The matrix of the mind: object relations and the psychoanalytic dialogue

T h e

M a t r i x

Object

o f

Relations

the Psychoanalytic

Thomas

t h e

and Dialogue

H. Ogden,

8

M i n d

M.D.

\

A JASON ARONSON B O O K

ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD PUBLISHERS, INC. Lanham • Boulder • New York • Toronto • Oxford

fEB

y ZGQ6

Certain chapters of this volume are based on prior publications ofthe author, as follows: Chapter 2: "Instinct, phantasy and psychological deep structure: a reinterpretation of aspects ofthe work of Melanie Klein," Contemporary Psychoanalysis 20:500-525,1984; Chapter 6: "The concept of internal object relations," International Journal ofPsychoAnalysis 64:181-198, 1983; Chapter 7: "The mother, the infant, and the matrix: Interpretations of aspects ofthe work of Donald Winnicott," Contemporary Psychoanalysis 21:346-371, 1985; Chapter 8- "On potential space," International Journal ofPsycho-Analysis 66:129-141,1985. A JASON ARONSON BOOK ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD PUBLISHERS, INC. Published in the United States of America by Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. A wholly owned subsidiary of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706 www.rowmanlittlefield.com PO Box 317 Oxford OX2 9RU, UK

0 3

Copyright© 1990, 1986 by Thomas H. Ogden, M.D. First Rowman & Littlefield edition 2004 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission ofthe publisher. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Ogden, Thomas H. The matrix ofthe mind Bibliography: p.247 Includes index. 1. Object relations. (Psychoanalysis) 2. Mother and child. 3. Mental illness I. Title. BF175.0365 1986 616.89 85-13404 ISBN 0-87668-742-7 (hardcover) ISBN 1-56821-051-5 (softcover) Printed in the United States of America G? The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992.

tf

To my

wife,

Sandra

C o n t e n t s

Preface xi A cknowledgments

xiii 1

The

Instinct,

Psychoanalytic

Phantasy,

Structure

in the

Dialogue

and Work

1

Psychological of Melanie

Deep Klein

9

The Concept of Phantasy 10 Psychological Deep Structure 13 The Preconception and the Realization 15 Freud's Conception of "Inheritance of Knowledge" 18 The Symbolic Form of Early Phantasy Activity 23 The Role of the Environment 31 Concluding Comments 37

The

Paranoid-Schizoid Self

as Object

Splitting 43 Early Stages of Integration

59

Position: 41

The Matrix of the Mind Splitting as Discontinuity of History Summary 64

61

4 The

Depressive

Position

the Historical

and Subject

the Birth

of

67

The Transition into the Depressive Position 68 The Development of Subjectivity 71 The Management of Danger in the Depressive Position 76 The Creation of History 79 The Manic Defense 84 The Achievement of Ambivalence 88 The Depressive Position and the Oedipus Complex Summary 98

Between

the Paranoid-Schizoid

the Depressive

Position

91

and 101

Acute Regression to the Paranoid-Schizoid Position A Foray into the Depressive Position 113 The Creation of Psychic Reality 117 Oedipal-Level Transference and Countertransference 119 Concluding Comments 129

Internal

Object

Relations

104

131

An Object Relations Theory of Internal Objects Transference, Countertransference, and Projective Identification 150 Summary 164

133

Contents 7 The

Mother, the

Work

the Infant,

and

the Matrix

of Donald

Winnicott

in

167

I. The Period of the Subjective Object 169 II. The Period of Transitional Phenomena 178 III. The Period of Whole-Object Relatedness 190 Summary 200 8 Potential

Space

203

Winnicott's Language 204 The Phenomenon of Playing 206 Potential Space and the Dialectical Process 208 Psychopathology of Potential Space 214 The Symbol, the Symbolized, and Subjectivity 224 Empathy and Projective Identification 227 Summary 231

Dream

Space

Dream Space 234 Analytic Space 238 References Index

261

247

and

Analytic

Space

233

P r e f a c e

If it had been possible to do so, this volume would have been written in a form in which several themes are presented simultaneously and in dynamic tension with one another. Despite the unavoidable linearity of the book, I hope that I have managed to capture something of the n a t u r e of the coexistence of primitive and mature aspects of experience—for example, the dialectical relationship between t h e paranoid-schizoid and the depressive states of being and t h e simultaneity of the infant's experience of being at one with and separate from the mother. I would like to suggest that each time the text begins to elaborate a linear conception of the relationship between these ideas, the reader attempt to re-cast these ideas in his own mind in a form that preserves a sense of the simultaneity of diverse dimensions of experience. In such a form, elements do not simply lead to or succeed one a n o t h e r ; rather, there is a coexistence of irresolvably different elements that have entered into a relationship of evolving, mutually enriching negations of one another. T.H.O. San Francisco, CA September 10, 1989 XI

A

c k n o w l e d g m e n t s

I would like to express my gratitude to my wife, Sandra, whose insight into the ideas I have been developing has been indispensable in t h e writing of this book. Clinical and theoretical discussions with Dr. James Grotstein h a v e formed an important background for m a n y of the concepts presented in this volume. I am deeply indebted to him for t h e warmth and generosity he has shown me as a friend and teacher. I am grateful to Dr. Bryce Boyer for all that he has taught me about the art, the discipline, and the courage involved in treating very disturbed patients. T h e seminars I have taught with him have been a great s o u r c e of pleas u r e for me. As will become clear in the course of this book, I believe that ideas are formed a n d developed dialectically. I am indebted to t h e supervisees with whom I have worked, and the m e m b e r s of t h e various seminars that I have led on object relations t h e o r y , for helping to create a series of generative dialogues t h a t shaped t h e ideas discussed in this volume.

1 T h e

P s y c h o a n a l y t i c D i a l o g u e

We die with the dying: See, they depart, and we go with them. We are born with the dead: See, they return, and bring us with them. —T. S. Eliot, Four Quartets

T h i s book is offered as a n act of interpretation. Different psychoanalytic perspectives are m u c h like different languages. Despite t h e extensive overlap of semantic content of the written texts of different languages, each language creates m e a n i n g t h a t c a n n o t be generated by t h e other languages now spoken or preserved in written form. T h e interpreter is n o t merely a passive carrier of information from o n e person to a n o t h e r ; he is t h e active preserver and creator of m e a n i n g as well as the retriever of t h e alienated. As s u c h , t h e i n t e r p r e t e r safeguards the fullness of h u m a n discourse. Psychoanalysis, b o t h as a t h e r a p e u t i c process and as a set of ideas, develops in the form of a discourse between

The Matrix of the Mind subjects, each interpreting his own productions and those of t h e o t h e r . Speaking for t h e m o m e n t about psychoanalysis as a theory (or, more accurately, a set of theories), each important contribution provides a degree of resolution for a theoretical or clinical problem, and in so doing creates a new epistemologic dilemma. A subsequent cont r i b u t i o n no longer addresses t h e same issue that an earlier c o n t r i b u t i o n has addressed, for that problem no longer exists; it has been forever altered. T h e more significant t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n , t h e more radically (and interestingly) the epistemologic problem is transformed. British object relations t h e o r y represents a diverse collection of c o n t r i b u t i o n s to t h e psychoanalytic discourse and has altered the character of the epistemologic problems presently accessible for psychoanalytic consideration. In this volume several pivotal ideas emerging from t h e work of t h e British school will be discussed, primarily concepts introduced by Melanie Klein, Donald W i n n i c o t t , a n d , in a more limited way, Ronald Fairbairn and Wilfred Bion. I do not attempt to survey or synthesize t h e contrib u t i o n s of these analysts; r a t h e r , my aim is to clarify, critique, and interpret, and in t h e process to generate new analytic understandings. Even though I will discuss individual concepts and groups of c o n c e p t s contributed by m e m b e r s of t h e British school, I h o p e to convey something of t h e m o v e m e n t of t h o u g h t underlying the u n u s u ally generative discourse in which these ideas were developed. T h e contributions to t h e psychoanalytic dialogue u p o n which I will focus were made in the period between 1925 and the early 1970s. That discourse is over, and I will not attempt to r e c o n s t r u c t it historically. My rendering of Klein, W i n n i c o t t , Fairbairn, Bion, and o t h e r s is not an effort to replicate the t h i n k i n g of these analysts, since the m o m e n t in the dialogue at which their contributions were

The Psychoanalytic Dialogue made has passed. All that can be alive at present is our own capacity for interpretation, and it is toward that end that I will devote my efforts. Both in t h e analytic dialogue (between analyst and analysand) and in the psychoanalytic discourse (among analytic t h i n k e r s ) , each act of intepretation preserves the original (experience or idea) while simultaneously generating new meanings and understandings of oneself and t h e other. Unless t h e original is preserved t h r o u g h language and in conscious and unconscious m e m o r y , we are trapped in a never-ending present u p o n which we cannot reflect and from which we cannot learn. T h e isolation of a portion of either t h e analytic dialogue between patient and analysand, or t h e analytic discourse among analytic t h i n k e r s results in individual or cultural self-alienation. It is not that a part of the past disappears; that cannot happen, because t h e past is immutable. W e can, however, isolate ourselves from our history. History differs from the past in that t h e past is simply a collection of events, while history is a creation reflecting our conscious and u n c o n s c i o u s m e m o r y of, o u r personal and collective rendering of, o u r distortions of, our i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of, the past. By isolating ourselves from the history of the dialogue that has preceded us a n d , in a sense, has created us in t h e present, we become less able to recognize and understand ourselves fully t h r o u g h the symbols, the meanings, the ideas, t h e feelings, the art, and t h e work that we create. To the extent that we isolate ourselves from a portion of the discourse, we are deadened, because to that same degree, we do not exist for ourselves (i.e., selfreflectively). A principal goal of clinical psychoanalysis is the progressive recapturing of self-alienated personal experience, isolated from the intrapersonal and interpersonal discourse, a process that allows t h e analysand to

The Matrix of the Mind m o r e fully recognize and u n d e r s t a n d who he is, and who he is becoming. In t h e retrieval of t h e alienated, the analysand becomes m o r e fully alive as a subjective, historical h u m a n being. He becomes m o r e capable of engaging in a fuller (less self-alienated) intrapersonal as well as interpersonal dialogue. He becomes less fearful of that which he formerly isolated from himself a n d , to that e x t e n t , becomes m o r e free. My goal in t h e present v o l u m e is to c o n t r i b u t e to t h e retrieval of t h e alienated t h r o u g h my own acts of interpretation of ideas i n t r o d u c e d by Klein, W i n n i c o t t , Fairbairn, and Bion. T h e c o n t r i b u t i o n s of these analysts to a large extent have been isolated from t h e worldwide psychoanalytic dialogue, leading to a depleting form of self-alienation in psychoanalytic t h i n k i n g (see Jacoby [1983] for a discussion of the ahistorical character of American psychoanalysis over the past forty years). T h e first p o r t i o n of this v o l u m e re-interprets facets of t h e work of Melanie Klein. In t h e initial chapter on Klein (Chapter 2), a study of t h e Kleinian conception of phantasy is used as a vehicle for exploring psychoanalytic instinct t h e o r y as a t h e o r y of meaning. I will propose that C h o m s k y ' s concept of linguistic deep s t r u c t u r e provides a useful analog for t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e Kleinian conception of " p h y l o g e n e t i c i n h e r i t a n c e of ideas." I n s t i n c t t h e o r y is viewed not as a t h e o r y of i n h e r i t e d , preformed ideas b u t , r a t h e r , as a t h e o r y of i n b o r n , organizing codes (associated with t h e life and death instincts) by which perception is organized and meanings are a t t a c h e d to experience in a highly determined way. A r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Kleinian instinct t h e o r y serves to provide a fresh u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the m o n u m e n t a l significance of F r e u d ' s instinct t h e o r y . F r e u d ' s c o n t r i b u t i o n is not a static text b u t , r a t h e r , a set of ideas that is con-

Tke Psychoanalytic Dialogue stantly evolving and being transformed in t h e context of t h e s u b s e q u e n t dialogue. W e take it for granted that one c a n n o t u n d e r s t a n d Klein without u n d e r s t a n d i n g F r e u d ; I believe that it is also t r u e that o n e c a n n o t fully u n d e r s t a n d Freud without u n d e r s t a n d i n g Klein. F r e u d was aware that his writing contained m o r e meaning t h a n he himself recognized. It was for this reason that he rarely revised his earlier papers; r a t h e r , he allowed t h e m to stand as they were and added ideas h e developed later in t h e form of footnotes to the original text. In that way, he hoped to avoid inadvertently obfuscating the t r u t h of the earlier version, which he was concerned he would lose as his thinking "progressed." Kleinian t h e o r y dwells heavily on t h e n a t u r e of primitive mental contents, but this most explicit level of Klein's t h i n k i n g often obscures t h e implicit theory of biological s t r u c t u r e as t h e organizing container for the ideational a n d affective c o n t e n t s of mind. In Chapters 3, 4, and 5, t h e Kleinian conceptions of t h e paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions are interpreted as conceptions of states of being. E n t r y into these positions r e p r e s e n t s t h e transition from t h e purely biological to psychological experience (the paranoid-schizoid position) and from the impersonalpsychological to subjective experience (the depressive position) . T h e distinctive states of being associated with each of these positions together (in a dialectical interplay similar to that between the conscious and u n c o n s c i o u s mind, b u t not divided along lines of consciousness) c o n s t i t u t e e n d u r i n g , fundamental c o m p o n e n t s of all subsequent psychological states. A series of clinical vignettes is presented in Chapter 5 that focus upon patients who are involved in making a transition from a p r e d o m i n a n t l y paranoid-schizoid mode of organizing experience to a depressive mode of organiz-

The Matrix of the Mind ing experience. It is of central clinical i m p o r t a n c e that the therapist be able to recognize and u n d e r s t a n d t h e n a t u r e of this transition, since his u n d e r s t a n d i n g of this shift in t h e p a t i e n t ' s mode of organizing e x p e r i e n c e powerfully influences t h e way t h e therapist listens, how he intervenes, and how he u n d e r s t a n d s t h e p a t i e n t ' s response to his i n t e r v e n t i o n . In Chapter 6, the development of t h e concept of internal object relations is traced t h r o u g h t h e work of F r e u d , A b r a h a m , Klein, Fairbairn, W i n n i c o t t , and Bion. Fairbairn's revision of F r e u d and Klein c o n s t i t u t e s a critical advance in t h e development of object relations t h e o r y . I propose in this chapter that internal object relations be t h o u g h t of as paired, split-off, and repressed aspects of ego. T h e s e paired aspects of self ( t h e i n t e r n a l object relationship) are viewed not simply as self and object representations, but as paired suborganizations of personality capable of semi-autonomously generating experience. T h i s discussion of t h e concept of internal object relations represents an exploration of o n e s i d e — t h e object or c o n t e n t side—of a dialectical relationship between t h e c o n t a i n e r and t h e c o n t a i n e d , a relationship between psychological-interpersonal space and its mental c o n t e n t s . As s u c h , this chapter prepares the way for a study of the work of Donald W i n n i c o t t , whose work is devoted to t h e study of t h e other s i d e — t h e c o n t a i n e r side—of this dialectical pair. In t h e final t h r e e chapters, I seek to clarify, i n t e r p r e t , and extend aspects of t h e work of Donald W i n n i c o t t , including his conception of t h e development of t h e m o t h e r - i n f a n t . T h e work of both F r e u d and Klein focused on t h e n a t u r e of psychological c o n t e n t s , functions and s t r u c t u r e s and their intrapsychic and interpersonal (e.g.,

The Psychoanalytic Dialogue transferential) manifestations. W i n n i c o t t expanded t h e field of psychoanalytic exploration to include a study of t h e development of the space in which mental c o n t e n t s , functions, and s t r u c t u r e s , as well as interpersonal relations, exist. In Chapters 8 and 9, W i n n i c o t t ' s concept of potential space is discussed in t e r m s of a series of dialectical relationships between reality and fantasy, m e and not-me, symbol and symbolized, etc., each pole creating, preserving, and negating its opposite. T h i s concept is perhaps the most i m p o r t a n t of W i n n i c o t t ' s c o n t r i b u t i o n s to psychoanalysis and at t h e same time the most elusive of his ideas. Potential space is not initially an intrapsychic space, for t h e r e is not yet an individual psyche in early infancy; r a t h e r , it is at first an interpersonal space created jointly by m o t h e r and infant. It is in this space t h a t t h e individual infant " b e g i n s to b e " ( W i n n i c o t t , 1967a) and later learns to play, dream, work, and to create and interpret his symbols. Failure to create or maintain this dialectical process leads to forms of psychopathology that include t h e experiencing of o n e ' s t h o u g h t s , feelings, and perceptions as things in t h e m s e l v e s ; t h e foreclosure of imagination; fetishistic object usage; and a failure to attach m e a n i n g to experience. Emerging from t h e dialogue t h a t c o n s t i t u t e s object relations t h e o r y are i m p o r t a n t c o n t r i b u t i o n s to a psychoanalytic conceptualization of mental c o n t e n t s (e.g., the concept of preconceptions of objects [psychological deep s t r u c t u r e ] , the concept of internal object relations, the n o t i o n of t h e discovery of the externality of objects). But beyond this is t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g developed in this portion of t h e psychoanalytic dialogue that mental c o n t e n t s exist in a psychological space that is at first almost entirely

The Matrix of the Mind i n t e r p e r s o n a l , only later evolving i n t o a personal i n t e r n a l e n v i r o n m e n t . It is t h e dialectical interplay of o u r m e n t a l c o n t e n t s and the personal and i n t e r p e r s o n a l psychological space in which t h e y a r e lived that c o n s t i t u t e s t h e matrix of t h e mind.

2 I n s t i n c t ,

P h a n t a s y ,

P s y c h o l o g i c a l S t r u c t u r e

i n

M e l a n i e

t h e

a n d

D e e p W o r k

o f

K l e i n

If you are applying psychoanalytic treatment to children you should meet Melanie Klein. . . . She is saying same things that may or may not be true, and you must find out for yourselffor you will not get what Melanie Klein teaches in my analysis with you. —Communication by James Strachey to his analysand Donald Winnicott

A l t h o u g h a significant p r o p o r t i o n of t h e world's analysts are Kleinian analysts, a serious consideration of the work of Melanie Klein has n o t been a major part o f t h e dialogue t h a t c o n s t i t u t e s A m e r i c a n p s y c h o a n a l y t i c thinking. Too often, when Klein's t h e o r y is considered, it is scrutinized only long e n o u g h to be dismissed on t h e basis of o n e

The Matrix of the Mind

10

" u n t e n a b l e " idea or a n o t h e r , s u c h as K l e i n ' s c o n c e p t i o n of t h e death instinct, her developmental timetable, or her t h e o r y of technique. A l t h o u g h I am n o t a K l e i n i a n a n d h a v e profound disagreements with m a n y aspects of her work, my aim is to present Klein's t h i n k i n g in a light t h a t may a c c o u n t for t h e i m p o r t a n t influence her ideas h a v e had on t h e develo p m e n t of psychoanalytic t h o u g h t outside the U n i t e d States. In particular, Klein h a s had a powerful influence on t h e development of British object relations t h e o r y , as m u c h t h r o u g h t h e rejection of her ideas as by their acceptance. T h e work of W i n n i c o t t , F a i r b a i r n , G u n t r i p , and Balint m u s t in large part be u n d e r s t o o d as a reaction to Kleinian t h e o r y . K l e i n ' s ideas and t h e reaction against t h e m c o n s t i t u t e a good deal of t h e dialogue u n d e r l y i n g t h e development of object relations t h e o r y . T h e d y n a m i c s of this dialogue are i n c o m p r e h e n s i b l e if o n e has never embraced Klein's ideas for even a m o m e n t . O n e must understand Kleinian t h e o r y in order to move b e y o n d it.

The

Concept

of

Phantasy

In discussing Klein, o n e must begin with t h e concept of p h a n t a s y , for this is t h e h u b of t h e m i n d - b o d y system she envisions. P h a n t a s y 1 for Klein (1952a) is t h e psychic 'English analysts, particularly the Kleinians, have tended to use the ph spelling of phantasy. Isaacs (1952) felt that the ph spelling connotes more of the unconscious dimension of the idea, whereas fantasy with an / should be used to refer to the more conscious, daydream level of this group of mental activities. Non-Kleinian, American analysts have never employed this distinction. Although Strachey in the Standard Edition uses the ph spelling of phantasy exclusively, American analysts have used only the/spelling. In this volume, I will use the spelling adopted by the analyst whose work is under discussion.

Instinct, Phantasy, and Psychological Deep Structure

11

r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of instinct. I n s t i n c t itself is a biological e n t i t y , and so p h a n t a s y is t h e psychic r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of o n e ' s biology. I n s t i n c t must u n d e r g o some type of transformation in o r d e r to g e n e r a t e " m e n t a l corollaries" (Isaacs, 1952)—i.e., phantasies. T h e functional unit of t h e mind t h a t is responsible for this transformation is t h e id. I n s t i n c t s , as part of o n e ' s biology, are present from b i r t h , a n d t h e id performs its transformational function from t h e beginning. T h e n e w b o r n infant's world at the outset is a bodily world, a n d p h a n t a s y r e p r e s e n t s the i n f a n t ' s a t t e m p t to transform somatic e v e n t s into a mental form. Even into a d u l t h o o d , p h a n t a s y never loses its conn e c t i o n with t h e body. P h a n t a s y c o n t e n t is always ultimately traceable to t h o u g h t s and feelings about the workings and c o n t e n t s of o n e ' s own body in relation to the workings a n d c o n t e n t s of t h e body of t h e o t h e r . K l e i n ' s conception of instinct derives from F r e u d ' s (1905) definition of instinct as " t h e d e m a n d made [by the body] u p o n t h e mind for w o r k " (p. 168). For Klein, the body's " d e m a n d " has information encoded in it t h a t t h e mind (specifically, t h e id) as receiver transforms into psychic p h e n o m e n a with specific c o n t e n t s . A great part of that which makes up o n e ' s inherited c o n s t i t u t i o n appears on a psychological plane t h r o u g h t h e operation of t h e instincts. Does this mean that the infant i n h e r i t s t h o u g h t s , and t h i n k s t h o s e t h o u g h t s from the beginning? T h i s would clearly be an u n t e n a b l e psychological t h e o r y . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , it is very often at this j u n c t u r e that Kleinian t h e o r y is dismissed as absurd. Many analysts see little point in p u r s u i n g a t h e o r y t h a t evolves from t h e a s s u m p t i o n s that t h e infant is born with ideas that do not derive from experience and that t h e infant can think at birth in ways that Piaget has shown a r e not possible until m u c h later in development. Before discarding t h e whole system of Kleinian t h o u g h t on these g r o u n d s , however, it

The Matrix of the Mind

12

is worthwhile to listen carefully to t h e language of t h e Kleinians to see if such apparently u n t e n a b l e ideas m a k e sense from any perspective. In her classic paper on p h a n t a s y , Isaacs

(1952)

writes, It has sometimes been suggested t h a t u n c o n s c i o u s phantasies such as that of " t e a r i n g [the breast] to b i t s " would not arise in t h e child's mind before he had gained t h e c o n s c i o u s knowledge that tearing a person to bits would mean killing him or h e r . S u c h a view does not meet t h e case. It overlooks t h e fact that such knowledge is inherent in bodily impulses as a vehicle of instinct, in t h e aim of instinct, in t h e excitation of t h e organ, i.e. in this case, t h e m o u t h . T h e p h a n t a s y that his passionate impulses will destroy the breast does not r e q u i r e t h e infant to have actually seen objects eaten up and destroyed, and t h e n to have come to t h e conclusion that he could do it too. This aim, this relation to t h e object, is i n h e r e n t in t h e c h a r a c t e r a n d direction of t h e impulse itself and in its related affects, (pp. 9 3 - 9 4 ) Isaacs is proposing h e r e that t h e idea of tearing an object to bits is not learned b u t , r a t h e r , is intrinsic to the aim of the instinct. Klein makes t h e same point when s h e a t t r i b u t e s the infant's knowledge of t h e breast before it is e n c o u n t e r e d to " p h y l o g e n e t i c i n h e r i t a n c e " (1952a, p. 117 fn.). In this conception of instinct, the Kleinians have expanded t h e concept of aim from F r e u d ' s (1905, 1915a) original usage, in which t h e aim of an instinct was the discharge of tension. Isaacs's usage is not incompatible with F r e u d ' s but it goes beyond his to state that the aim of t h e instinct in any given i n s t a n c e is characterized by a specific type of object relatedness that includes specific

Instinct, Phantasy, and Psychological Deep Structure

13

affective and ideational qualities not dependent on actual experience with objects.

Psychological

Deep

Structure

If t h e infant is not born with t h o u g h t s , how does he come by this " k n o w l e d g e " of objects if not by experience? T h e Kleinians do not offer an answer to t h e question beyond t h e n o t i o n of " p h y l o g e n e t i c i n h e r i t a n c e " (Klein, 1952c), but I believe t h a t an answer might be provided by analogy with C h o m s k y ' s (1957, 1968) concept of linguistic deep s t r u c t u r e . I n f a n t s are n o t born knowing F r e n c h , English, Russian, or any o t h e r language, but given an ordinary e n v i r o n m e n t and ordinary constitutional e n d o w m e n t , each infant learns at least o n e of the languages now spoken on this planet. It is simply not possible, according to C h o m s k y , for a h u m a n being to deduce and operationalize t h e grammatical s t r u c t u r e of language without a preexisting system with which to select from and organize t h e mass of s o u n d s to which one is exposed. Chomsky refers to this system, this code, as t h e " d e e p s t r u c t u r e " of language. T h e individual does not h a v e to, nor could he, create a g r a m m a r . T h e infant is born with a code that is built into t h e mode of functioning of his perceptual, cognitive, a n d m o t o r a p p a r a t u s e s t h a t will d e t e r m i n e that he will organize sensory data and r e n d e r t h e m linguistically meaningful in a highly specific way. In other words, the infant will organize a u d i t o r y stimuli in a way that is determined by t h e inborn code. T h e a s s u m p t i o n u n d e r l y i n g Chomsky's concept of deep s t r u c t u r e is that h u m a n beings do not randomly organize experience. N o t h i n g is perceived absolutely freshly, i.e., free of p r e c o n c e p t i o n s , preexisting schemata, preexisting systems for organizing that which is perceived.

14

The Matrix of the Mind

M e a n i n g c a n n o t be generated absolutely de novo. Very similar u n d e r s t a n d i n g s of t h e processing of experience in t e r m s of i n h e r e n t s t r u c t u r e s h a v e b e e n developed by Jakobson and de S a u s s u r e in t h e field of linguistics, LeviS t r a u s s in t h e field of a n t h r o p o l o g y , and Piaget in t h e field of developmental psychology. T o begin with a basic example of an i n h e r e n t system of organizing p e r c e p t i o n , h u m a n color perception is not simply a m a t t e r of passively receiving sensory data and c o n v e r t i n g those data into visual experience. T h e primary colors, perceived as discrete differentiated groupings, are t h e p r o d u c t s of a preexisting schema by which o n e organizes into g r o u p s certain p o r t i o n s of t h e c o n t i n u o u s range of wavelengths of light (Bornstein, 1975). T h e groupings of wavelengths that we call colors are b o t h arbitrary a n d universal a m o n g h u m a n beings and are t h e p r o d u c t of t h e way in which we organize t h e c o n t i n u o u s s p e c t r u m of wavelengths, each wavelength differing from t h e next o n e by a fixed q u a n t i t y of energy. W e all divide t h e s p e c t r u m in precisely t h e same way (in t h e a b s e n c e of color blindness) because of a preexisting biological schema that we use to organize o u r perceptions. Similarly, o u r organization of s o u n d s into p h o n e m e s (the basic u n i t s of s o u n d from which words are constructed) is not a m a t t e r of passive reception of an existing external order. T h e distinction between t h e p h o n e m e s " b a " and " p a , " for example, is not a quality of t h e stimuli themselves. R a t h e r , it is built into o u r system of organizing stimuli. T h e h u m a n being is incapable of perceiving any s o u n d as existing between these two p h o n e m e s (Eimas, 1975). T h e shapes and shadings composing the h u m a n face are preferentially discernible by t h e infant on t h e basis of constitutionally d e t e r m i n e d m o d e s of organizing perception ( S t e r n , 1983). Again, we organize visual data into

15

Instinct, Phantasy, and Psychological Deep Structure

groupings (in this instance shapes and shadings) that are not o u r own individual creations b u t , r a t h e r , the product of a system for organizing perception that is shared by all h u m a n beings. I n h e r i t e d modes of organizing experience can be viewed as t h e c o u n t e r p a r t of animal instincts. T h e chick has an inherited code with which to organize and respond to stimuli, a code t h a t precedes any actual experience. T h e chick, without prior experience of predatory danger, will scurry for cover u p o n sighting t h e wing pattern of a predator (Lorenz, 1937; T i n b e r g e n , 1957). From t h e perspective of the concept of inherited codes or templates by which actual experience is organized, t h e Kleinian concept of i n b o r n "knowledge . . . i n h e r e n t in bodily i m p u l s e s " (Isaacs, 1952, p. 94) can be u n d e r s t o o d not as inherited t h o u g h t s , but as a biological code t h a t is an integral part of instinct. T h e infant is not born with t h e knowledge of, or phantasy a b o u t , tearing at the breast, but has a powerful predisposition to organize and make sense of experience along specific lines. W h e t h e r those predetermined lines are t h e ones proposed by Klein is still very m u c h an open question. T h e conceptualization of i n s t i n c t s as psychological deep s t r u c t u r e s , however, seems a necessary addition to psychoanalytic instinct theory (Grotstein, 1985; Ogden, 1985). (See Samuels, 1983, for an application of a similar conception of " i n h e r i t a n c e of k n o w l e d g e " to t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g of J u n g ' s concept of archetypes.)

The

Preconception

and

the

Realization

In the beginning, p h a n t a s y is t h e infant's interpretation of experience. (I will defer a discussion of t h e form of symbolization and t h e degree of subjectivity that Klein attrib-

16

The Matrix of the Mind

utes to the infant's experience at t h e beginning of development.) W h i c h phantasies are m o r e compelling t h a n o t h e r s for t h e infant at a given m o m e n t is d e t e r m i n e d by t h e interplay of t h e i n f a n t ' s c o n s t i t u t i o n and actual experience. For Klein, t h e e m p h a s i s is clearly on t h e former: " T h e s t r e n g t h of t h e ego—reflecting t h e state of fusion between t h e two instincts—is, I believe, c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y d e t e r m i n e d " (Klein, 1958, pp. 2 3 8 - 2 3 9 ) . Using t h e paradigm of codes a n a l o g o u s to t h e d e e p s t r u c t u r e of language, I would restate K l e i n ' s ideas in t h e following way: T h e relative c o n s t i t u t i o n a l e n d o w m e n t of life and death instincts 2 is t h e major d e t e r m i n a n t of which code t h e infant will rely u p o n to i n t e r p r e t experience. Experience interpreted in accord with the death instinct will be a t t r i b u t e d aggressive and d a n g e r o u s meanings 3 , 2

It is beyond the scope of the present discussion to explore in any detail the Kleinian conception of the life and death instincts. Very schematically, the psychological correlates of the life instinct include the loving, sexual, nurturing, attachment-seeking, and generative motivations, whereas the psychological correlates of the death instinct include destructive, disintegrative, envious, and hostile motivations. In the beginning, the infant experiences a sense of diffuse, internal danger deriving from the death instinct. This sense of "nameless dread" (Bion, 1962a), when defended against by means of splitting and projective identification, results in the establishment of a persecutory object world split off from one's good objects. The nature of the mental activity involved in this early stage of psychological organization (the paranoid-schizoid position) will be discussed in-Chapter 3. 3

Grotstein (1985), building upon the work of Bion, has proposed that the death instinct be understood not as a caldron of destructive impulses (Klein, 1952c), nor as the psychological correlate of entropy (Freud, 1920), but as a system of inborn schemata serving to orient the individual to potential danger. The infant is seen as constitutionally endowed with a set of preconceptions that allows him to interpret experience in terms of possible danger of a prey-predator type. The

Instinct, Phantasy, and Psychological Deep Structure

17

whereas experience organized in t e r m s of the life instinct will be u n d e r s t o o d in t e r m s of n u r t u r i n g , loving meanings. T h e role of actual experience with t h e m o t h e r is i m p o r t a n t , b u t secondary: To what extent t h e s t r e n g t h of t h e ego can be maintained a n d increased is in part affected by external factors, in particular, t h e m o t h e r ' s a t t i t u d e towards t h e infant. However, e v e n w h e n t h e life instinct a n d t h e capacity for love predominate, destructive impulses are still deflected o u t w a r d s a n d c o n t r i b u t e to t h e creation of p e r s e c u t o r y and dangerous objects which are re-introjected. (Klein, 1958, p. 239) Actual experience may support an instinctual mode of organizing experience, but does not create t h e mode by which t h e experience is interpreted. For instance, persistent deprivation will lend emotional intensity to interpretations m a d e - i n accord with t h e death instinct. Actual deprivation will confirm t h e infant's readiness to experience his object as dangerous. T h e sense of danger is not created by t h e deprivation; real danger simply confirms t h e i n f a n t ' s anticipation that s u c h danger exists. M o r e o v e r , s u c h anticipation of danger will not be entirely discont i n u e d by the absence of actual danger. I n t e r p r e t i n g experience along the lines of m e a n i n g that follow from t h e code c o n n e c t e d with the death instinct will go on despite good experience: " E v e n t h e child who has a loving relation with his m o t h e r has also unconsciously a terror of

death instinct is conceived of as the origin of unconscious ego defenses as well as many of the primary autonomous ego functions which perform the function of seeking out and managing both internal and external danger.

The Matrix of the Mind

18

being devoured, t o r n u p , and destroyed by h e r " (Klein, 1963b, p. 277). In Kleinian t h e o r y t h e instincts are conceived of as biologically d e t e r m i n e d organizations that utilize actual experience to link a " p r e c o n c e p t i o n " with its "realizat i o n " (Bion, 1962b). For example, t h e p r e c o n c e p t i o n of danger is linked with a facet of reality t h a t can be experienced as dangerous. T h e p r e c o n c e p t i o n is not an idea b u t , r a t h e r , the potential for an idea. It is only in t h e linking of t h e p r e c o n c e p t i o n with t h e real t h a t a conception (a t h o u g h t ) is generated.

Freud's 'Inheritance

Conception of

of Knowledge 99

I consider this u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e Kleinian concept of phylogenetically inherited " k n o w l e d g e " (what Bion, [1962a] t e r m s " p r e c o n c e p t i o n " ) to be an outgrowth of t h e second (chronologically) of F r e u d ' s two most fundamental c o n t r i b u t i o n s to psychology. T h e first of these contributions is h i s conception of t h e u n c o n s c i o u s m i n d , t h e notion t h a t o n e has t h o u g h t s , feelings, motivations, etc., of which o n e is u n a w a r e , b u t that n o n e t h e l e s s play a powerful role in d e t e r m i n i n g t h e n a t u r e of o n e ' s observable t h o u g h t s , feelings, and behavior. T h e second of F r e u d ' s two m o n u m e n t a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s was his t h e o r y of sexual meanings. I believe t h a t t h e significance of this second c o r n e r s t o n e of psychoanalytic t h e o r y has to a considerable degree been lost sight of in r e c e n t years. F r e u d claimed not only that sexual desire is a terribly powerful h u m a n m o t i v a t i o n , b u t also that it exists from birth. (This m u c h of F r e u d ' s sexual t h e o r y is generally u n d e r s t o o d and appreciated, b u t I do n o t believe this to be the major significance of F r e u d ' s sexual theory.) Far m o r e radical a pro-

Instinct, Phantasy, and Psychological Deep Structure

19

posal was F r e u d ' s n o t i o n that all h u m a n motivations, all h u m a n psychopathology, all h u m a n cultural achievem e n t s , all h u m a n behavior, can be u n d e r s t o o d in t e r m s of sexual meanings.4 F r o m t h i s perspective, t h e sexual instinct is n o t simply a striving, an impulse, a desire, but the vehicle by which h u m a n beings create meaning. In other words, F r e u d did n o t simply propose that t h e sexual instinct be t h o u g h t of as generating sexual wishes and impulses. Of m u c h wider significance is t h e implication that h u m a n beings interpret all perceptions in t e r m s of sexual meanings, t h e r e b y creating experience. O n e makes sense of o n e ' s internal and external p e r c e p t i o n s t h r o u g h t h e lens of t h e system of sexual meanings. To use still a n o t h e r m e t a p h o r , t h e sexual instinct is t h e Rosetta s t o n e that allows t h e h u m a n being to translate raw sensory data into meaning-laden experience (see Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983, for a discussion of this idea from a different perspective). F r e u d ' s t h e o r y of psychological development is built u p o n t h e n o t i o n of an inborn expectancy of particular constellations of meanings (including dangers specific to each phase of development) where expectancy does not depend on actual experience.5 T h e universality of castration

4

From the time Freud (1905) introduced the concept of instinct, he thought of the sexual instinct as accompanied by a second instinct (the ego instinct, and, as he came to maintain after 1920, the death instinct). As a result, instinct-derived psychological meanings were, for Freud, never exclusively sexual in nature. However, as can be seen, for example, in Freud's conceptions of the neuroses, his theory of instinct-derived meaning was most centrally a theory of sexual meaning. s That Freud at times placed greater emphasis on inborn, phylogenetically determined schemata than on actual experience is unmistakable: "Whenever experiences fail to fit in with hereditary schema, they become remodelled in the imagination" (Freud, 1918, pp. 119).

20

The Matrix of the Mind

anxiety, for example, is not simply t h e p r o d u c t of environmental factors; r a t h e r , experience serves as a trigger for an i n b o r n expectation of a specific form of bodily damage. F u r t h e r , t h e Oedipus complex as a whole is u n d e r s t o o d by Freud as a universal mode of organizing and r e s p o n d i n g to experience, a n d n o t simply as a feature of t h e family e n v i r o n m e n t to which t h e child r e s p o n d s . H e r e , again, o n e is confronted by F r e u d ' s boldness: He not only suggested t h a t all h u m a n experience can be u n d e r s t o o d in t e r m s of sexual meanings, b u t proposed t h a t t h e Oedipus complex is a major principle by which these m e a n i n g s (ultimately sexual in n a t u r e ) are organized. O n e can scarcely imagine t h e e n o r m i t y of t h e challenge F r e u d posed for himself in a t t e m p t i n g to discern a single system by which all h u m a n m e a n i n g is created, a single lens t h r o u g h which all raw sensory data are filtered, organized, and a t t r i b u t e d meaning. And yet this is t h e puzzle for which F r e u d ' s t h e o r y of sexuality a n d t h e O e d i p u s complex is t h e proposed solution. For F r e u d , phylogenetic i n h e r i t a n c e is t h e basis for t h e capacity of instinct to give rise to universal constellations of sexual meanings: W h e n c e comes t h e need for t h e s e [universal sexual] p h a n t a s i e s and t h e material for t h e m ? T h e r e can be no doubt that their sources lie in t h e instincts; b u t it h a s still to be explained why t h e s a m e p h a n t a s i e s with t h e same c o n t e n t are created on every occasion. I am prepared with an answer which I know will seem daring to you. I believe t h e s e primal phantasies, a s I should like to call t h e m , and no doubt a few o t h e r s as well, are a phylogenetic e n d o w m e n t . In t h e m , t h e individual reaches beyond his own e x p e r i e n c e i n t o primaeval experience at points w h e r e his own expe-

Instinct, Phantasy, and Psychological Deep Structure

21

rience has been too r u d i m e n t a r y . It seems to me quite possible that all t h e things t h a t are told us today in analysis as p h a n t a s y — t h e seduction of children, the inflaming of sexual excitement by observing parental i n t e r c o u r s e , t h e threat of castration (or r a t h e r castration itself)—were once real o c c u r r e n c e s in t h e primaeval times of t h e h u m a n family, and that children in their p h a n t a s i e s are simply filling in t h e gaps in individual t r u t h with p r e h i s t o r i c t r u t h . I h a v e repeatedly been led to suspect that t h e psychology of t h e n e u r o s e s has stored u p in it m o r e of t h e antiquities of h u m a n development t h a n any o t h e r source. (Freud, 1 9 1 6 - 1 7 , pp. 3 7 0 - 3 7 1 ) From this perspective, Klein has not introduced a radical d e p a r t u r e from F r e u d ' s conceptualization of " i n h e r i t a n c e " of knowledge; r a t h e r , she has expanded his n o t i o n of i n h e r e n t readiness to organize experience in specific ways and extended it to preoedipal experience. In p a r t i c u l a r , she focused on the forms of preconception characterizing oral, anal, a n d early phallic levels of develo p m e n t . W h e n Isaacs (1952) proposed that the i n f a n t ' s knowledge of t h e breast and his wish to tear it to bits be u n d e r s t o o d as i n h e r e n t in t h e instincts, s h e was elaborating and extending to early phases of instinctual developm e n t , principles that are at t h e core of o n e of F r e u d ' s r e v o l u t i o n a r y c o n t r i b u t i o n s to psychology: t h e potential of instinct to serve as a Rosetta stone for m a n ' s attribution of m e a n i n g to experience. For Klein, actual e x p e r i e n c e which varies considerably in different families, c u l t u r e s , and eras serves to provide data to be organized in a highly predetermined way by t h e code i n h e r e n t in t h e instincts. Using t h e analogy of t h e deep s t r u c t u r e of language, a very wide

22

The Matrix of the Mind

range of p h o n e m i c data (the s o u n d of actual spoken language) will provide sufficient " s t i m u l i " for t h e infant to perceive and organize t h e s o u n d u n i t s of language into a system that c o n s t i t u t e s t h e syntactic and s e m a n t i c struct u r e of a particular language. I n t e r a c t i o n with p a r e n t i n g figures, including e x p o s u r e to spoken language, is essential, b u t not as a s o u r c e of specific information about a m e t h o d of c o n s t r u c t i n g a g r a m m a r . R a t h e r , actual experience triggers a s e q u e n c e of i n b o r n functions by which perceived speech s o u n d s are organized. In t e r m s of t h e ethological analogy i n t r o d u c e d earlier, t h e m o t h e r h e n does not teach h e r chicks t h e details of the wing p a t t e r n s of predators, n o r does she teach t h e m by example t h e adaptive fight and flight responses to t h e recognition o f t h e p r e d a t o r . I n s t e a d , t h e m o t h e r i n g activities of t h e hen safeguard t h e c h i c k ' s biologically determined m a t u r a t i o n a l processes, which i n c l u d e complex, highly differentiated instinctual r e s p o n s e p a t t e r n s s u c h as t h e ability to differentiate p r e d a t o r and n o n - p r e d a t o r , and to respond in a m a n n e r specific to each. Bowlby's (1969) u n d e r s t a n d i n g of i n b o r n a t t a c h m e n t and separation b e h a v i o r p a t t e r n s is related to, a l t h o u g h not identical to, t h e conception of psychological deep s t r u c t u r e that 1 h a v e outlined. Bowlby's focus is not on t h e psychological organization of m e a n i n g s along particular lines b u t , r a t h e r , on t h e interplay of t h e e n v i r o n m e n t and i n n a t e behavioral systems: A t t a c h m e n t behavior . . . is held to h a v e a biological function specific to itself. . . . A t t a c h m e n t behavior is regarded as what o c c u r s w h e n certain behavioral systems are activated. T h e behavioral systems themselves a r e believed to develop within t h e infant as a result of his i n t e r a c t i o n with his e n v i r o n m e n t of

Instinct, Phantasy, and Psychological Deep Structure

23

e v o l u t i o n a r y adaptedness, and especially of his interaction with the principal figure in t h e e n v i r o n m e n t , namely his m o t h e r , (pp. 179-180) Bowlby's t h e o r y is similar to t h e notion of psychological deep s t r u c t u r e in that it focuses upon t h e u n l e a r n e d , " s u p r a - i n d i v i d u a l " elements in a t t a c h m e n t and separation behavior. It differs from t h e psychoanalytic deep struct u r e c o n c e p t i o n , however, in that it deals with patterns of behavior r a t h e r t h a n systems of g e n e r a t i n g and organizing meaning.

The Early

Symbolic Phantasy

Form A

of ctivity

T h u s far two aspects of the development of early mental life h a v e been put aside in order to focus on t h e process by which " p h y l o g e n e t i c i n h e r i t a n c e of knowledge" might occur. A t t e n t i o n will now be focused on t h e way in which early m e n t a l c o n t e n t s (primitive phantasies) are experienced by t h e infant. W e are now asking: W h a t , according to Klein, is t h e form of symbolization utilized by t h e infant (e.g., words, visual images, bodily sensations), and what is t h e degree of subjectivity of which t h e infant is capable? I will a d d r e s s first t h e Kleinian notion of t h e form, as opposed to t h e mode, of symbolization involved in early p h a n t a s y activity. (The mode of symbolization involved in t h e paranoid-schizoid position, i.e., symbolic equation, will be discussed later.) O n e c a n n o t help but become skeptical a b o u t Kleinian early developmental theory, if one u n d e r s t a n d s t h e t h e o r y as portraying t h e infant as engaged in symbolic mental activity comparable to adult

24

The Matrix of the Mind

p h a n t a s y , differing only in t h e degree of primitivity of t h e c o n t e n t s . O n e frequently h e a r s it said that t h e Kleinians imagine the infant capable of p h a n t a s y long before his symbolic (particularly verbal) capacities could possibly have developed to t h e point required for s u c h activity. S u c h criticism is based on an incomplete u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e Kleinian conception of p h a n t a s y . T h e Kleinians do not limit t h e concept of p h a n t a s y to p h a n t a s i e s in t h e form of visual and verbal symbols: " A t first, t h e whole weight of wish and p h a n t a s y is b o r n e by sensation and affect" (Isaacs, 1952, p. 92). If one is to u n d e r s t a n d Kleinian t h e o r y of early phantasy activity, o n e must always keep in mind t h a t t h e Kleinians' written descriptions of early phantasies are necessarily in verbal t e r m s a n d , therefore, are only indirectly related to an actual preverbal infantile p h a n t a s y . T h e infant does n o t t h i n k in verbal t e r m s : T h e adult way of regarding t h e body and t h e mind as two separate sorts of experience can certainly not hold t r u e of t h e i n f a n t ' s world. It is easier for adults to observe actual sucking t h a n to r e m e m b e r or understand what t h e experience of sucking is to t h e infant, for whom t h e r e is no d i c h o t o m y of body and m i n d , but a single, undifferentiated experience of sucking and phantasying. Even t h o s e aspects of psychological experience which we later on distinguish as "sensat i o n " , "feeling", etc., c a n n o t in t h e early days be distinguished and separated. S e n s a t i o n s , feelings, as s u c h , emerge t h r o u g h development from t h e primary whole of experience, which is t h a t of sucking—sensing—feeling—phantasying. T h i s total experience becomes gradually differentiated into its various aspects of experience: bodily m o v e m e n t s , sensations, imagin-

Instinct, Phantasy, and Psychological Deep Structure

25

ings, knowings, and so on. ( W . C. M. Scott, 1943, in Isaacs, 1952, pp. 92-93fn) T o begin to get a sense of t h e infant's phantasy experience, o n e must attempt t h e impossible in trying to imagine oneself outside t h e system of verbal symbols in which adults live and are trapped, and instead, to imagine oneself in a system of n o n v e r b a l , sensory experience (including kinesthetic and visceral experience). T h i s act of imagination involves, in p a r t , an attempt to think without words. Despite t h e e x t r e m e difficulty we have in imagining ourselves in t h e psychological state of the infant, t h e r e is n o t h i n g mystical about t h e idea of infantile phantasy. T h e d i s c o n t i n u i t y between t h e adult state and t h e infantile state can be u n d e r s t o o d to derive in part from t h e difference in form and mode of symbolic activity employed by infants from that used by children and adults. T h e fact that infantile phantasy is not directly observable poses no greater theoretical problem t h a n t h e concept o f t h e u n c o n scious mind itself, which is by definition unobservable. As with t h e u n c o n s c i o u s , only the derivatives of infantile p h a n t a s y are observable.

The Degree of Subjectivity and Mode of Symbolization in Early Phantasy Activity In developing a sense of t h e n a t u r e of t h e Kleinian conception of early phantasy activity, we must at this point inquire into t h e way in which t h e Kleinians conceive of the place of t h e subject in relation to his signs and symbols in t h e process of re-presenting bodily experience in phantasy. In o t h e r words, one must attempt to u n d e r s t a n d how Klein conceived of t h e way in which the infant experiences himself in relation to his t h o u g h t s and sensations.

26

The Matrix of the Mind

Klein is not explicit about t h e way in which she views t h e infant's experience of his early p a r t - o b j e c t relationships. T h e following is representative of Klein's discussions of t h e i n f a n t ' s feelings in relation to idealized and persecutory internal objects: It is characteristic of t h e e m o t i o n s of t h e very y o u n g infant t h a t t h e y are of an e x t r e m e and powerful n a t u r e . T h e frustrating (bad) object is felt to be a terrifying p e r s e c u t o r , t h e good breast t e n d s to t u r n into the " i d e a l " breast which should fulfil] t h e greedy desire for unlimited, immediate, and everlasting gratification. T h u s , feelings arise a b o u t a perfect and inexhaustible breast, always available, always gratifying. A n o t h e r factor w h i c h makes for idealization of t h e good breast is t h e s t r e n g t h of t h e i n f a n t ' s p e r s e c u t o r y fear, which creates t h e need to be protected from p e r s e c u t o r s and therefore goes to increase t h e power of an all-gratifying object. T h e idealized breast forms the corollary of t h e persecuting b r e a s t ; and insofar as idealization is derived from t h e need to be protected from p e r s e c u t i n g objects, it is a m e t h o d of defence against anxiety. (1952c, p. 64) From this a c c o u n t and m a n y o t h e r s like it (see, for example, Klein, 1930), Klein leaves a fundamental question unaddressed: Is t h e r e a subjective self feeling frightened of bad objects and feeling protected by good o n e s ; or is it simply a fact (experienced by no o n e in particular) t h a t t h e r e is danger posed by bad objects a n d a corresponding need for protection provided by good objects? In t h e latter case (where things just h a p p e n ) , no subjectivity is involved; t h e r e is simply registration of sensation with an absence of a feeling of " I - n e s s , " an absence of a sense of oneself as observer and creator of o n e ' s own t h o u g h t s ,

Instinct, Phantasy, and Psychological Deep Structure

27

feelings, and perceptions. T h e language that Klein uses here is characteristic of her discussion of infantile phantasy in that she relies heavily on t h e passive voice to describe infantile experience: " t h e bad object is felt to be . . . ," " t h e good breast t e n d s to t u r n into . . . ," "feelings arise . . . , " fears " c r e a t e t h e n e e d " for protection, the idealized object "is derived from the need to be prot e c t e d . " Only indirectly t h r o u g h this use of language is t h e r e indication that Klein conceives of early infantile experience as nonsubjective (that is, devoid of a sense of "I-ness"). T h e s u b s e q u e n t work of Kleinians (Bick [1968], Bion [1962a]), Meltzer [1975], Segal [1957], T u s t i n [1972], and others) h a s to a large degree moved toward a conception of early infantile experience as devoid of subjectivity. T h e i n f a n t ' s t h o u g h t s , feelings and perceptions are conceived of by t h e s e followers of Klein as constituting things in themselves, events that simply occur. T h e infant does not experience himself as having a point of view or perspective. T h e r e is no infant as t h i n k e r or interpreter of his experience. F r o m an outsider's point of view, t h e infant interprets perceptions in, for example, a paranoid or a loving way. T h e infant, however, has no awareness of himself as interpreter of experience in the earliest phase of development (the paranoid-schizoid position). T h e self that does exist is t h e self as object, not t h e self as subject. (This state of being will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3.) The Infant's

Mental

Capacities

At this p o i n t , t h e question again arises as to w h e t h e r t h e Kleinians "really believe" t h a t such complicated mental activity as that involved in t h e phantasy of tearing the breast to bits goes on in the first weeks and m o n t h s of life.

28

The Matrix of the Mind

I m p o r t a n t questions r e m a i n , even given that infantile phantasies as conceived by Klein are not verbally symbolized, do not presuppose the development of t h e symbolic function further t h a n the state of n o n v e r b a l symbolic e q u a t i o n , and involve little, if a n y , subjectivity. How can t h e Kleinians a s s u m e t h e p r e s e n c e of r a t h e r advanced cognitive capacities in the first weeks of life? How can t h e Kleinians a s s u m e that t h e capacity to differentiate outside and inside, t h e capacity to represent t h e m o t h e r in her absence, the capacity to differentiate self from nonself, t h e capacity to differentiate t h e m o t h e r from o t h e r people, etc., all exist in t h e first weeks of life when Piaget has d e m o n s t r a t e d t h a t these capacities are not achieved until significantly later in development? I believe that Klein and her early circle (including Isaacs, Riviere, H e i m a n n , and Rosenfeld) did not have available the data required to reply to these questions. Isaacs (1952) invoked t h e concept of t h e c o n t i n u i t y of development in saying t h a t , just as children u n d e r s t a n d language before they can speak, p h a n t a s y activity r e q u i r e s considerable development before evidence of p h a n t a s y is seen in verbal p r o d u c t i o n s a n d play activity. I feel t h a t a fuller consideration of t h e development of mental capacities u n d e r l y i n g p h a n t a s y activity can now be made on t h e basis of the principles of development emerging from t h e neonatal observational research of Bower (1977), Brazelton (1981), Eimas (1975), Sander (1975), S t e r n (1977), T r e v a r t h a n (1979), and o t h e r s . T h e s e data suggest t h a t cognitive capacities do not develop solely along a unitary chronological s e q u e n c e of differentiating and integrating s t r u c t u r e s . Few would question t h e existence of t h e developmental s e q u e n c e so elegantly demonstrated by Piaget (1936). Added to Piaget's u n d e r s t a n d ing of cognitive d e v e l o p m e n t , h o w e v e r , is the n o t i o n of

Instinct, Phantasy, and Psychological Deep Structure

29

t h e operation of capacities m u c h earlier t h a n expected where t h e operation of s u c h capacities is necessary for t h e infant's participation in a life-sustaining, early form of relatedness to t h e m o t h e r , i.e., the m o t h e r - i n f a n t dialogue of t h e first days and weeks of life (see Grotstein, 1983; S t e r n , 1983). Stern (1977) describes t h e infant's " i n n a t e predilect i o n " for specific visual configurations making up t h e h u m a n face. T h e i n f a n t ' s capacity for shape and shading discriminations allows him to discern and select such configurations " w i t h o u t any previous specific learning e x p e r i e n c e s " (Stern, 1977, p. 36). [The infant's] special interest [in t h e h u m a n face] is founded on a biological basis by virtue of the infant's i n n a t e bias for certain kinds and a m o u n t s of stimulation . . . t h e s h a r p angles provided by the c o r n e r s of t h e eyes as well as the light-dark contrast of pupil and eye white (sclera) and of eyebrow and skin are especially fascinating to the infant. From the beginning, t h e n , the infant is " d e s i g n e d " to find the h u m a n face fascinating. . . . (Stern, 1977, p. 37) T h e infant very early on becomes able to differentiate t h e m o t h e r ' s face from o t h e r faces (Brazelton, 1981). However, t h e shape and shading discriminations involved in this cognitive task and t h e capacity for recall of these d i s c r i m i n a t i o n s a r e not stabilized, n o r are they generalized, and will not become a stable part of t h e observable, differentiated cognitive capacities demonstrable in Piagetian test situations until m u c h later in development. (Piaget's [1954] stage of object p e r m a n e n c e wherein the infant achieves t h e capacity to maintain a mental representation of an i n a n i m a t e object in its absence does not

30

The Matrix of the Mind

o c c u r until t h e last q u a r t e r of t h e first year of life.) Using this model of cognitive capacities developing along more t h a n o n e timetable and depending heavily on the specific emotional and interpersonal context, o n e could e n t e r t a i n t h e possibility that t h e m e n t a l activity involved in t h e Kleinian conception of infantile p h a n t a s y may involve t h e m o r e unstable and m o r e context-limited cognitive o p e r a t i o n s t h a t are out of s y n c h r o n y with t h e development of t h e stable cognitive s t r u c t u r e s described by Piaget. A second relevant t r e n d emerging from t h e neonatal observational research of the last t h r e e decades is t h e idea that t h e infant uses m o r e t h a n o n e form of knowledge about objects. O n e form of knowledge seems to develop in a sequence of steps (each cognitive d e v e l o p m e n t building upon previous ones in a fashion t h a t allows for increasingly complex mental o p e r a t i o n s ) ; t h e o t h e r seems to be more intuitive in that it does not d e p e n d on a stepwise series of advances in m e n t a l functioning. For example, Bower (1971) has d e m o n s t r a t e d t h a t in t h e first weeks of life, infants h a v e a sense of t h e c o n t i n u i t y of t h e existence of t h e object over time and space. In o n e set of experim e n t s , 20-day-old infants showed s u r p r i s e when an object failed to reappear after a screen was r e m o v e d t h a t had been placed between t h e infant and t h e object. In a n o t h e r set of experiments, when an 8-week-old i n f a n t ' s view of a portion of t h e path of a moving object was occluded by a screen, t h e infant's eye and head m o v e m e n t s anticipated t h e reappearance of t h e object at t h e o t h e r side of t h e screen before t h e object actually b e c a m e visible in its new location. It seems t h a t even very y o u n g infants know t h a t an object is t h e r e even after it h a s been hidden . . . T h e early age of t h e infant and t h e novelty of t h e test

Instinct, Phantasy, and Psychological Deep Structure

31

situation make it unlikely t h a t s u c h a response has been learned. (Bower, 1971, p. 35) This early sense of c o n t i n u i t y of m a t t e r over time and space could be t h o u g h t of as an i m p o r t a n t part of the infant's " i n t u i t i v e " sense of objects from birth. T h e consolidations of t h e sense of object p e r m a n e n c e at 8 to 10 m o n t h s and at 18 to 22 m o n t h s reflect m u c h m o r e complex, m o r e highly s t r u c t u r e d , and m o r e stable cognitive a c h i e v e m e n t s . Yet, this early anticipation of t h e absent object must be taken into a c c o u n t in assessing Klein's conception of the infant as capable of recalling the m o t h e r in her absence in t h e first weeks of life. T h i s early intuition a b o u t the n a t u r e of objects reflects t h e operation of psychological deep s t r u c t u r e s , inborn modes of organizing perception. T o acknowledge that t h e r e a r e inborn modes of organizing experience is not to say that o n e has established that t h e infant is capable of the complexity of mental activity that Klein envisions or that t h e c o n t e n t of that mental activity is of t h e sort hypothesized by Klein.

The

Role

of the

Environment

W i t h this u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e Kleinian conception of instinct, p h a n t a s y , and preconception in mind, we can now consider Klein's idea a b o u t t h e infant's relationship to t h e e n v i r o n m e n t . For Klein (1952c, 1957, 1958), the infant is at first a prisoner of his own state of mind which is not experienced as a state of mind. In t h e very beginning, t h e infant sees in t h e external world only what he expects to see on t h e basis of p r e c o n c e p t i o n s (the organization of perception formed on t h e basis of inherited

32

The Matrix of the Mind

modes of organizing experience). T h e s e expectations are of two general types, reflecting t h e deep s t r u c t u r e s corresponding to the life and death instincts. For Klein, t h e death instinct generates m o r e anxiety t h a n t h e life instinct and initially exerts a far m o r e powerful influence on t h e way t h e infant organizes experience. For Klein (1952a), the death instinct generates a sense of danger that is given specific shape as t h e infant organizes his perceptions (both internal bodily sensation and t h e perception of external objects) in accord with t h e mode of a t t r i b u t i o n of m e a n i n g i n h e r e n t in that instinct. A second system of m e a n i n g is generated by t h e infant's organization of perception in accord with t h e life instinct. I m p r i s o n e d in his expectations, t h e infant is unable to learn from experience, because new experience is i n t e r p r e t e d only in t e r m s of these expectations. An analogous s i t u a t i o n exists in t h e profoundly paranoid adult patient who experiences all new relationships in t e r m s of his expectations of danger. Someone who is genuinely kind to t h e intensely paranoid patient is seen by t h e patient as f r a u d u l e n t , m a n i p u l a t i n g the patient into a position of vulnerability. Similarly, t h e hypochondriacal patient experiences all bodily sensations in accord with his delusional sense of internal danger. Normal findings on physical and laboratory e x a m i n a t i o n s are not t h e least bit reassuring, because these data a r e a t t r i b u t e d m e a n i n g and denied m e a n i n g in accord with a self-fulfilling paranoid system. To summarize, t h e infant, for Klein, initially creates his reality: " T h e child's earliest reality is wholly phantast i c " (Klein, 1930, p. 238). In part this can be u n d e r s t o o d as a projection of t h e infant's internal world o n t o his external objects (Grotstein, 1980a). But even more basic t h a n t h e n o t i o n of projection is t h e idea t h a t t h e infant is incapable of doing a n y t h i n g b u t a t t r i b u t i n g m e a n i n g to

Instinct, Phantasy, and Psychological Deep Structure

33

experience on the basis of his inborn codes, the life and death instincts. T h e q u e s t i o n will now arise as to how t h e infant ever breaks o u t of the i m p r i s o n m e n t of his preconceptions. How does t h e infant as conceived of by Klein ever become capable of learning from experience? O n e form of answer given by Kleinians is that, in combination with the biological m a t u r a t i o n of t h e infant, good experiene softens t h e infant's conviction about t h e dangers, in the world: W h e n t h e r e is a p r e d o m i n a n c e of good experience over bad experience, t h e ego acquires a belief in t h e p r e v a l e n c e of the ideal object over t h e p e r s e c u t o r y objects and also of t h e p r e d o m i n a n c e of its own life instinct over its own death instinct. (Segal, 1964, p. 37) T h i s is not an entirely satisfying a n s w e r , however; o n e wonders why t h e infant should trust good experience instead of dismissing it as a trick or deception. T h e relative constitutional e n d o w m e n t of life and death instincts also figures largely in Kleinian t h i n k i n g about t h e i n f a n t ' s capacity to emerge from this initially closed intrapsychic system. It is argued that if constitutional e n d o w m e n t of the life instinct is p r e d o m i n a n t over t h e death instinct, the projection of derivatives of the life instinct o n t o objects will allow for the creation of idealized good objects t h a t serve to defend t h e ego against t h e p e r s e c u t o r y objects. But this explanation does not explain t h e capacity of t h e infant to alter his relationship to bad objects o t h e r t h a n by relying on idealized good objects to protect him against the danger. By analogy, t h e adult paranoid patient does n o t emerge from paranoia by developing a mental police force to protect him against danger.

34

The Matrix of the Mind

A change in t h e quality of the infant's experience ofthe bad object is not explained by a q u a n t i t a t i v e shift in t h e balance of power between good and bad objects. Although I do not find either of t h e aforementioned Kleinian explanations sufficient to a c c o u n t for t h e infant's acquisition of t h e capacity to learn from experience, I feel that implicit in o n e of Klein's c o n c e p t s is a m o r e p e n e t r a t i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g of this q u e s t i o n . T h e concept to which I am referring is projective identification, which provides a way of u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e way in which t h e infant is able to emerge from t h e closed system of his internal psychological world. Having superimposed his internal world on t h e external o n e , t h e infant is imprisoned until t h e m o t h e r allows herself to be used in a process t h r o u g h which a m o t h e r - i n f a n t entity is created that is n e i t h e r infant nor m o t h e r , b u t a p r o d u c t of t h e two. Although Klein only implicitly conceived of the process of projective identification in this way, 6 I view it as that aspect of early d e v e l o p m e n t which allows t h e infant to move beyond himself (Ogden, 1979, 1981, 1982a). 7 6

In her two principal discussions of projective identification, Klein (1946, 1955) predominantly treated projective identification as an intrapsychic process utilized as a means of defending against anxiety generated by the death instinct. However, her examples and her use of language imply an interpersonal component of the process. She emphasizes that, in projective identification, unconscious contents are projected "into'" (1946, p. 8), not onto the object. Bion (1962a) developed the idea of projective identification as a relationship of container and contained that serves not only as a defense, but as a form of communication in which two personality systems modify each another. 7 The necessity for conceptualizing a process by which there is movement from a closed psychological system to an open one is not unique to the Kleinian theory of development. For Freud (1914), the infant must move from an intrapsychic state of "absolute narcissism"

Instinct, Phantasy, and Psychological Deep Structure

35

Projective identification, as I u n d e r s t a n d it, allows t h e infant (more a c c u r a t e l y , t h e m o t h e r - i n f a n t ) to process experience in a way t h a t differs qualitatively from a n y t h i n g that had been possible for t h e infant on his own. In projective identification, the projector induces a feeling state in a n o t h e r that corresponds to a state that the projector had been unable to experience for himself. T h e object is enlisted in playing a role in an externalized version of the projector's u n c o n s c i o u s psychological state. W h e n a " r e c i p i e n t " of a projective identification allows the induced state to reside within him without immediately a t t e m p t i n g to rid himself of these feelings, the p r o j e c t o r recipient pair can experience that which had been projected in a m a n n e r unavailable to the projector alone. Projective identification is not simply a process wherein t h e m o t h e r (as object of a projective identification) " m e t a b o l i z e s " experience for t h e infant (projector) and t h e n r e t u r n s it to him in a form that t h e infant can utilize. Although this is a c o m m o n conception of projective identification, this u n d e r s t a n d i n g falls short in that it implies that t h e infant's receptivity remains u n c h a n g e d t h r o u g h o u t t h e process. W i t h o u t a change in t h e infant's way of experiencing his perceptions, he would not be able to modify his expectations even if his projection had been modified by t h e m o t h e r and made available to him t h r o u g h (p. 150) to a later stage of object relatedness and secondary narcissism. As with Klein, Freud never described the process by which the infant escapes his initially closed psychological system in which all psychological investment is in the self, other than to say that instinctual frustration forces reality upon the maturing infant and leads to the development of the reality principle. The impetus for the development of an open psychological system is accounted for in this way, but the psychological and interpersonal processes that mediate this change remain unspecified.

36

The Matrix of the Mind

her e m p a t h i c caregiving. I believe t h a t a form of psychological activity qualitatively different from t h e "metabolizi n g " or " p r o c e s s i n g " c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e role o f t h e m o t h e r in projective identification is involved in t h e i n f a n t ' s initial m o v e m e n t out of t h e closed system of his i n t e r n a l world. In projective identification, a potential for a certain quality of experience is generated by the m o t h e r - i n f a n t entity. Lacan (1956b) refers to t h e new psychological entity created by m o t h e r and infant (or patient and analyst) as " t h e O t h e r . " T h e m o t h e r - i n f a n t of successful projective identification is an e n t i t y greater t h a n e i t h e r individual alone and is capable of g e n e r a t i n g a quality of being that n e i t h e r individual alone could h a v e generated. I feel t h a t t h e t e r m s processing and metabolizing are misleading when referring to t h e psychological activity of t h e object of a projective identification; these t e r m s refer to a psychological activity that t h e recipient alone could engage in, independently o f t h e projector. Bion's (1962a) concept of t h e c o n t a i n e r and t h e c o n t a i n e d m o r e accurately represents t h e situation. C o n t a i n m e n t involves not only an alteration of t h a t which has been projected, b u t also an alteration of t h e projector in t h e process of creating t h e type of emotional linkage t h a t is involved in projective identification. I believe that Donald W i n n i c o t t ' s work on primary maternal preoccupation (1956), t h e stage of illusion (1951), and potential space (1971) can be u n d e r s t o o d as a development of t h e notion of projective identification as a form of s i m u l t a n e o u s o n e n e s s and twoness (unity and separateness of m o t h e r and infant) t h a t in t u r n creates a potential for a form of experience that is m o r e generative t h a n the sum of t h e individual psychological states cont r i b u t i n g to il. (See Chapters 7 and 8 for further discussion of t h e relationship of the concept of projective identification to W i n n i c o t t ' s concept of potential space.)

Instinct, Phantasy, and Psychological Deep Structure

37

W i t h this u n d e r s t a n d i n g of projective identification in m i n d , we can say that Kleinian t h i n k i n g includes an implicit conception of the i m p o r t a n c e of t h e e n v i r o n m e n t , a l t h o u g h Klein herself may not have fully recognized this implication of the concept of projective identification. W i t h o u t t h e m o t h e r ' s serving as container for the infant's projective identifications, the infant would be doomed to an autistic or psychotic existence. Bion (1959, 1962a) refers to the m o t h e r ' s inability or unwillingness to accept t h e infant's projective identification as an " a t t a c k on linkage." T h i s behavior is t h e n internalized by t h e infant in the form of self-directed attacks on efforts to link t h o u g h t s and to generate emotional ties (linkages) to other people. This process, according to Bion (1959), is an essential factor in t h e etiology of schizophrenia and other severe emotional disturbances. From the perspective of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g of projective identification that I have outlined, t h e conception of early development proposed by Klein need not u n d e r v a l u e t h e e n v i r o n m e n t , t h e real m o t h e r , since the m o t h e r serves as a key p a r t n e r in t h e shared psychological process constituting projective identification. T h i s conception of t h e m o t h e r - i n f a n t of projective identification as t h e basic psychological unit of earliest development provides what I believe to be a far more satisfactory explanation t h a n those explicitly offered by Klein for the infant's capacity to develop beyond t h e confines of his inherited system of preconceptions.

Concluding

Comments

Melanie Klein has enriched psychoanalytic theory t h r o u g h her a t t e m p t s to delineate the n a t u r e of very early mental activity. T h e intense and often heated debate over

The Matrix of the Mind

38

Kleinian developmental t h e o r y h a s centered almost exclusively on t h e dating of t h e appearance of mental activity, i.e., p h a n t a s y ; t h e degree of specificity of early p h a n t a s y activity; t h e p r e d o m i n a n t l y aggressive and p e r s e c u t o r y c o n t e n t attributed to these phantasies; and t h e divergence of s u c h a conception from a Piagetian conception of t h e formation of cognitive capacities. T h e circumscribed focus of this debate has obscured a n u m b e r of important features of the Kleinian contribution. First, in any developmental t h e o r y , t h e proposed sequence and interrelationship of developmental phases is of far greater significance t h a n a precise dating of e v e n t s . O n e does Kleinian theory a disservice by dismissing it on the basis of an implausible chronology before considering the possible value of its revised c o n c e p t i o n of levels of early psychological organization. 8 Second, t h e r e is a t e n d e n c y in discussing Klein to view her ideas as p r o n o u n c e m e n t s to be accepted or rejected, r a t h e r t h a n h y p o t h e s e s to be modified in accord with s u b s e q u e n t theoretical advances and new clinical a n d observational data. W h e n Kleinian t h e o r y is taken as a set of h y p o t h e s e s to be modified, extended, or in part discarded, o n e generates a frame of mind in which it b e c o m e s possible to build upon what is implicit in the t h e o r y (even when Kleinians themselves seem u n a w a r e of a particular potential of their ideas). For example, t h e Kleinian notion that knowledge of objects is i n h e r e n t in t h e aim of t h e instinct lends itself 8

I fully concur with Winnicott's (1954) comments distinguishing the timetable from specific conceptual contents within Klein's developmental theory: "If I find an analyst claiming too much for the depressive position in the development that belongs to the first six months of life, 1 feel inclined to make the comment: what a pity to spoil a valuable concept by making it difficult to believe in" (p. 163).

Instinct, Phantasy, and Psychological Deep Structure

39

to being developed into a conception of psychological deep s t r u c t u r e analogous to C h o m s k y ' s notion of linguistic deep s t r u c t u r e . T h i s is a necessary c o m p o n e n t of any psychoanalytic developmental theory and does not simply represent an effort to make plausible a Kleinian conception of phylogenetic inheritance. In addition, t h e idea of projective identification has been developed by Bion and o t h e r s into a concept t h a t bridges t h e intrapsychic and the interpersonal despite the fact that Klein herself only minimally developed this aspect of her thinking. T h i r d , focusing on t h e m o r e apparent difficulties in Kleinian t h e o r y (e.g., t h e early developmental timetable) o b s c u r e s o t h e r significant limitations of Kleinian thinking. For example, o n e of t h e most limiting features of Klein's developmental t h e o r y is her conception of t h e infant as an i n d e p e n d e n t psychological entity capable of wishes and defenses t h a t are projected o n t o and into obj e c t s t h a t c o n s t i t u t e i n d e p e n d e n t psychological systems. Not only did Klein u n d e r v a l u e t h e role of t h e environm e n t , but s h e seems to have had little conception of t h e m o t h e r - i n f a n t as the basic psychological unit undergoing development in t h e beginning. Paradoxically, I feel that Klein's concept of projective identification can be utilized as t h e basis for a conception of t h e creation of the m o t h e r - i n f a n t psychological unit as Bion has d o n e in his conception of t h e c o n t a i n e r and t h e contained and as W i n n i c o t t has d o n e in his conception of an early stage of illusion and in his concept of potential space.

3 T h e

P a r a n o i d - S c h i z o i d

P o s i t i o n :

S e l f

a s

O b j e c t

The affirmation, "I live" is only conditionally correct, it expresses only a small and superficial part of the principle, "Man is lived by the It." —George Groddeck

Melanie Klein's view of psychological development can be viewed as a biphasic progression from t h e biological to the impersonal-psychological, and from t h e impersonal-psychological to the subjective. T h e first of these developmental advances involves a transformation of the infant as a purely biological entity into t h e infant as a psychological entity. For Klein, this transformation is mediated by what I h a v e termed psychological deep structures associated with t h e life and death instincts. P h a n t a s y is a reflection of the operation of these psychological deep s t r u c t u r e s , j u s t as speech is t h e " p r o d u c t o f linguistic deep s t r u c t u r e s . For

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Klein, t h e shift from t h e biological to t h e psychological c o n s t i t u t e s the e n t r y of t h e infant into t h e paranoidschizoid position. As will be discussed, the paranoid-schizoid position is a phase of d e v e l o p m e n t w h e r e i n t h e self exists p r e d o m i n a n t l y as object. T h i s is a developmental phase of " i t - n e s s , " wherein t h e infant is lived by h i s experience. T h o u g h t s and feelings h a p p e n to t h e infant r a t h e r t h a n being t h o u g h t or felt by t h e infant. T h e transition from t h e paranoid-schizoid position to t h e depressive position, wherein a subjective " I " emerges, is made possible by t h e biological m a t u r a t i o n of t h e infant and is mediated by the psychological-interpersonal process of projective identification. T h e depressive position constitutes a m o r e complex psychological organization, wherein a new realm of experience, a new state of being, 1 is generated. I believe that K l e i n ' s c o n c e p t s of t h e paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions represent i m p o r t a n t contributions to a psychoanalytic u n d e r s t a n d i n g of basic psychological states of being that a r e developed in infancy and persist t h r o u g h o u t life. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , because these ideas have been treated as inseparable from t h e body of Kleinian t h e o r y , an u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e s e concepts h a s

'When I speak of a state of being, I have in mind that aspect of psychological experience having to do with what it feels like to be alive. The quality of a given state of being is a reflection of the degree of subjectivity (the experience of "I-ness") that has been achieved; the psychological location of this subjectivity in relation to the individual's thoughts, his mind, his body, the not-I; the experience of the psychological space in which one thinks one's thoughts, lives in one's body, dreams one's dreams; the sense of the place of one's experience in relation to one's past and one's future; the degree of differentiation of one's self, one's symbols, and the symbolized.

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not been integrated into t h e dialogue t h a t c o n s t i t u t e s American psychoanalytic thinking. In t h i n k i n g about Klein's proposal that t h e paranoidschizoid position r e p r e s e n t s a universal, normative developmental phase dominated by a defensive response to the death instinct, one should also consider t h e possibility t h a t t h e paranoid-schizoid position represents a breakdown p h e n o m e n o n resulting from t h e p r e m a t u r e disruption of primitive c o n n e c t e d n e s s of m o t h e r and infant. W h e n t h e paranoid-schizoid position is viewed from the latter perspective, i. e., as t h e result of t h e breakdown of t h e m a t e r n a l " h o l d i n g e n v i r o n m e n t " ( W i n n i c o t t , 1960b), the state of fearfulness associated with the paranoid-schizoid position need not be u n d e r s t o o d as a response to the death instinct b u t , r a t h e r , as a response to t h e disruption of the primitive interpersonal bond of m o t h e r and infant.

Splitting In t h e previous chapter, I discussed t h e Kleinian conception of t h e m a n n e r in which early development is shaped by t h e infant's instinctual e n d o w m e n t . I suggested that t h e s t r u c t u r i n g of experience provided by t h e instincts can be t h o u g h t of as t h e manifestation of psychological deep s t r u c t u r e analogous to C h o m s k y ' s (1957, 1968) concept of linguistic deep s t r u c t u r e . T h e deep s t r u c t u r e s associated with t h e life and death instincts lead t h e infant to organize experience in t e r m s of anticipated dangers (reflecting t h e operation o f t h e death instinct [see Grotstein, 1985]) and anticipated object a t t a c h m e n t s (reflecting the operation of t h e life instinct). For Klein, the first psychological task of t h e infant is t h e m a n a g e m e n t of danger generated by t h e death instinct.

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Klein (1952c) conceived of this danger as being experienced by t h e infant as a threat of i n t e r n a l destructiveness 2 that m u s t somehow be managed. T h e most basic mode of management of danger is that of separating t h e endangering from t h e endangered. Logic and volition are no more involved in this p a t t e r n of defense t h a n t h e y are in the neurologic reflexes of t h e n e w b o r n infant (e.g., t h e sucking and grasping reflexes). T h e a t t e m p t to attain safety by separating t h e endangered from t h e endangering is an inherited mode of response to danger—it is a biological p h e n o m e n o n with psychological manifestations. Although Klein did not use ethological analogies, I would see splitting as analogous to t h e chick's u n l e a r n e d response to t h e perception of t h e h a w k ' s wing p a t t e r n . T h e chick's reaction is to flee a n d not to attack t h e hawk (unless c o r n e r e d ) , i.e., to separate itself from t h e danger (Lorenz, 1937; T i n b e r g e n , 1957). I u n d e r s t a n d splitting to be a similarly biologically d e t e r m i n e d mode of managing danger. (The process of splitting can be u n d e r s t o o d in this way, w h e t h e r or not one views, as Klein did, t h e derivatives of t h e death instinct as t h e ultimate s o u r c e of danger.) In t h e c o u r s e of d e v e l o p m e n t , this biologically determined mode of managing danger is elaborated psychologically. Each of the primitive psychological defenses can be u n d e r s t o o d as c o n s t r u c t i o n s based u p o n t h e mode of managing danger seen in splitting, i.e., built u p o n t h e biologically determined effort to create safety by distanc-

2

The instinctual code associated with the death instinct serves to organize the sense of danger into object-related narratives, (e.g., preypredator phantasies [see Grotstein, 1985]). Bion (1962a) described the pathological degeneration of object-related phantasies of danger into a sense of "nameless dread" that occurs when the mother is unwilling or unable to process the infant's projective identifications.

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ing t h e endangered from t h e endangering. Projection, for example, can be u n d e r s t o o d as an effort in p h a n t a s y to remove an internal danger by locating t h e danger outside of oneself, i.e., separating oneself from it as if it were located in a n o t h e r . Introjection is used to separate a valued external object from an endangering one, by locating one or the o t h e r of these external objects within oneself and thereby p r o t e c t i n g t h e valued object. Denial separates oneself from t h e dangerous object by emotionally treating t h e object as if it had been annihilated. In t h e early stage of development t h a t is u n d e r discussion, these defensive activities are reactions as opposed to responses. Biological a u t o m a t i c i t y has been transformed into psychological a u t o m a t i c i t y . A l t h o u g h Klein did not explicitly address t h e question of subjectivity, it seems implicit in Klein's clinical and theoretical a c c o u n t s that in the paranoid-schizoid position, t h e r e is no interpreting subject mediating between perception of danger and r e s p o n s e to it. T h e fact that this is a psychology without a subject is the basic paradox of t h e paranoidschizoid position. Psychological experience of t h e type being described exists in itself, but not for a self. F u r t h e r , it m u s t be kept in mind that for p a t i e n t s operating in a p r e d o m i n a n t l y paranoid-schizoid mode, t h o u g h t s and feelings a r e palpable objects and forces that appear, disappear, c o n t a m i n a t e , t r a n s f o r m , destroy, rescue, etc. For example, a patient operating in a paranoid-schizoid mode may shake his head to get rid of t o r m e n t i n g feelings, may literally put his t h o u g h t s into a letter and send t h e letter to t h e person who should hold these t h o u g h t s , or may request x-rays in order to be able to see t h e thing inside of him that is driving him crazy (see Ogden, 1979, 1981, 1982b for clinical examples of s u c h reification and transposition of mental p h e n o m e n a ) .

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Projective identification develops as a psychologicalinterpersonal elaboration of t h e process of splitting. In t h e beginning, t h e infant is confronted with raw sensory data that must be a t t r i b u t e d m e a n i n g before this s t i m u l a t i o n can be transformed into experience. Sensory data, before they are a t t r i b u t e d m e a n i n g (transformed i n t o what Bion [1962a] calls " a l p h a e l e m e n t s " ) , are simply things-inthemselves (which Bion refers to as " b e t a e l e m e n t s " ) . For example, the infant's low blood sugar level is physiologically registered, b u t this event does not yet c o n s t i t u t e t h e experience of h u n g e r , which involves an a t t r i b u t i o n of meaning to sensory data. Bion (1962a, 1962b) believes that t h e creation of meaning is initially an interpersonal process mediated by an early form of projective identification. In this psychological-interpersonal process, t h e infant projects beta elements (sensory data prior to their transformation into personally meaningful experience) into the m o t h e r , who, t h r o u g h her containment of the projective identification, t r a n s f o r m s t h e i n f a n t ' s things-in-themselves into meaningful e x p e r i e n c e (e.g., h u n g e r ) . T h e infant t h e n reinternalizes t h e experience in a form t h a t he can use to g e n e r a t e his own t h o u g h t s and feelings. T h r o u g h this early form of projective identification, experience is created interpersonally from which t h e infant is able to learn. 3 More m a t u r e forms of projective identification are developed once t h e infant, child, or adult has developed t h e capacity to generate meanings for himself. U n d e r s u c h c i r c u m s t a n c e s , projective identification involves a fantasy 3

It seems to me that, given the framework Bion is proposing, the notion that beta elements are projected by the infant into the mother presupposes that these elements have acquired some degree of meaning. Otherwise, it would be difficult to imagine why they would be noticed or singled out for "ejection."

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of expelling these split-off internal c o n t e n t s and of taking c o n t r o l of a n o t h e r person from within (Klein, 1946, 1955). Associated with this fantasy is an actual interpersonal i n t e r a c t i o n in which pressure is exerted on t h e other person to experience himself and behave in a m a n n e r congruent with the projector's unconscious phantasy (Bion, 1959). T h e recipient who successfully manages t h e feelings engendered in him makes available to t h e projector ( t h r o u g h t h e interaction) a modified, m o r e integrable version of the set of meanings that had been previously impossible to manage (Langs, 1976; Malin and Grotstein, 1966; Ogden, 1979). 4 Having discussed various defensive uses of splitting (including splitting as an aspect of projective identificat i o n ) , it must be emphasized that splitting is not simply a defense; it is even m o r e basically a mode of organizing experience. T h i s form of mental operation is used in the beginning to create order out of the chaos of the infant's earliest experience on t h e basis of categories i n h e r e n t in his instinctual deep s t r u c t u r e . Splitting is a binominal ordering of experience, i.e., a dividing of experience into categories of pleasure and u n p l e a s u r e , danger and safety, h u n g e r and satiation, love and h a t e , me and not-me, and so on. In t h e paranoid-schizoid position an i n t e r p r e t i n g subject with a c o n t i n u o u s personal history maintained 4

I believe that a revision of this understanding of projective identification is required. As was alluded to in Chapter 2,1 feel that projective identification must be understood in terms of the creation of a new psychological unit (the mother-infant or projector-recipient), the formation of which accounts for the ability of the projector to move beyond his previous mode of organizing experience, i.e., to move beyond himself. Further discussion of this form of mental activity will be presented in Chapters 7 and 8.

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t h r o u g h conscious and u n c o n s c i o u s m e m o r y h a s n o t yet developed. As a r e s u l t , in splitting, each event exists in itself, b u t not for a self existing over time or in relation to a n y t h i n g b u t itself. As will be discussed, t h e process of repression which is developed in t h e depressive position involves the preservation of a whole object even in its exile from awareness. Splitting is a b o u n d a r y - c r e a t i n g mode of t h o u g h t and therefore a part of an order-generating (not yet a personal meaning-generating) process. Presubjective

Experience

T o t h e point in development discussed t h u s far, for Klein, t h e r e is not yet a person i n t e r p r e t i n g his experience. T h e r e is not yet an " I . " T h e paranoid-schizoid position is the realm of " t h e i t , " even t h o u g h it is not exclusively t h e realm of the id (i.e., instinctual p r e s s u r e s ) . In o t h e r words, the early ego (the adaptive organizing c o m p o n e n t of personality) is also impersonal in that it is practically devoid of subjectivity, a sense of " I - n e s s . " T h e infant, when faced with the threat of danger generated by the processing (not yet an interpreting) of experience in accord with the death instinct, utilizes splitting. Splitting is an attempt at achieving safety by p u t t i n g distance between the endangering and t h e endangered aspects of oneself and o n e ' s objects. Objects are valuable, but t h e r e is not yet an " I " to love t h e m or value t h e m . T h e self that exists is t h e self as object, as opposed to t h e subjective self. T h e subjective self could be t h o u g h t of as r e p r e s e n t e d by t h e self-reflective awareness of " I a m " in t h e s e n t e n c e " I am being a t t a c k e d . " T h e " I a m " is a c o n d e n s a t i o n of " I am aware that I experience myself as . . ." T h e self in t h e paranoidschizoid position is the self as object, not t h e self as

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creator and interpreter of o n e ' s t h o u g h t s , feelings, perceptions, and the like. T h e self as object corresponds to an u n s p o k e n , nonreflective self in t h e s e n t e n c e " I t ' s h o t " (as opposed to " I am aware that it feels hot to m e " ) or " H e ' s d a n g e r o u s " (as opposed to " I am aware t h a t I experience him as d a n g e r o u s " ) . 5 On several occasions, I have worked with, or have had p r e s e n t e d to me in supervision, patients who did not use personal p r o n o u n s in their speech and used very few active verb forms. For example, a hospitalized, acutely psychotic schizophrenic patient, having been hit by a n o t h e r patient, said, " I n kitchen . . . fuck . . . face smash . . . crack . . . son of a b i t c h . " T h i s use of language c a p t u r e s some of t h e state of being of t h e paranoid-schizoid position in which things simply h a p p e n . In work with a borderline patient, a similar but less extreme omission of personal p r o n o u n s o c c u r r e d : " W e n t to school today . . . no luck . . . t e a c h e r ' s a prick . . . hate h i m . " As this went on session after session, I was increasingly struck by t h e way in which the patient did not experience himself as an active personal agent b u t , r a t h e r , as an object to whom life e v e n t s occured. F a u l k n e r has captured t h e experience of t h e nonreflective self in t h e character of t h e " i d i o t " in The Sound 5

This conception of a nonreflective state overlaps to a degree with Sartre's (1943) notion of being-in-itself, a form of being that simply is what it is: "Being-in-itself has no within which is opposed to a without and which is analogous to a judgment, a law, a consciousness of itself. The in-itself has nothing secret; it is a solid. In a sense we can designate it as a synthesis. But it is the most indissoluble of all: the synthesis of itself with itself (p. lxvi). This aspect of being is absolutely undifferentiated from itself and is therefore a far more extreme form of objectivity (nonreflectiveness) than that associated with the paranoid-schizoid position.

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and the Fury: " B e n ceased whimpering. He watched t h e spoon as it rose to his m o u t h . It was as if even eagerness were muscle-bound in him too, and h u n g e r itself inarticulate, not knowing it is h u n g e r . " Split Object

Relations

T h e infant, in addition to dividing his objects into categories that help to separate t h e e n d a n g e r i n g and t h e endangered, also divides his perception of himself for t h e same purpose. T h e object, according to Klein (1946), is n e v e r split without a c o r r e s p o n d i n g split of t h e ego. Facets of object-related experience are isolated from o n e a n o t h e r . T h e loving self (as object) stands in relation to t h e loving object, and is set apart from t h e h a t i n g self (as object) and the hating object. In splitting, o n e form of relationship between self and object is split from o t h e r experiences of oneself in relation to t h e o t h e r . It is m o r e accurate to say that t h e infant generates part-object relationships t h a n it is to say he creates part-objects, because t h e r e is always a self (as object) in t h e experience of oneself in relation to the o t h e r . T h e successful feeding experience (or any o t h e r experience involving a successful "fitting t o g e t h e r " of m o t h e r and infant) generates a feeling of a c o n t e n t e d , loved self in relation to a loving object. A frustrating feed, on the o t h e r h a n d , generates t h e sense of a h a t i n g self in relation to a dissatisfying, hurtful object. (For Klein [1952b], t h e infant's projections d e t e r m i n e to a very great extent w h e t h e r a given feed is experienced as loving or hurtful.) These loving and hurtful facets of experience (part-object relationships) are isolated from one another because it is too dangerous for the primitively organized infant to love the object he hates, and hate the object he loves, and upon whom

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the infant is absolutely dependent. Instead, the infant uses o m n i p o t e n t thinking, projection, introjection, denial, idealization, and projective identification to rearrange his internal object world in an effort to separate endangered aspects of self and object from their endangering aspects. T h e h a t i n g self and its relation to a hating object is split off from t h e loving self in relation to a loving object. W h e n , for example, a hating object is felt to pose an internal danger to a loving aspect of self, the infant in p h a n t a s y ejects t h e endangered aspect of self into an external object, in order to create some distance between t h e d a n g e r o u s object and the self. In projective identification t h e r e is an interpersonal c o m p o n e n t of t h e process that accompanies t h e projective p h a n t a s y . T h e infant as projector experiences himself as having been depleted of lovable parts of himself and may t h e n feel all t h e m o r e d e p e n d e n t on the object who is felt to contain all that is good (Klein, 1946). Loving aspects of self, having previously been projected outward in order to safeguard t h e m from internal danger, may later be felt to be endangered by a hating external object. Internalization of either the hating external object or t h e loved o n e will temporarily s e c u r e a m o d i c u m of safety. Inevitably, new dangers (actual and phantasied) come about and require new a r r a n g e m e n t s of parts of self and part-objects. Associated with t h e belief in t h e value of separating t h e endangering from the endangered are specific beliefs about how this safety is achieved, for example, the p h a n t a s y that o n e can better control an object that is within oneself, and t h e phantasy that an ejected object has been banished and will never r e t u r n . T h i s , t h e n , is t h e phenomenology and mode of operation of t h e paranoid-schizoid position. T h e paranoid-schizoid position is in ascendancy, according to Klein (1948),

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in t h e first t h r e e m o n t h s of life, and is followed in t h e fourth to s e v e n t h m o n t h s by t h e depressive position. T h e t e r m position is used to refer to a level of psychological organization with its characteristic form of object relatedness, form of symbolization, modes of defense, type of anxiety, m a t u r i t y of ego and superego functioning, etc. T h e s e " p o s i t i o n s " are not passed t h r o u g h b u t , r a t h e r , c o n t i n u e t h r o u g h o u t life as co-existing modes of organizing and processing experience (Klein, 1952a; Bion, 1950, 1963), each generating a distinctive quality of being. (The relationship between t h e paranoid-schizoid and t h e depressive positions will be discussed in t h e next chapter.) T h e paranoid-schizoid position is " s c h i z o i d " because in this phase, t h e infant relies heavily u p o n splitting of self and object as a defense a n d mode of organizing experience; it is " p a r a n o i d " because t h e infant relies on projective phantasies and projective identification in an effort to defend himself against object-related dangers, w h i c h , according to Klein (1948), represent a system of meanings derived from the death instinct. T h e leading anxiety of t h e paranoid-schizoid position is t h e fear of annihilation of oneself and o n e ' s valued objects. T h i s does not mean that all infants are paranoid schizophrenics. O n t h e c o n t r a r y , it is an inability to adequately employ splitting t h a t , a m o n g other conditions, can lead to severe psychopathology, including schizophrenia. Failure of

Splitting

T h e plight of a psychotic adolescent can be u n d e r s t o o d in t e r m s of t h e p a t i e n t ' s inability to use splitting effectively: H., a 14-year-old boy who was hospitalized on a longterm analytically oriented ward, where I saw him in

The Paranoid-Schizoid Position: Self as Object daily p s y c h o t h e r a p y , was t o r t u r e d by self-accusatory t h o u g h t s d u r i n g virtually every waking m o m e n t and frequently in his dreams. Each t i m e he t o u c h e d an object he became frightened that he would be accused of a t t e m p t i n g to steal it. Every woman he looked at triggered fears that he would be accused of intending to rape her or of h a v i n g obscene t h o u g h t s about her. Each time he saw a m a n , he became frightened that he would be accused of being a h o m o s e x u a l , or that he would call t h e man a q u e e r , and that the man would t h e n retaliate. F r e q u e n t l y , in t h e course of a day, the patient's internal psychological barrage would become so intense that he would scream in pain. In conscious and u n c o n s c i o u s phantasy he " d u m p e d " his internal state (his "sick b r a i n " ) into me. He c o m m u n i c a t e d his plight to me by bombarding me in the way he felt bombarded. T h e sessions were filled with an endless stream of t h r e a t s , name-calling, and p o u n d i n g of my office f u r n i t u r e , walls, and doors that at times reached almost deafening proportions. H. was careful not to do any "real d a m a g e . " W h e n this became a danger, he redoubled his assaults on himself. He told me on m a n y occasions that he would give a n y t h i n g for just five seconds of peace. Although he never once acknowledged valuing me or the therapy, he arrived a half-hour early to each meeting " i n order to shit o n " me by relentlessly ringing the waiting room buzzer. E v e r y t h i n g that this patient t h o u g h t and felt (in phantasy) became c o n t a m i n a t e d . In the transference he could not love me or value me without fearing that it would be tainted love, e.g., h o m o s e x u a l , incestuous, greedy, or damaging. T h e p a t i e n t ' s powerful

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The Matrix of the Mind sense t h a t every facet of e m o t i o n a l life is contaminated or about to be c o n t a m i n a t e d , is t h e hallmark of a primitive inadequacy of splitting. F r o m H . ' s (unconscious) point of view, he loved hatefully and hated lovingly, and therefore was terrified of doing either.

T h e infant must be able to split in order to feed safely without the intrusion of t h e anxiety t h a t he is h a r m i n g his m o t h e r , and without t h e anxiety t h a t she will h a r m h i m . It is necessary for an infant to feel t h a t t h e m o t h e r who is taking care of h i m is fully loving and has n o c o n n e c t i o n whatever with t h e m o t h e r who " h u r t s " him by making him wait. T h e anxiety arising from t h e t h o u g h t t h a t t h e n u r t u r i n g m o t h e r and t h e frustrating m o t h e r are o n e a n d t h e same would rob t h e infant of t h e security t h a t he needs in order to feed safely. Similarly, t h e ability to desire safely would be lost if the infant, while feeding, experienced himself as t h e same infant who angrily wished to control and to subjugate t h e b r e a s t / m o t h e r in her absence. W h i l e feeding, t h e infant must experience himself as loving in an u n c o m p l i c a t e d , u n c o n t a m i n a t e d way in order to be able to feel t h a t he can want w i t h o u t damaging. Splitting not only safeguards t h e i n f a n t ' s need to give and receive love; it also safeguards his need to hate. If t h e object of t h e infant's h a t e is c o n t a m i n a t e d with facets of t h e loved object, t h e infant will n o t be able to h a t e it safely. (The assumption that t h e infant has a need to h a t e is not d e p e n d e n t u p o n t h e Kleinian a s s u m p t i o n of the p r e s e n c e of powerful, constitutionally d e t e r m i n e d destructive wishes. For i n s t a n c e , o n e could postulate, as did W i n n i c o t t [1947, 1957] and Fairbairn [1944], t h a t h a t e arises from excessively frustrated need and t h a t it is essen-

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tial for n o r m a l development that t h e infant, child, or adult be able to experience this feeling without being frightened by it.) Ms. K., a 23-year-old a n o r e c t i c / b u l i m i c patient being treated in intensive individual t h e r a p y , evidenced a compulsive need to vomit o u t hated and hating internal c o n t e n t s (food in her stomach t h a t she feared would make her fat, and t h a t was making her stomach painfully bloated). She would not permit herself to move from the t e n e m e n t in which she was living into a " d e c e n t a p a r t m e n t , " which she could have afforded easily. T h e patient felt unable to move because she did not want to eat and vomit in a " n i c e p l a c e , " nor did she want to or feel able to give up " b i n g e i n g " and vomiting. T h e therapist u n d e r s t o o d t h e p a t i e n t ' s refusal/ inability to move from her present apartment as a wish to retain her method of hating in an u n c o n t a m i nated way. Moving into t h e new a p a r t m e n t would h a v e entailed an act of love (of herself) that she did not want c o n t a m i n a t e d by t h e eating binges followed by vomiting (a symbolic act of violent hatred of her m o t h e r and herself). Both loving and hating, after all, are necessary parts of t h e spectrum of h u m a n emotion and t h e patient could not give up hating in order to love, even if taking care of herself by moving out of the tenem e n t seemed to her like t h e " s a n e t h i n g to d o . " On t h e o t h e r h a n d , she did not want to give up loving (by not moving into an adequate a p a r t m e n t ) in order to h a t e (which she equated with bingeing and vomiting), and as a result felt unable to make a decision.

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56

T h e following clinical material is taken from an intensive p s y c h o t h e r a p y of an 18-year-old w o m a n with anorexia nervosa. Over a period of almost a year, Ms. S. starved herself almost to death because her m o t h e r ' s food (which s h e generalized to include all food) was " t o o r i c h . " T h i s patient professed deep love for her m o t h e r and was unable to think of a single thing about her m o t h e r that she did not like and admire. Not only was her m o t h e r ' s food too rich, it was also at times felt to be " t o o good to e a t " ; in fact, the patient did not even like to see her m o t h e r ' s food being cooked because it was too good to cook. E v e n t u a l l y , in t h e c o u r s e of t h e r a p y , o n e of the p a t i e n t ' s c e n t r a l u n d e r l y i n g conflicts was clarified: her m o t h e r was " t o o good to hate." (This was not a matter of failure of repression in relation to an ambivalently loved m o t h e r ; this patient was unable to utilize effectively even t h e m o r e primitive defense of splitting in relation to a m o t h e r experienced as a collection of part-objects.) Unable to split off t h e hated aspect of her m o t h e r , t h e patient s u b s u m e d this aspect in t h e good aspect of t h e m o t h e r , where t h e hated aspect was disguised as " t o o m u c h of a good t h i n g . " T h i s is q u i t e the opposite of ambivalence; it is an inability to separate the hated and t h e loved, followed by a disguising of t h e hated as the loved. T h e following dual dilemma resulted: 1. an inability to h a t e (very few patients that I have seen have been less able to directly experience a feeling of anger), and 2. an inability to love (the p a t i e n t ' s inability to eat and in that way symbolically provide love or accept love for herself).

The Paranoid-Schizoid Position: Self as Object

57

In s u m m a r y , splitting allows t h e infant to feed safely and to love, and to desire and hate safely, without developing o v e r w h e l m i n g anxiety that he is being destroyed by, or destroying that which he loves. Failure of

Integration

Splitting, although most basically a mode of organizing experience, comes to serve a defensive function. (This situation is analogous to that of the development of language itself: although language is fundamentally a medium for t h i n k i n g and c o m m u n i c a t i n g , it secondarily acquires defensive functions.) As has been discussed, splitting as an early defense serves primarily to regulate, by m u t u a l isolation, t h e relationship of loving and hating facets of experience. An inability to diminish o n e ' s reliance upon splitting reflects excessive anxiety about t h e dangers involved in t h e i n t e r p e n e t r a t i o n of different feeling states, particularly love and hate. Splitting processes, fueled by anxiety of this type, become rigid and unchanging. T h e following clinical vignette illustrates some of t h e behavioral and experiential correlates of c o n t i n u e d reliance u p o n splitting as a defense. Ms. N., a patient being seen in intensive psychotherapy, carried on a cluster of s i m u l t a n e o u s but completely separate relationships that included a comforting relationship with her h u s b a n d , whom she " m o t h e r e d " and by whom she was m o t h e r e d , and a highly sensual relationship with an older man. T h e p a t i e n t ' s h u s b a n d knew n o t h i n g of the older m a n , and t h e other man knew almost n o t h i n g about the h u s b a n d . N e i t h e r man was told about t h e therapist, and t h e therapist was told only highly edited data

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The Matrix of the Mind

a b o u t the other two men. T h e patient became aware t h a t when she was with one of these t h r e e m e n , it was almost as if t h e o t h e r two m e n did not exist. M u c h m o r e distressing t h a n t h e discontinuity of her object world was t h e realization t h a t t h e person w h o m she felt herself to be w h e n with h e r h u s b a n d barely existed when she was with t h e older m a n . F r e q u e n t l y , while at h o m e , Ms. N. would experience a panicky feeling of loss t h a t would send her r u n n i n g back to the o t h e r man. T h i s was done not simply to reclaim the lost object, b u t , perhaps even m o r e i m p o r t a n t , to reclaim a missing part of herself. W h e n with t h e older m a n , she would b e c o m e d i s t r a u g h t about t h e other missing part of herself and would t h e n anxiously r e t u r n to her h u s b a n d . T h e patient felt t h a t t h e relationship with t h e therapist held the potential to bring her " t o g e t h e r in one p l a c e . " T h r o u g h o u t this phase of t h e t h e r a p y , however, t h e patient also experienced t h e therapist as d a n g e r o u s because she felt he might interfere with her delicate system by d e m a n d i n g that she give up t h e affair, t h e marriage, or t h e t h e r a p y . Ms. N. felt t h a t having to make s u c h a choice would literally drive her crazy. T h e patient was able to u n d e r s t a n d t h e ways in which this fear was similar to childhood fears that she would h a v e to choose between her feuding parents, between her p a r e n t s and her sister, between herself as her p a r e n t s saw her a n d herself as she viewed herself. Ms. N. used splitting to g e n e r a t e a g r o u p of partobject relationships, each with its own sense of self and set of conscious and u n c o n s c i o u s object-related phantasies. Splitting was utilized in an effort n o t to have to make choices between these facets of expe-

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59

rience because to choose one would be in effect to a n n i h i l a t e t h e o t h e r aspects of herself. Ms. N. used lying (unnecessary elaborations of t h e t r u t h to make a story better t h a n it was), promiscuity, and petty theft in an attempt to feel more alive and present. Splitting had not only resulted in compartmentalization of her life, it had robbed each sector of vitality, since she could never feel fully present in any given situation or relationship. T h i s is t h e experiential refe r e n t for t h e idea that whenever the object is split t h e r e is a corresponding splitting of t h e ego. Part of t h e experience of splitting of t h e ego is a feeling that part of oneself is missing since any given part-object relationship of necessity reflects only one isolated aspect of oneself.

Early

Stages

of

Integration

Paradoxically, t h e achievement of a d e q u a t e splitting is t h e necessary g r o u n d w o r k for the eventual integration of partobjects and parts of self into whole objects and a continuous sense of self. T h e reason for this is that it is only when o n e has achieved relative freedom from the anxiety that loving experience is, or is about to be, contaminated by h a t i n g experience, and vice versa, that one may dare to bring these different facets of experience into closer relation with each o t h e r . A borderline patient, after m a n y years of therapy, conveyed t h e experiential level of t h e achievement of adequate splitting in t h e following way: she said that, until that p o i n t , her fantasies and dreams had frequently contained lines or forms that went off endlessly in two directions. Now, for the first time, her fantasies contained lines

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The Matrix of the Mind

that had two ends. T h i s change r e p r e s e n t e d an e n h a n c e m e n t of t h e patient's capacity for a d e q u a t e splitting: each end of a line is tangibly different from its opposite end. E a c h is distinctly itself and not t h e o t h e r . Each c a n n o t be mixed up with, confused with, or c o n t a m i n a t e d by t h e other. T h e following is an example of t h e earliest stages of integration of an e x t r e m e form of pathologically split object relations. A 46-year-old, chronically psychotic paranoid schizop h r e n i c was treated over a period of m a n y years in a clinic, where he bullied and intimidated t h e staff as well as t h e o t h e r patients. At times h e had menacingly pinned staff m e m b e r s against t h e wall and had t h r o w n f u r n i t u r e a r o u n d t h e waiting room. T h e patient, Mr. E., unconsciously relied u p o n hostile partobject relatedness as a defense against affectionate relatedness, since t h e latter feelings were invariably c o n n e c t e d with a terrifying sense of physically becoming t h e o t h e r p e r s o n . H e could feel his chin becoming t h e other p e r s o n ' s chin. From t h e r e , he experienced the rest of his face, and t h e n his e n t i r e body, becoming t h a t of t h e o t h e r p e r s o n . T h e therapist c o m m e n t e d that t h e p a t i e n t ' s suspiciousness, guardedness, and fearfulness all served to make it feel less likely that this physical t r a n f o r m a t i o n would take place. In a session in this period of t h e t h e r a p y , Mr. E. reported a strange experience. He h a d spoken with a man outside of his building w h o m he had k n o w n for m a n y years who " f a v o r e d " h i m . (The word favored has a double m e a n i n g , particularly in t h e S o u t h , w h e r e t h e patient grew u p , of physically resembling and of acting kindly toward. For this patient, t h e two

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61

meanings were unconsciously inseparable.) Mr. E. was extremely disturbed by t h e fact that he saw in the m a n ' s face " a n ugly b e a u t y , " s o m e t h i n g he had never e n c o u n t e r e d before. T h e patient, in a way that reflected an u n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c g r o u n d e d n e s s and presence, asked t h e therapist if he knew what t h e patient was talking about, and if he had ever seen such a thing himself. Mr. E . ' s calm, u n t h r e a t e n i n g , and yet persistent asking of the therapist if he knew of such a feeling was u n d e r s t o o d by t h e therapist as the pat i e n t ' s way of asking t h e therapist what his response would be to this new m i x t u r e (initial integration) of hostile and affectionate transference feelings (displaced o n t o t h e man e n c o u n t e r e d on t h e street).

Splitting

as Discontinuity

of

History

In t h e paranoid-schizoid position, the p r e d o m i n a n t mode of symbolization ("symbolic e q u a t i o n , " Segal, 1957) is o n e in which t h e symbol and t h e symbolized are emotionally indistinguishable since t h e r e is no interpreting self to mediate between symbol and symbolized. T h e r e is no sense t h a t o n e a t t r i b u t e s meaning to o n e ' s perception; events are what they are, and interpretation and perception are treated as identical processes. Sensory experience is u n m e d i a t e d 6 by an interpreting subject. 6

Lacan's (1949-1960) conception of the realm of the imaginary (prior to the entry into the symbolic order) and Hegel's (1807) conception of the nature of nondialectical or predialectical "unselfconscious," "unself-aware" experience also involve conceptions of unmediated (immediate) sensory experience. For Lacan, it is the system of linguistic symbols that allows one to mediate between oneself and one's lived sensory experience. For Hegel, this is achieved through the mediation of work (man's productions) that is done for purposes other than that required for man's survival as an animal.

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The Matrix of the Mind

W i t h i n this state of m i n d , splitting generates a distinct quality of experience (state of being) quite different from t h a t which develops later. T h e m e n t a l operation of splitting creates a state of mind in which t h e r e is " n o inb e t w e e n . " A plane has two faces a n d two faces o n l y ; an observer can never see both sides at once. (This state stands in contrast to a situation w h e r e different facets of experience create and negate o n e a n o t h e r , always standing in relation to t h e o t h e r in t h e mind of t h e observer.) In t h e paranoid-schizoid position, t h e r e is no psychological vantage point from which m o r e t h a n o n e emotional plane can be taken in. W h e n a borderline patient feels angry at and disappointed by t h e therapist, h e feels that he h a s now discovered the t r u t h . T h e therapist is unreliable, and t h e patient should h a v e known it all along. W h a t had previously been seen by t h e patient as evidence of t h e t h e r a p i s t ' s trustworthiness, now is seen to h a v e been an act of d e c e p t i o n , a mask, a cover-up for what h a s b e c o m e a p p a r e n t . T h e t r u t h is now o u t , and the patient will n o t deceive himself or be caught off guard again. History is instantaneously rewritten. T h e therapist is not t h e person t h e patient t h o u g h t h e was; he is now discovered to be s o m e o n e new. Each time I h a v e arrived at this j u n c t u r e in a t h e r a p y , I have been freshly s t u n n e d by t h e coldness of t h e p a t i e n t ' s r e n u n c i a t i o n of shared experience. T h e r e is an assault on the emotional history of t h e object relationship. T h e present is projected backward and forward, t h u s creating a static, eternal, nonreflective present. W h e n the more affectionate side of the psychological plane " r e a p p e a r s , " t h e patient often feels t h a t he has " o v e r r e a c t e d " or has been " p a r a n o i d " and now reinterprets t h e past and recreates t h e therapist in a new light. Very frequently, t h e patient simply does not r e m e m b e r

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63

feeling o t h e r t h a n he does at p r e s e n t . For example, t h e patient forgets ever having felt shocked and frightened by t h e therapist's "gross i n c o m p e t e n c e " when t h e therapist forgot t h e n a m e of the p a t i e n t ' s girlfriend. (In Chapter 5, an extended clinical a c c o u n t will be given of massive negation of t h e history of shared experience t h a t accompanies a p a t i e n t ' s psychotic decompensation.) For the patient relying heavily on splitting, the good (loved) therapist and t h e bad (feared and hated) therapist are different people. T h e good therapist can never be disappointing, because as soon as he is disappointing, it is no longer he (the good therapist) with whom the patient is dealing. By definition, it could not have been the loved and loving therapist. Similarly, in a state of mind in which processes of splitting p r e d o m i n a t e , o n e ' s hostile self feels d i s c o n t i n u o u s from o n e ' s loving self, i.e., one does not experience oneself as the same person in different affective states. T h e c o u n t e r t r a n s f e r e n c e experience of the therapist when a patient utilizes a splitting defense frequently has a disturbingly d i s c o n t i n u o u s quality that reflects the pat i e n t ' s emotional discontinuity. W h e n the patient consciously and unconsciously treats the therapist as two or more distinctly different people, a corresponding disruption of the continuity of experience of self is engendered in t h e therapist. This very frequently results in amnesia on t h e part of t h e therapist about e v e n t s earlier in a given session, or in previous sessions. In a sense t h e patient " c r e a t e s " t h e therapist, not only in p h a n t a s y , but also in reality, in that t h e patient emotionally draws upon the therapist according to the d o m i n a n t transference configurations. T h e r e is a suggestive parallel between this understanding of splitting in t h e paranoid-schizoid position and

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64

t h e conclusions that T. G. R. Bower (1971) h a s drawn from his neonatal observational research: According to these studies, it seems that infants less t h a n 16 weeks old live in a world articulated in t e r m s of solids t h a t are stably arranged in space according to their location, with a constancy of existence when they occlude o n e a n o t h e r . It is, h o w e v e r , a grossly overpopulated world. An object becomes a different object as soon as it moves to a new location. In this world, every object is u n i q u e . T h e infant must cope with a very large n u m b e r of objects, w h e n only one is really t h e r e , (pp. 3 7 - 3 8 ) T h i s physical d i s c o n t i n u i t y of objects when t h e objects are moved seems to parallel t h e emotional discontinuity of self and object in different affective " p o s i t i o n s " in t h e paranoid-schizoid state. T h e infant's world in this phase of development becomes cluttered with emotionally different objects that are, from t h e point of view of an outside observer, a single object.

Summary T h e Kleinian conception of t h e paranoid-schizoid position is a formulation of the infant's first foothold in t h e psychological sphere. T h i s position involves a mode of generating and organizing experience in which experience is p r e d o m i n a n t l y of an i m p e r s o n a l , nonreflective n a t u r e (i.e., experience of self that has little quality of " I - n e s s " ) . T h o u g h t s and feelings are not personal creations; they are e v e n t s t h a t happen. O n e does not i n t e r p r e t o n e ' s experience; one reacts to it with a high degree of a u t o m a t i c i t y .

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65

O n e ' s symbols do not reflect a layering of personal meanings to be interpreted and u n d e r s t o o d ; o n e ' s symbols are what they stand for. T h i s is the realm of things in themselves. T h e principal mode of managing danger is splitting, a rearranging of things in themselves in an effort to separate t h e endangered from t h e endangering. Projective identification is an elaboration of t h e process of splitting in which o n e uses a n o t h e r person to experience at a distance that which o n e is unwilling or unable to experience oneself. Splitting allows t h e infant, child or adult, to love safely and hate safely, by establishing discontinuity between loved and feared aspects of self and object. W i t h o u t s u c h d i s c o n t i n u i t y , the infant could not feed safely and would die. Basic to the state of being characterizing the paranoid-schizoid position is t h e continual rewriting of history in the service of maintaining discontinuities of loving and hating aspects of self and object. It is essential that only one emotional plane exist at a time. Otherwise, object relations become contaminated a n d , as a result, unbearably complex for the primitive psyche.

4 T h e

D e p r e s s i v e a n d

t h e

t h e

P o s i t i o n

B i r t h

H i s t o r i c a l

o f

S u b j e c t

Klein was able to make it clear . . . how the capacity for concern and to feel guilty is an achievement. . . . This is Klein's most important contribution in my opinion, and I think it ranks with Freud's concept of the Oedipus complex. —Donald Winnicott

T h e paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions are Klein's conceptualization of psychological organizations t h a t generate distinctive realms of experience or states of being. O n e does not leave the paranoid-schizoid position behind at t h e " t h r e s h o l d " of t h e depressive position; r a t h e r , one establishes m o r e or less sucessfully a dialectical relationship between t h e two, a relationship in which each state creates, preserves, and negates t h e o t h e r , just as the conscious and u n c o n s c i o u s mind do in F r e u d ' s topographic model. 67

The Matrix of the Mind

68

T h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e depressive position t h a t will be presented in this chapter builds u p o n ideas introduced by Klein, b u t substantially goes b e y o n d t h a t which is explicit in K l e i n ' s writing. Melanie Klein was interested primarily in mental c o n t e n t s and as a result left relatively unexplored t h e implications of her t h e o r y for a psychoanalytic conception of fundamental b a c k g r o u n d states of being.

The

Transition

into

the

Depressive

Position

As discussed in the previous c h a p t e r , t h e paranoid-schizoid position is a mode of generating experience that is impersonal and a u t o m a t i c . Danger and safety are managed by means of r e n d e r i n g experience d i s c o n t i n u o u s (by means of splitting) and by ejecting into a n o t h e r person unacceptable or endangered aspects of self (by means of projective identification). T h e paranoid-schizoid position involves a nonreflective state of being; o n e ' s t h o u g h t s and feelings are events that merely h a p p e n . T h e depressive position c o n s t i t u t e s an entirely different realm of experience from t h a t which c o n s t i t u t e s t h e paranoid-schizoid position. E n t e r i n g into the depressive position involves a m o n u m e n t a l psychological advance. T h e concept of a developmental line (A. F r e u d , 1965) does not adequately c a p t u r e t h e n o n l i n e a r n a t u r e of t h e shift that o c c u r s , nor is it analogous to t h e piecing together of a jigsaw puzzle, slowly b u t surely creating a whole o u t of t h e sum of t h e parts (as in Glover's [1968] conception of the early development of t h e ego from ego nuclei). A more apt analogy may be drawn from physics: E l e m e n t s and conditions a c c u m u l a t e , leading to t h e a c h i e v e m e n t of a critical

The Depressive Position and the Birth of the Historical Subject

69

mass, at which point a new state, built u p o n , but qualitatively different from that which preceded it, emerges in a form that could not h a v e been anticipated by looking at t h e sum of the ingredients (see Spitz's [1959] genetic field theory). W h i l e t h e transition between these two modes or positions has qualities of a q u a n t u m leap, it must also be kept in mind that t h e paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions are processes and not static entities. It is therefore misleading to talk about the " a c h i e v e m e n t of the depressive p o s i t i o n . " It would be m o r e accurate to say t h a t o n e has begun to function to some extent in the mode of the depressive position, keeping in mind that this mode is undergoing continual development over the course of o n e ' s life and that operation in this mode always presupposes s i m u l t a n e o u s operation in the mode of the paranoidschizoid position. From a Kleinian perspective (as elaborated by Bion [1962a, 1963, 1967]), the psychological-interpersonal process of projective identification is one of t h e principal vehicles (in association with psycho-physiologic maturation and a p r e d o m i n a n c e of good experience) by which m o v e m e n t is made from the paranoid-schizoid position to t h e depressive position. T h e infant's object world in the paranoid-schizoid position consists of part-objects that interact along lines predetermined by the two major instinctual codes. Actual experience, unless modified by the process of projective identification, will simply confirm the i n f a n t ' s polarized p r e c o n c e p t i o n s of absolute danger and serene safety. Projective identification allows for an exit from the initially closed system of t h e infant's psychic reality. T h e interaction with t h e m o t h e r that c o n s t i t u t e s projective

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The Matrix of the Mind

identification makes it possible for t h e infant to modify his instinctual p r e c o n c e p t i o n s , i.e., to learn from experience. An infant's nonreflective anticipation of sadistic rejection by t h e m o t h e r may be tempered t h r o u g h t h e m a t e r n a l " c o n t a i n m e n t p r o c e s s " (Bion, 1962a, 1962b). T h e idealized object undergoes modification in a similar way. Good experience and m a t u r a t i o n do n o t fully a c c o u n t for t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of part-objects; it is t h e modification of the quality of the infant's receptivity and meaning-generating system which occurs in t h e interaction that c o n s t i t u t e s projective identification, 1 that makes it possible for t h e infant to discriminate new experience from that which had been anticipated. T h e Kleinians (Klein, 1935, 1958; Segal, 1957, 1964) invoke a combination of m a t u r a t i o n a l factors and actual experience to a c c o u n t for t h e integration of good and bad part-objects. T h e m a t u r a t i o n a l factors include a diminution of instinctual drive intensity a n d an unfolding of cognitive capacities, including t h e stabilization of t h e capacity for reality testing and m e m o r y . W i t h these maturational changes as a foundation, t h e integration of partobjects and parts of self becomes possible when good experience predominates. Satisfactory experience with objects e n h a n c e s t h e infant's feeling of a t t a c h m e n t to and love from internal good objects and diminishes t h e infant's fear of bad objects. As this o c c u r s , bad objects need not be as forcefully e x t r u d e d by m e a n s of projection and projective identification. T h e result is a decrease in persecutory anxiety. T h e good object need not be kept q u i t e so emotionally separate from t h e bad object and gradually, *As discussed in Chapter 2, Klein was only minimally aware of these interpersonal implications of the concept of projective identification.

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71

as this process proceeds, good and bad aspects of self and good and bad part-objects can be experienced as different qualities of a single whole object and a single whole self. 2

The

Development

of

Subjectivity

In the process of moving from part-object relatedness into whole-object relatedness and from split-self experience to a c o n t i n u i t y of experience of self, t h e infant becomes h u m a n and potentially h u m a n e . In attempting to understand t h e transformation in t h e quality of experience that becomes possible in t h e depressive position, one is struck by t h e wide array of developmental advances t h a t underlie this m e t a m o r p h o s i s , e.g., an e n h a n c e d capacity for selfobject differentiation, the development o f t h e capacity for symbol formation, increased capacities for affective modu2

Klein's explanation of the achievement of whole object relations is a mechanical one and does not address the question of what has changed to allow the radical transformation of the quality of experience achieved in the whole object relatedness of the depressive position. Klein's (1935, 1940) thinking is hampered by the fact that she is dealing entirely in the conceptual vocabulary of mental contents. Her explanation is a quantitative one in which successive deletions of affective and ideational extremes allow a "coming together" of good and bad internal parts to form an internally cohesive whole object and whole ego. I believe that Klein's failure to adequately develop a conceptualization of the intrapersonal and interpersonal matrix within which mental contents exist left her with insufficient terms to account for the transformation that she is addressing. A fuller understanding of the nature of the radical developmental transformation in question depends upon an understanding of Winnicott's conception of potential space. The discussion of this contribution to the psychoanalytic dialogue will be deferred until Chapters 7, 8, and 9.

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lation, reality testing, and m e m o r y . No single developmental advance a c c o u n t s for t h e shift in t h e i n f a n t ' s state of being that will be described. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , o n e c a n n o t address t h e developmental whole w i t h o u t considering t h e parts separately, t h e r e b y giving t h e illusion of o n e part leading to a n o t h e r sequentially. In actuality, each aspect of development creates t h e conditions necessary for t h e emergence of t h e o t h e r s . I will begin with a discussion of t h e development of subjectivity, the experience of " I - n e s s , " which is a concomitant of t h e differentiation of symbol and symbolized. I n the paranoid-schizoid position, t h e symbol and t h e symbolized were emotionally interchangeable, leading to an immediacy of experience manifested in e x t r e m e concreteness of t h o u g h t , e n t r a p m e n t in the manifest, and delusional quality of experience (including transference experience). T h e symbol is what it represents. At t h e threshold of t h e depressive position, t h e m a t u r i t y of the infant's psychological organization has reached t h e point where a s t r u c t u r a l shift b e c o m e s possible. W h e n symbol and symbolized become distinguishable, a sense of "In e s s " fills t h e space between symbol and symbolized. T h i s " I " is the interpreter of o n e ' s symbols, t h e mediator between o n e ' s t h o u g h t s and that which o n e is t h i n k i n g about, the intermediary between t h e self and o n e ' s lived sensory experience. O n e might well ask w h e t h e r t h e sense of " I - n e s s " makes it possible to differentiate between symbol and symbolized or w h e t h e r t h e differentiation of symbol and symbolized allows for t h e e m e r g e n c e of a sense of " I - n e s s . " I would view both as t r u e : each makes the o t h e r possible, but n e i t h e r is t h e cause of t h e o t h e r in a linear sense. At t h e m o m e n t that the infant becomes capable of experiencing himself as the i n t e r p r e t e r of his perceptions,

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the infant as subject is born. All experience from that point on is a personal creation (unless t h e r e is subsequent regression). In t h e paranoid-schizoid position, e v e r y t h i n g is what it is (i.e., e v e n t s speak for themselves), whereas in the depressive position, n o t h i n g is simply what it appears to be (events do not have intrinsic meaning). In t h e depressive position an event is what o n e makes of it; its significance lies in t h e interpretation o n e gives it. 3 (It must be kept in mind that the psychological state of being just described always coexists with t h e paranoid-schizoid position wherein perceptions are experienced as things in themselves.) W h e n t h e infant becomes an i n t e r p r e t i n g subject, he can for t h e first time project that state of mind into his sense of t h e o t h e r and consider the possibility that other people experience feelings and t h o u g h t s in m u c h t h e same way. Awareness of the possibility that a n o t h e r person is a subject as well as an object creates t h e conditions wherein t h e infant can feel c o n c e r n for a n o t h e r person. 4 W h e n t h e infant becomes capable of feeling concern for a n o t h e r as a whole and separate person, i.e., a living h u m a n being, he t h e n becomes capable of guilt and the

3

Even though one interprets one's experience in the depressive position, each individual as an isolate cannot create meaning. Meanings are created intersubjectively in the context of one's family and culture, with language utilized as the vehicle for a shared system of symbols and understandings (see Habermas, 1968). *Winnicott (1954-1955) refers to this developmental advance as the infant's development of the capacity for "ruth" (p. 265), which contrasts with the state of "ruthlessness" that exists prior to the development of the recognition of the other as a living person. Ruthlessness for Winnicott is not hostile in intent; rather, it simply reflects the infant's inability to have empathy for the mother with regard to the impact of his intense neediness and dependence on her.

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wish to make reparations. It is possible for him to feel bad about t h e way in which he h a s h u r t a n o t h e r person (in reality or in phantasy) and to a large degree to be able to distinguish between real and imagined h a r m . T h e r e are major differences between t h e experience of d e s t r u c t i v e n e s s and restitution in t h e paranoid-schizoid and that in t h e depressive position. In t h e former t h e object of o n e ' s aggression is an impersonal object that is not felt to have feelings or subjectivity, because t h e infant himself is devoid of subjectivity. T h e paranoid-schizoid position is a magical state in which one need n o t be c o n c e r n e d about destroying o n e ' s e n e m y b e c a u s e o n e is able o m n i p o t e n t l y to re-create what o n e has destroyed if o n e wishes to restore it. 5 From t h e vantage point of this u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e experiential state characterizing t h e paranoid-schizoid position, it is possible to u n d e r s t a n d why t h e principal anxiety of t h e paranoid-schizoid position is not t h e fear of 5

The distinction here between the subjectivity and objectivity of the other is to some extent captured in the following political allegory. It has been suggested that "the button" for launching missiles carrying nuclear warheads be surgically implanted under the skin of a Secret Service agent who would accompany the President at all times. If the President decides to enter the country into a nuclear war, he would have to cut open the skin of the Secret Service man in order to "press the button." It is with considerable shame that we admit to ourselves that in some sense we recoil more from the idea of cutting open the Secret Service man than we do at the prospect of the destruction of (unmentioned) millions of people. In our identification with the President in this phantasied scene, the Secret Service agent is experienced as a man who has to be looked at, talked to, and touched, and therefore is alive as a human being; the millions whom we do not visualize in this phantasy are not alive for us as human beings and therefore cannot suffer pain and cannot die.

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death b u t t h e fear of " n i h i l a t i o n . " 6 O n e c a n n o t die if one is not alive. Chairs do not die nor are they h u r t ; they are damaged or destroyed. In t h e paranoid-schizoid position, t h e r e is no immutable history created intersubjectively and preserved in subjective m e m o r y . Instead of dying, o n e disappears without a trace. In c o n t r a s t , a death at t h e end of a life is both m o r e and less absolute. It is less absolute because a person may anticipate t h a t h e will c o n t i n u e to exist in t h e people who h a v e been influenced by shared experience or by t h e symbols that he has created (and which h a v e been interpreted by others) to reflect his individuality. Paradoxically, t h e idea of death from the point of view of t h e paranoid-schizoid position is less absolute t h a n it is in t h e context of t h e depressive posit i o n . I n t h e paranoid-schizoid position absence is n e v e r p e r m a n e n t ; t h e r e is always the possibility of o m n i p o t e n t re-creation of t h e absent object. W h i l e the principal anxiety of t h e paranoid-schizoid position is t h e fear of nihilation, the principal anxiety of t h e depressive position is t h e fear of the loss of t h e object. T h e lost object is experienced as a whole and separate h u m a n being w h o m o n e fears o n e has driven away, h a r m e d , or killed. M o u r n i n g is the working t h r o u g h of depressive anxiety; depression and manic-depressive illness are pathological formations generated in response to

6

Kojeve's (1934-1935) neologism neantir translated by Nichols (1960) as "nihilate" seems to me to capture the idea of the negation of one's existence. The term annihilate heavily connotes violent and destructive negation of one's existence or the existence of the other. In this book, I will use either nihilate or annihilate, depending upon whether the act of destruction is central to the activity described.

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depressive anxiety. (The manic defense against depressive anxiety will be discussed later in this chapter.)

The

Management the

Depressive

of Danger

in

Position

T h e objectivity (nonreflectiveness) of t h e self in the paranoid-schizoid position a c c o u n t s for t h e mode of managing danger t h a t is utilized in that state of being. In a world of things in themselves (including t h e self as object), it is not possible to secure safety t h r o u g h an u n d e r s t a n d i n g or compromise in which each of two or m o r e parties (subjects) are changed (intersubjectively) in order to make their peace. I n a realm of objects (as opposed to subjects) safety is attained t h r o u g h q u a n t i t a t i v e shifts and magical all-or-nothing t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s . O n e achieves safety in relation to internal danger by magically placing t h e danger outside of oneself; o n e protects oneself against persecutory objects by acquiring a greater a r m y of good objects; one p r o t e c t s an endangered aspect of self by magically transforming a n o t h e r person into a repository for that aspect of self, t h u s preserving oneself in t h e form of a n o t h e r with w h o m one maintains a c o n n e c t i o n of identity (projective identification). T h e r e n u n c i a t i o n of o m n i p o t e n c e in t h e depressive position is integrally c o n n e c t e d with t h e establishment of the separateness of t h e object from oneself. It is only when o n e c a n n o t create or magically t r a n s f o r m t h e object t h a t s o m e t h i n g or s o m e o n e exists that is not oneself. If t h e r e is s o m e o n e who is not me, w h o m I c a n n o t create, c o n t r o l , and transform, t h e n I also emerge as a separate p e r s o n . In t h e r e n u n c i a t i o n of o m n i p o t e n c e , t h e real is created as an entity separate from o n e ' s t h o u g h t s . In

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t e r m s of symbol formation, t h e symbolized (the referent of my t h o u g h t s in t h e real) is for t h e first time freed from t h e symbol that I create (my t h o u g h t s and feelings about t h a t which I am perceiving). O n e is freed from t h e realm of t h e t h i n g in itself. 7 Envy and

Jealousy

T h e distinction between envy and jealousy provides specific experiential referents for t h e preceding discussion of t h e relationship of t h e paranoid-schizoid to t h e depressive position. For Klein (1952c, 1 9 5 7 , 1 9 6 1 ) , envy is one of the most i m p o r t a n t manifestations of t h e death instinct. As a p h e n o m e n o n of t h e paranoid-schizoid position; envy is a part-object relationship in which o n e hates the object for having what o n e feels one does not have and what o n e desperately needs. O n e wishes to steal t h e envied possession from t h e object and spoil whatever o n e c a n n o t steal. D u r i n g t h e p s y c h o t h e r a p y of a severely disturbed patient, t h e therapist became pregnant. T h e patient, Ms. W . , blandly denied having any feelings about this, b u t developed a terrifying feeling that she would discover an aborted fetus in each toilet she was a b o u t to use. D u r i n g t h e same period, Ms. W . found it u n b e a r a b l y painful to shop in stores because she could b u y only a few items, leaving so m u c h in t h e store t h a t t h e few items she was able to p u r c h a s e felt

7

This space between one's omnipotence and that which lies outside of one's omnipotence is Winnicott's (1971e) "potential space" and was largely unrecognized and unexplored by Klein. This aspect of early development will be examined in detail in the discussion of Winnicott's work on potential space (see especially Chapter 8).

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The Matrix of the Mind like a mockery of h e r . It was with great effort t h a t she refrained from stealing. T h e p a t i e n t ' s u n c o n s c i o u s wish to h a v e all of t h e therapist completely to herself led to intense, u n c o n scious envy of t h e t h e r a p i s t ' s baby (and, secondarily, of t h e therapist for h a v i n g t h e baby). T h e patient u n c o n s c i o u s l y wished to kill t h e baby because t h e baby possessed what t h e patient wanted. In addition, Ms. W . wished to spoil t h e envied possession of t h e baby and of t h e therapist.

E n v y involves a two-person, part-object relationship, whereas jealousy is u n d e r s t o o d as a t h r e e - p e r s o n , wholeobject-related p h e n o m e n o n of t h e depressive position. Jealousy is a manifestation of t h e individual's wish to be loved in t h e way h e feels t h a t a n o t h e r person (the object of jealousy) is loved by a t h i r d p e r s o n . It involves a degree of e m p a t h y with t h e o t h e r p e r s o n ( p u t t i n g oneself into t h e place of the object of jealousy w i t h o u t losing oneself in t h e other) and a sense of t h e third person as a whole and separate o t h e r w h o m o n e can imagine being loved by and loving. Envy involves not only h a t r e d of the object for possessing the good, b u t also hatred of t h e good itself, because t h e owner and t h e owned are emotionally equivalent. Jealousy is a far m o r e complex feeling state (at core an ambivalently loving set of feelings) t h a t involves anger at being excluded from a love relationship. O n e wishes to love and be loved, but feels s h u t o u t of that experience by a n o t h e r person, who is felt to be enjoying that love relationship in o n e ' s stead. Jealousy is built u p o n a series of wish-fear compromises designed in large part to deal with problems of ambivalence: O n e dares n o t engage in a love

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relationship, and yet one does so vicariously t h r o u g h an identification with the object of jealousy; one dares not directly hate t h e love object, instead hating a displacement object (the object of jealousy); one fears t h e fantasied d e s t r u c t i v e n e s s of sexual excitement and modulates it t h r o u g h t h e use of an i n t e r m e d i a r y ; o n e disguises violently i n t r u s i v e voyeuristic wishes in t h e feeling that one has been forced into the position of t h e intensely interested observer. In jealousy, these wishes and fears are feelings generated by a subject. O n e ' s feelings are potentially experienceable as o n e ' s own, even t h o u g h one may vigorously attempt to disown these feelings by means of repression, projection, denial, displacement, or projective identification. Having schematically described envy and jealousy as if t h e y were separable feeling states, it is i m p o r t a n t to emphasize that these emotions represent coexisting ends of a single gradient, always standing in a hierarchial relationship to each o t h e r . Neither envy nor jealousy is enc o u n t e r e d in p u r e form. Each psychological state in which these feelings play a role must be u n d e r s t o o d in t e r m s of an interplay of these two forms of relatedness.

The

Creation

of

History

In t h e depressive position, t h e infant increasingly ren o u n c e s t h e power to magically re-create t h a t which he has damaged or destroyed. In this new emotional context, t h e infant develops a new quality of object relatedness that involves the wish to make up for what he has done. He c a n n o t nihilate t h e past and start again. T h e historical self exists for t h e first time.

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T h e experience of history is a distinctly h u m a n phen o m e n o n (Kojeve, 1 9 3 4 - 1 9 3 5 ) . Animals u n d e r g o evolutionary progression in which biologically d e t e r m i n e d response p a t t e r n s are played out. History r e q u i r e s t h e capacity for self-reflection. In t h e a b s e n c e of this capacity, animals live only in t h e present. Only man self-reflectively can r e m e m b e r who he was after h e is changed by his experience in t h e world. T h e infant in t h e depressive position begins to experience both himself and the other person as largely the same people t h e y were before t h e infant, for example, h u r t t h e m o t h e r (in phantasy or in reality). T h e y do not become different people, b u t an additional event has been added to their c o m m o n experience. In c o n t r a s t , in t h e paranoid-schizoid position, t h e past is constantly changing; each new event radically changes all previous ones. T h e p r e s e n t is immediately projected o n t o all previous experience t h u s nihilating t h e past. T h e past becomes merely a fluid extension of t h e present. W h e n t h e borderline patient becomes angry at t h e therapist, all previous experience is viewed as a deception on the part of t h e therapist. (See Chapter 5 for clinical examples of s u c h rewriting of history.) In the depressive position, t h e infant no longer has access to t h e kind of Orwellian rewriting of history that is possible in t h e paranoid-schizoid position. I n t h e depressive state of being, when o n e feels t h a t one has h u r t a n o t h e r person, o n e is stuck with that fact. O n e c a n n o t negate or rewrite history, one c a n n o t obliterate t h e fact that a n event of a given n a t u r e has o c c u r r e d . O n e can try to make it u p to t h e o t h e r person, knowing full well t h a t this one does not change t h e past. T h e development of t h e capacity to make reparations of a nonmagical type is o n e of t h e hallmarks of t h e depressive position.

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Only w h e n a n o t h e r person can no longer be magically re-created (e. g., by wholesale substitution of a new mothering figure for an absent o n e ) , does it become possible to miss s o m e o n e who is away or to m o u r n s o m e o n e who has died or who has left p e r m a n e n t l y . W h e n the o t h e r can be experienced as having an existence separate from o n e ' s own, it becomes possible to be with that person and be away from t h a t person in an entirely different way from t h a t which had been possible previously. O n e cannot leave or be left by a n o t h e r person if o n e has not allowed the o t h e r person to be present and alive as a h u m a n being. By analogy, o n e c a n n o t leave a place one has never been to (see Searles, 1982). T h e danger to which one exposes oneself in e n t e r i n g t h e world of h u m a n beings (i.e., in achieving t h e whole-object relatedness of t h e depressive position) is t h a t of feeling c o n c e r n for people whom o n e does not control. Therefore, one opens oneself to the possibility of being left (physically and emotionally) by a n o t h e r person. T h e feeling of loneliness is generated and m a i n t a i n e d for the first time in t h e depressive position. T h e experiencing of loneliness over time requires t h a t t h e individual tolerate t h e presence of an absence without filling t h e void with projections of t h e self, t h r o u g h hallucinatory wish fulfillment or t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of a paranoid world in which p e r s e c u t o r y objects provide constant company. T h e principal anxiety of t h e depressive position, the anxiety that one will h a r m or drive away the person whom o n e loves, could not possibly have arisen in the paranoidschizoid position even t h o u g h t h e r e were phantasies of a n n i h i l a t i n g t h e object in that state. In the paranoidschizoid position, t h e people who are loved and t h e people who are hated are different people. T h i s is a r e s t a t e m e n t from a different vantage point of t h e idea that the process

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of splitting in t h e paranoid-schizoid position allows t h e infant to avoid t h e dilemma of h a t i n g t h e loved p e r s o n and loving t h e hated person. F r o m t h e perspective developed t h u s far, it can be seen t h a t t h e t e r m depressive position is a misleading one. T h e t e r m historical position better r e p r e s e n t s what is normative in t h e achievement of this psychological organization. M o u r n i n g r a t h e r t h a n depression is t h e psychological process by which previous object ties are relinquished. Historical m e m o r y is itself a form of m o u r n i n g in t h a t it acknowledges t h e fact that t h e past (and t h e object ties t h a t c o n s t i t u t e o n e ' s past) no longer exist in their earlier form. As F r e u d (1911-1915) pointed o u t in his technical papers, transference is an act of repeating instead of remembering and is therefore always a resistance to relinquishing t h e object ties c o n s t i t u t i n g t h e transference. Analysis of t h e transference is in part a process of transforming a repetition into a m e m o r y and in this sense is aimed at expanding t h e historicity of t h e depressive position. T h e process of transforming e n a c t m e n t into remembering (the elaboration of feelings in a symbolic realm with a historical dimension) and t h e sustaining of those feelings over time is at t h e heart of what F r e u d (1932) m e a n t by: "Wo Es war, soil Ich werden" ( " W h e r e it was, t h e r e I shall b e " ) . Responsibility

for Action in the Depressive

Position

T h e act of avowing o n e ' s role as t h e i n t e r p r e t e r of experience is an important form of taking responsibility for o n e ' s actions. T h e c o u n t e r p a r t of this experience of being responsible for o n e ' s actions (including mental activity) is t h e experience of freedom. It is only w h e n o n e has empowered oneself with t h e responsibility for o n e ' s actions t h a t

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o n e can make choices in which one feels varying degrees of freedom, depending u p o n t h e perceived importance of limiting i n t e r n a l and external factors. Schafer's (1976) action language is t h e fully articulated language of t h e depressive position. It is a way of speaking in which t h e subject's responsibility for his t h o u g h t s , feelings, and behavior is fully acknowledged. For example, Schafer believes t h a t reification of affect and motivation serves to disavow the subject's position as active agent in relation to his psychological activity and behavior. In an u n c o n s c i o u s effort to disavow his responsibility for what he has angrily done, a patient might say, " T h e anger was building up in me to t h e point t h a t I e x p l o d e d " or " I d o n ' t know what made me do t h a t . " In an action-disclaiming stance, patients unconsciously protest, " ' A l l o w us o u r illusions of ignorance, passivity and helplessness. W e dare not acknowledge that we are masters in o u r own h o u s e . ' " (p. 154). In the fully developed depressive position (a neverachieved ideal state), we are subjects aware of our responsibility for our t h o u g h t s , feelings, and behavior. However, from t h e perspective developed in this chapter, t h e depressive position coexists dialectically with t h e paranoid-schizoid position. W h e n t h e individual is functioning predomin a n t l y in a paranoid-schizoid mode, he is to a considerable degree lived by experience. It is therefore i n a c c u r a t e to use language t h a t implies otherwise. Action language fails to reflect t h e n a t u r e of the s t r u c t u r e of the paranoidschizoid c o m p o n e n t of all psychological states, a compon e n t that is p r e d o m i n a n t in primitive mental states. T h e individual's inability to fully experience himself as " t h e master of his own h o u s e , " is not simply a reflection of a " f r i g h t e n e d , r e s i s t a n t , action-disclaiming s t a n c e " (p. 154).

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T o t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e r e is not yet a subject in t h e paranoid-schizoid position, o n e c a n n o t possibly take responsibility for e m o t i o n s t h a t present themselves to a nonsubjective self as forces and objects impinging u p o n or e m a n a t i n g from a self as object. T h i s experience of self as object is not simply a defense; it is an inevitable compon e n t of psychological development and an ongoing facet of psychological organization. O n e does not leave behind this mode of organizing experience; o n e i n c o r p o r a t e s it i n t o t h e m a t u r e dialectical relationship of t h e paranoid-schizoid and depressive states of being. F r o m this perspective, Schafer's action language overstates t h e degree to which we are subjects and u n d e r e s t i m a t e s t h e degree to which the self forever r e m a i n s an object. T h e it (id) n e v e r fully becomes I (ego), n o r would we want it to. W e need language o t h e r t h a n action language to talk with and about that aspect of being.

The

Manic

Defense

P a t i e n t s who have unstably a c h i e v e d ' t h e depressive position often rely on a specific form of defense t h a t Klein (1935, 1952c) t e r m s the manic process or defense. T h i s defense (more accurately t h o u g h t of as a g r o u p of defenses) is an in-between p h e n o m e n o n , i n c o r p o r a t i n g elem e n t s of t h e psychic organization of b o t h t h e paranoidschizoid and t h e depressive positions. It is a defense against depressive anxiety (the fear of t h e loss of an object t h a t is experienced as whole and separate), b u t employs modes of defense t h a t are characteristic of t h e paranoidschizoid position (e.g., splitting, denial, projection, introjection, idealization, projective identification, and omnipotent t h i n k i n g ) . T h e manic process involves a regression

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to a state of being in which subjectivity, historicity, the experience of psychic reality, and t h e capacity for m a t u r e symbol formation are all greatly compromised. T h e patient who utilizes manic defenses does not live in a world of layered symbolic m e a n i n g s where feelings, t h o u g h t s , and e v e n t s can be u n d e r s t o o d . T h e h y p o m a n i c or manic patient lives in a world of action where events speak for themselves and are dealt with reactively. T h e manic defense is by no means used only by manic-depressive patients any m o r e t h a n projection is a defense utilized exclusively by paranoid patients. However, t h e manic defense is seen in its most e x t r e m e form in manic and h y p o m a n i c states. O n c e one has begun to consolidate t h e psychic organization o f t h e depressive position, t h e manic defense becomes a part of t h e n o r m a t i v e defensive repertoire. T h e manic defense involves t h e denial of o n e ' s dep e n d e n c e on other people (Klein, 1935, 1963b). This denial is reinforced by t h e u n c o n s c i o u s phantasy of omnipot e n t control over t h e object, which phantasy protects the individual against t h e anxiety of being abandoned by t h e object: O n e need not fear the loss of an object over which one feels o n e has absolute control. Moreover, c o n t e m p t for t h e object serves to insulate the individual from loss, since o n e need not be c o n c e r n e d by t h e loss of t h e despised, worthless object (see Segal, 1964). I was asked to consult on a hospitalized man in his early forties who had been involuntarily committed to t h e hospital two days earlier. T h e patient, Mr. L., walked haughtily into t h e interview room and immediately began to complain about the "smallness of m i n d " of t h e ward n u r s i n g staff. He felt that t h e o p p o r t u n i t y to speak with a physician might be more interesting for him. He spoke in a loud, vaguely

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t h r e a t e n i n g voice that clearly c o n v e y e d how explosively angry he could get if h e were made to feel t h a t he was not totally in control of t h e situation. He used F r e n c h and G e r m a n idioms to express t h e precise meanings he was looking for. Mr. L. told me t h a t he had been a graduate s t u d e n t in comparative l i t e r a t u r e at a prestigious u n i v e r s i t y , but for financial reasons had been unable to complete his studies. He was avoiding talking about a n y t h i n g that might lead m e to ask him why he was in t h e hospital. T h a t subject would h a v e shattered t h e illusion that t h e two of us were simply " e d u c a t e d m e n " striking u p a conversation. Despite his bluster, t h e r e was s o m e t h i n g q u i t e poignant about this m a n ' s fragility; he seemed to be silently pleading with m e t h r o u g h o u t t h e interview not to rob him of his illusions. T h e mood of the h o u r shifted when he asked me how many foreign languages I spoke. I hesitated and said that I hoped he would allow me not to take his question literally since . . . He i n t e r r u p t e d me before I could finish t h e t h o u g h t by saying t h a t I was obviously a t t e m p t i n g to conceal t h e t r u e d e p t h s of my ignorance and t h a t h e had no m o r e interest in talking with me. It seemed to me t h a t Mr. L. felt t h a t my r e l u c t a n c e to answer his question a n d t h e likelihood that I was about to offer an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n represented an effort to flaunt my power, to diminish h i m , and to take control of the interview. At that point, he picked up a magazine from t h e table between us and began t h u m b i n g t h r o u g h it with a feigned air of relaxation. For t h e next fifteen m i n u t e s he acted as if he were alone in the r o o m , especially when I a t t e m p t e d to talk to him. W h e n I finally told him that our time was up h e gave no r e s p o n s e at all

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and we sat t h e r e in silence for several m i n u t e s . At that point he tossed his magazine o n t o t h e table, saying, " I t ' s too hot in this r o o m ; I ' m getting o u t of h e r e . " He left the r o o m , but I sensed that he had not gone far. W h e n I opened t h e door to t h e hallway, he was standing very close to the door. I said that I, too, felt that t h e r e was m o r e to say to each o t h e r and that we could talk together t h e following day if he liked. W i t h his head down, he slowly walked away. In this interview, Mr. L. relied heavily on a set of manic defenses that included denial (of my ending of the meeting and of t h e n a t u r e of o u r relationship), a grandiose twinship p h a n t a s y (the two of us as superior m e n ) , cont e m p t , and phantasied o m n i p o t e n t control (reflected in his d o m i n a t i o n of t h e flow and direction of t h e interview). T h e patient also relied on projective identification; t h r o u g h this process it was I who carried t h e p a t i e n t ' s disowned feelings of trepidation and of sadness (until t h e interview was over). Despite the primitive n a t u r e of t h e defenses being utilized, it was clear t h a t Mr. L. was att e m p t i n g to protect himself against painful loss of selfesteem a n d loss of c o n n e c t e d n e s s with a n o t h e r person. T h i s patient would not allow t h e disaster of a severed a t t a c h m e n t to h a p p e n to him, and yet he could not entirely keep himself from yearning for the company of a n o t h e r person on whom he unconsciously hoped he could depend. T h e use of m a n i c defenses is rarely as dramatic as in the case just described. It must be reiterated that manic defenses c o n s t i t u t e a c o m p o n e n t of t h e defensive repertoire of all individuals. For example, a n e u r o t i c patient who was experiencing fear of a b a n d o n m e n t in the context of a maternal transference would retreat from his custom-

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ary (relatively m a t u r e ) mode of object relatedness and would begin treating t h e therapist in a condescending fashion, e.g., by becoming grandiose (in a disguised way) about his own a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s in comparison with t h o s e of the therapist. At times, this p a t i e n t ' s manifestations of t h e manic defense were extremely subtle, initially observable only in t h e h i n t of c o n t e m p t in his tone of voice or an air of n o n c h a l a n c e about a delay in paying his bill.

The

Achievement

of

Ambivalence

I would like at this point to focus t h e discussion on t h e psychological-interpersonal processess involved in t h e developmental m o v e m e n t toward t h e capacity for ambivalence. T h e idea of t h e integration of good and bad partobjects, a l t h o u g h heuristically appealing, does not fully describe what is involved in this developmental advance. Ambivalence is not simply a m a t t e r of consciously and unconsciously loving and hating t h e same object at a given m o m e n t , for this might well describe a very primitive undifferentiated state of affairs often seen in schizop h r e n i c patients. U n d e r s u c h c i r c u m s t a n c e s , t h e schizophrenic patient is unable to d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r his feelings are of a loving or h a t i n g n a t u r e since these emotions are "all mixed-up t o g e t h e r . " T h e r e is a physical correlate t h a t r e g u l a r l y a c c o m p a n i e s t h i s failure to differentiate feelings: the patient is unable to distinguish between different p h y s i c a l / e m o t i o n a l s e n s a t i o n s , e.g., b e t w e e n h u n g e r and sexual excitement or between nausea and anger. Likewise, it is not sufficient to say that in ambivalence o n e hates consciously and loves u n c o n s c i o u s l y or vice versa, because this does not address t h e relationship

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of that which is hated to that which is loved. T h e critical achievement in the a t t a i n m e n t of ambivalence is the fact t h a t t h e person one hates is t h e same person whom one has loved and unconsciously still loves and hopes to openly love again. T h e r e is no rewriting of history; t h e r e is no feeling that o n e has uncovered the t r u t h of which o n e was previously only dimly aware. W h e n o n e hates, t h e love that o n e had felt is still real and is present in t h e history that o n e shares with the person hated. Therefore, the feeling of sadness is integral to ambivalence because nothing can be taken back. In the paranoid-schizoid position sadness is simply not part of o n e ' s emotional vacabulary. How could it be? E v e r y t h i n g is taken back when a new emotional state is entered. T h e feelings of sadness involved in m o u r n i n g , guilt, and t h e r e n u n c i a t i o n of omnipotence are a m o n g t h e " p r i c e s " o n e pays for becoming h u m a n in t h e way that o n e does in t h e depressive position. T h e " d e p r e s s i o n " of t h e depressive position is m o r e accurately t h o u g h t of as a feeling of sadness involved in t h e acknowledgment that history cannot be rewritten. O n e is vulnerable to loss of loved objects whom o n e c a n n o t omnipotently control and whom one c a n n o t re-create or restore. T h e r e is sadness in the knowledge that o n e can attempt to make up for t h e h a r m one has done, but one c a n n o t change the fact that it has been done. F u r t h e r , the sadness of t h e depressive position is connected with t h e acceptance of t h e fact that o n e ' s most passionate longings deriving from o n e ' s early object relations were not fully realized and will not be fulfilled in t h e way that one had wished. As will be discussed later, central among these " r e n u n c i a t i o n s " (perhaps better described as regretful resignations) are o n e ' s oedipal longings. T h e p h e n o m e n o n of m a t u r e transference (as opposed to delusional or psychotic transference described by Searles,

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1963 and Little, 1958) makes t h e sadness o f t h e depressive position bearable. For just as o n e c a n n o t take back t h e past, t h e past can never be taken away. T h e form of transference possible in t h e depressive position allows o n e to p e r p e t u a t e , to h a v e again, i m p o r t a n t parts of what o n e has experienced with people whom o n e has lost t h r o u g h absence, death, emotional unavailability, or psychological change. This transference experience (both within and outside of t h e t h e r a p e u t i c setting) makes tolerable t h e pain of loss. O n e does not magically replace earlier objects; o n e experiences with t h e new p e r s o n feelings like t h o s e one felt with t h e previous p e r s o n . In this way o n e does not have to give up entirely past experience with significant objects. O n e may have to give up people whom o n e has lost, b u t one does not have to give up 'entirely o n e ' s experience with t h o s e people. O n e knows t h a t t h e person in t h e present (the transference object, who is also experienced as a real person in his own right) and the original object are different. But this knowledge is tolerable because t h e new experience (unconsciously) feels connected with t h e earlier one, and in this way earlier experience is preserved. A very i m p o r t a n t distinction can be made at this point: Transference in the depressive position is an attempted preservation of a feeling state from a past relationship; transference in the paranoid-schizoid position is an attempted preservation of the lost object itself. In psychotic or delusional transferences, the patient experiences t h e present object and t h e original object as identical, despite " i n c o n s e q u e n tial" dissimilarities of sex, age, race, and so on. In t h e paranoid-schizoid position history is constantly being rewritten and this rewriting can easily include m a t t e r s of age, sex, or race.

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W e can now see from a new vantage point that t h e capacity for t h e type of transference achieved in t h e depressive position provides t h e potential for making tolerable t h e idea of o n e ' s own death. Just as o n e comes to feel that o n e ' s experience with lost objects is never entirely lost, it is also possible to come to feel that o t h e r s ' experience with oneself and the symbols o n e has created may not be entirely lost after o n e ' s d e a t h .

The

Depressive the

Oedipus

Position

and

Complex

Psychological conflict generated in the depressive position is of a distinctly different type t h a n that seen in the paranoid-schizoid position. T h e father whom o n e wishes dead is t h e same person whom one loves and would not want to lose. In the depressive position, phantasies of o m n i p o t e n t l y a n n i h i l a t i n g o n e ' s rival no longer provide a satisfactory solution to a problem in a h u m a n relationship. In n o r m a l development, a new form of defense is generated in this setting. T h e new defense preserves t h e contin u i t y of t h e history of t h e object relationship even as it wards off awareness of an aspect of t h e relationship. T h e new defense, repression, is based on an u n c o n s c i o u s belief that " w h a t I d o n ' t know won't h u r t me, and forgetting won't h u r t [or change the identity of] the forgotten." O n e ' s relationship with o n e ' s father, including o n e ' s murd e r o u s anger toward him when he is felt to be acting selfishly, unfairly, and tyrannically, is preserved unconsciously. In t h e act of repression o n e changes what one knows (more a c c u r a t e l y , what o n e avows knowing), not who o n e is or who t h e o t h e r person is. History is not

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rewritten in repression as it is in splitting; r a t h e r , h i s t o r y (which is a c o m b i n a t i o n of m e m o r y a n d p h a n t a s y ) is " b u r i e d " and t h e r e b y preserved. It is often incorrectly t h o u g h t t h a t t h e oedipal phase of development follows t h e depressive position. S u c h a conception mixes qualitatively different developmental c o n s t r u c t s . T h e achievement of t h e depressive position is t h e e n t r y into t h e world of whole object relations, i.e., t h e world of subjective h u m a n beings each possessing an immutable past and a relatively fixed history. T h e s e persons can be cared about and m o u r n e d for; one can feel guilt and remorse toward t h e m . T h e relationship of the depressive position to t h e oedipal situation is t h e relationship between c o n t a i n e r and c o n t e n t , each shaping and influencing t h e o t h e r . ' As discussed in Chapter 2, t h e Oedipus complex for F r e u d is n o t simply o n e of m a n y psychological c o n t e n t s ; it is a phylogenetically d e t e r m i n e d n u c l e u s for t h e creation and organization of sexual and aggressive meanings. For this reason t h e Oedipus complex is treated by F r e u d as a c o r n e r s t o n e of psychoanalysis, a f u n d a m e n t a l t h e o r y of symbolic meanings, a developmental t h e o r y , a t h e o r y of pathogenesis, and a t h e o r y of t h e r a p y . I n this c h a p t e r , I will make a few i n t r o d u c t o r y c o m m e n t s toward a discussion of this i m p o r t a n t topic. Klein (1945, 1952c, 1955) viewed t h e Oedipus complex as a p h e n o m e n o n of t h e depressive position. K l e i n ' s developmental timetable is based on a s y n c h r o n i c as well as a d i a c h r o n i c view of development. Stages of developm e n t follow o n e a n o t h e r sequentially a n d , at t h e same time, all psychosexual stages coexist from t h e beginning. For example, in speaking of t h e early development of the girl, Klein (1932a) writes:

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Since the oral frustration she has suffered from her m o t h e r h a s stimulated all h e r o t h e r erotogenic zones as well and has aroused her genital t e n d e n c i e s and desires in regard to her father's penis, t h e latter becomes t h e object of her oral, u r e t h r a l , anal and genital impulses, all at the same time [italics added], (p. 272) At a n o t h e r point, Klein (1932a) elaborates: . . . In my opinion, t h e early equation of the penis with t h e breast is ushered in by t h e frustration she [the girl] has suffered from t h e breast in early childhood, and at once exerts a powerful influence on her and greatly affects t h e whole t r e n d of her developm e n t . I also believe that t h e e q u a t i o n of penis and breast, accompanied as it is by a "displacement from above d o w n w a r d , " activates the oral, receptive qualities of t h e female genital at an early age a n d prepares for the vagina to receive t h e penis. It t h u s clears t h e way for t h e little girl's Oedipus t e n d e n c i e s — t h o u g h these, it is t r u e , do not unfold their full power until m u c h l a t e r — a n d lays the foundation of her sexual development, (p. 271, fn.) Bibring (1947) has described Klein's t h i n k i n g as a development theory in which " s p r e a d i n g " (p. 73) occurs between levels of libidinal development, prior to a time at which one ordinarily conceives of the " l a t e r " developm e n t phases (e.g., u r e t h r a l , anal, and genital) as having been reached. D e v e l o p m e n t is u n d e r s t o o d by Klein not only as a process of sequential unfolding but also as a process of " p r e c i p i t a t i o n " (Bibring 1947, p. 83), i.e., the

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early calling into play of aspects of all levels of libidinal development. T h e u n c o n s c i o u s , according to Klein, is not limited to a linear, sequential mode of m a t u r a t i o n or development. (See also Boyer, 1967, for a lucid description of t h e s y n c h r o n i c aspect of Kleinian developmental theory.) Oedipal experience originating in t h e fourth to sixth m o n t h s of life is organized by t h e child as a m i x t u r e of oral, u r e t h r a l , anal, and genital phantasies (Klein, 1928, 1932b, 1952c). T h e s e include, for example, c o n c e p t i o n s of parental i n t e r c o u r s e as involving t h e m o t h e r ' s eating u p t h e father with her m o u t h / v a g i n a ; p h a n t a s i e s of fecal babies inside the m o t h e r ; phantasies of t h e child enviously p e n e t r a t i n g the m o t h e r and destroying t h e f a t h e r / p e n i s / rival-sibling-babies inside t h e m o t h e r . (For a detailed acc o u n t of t h e n a t u r e of these phantasies, see Klein, 1932b.) As I h a v e discussed in Chapter 2, t h e c o n t e n t of these phantasies (that arise prior to experience-derived knowledge of sexual a n a t o m y and sexual intercourse) is understood by Klein (1932b, 1952c) to be part of o n e ' s phylogenetic inheritance. T h e i n t e n s e debate over this aspect of t h e Kleinian developmental timetable and t h e debate about the n a t u r e of t h e c o n t e n t s of t h e child's sexual and oedipal phantasies (see Bibring, 1947; Glover, 1945; W a e l d e r , 1937; Zetzel, 1956), has, I believe, p r e v e n t e d a full discussion and exploration of t h e implications of Klein's more basic proposal t h a t t h e Oedipus complex arises in a n d is resolved within t h e c o n t e x t of a depressive organization. In what follows I will discuss my own understanding of t h e implications of t h e " d e p r e s s i v e " (i.e., historical) context for t h e oedipal drama. T h e ideas I will p r e s e n t were n o t explored by Klein. T h e critical emotional capacities involved in t h e resolution of t h e oedipal situation are t h e capacity for subjec-

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tivity, historicity, object love, ambivalence, m o u r n i n g , guilt, and reparation. In the positive oedipal situation for the boy, t h e child's love for his m o t h e r has t h r u s t him into a conflict of subjective desire. He has fallen in love with his m o t h e r and unconsciously wishes for genital as well as pregenital sexual relations with h e r ; at t h e same time he u n c o n s c i o u s l y feels t h a t t h e fulfillment of these wishes involves t h e breaking of sacred laws (Eliade, 1963; Loewald, 1979). Culturally, these sacred laws (which are comm u n i c a t e d unconsciously by t h e parents) involve the prohibition of incest and of parricide. In t e r m s of the child's individually generated system of meanings, the idea of sexual i n t e r c o u r s e with o n e ' s m o t h e r involves a regression to an undifferentiated state and therefore a nihilation of oneself and o n e ' s m o t h e r as separate individuals. In addition to this nihilation of self and o t h e r , t h e r e is also a wish on t h e part of the boy to kill his father, m o t h e r , and siblings, insofar as they are experienced as getting in the way of t h e fulfillment of his desires. S u c h conflict of desire is not possible in a predomin a n t l y paranoid-schizoid state, since t h e r e is not yet a subject responsible for his t h o u g h t s , feelings, and behavior. W h e n o n e ' s t h o u g h t s a n d feelings are experienced as e v e n t s or forces that simply h a p p e n , one c a n n o t be conflicted. O n e can fear, bemoan, or yearn for specific internal and external e v e n t s (e.g., a primitive tribesman might beseech t h e gods for rain or fear t h e effects of his "evil e y e " on his child), but these are not internal conflicts of subjective desire. T h e impact of the Oedipus complex on the formation of psychological s t r u c t u r e is d e t e r m i n e d by the child's m e t h o d of attempting to resolve this conflict of subjective desire. If splitting and r e e n a c t m e n t are used as methods of

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defense against oedipal anxiety, limited psychological change occurs. T h e child endlessly keeps multiple poles of his conflicted wishes alive simultaneously (e.g., the boy's wish to be his m o t h e r ' s h u s b a n d and sexual p a r t n e r and his wish to be her child), and establishes a series of relationships with part-objects embodying each of t h e aspects of his u n r e n o u n c e d wishes. (See t h e case of Ms. H. described in Chapter 3 for an example of splitting used to manage oedipal desires.) W h e n one is able to maintain t h e whole-object relatedness, subjectivity, a n d historicity of t h e depressive position in the face of oedipal conflict, o n e ' s unwillingness to violate sacred p r o h i b i t i o n s in t h e acts of incest and parricide outweighs o n e ' s desire for t h e e n a c t m e n t of o n e ' s oedipal wishes. T h e context of this r e n u n c i a t i o n of oedipal strivings is b o t h i n t r a p s y c h i c and i n t e r p e r s o n a l . T h e p a r e n t s must both accept t h e child's wishes and protectively prohibit t h e m . T h e child's u n c o n s c i o u s sexual desires must be recognized by t h e p a r e n t s in order for t h e child to experience oedipal love as an i m p o r t a n t reflection of individuality, separateness, and consolidation of gender identity. T h e child's parricidal wishes m u s t also be recognized and accepted by t h e parents, because these, too, are wishes that help establish t h e foundation for t h e child's efforts to t r a n s c e n d psychologically his or her identity as a child and eventually become an adult and parent. " I n our role as children of our p a r e n t s , by g e n u i n e emancipation [in t h e process of mastering t h e Oedipus complex], we do kill s o m e t h i n g vital in t h e m [our p a r e n t s ] — n o t all in o n e blow and not in all respects, but c o n t r i b u t i n g to their dying. As p a r e n t s of o u r children we u n d e r g o t h e same fate, unless we diminish t h e m [by n o t allowing t h e m to grow u p ] " (Loewald, 1979, p. 395).

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But, of course, t h e r e is far more to the parental response to the child's Oedipus complex t h a n t h e recognition (and the particular type of acceptance described by Loewald) of the child's desires. T h e p a r e n t s must at the same time assist the child in his efforts at preserving his own and his p a r e n t s ' individual existences, which are t h r e a t e n e d by i n c e s t u o u s and parricidal wishes. In order to u n d e r s t a n d t h e n a t u r e of the role of t h e p a r e n t s in this situation, one must differentiate between prohibition and t h r e a t . A t h r e a t a t t e m p t s to induce compliance t h r o u g h t h e induction in t h e o t h e r of a fear of p u n i s h m e n t or retaliation. Prohibition need not include t h r e a t ; a danger sign on an electrical fuse box need not be experienced as t h r e a t e n i n g . U n d e r proper circumstances, the parents' oedipal prohibitions are offered and recognized as predominantly protective, caretaking injunctions that provide safety in the face of potential object-related dangers. Because t h e talion principle constitutes an important aspect of paranoid-schizoid morality, t h e parental prohibitions are universally distorted by the child and experienced in part as t h r e a t s (of castration and infanticide) that retaliate for t h e child's sexual and aggressive wishes. To the extent that parental prohibitions are experienced as threats, t h e child internalizes a primitively punitive superego. Polarization of t h e p u n i s h i n g and the p u n i s h e d , the endangering and t h e endangered is a form of splitting that does not involve m o u r n i n g and does not lead to successful resolution of t h e Oedipus complex. On t h e o t h e r h a n d , when parental prohibitions are unconsciously experienced as caretaking injunctions (albeit to a large extent unwelcome ones), identification with o n e ' s prohibiting p a r e n t s facilitates both the m o u r n i n g of the lost object relationship (e.g., the girl's r o m a n t i c , erotic

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relationship with her father) and t h e establishment of i n t e r n a l safety vis-a-vis o n e ' s sexual a n d aggressive desires. T h e r e n u n c i a t i o n of t h e girl's sexual and r o m a n t i c love for her father (or t h e b o y ' s love of his m o t h e r ) is not crisp and absolute (for that would reflect denial) and is perhaps better described as regretful resignation. T h e pain of this m o u r n i n g is to some e x t e n t mitigated by t h e indep e n d e n c e that t h e child achieves in t h e process. Oedipal love, like all acts of falling in love, h a s an addictive, driven quality. T h e r e is considerable relief for t h e latency-aged child in his or her release from t h e internal p r e s s u r e of being in love with a forbidden object. A degree of freedom from this intense and conflicted set of object relations allows t h e child t h e o p p o r t u n i t y to begin to develop a life separate from his or her parents. ' T h e identification with t h e prohibiting p a r e n t s that underlies t h e establishment of t h e superego is motivated largely by a wish to make r e p a r a t i o n s to o n e ' s parents, whom o n e loves a n d toward w h o m o n e feels guilt for o n e ' s m u r d e r o u s and i n c e s t u o u s wishes. In becoming like o n e ' s p a r e n t s by internalizing their u n c o n s c i o u s p r o h i b i t i o n s of o n e ' s sexual and aggressive strivings, o n e a t t e m p t s to make up for t h e fantasied incest and parricide. Paradoxically, t h r o u g h t h e same identificatory act, o n e moves toward completing the process of becoming i n d e p e n d e n t by providing o n e ' s own i n t e r n a l e n v i r o n m e n t of safety.

Summary T h e question of what lies " b e y o n d t h e depressive p o s i t i o n , " from the perspective developed in this c h a p t e r , is a question based on a misconception. T h e " d e p r e s s i o n " of the depressive position is not s o m e t h i n g that is over-

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come or worked t h r o u g h in order to get to a n o t h e r phase of development. Feelings of loss, guilt, sadness, remorse, compassion, e m p a t h y , and loneliness are b u r d e n s that are unavoidable if o n e is to become a historical h u m a n being in t h e depressive position. W h a t o n e gains is subjective h u m a n n e s s and the potential to be free to make choices. This is not a dilemma that one resolves: one is stuck with it, with all of its advantages and disadvantages, unless one regressively flees from it into t h e refuge and imprisonm e n t of the paranoid-schizoid position or t h r o u g h the use of manic defenses.

5 B e t w e e n

t h e

P a r a n o i d - S c h i z o i d t h e

D e p r e s s i v e

a n d

P o s i t i o n

I thought that A rgos and I participated in different universes; I thought that our perceptions were the same, but that he combined them in another way and made other objects of them; I thought that perhaps there were no objects for him, only a vertiginous and continuous play of extremely brief impressions. I thought of a world without memory, without time; 1 considered the possibility of a language without nouns, a language of impersonal verbs or indeclinable epithets. —forge Luis Borges, "The Immortal"

In this chapter I will, t h r o u g h a series of clinical vignettes, attempt to c a p t u r e s o m e t h i n g of t h e experience of moving between the paranoid-schizoid and t h e depressive positions. My examples are offered as illustrations of the ways in which t h e concepts of t h e paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions, as interpreted in t h e previous two chapters, 101

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serve to e n h a n c e t h e clinical work of t h e non-Kleinian therapist. 1 Before moving to t h e clinical material, I would like to outline a classification of psychopathology built u p o n t b e conceptualizations of t h e paranoid-schizoid and depressive states of being t h a t were developed in t h e p r e v i o u s chapters. T h i s conception of levels of psychopathology will serve as a background for t h e s u b s e q u e n t clinical discussion. (This classification r e p r e s e n t s a synthesis and extension of t h e work of Bion [1967], F r e u d [1896a, 1914, 1915b], Klein [1935, 1975], Fairbairn [1941, 1944, 1946], K e r n b e r g [1970], McDougall [1974], W i n n i c o t t [ 1 9 5 9 1964], and others.) T h e most developmentally advanced g r o u p (metaphorically, t h e " h i g h e s t level") of psychological disorders reflects conflict in the s p h e r e of personal m e a n i n g s (including desires) in a personality system that is s u f f i ciently developed for t h e individual's desires to be experienced as his own. T h e person is a subject as well as an object who experiences himself as a whole individual, c o n t i n u o u s in relation to himself and o t h e r s over time and space. T h e person lives in t h e realm of layered symbolic meanings. Paradigmatic of this level of psychopathology are the neuroses, which are u n d e r s t o o d in part as manifestations of conflicted oedipal meanings. In t h e psychopathology of conflicted personal meaning, o n e ' s desires—for example, a boy's sexual and filial feelings toward his m o t h e r — a r e experienced as painfully incompatible. Por-

•I would like to express my gratitude to the therapists whom I have supervised for discussing their clinical work with me in a way that has helped me greatly in developing and clarifying many of the ideas discussed in this chapter.

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tions of o n e ' s system of meanings are disowned and yet preserved by means of repression and related defenses, e.g., displacement, isolation of affect, intellectualization, and compromise s y m p t o m formation. In Kleinian terminology, this is the psychopathology developed in t h e depressive position. A second, more primitive g r o u p of psychological dist u r b a n c e s involves embattled " i m p e r s o n a l " meanings that are experienced as things in themselves. Desires are not experienced as o n e ' s own t h o u g h t s and feelings b u t , r a t h e r , as things or forces by which one is attacked, protected, drowned, suffocated, eaten alive, b u r n e d , or penetrated. Symbolization is in the form of symbolic equation. Subjectivity is in a r u d i m e n t a r y state of development, a n d therefore t h e self is predominantly t h e self as object that can do things and can be done to but that does not experience itself as t h e a u t h o r of desire or t h e i n t e r p r e t e r of experience. T h e psychoses are paradigmatic of this form of psychopathology, which is developed in the paranoid-schizoid position. In this schema, a very wide range of psychopathological states (including borderline conditions, pathological narcissism, severe character disorders, psychotic depression, manic-depressive illness, and perversions) are viewed as problems of balance and i n t e r c o m m u n i c a t i o n between depressive and paranoid-schizoid modes. In Chapter 8, these " d i s t u r b a n c e s of b a l a n c e " will be discussed as the breakdown of a dialectical relationship between reality and p h a n t a s y . A third g r o u p of mental disturbances (the "lowest l e v e l " of psychopathology) involves t h e foreclosure of meaning. T h i s is a realm of " n o n e x p e r i e n c e " in which potential t h o u g h t s and feelings are n e i t h e r attributed symbolic m e a n i n g as they are in t h e neuroses, nor given ex-

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istence as things as they are in t h e psychoses. Examples of this level of d i s t u r b a n c e include p s y c h o s o m a t i c illness (McDougall, 1974), alexithymia ( N e m i a h , 1977; Sifneos, 1972), and schizophrenic n o n e x p e r i e n c e (Bion, 1959, 1962a; Ogden, 1981). T h e person exists b u t , to t h e extent t h a t he has foreclosed meaning, he is psychologically dead. T h e psychotic patient has at least generated a psychological illness (albeit o n e in which feelings and ideas are treated as things), but even this r e p r e s e n t s an a d v a n c e over a state in which the strain that might have become experience is for example relegated to t h e realm of bodily illness (see McDougall, 1984a). It must be kept in mind that all t h r e e levels of psychopathology are p r e s e n t in every individual, and therefore that psychosomatic foreclosure of meaning may be a feature to consider in t h e t r e a t m e n t of both t h e n e u r o t i c and t h e psychotic patient. W i t h these schema as a r o u g h m e a n s for grouping forms of psychopathology, I t u r n now to a discussion of clinical material in which t h e p a t i e n t ' s mode of organizing experience and mode of object-relatedness shift as the patient moves between a p r e d o m i n a n t l y paranoid-schizoid and a p r e d o m i n a n t l y depressive state of being. As will be discussed, a corresponding shift is required in t h e therapist's way of listening, his way of conceptualizing t h e t h e r a p e u t i c interaction, and his mode of response to the patient.

Acute the

Regression

Paranoid-Schizoid

to Position

W h e n a patient is functioning in a p r e d o m i n a n t l y paranoid-schizoid mode, t h e t h e r a p e u t i c relationship does not develop in t h e context of a body of acknowledged, shared experience. In t h e e x t r e m e , t h e schizophrenic patient feels

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that a new therapist has appeared with each new feeling state (Searles, 1972). Mr. H., a single man in his early thirties, had suffered since adolescence from intense anxiety of a paranoid type. He had experienced periods of confusion in late adolescence and had been unable to work or attend college. In t h e course of intensive psychotherapy over a period of seven years, he had been able to graduate from college and handle a responsible job in t h e c o m p u t e r field. T h e patient had been born with a congenital heart defect that had alarmed his m o t h e r and had led her to " d o e v e r y t h i n g for him, but b r e a t h e . " Most of his developmental landmarks had been delayed. His father was excluded from the m o t h e r - c h i l d pair until the patient became schoolaged. At that point, the p a t i e n t ' s m o t h e r abruptly left t h e patient in t h e care of his father and a series of housekeepers. Mr. H.'s father made no secret of the fact that he experienced the patient as an " a l b a t r o s s " a r o u n d his neck. I n t h e therapy, the patient was very fearful of developing feelings of affection for, or dependence u p o n , t h e therapist. Mr. H. continually referred to t h e therapist as a "necessary evil, like bad-tasting m e d i c i n e . " In the initial years of t h e r a p y , Mr. H. led a schizoid existence with practically no real relationships, s u b s t i t u t i n g loud rock music, television, and m a s t u r b a t i o n for h u m a n contact. I will n o t focus h e r e on t h e process by which the patient progressed from his heavy reliance on schizoid withdrawal and c o m m u n i c a t i o n by means of projective identification to more m a t u r e object-relatedness. In the c o u r s e of this work the patient developed an i n t e n s e , ambivalent tie to t h e therapist. As this tie

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developed, t h e patient i n t e r m i t t e n t l y experienced homosexual anxiety. At one point, Mr. H. haltingly m e n t i o n e d t h a t a friend had c o m m e n t e d t h a t o n e man can like a n o t h e r man w i t h o u t it being a sign that they are homosexuals. T h e patient t h e n said, " I t just occ u r r e d to me t h a t t h e r e must be s o m e t h i n g like that going on h e r e , but if you ever remind me that I ' v e said it, I'll deny it. You know I will." In t h e latter part of t h e seventh year of t h e r a p y , a friend of the patient was in the process of terminating his therapy, which greatly h e i g h t e n e d t h e pat i e n t ' s anxiety about his feeling of d e p e n d e n c e u p o n t h e therapist. At t h e same time, the patient reported getting into fights with his boss as a result of what t h e patient perceived as the boss's i n c o m p e t e n c e . Mr. H. talked at great length a b o u t t h e fact that h e d i d n ' t give a d a m n if his boss tried to fire him because b o t h he and his boss knew t h a t t h e patient could get a new job a n y t i m e he wanted. T h e therapist, in this period of t h e work, began to experience the patient as " s t i c k y , " a feeling t h a t he understood as a reflection of the fear t h a t t h e patient might never be able to end this therapy and that t h e patient and therapist would "grow old tog e t h e r . " T h e therapist experienced a form of "claust r o p h o b i a " when with t h e patient. Only in retrospect, after t h e therapist sought c o n s u l t a t i o n on this case, did he come to u n d e r s t a n d this claustrophobia in t e r m s of a projective identification 2 on t h e part of t h e

Projective identification, although a primitive mode of defense and communication, is not exclusively a feature of the paranoid-schizoid position. Since paranoid-schizoid and depressive modes always coexist, projective identification is a potential facet of all psychological states and all forms of object-relatedness.

Between the Paranoid-Schizoid and the Depressive Position p a t i e n t , in which feelings c o n g r u e n t with those o f t h e p a t i e n t ' s b u r d e n e d and suffocated (internal object) father and m o t h e r were engendered in t h e therapist. S u c h feelings led to an intensification of t h e therapist's t h e n largely u n c o n s c i o u s fears of his own inclination (stemming from his own childhood) to cling fearfully to a withdrawing object. T h e result of t h e t h e r a p i s t ' s inability to manage this projective identification was a series of interventions reflecting t h e t h e r a p i s t ' s fearfulness of t h e pat i e n t ' s (and his own) wishes never to be independent of each o t h e r . For example, Mr. H. reported a dream in which t h e manifest c o n t e n t depicted t h e p a t i e n t ' s c h a n c e meeting of a former school teacher whom the patient had greatly admired. In t h e dream Mr. H. felt p r o u d of all t h a t he had accomplished, but he was afraid that t h e teacher did not really r e m e m b e r him. He was also afraid that t h e teacher had not fared well. Only in retrospect did the therapist u n d e r s t a n d t h e dream as an expression of the p a t i e n t ' s anxiety about completing therapy. T h i s had been represented in t h e dream by t h e fear of having been forgotten by the teacher (therapist), and in t h e anxiety about t h e welfare of t h e teacher (therapist) after the separation. At a n o t h e r point, the therapist drew Mr. H.'s a t t e n t i o n to t h e fact that t h e patient was now able to manage an aspect of his life that he had been unable to manage earlier. W h e n Mr. H. did finally m e n t i o n a t h o u g h t a b o u t " s o m e d a y " finishing therapy, t h e therapist c o m m e n t e d on Mr. H.'s vagueness. T h e cumulative effect of these and n u m e r o u s similar interventions was to exacerbate the p a t i e n t ' s anxiety about being found to be a destructive drain on t h e therapist, leading to t h e t h e r a p i s t ' s p r e m a t u r e t e r m i n a t i o n of the therapy.

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Over t h e weekend following t h e session in which t h e therapist had c o m m e n t e d on t h e p a t i e n t ' s vagueness with regard to t h o u g h t s about t e r m i n a t i o n , Mr. H. become floridly psychotic and was taken to a local emergency room. T h e therapist was notified and went to meet with t h e patient. Mr. H. was frightented of t h e therapist and asked not to be left in a r o o m alone with him. T h e patient was at times extremely agitated, yelling that t h e therapist was a d a n g e r o u s , devious man who had m u r d e r e d and chopped up dozens of patients and had buried t h e m u n d e r his office while p r e t e n d i n g to be a " r e s p e c t a b l e " doctor. T h e therapist a t t e m p t e d over a period of h o u r s to talk with t h e patient. At several points t h e therapist c o m m e n t e d on what had o c c u r r e d in t h e last session. He said that he felt t h a t Mr. H. must h a v e felt that t h e therapist was t r y i n g to get rid of t h e patient when they were discussing t h e p a t i e n t ' s reference to t e r m i n a t i o n . He said t h a t he u n d e r s t o o d t h a t this must h a v e felt dangerously close to Mr. H . ' s experience as a child when he had felt suddenly and absolutely cut off from his m o t h e r . T h e patient kept insisting that he was not going to be manipulated by t h e therapist's tricks, although he made n o effort to leave t h e r o o m . T h e therapist made reference to previous events in t h e t h e r a p y t h a t h e and t h e patient had weathered t o g e t h e r , but t h e patient said he considered this just a n o t h e r of t h e t h e r a p i s t ' s ploys. T h e therapist had the fantasy that t h e person he was talking to in t h e emergency room was not t h e same patient with whom he had worked over t h e previous seven years. Mr. H. refused to take any m e d i c a t i o n , n o r would he accept from t h e emergency r o o m staff t h e

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n a m e s of o t h e r t h e r a p i s t s w h o m he might consult. For the next four days, t h e patient remained in a paranoid state. T h e therapist was aware that Mr. H. was spending his t i m e in t h e neighborhood of t h e t h e r a p i s t ' s office, but the therapist made no effort either to speak to or to go o u t of his way to avoid t h e patient. Neither did he feel afraid o P t h e patient. Beginning on t h e second of these four days, t h e patient periodically sat in t h e t h e r a p i s t ' s waiting room when he knew that the therapist was not in t h e building. Mr. H. finally p h o n e d t h e therapist to ask to r e s u m e t h e r a p y . I n t h e first of these meetings, the patient seemed to be reacquainting himself with someo n e whom he had k n o w n years before and a t t e m p t i n g to d e t e r m i n e in what ways t h e o t h e r person had changed. His anger at and distrust of t h e therapist were present b u t not overwhelming. In t h e m o n t h s that followed, as t h e patient became able to reflect u p o n this period of t h e t h e r a p y , he said that in the emergency r o o m and for most of t h e week t h a t followed, he had felt certain t h a t t h e therapist had m u r d e r e d him and that he was his own ghost who was refusing to die. He had felt that his revenge on t h e therapist would be to h a u n t him and he guessed t h a t that was why he felt compelled to spend his time in t h e t h e r a p i s t ' s neighborhood. Mr. H. c o m m e n t e d again and again that he felt as if he were r e c o u n t i n g a d r e a m in r e m e m b e r i n g this period. T h e therapist had been like a figure in a n i g h t m a r e . T h e cause and effect relationships that he now saw seemed to him to be supplied in retrospect, since at t h e time he "did not do things for r e a s o n s , " he did what he did because he " h a d t o . " He said he could not really be certain what o c c u r r e d t h e n and what he

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was reading into it afterward. In fact, at times he was not s u r e w h e t h e r he was making it all u p retrospectively; he almost wished he were. Mr. H. said with some a m u s e m e n t t h a t his h a u n t i n g of t h e therapist had been a " b e n i g n h a u n t i n g , " because he had spent a good deal of his time cleaning u p papers from t h e street. T h e therapist told Mr. H. t h a t he u n d e r s t o o d how his c o m m e n t s had been h e a r d as reflecting t h e t h e r a p i s t ' s wish to get rid of Mr. H. and t h a t t h a t must h a v e been terrifying to him. T h e therapist also said t h a t he felt that t h e patient had fled as m u c h to protect t h e therapist from his anger as o u t of fear of being h u r t by him. After all, t h e patient had symbolically killed and exiled himself and set up a protective vigil for t h e therapist. In t h e period prior to t h e onset of t h e psychosis, Mr. H. had a t t e m p t e d to utilize m a n i c defenses, i n c l u d i n g denial of d e p e n d e n c e , devaluation of t h e object, and omnipotent phantasies of replacing o n e object by a n o t h e r . In this period, Mr. H . ' s boss served as a t r a n s f e r e n c e displacement object. W h e n t h e patient n o longer was able to maintain a manic defense, a full-blown regression resulted. Mr. H. t h e n engaged in a radical rewriting of history in his flight from t h e fears of object loss and d e s t r u c t i o n of t h e therapist (a heretofore ambivalently loved object). T h e therapist was physically recognizable, but was an emotionally different e n t i t y , n o longer a h u m a n being who had shared a body of experience with t h e patient. Instead, t h e r e was a discovery of a new t r u t h that changed e v e r y t h i n g . T h e therapist was felt to h a v e been u n m a s k e d as an imposter. In this state, t h e fearfully anticipated loss of t h e therapist at t h e end of t h e r a p y and

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t h e fear of h a r m i n g t h e therapist were transformed into a series of assaults and c o u n t e r a s s a u l t s between endangered and endangering objects. In retrospect, the p a t i e n t ' s c o m m e n t that he would deny his affectionate-sexual interest in the therapist if later called u p o n to acknowledge it, can be heard as a wish t h a t history could be defensively negated. In the depressive position, this disavowal entails an u n c o n s c i o u s act of hiding and preserving an aspect of oneself in relation to a n o t h e r person (i.e., repression). In t h e p a t i e n t ' s regression to t h e paranoid-schizoid position, this disavowal became m u c h more profound and involved a wholesale rewriting of history (based u p o n splitting), t h e r e b y r e n d e r i n g d i s c o n t i n u o u s t h e patient and his experience with others. T h e present was projected backward and forward in time, destroying history as an evolving process and creating a timeless present. Each new affective state was experienced as t h e discovery of t h e t r u t h which t h e n discredited previous experience as false illusion. At this point, I would like to draw a t t e n t i o n to two facets of t h e technical handling of the case. First, in handling t h e regression to the paranoid-schizoid position, transference interpretation was attempted and its efficacy evaluated. I believe that t h e interpretation of t h e meaning of t h e regression as a response to t h e p a t i e n t ' s fear of a b a n d o n m e n t and his wish to retaliate, was accurate. However, since t h e patient was at t h a t point minimally able to differentiate internal and external reality, his capacity to utilize verbal interpretation was quite limited. T h e utilization of interpretation involves an act of mediation between symbol and symbolized by a subject who experiences himself as distinct from both. However, even in profound regression, t h e r e is almost always an aspect of personality t h a t r e m a i n s capable of s u c h differentiation

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(except in full-blown manic a n d paranoid states). For this reason, interpretation plays a role in t h e t r e a t m e n t of all phases of regression (see Boyer, 1983; Boyer and Giovacchini, 1967). S e c o n d , t h e t h e r a p i s t ' s c o n t i n u e d p r e s e n c e d u r i n g an extended interview, despite t h e p a t i e n t ' s attacks u p o n h i m , served a c o n t a i n i n g function for t h e p a t i e n t ' s psychotic experience. T h e fact that t h e patient felt on t h e verge of disintegration was r e p r e s e n t e d in his delusion of t h e chopped-up patient buried u n d e r t h e t h e r a p i s t ' s office. T h e t h e r a p i s t ' s nonretaliative a t t e m p t s to u n d e r s t a n d t h e p a t i e n t ' s experience offered Mr. H. access to an integrating interaction. T h e patient did not flee from t h e r o o m nor did he accept medications or t h e s u b s t i t u t i o n of a n o t h e r therapist. Instead, he made use of t h e therapist as' a containing presence 3 (both d u r i n g t h e interview and later by sitting in t h e t h e r a p i s t ' s waiting room and spending his time near the therapist's office) as opposed to using t h e therapist as an idealized, protective object or as a persecutory object. Mr. H . ' s use of t h e therapist as a c o n t a i n i n g p r e s e n c e facilitated his reintegration and r e t u r n to t h e therapist as object. At t h a t point t h e same i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s were offerred that had been made in t h e emergency r o o m , but because the patient now had m o r e fully reemerged as subject, he could participate in a different way in t h e process of using symbols to mediate between himself and his immediate lived experience.

3

The idea of a relationship to a containing presence is only hinted at by Klein (1955). This notion was made central by Winnicott and will be discussed in Chapter 7.

Between the Paranoid-Schizoid and the Depressive Position A Foray

into

the

Depressive

113

Position

T h e i m p o r t a n c e to clinical practice of t h e recognition of the features of paranoid-schizoid and depressive modes of processing experience is not restricted to t h e management of d r a m a t i c regressions of the type just described. Some patients oscillate between t h e two psychological organizations in almost every session. However, as in the case that will now be described, forays into a depressive mode may be quite striking when they emerge from a background of long periods of part-object relatedness in which t h e therapist has hardly ever been acknowledged as a subject. A therapist had been meeting with Mr. L. early in the m o r n i n g , before regular h o u r s . T h i s a r r a n g e m e n t had become necessary when the patient took a new job. In t h e two-and-one-half years of these early meetings, Mr. L.'s only acknowledgment of this h o u r was an occasional complaint about the i n c o n v e n i e n c e that these a p p o i n t m e n t s had caused him. It therefore came as a surprise to t h e therapist when the patient said one m o r n i n g that he felt somewhat embarrassed by his previous blindness to t h e fact that t h e therapist also had been inconvenienced by the early app o i n t m e n t s . Mr. L. worried that he might be "missi n g " t h i n g s that are obvious to other people and that this might p u t him at a disadvantage socially and in getting ahead at work. T h e patient had regularly engaged in r a t h e r r u t h l e s s relations with women and business colleagues. He felt that this was " t h e way things are d o n e " and r a t h e r blithely, guiltlessly, and unapologetically conducted his life in that way. T h e therapist did not c o m m e n t at this point on

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t h e p a t i e n t ' s observation about himself. However, t h e idea that t h e patient might be " m i s s i n g " s o m e t h i n g was over time used by t h e patient as t h e h u b of a n e t w o r k of ideas to which he would periodically ret u r n . T h e meanings for Mr. L. o f t h e word " m i s s i n g " became broadened in t h e c o u r s e of this work to include not only the idea of failing to perceive somet h i n g he could use in his " d e a l i n g s " with o t h e r s , but also the idea of missing out on a set of feelings that o t h e r people feel. This ultimately led to a sense that a part of himself was missing. T h e fleeting e m p a t h y d e m o n s t r a t e d by t h e patient at the point in t h e r a p y just described reflected t h e beginning of a capacity for an awareness of t h e subjectivity of a n o t h e r person. T h e following is a n o t h e r example of t h e beginning of m o v e m e n t from t h e paranoid-schizoid to the depressive position, this time reflected in t h e altered type of reparation t h e patient a t t e m p t s in t h e transference. Ms. C. regularly expressed her dissatisfaction with the therapy and t h e therapist b u t brought t h e therapist an a n n u a l C h r i s t m a s gift. Even t h o u g h t h e patient had been railing at t h e therapist t h e p r e v i o u s day, e v e r y t h i n g was different on t h e day she b r o u g h t the gift. T h e r e was an air of joviality that was jolting to t h e therapist even after this had h a p p e n e d for several years. T h e therapist experienced t h e gifts as " T r o j a n h o r s e s , " angry d e m a n d s for submission in the guise of a peace offering. Each time t h e C h r i s t m a s gift was given, t h e therapist interpreted the p a t i e n t ' s resistance to consider-

Between the Paranoid-Schizoid and the Depressive Position ing t h e m e a n i n g of t h e gift giving. T h e patient unconsciously viewed these resistance i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s as indications that t h e reparative wish had not been recognized or accepted. As a result, t h e patient would immediately become infuriated and would s t u b b o r n l y refuse to give any t h o u g h t at all to t h e therapist. T h e therapist was correct that t h e r e was a demand being made by t h e patient that her o m n i p o t e n t wishes be accepted without modification. However, t h e therapist's failure to recognize and acknowledge t h e fact t h a t t h e wish was in part reparative led t h e patient to defensively withdraw the gesture and s u b s t i t u t e raw hostility. In t h e fourth year of t h e r a p y , the therapist was s u d d e n l y called away for two weeks because of t h e death of a relative. T h i s was t h e only time t h a t t h e therapist had had to cancel Ms. C.'s therapy h o u r s on s h o r t notice. T h e therapist p h o n e d t h e patient and told her that s o m e t h i n g unexpected had occurred and t h a t she would be away for two weeks. W h e n t h e therapist r e t u r n e d , Ms. C brought some food that she had baked. T h e food itself was not the gift. T h e gift was t h e p a t i e n t ' s willingness to attempt to talk about t h e m e a n i n g of t h e p r e s e n t . Formerly, t h e gift itself had t h e magical function of makings things right, clearing the air, and creating good feeling. Now t h e patient seemed to sense that t h e object given was inert and t h a t her effort to express reparative concern for the therapist must be located in an intersubjective process of offering something of herself to the therapist as a separate person with her own subjectivity. Earlier in the t h e r a p y , this patient could not

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h a v e empathized sufficiently with t h e therapist to h a v e k n o w n what t h e therapist might h a v e w a n t e d . T h e therapist had been treated almost entirely as an externalization of o n e or m o r e of t h e p a t i e n t ' s internal objects. In the giving of t h e gift following t h e t h e r a p i s t ' s absence, t h e patient seemed to h a v e genuinely given s o m e t h i n g to the t h e r a p i s t , s o m e t h i n g that she had created (food t h a t she had cooked a n d t h o u g h t s that she had t h o u g h t ) a n d therefore, symbolically, had given s o m e t h i n g of herself. Also, o n e might speculate t h a t the gift of food had particular e m p a t h i c significance in that it might have reflected t h e p a t i e n t ' s c o n s c i o u s or u n c o n s c i o u s suspicion t h a t a death had occurred and t h a t t h e therapist might be comforted by food, as in the oral symbolism manifested in a wake. On the occasion of t h e p a t i e n t ' s giving of t h e food and t h e a t t e n d a n t associations, t h e therapist simply t h a n k e d t h e p a t i e n t a n d did n o t i n t e r p r e t resistance to further associations. T h i s resulted in t h e p a t i e n t ' s feeling t h a t her wish to m a k e up for what she had done (and t h o u g h t ) had been accepted by t h e therapist. T h e shared e x p e r i e n c e could be and was discussed later. W h e n s u b s e q u e n t gifts were offered, the therapist did n o t immediately i n t e r p r e t t h e associated resistances. T h e earlier i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of resist a n c e represented a disguised c o u n t e r a t t a c k on t h e part of t h e therapist and therefore was itself a part of a t r a n s f e r e n c e - c o u n t e r t r a n s f e r e n c e acting o u t . It is u n f o r t u n a t e when a therapist feels obligated to i n t e r p r e t immediately either t h e expressive or t h e resistant facet of transference acting out or acting in. It may take m o n t h s or years before this can be d o n e

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in a p r o d u c t i v e way, but that delay does not necessarily mean t h a t o n e is involved in a t h e r a p y that att e m p t s only to be a corrective emotional experience.

The

Creation

of Psychic

Reality

A different mode of analytic work b e c o m e s possible as t h e space between symbol and symbolized is created in t h e course of t h e r a p y . T h e capacity to make this differentiation enables t h e patient to view his t h o u g h t s , feelings, perceptions, and behavior as c o n s t r u c t i o n s , as opposed to impersonal registrations of fact. Only w h e n o n e ' s behavior is viewed (at least in part) as a personal symbolic construction can o n e be c u r i o u s about why o n e does what o n e does, how o n e does it, with whom o n e does it, and when o n e does it. A bulimic patient became aware for t h e first t i m e after a year of t h e r a p y that t h e r e was an irony in t h e fact t h a t she came to t h e r a p y at a great "sacrifice" of time, m o n e y , and effort in order to rid herself of her bulimia, and yet carefully arranged to have time to " b i n g e " after each therapy h o u r . Earlier in t h e therapy, she simply had done these things a n d had never consciously t h o u g h t about it. W i t h t h e psychological shift reflected in t h e awareness of t h e irony involved in her behavior, it became possible to utilize t h e p a t i e n t ' s repeated references to t h e potential power of her aggressiveness, demandingness and controllingness to help her u n d e r s t a n d t h e way in which d e v o u r i n g food after t h e meetings had served in the p a t i e n t ' s (unconscious) mind to protect t h e therapist

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from being eaten alive by t h e patient. W h a t had been s o m e t h i n g h a p p e n i n g to t h e patient (a need to binge) became her wish (to eat in a particular way) t h a t served to deflect d a n g e r o u s feelings from t h e therapist and t h e r e b y safeguard t h e relationship with t h e therapist. F r e u d ' s (1932) s t a t e m e n t of t h e analytic goal, " W h e r e it was, t h e r e I shall be (or shall be b e c o m i n g ) " {"WoEs war, solllch werden")*, is an eloquent description of t h e experiential shift involved in t h e m o v e m e n t from a paranoid-schizoid to a depressive state. In this light, t h e goal of psychoanalysis is t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of t h a t w h i c h had been an impersonal event (it) t h a t is h a p p e n i n g to m e (e.g., an anxiety " a t t a c k , " a " w a v e " of depression, an irresistible " n e e d " to binge, to take drugs, to put oneself in physical danger), into an experience that has a quality of " I - n e s s . " For example, a compulsion to starve myself t h a t has been an irresistible urgent need may come to be experienced as s o m e t h i n g I am doing, and doing in a particular way because I am convinced (for r e a s o n s t h a t I may come to u n d e r s t a n d ) t h a t if I starve myself, I will not be accused or accuse myself of being greedy, or perverse, o r m u r d e r o u s . Oral deprivation is a n expression of m y belief that eating will result in my h a v i n g a body of a feared weight, shape, size, t e x t u r e , or odor, all of which are shameful signs of what I h a v e d o n e , t h e way I h a v e

*This statement was mistranslated by Strachey as "Where id was, there ego shall be" (Freud, 1932, p. 80). Freud (1926) explicitly cautioned against the use of "orotund Greek names" (p. 195) for the labeling of these everyday experiences of self and of inanimate nonself (within ourselves).

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done it, a n d the r e a s o n s for which I have done it. In the process of " i t " becoming " m e , " it becomes possible for me to u n d e r s t a n d why I hold so tightly to this conviction, how I developed t h e conviction, and t h e n a t u r e of t h e pain t h a t I would feel in relinquishing it.

Oedipal-Level and

Transference Countertransference

Often when a patient has begun to e n t e r a realm of experience that is p r e d o m i n a n t l y of a depressive quality, oedipal c o n t e n t emerges in t h e transference a n d c o u n t e r t r a n s ference. T h e feelings involved in t h e oedipal situation, e.g., ambivalent triangular object ties, guilt, jealousy, and rivalry are reflections of t h e fact that t h e development of t h e capacity for whole object-relatedness is well u n d e r way. T h e r e a r e primitive p r e c u r s o r s of such experience in t h e paranoid-schizoid position, e.g., envy of t h e possessions of t h e object. However, the quality of experience in t h e paraniod-schizoid position is quite different from t h e oedipal situation developed in t h e depressive position. For example, the anxiety and guilt involved in wishing to defeat a n d m u r d e r t h e same person o n e loves is a n entirely different experience from that of wishing to destroy or steal valued (envied) c o n t e n t s of a split-off bad object. A therapist had been seeing Ms. D. in intensive psyc h o t h e r a p y for about five years. T h e therapy had been a p r o d u c t i v e one, a n d t h e patient, who had initially been diagnosed as schizophrenic, had begun to relate and function in increasingly m a t u r e ways. T h e analytic work had centered a r o u n d the patient's

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fears of melting into, taking over, or being taken over by t h e therapist. Ms. D. had gone t h r o u g h periods of intense rage toward t h e therapist, some of which were experienced in t h e form of shrieking in t h e sessions. A great deal of t h e anger, h o w e v e r , was displaced o n t o Ms. D.'s h u s b a n d , with w h o m t h e patient engaged in violent physical fights. P r i m i t i v e sexual feelings were disguised as, and confused with, anger in these fights. T h e r e also had been long periods over t h e c o u r s e of this t h e r a p y in which Ms. D. had fearfully w i t h d r a w n from t h e therapist and had sat silently d u r i n g m a n y of t h e s e meetings. T h e c o n s u m i n g intensity of t h e transference feelings was u n d e r s t o o d and i n t e r p r e t e d as a repetition of aspects of t h e p a t i e n t ' s relationship with her m o t h e r . Ms. D.'s m o t h e r , a chronically depressed w o m a n , relied heavily u p o n t h e patient as a receptacle into which to d u m p her misery. S h e would also periodically fly i n t o rages at t h e patient. In t h e c o u r s e of t h e r a p y , Ms. D. came to u n d e r s t a n d her role in unconsciously provoking her m o t h e r ' s rages as a way of consolidating t h e b o n d with her m o t h e r when she became a n x i o u s that h e r m o t h e r was "drifting a w a y . " In t h e fifth year of t h e r a p y , t h e therapist began to be aware t h a t , a l t h o u g h h e had enjoyed working with this patient, he was now for t h e first time finding t h e patient sexually attractive. D u r i n g this period, Ms. D. reported no d r e a m s (in s h a r p contrast to t h e p r e v i o u s a b u n d a n c e of dream material) and seemed to be coyly secretive as opposed to being angrily or fearfully w i t h d r a w n . In t h e initial years of t h e r a p y , t h e patient had felt painfully weak and inadequate in comparison to t h e therapist and h e r h u s b a n d , b o t h of whom s h e

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idealized as powerful, protective men. T h e patient had derived no pleasure from either foreplay or sexual i n t e r c o u r s e with her h u s b a n d , b u t did enjoy t h e cuddling that preceded and followed sex. I n t h e period t h a t followed t h e t h e r a p i s t ' s initial awareness of t h e p a t i e n t ' s sexual attractiveness, t h e p a t i e n t ' s a t t i t u d e toward sex shifted dramatically. She began to complain that her h u s b a n d was clumsy and insensitive sexually. She had fantasies d u r i n g i n t e r c o u r s e with her h u s b a n d of having sex with other men. Ms. D. began seriously to consider leaving h e r h u s b a n d . D u r i n g this period t h e patient experienced intense anxiety when in the presence of any m a n , including t h e therapist. She felt that t h e anxiety derived from a fear of being seen to have sexual t h o u g h t s a n d feelings. She imagined that she would feel humiliated if a n y o n e knew that she had sexual feelings, even t h o u g h she intellectually knew that s u c h feelings were universal. Eventually t h e patient began to realize that it was her wish for a sexual relationship with t h e therapist t h a t would be t h e most humiliating revelation. She felt that it would be humiliating in large part because it would be unreciprocated and that she would feel like a pathetic fool. T h e p a t i e n t , to this point in t h e r a p y , had said extremely little about her father, b u t d u r i n g this period s h e discussed what she had been told about her father's desertion of the family when she was just u n d e r 2 years of age. T h e father had remarried and maintained contact with t h e patient in an unpredictable way t h r o u g h o u t her childhood and adult life. Her relationship with him was characterized by an idealization of his new family, from which t h e patient felt painfully excluded. T h e patient c o n n e c t e d her fear of

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being a fool in relation to t h e therapist with her feeling t h a t her affection toward h e r father h a d been either unrecognized or u n v a l u e d . T h i s work had t h e familiar ring of t h e beginning of the analysis of whole-object-related oedipal transference feelings. However, an analysis of t h e material exclusively at this level would h a v e been incomplete. T h e r e was a form of e n a c t m e n t that s u r r o u n d e d this self-reflective analytic work that c o m m u n i c a t e d a n o t h e r level of meaning. T h i s phase of the work was continually p u n c t u a t e d by crises. For example, Ms. D. would call t h e therapist in t h e late evening choking on her tears, saying t h a t s h e was feeling u n a b l e to b r e a t h e because of i n t e n s e anxiety a b o u t going off alone to work t h e following day. S h e was b e h i n d in her work and felt completely " u n p r e p a r e d " to face it again. T h e therapist in this instance told the patient that he felt that she must have felt u n p r e p a r e d for t h e feelings that she had had d u r i n g t h e session that day and that she was afraid s h e could not manage t h o s e feelings on her own until t h e next meeting. In the next meeting two days later, Ms. D. said that she had felt a n n o y e d at t h e therapist for asking her to do s o m e t h i n g (i.e., t h i n k a b o u t what had happened in the meeting), when her i n t e n t i o n in calling him was to get him to do s o m e t h i n g for h e r . However, at the same time, she noticed that her anger had served as a distraction from, and therefore as a relief from, the anxiety and fear that she had been feeling. In t h e course of their p h o n e c o n v e r s a t i o n , she could feel herself breathing m o r e easily. She said that t h e more she t h o u g h t about it, t h e m o r e she wondered w h e t h e r the therapist had intended this effect. She was aware that if this were so, she would again be

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falling into an intense dependence upon the therapist and she did n o t want to feel that this was the case. T h e therapist noted, but did not interpret to the patient, that she had defensively transformed her disappointment and annoyance into magical idealization. •Crises d u r i n g this period of t h e therapy could be u n d e r s t o o d as reflections of anxiety generated in the face of conflicted t r a n s f e r e n c e feelings, p r e d o m i n a n t l y of an oedipal n a t u r e . Enacted in t h e crises was a flight from whole-object relations by means of a re-creation of unmediated sensory closeness t h a t is involved in primitive object-relatedness characteristic of t h e paranoid-schizoid position. In a p r e d o m i n a n t l y depressive mode, ideas, feelings, and dreams a r e placed in t h e analytic space between patient and therapist for both to reflect upon and to experience. In c o n t r a s t , crises are not events that stand between separate people. T h e y are events in which t h e patient and therapist are " i n it t o g e t h e r . " At o n e point in a crisis t h e patient asked t h e therapist, " W h a t are we going to d o ? " Crises were an effort to reestablish an u n m e d i a t e d sensory closeness; t h e patient desperately missed such closeness while functioning in a m a t u r e mode of relatedness involving intimacy mediated by the separateness of subjects using symbols for c o m m u n i c a t i o n and for self-reflection. T h e inevitable isolation of whole-object relatedness (the anxiety of going off alone to work or of managing feelings alone between sessions) was part of what the patient felt " u n p r e p a r e d for.' T h u s , this phase of Ms. D.'s psychotherapy was characterized by advances in the development of t h e depressive mode, i n c l u d i n g t h e elaboration of whole-objectrelated oedipal transferences and c o u n t e r t r a n s f e r e n c e s .

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Defensive regression to t h e paranoid-schizoid mode was motivated by a flight from conflicted personal oedipal m e a n i n g s and a flight from t h e inevitable distance/isolation e n c o u n t e r e d in t h e symbolically mediated quality of experience in t h e depressive position. T h e Oedipus complex facilitates t h e triangularization of experience. Lacan (1957, 1961; see also Lemaire, 1970) h a s discussed t h e way in which t h e name-of-the-father as carrier of symbols and names serves as t h e essential intermediary between m o t h e r and infant. W i t h o u t t h e thirdness i n t r o d u c e d by t h e child's u n c o n s c i o u s identification with t h e father, and w i t h o u t t h e system of symbols provided by language, t h e infant would n e v e r be able to distance himself from his m o t h e r or from his own experience sufficiently to engage in mediated (self-reflective) experience. T h e following clinical material, taken from t h e psyc h o t h e r a p y of a seriously disturbed, borderline w o m a n , provides a second illustration of t h e role of t h e oedipal configuration in the process of individuation in t h e depressive position. Ms. N., a 27-year-old college s t u d e n t , had been bulimic for five years prior to t h e beginning of t h e r a p y , which had commenced when she was 21 years old. T h e bulimia c o n t i n u e d t h r o u g h t h e first four years of t h e r a p y , at which point t h e patient e n t e r e d into an erotized r o m a n t i c relationship with a college professor a b o u t t h i r t y years h e r senior. T h e relationship, which was in its second year at t h e time being focused u p o n h e r e , was never explicitly sexual. T h e following excerpt is taken from a session in t h e fifth year of therapy.

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T h e patient began the session by telling t h e therapist that a great deal had happened since they had last met two days earlier and that the therapist should j u s t sit back and listen. T h e patient told t h e therapist that d u r i n g t h e previous day she had been studying in t h e park and had talked with a very h a n d s o m e man a few years older t h a n she. Ms. N. wondered w h e t h e r t h e therapist was jealous of t h e interest being shown in t h e patient and even suspected she might be trying to make t h e therapist jealous. Before class, on t h e m o r n i n g of this session, Ms. N. had chatted with the teacher with whom she was infatuated. S h e had told him about t h e man in the park, but had exaggerated her involvement with him. Later in t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n , she coquettishly had asked him if he would "give her a w a y " in t h e wedding if she married t h e man in the park. He had said, "Yes, but reluctantly." T h e teacher was at t h e time organizing an academic committee and asked t h e patient along with several o t h e r s t u d e n t s to participate in it. T h e patient offered an excuse for not becoming a member of t h e c o m m i t t e e even t h o u g h she felt she would very m u c h like to have done so. She felt she could not participate because t h e c o m m i t t e e was to meet at a time that she regularly set aside for her elaborate rituals that preceded her bingeing and vomiting episodes. Ms. N. t h e n cried and beseeched t h e therapist not to attempt to get her to give u p her bingeing and vomiting because she did not feel she could live without it. Ms. N. had begun this meeting by asking that the therapist not interfere while t h e patient played with ro-

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m a n t i c oedipal d a y d r e a m s in the t h e r a p i s t ' s presence. T h e patient was in part aware of her efforts to make t h e t h e r a p i s t / m o t h e r jealous, but was u n a w a r e that she was a t t e m p t i n g to s e c u r e t h e permission of t h e therapist to be interested in a n y o n e o t h e r t h a n the therapist. (Symbolically, t h e patient was asking for her m o t h e r ' s blessing for her wish to engage in an oedipal r o m a n c e with her father.) T h e professor with whom t h e patient was flirting intuitively took t h e role of a devoted father in the t h r o e s of a r o m a n c e with his d a u g h t e r , a r o m a n c e t h a t he knows, and in part regrets, m u s t not become overtly sexual and which m u s t end by his being replaced by a n o t h e r man. T h e patient coyly teased t h e teacher with stories a b o u t a younger m a n , to which t h e professor jealously responded with an invitation of his own. T h e professor's acting out of t h e p a t i e n t ' s p h a n t a s y was in part gratifying and in part frightening to t h e patient. T h e r o m a n c e with a transference father served as an essential wedge between t h e m o t h e r / t h e r a p i s t and daught e r / p a t i e n t . T h e emotional p r e s e n c e of t h e father introduced t h i r d n e s s , a vantage point outside of t h e m o t h e r infant dyad. T h i s t h i r d n e s s offered t h e possibility of a perspective from which t h e d a u g h t e r might (by identification) view herself a n d her relationship with her m o t h e r . In this sense, t h e O e d i p u s complex is t h e exit from t h e nonreflective, twoness of t h e paranoid-schizoid position. However, Ms. N. was deeply divided about making use of this exit. In effect, she told herself and her transference father (the professor) that her loyalty to her i n t e r n a l object m o t h e r came first. She was not willing or able to give up t h e tie to t h e internal object m o t h e r (represented in t h e bulimic symptomatology) sufficiently to make room for a third. T h i s primitive tie to t h e i n t e r n a l object-mother

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is not at all comparable to t h e tie to t h e father or m o t h e r in t h e oedipal situation. T h e m o t h e r of bingeing and vomiting is a m o t h e r of bodily functions who is inseparable from oneself, whom one d e v o u r s , mixes with o n e ' s blood, and t h e n partially vomits out in order not to disappear into her or be taken over by h e r . T h i s is t h e m o t h e r to w h o m t h e patient is conflictedly loyal, enslaved, and enmeshed. T h e therapist as oedipal object-mother t h r e a t e n s to interfere with a m o r e primitive tie to the internal object-mother related to in t h e act of bingeing and vomiting, and formerly related to in t h e symbiotic transference to t h e therapist. T h e patient begged the oedipal objectm o t h e r / t h e r a p i s t not to insist t h a t she give up t h e tie to t h e m o r e primitive, internal object-mother. T h e i n t r o d u c t i o n by t h e patient of r o m a n t i c / s e x u a l feelings for t h e teacher reflected the introduction of thirdness, b o t h in t h e realm of object relations and in t h e arena of symbol formation. Ms. N. at the same time as she developed a " c r u s h " on her teacher, became c u r i o u s about t h e meanings of experience (e.g., her bingeing). T h e patient, as interpreting subject, could serve as a third entity interposed between symbol and symbolized, i.e., between her t h o u g h t s (her symbolic c o n s t r u c t i o n s ) and t h a t which s h e was t h i n k i n g about (the symbolized). As in t h e case of Ms. D. described earlier, t h e patient was deeply torn by t h e prospect of t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of t h i r d n e s s . T h i r d n e s s offered relief from t h e feeling of painful e n t r a p m e n t in t h e d e p e n d e n c e u p o n the therapist; at t h e same time, t h e r e was an i n t e n s e sense of loss involved in giving u p the feeling of unmediated relatedness that had been experienced in the m o r e primitive relationship to t h e m o t h e r / t h e r a p i s t . T h e pain involved in the r e n u n c i a t i o n of this (phantasied) life-sustaining form

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of relatedness is a significant part of what is depressive about t h e " d e p r e s s i v e " position. The Creation of Reflective

Distance

Still a n o t h e r clinical feature of the e n t r y into t h e depressive position is t h e sense of development of reflective distance from oneself, in which " I " can observe " m e . " A patient described her experience prior to this development as a " f l u r r y of a c t i v i t y " : A friend who had not seen m e for a b o u t a year told m e t h a t until today h e felt t h a t when he looked into my eyes he could see right t h r o u g h me. I know what he means. W h a t you saw was what you got. 'He was not intending to be insulting. I used to strike him as honest and straightforward and he liked t h a t . H e ' s not so s u r e he likes me being m o r e m y s t e r i o u s , maybe even deceptive. I t ' s not as if I ' m off in t h e c o r n e r observing myself. T h e awareness of myself and the doing are in t h e same place. I can feel t h e wind against t h e backs of my calves when I walk. It's not that I never used to think about myself or be self-reflective, b u t this is different. T h e r e is me and t h e r e is s o m e t h i n g inside m e , not something, but s o m e o n e , but since that s o m e o n e is inside me, I can have some idea who it is and n o t just be it. Sometimes this is c o n n e c t e d with a feeling that it's a physical space inside my body, but it's s o m e t i m e s in my head or isn't located any specific place in my body. I t ' s a feeling, not a place, but it feels like a place.

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Comments

T h e s e clinical a c c o u n t s have been offered in an attempt to provide a sense of t h e way in which a conceptualization of paranoid-schizoid and depressive modes of experience may serve to help t h e therapist organize clinical data. T h e use of these ideas, it is hoped, will facilitate e m p a t h y with " t h e i t " while t h e therapist facilitates the p a t i e n t ' s efforts to more fully become a subject.

6 I n t e r n a l

O b j e c t

R e l a t i o n s

Object relations t h e o r y , often e r r o n e o u s l y t h o u g h t to be an exclusively interpersonal t h e o r y that diverts a t t e n t i o n from t h e u n c o n s c i o u s , is in fact fundamentally a t h e o r y of u n c o n s c i o u s i n t e r n a l 1 object relations in d y n a m i c interplay with c u r r e n t interpersonal experience. T h e analysis of i n t e r n a l object relations centers upon the exploration of t h e relationship between internal objects and the ways in which t h e patient resists altering these u n c o n s c i o u s internal object relations in t h e face of c u r r e n t experience. Classical t h e o r y does not include a concept of internal objects. Instead t h e r e are related and, in part, overlapping concepts of m e m o r y traces, mental r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of self and object, introjects, identifications, and psychic structures. It is t h e thesis of this chapter that t h e "internalizat i o n " of an object relationship necessarily involves a splitL

In this chapter, the term "internal" will be used to refer not to a geographic locale, but to an intrapersonal event (i.e., an event involving a single personality system) as opposed to an interpersonal interaction involving two or more people. 131

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ting of t h e ego 2 into parts t h a t , when repressed, c o n s t i t u t e internal objects which stand in a particular u n c o n s c i o u s relationship to o n e a n o t h e r . T h i s internal relationship is shaped by t h e n a t u r e of t h e original object r e l a t i o n s h i p but does not by any means bear a one-to-one correspondence to it, and is potentially modifiable by s u b s e q u e n t experience. T h e internal object relationship may be later reexternalized by m e a n s of projection and projective identification in an interpersonal setting, t h u s g e n e r a t i n g t h e transference and c o u n t e r t r a n s f e r e n c e p h e n o m e n a of analysis and all o t h e r interpersonal interactions. I further propose that internal objects be t h o u g h t of as dynamically u n c o n s c i o u s suborganizations of t h e ego capable of generating m e a n i n g and experience, i.e., capable of t h o u g h t , feeling, and perception. T h e s e suborganizations stand in u n c o n s c i o u s relationships to o n e a n o t h e r and include (1) self-suborganizations of ego, i.e., aspects of the ego in which the person more fully experiences his ideas and feelings as his own, and (2) object suborganizations of ego, t h r o u g h which m e a n i n g s are generated in a mode based u p o n an identification of an aspect of t h e ego with t h e object. T h i s identification with t h e object is so t h o r o u g h t h a t o n e ' s original sense of self is almost entirely lost. This conception of i n t e r n a l object relations goes well beyond t h e classical notion of self and object m e n t a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s (see H a r t m a n n , 1964; Jacobson, 1964; 2

The term ego will be used to refer to an aspect of personality capable of generating conscious and unconscious psychological meanings including perceptual meanings, cognitive meanings, and emotional meanings. As development proceeds, this aspect of personality becomes increasingly capable not only of organizing and linking individual meanings in the process of thinking, remembering,loving, hating, etc., but also of regulating the relationship between suborganizations of ego that have been split off from the original whole.

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Sandler and Rosenblatt, 1962). Proposed h e r e is t h e idea that t h e ego is split into parts, each capable of generating experience in a mode modeled after either o n e ' s sense of an object in an early object relationship experience or o n e ' s experience of oneself in the same early object relationship. T h e two parts of t h e ego remain linked a n d , when repressed, c o n s t i t u t e an u n c o n s c i o u s internal object relationship. T h i s conceptualization of internal object relations is an o u t g r o w t h of t h e work of F r e u d , A b r a h a m , Melanie Klein, Fairbairn, W i n n i c o t t , and Bion. Although t h e r e are significant theoretical differences among this g r o u p of analysts, t h e concept of internal objects has been handled by each of t h e m in s u c h a way as to lay t h e groundwork for t h e next, in what together c o n s t i t u t e s a central line of t h o u g h t of object relations t h e o r y . T h e c o n t r i b u t i o n of each of these analysts to t h e concept of internal object relationships will be discussed, and an integrated conception of t h e n a t u r e of internal object relations will be p r e s e n t e d . I will t h e n show how t h e clinical p h e n o m e n a of transference, c o u n t e r t r a n s f e r e n c e , and resistance can be u n d e r s t o o d m o r e fully when viewed from the perspective of t h e t h e o r y of internal objects proposed.

An

Object

Relations

of Internal

Theory Objects

Freud F r e u d did not use t h e term " i n t e r n a l objects," nor did he generate a conceptualization equivalent to that which will be discussed as an object relations conception of internal objects. In The Interpretation of Dreams (1900), Freud

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implied t h a t u n c o n s c i o u s m e m o r y traces had t h e power to p e r p e t u a t e t h e feelings involved in forgotten early experience, could attract a t t e n t i o n to themselves in t h e c o u r s e of dream and s y m p t o m formation, and could press for conscious expression, d r e a m r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , and symbolic r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in s y m p t o m a t i c behavior and c h a r a c t e r pathology. In 1914, F r e u d introduced t h e idea t h a t u n c o n scious phantasies about objects may u n d e r certain circumstances take t h e place of actual relationships with people. In " M o u r n i n g and M e l a n c h o l i a " (1917), identification is viewed as t h e m e a n s by which o n e not only rem e m b e r s , but in part emotionally replaces, a lost external object with an aspect of oneself that has been modeled after t h e lost external object. F r e u d described how in melancholia a relationship with an external object is " t r a n s f o r m e d . . . into a cleavage between t h e critical activity of t h e ego a n d t h e ego a s altered by identification" (p. 2 4 9 ) . In o t h e r words, an e x t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p is replaced by an internal o n e that involves an interplay of two active aspects of t h e person t h a t have resulted from a splitting of t h e ego. In 1923, F r e u d extended t h e notion of identification to include n o t only a modeling of oneself after t h e external object, b u t , as in t h e case of superego formation, a process by which the functions of t h e external object are instated within t h e psyche. F r e u d (1940a) at t h e end of his life summarized his t h e o r y of s t r u c t u r e formation by which a new active agency is g e n e r a t e d : A portion of t h e external world has, at least partially, been a b a n d o n e d as an object and h a s instead, by identification, been taken into t h e ego and t h u s become an integral part of the internal world. T h i s new psychical agency c o n t i n u e s to carry on t h e functions

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which have h i t h e r t o been performed by t h e people [the a b a n d o n e d objects] in t h e external world: it observes t h e ego, gives it orders, judges it and threatens it with p u n i s h m e n t s , exactly like p a r e n t s whose place it has taken, (p. 205) F r e u d t h u s proposes a model wherein an external object is " b y identification . . . taken into t h e e g o . " He goes on to explain t h a t taking t h e object into t h e ego involves establishing " a new psychical a g e n c y , " i.e., an aspect of personality t h a t has t h e capacity to carry on functions in t h e internal world previously performed in t h e external world by the object. T h i s new agency stands in relation to t h e ego and can perceive, t h i n k , respond, and initiate activity. F u r t h e r , it has its own system of motivations: " i t observes t h e ego, gives it orders, judges it a n d t h r e a t e n s it with p u n i s h m e n t s . " F r e u d is h e r e describing a n o r m a l developmental sequence wherein t h e child, in t h e context of his relations with external objects, establishes a suborganization of ego t h a t has t h e capacity for i n d e p e n d e n t motivation and carries on an object relationship with o t h e r aspects of t h e ego. F r e u d ' s " F e t i s h i s m " (1927) and "Splitting of the Ego in t h e Process of D e f e n s e " (1940b) invoke t h e concept of a split in t h e ego 3 to a c c o u n t for t h e way in which o n e can know and not know at t h e same time. I n o t h e r words, t h e ego can be defensively divided so as to operate on t h e basis of different types of u n d e r s t a n d i n g of reality. This repre3

Betteiheim (1983) pointed out that "the ego" is an incorrect translation of "das Ich" which is more accurately translated as "the I." The phrase "splitting of the I" better captures the notion of a subdivision of the person's capacity to think, perceive, and create experience than does the more impersonal "splitting of the ego."

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sents b o t h a clarification of t h e process of ego splitting involved in superego formation and an extension of the idea to a c c o u n t for internal division within t h e personality, o t h e r t h a n t h a t involved in superego formation. A braham F r e u d ' s concept of psychic s t r u c t u r e s or " a g e n c i e s " operating in an " i n t e r n a l w o r l d " that is developed in t h e context of o n e ' s early relations with external objects constitutes t h e theoretical framework within which all succeeding c o n t r i b u t i o n s to object relations t h e o r y were developed. Karl A b r a h a m ' s work played a pivotal role in t h e development of t h e object relations b r a n c h of psychoanalytic t h e o r y and in particular provided t h e f o u n d a t i o n u p o n which b o t h Klein and Fairbairn developed their ideas. W o r k i n g within t h e framework of F r e u d ' s sexual instinct t h e o r y , A b r a h a m (1924) placed m o r e i m p o r t a n c e t h a n did F r e u d on t h e role of t h e object in libidinal development and placed m o r e e m p h a s i s on t h e place of u n c o n s c i o u s p h a n t a s y in psychological life. A b r a h a m ' s division of early development into preambivalent, ambivalent, and postambivalent p h a s e s was t h e f o r e r u n n e r of Klein's and Fairbairn's schizoid 4 and depressive levels of early psychological organization. I n h e r e n t in A b r a h a m ' s conception of different forms of ambivalence toward obj e c t s was t h e n o t i o n t h a t a variety of forms of psychological conflict existed over t h e experience of self-object differentiation. *Klein initially used the term paranoid position but, under the influence of Fairbairn's work, adopted the term paranoid-schizoid position in 1952 (Klein, 1975, p. 2n).

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W h i l e A b r a h a m ' s c o n t r i b u t i o n s to object relations theory consisted largely in his shift of emphasis within the conceptual framework provided by F r e u d , Melanie Klein (1975), by making t h e role of u n c o n s c i o u s internal object relationships p r i m a r y , introduced a new perspective from which to organize clinical and metapsychological thinking. Klein (1946, 1958) conceived of t h e infant at birth as functioning with a primitive, loosely organized, b u t whole ego in relation to an object that is experienced as whole. U n d e r t h e pressure of t h e intolerable anxiety of impending annihilation p r o d u c e d by t h e death instinct, t h e infant defensively a t t e m p t s to distance himself from his sense of d e s t r u c t i v e n e s s by splitting b o t h t h e ego and t h e object into m o r e manageable (because separate) good and bad facets of object-related experience. Stated in less mechanical terms, t h e infant simplifies an unmanageably complicated relationship with t h e m o t h e r (including t h e coexist e n c e of h a t i n g and loving feelings felt toward and experienced from t h e m o t h e r ) by treating t h e relationship as if it were m a n y relationships between unmistakably loving and u n m i s t a k a b l y malevolent c o n c e p t i o n s of self and object. T h e s e aspects of t h e infant's relationship with t h e object are kept separate by means of projective and introjective phantasies. T h e infant's splitting of his experience of his relationships with objects allows him to create a psychological s a n c t u a r y (safe from hostile and destructive feelings) within which he can feed safely, take in safely what he needs from his m o t h e r . This t h e o r y of early development established a conception of psychological life based u p o n an internal organization derived from t h e relationship of split-off aspects

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of t h e ego to associated i n t e r n a l objects. T h e r e are considerable s h o r t c o m i n g s in Klein's t h e o r y of internal object relations. Most fundamentally, Klein is n o t clear w h e t h e r she views internal object relations as p h a n t a s i e s or as relationships between active agencies capable of feeling, t h i n k i n g , and perceiving. In fact, she says both and often mixes t h e two by formulating clinical p h e n o m e n a in t e r m s of relationships between an active agency and a t h o u g h t (see Mackay, 1981). T h i s involves a confusion of levels of abstraction analogous to saying t h a t a t h o u g h t is contained in a n e u r o n . T h e fallacy of establishing direct r e l a t i o n s between active agencies and ideas p e r m e a t e s K l e i n ' s writing. For example, in describing t h e development of early psychological life, Klein writes, " T h e splitting off of p e r s e c u t o r y figures which go to form part of t h e u n c o n s c i o u s is b o u n d up with splitting off idealized figures as well. Idealized figures are developed to protect t h e ego against t h e terrifying o n e s " (1958, p. 2 4 1 ) . Classical analysts point out t h a t the notion of idealized figures p r o t e c t i n g t h e ego against terrifying ones is t a n t a m o u n t to proposing t h a t t h e r e are internal friendly and hostile " d e m o n s " operating within t h e mind. " A m u l t i t u d e of m i n d s is introduced into a single psychic a p p a r a t u s . . . t h e p e r s o n is being envisaged as a c o n t a i n e r of i n n u m e r a b l e , i n d e p e n d e n t microorganizations that are also m i c r o d y n a m i s m s " (Schafer, 1968, p. 62). Kleinians have replied that these figures are not d e m o n s b u t , r a t h e r , u n c o n s c i o u s phantasies: " I n t e r n a l objects are not 'objects' situated in t h e body or t h e psyche: like Freud [in his t h e o r y of t h e superego] Melanie Klein is describing u n c o n s c i o u s p h a n t a s i e s which people have about what they c o n t a i n " (Segal, 1964, p. 12). Despite this clarification on t h e part of t h e Kleinians, however, i t - m u s t be r e m e m b e r e d that an u n c o n s c i o u s phan-

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tasy (the product of " p h a n t a s y - t h i n k i n g " [Isaacs, 1952, p. 108]) is, after all, a t h o u g h t , as are t h e figures within t h e p h a n t a s y . If internal objects are t h o u g h t s , as Segal and Isaacs conceptualize t h e m to be, t h e n they cannot themselves t h i n k , perceive, or feel, n o r can they protect or attack t h e ego. Even to the present, Kleinian theorists h a v e not been able to disentangle themselves from the Scylla of demonology a n d t h e Charybdis of mixing incompatible levels of a b s t r a c t i o n (i.e., active agencies and thoughts). Fairbairn T h i s Kleinian t h e o r y of internal object relations, with its unsatisfactory m i x t u r e of phantasy and d y n a m i s m , together with F r e u d ' s t h e o r y of t h e origin of t h e superego, formed t h e background for Fairbairn's c o n t r i b u t i o n s to object relations theory. Fairbairn ( 1 9 4 0 , 1 9 4 4 ) , like Klein, viewed t h e infantile ego as whole at birth and capable of relating to whole external objects. To t h e extent that t h e " f i t " between m o t h e r and infant is lacking, the infant experiences an intolerable feeling of disconnectedness and defends himself by means of splitting off t h e aspects of the ego which were felt to be unacceptable to t h e m o t h e r . T h e s e split-off portions of ego remain fixed in a relationship with t h e unsatisfactory aspect of t h e object. This part-object relationship (split-off ego in relation to an emotionally absent or rejecting object) is repressed in order to master t h e feelings involved and in an effort to change t h e object into a satisfactory object. T h e ego and frustrating object u n d e r g o further subdivisions along lines of cleavage determined by different affective qualities of the unsatisfactory object relationship. For example, t h e tantalizing qualities of t h e relationship and t h e rejecting

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qualities of t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e c o m e separated from o n e a n o t h e r in t h e infant's i n t e r n a l world. A significant aspect of the ego (the central ego) retains a relationship with t h e accepting and accepted qualities of t h e object (the "good e n o u g h " m o t h e r [ W i n n i c o t t , 1951] as opposed to t h e defensively idealized m o t h e r ) . T h e central ego is in part t h e c o n s c i o u s ego but also includes dynamically u n c o n scious facets, e.g., its defensive efforts to make itself unaware of t h e unsatisfactory aspects of object-related experience. Fairbairn, a l t h o u g h working within a F r e u d i a n psychoanalytic framework, was struggling against what he felt were shortcomings of both t h e F r e u d i a n and t h e Kleinian theories. Fairbairn (1946) pointed out that F r e u d (1932) conceived of t h e id as energy without s t r u c t u r e and t h e ego as s t r u c t u r e without energy; t h e id was seen as " i n stinctual cathexes seeking d i s c h a r g e — t h a t in our view is all t h e r e is in t h e i d " (Freud, 1932, p. 7 4 ) , and t h e ego was perceived as organized into functions but lacking its own source of energy. Fairbairn (1944, 1946) replaced t h e Freudian d i c h o t o m y of ego and id, s t r u c t u r e and energy, with a notion of " d y n a m i c s t r u c t u r e s . " T h e s e d y n a m i c s t r u c t u r e s are conceived of as aspects of t h e mind capable of acting as i n d e p e n d e n t agencies with their own motivational systems. In psychological terms, Fairbairn is saying that these aspects of t h e person have t h e capacity to t h i n k and to wish according to their own system of g e n e r a t i n g meaning. According to this t h e o r y , each bit of ego (aspect of t h e personality) defensively split off in t h e course of development functions as an entity in relation to internal objects and in relation to o t h e r subdivisions of the ego. W i t h regard to t h e i m p o r t a n t question of t h e theoretical s t a t u s of internal objects, Fairbairn states:

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In t h e interest of consistency, I must now draw t h e logical conclusion of my t h e o r y of d y n a m i c s t r u c t u r e and acknowledge t h a t , since internal objects are struct u r e s , they must necessarily be, in some m e a s u r e at least, dynamic. In drawing this conclusion and making this acknowledgment, I shall not only be here following t h e precedent of F r e u d , but also, it would seem, conforming to t h e d e m a n d s of s u c h psychological facts as are revealed, e.g., in d r e a m s and in the p h e n o m e n a of paranoia. . . . It must be recognized, h o w e v e r , t h a t , in practice, it is very difficult to differe n t i a t e between t h e activity of internalized objects and t h e activity of t h e ego s t r u c t u r e s with which they are associated; a n d , with a view to avoiding any app e a r a n c e of demonology, it seems wise to err, if anyt h i n g , on t h e side of overweighting the activity of the ego s t r u c t u r e s r a t h e r t h a n otherwise. It r e m a i n s t r u e , nevertheless, that u n d e r certain conditions internalized objects may acquire a d y n a m i c independence which c a n n o t be ignored. It is doubtless in this direction that we must look for an explanation of the f u n d a m e n t a l animism of h u m a n beings, which is n o n e t h e l e s s persistent u n d e r the surface. . . . (1944, p. 132)

F a i r b a i r n ' s conclusion that n o t only ego suborganizations, but also internal objects, must be considered " i n some m e a s u r e at l e a s t " to be d y n a m i c s t r u c t u r e s , fully establishes the concept of internal object relations between active s e m i a u t o n o m o u s agencies within a single personality. However, t h e passage just quoted demonstrates that Fairbairn hesitated in drawing his conclusion. In large part it seemed overly close to Klein's formula-

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tions, which he considered demonologic. T h e r e are a n u m b e r of incompletely formulated aspects of F a i r b a i r n ' s t h e o r y which may h a v e c o n t r i b u t e d to his misgivings about this facet of his thinking. In s t u d y i n g Fairbairn's work, o n e searches in vain for definitions of t h e t e r m s structure and dynamic. ( O n e also is unable to find a definition of t h e concept of psychic s t r u c t u r e in F r e u d ' s writing.) I infer from F a i r b a i r n ' s use of t h e t e r m structure that he is t h i n k i n g of a stable set of ideas or m e n t a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s . T h e s e c o n s c i o u s and unconscious ideas are consistent beliefs in t e r m s of which o n e plans a n d m e a s u r e s o n e ' s b e h a v i o r a n d o n e ' s responses to new experience. But these ideas do not t h e m selves t h i n k , respond, or perceive. T h e capacity for thinking, feeling, and perceiving is t h e basis" for t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t an aspect of t h e personality is dynamic. W h e n Fairbairn says that i n t e r n a l objects are not " m e r e objects" b u t d y n a m i c s t r u c t u r e s , h e seems to mean t h a t internal figures are n o t simply m e n t a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of objects b u t , r a t h e r , active agencies whose activity is perceived by themselves and by other dynamic structures to have specific characteristics, which are t h e n organized and registered as stable m e n t a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s . S t r u c t u r e may exist without d y n a m i s m (stable sets of ideas or convict i o n s ) , b u t it is not possible for t h e r e to be d y n a m i s m without s t r u c t u r e . For Fairbairn, t h e concept of id as energy reservoir is replaced by a n o t i o n of an u n c o n s c i o u s set of ego and object s t r u c t u r e s , each capable of psychological activity of varying degrees of primitivity. It r e m a i n s unclear in F a i r b a i r n ' s t h i n k i n g what relationship t h e concept of ego bears to t h e concept of dynamic internal objects. Can t h e r e be d y n a m i c s t r u c t u r e (e.g., an internal object) t h a t is distinct from ego? T h i s

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appears to be what Fairbairn is saying a n d , as will be discussed later, may be t h e reason for his hesitancy to acknowledge fully t h e dynamic n a t u r e of internal objects. Winnicott Donald W i n n i c o t t ' s major c o n t r i b u t i o n to t h e theory of internal object relations is t h e concept of multiple selforganizations functioning in relation to o n e a n o t h e r within the personality system. W i n n i c o t t (1951, 1952, 1954, 1960a) envisioned the infant as born with t h e potential for u n i q u e individuality of personality (termed a T r u e Self personality organization), which can develop in t h e context of a responsive holding e n v i r o n m e n t provided by a good-enough m o t h e r . However, when a m o t h e r substit u t e s s o m e t h i n g of herself for t h e infant's s p o n t a n e o u s g e s t u r e (e.g., her own anxiety over separateness for t h e infant's c u r i o u s exploration), the infant experiences traumatic disruption of his developing sense of self. W h e n such " i m p i n g e m e n t s " are a central feature of t h e early m o t h e r - c h i l d relationship, the infant will attempt to defend himself by developing a second (reactive) personality organization (the False Self organization). This False Self vigilantly m o n i t o r s and adapts to t h e conscious a n d unconscious needs of t h e m o t h e r and in so doing provides a protective exterior behind which t h e T r u e Self is afforded t h e privacy t h a t it r e q u i r e s to maintain its integrity. T h e False Self is not conceived of as malevolent. On the c o n t r a r y , the caretaker self (1954) energetically " m a n ages" life so that an i n n e r self might not experience the threat of annihilation resulting from excessive pressure to develop according to t h e internal logic of a n o t h e r person (e.g., t h e m o t h e r ) . T h e dread of annihilation experienced by t h e T r u e Self results in a feeling of u t t e r dependence on

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the False Self personality organization. This makes it extremely difficult for a p e r s o n to diminish his reliance on this False Self mode of functioning despite an awareness of the e m p t i n e s s of life t h a t devolves from s u c h functioning. F u n c t i o n i n g in this mode can frequently lead to academic, vocational, and social success, but over time the person increasingly experiences himself as bored, " g o i n g t h r o u g h t h e m o t i o n s , " detached, m e c h a n i c a l , and lacking s p o n t a n e i t y (see Ogden, 1976). T h e theoretical status of t h e object is not discussed by W i n n i c o t t , but his writing makes it clear that he treats internal objects as m e n t a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s . Both Fairbairn's t h e o r y of d y n a m i c s t r u c t u r e and W i n n i c o t t ' s conception of t h e T r u e and False Selves represent steps in t h e development of an object relations t h e o r y in which u n c o n scious aspects of the person, each with the capacity to generate meanings according to its own p a t t e r n s of linkage, engage in internal relationships with o n e a n o t h e r . Implicit in Fairbairn's and W i n n i c o t t ' s t h i n k i n g is t h e idea that conceptualizing i n t r a p s y c h i c conflict as an u n c o n scious p h a n t a s y of opposing internal forces does not adequately c a p t u r e t h e way in which t h e person is in fact feeling, t h i n k i n g , perceiving, and behaving in two ways at once, not simply imagining that to be t h e case. According to Fairbairn and W i n n i c o t t , it is m o r e a c c u r a t e to say t h a t t h e person is behaving as two people at o n c e t h a n to say he is t h i n k i n g about being two people at odds with each o t h e r . Bion W i t h t h e unsettled issue of t h e theoretical s t a t u s of internal objects in mind, a consideration of aspects of t h e work of Wilfred Bion becomes particularly p e r t i n e n t . Bion at first described projective identification as an interpersonal

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process in which o n e finds oneself " b e i n g manipulated so as to be playing a p a r t , n o m a t t e r how difficult to recognize, in somebody else's p h a n t a s y " (1952, p. 149). In the interpersonal setting, t h e person projectively identifying engages in an u n c o n s c i o u s p h a n t a s y of ejecting an unwanted or endangered aspect of himself and of depositing that part in a n o t h e r person in a controlling way. Interpersonal p r e s s u r e is exerted on t h e " r e c i p i e n t " of t h e projective identification, p r e s s u r e t h a t is u n c o n s c i o u s l y designed to coerce the " r e c i p i e n t " into experiencing himself and behaving in a way t h a t is c o n g r u e n t with the unconscious projective p h a n t a s y . U n d e r optimal circumstances, t h e recipient " c o n t a i n s " (Bion, 1962a) or " p r o c e s s e s " (i.e., handles maturely) t h e evoked feelings and ideas, and t h u s makes available for reinternalization by the projector, a more manageable and integrable version of that which had been projected. (See Ogden, 1979, 1981, 1982a for more detailed discussions of projective identification.) Bion (1957) later made clear that he viewed projective identification not only as an interpersonal process but as an intrapersonal process as well. He conceives of the individual as composed of multiple personality suborganizations, each capable of functioning s e m i a u t o n o m o u s l y , and t h u s capable of processing one a n o t h e r ' s projective identifications. As can be seen from t h e foregoing discussion, this view of t h e personality system is an outgrowth of Klein's, Fairbairn's, and W i n n i c o t t ' s c o n t r i b u t i o n s to object relations t h e o r y . For Bion (1956, 1957) projective identification involves t h e splitting of t h e personality (not simply a splitting of self-representations) and an ejection of t h e resulting suborganization into an internal object. T h e schizophrenic, because of an almost complete incapacity to tolerate reality, replaces perception with an extreme

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form of projective identification. By fragmenting perceptual functions into isolated c o m p o n e n t parts and t h e n projecting these functions (still experienced to some extent as self) into t h e object, t h e schizophrenic creates a type of internal object termed a " b i z a r r e object." T h e object is t h e n experienced as having life of its own; " I n t h e p a t i e n t ' s p h a n t a s y t h e expelled particles of ego lead an i n d e p e n d e n t and uncontrollable existence outside t h e personality, but either c o n t a i n i n g or c o n t a i n e d by external objects" (1956, p. 39). An example given by Bion is the projection of the visual function into a g r a m o p h o n e (more accurately, t h e psychological r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e gramop h o n e ) , t h u s producing a bizarre object felt to be capable of spying upon t h e patient. It is as if a part of t h e personality " h a s become a t h i n g " (1957, p. 48). T h i s type of defensive fragmentation and projection of t h e mind into an object (representation) is t h e hallmark of t h e p s y c h o t i c personality. Bion stresses t h e role of phantasy in t h e process of g e n e r a t i n g bizarre objects. In so doing, h o w e v e r , h e appears to overlook the way in which t h e process of fragmentation of t h e m e n t a l a p p a r a t u s is m o r e t h a n a p h a n t a s y . I believe that one m u s t u n d e r s t a n d t h e formation of bizarre objects as involving two different softs of mental operation. O n e facet of t h e process is simply a p h a n t a s y — a g r a m o p h o n e is a mental r e p r e s e n t a t i o n that is imagined to be capable of perception. However, this p h a n t a s y is a t h o u g h t generated by a part of t h e mind that has, in fact, been split off from the " n o n p s y c h o t i c " mind and is actually functioning as an active, separate suborganization of t h e personality t h a t experiences itself as a t h i n g (see Ogden, 1980, 1982b). I u n d e r s t a n d t h e g r a m o p h o n e image to be equivalent to a self-representation of t h i s aspect of the personality. Grotstein (1981, 1983) has built u p o n Bion's t h e o r y

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of the s i m u l t a n e o u s functioning of psychotic and nonpsyc h o t i c parts of t h e personality to c o n s t r u c t a " d u a l track m o d e l " of t h e mind in which experience is no longer conceived of as u n i t a r y , b u t as an overlapping of two or m o r e separate experiences generated by a u t o n o m o u s suborganizations of the personality. Only t h r o u g h integration of various experiential perspectives is t h e illusion of unitary experience created, m u c h as an integrated visual field with visual depth is achieved t h r o u g h an integration of slightly different visual images perceived by each eye. Grotstein's proposal r e p r e s e n t s an i m p o r t a n t rediscovery of o n e of F r e u d ' s most fundamental c o n t r i b u t i o n s to psychology. F r e u d proposed that we view the h u m a n mind as consisting of two facets, the conscious and the u n c o n scious mind. Although these two aspects of mind function in different modes (primary and secondary process), they operate c o n c u r r e n t l y and together c o n t r i b u t e to t h e generation of experience that feels unitary to t h e subject. T h i s sense of u n i t y of experience is achieved despite t h e fact that t h e conscious and u n c o n s c i o u s aspects of mind are operating s e m i a u t o n o m o u s l y .

A Revised Theory of Internal

Objects

Before presenting an integration of the foregoing cont r i b u t i o n s to a t h e o r y of internal objects, I will briefly recapitulate the critical t u r n i n g points in the development of this aspect of psychoanalytic t h e o r y . Melanie Klein was t h e first to establish a conception of an internal object world organized a r o u n d internal object relationships, consisting of an u n c o n s c i o u s split-off aspect of ego in relation to a n internal object. Her t h e o r y suffered from a n unsatisfactory formulation of t h e theoretical status of internal objects, which were conceived of as u n c o n s c i o u s phanta-

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sies but were at t h e same time t h o u g h t of as capable of t h i n k i n g , feeling, perceiving, and responding. Fairbairn clarified t h e m a t t e r by stating that n e i t h e r objects n o r object r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s a r e internalized; r a t h e r , t h a t which is internalized is an object r e l a t i o n s h i p consisting of a split-off part of t h e ego in relation to an object which is itself, at least in p a r t , a d y n a m i c s t r u c t u r e . T h e split-off aspect of t h e ego r e t a i n s t h e capacity to function as an active psychological agency, a l t h o u g h it functions in a primitive mode d u e to its relative isolation from o t h e r aspects of t h e developing personality. Fairbairn, a l t h o u g h designating internal objects d y n a m i c s t r u c t u r e s , did not explain how an i n t e r n a l object ( p r e s u m a b l y originally a t h o u g h t ) achieves its d y n a m i s m . W i n n i c o t t extended t h e notion of splitting of t h e ego to include subdivisions of t h e experience of self b u t did n o t c o n t r i b u t e to a clarification of the concept of i n t e r n a l objects. Bion's t h e o r y of t h e pathological formation of bizarre objects provided an i m p o r t a n t insight into t h e formation of all internal objects. He envisioned a defensive splitting of t h e mind into parts that include active suborganizations of t h e m i n d , which t h e n experience themselves as h a v i n g b e c o m e things. T h u s , t h e formation of a bizarre object is a process by which a suborganization of t h e mind engages in a specific object-related p h a n t a s y involving feelings of merger with, or e n t r a p m e n t by, t h e object. On the basis of these c o n t r i b u t i o n s to object relations t h e o r y , I shall now a t t e m p t to clarify t h e theoretical status of internal objects in a way t h a t will facilitate clinical t h i n k i n g a b o u t various t r a n s f e r e n c e and resistance phen o m e n a . An internal object r e l a t i o n s h i p necessarily involves an interaction between two subdivisions of t h e personality, each subdivision capable of being a n active psychological agency. Otherwise, o n e ' s t h e o r y m u s t posit either a direct relationship between n o n e q u i v a l e n t levels

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of a b s t r a c t i o n , e.g., t h e ego (a s t r u c t u r e ) in a relationship with an object r e p r e s e n t a t i o n (a t h o u g h t ) or a relationship between two t h o u g h t s , which would necessarily give t h o u g h t s t h e power to t h i n k . F r e u d ' s recognition of the fact that two active agencies are required for an internal object relationship is reflected in his t h e o r y of superego formation wherein t h e ego is seen as split into two active organizations in an i n t e r n a l relationship with o n e a n o t h e r . F a i r b a i r n ' s insight t h a t object relationships, r a t h e r t h a n objects, are internalized opened t h e way to thinking of both the self- and t h e object-components of t h e internal relationship as active agencies, " d y n a m i c s t r u c t u r e s . " T h e self-component was u n d e r s t o o d as a split-off aspect of the ego, t h u s a c c o u n t i n g for its capacity to t h i n k , perceive, and respond. However, although Fairbairn recognized that theoretical consistency demanded that t h e object-component of t h e internal object relationship also be considered a d y n a m i c s t r u c t u r e , he did not offer an explanation for t h e source of t h e dynamism of t h e internal object. Applying Bion's theory of t h e formation of pathological bizarre objects to t h e formation of internal objects in general, o n e can conceptualize i n t e r n a l objects as split-off aspects of t h e ego that have been "projected i n t o " mental representations of objects; an aspect of ego is split off and becomes profoundly identified with an object r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . Because the ego suborganization is itself capable of generating meanings, its identification with an object representation results in a shift in t h e way that aspect of t h e person t h i n k s of itself. T h a t which was originally an object representation becomes experientially equivalent to a self-representation of o n e of t h e split-Off facets of ego. In this light, I suggest that t h e internalization of an object relationship be t h o u g h t of as necessarily involving a dual subdivision of t h e ego. Such a dual split would result in the formation of two new suborganizations of the ego, one

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identified with the self in the external object relationship and the other thoroughly identified with the object. T h i s formulation a c c o u n t s for t h e d y n a m i c n a t u r e of t h e i n t e r n a l object and also defines t h e relationship between t h e concept of ego and the concept of internal objects. In brief, internal objects a r e subdivisions of t h e ego t h a t a r e heavily identified with an object r e p r e s e n t a t i o n while m a i n t a i n i n g t h e capacities of t h e whole ego for t h o u g h t , p e r c e p t i o n , and feeling. S u c h a proposal goes no further in t h e direction of demonology t h a n did F r e u d in describing the form a t i o n of t h e superego. T h e logical extension of F a i r b a i r n ' s t h e o r y of dynamic s t r u c t u r e is that t h e ego is t h e only source of dynamism and that further dynamic s t r u c t u r e s are formed only by a subdivision of t h e ego. T h e d y n a m i s m of a n ' i n t e r n a l object m u s t in every case reflect t h e fact t h a t a n aspect of t h e ego has been split off and is at t h e core of t h e new s t r u c t u r e . T h e fact that this s t r u c t u r e (the i n t e r n a l object) is experienced as nonself is a c c o u n t e d for by m e a n s of its profound identification with t h e object. Internalization r e q u i r i n g a splitting of t h e ego o c c u r s o n l y in early develo p m e n t , a n d , as a r e s u l t , t h e identification with t h e object is of a poorly differentiated n a t u r e . T h e experiential quality of t h e identification is o n e of " b e c o m i n g t h e object" as opposed to "feeling like" t h e object. Adult "internalizat i o n s " are built u p o n existing splits in t h e ego a n d do n o t involve t h e creation of new ones.

Transference, and

Projective

Countertransference, Identification

From t h e perspective of t h e view of i n t e r n a l object relations presented above, t r a n s f e r e n c e a n d c o u n t e r t r a n s ference can now be u n d e r s t o o d as t h e interpersonal exter-

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realization ( " a c t u a l i z a t i o n , " Ogden, 1980, 1982b) of an internal object relationship. T r a n s f e r e n c e can take one of two forms, depending on w h e t h e r it is t h e role of t h e object or that of the self in the internal object relationship that is assigned to a n o t h e r person in the externalization process. W h e n it is t h e role of t h e i n t e r n a l object t h a t is projected, t h e patient experiences a n o t h e r person as he has u n c o n s c i o u s l y experienced that internal object (an u n c o n s c i o u s split-off part of the ego identified with the object). In s u c h a case, c o u n t e r t r a n s f e r e n c e involves the t h e r a p i s t ' s u n c o n s c i o u s identification with t h a t aspect of t h e p a t i e n t ' s ego identified with t h e object (Racker's "comp l e m e n t a r y identification" [1957]). Projective identification involves in addition an interpersonal p r e s s u r e on the therapist to engage in s u c h an identification. T h e " r e c i p i e n t " (e.g., t h e therapist) is coerced into seeing himself only as t h e object represented in t h e internal object relationship. More accurately, t h e r e is an a t t e m p t to make t h e recipient's experience c o n g r u e n t with t h e way in which t h e internal object (aspect of t h e ego) experiences itself a n d perceives the self-component of t h e internal relationship. T h e subject unconsciously phantasizes that he ejects part of himself and e n t e r s t h e object in a controlling way. Transference T h i s form of externalization in which a n o t h e r person is treated as if he were t h e object-component of an internal object relationship is t h e process that is generally referred to as transference. For example, a 20-year-old patient maintained a fearful b u t defiant internal relationship in which one aspect of ego was locked in battle with a n o t h e r split-off aspect of ego identified with a bullying father r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . T h i s patient was preoccupied with his anx-

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iety a b o u t a particular male teacher, whom he experienced as extremely intimidating. Nevertheless, t h e patient would struggle against u n c o n s c i o u s wishes to u n d e r m i n e and " s h o w u p " t h e teacher in class. S u c h a transference relationship (based on t h e externalization of the object-comp o n e n t of t h e internal relationship) became a projective identification as t h e patient began to imagine being able to " p u s h t h e b u t t o n s " of t h e teacher in an o m n i p o t e n t way and would in reality provoke t h e teacher into a bullying stance. T h e o t h e r of the two forms of transference described o c c u r s when the patient experiences a n o t h e r person (e.g., the therapist) in t h e same way t h e i n t e r n a l object (split-off portion of ego identified with t h e object) experiences t h e aspect of t h e ego identified with self. T h e c o u n t e r t r a n s ference in this case consists of t h e t h e r a p i s t ' s identification with t h e self-component of t h e p a t i e n t ' s i n t e r n a l object relationship (Racker's " c o n c o r d a n t identificat i o n " [ 1 9 5 7 ] ) . Projective identification would in t h i s case involve, in addition, an u n c o n s c i o u s p h a n t a s y of projecting t h e self-component into t h e external object together with interpersonal p r e s s u r e on t h e object for compliance with this p h a n t a s y , i.e., p r e s s u r e on t h e external object to experience himself only as t h e i n t e r n a l object experiences t h e self in t h e internal object relationship. T h e externalization o f t h e self-component of an internal object relationship was exemplified by a psychotic adolescent who was c o n t i n u a l l y t o r m e n t e d by i n t r u s i v e obsessional t h o u g h t s , a c c u s a t o r y auditory h a l l u c i n a t i o n s , a n d feelings t h a t his mind was being controlled. He felt t h a t he could not find a single m o m e n t of reprieve from these i n t e r n a l emotional assaults. T h e patient was seen in intensive individual p s y c h o t h e r a p y in a long-term psychiatric hospital. In t h e c o u r s e of this work, t h e p a t i e n t ' s

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c u r r e n t experience came to be u n d e r s t o o d as an internal version of his experience of h i s relationship with his m o t h e r , who had regularly, secretly observed him for h o u r s at n u r s e r y school, had given him placebo medication for his " n e r v e s , " and had tape-recorded his d i n n e r conversation and temper t a n t r u m s to play back to him for " s t u d y " later. He had been sent to a family friend for " t h e r a p y . " Following each session, t h e " t h e r a p i s t " would report to t h e p a r e n t s a b o u t what had transpired. In the p s y c h o t h e r a p y o c c u r r i n g d u r i n g t h e patient's hospitalization, the patient subjected t h e therapist to a continual verbal and sensory barrage. In a relentless, loud, w h i n y , highly pressured tone of voice, he would make incessant d e m a n d s of the therapist. W h e n not gratified, t h e patient would call t h e therapist a string of mocking names that were repeated so often and so loudly that a 50m i n u t e session felt to the therapist like being subjected to t h e din of a jack h a m m e r for h o u r s . T h e therapist not only felt angry, but also experienced feelings of disorganization and u t t e r helplessness that at times gave him t h e panicky feeling that he was drowning. T h e patient described these sessions as " n e g a t i v e mind control g a m e s , " a term which referred to the idea that efforts at controlling his mind were " j a m m e d " and t h e j a m m i n g in t u r n had the effect of sending the mind control back to its source. In this example, t h e self-component of an internal object relationship (in which t h e patient experienced himself as violently i n t r u d e d u p o n by his mother) was projected into the therapist. T h e phantasy of negative mind control was accompanied by an interpersonal interaction that served to induce in t h e therapist the experience of the self in the internal object relationship. T h e p h a n t a s y , the interpersonal pressure, and t h e therapist's resonant response together constituted a projective identification.

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T h e following is a n o t h e r example of t h e type of transference involving t h e externalization of t h e self-component of t h e internal object relationship. R o b e r t , a 20-yearold schizophrenic patient seen in intensive p s y c h o t h e r a p y , u n c o n s c i o u s l y engaged in a painful i n t e r n a l object relationship in which h e felt " c o n t a m i n a t e d " by a m o t h e r who would i n s i n u a t e herself into every facet of his body and mind. D u r i n g an extended period of t h e r a p y , t h e patient refused to b a t h e , and as time went on t h e therapist became preoccupied with t h e p a t i e n t ' s odor, which filled t h e office long after t h e patient had left. T h e t h e r a p i s t ' s office chair absorbed t h e p a t i e n t ' s odor and became a symbol of the p a t i e n t ' s e n t r y into t h e t h e r a p i s t ' s life outside of t h e therapy h o u r s . T h u s , t h e therapist felt as if he himself had become inescapably suffused by t h e patient. In this case, the therapist had unwittingly been coerced into experiencing himself as the self-component of t h e internal relationship to t h e c o n t a m i n a t i n g m o t h e r (an aspect of t h e pat i e n t ' s ego identified with t h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e m o t h e r ) . (See Ogden, 1982a, for an in-depth discussion of this case.) It is my experience that projective identification is a universal feature of t h e externalization of an internal object relationship, i.e., of transference. W h a t is variable is the degree to which t h e external object is enlisted as a participant in t h e externalization of t h e i n t e r n a l object relationship. T h e r e is always a c o m p o n e n t of t h e therapist's response to the p a t i e n t ' s transferences that represents an induced identification with an aspect of t h e pat i e n t ' s ego that is locked in a particular u n c o n s c i o u s internal object relationship. T h i s identification on t h e part of t h e therapist r e p r e s e n t s a form of u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e patient that can be acquired in no o t h e r way.

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In my opinion, it is not possible to analyze the transference w i t h o u t making oneself available to participate to some degree in this form of identification. However, it is by no means sufficient to h a v e become a participant in the externalization of an internal relationship. O n e m u s t , in addition, be able to u n d e r s t a n d that which one is experiencing as a reflection of a need on t h e part of t h e patient to reduce t h e therapist to t h e status of a surrogate for a part of the p a t i e n t ' s ego. T h e therapist must himself be aware that t h e patient is excluding all aspects of the t h e r a p i s t ' s personality that do not correspond to t h e feat u r e s of t h e split-off ego with which t h e therapist is being identified. T h e r e is considerable psychological work involved in t h e t h e r a p i s t ' s consciously and unconsciously integrating t h e roles imposed upon him with his larger, more reality-based sense of himself (in particular, his role as therapist). Resistance F r o m the perspective of this conception of internal objects, resistance is u n d e r s t o o d in t e r m s of the difficulty the patient has in giving up the pathological a t t a c h m e n t s involved in unconscious internal object relationships. Fairbairn (1944, 1958) was the first to u n d e r s t a n d resistance in this way and placed particular emphasis on t h e tie to the bad internal object. T h i s tie is based on o n e ' s need to change t h e bad object into the kind of person o n e wishes t h e object were. Fairbairn (1944) described two forms of a t t a c h m e n t to t h e frustrating internal object. O n e form is t h e attachment of t h e craving self to -the tantalizing object. T h e n a t u r e of this tie to t h e object is that of t h e addict for the

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addicting agent and is extremely difficult to relinquish. (See Ogden, 1974, for a description of a p s y c h o t h e r a p y in which t h e central resistance was derived from this type of internal object tie.) T h e second category of bond to a bad internal object is t h e tie of t h e wronged and spoiling self to t h e u n l o v i n g , rejecting object. T h i s often takes t h e form of a c r u s a d e to expose t h e unfairness of, coldness of, or o t h e r forms of wrongdoing on the part of t h e i n t e r n a l object. Fairbairn (1940) presented graphic clinical data demo n s t r a t i n g t h e p h e n o m e n o n of loyalty to t h e bad i n t e r n a l object that is fueled by t h e u n c o n s c i o u s conviction that a bad object is far preferable to no object at all. F a i r b a i r n ' s thinking stems from the idea that a h u m a n being's sanity and survival depend on object-relatedness, and a p e r s o n experiences t h e t e r r o r of i m p e n d i n g a n n i h i l a t i o n w h e n he feels t h a t all external and i n t e r n a l object ties are being severed. Therefore, he clings desperately to any object tie (external or i n t e r n a l ) , even ones that are experienced as bad, when that is all t h a t is available. Fairbairn, because of his incomplete formulation of the n a t u r e of i n t e r n a l objects, focused exclusively on resistances derived from t h e experience of t h e self-compon e n t of the internal object relationship. As discussed earlier, Fairbairn only hesitantly accepted t h e idea that internal objects are dynamic s t r u c t u r e s and was not able to delineate the relationship between t h e concept of i n t e r n a l objects and t h e concept of ego. As a r e s u l t , h e restricted himself to studying ways in which the loyalty of t h e self to the i n t e r n a l object functions as a resistance to t h e r a p e u t i c work. O t h e r forms of resistance become recognizable from the perspective of a t h e o r y that regards i n t e r n a l object relations as involving two active agencies, each capable of

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generating experience. Not only does o n e e n c o u n t e r resist a n c e s t e m m i n g from t h e loyalty of the self to t h e bad object, o n e regularly e n c o u n t e r s resistance based on the object's need for t h e self. T h i s is not to i n t r o d u c e a conception of an inner world occupied by internal objects flying about o n e ' s mind on their own steam. From the perspective of t h e present c h a p t e r , these internal objects are u n d e r s t o o d as aspects of the ego identified with objects, and as such can e n t e r into a t o r m e n t i n g , tantalizing, humiliating, dependent or any o t h e r form of relatedness to o t h e r aspects of the ego. F r e u d himself used s u c h words to describe t h e relationship o f t h e superego to t h e ego. Resistance to giving up internal object ties can t h u s be seen to stem b o t h from t h o s e aspects of ego experienced as self and from those aspects of ego identified with objects. T h e latter set of resistances have not been nearly as well recognized nor elucidated. Heretofore, focus has been placed almost exclusively on the experience of the self in relation to objects in internal object relations. This has been so largely because t h e object c o m p o n e n t has been conceptualized primarily as a mental representation (an idea), and therefore, it would not make sense to talk about the way in which a t h o u g h t experiences a change in an internal object relationship. However, from the perspective of the object as suborganization of t h e ego, o n e is in a position to think a b o u t the following aspects of resistance s t e m m i n g from t h e unwillingness of the object to relinquish its tie to other aspects of t h e ego involved in internal object relationships: 1. T h e ego suborganization identified with the object is u n d e r constant pressure from the self-component of the relationship to be transformed into a good object. S u c h a

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transformation is s t r e n u o u s l y resisted by t h e object-comp o n e n t , b e c a u s e this type of massive shift in identity would be experienced as t h e annihilation of an aspect of t h e ego. T h e internal object r e l a t i o n s h i p is vigorously defended from two directions: T h e self-component is unwilling to risk annihilation resulting from absence of object relatedness and instead strives to change t h e bad object into a good o n e ; at the same time, the objectc o m p o n e n t fends off annihilation that would result from being transformed into a new entity (the good object). It is this latter motivation that a c c o u n t s for t h e often e n c o u n tered m o m e n t in t h e r a p y when t h e patient pleadingly looks at the therapist and says, " I know that what I am doing is self-defeating, but to stop t h i n k i n g and acting in that way would require that I become somebody else and I can't do t h a t . I w o u l d n ' t recognize myself when I look in the m i r r o r . " In work with borderline and s c h i z o p h r e n i c patients, this form of resistance often u n d e r l i e s t h e p a t i e n t ' s intensely conflicted feelings a b o u t accepting the t h e r a p i s t ' s interpretations. F r e q u e n t l y , t h e t r a n s f e r e n c e relationship in s u c h c i r c u m s t a n c e s involves an externalization of an internal object relationship of t h e following type: t h e analyst is experienced as t h e self-component of t h e internal relationship in which t h e self is intent on c h a n g i n g the object-component at t h e cost of a n n i h i l a t i n g that aspect of the patient. For example, a schizophrenic patient over m a n y years of t h e r a p y would periodically become psychotic and regress profoundly to t h e point of e n t e r i n g an almost totally m u t e , immobile state t h a t would last for many m o n t h s . T h e s e regressions o c c u r r e d just as t h e patient began to "get b e t t e r . " " I m p r o v e m e n t " was experienced by t h e patient as literally becoming t h e therapist and in so doing losing himself entirely. S t u b b o r n passivity

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evidenced by the patient at s u c h points was an unconscious assertion t h a t t h e therapist could n o t i n d u c e , seduce, manipulate, or coerce the patient into changing into t h e person that t h e therapist " w a n t e d " or " n e e d e d " the patient to be. " G e t t i n g b e t t e r " m e a n t being transformed into somebody else and no longer existing as the person he felt himself to be. I n t e r p r e t a t i o n s are regularly experienced by schizop h r e n i c and borderline patients as placing the patient in a terrible dilemma: to listen (in phantasy to " t a k e i n " ) is to risk becoming changed into t h e therapist; not to listen (in phantasy to "refuse to take i n " ) is experienced as risking losing all c o n n e c t i o n with t h e therapist and as a result floating off into absolute "outer-space-like" isolation. Either way, t h e p a t i e n t ' s existence is t h r e a t e n e d . T h e danger of losing o n e ' s self as a result of being transformed into a " g o o d " object is t h e danger experienced by the object-component of t h e internal relationship; t h e risk of absolute isolation r e s u l t i n g from loss of t h e c o n n e c t i o n with t h e internal object is t h e danger experienced by the self-component of t h e internal object relationship. It is as i m p o r t a n t for the object-component of ego in the internal relationship to resist being changed by t h e self-component as it is for t h e self-component to attempt to change t h e bad object into a good one. 2. T h e suborganization of ego identified with the object experiences as m u c h need for object relatedness as the self-component o f t h e internal object relationship. T h e object-component frequently m a i n t a i n s internal object ties by m e a n s of a t t e m p t i n g to exert control over its object (i.e., control over t h e self-component of the internal relationship). T h e object-component may t a u n t , shame, t h r e a t e n , d o m i n a t e , or induce guilt in its object (the self-

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c o m p o n e n t of the internal relationship) in order to maintain c o n n e c t e d n e s s with the self-component. T h e s e efforts at control over t h e self-component become greatly intensified when t h e r e is danger of t h e b o n d being t h r e a t e n e d , e.g., by a m o r e m a t u r e form of relatedness to t h e therapist that would make this i n t e r n a l , m o r e primitive form of relatedness less necessary. 5 An obsessional patient in intensive p s y c h o t h e r a p y would regularly disrupt her rare periods of g e n u i n e selfanalytic free association with " o u t b r e a k s " of obsessional self-torment. For instance, while insightfully discussing an i n t e r c h a n g e with a boyfriend, she i n t e r r u p t e d her train of t h o u g h t to r u m i n a t e self-critically about her weight, a subject with which she was chronically preoccupied. As t h e r u m i n a t i o n s c o n t i n u e d she became a n x i o u s that t h e therapist would t e r m i n a t e t h e r a p y because of her endless and fruitless obsessional thinking. T h e patient was at this point in therapy aware o f t h e c o n n e c t i o n between her selft o r m e n t and t h e way in which she had c o n t i n u a l l y felt belittled and t o r m e n t e d by her m o t h e r . T h e p a t i e n t ' s m o t h e r , in addition to tirelessly pointing out her disdain for t h e patient, regularly t h r e a t e n e d to send her away to live with relatives. (It m u s t be emphasized that it is t h e p a t i e n t ' s experience of her m o t h e r , not an objective depic5

The unconscious self and object suborganizations of the ego are affected to some extent by current experience. Self suborganizations of the ego are influenced by experience, particularly as the current experience involves issues of goals, ambitions, and autonomy. Object suborganizations are influenced by current relations with external objects particularly with regard to issues of idealization, denigration, jealousy, envy, etc. One measure of psychological health is the degree to which internal object relations can be modified in the light of current experience.

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tion of t h e m o t h e r , that is preserved in t h e internal object relationship.) T h e internal object relationship u p o n which t h e transference was modeled consisted of a m u t u a l l y d e p e n d e n t mother-child relationship in which t h e child was willing and eager to be masochistic if t h a t would help solidify the tie to a sadistic m o t h e r who was felt to be always on the verge of a b a n d o n i n g h e r . T h e internal object (suborganization of t h e ego) experienced t h e ability of other aspects of t h e patient to engage in free association in t h e t h e r a p e u t i c setting as dangerous evidence of an e n h a n c e d capacity of t h o s e other aspects of t h e ego to engage in a m o r e m a t u r e form of relatedness to t h e therapist. T h e fear of this more m a t u r e form of object tie resulted from t h e object's conviction that such relatedness would make t h e self-component of t h e internal object relationship less dependent on t h e object-component. In t h e clinical sequence described, the object (suborganization of ego) t h e n redoubled its efforts to subject the masochistic self to sadistic t o r m e n t in t h e form of guilt-inducing t a u n t s about being overweight. T h e n a t u r e of t h e ultimate threat made by t h e object-component is that of abandoning t h e self-compon e n t of the internal relationship. In t h e clinical sequence, t h e threat of a b a n d o n m e n t is projected onto t h e therapist and is experienced as a t h r e a t made by t h e therapist to a b a n d o n the patient if she does not behave as he demands. In this clinical material, t h e resistance (the disruption of t h e free association) arose from t h e fear of giving up a particular i n t e r n a l object relationship. T h i s fear is p r e d o m i n a n t l y t h a t of t h e object (ego suborganization) which, upon sensing decreasing d e p e n d e n c e on t h e part of t h e self-component, reintensified its efforts to control by raising t h e spectre of a b a n d o n m e n t . In t h e context of an

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internal object relationship, any i n d e p e n d e n t activity on the part of one party of t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p is experienced as an impending dissolution of t h e relationship which is based on m u t u a l d e p e n d e n c e . F r o m t h e perspective of t h e p a t i e n t ' s u n c o n s c i o u s psychic reality, it is as essential for t h e object-component of ego in an internal relationship to maintain its tie to t h e self-component as it is for t h e selfc o m p o n e n t to tirelessly p u r s u e and a t t e m p t to hold o n t o the i n t e r n a l object. 3. Feelings of envy experienced by t h e object-component and directed at t h e self-component of an i n t e r n a l object relationship c o n s t i t u t e a n o t h e r type of internal object-relatedness that can serve as t h e basis for resistance. Not infrequently we hear p a t i e n t s expressing envy toward o t h e r s at times when it does not make immediate sense in t e r m s of t h e p a t i e n t ' s c u r r e n t situation. For example, a borderline patient who had been in intensive p s y c h o t h e r a p y for four years was able for t h e first time in a decade to r e t u r n to school and to relate to her second h u s b a n d in a way in which she was taking some pride. She had a b a n d o n e d her latency-aged children when she left her first h u s b a n d fifteen years previously. In her c u r r e n t therapy meetings, in addition to discussing t h e e n h a n c e d feelings of self-worth, she reported h a v i n g written an extremely angry letter to her children. As she talked about this, she said that she had been a m u c h better m o t h e r to t h e m t h a n her own m o t h e r (who had committed suicide when she was 10 years old) had been to h e r . It became a b u n d a n t l y clear to t h e patient that she was feeling intensely envious of her children. From t h e point of view of t h e self in an i n t e r n a l object r e l a t i o n s h i p with a deeply depressed, rejecting m o t h e r , envy is not a feeling one

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would expect at a time when t h e patient is experiencing e n h a n c e d self-esteem. However, from the point of view of t h e object (the p a t i e n t ' s ego suborganization identified with her m o t h e r ) , not only is control over the self-component t h r e a t e n e d by e n h a n c e d feelings of self-esteem, the object also feels e n v i o u s of t h e self for this newly acquired set of feelings. T h e object-component, in order to maintain a tie (based on control) over t h e self-component, wished to sap t h e feelings of well-being from its object (the self) and make those feelings its own. It is vitally import a n t for t h e object to m a i n t a i n c o n n e c t e d n e s s with t h e self. Signs of diminished d e p e n d e n c e on t h e part of t h e self will be enviously attacked as t h e object (suborganization of ego) begins to fear being left behind. Searles (1979) vividly described similar clinical data in which t h e patient unconsciously functions as multiple people, o n e of whom may become jealous of t h e o t h e r . He gives detailed a c c o u n t s of t h e way in which such i n t e r n a l splitting may be externalized as a c o u n t e r t r a n s f e r e n c e experience in which one aspect of the therapist feels jealous of a n o t h e r aspect of himself that is felt to be more desirable to t h e patient. Searles (1979) c o n c u r s with Fairb a i r n t h a t , a l t h o u g h s u c h internal divisions a r e m o r e app a r e n t in borderline and schizoid individuals, "it would take a bold man to claim that his ego was so perfectly integrated as to be incapable of revealing any evidence of splitting at t h e deepest levels, or that s u c h evidence of splitting of t h e ego could in no c i r c u m s t a n c e s declare itself at more superficial levels, even u n d e r conditions of extreme suffering or h a r d s h i p or d e p r i v a t i o n " (Fairbairn, 1940, p. 8). Searles focuses entirely on jealousy of the self for a n o t h e r aspect of self. T h e theoretical framework of the

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present chapter allows us to supplement Searles's ideas with a way of t h i n k i n g about types of resistance based on jealousy or envy of an internal object for t h e self.

Summary T h e concept of internal object relations is first approached in this chapter t h r o u g h a study of its historical developm e n t . F r e u d ' s theory of superego formation involves t h e notion of a splitting of t h e ego (in t h e context of t h e child's identification with an external object) followed by t h e establishment of a relationship between the two resultant aspects of ego. Melanie Klein c o n t r i b u t e d t h e n o t i o n of an internal object world organized a r o u n d t h e relationships of split-off aspects of ego to i n t e r n a l objects. However, Klein's writing is fraught with c o n t r a d i c t i o n s about whether internal objects are to be viewed as phantasies, active agencies, or b o t h . Fairbairn insisted that object relationships, not objects, are internalized and that internal objects are at least in part d y n a m i c s t r u c t u r e s . He fully established for t h e first time t h e n o t i o n that all i n t e r n a l object relationships involve two active agencies. However, t h e s o u r c e of t h e d y n a m i s m of objects was left unexplained. Bion's t h e o r y of bizarre objects provides a model for t h i n k i n g about t h e way in which an aspect of t h e mind may become split off and engage in a profound" identification with an inanimate object, leading to t h e feeling that it has become " a t h i n g . " On the basis of these developments, I h a v e proposed that a dual split in t h e ego is required for t h e establishm e n t of an internal object relationship. O n e split-off aspect of ego is identified with the self in t h e original object relationship; a n o t h e r is t h o r o u g h l y identified with t h e

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object. T h e concepts of transference, countertransference, and projective identification are t h e n viewed from this perspective. Resistance is u n d e r s t o o d as t h e difficulty a patient has in relinquishing pathological a t t a c h m e n t s involved in u n c o n s c i o u s internal object relationships. T h e view of internal objects proposed in this chapter brings into focus types of resistance that had formerly been only partially u n d e r s t o o d . T h e s e types of resistance are based on the need of t h e internal object (suborganization of ego) not to be changed by the self (suborganization of ego), t h e dependence of t h e internal object on the self, and the envy and jealousy of t h e internal object for the self-component of the i n t e r n a l object relationship.

7 T 7 i e

M o t h e r ,

a n d

t h e t h e

D o n a l d

t h e

I n f a n t ,

M a t r i x

W o r k

i n

o f

W i n n i c o t t

A book which does not contain its counterbook is considered incomplete. —Jorge Luis Borges, "Tlon, Uqbar, Orbis, Tertius"

Donald W i n n i c o t t developed his c o n t r i b u t i o n to t h e psychoanalytic dialogue in t h e intellectual and social climate of t h e British Psychoanalytical Society d u r i n g t h e 1920s t h r o u g h t h e early 1970s. D u r i n g m u c h of this period, the British Society was sharply and often bitterly divided between t h e ideas a n d personalities of A n n a Freud and Melanie Klein. W i n n i c o t t was analyzed first by James S t r a c h e y a n d t h e n by Joan Riviere, o n e of t h e early Kleinian " i n n e r c i r c l e " ; he was supervised by Melanie Klein in his psychoanalytic work with children. Although Winni167

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c o t t ' s t h i n k i n g developed in a direction different from t h a t of Klein, he n e v e r d e n o u n c e d Kleinian t h i n k i n g , as did m a n y analysts who had at o n e point been open to her ideas (e.g., Glover [1945] and Schmideberg [1935]). W i n n i c o t t was a dialectician. His t h i n k i n g t h r i v e d in the m e d i u m of t h e i n t e n s e debate between t h e classical Freudian and t h e Kleinian groups. He u n d e r s t o o d that once we feel that we h a v e finally resolved a basic psychoanalytic issue (either in o u r t h e o r y or in o u r u n d e r s t a n d ing of patients), o u r t h i n k i n g has reached an impasse. W i n n i c o t t (1968) states, I think w i t h o u t false h u m i l i t y , that he offered his p a t i e n t s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s to let t h e m know t h e limits of his u n d e r s t a n d i n g . M a n y of W i n n i cott's most valuable clinical and theoretical c o n t r i b u t i o n s are in t h e form of paradoxes that he asks us to accept without resolving, for t h e t r u t h of t h e paradox lies in n e i t h e r of its poles, but in t h e space between t h e m . Object relations t h e o r y is not composed of a discrete collection of principles: r a t h e r , it r e p r e s e n t s a diverse collection of c o n t r i b u t i o n s t h a t , in my opinion, have been developed in t h e context of one of t h e most i n t e n s e and fruitful of psychoanalytic dialogues. In this chapter I will focus on t h e n a t u r e of t h e i n f a n t ' s d e p e n d e n c e on t h e m o t h e r as this concept emerges from t h e work of Donald W i n n i c o t t . I believe t h a t W i n n i c o t t ' s u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e m o t h e r ' s role in early development becomes fully accessible only when it is approached from the vantage point of t h e dialogue with Klein within which his ideas were developed. T h e W i n n i c o t t i a n ideas that will be discussed are not simply refutations of Klein, n o r revisions of Klein, nor extensions of Klein. T h e s e c o n t r i b u t i o n s are ideas generated in response to a rich epistemologic dilemma created in large part by t h e Kleinian c o n t r i b u t i o n . T h e next t h r e e sections of this chapter explore t h r e e

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different forms of W i n n i c o t t ' s conception of t h e infant's evolving dependence on the m o t h e r . T h e r e will be an a t t e m p t , t h r o u g h t h e clarification, i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , and extension of W i n n i c o t t ' s ideas, to make more fully accessible for analytic consideration i m p o r t a n t m e a n i n g s implicit in this facet of W i n n i c o t t ' s work.

I. The

Period

of the

Subjective

Object

Although Klein did not ignore t h e role of the m o t h e r , W i n n i c o t t did not believe that Klein u n d e r s t o o d t h e nat u r e of the m o t h e r - i n f a n t relationship. She [Klein] paid lip-service to e n v i r o n m e n t a l provision, b u t would never fully acknowledge t h a t along with t h e d e p e n d e n c e of early infancy is truly a period in which it is not possible to describe an infant witho u t describing the m o t h e r whom the infant has not yet become able to separate from a self. Klein claimed to have paid full a t t e n t i o n to t h e e n v i r o n m e n t a l factor, but it is my opinion that she was temperamentally incapable of this. ( W i n n i c o t t , 1962a, p. 177) T h e specific qualities of t h e interpersonal relationship between m o t h e r and infant play a role secondary to t h a t of phantasy in Kleinian t h i n k i n g even t h o u g h , for Klein, p h a n t a s y is always object related in c o n t e n t . T h e m o t h e r as she actually exists is seen by Klein as eclipsed by t h e phantasied m o t h e r who is c o n s t r u c t e d by t h e infant on t h e basis of the i n f a n t ' s projections: " T h e child's earliest reality is w h o l l y - p h a n t a s t i c " (Klein, 1930, p. 238). T h e idea t h a t t h e infant is isolated from what an observer would consider reality is not what W i n n i c o t t objects to in

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Kleinian theory. R a t h e r , W i n n i c o t t ' s objection is to what he views as Klein's failure to e x a m i n e t h e n a t u r e of t h e influence on psychological development of t h e infant's d e p e n d e n c e on t h e m o t h e r . Klein's focus was almost exclusively on psychological c o n t e n t s : their origins in biology (instinctual deep s t r u c t u r e ) , their i n t r a p s y c h i c elaboration (e.g., by m e a n s of splitting, projection, introjection, o m n i p o t e n t t h o u g h t , idealization, and denial), a n d their interpersonal t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s (by m e a n s of projective and introjective identification). W i n n i c o t t was not u n a w a r e of t h e potential for an interpersonal d i m e n s i o n to K l e i n ' s concept of projective identification. However, projective identification was for Klein primarily a process by which psychological c o n t e n t s were modified; it was not intended to address t h e basic u n i t y of m a t e r n a l and infantile psychology. Klein (1946, 1948, 1957) viewed t h e infant as a distinct psychological entity from birth. Psychological development was u n d e r s t o o d by her as a series of biologically determined defensive t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s engaged in by t h e infant to take care of himself in t h e face of i n t e r n a l and external danger. In c o n t r a s t , W i n n i c o t t ' s t h e o r y of development is not a depiction of defensive a d j u s t m e n t s made by an infant in t h e face of danger. R a t h e r , it is a n exploration of t h e m o t h e r ' s provision of protective p o s t p o n e m e n t and dosed stimulation. W h e n t h e infant is in t h e womb, t h e m o t h e r ' s role is to provide an e n v i r o n m e n t t h a t will b u y t h e infant t h e time that he needs to m a t u r e before having to face the inevitable task of physical separation at birth. In precisely the same way, the m o t h e r ' s role in the first m o n t h s of life (prior to t h e i n f a n t ' s e n t r y into t h e period of the transitional p h e n o m e n a at " a b o u t four to six to eight to twelve m o n t h s " [ W i n n i c o t t , 1951, p. 4 ] ) , is to provide an e n v i r o n m e n t in which the p o s t p o n e m e n t of

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psychological separateness can occur while t h e infant develops as a result of the interplay of biological m a t u r a t i o n and actual experience. (As will be discussed, a crucial part of this interplay involves dosed stimulation including frustration.) T h e fact t h a t t h e infant can develop only in t h e protective, postponing 1 envelope of t h e maternal environm e n t c o n s t i t u t e s one level of t h e meaning of W i n n i c o t t ' s (1960a) n o t i o n that " t h e r e is no such thing as an i n f a n t " (p. 39 fn.). Mother-Infant

Unit

A new psychological entity is created by m o t h e r and infant that is not t h e o u t c o m e of a process of simple s u m m a t i o n of parts. T h e situation is more akin to t h e interaction of two elements reacting with one a n o t h e r to g e n e r a t e a new e n t i t y , a c o m p o u n d . It is the " c o m p o u n d , " the m o t h e r infant, that is the unit of psychological development for W i n n i c o t t : " T h e behaviour of t h e e n v i r o n m e n t is part of

•I am aware that I am reversing the usual way of viewing a developmental sequence. Ordinarily, an earlier developmental phase is thought of as preparatory for the succeeding one. I am suggesting that an earlier developmental phase also forestalls the next one. Clearly, no intentionality is being attributed to the biological function of postponement. Psychology is not merely an epiphenomenon of biology: biology and psychology are inseparable facets of a single developmental/ maturational process. Early stages of psychological maturation and development serve to help the organism manage in a state of biological immaturity and in this sense secure the organism time to mature. Freud's (1895, 1896b, 1918) concept of "deferred action" (nachtraglich) speaks to the same point: for example, "The retardation of puberty makes possible posthumous primary processes" (1895, p. 359).

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t h e individual's own personal d e v e l o p m e n t " ( W i n n i c o t t , 1971e, p. 53). Since t h e m o t h e r - i n f a n t is a psychological entity c o n t r i b u t e d to by (what an outside observer would design a t e as) t h e m o t h e r and t h e infant, t h e unit of psychological development is always both a primitive psychological organization and a relatively m a t u r e one. In this sense, all levels of psychological development are represented in t h e psyche of t h e m o t h e r - i n f a n t . (This a c c o u n t s for t h e presence of t h e implicit s y n c h r o n i c developmental axis in W i n n i c o t t ' s thinking t h a t will be described.) T h e study of psychological development is not simply t h e study of t h e growth of t h e infantile psyche from primitivity to maturity; it is also t h e study of t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e m o t h e r infant into a m o t h e r and infant. An aspect of t h e m o t h e r is mixed u p with t h e infant in a state t h a t W i n n i c o t t refers to as " p r i m a r y m a t e r n a l p r e o c c u p a t i o n " (1956). T h i s experience of losing oneself in a n o t h e r ("feeling herself into her i n f a n t ' s p l a c e " [p. 304]) is t h e m o t h e r ' s e x p e r i e n c e of b e c o m i n g a part of t h e m o t h e r - i n f a n t . If t h e r e is no aspect of t h e m o t h e r that is at o n e with t h e infant, t h e infant is experienced as a foreign object. O n e s u c h m o t h e r referred to her baby as " t h e thing t h a t lives in m y h o u s e . " (Of c o u r s e , t h e r e is an element of this feeling of alienation in t h e s p e c t r u m of emotions experienced by most m o t h e r s . ) If t h e r e is no aspect of t h e m o t h e r o u t s i d e of t h e e x p e r i e n c e of p r i m a r y maternal p r e o c c u p a t i o n , t h e m o t h e r has in fact b e c o m e psychotic. U n d e r s u c h c i r c u m s t a n c e s , separation from t h e baby is concretely experienced as a form of a m p u t a t i o n . For W i n n i c o t t (1951, 1962b), psychological developm e n t does not begin with t h e unfolding of a biologically p r e d e t e r m i n e d set of psychological functions by which t h e infant takes care of himself in t h e face of anxiety; r a t h e r ,

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early development c e n t e r s a r o u n d t h e m o t h e r ' s initial provision of t h e illusion of the "subjective object," i.e., t h e creation of t h e illusion that internal and external reality are o n e and t h e same. T h e m o t h e r is able, in her state of primary maternal p r e o c c u p a t i o n , to provide the infant with what he needs, in t h e way that he needs it, when he needs it, as if he had "created 1 t h e object. The illusion of "invisible oneness." Winnicott's (1951) use of t h e idea of t h e illusion of " c r e a t i n g the b r e a s t " is somewhat confusing if t h e notion of creating t h e breast is t h o u g h t to involve an awareness of o t h e r n e s s . In t h e beginning, the illusion created by t h e m o t h e r is not an illusion of t h e infant's o m n i p o t e n t power to create what is needed; r a t h e r , t h e illusion is that need does not exist. I believe t h a t t h e idea of "invisible o n e n e s s " (see C h a p t e r 8) of m o t h e r and infant is perhaps m o r e expressive of the form of experience t h a t W i n n i c o t t is proposing t h a n is t h e idea of t h e infant's creating the breast. T h e creation of t h e breast is an observable p h e n o m e n o n only from a point of view outside of the m o t h e r infant unit. W i t h i n t h e m o t h e r - i n f a n t u n i t , t h e creation of t h e breast is not noticed, because the infant in this state does n o t yet have a point of view from which to notice a n y t h i n g . In a h o m o g e n e o u s field, t h e r e are no vantage points, no foreground or background. W i t h o u t difference, t h e r e can be no perspective. T h e m o t h e r ' s caretaking is good e n o u g h when it is so u n o b t r u s i v e as to be u n n o t i c e d . Even the stimulation needed by the infant and provided by t h e m o t h e r is u n n o t i c e d at first. T h e infant's ability to be sensorally alive and to make complex discriminations (see S t e r n , 1977) is not t h e same as awareness of self or of o t h e r . T h e delaying of t h e infant's awareness of separateness is achieved in large part by m e a n s of t h e m o t h e r ' s meeting of t h e infant's need before need becomes desire.

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T h e infant without desire is n e i t h e r a subject n o r an object: t h e r e is not yet an infant. Because W i n n i c o t t ' s t h i n k i n g involves a subtle mixt u r e of explicit d i a c h r o n i c 2 c o n c e p t i o n s of d e v e l o p m e n t and implicit s y n c h r o n i c n o t i o n s , t h e idea t h a t t h e m o t h e r must at t h e outset protect t h e infant from awareness of desire is an i n c o m p l e t e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of W i n n i c o t t ' s thinking. It is t r u e t h a t W i n n i c o t t (1945, 1971a) repeatedly states that in t h e beginning t h e m o t h e r m u s t meet t h e i n f a n t ' s needs and in so doing protect t h e baby from p r e m a t u r e awareness of separateness. I n this c o n c e p t i o n of things, separateness follows o n e n e s s in a sequential, chronological way. At o t h e r times, h o w e v e r , W i n n i c o t t ( 1 9 5 4 - 1 9 5 5 , 1963) states t h a t m o t h e r i n g , even at t h e beginning, must n o t be too good. T h e infant is robbed of t h e experience of desire if his every need is anticipated and met before it is experienced, for example, as appetite. Even u n d e r n o r m a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s , t h e meeting of t h e infant's needs forecloses i m p o r t a n t possibilities at t h e same time that it satisfies a n d protects t h e infant. 2

A diachronic developmental axis involves a linear, sequential conception of development in which one phase of development builds upon the previous one through processes that include structural differentiation, integration, and epigenetic unfolding of maturational potentials. Freud's (1905) sequence of psychosexual phases, Anna Freud's (1965) conception of developmental lines, Piaget's (1946) notion of stepwise development of cognitive structures through assimilation and accommodation, and Erikson's (1950) conception of an epigenetic unfolding of psychosocial stages, are all examples of diachronic conceptions of development. A synchronic developmental axis involves a conception of coexisting hierarchically interrelated levels of development. Freud's (1896b, 1918) conception of "stratification," Klein's (1932b) notion of the spreading of libidinal excitation between levels of development, and Lacan's (1957) conception of the imaginary and symbolic orderings of experience, represent synchronic developmental conceptions.

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T h e baby is fobbed off by t h e feed itself; instinct tension disappears, and t h e baby is both satisfied and cheated. It is too easily assumed that a feed is followed by satisfaction and sleep. Often distress follows this fobbing off, especially if physical satisfaction too quickly robs the infant of zest. T h e infant is t h e n left with: aggression u n d i s c h a r g e d — b e c a u s e not enough muscle erotism or primitive impulse (motility), was used in the feeding process; or a sense of " f l o p " — since t h e s o u r c e of zest for life has gone suddenly, and the infant does not know it will r e t u r n . (Winnicott, 1 9 5 4 - 1 9 5 5 , p. 268) So it is not sufficient to say that the m o t h e r must in the beginning meet t h e infant's needs in order to protect t h e infant from p r e m a t u r e knowledge of separateness (a d i a c h r o n i c s t a t e m e n t ) . Neither is it sufficient to say that t h e m o t h e r from the beginning must meet the infant's need for " z e s t " in allowing t h e infant the o p p o r t u n i t y to develop desire t h r o u g h t h e experience of partially unfulfilled needs. Only a paradoxical statement in which both t h e s y n c h r o n i c and d i a c h r o n i c axes are represented can approach completeness: the m o t h e r must shield t h e infant from awareness of desire and separateness, and t h e m o t h e r must safeguard the i n f a n t ' s o p p o r t u n i t y to experience desire and t h e accompanying knowledge of separateness. Instinct, Defense and

Individuality

Central to W i n n i c o t t i a n (1971a) developmental theory is t h e idea t h a t t h e r e is a potential individuality at birth and t h a t t h e m o t h e r (both as e n v i r o n m e n t and as object) facilitates the development of that unfolding individuality. In large p a r t , t h e task of t h e m o t h e r is not to interfere with t h e infant's s p o n t a n e o u s development t h a t begins as

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a state of "formless" (1971d, p. 64) "going on being". T h e development of t h e psychological system is not predominantly propelled by t h e need to find c h a n n e l s for the discharge of instinctual tension (as in F r e u d ' s energy model) nor by t h e need to defend against danger posed by t h e death instinct (as in Kleinian t h e o r y ) . T h i s is not to say that W i n n i c o t t rejected either instinct t h e o r y or t h e n o t i o n of t h e central role of anxiety in the normal s t r u c t u r i n g of the psyche in general, and of the ego in particular. For W i n n i c o t t , it is all a m a t t e r of t h e timing of t h e h a n d i n g over of caretaking (including defensive operations) from the m o t h e r (more a c c u r a t e l y , t h e m o t h e r - i n f a n t ) to t h e infant. If t h e r e is a p r e m a t u r e r u p t u r e of the holding e n v i r o n m e n t , the infant too early becomes a reactive c r e a t u r e , and develops hypert'rophied, rigid defensive s t r u c t u r e s . U n d e r s u c h c i r c u m s t a n c e s , the infant must attempt to deal with psychological tasks t h a t he is not yet maturationally equipped to manage. On the other h a n d , if t h e holding e n v i r o n m e n t is " t o o g o o d " for too long, the infant is prevented from experiencing dosed frustration, tolerable anxiety, desire, and conflict, and as a result will not develop ways of caring for himself (including defending himself psychologically). All of these qualities of e x p e r i e n c e — f r u s t r a t i o n , a n x i e t y , desire, conflicted d e s i r e — i n t r o d u c e difference and lead to internal differentiation. T h e creation of t h e u n c o n s c i o u s mind (and therefore, t h e conscious mind) becomes possible and necessary only in t h e face of conflicted desire t h a t leads to t h e need to disown and yet preserve aspects of experience, i.e., the need to maintain two different modes of experiencing t h e same psychological event simultaneously. In o t h e r words, t h e very existence of t h e differentiation of t h e c o n s c i o u s and u n c o n s c i o u s mind stems from a conflict between a desire to f e e l / t h i n k / b e in specific ways, and t h e desire not to f e e l / t h i n k / b e in t h o s e ways.

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For W i n n i c o t t , t h e ability of t h e infant to make use of t h e integrating and s t r u c t u r i n g effects of instinctual experience (including instinctual conflict) depends upon t h e m o t h e r ' s success in postponing (and yet preserving) t h e i n f a n t s awareness of desire, and therefore of conflicted desire, until, a n d not b e y o n d , t h e point where the infant experiences his feelings as his own. Prior to that point, " t h e instincts can be as external as a clap of t h u n d e r or a h i t " ( W i n n i c o t t , 1960a, p. 141), and will disrupt t h e infant's developing sense of internally generated desire. Once a sense of self has begun to consolidate (in t h e way t h a t will be described below), instinctual experience serves to focus and organize t h e infant's sense of himself as a u t h o r of his experience ( W i n n i c o t t , 1967a). O n e ' s being takes specific form in the process of feeling and acting u p o n o n e ' s desires. The Defensive

Preservation

of the Self

W h e n t h e r e is a prolonged and serious failure to provide a good e n o u g h holding e n v i r o n m e n t , 3 the infant is t h r o w n into a state of chaos and disruption of his sense of " g o i n g on b e i n g " ( W i n n i c o t t , 1963, p. 183). T h e o u t c o m e is childhood psychosis or the n u c l e u s of adult psychotic or borderline states. W h e n t h e failure of the holding envir o n m e n t is less severe, t h e infant may be able to develop a defensive personality organization that takes over t h e caretaking function of t h e m o t h e r . T h i s organization is devel-

3

It is important to emphasize that inadequacy of mothering is only one of the possible causes of failure of the holding environment. Other important causes include prematurity of birth, physical illness of the infant, unusual sensitivity on the part of the infant, and "lack of fit" between the temperaments of a particular mother and a particular infant.

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oped in a state of perceived danger. Instead of the mutually e n r i c h i n g interplay t h a t results from t h e differentiation of the conscious and u n c o n s c i o u s m i n d s a n d t h e establishm e n t of a " s e m i p e r m e a b l e " repression barrier, t h e r e develops an alienation of o n e aspect of self from a n o t h e r ( W i n n i c o t t , 1960b, 1963). T h e defensive, caretaking self (the False Self) is established almost exclusively for t h e p u r p o s e of securing t h e protective isolation of t h e infant's potential for psychological individuality (the T r u e Self)T h i s isolation of the T r u e Self inevitably leads to feelings of e m p t i n e s s , futility, and deadness. T h e walling-off of a protected self stands in c o n t r a s t to t h e dual role of censorship and selective, disguised expression performed by t h e u n c o n s c i o u s ego in n o r m a l development. T h e difference between normally developing defenses and a psychological split leading to t h e development of a False Self defensive organization lies in t h e fact that normally developing defenses enable t h e individual not only to organize and disavow experience, b u t also to u n c o n s c i o u s l y p r e s e r v e disavowed desires that are n o n e t h e l e s s o n e ' s own. In contrast, t h e formation of a False Self personality organization forecloses t h e development of significant aspects of what might h a v e become oneself.

II.

The

Period

of Transitional

Phenomena

Although t h e paradox of o n e n e s s and separateness of m o t h e r and infant has its origin in t h e earliest period of d e v e l o p m e n t , t h e r e is a shift in t h e quality of this dialectical relationship in t h e period of development in which transitional p h e n o m e n a o c c u r . It is to this period that I would now like to t u r n . Here again, W i n n i c o t t ' s t h i n k i n g is in part a response to t h e Kleinian c o n t r i b u t i o n .

The Mother, the Infant, and the Matrix The Infant's

Psychological

179 Matrix

In both t h e Kleinian and W i n n i c o t t i a n c o n c e p t i o n s of development t h e r e is a n o t i o n t h a t t h e infant in t h e beginning r e q u i r e s insulation from external reality. For W i n n i cott, t h e insulation is generated by t h e maternal provision of t h e illusion of t h e subjective object. T h e infant as conceived of by Klein (1930) is insulated by a "wholly p h a n t a s t i c " reality. T h e Kleinian infant sees t h e world t h r o u g h t h e lens of phylogenetically determined preconceptions a n d in this sense " c r e a t e s " his internal and external object world, which are at first indistinguishable from each o t h e r . T h i s is t h e Kleinian version of t h e infant's " p r o t e c t i v e shield" (Freud, 1920, p. 30). T h e following question t h e n arises in W i n n i c o t t i a n , F r e u d i a n , and Kleinian developmental theory: given that t h e infant is initially insulated from external reality, how is t h e infant able to utilize actual experience in t h e process of emerging from his initial state of isolation? 4 H e r e again, W i n n i c o t t ' s c o n t r i b u t i o n to t h e psychoanalytic understanding of t h e developmental process involves a shift in perspective (a r e s t a t e m e n t of t h e epistemologic problem) from an attempt to u n d e r s t a n d the development of t h e infant to an attempt to u n d e r s t a n d the development of the m o t h e r - i n f a n t . Neither Klein nor Freud was oblivious to *Freud (1900, 1911) understood early psychological development as involving a move from an initial solipsistic world of hallucinatory wish fulfillment. This is viewed as the outcome of the interplay of the biological maturation of the organism and actual experience with objects. The infant at first utilizes hallucinatory wish fulfillment to insulate himself from frustrating external reality. However, as the infant matures biologically, he shifts from efforts to create gratifying reality hallucinatorily to an effort to utilize actual experience of frustration to find other, more effective, adaptive, and indirect ways of gratifying instinctual needs.

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the role of t h e m o t h e r (as object), but it was not until W i n n i c o t t that psychoanalysis developed a c o n c e p t i o n of t h e m o t h e r as t h e infant's psychological matrix. 5 From a Winnicottian perspective, the infant's psychological contents can be understood only in relation to the psychological matrix within which those contents exist. T h a t matrix is at first provided by the m o t h e r . T h i s is a second level of m e a n i n g (to be added to t h e inseparability of t h e infant from t h e protective, postponing function of t h e m a t e r n a l holding e n v i r o n m e n t ) of W i n n i c o t t ' s n o t i o n that t h e r e is no s u c h thing as an infant. Because t h e i n t e r n a l holding environm e n t of t h e infant, his own psychological m a t r i x , takes time to develop, t h e i n f a n t ' s m e n t a l c o n t e n t s initially exist within t h e matrix of t h e m a t e r n a l m e n t a l and physical activity. In o t h e r words, in t h e beginning, t h e ' e n v i r o n mental m o t h e r provides t h e mental space in which t h e infant begins to g e n e r a t e experience. It is in this sense that I feel that a new psychological e n t i t y is created by t h e m o t h e r and (what is becoming) t h e infant. 6 Even t h o u g h aspects of t h e i n f a n t ' s psychological c o n t e n t s may be experienced as things in themselves (see Chapter 3) and t h u s may in t h e m s e l v e s be q u i t e impervious to new experience, t h e i n f a n t ' s psychological matrix 5

The word "matrix" is derived from the Latin word for womb. Although Winnicott (1958b) only once used the word "matrix" in his written work (when he referred to ego-relatedness as the "matrix of transference"), it seems to me that matrix is a particularly apt word to describe the silently active containing space in which psychological and bodily experience occur. 6 Lacan's (1956a) concept of "the Other" similarly refers to a third psychological entity (an intersubjective entity) generated in the analytic setting that is distinct from the patient and from the analyst: "The Other is therefore the locus in which is constituted the I who speaks with him who hears. . . ." (p. 141).

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(the maternal holding e n v i r o n m e n t ) is steadily changing and is highly sensitive to modification by new experience. T h e holding e n v i r o n m e n t (psychological matrix) shifts not only in relation to t h e infant's changing emotional needs (e.g., a need to be held, to be calmed, to be entertained, to show off), but also in relation to t h e infant's shifting m a t u r a t i o n a l and developmental needs (e.g., mat u r i n g motor and cognitive capacities). T h e period of the transitional p h e n o m e n o n could be u n d e r s t o o d as the phase of internalization by t h e infant (perhaps m o r e accurately described as the appropriation to t h e infant) o f t h e psychological matrix. T h e maternally provided psychological matrix is in a state of continual erosion from the beginning, but only after several m o n t h s does t h e infant begin to consolidate his capacity to generate and maintain his own psychological matrix. In this period of t h e transitional p h e n o m e n o n , t h e role of the m o t h e r is one of gradual disillusionment, i.e., a gradual weaning of t h e infant from maternal provision of the holding e n v i r o n m e n t that had served as the infant's psychological matrix. In the course of this weaning process, the infant develops t h e capacity to be alone ( W i n n i c o t t , 1958a). The Presence of the Absent

Mother

An i m p o r t a n t distinction must be made at this point in order to u n d e r s t a n d W i n n i c o t t ' s t h i n k i n g a b o u t t h e development of t h e capacity to be alone: W h a t is internalized in this process is not the m o t h e r as object, but t h e m o t h e r as e n v i r o n m e n t . T h e p r e m a t u r e "objectification" (discovery o f t h e m o t h e r as object), and internalization of the objectm o t h e r lead to the establishment of an omnipotent internal-object-mother. T h i s internalization of m o t h e r as om-

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nipotent object is q u i t e different from t h e establishment of t h e capacity to be alone. (The former process is often a defensive s u b s t i t u t e for the latter.) In t h e development of t h e capacity to be alone, t h e infant develops t h e ability to g e n e r a t e t h e space in which he lives. (This space, referred to by W i n n i c o t t as " p o t e n tial s p a c e , " will be discussed in detail in Chapters 8 and 9.) Until t h e point in development being focused u p o n , t h e m o t h e r and infant have together created this space, which is not coextensive with t h e u n i v e r s e b u t , r a t h e r , is a personal space. It is not exactly limited by o u r skin, and it is not exactly t h e same as o u r mind. In addition to these (inexact) dimensions of body and mind, this experience of a containing space includes t h e experience of t h e space in which we work creatively, t h e space in which we relax " f o r m l e s s l y , " t h e space in which we dream, 7 and t h e space in which we play. A paradoxical s t a t e m e n t m u s t be made about t h e process of t h e development of t h e individual's capacity to generate this space: t h e child must h a v e t h e o p p o r t u n i t y to play alone in t h e p r e s e n c e of t h e absent m o t h e r , and in t h e absence of t h e present m o t h e r . T h i s paradox can be u n d e r s t o o d in t h e following way: t h e m o t h e r is absent as object, but is t h e r e as t h e u n n o t i c e d , but p r e s e n t containing space in which the child is playing. T h e m o t h e r must not make her p r e s e n c e as object too i m p o r t a n t , for this would lead t h e child to become addicted to her as omnipotent object. T h e development of t h e capacity to be alone is a process in which t h e m o t h e r ' s role as invisible c o a u t h o r 7

Lewin (1950) refers to this "backdrop" (p. 83) upon which dreaming occurs as the "dream screen"; Khan (1972) uses the term dream space for this area of experiencing; Grotstein (1981) refers to this and other backgrounds of experience as the "background object of primary identification."

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of potential space is taken over by (what is becoming) the child. In this sense, t h e healthy individual, when alone, is always in t h e presence of the self-generated, e n v i r o n m e n tal m o t h e r . Impending

Annihilation

and the Disruption

of the

Matrix

A l t h o u g h t h e maternal c o n t r i b u t i o n to t h e creation of potential space is u n n o t i c e d by t h e infant, t h e disruption of this invisible provision is a highly visible event that is experienced by the infant as impending annihilation. At s u c h times, a discrete, separate infant is precipitiously (defensively) brought into existence in order to attempt to manage t h e catastrophe. Using Balint's (1968) imagery, t h e infant's relationship to t h e e n v i r o n m e n t a l m o t h e r is very m u c h like t h e a d u l t ' s relationship to air: we ordinarily take t h e air we b r e a t h e for granted, taking from it what we need and expelling into it what we do n o t need. However, if we are deprived of it for even a few m o m e n t s , we become acutely and terrifyingly aware of the way in which we are utterly d e p e n d e n t upon it for our lives. Psychologically this corresponds to t h e failure of t h e relationship with the envir o n m e n t a l m o t h e r leading to the calamitous intrusion of awareness of d e p e n d e n c y on an absent mother-as-object. T h e incompleteness of the process of appropriation to the infant of t h e psychological matrix was evidenced by a successful engineer who, having married a woman 20 years his senior, could only feel alive when he was working on his car in t h e garage while his wife was in t h e house. If she were not at h o m e , he could n o t work in this engrossed state and would impatiently await her r e t u r n . On t h e o t h e r h a n d , he would become enraged if she were to come into the garage while he was working. Her actual physical presence

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184

was experienced as a violent, u n w e l c o m e i n t r u s i o n and made it impossible for him to work. M a n y c h r o n i c sleep d i s t u r b a n c e s reflect an inadeq u a t e development of t h e i n t e r n a l psychological matrix. Falling asleep involves a n act of faith in o u r capacity to hold o u r existence over time while giving u p almost all forms of conscious control. In sleep, we give ourselves over to our internal holding e n v i r o n m e n t . 8 Addiction

to the Mother as Object

Fain (1971, quoted by McDougall, 1974) h a s described forms of infantile i n s o m n i a t h a t seem to be related to difficulties in t h e i n f a n t ' s use of t h e m o t h e r as environm e n t . S o m e of t h e infants studied by Fain seem to have become addicted to t h e actual physical presence of the m o t h e r and could not sleep unless t h e y were being held. T h e s e infants were u n a b l e to provide themselves an internal e n v i r o n m e n t for sleep. Fain has observed that t h e 8

Nursery rhymes (often symbolically about sleeping and told at bedtime) are replete with references to the child's fear of falling. Rock-a-bye baby On the tree-top— When the wind blows. The cradle will rock. When the bough breaks. The cradle will fall, And down will come baby, Cradle and all. The danger here is not simply that of bodily injury, or even that of separation anxiety; it is the danger of the disruption of the container of sleep, the infant's partially internal and partially external psychological matrix.

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m o t h e r s of many of these infants interfered with the a t t e m p t s of their infants to provide themselves substitutes for her physical p r e s e n c e (for example, in autoerotic activities such as t h u m b - s u c k i n g ) , t h u s rendering t h e infant fully dependent upon t h e actual m o t h e r as object. In my experience as a c o n s u l t a n t to clinicians working with severely disturbed patients, I have found that therapists doing what they feel to be " s u p p o r t i v e t h e r a p y " with borderline and schizophrenic patients are frequently engaged in t h e process of addicting t h e patient to the therapist as object. As the following example illustrates, this potential danger exists even in well-conducted analytic work with disturbed patients. A severely disturbed borderline patient had been seen in p s y c h o t h e r a p y t h r e e times per week for six years and had made significant progress in the c o u r s e of this work. Because of a c o u n t e r t r a n s f e r e n c e problem arising from an interplay of feelings induced by t h e patient's projective identifications and feelings arising from t h e therapist's own childhood, t h e therapist was finding it difficult to tolerate t h e p a t i e n t ' s growing independence. W h e n the patient, S., became a n x i o u s a b o u t his plan to enroll in a vocational program, he became pleadingly d e m a n d i n g that t h e therapist p h o n e t h e agency to get information about enrollm e n t r e q u i r e m e n t s and procedures. Although S.'s associations and dream material made it clear in retrospect t h a t he was unconsciously asking for permission to do this for himself, the therapist acquiesced to his manifest d e m a n d . Having made the p h o n e call, t h e therapist in t h e next meeting handed t h e patient a sheet of paper on which he had recorded t h e information that he had received from t h e organization. S.

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immediately exploded with rage, yelling obscenities at t h e therapist. He t h e n stormed out of t h e office, terrified that he would h u r t t h e therapist. T h e patient did not r e t u r n to t h e r a p y for t h r e e weeks. In t h e course of supervision, it was possible for t h e therapist to u n d e r s t a n d what h a d h a p p e n e d in t h e t h e r a p y and to predict that t h e patient would r e t u r n to t h e t h e r a p y in a pathetic, a n x i o u s state that would be designed to reassure t h e therapist that the patient was utterly dependent u p o n him. W h e n S. did in fact r e t u r n in this way, t h e therapist told him that he t h o u g h t S. must feel that t h e therapist wanted to t u r n him into a baby. In t h e c o u r s e of t h e meeting, t h e therapist also said that it seemed that t h e patient had decided that falling apart (and t h u s d e m o n s t r a t i n g his need for t h e therapist) was a price worth paying if t h e alternatives were killing t h e therapist, leaving him, or having the therapist leave S. T h e patient seemed relieved that t h e therapist u n d e r s t o o d something of what he had been feeling. Before t h e next meeting, t h e patient a n d a friend went to t h e rehabilitation c e n t e r , w h e r e t h e patient picked up a copy of t h e e n r o l l m e n t p r o c e d u r e s . On t h e way h o m e he became extremely a n x i o u s and began to fear that t h e meeting with t h e therapist had been a figment of his imagination. He called t h e therapist in a panic, asking for an extra meeting immediately. T h e therapist said t h a t he t h o u g h t that S. could wait until their next scheduled meeting t h e next day. W i t h that t h e p a t i e n t ' s anxiety subsided. In t h e case just described, t h e therapist had abandoned his role as provider of a t h e r a p e u t i c e n v i r o n m e n t (an analytic space) and had instead begun to insert himself into the p a t i e n t ' s life as an o m n i p o t e n t object. T h e patient

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craved such an object relationship (a primitive maternal transference), but was sufficiently healthy to struggle against t h e enslaving addiction t h a t s u c h a relationship inevitably generates. Traumatic

and Nontraumatic

Discovery

of

Separateness

In t h e period of t h e transitional p h e n o m e n o n , t h e infant (or patient) must not be abruptly confronted with t h e experiential fact that he has his own m i n d , that he has his own area of experiencing within which he t h i n k s his t h o u g h t s , feels his feelings, dreams his dreams, and does his playing. T h e infant requires time to make this experiential discovery for himself. If t h e infant has this opport u n i t y , t h e discovery can at least in part be a welcome o n e (see M a h l e r ' s [1968] description of t h e exhilaration of t h e practicing subphase of separation-individuation). T h e crucial psychological-interpersonal p h e n o m e n o n that makes possible t h e weaning of t h e infant from the m a t e r n a l l y provided psychological matrix is t h e mainten a n c e of a series of paradoxes: T h e infant and m o t h e r are o n e , and the infant and m o t h e r are two; t h e infant has created the object and t h e object was t h e r e to be discovered; t h e infant must learn to be alone in t h e p r e s e n c e of t h e m o t h e r ; and so on. It is essential that the infant or child never be asked which is the t r u t h ( W i n n i c o t t , 1951). Both are true. T h e s i m u l t a n e o u s m a i n t e n a n c e of t h e emotional t r u t h of o n e n e s s with t h e m o t h e r a n d of separateness from her makes it possible for t h e infant to play in t h e potential space between m o t h e r and infant. (In Chapters 8 and 9 t h e normal and pathological development of potential space will be discussed.) T h e experience of the absence of t h e m o t h e r as object is a p h e n o m e n o n of t h e depressive position (that is, the period of development in which whole object-relatedness

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is being consolidated). Loss of t h e mother-as-object is reacted to with feelings of sadness, loneliness, guilt, and sometimes, desolation. If t h e capacity to be alone has been achieved (that is, if t h e e n v i r o n m e n t a l m o t h e r has been internalized), this loss can be survived. T h e loss of t h e m o t h e r - a s - e n v i r o n m e n t is a far m o r e catastrophic e v e n t , to which o n e responds with a feeling of impending loss of oneself. T h e person experiences himself as on t h e edge of dissolving. Sometimes, if t h e situation h a s not reached a point where t h e patient has entered a state of panic or has instituted massive defensive withdrawal, t h e patient may report being unable to t h i n k or n o t knowing who h e is. O n c e when working with a patient in this state, I addressed the patient (Todd) by n a m e . He looked at me with a combination of b e w i l d e r m e n t , fear, and despair and said in a m o n o t o n e , " T o d d is lost and gone f o r e v e r . " T h e patient told m e h e did not know what h i s n a m e was b u t h e did n o t t h i n k it was T o d d . He t h e n e n t e r e d a state of u t t e r panic and fled from t h e office. He screamed in t h e hallway w i t h o u t words and h u r l e d himself at t h e walls. It was only in t h e course of being held tightly in t h e a r m s of t h r e e of t h e ward staff that he was able to stop flailing a n d begin to be calmed. As t h e panic m o u n t s for a patient experiencing this form of dissolution of self, t h e r e is a powerful need to r e c o n s t r u c t a holding e n v i r o n m e n t . It is often at this point (as in t h e case just described) t h a t t h e patient feels compelled to create s u c h havoc (an externalization of the internal catastrophe) t h a t it becomes necessary for police or ward staff, physically and sometimes violently, to restrain t h e patient. It is essential that t h e c o n t a i n i n g activ-

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ity be a h u m a n i n t e r a c t i o n ; i.e., a person must be present with t h e patient in sheets, in restraints, or in a "seclusion r o o m . " Otherwise, the p a t i e n t ' s t e r r o r is magnified, leaving him only suicide, profound autistic withdrawal, or selfmutilation as m e t h o d s of managing his state of psychological catastrophe. In one instance in which interpersonal c o n t a i n m e n t was not provided, it was reported to m e that a patient who had been locked in a seclusion room enucleated an eye with his fingers in what was later inferred to have been an attempt to s h u t out unbearable experience. W i t h this conception of t h e psychological matrix in m i n d , it is now possible to reconsider aspects of Kleinian t h i n k i n g from a slightly altered perspective. For Klein, t h e r e is an implicit notion that t h e matrix for t h e infant's psychological life is ultimately a biological one. T h e life and death instincts as vehicles for phylogenetically inherited p r e c o n c e p t i o n s are together t h e organizer and container of psychological life. Instinctual deep s t r u c t u r e is a biological e n t i t y t h a t organizes psychology a n d is n e v e r directly experienced, just as o n e never directly experiences o n e ' s brain or o n e ' s linguistic deep s t r u c t u r e . T h e experiential manifestation of t h e s t r u c t u r i n g function of t h e i n s t i n c t s is the organizing and containing effect of the a t t r i b u t i o n of m e a n i n g (along biologically predetermined lines) to chaotic barrages of raw sensory data. It goes w i t h o u t saying that psychology is embedded in biology (i.e., mental p h e n o m e n a have physiologic substrates), but Kleinian and Freudian instinct t h e o r y go farther t h a n that to implicitly offer a conception of biology (perhaps more accurately termed psychobiology) as a matrix for a system of psychological meanings. For W i n n i c o t t , t h e infant's biological matrix interp e n e t r a t e s t h e maternally provided matrix: both are unobtrusively present unless t h e r e is a disruption of the inter-

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personal matrix. W h e n s u c h d i s r u p t i o n s occur, as they inevitably do, t h e infant must utilize his own biologically determined psychological defenses, including very primitive forms of splitting, projection, introjection, denial, and idealization. F r o m a W i n n i c o t t i a n perspective, these psychological operations are viewed not as defenses against the derivatives of the death instinct, but as facets of t h e i n f a n t ' s constitutionally given capacity to contain and order his own experience in t h e face of an e m e r g e n c y arising from the inevitable failure of the maternal facet of his psychological matrix.

III.

The

Whole-Object

Period

of

Relatedness

'

T h u s far, I h a v e addressed the W i n n i c o t t i a n conception of the role of the m o t h e r as a holding, postponing environm e n t and t h e role of t h e m o t h e r as o v e r s e e r of t h e weaning process t h r o u g h which t h e " i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n " (or appropriation to t h e infant) of t h e psychological matrix occurs. I will now focus on t h e role of t h e m o t h e r in t h e period of development d u r i n g which t h e infant achieves " u n i t s t a t u s , " i.e., whole-object relatedness in t h e depressive position. The Survival of the Object and the Discovery of Externality In the depressive position, t h e infant is no longer as d e p e n d e n t on t h e m o t h e r as matrix for his psychological c o n t e n t s . He is able to provide m u c h of that for himself. However, his d e p e n d e n c e on t h e m o t h e r has by no m e a n s ended; it has taken on a new form. T h e infant is now

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d e p e n d e n t on the mother-as-object, whom he is in the process of discovering (as opposed to creating). His cont i n u e d emotional d e v e l o p m e n t , including t h e development of t h e capacity to " u s e o b j e c t s " ( W i n n i c o t t , 1968) and t h e development of psychic reality, depends u p o n t h e m o t h e r performing her role as external object over time. If we view holding as d o m i n a n t a m o n g t h e functions of t h e m o t h e r in t h e earliest stage of d e v e l o p m e n t , and weaning as t h e d o m i n a n t function in t h e period of t h e transitional p h e n o m e n o n , in t h e depressive position 9 t h e critical task of t h e m o t h e r can be conceived of as surviving over time. Here again, it is not possible to u n d e r s t a n d this aspect of W i n n i c o t t ' s c o n t r i b u t i o n to t h e psychoanalytic dialogue in isolation from an u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e Kleinian c o n t r i b u t i o n . W h a t is being developed in this facet of W i n n i c o t t ' s thinking is a theory of t h e relationship of the infant to his internal objects, the relationship of internal objects to actual objects, and t h e relationship of internal objects to m e n t a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of external objects. I n classical t h e o r y , t h e r e is no equivalent to the Kleinian c o n c e p t i o n of internal objects. For Klein, the internal object originates in t h e inherited preconceptions associated with the instincts (which I have referred to as psychological deep s t r u c t u r e ) . T h e mental representation of t h e object is not inherited, but the s t r u c t u r e for t h e idea is inherited and is given form as a mental representation when the infant e n c o u n t e r s actual objects. T h e actual breast, for example, is merely a shape that is given to the

9

The gradual attainment of the depressive position for Winnicott (1954-1955), occurs approximately in the second half of the first year of life. This development is marked by the infant's becoming able to "play at dropping things" (p. 263), an ability the infant usually develops to "a fine art" (p. 263) by about 9 months of age.

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" p r e c o n c e p t i o n " (Bion, 1962a, 1962b) of t h e breast. It must be emphasized that t h e " p r e c o n c e p t i o n " is not yet a conception (an idea), b u t the potential for a c o n c e p t i o n , which becomes an idea when t h e p r e c o n c e p t i o n m e e t s its " r e a l i z a t i o n " (Bion, 1962a, 1962b) in the actual e n c o u n ter with the breast. T h e infant does not anticipate t h e actual breast in the sense of having a mental p i c t u r e of it prior to e n c o u n t e r i n g it; on the o t h e r h a n d , h e "recognizes" it when he e n c o u n t e r s it, because it is part of his biologically s t r u c t u r e d internal order t h a t was silently available to be given representational form. From a Kleinian perspective, t h e formation of an internal object is only secondarily an internalization process. More fundamentally, this form of mental object has its origins in t h e infant's psychological deep s t r u c t u r e , is given shape t h r o u g h t h e infant's experience in t h e world, and is t h e n (re)internalized with t h e representational qualities it has accrued. Only t h o s e qualities of t h e actual external object that h a v e c o r r e s p o n d e n c e to t h e s t r u c t u r ally preconceived object are utilized ( " s e e n " ) in creating t h e i n t e r n a l object r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . R e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of internal objects formed in this way stand in contrast to external object r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s w h i c h a r e later developments. T h e formation of external object r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s is p r e d o m i n a n t l y an internalization process and d e p e n d s upon the capacity of t h e infant to learn from experience, i.e., to notice and utilize t h e difference between t h e actual and t h e anticipated object. Early o n , t h e actual object is eclipsed by the anticipated object. 1 0 Because i n t e r n a l ob10

When classical analytic thinkers (e.g., Jacobson [1964] and Mahler [1968]) refer to object relations, they are predominantly referring to the real interaction with actual external objects, and the internalization that follows from this interaction. The early object is not predom-

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j e c t s are the infant's first creations, they operate almost entirely u n d e r t h e aegis of o m n i p o t e n t thinking. For Klein, projective identification is t h e principal method by which internal objects formed in t h e way just described are modified. T h e m o t h e r ' s c o n t a i n m e n t of a projective identification is a process of modifying an infantile p r e c o n c e p t i o n . T h r o u g h this process, internal objects are gradually " c l e a n s e d " (Grotstein, 1980a, 1980b) of projective distortion leading to the formation of external object representations. No mental representation ever entirely loses its c o n n e c t i o n with its origins as an internal object, but with adequate maternal c o n t a i n m e n t of the infant's projective identifications, mental representations acquire increasing a u t o n o m y from these origins and from the o m n i p o t e n t t h i n k i n g associated with relations between i n t e r n a l objects. This consolidation of t h e " e x t e r n a l i t y " of t h e object r e p r e s e n t a t i o n is reflected in t h e degree to which t h e individual is capable of e n t e r i n g into relationships with actual objects in a m a n n e r that involves m o r e t h a n a simple transference projection of his internal object world. T h e schizoid patient is far m o r e the prisoner of his o m n i p o t e n t internal object world (which is projected o n t o c u r r e n t objects) t h a n is the healthy individual, for whom transference provides only a background for relations with real objects, whose qualities are perceived and responded to even when these qualities differ from the subject's transference expectations. inantly created by the infant; it is responded to, influences, and is influenced by the infant, and modifies the infant's psychological structure through an internalization process. British object relations theory (under the influence of ideas developed by Klein) places more emphasis on the role of phantasy, projection, and deep structural "anticipation" of objects.

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From t h e perspective developed t h u s far, t h e theoretical problem for psychoanalysis is n o t simply to a c c o u n t for t h e creation of p h a n t a s y objects (internal objects), b u t also to a c c o u n t for t h e creation of external objects. In other words, psychoanalysis r e q u i r e s a t h e o r y t h a t addresses t h e way in which t h e infant develops t h e capacity to see b e y o n d t h e world he has created t h r o u g h t h e projection of internal objects. Despite t h e fact t h a t W i n n i c o t t was n o t satisfied with t h e Kleinian resolution to this theoretical problem (i.e., t h e notion of cleansing of internal objects t h r o u g h maturation and successive projective identifications), he did accept m a n y of t h e basic premises o u t of which this theoretical problem was formulated. Specifically, he adopted the Kleinians' implicit conception of t h e origin of internal objects in biologically d e t e r m i n e d p r e c o n c e p t i o n s , alt h o u g h W i n n i c o t t ' s c o n c e p t i o n of t h e specificity and nat u r e of these p r e c o n c e p t i o n s differed markedly from Klein's. For W i n n i c o t t , t h e infant is born with only a vague s t r u c t u r a l readiness for need-fulfilling objects. I infer t h a t this s t r u c t u r a l readiness a c c o u n t s for t h e way in which t h e infant is not surprised or excited by t h e object (e.g., t h e breast) that is empathically provided by t h e m o t h e r since t h e breast corresponds to t h e world t h e infant anticipates. Unless t h e object were fully " e x p e c t e d , " i.e., fully c o n g r u e n t with t h e infant's i n t e r n a l order of things t h a t predates actual experience, t h e infant would " n o t i c e " t h e object, which would result in premat u r e awareness of separateness. It is because the infant is s t r u c u t r a l l y (not motivationally) anticipating the object, t h a t the object can be perceived w i t h o u t being noticed as separate or different from t h e self. In W i n n i c o t t ' s c o n c e p t i o n of d e v e l o p m e n t , r o o m must be made psychologically for t h e discovery of t h e

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external object. W i n n i c o t t (1968) states, in his enigmatic way, that it is the infant's d e s t r u c t i o n of the object (while t h e m o t h e r survives t h e destruction) that allows t h e infant to discover externality. W h a t I infer he m e a n s is that the i n f a n t ' s r e n u n c i a t i o n of t h e o m n i p o t e n c e of t h e internal object entails a crucial act of faith. T h e infant allows himself to drop out of t h e a r m s of t h e o m n i p o t e n t internal object, 1 1 into the arms of a (potential) object whom he has not yet met, since until t h a t point the external m o t h e r has been eclipsed by t h e o m n i p o t e n t internal-object-mother. From t h e point of view of an outside observer, t h e external-object-mother has always been t h e r e and has created (with t h e infant) the illusion of the subjective object. However, t h e very fact t h a t this illusion has been successfully created and m a i n t a i n e d , has allowed the infant not to be aware ofthe existence o f t h e external-object-mother, who exists outside the realm of his omnipotence. The infant has, of c o u r s e , met her but has not " n o t i c e d " h e r ; he has mistaken her for himself (i.e., his creation). T h e act of faith that takes place in giving up ( " d e s t r o y i n g " ) t h e internal object is an act of trust in the (as yet invisible) p r e s e n c e of t h e external-object-mother. It is therefore crucial that t h e real and separate m o t h e r be t h e r e (to catch t h e infant) when t h e infant is in the process of making r o o m for her and recognizing her t h r o u g h his act of r e n u n c i a t i o n (destruction) of the o m n i p o t e n t internalobject-mother:

11

For Winnicott, unconscious omnipotent internal objects are defensively created in response to painful, but inevitable disruptions of the maternal holding environment. The infant deals with the anxiety and feelings of helplessness arising from a premature awareness of separateness by constructing a world of internal objects operating according to rules reflecting his own omnipotence.

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T h e subject says to the object [the i n t e r n a l object]: " I have destroyed y o u , " and t h e object [the externalobject-mother] is t h e r e to receive t h e c o m m u n i c a tion. F r o m now on t h e subject says, " H u l l o , object!" " I ' v e destroyed y o u . " " I love y o u . " " Y o u have value for me because of your survival of my d e s t r u c t i o n of y o u . W h i l e I am loving you [the real-mother-in-theworld, outside of the infant's o m n i p o t e n c e ] , I am all t h e time destroying you [the o m n i p o t e n t internalobject-mother] in ( u n c o n s c i o u s fantasy). . . . T h e subject can now use t h e [external] object that has survived. ( W i n n i c o t t , 1968, p. 90) T h e external object at this j u n c t u r e can be made use of for t h e first time, because t h e object that is being recognized and interacted with is an object-in-the-world, outside of oneself. Up to t h a t p o i n t , t h e actual qualities of t h e object, and t h e r o o t e d n e s s of t h e object-in-the-world outside oneself, were imperceptible a n d , therefore, unusable. T h e infant had paid for his (necessary) insulation in the illusion of t h e subjective object, t h r o u g h postponem e n t of t h e discovery of a world of utilizable objects, i.e., people with whom he can e n t e r into a realm of shared experience-in-the-world outside of himself. T h e survival of t h e object is a form of holding t h e situation over time in s u c h a way that t h e object-mother (or therapist) r e m a i n s emotionally p r e s e n t while t h e infant (or patient) a t t e m p t s to carry out t h e act of trust involved in loosening his grip on t h e o m n i p o t e n t internalobject-mother. An inability to r e n o u n c e t h e i n t e r n a l object arises either when the external object fails to be t h e r e to catch the infant when he allows himself to fall into her a r m s , or

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when the infant's experience with the illusion of t h e subjective object has not instilled in him a faith in the world sufficient to allow him to drop into t h e a r m s of an object he has not yet seen. W h e n t h e external object fails to survive, (i.e., fails to be physically or emotionally present when needed), the infant must tighten his hold on the o m n i p o t e n t internal object, which t h e n becomes t h e only form of safety available to the infant. T h e individual becomes imprisoned in his magical internal object world to which he t h e n rigidly clings. As a result, he develops very little ability to recognize or make use of t h e externality of his object world. A later version of this same process o c c u r s when the child allows himself or herself to leave t b e " o r b i t " of t h e preoedipai m o t h e r and move into the "gravitational p u l l " of t h e oedipal love object. T h e actual parental object of oedipal love must be t h e r e to " c a t c h t h e c h i l d " o n c e he or she has taken t h e risk of falling in love. W h e n the oedipal love object is not emotionally or physically t h e r e to recognize, accept, and (to a degree) reciprocate t h e child's oedipal love, t h e child r e t r e a t s into t h e orbit of t h e powerful preoedipai m o t h e r from whose domination he or she may t h e n never be able to escape. Ruth, Guilt, and the Benign

Circle

In t h e same psychological-interpersonal process t h r o u g h which t h e infant discovers t h e externality of objects, he also develops a dawning awareness of his impact on the newly discovered external-object-mother. Up to this point he has treated his m o t h e r " r u t h l e s s l y " ( W i n n i c o t t , 1 9 5 4 1955), i.e., without r u t h (concern). T h e infant has done so, not because in his o m n i p o t e n c e he has wished to h a r m

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t h e object, but because he has not yet developed awareness of t h e object as a subject, a n d therefore h a s h a d n o e m p a t h y for the object. T h e infant, in discovering t h e externality of objects, begins to develop a sense of how fierce he can be in his efforts to satisfy his wants and in his a t t e m p t s to get rid of what gets in his way. T h e infant unconsciously fears that he does serious damage to his m o t h e r in t h e c o u r s e of demanding and taking from her. T h e function of t h e m o t h e r at this point is to " h o l d t h e situation over t i m e " ( W i n n i c o t t , 1954-1955, 1968) so t h a t t h e infant, while damaging the m o t h e r in (unconscious) fantasy, is at t h e same time discovering on a m o m e n t - t o - m o m e n t basis t h a t she is alive and present in a way that differs from his u n c o n s c i o u s fantasy experience. It is in t h e s i m u l t a n e o u s experiencing of t h e fantasied d e s t r u c t i o n of t h e internalobject-mother and t h e experiencing of a relationship to a m o t h e r as object who is p r e s e n t a n d unretaliative t h a t t h e infant has t h e o p p o r t u n i t y to j u x t a p o s e two forms of experience, b o t h of which are real (internal and external reality). It is from this j u x t a p o s i t i o n over time that t h e infant c o n s t r u c t s t h e state of mind t h a t we term psychic reality. If, for example, the m o t h e r is able to bear with (over a period of time) the aggression involved in a vigorous feed and its sequelae, she is t h e r e , not only to survive t h e experience, but also to recognize t h e m e a n i n g of a reparative gift from t h e infant, and to accept the gift from him (e.g., a bowel m o v e m e n t or a " c o o " ) . In this way, t h e m o t h e r allows t h e infant to m a k e u p for t h e fantasied h a r m that he has done and c o n t i n u e s to do in fantasy, a n d for t h e strain that he has, in fact, caused. Although Klein (1935, 1940) i n t r o d u c e d t h e idea of t h e development in t h e depressive position of t h e wish to

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make reparation, she did not explore in a n y depth the n a t u r e of t h e i n t e r p e r s o n a l i n t e r a c t i o n mediating either this development or t h e discovery of t h e externality of t h e object. Klein was, of course, aware t h a t t h e infant's feelings of guilt and his wish to make reparation are objectrelated p h e n o m e n a . She did not, however, focus sufficient a t t e n t i o n u p o n t h e n a t u r e of the relationship with t h e real external object: s o m e o n e m u s t be t h e r e to recognize t h e i n f a n t ' s feelings of guilt and to accept t h e infant's reparative gift if t h e infant's psychological act is to be brought to completion. For the completion of this " b e n i g n circle" ( W i n n i c o t t , 1958a, p. 24) t h e infant is utterly dependent on t h e m o t h e r as object and c a n n o t grow without her act of surviving t h e infant's fantasied destruction of her and t h r o u g h her u n c o n s c i o u s recognition of the m e a n i n g and acceptance of t h e gift. To recapitulate, W i n n i c o t t ' s conception of this third form of dependence of t h e infant on t h e m o t h e r (i.e., t h e d e p e n d e n c e on t h e m o t h e r as object) was developed in t h e context of Klein's conception of internal objects and her concept of the depressive position. W i n n i c o t t differed from Klein in making central t h e role of t h e infant's experience with t h e m o t h e r as object. T h e infant's experience with an object surviving over time, in conjunction with his u n c o n s c i o u s r e n u n c i a t i o n of t h e internal object, creates t h e conditions necessary for the discovery of t h e external object. T h i s interplay of fantasy and experience with objects also generates t h e conditions for t h e creation of psychic reality, an a c h i e v e m e n t built upon t h e differentiation of internal and external reality. Externality is not created o n c e and for all by a single act of " d e s t r u c t i o n " ( r e n u n c i a t i o n ) of t h e internal object. T h e pull of the primitive tie to t h e internal object must be consistently resisted. In psychological terms, the i n t e r n a l object must

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be c o n s t a n t l y destroyed in u n c o n s c i o u s fantasy, t h u s continually making room for t h e rediscovery of t h e external object.

Summary In this c h a p t e r , W i n n i c o t t ' s conception of t h e developm e n t of t h e m o t h e r - i n f a n t into a m o t h e r and an infant was discussed in relation to t h r e e forms of infantile dependence. T h e conceptualization of each of these forms of d e p e n d e n c e has been u n d e r s t o o d in relation to specific aspects of t h e Kleinian c o n t r i b u t i o n , which are both preserved and superseded in t h e W i n n i c o t t i a n c o n t r i b u t i o n . According to W i n n i c o t t , t h e infant in t h e beginning can survive and develop only within t h e protective, postp o n i n g envelope of t h e m a t e r n a l holding e n v i r o n m e n t , and in this sense, at t h e o u t s e t , " T h e r e is n o s u c h t h i n g as an i n f a n t ; " T h e unit of psychological development in t h e beginning is t h e m o t h e r - i n f a n t . T h e m o t h e r ' s psychological and physical activity provides t h e initial matrix for t h e infant's mental and bodily experience. T h e infant is protected from knowledge of separateness by t h e m o t h e r ' s provision of t h e illusion of t h e subjective object (the illusion t h a t externality and internality are o n e a n d t h e same). I n t h e period of t h e transitional p h e n o m e n o n , t h e developmental task for t h e m o t h e r - i n f a n t pair is t h e nont r a u m a t i c weaning of t h e infant from t h e maternal provision of t h e psychological matrix. T h i s is achieved in part t h r o u g h t h e infant's experience of playing alone in t h e presence of the absent mother and in the absence of the present m o t h e r . In o t h e r words, t h e infant must h a v e t h e experience of playing in t h e presence of t h e mother-as-

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e n v i r o n m e n t and in t h e absence of t h e mother-as-object. T h r o u g h the internalization o f t h e e n v i r o n m e n t a l m o t h e r , t h e infant develops t h e capacity to g e n e r a t e for himself a matrix for his psychological and bodily experience. T h e persistent intrusion of t h e m o t h e r into t h e infant's playing results in extreme d e p e n d e n c e on t h e actual externalobject-mother. T h i s leads to t h e defensive internalization o f t h e mother-as-object and an addictive relationship to an o m n i p o t e n t internal-object-mother, r a t h e r t h a n t h e establ i s h m e n t of t h e i n f a n t ' s self-generated i n t e r n a l holding e n v i r o n m e n t (psychological matrix). T h e third form of d e p e n d e n c e is that of the infant's d e p e n d e n c e on the m o t h e r ' s capacity to survive over time in t h e period of whole object-relatedness. T h e actual external-object-mother has to this point been largely eclipsed by t h e infant's projection of his internal object world. I n t h e period of whole-object relatedness, t h e infant is engaged in t h e process of r e n o u n c i n g (in u n c o n s c i o u s fantasy, " d e s t r o y i n g " ) t h e o m n i p o t e n t internal-objectm o t h e r , t h u s making r o o m for the discovery of the actual external-object-mother. This involves an act of faith in which t h e infant allows himself to drop out of t h e arms of t h e o m n i p o t e n t internal-object-mother into t h e arms of t h e external object who had always been t h e r e , but had never been noticed. In this process, t h e actual m o t h e r must be physically and emotionally present over time to survive t h e infant's actual and fantasied acts of destruction, and to recognize a n d accept h i s reparative gifts. T h e external object that is being discovered (as opposed to created) is an object that can be " u s e d " in an entirely new way since a r e l a t i o n s h i p with t h e discovered object is a relationship with an object rooted in t h e world, outside of t h e infant's omnipotence.

8 P o t e n t i a l

S p a c e

P e r h a p s t h e most i m p o r t a n t and at t h e same t i m e most elusive of t h e ideas introduced by Donald W i n n i c o t t is t h e concept of potential space. Potential space is t h e general t e r m W i n n i c o t t used to refer to an i n t e r m e d i a t e area of experiencing that lies between fantasy and reality. Specific forms of potential space include t h e play space, t h e area of t h e transitional object and p h e n o m e n a , t h e analytic space, t h e area of cultural experience, and t h e area of creativity. T h e concept of potential space remains enigmatic in part because it has been so difficult to extricate the m e a n i n g of t h e concept from t h e elegant system of images and metap h o r s in which it is c o u c h e d . This chapter is an attempt to clarify t h e concept of potential space and to explore the implications t h a t this aspect of W i n n i c o t t ' s work holds for a psychoanalytic t h e o r y of t h e n o r m a l and pathological development o f t h e capacity for symbolization and subjectivity. A l t h o u g h potential space originates in a (potential) physical and mental space between m o t h e r and infant, it later becomes possible, in t h e c o u r s e of normal develop203

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m e n t for t h e individual infant, child, or adult to develop his own capacity to g e n e r a t e potential space. T h i s capacity c o n s t i t u t e s an organized and organizing set of psychological activities operating in a particular mode. T h e concept of t h e dialectical process will be explored as a possible paradigm for u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e form or mode of t h e psychological activity generating potential space.

Winnicott9s

Language

I will begin by presenting in W i n n i c o t t ' s words his concept of t h e n a t u r e of potential space. I will not attempt at this point to explicate or interpret, a n d for t h e m o m e n t will h o n o r W i n n i c o t t ' s a d m o n i t i o n to allow t h e paradoxes " t o be accepted and tolerated and respected . . . and not to be r e s o l v e d " ( W i n n i c o t t , 1971e, p. xii). For W i n n i c o t t , as for perhaps no o t h e r analytic writer, it is crucial t h a t we begin with his ideas in h i s own words. For W i n n i c o t t , m e a n i n g lies in t h e form of t h e writing as m u c h as in t h e c o n t e n t : " T h e whole forms a u n i t " ( W i n n i c o t t , 1967a, P- 99). 1. " P o t e n t i a l space . . . is t h e hypothetical area that exists (but c a n n o t exist) between the baby and the object (mother or part of m o t h e r ) d u r i n g t h e phase of the repudiation of t h e object as not-me, t h a t is, at the end of being merged in with t h e o b j e c t . " ( W i n n i c o t t , 1971f, p. 107) 2. Playing, creativity, transitional p h e n o m e n a , p s y c h o t h e r a p y , and " c u l t u r a l " experience ( " t h e accent is on e x p e r i e n c e , " 1967a, p. 99) all h a v e a place in which they occur. T h a t place, potential space, " i s not inside by any use of the word. . . . Nor is it outside,

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205

t h a t is to say it is not part of the repudiated world, the n o t - m e , that which the individual has decided to recognize (with whatever difficulty and even pain) as truly external, which is outside magical c o n t r o l . " (1971c, p. 41). Potential space is an intermediate area of experiencing that lies between (a) t h e inner world, " i n n e r psychic r e a l i t y " (1971b, p. 106), and (b) " a c t u a l or external r e a l i t y " (1971c, p. 41). It lies " b e t w e e n t h e subjective object a n d t h e object objectively perceived, between me-extensions and n o t - m e " (1967a, p. 100). 3. " T h e essential feature [of this area of experiencing in general and the transitional object in particular] is . . . the paradox and the acceptance of the paradox: t h e baby creates t h e object, but t h e object was t h e r e waiting to be created. . . . In the rules of t h e game we all know that we will n e v e r challenge t h e baby to elicit an answer to the q u e s t i o n : did you create t h a t or did you find i t ? " (1968, p. 89). 4. T h i s " a r e a is a p r o d u c t of t h e experiences of the individual person (baby, child, adolescent, adult) in t h e e n v i r o n m e n t that o b t a i n s . " (1971b, p. 107) 5. P o t e n t i a l space both joins and separates t h e infant (child, or adult) and t h e m o t h e r (object). " T h i s is the paradox I accept and do not attempt to resolve. T h e baby's separating-out of the world of objects from t h e self is achieved only t h r o u g h the absence of a space between [the infant and m o t h e r ] , t h e potential space being filled in in the way that 1 am describing" [i.e., with illusion, with playing and with symbols]. (1971b, p. 108) It seems to me that within the framework of the m e t a p h o r s and paradoxes that W i n n i c o t t has generated to

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c o n v e y his conception of potential space, t h e r e is little if a n y t h i n g I can add to clarify or e x t e n d what h e has said. It is very difficult to find words of o n e ' s own to discuss t h e extremely complex set of ideas t h a t W i n n i c o t t h a s managed to c o n d e n s e into his deceptively simple, highly evocative metaphorical language. W i n n i c o t t ' s ideas are entrapped, to a far greater degree t h a n is ordinarily t h e case, in t h e language in which t h e y are p r e s e n t e d . T h e result is a peculiar c o m b i n a t i o n of clarity a n d opacity in W i n n i c o t t ' s t h i n k i n g about potential space t h a t has given it popular appeal (the concept of t h e transitional object in particular) while at t h e same time insulating t h e ideas from systematic exploration, modification, and e x t e n s i o n . It is o n e of t h e tasks of this c h a p t e r to use language not used by W i n n i c o t t to discuss t h e p h e n o m e n a addressed by t h e concept of potential space. T h e n e w t e r m s , it is hoped, will not alter t h e essential m e a n i n g s of t h e original language and may provide access to u n d e r s t a n d ings of potential space not provided by W i n n i c o t t .

The

Phenomenon

of

Playing

It might be useful at this point to p r e s e n t some of t h e experiential referents for t h e abstract set of ideas involved in t h e concept of potential space. In t h e following example, t h e state of mind required for playing (i.e., potential space) is at first absent and t h e n made present. A two-and-a-half-year-old child, after having been frightened by h a v i n g his head go u n d e r w a t e r while being given a b a t h , became highly resistant to taking a b a t h . S o m e m o n t h s later, after gentle b u t persistent coaxing by his m o t h e r , he very r e l u c t a n t l y allowed himself to be placed in four i n c h e s of bath water. T h e

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207

child's e n t i r e body was t e n s e ; his h a n d s were tightly clamped o n t o his m o t h e r ' s . He was not crying, but his eyes were pleadingly glued to t h o s e of his m o t h e r . O n e knee was locked in extension while t h e o t h e r was flexed in order to hold as m u c h of himself o u t of t h e water as he could. His m o t h e r began almost immediately to try to interest him in some b a t h toys. He was.not t h e least bit interested until she told him she would like some tea. At that point t h e tension that had been apparent in his a r m s , legs, a b d o m e n , and particularly his face, abruptly gave way to a new physical and psychological state. His knees were now bent a little; his eyes surveyed t h e toy cups and saucers and spotted an e m p t y s h a m p o o bottle, which he chose to use as milk for t h e tea; the tension in his voice shifted from t h e tense insistent plea, " M y n o t like b a t h , my not like b a t h , " to a n a r r a t i v e of his play: " T e a n o t too h o t , it's okay now. My blow on it for you. Tea y u m m y . " T h e m o t h e r has some " t e a " and asked for more. After a few m i n u t e s , the m o t h e r began to reach for t h e washcloth. T h i s resulted in t h e child's ending of t h e play as abruptly as he had started it, with a r e t u r n of all of t h e initial signs of a n x i e t y , t h a t had preceded t h e play. After t h e m o t h e r reassured t h e child that she would hold him so he would n o t slip, she asked him if he had any m o r e tea. He did, and playing was resumed.

T h e foregoing is observational data and does not e m a n a t e from a psychoanalytic process. Nonetheless, the observations do convey a sense of the way in which a state of mind was generated by t h e m o t h e r and child in which t h e r e was a transformation of water from something frightening to a plastic m e d i u m (discovered and created by the child) with meanings t h a t could be communicated. In this

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transformation, reality is not denied; t h e d a n g e r o u s water is r e p r e s e n t e d in t h e playing. N o r is fantasy robbed of its v i t a l i t y — t h e child's breath magically changed d a n g e r o u s water into a loving gift. T h e r e is also a quality of " I - n e s s " that is generated in play t h a t differs from t h e riveted stare and desperate holding-on that had c o n n e c t e d m o t h e r and infant prior to the beginning of play. In t h e course of this c h a p t e r the significance of each of t h e features of t h e state of mind noted here will be discussed.

Potential Dialectical

Space

and

the

Process

A dialectic is a process in which each of two opposing concepts creates, informs, preserves, and negates the other, each standing in a dynamic (ever-changing) relationship with the other (Hegel, 1807; Kojeve, 1934-1935). T h e dialectical process moves toward integration, b u t integration is never complete. Each integration creates a new dialectical opposition and a new d y n a m i c tension. In psychoanalysis, the central dialectic is that of F r e u d ' s conception of t h e relationship between t h e conscious and t h e u n c o n s c i o u s mind. T h e r e can be no conscious mind without an u n c o n scious mind and vice versa; each creates t h e o t h e r and exists only as a hypothetical possibility without t h e o t h e r . In mathematical language, t h e c o n s c i o u s mind and u n c o n scious mind i n d e p e n d e n t of o n e a n o t h e r are empty sets; t h e y become full only in relation to o n e a n o t h e r . T h e u n c o n s c i o u s mind acquires psychological c o n t e n t s only to t h e e x t e n t that t h e r e is a category of psychological event t h a t has t h e quality of consciousness and vice versa. T h e dialectical process is centrally involved in the creation of subjectivity. By subjectivity, I am referring to

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209

t h e capacity for degrees of self-awareness ranging from intentional self-reflection (a very late achievement) to t h e most subtle, u n o b t r u s i v e sense of " I - n e s s " by which experience is subtly endowed with the quality that o n e is t h i n k i n g o n e ' s t h o u g h t s and feeling o n e ' s feelings as opposed to living in a state of reflexive reactivity. Subjectivity is related to, but not t h e same as, consciousness. T h e experience of c o n s c i o u s n e s s (and unconsciousness) follows from t h e achievement of subjectivity. Subjectivity, as will be discussed, is a reflection of t h e differentiation of symbol, symbolized, and interpreting subject. T h e emergence of a subject in t h e course of this differentiation makes it possible for a person to wish. T h e wish to make oneself u n a w a r e of an aspect of o n e ' s system of meanings sets the stage for t h e differentiation of conscious and u n c o n s c i o u s realms of experience. Paradoxically, " I - n e s s " is made possible by t h e o t h e r . W i n n i c o t t (1967b) describes this as the infant's discovery of himself in what he sees reflected in his m o t h e r ' s eyes. T h i s c o n s t i t u t e s an interpersonal dialectic wherein Tn e s s " and o t h e r n e s s create one a n o t h e r and are preserved by t h e o t h e r . T h e m o t h e r creates the infant and the infant creates t h e m o t h e r . (In discussing dialectics, we are always considering concepts [e.g., t h e concept of m o t h e r and t h e concept of infant] and not material entities.) Meaning a c c r u e s from difference. T h e r e can be no m e a n i n g in a completely h o m o g e n e o u s field. T h e exist e n c e of the h o m o g e n e o u s field itself could not even be recognized, because t h e r e would be no t e r m s other t h a n itself to a t t r i b u t e to it. O n e c a n n o t h a v e a dictionary with only o n e word; in t h e o r y , o n e can have a dictionary with two words, because each word would supply the contrast necessary for t h e recognition and definition of the o t h e r . F r o m this perspective, the u n c o n s c i o u s mind in itself does

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not c o n s t i t u t e a system of meanings. T h e r e are no negatives and no c o n t r a d i c t i o n s in t h e u n c o n s c i o u s (Freud, 1915b), simply t h e static coexistence of opposites that is the hallmark of primary process t h i n k i n g . T h e system Conscious is required to generate u n c o n s c i o u s meaning and the system Unconscious is required to create conscious meaning. At t h e very beginning (perhaps only a hypothetical m o m e n t ) , t h e subjectivity of t h e m o t h e r - i n f a n t unit is only a potential held by t h e aspect of t h e m o t h e r t h a t lies outside of t h e m o t h e r - i n f a n t . W i n n i c o t t (1960a) can be taken q u i t e literally when he says t h a t t h e r e is no s u c h thing as an infant (without a m o t h e r ) . I would add that within t h e m o t h e r - i n f a n t u n i t , n e i t h e r is t h e r e a n y s u c h thing as a m o t h e r . T h e preoccupation of t h e m o t h e r (what an observer would see as t h e m o t h e r ) with fitting herself into t h e place of t h e infant would be considered an illness if this type of loss of oneself in a n o t h e r were to occur in a different setting ( W i n n i c o t t , 1956). T h e m o t h e r - i n f a n t (in isolation from t h e part of t h e m o t h e r that is outside this unity) is incapable of subjectivity. Instead, t h e r e is t h e " i l l u s i o n " 1 (in most ways closer

l

The term illusion is used at different points by Winnicott to refer to two quite dissimilar phenomena. The first is the illusion of the subjective object (more accurately described as the illusion of the invisible subject and object), where the mother's empathic responsiveness protects the infant from premature awareness of the self and of the other. This illusion provides a protective insulation for the infant (Winnicott, 1948). The second (developmentally later) form of illusion is the illusion that fills potential space, e.g., the form of illusion encountered in playing. Here, the experience of oneness with the mother and separateness from her coexist in a dialectical opposition (Winnicott, 1971c).

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211

to a delusion) that the m o t h e r and infant are not separate and in fact do not exist. T h e m o t h e r exists only in t h e form of the invisible holding e n v i r o n m e n t in which t h e r e is a meeting of t h e infant's needs in a way t h a t is so u n o b t r u s i v e t h a t t h e infant does not experience his needs as needs. As a result, t h e r e is not yet an infant. If t h e r e is a good-enough fit between m o t h e r and infant and such an i l l u s i o n / d e l u s i o n is created, t h e r e is no need for symbols, even of t h e most primitive type. Instead, t h e r e is an u n d i s t u r b e d state of "going on being" ( W i n n i c o t t , 1956, p. 303) that will later become the backg r o u n d of experience, but at p r e s e n t is invisible because t h e r e is n o t h i n g with which to c o n t r a s t it; it is both background and foreground. Symbols are required only when t h e r e is desire; at t h e stage of development being discussed, t h e r e is only need that is m e t ; t h e satisfied need does not generate desire (i.e., wishing) for which symbols are required. T h e u n d i s t u r b e d , h a r m o n i o u s l y functioning m o t h e r infant unit may be only a hypothetical entity, because of t h e inevitable imperfection of fit between m o t h e r and infant. 2 T h e well-dosed frustration that results provides t h e first o p p o r t u n i t y for awareness of separateness. At this point, t h e task for the aspect of t h e m o t h e r

2

The research findings of Brazelton (Brazelton and Als, 1979), Sander (1964), Stern (1977), and others reveals an active "dialogue" between mother and infant from the first days of life. This suggests the possibility of an early, nontraumatic sensing of otherness. Grotstein (1981) has pointed out that it is not necessary to decide if there is mother-infant unity or if there is early awareness of otherness. The two may coexist as separate "tracks" of a dual consciousness. (The need for developmental thinking to include both synchronic and diachronic axes was discussed in Chapter 7.)

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who is not a part of t h e m o t h e r - i n f a n t unit is to make her presence (the m o t h e r as object) k n o w n in a way t h a t is not frightening a n d therefore does n o t h a v e to be denied or in o t h e r ways defended against by t h e infant. It is this period of t h e very earliest awareness of separateness, beginning at " a b o u t four to six to eight to twelve m o n t h s " (Winnicott, 1951, p. 4), that has been the focus of W i n n i c o t t ' s work on potential space. He has proposed t h a t , in order for this transition from m o t h e r - i n f a n t u n i t y to a state in which t h e r e is mother-and-infant to be n o n p a t h o g e n i c , t h e r e must be a potential space between m o t h e r and infant that is always potential (never actual) because it is filled in with t h e state of mind t h a t embodies t h e never-challenged paradox: T h e infant and m o t h e r are one, and t h e infant and m o t h e r are two. T h e m o v e m e n t from m o t h e r - i n f a n t u n i t y (invisible e n v i r o n m e n t a l m o t h e r ) to m o t h e r and infant ( m o t h e r as object) r e q u i r e s t h e establishment of t h e capacity for a psychological dialectic of o n e n e s s and of separateness in which each creates and informs t h e o t h e r . At first t h e " t w o n e s s " (that coexists with oneness) c a n n o t be distributed between t h e m o t h e r and t h e infant in a way t h a t clearly demarcates t h e two as separate individuals; r a t h e r , at this point twoness is a quality of t h e m o t h e r - i n f a n t . This is what Winnicott (1958a) is referring to when he talks about t h e infant's development of the capacity to be alone in the presence of t h e m o t h e r . T h e transitional object is a symbol for this separateness in u n i t y , u n i t y in separateness. T h e transitional object is at t h e same time t h e infant (the o m n i p o t e n t l y created extension of himself) and not t h e infant (an object he has discovered t h a t is outside of his o m n i p o t e n t control). T h e a p p e a r a n c e of a relationship with a transitional

Potential Space

213

object is not simply a milestone in t h e process of separat i o n - i n d i v i d u a t i o n . T h e relationship with t h e transitional object is as significantly a reflection of t h e development of t h e capacity to m a i n t a i n a psychological dialectical process. T h e c o n s e q u e n c e s of this a c h i e v e m e n t are moment o u s and include t h e capacity to g e n e r a t e personal meanings represented in symbols that are mediated by subjectivity (the experience of oneself as subject who has created o n e ' s symbols). T h e a t t a i n m e n t of t h e capacity to maintain psychological dialectics involves the transformation of t h e u n i t y that did not require symbols into " t h r e e n e s s , " a d y n a m i c interplay of t h r e e differentiated entities. T h e s e entities are t h e symbol (a t h o u g h t ) , t h e symbolized (that which is being t h o u g h t a b o u t ) , and t h e i n t e r p r e t i n g subject (the t h i n k e r generating his own t h o u g h t s and i n t e r p r e t i n g his own symbols). For heuristic purposes, t h e original homogeneity of t h e m o t h e r - i n f a n t unit can be t h o u g h t of as a point (Grotstein, 1978). T h e differentiation of symbol, symbolized, and interpreting subject creates t h e possibility of triangularity within which space is created. T h a t space between symbol and symbolized, mediated by an i n t e r p r e t i n g self, is t h e space in which creativity becomes possible and is t h e space in which we are alive as h u m a n beings, as opposed to being simply reflexively reactive beings. This is W i n n i c o t t ' s potential space. T h i s t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of u n i t y into t h r e e n e s s coincides with t h e transformation of t h e m o t h e r - i n f a n t unit into m o t h e r , infant, and observer of mother-and-infant as t h r e e distinct entities. O n e n e s s (the invisible m o t h e r infant) becomes t h r e e n e s s , since at t h e m o m e n t of differentiation within the m o t h e r - i n f a n t u n i t , not only are

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214

t h e m o t h e r and infant created as objects, b u t also, t h e infant is created as subject. T h e infant as subject is t h e observer of m o t h e r and infant as (symbolic) objects; t h e infant is now t h e creator and i n t e r p r e t e r of his symbols.

Psychopathology

of Potential

Space

W i n n i c o t t states t h a t symbols originate within potential space. I n t h e absence of potential space, t h e r e is only fantasy; within potential space imagination can develop. I n fantasy, " a dog is a dog is a d o g " (1971d, p. 33), while imagination involves a layering of symbolic meanings. I n these very brief s t a t e m e n t s , W i n n i c o t t points to a t h e o r y of t h e psychopathology of t h e symbolic function, a t h e o r y t h a t r e m a i n s to be completed. In this section, I will attempt to begin to fill in t h a t t h e o r y of t h e psychopathology of symbolization by studying various forms of incompleteness or collapse of t h e capacity to m a i n t a i n a psychological dialectical process. As will be seen, t h e symbolic function is a direct c o n s e q u e n c e o f t h e capacity to m a i n t a i n psychological dialectics, and t h e psychopathology of symbolization is based on specific forms of failure to create or maintain these dialectics. As was discussed earlier, when t h e r e is a good-enough fit between m o t h e r and infant, in t h e very beginning (in t h e period of t h e invisible m o t h e r - i n f a n t ) , t h e r e is n o need or o p p o r t u n i t y for symbols. W i t h i n t h e context of t h e m o t h e r - i n f a n t u n i t , t h e person w h o m an observer would see as t h e m o t h e r is invisible to t h e infant and exists only in t h e fulfillment of need t h a t the infant does not yet recognize as need. T h e m o t h e r - i n f a n t u n i t y can be disrupted by t h e m o t h e r ' s s u b s t i t u t i o n of s o m e t h i n g of herself for t h e i n f a n t ' s s p o n t a n e o u s gesture. W i n n i c o t t

Potential Space

215

(1952) refers to this as " i m p i n g e m e n t . " Some degree of failure of e m p a t h y is inevitable and in fact essential for t h e infant to come to recognize needs as wishes. However, t h e r e comes a point at which repeated impingement constitutes " c u m u l a t i v e t r a u m a " ( K h a n , 1963; Ogden, 1978). C u m u l a t i v e t r a u m a is at o n e pole of a wide spectrum of causes of p r e m a t u r e d i s r u p t i o n of t h e m o t h e r - i n f a n t u n i t y . O t h e r causes include constitutional hypersensitivity (of m a n y types) on t h e part of t h e infant, t r a u m a resulting from physical illness of t h e infant, and illness or death of a parent or sibling. W h e n p r e m a t u r e disruption of t h e m o t h e r - i n f a n t u n i t y occurs for any reason, several distinct forms of failure to create or adequately maintain t h e psychological dialectical process may result: 1. T h e dialectic of reality and fantasy collapses in the direction of fantasy (i.e., reality is subsumed by fantasy) so t h a t fantasy becomes a thing in itself as tangible, as powerful, as dangerous and as gratifying as t h e external reajity from which it c a n n o t be differentiated. 2. T h e dialectic of reality and fantasy may become limited or collapse in the direction of reality when reality is used predominantly as a defense against fantasy. U n d e r s u c h circumstances, reality robs fantasy of its vitality. Imagination is foreclosed. 3. T h e dialectic of reality and fantasy becomes restricted when reality and fantasy are dissociated in such a way as to avoid a specific set of meanings, e.g., the "splitting of t h e e g o " in fetishism. 4. W h e n t h e m o t h e r and infant e n c o u n t e r serious a n d sustained difficulty in being a m o t h e r infant, the infant's p r e m a t u r e and t r a u m a t i c awareness of his separateness makes experience so unbear-

The Matrix of the Mind

216

able that e x t r e m e defensive m e a s u r e s are instituted that take t h e form of a cessation of t h e a t t r i b u t i o n of m e a n i n g to perception. Experience is foreclosed. It is not so m u c h t h a t fantasy or reality is denied; r a t h e r , n e i t h e r is created. T h e s e four categories are meant only as examples of types of limitation of t h e dialectical process. In n o sense is this list m e a n t to be exhaustive. Reality

Subsumed

by

Fantasy

T h e first of t h e forms of failure to create and maintain a psychological dialectical process is that in which t h e "reality pole" of t h e psychological dialectic is not established on an equal plane with t h e " f a n t a s y p o l e " or is weakened by actual experience that is felt to be indistinguishable from, and therefore powerfully confirmatory of, fantasy. T h e t e r m reality is not used to d e n o t e s o m e t h i n g independent of o n e ' s processing of perception, since even at o u r most " r e a l i s t i c , " we organize, a n d in t h a t sense create, o u r perceptions according to o u r individual psychological schemata. T h e t e r m reality is used h e r e to refer to that which is experienced as outside of t h e realm of t h e subject's omnipotence. W h e n t h e "reality pole" of t h e psychological dialectic collapses, t h e subject becomes tightly imprisoned in the realm of fantasy objects as things in themselves. T h i s is a two-dimensional world which is experienced as a collection of facts. T h e hallucination does not sound like a voice, it is a voice. O n e ' s h u s b a n d does not simply behave coldly, he is ice. O n e does n o t feel like o n e ' s father, o n e ' s father is in o n e ' s blood and must be bled o u t in o r d e r for o n e to be free of him. T h e form of transference generated

Potential Space

217

when t h e psychological dialectic of reality and fantasy has collapsed in t h e direction of fantasy is t h e delusional transference (see Little, 1958; Searles, 1963): the therapist is n o t like the p a t i e n t ' s m o t h e r , he is t h e patient's mother. A borderline patient experiencing t h e form of collapse of potential space u n d e r discussion became terrified of d e p a r t m e n t store m a n n e q u i n s , feeling that they were living people. For this patient t h e r e was no concept of m a n n e q u i n s being "life-like"; either they were alive or they were not. O n e t h i n g does not stand for a n o t h e r . Things are what they are. (Segal [1957] uses the term symbolic equation for this relationship of symbol and symbolized.) As o n e approaches the state where n o t h i n g is felt to represent a n y t h i n g but itself, one becomes more and m o r e imprisoned in t h e realm of the thing in itself. Little that one experiences can be understood, because u n d e r s t a n d i n g involves a system of layering of meanings, one layer forming t h e context by which t h e other layers take on significance. For example, t h e past, the present, dreams, and transference experiences, each provides a context for t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e o t h e r s and is u n d e r s t a n d a b l e only in t e r m s of the others. W i t h limited capacity to distinguish symbol and symbolized, that which is perceived is unmediated by subjectivity (a sense of oneself as creator of meanings). T h e upshot is that perceptions carry with t h e m an impersonal imperative for action and must be gotten rid of, clung to, concealed, hidden from, put into s o m e o n e else, worshipped, s h a t t e r e d , etc. W h a t t h e person cannot do is u n d e r s t a n d . This is so, not because t h e person does not

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The Matrix of the Mind

wish to u n d e r s t a n d his experience; r a t h e r it is so because as o n e approaches t h e realm of t h e t h i n g in itself, everything is what it is, so that t h e potential for u n d e r s t a n d i n g simply does not exist. A borderline patient knew t h a t t h e therapist, who had begun t h e h o u r t h r e e m i n u t e s late, did so because h e preferred t h e patient whose h o u r preceded this pat i e n t ' s . T h e patient told t h e therapist that she had decided to t e r m i n a t e t h e r a p y , s o m e t h i n g she had been t h i n k i n g about doing for a long time b u t had not previously told the therapist. A t t e m p t s on t h e part of the therapist to u n d e r s t a n d why t h e patient interpreted t h e lateness in this particular way were met with exasperation. T h e patient accused t h e therapist of relying on textbook i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s to d e n y t h e obvious. For this patient, feelings are facts to be acted u p o n and not e m o t i o n a l responses to be u n d e r s t o o d . T h e r e is no space between symbolized (the t h e r a p i s t ' s lateness) and the symbol (the p a t i e n t ' s emotionally colored representation of t h e therapist). T h e two (the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and t h e external event) are treated as one. A patient r e c e n t l y told me, " Y o u c a n ' t tell me I d o n ' t see what I s e e . " W i t h t h e collapse of t h e distinction between symbol and symbolized, t h e r e is n o r o o m in which to " e n t e r t a i n " ideas and feelings. T r a n s f e r e n c e takes on a deadly serious quality; illusion becomes delusion; t h o u g h t s become plans; feelings become impending actions; transference projections become projective identifications; play becomes compulsion. U n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e m e a n i n g of o n e ' s experience is possible only when o n e t h i n g can stand for a n o t h e r with-

Potential Space

219

out being t h e o t h e r ; this is what c o n s t i t u t e s t h e ment of the capacity for symbol formation proper 1957). T h e development of t h e capacity for symbol tion proper frees o n e from the prison of t h e realm t h i n g in itself. 3 Reality

as Defense against

attain(Segal, formaof the

Fantasy

A second form of pathological distortion of the psychological dialectical process is that in which " t h e reality p o l e " of the dialectical process is used predominantly as a defense against fantasy. W h e n e v e r t h e potential for a psychological dialectical process is limited for defensive purposes (i.e., to exclude, modify, or diminish the significance of a given group of possible t h o u g h t s ) , a price is paid. I n this case, t h e price is t h e foreclosure of imagination. W h e n a relatively unrestricted psychological dialectical process has been established, a little girl playing h o u s e is both a little girl a n d a m o t h e r , and t h e question of which she is, never arises. Being a little girl who feels loved by her m o t h e r (in reality) makes it safe for her to borrow what is her m o t h e r ' s (in fantasy) without fear of retaliation or fear of losing herself in her m o t h e r , a n d , as a result, disappearing as a separate person. Being a m o t h e r (in fantasy) gives t h e little girl access to and use of all the r i c h n e s s of t h e c u l t u r a l , familial, and personal symbols 3

Lacan (1949-1960) has pointed out that the individual, having attained the capacity for symbolization, becomes freed of one form of imprisonment (that of unmediated sensory experience) only to enter a new prison, that of the symbolic order. In the realm of the symbolic order, language provides us with symbols that long preexisted us and in that way determines our thoughts, even though we labor under the illusion that we create our own symbols.

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The Matrix of the Mind

(e.g., in relation to what it means to be a female, a m o t h e r , a n d a d a u g h t e r ) that h a v e been consciously a n d u n c o n sciously conveyed in t h e c o u r s e of real e x p e r i e n c e with her m o t h e r , father, and o t h e r s . On t h e o t h e r h a n d , if t h e little girl is only a little girl, she is unable to play; she is unable to imagine and will be unable to feel she is alive in any full sense. S u c h a situation arises when reality must be used as a defense against fantasy. 4 A boy who had been allowed to witness his p a r e n t s having i n t e r c o u r s e , as well as the very painful delivery of his y o u n g e r b r o t h e r , h a d developed by t h e age of 6 a precocious intelligence and a " g r o w n - u p " mode of relating that was marked by a profound skepticism. He was interested in finding " l o g i c a l " explanations for " a m a z i n g " things, in particular, television s t u n t s . W h e n as a 7 year old he was taken to a m a r i o n e t t e show, his p a r e n t s became c o n c e r n e d because t h e boy found n o t h i n g pleasurable about t h e show and instead was preoccupied by his a w a r e n e s s of t h e fact that t h e c h a r a c t e r s were only wooden, carved figures dangling on strings that were manipulated by people b e h i n d t h e screen. Of c o u r s e , his perception was " a c c u r a t e , " b u t t h e powerful awareness of this reality p r e v e n t e d t h e dialectical interplay of fantasy and reality that generates t h e possibility for imagination. For this child, t h e danger of wishes and fears " c o m -

4

If the little girl is only a mother, she is psychotic and will in time become terrified by her fantasied posession of adult sexuality and adult (omnipotent) power over life and death. Here, the reality pole of the dialectic has collapsed into the fantasy pole of the dialectic as discussed earlier.

Potential Space

221

ing t r u e " in a d e s t r u c t i v e and terribly frightening way had in all likelihood been m a d e too real by h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of what he had witnessed ( " b e h i n d t h e scenes") earlier in his life. S u c h dramatic early experiences are n e i t h e r a necessary n o r a sufficient condition for fantasies to be experienced as frightening things that need to be controlled t h r o u g h an exaggerated appeal to reality. P a t i e n t s chronically experiencing this form of collapse of t h e dialectical process present few if any dreams, dismissing t h e ones they do present as " s e n s e l e s s , " " c r a z y , " " s t u p i d , " " w e i r d , " and t h e like. W h e n d r e a m s are presented by these patients, t h e dreams are often barely distinguishable from their conscious t h o u g h t s , e.g., t h e dreams may depict embarrassing situations that t h e patient regularly t h i n k s about consciously. Associations to t h e d r e a m s a r e often a cataloging of which parts of t h e dream did or did not " r e a l l y " occur and precisely what the real situation was that is alluded to or depicted in the dream. S o m e of these p a t i e n t s are keen observers and will notice when a single book has been moved in a large bookshelf in the t h e r a p i s t ' s office. W h e n t h e patient is asked a b o u t his response to a detail that has been noticed, the patient will be extremely skeptical about what benefit could possibly a c c r u e from a discussion of such a trivial thing. I have been told at such m o m e n t s that looking for some personal significance in the observed detail would be "like trying to get blood from a s t o n e . " T h e fixity of the p a t i e n t ' s focus on reality is in fact designed to " d r a i n the blood o u t " of fantasy. T h e dialectical resonance of realistic and fantastic m e a n i n g s is foreclosed, leaving the patient incapable of imagination.

The Matrix of the Mind

222 Dissociation

of Reality

and

Fantasy

Fetishes and perversions can be u n d e r s t o o d as representing a particular form of limitation of t h e dialectical process in which the reality and fantasy poles become dissociated from one a n o t h e r . F r e u d (1927) pointed out that fetishes involve a "splitting of t h e e g o " in such a way that the subject both knows and does not know that women do not have penises. T h i s psychological state does not constitute a t r u e psychological dialectic, because it has been c o n s t r u c t e d largely in t h e service of denial and as a result involves a severe limitation of t h e way in which o n e pole of t h e dialectic is allowed to inform a n d be informed by the o t h e r . A dialectical process becomes limited when o n e imposes restrictions u p o n it: all possible c o m b i n a t i o n s of meanings are possible except t h o s e leading to the t h o u g h t that women do not h a v e penises. T h a t t h o u g h t , or any "derivative of it, must n e v e r be t h o u g h t . To t h e extent t h a t t h e r e is s u c h a limitation placed on a dialectical process, reality and fantasy no longer inform o n e a n o t h e r and instead stand isolated in a state of static coexistence. A dialectical relationship allows for r e s o n a n c e of meanings, for example, conscious and u n c o n s c i o u s meanings. Splitting of t h e type involved in p e r v e r s i o n s and fetishism can be u n d e r s t o o d as involving not only denial, but also t h e foreclosure of dialectical r e s o n a n c e t h a t might g e n e r a t e meanings that one feels are dangerous.

Foreclosure of Reality

and

Fantasy

T h e final form of failure to achieve t h e capacity to create and maintain a psychological dialectical process that will be addressed is more e x t r e m e t h a n t h o s e discussed t h u s far. T h e forms of dysfunction described previously have

Potential Space

223

all involved a limitation of (metaphorically, a "collapse" of) a dialectic that had to a significant degree been established and was secondarily becoming limited. W h a t will be discussed now is a primary failure to generate a psychological dialectical process manifesting itself as a " s t a t e of n o n e x p e r i e n c e " (Ogden, 1980). In a state of nonexperience t h e r e is perception, but perception remains raw sensory data t h a t is n o t a t t r i b u t e d meaning. Meanings are not denied, t h e y simply are not created. This state has been described variously as a " f o r e c l o s u r e " of the psychological (McDougall, 1974), as an " a b s e n c e " analogous to that seen in a petit mal seizure (Meltzer, 1975), as "blank p s y c h o s i s " (Green, 1975), psychotic " n o t - b e i n g " (Grotstein, 1979b), and as " d e a t h in life" (Laing, 1959). In the context of intensive p s y c h o t h e r a p e u t i c work with c h r o n i c schizophrenic patients, I have described the state of nonexperience as a state in which . . . all experience is emotionally equivalent, one thing is just as good or just as bad as a n y t h i n g else; all things, people, places and behavior are emotionally interchangeable. . . . E v e r y t h i n g can be substituted for e v e r y t h i n g else, creating a situation analogous to a n u m e r i c a l system in which t h e r e are an infinite n u m b e r of integers but all are equal to one a n o t h e r in value. Addition, subtraction and all o t h e r operations would be formally possible, but t h e r e would be no point in a n y of t h e m , since you would always arrive at t h e same value with which you had begun. (Ogden, 1980, p. 520) As 1 h a v e discussed elsewhere (Ogden, 1980, 1982a, 1982b), I view the state of n o n e x p e r i e n c e as a superordin a t e defense resorted to when all other defensive opera-

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The Matrix of the Mind

tions h a v e proved insufficient to protect t h e infant against sustained, overwhelming psychological pain. U n d e r s u c h c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h e infant ceases to a t t r i b u t e m e a n i n g to his perception, t h u s failing to generate emotional significance (personal meaning) of any type. In t h e context of t h e p r e s e n t discussion, this a m o u n t s to t h e foreclosure of t h e possibility of generating both realistic and fantastic meanings, t h u s denying t h e infant t h e elements from which he might c o n s t r u c t a dialectical process involving fantasy and reality.

The

Symbol, and

the

Symbolized, Subjectivity *

As has been discussed, t h e establishment of t h e psychological dialectical process creates c o n d i t i o n s wherein experience is a t t r i b u t e d m e a n i n g s that can be u n d e r s t o o d as opposed to simply c o n s t i t u t i n g a p a t t e r n of facts to be acted u p o n . T h e establishment of t h e distinction between the symbol and t h e symbolized is inseparable from t h e establishment of subjectivity: t h e two a c h i e v e m e n t s are two facets of t h e same developmental e v e n t . P a r a p h r a s i n g W i n n i c o t t , o n e could say that potential space lies between the symbol and the symbolized. T o distinguish symbol from symbolized is to distinguish o n e ' s t h o u g h t from t h a t which o n e is t h i n k i n g a b o u t , o n e ' s feeling from that which one is responding to. For symbol to stand i n d e p e n d e n t l y of symbolized, t h e r e must be a subject engaged in t h e process of interpreting perceptions. O n e might ask what is new in this supposed developmental advance, because logically t h e r e has always been a person i n t e r p r e t i n g h i s experience. That is, of course, so from an outside observer's point of view, but it has not been so from t h e subject's

Potential Space

225

point of view. In fact, a subject did not exist when symbol and symbolized were undifferentiable. T h e achievement of the capacity to distinguish symbol and symbolized is t h e achievement of subjectivity. 5 From this point o n , symbolic function always involves the t h r e e n e s s of the i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p of t h r e e distinct entities: (1) t h e symbol (the t h o u g h t ) ; (2) the symbolized (that which is being t h o u g h t a b o u t ) ; and (3) t h e thinker (the i n t e r p r e t i n g self), who is creating his t h o u g h t s and who stands apart from both t h e t h o u g h t and the thing being t h o u g h t a b o u t . Potential space ceases to exist as any two of these t h r e e elements become dedifferentiated: the t h i n k e r and the symbol, t h e symbol and the symbolized, or the t h i n k e r and t h e object of t h o u g h t (the symbolized). T h e r e are important implications in the foregoing discussion for a theory of the development of the capacity for symbolization. T h e period prior to t h e establishment of t h e dialectical process (prior to t h e period of t h e transitional p h e n o m e n o n ) is characterized not by internal objects as things in themselves, as Melanie Klein (1946) would h a v e it, b u t , r a t h e r , by an absence of the need for symbols at all. In t h e period of the " i n v i s i b l e " m o t h e r infant unit t h e r e is n e i t h e r a m o t h e r nor an infant since t h e e n v i r o n m e n t a l m o t h e r exists only as the invisible fulfillment of t h e infant's needs before they become desires. As discussed earlier, W i n n i c o t t ' s conception of development can be t h o u g h t of as a m o v e m e n t from an original state of " o n e n e s s " that is not experienced as oneness because t h e homogeneity of t h e situation precludes an appreciation of difference a n d , therefore, t h e delineation 5

This parallels the Kleinian conception of the creation of psychic reality in the depressive position (Klein, 1958).

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The Matrix of the Mind

of meanings. T h e developmental progression, in t h e context of good-enough m o t h e r i n g , is to " t h r e e n e s s , " wherein t h e r e is a relationship between symbol and symbolized that is mediated by an i n t e r p r e t i n g subject. T h e invisible m o t h e r - i n f a n t has become a mother-and-infant as (symbolic) objects, and infant as i n t e r p r e t i n g subject. T h e infant as subject makes it possible for t h e infant to become aware of t h e m o t h e r ' s subjectivity. T h i s t h e n allows for t h e development of " r u t h " ( W i n n i c o t t , 1958b), t h e capacity for c o n c e r n for a n o t h e r person as a whole and separate h u m a n being capable of feelings like, not t h e same as, o n e ' s own. W i t h t h e development of this awareness of t h e subjectivity of t h e o t h e r comes t h e capacity for guilt, for m o u r n i n g , for e m p a t h y , and for t h e desire to make reparations as opposed to magical restoration of t h e da'maged object. From this perspective, t h e breakdown of t h e dialectical process generating the realm of t h e t h i n g in itself can be u n d e r s t o o d to h a v e a specific place in t h e development of object relations: twoness (infant and m o t h e r as objects in the absence of infant as i n t e r p r e t i n g subject) corresponds to t h e realm of the t h i n g in itself. T h e r e are only objects and no subjects. T h i s is always a p r o d u c t of the breakdown of t h r e e n e s s (the dialectic of fantasy and reality, symbol and symbolized mediated by a subject) and n o t t h e n o r m a t i v e progression from t h e invisible o n e n e s s of t h e original m o t h e r - i n f a n t unit. W i n n i c o t t t h u s implies t h a t he views t h e n o r m a l development of fantasy as being from its inception part of a dialectical process in which fantasy creates and is created by reality. S u c h a conclusion r u n s c o u n t e r to Melanie Klein's (1946, 1952c) notion o f t h e place in normal development of t h e p a r a n o i d - s c h i z o i d position prior to t h e depressive position. In t h e p a r a n o i d - s c h i z o i d posi-

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227

tion, fantasy, symbolic e q u a t i o n , and part-object relatedness p r e d o m i n a t e . For Klein the depressive position ( t h r e e n e s s consisting of subject, symbol and symbolized) develops out of t h e twoness of t h e paranoid-schizoid position (symbol and symbolized in t h e absence of a subject capable of awareness of psychic reality.) For W i n n i c o t t , t h e form of fantasy that Klein associates with t h e paranoid-schizoid position (a form of fantasy using symbolic equation as t h e mode of symbolization) always represents a breakdown of t h r e e n e s s . T h e r e are inevitable breakdowns in the development of t h r e e n e s s because of inevitable and necessary failures in the m o t h e r - i n f a n t relationship. This leads t h e infant to defend himself psychologically in a paranoid-schizoid mode. Pathological develo p m e n t e n s u e s only when t b e failures in t h e m o t h e r infant relationship (leading to the breakdown of threeness) are e x t r e m e or c h r o n i c .

Empathy

and

Projective

Identification

T h e foregoing discussion of t h e development of the dialectical process and symbolization provides a context for an e n h a n c e d u n d e r s t a n d i n g of aspects of projective identification and its relationship to empathy. E m p a t h y is a psychological process (as well as a form of object-relatedness) that occurs within t h e context of a dialectic of being and not-being the o t h e r . W i t h i n this c o n t e x t , ( W i n n i c o t t would say, " w i t h i n potential s p a c e " ) , one plays with the idea of being t h e o t h e r while knowing that o n e is n o t . It is possible to try on for size o n e identification and t h e n a n o t h e r (i.e., to play with the feeling of being the o t h e r in different ways), because the opposite pole of t h e dialectic diminishes the danger of

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being trapped in t h e o t h e r and ultimately of losing oneself in t h e o t h e r . Projective identification, on t h e o t h e r h a n d , can be u n d e r s t o o d as a psychological-interpersonal process (a form of defense, c o m m u n i c a t i o n , and object-relatedness) occurring outside of t h e dialectic of being and not-being t h e o t h e r , i.e., outside of potential space. Projective identification can be t h o u g h t of as involving t h e following c o m p o n e n t s or " p h a s e s " (Ogden, 1979, 1982a): (1) an u n c o n s c i o u s projective fantasy of depositing a part of oneself in t h e o t h e r , (2) an interpersonal pressure exerted on t h e other to experience himself and behave in c o n g r u e n c e with t h e u n c o n s c i o u s projective fantasy, and (3) t h e " r e c i p i e n t ' s " processing of t h e induced experience followed by t h e projector's reinternalizing (by m e a n s of introjection or identification) of a modified version of t h a t aspect of himself that had been (in fantasy) ejected. I n t e r p e r s o n a l l y , projective identification is t h e negative of playing; it is a coercive e n l i s t m e n t of a n o t h e r person to perform a role in t h e projector's externalized u n c o n s c i o u s fantasy. T h e effect of this process on t h e recipient is to t h r e a t e n his ability to experience his subjective state as psychic reality. I n s t e a d , his p e r c e p t i o n s are experienced as " r e a l i t y " as opposed to a personal cons t r u c t i o n . T h i s process r e p r e s e n t s a limitation o f t h e recipient's psychological dialectical processes by which symbolic meanings are generated and u n d e r s t o o d . N e i t h e r t h e projector n o r t h e recipient of t h e projective identification is able to experience a range of personal meanings. On t h e c o n t r a r y , t h e r e is only a powerful sense of inevitability. N e i t h e r party can conceive of himself or of t h e o t h e r , any differently or less intensely t h a n he does at present (Ogden, 1981). T h e " p r o c e s s i n g " of a projective identification by a therapist can be u n d e r s t o o d as the t h e r a p i s t ' s act of re-

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229

establishing a psychological dialectical process in which t h e induced feeling state can be experienced, t h o u g h t about, and u n d e r s t o o d by an interpreting subject. This dialectical process has both intrapsychic and interpersonal dimensions. That is, both subjectivity and intersubjectivity are involved. T h e set of meanings generated in this process provides t h e data with which t h e therapist might develop an u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e t r a n s f e r e n c e , instead of feeling compelled to act u p o n , deny, or accept the inevitability of his c u r r e n t experience of himself and of the patient. I was asked to consult on a patient diagnosed as borderline who had been hospitalized for a few days after a suicide gesture. A male member of t h e n u r s i n g staff who had been working with this patient told me that t h e patient was extremely competitive, to t h e point that it was nearly impossible to engage in any kind of ward activity with her. T h e previous evening, he had seen t h e patient with a deck of playing cards and had asked h e r if s h e wanted to have a game of cards. T h e patient agreed, b u t immediately proceeded to shower him with criticism about the way he shuffled and dealt t h e cards. T h e n u r s e told me that he explained to t h e patient that he had no desire to e n t e r into a struggle with her and that when she wanted to play cards, he would be happy to do so if she would let him know. He t h e n walked away, and t h e patient did not approach him after that. W h e n I spoke with t h e patient for t h e consultation, she said that she was n e r v o u s about talking with me and when I inquired why, she said she was afraid she would n o t do well at it. W h e n I asked her in what way she was afraid of failing, she told me that she was c o n c e r n e d that she would be less t h a n h o n e s t — n o t

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t h a t she would be dishonest in t h e sense of lying, but that she would leave me with a false impression of her. In t h e course of t h e interview, she told m e a n u m b e r of things about herself, all of w h i c h , I later found out from her therapist, were i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s he had given h e r . T h e interview had a r o u t i n e feeling to it, very m u c h that of a patient talking to a d o c t o r . T h e r e was almost no sense of discovery, surprise, h u m o r , or originality on either of o u r parts. I could not shake t h e awareness that we were sitting in a room in a hospital and t h a t I was a psychiatrist c o n d u c t i n g an interview with a patient. As a r e s u l t , it felt as if n o t h i n g s p o n t a n e o u s could h a p p e n between us. T h e patient fed me t h e insights t h a t s h e t h o u g h t I wanted from h e r , but she was not depleted or robbed in t h e process because t h e insights were not h e r s and she did not value t h e m . T h e y were hospital p r o p e r t y given to her by a n o t h e r doctor, and s h e was merely passing t h e m on to me. S o m e t h i n g else was o c c u r r i n g between t h e patient and me t h a t I was only subliminally aware of d u r i n g the interview, b u t which b e c a m e clearer immediately after t h e interview was over. W h e n I left the meeting with this patient, I felt a pressing need to talk to someone. It did not have to be a n y o n e in particular or about any specific topic, b u t t h e need to talk with someone was u n m i s t a k a b l e . It took some time for me to become aware of the loneliness I had felt while talking to this patient. As I t h o u g h t about t h e interview with this patient, her b e h a v i o r with t h e n u r s e t h e p r e v i o u s e v e n i n g m a d e more sense. She had ridiculed t h e way he was playing, not in order to defeat h i m , b u t to hide from him and from

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231

herself t h e fact t h a t she did n o t know how to play. Of course, she knew the rules of the game, b u t she could not e n t e r into a frame of mind in which playing might take place. Similarly, with me s h e began t h e interview by warning me t h a t o u r talk might look like a meaningful exchange, but it would n o t be one. (I am referring to her anxiety about t h e false impression she would give me.) W h a t would look like discoveries about herself would prove to be only stale repetitions of her therapist's ideas. Her principal c o m m u n i c a t i o n to t h e n u r s e and to me was a plea for us to u n d e r s t a n d that she felt intensely isolated by her inability to play. Her c o m m u n i c a t i o n was not in words, b u t by m e a n s of an i n d u c t i o n of a feeling of loneliness in me. T h i s is what W i n n i c o t t would call a "direct c o m m u n i c a t i o n " (1971d, p. 54), and what I would understand as a projective identification. W h e n a patient is incapable of generating t h e state of mind necessary for playing to occur, he or she will be isolated from o t h e r s except by means of the direct kind of linkage possible in projective identification. " O n l y in playing is communication possible, except direct c o m m u n i c a t i o n which belongs to psychopathology or to an extreme of i m m a t u r i t y " (Winnicott, 1971d, p. 54).

Summary I have proposed that W i n n i c o t t ' s concept of potential space be u n d e r s t o o d as a state of mind based upon a series of dialectical relationships between fantasy and reality, me and not-me, symbol and symbolized, etc., each pole of t h e dialectic creating, informing, a n d negating t h e other. T h e achievement of s u c h a dialectical process occurs by means of a developmental advance from t h e "invisible o n e n e s s "

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of t h e m o t h e r - i n f a n t unit to the subjective t h r e e n e s s of t h e mother-and-infant (as symbolic objects) and the infant (as interpreting subject). Failure to create or maintain t h e dialectical process leads to specific forms of psychopathology that include t h e experience of t h e fantasy object as a t h i n g in itself, t h e defensive use of reality that forecloses imagination, t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p to a fetish object, and t h e state of " n o n e x p e r i e n c e . " T h e " p r o c e s s i n g " of a projective identification is u n d e r s t o o d as t h e reestablishment of t h e recipient's capacity to maintain a dialectical process (e.g., of me and not-me) that had been limited in t h e course of t h e recipient's u n c o n s c i o u s participation in t h e projector's externalized, u n c o n s c i o u s fantasy.

9 D r e a m

S p a c e

A n a l y t i c

a n d

S p a c e

In this chapter, aspects of two forms of potential space will be considered: dream space and analytic space. Dreaming is u n d e r s t o o d as an internal c o m m u n i c a t i o n in which a dream presentation is generated by o n e aspect of self and u n d e r s t o o d by a n o t h e r aspect of self. T h e dream presentation as thing in itself is brought into a dialectical process by a n o t h e r aspect of self t h r o u g h which process symbolic meanings and dream experience are generated. T h e schizop h r e n i c , when unable to maintain a psychological dialectical process, t r a n s f o r m s the dream presentation into a hallucination. T h e analytic space is viewed as an intersubjective state, generated by patient and therapist, in which meanings can be played with, considered, u n d e r s t o o d , etc. T h e p a t i e n t ' s projective identification is a " d i r e c t " form of c o m m u n i c a t i o n t h a t u n d e r m i n e s t h e therapist's capacity to maintain a psychological dialectical process. T h e therapist u n d e r m i n e s t h e analytic space when his i n t e r v e n t i o n s 233

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234

c o n s t i t u t e " s t a t e m e n t s of facts." T h e latter c o n t r i b u t e to a foreclosure of t h e realm of personal meanings and experience.

Dream

Space

Up until t h e time that Donald W i n n i c o t t i n t r o d u c e d his work on potential space, psychoanalysis had developed a r a t h e r full knowledge of dream c o n s t r u c t i o n and symbolism, but a very incomplete u n d e r s t a n d i n g of dreaming. In this c h a p t e r , I will propose that t h e d r e a m p r e s e n t a t i o n must u n d e r g o a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n in a " d r e a m s p a c e " in order for dreaming to o c c u r . T h i s is an extension of W i n n i c o t t ' s distinction between fantasy and imagination: t h e former is a static, dissociated process that r e m a i n s isolated from living and d r e a m i n g (1971b, p. 27). Imagination r e p r e s e n t s the result of a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n t h a t fantasy undergoes when it is b r o u g h t into potential space, i.e., when t h e r e is " a place from which to become a w a r e " (1971b, p. 27 fn.) of o n e ' s fantasies. Before t h e r e is s u c h a place (potential space), a fantasy object is a static thing in itself, devoid of resonating symbolic meanings, representing n o t h i n g b u t itself: in fantasy " a dog is a dog is a d o g " (1971b, p. 33). A dream will be viewed h e r e as an i n t e r n a l c o m m u n i cation involving a primary process c o n s t r u c t i o n generated by o n e aspect of self that must be perceived, understood, and experienced by a n o t h e r aspect of self. T h e p r i m a r y process c o n s t r u c t i o n c o n s t i t u t e s t h e dream p r e s e n t a t i o n which is an internal sensory event. As with every o t h e r sensory registration (including c o m m u n i c a t i o n s from other people), the dream p r e s e n t a t i o n initially c o n s t i t u t e s a thing in itself from t h e point of view of t h e aspect of self

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235

a t t e m p t i n g to u n d e r s t a n d it. T h i s raw sensory data must u n d e r g o some form of psychological transformation in order for d r e a m i n g to o c c u r . Grotstein (1979b) makes a similar distinction between t h e d r e a m p r e s e n t a t i o n a n d d r e a m i n g w h e n h e differentiates the dreamer-who-dreams-the-dream from the d r e a m e r - w h o - u n d e r s t a n d s - t h e - d r e a m . T h e dreamer-whodreams-the-dream creates t h e primary process presentation; t h e dreamer-who-understands-the-dream is t h e int e r p r e t e r , t h e creator of symbolic meanings. Sandler (1976) distinguishes the " d r e a m w o r k " (a primary process mode of thinking) from t h e u n c o n s c i o u s " u n d e r s t a n d i n g w o r k " (a higher-order symbolic function). Sandler points out that t h e r e would be n o point in t h e dream work if t h e r e were not a n o t h e r aspect of t h e person to u n d e r s t a n d t h e disguised dream wish. Dreaming involves t h e capacity to transform the static coexistence of opposites seen in primary process t h i n k i n g into a dialectical relationship of opposites wherein m e a n i n g s and dream experience 1 are generated. In primary process t h i n k i n g (resulting in the dream pres e n t a t i o n ) , t h e r e is no negation; each pole of a potential c o n t r a d i c t i o n exists i n d e p e n d e n t l y of the o t h e r . T h e notion of static coexistence of opposites in the u n c o n s c i o u s follows directly from F r e u d ' s (1915b) observation that t h e r e are no negatives in t h e u n c o n s c i o u s . W h e n opposites statically coexist (i.e., before t h e u n c o n s c i o u s thing

'Pontalis (1972) believes that analysts err in limiting their conception of a dream to its value as the conveyor of symbolic meanings, thus neglecting the centrality of "dream experience," i.e., "the subjective experience of the dreamer dreaming, and the inter-subjective experience of therapy in which the dream is brought to the analyst, both offered and withheld, speaking yet silent" (p. 23).

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presentation becomes h y p e r c a t h e c t e d in t h e process of becoming conscious), no m e a n i n g s can be g e n e r a t e d , since m e a n i n g r e q u i r e s difference, a d y n a m i c r e l a t i o n s h i p between an idea and t h a t which it is n o t . In a completely h o m o g e n e o u s field, t h e r e can be no m e a n i n g , because the e n t i r e field is invisible until it is c o n t r a s t e d with somet h i n g t h a t it is not. 2 D r e a m i n g is t h e process of bringing t h e dream presentation into a dialectical process, t h e r e b y creating t h e dream experience, i.e., creating meaningful experience where t h e r e had only been static coexistence of bits of data. T h e e n t r y o f t h e dream p r e s e n t a t i o n into a dialectical process involves the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n into symbols t h a t can be u n d e r s t o o d by an i n t e r p r e t i n g self. Symbolizing o c c u r s only within t h e context of a dialectical process, a n d , conversely, t h e existence of a dialectical process is manifested by t h e process of generating symbolic m e a n i n g s (although it is by no m e a n s restricted to t h e process of generating symbolic m e a n i n g s ) . I n t h e absence of a dialectical process (and therefore in t h e absence of t h e capacity for symbolization), t h e dream p r e s e n t a t i o n , instead of being transformed into a set of symbolic m e a n i n g s in t h e process of d r e a m i n g , becomes transformed into a h a l l u c i n a t i o n . T h e schizop h r e n i c , when incapable of m a i n t a i n i n g a psychological dialectical process, is c o n s e q u e n t l y incapable of dreaming (creating dream experience). It is n o t , as had been believed, t h a t s c h i z o p h r e n i c s do n o t d r e a m ; r a t h e r , t h e dream presentation is transformed into a hallucination

2

Sartre (1943) makes a similar point when he states that there must be a rim of negation (nothingness) around "being-in-itself" in order for reflective consciousness ("being-for-itself") to be generated.

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237

that is subjectively interchangeable with waking hallucinatory experience and therefore is n o t noticed by t h e schizop h r e n i c as a u n i q u e form of psychological e v e n t . A hospitalized, c h r o n i c schizophrenic patient whom I had been seeing five times a week in p s y c h o t h e r a p y for several years reported that his r o o m m a t e had gotten u p in t h e middle of t h e night and drowned him in a b a t h t u b by holding his head u n d e r t h e water until he was dead. T h e n u r s i n g staff had told me that t h e patient had slept t h r o u g h t h e night, so I asked the patient if h e had dreamed that. He was surprised that I asked him and looked confused. D r e a m experience was so interchangeable with waking experience for this patient t h a t t h e fact t h a t he was alive and talking to me was not the slightest bit more real to him t h a n what I imagined had been a dream. For him, it was equally possible t h a t c u r r e n t experience was hallucination as it was that his dream experience was real. Even in this case, t h e r e is reason to believe t h a t t h e r e had been some symbolic reworking of t h e dream presentation. T h e fact t h a t t h e schizophrenic patient created a psychological event t h a t not only could be noticed and r e m e m b e r e d , but t h a t also was i m p o r t a n t enough to c o m m u n i c a t e to me shows that some reworking of t h e dream presentation had o c c u r r e d . T h e patient transformed t h e dream presentation into a form of hallucination r a t h e r t h a n into a symbolic form. (Despite my suspicion t h a t t h e hallucination presented by this patient had begun as a dream p r e s e n t a t i o n , it is also possible t h a t t h e p a t i e n t ' s experience of having been d r o w n e d was a h a l l u c i n a t o r y elaboration of some actual event or may even h a v e been a c u r r e n t hallucination [a hallucinated m e m o r y ] ) .

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D r e a m i n g occurs for a n e u r o t i c patient when he subjects t h e dream presentation (the t h i n g in itself) to a symbolic t r a n s f o r m a t i o n . T h e dream is " d r e a m e d " (is created as a dream experience) at t h e m o m e n t the symbolic transformation occurs, w h e t h e r that be at t h e m o m e n t an u n c o n s c i o u s u n d e r s t a n d i n g is achieved in sleep that may only be experienced later as an element in o n e ' s waking m o o d , or w h e t h e r it o c c u r s at t h e m o m e n t of waking, or at the m o m e n t it is " r e m e m b e r e d " in an analytic session.

Analytic

Space

Analytic space can be t h o u g h t of as t h e space between patient and analyst in which analytic experience (including t r a n s f e r e n c e illusion) is generated and in which personal m e a n i n g s can be created and played with. It is a potential space, t h e existence of which can by no m e a n s be taken for granted. Psychotherapy is done in the overlap of the two play areas, that of the patient and that ofthe therapist. If t h e therapist c a n n o t play, t h e n he is n o t suitable for t h e work. If t h e patient c a n n o t play, t h e n s o m e t h i n g needs to be d o n e to enable t h e patient to become able to play, after which p s y c h o t h e r a p y may begin. (Winnicott, 1971e, p. 54) (It is beyond t h e scope of this paper to discuss t h e problem of working with patients who are unable to play. T h e present discussion addresses work with p a t i e n t s who are able to participate in t h e creation a n d d i s r u p t i o n of analytic space.) W i t h i n analytic space, fantasy and reality stand in a

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239

dialectical relationship to each o t h e r . T h e capacity for m a t u r e transference (as opposed to delusional transference) involves t h e capacity to g e n e r a t e an illusion that is experienced simultaneously as real and not real. If the t r a n s f e r e n c e experience becomes too real (i.e., if the dialectical relationship collapses in t h e direction of fantasy), delusional transference is generated. If reality is (defensively) made too p r e s e n t , obsessional intellectualization and c o n c r e t e operational thinking (Marty and M'Uzan, 1963; McDougall, 1984b) often predominate. A p a t i e n t ' s use of projective identification can be t h o u g h t of as a collapsing of analytic space in a way that t h r e a t e n s t h e t h e r a p i s t ' s capacity to m a i n t a i n a state of mind in which his own feelings and t h o u g h t s can be u n d e r s t o o d as symbolic c o n s t r u c t i o n s as opposed to regist r a t i o n s of fact (Ogden, 1982b). W i n n i c o t t (1971e) views projective identification as "direct c o m m u n i c a t i o n . " It is " d i r e c t " in the sense that it is c o m m u n i c a t i o n by means of a direct induction of a feeling state in a n o t h e r person that is n o t p r e d o m i n a n t l y (and often not at all) mediated by verbal symbols. W h e n t h e patient is relying heavily on projective identification as a mode of c o m m u n i c a t i o n , defense, and object-relatedness, the therapist feels locked into a fixed position or sequence of fixed affective states in relation to himself and to t h e patient. T h e r e is such a powerful sense of inevitability about o n e ' s feeling state that o n e does not even consider it to be a subjective state; r a t h e r , it is treated as " r e a l i t y . " T h e therapist working with borderline and schizop h r e n i c patients m u s t come to accept a degree of unwitting participation in t h e p a t i e n t ' s u n c o n s c i o u s object world as an unavoidable a v e n u e to u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e transference (Ogden, 1979, 1981). W h e n t h e therapist allows himself to be used in this way, he is in part no

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longer a separate person listening to a n o t h e r person. He h a s become t h e " e j e c t e d " part of t h e patient. T h i s part n o n e t h e l e s s c o n t i n u e s to be part of t h e patient, whose psychological perimeter now includes t h e therapist. In making himself available in this way, t h e therapist foregoes his own access to a m e / n o t - m e dialectic and becomes t h e patient to.a degree in a way t h a t is unmodified by t h e knowledge that he is not t h e patient. W h e n the therapist is serving as t h e object of a p a t i e n t ' s projective identification, t h e therapist often feels impelled to " d o s o m e t h i n g " a b o u t what is h a p p e n i n g instead of a t t e m p t i n g to u n d e r s t a n d what he is experiencing. W h e n t h e therapist feels compelled to take action in this way, he is very often exacerbating t h e collapse of t h e t h e r a p e u t i c space, t h e space in which meanings can be u n d e r s t o o d instead of dispelled. It is by no means only u n d e r t h e p r e s s u r e of a pat i e n t ' s projective identifications that t h e therapist can c o n t r i b u t e to t h e collapse of analytic space. Analytic therapy is c o n d u c t e d in t h e realm of meanings, in t h e space between symbol and symbolized mediated by t h e self (as interpreter of o n e ' s symbols). Borderline p a t i e n t s characteristically operate in t h e realm of action (as thing in itself); t h e depressed patient uses self-punishment as a form of activity serving to discharge (the potential for) guilt and t h u s avoid t h e experience of guilt (Loewald, 1979); the fetishist freezes potential experience in a t h i n g (fetish object) that excites and s u b s t i t u t e s for t h e experience of being alive with a n o t h e r p e r s o n : " H e [the fetishist] steals his own d r e a m s " (Pontalis, 1972, p. 33). Many borderline patients, for example, c a n n o t suspend from their consciousness an immediate awareness of t h e fact t h a t t h e analyst is " j u s t a guy t r y i n g to e a r n a b u c k " and that his patients are his c u s t o m e r s . For a

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patient capable of creating with t h e analyst an analytic space, t h e fact that t h e analyst must be paid for his work can be played with, i.e., used as material for generating transference illusion. O n e form of playing with this perception is t h e creation of t h e transference illusion (e.g., u n d e r the sway of a maternal transference) that t h e analyst would c o n t i n u e seeing the patient w h e t h e r or not the patient could pay for t h e meetings. From t h e r e perhaps, t h e idea will be elaborated to include t h e image of the patient being injured, unable to work, out of money, and yet c o n t i n u i n g to be seen by the analyst. W i t h i n potential space, this playing with an idea c o n s t i t u t e s imagination. Potential space collapses u n d e r conditions where the question " W h a t would h a p p e n if I weren't p a y i n g ? " must be answered. U n d e r such conditions, t h e patient may fail to pay t r e a t m e n t bills for m o n t h s , forcing the therapist to answer t h e p a t i e n t ' s question concretely. In s u c h a case, imagination (playing with ideas and feelings) has degenerated into an e n a c t m e n t of fantasy in reality (enactment of a set of ideas and feelings that are treated as facts). T h i s is analogous to play d i s r u p t i o n in child t h e r a p y : because of t h e p a t i e n t ' s anxiety, the intersubjective space in which playing o c c u r s is replaced by real space in which danger can be managed and acted upon. It is t h e task of t h e therapist, t h r o u g h the managem e n t of the framework of t h e r a p y and t h r o u g h his interp r e t a t i o n s , to provide conditions wherein the patient might dare to create personal meanings in a form that he can experience and play with. T h e therapist working with b o r d e r l i n e p a t i e n t s is forever a t t e m p t i n g to " p r y o p e n " t h e space between symbol and symbolized, t h u s creating a field in which meanings exist, where o n e t h i n g stands for a n o t h e r in a way t h a t can be t h o u g h t about and understood. W h e r e symbol is indistinguishable from symbol-

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ized, each presentation stands only for itself a n d , therefore, n o t h i n g can be u n d e r s t o o d : each perception is what it is, and that is all t h e r e is to it. Either t h r o u g h lack of training or u n d e r t h e p r e s s u r e of i n t e n s e c o u n t e r t r a n s f e r e n c e feelings, t h e therapist may cease to interpret the symbolic meanings t h a t t h e patient is able to create and instead present i n t e r v e n t i o n s t h a t c o n s t i t u t e things in themselves, " s t a t e m e n t s of f a c t . " T h e following are examples of s u c h i n t e r v e n t i o n s : " I agree t h a t you did a lousy t h i n g in t h a t i n s t a n c e . " " I f t h e y d o n ' t pay, you s h o u l d n ' t work t h e r e a n y m o r e . " " Y o u ' l l feel better after a little time has passed." (Of course, t h e r e is a time a n d place for suggestion, e x h o r t a t i o n , a n d reassurance. I am speaking h e r e about problems arising from consistent reliance u p o n s u c h forms of c o m m u n i c a t i o n and relatedness.) In these i n t e r v e n t i o n s , t h e r e is little space between symbol and symbolized in which to understand meaning. W h e n a therapist regularly i n t e r v e n e s in this way, t h e realm of m e a n i n g to a large degree is foreclosed to t h e p a t i e n t , a n d acting o u t on t h e part of t h e patient is likely to follow. T h e following are less obtrusive examples of types of i n t e r v e n t i o n s t h a t tend to erode analytic space by stating " f a c t s " instead of i n q u i r i n g into t h e p a t i e n t ' s mode of c o n s t r u c t i n g his personal symbolic meanings. A therapist with a patient who as a child had felt u n d e r p r e s s u r e to live up to his p a r e n t ' s "shifting and impossible e x p e c t a t i o n s " said to the patient, " Y o u could never be sure what t h e standard was and how to pass t h e t e s t . " T h e t h e r a p i s t ' s i n t e r v e n t i o n was a s t a t e m e n t of an aspect of t h e p a t i e n t ' s psychic reality, i.e., o n e way in

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which t h e patient viewed himself and his parents. However, t h e i n t e r v e n t i o n stated t h e psychic reality (the pat i e n t ' s view of himself as a child) as a fact r a t h e r t h a n as a personal symbolic c o n s t r u c t i o n p u t together and maintained for reasons t h a t can be u n d e r s t o o d — i t was a meaning created by t h e p a t i e n t , not a fact discovered by t h e therapist. T h e impact of t h e i n t e r v e n t i o n was to support subtly t h e patient's defense, which consisted of his seeing himself as a victim of external forces (his parents, teachers, school a d m i n i s t r a t o r s , and t h e therapist, n o n e of w h o m seemed to be able to make up their minds). An alternate way of framing the i n t e r v e n t i o n would have been to say, " I t seems t h a t you felt t h a t y o u r p a r e n t s ' standards were constantly shifting so that you didn't know how to satisfy t h e m . Y o u ' v e said that even now you frequently experience things t h a t w a y . " In offering genetic clarifications and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s it is i m p o r t a n t not to treat t h e p a t i e n t ' s symbolization of his past experience as if it were o n e and t h e same with t h e symbolized, i.e., o n e and t h e same with t h e past experience itself. W h a t is of i m p o r t a n c e is t h e way in which t h e patient c o n s t r u c t s his symbolic representation of the past. T h e past no longer exists and is absolutely irretrievable. T h e patient in t h e present creates his own history, i.e., t h e patient creates symbols representing his conception of his past. It is o n e of t h e analytic tasks to understand t h e p a t i e n t ' s r e a s o n s for symbolically representing his past in t h e way t h a t he does. (See Schafer's [1975] conception of t h e p a t i e n t ' s history as an evolving cons t r u c t i o n , as opposed to a static, discoverable entity.) " Y o u fail to recognize how self-defeating you are at y o u r j o b and in your work with m e . " Alternately, o n e might say, " I think it scares you to think that it is

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you who is invested in defeating yourself at y o u r j o b and with m e . " In t h e first i n s t a n c e , t h e therapist knows t h e patient has been self-defeating and tells t h e patient he is blinding himself to t h a t fact. In t h e second version, t h e therapist is saying that h e feels that tbe patient feels frightened (for r e a s o n s that can be u n d e r s t o o d ) of c o n s t r u i n g (symbolizing) his behavior in a particular way. A third example: A female patient has told t h e therapist that she loves him and has sexual fantasies about him and wishes to have an affair with him. In t h e next session, she feels disgusting and does not know why. T h e therapist responds: " M y not h a v i n g a sexual relationship with you has made you feel disgusting for wishing that that could b e . " Alternately, t h e therapist might have said, " I t h i n k y o u ' v e taken my not getting involved with you sexually and romantically as evidence t h a t I feel you should not want that and are disgusting if you do wish for t h a t . " In t h e first version, t h e therapist tells t h e patient t h a t she feels disgusting as a result of s o m e t h i n g he has done (i.e., as a result of his not getting involved with her romantically and sexually). This leaves open the possibility t h a t t h e r e is inevitability 3 about her response: u n r e q u i t e d sexual 3

Patients hold powerful convictions regarding inevitability of meaning that must be disentangled by the analyst. For example, analysands often treat it as self-evident that a woman would feel disgusting for being "fat" or that a man would feel ashamed of having a penis that is "too small." Patients evidence considerable resistance to viewing these ideas as personal beliefs that they have constructed for reasons that can be understood.

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and r o m a n t i c wishes make one feel disgusting. In the second, t h e emphasis is not on t h e cause-and-effect relationship (one t h i n g inevitably leading to a n o t h e r ) , b u t on the p a t i e n t ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e m e a n i n g of what has transpired. Analytic space is a frame of mind contributed to by patient and therapist in which a multiplicity of meanings can be e n t e r t a i n e d and played with. O n e t h o u g h t does not " c a u s e " or have direct impact u p o n a n o t h e r . T h e subject, t h r o u g h his act of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , mediates between meanings and creates relationships a m o n g symbols. Each personal m e a n i n g influences t h e subject's way of constructing and interrelating his symbols and consequently affects his s u b s e q u e n t acts of interpreting experience. This is the h e r m e n e u t i c equivalent of t h e cause-and-effect relationship in physical science. W h e n analytic space collapses, the patient becomes imprisoned in the confines of signs c o n n e c t e d to o n e a n o t h e r by a sense of opaque inevitability.

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I n d e x

Abraham, K., 6, 133, 137 and object relations theory of internal objects, 136 Absence, 223 Absent mother, presence of, 181-183 Absolute narcissism, 34 Action deferred, 171 responsibility for, in depressive position, 8284 Active aspects, of person, 134 Actualization, 151 Acute regression, to paranoid-schizoid position, 104-112 Addiction, to.mother as object, 184-187 Agency, active, 134-135 Alpha elements, 46

Als, H., 211 Ambivalence, achievement of, 88-91 Analytic space, 238-245 Annihilation, impending, and disruption of matrix, 183-184. 5ee also Nihilation Background object of primary identification, 182 Balint, M., 10, 183 Behavior, patterns of, 23 Behavioral systems, 22-23 Being, state of, 42 Being-for-itself, 236 Being-in-itself, 49, 236 Benign circle, ruth, guilt and, 197-200 Beta elements, 46 Bettelheim, B., 135 261

262 Bibring, E., 93, 94 Bick, E., 27 Bion, W. R., 2 , 4 , 6 , 16, 18, 27, 34, 36, 37, 39, 44, 46, 52, 69, 70, 102, 104, 133, 164, 192 and object relations theory of internal objects, 144150 Birth of historical subject, depressive position and, 67-99 Bizarre object, 146 Blank psychosis, 223 Bornstein, M., 14 Bower, T. G. R., 28, 30 on infant's mental capacities, 30-31 on physical discontinuity of objects, 64 Bowlby, J., on behavioral systems, 22-23 Boyer, L. B., 94, 112 Brazelton, T. B., 28, 29, 211 Breast, creation of, 173 British Psychoanalytical Society, 167 Chomsky, N., and concept of linguistic deep structure, 4, 13-14, 39, 43 Communication, direct, 231, 239 Complementary identification, 151

The Matrix of the Mind Compound, mother-infant as, 171 Concordant identification, 152 Conscious, 210 Containment, of feelings and ideas, 145 Containment process, 70 Countertransference oedipal-level transference and, 119-128 and projective identification, transference and, and internal object relations, 150-164 Creation * of breast, 173 of history, 79-84 of psychic reality, 117-119 of reflective distance, 128 Cumulative trauma, 215

Danger, management of, in depressive position, 7 6 79 Death in life, 223 Deep structure(s), psychological, 13-15, 41 Defense against fantasy, reality as, 219-221 and individuality, instinct and, 175-177 manic, 84-88

Index Defensive preservation of self, 177-178 Deferred action, 171 Depressive position and birth of historical subject, 67-99 danger in, management of, 76-79 foray into, 113-117 and Oedipus complex, 9 1 98 paranoid-schizoid position and, between, 101-129 responsibility for action in, 82-84 transference in, 90 transition into, 68-71 de Saussure, F., 14 Development of subjectivity, 71-76 Dialectical process, potential space and, 208-214 Dialogue, psychoanalytic, 1 8 Direct communication, 231, 239 Discontinuity of history, splitting as, 61-64 Discovery A of externality, survival of object and, 190-197 of separateness, traumatic and nontraumatic, 187190 Disruption of matrix,

263 impending annihilation and,183-184 Dissociation of reality and fantasy, 222 Distance, reflective, creation of, 128 Dream screen, 182 Dream space, 182, 234-238 Dreaming, 235-238 Dual split, 149 Dynamic structures, 140, 142 Early fantasy activity degree of subjectivity and mode of symbolization in, 25-27 symbolic form of, 23-31 Early stages of integration, 59-61 Ego in internal object relations, 132, 135 suborganizations of, 149150 Eimas, P., 14, 28 Eliade, M., 95 Empathy, and projective identification, 227-231 Environment, role of, 3137 Envy, and jealousy, 77-79 Erikson, E., 174 Expected object, 194 Experience, presubjective, 48-50

264 Externality, discovery of, survival of object and, 190-197 Fain, M., 184-185 Fairbairn, W . R. D., 2, 4, 6, 10, 54, 102, 133, 136, 144, 145, 150, 163, 164 and internal objects, 147148 and object relations theory of internal objects, 139143 and resistance, 155-156 on theoretical status of internal objects, 140141 False Self, 143-144, 178 Fantasy. See also Phantasy dissociation of reality and, 222 foreclosure of reality and, 222-224 reality as defense against, 219-221 reality subsumed by, 216219 Fantasy activity, early. See Early fantasy activity "Fetishism," 135 Foreclosure, of reality and fantasy, 222-224 Freud, A., 68, 167, 174 Freud, S., 4-5, 6-7, 11, 12, 16, 34-35, 67, 82, 92, 102, 118, 133, 136, 137,

The Matrix of the Mind 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 147, 149, 150, 157, 164, 168, 171, 174, 176, 179, 208,210,222,235 on active agency, 134-135 and hallucinatory wish fulfillment, 179 and "inheritance of knowledge," 18-23 and object relations theory of internal objects, 133136 on sexual meanings, 20-21 Giovacchini, P. L., 112 Glover, E., 68, 94, 168 ' "Good enough" mother, 140 Green, A., 223 Greenberg, J., 19 Grotstein, J., 15, 1 6 , 2 9 , 3 2 , 43, 44, 47, 182, 193, 211,213,223,235 dual track model of, 147 Guilt, and benign circle, ruth and,197-200 Guntrip, H., 10 Habermas, J., 73 Hartmann, H., 132 Hegel, G. W. F., 61, 208 Heimann, P., 28 Historical position, 82 Historical subject, birth of, depressive position and, 67-99 History

Index creation of, 79-84 splitting as discontinuity of, 61-64 Holding, 43, 191 Identification complementary, 151 concordant, 152 primary, background object of, 182 projective. See Projective identification Illusion, 210-211 Impending annihilation, and disruption of matrix, 183-184 Impingements, 143, 215 Individuality, instinct and defense and, 175-177 "I-ness," 26, 48, 64, 72, 208, 209 Infant mental capacities of, 27-31 psychological matrix of, 179-181 Inheritance of knowledge, Freud's conception of, 18-23 Instinct defense and individuality, 175-177 Klein's conception of, 1113,16-18 Integration early stages of, 59-61 failure of, 57-59

265 Internal object relations, 131-165 Internal world, 136 Internalization, 190 The Interpretation of Dreams, 133-134 Invisible oneness, 173, 231232 Isaacs, S., 10, 1 1 , 2 1 , 2 4 , 2 5 , 28, 139 on phantasy, 12 "It-ness," 42 Jacobson, E., 132, 192-193 Jakobson, R., 14 Jealousy, envy and, 77-79 Jung, C. G., 15 Kernberg, 0 . , 102 Khan, M.,M. R., 182,215 Klein, M., 2, 4-5, 6-7, 9-39, 4 1 - 4 2 , 6 7 - 6 8 , 6 9 , 70, 77, 84, 85, 102, 103, 112, 133, 136, 139, 140, 141-142, 145, 164, 167, 168, 174, 176, 178, 179180, 200, 225 and development, 226-227 and environment, 31-37 on experience with mother, 17 and infant guilt, 198-199 on infant's feelings, 26 and instinct, 11-13, 16-18 and matrix for infant's psychological life, 189

266 Klein, M., (continued) and mother-infant relationship, 169-170 and object relations theory of internal objects, 137139 on Oedipus complex, 9 2 94 and paranoid schizoid position, 42-43, 64-65 and phantasy, 10-13 preconception and realization and, 15-18 psychological deep structure and, 13-15 and splitting, 43-45, 47, 48,50-51, 52,54 and symbolic form of early phantasy activity, 23-31 and theoretical status of internal objects, 147 and whole object relations, 71, 191-194 Knowledge, inheritance of, Freud's conception of, 18-23 Kojeve, A., 75, 80, 208 Lacan, J . , 3 6 , 61, 124, 174, 180, 219 Laing, R. D., 223 Langs, R., 47 Lemaire, A., 124 Levi-Strauss, C , 14 Lewin, B., 182 Little, M., 90, 217

The Matrix of the Mind Loewald, H., 95, 96, 97, 240 Lorenz, K., 15, 44 MacKay, N., 138 Mahler, M., 187, 192-193 Malin, A., 47 Management of danger, in depressive position, 7679 Manic defense, 84-88 Marty, P., 239 Maternal preoccupation, primary, 172 Matrix derivation of, 180 disruption of, impending annihilation and, 183184 psychological, of infant, 179-181 McDougall, J., 102, 104, 184, 223, 239 Meaning(s),210 sexual, 18-19 Meltzer, D., 27, 223 Mental capacities, of infant, 27-31 Mental corollaries, 11 Metabolizing, 35, 36 Mitchell, S., 19 Mother absent, presence of, 181183 "good enough," 140 as object, addiction to, 184-187

Index Mother-infant unit, 171-175 "Mourning and Melancholia," 134 M'Uzan, M. de, 239 Narcissism, absolute, 34 Nemiah, J., 104 Nichols, J., 75 Nihilation, 75. See also Annihilation Nonexperience, 103-104, 223, 232 Not-being, 223 Object background, of primary identification, 182 bizarre, 146 mother as, addiction to, 184-187 self as, 41-65 subjective, period of, 169178 survival of, and discovery of externality, 190-197 Object relations internal, 131-165 split, 50-52 Objectification, 181 Oedipal-level transference and countertransference, 119-128 Oedipus complex, 20, 67 depressive position and, 91-98 Klein on, 92-94

267 Ogden, T., 15, 34, 45, 47, 104, 144, 145, 146, 151, 154, 1 5 6 , 2 1 5 , 2 2 3 , 2 3 9 on nonexperience, 223 and projective identification, 228 Oneness, 212, 213, 225 invisible, 173, 231-232 "The Other," 36, 180 Paranoid position, 136 Paranoid-schizoid position, 41-65, 136 acute regression to, 104112 and depressive position, between, 101-129 Klein and, 42-43, 64-65 transference in, 90 Part-object relationships, 5051 Patterns of behavior, 23 Phantasy. See also Fantasy Klein's concept of, 10-13 Phantasy-thinking, 139 Phylogenetic inheritance, 13, 23. See also Knowledge Piaget, J., 11, 1 4 , 2 8 , 2 9 - 3 0 , 38, 174 Playing, phenomenon of, 206-208 Pontalis, J.-B., 235, 240 Potential space, 77, 182, 203-232 and dialectical process, 208-214

268 Potential space (continued) psychopathology of, 214224 Preconception, 192 and realization, 15-18 Preoccupation, maternal, primary, 172 Presence of absent mother, 181-183 Preservation of self, defensive, 177-178 Presubjective experience, 4 8 50 Primal phantasies, 20 Primary identification, background object of, 182 Primary maternal preoccupation, 172 Processing, of projective identification, 36, 145, 232 Projective identification, 36, 145, 232 empathy and, 227-231 transference, countertransference and, and internal object relations, 150-164 Protective shield, 179 Psychic reality, creation of, 117-119 Psychoanalytic dialogue, 1-8 Psychological deep structure(s), 13-15, 41 Psychological matrix, of infant, 179-181

The Matrix of the Mind Psychopathology, of potential space, 214-224 Psychosis, blank, 223

Racker, H., 151, 152 Reality as defense against fantasy, 219-221 dissociation of fantasy and, 222 foreclosure of fantasy and, 222-224 psychic, creation of, 117119 subsumed by fantasy, 216219 Realization, 192 preconception and, 15-18 Recipient, 145, 151 Reflective distance, creation of, 128 Regression, acute, to paranoid-schizoid position, 104-112 Relationships, part-object, 50-51 Resistance, 155-164 Responsibility for action, in depressive position, 8 2 84 Riviere, J., 28, 167 Rosenblatt, B., 133 Rosenfeld, H., 28 Ruth, 226 guilt, and benign circle, 197-200

Index Samuels, A., 15 Sander, L., 2 8 , 2 1 1 Sandler, J., 133, 235 Sartre, J.-P., 236 on being-in-itself, 49 Schafer, R., 138, 243 and action language in depressive position, 8 3 84 Schmideberg, M., 168 Scott, W. C. M., on early fantasy activity, 24-25 Searles, H., 81, 89-90, 105, 217 and jealousy of self for another aspect of self, 163-164 Segal, H., 27, 6 1 , 7 0 , 85, 138, 1 3 9 , 2 1 7 , 2 1 9 on infant's experience, 33 Self. See also False Self; True Self defensive preservation of, 177-178 as object, 41-65 Separateness, traumatic and nontraumatic discovery of, 187-190 Sexual meanings, 18-19 Shield, protective, 179 Sifneos, P., 104 Space analytic, 238-245 dream, 182, 234-238 potential. See Potential space Spitz, R., 69

269 Split object relations, 50-52 Splitting, 43-59 as discontinuity of history, 61-64 failure of, 52-57 Klein and, 43-45, 47, 48, 50-51, 52, 54 "Splitting of the Ego in the Process of Defense," 135 Standard Edition, 10 State of being, 42 Stern, D., 1 4 , 2 8 , 2 9 , 2 1 1 on infant's mental capabilities, 29 Strachey, J . , 9 , 10, 118, 167 on Klein, 9 Stratification, 174 Structure(s), 142 dynamic, 140 psychological deep, 13-15, 41 Subject, historical, birth of, depressive position and, 67-99 Subjective object, 173 period of, 169-178 Subjectivity degree of, and mode of symbolization in early fantasy activity, 25-27 development of, 71-76 symbol, symbolized and, 224-227 Survival, of object, and discovery of externality, 190-197

270 Symbol, symbolized, and subjectivity, 224-227 Symbolic equation, 61, 217 Symbolic form of early fantasy activity, 23-31 Symbolization, mode of, degree of subjectivity and, in early fantasy activity, 25-27 Threeness, 213, 226,227 Tinbergen, N., 15, 44 "Tion, Ugbar, Orbis, Tertius," 167 Transference and countertransference, oedipal-level, 119-128 in depressive position, 90 and internal object relations, 150-155 in paranoid-schizoid position, 90 Transition, into depressive position, 68-71 Transitional phenomena, period of, 178-190 Trauma, cumulative, 215 Traumatic and nontraumatic discovery of separateness, 187-190 Trevarthan, C , 28 True Self, 143-144, 178 Tustin, F., 27 Twoness, 212, 226, 227 Unconscious, 210 Unit status, 190

The Matrix of the Mind Waelder, R., 94 Weaning, 191 Whole-object relatedness, period of, 71, 190-200 Winnicott, D. W., 2, 4, 6-7, 9, 10, 36, 38, 43, 54, 67, 7 1 , 7 3 , 77, 102, 112, 133, 140, 145, 167-201, 203,209, 2 1 0 , 2 1 1 , 2 1 2 , 213, 214-215, 231, 239. See also Infant; Matrix; Mother and development, 225-227 and dream space, 234 and illusion, 210 and internal objects, 148 on Klein and motherinfant relationship, 169 language of, on potential space, 204-206 on meeting of infant's needs, 175 and object relations theory of internal objects, 143144 and period of subjective object, 169-178 and period of transitional phenomena, 178-190 and period of whole-object relatedness, 190-200 on play, 238 World, internal, 136

Zetzel, E., 94

About the Author Thomas Ogden, M . D . , is a graduate of Amherst College, the Yale School of Medicine, and the San Francisco Psychoanalytic Institute. He has served as an Associate Psychiatrist at the Tavistock Clinic, London, and is currently Co-director of the Center for the Advanced Study of the Psychoses, a member of the faculty of the San Francisco Psychoanalytic Institute, and a Supervising and Training Analyst at the Psychoanalytic Institute of Northern California. Dr. Ogden is the author of The Primitive Edge of Experience, The Matrix of the Mind: Object Relations and the Psychoanalytic Dialogue, and Projective Identification and Psychotherapeutic Technique. He teaches, supervises, and maintains a private practice of psychoanalysis in San Francisco.