The Military Balance in the Cold War: US Perceptions and Policy, 1976-1985 (Cold War History)

The Military Balance in the Cold War This book examines the impact of American perceptions of the military balance bet...

Author: David Walsh

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The Military Balance in the Cold War

This book examines the impact of American perceptions of the military balance between the United States and the Soviet Union during the key period of 1976–85. That decade witnessed the decline of the US–Soviet De´tente and the resurgence of superpower confrontation, often called the ‘‘Second Cold War.’’ Among the factors contributing to this shift was the American view of the military balance—that is, whether the United States had been or was being overtaken by the Soviet Union in terms of military capability. Since then, the military balance has been viewed within the overall context of issues impacting superpower relations during this era. However, American attitudes of the time were based heavily on the military balance, and perceptions of it came to have a decisive impact on US policy. Dr Walsh examines the full range of issues—strategic and European-based forces, power-projection capabilities, and military spending—and their role in shaping perceptions, not just of the military balance but also in such key areas of international relations as arms control, trans-Atlantic diplomacy and Third World conﬂict. In doing so, the author shows how the perceptions of the 1970s contributed to key policy decisions in the 1980s, which themselves played a signiﬁcant role in bringing the Cold War to an end. This book will be of interest to advanced students of Cold War history, Strategic Studies, US foreign policy and IR in general. David M. Walsh has a PhD in International History from the London School of Economics.

Cold War history series Series Editors: Odd Arne Westad and Michael Cox ISSN: 1471-3829 In the new history of the Cold War that has been forming since 1989, many of the established truths about the international conﬂict that shaped the latter half of the twentieth century have come up for revision. The present series is an attempt to make available interpretations and materials that will help further the development of this new history, and it will concentrate in particular on publishing expositions of key historical issues and critical surveys of newly available sources. 1. Reviewing the Cold War Approaches, interpretations, and theory Odd Arne Westad (ed.) 2. Rethinking Theory and History in the Cold War Richard Saull 3. British and American Anticommunism before the Cold War Marrku Ruotsila 4. Europe, Cold War and Co-existence, 1953–1965 Wilfred Loth (ed.) 5. The Last Decade of the Cold War From conﬂict escalation to conﬂict transformation Olav Njølstad (ed.) 6. Reinterpreting the End of the Cold War Issues, interpretations, periodizations Silvio Pons and Federico Romero (eds) 7. Across the Blocs Cold War cultural and social history Rana Mitter and Patrick Major (eds) 8. US Paramilitary Assistance to South Vietnam Insurgency, subversion and public order William Rosenau 9. The European Community and the Crises of the 1960s Negotiating the Gaullist challenge N. Piers Ludlow

10. Soviet–Vietnam Relations and the Role of China 1949–64 Changing alliances Mari Olsen 11. The Third Indochina War Conﬂict between China, Vietnam and Cambodia, 1972–79 Odd Arne Westad and Sophie Quinn-Judge (eds) 12. Greece and the Cold War Front line state, 1952–1967 Evanthis Hatzivassiliou 13. Economic Statecraft during the Cold War European responses to the US trade embargo Frank Cain 14. Macmillan, Khrushchev Berlin Crisis, 1958–1960 Kitty Newman

and

the

´tente in Europe 15. The Emergence of De Brandt, Kennedy and the formation of Ostpolitik Arne Hofmann 16. European Integration and the Cold War Ostpolitik–Westpolitik, 1965–1973 N. Piers Ludlow 17. Britain, Germany and the Cold War The search for a European de´tente 1949–1967 R. Gerald Hughes 18. The Military Balance in the Cold War US perceptions and policy, 1976–85 David M. Walsh

The Military Balance in the Cold War US perceptions and policy, 1976–85 David M. Walsh

First published 2008 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business # 2008 David M. Walsh

This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2007. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Walsh, David, Ph. D. The military balance in the Cold War : US perceptions and policy, 1976-85 / by David Walsh. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-415-42619-0 (hardback : alk. paper) 1. United States-Defenses. 2. United States--Armed Forces. 3. Cold war. 4. Balance of power. 5. Soviet Union--Defenses. 6. Soviet Union--Armed Forces. I. Title. UA23.W315 2007 3530 .03327309047--dc22 2007003129

ISBN 0- 203- 94631- 6 Master e-book ISBN ISBN10: 0–415–42619–7 (hbk) ISBN10: 0–203–94631–6 (ebk) ISBN13: 978–0–415–42619–0 (hbk) ISBN13: 978–0–203–94631–2 (ebk)

Contents

Preface Acknowledgements List of abbreviations Introduction

viii ix x 1

PART I

Strategic forces

13

1

The counterforce doctrine The development of ‘‘Limited Nuclear Options,’’ 1974–77 15 The Carter years—PRM 10 to PD 59, 1977–80 22 Counterforce and Soviet strategy: The role of perception 31 The Nixon–Ford years 31 The Carter years 35 Conclusion 39

15

2

Protracted nuclear war Strategy 44 Weapons 50 The Soviet threat 54 Conclusion 59

42

3

Of shelters and Star Wars Introduction 63 Civil defense 63 Soviet civil defense—The view in the 1970s 66 Soviet civil defense—The view in the 1980s 72 US civil defense—Programs and plans 74 The Strategic Defense Initiative, 1983–85 79

63

vi

Contents The Soviet challenge 83 Conclusion 86

PART II

The balance in Europe

89

4

The nuclear balance The ‘‘neutron bomb’’ and alliance cohesion, 1977–78 92 The LRTNF debate, 1979–83 97 US perceptions and the Soviet threat 105 Conclusion 107

91

5

Conventional forces Prelude to the LTDP, 1974–77 111 The three percent decision and the LTDP 114 The balance in the Central Region 117 Continued efforts, similar results, 1981–85 124 Conclusion 127

109

PART III

Power projection

129

6

The naval balance The shifting balance of power at sea 132 The 1970s: Of missions and dollars 135 The naval balance: Lists and capabilities 139 The 600-ship navy and the balance of sea power in the 1980s 144 Conclusion 150

131

7

Forces for rapid deployment Carter and the RDF, 1977–81 155 Reagan and the Central Command, 1981–85 164 US and Soviet power projection capabilities compared 169 Conclusion 171

153

PART IV

Defense spending

173

8

175

The expenditure debate The balance of military spending in the mid-1970s 176 Team B 180

Contents

vii

The Carter years 183 The Reagan increases, 1981–85 188 Conclusion 193 Conclusion Notes Bibliography Index

195 208 250 267

Preface

The years 1976–85 witnessed the decline of the US–Soviet De´tente established during the early 1970s and the resurgence of superpower confrontation, known as the ‘‘Second Cold War.’’ A signiﬁcant contributing factor was the American view of the military balance. Put simply, debate rested on whether the United States had been, or was being, overtaken by the Soviet Union in terms of military capability. Since that time, the military balance has been viewed in the overall context of issues impacting superpower relations during this era. However, American attitudes toward the Soviet Union were based heavily on perceptions of it. These came to have a major impact on US policy during 1976–85. As much documentation has only recently become available, a detailed analysis of this subject has as yet not been forthcoming. This book examines the issues involved in the debates for each category of importance in the military arena, as well as the positions of the participants, both ofﬁcial and public. As a historical analysis, it stays within the parameters of what was known to the participants and relies heavily on documents and sources from that period. The impact that the decisions had on future events is also analyzed and discussed.

Acknowledgements

My deepest personal thanks to Dr Odd Arne Westad of the London School of Economics, who supervised the dissertation on which this book is based and provided important suggestions in direction and for revision; to Professor Ibrahim Karawan at the University of Utah, who offered continual support and encouragement; and to my parents, who provided unquestioned love and support throughout the process of research and writing.

Abbreviations

ACDA ALCM AIMS C3I CDI

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Air-Launched Cruise Missile Alternative Integrated Military Strategies Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence Center for Defense Information/Conventional Defense Initiative CENTCOM Central Command CPD Committee on the Present Danger DCI Director of Central Intelligence DIA Defense Intelligence Agency DPC Defense Planning Committee (NATO) ERW Enhanced Radiation Weapon GLCM Ground-Launched Cruise Missile GSFG Group of Soviet Forces, Germany IRBM Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff INF Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces LNO Limited Nuclear Option LRINF Long-Range Intermediate Nuclear Forces LRTNF Long-Range Theater Nuclear Forces LSO Limited Strategic Option LTDP Long Term Defense Program MAB Marine Amphibious Brigade MAD Mutually Assured Destruction MAF Marine Amphibious Force MAU Marine Amphibious Unit MIRV Multiple, Independently-Targetable Re-Entry Vehicle MPS Multiple Protective Shelters/Maritime Prepositioning Ships NCA National Command Authority NSC National Security Council NSDM National Security Decision Memorandum NSSM National Security Study Memorandum NSDD National Security Decision Directive

Abbreviations NTPS NUWEP PD PFIAB PRM RDF RDJTF SACEUR SCC SDI SIOP SLBM SSBN TNF

Near-Term Prepositioning Ships Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy Presidential Directive President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board Presidential Review Memorandum Rapid Deployment Force Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Special Coordinating Committee Strategic Defense Initiative Single Integrated Operational Plan Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile Submarine Theater Nuclear Forces

xi

Introduction

The period from 1976 to 1985 saw a considerable deterioration in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Two distinct periods can be identiﬁed for this timeframe: the decline and fall of De´tente between 1976 and 1980 and the ‘‘Second Cold War’’ of 1980 to 1985. The reasons for this turn of events were numerous. The differing concepts of ´tente held by the United States and the Soviet Union played a conDe siderable role in leading to a deterioration in relations. Soviet actions in Angola, the Horn of Africa, and Afghanistan, appeared, in American eyes, ´tente. Another cause was that the superpower to violate the spirit of De ´tente was a global process, in which numerous interests came into play, De many of which exacerbated conﬂict rather than alleviated it. One aspect that received considerable attention during this time was that of the military balance between the two powers. During 1976–80, critics of De´tente came to see the military balance as shifting dangerously in favor of the Soviet Union. These critics saw a link between the large-scale Soviet military buildup and the greater willingness on Moscow’s part to use force, both directly and indirectly, in the Third World. They saw this increased military capability as a means for the Soviet Union to achieve global hegemony, at the expense of the United States. These critics did not go unanswered. Analysts and commentators both within and outside of government challenged the view that the Soviet Union was overtaking the United States in terms of military power. However, the critics, who included such prominent individuals as Paul Nitze, who had more than 25 years experience in ofﬁcial national security positions, were able to convince both elite and public opinion of an increasing Soviet threat. It was this debate, on the perception of the superpower military balance, that came to be so prominent during this time. The period 1980– 85, which saw a resurgence of US–Soviet confrontation, witnessed the implementation of many of the hawks’ arguments in American foreign and defense policy. The historiography of this period makes considerable mention of the importance the military balance—or the perception of it—had on the

2

Introduction

shaping of events. Generally, the historiography can be divided into two categories: the work of analysts writing during the period and that of historians writing since the end of the Cold War. In the ﬁrst category are those like Fred Halliday, who devoted a chapter of his book on superpower relations in the 1970s and 1980s to what he termed ‘‘The Decline of US Military Superiority.’’1 Halliday viewed the military aspect as implicitly linked to other developments during the 1970s: [T]he US military programmes of the Second Cold War period reﬂect the combination of three interrelated considerations: an attempt to lengthen once again the quantitative gap between US and Soviet capabilities; a desire to take advantage of the opportunities for greater superiority opened up by new technological developments to develop a war-winning capacity; and anxiety at the manner in which the erosion of the US military superiority had led to the emergence of challenges to US policy in the world at large. (My italics)2 Halliday went on to note that ‘‘on its own the arms race would not have precipitated the Second Cold War: that developed only out of the combination of the shift in the military balance with other developments that compounded US alarm at the change in the military sphere.’’3 For political scientist John G. Stoessinger, the perceptions of individual leaders also played an important role in the shift in superpower relations. This was particularly true of Ronald Reagan, who came to the Presidency with a view of the Soviet Union not only as an ‘‘evil empire’’ but as posing an immediate danger to the United States and its allies across the globe. The result, according to Stoessinger, was that ‘‘Under the ﬁrst term of Ronald Reagan’s presidency, the Soviet–American relationship deteriorated to a level not seen since the days of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.’’4 The military programs pursued by the United States during this time—particularly the deployment of Pershing and Cruise missiles in Europe, the MX ICBM, and the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)—were reﬂective of this climate of mutual distrust and hostility.5 Writing in 1988, very soon after the events of the period in question, John Newhouse saw the resurgence of the Right in American domestic politics and the Carter Administration’s inconsistencies, including its sidelining of prominent hawks like Nitze, as leading to a rejection of the De´tente process.6 For the post–Cold War historians, there is some similarity to the analyses of those writing in the 1980s, although with a broader examination of the debates that took place. Richard Crockatt points out that the very real increases in Soviet military capabilities led to a debate between alarmists who saw such advances as being part of an expansionist strategy on the part of the Soviet Union and those who saw such capabilities as more defensive in nature. As Crockatt states, ‘‘Soviet policy

Introduction

3

may have been reactive, though none the less threatening to Western observers for that, since the Soviet Union’s capacity to react effectively was greatly enhanced.’’7 As Odd Arne Westad notes regarding American perceptions of arms control and Soviet policy during the Carter years: . . . the main issue was an increasing suspicion that SALT served as a smokescreen for Soviet expansion in Asia and Africa . . . It was the soothing part of a global strategy, in which the Soviet Union was out to replace the United States as the dominant world power. The American response was to set up a more powerful form of containment and more effective global competition for inﬂuence.8 However, some interpretations during the 1990s have questioned the nature of developments in US–Soviet relations in the 1970s and 1980s. Olav Njolstad argues that the Carter Administration’s approach to arms control, and its view of the SALT process as being the sine qua non of De´tente, helped lead to its collapse, as it excluded other issues, particularly US–Soviet competition in the Third World.9 According to Njolstad, ‘‘in spite of a decade of arms control, the ideological-political and geopolitical competition between the superpowers had become more intense. This perception, which seems even more accurate in retrospect, ´tente.’’10 was like a suicide pill for de Although these and other histories of the period take into account the role of the military balance, their broad subject matter (the Cold War, US–Soviet relations) prevents them from making a more in-depth analysis of the subject. Many analyses of the military balance tend to reﬂect capabilities, rather than perceptions of intentions that would accrue from the possession of such capabilities, held by the Soviet Union vis-a`vis the United States. Although American perceptions of the military balance were by no means the only explanation for the shift in superpower relations in the 1970s and 1980s, they played a signiﬁcant role in effecting this shift. From 1976, the debate over US–Soviet relations increasingly came to be seen in terms of the military balance between the two countries. The increasing emphasis on the geopolitical balance and arms control reﬂected back into this debate. Soviet ‘‘gains’’ in the Horn of Africa and the debate over SALT II involved considerable analyses of Soviet military effectiveness, and the danger it posed, to the United States. The importance of this debate was evidenced by the rise of numerous groups in the United States dedicated to shaping both elite and public opinion on their view of the Soviet threat. The Committee on the Present Danger (CPD), founded in November 1976, was the best known and most active of these. Increasingly, these organizations took center stage in debates on American foreign policy, with which of course defense policy was closely linked. Their central message was that the

4

Introduction

Soviet Union was in the process of overtaking the United States in terms of overall military capability and that it could, within a few years, achieve its geopolitical goals at the expense of the United States. The only counter was a major American buildup. Arms control, a linchpin of superpower De´tente, was seen as unsatisfactory or even dangerous for the United States to pursue at the time. Much of this held true for the Reagan Administration between 1981 and 1985, as many of its top ofﬁcials were drawn from groups like the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD). There had, of course, been earlier eras in which the public mood had been affected by such calls for increased preparedness, but the 1970s differed from these in a very important way. At the time of the ‘‘First’’ Cold War in the late 1940s, Soviet ideology was seen as the primary danger, backed up by military might. The devastation of the Second World War, and the role of Communist parties in the resistance to Nazi occupation in many West European countries, meant that the Soviet Union had potential ideological allies who could subvert Western governments from within. American military power was seen as containing Soviet military power in Eastern Europe while helping maintain stability in the West. In the 1970s, on the contrary, Soviet ideological appeal was ebbing. The rise of ‘‘Eurocommunism’’ meant that the signiﬁcantly weakened and divided Western Communist parties became even less afﬁliated with Moscow. Even in the Third World, it was challenged by Chinese Communism and even by Cuba, which conducted several interventions in Africa during this time. The main danger from the Soviet Union lay, it appeared, in its military capacity, as well as the reductions in US defense spending and force posture in the aftermath of the Vietnam War. For proponents of the Soviet threat, the danger was that Moscow might be tempted to risk war if it believed it could succeed in achieving its aims. The lack of other ﬁelds of competition, most notably economic and ideological, meant that the danger of a Soviet resort to military means was heightened. From the Americans’ point of view, the Soviet military buildup was tailored to such a policy. Four key areas of concern presented themselves. First, the Soviet strategic buildup, which had been underway since the 1960s, began to bear fruit. Soviet nuclear forces, it now appeared, were able to carry out operations against US strategic forces that could enable the USSR to prevail in a nuclear exchange. As strategic forces were the centerpiece of the military balance, such a radical shift was seen as dangerously destabilizing. Second, the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies had vastly increased the capabilities of their conventional forces in Europe, where the USSR had deployed the SS-20 ballistic missile, representing a vast improvement to Soviet intermediate-range nuclear forces. These developments appeared to herald a shift in the European balance, causing

Introduction

5

unfavorable geopolitical changes for the United States. Third, the vast increase in the size and capability of the Soviet Navy and other power projection forces was seen as an example of Soviet efforts to extend inﬂuence in the Third World. Finally, Soviet military spending had been vastly increased from the 1960s on, whereas that of the United States had been considerably reduced by the mid-1970s. Taken individually, any one of these developments would have been worrisome. As these took place simultaneously, they were a cause for considerable alarm. This was exacerbated by the fact that US military power had declined considerably since the early 1970s. The war in Vietnam and subsequent budget cuts had considerably reduced funding for strategic and European-based forces. Moreover, the NATO allies had also been reducing defense spending, in part due to the 1973 oil crisis. US power projection forces also shrank, with major reductions in naval ship levels. Soviet interventions—along with those of proxies like Cuba—in Angola and the Horn of Africa, followed by the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, were attributed by many in the United States to the growing imbalance of military power and a resultant willingness of the Soviet leadership to use force. These perceptions were shaped by what was known—and not known—about Soviet military power as well as the political and economic systems that shaped it. Interestingly, much was known about the USSR’s armed forces. The performance of weapon systems, for example, was often gleaned by NATO observers, particularly those monitoring Soviet exercises under the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) agreements.11 Soviet naval exercises also yielded much useful information to Western nations, whose forces monitored these maneuvers. Soviet weapons captured by the Israelis were carefully examined by US intelligence. A sophisticated network of US listening stations was able to determine the characteristics of Soviet ballistic missiles during tests. The US intelligence community annually submitted detailed reports on numerous facets of the Soviet military effort, including strategic forces, forces in Central Europe, and naval deployments. Even military expenditures, perhaps the most difﬁcult aspect of the military balance to ascertain, were scrupulously examined, with such minutiae as inﬂation and pricing in the Soviet Union included. Nor was such knowledge limited to a small, elite circle of decision makers. Numerous publications, from ofﬁcial reports to books by military analysts, were readily available to the American public. The Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff published detailed annual reports to Congress. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, numerous volumes examining the superpower military balance were also published, in a variety of formats and with sometimes widely differing views.12 This applied to Soviet strategic and tactical precepts. To no

6

Introduction

small degree, such analyses were based on Soviet military writings and journals, which provided much useful information on military doctrine. Although much was known about Soviet military capabilities and strategy, there were some signiﬁcant points of disagreement between analysts on this subject—disagreements that helped to underpin much of the debate on the military balance during the 1970s and 1980s. The ability of the Soviet armed forces to achieve what many alarmists feared—a coordinated strategic strike against the United States, a blitzkrieg into NATO Europe, a successful thrust into the Persian Gulf, or a sustained naval conﬂict with the United States—was a source of contention. Non-alarmists like Andrew Cockburn noted many facets of the Soviet military system hindering such capabilities: an ofﬁcer class far more interested in intrigue and personal gain than professionalism; a conscript military rife with drunkenness and ethnic tensions; rigid tactical precepts that ensured inﬂexibility in operations; unrealistic training; and the design of Soviet weapons, which led to unreliability and often outright inferiority to their Western counterparts. Those on the other side of the debate, like Edward Luttwak, noted the ability of the Soviet forces to carry out world-wide operations in peacetime as well as the success of daring Soviet operations in Afghanistan in 1979 and the numerical superiority enjoyed by the USSR in areas of vital interest to the United States, particularly Central Europe.13 As for incompetence and disaffection, Luttwak noted similar problems in all military forces, particularly regarding errors in maintenance and the incompetence of personnel, not to mention the experience the USSR had in maintaining large, ethnically diverse armed forces.14 Luttwak also noted the improvements in Soviet weaponry, and the fact that these were being produced in much greater numbers than their Western counterparts.15 A more important source of contention was over what the Soviets intended to use their armed forces for. In other words, was the Soviet leadership acquiring what appeared to be a vastly increased military capability for defensive purposes to counter the threat from the United States and its NATO allies in the West and from China in the East? Or was it doing so in order to achieve geopolitical hegemony, at the expense of the United States, whose own military capabilities appeared to have declined between 1968 and 1975? This debate began in earnest late in 1976, when, in response to criticisms of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimates of Soviet strategic capabilities, a panel of outside analysts, known as ‘‘Team B,’’ carried out a study of the estimate process. ‘‘Team B’’ was critical of the CIA’s efforts on the grounds that they did not take into account Soviet ideological and strategic objectives. The members of ‘‘Team B’’ included those like Richard Pipes, former director of the Russian Research Center at Harvard, and Paul Nitze, who had served as a member of the US SALT delegation in the early 1970s. They, and their colleagues, saw the Soviet buildup from the mid-1960s

Introduction

7

on as an indication of an effort by the Soviet Union to achieve global hegemony by establishing military superiority over the United States and its allies. This was noted prominently in their report: Team ‘‘B’’ agreed that all the evidence points to an undeviating Soviet commitment to what is euphemistically called ‘‘the worldwide triumph of socialism’’ but in fact connotes global Soviet hegemony . . . ´tente) is a ‘‘Peaceful coexistence’’ (better known in the West as de grand strategy adapted to the age of nuclear weapons. It entails a twin thrust: (1) stress on all sorts of political, economic, ideological, and other non-military instrumentalities to penetrate and weaken the ‘‘capitalist’’ zone . . . and (2) an intense military buildup in nuclear as well as conventional forces of all sorts, not moderated either by the West’s self-imposed restraints or by SALT.16 In speciﬁcally military terms, the authors noted, Team ‘‘B’’ feels the USSR strives for effective strategic superiority in all the branches of the military, nuclear forces included. For historic reasons, as well as for reasons inherent in the Soviet system, the Soviet leadership places unusual reliance on coercion as a regular instrument of policy . . . It likes to have a great deal of coercive capability at its disposal at all times, and it likes for it to come in a rich mix so that it can be optimally structured for any contingency that may arise. (Italics in original.)17 The ‘‘Team B’’ report was leaked to the press soon after it was issued in November 1976, the same month that the CPD was formed. Its members included Pipes, Nitze, and others who had been on ‘‘Team B,’’ and their public papers strongly resembled their views of Soviet military power and geopolitical ambitions as stated in the ‘‘Team B’’ report. In their initial paper, ‘‘Common Sense and the Common Danger,’’ published in November 1976, the CPD unambiguously described what it saw as the threat posed by the Soviet Union: The principal threat to our nation, to world peace, and to the cause of human freedom is the Soviet drive for dominance based upon an unparalleled military buildup . . . For more than a decade, the Soviet Union has been enlarging and improving both its strategic and its conventional military forces far more rapidly than the United States and its allies. Soviet military power and its rate of growth cannot be explained or justiﬁed by considerations of self-defense. The Soviet Union is consciously seeking what its spokesmen call ‘‘visible preponderance’’ for the Soviet sphere. Such preponderance, they

8

Introduction explain, will permit the Soviet Union ‘‘to transform the conditions of world politics’’ and determine the direction of its development.18

These themes would set the tone for the argument of the alarmist camp over the next decade. The crises of the late 1970s, including those in the Horn of Africa and Afghanistan, intensiﬁed the concerns of alarmists. Writing in 1980, Edward Luttwak saw the combination of several factors as heightening the possibility of superpower conﬂict during the next few years: the fact that Western nations, led by the United States, would close the gap in military power by the mid-1980s (based on the 3 percent increase in defense spending by NATO from 1978); the worsening state of the Soviet economy, which could lead Soviet leaders to make hard choices between reductions in military spending and the use of their military power to achieve geopolitical goals in a narrowing period of opportunity; and the growing operational conﬁdence in Soviet military capacity by the leadership, which could make it less averse to risking war.19 On the other side of the debate were the non-alarmists, who emphasized a sense of insecurity on the part of the Soviet leadership as being the key element in the Soviet buildup. The Center for Defense Information (CDI), a liberal research center, noted in a May 1976 report that ‘‘It is the Soviet Union, particularly since the Sino-Soviet split, that has found itself in a ‘Fortress Russia’ position. Soviet geographic vulnerabilities are striking and contribute to what [former Director of Central Intelligence] William Colby has called ‘a national historical ﬁxation on the problem of invasion.’ ’’20 The same report also cited the Soviets’ perception of the buildup of forces in Europe and Asia: NATO has improved also. Undoubtedly a number of factors are involved, including instabilities in Eastern Europe. The perceived threat from China probably has created a generalized heightened Soviet sense of insecurity. The Soviet build-up in the east and in the west may be related, rather than separate as described by the Defense Department.21 Writing in 1983, Andrew Cockburn noted similar difﬁculties for the Soviets. ‘‘The Soviet leadership is all to conscious of the fact that the United States and its allies face only one threat—the USSR—while the Soviet Union, on the other hand, must consider a series of threats.’’22 He then gave a detailed description of this situation while emphasizing the threat of US and Allied nuclear forces: On their immediate western national border, a number of subservient states are nominally under their control but wracked by internal dissent. Outside these states lies the ring of unfriendly powers armed with nuclear weapons. Not only do the British,

Introduction

9

French and Chinese maintain bombers and missiles that can reach the territory of the USSR, but there are also American-made nuclear weapons under the partial control of Belgian, Dutch, West German, Italian, Greek and Turkish forces. Beyond this threat to the homeland from bordering states, the Russian contemplate four American ﬂeets: one in the North Atlantic, one in the Mediterranean, and two in the Paciﬁc. Each ﬂeet has aircraft carriers with nuclear bombers on board . . . They see an American buildup in the Indian Ocean. The island of Diego Garcia is prepared for a squadron of B-52 nuclear bombers, and already an American carrier task force with nuclear bombers capable of reaching the southern Soviet Union is permanently based in the Indian Ocean.23 Cockburn also noted the far smaller gross national product (GNP) of the Soviet Union (reckoned to be just two- thirds that of the United States at the time) and ‘‘the Soviets’ sense of competing on unequal terms with the United States . . . as a backward society against the world’s most advanced economies’’ in his assessment of the balance of military power and perceptions of it.24 Some critics also took issue with the alarmists’ view of Soviet strategic precepts, which were alleged to betoken an emphasis on victory in a war involving strategic nuclear forces. Fred Kaplan, who served as defense policy adviser to US Representative Les Aspin, wrote in 1980 that ‘‘The Soviets have obviously been inﬂuenced by Clausewitz; but this means only that they see the nature and intensity of war as being determined by political factors, and since nobody has ﬁgured out any political goal for which the Soviets might be willing to risk a nuclear holocaust, the Clausewitz connection can hardly be seen as horrifying or as inimical to the prospects of deterrence.’’25 In his conclusion, Kaplan noted that while the USSR is modernizing its military capabilities—and doing some things earlier and more quickly than the U.S. had anticipated a few years ago—this build-up does not and will not, for the foreseeable future, jeopardize the United States’ ability to respond ﬂexibly and selectively, or all-out, to Soviet nuclear strikes. Nor is there any credible evidence that the USSR could . . . utilize the nuclear arsenal in campaigns of political intimidation or coercion—no more so now, or in the near future, than either side has been able to do since the early 1960s. (Italics in original.)26 Beyond the perceptions of the differing camps, which were based on what was known—or believed—about the military balance at the time, is the fact that, despite the wealth of information that was to be had on

10

Introduction

Soviet weapons and strategy, there was nonetheless a good deal that was not known about Soviet capabilities. Precisely how much equipment was being produced, for example, was at times a guessing game. The actual number of Soviet ICBMs produced each year was difﬁcult to verify. Therefore, analysts counted ICBM silos, as these weapons needed silos for deployment, and thus a relatively accurate estimate of deployed ICBMs could be made.27 Similarly, as the debate over Soviet strategic objectives between alarmists and non- alarmists indicates, the purpose behind the Soviet buildup often depended upon whose sources one believed. Although Soviet strategists planned for offensive action in the event of war and the Soviet armed forces were vastly increased, Soviet leaders openly stated that war—particularly nuclear war—had to be avoided. Not surprisingly, each camp in the debate had its own interpretations of these contradictory facets of the Soviet leadership. An analysis of American perceptions of the superpower military balance is a major part of understanding the history of this era of the Cold War. The course of the struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union came to be shaped, to a signiﬁcant degree, by this issue, not only to 1985 but beyond. The massive US military buildup of the 1980s was shaped by the debates of the 1970s on the military balance. This buildup played a signiﬁcant role in forcing the Soviet Union, from 1985 onward, to reorient its foreign and defense policies away from confrontation and an emphasis on offensive action to one of co-operation and a defensive military posture. The costs of renewed confrontation also helped force the USSR into a decline that ended with its collapse in 1991. The Soviet economy, under growing strain since the mid-1970s, was unable to sustain the effort needed to match the vastly expanded American defense buildup. The key areas of concern in the debates were strategic nuclear forces, the balance in Europe, naval power and power projection, and defense spending. This study will examine each of these issues, including the sub-issues within them, to present a detailed view of this subject. The focus will be on the debates that took place regarding these issues and on how they came to shape events. It will avoid the use of hindsight— unavailable to those engaged in debates and decision-making at the time—so as to replicate a feel for the tenor of the times. Developments during the period will be analyzed in relation to the debates taking place, so as to show how perceptions were shaped by events, and vice versa. In discussing military terminology and weapon systems, explanations of capabilities will be included, and technical terms will likewise be deﬁned. Additionally, the various points of view will be deﬁned in terms of the capacity of those holding them. That is to say, the ofﬁcial views of Secretaries of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be discussed separately from the views of members of the CPD as private citizens.

Introduction

11

Furthermore, the positions of alarmists, or ‘‘hawks,’’ as opposed to nonalarmists or ‘‘doves,’’ will be analyzed independently of each other, in order for the reader to gain a ﬁrm understanding of the positions held by these groups. Comparisons, however, will be made when necessary, as when speciﬁc arguments by one camp were matched by the other.

Part I

Strategic forces

1

The counterforce doctrine

The 1970s witnessed two important shifts in American nuclear strategy. First, whereas earlier doctrines—most notably ‘‘Massive Retaliation’’ in the 1950s and the theory of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) of the 1960s—stressed an all-out response by US nuclear forces against the Soviet Union if nuclear war erupted, the strategies of the 1970s stressed the need for a more limited use of nuclear weapons, tailored to the particular scenario at hand. Second, the emphasis on which targets to attack also shifted. The MAD theory of the 1960s had emphasized inﬂicting considerable damage on Soviet population and industry as the cornerstone of American deterrent policy, with considerably less emphasis on Soviet political and military targets per se. This emphasis on countervalue (targeting an enemy’s means of economic and societal cohesion) shifted to counterforce (targeting an enemy’s armed forces, with considerable emphasis on his nuclear forces). There were several reasons for this shift. The technological developments of the 1960s, most particularly the multiple, independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV), combined with vastly improved guidance for ballistic missiles, began to make themselves felt during the 1970s. These developments gave strategists and statesmen the ability to adapt more ﬂexible nuclear postures, which could be critical during a superpower crisis. The massive build-up of Soviet strategic forces from 1965 meant that the credibility of MAD was questionable in the face of Soviet nuclear forces that were now more numerous, sophisticated, and ﬂexible. A strategy aimed at reducing this threat in the event of hostilities, and of limiting damage to the United States while maintaining the credibility of the US nuclear deterrent for its allies abroad, appeared to be in order.

The development of ‘‘Limited Nuclear Options,’’ 1974–77 The idea of using nuclear forces to reduce an enemy’s military capabilities had existed prior to the 1970s. During the Kennedy Administration, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara had explored

16

Strategic forces

counterforce ideas in American nuclear planning. In his review of the US nuclear war plan, the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP, adopted in 1960), he made a considerable effort to establish a more selective approach to nuclear war. The new SIOP, approved in January 1962, incorporated such features as the ability to selectively attack Soviet nuclear forces, maintain a reserve of nuclear weapons for later use, and the ability to strike or withhold attacks on Soviet command-and-control centers.1 In June of that year, McNamara spoke at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor, where he declared that ‘‘nuclear war should be approached in much the same way that more conventional military operations have been regarded in the past.’’ McNamara soon shifted nuclear planning away from this, most notably due to the need for far higher numbers of missiles and bombers to carry out such a strategy (above what McNamara had planned for the US strategic forces).2 Although some ﬂexibility would remain in US nuclear war plans, the primary emphasis shifted to a countervalue posture. The developments of the 1960s discussed earlier, and the achievement of nuclear parity by the Soviet Union in the latter part of the decade, led to a reassessment of American nuclear strategy. The Nixon Administration, upon taking ofﬁce in 1969, publicly emphasized a policy of ‘‘sufﬁciency’’ regarding the strategic balance. The US ‘‘triad’’ of nuclear delivery systems (land-based ICBMs, ballistic-missile submarines, and long-range bombers) was, in quantity at least, enough to ensure deterrence of the Soviet Union at this level. However, the increasing numbers of Soviet missiles, together with improved range and accuracy, appeared to undermine the essence of MAD. After all, the Soviets could have the capability, as the 1970s wore on, of exercising counterforce options that could threaten US deterrent forces and could also ‘‘decouple’’ such areas of vital American interest as Europe through the threat—actual or implied—to use such forces if the United States was to use nuclear weapons to defend its allies. Furthermore, if a nuclear war were to break out, the options for the United States might be very narrow. President Nixon summed up the difﬁculty of MAD— and the need for ﬂexibility—in 1970: In its broader political sense, sufﬁciency means the maintenance of forces adequate to prevent us and our allies from being coerced. Thus the relationship between our strategic forces and those of the Soviet Union must be such that our ability and resolve to protect our vital security interests will not be underestimated. I must not be-and my successors must not be-limited to the indiscriminate destruction of enemy civilians as the sole response to challenges . . . It would be inconsistent with the political meaning of sufﬁciency to base our force planning solely on some ﬁnite-and theoretical-capacity to inﬂict casualties presumed to be unacceptable to the other side.3

The counterforce doctrine

17

Nixon’s concerns led to action regarding nuclear planning. In April 1971, the National Security Council initiated a ‘‘Strategic Objectives Study’’; the following year, an interdepartmental group was established, led by National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger, that studied a number of limited nuclear options. These included warnings using small numbers of weapons, limited strikes, and the threat of a Soviet counterforce attack on US ICBMs.4 These efforts resulted in National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 169, issued on February 13, 1973. It called for a review of US nuclear policy, which would ‘‘embrace all U.S. nuclear forces, including strategic, theatre, and tactical.’’5 The review that emerged from NSSM 169 was National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 242, issued on January 17, 1974. It was this document that would become the basis for US strategic planning for the next 6 years. In approving NSDM 242, President Nixon emphasized the continuity in US strategy, echoing the counterforce emphasis of McNamara more than a decade earlier. ‘‘These decisions do not constitute a major new departure in U.S. nuclear strategy; rather, they are an elaboration of existing policy. The decisions reﬂect both existing political and military realities and my desire for a more ﬂexible nuclear posture.’’6 While stating that deterrence remained the priority of US nuclear forces, NSDM 242 stated that, should deterrence fail, the primary objective would be ‘‘to seek early war termination, on terms acceptable to the United States and its allies, at the lowest level of conﬂict possible. This objective requires planning a whole range of limited nuclear employment options which could be used in conjunction with supporting political and military measures (including conventional forces) to control escalation.’’7 Most important as far as strategic planning was concerned, NSDM 242 called for plans: in which the level, scope, and duration of violence is limited in a manner which can be clearly and credibly communicated to the enemy. The options should (a) hold some vital enemy targets hostage to subsequent destruction by survivable nuclear forces, and (b) permit control over the timing and place of attack execution, in order to provide the enemy opportunities to reconsider his actions.8 It is in this passage that the shift can be seen from the prevalent MAD strategy of the 1960s. Holding ‘‘vital enemy targets hostage’’ could include major cities, even Moscow, which most certainly would have been hit by US forces operating under an assured destruction posture. Moreover, MAD was meant to communicate American intentions in the event of nuclear war simply through its execution, in that utter devastation would befall the Soviet Union if it decided to wage a general

18

Strategic forces

nuclear war with the United States. With the ﬂexible options described by NSDM 242, actions taken during a nuclear war could send a signal to the Soviet leadership regarding the cost of their actions and whether they should be pursued. This idea, known as intra-war deterrence, either could cause the Soviets to terminate hostilities or, failing that, would provide forces available to attack a set of Soviet targets withheld from earlier strikes. To facilitate the identiﬁcation of such targets to be attacked or withheld in these options, NSDM 242 directed the Defense Department to establish the Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy (NUWEP). Authorized by Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger on April 4, 1974, this policy, known as NUWEP-1, provided the operational basis for NSDM 242.9 A key objective of NUWEP-1 was the ability of US strategic forces to destroy some 70 percent of Soviet industry that would be needed for postwar recovery.10 This would satisfy NSDM 242’s guidelines about ‘‘holding enemy targets hostage,’’ as attacks on Soviet economic assets would seriously and adversely affect the USSR’s ability to maintain cohesion in the aftermath of a nuclear exchange. In a question-and-answer session with members of the press at the Overseas Writers luncheon, Schlesinger noted a link between the procurement of advanced strategic systems to support the strategy and progress in the SALT negotiations, which would limit the future size of US strategic forces. ‘‘If they [the Soviets] insist on racing,’’ referring to the improvements in the USSR’s strategic capabilities, ‘‘we are prepared to match them.’’11 In Congressional testimony, Schlesinger noted the purpose of the new strategy; to deter the Soviets from the use of nuclear forces in a counterforce role. ‘‘We have no desire to develop a unilateral counterforce capability against the Soviet Union . . . What we wish to avoid is the Soviet Union having a counterforce capability against the United States without our being able to have a comparable capability’’ (My italics).12 Schlesinger later deﬁned the new strategy in terms that would remain its basis for the rest of the decade. ‘‘What we are trying to do is to place ourselves in a position where we are able to respond to every level of attack, not necessarily by going into a major counterforce strike.’’13 In examining Soviet capabilities, Schlesinger warned that from 1975 the USSR would probably begin to add MIRVed warheads to around 200 ICBMs per year. This would mean that, by 1981–82, the Soviets would have deployed some 7,000 MIRVs.14 Such a force would give the Soviet Union a counterforce capability against US strategic forces. In a letter to Senator Edward Brooke, President Ford reiterated Schlesinger’s views of the new strategy as a means of strengthening deterrence: As improved command and control and newer systems permit, we are increasing the ﬂexibility of our forces to be more fully prepared

The counterforce doctrine

19

for all possible contingencies. Because ﬂexible options will increase the credibility of our deterrent, they will help to decrease the chance of a conﬂict starting in the ﬁrst place.15 The idea of extended deterrence—of using American nuclear forces to support conventional forces in defense of allied states and areas of vital interest—also received emphasis. By coupling the strategic deterrent to theatre and conventional forces, NSDM 242 reafﬁrmed NATO strategy regarding ﬁrst use of nuclear weapons to deter a Soviet conventional assault in Europe. MC 14/3, approved by the Alliance in December 1967, speciﬁcally called for ‘‘deliberate escalation,’’ ‘‘to defeat aggression by . . . where possible controlling, the scope and intensity of combat, making the cost and the risk disproportionate to the aggressor’s objectives and the threat of nuclear response progressively more imminent.’’16 Thus, extended deterrence reafﬁrmed the US commitment to the defense of Europe.17 This did not, however, mark a return to the pre–McNamara era of ‘‘Massive Retaliation,’’ in which nuclear weapons would be a weapon of ﬁrst resort. In her study of American counterforce planning in the 1970s, Lynn Etheridge Davis noted, American analysts did not believe that the limited ﬁrst use of nuclear weapons could or should take the place of a defence based initially on a conventional response: in the long term the United States would seek to deploy conventional forces to deter enemy conventional attacks . . . Nuclear weapons would only be used following the outbreak of hostilities.18 This did not, however, mean that the United States would be deterred from the ﬁrst use of nuclear weapons outside the NATO area. As Davis points out, the counterforce strategy set out by NSDM 242 ‘‘left open the possibility that the United States would plan for the limited ﬁrst use of nuclear weapons throughout the world’’ and that ‘‘The enemy could never be conﬁdent that the United States would not respond with nuclear weapons to the use of military force anywhere in the world.’’ (My Italics)19 Experts on the subject of strategic nuclear forces came to view the shift from MAD to this more reﬁned approach as representing a response to the shift in the strategic balance during this time. As Davis points out, American analysts held a general assumption: if the Soviet Union had the capability for limited use of nuclear weapons, the United States needed it too. Flexibility could force the enemy to abandon actions that assumed an American response of ‘nothing’ rather than ‘all.’20

20

Strategic forces

Colin S. Gray, a consultant at the Hudson Institute, noted that nuclear strategy was shaped to a considerable extent by the existence of weapons that had been developed earlier but lacked a clear strategic rationale at the time of deployment. He also noted ‘‘that strategic doctrine does inﬂuence the selection of weapon systems, the way in which the arms race is conducted and the determination of arms control policies.’’21 In the context of the 1970s, the development of new strategic systems like MIRV, improvements in missile guidance, and other technological advancements helped to shape US nuclear strategy. Although NSSM 169 and NSDM 242 were created by the National Security Council, the responsibility for the further reﬁnement and implementation of the counterforce strategies outlined in these documents rested with Secretary of Defense Schlesinger. The adaptation of Limited Nuclear Options (LNO) would be a key feature of his tenure at the Pentagon (1973–75). Indeed, the cumulative countervailing strategy adopted between 1974 and 1977 came to be known as the ‘‘Schlesinger Doctrine.’’ In his annual report to Congress for Fiscal Year 1975, Schlesinger pointed out that earlier US counterforce strategies had ‘‘all involved large numbers of weapons,’’22 which did not appear to be in tune with the development of LNOs and selective use of weapons for such purposes as demonstration effect. Schlesinger continued his analysis by stating What we need is a series of measured responses to aggression which bear some relation to the provocation, have prospects of terminating hostilities before general nuclear war breaks out, and leave some possibility for restoring deterrence . . . In other words, to be credible, and hence effective over the range of possible contingencies, deterrence must rest on many options and on a spectrum of capabilities . . . to support these options.23 In summing up the need for ﬂexible options for the US strategic forces, Schlesinger pointed out what he sought to avoid through a strategy incorporating such options: We do not propose to let an opponent threaten a major component of our forces without our being able to pose a comparable threat. We do not propose to let an enemy put us in a position where we are left with no more than a capability to hold his cities hostage after the ﬁrst phase of a nuclear conﬂict. And certainly we do not propose to see an enemy threaten one or more of our allies with his nuclear capabilities in the expectation that we would lack the ﬂexibility and resolve to strike back at his assets . . . in such a way as to make his effort both high in cost and ultimately unsuccessful.24

The counterforce doctrine

21

The following year, Schlesinger addressed critics of the new emphasis on ‘‘warﬁghting rather than deterrence,’’ as he put it: Our objective remains deterrence, but modern deterrence across the spectrum of the nuclear threat. And that requires us to be prepared with credible responses to a variety of contingencies. Considering all the risks associated with the use of nuclear weapons, this kind of preparation does not in any way imply an effort to substitute limited nuclear response options for other instruments of military power.25 John B. Walsh, Deputy Director for Strategic and Space systems in the Ofﬁce of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, testiﬁed before the Senate Armed Services Committee in 1976 that In attempting to retaliate for an attempted disarming ﬁrst strike, one possibility, of course, is that of wiping out the Soviet Union. However, I think that a better way of responding is to wipe out what forces he holds back—his remaining blackmail capability—and, hence leave him in a position where he is worse off having executed the strike then not having executed it. If he is worse off doing it, he is not likely to do it.26 To make US strategic forces more capable of carrying out these missions, Schlesinger asked Congress to help fund programs that would be of vital importance for carrying out counterforce missions. Most important of these were hard-target kill capabilities27—meaning the ability to attack and destroy hardened Soviet ICBM silos and command-andcontrol centers—including improved warhead yield and accuracy and command-and-control.28 Documents classiﬁed at the time concur with Schlesinger’s views. A RAND Corporation report from October 1975 noted the importance of ICBMs in carrying out such strategies: ‘‘We believe that ICBMs possess and promise more of the desired attributes for LSOs than any other strategic force element. If LSOs are a special role for ICBMs, the principal concerns will be to ensure effective and ﬂexible targeting with minimum collateral damage.’’29 Schlesinger’s successor, Donald Rumsfeld, continued LNO development. In his ﬁrst report to Congress, Rumsfeld described the need for ﬂexible targeting options and the dangers of relying on assured destruction: Although many people suppose that a massive surprise attack against our cities and forces is the only way in which a strategic nuclear exchange might begin, it is only one of a number of possibilities . . . we cannot count on others to refrain from inventing ways

22

Strategic forces to attack a limited but vital set of targets, and we would be foolish indeed not to think of countermeasures that opponents and friends can recognize as plausible and credible. Deterrence is not weakened by ﬂexibility; it is strengthened.30 (My italics)

Rumsfeld also described in greater detail just what military targets would be covered by LNOs and why: Nor should we rule out coverage of some enemy silos, airﬁelds, or submarine bases on a second strike. Contrary to a popular view, many of these targets would remain of interest after an enemy had struck . . . because some of the launch points—bomber bases and certain ICBM silos, for example—could be used to reload . . . offensive forces.31 On January 20, 1977, Ford authorized NSDM 348, ‘‘U.S. Defense Policy and Military Posture.’’ In calling for a strategic balance to be maintained with the Soviet Union, the section addressing strategic forces stated that A range of credible options is thus critical to maintaining deterrence, as well as to escalation control, satisfactory war termination, and postwar recovery. Therefore, the nuclear employment policy directed by NSDM 242 is reafﬁrmed, as ampliﬁed below . . . Our strategic nuclear forces should be capable of meeting targeting requirements against political, economic, and military targets related to postwar recovery: permit ﬂexible response options: and provide a strategic reserve.32 By 1977, LNOs were central to US strategy. As will be seen, Soviet nuclear doctrine, and its own counterforce emphasis, would become a means of both justiﬁcation of US strategy and as a source of peril for the maintenance of a viable US strategic deterrent.

The Carter years—PRM 10 to PD 59, 1977–80 Upon taking ofﬁce in 1977, Jimmy Carter decided to examine existing strategy. In February, Carter authorized the National Security Council (NSC) to undertake a comprehensive study of US foreign and defense policy, including military strategy. The ﬁrst of two parts of the study, known as Presidential Review Memorandum (PRM) 10, would be a comprehensive review of US military strategy. Among the topics to be addressed were ‘‘deterrence at reciprocally lowered strategic levels’’ and the ‘‘viability and desirability of the ‘triad’ posture.’’33 The report, issued in June, posited a series of questions regarding US military posture and

The counterforce doctrine

23

strategy. Question six, ‘‘What constitutes an adequate strategic force posture?’’34 addressed nuclear strategy directly. Four major objectives were outlined by PRM 10 regarding the role of US strategic nuclear forces: Deter nuclear attack on the US, our forces, our allies, and others whose security is important to the US. In conjunction with general purpose and theatre nuclear forces, enhance deterrence on non-nuclear aggression, particularly against NATO and our Asian allies. Should deterrence fail and nuclear conﬂict occur, control escalation, limit damage to the degree possible, and terminate the conﬂict quickly on acceptable terms. If escalation cannot be controlled, obtain the best possible outcome for the US and its allies. Insure that the US, our allies, and others whose security is important to the US can act without intimidation stemming from perceptions that the strategic balance favored or was increasingly favoring the USSR.35 As with previous administrations, deterrence remained at the top of the list of priorities for the strategic forces. Objectives two and three, however, clearly show the inheritance of the Schlesinger Doctrine: the strategic forces would be coupled to US theatre and conventional forces and, implicitly, to US allies; and the need for options less than all-out retaliation. This clearly pointed to the need for a continued reﬁnement of counterforce strategy, given also that weapon developments were continually improving. The authors of PRM 10 were hardly stressing that a limited nuclear exchange would be beneﬁcial to either side, however. In Section II, they noted ‘‘Whichever side initiates a limited nuclear attack against the ICBM forces of the other side will not ﬁnd itself better off in terms of the residual number of ICBMs, ICBM RVs, and throwweight.’’36 The idea behind counterforce was not to prepare to ﬁght a nuclear war to achieve a geopolitical goal but rather to deter the Soviets from attempting to do the same. PRM 10 led to the issues regarding strategic forces being addressed closely by Carter’s Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown. In June 1977, Brown authorized a review, based on PRM 10’s ﬁndings, to be prepared to more fully determine what forces and strategies were needed for the options outlined. In a subsection, ‘‘US Military Strategy for Strategic Forces’’, ﬁve questions were listed. Two of these addressed counterforce issues: ‘‘To what extent should the US acquire an efﬁcient hard-target-kill capability and for what purposes?’’ and ‘‘Should the US acquire forces

24

Strategic forces

for a Strategic Reserve Force, i.e., forces in excess of other requirements . . . in a strategic nuclear war.’’37 Such attention indicated that counterforce strategies were central to the administration’s strategic planning. Two key reasons for this are given by Desmond Ball. ‘‘The arguments for a wide range of nuclear options were now accepted throughout the Pentagon.’’38 An even more important reason was that many of the strategic force requirements of a strategy of controlled, limited, counterforce operations, together with the necessary command and control arrangements, were already emplaced; unless one were persuaded of their counterproductive arms control impact, there would have been little point in dismantling them and denying oneself the potential options and ﬂexibility they allowed.39 PRM 10 led to the drafting of Presidential Directive (PD) 18, issued in August 1977. A key goal of American national security policy was to ‘‘Counterbalance . . . Soviet military power and adverse inﬂuence in key areas, particularly Europe, the Middle East and East Asia.’’40 Soon after, a report was issued covering topics of nuclear strategy in relation to PD 18. It showed a broadening of interest with regard to nuclear forces, as the authors made clear in the introduction: . . . in evaluating employment policy we are concerned not only with the objectives of policy as stated in PD-18 and NSDM-242, but also with the guidance that has been developed to implement policy, and the capabilities . . . that support these plans. It is the interaction between these elements that we will evaluate . . . with particular emphasis on the responsiveness of plans to stated objectives and their feasibility in light of projected capabilities.41 (My italics) During Harold Brown’s tenure, these issues would become interwoven with the overall US strategic posture. PRM 10, PD 18, and associated documents were of course classiﬁed, circulated to a relatively small number of people in the upper echelons of the Carter Administration. In more open and available sources, however, these concerns were also apparent. In his ﬁrst report to Congress in 1978, Secretary Brown stated what should be expected of the strategic forces: Assured destruction cannot be the only response available to the President. We are quite uncertain as to how an adversary with increasingly sophisticated strategic nuclear forces might consider employing them in the event of a deep and desperate crisis . . . As a consequence, we must have the ﬂexibility to respond at a level appropriate to the type and scale of his attack.

The counterforce doctrine

25

As part of that ﬂexibility, we must be able to launch controlled counterattacks against a wide range of targets—including theatre nuclear and conventional forces, lines of communication, war-supporting industry, and targets of increasing hardness: from aircraft runways and nuclear storage sites to command bunkers and ICBM silos. It should be added that a great many of these facilities—including airﬁelds and ICBM silos—could remain priority targets for a second strike. (My italics)42 Brown went further in discussing just what was needed to ensure this. Under the heading ‘‘Capabilities’’, he listed ﬁve key areas needed for a credible nuclear posture. Among these were ‘‘a survivable command, control, and communications (C3) system to select and direct the necessary action.’’43 Also, reserves were needed ‘‘so that we can hold a portion of them in reserve for an indeﬁnite period of time.’’44 The following year, Brown reiterated these themes. ‘‘We must have forces in sufﬁcient numbers and quality so that they can: (1) survive a well-executed surprise attack; (2) react with the timing needed, both as to promptness and endurance, to assure the deliberation and control deemed necessary by the National Command Authorities (NCA); (3) penetrate any enemy defenses; and (4) destroy their designated targets.’’45 Brown also set out what would become the term used to deﬁne the Carter Administration’s policy for strategic forces, the ‘‘Countervailing Strategy.’’ In the 1980 report, the Secretary clearly deﬁned just what was meant in terms of US strategic planning and what would be necessary for this to be feasible: We must also have the redundancy and diversity built into these forces to ensure against the failure of any one component of the capability, to permit the cross-targeting of key enemy facilities, and to complicate the enemy’s defenses as well as his attack . . . To have a true countervailing strategy, our forces must be capable of covering, and being withheld from, a substantial list of targets . . . The necessary forces should be included in whatever requirements we set for a strategic nuclear reserve following initial exchanges.46 The carrying out of these strategies would rest with the US military, and the views of uniformed strategists supported the policies put forward during these years. General George Brown, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) from 1974 to 1978, stated his view clearly. ‘‘Strategic nuclear offensive forces are a critical element in the US deterrent strategy. They must have and be perceived to have the selectivity and ﬂexibility to respond immediately to any level of aggression. They must be ﬂexible

26

Strategic forces

enough to ensure conﬂict termination at the lowest feasible level on terms acceptable to the United States, should deterrence fail.’’47 General Brown reiterated this in his Posture Statement the following year: ‘‘Inherent in this strategy is the need for weapons in sufﬁcient numbers, and of appropriate characteristics, to maintain a stable strategic balance in the face of Soviet technological advances.’’48 The Countervailing Strategy was not simply seen as a means of striking at Soviet forces. From early in the Administration, an emphasis was placed on attacking the means of central political control, as well as the economic production base, of the Soviet Union.49 Some, most notably National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, emphasized a strategy that would see the heaviest casualties inﬂicted upon the Great Russian population, as opposed to other national groups (Ukrainians, Latvians, etc.) to eliminate the effective functioning of the Soviet state.50 In other words, if deterrence failed, the United States would be able to shatter the Soviet Union’s highly centralized system of political and economic control. The Carter Administration concentrated on several key areas to make the Countervailing Strategy more effective. To maintain the United States as a functioning society in the event of a general nuclear war, C3 capabilities were emphasized. PD 53, issued in November 1979, stated that ‘‘It is essential to the security of the United States to have telecommunications facilities adequate to satisfy the needs of the nation during and after any national emergency.’’51 At the top of the list of priorities for telecommunications in such circumstances was listed ‘‘Connectivity between the National Command Authority and strategic and other appropriate forces to support ﬂexible execution of retaliatory strikes during and after an enemy nuclear attack.’’52 This linked strongly to the issue of economic mobilization.53 PD 57, issued in March 1980, stated ‘‘It is of fundamental importance to the national security that the United States maintain the capability to mobilize its national resources in a timely and efﬁcient manner in order to respond effectively to crises that might arise.’’54 The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was directed to ‘‘ensure that all existing and pending Executive Orders pertaining to mobilization are made consistent with this directive.’’55 This was followed in June 1980 by PD 58, meant to preserve the continuity of government in the event of nuclear war. Its particular emphasis was on the National Command Authority (NCA).56 These decisions indicate how detailed counterforce planning had become. Whereas the Schlesinger Doctrine had placed primary emphasis on limited options, the Countervailing Strategy envisioned a full range of objectives for US strategic forces. In his FY 1981 report to Congress, Secretary Brown deﬁned this strategy: These plans should include options to attack the targets that comprise the Soviet military force structure and political power structure, and

The counterforce doctrine

27

to hold back a signiﬁcant reserve. In other words, we must be able to deter Soviet attacks by making it clear to the Kremlin that, after such an attack, we would not be forced to the stark choice of either making no effective military response or totally destroying the Soviet Union. We could instead attack, in a selective and measured way, a range of military, industrial, and political control targets, while retaining an assured destruction capacity in reserve.57 (My italics) All these elements were to be found in the Carter Administration’s next, and best known, strategic directive. Issued on July 25, 1980, PD 59 directed that US strategic forces be prepared to engage in operations against a wide variety of Soviet targets, both military and political, particularly hardened C3 centers. American C3I capabilities would continue to be increased to provide battle damage assessment and more effective targeting of warheads. A secure reserve of strategic weapons would also be available for long-term operations.58 In an introductory note to PD 59, President Carter described what it was meant to accomplish. ‘‘[I]f deterrence fails initially, we must be capable of ﬁghting successfully so that the adversary would not achieve his war aims and would suffer costs that are unacceptable . . . ’’59 The President then outlined the importance of PD 59 in pursuing wartime military objectives: The employment of nuclear forces must be effectively related to operations of our general purpose forces. Our doctrines for the use of forces in nuclear conﬂict must insure that we can pursue speciﬁc policy objectives selected by the National Command Authorities at that time, from general guidelines established in advance. (My italics)60 In his ﬁnal report to Congress in January 1981, Brown listed ﬁve elements of the Countervailing Strategy incorporated into PD 59: ﬂexibility, escalation control, survivability and endurance, targeting objectives, and reserve forces. Under targeting, four categories, listed as follows, were discussed: strategic nuclear forces, other military forces (theatre and conventional), leadership and control, and industrial and economic base.61 In September 1980, Secretary Brown testiﬁed in hearings before the US Senate regarding PD 59. He outlined the importance the strategy had in dissuading the Soviets from contemplating the use of nuclear weapons: PD-59 will not enhance Soviet conﬁdence in predicting what the U.S. response to a limited Soviet attack would be. Rather, it should increase Soviet certainty that there will be a U.S. response—a response that will clearly dispel any illusion that the Soviets might have regarding winning a nuclear war at acceptable, if large, cost.62

28

Strategic forces

Both Brown and Secretary of State Edmund Muskie stressed the enhancement of support of US and Allied forces in NATO Europe63 as well as the relationship of PD 59 to overall US military strategy.64 Thus the concept of Extended Deterrence, deﬁned as ‘‘deterrence of attack against U.S. friends and allies or peripheral U.S. interests,’’ was enshrined in PD 59.65 PD 59 was a culmination of counterforce strategy stretching back to NSDM 242. Where it differed from its predecessors was in its emphasis on attacking Soviet leadership targets, as opposed to the earlier emphasis— most notably during Schlesinger’s term at the Pentagon—on economic targeting.66 In this sense, it was a reﬂection of Brzezinski’s emphasis on ethnic targeting. Brown outlined the importance of this in September 1980: Now, clearly, their industry and their population are important to them, but so are their military forces, so is their political and military control over the elements of Soviet power. We need to be able to show them—and in order to be able to show them we need to have the forces, the doctrine and the command and control that will enable us to do this—that given a nuclear war, whatever it is that the Soviet leadership counts as most important to it, would be threatened and would in an exchange or a series of exchanges be destroyed. (My italics)67 Perhaps as important, if not more so, was that PD 59 emphasized a trend that had been taking shape throughout the Carter years: the emphasis on protracted nuclear war. Whereas earlier strategies had envisioned at most a few days or weeks regarding the length of a general nuclear war between the superpowers, PD 59 emphasized that such a conﬂict could last for several months.68 In order for PD 59 to be implemented, the strategic forces needed to be properly structured to carry out the tasks assigned to them. A number of programs had been underway since the mid-1970s to enhance US counterforce capabilities, and these received considerably greater funding by 1981. Two key areas received attention: the weaponry of the strategic forces and the C3I needed to support them.69 Particular emphasis was placed on upgrading the ICBM force, as its combination of accuracy and readiness meant that it possessed prompt, hard-target kill capability. In other words, American ICBMs were the most effective means of carrying out rapid attacks on Soviet commandand-control centers, ICBM launch centers, and silos where reserve missiles were located. The Minuteman force, most particularly the MIRVed Minuteman IIIs, received considerable attention. Starting in 1980, the Mark 12A warhead was ﬁtted to 300 of these missiles, which

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effectively doubled their explosive yield from 170 kilotons to 335–350 kilotons.70 Additionally, all 550 Minuteman IIIs were ﬁtted with the NS20 guidance system, which increased their accuracy to one-tenth of a mile.71 Against Soviet ICBM silos hardened to withstand roughly 2,000 pounds of overpressure per square inch (psi), this gave the Minuteman IIIs—or at least those ﬁtted with the Mark 12A warhead—a pronounced silo-killing capability needed to carry out the counterforce options enshrined in PD 59.72 With growing concern over the vulnerability of ﬁxed silo ICBMs, development of the mobile MX also continued. Nor was the ICBM force the only leg to receive attention. The bomber force was to receive a considerable boost with the conversion of some 173 B-52G/H bombers to carry the air-launched cruise missile (ALCM), of which nearly 3,400 were to be procured during the 1980s.73 Additionally, 12 Poseidon submarines, each capable of carrying 16 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), were backﬁtted with new Trident I missiles, beginning in October 1979.74 Nine new Trident subs, each with 24 missiles, had received funding authorization by FY 1981.75 The mobile MX, ALCM, and Trident would enable US strategic forces to utilize the ﬂexible targeting packages emphasized by PD 59.76 While strategic delivery systems received considerable attention, US C3I systems were also enhanced. Command-and-control centers were hardened, and mobility was stressed. Furthermore, new reconnaissance systems, mostly satellites, were developed, to enable the NCA to assess damage and targets to be attacked.77 Additionally, improvements to existing warning systems and the addition of a new nuclear detection system, as well as mobile warning stations, were planned.78 Moreover, a ﬂeet of six E-4B command aircraft was the goal set at this time. These included an airborne alert aircraft, the Airborne National Command Post (ABNCP), and a ground alert aircraft, known as the National Emergency Airborne Command Post (NEACP), in which the President would most likely be located in the event of nuclear war.79 The characteristics of the various command aircraft were impressive: Airborne endurance is increased with refuelling, and secure, antijam communications are provided. Key communications improvements will increase reliability and survivability of communications to MINUTEMAN and TITAN wings, to airborne strategic bombers, and to the TACAMO [Take Charge and Move Out—Navy SSBN C3 aircraft] aircraft relaying execution messages to SSBNs. To assure continued operations during nuclear war, the E-4B is hardened against nuclear effects, including electromagnetic pulse (EMP).80 A key inﬂuence on the development of counterforce doctrine throughout this period was the US war plan, the SIOP. By 1974, when NSDM 242 was drafted, more than 25,000 targets had been identiﬁed.81 By 1980, the

30

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war plan, SIOP-5D, contained a staggering 40,000 targets.82 Clearly, a need for target prioritization was in order. US strategic planners had divided the list of targets into four key groups: (1) Soviet nuclear forces (both strategic and theatre), which included launching centers, nuclear weapon storage sites, bomber and other bases for nuclear-capable aircraft, and SSBN bases; (2) conventional forces, including storage depots, tank and vehicle parks, conventional airbases, and marshalling areas; (3) Soviet political and military leadership posts used for C3I; and (4) economic and industrial targets.83 SIOP-5D further listed target ‘‘sets’’ from these groups, which were organized into four general attack options: Major Attack Options (MAO), corresponding to the MAD theories of the 1960s; Selected Attack Options (SAO) and Limited Attack Options (LAO), which allowed for selective attacks on either military or economic targets; Regional Nuclear Options (RNO), for use in support of forces in regional contingencies (e.g., defending NATO Europe from a Soviet invasion).84 This mirrored Harold Brown’s deﬁnition of targeting priorities in PD 59, the basis for the ‘‘Countervailing Strategy.’’ It is important to note that SIOP-5D predated PD 59 by some nine months and that the target list had been increasing steadily. Nor was the SIOP the only plan to be affected by the ‘‘Countervailing Strategy.’’ Among the provisions of PD 59 was the drafting of a revised Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy, which became known as NUWEP-2 or NUWEP80. This marked a signiﬁcant shift in emphasis from NUWEP-1, which placed primary emphasis on attacking Soviet industry that could be used for postwar recovery. NUWEP-2 prioritized Soviet military and political targets. Furthermore, Soviet economic targets would be included due to their role in supporting the USSR’s war effort.85 Certainly a purely military strategy existed for the use of the US strategic forces already. What the ofﬁcial adaptation of counterforce strategies from NSDM 242 to the various directives of the Carter Administration culminating in PD 59 indicate is that it became necessary for military strategy to be interwoven with other aspects of US national security policy, which would become the basis for policies regarding foreign affairs and national defense.

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‘‘Diplomacy without arms, said Frederick the Great, is like music without instruments,’’ wrote Michael Howard in 1983, ‘‘and though military instruments unorchestrated by diplomacy produce only a bloody cacophony, their total absence is likely to result in impotent silence.’’86 Howard’s analysis is quite cogent here. A nuclear war plan separate from a geopolitical strategy combining both foreign and defense policy would be capable only of the most general deterrence. The awesome growth of American strategic nuclear potential in the 1970s meant that such a harmonization of strategy and policy was of the utmost importance. Between 1974 and 1980, the United States expanded and reﬁned its counterforce strategy, adding considerably to its strategic forces and drafting plans for their use in the event of war. These efforts were aimed at deterring the Soviet Union, with its vastly expanded strategic capabilities, from utilizing these forces in the event of a crisis to coerce the United States and its allies. Indeed, the need to maintain a ﬂexible military posture was at the center of American efforts during this time. Perceptions of Soviet strategic capabilities, based on what US policymakers and analysts believed about Soviet doctrine and forces, are the subject of the following section.

Counterforce and Soviet strategy: The role of perception The Nixon–Ford years The growth of Soviet strategic capabilities from the mid-1960s on was a worrisome development for US ofﬁcials during the decade of the 1970s. Schlesinger pointed out the implications of the Soviet buildup in 1974: Primarily at issue are the answers to two major questions. To what extent have the Soviets simply responded to and tried to counter U.S. initiatives? And to what extent have they sought (and do they continue to seek) something more ambitious than a capability for second-strike massive retaliation against the United States?87 Schlesinger went on to describe Soviet programs, including additional ICBM throwweight and development of the Backﬁre bomber with at least some long-range capability. He warned that, while it could not be stated absolutely, the Soviet leadership might perceive their growing strategic ` -vis the United States.88 capabilities as giving them a military edge vis-a Donald Rumsfeld shared his predecessor’s view of the Soviet strategic force structure: . . . there is an increasing possibility that major asymmetries will develop between U.S. and Soviet strategic offensive forces . . . and

32

Strategic forces that the Soviet strategic capability will come to be seen as superior to that of the United States.89 If the Soviet strategic posture is already impressive today—in numbers, throw-weight, and survivability—it is becoming even more so in terms of qualitative improvements which are part of the current wave of modernization.90

As for the relationship between Soviet strategy and force deployment, Rumsfeld observed, ‘‘Soviet programs do not reﬂect an interest in deterrence by massive retaliation alone; their strategic nuclear posture is developing a war-ﬁghting capability.’’91 These views were shared by JCS Chairman General Brown. In 1975, he noted that ‘‘The Soviet Union’s focus is not simply on maintaining the current advantage in terms of megatonnage and throwweight, but it applies as well to accuracy, ﬂexibility, survivability and MIRVing intercontinental missiles.’’92 General Brown went further in his report for 1978, indicating a clear link between military capacity and geopolitical objectives: Continued improvements in Soviet forces imply that war-ﬁghting and war-winning capabilities are fundamental Soviet military goals . . . should a conﬂict develop, it appears they intend to have the means, both conventional and nuclear, to ensure an outcome favorable to them. As the Soviets approach such capability, they may well be inclined to test US resolve . . . Before moving on to the views of the Carter Administration regarding the Soviet strategic threat, it is important to examine Soviet strategic capabilities as they were understood at the time. In 1976, the balance appeared to be one of ‘‘essential equivalence.’’ The United States possessed 8,530 deliverable strategic warheads compared with the Soviet Union’s 3,250, a clear lead. Not only were US warheads more evenly divided between ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers, but, in terms of SLBM warheads and bomber weapons, the American lead was pronounced.93 In equivalent megatonnage, the balance was reversed, with 3,735 EMT for the USSR to the US total of 1,930.94 In terms of throwweight, the balance was rather even, with the Soviet Union enjoying a substantial lead over the United States in ICBMs (7 million pounds to 2.4 million) and a slighter lead for SLBMs (1.2 million to 900,000). In bomber payload, the United States was clearly ahead, with 22.8 million pounds to the USSR’s 4.7 million.95 However, it was the ICBM that provided the superpowers with the most effective capacity for launching prompt, counterforce attacks. It was here that the Soviet Union appeared to be taking the lead. In 1975,

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three new types of ICBM—the SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19—were introduced. The SS-17 and SS-19 were capable of carrying four and six MIRVs, respectively, whereas the SS-18 could carry eight. Additionally, these missiles could be conﬁgured to carry single warheads with enormous yields. The SS-17s and SS-19s, for example, could carry a 5-megaton warhead, whereas the SS-18 was estimated to deploy a 15–25-megaton warhead in this conﬁguration.96 This meant that a counterforce attack could be mounted with MIRVed examples of these missiles on US Minuteman and Titan ICBM silos and launch control centers (LCC) as well as against US bomber bases. At the same time, hardened US C3 installations could be knocked out by the massive single warhead variants of these missiles. The Soviets also deployed the SS-N-8 SLBM, with a range of some 4,800 miles, signiﬁcantly greater than its US equivalents, the Polaris and Poseidon.97 These new missiles enabled the Soviet SSBN force to hold US cities as countervalue targets with greater ease. The combination of these weapons meant that a strong possibility existed that the Soviet leadership, in a severe crisis, might be tempted to initiate a counterforce war with the United States, having enough conﬁdence in their strategic forces to view this as feasible. Intelligence estimates were also worrying. The CIA’s National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) painted a worrisome picture of the US–Soviet strategic balance throughout the 1970s. NIE 11-3/8-76, issued in late 1976, warned of the implications of the Soviet strategic buildup: Soviet forces for intercontinental conﬂict have political as well as military utility. The Soviets see these forces, along with other military capabilities, as serving their long-term aim of achieving a dominant position over the West. At present, they believe that the growth of their capabilities for intercontinental conﬂict . . . have helped create a new ‘‘correlation of forces’’ in the world that is more favorable to the USSR . . . In a confrontation, the Soviets expect their strategic power to enhance the prospect of favorable outcomes. (My underline)98 The role of Soviet military doctrine with regard to strategic nuclear forces was addressed as well: The available open and classiﬁed Soviet literature indicates that the Soviets are committed to improving their capabilities for waging nuclear war. This commitment reﬂects a leadership consensus on the need to assure the survival of the Soviet Union in case of such a war and a military doctrine which holds that a nuclear war could be won . . . (My italics).99

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Strategic forces

The 1977 NIE reiterated these views: Soviet military doctrine sets a goal of creating war-winning capabilities and then deﬁnes this posture as the best deterrent . . . the Soviets see nuclear weapons and the long-range means of delivering them as both offensive and defensive, in that they can attack the enemy’s military forces, thereby reducing his capability to attack the USSR.100 The intelligence community’s alarm over Soviet strategic capabilities was exempliﬁed by the ‘‘Team B’’ report issued in December 1976. Led by Professor Richard Pipes of Harvard, and including Professor William Van Cleave as an associate, together with Paul Nitze and Paul Wolfowitz—a member of ACDA at the time—as part of the advisory panel, ‘‘Team B’’ issued a critique of earlier NIE’s, particularly 11-3/8-76. Among the most important issues was Soviet strategy. The integration of the armed forces into the political process—the opposite of civil – military relations in the United States—meant that Soviet strategic thought was altogether different from its American counterpart.101 The authors forcefully set out what they believed to be Soviet grand strategy, including strategic nuclear forces: . . . in the USSR, military weapons in general, and strategic nuclear weapons in particular, are treated not as unique instruments to be used as a very last resort, but as elements of a whole range of mutually supporting means of persuasion and coercion available to the state in pursuit of its interests. (Italics in original.)102 In addressing Soviet ICBM development, the authors came to a stark conclusion: The full sweep of these programs, and in particular the great ICBM throw weight, the improvement and multiplication of MIRVed warheads given that throw weight, and the steady modernization of the ICBM force—e.g. in accuracy and systems reliability—support a conclusion that the Soviets seek clear superiority in the capabilities of these forces, including the maximum feasible counterforce and warﬁghting capability.103 The ‘‘Team B’’ report was leaked to the press, and it helped shape the overall debate on Soviet strategic capabilities and intentions. The incoming Carter Administration would ﬁnd itself challenged by the shift in the debate generated by ‘‘Team B’’ and would be pushed toward directions in its national security policy that, in the end, would be similar to ‘‘Team B’’s’ outlook.

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The Carter years Harold Brown raised concerns that were similar to those of his predecessors and reﬂected a link to Soviet military strategy. ‘‘Their current programs have breadth, depth, and momentum,’’104 Brown noted in 1978. He went on to speculate about the nature of Soviet rationales for such programs: Conceivably they are as interested as we are in the concept of options and controlled nuclear campaigns. They probably have the capability, even now, to employ their offensive forces with some ﬂexibility, and we cannot preclude their being quite selective in their targeting. Much of what they are doing both offensively and defensively coincides with the actions that would support a damage-limiting strategy. And it is within the realm of possibility that they are attempting to acquire what have been called ‘‘war winning’’ capabilities.105 The following year, Brown noted that the Soviet Union continued to develop ‘‘a large ICBM force with an expanding hard-target-kill capability.’’106 What worried Brown about these developments ‘‘is the degree of emphasis in Soviet military doctrine on a war-winning nuclear capability, and the extent to which current Soviet programs are related to the doctrine.’’107 Brown’s concerns about Soviet warﬁghting strategy intensiﬁed over the remainder of his tenure. In his 1981 report, he stated, ‘‘[T]here are suggestions also that if a nuclear war occurred, the time-honored military objectives of national survival and dominant military position at the end of the ﬁghting would govern and so must shape military preparations beforehand.’’108 In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in September 1980, Secretary Brown noted, ‘‘Soviet actions are such that they have clearly shown a willingness to use power in whatever way it serves their interests—Afghanistan is only the latest in a long series of examples.’’109 He linked these actions to a perception of conﬁdence by the Soviet leadership in their strategic forces to secure victory in a general nuclear war.110 General Brown’s successor, General David Jones, noted his worries regarding Soviet strategy, particularly in light of their considerable strategic force improvements: ‘‘They have a doctrine which considers nuclear war as thinkable and they are not only building their offensive forces, but are giving great attention to command and control, civil defense, air defense, and all other elements needed to ﬁght a nuclear war’’ (My italics).111 As De´tente collapsed and the ‘‘Second Cold War’’ began between the two superpowers, Jones’ concerns over Soviet strategic capabilities and doctrine became more strident. In 1980, he warned of the dangers of an

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imbalance of nuclear strength between the United States and the Soviet Union favoring the latter: I anticipate such a disparity would be reﬂected in a more conﬁdent Soviet leadership, increasingly inclined toward more adventurous behavior in areas where our interests clash and where US ability to respond by conventional means could be circumscribed. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan could well be a ‘‘leading edge’’ event reﬂecting precisely such a heightened conﬁdence.112 A . . . likely consequence is that it will affect the Soviet perception of the military balance in a way which might embolden them to act with less restraint in international affairs. It is thus the political consequences of the shifting strategic balance which are of greatest immediate concern. (My italics)113 The CIA continued to warn of Soviet strategic improvements. In an NIE from 1978, it was noted that ‘‘Soviet strategic offensive and defensive programs have continued to display the broad scope, vigor, and persistence to which we have called attention in previous estimates.’’ Furthermore, ‘‘the present phase [of Soviet force modernization] stresses operational ﬂexibility while maintaining highly centralized control.’’114 In examining force improvements for the next decade, the report listed four ‘‘general objectives’’: improvement of overall counterforce and damage-limitation capabilities; enhanced perceptions of a strategic balance favoring the USSR; an emphasis on quality, without an undue reduction in numbers, of the Soviet strategic forces; and an improvement in C3I to engage in LNOs and in protracted nuclear warfare.115 In the 1980 NIE, geopolitical implications were discussed: The Soviets probably view their improved strategic position as providing a more favorable backdrop than before to the conduct of an assertive foreign policy and to the projection of Soviet power abroad. They probably do not see the present situation of approximate strategic nuclear parity as providing them with the latitude to safely confront the United States directly in areas where they perceive US vital interests to be involved. However, in areas they believe the United States regards as less central to its interests, particularly in regions where the USSR enjoys a preponderance of conventional forces and the advantage of proximity, such as Afghanistan, the current strategic relationship probably enhances Soviet conﬁdence that the risk of a US local or escalatory military response would be negligible.116 The link between military capability and political objectives was not lost on US policymakers during this time. In testimony before the Senate

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Foreign Relations Committee in July 1979, Secretary Brown gave a succinct summary of the relationship between strategic forces and the global balance of power: In addition to their purely military capabilities . . . strategic nuclear forces—like other military forces—have a broader role in the world. Countries . . . make judgements about our strength and that of the Soviets. The behavior of all those countries will be inﬂuenced by their judgements. It is in that respect that our second objective—essential equivalence— particularly applies. It requires that our forces overall be, and be recognized as, at least on a par with those of the Soviet Union. Otherwise the Soviet could gain in the world (and we lose), without war, from changes in perceptions about the balance of nuclear power. (My italics)117 A few days later, in a hearing before the same body, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who had been in ofﬁce during the development of LNOs earlier in the decade, warned of what an imbalance of strategic forces would mean for US foreign policy and global stability: The deterrent effect of our strategic forces in defense of allies will continually decline; our strategic forces will surely lose their ability to offset the Soviet capacity for regional intervention. And this capacity will be reinforced by the growing edge in Soviet theater nuclear forces, a naval and airlift capability which immeasurably extends the reach and preponderance of Soviet conventional power.118 With the development of nuclear strategy during the Carter years, US ofﬁcials increasingly pointed to these efforts as having strengthened efforts at extended deterrence. Secretary of State Muskie declared in September 1980 that I am conﬁdent that the countervailing strategy not only strengthens deterrence but also establishes a ﬁrmer basis for our diplomacy with the Soviets. It underlies our determination to respond to any challenges to our vital interests, at the same time it conﬁrms that we pose no threat to the legitimate interests of other states. As such, it leaves the Soviets no room for doubt about our will or our peaceful intentions.119 All this reﬂected ofﬁcial views of US Government agencies and the military. For analysts outside of government, these views, while valid, had to be tempered with other factors, including the reverse of what has been discussed here: namely, Soviet perceptions of American strategy. David Holloway, citing Soviet writers on the subject, noted ‘‘the growth of

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Strategic forces

Soviet strategic power has restricted the United States’ ability to use its strategic forces in support of its foreign policy.’’120 However, he continued that other writers ‘‘have argued that American plans for more selective use of strategic weapons—as envisaged . . . by the Schlesinger doctrine of 1974 and Presidential Directive 59 of 1980—show that the United States is trying to escape from the restrictions of parity and to restore political utility to its strategic forces.’’121 Richard Burt, on the contrary, emphasized the links between military power and political objectives in Soviet strategy. ‘‘Like super-power strategic arms competition, nuclear conﬂict is understood as a continuation of the ideological struggle. In Clausewitzian terms, war—even involving super-power strategic exchanges—is a ‘supremely political act’ in which the Soviet Union can and, indeed, must prevail.’’122 Benjamin S. Lambeth viewed Soviet doctrine as one geared toward warﬁghting and victory. He discerned ﬁve key themes in Soviet doctrine: A counterforce strategy was the best means of enhancing deterrence; if a general nuclear war did occur, victory was possible; a ﬁrst strike was necessary to ensure victory; restraint was dangerous; and quantity would also play an important role in any such conﬂict.123 Most strident on his views of a Soviet war-winning nuclear strategy, and well versed on Soviet military writings on this subject, was Richard Pipes, who made two key points regarding Soviet strategy: Because of Soviet adherence to the Clausewitzian principle that warfare is always an extension of politics—i.e. subordinate to overall political objectives . . . Soviet military planning is carried out under the close supervision of the country’s highest political body, the Politburo. Thus, military policy is regarded as an intrinsic element of ‘‘grand strategy,’’ whose arsenal includes a variety of non-military instruments. (My italics)124 In Pipes’s view, Soviet strategy had developed throughout the Cold War in a consistent manner, based on the dictum of Clausewitz linking politics and war, and therefore emphasized the idea of using all elements of military power, including strategic nuclear forces, to achieve Soviet geopolitical goals. Furthermore, in accordance with what was written in the ‘‘Team B’’ report, Pipes cited Soviet history and ideology as playing a pivotal role in the intellectual shaping of Soviet strategy: ‘‘The Soviet ruling elite regards conﬂict and violence as natural regulators of all human affairs: wars between nations, in its view, represent only a variant of wars between classes, recourse to one or the other being dependent on circumstances.’’125 These analysts viewed the strategic balance in a manner generally similar to the ofﬁcials responsible for making policy. For example, the role of political decision-making in the formulation of strategy in the Soviet Union

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was emphasized, albeit to different degrees by such writers as Burt and Pipes. Open Soviet sources regarding nuclear war corroborated these— and ofﬁcial—views of Soviet strategy as having a war-winning emphasis. This found its way into ofﬁcial US war planning, particularly during the Carter years. The drafting of US nuclear strategy during that time tended to be based on a more thorough study of Soviet literature on the subject, and this led to a greater emphasis on targeting Soviet military and political targets, as opposed to the importance of economic and population centers stressed in earlier strategies.126 The most public impact of these shifts in nuclear strategy was to be seen in the drafting of the SALT II agreement. Widely criticized by conservatives as locking the United States into a position of strategic inferiority, it in fact allowed both the United States and the Soviet Union to maintain nearly intact their strategic programs for the next several years. For example, the Soviets were allowed to retain their 308 SS-18 heavy ICBMs, with their enormous counterforce capability, whereas the United States was able to develop its 10-warhead MX ICBM. Furthermore, after a two-year protocol, the United States would be able to deploy cruise missiles on its B-52 bombers, which themselves represented an important addition to US counterforce capabilities. Although the total number of MIRVed missiles and missile-equipped bombers was limited to 1,200 (and MIRVed ICBMs to 820) for each side, such forces were well within what was needed to carry out counterforce operations.127 Although unratiﬁed, both countries adhered to its limitations, an indication (at least in part) that it was sound regarding strategic doctrine.

Conclusion The development of US nuclear strategy during the 1970s, which saw an increasing emphasis on counterforce operations and nuclear warﬁghting, was inﬂuenced by a variety of factors. The De´tente process was critical in shaping much thinking on how US strategic forces would be used, and the rise, decline, and fall of de´tente inﬂuenced the process of strategic planning considerably. ´tente came about, in no small part, due to It has been well said that De the realization that the Soviet Union had achieved parity with the United States. Although the overall military balance might raise questions about the totality of this statement, it is certainly appropriate in terms of strategic forces. For Presidents Nixon and Ford, and for President Carter up to about 1979, the challenge was to maintain this equilibrium of strategic power—or ‘‘essential equivalence’’—to sustain strategic parity and convince Americans, many of whom were suspicious of or hostile toward ´tente, that this was a sound policy. The growth in Soviet strategic De power meant that MAD simply could not be sustained. If the Soviets were planning to approach nuclear war as a winnable prospect, then the policies

40

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supporting deterrence had to take this into account. NSDM 242, with its emphasis on limited strikes and ﬂexibility, was, in part, a response to this shift in strategy. So were the Carter Administration’s early policies regarding nuclear strategy, as enunciated in PRM 10 and PD 18. In other words, a robust American nuclear strategy would enable the ` -vis its primary United States to maintain a credible strategic posture vis-a geopolitical adversary. This extended to arms control, as important weapon systems, like the MX ICBM and cruise missiles, were secured in SALT II, thus allowing US force planners to match arms with strategy. During the late 1970s, relations between the superpowers became strained, leading to growing opposition in the United States to De´tente. US nuclear strategy began to take on another role, that of shoring up the Carter Administration in the face of critics of its foreign and defense policies. From 1978 onward, US strategic policy took on an ever more comprehensive approach to the waging of a general nuclear war with the Soviet Union. Civil defense, C3I, and targeting packages all came together to form what became known as the ‘‘Countervailing Strategy.’’ With the onset of the Second Cold War in 1979–80, the political purpose of American strategic policy became one supporting a more robust geopolitical effort, in conjunction with the enunciation of the Carter Doctrine in January 1980 (stating US willingness to defend the Persian Gulf), the creation of the Rapid Deployment Force in support of this, and the decision on Long-Range Theater Nuclear Forces (LRTNF) deployment by the United States and its NATO allies. At its core, US nuclear strategy, as it developed from 1974 to 1980, became ever more focused on a counterforce doctrine. From the rather limited plans outlined by NSDM 242 to the comprehensive, ‘‘Countervailing’’ approach of PD 59, this strategy was evolutionary.128 In a key address made in August 1980 at the US Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, Harold Brown emphasized this phenomenon regarding PD 59: At the outset, let me emphasize that P.D. 59 is not a new strategic doctrine; is not a radical departure from U.S. strategic policy over the past decade or so. It is, in fact, a reﬁnement, a codiﬁcation of previous statements of our strategic policy. P.D. 59 takes the same essential strategic doctrine, and restates it more clearly, more cogently, in the light of current conditions and current capabilities. (Italics in original.)129 Other US ofﬁcials reiterated Brown’s statements. ‘‘As such, the countervailing strategy is not a radical departure from previous policy,’’ Secretary of State Muskie declared in September 1980. ‘‘It is rather the result of a gradual evolution of our doctrine over a period of years in response to changing conditions and new knowledge.’’130 Senator Frank Church, in a statement issued about PD 59, declared ‘‘As for the substance of PD-59 itself, I am satisﬁed . . . that it is not a fundamental change in U.S. strategic

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policy. It is clear that the United States has not relied solely on the threat of massive retaliation on Soviet cities for deterrence for many years, if ever . . . This has been the case since at least the mid-1960s.’’131 A considerable amount of strategic weaponry, most notably the improved Minuteman IIIs, the Trident SLBM, the ALCM, and new C3I systems, was already entering service when Carter left ofﬁce in 1981. The Reagan Administration would take a more consistent public stand in its ﬁrst term regarding a counterforce strategic policy and would accelerate enhancements to the strategic forces, including a new version of the B-1 bomber and the D-5 variant of Trident. This policy, however, would be an inheritance stretching back nearly a decade and would, in many ways, continue along what was now becoming a well-worn path.

2

Protracted nuclear war

By 1981, the international situation had changed markedly. Whereas most of the 1970s had witnessed De´tente between the United States and the Soviet Union, by the beginning of the 1980s, the two superpowers found themselves in a state of renewed confrontation or what has been termed the ‘‘Second Cold War.’’ Among the concerns at this time, as it had been increasingly during the late 1970s, was that of the US–Soviet military balance, particularly in terms of strategic nuclear forces. Although the concerns were similar, the dynamic, at least at the ofﬁcial level, had changed. Whereas Presidents Ford and Carter had attempted to confront the military situation within the overall bounds of De´tente, President Reagan, at least rhetorically, rejected the framework of this policy as it had evolved in the 1970s. Reagan viewed De´tente as having dangerously eroded American military strength while allowing the Soviet Union to match or even in some cases exceed the United States in many areas of comparison. This required a considerable expansion of US military capabilities, to restore a favorable balance of power and thus a less confrontational relationship with Moscow.1 Reagan’s views had become more prominent during the late 1970s, as a number of organizations emerged warning Americans of their country’s military imbalance vis a` vis the USSR. Most prominent of these (and of which Ronald Reagan was a member) was the Committee on the Present Danger. When Reagan took ofﬁce in 1981, its members were appointed to Executive positions in considerable numbers. Among those better known were Richard Pipes (Director of Soviet Affairs for the National Security Council), Richard Perle (Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy), and Paul Nitze (Chief Negotiator to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Talks and, later, Special Representative for Arms Control and Disarmament Negotiations).2 Among those who served in government during this time was Colin S. Gray, who had argued for the adaptation by the United States of a ‘‘warwinning’’ nuclear strategy.3 In an article published by International Security in 1979, Gray argued for such an approach to strategic planning. ‘‘One of the essential tasks of the American defense community is to help ensure that in

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moments of acute crisis the Soviet general staff cannot brief the Politburo with a plausible theory of military victory.’’ (Emphasis in original.)4 Gray called for a strategy that would target the structure of the Soviet state: We resist the external military pressure of the Soviet Union, and effect carefully selected kinds of damage against the capacity of the Soviet state to function with authority at home . . . a war plan directed at the destruction of Soviet power would have inherent plausibility in Soviet estimation [of the risks of war]. (Emphasis in original.)5 The following year, Gray co-authored an article titled ‘‘Victory is Possible’’ in the journal Foreign Policy. The subject was, of course, general nuclear war. ‘‘Recognition that war at any level can be won or lost, and that the distinction between winning and losing would not be trivial, is essential for intelligent defense planning . . . U.S. strategic targeting doctrine must have a unity of political purpose from the ﬁrst to the last strikes.’’6 These ideas would come to play an important role in US nuclear strategy during the 1980s. Given the background of the new President and much of his national security team, it is not surprising that a more thrusting nuclear strategy was developed from that which had gone before. Scenarios for waging nuclear war were soon leaked, indicating the new administration’s view of a conﬂict continuing for an extended period of time, in some cases up to ﬁve years. These scenarios incorporated conventional concepts such as military recovery and indicated a war in which both sides would launch selected attacks to secure a greater advantage.7 A war game called Ivy League, carried out in March 1982, was publicly announced beforehand, and its substance promptly leaked. This exercise simulated a Soviet strategic attack on the United States and dealt with the continuity of government after such an occurrence, with a strong emphasis on the ability to continue to wage war.8 This, together with statements by Reagan and toplevel cabinet members indicating the feasibility of victory, gave a strong impression of a qualitative shift in US nuclear strategy.9 Although this was certainly a valid assessment of the situation held at the time by the American public (as well as by many in Western Europe and by the Soviet leadership), this view was not entirely accurate, for two reasons. First, although the Reagan Administration’s approach to nuclear strategy had changed from that held by its predecessors, it also represented an evolution from what had been established in the 1970s. Its antecedents can be traced back, in a strongly linear fashion, to NSDM 242, the framework for the so-called ‘‘Schlesinger Doctrine.’’ More recently, the many Presidential Directives of the Carter years, culminating in PD 59, provided a solid base for the new administration to formulate its approach to nuclear strategy.

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Strategic forces

Second, although the Reagan Administration devoted considerable funding for strategic forces, many of the weapons and systems were already in service, programmed to enter service, or being developed by 1981. As will be seen, few new systems were introduced during the early 1980s. These weapons did, however, make the shift to a strategy of ‘‘prevailing’’ in a general nuclear war appear to be more feasible and thus served to reinforce the Reagan Administration’s strategic policies. This chapter will therefore examine these two key areas of nuclear strategy during the early 1980s—its evolution from what existed before and the importance of weapons development in its formulation. The similarities and differences regarding the new strategy as opposed to that developed through the 1970s will of course be scrutinized. As ever, the inﬂuence of ofﬁcial perceptions of Soviet capabilities will be included, as will the inﬂuence on public perceptions of the ofﬁcial rhetoric emanating from Washington at this time.

Strategy The Reagan Administration moved quickly to establish a set of criteria for strategic nuclear policy. National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 12, issued October 1, 1981, described the basis for the modernization of US strategic forces: The Modernization program outlined by this directive will guide the long-term development of our strategic forces. It will help redress the deteriorated strategic balance with the Soviet Union. The result will be a deterrent that is far more secure and stable than our present nuclear forces.10 At a press conference the following day, President Reagan noted three key objectives of the strategic forces program: ‘‘– It will act as a deterrent against any Soviet actions directed against the American people or our allies; ‘‘– It will provide us with the capability to respond at reasonable cost and within adequate time to any further growth in Soviet forces; ‘‘– It will signal our resolve to maintain the strategic balance, and this is the keystone to any genuine arms reduction agreement with the Soviets.’’11 The President then listed ﬁve ‘‘main features’’ of this effort: (1) The deployment of 100 B-1 strategic bombers and cruise missiles—together with the development of a ‘‘stealth’’ bomber—to strengthen the strategic bomber force; (2) Continued deployment of Trident missiles and submarines as well as the development of an improved Trident missile and deployment of nuclear cruise missiles on subs; (3) An interim deployment

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of MX ICBMs in existing silos, with a new deployment system to be decided upon by 1984; (4) Improvements to C3 systems; and (5) A buildup of strategic defense capabilities, including both air and civil defense.12 Nearly all these efforts were a continuation of programs initiated during the Carter years. In December 1981, the Reagan Administration issued its blueprint for nuclear strategy, NSDD 13. Although only a fraction of this document has been declassiﬁed, it essentially reafﬁrmed the approach of the Carter Administration as set out in PD 59 regarding the role of US strategic forces while ofﬁcially superceding PD 59.13 These two key directives would be augmented as time went on, as the Administration spelled out in more concrete terms the nature of its speciﬁc strategic programs. NSDD 91, issued on April 19, 1983, amended the provisions of NSDD 12. It listed seven key areas for strategic forces development (one remains classiﬁed): strategic communications; the strategic bomber force; submarine-launched ballistic missiles; strategic defense; ICBM deployment; and the development of a new, ‘‘small’’ ICBM.14 Perhaps the most detailed discussion of the role of the US strategic forces during this time was to be found in NSDD 32. Issued in April 1982, it provided a detailed analysis of US national security strategy. In its discussion of nuclear forces, NSDD 32 listed a fundamental tenet of US strategy: ‘‘the United States and its allies must prevail and in the process be able to force the Soviet Union to seek earliest termination of hostilities at the lowest possible level of violence and on terms favorable to the United States.’’15 The earlier NSDDs on nuclear strategy were then integrated with these objectives: U.S. nuclear employment planning supports this strategy by ensuring the availability of the greatest amount of targeting ﬂexibility to the NCA, strengthening the linkage between nuclear and conventional forces, limiting collateral damage, and maximizing the Soviet uncertainty regarding their ability to successfully execute a nuclear attack.16 Another area where the initiatives of the Carter years were expanded and reﬁned was C3I. NSDD 97 of August 3, 1983, stated that ‘‘A survivable telecommunications infrastructure able to support national security leadership is a crucial element of U.S deterrence.’’17 The authors of this report described the importance of improved telecommunications: It must be manifestly apparent to a potential enemy that the U.S. ability to maintain continuity of command and control of all military forces, and conduct other essential national leadership functions cannot be eliminated by a nuclear attack. If deterrence fails, the national telecommunications infrastructure must possess the functional

46

Strategic forces characteristics . . . necessary to provide a range of telecommunications services to support . . . essential national leadership requirements.18

Two of the key requirements outlined in NSDD 97 were ‘‘ensuring continuity of command and control of military forces’’ and ‘‘providing for continuity of government and essential functions thereof.’’19 This was a reﬁnement of the Carter Administration’s PD 53 on this subject, as NSDD 12 had been.20 NSDD 97 expanded on another Carter directive, PD 57, regarding mobilization of US forces, as it listed ‘‘support of military mobilization as directed by the President’’21 to be one of the objectives of US national security telecommunication policy. The most comprehensive directive on this area came on September 17, 1984 with NSDD 145. Its objective Provides initial objectives, policies, and an organizational structure to guide the conduct of national activities directed toward safeguarding systems which process or communicate sensitive information from hostile exploitation; establishes a mechanism for policy development; and assigns responsibilities for implementation. It is intended to assure full participation and cooperation among the various existing centers of technical expertise throughout the Executive Branch, to promote a coherent and coordinated defense against the hostile intelligence threat to these systems, and to foster an appropriate partnership between government and the private sector in attaining these goals.22 Whereas earlier directives like NSDD 97 set forth the overall objectives of the Reagan Administration’s policy in this area, NSDD 145 established a high-level steering group, including the Secretaries of State, Defense and the Treasury, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Attorney General, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Directors of the FBI and the National Security Agency (NSA) and of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), responsible for civil defense. NSDD 145 exhaustively outlined the roles and scope of their activities, which would be wide-ranging. The goal set out by the directive was to streamline interaction between the government and all existing telecommunication networks in the event of war. Although these efforts clearly show a continuation of US nuclear doctrine from the 1970s, the Reagan policies did emphasize a different objective to that of earlier strategies. The ‘‘Schlesinger Doctrine’’ outlined by NSDM 242 had outlined limited nuclear options for American strategic forces, and PD 59 and other directives of the Carter years had emphasized the denial of victory to the Soviet Union in a nuclear war. The Reagan strategies, like those outlined in NSDD 13, laid a far greater emphasis on the idea of prevailing in such a conﬂict.

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The document that most directly spelled out the new American approach was the Fiscal Year 1984–1988 Defense Guidance, which was promptly leaked to the press. The goal for the United States in a general nuclear war would be to ‘‘prevail and be able to force the Soviet Union to seek earliest termination of hostilities on terms favorable to the United States’’ (My italics).23 The authors of the document went on to outline how such an objective would be attained: The United States must have plans that assure US strategic nuclear forces can render ineffective the total Soviet military and political power structure . . . throughout a protracted conﬂict period and afterward, the capability to inﬂict very high levels of damage against the industrial/economic base of the Soviet Union . . . so that they have a strong incentive to seek conﬂict termination short of an all-out attack on our cities and economic assets.24 US strategic forces would also be ‘‘capable, under all conditions of war initiation, of attacking a wide range of targets, even when retaliating to a massive strike received without strategic warning.’’ Thus, these forces were to be ‘‘capable of supporting controlled nuclear counterattacks over a protracted period while maintaining a reserve of nuclear forces.’’25 Additionally, the Defense Guidance called for ‘‘decapitation’’ strikes against the Soviet Union’s ‘‘political and military leadership and communications lines.’’26 Although some of this had been present in earlier strategies, it had largely been seen as an attempt to prevent the USSR from coordinating its nuclear forces in a conﬂict. Here, it appeared to concur with a strategy of winning a nuclear war.27 The Defense Guidance envisaged a major increase in the size of the US strategic nuclear forces. In 1982, these forces deployed 32 ballistic missile submarines, 376 strategic bombers, and 1,053 ICBMs. By 1991, these totals would be 44 submarines, 483 bombers, and 1,254 ICBMs.28 Given that the unratiﬁed SALT II Agreement would have expired, and with arms control at an impasse at this time, such force levels were feasible. A front-page article in the Chicago Tribune the following January summarized the document as follows: It represents a subtle but signiﬁcant shift in the thinking about an extended nuclear war, from the . . . Carter concept of ensuring that the Soviets do not win to the Reagan view of outlasting them by retaining enough offensive nuclear capability to prevent a U.S. loss and guarantee victory. Nowhere does the document bluntly state that a nuclear war could be won. But Reagan appears to go a step farther than Carter by

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Strategic forces implying victory is possible if enough weapons survive the opening and subsequent onslaughts to ensure a ﬁnal strike.29

Most important in formulating the new US nuclear strategy was Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger. He presided over the drafting of the Defense Guidance, and in his reports to Congress, he reiterated many of the themes regarding nuclear strategy. Weinberger, together with Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle, was strongly opposed to the SALT II limits that the superpowers had been adhering to since 1979, believing that they had left the United States vulnerable to superior Soviet forces. When in late 1981 President Reagan announced a new arms control effort—the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START)—Perle called for a ceiling on missile throwweights. As the Soviet Union was far ahead in this area, this would have meant a reduction of the Soviet strategic forces by some 60 percent, without affecting US force levels.30 Moreover, the initial START proposal clearly reﬂected existing plans to modernize the US strategic forces while sharply reducing those of the USSR. Under Reagan’s START proposal, announced on May 9, 1982, the Soviet Union would have to eliminate most of the modern ICBMs deployed during the 1970s—the SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19. The United States, by contrast, would be able to carry out nearly all its strategic modernization plans, including the deployment of MX and cruise missiles.31 Weinberger’s and Perle’s attitudes had led to conﬂict with the State Department, particularly after George Shultz became Secretary of State in June 1982. One of Shultz’s subordinates was Richard Burt, who served as Assistant. Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs and was active in shaping his department’s approach to arms control. Both Perle and Burt were highly knowledgeable on strategic issues, and they would clash frequently and often over the substance of the START efforts.32 Burt, for example, challenged Perle’s ceiling on throwweight and proposed ceilings of 5,000 strategic warheads on ICBMs. Nor was the State Department alone in opposing Weinberger’s and Perle’s plans. One of the most vocal critics was JCS Chairman General Jones. From their ﬁrst ofﬁcial meeting on January 15, 1981 (a traditional orientation meeting between the Defense Secretary and the JCS meant to set policy for the coming administration), relations between Jones and Weinberger were strained.33 Whereas the JCS preferred a steady but sustainable military buildup that would match forces to strategy, Weinberger’s enormous budget requests were seen as destabilizing, as they would lead to short-term gains at the expense of the long-term availability of funds for defense.34 These disagreements extended into nuclear strategy. Jones and the JCS as a whole were alarmed by the large number of ‘‘time urgent targets,’’ like Soviet C3I centers, that would have to be struck early in

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a strategic exchange. Such capabilities were beyond the means of US strategic forces at the time and would remain so for the foreseeable future.35 For this reason, the JCS proposed a START level of 850 strategic missile launchers, as this would allow for a more reasonable number of time-urgent targets to be included in planning.36 Soon after he retired in June 1982, Jones, in a Washington Post interview, warned that the strategies outlined by Weinberger were simply not attainable. ‘‘I don’t see much of a chance of a nuclear war being limited or protracted,’’ Jones noted. ‘‘If you really put a lot of emphasis on it [preparing for such a conﬂict], you’ve got a bottomless pit in terms of dollars.’’37 The view that the United States had to be prepared to achieve victory over the Soviet Union in a general nuclear war was stated by Weinberger in his annual reports to Congress. In his 1983 report, Weinberger stated that ‘‘U.S. forces will be capable under all conditions of war initiation to survive a Soviet ﬁrst strike and retaliate in a way that permits the United States to achieve its objectives’’ (My italics). There would be an ‘‘emphasis on enduring survivability’’ for these forces.38 Interestingly, Weinberger, in later reports, emphasized the continuity of American nuclear strategy through the present administration. In 1984, for example, he outlined a key principle of US military strategy— combat operations, including nuclear operations—as follows: . . . should deterrence fail, our strategy is to restore peace on favorable terms. In responding to an enemy attack, we must defeat the attack and achieve our national objectives while limiting—to the extent possible and practicable—the scope of the conﬂict. We would seek to deny the enemy his political and military goals and to counterattack with sufﬁcient strength to terminate hostilities at the lowest possible level of damage to the United States and its allies. (Underlining in original)39 As can be seen, the idea of ‘‘denial’’ bears a strong resemblance to Harold Brown’s Countervailing Strategy. This is seen even more directly in Secretary Weinberger’s discussion of nuclear strategy later in the report: We must make sure that the Soviet leadership, in calculating the risks of aggression, recognizes that because of our retaliatory capability, there can be no circumstances in which it could beneﬁt by beginning a nuclear war at any level or of any duration. If the Soviets recognize that our forces can and will deny them their objectives at whatever level of nuclear conﬂict they contemplate and, in addition, that such a conﬂict could lead to the destruction of those political, military, and economic assets that they value most highly, then deterrence is effective and the risk of war eliminated.40

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The following year, Weinberger cited the endurance of ﬂexible nuclear options in US defense planning: ‘‘Of course, this concept of seeking to enhance deterrence and to limit the level of destruction by having ﬂexible and enduring forces is not new. It has been squarely in the mainstream of American strategic thinking for over two decades’’ (My italics).41 Weinberger also emphasized this approach in his meetings with the press. In an October 1982 interview with the editors of the French journal Valeurs Actuelles, Weinberger reiterated the primary goal of the US strategic forces as ‘‘to deter nuclear war.’’ He went on to note that . . . our deterrent posture must be based on what deters the Soviets, because it is their perception, not ours, on which we must form the basis of our deterrent posture. To this end, it has been our belief that deterrence is best served by the possession of forces and plans for their use, which make Soviet assessments of possible war outcomes, under any contingency, so uncertain and dangerous as to create strong disincentives for initiating attack or aggression against us or our Allies. (Underlining in original)42 One key reason, it would appear, for Weinberger’s emphasis on the continuity of American nuclear strategy, in regard to counterforce, was that the Reagan Administration’s strategy had been an evolution from what had gone before. This was not simply to allay public fears over this approach to nuclear war—which had risen sharply between 1981 and 1984—or to be disingenuous. Although the strategy of the Reagan Administration reﬂected its own strongly held ideological and strategic beliefs, it would not have been possible to simply establish a strategy of ‘‘prevailing’’ at the level of general nuclear war with the Soviet Union had not the groundwork already been established. James Schlesinger and Harold Brown had provided the foundation for American nuclear strategy for nearly a decade, and this had included extensive planning with numerous detailed options for the use of US strategic forces. The evolution of this strategy, from limited options to ‘‘countervailing,’’ made the jump to ‘‘prevailing’’ relatively straightforward.

Weapons In order for a strategy to be implemented effectively, the necessary weapon systems must be available. The strategic weapons slated to enter the US arsenal in the early and mid-1980s were well-suited to a strategy of ‘‘victory’’ in a general nuclear war, as they provided the necessary accuracy and warhead numbers for it to be carried out. What was often overlooked in public debate at the time, and is still not fully appreciated, was that the numerous strategic systems advanced by the Reagan Administration had, in nearly all cases, either been in development for

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several years or been slated for deployment in the 1980s. Developed for the evolving counterforce strategy during the 1970s, they were easily adapted to the strategic developments of the 1980s. In terms of offensive weapons, the most important systems advanced between 1981 and 1985 were the MX ICBM (termed Peacekeeper by the Reagan Administration); development of a ‘‘small’’ ICBM; the Trident I and II missiles and submarines to launch them; the B-1B longrange bomber; the Advanced Technology Bomber (which evolved into the B-2 stealth bomber); and cruise missiles, most notably air- and sealaunched.43 Yet nearly all these weapons had their origins from earlier administrations, some going back as far as the Nixon years. This was true of the Trident I missile and submarine.44 Research and development of the B-1 had begun in the 1960s and continued up to the 1980s despite cancellation by the Carter Administration.45 The MX and cruise missiles were all developments of the Nixon–Ford years, with much research and development (and, in the case of cruise missiles, planned deployment) undertaken by the Carter Administration.46 The stealth bomber began development during the Carter years as well. Some of the existing weapons, like the Trident I, were already in service, whereas others like the ALCM were deployed in accordance with Carter Administration plans.47 What made these weapons adaptable to the latest counterforce strategies was their accuracy. The need to destroy hardened Soviet commandand-control centers, as well as the capability to knock out hardened ICBM silos, was pressing to carry out the scenarios envisioned by US strategic planners in the early 1980s. Some weapons were already online for such operations. The Reagan Administration continued the Carter program of upgrading 300 Minuteman III ICBMs with Mark 12A warheads, which was completed in 1983.48 This gave the US strategic forces 900 or so highly accurate warheads with prompt, hardtarget kill capability. The accuracy and range of the ALCM meant that Soviet conventional force targets, like ammunition dumps, vehicle parks, barracks, and airﬁelds, could be hit with far more certainty of destruction. This would release ICBM and SLBM warheads for use on other targets and also restore the long-range bomber force to prominence within the US strategic Triad. The Trident I had greater range and accuracy than the Poseidon missile, which had entered service in the early 1970s. Equipping 12 older SSBNs and the new Ohio-class submarines that began entering service in 1982, these missiles enabled US forces to more effectively carry out countervalue missions against the Soviet heartland. The Reagan Administration did ﬁnd itself thrust into a major area of contention with the MX ICBM, due mainly to the debate during the 1970s regarding ICBM vulnerability. NSDD 35, of May 17, 1982, halted the Carter program for Multiple Protective Shelters (MPS) deployment

52

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of the MX. NSDD 73, issued January 3, 1983, directed a new study on feasibility of the ‘‘Dense Pack’’ system, as well as other approaches, to overcome Congressional opposition. As with earlier directives, NSDD 73 stipulated an initial operational capability (IOC) of 1986, with full deployment by 1989.49 After much debate, the MX was deployed in 1986, although only 50, rather than the planned 100, were put into service. As indicated by the MX deployment, the programs most important to the Reagan Administration—MX, Trident II, and the B-1B—were all slated for deployment in the second half of the 1980s, in what became the Administration’s second term. According to Secretary Weinberger’s reports to Congress in 1984, Peacekeeper ICBMs would account for less than 10 percent of the US ICBM force by 1988 but would provide nearly 25 percent of ICBM warheads by this time.50 The B-1B, a variant of the existing B-1 bomber developed in the early 1980s as directed by the Reagan Administration, would account for nearly 25 percent of the US strategic bomber force by 1988 and carry some 37 percent of its weapons.51 The Trident II would provide the US SSBN force with the capability of launching prompt counterforce strikes against hardened Soviet targets, which until this time had only been available to the ICBM force.52 The new Trident SLBMs, together with the new Midgetman ‘‘small’’ ICBM, would complete the nuclear modernization program by the end of the decade.53 All this indicated that the Reagan Administration would have to rely, at least in part, on the Countervailing Strategy. As the systems most important for the newer strategy of ‘‘Prevailing’’ were still some years away, the 1980s could be called, from the standpoint of weapons development and acquisition, a transitional era in nuclear strategy, in which the newer ideas of the Reagan defense establishment gradually replaced the heretofore existing ideas of the Carter Administration. At the same time, the inﬂuence of these earlier strategies, harking back to NSDM 242, remained in terms of their evolutionary nature, most particularly in that they had enabled the weapon systems needed for the nuclear strategies of the early 1980s to be developed and deployed. A key area of investment for the Reagan Administration, as it had been for Carter, was in C3I. Not only were more rapid communications links needed (to communicate more quickly with the strategic forces), but these also needed to be more survivable to prevent the Soviets from knocking out such centers and thus rendering US forces ineffective. The Air Force Satellite Communication System (AFSATCOM) had entered service, enabling greater command-and-control of US strategic forces.54 Another satellite system, perhaps more important, was Milstar, which, operating at extremely high frequencies (EHF), provided secure, twoway communications between all US nuclear forces, both strategic and tactical.55 This would make the execution of nearly any option under the SIOP feasible, which had not been possible to this extent before.

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Improved communication with SSBNs was also a priority, with the use of extremely low frequency (ELF) equipped communication centers and aircraft being announced in October 1981.56 The procurement of E-4B command aircraft, which gave the President, his advisors, and all necessary military commanders an airborne platform for waging a general nuclear war, continued during this time.57 As noted earlier, weapons must be matched to strategy to form a symbiotic relationship that establishes policy regarding the strategic nuclear forces. The various NSDDs and the Defense Guidance provided a look at how this policy was formulated and implemented. By 1983, however, the need for a full discussion of such matters had become evident. The growing anti-nuclear movement in the United States, together with the heated Congressional debate over MX deployment, led the Reagan Administration to appoint a committee, led by former National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, to conduct a review of the US strategic force posture. Known as ‘‘The Report of the President’s Commission on Strategic Forces,’’ or the Scowcroft Report, it was issued in April 1983. The authors described the overall strategic situation, including the large-scale Soviet strategic buildup of the past decade, and then set out recommendations for the modernization of the US strategic forces. The report called for the continuation of efforts to improve C3 capabilities as well as the bomber and submarine forces. The deployment of Trident submarines and the development and deployment of D-5 missiles were stressed, due to survivability and the fact that the D-5’s ‘‘greater accuracy will also enable it to be used to put some portion of Soviet hard-targets at risk.’’58 As for the ICBM force, the authors called for a multi-faceted plan to maintain the viability of this leg of the Triad. First, the Midgetman missile, a small (15 ton, as opposed to the 100-ton MX) ICBM with a single warhead, would be deployed in various basing modes. Second, 100 MX ICBMs would be deployed in Minuteman ICBM silos as a replacement for earlier variants of this missile and for obsolescent Titan II ICBMs. Third, MX basing options, like multiple aimpoints, would continue to be studied.59 Turning to relations with the Soviet Union as affected by the strategic balance, the authors stressed efforts on arms control. ‘‘It is a legitimate, ambitious, and realistic objective of arms control agreements to channel the modernization of strategic forces, over the long term, in more stable directions than would be the case without such agreements.’’60 The importance of both a robust US strategic deterrent and arms control efforts was also cited. ‘‘The strategic modernization program recommended herein and the arms control considerations contained in this report are consistent with an important aspect of such stability.’’61 The Scowcroft Commission’s report was, as noted earlier, motivated greatly by political factors, and it gave the various players in the strategic

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Strategic forces

forces debate much of what they wanted. The immediate deployment of MX, as well as of the future addition of Midgetman, satisﬁed those in Congress who wanted the administration to follow through with its promise to enhance US counterforce capabilities in the near-term. Thus, the overall US strategic modernization effort was unhampered, with Congress now satisﬁed that it was a sound approach. Moreover, the report had put a signiﬁcant emphasis on arms control. This helped shift public perceptions of the Reagan Administration, which now appeared to be committed more to arms control and less to unrestrained competition.62 The policies laid out by the Scowcroft Commission would become the basis of US strategic policy for the remainder of the decade, and up to the end of the Cold War.63 This fact is ironic: given the investment in the US strategic forces and the priorities assigned to them in the early 1980s, these efforts bore fruit just as the rationale for their deployment was rapidly changing. As it turned out, the ideological and strategic conditions that helped push the Reagan Administration toward this more aggressive strategy had shifted signiﬁcantly by the end of the decade. It was at this point that such strategies, matched to weapons, became feasible. In this regard, the weapons themselves were signiﬁcant. Although much debate was caused by the revelations made in the Defense Guidance regarding strategy, systems like the MX, B-1B, and Trident were concrete manifestations of such planning. The emphasis placed on their capabilities gave an impression that the Reagan Administration was serious in pursuing its nuclear strategy, to a greater extent than had previous administrations. Here, perception was key. Although widespread improvements had taken place regarding US strategic weaponry between 1974 and 1980, more emphasis had been placed on strategy. During 1981–85, however, the push to deploy such armaments created a perception that the Reagan Administration might intend to use or threaten their use in the event of a crisis with the USSR. Such beliefs thus played a key role in shaping the nuclear debate during this time.

The Soviet threat All this took place during a resurgence in confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Reagan Administration’s expansion of US strategic forces was driven by the perception that the USSR had gained a decisive edge in this category. The Defense Department during these years continued the tradition of warning of the growing Soviet strategic threat. It issued a special publication, Soviet Military Power, describing the danger presented by the USSR’s military buildup. Although ﬁrst issued in 1981, it was published annually from 1983.

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The tone was set in the 1981 edition: In developing and deploying their strategic nuclear forces, the Soviets have subscribed neither to Western notions of strategic sufﬁciency nor to the concept of assured destruction. Instead, while they believe that nuclear war and its debilitating results must be avoided, they see the development of superior capabilities wedded to a strategy designed to achieve military victory and a dominant postwar position as the only rational approach to nuclear forces.64 The 1983 edition spelled out the long-term peacetime and wartime objectives of the Soviet strategic forces: Soviet leaders since Khrushchev’s time have followed a consistent policy for nuclear development. Their main objective is to capitalize, in peacetime, on the coercive leverage inherent in powerful nuclear forces, to induce paralysis and create disarray in the free societies. In wartime, they regard employment of those forces as the key to their survival and winning.65 (My italics) The authors went on to note that Soviet intercontinental forces are designed to fulﬁll their missions under the best and worst of circumstances. In the Soviet view, the most favorable circumstance is a ﬁrst or preemptive strike; the least favorable is a follow-on strike after nuclear weapons have hit the USSR . . . . . . the Soviets appear to believe that nuclear war might last for weeks, even months, and have factored this into their force development.66 The role of the Reagan Administration’s strategic program was also emphasized. Weapons like the MX, Trident II, B-1B bomber, and nuclear-tipped cruise missiles were described and compared with their Soviet counterparts. On the whole, Soviet Military Power helped to create a public impression of a militarily expanding USSR being matched by a reinvigorated US defense capability and of the need to maintain the high momentum of American efforts to ensure a stable strategic relationship. Like the Pentagon, the JCS raised concerns over the strategic balance throughout the period. Its 1983 report stated ‘‘The Soviets have steadily increased the capability of these forces [strategic offensive] until they now exceed U.S. forces in several measures of capability . . . The US no longer enjoys strategic nuclear superiority, and the overall effectiveness of our retaliatory capability has become increasingly uncertain.’’67 In

56

Strategic forces

many ways, the JCS reports of the early 1980s mirrored those of the half-decade before, in terms of what had led to this state of affairs and what constituted the threat: The increased uncertainty in the effectiveness of the US strategic deterrent has resulted from Soviet strategic force modernization and delays and deferrals of US modernization programs . . . Soviet doctrinal writings . . . assign little importance to the concept of deterrence and comparisons of balance as are common in the West. Soviet doctrine talks instead of sufﬁciency to achieve objectives by the possession of credible warﬁghting capabilities.68 In the 1984 report, factors of expenditure, history, and the relationship between strategic and other forces were added in explaining the strategic balance: Over the past two decades, the balance of strategic nuclear power has shifted steadily toward the Soviet Union. Since the Cuban missile crisis and the attendant Soviet political humiliation, the USSR began a massive program of strategic force modernization . . . The Soviet Union, having broadly enhanced its ability to engage in and endure a nuclear conﬂict, now enjoys signiﬁcant advantages in certain measures of nuclear forces. (My italics)69 Another concern shared by the JCS during this time was the Soviet advantage in hard-target—and particularly prompt, hard-target—kill potential. In all but one (FY 1984) of its Military Posture reports between 1982 and 1985, the Soviets were shown to be enjoying a superiority in time-urgent hard-target kill potential (the ability to destroy US ICBMs in their silos and to knock out hardened C3I centers swiftly) from about 1979 and gaining an advantage in overall hard-target kill potential from about 1983.70 The organization most involved in estimating the Soviet threat was, of course, the CIA. A series of NIEs produced during this period showed the Soviet Union as being driven by both a willingness to avoid the use of their strategic forces in conﬂict and with the need to ensure that if war should come the USSR had to be prepared to wage it. In the ‘‘Key Judgements’’ section of an NIE produced in February 1983, the authors succinctly describe these key Soviet concerns: The Soviets believe that in the present US-Soviet strategic relationship each side possesses strategic nuclear capabilities that could devastate the other after absorbing an attack. They seek superior capabilities to ﬁght and win a nuclear war with the United States, and have been working to improve their chances of prevailing in

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such a conﬂict. A tenet in their strategic thinking holds that the better prepared the USSR is to ﬁght in various contingencies, the more likely it is that potential enemies will be deterred from initiating attacks on the Soviet Union and its allies and will be hesitant to counter Soviet political and military actions.71 Another aspect of Soviet strategic policy was that ideology affected doctrine. ‘‘Soviet leaders view strategic arms policy in the context of a persistent, long-term struggle between two world systems of socialism and capitalism . . . From their viewpoint, progress in this struggle is measured by favorable shifts in the overall ‘correlation of forces’—political, ideological, economic, social, and military. They seek through strategic and other military programs to continue shifting the military component of the correlation of forces in favor of the USSR and its allies.’’72 Although this reﬂected the position of the CIA on Soviet strategic force programs that had existed during the 1970s, the stronger ideological tone of the new administration was felt in some of the Agency’s reports. Some of this went back to the mid-1970, when debate over Soviet strategic capabilities took place in the US intelligence community. This had led to the ‘‘Team B’’ report in 1976 and had helped to shift the focus of the CIA’s estimates on Soviet strategic forces toward a ‘‘worst case’’ approach. George H. W. Bush, Reagan’s Vice President, had served as Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) in 1976–77. It was Bush who directed the ‘‘competitive analysis’’ of the NIE process, which had led to the ‘‘Team B’’ report.73 Many of the views held by the CPD were carried over into government by its members at this time: William Casey, Reagan’s DCI from 1981 to 1987, had been a member of the CPD.74 A March 1982 NIE is representative of the prevailing view of the Reagan Administration: Soviet leaders view strategic arms policy in the context of a persistent, long-term struggle expansion of Soviet inﬂuence and the Communist system. They recognize that military power is necessary to sustain the Communist regime and expand its inﬂuence in the world. It is the USSR’s principal asset for competition in the global arena. The Soviets’ ultimate objective is global political and military domination. They view the United States as the principal strategic threat, the greatest obstacle to their political-military activities and the achievement of their goals. US military power will continue to be the major external inﬂuence on Soviet weapons development and acquisition and on Soviet planning for strategic nuclear operations.75 (My italics) Beyond the positions taken by the CIA on matters of Soviet policy and ideological objectives regarding their strategic forces, these reports cited the continued improvements to Soviet forces, particularly in areas

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necessary to wage war. NIE 11-3/8-81, for example, noted that, by 1991, the USSR would have between 9,000 and 15,000 ‘‘hard-target missile reentry vehicles’’ [warheads].76 The authors of the next year’s NIE were somewhat less strident in their appraisal of Soviet strategic force modernization. A detailed study on Soviet forces included how they would be affected by US arms control proposals, most notably START. The authors noted that without START, Soviet deployed ICBMs and SLBMs could increase between 13 and 25 percent by 1992, whereas START would see a reduction by 64 percent over the same time frame.77 In both reports, however, the conclusions are similar—the need to prevail in a general nuclear war. ‘‘The Soviets are attempting to prepare their leaders and military forces for the possibility of having to ﬁght a nuclear war,’’ wrote the authors of NIE 11-3/8-81, ‘‘and are training to be able to maintain control over increasingly complex conﬂict situations.’’78 This was echoed by the following year’s NIE: Soviet perceptions of the growing complexity of warfare have led to greater efforts to plan forces and operations against a backdrop of more varied contingencies and to achieve greater realism in combat training. The Soviets’ principal aims have been to enhance their operational ﬂexibility and force sustainability and to increase the probability of maintaining continuity of control in a nuclear conﬂict.79 Nor was it simply in the area of estimation of Soviet strategic capabilities that CIA analysts discussed their importance in US–Soviet relations. In an August 1982 NIE analyzing the security relationship between the two superpowers, the authors noted that The balance of strategic nuclear forces is a critical index for Moscow’s assessment of relative military power between the United States and the USSR. In 1981 the USSR further improved the striking power and survivability of its strategic intercontinental and intermediaterange nuclear offensive forces, made progress in overcoming some of the weaknesses of its strategic defenses, and improved its supporting command, control, and communications systems.80 This view of Soviet strategic capabilities was of steady improvement as well as of a coherent strategy that would enable them to be used by the Soviet leadership if all other options were perceived to have been exhausted. The Pentagon, the JCS, and the CIA shared these views of Soviet capabilities. These complemented and reinforced the Reagan Administration’s approach to strategic force planning, as a means of matching the Soviet Union in the ability to wage a general nuclear war, and thus achieve the best form of deterrence believed to be possible.

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Although these views of Soviet strategic capabilities were generally held by the Reagan Administration as a whole, there was a difference in the level of intensity among certain of its members. Caspar Weinberger and William Casey were perhaps the most alarmist in their view of the Soviet threat and its implications, whereas George Shultz was more pragmatic about Soviet capabilities, stressing arms control as part of an overall approach to the USSR and as a means of channeling Soviet force improvements in a manageable way. By 1984, a broader consensus existed regarding the role of arms control and strategic stability, as had been outlined in the Scowcroft Report.81 The minutes of a National Security Council meeting held on September 18, 1984, provide a good example of how this sort of thinking expressed itself at the top levels of government. In arguing for a renewal of START efforts, Shultz pointed out that ‘‘unconstrained military growth by the Soviet Union is not to our advantage. We have more difﬁculty with the politics of modernization than they do. Reductions are to our advantage.’’82 Later in the discussion, Weinberger argued that ‘‘It’s important that you [President Reagan] let them see your desire for reducing but also that we are not going to permit them to maintain an advantage.’’83 Shultz, however, was generally on the defensive during this time, despite the fact that Reagan agreed with many of his ideas about a resumption of US–Soviet arms control efforts, due in no small part to the lack of coordination in the administration and Reagan’s unwillingness to act decisively to establish cohesive positions on such issues.84 Only after Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in March 1985 and signaled a strong desire for a resumption in negotiations did the Reagan Administration move forward in this area.

Conclusion As discussed earlier, the Reagan Administration’s policy toward nuclear strategy was a combination of its own ideas and an inheritance from what had been laid down in the decade before. Most of the major deployments and R & D programs of the ﬁrst Reagan term were underway during the Carter years, and some even earlier. The strategy adopted by Reagan and Weinberger could trace its origins directly back to NSDM 242. A conﬁrmation of this comes, ironically, from a member of the Carter Administration who had helped to shape US strategic planning during its tenure. In 1984, Leon Sloss—a former State Department strategic arms analyst who had also directed the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the nuclear policy targeting study that formed the basis of PD 5985—co-authored an article on this subject with an eye to critiques of the Reagan Administration’s strategic concepts. Going back to NSDM

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242, the authors listed three key elements that formed the basis of US nuclear strategy from that time: escalation control, a secure force of strategic weapons held in reserve, and the targeting of US forces so as to impede the Soviet postwar recovery.86 Continuing their discussion into the Carter years, the authors noted, The PD-18 studies also prompted defense policymakers to focus on the possibilities of protracted nuclear war . . . Given the sizes of forces on both sides and the increasing emphasis in both U.S. and Soviet doctrines on strategic reserves, it seemed highly plausible that substantial nuclear and conventional forces would remain even after a large-scale nuclear exchange. The actions and interactions of these forces would have to be taken into account in the development of our strategic war plans. (My italics)87 These ideas, of course, were central to US strategy in the early 1980s. Indeed, one can ﬁnd such concepts in the text of NSDD 32 and the Defense Guidance. Such developments, the authors believed, would have a beneﬁcial effect for strategic stability. ‘‘Soviet perceptions that the United States could engage in protracted war would reinforce our ability to deter Soviet aggression.’’88 Again, the Reagan Administration voiced the same rationale for its strategic planning. Turning to the Reagan Administration, the authors noted, In essence, the Reagan Administration, for its part, has accepted PD59 and turned its attention to the implementation of the strategy, particularly with respect to procuring the forces and C3I required to support it. While the terminology of current declaratory policy differs somewhat from its predecessor, the strategic logic adopted by the Reagan Administration denotes essentially a continuation of the policy evolution described above. (My italics)89 The relationship between strategy and the weapons necessary to implement it cannot be overlooked. By 1985, the United States had relatively few forces in being with which to carry out the more ambitious war plans outlined by the Reagan Administration, let alone PD 59. John M. Collins, a military expert and a highly respected analyst for the Congressional Research Service during this time, summed up the situation in the mid-1980s: High-conﬁdence U.S. abilities to destroy very hard, time-sensitive targets await 100 MX ICBMs (half the quantity President Carter intended to procure) and Trident II SLBMs. Endurance during protracted nuclear war depends on survivable systems not available

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now. Deterrence predicated on war-ﬁghting capacities without forces for homeland defense is questionable. Protection for the American people and production base presently is contingent on successful counterforce second strikes, escalation control, and a quick cease-ﬁre, none of which holds much promise at this point. Attendant deﬁciencies, in turn, reduce the deterrent value of threats to retaliate against the Soviet Union if they attack U.S. allies, because this nation is naked to reciprocal assaults.90 Collins’s analysis neatly describes the problems that US strategic forces would continue to face for some years yet. Although some systems like the E-4B command aircraft and the Mark 12A-equipped Minuteman III ICBMs were in place, the full range of systems needed for the execution of protracted war strategies would not be available until the early 1990s, by which time the international situation had completely changed from that of a decade before. During the Reagan Administration’s ﬁrst term, a number of weapon systems were withdrawn from service: 29 Titan II ICBMs, each equipped with a nine-megaton warhead, the largest in the US inventory, were withdrawn by 1985;91 ﬁve squadrons of B-52Ds, some 75 aircraft,92 by 1983; and the Polaris submarine force (eight submarines with 128 missiles93) by 1982. Many of these systems were ageing, and their weapons were certainly less accurate than those of the systems replacing them. However, the overall megatonnage able to be delivered fell as a result. During 1984–85, it fell by 99 megatons, due to the withdrawal of 11 Titan IIs.94 The Reagan Administration’s approach to nuclear strategy at this time was therefore one of often bellicose rhetoric, matched by generally more balanced military preparation. It was often the nature of this rhetoric that caused public alarm and shaped a perception of the US Administration as warlike. Many of Reagan’s statements regarding the Soviet Union have become well known. In his 1981 West Point commencement speech, Reagan identiﬁed the USSR as an ‘‘evil force.’’ In March 1983, Reagan would make his most famous assessment of the Soviet Union, calling it ‘‘the focus of evil in the modern world . . . an evil empire.’’95 These statements, combined with the public leaks of the Administration’s strategic planning like the Defense Guidance, created a perception among the American public, the United States’ allies (particularly in NATO Europe), and the USSR that the Reagan Administration believed a general nuclear war might be a viable option. It is now known that Reagan became alarmed about the prospect of such a conﬂict during this time, something that shaped his policies in the years to come. Thomas C. Reed, who served as Reagan’s appointments secretary and on the NSC staff at this time, describes the profound effect that Reagan’s brieﬁng on the SIOP (in February 1982) had on him and how it helped lead to the decision to initiate the Strategic Defense

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Initiative (SDI)96 to eliminate the threat of nuclear attack. Certainly a case can be made that his subsequent arms control proposals, including that made to Gorbachev at Reykjavik in October 1986, were guided by what he learned of nuclear warﬁghting. Furthermore, Reagan was generally cautious in dealing with the Soviet Union in his ﬁrst term and avoided threatening the use of nuclear forces vis a` vis the Soviet Union during confrontations like those over Poland in 1981–82, Central America, or the KAL 007 shootdown. By contrast, both Presidents Nixon (in October 1973 regarding threatened Soviet intervention in support of Egypt against Israel) and Carter (in January 1980 regarding the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan) had invoked nuclear weapons directly or indirectly as a warning to the USSR.97 By contrast, Reagan sought to project a tougher American image both at home and at abroad, in response to the multiple crises of the 1970s, which had led to doubts about American power and will. The confrontational era in US–Soviet relations was inherited from the Carter Administration, which had adopted tougher policies as a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. For Reagan, this provided an opportunity to boost American pride and to identify the Soviet Union clearly as a dangerous adversary. There can be no doubt that American military capacity needed to be improved and to a more signiﬁcant degree than had been the case during the Carter years. However, this combined with the perception of an increasing Soviet threat—and even possible ‘‘superiority’’ in the area of strategic forces—to create the impression of an extraordinarily activist approach by the United States. The strategy and forces that emerged between 1981 and 1985 were the result of long-standing and evolving approaches to the waging of nuclear war. These developments took place at a time of heightened superpower tension and hostile rhetoric. The perception was that the Reagan Administration intended to utilize these strategies and forces based on its well-known perceptions of the Soviet threat. As events proved, the intentions and perceptions of the administration—like the intentions and capabilities of the United States to wage such a war— differed considerably.

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Introduction In the area of strategic defense against nuclear attack—manifested both in active forces of interceptors and anti-ballistic missiles (ABM) and in passive measures such as civil defense—US efforts waxed and waned during the 1950s and 1960s. A major air and civil defense program was instituted, as were efforts to develop an ABM system. However, by the late 1960s, these went into decline. The growth in Soviet ICBM and SLBM launchers meant that any ABM system would be in danger of being overwhelmed by sheer numbers of warheads. Furthermore, any attempt by either the United States or the Soviet Union to match increasing warhead levels—made all the more difﬁcult by MIRVing efforts—would lead to an arms race that could easily escape their control. Accordingly, both nations agreed to a signiﬁcant curtailment of their ABM efforts in 1972. On the American side, the lack of a large, effective Soviet strategic bomber force led to a rundown of US air defense forces, whereas the enormous numbers of rapidly deliverable Soviet strategic warheads meant that efforts to protect the US population in the event of nuclear war were generally seen as futile, meriting little attention. As concerns about the Soviet military buildup emerged in the mid1970s, strategic defense became an issue in the United States. The Soviets, unlike the Americans, placed a high priority on strategic defense. As the US Strategic Air Command possessed a far more formidable bomber force than the USSR, a commitment to a large air defense system made sense. As for civil defense, the Soviet Union’s very signiﬁcant efforts in this area indicated, to many American defense analysts, a dangerous effort aimed at supporting a strategy of victory in a nuclear war.

Civil defense Among the ﬁrst to sound the alarm over Soviet civil defense was Richard Pipes, who was instrumental in setting the tone for the debate over the

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military balance at this time. In 1977, Pipes deﬁned what he saw as the danger posed by Soviet civil defense: Its [civil defense in the Soviet Union] chief function seems to be to protect what in Russia are known as the ‘‘cadres,’’ that is, the political and military laders as well as industrial managers and skilled workers-those who could re-establish the political and economic system once the war was over. Judging by Soviet deﬁnitions, civil defense has as much to do with the proper functioning of the country during and immediately after the war as with holding down casualties.1 In the view of Pipes and other analysts, Soviet civil defense was structured to allow for rapid political, social, and economic recovery after a nuclear war. This approach was seen as being in opposition to, and even negating, the American theory of MAD, which was posited on an ability to kill a large percentage of the Soviet population and destroy much of the USSR’s economic capacity. As the US civil defense effort was minimal, the actual MAD theory applied to the United States, rather than the Soviet Union which viewed civil defense as a vital element of strategic planning. Even with an extensive civil defense network, however, the USSR could expect enormous casualties in the event of a nuclear war with the United States. For analysts like Pipes, history appeared to indicate that even such dreadful loss of life could be absorbed by the Soviet Union and still be acceptable: In World War II, the Soviet Union lost 20 million inhabitants out of a population of 170 million—i.e. 12 per cent; yet the country not only survived but emerged stronger politically and militarily than it had ever been. Allowing for the population growth which has occurred since then, this experience suggests that as of today the USSR could absorb the loss of 30 million of its people and be no worse off, in terms of human casualties, than it had been at the conclusion of World War II.2 It is important to note that Pipes was writing in the capacity of a public commentator in the above discussion of Soviet civil defense policy. A year earlier, he played a major role in shaping ofﬁcial attitudes on this theme as head of ‘‘Team B.’’ Civil defense was given signiﬁcant attention by the authors of the report, and Pipes’s public views of the following year can clearly be seen in the classiﬁed analysis: The great importance attached by the USSR to its civil defense effort provides an unmistakable clue to Soviet overall doctrine with regard to general nuclear war . . . When viewed in combination with active

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strategic defenses and strategic attack forces the civil defense effort underscores the frankly stated Soviet adherence to the Clausewitzian concept of war as an extension of politics—even under nuclear conditions. These efforts contradict the assumptions that the Soviets view nuclear exchange as tantamount to destruction of their society and system or that they perceive strategic nuclear capabilities primarily as a deterrent. Rather these efforts point to the structuring of both defense and offense for war-ﬁghting, with deterrence being a derivative function. (My italics)3 Pipes’s views were shared by the CPD, which was established at about the same time as the Team B report was issued. In October 1978, the CPD stated that ‘‘the potential effect of such a war-survival program on our deterrent could be so great as to nearly nullify it—some calculations indicate that Soviet civil defense and industrial dispersal programs would reduce Soviet casualties during a full nuclear exchange to onetenth those of the United States.’’ (Emphasis in original.)4 ‘‘[T]hey [the Soviets] might well perceive circumstances in which such losses would be risked, especially if they judged that our perception of the imbalance of risks would be such as to create opportunities for self-serving diplomacy.’’5 By the late 1970s, the issue of civil defense had become a topic of importance in the overall discussion of the US–Soviet military balance. For hawks, the Soviet civil defense system would provide it with the option of engaging in a general nuclear war with the United States if it deemed such a conﬂict was necessary. In testimony given before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1977, General Daniel Graham, who had served as head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, put Pipes’s views of the role of Soviet civil defense into a deﬁnable scenario. ‘‘The Soviets evacuate their cities and hunker down. Then they move against NATO or Yugoslavia or China or the Middle East with superior conventional forces. The United States is faced with the demand to stay out or risk a nuclear exchange in which 100 million Americans would die as opposed to 10 million Russians.’’6 These views were criticized by doves, who argued that the scenarios envisioned were implausible, containing too many uncertainties to be realistic. Fred Kaplan, argued that hawks based much of their analysis on manuals published by the Soviet civil defense bureaucracy. These publications, Kaplan argued, often presented a brighter picture of the efforts undertaken than really existed.7 The CDI argued that the renewed interest in civil defense in the United States was in fact a mirror image of what was alleged of the USSR: an effort to make US counterforce strategies more feasible by limiting American casualties in a strategic exchange.8 During the late 1970s, however, the hawks’ views were ascendant in the debate over strategic forces issues, including civil defense. When the

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Reagan Administration came to ofﬁce in 1981, civil defense became central to US strategic policy. Already, the Carter Administration had made civil defense a greater priority by the time it left ofﬁce, as part of its ‘‘Countervailing Strategy.’’ During the early 1980s, however, the Reagan Administration would emphasize civil defense, which helped fuel controversy over what was intended by such an enhanced American program. To understand these debates, it is necessary to examine what was known about Soviet civil defense, both publicly and within the US intelligence community, and to examine the state of the US civil defense program, and how it was shaped by developments during this time.

Soviet civil defense—The view in the 1970s From 1976, Soviet civil defense attracted the attention of a wide variety of defense analysts and journals. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) addressed the issue in its Strategic Survey that year. It estimated that the Soviet civil defense apparatus, headed by General Alexandr T. Altunin, had a staff of 50 generals and another 70,000 ofﬁcials across the USSR.9 The article described the extensive construction of fallout shelters for senior civil and military ofﬁcials, construction of fallout shelters in apartment complexes, and plans for evacuation over a 72-hour period.10 However, the IISS pointed out that ‘‘many of the assertions about Soviet civil defense are drawn from statements contained in civil defense manuals, and it is difﬁcult to determine whether these are expressions of what the Soviet Union would like to achieve or of what she has already achieved.’’11 In relation to Soviet strategy, the IISS stated, A reading of Soviet strategic doctrine indicates that war survivability is a central element of Soviet strategy. However the signiﬁcance of Soviet strategic writings is assessed, it seems clear from both words and deeds that Soviet leadership endorses the concept of damage limitation-the ability to minimize the damage to the nation should war occur.12 In conclusion, the IISS emphasized the importance of perception for the United States in this area of the strategic balance: the existence of a widespread Soviet civil defence effort at least to some extent weakens American conﬁdence in the capability of the US deterrent force and strengthens American suspicions about Soviet motivations. This does not augur well either for strategic arms control or for the maintenance of a stable Soviet-American strategic relationship. (My italics)13

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Whatever one’s views on the effectiveness of civil defense, what was beyond doubt was its vast size and, according to Soviet military organization, its role as a part of the country’s military effort. From 1961, civil defense had been overseen by the Ministry of Defense, with a major emphasis on its role from 1972, when General Altunin became head of the organization.14 Some 100,000 people were involved in civil defense by 1983,15 of whom some 50,000 were regular troops backed up by some 65,000 reservists.16 In addition to the 50,000 active civil defense troops, some 50,000 personnel from other branches of the military were assigned civil defense duties as well.17 Nor was this an auxiliary force. Upon his appointment to command the Civil Defense troops, General Altunin had been named a Deputy Minister of Defense, placing him within the overall Soviet military establishment.18 At the top was the central headquarters for civil defense. At the regional level, chairmen had a military staff, who coordinated civil defense efforts with the regional military command.19 This structure was meant to ensure that, in the event of war, civil defense efforts would be complementary to military operations. Although hawks and doves agreed that the Soviet civil defense establishment was considerable, they disagreed on how effective this vast organization was in practice. Many were skeptical of what the Soviets could achieve in the face of an overwhelming attack by thousands of US strategic warheads over a relatively short time. Protection of the Soviet population, for example, rested upon mass evacuation of the cities, in which columns of 500–1,000 people would depart for the countryside, where they would build shelters, gather food, and hunker down until further notice.20 Essential workers would be housed in fallout shelters either in the cities or in the countryside and, in theory, would return to work once the worst had passed. Efforts to harden industry against the effects of nuclear blast, such as hardening of machinery and the removal of ﬂammable materials, would likewise occur.21 Although such plans appeared sound on paper, they were fraught with severe difﬁculty if applied to actual conditions existing in the USSR. Andrew Cockburn points out that, in the entire Soviet Union, just 2 million cars, 2 million trucks, and 200,000 buses existed for the evacuation of the urban population to the countryside—a severe problem, to say the least, as Soviet civil defense plans relied heavily on motor transport for urban evacuation.22 Furthermore, the columns of between 500 and 1,000 moving by foot could realistically move no more than about one-and-a-half miles per hour, or 30 miles per day, well within the blast and fallout radii of nuclear warheads.23 Weather also would have played a part, as the brutally cold winter and rainy autumn would have played havoc with transport and shelter construction, whereas the destruction

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of much of the USSR’s transport system would have made any movement much more difﬁcult.24 Even before a nuclear attack, the inadequacies of Soviet society would have played a major role in hampering efforts at effective civil defense. Cockburn points out that civil defense plans called for the population to stock up on enough food to last for two weeks. As it took queues of several hours just to buy a daily ration of bread or meat, the idea that a sudden mass attempt to get hold of such supplies could be dealt with accordingly was far-fetched, to say the least.25 Cockburn’s analysis succinctly sums up the case of the doves in the debate. Despite its size, funding, and extensive organization, Soviet civil defense, if confronted by the realities of a nuclear war, could provide little in terms of protection for the citizens of the USSR. That such efforts could support a Soviet war-winning nuclear strategy—as Pipes and Graham had argued—appeared impossible. Writing in 1980, Fred Kaplan cited a study by the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, which estimated that just 150 plants held 50 percent of the USSR’s production capacity for chemicals, primary metals, power generators and other vital equipment: 400 plants produced 75 percent of the total output.26 Kaplan also noted that, according to a study by the US Ofﬁce of Technology Assessment, just 10 American missiles—three triple warhead Minuteman III ICBMs and seven Poseidon SLBMs equipped with nine warheads apiece—were capable of destroying 73 percent of the industrial reﬁning capacity of the USSR.27 Kaplan summarized the situation faced by Soviet civil defense planners regarding industrial protection: Virtually every sector of the Soviet economy is highly centralized, and the great bulk of its productive capacity lies in the large urban centers. In short, it wouldn’t take very many warheads to do devastating damage to the Soviet industrial structure. The Soviet economy—deliberately concentrated to make most efﬁcient use of a heavily bottlenecked and centralized planning system—is not at all conducive to a civil defense program designed to survive an all-out retaliatory attack by the United States.28 Marshall Shulman, a Deputy National Security Adviser in the Carter Administration, echoed this view. ‘‘The civil defense program . . . is by no means of an order that would give the Soviet leadership conﬁdence that they could substantially reduce their casualties . . . They’d be out of their minds to think it would do that.’’29 The ofﬁcial literature of the US Government tended to have a mixed view of how effective Soviet civil defense measures were in affecting the strategic balance. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger’s annual reports for FYs 1975 and 1976 mentioned nothing about Soviet civil defense in

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discussing the USSR’s strategic forces. Only ABM and air defenses were analyzed. Donald Rumsfeld did address the Soviet civil defense capability, beginning in his FY 1977 report. The greater Soviet investment in this area, Rumsfeld warned, ‘‘bears directly on our strategic relationship with the Soviets and on the credibility of our deterrent posture.’’30 However, the report gave civil defense a mere paragraph of discussion, expressing a concern on this subject. Rumsfeld’s FY 1978 report likewise discussed Soviet civil defense, but generally listed its priorities (continuity of Communist Party control, economic viability, and protection of the population), while reiterating the emphasis the USSR placed on this area.31 Harold Brown gave a general description of Soviet civil defense (including the ﬁgure for 100,000 military and civilian personnel involved) in his FY 1979 report.32 The following year, Brown did supply more concrete evidence of the capabilities of Soviet civil defense, albeit with qualiﬁcations. Discussing blast shelter construction, Brown stated ‘‘If this results in a pace of construction matching what has happened since 1968, by 1988 the number of people who could be sheltered (which is not the same thing as surviving) in urban areas could increase to some 30 million—about 17 per cent of what we project the Soviet urban population to be at that time.’’33 Brown went into greater detail the following year, although he emphasized the difﬁculties facing Soviet planners: The Soviets could probably shelter about 6–12 percent of the total work force at key industrial installations . . . Nationwide, the Soviets have probably constructed at lest 20,000 blast-resistant shelters, more than half of which are intended for key industrial workers . . . they can protect approximately 13 million people, or roughly 10 percent of the total residents in cities of 25,000 people or more. However, the vast majority of the urban population would have to be evacuated from cities in order to receive some degree of protection . . . There is no evidence that evacuation exercises have been conducted involving the movement of large numbers of people.34 The JCS sounded a more alarmist view during the late 1970s. General Brown described the close link between civil defense and military strategy in the USSR: The Soviet Union includes civil defense as an integral part of its strategic defense and damage limiting programs. Their rationale asserts that credible civil defense contributes to deterrence, to strategic stability, and to the ability of the state to survive . . . The shelter program for urban areas appears to be designed for the protection of people deemed essential rather than for the general populace.35

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General Brown admitted that ‘‘While these various activities are occurring, their extent and effectiveness are unknown to our intelligence community at this time.’’36 General Brown’s successor, General Jones, was also concerned about Soviet civil defense efforts. In his ﬁnal report as Chairman, General Jones stated: Soviet civil defense is a nationwide program under military control. It is viewed by the Soviet leadership as part of the USSR’s overall military strategy. Its objectives are to protect people—especially the leadership and the essential work force—to facilitate the continuity of economic activity in wartime, and to enhance the capability for recovery from the effects of war.37 Perhaps the most authoritative and widely available publication of the US Government during this time was The Effects of Nuclear War, a report issued in 1980 by the US Congress’ Ofﬁce of Technology Assessment. The report was drafted by authors from various backgrounds and with differing political views.38 The report analyzed the effects of a nuclear attack in four cases: a single or multiple warhead attack on Detroit, Michigan, and Leningrad, similar in both size and population; an attack on oil reﬁneries, in which each side used 10 missiles; a counterforce attack on ICBM silos; and a large-scale attack on numerous civilian and military targets.39 The report was quite wide-ranging and detailed. In a chapter on civil defense, the authors cited hawks like T. K. Jones in assessing the effectiveness of Soviet civil defense. However, they also cited a December 1978 report by ACDA, indicating that blast shelters might reduce fatalities to 80 percent of those in an unsheltered case, but this could be offset by targeting additional weapons (e.g. those on bombers and submarines that would be alerted during a crisis) against cities. Evacuation might reduce fatalities to a range of 25 million to 35 million, but if the United States were to target the evacuated population, some 50 million might be killed. Furthermore, civil defense could do little to protect the Soviet economy, so many evacuees and millions of injured could not be supported after the attack ended.40 In assessing the effects of a nuclear attack on Leningrad, the casualty ﬁgures listed in the report did not appear to give the Soviets grounds for complacency. A one-megaton airburst detonation (equivalent to that of a US Minuteman II ICBM warhead) would have caused some 890,000 fatalities and 1,260,000 injuries. For a 9-megaton airburst (equivalent to a US Titan II ICBM warhead), the casualties would have been 2,460,000 killed and 1,100,000 injured, whereas 10 40-kiloton airbursts (the explosive

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power of a US Poseidon C-3 SLBM) would have caused 1,020,000 deaths and 1,000,000 injuries.41 To be sure, these results postulated that the population received no warning of attack and that the attacks occurred at night, with most people at home.42 As the authors noted, however, in Leningrad ‘‘People live close to where they work. In general, there is no cross-city movement.’’43 In a real attack, there would most certainly have been at least minimal warning, meaning that workers—who in Leningrad would include many essential workers—would have had at least some time to try and reach blast shelters. Moreover, Leningrad, the authors noted, had advantages over Detroit, including the greater spacing of apartment buildings, the fact that buildings were, on the whole, less likely to burn, and transportation, particularly the metro system, was excellent, expediting evacuation from the city.44 Still, the high casualty rates, even if one makes allowance for some efforts at evacuation and shelter, show that the Soviet Union, if it came under a full-scale nuclear attack, would suffer unprecedented devastation over a very brief time. Although most of the CIA’s analyses of Soviet strategic forces were classiﬁed during this time, one report—and the only one speciﬁcally dedicated to the subject by the Agency at this time—was made public upon release. In July 1978, the CIA issued a report, titled ‘‘Soviet Civil Defense.’’ It described the USSR’s civil defense efforts and their goals and then discussed just how effective they would be in actually protecting the population. The authors stated that ‘‘Under the most favorable conditions for the USSR, including a week or more to complete urban evacuation and then to protect the evacuated population, Soviet civil defenses could reduce casualties to the low tens of millions.’’45 At the very worst, ‘‘with only a few hours or less to make ﬁnal preparations, Soviet casualties would be well over 100 million but a large percentage of the leadership would probably survive.’’46 This gibed with the Soviets’ emphasis on protecting the leadership cadres of the Communist Party and armed forces, who would certainly have had pre-planned evacuation routes to hardened command posts available to facilitate their safety. In summarizing the current (1978) situation, the authors wrote, The Soviets almost certainly believe their present civil defenses will improve their ability to conduct military operations and will enhance the USSR’s chances for survival following a nuclear exchange. They cannot have conﬁdence, however, in the degree of protection their civil defense would afford them, given the many uncertainties attendant to a nuclear exchange.47 The CIA’s classiﬁed reports from this period echoed the ﬁndings of the 1978 report. NIE 11-3/8-76, the estimate ‘‘countered’’ by ‘‘Team B,’’ gave this view of the program:

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Strategic forces It is our tentative judgement that, under optimum conditions which included an adequate period of warning and evacuation, Soviet civil defenses would assure survival of a large percentage of the leadership, would reduce prompt casualties among the urban population to a small percentage, and would give the Soviets a good chance of being able to sustain the population with medical supplies. With minimal warning, some key leaders would probably survive, but the urban population would suffer very high casualties and the chances of adequately supplying survivors would be poor. (My italics)48

This was reiterated in the 1978 NIE: ‘‘The effectiveness of civil defense in reducing casualties and in coping with the postattack period would depend primarily on the time available to make ﬁnal preparations before an attack.’’49 Postulating a situation in which 2,200 US warheads struck the Soviet Union in a single-wave attack, the authors gave the lowest casualty ﬁgure (optimum warning time and preparation) as 20 million and the highest (under a worst-case scenario) of some 120 million.50 The authors concluded that ‘‘While a large percentage of essential personnel sheltered at economic facilities would probably survive a US attack, the Soviets could not prevent massive industrial and economic damage.’’51 These reports by Congress and the CIA show how both arguments about Soviet civil defense shaped a picture of the program. The USSR certainly took its efforts in this area seriously but that did not mean that a majority of its citizens would have been protected in the event of nuclear war or that the civil defense efforts, even if effective under bestcase circumstances, could allow the Soviet leadership to pursue an aggressive global strategy vis-a`-vis the United States. Both sides in the debate found ammunition for their arguments in these ﬁndings. Doves argued that Soviet civil defense capabilities would not allow for the Kremlin to engage in risky geopolitical actions, as had been argued by the hawks. Massive casualties and collateral damage would preclude such efforts. The hawks, on the contrary, saw the Soviet efforts to protect leadership cadres as being central to enabling them to engage in such actions. As Pipes argued, the survival of these cadres, as well as of enough skilled personnel to rebuild and manage the economy and the functions of the state, was enough to ensure victory.

Soviet civil defense—The view in the 1980s Interestingly, although many of those who later attained prominent national security posts in the Reagan Administration had warned strenuously about the growth of Soviet civil defense capabilities in the 1970s, relatively little was discussed in ofﬁcial reports. In his ﬁrst annual report, Secretary Weinberger noted these efforts only in passing. ‘‘The

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Soviets,’’ he wrote, ‘‘have . . . continued development of and paid increasing attention to civil defense and a wide variety of measures, designed to enhance the prospect of survival of key elements of their society after the outbreak of a nuclear war.’’52 In the publication Soviet Military Power, meant to show the scope of the USSR’s military buildup, the entry on civil defense provided a mixed view of these efforts. Although the authors noted that ‘‘Given a war-crisis warning of only a few hours, the survival and effective functioning of the 110,000 government and other ofﬁcials necessary to lead the Soviet Union may be possible,’’53 they also noted A civil defense problem of vital concern to the Soviets is their continuing inability to provide physical protection for their industrial installations. Although there have been numerous references in Soviet civil defense literature to the desirability of dispersal of key industries for protection purposes, little has been done to achieve this goal. (My italics)54 The next three annual reports did not even address Soviet civil defense, a departure from the reports of both Rumsfeld and Brown in the 1970s. The JCS, chaired at this time by General John W. Vessey, devoted just four sentences to the subject in their FY 1983 Military Posture statement, and in these merely listing Soviet shelter and evacuation programs and the ﬁgure of 11 percent of the population that would be protected.55 The next three annual statements provided a mere paragraph or so on this subject and tended to reiterate what had come before.56 Nor did the CIA have much additional comment on Soviet civil defense. In its two NIE’s analyzing Soviet strategic nuclear forces during this period, the Agency gave nearly identical statements on this subject. The ﬁrst NIE, released in March 1982, said the following about Soviet civil defense capabilities: We believe that, with as little as a few hours’ warning, a large percentage of Soviet civilian leaders—party, government, and economic—would probably survive a large-scale US nuclear strike. A large-scale retaliatory nuclear attack directed against Soviet economic installations would cause severe damage to the plant and equipment at the vast majority of these facilities. Timely implementation of sheltering and dispersal plans would provide effective protection for a large percentage of the essential work force at key facilities. Soviet population casualties would vary greatly, depending on the extent to which civil defense measures had been implemented.57 As can be seen from this statement—repeated nearly verbatim in the following year’s NIE on the same subject58—the CIA believed that Soviet industry would suffer heavily in a nuclear war, as would the

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general population. It was broadly accepted that, as would most major powers, the USSR would prioritize the protection of its top leadership in the event of nuclear war. However, the view that enough of the country’s population and industry could be protected and be counted on to form the nucleus of a rebuilding effort was not one that appeared to enjoy widespread support, even in the Reagan Administration. Nor did General Altunin appear to have an omnipotent view of the organization he commanded. Cockburn quotes a ‘‘state of the program’’ message given in 1976, in which Altunin remarked ‘‘Many people assembled for such sessions [i.e. civil defense training] and were lead through the various points of a demonstration exercise, but the trainees did not receive what was most necessary. The practical portion was poorly organized and . . . stereotyped.’’59 Given the mixed view of Soviet civil defense preparedness held by the Pentagon and the CIA in the early 1980s, these statements appeared to have been applicable to this period of time as well.

US civil defense—Programs and plans Compared with the vast Soviet civil defense effort, that of the United States appeared miniscule. The US civil defense system consisted of just 10,000 civilian employees, backed up by another 20,000 part-time volunteers, organized in a civilian agency, the Ofﬁce of Civil Defense, administered by the Secretary of the Army.60 Whereas the Soviet civil defense structure was part of the armed forces, in the United States the only military personnel involved in civil defense were the 3,782 commissioned and non-commissioned ofﬁcers, all reservists, who were not assigned to speciﬁc reserve units and part of civil defense through the Mobilization Designee (MOBDES) program.61 Gradually, as the 1970s wore on, the United States began to examine its civil defense capabilities. In part—and, ironically, a mirror image of the reasons alleged for a strong Soviet civil defense effort—this stemmed from the adaptation of LNOs. Schlesinger, in his 1976 annual report, noted that Our civil defense program is, and has always been, an essential element of our overall strategic deterrence posture. Hence, one would expect that the recent shift in emphasis towards a more ﬂexible strategic response policy . . . would be reﬂected in our Civil Defense Program. That is indeed the case. We are seeking to reﬂect in our civil defense planning the wider range of response options that we are now introducing into our military planning. (My italics)62 Schlesinger’s 1975 annual report cited several areas for attention, including the designation of areas at high risk to the effects of nuclear

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attack; development of relocation plans, and for a ‘‘shelter survey,’’ to determine how best to implement a fallout shelter program.63 Schlesinger’s request, however, was rather modest: $86.3 million, of which just $9 million would go for the shelter survey and another $40.3 million would go to state and local governments in order for them to play a part in civil defense efforts. The remaining $37 million would go to maintain the program’s overall functions.64 The following year, Schlesinger requested $108 million for civil defense—$88 million for FY 1976 and $20 million for the Transition budget into FY 1977. This would see modest increases for state and local governments and for the shelter survey.65 Among the efforts undertaken were studies of ‘‘high-risk’’ areas like the Atlantic seaboard, where dense urban concentrations would have seen heavy casualties in a nuclear attack and in coordination between the national, state, and local governments in civil defense efforts.66 These efforts were complemented by those of the Ford Administration to improve civil defense. NSSM 244, issued on July 24, 1976, directed that the authors ‘‘should take into account the current status of US and Soviet civil defense programs, their potential impact on the strategic nuclear balance, and their implications for our ﬂexible nuclear options strategy (NSDM 242).’’67 The Carter Administration also began to take an interest in improving civil defense. In September 1977, President Carter ordered a study, known as PRM 32, in which ‘‘the Policy Review Committee undertake a review of issues related to civil defense in the United States and the Soviet Union . . . to analyze the strategic implications of civil defense programs to the United States and the Soviet Union, and to determine what changes, if any, should be made in current US policies related to civil defense questions.’’68 This study provided a comparison of the US and Soviet civil defense establishments as well as ‘‘the capabilities and effectiveness of these programs during, immediately after, and for up to six months after an attack.’’69 It further examined the policy for civil defense, particularly in relation to developments in the strategic balance overall, its strategic usefulness, and the implications such programs would have for Soviet civil defense efforts and US strategic doctrine.70 The PRM 32 study led to PD 41, issued in September 1978. This clearly described the link between an enhanced US civil defense posture and the reﬁnement of ﬂexible nuclear strategy during this time. The objectives of US civil defense would be to Enhance deterrence and stability in conjunction with our strategic offensive and other strategic defensive forces . . . Reduce the possibility that the U.S. could be coerced in time of crisis.

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Strategic forces Provide some increase in the number of surviving population and for greater continuity of government, should deterrence and escalation control fail, in order to provide an improved basis for dealing with the crisis and carrying out eventual national recovery.71

Although the authors stressed that such efforts did not ‘‘suggest any change in continuing US reliance on strategic offensive nuclear forces as the preponderant factor in maintaining deterrence,’’ they pointed out that ‘‘Civil defense, as an element of the strategic balance, should assist in maintaining perceptions of that balance favorable to the U.S.’’ (My italics)72 On July 15, 1979, the renewed emphasis on civil defense was exempliﬁed by Executive Order 12148, which transferred responsibility for civil defense from the Pentagon to the FEMA.73 This order deﬁned FEMA’’s brief as being to ‘‘enhance deterrence and stability in conjunction with our strategic offensive and defensive forces.’’74 The Pentagon had already placed evacuation as the main effort of civil defense, akin to planning in the USSR. The goals of the US civil defense program were listed in Harold Brown’s FY 1979 report as development of crisis relocation plans, surveys of fallout shelter spaces in existing structures in potential target areas and crisis relocation host areas, maintenance of radiological defense systems and capabilities, development of State and local government emergency operating capabilities, maintenance of a national CD warning system, and peacetime training and exercising for those who would play key roles in actually implementing the program in time of crisis.75 As with Schlesinger, Brown linked civil defense efforts to the more ﬂexible nuclear strategy adopted and reﬁned by the United States during this time. In his 1981 report, Brown gave a clear link between the two. ‘‘Civil defense planning will continue to be fully compatible with overall US strategic policy and . . . maintain an effective link between strategic nuclear planning and nuclear attack preparedness planning’’ (My italics).76 Despite the transfer of the civil defense responsibility to FEMA, both the National Security Council and the Pentagon would oversee the development of civil defense planning.77 During the Carter years (FY 1979–82), the United States spent some $406 million on civil defense, up from $254 million from FY 1975 to 1977.78 These ﬁgures indicate a major investment in civil defense during the Carter years, greatly inﬂuenced by the evolution of US nuclear strategy toward a ‘‘Countervailing’’ posture. This strategy, emphasized by Secretary Brown and PD 41, required an enhanced civil defense capability to prevent the USSR from ‘‘prevailing’’ in a nuclear conﬂict. Ironically, such efforts tended to validate the position of the

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hawks, by creating a ‘‘mirror image’’—albeit on a smaller scale—of Soviet civil defense efforts during this time.79 The incoming Reagan Administration viewed a widespread civil defense program as a distinct possibility, and its national security directives bear this out. NSDD 12 outlined the administration’s plan for improving the US strategic force posture. Strategic defense was included among the priorities, including civil defense: ‘‘An expanded, cost effective civil defense program will be developed.’’80 NSDD 23, issued on February 3, 1982, called for ‘‘survival of the US population in the event of nuclear attack preceded by strategic warning, and for continuity of government, should deterrence and escalation control fail.’’81 One of the provisions of NSDD 23 was a study to ‘‘allow a funding decision to be made on a program to protect key defense and population relocation support industries. These preparations will allow for initial deployment of an industrial protection system in 1985 and full deployment by 1987.’’82 This would ﬁt into the overall goal of US civil defense, which was to ‘‘provide an improved basis for dealing with crisis and carrying out eventual national recovery.’’83 NSDD 26, issued on February 25, 1982, reiterated the commitment to effective civil defense efforts and stated bluntly what the role of civil defense in US strategic planning was to be: Civil Defense, along with an effective Continuity of Government program, emergency mobilization, and secure and reconstitutable telecommunications systems, is an essential ingredient of our nuclear deterrent forces. It is a matter of national priority that the US have a Civil Defense program which provides for the survival of the US population. (My italics)84 These goals were incorporated in NSDD 47, issued on July 22, 1982. This directive dealt with preparation for mobilization involving a wide range of contingencies. As for civil defense, the directive stated ‘‘it is the policy of the United States that all Federal agencies shall participate in, and support, the civil defense program for population protection, communications and warning, training and education, and industrial protection.’’85 Based on these directives, the US Congress authorized a civil defense program in 1982 that provided FEMA with some $4 billion in funding during the early 1980s.86 This reﬂected a massive effort to improve US civil defense capabilities, which was linked, as in the Ford and Carter administrations, to the development of US nuclear strategy. The Reagan Administration emphasized a strategy of ‘‘prevailing’’ in a protracted nuclear conﬂict. A civil defense program meant not only to protect the political and military leadership of the United States but a large percentage of the population was therefore necessary.

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Whether the US civil defense program would have been any more effective in the event of a nuclear war than that of the Soviet Union remained uncertain. As US–Soviet tensions resumed during the early 1980s, this issue remained a source of debate, very much along the lines of the previous decade. Many of the ofﬁcial estimates regarding the effectiveness of US civil defense efforts tended to mirror the optimistic views of their Soviet counterparts. The Pentagon estimated in the mid-1970s that, with proper civil defense measures, just 800,000 Americans would be killed in a Soviet counterforce strike on US strategic forces. However, a Congressional report projected that such an attack would instead kill between 3.2 and 16.3 million Americans, whereas an attack on US ICBM bases in Missouri alone would kill some 10.3 million.87 Estimates in the early 1980s by FEMA that the population of Manhattan could be evacuated in 48 hours appeared to be based largely on wishful thinking.88 Clearly the emphasis on evacuation from urban to rural areas would have presented the US civil defense system with numerous difﬁculties, as David Miller points out: Whether the gasoline would have been available for such a mass movement, whether the huge numbers of travellers would have been amenable to control, and whether the rural areas could have accepted and sustained the numbers involved was never put to the test.89 The views of certain US ofﬁcials regarding civil defense90 indicated their considerable lack of understanding of their area of responsibility. Civil defense efforts in the United States during the early 1980s faltered, due to public apathy and a general loss of interest by the US Government.91 The American view of Soviet civil defense, and the US civil defense efforts meant to create something of a similar capability, reﬂected perceptions of the character of the Soviet state. Hawks held the view—not entirely inaccurate, of course—of the Soviet Union as a regimented, totalitarian society in which the population was disciplined and where the basis for societal organization was highly militaristic. For doves, the inefﬁciency of Soviet bureaucracy was emphasized, including such factors as the ability of Soviet citizens to avoid unpleasant tasks like civil defense exercises and potential for mismanagement and poor training by civil defense ofﬁcials. Furthermore, the difﬁculty these ofﬁcials would have had in overcoming the very real geographic and economic challenges stemming from attempts to protect the population from the effects of a nuclear war was also important in the doves’ case. From the late 1970s, the hawks’ case gained pre-eminence in US civil defense policy. When the Reagan Administration came to ofﬁce in 1981, many of those who had argued for an enhanced US civil defense

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program found themselves in important positions. However, they had overlooked many of the problems faced by their Soviet counterparts, particularly in the details of planning. Therefore, they came face to face with such difﬁculties when they attempted to establish a similar capability for the United States. Thus, the Americans found themselves with a civil defense policy combining high expectations with very little practical ability to fulﬁl them, just as their Soviet counterparts did.

The Strategic Defense Initiative, 1983–85 On March 23, 1983, President Reagan made a nationally televised address. Its subject was familiar—the need for the United States to strengthen its defenses in the face of the Soviet military buildup. At its conclusion, however, Reagan proposed an idea that would be among the most radical in the history of postwar American national security policy. The President stated it thus: Let me share with you a vision of the future which offers hope. It is that we embark on a program to counter the awesome Soviet missile threat with measures that are defensive . . . what if free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest upon the threat of instant U.S. retaliation to deter a Soviet attack; that we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or that of our allies? . . . My fellow Americans, tonight we are launching an effort which holds the promise of changing the course of human history. There will be risks, and results take time. But with your support, I believe we can do it.92 (My italics) What differentiated Reagan’s vision from other, earlier efforts at strategic defense was that defense could supplant offense in the strategic relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. This speech, soon dubbed the ‘‘Star Wars speech,’’ led directly to one of the most controversial and intriguing American military initiatives of the era: the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Although Reagan’s idea was a radical one, the idea of active strategic defense was hardly unknown. It had, in fact, been analyzed and, to a limited extent, implemented over the past 20 years. As mentioned earlier, the development of ABMs had proceeded apace during the 1960s and had resulted in deployment by both superpowers in the 1970s. However, the development of MIRVed ballistic missiles led to the realization that any comprehensive ABM system was likely to be overwhelmed and that limited protection of important sites was the only possible use for active strategic defenses. The ABM Treaty of 1972 enshrined limited active defenses, and its 1974 amendment limited the

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superpowers to one ABM site apiece. The US Safeguard system, deployed at Grand Forks, North Dakota, was deactivated in 1975, almost immediately after achieving operational capability. The Soviets built a site outside Moscow, consisting of 32 ABM-1 Galosh missiles, providing the capital and its environs with minimum ABM defense. Reagan’s idea, however, went beyond the deployment merely of ground-based missiles. It extended to laser and particle beam (or ‘‘directed-energy’’) weapons, including those that could be deployed in space. Again, these were not necessarily radical concepts in and of themselves. Both superpowers had conducted research programs on directed-energy weaponry for several years prior to the initiation of SDI. However, the complexity of the technology, as well as questions about effectiveness, limited these efforts,93 although the Soviet Union was believed to have carried out seven tests of interceptor (‘‘killer’’) satellites in 1976.94 Given the low level of interest in space-based weapon systems, Reagan’s proposed SDI was indeed amazing. It was also daunting. To create a defense that would aim for almost full protection of the West (it was also intended to protect the NATO allies in Western Europe) would require the development and deployment of a vast array of systems that had never before been tested as well as a means of synchronization ensuring nearly 100 percent reliability. Before discussing the progress of SDI and the views held in Washington regarding its impact on US–Soviet relations, it is necessary to examine the origins of SDI. Reagan’s views were inﬂuenced by Edward Teller, among the most senior of America’s scientists who had played a pivotal role in the development of thermonuclear weapons. In 1966, Reagan, the then Governor-elect of California, had visited the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, where tests of ABM technology were being conducted. Teller described the technology to Reagan, who came to view such defensive weaponry as being a necessity for the security of the United States.95 During the late 1970s, the debate over ICBM vulnerability, and the development of the MX missile, led to calls by Republicans, including Reagan, to provide for an ABM system to protect MX.96 This view was held by some of Reagan’s defense advisors during his campaign. Another more ideological group held that the ABM Treaty was keeping the United States in a position of inferiority, as it could not adequately defend itself against Soviet strategic attack. This group, which included Richard Allen, Reagan’s ﬁrst National Security Adviser, wrote the Republican Party’s defense plank during the 1980 campaign.97 Regarding strategic defense, it called for ‘‘a vigorous research and development of an effective anti-ballistic missile system, such as . . . in the Soviet Union, as well as more modern ABM technologies.’’98 At the start of his Presidency, Reagan was urged to develop an ABM system utilizing such

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technologies as the ‘‘X-Ray laser,’’ which had been tested at Lawrence Livermore in 1980.99 Some of the arguments for space-based defense began to enter the public arena. In 1981, for example, David Baker, who had worked for NASA and had played an important role in the development of the Space Shuttle, wrote a book on the subject, The Shape of Wars to Come. In it, Baker argued that particle beam weapons could be used as an ABM system. Moreover, he argued that the Soviet Union was well ahead of the United States in this area and that it could develop a capability in the not so distant future. After describing how such weapons would work, Baker warned of the consequences of an ABM system utilizing such technology: The most effective application of the beam weapon would be in the ABM role, neutralizing incoming warheads before they reached their targets and effectively screening the home country from ballistic missile attack. This would have the most profound signiﬁcance for the concept of mutually assured destruction, giving one country the power to blackmail all others.100 The Reagan Administration began to outline plans for the development of weapons to be used in space. NSDD 12 emphasized strategic defense. ‘‘Strategic defenses will be modernized, including air and space defenses. A vigorous research and development program will be conducted on ballistic missile defense systems.’’101 A White House fact sheet on US space policy, issued in July 1982, outlined the purpose of US military space policy: The United States will proceed with development of an anti-satellite (ASAT) capability, with operational deployment as a goal. The primary purposes of a United States ASAT capability are to deter threats to space systems of the United States and its Allies and, within such limits imposed by international law, to deny any adversary the use of space-based systems that provide support to hostile military forces. (My italics)102 The concluding remarks show that the United States was concerned with the possibility of Soviet space-based systems. Although these included communications and reconnaissance satellites, which had been present for more than 20 years, the danger of Soviet space-based weapon systems, like the sophisticated weaponry described by Baker, was certainly a concern. Among the most important events in shaping Reagan’s decision to deploy a space-based defensive system was a letter written to him on July 23, 1982, by Edward Teller. In it, Teller described the scientiﬁc efforts being made to develop such systems, and their potential.

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‘‘Operating . . . against distant targets in space, the effects of some of these techniques [i.e. particle beam] are expected to be spectacularly destructive; however, it is enemy warheads, rockets and satellites, not lives, which will be destroyed.’’103 Teller then warned of the danger of the USSR taking the lead in such technologies: There are reasons to believe that the Soviet Union might be a few years ahead of us in each of these areas of development [of spacebased weapons technology]; . . . Because of their extraordinary potential, it seems likely that the Soviets would seek an early opportunity to employ such means to negate our offensive strategic capabilities, the more so as a ‘‘bloodless’’ victory would be in prospect.104 He concluded by urging the deployment of such systems by the United States, by noting the stakes involved: If the Soviets should be the ﬁrst to develop and deploy these defensive nuclear weapons, the Free World is in the deepest possible trouble. However, if we act in this matter promptly and with the full vigor of which we are capable, we may end the Mutual Assured Destruction era and commence a period of assured survival on terms favorable to the Western Alliance.105 (My italics) It was the last half of the ﬁnal sentence in this paragraph that would be most attractive for Ronald Reagan, who came to the decision to deploy SDI and emphasized it as being a means to overcome the threat of nuclear war. Much of this view came from Reagan’s visit to the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) headquarters in 1979, where he was appalled to learn that the United States had no effective defense against incoming nuclear warheads.106 As a candidate, Reagan had expressed his concerns over a lack of US strategic defenses: ‘‘With all this great technology of ours, we . . . cannot stop any of the weapons that are coming at us. I don’t think there’s been a time in history when there wasn’t a defense against some kind of thrust . . . ’’107 So too did Reagan’s brieﬁng on the SIOP, which helped give Reagan the impetus he needed to initiate SDI.108 One other area that should be noted is the popular climate in the United States at the time. By 1982, Reagan’s strong rhetoric, as well the emphasis on ‘‘prevailing’’ in a nuclear war against the USSR, had led to the emergence of a popular movement calling for a ‘‘freeze’’ on the deployment of nuclear weaponry by the superpowers. Such views were held by many in Congress, particularly in the Democrat-controlled House of Representatives, where, on August 6, 1982, a resolution calling

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for an immediate freeze was defeated by just 204 votes to 202.109 In his letter to Reagan, Teller argued that a space-based ABM program ‘‘may also constitute a uniquely effective reply to those advocating the dangerous inferiority implied by a ‘nuclear freeze.’ ’’110 Through SDI, Reagan was attempting to initiate a radical solution to the arms race—disarmament through effective defense.111 Whereas hawks like Caspar Weinberger and Richard Perle saw SDI as a means of enabling the United States to develop a ‘‘war-winning’’ strategic nuclear capability,112 Reagan adhered to his idealistic vision of SDI throughout his presidency. The question of whether SDI was feasible, and how it would affect US–Soviet relations, remained to be seen.

The Soviet challenge Not surprisingly, the news that the United States was seeking to develop and deploy a strategic defense system that would protect the West from ballistic missiles was treated with alarm by the Soviet Union. As John Newhouse describes it, ‘‘The Soviets may have felt as if they were condemned to an endless and exhausting game of catch-up with a power holding higher cards.’’113 The Soviet economy was in dire straits, suffering from both poor management and the effects of more than 15 years of heavy defense expenditures. The Soviets knew that an effort on their part to match SDI could lead to ruin. The Soviet reaction was anticipated by the Americans. In September 1983, the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) issued a joint report on Soviet reactions to SDI. The authors summarized the expected Soviet approach to undermining SDI: In the near term, we expect the Soviets to rely principally on a concerted political and diplomatic effort ﬁrst to force the United States to drop its ballistic missile defense (BMD) plans or, failing that, to negotiate them away. There are also certain . . . military steps that the Soviets could take . . . for the purpose of improving their bargaining position and for preparing them for initial US deployment should it occur. (My italics)114 The authors noted that in the long term, the Soviets ‘‘will look for effective countermeasures’’115 to SDI: . . . ICBMs and . . . SLBMs can be upgraded with new boosters, decoys, penetration aids, and multiple warheads. The signatures of these systems can be reduced and new launch techniques and basing schemes . . . devised which make them less vulnerable to US missile warning and defensive weapon systems. These systems can also be hardened or modiﬁed to reduce their vulnerability to directed energy weapons.

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Strategic forces The Soviets can employ other offensive systems, particularly manned bombers and long-range cruise missiles with improved penetration aids and stealth technologies, to assume a greater burden of the strategic offensive strike role and to exploit the weaknesses in US air defense capabilities.116

The Soviet effort at developing directed energy weapons was also cited as being able to ‘‘provide antisatellite capabilities which could be used against some space-based elements of a US BMD system.’’117 The authors summarized the overall reaction by the USSR to SDI as follows: We believe it is highly unlikely that the Soviets will undertake a ‘‘crash’’ program in reaction to US BMD developments, but rather will seek to counter them by steadily paced efforts over the decades the United States will need to develop and deploy its overall defense. They will look for solutions that are least disruptive to their way of doing business and involve the least possible change to their planned programs. The Soviets are not likely to embrace a fundamental shift in the strategic environment entailing reliance on strategic defenses by both sides. (My italics)118 The US intelligence community, however, did note that the Soviet Union had been pursuing directed energy technologies and was attempting to utilize them for its own BMD efforts. The authors of the CIA–DIA report of September 1983 believed that ‘‘In most of the directed energy weapons technologies, the Soviets are now on a par with, or lead, the United States. They are likely to pursue these efforts regardless of whether the United States sustains its strategic defense initiative’’ (My italics).119 Eighteen months later, in March 1985, the CIA, in a report on Soviet directed energy weapons, broadened this view of the USSR’s capabilities in this ﬁeld: The Soviet Union is believed to be interested in the development of directed energy weapons (lasers, particle beams, and microwaves) for ballistic missile defense and anti-satellite (ASAT) applications . . . The resources the Soviets have applied to these efforts are believed to be greater than those which the United States has applied. (Underlining in original)120 Laser technology was an area of concern for the authors, since it appeared that the Soviets had already deployed usable laser weapons: . . . the Soviets have begun to develop and test laser weapons. The Soviets already have a ground-based laser capable of damaging

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some US satellites and which may be used to investigate the feasibility of lasers for ballistic missile defense applicatons. (Underlining in original)121 With a view toward US–Soviet relations on this issue, the authors noted Hostile Soviet reactions to the US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and lobbying against the SDI by high-level Soviet scientists must be tempered by the fact that the Soviet Union has not admitted to its own long-standing counterpart research and the most vocal Soviet scientists have themselves been heavily involved in that weapons research.122 As an interpretation of actual Soviet behavior, the 1983 report, with its view that Moscow would take the ‘‘least disruptive’’ approach to countering SDI, proved to be the most accurate. Raymond Garthoff notes that the Soviets studied means of countering SDI but that ‘‘studies by Soviet scientists had . . . led to the conclusion not to attempt to emulate the SDI program beyond the existing research effort.’’123 Not surprisingly, SDI became an important issue in arms control negotiations when they resumed in 1985. NSDD 153, issued on January 1, 1985, gave considerable attention to both the Soviet and the American positions on SDI: The Soviet Union fully recognizes that the SDI program . . . offers the prospect of permitting the U.S . . . to ﬂank years of Soviet defensive investment and to shift the ‘‘state-of-the-art’’ in defenses into areas of comparative U.S. advantage. This is one of the reasons that the primary Soviet focus has not been on attacking the idea of the increased contribution of defenses to deterrence, which lies at the heart of the SDI program, but rather, on ‘‘preventing the militarization of space.’’124 In stating the US position, care is taken to distinguish the time frame for deployment with respect to the ABM Treaty: In the near term, the SDI program directly responds to the ongoing and extensive Soviet anti-ballistic missile effort, which includes all the actual deployments permitted under the ABM Treaty. It provides a powerful deterrent to any Soviet decision to rapidly expand its ballistic missile capability beyond that contemplated by the ABM Treaty.125 The NSC was not alone in recognizing the impact SDI would have on arms control. In a 1983 memo to George Keyworth, President Reagan’s

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scientiﬁc adviser, Under Secretary of Defense Fred Ikle included a list of points regarding SDI. Regarding arms control, SDI was seen as playing an important role in strategic arms talks. ‘‘If the Soviets are convinced that they cannot prevent a US ballistic missile defense program through political and propaganda means they may become more willing to engage in genuine negotiations for offensive force reductions.’’126 On the same subject, it was stated that ‘‘In the long run, ballistic missile defenses may open new incentives and opportunities for combining arms agreements and unilateral measures to achieve stability at lower levels of offensive forces.’’127

Conclusion At the outset of this section, SDI was described as being a truly radical approach, indeed unique in American national security policy. This was because SDI, in its concept and intention, reﬂected the view of one man: Ronald Reagan. Whereas earlier strategic efforts had been inﬂuenced by such factors as bureaucratic politics and threat perception, SDI bore Reagan’s unique world view. Development of space-based weapons was not new, but this had slowed due to such factors as cost, practicability, and views of arms race instability. Yet Reagan was suggesting something that no other US President during the Cold War had even thought feasible—the absolute, total defense of the United States and thus the end of the danger of nuclear war. Any analysis of Ronald Reagan’s personality and worldview is lengthy and complex and beyond the scope of what is being discussed here. It is important, however, to analyze some elements to gain a better understanding of SDI and why it came to have the impact it did during the 1980s. John Newhouse saw two important sides of Reagan: the fantasist, who viewed the world through the lens of Hollywood screenplays (which came to inﬂuence many of his speeches), and the hard-headed realist, shaped by his experiences as President of the Screen Actors Guild and as Governor of California, capable of pragmatic action and tough negotiation.128 It would appear that SDI emerged from Reagan’s fantasist side. Indeed, historians have argued with cinematic evidence that there are direct links between Reagan’s views and the screenplays of certain ﬁlms.129 Yet an afﬁnity for Hollywood ﬁlms does not in and of itself explain Reagan’s unshakeable faith in SDI, even as the obstacles to its successful deployment mounted. Reagan saw SDI as an example of America’s desire for peace, using its scientiﬁc and technological capabilities to develop a system that would end the state of nuclear threat and bring a lasting peace to the world. Given his deeply rooted beliefs, together with his abhorrence of nuclear weapons, Reagan saw SDI almost as the sole means of achieving

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world peace and ridding the world of these armaments, as opposed to the process of arms control that had been pursued by his predecessors. However, at the height of a renewed Cold War, SDI, regardless of Ronald Reagan’s vision for it, seemed an example of a new stage in the arms race, made possible by technology and the ideological climate of the time. The American approach to strategic defense over the decade from 1976 to 1985 reﬂects two key chronological themes. First, the development of an enhanced US civil defense capability paralleled the development of a more ﬂexible nuclear strategy. As with the need to have ﬂexible strategies for the use of strategic offensive forces, the need to utilize civil defense to mitigate the effects of a Soviet attack was seen as complementary. An improved civil defense capability would, it appeared, prevent the Soviet Union from achieving what it might have believed would be ‘‘victory’’ in a nuclear conﬂict. Such thinking was, of course, based on perceptions of Soviet nuclear strategy. By 1982, it was becoming clear that an enhanced civil defense posture was not enough to provide the United States with an effective strategic defense against the USSR’s vast strategic capabilities. This leads into the second key theme of this subject: the initiation and development of SDI. The fact that Ronald Reagan was present at the apex of US national security policy at this time was the key factor precipitating this turn of events. A different president might have maintained civil defense at present levels and initiated a limited ABM effort, thus improving the US strategic defense posture. Reagan’s unshakable belief in total defense led to SDI. Granted, there had been warnings from hawks about the possibility of a Soviet space-based weapons capability: that had helped spur Edward Teller’s letter to Reagan in July 1982. However, the overall vision for SDI stemmed from Reagan himself. For Reagan, the development of such a system would force the Soviet Union to abandon the arms race and join the United States in a meaningful nuclear disarmament effort, thus ending both the balance of terror and the Cold War. His speech on US–Soviet relations in January 1984 was evidence of such an approach, which culminated at Reykjavik in 1986, where Reagan and Gorbachev proposed a three-stage, 15-year plan for the elimination of offensive strategic weapons. Although it foundered, ironically, on the question of SDI, it is indicative of Reagan’s belief that such a goal was feasible, even if the method of achieving it— SDI—was unrealistic.

Part II

The balance in Europe

4

The nuclear balance

The cornerstone of US strategic policy during the Cold War was indubitably Western Europe, which had, in the twentieth century, come to prominence as an area of vital American interests as a result of the two world wars and their aftermath. The projection of Soviet power and inﬂuence into Central Europe after 1945, and the conﬂict this had helped spawn between the superpowers, had led the United States to bind itself institutionally, through the NATO alliance, to the defense of Western Europe from Soviet designs. From the early 1950s, this commitment had necessitated a large-scale US military deployment in the region, which became the consistent primary focus of American military strategy. For American strategic planners, this required a nuclear commitment to Europe’s defense. Although sizable US conventional forces were stationed in several European NATO states and the European conventional forces were also considerable, the imbalance with the USSR and its Warsaw Pact satellites (both real and perceived) in this area necessitated the deployment of US nuclear weapons to Europe to provide a link between conventional defense and the US strategic arsenal. If, as widely believed, a Soviet offensive overran NATO conventional forces, theatre and tactical nuclear weapons would be used, opening the way for the use of US strategic forces if the Soviets did not halt their aggression forthwith. This link between NATO conventional and European-based nuclear forces and the US strategic deterrent, known as ‘‘coupling,’’ would remain the centrepiece of NATO strategy throughout the Cold War. Theatre nuclear forces were especially important. JCS Chairman General Jones noted this in the introduction to his 1980 posture statement: NATO has long viewed theater nuclear weapons as both an essential leg of the ‘‘NATO Triad’’ (conventional, theater nuclear, and strategic nuclear forces) and a key element in assuring the credibility of the escalation option within NATO’s ﬂexible response strategy.1 This approach had been effective during the 1950s and 1960s. However, as the Soviets increased and improved their strategic arsenal, perceptions

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about the US nuclear guarantee to NATO Europe began to shift. The Soviet buildup had, by the mid-1970s, begun to encompass theatre forces as well. In 1976, the Soviets began to deploy a new intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), the SS-20, to replace older systems targeted on Western Europe. In addition, Soviet conventional forces deployed in Central and Eastern Europe were improved both quantitatively and qualitatively. By 1977, these combined improvements in Soviet forces had begun to raise alarm in the West. The issue of Soviet force improvements received considerable public attention as a result of a speech given by West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in October 1977. In it, he outlined a variety of Allied concerns over US defense and foreign policy in relation to the military balance in Europe. Citing the SALT II negotiations then under way, Schmidt called for parity in both strategic systems (covered in the SALT negotiations) and theatre systems deployed in Europe. As theatre weapons would most likely be used in a European war (and would remain predominant, even if strategic forces did take part), Schmidt was enunciating a concern shared by many in Western Europe. In their eyes, such forces were strategic, and as most NATO (except for the British and French independent deterrents) and all Warsaw Pact theatre weapons were ultimately under the control of the superpowers, they had to be included in the overall nuclear equation.2 ‘‘Strategic arms limitations conﬁned to the United States and the Soviet Union,’’ Schmidt declared, ‘‘will inevitably impair the security of the West European members of the Alliance vis-a vis Soviet military superiority in Europe if we do not succeed in removing the disparities of military power in Europe parallel to the SALT negotiations.’’3

The ‘‘neutron bomb’’ and alliance cohesion, 1977–78 These concerns helped push the United States toward exploring options for deploying improved theatre and tactical systems in Europe. New nuclear artillery shells were in development for 155-mm and 8-inch howitzers, whereas a new US short-range missile, the Lance, began entering service. Along with these improvements, the United States had also developed a new type of nuclear warhead, known as the Enhanced Radiation Warhead (ERW). This weapon relied on using a fusion reaction to produce an explosion that would reduce blast effect. This would concentrate the force of the blast within a relatively small area, with radioactive fallout being similarly concentrated for maximum lethal effect.4 Against massed Soviet tank formations, the ERW would cause enormous casualties while minimizing the physical damage in the area where it was used. In practical terms, this would enable NATO forces to match improved Soviet tactical missiles and artillery and, theoretically,

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would allay West German fears regarding the use of nuclear weapons on their soil.5 Indeed, the damage limitation features of ERW were central to the issue of nuclear weapons in Europe, as they were implicitly linked to supporting NATO conventional forces in the event of a Warsaw Pact invasion. It was these very features that would shape the debate over ERW deployment, a debate that would have far-reaching consequences for the Atlantic Alliance in the decade ahead. By the mid-1970s, US defense planners had begun to take into account damage-limitation options in planning for a possible nuclear conﬂict in Europe. In his FY1976 report, Schlesinger spelled out these efforts: . . . we should continue to develop selective, carefully controlled options that will permit us: (a) to enhance our ability to deal with major penetrations of an allied sector and achieve a quick, decisive reversal of the tactical situation; and (b) to engage . . . in a highly discriminating interdiction campaign against enemy lines of communication. Both . . . options are designed so as to minimize the incentives for the enemy to reply . . . or to respond with uncontrolled attacks. As I indicated earlier, changes in the size and composition of our deployed nuclear stockpiles and systems will improve our ability to accomplish these ends.6 Rumsfeld reiterated this view in his Fiscal Y ear 1978 report. ‘‘The objective,’’ he wrote, ‘‘has been and remains to increase kill probabilities, reduce collateral damage, and economize in the use of scarce nuclear materials.’’7 Thus, as concerns were raised by the European NATO members about the perceived imbalance of nuclear forces on the Continent, the United States had available technologies enabling the deployment of weapons to redress this inadequacy. President Ford authorized development of the ERW in 1976,8 although a decision on deployment was not yet made by the time he left ofﬁce. The Carter Administration found itself embroiled in the ERW issue some six months after taking ofﬁce. In June and July 1977, Walter Pincus of the Washington Post wrote several articles describing the ERW and its capabilities. This quickly led to an uproar among anti-nuclear groups in Europe, with a strong element of anti-American sentiment present in the debate. The USSR directed a strong propaganda effort against the ERW, calling it a ‘‘capitalist bomb’’ that would kill people but leave property intact.9 This led the ERW to be termed the ‘‘neutron bomb.’’ Within a short time, the ERW became an important issue in transatlantic relations. u Qestions were raised about what its addition to the NATO arsenal would mean for crisis stability and the use of nuclear weapons in a European war. Would the ERW enhance deterrence by

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virtue of its ﬂexibility, as its proponents claimed, by limiting collateral damage and concentrating its destructive effects on invading Soviet forces? Or, as opponents argued, would it lead to a temptation by NATO to resort to nuclear weapons early in a conﬂict, initiating unintended consequences and widespread destruction as a result? With arguments for and against deployment, President Carter compromised, asking Congress to provide funding for production, in July 1977, which was done four months later. However, no decision on ERW deployment was made at the time.10 This reﬂected the predicament faced by both the United States and NATO Europe over ERW deployment. The Allies, particularly the West Germans, who supported deployment wanted the Americans to come to a decision on this issue, due to widespread public opposition. The Americans, stung by criticism over ERW, wanted the onus to be on the Europeans, as they had requested an improvement in NATO theatre and tactical forces. The Europeans, in other words, had to decide on where and how to base ERW, as the priority for its deployment would be the defense of NATO Europe. A lack of consensus on this issue in Europe created a perception of indecision for American policymakers, who viewed the Europeans as being half-hearted on important matters pertaining to their defense. Throughout this period, US ofﬁcials went out of their way to emphasize that the ERW was considered to be a nuclear weapon rather than a ‘‘grey area’’ weapon that might be considered conventional and thus have a lower threshold of use than other nuclear warheads. Harold Brown made this clear in his FY1979 report: These weapons [ERW] would not lower the nuclear threshold: the consequences of using any nuclear weapons is so uncertain that the decision to release enhanced radiation weapons would be no easier than any other nuclear decision. They would make our constraints policy of minimizing collateral damage easier to achieve, and improve somewhat the chances that a tactical use of nuclear weapons cold be kept under some degree of control . . . But they are neither a panacea nor a special cause for alarm. (My italics)11 Although such statements provided comfort to proponents of deployment in Europe, Carter’s vacillation meant that the debate dragged on, leading to an ever more emotional argument over ERW. An American offer to include ERW in negotiations on arms control in Europe in return for a reduction in the number of SS-20s by Moscow went nowhere.12 Much of the pressure emanating from the ERW debate was felt by Helmut Schmidt, whose Social Democratic Party (SPD) was seriously divided over the need for ERW deployment, the bulk of which (if not all) would be in West Germany. In a telephone conversation with Carter, Schmidt raised the issue of ‘‘singularity,’’ or the basing of ERW

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in West Germany alone. Schmidt insisted that other NATO states, most notably Belgium and the Netherlands, accept some ERW warheads on their soil, to deﬂect public criticism and ‘‘share the burden’’ of deployment among the Allies.13 By early 1978, Schmidt—who had expended considerable political capital in his efforts regarding ERW—had reached a compromise whereby ERW deployment would be contingent on success in arms control negotiations over forces in Europe. After two years, if such talks were not successful, ERW would be deployed.14 Carter, however, who had deep moral reservations over ERW and saw little practical gain in deployment, took action that led to the unravelling of this formula. In March 1978, Carter cancelled a NATO ministerial meeting on ERW, sending Assistant Secretary of State Warren Christopher to Bonn to inform Schmidt of Carter’s views about cancellation. This alarmed the West Germans, who had gone to great lengths to accept the framework for deployment in response to American pressure on this issue. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, West Germany’s foreign minister, stated that Schmidt supported production and possible deployment. On April 4, a leak to the press indicated that Carter would not produce the ERW, and over the next two days came indications that the President was ‘‘reviewing’’ the issue. On April 7, Carter announced that he was ‘‘deferring’’ a production decision, just two days after West Germany publicly announced support for ERW production.15 Although Carter sweetened the blow somewhat with the announcement that Lance missiles and 155-mm and 8-inch artillery would undergo nuclear modernization with the possibility of ERW capability,16 the effect of this episode on Trans Atlantic relations in the Alliance was extremely detrimental. Relations between Carter and Schmidt, which were at best correct before the issue came to a head in 1978, declined sharply. Schmidt believed that Carter had callously (or even intentionally) undermined his position, as he had expended considerable political capital to win support from the divided and skeptical SPD.17 Carter, for his part, was seen as an untrustworthy and ineffective leader, a man incapable of making important decisions and sticking to them. Such weaknesses were seen by Allied leaders as dangerous shortcomings for an American president, who might conceivably make life-or-death decisions in a crisis. Carter, for his part, saw ERW as a response to a European concern over the nuclear balance and believed that the responsibility for deployment therefore rested with the Europeans, particularly the West Germans. Without agreement on this issue, production of ERW by the United States would serve no purpose.18 Although ERW would adversely affect US relations with the European allies as a whole, the most serious strains were with West Germany. During the Spring of 1977, a special task force directed the study of Europe as part of PRM 10. West Germany was central to America’s European policy, as the PRM 10 drafters noted:

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The balance in Europe The FRG remains the United States’ prime European asset, with economic strength and a basic domestic consensus on foreign policy goals . . . American inﬂuence, among other factors, means that changes in the party in power . . . will have little effect on Bonn’s foreign policy. On balance, the new German self-conﬁdence can serve U.S. interests if the relationship is carefully managed. (My italics; underlining in original)19

Given the mishandling of the ERW issue by Carter, it appeared that a key tenet of his national security strategy had been discarded. Rather than a relationship that was ‘‘carefully managed,’’ it appeared that relations between the United States and West Germany, heretofore based on a strong commitment to NATO unity and cohesion, were now subject to the whim of President Carter, who had based his decision to a signiﬁcant extent on his own personal views of the issue at hand. The ERW imbroglio raised questions about how Carter would shape policy toward Europe. After all, this was the centrepiece of American foreign policy since 1945. Whereas other regions like Southeast Asia and the Middle East had waxed and waned in importance for Washington over the years, Western Europe had consistently maintained its vital importance throughout the entire post-war era. Carter’s hesitation on ERW led to serious concerns over the credibility of the United States, as it represented the most sophisticated tactical nuclear weapon in the US arsenal, tailor-made for use on European battleﬁelds. If the American leadership could not, in reasonable time, make a decision in support of its closest allies, how could the United States, clearly the leading Western power and the indispensable engine of the Atlantic Alliance, be trusted to make decisions that might determine Western Europe’s future for decades to come? At the heart of the debate over ERW was a perceptual difference between the Allies. For the Americans, ERW was seen as a weapon needed by the Europeans to allay fears of the Soviet threat. Given the presence of thousands of US and Allied warheads in Europe, and the ﬂexibility of their delivery systems, the improved Soviet theatre posture was not in and of itself seen as overly dangerous. The primary importance of ERW, therefore, was seen as maintaining European conﬁdence in the US commitment to their security. For the Europeans, on the contrary, ERW was seen as central to their defense. Given the state of strategic parity between the superpowers, any Soviet advantage in theatre forces was seen as dangerously undermining the balance of military power in Europe. Deploying ERW was therefore seen as vital to maintaining the perception of military stability. These perceptions ﬁgured prominently in the decisions made during 1978 regarding deployment. Because the Europeans had raised the issue of improving theatre nuclear forces, the Americans believed that they had to take the lead in deciding when and where ERW would be

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deployed. For their part, the Europeans, and particularly Helmut Schmidt, wanted the Americans to show leadership on this issue and make this decision. These perceptions, however, were conﬂicting, and little effort was made to bridge this gap, resulting in serious transatlantic strains over this issue. To a great extent, the ERW imbroglio helped lead to another contentious debate over the deployment of US nuclear weapons in Europe, this time regarding long-range theatre nuclear missiles. The need for Allied solidarity would be the main legacy of the ERW debate and would be prominent in the theatre missile deployment negotiations. In examining ERW, a valid case could be made that it helped create the long and not always harmonious debate over theatre nuclear forces that emerged during 1979.

The LRTNF debate, 1979–83 The alarm over the balance of forces in Europe during the 1970s came, in no small part, from the improvements to Soviet Long-Range Theatre Nuclear Forces (LRTNF), particularly the deployment of the SS-20. Although designed to replace older SS-4 and SS-5 missiles, the SS-20 was, in comparison with its predecessors, a quantum leap in terms of capability. Whereas the SS-4s and SS-5s were deployed at ﬁxed sites or in silos and had one warhead, the SS-20 was fully mobile and carried three warheads, each independently targetable. It also had greater range (4,400–5,000 km) than the SS-4 (2,000 km) and SS-5 (4,100 km).20 Taken in combination with the development of new Soviet battleﬁeld nuclear weapons and the deployment of the Backﬁre bomber in the western USSR, the SS-20 appeared to herald an attempt by the Soviet Union to establish regional nuclear superiority in Europe. This would cancel out NATO’s ability to use its nuclear forces to deter a Soviet conventional attack against Western Europe, which many analysts and commentators saw as a prelude to a worrying trend. Termed ‘‘Finlandization’’ in reference to what was seen as the USSR’s ability to inﬂuence, through its preponderance of power, Finnish foreign and even domestic policies, this theory held that the Soviet Union, with its conventional and nuclear superiority vis-a`-vis NATO Europe, would be able to intimidate the European members of the Alliance into acceding to Soviet desires. These would enable the USSR to increase its inﬂuence throughout Western Europe, at the expense of the United States, and thus tip the global balance of power radically in its favor.21 The response to this perceived imbalance of power came, at ﬁrst, from the European NATO members. Helmut Schmidt’s October 1977 speech in London had sounded the alarm and forced Washington to examine the situation. The Carter Administration had also begun to worry about the nuclear balance in Europe. The European Task Force that drafted

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PRM 10’s assessment of the region described the situation in May 1977: ‘‘There is strategic parity and a rough standoff in theater nuclear forces despite greater NATO numbers’’ (Underlining in original).22 Perceptions of the US nuclear commitment to Europe, among both the NATO allies and the Warsaw Pact, were then summarized: NATO European allies believe the credibility of the triad [of strategic, theater, and conventional forces defending NATO Europe] hinges on the U.S. strategic and theater nuclear forces. While a palpable risk of a nuclear strike on the Soviet homeland is seen as the key to deterrence, theatre nuclear weapons are also critical in offsetting Pact conventional advantages and in their role as part of overall NATO strategy. Warsaw Pact views are, in many respects, the mirror image. The U.S. will to use nuclear weapons on Europe’s behalf is key to the East’s vision of NATO . . . the Soviets attempt to de-couple U.S. nuclear weapons from NATO through SALT or regional controls on the use of nuclear weapons. (Underlining in original)23 A meeting of the Special Coordinating Committee (SCC) of the NSC held on July 7, 1977, gave a stark description of the LRTNF situation. Addressing PRM 10’s assessment of the European balance, the participants noted that ‘‘Soviet theater nuclear capabilities in Europe are improving signiﬁcantly, and only concerted Western efforts to fulﬁl present improvement programs would halt (but not reverse) current trends in their favor in the military balance on the Central Front’’ (My italics).24 With such concerns in mind, the United States began to quietly modernize its nuclear forces committed to NATO. By 1977, ﬁve Polaris submarines, equipped with a total of 80 single warhead missiles, had been replaced by two Poseidon submarines, equipped with 32 missiles and over 400 warheads. These were assigned to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) for use in the event of a European nuclear war and represented a quantum leap in the West’s strategic capability in this area.25 The number of F-111 dual-capable strike aircraft based in the United Kingdom grew from 80 to 164 during this time.26 All told, NATO ﬁelded some 7,000 nuclear warheads in Europe, whereas more than 3,000 aircraft, missiles, and artillery pieces were designated as nuclear capable.27 During 1977 and early 1978, the Carter Administration found itself pressured to pay more attention to the issue of LRTNF. Two reasons existed for this. First, the diplomatic ﬁasco over ERW had led to serious questions about American credibility regarding NATO. Second, the SALT II negotiations had begun to address certain weapons that could

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be deployed in Europe as theatre systems. From the Europeans’ perspective, the issue of both range and numbers deployed for cruise missiles was a key concern. These weapons—small, cheap and highly accurate—were seen as being an effective deterrent to the Soviet buildup, particularly the SS-20s. In 1977, the Carter Administration dispatched a brieﬁng team to NATO to describe all aspects of cruise missiles and possible deployment. Although even-handed in their briefings, the team attempted to shift European attitudes toward support for American efforts through SALT to negotiate limitations on cruise missile capabilities. This, of course, meant that the Cruise Missile’s potential was played down by the briefers.28 However, from mid-1978 and the ERW ﬁasco, LRTNF had to be looked at afresh. In June 1978, the NSC drafted PRM 38, meant to ‘‘focus on identifying and assessing the major political and military issues bearing on long-range theatre nuclear capability in Europe and arms control.’’29 Already, in November 1977, a High-Level Group (HLG) had been formed, and, in a meeting at Los Alamos, New Mexico in February 1978, the European delegates called for NATO to deploy a new theatre weapon system.30 By October, the HLG was able to begin studies on possible LRTNF forces.31 At the same time, National Security Adviser Brzezinski made a secret trip to Europe to meet the key Allied heads of state: British Prime Minister James Callaghan, French President Giscard d’Estaing, and Helmut Schmidt. As a result, a four-power meeting was set for January 1979 at Guadeloupe.32 The Americans needed European support for SALT II and thus needed to determine a framework for LRTNF deployment. The British sought to purchase Trident missiles to replace their Polaris force, whereas the French wanted continued American support for their own nuclear weapon program. Furthermore, such weapons as cruise and SS20 (seen as ‘‘grey area’’ weapons due to both their theatre and their strategic potential) needed to be addressed in the SALT negotiations.33 At Guadeloupe, the four leaders decided to deploy US LRTNF weapons in Western Europe. Schmidt had accepted this so long as ‘‘singularity’’ was avoided and other states accepted deployment of the weapons on their soil as well.34 He had also secured agreement that negotiations on theatre weapons would occur parallel to planning for deployment of LRTNF.35 Thus was born the ‘‘two-tier’’ or ‘‘two-track’’ approach regarding this issue.36 Three months later, NATO created the so-called Special Group of the HLG,37 which would examine important political issues, including the impact of arms control on LRTNF improvements.38 Throughout 1979, these groups met and determined both the military and the political approaches to be taken regarding LRTNF deployment. By year’s end, NATO was ready to reach a public decision on this issue. At a meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group in The Hague on November 13–14, 1979,

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The balance in Europe Ministers noted that the modernization of theatre nuclear systems would, by adding highly accurate and survivable, long-range systems based in NATO Europe, enhance NATO’s deterrent and strengthen the linkage between NATO’s conventional forces and United States intercontinental strategic systems; and by augmenting NATO long range theatre nuclear forces, close a gap in the spectrum of escalation and provide increased options for restrained and controlled responses.39

Here exists the rationale for the deployment of LRTNF, both to strengthen the NATO deterrent and to maintain the ‘‘coupling’’ of US strategic forces. Indeed, many of the arguments made for ERW deployment two years earlier can be seen, namely, the link between the US nuclear commitment and maintaining a balance with the USSR in theatre forces. Whereas American and European perceptions of the role of ERW in the military balance had been very different in 1978, by late 1979 they were very similar regarding LRTNF. On December 12, following a meeting of the Defense Planning Committee, a special meeting of the Alliance’s foreign and defense ministers came to a decision on LRTNF deployment. In accordance with what had been decided during the HLG’s meetings, a total of 572 missiles—108 Pershing II and 464 Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM)—would be deployed in Europe. To avoid the appearance of increased reliance on nuclear weapons for deterrence, some 1,000 US nuclear warheads would be withdrawn from Europe.40 Furthermore, as part of the ‘‘dualtrack’’ approach, the ministers emphasized the need for arms control agreements that would create equal ceilings on US and Soviet theatre systems.41 It was in the area of strategic arms control that the issue of LRTNF was brought up. The Soviets had, since the talks leading to the SALT I agreement in 1972, expressed concern over the presence of American Forward Based Systems (FBS)—nuclear missiles and nuclear-capable aircraft based in Europe and Asia or on aircraft carriers in nearby waters—that could, along with the US strategic forces Triad, be considered a part of the US strategic nuclear posture. In 1979, these forces in Europe included 108 Pershing IA missiles (based in West Germany), over 150 F-111’s based in Great Britain, some 250 F-4 ﬁghter-bombers, 20 A-6 and 40 A-7 attack aircraft, stationed on European bases and aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean.42 The Americans had excluded these systems from SALT, maintaining that they were tied to regional defense and were not therefore strategic. A CIA report issued in May 1977 took note of the Soviet emphasis on FBS: The Soviets believe they have a strong case—and one that could be particularly effective in inﬂuencing foreign public opinion—that US

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forward-based systems are a strategic asymmetry in US favor and are a proper subject for bilateral limitations on strategic arms.43 One option noted by the authors was for a limitation on cruise missiles as a means of deﬂecting Soviet insistence on FBS inclusion. A major US effort toward strategic reductions—like that seen in March 1977—could have led to Soviet insistence on a freeze on new FBS before 1985, although the Soviet demand for FBS reduction ‘‘is one they probably will not ultimately insist on.’’44 By 1978, however, the idea of including some concessions on these forces, in response to a Soviet reduction in LRTNF (i.e., the SS-20s) was seen as meriting consideration. In February of that year, an SCC meeting addressed these issues in relation to a planned SALT III agreement: We will include the following formula in a unilateral statement: ‘‘Any further limitation on U.S. systems principally designed for theatre missions should be accompanied by appropriate limits on Soviet theatre systems.’’ We will present this approach in the February 24 NAC [North Atlantic Council] consultations, while maintaining our ﬂexibility on the speciﬁc language of a statement.45 As it happened, the issue of FBS was not included in the ﬁnal SALT II agreement, signed in June 1979. However, the idea of such a formula was considered for a possible SALT III agreement, which it was believed would be negotiated in the early 1980s. The issue of LRTNF, therefore, had been decided upon by both the United States and its European allies. Although there would be difﬁculties— that is, Dutch and Belgian reluctance, due to domestic opposition, to come to an immediate decision over basing—the framework of deployment and arms control had been agreed to. The mix of the two systems—the Pershing II with its prompt, hard-target kill capability, the GLCM with its greater range but longer ﬂight time—helped to allay fears that these new systems represented a forward-based US ﬁrst-strike capability.46 The fact that more than three-quarters of the missiles were GLCMs strengthened this view. However, whereas the efforts leading to the December 1979 decision had been initiated by the Europeans to strengthen the American nuclear link to the Allies, by this time, LRTNF deployment was also being championed by Americans increasingly disillusioned with De´tente. In September 1979, Henry Kissinger gave a speech in Brussels titled ‘‘The Future of NATO.’’ Addressing the issue of theatre nuclear forces, Kissinger warned If there is no theater nuclear establishment on the continent of Europe, we are writing the script for selective blackmail in which

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The balance in Europe our allies will be threatened, and in which we will be forced into a decision whereby we can respond only with a strategy that has no military purpose but only the aim of destruction of populations.47

Kissinger further argued that ‘‘either the Soviet nuclear threat in theater nuclear forces against Europe be eliminated (which I do not see is possible), or . . . an immediate effort be made to build up our theater nuclear forces.’’48 Although inﬂuential Americans began to call for a stronger effort at LRTNF modernization, events began to shift this debate onto a different plane. Within two weeks of the NATO ministers’ decision on Pershing II and GLCM deployment, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, providing a spark for a renewed Cold War between the superpowers. Rather than a means of ensuring De´tente through effective deterrence, LRTNF now appeared to serve as a symbol of American resolve in a new era of confrontation with the USSR. In other words, what was seen as a strengthening of the existing state of East–West relations—something which the Europeans had desired— now appeared to suit a more bellicose approach from Washington, which the Europeans, having more at stake in the De´tente developed during the 1970s, did not tend to endorse. This was made plainly evident when, as a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Carter withdrew the SALT II treaty from US Senate consideration at the beginning of 1980. The hope that a SALT III treaty would then be negotiated, and in which equal LRTNF levels would be established, appeared dashed. Now, deployment, rather than deployment and negotiations, appeared to be the only conceivable outcome.49 The difference of opinion regarding deployment became more visible after Ronald Reagan took ofﬁce in 1981. Carter had seen the renewed confrontation as a period in which the Soviet Union would, after accepting American resolve, return to a more businesslike approach in superpower relations. Reagan saw this situation as succeeding De´tente, in which the United States was now engaged in a struggle for the survival of freedom across the globe, in direct competition with Moscow. However, in May 1981, at a meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome, the United States announced that it would open talks on limiting LRTNF (now termed Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces or INF). This was welcomed by the European NATO members, who saw the issue as being one that could cause a serious rift in Trans Atlantic relations.50 In November 1981, Reagan proposed the so-called ‘‘Z ero Option,’’ by which all Soviet LRTNF missiles would be dismantled in return for the United States not deploying Pershing IIs and GLCMs.51 This approach had a strong appeal for President Reagan, as indicated in a November 1981 memorandum for discussion with the chief US INF negotiator, Paul Nitze. ‘‘We are offering a very bold and constructive

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proposal on limiting the major missile threat in Europe,’’ the President pointed out, before describing in greater detail its importance: I want to emphasize that the zero level proposal I made public on November 18 is a serious proposal and that we will be negotiating it in good faith. Our Allies support it strongly as well. o Yu should emphasize that any levels of intermediate range above zero threatening Europe will be because the Soviets will not accept that limit. (My italics)52 However, it faced several practical problems. The Soviets would have to dismantle several hundred missiles, including their most modern SS20s, in return for an American promise not to deploy weapons that were not yet in place. Moreover, some of the NATO states in which the missiles might be deployed, most notably Belgium and the Netherlands, had not made a ﬁnal decision on deployment; thus, some of the new US missiles might not be stationed in Europe anyway, meaning that Moscow had even less incentive for accepting the ‘‘Z ero Option.’’ 53 Another factor mitigating against this approach was the fact that the British and French nuclear deterrents would remain unaffected.54 These forces, while small compared the massive US and Soviet arsenals, were hardly insigniﬁcant. Britain deployed four ballistic missile submarines with a total of 64 missiles, whereas France deployed ﬁve missile submarines with 80 missiles, about 30 strategic bombers, and 18 IRBMs.55 These would remain a formidable striking force in the European theatre, even if (as was the case of the French arsenal) they were under respective national, rather than NATO, control. Nonetheless, the ofﬁcial US position remained the ‘‘Z ero Option,’’ and the superpowers conducted a series of negotiations on INF in Geneva from November 1981 through November 1983.56 On the whole, neither side was able to make headway in the negotiations. The terms of the US position were unacceptable to the Soviets, who were unable to offer an acceptable alternative. The only real sign of progress came in June 1982. During an informal meeting, later termed the ‘‘Walk in the Woods,’’ Paul Nitze and Y uli Kvitsinsky, his Soviet counterpart, agreed to a formula for INF. The Soviets would reduce their force to just 75 SS-20s facing Europe while eliminating some 380 older SS-4s and SS-5s. The Americans would be allowed to deploy just 75 GLCMs in return.57 However, both Washington and Moscow rejected this proposal. On the American side, there was a lack of coordination as well as the opposition of more hawkish members of the Reagan Administration (most notably Weinberger and Assistant Secretary Perle), who worried that giving up Pershing IIs would have harmed deterrence in Europe.58 Also, it was seen as destabilizing relations with the European NATO allies, especially West Germany’s Helmut Schmidt, who would have been outraged that a weapon system he had agreed to had been sharply curtailed in deployment, as had been the

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case with ERW.59 The Soviets too rejected this proposal, as it would have left British and French forces intact and forced a massive reduction in their own INF arsenal with little American reciprocity.60 In terms of relations with the European NATO allies, the ‘‘Walk in the Woods’’ brought about criticism on two counts. First, although Nitze had been acting on his own, it was feared that Reagan could have put his position and prestige as President behind the offer. This revived the European fear of the superpowers ‘‘doing a deal’’ over the heads of European leaders, a concern shared by American hawks like Weinberger and Perle. Second, the fact that the deal had been rejected by the United States was also condemned, as it was seen as a missed opportunity both to gain a substantial Soviet INF reduction while improving NATO capabilities in this area. It was also seen as a missed opportunity to reduce tensions between the two superpowers, which had led to fears of war in Western Europe and a massive anti-nuclear movement that, by 1982, had come to exert considerable pressure in several European countries. Nonetheless, the ‘‘Walk in the Woods’’ did lead to some ﬂexibility in American INF proposals. NSDD 104, issued on September 21, 1983, described this approach: While actively keeping our proposal to eliminate all land-based LRINF missiles on the table, the United States formally notiﬁed the Soviet Union that the United States is prepared to enter into an interim agreement under which the United States would accept a limit at some ﬁnite, agreed number of warheads on LRINF landbased missile launchers if the Soviet Union reduces the number of warheads on its LRINF land-based missile force to an equal level on a global basis.61 Despite this modiﬁcation, the INF negotiations broke down in November 1983, as the ﬁrst Pershings and GLCMs were due to be deployed. The Soviets, on learning of the impending deployments, walked out of the talks in Geneva. The lion’s share of the blame for the failure of the negotiations therefore fell upon the Soviet Union.62 In December 1983, the ﬁrst nine Pershing IIs were deployed to West Germany, with GLCMs arriving in the United Kingdom at the same time. By December 1985, all 108 Pershing IIs had been deployed in West Germany, whereas a total of 464 GLCMs had been stationed in the United Kingdom, West Germany, Italy, and Belgium by March 1986.63 As the Netherlands had demurred on deployment, extra GLCMs were stationed in West Germany. The deployment of improved LRTNF was necessitated by the ERW debate and was shaped by many of the same perceptions. The need to maintain a European nuclear balance with the Soviet Union was central in the decision to deploy LRTNF as well as maintain transatlantic solidarity.

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However, differing sets of perceptions were at work during these years. During 1978–79, LRTNF deployment was seen as helping to maintain ´tente in Europe, as a stable military balance would facilitate European De arms control and further the process of cooperation between East and West. From December 1979, when the decision on deployment was made, this began to change. The emergence of a renewed Cold War saw LRTNF representing a more robust Western security policy vis-a`-vis the USSR. Although the European NATO allies certainly recognized this shift in perceptions, it was most pronounced in the United States, the Alliance’s most powerful member and the nation that would produce and deploy these weapons to defend its allies.

US perceptions and the Soviet threat From the American perspective, the overall Soviet military threat to Europe was central in the nuclear issue. Naturally, this played a key role in determining the US response. Secretary Brown observed Soviet LRTNF capabilities in his FY1980 report: Judgements about the adequacy of our theater nuclear forces will be affected strongly by the role given to them in deterring Soviet nuclear or conventional attacks. These judgements, in turn, are affected by the counterpart capabilities of the Soviet Union. . . . most of their peripheral attack forces appear to be oriented toward Western Europe. NATO, by contrast, has few theater nuclear systems that can reach these Soviet forces. Coverage of the Soviet peripheral attack forces would have to come primarily from the U.S. strategic capabilities, as NATO recognized some time ago.64 From both a political and a military standpoint, the new LRTNF weapons provided a sound means to rectify a perceived imbalance of power in an area crucial to American security. In his 1984 report, Weinberger noted, By virtue of their high accuracy, both Pershing II and GLCM will provide an effective capability to attack hard targets while limiting collateral damage. In addition, each system has distinctive characteristics that complement those of the other. Pershing II offers a high assurance of penetrating future Soviet defenses, [and] has the capability to strike time-urgent targets . . . GLCM’s longer range will allow it to attack deeper targets and to be based farther rearward, thereby increasing its pre-launch survivability and offering an opportunity for broader participation among the allies by hosting U.S. deployments on their soil.65 The JCS cited the importance of LRTNF to both European and US security. In his 1981 posture statement, General Jones emphasized the

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necessity of deployment of the Pershing II and GLCM in support of NATO: Continued modernization and strengthening of Soviet theater nuclear and conventional forces have highlighted the need for NATO TNF modernization, particularly in longer-range systems where the greatest deﬁciency lies. Modernization is not designed to match the Warsaw Pact system-by-system, but to provide signiﬁcant long-range capability enhancing the range of possible responses to aggression. US theater nuclear systems . . . are intended to compliment allied capabilities in meeting the projected threat.66 The State Department, dealing with the likely diplomatic and political moves to be made by the Soviet Union, saw the issue of LRTNF as being ripe for exploitation by Moscow. In an August 1979 report, the Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research noted that the Soviets would try ‘‘to protect deployment programs of the new Soviet systems, especially the SS-20’’ while attempting ‘‘to seize the political/propaganda high ground’’ on the LRTNF issue. Such moves would serve ‘‘to impede the development of an added NATO long-range theater nuclear capability.’’67 During the ﬁrst two years of the Reagan Administration, the Bureau also warned of Soviet efforts to take advantage of LRTNF negotiations in Geneva. The Bureau warned in a November 1982 report of concrete military steps that could be taken by the USSR in addition to a variety of negotiating positions and propaganda efforts: Moscow may also take certain military steps to gain leverage in INF talks and to increase Soviet military capabilities. Moscow could, for example, deploy SS-20s well beyond their current numbers. The Soviets might be able to deploy long-range . . . GLCMs by the mid 1980s.68 In examining American perceptions during this time, it is important to note the differences in opinion between the Carter and Reagan administrations as to their deﬁnitions of the military balance. The Carter Administration viewed it as one of rough parity—‘‘essential equivalence,’’ to use its terminology. This meant that US and Allied military programs were shaped to maintain this balance of power, and to prevent the Soviets from gaining an undue advantage. The Reagan Administration, on the contrary, saw an imbalance of military power, favoring the Soviet Union, as having emerged by 1981. The priority for the United States was therefore to establish military superiority over the Soviet Union across the military spectrum to forestall Soviet expansionism. One area where this became apparent was in INF negotiations. Whereas the Carter Administration saw negotiations on these forces as

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being in line with the SALT process (in which an essential equivalence would be maintained), Reagan and his advisers saw these efforts as complementing efforts to restore American superiority, by eliminating Soviet advantages. The ‘‘Z ero Option’’ would have fully eliminated the Soviet INF threat to Europe while merely halting US efforts on similar weapons. The ‘‘Walk in the Woods’’ would have had a similar effect. By limiting superpower INF missiles to 75 apiece, this would have placed the burden of disarmament on the USSR. It would also have allowed the United States to show NATO that it had accomplished a major reduction in the Soviet threat, in return for minimal US INF deployment. The differences in opinion existing between the two presidents were mirrored by those existing between the United States and its European allies.

Conclusion The ofﬁcial US view during this time saw improvements to Soviet LRTNF as creating multiple threats—military, political, and diplomatic—for NATO. The deployment of Pershing IIs and GLCMs was seen in a similar manner and underlines the essential nature of this issue: that it was a matter of perception on many levels, with repercussions to be felt at each of them if this deployment was not undertaken. From a European perspective, the issue tended to swing between two extremes: on the one hand, doubts about the US nuclear commitment to Europe, which had existed to some extent since the early 1960s; on the other, the view that the United States might be too eager to use these forces in a European war to limit nuclear use to the Continent, away from the United States itself. These concerns arose ﬁrst during the ERW episode. A weapon offered by the United States to allay European concerns regarding the perceived imbalance of theatre weapons vis-a`-vis the Soviet Union became an object of heated debate over whether it would serve as a deterrent or a usable weapon. These issues had not been resolved when the debate regarding LRTNF emerged, meaning that much of the same sort of rhetoric was heard. Thus, the issue of what would best serve the Atlantic Alliance in terms of military security tended to become lost among a plethora of arguments. Like the Americans with the strategic balance, the Europeans placed great emphasis on the perception of the balance of theatre forces regarding their role in NATO’s security.69 On this issue, the Europeans’ concerns tended to correlate with those of more hawkish Americans. These were reinforced by European concerns that, due to what appeared to be Soviet LRTNF superiority, the American commitment was in jeopardy. This, in turn, led to yet another offer by the United States to provide new weapons to maintain the balance.

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Y et it was not only differing views of the nature of such weapons that led to friction between the United States and the European NATO allies. The international political climate also had a part to play. During the debate over ERW and LRTNF deployment, De´tente, although under serious pressure, persisted. From 1980, the emergence of the Second Cold War changed the nature of debates over many issues of the East– West balance. Whereas LRTNF had been seen as a means of preserving ´tente, during the early 1980s, they deterrence within a framework of De came to symbolize a new American assertiveness vis-a`-vis the USSR, leading to European fears that manifested themselves in massive public protests. Many NATO governments, including those of the Netherlands (which ultimately did not deploy GLCM) and Belgium (which delayed considerably its decision to deploy) had to take these into account in formulating policy. These concerns led to the ‘‘Dual-Track’’ formula for deployment, linking it to progress in arms control in this area. However, the approach taken by the Americans from 1981 through the ‘‘Z ero Option’’ meant that for numerous reasons (including Soviet intransigence), negotiations tended to fall by the wayside. The European NATO countries were therefore faced with the need to make good on their promise to deploy Pershing II and GLCM, as to delay or refuse would undermine Allied credibility. With widespread public protest by 1983, however, the political costs appeared signiﬁcantly higher than had been the case 4 years earlier. The issue of the European nuclear balance is an example of how Alliance politics, and the perceptions on which they were based, came to shape decision-making. Here, not only did such factors as domestic public opinion and interagency views play a role, but also two often differing views of the same situation, which had to be harmonized in order for a workable decision to be agreed to. This lay at the heart of the LRTNF debate and, as shall be seen, that over the conventional balance as well.

5

Conventional forces1

At the same time that the USSR’s deployment of SS-20s began to draw attention to the military situation in Europe, the issue of the conventional forces balance—particularly in the area known to NATO as the Central Region2—began to attract greater scrutiny in the West. The shaping of this aspect of the balance went back nearly a decade and involved several important developments in defensive strategies, diplomacy, and military posture. First, and most important, was a decision made in December 1967 regarding NATO’s defense strategy. Known as Military Committee document 14/3 (MC 14/3), this strategy saw NATO responding to military actions by the Warsaw Pact at the same level using the same means (at least initially.) Thus, small-scale actions (such as probing assaults across the inter-German border) would be met by similar-sized forces.3 This extended the doctrine of ‘‘Flexible Response’’ adapted by the United States during the Kennedy Administration to NATO as a whole. As the term ‘‘Flexible Response’’ indicates, NATO would meet Warsaw Pact aggression on the level at which it was initiated, only resorting to increased levels of force (i.e., theatre and strategic nuclear weapons) as necessitated by the military situation. This shift in strategy, which had been debated by NATO for several years, was necessitated by the massive buildup of Soviet strategic forces, vitiating the earlier American strategy of ‘‘massive retaliation,’’ which saw NATO conventional forces as a tripwire for the use of theatre and strategic weapons against the USSR and the Warsaw Pact in the event of a European war. As with any signiﬁcant decision by an alliance such as NATO, MC 14/3 had a strong political context, which would play an important role a decade later as efforts toward strengthening the Alliance’s conventional forces began to be made. This strategy was complimentary to the concurrent decision by the Alliance, made at the North Atlantic Council’s meeting in Brussels. Known popularly as the Harmel Report, this decision, titled ‘‘The Future Tasks of the Alliance,’’ outlined two key goals. First, regarding defense, ‘‘the Alliance will maintain, as necessary, a sui-

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table military capability to assure the balance of forces [between NATO and the Warsaw Pact], thereby creating a climate of stability, security and conﬁdence.’’4 This enabled NATO to carry out its second goal: In this climate the Alliance can carry out its second function, to pursue the search for progress towards a more stable relationship in which the underlying political issues can be solved. Military security ´tente are not contradictory but complimentary. It is the and a policy of de necessary condition for effective policies directed towards a greater relaxation of tensions. (My italics)5 By embracing the realities of the military balance and adopting NATO strategy to them, MC 14/3 thus provided the nucleus for NATO’s ﬁrst goal, which of course made the second possible. However, at the time that MC 14/3 and Harmel were issued, the ability of the United States, the Atlantic Alliance’s most powerful member, to provide a strengthened conventional role was under severe strain. By 1968, the United States had deployed some 543,000 military personnel in Southeast Asia, with an enormous logistical effort involving its forces around the globe. As early as 1966, 15,000 US ‘‘specialist’’ personnel had been withdrawn from Europe and deployed to Vietnam.6 In 1968, another 28,000 US troops—two-thirds of a mechanized division, an armored cavalry regiment and support personnel—were withdrawn from West Germany to the United States. Although they remained committed to a role in the defense of NATO, the need for experienced troops for deployment to Vietnam was one of the reasons for this action.7 This sapping of military resources, as well as serious disciplinary and morale problems and major reductions in funding for US conventional forces in the aftermath of the war, meant that the American contribution to NATO in this area could not be seen with the same conﬁdence as was the case a decade earlier. The political situation had also stabilized. From 1967, and especially 1969, East–West relations improved markedly. West German Chancellor Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik helped pave the way for a settlement of many outstanding issues causing tensions in Europe. This coincided with the emerging US–Soviet De´tente, which intersected with European De´tente in such efforts as the Quadripartite Agreement over Berlin in 1971 and the Helsinki Accords of 1975, the high point of these efforts in Europe. Major improvements in NATO’s conventional military capabilities were therefore not of vital concern, as the political climate did not appear to demand such efforts.

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Prelude to the LTDP, 1974–77 Beginning in 1974, however, a shift in perceptions began in the United States. With Vietnam now past, American policymakers began to look anew at the military situation in Europe and at the composition of US forces there, with an eye to strengthen their capabilities. In 1974, Senator Sam Nunn proposed an amendment to the defense authorization bill calling for a reduction of 18,000 US support troops in Europe. These could, however, be replaced by combat troops, enhancing the ﬁghting ability of the forces stationed there. The Ford Administration gave its support to this measure.8 The need for such improvements was echoed by Secretary of Defense Schlesinger in his report to Congress in 1974: To stress that we and our NATO allies have the ground and tactical air forces to mount a stalwart defense against the ‘‘designated’’ (or expected) Pact threat does not mean that we can view the situation in Europe with complacency. As I have indicated, NATO has somewhat fewer forces than the Pact, and if more pessimistic assumptions are made about several key variables (such as Pact mobilization and deployment time, warning and allied responses), the NATO position begins to look more precarious and the nuclear threshold becomes lower. It is also the case that while a rough balance of forces is essential to deterrence, it by no means guarantees an acceptable outcome for NATO if deterrence should fail. Even as we preserve the equilibrium, there remain a number of quantitative and qualitative weaknesses in our collective posture that must be removed.9 Thanks to the Nunn Amendment, the Ford Administration moved to strengthen US forces deployed in NATO Europe. Two brigades and other ground combat elements were slated for deployment in 1975, and additional Air Force units were also scheduled to be sent at the same time.10 As a result of these efforts, the 1970s witnessed a rebuilding of US conventional forces in Europe. What became clear, however, was that an Alliance-wide, long-term conventional buildup was needed in order to redress the imbalance of military power in the Central Region. A new American Administration would take the lead in formulating such a policy, so as to ensure that NATO would achieve the goals set out by MC 14/3 nearly a decade earlier. By January 1977, the United States had begun to improve its conventional military capabilities in the Central Region. In accordance with the Nunn Amendment of 1974, some 13,909 combat personnel had been deployed to Europe during FYs 1975 and 1976 in place of the 18,000 support troops to be withdrawn.11 Another program that had been initiated during the mid-1970s was known as Pre- Positioning Of Materiel Conﬁgured to Unit Sets (POMCUS). US Army formations

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based in the continental United States and earmarked for reinforcement to NATO Europe had sets of equipment deployed in Europe. When ordered to deploy, these troops would be airlifted there to ‘‘marry up’’ with their equipment, thus accelerating the reinforcement process considerably. Considerable planning and reﬁnement of the POMCUS program was underway by 1977.12 However, increased airlift capabilities did not receive the funding that POMCUS had, meaning that a shortfall in available air transport assets was emerging.13 The incoming Carter Administration began to focus its efforts toward strengthening the Atlantic Alliance and US–West European cooperation overall. In February 1977, the administration issued PRM 9, titled ‘‘Comprehensive Review of European Issues.’’ Its aim was to ‘‘Examine broad trends in US relations with Western Europe, the European Community, and other major institutions . . . and the relative utility of available frameworks in which the US and Western Europe deal with each other.’’14 Not surprisingly, NATO received considerable attention: The review should identify major issues confronting NATO, including steps the US might take to invigorate the Alliance politically. Taking into account the improvements in Warsaw Pact and NATO capabilities . . . there should also be a general examination of NATO’s basic military posture and overall force structure and current strategy and tactics, including the question of warning time of an unreinforced surprise attack. The review should consider: the issue of warning time, questions of Allied defense investment, procurement procedures, standardization, and interoperability of weapons systems; and whether a basic NATO review of important aspects of the Alliance’s strategy and doctrine would be appropriate.15 The military situation in NATO’s Central Region came to occupy a signiﬁcant place in PRM 10. A European Task Force on Comprehensive Net Assessment was established as part of the PRM 10 effort. Its authors were directed in March 1977 to ‘‘describe in summary form projected trends in the NATO/Warsaw Pact balance,’’ as well as ‘‘the impact of Soviet doctrine and objectives on the European military balance; likely trends in (and implications for the military balance of) the force posture of individual Warsaw Pact states; and any internal factors in the Warsaw Pact that affect its military posture.’’16 This emphasis on Soviet doctrine was common throughout PRM 10, and here it reﬂected concerns about shifts in Soviet military planning that could threaten the balance in Europe. As for NATO, the Task Force would ‘‘Examine trends in defense relations among the NATO Allies.’’ This would include joint planning, standardization of weaponry and equipment, greater defense cooperation among the European NATO states, and ‘‘the political and military requirements for major US force deployments in the European theater over the long- term.’’17

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By May 1977, the Task Force had completed a summary of European issues, including the military balance. Its discussion of trends in this area was rather bleak. Overall, the balance was termed ‘‘adverse,’’ due to ‘‘improvements in Pact forces over the last decade . . . The Pact would . . . have a signiﬁcant initial advantage in an unreinforced Soviet initiated attack.’’18 It also noted the importance of Soviet doctrine in shaping the conduct of a European war and the existing force posture of the Warsaw Pact: Soviet strategy for war in Europe places a premium on force superiority at the outset, on neutralizing NATO airpower and on securing key objectives within two to three weeks—thereby hoping to disrupt or prevent NATO reinforcement. The Pact’s greatest advantage lies in a short, non-nuclear war. (Underlining in original)19 The summary gave mixed reviews to NATO. ‘‘NATO has made signiﬁcant, though limited, advances in a number of areas: standardization, interoperability of weapons systems, and joint planning.’’ However, ‘‘Because of economic factors, European NATO members have not signiﬁcantly increased their defense budgets, and some reductions in effectiveness are likely, particularly in British, Italian and Belgian forces.’’20 The technological balance was also emphasized. ‘‘NATO possesses an advantage, if a diminishing one, over the Warsaw Pact in general technology and in the ability to apply it; the latter remains the key Soviet weakness . . . Despite NATO’s advantage, a signiﬁcant advance by either side could affect the military balance’’ (My italics; underlining in original).21 Many of these concerns found their way into the ﬁnal draft of PRM 10, issued in June 1977. ‘‘The Pact’s large, modern ground forces in Eastern Europe and the Western USSR pose the major threat to NATO.’’ It went on to note: ‘‘The major imbalances from NATO’s perspective are the Pact’s potential for quickly building up its combat forces in East Europe and NATO’s low inventory of combat consumables . . . The assessment concludes that the chance of NATO stopping an attack with minimal loss of territory and then achieving its full objective of recovering that land which had been lost appears remote at the present time.’’22 The efforts to rebuild US conventional strength in Europe had, by 1977, become central to American defense planning. Beginning with the Nunn Amendment of 1974, a gradual increase in US troop strength had been underway, with an emphasis on the deployment of combat formations and the stationing of equipment for US reinforcements in Europe. PRM 10 addressed the key issues of the military balance in the Central Region, and thus provided a framework for the efforts that would take place during the Carter years. These efforts would come to form the basis of NATO defense policy into the next decade.

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The three percent decision and the LTDP By May 1977, the Carter Administration had made considerable progress in formulating its NATO policy. Although PRM 10 was still a month away, existing studies helped shape efforts. In November 1976, the RAND Corporation had completed a study called Alliance Defense in the Eighties (AD-80), which included many ideas that would shape US policy. Among these were the increasing Soviet emphasis on rapid, combined-arms assaults by conventional forces. The amount of warning time for a Warsaw Pact attack, which had been assumed by NATO to be considerable, was seen as being signiﬁcantly reduced by AD-80. Most important was the fact that its principal author, Robert W. Komer, who became the Defense Department’s Special Adviser on NATO Affairs, had been part of Jimmy Carter’s Presidential election campaign, preparing background papers on these issues.23 The importance of AD-80 for the Carter Administration’s planning was its emphasis on both long-term, Alliance-wide efforts at defense improvements and the need for highlevel cooperation in order for this to be achieved.24 During the ﬁrst months of the Carter Administration, informal discussions between American and European ofﬁcials brought tacit support for new American initiatives regarding conventional force improvements. At the London Summit, held between May 10 and 11, 1977, Carter publicly introduced the Long-Term Defense Program (LTDP) to his fellow Allied leaders. The LTDP, in the President’s words, would be ‘‘a long-term program to strengthen the Alliance’s deterrence and defense in the 1980s,’’25 implicitly linking it to the goals of the Harmel Report nearly a decade before. Whereas US involvement in Vietnam had diverted attention from NATO at that time, it now appeared that the central focus of American strategic planning would be on Europe Carter’s fellow heads of state received the LTDP most favorably, giving it their blessing and instructing their defense ministers to make plans in order for the program to be ready by the time of the May 1978 NATO summit.26 Like the Americans, the European NATO members had become increasingly alarmed by the improvements in Warsaw Pact conventional forces in Eastern Europe. In December 1976, NATO’s Defense Planning Committee (DPC) cited the danger of a low-warning attack by the Warsaw Pact, while citing improvements in NATO forces. These included the restructuring of US and West German forces for greater combat capability.27 The need for efforts to be coordinated by all members of the Alliance was clearly recognized and appreciated by its leaders in 1977. Meeting a week later in Brussels, the DPC set to work establishing a formal framework for the LTDP. The Committee established a planning guidance for the years 1979–84, which would address such issues as defense cooperation, planning, and improvements in weapons acquisition and mobilization.28 In the short term, the DPC declared its

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immediate effort would focus on ‘‘a program of short-term measures in areas of anti-armor, war reserve munitions, and readiness and reinforcement,’’ while simultaneously it would ‘‘prepare a time-phased defense action program concentrating on a limited number of areas where collective action is urgently required.’’29 The ﬁrst, and most public, order of business for NATO with regards to the LTDP was to decide on common levels of increases in defense spending. The DPC had agreed to an increase of three percent per year to maintain a sustainable growth in expenditures.30 This would also allow NATO to match Soviet defense expenditure increases on a percentage basis, which would be only slightly higher at 5 percent per annum.31 It marked an area of vital importance for improvement by NATO. During the 1970s, most European NATO members had been forced to reduce spending, thanks to the recession of 1973–75 and the need to maintain the highly developed social welfare systems that had become the centerpiece of public policy. The United States had only just begun to move toward increasing defense expenditures, and the fruits of these efforts would take several years to reap. The DPC was nonetheless ﬂexible in its implementation of this agreed level, noting that ‘‘some individual countries’ economic circumstances will affect what can be achieved.’’32 Over the following year, the DPC formulated a coherent plan of action for the Alliance based on the LTDP. Ten so-called ‘‘Action Areas’’ were identiﬁed: air defense; command, control, and communications; electronic warfare; logistics; maritime posture; rationalization; readiness; reinforcement; reserve mobilization; and theatre nuclear modernization.33 At the DPC’s meeting in Brussels in May 1978, the ministers reafﬁrmed the three percent decision and went on to declare . . . that the Long-Term Defence Programme was designed in particular to meet the need for a more comprehensive framework for NATO’s defence planning, incorporating a longer-term approach, and thus enabling the collective needs of the Alliance to be taken more into account in the development of national plans.34 Eleven days later, at the North Atlantic Council summit in Washington, DC, the leaders of the NATO countries participating in the LTDP formally approved it and declared that it necessitated ‘‘vigorous followthrough action to be taken by national authorities and at NATO and international military headquarters,’’ and that ‘‘In taking these decisions, these Allied leaders concluded that, in the absence of equitable arms control and disarmament agreements, a satisfactory balance in strategic, theatre nuclear and conventional terms could only be assured by greater efforts to modernize and strengthen the military capacity of the Alliance.’’35

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Despite these resolute statements, problems soon arose as to how the LTDP’s goals would be achieved. First and foremost, the LTDP left the actual implementation of its ‘‘Action Areas’’ to the states taking part in it.36 Because of the LTDP’s importance, the United States was able to keep it outside of the regular NATO force planning structure.37 Most troublesome for LTDP implementation was that updating the LTDP in terms of introducing new recommendations to meet deﬁciencies was nearly impossible. National governments reported progress in NATO Defense Planning Questionnaires, rather than—as Robert Komer had hoped—through an annual LTDP review.38 John Dufﬁeld has identiﬁed two areas where the LTDP came up short. First, it failed to make substantial increases in the size of NATO’s conventional forces in the Central Region. Rather than the six division equivalents called for by the United States, the allies only planned for six reserve brigades to be formed, and then only by the late 1980s. Second, the LTDP was meant to encompass all of NATO in terms of planning, and that meant that topics like the air defense of Britain and Portugal came into its purview. From the nine ‘‘Action Areas’’ for conventional forces outlined in 1977, these had grown to over 150 by 1981.39 The original goal of increasing NATO’s strength in the area of primary confrontation with the Warsaw Pact, the Central Region, was thus signiﬁcantly undermined by this approach. The diffusion of actual implementation to participating countries had a negative impact on meeting the goal of 3 percent defense spending increases. Often, creative national bookkeeping was carried out in order to create the illusion of a continual 3 percent increase. Perhaps the most extreme was Great Britain. Its 1979–80 defense budget was under spent, as it was an increase of 2.99 percent over that for the previous year. For 1981–82, Britain announced a 5 percent increase for one year, followed by zero growth for the next.40 The oil price rises of 1979 helped trigger a recession that lasted until 1983, again reducing funds available for defense among European NATO members. According to the Pentagon, real defense spending among the Allies increased by 2 percent in 1978, 2.5 percent in 1979, and 1.9 percent in 1980.41 Events in the Persian Gulf also helped dissipate the efforts to improve NATO’s defenses in the Central Region. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan led the United States to establish the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) for possible military intervention. Substantial US airlift and sealift assets would go to support the RDF, while both the US Army and Air Force would have to divert forces away from Europe toward the Persian Gulf. This was noted in the Pentagon’s 1981 annual report: ‘‘Although our Rapid Deployment Forces comprise far fewer forces than those which would be deployed to a NATO war, non-NATO contingencies may place more stringent demands on our mobility forces.’’42 With at best minimal increases in European NATO forces during this time, this

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reduction of US capabilities meant the situation in the Central Region remained detrimental. From 1981, a new administration and national security team would be making policy in Washington. The Reagan Administration was determined to rebuild US military strength across the board, and it continued large-scale improvements to NATO-assigned forces. However, it would also face many of the problems its predecessor had in attempting to achieve a robust, Alliance-wide improvement in conventional capabilities in the Central Region. Before these efforts are examined, an analysis of the actual military balance during the period is necessary to maintain a proper perspective of developments.

The balance in the Central Region In 1979, NATO forces deployed in the Central Region were organized into 26½ divisions, ﬁelding 6,180 main battle tanks and supported by 1,637 combat aircraft. Facing them were 58 Warsaw Pact divisions equipped with 19,000 main battle tanks and 2,800 combat aircraft.43 Not surprisingly, these ﬁgures tended to have a major impact on public views of the balance in the West. However, the real issues—those to be addressed by the LTDP—were less well understood. The state of Warsaw Pact forces, as a whole, has been the subject of numerous studies and analyses, both at the time and since, and their disadvantages are well known: recalcitrant East European forces (particularly the Czech and Polish forces); disparities in equipment between Soviet and East European contingents; the low readiness of many Warsaw Pact divisions; and the often serious difﬁculties experienced during attempts to mobilize reservists to bring these formations to full strength.44 By the late 1970s, however, a shift in Soviet planning, which of course was adopted by the Pact as its overall strategy, was seen with increasing alarm in the West. Whereas Soviet doctrine had always emphasized the importance of the offensive, the 1970s saw the USSR increasingly shift emphasis to maintaining large, highly capable forces in Eastern Europe that would be prepared, in relatively little time, to initiate rapid offensive actions against NATO. Writing in 1981, David Isby, a well-respected defense analyst, described just how these tactics would shape Soviet operations: Only the offensive will yield victory, and speed, shock and manoeuvre is the decisive component of the offensive. On the nuclear battleﬁeld it may be the best defense against nuclear targeting. The Soviets insist on maintaining the momentum of the offensive. Even if nuclear weapons are not used to defeat the enemy, surprise, suppressive ﬁre, bypassing or outﬂanking resistance and a greater emphasis on ‘‘daring thrusts’’ will contribute to the speed, shock and manoeuvre . . .

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The balance in Europe . . . Surprise is seen as a key ‘‘force multiplier,’’ making the Soviet forces much more effective than they would otherwise be. The Soviets would apparently be willing to forgo some of their numerical superiority and logistical preparation to ensure that lengthy mobilisation did not alert the enemy. (My italics)45

Ofﬁcial publications echoed these concerns. In his military posture statement for FY 1978, JCS Chairman General Brown described Soviet doctrine—introduced in 1970—as one which calls for a blitzkrieg type of offensive using massed armor attacks across a wide front. This doctrine calls for the seizure of deep objectives within a few days or weeks at most. The Warsaw Pact current force structure capabilities and logistic base reﬂect this thinking. In view of this Warsaw Pact capability and the new doctrine, it is clear that the West must . . . be prepared to repel an attack with little or no warning.46 These publicly stated views were reinforced by classiﬁed documents on this subject. A CIA report issued in January 1979 mirrors the description of Soviet operations described by Isby and General Brown: Soviet military strategy calls for a massive and rapid ground offensive into NATO territory in Central Europe to defeat NATO forces, disrupt mobilization, and seize or destroy ports and airﬁelds to prevent reinforcement. Because this strategy envisions a highly ﬂuid battleﬁeld and high rates of advance, Pact planners hope to overrun, penetrate, or bypass NATO forward defenses rapidly to prevent the Western Alliance from strengthening its defenses and using the time gained for mobilization and reinforcement. To achieve the force ratios deemed necessary to accomplish its objectives, the Pact has evolved mobilization and attack concepts that are intended to maximize initial combat power, on the assumption that a war in Europe would be short, and therefore decided largely by forces in being or quickly available. (My italics)47 The issue of warning time was becoming important in planning for NATO’s Central Region defense. Overall, this was not thought to be a general cause for alarm. In an April 1978 report, the CIA estimated that the most effective form of surprise attack—a standing-start attack utilizing some 15 divisions—could be prepared for in under 24 hours. Still, even if such an action was taken under the aegis of an exercise, it would have difﬁculty remaining undetected. ‘‘The forward movement of an attack force of some 15 divisions,’’ the CIA report noted, ‘‘would provide

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many additional indicators to NATO intelligence which routinely monitors military activity in East Germany. This massive movement would be difﬁcult, if not impossible, to mask as an exercise for long.’’48 The more likely options for attack, according to the authors, would involve between two and four fronts.49 A two-front attack ‘‘would require about four days to prepare for,’’ meaning that ‘‘US and NATO decision-makers would almost certainly have three days or more of warning.’’50 Anything larger would be exceedingly difﬁcult to conceal. A three-front attack, probably the smallest the Warsaw Pact could mount with any chance for strategic success, would have required the mobilization of ‘‘some 600,000 men, brought some 30 understrength or cadre divisions to full strength, moved . . . 56 divisions to . . . combat positions, prepared them for combat, set up wartime command and control networks, and established logistics lines of communications.’’51 Where the authors did express concern was over the ability of the Pact to carry out a gradual buildup for war. Although a gradual implementation would provide us more opportunities to detect some of the preparations and more time to validate our information, the early preparations would probably be ambiguous and might be difﬁcult to distinguish from routine force improvements or exercises. Such incremental preparations would provide the Soviets opportunities for concealment and deception, but the effectiveness of such measures would decrease in proportion to their scale.52 It is important to understand what forces existed to carry out such operations, and their capabilities. By far the most powerful Warsaw Pact forces deployed in the Central Region were those of the USSR. By 1977, the Soviets deployed some 500,000 men in this area.53 A total of 27 Soviet divisions were stationed in the Central Region, including 2 in Poland and 5 in Czechoslovakia. By far the most effective concentration of Red Army forces was the Group of Soviet Forces Germany (GSFG), which totaled 20 combat divisions (10 tank and 10 motor riﬂe) organized into ﬁve armies (three tank and two combined arms.)54 The 16th Air Army, with 900 combat aircraft, provided air support for the GSFG.55 By 1980, the GSFG numbered 380,000 men, 7,000 tanks, 3,000 infantry ﬁghting vehicles, and 300 helicopters, with the 34th Guards Artillery Division, three times larger than an ordinary unit of its type, providing ﬁre support.56 Much of this increase in the GSFG’s capability was a phenomenon of the 1970s, part of the Soviet Union’s overall increase in its military power. According to John Erickson, between 1972 and 1977, the GSFG was estimated to have expanded from 250,000 men to more than 370,000.57 Moreover, all Soviet divisions in Eastern Europe were maintained at Category 1 readiness levels, in other words at full strength in

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men and equipment. New equipment, like T-64 and T-72 tanks, Mi-24 helicopters, MiG-23/27 ﬁghter-bombers, and Sukhoi Su-24 strike aircraft added considerably to their combat potential. Furthermore, selfpropelled artillery systems, akin to that used by NATO, replaced much of the Red Army’s older, towed artillery pieces during this time. Logistics capabilities, particularly engineer units, were also vastly improved.58 All of these improvements to Soviet forces appeared to bear out defense analyst Sherwood Cordier’s view that ‘‘It is obvious that Russian forces and weapons are tailored to wage an offensive, mechanized and lightning war.’’59 Although, on the whole, the East European forces of the Pact were not as well equipped or combat ready as their Soviet counterparts, they did come to play an important role in Soviet operational planning. During 1977 and 1978, the East German Defense Ministry began to issue plans similar to those of the Soviets and integrated them into overall planning. The General Ofﬁcers’ Training Course, for example, included a theme called ‘‘Preparation and Conduct of Offensive Operations Along the Front With and Without Nuclear Weapons.’’60 Nor did this emphasis remain limited to military staff texts. In 1980, a major Warsaw Pact exercise, ‘‘Comrades-in-Arms-80,’’ was held in East Germany. This exercise stressed a major offensive against NATO forces, and, in its initial stage, termed ‘‘Conduct of operations at the outset of a war,’’ Warsaw Pact forces utilized numerical superiority to break through NATO defenses, followed by reserves and with diversionary airborne and amphibious assaults behind NATO lines.61 In examining these developments in Warsaw Pact forces, NATO planners had to examine their own forces’ strengths and weaknesses. Although NATO forces enjoyed high levels of technical competence in terms of training and ﬁelded, on the whole, better equipment, there were some serious deﬁciencies in NATO’s defense planning. Three key areas stand out among these difﬁculties. First, the lack of standardization among NATO forces caused considerable logistical problems. Because NATO’s defense efforts (although coordinated at the ministerial level and through the various levels of NATO military commands) allowed procurement of weaponry and equipment to occur at the national level, in many areas there was a lack of commonality. Belgium, for example, used US, French, and West German arms, in addition to its nationally produced weapons. Even some of the equipment used by two or more allies tended to be lagging behind the latest models being introduced at the time. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the West German Leopard 1 main battle tank was replaced in production and in front-line West German service by the Leopard 2. However, the Belgian, Canadian, and Dutch armies operated the earlier variant of the Leopard throughout the 1980s. Ammunition was also a problem. Most NATO troops were issued with automatic riﬂes calibrated to ﬁre 7.62-mm

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rounds. However, the US M-16 ﬁred a 5.56-mm round. Such differences existed across the military spectrum in NATO. It was no accident that among the ‘‘Action Areas’’ of the LTDP, Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability (RSI) was included prominently. A second problem had to do with geography. NATO forces deployed in West Germany were organized into two army groups: Northern Army Group (NORTHAG) covered West Germany from the Danish border in Schleswig-Holstein to the area just south of Bonn, whereas Central Army Group (CENTAG) was responsible for defending from this area to the Austrian border. The NORTHAG area of responsibility was narrower and offered less defense-in-depth than that of CENTAG. However, given NATO’s emphasis on forward defense (as close to the Inter-German Border as possible), in order to limit damage and casualties in West Germany, there was a need for a strong reserve in NORTHAG to support the forward-deployed forces. In practice, however, this was not the case. This led to the issue of maldeployment. NORTHAG was composed, north to south, of four corps: I Netherlands, I West German, I British, and I Belgian.62 CENTAG was made up, from north to south, of four corps as well: III West German, V U.S., VII U.S., and II West German. Behind these formations, the I and II French Corps, although not under NATO military control, were stationed and were considered part of a defending force in the event of war.63 A Canadian brigade group and a West German parachute division were also deployed.64 Although the forces assigned to NORTHAG and CENTAG appeared to be roughly equal in strength, in actuality their deployment exposed serious discrepancies. I Netherlands Corps, for example, deployed just one armored brigade, a reconnaissance battalion and supporting elements in West Germany. The remaining forces would be deployed forward as reinforcements. It would have taken the Dutch Government 96 hours between an order for deployment and the time these troops reached their assigned positions.65 Similarly, in 1977, a brigade from each of the two divisions of I Belgian Corps was withdrawn from West Germany.66 Given that the equipment of the Dutch and Belgian forces was not at the same level as that of the British and West German forces in NORTHAG, these undermanned formations would have had a tough time holding against a full-scale Warsaw Pact assault, meaning that the left and right ﬂanks of NORTHAG would have been seriously jeopardized. The two West German and two US corps that composed CENTAG constituted a strong armored and mechanized force, backed up by the powerful French corps. Certainly, Warsaw Pact forces would have found these formations a tough nut to crack. However, if the forces in NORTHAG were overrun, Warsaw Pact armies, spearheaded by the GSFG, would have been able to roll forward into the Netherlands and

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Belgium with little difﬁculty, and perhaps—as the Germans had in 1914 and 1940—swung south into France itself. Needless to say, the defeat of NORTHAG forces would have been catastrophic in a conventional war in the Central Region and would have necessitated a nuclear decision, with all its attendant risks, much sooner than NATO would have preferred to have been the case. The issue of force deployment was certainly serious. Yet it was not addressed in the LTDP, and little was done to rectify it. Among the reasons for this was the enormous cost involved in shifting the more powerful US and West German CENTAG forces into a position to support NORTHAG. According to the Pentagon’s annual report for FY 1979, the costs of shifting a single battalion toward a more forward position near the Inter-German Border would have cost at least $30 million.67 The United States, however, did attempt to rectify this situation, deploying a brigade to Garlstedt (in the NORTHAG area) during 1978.68 Another reason for maldeployment in the Central Region was that the stationing of NATO contingents reﬂected the axis of advance of the Allied armies during World War II. This deployment had become cemented over more than 30 years, and a shift, however desirable, would have had to contend with deep-seated institutional views of this arrangement.69 The third key problem facing NATO with regard to the Central Region was mobilization. Although the Warsaw Pact had made efforts to reduce the amount of warning time given to NATO in the event of major war, the need for large-scale mobilization of reserves and their deployment opposite NATO in the Central Region was still necessary to assure success. Because the Warsaw Pact would have the advantage of choosing when and where it would launch its offensive, it would have the advantage of a lead time over NATO mobilization. On the day NATO would have begun mobilization, it would have had 390,700 men available, while the Warsaw Pact deployed 560,400. Just a week later, this balance would be 399,700 for NATO and 660,300 for the Warsaw Pact. It would have taken NATO 35 days to mobilize 640,000 men, while the Warsaw Pact would have mobilized 930,400 men a week before the NATO total.70 Taking into account casualties as a result of combat attrition, these totals would of course be reduced. Still, with such a lead in time and numbers, the Warsaw Pact would most certainly enjoy a signiﬁcant numerical advantage, which would complicate matters for NATO. Furthermore, US, British, and Canadian reinforcements would have had to deploy from their home countries, and would thus have had to come considerable distances by sea and air to reach the ﬁghting. These issues were not well addressed by the LTDP. The main improvements in NATO’s defense posture came from actions taken by the United States and West Germany. US forces in Europe were increased by 35,000 during 1977–78.71 Three divisional equipment sets

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were planned under POMCUS for the FY 1980–82 time frame.72 Major efforts were made to improve reinforcement capabilities. The Rapid Reinforcement Program, initiated in 1980, sought to deploy 200,000– 300,000 US troops to Europe in two weeks, with some 1,900 combat aircraft to be sent there in just one week.73 Defense Secretary Brown declared that this would amount to ‘‘a total of US ground ﬁrepower greater than is in the entire [West] German Army and twice the number of air squadrons that are in the [West German] Luftwaffe.’’74 These plans would see the US ground combat contingent in the Central Region doubled to 10 divisions in less than two weeks, with the number of Air Force tactical ﬁghter squadrons concurrently growing from 28 to 80.75 For their part, the West Germans had begun, in 1975, to create three armored brigades, raising the total from 33 to 36. Six all-arms, heavily mechanized Home Defense brigades were also to be formed.76 There were some notable successes at the NATO level. The Periodic Armaments Planning System, developed by NATO’s Conference of National Armament Directors, and NATO Armaments Planning Review, represented an effort at improving RSI.77 A major step in this direction was the NATO Mutual Support Act of 1979, which became law in the United States in August 1980. This helped reduce export controls on the sale of US military equipment to the European NATO allies.78 Among the successes in member cooperation was the decision by four NATO countries, including Belgium and the Netherlands, to purchase the F-16, which would become the standard US Air Force ﬁghterbomber in the 1980s. On the whole, the LTDP’s results were mixed. It did lead to some improvements in NATO’s conventional force capabilities and served to focus the Alliance as a whole on the efforts to enhance military preparedness. However, it suffered from two key ﬂaws. First, as mentioned earlier, the ‘‘Action Areas’’ covered grew to such an extent that it lost focus on what it was originally intended to do: namely, improve the combat capabilities of NATO’s Central Region forces. Second, and even more important, the implementation of goals was left to the member states themselves and not regulated by LTDP planners. This meant that issues that would have been politically unpopular, particularly force deployment, could be ignored, while the actual levels of defense spending were often at variance with the spirit of the 3 percent goal set out in 1977. In the end, such improvements in conventional forces as were made were carried out by national governments—particularly the United States and West Germany—acting on their own. These were, however, curtailed by a lack of action on the part of other NATO members who were unable or unwilling to increase their share of the burden. By 1981, most of the difﬁculties that beset NATO’s Central Region posture in 1977 remained.

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Continued efforts, similar results, 1981–85 The Reagan Administration took ofﬁce on a pledge to restore the credibility of the United States’ apparently weakened military posture. A key area where this would occur was Europe, central to American geopolitical interests and the focus of the United States’ most important alliance. NSDD 32, issued in April 1982, stated clearly US policy toward NATO: . . . our primary objective is to strengthen NATO’s capability to deter or defeat a Soviet attack. In wartime, the U.S. will support NATO strategy which requires forward defense with conventional forces supported by the possibility of nuclear escalation. In peacetime, U.S. objectives are to enhance deterrence through major improvements in NATO’s conventional capabilities . . . and to obtain increased Allied defense contributions in Europe.79 Surprisingly, the area where the forces of the two superpowers and their most important alliances directly confronted one another—Europe’s Central Region—would receive relatively less emphasis during the Reagan Administration’s ﬁrst term than from its predecessor. The LTDP generally withered away, with its last program report issued in 1983. NATO’s established defense organizations had already assumed most of the duties of the LTDP group, which made these efforts more general within the Alliance’s defense planning.80 As in the 1970s, ensuring continued increases in European NATO defense expenditures continued to face difﬁculties. At the May 1981 DPC meeting in Brussels, the ministers declared that ‘‘notwithstanding economic and ﬁnancial constraints the standing Allied commitment to the 3 percent formula guidance has been conﬁrmed.’’81 This was reiterated by the DPC in its Brussels meeting the following May.82 In reality, from 1982 most of the European NATO members were unable to meet this goal and lagged far behind the United States in this area.83 In 1982, US General Bernard Rogers, SACEUR, stated that the European NATO countries would need to increase spending by 4 percent per year in order to achieve meaningful force improvements.84 However, with Trans-Atlantic relations strained by LRTNF, and with the need to maintain Alliance cohesion on this issue, the Reagan Administration demurred from placing heavy pressure on the European allies to meet such increases.85 A key reason for a lack of major European NATO spending increases was the economic recession of 1979. As mentioned earlier, the European NATO countries were forced to safeguard their elaborate social welfare systems, meaning that defense spending took a back seat in terms of national priorities. According to a NATO study published in 1984, US defense spending increased, on average, by 6.2 percent between 1979 and 1983, meaning that defense spending equalled 6.9 percent of gross

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domestic product (GDP). The average for NATO as a whole was just 5.5 percent.86 It is important to note that these were the years during which the LTDP experienced its high-water mark (1979–81), and before the truly vast spending increases of the Reagan Administration were fully felt. The Reagan Administration was forced to address these issues beginning in 1982, just as its predecessor had done. Congress examined the disparities in US and European NATO defense spending, and, given the buildup of other aspects of US military power—strategic, naval and power projection forces—began to put pressure on the Europeans to ‘‘do more of their fair share.’’ Among the measures Congress passed was a ceiling on 316,000 US military personnel deployed in Europe in 1982 (This was raised to 326,000 two years later, with a sub-limit of 90,000 for the Air Force.)87 This was in response to an amendment introduced by Senator Sam Nunn, who had helped increase US combat strength in Europe in 1974. It called for a reduction of 90,000 US personnel from Europe over three years, unless the European NATO members achieved the 3 percent goal promised in the LTDP.88 Another issue that forced the Reagan Administration to act was the debate over no ﬁrst use of nuclear weapons. Although NATO did not abandon its strategy of nuclear deterrence, this debate, combined with the growth of signiﬁcant anti-nuclear movements in Europe during this time, meant that a stronger conventional defense was desirable.89 Accordingly, efforts toward this objective were made beginning in 1984. A Pentagon report to Congress issued that year stressed the need for a new long-term plan for NATO to improve its conventional military posture. This led, in May 1985, to the Conventional Defense Initiative (CDI). However, as East–West tensions began to decline, the impetus for the CDI was lessened. Accordingly, its achievements were generally modest.90 On the whole, the Alliance was able to improve its conventional military capabilities during the early 1980s. New tanks, artillery pieces, helicopters and combat aircraft were deployed, adding to combat effectiveness among the various forces. At the same time, actual Alliance-wide efforts remained limited.91 As in the Carter years, efforts by individual states were more important than those made by NATO in concert. Thus, many of the same problems that had existed before—the varying quality of national contingents and proper deployment to match the geography of the Central Region—remained during the 1980s. Perhaps the most successful national effort was made by the United States. By 1985, US ground forces were receiving considerable quantities of new equipment like the M-1 Abrams main battle tank, Bradley infantry ﬁghting vehicle, AH-64 attack and UH-60 transport helicopters, which improved their capabilities signiﬁcantly. The US Air Force received additional F-15 ﬁghters and large numbers of F-16 ﬁghter-bombers and A-10 ground-attack aircraft. New anti-tank and surface-to-air missiles were also deployed with US forces. The POMCUS program also con-

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tinued, with additional sets deployed in the Netherlands and Belgium by FY 1985. This brought the total number of available divisional equipment sets prepositioned in NATO Europe to six, enough to guarantee deployment of a 10-division US ground force.92 In two other ways, US conventional forces underwent major improvements during this time. The quality of personnel in the US military improved markedly in the 1980s over where it had been in the previous decade. At least as important was the shift in US conventional military strategy that began to take shape during this time. Beginning in 1976, the US Army initiated and reﬁned a doctrine known as Air-Land Battle. Ofﬁcially known as Field Manual (FM) 100–5: Operations of Army Forces in the Field, it was shaped by both the US military experience in Vietnam and the combined arms ﬁghting of the 1973 Arab– Israeli War. As a study by the US Army’s Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas pointed out in 1988, the manual called for US Army forces ‘‘to prepare to ﬁght outnumbered and win and to win the ﬁrst battle;’’ while reiterating that ‘‘the tank was ‘the decisive weapon’ of ground combat . . . it could not survive on ‘the modern battleﬁeld’ except as part of a ‘combined arms team’ that included all the other branches of the Army and tactical air forces.’’93 This strategy was aimed at defeating a Warsaw Pact invasion of West Germany, and doing so as close to the Inter-German Border as possible. As Major Paul H. Herbert, author of the Leavenworth study, wrote, Its features included deploying all forces forward without retaining reserves; ﬁghting aggressively in a ‘‘covering force area’’ forward of the main defensive area to force the enemy to commit his main attack echelons; detecting the enemy’s main attack; and reinforcing against it by moving . . . from other sectors of the battleﬁeld where the defender would accept a certain degree of risk. Fighting to retain ground was a special case in the active defense, which focused on ﬁghting the attacker’s forces wherever they went on a ﬂuid battleﬁeld. By trading some space for enemy combat power and . . . reinforcing against the enemy’s main attack, the defender hoped to achieve a favorable combat ratio at the point of decision.94 Air-Land Battle thus helped to determine what weapons the US Army would deploy in Europe. The new strategy also began to be disseminated among the European NATO allies, whose forces would have of course operated with the Americans in the event of war.95 It also satisﬁed the goal of ‘‘Forward Defense’’ of West Germany, keeping the invading Warsaw Pact forces as far to the east as possible, and perhaps even reversing them, without an immediate recourse to nuclear weapons.

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Conclusion On the whole, the conventional combat capabilities of NATO’s Central Region forces improved between 1978 and 1985. Overall, though, these improvements fell short of what had been intended by the LTDP. According to historian John Dufﬁeld, NATO’s ground forces capabilities increased by 19 percent by 1984, while the estimated Warsaw Pact improvements were 18 percent for the same time frame.96 Three key reasons exist for NATO’s inability to make Alliance-wide conventional force improvements during this period. First, as has been noted, the economic situation reduced defense outlays. A second issue was LRTNF deployment. European NATO governments expended considerable political capital in order for these weapons to be deployed on their soil. A major increase in conventional forces, along lines set by the Americans, could have had a very negative impact among the public in such countries as Belgium and the Netherlands. Despite the efforts made during the 1980s, and the emphasis in US policy on conventional force improvements by the NATO allies, this objective was simply too politically detrimental for the Americans to pursue. Third, the LTDP and the efforts of the Reagan Administration had their roots in the Harmel Doctrine and MC 14/3 back in 1967. This had enshrined the concept of ‘‘Flexible Response’’ in NATO military planning. Thus, greater conventional forces were needed. However, this also preserved the link to theatre and strategic nuclear forces in this structure. MC 14/3 had, at heart, been a compromise between the Americans’ view of the feasibility of a conventional NATO defense, and the European members’ view that the nuclear link had to be maintained.97 For the United States, the establishment of strategic parity with the Soviet Union meant that, in the Central Region, it would be wise to establish a favorable conventional balance. The Europeans, however, saw the preparation for major conventional war, and the possible avoidance of using nuclear weapons, as an indication of partial decoupling by the United States. As for the development of the LTDP, it was plagued by a vast expansion of priorities. What began as an effort to enhance NATO’s conventional force posture in the Central Region thus became a catch-all enterprise, motivated by national political factors and constituencies, that saw a major diffusion of effort toward other areas of NATO Europe. While some of these issues were deserving of attention, it would probably have been wiser to address them outside of the LTDP. These problems continued into the 1980s. Even in the areas where the LTDP did address the Central Region, many important issues were not addressed. Most notably, that of maldeployment of forces, which could have had

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fatal consequences for the Alliance in the event of a Warsaw Pact invasion. Even the United States, the driving force behind the LTDP, faced such difﬁculties. The formation of the RDF in 1979–80 meant that some of the forces, as well as considerable airlift and sealift elements necessary for European reinforcement, would heretofore be diverted to a Persian Gulf contingency. In the event of a global crisis affecting both NATO Europe and the Gulf, this would have forced US planners to make difﬁcult decisions regarding strategic priorities. In the end, it was the United States that did the most to improve the conventional defense posture of NATO’s Central Region, often through unilateral efforts. Beginning in 1974, the United States took the lead in the conventional force buildup in NATO Europe. From the unilateral efforts undertaken during the Ford Administration, this developed into the LTDP and an Alliance-wide effort. Throughout the Carter years, the Americans were the driving force behind the LTDP and consistently increased the capabilities of their Central Region forces. Stockpiling equipment and the vast improvement of troop and weapon quality from 1978 on were the main examples of this. With the exception of West Germany and Great Britain, most other NATO members did little to improve the state of the Alliance’s defense posture in this area. The story of the LTDP and other efforts during the late 1970s and early 1980s is an example of how a variety of factors—many of them not in fact of a military nature—came to play a role in shaping the policies of the NATO Alliance toward its common adversary. It is a salutary example of multi-national decision-making, which, of course, does not always achieve what it sets out to do.

Part III

Power projection

6

The naval balance

As with most categories of the US–Soviet military balance during the 1970s, comparisons of American and Soviet naval strength reﬂected two trends common in assessments of the time: ﬁrst, the decline in overall numbers and funding resulting from the war in Vietnam and its aftermath, which affected all branches of the US armed forces; second, the concurrent increase in investment by the Soviet Union in its military during this same period. The results of these developments would shape the debate on the balance of naval power during the 1970s and play a considerable role in shaping policy during the 1980s, when the Reagan Administration would undertake a massive expansion of naval strength. Although all branches of the US military had suffered reductions in force during the 1970s, the US Navy was particularly hard hit. Schlesinger noted in his FY 1975 report to Congress that although the US Navy had some 951 ‘‘commissioned general purpose ships’’ (aircraft carriers, major surface combatants, submarines, amphibious ships, and replenishment vessels) in service in FY 1968, this number had fallen to just 588 by FY 1973 and would fall again to 522 by FY 1975.1 Indeed, numbers fell even further, down to 476 ships in 1976 and then to 462 in 1978.2 This did not, however, reﬂect a particular desire to erode American naval strength for its own sake. Most of the ships decommissioned during this time were built during World War II, particularly destroyers, submarines, and minesweepers.3 These vessels had reached block obsolescence by the 1970s, having in some cases served in three major wars (World War II, Korea and Vietnam), as well as in an exacting peacetime environment. Moreover, they were unable to carry the increasingly sophisticated electronics, weaponry, and, in the case of the war-built carriers, aircraft that entered service with the US Navy during this time. What was problematic was that as vast numbers of older ships were retired, there was not an across-the-board effort to match these reductions with considerable numbers of new vessels. Eleven years elapsed (1964–75) during which no new destroyers were added to the US ﬂeet,4 while only two nuclear-powered cruisers joined the ﬂeet between 1967

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and 1976.5 The nuclear-powered carrier Nimitz took a full seven years to build and commission.6 There were some major efforts during this time, especially with frigates and attack submarines,7 but on the whole, American naval efforts were inconsistent and did not reﬂect commitment to an overall strategic plan. The Soviet Navy, by contrast, was undergoing steady development in order to become a ﬂeet with global presence, capable of projecting Soviet power in many areas where the USSR had not previously enjoyed a military presence. Under the energetic leadership of Admiral of the Fleet Sergei Gorshkov, who had assumed this position in 1956, the Soviet Navy had, by the 1970s, shifted its efforts away from countering US carrier task forces and ballistic missile submarines in waters near the Soviet Union to building a ﬂeet capable of challenging American naval forces in areas considered to be of importance to Moscow.8 By 1977, the inventory of the Soviet Navy included 32 cruisers, 87 destroyers, and 107 escort ships (frigates or frigate-type vessels), as well as over 258 general purpose submarines (more than 80 nuclear-powered) and the Kiev, the Soviet Union’s ﬁrst aircraft carrier.9 The Soviet ﬂeet was receiving more effective warships, with new anti-ship cruise missiles as a major offensive element. Soviet naval aviation, although it could not match the powerful air wings of the US carrier ﬂeet, was receiving more potent land-based bombers, like the Tu-22M Backﬁre, which posed a greater threat than had their less capable predecessors.10

The shifting balance of power at sea The two trends discussed above led to a growing sense of parity between the superpower navies, a marked change from the ﬁrst quarter century of the Cold War, when the US Navy had reigned supreme. The Soviet Navy began to display its capabilities on the high seas. In 1970 the ﬂeet engaged in a major exercise, Okean, in which some 200 surface ships and submarines operated in the Atlantic and Paciﬁc Oceans. Anti-carrier and anti-submarine warfare were practiced, as were amphibious landings with Warsaw Pact forces.11 Another Okean exercise was held in 1975, with similarly sized forces and also in the Atlantic and Paciﬁc. Signiﬁcantly, the Soviets made use of overseas bases, with naval aircraft staging out of Aden (South Yemen), Somalia, and Guinea. Soviet forces also practiced convoy escort in the Barents Sea and the Sea of Japan, which appeared to emphasize a role that the Soviet Navy had not paid much attention to before.12 Nor were routine exercises the only example of how the USSR displayed its growing naval strength. A series of crises in the Middle East during this time showed the Soviet Navy’s ability to challenge the US ﬂeet directly. In September 1970, as a result of upheaval in Jordan, both superpowers forward-deployed signiﬁcant naval forces to the eastern

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Mediterranean. Facing the US Sixth Fleet’s two carrier groups were some 49 ships of the Fifth Eskadra, the Soviet Mediterranean naval force. This total included 16 surface warships and 10 submarines. Although the crisis soon blew over, the presence of the large Soviet force unnerved many top US military ofﬁcers, including members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.13 Writing of the incident later, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, then Chief of Naval Operations, recalled that They [the Soviets] learned that . . . though the United States was deeply concerned with what happened in the Middle East, it was stretched very thin there in a military sense. The terrible danger of that last state of affairs is, of course, that in a major crisis—which the Jordanian trouble was not—the alternatives became backing down (abandoning old principles and old friends) or escalation (risking total war).14 Three years later, Admiral Zumwalt’s concerns appeared justiﬁed. In October 1973, Egypt and Syria launched a full-scale attack on Israel. As ﬁerce ﬁghting raged between Arab and Israeli forces, both the United States and the Soviet Union undertook resupply efforts to maintain their allies. As Israel gained the upper hand and threatened to destroy a large portion of Egypt’s army in the Sinai, the Soviet Union prepared to deploy airborne troops to break the Israeli encirclement. The United States responded with a Defense Condition 3 alert of its armed forces, leading to a cease-ﬁre and an end to hostilities. What is most important to understand is that the superpowers’ primary means of inﬂuencing the conﬂict militarily rested with their ﬂeets in the Mediterranean. On October 6, the day the war began, the Fifth Eskadra numbered 58 ships, including 15 submarines, 4 cruisers, 6 destroyers, 5 frigates, 2 amphibious ships, and 2 minesweepers. Facing them were the Sixth Fleet’s 48 ships, which included 2 aircraft carriers and the ﬂeet ﬂagship, a cruiser.15 An amphibious task force was also present carrying a US Marine contingent.16 It is important to look at the disposition of these forces, because the area in question is quite vast. One carrier was visiting Athens, Greece, while the other was cruising off Spain. The amphibious group was near Soudha Bay, Crete, where they had taken part in a major exercise.17 Soviet forces were concentrated in the eastern Mediterranean. During the course of events, the Soviets built up their naval forces considerably. By October 14, the Fifth Eskadra numbered 69 ships, which grew to 80 by October 24.18 By the end of October the Soviet Navy had deployed a total of 96 ships in the Mediterranean, including 25 major surface warships and 25 submarines.19 The Sixth Fleet built up to a force of 60 ships—including an additional carrier and 10 attack submarines20—during this time. However,

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US naval forces were not concentrated, due to delays in decision-making in Washington and the need to deploy a line of picket ships to cover the US airlift to Israel. This reﬂected on the ﬂeets’ role in carrying out their nations’ resupply policies. However, Soviet air and sea resupply efforts to Egypt and Syria were aided by the concentration of Soviet naval forces.21 Moreover, the outnumbered US submarine force was spread thin attempting to keep track of its larger Soviet counterpart.22 The events of October 1973 had a considerable impact on how the naval balance came to be perceived. For the ﬁrst time since World War II, the US Navy had faced a serious challenge at sea from a rival ﬂeet. Furthermore, the two ﬂeets were, in terms of capabilities, closely matched. The three US carrier groups between them mustered some 200 ﬁghter and attack aircraft, and the surface combatants and submarines were well-armed. On the other hand, the concentrated Soviet ﬂeet had a powerful arsenal of anti-ship weapons, including 88 surface-to-surface missiles and 348 torpedoes.23 When it is remembered just how tense the situation in the Mediterranean had become by the end of the crisis, the threat of combat was certainly not far off.24 What would happen in future confrontations between a similarly imposing Soviet ﬂeet and a US Navy whose future strength might be in doubt? The correlation between a decline in the overall size of the US Navy and the growth of the Soviet Navy was noted at the outset of this chapter. It should also be noted that these developments correlated with a shift in the geopolitical situation in the Third World. The establishment of pro-Soviet regimes in many states in Africa, as well as the collapse of American-backed governments in Southeast Asia in the mid-1970s, was perceived as a marked shift in the ‘‘correlation of forces’’ in Moscow’s favor. The increasing deployment of Soviet naval forces in the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans reﬂected a greater use of this service as an instrument of Soviet foreign policy, providing a visible sense of military strength in these regions. Moreover, the securing of bases by the Soviet Union in many of these countries meant that Moscow now had a concrete presence in these areas, and, it seemed, a more direct inﬂuence in how regional (and by extension global) affairs would be settled. The use of such bases during the Okean exercise in 1975 appeared to support a direct link between Soviet regional successes and its overall geopolitical strategy, which, from an American perspective, came to rely increasingly on a forward military presence in the Third World. This highlights an important point about naval power during this time. Navies, unlike the strategic nuclear forces or the forces deployed in Europe, had a dual use. First, to support these two categories of military deterrence. The ballistic-missile submarines of the superpowers provided a potent leg of their strategic nuclear triads, while also playing a key role in any war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The ability of the US Navy to escort men and material across the Atlantic to stop a

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Warsaw Pact invasion of NATO was vital, as was its ability to defeat Soviet naval forces attempting to interfere with this objective. The Soviet Navy would of course have had a vital role in disrupting these efforts, as well as defeating US and NATO naval forces. The second key role of naval forces, discussed in part above, was as a means of projecting military power into the Third World. The ﬂexibility of these forces, in the sense that they could project power from sea to land (air strikes and amphibious landings) meant that they could be used effectively against opposing Third World states, as well as to deter both these states and the rival superpower from taking similar action. This had proven to be vital for the United States, and, it appeared, of growing importance for the Soviet Union. Given the importance of the superpower maritime balance, it was only a matter of time before the United States began to examine the state of its navy. By the mid-1970s, American policymakers began to take a hard look at the apparently adverse trends in the balance of power, and particularly in terms of naval forces. The need to rebuild US naval strength after the decline of the early 1970s, and to regain a clear-cut edge over the growing Soviet ﬂeet, became a priority.

The 1970s: Of missions and dollars The need for a broad-based increase in US naval strength became apparent during the mid-1970s. Schlesinger, in his FY 1975 report, indicated that this would soon be undertaken, noting that ‘‘Beginning in FY 1977, the trend [of numerical decline] will be markedly reversed as the number of new ships delivered to the ﬂeet exceeds the number being retired.’’25 The FY 1975 budget included requests for a new ‘‘Sea Control Ship’’ to provide a less costly aircraft carrier to protect amphibious groups and convoys,26 new destroyers, nuclear-powered cruisers and attack submarines, and development of the Aegis system for ship defense and battle management.27 Anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities would also be enhanced, with procurement of 12 10-plane squadrons of carrier-based S-3 aircraft.28 The Navy would also receive other carrier-based aircraft, including F-14 Tomcat ﬁghters,29 along with missile systems like the air- and sea-launched Harpoon.30 This program reﬂected an emphasis on a smaller but more potent ﬂeet built around the sea control mission. Nuclear power was also emphasized for ship propulsion, which increased the cost of such ships, as well as limited the numbers that could be built. This was indicated by the nuclear-powered ship construction programs tentatively laid out by Secretary Schlesinger for FY 1976–80. During that time, it was planned that construction would commence for 2 aircraft carriers, a cruiser and 12 attack submarines. Seven ballistic missile submarines were included, reducing the overall number of general purpose nuclear vessels to be

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delivered.31 During FY 1974–77, the cost of the nuclear-powered ships would come to some $5 billion.32 This was just a fraction of overall expenditures for the US Navy, which would require a plethora of other ships, not to mention aircraft, weapons, electronics and items like ammunition, fuel, and stores, to maintain operational capability. Rumsfeld continued the commitment to a ﬂeet geared toward sea control and power projection. His ﬁve-year shipbuilding program (FY 1977–81) included some 111 ships of all types, including 11 attack submarines, 3 carriers (one a sea control ship), 10 guided-missile cruisers and destroyers, 40 guided-missile frigates, and numerous auxiliary ships.33 The following year, in his ﬁve-year shipbuilding program for FY 1978–82, Rumsfeld listed a total of 178 ships, of which 157 were new construction and the remainder to return from overhaul for service life extension.34 Additionally, 106 ships had been authorized by Congress but had not yet been delivered, including 2 carriers, 3 cruisers, 25 destroyers, and 30 attack submarines.35 These ﬁgures would have seen a major rejuvenation of the US ﬂeet by the mid-1980s, based on the established precepts of US naval power, namely control of the seas for both power projection missions and the maintenance of naval superiority vis a` vis the Soviet Union. A day after Secretary Rumsfeld’s FY 1978 report was issued, the Ford Administration issued NSDM 344, which would ‘‘Provide for steady growth in active ship force levels to attain and maintain an active force of about 600 ships in the mid-1990s.’’36 The force levels were nearly identical to Rumsfeld’s ﬁgures and reﬂected a commitment to ‘‘maintain a superiority in maritime capability that can deter or defeat the Soviet threat in a timely manner,’’ as well as to ‘‘maintain maritime forces capable of carrying out other U.S. military requirements.’’37 Within days, Jimmy Carter took ofﬁce. During his campaign in 1976, Carter had been critical of the high cost of defense during the Nixon and Ford Administrations. Among the areas of concern was that of the Navy’s nuclear-powered ships, whose costs had escalated during the 1970s. For the FY 1976–79 period, the carrier and cruiser construction programs together came to over $3.7 billion, while attack submarine construction totaled over $2.8 billion.38 More fundamental than a desire to fulﬁl campaign promises for the new administration was a differing view of global strategy. The Nixon and Ford Administrations had budgeted for defense based on a continued requirement for major power projection forces, including, of course, the Navy. The Carter Administration differed somewhat in its view. While it continued to view a forward-deployed ﬂeet as a necessity, it placed greater emphasis on the defense of NATO Europe, with more limited contingencies in areas like Japan. PRM 10, issued in June 1977, outlined a variety of military contingencies that the United States might face in the years ahead. The authors of the study placed considerable

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emphasis on a war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Europe and provided a detailed outline of what the role of the Alliance’s naval forces (including the US Navy) would be: ‘‘NATO maintains major maritime forces primarily in order to ensure that military and economic resupply cargoes can be moved to Europe to sustain NATO combat capability and preclude the Pact from considering that it has an option of outlasting NATO.’’39 The authors went on to note the advantages that US naval forces would have in conﬂicts outside of NATO Europe, including Korea. However, the increasing focus of the Carter Administration on NATO, particularly through the LTDP, which included naval forces as an ‘‘action area,’’ meant that the US Navy would heretofore give greater prominence to this role, with less emphasis on sea control in waters outside Europe. The Carter Administration did make a signiﬁcant effort to address naval matters during its tenure. In March, 1978, the Department of the Navy issued a study, known as Sea Plan 2000, that outlined what the US Navy’s overall strength would be over the next two decades. Three ‘‘Options’’ were listed in terms of ship numbers, each corresponding to what the authors deemed to be the missions of the US ﬂeet. Option 1, described as having ‘‘a low degree of ﬂexibility, with minimal capability across the range of naval tasks,’’ postulated a ﬂeet of 439 active ships, plus 35 reserve and sealift vessels. This corresponded with the NATO focus of PRM 10. Option 2, a somewhat enhanced version of Option 1, listed 535 active (plus 44 reserve/sealift) vessels. Option 3, designed to provide ‘‘a high degree of versatility in the form of a wider range of military and political actions,’’ was closest to planning during the Ford years. A total of 585 active and 46 reserve/sealift ships was listed in this option. In the eyes of the authors, Option 1 was ‘‘high risk,’’ Option 2 provided a ‘‘minimum acceptable risk,’’ and Option 3 ‘‘a lower risk.’’40 Sea Plan 2000 would come to play an important role in US naval planning during the coming decade. For the moment, though, it would be the tenets of PRM 10, as well as world events, that would shape the development of the US Navy. Secretary Brown listed four main ‘‘objectives’’ for FY 1979–83: improving ASW forces; improving the Navy’s anti-air warfare (AAW) capabilities; improving the anti-ship capabilities of US naval forces (particularly through the acquisition of Harpoon and Tomahawk cruise missiles); and improving the ﬂeet’s combat readiness.41 The FY 1979 budget saw major reductions in funding for new nuclear cruisers and Aegis destroyers. Greater attention was given to modernizing older AAW destroyers so as to improve this capability at less cost. Development of Vertical/Short Take-Off and Landing (V/STOL) carriers replaced funding for additional nuclear carriers in the budget, while acquisition of nuclear attack submarines was funded at around $460 million.42 The FY 1979 shipbuilding

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program was set at 15 ships, with funds for service life extensions for carriers and modernization of AAW destroyers.43 The budget for FY 1980 was similar, with a relatively modest ﬁveyear shipbuilding program (FY 1980–84) of 67 ships. In types of ships as well as in numbers, this contrasted sharply with what Rumsfeld had listed during his time in ofﬁce. Only ﬁve new attack submarines would be built, down from 11 in Rumsfeld’s FY 1977–81 program. The destroyer program remained generally stable, with 10 new ships to be delivered, along with 10 modiﬁed units. A new guided missile frigate would be procured in considerable numbers (25 by FY 1984), as these were valuable AAW escort ships. However, no additional cruisers were to be procured, while only two carriers would undergo service life extensions.44 In shifting its strategic priorities, the Carter Administration began to face opposition to its plans, particularly from Congress. Instead of the V/ STOL carrier that the administration had proposed in its FY 1979 defense budget, Congress voted funds for a fourth Nimitz-class nuclear carrier. In response, President Carter vetoed the funding for this vessel. Congress, however, remained undeterred, adding funds in the FY 1980 budget, which Carter was forced to accept.45 At least as important as Congressional opposition in shaping the Carter Administration’s naval program was the shift in the international arena during its third year in ofﬁce. The Iranian Revolution and the Hostage Crisis, followed by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, helped bring about a change in the administration’s view of the US Navy’s role in its overall global strategy. The ability to rely on regional allies to augment US forces in the Third World came into question, while the willingness of the Soviet Union to engage in direct military intervention outside of the Warsaw Pact appeared to betoken an increasingly direct Soviet challenge to American interests. A ﬂeet suited to power projection, including large aircraft carriers and their battle groups, which had been the standard during the Nixon-Ford years, appeared once again to be necessary. Brown’s FY 1981 report reﬂected this renewed power projection emphasis. The shipbuilding program for FY 1981–85 was increased to 97 new ships, an increase of 30 from the year before. This included 16 new Aegis missile cruisers, with 2 new destroyer classes and a new class of nuclear attack submarines.46 Another 81 ships had been authorized but not yet delivered by the end of FY 1980. This total included two carriers, one of which had been funded over Carter’s veto in FY 1980.47 Adding to his four objectives for the US Navy listed in his FY 1979 report, Brown added two more for FY 1981: ‘‘Maintaining worldwide presence and crisis management forces’’ and ‘‘Improving ﬂeet balance and weapons modernization.’’48 Such objectives strongly complemented a strategy emphasizing sea-based power projection. By the time Brown’s

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ﬁnal report was issued to Congress in January 1981, it bore a strong resemblance to the Rumsfeld budgets put forward more than four years earlier. The shipbuilding program for FY 1982–86 came to 99 ships, 80 of which were to be built new.49 Moreover, whereas it had been planned that the carrier force would fall from 15 to 12 ships by FY 1982, the budget for that year included a 13-carrier force by that time.50 By 1981, the United States had returned to a naval policy emphasizing forward deployment and power projection, as a result of world events, which necessitated an emphasis on power projection forces for regions like the Persian Gulf. Concentration on NATO Europe had been superseded by a more global approach. The incoming Reagan Administration would make its naval buildup central to its defense effort. However, as in other areas, the groundwork had already been laid over the past year or so, and even earlier. Before going into the details of the naval expansion of the 1980s, it is important to discuss the prevailing views of the US–Soviet naval balance during the decade before, in order to have a clearer picture of the context in which decisions were made.

The naval balance: Lists and capabilities Much analysis of the superpower naval balance was guided by simple lists of warships, which in and of themselves were often misleading. One study from 1978, conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University, provided a comprehensive ship-by-ship numerical comparison of the two ﬂeets, complete with net changes between 1970 and 1977. While interesting, these ﬁgures need qualiﬁcation with other factors (which the CSIS study fortunately provides.)51 Factors like crew training, ship endurance, range of weapons and aircraft, capabilities in AAW and ASW, and, very importantly, geography must all be examined to attain an understanding of the naval balance. At the heart of the debate over the naval balance was the simple fact that the two navies reﬂected differing ideas of how sea power was to be exercised. ‘‘U.S. and Soviet navies are . . . structured asymmetrically in almost every respect,’’ John Collins wrote in 1978.52 The US Navy emphasized a central role for aircraft carriers and their air wings, as the centrepiece of task forces built to defeat an enemy ﬂeet and provide for power projection. The Soviet Navy sought to utilize its missile-armed submarines and ships, as well as land-based aircraft, to destroy hostile naval forces (including US carrier task forces), thus denying an enemy the ability to use the seas to his advantage. As with the European balance, so too with the maritime: the United States, as well as its NATO allies to a certain extent, planned for a protracted naval conﬂict, as sea control, by deﬁnition, requires naval forces that can operate for a long time and have a self-sustaining capability.

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The Soviet Union, by contrast, planned a naval war that would be brief and intense, as sea denial would not require forces to remain on station very long after the action had taken place. In a paper presented to the IISS in 1975, Johan Jorgen Holst, the Director of Research for the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, succinctly deﬁned the differences between the two ﬂeets in terms of surface warship design: Some of the design differences between Soviet and American surface combatants may be explained in terms of the different requirements of the sea-control and sea-denial missions. The sea-denial mission puts a design emphasis on heavy ﬁre-power and a ﬁrst-strike capability against the opponent’s forces, rather than on self-sufﬁciency for extended deployments. Thus Soviet ships generally have greater speed than their American counterparts, while the latter have greater endurance, mainly because of their larger size. The American underway replenishment capability is much superior to that of the Soviet Union . . . Soviet ships generally carry a greater total weight of ammunition than US ships, but they carry little or no reload for their major missile and torpedo systems.53 As Holst’s analysis shows, the basic philosophy of war-ﬁghting of the US and Soviet navies determined the design and purpose of their forces. Eric Morris noted this trend in examining the Soviet ﬂeet. ‘‘ . . . the major surface units . . . are required, it would seem, to counter surprise attacks on a concentrated deployment rather than in sustained operations in a hostile environment.’’54 Morris’ analysis had its basis in fact, as the Fifth Eskadra had deployed its surface warships in such a concentrated fashion against the US Sixth Fleet during the October 1973 crisis. The Soviets’ mass production of small, missile-ﬁring attack craft—which were nearly non-existent in the US Navy—were another indication of the importance of the sea-denial mission. Worth H. Bagley, a retired US Navy admiral, noted in 1977 that ‘‘In any case, the Soviet Navy possesses the launch platforms and cruise missiles to concentrate about eight standoff systems against each important American naval target in the open seas. As Soviet patrol boats come into the engagement, the ratio increases by at least 25 per cent.’’55 This buildup of Soviet naval strength, with powerful surface and submarine forces providing considerable ﬁrepower, appeared to challenge US and Allied ﬂeets. However, if the US Navy suffered from difﬁculties with its operational planning—namely, the vulnerability of forward-deployed forces—the Soviet Navy too faced problems with its plans for waging war. Eric Morris got to the heart of the matter in describing these difﬁculties: ‘‘ . . . the Russians have not constructed a balanced ﬂeet on the Western pattern . . . There is instead a heavy emphasis on submarines and these,

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together with many of the surface ships, are quite rigidly divided into speciﬁc tasks or missions.’’56 Perhaps the greatest deﬁciency experienced by the Soviet Navy lay in the quality of its personnel. Several Western naval experts noted this in their analyses of Soviet naval power during the 1970s. John Moore, a retired Royal Navy captain and a highly respected naval analyst, discussed this phenomenon. ‘‘The manning of the Soviet navy presents that most difﬁcult of all mixtures—a professional ofﬁcer corps directing a conscript Lower Deck . . . a fact which clearly worries Admiral Gorshkov.’’57 The fact that the Soviet armed forces relied so heavily on conscription to ﬁll the enlisted and non-commissioned ranks meant that, in the Soviet Navy, there was both a high turnover and rapid advancement for very young personnel, particularly because very few volunteered to stay on after their required naval service. ‘‘It is hardly surprising,’’ Moore continues, ‘‘that a system such as this throws a very heavy technical burden on the ofﬁcers and senior ratings . . . the total of ofﬁcers and ratings is about 425,000 whilst the annual intake of trainees is a little over 100,000.’’58 This analysis must be balanced against the fact that, during the 1970s, the US Navy also suffered from serious personnel problems. The lingering effects of the Vietnam era, most particularly strained race relations and drug abuse, plagued the ﬂeet, while retention rates, although not as serious as in the Soviet Navy, were worrisome. To give one example, in FY 1977 the goal for retention of nuclear submarine ofﬁcers was 60 percent (154 ofﬁcers.) The actual ﬁgure for that year was just 38 percent (98 ofﬁcers.) Moreover, 1977 saw the US Navy record the highest desertion rate in its history.59 Although these problems were alleviated somewhat by the end of the decade, difﬁculties remained. Although re-enlistments for second-term and above enlisted personnel were high, ofﬁcer retention was between 30 and 40 percent, rather than the Navy’s desired 60 percent level.60 ‘‘While the Navy faces major problems in both the ofﬁcer and enlisted categories,’’ wrote Norman Polmar in 1981, ‘‘the relative sophistication of Navy ships and aircraft continues to increase, making still more demands on the quality of personnel required to operate the modern ﬂeet.’’61 Despite these problems in the US Navy, its personnel were, in comparison to their Soviet counterparts, rated to be better sailors. Speaking in 1977, when the US Navy appeared to be at a sort of nadir in terms of personnel quality, John Moore was able to state: If we compare the standard of the men of the U.S. Navy with the standard of the men of the Soviet navy, we ﬁnd that this country is winning all along the line. Its men are better educated and better trained; they are used to technology. And they are competing with

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Having discussed the warﬁghting capability of the Soviet Navy (as well as that of the US Navy), we must address another question: what was its strategic purpose at this time? The deployment of Soviet warships to ports along the Atlantic and Indian Ocean coasts of Africa, as well as the larger Soviet naval squadrons that were to be found in distant waters, led to speculation that the Soviet Navy was now serving a political purpose not dissimilar to that of Western navies: as an example of a globalist Soviet foreign policy meant to compete with the West in the Third World. By the late 1970s, the Soviets had gained access to ports in Angola, Somalia, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Syria, Cuba, and Guinea. This increased the Soviet Navy’s ability to stage sea and air operations in the Indian and Atlantic Oceans with greater ease, as well as deploy forces in the Caribbean Sea and the Persian Gulf. The success enjoyed by proSoviet factions in Angola and Mozambique in 1975 helped strengthen Soviet inﬂuence in Africa, and thus to improve the Soviet naval position here. The US Navy, not surprisingly, noted the correlation between Soviet naval expansion and an enhanced global presence. In the 1975 edition of Understanding Soviet Naval Developments, it was noted ‘‘During the past few years there has been evidence that the Soviets will rely more and more on naval forces for overseas projection . . . the national leadership of the Soviet Union recognizes the signiﬁcance of sea power in the last quarter of the 20th Century.’’63 In the 1978 edition, the authors wrote ‘‘Today, Soviet naval forces are deployed continuously on several seas . . . They demonstrate Soviet military might through port visits . . . demonstrate support for Soviet clients, and inhibit Western military initiatives.’’64 A DIA report issued in February 1980 on the Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean echoed ofﬁcial American views of this phenomenon. ‘‘The Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean is an example of the Soviet use of seapower to support state interests and implement national policy. In support of these general aims, the Soviet presence is designed to enhance the image of the USSR as a global military power in the eyes of Indian Ocean littoral states and thereby increase Soviet regional inﬂuence at the expense of western and Chinese Communist inﬂuence.’’65 However, the USSR did suffer setbacks in its attempt to expand its naval presence in the Third World. Although it had deployed a powerful armada in the eastern Mediterranean in October 1973, it must be remembered that the Soviet Navy was ejected from its considerable base infrastructure in Egypt just a year earlier and lost all access to Egyptian facilities in 1976. The war between Ethiopia and Somalia in the Ogaden in 1977–78 led to a loss of Soviet access to the port and air facilities at Berbera.

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In discussing this situation, it should be remembered that there were considerable limitations on the Soviet Union’s ability to use these installations. The authors of the IISS Strategic Survey in 1979, analyzing the use of the Soviet Navy as an instrument of foreign policy, noted this. ‘‘Since the late 1950s the Soviet Union has gained access to shore support in several third-world countries. But this access has not been to bases, which the USSR could use as she pleased, but to facilities, which can be used only at the discretion of the host nation’’66 (My italics). The limitations placed by these countries on Soviet usage meant that forward-deployed Soviet naval forces often had to rely on a considerable force of underway replenishment ships, particularly in the Indian Ocean.67 This meant that the Soviet Navy had to rely on its bases in the USSR for most of its overall support and reinforcement. Here the issue of geography must be addressed, as it was of prime importance in considering the effectiveness of the Soviet ﬂeet, particularly in wartime. The Soviet Navy was divided into four ﬂeets: the Northern, based along the Arctic Ocean and having as a primary responsibility operations in the North Atlantic; the Baltic, which would have operated against Denmark and West Germany in the event of war; the Black Sea, which provided the forces for the Fifth Eskadra in the Mediterranean; and the Paciﬁc, which also provided units for the Indian Ocean Squadron. The Northern and Paciﬁc ﬂeets were the two largest, as they would have had the greatest responsibilities in wartime. While the size of the ﬂeets was impressive,68 the geographical odds they faced in getting to sea were formidable. The Northern Fleet would have to round the North Cape (dominated by NATO member Norway), then, after an open run through the Norwegian Sea, would face the Greenland– Iceland–Faeroes–UK Gap, which would place severe restrictions on passage, particularly for submarines. The Baltic Fleet faced an even worse situation, as the Danish Straits are just 40 miles wide. The Black Sea Fleet would face the Bosporus, 3/4 of a mile at its narrowest, while the Paciﬁc Fleet would have to contend with the various straits adjacent to Japan and Korea to get to the open ocean.69 US, NATO, and other friendly naval forces would have presented a formidable challenge at these bottlenecks early in a war. This situation was in sharp contrast to the US Navy, which enjoyed warm water ports on both the long Atlantic and Paciﬁc Coasts, much further from deployed Soviet forces. The US Second Fleet in the Atlantic and Third Fleet in the Eastern Paciﬁc were able to deploy from bases at Norfolk, San Diego, and Pearl Harbor. The Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean was able to call on bases like Naples. The Seventh Fleet in the Western Paciﬁc deployed from Yokosuka, Japan, and Subic Bay, Philippines. In the Indian Ocean, Diego Garcia had by the end of the 1970s grown into a signiﬁcant naval base.70 This state of affairs would have been lopsided enough in war. In peace, when the superpower ﬂeets were routinely forward deployed,

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this also had an effect. The US Navy could deploy forces for longer periods of time and with fewer support ships than the Soviet Navy. In early 1980, for example, three US carrier battle groups—centered on the Midway, Kitty Hawk and Nimitz—were deployed in the Indian Ocean. This presented a far more powerful strike force than could be brought to bear by the Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron.71 A good summary for the growth of Soviet naval power during the 1970s comes from Breyer and Polmar, who in 1977 offered their opinion on what the American contribution to the state of the naval balance had been during the decade, something taken to heart by the Reagan Administration four years later: ‘‘. . . the Americans themselves are largely responsible for the closing of the gap . . . in recent years the Americans have not made any technological progress . . . they have lost their numerical superiority . . . because they have drastically reduced their ship inventory, and . . . because of the small amount of new construction.’’72

The 600-ship navy and the balance of sea power in the 1980s A key objective of the Reagan Administration’s defense program was the expansion of the US Navy to a force of 600 general purpose ships. This had been the goal set during the Ford Administration but shelved during the Carter years.73 Such a ﬂeet was linked to the new administration’s view of global US interests and the Soviet threat to them. Weinberger, in his ﬁrst report to Congress in 1982, described the necessity of naval superiority: We are determined to restore and maintain maritime superiority over the Soviets. The question of the use of naval forces by the United States or its adversaries to protect or further their interests is closely related to the more general question of the ability of each side to project power in various areas of the world. Today, we have critical interests in many places that are distant from the Continental United States. These places include . . . the homelands of our European and Asian allies and regions—notably the Persian Gulf—on which we and our allies critically depend.74 Weinberger’s plans saw a ﬂeet totaling between 610 and 640 operational ships by the early 1990s. This would include auxiliary, sealift and reserve vessels, as well as combat ships.75 The FY 1983–87 shipbuilding program included some 133 new ships, along with 16 conversions and reactivations. Among the ships to be built were two additional Nimitz-class nuclear carriers, while the four battleships of the Iowa class, built during World War II, were to be reactivated to lead surface groups to complement carrier battle groups.76 Funding

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was also vastly increased, with a request of over $6.8 billion for the carrier program alone for FY 1983.77 Within three years, the US Navy had made impressive strides in the size of its deployable battle forces (ships able to be deployed for combat or in support of combat forces.) From 479 ships at the start of 1981, this total had grown to 491 by the end of that ﬁscal year, then to 513 by FY 1982, falling to 506 in FY 1983 (as a result of retiring older vessels.)78 By FY 1984 this had grown to 52579 and to 542 by FY 1985.80 Equally impressive was the turnaround in the situation regarding naval personnel. Thanks to major increases in pay and beneﬁts during the early 1980s, enlistment and retention rates increased signiﬁcantly. By 1984, the US Navy met 100 percent of its recruiting goals.81 Whereas the Navy had a shortage of 22,000 senior petty ofﬁcers in 1981, that had been reduced to 9,300 by 1983.82 Ofﬁcer recruiting and retention also improved. From a range of 30–39 percent retention in FY 1980, by FY 1983 this had improved to between 45–60 percent.83 Personnel quality was also high, some 90 percent of male enlistees being high school graduates.84 While there was considerable Congressional and public support for naval expansion during the 1980s, the enormous growth in the funding and scope of the US Navy during this time is due to the efforts of Reagan’s Navy Secretary, John F. Lehman. Lehman had championed a 600ship ﬂeet built around 15 carrier battle groups, 4 battleship groups, and 100 attack submarines, as well as greatly expanded amphibious lift capabilities.85 During the 1970s, the goal had generally been to maintain a force of between 12 and 13 carriers. Lehman argued strongly for the needed funds to build up the ﬂeet and linked this with a broad-based maritime strategy. Lehman outlined eight principles of maritime strategy: the need to tailor the maritime strategy to US national security policy; ensure that the Navy’s missions clearly emulate the principles of the strategy; establish maritime superiority over the Soviet Union; ensure such superiority is carried out within the framework of the strategy; ensure that it is based on a realistic assessment of the threat; ensure that it is global in scope; integrate US and Allied forces into the strategy; and ensure that it is a forward strategy.86 It was the idea of a forward strategy that set Lehman’s approach apart from much that had gone before. Although elements of it had existed in American strategic thought throughout the Cold War (as with plans to use carrier-based nuclear bombers to strike the Soviet Union in the 1950s), Lehman’s maritime strategy was much more comprehensive. In Lehman’s words, ‘‘With the global nature of our maritime tasks, the limited forces available dictate that our strategy must be a forward one, a strategy that identiﬁes and exploits Soviet weaknesses such as inherently unfavorable maritime geography. It must force the Soviet Union to use its maritime forces, particularly its attack submarines, to defend its

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vulnerabilities rather than allowing the Soviets the initiative to prey on our vulnerabilities.’’87 A powerful force of carrier and battleship groups, together with a large attack submarine ﬂeet, was seen as vitally important in carrying out these goals. This naval strategy corresponded to overall US national strategy. NSDD 32 outlined objectives for US conventional forces that the Navy was well suited to carrying out. These included ‘‘Putting . . . Soviet interests at risk, including those in the Soviet homeland.’’88 It also directed that ‘‘Counteroffensives will be directed at places where the US can affect the outcome of the war . . . US actions . . . will be designed to protect essential US interests, take advantage of Soviet vulnerabilities, and divert Soviet attention and forces from Europe and Southwest Asia.’’89 This was the basis for the Reagan Administration’s strategy of ‘‘horizontal escalation,’’ which would allow US forces, in the event of war with the Soviet Union or its proxies, to attack areas of Soviet vulnerability. For example, a Soviet invasion of Iran or seizure of West Berlin could be matched by a US attack against Cuba or North Korea, in order to force the Soviets to divert forces for their defense.90 As Secretary Weinberger declared in his Report for FY 1983: We may be forced to cope with Soviet aggression, or Soviet-backed aggression, on several fronts. But even if the enemy attacked at only one place, we might choose not to restrict ourselves to meeting aggression on its own immediate front. We might decide to stretch our capabilities, to engage the enemy in many places, or to concentrate our forces and military assets in a few of the most critical arenas. (Underlining in original.)91 As with the rest of the US defense buildup of the early 1980s, the naval increases were seen as a counter to growing Soviet naval strength. It is therefore necessary to assess the superpower naval balance during this time. Given the importance in the maritime balance between the superpowers, it is not surprising that the Reagan Administration turned to the intelligence community to produce a comprehensive study of the Soviet Navy. In March, 1983, the CIA produced an NIE on this subject. In the ‘‘Key Judgements’’ section, the authors noted the improvements in Soviet naval capabilities during the 1970s: Over the past decade, the role of the Navy within the USSR’s national strategy has continued to evolve, supported by additional operational experience and an ambitious naval construction program. This program, emphasizing larger ships with increased endurance and technologically advanced weapon and electronic systems, has enhanced the Navy’s capability for sustained conventional combat and distant area deployments.92

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However, the authors went on to note that ‘‘Within the Soviets’ overall wartime strategy . . . the primary initial tasks of the Navy remain: To deploy and provide protection for the ballistic missile submarines in preparation for and conduct of strategic and theater nuclear strikes’’ and ‘‘To defend the USSR and its allies from strikes by enemy ballistic missile submarines and aircraft carriers.’’93 Although these missions had been present in Soviet naval planning since the 1950s, their scope and range had increased greatly by the 1980s. The authors noted this in describing the areas of operation for Soviet naval forces assigned these tasks: Accomplishment of these tasks would entail attempts to . . . conduct sea denial operations . . . to about 2,000 kilometers from Soviet territory. We believe that virtually all of the Northern and Paciﬁc Fleets’ available major surface combatants and combat aircraft and some three-quarters of their available attack submarines would be initially committed to [these] operations . . . Other initial naval wartime tasks are: support of ground force operations in the land theatres of military operations . . . and some interdiction of Western sea lines of communication.94 As for forward deployment, the authors noted that ‘‘In addition to its wartime tasks the Soviet Navy will continue to play important peacetime roles, ranging from routine show-the-ﬂag port visits to support for distant-area client states during crisis situations and limited wars. Given the likelihood of continued instability in the Third World, the use of . . . naval diplomacy and power projection techniques probably will increase during the 1980s . . . ’’95 Such views were echoed by analysts outside of government. Norman Polmar wrote that Soviet naval development appeared to add the role of power projection to that of ASW defense, strategic deterrence through protection of ballistic missile submarines, and the ability to engage in conventional naval warfare utilizing air, surface, and submarine forces.96 This emphasis seemed to be leading to a situation in the 1980s where ‘‘the Soviet Navy appears to be moving toward a long-range capability of confronting Western or Third World forces at several levels of crisis or combat, including the ability to ﬁght a conventional as well as a nuclear war at sea.’’97 This analysis was made in 1983, after the death of Brezhnev, a strong supporter of Admiral Gorshkov, and it was not clear what policy would be under Andropov. However, Polmar noted, ‘‘the momentum for a continued naval buildup is strong, and the rigidly structured economy of the USSR prevents radical changes in defense programs. Above all, the Soviet leadership certainly understands the importance of Soviet use of the seas for that nation’s political, economic, and military activities.’’98 The Soviet Navy did maintain a large force of combat ships and submarines through the early 1980s, but it did not grow sharply in numerical

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terms. According to the IISS, in mid-1982, the Soviet Navy possessed 290 major surface combatants. This remained the same the following year. In 1984, this number grew to 293, then fell slightly to 289. For submarines, traditionally an important element in Soviet naval planning, there was only modest growth: 273 attack boats (including those equipped with cruise missiles) in 1982; 276 in 1983; 278 in 1984; and down to 269 in 1985.99 This can be compared to the number of American ships in these categories. US totals for major surface combatants and attack submarines in 1982 were, 204 and 90, respectively. In 1983, this fell slightly to 201 for surface ships and rose to 95 for subs; in 1984, the ﬁgures were 206 and 95; in 1985, 213 and 95.100 More than simple numbers were the varying capabilities that existed between the ships being commissioned by the two ﬂeets. During 1982, each navy added an aircraft carrier to its forces: a Nimitz-class carrier joined the US Navy, while the Soviet Navy received a Kiev-class vessel.101 The quality of the air wings was heavily lopsided. A typical US Navy carrier air wing in the early 1980s consisted of 89 aircraft and helicopters organized into 10 squadrons: ﬁghters, light and medium attack/tanker, early warning, electronic warfare, reconnaissance, antisubmarine aircraft, and helicopter.102 The Soviet carriers operated only 12 aircraft and 24 helicopters.103 Moreover, the US Navy deployed 13 carriers by late 1982, while the Soviet Navy deployed just 3, one each with the Northern, Black Sea, and Paciﬁc Fleets.104 Despite the impressive size of the Soviet Navy, a great many vessels were obsolescent. The Soviet attack submarine force is a case in point. Of the 490 such boats built by the USSR during the Cold War era (in this case early 1950s to late 1980s), just 108 were designed and built from the 1970s on.105 Soviet submarines, particularly nuclear boats, were far noisier than their American counterparts, which would have made them much more vulnerable in wartime.106 Not only was the US Navy growing in numbers and overall capability, but it was also, in accordance with Secretary Lehman’s maritime strategy, establishing a much more visible forward presence. Between August 1 and October 16, 1981, the US Atlantic Fleet engaged in exercise Ocean Venture ’81, which involved a total of 14 nations, some 120,000 personnel, 250 ships, and 1,000 aircraft. The US Navy deployed two carrier battle groups, led by the Dwight D. Eisenhower and Forrestal, to take part. The exercise began in the South Atlantic, then continued in the Caribbean and off the Atlantic Seaboard with joint US–Canadian maneuvers. This evolved into a major NATO naval exercise involving operations in the Norwegian Sea, as well as in the Baltic. The American carriers also gave support to a mock conventional war in Europe, and practiced convoy escort in the Atlantic. This series of exercises were the largest conducted by the US Navy in several years.107 The US Navy carried out similar operations in the Paciﬁc. In April– May 1983, major exercises in the Northwest Paciﬁc, known as FLEETEX

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83-1, were conducted, involving 3 US carrier battle groups, centered on the Midway, Coral Sea and Enterprise, totaling more than 40 ships. These included vessels of the Canadian Navy and the US Coast Guard. Supported by US Air Force early warning aircraft and B-52 bombers, the ﬂeet conducted simulated attacks on Soviet Paciﬁc bases, while US attack subs and ASW aircraft deployed in protected ‘‘bastions’’ of Soviet ballistic missile boats. The armada of ships actually came to within 720 kilometers (450 miles) of the Kamchatka Peninsula, and aircraft from the Enterprise and Midway overﬂew Zelenny Island in the Sovietcontrolled Kurils.108 The purpose of these exercises was two-fold. First, to practice the new US maritime strategy, as noted earlier. The second was more directly related to US–Soviet relations at the time. In March 1981, President Reagan had authorized the US Navy to operate near the coasts of the Soviet Union. Their objective was to show Moscow that the United States and its allies could engage in operations close to Soviet territory in strength, and in such a way as to inﬂict considerable damage on the Soviet Navy in wartime.109 In displaying American geopolitical will vis a` vis the USSR, the US Navy increasingly revealed the weaknesses of its Soviet counterpart. The Soviet Navy was never able to match the wide-ranging exercises of the Americans during the 1980s, as its Okean manovers in 1970 and 1975 had done. This is not to say that the Soviet Navy was idle. A major amphibious exercise was undertaken in July 1981 by Soviet and Syrian forces in the Eastern Mediterranean involving over 1,000 Soviet Naval Infantry.110 In September of that year, the Soviet Navy deployed 60 ships and landed more than 6,000 Naval Infantry and Army troops as part of Zapad ’81, a major combined-arms exercise conducted in the Baltic near the Polish border. The size of the exercise (the Soviets ofﬁcially declared that some 100,000 personnel took part) and its political signiﬁcance (it occurred three months before martial law was imposed in Poland as a result of the challenge of the Solidarity movement) meant that the Navy could still be seen as important to Soviet foreign policy.111 Nonetheless, when it is considered that the US Navy was able to participate in a plethora of combined-arms exercises that achieved such impressive results, Soviet activities are put into proper perspective. Furthermore, the role of allied navies, alluded to at various times in this chapter, cannot be ignored. Whereas the Warsaw Pact could offer relatively little in terms of forces outside the Baltic, NATO naval forces provided considerable support to the US Navy in the North Atlantic and in the Norwegian, North, Baltic, and Mediterranean Seas. Excluding ballistic missile submarines, by 1983 NATO could deploy 409 warships and submarines against the Warsaw Pact’s 309, with considerable numerical superiority in the Mediterranean (144 to 118.) The Soviet Paciﬁc Fleet deployed 158 ships against 142 for the US Paciﬁc Fleet, but

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this was more than redressed by Japan’s 48 destroyers and frigates and 14 submarines, and by China’s 27 destroyers and frigates, 83 submarines, and vast numbers of small combatants.112 It should be remembered that China, perhaps even more than the United States and its NATO allies, was considered as posing a direct threat of war by the Soviets. On the whole, the quality of these forces was signiﬁcantly higher than that of the Warsaw Pact, which utilized obsolescent Soviet equipment and replicated the difﬁculties in personnel found in the Soviet Navy. While the Chinese Navy left much to be desired in terms of capability, it would have added substantial numbers to US and allied naval forces in the Paciﬁc in the event of war with the USSR. Added to the advantages in ship endurance, weapons effectiveness, training, and overall warﬁghting capability enjoyed by the US Navy, this portended a decisive shift away from the Soviet Union in the naval balance. The geopolitical shifts of the 1970s did little to improve the Soviet naval position in areas outside the USSR. Soviet support for Ethiopia in the Ogaden war gave her access to air and naval facilities at Massawa, on the Red Sea. However, this meant a loss of the facilities in neighboring Somalia, including the major base at Berbera, on the Indian Ocean. The United States gained access to Berbera from 1981 and added an important new facility to its infrastructure in the Indian Ocean. The Soviet Navy, meanwhile, was bottled up in the Red Sea, between the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb and the Suez Canal (controlled by Egypt, a US ally.) The Soviets did gain access to the American-built bases at Cam Ranh Bay and Danang, Vietnam during this time, but these were matched by the mighty US base at Subic Bay in the Philippines, while air bases in Australia, Guam, and the Philippines more than compensated for the Soviet contingents in Vietnam. As for Cuba, Soviet installations there would have been among the ﬁrst attacked in the event of global war. By 1985, the United States had established a clear margin of maritime superiority over the Soviet Union. The ability of the US Navy to operate in forward areas adjacent to the USSR, as well as maintain an effective presence in such regions as the Indian Ocean, was markedly superior to what the Soviet Navy could accomplish. Moreover, the US Navy gained combat experience during this time in Grenada and Lebanon that taught it valuable operational lessons in combined-arms operations. The variety of missions practiced during the large-scale maneuvers of the early 1980s—anti-surface warfare, AAW, ASW, strategic strike, and amphibious operations—provided it with invaluable lessons. The fact that these exercises were carried out with allied forces broadened this experience considerably.

Conclusion In looking at the 1976–85 timeframe, it becomes clear that the lack of investment in US naval strength up to about 1980 played an important

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role in the shift in the balance of sea power during the 1970s. Major reductions in ship numbers occurred during the early 1970s, and US shipbuilding efforts did not keep pace, meaning that as older vessels were retired, new ships entered service in far smaller numbers. Furthermore, the inconsistency of US naval planning, shifting from a planned signiﬁcant increase during the Ford years to apparent naval retrenchment under Carter, and combined with overruns of cost and shipbuilding meant that a steady response to the Soviet buildup was not achieved. For the Soviet Union, the situation was very different. Admiral Gorshkov’s leadership, combined with major naval investment, allowed the USSR to shift the balance somewhat in its favor. The need to develop a large ‘‘blue water’’ navy to project Soviet power into the Third World, as well as to support the central military balance in Europe, played a major role in driving this effort forward. However, the balance began to shift from 1980. A greater emphasis on US power projection capabilities by the Carter Administration led to increases in naval spending. These included funding for the traditional assets of US naval power—a nuclear-powered carrier, attack submarines, and major surface warships. Carter’s successor, of course, expanded this effort greatly. The vigorous naval buildup of the Reagan Administration, particularly Secretary Lehman’s efforts, saw a resurgence in US naval power that left the Soviet Navy well behind by the mid-1980s, exacerbating its existing difﬁculties while adding additional ones. Moreover, the Soviet Navy did not gain any actual combat experience during this time, while it was forced onto the defensive by the US naval strategy. Soviet forward-deployed naval forces in such areas as the Caribbean simply did not have the endurance or capabilities of similarly deployed American ﬂotillas (in the Indian Ocean, for example.) Among the many important roles played by the US and Soviet navies during this period—and certainly the most visible—was that of power projection, training for or taking part in operations in the Third World in support of other forces assigned to this task. Given the growing concern during the 1970s that Soviet military power—including naval power—was contributing to an unfavorable geopolitical balance in Moscow’s favor, the US naval expansion from 1980 was in step with the overall American buildup of forces undertaken by the Carter and Reagan Administrations. The renewal of confrontation between the superpowers during this period played a pivotal role in propelling this effort. The naval balance during the 1980s came to serve as an indicator of a resurgence of American power and geopolitical will, particularly in such actions as Grenada (1983) and the large-scale exercises in the Caribbean and off Central America (1982–84), which involved signiﬁcant displays of US naval strength.113 Combined with the projection of US naval forces into areas close to the Soviet heartland, these came to represent the visibly thrusting effort by the United States to reassert its

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military primacy vis a` vis the Soviet Union. In the Third World, which had played a signiﬁcant role in bringing about the renewed superpower confrontation of the early 1980s, such an effort was seen as crucial by US policymakers. This would become evident in the balance of power projection forces as a whole, discussed in the following chapter.

7

Forces for rapid deployment

The emergence of a balance of power projection forces between the United States and the Soviet Union during the 1970s was a relatively recent phenomenon. The United States had, since the end of World War II (when the capability was acquired on a vast scale), been at the forefront here. The Korean and Vietnam wars, together with interventions in Lebanon (1958) and the Dominican Republic (1965), were examples of the American capacity for deploying and sustaining large combat forces in regions far from its own territory. Apart from the deployment of air defense personnel to Egypt in 1970, during that country’s ‘‘War of Attrition’’ with Israel, the USSR was unable to match such deployments. The stationing of nuclear weapons in Cuba during 1962 was reversed by the United States, a dramatic example of Moscow’s inability to successfully engage in such actions during this time. The experience of Vietnam, however, led to disillusionment with large-scale interventions, without a direct threat to national security. Congressional action, including the War Powers Act of 1973, reﬂected this mood. Accordingly, the emphasis on power projection forces declined during the 1970s. Instead of utilizing its own forces, the United States would provide military equipment to local allies in order for these countries to play a stabilizing role in regions of importance. The Nixon Doctrine led to such efforts in Southeast Asia and, most importantly, in Iran, where the Shah came to be seen as a pillar of stability in an area of vital importance for Washington. At the same time, the Soviet Union began an expansion of its own capabilities in this area. Along with its naval buildup, the USSR began to expand its airlift and sealift capabilities, improved the infrastructure of naval facilities in areas like the Indian Ocean, and developed forces for power projection missions. These developments coincided with growing upheaval in the Third World. A series of successful guerrilla wars and coups in Africa led to the establishment of left-leaning regimes in Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, and elsewhere. The fall of pro-American governments in South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos in 1975 reﬂected this trend. From an American

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perspective, the fact that many of these new regimes were (or appeared to be) pro-Soviet marked a shift in the global balance of power toward Moscow. The role of the Soviet Union was also seen to be decisive. The Soviet support for the Vietnamese Communists in 1974–75, the combined role of Soviet arms and Cuban combat troops in Angola in 1975, as well as Soviet support for rebels in Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau indicated a Soviet strategy of intervention (albeit through proxy troops and arms supplies) in the Third World. Nor was the Soviet Union’s more assertive role the only concern in Washington. The embargo of oil supplies to the United States by Arab members of OPEC in 1973–74 drew American attention toward the issue of intervention in the Persian Gulf. The dependence of the United States on such supplies for its own prosperity was brought home sharply by this event. Furthermore, the embargo was carried out by such friendly governments as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, as a result of American support for Israel in the 1973 war. If hostile forces—either internal or external—should seize control of these countries, the possibility of a longer and more comprehensive cutoff of oil supplies was much greater. It was during the winter of 1974–75 that the issue of US military intervention to secure Persian Gulf oil was ﬁrst broached. President Ford stated that ‘‘If a country is being strangled . . . that in effect means that a country has a right to protect itself against death.’’1 Schlesinger noted ‘‘it is indeed feasible’’ to use American military power in such an event.2 In a widely read article in January 1975, Robert W. Tucker, a professor of International Relations at Johns Hopkins University, argued that a case existed for the use of force to secure oil supplies in such an eventuality. ‘‘There is a general consensus . . . that if the present situation goes on unaltered, a disaster resembling the 1930s is indeed a distinct possibility and that it would have as its immediate and precipitating cause the present oil price.’’3 In August 1975, the US Congress issued a report on the subject of US military intervention in the Persian Gulf. It highlighted the dependence of the United States on imported oil, although this was lower than most of the NATO allies and Japan (37 percent for the United States as opposed to 95–100 percent for these nations.)4 The consequences of ‘‘sustained sanctions by the Arab [oil producing] states, perhaps abetted by Iran,’’ were described in stark terms: . . . severe economic and social problems probably would alter America’s fundamental lifestyle. Oil shortages up to 50 percent, for example, could be expected in New England and some Middle Atlantic States. Shifting essential oil supplies from west to east would be a slow, laborious process. Pipelines are few and capacities low. Tankers would have to transit the Panama Canal, which excludes all such ships larger than 65,000 deadweight tons.5

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This would be the result of a loss of at most 20 percent of US oil imports.6 As noted above, the economies of NATO Europe and Japan relied to a much greater extent on Persian Gulf oil. As the events of 1973–74 showed, such a denial of petroleum supplies would have a very adverse effect on the economies of all developed nations, as well as much of the Third World.7 The interdependence of the Western industrial states meant that insulation from such economic turmoil was simply impossible. This knowledge would inﬂuence American policy toward the Persian Gulf. By 1977, concerns over the security of Persian Gulf oil had segued into concerns over the increase of Soviet inﬂuence in key areas of the Third World. The Soviet Union appeared to be ﬁlling the vacuum left by Western powers, particularly in Africa. Moreover, the emergence of a pro-Soviet regime in South Yemen had raised fears that the Arabian Peninsula could soon come under pressure from the Soviets and their proxies. The perceived threat from the USSR in both mineral-rich subSaharan Africa and the petroleum-rich Persian Gulf began to have an impact on US policymakers by the time Jimmy Carter took ofﬁce, and these perceptions would come to play a role in shaping overall US national security policy.

Carter and the RDF, 1977–81 The new administration began to take an interest in improving US military capabilities for power projection. In outlining the requirements for study in PRM 10, President Carter directed its authors to ‘‘evaluate the relative ability of the U.S. and its allies to achieve U.S. objectives in speciﬁed military contingencies.’’8 PRM 10 outlined several scenarios involving US power projection forces, including situations in the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa. In both contingencies, sizeable US forces from the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force were committed.9 The authors of PRM 10 saw this capability as central to US strategy. Dividing their study into eight Alternative Integrated Military Strategies (AIMS), they cited three roles for such forces: as part of a global war with the Soviet Union; for peacekeeping operations in the Third World; and for direct intervention where US interests were threatened.10 In summarizing the roles of power projection for the various AIMS, the authors stated ‘‘The Third World is seen to have such importance that the US requires signiﬁcant capabilities for unilateral intervention, to the extent of risking a military confrontation with the Soviets if necessary.’’11 ‘‘In all AIMS,’’ they continued, ‘‘the US would have a major capability for intervention in the third world inherent in its forces even if not bought speciﬁcally for that purpose.’’12 This analysis led to discussion elsewhere, including the Pentagon. Secretary Brown, together with the JCS, listed some important questions

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in relation to PRM 10. Relating to US strategy and the availability of forces (which became an important issue in power projection planning), Secretary Brown and the JCS listed the following question: ‘‘To what extent should the US acquire military capabilities, above those required for the European theater, to undertake military operations (either offensive or defensive) against the Soviets in a US-USSR war?’’13 Even more important were the questions regarding ‘‘US Military Strategy for Crisis Management and Potential Local Wars:’’ What should be the planned extent of US military forces (and supplies) available for crisis management or intervention in local wars? To what extent should these forces (or supplies) be available without drawing from those required for a major US-USSR war? In what individual regions of the world should the US plan for the use of US military forces in crises and potential local wars (Middle East, Korea)? Are there any regions where the US should plan for the use of land combat forces?14 As a review memorandum, PRM 10 was meant as a stepping stone to a more concrete American policy. This came in August 1977 with the issuing of PD 18, which included the objective that would lead to the creation of a specialized, multi-service power projection force. In discussing competition with the Soviet Union, Carter called for efforts to ‘‘Counterbalance, together with our allies and friends, by a combination of military forces, political efforts, and economic programs, Soviet military power and adverse inﬂuence in key areas, particularly Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia.’’ (My italics)15 Although it would not be established for almost two-and-a-half years, the PRM 10 study and PD 18 led to planning for what became known as the Rapid Deployment Force—a specialized power projection force meant to swiftly deploy to Third World trouble spots in order to secure US interests.16 This would consist of about 100,000 men, who would have a self-sustained logistical capability.17 At its core would be ‘‘a ‘deployment force of light divisions with strategic mobility’ for global contingencies, particularly in the Persian Gulf region and Korea,’’ according to National Security Adviser Brzezinski.18 Between 1977 and 1979, there was little headway made on the development of such a power projection force.19 In part, this reﬂected the general view of the Carter Administration, which favored negotiation of Third World issues with the Soviet Union or through the United Nations. Events, however, began to push the Carter Administration, which had concentrated much effort on improvement of NATO forces and on a stable strategic balance, toward a renewed effort in this area. The ﬁghting in the Ogaden between Ethiopia and Somalia played a role in this.

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Facing invading Somali forces and local guerrillas (as well as rebels in Eritrea), a hodgepodge of Ethiopian and East Bloc forces, including Cuban armored units and East European specialists, were commanded by Soviet General Vasily I. Petrov, First Deputy Commander-In-Chief of the Red Army. A massive Soviet airlift of weapons to Ethiopia, followed by the combined forces’ counterattack, drove the Somalis from the Ogaden. This success meant that Ethiopian forces were shifted to the Eritrean front, where they gained the upper hand against the insurgents.20 The conﬂict in the Ogaden led to a reappraisal of using US forces in regional conﬂict, even if only to present a show of force. In a meeting of the NSC’s SCC on February 22, 1978, US responses to the crisis were debated. One possibility discussed was the deployment of a US carrier task force to the region. Brzezinski and Brown expressed support for this. Brzezinski saw the need to deter an Ethiopian invasion of Somalia, a distinct possibility at the time, and also to serve two other purposes. First, to support the possible deployment of pro-US forces from such countries as Egypt, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. Second, to give encouragement to these countries to supply arms to Somalia, because the task force would be able to protect arms shipments. Such a deployment ‘‘could be a conﬁdence building measure, encouraging countries in the region that the U.S. is present, stands with them, will protect the ﬂow of arms, and will provide protection from the Russians.’’ Brown concurred, noting that the task force’s primary mission would be ‘‘to keep the Russians from attacking arms transfer shipments.’’21 This was meant to support Somalia in case of an Ethiopian invasion. It was also raised as a means of effecting a Somali withdrawal from the Ogaden. David Aaron, Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs, raised this issue. ‘‘We might consider a carrier in the context of asking [Somali President Mohammed] Siad-Barre to withdraw from the Ogaden and defend his country from the border.’’22 This meeting helped lead to of PD 32, setting out US policy toward the Horn of Africa. Although Carter refused to send a carrier to the Horn, he ‘‘indicated willingness to consider moving a carrier closer to the area—for example, Diego Garcia.’’23 In May, a NATO task force was dispatched to the Horn, in order to reassure Somalia of the West’s determination to safeguard her territorial integrity.24 In Carter’s view, US support for Somalia could only be provided if her sovereignty were jeopardized by Ethiopia, and not for its actions in the Ogaden.25 However, the growing importance of the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf, as well as an apparently more assertive Soviet policy, helped shift American efforts toward a more direct military presence.26 A marked shift in tone toward the use of US Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) came to be heard during 1978. In a speech at Wake Forest University in March, Carter declared that the United States would ‘‘counter any threats to our allies and our vital interests in Asia, the

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Middle East and other regions of the world.’’ This would be accomplished by ‘‘quickly deployable forces—air, land and sea—to defend our interests throughout the world.’’27 On June 7, during commencement exercises at the US Naval Academy at Annapolis, Carter identiﬁed the kind of threat these forces were meant to deter: The Soviet Union apparently sees military power and military assistance as the best means of expanding their inﬂuence abroad. Obviously areas of instability in the world provide a tempting target for this effort and all to often they seem ready to exploit any such opportunities. As became apparent . . . in Ethiopia . . . the Soviets prefer to use proxy forces to achieve their purposes.28 The Iranian Revolution of 1978–79, as well as conﬂict between North and South Yemen, brought an added impetus to the creation of a combined power projection force. During the Yemeni crisis in the summer of 1979, a squadron of F-15 ﬁghters, along with two AWAC aircraft, were deployed to Saudi Arabia, which provided American weaponry to North Yemen in order to defeat incursions from the Soviet-backed South. The carrier Constellation was deployed with a battlegroup to the Indian Ocean as well, protecting arms shipments to North Yemen.29 This marked a shift in US policy toward the Gulf, displaying a determination to utilize American forces to counter moves by Soviet proxies. In January 1979, Brzezinski famously enunciated the growing alarm among US planners toward events in the region: ‘‘An Arc of Crisis stretches along the shores of the Indian Ocean, with fragile political and social structures in a region of vital importance . . . The resulting . . . chaos could well be ﬁlled by elements hostile to our values and sympathetic to our adversaries.’’30 The events that brought about the creation of the RDF came in 1979, with the seizure of the US embassy in Teheran in November and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan the following month. These events, the ﬁrst spurred by the fall of the Shah, effectively marked the collapse of the Nixon Doctrine. In its place, Carter enunciated his own doctrine, directed toward the Persian Gulf. In his State of the Union address on January 23, 1980, he spelled out the threat posed by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan: The region now threatened by Soviet troops in Afghanistan is of great strategic importance: It contains more than two-thirds of the world’s exportable oil. The Soviet effort . . . has brought Soviet military forces to within 300 miles of the Indian Ocean and close to the Straits of Hormuz . . . The Soviet Union is now attempting to consolidate a strategic position that poses a grave threat to the free movement of Middle East oil. Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an

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assault on the vital interests of the United States. It will be repelled by use of any means necessary, including military force.31 Among the steps being taken, the President noted that ‘‘We are improving our capability to deploy US military forces rapidly to distant areas,’’ as well as ‘‘making arrangements for key naval and air facilities to be used by our forces in the region.’’32 With this bold declaration of American intent, an obvious need emerged for sufﬁcient military forces to give the Carter Doctrine muscle. Plans were already in place for such a capability. Since PRM 10 and PD 18 had been drafted in 1977, the JCS had planned for possible intervention in the Persian Gulf. In September 1978, they issued a report, titled ‘‘Review of US Strategy Related to the Middle East and the Persian Gulf.’’ Among vital US interests were the need to maintain access to the region’s oil and to prevent ‘‘an inimical power or combination of powers from establishing hegemony’’ in the Gulf.33 The report urged a continual US naval presence—based on carrier battle groups and amphibious forces—in the Indian Ocean.34 General Bernard Rogers, US Army Chief of Staff, briefed reporters in June 1979 on a ‘‘unilateral force’’ that would be centered around three Army divisions, including the 82nd Airborne.35 At the same time, President Carter’s Policy Review Committee met to consider options for the Persian Gulf. Among these were the establishment of a Middle East command, a major US naval presence in the Indian Ocean, expansion of military facilities, and a rapid reaction force of 100,000 men, as had been described by General Rogers.36 On October 1, the RDF was established with the mission of ‘‘conducting predeployment planning and training for non-NATO contingencies.’’37 By January 1980, therefore, plans for an American intervention capability for the Persian Gulf were underway.38 The establishment of the RDF had precedents. During the Kennedy and Johnson years, a similar force, known as Strike Command, was established to respond to Third World contingencies. It was composed of some six Army divisions—two of which were airborne—and Air Force units.39 Its role was to formulate plans for deployment, and did not have any forces under its direct control, except when used operationally. In 1962, the United States established a task force combining forces from the different services for possible use during the Cuban Missile Crisis. In 1965, this force was used in the Dominican Republic.40 In planning the RDF’s missions, three key threats appeared. First, Soviet military intervention in the Persian Gulf, either through an invasion of Iran or deployment of troops by air or sea into the Gulf itself. Second, that of a regional power (like Iraq) which, for its own reasons or in support of Soviet policy, invaded the Gulf oil-producing states like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Oman. Third, internal upheaval, akin to that in Iran in 1978–79, which would threaten oil supplies.

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Once its missions had been identiﬁed, the RDF would now comprise substantial forces from the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force. Given this fact, on March 1, 1980 the RDF was re-designated the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) and given primary responsibility for the defense of Southwest Asia.41 As JCS Chairman General Jones reported in 1980, ‘‘The RDJTF will be responsible for peacetime planning and for exercising of designated forces in their RDF roles; in the event of deployment to areas lacking adequate US command structure, the RDJTF would be the on-scene command element for operations.’’42 Its ﬁrst commander would be Marine General Paul X. Kelley. As with Strike Command 20 years before, the RDJTF did not require the establishment of any new combat units. All of the forces that would have come under its control were already in existence and would simply have been ordered to deploy. Only the fact that all four services—as opposed to the Army-Air Force combination of Strike Command—were included made this new force unique.43 The RDJTF would also have been able to deploy in a manner tailored to the situation at hand. As Secretary Brown wrote in 1980, ‘‘we have already designated speciﬁc units as components of our Rapid Deployment Forces (RDF) . . . The composition of the forces deployed will vary depending on the nature and location of the crisis.’’44 Accordingly, the RDJTF expanded greatly in terms of manpower, equipment, and assigned units. By 1981, the RDJTF, headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, consisted of the following forces: –

–

– –

Army: 82nd Airborne Division, 101st Air Assault Division, 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), plus one air cavalry, one armored and one air defense brigades, two Ranger battalions and a Special Forces Group. Navy: Three carrier battle groups (20–30 ships), 3 amphibious ready groups carrying Marine units, 5 maritime patrol squadrons, plus 13 pre-positioned ships with equipment. Marine Corps: One Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) plus one Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB). Air Force: Six Tactical Fighter Wings (plus one Group), an AWACS wing, and the 57th Air Division, made up of B-52 bombers and supporting tanker and reconnaissance aircraft.45

All told, these forces came to number some 200,000, with as many as 100,000 reserve personnel in support.46 Apart from 261 headquarters staff at MacDill, however, the RDJTF did not actually have operational control over these forces. Instead, they would be drawn as necessary, in whatever ‘‘package’’ was deemed necessary for the situation at hand.47 As General Kelley noted: Our task will be to develop a number of force packages, each with its own political signals and each with its own combat capabilities. At one end of the spectrum, we will have a light package that could

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deploy to any crisis spot in the world in a matter of days. On the other end will be the entire rapid deployment force. Simply stated, our force packages will be tailored to what is required for a speciﬁc crisis.48 Having identiﬁed the contingencies under which it would be used, and the forces assigned to it, it is necessary to examine the third question, perhaps the most challenging of all: How would the RDJTF be deployed to Southwest Asia? This was no easy task, as even a relatively small force would have experienced considerable challenges in deploying to the region. In order to allay such difﬁculties, the Carter Administration took action in three key areas. First, it improved US airlift and sealift capabilities. By 1981, US military airlift forces could call on 596 transport aircraft, 304 of which were long range. For sealift, there were 215 dry cargo vessels directly available.49 A new cargo aircraft, known as the C-X, was to be developed, and improvements to existing airlift assets were to be undertaken.50 A program to store or preposition military equipment on ships at Diego Garcia to support the RDJTF was to receive over $310 million, while a longer term prepositioning program would receive nearly $800 million.51 Second, bases in the region were identiﬁed and upgraded. Facilities in Egypt, Oman, Somalia, and Kenya began to be upgraded by the United States during this time. The base at Diego Garcia was also improved, with efforts to extend the runway there to 12,000 feet (enough to accommodate B-52 bombers, C-5 cargo planes, and P-3 maritime patrol aircraft), as well as dredge the lagoon to accommodate an aircraft carrier. In all, the United States planned to spend $2 billion over a ﬁve-year period to improve these facilities.52 The third effort was prepositioning. This was meant to ensure that enough supplies existed to sustain RDJTF units in combat. The Marine Corps embraced this concept early. The 7th MAB was designated as the Marines’ rapid reaction unit for the Gulf. Its equipment was stationed on the ships of the Near-Term Prepositioning Force (NTPF). Numbering 12,500 men, the 7th MAB was deployed at Twentynine Palms, California. In a crisis, it would be ﬂown to Southwest Asia and ‘‘marry up’’ with its equipment. Stationing of NTPF ships began in May 1980, and by July a total of seven ships had deployed.53 Despite the major efforts made during 1980 to expand the RDJTF’s capabilities, there remained serious issues and much criticism of the concept. Jeffrey Record gave perhaps the most serious critique of the RDF on military grounds. In his view, the RDF was ‘‘a fatally ﬂawed military instrument for the preservation of uninterrupted U.S. access to vital Persian Gulf oil—the principal rationale underlying the force.’’54 Among his criticisms was the fact that the Army and Air Force elements would be dependent on a major base infrastructure to carry out operations,

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thus negating the concept of rapid deployment. Furthermore, many of the units were unsuited to desert warfare or for ﬁghting large Soviet mechanized forces.55 Record suggested ‘‘a small, agile, tactically capable intervention force that is based at and supplied from the sea,’’ meaning that the Marine Corps would assume primary responsibility.56 This would avoid the political problems of a major US deployment ashore in the region, which could have led to strains with local allies.57 Christopher Coker concurred, noting the lack of suitable base facilities in the region and the considerable need for support personnel, including mobility forces.58 These critiques represented a fundamental debate over strategy regarding the RDF. Given the difﬁculties of distance and time that its forces would have faced, the strategies for using the RDF during 1980– 81 appeared to be quite risky. US planners saw the RDF as being deployed in a ‘‘pre-emptive’’ manner, meant to seize key objectives (i.e., oilﬁelds) before Soviet forces occupied them. This would mean that the RDF would serve as a ‘‘tripwire’’ force, meant to deter the Soviets by displaying American determination to defend the Gulf, albeit initially with very small forces. New York Times reporter Richard Halloran summed up the dangers of this strategy. ‘‘[The tripwire strategy] could be extremely risky, especially if the Soviet Union was the adversary. It would be the Cuban Missile Crisis on the ground, with two armies eyeball to eyeball.’’59 Statements by US military planners cast doubt on the ability of such a force to hold its objectives in the face of a Soviet assault. General Volney F. Warner, head of Readiness Command, warned that if the 82nd Airborne Division and a Marine brigade were sent to the Gulf—a force of some 35,000 men—they could be overwhelmed by superior Soviet forces.60 This led to concerns over the use of nuclear weapons if RDF forces were facing defeat. In early 1979, the Pentagon completed a study projecting a response to a Soviet invasion of Iran. It stated that US forces would need to resort to the use of tactical nuclear weapons to prevent a Soviet victory.61 In classiﬁed Congressional testimony, General Kelley concurred with this assessment, stating that nuclear weapons would probably have to be used to prevent the loss of the Persian Gulf to Soviet forces.62 While the tripwire concept had many critics, some saw it as making sense in the early years of the RDF. In the Spring 1981 issue of the journal International Security, Kenneth Waltz called for ‘‘linking a minimal defense to America’s strategic deterrent. What we should strive for is an asset-seizing, deterrent force that can handle both internal and external threats.’’ Elaborating on this, Waltz wrote that ‘‘a deterrent strategy, properly implemented, puts the Soviet Union on notice that maintaining a substantial ﬂow of oil from Persian Gulf states is a vital American interest . . . A deterrent strategy entails no use of nuclear weapons, if it succeeds, and can entail a limited and selective use, if it fails.’’63

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The development of the RDF concept between 1977 and 1980 provides a clear example of how American perceptions of the Soviet threat came to shape policy. Two key points are evident in this process. First, the nature of the perceived threat shifted. In 1977, the authors of PRM 10 and PD 18 saw instability in the Third World—the Middle East, of course, but also sub-Saharan Africa as well—as providing the main role for a power projection force. Soviet-backed proxy forces, like those of Cuba, were seen as potential opponents, necessitating a light, mobile force as a counter. By 1979, after events in the Horn of Africa, Iran and Afghanistan had brought home the need for a direct US military role in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf, the primary role of the RDF came to be seen as countering a Soviet military thrust, leading to the planning and conﬁguration of the RDJTF. While Soviet proxies and internal instability were listed among the RDJTF’s missions, the Soviet threat was given ﬁrst priority. As General Kelley noted, ‘‘The toughest contingency, and the one that certainly has captured my attention needless to say . . . is the direct confrontation with the Soviet Union.’’64 Second, the geographical area where such a force would have to ﬁght became focused on the Persian Gulf and surrounding areas. Whereas the RDF had originally been seen as having a global power projection mission, the RDJTF was focused primarily on Southwest Asia, with defense of the Persian Gulf its central role.65 There were several reasons for this. From 1977, for example, the CIA reported that the Soviet Union, despite considerable domestic oil reserves, might have to import petroleum, particularly from the Persian Gulf. Although there was disagreement over whether this would occur or what it might portend, it increased the Carter Administration’s concern over a Soviet threat to the region.66 The invasion of Afghanistan, of course, was seen as an indication of the USSR’s willingness to move directly into the region, now considerably less stable than it had been two years previously. An April 1980 NSC memorandum warned of a Soviet threat to Iran, and why such an action would be attractive for Moscow: For more than 150 years, the Russians have aspired to advance in this area . . . Iran could be a paying proposition with its vast oil and gas reserves—the ﬁrst really proﬁtable territorial acquisition for the Soviets. It could help pay for Cuba and Ethiopia and help surround and subdue Afghanistan. (Underlining in original)67 It also pointed out that in the event of U.S. military action on this issue ‘‘we must be prepared to go all the way and occupy a sizable part of the country. If we do not, we will merely open the way for a Soviet takeover and Soviet utilization of its resources. (Underlining in original)68 The Persian Gulf, of course, was the geographical focus of the Carter Doctrine, and the Soviet Union the primary threat. As Robert Tucker

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noted, ‘‘it is only the Soviet Union that represents ‘any outside force’ capable of gaining control of the Persian Gulf.’’69 These factors were representative of a renewed Cold War. The RDJTF, as conﬁgured, was perhaps the most visible instrument in a robust US response to what was seen as dangerous Soviet adventurism. Along with major increases in defense spending for FYs 1981–82 and the ‘‘Countervailing Strategy’’ exempliﬁed by PD 59, the RDJTF, as continually stressed, was a means of confronting the Soviet Union in the region that most likely to witness a clash between the two superpowers, the Persian Gulf. It has been argued that the Carter Doctrine helped spur several such measures during 1980–81.70 The concept of the RDF, therefore, is an example of the change not only in the Carter Administration but in the perception of the American public of the superpower relationship. Just as the RDF evolved from a Third World intervention force, meant to battle Soviet surrogates, to a all-service task force with its primary mission the defense of the Persian Gulf from a Soviet invasion, so too the public’s view of the Soviet threat. Whereas in 1977 the Soviets were seen as following an opportunistic policy in the Third World, by 1980 Soviet actions were seen as having triggered a new cold war, with the Persian Gulf its fulcrum. Policymakers and public alike came to see a robust military capability in this area as a vital step in checking Soviet aggressiveness, and the RDJTF reﬂected this perception.

Reagan and the Central Command, 1981–85 By the time Ronald Reagan arrived in the White House in January 1981, the RDJTF was a cornerstone of US military strategy. Harold Brown had declared the RDJTF one of the four pillars of US military strength, together with the Navy, US forces committed to NATO Europe, and the US strategic forces.71 The outgoing administration had bequeathed its successor a strategy emphasizing the security of the Persian Gulf as a top priority. Two directives, both issued January 15, 1981, bear this out. PD 62, focusing on US strategic interests, declared that ‘‘While NATO will retain ﬁrst call on force deployments in peacetime for wartime operations, the Persian Gulf shall have highest priority for improvement of strategic lift and general purpose forces in the Five Year Defense Program’’ (My italics).72 PD 63, addressing the Persian Gulf, cited several areas of effort. Among these were ‘‘building up our . . . capabilities to project force into the region while maintaining a credible presence there,’’ and ‘‘contribute to deterring and resisting Soviet penetration—political, economic, or military.’’73 The Reagan Administration saw the RDJTF in similar terms, while making it a part of a more expansive national strategy. NSDD 32 stated ‘‘The U.S. must plan, in conjunction with its allies, for a successful

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defense in a global war against the Soviet Union and its allies.’’ For Southwest Asia, the containment of Soviet inﬂuence and protection of oil supplies were key objectives. ‘‘U.S. military strategy is to deter Soviet aggression; if necessary, to combat the Soviets in the theater; and to prepare for executing counteroffensives elsewhere.’’74 The last point was in line with the new administration’s emphasis on ‘‘horizontal escalation,’’ by which a Soviet move in one part of the world could see a US response elsewhere, in order to keep Moscow off guard.75 In order to protect the Persian Gulf from a Soviet thrust, a three-‘‘tier’’ plan was outlined in NSDD 32: First, we must plan for and demonstrate our ability to project the RDJTF . . . quickly into the region to prevent a Soviet fait accompli . . . Second, if deterrence fails, we must plan to combat the Soviets in the theater to dissuade them from continued aggression. The third tier of Defense planning is to prepare for executing counter-offensives on other fronts where the U.S. has advantages. Throughout this planning process, the potential for this conﬂict to become global must be recognized and planned for. (Underlining in original)76 US general purpose force structure would reﬂect these priorities. ‘‘General order of priority will be given to improvements of forward deployed forces, forces providing ﬂexibility in deployment, such as the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, other units earmarked for earliest deployment, and associated lift forces.’’77 A similar approach was taken in the Reagan Administration’s ﬁve-year defense plan. Known as Fiscal Year 1984–1988 Defense Guidance, its contents were quickly leaked to the press. While much attention was focused on plans for a ‘‘protracted nuclear war,’’ considerable attention was given to a Persian Gulf contingency. Although US planning retained scenarios dealing with internal instability or war between local powers, its main emphasis was on checking direct moves by the Soviets or their proxies.78 Furthermore, a Soviet threat to the Persian Gulf would present Moscow with the danger of escalation in other geographical areas.79 The importance of Southwest Asia was repeatedly emphasized during this time. In Congressional hearings on defense appropriations in May 1982, for example, the importance of the region—and the RDJTF—was made plain. ‘‘The emergence of the Rapid Deployment Force and the emphasis on Southwest Asia have signiﬁcantly altered U.S. military planning. The area is now considered to be a third potential . . . theater of war—along with Europe and Northeast Asia.’’80 This approach was in line with the Reagan Administration’s view of the international situation at this time, based on its perceptions of the

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Soviet Union. Whereas the Carter Administration had seen the Soviet threat to the Persian Gulf as the ﬁrst among a variety of overall issues in its foreign policy, Reagan saw this as being the most signiﬁcant danger presented by the USSR, which had become the principal threat to American security. In a May 1981 RAND Corporation report, James Digby described this approach—which he termed the ‘‘Strategy of Full Recourse’’—and its application to Southwest Asia. Among the points he described were ‘‘the preparedness to deal with simultaneous challenges in many places . . . the enhancement of mobility forces, particularly naval forces . . . the restoration of a world-wide base system and selective forward basing in newly critical places,’’ and ‘‘the extension of the political use of U.S. nuclear strength.’’81 Perceptions of the military balance were also critical to this approach. A Pentagon statement, issued by the US Embassy in London in March 1982, stated ‘‘Nations in the region will shape their policies at least partially in accord with their perception of the prevailing military balance between the superpowers. The U.S. must not be perceived as wanting in either the will or the capability to defend Western interests—interests we share with regional states.’’82 Having inherited the RDJTF from Carter, Reagan moved to improve its effectiveness as a ﬁghting force. Central to this was the staging of exercises meant to familiarize these forces with the conditions they would face in combat. In November 1980 the ﬁrst of the annual Bright Star exercises in Egypt was carried out, which provided combined forces training for the RDJTF. One thousand four hundred troops of the 101st Air Assault Division took part in this exercise.83 In November 1981, a second Bright Star exercise was held. It was considerably broader in scope than its predecessor. Some 4,000 US troops were airlifted to Egypt, while equipment for a mechanized infantry battalion was sent by sea. The US forces carried out an airborne assault and desert warfare exercises and were supported by six B-52s. In Sudan, 350 US personnel carried out a joint exercise with Sudanese forces, while in Somalia another 350 Americans, using engineering equipment, carried out a joint exercise with Somali forces at the port of Berbera. In Oman, US Marines carried out an amphibious landing with Omani troops.84 Bright Star ’82 was a clear display of the RDJTF’s capabilities, as well as a show of American geopolitical determination in the region (it was held barely a month after the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat.) However, it also showed some of the lingering problems the new force faced. It took four days for the 4,000-man force sent to Egypt to be fully deployed. Furthermore, the inclusion of the B-52s appeared to reinforce the idea that the US military was continuing to rely on overwhelming ﬁrepower in lieu of ﬂexible strategic and tactical concepts.85 At the same time, the RDJTF’s importance within the American defense establishment grew. On October 1, 1981, the RDJTF was chartered by the

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Pentagon to be a separate joint task force reporting directly to the President through the JCS. The RDJTF commander was ordered to limit force planning to Southwest Asia, emphasizing the importance of this region and the need to focus the RDJTF’s attention on this area alone.86 This was a step closer to the Reagan Administration’s goal of elevating the RDJTF to a uniﬁed command.87 The Administration also sought to expand the RDJTF in terms of both forces assigned and prepositioning efforts. By 1982, the RDJTF had available as many as 11 Air Force Tactical Fighter Wings, a Navy surface action group (centered around a recommissioned battleship), and a second MAF.88 The Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS) program, an extension of the Carter effort, was planned for FY 1984. Upon completion, it would provide equipment and supplies for three MABs.89 These efforts increased the size and capability of the RDJTF.90 Moreover, as had been promised, the RDJTF was both elevated in status and changed in name. On January 1, 1983, the RDJTF became the US Central Command (CENTCOM), responsible for the defense of Southwest Asia.91 The establishment of CENTCOM removed the cumbersome system of shared responsibility between the JCS and Readiness Command. Now, akin to his counterparts in Europe, the Paciﬁc and Latin America, the Commander-In-Chief, CENTCOM would be answerable only to the JCS and the President. By 1985, the size of CENTCOM’s forces had increased well beyond what had been intended when planning for the RDF had begun in 1977. Including support units, CENTCOM could call on 291,600 personnel by this time: 131,000 soldiers, 53,000 sailors, 70,000 Marines, and 33,000 airmen. The augmented CENTCOM headquarters totalled 1,100.92 This last category is illustrative, as it is a four-fold increase over what the RDJTF had ﬁve years earlier. While most of these forces were deployed within the Continental United States, there were important forward-based forces already in Southwest Asia. One of the three carrier battle groups assigned to CENTCOM was always on station in the Indian Ocean, while a detachment of AWAC aircraft was deployed in Saudi Arabia.93 A Marine Amphibious Unit, some 1,800 strong, was usually deployed in the Indian Ocean as well, providing an on-scene spearhead.94 The scope of military exercises grew as well. Bright Star ’83 involved 26,500 US military personnel and covered Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, and Oman. In addition to airborne training in Egypt, Marines carried out amphibious training in Somalia, and, for the ﬁrst time, US, Egyptian, and Sudanese forces carried out combined exercises.95 Prepositioning efforts continued to improve the deployment capabilities of US forces. By 1985, the NTPF at Diego Garcia numbered 17 ships (with another in the Mediterranean.)96 By FY 1986, plans called for 13 MPS ships to replace the NTPF. These vessels would be able to carry supplies for

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three MABs (46,000 men.)97 US airlift and sealift capabilities were also increased. A program to acquire 50 additional C-5 transport aircraft was begun.98 In addition to MPS, the Navy converted eight SL-7 high-speed merchant vessels into sealift ships capable of carrying the equipment of an Army armored or mechanized infantry division.99 As during the Carter years, the Reagan Administration continued to improve US access to facilities in the region. Along with Egypt, Oman, Somalia, and Kenya, efforts were made to improve bases in Turkey. A 1982 agreement allowed US forces to establish NATO bases at Kars, Konya, and Van, near the Soviet border.100 The United States also reached an understanding with Saudi Arabia, allowing for use of bases. However, nearly all of these agreements were conditional on the situation at hand. Even Turkey stated that the new bases were to be used for a NATO, rather than a unilateral American, contingency.101 These efforts reﬂected the Reagan Administration’s overall geopolitical strategy. Applied to Southwest Asia, these efforts reﬂected a determination by US policymakers to thwart any Soviet threats there, as part of a global strategy. NSDD 75, issued January 17, 1983, outlined US policy toward the USSR. Militarily, Worldwide, U.S. general purpose forces must be strong and ﬂexible enough to affect Soviet calculations in a wide variety of contingencies. In the Third World, Moscow must know that areas of interest to the U.S. cannot be attacked or threatened without risk of serious U.S. military countermeasures.102 The directive went on to state ‘‘The U.S. effort in the Third World must involve . . . readiness to use U.S. military forces where necessary to protect vital interests and support endangered Allies and friends.’’103 NSDD 99, addressing Southwest Asia, listed as a regional security objective the ability to ‘‘deter Soviet aggression and maintain readiness for combat if necessary’’ as the top priority. This would ‘‘prevent the Soviet Union from attaining a position of hegemony in the region by deterring Soviet expansion.’’104 Military strategy also remained a topic of debate. At ﬁrst, given the limitations in the RDF concept, the Reagan Administration viewed it as a sort of ‘‘tripwire’’ force, akin to the view of US forces in Europe during the 1950s. In response to a Soviet invasion of Iran, a readily deployable force (about 500 strong) would have been sent to defend the oilﬁelds in the southwest of that country. These troops would be supported by the full range of US capabilities, including strategic nuclear forces.105 Such a strategy was risky, and as the RDJTF (and later CENTCOM) grew in size and capability, the ‘‘tripwire’’ concept faded. By 1983, according to the IISS, ‘‘Having enhanced her capability to deploy quickly and her access to bases en route to, as well as in, the region, the US is in a reasonable position to deter Soviet action so long as she shows political will

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to do so.’’106 However, while tremendous strides were made in the early 1980s, doubts remained about the ability of US forces to hold against an all-out Soviet offensive.107

US and Soviet power projection capabilities compared As a central objective of the RDF was to repel a Soviet intervention in the Persian Gulf, it is important to examine the two superpowers’ capacity for projecting military power. As US forces assigned to this task have been described in considerable detail, a comparable list of Soviet forces is necessary. The most effective Soviet forces for power projection were the seven airborne divisions, each with around 8,500 men. These forces were kept at Category I readiness level. Due to their importance, they were not assigned as part of the Red Army but instead were designated a reserve of the High Command, reporting to the Ministry of Defense.108 These divisions were well equipped109 and had seen action in recent years, including the invasions of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Afghanistan in 1979, on both occasions as a spearhead force.110 Providing airlift was Military Transport Aviation, deploying between 1,200 and 1,400 aircraft, including 50 giant An-22 cargo aircraft. This force would have been augmented by planes from Aeroﬂot in times of war.111 The Soviet Naval Infantry (marines) numbered some 12,000 during this period, organized into regiments (one each stationed with the Northern, Baltic, Black Sea, and Paciﬁc Fleets.)112 These forces were tailored for amphibious assault, but were largely directed to support the activities of the ﬂeets to which they were assigned. However, as the SovietSyrian exercise in 1981 showed, they did have the capability to operate in a power projection role, as did the presence of Soviet amphibious forces in the Indian Ocean during this time.113 A total of 83 amphibious ships supported these forces.114 Supply could have been provided by the Soviet merchant marine, numbering some 1,723 ships by mid-1982.115 If the Soviets did decide on an overland intervention in the Persian Gulf, they would rely on their heavy ground forces deployed adjacent to the region. Around 27 divisions were stationed in the Transcaucasian and Central Asian military districts of the USSR. Six more were deployed in Afghanistan. Supporting these forces were two tactical air armies (300–500 aircraft each) with another 100 in Afghanistan.116 Supporting these forces was the Soviet Navy’s Indian Ocean Squadron, able to be built up to about 20 or more ships in times of crisis. While these forces, taken as a whole, were formidable, the ability to deploy them effectively was debatable. Of the USSR’s seven airborne divisions, its most effective power projection force, only two (stationed in the Odessa and Transcaucasus Military Districts) had the Persian Gulf as a probable primary target. The 106th Guards Airborne Division, based at

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Tula near Moscow, was held in strategic reserve. However, as with US RDF forces, it would be ‘‘on call’’ for other contingencies.117 The Soviet Naval Infantry were generally designed to seize the various straits inhibiting the passage of the various Soviet ﬂeets. The relatively small detachments deployed in the Indian Ocean would have been unable to sustain themselves after a few days.118 Nor would an overland assault have been easy. Soviet forces in TransCaucasia would have had to advance some 1,000 miles in order to reach the head of the Gulf. The Zagros Mountains were ﬁlled with narrow passes that either local Iranian forces or US forces (special operations or air power) could have blocked without much difﬁculty. Few modern roads existed here, and rail links were even less developed. Soviet forces would be reliant on a long, tenuous supply line. An attempt by Soviet forces in Afghanistan to seize the Strait of Hormuz, at the mouth of the Gulf, would face similar problems with transport links, as well as opposition from US naval forces.119 Finally, there was also a major disparity in the forces needed for power projection possessed by both sides. As Michael Klare notes, the United States possessed considerable advantages in sea-based air power (13 aircraft carriers with 800 ﬁghter and attack aircraft, to just 4 with 40 far less capable aircraft) and amphibious shipping (944,000 tons to 175,000 tons), over the Soviet Union. In airlift, the Soviets did have an advantage (24,140 tons to 21,135 for the United States), but payload and range factors, as well as the higher quality of US aircraft, helped balance this out.120 According to Klare, who listed the superpowers’ rapid deployment forces (marines and ‘‘air-mobile forces’’), the United States had 215,000 troops available for such missions, while the Soviet Union had just 72,000, a 3-to-1 advantage.121 Both superpowers would have also had support from their allies. The United States could rely on small but well-trained British parachute, Royal Marine and Special Air Service units, while France, although often pursuing its own goals in the Third World, did maintain sizeable forces (Foreign Legion and marine) in Africa.122 Moreover, the ability of these forces to deploy rapidly, often with American logistical support (as in Zaire in 1978), made them an important factor in the balance. On the other hand, the Soviet role in the Horn of Africa in 1977–78 was an example of a growing Soviet capability in the region. Specialist personnel from East Germany, as well as Cuban troops, had proven their worth during the 1970s.123 The subject of military doctrine must also play a part in this analysis. The United States had, since World War II, developed the projection of power on a large scale as part of its strategy, as seen in Korea and Vietnam. The development of the RDF concept for the Persian Gulf, therefore, while representing tactical difﬁculties, was familiar to US planners. The ability to deploy a joint service, combined-arms force to deal with a variety of contingencies had been common since at least the early 1960s.

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For the Soviet Union, the situation was different. Not until the late 1960s had the USSR begun to project power—initially through its navy—on a large scale. The operations in Angola and the Horn of Africa in the following decade represented a limited direct role for the Soviet Union, while the invasion of Afghanistan was launched against a state bordering the USSR, and generally in a traditional manner, with heavy forces relieving the airborne troops who seized Kabul at the start of the operation. Furthermore, Soviet rapid deployment force could not sustain themselves for long. The US Marines, by contrast, were designed as a self-sustained combined-arms force that could operate on their own for up to a month. Any signiﬁcant Soviet military intervention in an area like the Persian Gulf would have reﬂected the Soviet planners’ reliance on heavy forces. This, by necessity, would have limited the distance from the Soviet Union that such interventions could have been mounted.124 Such considerations are central to the superpowers’ military doctrines and the role of power projection. The United States, as exempliﬁed by the RDF, saw deployments of large, self-sustaining military forces as part of its global strategy: the Soviet Union, by contrast, saw its power projection capabilities as part of operations from its own territory or contiguous areas.

Conclusion The debate over the power projection balance in the United States during the 1970s and 1980s represents strongly the way in which the country viewed its role in the world, as well as that of the Soviet Union. The Persian Gulf, with its vital petroleum supplies, ﬁrst brought attention to the need for US power projection capabilities in 1975, as a result of the Arab OPEC embargo. The Carter Administration, in PRM 10 and PD 18, reﬂected these concerns, with the inclusion of plans for what would become the RDF. The evolution of the RDF concept, from a Third World intervention force to a combined-arms task force meant to secure the Persian Gulf, is reﬂective of the shift in perception of the USSR’s role in the Third World, particularly in Southwest Asia. From 1977 until late 1979, the Carter Administration generally viewed US–Soviet relations as a mix of competition and cooperation. In terms of military strategy, this meant maintaining a strategic nuclear balance, strengthening NATO and establishing a framework for a RDF. Power projection forces were to be maintained as part of an overall package of national power, designed to maintain stability in the Third World. The events of 1979, culminating in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, changed this approach. A renewed cold war emerged by 1980, marked by more assertive US defense and foreign policies. The RDJTF was formally established, assigned to defend the Persian Gulf. The Carter

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Administration saw this as part of a more assertive policy toward the USSR, meant to show American resolve, but not necessarily as a new cold war. Such a display of strength could, in the long run, force the Soviets to ameliorate their behavior and return to a more constructive relationship.125 The Reagan Administration saw the situation very differently. The Soviet Union was, in the new President’s words, ‘‘the focus of evil in the modern world,’’ and an all-out Cold War approach was needed. The buildup of the RDJTF—and its evolution into CENTCOM—represented a determination to counter the Soviet threat as part of a robust containment policy. The emphasis on integrating Persian Gulf strategy as part of a possible global war with the Soviet Union reﬂected the Reagan Administration’s outlook. This emphasis on direct and indirect Soviet threats differed from the Carter view. While Harold Brown noted both ‘‘indigenous instability’’ and ‘‘Soviet adventurism’’ as being dangers in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean,126 Caspar Weinberger saw the Soviet Union as the primary source of instability in Southwest Asia and Africa.127 The development of the RDF/RDJTF reﬂects this shift in emphasis toward a direct Soviet threat. The initial 100,000-man RDF was to be light, with an emphasis on being able to put US forces into trouble spots and diffuse crises quickly. The RDJTF, with an initial strength of some 200,000 personnel—increased to nearly 300,000 in CENTCOM by the mid-1980s—reﬂected the need to have large forces from all the services prepared to wage war against Soviet ground, naval, and air forces. While the emphasis on rapid deployment remained, US planners accepted the need to sacriﬁce at least some of these capabilities in order to assure that forces for this requirement were included. In the event, neither administration used these forces on a large scale during this time. The abortive attempt to rescue the hostages from Teheran in April 1980 marked the only direct use of force during the Carter years. The deployment of US Marines in Lebanon in 1982–84 and the invasion of Grenada in October 1983 were the limits of similar action by Reagan. Although there were major US military exercises in Central America and the Caribbean during the early 1980s, these did not result in direct military action.128 Rather than direct action, these efforts sought to send a message to the Soviets—that Washington was willing to defend American interests in the Third World by force if need be. This had an impact on perceptions of the balance in other quarters, including the Third World, particularly regarding the USSR’s ability to support its proxies.129 By 1985, the Soviet Union was unable to compete in the Third World without paying an unacceptable price, and soon signaled a desire to move away from competition as part of a broader shift in its foreign and defense policies.

Part IV

Defense spending

8

The expenditure debate

In the debate over the US–Soviet balance in the 1970s, the issue of military expenditures emerged as one of its most persistent topics. It was also one of the most intangible measurements of relative military strength, for two reasons. First, the scale of Soviet defense expenditure was extraordinarily difﬁcult to ascertain, to say the least. A host of factors—the difﬁculty of determining the actual value of the ruble with that of the dollar, the USSR’s command economy, (which meant that much of its military effort was enmeshed within a variety of different ministries responsible for various sectors), the endemic secrecy of the Soviet state— contributed to this. Second, the variety of factors determining American defense spending, (including differing criteria listed in open reports, as well as such factors as inﬂation), meant that a determination of US expenditures, while far easier than ascertaining concurrent Soviet efforts, was still difﬁcult to discern. Moreover, the impact of ﬁgures available, which juxtaposed rising Soviet spending levels and declining American expenditures, had a considerable impact on the overall defense debate. Generally overlooked were such factors as what was being purchased by these increased Soviet sums. Often, the effectiveness of weapons procured was not commensurate to the sums invested. Nor did this focus on defense spending take into account the very different issues faced by the United States and the Soviet Union in making spending decisions. As John Collins cautioned in a study of the military balance published in 1978, ‘‘Comparing defense budgets . . . is among the most publicized, but least meaningful, means of measuring military power.’’1 Aside from the issues of deducing the actual scope of the superpowers’ military expenditures, political issues also played a role. The mid-1970s saw a shift in American views toward De´tente, particularly with regard to the military balance. The vast increases in Soviet military power throughout the decade—in strategic forces, forces deployed in Eastern Europe, and power projection capabilities—combined with a perceived decline in American military strength, were seen as indicators of the Soviet Union’s effort to utilize the De´tente process to gain a decisive

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edge in military power over the United States. Naturally, such an enormous military establishment needed similar vast ﬁnancial inputs to maintain and expand it. Defense spending thus became part of the often strident debate over the military balance. This debate reached into the various intelligence services of the United States, particularly the CIA. Charges that the Agency had not taken into account the full nature of the Soviet buildup were driven by both political and analytical factors. Many opponents of De´tente viewed the CIA’s leadership as supporters of this process. This view would play an important role in shaping the expenditure debate. The events of 1975–77 in this area resulted from this mixture of political and analytical issues and would set the tone for US defense spending—and national security policy—into the next decade.

The balance of military spending in the mid-1970s While discussions of defense spending were subject to divergent criteria, one fact did exist at the core of the debate: the US defense budget had fallen during the early 1970s. According to a Pentagon report issued in January 1977, the US defense budget had decreased by 12 percent in 1975 from what it had been in 1964, by some $7 billion.2 An important factor was the Vietnam War. There had been major increases in the defense budget in order to prosecute the conﬂict, but much of this had gone to support US forces in Southeast Asia, meaning that the normal cycle of research, development, testing, and evaluation of new systems, followed by procurement, was considerably disrupted. During FYs 1965–69, the budget rose from just under $120 billion to $165 billion, then fell sharply until levelling off in FY 1974. If the costs for the war are excluded, actual expenditures hovered around $120-125 billion between FY 1964–69, then declined to about $110 billion in FY 1973.3 These ﬁgures were part of the public record and generally easy to access. Far more difﬁcult was the level of Soviet defense spending. Few in the West or the USSR believed the ﬁgure listed under ‘‘Defense’’ in the Soviet State Budget, generally given as 17 billion rubles, was realistic in light of the enormous Soviet military effort.4 More problematic was making a reasonably accurate determination of the real level of Soviet expenditures. Because other areas, like military education (which was the responsibility of the Ministry of Education) and the large sectors of industry and the scientiﬁc community in the Soviet Union which supported the military effort (the Ministry of Transportation provided funding for military transport, for example), were not listed in the Soviet State Budget as being linked to defense, these areas had to be somehow estimated and included in an assessment of overall ﬁgures for Soviet expenditure.5 While the US intelligence community as a whole was geared toward this effort, the CIA was the agency primarily involved in producing the

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overall estimates. Given the numerous means of estimation and the many difﬁculties encountered in undertaking such a task, the CIA had, by the 1970s, established a framework for its efforts. Known as the ‘‘building block’’ approach, it included two main stages. First, the CIA’s analysts would count the production of military equipment in the USSR, as well as analyze the Soviet military’s order of battle (the number of divisions in the Red Army, for example). This information was provided by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), which coordinated US military intelligence.6 Second, the CIA would evaluate these ﬁgures through two sets of criteria. The analysts would ﬁrst determine what the cost would be for procurement and maintenance of such a force in US dollars. This would then be projected in rubles, which would give an idea of the overall Soviet defense effort relative to Soviet economic output. By doing so, the CIA was able to provide a relative estimate of US and Soviet expenditures, based in part on actual ‘‘hard’’ evidence (i.e., military production and deployment.)7 While the ‘‘building block’’ method appeared reasonable, there were numerous ﬂaws in its formulation. First, using a dollar-ruble comparison based on an estimate of what it would cost for the Soviets to maintain a force at American levels was misleading. The CIA worked with US defense contractors to ascertain the costs of Soviet equipment, which was certainly different from that of the United States. Much of the infrastructure of the Soviet defense industry was state subsidized, unlike that of the United States. Another problem was that the pace of many Soviet research and development projects was uneven, meaning that a comparison of such efforts with their US counterparts was misleading.8 An even more glaring problem existed with regard to comparing US and Soviet military pay scales. By the early 1980s, a Soviet conscript was paid 3.50 rubles (approximately $6.50) a month, while an US entry-level enlistee received $573 per month, as well as bonuses for housing and other expenses. As the CIA estimates assumed parity, this vastly inﬂated Soviet expenditures in this area.9 While the United States had consistently paid its military personnel more than the Soviet Union, the establishment of an All-Volunteer Force in 1973 saw pay rates double during the decade. As these levels were linked to cost-of-living increases, pay and beneﬁts grew.10 By 1978, for every dollar spent on defense, pay and allowances consumed almost 65 cents.11 For each cost-of-living increase in the United States—a frequent occurrence in the 1970s, an era of high inﬂation—the estimates for Soviet defense spending rose accordingly.12 The main challenges to the CIA’s estimates, however, were not made on the basis of an overestimation of Soviet spending, but rather that these levels were underestimated. Through the early 1970s, the CIA estimated that the Soviet Union allocated between six and eight percent of its GNP for defense. Other agencies disputed this ﬁgure. General

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Daniel O. Graham, who became deputy director for estimates at the DIA in 1970, began to challenge the CIA’s estimates. The DIA differed with the CIA’s pricing of Soviet weapons, because its analysts were using only those US equivalents closest to the Soviet equipment being estimated, rather than more sophisticated American weaponry. From 1970, the DIA refused to use the CIA’s spending ﬁgures in its reports.13 The DIA estimated that a full one-third of the Soviet State Budget went to defense.14 Upon becoming DIA director in 1974 (and later as a private citizen), General Graham challenged the use of the ‘‘building block’’ approach.15 Nor was the intelligence community alone in this debate. Schlesinger, who became Secretary of Defense in 1973, began to question the levels given for Soviet expenditure. Citing development and deployment of new, more sophisticated weapons by the Soviets, Schlesinger raised the question of ‘‘how . . . a country that is visibly deploying such weapons [can] do it with spending only 6–8 percent of its GNP on defense.’’16 By early 1975, matters had come to a head. Both the CIA and DIA undertook a major effort to ﬁnd Soviet sources to provide a realistic picture of Soviet defense spending. Defectors who had worked in planning ministries provided information on this subject to the Americans. One of these defectors, whose reputation for reliability was somewhat questionable, actually claimed to have seen the USSR’s defense budget for two years.17 The CIA and DIA established a joint team to debrief this source in April 1975. According to his information (covering 1969–70), total defense expenditure came to 47.5 billion rubles for 1969 and 49.6 billion (projected) for 1970. This helped to shift the CIA’s estimate of ruble value (heretofore estimated at 1955 levels and adjusted to 1970s prices) to one believed to be more accurate for the middle of the decade.18 The CIA was able to obtain a copy of the Statistical Handbook of the Politburo, which provided the ‘‘actual’’ levels of defense spending, reportedly decided upon some years earlier.19 This new evidence forced the CIA to rethink its estimates over the past several years. William Colby, the DCI, established a team of CIA and DIA analysts to draft an estimate based on this new information. Their report, SR 76–10053, was issued in February 1976. Incorporating the new information obtained the year before, the report nearly doubled the percentage of Soviet GNP allocated for defense, to 10–15 percent. This meant that in real terms the Soviet Union was spending some 40 percent more than the United States on defense.20 In May, the CIA issued SR-76-10121U, which estimated an increase of 10–20 billion rubles in Soviet defense spending between 1970 and 1975. Furthermore, defense spending, estimated as having increased by 4–5 percent from 1970 to 1973, increased to between 5 and 6 percent from 1973 onwards, as a result of strategic forces modernization.21 The report’s authors discussed the economic impact of this effort: ‘‘ . . . we now realize

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that Soviet leaders have been more willing than we thought to forgo economic growth . . . in favor of military capabilities. Nevertheless, we see no evidence that economic considerations are deterring the Soviets from continuing the present pace and magnitude of their defense effort.’’22 The CIA was quick to point out that this did not mean that the Soviet Union had outstripped the United States in terms of military capability, because it only pertained to spending. Indeed, the need to expend such sums meant that the Soviet ‘‘military industrial complex’’ was only half as efﬁcient as originally thought.23 Former CIA analyst William T. Lee, who had argued that Soviet defense expenditure was actually at the levels listed by the intelligence community in 1976, noted the implications. ‘‘Each year, more labor and much more capital have been required to produce a constant value of output, which indicates acute inefﬁciency.’’24 Many conservatives, who were suspicious of De´tente and alarmed by an apparently adverse military balance, jumped on these ﬁndings as evidence that they had been correct in their concerns. Schlesinger had already warned of the dire consequences of this. In an October 23, 1975 letter to Senator John L. McClellan, Chairman of the Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, Schlesinger noted that By most of the available measures, American power is declining and Soviet power is rising. No one can say precisely where the peril points lie as this process unfolds. But if real expenditures by the United States remain constant or continue to fall, while real Soviet outlays continue to rise, the peril points will occur in the relatively near future.25 These concerns were echoed in the press. Henry S. Bradsher, who would later become a senior CIA analyst, wrote in the Washington Star in February 1976 that ‘‘The new evaluation shows that the Kremlin’s determination to drive toward greater military strength, its readiness to sacriﬁce for armed might, are much stronger than had been apparent.’’26 Although Bradsher noted later in his article that this did not translate into larger forces in being, the tone is reﬂective of the alarm raised over such developments. Meanwhile, signiﬁcant changes had occurred in high positions within the US intelligence community. In November 1975, President Ford had ﬁred William Colby as DCI, replacing him with George Bush. James Schlesinger had been replaced as Secretary of Defense by Donald Rumsfeld, who appointed Robert F. Ellsworth as Assistant Secretary for Intelligence in January 1976.27 Bush sought to shift the CIA toward the role of analyzing foreign intelligence, after the scandals wrought by the Agency’s role in covert operations.28 As the debate continued, Ford decided to bring into play the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory

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Board (PFIAB). Its role was to provide an independent analysis of US foreign intelligence services, a sort of ‘‘watchdog’’ for the President.29 The issue that would bring PFIAB into the debate was the CIA’s estimate of Soviet strategic forces and their capabilities, known as NIEs. From the early 1970s, there had been increasing criticism of how NIEs were being conducted, because new Soviet strategic missiles and bombers were being deployed with greater capabilities than their predecessors. Moreover, the issue of higher Soviet defense expenditure was also implicit, because it was believed that the greater Soviet expenditure translated into more effective weaponry. PFIAB was well-placed to become involved in the debate. Since 1969, PFIAB had provided annual analyses of the strategic balance. These tended to differ from the NIEs, becoming more alarmist in their judgments on Soviet capabilities.30 Consisting of a varied group of professionals from several ﬁelds, it was politically to the right in its view of foreign and defense policy and the Soviet Union’s role in the world.31 In August 1975, PFIAB’s chairman, retired Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr, wrote to President Ford to request a ‘‘competitive analysis’’ be held regarding intelligence estimates.32 In December, CIA Director Colby, who would soon be replaced by Bush, agreed to undertake a review of the NIE system for gathering information on Soviet strategic forces, going back a decade. Issued to PFIAB in January 1976, the report generally supported the CIA’s methods for preparation of NIEs, although it did include some particular criticisms, particularly ‘‘the failure of the earlier estimates to foresee the degree to which Soviets would not only catch up to the United States in number of ICBMs but keep right on going.’’33 The ‘‘Track Record Study’’ appeared to vindicate the process by which NIEs were drafted. Most in PFIAB disagreed, focusing on shortcomings identiﬁed in the study to renew calls for competitive analysis.34 In April, President Ford directed the NSC—supported by recommendations from DCI Bush and Assistant Secretary Ellsworth—to undertake an experiment in this area.35 The group set up to carry out this task came to be known as Team B.

Team B The role of Team B, as its lettering suggests, was to provide a critique of Team A, the analysts engaged in drafting NIE 11-3/8-76, the CIA’s annual review of Soviet strategic forces. Bush and Deputy National Security Adviser William Hyland determined the scope of Team B’s task through joint negotiations. Separate reviews would handle technical issues, while a general review would ascertain whether or not the evidence would be able to support a conclusion different from the NIE analyses.36 The members of Team B were drawn from outside the intelligence community. On the whole, this group consisted of men whose views

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´tente and alarmed by the Soviets’ were shared by those critical of De military posture. Led by Richard Pipes, Professor of Russian history at Harvard, Team B’s associates were retired General Daniel Graham, former DIA director; Professor William Van Cleave, a member of the US SALT delegation; and Dr Thomas Wolfe, an analyst for the RAND Corporation, who had served as air attache´ (as a USAF colonel) in Moscow during the ‘‘Bomber Gap’’ of the 1950s.37 The Advisory Panel included Paul Nitze, who had also been a member of the US SALT delegation and had played a major role in drafting NSC 68 and the Gaither Report during the 1950s; and Paul Wolfowitz, who served in the ACDA at the time.38 Team B completed its report—titled ‘‘Soviet Strategic Objectives: An Alternative View’’—in December 1976, about the same time as NIE 11-3/ 8-76 was ﬁnished. Both reports were sent to PFIAB for review, and for both teams to argue their case. Although directed to analyze the CIA’s gathering of intelligence on Soviet strategic forces, Team B’s members were able to argue to PFIAB that their research illustrated that the CIA had not satisfactorily addressed issues of the Soviet Union’s overall strategic objectives, which Team B saw as using its growing military might as part of a design for global domination. These arguments won the day for Team B, as Team A’s arguments—that such considerations were outside the purview of the NIE 11-3/8 process—did not draw much support.39 Nonetheless, on January 7, 1977, DCI Bush approved NIE 11-3/8-76.40 Meantime, on December 26, 1976, the New York Times reported the gen´tente to eral ﬁndings of Team B, which was used by opponents of De charge that this process had allowed the Soviet Union to expand its power and inﬂuence at the expense of the United States.41 As William Hyland later wrote, ‘‘The exercise turned out to be a license for an attack on Ford’s own administration—a case of self-inﬂicted damage.’’42 Given the implications of Team B’s report, it is important to examine its contents and the language used by its authors. It consisted of three parts. Part I, titled ‘‘Judgements of Soviet Strategic Objectives Underlying NIEs and the Shortcomings of these Judgements,’’ analyzed the views of Soviet strategy and geopolitical ambitions contained in the NIEs. Part II, ‘‘A Critique of NIE Interpretations of Certain Soviet Strategic Developments,’’ discussed developments in Soviet strategic forces, from ballistic missiles and bombers to civil defense and ABM programs, as well as forces dedicated to theater use. Part III, ‘‘Soviet Strategic Objectives,’’ described the USSR’s political and military objectives in the context of the global power balance.43 Part II was within Team B’s purview, as it directly critiqued the CIA’s means of gathering intelligence on Soviet strategic forces. However, the other sections of the report went beyond what had been planned. Instead of concentrating on Soviet strategic capabilities, Team B incorporated this into a discussion of overall Soviet intentions, well beyond the scope of the NIEs they were supposed to be critiquing.

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Furthermore, the discussion used by Team B from the start emphasizes this approach. ‘‘Team ‘B’ found that the NIE 11-3/8 series through 1975 had substantially misperceived the motivations behind Soviet strategic programs, and thereby tended consistently to underestimate their intensity, scope, and implicit threat,’’ reads the ﬁrst sentence of the summary.44 Its conclusion was stark: Within the ten year period of the National Estimate the Soviets may well expect to achieve a degree of military superiority which would permit a dramatically more aggressive pursuit of their hegemonial objecitves, including direct military challenges to Western vital interests, in the belief that such superior force can pressure the West to acquiesce or, if not, can be used to win a military contest at any level. (Emphasis in original)45 This correlated with much of what PFIAB’s members believed regarding Soviet military power and global ambitions. Team B concentrated on strategy and capabilities, rather than on expenditures, in its report. However, some mention of what were seen to be CIA misperceptions in this area were included. The authors listed one of the assumptions of NIE drafters as ‘‘The U.S. commercial tradition and the business culture which permeates U.S. society,’’ which translated into a view that ‘‘peace and the pursuit of proﬁt are ‘normal’ whereas war is always an aberration.’’46 Team B’s members believed that The Soviet Union, by contrast, functions as a giant conglomerate in which military, political, and economic institutions—and the instruments appropriable to each of them—are seen as part of a diversiﬁed arsenal of power, all administered by the same body of men and all usable for purposes of persuasion and coercion. The distinction between the civilian and the military sectors of society and economy, appropriate to capitalist societies, is not very meaningful in the Soviet environment.47 The level of Soviet military spending, therefore, was determined by whatever the leadership in the Kremlin saw as necessary to pursue their coercive goals in the international arena. A good summary of the exercise was produced by the US Senate’s Select Committee on Intelligence in February 1978. Among its ﬁndings was that ‘‘the exercise had been so structured by the PFIAB and the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) that the B Team on Soviet objectives reﬂected the views of only one segment of the spectrum of opinion.’’48 However, the committee members did cite the importance of the exercise, in that ‘‘NIE’s on Soviet strategic capabilities and objectives still need improvement in a number of important respects.’’49

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Within a month of Team B’s report, Jimmy Carter became President. However, many of the report’s authors would play a major role in shaping the debate on the military balance. In November 1976, the CPD was formed. Among its founding members were Paul Nitze and William Van Cleave, who had been part of Team B. So too were Edward Teller and Claire Boothe Luce, who had served on the PFIAB.50 The CPD would emerge as a key opponent of De´tente, based heavily on assumptions about Soviet geopolitical objectives and military strength made by Team B. It would inﬂuence the new President’s national security policy in signiﬁcant ways.

The Carter years At ﬁrst, given candidate Carter’s statement in June 1976 that ‘‘without endangering the defense of our nation or commitments to our allies, we can reduce present defense expenditures by about $5 to $7 billion annually,’’51 it appeared that the US defense budget would be reduced, rather than increased. Carter’s June 1977 decision to cancel the B-1 bomber strengthened this view. However, this was not to be the case. The new administration did not ignore Team B’s ﬁndings. A copy was sent to Carter soon after he took ofﬁce. In response, Carter ordered a major study of US national security policy and strategy, PRM 10.52 The study that emerged, the ‘‘Military Strategy and Force Posture Review,’’ included a section on ‘‘Fiscal and Economic Implications.’’ As part of a list of 16 options, the report projected (for 1981) a force posture ranging from $16 billion below the ‘‘baseline’’ budget ﬁgure ($586.8 billion, including $145 billion in defense and security outlays) for a ‘‘low force structure option,’’ to a high of $25–35 billion above this ﬁgure for 12 of these options.53 In June 1977, Brzezinski noted that ‘‘A reasonable range [for future defense budgets] might be between $125 billion . . . and $135 billion.’’54 The recommendations made in PRM 10 would see a steady increase in defense spending through Carter’s term in ofﬁce, albeit at a slower pace than had been planned by Ford and Rumsfeld.55 The Carter Administration began reversing the generally downward trend in US defense spending, as part of its 3 percent increase agreed to with the NATO allies. For FY 1979, the ﬁrst Carter budget, defense outlays were set at $115.2 billion, up from $105.3 billion in FY 1978 and $95.7 billion in FY 1977.56 In his FY 1980 report, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown projected an increase from $111.9 billion in outlays for FY 1979 to $165.7 billion in FY 1984.57 Most importantly, this reversed the trend of declining funds for general purpose (i.e., conventional) forces that had been the norm since the Nixon years.58 In FY 1979, general purpose forces received $47.6 billion in funds, with just under $50 billion planned for FY 1980.59 By the end of Carter’s term in ofﬁce, the defense budget request stood at $180 billion, an increase (in constant FY 1982 dollars) of $17.5 billion over the FY 1980 budget.60

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The reasons for this increase were varied, including the necessity of maintaining a stable balance of military power with the Soviet Union in order to maintain De´tente, and the realization, particularly as a result of the crises in Iran and Afghanistan in 1979–80, that US military power had to be increased. Related to the need to maintain a viable balance was the issue of Soviet military expenditure. Among those arguing that the USSR was outspending the United States was the CPD. In a March 14, 1978 discussion titled ‘‘Peace With Freedom,’’ Eugene Rostow, Chairman of the CPD’s Executive Committee, stated that some ‘‘estimates conclude that the Soviet military budget today is between 60 and 80% higher than our own’’ and that, even with a 1.8 percent real increase in defense spending announced by Carter, ‘‘we will fall further behind.’’61 In a report issued in October of that year, titled ‘‘Is America Becoming Number 2?’’ the CPD stated that ‘‘Independent analyses have suggested that the CIA still underestimates current Soviet military expenditures because it estimates 3 to 5 percent growth in these expenditures during the 1970s, whereas for 1970–75 the ﬁgure should be 8 percent or more.’’ Estimating the total Soviet effort as being between 13 and 15 percent of GNP, the authors noted ‘‘This is, in peacetime terms, the allocation pattern of a partially mobilized economy. It means that the Soviets are operating, on a sustained and increasing basis, above the U.S. peak allocation of 13 percent during the Korean War.’’ (Emphasis in original)62 In an analysis similar to the Team B report, Richard Pipes, writing for the CPD in September 1979 on the Soviet desire for a SALT II agreement, noted that ‘‘the Communist system, which places the country’s entire human and economic resources in the hands of a self-perpetuating elite of rulers, is excellently adapted for purposes of military mobilization . . . economic factors making for militarism are reinforced by an ideology which views the modern age as the time of a life-or-death struggle between ‘capitalism’ and ‘socialism.’ ’’63 In a June 1978 report, the CIA noted that Defense activities have been well-funded, even during periodic economic setbacks, and follow-through on key programs has been strong . . . . . . All of the evidence available to us on Soviet defense programs under way and planned suggests that the long-term upward trend in allocation of resources to defense is likely to continue into the 1980s . . . The atmosphere in Moscow with regard to the economy, however, is one of concern, and the Soviet leaders could be considering modest alterations in military force goals. But even if such alterations were undertaken, the overall rate of growth of defense spending over the next ﬁve years or so probably would slow only marginally.64

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In an August 1978 report on the Soviet economy, the CIA noted that Although continued worsening of the economic scene is likely to trigger debate in Moscow over the future levels and patterns of military expenditures, to date the defense sector has not been affected by the changes in the rate of economic progress. Defense programs have great momentum as well as powerful political and bureaucratic support, and major military programs have been well funded.65 In contrast to the alarmist views of groups like the CPD, however, the CIA took a more restrained view of Soviet expenditures relative to American. In January 1979, the CIA issued a dollar-cost comparison of US and Soviet spending. It found that ‘‘For the 1968–78 period, the cumulative estimated dollar costs of Soviet defense activities exceeded US outlays by more than 10 percent . . . Estimated in constant dollars, Soviet defense activities increased at an average annual rate of 3 percent.’’66 The authors stated that ‘‘Evidence on weapon systems currently in production and development . . . and the increasing costs of modern weapons indicates that the long-term growth trend in Soviet defense activities will probably continue into the 1980s.’’67 In absolute ﬁscal estimates, however, the ﬁgures were more worrisome. ‘‘In 1978 the Soviet total was about $146 billion, nearly 45 percent higher than the US outlay of $102 billion.’’68 The Pentagon also warned of the gap between the US and Soviet spending. In his FY 1982 report, Secretary Brown noted that Over the past decade, U.S. investment [R, D, T & E, procurement, etc.] has fallen 20 percent, while Soviet investment has risen 50 percent. Cumulative Soviet investment from 1968 through 1979 has been about $270 billion more than ours. The important point is that the effects of today’s investment balance will be seen in the military balance in future years.69 In terms of overall spending, Soviet defense spending has increased steadily and signiﬁcantly by an average of four to ﬁve percent a year (measured in ruble costs), for each of the past 20 years, while U.S. defense spending (even excluding the Southeast Asia increment) rose and fell several times over the same period. This Soviet trend has continued, even as the rate of growth in Soviet GNP has declined.70 Other studies meant for ofﬁcial use concurred. A RAND note prepared for the US Air Force in February 1979 on comparative military spending noted ‘‘there is little question that the aggregate of Soviet military

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programs . . . are larger in size than those of the United States, and have been so for most of this decade. The Kremlin has maintained a fairly steady pace of increase in Soviet military outlays for 10–15 years, and U.S. ME [Military Expenditure] declined during the ﬁrst part of the 1970s.’’71 The authors concluded that ‘‘Given the duration of the Soviet ME buildup and the only somewhat shorter period of decline in American ME, a change must have taken place in comparative capability relative to the situation of the early 1960s’’ (Underlining in original). ‘‘Unless internal economic and political pressures act to slow down the Soviet military buildup, the United States must expect that stabilization of American ME will mean a continued lag in improvement of military capability relative to that of the USSR.’’72 In a September 1980 hearing before the Senate Intelligence Committee, several experts on the subject of Soviet defense expenditure, including analysts from the US intelligence community, provided worrisome testimony on the gap between the United States and the Soviet Union in this area. Robert Huffstutler, Director of the CIA’s Ofﬁce of Strategic Research, stated that Soviet defense spending grew to some 12–14 percent of Soviet GNP. According to Huffstutler, ‘‘The estimated dollar value of Soviet defense activities has exceeded U.S. outlays by a widening margin since 1971. By 1979 the Soviet total was about $165 billion, about 50 percent above U.S. outlays.’’73 Dr Steven S. Roseﬁelde, an adjunct professor at the US Naval Postgraduate School who had made extensive studies of Soviet military expenditures, sounded a similar theme: According to my calculations, real Soviet procurement 1960 to 1979 grew at 12.9 percent per annum in ruble terms and 9.6 percent . . . in dollars. For the decade of the seventies . . . Soviet procurement expenditures were twice those of the United States. In 1979 alone, the Soviets spent three times as much as the United States did on weapons measured in dollars. By 1977, the Soviet burden of defense measured in rubles had risen to a level that exceeded the burden . . . on the eve of the Nazi invasion.74 Most extensive was the testimony of former CIA analyst William T. Lee. According to his ﬁgures, the growth rate of Soviet military expenditure was an annual eight percent from 1970, meaning that by 1980 this level would double. Furthermore, the defense effort’s percentage of Soviet GNP would be some 18 percent in 1980, up from 12 to 13 percent in 1970.75 Like Roseﬁelde, Lee emphasized Soviet procurement of weapons and equipment. ‘‘Currently procurement’s share has risen to over 60 percent [of the budget.]’’76 The press began to show concern over this issue. An October 1979 Time Magazine article noted that ‘‘When reckoned in ‘constant dollars’ to avoid the distortion of inﬂation, the estimated U.S. defense outlays for

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ﬁscal 1980 are just about what they were in the strikingly low military budgets of the last Eisenhower years and lower than in most years since then.’’77 The article noted serious deﬁciencies in US military posture, particularly in retention of skilled personnel and recruitment, due to spiralling cost of living increases caused by inﬂation.78 By the time Ronald Reagan was elected in November 1980, a broad consensus had emerged over the issue of superpower military expenditures. Two key areas of agreement had been reached. First, the Soviet Union had, since at least the late 1960s, been spending more for defense than had the United States. As much of the US military effort during the formative years of the Soviet buildup had gone to the war in Vietnam, the additional American funds were therefore not utilized for RDT & E and follow-on procurement, as was the case for the Soviet Union. Second, and related to this last point, the Soviets had been able, thanks to their largely conscript forces, to invest a far higher percentage of their increasing budgets in such areas as procurement and research. This meant that as large quantities of new weapons were added to the Soviet armed forces, the next generation was already well into the development stage and would soon enter service. Despite the apparent economic difﬁculties facing the Soviet Union, a reversal of Soviet military expenditure rates was not believed to be in the ofﬁng. As Robert Huffstutler testiﬁed in 1980, The available evidence indicates that if the Soviets do not alter their current plans, defense spending probably will grow over the next 5 years at or near the rate of the past 15 years . . . . . . In the longer term, growing economic difﬁculties may push the Soviet leaders to reexamine their plans with a view to reducing the growth of defense spending . . . Whatever choices they make . . . we think it highly unlikely that even in the longer term economic difﬁculties will force a reversal of the Soviet leaders’ longstanding policy of continuing to improve their military capabilities.79 This consensus on Soviet defense spending led to a similar consensus on that of the United States—it had to be signiﬁcantly increased. However, differing schools of thought existed on how much was needed. Ofﬁcials of the Carter Administration, like Harold Brown, saw the levels spent in FY 1981–82 as providing a steady base for growth into the 1980s. Many on the right, however, saw these as mere stopgap measures, meant to provide only a bare minimum of increased military strength and inadequate to match the far greater effort of the Soviet Union. The debate, as it were, on how much was enough would continue into the Reagan Administration, many of whose top ofﬁcials had been in the CPD. How they would succeed in making their ideas policy remained to be seen.

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The Reagan increases, 1981–85 Among the views Ronald Reagan brought with him to the White House was a belief that the Soviet Union had consistently outspent the United States on defense throughout the 1970s. In his ﬁrst State of the Union address, given on February 18, 1981, Reagan stated that ‘‘Since 1970, the Soviet Union has invested $300 billion more in its military forces than we have.’’80 For President Reagan, this translated into an unfavorable military balance. ‘‘The truth of the matter,’’ he said off-the-record in March 1982, ‘‘is that, on balance, the Soviet Union does have a deﬁnite margin of superiority.’’81 In October 1981, the Pentagon issued an assessment of Soviet strength, Soviet Military Power, in which Secretary Weinberger stated To support the continuing growth and modernization of the armed forces, the Soviet Union over the past quarter century has increased military expenditures in real terms, devoting an average of 12-to-14 percent of its Gross National Product each year to the Soviet military. The estimated dollar costs of Soviet military investment exceeded comparable US spending by 70 percent in 1979.82 Reagan had served on the Board of Directors of the CPD,83 and much of his thinking on defense matters had been shaped by his tenure. In a May 1980 report, ‘‘Countering the Soviet Threat,’’ the CPD criticized the increased Carter defense program as being far too low to match Soviet expenditures. ‘‘That ﬁgure [some $260 billion for FY 1980–85] approximates the amount by which the Soviets have exceeded the United States in military expenditures over the last decade.’’84 Other conservative critics agreed. Analyzing the FY 1981 budget, Francis P. Hoeber and William Schneider wrote that Using the median ratio of Soviet-American defense expenditure in 1978 estimated by the CIA—1.5–1—and further assuming that President Carter agrees to increase US defense expenditure from his recommended rate of growth of three percent to ﬁve percent, 42 years will elapse (i.e. until the year 2022) before US defense expenditure will catch up to Soviet expenditure (four percent per year.)85 The Reagan Administration moved swiftly not only to prepare increased future defense budgets, but to add funds to the existing Carter budgets as well. Carter’s ﬁnal budget request stood at just over $200 billion, a $26.4 billion increase over the previous year’s budget. Within a month of taking ofﬁce, Reagan had approved an increase of $32.6 billion above this level. Congress provided nearly all of the funds requested by Reagan.86

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Whereas the Carter Administration had planned for 5 percent growth in outlays for the FY 1980–86 period, Reagan and Weinberger planned to increase outlays for this same time frame by 8.4 percent.87 In his ﬁrst report to Congress, Weinberger outlined his Five-Year Defense Plan, which would see total outlays of over $1.4 trillion for the FY 1983–87 period (in current dollars.)88 Defense, which stood at 5.9 percent of GNP in FY 1982, would grow to 7.4 percent for FY 1987.89 By any standard, these were enormous sums, and questions were soon raised about the need for such a massive increase. Given the apparent increases in Soviet military capability and the perception of American weakness during the 1970s, public support for Reagan’s buildup was at ﬁrst considerable. However, as budgets for health, welfare, and education were sharply reduced in order to help pay for the defense increase, and reports of waste and mismanagement of funds came to light, this position shifted. In a 1981 poll, 51 percent of respondents believed that the United States was spending too little on defense, with only 15 percent believing that too much was being spent. The following year, 36 percent believed that too much was being spent, and 19 percent too little (the percentage who believed defense spending was adequate grew from 22 percent in 1981 to 36 percent in 1982.)90 Reagan’s defense increases drew criticism from several quarters. The CDI strongly criticized the approach to the defense buildup in 1981, noting ofﬁcial studies identifying waste in defense spending, warning of higher inﬂation, and criticizing the lack of a coherent strategy to support these increases. It called for a national commission to be established to determine US defense needs and for the military to be given a year to develop its case for a buildup of the size being undertaken.91 In 1982, the CDI stated its belief that the United States retained military superiority vis a` vis the Soviet Union. Moreover, its threat to US interests was also judged to be far less than was believed by the Reagan Administration.92 That liberal groups like the CDI would oppose the Reagan buildup was not surprising, but many well-respected conservatives also came to question its pace and scope. In March 1983, six former policymakers— W. Michael Blumenthal, John B. Connally, C. Douglas Dillon, Henry H. Fowler, Peter G. Peterson, and William E. Simon—sent a letter to President Reagan arguing that his defense buildup was unsustainable.93 Another, perhaps more surprising opponent of the Reagan buildup was the CPD. Its view was that these increases were not doing enough to redress the balance. Reagan’s expenditures were merely enhanced variants of Carter’s FY 1981 and 1982 budgets, well below what was needed to reverse the dangerous imbalance of military power. In a March 1982 study, ‘‘Is the Reagan Defense Program Adequate?’’ the CPD called for a budget that was $91 billion above the Reagan budgets for FY 1981–85.94 Citing the USSR’s growing military capability, the authors stated ‘‘The Administration’s defense program is a minimal one. It will not halt the

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unfavorable trends in the U.S.-Soviet military balance, let alone reverse them.’’95 Its June 1982 report, ‘‘Has America Become Number 2?’’ showed Soviet defense outlays at $250 billion for 1981, while US spending was near $160 billion.96 ‘‘The important gains in the military balance that have already resulted from the Soviet effort . . . will become even more impressive over the next several years as this differential in investment is reﬂected in ﬁelded capabilities,’’ the authors noted.97 The CDI took a different view of Soviet expenditures. In its 1982 review of Soviet military strength, the CDI noted that The military capability of the Soviet Union is best measured by the size, composition and location of its forces. The number of tanks, aircraft, ships, and combat personnel which the Soviets have is a signiﬁcant measure of their military strength. But whether they spend a lot or a little is not by itself a valid measure of military strength.98 The CDI also noted that, in terms of overall military spending, the United States, its NATO allies, and China together spent $298 billion in 1980, whereas the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies spent just $202 billion that year.99 A useful analysis of the reasoning behind the Soviet military increases was provided by Abraham S. Becker’s September 1983 report for the RAND Corporation: The USSR’s propensity to expand its military expenditure from year to year is rooted in security concepts that pose almost open-ended demands for military resources; it is anchored in a political structure that fuses party and military in unchallenged control of policy . . . on security issues. There is, therefore, enormous momentum behind the Soviet military buildup . . . 100 This debate was, of course, fueled by views on what the Soviets were spending, as well as what this meant for the military balance. For the ﬁrst two years of the Reagan Administration, this remained based on the CIA estimates of the 1970s and particularly the revised ﬁgures provided after 1976. The Agency itself continued to sound a somber tone. A July 1981 memorandum—itself an update of a 1978 NIE regarding Soviet geopolitical ambitions—emphasized Moscow’s military buildup. ‘‘The momentum of programs already under way and the Soviet leaders perception of actual and potential threats in the 1980s makes any letup in their efforts unlikely.’’101 In language similar to that used in the Team B report, the memorandum’s authors stated ‘‘We believe that Moscow perceives military power to be the most critical factor underlying Soviet foreign policy.’’102 They went on to note that

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As it enters the 1980s the current Soviet leadership sees the heavy military investments . . . paying off in the form of unprecedentedly favorable advances across the military spectrum, and over the long term in political gains where military power or military assistance has been the actual instrument of policy or the decisive complement to Soviet diplomacy.103 NIE 11/4-82, issued in August 1982, concurred. ‘‘The Soviets recognize that . . . continued high levels of defense investment are necessary to sustain the present dimensions of Moscow’s global role . . . we expect that Soviet defense spending will continue to grow at about its historical rate of 4 percent a year at least through 1985.’’104 From 1982, however, the CIA’s estimates changed. In that year the USSR carried out major price reforms, including the valuation of the ruble. The CIA thus began the challenging task of updating its ruble estimates from 1970 values to those of 1982. This process showed that defense spending consumed a steady 14 percent of Soviet GNP throughout the 1970s and early 1980s. In part, this was due to considerable inﬂation that accompanied the ruble price adjustments in 1970 and 1982.105 Although not fully completed until 1986,106 this effort began to shift the CIA’s estimates of Soviet military expenditure. In February 1983, a CIA study of Soviet spending in dollar and ruble values noted that ‘‘this year’s review shows a period of almost no growth in the dollar costs for Soviet procurement from 1976 to 1981.’’107 In September 1983 Congressional hearings, Deputy Director for Intelligence Robert Gates disclosed that improved intelligence and information had led the CIA to reassess Soviet expenditure growth rates. Accordingly, whereas Soviet increases had been on the order of 4–5 percent annually during the early 1970s, by the end of the decade this had fallen to around 2 percent.108 Even more importantly, ‘‘procurement of military hardware— the largest category of defense spending—was ﬂat in 1976–81 . . . [and that trend] appears to have continued in both 1982 and 1983.’’109 These were important revelations regarding the actual levels of Soviet spending. However, the US intelligence community was slow to react. Robert Huffstutler, now director of the Ofﬁce of Soviet Analysis (SOVA), responsible for coordinating estimates of the Soviet military and economy, ordered the ﬁgures checked and double checked to ensure that estimates issued in 1982 were correct. Not until July 1983 did the CIA issue a paper regarding these new ﬁgures, and then listed a host of reasons (production and transportation difﬁculties, delays in technical development, etc.) that lessened the impact of the Agency’s ﬁndings.110 The Reagan Administration played down Gates’ ﬁgures for Soviet spending, emphasizing more tangible factors in the military balance in order to sustain the momentum of its defense buildup.111

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Even if the Reagan Administration had decided to signiﬁcantly reduce US spending as a result of these disclosures, the momentum of its efforts meant that such reductions would not occur until nearly the end of Reagan’s second term. Outlays for FY 1983 stood at $205 billion, those for FY 1984 at nearly $221 billion and for FY 1985 $246.3 billion. The request for FY 1986 was $277.5 billion.112 The vast increases in US defense spending during Reagan’s ﬁrst term were meant to restore American military strength vis a` vis that of the Soviet Union. Two key reasons for this effort stand out. First, there was the need to establish the perception of restored US strength in the global arena. The American public tended to recognize this shift. In a 1982 poll, 41 percent of respondents believed that the Soviet Union was militarily superior to the United States, with the same percentage believing that the two powers were equal in this category. Just 7 percent believed that the United States enjoyed military superiority. Just two years later, after the major increases began to make themselves felt, the number of respondents believing the USSR to be superior had fallen to 27 percent, while 10 percent believed the United States was superior. Fifty-seven percent believed that parity existed between the superpowers.113 The second reason, only fully recognized (and still debated) after the end of the Cold War, was the effort to force such a heavy burden on the Soviet Union through its military effort that it would be forced to alter its foreign and military policies. Key Reagan Administration ofﬁcials, as well as the CIA, came to recognize the very serious economic difﬁculties faced by the Soviet leadership. Harry Rowen, Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, testiﬁed before the U.S. Congress’ Joint Economic Committee (JEC) in October 1981 that ‘‘The overall state of the [Soviet] economy can be summarized very brieﬂy. It is an economy in a great deal of difﬁculty . . . there is a very serious problem that the Soviet leadership faces.’’114 The authors of NIE 11/4-82 noted that the Soviet economy would probably only grow by 1–2 percent in the 1980s, and with defense spending increasing by 4 percent annually, its share of GNP could grow to nearly 20 percent by 1990.115 The consequences were seen as serious: This level of military spending would drastically reduce the ability of the Soviet leadership to allocate additional resources to investment and consumption. Under these conditions, continued growth in defense spending at its historical rate could lead to declines in living standards. Per capita consumption probably would continue to grow marginally for the next few years, but, by mid-decade, would almost certainly be in decline.116 Analysts outside government agreed. Abraham S. Becker wrote that ‘‘Accelerated defense spending poses grave dangers for the [Soviet]

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economy and the society . . . even if military budget growth is cut to zero, the economic effects will be small.’’117 In Becker’s estimation, only a major reduction in Soviet military expenditure would signiﬁcantly affect the economy. Such concerns were recognized in policy planning. NSDD 32’s authors noted that ‘‘the Soviets will continue to have important vulnerabilities. The economies and the social systems of the Soviet Union and of most Soviet allies continue to exhibit serious structural weaknesses.’’118 Among the objectives listed for US national security policy was To foster, if possible in concert with our allies, restraint in Soviet military spending, discourage Soviet adventurism, and weaken the Soviet alliance system by forcing the USSR to bear the brunt of its economic shortcomings, and to encourage long-term liberalizing and nationalist tendencies within the Soviet Union and allied countries. (My italics)119 The combination of vast increases in US defense spending, combined with signiﬁcant efforts to reduce sales of ‘‘dual-use’’ technologies (superconductors, for example) to the USSR, was therefore an integral part of the Reagan Administration’s national security policy. Such efforts were undertaken with the goal of weakening the USSR’s economic structure and thus the base of support for the Soviet military establishment.120

Conclusion Although difﬁcult to quantify as a means of measuring military strength, it could be said that the issue of defense spending remained a constant throughout the period 1976–85. Because Americans tend to look upon ﬁscal issues as being central to policy, the issue of which of the superpowers was spending more on its military took a central role in the overall debate over the balance. At its core, this debate was political. What made it important in the 1970s was that it was used not simply to call for an increased US defense budget (which really did not occur until the Carter Administration late in the decade), but also as part of an overall effort to shift US foreign policy. The establishment of Team B and its subsequent report displayed this approach. The growing opposition to De´tente in the Ford Administration, and particularly among agencies like PFIAB, was expressed through debates over intelligence. Charges that the CIA had underestimated the Soviet strategic threat led to the Team B exercise, which broadened the scope of its analysis to argue that in fact the CIA had misperceived Soviet intentions as well. Team B, it should be remembered, had little to say on Soviet expenditures, but rather assumed that these were part of the overall Soviet effort to attain global hegemony. The goal of the Team B report was to

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serve as a clarion call for the United States to compete with the Soviet Union and thus thwart its aggressive ambitions. This had an impact on the Carter Administration. The shape of the public debate on defense, including expenditure levels, was taken up by groups like the CPD, which presented a picture of a massive Soviet buildup overtaking the United States. Moreover, Carter had been inﬂuenced by the Team B report and had, in conjunction with the NATO allies, set an annual goal of 3 percent growth in defense spending. From 1978, as De´tente went into decline, US defense expenditures rose. The large-scale increases in FY 1981–82, while necessary to improve US capabilities, also had the effect of being seen as indicating a robust US national security policy, meant to redress the Soviet geopolitical gains of the past decade. The true impact of the right’s arguments came during the ﬁrst term of the Reagan Administration. Many of the CPD’s members, including Paul Nitze and Richard Pipes (who had helped draft the Team B report), served in the new administration, and Reagan had himself been a member of the CPD. Reagan’s outlook on the military balance, including of course expenditure, was almost wholly in line with that of the CPD. The vastly increased US defense budgets from 1982 to 1985 were a logical outcome of the Reagan Administration’s approach to national security issues. Placing a burden on the Soviet Union due to its high military expenditure was a central tenet of Reagan’s national security strategy, made possible by the enormous increases in US spending. Although the intricacies of strategic weapons, the military balance in Europe or the naval balance, waxed and waned with varying intensity during this time, the constant of each year’s defense budget helped focus attention on this issue. Because all aspects of military power rested on the funding provided to maintain and expand the forces in being, the debate over how much was enough became intricately linked with issues of policy and strategy. Given the importance of the debate over the military balance, it comes as no surprise that this often most elusive means of its measurement came to occupy such a central position. In many ways, the expenditure debate—combining both perceptions of Soviet efforts and the development of US strategy and force posture—is a useful representative of the overall debate on the military balance. As the central input for the armed forces of both superpowers, military expenditure determined their scope and global reach, and thus underpinned all the key issue areas of military power during the decade examined here.

Conclusion

The military balance was key in shaping US–Soviet relations between 1976 and 1985, and perception was central to the debates over the military capacity of the superpowers. In each of the four main categories examined here—strategic forces, forces in Europe, power projection capabilities, and military expenditure—perceptions of growing Soviet capabilities and a declining American position were central concerns for US policymakers. Closely linked with this was the concern that this shift would lead to a more bellicose policy by the Kremlin, meant to establish Soviet global hegemony. It was feared that a serious imbalance of military power in Moscow’s favor could, in the event of a superpower crisis, lead the United States and its allies to acquiesce to Soviet demands. Beyond these concerns, each category of the military balance had issues unique to it. With strategic forces, strategy and technological innovation drove developments, themselves linking with foreign and domestic policy to shape perceptions of superpower relations. In Europe, the role of NATO, central to US national security policy, meant that key allies like West Germany came to play a prominent role in US decision-making, particularly on nuclear forces. The issue of power projection capabilities was tied in with growing Third World instability, and thus came to serve as a bellwether for US–Soviet relations throughout the decade in question. Military expenditure levels were of particular concern for Americans, who tended to see military effectiveness as dependent upon how much money was spent on defense. Some of these concerns overlapped, as with the notion of Soviet coercion. The belief held by alarmists that Soviet superiority in strategic forces—particularly in ICBMs—could force the United States to acquiesce to Soviet demands in a crisis, was matched by similar concerns regarding Europe, where the phenomenon of ‘‘Finlandization’’ was seen as the consequence of unfavorable trends in the superpower military balance. Such concerns were seen as part of an attempt by the USSR to achieve superiority across the board, as part of a strategy whereby all aspects of military power—strategic nuclear, theater and conventional forces in Europe, and power projection—would combine to provide a basis for the establishment of Soviet hegemony.

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These perceptions and concerns were based upon what was known and believed about Soviet military capabilities in the United States. As noted in the introduction, a good deal was known about the performance of Soviet weaponry and military strategy and was listed in ofﬁcial publications, classiﬁed documents, and in both specialized publications and the general press. The US intelligence community was able to gather copious amounts of information regarding the speciﬁcations of Soviet equipment, even of those systems about which data were most difﬁcult to obtain. The issue of ICBM accuracy provides a case in point. During October– November 1977, CIA analysts, utilizing information from satellite reconnaissance of six tests of Soviet SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs, came to realize that Soviet designers had developed modiﬁed versions of these missiles with far greater accuracy than had been the case previously. Furthermore, the new guidance systems on the SS-18s and SS-19s were similar to those installed on US Minuteman III ICBMs being ﬁtted with Mark 12A warheads.1 Information obtained since the end of the Cold War has proved the CIA’s analysts to be correct in their estimates.2 Information obtained on Soviet conventional forces (generally easier to ﬁnd due to a multiplicity of sources, including allies) provided US analysts with a reasonably accurate view of Soviet capabilities across a broad spectrum. Similarly, Soviet military strategy found its way into the arguments of both alarmists and non-alarmists. Both Richard Pipes, writing in 1977 about Soviet views of ‘‘victory’’ in a nuclear war, and Fred Kaplan, describing Soviet strategic capabilities with skepticism three years later, used Soviet sources to support their arguments. One source used by both authors is Marshal V. D. Sokolovskii’s Military Strategy, from which both authors draw conclusions amenable to their positions.3 While much was known about Soviet weaponry and military strategy, there were areas in which knowledge was limited and based in part on conjecture. The morale of the Soviet armed forces provided a case in point. Andrew Cockburn went to great lengths in his 1983 study of the Soviet military to expose the violence, racism, and drunkenness rife among Soviet conscripts, as well as the vast gulf between men and ofﬁcers, whose main objective was to obtain promotions and social status.4 Edward Luttwak, acknowledging that such problems existed, took a different view. Addressing problems of morale and troop performance, Luttwak noted that these were present in all armed forces to a degree, while divisions between ofﬁcers and men were mitigated by the fact that these were a long-standing and accepted tradition in the Soviet (and Czarist Russian) armed forces. As for ethnic tensions, Luttwak pointed out (as did Cockburn) that the Soviet military tended to put non-Slavic conscripts in support formations (such as construction and transport) in order to maintain efﬁciency in their combat units.5 This raised the question of whether or not the Soviet ﬁghting man— upon whose shoulders rested the success of any military operation initiated

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by the USSR—would be capable of carrying out the tasks assigned him, particularly in a war of conquest. Much of the high esteem afforded to the Soviet soldier stemmed from the experience of World War II, when, in spite of staggering losses, the Red Army managed to play the primary role in the defeat of Nazi Germany, culminating in the capture of Berlin in May 1945. This effort, however, was in response to an invasion meant to subjugate the Russian nation. Followed by mass extermination along national and racial lines. A war of aggression launched against NATO Europe, for example, would not have the same motivation of national survival present in World War II, any more than an attempt to conquer the Persian Gulf’s oil reserves would have. The invasion of Afghanistan provided evidence for both alarmists and non-alarmists on Soviet capabilities. Luttwak saw Afghanistan as representing an enormous improvement in Soviet military capability, with well-coordinated airborne and ground operations marking a very different level of performance from the invasion of Czechoslovakia 11 years before.6 Cockburn, however, warned against placing too much emphasis on Soviet performance in Afghanistan because ‘‘the motley groups of poorly armed tribesmen against which the Soviets are ﬁghting bear little resemblance to the kind of opposition they would face in a direct assault on the West.’’7 It is important to note that although Afghanistan would later become a serious drain in both lives and treasure for the USSR, at the time (1983–85) of Cockburn’s and Luttwak’s writing, it had yet to reach that point.8 Beyond debates over Soviet capabilities and the intentions that lay behind them was their relation to US national security policy and military capabilities. This relationship is central to understanding the importance of the issues that came to the fore in these debates. The issues within the categories examined here—strategic forces, Europeanbased forces, power projection capabilities, and military expenditure— were interwoven, while each of these categories was linked to the others. Since the formation of NATO in 1949, US national security policy emphasized defense of overseas allies as equal to the defense of US territory. By the late-1950s the geographic scope of US strategic interests encompassed Western Europe, East Asia and, to varying degrees, Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Despite the withdrawal from Vietnam, this strategic outlook—now centered more on Europe and Northeast Asia—remained intact in the 1970s. To successfully support this strategy, the United States relied on a symbiotic relationship between its nuclear and conventional forces stationed overseas and the strategic nuclear forces based in the United States. This offset Soviet numerical superiority in conventional forces in Europe, and of Communist China and North Korea in Asia. The technological superiority of US and Allied conventional forces, as well as US naval superiority, ensured a decisive edge in the East–West military

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balance throughout the 1950s and 1960s, most dramatically revealed in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, when the combination of US superiority in strategic and conventional forces at the point of crisis proved decisive in ensuring a favorable outcome. By the mid-1970s, the balance began to shift. The Soviet Union began a major military buildup from the mid-1960s. A decade later, it had achieved parity in strategic and European-based theatre forces. Moreover, major improvements to Soviet conventional forces had taken place, particularly in Europe, and power projection capabilities (particularly naval forces) had also been signiﬁcantly enhanced. The comprehensive nature of the Soviet military buildup appeared to seriously challenge US national security strategy. First and foremost, at the level of strategic forces, the achievement of parity by the USSR undermined the perceived utility of US strategic forces for extended deterrence. If Soviet ICBM’s could knock out their American counterparts—the only strategic weapons capable of similarly accurate, prompt attacks—in their silos, the other elements of the strategic forces—ballistic missile submarines and bombers—would inﬂict only limited damage on Soviet forces, while Soviet strategic defenses, including civil defense, would minimize damage and casualties. This appeared to betoken a ‘‘war-winning’’ nuclear strategy on the part of the Soviet Union, which would eliminate the use of US strategic forces for extended deterrence on the grounds of unacceptable risk. The issue of nuclear strategy was thus important to change the perception that US strategic forces had lost their utility in providing extended deterrence. The growth in Soviet strategic capabilities appeared to be central in an overall buildup of forces providing Moscow with the means to pursue an aggressive geopolitical strategy. The need to create the perception that the US strategic forces were capable of an extended deterrent role was vital to counteract this. Moreover, the geographical expansion of US strategic interests, most particularly to the Persian Gulf from 1980, meant that US strategic forces had to provide a credible umbrella in areas where US conventional strength would take time to play a decisive role in a confrontation. The ‘‘Schlesinger Doctrine’’ of 1974 set the pattern of ﬂexible options for US strategic planners, evolving into the ‘‘Countervailing Strategy’’ of the late 1970s and to plans for ‘‘protracted nuclear war’’ in the early 1980s. The development of more ambitious nuclear strategies in many ways coincided with the decline of De´tente between the superpowers, as other factors—particularly what appeared to be a more aggressive Soviet approach in international affairs—led to a confrontational tone in US– Soviet relations. A US nuclear strategy that appeared robust was seen as a prerequisite for a determined American effort to challenge what was seen as destabilizing Soviet behavior. Intertwined with planning were efforts to improve strategic defenses, as the minimizing of civilian

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casualties was central to a successful nuclear strategy. Civil defense received considerable attention from 1978 through 1983, when its utility as a means of minimizing the effects of nuclear attack appeared to be less than expected. This, in part, led to President Reagan’s SDI program as a means for providing an effective strategic defense. The region most vital to US national security strategy was Europe. Along with the strategic forces, the forces assigned to NATO Europe were the most consistently important. It was here that consistent efforts to improve US forces were made from the mid-1970s, and that alliance politics came to play a role in decision-making. Perceptions among NATO allies, particularly West Germany, that the East–West military balance was tilting in the USSR’s favor did much to spur the United States to take action to rectify this perceived imbalance and thus reassure the Europeans of American reliability. Considerations similar to those existing in the debate over strategic forces were present regarding Europe. The combination of greatly improved Soviet theatre and conventional forces was seen as posing a danger of intimidation for NATO, which could force the Allies to adopt a neutralist policy rather than face war with superior Soviet forces (backed up by superior strategic forces checking those of the United States.) The indecision regarding the ERW in 1977–78 increased the pressure on US policymakers to take the lead in LRTNF during 1979. Similarly, improvements to US conventional forces, underway from 1974, were enmeshed in NATO as a whole with the May 1977 decision on a 3 percent defense spending increase and the LTDP. Perhaps the issue that contributed most to the shift in superpower relations during the late 1970s was the Third World. The collapse of pro-US regimes in Southeast Asia in 1975, followed by the crises in Angola that year and in the Horn of Africa in 1977–78, appeared to indicate an expansion of Soviet power and inﬂuence in the developing nations, concurrent with a decline of the US position here. One reason for this was the expansion of Soviet power projection forces, as well as support from key proxies like Cuba and East Germany. The Horn of Africa was seen as a watershed in terms of Soviet involvement in the Third World, indicating the ability and will on Moscow’s part to use force. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979–80 ended De´tente and ushered in the Second Cold War. It is important to note that Afghanistan marked the convergence of two key elements that played a major role in the deterioration of US–Soviet relations in the 1970s: Soviet actions in the Third World and American perceptions of the military balance. Central among the actions taken by the United States at the beginning of the Second Cold War was the Carter Doctrine designating the Persian Gulf as an area of vital interest. The establishment of the RDJTF in March 1980, a large, combined-arms force consisting of ground, naval,

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and air units from all of the armed services, was clearly directed toward the defense of the Gulf from a Soviet invasion. The development of the RDJTF from the original RDF, conceived as a light mobile strike force to maintain stability in the Third World, indicated Washington’s perception of Soviet military involvement as the key threat to Third World stability. The Reagan Administration expanded the RDJTF into the Central Command and also emphasized Soviet military threats in the Third World. The expansion of US naval power from 1980 was closely linked with the buildup of power projection capabilities. At ﬁrst meant to support forces like the RDJTF, during the Reagan years, naval power came to be seen as a means of forcing the Soviet Union onto the defensive in the Cold War, both through its potential of threatening the Soviet homeland and in supporting Third World interventions meant to roll back Soviet inﬂuence. The basic input of military power is the money provided to maintain and expand the forces in being. The reductions in US defense spending from FYs 1973–78 coincided with continued increases of up to 4 percent in Soviet expenditures during this period, continuing a trend that had been underway since the mid-1960s. Because Soviet capabilities appeared to improve while those of the United States declined, the divergence in expenditures was seen as central, and thus became a key issue in the debate over the military balance. Furthermore, defense spending played a role in various aspects of policy. The decision to increase the NATO members’ budgets by 3 percent was in step with the American decision to increase spending by this amount, occurring in the FY 1979 budget. Military expenditures were perceived as an indication of American determination to rectify what was seen as an unfavorable military balance with the Soviet Union. From 1980, major increases in US defense spending occurred, coinciding with the emergence of the Second Cold War. The Reagan Administration undertook a massive military buildup, supported by enormous increases over the last two Carter budgets, which themselves reﬂected steady growth over previous ﬁscal years. For President Reagan and many of his national security planners, this increase was seen as a corrective not only to under-investment in the 1970s but as the keystone to an overdue and necessary adaptation of an assertive US geo-strategic policy vis a` vis the Soviet Union. The perceptions of the military balance held by Americans in the 1970s came to play a crucial role in shaping of strategic policy in the 1980s. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan led to a shift in the Carter Administration’s strategic outlook, particularly with regard to power projection capabilities. A policy of containment, akin to those of the Truman and Eisenhower years, was adopted, directed toward the Persian Gulf. The Reagan Administration came into ofﬁce convinced of the need to confront the USSR in the international arena. The new

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President, together with several of his key national security advisers like Paul Nitze, Richard Pipes, and John Lehman, had been members of the CPD, which had warned of the growing military imbalance between the superpowers and the danger of increased Soviet aggression as a result.9 The policies that would be followed between 1981 and 1985—increased strategic forces and ‘‘protracted’’ nuclear warﬁghting strategies, continued improvements for US forces in Europe, the massive buildup of naval and other power projection forces, and the enormous defense budget increases—reﬂected strongly the remedies called for by the CPD in order to prevent the Soviet Union from gaining military superiority over the United States.10 These steps combined with other aspects of the Reagan Administration’s national security policy, including economic warfare, support for anti-Communist insurgents in the Third World, and a diplomatic offensive against the USSR as part of a thrusting Cold War strategy, meant to regain the initiative for the West in the conﬂict.11 The rollback of Soviet power and inﬂuence, as opposed to the containment espoused by Carter in 1980–81, was now the objective. For both approaches, signiﬁcantly enhanced US military capability was critical, as was the perception of its efﬁcacy. Ultimately, the debates of the 1970s and the policies they set into motion in the 1980s played a crucial role in bringing the Cold War to an end. First, and perhaps most obvious, the attempt by the Soviet Union to match US defense outlays did much to weaken the Soviet economy to an unacceptably dangerous point. Related to this was the shift in US strategy. The development of nuclear strategies that emphasized ‘‘victory’’ in a nuclear conﬂict, together with concepts for a thrusting use of conventional forces, meant that the Soviet leadership now had to face the possibility of its homeland becoming a battleground in the event of war. This appeared to nullify the principles of existing Soviet strategy, emphasizing offensive operations at all levels against the territory of the USSR’s enemies. Now, the USSR was on the defensive and forced to shift its strategic precepts accordingly. This applied to the Third World as well. Whereas the Soviet Union appeared to enjoy the initiative in the 1970s, by 1985 the advantage had shifted to the United States. Along with covert action, the visible deployment of US forces in Central America, the Caribbean and in the Persian Gulf, as well as a major increase in power projection capability, indicated Washington’s determination not only to defend its interests in the developing world but to actively undermine those of the USSR. A second and related impact of developments in the 1980s was on American perceptions of the military balance. Whereas many strategic analysts, political leaders and the general public had become alarmed over what was seen as an dangerous shift in the balance in the USSR’s favor during the 1970s, by 1985 this view had changed. The view that the United States had, at the very least, considerably narrowed the gap

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in military capacity with the Soviet Union helped lead to a shift in policy. As early as 1984, Reagan had begun to emphasize a thawing of the Cold War. His belief was that with the restoration of American power and will, the United States could now take the initiative in reducing tensions. The return of self-conﬁdence among the American public, based both on economic recovery and the perception of a restoration of respect for the United States abroad, bolstered this view. The result was the thawing of tensions during 1985, which led to a genuine rapprochement from 1987 to the end of the Cold War. As important was the change in the Soviet leadership. The accession to power of Mikhail Gorbachev in March 1985 has come to be seen as marking the end of the Second Cold War. Although a wary De´tente would last until the Reykjavik Summit in late 1986, Gorbachev’s rise to power marked a profound shift in US–Soviet relations. More than simply reducing the burden of the USSR’s military effort, Gorbachev aimed to restructure Soviet domestic and foreign policy, as part of a dramatic reorganization of society. A key rationale behind Gorbachev’s thinking was the realization that the level of superpower competition, resulting from the emergence of the Soviet Union as a truly global power in the 1970s, was unsustainable. This level was reached due to the enormous Soviet military buildup that occurred from the mid-1960s on. The large-scale US buildup of the early 1980s was a response to this effort, based on American perceptions that developed in the second half of the 1970s. The cost to the Soviet Union had been so high that only a genuine reordering of the international system could allow the USSR to transform itself into a viable and productive society. The result would be the collapse of the Soviet system, beginning with the fall of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe in 1989 and ﬁnally of the USSR itself two years later. In part, perceptions that evolved some 15 years before would play a role in one of the twentieth century’s most important transformations. Related to the military buildup of the 1980s and the end of the Cold War was a technological revolution. The 1970s witnessed a ﬂowering of computer development, which made these systems both more compact and capable. Whereas computers had once ﬁlled large rooms and required an entire staff to operate them, now many were ﬁtted to tabletops for individual use. This led to vastly improved communication systems for use by the military. The development of microprocessors allowed for the computerization of weapons, leading to the introduction of ‘‘smart’’ bombs and missiles. With the reduced defense budgets of the 1970s, and the concentration on nuclear forces and conventional weaponry, the true impact of these developments would not be felt until the 1980s, when US defense spending grew exponentially. Although it would take time, the computer revolution would bring about a transformation in the American way of war. The experience of

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the two world wars, particularly World War II, had led to an attrition strategy being adopted by US military planners. Firepower, particularly artillery and air strikes, would inﬂict such massive casualties on an enemy that he would be unable to continue operations. Bombardment of the enemy’s homeland would destroy war industries as well as communication centers and follow-up forces. Beginning with ﬂexible nuclear strategies, US planners began to see the possibilities offered by computerization. The Arab–Israeli War of 1973 also showed the importance of combined-arms warfare, with ground combat units and air forces operating in support of one another on the battleﬁeld. The Air–Land Battle strategy, ﬁrst issued in 1976, exempliﬁed the shift away from the attrition warfare of the past: ‘‘Today the US Army must above all else, prepare to win the ﬁrst battle of the next war’’ (Italics in original).12 By the mid-1980s, Air–Land Battle had been reﬁned and was now the centerpiece of US conventional strategy. The integration of new technologies made the execution of fast-paced combined arms operations feasible. The US naval strategy of the 1980s, emphasizing operations against the Soviet homeland, complemented Air–Land Battle by emphasizing the need to take the ﬁght into the enemy’s territory, rather than ﬁghting a defensive battle that would relinquish strategic initiative.13 Computerization also led to shifts in nuclear strategy, in a process of evolution going back to the early 1970s. It had been the establishment of parity by the Soviets in the 1960s that had helped spur the development of alternative strategies and the technology that enabled them to be put into practice. The development of microprocessors had enabled US weapons designers to develop more accurate warheads for ballistic missiles, as well as smaller, more accurate long-range cruise missiles. This enabled US strategists to develop ‘‘war winning’’ nuclear strategies by the early 1980s. SDI, developed from 1983, exempliﬁed the computer revolution, because it would not have been possible to even consider such a system without the development of microprocessors and information systems (like the Internet) that had taken place over the previous decade. The impact of these developments would be felt in the 1980s, and the Soviets would be the ﬁrst to understand their implications. Norman Friedman describes the strategic situation at the start of the 1980s: they [the Soviets] also faced a reversal of their military position, due to a new military revolution, computer proliferation. Few if any in the West seem to have realized just how quickly the balance of military power was tipping, probably because in the late 1970s most analysts concentrated on nuclear weapons, which were relatively easy to count and to understand. Yet, once both sides were heavily armed, once a ﬁrst strike was no longer practical, nuclear weapons were essentially unusable . . . By the early 1980s . . . Western

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Conclusion microcomputers provided a potentially winning edge—which the Soviets found they could not match. Computers and the related ‘‘brilliant’’ weapons matured just as Ronald Reagan decided to boost U.S. defense spending.14

Although the Soviets attempted to redress the imbalance in technology, they were unsuccessful, due to the rigidity of the Soviet system. Central planning led to an ossiﬁcation of efforts, an inability to adapt to new trends in technology and means of production. This extended to the military sector, which received the bulk of economic resources. Because long-term planning set goals for production well in advance of new technological developments, innovation and ﬂexibility simply could not be utilized. Furthermore, the existing bureaucracies within the Soviet military-industrial complex were loath to divert resources to new technologies that could threaten their lock on resources. Such resistance was found in the Politburo, which had little desire for a re-structuring of the economy, despite growing evidence of the revolutionary potential of new technologies.15 Gorbachev’s efforts to bring about political change in the Soviet system, namely Glasnost, were spurred by the USSR’s dire economic situation. A primary cause was the debilitating military competition with the West, particularly the United States. Thus, perceptions and actions of the 1970s and 1980s again come into play, since these contributed to the situation inherited by Gorbachev. Because political liberalization was needed to bring societal change (and improve economic performance), it was undertaken to a degree never before seen in the USSR. The scope of change led eventually to the collapse ﬁrst of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe and then to that of the Soviet Union itself.16 The end of the Cold War left the United States largely unchallenged as the global hegemonic power. Its new position was conﬁrmed by the Gulf War. Iraq’s armed forces were organized and trained by Soviet advisers and followed Soviet tactical precepts, and the USSR had been Iraq’s largest supplier of military equipment. In many ways, the Gulf War, waged by both rapidly deployable and European-based US forces, and allies, including large British and French contingents, against the Soviet-conﬁgured Iraqi military resembled a hypothetical conventional war in Europe between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Maneuver warfare, deep penetration of enemy territory, the integration of land, naval and air forces, the use of computers for C3I, and above all the use of PGMs at all levels of combat operations were hallmarks of the revolution in warfare that had occurred over the past decade. The defeat of Iraq in the Gulf War could therefore be seen, in a roundabout way, as a defeat for the military establishment of the Soviet Union, and thus an indirect denouement of the Cold War.17 Despite the reduction of its armed forces after 1991, the United States utilized the technology deployed in the last decade of the Cold War to

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maintain a force structure that outclassed any potential opponent in the post–Cold War era. The concepts developed during the 1970s and 1980s were reﬁned to take account of ever improving technologies, particularly information processing. The ability to adapt such technologies into the existing force structure stemmed from the changes made in the 1980s that placed these systems at the center of operational planning and procurement. The emphasis on rapid deployment remained a cornerstone of US planning, with threats of instability in failed states (like Somalia and Yugoslavia) replacing those of Third World intervention by Soviet and proxy forces. This emphasis enabled the United States to project power in areas of conﬂict with relatively small forces and from bases at some distance from the battle area. Bosnia and Kosovo were examples of such operations. In the Persian Gulf, the United States relied on an ‘‘over the horizon’’ presence—not unlike that of the 1980s involving rapid deployment forces—that could ensure a large-scale buildup if necessary. The War on Terror has seen similar operational concepts in Afghanistan (special operation forces and light infantry supported by airpower) and Iraq (an operational model similar to 1991, albeit on a smaller scale, with even greater integration of PGMs and computers.) Although the importance of nuclear forces declined with the end of the Soviet threat, a strategy emphasizing selective nuclear options remained, in order to deter revanchist Third World states (Iran and North Korea) from using weapons of mass destruction against US forces and allies. Strategic defense remained part of US planning, although it was scaled down from the ambitious SDI program of the Reagan years to a more modest system of land-based ABMs.18 The development of US–Soviet relations between 1976 and 1985, the ´tente to confrontation and the emergence of the Second turn from De Cold War, had many factors, of which the military balance was but one. However, with hindsight, it may be seen that perceptions of the military balance, particularly on the American side, came to play the most farreaching role in helping to bring about the change in the international situation. This was because the military balance, with its numerous categories of importance, overlapped into other areas of debate regarding superpower relations. The strategic balance was intricately linked to issues regarding the NATO alliance and the Third World, particularly as the United States moved to develop a speciﬁc direct intervention capability from 1980. The European balance was shaped heavily by the concerns of European NATO allies in relation to the balance of forces in Central Europe. Issues regarding power projection forces reﬂected growing American concerns over Third World stability during the 1970s. All of these concerns came to shape debate over military expenditure, because it was believed that the strengths and weaknesses of US forces in each category depended on the funding allocated. Many of the key events of the period in international relations—the SALT II debate,

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NATO’s decision to deploy Pershing II and Cruise missiles, the promulgation of the Carter Doctrine, SDI—reﬂected American perceptions of the military balance. The inﬂuence that the debate had on developments in US–Soviet relations was of course mixed in with other factors, including trade, human rights, and domestic politics. Its impact, therefore, was not readily apparent to analysts at the time these events were unfolding. Nor were all the links between certain categories of the military balance and other areas clearly visible. ICBM vulnerability was intertwined with the development of nuclear strategy during the 1970s, itself central to the concept of US national security strategy. Often differences in assumptions regarding the role of military power led to widely differing views. The CPD viewed strategic nuclear forces as supporting US theatre and conventional forces in Europe, as well as forces in East Asia and the Persian Gulf, as part of overall US strategy. For the CPD, this translated to large, ﬂexible strategic forces. The CDI, on the other hand, viewed these forces as providing deterrence against a Soviet nuclear attack on the United States, a ﬁnite role that allowed for a relatively modest number of delivery systems and warheads. A similar dichotomy of views existed regarding other areas of the military balance, leading to debates based on widely varying assumptions about the role and importance of military power. The end of the Cold War, and the resultant debate among historians over its cause, has led to a clouding of the importance of the military balance in shaping policy during the 1970s and 1980s, and thus the role it had in bringing about the events of 1989–91. One school of thought attributes the end of the Cold War to the efforts of Ronald Reagan, due to both his military buildup (which bankrupted the Soviet Union) and his refusal to compromise with the Soviet leadership until the arrival of Gorbachev in the Kremlin heralded a new approach for the USSR. Another approach cites the failures of the Soviet system as leading to the resolution of the East–West struggle, including the inability to adapt to the ever more interdependent global system that emerged from the 1970s on.19 Both schools have drawbacks when attempting to discern the role of the military balance. The ﬁrst school emphasizes the role it played during the 1980s, but tends to limit its scope to that of the Reagan years, ignoring the role played by the Carter Administration in such key areas as the evolution of nuclear warﬁghting strategies, the US buildup in Europe, and the identiﬁcation of the Persian Gulf as an area of strategic interest, leading to the creation of the RDF. The second school de-emphasizes the role of the military balance, focusing instead on factors within the Soviet bloc (including economic and social strains) in a manner that separates them from the international setting, that is, the Cold War. In completing this study of the US–Soviet military balance, two key conclusions can be reached. First, and most obvious, perceptions, even

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when initially held by a relatively small number of individuals, can come to shape overall policy. Whereas in 1976 only a handful of analysts were expressing alarm over what they saw as a shift in the military balance in the USSR’s favor, by 1980 their views were central in the debate over US national security policy. By 1985, these policies signiﬁcantly reﬂected these views. This was due in no small part to the presence of inﬂuential ﬁgures among the alarmists, especially Ronald Reagan. Just as important was the persistence of the alarmists in disseminating their message to the American public. By establishing a framework in which superpower relations came to be seen in light of the military balance—especially the alarmists’ views of it—policy came to reﬂect this outlook. This phenomenon ﬁrst came to be felt in the Carter Administration during 1979–80, when a series of Third World crises, together with the alarmists’ warnings over Soviet military strength, combined to shift policy decisively from De´tente toward confrontation. The second conclusion is linked to the ﬁrst: that perceptions can have an impact on the course of events that is completely unexpected and unforeseen. Few in the mid- and late 1970s could have predicted either the end of the Cold War within 15 years, let alone the impact that the debates of the time would have on shaping the international order after the Cold War. Such foresight was simply not possible, any more than analysts in 1910 could foresee the collapse of the existing European order within a decade, or in 1945 the shape of the Cold War that would come to dominate international relations ﬁve years later. Because the military balance was part and parcel of the Cold War, and had been for decades, the debates about it were simply seen within the context of the times, not something that would contribute to revolutionary transformations. It is perhaps this point that is most important to remember when attempting to draw lessons from the past to determine future developments. No doubt that the debates today regarding international relations will have a similar—and perhaps unexpected—impact in future decades. It is true that the past is prologue, but as predictor of what is to come, it can tell us only so much.

Notes

Introduction 1 F. Halliday, The Making of the Second Cold War, rev. edn (Verso, London, 1986), Chap. 3. 2 Ibid., p. 79. 3 Ibid., p. 80. 4 J. G. Stoessinger, Why Nations Go to War, 4th edn (St. Martin’s Press, Inc., New York, 1985), p. 213. 5 Ibid., pp. 216–17. 6 J. Newhouse, War and Peace in the Nuclear Age (Vintage Books, New York, 1988), Chaps IX and XI. Halliday also notes this factor in The Making of the Second Cold War, Chap. 5. 7 R. Crockatt, The Fifty Years’ War: The United States and the Soviet Union in World Politics, 1941–1991 (Routledge, London, 1995), p. 260. 8 O. A. Westad, The Fall of De´tente: Soviet–American Relations During the Carter Years (Scandinavian University Press, Oxford, 1997), p. 18. 9 Ibid., pp. 65–66. 10 Ibid., p. 66. 11 As Andrew Cockburn (The Threat: Inside the Soviet Military Machine (Vintage Books, New York, 1984), p. 30) notes, when NATO was trying to ﬁnd out the caliber of the T-72 tank’s main gun in the early 1970s, a French military ´ in Moscow asked his Soviet liaison whether it would be possible to attache inspect a T-72. The liaison was only too willing to oblige, which allowed the French attache´ to determine that the T-72 was equipped with a 125-mm main gun. 12 These included the work by Andrew Cockburn cited above as well as by Edward Luttwak (On the Meaning of Victory (Simon and Schuster, New York, 1986) and The Pentagon and the Art of War (Simon and Schuster, New York, 1985)); John M. Collins (U.S.-Soviet Military Balance: Concepts and Capabilities, 1960–1980 (McGraw-Hill Publications Co., New York, 1980), U.S.-Soviet Military Balance 1980–1985 (Pergamon-Brassey’s International Defense Publishers, McLean, VA, 1985); and Norman Polmar (Guide to the Soviet Navy and The Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD), both published roughly every 3–5 years.) 13 See Luttwak, The Pentagon, pp. 111–14. 14 Ibid., pp. 114–17. 15 Ibid., pp. 97–111. 16 In D. P. Steury, Intentions and Capabilities: Estimates on Soviet Strategic Forces, 1950– 1983 (Center for the Study of Intelligence, Washington, DC, 1996), p. 370.

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17 Ibid., pp. 370–71. The authors stated their belief that the primary goal of Soviet policy was ‘‘America’s isolation from its allies as well as in the separation of the OECD nations from the Third World, which, it believes, will severely undermine ‘capitalism’s’ political, economic, and ultimately, military might’’ (p. 371). 18 C. Tyroler II, Alerting America: The Papers of the Committee on the Present Danger (Pergamon-Brassey’s International Defense Publishers, McLean, VA, 1984), p. 4. 19 Luttwak, On the Meaning of Victory, pp. 263–74. 20 ‘‘The Artiﬁcial Crisis of American Security,’’ The Defense Monitor, Vol. V, No. 3, May 1976, p. 4. 21 Ibid., p. 5. 22 Cockburn, The Threat, p. 10. 23 Ibid., pp. 12–13. 24 Ibid., pp. 10–15. Cockburn also noted that the United States, which of course was the ﬁrst to develop atomic weapons, also was far ahead of the Soviet Union when it came to developing intercontinental strategic bombers (1948 as opposed to 1954 for the USSR), ballistic missile submarines (1960 to 1968 for the USSR), and multiple warhead missiles, in which the gap was nine years (p. 15). 25 F. Kaplan, Dubious Specter: A Skeptical Look at the Soviet Strategic Threat (Institute for Policy Studies, Washington, DC, 1980), p. 24. 26 Ibid., p. 74. 27 Cockburn, The Threat, p. 32.

1 The counterforce doctrine 1 P. Bobbitt, L. Freedman and G. Treverton, eds, US Nuclear Strategy: A Reader (New York University Press, New York, 1989), pp. 191–92. 2 T. Powers, ‘‘Choosing a Strategy for World War III,’’ The Atlantic Monthly (November, 1982), pp. 93–94. McNamara shared these ideas with the NATO allies. At the NATO Council meeting in Athens on May 5, 1962, he noted that ‘‘if both sides were to conﬁne their attacks to important military targets, damage, while high, would nevertheless be signiﬁcantly lower than if urbanindustrial areas were also attacked.’’ In Bobbitt et al., US Nuclear Strategy, pp. 206–7. 3 Bobbitt et al., US Nuclear Strategy, p. 393. 4 L. Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 2nd edn (Palgrave Macmillan, London, 1989), pp. 376–77. 5 NSSM 169, ‘‘U.S. Nuclear Policy,’’ February 13, 1973 in Presidential Directives on National Security: From Truman to Clinton (microﬁche: Cambridge, Chadwyck-Healy, 1994), Record #586. 6 NSDM 242, ‘‘Policy for Planning the Employment of Nuclear Weapons,’’ January 17, 1974 in Presidential Directives on National Security: From Truman to Clinton (microﬁche: Cambridge, Chadwyck-Healy, 1994), Record #504. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid. 9 D. Ball and J. Richelson, eds, Strategic Nuclear Targeting (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1986), p. 74. 10 Ibid. This requirement led to a considerable amount of activity within the defense bureaucracy, the US Air Force, and private think tanks like RAND

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12

13 14 15 16 17

Notes and the Hudson Institute, to determine which sectors of the Soviet economy should be targeted to achieve NUWEP-1’s objectives. M. Getler, ‘‘U.S. Studies Re-Targeting of Missiles,’’ The Washington Post, January 11, 1974, pp. A1, A16; J. W. Finney, ‘‘U.S. Retargeting Some Missiles Under New Strategic Concept,’’ The New York Times, January 11, 1974, p. A1. Brieﬁng on Counterforce Attacks: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and Organization of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, USGPO, Washington, DC, September 11, 1974 (sanitized and made public on January 10, 1975), p. 3. Henceforth Brieﬁng on Counterforce Attacks. Brieﬁng on Counterforce Attacks, p. 7. Ibid., pp. 9–10. A Defense Department study showed Soviet ICBM accuracy as being between 500 and 700 meters. (p. 10.) ‘‘Letter, Gerald R. Ford to Edward W. Brooke,’’ July 25, 1975, Presidential Directive-59, 8/23–31/80, Box 106, Counsel: Cutler, Jimmy Carter Library. B. Heuser, NATO, Britain, France and the FRG: Nuclear Strategies and Forces for Europe, 1949–2000 (Macmillan Press, Ltd., London, 1999), p. 53. As Fritz Ermarth noted, It has long been U.S. policy to assure that U.S. strategic nuclear forces are seen by the Soviets and our NATO allies as tightly coupled to European security. Along with conventional and theatre nuclear forces, U.S. strategic nuclear forces constitute an element of the NATO ‘‘triad.’’ The good health of the alliance politically and the viability of deterrence in Europe have been seen to require a very credible threat to engage U.S. strategic nuclear forces once nuclear weapons come into play above the level of quite limited use.

18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29

‘‘Contrasts in American and Soviet Strategic Thought,’’ International Security. Vol. 3, No. 2 (Fall 1978), p. 147. L. E. Davis, Limited Nuclear Options: Deterrence and the New American Doctrine, IISS Adelphi Paper No. 121 (IISS, London, 1976), p. 6. Ibid. Ibid. C. S. Gray, The Soviet-American Arms Race (Saxon House, D. C. Heath Limited, Hampshire, England, 1976), p. 78. DoD Annual Report FY 1975 (USGPO, Washington, DC, March 4, 1974), p. 36. Henceforth Report FY 1975. Ibid., p. 38. Ibid., p. 42. DoD Annual Report FY 1976 (USGPO, Washington, DC, February 5, 1975), p. II-6. Henceforth Report FY 1976. Counterforce Issues for the U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces. Congress of the United States: Congressional Budget Ofﬁce (USGPO, Washington, DC, 1978), p. 32. Henceforth Counterforce Issues. Prompt hard-target kill capabilities refers to the ability to strike such targets at the outset of a nuclear exchange; in this context, ICBM’s were seen as the most effective means to accomplish this. See esp. Report FY 1975 pp. 40–41 and Report FY 1976 pp. II-8—II-9. C. H. Builder, D. C. Kephart, A. Laupa, The U.S. ICBM Force: Current Issues and Future Options (RAND Corporation, PR-1754-R, October 1975), p. 82.

Notes

30 31 32 33

34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45

46 47 48 49

50 51

211

Excised copy. From the National Security Archive, Launch on Warning: the Development of U.S. Capabilities, 1959–1979. DoD Annual Report FY 1977 (USGPO, Washington, DC, January 27, 1976) pp. 46–47. Henceforth Report FY 1977. Report FY 1977, p. 47. NSDM 348, ‘‘U.S. Defense Policy and Military Posture,’’ National Security Decision Memoranda and Study Memoranda, Box 1, Gerald R. Ford Library. PRM 10, ‘‘Comprehensive Net Assessment and Military Force Posture Review,’’ February 18, 1977 in Presidential Directives on National Security: From Truman to Clinton (microﬁche: Cambridge, Chadwyck-Healy, 1994), Record #1382. PRM 10, ‘‘Military Strategy and Force Posture Review, Final Report,’’ June 1977 in Presidential Directives on National Security: From Truman to Clinton (microﬁche: Cambridge, Chadwyck-Healy, 1994), Record #1919. PRM 10, ‘‘Final Report,’’ p. 33. Ibid., p. II-6. ‘‘PRM 10 Force Posture Study,’’ June 6, 1977 in Presidential Directives on National Security: From Truman to Clinton (microﬁche: Cambridge, Chadwyck-Healy, 1994), Record #1918. D. Ball, Developments in U.S. Strategic Nuclear Policy Under the Carter Administration (Center for International and Strategic Affairs, University of California, Los Angeles, February 1980), p. 7. Ibid. PD 18, ‘‘U.S. National Strategy,’’ August 24, 1977 in Presidential Directives on National Security: From Truman to Clinton (microﬁche: Cambridge, Chadwyck-Healy, 1994), Record #1350. ‘‘[Nuclear Employment Policy],’’ 1977 in Presidential Directives on National Security from Truman to Clinton (microﬁche: Cambridge, ChadwyckHealy, 1994), Record #1360. DoD Annual Report FY 1979 (USGPO, Washington, DC, February 2, 1978), p. 55. Henceforth Report FY 1979. Ibid., p. 58. Ibid., p. 59. Report of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to the Congress on the FY 1980 Budget, FY 1981 Authorization Request and FY 1980–1984 Defense Programs (USGPO, Washington, DC, January 25, 1979), p. 77. Henceforth Report FY 1980. Ibid. Defense Posture Statement FY 1978 (USGPO, Washington, DC, January 20, 1977), p. 6. Henceforth Posture FY 1978. Defense Posture Statement FY 1979 (USGPO, Washington, DC, January 20, 1978), p. 21. Henceforth Posture FY 1979. See Freedman, Evolution, pp. 392–94. A White House ofﬁcial told Richard Burt of The New York Times that ‘‘targeting should not be done in a political vacuum . . . Some targets are of greater psychological importance to Moscow than others, and we should begin thinking of how to use our strategic forces to play on these concerns.’’ R. Burt, ‘‘Pentagon Reviewing Nuclear War Plans,’’ The New York Times, December 16, 1977, p. A7. See Powers, ‘‘Choosing a Strategy for World War III,’’ pp. 90–91 for an indepth discussion of Brzezinski’s view. PD 53, ‘‘National Security Telecommunications Policy,’’ November 15, 1979 in Presidential Directives on National Security: From Truman to Clinton (microﬁche: Cambridge, Chadwyck-Healy, 1994), record #1369.

212

Notes

52 Ibid. 53 R. Garthoff, De´tente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan, rev. edn (The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 1994), p. 869. 54 PD 57, ‘‘Mobilization Planning,’’ March 3, 1980 in Presidential Directives on National Security: From Truman to Clinton (microﬁche: Cambridge, Chadwyck-Healy, 1994), record # 1372. 55 Ibid. 56 Garthoff, De´tente and Confrontation, p. 869. 57 DoD Annual Report FY 1981 (USGPO, Washington, DC, January 29, 1980), p. 66. Henceforth Report FY 1981. 58 Freedman, Evolution, pp. 393–94; D. Ball, The Future of the Strategic Balance (Australian National University, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Canberra, Australia, November 1980), pp. 23–24. 59 PD 59, ‘‘Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy,’’ July 25, 1980, Jimmy Carter Library. http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/pddirectives/pd59.pdf 60 Ibid. 61 DoD Annual Report FY 1982 (USGPO, Washington, DC, January 19, 1981), pp. 40–42. Henceforth Report FY 1982. 62 Nuclear War Strategy: Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 96th Congress, 2nd Session on Presidential Directive 59 (USGPO, Washington, DC, September 16, 1980), p. 37. Henceforth Nuclear War Hearing. 63 Nuclear War Hearing, p. 17. 64 Ibid., p. 24. 65 Memo, Jasper Welch to Zbigniew Brzezinski, ‘‘Senate Foreign Relations Committee Paper on PD-59,’’ September 11, 1980: PD-59, 5/80–81/81, Box 35, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, Jimmy Carter Library. 66 P. Pringle and W. Arkin, S.I.O.P.: The Secret U.S. Plan for Nuclear War (W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., New York, 1983), p. 185. 67 Nuclear War Hearing, p. 10. 68 Pringle and Arkin, SIOP, p. 185. 69 Ibid., p. 190. 70 T. B. Cochran, W. M. Arkin and M. M. Hoenig, Nuclear Weapons Databook: Volume 1 U.S. Nuclear Forces and Capabilities (Ballinger Publishing Co., Cambridge, MA, 1984), p. 116. 71 Ibid., p. 116; Powers, ‘‘Choosing a Strategy for World War III,’’ p. 106. 72 Powers, ‘‘Choosing a Strategy for World War III,’’ p. 106. 73 Cochran, Arkin and Hoenig, Nuclear Weapons, p. 177. 74 Ibid., p. 142. 75 Ibid., p. 140. 76 Pringle and Arkin, SIOP, p. 190. 77 Ibid. 78 Report FY 1982, p. 121. 79 Ibid., p. 122. The E-4B ﬂeet included three aircraft converted from E-4A standard. 80 Ibid. 81 Powers, ‘‘Choosing a Strategy for World War III,’’ pp. 108–9. 82 Pringle and Arkin, SIOP, p. 186. It is important to note that the US strategic arsenal consisted of just 10,000 warheads at this time. 83 Ibid., pp. 186–87. These target groups were those described to the Senate Armed Services Committee by the Pentagon in March, 1980, when SIOP5D was adopted. 84 Pringle and Arkin, SIOP, p. 187.

Notes

213

85 Ball and Richelson, Strategic Nuclear Targeting, p. 79. 86 From the forward to C. Coker, US Military Power in the 1980s (The Macmillan Press, Ltd., London, 1983), p. xi. 87 Report FY 1975, p. 29. 88 Ibid., p. 30. 89 Report FY 1977, p. iv. 90 DoD Annual Report FY 1978 (USGPO, Washington, DC, January 17, 1977), p. 18. 91 Ibid. 92 General George S. Brown, USAF. ‘‘United States Military Posture for FY 1976,’’ cited in N. Polmar, Strategic Weapons: An Introduction (Macdonald and Jane’s, Ltd., London, 1976), p. 111. 93 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) The Military Balance 1976– 77 (IISS, London, 1977), p.106. 94 Ibid., p. 107. 95 Ibid. 96 IISS, Military Balance 1977–78 (IISS, London, 1978) p. 77. 97 Ibid. 98 NIE 11-13/8-76, Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Conﬂict through the Mid-1980s (1976), p. 16. Henceforth NIE 11-3/8-76. The authors (p. 18) included commentary by the Assistant Chief of USAF Intelligence that Soviet interventions in the Middle East, Southeast Asia and Angola were made possible by improvements to Soviet strategic forces. 99 NIE 11-13/8-76, p. 18. 100 NIE 11-4-77, Soviet Strategic Objectives (January 12, 1977), p. 7. 101 ‘‘Intelligence Community Experiment in Competitive Analysis: Soviet Strategic Objectives: An Alternative View; Report of Team ‘B,’ ’’ December 1976, p. 10. Henceforth ‘‘Team ‘B’ ’’. 102 ‘‘Team ‘B,’ ’’ p. 11. 103 Ibid., p. 21. 104 Report FY 1979, p. 62. 105 Ibid. 106 Report FY 1980, p. 80. 107 Ibid. 108 Report FY 1981, p. 83. 109 Nuclear War Hearing, p. 31. 110 Ibid. 111 United States Military Posture for FY 1980 (USGPO, Washington, DC, 1979), p. v. Henceforth Posture FY 1980. 112 United States Military Posture for FY 1981 (USGPO, Washington, DC, 1980), p. iii. Henceforth Posture FY 1981. 113 Posture FY 1981, p. 30. 114 NIE 11-3/8-77. Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conﬂict through the Late 1980s (February, 1978) p. 1. Henceforth NIE 11-3/8-77. 115 NIE 11-3/8-77, pp. 1–2. 116 NIE 11-3/8-79. Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conﬂict through the 1980s (March 17, 1980), p. 4. 117 ‘‘Senate Foreign Relations Committee-1:Brown,’’ July 23, 1979, p. 113: Presidential Directive-59, 8-22-80, Box 106, Counsel: Cutler; Jimmy Carter Library. 118 ‘‘Senate Foreign Relations Committee-3:Kissinger,’’ July 31, 1979, p. 164: Presidential Directive-59, 8-22-80, Box 106, Counsel: Cutler; Jimmy Carter Library. General Alexander Haig testiﬁed before the Senate Armed Services Committee that ‘‘in crises with the Soviet Union from the Cuban

214

119

120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130

131

Notes missile crisis of 1962 . . . our . . . President was always reassured by a backdrop of strategic superiority vis-a`-vis the Soviet Union.’’ Such historical comparisons to the situation in the late-1970s were often made as an indication of a shift in the global power balance resulting from a loss of US superiority. ‘‘Senate Armed Services Committee-1: Haig,’’ July 26, 1979, p. 359: Presidential Directive-59, 8/22/80, Box 106, Counsel: Cutler; Jimmy Carter Library. ‘‘Secretary Muskie: U.S. Nuclear Strategy (September 16, 1980),’’ United States Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington, DC: Presidential Directive-59, 9/80, Box 106, Counsel: Cutler; Jimmy Carter Library. D. Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race (Yale University Press, London, 1983), p. 50. Ibid. In J. Erickson and E. J. Feuchtwanger, eds, Soviet Military Power and Performance (The Macmillan Press, Ltd., London, 1979) pp. 164–65. In J. Baylis and G. Segal, eds, Soviet Strategy (Osmun & Co. Publishers, Inc., Montclair, NJ, 1981) pp. 108–17. R. Pipes, U.S.-Soviet Relations in the Era of De´tente (Westview Press, Inc., Boulder, CO, 1981) p. 149. Ibid., p. 147. See Powers, ‘‘Choosing a Strategy for World War III,’’ and esp. L. Sloss and M. D. Millot, ‘‘U.S. Nuclear Strategy in Evolution,’’ Strategic Review, Vol. XII, No. 1 (Winter 1984), pp. 19–28. See Survival, Vol. XXI, No. 5 (September/October 1979), pp. 217–30 for the text of SALT II. See J. Anderson, ‘‘Not-So-New Nuclear Strategy,’’ The Washington Post, October 12, 1980, p. C7 for a succinct description of the links between NSDM 242 and PD 59. In Bobbitt et al., US Nuclear Strategy, p. 410. ‘‘Secretary Muskie: U.S. Nuclear Strategy (September 16, 1980),’’ United States Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington, DC: Presidential Directive-59, 9/80, Box 106, Counsel: Cutler; Jimmy Carter Library. Memo, Carl. R. Smith to Lloyd N. Cutler, ‘‘PD-59,’’ September 11, 1980, Presidential Directive-59, 9/80, Box 106, Counsel: Cutler; Jimmy Carter Library.

2 Protracted nuclear war 1 This was echoed by the Republican Party’s 1980 platform: ‘‘Before arms control negotiations can be undertaken, the security of the United States must be assured by the funding and deployment of strong military forces sufﬁcient to deter conﬂict at any level or to prevail in battle should aggression occur’’ (Underlining in original). Position Paper, ‘‘Republican Party Platform—Detroit—July 1980; The Role of Arms Control in Defense Policy,’’ March 26, 1981, Folder NSC 00006, Box 91282, Executive Secretariat Meeting Files, Ronald Reagan Library. 2 Tyroler II, Alerting America, pp. ix–xi. According to this list, 59 of the Committee’s members were appointed to the Reagan Administration. 3 Tyroler, Alerting America, p. ix. Gray served as a member of the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament. 4 C. S. Gray, ‘‘Nuclear Strategy: the Case for a Theory of Victory.’’ International Security Vol. 4, No.1 (Summer 1979), p. 56.

Notes

215

5 Gray, ‘‘Nuclear Strategy,’’ pp. 68–69. 6 C. S. Gray and K. Payne, ‘‘Victory is Possible.’’ Foreign Policy 14 (Summer 1980), pp. 14, 18. 7 Newhouse, War and Peace, p. 337. 8 T. B. Allen, War Games: Inside the Secret World of the Men who Play at World War III (William Heinemann Ltd., London, 1987), pp. 205–13. The reason for ofﬁcial notiﬁcation was ‘‘to tell the Soviet Union and the rest of the world that decapitation would not stop the United States from massive retaliation’’ (p. 211). Previously, most Presidential nuclear war games had been kept strictly classiﬁed and strictly denied (Allen, Op cit., p. 213). 9 J. Newhouse, War and Peace, p. 337. 10 NSDD 12, ‘‘Strategic Forces Modernization Program,’’ October 1, 1981 in Presidential Directives on National Security From Truman to Clinton (microﬁche: Cambridge, Chadwyck-Healy, 1994), Record #1225. 11 Public Papers of the Presidents: Ronald Reagan 1981. January 20–December 31, 1981 (USGPO, Washington, DC, 1982), p. 878. 12 Ibid., pp. 878–79. 13 NSDD 13, ‘‘Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy,’’ December 1981 in Presidential Directives on National Security From Truman To Clinton (microﬁche: Cambridge, Chadwyck-Healy, 1994), Record #1226. The details that have been uncovered about NSDD 13 are described in R. Garthoff, The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War (The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 1994), p. 36. 14 NSDD 91, ‘‘Strategic Forces Modernization Program Changes,’’ April 19, 1983 in Presidential Directives on National Security from Truman to Clinton (microﬁche: Cambridge, Chadwyck-Healy, 1994), Record #1310. 15 NSDD 32, ‘‘U.S. National Security Strategy,’’ April 1982, Folder 8290283, Box 4, Related Documents (System II), Ronald Reagan Library. 16 Ibid. 17 NSDD 97, ‘‘National Security Telecommunications Policy,’’ August 3, 1983 in Presidential Directives on National Security from Truman to Clinton (microﬁche: Cambridge, Chadwyck-Healy, 1994), Record #1315. 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid. 20 See Garthoff, The Great Transition, p. 36. 21 NSDD 97. 22 NSDD 145, ‘‘National Policy on Telecommunications and Automated Information Systems Security,’’ September 17, 1984 in Presidential Directives on National Security: From Truman to Clinton (microﬁche: Cambridge, ChadwyckHealy, 1994), Record #1425. 23 R. Halloran, ‘‘Pentagon Draws Up First Strategy For Fighting a Long Nuclear War,’’ New York Times, May 30, 1982, p. A1. 24 L. Freedman, Evolution, p. 406. 25 G. C. Wilson, ‘‘Preparing for Long Nuclear War Is Waste of Funds, Gen. Jones Says,’’ Washington Post, June 19, 1982, p. A3. 26 Halloran, ‘‘Long Nuclear War,’’ p. A12. 27 A Pentagon ofﬁcial who briefed the press on the Defense Guidance, perhaps concerned that this might have been the view of the doctrine set forth by it, stated that ‘‘[N]o one is suggesting that a protracted [nuclear] war is . . . something that we are planning to do. But the capability of dealing with a protracted attack upon us is important to develop, because if we develop the capability . . . we can hope to deter it.’’ Wilson, ‘‘Preparing For Long Nuclear War,’’ p. A2.

216

Notes

28 Ibid. 29 ‘‘U.S. Arms Plan Bared,’’ Chicago Tribune, January 17, 1983, p. 8. 30 F. FitzGerald, Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars and the End of the Cold War (Simon & Schuster, New York, 2000), p. 182. 31 Ibid., pp. 153–54. 32 Their debates made them something of a pair of duelists in they eyes of the press. As John Newhouse notes, the pair ‘‘were Shultz-Weinberger surrogates.’’ (p. 351.) 33 M. Perry, Four Stars (Houghton Mifﬂin Co., Boston, MA, 1989), pp. 279–83. Weinberger had argued that a massive strategic buildup was needed immediately, or the United States would be ‘‘in grave peril’’ (p. 281), something that went beyond what Jones and the other JCS members believed to be the case. 34 Perry, Four Stars, p. 284. 35 FitzGerald, Way Out, p. 184. 36 Ibid., pp. 183–84. Burt had initially proposed a level of 1,200. 37 Wilson, ‘‘Preparing for a Long Nuclear War,’’ p. A2. 38 DoD Annual Report for FY 1983 (USGPO, Washington, DC, February 8, 1982), p. I-17. Henceforth Report FY 1983. 39 DoD Annual Report for FY 1984 (USGPO, Washington, DC, February 1, 1983), p. 32. Henceforth Report FY 1984. 40 Report FY 1984, p. 51. 41 DoD Annual Report for FY 1985 (USGPO, Washington, DC, February 1, 1984), p. 29. Henceforth Report FY 1985. 42 Memo, John H. Stanford to Col. Michael O. Wheeler, October 13, 1982, ID # 06578, FG 013, WHORM: Subject File, Ronald Reagan Library. 43 These systems are given priority in Administration documents from this time. See esp. Report FY 1983, pp. III-57–63; Report FY 1984 pp. 219–25; Report FY 1985, pp. 185–92; DoD Annual Report for FY 1986 (USGPO, Washington, DC, February 4, 1985) pp. 52–53, 206–13. Henceforth Report FY 1986; and NSDD-91. 44 J. N. Gibson, Nuclear Weapons of the United States: An Illustrated History (Schiffer Publishing, Ltd., Atglen, PA, 1996), p. 38 (missile) and p. 50 (submarine). 45 Ibid., pp. 79–81. 46 Freedman, Evolution, p. 406; Gibson, Nuclear Weapons, pp. 29–30, 82, 115–18, 156–59. For a good discussion on weapons development during this time, see C. Campbell, Weapons of War (Peter Bedrick Books, New York, 1983), pp. 195–201. 47 These were inﬂuenced by SALT II provisions, to which the Reagan Administration adhered. These stipulated that cruise missiles could not be deployed until 1982, which was when these weapons ﬁrst entered service with USAF B-52G squadrons. 48 Gibson, Nuclear Weapons, p. 24. 49 NSDD 73, ‘‘The Peacekeeper Program Assessment,’’ January 3, 1983 in Presidential Directives on National Security: From Truman to Clinton (microﬁche: Cambridge, Chadwyck-Healy, 1994), Record #1290. 50 Report FY 1985, p. 186. 51 Ibid., p. 190. 52 See A. H. Cordesman, Deterrence in the 1980s: Part I—American Strategic Forces and Extended Deterrence, IISS Adelphi Paper 175 (IISS, London, 1982), p. 26 for an in-depth description of the Trident II/D-5’s capabilities and their implications for US strategic doctrine. 53 Report FY 1986, p. 57. 54 Campbell, Nuclear Weapons Fact Book (Presidio Press, Novato, CA, 1984), p. 107.

Notes

217

55 Pringle and Arkin, SIOP, p. 237. 56 Ibid., pp. 229, 232. 57 C. Chant and I. Hogg. Nuclear War in the 1980s? (Nomad Publishers, Ltd., New York, 1983), p. 38. A total of six aircraft was planned by 1983. 58 In Bobbitt et al., US Nuclear Strategy, p. 490. 59 Ibid., pp. 492–503. 60 Ibid., p. 504. 61 Ibid. 62 Fitzgerald, Way Out, pp. 193–94. An indication of the political motivations involved can be gauged by the fact that the Commission’s members ‘‘had brokered a deal between Representative Les Aspin, a key Democrat on the House Armed Services Committee, Secretary Weinberger and others.’’ (p. 193.) The broad nature of recommendations bears this out. 63 NSDD 91, for example, directed the immediate deployment of MX ICBMs in Minuteman silos, as well as the programs regarding bombers, submarines, strategic defense and C3I outlined in the report. 64 Soviet Military Power (USGPO, Washington, DC, September 1981), p. 95. This was included in Secretary Weinberger’s 1983 Report to Congress as an annex. 65 Soviet Military Power 1983 (USGPO, Washington, DC, March 1983), p. 13. 66 Ibid., p. 16. 67 United States Military Posture for FY 1983 (USGPO, Washington, DC, January 1982), p. 19. Henceforth Posture FY 1983. 68 Posture FY 1983, pp. 19–20. 69 United States Military Posture for FY 1984 (USGPO, Washington, DC, January 1983), pp. 13–14. Henceforth Posture FY 1984. 70 Posture FY 1983, p. 23; United States Military Posture for FY 1985 (USGPO, Washington, DC, January 1984), p. 23; United States Military Posture for FY 1986 (USGPO, Washington, DC, January 1985), p. 21. 71 NIE 11-3/8-82, ‘‘Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conﬂict, 1982–92’’ (Washington, DC, February 15, 1983), p. 5. Henceforth NIE 11-3/8-82. 72 NIE 11-3/8-82, p. 16. 73 See A. H. Cahn. Killing De´tente: The Right Attacks the CIA (The Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park, PA, 1998) for a history of this period and the events surrounding ‘‘Team B.’’ 74 Cahn, Killing De´tente, p. 30. Fitzgerald (p. 157) quotes Robert Gates, Casey’s executive assistant at the CIA and later DCI himself, as describing Casey’s priority at the Agency as ‘‘primarily to wage war against the Soviet Union’’ in his capacity as DCI. 75 NIE 11-3/8-81, ‘‘Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conﬂict, 1981–91’’ (Washington, DC, March 23, 1982), p. 1. Henceforth NIE 11-3/8-81. 76 NIE 11-3/8-81, p. 4. The authors deﬁne hard-target re-entry vehicles as ‘‘those that have a 50-percent or greater probability of destroying a target hardened to 14 megapascals (2,000 pounds per square inch.)’’ 77 NIE 11-3/8-82, p. 19. It is interesting to note that the ﬁgure for reductions paralleled Richard Perle’s throw-weight controls in his arms control proposals. 78 NIE 11-3/8-81, pp. 18–19. 79 NIE 11-3/8-82, p. 28. 80 NIE 11/4-82, ‘‘The Soviet Challenge to US Security Interests’’ (Washington, DC, August 10, 1982), p. 14. 81 NSDD 98, issued on June 14, 1983 and outlining policy on the START negotiations, noted that ‘‘The Report of the Commission on Strategic Forces headed by General Scowcroft . . . has provided a consistent and coherent framework to guide our thinking about the . . . elements of our national security policy, deterrence, defense and arms control.’’ NSDD 98, ‘‘U.S. Approach

218

82 83 84

85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97

Notes

to START Negotiations-VI,’’ June 14, 1983, Folder ‘‘NSDD’s 91–100,’’ Box 1, National Security Decision Directives 1-250, Ronald Reagan Library. NSC Meeting, September 18, 1984, Folder ‘‘NSPG 96,’’ Box 4, Records Declassiﬁed and Released by the National Security Council, Ronald Reagan Library. Ibid. Fitzgerald,Way Out (pp. 266–68), describes how an NSC meeting on achieving a secure peace in Central America broke down along ideological lines, and how the President was unable to make a decision. She notes that both Shultz and Weinberger met with Reagan privately later on, with Shultz stressing that the President needed to shake up his foreign policy team. However, he did not do so. T. Powers, ‘‘Choosing a Strategy for World War III,’’ p. 91. L. Sloss and M. D. Millot, ‘‘U.S. Nuclear Strategy in Evolution,’’ Strategic Review, Vol. XII, No.1 (Winter 1984), pp. 22–23. Ibid., p. 24. Ibid. Ibid., p. 25. Collins, U.S.-Soviet Military Balance 1980–1985, p. 60. IISS, The Military Balance 1985–1986 (IISS, London, 1985), p. 6. IISS, The Military Balance 1981–1982 (IISS, London, 1982), p. 5. Collins, Military Balance 1980–1985, p. 58; Military Balance 1981–1982, p. 5. IISS, Military Balance 1985–1986, p. 3. A total of 52 Titan IIs were in service in 1981. J. G. Stoessinger, Nations at Dawn: China, Russia, and America, 6th edn (McGraw-Hill, Inc., New York, 1994), p. 249. T. C. Reed, At the Abyss: An Insider’s History of the Cold War (Presidio Press, New York, 2004), pp. 241–45 (on the SIOP brieﬁng); 254–57 (on SDI.) L. Freedman, Atlas of Global Strategy (Facts on File, Inc., New York, 1985), pp. 110–11.

3 Of shelters and Star Wars 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19

Pipes, U.S.-Soviet Relations, p. 166. Ibid. ‘‘Report of Team ‘B,’ ’’ p. 25. Tyroler, Alerting America, p. 58. Ibid. Cockburn, The Threat, p. 376. Kaplan, Dubious Specter, p. 34. See ‘‘The New Nuclear Strategy. Battle of the Dead?’’ The Defense Monitor, Vol. V, No. 5 (July 1976) for a discussion of this view. IISS, Strategic Survey 1976 (IISS, London, 1977), p. 32. Ibid., pp. 32–33. Ibid., p. 32. Ibid., p. 34. Ibid. Campbell, Weapons of War, p. 222. Cockburn, The Threat, p. 375. Campbell, Weapons of War, p. 222. H. F. and W. F. Scott, The Armed Forces of the USSR (Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1979), pp. 243–44. J. Shaw et al., eds, Nuclear Attack: Civil Defence Aspects of Civil Defence in the Nuclear Age (Brassey’s Publishers, Ltd., Oxford, 1982), p. 260. Ibid., p. 264.

Notes 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38

39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63

219

Cockburn, The Threat, p. 377. Ibid. Ibid., pp. 379–80. These ﬁgures pertain to the early 1980s. Ibid., p. 380. Ibid., pp. 380–81. Ibid., p. 381. Kaplan, Dubious Specter, p. 37. Ibid. Ibid. R. Scheer, With Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush and Nuclear War (Random House, New York, 1982), p. 116. Report FY 1977, p. 57. Report FY 1978, p. 64. Report FY 1979, p. 52. Report FY 1980, p. 74. Report FY 1981, p. 78. U.S. Military Posture for FY 1978 (Washington, DC, January 20, 1977), p. 29. Henceforth Military Posture FY 1978. Ibid. U.S. Military Posture for FY 1982 (USGPO, Washington, DC, January 1981), p. 108. Henceforth Military Posture FY 1982. The Nuclear War Effects Advisory Panel included General Russell F. Dougherty, USAF (Ret.), former commander-in-chief of SAC; Admiral Gene R. LaRocque, USN (Ret.), Director of the CDI; and several scientists, including Sidney Drell, Richard Garwin and Jack Ruina, all of whom had experience with defense scientiﬁc matters. The Effects of Nuclear War, Ofﬁce of Technology Assessment, Congress of the United States (Croom Helm Ltd., London, 1980), p. 5. Ibid., p. 57. Ibid., p. 37. Ibid., p. 27. Conditions were the same for Detroit. Ibid., p. 39. Ibid. NI 78-10003, ‘‘Soviet Civil Defense,’’ July 1978, p. 4. Ibid. Ibid., p. 12. NIE 11-3/8-76, ‘‘Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Conﬂict through the Mid-1980s,’’ December 21, 1976, p. 56. NIE 11-3/8-77, ‘‘Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conﬂict Through the late 1980s,’’ February 1978, p. 22. Ibid., p. 23. Ibid. Report FY 1983, p. II-11. ‘‘Soviet Military Power,’’ in Report FY 1983, p. 69. Ibid. Posture FY 1983, p. 26. See Posture FY 1984, p. 18; Posture FY 1985, p. 33; Posture FY 1986, p. 32. NIE 11-3/8-81, pp. 17–18. NIE 11-3/8-82, p. 40. Cockburn, The Threat, p. 384. Campbell, Weapons of War, p. 212. Shaw et al., Nuclear Attack, p. 197. Report FY 1976, p. II-54. Report FY 1975, pp. 78–79.

220 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78

79

80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90

Notes Ibid., p. 80. Report FY 1976, p. II-57. Ibid., pp. II-55–56. NSSM 244, ‘‘U.S. Civil Defense Policy,’’ July 24, 1976, in Presidential Directives on National Security: From Truman to Clinton (microﬁche: Cambridge, Chadwyck-Healy, 1994), Record # 2150. PRM/NSC 32, ‘‘Civil Defense,’’ September 30, 1977, in Presidential Directives on National Security: From Truman to Clinton (microﬁche: Cambridge, Chadwyck-Healy, 1994), Record # 1197. PRM/NSC 32, ‘‘Civil Defense,’’ Jimmy Carter Library, June 23, 1980. http:// www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/documents/prmemorandums/prm32.pdf Ibid. PD/NSC 41, ‘‘U.S. Civil Defense Policy,’’ Jimmy Carter Library, June 23, 1980. http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/documents/pddirectives/pd41.pdf Ibid. Report FY 1981, p. 139. Campbell, Weapons of War, p. 212. Report FY 1979, p. 127. Report FY 1981, p. 139. Ibid. Shaw et al., Nuclear Attack, p. 202. NI 78-10003 estimated Soviet civil defense expenditures at around 400 million rubles in 1976, or the equivalent of $2 billion for the United States (p. 3.) Cockburn, however, notes that the CIA’s estimates were determined by how much an equivalent program would have cost the United States, in terms of pay and costs. This certainly inﬂated the estimates, since Soviet military civil defense personnel were paid a mere $6.50 in rubles per month. (pp. 375–76) This included some Soviet plans for urban evacuation. The authors of PD 41, for example, noted that ‘‘U.S. civil defense programs will take advantage of the mobility of the population stemming from wide ownership of private automobiles, the extensive highway systems, and the large number of nonurban potential housing facilities to achieve crisis relocation of the urban population.’’ NSDD 12. NSDD 23, ‘‘U.S. Civil Defense Policy,’’ February 3, 1982, in Presidential Directives on National Security: From Truman to Clinton (microﬁche: Cambridge, Chadwyck-Healy, 1994), Record #1235. Ibid. Ibid. NSDD 26, ‘‘U.S. Civil Defense Policy,’’ February 25, 1982, in Presidential Directives on National Security: From Truman to Clinton (microﬁche: Cambridge, Chadwyck-Healy, 1994), Record #1238. NSDD 47, ‘‘Emergency Mobilization Preparedness,’’ July 22, 1982, in Presidential Directives on National Security: From Truman to Clinton (microﬁche: Cambridge, Chadwyck-Healy, 1994), Record #1266. Cockburn, The Threat, p. 394. ‘‘Battle of the Dead?’’ p. 12. Cockburn, The Threat, p. 379. D. Miller, The Cold War: A Military History (John Murray Publishers, Ltd., London, 1998), p. 151. Best known are T. K. Jones’ statements, made while serving in the Reagan Administration: ‘‘if there are enough shovels to go around, everybody’s going to make it’’; and ‘‘It’s the dirt that does it [provides the most effective protection against fallout],’’ Scheer, With Enough Shovels, p. 18.

Notes

221

91 Cockburn, The Threat, p. 379; Garthoff, The Great Transition, p. 508. 92 Address, Ronald Reagan to the nation, March 23, 1983, ID #83–12, SP735, WHORM: Subject File, Ronald Reagan Library. 93 Newhouse, War and Peace, p. 363. 94 B. M. Jasani, Outer Space-Battleﬁeld of the Future? (Taylor & Francis Ltd., London, 1978), p. 182. 95 Newhouse, War and Peace, p. 360. 96 F. FitzGerald, Way Out, p. 118. 97 Ibid., p. 119. 98 Ibid. 99 Newhouse, War and Peace, p. 360. 100 D. Baker, The Shape of Wars to Come (Stein and Day Publishers, Briarcliff Manor, NY, 1982), p. 193. 101 NSDD 12. 102 White House Fact Sheet, ‘‘National Space Policy,’’ July 4, 1982, folder ‘‘SDI 1982,’’ Box 1 of 2, Donald Baucum Files, Ronald Reagan Library. Among the uses of such an ASAT system would be the destruction of satellites used to assist the targeting of ballistic missiles. By putting these out of action, a potential nuclear aggressor—most likely the USSR—would be unable to coordinate a strategic attack upon the United States. (P. M. Boffey, ‘‘Pressures Are Increasing For Arms Race in Space,’’ The New York Times, October 18, 1982, p. B9.) 103 Letter, Edward Teller to Ronald Reagan, July 23, 1982, folder ‘‘SDI 1982,’’ Box 1 of 2, Donald Baucum Files, Ronald Reagan Library. 104 Ibid. 105 Ibid. 106 See FitzGerald, Way Out, pp. 20–21, 99–102 for an in-depth analysis of the NORAD visit. 107 Newhouse, War and Peace, p. 339. 108 Freedman, Evolution, pp. 413–14. 109 Newhouse, War and Peace, p. 348. 110 Letter, Teller to Reagan. 111 Ibid. Newhouse describes Reagan as ‘‘an abolitionist’’ regarding nuclear weapons. ‘‘He wanted to have the advantage in nuclear weapons or else to rid the world of them . . . Before very long, he would decide that technology could give America a security moat in outer space.’’ (p. 339) 112 FitzGerald, Way Out, pp. 256–57. Speaking to the National Press Club in May 1984, Weinberger noted ‘‘[SDI] does not preclude, of course, any intermediate deployment that could provide, among other things, defense of the offensive deterrent forces, which of course we still have to maintain.’’ Perle, a staunch opponent of the 1972 ABM Treaty, saw SDI as a means of undermining this agreement, as well as hampering US–Soviet arms control efforts. (pp. 257–58) 113 Newhouse, War and Peace, p. 363. 114 NIC M 83-10017, ‘‘Possible Soviet Responses to the US Strategic Defense Initiative,’’ Interagency Intelligence Assessment, September 12, 1983, p. vii. 115 Ibid. 116 Ibid. 117 Ibid. 118 Ibid., p. viii. 119 Ibid., pp. vii–viii. 120 CIA working paper, ‘‘Soviet Directed Energy Weapons—Perspectives on Strategic Defense,’’ March 1985, p. iii. 121 Ibid. 122 Ibid. 123 Garthoff, The Great Transition, pp. 516–17.

222

Notes

124 NSDD 153, ‘‘Instructions for the Shultz-Gromyko Meeting in Geneva,’’ January 1, 1985, in Presidential Directives on National Security: From Truman to Clinton (microﬁche: Cambridge, Chadwyck-Healy, 1994), Record # 1434. 125 Ibid. 126 Memo, Fred C. Ikle to George A. Keyworth, November 17, 1983, folder ‘‘Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI),’’ Box 1 of 2, Donald Baucum Files, Ronald Reagan Library. 127 Ibid. In testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1984, Keyworth noted that SDI provided ‘‘Options to begin disarming the perception if not the fact, of each other’s ﬁrst-strike capability’’ (My italics). Statement on the President’s Strategic Defense Initiative by Dr. George A. Keyworth, Science Adviser to the President, Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate (98th Congress, Second Session), April 25, 1984, folder ‘‘SDI 1984 (1),’’ Box 1 of 2, Donald Baucum Files, Ronald Reagan Library. 128 Newhouse, War and Peace, pp. 334–35. 129 See esp. Newhouse, War and Peace, p. 360; note: FitzGerald, Way Out, pp. 22–23, 25, 38. Both Newhouse and FitzGerald note the Alfred Hitchcock ﬁlm Torn Curtain (1966) as having an important inﬂuence on Reagan’s views of missile defense. In it, an American agent states that ‘‘We [the United States] will produce a defensive weapon that will make all offensive nuclear weapons obsolete—and thereby abolish the terror of nuclear warfare.’’ (Newhouse, p. 360; FitzGerald, p. 23. My italics) 130 Newhouse, War and Peace, p. 339.

4 The nuclear balance 1 2 3 4

5 6 7 8 9 10 11

12

Posture FY 1980, p. vi. Newhouse, War and Peace, p. 309; Garthoff, De´tente and Confrontation, p. 941. Garthoff, De´tente and Confrontation, p. 942. Campbell, Weapons of War, p. 53. Contrary to popular belief, the ERW would not produce higher radiation effects than existing nuclear warheads. Rather, these effects would be emphasized due to the reduced blast effects of the warhead itself. This was often overlooked at the time. See esp. Garthoff, De´tente and Confrontation, p. 937. Ibid. Report FY 1976, P. III-3. Report FY 1978, p. 83. R. Crockatt, The Fifty Years’ War, p. 269. Ibid.; Garthoff, De´tente and Confrontation, p. 937. Garthoff, De´tente and Confrontation, p. 937. Report FY 1979, p. 72. For a diagram and accompanying description of ERW, see J. Dornan (Cons.) The U.S. War Machine: An Encyclopedia of American Military Equipment and Strategy (Salamander Books, Ltd., London, 1978), pp. 84–85. Garthoff, De´tente and Confrontation, p. 938. This was suggested in February 1978, in an NSC meeting on SALT. A U.S. decision to produce the ER, looking to its initial deployment in Europe in about two years; a simultaneous offer to the Soviets to forgo ER deployment in return for non-deployment of the SS-20; a statement of Allied support for this approach, including ER deployment in Europe if the arms control objective is not achieved.

Notes

13

14 15 16 17

18

223

However, in a prophetic statement that indicated how this issue would be resolved, the authors noted that ‘‘the President noted that he wishes to reserve the ﬁnal decision on the ER production and ﬁnal clearance of any public statements to himself.’’ Memo, Zbigniew Brzezinski to the Vice President et al., ‘‘SCC Meeting on Allied Consultations and SALT, February 14, 1978,’’ February 16, 1978, USSR Related Documents Opened (II), Box 116, Vertical File, Jimmy Carter Library. Newhouse, War and Peace, p. 310. According to James Schlesinger, who served as Carter’s Energy Secretary (responsible for the production of US nuclear weapons), Carter wanted Schmidt to accept ERW deployment if it was produced, while Schmidt wanted other NATO members to accept its deployment before West Germany did so. Carter linked these two issues (production and deployment), leading to the trouble in negotiations. Interview with James Schlesinger, Miller Center Interviews, Carter Presidency Project, Vol. XXII, July 19, 1984, pp. 61–62, Jimmy Carter Library. Henceforth Interview with James Schlesinger. Crockatt, The Fifty Years’ War, p. 269. Garthoff, De´tente and Confrontation, p. 938. Ibid., pp. 938–39. According to James Schlesinger, Schmidt should have explained his position to Carter, and urged him to take the lead on the ERW issue. Carter, for his part, should have maintained the production-deployment formula, which he eschewed. Interview with James Schlesinger, pp. 61–62. From the perspective of two key American foreign policymakers comes a slight difference of opinion on how the issue of ERW played out. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, in his Hard Choices: Critical Years in America’s Foreign Policy (Simon & Schuster, New York, 1983), sees both sides of the issue. In our minds, the decisions on production and deployment were linked. There was no sense in producing the ERW unless it could be deployed in Europe . . . Yet if it were to appear that the allies were being pressured by the United States to accept the weapon, European political opposition could become unmanageable. (pp. 68–69)

For National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, the denouement of ERW had a different cause. In his Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser 1977–1981 (Farrar-Straus-Giroux, New York, 1983), he sees Helmut Schmidt as being responsible for widening the breach in TransAtlantic relations. ‘‘Schmidt had obviously manoeuvred to make the decision appear a purely American one’’ (p. 306). As Brzezinski tells it, Carter, recognizing the pressure Schmidt was under politically, took most of the blame for deferment of ERW. ‘‘To protect Schmidt and allied unity, Carter thus paid a high personal price’’ (Ibid.). Given the poor state of personal relations between Brzezinski and Schmidt, this is not surprising (see Newhouse, War and Peace, p. 308 for a good description of this relationship.) 19 Memo, Gregory F. Treverton for Members of the European Task Force on Comprehensive Net Assessment (PRM/NSC-10), ‘‘Summary and Differences of View,’’ May 20, 1977, Presidential Review Memoranda 10 Through 36–47, Box 105, Vertical File, Jimmy Carter Library. 20 NATO and the Warsaw Pact: Force Comparisons (NATO Information Service, Brussels, 1984), p. 34. 21 For a good description of this phenomenon, see W. Laqueur, The Political Psychology of Appeasement: Finlandization and Other Unpopular Essays (Transaction,

224

22

23

24 25 26 27 28 29

30 31 32 33 34 35 36

37 38 39 40

Notes

Inc., New Brunswick, NJ, 1980), esp. ‘‘Finlandization,’’ pp. 3–22. For a critique of this theory, see D. Allin, Cold War Illusions: America, Europe and Soviet Power 1969–1989 (Macmillan Press, Ltd., London, 1994), esp. Chap. 4. Memo, Gregory F. Treverton to Members of the European Task Force on Comprehensive Net Assessment (PRM/NSC 10), ‘‘Summary and Differences of View,’’ May 20, 1977, Presidential Review Memorandum-10, Box 105, Vertical File, Jimmy Carter Library. Ibid. The authors went on to stress that ‘‘NATO Allies stress the American nuclear commitment because they have no other choice . . . Europe could, but will not, develop its own independent strategic deterrent based on the British and French forces.’’ Memo for the Secretary of State et al, ‘‘SCC Meeting on PRM 10, July 7, 1977,’’ July 25, 1977, USSR 1980–1995, Box 116, Vertical File, Jimmy Carter Library. Garthoff, De´tente and Confrontation, p. 936. Ibid. IISS, Military Balance 1977–1978, p. 17. Garthoff, De´tente and Confrontation, p. 943. PRM/NSC 38, ‘‘Long-Range Theater Nuclear Capabilities and Arms Control,’’ June 22, 1978 in Presidential Directives on National Security: From Truman to Clinton (microﬁche: Cambridge, Chadwyck-Healy, 1994), Record #1204. Garthoff, De´tente and Confrontation, p. 944. Ibid., p. 945. Newhouse, War and Peace, pp. 323–24. Ibid., p. 324. Garthoff, De´tente and Confrontation, p. 946. Ibid., p. 947. There were no formal notes of the meeting at Guadeloupe. However, Brzezinski (p. 295) did record is observations in his journal, and believed that the meeting ‘‘was a thoroughly stimulating and comprehensive review of the security situation . . . I could sense out of the dialogue there was emerging a recognition that a common Western position was needed that has to be more concrete.’’ However, while praising Giscard and Callaghan, as well as Carter (‘‘very effectively taking the lead and pressing the others to deﬁne their response to the perceived threat’’), Brzezinski remained critical of Schmidt, who ‘‘gave us a rather elementary lecture on nuclear strategy,’’ and appeared ‘‘least inclined to agree on any ﬁrm response’’ to the perceived threat of Soviet LRTNF forces. Garthoff, De´tente and Confrontation, p. 947. G. Treverton, Nuclear Weapons in Europe, IISS Adelphi Papers No. 168 (IISS, London, 1981), p. 25. Whereas the HLG included NATO defense ministers, the Special Group consisted of foreign ministers. Final Communique´, Nuclear Planning Group, The Hague, November 13–14, 1979. http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49–95 This was enshrined in PD 51, amended on March 28, 1980. The withdrawal was meant to permit a streamlining of the overall stockpile to leave ore modern and effective capabilities . . . and provide the basis for greater operational ﬂexibility and efﬁciency . . . the 1000 warhead withdrawal is in the overall security interest of the US and its allies and will contribute to achievement of greater stability in the military balance in Europe.

Notes

41 42 43 44 45

46 47 48 49 50 51

52 53 54 55

56 57 58

59 60 61

225

‘‘Amendment to Nuclear Weapons Deployment (PD/NSC 51),’’ March 28, 1980, www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/documents/pd51. Special Meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers, Brussels, December 12, 1979. http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49–95 Treverton, Nuclear Weapons, pp. 31–32. Memo, Stansﬁeld Turner to Jimmy Carter, ‘‘An Assessment of Soviet Perceptions on SALT-May 1977,’’ June 2, 1977, USSR Related Documents Opened (I), Box 116, Vertical File, Jimmy Carter Library. Ibid. Memo, Zbigniew Brzezinski to The Vice President et al, ‘‘SCC Meeting on Allied Consultations and SALT, February 14, 1978,’’ February 16, 1978, USSR Related Documents Opened (II), Box 116, Vertical File, Jimmy Carter Library. The Pershing II’s range was just 1,800 km, west of Moscow, while that of the GLCM was 2,500 km. See Force Comparisons, pp. 34, 37; Posture FY 1983, p. 29. H. Kissinger, For the Record: Selected Statements 1977–1980 (Weidenfeld & Nicholson Ltd. and Michael Joseph Ltd., London, 1981), p. 241. Ibid., p. 242. Newhouse, War and Peace, pp. 342–43. R. Garthoff, The Great Transition, p. 551; NATO Final Communique´s 1981–1985 (NATO Information Service, Brussels, n.d.), p. 7, 28. J. Stoessinger, Nations at Dawn, p. 252. This was spelled out ofﬁcially in NSDD 15, issued on November 16, 1981. This policy would be part of an approach ‘‘to seek subsequent limits with signiﬁcant reductions for other nuclear weapons systems to achieve global, equal and veriﬁable levels of weapons.’’ NSDD 15, ‘‘Theater Nuclear Forces (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces),’’ November 16, 1981 in Presidential Directives on National Security: From Truman to Clinton (microﬁche: Cambridge, Chadwyck-Healy, 1994), Record #1228. Memo, Richard Allen to Ronald Reagan, ‘‘Telephone Call to Paul Nitze Chief U.S. Negotiator–INF Negotiations,’’ November 25, 1981, Folder Phone Calls (015), Box 1, Presidential Handwriting File, Ronald Reagan Library. Newhouse, War and Peace, p. 354. Stoessinger, Nations at Dawn, p. 252. See Campbell, Weapons of War, pp. 142, 224, 226; D. Miller, The Cold War, p. 418. The British Polaris A-3TK missiles had recently been upgraded through the Chevaline program; The French effort included deployment of S-3 IRBMs and new SLBMs, while the Mirage IVA force received new bombs. Garthoff, The Great Transition, p. 551. Newhouse, War and Peace, pp. 355–56. The Reagan Administration also listed its objections through a directive, NSDD 56, issued on September 15, 1982, that stated ‘‘The U.S. cannot accept a position in which the Soviets retain short time-of-ﬂight SS-20 ballistic missiles while the U.S. foregoes Pershing II ballistic missiles (and retains only the slower, air-breathing GLCMs.)’’ NSDD 56, ‘‘Private INF Exchange,’’ in Presidential Directives on National Security from Truman to Clinton (microﬁche: Cambridge, Chadwyck-Healy, 1994), Record #1273. Newhouse, War and Peace, pp. 356–57. Ibid., p. 357. NSDD 104, ‘‘U.S. Approach to INF Negotiations-II,’’ September 21, 1983, Folder NSDDs 101–110, Box 1, National Security Decision Directives 1-250, Ronald Reagan Library.

226

Notes

62 This was reinforced by the fact that at a meeting of NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) at Montebello, Canada on October 27, 1983, a decision to withdraw 1,400 nuclear warheads from NATO stockpiles ‘‘during the next several years’’ was taken. ‘‘Moreover, this reduction will not be affected by any deployment of Longer-Range INF (LRINF) since one warhead will be removed for each Pershing II or . . . GLCM warhead deployed.’’ NATO Final Communique´s, p. 106. 63 J. N. Gibson, Nuclear Weapons, p. 162, 175. 64 Report FY 1980, p. 83. 65 Report FY 1984, p. 232. 66 Posture FY 1981, pp. 46–47. 67 ‘‘Theater Nuclear Force Negotiations: The Initial Soviet Approach,’’ August 10, 1979, pp. i–ii. 68 282-AR, ‘‘INF Negotiations: The Likely Soviet Approach,’’ November 20, 1982, p. iii. 69 As Christopher Coker, writing during the height of the debate in 1983, noted, The SS-20s do not present as immediate a threat to European security as the SS-4s or SS-5s did in the early 1960s . . . They hardly give rise to any particular concern that the Soviet Union intends to devastate Western Europe, since it has had that capability for 20 years and does not need intermediate forces to do it. US Military Power in the 1980s, p. 26.

5 Conventional forces 1 This chapter is based, in part, on my MSc thesis, American Perceptions of the U.S.–Soviet Military Balance: NATO’s Central Region, the Long-Term Defense Program and LRTNF, 1977–1980 (2000). However, while I draw from that work (and have found the works referenced within to be useful in the preparation of this chapter), it differs considerably, as it deals with the LRTNF issue (discussed in Chapter 4) along with the conventional balance in one study, whereas the two are separate here. 2 Geographically, this term encompasses West Germany and the Benelux states for NATO and East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia for the Warsaw Pact. This corresponds with NATO military delineation at the time. 3 J. Dufﬁeld, Power Rules: The Evolution of NATO’s Conventional Force Posture (Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 1995), pp. 179–80. 4 North Atlantic Council, ‘‘The Future Tasks of the Alliance,’’ Brussels, December 13–14, 1967. http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49–95 5 Ibid. 6 Dufﬁeld, Power Rules, p. 182. 7 W. Mako, U.S. Ground Forces and the Defense of Central Europe (The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 1983), pp. 21–22. 8 Dufﬁeld, Power Rules, p. 210. 9 Report FY 1975, p. 91. 10 Report FY 1976, pp. I-19, III-29. 11 Report FY 1977, p. 231. 12 Report FY 1978, p. 228; Posture FY 1978 (Washington, DC, January 20, 1977), pp. 38–39; Posture FY 1979, p. 48. 13 Report FY 1978, p. 229.

Notes

227

14 PRM 9, ‘‘Comprehensive Review of European Issues,’’ February 1, 1977 in Presidential Directives on National Security: From Truman to Clinton (microﬁche: Cambridge, Chadwyck-Healy, 1994), Record #1381. 15 Ibid. 16 Memo, Robert Hunter to the Members of the European Task Force on Comprehensive Net Assessment (PRM/NSC-10), ‘‘Terms of Reference,’’ March 28, 1977, Presidential Review Memorandum 10 through 36–47, Box 105, Vertical File, Jimmy Carter Library. 17 Ibid. 18 Memo, Gregory F. Treverton to Members of the European Task Force on Comprehensive Net Assessment (PRM/NSC 10), ‘‘Summary and Differences of View,’’ May 20, 1977, Presidential Review Memorandum 10 through 36–47, Box 105, Vertical File, Jimmy Carter Library. 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid. 22 PRM/NSC 10 Related, ‘‘PRM/NSC 10: Military Strategy and Force Posture Review, Final Report,’’ June 1977 in Presidential Directives on National Security: From Truman to Clinton (microﬁche: Cambridge, ChadwyckHealy, 1994), Record # 1919. 23 Dufﬁeld, Power Rules, pp. 213–14; D. Greenwood, ‘‘NATO’s Three Per cent Solution,’’ Survival Vol. 23, No. 6 (November–December 1981), p. 253. 24 Dufﬁeld, Power Rules, p. 214. 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid.; Final Communique, Defense Planning Committee, Brussels December 5–6, 1976. http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49–95 28 Ministerial Guidance-1977, Defense Planning Committee, Brussels May 17–18, 1977. http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49–95 29 Final Communique, Defense Planning Committee, Brussels May 17–18, 1977. http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49–95 30 Ministerial Guidance-1977, Defense Planning Committee, Brussels May 17–18, 1977. http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49–95 Another reason for this level was that this is what the Carter Administration had decided was a stable level for US defense spending increases. (Garthoff, De´tente and Confrontation, p. 936.) 31 Ministerial Guidance-1977, Defense Planning Committee, Brussels May 17–18, 1977. http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49–95 32 Ibid. 33 ‘‘The Long-Term Defence Programme-A Summary,’’ Documents section, NATO Review Vol. 26, No. 4 (August 1978), pp. 30–31. 34 Final Communique, Defense Planning Committee, Brussels May 18–19, 1978. http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49–95 35 Final Communique, North Atlantic Council, Washington May 30–31, 1978. http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49–95 36 Dufﬁeld, Power Rules, p. 216. 37 Ibid., p. 217. 38 Ibid. 39 Ibid., p. 219. 40 Greenwood, ‘‘NATO’s Three Per cent Solution,’’ pp. 254–55. 41 Report FY 1982, p. 218. The 1980 ﬁgure was preliminary at the time. 42 Report FY 1981, p. 207. 43 White Paper 1979: The Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Development of the Federal Armed Forces (Ministry of Defense, Federal Republic of Germany, Bonn, September 4, 1979), p. 119.

228

Notes

44 See my American Perceptions for more detailed discussions of these issues. For a description of reserve mobilization, see Cockburn, The Threat, Chap. 7. 45 D. Isby, Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army (Jane’s Publishing, Inc., New York, 1981), p. 12. 46 Posture FY 1978, p. 37. 47 NIE 11-14-79, ‘‘Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO’’ (Washington, DC, January 31, 1979), p. 54. 48 NIE 4-1-78, ‘‘Warsaw Pact Concepts and Capabilities for Going to War in Europe: Implications for NATO Warning of War’’ (Washington, DC, April 10, 1978), p. 39. 49 According to the authors, a front would number between three and ﬁve armies, each with three to ﬁve tank and/or motor riﬂe (mechanized) divisions, supported by an air army of 600 aircraft. Brought up to full strength, a front would number some 400,000 men, including some 100,000 support personnel (NIE 4-1-78, p. 27). 50 NIE 4-1-78, p. 39. 51 Ibid. 52 Ibid. 53 Dufﬁeld, Power Rules, p. 206. 54 Collins, Military Balance 1960–1980, p. 311. 55 Ibid. 56 Miller, The Cold War, p. 252. 57 In S. Cordier, Calculus of Power: The Current Soviet-American Conventional Military Balance in Central Europe, 3rd edn (University Press of America, Inc., Washington, DC, 1980), p. 6. 58 Ibid., p. 11. 59 Ibid., pp. 11–12. 60 ‘‘Warsaw Pact Military Planning in Central Europe: Revelations from the East German Archives,’’ translated and annotated by Mark Kramer. http:// cwihp.si.edu/cwihplib.nsf 61 Ibid.; And also my ‘‘American Perceptions of the U.S.-Soviet Military Balance,’’ p. 13. 62 H. Faringdon, Confrontation: The Strategic Geography of NATO and the Warsaw Pact (Routledge & Kegan Paul Inc., New York, 1986), p. 269. 63 Ibid. 64 Ibid., p. 270. 65 Miller, The Cold War, p. 234. 66 Ibid., p. 232. 67 Report FY 1979, p. 237. 68 Ibid., p. 238. 69 See Faringdon, Confrontation, p. 268. As he notes, ‘‘It is as if France in the 1850s was still garrisoned by the victorious allies of 1815, and the British and Prussians preserved the alignment they had taken up at Waterloo.’’ 70 R. Fischer, Defending the Central Front: The Balance of Forces, IISS Adelphi Papers No. 127 (IISS, London, 1976), p. 23. 71 Garthoff, De´tente and Confrontation, p. 936. 72 Report FY 1980, p. 206. 73 Report FY 1981, p. 110. 74 Ibid., p. 49. 75 Dufﬁeld, Power Rules, p. 220. 76 Ibid., pp. 210–11. 77 Report FY 1980, p. 216. 78 Report FY 1982, p. 213.

Notes

229

79 NSDD 32, ‘‘U.S. National Security Strategy,’’ April 1982, Folder 8290283, Box 4, Related Documents (System II), Ronald Reagan Library. 80 Dufﬁeld, Power Rules, p. 222. 81 NATO Final Communiques 1981–1985, p. 33. Henceforth NATO Final Communiques. 82 NATO Final Communiques, p. 47. 83 Dufﬁeld, Power Rules, p. 222. 84 Ibid., p. 346. 85 Ibid., pp. 222–23. 86 NATO and the Warsaw Pact: Force Comparisons, p. 46. 87 Dufﬁeld, Power Rules, pp. 225–26. 88 Ibid. 89 NSDD 32 reiterated US support for MC 14/3, while stressing a stronger conventional capability, in order to lessen the possibility that NATO might have to resort to nuclear weapons in the event of war. 90 See Dufﬁeld, Power Rules, pp. 226–28. 91 One signiﬁcant success was the NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Program, initiated in the late 1970s. From January 1982, 18 E-3A AWACS aircraft were deployed to NATO for use in West Germany. Report FY 1983, p. III-118. 92 Report FY 1985, p. 207; Report FY 1986, p. 227. 93 Herbert, Major P. H. Deciding What Has to Be Done: General William E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations, Leavenworth Paper No. 16 (Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS. July 1988), pp. 7–8. 94 Ibid., p. 9. 95 FM 100-5, issued in an updated form in August 1982, noted that, regarding NATO Europe, ‘‘The ultimate goal is interoperability in both equipment and methods of operations, allowing multinational forces to operate smoothly and effectively together. Allied tactical publications establish a basis for a common understanding of doctrine among nations and provide NATO commanders with guiding principles.’’ Operations FM 100-5, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, DC, August 20, 1982, pp. 17–4. 96 Dufﬁeld, Power Rules, p. 221. 97 Ibid., pp. 179–80.

6

The naval balance 1 Report FY 1975, p. 117. 2 N. Polmar, The Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet, 11th edn (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 1978), p. 2. 3 For a complete list of US naval vessels decommissioned between 1970 and 1980, see N. Polmar, The Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet, 12th edn (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 1981), pp. 400–414. 4 Polmar, U.S. Fleet, 11th edn, pp. 91, 94. 5 Ibid., p. 64. 6 Ibid., p. 48. 7 Polmar, U.S. Fleet, 12th edn, pp. 121, 29. 8 For a detailed analysis of Soviet naval development since World War II, see S. Breyer and N. Polmar, Guide to the Soviet Navy, 2nd edn (Naval

230

9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39

40

Notes Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 1977), pp. 29–49: N. Polmar, Soviet Navy, pp. 67–80. Breyer and Polmar, Guide to the Soviet Navy, 2nd edn, p. 12. Ibid., p. 488; Polmar, Soviet Navy, pp. 22–26, 330–31. Polmar, Soviet Navy, p. 61. Ibid. B. W. Watson, Red Navy at Sea: Soviet Naval Operations on the High Seas, 1956–1980 (Westview Press, Inc., Boulder, CO, 1982), pp. 98–99. Ibid., p. 99. Ibid., p. 103. D. F. Winkler, Cold War at Sea: High Seas Confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2000), p. 120. Watson, Red Navy at Sea, p. 103; Winkler, Cold War at Sea, p. 120. Watson, Red Navy at Sea, pp. 103–5. Polmar, Soviet Navy, p. 19. Winkler, Cold War at Sea, p. 121. Ibid., pp. 120–21. Ibid., p. 121. Ibid., p. 122. Winkler (p. 121) states that ‘‘the Soviets had the capability to launch a coordinated salvo of forty surface-to-surface missiles’’ at the U.S. ﬂeet. In order to prevent this, US forces were ordered into close proximity to their Soviet counterparts. ‘‘American destroyers and cruisers positioned themselves within gun range of tailing Soviet missile ships, ready to ﬁre at the ﬁrst hint of a missile launch . . . Over the horizon, armed American attack aircraft constantly circled the Soviet missile ships.’’ (Ibid.) Report FY 1975, p. 117. Ibid., pp. 119, 121. Ibid., pp. 119, 127–29, 130. Ibid., pp. 119, 123. Ibid., pp. 147–49. Ibid., pp. 133–34, 135. Report FY 1976, p. III-74. Ibid., pp. III-76–77. In addition, the Trident submarine program, which was part of the Navy, consumed over $9.5 billion during this same period. Report FY 1977, p. 130. Report FY 1978, p. 190. Ibid., p. 177. NSDM 344, ‘‘Navy Shipbuilding Program,’’ January 18, 1977, Box 1, National Security Decision Memoranda and Study Memoranda, Gerald R. Ford Library. Ibid. Report FY 1978, pp. 191–92. PRM/NSC 10 Related, ‘‘PRM/NSC-10: Military Strategy and Force Posture Review, Final Report,’’ June 1977 in Presidential Directives on National Security: From Truman to Clinton (microﬁche: Cambridge, ChadwyckHealy, 1994), Record # 1919. F. H. Hartmann, Naval Renaissance: The U.S. Navy in the 1980s (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 1990), pp. 30–31. One telling difference between Options 1 and 3 was in the number of ships needed for power projection missions. Option 1 listed 10 carriers, 10 Aegis ships, 74 cruiser/ destroyer and 52 amphibious ships in its total, while Option 3 listed, respectively, 14, 28, 114 and 78 in its total.

Notes 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51

52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68

69 70

231

Report FY 1979, pp. 164–67. Ibid., pp. 193–95. Ibid., p. 169. Report FY 1980, p. 174. Polmar, U.S. Fleet, 12th edn, p. 48. Report FY 1981, p. 189. Ibid., p. 170. Ibid., p. 172. Report FY 1982, p. 171. The acquisitions and conversions were mainly of civilian ships for use as military cargo and hospital ships. This total included two British-built Lyness auxiliaries. Report FY 1982, p. 154. J. M. Collins, American and Soviet Military Trends Since the Cuban Missile Crisis (Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, 1978), pp. 260–81. These lists compare the performance of US and Soviet aircraft and missiles, as well as ship tonnage and weaponry. J. M. Collins and A. Cordesman, Imbalance of Power: Shifting U.S.-Soviet Military Strengths (Presidio Press, San Rafael, CA, 1978), p. 152. In Power at Sea II. Super-powers and Navies, IISS Adelphi Paper No. 123 (IISS, London, 1976), p. 10. E. Morris, The Russian Navy: Myth & Reality (Hamish Hamilton Ltd., London, 1977), p. 59. W. H. Bagley, Sea Power and Western Security: The Next Decade, IISS Adelphi Paper No. 139 (IISS, London, 1977), p. 16. Morris, The Russian Navy, pp. 59–60. Erickson and Feuchtwanger, Soviet Military Power, pp. 84–85. Ibid., p. 85. Polmar, U.S. Fleet, 11th edn, p. 10. Polmar, U.S. Fleet, 12th edn, p. 11. Ibid., p. 12. John Charles Daly, Moderator: Charles E. Bennett, Patrick J. Leahy, John Moore, John Warner. The U.S. Navy: What is its Future? AEI Forums (American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC, 1977) p. 19. Understanding Soviet Naval Developments (Ofﬁce of the Chief of Naval Operations, Department of the Navy, Washington, DC, April 1975), p. 9. Understanding Soviet Naval Developments 3rd edn (Ofﬁce of the Chief of Naval Operations, Department of the Navy, Washington, DC, January 1978), pp. 10–11. DDB-1200-159-80, ‘‘Defense Intelligence Report: Soviet Naval Indian Ocean Operations,’’ February 1980, p. 10. IISS Strategic Survey 1979 (IISS, London, 1980), p. 23. According to Watson, the Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron in 1980 consisted of 20–22 ships, of which the largest number—10 ships—were auxiliaries. (p. 148.) The Northern Fleet deployed over 70 major warships and 135 attack submarines; the Baltic Fleet 46 warships and 29 submarines; the Paciﬁc Fleet some 83 warships and 80 attack submarines; the Black Sea Fleet 32 warships and 15 attack submarines (as of January 1980.) (listed in Collins, Military Balance 1960–1980, p. 250.) Collins, Military Balance 1960–1980, pp. 242–43. According to Collins, Military Balance 1960–1980, p. 247, the US Atlantic Fleet (Second and Sixth Fleets) consisted of 5 carrier task forces and 42 attack submarines, while the Paciﬁc Fleet (Third and Seventh Fleets) con-

232

71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90

91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99

100

Notes sisted of 5 carrier task forces and 35 attack submarines. Two additional carrier task forces were deployed in the Indian Ocean (as of January 1980.) Each carrier task force numbered between 8and 10 ships of all types. F. Barnaby, ‘‘Maneuvers in the Indian Ocean,’’ The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May 1980, p. 8. Breyer and Polmar, Guide to the Soviet Navy, p. 49. See Report FY 1977, p. 95. This was also the level set in Option 3 of Sea Plan 2000. Report FY 1983, p. II-12. Ibid., p. III-20. Ibid., p. III-36. Ibid., p. III-29. Report FY 1984, p. 140. Report FY 1985, p. 136. Report FY 1986, p. 155. This number was projected to grow to 555 by the end of FY 1986. N. Polmar, The Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet, 13th edn (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 1984), p. 26. Ibid. Ibid., p. 28. Ibid., p. 26. J. F. Lehman, Jr, Command of the Seas (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 1988), p. 141. Ibid., pp. 121–38. Ibid., p. 137. NSDD 32. Ibid. See esp. Garthoff, The Great Transition, pp. 37–38; J. A. Nathan, ‘‘Return of the Great White Fleet,’’ The Nation, March 5, 1983, p. 270; R. W. Komer, ‘‘Maritime Strategy Versus Coalition Defense,’’ Foreign Affairs, Vol. 60, No. 5, (Summer 1982), p. 1128. Report FY 1983, pp. I-15–16. NIE 11-15-82/D, ‘‘Soviet Naval Strategy and Programs Through the 1990s,’’ March 1983, p. 5. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid, p. 7. Polmar, Soviet Navy, p. 2. Ibid., p. 3. Ibid. IISS Military Balance 1982–1983 (IISS, London, 1982), p. 15; Military Balance 1983–1984 (IISS, London, 1983), p. 16; Military Balance 1984–1985 (IISS, London, 1984), p. 19; Military Balance 1985–1986, p. 24. There are some variations on numbers in the IISS analyses. In the 1985–1986 edition, for example, the authors note that 10 Yankee I-class ballistic missile submarines were being converted for use as attack subs. Accordingly, the authors list 203 for total attack submarines, and note, in parentheses, the 213 total if these vessels were included in that count. This also reﬂects in the grand total of all Soviet submarines for that year (371–81), which includes command, rescue, and research subs. IISS Military Balance 1982–1983, p. 7; 1983–1984, p. 7; 1984–1985, p. 7; 1985–1986, p. 9. As with the Soviet ﬁgures, numbers of major surface warships, in terms of deﬁnitions, ﬂuctuated. In the 1983–1984 issue, the authors, breaking with earlier practice, placed aircraft carriers (of which

Notes

101 102 103

104 105 106 107

108

109

110 111 112 113

233

there were 14) in a separate category from major surface warships. They returned carriers to this category the following year. Also, in the 1985–1986 issue, the US Navy’s training carrier was not included in the total of major combat ships, as it had been in earlier issues. Polmar, Soviet Navy, p. 126. Miller, The Cold War, p. 431. Each carrier had 2 ﬁghter and 2 light attack squadrons. Polmar, Soviet Navy, p. 126. According to Andrew Cockburn (p. 408), the Soviet Yak-36 Forger VTOL (Vertical Take-Off and Landing) aircraft had a total ﬂight time of just 16 minutes, due to the amount of fuel it consumed in getting airborne. Polmar, Soviet Navy, p. 3. Miller, The Cold War, pp. 429–30. As Cockburn notes, ‘‘when the Soviet Alpha class submarine was undergoing sea trials in the Norwegian Sea in the spring of 1980, the US Navy was able to hear it from Bermuda’’ (p. 426.) Allen, War Games, p. 288; N. Polmar, E. Wertheim, A. Bahjat and B. Watson. Chronology of the Cold War at Sea, 1945–1991 (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 1998), pp. 189–90. The Norwegian Sea phase is particularly illuminating. A total of 83 ships—British, Canadian and Norwegian, led by the Eisenhower battle group—sailed undetected through the Greenland–Iceland–UK Gap. In an even more daring move, a cruiser and three other ships were detached from the task force and managed to round the North Cape and into the Barents Sea, where they operated for nine days near important Soviet military installations on the Kola Peninsula. See B. B. Fishcer, A Cold War Conundrum (Center for the Study of Intelligence, Washington, DC, 1997), pp. 5–6. http://www.cia.gov/csi/monograph/ coldwar/source.htm Fischer, A Cold War Conundrum, p. 6. Earlier in 1983, the carrier Carl Vinson led a battle group undetected into the Bering Sea for 12 days, and the battleship New Jersey entered the Sea of Okhotsk (Hartmann, Naval Renaissance, pp. 246–47.) Fischer, A Cold War Conundrum, p. 5. As the author puts it, ‘‘Fleet exercises conducted in 1981 and 1983 near the far northern and far eastern regions of the Soviet Union demonstrated US ability to deploy aircraft-carrier battle groups close to sensitive military and industrial sites, apparently without being detected or challenged early on.’’ (Ibid.) Polmar, Soviet Navy, p. 61. Ibid., p. 17; M. Kidron and D. Smith, The War Atlas: Armed Conﬂict-Armed Peace (Simon & Schuster, New York, 1983), Map 7. Cockburn, The Threat, pp. 412–13. Among the largest naval maneuvers undertaken during this time came with Ocean Venture ’82, carried out in June, 1982. Some 60 warships, including the carriers Forrestal and Independence, took part in the three-week exercise, which featured an amphibious landing by 2,000 marines in Puerto Rico. It showed that the US Navy was capable of numerous operations, including a possible blockade of Cuba to halt that nation’s support for guerrillas in El Salvador. Indeed, Secretary Lehman had declared that the US Navy was capable of establishing a blockade ‘‘anywhere in the Caribbean.’’ M. T. Klare, ‘‘Testing Out Haig’s New War Policy,’’ The Nation, June 19, 1982, front cover, pp. 750–51; ‘‘Marines Hit Island Beach in Cuba Signal,’’ Washington Post, May 9, 1982, p. A3.

234

Notes

7 Forces for rapid deployment 1 R. W. Tucker, ‘‘Further Reﬂections on Oil & Force,’’ Commentary, March 1975, p. 47. It is important to note that Ford based his statement on a ‘‘hypothetical question’’ regarding an embargo. 2 ‘‘The Oil Crisis: Is there a Military Option?’’ Defense Monitor, Vol. VIII, No. 11 (December 1979), p. 2. 3 R. W. Tucker, ‘‘Oil: The Issue of American Intervention,’’ Commentary, January 1975, p. 24. 4 U.S. Congress, Committee on International Relations, Special Subcommittee on Investigations: Oil Fields as Military Objectives: A Feasibility Study, Report prepared by the Congressional Research Service, 94th Congress, 1st Session, Parts I and II (USGPO, Washington, D. C. August 21, 1975), pp. 8–9. Henceforth Oil Fields. 5 Oil Fields, p. 5. This would also directly affect national defense. As the report noted, ‘‘U.S. Armed Forces . . . already have severely curtailed maneuvers, other training exercises, ﬂight schedules, and ship steaming time for Reserves as well as active elements. Additional restrictions would affect operational readiness adversely.’’ (Ibid.) 6 Oil Fields, p. 6. The Arab OPEC members supplied 12.3 percent of this total, Iran 7.7 percent. 7 Tucker notes that the GNP growth rate for OECD countries fell from 6.3 percent in 1973 to 0.2 percent in 1974. ‘‘Further Reﬂections on Oil & Force,’’ p. 48. 8 PRM 10. 9 PRM 10 Related. For the Middle East contingency the authors listed three carrier task groups, an MAF, three Army Divisions, and 12 Air Force ﬁghter squadrons. For sub-Saharan Africa, one or two carrier task groups, an MAB, an Army division and two Air Force ﬁghter squadrons. A Marine Amphibious Force consisted of a Marine division, a Marine Air Wing, and a Force Service Support Group for logistical backup. Each MAF consisted of three MABs. The Marine Corps in the 1980s: Prestocking Proposals, the Rapid Deployment Force, and Other Issues, Congress of the United States: Congressional Budget Ofﬁce (USGPO, Washington, DC, May 1980), p. 12. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid. 13 PRM/NSC 10 Related, ‘‘PRM-10 Force Posture Study.’’ The emphasis on a possible US–Soviet confrontation in the Middle East was made in an NSC memorandum issued on July 8, 1977. It warned that the U.S. is more likely to see a need to employ forces outside the NATO/[Warsaw] Pact context than in it. The most obvious possibility is the Middle East: U.S. interests there continue to grow as Western access to oil becomes more important; the possibility of conﬂict, potentially involving the USSR, remains higher there than in other parts of the world.

14 15 16 17

O. Njolstad, ‘‘Shifting Priorities: The Persian Gulf in US Strategic Planning in the Carter Years,’’ Cold War History, Vol. 4, No. 3, April 2004, p. 26. Ibid. PD 18. Garthoff, De´tente and Confrontation, p. 1085. M. T. Klare, Beyond the ‘‘Vietnam Syndrome’’: U.S. Interventionism in the 1980s (Institute for Policy Studies, Washington, DC, 1981), pp. 69–70.

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235

18 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 177. In September 1977, Secretary Brown emphasized the need ‘‘to maintain a defense posture that permits us to respond effectively and simultaneously to a relatively minor as well as to a major military contingency.’’ This would include ‘‘a limited number of relatively light land combat forces . . . moderate naval and tactical air forces; and strategic mobility forces with the range and payload to minimize our dependence on overseas staging and logistical support bases.’’ D. A. Quinlan, The Role of the Marine Corps in Rapid Deployment Forces (National Defense University Press, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC, 1983), p. 2. 19 As General Paul X. Kelley, the ﬁrst commander of what would become the Rapid Deployment Force, testiﬁed before the House Budget Committee in October 1980, the Pentagon began planning for such a force in 1977. With the Carter Administration’s emphasis on NATO, however, such plans were ‘‘placed on the back burner.’’ Military Readiness and the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF): Hearings Before the Committee on the Budget, House of Representatives, 96th Congress, 2nd Session (USGPO, Washington, DC, September 30–October 1, 1980), p. 45. Henceforth Hearings RDJTF. 20 Luttwak, On the Meaning of Victory, p. 269; IISS Strategic Survey 1977 (IISS, London 1978), pp. 21–26; IISS Strategic Survey 1978 (IISS, London 1979), pp. 94–98; Westad, The Fall of De´tente, p. 20. 21 Special Coordination Committee, ‘‘The Horn of Africa,’’ February 22, 1978, pp. 9–10. USSR-US Conference, 3–95 Brieﬁng Book (I), Box 117, Vertical File, Jimmy Carter Library. 22 Ibid., pp. 10–11. Brzezinski, however, saw a carrier deployment as providing ‘‘military support if the Iranians or other outsiders provide air cover for Somalia. We should not engage the Ethiopians or Cubans directly.’’ JCS Chairman General Jones opined that, due to Ethiopian momentum to cross the border, ‘‘once a task force is sent in, there will be much harder decisions afterward’’ (p. 11) 23 PD 32, ‘‘Horn of Africa,’’ February 24, 1978. http://www.jimmycarterlibrary. gov/ documents/pddirectives/pd32.pdf 24 C. Coker, NATO, The Warsaw Pact and Africa (St. Martin’s Press, Inc., New York, 1985), p. 109. This task force included seven US destroyers, but not a carrier. 25 James Schlesinger, Energy Secretary during the Carter years, notes that Carter saw Soviet actions in the Horn of Africa as detrimental to US interests and wanted to give greater support to Somalia. However, due to Somali aggression in the conﬂict, Carter felt that such support would be unacceptable. Interview with James Schlesinger, pp. 13–15. 26 Strong divisions existed in the Carter Administration over such issues. Brzezinski sums this up well. For the more dovish members of the Administration ‘‘The Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf region was to be addressed through arms control efforts with the Soviets. The other side, on which I found myself, pointed to the momentum and character of Soviet military programs, the vulnerability of the oil-rich region around the Persian Gulf, and the growing Soviet projection of power.’’ (pp. 177–78) 27 R. P. Haffa, Jr, The Half-War: Planning U. S. Rapid Deployment Forces to Meet a Limited Contingency, 1960–1983 (Westview Press, Inc., Boulder, CO, 1984), p. 115. 28 Address by the President (Carter) at the US Naval Academy’s Commencement Exercises, Annapolis, June 7, 1978 (Excerpt), ‘‘Confrontation or Cooperation with the Soviet Union,’’ USSR-US Conference 3/95: Brieﬁng Book (II), Box 117, Vertical File, Jimmy Carter Library.

236

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29 D P. Jones, ed., U.S. Defense Policy: Weapons, Strategy and Commitments, 2nd edn (Congressional Quarterly, Inc., Washington, DC, 1980), p. 75, 78; A. Hughey, ‘‘The Age of Aircraft Carrier Diplomacy,’’ Forbes, July 21, 1980, p. 57. 30 F. Halliday, Threat from the East? Soviet Policy from Afghanistan and Iran to the Horn of Africa (Penguin Books, Ltd., Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1982), p. 25. In a memorandum prepared for President Carter on December 2, 1978, Brzezinski sounded an even more alarmist tone. ‘‘There is no question in my mind that we are confronting the beginning of a major crisis, in some ways similar to the one in Europe in the late [19]40’s . . . the West as a whole may be faced with a challenge of historic proportions.’’ Njolstad, ‘‘Shifting Priorities,’’ pp. 23–24. 31 Memo, Zbigniew Brzezinski to Secretary of State et al., ‘‘The U.S. Response to Afghanistan,’’ February 12, 1980, National Security Affairs, Box 1, Country File, Afghanistan 2/80, Jimmy Carter Library. 32 Ibid. 33 M. A. Palmer, Guardians of the Gulf: A History of America’s Expanding Role in the Persian Gulf, 1833–1992 (The Free Press, New York, 1992), pp. 102–3. 34 Ibid., p. 103. 35 Klare, Beyond the ‘‘Vietnam Syndrome,’’ p. 71. 36 Haffa, The Half-War, pp. 61–62. 37 M. O. Johnson, Military Force and American Policy in Southwest Asia, 1979– 1982: A Study of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Virginia, May 1982, p. 77. 38 According to his memoirs, Brzezinski played a considerable role in spurring the efforts of 1979 toward establishment of the RDF. Dissatisﬁed with the Pentagon’s ‘‘slow reaction,’’ he pressured Secretary Brown for progress reports on this issue. He notes that, in a discussion with Brown, the idea of calling this force the Rapid Deployment Force was born (p. 456). As Njolstad (p. 27) notes, in July 1977 Brzezinski recommended that the United States should increase its capability to intervene militarily in the Persian Gulf region and other non-European theatres on a large scale and at fairly short notice. More speciﬁcally, he suggested the creation of ‘‘a highly responsive, global strike force’’-what would soon be referred to as the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF). 39 Haffa, The Half-War, pp. 93–103, 130. 40 C. Campbell, Weapons of War, p. 241. 41 Report FY 1982, p. 189. This role was actually assigned in August 1980 (Posture FY 1982, p. 55.) 42 Posture FY 1981, p. iv. In day-to-day operations, the RDJTF would be part of the Readiness Command, headed by the Army, while in operational situations it would come under the direct control of the JCS. Polmar, U.S. Fleet, 13th edn, p. 22. 43 Haffa, The Half-War, p. 130. As General Kelley noted in October 1980, ‘‘to the best of my knowledge, it is the ﬁrst time in the history of our country that we have amalgamated the combat capabilities of all four services under one headquarters in peacetime.’’ Hearings RDJTF, p. 44. 44 Report FY 1981, p. 9. 45 Johnson, Military Force, pp. 138–39; Klare, Beyond the ‘‘Vietnam Syndrome,’’ p. 73. It is interesting to note that this force structure was nearly identical to that listed in the AIMS for a Middle East contingency in PRM 10.

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46 Klare, Beyond the ‘‘Vietnam Syndrome,’’ p. 76. Until 1980, the President was authorized by law to call up 50,000 reserve personnel without Congressional approval. In that year, due to the need for signiﬁcant additional forces to support the RDJTF, this level was raised to 100,000. Department of Defense Appropriations for 1983: Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 97th Congress, 2nd Session, Part 6 (USGPO, Washington, DC, May 25, 1982), p. 73. Henceforth Hearings 1983. 47 A Discussion of the Rapid Deployment Force with Lieutenant General P.X. Kelley, American Enterprise Institute (AEI) Special Analyses (American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC, February 5, 1980), p. 4. 48 Ibid. As Paul Davis, Director of the RAND Corporation’s Strategic Assessment Center, noted ‘‘A given RDJTF might be battalion-sized, or might instead consist of a number of Army and Marine divisions as well as supporting air and naval forces.’’ P. K. Davis, Observations on the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force: Origins, Direction, and Mission, P-6751 (RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, June 1982), p. 3. 49 Report FY 1982, p. 199. 50 Ibid., p. 201–2. 51 Ibid., pp. 205–6. 52 IISS Strategic Survey 1980–1981 (IISS, London, 1981), p. 18; ‘‘Digging in at Diego Garcia,’’ Time, July 14, 1980, p. 29. 53 D. Eshel, The U.S. Rapid Deployment Forces (Arco Publishing, Inc., New York, 1985), p. 169; Polmar, U.S. Fleet, 13th edn, p. 23; J. Record, The Rapid Deployment Force and U.S. Military Intervention in the Persian Gulf (Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc., Washington, DC, 1981), p. 49. 54 Record, The Rapid Deployment Force, p. vii. 55 Ibid. Record also cited an issue that had been at the center of the RDF’s creation; many units had a dual role in US military plans. According to Record, all 4 Army divisions and a brigade, together with the 12 Air Force tactical ﬁghter squadrons, had a NATO role (p. 54). 56 Record, The Rapid Deployment Force, pp. vii–viii. 57 Ibid., p. vii. 58 Coker, US Military Power, pp. 32–33. Coker points out that ‘‘Simply to deploy the 15,700 strong 82nd Airborne Division in the Gulf’’ would require ‘‘11,000 more support personnel.’’ 59 R. Halloran, ‘‘Gaps in Training and Equipment Hinder Rapid Deployment Force,’’ The New York Times, September 26, 1980, p. A24. 60 G. C. Wilson, ‘‘Outlook Grim in a War for Mideast Oil,’’ Washington Post, October 28, 1980, pp. A1, A7. The units listed were the most that could be deployed in a 21-day period. General Warner himself stated that deployment of most RDF forces in a timely manner would be unlikely before 1985, due to a lack of airlift and sealift assets. 61 R. Burt, ‘‘Study Says a Soviet Move in Iran Might Require U.S. Atom Arms,’’ The New York Times, February 2, 1980, p. A1. See also Halloran, ‘‘Gaps in Training,’’ p. A24. 62 J. Anderson, ‘‘Political Problems for the RDF,’’ Washington Post, January 3, 1981, p. C9. The idea of using nuclear forces in support of conventional forces had become part of US strategy. In September 1980, Secretary of State Muskie stated ‘‘I am conﬁdent that the countervailing strategy . . . establishes a ﬁrmer basis for our diplomacy with the Soviets. It underlines our determination to respond to any challenges to our vital interests.’’ ‘‘Secretary Muskie: U.S. Nuclear Strategy (September 16, 1980),’’ Presidential Directive-59, 9/80, Box 106, Counsel: Cutler, Jimmy Carter Library.

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63 K. N. Waltz, ‘‘A Strategy for the Rapid Deployment Force,’’ International Security, Vol. 5, No. 4, (Spring 1981), pp. 63, 68–69. Waltz (p. 67) likened such a force to the 4,500-man US garrison in West Berlin, who ‘‘are there for the sake of deterrence.’’ 64 Hearings RDJTF, p. 58. 65 According to General Kelley, ‘‘My mission includes any contingency outside of NATO. We are focused primarily for the near term on Southwest Asia . . . We are a force to contend with anything up to and including the Soviet Union outside of NATO’’ (My italics). Hearings RDJTF, p. 52. Haffa (p. 130) notes that the RDJTF’s primary focus was on Southwest Asia. 66 Johnson, Military Force, pp. 16–17. 67 Memo, Paul B. Henze to Zbigniew Brzezinski, ‘‘Iran and the Soviets,’’ April 11, 1980, ‘‘4/80,’’ Box 4, Horn Special (27), Jimmy Carter Library. 68 Ibid. 69 R. W. Tucker, ‘‘American Power & the Persian Gulf,’’ Commentary, November 1980, p. 29. 70 Melvyn Lefﬂer, for example, saw Brzezinski as being the main architect of this overall approach: Brzezinski’s inclination to challenge Soviet power . . . came to the forefront of administration concerns. Carter’s national security adviser wanted to use the crisis atmosphere generated by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to implement earlier plans for a new American–led security framework and military presence in the Persian Gulf-Middle East region. Brzezinski also sought to redeﬁne the nation’s deterrence and nuclear war strategies.

71 72 73 74 75

76

77 78 79 80

‘‘From the Truman Doctrine to the Carter Doctrine: Lessons and Dilemmas of the Cold War,’’ Diplomatic History, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Fall 1983), p. 255. Waltz, ‘‘A Strategy for the Rapid Deployment Force,’’ p. 50. PD 62, ‘‘Modiﬁcations in U.S. National Strategy,’’ January 15, 1981. http:// www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/pddirectives/pd62.pdf PD 63, ‘‘Persian Gulf Security Framework,’’ January 15, 1981. http:// www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/pddirectives/pd63.pdf NSDD 32. This view was held by JCS Chairman General Jones. In a May 1981 interview, Jones alluded to the idea of widening a conﬂict—such as a Soviet intervention in the Gulf—by moves elsewhere. Although for security reasons not overly speciﬁc, Jones stated that an effort to ‘‘clean out the Soviet ﬂeet in the Indian Ocean’’ was a possible response. E. Ulsamer, ‘‘The Pentagon Is Gearing Up for the ‘80s,’’ Air Force Magazine, May, 1981, p. 51. NSDD 32. The Directive saw a superpower clash in the region as the prelude to a wider conﬂict. ‘‘It is questionable whether either superpower could restrict to one theater a war which would impact critically on the economies of the US, Western Europe, and Japan.’’ Ibid. As Johnson (pp. 54–55) noted, ‘‘Reagan seems to have recognized that the Soviets might be equally tempted to take advantage of internal stability or of intraregional conﬂicts.’’ R. Halloran, ‘‘Long Nuclear War,’’, p. A12; ‘‘U.S. Arms Plan Bared,’’ p. 8. Hearings 1983, p. 1. The term ‘‘Southwest Asia’’ generally covers Asia from the Suez Canal to Pakistan. However, Sudan and the Horn of Africa were included in US planning for the RDJTF. Hearings 1983, p. 70.

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81 J. Digby, The Emerging American Strategy: Application to Southwest Asia, N-1700-FF (Santa Monica, CA, May 1981), p. vii. 82 ‘‘Defense Department Statement on the Mission of the Rapid Deployment Task Force,’’ International Communication Agency, U.S. Embassy, London, March 16, 1982, p. 5. 83 IISS Strategic Survey 1980–1981, p. 18. 84 United States Military Posture for FY 1983 (Washington, DC, 1982), p. 102. For a in-depth discussion of the exercise, particularly in Egypt, see M. J. H. Taylor, ed., Jane’s 1982–83 Aviation Review (London, 1982), pp. 51–58. 85 Coker, US Military Power, p. 32. In the earlier Bright Star exercise, it took six days for a 900-man infantry battalion to be deployed to Egypt. E. O’Ballance, ‘‘The US Rapid Deployment Force,’’ Foreign Affairs Research Institute, London, October 1981, p. 3. 86 Report FY 1983, p. III-103. Several top administration ofﬁcials emphasized this focus. Weinberger and Navy Secretary Lehman stated in 1981 that the Persian Gulf was the RDJTF’s area of operations, and that Soviet forces were the main threat to be countered. General Robert C. Kingston, RDJTF commander, declared his mission to be defense of Persian Gulf oil from both Soviet and Soviet proxy forces. Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, 1981, motion picture (US Information Agency, 1982), National Archives (II) at College Park, MD, Henceforth RDJTF, 1981. 87 Report FY 1983, p. III-105. 88 Report FY 1983, p. III-103. This corresponded to the forces listed for the RDJTF in the Defense Guidance, issued the same year. Halloran, ‘‘Long Nuclear War,’’ p. A12. 89 Report FY 1983, p. III-105. 90 As General Kingston declared in 1981, ‘‘When you look at the components that I have . . . You’re talking about the best front-line troops that the United States has, in any service.’’ This meant that the RDJTF could ‘‘go in harm’s way against Soviet forces, in strength and with signiﬁcant capability.’’ RDJTF, 1981. 91 In order to form CENTCOM, the European and Paciﬁc commands had their geographic boundaries revised, corresponding to the area of responsibility for the RDJTF. United States Central Command, 1983, motion picture (US Information Agency, 1983), National Archives (II) at College Park, MD. Henceforth CENTCOM, 1983. 92 Eshel, The U.S. Rapid Deployment Forces, p. 202. 93 IISS Strategic Survey 1982–1983, p. 136. Although the AWACs were under Saudi control, US forces maintained access to information provided by these aircraft. 94 Polmar, U.S. Fleet, 13th edn, p. 21. 95 R. Halloran, ‘‘Poised for the Persian Gulf,’’ The New York Times Magazine, April 1, 1984, p. 61. 96 Freedman, Atlas of Global Strategy, p. 67. 97 Polmar, U.S. Fleet, 13th edn, p. 23 98 IISS Strategic Survey 1982–1983, p. 135. 99 These were the fastest vessels to be built for the US merchant service, capable of 33 knots (Polmar, U.S. Fleet, 13th edn, p. 270). 100 IISS Strategic Survey 1982–1983, p. 136. 101 Ibid. 102 NSDD 75, ‘‘U.S. Relations with the USSR,’’ January 17, 1983, Folder ‘‘NSDDs 71-80,’’ Box 1, National Security Decision Directives 1-250, Ronald Reagan Library. 103 Ibid.

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104 NSDD 99, ‘‘United States Security Strategy for the Near East and South Asia,’’ July 12, 1983, Folder ‘‘NSDDs 91-100,’’ Box 1, National Security Decision Directives 1-250, Ronald Reagan Library. 105 Campbell, Weapons of War, p. 247. In discussing the use of nuclear weapons to defend the Gulf, both the Carter and Reagan Administrations were drawing on the growing set of options presented by evolving nuclear strategies. Carter’s PD 59 and Reagan’s NSDD 13 provided a role for the US strategic forces in such contingencies. See Freedman, Evolution, esp. Chaps 25–26. 106 IISS Strategic Survey 1982–1983, p. 137. 107 NSDD 32, for example, states bluntly: ‘‘For at least the next several years, we are unlikely to succeed in achieving our objectives against a determined Soviet attack in Southwest Asia.’’ The Defense Guidance issued in 1983 declared ‘‘We must acquire a reasonable assurance of achieving United States war-ﬁghting objectives in Southwest Asia by the end of the decade.’’ Halloran, ‘‘Poised for the Persian Gulf,’’ p. 39. 108 Campbell, Weapons of War, p. 250. It should be noted that Red Army support troops were assigned to these divisions. 109 Each division had 107 armored ﬁghting vehicles, 30 self-propelled assault guns, 18 122-mm howitzers, 18 multiple-rocket launchers and 36 mobile anti-aircraft guns.(U. Ra’anan, R. L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr and G. Kemp, Projection of Power: Perspectives, Perceptions and Problems (Archon Books, Hamden, CT, 1982), p. 144.) 110 Campbell, Weapons of War, p. 250. 111 Ibid., p. 249; Klare, Beyond the ‘‘Vietnam Syndrome,’’ p. 124. The Soviets also maintained special operation brigades, comparable to US Army Rangers, and special forces, akin to US Special Forces, designed for long-range penetration operations (Campbell, p. 250.) 112 N. Polmar, Soviet Navy, p. 31. 113 Klare, Beyond the ‘‘Vietnam Syndrome,’’ p. 123. 114 Polmar, Soviet Navy, p. 3. 115 Ibid., p. 412. 116 Kidron and Smith, The War Atlas, Map 19. 117 Ra’anan et al., Projection of Power, p. 146. 118 Klare (p. 123) notes that these forces had only 4–5 days of supplies. 119 Collins, 1960–1980, pp. 385–86. 120 Klare, Beyond the ‘‘Vietnam Syndrome,’’ p. 128. US amphibious ships, numbering 60, could lift 1.15 MAFs, considerably more than the Soviet ﬂeet could. M. L. Bartlett, Assault from the Sea: Essays on the History of Amphibious Warfare (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 1983), p. 407. 121 Klare, Beyond the ‘‘Vietnam Syndrome,’’ p. 128. Such ﬁgures are somewhat deceptive. In Southwest Asia, for example, the USSR would have a large force of heavy divisions on the scene to support such light forces, while US forces would have had to arrive over several weeks. 122 By 1981, France maintained 4,500 troops in Djibouti, on the Horn of Africa, and another 4,000 on Reunion Island in the Indian Ocean (Klare, p. 131.) 123 See esp. W. S. Thompson, Power Projection: A Net Assessment of U.S. and Soviet Capabilities (National Strategy Information Center, Inc. New York, 1978), pp. 33–38 and S. S. Cordier, U.S. Military Power and Rapid Deployment Requirements in the 1980s (Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1983), Chap. III for an analysis of Soviet actions during this time. 124 According to Lawrence Freedman Atlas of Global Strategy, by 1985 the Soviet Union had just 12 naval anchorages outside of the Warsaw Pact area

Notes

125

126 127

128

129

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(pp. 18–19.) By contrast, the United States (excluding air bases in NATO Europe and Japan) at this time had 21 forward air bases, 18 forward naval bases, and 17 naval anchorages (pp. 22–23.) Moreover, the US facilities were generally well distributed across the globe, whereas their Soviet counterparts were (apart from along the Indian Ocean littoral) spread very thin. Zbigniew Brzezinski outlined this approach in December 1980. ‘‘By moving as we have to contain a possible Soviet push into Southwest Asia, we also position ourselves to work for a more constructive and positive relationship with the Soviet Union . . . our ability to deter Soviet pressure . . . provides us . . . with the foundation for a stable dialogue.’’ ‘‘Building a Security Framework in the Persian Gulf,’’ International Communication Agency, U.S. Embassy, London, December 8, 1980, pp. 5–6. Report FY 1982, p. vii. Report FY 1983, p. II-19. As Weinberger stated in 1983, ‘‘The main threat to the Central Region [CENTCOM’s area of responsibility] is the same threat we face all over the world. It is the threat of increased Soviet aggression and aggressiveness and increased Soviet military activity.’’ CENTCOM, 1983. However, their intent was to make it clear to the Soviet Union, as well as Cuba, that such action could take place. Ocean Venture ’82, a three-week exercise held in May 1982, involved some 45,000 US personnel, 60 warships, 360 combat and 132 transport aircraft. It covered parts of Florida, Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands, and the simulated enemy, known as ‘‘Brown,’’ was intended to be Cuba. As the Washington Post noted, ‘‘U.S. ofﬁcials say the three-week . . . operation is designed to ‘send a signal’ that Washington is prepared to protect its Caribbean interests.’’ As Klare noted, ‘‘[I]t can be seen as a signiﬁcant military operation in its own right—as a warm-up for the forces and command centers that would be employed in any actual attacks.’’ Klare, ‘‘Testing Out Haig’s New War Policy,’’; ‘‘Marines Hit Island Beach in Cuba Signal,’’. Garthoff (The Great Transition, pp. 720–21), notes that the Soviet Union refused to send MiG-21 ﬁghters to Nicaragua, as a result of American threats to destroy such aircraft, in 1983. The following year, Moscow refused to deploy a naval force off Nicaragua, as Cuba requested. Shortly after Reagan took ofﬁce, a Cuban delegation, headed by Raul Castro, Fidel’s brother and defense minister, conveyed Cuban alarm over the possibility of a US attack. In reply, Leonid Brezhnev reportedly said ‘‘We cannot ﬁght in Cuba because it is 11,000 kilometers away. If we go there, we’ll get our heads smashed’’ (p. 684). That, as much as anything else, is an example of the balance of power projection capability at this time.

8 The expenditure debate 1 Collins and Cordesman, Imbalance of Power, p. 9. The authors of a RAND Corporation study of the superpowers’ military expenditures elaborated on this theme: Military Expenditure (ME) cannot be an indicator of national security or even of military security, because these concepts incorporate many other factors besides the development, preparation or use of military forces . . . it is inputs to force potential, not output, that ME actually measures— the potential to produce military goods and services. (My italics)

242

2 3

4 5 6 7 8 9 10

11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

19 20 21 22 23

24 25

Notes A. J. Alexander, A. S. Becker, W. E. Hoehn, Jr, The Signiﬁcance of Divergent U. S.-USSR Military Expenditure, N-100-AF. (RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, February 1979), p. v. U. S. Defense Perspectives Fiscal Year 1978 (USGPO, Washington, DC, January 1977), pp. 8, 33. U.S. Defense Perspectives, p. 8. All ﬁgures are in FY 1978 dollars. A Brookings Institution study found that, in constant 1978 dollars, the US defense budget, according to Ford Administration plans, would grow to $129.2 billion in outlays for FY 1982. This would put it some $6 billion above the FY 1964 budget, the ﬁrst post-Vietnam budget to exceed that level. B. M. Blechman, et al., The Soviet Military Buildup and U.S. Defense Spending (The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 1977), p. 2. Collins and Cordesman, Imbalance of Power, p. 10. Ibid. Cahn, Killing De´tente, p. 133. J. Prados, The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence Analysis and Russian Military Strength (The Dial Press, New York, 1982), p. 246. Cahn, Killing De´tente, p. 133. Cockburn, The Threat, pp. 56, 126. In his FY 1975 report, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, in his request for supplemental funding for the FY 1974 budget, listed military pay and cost of living increases (including military retired pay) to account for just over $3.4 billion, out of a total request of more than $6.2 billion. Report FY 1975, p. 17. Collins, American and Soviet Military Trends, p. 46. This category included recruiting and human relations. Cahn, Killing De´tente, p. 133. Prados, The Soviet Estimate, p. 246. Cahn, Killing De´tente, p. 134. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., pp. 133–34; Prados, The Soviet Estimate, p. 247. N. E. Firth and J. H. Noren, Soviet Defense Spending: A History of CIA Estimates, 1950–1990 (Texas A & M University Press, College Station, TX, 1998), pp. 61–64. In mid-1967, the USSR had adjusted industrial prices, which of course included military equipment. The CIA eventually corrected its estimates based on this development. (p. 64) Cahn, Killing De´tente, p. 135. Prados, Op cit. As CIA analyst Hans Heymann noted, the defector who provided this document ‘‘was a so-so source; the more we delved, the less sure we were’’ (Cahn, p. 135.) Prados, Op cit. SR 76-10121U, ‘‘Estimated Soviet Defense Spending in Rubles, 1970–75,’’ May 1976, p. 1. SR 76-10121U, p. 2. Cahn, Op cit. According to Prados (pp. 247–48), this view was expressed by Andrew Marshall, head of the Net Assessment Group at the Pentagon. Whereas the Soviet economy was only 47 percent as large as the US economy in 1964, it had risen to just 52 percent by 1980, the year when Nikita Khruschev predicted it would equal that of the United States. In W. Schneider, Jr and Francis P. Hoeber, Arms, Men, and Military Budgets: Issues for Fiscal Year 1977 (Crane, Russak & Co., Inc., New York, 1976), p. 255. Cahn, Killing De´tente, pp. 135–36. Eight days earlier, Schlesinger had raised the same concerns with President Ford. With inﬂation running high,

Notes

26 27 28 29 30 31

32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41

42

43 44 45 46 47 48

49 50

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Schlesinger noted that ‘‘The [ﬁve-year defense] program will shrink about 7% in real terms from last year.’’ To preserve it, a budget of some $100 billion, rather than the $122 billion requested by the military, was seen as realistic by Schlesinger. Memorandum of Conversation, President Ford et al., ‘‘Defense Budget,’’ October 15, 1975, Box 16, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Gerald R. Ford Library. Cahn, Killing De´tente, p. 136. Prados, The Soviet Estimate, p. 249. Ibid. Cahn, Killing De´tente, pp. 100–101; Prados, The Soviet Estimate, p. 249. Cahn, Killing De´tente, p. 103; Prados, The Soviet Estimate, p. 249. Cahn (p. 104) notes that PFIAB’s members—who included Edward Teller, Claire Boothe Luce, Vice President Nelson Rockefeller, and George ´tente, viewed the Soviet Union as Shultz—‘‘were openly skeptical about de an expansionist totalitarian state that posed a great threat to world peace and freedom, and believed that the survival of free institutions around the world depended on a resurgence of American military power.’’ Prados, Op cit. Cahn, Killing De´tente, pp. 128–29. Ibid., pp. 129–32. Prados, The Soviet Estimate, p. 249. Ibid., p. 250. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., pp. 252–53. Ibid., p. 253. D. Binder, ‘‘New C.I.A. Estimate Finds Soviet Seeks Superiority in Arms,’’ New York Times, December 26, 1976, pp. A1, A14. A CIA analyst quoted in the article called the exercise ‘‘a somewhat unfair setup,’’ while another stated that ‘‘It [the Team A-B exercise] was an absolute disaster for the CIA,’’ since its methodology was stridently attacked as ‘‘faulty’’ by Team B’s members. W. Hyland, Mortal Rivals: Understanding the Hidden Pattern of Soviet-American Relations (Touchstone, New York, New York, 1988), p. 85. DCI Bush expressed similar views in an NSC meeting in January 1977. ‘‘The competitive analysis idea seemed good at the time and I certainly did not think it would go public . . . I am against institutionalizing the alternative analysis approach.’’ Minutes, National Security Council Meeting, ‘‘Semiannual Review of the Intelligence Community,’’ January 13, 1977, Box 2, National Security Adviser, National Security Council Meetings File, Gerald R. Ford Library. ‘‘Intelligence Community Experiment in Competitive Analysis: Soviet Strategic Objectives: An Alternative View; Report of Team ‘B’, ’’ December 1976. ‘‘Report of Team ‘B,’ ’’ p. 1. Ibid., p. 50. Ibid., p. 10. Ibid., pp. 10–11. The National Intelligence Estimates A-B Team Episode Concerning Soviet Strategic Capability and Objectives: Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Subcommittee on Collection, Production and Quality, United States Senate together with Separate Views (USGPO, Washington, DC, February 16, 1978), p. 2. Ibid. Tyroler, Alerting America, pp. 5–9.

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51 M. Thompson, ed., U.S. Defense Policy: Weapons, Strategy and Commitments (Congressional Quarterly, Inc., Washington, DC, April 1978), p. 5. 52 Prados, The Soviet Estimate, p. 253. 53 PRM/NSC 10 Related, ‘‘Military Strategy and Force Posture Review, Final Report.’’ 54 Memo, Zbigniew Brzezinski to Jimmy Carter, ‘‘Review of the FY 79-83 Defense Program,’’ June 1, 1977, Presidential Review Memorandum-10: Presidential Review Memorandum-10 through Presidential Review Memorandum 36-47, Vertical File, Jimmy Carter Library. 55 H. Smith, ‘‘Carter Study Takes More Hopeful View of Strategy of U.S.,’’ New York Times, July 8, 1977, pp. A1, A4. A State Department ofﬁcial was quoted as saying that PRM 10 ‘‘sets a middle course. You don’t have to panic with the Russians, but you do have to have some real growth in our forces.’’ In contrast to the Carter levels, Rumsfeld had planned for a $150 billion budget by FY 1981. 56 Report FY 1979, p. 12. 57 Report FY 1980, p. 320. 58 In 1970, National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger had stated in an NSC memorandum that ‘‘The priority for General Purpose Forces reductions should be given to tactical air forces, ASW forces, escort ships and amphibious task forces. The Defense Program should maintain no fewer than 161/3 active divisions.’’ NSDM 84, ‘‘Defense Program FY 72-76,’’ September 11, 1970 in Presidential Directives on National Security: From Truman to Clinton (microﬁche: Cambridge, Chadwyck-Healy, 1994), Record #712. 59 Report FY 1980, p. A-1. 60 Report FY 1982, p. 307. 61 Tyroler, Alerting America, p. 29. 62 Ibid., p. 86. 63 Ibid., pp. 166–67. 64 SR 78-10121, ‘‘Estimated Soviet Defense Spending: Trends and Prospects,’’ June 1978, pp. 9–10. 65 ER 78-10512, ‘‘The Soviet Economy in 1976–77 and Outlook for 1978,’’ August 1978, pp. 10–11. DCI Stansﬁeld Turner emphasized the difﬁculty Soviet leaders would have in reversing the long-term trends of increased spending. In June 1979, Turner told members of the Joint Economic Committee (JEC) that ‘‘Reducing defense spending . . . in a period of very probable leadership change could be equally difﬁcult since those vying for power will be reluctant to take actions which might alienate the military.’’ D. J. MacEachin, CIA Assessments of the Soviet Union: The Record Versus the Charges: An Intelligence Monograph, CSI 96-001 (Center for the Study of Intelligence, Washington, DC, May 1996), pp. 13–14. 66 SR 79-10004, ‘‘A Dollar Cost Comparison of Soviet and US Defense Activities, 1968–78,’’ January 1979, p. 3. 67 Ibid. 68 Ibid. 69 Report FY 1982, p. 16. 70 Ibid., p. 17. 71 Alexander et al., U.S.-USSR Military Expenditure, p. 22. 72 Ibid., pp. 23–25. 73 CIA Estimates of Soviet Defense Spending: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, 96th Congress, 2nd Session. (USGPO, Washington, DC, September 3, 1980), pp. 8–9. Henceforth CIA Estimates.

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74 CIA Estimates, p. 16. 75 Ibid., p. 22. 76 CIA Estimates, p. 24. Huffstutler saw the allocation of Soviet expenditures somewhat differently. ‘‘Since about 1965, about half of the estimated Soviet defense spending has gone to investment in weapons, equipment and facilities, almost one-third to operating costs, and roughly one-ﬁfth to military research and development.’’ CIA Estimates, p. 7. 77 ‘‘The Price of Power,’’ Time, October 29, 1979, p. 26. 78 ‘‘The Price of Power,’’ p. 31. The article also noted (p. 27) that inﬂation led to vast increases in the cost of even the cheapest items. A 5.56-mm round for an M-16 riﬂe increased from 6 cents to 19 cents during the 1970s, or 217 percent higher. The same was true for an M-16 ($82 to $260.) The biggest increase in price was for the CH-53A Sea Stallion helicopter, from $1.9 million to $10.4 million, or 447 percent. 79 CIA Estimates, p. 7. 80 Cahn, Killing De´tente, p. 132. 81 Garthoff, The Great Transition, p. 41. 82 Report FY 1983, p. 9. 83 Tyroler, Alerting America, p. ix. 84 Ibid., p. 179. 85 F. P. Hoeber, W. Schneider, Jr, N. Polmar and R. Bessette. Arms, Men, and Military Budgets: Issues for Fiscal Year 1981 (Transaction Books, New Brunswick, NJ, 1980), p. 17. 86 Garthoff, The Great Transition, p. 33. 87 C. Coker, US Military Power, p. 64. Richard Crockatt, writing more than a decade later, pointed out that Though clearly a trend towards higher expenditure had begun under Carter-real growth for the years 1979–81 was 4.0 percent, 3.1 percent and 4.8 percent respectively-under Reagan real annual growth for the four budgets of his ﬁrst term 7.8 percent, 7.3 percent, 4.2 percent, and 9.5 percent. (p. 306) 88 Report FY 1983, p. I-4. The FY 1982 budget ($182.8 billion in outlays) would be followed by a FY 1983 budget of $215.9 billion. 89 Ibid. 90 Garthoff, The Great Transition, pp. 41–42. A Newsweek poll in June 1981 showed 64 percent of respondents approving of Reagan’s budget increases. This marked a strong overall consensus on defense at the time. A plurality (48 percent) believed that Reagan had ‘‘developed an effective defense policy for the United States.’’ M. Sheils et al., ‘‘Searching for a Strategy,’’ Newsweek, June 8, 1981, p. 31. 91 ‘‘Military Budget up $80 Billion in Two Years,’’ The Defense Monitor Vol. X, No. 3, 1981. 92 ‘‘Soviet Military Power: Questions and Answers,’’ The Defense Monitor Vol. XI, No. 1, 1982. 93 Garthoff, The Great Transition, p. 39. It is also interesting to note that Connally, Dillon, and Fowler were Founding Board Members of the CPD (Tyroler, pp. 5–6.) 94 Tyroler, Altering America, p. 187. 95 Ibid., p. 196. 96 Ibid., p. 210. 97 Ibid., p. 208.

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98 ‘‘Soviet Military Power: Questions and Answers,’’ p. 3. 99 Ibid. p. 12. 100 A. S. Becker, Sitting on Bayonets? The Soviet Defense Burden and Moscow’s Economic Dilemma, P-6908. (RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, September 1983), p. 34. 101 ‘‘Memorandum to Holders of NIE 11-4-78, ‘Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena,’ ’’ July 1981, USSR/US Conference 5/94: Briefing Book II, Box 117, Vertical File, Jimmy Carter Library. 102 Ibid. 103 Ibid. 104 NIE 11/4-82, p. 34. 105 Firth and Noren, Soviet Defense Spending, pp. 80–81. 106 Ibid., p. 80. 107 Ibid., pp. 75–76. Newhouse (p. 377) noted that Soviet defense spending had ‘‘ﬂattened out in 1977’’ and had remained at that level into the 1980s. 108 Garthoff, The Great Transition, p. 41. 109 Ibid. 110 Firth and Noren, Soviet Defense Spending, pp. 77–78. 111 Garthoff, The Great Transition, p. 41. 112 Report FY 1985, p. 64; Report FY 1986, p. 71. 113 Garthoff, The Great Transition, p. 42. The CPD conducted its own poll on defense in 1984. Seventy-one percent supported ‘‘current or greater levels of U.S. defense spending.’’ As for who was more powerful militarily, 40 percent believed that the United States was stronger, 41 percent the Soviet Union. Tyroler, Altering America, pp. 284–86. 114 MacEachin, ‘‘The Record Versus the Charges,’’ p. 16. A CIA report submitted to the JEC in August 1981, ‘‘Consumption in the USSR: An International Comparison,’’ noted that ‘‘In the USSR, long-continued investment priorities favoring heavy industry and defense, coupled with a rigid and cumbersome system of economic organization, have combined to produce a consumer sector that . . . is in many respects primitive, grossly unbalanced and in massive disequilibrium.’’ (My italics) (pp. 15–16) 115 NIE 11/4-82, p. 34. 116 Ibid. 117 Becker, Sitting on Bayonets? p. 33. 118 NSDD 32. 119 Ibid. 120 Independent political analysts, both at that time and since, noted the presence of such efforts. Fred Halliday, in The Making of the Second Cold War (p. 51), noted that the expenditure burden that the USSR carries, with a GNP less than half that of the USA, has enormous debilitating consequences for the rest of the economy . . . given the Soviet desire to match US capabilities, US advances have imposed new expenditures on the USSR. Peter Schweizer, in Reagan’s War: The Epic Story of His Forty-Year Struggle and Final Triumph over Communism (Anchor Books, New York, 2003), p. 155, argues that Reagan pursued a strategy to defeat the Soviet Union in the Cold War. According to Schweizer, as early as 1963 Reagan had ‘‘conceived a plan to squeeze the Soviet economy with a military buildup and a cutoff of trade.’’

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Conclusion 1 D. H. Dunn, The Politics of Threat: Minuteman Vulnerability in American National Security Policy (Macmillan Press, Ltd., London, 1997), p. 110. 2 The SS-18 had signiﬁcant enhancements to its capability thanks to these modiﬁcations: ‘‘The missile’s improved accuracy allowed to reduce the warhead yield. This was done without sacriﬁcing the missile’s effectiveness, which meant that the number of warheads on the MIRVed version of the missile could be increased from 8 to 10.’’ (P. Podvig, ed., Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces (The MIT Press, London, 2001), p. 217.) The improved SS19s had both improved accuracy and greater warhead yield, with six MIRVs each with a yield of 550–750 kt. (Podvig, p. 222.) 3 Pipes, U.S.-Soviet Relations, p. 156, used a quote from Sokolovskii to support his thesis that the Soviets saw nuclear war in Clausewitzian terms; that is, an extension of politics by other means: ‘‘It is well known that the essential nature of war as a continuation of politics does not change with changing technology and armament’’ (Italics in original). Kaplan, Dubious Specter, p. 15, uses the same quote by Sokolovskii as Pipes, but then uses another Soviet source, Marxism-Leninism on War and Army, published in 1972, to argue against what he sees as a narrow view of Soviet strategic concepts (pp. 16–17). 4 Cockburn, The Threat, Chaps 3–4. 5 Luttwak, Pentagon, pp. 114–17. 6 Luttwak, Pentagon, pp. 112–13; On the meaning of Victory, pp. 269–71. 7 Cockburn, The Threat, p. 272. He also noted a report by a British photographer who accompanied Afghan rebels on an ambush of a Soviet column in April 1982 indicated that Soviet infantry in BMP armored personnel carriers did not leave the safety of their vehicles and outﬂank the Afghans, ‘‘although this would have been very easy to do’’ (p. 273). Such rigidity indicated a continued inﬂexibility in Soviet tactical precepts. 8 Luttwak (Pentagon, pp. 111–12), noted that The powerful urge to see a Vietnam in Afghanistan remains frustrated . . . fewer than 5 percent of all Soviet Army troops, no more than ﬁve divisions, are in Afghanistan . . . More than one-third of all American Army troops were in Vietnam by 1968, by contrast . . . What we see in Afghanistan is . . . a leisurely imperial paciﬁcation . . . there will be no hurried evacuation, no abandonment. (Italics in original) 9 Tyroler, Alerting America, p. x. 10 According to Norman Friedman, The Fifty Year War: Conﬂict and Strategy in the Cold War (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2000), two key strategic plans complemented these efforts. The Maritime Strategy put into practice by John Lehman (see Chapter 6) caused the Soviets to consider US conventional operations against their territory. As Friedman notes, A credible threat would force the Soviets to hold back large forces . . . Their [the Soviets’] naval exercises began to concentrate on home defense against an attacking U.S. ﬂeet rather than . . . attacks on Western shipping. They strengthened their coast defenses—which meant reducing the threat they could deploy against the NATO army on the Central Front. (p. 462)

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The US Army’s AirLand Battle doctrine (see Chapter 5), which would have seen US and other NATO forces advance into East Germany in order to destroy follow-up Warsaw Pact forces. According to Friedman, Both Maritime Strategy and AirLand Battle showed an aggressiveness hitherto absent in NATO . . . the offensive emphasis in AirLand Battle must have suggested to many in Eastern Europe that, in the event of war, Allied forces might liberate their countries. That message was certainly widely understood in the United States of the early 1980s. (p. 463) 11 According to Peter Schweizer, esp. Chaps 13–14, Reagan and his advisers wedded the military buildup to a long-term strategy of bringing about ideological change within the USSR. Richard Pipes, serving as the NSC’s Soviet affairs expert, drafted a study—eventually leading to NSDD 32—establishing this as the centrepiece of US Cold War strategy. Pipes summarized the objectives of this approach: U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union must . . . address . . . the requirement to contain and reverse Soviet expansion and the need to strengthen and sustain a process of promoting change within the USSR . . . that will reduce the Soviet threat to U.S. interests and those of our allies. This second track of US policy toward the Soviet Union is not designed to preserve the status quo, but to assist internal forces that might lead to constructive change. (My italics) (p. 158) 12 Doughty, Major R. A., The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946–76, Leavenworth Paper No. 1 (Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, KS, August 1979), p. 41. 13 The US Army Field Manual that outlines Air–Land Battle, FM 100-105, states that ‘‘Economy of force, mobility, surprise, and bold, aggressive actions should achieve decisive results . . . Support from the other services is essential to the success of the Army mission in joint operations.’’ Operations FM 100-5, p. 16–2. 14 Friedman, The Fifty Year War, p. 445. ‘‘Brilliant’’ refers to a weapon that is able to determine a target and isolate it from background terrain (Friedman, p. 448.) Lawrence Freedman (The Revolution in Strategic Affairs, IISS Adelphi Paper 318 (IISS, Oxford, 1998), p. 27), concurs with this analysis. ‘‘Soviet planners were painfully aware of their country’s deﬁciencies in advanced technology, especially in electronics, and sensed that the US was gaining a signiﬁcant qualitative advantage.’’ 15 Friedman, The Fifty Year War, pp. 449–50. As William Odom noted, ‘‘Steady technological change in the West did not have the same impact on the overall economy; thus Soviet industry accumulated an ever-larger stock of older industrial technology, creating an ever-widening technology gap.’’ The Collapse of the Soviet Military (Yale University Press, London, 1998), p. 224. 16 Michael Ignatieff summarized the impact of the technological revolution on the end of the Cold War. ‘‘America won the Cold War because it entered a new type of economy—based on knowledge and computers—and left its strategic competitor marooned inside the crumbling remains of the industrial era.’’ Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond (Picador USA, New York, 2000), p. 167. 17 As the geographic location of the Gulf War indicates, the development of the RDF in the early 1980s came to play an added role in the evolution of US

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force structure and strategy. James Digby, in a December 1980 RAND paper, outlined several ‘‘Principles for the Design of Projection Forces.’’ Among those he listed were the need ‘‘to make full use of information gathering and processing capabilities in order to send forces where they are needed the most . . . Units from all services . . . need to be able to communicate with each other while they are part of a joint task force.’’ In his conclusion, Digby noted that ‘‘we have a great potential for making it [U.S. military strength] more ﬂexible and deployable.’’ (Underlining in original) Modern Weapons for NonNATO Contingencies, RAND Paper P-6521 (RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, December 1980), pp. 9, 15. 18 Emblematic of this approach was the Nuclear Policy Review submitted to Congress by the Bush Administration in January 2002. While maintaining a scaled-down Triad of strategic forces, it offered some changes. According to Lawrence Freedman, ‘‘The shifts were in the integration of non-nuclear and nuclear systems, an enhanced role for active defenses . . . and the development of a system that could respond quickly to changes in the strategic environment.’’ Only in the development of deep-penetrating warheads (‘‘bunker-busters’’) did the strategy differ signiﬁcantly from what had gone before. The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 3rd edn (Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire 2003), p. 433. 19 An example of the ﬁrst school is Peter Schweizer’s Reagan’s War, in which the author states ‘‘it is . . . not possible to understand the collapse of the Soviet Union separate from Ronald Reagan: the two are intertwined.’’ (p. 3) Schweizer concludes by noting the defeat in Afghanistan, together with the survival of Solidarity in Poland, ‘‘burned a hole in the heart of the [Soviet] empire that could never be ﬁlled. In both of these cases, Reagan proved decisive in victory.’’ (p. 284) The second school is exempliﬁed by Frances FitzGerald. She writes that ‘‘Gorbachev launched a political revolution in the Soviet Union . . . and the Cold War was over long before the American foreign policy establishment knew it.’’ (p. 18) FitzGerald goes on to describe the second school’s view of the Cold War’s conclusion: What did happen in the 1980s was that the Soviet economy continued to deteriorate as it had during the 1970s. The economic decline . . . resulted form the failures of the system created by Lenin and Stalin— not from any effort on the part of the Reagan administration . . . It was Gorbachev’s efforts to reverse the decline and to modernize his country that knocked the props out from under the system. The revolution was in essence a series of decisions made by one man, and it came as a surprise precisely because it did not follow from a systemic breakdown. (p. 475)

Bibliography

Unpublished materials Academic dissertations Johnson, Maxwell Orme. Military Force and American Foreign Policy in Southwest Asia, 1979–1982: A Study of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, PhD dissertation, Woodrow Wilson Department of Government and Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia, May 1982. Walsh, David M. American Perceptions of the U.S.-Soviet Military Balance: NATO’s Central Region, the Long-Term Defense Program and LRTNF, 1977–1980, MSc dissertation, Department of International History, London School of Economics and Political Science, September 2000.

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Index

5.56-mm automatic riﬂes 121 7.62-mm automatic riﬂes 120 7th MAB 161 16th Air Army 119 34th Guards Artillery Division 119 82nd Airborne Division 159, 162 101st Air Assault Division 166 106th Guards Airborne Division 169, 170 Aaron, David 157 ABM see anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs) ABM Treaty 79, 85 ‘‘Action Areas’’, of LTDP 115–16, 121, 123 active strategic defense, Reagan’s idea of 79 Advanced Technology Bomber (ATB) 51 Aegis system for ship defense and battle management 135, 137 Aeroﬂot 169 Afghanistan Soviet invasion of 5, 102, 116, 138, 158, 171 Soviet operations in 6 AH-64 attack helicopter 125 Air Force Satellite Communication System (AFSATCOM) 52 Air Force Tactical Fighter Wings 167 air-land battle strategy 126, 203 air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) 29, 51 Airborne National Command Post (ABNCP) 29 ‘‘air-mobile forces’’ 170 All-Volunteer Force 177 Alliance Defense in the Eighties (AD-80), RAND study 114 Alliance, military capacity of 115

Alliance’s naval forces, role of 137 Alternative Integrated Military Strategies (AIMS) 155 Altunin, Alexandr T. 66–67, 74 American nuclear strategy see US nuclear strategy An-22 cargo aircraft 169 Anderson, George W. 180 Angola, Soviet actions in 171 anti-air warfare (AAW) capabilities 137 anti-armor, program of short-term measures in 115 anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs) 63 ABM-1 Galosh missiles 80 development of 79 effective 80 anti-nuclear movement 53, 104 anti-satellite (ASAT) applications 84 capability 81 anti-ship cruise missiles 132 anti-ship weapons 134 anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities 135 anti-surface warfare 150 Arab–Israeli War 203 Arab OPEC embargo 171 Armaments Planning Review, NATO’s 123 arms control 4, 40, 47, 53, 108 agreements need for 100 realistic objective of 53 American perceptions of 3 Carter Administration’s approach to 3 effort, announced by Reagan 48 emphasis on 54

268

Index

arms control (Continued) European 105 in Europe, to include ERW in negotiations 94 impact on LRTNF improvements 99 linchpin of superpower De´tente 4 negotiations ERW in 94 importance of SDI in 85–87 success over forces in Europe 95 policies, determination of 20 PRM 38 focus on 99 proposals 62 role of 59 US proposals 58 US-Soviet efforts, resumption of 59 see also SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks); START (Strategic Arms reduction Talks) Arms Control and Disarmament agency 59, 68 agreements 115 negotiations 42 Arms race 20 Aspin, Les 9, 65 Atlantic Alliance 93, 96, 107 strengthening of 112 attack aircraft, A-types A-6/A-7 100 A-10 125 see also B-type bombers; F-type ﬁghters/ﬁghter-bombers; MiG-23/27 ﬁghter-bombers AWAC aircraft 158, 167 Bagley, Worth H. 140 Baker, David 81 Ball, Desmond 24 ballistic missile defense (BMD) system 83 US 84 Baltic Fleet 143 Becker, Abraham S. 190, 192–93 Benjamin S. Lambeth 38 Black Sea Fleet 143 blast shelters advantages of 70 construction, Brown on 69 Blumenthal, W. Michael 189 ‘‘Bomber Gap’’ 181 bomber payload 32 Bradley infantry ﬁghting vehicle 125

Bradsher, Henry S. 179 Breyer, Siegfried 144 Bright Star ’82 166 ’83 167 Brooke, Edward 18 Brown, George 25 Brown, Harold 23–28, 30, 32, 35, 37, 40, 49, 50, 69, 70, 73, 76, 94, 105, 118, 123, 137–38, 155–57, 160, 164, 172, 183, 185, 187 Brzezinski, Z bigniew 26, 28, 99, 156–58, 183 B-type bombers B-1 41, 44 B 52, 54–55 B-2 51 B-52 9, 39, 149, 161, 166 conversion of G/H models to carry ALCM 29 ‘‘building block’’ approach, CIA’s 177 Burt, Richard 38–39, 48 Bush, George H. W. 57, 179, 180–81 C3 (command, control, and communications) system 25–26 C3I (command, control, communications and intelligence) 27–28, 36, 52 C3I centers, Soviet 48 C-5 aircraft 161, 168 Callaghan, James 99 Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, Soviet access to 150 Canadian brigade group 121 capitalism 57 and socialism, life or death struggle between 184 ‘‘capitalist bomb’’ 93 Carter and the RDF (1977–81) 155–64 Carter, Jimmy 3, 22–23, 27–28, 35, 37, 39, 40–43, 45–47, 51–52, 59–60, 62, 75–76, 94–96, 102, 106, 113–14, 125, 128, 136, 138, 144, 151, 155–59, 161, 163–64, 166–68, 172, 183–84, 188–89, 194, 200–201 Carter years 35–39 defense spending during 183–87 PRM 10 to PD 59 (1977–80) 22–31 Casey, William 57, 59 Center for Defense Information (CDI) 8, 65, 125, 206

Index approach to the defense buildup, criticized by 189 view of Soviet expenditures 190 Central Army Group (CENTAG) of NATO 121 Central Command (CENTCOM) 167–68 Central Europe, Soviet power and inﬂuence in 91 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), criticisms of 6 China military spending 190 posing a direct threat of war by Soviets 150 as a threat to Soviet Union 6, 8 navy 150 civil defense 63–66 investment during Carter years 76 Soviet: view in 1970s 66–72 Soviet: view in 1980s 72–74 Clausewitz 9, 38, 65 Clausewitzian concept of war, Soviet adherence to 65 Clausewitzian principle 38 Cockburn, Andrew 6, 8–9, 67–68, 74, 196–97 Coker, Christopher 162 Colby, William 8, 178–80 Cold War 10, 38, 207 end of 2, 202, 206 First/Second 4 renewed 87, 105, 164 US strategic policy during 91 Collins, John 60–61, 139, 175 Committee on the Present Danger (CPD) 3–4, 42 ‘‘Comrades-in-Arms-80’’ 120 Conference of National Armament Directors, NATO’s 123 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) 5 Congressional Research Service 60 Connally, John B. 189 Constellation 158 conventional forces 109 the balance in the central region 117–23 continued efforts and similar results (1981–85) 124–26 improvements, American initiatives regarding 114 LTDP

269

and the 3 %decision 114–17 prelude to (1974–77) 111–13 Coral Sea 149 Cordier, Sherwood 120 counterforce doctrine the Carter years 35–39 PRM 10 to PD 59 (1977–80) 22–31 counterforce and Soviet strategy: role of perception 31–34 development of 29 LNOs, development of (1974–77) 15–22 Corps (NATO) I Belgian 121 I British 121 I French 121 I Netherlands 121 I West German 121 II French 121 II West German 121 III West German 121 V US 121 VII US 121 counterforce strategy 38 counterforce war, possibility of 33 ‘‘Countering the Soviet Threat’’ 188 ‘‘Countervailing Strategy’’ 25–26, 40, 52, 66, 198 basis for 30 incorporated in PD 59 27 Crockatt, Richard 2 cruisers 132 Cuban Missile Crisis 159, 162, 198 C-X 161 Czechoslovakia, Soviet invasion of 197 Danang, Vietnam, Soviet access to 150 Davis, Lynn Etheridge 19 Defense Condition 3 alert 133 Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) 65, 83, 177 Defense Planning Committee (DPC) 100, 114–15 defense spending the expenditure debate 175 the balance of military spending in mid-70s 176–80 the Carter years 183–87 the Reagan increases, 1981–85 188–93 Team-B 180–83

270

Index

deliverable strategic warheads, in US and Soviet Union, comparison of 32 ‘‘Dense Pack’’ system, feasibility of 52 destroyers 132 De´tente American views toward, shift in 175 decline and fall of 1 in Europe 105 Reagan’s view on 42 superpower 4 Diego Garcia 9, 143, 161 NTPF at 167 Dillon, C. Douglas 189 Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) 182 ‘‘Dual-Track’’ formula for deployment 108 Dufﬁeld, John 116, 127 Dwight D. Eisenhower 148 E-4B command aircraft 29, 61 procurement of 53 Eastern Europe ground forces in 113 Soviet divisions in 119 Warsaw Pact conventional forces in, improvements in 114 East–West military balance, issues of 108 military balance, throughout 50s and 60s 197 relations, improvement in 110 tensions 125 Ellsworth, Robert F. 179, 180 Enhanced Radiation Warhead (ERW) 92 damage limitation features of 93 deployment 95 indecision regarding 199 role in military balance 100 as weapon to allay fears of Soviet threat 96 Enterprise 149 Erickson, John 119 escort ships 132 ‘‘Eurocommunism,’’ rise of 4 Europe military balance in 92 US combat strength in 125 US forces in 122 US nuclear commitment to 98

US support troops in, reduction of 111 Europe, balance in conventional forces 109 the balance in the central region 117–23 continued efforts and similar results (1981–85) 124–26 LTDP, and the 3 %decision 114–17 LTDP, prelude to (1974–77) 111–13 the nuclear balance 91 the LRTNF debate (1979–83) 97–105 ‘‘neutron bomb’’ and alliance cohesion (1977–78) 92–97 US perceptions and the Soviet threat 105–7 European military balance, impact of Soviet doctrine on 112 European NATO allies relations with 104 US military equipment to, control on 123 European NATO defense spending 125 European nuclear war 98 European Task Force 97 on Comprehensive Net Assessment 112 extended deterrence, concept of 28 fallout shelter program 75 fallout shelters construction of 66 for essential workers 67 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 26, 46 funding to improve US civil defense capabilities 77 to oversee development of civil defense planning 76 Fifth Eskadra 133, 140, 143 Finlandization 97, 195 Fiscal Y ear (FY ) reports 1976, Schlesinger on nuclear conﬂict in Europe 93 1977 69 1978 93 Brown’s military posture statement for 118 1979 69, 76 on ERW 94

Index 1980, Brown on Soviet LRTNF capabilities in 105 1981 26, 29 1983, Military Posture statement 73 1985, additional sets of deployment to Netherlands and Belgium by 126 Five eYar Defense Program/Plan 164, 189 ﬁve-year shipbuilding programs 136, 138 FLEETEX 83–1 148 ﬂexible nuclear strategies 87, 203 reﬁnement of 75 Flexible Response concept in NATO military planning 127 doctrine of 109 forces for rapid deployment 153 Carter and the RDF (1977–81) 155 Reagan and the Central Command (1981–85) 164–69 US and Soviet power projection capabilities 169–71 Ford, Gerald R. 18, 22, 31, 39, 42, 51, 77, 93, 137–38, 151, 154, 179, 180–81, 183, 193 Forrestal 148 Forward Based Systems (FBS) 100 Soviet demand for reduction 101 Fowler, Henry H. 189 Frederick the Great 31 French nuclear weapon program 99 F-type ﬁghters/ﬁghter-bombers F-4 100 F-14 Tomcat 135 F-15 125, 158 F-16 123, 125 F-111 dual-capable strike aircraft 98, 100 Garthoff, Raymond 85 Giscard d’Estaing 99 Glasnost 204 Gorbachev, Mikhail 59, 62, 87, 202, 204, 206 Gorshkov, Sergei 132, 141, 147, 151 Graham, Daniel 65, 68, 178, 181 Gray, Colin S. 20, 42–43 Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM) 100–102

271

deployment in UK, West Germany, Italy, and Belgium 104, 106 Group of Soviet Forces Germany (GSFG) 119 Gulf War 204 Halliday, Fred 2 Halloran, Richard 162 Harmel Report 109–10, 114 Harpoon missiles 135, 137 helicopters AH-64 125 Mi-24 120 UH-60 125 Helsinki Accords 110 Herbert, Paul H. 126 High-Level Group (HLG) of NATO 99 Hoeber, Francis P. 188 Holst, Johan Jorgen 140 Home Defense brigades (West German) 123 Horn of Africa 1, 3, 8, 163, 199 Soviet role in 170–71 Howard, Michael 31 Huffstutler, Robert 186–87, 191 Hyland, William 180–81 ICBMs American 28 with hard-target-kill capability 35 land-based 16 LSOs as special role for 21 Minuteman see Minuteman III ICBMs MIRVed 39 MIRVed warheads by USSR 18 MX ICBMs 51–53 10-warhead 39 residual number of 23 and SLBM developments, Soviet 34 and SLBMs warheads 51 Soviets’ 10 Soviet superiority in 195 types of 33 in United States/Soviet Union 32 US, threat of Soviet counterforce attack on 17 warheads on 48, 70 see also speciﬁc types ICBM silos 25, 51 as indicator of ICBMs 10 Soviet 21 vulnerability of 29

272

Index

ICBM throwweight 31 Ikle, Fred 86 Indian Ocean American buildup in 9 Soviet naval presence in 142 industrial dispersal programs 65 INF missiles 107 interceptors, active forces of 63 intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) 92 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) 102–3 missiles 107 Soviet reduction 104 talks 42 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) 66, 140, 148, 168 intra-war deterrence 18 Iowa-class battleships 144 Iran Hostage Crisis in 138 hypothetical Soviet invasion of 162, 168 revolution in 138, 158 Isby, David 117–18 Israel American support for 154 full-scale attack by Egypt and Syria upon 133 Ivy League (exercise) 43 Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) 25, 46, 48 Jones, David 35, 48–49, 70, 91, 105, 160 Kaplan, Fred 9, 65, 68, 196 Kelley, Paul X. 160, 162–63 Keyworth, George 85 Kiev 132, 148 Kissinger Henry 17, 37, 101–2 Kitty Hawk 144 Klare, Michael 170 Komer, Robert W. 114, 116 Kremlin 27, 72 arrival of Gorbachev in 206 bellicose policy by 195 for greater military strength 179 on level of military spending 182, 186 Kvitsinsky, Y uli 103 Lance missiles 92, 95 Laser technology 84 launch control centers (LCC)

33

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 80 Lee, William T. 179, 186 Lehman, John F. 145, 148, 151, 201 Leopard 1/2 main battle tanks 120 Limited Attack Options (LAO) 30 Limited Nuclear Options (LNOs) 36 adaptation of 20, 74 development of (1974–77) 15–22 London Summit (NATO) 114 Long-Range Theatre Nuclear Forces (LRTNF) 40 debate (1979–83) 97–105 Trans-Atlantic relations strained by 124 Long-Term Defense Program (LTDP) 115, 199 ‘‘Action Areas’’ of 121 importance of 116 prelude to 111–13 and three percent decision 114–17 LRTNF see Long-Range Theatre Nuclear Forces (LRTNF) LSOs, as special role for ICBMs 21 LTDP see Long-Term Defense Program (LTDP) Luce, Claire Boothe 183 Luttwak, Edward 6, 8, 196–97 M-1 Abrams main battle tank 125 M-16 121 MAD see Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) Major Attack Options (MAO) 30 Marine Amphibious Brigades (MABs) 161, 167–68 Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) 160, 167 Marine Amphibious Unit 167 Marine Corps (U.S.) 155, 160–62 Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS) program 167 maritime strategy (US), 145 Mark 12A warhead 28 Minuteman IIIs with 29, 51, 61 ‘‘massive retaliation’’ 15, 19 American strategy of 109 McClellan, John L. 179 McNamara Robert 15–17, 19 megatonnage 32, 61 Mi-24 helicopters 120 Middle East oil, movement of 158 Midgetman ICBM 52–53 Midway 144, 149

Index MiG-23/27 ﬁghter-bombers 120 military balance in 1970s 10 ERW role in 100 in Europe 92 importance of 206 shift in USSR’s favor 206 Military Committee document 14/3 (MC 14/3) 109–10 military deterrence, categories of 134 military forces, problems in 6 military personnel, pay scale in Soviet and US, comparison of 177 military power, and political objectives, links between in Soviet strategy 36, 38 ‘‘Military Strategy and Force Posture Review’’ 183 Military Transport Aviation 169 Milstar 52 Minuteman force 28 Minuteman ICBM silos 53 Minuteman II ICBM warhead 70 Minuteman III ICBMs 68, 196 Mark 12A-equipped 51, 61 MIRVed 28 with NS-20 guidance system 29 MIRV see multiple, independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) missiles 51 air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) 29 deliverable strategic warheads, in US and Soviet Union 32 ICBM, Soviets 10 INF 107 Minuteman III with Mark 12A warhead 28 MX and cruise 48 SLBMs 29 SS-20 ballistic 4 Trident I 29 see also speciﬁc types Mobilization Designee (MOBDES) program 74 Moore, John 141 Moscow 4, 149, 163, 198 on acceptance of ‘‘zero option’’ 103 approach to countering SDI 85 assessment of relative military power 58 geopolitical balance in favor of 151

273

global balance of power toward, shift in 154 global role 191 importance of building ﬂeets to challenge American naval forces 132 to keep off guard 165 LRTNF exploitation by 106 military balance in, imbalanced 195 military build up 190 reduction in the number of SS-20s by 94 relationship with 42 shift in ‘‘correlation of forces’’ in favour of 134 US competition with 102 willingness to use force 1 multiple, independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) 15, 20 ballistic missiles, MIRVed, development of 79 ICBM types carrying 33 warheads added to ICBMs by USSR 18 multiple protective shelters (MPS) 51 Carter program for 52 Muskie, Edmund 28, 37, 40 Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) 15–17, 39 American theory of 64 theories, MAO corresponding to 30 MX ICBMs 51–55 10–warhead 39 ABM system to protect 80 deployment in silos 45 deployment, congressional debate over 53 mobile 29 NASA 81 National Command Authority (NCA) 25–26 National Emergency Airborne Command Post (NEACP) 29 National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) 36 NIE 11–13/8–76 33, 71, 180, 181 NIE 11–13/8–81 58 NIE 11/4–82 191–92 process, ‘‘competitive analysis’’ of 57 series of 56

274

Index

National Security Agency (NSA) 46 National Security Council (NSC) 17, 22, 59 to oversee development of civil defense planning 76 National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) NSDD 12 44 emphasis of strategic defense in 81 plan for improved US strategic force posture 77 NSDD 13 45 NSDD 23 77 NSDD 26, role of civil defense in US strategic planning 77 NSDD 32 45, 164 on US policy toward NATO 124 NSDD 35 51 NSDD 47 77 NSDD 73 52 NSDD 75 168 NSDD 91 45 NSDD 97 45 key requirements outlined in 46 NSDD 99 168 NSDD 104 104 NSDD 145 46 NSDD 153 85 National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) NSDM 242 17, 19–20, 24, 28, 29, 40, 43, 52, 59, 75 counterforce strategies from 30 nuclear employment policy directed by 22 operational basis for 18 NSDM 344 136 NSDM 348 22 National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 17 NSSM 169 20 NSSM 244 75 NATO allies 5, 6, 98 protection of 80 attention towards 112 Central Region defense, planning for 118 Central Region forces, combat capabilities of 123 defense policy, basis of 113 defense spending by 8 defense strategy, MC 14/3 109

deployment of Pershing II and GLCM in support of 106 Europe 6 defense of 94 need for enhanced support of US and Allied forces in 28 focus of PRM 10 137 military planning, concept of ‘‘Flexible Response’’ in 127 mobilization 122 strategy during Cold War, crux of 91 strategy on ﬁrst use of nuclear weapon 19 threat to 113 unity and cohesion 96 US policy toward 124 NATO Mutual Support Act 123 NATO naval forces 149 NATO/Warsaw Pact balance 112 naval balance 131 the 1970s, of missions and dollars 135–39 the 1980s, balance of sea power in 144–50 lists and capabilities 139–40 shifting balance of power at sea 132–35 naval power balance during 1970s 131 naval superiority, necessity of for U.S. 144 naval personnel, US and Soviet, compared 141 Navy (U.S.), need for quality personnel 145 Near-Term Prepositioning Force (NTPF) 161 ‘‘neutron bomb’’ and alliance cohesion (1977–78) 92–97 Newhouse, John 2, 83, 86 NIE see National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) Nimitz 132, 144, 148 Nitze, Paul 1–2, 6–7, 34, 42, 102–4, 181, 183, 194, 201 Nixon, Richard 16–17, 31, 39, 51, 62, 136, 138, 153, 158, 183 Njolstad, Olav 3 North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) 82 North Atlantic Council 102, 115 Northern Army Group (NORTHAG) of NATO 121, 122 Northern Fleet 143

Index Norwegian Institute of International Affairs 140 NSDD see National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) NSDM see National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) NSSM see National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) nuclear balance 91 the LRTNF debate (1979–83) 97–105 ‘‘neutron bomb’’ and alliance cohesion (1977–78) 92–97 US perceptions and Soviet threat 105–7 nuclear conﬂict 38 nuclear delivery systems 16 ‘‘nuclear freeze’’ 83 Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) 99 nuclear strategy NSDDs on, integrated objectives of 45 Reagan Administration’s approach to 61 nuclear war 16 preparedness of Soviets to protect leadership, population & industry 73–74 protracted see protracted nuclear war nuclear weapon program, French 99 nuclear weapons deployment by superpowers, call for ‘freeze’ on 82 ﬁrst use of 19 reserve of 16 Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy (NUWEP) 18, 30 Nunn Amendment 111, 113 Nunn, Sam 111, 125 Ocean Venture ‘81 148 offensive weapons 51 Ofﬁce of Soviet Analysis (SOVA) 191 Ofﬁce of Technology Assessment 68, 70 Ofﬁce of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering 21 Ogaden war 150 oil embargo 154 Okean exercises 132, 134, 149 P-3 maritime patrol aircraft 161 PD see Presidential Directive (PD)

275

‘‘Peace With Freedom’’ 184 Peacekeeper see MX ICBMs Pearl Harbor 143 Pentagon 55 acceptability of wide range of nuclear options in 24 annual report for FY 1979 122 civil defense, evacuation as main effort of 76 defense spending among Allies, increase in 116 Schlesinger’s term/tenure at 20, 28 Soviet counterforce strike, estimated fatalities in the event of 78 on US defense budget 176 Periodic Armaments Planning System 123 Perle, Richard 42, 48, 83, 103–4 Pershing missiles IA 100 II 100–102 deployment in West Germany 104, 106 Persian Gulf RDF concept for 170 US military intervention in 154 Persian Gulf oil 161 security of 154 Peterson, Peter G. 189 PFIAB see President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) Pipes, Richard 6–7, 34, 38–39, 42, 63–65, 68, 72, 181, 184, 194, 196, 201 Polaris missiles 33, 61, 98 Polmar, Norman 141, 144, 147 POMCUS (Pre-Positioning of Materiel Conﬁgured to Unit Sets) 111–12, 123, 125 Poseidon missiles 29, 33, 51, 68, 71, 98 power balance at sea, shifting of 132–35 power projection forces for rapid deployment 153 Carter and the RDF (1977–81) 155 Reagan and the Central Command (1981–85) 164–69 US and Soviet power projection capabilities 169–71 the naval balance 131

276

Index

power projection (Continued) the 1970s: of missions and dollars 135–39 the 600-ship navy, and balance of sea power in the 1980s 144–50 lists and capabilities 139–40 shifting balance of power at sea 132–35 Presidential Directive (PD) PD 18 24, 156 PD 32 157 PD 41 75–76 PD 53 26, 46 PD 57 26 PD 58 26 PD 59 27–28, 164 provision for revised NUWEP in 30 regarding role of US strategic forces 45 on selective use of strategic weapons 38 on silo-killing capability 29 PD 62 164 PD 63 164 Presidential Review Memorandum (PRM) PRM 9 112 PRM 10 22, 95, 112, 113, 136, 155, 156 NATO focus of 137 on role of US strategic nuclear forces 23 on US national security policy and strategy 183 PRM 10 to PD 59 (1977–80) 22–31 PRM 32 75 President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) 179, 182, 193 PRM see Presidential Review Memorandum (PRM) protracted nuclear war 42 emphasis during Carter years 28 plans in early 1980s for 198 plans in Reagan Administration for 165 the Soviet threat 54–59 strategy 44–50 weapons 50–54

u Qadripartite Agreement over Berlin 110 RAND Corporation report 166, 181, 190 on ICBMs 21 Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) 116, 156 and Carter 155–64 creation of 40 emergence of 165 establishment of 159 formation of 128 redesignation of 160 Soviet 171 as ‘‘tripwire’’ force 162 Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) 160–61, 163–64, 165–68 establishment of 199–202 Rapid Reinforcement Program 123 Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability (RSI) 121 goal of improving 123 Reagan, Ronald 2, 42–44, 47–48, 52, 57, 59, 61–62, 79–83, 85–87, 102, 104, 107, 149, 164, 166, 172, 187–89, 194, 199–200, 202, 204–7 military buildup, public support for 189 Red Army forces, effective concentration of 119 Reed, Thomas C. 61 Regional Nuclear Options (RNO) 30 Report of the President’s Commission on Strategic Forces see Scowcroft Report reserve/sealift vessels 137 Reykjavik Summit 202 Rogers, Bernard 124, 159 Roseﬁelde, Steven S. 186 Rostow, Eugene 184 Rowen, Harry 192 Rumsfeld, Donald 21–22, 31–32, 69, 73, 93, 136, 138–39, 183 S-3 aircraft 135 Sadat, Anwar 166 ‘‘Schlesinger Doctrine’’ 43, 198 inheritance of 23

20, 26,

Index outlined by NSDM 242 46 on selective use of strategic weapons 38 Schlesinger, James 18, 20–21, 23, 26, 28, 31, 38, 43, 46, 50, 68, 74, 75–76, 93, 111, 131, 135, 154, 178–79, 198 Schmidt, Helmut 92, 94–95, 97, 99, 103 Schneider, William 188 Scowcroft Report 53, 59 Scowcroft, Brent 53, 54, 59 SDI see Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) ‘‘Sea Control Ship’’ 135 Sea Plan 2000 137 sea power shifting balance of during 1970s 132–35 balance in 1980s 144–50 Second Cold War 1, 35, 40, 42, 199 emergence of 200 end of 202 US military programmes of 2 Selected Attack Options (SAO) 30 Senate Armed Services Committee 21 Senate Foreign Relations Committee 35, 37, 65 Senate Intelligence Committee 186 ‘‘shelter survey’’ 75 shelters and star wars civil defense 63–66 the Soviet challenge 83–86 Soviet civil defense 1970s view 66–72 1980s view 72–74 strategic defense initiative (1983–85) 79–83 US civil defense, programs and plans 74–79 ship construction programs, nuclearpowered 135 shipbuilding program for FY1981–85 138 for FY1982–86 139 FY1983–87 144 Shulman, Marshall 68 Shultz, George 48, 59 Simon, William E. 189 Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) 16, 29 execution of nuclear option under 52 Reagan’s brieﬁng on 61

277

SIOP-5D 30 Sino-Soviet split 8 SL-7 sealift ships 168 Sloss, Leon 59 Social Democratic Party (SPD) 94 socialism 7, 57 Sokolovskii, V. D 196 Somalia, possible Ethiopian invasion of 157 Southeast Asia, deployment of US troops in 110 Southwest Asia, importance of 165 Soviet aggression 60 increased 201 Soviet bureaucracy, inefﬁciency of 78 Soviet C3I centers 48 Soviet challenge 83–86 Soviet civil defense 63 1970s view 66–72 1980s view 72–74 American view of 78 CIA report 71 danger posed by 64 General Jones on 70 and industrial dispersal programs 65 policy, discussion of 64 Soviet defense expenditure 115 Soviet defense industry 177 Soviet defense spending 176 increase in 185 Soviet doctrine impact on European military balance 112 key themes of 38 Soviet economy 10 Soviet ﬂeets 132, 134, 143 Soviet forces, effective for power projection 169 Soviet GNP, allocated for defense 178 Soviet grand strategy 34 Soviet ICBM silos 21 Minuteman IIIs against 29 Soviet ICBMs 10 and SLBM launchers, growth in 63 Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron 144, 169 Soviet leadership, contradictory facets of 10 Soviet LRTNF superiority 107 Soviet military airlift capacity of 170 buildup 63, 92, 99

278

Index

Soviet military (Continued) in 1974, implications of according to Schlesinger 31 in the East/West 8 formative years of 187 nature of 198 purpose behind 10 capacity, operational conﬁdence in 8 doctrine, role with regard to strategic nuclear forces 33 expenditure CIA’s estimates of 191 issue of 184 spending 181 strategy 35 Soviet naval aviation 132 Soviet Naval Infantry 169–70 Soviet Navy 5, 132, 134 division of ﬂeets 143 Kiev-class vessel for 148 capability during 1970s 141 loss of access to Berbera port 142 surface combatants in 148 warﬁghting capability of 142 Soviet nuclear forces 30 Soviet numerical superiority in conventional forces 197 Soviet Paciﬁc Fleet 143, 149 Soviet rapid deployment forces 171 Soviet society, inadequacies challenging an effective civil defense 68 Soviet SSBN force 33 Soviet strategic capability 31–32 Soviet strategic buildup 53 implications of 33 Soviet strategic forces build-up of 15 CIA on 57 long-term peacetime and wartime objectives of 54 see also strategic forces Soviet Strategic Objectives, part of Team B report 181 Soviet strategic policy 57 Soviet strategic threat 54 Soviet strategy and counterforce 31–34 links between military power and political objectives in 38 views of 39 Soviet-Syrian exercise 169 Soviet threat 54–59

on nuclear balance, and US perceptions 105–7 Soviet Union deterring of 31 ‘Fortress Russia’ image of 8 Gross national product (GNP) 9 increase in military power 119 military superiority over, as a US priority 106 nuclear parity achievement by 16 relations with 53 and United States defense expenditure, median ratio of 188 De´tente between 42 deterioration in relations between 1 imbalance of nuclear strength between 36 strategic relationship between 66 see also USSR (and also relevant Soviet entries) Soviet weakness 113 Soviet weaponry design of 6 improvements in 6 and military strategy 196 and strategy 10 space-based defense 81 Space Shuttle 81 SR 76–10053 178 SR-76–10121U 178 SS-4s/-5s/17/-18/-19 39, 48, 103, 196 types of ballistic missiles 33 SS-20 92, 94, 103 deployment of 97 SS-N-8 SLBM 33 SSBNs 29, 51 improved communication with 53 ‘‘Star Wars speech’’ 79 START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) 48, 58 efforts, renewal of 59 level, JCS proposal 49 Stoessinger, John G. 2 strategic and other forces, relationship between 56 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) 3, 7, 99 negotiations 18 SALT I Agreement 100 SALT II Agreement 3, 47–48, 92, 98, 184

Index debate over 205 drafting of 39 European support for 99 withdrawal by Carter from US Senate consideration 102 SALT III agreement, plans for 101 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks see SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) strategic defense 63 inclusion among priorities 77 Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) 2, 62, 79–83 expected Soviet approach to 83 origins of 80 overall reaction by USSR to 84 as solution to arms race 83 Soviet reactions to 85 strategic delivery systems 29 strategic forces Carter Administration’s policy for see Countervailing Strategy the counterforce doctrine the Carter years 35–39 the Carter years—PRM 10 to PD 59 22–31 counterforce and Soviet strategy: role of perception 31–35 ‘‘limited nuclear options’’, development of 15–22 development, key areas for 45 imbalance of, implications of 37 program, objectives of 44 protracted nuclear war 42 the Soviet threat 54–59 strategy 44–50 weapons 50–54 of shelters and star wars civil defense 63–66 the Soviet challenge 83–86 Soviet civil defense, 1970s view 66–72 Soviet civil defense, 1980s view 72–74 strategic defense initiative (1983–85) 79–83 US civil defense—programs and plans 74–79 strategic nuclear policy, criteria for 44 strategic objectives study 17 strategic reserve force 23 strategic weaponry 41

279

strategic weapons, selective use of 38 strategy, and the weapon, relationship between 60 ‘‘Strategy of Full Recourse’’ 166 Strike Command 159–60 Subic Bay, Philippines 150 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) 29 submarines 132 Ohio-class 51 Sukhoi Su-24 strike aircraft 120 superpower(s) crisis 15, 195 maritime balance 135 military balance, perception of 1 naval balance 146 navies, parity between 132 security relationship between 58 Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) 98, 124 T-64/T-72 tanks 120 Take Charge and Move Out—Navy SSBN C3 aircraft (TACAMO) aircraft 29 ‘‘Team B’’ 6–7, 64, 71 report 34, 38, 57, 65 goal of 193 set up of 180 telecommunications, importance of 45 Teller, Edward 80–83, 87, 183 Third World instability in 147, 163, 195 Soviet strategy of intervention in 154 stability 205 Third World intervention force 171 Throw weight 23, 32 Titan II ICBMs 53 silos for 33 warhead 70 Tomahawk cruise missiles 137 torpedoes 134 ‘‘Track Record Study’’ 180 Trident missiles 44, 54–55 D-5 variant of 41, 53 I and II missiles 29, 51–52 Trident submarines 53 ‘‘tripwire’’ force 162, 168 Tu-22M Backﬁre bomber 31, 97, 132 Tucker, Robert W 154, 163

280

Index

UH-60 transport helicopter 125 United States (US) air defense forces, rundown of 63 buildup 3, 10 civil defense objectives of 75–76 overall goal of 77 programs and plans 74–79 defense budget 176 defense planning, ﬂexible nuclear options in 50 defense spending 185, 202 factors determining 175 increase in 124–25, 192 deterrent force, capability of 66 deterrent policy, cornerstone of 15 deterrent strategy 25 ﬂeets 133, 140, 149 Atlantic 148 Second 143 Seventh 143 Sixth 133, 140, 143 Third 143 foreign policy, and global stability 37 involvement in Vietnam 114 military see US military national security policy 30, 195 key goal of 24 Reagans proposal 79 SDI, as unique approach in 86 national security strategy, analysis of 45 national security telecommunication policy, objectives of 46 naval forces 134 (see also US Navy) nuclear war plan 16 (see also US nuclear strategy) relations with the European allies, inﬂuence by ERW 95 safeguard systems 80 space policy, White House fact sheet on 81 Strategic Air Command 63 strategic defenses, Reagan’s concerns over lack of 82 strategic forces (see also strategic forces) basis for modernization of 44 ‘‘coupling’’ of 100 expansion of 54 nuclear, PRM 10 on role of 23 strategic modernization effort 54 strategic policy

basis of 54 civil defense in 66 during Cold War 91 strategic weaponry 54 strategy, Soviet perceptions of 37 US–West European cooperation 112 war planning 29, 39 United States (US), and Soviet Union confrontation, resurgence of 1 defense spending, gap between 185 De´tente between 42, 110 imbalance of nuclear strength between 36 military balance 42, 65, 206 during 70s 131 unfavorable trends in 190 power projection capabilities 169–71 relations in 70s, deterioriation of 199 between 1976 and 1985 195 confrontational era in 62 shift in 202 strategic 56 resurgence in confrontation between 54 tensions, resumption of 78 US counterforce capabilities 28 strategies 65 US INF deployment 107 US LRTNF weapons, in Western Europe 99 US military buildup of 10 CENTCOM 167–68 conventional strategy 126 space policy, purpose of 81 strategy for crisis management and potential local wars 156 key principle of 49 strength, pillars of 164 superiority, decline of 2 US Navy 149 challenge from rival ﬂeet 134 planning in the 1970s 135 warﬁghting capability of 142 US nuclear strategy 40 development of 77 drafting of 39

Index foundation for 50 reassessment of 16, 49 shifts in 15 strategic nuclear potential, growth of 31 technological advancements to shape 20 Weinberger’s emphasis on continuity of 49–50 US RDF, objective of 169 US SALT delegation 181 see also SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) USSR 4, 8, 54 addition of MIRVed warheads to ICBMs by 18 airborne divisions of 169 civil defense and military strategy in, link between 69 collapse of 10 deployment of SS-20s 109 hard-target missile re-entry vehicles/ warheads 58 inﬂuence throughout Western Europe 97 military buildup, scope of 73 military capabilities in, modernization of 9 naval strength 132 production capacity for chemicals, primary metals, power generators and other vital equipment 68 propaganda against ERW 93 reaction to SDI 84 and United States, relative military power between 58 and Warsaw Pact satellites 91 see also Soviet Union Van Cleave, William 34, 181, 183 Vessey, John W. 73 Vietnam deployment of US troops in 110 experience of for US 153 US involvement in 114 US military experience in 126 Vietnam War 5, 176 Vietnamese Communists, Soviet support for 154 V/STOL (Vertical/Short Take-Off and Landing) carriers 137–38

281

‘‘Walk in the Woods’’ 103–4, 107 Walsh, John B 21 Waltz, Kenneth 162 ‘‘War of Attrition’’ 153 War Powers Act 153 war-survival program 65 war, as extension of politics 65 warhead missiles 98 warheads deliverable strategic, in US and Soviet Union 32 Mark 12A, Minuteman III ICBMs with 51 Warner, Volney F 162 Warsaw Pact 92–93, 98, 109, 112–13, 116, 137–38, 150 ability for gradual buildup 119 allies 4 conventional forces in Eastern Europe, improvements in 114 East European forces of 120 forces 121, 126 state of 117 mobilization 122 satellites 91 ‘‘war-winning’’ nuclear strategy 42 weapons 50–54 anti-ship 134 space-based 80 Weinberger, Caspar 48–49, 50, 52, 59, 72, 83, 103–5, 144, 146, 172, 188–89 West Germany ‘‘Forward Defense’’ of 126 support for ERW production 95 Warsaw Pact invasion of 126 West German parachute division 121 Westad, Odd Arne 3 Western Europe, US LRTNF weapons in 99 Wolfe, Thomas 181 Wolfowitz, Paul 34, 181 world peace, threat to 7 World War II 64, 122, 131, 144, 203 experience of 197 emen, North and South, conﬂict Y between 158 Zapad ‘81 149 ‘‘Z ero Option’’ 102–3, 107, 108 umwalt, Elmo 133 Z

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