [Apostoli and Brown, 1995] is extended to multi-ary modal operators. The connection with hypergraph colourings recognized by Wagner implies that if the completeness result holds, then a hypergraph operation corresponding to 2/n+ 1, forming the pairwise union of the edges of every pair out of n+1 input hypergraphs, together with trivial operations of edge-addition and edge-contraction, will produce all the non-n-colourable hypergraphs from the trivially non-n colourable singleton loop graphs. This result was later generalized, in the appendix of Brown and Schotch [1999]. The chromatic index of a hypergraph H is defined as the least number of colours required for a proper colouring of H. The generalization shows that using any hypergraph of chromatic index n+1 as a ‘template’ for aggregation together with edge-addition and contraction will allow the construction of all the non-n colourable hypergraphs. In a general spirit, Brown [2000], Brown and Schotch [1999], and Brown [2002] present an approach to aggregation that shifts aggregation from operator rules like 2/n + 1 to structural rules governing how conclusions from sets of premises. Such logics arise from consideration of the type-raising transition involved in go ing from from truth-preservation as a relation between sentences in a language to ‘truth-preservation’ as a relation between sets of sentences. The structural rule for aggregation applies the graph-theoretic completeness results, beginng with the closure of singleton premise sets (treated as hypergraphs with a single, singleton edge) under our graph-theoretical analogue of 2/n + 1 (along with edge-addition and contraction). The rule allows the derivation of anything provable in a base logic from every member of a resulting hypergraph. On this account, full aggre gation is not a matter of having the rule α, β α ∧ β, but a matter of the set of graphs we can construct from our singleton premise graphs. Classical (full) aggregation results when no chromatic index limit is imposed on the hypergraphs we can reason from. The advantage of this approach is that the resulting account of aggregation is independent of the connectives available in the object language. Subsequent explorations by T. (later D.) Nicholson, first an undergraduate and then a doctoral student of Jennings, led to dualized formulations of these logical results [Nicholson, Jennings and Sarenac, 2002] and to deeper graph-theoretical results, including an axiomatization of the notion of ‘family resemblance’ [Nichol son and Jennings, forthcoming] and a more general characterization of the non-n colourable hypergraphs and their duals, the n-chines. This has led to the latest formulation of these weakly aggregative logics, using dual formulations based on
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the transverse hypergraphs. A new completeness proof based on this dualized ap proach to aggregation is due to Jennings, D. Sarenac, and especially D. (then T.) Nicholson — see [Nicholson et al., 2001]. This work is built on some interesting new concepts, and develops some striking results about them that have elegant and illuminating connections to the original presentation of forcing. Dual to the notion of an n-trace is an n-chine. We begin by redefining the notion of an n-trace in terms of colourings: Let an n-colouring of the elements of a set S be a function C in S → {1, . . .n}. Then an n-trace T is a set of sets, τi such that any n-colouring of the elements of T ’s members leaves at least one τi ∈ T monochrome. Similarly, the n-chines Xn are sets X whose members χi are such that any n-colouring of the elements of X’s members will be such that every element of X includes a member with one of the n-colours, i.e. ∃i ∈ n such that 1 (i) ∩ χj = ∅. A left-formulated n-chine on a set of sentences Γ is all χj ∈ X, C− a conjunction of disjunctions of the elements of an n-chine on Γ, while a rightformulated n-chine on a set of sentences ∆ is a disjunction of conjunctions of the elements of an n-chine on ∆. The original aggregation rule of forcing is 2/n + 1 : Γ[ α1 . . .Γ[ αn+1 /Γ[ (αi ∧ αj), 1 ≤ i = j ≤ n + 1 It is based, as we’ve seen, on the complete graph on n + 1 vertices, which is the smallest non-n colourable hypergraph. But we can replace that rule with a dual, chine-based rule: n/n + 1 : Γ[ α1 . . .Γ[ αn+1 /Γ[ (αi ∨ . . . ∨ αj ), 1 ≤ i = j ≤ n + 1 where the disjunctions are amongst the n-tuples drawn from the αi . One extremely elegant result of the exploration of this new formulation of forcing is a simple graph-theoretic criterion for n-chines: X is an n-chine if and only if the intersection of every n-tuple of elements of X is non-empty. An illuminating relation between chines and traces is that the set of least interceptors of an n-chine is a n-trace, and vice versa: T ∈ Tn ⇒ {χ|∀τ ∈ T : χ ∩ τ = ∅ & ∀χ , χ ⊂ χ → ∃τ ∈ T : χ ∩ τ = ∅} ∈ Xn X ∈ Xn ⇒ {τ |∀χ ∈ X : τ ∩ χ = ∅ & ∀τ , τ ⊂ τ → ∃χ ∈ X : τ ∩ χ = ∅} ∈ Tn Finally, new ideas about aggregation have emerged in an axiomatization of the notion of family resemblance [Nicholson and Jennings, forthcoming]. The theory of family resemblance Nicholson and Jennings propose is grounded in Wittgenstein’s suggestion that the similarities connecting various kinds of things (get some results in here) involve a collection of properties that members of the kind possess in overlapping, criss-crossing combinations. But the formal details are far richer than the apparently elementary nature of their proposal would suggest. Nicholson and Jennings define the formal notion of a family in a very general way: Let P be a set of properties. Then
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A set F is a family on P if and only if F ⊆ 2P , where F = ∅ and ∅ ∈ F . Family resemblance is a matter of overlap between various members of the family, so what we need to produce a measure of resemblence here isa measure, or measures of that overlap. Where S is a set and q an integer, let Sq be the set of q-tuple subsets of S. Jennings and Nicholson next define the harmonic number of a family F:
def df η(F) = min n : ∃G ∈ Sn : G = ∅, if this limit exists; else = ∞. This by itself is not particularly new except as an application of earlier notions: In terms of our earlier vocabulary the greatest n such that F is an n-chine is F’s harmonic number. But Nicholson and Jennings generalize on this notion, defining the n(-harmonic) saturation number of F, σn (F): F def σn (F) = min m ≥ 1 : ∃k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, ∃G ∈ :| ∩G |≤ m. k This notion measures the thickness of the minimal overlap amongst n-tuples drawn from F, set equal to one more than the cardinality of the minimum overlap. By measuring this minimal thickness of family resemblance for different cardinalities of selections from F, σn (F), these numbers provide a partial ordering of family resemblance that allows us to compare different families and their relations in a variety of ways. Recently, Jennings, Schotch and Brown have returned to work on the set-set consequence relation first explored in “On Detonating”. Brown has adapted the completeness proof for the forcing relation to the set-set case. The key to this proof is a main lemma that demonstrates the equivalence of two distinct represen tation theorems. The lemma shows that aggregation on the left and right of the turnstile is all that distinguishes a multiple premise and conclusion logic from a base consequence relation defined on single sentences. Thus we can say that Γ[ ∆ if and only ∃α : Γ[ α and α[ ∆. The graph-theoretical result of [Brown and Schotch, 1999] shows that the aggregation imposed by n-coverings of premise and conclusion sets can be captured separately by 2/n + 1 on the left and right (or, dually, by n/n + 1). Thus the completeness result for the single conclusion case (easily dualized to cover the single premise/multiple conclusion case) extends to the multiple conclusion logic. These ideas about aggregation have been brought to bear on some interesting applications as well; we briefly describe three of them here. First, in a project that began in 1984, David Braybrooke, Brown and Schotch developed hyperdeontic logic, a logical system combining a dynamic logic of action with a logic of rules. The aim of the project was to arrive at a formal system in which the contents of rules could be clearly expressed, in a way that would illuminate various discussions of rules in social history. The results of this investigation appeared in [Braybrooke, Brown and Schotch, 1995], as well as a few articles — for specifically logical work
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see especially [Schotch, 1996; 2006]. In this work weak aggregation is applied as Jennings and Schotch originally envisioned, to prevent the trivialization of rule systems when they make inconsistent demands. Rather than conclude that such a system demands that its subjects bring about ⊥ (and everything that follows from ⊥), this system respects the level of a rule-systems’ demands. Conflict remains (not all the demands can be met), but this view of the logic of rules allows us to reason sensibly about what is and isn’t required by the rules when such conflicts arise. Second, in his thesis work [Brown, 1985] and in subsequent work [Brown, 1992a; 1993], Brown explored the use of non-aggregative and weakly-aggregative paraconsistent logics to capture the contents of conflicting and internally-inconsistent theories in science. This work has since been extended to work on the idea of ap proximate truth and its contextually-restricted nature, allowing even inconsistent theories to qualify as approximately true within certain contexts of application. Brown’s dissertation examined the mid-to-late nineteenth century conflict over the age of the earth. The later work has focused on the inconsistency of the old quan tum theory, and especially Niels Bohr’s theory of the hydrogen atom. In his [1913], Bohr explicitly proposed a policy of division: As a response to the inconsistencies of Planck’s theory of black-body radiation, Bohr separated his quantized account of the allowed states of the hydrogen atom from the classical eletrodynamic treat ment of the light emitted (and, in later work, absorbed) by the atom; Einstein saw in this clever maneuver ‘the ultimate musicality of thought’. However, while the use of forcing allows us to avoid disaster in our logical models of the contents of inconsistent theories, it doesn’t do as much as we would like to account for actual patterns of reasoning involved in applying these theories. From the very beginning, forcing was recognized to be a very weak consequence relation. In effect, forcing takes the consequences of Γ, where (Γ) = n, to be the sentences that survive every n-division of the contents of Γ. Each n-division produces, after closure of each element of the division under , the union of n classical theories.11 So the closure of Γ under forcing is an intersection of unions of n classical theories — from a certain point of view, one might well ask, what makes such an object a single theory? The formal answer, that it’s a set closed under a consequence relation, is satisfying enough for formal purposes. But for applications, we surely want a closer inferential integration in order to give a nice account of how one reasons with such inconsistent theories. Schotch and Jennings [1989; 1981] explore ways to strengthen forcing. A-forcing, considers only those divisions that keep sets of sentences having some property A ‘together’ in the same element of the division. If we choose consistency for this property (that is, if we regard as consequences of Γ the consequences of every consistent subset) we get the relation "∗ of [Schotch and Jennings, 1981]. If we close under this relation and then close the results, indefinitely many times, we get the " (read ‘yields’) relation, which is reflexive, transitive and monotonic. 11 In divisions with a trivial cell, of course, we get the set of all sentences, but so long as (Γ) = ∞, only the non-trivial divisions do any work.
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But there is a problem with ": It makes things worse, inflating the level of any inconsistent set to ω. For example, let Γ be {p, ¬p}. Then the closure of Γ under "∗ , Csucc∗ (Γ) includes ‘p → A’, for every sentence A. And {p, p → A} is consistent so long as A is consistent. So at the next application of "∗ , the results will include every consistent sentence in the language. This is not quite trivialization — we won’t be able to obtain any contradictions. What we have is the union of every consistent theory in the language. And that is too close to trivialization for comfort. In his MA thesis work with Jennings [Thorn, 1999], Paul Thorn also explored ways of strengthening the forcing relation. One proposal, called n-forcing+ [Thorn, 1999, 91], involves adding to each cell of an n-partition every sentence in the premise set consistent with every consistent subset of Γ. This relation strengthens forcing by eliminating some of the divisions of Γ (the unnecessarily weak ones, in the sense that any members of Γ that are consistent with every consistent cell in any n-division of Γ). We could even eliminate some more, combining A-forcing with Thorn’s proposal to arrive, at the limit, at (Γ) consistent theories each of which is the classical closure of some maximal consistent subset of Γ. But, though this approach avoids the near-trivialization of ", it still leaves us with a union of
(Γ) classical theories as the final result. The skeptical observer will want to know why we should regard the result as a single (Γ)-theory rather than (Γ) separate theories. With some specific applications in mind and the same concerns about the weak ness of forcing, Priest and Brown [2004] proposes yet another way to strengthen the forcing relation. Assuming from the start (as some applications suggest) that a particular division is already in view, the authors went on to propose an approach they call ‘chunk and permeate’: Certain kinds of sentences that can be inferred in some cells of the division are allowed to ‘permeate’ through into other cells of the division, where further inferences can be made. So to specify a chunk and permeate theory, we must specify a division of its claims, and a permeation rule determining what consequences from each element of the division are to permeate into what other cells. As with the " relation, the full results of this process are not to be had in a single step; in general, we must close, permeate, close again, and so on, to arrive at all the results such an approach can produce. But, unlike ", Brown and Priest propose a more restricted rule for combining the results of each step to obtain further consequences. As we’ve seen, if consistency alone is enough to allow sentences to be combined into premise sets from which new conclusions are drawn at the next step, then if we begin with an inconsistent set, we can in fer every consistent sentence in the language. Brown and Priest’s more restricted permeation relation allows us to hope (at least) and prove (in some cases) that the chunk and permeate relation will preserve the level of our original set. In the ini tial form of chunk and permeate, a single element of the division is specified as the place where conclusions are drawn. Aside from some odd cases (in which another element of the division is allowed to trivialize but is sufficiently isolated by the permeation relation that it does not export its trivialization through to the con
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clusion element) level-preservation is essential to non-trivial chunk and permeate structures. One advantage of this approach is that the consequences derived from such a the ory are not always consequences of some consistent sub-theory of Γ. Thus, a chunk and permeate theory can have a stronger kind of logical unity than we find when we simply close Γ under forcing. More to the point for those concerned about ap plications, this procedure for extracting consequences from an inconsistent theory reflects the apparent practice of two important examples of inconsistent theories: the early calculus and old quantum theory. In both cases, calculations produce results that are then treated using mathematical theories that are incompatible with the principles and operations employed in the initial calculation. In [Brown, 1999] another application of forcing is considered. Forcing in its original form aims to keep aggregation from turning contrary sentences into con tradictions. With this in mind, it was natural to consider the lottery paradox and Kyburg’s preferred diagnosis of it in terms of conjunctivitis: The insistence that rational acceptance is closed under conjunction. But, from the point of view of a probabilistic rule of acceptance, contradictions (whose probability is always 0) are not the only ‘bad’ sentences: We may well regard sentences falling below a certain probability threshold as unacceptable as well. This suggests a variation on level: Let εp (Γ) be the least n such that an n-division of Γ has no cell whose closure under conjunction includes a sentence of probability less than ε. Then we can take as the consequence set of Γ, relative to the threshold ε, its closure under
ep (Γ)-forcing. Finally and most recently, Jennings and Nicholson (forthcoming) propose a general logic of taxonomic ranks based on their n-saturation numbers, a measure of family resemblance. Two familiar operations that preserve family resemblance are edge addition and edge expansion. Jennings and Nicholson capture these two operations under the relation of subsumption: Given families F and G, F � G (read F subsumes G) iff for every edge g in G, there is an edge f in F such that f ⊇ g. Clearly, if σn (G) > m, then σn (F) > m. This gives us the first rule of the logic: [↑$] : given F, if G � F, obtain G. The next rule tells us how to aggregate families to produce new families that preserve σn , using an aggregation principle very close to that for aggregating nchines: We begin with a sequence of families, S = F1 , . . .Fi , . . .Fq . For T a set and n ≥ 1, T n-covers S if ∃{F1 , . . .Fn } ∈ (Sn ) such that ∀i ∈ {1, . . ., n}, T is a superset of some e ∈ Fi . T is a minimal n-cover if and only if T is an n-cover and every proper subset of T is not an n-cover. Then n/q(F1 , . . .Fi , . . .Fq ) is the set of all minimal n-covers of S. With these definitions in hand, the aggregation rule is straightforward: [n/n + 1]: Given G1 , . . ., Gn , obtain n/n + 1(G1 , . . ., Gn ), for n ≥ 1. Taxonomic rank, relative to an m − n derivation D of a family F is defined as the position of a family F in the derivation. Such ranks arise when wider families,
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by subsuming narrower ones and/or being constructed by our aggregation rule, have at least the degree of family resemblance of the starting families. This ac count makes taxonomy a study of the preservation of a class of measures of family resemblance. The horizons of preservationist thinking extend beyond these weakly aggregative systems. The generalizations of consistency that forcing preserves are just one set of properties that can be preserved by an interesting consequence relation. But this case alone is enough to establish the interest of preservationism in logic: Broadening the range of properties that a consequence relation could preserve has produced alternative consequence relations that are both formally interesting and philosophically promising.
Two Further Preservationist Ideas A. Paradox tolerance, conditionals and Nobel measures In “Paradox Tolerant Logic” [1983], Jennings and Johnston proposed a preserva tionist approach to producing new forms of conditional connective. Their idea was to add a meta-semantic value to the usual truth value, intuitively read as “fixed ness”. A sentence’s truth value was taken as fixed if its truth value is settled by the nature of the language, with no need for further input from the way the world is. And they assumed that we will want, from time to time, to be able to reason productively within a language that produces, in some circumstances, untoward (i.e. contradictory) consequences. By insisting on the preservation of fixedness, though, we can block inference from such unfortunate results to arbitrary conclu sions about how the world is. The necessary technicalities for the system are straightforward: The sentences of a theory’s language are treated as unanalyzed atoms. They are assigned ordered pairs of values, selected from 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1 and 0, 0. The first member of the pair indicates truth or falsity, while the second indicates fixedness (settled by the choice of language) or lack of fixedness (settled by language and the way the world is). The tables for connectives in the logical system within which we study the theory language are set up intuitively, ensuring that classical tautologies receive the value 1, 1 while contradictions are assigned 0, 1. A conjunction of two fixed truths is itself a fixed truth; a conjunction including a fixed falsehood is a fixed falsehood. Negations reverse truth value while preserving fixity. The resulting tables are straightforward: α
¬α
1, 1
0, 1
1, 0
0, 0
0, 1
1, 1
0, 0
1, 0
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∨
1, 1
1, 0
0, 1
0.0
1, 1
1, 1
1, 1
1, 1
1, 1
1, 0
1, 1
1, 0
1, 0
1, 0
0, 1
1, 1
1, 0
0, 1
0, 0
0, 0
1, 1
1, 0
0, 0
0, 0
∧
1, 1
1, 0
0, 1
0, 0
1, 1
1, 1
1, 0
0, 1
0, 0
1, 0
1, 0
1, 0
0, 1
0, 0
0, 1
0, 1
0, 1
0, 1
0, 1
0, 0
0, 0
0, 0
0, 1
0, 0
Finally, an implication connective is introduced which aims to capture the clo sure under consequence of a set of sentences in the theory’s language. The truthtable for this implication requires that a true implication preserve both truth and fixedness; fixedness of the conditional itself is decided by considering the change ability of the conditional’s truth value in the light of the changeability of the antecedent’s and conditional’s truth values and the (meta) fixedness of their fixed ness values (300). The result is the following matrix: →
1, 1
1, 0
0, 1
0, 0
1, 1
1, 1
0, 1
0, 1
0, 1
1, 0
1, 1
1, 0
0, 0
0, 0
0, 1
1, 1
0, 1
1, 1
0, 1
0, 0
1, 1
1, 0
1, 0
1, 0
The original idea of PTL was to provide a non-explosive conditional that could serve in metalinguistic discussion of the consequence relation of some object lan guage. One result of this metalinguistic focus is that Jennings and Johnston were not concerned with nested conditionals. Still, if we do consider nested cases, the non-explosive nature of the PTL conditional evaporates. Preserving both truth and fixity from left to right ensures that the ‘empirical consequences’ of the theory don’t trivialize when the theory’s language implies contradictory ‘fixed’ truths. But given a fixed contradiction ⊥ the nested conditional, (⊥ → α) → α holds for every α, and we are only two MPP inferences away from trivialization.
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Extending the PTL approach to conditionals, Darko Sarenac’s MA thesis [2000] presents an infinite sequence of conditionals, each involving a longer string of ‘meta-valuational’ properties. PTL assigned 2-place values to sentences in L VP T L : L → {1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0} with the first member of these ordered pairs was read as the truth-value of a sentence, while the second was read as fixedness. Sarenac extended this approach to n-place valuations, VS : L → {1, 1, . . .1, . . .1, 0, . . .0, 0, 1, . . .1, . . .0, 0, . . .} The first place in each n-tuple indicates the sentence’s truth value, while the rest indicate whether it has or lacks certain ‘meta-valuational’ properties, understood as properties of the preceding properties in the sequence. This apparatus allowed Sarenac to produce a sequence of logics, P T Ln , whose conditionals are progres sively less explosive, as the sequence of properties preserved by the conditionals grows. The measure of explosiveness is defined relative to classically inconsistent sets of sentences, for instance {⊥} or {α, ¬α}. In P T L, ⊥ → α fails when α has the value 0, 0, and α → (¬α → β) fails when β has the value 0,0. But when we nest conditionals and apply modus ponens, the old explosions come back: ⊥ → (⊥ → α) always holds because the fixity value of ⊥ → α is always 1 (see line 3 of the matrix for → P T L above). Similarly, ¬α → (α → (¬α → β) always holds, for the same reason. So ‘first degree’ implication of P T L is paraconsistent in the sense that: ∃α P T L ⊥ → α.
But ‘second degree’ P T L implication is not paraconsistent, since:
∀α P T L ⊥ → (⊥ → α). Sarenac defined a properly implicationally paraconsistent implication connective as one such that: ∃α, β : No theorem of L is of the form x → (y → . . .(((. . . → β))). . .), x and y ranging over α, ¬α. As we’ve seen, while P T L α → (¬α → β), P T L ¬α → (α → (¬α → β)). So P T L is not properly implicationally paraconsistent: P T L has conditional theorems that, given a sequence of applications of MPP, would allow us to infer any sentence in the language from the premise set {α, ¬α}. Sarenac then introduced a measure of explosiveness for a logic’s conditional. The definition of this notion turns on the depth of conditional nesting required for trivializing theorems like these to obtain. Consider the formula (α → (¬α → β)).
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This sentence is an implicational fuse for the set {α, ¬α}; any logic L which in cludes this sentence as a theorem will detonate this set — that is, with this as a premise set, we need only make two modus ponens inferences to infer any sentence in the language, [Sarenac, 2000, 19]. While P T L lacks this fuse for {α, ¬α}, we have seen that it still has a fuse of its own for this set. But the fuse P T L provides is a longer fuse. This is the main idea behind Sarenac’s Nobel measure (22–3). We will build up to the definition of the Nobel measure of a set Γ in a logic L, beginning with a straightforward definition of the depth of conditional nesting of a sentence: i.
If α is not an implication, C(α) = 0
ii.
If α is an implication and γ is the consequent of α, then C(α) = 1 + C(γ).
Next, the fuse measure is defined for sentences γ that involve only the implication and negation connectives. Given a premise set Γ, the fuse measure of γ is a function fΓL with the value C(γ) if γ is a fuse for Γ in the logic L, and ∞ otherwise. The Nobel measure of a set Γ is then the length of the shortest fuse for Γ, if there is such a fuse, and ∞ otherwise. The general idea behind the P T Ln sequence of logics is very elegant: Sentences are assumed to have or lack many properties of semantic interest; these properties are gathered together in P = Pi , 1 ≤ i ≤ n. A valuation on the language assigns not just truth or falsity (a value for P1 ) to each sentence, but a value for each of the other properties as well. Each property Pi can be represented as a function in L → 2, and the full value of a sentence written as the sequence of the values of these functions. The conditional is required to preserve all the properties that the antecedent possesses, not just its truth. So, as in P T L, a conditional with a false antecedent is not necessarily true, and a conditional is trivially true only when the antecedent lacks all of the preservable properties. The trick in generating the sequence of increasingly less-volatile conditionals lies in arranging the non alethic part of the conditional truth function to ensure, as each new property is added, that the minimum fuse lengths for {⊥} and {α, ¬α} are increased. The intersection of these increasingly weak conditional logics provides us with a truly non-explosive conditional, though (unlike the members of the P T Ln sequence) a complete axiomatization remains in question. Sarenac also explores another route to the goal of a non-explosive conditional which makes do with just two properties. The key difference between the properly paraconsistent conditional of SX and the conditional of P T L is that SX’s condi tional retains the second value of its consequent.12 As a result, the conditional does not always receive the value ‘fixed’ when the antecedent is ⊥: 12 This creates difficulties for reading the second value as fixedness, but the P T L sequence n has already opened the door to a vast multiplicity of semantic properties that sentences may have or lack.
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→SX
1, 1
1, 0
0, 1
0, 0
1, 1,
1, 1
0, 0
0, 1
0, 0
1, 0
1, 1
1, 0
0, 1
0, 0
0, 1
1, 1
0, 0
1, 1
0, 0
0, 0
1, 1
1, 0
1, 1
1, 0
The upshot is that in SX, there is no fuse for ⊥ or for {α, ¬α}; the Nobel measure of these sets is undefined. Nevertheless, SX is not paraconsistent by some other measures. While the SX conditional does not provide the means to detonate every necessary falsehood, SX follows P T L in treating the alethic profile of other connectives in a completely classical way. Still, SX and the P T Ln sequence provide useful models of conditionals that are resistant to trivialization. A weak but interesting form of preservationist paraconsistency is achieved here, as is a wider view of the properties that a conditional might be asked to preserve (and that might be of more general logical interest as well).
Ambiguity and Wild Cards: Brown [1999] began a line of work connecting logics first exploited by relevance and dialetheic logicians to preservationist ideas. The inspiration for this project emerged from reflections on some remarks by Diderik Batens. Batens had de scribed his own modest motives, which led him to pursue a paraconsistent logic that would make minimal alterations in reasoning while allowing for tolerance of inconsistency. Batens was particularly concerned to isolate inconsistency by re stricting its impact to a subset of the atoms; his approach was to make consistency the default assumption, and retract inferences when that assumption led to trou ble. While returning home after the First World Congress on Paraconsistency in Ghent in 1997, Brown began to explore a central idea of his own approach, guided by the same modest aim. The idea was that, by treating certain sets of atomic sentences as ambiguous, we can project consistent images of inconsistent premise sets: Γ is an consistent image of Γ based on A iff ii.
A is a set of sentence letters.
iii. Γ is consistent. iv. Γ results from the substitution, for each occurrence of each member a of A in Γ, of one of a pair of new sentence letters, af and at . We write ConIm(Γ , Γ, A) for this relation. An obvious, if crude, measure of how far a set Γ is from being consistent, can be given by the number of atoms in the smallest set of atoms whose treatment as ambiguous would be sufficient to produce a consistent image of Γ. A subtler measure (respecting the fact that the ‘cost’ of treating an unanalyzed atom as
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ambiguous needn’t be some fixed and equal quantity for all atoms) is to consider the set of least sets each of which is sufficient for projecting a consistent image of a premise set, Γ. We define Amb(Γ) as the set of least sets each of which is the base of some projection(s) of a consistent image of Γ. Formally: Amb(Γ) = {A|∃Γ : ConIm(Γ , Γ, A) ∧ ∀A , A ⊂ A, ¬∃Γ : ConIm(Γ , Γ, A )} We can now give a formal definition of the preservation relation: ∆ is an Amb(Γ)-preserving extension of Γ ⇔ Amb(Γ ∪ ∆) ⊆ Amb(Γ). To indicate that this preservation relation determines the acceptability predicate for our logic, we define: Accept(∆, Γ) iff ∆ is an Amb(Γ)-preserving extension of Γ ⇔ Amb(Γ ∪ ∆) ⊆ Amb(Γ). Combined with the earlier account of consequence relations as preserving the acceptability of all acceptable extensions, this leads us to a new consequence rela tion: Γ|Amb α ⇔ ∀∆ : Accept(∆, Γ) → Accept(∆ ∪ {α}, ∆). That is to say, α follows from Γ if and only if α is an acceptable extension of every acceptable extension of Γ. Such an extension, we can say, doesn’t make things worse because at least one of the ‘ambiguity’ sets allowing us to produce a consistent image of Γ will also allow us to produce a consistent image of Γ . Brown [1999] shows that this consequence relation is identical to the consequence relation of Priest’s logic of paradox (LP). This leads to an important (if obvious) obser vation about paraconsistent logics: The same consequence relation can be given very different philosophical readings. Priest’s LP is a dialetheic logic, originally presented using Kleene’s strong 3-valued matrices and treating the non-classical value (a fixed point for negation) as designated. But we can view the inferences of LP as guided instead by a preservationist understanding of the constraints that come in to prevent trivialization. LP is inelegant in much the way that singleton forcing is inelegant: it treats inconsistency on the left differently than it does theorems on the right. In LP, classical contradictions on the left don’t trivialize, but classical tautologies on the right do, that is, any such tautology follows from every premise set; cast in multiple-conclusion form, LP makes inconsistent premise sets nontrivial. Not every conclusion set follows from these. But LP trivializes all conclusion sets whose closure under disjunction includes a tautology. First degree entailment (FDE) is a logic closely related to LP that treats inconsistency on the left and its dual on the right symmetrically. Brown [2001] presents a closely related ambiguity-based account capturing the consequence relation of first degree entailment.
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This treatment of FDE requires careful development of the symmetries of the consequence relation. Perhaps the most direct approach to re-imposing the leftright symmetries of classical logic on the ambiguity semantics for LP is to dualize the property to be preserved, and demand that this dual property be preserved from right to left. Having used ambiguity to project consistent images of the premise set, we now also use ambiguity to project consistently deniable images of the conclusion set. Let Amb∗ (∆) be the set of minimal sets of sentence letters whose ambiguity is sufficient to project a consistently deniable image of ∆. We require that any sentence from which ∆ follows be an acceptable extension of every acceptable extension of ∆, where acceptability is consistent deniability: Γ is an Amb∗ (∆)-preserving extension of ∆ ⇔ Amb∗ (∆ ∪ Γ) ⊆ Amb∗ (∆) We write this Accept∗ (Γ, ∆); the idea this time is that a set Γ is acceptable as an extension of a commitment to denying ∆ if and only if Γ includes ∆, and extending ∆ to Γ doesn’t make things worse, i.e. does not require any more ambiguity to produce a consistently-deniable image than merely denying ∆ does. Now we can define right-to-left consequence relation, with sentences on the left and sets of sentences on the right: γ Amb∗∗ ∆ ⇔ ∀∆ : Accept∗ (Γ, ∆) → Accept∗ (Γ ∪ {γ}, Γ). In English, ∆ follows from γ if and only if γ is an acceptable extension of every acceptable extension of ∆, considered as a set we are committed to denying. We can combine these two asymmetrical consequence relations to a symmetrical one by treating sets on the left as closed under conjunction and sets on the right as closed under disjunction, and demanding that both these consequence relations apply: Γ Sym ∆ ⇔ ∃δ ∈ Cl(∆, ∨) : Γ Amb δ&∃γ ∈ Cl(Γ, ∧) : γ Amb∗ ∆. Alternatively (linking both to a purely sentential consequence relation, so that the symmetrical set-set relation arises from type-raising a symmetrical sentencesentence relation), we can put it this way instead: Γ Sym ∆ ⇔ ∃δ ∈ Cl(∆, ∨), ∃γ ∈ Cl(Γ, ∧) : γ Sym δ. Where γ Sym δ iff {γ} Amb δ&γ Amb∗ {δ}. But the upshot of this maneuver is not the elegant FDE, but a less-refined logic sometimes called K ∗ . The two logics agree on the consequence relation except when classically trivial sets lie on both the left and the right. In those cases the triviality of the set on the other side ensures that the property we’re preserving is indeed preserved. So K ∗ , which is the logic just proposed here, trivializes when classically trivial sets appear on both the left and the right. To capture FDE, we need to be subtler about how to produce our symmetrical consequence relation.
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The trick is to produce consistent images of premise sets and non-trivial images of conclusion sets simultaneously, requiring that the sets of sentence letters used to project these images be disjoint:13 Γ F DE ∆ iff every such consistent image of Γ can be consistently extended by some member of each compatible non-trivial image of ∆ (i.e. each non-trivial image of ∆ based on a disjoint set of sentence letters), or (now equivalently): Γ F DE ∆ iff every such non-trivial image of the conclusion set can be extended by some element of each non-contradictory image of the premise set while preserving its consistent deniability. Interestingly, there is another way to express this relation, which opens up a new understanding of preservation. This approach focuses less on what features of our premise and conclusion sets are preserved from left to right and right to left, and more on what we want to preserve regarding the consequence relation itself. We can say that we are preserving is the classical consequence relation itself, under a range of minimally ambiguous, consistent (or consistently deniable) images of our premises and conclusions: Γ F DE ∆ iff every image of the premise and conclusion sets, I(Γ), I ∗ (∆) obtained by treating disjoint sets of sentence letters drawn from Amb(Γ) and Amb∗ (∆) as ambiguous is such that I(Γ) I ∗ (∆). This suggests a new preservationist strategy for producing new consequence re lations from old. We can say that the new consequence relation holds when and only when the old relation holds in all of a range of cases anchored to (centered on) the original premise and conclusion sets. This strategy can eliminate or re duce trivialization by ensuring that the range of cases considered includes some non-trivial ones, even when the instance forming our ‘anchor’ is trivial. In fact, this idea can also be applied to Schotch and Jennings’ weakly aggregative forcing relation. A different presentation of these ambiguity-logics was explored in [Brown, 2005, ms.], a paper presented at the 2005 meetings of the Society for Exact Philosophy. Rather than construct consistent images of premise sets and consistently deniable images of conclusion sets, this presentation treated some atoms as ‘wild cards’ in constructing valuations. Wild card valuations differ from classical valuations only in how they treat a set of ‘wild-card’ atoms. Let L be a propositional language, At = {p, q, r, . . .} the set of atoms of L, and S1 , . . .Sn , . . . the sentences of L. A wild card valuation begins by selecting an 13 In effect, ambiguity allows us to capture the results of using ‘both’ and ‘neither’ as (respec tively) designated and non-designated fixed points for negation, while insisting that the two sets of ambiguously-treated letters be disjoint ensures that we never treat the same sentence letter in both these ways.
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element of 2At , W , as the set of wild card atoms. We assign values to the sentences of L first by settling on an a.
Assignment of 0 or 1 uniformly to each member of At − W .
Call this assignment AAt−W . Next, we b.
Assign 0 or 1 to each instance of an atom in W .14
Call the resulting assignment (now specified for each instance of each atom through out L) W AAt−W . From here, we c.
Assign 0 or 1 to each complex sentence, based on the usual truth functional interpretation of the connectives.
The result is a wildcard valuation, W VAt−W . Let VAt−W be the set of all such valuations based on a given AAt−W .15 We don’t apply the members of VAt−W directly to arrive at our consequence relation. Instead, we quantify across them to obtain a valuation based on all the wildcard valuations for each wildcard set W . This is straightforward: Let VAt−W be the valuation determined by all the members of VAt−W . Then VAt−W ∈ L → {1, 0}, where VAt−W (S) = 1 if ∃V ∈ VAt−W : V (S) = 1. VAt−W (S) = 0 else. The last step is to define our consequence relation. But this is straightforward; we simply use the usual definition: Γ W α ⇔ ∀VW [(∀γ ∈ Γ, VW (γ) = 1) ⇒ VW (α) = 1]. The result is LP again; a dual treatment of wildcard valuations on the right allows us to capture K ∗ and FDE as well.
Final Reflections on Preservation The closing point of [Brown, 2003, ms.] is that, like the ambiguity semantics for FDE developed above, forcing too can be described as preserving the classical con sequence relation across a range of related premise and conclusion sets, anchored to the given sets. By definition, Γ[ ∆ holds if and only if the classical consequence relation holds between some pair of cells in every (Γ), (∆) division of Γ and ∆’s content. But we can capture this preservation of in a way that emphasizes the parallel between our ambiguity semantics for FDE and forcing more strongly. Instead of dividing Γ’s content amongst the members of families of sets indexed to (Γ), we can achieve 14 This allows each instance of a wild-card atom in each sentence of L to receive either value freely. 15 So V At−∅ is just the singleton set of one classical valuation on L.
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the same effect by means of ambiguity (note that for purposes of forcing, we insist that ambiguity does not arise within a single sentence): When (Γ) = n, we replace the sentence letters of Γ with n sets of new sentence letters, and produce images of Γ that replace the sentence letters in each γ ∈ Γ with sentence letters drawn from one of these sets. Supposing that no numerical subscripts appear in the sentence letters of Γ, we can replace the sentence letters of each sentence in Γ with the same letters combined with subscripts drawn from one of 1, . . .n. Then we can say that Γ[ δ if and only if every such image of Γ has some such image of δ (i.e. an image of δ produced by replacing its sentence letters with letters combined with one of our subscripts) as a classical consequence. Similarly, we can say that γ[ ∆ if and only if every such image of ∆ is such that some such image of γ (i.e. an image of γ produced by replacing its sentence letters in the same way) is a premise from which it follows classically. Finally, we can invoke the singleton bridge principle, and say that Γ[ ∆ if and only if for some α, β, Γ[ α, β[ ∆, and α β, where is just the classical single turnstile. This observation, together with the earlier comments on the preservationist treatment of FDE, leads to my closing theme. The classroom treatment of classi cal logic puts the emphasis on the guaranteed preservation of truth. One preser vationist response to this addresses it head on: To offer something else worth preserving, and show that it actually helps. This, of course, is most apparent when the preservation of truth becomes trivial. But another is to question the preservation of truth more closely, and to look more broadly at what is preserved in various consequence relations. Recent work by Jennings and some of his students has made a frontal assault on the first task. For an early example of this line of work, see [Jennings and Sarenac, 2006], where Pilate’s infamous question, ‘what is truth,’ gets some respect. The second got its start, for this author at least, in a conversation with Peter Apostoli about multiple-conclusion logics and Gentzen-style systems for them. Apostoli remarked that one might describe such systems as preserving the consequence re lation itself. That suggestion inspired the readings here of both ambiguity-logics and forcing as preserving the classical consequence relation under ‘imaging’ oper ations applied to premise and conclusion sets. But more general questions arise here: What makes a property or relation a logically interesting preservable? What constraints on consequence relations remain, once a more general view of preserv ables is arrived at? So long as we think in terms of acceptably assertable extensions of premise sets and acceptably deniable extensions of conclusion sets, reflexivity seems inescapable; so long as all the acceptable extensions of an acceptable ex tension of a set Γ are themselves acceptable extensions of Γ, transitivity will also remain in place. Monotonicity is the most vulnerable of the traditional constraints, failing as soon as our standard for acceptable extensions is allowed to vary in re sponse to what preservable property Γ turns out to have. But the others, too, can fail; how interesting (and illuminating) those failures may be remains to be seen. As to what makes a property preservable, no general account has yet emerged. Developing generalizations of consistency (and consistent deniability, on the right)
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has certainly proved fruitful. Preservation of probability bounds on acceptable sentences has also been proposed, and, as we’ve just seen, preservation of the con sequence relation itself under some transformations of premises and conclusions. But much remains to be discovered. BIBLIOGRAPHY [Apostoli and Brown, 1995] P. Apostoli and B. Brown. A Solution to the Completeness Problem for Weakly Aggregative Modal Logic. Journal of Symbolic Logic, 60, 3. 832-842, 1995. [Batens et al., 2000] D. Batens, J. van Bendegum, and G. Priest, eds. Frontiers of Paracon sistency: Proceedings of the First World Conference on Paraconsistency. Baldock, Hertford shire, England ; Philadelphia, PA: Research Studies Press, 2000. [Belnap, 1977] N. D. Belnap. How a Computer Should Think. 30-56 in G. Ryle (ed.) Contem porary Aspects of Philosophy. Stocksfield, Eng.; Boston: Oriel Press, 1977. [Belnap, 1990] N. D. Belnap and G. Massey. Semantic Holism is Seriously False. Studia Logica, 83-86, 1990. [Braybrooke, 1996] D. Braybrooke, ed. Social Rules: Origin; Character; Logic; Change. Boulder: Westview Press, 1996. [Brown et al., 2004] B. Brown and G. Priest. Chunk and Permeate. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 33, 379-388, 2004. [Brown, 2004a] B. Brown. The Pragmatics of Empirical Adequacy. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 82, 242-263, 2004. [Brown, 2004b] B. Brown. Knowledge and Non-Contradiction. In G. Priest and J.C. Beall, eds., The Law of Non-Contradiction, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. [Brown, 2003] B. Brown. Notes on Hume and Skepticism of the Senses. Croatian Journal of Philosophy, 3 (9), 289-303, 2003. [Brown, 2000] B. Brown. Paraconsistent Classical Logic. In W.A.Carnielli, M.E.Coniglio and I.M.L.D’Ottaviano, eds., Paraconsistency: The Logical Way to the Inconsistent- Pro ceedings of the II World Congress on Paraconsistency 2000, Marcel Decker, New York, 2000. [Brown, 2002a] B. Brown. Approximate Truth. 81-103 in J. Meheus, ed., Inconsistency in Science, Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer, 2002. [Brown, 2002b] B. Brown. On Paraconsistency. Part XII, entry 39, pp. 628-650 in Dale Jaquette, ed., A Companion to Philosophical Logic Malden: Mass, Oxford: Blackwell, 2002. [Brown, 2001] B. Brown. LP, FDE and Ambiguity. In H. Arabnia, ed., IC-AI 2001 Volume II- Proceedings of the 2001 meetings of the International Conference on Artificial Intelligence, CSREA publications, 2001. [Brown, 2000] B. Brown. Simple Natural Deduction for Weakly Aggregative Paraconsistent Logic. In Batens, van Bendegum, Priest (eds.), 2000. [Brown, 1999a] B. Brown. Adjunction and Aggregation. Nous 33:2, 1999. [Brown, 1999b] B. Brown. Yes, Virginia, There Really are Paraconsistent Logics. Journal of Philosophical Logic 28: 489-500, 1999. [Brown, 1999c] B. Brown. Smoke and Mirrors: A Few Nice Tricks: Critical Notice of Smoke and Mirrors by J. Brown, Dialogue, XXXVIII, 123-34, 1999. [Brown, 1996] B. Brown. Rules and the Rationality of Scientific Cultures. 53-74 in [Braybrooke, 1996]. [Brown, 1993] B. Brown. The Force of 2/n+1. in Martin Hahn, ed., Vicinae Deviae Burnaby: Simon Fraser University, 151-163, 1993. [Brown, 1993a] B. Brown. Old Quantum Theory: A Paraconsistent Approach. PSA 1992, Vol. 2, Philosophy of Science Association, 397-411, 1993. [Brown, 1992b] B. Brown. Rational Inconsistency and Reasoning. Informal Logic, XIV (1992) 5-10, 1992. [Brown, 1992a] B. Brown. Struggling with Conditionals. (critical notice of David Sanford, If P, then Q: Conditionals and the Foundations of Reasoning, London and New York: Routledge, 1989 Dialogue, 31, 4 (1992) 327-32, 1992. [Brown, 1990] B. Brown. How to be Realistic About Inconsistency in Science. Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, 21, 2 (Je 1990) 281-294, 1990.
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[Brown and Lepage, 2006] B. Brown and F. Lepage. Truth and Probability: Essays in honour of Hugues Leblanc, London: College Publications, at King’s College London, 2006. [Brown and Woods, 2001a] B. Brown and J. Woods, eds. Logical Consequence: Rival Ap proaches, Proceedings of the 1999 meeting of the Society for Exact Philosophy. General Editor: Dov Gabbay. Stanmore, Middlesex: Hermes Science Press, 2001. [Brown and Woods, 2001b] B. Brown and J. Woods, eds. New Essays in Exact Philosophy: Logic, Mathematics and Science: Proceedings of the 1999 meeting of the Society for Ex act Philosophy. General Editor: Dov Gabbay (Stanmore, Middlesex: Hermes Science Press), 2001. [Brown and Schotch, 1999] B. Brown and P. K. Schotch. Logic and Aggregation. Journal of Philosophical Logic 28: 265-287, 1999. [d’Entremont, 1982] B. H. d’Entremont. Inference and Level, M.A. thesis, Dalhousie Univer sity, 1982. [Jennings, 1967] R. E. Jennings. Preference and Choice as Logical Correlates. Mind. 76: 556 567, 1967. [Jennings, 1974a] R. E. Jennings. Pseudo-Subjectivism in Ethics. Dialogue. 13: 515-518, 1974. [Jennings, 1974b] R. E. Jennings. A Utilitarian Semantics for Deontic Logic. Journal of Philo sophical Logic. 3: 445-456, 1974. [Jennings, 1981] R. E. Jennings. A Note on the Axiomatisation of Brouwersche Modal Logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic. 10: 41-43, 1981. [Jennings, 1982] R. E. Jennings. The Subjunctive in Conditionals and Elsewhere. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. 63: 146-156, 1982. [Jennings, 1994] R. E. Jennings. The Genealogy of Disjunction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994. [Jennings, 1985] R. E. Jennings. Can there be a natural deontic logic? Synthese. N 85; 65: 257-273, 1985. [Jennings and Johnston, 1983] R. E. Jennings and D. K. Johnston. Paradox-Tolerant Logic. Logique et Analyse. 26: 291-308, 1983. [Jennings et al., 1980] R. E. Jennings, D. K. Johnston, and P. K. Schotch. Universal First Order Definability in Modal Logic. Zeitschrift fuer Mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik. 26: 327-330, 1980. [Jennings and Sarenac, 2006] R. E. Jennings and D. Sarenac. The Preservation of Truth. 1-16 in [Brown and Lepage, 2006]. [Jennings and Schotch, 1978] R. E. Jennings and P. K. Schotch. De Re and De Dicto Beliefs. Logique et Analyse. 21: 451-458, 1978. [Jennings and Schotch, 11980] R. E. Jennings and P. K. Schotch. Inference and Necessity. Jour nal of Philosophical Logic AG 80; 9: 327-240. [Jennings and Schotch, 1981a] R. E. Jennings and P. K. Schotch. Probabalistic Considerations on Modal Semantics. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic. Jl 81: 22; 227-238. [Jennings and Schotch, 1981b] R. E. Jennings and P. K. Schotch. Epistemic Logic, Skepticism and Non-Normal Modal Logic. Philosophical Studies. 40: 47-68, 1981. [Jennings and Schotch, 1984] R. E. Jennings and P. K. Schotch. The Preservation of Coherence. Studia Logica. 43: 89-106, 1984. [Jennings and Schotch, 1981c] R. E. Jennings and P. K. Schotch. Some Remarks on (Weakly) Weak Modal Logics. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic. 22: 309-314, 1981. [Jennings et al., 1981] R. E. Jennings, P. K. Schotch, and D. K. Johnston. The N-order Un definability of the Geach Formula. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic. 22: 375-378, 1981. [Johnston, 1976] D. Johnston. A Generalized Relational Semantics for Modal Logic: MA thesis, Simon Fraser University, 1976. [Jonson and Tarski, 1951] B. Jonson and A. Tarski. Boolean Algebra with Operators. Ameri can Journal of Mathematics 73 891-939, 1951. [Massey, 1982] G. J. Massey. Bizarre Translation Defended. Philosophical Studies, N 82; 42: 419-423, 1982. [Massey, 1977] G. J. Massey. Negation, Material Equivalence and Conditioned Non-conjunction: Completeness and Duality. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic. JA 77; 18: 140-44, 1977. [Massey, 1966] G. J. Massey. The theory of truth-tabular connectives, both truth-functional and modal. Journal of Symbolic Logic, D 66; 31: 593-608, 1966.
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[McLeod and Schotch, 2000] M. McLeod and P. K. Schotch. Remarks on the Modal Logic of Henry Bradford Smith. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 29 (6) 603-615, 2000. [Nicholson and Jennings, forthcoming] D. Nicholson and R. E. Jennings. An Axiomatization of Family Resemblance, forthcoming. [Nicholson et al., 2000] T. Nicholson, D. Sarenac, and R. E. Jennings. In [Brown and Woods, 2001a]. [Priest et al., 1989] G. Priest, R. Routley, and J. Norman. Paraconsistent Logic: Essays on the Inconsistent, Munich: Philosophia Verlag, 1989. [Sarenac, 2000] D. Sarenac. A Preservationist Approach to Implication, M.A thesis, Si mon Fraser University, 2000. [Sarenac and Jennings, ] D. Sarenac and R. E. Jennings. The Preservation of Relevance. Eidos J 03; 17 (1): 23-36. [Schotch, 1996] P. K. Schotch. Hyperdeontic Logic: An Overview, In [Braybrooke, 1996, 21–37] [Schotch, 2000] P. K. Schotch. Skepticism and Epistemic Logic. Studia Logica 65: 187-198, 2000. [Schotch, 2006] P. K. Schotch. David Braybrooke on th eTrack of PPE. In [Sherwin and Schotch, 2006], pp. 325–344. [Schotch and Jennings, 1989] P. K. Schotch and R. E. Jennings. On Detonating. In [Priest et al., 1989, 306–327]. [Schotch and Jennings, 1981] P. K. Schotch and R. E. Jennings. Modal Logic and the Theory of Modal Aggregation. Philosophia. 9: 265-278, 1981. [Schotch and Jennings, 1980] P. K. Schotch and R. E. Jennings. Inference and Necessity. Jour nal of Philosophical Logic. 9 327-340, 1980. [Scott, 1974] D. Scott. Completeness and Aximatizability in Many-Valued Logic, Proceedings of Symposia in Pure Mthematics XXV; Proceedings, University of California, Berkeley, 23-30 June, 1971. Providence, RI: American Mathematical Society, 1974. [Segerberg, 1971] K. Segerberg. An Essay on Classical Modal Logic, Volume I Uppsala University Press, Uppsala, 1971. [Sherwin and Schotch, 2006] Engaged Philosophy: Essays in Honour of David Braybrooke. Tornto: University of Toronto Press, 2006. [Thorn, 1998] P. Thorn. The Normative Character of Interpretation and Mental Ex planation, M.A. Thesis, Simon Fraser University, 1998. [Wong, 1997] P. Wong. Weak Aggregative Modal Logics with Multi-ary Modal Operators. Tech nical Report TR-ARP-10-97. Automated Reasoning Project, Research School of Infor mation Sciences and Engineering, Australian National University, 1997. [Wong, 1998] P. Wong. Paraconsistent Inference and Preservation. Technical Report TR ARP-11-98. Automated Reasoning Project, Research School of Information Sciences and Engineering, Australian National University, 1998. [Wong and Besnard, 2001] P. Wong and P. Besnard. Paraconsistent Reasoning as an Analytic Tool. Logic Journal of IGPL 9(2) 217-230, 2001. [Wong and Besnard, 2003] P. Wong and P. Besnard. Modal (Logic) Paraconsistency. 540-551 in Nielsen, T.D. and Zhang, N.L. Symbolic and Quantitative Approaches to Reasoning with Uncertainty: 7th European Conference, ECSQARU 2003 Aalborg, Denmark, July 2-5, 2003 Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science Vol 2711. Springer Verlag, 2003.
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PARACONSISTENCY AND DIALETHEISM
Graham Priest
1
1.1
INTRODUCTION
Delineating the Topic of this Article
This article is about paraconsistent logic, logic in which contradictions do not entail everything. Though the roots of paraconsistency lie deep in the history of logic, its modern developments date to just before the middle of the 20th century. Since then, paraconsistent logic — or better, logics, since there are many of them — have been proposed and constructed for many, and very different, reasons. The most philosophically challenging of these reasons is dialetheism, the view that some contradictions are true. Though this article will also discuss other aspects of paraconsistency, it will concentrate specifically on its dialetheic aspects. Other aspects of the subject can be found in the article ‘Paraconsistency: Preservational Variations’ in this volume of the Handbook. The subject also has close connections with relevant logic. Many related details can therefore be found in the article ‘Relevant and Substructural Logics’, in Volume 4 of the Handbook. In the following two parts of this article, we will look at the history of the subject before about 1950. We will look at the history of paraconsistency; then we will look at the history of dialetheism. In the next two parts, we will turn to the modern developments, those since about 1950; first paraconsistency, then dialetheism. In the final three parts of the article will look at some important issues that bear on paraconsistency, or on which paraconsistency bears: the foundations of mathematics, the notion of negation, and rationality.
1.2
Defining the Key Notions: Paraconsistency
Let us start, however, with definitions of the two central notions of the article. Perhaps the major motivation behind paraconsistency in the modern period has been the thought that there are many situations where we wish to handle incon sistent information in a sensible way — and specifically, where we have to infer from it. (We may also wish to revise the information; but that is another matter. And a knowledge of what does or does not follow sensibly from the information may be necessary for an intelligent revision.)
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Let be any relation of logical consequence.1 Let ¬ denote negation. (What, exactly, this is, we will come back to later in this essay.) Then the relation is called explosive if it satisfies the principle of Explosion: α, ¬α β or, as it is sometimes called, ex contradictione quodlibet. Explosion is, on the face of it, a most implausible looking inference. It is one, however, that is valid in “classical logic”, that is, the orthodox logic of our day. Clearly, an explosive notion of logical consequence is not a suitable vehicle for drawing controlled inferences from inconsistent information. A necessary condition for a suitable vehicle is therefore that Explosion fail. This motivates the now standard definition: a consequence relation is paraconsistent if it is not explosive. The term was coined by Mir´o Quesada at the Third Latin American Symposium on Mathematical Logic in 1976.2 Given a language in which to express premises and conclusions, a set of sentences in this language is called trivial if it contains all sentences. Let Σ be a set of sentences, and suppose that it is inconsistent, that is: for some α, Σ contains both α and ¬α. If is explosive, the deductive closure of Σ under (that is, the set of consequences of Σ) is trivial. Conversely, if is paraconsistent it may be possible for the deductive closure of Σ to be non-trivial.3 Hence, a paraconsistent logic allows for the possibility of inconsistent sets of sentences whose deductive closures are non-trivial. Paraconsistency, in the sense just defined, is not a sufficient condition for a consequence relation to be a sensible one with which to handle inconsistent infor mation. Consider, for example, so-called minimal logic, that is, essentially, intu itionist logic minus Explosion. This is paraconsistent, but in it α, ¬α ¬β, for all α and β.4 Hence, one can infer the negation of anything from an inconsistency. This is not triviality, but it is clearly antithetical to the spirit of paraconsistency, if not the letter. It is possible to try to tighten up the definition of ‘paraconsistent’ in various ways.5 But it seems unlikely that there is any purely formal necessary and sufficient condition for the spirit of paraconsistency: inconsistent information may make a nonsense of a consequence relation in so many, and quite different, 1 In this article, I will think of such a relation as one between a set of premises and a single conclusion. However, as should be clear, multiple-conclusion paraconsistent logics are also quite feasible. In listing the premises of an inference, I will often omit set braces. I will use lower case Greek letters for individual premises/conclusions, and upper case Greek letters for sets thereof. Lower case Latin letters, p, q, r, will indicate distinct propositional parameters. 2 The prefix ‘para’ has a number of different significances. Newton da Costa informed me that the sense that Quesada had in mind was ‘quasi’, as in ‘paramedic’ or ‘paramilitary’. ‘Para consistent’ is therefore ‘consistent-like’. Until then, I had always assumed that the ‘para’ in ‘paraconsistent’ meant ‘beyond’, as in ‘paranormal’ and ‘paradox’ (beyond belief). Thus, ‘para consistent’ would be ‘beyond the consistent’. I still prefer this reading. 3 Though, of course, for certain inconsistent Σ and paraconsistent , the set of consequences may be trivial. 4 Since α β → α and β → α ¬α → ¬β. 5 See, for example, Urbas [1990].
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ways.6 Better, then, to go for a clean, simple, definition of paraconsistency, and leave worrying about the spirit to individual applications.
1.3
Defining the Key Notions: Dialetheism
No similar problems surround the definition of ‘dialetheism’. The fact that we are faced with, or even forced into operating with, information that is inconsistent, does not, of course, mean that that information is true. The view that it may be is dialetheism. Specifically, a dialetheia is a true contradiction, a pair, α and ¬α, which are both true (or equivalently, supposing a normal notion of conjunction, a truth of the form α ∧ ¬α). A dialetheist is therefore a person who holds that some contradictions are true. The word ‘dialetheism’ and its cognates were coined by Priest and Routley in 1981, when writing the introduction to Priest, Routley, and Norman [1989].7 Before that, the epithet ‘paraconsistency’ had often been used, quite confusingly, for both dialetheism and the failure of explosion.8 A trivialist is a person who believes that all contradictions are true (or equiva lently, and more simply, who believes that everything is true). Clearly, a dialetheist need not be a trivialist (any more than a person who thinks that some statements are true must think that all statements are true). As just observed, a person may well think it appropriate to employ a paraconsistent logic in some context, or even think that there is a uniquely correct notion of deductive logical consequence which is paraconsistent, without being a dialetheist. Conversely, though, it is clear that a dialetheist must subscribe to a paraconsistent logic — at least when reasoning about those domains that give rise to dialetheias — unless they are a trivialist. A final word about truth. In talking of true contradictions, no particular notion of truth is presupposed. Interpreters of the term ‘dialetheia’ may interpret the notion of truth concerned in their own preferred fashion. Perhaps surprisingly, debates over the nature of truth make relatively little difference to debates about dialetheism.9
6 For example, as we will see later, the T -schema (plus self-reference) gives triviality in any logic that contains Contraction (α → (α → β) α → β). Yet Contraction is valid in many logics that standardly get called paraconsistent. 7 Chapters 1 and 2 of that volume cover the same ground as the next two parts of this essay, and can be consulted for a slightly different account. 8 The term dialetheia was motivated by a remark of Wittgenstein [1978, p. 256], where he compares the liar sentence to a Janus-headed object facing both truth and falsity. A di/aletheia is, thus, a two-way truth. Routley, with an uncharacteristic purism, always preferred ‘dialethic’, ‘dialethism’, etc., to ‘dialetheic’, ‘dialetheism’, etc. Forms with and without the ‘e’ can now both be found in the literature. 9 See Priest [2000a].
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2 PARACONSISTENT LOGIC IN HISTORY
2.1 Explosion in Ancient Logic Having clarified the central notions of this essay, let us now turn to its first main theme. What are the histories of these notions? Paraconsistency first. It is sometimes thought that Explosion is a principle of inference coeval with logic. Calling the received theory of inference ‘classical’ may indeed give this impression. Nothing could be further from the truth, however. The oldest system of formal logic is Aristotle’s syllogistic;10 and syllogistic is, in the only way in which it makes sense to interpret the term, paraconsistent. Consider, for example, the inference: Some men are animals.
No animals are men.
All men are men.
This is not a (valid) syllogism. Yet the premises are contradictories. Hence contradictions do not entail everything. Aristotle is well aware of this, and points it out explicitly: In the first figure [of syllogisms] no deduction whether affirmative or negative can be made out of opposed propositions: no affirmative de duction is possible because both propositions must be affirmative, but opposites are the one affirmative, the other negative... In the middle figure a deduction can be made both of opposites and of contraries. Let A stand for good, let B and C stand for science. If then one assumes that every science is good, and no science is good, A belongs to every B and to no C, so that B belongs to no C; no science, then is science. Similarly if after assuming that every science is good one assumed that the science of medicine is not good; for A belongs to every B but to no C, so that a particular science will not be a science... Consequently it is possible that opposites may lead to a conclusion, though not always or in every mood.11 Syllogistic is not a propositional logic. The first logicians to produce a propo sitional logic were the Stoics. But there is no record of any Stoic logician having endorsed Explosion either. Nor do any of the critics of Stoic logic, like Sextus Empiricus, mention it. (And this surely would have been grist for his mill!) Stoic logicians did not, therefore, endorse Explosion. 10 The investigation of logic in the East, and especially in India, starts at around the same time as it does in Greece. But for some reason, Indian logic never developed into a formal logic in anything like the Western sense. There is, at any rate as far as I am aware, no Indian logician who endorsed Explosion or anything like it. There are good reasons for this, as we will see in due course. 11 Prior Analytics 63b 31-64a 16. The translation is from Barnes [1984]. Note also that there is nothing suspicious about taking some of the terms of the syllogism to be the same. As this quote shows, Aristotle explicitly allows for this.
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It might be thought that Stoic logic was, none the less, explosive, on the follow ing grounds. Consider the principle of inference called the Disjunctive Syllogism: α, ¬α ∨ β β Given this, Explosion is not far away, as can be seen by the following argument, which we will call William’s argument (for reasons that will become clear in a moment): ¬α α ¬α ∨ β β (Premises are above lines; corresponding conclusions are below.) Now, Stoic lo gicians did explicitly endorse the Disjunctive Syllogism. It was one of their five “axioms” (indemonstrables).12 So perhaps their logic was explosive, though they did not notice it? No. It is too much to ask one to believe that such good logicians missed a two-line argument of this kind. The most likely explanation is that Stoic logicians did not endorse William’s argument since they did not endorse the other principle it employs, Addition: αα∨β Though the precise details of the Stoic account of disjunction are somewhat moot, there are reasons to suppose that the Stoics would not account a disjunction of an arbitrary α and β even as grammatical: disjunctions were legitimate when the disjuncts were exclusive, and enumerated an exhaustive partition of some situation or other (as in: It’s either Monday, or it’s Tuesday, or ... or it’s Sunday).13
2.2
Explosion in Medieval Logic
The understanding of disjunction — and conjunction for that matter — in any thing like its contemporary truth-functional sense seems not to emerge in logic until about the 12th century.14 It is therefore not surprising that the first occur rence of William’s argument seems to appear at about the same time. Though the evidence is circumstantial, it can be plausibly attributed to the 12th century Paris logician, William of Soissons, who was one of the parvipontinians, logicians who made a name for themselves advocating Explosion.15 William’s argument was well known within about 100 years. It can be found quite clearly in Alexander Neckham at the end of the 12th century,16 and it is clearly stated in the writings of the mid-14th century logician now known only as Pseudo-Scotus.17 12 See, 13 For 14 See 15 See 16 See 17 See
e.g., Boche´ nski [1963, p. 98].
a discussion of Stoic disjunction, see Jennings [1994, ch. 10].
Sylvan [2000, section 5.3].
Martin [1986].
Read [1988, p. 31].
Kneale and Kneale [1962, p. 281f].
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The history of the principle of Explosion in medieval logic after this time is a tangled one, and surely much of it still remains to be discovered. What one can say for sure is that logical consequence, and with it Explosion, was one of the topics that was hotly debated in medieval logic. (One thing that muddies the waters is the fact that logicians tended to run together logical consequence and the conditional, calling both consequentiae.) Most of the major logicians distinguished between different notions of logical consequence.18 The various notions go by different names for different logicians. But it was not uncommon to distinguish between a “material” notion of validity, according to which Explosion held, and a “formal” notion of validity, requiring some sort of connection between premises and conclusion. Unsurprisingly, Explo sion did not hold in the latter.19 One factor that drove towards accepting Explosion, at least for material con sequences, was a definition of validity that started to become popular around the 13th century, and which may be stated roughly as follows:20 A valid inference is one in which it is impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion to be false. The account was by no means accepted by all. But given the common assumption that it is impossible for contradictions to be true, ¬�(α ∧ ¬α), and a few plausible principles concerning truth functional conjunction and modality, it follows that, for arbitrary β, ¬�((α ∧ ¬α) ∧ β). Assuming that the ‘and’ italicized in the above definition is truth functional, this is just Explosion.21 Of particular note in the present context are the Cologne logicians of the late 15th century. These rejected Explosion as a formally valid principle, and with it the Disjunctive Syllogism (thereby prefiguring modern paraconsistent and relevant logic), specifically on ground that both fail if we are reasoning about situations in which, maybe per impossibile both α and ¬α hold.22 As is well known, the study of logic went into decline after this period. The subtle debates of the great medieval logicians were forgotten. Formal logic came to be identified largely with syllogistic. A few propositional inferences, such as modus ponens (α, α → β β) and the Disjunctive Syllogism, are sometimes stated in logic texts, but Explosion is not one of them (and neither is Addition). Even the greatest logician between the middle ages and the end of the 19th century, Leibniz, 18 Perhaps with some indication of which notion of consequence was appropriate in which sort of case. See Stump [1989, p. 262f]. 19 See, e.g., Sylvan [2000, 5.4]. 20 See, e.g., Boh [1982]; Ashworth [1974, pp. 120ff]. 21 Many definitions of validity are to be found in medieval logic. The one in question goes back well beyond the 13th century. Indeed, arguably it goes back to Megarian logicians. But in earlier versions, the conjunction was not necessarily interpreted truth functionally. For a full discussion, see Sylvan [2000]. 22 See Ashworth [1974, p. 135]. A similar line was run by de Soto in the early 16th century. See Read [1993, pp. 251–5].
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does not mention Explosion in his writings.23 It seems fair to say, therefore, that oblivion ensured that paraconsistency became the received position in logic once more.
2.3
Explosion in Modern Logic
Things changed dramatically with the rise of modern logic at the end of the 19th century. For the logical theory invented by Frege, and subsequently taken up by Russell — classical logic — is explosive. (This needs no documentation for contemporary readers.) But Frege and Russell were introducing (or reintroducing) into logic something very counter-intuitive.24 Since neither of them was much of a student of medieval logic (nor could they have been, given the poor scholarship of the period at the time), what needs discussion is where the drive for Explosion came from. The motors are at least two.25 Frege and Russell realised the power of a truth-functional analysis of connec tives, and exploited it relentlessly. But they were over-impressed by it, believing, incorrectly, that all interesting logical connectives could be given a truth func tional analysis. The point was later to be given central dogmatic status by Rus sell’s student, Wittgenstein, in the Tractatus. Now, if one gives a truth functional analysis of the conditional (if...then...), the only plausible candidate is the ma terial conditional, ¬α ∨ β (α ⊃ β). Given this, the most natural principle for the conditional, modus ponens, collapses into the Disjunctive Syllogism, to which the logic is therefore committed. Given that the truth functional understanding of disjunction immediately vouchsafes Addition, Explosion is an immediate corollary. The second source of Explosion is, in many ways, more fundamental. It is a fusion of two things. The first is an account of negation. How, exactly, to understand negation is an important issue in the history of logic, though one that often lurks beneath the surface of other disputes (especially concerning the conditional). (More of this later.) In the middle of the 19th century an account of propositional negation was given by George Boole. According to Boole, negation acts like set-theoretic complementation. Specifically, for any α, α and ¬α partition the set of all situations: the situations in which ¬α is true are exactly those where α fails to be true. (Note that this is not entailed by a truth functional account of negation. Some paraconsistent logics have a different, but still truth functional, theory of negation.) Boole’s way of looking at negation, and more generally, the 23 At least according to the account of Leibniz’ logic provided by Kneale and Kneale [1962, pp. 336ff]. 24 And Russell, at least, was aware of this. There is a folklore story concerning Russell — Nick Griffin tells me that a version of it can be found in Joad [1927] — which goes as follows. Russell was dining at high table at Trinity, when he mentioned to one of his fellow dons that in his logic a contradiction implies everything. According to one version, the don, righly incredulous, challenged him to deduce the fact that he was the Pope from the claim that 2 = 3. After some thought, Russell replied: ‘Well, if 2 = 3 then, subtracting 1 from both sides, it follows that 1 = 2. Now the Pope and I are two. Hence, the Pope and I are one. That is, I am the Pope’. 25 There are certainly others. For example, Explosion is endorsed by by Peano [1967, p. 88], but his reasons for it are not stated.
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analysis of propositional operators in set-theoretic terms, was highly influential on the founders of modern logic. Russell, for example, took Boole’s work to be the beginning of ‘the immense and surprising development of deductive logic’ of which his own work formed a part.26 The second element entering into the fusion is an account of validity, to the effect that an inference is valid if there are no situations, or models, as they were to come to be called, in which the premises are true and the conclusion is false. The account is not stated by either Frege or Russell, as far as I am aware. It is implicit, however, at least for propositional logic, in the truth-tabular account of validity, and was developed and articulated, by Tarski and other logicians, into the modern model-theoretic account of validity. Neither the Boolean theory of negation nor the model-theoretic account of va lidity, on its own, delivers explosion.27 But together they do. For a consequence of Boole’s account is that exactly one of α and ¬α holds in every model. It follows that there is no model in which α and ¬α hold and which β fails. The model theoretic account does the rest. (The argument is clearly a relative of the medieval argument for Explosion based on the modal definition of validity.) It is interesting to note that William’s argument for Explosion does not seem to figure in discussions during this period. It was left to C. I. Lewis to rediscover it. (It is stated in Lewis and Langford [1932, p. 250].) There is a certain irony in this, since Lewis was one of the major early critics of Russell on the matter of the conditional. Lewis, whilst rejecting a material account of the conditional, was driven by William’s argument to accepting an account according to which contradictions do imply everything (“strict implication”). It is perhaps also worth noting that both Russell and Lewis perpetuate the medieval confusion of validity and the conditional, by calling both ‘implication’. Pointing out this confusion was to allow Quine to defend the material conditional as an account of conditionality.28 The problems with the material conditional go much deeper than this, though.29 Lewis was not the only critic of “classical logic” in the first half of the century. The most notable critics were the intuitionists. But though the intuitionists re jected central parts of Frege/Russell logic, they accepted enough of it to deliver Explosion.30 First, they, accepted both the Disjunctive Syllogism and Addition. They also accepted a model-theoretic account of validity (albeit with models of a somewhat different kind). They did not accept the Boolean account of negation. But according to their account, though α and ¬α may both fail in some situations, 26 Russell [1997, p. 497]. I also have a memory of him calling Boole the ‘father of modern logic’, but I am unable to locate the source. Boole himself was not a modern logician. Though he may have stretched this to its limits, syllogistic was squarely the basis of his work. He might plausibly, therefore, be thought of as the last of the great traditional logicians. 27 We will see later that the model-theoretic account of validity is quite compatible with paraconsistent logic. As for negation, it may follow from the Boolean account that contradictions are true in no situation; but this says nothing about consequence. 28 Quine 1966, p. 163f]. 29 See Priest [2001a, ch. 1]. 30 Though they were criticized on this ground, for example by Kolmogorov. Dropping Explosion from Intuitionist logic gives Johannson’s “minimal logic”. See Haack [1974, p. 101f].
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they cannot, at least, both hold. This is sufficient to give Explosion. So this is how things stood half way through the 20th century. Classical logic had become entrenched as the orthodox logical theory. Various other logical the ories were known, and endorsed by some “deviant” logicians — especially modal and intuitionist logic; but all these accounts preserved enough features of classical logic to deliver Explosion. Explosion, therefore, had no serious challenge. We will take up the story concerning paraconsistency again in a later section. But now let us back-track, and look at the history of dialetheism. 3
3.1
DIALETHEISM IN HISTORY
Contradiction in Ancient Philosophy
Can contradictions be true? At the beginning of Western philosophy it would seem that opinions were divided on this issue. On the face of it, certain of the Presocratics took the answer to be ‘yes’. Uncontroversially, Heraclitus held that everything was in a state of flux. Any state of affairs described by α changes into one described by ¬α. More controversially, the flux state was one in which both α and ¬α hold.31 Hence, we find Heraclitus asserting contradictions such as:32 We step and do not step into the same rivers; we are and we are not. On the other hand, Parmenides held that what is has certain amazing properties. It is one, changeless, partless, etc. A major part of the argument for this is that one cannot say of what is that it is not, or vice versa:33 For never shall this be forcibly maintained, that things that are not are, but you must hold back your thought from this way of inquiry, nor let habit, born of much experience, force you down this way, by making you use an aimless eye or an ear and a tongue full of meaningless sounds: judge by reason the strife-encompassed refutation spoken by me. This certainly sounds like a proto-statement of the Law of Non-Contradiction. And Zeno, according to tradition Parmenides’ student, made a name for himself arguing that those who wished to deny Parmenides’ metaphysics ended up in contradiction — which he, at least, took to be unacceptable. The dialogues of Plato are somewhat ambivalent on the matter of contradiction. For a start, in the Republic we find Socrates enunciating a version of the Law of Non-Contradiction, and then arguing from it:34 31 And Heraclitus held, it would seem, that the flux state is sui generis. That is, α ∧ ¬α entails neither α nor ¬α. 32 Fragment 49a; translation from Robinson [1987]. 33 Fragment 7; translation from Kirk and Raven [1957, p. 248]. 34 436b. Hamilton and Cairns [1961].
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It is obvious that the same thing will never do or suffer opposites in the same respect in relation to the same thing and at the same time. In the later dialogue, the Parmenides, the same Socrates expresses less confidence: Even if all things come to partake of both [the form of like and the form of unlike], and by having a share of both are both like and unlike one another, what is there surprising in that? ... when things have a share in both or are shown to have both characteristics, I see nothing strange in that, Zeno, nor yet in a proof that all things are one by having a share in unity and at the same time many by sharing in plurality. But if anyone can prove that what is simple unity itself is many or that plurality itself is one, then shall I begin to be surprised.35 Thus, it may be possible for things in the familiar world to have inconsistent properties, though not the forms.36 What to make of the later part of this puzzling dialogue is notoriously hard. But taking the text at face value, Parmenides does succeed in showing that oneness itself does have inconsistent properties of just the kind to surprise Socrates. Interpreting texts such as these, especially the Presocratics, is fraught with difficulty, and it may well be thought that those I have cited as countenancing violations of Law of Non-Contradiction did not really do so, but were getting at something else. It should be noted, then, that a commentator no less than Aristotle interpreted a number of the Presocratics as endorsing contradictions.37 In Book 4 of the Metaphysics, he takes them in his sights, and mounts a sustained defence of the Law of Non-Contradiction, which he enunciates as follows (5b 18-22):38 For the same thing to hold good and not hold good simultaneously of the same thing and in the same respect is impossible (given any further specifications which might be added against dialectical difficulties). The rest of the text is something of an exegetical nightmare.39 The Law is, Aris totle says, so certain and fundamental that one cannot give a proof of it (5b 22-27). He then goes on straight away to give about seven or eight arguments for it (de pending on how one counts). He calls these elenchic demonstrations, rather than 35 129b,
c. Hamilton and Cairns [1961]. is tempting to read Socrates as saying that things may be inconsistent in relational ways. That is, an object may be like something in some ways and unlike it in others. This would not be a real contradiction. But this cannot be what Socrates means. For exactly the same can be true of the forms. The form of the good might be like the form of unity in that both are forms, but unlike it in that it is the highest form. 37 Heraclitus and Protagoras are singled out for special mention. Protagoras claimed that if someone believes something, it is true (for them). Hence α may be true (for some person), and ¬α may be true (for someone else). This does not sound quite like a contradiction. But of course, if someone believes α ∧ ¬α, then that is true (for them). 38 Kirwan [1993].
39 For a full analysis of the text, see Priest [1998].
36 It
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proofs. Exactly what this means is not clear; what is clear is that the opponent’s preparedness to utter something meaningful is essential to the enterprise. But then, just to confuse matters, only the first of the arguments depends on this preparedness. So the latter arguments do not seem to be elenchic either. Leaving this aside, the arguments themselves are varied bunch. The first argu ment (6a 28-7b 18) is the longest. It is tangled and contorted, and it is not at all clear how it is supposed to work. (Some commentators claim to find two distinct arguments in it.) However one analyses it, though, it must be reckoned a failure. The most generous estimate of what it establishes is that for any predicate, P , it is impossible that something should be P and not be P (¬�(P a ∧ ¬P a)) which sounds all well and good at first. But one who really countenances violations of the Law of Non-Contradiction may simply agree with this! For they may still hold that for some P and a, P a ∧ ¬P a as well. It will follow, presumably, that �(P a ∧ ¬P a), and hence that �(P a ∧ ¬P a) ∧ ¬�(P a ∧ ¬P a). This is a contra diction (we might call it a “secondary contradiction”), but contradiction is clearly not a problem in this context.40 When we turn to the other arguments (7b 18-9a 6), matters are even worse. For the majority of these arguments, if they establish anything at all — and they certainly have steps at which one might cavil — establish not the Law of NonContradiction, but what we might call the Law of Non-Triviality: it is not possible that all contradictions be true. Dialetheists may of course agree with this. Aris totle, in fact, seems to slide between the two Laws with gay abandon, possibly because he took his main targets to be not just dialetheists, but trivialists.41 A couple of the arguments do not even attempt to establish the Law of Non-Triviality. What they conclude is that it is impossible for anyone to believe that all contra dictions are true. It is, of course, compatible with this that all contradictions are true, nonetheless. Aristotle’s defence of the Law of Non-Contradiction must therefore be reckoned a failure. It’s historical importance has been completely out of proportion to its intellectual weight, however. Since the entrenchment of Aristotelian philosophy in the medieval European universities, the Law of Non-Contradiction has been high orthodoxy in Western philosophy. It is taken so much for granted that there has, improbably enough, been no sustained defence of the Law since Aristotle’s. (Of which other of Aristotle’s philosophical views can one say this?) It is worth noting, finally, that the Law of Non-Contradiction — and its mate the Law of Excluded Middle, also defended in Book 4 of Metaphysics — are not logical principles for Aristotle, but metaphysical principles, governing the nature of beings qua beings. By the time one gets to Leibniz, however, the Laws have been absorbed into the logical canon. 40 In fact, in many paraconsistent logics, such as LP , ¬(α ∧ ¬α) is a logical truth, and in their modalised versions, so is ¬�(α ∧ ¬α). Every contradiction therefore generates secondary contradictions. 41 The slide between ‘some’ and ‘all’ is also not uncommon in others who have tried to defend the law.
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3.2 A Minority Voice: Neoplatonism and its Successors There is just one tradition that stands out against the orthodox acceptance of the Law of Non-Contradiction. This is the metaphysical tradition that starts with the Neoplatonists, and goes through the great Christian mystics, Eruigina and Eckhart, and their Renaissance successors, such as Cusanus. What holds this tradition together is the belief that there is an ultimate reality, the One, or in its Christian form, the Godhead. This reality is, in some sense, responsible for the existence of everything else, including humankind. Humankind, being alienated from the reality, finds its ultimate fulfillment in union with it. This tradition draws on, amongst other things, some of the later Platonic di alogues, and especially the Parmenides. As we noted, in the second half of this dialogue Parmenides shows the One to have contradictory properties. It is per haps not surprising, then, to find writers in this tradition having a tendency to say contradictory things, especially about the ultimate reality. For example, referring explicitly to Parmenides 160b 2-3, Plotinus says:42 The One is all things and no one of them; the source of all things is not all things and yet it is all things...43 Eckhart says, sometimes, that the Godhead is being; and, at other times, that it is beyond being — and thus not being.44 And Cusanus says that:45 in no way do they [distinctions] exist in the absolute maximum. The absolute maximum... is all things, and whilst being all, is none of them; in other words, it is at once the maximum and minimum of being. Cusanus also attacked contemporary Aristotelians for their attachment to the Law of Non-Contradiction.46 The contradictory claims about the One are no mere aberration on the part of these writers, but are driven by the view of the One as the ground of all things that are. If it were itself anything, it would not be this: it would be just another one of those things. Consequently, one cannot say truly anything to the effect that the One is such and such, or even that it is (simpliciter ); for this would simply make it one of the many. The One is therefore ineffable. As Plotinus puts it (Ennead V.5.6): The First must be without form, and, if without form, then it is no Being; Being must have some definition and therefore be limited; but the First cannot be thought of as having definition and limit, for thus 42 Ennead
V.2.1. Translation from MacKenna [1991]. inserts the words ‘in a transcendental sense’ here; but they are not in the text. I think that this is a misplaced application of the principle of charity. 44 See Smart [1967, p. 450]. 45 Of Learned Ignorance I.3. Translation from Heron [1954]. 46 See Maurer [1967]. 43 MacKenna
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it would not be the Source, but the particular item indicated by the definition assigned to it. If all things belong to the produced, which of them can be thought of as the supreme? Not included among them, this can be described only as transcending them: but they are Being and the Beings; it therefore transcends Being. But even though the One is ineffable, Plotinus still describes it as ‘the source of all things’, ‘perfect’ (Ennead V.2.1), a ‘Unity’, ‘precedent to all Being’ (Ennead VI.9.3). Clearly, describing the ineffable is going to force one into contradiction.47
3.3
Contradiction in Eastern Philosophy
We have not finished with the Neoplatonist tradition yet, but before we continue with it, let us look at Eastern Philosophy, starting in India. Since very early times, the Law of Non-Contradiction has been orthodox in the West. This is not at all the case in India. The standard view, going back to before the Buddha (a rough contemporary of Aristotle) was that on any claim of substance there are four possibilities: that the view is true (and true only), that it is false (and false only), that it is neither true nor false, and that it is both true and false. This is called the catuskoti (four corners), or tetralemma.48 Hence, the possibility of a contradiction was explicitly acknowledged. The difference between this view and the orthodox Western view is the same as that between the semantics of classical logic and the four-valued semantics for the relevant logic of First Degree Entailment (as we shall see). In classical logic, sentences have exactly one of the truth values T (true) and F (false). In First Degree Entailment they may have any combination of these values, including both and neither. Just to add complexity to the picture, some Buddhist philosopers argued that, for some issues, all or none of these four possibilities might hold. Thus, the major 2nd century Mahayana ag¯ arjuna is sometimes interpreted in one or other of these Buddhist philosopher N¯ ways. Arguments of this kind, just to confuse matters, are also sometimes called catuskoti. Interpreting N¯ ag¯ arjuna is a very difficult task, but it is possible to interpret him, as some commentators did, as claiming that these matters are simply ineffable.49 The Law of Non-Contradiction has certainly had its defenders in the East, ay¯ a tradition. This in though. It was endorsed, for example, by logicians in the Ny¯ fluenced Buddhist philosophers, such as Darmak¯ırti, and, via him, some Buddhist schools, such as the Tibetan Gelug-pa. Even in Tibet, though, many Buddhist schools, such as the Nyngma-pa, rejected the law, at least for ultimate truths. Turning to Chinese philosophy, and specifically Taoism, one certainly finds ut terances that look as though they violate the Law of Non-Contradiction. For ex 47 Nor can one escape the contradiction by saying that the One is not positively characterisable, but may be characterised only negatively (the via negativa). For the above characterisations are positive. 48 See Raju [1953–4]. 49 This is particularly true of the Zen tradition. See Kasulis [1981, ch. 2].
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ample, in the Chuang Tzu (the second most important part of the Taoist canon), we find:50 That which makes things has no boundaries with things, but for things to have boundaries is what we mean by saying ‘the boundaries between things’. The boundaryless boundary is the boundary without a bound ary. A cause of these contradictions is not unlike that in Neoplatonism. In Taoism, there is an ultimate reality, Tao, which is the source and generator of everything else. As the Tao Te Ching puts it:51 The Tao gives birth to the One.
The One gives birth to the two.
The Two give birth to the three —
The Three give birth to every living thing.
It follows, as in the Western tradition, that there is nothing that can be said about it. As the Tao Te Ching puts it (ch. 1): The Tao that can be talked about is not the true Tao. The name that can be named is not the eternal name. Everything in the universe comes out of Nothing. Nothing — the nameless — is the beginning...
Yet in explaining this situation, we are forced to say things about it, as the above quotations demonstrate. Chan (Zen) is a fusion of Mahayana Buddhism and Taoism. As might therefore be expected, the dialetheic aspects of the two metaphysics reinforce each other. Above all, then, Zen is a metaphysics where we find the writings of its exponents ogen full of apparent contradictions. Thus, for example, the great Zen master D¯ says:52 This having been confirmed as the Great Teacher’s saying, we should study immobile sitting and transmit it correctly: herein lies a thorough investigation of immobile sitting handed down in the Buddha-way. Al though thoughts on the immobile state of sitting are not limited to a ueh-shan’s saying is the very best. Namely: ‘thinking single person, Y¨ is not thinking’. or:53 50 22.6.
Translation from Mair [1994]. 42. Translation from Kwok, Palmer and Ramsey [1993]. What the one, two and three are is a moot point. But in one interpretation, the one is the T’ai-Chi (great harmony); the two are Yin and Yang. 52 Kim [1985, p. 157].
53 Tanahashi [1985, p. 107].
51 Ch.
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An ancient buddha said, ‘Mountains are mountains, waters are wa ters.’ These words do not mean that mountains are mountains; they mean that mountains are mountains. Therefore investigate mountains thoroughly... Now interpreting all this, especially the Chinese and Japanese writings, is a hard and contentious matter. The writings are often epigrammatic and poetical. Certainly, the writings contain assertions of contradictions, but are we meant to take them literally? It might be thought not. One suggestion is that the contradictions are uttered for their perlocutionary effect: to shock the hearer into some reaction. Certainly, this sort of thing plays a role in Zen, but not in Mahayana Buddhism or Taoism. And even in Zen, contradictions occur in even the theoretical writings. More plausibly, it may be suggested that the contradictions in question have to be interpreted in some non-literal way. For example, though ultimate reality is literally indescribable, what is said about it gives some metaphorical description of its nature. This won’t really work either, though. For the very reason that ultimate reality is indescribable is precisely because it is that which brings all beings into being; it can therefore be no being (and so to say anything about it is contradictory). At least this much of what is said about the Tao must be taken literally, or the whole picture falls apart.54
3.4
Hegel
Let us now return to Western philosophy, and specifically to Hegel. With the philosophers we have met in the last two sections, because their utterances are often so cryptic, it is always possible to suggest that their words should not be taken at face value. By contrast, Hegel’s dialetheism is ungainsayable. He says, for example:55 ...common experience... says that there is a host of contradictory things, contradictory arrangements, whose contradiction exists not merely in external reflection, but in themselves... External sensuous motion is contradiction’s immediate existence. Something moves, not because at one moment it is here and at another there, but because at one and the same moment it is here and not here, because in this “here”, it at once is and is not. Why does he take this view? For a start, Hegel is an inheritor of the Neoplatonic tradition.56 Hegel’s One is Spirit (Geist). This creates Nature. In Nature there are individual consciousnesses 54 It is true that in Chinese philosophy, unlike in Neoplatonism, the arguments that tie the parts of the picture together are not made explicit; but they are there implicitly: readers are left to think things through for themselves. 55 Miller [1969, p. 440]. 56 The genealogy is well tracked in Kolakowski [1978, ch. 1].
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(Spirit made conscious), who, by a process of conceptual development come to form a certain concept, the Absolute Idea, which allows them to understand the whole system. In this way Spirit achieves self-understanding, in which form it is the Absolute.57 There is much more to the story than this, of course, and to understand some of it, we need to backtrack to Kant. In the Transcendental Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant argues that Reason itself has a tendency to produce con tradiction. Specifically, in the Antinomies of Pure Reason, Kant gives four pairs of arguments which are, he claims, inherent in thought. Each pair gives a pair of contradictory conclusions (that the world is limited in space and time, that it is not; that matter is infinitely divisible, that it is not; etc.) The only resolution of these contradictions, he argues, lies in the distinction between phenomena and noumena, and the insistence that our categories apply only to phenomena. The antinomies arise precisely because, in these arguments, Reason over-stretches it self, and applies the categories to noumena. There is a lot more to things than this, but that will suffice for here.58 Priest, G. Hegel criticised Kant’s distinction between phenomena and noumena. In partic ular, he rejected the claim that the two behave any differently with respect to the categories. The conclusions of Kant’s Antinomies therefore have to be accepted — the world is inconsistent:59 to offer the idea that the contradictions introduced into the world of Reason by the categories of the Understanding is inevitable and es sential was to make one of the most important steps in the progress of Modern Philosophy. But the more important the issue raised the more trivial was the solution. Its only motive was an excessive ten derness for the things in the world. The blemish of contradiction, it seems, could not be allowed to mar the essence of the world; but there could be no objection to attaching it to the thinking Reason, to the essence of the mind. Probably, nobody will feel disposed to deny that the phenomenal world presents contradictions to the observing mind; meaning by ‘phenomenal’ the world as it presents itself to the senses and understanding, to the subjective mind. But if a comparison is in stituted between the essence of the world, and the essence of the mind, it does seem strange to hear how calmly and confidently the modest dogma has been advanced by one and repeated by others, that thought or Reason, and not the World, is the seat of contradiction. Moreover, the Kantian contradictions are just the tip of an ice-berg. All our categories (or at least, all the important ones), give rise to contradiction in the same way. Thus, the contradictions concerning motion with which we started this section arise from one of Zeno’s paradoxes of motion. And it is reflection on these 57 For
fuller discussion, see Priest [1989–90].
and discussion can be found in Priest [1995, chs. 5, 6].
59 Lesser Logic, Section 48. Translation from Wallace [1975].
58 Details
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contradictions which drives the conceptual development that forces the emergence of the concept of the Absolute Idea. Famously, many aspects of Hegel’s thought were taken up by Marx (and Engels). In particular, Marx materialised the dialectic. In the process, much of the dialetheic story was simply taken over. This adds little of novelty that is important here, though, and so we do not need to go into it.60
3.5 Precursors of Modern Dialetheism So much for the Neoplatonic tradition. Outside this, dialetheists and fellow trav ellers are very hard to find in Western philosophy. Around the turn of the 20th century, intimations of the failure of the Law of Non-Contradiction did start to arise in other areas, however. Let us look at these, starting with Meinong. Meinong’s theory of objects had two major postulates. The first is that every term of language refers to an object, though many of these objects may not exist. The second is that all objects may have properties, whether or not they exist. In particular, with reservations that we will come back to in a moment, all objects which are characterised in certain ways have those properties which their charac terisations attribute to them (the Characterisation Principle). Thus, for example, the fabled Golden Mountain is both golden and a mountain; and, notoriously, the round square is both round and square. As the last example shows, some objects would appear to violate the Law of Non-Contradiction by being, for example, both round and square. Meinong was criticised on just these grounds by Russell [1905]. He replied that one should expect the Law to hold only for those things that exist, or at least for those things that are possible. Impossible objects have — what else? — impossible properties. That is how one knows that they cannot exist. As he puts it:61 B.Russell lays the real emphasis on the fact that by recognising such objects the principle of contradiction would lose its unlimited validity. Naturally I can in no way avoid this consequence... Indeed the principle of contradiction is directed by no one at anything other than the real and the possible. Things are not quite as straightforward as may appear, however.62 It is not entirely clear that Meinong does countenance violations of the Law of Non-Cont radiction in the most full-blooded sense of the term. The round square is round and square, but is it round and not round? One would naturally think so, since being square entails not being round; but Meinong may well have thought that this entailment held only for existent, or at least possible, objects. Hence he may not have held there to be things with literally contradictory properties. 60 Details
can be found in Priest [1989–90].
[1907, p. 16].
62 The following is discussed further in Routley [1980].
61 Meinong
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But what about the thing such that it is both round and it is not the case that it is round? This would seem to be such that it is round and it is not the case that it is round. Not necessarily. For Meinong did not hold that every object has the properties it is characterised as having. One cannot characterise an object into existence, for example. (Think of the existent round square).63 The Characterisation Principle holds only for certain properties, those that are assumptible, or characterising. It is clear that Meinong thought that existence and like properties are not characterising, but Meinong never came clean and gave a general characterisation of characterising properties themselves. So we just do not know whether negation could occur in a characterising property. Hence, though there are certainly versions of Meinong’s theory in which some objects have contradictory properties, it is not clear whether these are Meinong’s. The next significant figure in the story is the Polish logician L � ukasiewicz. In � ukasiewicz published a book-length critique of Aristotle on the Law of Non1910, L Contradiction. This has still to be translated into English, but in the same year he � ukasiewicz gives a damning published an abbreviated version of it, which has.64 L critique of Aristotle’s arguments, making it clear that they have no substance. Following Meinong’s lead, he also states that the Law of Non-Contradiction is not valid for impossible objects.65 However, he does claim that the Law is a valid “practical-ethical” principle. For example, without it one would not be able to establish that one was absent from the scene of a crime by demonstrating that one was somewhere else, and so not there.66 Given the logical acumen of the � ukasiewicz’s position here is disappointing. One does not rest of the article, L � ukasiewicz requires. It is sufficient need a universally valid law to do what L that the situation in question is such as to enable one to rule out inconsistency in that particular case. (Compare: even a logical intuitionist can appeal to the Law of Excluded Middle in finite situations.) For the same reason, an inductive generalisation from this sort of situation to the universal validity of the Law — or even to a law covering existent objects — is quite groundless. Another philosopher who was prepared to brook certain violations of the Law of Non-Contradiction, at around the same time, was the Russian Vasiliev.67 Like L � ukasiewicz, Vasiliev held the Law to be valid for the actual world, but he held that it might fail in certain “imaginary worlds”. These are worlds where logic is different; there can be such things, just as there can be worlds where geometry is non-Euclidean. (Recall that he was writing before the General Theory of Relativ ity.) He did not think that all of logic could change from world to world, however. Essentially, positive logic, logic that does not concern negation (what he called 63 In fact, using an unbridled form of this principle, one can establish triviality. Merely consider the thing such that it is self-identical and α, for arbitrary α. 64 The book is Lukasiewicz � [1910]; the English translation of the abbreviated version is Lukasiewicz � [1970]. 65 [1970, section 19]. 66 [1970, section 20]. 67 Only one of his papers has been translated into English, Vasiliev [1912–13]. For further discussion of Vasiliev, see Priest [2000b].
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‘metalogic’) is invariant across all worlds. Only negation could behave differently in different worlds. Vasiliev also constructed a formal logic which was supposed to be the logic of these imaginary worlds, imaginary logic. This was not a modern logic, but a version of traditional logic. In particular, Vasiliev added to the two traditional syntactic forms ‘S is P (and not also not P )’, and ‘S is not P (and not also P )’, a third form, ‘S is P and not P ’. He then constructed a theory of syllogisms based on these three forms. (For example, the following is a valid syllogism: all S is M ; all M is P and not P ; hence, all S is P and not P .) Though Vasiliev’s logic is paraconsistent, it is not a modern paraconsistent logic: it is paraconsistent for exactly the same reason that standard syllogistic is. Nor, in a sense, is Vasiliev a dialetheist, since he held that no contradictions are true. His work clearly marks a departure from the traditional attitude towards the Law of Non-Contradiction, though. The final figure to be mentioned in this section is Wittgenstein. Though Wittgenstein’s views evolved throughout his life, they were mostly inhospitable to dialetheism. For most of his life, he held that contradictions, and especially the contradictions involved in the logical paradoxes, were senseless (in the Tractatus), or failed to make statements (in the transitional writings). However, towards the end of his life, and specifically in the Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, he came to reject this view:68 There is one mistake to avoid: one thinks that a contradiction must be senseless: that is to say, if e.g. we use the signs ‘p’, ‘∼’, ‘.’ consistently, then ‘p. ∼ p’ cannot say anything. The crucial view here seems to have been that concerning language games. People play a variety of these, and if people play games in which contradictions are ac cepted, then contradictions are indeed valid in those games (shades of Protagoras here). The logical paradoxes might just be such. As he says:69 But you can’t allow a contradiction to stand: Why not? We do some times use this form of talk, of course, not often — but one could imag ine a technique of language in which it was a regular instrument. It might, for example be said of an object in motion that it existed and did not exist in this place; change might be expressed by means of contradiction. Unsurprisingly, Wittgenstein also had a sympathy towards paraconsistency. In 1930, he even predicted the modern development of the subject in the most striking fashion:70 68 Wittgenstein
[1978, pp. 377f].
[1978, p. 370].
70 Wittgenstein [1979, p. 139].
69 Wittgenstein
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I am prepared to predict that there will be mathematical investiga tions of calculi containing contradictions and that people will pride themselves in having emancipated themselves from consistency too. But his own efforts in this direction were not very inspired, and never came to much more than the directive ‘infer nothing from a contradiction’.71 Hence, Wittgenstein exerted no influence on future developments. Indeed, of all the people mentioned � ukasiewicz who was to exert an (indirect) influence on in this section it was only L the development of paraconsistency, to which we now return. 4
MODERN PARACONSISTENCY
4.1 Background The revolution that produced modern logic around the start of the 20th century depended upon the application of novel mathematical techniques in proof-theory, model theory, and so on. For a while, these techniques were synonymous with classical logic. But logicians came to realise that the techniques are not specific to classical logic, but could be applied to produce quite different sorts of logical systems. By the middle of the century, the basics of many-valued logic, modal logic, and intuitionist logic had been developed. Many other sorts of logic have been developed since then; one of these is paraconsistent logic. The commencement of the modern development of paraconsistent logics oc curred just after the end of the Second World War. At that juncture, it was an idea whose time had come — in the sense that it seems to have occurred to many different people, in very different places, and quite independently of each other. The result was a whole host of quite different paraconsistent logics. In this section we will look at these.72 I will be concerned here only with propositional logics. Though the addition of quantifiers certainly raises novel technical problems sometimes, it is normally conceptually routine. I shall assume familiarity with the basics of classical, modal, many-valued and intuitionist logic. I will use |=X as the consequence relation of the logic X. C is classical logic; I is intuionist logic.
4.2 Ja´skowski and Subsequent Developments The first influential developments in the area are constituted by the work of the Polish logician Ja´skowski, who had been a student of L � ukasiewicz. Ja´skowski published a system of paraconsistent logic in 1948,73 which he called discussive (or discursive) logic. Ja´skowski cites a number of reasons why there might be situations in which one has to deal with inconsistent information, but the main 71 See Goldstein [1989] for discussion. According to Goldstein, the view that a contradiction entails nothing is present even in Wittgenstein’s earlier writings, including the Tractatus. 72 For technical information concerning the systems, see Priest [2002], where details explained in this section are discussed further. Proofs not given or referenced here can be found there. 73 Translated into English as Ja´ skowski [1969].
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idea that drives his construction is indicated in the name he gives his logic. He envisages a number of people engaged in a discussion or discourse (such as, for example, the witnesses at a trial). Each participant vouchsafes certain information, which is consistent(!); but the information of one participant may contradict that of another. Technically, the idea is implemented as follows.74 An interpretation, I, is a Kripke-interpretation for S5. It helps (but is not necessary) to think of I as coming with a distinguished base-world, g. What is true at any one world is thought of as the information provided by a participant of the discourse, and what holds in the discourse is what is true at any one of its worlds. This motivates the following definitions (where � is the usual possibility operator of modal logic): α holds in I iff �α is true at g Σ |=d α iff for all I, if β holds in I, for all β ∈ Σ, then α holds in I It is a simple matter to show that |=d is paraconsistent. A two-world model where p is true at w1 (= g) and false at w2 , but q is true at neither w1 nor w2 will demonstrate that p, ¬p d q. It should be noted, though, that α ∧ ¬α |=d β, since, whatever α is, α ∧ ¬α holds in no I. It follows that the rule of Adjunction, α, β |=d α ∧ β, fails. This approach may therefore be classified under the rubric of non-adjunctive paraconsistent logic. As is clear, different discussive logics can be obtained by choosing underlying modal logics different from S5.75 A notable feature of discussive logic is the failure of modus ponens for the material conditional, ⊃: p, p ⊃ q d q. (The two-world interpretation above demonstrates this.) In fact, it can be shown that for sentences containing only extensional connectives there is no such thing as multi-premise validity, in the sense that if Σ |=d α, then for some β ∈ Σ, β |=d α. Moreover, single-premise inference is classical. That is, α |=d β iff α |=C β. In virtue of this, Ja´skowski defined a new sort of conditional, the discursive conditional, ⊃d , defined as follows: α ⊃d β is �α ⊃ β. It is easy to check that α, α ⊃d β |=d β (that is, that �α, �(�α ⊃ β) |= �β ), provided that the accessibility relation in the underlying modal logic is at least Euclidean (that is, if wRx and wRy then xRy). This holds in S5, but may fail in weaker logics, such as S4. The weakness produced by the failure of Adjunction, and multi-premise infer ences in general, may be addressed with a quite different approach to constructing a non-adjunctive paraconsistent logic. The idea is to allow a certain amount of 74 What follows is somewhat anachronistic, since it appeals to possible-world semantics, which were developed only some 10-15 years later, but it is quite faithful to the spirit of Ja´skowski’s paper. 75 A somewhat different approach is given in Rescher and Brandom [1980]. They define validity in terms of truth preservation at all worlds, but they allow for inconsistent and incomplete worlds. What holds in an inconsistent world is what holds in any one of some bunch of ordinary worlds; and what holds in an incomplete world is what holds in all of some bunch of ordinary worlds. It can be shown that this results in the same consequence relation as discussive logic.
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conjoining before applying classical consequence. Since arbitrary conjoining can not be allowed on pain of triviality, the question is how to regulate the conjoining. One solution to this, due first, as far as I know, to Rescher and Manor [1970–71], is as follows. Given any set of sentences, Σ, a maximally consistent (mc) subset of Σ is a set Π ⊆ Σ, such that Π is classically consistent, but if α ∈ Σ − Π, Π ∪ {α} is classically inconsistent. Then define: Σ |=rm α iff there is some mc subset of Σ such that Σ |=C α. |=rm is non-adjunctive, since p, ¬p rm p ∧ ¬p. ({p, ¬p} has two mc subsets, {p} and {¬p}.) It does allow multi-premise inference, however. For example, p, p ⊃ q |=rm q. ({p, p ⊃ q} has only one mc subset, namely itself.) |=rm has an unusual property for a notion of deductive consequence, however: it is not closed under uniform substitution. For, as is easy to check, p, q |=rm p ∧ q, but p, ¬p rm p ∧ ¬p.76 A different way of proceeding, due to Schotch and Jennings [1980], is as follows. Define a covering of a set, Σ, to be a finite collection of disjoint sets, Σ1 , ..., Σn , such that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Σi ⊆ Σ and is classically consistent, and for all α ∈ Σ, at least one of the sets classically entails α. Define the level of incoherence of Σ, l(Σ), to be the smallest n such that Σ has a covering of size n; if it has no such covering, then set l(Σ) (conventionally) as ∞. If Σ is classically consistent, then l(Σ) = 1. A set such as {p, ¬p, q} has level 2, since it has two coverings of size 2: {p, q} and {¬p}; {¬p, q} and {p}. And if Σ contains a member that is itself classically inconsistent, then l(Σ) = ∞. Now define: Σ |=sj α iff l(Σ) = ∞, or l(Σ) = n and for every covering of Σ of size n, there is some member of it that classically entails α. The intuition to which this answers is this. We may suppose that Σ comes to us muddled up from different sources. The level of a set tells us the simplest way we can unscramble the data into consistent chunks; and however we unscramble the data in this way, we know that some source vouchsafes the conclusion. Like |=rm , |=sj is non-adjunctive, since p, ¬p rm p ∧ ¬p. ({p, ¬p} has level 2, with one covering: {p}, {¬p}.) But it does allow multi-premise inference. For example, p, p ⊃ q |=sj q. ({p, p ⊃ q} is of level 1.) And |=sj is not closed under uniform substitution. For p, q |=sj p ∧ q, but p, ¬p sj p ∧ ¬p. But |=rm and |=sj are not the same. For a start, since p ∧ ¬p is classically inconsistent, {p ∧ ¬p} has level ∞ and so {p ∧ ¬p} |=sj q. But {p ∧ ¬p} has one mc subset, namely the empty set, φ; and φ C q; hence, p ∧ ¬p rm q. Moreover, let Σ = {p, ¬p, q, r}. Then Σ has two mc subsets {p, q, r}, and {¬p, q, r}. Hence Σ |=rm q ∧ r. But Σ has level 2, and one covering has the the members: {p, q}, {¬p, r}. Hence, Σ sj q ∧ r. Finally, |=rm is monotonic: if Σ has an mc subset that classically delivers α, so does Σ ∪ Π. But |=rm is not: p, q |=sj p ∧ q, whilst p, ¬p, q sj p ∧ q, since {p, ¬p, q} has level 2, and one covering is: {¬p, q}, {p}. We can look at the Schotch/Jennings account in a somewhat different, but illuminating, fashion. A standard definition of classical consequence is the familiar: 76 We could define another consequence relation as the closure of |= rm under uniform substi tution. This would still be paraconsistent.
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Σ |=C α iff for every evaluation, ν, if every member of Σ is true in ν, so is α. Equivalently, we can put it as follows. If Σ is consistent: Σ |=C α iff for every Π ⊇ Σ, if Π is consistent, so is Π ∪ {α} (If Σ is not consistent, then the biconditional holds vacuously.) In other words, a valid inference preserves consistency of supersets. Or, to put it another way, it preserves coherence of level 1. Now, if Π is inconsistent, there is not much consistency to be preserved, but we may still consider it worth preserving higher levels of coherence. This is exactly what |=sj does. For, as is noted in Brown and Schotch [1999], if for some n, l(Σ) = n: Σ |=sj α iff for every Π ⊇ Σ, if l(Π) = n then l(Π ∪ {α}) = n (If l(Σ) = ∞, the biconditional holds vacuously.)77 Thus, the Schotch/Jennings construction gives rives to a family of paraconsistent logics in which validity may be defined in terms of the preservation of something other than truth. Such preservational logics are the subject of another article in this Handbook, and so I will say no more about them here.
4.3
Dualising Intuitionism
The next sort of system of paraconsistent logic was the result of the work of the Brazilian logician da Costa starting with a thesis in 1963.78 Da Costa, and his students and co-workers, produced many systems of paraconsistent logic, including more discussive logics. But the original and best known da Costa systems arose as follows. In intuitionist logic, and because of the intuitionist account of negation, it is possible for neither α nor ¬α to hold. Thus, in a logic with a dual account of negation, it ought be possible for both α and ¬α to hold. The question, then, is how to dualise. Da Costa dualised as follows. We start with an axiomatisation of positive intuitionist logic (that is, intuitionist logic without negation). The following79 will do. The only rule of inference is modus ponens. α ⊃ (β ⊃ α) 77 From left to right, suppose that l(Σ) = n, Σ |= sj α, Π ⊇ Σ, and l(Π) = n. Let Π1 , ..., Πn be a covering of Π. Let Σi = Σ ∩ Πi . Then Σ1 , ..., Σn is a covering of Σ. Thus, for some i, Σi |=C α. Hence, Πi |=C α, and Π1 , ..., Πn is a covering of Π ∪ {α}. Conversely, suppose that l(Σ) = n, and for every Π ⊇ Σ, if l(Π) = n then l(Π ∪ {α}) = n; but Σ sj α. Then there is some partition of Σ, Σ1 , ..., Σn , such that for no i, Σi |=C α. Hence, for each i, Σi ∪ {¬α} is consistent. Thus, if Π = Σ ∪ {¬α ∧ σ; σ ∈ Σ}, l(Π) = n. Hence, l(Π ∪ {α}) = n. But this is impossible, since α cannot be consistently added to any member of a covering of Π of size n. 78 The most accessible place to read the results of da Costa’s early work is his [1974]. 79 Taken from Kleene [1952].
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(α ⊃ β) ⊃ ((α ⊃ (β ⊃ γ)) ⊃ (α ⊃ γ)) (α ∧ β) ⊃ α (α ∧ β) ⊃ β α ⊃ (β ⊃ (α ∧ β)) α ⊃ (α ∨ β) β ⊃ (α ∨ β) (α ⊃ γ) ⊃ ((β ⊃ γ) ⊃ ((α ∨ β) ⊃ γ)) One obtains an axiomatization for full intuitionist logic if one adds: (α ⊃ β) ⊃ ((α ⊃ ¬β) ⊃ ¬α)) α ⊃ (¬α ⊃ β) It is clear that one certainly does not want the second of these in a paraconsistent logic; the first, being a version of reductio ad absurdum, is also suspect.80 The two most notable consequences of these principles for negation are: α ⊃ ¬¬α ¬(α ∧ ¬α) (though not, of course, the converse of the first). Both of these, in their own ways, can be thought of as saying that if something is true, it is not false, whilst leaving open the possibility that something might be neither. To obtain a paraconsistent logic, it is therefore natural to take as axioms the claims which are, in some sense, the duals of these: 1¬ ¬¬α ⊃ α 2¬ α ∨ ¬α Both of these, in their ways, can be thought of as saying that if something is not false, it is true, whilst leaving open the possibility that something may be both. Adding these two axioms to those of positive intuitionist logic gives da Costa’s system Cω . Next, da Costa reasoned, there ought to be a way of expressing the fact that α behaves consistently (that is, is not both true and false). The natural way of doing this is by the sentence ¬(α ∧ ¬α). Write this as αo , and consider the principles: 1o β o ⊃ ((α ⊃ β) ⊃ ((α ⊃ ¬β) ⊃ ¬α))) 2o (αo ∧ β o ) ⊃ ((α ∧ β)o ∧ (α ∨ β)o ∧ (α ⊃ β)o ∧ (¬α)o ) The first says that the version of the reductio principle we have just met works provided that the contradiction deduced behaves consistently. The second (in which the last conjunct of the consequent is, in fact, redundant) expresses the plausible thought that if any sentences behave consistently, so do their compounds. Adding these two axioms to Cω gives the da Costa system C1 . 80 Though, note, even a paraconsistent logician can accept the principle that if something entails a contradiction, this fact establishes its negation: versions of this inference are valid in many relevant logics.
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The addition of this machinery in C1 allows us to define the strong negation of α, ¬∗ α, as: ¬α ∧ αo . ¬∗ α says that α is consistently false. It is possible to show that ¬∗ has all the properties of classical negation.81 But as is well known, the addition of classical negation to intuitionist logic turns the positive part into classical logic. (Using the properties of classical negation, it is possible, reasoning by cases in a standard fashion, to establish Peirce’s Law: ((α ⊃ β) ⊃ α) ⊃ α, which is the difference between positive intuitionist and classical logics.) Hence, the positive logic of C1 is classical logic. It might be thought that one needs more than αo to guarantee that α behaves consistently. After all, in contexts where contradictions may be acceptable, why might we not have αo ∧ α ∧ ¬α? In virtue of this, it might be thought that what is required in condition 1o is not αo , but αo ∧ αoo . Of course, there is no a priori guarantee that this behaves consistently either. So it might be thought that what is required is αo ∧ αoo ∧ αooo ; and so on. Let us write αn as αo ∧ ... ∧ αo...o (where the last conjunct has n ‘o’s). Then replacing ‘o’ by ‘n’ in 1o and 2o gives the da Costa system Cn (1 ≤ n < ω). Just as in C1 , in each Cn , a strong negation ¬∗ α can be defined as ¬α ∧ αn , and the collapse of the positive part into classical logic occurs as before. Semantics for the C systems were discovered by da Costa and Alves [1977]. Take the standard truth-functional semantics for positive classical logic. Thus, if ν is an evaluation, ν(α ∨ β) = 1 iff ν(α) = 1 or ν(β) = 1; ν(α ⊃ β) = 1 iff ν(α) = 0 or ν(β) = 1, etc. Now allow ν to behave non-deterministically on negation. That is, for any α, ν(¬α) may take any value. Validity is defined in the usual way, in terms of truth preservation over all evaluations. It is clear that the resulting system is paraconsistent, since one can take an evaluation that assigns both p and ¬p the value 1, and q the value 0. The system just described is, in fact, none of the da Costa systems. In a certain sense, it is the most basic of a whole family of logics which extend positive classical logic with a non-truth-functional negation. The Cn systems can be obtained by adding further constraints on evaluations concerning negation. Thus, if we add the conditions: (i) If ν(¬¬α) = 1 then ν(α) = 1 (ii) If ν(α) = 0 then ν(¬α) = 1 we validate 1¬ and 2¬ . Adding the conditions: If ν(β n ) = ν(α ⊃ β) = ν(α ⊃ ¬β) = 1 then ν(α) = 0 If ν(αn ) = ν(β n ) = 1 then ν((α ∧ β)n ) = ν((α ∨ β)n ) = ν((α ⊃ β)n ) = (¬α)o = 1 81 Specifically,
¬∗ satisfies the conditions:
(α ⊃ β) ⊃ ((α ⊃ ¬∗ β) ⊃ ¬∗ α)) ¬∗ ¬ ∗ α ⊃ α which give all the properties of classical negation. See da Costa and Guillaume [1965].
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then gives the system Cn (1 ≤ n < ω). The semantics for Cω are not quite so simple, since positive intuitionist logic is not truth-functional. However, non-deterministic semantics can be given as fol lows.82 A semi-evaluation is any evaluation that satisfies the standard conditions for conjunction and disjunction, plus (i), (ii), and: If ν(α ⊃ β) = 1 then ν(α) = 0 or ν(β) = 1 If ν(α ⊃ β) = 0 then ν(β) = 0 A valuation is now any semi-evaluation, ν, satisfying the further condition: if α is anything of the form α1 ⊃ (α2 ⊃ (...αn )...), where αn is not itself a conditional, then if ν(α) = 0, there is a semi-valuation, ν , such that for all 1 ≤ i < n, ν (αi ) = 1 and ν (αn ) = 0. Validity is defined in terms of truth preservation over all evaluations in the usual way. As we have seen, all the C systems can be thought of as extending a positive logic (either intuitionistic or classical) with a non-truth-functional negation. They are therefore often classed under the rubric of positive plus logics. A singular fact about all the positive plus logics is that the substitution of provable equivalents breaks down. For example, α and α ∧ α are logically equivalent, but because negation is not truth functional, there is nothing in the semantics to guarantee that ¬α and ¬(α ∧ α) take the same value in an evaluation. Hence, these are not logically equivalent. Da Costa’s systems are the result of one way of producing something which may naturally be thought of as the dual of intuitionist logic. There are also other ways. Another is to dualise the Kripke semantics for intuitionist logic. A Kripke semantics for intuitionist logic is a structure W, R, ν, where W is a set (of worlds), R is a binary relation on W that is reflexive and transitive, and ν maps each propositional parameter to a truth value at every world, subject to the heredity condition: if xRy and νx (p) = 1, νy (p) = 1. The truth conditions for the operators are: νw (α ∧ β) = 1 iff νw (α) = 1 and νw (β) = 1 νw (α ∨ β) = 1 iff νw (α) = 1 or νw (β) = 1 νw (α ⊃ β) = 1 iff for all w such that wRw , if νw (α) = 1 then νw (β) = 1 νw (¬α) = 1 iff for all w such that wRw , νw (α) = 0 (Alternatively, ¬α may be defined as α ⊃ ⊥ where ⊥ is a logical constant that takes the value 0 at all worlds.) It is not difficult to show that the heredity condition follows for all formulas, not just parameters. An inference is valid if it is truth-preserving at all worlds of all interpretations. Dualising: everything is exactly the same, except that we dualise the truth conditions for negation, thus: 82 Folowing
Lopari´c [1986].
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νw (¬α) = 1 iff there is some w , such that w Rw and νw (α) = 0 It is easy to check that the general heredity condition still holds with these truth conditions. Since nothing has changed for the positive connectives, the positive part of this logic is intuitionist, but whereas in intuitionist logic we have α∧¬α |=I β and α |=I ¬¬α, but not β |=I α ∨ ¬α or ¬¬α |=I α, it is now the other way around. Details are left as an exercise. Here, though, is a counter-model for Explosion. Let W = {w0 , w1 }; w0 Rw1 ; at w0 , p and q are both false; at w1 , p is true and q is false. It follows that ¬p is true at w1 , and hence w1 gives the counter-model.83 Despite similarities, the logic obtained in this way is distinct from any of the C systems. It is easy to check, for example, that ¬α is logically equivalent to ¬(α ∧ α), and more generally, that provable equivalents are inter-substitutable. Yet a third way to dualise intuitionist logic, is to dualise its algebraic seman tics.84 A Heyting algebra is a distributive lattice with a bottom element, ⊥, and an operator, ⊃, satisfying the condition:85 a ∧ b ≤ c iff a ≤ b ⊃ c which makes ⊥ ⊃ ⊥ the top element. We may define ¬α as α ⊃ ⊥. A standard ex ample of a Heyting algebra is provided by any topological space, T . The members of the algebra are the open subsets of T ; ∧ and ∨ are union and intersection; ⊥ is the empty set, and a ⊃ b is (a ∨ b)o , where overlining indicates complementation, and o here is the interior operator of the topology. It is easy to check that ¬a = ao . It is well known that for finite sets of premises, intuitionist logic is sound and com plete with respect to the class of all Heyting algebras — indeed with respect to the class of Heyting algebras defined by topological spaces. That is, α1 , ..., αn |=I β iff for every evaluation into every such algebra ν(α1 ∧ ... ∧ αn ) ≤ ν(β). We now dualise. A dual Heyting algebra is a distributive lattice with a top element, , and an operator, ⊂, satisfying the condition: a ≤ b ∨ c iff a ⊂ b ≤ c which makes ⊂ the bottom element. We may define ¬a as ⊂ a. It is not difficult to check that if T is any topological space, then it produces a dual Heyting algebra whose elements are the closed sets of the space; ∧ and ∨ are union and intersection; is the whole space; and a ⊂ b is (a ∧ b)c , where c is the closure c operator of the space. ¬b is clearly b . Validity is defined as before. We may call the logic that this construction gives closed set logic. Again, we have β |=I α ∨ ¬α and ¬¬α |=I α, but not their duals. Verification is left as an 83 A version of these semantics can be found, in effect, in Rauszer [1977]. In this, Rauszer gives a Kripke semantics for a logic he calls ‘Heyting-Brower Logic’. This is intuitionist logic plus the duals of intuitionist ¬ and ⊃. 84 As discovered by Goodman [1981]. 85 I use the same symbols for logical connectives and the corresponding algebraic operators, context sufficing to disambiguate.
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exercise, but a counter-model to Explosion is provided by the real numbers with their usual topology. Consider an evaluation, ν, such that ν(p) = [−1, +1], and ν(q) = φ. Then ν(p ∧ ¬p) = {−1, +1}, which is not a subset of φ. (This example illustrates how the points in the set represented by p ∧ ¬p may be thought of as the points on the topological boundary between the sets represented by p and ¬p.) It is to be noted that closed set logic is distinct from all the C systems. For example, it is easy to check that ¬α and ¬(α ∧ α) are logically equivalent — and more generally, that provable equivalents are inter-substitutable. Finally, as one would expect, modus ponens fails for ⊂. (It is, after all, the dual of ⊃.) It is a simple matter to construct a topological space where a ∩ (a ∩ b)c is not a subset of b. (Hint: take a to be the whole space.) Indeed, it may be shown that there is no operator definable in terms of ∧, ∨, ⊂ and ⊥ that satisfies modus ponens. Hence closed set logic is distinct from the logic obtained by dualising Kripke semantics as well.86
4.4 Many-Valued Logics It is not only intuitionism that allows for truth value gaps. In many-valued logics it is not uncommon to think of one of the values as neither true nor false. Hence another way of constructing a paraconsistent logic is to dualise this idea, with a many-valued logic that employs the value both true and false or something similar. The idea that paradoxical sentences might take a non-classical truth value goes back to at least Bochvar [1939]. But the idea that this might be used to construct a many-valued logic that was paraconsistent first seems to have been envisaged by the Argentinian logician Asenjo in 1954, though the ideas were not published until [1966]. As well as having the standard truth values, t and f , there is a third value i, which is the semantic value of paradoxical or antinomic sentences. The truth tables for conjunction, disjunction and negation are: ¬ t i f
f i t
∧ t i f
t t i f
i i i f
∨ t i f
f f f f
t t t t
i t i i
f t i f
and defining α ⊃ β as ¬α ∨ β gives it the table: ⊃ t i f
t t t t
i i i t
f f i t
86 I suspect that they have the same conditional-free fragment, though I have never checked the details. According to Goodman [1981, p. 124], closed set logic does have a Kripke semantics. The central feature of this is that it is not truth that is hereditary, but falsity. That is, if xRy and νx (α) = 0 then νy (α) = 0.
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The designated values are t and i. That is, a valid inference is one such that there is no evaluation where all the premises take the value t or i, and the conclusion does not.87 The logic is a very simple and natural one, and has been rediscovered a number of times since. For example, it and its properties were spelled out in more detail in Priest [1979], where it is termed LP (the Logic of Paradox), a name by which it is now standardly known. It is not difficult to see that LP is a paraconsistent logic: take the evaluation that sets p to the value i, and q to the value f to see that p, ¬p LP q. Despite this, it is not difficult to show that the logical truths of LP are exactly the same as those of classical logic. The same evaluation that invalidates Explosion shows that modus ponens for ⊃ is not valid: p, ¬p ∨ q LP q. The logic may be extended in many ways with a many-valued conditional connective that does satisfy modus ponens. Perhaps the simplest such connective has the following truth table: → t i f
t t t t
i f i t
f f f t
Adding this conditional gives the logic RM3 .88 It is clear that many-valued paraconsistent logics may be produced in many different ways. Any many-valued logic will be paraconsistent if it has a designated value, i, such that if ν(p) = i, ν(¬p) = i. Thus, L � ukasiewicz continuum-valued logic (better known as a fuzzy logic) will be paraconsistent provided that the designated values include 0.5; but we will not go into this here.89 The semantics of LP may be reformulated in an illuminating fashion. Let 1 and 0 be the standard truth values true and false. And let us suppose that instead of taking an evaluation to be a function that relates each parameter to one or other of these, we take it to be a relation that relates each parameter to one or other, or maybe both. Let us write such an evaluation as ρ. We may think of αρ1 as ‘α is true (under ρ)’ and αρ0 as ‘α is false (under ρ)’. Given an evaluation of the propositional parameters, this can be extended to an evaluation of all formulas by the standard truth-table conditions: ¬αρ1 iff αρ0 ¬αρ0 iff αρ1 87 Designation is crucial here. The truth tables are the same as those of Kleene’s strong three valued logic. But there, the value i is thought of as neither true nor false, and hence not designated. This logic is not a paraconsistent logic. The designated values are not actually specified in Asenjo [1966], but designating i does seem to be faithful to his intentions. 88 The logic is so called because it is one of a family of n-valued logics, RM , whose intersection n is the semi-relevant logic RM (R-Mingle). I am not sure who first formulated RM3 . The earliest reference to it in print that I know is in Anderson and Belnap [1975]. 89 An argument for paraconsistency, based on a semantics with degrees of truth, was mounted na in a doctoral thesis of 1979, and subsequently, e.g., in [1989]. His semantics is more by Pe˜ � ukaziewicz continuum-valued logic, though. complex than standard L
158 α ∧ βρ1 iff α ∧ βρ0 iff α ∨ βρ1 iff α ∨ βρ0 iff
Graham Priest
αρ1 and βρ1 αρ0 or βρ0 αρ1 or βρ1 αρ0 and βρ0
It is an easy matter to check that ρ relates every formula to 1 or 0 (or both). Moreover, if we write: t for: α is true and not false f for: α is false and not true i for: α is true and false then one can check that the conditions produce exactly the truth tables for LP . Further, under this translation, α takes a designated value (t or i) iff it relates to 1. So the definition of validity reduces to the classical one in terms of truthpreservation: Σ |=LP α iff for every ρ, if βρ1 for all β ∈ Σ, then αρ1 Hence, LP is exactly classical logic with the assumption that each sentence is either true or false, but not both, replaced with the assumption that each sentence is either true or false or both. Given these semantics, it is natural to drop the constraint that ρ must relate every parameter to at least one truth value, and so allow for the possibility that sentences may be neither true nor false, as well as both true and false. Thus, if we repeat the above exercise, but this time allow ρ to be an arbitrary relation between parameters and {0, 1}, we obtain a semantics for the logic of First Degree Entailment (F DE). These semantics were discovered by Dunn in his doctoral dissertation of 1966, though they were not published until [1976], by which time they also had been rediscovered by others.90 Since the semantic values of F DE extend those of LP it, too, is paraconsistent. But unlike LP it has no logical truths. (The empty value takes all these out.) It is also not difficult to show that F DE has a further important property: if α |=F DE β then α and β share a propositional parameter. F DE is, in fact, intimately related with the family of relevant logics that we will come to in the next subsection. Dunn’s semantics can be reformulated again. Instead of taking evaluations to be relations, we can take them, in a classically equivalent way, to be functions whose values are subsets of {1, 0}. It is not difficult to check that the truth conditions of the connectives can then be represented by the following diamond lattice: %
{1}
&
φ &
{0}
%
{1, 0}
90 It is interesting to note that when Dunn was a student at the University of Pittsburgh he took some classes in the mathematics department where he was taught by Asenjo. Apparently, neither realised the connection between their work at this time.
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If ν is any evaluation of formulas into this lattice, ν(α ∧ β) = ν(α) ∧ ν(β);91 ν(α ∨ β) = ν(α) ∨ ν(β); and ν(¬α) = ¬ν(α), where ¬ maps top to bottom, vice versa, and maps each of the other values to itself. Suppose that we now define validity in the standard algebraic fashion: α1 , ..., αn |= β iff for every ν, ν(α1 ) ∧ ... ∧ ν(αn ) ≤ ν(β) Then the consequence relation is again F DE. The proof of this is relatively straightforward, though not entirely obvious. These semantics may be generalised as follows. A De Morgan lattice is a struc ture L, ∧, ∨, ¬, where L, ∧, ∨ is a distributive lattice, and ¬ is an involution of period two; that is, for all a, b in L: ¬¬a = a If a ≤ b then ¬b ≤ ¬a It is easy to check that the diamond lattice is a De Morgan lattice. One may show that F DE is sound and complete not just with respect to the diamond lattice, but with respect to the class of De Morgan lattices. (Thus, the class of De Morgan lattices relates to the diamond lattice as the class of Boolean algebras relates to the two-valued Boolean algebra in classical logic.) All these results are also due to Dunn. De Morgan lattices have a very natural philosophical interpretation. The mem bers may be thought of as propositions (that is, as the Fregean senses of sentences). The ordering ≤ may then be thought of as a containment relation. Thus, α |= β iff however the senses of the parameters are determined, the sense of α contains that of β.
4.5
Relevant Logic
The final approach to paraconsistent logic that we will consider is relevant logic. What drove the development of this was a dissatisfaction with accounts of the con ditional that validate “paradoxes” such as the paradoxes of material implication: α |= (β ⊃ α) ¬α |= (α ⊃ β) As soon as the material account of the conditional was endorsed by the founders of classical logic, it came in for criticism. As early as a few years after Prin cipia Mathematica, C.I.Lewis started to produce theories of the strict conditional, α−−⊃ ⊃β (�(α ⊃ β)), which is not subject to these paradoxes. This conditional was, however, subject to other “paradoxes”, such as: 91 Again, I write the logical connectives and the corresponding algebraic operators using the same symbol.
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⊃β �β |= α−−⊃
�¬α |= α−−⊃ ⊃β Lewis eventually came to accept these. It is clear, though, that such inferences are just as counter-intuitive. In particular, intuition rebels because there may be no connection at all between α and β. This motivates the definition of a relevant logic. If L is some propositional logic with a conditional connective, →, then L is said to be relevant iff whenever |=L α → β, α and β share a propositional parameter.92 Commonality of the parameter provides the required connection of content. Though closely connected with paraconsistency, relevant logics are quite distinct. None of the paraconsistent logics that we have met so far is relevant.93 Moreover, a relevant logic may not be paraconsistent. One of the first relevant logics, Π of Ackermann [1956], contained the Disjunctive Syllogism as a basic rule. If this is interpreted as a rule of inference (i.e., as applying to arbitrary assumptions, not just to theorems), then Explosion is forthcoming in the usual way. The history of relevant logic goes back, in fact, to 1928, when the Russian lo gician Orlov published an axiomatisation of the fragment of the relevant logic R whose language contains just → and ¬. This seems to have gone unnoticed, how ever.94 Axiomatizations of the fragment of R whose language contains just → were given by Moh [1950] and Church [1951]). The subject took off properly, though, with the collaboration of the two US logicians Anderson and Belnap, starting at the end of the 1950s. In particular, in [1958] they dropped the Disjunctive Syllo gism from Ackermann’s Π to produce their favourite relevance logic E. Both E and R are paraconsistent. The results of some 20 years of collaboration between Anderson, Belnap, and their students (especially Dunn, Meyer, and Urquhart) is published as Anderson and Belnap [1975], and Anderson, Belnap, and Dunn [1992]. Initially, relevance logic was given a purely axiomatic form. For reasons that will become clear later, let us start with an axiom system for a relevant logic that Anderson and Belnap did not consider, B. A1. A2. A3. A4. A5. A6. A7.
α→α α → (α ∨ β) (and β → (α ∨ β)) (α ∧ β) → α (and (α ∧ β) → β) α ∧ (β ∨ γ) → ((α ∧ β) ∨ (α ∧ γ)) ((α → β) ∧ (α → γ)) → (α → (β ∧ γ)) ((α → γ) ∧ (β → γ)) → ((α ∨ β) → γ) ¬¬α → α
92 According to this definition F DE is not a relevant logic, since it has no conditional connec tive. However, if we add a conditional connective, subject to the constraint that |= α → β iff α |=F DE β, it is. This is how the system first arose. 93 With the exception of F DE as understood in the previous footnote. 94 It was rediscovered by Doˇ sen [1992].
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R1. R2. R3. R4. R5.
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α, α → β β α, β α ∧ β α → β (γ → α) → (γ → β) α → β (β → γ) → (α → γ) α → ¬β β → ¬α
The logic R can be obtained by adding the axioms: A8. (α → β) → ((β → γ) → (α → γ)) A9. α → ((α → β) → β) A10. (α → (α → β)) → (α → β) A11. (α → ¬β) → (β → ¬α) (and dropping R3-R5, which are now redundant).95 F DE is, it turns out, the core of all the relevant systems, in that if α and β contain no occurrences of → then α |=F DE β iff α → β is provable (in no matter which of the above-mentioned systems). Like F DE, B has no logical truths expressible in terms of only ∧, ∨, and ¬. In R, however, α ∨ ¬α is a logical truth, as, in fact, are all classical tautologies. The axiom systems, by themselves, are not terribly illuminating. An important problem then became to find appropriate semantics. The first semantics, produced by Dunn, was an algebraic one. Define a De Morgan monoid to be a structure L, ∧, ∨, ¬, →, ◦, e. Where L, ∧, ∨, ¬ is a de Morgan lattice and → is a binary operator (representing the conditional). It is convenient to extract the properties of the conditional from a corresponding residuation operator (a sort of intensional conjunction); this is what ◦ is. e is a distinguished member of L; it’s presence is necessary since we need to define logical truth, and this cannot be done in terms of the top member of the lattice (as in the algebraic semantics for classical and intuitionist logics), since there may be none. The logical truths are those which are always at least as great as e. In a De Morgan monoid, the additional algebraic machinery must satisfy the conditions: e◦a=a a ◦ b ≤ c iff a ≤ b → c If a ≤ b then a ◦ c ≤ b ◦ c and c ◦ a ≤ c ◦ b a ◦ (b ∨ c) = (a ◦ b) ∨ (a ◦ c) and (b ∨ c) ◦ a = (b ◦ a) ∨ (c ◦ a) Note that e ≤ a → b iff e ◦ a ≤ b iff a ≤ b, so conditionals may be thought to express containment of propositional content. 95 E
is obtained from R by deleting A9 and adding:
(α → ¬α) → ¬α (α → γ) → (((α → γ) → β) → β) (N (α) ∧ N (β)) → N (α ∧ β) where N (γ) is (γ → γ) → γ. E is a much clumsier system than R. Initially, Anderson and Belnap thought that the → of E was exactly the modalised → of R. That is, they believed that if one adds an appropriate modal operator, �, to R, then �(α → β) behaves in R, just like α → β behaves in E. They even stated that should this not turn out to be the case, they would prefer the modalised version of R. It turned out not to be the case.
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Finally, define: Σ |= α iff for all evaluations into all De Morgan monoids, if e ≤ ν(β) for all β ∈ Σ, e ≤ ν(α) This consequence relation is exactly one for B. Stronger relevant logics can be obtained by putting further constraints on ◦. In particular, the logic R is produced by adding the following constraints: ◦8 a ◦ (b ◦ c) = (a ◦ b) ◦ c ◦9 a ◦ b = b ◦ a ◦10 a ≤ a ◦ a ◦11 a ◦ b ≤ c iff a ◦ ¬c ≤ ¬b ◦8-◦11 correspond to A8-A11, respectively, in the sense that the structures ob tained by adding any one of them are sound and complete with respect to the axiom system obtained by adding the corresponding axiom to B.96 Perhaps the most robust semantics for relevant logics are world semantics. These were produced by the Australian logician R. Routley (later Sylvan), in conjunction with Meyer, who moved to Australia, in the early 1970s.97 The re sults of some 20 years of collaboration between Routley, Meyer, and their students, especially Brady, are published in Routley, Plumwood, Meyer and Brady [1984] and Brady [2003]. Historically, the world semantics piggy-backed upon yet another semantics for F DE produced by Sylvan and V.Routley (later Plumwood).98 An interpretation for the language of F DE is a structure W, ∗, ν, where W is a set of worlds, and ν is a function that assigns every propositional parameter a truth value (0 or 1) at every world. Thus, for all w ∈ W , νw (p) = 0 or νw (p) = 1. The novel element here is ∗. This is a function from worlds to worlds, satisfying the condition: w∗∗ = w. w∗ is often glossed as the “mirror image” world of w; but its philosophical understanding is still a matter of some debate.99 The truth conditions for the connectives are: νw (α ∧ β) = 1 iff νw (α) = 1 and νw (β) = 1 νw (α ∨ β) = 1 iff νw (α) = 1 or νw (β) = 1 νw (¬α) = 1 iff νw∗ (α) = 0 96 Dunn worked out the details for R. It was Meyer who worked out the details for B and the logics between B and R. See Meyer and Routley [1972]. 97 Related ideas were published by Urquhart [1972] and by Fine [1974]. 98 See Routley and Routley [1972]. 99 For what is, I think, the most coherent story, see Restall [1999].
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Thus, in the case where w∗ = w, the truth conditions for ¬ collapse into the standard ones of modal logic. Validity is defined in terms of truth-preservation at all worlds of all interpretations. Again, it is not entirely obvious that these semantics deliver F DE, but it is not difficult to establish this. Essentially, it is because a relational evaluation, ρ, and a pair of worlds, w, w∗ , are equivalent if they are related by the conditions: νw (α) = 1 iff αρ1 νw∗ (α) = 0 iff αρ0 Thus, a counter-model to Explosion is provided by the interpretation with two worlds, w, w∗ , such that p is true at w and false at w∗ (so that ¬p is true at w); but q is false at w. We can build an account of the conditional on top of this machinery as one ⊃β is true at world w iff at every would in a standard modal logic. Thus, α−−⊃ (accessible) world either α is false or β is true. The behavior of ∗ suffices to ⊃ ⊃(β ∨ ¬β) nor (α ∧ ¬α)−− ⊃β is valid. But the logic is not a ensure that neither α−−⊃ relevant logic. The trouble is, for example, that q −−⊃ ⊃q is true at all worlds. Hence ⊃ ⊃(q −− ⊃q) is also true at all worlds, and so logically valid. To finish the job of p−−⊃ producing the semantics for a relevant logic, we therefore need further machinery. In Routley/Meyer semantics, a new class of worlds is introduced.100 The worlds we have employed so far may be called normal worlds. The new worlds are nonnormal worlds. Non-normal worlds are logically impossible worlds, in the sense that in these worlds the laws of logic may be different from what they are at pos sible (normal) worlds — just as the laws of physics may be different at physically impossible worlds. In particular, if one thinks of conditionals as expressing the laws of logic — so that, for example α → α expresses the fact that α follows from α — then non-normal worlds are worlds where logically valid conditionals (like α → α) may fail. Thus p → (q → q) will not be logically valid, since there are worlds where p is true, but q → q is false. Specifically, an interpretation is a structure W, N, ∗, R, ν. W , ∗, and ν are as before. N is a subset of W , and is the class of normal worlds, so W − N is the class of non-normal worlds. The truth conditions for ∧, ∨, and ¬ are as before.101 At normal worlds, w: νw (α → β) = 1 iff for all w ∈ W , either νw (α) = 0 or νw (β) = 1 ⊃. To state the truth conditions These are the simple S5 truth conditions for −−⊃ for α → β at non-normal worlds we require the relation R. This is an arbitrary
relation on worlds; but unlike the binary accessibility relation of standard modal logic, it is a ternary relation. Thus, for all w ∈ W − N :
100 The following are not quite the original Routley/Meyer semantics, but are a simplified form due to Priest and Sylvan [1992] and Restall [1993]. 101 It is possible to perform exactly the same construction concerning conditionals, but imposed not on ∗ semantics for negation, but on the Dunn four-valued semantics. The result is a family of perfectly good relevant logics, but not the Anderson Belnap family under consideration here.
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νw (α → β) = 1 iff for all x, y ∈ W such that Rwxy, either νx (α) = 0 or νy (β) = 1 Given these truth conditions, it is clear that a conditional such as q → q may fail at a non-normal world, w, since we may have Rwxy, with q true at x, but false at y. In this way, relevance is obtained. Note that if x = y the truth conditions for → at non-normal worlds collapse into the S5 truth conditions. Hence, we may state the truth conditions for → at all worlds uniformly in terms of the ternary relation, provided that at normal worlds we define R in terms of identity. That is, for normal worlds, w: Rwxy iff x = y Validity is defined in terms of truth preservation at normal worlds. Thus: Σ |= α iff for every interpretation and every w ∈ N , if νw (β) = 1 for all β ∈ Σ, νw (α) = 1 These semantics are a semantics for the relevant logic B. Stronger relevant logics may be produced by adding constraints on the ternary relation R. For example, the relevant logic R is produced by adding the following constraints. For all x, y, z, u, v ∈ W :102 R8. If ∃w(Rxyw and Rwuv) then ∃w(Rxuw and Rywv) R9. If Rxyz then Ryxz R10. If Rxyz then ∃w(Rxyw and Rwyz) R11. If Rxyz then Rxy ∗ z ∗ Each of these constraints corresponds to one of A8-A11, in the sense that the axiom is sound and complete with respect to the class of interpretations in which the corresponding constraint is in force. An important issue to be faced is what, exactly, the ternary relation means, and why it should be employed in stating the truth conditions of conditionals. Whether there are sensible answers to these questions, and, if so, what they are, is still a matter for debate. Some, for example, have tried to explicate the notion in terms of the flow of information.103 It is worth noting that the ternary relation can be avoided if one simply assigns conditionals arbitrary truth values at nonnormal worlds — which makes perfectly good sense, since at logically impossible worlds, logical principles could, presumably, do anything. This construction gives a relevant logic weaker than B.104 At any rate, the relevant logic B is the analogue of the modal logic K, in the following sense. K is the basic (normal) modal logic. In its semantics, the binary accessibility relation is arbitrary. Stronger logics are obtained by adding constraints on the relation. Similarly, B is the basic relevant logic (of this family). 102 Added in press: The condition R9 is not quite right. See the second edition of Priest [2001, 10.4a.5. 103 For further details, see Priest [2001a, 10.6]. 104 See Priest [2001a, ch. 9].
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In its semantics, the ternary accessibility relation is arbitrary. Stronger logics are obtained by adding constraints on the relation. It was this fact that became clear with the invention of the world-semantics for relevant logics by the Australian logicians. Moreover, just as the early work on modal logic had concentrated on systems at the strong end of the modal family, so Anderson and Belnap’s work had concentrated on systems at the strong end of the relevant family.105 Further details concerning relevant logic can be found in the chapter on the subject in this Handbook, so we will pursue the issue no further here. We have now looked at the development of paraconsistent logics in the modern period, based on four distinct ideas. This survey is certainly not exhaustive: there are other approaches.106 But we have tracked the major developments, and it is now time to return to dialetheism.
5
5.1
MODERN DIALETHEISM
Inconsistent Information
As we noted in 1.2, the major motive for modern paraconsistency is the idea that there are situations in which we need to reason in a non-trivial way from inconsis tent information. The early proponents of paraconsistent logics mentioned various such situations, but the first sustained discussion of the issue (that I am aware 105 A word on terminology. The Americans called the subject relevance logic, since they took the logic to be spelling out what relevance was. This was rejected by Sylvan, who argued that the logics did not provide an analysis of relevance as such. The logics were relevant, but this fact fell out of something more fundamental, namely, truth preservation over a suitably rich class of (and especially impossible) worlds. Following Sylvan, Australian logicians have called the logics relevant logics. 106 A quite different approach goes back to research starting in the late 1950s. This also has relevance connections. It is a natural idea that classical logical consequence lets in too much, and specifically, that it lets in inferences where the premises and conclusion have no connection with each other. The thought then is to filter out the irrelevant inferences by imposing an extra condition. Specifically, define the inference from α to β to be prevalid if α |=C β and F (α, β). Prevalid inferences may not be closed under substitution. So define an inference to be valid if it is obtained from a prevalid inference by uniform substitution. The condition F is a filter that removes the Bad Guys. A suitable choice of F gives a paraconsistent logic. The first filter logic was given by Smiley [1959]. His filter was the condition that α not be a classical contradiction and β not be a classical tautology. It is clear that this makes the inference p ∧ ¬p q invalid. It is also easy to check that the following inferences are valid under the filter: p ∧ ¬p p ∧ (¬p ∨ q), p ∧ (¬p ∨ q) q. (The first is a substitution instance of p ∧ r p ∧ (r ∨ q).) This shows two things: first, that the disjunctive syllogism holds, unlike in most other paraconsistent — and particularly relevant — logics; second, that the transitivity of deducibility breaks down. The failure of transitivity is, in fact, typical of filter logics (though not invariably so). Perhaps the most interesting filter logic was developed by Tennant [1984], a student of Smiley. It is given most naturally in multiple-conclusion terms. (Thus, Σ |=C Π iff every classical evaluation that makes every member of Σ true makes some member of Π true.) Accordingly, Σ |= Π iff Σ |=C Π and there are no proper subsets Σ ⊂ Σ, Π ⊂ Π, such that Σ |=C Π . The filter takes out redundant “noise”. Suitably developed, this approach can be used to construct a family of relevant but non-transitive logics. See Tennant [1992].
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of) is Priest and Routley [1989].107 A list of the situations involving inconsistent information that have been mooted include: 1. Information collected from different sources, at different times, etc., espe cially in computational information processing. 2. Various theories in science and mathematics. 3. Various theories in philosophy. 4. Various bodies of law and other legal documents. 5. Descriptions of borderline cases concerning vague predicates. 6. Descriptions of certain states of change. 7. Information concerning over-determination and multi-criterial terms. 8. Information generated by paradoxes of self-reference. Of these, the most straightforward is 1.108 Information collected in this way is clearly liable to be inconsistent. The situation is particularly crucial in modern information processing, where the amount of information is humanly unsurveyable. Whilst, no doubt, one would normally wish to revise inconsistent information when it occurs in this context, we might be in a situation in which we do not know how to revise consistently. Worse, as is well known, there is no algorithm for inconsistency, so we may not even know that the information is inconsistent. For 2, it is a fact that various theories in the history of science have been inconsistent, and known to be so. Perhaps the most striking example of this is the Bohr theory of the atom, whose inconsistency was well recognised — even by Bohr. To explain the frequency of radiation emitted in quantum transitions, classical electromagnetic theory had to be employed. But the same electromagnetic theory contradicts the existence of stationary states for an electron in orbit; it entails that such electrons, since they are accelerating, will radiate (and so lose) energy.109 107 The essay, which can be consulted for further discussion of the material that follows, is one of the introductory chapters of Priest, Routley, and Norman [1989]. This was the first collection of essays on paraconsistency, and contains essays by most of the founders of the subject. It may be noted that the completed manuscript of the book was sent to the publisher in 1982, which is a more accurate dating of its contents. The book contains a useful bibliography of paraconsistecy to that date. 108 A supposed example of this that is sometimes cited is the information provided by witnesses at a a trial, who frequently contradict one another — and themselves. This example, though, is not very persuasive. For, plausibly, the pertinent information in this sort of case is not of the form ‘the car was red’, ‘the car was not red’, but of the form ‘witness x says that the car was red’, ‘witness y says that the car was not red’. (The judge and jury may or may not conclude something about the colour of the car.) Information of this kind is consistent. 109 The Bohr theory has long since been displaced by modern quantum theory. But this, too, sails close to the paraconsistent wind in a number of places. To mention just one: the Dirac δ-function has mathematically impossible properties. The integral of the function is non-zero; yet its value at all but one point is zero.
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An example of an inconsistent theory in the history of mathematics is the orig inal calculus of Newton and Leibniz. Again, the inconsistency of this was well known at the time. It was pointed out forcibly by Berkeley, for example. In computing derivatives one needed to divide by infinitesimals, at one stage, and so suppose them to be non-zero. In the final stage of the computation, however, one had to ignore infinitesimal summands, hence assuming, in effect, that they are zero.110 We will return to the issue of inconsistent mathematical theories later. Turning to 3, the examples of inconsistent theories in the history of philosophy are legion. Indeed, most philosophers who have constructed theories of any degree of complexity have endorsed principles that turned out to be contradictory. No doubt, many of these philosophers contradicted themselves unwittingly. However, in Section 2 above, we noted various philosophers for whom this was not the case: Heraclitus, Hegel, and Meinong (at least, as many people interpreted him). Again, we will return to inconsistent philosophical theories later. We will also come to the other cases on the list above in a minute. But given even just these cases, it is clear that inferences must be, or were, drawn from inconsistent information. What inference mechanism was employed in each of the historical cases is a matter for detailed historical investigation. There is no a priori reason to suppose that it was one of the formal paraconsistent logics we looked at in the last section — though there is no a priori reason to suppose that it was not, either. What is ungainsayable is that in all these cases, where inference goes ahead in contexts whose inconsistency — or the possibility thereof — is explicitly acknowledged, some inference procedure that is de facto paraconsistent must (have) be(en) employed.
5.2 The Rise of Modern Dialetheism In none of the cases so far discussed is there much temptation to suppose that the inconsistent information in question is true, that is, that we have an example of dialetheism — unless one endorses one of the philosophical theories mentioned, such as Meinongianism. Even in the cases of inconsistent theories in science and mathematics, we may suppose that the theories were important, not because they were taken to be true, but because they were useful instrumentally, or perhaps they were taken to be good approximations to the (consistent) truth. In fact, none of the paraconsistent logicians mentioned in the previous section who wrote before the 1970s, with the exception of Asenjo, comes close to endorsing dialetheism.111 Indeed, it is clear that some of the formal paraconsistent logics of the last section do not even lend themselves to dialetheism. Non-adjunctive logics, in particular, though they concern the aggregation of information that is, collectively, inconsistent, have no truck with the idea that the information 110 For an analysis of this, and many other inconsistent mathematical theories, see Mortensen [1995]. 111 This is true even of da Costa, who was much concerned with inconsistent set-theories. He tended to regard these simply as interesting and possibly important mathematical theories.
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from any one source is inconsistent. To bring this home, note that for each of the non-adjunctive constructions, one can formulate explicitly dialetheic versions. For example, consider discussive logic. Repeat the construction, but based not on a classical modal logic, but on a paraconsistent modal logic that allows for inconsistent worlds (for example, of the kind in the world-semantics of relevant logic). Or in the Rescher/Manor construction, instead of considering maximal consistent sets, consider maximal non-trivial sets, and then apply a paraconsistent consequence relation to these. How to handle pieces of information from multiple sources, which do not fit together happily, is a problem for everyone, dialetheist or otherwise. The rise of the modern dialetheist movement can most naturally be seen as start ing in the 1970s with the collaboration between Priest and Routley in Australia.112 Priest argued for dialetheism in [1973] in an argument based on paradoxes of selfodel’s Theorem. The case was mounted in detail in a paper, later reference and G¨ published as [1979], given at a meeting of the Australasian Association for Logic in Canberra in 1976, where Priest and Routley first met. Priest [1987] is a sustained defence of dialetheism. Routley became sympathetic to dialetheism because of his work on the semantics of relevant logics, and the possibility of applying relevant logic to logical paradoxes and to Meinong. He endorsed the position in [1977] and [1979].113 It is worth noting that it was the development of the world-semantics for relevant logic which brought the dialetheic potential of relevant logic to the fore. If there are inconsistent worlds, a person of a naturally curious disposition will ask how one knows that the actual world is not one of them. The American relevant logicians never showed any tendency towards dialetheism. Even Dunn, who was responsible for the four-valued semantics, preferred to read 1 and 0 as ‘told true’ and ‘told false’, rather than as ‘true’ and ‘false’: inconsistent information could be given, but not the truth. Endorsing the world-semantics for relevant logic does not require dialetheism, however. It is quite possible to suppose that all the inconsistent worlds are non-normal, that is, that for all w ∈ W − N , w = w∗ . The logic will still be relevant, but will validate Explosion, and so not be paraconsistent. Alternatively, one may suppose that some normal worlds are inconsistent, so that the logic is paraconsistent, but that the actual world has special properties; in particular, consistency.
5.3 Arguments for Dialetheism Let us now return to the list of examples in 5.1. The rest of the examples on the list have been mooted as dialetheias. Let us start with 4. It is not uncommon 112 Readers must remember, especially at this point, that this essay is not being written by an impartial historian, and make due allowances for this. 113 In this paper Routley describes his position as ‘dialectical’, taking the view to be identical with aspects of dialectical logic in the Hegel/Marx tradition. Whilst there certainly are con nections here, the simple identification is, at the very least, somewhat misleading, and Routley dropped the description after the term ‘dialetheism’ was coined.
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for legal documents to have unforeseen consequences; sometimes, these can be contradictory. Suppose, for example, that the constitution of a certain country contains the clauses: All university graduates are required to perform jury service. No woman shall be a member of a jury. We may suppose that when the constitution was written, university admission was restricted to male clergy, as it had been for hundreds of years. Some time later, however, universities open their doors to women. Women graduates are then both required to perform and forbidden from performing jury service.114 Of course, once the contradiction came to light, the constitution would presumably be changed, or a judge would rule one way or the other (which is tantamount to the same thing). But until and unless this is done, we have a legal contradiction. The law has a number of mechanisms for defusing prima facie contradictions. For example it is a general principle that constitutional law outranks statute law, and that a later law overrides an earlier law. Clearly, such principles may well resolve an explicit contradiction in legislation. However, equally clearly, the situa tion may be such that none of the principles applies. (The situation just described might be one of these.) And where this is the case, the contradictions are not just prima facie. Turning to 5, the idea is this. Given a vague predicate, there is a grey area between cases in which it clearly applies and cases where it clearly does not. Thus, there is no point at which a tadpole ceases to be a tadpole and becomes a frog. Suppose that Fred is a creature in this grey area. Intuition says that Fred is as much tadpole as not tadpole, and as little tadpole as not tadpole. In other words, the semantic value of ‘Fred is a tadpole’ is symmetrically poised between truth and falsity. It is commonplace to suppose that a sentence such as this is neither true nor false. But as far as the story so far goes, both true and false is just as good. Moreover, for any consideration that drives one towards truth value gaps, there would seem to be dual considerations that drive one towards truth value gluts.115 To be honest, any simple three-valued solution to the problem of vagueness is going to be problematic for very simple reasons. Just as the boundary between being true and being false is grey in such cases, so the boundary between being true and being neither true nor false, or being both true and false, is also grey. Little therefore seems to have been gained by moving to three semantic values. Considerations of this kind have led some logicians to endorse a continuum-valued semantics to deal with vagueness. Assuming, as is standard, that such values are numbers in the range [0, 1], and that if the value of α is x, the value of ¬α is 114 In a similar way, the rules of a game, such as chess, may well have untoward consequences, such as a contradiction in certain recondite situations that come to light. 115 See Hyde [1997].
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1 − x, then a contradiction α ∧ ¬α may certainly be half-true — and 0.5 may be a designated value in the context. In some ways, issues are similar when we move to 6. Consider a state of affairs described by α, which changes, perhaps instantaneously, to one described by ¬α. It may be that there is something about the point of transition that determines either α or ¬α as true at that transition. Thus, for example, if a car accelerates continuously from rest, there is a last point with zero velocity, but no first point with a non-zero velocity. But, again, it may be that the situation is completely symmetrical. Thus, if a subatomic particle makes an instantaneous transition from one quantum state to another, there are no continuity considerations to determine the situation at the point of transition one way or the other. In such situations, the transition state is symmetrically poised between α and ¬α. Either, then, neither α nor ¬α is true, or both are. Moreover, in this case, there are some considerations, at least, which push towards the latter conclusion. The state, whatever it is, is a state of change. Such a state is naturally described as one in which α ∧ ¬α holds. (Recall Heraclitus.) A state where neither α nor ¬α holds is less naturally thought of as a state of change. For if neither holds, then α has ceased to be true. That change is already over. It is true that if α ∧ ¬α holds then α still holds, so its ceasing is yet to occur. But in this case, at least ¬α has already started: change is under way. Or to put it another way: an instant where neither α nor ¬α holds cannot be a transition state between one where α holds and one where ¬α holds. For it is quite possible that such a state might be followed by ones where ¬α does not hold: ¬α never starts at all! The idea can be applied to one of Zeno’s paradoxes of motion: the arrow. Recall that this goes as follows. Consider an arrow at an instant of its motion. During that instant it advances not at all on its journey. Yet somehow in the whole motion, composed of just such instants, it does advance. How can this be possible? Standard measure-theory tells us that an interval of non-zero measure is composed of points of zero measure. Fine. But how can a physical advance be constituted by a bunch of no advances? A bunch of nothings, even an infinite bunch, is nothing. A resolution is provided by the previous considerations concerning change. At an instant of the motion, the arrow is at point p. But it is in a state of change, so it is not there as well. Thus, it is also at other points; presumably those just before and just after p. In the instant, then, it does occupy more than one point; it does make some advance on its journey. Finally in this section, let us consider 7. It is a commonplace to note that versions of verificationism may give rise to truth-value gaps since, for certain α, neither α nor ¬α may be verified — or even verifiable. It is less often noted that other versions may give rise to truth value gluts. Specifically, it is not uncommon for terms of our language to be multi-criterial — that is, for there to be differ ent criteria which are semantically sufficient for the application of the term. For example, the appropriate reading from a correctly functioning alcohol thermome ter is sufficient to determine the temperature of some water to be 4◦ c. But the appropriate reading of a thermo-electric thermometer is equally sufficient for the
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same. Now, normally, if we test for both of these criteria, they will either both hold or both fail. But in circumstances of a novel kind, it might well happen that the criteria fall apart. The alcohol thermometer may tell us that the temperature is 4◦ ; the thermo-electric thermometer may tell us that it is 3◦ , and so not 4◦ . It might be argued that if such a situation occurs, what this shows is that the terms in question are ambiguous, so that ‘3◦ ’ is ambiguous between 3◦ -by-an alcohol-thermometer, and 3◦ -by-an-electro-chemical-thermometer. And doubtless, should this situation arise, we probably would replace our old concept of tem perature by two new concepts. In just this way, for example, the term ‘mass’, as employed before the Special Theory of Relativity, was replaced by two terms ‘rest mass’ and ‘inertial mass’, afterwards. But it can hardly be claimed that the old term was semantically ambiguous before, in the way that, say, ‘cricket’ is (the insect and the game). It had a single meaning; we just recognised that meaning as applicable in different, and logically independent, ways. Thus, the situation, as described in the old language, really was inconsistent.
5.4
Truth and the Paradoxes of Self-Reference
This brings us to the last item on the list: the paradoxes of self-reference. As a matter of documented fact, this is the consideration that has been historically most influential for dialetheism. It is also, I think it fair to say, the consideration to which it is hardest to object coherently. Paradoxes of this kind are apparently valid arguments, often very simple arguments, starting from things that seem obviously true, but ending in explicit contradictions. Unless one can fault them, they establish dialetheism. Though many arguments in the family are, historically, quite recent, paradoxes of the family have been known now for close to two and a half thousand years. It is a mark of their resilience that even now there is still no consensus amongst those who think that there is something wrong with them as to what this is. Better, then, to stop trying to find a fault where none exists, and accept the arguments at face value. It is conventional wisdom to divide the paradoxes into semantic and set-theoretic. Though I think that this a profoundly misleading distinction,116 it will be useful to employ it here. Let us start with the semantic paradoxes. These are para doxes that concern notions such as truth, satisfaction, reference. Take everyone’s favourite: the liar paradox.117 At its simplest, this is the claim: this claim is false. If it is true then it is false; and if it is false then it is true. Contradiction in either case. To tighten up the argument, let us write T for ‘is true’. Then the liar is a truth-bearer,118 λ, of the form ¬T λ. (The angle brackets here are some name forming device.) Now, an almost irresistible principle concerning truth, stated first 116 See
Priest [1995, Part 3]. should be noted that though the paradox is a paradigm of the family, it has features that other members of the family do not have, and vice versa. One can not simply assume, therefore, that a solution to it automatically generalises to all members of the family. 118 One can choose whether these are sentences, propositions, beliefs or wot not, as one pleases. 117 It
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by Aristotle, is that something is true iff what it claims to be the case is in fact the case; as it is usually called now, the T -schema. For every α: T α ↔ α In particular, T λ ↔ λ. And given what λ is: T λ ↔ ¬T λ. T λ ∧ ¬T λ now follows, given various logical principles, such as the law of excluded middle, or consequentia mirabilis (α → ¬α ¬α). The solutions to the liar and other semantic paradoxes that have been suggested — particularly in the last 100 years — are legion. This is not the place to attempt an exhaustive analysis of them. Further details can be found in the article on the paradoxes of self-reference in this Handbook. However, all attempts to provide a consistent analysis of the paradoxes run into fundamental problems. To see this, let us start by considering what are probably the two most influential such attempts in the last 100 years. The first of these is based on the work of Tarski. According to this, a language may not contain its own truth predicate. That is, a predicate satisfying the T schema for every sentence of a language L, must not occur in L itself, but must occur in a metalanguage. Of course, the move must be repeated, generating a whole hierarchy of languages, H, each of which contains a truth predicate for lower members of the hierarchy, but is semantically open: it does not contain its own truth predicate. In no sentence of the hierarchy may we therefore formulate a self-referential liar sentence. Of the many objections that one may raise against this solution, note here only the following. Given the resources of H, one may formulate the sentence: λH : λH is true in no member of H. Now we have a choice: is λH a sentence of some language in H or not? Suppose it is. We may therefore reason about its truth in the next member of the hierarchy up. If it is true, then it is not true in any member of H. Contradiction. Hence it cannot be true in any member of the hierarchy. That is, we have established λH . Hence, λH is a true sentence of some language in H. And we have already seen that this leads to contradiction. Suppose, on the other hand, that λH is not a member of the hierarchy. Then H is not English, since λH clearly is a sentence of English. The construction does not, therefore, show that the rules governing the truth predicate in English are consistent.119 The other particularly influential theory is Kripke’s. According to this, certain sentences may fail to take a truth value, and so be neither true nor false. Starting with a language which contains no truth predicate, we may augment the language 119 Here, and in what follows, I am assuming that English is the language of our vernacular discourse. Exactly the same considerations apply if it is some other natural language.
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with one, and construct a hierarchy. Not, this time, a hierarchy of languages, but a hierarchy of three-valued interpretations for the extended language. At the base level, every sentence containing T is neither true nor false. As we ascend the hierarchy, we acquire information to render sentences containing T determinately true or false. In particular, if we have shown that α is true at a certain level of the hierarchy, this suffices to render T α true at the next. If we play our cards right, we reach a level, F (a fixed point), where everything stabilises; by then, every sentence has a fixed semantic status; in particular, for every α, α and T α have the same status. It is this fixed-point interpretation that is supposed to provide an account of the behaviour of the truth predicate. Sentences that are determinately true or determinately false at the fixed point are called grounded. The liar sentence is, unsurprisingly, ungrounded. And being neither true nor false, it slips through the dilemma posed by the liar paradox argument. Again, of the many objections that may be brought against the theory, we note just one. Consider the sentence: λF : λF is not true at F What status does λF have at F ? If it has the status true, then it is not true at F . Contradiction. If it does not have the status true (in particular, if it is neither true nor false), then what it says to be the case is the case. Hence it is true. Contradiction again. One may object by noting that if λF is neither true nor false at F , then so are T λF and ¬T λF . Hence the final step of the reasoning does not follow. But if one chooses to break the argument in this fashion, this just shows, again, that the behaviour of T at the fixed point is not that of the English truth predicate. For according to the theory, λF is not true at the fixed point; and the theorist is committed to the truth of this claim. At this point, the only option,120 is to locate the discourse of the theorist outside the language L — in effect, taking the theorist’s truth predicate to be in a metalanguage for L. But this just shows that the construction does not establish the truth predicate of English to behave consistently. For the theorist is speaking English, and the construction does not apply to that. If we look at these two solutions, we can see a certain pattern. The machinery of the solution allows us to reformulate the liar paradox. Such reformulations are often call extended paradoxes. This is something of a misnomer, however. These paradoxes are not new paradoxes; they are just the same old paradox in a new theoretical context. What generates the paradox is a heuristic that allows us to construct a sentence that says of itself that it is not in the set of bona fide truths. Different solutions just characterise this set in different ways. At any rate, the only options in the face of these reformulated paradoxes are to accept contradiction or to deny that the machinery of the solution is expressible in the language in question. Since the machinery is part of the discourse of the theoretician, English, this shows that English discourse about truth has not been shown to be consistent. 120 Which
Kripke, in fact, exercised.
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The pattern we see here manifests itself, in fact, across all purported solutions to the liar paradox, showing them all to be deeply unsatisfactory for exactly the same reason.121 Neither is this an accident. There are underlying reasons as to why it must happen. We can put the matter in the form of a series of dilemmas. The liar and its kind arise, in the first place, as arguments in English. One who would solve the paradoxes must show that the semantic concepts of English involved are not, despite appearances, inconsistent — and it is necessary to show this for all such concepts, for they are all embroiled in contradiction. Attempts to do this employing the resources of modern logic all show how, for a given language, L, in some class of languages, to construct a theory TL , of the semantic notions of L, according to which they behave consistently. The first dilemma is posed by asking the question of whether TL is expressible in L. If the answer is ‘yes’, the liar heuristic always allows us to reformulate the paradox to generate inconsistency. Nor is this an accident. For since TL is expressible in L, and since, according to TL , things are consistent, we should be able to prove the consistency of TL in TL . And provided that TL is strong enough in other ways (for example, provided that it contains the resources of arithmetic, which it must if L is to be a candidate for English), then we know that TL is liable to be inconsistent by G¨odel’s second incompleteness Theorem. (Any theory of the appropriate kind that can prove its own consistency is inconsistent.) If the answer to the original question in ‘no’, then we ask a second question: is English (or at least the relevant part of it), E, one of the languages in the family being considered? If the answer to this is ‘yes’, then it follows that TE is not expressible in English, which is self-refuting, since the theorist has explained how to construct TE in English. If, on the other hand, the answer to this question is ‘no’, then the original problem of showing that the semantic concepts of English are consistent has not been solved. Hence, all attempts to solve the paradox swing uncomfortably between incon sistency and a self-refuting inexpressibility. The problem, at root, is that English is, in a certain sense, over-rich. The semantic rules that govern notions such as truth over-determine the truth values of some sentences, generating contradiction. The only way to avoid this is to dock this richness in some way. But doing this just produces incompleteness, making it the case that it is no longer English that we are talking about.122 What we have seen is that the liar paradox and its kind are more than just 121 For
detailed arguments, See Priest [1987, ch.1], and Priest [1995, Part 3]. move is possible at this point: an explicitly revisionary one. This concedes that the rules that govern ‘is true’ in English generate contradictions, but insists that the concept should be replaced by one governed by rules which do not do this. This was, in fact, Tarski’s own view, and was the spirit in which he offered the hierarchy of metalanguages. But why must we revise? If our notion of truth is inconsistent, does this just not show us that an inconsistent notion is perfectly serviceable? And if we must go in for some act of self-conscious conceptual revision, then a revision to a paraconsistent/dialetheic conceptual framework is clearly a possibility. The mere proposal of a consistent framework is not, therefore, enough: it must be shown to be superior. As we will see in the final part of this essay, this seems rather hard task. 122 Another
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prima facie dialetheias. Attempts to show them to be only this, run into severe difficulties. At this point, a natural question is as follows: if consistent attempts to solve the paradoxes run into the problem of reformulated paradoxes, what about dialetheic solutions? In particular, if sentences may be both true and false, perhaps the bona fide truths are the ones that are just true. So what about: λD : λD is not (true only) If it is true it is also false. If it is false, it is true only. Hence it is true. Hence, it would seem to be true and false. But if it is true, it is not false. Hence it is true, false, and not false. We have certainly run into contradiction. But unlike consistent accounts of the paradox, this is hardly fatal. For the very point of a dialetheic account of the paradoxes is not to show that self-referential discourse about truth is consistent — precisely the opposite. This is a confirmation, not a refutation! There is an important issue here, however. Though some contradictions are acceptable to a dialetheist, not all are, unless the dialetheist is a trivialist. Now there is an argument which purports to show that the T -schema entails not just some contradictions; it entails everything. In particular, suppose that the con ditional involved in the T -schema satisfies both modus ponens and Contraction: α → (α → β) α → β. Let α be any sentence, and consider the sentence: λα : T λα → α (if this sentence is true then α). The T -schema gives: T λα ↔ (T λα → α) whence Contraction from left to right gives: T λα → α whence modus ponens from right to left gives T λα . A final modus ponens delivers α. Arguments of this kind are usually called Curry paradoxes, after one of their inventors. A dialetheic solution to the paradoxes therefore depends on endorsing a paraconsistent logic whose conditional does not satisfy Contraction.123 Paraconsistent logics whose positive parts are classical or intuitionistic, such as the positive-plus logics of 4.3, contain Contraction, and so are unsuitable. Even the stronger rele vant logics in the vicinity of R endorse Contraction. But weaker relevant logics, in the vicinity of B, do not. It can be shown that a theory containing the T -schema and self-reference (even all of arithmetic), and based on a weaker relevant logic, though inconsistent, is non-trivial. It can be shown, in fact, that all the sentences 123 Or modus ponens, though this is a less easy position to defend. It has been defended by Goodship [1996].
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that are grounded in Kripke’s sense (and so contain only extensional connectives) behave consistently.124 We have yet to deal with the set-theoretic paradoxes, but before we turn to these, let us return to the issue of inconsistencies in philosophical theories.
5.5 The Limits of Thought A few philosophers have endorsed explicitly contradictory theories. Many have endorsed theories that turned out to be accidentally inconsistent — accidental in the sense that the inconsistencies could be trimmed without fundamental change. But there is a third group of philosophers. These are philosophers who, though they could hardly be said to be dialetheists, yet endorsed theories that were essen tially inconsistent: inconsistency lay at the very heart of their theories; it could not be removed without entirely gutting them. Such inconsistencies seem to occur, in particular, in the works of those philoso phers who argue that there are limits to what can be thought, conceived, described. In the very act of theorising, they think, conceive, or describe things that lie be yond the limit. Thus, many philosophers have argued that God is so different from anything that people can conceive, that God is literally beyond conception or de scription. This has not prevented them from saying things about God, though; for example, in explaining why God is beyond conception. A famous example of the same situation is provided by Kant in the first Cri tique. Kant espoused the distinction between phenomena (things that can be experienced) and noumena (things that cannot). Our categories of thought apply to the former (indeed, they are partly constitutive of them); but they cannot be applied to the latter (one reason for this: the criteria for applying each of the categories involves time, and noumena are not in time). In particular, then, one can say nothing about noumena, for to do so would be to apply categories to them. Yet Kant says much about noumena in the Critique; he explains, for example, why our categories cannot be applied to them. Another famous example of the same situation is provided by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus. Propositions express the facts that constitute the world. They can do so because of a commonality of structure. But such structure is not the kind of thing that propositions can be about (for propositions are about objects, and structure is not an object). One can say nothing, therefore, about this structure. Yet the Tractatus is largely composed of propositions that describe this structure, and ground the conclusion that it cannot be described. None of the philosophers referred to above was very happy about this contra dictory situation; and all tried to suggest ways in which it might be avoided. In theology, it was not uncommon to draw a distinction between positive and nega tive attributions, and to claim that only negative assertions can be made of God (via negativa), not positive. But not only is the positive/negative distinction hard 124 The result was first proved for a version of set theory by Brady [1989]. Its adaptation to truth is spelled out in Priest [2002, Section 8].
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to sustain — to say, for example, that God is omnipotent is to say that God can do everything (positive); but it is equally to say that there is nothing that limits God’s power (negative) — the very reasons for supposing that God is ineffable would clearly seem to be positive: ineffability arises because God’s characteristics exceed any human ones by an infinite amount. In the Critique, Kant tried to defuse the contradiction in a not dissimilar way, claiming that the notion of a noumenon had a merely negative, or limiting, func tion: it just serves to remind that there are bounds to the applicability of our cat egories. But this does not actually address the issue, which is how we can possibly say anything at all about noumena; indeed, it makes matters worse by saying more things about them. And again, Kant says lots of things about noumena which go well beyond a simple assertion of this limiting function; for example, he defends free will on the ground that the noumenal self is not subject to causation. The issue was faced squarely in the Tractatus. Wittgenstein simply accepted that he could not really say anything about the structure of language or the world. The Tractatus, in particular, in mostly meaningless. But this is not at all satis factory. Apart from the fact that we do understand what the propositions of the Tractatus say — and so they cannot be meaningless — if this were indeed so, we would have no ground for supposing that the propositions are meaningless, and so accepting Wittgenstein’s conclusions. (You would not buy a second-hand ladder from such a person.) None of the saving stratagems, then, is very successful. Nor is this surprising. For there is something inherently contradictory in the very project of theorising about limits of thought. In the very process, one is required to conceive or describe things that are on the other side — as Wittgenstein himself points out in the introduction to the Tractatus. The contradiction concerned is therefore at the very heart of the project. It is no mere accidental accretion to the theory, but is inherent in its very problematic. If there are limits to thought, they are contradictory — by their very nature. Of course, one might reject the contradiction by rejecting the claim that there are things beyond the limit of thought. (This is exactly Berkeley’s strategy in his argument that everything can be conceived.) There is no God; or if there is, God is perfectly effable. Hegel argued that our categories are just as applicable to noumena as they are to phenomena.125 And in the introduction to the English version of the Tractatus, Russell argued that what could not be stated in the language of the Tractatus could be stated in a metalanguage for it. How successful these particular moves are, is another matter. There certainly are general philosophical reasons for supposing there to be things beyond the limits of thought. The most definitive reasons for supposing this take us back to the semantical paradoxes of self-reference. There are so many objects that it 125 This is ironical, to a certain extent, since Hegel was a philosopher who was prepared to accept contradictions. But in this respect, the move takes Hegel out of the frying pan, and into the fire. For the move undercuts Kant’s solution to the Antinomies of Pure Reason, which contradictions must therefore be endorsed.
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impossible that all of them should have a name (or be referred to). There is, for example, an uncountable infinitude of ordinal numbers, but there is only a countable number of descriptions in English. Hence, there are many more ordinal numbers than can have names. In particular, to turn the screw, since the ordinal numbers are well-ordered, there is a least ordinal number that has no description. But we have just described it. Perhaps, it may be thought, something fishy is going on here with infinity. Historically, infinity has always, after all, been a notion with a question mark hanging over it. But similar paradoxes do not employ the notion of infinity. Given the syntactic resources of English, there is only a finite number of descriptions of some fixed length — say less than 100 words — and, a fortiori, only a finite number of (natural) numbers that are referred to by them. But the number of numbers exceeds any finite bound. Hence, there are numbers that cannot be referred to by a description with fewer than 100 worlds. And again, there must be a least. This cannot be referred to; but we have just referred to it. These two paradoxes are well known. The first is K¨ onig’s paradox; the second is Berry’s. They are semantic paradoxes of self-reference in the same family as the liar. We now see them in another light. They are paradoxes of the limits of thought; and contradiction is just what one should expect in such cases.126
6
THE FOUNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICS
6.1 Introduction: a Brief History The development of modern logic has been intimately and inextricably connected with issues in the foundations of mathematics. Questions concerning consistency and inconsistency have been a central part of this. One might therefore expect paraconsistency to have an important bearing on these matters. Such expectations would not be disappointed. In this part we will see why. In the process, we will pick up the issue of the set-theoretic paradoxes left hanging in the previous section. Let us start with a brief synopsis of the relevant history.127 The nineteenth century was a time of great progress in the understanding of foundational matters in mathematics, matters that had been murky for a very long time. By the end of the century, the reduction of rational, irrational, and complex numbers to the natural numbers was well understood. The nature of the natural numbers still remained obscure. It was in this context that Frege and Russell proposed an analysis of the natural numbers (and thence of all numbers) in purely logical terms. A vehicle for this analysis needed to be built; the vehicle was classical logic. It was more than this, though; for what was also needed was a theory of extensions, or sets, which both Frege and Russell took to be part of logic. According to 126 The
issues of this section are discussed at much greater length in Priest [1995]. details can be found in the articles on Frege, Russell, Hilbert, and G¨ odel in this Handbook. 127 Further
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Frege’s theory of extensions, the simplest and most obvious, every property has an extension. This is the unrestricted principle of set abstraction: ∀y(y ∈ {x; α(x)} ↔ α(y)) The schema looks to be analytic, and very much like a part of logic. The reduction was a very successful one... except that this theory of sets was found to be inconsistent. At first, the contradictions involved, discovered by Can tor, Burali-Forti and others, were complex, and it could be hoped that some error of reasoning might be to blame. But when Russell simplified one of Cantor’s ar guments to produce his famous paradox, it became clear that contradiction lay at / x for α(x) gives: the heart of the theory of sets. Taking x ∈ ∀y(y ∈ {x; x ∈ / x} ↔ y ∈ / y) Now writing {x; x ∈ / x} as r, and instantiating the quantifier with this, produces r∈r↔r∈ / r, and given some simple logical principles, such as the law of excluded middle or consequentia mirabilis, contradiction follows. In response to this, mathematicians proposed ways of placing restrictions on the abstraction principle which were strong enough to avoid the contradictions, but not too strong to cripple standard set-theoretic reasoning, and particularly some version of the reduction of numbers to sets. How successful they were in this endeavour, we will return to in a moment. But the result for Frege and Russell’s logicist programme was pretty devastating. It became clear that, though the reduction of numbers to sets could be performed, the theory of sets employed could hardly be taken as a part of logic. Whilst the unrestricted abstraction schema could plausibly be taken as an analytic principle, the things that replaced it could not be seen in this way. Nor could this theory of sets claim any a priori obviousness or freedom from contradiction. This fact gave rise to another foundational programme, Hilbert’s. Hilbert thought that there were certain mathematical statements whose meanings were evident, and whose truth (when true) was also evident, finitary statements — roughly, numerical equations or truth-functional compounds thereof. Other sorts of statements, and especially those containing numerical variables — which he termed ideal — had no concrete meaning. We can reason employing such statements, but we can do so only if the reasoning does not contradict the finitary base. And since Hilbert took the underlying logic to be classical logic, and so explosive, what this meant was that the reasoning had to be consistent. Hence, it was necessary to prove the consistency of our formalisation of mathematics. Of course, a proof could have significance only if it was secure. Hence, the proof had to be carried out finitistically, that is, by employing only finitary statements. This was Hilbert’s programme.128 The programme was killed, historically, by G¨ odel’s famous incompleteness theo rems. G¨odel showed that in any consistent theory of arithmetic there are sentences 128 See
Hilbert [1925].
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such that neither they nor their negations could be proved. Moreover, the con sistency of the theory in question was one such statement. Hence, any consistent theory which includes at least finitary reasoning about numbers can not have its odel demon consistency shown in the theory itself. To confound matters further, G¨ strated that, given a theory that was intuitively sound, some of the sentences that could not be proved in it could, none the less, be shown to be true. Let us now turn to the issues of how paraconsistency bears on these matters and vice versa.
6.2 The Paradoxes of Set Theory For a start, the set-theoretic paradoxes provide further arguments for dialetheism. The unrestricted abstraction schema is an almost irresistible principle concerning sets. Even those who deny it have trouble sticking to their official position. And if it is what it appears to be, an a priori truth concerning sets, then dialetheism is hard to resist. As mentioned above, set theorists tried to avoid this conclusion by putting re strictions on the abstraction schema. And unlike the corresponding situation for the semantic paradoxes, there is now some sort of orthodoxy about this. Essen tially, the orthodoxy concerns Zermelo Fraenkel set theory (ZF ) and its intuitive model, the cumulative hierarchy. This model is the set-theoretic structure ob tained by starting with the empty set, and applying the power-set iteratively. The construction is pursued all the way up the ordinals, collecting at limit ordinals. The instances of the abstraction schema that are true are the ones that hold in the hierarchy. That is, the sets postulated by the schema do not exist unless they are in the hierarchy.129 Notice that it is not contentious that the sets in the hierarchy exist. All may agree with that. The crucial claim is the one to the effect that there are no sets outside the hierarchy. Unfortunately, there seems to be no very convincing reason as to why this should be so. It is not the case, for example, that adding further instances of the abstraction schema must produce inconsistency. For example, one can postulate, quite consistently with ZF , the existence of non-well-founded sets (that is, sets, x0 , such that there is an infinitely descending membership sequence x0 ' x1 ' x2 ' ...; there are no such sets in the hierarchy). Moreover, there are reasons as to why an insistence that there are no sets other than those in the hierarchy cannot be sustained. For a start, this is incompatible with mathematical practice. It is standard in category theory, in particular, to consider the category of all sets (or even all categories). Whatever else a category is, it is a collection of a certain kind. But the set of all sets in the hierarchy is not itself in the hierarchy. Indeed, if one supposes that there is such a set then, given 129 There are variations on the idea; for example, concerning whether or not to countenance proper classes (sub-collections of the whole hierarchy that cannot be members of anything); but these do not change the fundamental picture. In particular, all the arguments that follow can be reworked to apply to the collection of all classes (that is, sets or proper classes).
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the other resources of ZF , contradiction soon ensues. More fundamentally, the insistence flies in the face of the Domain Principle. A version of this was first enunciated by Cantor. In a modern form, it is as follows: if statements quantifying over some totality are to have determinate sense, then there must be a determinate totality of quantification. The rationale for the Principle is simple: sentences that contain bound variables have no determinate sense unless the domain of quantification is determinate. Is it true, for example, that every quadratic equation has two roots? If we are talking about real roots, the answer is ‘no’; if we are talking about complex roots, the answer is ‘yes’. Now, statements of set theory have quantifiers that range over all sets, and, presumably, have a determinate sense. By the Domain Principle, the set of all sets must therefore be a determinate collection. But it is not a collection located in the hierarchy, as we have just noted.130 The orthodox solution to the paradoxes of set theory is therefore in just as much trouble as the plethora of solutions to the semantic paradoxes.
6.3
Paraconsistent Set Theory
In contrast with attempted consistent solutions to the set-theoretic paradoxes, a dialetheic approach simply endorses the unrestricted abstraction schema, and accepts the ensuing contradictions. But since it employs a paraconsistent conse quence relation, these contradictions are quarantined. As with semantic paradoxes, not all paraconsistent logics will do what is required. For example, in a logic with modus ponens and Contraction, Curry paradoxes are quickly forthcoming. If α is any sentence, then the abstraction schema gives: ∀y(y ∈ {x; x ∈ x → α} ↔ (y ∈ y → α)) Now write {x; x ∈ x → α} as c, and instantiate the universal quantifier with it to obtain: c ∈ c ↔ (c ∈ c → α); then argue as in the semantic case. It was shown by Brady [1989] that when based on a suitable relevant logic that does not endorse Contraction (but which contains the law of excluded middle), set theory based on the unrestricted abstraction schema, though inconsistent, is non-trivial.131 Let us call this theory naive relevant set theory. The next obvious question in this context concerns how much standard set theory can be derived in naive relevant set theory. In particular, can the reduction of number theory to set theory be obtained? If it can, then the logicist programme looks as though it can be made to fly again; Frege and Russell are vindicated. In naive set theory, and with a qualification to which we will return in a moment, naive set theory is sufficient for most workaday set theory, concerning the basic settheoretic operations (unions, pairs, functions, etc.).132 As to whether it provides 130 There are various (unsatisfactory) ways in which one may try to avoid this conclusion. These are discussed in Priest [1995, ch. 11]. 131 Brady [1983] also showed that without the law of excluded middle, the theory is consistent. 132 Details can be found in Routley [1977].
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for the essential parts of the theory of the transfinite, or for the reduction of number theory to set theory, no definitive answer can presently be given. What can be said is that the standard versions of many of the proofs concerned fail, since they depend on properties of the conditional not present in the underlying logic. Whether there are other proofs is not known. But the best guess is that for most of these things there probably are not. If this is the case, a big question clearly hangs over the acceptability of the theory. If it cannot accommodate at least the elements of standard transfinite set theory in some way, it would seem to be inadequate. Actually, the situation is more complex than I have so far indicated, due to considerations concerning extensionality. The natural identity condition for sets is coextensionality: two sets are the same if, as a matter of fact, they have the same members. That is: ∀x(α ≡ β) → {x; α} = {x; β} where ≡ is the material biconditional (α ≡ β is (α ∧ β) ∨ (¬β ∧ ¬α)). But if one formulates the identity conditions of sets in naive relevant set theory in this way, / x}. We can show that r ∈ r ∧ r ∈ / r. Hence, trouble ensues. Let r be {x; x ∈ for any α, we have α ≡ r ∈ r, and so {x; α} = {x; r ∈ r}.133 Given standard properties of identity, it follows that all sets are identical. One way around this problem is to replace the ≡ in the identity conditions with an appropriate relevant biconditional ↔.134 But there is a cost. Let x be the complement of x, {y; y ∈ / x}. Then one can show that for any x and y, ¬∃z z ∈ x ∩ x, and ¬∃z z ∈ y ∩ y. Thus, x ∩ x and y ∩ y are both empty; but one cannot show that they are identical, since arbitrary contradictions are not equivalent: it is not the case that (z ∈ x ∧ z ∈ / x) ↔ (z ∈ y ∧ z ∈ / y). One might think this not too much of a problem. After all, many people find a unique empty set somewhat puzzling. However, the problem is quite pervasive. There are going to be many universal sets, for example, for exactly the same rea son.135 The structure of sets is not, therefore, a Boolean algebra. Unsurprisingly, it is a De Morgan algebra.136 And assuming, as seems natural, that a universe of sets must have an underlying Boolean structure, this shows that using an in tensional connective to state identity conditions is going to deliver a theory of some kind of entity other than sets.137 Extensionality lies deep at the heart of set theory. {x; α} = {x; r ∈ r ∧ x = x} if one does not like vacuous quantification. is how extensionality is stated in Brady’s formulation. 135 And quite generally, every set is going to be duplicated many times; for if τ is any contingent truth, the same things satisfy α(x) and α(x) ∧ τ . But it is not the case that α(x) ↔ (α(x) ∧ τ ). 136 Indeed, as Dunn [1988] shows, if we add the assumption that there is a unique empty set and a unique universal set, the underlying logic collpses into classical logic. 137 Possibly properties, which are more naturally thought of as intensional entities. If we read set abstracts as referring to properties and ∈ as property instantiation then this problem does not arise, since there is no reason to expect a Boolean algebra. Note, also, that a naive theory of properties of this kind is not problematic if it is unable to deliver transfinite set theory. A dialetheic theory of properties is, in fact, quite unproblematic. 133 Or
134 This
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Can this fact be reconciled with a dialetheic account of sets? There is one way. Formulate the theory entirely in terms of material conditionals and biconditionals. Not only are these employed in the statement of identity conditions of sets, but they are also employed in the abstraction schema. After all, this is how it is done in ZF . Call this theory simply naive set theory. If one formulates set theory in this way, the argument that all sets are identical fails, since it requires a detachment for the material conditional: — in effect, the disjunctive syllogism. Indeed, it is now an easy matter to show that there are models of the theory with more than one member. Such a move radically exacerbates the problem concerning the proof-theoretic power of the theory, however. Since the material conditional does not detach, the theory is very weak indeed. Fortunately, then, standard set theory may be interpreted in a different fashion. It can be shown that any model of ZF can be extended to a model of simply naive set theory.138 The original model is, in fact, a consistent substructure of the new model. Hence, there are models of naive set theory in which the cumulative hierarchy is a consistent sub-structure. And we may take the standard model (or models) of naive set theory to be such (a) model(s). In this way, classical set theory, and therefore all of classical mathematics, can be interpreted as a description of a consistent substructure of the universe of sets. This fact does nothing much to help logicism, however. In particular, one cannot argue that the principles of arithmetic are analytic, since, even if the axioms of set theory are analytic, the former have not been deduced from the latter.
6.4
G¨ odel’s Theorems
Let us now turn to G¨ odel’s incompleteness theorems. These concern theories that contain arithmetic, phrased in a standard first order language (with only exten sional connectives). Without loss of generality, we can consider just arithmetic itself. A simple statement of G¨odel’s first theorem says that any consistent theory of arithmetic is incomplete. This need not be disputed. Careless statements of the theorem often omit the consistency clause. What paraconsistency shows is that the clause is absolutely necessary. As we will see, there are complete but inconsistent theories of arithmetic.139 The existence of these follows from a general model-theoretic construction called the Collapsing Lemma. I will not go into all the formal details of this here, but the essential idea is as follows. Take any classical model, and consider any equivalence relation on its domain, that is also a congruence relation on the interpretations of the function symbols in the language. Now construct an LP interpretation by identifying all the elements in each equivalence class. Any predicate of the lan guage is true of the elements identified if it is true of some one of them; and it is 138 See
Restall [1992]. was first demonstrated, in effect, by Meyer [1978]. The same paper shows that the non-triviality (though not the consistency) of a certain consistent arithmetic based on relevant logic may also be demonstrated within the theory itself. Further technical details of what follows can be found in Priest [2002, Section 9]. 139 This
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false if it is false of some one of them. The resulting interpretation is the collapsed interpretation; and the Collapsing Lemma states that anything true in the original interpretation is true in the collapsed interpretation. Hence, if the original inter pretation is a model of some theory, so is the collapsed interpretation. Of course, it will be a model of other things as well. In particular, it will verify certain con tradictions. Thus, for example, suppose that a and b are distinct members of an equivalence class. Then since a = b was true before the collapse, it is true after the collapse. But since a and b have now been identified, a = b is also true. To apply this to the case at hand, take arithmetic to be formulated, as is usu ally done, in a first-order language containing the function symbols for successor, addition, and multiplication; and consider any model of the set of sentences in this language true in the standard model — maybe the standard model itself. It is easy to construct an appropriate equivalence relation, , and apply the Col lapsing Lemma to give an interpretation that is a model of an inconsistent theory containing classical arithmetic. For example, the following will do: for a fixed n, a b iff (a, b ≥ n) or (a, b < n and a = b). (This leaves all the numbers less than n alone, and identifies all the others.) To bring this to bear on G¨ odel’s theorem, choose an equivalence relation which makes the collapsed model finite. The one just mentioned will do nicely. Let T be the theory of the collapsed model (that is, the set of sentences true in it). Since what holds in a finite model is decidable (essentially by LP truth tables; quantifiers are equivalent to finite conjunctions and disjunctions), T is decidable. A fortiori, it is axiomatic. Hence, T is an axiomatic theory of arithmetic. It is inconsistent but complete. Let us turn now to the second incompleteness theorem. According to this, if a theory of arithmetic is consistent, the consistency of the theory cannot be proved in the theory itself. Inconsistent theories hardly bear on this fact. Classically, consistency and non-triviality are equivalent. Indeed, the canonical statement of consistency in these matters is a statement of non-triviality. In a paraconsistent logic the two are not equivalent, of course. T , for example, is inconsistent; but it is not trivial, provided that the equivalence relation is not the extreme one which identifies all elements of the domain (in the example of just given, provided that n > 0). The question of whether the non-triviality of an inconsistent but non-trivial theory can be proved in the theory itself is therefore a real one. And it can. Consider T . Since it is decidable, its membership relation is expressible in the language of arithmetic. That is, there is a sentence of one free variable, π(x), such / T then ¬π(α) is that for any sentence, α, if α ∈ T then π(α) is true, and if α ∈ true. (Here, α is the numeral of the code number of α.) Hence, by the Collapsing Lemma: π-in: if α ∈ T , π(α) ∈ T π-out: if α ∈ / T then ¬π(α) ∈ T
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(Of course, for some αs, π(α) and ¬π(α) may both be in T .) Then pro / T , and so vided that the equivalence relation does not identify 1 and 0, 1 = 0 ∈ ¬π(1 = 0 ∈ T . Hence, T is non-trivial, and the statement expressing the nontriviality of T is provable in T . G¨ odel’s second incompleteness Theorem does fail in this sense. We have not finished with G¨ odel’s Theorem yet, but let us ask how these mat ters bear on the issue of Hilbert’s Programme. Hilbert’s programme required that mathematics be formalised, and that the whole formalised theory be a conserva tive extension of the finitary part. Interestingly, Hilbert’s motivating considera tions did not require the formalisation to be consistent (though since he assumed that the underlying logic was classical, this was taken for granted). Like all in strumentalisms, it does not matter what happens outside the core (in this case, the finitary) area. The point is that the extension be a conservative one over the core area. So the use of an inconsistent theory is quite compatible with Hilbert’s programme, in this sense. Does the construction we have been looking at provide what is required, then? Not exactly. First, as far as has been shown so far, it might be the case that both π(1 = 0) and ¬π(1 = 0) are in T . If this is the case, the significance of a non-triviality proof is somewhat moot. (It could be, though, that with careful juggling we can ensure that this is not the case.) More importantly, T is not a conservative extension of the true numerical equations. For since the model is finite, distinct numbers must have been identified. Hence, there are distinct m and n such that m = n ∈ T .140 There are certainly collapsed models where this is not the case. Suppose, for example, that we collapse a classical non-standard model of arithmetic, identifying some of the non-standard numbers, but leaving the standard numbers alone. Then the equational part of the theory of the collapsed model is consistent. In this case, though, the collapsed model is not finite, so there is no guarantee that its theory is axiomatisable. Whether or not there are collapses of non-standard models of this kind where the theory of the collapsed model is axiomatisable, or there are other axiomatic inconsistent theories with consistent equational parts, is not known at present.
6.5
G¨ odel’s Paradox
As we have noted, paraconsistency does not destroy G¨ odel’s theorems provided that they are stated in the right way; and in particular, that the consistency clauses are spelled out properly. Otherwise, they fail. The theorems have been held to have many philosophical consequences. If consistency is simply taken for granted, paraconsistency entirely undercuts any such mooted consequence. But, it may be argued, we are interested only in true theories, and the inconsistent theories in question can hardly be true. This move is itself moot. Once dialetheism is taken on board, it cannot simply be assumed that any true mathematical theory is consistent — especially in areas where paradoxes play, such as set theory. But 140 There is a radical move that is possible here, though: to accept that the true equations are themselves inconsistent. See Priest [1994].
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leave the flights of set theory out of this; what of arithmetic? Could it be seriously supposed that this is inconsistent? This brings us back to the version of G¨ odel’s theorem with which I ended the first section of this part. According to this, given any axiomatic and intuitively correct theory of arithmetic, there is a sentence that is not provable in the theory, but which we can yet establish as true by intuitively correct reasoning. The sentence is the famous undecidable sentence that “says of itself that it is not provable”; that is, a sentence, γ, of the form ¬π(γ).141 Now consider the canons of mathematical proof, those procedures whereby we establish mathematical claims as true. These are certainly intuitively correct — or we would not use them. They are not normally presented axiomatically; they are learned by mathematics students by osmosis. Yet it is reasonable to suppose that they are axiomatic. We are finite creatures; yet we can recognise, in principle, an infinite number of mathematical proofs when we see them. Hence, they must be generated by some finite set of resources. That is, they are axiomatic. In the same way, we can recognise an infinite number of grammatical sentences. Hence, these, too, must be generatable by some finite rule system, or our ability to recognise them would be inexplicable. Now consider the undecidable sentence, γ, for this system of proof. By the theorem, if the system is consistent, we cannot prove γ in it. But — again by the theorem — we can prove γ in an intuitively correct way. Hence, it must be provable in the system, since this encodes our intuitively correct reasoning. By modus tollens it follows that the system is inconsistent. Since this system encoded precisely our means of establishing mathematical claims as true, we have a new argument for dialetheism. What of the undecidable sentence? It is not difficult to see that it is provable. Let us use as a sign for our intuitive notion of provability. It is certainly intu itively correct that what is provable is true (indeed, this is analytic), i.e., for all α, π(α) ⊃ α. In particular, then, π(γ) ⊃ ¬π(γ). It follows that ¬π(γ), i.e., γ. Of course, since we have a proof of γ, we have also demonstrated that π(γ), i.e., ¬γ. Thus, the “undecidable” sentence is one of the contradictions in question. It is worth noting that if T is the formal system introduced in the / T . But in the latter last section, both γ and ¬γ are in T . For γ ∈ T or γ ∈ case, ¬π(γ) ∈ T (by π-out), i.e., γ ∈ T anyway. But then π(γ) ∈ T (by π-in), i.e., ¬γ ∈ T . Hence T captures these aspects of our intuitive proof procedures admirably. At any rate, arithmetic is inconsistent, since we can prove certain contradictions to be true; and γ is one of them. In fact, dressed in the vernacular, γ is a very recognisable paradox, in the same family as the liar: this sentence is not provable. If it is provable, it is true, so not provable. Hence it is not provable. But then we have just proved it. We may call this G¨ odel’s paradox ; it returns us to the discussion of semantic paradoxes in the last part. We see that there is a very intimate connection between these paradoxes, G¨odel’s theorems, and dialetheism. 141 The theorem is proved explicitly in this form in Priest [1987, ch. 3], where the following argument is discussed at much greater length.
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7 NEGATION
7.1
What is Negation?
We have now looked at the history of both paraconsistency and dialetheism. No account of these issues could be well-rounded, however, without a discussion of a couple of philosophical notions which are intimately related to both. One of these is rationality, which I will deal with in the next part. The other, which I will deal with in this part, is negation. This is a notion that we have been taking for granted since the start of the essay. Such a crucial notion clearly cannot be left in this state. So what is negation?142 A natural thought is that the negation of a sentence is simply one that is obtained by inserting the word ‘not’ at an appropriate point before the main verb (or by some similar syntactic construction in other languages). This, however, is not right. It may well be that the negation of: 1 Bessy is a cow is: 1n Bessy is not a cow But as Aristotle pointed out a long time ago143 the negation of: 2 Some cows are black is not: 2 Some cows are not black but rather: 2n No cows are black Worse, inserting a ‘not’ in a sentence often has nothing to do with negation at all. Consider, for example, the person who says: ‘I’m not British; I’m Scottish’ or ‘Australia was not established as a penal colony; it was established as a British territory using forced labour’. In both cases, the “notted” sentence is true, and the utterer would not suppose otherwise. What the ‘not’ is doing, as the second sentence in each pair makes clear, is rejecting certain (normal?) connotations of each first sentence. Linguists sometimes call this ‘metalinguistic negation’.144 What these examples show is that we have a grasp of the notion of negation, independent of any particular use of the word ‘not’, which we can use to determine 142 The
material in this section is discussed further in Priest [1999a]. Interpretatione, ch. 7. 144 See, e.g., Horn [1989, ch. 5], for an excellent discussion. In the context of logic, the termi nology is clearly not a happy one. 143 De
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when “notting” negates. We can see that this relationship holds between examples like 1 and 1n, and 2 and 2n, but not between 2 and 2 . This is the relationship between contradictories; let us call it the contradictory relation. We can, and of course modern logicians usually do, use a symbol, ¬, with the understanding that for any α, α and ¬α bear the contradictory relation to each other, but ¬ is a term of art.145 Perhaps it’s closest analogue in English is a phrase like ‘It is not true that’ (or equivalently, ‘It is not the case that’). But this is not exactly the same. For a start, it brings in explicitly the notion of truth. Moreover, these phrases can also be used as “metalinguistic” negations. Just consider: ‘It’s not true that he’s bad; he’s downright evil’. Negation, then, is the contradictory relation. But what relation is that? Dif ferent accounts of negation, and the different formal logics in which these are embedded, are exactly different theories which attempt to provide answers to this question. One may call these different notions of negation simply different nega tions if one wishes, but one should recall that what they are, really, are different conceptions of how negation functions. In the same way, different theories of mat ter (Aristotelian, Newtonian, quantum) provided different conceptions of the way that matter functions.
7.2 Theories of Negation There are, in fact, many different theories as to the nature of negation. Classical logic and intuitionist logics give quite different accounts, as do many other modern logics. Indeed, we have already looked at a number of paraconsistent accounts of negation in Part 4. The existence of different theories of negation is not merely a contemporary phenomenon, however. There are different theories of negation throughout the history of logic. Let me illustrate this fact by looking briefly at three, one from ancient logic, one from (early) medieval logic, and one from (early) modern logic. The first account is Aristotle’s. First, Aristotle has to say which sentences are the negations of which. This, and related information, is encapsulated in what later came to be known as the square of opposition: All As are Bs.
No As are Bs
Some As are Bs.
Some As are not Bs.
The top two statements are contraries. The bottom two are sub-contraries. For mulas at the opposite corners of diagonals are contradictories, and each statement at the top entails the one immediately below it. The central claims about the properties of contradictories are to be found in Book 4 of the Metaphysics. As we have seen, Aristotle there defends the claim that negation satisfies the laws of non-contradiction and excluded middle: 145 The device goes back to Stoic logicians who simply prefixed the whole sentence with a ‘not’ — or at any rate its Greek equivalent. Medieveal logicians often did the same — in Latin.
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LEM �(α ∨ ¬α) LNC ¬�(α ∧ ¬α) Further discussion of the properties of contradictories is found in De Interpreta tione. Prima facie, Aristotle appears there to take back some of the Metaphysics account, since he argues that if α is a contingent statement about the future, nei ther α nor ¬α is true, prefiguring theories that contain truth-value gaps. There is, however, a way of squaring the two texts, and this is to read Aristotle as endorsing supervaluation of some kind.146 Even though α and ¬α may both be neither true nor false now, eventually, one will be true and the other will be false. Hence, if we look at things from an “eventual” point of view, where everything receives a truth value, α ∨ ¬α (and so its necessitation) is true. In this way, Aristotle can have his law of excluded middle and eat it too. Whether the texts can reasonably be interpreted in this way, I leave Aristotle scholars to argue about. Whatever one says about the matter, this is still only a part of Aristotle’s account of negation. It does not specify, for example, what inferential relations negations enter into.147 What are these according to Aristotle? The major part of his answer to this question is to be found in the theory of syllogistic. This tells us, for example, that ‘all As are Bs and no Bs are Cs’ entails ‘no As are Cs’. Scattered through the Organon are other occasional remarks concerning nega tion and inference. For example, Aristotle claims (Prior Analytics 57b 3) that contradictories cannot both entail the same thing. His argument for this depends on the claim that nothing can entail its own negation. Aristotle never developed these remarks systematically, but they were to be influential on the next theory of negation that we will look at. This was endorsed by medieval logicians including Boethius, Abelard, and Kil wardby. It can be called the cancellation view of negation, since it holds that ¬α is something that cancels out α.148 As Abelard puts it:149 No one doubts that [a statement entailing its negation] is improper since the truth of any one of two propositions that divide truth [i.e., contradictories] not only does not require the truth of the other but rather entirely expels and extinguishes it. As Abelard observes, if negation does work like this then α cannot entail ¬α. For if it did, α would contain as part of its content something that neutralises it, in which event, it would have no content, and so entail nothing (or at least, nothing with any content). This principle, and related principles such as that nothing can entail 146 For
further discussion of supervaluation, see Priest [2001, 7.10]. bring this point home, note that both �(α ∨ ¬α) and ¬� (α ∧ ¬α) may well hold in a modal dialetheic logic. 148 For details, see Martin [1987] and Sylvan [2000]. 149 De Rijk [1970, p. 290]. 147 To
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a sentence and its contradictory, are now usually called connexivist principles.150 Such principles were commonly endorsed in early medieval logic. Carried to its logical conclusion, the cancellation account would seem to imply something much stronger than any of the connexivist principles so far mentioned; namely, that a contradiction entails nothing (with any content). For since ¬α cancels out α, α ∧ ¬α has no content, and so entails nothing. This, of course, is inconsistent with Aristotle’s claim which we noted in 2.1, that contradictories sometimes entail conclusions and sometimes do not. So this is not Aristotle’s view. But some philosophers certainly took the account to its logical conclusion. Thus, Berkeley, when criticising the infinitesimal calculus in the Analyst, says:151 Nothing is plainer than that no just conclusion can be directly drawn from two inconsistent premises. You may indeed suppose anything possible: But afterwards you may not suppose anything that destroys what you first supposed: or if you do, you must begin de novo... [When] you ... destroy one supposition by another ... you may not retain the consequences, or any part of the consequences, of the first supposition destroyed. Despite the fact that this quotation comes from Berkeley, allegiance to the cancel lation view of negation, and to the connexivist principles that it delivers, waned in the later middle ages.152 The third account of negation we will look at is Boole’s, as he explains it in the Mathematical Analysis of Logic.153 Boole’s starting point in his logical investiga tions was the theory of the syllogism. His aim was to express syllogistic premises as equations, and then to give algebraic rules for operating on these which draw out their consequences. To turn the syllogistic forms into equations, he invokes the extensions of the terms involved. Thus, if a is the set of things that are A , etc., appropriate translations are: All As are Bs: No As are Bs: Some As are Bs: Some As are not Bs:
a(1 − b) = 0 ab = 0 ab = ν a(1 − b) = ν
Here, 1 is an appropriate universal class, so that 1 − b is the complement of b, 0 is the empty class, juxtaposition is intersection, and ν is an arbitrary non-empty class (necessary since Boole wants equations, not inequations). 150 For
modern connexivism, see Priest [1999b].
and Jessop [1951, p. 73].
152 The reason seems to be that a truth functional account of conjunction and disjunction gained
ground at this time. This makes trouble for connexivist principles. For by truth functionality, α ∧ ¬α α; so by contraposition ¬α ¬(α ∧ ¬α). But α ∧ ¬α ¬α. Hence, by transitivity, α ∧ ¬α ¬(α ∧ ¬α). See Martin [1987] and Sylvan [2000]. 153 The account given in the Laws of Thought is slightly different, but not in any essential ways. 151 Luce
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Boole extends this machinery to a propositional logic. To do this, he thinks of propositions as the sorts of thing that may change their truth value from cir cumstance to circumstance.154 He can then think of ‘if X then Y ’ as ‘all cases in which X is true are cases in which Y is true’: x(1 − y) = 0. Moreover, we may translate the other standard connectives thus: X and Y : X or Y : It is not the case that X:
xy x+y 1−x
where + is union, which Bo