The Origin of War: The Evolution of a Male-Coalitional Reproductive Strategy

THE ORIGIN OF WAR: Evolution of a Male-Coalitional Reproductive Strategy

by Johan M.G. van der Dennen

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 The Origin of War: Introduction

1.1 Why the Interest in (Primitive) War? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.1.1 Complications of Culture. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.2 The Concepts of Evolutionary Theory. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 1.2.1 Evolution by Means of Natural Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 1.2.2 Competition and Conflict. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 1.2.3 Selfish Gene Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 1.2.4 Game Theory and the Concept of `Evolutionarily Stable Strategy' 16 1.2.5 Group Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 1.2.6 Cost/Benefit Calculus and `Good-for-the-Species' Thinking . . . 21 1.2.7 Kin Selection and Inclusive Fitness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 1.2.8 Exploitative Manipulation and Evolutionary Arms Races . . . . . 26 1.2.9 Replicators and Vehicles. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 1.2.10 Adaptations and Adaptiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 1.2.11 ESS versus EQUUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 1.2.12 Ultimate versus Proximate Explanations . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 1.3 The Evolution of (Ritualized) Aggression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 1.3.1 Ritualized Aggression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 1.3.2 A Simple Model: The War of Attrition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 1.3.3 Hawks and Doves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 1.3.4 The Prudent Hawk Gambit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 1.3.5 Pure, Mixed, and Conditional Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

1.3.6 Asymmetric Contests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 1.3.7 Conventional Fighting as Assessment of RHP. . . . . . . . . . . 43 1.3.8 The Evolution of Territoriality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 1.3.9 Dominance Hierarchies and Cost/Benefit Calculus . . . . . . . . 48 1.3.10 The Evolution of War? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 1.4 The Study of Primitive War: A Brief History. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 1.4.1 Classical Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 1.4.2 The Widening of the Eurocentric World View. . . . . . . . . . . 57 1.4.3 The Age of the Philosophers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 1.4.4 War as a Cultural Invention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 1.4.5 The Rise of Academic Anthropology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 1.4.5.1 Evolutionism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 1.4.5.2 Social Darwinism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 1.4.6 The Major Contemporary Anthropological Schools. . . . . . . . . 63 1.4.6.1 Ethnopsychology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 1.4.6.2 Marxism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 1.4.6.3 The Cultural History School . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 1.4.6.4 The `Grand Diffusionists' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 1.4.6.5 The `Sociological' School . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 1.4.6.6 Functionalism and Structuralism . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 1.4.6.7 The Correlationists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 1.4.6.8 Evolutionary Bio-anthropology . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

2 The Concept and Characteristics of War in Primitive Societies

2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

2.2 Quantitative Criteria in the Definition of War . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 2.3 Concepts and Definitions of `Primitive' War. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 2.4 The Historical Continuity of War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 2.5 Attempts to Define `True' War. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 2.6 Types of Primitive Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 2.7 Lex Talionis: Feuding and/or/versus Warfare. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 2.7.1 The Concept of Feud. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 2.7.2 Feud as a Juridical Mechanism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 2.7.3 Feud as Outlaw Behavior. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 2.7.4 Primitive Warfare as an Extended Feud. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 2.7.5 Feuding and Warfare: Distinct or Overlapping Categories? . . . . 87 2.7.6 Feuding and Warfare: Harsh Reality Strikes Back. . . . . . . . . 88 2.8 Interlude: Discussion and Proposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 2.9 The Forms and Tactics of Primitive Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 2.9.1 Weapons and Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 2.9.2 The Raid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 2.9.3 The Treacherous Feast. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 2.9.4 The Pitched Battle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 2.10 General Characteristics of Primitive War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 2.11 The Hobbes-Rousseau Controversy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 2.11.1 A Study of War. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 2.11.2 Other General Conclusions from the Q.Wright Study . . . . . . . 109 2.11.3 Cultural Evolution and War. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 2.11.4 Belligerence and Civilization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 2.11.5 War as `Agent of Progress'. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

2.11.6 Political Centralization and Military Sophistication. . . . . . 119 2.11.7 Other Correlates of Primitive Belligerence. . . . . . . . . . . 122 2.11.7.1 Primitive Militarism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122 2.11.7.2 Anti-Hedonism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126 2.11.7.3 Combative Sports and Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130 2.11.7.4 Matrilocality/Patrilocality, Feuding and Warfare . . . 131 2.11.7.5 Social-Structural and Psychocultural Dispositions. . . 134 2.11.7.6 Warfare Regulation in Primitive Societies. . . . . . . 137 2.11.7.7 Resource Unpredictability, Mistrust, and War . . . . . 139 2.11.7.8 Peace between Participatory Policies . . . . . . . . . 140 2.11.7.9 Fear and Inducement to Military Participation. . . . . 140 2.11.8 Epilogue. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142

3 Nonhuman Intergroup Agonistic Behavior and `Warfare'

3.1 Intergroup Agonistic Behavior: Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143 3.2 Animal `Wars'. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150 3.2.1 How Tiny Organisms Wage Huge Battles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151 3.3 The Extent of Animal IAB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154 3.4 General Observations on IAB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157 3.5 The Chimpanzee versus the Baboon IAB Pattern . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167 3.6 Proximate Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173 3.7 Socio-ecology: Making Sense of It All. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176 3.8 Ultimate Explanations of Chimpanzee `Warfare'. . . . . . . . . . . . . 180 3.9 Chimpanzee Hunting and `Warfare' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190 3.10 Criticism of the `Chimp-Model' of the Evolution of Warfare . . . . . . 193

3.11 The Evidence of Human Warfare. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197 3.11.1 Skeletal Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199 3.11.2 Pictorial Evidence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209 3.11.3 Evidence from Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211 3.11.4 Other Evidence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212 3.12 Some Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213

4 Biological and Ecological Theories of the Origin and Evolution of War

4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215 4.2 Social Darwinism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215 4.2.1 Racialism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216 4.2.2 Evolutionism/Selectionism: The Struggle for Existence. . . . . . 221 4.2.3 Ignoble Savages. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233 4.2.4 Social Selectionism and Degenerationism. . . . . . . . . . . . . 235 4.2.5 The Moral Majesty of War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239 4.2.6 Instinctivism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251 4.2.7 Epilogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255 4.3 The True Heirs of Malthus (and Hobbes) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257 4.4 Ecological-Demographic Theories. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260 4.4.1 The Savage Solution to the Malthusian Dilemma. . . . . . . . . . 261 4.4.2 Criticism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265 4.5 Functionalist and Multifunctionalist Theories. . . . . . . . . . . . . 266 4.5.1 Multiphase War Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269 4.5.2 Criticism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270 4.5.3 General Criticism of Functionalist Theories. . . . . . . . . . . 273

4.6 Materialist Theories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 276 4.6.1 Land and Game. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277 4.6.2 The Theoretical Basis of Materialism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278 4.6.3 Criticism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 281 4.7 Group Territoriality and the Evolution of War. . . . . . . . . . . . . 286 4.7.1 Criticism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287 4.8 Hunting and Warfare: `Carnivorous Psychology' Theory . . . . . . . . . 290 4.8.1 The `Killer Ape' Hypothesis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292 4.8.2 A Reformulation of the Redirection Hypothesis. . . . . . . . . . 293 4.8.3 The `Fear-Biter' Hypothesis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295 4.8.4 Criticism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296 4.9 The Balance-of-Power Hypothesis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 298 4.9.1 Criticism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300 4.10 Human Brain Evolution and Warfare. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302 4.11 Weapons, Intelligence, and Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305 4.11.1 Criticism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 307 4.12 Level-of-Selection and the Evolution of Warfare. . . . . . . . . . . . 308 4.12.1 Group Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 308 4.12.2 Genic/Individual Selection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 310 4.12.3 Criticism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 312 4.13 Cultural Filter Superimposition and Preadaptations . . . . . . . . . . 313 4.13.1 Criticism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315 4.14 A Biocultural Approach to Human Nastiness. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315 4.15 From "Cherchez la ressource" to "Cherchez la femme". . . . . . . . . . 317 4.15.1 Blood Revenge, Women and Warfare. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317

4.15.2 Criticism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 321 4.15.3 Male Coalitional Psychology and the Evolution of War. . . . . . 322 4.15.4 Criticism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 326 4.15.5 Reproductive Success, Sexual Selection, and Conflict. . . . . . 327 4.15.6 Criticism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 331

5 Cultural Theories and Proximate-Level Explanations of Primitive War

5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333 5.1.1 Warrior versus Soldier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 336 5.1.2 A Brief Digression on `Causes of War'. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 338 5.2 Sociocultural Selection and Evolution of War . . . . . . . . . . . . . 341 5.2.0.1 Biphasic Theory of the Evolution of War. . . . . . . . . 342 5.2.0.2 The Four-Stage Model of the Evolution of War . . . . . . 347 5.2.0.3 The Levels of Military Organization. . . . . . . . . . . 351 5.2.0.4 Simple vs Middle-range Societies . . . . . . . . . . . . 355 5.2.1 Warfare as Macroparasitism: The Prevailing View. . . . . . . . . 359 5.2.2 Marxism-Leninism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 362 5.2.3 Theory of the Unique Origin of War: The Diffusionists. . . . . . 364 5.2.4 War: A Social Theme and Cultural Invention . . . . . . . . . . . 365 5.2.4.1 Cultural-Learning Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 366 5.2.5 Frustration-Aggression Displacement Theory . . . . . . . . . . . 367 5.2.5.1 The Concept and Theories of Aggression . . . . . . . . . 367 5.2.5.2 Personal Aggressiveness and War. . . . . . . . . . . . . 379 5.2.5.3 `Belly hot with anger': Redirection of Aggression. . . . 381 5.2.6 Schismogenesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 382

5.2.7 Conflict Theories. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 383 5.2.8 Exchange Theory, Reciprocity and War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 384 5.2.9 Unrestricted Primitive Warfare and Trap Psychology . . . . . . . 385 5.2.10 Psychoanalytic Theories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 387 5.2.10.1 The Sadomasochistic Theory of War: `Destructive orgasm' 388 5.2.10.2 Herd Instincts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 389 5.2.10.3 Filicide and Intergenerational Male Hostility . . . . . 390 5.2.10.4 War as Purification Rite. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 391 5.2.10.5 War and the Paranoid Elaboration of Mourning. . . . . . 392 5.2.10.6 War as the Supreme Feast. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 394 5.2.10.7 War-Breeding Complexes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 395 5.2.10.8 The Emotional Satisfactions of War. . . . . . . . . . . 396 5.3 Assessment of Motives. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 397 5.3.1 Blood Revenge: Lex Talionis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 405 5.3.2 Vanity Fair: War for Honor, Glory, Prestige. . . . . . . . . . . 410 5.3.3 Warfare as Callisthenics and Catharsis: Game-like wars . . . . . 412 5.3.4 Magico-Religious Motives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 416 5.3.4.1 Belief in, and Fear of, Magic and Witchcraft . . . . . . 417 5.3.4.2 Human Sacrifice. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 418 5.3.4.3 Head- and Trophy-hunting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 419 5.3.5 `Twixt Eros and Thanatos': Sex, Women and Warfare. . . . . . . . 422 5.3.5.1 The Warrior Cult . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 424 5.3.6 War for Land and Territorial Encroachment. . . . . . . . . . . . 427 5.3.7 War for Booty and Spoils . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 428 5.3.8 Cannibalism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 429

5.3.9 War for Slaves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 431 5.3.10 Power, Conquest and Political Expansion . . . . . . . . . . . . 433

6 Of Badges, Bonds and Boundaries: Ethnocentrism, Xenophobia and War

6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 437 6.1.1 The Collectiveness of Human Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 437 6.1.2 The Justification of Violence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 438 6.1.3 The Maliciousness of Ideological Conflicts . . . . . . . . . . . 439 6.1.4 Symbol Systems-cum-Sentiment Structures. . . . . . . . . . . . . 441 6.1.5 Fear Susceptibility. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 445 6.2 Ethnocentrism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 446 6.3 Ethnocentrism: Brief History of the Concept. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 447 6.4 Ethnocentrism and Nationalism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 453 6.5 The Adaptive Significance of Xenophobia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 455 6.5.1 The Function of Enemies and the Need to Have Enemies . . . . . . 460 6.6 Theories of Ethnocentrism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 461 6.6.1 Realistic Group Conflict Theory. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 462 6.6.2 Sociopsychological Theories. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 462 6.6.2.1 Group Narcissism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 462 6.6.2.2 Projection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 463 6.6.2.3 Compensatory or Protest Masculinity. . . . . . . . . . . 463 6.6.3 LeVine and Campbell's Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 464 6.7 Social Identity Theory and Group Animosity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 466 6.8 Dynamics of In-group/Out-group Differentiation . . . . . . . . . . . . 469 6.9 The Logic of Ethnocentrism: The Duality of the Human Mind. . . . . . . 473

6.9.1 Limited Sympathy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 474 6.9.2 Group Identification and Prejudice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 475 6.9.3 Stereotypes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 476 6.9.4 Self-system and Self-deception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 477 6.9.5 Pre-judgments: The Logic of Probability. . . . . . . . . . . . . 477 6.9.6 Reduction of Uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 478 6.9.7 Reification. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 479 6.9.8 Emotions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 479 6.10 Evolutionary Theories of Ethnocentrism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 480 6.10.1 Kin Selection and Inclusive Fitness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 482 6.10.2 Cultural Badges and the Mechanisms of Kin Recognition . . . . . 484 6.10.3 The Ethnic Phenomenon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 485 6.10.4 The Genetic Seeds of Warfare. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 488 6.10.5 Criticism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 493

7 The Politics of Peace in Primitive Societies: The Adaptive Rationale behind Corroboree and Calumet

7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 497 7.2 The Security Dilemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 499 7.3 Fierce Peoples?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 503 7.4 The Inventory of Allegedly Peaceful Societies. . . . . . . . . . . . . 505 7.5 Peace as the Normal Condition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 507 7.6 Prudent Feuders. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 509 7.7 Peacefulness Does Not Equal Pusillanimity or `Gentleness'. . . . . . . 509 7.8 Bellicosity Does Not Equal Aggression. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 511 7.9 Primitive War as a Post-Contact Phenomenon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 514

7.10 The Characteristics of Peaceful Peoples. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 515 7.11 A Typology of Peace. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 519 7.11.1 Strategies of Negative Peace. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 521 7.11.2 Strategies of Positive Peace. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 521 7.12 Purification Rituals: Ambivalence toward the Enemy . . . . . . . . . . 532 7.13 Epilogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 534

8 By Way of Summary: An Evolutionario

8.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 539 8.2 Prelude: Humble Beginnings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 541 8.3 Why Did Sex Evolve?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 545 8.3.1 Why Only Two Sexes?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 548 8.3.2 Quantity versus Quality: r- versus K-selection . . . . . . . . . 549 8.3.3 Sexual Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 549 8.3.4 Reproductive Success (RS) and Parental Investment Theory . . . . 552 8.4 Of Primates, HUCHIBOs and Hominids . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 554 8.4.1 The Primate Adaptations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 554 8.4.2 The Pongid-Hominid Common Ancestor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 557 8.4.3 East of Eden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 558 8.4.4 Bipedalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 560 8.4.5 The Chimpanzee Connection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 563 8.4.6 Group Territoriality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 564 8.4.7 Social and Machiavellian Intelligence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 565 8.4.8 Brains and the Cognitive Niche . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 568 8.4.9 Sociality. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 570

8.4.10 Hunting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 572 8.4.11 The Other Mammalian Social Hunters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 575 8.4.12 Tool Use and Culture. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 577 8.4.13 The Human Mating System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 579 8.4.14 Ecological Dominance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 584 8.4.15 War as a Parental Investment Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . 587 8.4.16 Group Size and Balances of Power. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 589 8.4.17 The Agricultural Revolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 591 8.4.18 Epilogue. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 593

Appendices (List of peoples allegedly without war) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 595 Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 675 Dutch Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 837 Index of Names. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843

1 The Origin of War: Introduction 1.1 Why the Interest in (Primitive) War? When I embarked upon the enterprise of collecting literature on human primitive war some 15 years ago - with the objective to understand the origin of this puzzling and frightening phenomenon of intrahuman, intergroup killing - little did I suspect that some ten years later that subject would be very much alive and kicking in disciplines as diverse as cultural anthropology, ethology, evolutionary biology and sociobiology, and the socio-ecological branch of primatology, generating an abundance of novel and intriguing theories, engendering new waves of empirical (cross-cultural) research, and lots and lots of controversies. At that time, the question of the origin and evolution (if any) of human warfare was a totally marginal and neglected domain of investigation. Among polemologists (or peace researchers as they are known in the Anglosaxon language area), there seemed to be an unshakable consensus that war was a cultural invention and social institution, which had originated somewhere in Mesopotamia some five thousand years ago (It actually was, and still is, a curious blend of the credos of the Margaret Mead school of anthropology, the simplistic dogmas of behaviorist psychology, and a historicist sociology - all consenting to the tabula rasa model of human behavior, i.e., the assumption of infinite plasticity and sociocultural determinism - inexplicably mixed with assumptions of a static Human Nature derived from the Realist school of political science). Such a conception precluded any evolutionary questions: war had a history and development, but no evolution in the Darwinian sense. My main field of interest at that time was all aspects of animal and human aggression and violence, especially the collective and organized violence known as war. For most polemologists, including myself, this meant, in fact, studying contemporary warfare, i.e., from roughly the Napoleonic wars to the Vietnam war. Others regarded only the post-World-War-II wars or the Cold War to be of any scientific relevance. I gradually became interested in the study of ’primitive’ war (i.e., warfare in nonliterate, prestate-level societies) for several reasons: (1) It was not unusual at that time (nor is it now) to point to the alleged ubiquity and universality of war as somehow conclusive evidence of human ’innate aggression’, or some other evil streak in human nature. I have always felt extremely unhappy with such a notion, which has a strong foothold in western Christian tradition, and I decided, if not to refute, at least to challenge



it. (2) I also gradually discovered that the wisdom of the age in regard to primitive war was sadly unsatisfactory, highly stereotyped (’noble’ versus ’ignoble’ savage), and totally inadequate for theoretical propositions beyond the cocktail-party-wisdom level. This was the main reason to start the Ethnological Inventory Project: a compilation of the warring/feuding behaviors (or absence thereof) and motives of all the societies ever described in the ethnological and 1 ethnographical literature, as much as possible based on original sources . Some preliminary results of this ongoing research have been reported in van der Dennen (1990, 1993), and Ch. 7. (3) And last, but not least, I soon found myself absorbed in the subject matter, sucked into the maelstrom, intrigued, indeed, fascinated for its own sake. How was this all possible? How did war originate? And - perhaps above all - WHY? While I was frenziedly skimming all the literature I could lay hands on in search of some solution, some hint even, to the vexing problem of why human beings - ’primitive’ or ’civilized’ did not seem to make a difference - exhibited this peculiar behavior of massively and concertedly exterminating members of their own kind, two things happened which changed my perspective dramatically. The first was Jane Goodall’s reports in the seventies - in the first reports her despairing bewilderment about the discoveries is clearly perceptible - of strange and horrible events happening in the chimpanzee population she had been observing for many years. Some of her beloved animals seemed to have acquired a taste for cannibalism, and, incredibly, one community of chimpanzees actually seemed to be trying to deliberately exterminate another community, in such a way as to closely resemble human raiding in warfare. Obviously, Homo sapiens sapiens was no longer unique among the creatures that crawl this earth in its destructive propensities. Equally obviously, all theories about the origin of war, in which implicitly Man’s uniqueness was presumed, could be put quietly to rest. A broader, more general explanatory perspective or framework was required: an evolutionary one. The second change which had an impact on my thinking occurred gradually. What had at first looked like bedazzling, kaleidoscopic diversity - all these different cultures and diverse societies, almost limitless in their variability of behaviors, customs, values and world views - gradually turned into a much more coherent view of rather superficial variations on a common theme. The 1

It was also growing dissatisfaction with the rather static character of the Human Relations Area Files and its virtual monopoly position as a universal data base (though it is incomplete and unreliable: cf. Fedigan, 1986; Knauft, 1991), and the increasing number of discrepancies I seemed to discover between several other inventories and the sources I had uncovered, which prompted the Ethnological Inventory Project. Not hampered by any methodological constraints, I could freely indulge in the fascinating accounts of ‘savages’ reported by missionaries, travellers and adventurers from about the 16th century onward.



common theme we might as well call ’human nature’, the variations stemming from the contingencies and bric-à-brac of the material culture and the social cosmologies of the peoples involved. What gradually emerged was the constancy beneath the superficial differences, the communality beneath the variations; it dawned upon me that all these variations were indeed variations on a common theme, and that this common theme must be something like a universal psychology. There was only one theory which could accommodate this new insight: evolutionary theory. In the remainder of this chapter, I shall us the term sociobiology as a shorthand for evolutionary biology, socio-ecology, ethology, Darwinian psychology, and similar disciplines, with the emphasis on evolutionary biology and Darwinian psychology. Why a sociobiological approach? Some critics would object that it is unethical or immoral (it should not be done); others that it is irrelevant (it’s a dead-end street). For many people, including myself, war is an abhorrent subject to deal with in the first place; and sociobiological explanations being in themselves detestable, sociobiological explanations of warfare are, so to speak, repulsive 2 to the power two . My own position is that the questions sociobiology poses are relevant, legitimate and valid. But whether sociobiology can provide valid answers to these questions is another question altogether (Cf. Voorzanger, 1987). That is, among other things, what I intend to investigate in this study. One caveat is in order: there is no such thing as the evolutionary-biological theory. Rather it is a collection of premises, (sometimes contradictory) hypotheses, and islands of theory formation: a paradigm in statu nascendi. What these have in common is the assumption that Homo sapiens sapiens (Man, for short), like all other organisms, evolved, and that at least part of his behavioral repertoire can be understood in an evolutionary perspective. There is no compelling reason why selection and evolution should be confined to operate only on the morphology and neurophysiology of organisms. Those readers who are convinced that human social behavior is somehow beyond evolutionary explanation, I sincerely recommend not to waste their time reading this book, 3 as I shall make no attempt whatsoever to convince or convert them . Van den Berghe (1991) has pointed out that AProperly understood, evolutionary theory is intellectually repugnant to most of us. It is not easy to accept that evolution is a meaningless tale told by an idiot@. My attempt to explain the existence of a disgusting phenomenon (war) by means of a revolting theory (evolution) may not be particularly appealing to many readers. 2

3

Strictly speaking, natural selection does not select directly for behaviors; it selects for the psychological processes that (in conjunction with the environment) underlie behavior (D. Brown, 1991). Evolutionary psychology attempts to discover the innate psychological processes that constitute (or are key ingredients in) human nature, that were shaped by evolution, and that may C in our present environment C result in behavior that makes no sense at all in terms of maximizing reproductive success (e.g., Cosmides & Tooby, 1987; Symons, 1989; Tooby & Cosmides, 1989).



Let me qualify my own position as ’methodical skepsis’, which means not only skepsis about methods, but skepsis as a method, as the only way to avoid traps, pitfalls, self-delusions, and the fables, fallacies, and folderol that science generates. Furthermore, I am inclined to believe that science is not about solutions but about problems and questions, about ignorance rather than knowledge (and that the German adage "Wissenschaft ist was Wissen schaft" is in a fundamental way wrong). That science may sometimes hit or stumble upon a solution for a particular problem is only a fortunate coincidence. The everyday business of science is to generate, test, and possibly reject theories: conjectures and refutations (Popper, 1963). Before I add yet another misunderstanding, I would like to emphasize that I am skeptical toward all theories. The reader should not be afraid that I shall try to proselytize or impose my own pets upon him. What I intend to do is to present the material as objectively as possible, and everyone should feel absolutely free to reject or accept, or be quite indifferent to, the conclusions I shall eventually draw. Why, then, one might well ask, embark upon such an enterprise? The answer is, at least part of the answer is, that others have already done so, which gives me an opportunity to weed out the ’just-so stories’ from the more compelling arguments. Another partial answer is that this study is also the outcome of an act of faith. If I did not ’believe’ at least in the possibility of evolutionary explanation, I would have refrained from it. It is the belief that evolutionary theory can provide a framework (or paradigm, if one likes) in which social behavior makes more sense in toto than in other Behavioristic psychology assumed that the human mind was virtually a tabula rasa: it had little wiring, and that of a very general sort. But behaviorism, or extreme versions of it, has been shown to have severe limitations. Current thought C forcefully supported by data on the highly specific cognitive, emotional, or behavioral deficits that result from brain lesions in specific locations C thus has it that the mind is wired in great detail. This restoration of the localizing or faculty theory of the brain, which had been swept aside by behaviorism, is further buttressed by lessons from the attempts to develop artificial intelligence and by evolutionary theory. Creating artificial intelligence has been much more complicated than was first thought, and constructing systems that duplicate the performance of even relatively simple mental tasks requires considerable preprogramming that is specific to the task and that is analogous to ‘innate knowledge’. In other words, the model of the human mind as comprising general-purpose ‘intelligence’ finds no support in artificial intelligence. The relevant theoretical consideration is that in the course of its evolution the human species did not encounter general problems, it encountered specific problems, such as recognizing faces and detecting cheaters in social exchanges. We should no more expect a general-purpose mental organ to evolve than we should expect general-purpose anatomical or physiological organs (D. Brown, 1991; Cosmides & Tooby, 1987; see also Fodor, 1983). These mental mechanisms, with very few possible exceptions, must be panhuman (universal) and must have evolved in the long period in which humans were hunter-gatherers.



frameworks (paradigms), or, in other words, that it has potentially greater explanatory power than competing paradigms, in the sense that an evolutionary paradigm can more easily accommodate the other frameworks than vice versa. This is simply another way of stating that an ultimate framework can more easily accommodate proximate frameworks than vice versa (See ' 1.2.12). 1.1.1 Complications of Culture The - at least partial - independence of culture, as an ’autonomous’ phenomenon, from biological evolution manifests itself, it is argued, at least in three forms or aspects: temporal, spatial and structural. Firstly, the theoretical rate of genetic change in time is too small to meet the rapid changes that have occurred in human cultures historically. Secondly, the very large cultural differences observed among contemporaneous populations cannot be reduced to biological differences. And thirdly, culture is a group phenomenon par excellence, opposed to biological evolution that works through the differential survival and reproduction of individuals. These differences between biological and cultural evolution have induced social scientists to separate them sharply as independent realities, two distinct domains of human existence. The sociologist Emile Durkheim (1893) stressed that social facts are not reducible to any other level of understanding. Durkheim’s legacy has dominated the social sciences during the 20th century. Leslie White (1949) asserted that culture must be considered as a phenomenon sui generis, as a class of events and processes that behaves in terms of its own elements and processes and laws and which, consequently, can be explained only in terms of its own elements, processes and laws. Sahlins (1977) and Sahlins & Service (1960) regard culture as an arbitrary reality independent from biology. It creates an autonomous symbolic order in a particular society. In this view, human beings are not socially defined by their organic qualities but exclusively by the meaningful values of culture. In considering warfare from an evolutionarily biological perspective, we implicitly make, of course, the assumption that (aspects of) warring behavior have indeed evolved in the Darwinian sense, and are not just ’cultural inventions’. This is a ’dangerous’ assumption for many people, as it seems to imply ’genetic determinism’, the worst heresy sociobiology is accused of. Furthermore, such an assumption is quite absurd for those critics, who maintain that human warfare has a history as a one-time cultural invention, but no evolution. Such a position seems implicitly to convey the message that human behavior is totally and absolutely shaped by culture, that human culture has totally and absolutely taken over the hegemony of the genes, and that, hence, any biological approach to human behavior is quite irrelevant. My first tentative answer to the cultural determinists would be that the discovery of chimpanzee ’warfare’, and the growing body of literature on



intergroup conflicts in primates and other mammals (see Ch. 3), make such a monolithically cultural position very unlikely, unless the term culture is substantially diluted. My second tentative answer would be that all human (and nonhuman) behavior is always the product of complex interactions of many forces or determinants on many levels-of-analysis, including evolutionary ones. Ultimately, all organisms are the products of the former strategies of their genes. And the human being, however magnificent and god-like a creature he may consider himself to be, is no exception. This is not to deny that the relationship between biological and cultural evolution is still a problematic, controversial, and hotly debated issue. Thus we are informed < < < < < < <

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that cultural evolution is just the continuation of natural evolution by other means; in other words, that natural and cultural evolution constitute one single evolutionary process; that it is Man’s nature to have culture, and that all human behavior is ’mediated’ by culture; that culture and nature are the arguments in a false dichotomy; that natural evolution keeps cultural evolution on a leash by means of epigenetic rules in a gene-culture coevolutionary process; that cultural evolution operates in the same way as, or analogous to, natural evolution, by means of blind and random variation and selective retention, but on memes or culturgens as replicators instead of genes; that cultural evolution is an independent development beyond Darwinian evolution, having non-Darwinian properties: the so-called Lamarckian inheritance of whatever is considered as a unit of cultural transmission; that sociocultural evolution is different from biological evolution in speed, structure and dynamics, but is nevertheless rooted in, and constrained by, the behavioral repertoire resulting from biological evolution; that Man genetically tracks his culture; that culture is, to all effects, the opposite, or even the denial or transcendence, of nature; that there is an inevitable (intrapsychic) conflict between Man’s ’nature’ and the demands and constraints of his culture; or that Man is torn apart by the clashing forces of his innate schizophysiology; or that there is a lag between the evolution of Man’s brain and Man’s mind; or that Man is a misfit in his man-made environment (these dualistic views mostly equate Man’s nature with dark, irrational, uncontrollable and often destructive, forces or motivations bridled by the rational and constructive superimpositions of culture); that culture is the mode of transmission of the total set of artifacts and

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mentifacts (ideas; descriptive, evaluative and prescriptive information) which enables Man to shelter and protect himself from nature; that Man is a unique and rational being totally divorced from nature because humans have minds, symbolic language, rationality, etc. (which virtually always collapses into the same circular argument);

Notice that many of these views imply that there is a non-sequitur, if not outright conflict, between natural and cultural evolution. One neat example is the ’dual inheritance model’ of cultural transmission developed by Boyd & Richerson (1985). They point out that certain evolutionary forces characteristic of cultural evolution may lead to maladaptive outcomes in terms of genetic fitness. The authors thus explicitly admit the possibility of conflicts between cultural and genetic evolution. Also Campbell (1975) envisaged such a possibility: "For many behavioral dispositions the two systems support each other. For others, the two are in conflict, and curb each other", because the retention system of cultural evolution inevitably "includes a lot of noise, maladaptive mutations and chaff, along with selected kernels of wisdom". Curiously - paradoxically? - it is evolutionary reasoning itself which may predict such a nature-culture clash: "... evolutionary reasoning alerts investigators to the likely prospect that crucial aspects of human symbolic behavior, specifically the enhanced capacities for deception and self-deception, may well engender circumstances that encourage individuals to behave contrary to their material and reproductive self-interest" (Crippen, 1992). Culture, in brief, can not be viewed as a mechanism that invariably contributes to fitness maximization. Another tentative answer might be: It does not matter how a particular behavior arises, whether by Darwinian selection or by cultural invention. Once in existence, however, it is subject to Selection (natural and cultural selection). If this behavior does not contribute to inclusive fitness in the long run, it will be selected against. If it is a cultural trait that does not, on average, enhance the reproductive success or the survival of the protagonists, it will eventually be substituted by another trait (or the protagonists will go extinct). Cultural and symbolic capacities, which impose high costs on human organisms in terms of energy, nutrients, and risks of malfunction, would not have been retained by natural selection if they did not confer some degree of selective advantage on their bearers (e.g., Irons, 1979; Lopreato, 1984; Green, 1995). Graham Richards (1987) has sorted out the various theoretical positions regarding the relative statuses of biological and cultural evolution. Briefly, the main schools include (a) Biological evolution has been totally supplanted by sociocultural evolution; (b) Biological evolution and cultural evolution are aspects of a single evolutionary process; (c) Biological and sociocultural



evolution are fundamentally conflicting; (d) Biological and sociocultural evolution are parallel processes; (e) Sociocultural evolution is subordinated to biological evolution. Richards’ overview and lucid account of the merits and demerits of the 4 theoretical stances is highly recommended . All in all, one gets the impression that many theorists are extremely unhappy with the notions of culture and cultural evolution. This is no dark mystery if one realizes the astonishing complexities involved for a theory of evolution by means of natural selection. Anticipating the exposition of the concepts of contemporary evolutionary biology in the next section, a brief digression to the founding fathers of evolutionary theory might provide a taste of the struggle with the problems involved. The human capacity for culture and all that it entails (intelligence, language, morality, altruism, justice, etc.) posed a real and serious problem to the early evolutionists (Cronin, 1991). Alfred Russell Wallace, the co-founder of classical Darwinian evolutionary theory, for example, became more and more convinced that natural selection could not possibly account for our advanced mental attributes and the distinctly human brain. And, what is worse, some of these refined capacities would even have been a downright nuisance and a danger "in the severe struggle he [the savage] has to carry on against nature and his fellow-man" (Wallace, 1891). Charles Darwin strongly disagreed with this view, as did, initially, Thomas Huxley. Eventually, however, ’Darwin’s bulldog’ came to believe that human morality must have been the result of cultural evolution only: the struggle for existence in nature, he held, is so profoundly red-in-tooth-and-claw that it would smother a developing morality at birth because morality must necessarily work against nature: "[S]ince law and morals are restraints upon the struggle for existence, the ethical process is in opposition to the principle of the cosmic process [the Hobbesian war of each against all], and tends to the 4

For other reviews of, and positions and arguments in, this vast literature, see: Alexander, 1979, 1987; Bonner, 1955, 1980; Boulding, 1978; Boyd & Richerson, 1980, 1981, 1983, 1985; B.Campbell, 1970, 1972, 1979; D.Campbell, 1972, 1975, 1983; Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981; Crippen, 1992; Darlington, 1969, 1978; Dawkins, 1982; Dobzhansky, 1955, 1962; Dobzhansky & Boesiger, 1983; Durham, 1976, 1979, 1987, 1990, 1991; Freud, 1930; Goldschmidt, 1966, 1969; Haas, 1990; Holloway, 1981; Kitcher, 1985; Kitihara-Frisch, 1980; Koestler, 1968; Lopreato, 1984; Lumsden & Wilson, 1981, 1983; MacLean, 1987; Maxwell, 1984; Maynard Smith, 1975, 1982; 1989; McCauley, 1990; Mumford, 1961; Parker, 1985; Plotkin, 1982, 1988; Plotkin & Olding-Smee, 1981; Reynolds, 1984; Richards, 1987; Richerson & Boyd, 1978; Rindos, 1985, 1986; Ruyle, 1973; Sagan, 1977; Sahlins & Service, 1960; Service, 1975; Stebbins, 1982; Tinbergen, 1968, 1981; Uyenoyama & Feldman, 1980; Voorzanger, 1987; Washburn & Howell, 1960; Washburn & Moore, 1980; White, 1959; E.O. Wilson, 1975, 1978; de Winter, 1984. In Ch. 8 it will be argued that the concept of culture is not very helpful for an evolutionary reconstruction of the hominid trajectory.



suppression of the qualities best fitted for success in that struggle" (Huxley, 1894). Herbert Spencer, the founding father of Social Darwinism (which we shall encounter later on) argued that the inheritance of acquired characteristics was the only possible evolutionary force responsible for the evolution of human morality. His vision was that the inheritance of acquired characteristics (a theory of evolution associated with the French naturalist Lamarck) would bridge the gap between biological and cultural evolution, forging them into one grand seamless process (Cronin, 1991). In the next section I shall return to some of these issues. My point of view is that many phenomena surrounding war and warfare, war practices, rituals, motives, etc. cannot be properly understood without the sociocultural context (i.e., the shared set of meanings, ideas, concepts, beliefs, values, assumptions) in the construction of the various social cosmologies. We simply cannot do without cultural categories, as will be exemplified in the discussion of the materialist school and the sociocultural construction of what constitutes a resource (Ch. 5). I regard human beings as shrewd social strategists, clever manipulators, and conscious, intelligent decision-makers in the service of their inclusive fitness, operating within the constraints of their cultural semantics: the signification and interpretative frameworks (the semiotics and ethics) provided by the culture they happen to have been born in. The cultural aspects of human behavior should not, however, be portrayed as disembodied systems of symbolic information, as is commonly done by cultural anthropologists. This is a rather curious stance in light of our knowledge of cultural universals (D. Brown, 1991). It is far more plausible to assume that these cultural universals - including language acquisition and structure, toolmaking, kinship rules and incest avoidance, religion, morality, age- and sex-differentiated roles and statuses, some degree of ethnocentrism and territoriality, etc. - are grounded in universal features of human nature, traits that, in turn, are intimately linked to properties of the human central nervous system. As such, both the capacity for and the expression of cultural behavior may be viewed as products of evolution by means of natural selection (Crippen, 1992). Yet another tentative answer might be: Basically, both natural and cultural evolution are processes of information transmission. One transmits the information contained in the DNA, the other the information contained in the mind. For example, sex (male/female) is a biological category. Gender (masculine/feminine), on the other hand, is a cultural category, implying norms, standards, values, meanings, and templates or prescriptions of appropriate conduct and role behavior; but ultimately the cultural category of gender does not make any sense without the biological category of sex. It is often asserted that culture is a Lamarckian process. It means that social



knowledge and organization are transmitted not by genes but by learning, from simple imitation to linguistic information. The function of culture is to transmit the information acquired during individual life from generation to generation. In this sense culture really is a Lamarckian process that departs radically from biological evolution in both structure and dynamics. However, culture may conform to the Darwinian ’logic’ in at least three different senses. Firstly, the biological capacity for culture itself is transmitted genetically. Secondly, sociocultural traits still cannot escape ultimate evolution by natural selection. Finally, cultural evolution could follow the same laws and principles that work in biological evolution. The core of the sociobiological approach is that behavioral capacities and tendencies have developed in response to the environment in human evolutionary history through natural selection. Human customs, social institutions and cultural forms have not developed in a biological vacuum, but under the conditions of interactions with natural selection. The biological nature of early Homo must have faced the ecological challenges in the ancient environment, have influenced the elementary shapes of social structures, and have constrained possible trajectories of human history.

1.2 The Concepts of Evolutionary Theory In the following paragraphs, the instrumentarium (the conceptual apparatus and basic ideas) of neo-Darwinian evolutionary biology will be briefly introduced. A thorough understanding of the basics of sociobiology is indispensable in order to grasp and appreciate the explanatory power of the evolutionary framework. 1.2.1 Evolution by Means of Natural Selection According to Mayr (1982), the classical theory of evolution by means of natural selection consists of three inferences based on five facts. The first inference claims that since more individuals are produced than can be supported by available resources, there must be a fierce struggle for existence among the individuals of a population, resulting in the survival of only some of the progeny of each generation. This inference is based on the facts that (1) all species have great potential fertility (fecundity), (2) populations normally display stability, and (3) natural resources are limited and, in a stable environment, remain relatively constant. The second inference claims that survival in the struggle for existence is not random but depends in part on the hereditary constitution of the surviving individuals. This unequal survival constitutes a process of natural selection. This inference is based on the facts that (4) no two individuals are exactly the



same and (5) that much of this variation is heritable. The third inference claims that over the generations this process of natural selection will lead to a continuing gradual change in populations, that is, to evolution and the production of new species (speciation). Note that this formulation of classical Darwinian theory is still considered to be valid, though much of the terminology has now changed (e.g., ’competition for scarce resources’ versus ’struggle for existence’; ’reproductive success’ versus ’fitness’), and the modern (also called ’synthetic’) theory of evolution is thoroughly gene-centered instead of organism- or group-centered as it was in Darwin’s time. In contrast to classical Darwinism, the emphasis now is not on morphology and anatomy of organisms, but on behavior - or more accurately, on behavioral strategies; and not on survival or differential mortality, but on differential reproductive success as the only currency in the cold calculus of evolution. In order to reproduce at all, an organism has, of course, to survive at least till the age of sexual maturity in the arena of nutritional competition, before it can enter the arena of reproductive competition. From this account of evolution by natural selection, it may be deduced that selection is both short-sightedly opportunistic and conservative. Conservative in the sense that it does not create ex nihilo, but by remodeling, reshaping, retinkering, or ’refunctioning’ whatever happens to be available of existing structures, substrates and behavior. That is why many of our organs give the strong impression of being provisional patchwork (which, by the way, is not the only reason: they are often also uneasy compromises as a result of different, conflicting, opposing and mutually counteracting, selection pressures). Adaptive organization, as Pittendrigh (1958) stated, is "a patchwork of makeshifts pieced together, as it were, from what was available when opportunity knocked, and accepted in the hindsight, not the foresight, of natural selection". And not only a ’patchwork of makeshifts’, but also a ’tangle of compromises’ (Tinbergen, 1965). Like a river, natural selection blindly meanders its way down along the successive trajectories of immediately available least resistance. In classical theory, it was little appreciated that substantial costs are involved: Every evolutionary adaptation must cost something, costs being measured in lost opportunities to do other things. There are always costs and trade-offs involved (Dawkins, 1982; Cronin, 1991). And evolution is short-sightedly opportunistic in the sense that there is no ulterior goal, no ’Grand Design of Nature’, no ’Plan of Progress’, no ’Point Omega’. Whatever is momentaneously and selfishly beneficial, i.e., whatever contributes to an individual’s reproductive success (and that is what ’fitness’ is all about) will be selected for, even if that what is selected for is to the detriment of the species as a whole. This latter statement may come as an



unpleasant surprise to those readers who are accustomed to think that organisms happily, harmoniously, and even self-sacrificingly, cooperate and reproduce in order to ensure the survival and secure the continuation of the species. Another principle eminently enters the stage as soon as this harmonious and erroneous view of nature is abandoned. Having limited time and energy budgets, and basically needing the same, and equally limited, resources and commodities for survival and reproduction as their conspecifics, organisms may be expected to compete with, and be in conflict with one another more or less continuously and ubiquitously, and to have developed neurophysiological, endocrinological and behavioral structures and mechanisms adapted to such situations of competition and conflict, at least in primordial form. And because, as evolutionary biology furthermore predicts, in sexually reproducing species one sex (mostly the males) competes for the ultimately limiting reproductive resource (mostly the females), armaments, vigor and fighting capabilities are in many species confined to, or more developed and conspicuous in, the males. Agonistic behavior and its morphological paraphernalia are almost universally sexually dimorphic. In this view, organisms are clever and shrewd - though not necessarily conscious - strategists and inclusive fitness maximizers (which is expected to be reflected in the ’software’ of the individual, i.e., its motivational, emotional and cognitive make-up). 1.2.2 Competition and Conflict Conflict on all levels of organic existence is pervasive, persistent, ubiquitous. Conflict is the universal experience of all life forms. Organisms are bound in multiple conflict-configurations and -coalitions, which have their own dynamic and their own logic. This does not mean, however, that the more paroxysmal forms of conflict behavior, naked violence and destruction, are also universal. Conflict and cooperation are always intertwined. Conflicts do, however, have a propensity to gravitate towards violence. Sociobiological reasoning predicts conflict potentials in every area where there is a relative difference in coefficients of relatedness, and wherever the reproductive interests of individuals are not absolutely identical: motherembryo conflict, parent-offspring conflict, sibling rivalry, conflict between the sexes (the ’battle of the sexes’), male-male conflict, female-female conflict, and intergroup conflict along ethnic, ’racial’, tribal, ideological and other boundaries and cleavages. Indeed, field observations of a great number of species have confirmed these predictions: feticide, infanticide, siblicide, homicide, cannibalism and kronism, and rape, as the most extreme and gory forms of ’conflict-resolution’, are much more widespread in the animal kingdom than was ever envisaged by the first generation of ethologists, such as Lorenz, who thought that animals had innate



inhibitions against killing conspecifics, and that Homo sapiens sapiens was a 5 biological freak and misfit because he apparently lacked those inhibitions . But, as will be seen, competition and conflict do not, automatically and inevitably, imply violence. Violence - the elimination, destruction, incapacitation or mutilation of the opponent - is one way to attempt to (re)solve conflict, and very often it is not the most sensible way, as it incurs extremely high costs (in terms of the time and energy budget: wasted time and opportunities, exhaustion, and injuries or death) to the organism that engages in such behaviors, and the benefits to be derived do not often exceed the costs (bear in mind that even superficial wounds and lacerations make the animal vulnerable to sepsis, infection and debilitation or death). In contrast to the vision of nature as ’red-in-tooth-and-claw’ (Tennyson), which suggests violence, destruction, bloodshed, cruelty and callousness, contemporary evolutionary biology does not stipulate that violence is the best strategy. It does not, however, exclude the possibility in certain well-defined circumstances either (See ' 1.3.1). The universality and ubiquity of conflict in the animal and the human world is, in evolutionary-biological theorizing, expected on the basis of competition over scarce or limiting resources. The units which compete for these scarce resources can be individuals, coalitions of individuals, populations (interdemic competition), species (interspecific competition), etc. Theoretically, populations of two species may interact in 9 basic ways: neutralism, mutual inhibition, competition, amensalism, parasitism, predation, commensalism, proto-cooperation, and mutualism (Odum, 1971; E.O. Wilson, 1975). Interspecific competition, or competition of two species for the same resources is, as E.O. Wilson (1970, 1975) explains, more fatal than a predator-prey relation. Competition eventually leads to the extermination of the species with the smaller growth capacity; a predator-prey relation only leads to periodic oscillation around a mean value (Volterra, 1928; von Bertalanffy, 1968). Competition, as Miller (1967) modified the original Clements & Shelford (1939) definition, is "the active demand by two or more individuals of the same 5

The ‘misfit’ conception of man, as propagated by Lorenz, Tinbergen, Freud and many of their disciples, may be considered a revival of the doctrine of Original Sin B which has permeated Judeo-Christian culture ever since St. Augustine (354-430) B in biological terms. ATwo of the most significant psychologists of the twentieth century@, Barash & Lipton (1985) commented, ASigmund Freud and Konrad Lorenz, reinforced a pessimistic view of human nature by their inadvertent misapplication of Darwin’s theory... Even worse, if it so happened that all other animals normally restrained themselves, and behaved ‘for the good of the species’, and selfishness and violence occurred only within Homo sapiens, then people really would be aberrant, biologically tainted with a kind of original sin. Konrad Lorenz and his generation of ethologists were apparently unaware of the ubiquity of animal violence, and thus they falsely attributed special malevolence to human beings@.



species (intraspecies competition) or members of two or more species at the same trophic level (interspecies competition) for a common resource or requirement that is actually or potentially limiting". This definition is consistent with the assumptions of the Lotka-Volterra equations, which still form the basis of the mathematical theory of competition (Levins, 1968). Intraspecific competition occurs when two or more individuals seek access to a resource that is somehow important to the fitness of each and that is restricted in abundance such that optimal utilization of the resource by one individual requires that another settle for suboptimal utilization. In other words, if there is enough to go around, then there is no reason for competition - e.g., few animals ever compete for air. However, severe competition may erupt over food, water, nesting sites, and/or appropriate mates (Barash, 1977, 1979; Cf. E.O.Wilson, 1970, 1975; Daly & Wilson, 1978; Trivers, 1985; Huntingford & Turner, 1987; Archer, 1988; van der Dennen & Falger, 1990; van der Dennen, 1992; a.o.). Nicholson (1955) was the first to make a distinction between contest competition and scramble competition. Non-aggressive scramble competition occurs when each participant attempts to accumulate and/or utilize as much of the critical resource as it can, without regard to any particular social interaction with its competitors (comparable to an Easter egg hunt). If the resource is used up in the process, then the winners of scramble competition are the individuals who have converted the largest part of that resource into copies of themselves. Fitness in this case has been achieved by simply out-reproducing the competition, usually by being most efficient at locating, exploiting, or garnering the resource in question. In contrast, contest competition would be occurring if the participants first argued, fought, or somehow disputed among themselves, and then use the outcome of such interactions to determine access to resources: To the victor belong the spoils (Barash, 1977; Huntingford & Turner, 1987). The fitness of both parties (that is their chances of surviving and reproducing) will depend critically on how these conflicts are resolved. So we should expect to find that animals have evolved ways of increasing their chances of coming out on top. Alternatively, competition may be sidestepped by mutual avoidance, either in space or in time. Responses to conflicting interests other than scramble competition are often referred to as interference competition. The use of physical coercion in response to a conflict of interest is often described as aggression. Aggression may be considered to be the proximate mechanism of contest competition. It takes place when individuals interact with each other such that one of them is induced to surrender access to some resource important to its fitness. The exact forms of aggression vary widely, from intimidating displays and threats to actual fights. It may be considered to be a special case of coercive manipulation in which the desired outcome is brought about by intense displays, which can, if required, be escalated to direct physical confrontation,



and injury, or even death, of one or both of the contestants (Barash, 1977; Huntingford & Turner, 1987). Just as animals are expected to exert themselves to acquire important resources or enlarge their supply, thereby enhancing their fitness, they are also expected to resist the loss of important resources, thereby avoiding decrements to their fitness. Offense is often differentiated from defense in both human and animal conflict behavior. It is hard to draw a clear dividing line at any point of the continuum from offense or attack through offensive and defensive threat and submission to escape, yet it seems improper to include escape under the heading of Y meaning aggression. Therefore ’agonistic behavior’ (from the Greek ’contest’), which refers to a "system of behavior patterns having the common function of adaptation to situations involving physical conflict" (Scott & Fredericson, 1951), is offered as the more inclusive term. Another (and independent) distinction is that made by E.O. Wilson (1975) between resource competition (called ’nutritional competition’ by Symons [1979]) and sexual competition (called ’reproductive competition’ by Symons). Sexual competition involves access to receptive mates; it may include both contest and scramble forms. One form of sexual competition which is similar to scramble competition is unobtrusive mating (or kleptogamy), where a male sneaks up to one of a number of females which are being guarded by another male. There are a number of indirect forms of sexual competition which fall into the category of ’contest’ competition yet do not involve fighting. In males, competition may take the form of removing a rival’s sperm prior to mating, sperm competition, or olfactorily induced pregnancy block. In females, it may take the form of suppression of the reproductive activity of other females (e.g., Archer, 1988). The evolutionary rules underlying interspecific variations in competitive aggression specifically for food resources have been covered by J.L. Brown (1964), E.O. Wilson (1975), Clutton-Brock & Harvey (1976), Geist (1978), and Archer (1988) among others. When food is abundant, aggression will be unnecessary since the same benefits can be obtained without it. When food is scarce, it will often be advantageous for the animal to use its energy in foraging for food (i.e., scramble competition) rather than in contest competition, particularly when food is widely dispersed or difficult to find. In general, therefore, we might expect aggression to occur under conditions of intermediate food availability.



1.2.3 Selfish Gene Theory One of the greatest achievements of evolutionary biology is perhaps its ability to explain the apparent harmony, beauty, peacefulness, cooperation and altruism that we undoubtedly perceive in much of nature as outcomes of individual, self-centered and short-sighted conflict strategies (or, rather, the strategies of the genes of which the individual is just the temporary vehicle). Though already suggested some 50 years ago by mathematically oriented biologists like Fisher (1930) and Haldane (1932), it has only very recently been realized that the basic unit of natural selection is not the species, the group, the individual, or even the chromosome: it is the formerly hypothetical (and potentially immortal) gene. It consists of desoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), and its most important biochemical property is its tendency to make replicas or copies of itself. As Dawkins (1976) in his anthropomorphic metaphor puts it, each gene ’selfishly’ attempts to spread as many copies of itself as possible. This copies-maximizing behavior is the result of natural selection, genetic variation, and, ultimately, the biochemical properties of the DNA. In this parlance, also, the individual organisms are merely the vehicles or throw-away survival machines for those selfish genes (Dawkins, 1976 et seq.; Wind, 1982 et seq.; Cronin, 1991). Interestingly, we may expect conflict even at this level of ’selfish’ genes: Intragenomic conflict. There are now known, for example, to be genes causing segregation distortion (’meiotic drive’) which makes them to be present in more than half of the gametes. As G.C. Williams (1979) made clear: "The really fundamental question in evolution may be answerable only by regarding each gene as ultimately in conflict with every other gene, even those at other loci in the same cell" (Cf. Crow, 1979; Cosmides & Tooby, 1981; Dawkins, 1982; Wind, 1984; and Ridley, 1993).



1.2.4 Game Theory and the Concept of ’Evolutionarily Stable Strategy’ (ESS) Natural selection is ultimately differential survival of alleles in gene pools. We can talk about the Darwinian evolution of behavior only if we are prepared to visualize genetically determined behavioral alternatives in the population. Each genetically determined behavioral alternative is referred to as a ’strategy’. A strategy in this sense can be defined only by contrast with at least one alternative. It does not have to be something the animal works out in a cognitive or purposive sense. Rational decisions do not come into ESS theory. Rather, each organism is assumed to be provided with a nervous system which is wired up in advance so that it performs in a certain way, programmed, in other words. A strategy stands to an organism in the same relation as a program to a computer. It is an unconscious behavior program, a candidate for natural selection in competition with alternative strategies. Then we can ask which program or combination of programs will be stable against evolutionary invasion by alternative minority programs which might arise in the population by mutation or immigration (Maynard Smith, 1974, 1976, 1978; Maynard Smith & Price, 1973; Maynard Smith & Parker, 1976; Dawkins, 1980; Caryl, 1981) The defining characteristic of an ESS, according to Dawkins (1980), is not that it is the optimum or even the ’best’ strategy for all individuals involved. Rather, it is immune to cheating. In simpler phrasing, an ESS is a strategy with the property that if most of the members of a large population adopt it, then no mutant strategy can invade the population. In other words, a strategy is evolutionarily stable if there is no mutant strategy that gives higher Darwinian fitness to the individuals adopting it. Any mutants practicing a different strategy will reap a lower reproductive payoff, and eventually will die out 6 (Maynard Smith, 1978) . In ' 1.3 the concepts of strategy and ESS will be applied to a game-theoretical analysis of (the evolution of) ritualized or conventional aggression.

6

Mathematically, an ESS is defined as follows: A strategy I is an ESS if the expected utility of I played against itself is greater than the utility of any other strategy J played against I. This can be written Ei (I) > Ei (J), where E gives the expected utility of the strategy in parentheses played against the strategy indicated by the subscript. In a population consisting entirely of individuals adopting strategy I, rare variants arising by mutation which adopted a different strategy J would not increase in frequency, and hence the population would be stable under mutation and selection. An ESS may be either a pure strategy or a mixed strategy if it consists of adopting one out of a set of pure strategies according to a set of preassigned probabilities. If so, a stable population could either be genetically polymorphic, with appropriate frequencies of individuals adopting different pure strategies, or it could be monomorphic, the behavior of all individuals being random in an appropriate way (Maynard Smith, 1978).



1.2.5 Group Selection Group selection is one of the most confused and confusing topics in modern evolutionary biology. It is part of an ongoing and sometimes acrimonious, controversy over the ’level-of-selection’. The term ’group selection’ is used in a dazzling number of different meanings. One generic meaning of the term ’group selection’ is the idea that a trait may evolve for the benefit or the ’greater good’ of the group or species, but at the expense of the individual gene carrier. In brief the group selection paradigm states that ’something’ evolves because it is good, or beneficial, or advantageous, or functional, or adaptive for the group or the species. A recurrent problem with the group selection paradigm is that ’something’ (be it somatic or behavioral) which evolves for the good of the individual organism always overrules that which may evolve for the ’greater good’ of the species. One example may suffice to illustrate this important principle of evolutionary biology: Induced abortions, intrauterine resorption of embryos, cannibalism and kronism of offspring, nest desertion and infanticide exist as evolved mechanisms and behaviors (strategies, for short) in many species. These strategies can hardly be construed as good for the (preservation of the) species. Yet, they have evolved, and virtually all of these strategies can be shown to be adaptive in terms of reproductive success, not for the species but for the individual organism practicing them. Claims that selection operates at a higher level than the individual, that is, at the level of the group or species, favoring traits that allow these larger units to survive, have been variously called the ’group selection fallacy’, the ’species benefit fallacy’ or ’greater goodism’. This idea of ’greater goodism’, as will be seen, is now commonly rejected for reasons elaborated below, and, as Maxwell (1991) explains: "Within sociobiological circles, belief in this phenomenon marks you as a member of the out-group. The theory of group selection is viewed as one of the great mistakes made by earlier biologists - notably by Wynne-Edwards (1962). It holds that traits (particularly altruistic traits) that make Group A more fit than Group B (as a group) can proliferate because Group A will survive and Group B will die out. For instance, a group or population of animals that limits its birthrate would avoid overconsumption of resources and consequent famine, hence it would do better than a groups of prolific profligate individuals. The flaw in group-selectionist thinking is that there is no way to explain how the early mutants with this self-sacrificing trait would survive - they would obviously be out-reproduced by their fellow groupmembers. For the most part, it has now been shown (by George C. Williams [1966] and others) that the illusion of group selection can usually be explained by individual selection or by kin selection". The mechanisms involved are quite easy to understand: "Traits that lower individual reproductive success tend automatically to be eliminated from the



population so that later, possible indirect benefits to the species itself are irrelevant to the traits’ fate within the species. All traits must begin as rare in a species and can increase in frequency only if they increase the survival and reproductivity of those bearing the traits" (Trivers, 1985) But there is a more fundamental reason why group selection, in this sense, is evolutionarily very unlikely, and that is the basic difference between replicators and vehicles (See ' 1.2.9). The other generic meaning of the term ’group selection’ is the idea that in the course of human evolution, groups have competed with one another - some groups subjugating other groups, some groups absorbing and assimilating other groups, some groups even eliminating other groups altogether - and that these events must have had an impact on the gene pools and (the direction of) human evolution. As applied to the human species, therefore, group selection may be eminently possible, "since one group of humans can consciously organize their altruistic behaviors and wipe out a rival group" (Maxwell, 1991). We shall encounter especially this latter meaning of ’group selection’ in the chapters to follow. This latter meaning of the term ’group selection’ is probably what Darwin envisaged when attempting to explain human morality (which posed a serious problem for his theory). Darwin starts by considering competition between groups. If a group that has a high proportion of unselfishly devoted members comes into conflict with a group that has a high proportion of selfish members, it is easy to see that the group of altruists will triumph. Their discipline, fidelity, courage and other such qualities will soon ensure victory. But the problem is to explain how unselfishness ever got off the ground in the first place: "[H]ow within the limits of the same tribe did a large number of members first become endowed with these social and moral qualities, and how was the standard of excellence raised?" (Darwin, 1871). Unselfish members would not have the most offspring, Darwin realized - quite the contrary: It is extremely doubtful whether the offspring of the more sympathetic and benevolent parents, or of those which were the most faithful to their comrades, would be reared in greater number than the children of selfish and treacherous parents of the same tribe. He who was ready to sacrifice his life... rather than betray his comrades, would often leave no offspring to inherit his noble nature. The bravest men, who were always willing to come to the front in war, and who freely risked their lives for others, would on an average perish in larger number than other men (Darwin, 1871). He concedes that the problem looks almost intractable: "Therefore it seems scarcely possible... that the number of men gifted with such virtues, or that the standard of their excellence, could be increased through natural selection, that



is, by the survival of the fittest". Darwin sees two ways out of the difficulty. One is reciprocity: "[E]ach man would soon learn that if he aided his fellowmen, he would commonly receive aid in return". But when he turns to his other solution, he seems to suggest that individual sacrifice for the sake of the group can evolve because it pays off in intergroup competition: It must not be forgotten that although a high standard of morality gives but a slight or no advantage to each individual man and his children over the other men of the same tribe, yet that an advancement in the standard of morality and an increase in the number of well-endowed men will certainly give an immense advantage to one tribe over another. There can be no doubt that a tribe including many members who, from possessing in a high degree the spirit of patriotism, fidelity, obedience, courage, and sympathy, were always ready to give aid to each other and to sacrifice themselves for the common good, would be victorious over most other tribes; and this would be natural selection (Darwin, 1871). This passage, as Cronin (1991) comments, is puzzling. Darwin specifically said that he is now tackling the problem how altruism gets established within the group; he takes care to remind us "that we are not here speaking of one tribe being victorious over another". And yet he seems to be speaking of exactly that. See Grafen (1984), Melotti (1987) and Cronin (1991) for a host of other meanings of the term ’group selection’. To confuse matters more, it must be admitted that E.O. Wilson, the founding father of sociobiology, did not reject group selection as a theoretical possibility. He argued that "pure kin and pure interdemic selection are the two poles at the end of a gradient of selection on ever enlarging nested sets of related individuals" (E.O. Wilson, 1975). Alexander (1974), another ’ancestor’ of modern evolutionary biology, even reasoned that especially human groups would be expected to have been amenable to powerful group selection: For two reasons human social groups represent an almost ideal model for potent selection at the group level. First, the human species is (and possibly always has been) composed of competing and essentially hostile groups that frequently have not only behaved toward one another in the manner of different species, but also have been able quickly to develop enormous differences in reproductive and competitive ability because of cultural innovation and its cumulative effects. Second, human groups are uniquely able to plan and act as units, to look ahead and purposely carry out actions designed to sustain the group and improve its competitive position. These features may actually represent an exhaustive list of the precise attributes of a species that would maximize its likelihood of



significant group selection, or evolution by differential extinction of groups. Thus group selection involves the paradox that competing populations must be sufficiently isolated to become different in ways that may lead to their differential extinction yet close enough together that they can replace one another. This condition is obviously fulfilled with sympatric competing species, which are intrinsically isolated. So, to some extent, are hostile neighboring populations of humans (Alexander, 1974). To confuse matters even more, if that is still possible, cultural anthropologists use the term ’group selection’ or ’cultural selection’ (vide infra) in their own idiosyncratic way, sometimes contrasting it with ’biological group selection’, sometimes contrasting it with ’biological selection’, and sometimes simply referring to group competition. I warned you it was a confusing topic. 1.2.6 Cost/Benefit Calculus and ’Good-for-the-Species’ Thinking Even without a sophisticated ESS analysis it is not difficult for a modern Darwinian to see that a male animal might well do better by showing some restraint in combat with other males: After all, a policy of let-rip could be very costly. Even a strong male in his prime could have a lot to lose. Opportunity costs, for example: time and energy that he devotes to vanquishing rivals cannot be devoted to catching prey or attracting mates (aggressive neglect). And then there is the fact that, however useful it is to have a rival out of the way, it is equally useful for his other rivals, and it is he that has paid the removal costs. What is more, if the animal that he is fighting already possesses the mate or territory that he wants, the possessor was presumably once a victor, so he is challenging a former champion. In short, the benefits must be set against the costs. Darwin, Wallace and their contemporaries failed to see the costs of conventions. Failing to see the costs of combat is just another side of that same coin (Cronin, 1991). Gradually, as ’good-for-the-species’ thinking began to permeate Darwinism, conventional combat shed its visibility. "Ritualization... has been very important" Julian Huxley stated "in reducing intra-specific damage, by ensuring that threat can ensure victory without actual fighting, or by ritualizing combat itself into what Lorenz calls a tournament... [T]ournament fights provide maximum damage-reduction" (Huxley, 1967). Indeed, ritualized combat came to play a starring role in greater-goodism. What better evidence that natural selection works for the good of the species than that two hefty rivals, capable of tearing one another limb from limb, choose to settle matters peaceably, with a nod and a grunt?



This line of thinking culminated in the 1960s with Konrad Lorenz’s book On Aggression (1966). "Though occasionally, in territorial or rival fights, by some mishap a horn may penetrate an eye or a tooth an artery, we have never found that the aim of aggression was the extermination of fellowmembers of the species concerned" (Lorenz, 1966, p. 38). By contrast, aggression towards other species is no-holds-barred. Or so, at least, Lorenz seems at times to be telling us. And he has certainly been widely criticised for taking a group- or species-level view (e.g. Ghiselin, 1974; Kummer, 1978; Maynard Smith, 1972; Ruse, 1979). Lorenz’s Darwinism is so confused, however, that it is impossible to tell what exactly he had in mind. It is to Wynne-Edwards that one must turn both for an explicit recognition that conventional combat poses a problem and for an explicit attempt to explain it by group selection: "[T]he wholesale wounding and killing of members by one another is generally damaging to the group and has consequently been suppressed by natural selection... [A]ny immediate advantage accruing to the individual by killing and thus disposing of his rivals for ever must in the long run be overridden by the prejudicial effect of continuous bloodshed on the survival of the group as a whole... [C]onventions... have evolved to safeguard the general welfare and survival of the society, especially against the antisocial, subversive self-advancement of the individual" (Wynne-Edwards, 1962, pp. 130-1). At least one knows where he stands, even if it is resolutely in the wrong place. ’Preservation of the species’ has no evolutionary relevance whatsoever, even though, of course, the interests of the individuals and the interests of the group or species do seem to coincide neatly and seamlessly (Cronin, 1991). In this study, evolutionary theory serves a twofold purpose. Firstly, it serves as a kind of selection criterion (no pun intended): In analogy to Occam’s razor it may be called Darwin’s scissors. Theories and hypotheses about human behavior, especially war and warlike activities, that do not incorporate some biologic or actually run counter to selection thinking are considered to be not very viable in the long run. The alternative would inevitably boil down to the assertion that the behavior concerned is some arbitrary, random, senseless and purposeless ’cultural whim’, to be ’explained’ by an equally arbitrary and capricious ’cultural theory’. To be sure, many human behaviors are rather arbitrary and senseless, and to be understood in their historical and cultural context, but regarding matters of life and death, of survival and procreation, of sex and violence, war and peace, this is unlikely to be the whole story. Especially in these vital and lethal domains of life the strategies of the genes can be expected to be prominently and abundantly present. And secondly, selection thinking provides a basis for comparing species as



strategists: Other organisms have had to solve the same kinds of problems as we had: problems of uneasy coexistence, of sociality and competition, predation, parasitism, mate selection, parental investment, exploitation and manipulation, etc. Comparing species as strategists also avoids the common and presumptuous - fallacy of speciesism or anthropocentric apartheid: The, mostly implicit, assumption that all non-human animals (from bacteria to chimpanzees) fall into one single explanatory category whereas Homo s. sapiens alone stands apart, an entirely different explanatory realm. Now, that assumption really is mistaken - and speciesist to boot. There are many, many ways of being a Darwinian strategist. And they don’t divide neatly into ’human ways’ and ’all the rest’. The reason that we are justified in assuming sameness of strategic principles is that, although behaviour is manifested in organisms, strategies belong ultimately to genes. And genes are not speciesist. What is more, to erect a biological apartheid of ’us’ and ’them’ is to cut ourselves off from a potentially useful source of explanatory principles. Once we have understood ourselves as naturally selected tacticians, we might have a suggestive heuristic guide to the tactics that natural selection has employed with other living things... All we need to imagine is that, in pursuit of the same strategies as ours, other living organisms might have converged on the same tactics. There’s nothing unduly anthropomorphic about that. We’re not assuming that organisms think as we do. We’re not even assuming that they think at all. After all, chromosomes and plants manage to implement Darwinian principles even without brains. It is natural selection that has done their ’thinking’. Nevertheless, their strategic choices and ours could run parallel, the structure of their behaviour could be the same, because natural selection has implemented its strategies in similar style. Admittedly, we are unique. But there’s nothing unique about being unique. Every species is in its own way (Cronin, 1991). 1.2.7 Kin Selection and Inclusive Fitness Besides Selfish Gene Theory and ESS, the third basic idea of sociobiology (and the one which triggered its origin) is the explanation of the paradoxical behavior which (somewhat anthropomorphically) is called altruism: why should an individual organism decrease its fitness or even sacrifice itself for another individual? Many individuals among the social insects, for example, do not reproduce and even sacrifice themselves for their conspecifics (See Ch. 3). Indeed, as Cronin (1991) observes, in some respects animals behave more like the moral paragons of Aesop - working dutifully for the sake of the community, noble in spirit and generous in deed - than the hard-bitten, selfseeking individualists that relentless natural selection would seem to favor.



The answer is that their genetic relationship is such that decreasing their own fitness, or even reducing it to zero, may contribute to the survival of the copies of the individual’s genes present in other individuals. This is most apparent in its kin, and this type of selection is therefore called kin selection: the fitness of the individual and that of its relatives sharing the same genes is called inclusive fitness. More formally, we can speak of a gene’s effect on an individual’s inclusive fitness: the amount by which the gene increases or decreases the reproductive success of the individual, plus the amount by which it increases or decreases the reproductive success of relatives, each amount weighed by the appropriate degree of relatedness (On the concept of inclusive fitness see especially: Fisher, 1930; Haldane, 1932; Hamilton, 1963 et seq.; E.O. Wilson, 1975; Dawkins, 1976, 1979, 1985; Van den Berghe & Barash, 1977; Michod, 1982; Krebs & Davies, 1984; Grafen, 1984; Trivers, 1985; Fox, 1989; Cronin, 7 1991) . In order to appreciate this solution, consider for a moment what exactly, and how enormous, the problem was for the Darwinian view of nature. I freely paraphrase Cronin’s (1991) eloquent account: A bird gives an alarm call. This seems a highly altruistic act: warning others of danger but perilously alerting predators to its own presence. How can we explain it? If we take an organism-centered view, as did classical Darwinism, 7

In more technical terms: The theory of kin selection is based upon the insight that an individual’s fitness has two components: (1) fitness gained through the replication of its own genetic material through reproduction, and (2) inclusive fitness gained from the replication of copies of its own genes carried in others as a result of its own actions. When an actor behaves altruistically toward its kin, fitness benefits to kin also benefit the actor, but the actor’s benefits are devalued by the coefficient of relatedness (r) between actor and kin. The coefficient of relatedness represents the probability that two individuals will obtain copies of the same gene through common descent from a single ancestor. The precise genealogical relationship among kin determines the probability that both will share the same gene through common descent. In diploid species, identical twins share all genetic material (r = 1), while parents share exactly one-half of their genetic material with their offspring (r = 0.5), and share on average one-quarter of their genetic material with their grandchildren (r = 0.25). Hamilton (1964) was the first to show that altruistic acts toward kin increase the inclusive fitness of the actor only if the increment to the recipient’s fitness (b) weighted by the coefficient of relatedness between them (r) is greater than the decrement to the actor’s fitness (c), or b x r > c. Hamilton’s rule is sometimes expressed in an equivalent form as K > 1/r, where K equals b/c. Under a specified set of conditions, altruistic behaviors are expected to conform to Hamilton’s rule. For altruistic interactions to be favored by kin selection, the conditions of Hamilton’s rule must be met. If an actor’s behavior decreases his or her own fitness by two units (c = 2), but increases the fitness of a full sibling (r = 0.5) by five units (b = 5), then the ratio of b/c (5/2 = 2.5) will exceed 1/r (1/0.5 = 2). All other things being equal, a mother is expected to behave altruistically toward her offspring (r = 0.5) only if the benefits to her offspring are greater than twice the costs of her altruism (b > 2c). The same female is expected to behave altruistically toward her first cousin (r = 0.125) only if the benefits to her cousin are greater than eight times her own costs (b > 8c). Thus, altruism is expected to be selectively directed toward kin, and close kinship is expected to facilitate costly altruism (Silk, 1987).



we simply shall not be able to. Worse, if we take a group- or species-level view, we might be able to ’explain’ it all too easily as for the ’greater good’ of the group or species. And we shall end up in the kind of muddle that permeated Darwinism for several decades. But what if we hold steadily to a gene-centered view?. If the beneficiaries of the altruistic act are the animal’s relatives, we can explain it by kin selection theory: Natural selection would favor saving my kin rather than my skin, if the aid would be differentially and discriminatingly targeted toward members of my family. It is not easy for a gene to ’recognize’ copies of itself in other individuals, but the rules to discriminate between kin and nonkin need not require brothers and sisters and nieces and nephews to be identified as such. They could be very simple indeed: ’Help those reared in the same nest as yourself’ or ’Help those with the same smell as yourself’ or (in altricial species) ’Help your neighbor’ (See also Ch. 7). But what if the beneficiaries of the altruistic act are not the animal’s kin? How might we explain altruistic behavior then? Reciprocity (’if you scratch my back, I’ll scratch yours’), first suggested by Trivers (1971, 1985), is one answer. What looks like altruism might really pay the participants: they could be exchanging altruistic favors in such a way that each does better from cooperating than it would from failing to cooperate. The costs of a good deed are compensated for by a good deed in return. But how could such a mutually beneficial arrangement come about? To a selfish Darwinian strategist it is ripe for exploitation. Certainly, cooperation pays. But would not defecting pay the defector even more? Far from evolving, the cooperation would degenerate into cheating, with defectors seizing unrequited good turns. If only everyone would cooperate, everyone would be better off; but the best course for any individual is to pursue its own self-interest; and so everyone will inevitably end up worse off: The perennial ’tragedy of the commons’. Axelrod & Hamilton (1981) and Axelrod (1984) turned to a well-analyzed model in game theory, the Prisoner’s Dilemma, because it captures just that problem: The rational pursuit of individual self-interest driving everyone into an outcome that nobody prefers. But the dilemma has a solution. Suppose that the participants play the game repeatedly, suppose that each knows that the two of them are likely to meet an indefinite number of times. Under such conditions cooperation can evolve. Consider, for example, the strategy Tit for Tat: cooperate on the first move and after that copy what the other player did on the previous move. Tit for Tat is never the first to defect; it retaliates against defection by defecting on the next move but subsequently lets bygones be bygones. It turns out that this highly cooperative strategy can evolve, even when initially pitted against exploitative, readily-defecting strategies. And it can be stable against invasion by them. If it is to get off the ground, a



critical proportion of its encounters must be with cooperators like itself; otherwise the strategy Always Defect will evolve and be stable instead. In short, Tit for Tat pretty well amounts to an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS): once it, or something very like it, exceeds a critical frequency in the population, then such a strategy will be stable against invasion from any other. In evolution, a strategy is represented in any generation in proportion to its success in the previous generation. So, the more a Tit-for-Tat-like strategy is successful, the more likely it will be to encounter itself and the more it will be able to reap the rewards of mutual cooperation. And so it is that out of Darwinian self-interest cooperation can evolve; out of selfishness comes forth altruism (Cronin, 1991). 8

Reciprocal altruism , as an exchange of mutually beneficial favors, is in fact not ’altruism’ in the high-strung colloquial meaning of the word, but plain vanilla genetic self-interest, as is kin altruism. As a relatively complex form of social behavior, reciprocal altruism may be expected to be highly developed in our own species, as it necessitates individual recognition and memory, cost/benefit calculations, and the ability to detect, and take appropriate action against, cheaters (non-reciprocators). Trivers (1971) uses the term ’moralistic aggression’ to characterize the commonly punitive action against cheaters. As will be seen later on, the lex talionis, the uncodified law of the eye-for-aneye revenge, may be viewed as a kind of negative ’reciprocal altruism’ or reciprocity for short: "I render onto you in exact return the evil you have inflicted upon me or my kin". Vengeance and retaliation in ’primitive’ societies are, to a large extent, based on notions of equity, fairness, distributive justice, and moral obligation.

8

On reciprocal altruism see also: Trivers, 1971, 1985; Alexander, 1979; D. Wilson, 1980; Dawkins, 1982; Van den Berghe, 1983; J. Moore, 1984; Seyfarth & Cheney, 1984; Rothstein & Pierotti, 1987; Cosmides & Tooby, 1989.



1.2.8 Exploitative Manipulation and Evolutionary Arms Races Cooperative altruism does not exhaust the possibilities to explain the behavior of the vigilant bird. We have always to keep in mind that the behavior is really utterly selfish. As suggested by Zahavi (1977, 1987), who studied this sentinel behavior in a fascinating bird species, the Arabian babbler, living in Israel’s Negev semi-desert, the sentinel is doing so to help itself - and because of the danger. It is as if the babbler were communicating to its companions: "Look at what I can manage. I am strong and robust and alert enough to bear the burden of sentinel duty, to take on the costs and still be able to thrive. Only an individual of high quality could afford to handicap itself so much". So babblers positively compete to replace other group members as sentinels. There can be substantial benefits - especially in status position - to showing-off this way, even though it may impose severe costs. Let us return once again to the bird that gives an alarm call, but now suppose that it is a fake alarm call, that the bird is actually manipulating its fellow conspecifics. It is plainly ’whistling a lie’; there is no imminent danger of raptors or other predators. It just wants the others out of the way, fleeing to safety, in order to feast on some tidbits itself, undisturbed by its rivals. Such faking behavior has indeed been observed in birds (e.g., Munn, 1986). But then immediately the question arises: Why do these other birds let themselves be duped? The answer probably lies in an asymmetry in the selective forces: The useful gains from occasional cheating versus the possibly fatal danger of not taking every alarm call at face value. Finally, we must consider the possibility that the behavior really is selfsacrificial, that of a victim, a pawn, the instrument of others. This possibility derives more or less logically from ’extended phenotype thinking’ (Dawkins, 1982): One organism subtly and exploitatively manipulating another to the manipulator’s advantage. Perhaps some altruists really are acting against their own best interests, under the influence of genes that are in another organism’s body. Consider a cuckoo’s unwitting hosts, sacrificing themselves and their own offspring to satisfy their demanding foster-child. We could look on their behavior merely as a mistake, a ready-made niche that the cuckoo is using for its own ends rather than the ends ’intended’ by natural selection. On this analysis, the cuckoo’s behavior is explained adaptively but the hosts’ is not. We could, however, look on the behavior of the hosts as an adaptation, but this time as an adaptation that benefits the cuckoos, the adaptive phenotypic effect of a manipulative gene in the cuckoo’s body. On this analysis, too, there could be an arms race, with the hosts struggling to take



more control of their own destiny and the cuckoos tightening their grip or moving on to easier prey. There may well be an asymmetry in the strength of the selective forces acting on the cuckoos and their hosts. On the hosts’ side, it may not be worth the costs to invest in counter-adaptations against manipulation; spending a season rearing a cuckoo need not be fatal to reproductive success and might anyway be a rare event for any individual member of the host species. By contrast, we can expect the cuckoos to put up an impressive evolutionary fight because for them this race is a matter of life and death (Cronin, 1991). So the cuckoos probably owe some of their victory to the ’life-dinner principle’: "The rabbit runs faster than the fox, because the rabbit is running for his life while the fox is only running for his dinner" (Dawkins, 1982). The ’life-dinner principle’ illustrates a more general point about arms races and manipulation. If there is any asymmetry in the strength of the selective forces acting on the two sides, if the forces affecting the manipulator are more critical, more stringent than those affecting the manipulated, then natural selection will be unlikely to rescue the exploited from their exploitation. "If the individual manipulator has more to lose by failing to manipulate than the individual victim has to lose by failing to resist manipulation, we should expect to see successful manipulation in nature. We should expect to see animals working in the interests of other animals’ genes" (Dawkins, 1982). I have dwelt on these subjects of manipulation and exploitation not only because they illustrate most ingeniously the subtleties of evolutionary thinking, but also because it has become increasingly clear that these mechanisms exist indeed, are alive and kicking - in the social behavior of many species including, and especially, Homo s. sapiens. ’Genteel’ ideas of some vaguely benevolent mutual cooperation in social relationships are gradually being replaced by an expectation of stark, ruthless, opportunistic mutually exploitative manipulation (Alexander, 1974 et seq.; Ghiselin, 1974; Dawkins & Krebs, 1978; Dawkins, 1982; Trivers, 1985), especially within the family, in the ’battle of the sexes’ (van der Dennen, 1992), and, most pertinently, in the context of intragroup cooperation for intergroup competition, and the uneasy human intergroup relations themselves. 1.2.9 Replicators and Vehicles Rather than reviewing the many criticisms of higher-level selection, it is more illuminating to clarify the logic behind it all, which rests on the fundamental distinction between replicators and vehicles (Dawkins, 1976 et seq.). Only genes possess the biochemical properties to be replicators: They reproduce copies of themselves, on the whole faithfully, but with occasional



’translation errors’ (mutations); and they have phenotypic effects that influence the gene’s fate. So natural selection can act at the level of genes; genes are the only serious candidates for units of selection, not individual organisms, and not demes, groups, populations, species, etc. But if organisms are not replicators, what are they? The answer is that they are vehicles of replicators, carriers of genes, instruments of replicator preservation, temporary throw-away ’life support systems’ and ’survival kits’. Replicators are what get preserved by natural selection; vehicles are means for this preservation. Organisms are well integrated, coherent, discrete vehicles for the genes that they house; but they are not replicators, not even crude, low-fidelity replicators. Similar considerations hold, though even more strongly, for groups and other higher levels. Although in some loose sense they renew themselves, divide, bud off, persist, nevertheless they cannot be true replicators. They have no reliable means of self-propagation (Cronin, 1991). Selection is differential survival, and the units that survive over evolutionary time are not groups or individuals but replicators. Only genes are potentially ’immortal’. What light does all this throw on adaptations? Adaptations must be for the good of replicators, for the good of genes. But they are manifested in vehicles. Genes confer on vehicles properties that influence their own replication. So adaptations could, in principle, turn up at any level - at the level of organisms (either in the organism that bears the gene or in another), at the level of groups and even higher. There is no rigid rule as to where they will be manifested, in which vehicle (nor how). They are, however, most likely to occur in the organism that bears the gene. This is not only because the closest vehicle is the most amenable to physical influence. It is also because genes that share a body are likely, to a large extent, to ’agree’ over which phenotypic effects are adaptive. Conflicts of interests among same-body genes are dampened down by a common interest in the survival and reproduction of that body. Any gene in a genome will have been selected, among other things, for its compatibility with other genes in that genome, its contribution to their joint endeavour. And yet warring factions can arise even among genes that share a body. So how much more likely, and how much more acute, conflicts of interest will be among the looser assemblages of genes that make up higher-level vehicles - groups, populations, species (Cronin, 1991).



1.2.10 Adaptations and Adaptiveness Basically, an adaptation is a tentative solution to recurrent evolutionary problems. An adaptation is an anatomical structure, physiological process, or behavior pattern that enabled ancestral organisms to survive and reproduce in competition with other members of their species (G.C. Williams, 1966). Behavioral adaptations often involve behaviors that are contingent on conditions in the environment (and may even be sexually dimorphic). Hence, they may not appear to be characteristic of all members of the species. Crawford (1991) distinguishes two types: concurrently contingent strategies, and developmentally contingent strategies. Behavioral adaptations often provide alternative behaviors that depend upon either concurrent or past environmental conditions. It is the whole repertoire of behaviors that is considered to be adaptive, or at least has been adaptive in the past. It should be realized that not all behavior and other - morphological or 9 physiological - properties (or traits) are necessarily adaptive or contributory to spreading gene copies. The individual can be considered as a compromise of many different, competing - but necessarily cooperating - genes and hence organs or organ systems. Adaptation is the change of gene frequencies as a result of new (re)combinations and of changing ecological pressures resulting in a new ESS. Such a change implies time-inertia, i.e., many generations (Wind, 1984). But even given sufficient time to a species, not every one of its individuals can be expected to be optimally adapted; theoretically, only one genotype would be, and absence of genetic variability is nonadaptive. Finally, of course, behavior adaptive in one situation may be nonadaptive in another situation. Or rather, as van der Steen & Voorzanger (1985) have pointed out: behaviors can never be adaptive, full stop. Behavior A may be adaptive in comparison with behavior B, but nonadaptive in comparison with behavior C. In situational terms this must be translated as: Behavior A may be adaptive in comparison with behavior B in situation X, neutral in comparison with behavior C in situation X, and nonadaptive in comparison with behavior D in situation X, in which X is almost infinite. In a recent report on the Human Behavior & Evolution Conference, Glantz (1989) noticed a basic controversy which divided the Behavioral Ecologists and the Evolutionary Psychologists. The basic point of disagreement was this: Is current human behavior adaptive (i.e., does it function to maximize inclusive fitness), and related to this, is the brain a general purpose processor or does it 9

On adaptivenes see also: G.C. Williams, 1966; Kummer, 1971; Lewontin, 1974; E.O. Wilson, 1975; Gould & Lewontin, 1979; Wind, 1982; Trivers, 1985; Borgerhoff-Mulder, 1987; Betzig, 1989; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990; and Crawford, 1991.



possess domain-specific mechanisms (i.e., modularity)? If the brain is set up as a general purpose processor, it can work just as well in all kinds of environments, ancestral as well as contemporary, so it can be expected to produce adaptive behavior in all kinds of environments. The brain, in this perspective, is a great big machine that is designed to take all inputs, whatever they might be, and find the solution that maximizes inclusive fitness. If, on the other hand, the brain has special-purpose sub-processors (domainspecific modules) that are designed to deal with specific types of problems, it is likely to do much better in some environments (those where such problems are crucial) than in others (i.e., those where new kinds of problems have arisen). "You need the general purpose hypothesis in order to assert that behavior is always adaptive, even outside the natural environment. You don’t need it if you believe that behavior is sometimes adaptive and sometimes not" (Glantz, 1989). Is it necessary for evolutionists to prove that people today are maximizing their fitness, Glantz wonders, and he provides the answer that it is enough to show the continuing effect of adaptive mechanisms created by natural selection sometime in the past, continuing to exert some influence over current behavior. "I think that the difference between the two positions can be illustrated by two versions of the ’central theorem’ of sociobiology. The standard version reads as follows: "On the average, all organisms act in such a way as to maximize their inclusive fitness". The EP version might read: "On the average, all organisms have mechanisms which cause them to act in such a way as to maximize inclusive fitness as long as they are living in their Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness (EEA). Outside of EEA, the mechanisms may or may not produce adaptive behavior". 1.2.11 ESS versus EQUUS Like any branch of science, sociobiology has its limitations (Wind, 1982 et seq.). There are two main reasons why sociobiology should not be expected to provide easy answers to the intricacies of human social behavior. One reason is inherent in the discipline, as Wind (1984) explains: "While the basic paradigm of sociobiology - the selfish-gene concept - is quite simple as well as scientifically quite valid, the difficulties in its application in behavioral analyses seem to increase exponentially when passing from viroids and viruses (in which genotype and phenotype are virtually identical) and unicellular organisms to simple multicellular ones and the higher vertebrates including man. In the same order the practical value of sociobiology decreases". The other reason is more intricate and substantial. It has become increasingly clear that Homo s. sapiens, no longer the ’Crown of Creation’ ever since Darwin, is indeed an exceptional and odd species in the world of organisms. The time elapsed since our origin is - in evolutionary perspective - quite brief. Therefore, many of our genes’ frequencies and behaviors are still oscillating



without having reached yet a less disequilibrated state as is usually found among other - ’older’ - species. Stated in less technical terms, we are still in the wake of our evolutionary origin. Enigmatically, H. s. sapiens often seems to show evolutionarily odd properties such as celibacy, contraception, abortion, infanticide and other nonreproductive or even counter-reproductive behaviors. In other words, human beings do not seem to be intrinsically motivated to invariably maximize the number of their offspring. Hence, properties or traits - behavioral, physiological, or morphological - may exist that do not contribute to the spreading of gene copies, or that even hamper it, though, admittedly, these properties are likely to occur much less frequently than those that do contribute to fitness. Some of these odd properties may, in fact, very well have, at the individuals’ level, a negative selective value, and may be in the process of being selected against. Such a process will last longer when that negative selective value is smaller. Finally, odd behavior may be the result of recurrent mutations, pleiotropy, linkage and other genetical mechanisms. Because of these reasons H. s. sapiens is likely to show behaviors that can sociobiologically be qualified as an Evolutionarily Quite Uncommon, Unstable Strategy (EQUUS), instead of an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) (Wind, 10 1982 et seq.) . 1.2.12 Ultimate versus Proximate Explanations An important distinction in evolutionary biology, indeed in any attempt to explain animal and human behavior, is that between ultimate (or evolutionary or phylogenetic) and proximate (or immediate or ontogenetic) causes. A proximate explanation considers the immediate causation of that behavior in psychological or neurophysiological terms (e.g., stimulus configurations, motivations, appetites, physiological homeostasis, hormonal priming, dispositions, drives, etc.), or - on a larger time scale - in ontogenetic terms (e.g., growth, development, maturation, acquisition, learning, conditioning, habit formation, scenarios, scripts, social roles, etc.). But the time scale involved in proximate explanations is confined to the life span of the individual, from embryo in utero to corpse in humero. An ultimate explanation, on the other hand, would ask: why did this particular behavior evolve? Did it confer fitness advantages in the past to the bearer of this particular set of genes? 10

In more technical terms, the predictive power of sociobiology is limited by (1) The substrate being dynamic rather than static, because of the extremely complicated fabric of continuously changing gene frequencies and environmental interaction; (2) the large number of different genes involved as present in most survival machines; (3) the nonlinear relationships between gene frequencies and behavior characteristics; (4) the forces directing and determining gene selection being statistical (stochastic) in nature and implying time-inertia (Wind, 1982).



Many critics of sociobiology and, indeed, many sociobiologists themselves often fail to distinguish these levels-of-explanation. The proximate cause of a primitive raid may be, for example, the seeking of revenge, the redressing of a perceived evil to the ingroup. An ultimate approach would address the question how and why in (vertebrate?, primate?, hominoid?, human?) phylogeny revenge warfare ever developed: why was it selected?, had it survival value?, did it contribute to inclusive fitness?, did it lead to greater reproductive success in those species or peoples who practiced it than in those species or peoples that did not have it in their behavioral repertoire? These and similar questions invoke the time scale of evolution, of phylogeny, of the millions of years of natural selection that shaped us into what we are today. "Natural selection can honestly be described as a process for the maximization of short-sighted selfishness" as G.C. Williams (1988) states, but as the principle of kin-selection suggests, we are equally selected to be (short-sighted or not) nepotistically altruistic. Natural selection operates through the differential reproductive success of individual members of a population (or rather their genomes: the strategies of their selfish genes, of which the individual is just the temporary vehicle). We may expect that those genes that have not ’programmed’ their temporary vehicles with strong urges to reproduce have been selected against since time immemorial. We may also expect all organisms, including our own species, to be programmed to compete for differential reproductive success with their conspecifics, and for the resources and status positions which lead to the enhancement of reproductive success. But because our next-of-kin also bear replicas or copies of our own genes, natural selection will also favor those behavioral strategies which increase the reproductive success of our next-ofkin. This is ’kin-selection’, and it is measured in terms of ’inclusive fitness’, and its manifestation is nepotism or nepotistic altruism. A particular behavior is ’adaptive’ only in so far as it contributes to the organism’s inclusive fitness. It is rather easy to see that the concept of ’preservation of the species’ has no evolutionary relevance whatsoever. Reproductive success of the individual organism is the only currency in the calculus of evolution. Kin-selection also implies that the competing social units during human evolution were kinship clans, and that, as Chagnon (1988) states: "in the tribal world warfare is ipso facto the extension of kinship obligations by violence because the political system is organized by kinship".



1.3 The Evolution of (Ritualized) Aggression The concept of aggression as the proximate mechanism of contest competition was originally proposed by Barash (1977), and in this evolutionary context it is a very useful one. There is much in favor of viewing a great deal of animal behavior as optimum strategies for maximizing the rate of extraction of ’fitness gain’ from the available series of ’fitness gain parameters’ (resources) present in its environment. One consequence of the occurrence of discontinuously distributed resources is that they may be in short supply. Animal aggression (in the form of resource guarding) will be favored by selection when there are less resources than competitors and where an individual can achieve an immediate gain in fitness by forcibly ousting one of its conspecifics. Selection for aggression will be more intense the more discrete the resource (i.e., the easier it is to guard) and the higher its yield as a fitness gain parameter (a function both of its absolute effect and its shortness of supply). It is not surprising therefore that most of animal aggression relates to food fighting and especially to mating. Territoriality (vide infra) is often merely an adjunct to these two situations - an area is guarded because it has a high probable yield of food or mates, or both (Parker, 1974; Cf. Barash, 1982). Aggression is expected to be modulated by the degree of relatedness of the competing individuals (Hamilton, 1964). Darwin (1871) was very well aware of the individual advantages of aggression when he founded the theory of sexual selection. Animals invest time and energy in agonistic behavior and can run serious risks of injury or even death from fighting. Injury and death are obvious risks of fighting but displays and fights can also expose an animal to predators. Apart from the risk of attracting predators, males on lekking grounds run the risk of losing body condition or even starving because of the need to stay on the territory and keep displaying. Observations from the field and data on the bioenergetic costs of combat, of living subordinate to a victor, of healing wounds, of the shorter life expectancy as a consequence of higher susceptibility to predation when wounded, of the loss of mating opportunities (aggressive neglect), the cost of gaining access to resources to restore dominance, and of the chance to kill or injure kin, suggest that combat as an activity, and its consequences, are very expensive indeed. As well as the costs, however, there are also substantial benefits to being aggressive. Individuals can thereby gain exclusive use of a resource such as a food source, or may win exclusive mating rights. The more aggressive an animal is, the more benefits it may gain (such as extra food). But if an animal is too aggressive it might face unacceptably high costs (such as serious injury) so



the animal must weigh up the relative costs and benefits of its action and choose an optimum level of aggression (i.e., maximize the net benefits). If the costs are too high and the benefits too low, avoiding a fight may be preferable to competing. In other cases it may be worthwhile to fight vigorously, even to risk death, for a big enough prize, e.g., a mating opportunity. It is evident that there is value in searching for alternatives to combat that have much the same ultimate effects but not the same consequences. It has been recognized repeatedly that threats and displays probably evolved to substitute for combat (Collias, 1944; Walther, 1958 et seq.; Geist, 1966 et seq.; Schaller, 1967; a.o.). Threats are iconic signals clearly directed at an individual indicating incipient attack. (Dominance) displays, on the other hand, are abstract signals from which one cannot predict the actor’s action. They appear to aim at arousal by generating uncertainty in an opponent by emphasizing the size of weapons or body. The displayer does not address the opponent directly, and often changes his movements from the normal to act exaggeratedly slow or fast. Of the two, threats are probably the more expensive since they gear up the individual physiologically for combat, and they increase the risk - and hence the consequences - of a counterattack by the threatened opponent. We can therefore assume that combat elements are most costly, since they do lead to visible exertion of the opponents, threats are next in costliness, and dominance displays are least costly per display (Geist, 1978). Fear may represent psychophysiologically the more or less realistic assessment of the costs of an agonistic interaction. In its application to the analysis of the evolution of agonistic behavior, game theory assumes that behavior has costs (ranging from death or serious injury to exhaustion or mere waste of time) and benefits (acquisition of a food item, a potential territory, or a mate) which can be quantified in units based on the contribution to the individual’s reproductive fitness (Caryl, 1981). A useful discussion of the reasons for the choice of this unit as a ’common currency’ is presented by McCleery (1978). The game-theoretical models also include assumptions about strategies (or tactics, or gambits) that an individual is allowed to adopt in a dispute, and about the chances of victory, or of incurring costs, while using these tactics. The benefits that accrue to an individual adopting particular tactics will depend on what tactics are adopted by other members of the population, and for some models, this frequency dependence leads to perpetual change in the proportion of individuals adopting particular tactics (Caryl, 1981). Maynard Smith & Price (1973) were the first to propose a model of the evolution of conflict behavior in which selection acts entirely at the individual level, but in which the success of any particular strategy depends on what strategies are adopted by other members of the population.



1.3.1 Ritualized Aggression The power of the concept of the Evolutionarily Stable Strategy, and other concepts discussed above, can be illustrated by its application to the puzzling phenomenon of ritualized combat, or conventional aggression, between individual conspecifics. I freely adopt and adapt Cronin’s (1991) account. Combat between individual male conspecifics can be very dangerous, even lethal, especially in the mating season, as Darwin (1871) already noticed. But ritualized fighting is no myth, as Darwin noticed too. Evolutionarily, ritualized fighting poses a considerable theoretical difficulty, as pointed out by E.O. Wilson (1975) and Dawkins (1976): Why not always try to kill or maim the enemy outright? And when an opponent is beaten in a ritual encounter, why not go ahead and kill him then? Why not deliver the final coup de grâce whenever the situation permits? Why do animals hold back when they could slaughter, and eliminate the competitor once and for all? Allowed to run away, to paraphrase the childhood rhyme, the opponent may live to fight another day - and win next time. So in a sense the kindness shown an enemy seems altruistic, an unnecessary risk of personal fitness. If everyone else is foolish enough to obey such rules, why do not individuals break them, bluffing and cheating or going all-out for a quick victory? For the Lorenzian school of ethology ritualized aggression was no problem at all. On the contrary, it was evidently and ’naturally’ for the preservation of the species. Such ’good-for-the-species’ arguments are no longer tenable, however, and we have to look for an explanation at the genic level. ESS theory suggests that it is not enough to snatch a quick victory in a single encounter. What matters is whether a strategy is evolutionarily stable. Any strategy that is successful will end up, over evolutionary time, encountering itself more than it encounters any other strategy. So if it is to be evolutionarily stable against invasion, it must be able to do better against itself than any other strategy does against it: We must think, then, not just about a single encounter, nor even about all of a male’s encounters over his lifetime, but about the career of a strategy over evolutionary time. From that perspective, things begin to look different. Imagine a pugnacious bully, throwing his weight about, always ready for fight, always ready to pursue it to the bitter end. His rival is a coward, sloping off at the first sign of trouble, avoiding a punch-up at all costs. The bully will clearly do better in any particular encounter. But is bullying likely to be evolutionarily stable? Remember that we are not talking about a particular bullying individual. We are talking about a strategy acting out its bullying role in many different individuals over many generations.



Successful strategies will come to be represented in the population in proportion to their success. So eventually any bully will encounter other bullies more often than he encounters cowards. And when the bullying strategy encounters itself, costs will be greater and victory less assured. Bullying may no longer pay. We can see, then, that a strategy of all-out fighting for instant gains may well not be evolutionarily stable. And we can begin to see why, under a range of conditions, conventional combat may well be (Cronin, 1991). To return to Wilson’s (1975) question "Why do animals prefer pacifism and bluff to escalated fighting?", several lines of evidence suggest that non-lethal patterns of settling disputes, such as agonistic displays that end short of fighting, ritualized combat, and submission and appeasement signals, have most likely evolved because such behaviors benefit the individual actors engaging in these behaviors, not because species preservation calls for such beneficial patterns of behavior. In other words, individual animals generally do not kill or seriously wound conspecifics because usually it is not in their own genetic self-interest to do so (Fry, 1980). The main conclusion reached by pioneers Maynard Smith & Price (1973) was that in a species capable either of ’ritualized’ or ’escalated’ fighting - the latter being capable of seriously injuring an opponent - the evolutionarily stable strategy is to adopt the ritualized level, but to respond to escalation from an opponent by escalating in return. In a population adopting such a ’retaliation’ strategy, a mutant which adopted escalation tactics too readily would be more likely to get seriously injured than the typical members of the population, who would usually settle conflicts without escalation. If one views the various types of ritualized aggressive behavior witnessed in many species as reflections of individuals generally pursuing evolutionarily stable strategies, then overly pugnacious animals (as well as too zealous pacifists) would appear to be penalized in terms of reproductive success and fitness. In many circumstances, actors that fight more frequently or more forcefully than the majority of their conspecifics normally do would stand a higher chance of serious injury than their less pugnacious peers. If for instance an overly aggressive fighter continues a struggle with an already submissive partner, the latter, acting out of self-defense, may in turn escalate its response and seriously injure the imprudent opponent (Fry, 1980). Maynard Smith (1974) distinguished two types of ritualized contest: ’tournaments’ and ’displays’. An example of a tournament is a fight between two male deer, in which the antlers interlock and a pushing match ensues. The structure of antlers and the behavior of the contestants is adapted to prevent serious injury. Physical contact does take place, however, and victory usually goes to the larger, stronger and healthier individuals. Tournaments of this kind are common. In such cases, no special difficulty



arises in understanding how a ritualized contest can be settled; the model considered by Maynard Smith & Price (1973) seems adequate to explain why more dangerous weapons or tactics do not evolve. In a ’display’, no physical contact takes place, or if it does so it does not settle the contest and provides little or no information about which contestant would win an escalated contest. In such a contest, the winner is the contestant who continues for longer, and the loser the one who first gives way. It is the logic of contests of this kind (the so-called ’War of Attrition’) that is considered by Maynard Smith (1974). 1.3.2 A Simple Model: The War of Attrition The War of Attrition is one of the simplest models that have been considered. It represents a contest which is settled by display alone. In the model, individuals are imagined to show their threat display at constant intensity until one gives up, leaving the other, which was prepared to go on at this point, as the winner. In this game Maynard Smith (1974) showed that the ESS is to choose the duration of the display, X, according to the negative exponential distribution P(X) = (1/V) exp(-X/V) The average cost of the contest (owing to the time wasted in the display) under this model is equal to V/2, where V is the gain from victory (Maynard Smith, 1974). There exists a single ESS for most War of Attrition models with a monotonous increase of costs during attrition, and that is to settle the conflict according to ’who has more to gain or less to pay for persistence’ (Hammerstein & Parker, 1982). The War of Attrition is an example of an important class of models that Caryl (1981) calls ’continuous models’; the cost of a contest, dependent on its duration, is continuously variable. An alternative type of model is what Caryl calls the ’discrete model’. In this model, the contest can be fought at two distinct levels of escalation, and the most important factor in bringing it to an end is serious injury, which produces a large, discrete, increment in the cost of the contest and causes the injured animal to cease fighting. Game theorists have used discrete models to model escalation in animal contests, assuming that the escalation involves a series of steplike changes in the intensity and potential danger of the interactions (Caryl, 1981).



1.3.3 Hawks and Doves The simplest discrete model is the famous Hawks and Doves game (Maynard Smith, 1976; Maynard Smith & Parker, 1976). The pay-off matrix is shown in Fig. 1.3.3. Hawk

Dove

Hawk

(V-D)/2

V

Dove

0

V/2

Fig. 1.3.3. The Hawks and Doves game. The payoffs in the table are to the tactic in the row when played against the column. V is the gain from victory, D the cost of injury. For the matrix shown, which ignores the cost of threat, the ESS is to escalate with probability P = V/D (when V < D). If threat imposes a cost T on each opponent, the probability of escalation becomes P = (V + 2T)/(D + 2T) (Caryl, 1981).

Consider this simple model: A (theoretical) species that in contests between two individuals has only two possible tactics, a ’hawk’ tactic and a ’dove’ one. A hawk fights without regard to any convention and escalates the fighting until it either wins (that is, until its opponent runs away or is seriously injured) or is itself seriously injured. A dove never escalates; it fights conventionally, and then if its opponent escalates, it runs away before it is injured. At the end of a contest each contestant receives a payoff. The expected payoff to individual X in a contest with individual Y is written E(X,Y). The payoff is a measure of a change in the fitness of X as a result of the contest, and so it is determined by three factors: the advantage of winning, the disadvantage of being seriously injured and the disadvantage of wasting time and energy in a long contest. For the hawk-dove game suppose the effect on individual fitness is +10 for winning a contest and -20 for suffering serious injury. Suppose further two doves can eventually settle a contest but only after a long time and at a cost of -3. (The exact values of the payoffs do not affect the results of the model as long as the absolute, or unsigned numerical, value of injury is greater than that of victory). The game can be analyzed as follows. If the two individuals in a contest both adopt dove tactics, then since doves do not escalate, there is no possibility of injury and the contest will be a long one. Each contestant has an equal chance of winning, and so the expected payoff to one of the doves D equals the probability of D winning the contest (p = 1/2) times the value of victory plus the cost of a long battle, that is, E(D,D) equals (1/2)(+10) + (-3), or +2. Similarly, a hawk fighting another hawk has equal chances of winning or being injured but in any case the contest will be settled fairly quickly. Hence the



expected payoff E(H,H) is equal to (1/2)(+10) + (1/2)(-20) or -5. A dove fighting a hawk will flee when the hawk escalates, so that the dove’s expected payoff is 0 and the victorious hawk’s payoff is +10. Now suppose the members of a population engage in contests in the hawkdove game in random pairs and subsequently each individual reproduces its kind (individuals employing the same strategy) in proportion to the payoff it has accumulated. If there is an ESS for the game, the population will evolve toward it. The question, then, is: Is there an ESS for the hawk-dove game? It is evident that consistently playing hawk is not an ESS: a population of hawks would not be safe against all mutant strategies. Remember that in a hawk population the expected payoff per contest to a hawk E(H,H) is -5 but the expected payoff to a dove mutant E(D,H) is 0. Hence dove mutants would reproduce more often than hawks. A similar argument shows that consistently playing dove is also not an ESS. Serious injury = -20 E(H,H) = 1/2(+10) + 1/2(-20) = -5 Victory = +10 E(H,D) = +10 Long contest = -3 E(D,H) = 0 E(D,D) = 1/2(+10) + (-3) = +2 Hawk (H)

Dove (D)

Hawk (H)

-5

+10

Dove

0

+2

There is, however, a mixed strategy that fulfils the requirements of an ESS. A mixed strategy is one that prescribes different tactics to be followed in a game according to a specified probability distribution. The mixed strategy that is evolutionarily stable for the hawk-dove game is play hawk with probability 8/13 and play dove with probability 5/13. The hawk-dove model predicts that mixed strategies will be found in real animal contests, either in the form of different animals adopting different tactics (such as hawk and dove) or in the form of individuals varying their tactics (Maynard Smith, 1978). If the cost of injury D is so great that it exceeds the value of the prize, V, then hawks cannot exclude doves from the population: the ESS is a mixed equilibrium with p = V/D where p is the proportion of hawks. If D < or equal V then all animals are hawks (Caryl, 1981). Treisman & Collins (1980) demonstrated that in addition to the value of the prize and the possible damage inflicted, the animal’s fitness prior to a contest may affect the ESS for that contest in the hawk-dove game.



1.3.4 The Prudent Hawk Gambit It could be argued that display only rarely involves a high cost, whereas this is required in every escalated contest. But suppose a new gambit arose which involved escalating to the same level as hawks, but withdrawing after a suitable period of time even if no injury had occurred. The principle involved could be the same as that which allows animals to decide when to terminate display, and the period could be adjusted so that the occasional serious injury produced an average cost of V/2. Caryl (1981) calls this gambit the Prudent Hawk. This is the payoff matrix for the Prudent Hawk game: Hawk

Prudent Hawk

Dove

Hawk

(V-D)/2

-((V-D)/2).V/D

V

Prudent Hawk

((V-D)/2).V/D

0

V

Dove

0

0

V/2

To give the doves a chance, Caryl reverts to the convention that threat carries no cost. The new gambit would always win over doves; it would also sometimes win over hawks, although it would sometimes be injured in these contests. When the probability of injury in contest between two prudent hawks is V/D (so that the cost of these contests is equal to their average payoff, V/2), the ratios of types are: Hawks 1/( - 1)

Prudent Hawks : 1 :

Doves 1/

where = D/V, the ’riskiness’ of escalating. When = 2, hawks and prudent hawks each form 40 % of the population, but when = 8, prudent hawks have risen to 79 %. Thus by escalating, but stopping when prudent, an individual can do very well, and under this model most combats should be escalated. However, few should lead to serious injury - most would stop before this occurs. Intuitively, this seems to fit the biological facts better than the original model in which all escalated contests ended in serious injury. Geist’s (1971) review of data on moose and other species showed that it involved risk of injury or death (respectively) of about 10 % and 4 % per year, not per contest, while data for mule deer give an estimate of 10 % per year as the chance of injury (Geist, 1974), and data for musk oxen give values of 5 % to 10 % per year for the chance of death (Wilkinson & Shank, 1976).



1.3.5 Pure, Mixed, and Conditional Strategies Hawk and dove are pure strategies. But ’play hawk with probability p’ is a mixed strategy, and so is ’wait for a time t where t is drawn at random from a probability density function’. The diagnostic feature of a mixed strategy is that its specification contains at least one probabilistic statement (’Stochastic’ might be a better label than ’mixed’). The mathematical equivalent of a mixed strategy can be achieved if each individual plays a pure strategy, the population as a whole containing a mixture of pure strategists. We can thus think of the hawk-dove game as ending in a stable polymorphism, a mixture of pure hawks and pure doves in critical proportion, p. But equivalently the ESS could consist in each individual being a stochastic dawk, choosing to play dove or hawk at random, with a built-in bias corresponding to the critical proportion, p. Any combination of these two extremes would be stable, provided that in the population as a whole the strategy hawk was played p of the time and dove 1 - p of the time (Dawkins, 1980). A conditional strategy is like a computer program with an ’IF’ statement, such as ’retaliate IF your opponent attacks you’. Maynard Smith & Parker (1976) have considered the often surprising consequences of postulating strategies conditional upon asymmetries in aggressive contest between two individuals, for instance, ’attack if larger, retreat if smaller’ (Vide infra). In mammalian species where dominant males hold harems of females, subordinate males sometimes adopt a strategy known as kleptogamy (CluttonBrock, Albon & Guinness, 1979; Cox & LeBoeuf, 1977). Kleptogamists sneak briefly into harems and steal hurried copulations before being chased away by the harem master. It is possible that in some species kleptogamy and haremholding genuinely represent two strategies in a stable mix. In this case the average benefit of the two strategies will be equal. But in most cases it is much more likely that harem masters fare consistently better than kleptogamists, and that the ESS is the pure conditional strategy: ’if possible hold a harem; if not, be a kleptogamist’. Then in the stable state all males will be playing this one strategy, and the behavior that an individual actually shows will be conditional on factors such as his size or skill in combat (Dawkins, 1980).



1.3.6 Asymmetric Contests It is obvious that real animals can adopt strategies that are more complex than ’Always escalate’, ’Always display’ or some mixture of the two. For example, some animals make probes, or trial escalations. Other employ conventional tactics but will escalate in retaliation for an opponent’s escalation. There is, however, another important way in which many real animal contests do not conform to the hawk-dove model. Most real contests are asymmetric in that, unlike hawks and doves, the contestants differ from each other in some area besides strategy. Three basic types of asymmetries are encountered in animal contests. First, there are asymmetries in the fighting ability (the size, strength or weapons) of the contestants: Differences of this kind are likely to affect the outcome of an escalated fight. Second there are asymmetries in the value to the contestants of the resource being competed for (as in a contest over food between a hungry individual and a well-fed one): Differences of this kind are likely to affect the payoffs of a contest. Third, there are asymmetries that are called uncorrelated because they affect neither the outcome of escalation nor the payoffs of a contest. The uncorrelated asymmetries are of special interest because they often serve to settle contests conventionally (Maynard Smith, 1978; Cf. Maynard Smith, 1974; 1976; Parker, 1974; Maynard Smith & Parker, 1976; Parker & Rubenstein, 1981; Cronin, 1991). Nature offers asymmetries in abundance. Perhaps the best example of an uncorrelated asymmetry is found in a contest over a resource between the ’owner’ of the resource and an interloper. In calling this an uncorrelated asymmetry it is not meant that ownership never alters the outcome of escalation or the payoffs of contests; it simply means that ownership will serve to settle contests even when it does not alter those factors. To demonstrate the effect of such an uncorrelated asymmetry Maynard Smith (1978) returns to the hawk-dove game and adds to it a third strategy called bourgeois: If the individual is the owner of the resource in question, it adopts the hawk tactic; otherwise it adopts the dove tactic. In this game it is assumed that each contest is between an owner and an interloper, that each individual is equally likely to be in either role and that each individual knows which role it is playing. The payoffs for contests involving hawks and doves are unchanged by the addition of the new strategy, but additional payoffs must be calculated for contests that involve bourgeois contestants. For example, in a contest between a bourgeois and a hawk there is an equal chance that the bourgeois will be the owner (and so playing hawk) or the interloper (and so playing dove); hence E(B,H) equals 1/2E(H,H) + 1/2E(D,H) or -2.5. The remaining payoffs are calculated in a similar manner.



Fig. 1.3.6. The Hawk-Dove-Bourgeois Game Serious Injury = -20 Victory = +10 Long Contest = -3 E(H,B) = 1/2E(H,H) + 1/2E(H,D) = -5/2 + 10/2 = +2.5 E(D,B) = 1/2E(D,H) + 1/2E(D,D) = +0 + 2/2 = +1 E(B,H) = 1/2E(H,H) + 1/2E(D,H) = -5/2 + 0 = -2.5 E(B,D) = 1/2E(H,D) + 1/2E(D,D) = +10/2 + 2/2 = +6 E(B,B) = 1/2E(H,D) + 1/2E(D,H) = +10/2 + 0 = +5 Hawk (H)

Dove (D)

Bourgeois (B)

Hawk (H)

-5

+10

+22

Dove (D)

0

+2

+1

Bourgeois (B)

-22

+6

+5

The main point, however, is that there can never be an escalated contest between two opponents playing bourgeois, because if one is the owner and playing hawk, then the other is the interloper and playing dove. Therefore the payoff E(B,B) is equal to 1/2E(H,D) + 1/2E(D,H), or 5. When this figure is compared with the other payoffs, it is not difficult to see that consistently playing bourgeois is the only ESS for this game. Thus ownership is taken as a conventional cue for settling contests (Maynard Smith, 1978). In biological terms, a method for settling contests by taking into account some asymmetric feature, such as first arrival on a territory, which could not by itself influence the outcome, can be evolutionarily stable. 1.3.7 Conventional Fighting as Assessment of Resource Holding Power (RHP) Parker (1974; Cf. Parker & Rubenstein, 1981) examined the view that the adaptive value of conventional aspects of fighting behavior is for assessment of relative Resource Holding Power (RHP) of the combatants. According to this view, outcome of aggressive disputes should be decided by each individual’s fitness budget available for expenditure during a fight (determined by the fitness difference between adoption of alternative strategies, escalation or withdrawal without escalation) and on the rate of expenditure of the fitness budget if escalation occurs (determined by the RHPs of the combatants). Thus response thresholds for alternative strategies (’assessments’) will be



determined by natural selection on a basis of which opponent is likely to expend its fitness budget first, should escalation occur. This ’loser’ should retreat (before escalation) and the winner should stay in possession of the resource. Many aggressive decisions depend on whether one is a resource holder, or an attacker. Assuming the RHP of the combatants to be equal, there are many instances of fitness payoff imbalances between holder and attacker which should weight the dispute outcome in favor of one or other opponent by allowing it a greater expendable fitness budget. Usually the weighting favors the holder; the attacker therefore needs a correspondingly higher RHP before it may be expected to win. According to Parker (1974), there seems little doubt from the literature that assessment of RHP is occurring in most cases of animal combat. To avoid any implications of teleology, it must be stated that ’assessment’ in this context means only that the individual responds differentially to opponents on a basis of their RHP relative to its own; the only assessment of what is the appropriate response is the unconscious one performed by selection. Size, strength, weaponry, and experience all seem involved in RHP. Males are usually dominant over females. This often relates to RHP disparity because males are bigger; in some instances however secondary sexual characters are used as signals, e.g., comb size is a determinant of dominance in chickens (Collias, 1943). It seems possible that because of sexual selection male fitness may be increased by adopting a more dangerous strategy if this gives an overall increased insemination rate. Thus males of the same RHP as females may have a higher fitness budget for fighting over, say, food - because being in peak condition may affect male fitness more than female fitness because of intrasexual competition. When asymmetries in RHP are used to settle conflicts conventionally, then why not cheat?, why not exaggerate or even fake one’s signalling of high RHP?, why not always signal dominance?, why not fake the cues used to assess asymmetry?, why not conceal one’s intentions to either flee or escalate? Prima vista, it would seem highly advantageous to give false information - and there is always the temptation to ’lie’ - but there are severe costs attached to faking. For example, the more obvious the asymmetry the more costly (in terms of energy, time, and risk of injury) it will be to fake it. A falsely signalled commitment to escalate a fight may result in serious injury or even death if the cheat cannot live up to it. Some phenotypical properties (such as age, sex, small size, etc.), of course, cannot be faked at all, and these may be used as the most reliable cues and badges of status (Zahavi, 1977). Furthermore, in social species where individuals frequently encounter and individually recognize each other, cheats may be rather easily discovered. In general, when costs are not prohibitive and cheating brings temporary advantages, one may expect an arms race, a run-away selection of cheating and



countervailing ability to detect cheaters (e.g., Andersson, 1980). But such circumstances are probably not very common. In most cases, the costs of cheating/faking/lying are substantial and therefore these deceptive behaviors are unlikely to evolve. At least in these contexts, honesty may be the best policy (e.g., van Rhijn & Vodegel, 1980). 1.3.8 The Evolution of Territoriality ’Home range’ is the area that an animal learns to know thoroughly and habitually patrols (Seton, 1909; Burt, 1943), and which must satisfy all of its bioenergetic needs (Gittleman & Harvey, 1982), while the ’core area’ is the area of heaviest regular use within the home range (Kaufmann, 1962; Jennrich & Turner, 1969). The home range must be large enough to yield an adequate supply of energy. At the same time it should ideally be not much greater than this lower limit, because the animal will unnecessarily expose itself to predators by traversing excess terrain (E.O. Wilson, 1975). ’Territory’ is an area occupied more or less exclusively by an animal or group of animals by means of repulsion through overt defense or advertisement (Noble, 1939; J.L. Brown, 1964, 1975; E.O. Wilson, 1971, 1975; Cf. DysonHudson & Smith, 1978; Barash, 1982). The territory need not be a fixed piece of geography. It can be ’floating’ or ’spatiotemporal’ in nature, meaning that the animal defends only the area it happens to be in at the moment, or during a certain time of day or season, or both (Cf. Leyhausen, 1965). Territoriality, like other forms of contest competition, has taken protean shapes in different evolutionary lines to serve a variety of functions. According to E.O. Wilson (1975) the exclusive use of terrain must be due to one of the following five phenomena: (1) overt defense, (2) repulsion by advertisement, (3) the selection of different kinds of living quarters by different life forms or genetic morphs, (4) the sufficiently diffuse scattering of individuals through random effects of dispersal, or (5) some combination of these effects. Where interaction among animals occurs, specifically in the first two listed conditions, we can say that the occupied area is a territory. Territorial behavior is widespread in animals and serves to defend any of several kinds of resources (food supply, access to females, shelter, space for sexual display, nesting, etc.). The following classification of function, presented by E.O. Wilson, is an extension of one developed for birds by Mayr (1935), Nice (1941), Armstrong (1947), and Hinde (1956): Type A: a large defended area within which sheltering, nesting, and most food gathering occur. Type B: a large defended area within which all breeding activities occur but which is not the primary source of food. Type C: a small defended area around the nest. Type D: pairing and/or mating territories (leks).



Type E: roosting positions and shelters. Why should animals bother to defend any part of their home range? MacArthur (1972) proved that pure contest competition for food is energetically less efficient than pure scramble competition. This is a paradox easily resolved. Territoriality is a very special form of contest competition, in which the animal need win only once or a relatively few times. Consequently, the resident expends far less energy than would be the case if it were forced into a confrontation with conspecifics each time it attempted to forage. Its energetic balance sheet is improved still more it if comes to recognize and to ignore neighboring territorial holders - the ’dear enemy’ phenomenon (E.O. Wilson, 1975). Clearly, then, a territory can be made energetically more efficient than a home range in which competition is of the pure contest or the pure scramble form. But if this is the case, why are not all species with fixed home ranges also strictly territorial? The answer lies in what J.L. Brown (1964, 1975) has called economic defendability. Natural selection theory predicts that an animal should protect only the amount of terrain for which the defense gains more energy than it expends. In other words, if an animal occupies a much larger territory than it can monitor in one quick survey, it may find itself trotting from one end of its domain to the next just to oust intruders, an energetically wasteful activity. Furthermore, territorial defense is curtailed if it exposes animals too much to predation. There is also the phenomenon of aggressive neglect: defense of a territory results in less time devoted to courtship, fewer copulations, and neglected and less fit offspring. If there is less than enough for all of some requisite for reproduction - food, cover, mates, or nest sites - some individuals will probably receive less than others of the resource in short supply. The ’haves’ would then leave more offspring than the ’have nots’, other things being equal. The rewards of aggression depend on the stakes. If there is little to be gained by aggression and much to be lost by it, territorial behavior will be selected against. If there is much to be gained or guaranteed by aggression and little to be lost by it, territorial behavior will be selected for. Under steady-state conditions of competition, a norm for intensity of territorial behavior will most likely be established, with extremes in both directions selected against (J.L. Brown, 1964, 1975). In short, the territorial strategy evolved is the one that maximizes the increment of fitness due to extraction of energy from the defended area as compared with the loss of fitness due to the effort and perils of defense (E.O. Wilson, 1975; J.L. Brown, 1964, 1975; Crook, 1968, 1972; Schoener, 1971). The economic defendability model of territoriality was subsequently elaborated by Dyson-Hudson & Smith (1978). Economic defendability has several



components that interact to produce a cost-benefit ratio. The costs of territoriality include (1) the time, energy, and/or risk associated with defending an area; (2) the possible diversion of time and energy from other necessary activities; and (3) the possible negative consequences of relying on a spatially limited area for resources. The benefits of territoriality are simply those that result from exclusive access to critical resources; however, this benefit is relative to alternative (nonterritorial) modes of resource utilization. For any case of territoriality, the ratio of benefits to costs should exceed 1.0 (and probably by a comfortable margin). It can also be argued that adaptive processes in the long run will tend to produce optimal results and, thus, that the benefit/cost ratio for a territorial system should have an average value greater than the nonterritorial alternative available for the individual or group. The cost/benefit ratio of a territorial strategy is highly dependent on the pattern of resource distribution. For a general model of economic defendability, as presented by Dyson-Hudson & Smith, the important parameters of resource distribution are predictability and abundance. Predictability has both a spatial component (predictability of location) and a temporal one (predictability in time). Abundance or density of a resource can be measured in several ways: in terms of average density over a broad area (the average for the territory or home range), as an average value within a particular type or microhabitat (within-patch density), and in terms of the fluctuation in density over time (the range of variability). Resources that are predictable in their spatiotemporal distribution have greater economic defendability than unpredictable resources. A habitat where critical resources are predictable will be most efficiently exploited by a territorial system (holding other resource distribution parameters constant). Geometrical models of foraging indicate that it is more efficient for individuals to disperse to mutually exclusive foraging areas when food resources tend toward a uniform distribution and are predictable (Horn, 1968; C.C. Smith, 1968). Unpredictability of resources results in lowered benefits of territorial defense (in terms of resources controlled), and, below a certain threshold, territoriality will be uneconomical or even unviable (J.L. Brown, 1964). With a sufficient degree of resource predictability, clumping of individuals (coloniality) is expected to occur. Under these situations, efficient resource utilization may depend on the pooling of information about the location of ephemeral resource concentrations. In general, increased average density of critical resources makes a territorial system more economically defendable, simply by reducing the area that needs to be defended and thus reducing defense costs. However, density of resources within a patch combined with a high degree of unpredictability reduces the economic advantage of territoriality. That is, with sufficient within-patch density and patch unpredictability, localized and ephemeral superabundances result, where the temporary glut of resources is more than can be consumed and thus is best shared (either actively or passively) rather than defended.



Table 1.3.9: Relationship between resource distribution, territoriality, and foraging strategy (after Dyson-Hudson & Smith, 1978)

Resource Distribution

Economic Resource Defendability Utilization

Degree of Nomadism

A. Unpredict. Dense B. Unpredict. Scarce C. Predict. Dense D. Predict. Scarce

Low Low High Fairly low

High Very High Low Low-medium

Info-sharing Dispersion Territoriality Home ranges

1.3.9 Dominance Hierarchies and Cost/Benefit Calculus vs. Innate Inhibitions Popp & DeVore (1979) analyzed aggressive competition in the context of social dominance theory. Perhaps the single most important conclusion emerging from this study is that dominance hierarchies are expected to be timeand resource-specific. As we have seen, it is adaptive for an individual to be able to predict the outcome of an aggressive encounter; such an ability permits him to reduce costs by avoiding conflicts that will be lost and to increase benefits by competing to the end in encounters that he can win. In species that form long-term associations among a small set of individuals, one method of predicting the outcome of a competitive encounter is by the recollection of past encounters with a specific opponent. Past competitive experience with a known opponent under circumstances similar to the present competitive interaction can be useful in estimating the cost-benefit function for the opponent in aggressive competition. The best strategy for a subordinate individual who knows from past experience that it cannot win an encounter is to avoid the competition. It is this principle that is responsible for the often observed decline in the frequency of aggressive behavior when the members of a social group have had sufficient time to form dominance hierarchies. Popp & DeVore emphasize that both dominant and subordinate individuals must be viewed as actors that have been selected to display behaviors appropriate to the natural social environment for the maximization of their reproductive success. Dominance hierarchies do not exist because they bring harmony and stability to the social group, but as the consequence of self-interested actions, in the evolutionary sense, by each group member.



If an individual in an aggressive interaction terminates its aggressive behavior at or shortly after the time that its opponent gestures submissively, it will gain access to the disputed resource and on the average gain a net benefit for the entire interaction. If the winner continues to act aggressively toward the already submissive opponent, however, the situation changes substantially. If we assume that the victor continues the aggression with the intent to kill or seriously injure his submissive opponent, a new set of cost-benefit functions rapidly develop. Since no cost of competition could ordinarily exceed the costs of a fatal injury or, alternatively, since the benefit of saving one’s life is considerably higher than the benefit that could be derived from a disputed resource, the individual whose submissive behavior has failed to terminate its opponent’s aggression, will under most circumstances, fight desperately in an all-out self-defense. By contrast, the only benefit for the potential assassin would be the elimination of just one of many competitors. In addition, under natural conditions the submissive animal often has the opportunity to escape, and this further reduces the mortality directly attributable to aggressive competition. Note that the preceding argument is not at all equivalent to the frequent assertion that organisms possess an innate inhibition against killing conspecifics: whenever differences between two competitors in intrinsic competitive ability times the maximum adaptive expenditure for aggressive competition are sufficiently large, killers can be favored by natural selection. Although there is a number of noteworthy examples of strategies favored by natural selection that lead to the killing of conspecifics (e.g., infanticide, fratricide, siblicide, cannibalism), the cost-benefit functions do not often meet such criteria (avian siblicide may be a more common adaptive strategy, however: See Mock, Drummond & Stinson, 1990). 1.3.10 The Evolution of War? The proposition that war may have evolved during hominid/human evolution may seem odd - even absurd - for those readers who are accustomed to regard war as a social institution and cultural invention of relatively recent origin, i.e., concomitant with the emergence of states or state-like structures. Yet, it may be worthwhile to explore the possibility that war has evolved along with the emergence and evolutionary trajectory of the genus Homo. Many behaviors, traditionally considered to be uniquely human and of cultural origin, now have been shown to have evolved components, that is, to have been naturally selected. There is little doubt, for instance, that human sexuality or aggression (the agonistic behavioral system) do have such evolved components. And given the importance of these behavioral systems for the survival and reproductive success of the individual organism, such a state of affairs is not particularly astonishing, though many people are still very reluctant to



acknowledge any ’animal heritage’ in human behavior. Identifying evolved components in human behavior is often misconstrued as being an excuse or a subterfuge: "Our unalterable human nature being what it is...". It is equally often condemned as ’bad’, not only ’bad science’, but intrinsically morally bad because it runs counter to every soothing illusion man has created for himself. Other critics would grant the existence of evolved components at the individual level of behavior, but would assert that it is quite another step - in fact, illegitimate or irrelevant or impossible or simply impractical - to even consider war, genocide and massacres, as the most gory and extreme forms of human collective violence, to have some evolutionary background. Throughout recorded history, however, war has been a rather normal and accepted way of conducting disputes and settling conflicts of interests between political groups and other, e.g., ethnic, territorial, ’racial’, tribal and other collective units. It is a sobering thought that the ideal of peaceful coexistence has seldom been on the priority list of nation-states during the history of Western civilization, and even in this decade, with its unsuspected resurgence of bitter ethnic mass murders - it seems utopian more than ever. It would, however, be too facile to ascribe this deplorable state of affairs to some kind of ’innate aggressiveness’, ’beast-in-man-below-the-thin-veneer-of-civilization’ or ’universally warlike human nature’, or some other quasi-explanatory concept that obscures rather than clarifies the human condition. To aficionados of these and similar easy solutions I have very little to say. Rather, as the proverbial dwarf standing on the shoulders of giants, I intend to explore the evolutionary impact, as unbiased and sincere as possible, on the genesis and vicissitudes of war during the humanization process, or, at least, on the peculiar human cognitive and emotional make-up which underlies this collective destructive enterprise. In evolutionary perspective, the main problems I intend to address in this study are (a) to explain why war or its nonhuman equivalent (violent and more or less organized intergroup conflict) is confined in the animal kingdom to the hominids/humans, at least one species of chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes), and, though in much lesser and milder degree and less orchestrated, in some dolphins, social carnivores (such as hyenas), and a small number of primates, such as baboons and macaques; and (b) to simultaneously explain the conspicuous absence of the nonhuman equivalent of warfare in mammals generally, and primates in particular. This absence of violent intergroup competition in these animals is especially puzzling because they all have interindividual agonistic behavior (’aggression’) in their behavioral repertoires. A correlative problem concerns (c) the explanation of why it is universally males who are the warriors in humans and chimpanzees (in contrast to the social carnivores and primates in which females are prominently present in intergroup conflict); in other words, why warfare is such conspicuously sexually-dimorphic behavior. These are all ultimate-level questions. For the



corollary proximate-level questions of why human males fight in wars at all, their proximate motives, I shall review the pertinent literature.

1.4 The Study of Primitive War: A Brief History As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a remarkable trinity composed of primordial violence, hatred and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability, within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone... These three tendencies are like different codes of law, deep-rooted in their subject and yet variable in their relationship to one another. A theory that ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between them would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally useless. Karl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege (1832)

Sometimes a standpoint is only a point of departure. Whether one returns to it depends on what is discovered during the journey. But in order to convey the fascination of the journey of exploration, it might help to make clear what the original standpoint was in the first place. For that reason a number of concepts as used in this book have to be (briefly) dealt with. The term ’primitive’, as used throughout the book, may give rise to some misunderstandings. So it seems only appropriate to make myself perfectly clear on this subject. I do not use the term ’primitive’ in any negative or derogatory sense, nor in the sense of non-complex - primitive societies may in fact be more complicated than modern ones - but rather in the original Latin meaning ’primitivus’: "of or belonging to the first age, period or stage" (Hallpike, 1979), and as such has no derogatory implications whatsoever. I prefer this term to substitutes such as ’simple’, ’egalitarian’, ’unstratified’, ’preliterate or non-literate’, ’tribal’, ’band-level’, ’prestate or non-state’, ’acephalous’, ’preindustrial’ or, as one may find in older literature, ’savage’. It is roughly equivalent to what in German is called Naturvölker in contrast to Kulturvölker. In order to avoid unnecessary repetition, I shall alternately use the terms ’Man’, ’humans’, ’mankind’, ’humankind’ and Homo (sapiens) sapiens as equivalents and referring to the human species as a whole. There is no sexism involved, with one notable exception: As primitive warfare is predominantly a male business, the term ’Man’ in the context of war may sometimes refer mainly to the male members of the species. What is meant by warfare will be dealt with in some detail in the next chapter. It may suffice to say here that it generally denotes armed fighting between tribal or subtribal (such as moieties, clans, phratries, etc.) sociopolitical units. In blood feuds the minimum conflict unit above the individual level is the kinship group or the family. After these preliminaries, I now return to the main subject of this subchapter,



which is a brief overview of the history of the study of primitive peoples in general and primitive war in particular. 1.4.1 Classical Sources We are probably accustomed to think of the study of primitive war and warfare as a 19th and 20th century activity. Actually, observations of the war customs and habits - in fact, the first ethnographical accounts - of what were then described as savage or barbarian peoples, can already be traced back to Classical times. Although Aristotle had decreed that any war against animals and barbarians would be a just war, this did not prevent some Greek historiographers to look sometimes farther than their ethnocentric and civilized noses, and give fairly accurate accounts of the war practices of the nomadic peoples surrounding them. For these early observers war belonged to the natural order of things, a ’natural mode of acquisition’ as Aristotle called it, plainly justified by the law-of-the-jungle or the Might is Right arguments, so the question ’why war?’ - the question of causes or motives - did not customarily occur to them. Thucydides is the odd man out. In a surprisingly modern-looking analysis, he identified the root cause of the Peloponnesian War as a preemptive attack based on fear in the context of a power struggle and arms race: "What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear this caused in Sparta... The Athenians made their Empire more and more strong... [until] finally the point was reached when Athenian strength attained a peak plain for all to see and the Athenians began to encroach upon Sparta’s allies. It was at this point that Sparta felt the position to be no longer tolerable and decided by starting the present war to employ all her energies in attacking and if possible destroying the power of Athens" (Book x, Ch. 4). Only the nature of the power that posed a threat to the Spartans has changed over evolutionary and historical time. Among the primitive war practices reported by the ancient observers were: <

Head-taking and scalping Herodotus (Histories, iv, 64-66), the first comparative anthropologist avant la lettre, reported the practice of head-taking and scalping among the Scyths (whom he admired and therefore was not slandering, as Turney-High [1949] correctly observed). The Scythian warrior not only drank the blood of the first man he slew in battle but decapitated everyone he could. These heads were tokens of his right to share in the booty when the king distributed it. After the victorious Scythian warrior had taken an enemy head he removed the scalp and carefully prepared it. He proudly used the scalp as a napkin, often sewing many of them together to form a cloak. Sometimes a Scyth would completely flay an enemy for the purpose, and quivers made of flayed enemy arms were highly esteemed. The crania of enemies particularly detested were made into drinking cups.



Diodorus Siculus claimed that the Gauls, too, were head-takers. The Nordic Edda and Heimskringla rarely speak of head-taking, but they do mention the trait. <

Coup-counting Tacitus (Germania, 30) reported coup-counting among the Chatti, who were so military that he admiringly writes: "[O]ther Germans may be seen going to battle, but the Chatti go to war". Their youths did not shave or cut their hair until they had killed an enemy, so cowards and weaklings remained unkempt. The band of elite warriors owned no property and did no work, always knowing that they would be welcome to anybody’s food, which they wasted without regard for their host’s welfare. Such behavior was a clear parallel to that of a Plains Indian military association (Turney-High, 1949).

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War captives The Scyths used war captives to milk their mares for them, and finding them valuable, blinded them to make them docile and immobile. Their chronicler, Herodotus (iv, 2), ascribes such blinding to "their not being tillers of the ground but a pastoral race". The Scyths also sacrificed a vast number of war prisoners to their war god (iv, 62).

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(Lack of) discipline Tacitus (G, 6) reported disciplined cooperation among the Germans. He (G, 7) revealed that the traditional sib organization of the Germans, disciplined, subordinated, and welded into working order by the higher political authority, was one of the sources of their strength. Tactical units were bound together by the emotional value set on blood ties. This gave them strong incentive to courageous action. On the other hand, Caesar (De Bello Gallico, iv, 1) says that the Suebi would tolerate no battle discipline or direction, but strove by exercise, proper feeding and fasting, going naked in winter, and bathing in streams to make each individual a physical giant. The Thracians, according to the ancient chroniclers, could easily have threatened Greece, but their intense localistic attitudes prevented them. Herodotus (v, 3) called them one of the most powerful people in the world, and voiced the opinion that they would have been invincible if they had been able to effect internal unity. They could never accomplish this, and "herein therefore consists their weakness".

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Surprise attack and tactics Tacitus (G, 43) said that the Harii, a tribe of Lugii, were a strong, fierce, artful people. They liked to paint themselves and equipment black and attack on the darkest nights, striking "like an army of ghosts". They were



universally successful, partly because of their phantasmal appearance, for "in every battle after all the eye is conquered first". The same author shows that the Scots could also make able use of the night surprise attack (Tacitus, Agricola, 25-6). The Germans, trying to cross the Rhine, used a surprise stratagem against the Celtic Menapii, pretending to retire to their own land. They went 3 days away to effect this stratagem, but in a single night the German cavalry wheeled and attacked, catching the Menapii complacent and unprepared. The Menapii could only die (Caesar, iv, 4). Herodotus (iv, 46-47) speaks respectfully of the ’terrible and able’ Scyths, praising their superiority in tactical mobility. As horsed nomads they were expert mounted archers. Similarly, Caesar (DBG, iv, 2) praised the Suebi. In cavalry combats they often dismounted to fight afoot. Turney-High (1949), our best source on primitive tactics and strategy, comments that dismounting in a cavalry melee requires the highest kind of courage. The Chinese historian Ssu-ma Ch’ien (Sima Qian, ca. 100 BC) described Hsiung-nu (Xiongnu) nomadic tactics and strategy in terms almost identical with those applied by Herodotus to the Scyths. We have, furthermore, information on war tactics of the Bellovaci (Caesar, v, 56) and the Iapydes (Appian of Alexandria, Roman History, x, 18). < <

Duel Cassius Dio (Roman History, iii, 6,7) describes a championship duel in the struggle for supreme power between the Albans and the early Romans. Loot and spoil, and spoiling for a fight Tacitus (G, 14) commented on the Germanic youths’ dislike of peace, how they would seek service under foreign chiefs if their own tribe were cursed by a long period of quietude. The chiefs also preferred war, for from war came loot, and by loot one could maintain a large retinue, could make gifts of fine horses and weapons, could give banquets, and earn a name for generosity. "The chiefs fight for victory, the followers for their chief. Many noble youths, if the land of their birth is stagnating in a long period of peace and inactivity, deliberately seek out other tribes which have some war in hand. For the Germans have no taste for peace; renown is more easily won among perils, and a large body of retainers cannot be kept together except by means of violence and war... A German is not so easily prevailed upon to plough the land and wait patiently for harvest as to challenge a foe and earn wounds for his reward. He thinks it tame and spiritless to accumulate slowly by the sweat of his brow what can be got quickly by the loss of a little blood". Also the verdict of Herodotus (v, 4) on the Thracians is unequivocal: "[T]he best man, in their opinion, is the idle man, and the sort least worthy of consideration is the agricultural labourer. The most reputable sources of income are war and plunder".



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Honor and courage The honor motive is not as apparent in the literature on Eurasia as it is elsewhere, but it does appear. Scythian behavior, for example, resembled a Crow coup-counting council. The governor of each district held an annual wine feast at which all Scythian men who had slain a foe during the year dipped into the chief’s bowl. Those who had killed several could bring two cups and drink from both. Those who had killed no one had to sit aloof in disgrace. Tacitus (G, 14) reports of the early German peoples: "On the field of battle it is a disgrace to a chief to be surpassed in courage by his followers, and to the followers not to equal the courage of their chief. And to leave a battle alive after their chief has fallen means lifelong infamy and shame. To defend and protect him, and to let him get the credit for their own acts of heroism, are the most solemn obligations of their allegiance". Firm belief in a hereafter made the Germans and the Celts contemptuous of death. Caesar (vi, 14) said that the Gallic Druids taught the metempsychosis of souls as their cardinal doctrine, so that, fear of death being removed, the warriors could be incited to great valor. The Valhalla myth of the Nordic peoples was also a well-known fear-inhibiting idea.

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Divination Tacitus’ (A, 11) remarks about the Britons being superstitiously reckless at times and cowardly at others has a familiar ring. Caesar (i, 50) was once surprised that Ariovistus did not strike hard at him to win a decisive victory, but upon questioning the prisoners, he discovered that the German matrons, whose duty it was to foretell victory by lot and divination, had declared the heavens unpropitious and warned the king not to fight before the new moon. Also Tacitus (G, 3) said that the Germans divined the outcome of battle by ordeal. Fear could be repressed by entering only those battles the favorable outcome of which was assured. The Germans would not tolerate so much as a disciplinary blow from their commanders but submitted to death if the war divinity demanded it. The priests also carried "certain fetishes... and emblems into battle to insure success" (Tacitus, G, 7). Justin relates that a coalition of Celts under a petty chief named Catumandus attacked the Greek colony of Marseilles in about 400 BC, but were frightened away by some magico-religious omen.

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Destructiveness The devastation brought about by these peoples, in spite of their primitive technology, should not be underestimated. The Celts apparently left nothing standing when they conquered a country. Avienus (Ora Maritima) stated that the ravaging Gael always left desolation where prosperity once dwelt. And Herodotus complained about the Scythians’ insolence: They scoured the country and plundered everyone of whatever



they could. <

The role of women According to sources available, Eurasian women played a very great part in war. Caesar (i, 51) certainly reported no lack of spirit among the German women in the band of Ariovistus. The Germans arranged their wagons so as to make retreat impossible, setting their women on them so that they would beseech the advancing men with tears not to deliver them to Roman slavery. Similarly, Tacitus (G, 7,8) said that the Germans placed the women and children where they could behold their valor. Wives and mothers supplied the men with food and exhortation. He said the Germans wrested many a victory from apparent defeat because the women bared their breasts with pleas that they fall not into enemy thralldom. Women egging men on to war is also a common situation in the Norse legends (Biarkmol Him Foinu, Heimskringla). The Ramayana has several passages in which wives and mothers behaved very much like those reported by Caesar and Tacitus. The Aryan women, if we are to believe the hymns (e.g., Taittiriya Samhita) were, like the Nordic women, Valkyr fighters. The hymns also relate that the non-Aryan girls formed troops against the invaders which were in no way inferior to the male battalions (RigVeda, V, 51,80 et passim).

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Peaceability The classical literature does not only rhapsodize the warlike qualities of the ’barbarians’, it also provides striking examples of peaceful peoples. In describing the Libyan tribes, Herodotus (iv, 174) mentions the Garamantes: "Further inland to the southward, in the part of Libya where wild beasts are found, live the Garamantes, who avoid all intercourse with men, possess no weapons of war, and do not know how to defend themselves". The name of the tribe is probably corrupt, and the actual existence of this people may be doubted, but Herodotus tells the story matter-of-factually, without apparent astonishment about how such a defenseless people could have survived in his rapacious and predatory world. Similarly, he (iv, 26) relates of a certain Scythian tribe: "These people are supposed to be protected by a mysterious sort of sanctity; they carry no arms and nobody offers them violence; they settle disputes amongst their neighbors, and anybody who seeks asylum amongst them is left in peace. They are called Argippaei". Tacitus (G, 46) states of the Fenni at the end of the then-known world (and probably the early Finns): "The Fenni are astonishingly savage and disgustingly poor. They have no proper weapons, no horses, no homes". And yet "Unafraid of anything that man or god can do to them, they have reached a state that few human beings can attain: for these men are so



well content that they do not even need to pray for anything". Even among the bellicose early Germans there were exceptional tribes. Tacitus (G, 35) admiringly says of the Chauci: "They are the noblest people of Germany, and one that prefers to maintain its greatness by righteous dealing. Untouched by greed or lawless ambition, they dwell in quiet seclusion, never provoking a war, never robbing or plundering their neighbors. It is conspicuous proof of their valour and strength that their superiority does not rest on aggression". Also the Cherusci "have been left free from attack to enjoy a prolonged peace" (G, 36). To conclude this section with a touch of the hilarious, Herodotus tells the tragicomic story of the Psylli in Libya: "The neighbors of the Nasamones are the Psylli - but they no longer exist. There is a story which I repeat as the Libyans tell it: that the south wind dried up the water in their storage tanks, so that they were left with none whatever, as their territory lies wholly within the Syrtis. Upon this they held a council, and having unanimously decided to declare war on the south wind, they marched out to the desert, where the wind blew and buried them in sand. The whole tribe was wiped out, and the Nasamones occupied their former domain". I have dwelt somewhat on these classical sources, partly accumulated by Turney-High (1949), because here we already find virtually all the ingredients which characterize primitive war, as will be seen later: magical head-taking, scalping, victory-gloating, mutilation of the slain, coup-counting, the honor motive, the warrior cult, the sneak attack and ambush, magic and superstition; whereas other features, such as disciplined cooperation, almost transcend the boundaries of primitive war, almost go beyond the ’military horizon’ as Turney-High (1949) would put it, because it is much more characteristic to find that each warrior is a soloist, performing on his own stage for his own glory. Discipline and coordination in battle provide the watershed between the warrior and the soldier. 1.4.2 The Widening of the Eurocentric World View After the Classical period, the Dark Ages descended upon Europe, and the scene is replaced to the Arab world, where the vast continent of Africa gradually became to be explored (and exploited). Herodotus, of course, was the first to describe (from hearsay) the Egyptian and Libyan peoples, and there are other Classical sources on Africa (Strabo, Seneca, Pliny the Elder, Claudius Ptolemeus, Hanno, Kosmas Indikopleustes), but in general the more reliable information stems from Arab sources. Northern Africa was to experience a long and dramatic sequence of colonization by Carthaginians, Greeks, Romans, Vandals, Byzantines and Arabs. The kingdom of Ghana was first mentioned in writing by an Arab



author of the 8th century, al-Fazari, while three centuries later the Moorish geographer al-Bakri of Cordoba described the people and their rituals, mentioning among others the institutions of divine kingship and human sacrifice. The kingdom of Kanem (near Lake Chad) was mentioned by al-Yaqubi (9th century), while the 10th century writer al-Muhallabi made it clear that it was a divine kingdom with absolute power. Al-Masudi, great explorer and geographer, referred to a divine kingship state in the hinterland of modern Mozambique (" 922 A.D.). Ibn-Battuta (b. 1304) penetrated Africa as far as Timbuktu and Mali. There are also some Chinese sources on Eastern Africa: Tuan Cheng-shih (9th century), On Yang-Hsin (1060), and Chao Ju-kua (1226). Ibn-Khaldun of Tunis (1332-1406), in his Introduction to History (1377), was the first to formulate the so-called Überlagerungs-theory of the origin of the state, which is essentially a conquest theory - victorious nomadic pastoralists settle permanently among the conquered sedentary horticultural or agricultural people as overlords - and he may be considered to be one of the founders of the so-called ’conflict school’ of sociological thought. So here we find the first theorizing on primitive war and its possible role in state-formation, a recurrent theme in the pertinent literature up till today, and reaching its zenith among the Social Darwinists (See Holsti, 1913). Africa largely remained terra incognita until far into the 19th century. In the meantime, reports from explorers, ethnographers and missionaries about African tribal warfare had been accumulating to such an extent that the African Negro was considered to be the most warlike ’race’ by Davie (1929), whose monograph on primitive war, still firmly rooted in the Social-Darwinist tradition, is the classic on the subject, although, unfortunately, rather one-sided. One cannot escape the impression, however, that much of this havoc (and tribal war in Africa could be devastating in its ferocity, lethality and sequelae) has been caused, directly or indirectly, by European colonialism and the New World demand for slaves. 1.4.3 The Age of the Philosophers In Europe, meanwhile, the Scholastic thinkers had incorporated the classical sources, such as Aristotle, Plato, and the Stoa, in their body of knowledge on war, though they were preoccupied more with the justification of contemporary wars than with war causation in general. By this time 3 basic paradigms on human nature in relation to war had emerged: (a) Dualism (Plato, Spinoza) which saw the fundamental cause of war rooted in the eternal conflict between rationality and passion; (b) the Augustinian perspective which saw the inevitability of war rooted in Original Sin and Divine Revenge; and (c) the Thomist paradigm, which envisaged man as an essentially rational and perfectible being, who was not doomed to wage wars forever by some metaphysical imperative.



The latter paradigm was to have a profound influence on the Encyclopedists and Philosophes of the French Enlightenment. Political philosophy of that time centered on matters of state (Raison d’Etat) in relation to war (Dante, Nicolas of Cusa, Bodin, Macchiavelli). Most influential was Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan (1651), in which Hobbes postulated the thesis that the status naturalis of mankind was a status hostilis resulting in a "bellum omnium contra omnes" (war of all against all). As the reasons for this state of affairs he identified competition as well as the universal human motives of diffidence, glory and power ("I put for a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire for power after power, that ceaseth only in death"). Existential fear would then lead to the Social Contract. Hobbes’ views were contradicted by Montesquieu and, especially, Rousseau (Contrat Social, 1762): in the status naturalis, in the absence of property, war would be impossible. By their contemporaries these antithetical views were made the stake of the controversy whether original man, man in the state of nature, was peaceful or warlike. This so-called Hobbes-Rousseau controversy (treated more extensively in Ch. 2), has dominated the anthropological and sociological literature to the present day. Most philosophers (Spinoza, Locke, Kant) and the founders of international law (such as Grotius) did not envisage peace as the natural state of mankind. The discovery, and subsequent ravishing and subjugation, of the New World by the Spanish Conquistadors in the wake of Columbus, Cortez, Pisarro, etc., led not only to the destruction of entire civilizations like the Inca and Aztec, and the extermination of numerous primitive societies, but also to anthropological and ethnological information on a totally unknown, novel kind of human being: the American Indian. A dazzling, kaleidoscopic variety of culture patterns and sociocultural levels were to intrigue the observers. Columbus had brought back some Indians from the Caribbean region to present them to the Spanish court (One century later these Caribbeans were extinct). But the real introduction, from our point of view, to the people in their natural state and habitat, was a book by a German sailor, Hans Staden (1557), who had been washed ashore in South America after a shipwreck, and spent some time among the people we know as the Tupinamba (Brazil). The title of his book has some curiosity value: Wahrhaftige Historia und Beschreibung eyner Landschafft der wilden nacketen grimmigen Menschfresser Leuthen in der Newenwelt Amerika gelegen, etc.. Staden described the cannibalism and war customs of the Tupinamba in some detail (though doubt has arisen recently about its authenticity: cf. Arens, 1979). The book inspired Michel de Montaigne to write a thoughtful essay "On Cannibalism" (1580). (To be sure, there are even older sources: e.g. the book Historia de los Indios de Nueva España by Motolinia already dates from 1541). In the wake of the Conquistadors, who had come to plunder, and the first settlers, who had come to stay, followed the missionaries, who came to



convert. De las Casas had already appealed to the Conquistadors to save the souls of the Indians instead of killing them off. In practice, the Conquistadors had no pangs of conscience in saving the eternal souls and killing off the ephemeral bodies of the Indians. In North America Jesuit missionaries and explorers like Charlevoix, Lafitau, Le Petit and LeJeune gathered a cornucopia of information on the daily life and war and peace customs of numerous North American Indian tribes or nations, as they were generally called. The accounts and letters left by the missionaries have been collected in The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents, a multivolume publication edited by Thwaites (1897-1901), which still is a real Fundgrube for the student of primitive warfare. These, and other, accounts had another important effect. They led to the first really empirical investigation of primitive war: An Essay on the History of Civil Society by Adam Ferguson (1767). His conclusion was unequivocal: "We had occasion to observe that in every rude state the great business is war; and that in barbarous times, mankind, being generally divided into smaller parties, are engaged in almost perpetual hostilities". 1.4.4 War as a Cultural Invention Totally different conclusions were reached, however, by 19th century anthropologists, whose ethnological compilations and inventories began by now to appear with some regularity. Lewis Morgan (Ancient Society, 1877), for instance, posited the original communism of primitive societies. This was gefundenes Fressen for Friedrich Engels, who based his Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State (1884) on Morgan’s work. It was only when surplus production and socioeconomic classes appeared on the scene, he asserted, that class struggle and war did arise. In primitive societies, in which there is no surplus production, consequently there can be no war. This view of war as macroparasitism, as a predatory enterprise and cultural invention was to be the orthodox doctrine of Marxism-Leninism, as well the leitmotif of many non-Marxist historiographers (See Ch. 5). The idea that war, the institution of war, is a cultural invention proved to be attractive to many cultural anthropologists. Man an sich would be peaceful, it is culture that transforms him into a belligerent being. The names of Margaret Mead, Ruth Benedict, Dewey, Malinowski and White come immediately to mind. And indeed, the idea has an optimistic ring about it. When war is ’only’ an invention (Mead), it can also be ’dis-’ or ’uninvented’ and abolished: there is no arcane force or biological necessity which compels us to go on slaughtering one another in saecula saeculorum. Yet, such a view carries its own problems. Very few, if any, of the cultural inventionists ventured to pose further questions: why was war ’invented’ in the first place; why was it invented in so many cultures; and, crucial question, why



did supposedly peaceful human beings invent cultures in which war could be invented? A peculiar offshoot of cultural inventionism was the short-lived school of diffusionism (e.g., Perry, 1917), which held that warfare was uniquely and exclusively invented in predynastic Egypt, and subsequently spread from this focal point over the entire globe by means of cultural diffusion. It proved not too difficult to point out the limitations and identify the fallacies involved in this approach (e.g., Q.Wright, 1942). Like old soldiers who never die but just fade away, the diffusionist theory was gradually abandoned rather than refuted.



1.4.5 The Rise of Academic Anthropology



I will use the term anthropology in the broadest sense to include both anthropology and ethnology, ethnography, ethnohistory, etc. in order to avoid unnecessary repetitions. Already in 1590 José de Acosta invented the term 'moral history' to designate what was later to be called ethnography, i.e., the description of customs, rites, ceremonies, laws, government and wars of Indian peoples. Even before him, in 1520, Johann Boem had published a general work comparing the customs of European, Asian and African peoples: Omnium gentium mores, leges et ritus ex multis clarissimis rerum scriptoribus... super collectos (Cf. Rowes, 1964; Godelier, 1977). Modern academic anthropology began to take shape before the middle of the 19th century. Around the fin-de-siècle it had become a well-established discipline. The early anthropological treatises on primitive war were, with a few exceptions, predominantly compilative, casuistic, and illustrative in character, rather than explanatory (in the sense of theory building and empirical testing of hypotheses derived from the theory), while sources were used selectively to demonstrate man’s original belligerence or peacefulness, or whatever one was out to prove (e.g., Spencer, Jerusalem, Molinari, Holsti, Sumner, de Lapouge, Steinmetz, van der Bij, Waitz, Hellwald, Ratzel, Knabenhans, Weule, Vierkandt, Frobenius, Letourneau, among many others). The controversial opus magnum The Golden Bough by Frazer (1890), who had made an inventory of war ritual in primitive peoples, so impressed Freud that he devoted a chapter to it in his Totem und Tabu (1913). Freud tried to explain them as disculpation rituals (implying that also primitive man felt guilt and remorse about killing his fellow human beings) and he ventured to identify the psychodynamics underlying them. As may be inferred form the above, the Hobbes-Rousseau controversy was everything but dead when we enter the 20th century. It reached a new provisional climax in 1929, when the Dutch sociologist (who has entered history as the most fervent ’scientific’ apologist of war) Steinmetz, and his, also Dutch, opponent van der Bij, both published their treatises on primitive war. Steinmetz (Soziologie des Krieges, 1929) reached the conclusion, which was in fact more a presupposition with data selected to match it, that man must have been aggressive, belligerent (and cruel) from the very beginning in order to have survived and evolved at all, while van der Bij (Ontstaan en eerste ontwikkeling van den oorlog, 1929), on the basis of a literature study of the most ’primitive’ (he uses the term ’lowest’) of all primitive peoples ever described, concluded: "The lowest peoples known to us do not, or very reluctantly and loathingly, resort to group fighting; offensive fighting does not occur at the lowest cultural level". Van der Bij submitted that ’primitive’ peoples were non-belligerent because they were ’primitive’. Steinmetz retorted by stating that they were ’primitive’ because they were non-belligerent: "Die Völker, welche nicht kämpfen und am wenigsten aggressiv sind, bleiben auf der niedrigsten Stufe stehen" [Those peoples that do not wage war and that are the least aggressive remain at the lowest cultural level]. It is curious to see that their respective bibliographies (which in the case of Steinmetz hardly deserves



the name) hardly show any overlap, which means that at that time there already was a substantial body of anthropological data on the subject, from which one could select one’s sources to ’prove’ one’s own parti pris. The year 1929 produced, by the way, a bounty harvest for the study of primitive war: also Davie’s The Evolution of War and Hoijer’s The Causes of Primitive Warfare appeared in the same year. 1.4.5.1 Evolutionism The concept of evolution as an ordering principle in cultural anthropology was proposed about 1840 even before Darwin’s Origin of Species (1859). Evolutionism, the predominant school to the end of the 19th century, assumed a linear conception of human evolution and history: some groups progress more slowly, some faster as they advance from the simple to the complex, from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous, from the irrational to the rational (e.g. Spencer, Morgan, McLennan, Tylor). However, Morgan, and particularly Tylor, felt the necessity of introducing the concept of ’diffusion’, or spread, of cultural traits because reality proved to be recalcitrant, thus suggesting that characteristics could develop independently and converge and that a people could leap over ’stages’ of evolution by borrowing knowledge from others. Lewis Morgan (Ancient Society, 1877), with Spencer and Tylor the founder of academic anthropology, demonstrated that the kind of social relations which dominate the organization of most primitive societies are kinship relations. He then showed how these kinship relations had an internal logic which had to be discovered through detailed studies of marriage rules and kinship terminologies. He assumed that these kinship systems had a historical sequence (mankind evolving from sexually promiscuous ’primitive hordes’), and that gradually the incest prohibition had been introduced, and marriage between blood relations in wider and wider categories had become tabooed. The ’human family’ evolved from a primitive form of ’group marriage’ to the monogamy of European nuclear families. Morgan also supposed that matrilineal kinship systems had preceded patrilineal ones. The differentiation of primitive peoples in their modes of life and linguistic stock was due to a "constant tendency to disintegration... followed by a complete segmentation" which characterizes tribal society. Tribal multiplication was accompanied by a state of permanent war among them since each tribe considered itself at war with all those with whom there was no formally signed peace treaty and even these were provisional. Constant segmentation and war was a powerful obstacle in the progress of ’savage’ and ’barbarous’ tribes. There were, however, some tribal societies who reached the ’civilized’ stage, but at the price of the dissolution and disappearance of their clan and tribal organization. Almost a century later, Sahlins (1961) and Service (1962) proposed a scheme of social evolution in four stages: the band, the tribe, the chiefdom and finally the state, whereby ’civilization’ made its entry into history. Broadly speaking, this is also Morgan’s, scheme with the concept of ’band’ taking the place of the



’primitive horde’ (Godelier, 1977). Cultural evolutionists did not, in general, envisage the possibility of devolution or involution which may found in the Werdegang of societies; they regarded it almost exclusively as a general, progressive, one-way movement. Steward (1955) and some others saw in cultural evolution a multilineal phenomenon. Godelier (1977) denies even that: "[T]here is no evolution ’in general’, nor is there a ’general evolution’ of mankind". Admittedly, this is a maverick position in social anthropology. 1.4.5.2 Social Darwinism At the time when Social Darwinism (which might better be called Not-SoSocial-Spencerism) flourished, roughly around the fin-de-siècle, the Apology of War, which had had a long tradition in European history, also reached its zenith. Some cross-fertilization is undeniable. In fact, Social Darwinism, with its zeitgeistiges emphasis on differential mortality ("Nature red in tooth and claw") as the principal agent of selection, added some biological arguments, such as ’improvement of the race’, ’perfection of the species’ to the gamut of arguments inherited from metaphysical and étatistic War Apology. A typical example of such a notion of differential mortality may be found in Quinton's Maximes sur la Guerre (1930): "La femelle propage l'espèce, le mâle, par sa mort, la sélectionne". It was a perfectly logical construction, given their premises, that if war is the agent of progress, the motor of human biological and cultural evolution, abolition of war was not only inadvisable but downright immoral. "Die wirkliche Aufhebung des Krieges wäre das erste Symptom des Todes" [The abolition of war would be the first symptom of death] as Steinmetz (1929) tersely put it. Darwin had already considered the role of primitive warfare as an agent of group selection in human evolution. This was theoretically elaborated by Bagehot (1872), Spencer (1873), and Steinmetz (1899 et seq.). Social Darwinism, as an amalgamation of evolutionism, selectionism, racialism, instinctivism, and functionalism, will be considered in more detail in Ch. 4.



1.4.6 The Major Contemporary Anthropological Schools 1.4.6.1 Ethnopsychology Evolutionism, as a school of anthropological thought, had posited a universal human nature: all mankind was supposed to have a similar psychic outlook or mental equipment. This postulate was challenged by ethnopsychology (or cultural psychology), developing during the interbellum, based on the idea that culture conditions the very psychological makeup of individuals. In the 1930s Ruth Benedict found that the ways in which the Pueblo Indians thought and reasoned were strikingly different from the ways in which their immediate neighbors thought and reasoned, even though their geographical environment was virtually identical. Her conclusion was that each culture over the ages had evolved and given to its members a unique ’psychological set’ or orientation toward reality and that this set actually determined how the members saw and processed information from the environment. Culture, in effect, affects the ways in which the mind works. Such ’cultural relativism’, as it was to be called, led to many studies in culture and personality. 1.4.6.2 Marxism In the second half of the 19th century another kind of evolutionism developed: that of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Partly independent of anthropological evolutionism (Marx’s Critique of Political Economy dates from 1859), partly linked to it (Engels’ most important work appeared after Morgan’s Ancient Society and made use of it), the Marxist theory laid stress on the causes of human societal evolution. A society was defined by its mode of production, on which its political, juridical, and ideological superstructures were allegedly based. These super-structures continued to exist after the mode of production had changed, and in the conflict that followed, this contradiction opened the way to a new type of society. Numerous anthropologists have taken the Marxist analysis into account, even if only to retain its historical view and materialist orientation, but to reject its economic determinism (Mercier, 1977). The contemporary American school of Materialism will be discussed in more detail in Ch. 4. During the same period, especially toward the end of the 19th century, the tales of missionaries, traders, and travelling adventurers included an abundance of miscellaneous information that was collected in such works as Sir James Frazer’s Golden Bough (1890) and Ernest Crawley’s Mystic Rose (1902). These rather encyclopedic collections of customs, religious and magical practices, and other curious data were read with relish by the intellectual community; the theories that accompanied the collections were equally appreciated by evolutionary-minded anthropologists, as the theories were meant to establish an evolutionary sequence of magical, religious, and scientific phases in humanity’s inexorable march of progress.



1.4.6.3 The Cultural History School Frans Boas, a German-born American, was one of the first to scorn the evolutionist’s search for selected facts to grace abstract evolutionary theories; and he inspired a number of students - Ruth Benedict, Alfred Kroeber, Margaret Mead, and Edward Sapir - to go out and seek evidence of man’s behavior among men in their natural environments, to go into the field to gather facts and artifacts and record observable cultural processes. He thus is known as the founder of the so-called culture history school of anthropology, which for much of the 20th century, dominated American cultural anthropology. 1.4.6.4 The ’Grand Diffusionists’ The large and influential American school of ’culture history’ anthropologists led by Boas should not be confused with a distinct and smaller group of Austro-German diffusionists, led by Fritz Graebner and Wilhelm Schmidt, who constituted what has been called the ’culture-historical’ school in Europe. These latter, too, had rejected classical 19th-century evolutionism, but they were nevertheless inclined toward painting grand theories - principally the theory that out of a few ancient cultural centers or civilizations, born quite separately, there had developed all the array of cultures existing today. Diffusion, or the spreading of culture traits, in their view, was the prime force of human development, and all cultural development could be traced to a few inventive centers. Because they termed these original centers "Kulturkreise" (or "cultural clusters"), they were also known as the Kulturkreise school of anthropology. The British diffusionists (' 1.4.4; see also Ch. 6) were clearly inspired by this school. 1.4.6.5 The ’Sociological’ School In a similar way, Marcel Mauss in France influenced the characteristic tendencies of a whole generation of European sociologists and anthropologists, including Alfred Métraux and Claude Lévi-Strauss. He also influenced such men as the noted British anthropologists Bronislaw Malinowski and Arnold Radcliffe-Brown. In general, Mauss, like Boas, was insistent upon studying social phenomena as a system - but in a slightly different fashion. He conceived of systems as self-regulating or equilibrium-seeking, composed of elements that operate to maintain the integration or adaptation of the system. Mauss gave impetus, in fact, to what was called structuralism or the structural approach, which focussed more on society as an indivisible social organism than on society as an interrelation of individuals (the functionalist's emphasis).



1.4.6.6 Functionalism and Structuralism Some schools of research that began to develop between the two world wars more or less vigorously rejected the historical approaches. According to the cultural functionalists, including the followers of Malinowski, the only way to explain facts was to define the function that they performed currently in a given culture. The aim of all anthropological research, they held, should be to perceive the totality of a culture and the organic connection of all its parts. Consequently, comparison did not make sense: each culture was a unique reality. History, moreover, made no more sense; a culture was to be interpreted at one point in time, as if the age and the origin of the elements composing it were immaterial. The only thing that counted was the function the elements performed now. Earlier anthropologists had envisaged ’survivals’, customs or other cultural traits that survived from out of the past though no longer with any real function or meaning. But, according to the functionalists, everything current has some function. Whereas the name of Malinowski is associated with the school of functionalism, the names of Radcliffe-Brown and Lévi-Strauss are known as important proponents of present-day structuralism. A structure is not a sum of social relations, which are only the primary material from which the observer extracts 'structural models'. A structure is a system of which the members of a society being studied are not aware or only partly so. The model that the anthropologist constructs from the system is valid when the model's operation can account for all the observed facts. This exacting (and rather static) approach has has been applied to the study of kinship and marriage relations as well as myths (Mercier, 1977). In the study of primitive war, it appeared to be of minor significance.



1.4.6.7 The Correlationists A next major step in the study of primitive war was the introduction of cross-cultural, macroquantitative research techniques, which, on the one hand, permitted crude statistical analysis and discovery of correlational patterns, and, on the other hand, necessitated the set-up of reliable (but rather static) data-bases and standard cross-cultural samples, for reasons of mutual comparison, such as the widely used Human Relations Area Files (HRAF) sample. Beginning with Hobhouse, Wheeler & Ginsberg (1915) who subjected data on some 650 ’simple peoples’ to statistical analysis, (and on which Quincy Wright [1942] based his compilation), cross-cultural research permitted at least some concrete testing of hitherto speculative hypotheses and the sifting out of manifestly false ones. For example, the results of these earlier investigations were unequivocal: War, or rather belligerence, is a concomitant of increasing civilization (contrary to Steinmetz’ "humanization-of-war" thesis). Later studies have, with some exceptions, tended to confirm this general diachronic pattern. One such exception, the study by Midlarsky & Thomas (1975), whose investigation led them to conclude that "Whether a society is structurally complex and, therefore, differentiated, appears to have little bearing on its war experience", merits some comments. The term ’war experience’ as these authors use it, lumps together and confounds two fundamentally different categories. If a people A attacks a people B, they both experience war, but one is the attacker and the other the defender. The highly peaceful Hopi frequently had to defend themselves against raids of marauding surrounding tribes: they consequently had a great deal of war experience. But the crucial question is not how much war people experience, but why and when they wage offensive war. Obviously, not to make a distinction between offense and defense does not contribute much to better understanding of these vital (and lethal) phenomena. The relation between cultural complexity, societal development, and frequency and intensity of war, and other consistent correlates of primitive war will be considered in more detail in the next chapter.



1.4.6.8 Evolutionary Bio-anthropology Since the 1950s, a kind of ’revival’ took place in theory formation on primitive war, receiving its inputs from social and cultural anthropology with a strong functionalist and ecological-demographic orientation (White, Vayda, Naroll, Divale, Harris, Otterbein, Ferguson, and others), as well as from evolutionary biology, ethology and sociobiology (Lorenz, Eibl-Eibesfeldt, Tinbergen, E.O. Wilson, Alexander, Durham, and others), converging in their emphasis on ’realistic conflict’. Most sociobiologically-oriented theorists would, furthermore, subscribe to a number of theoretical premises, as Meyer (1987) has pointed out: (a) the adoption of a neo-Darwinian evolutionary framework which is mainly selectionist; (b) the consideration of genes as the unit of selection, which leads consequently to an intrinsically individualistic approach; (c) the consideration of kin selection; and (d) the acceptance of the inclusive fitness optimization or maximization principle as the central proposition of the evolutionary paradigm. Durham (1976) suggests a terse formulation of the underlying principle of ’phenotypic cost’: "[T]here is a biologically limited amount of time and energy available to each organism... natural selection adjusts the genetic influences on behavior so that this time and energy... are spent in ways that tend to maximize the representation of a given individual’s genes". These evolutionary bio-anthropological theories and their criticism constitute the subject-matter of Ch. 4. While these theories undoubtedly constitute the mainstream of present-day theorizing, one should not overlook the inputs from other disciplines, notably social psychology, psychoanalysis, sociology, political science, peace research (polemology), etc. These rather heterogeneous and kaleidoscopic contributions to our understanding of primitive war and its causation and genesis will be covered in Ch. 5.



2 The Concept and Characteristics of War in Primitive Societies 2.1 Introduction Etymologically, the term ’war’ is derived from Old High German werra, signifying confusion, discord or strife. War is a species of the genus of violence; more specifically, it is collective, direct, manifest, personal, intentional, organized, institutionalized, instrumental, sanctioned, and sometimes ritualized and regulated, violence. These distinguishing features and dimensional delineations are not limitative. It should be perfectly clear, however, that war, or the state of belligerence, is a very special category of macro-level violence (van der Dennen, 1977; 1981). Many researchers have emphasized the continuity of violence with other political methods, and have agreed with the Clausewitzian adage that "War is nothing but a continuation of political intercourse with an admixture of other means". Diametrically opposed to the vista of peace and war as a bipolar continuum, is the view of a sharp and clear-cut borderline existing between the two conditions, thus implying a boundary transgression in the transition from one state of affairs to the other: "Inter bellum et pacem nihil medium" (Cicero). Generally, war has been conceptualized as (1) a socio-political phenomenon; and (2) a judicial or legal phenomenon. According to the first conceptualization, war, in principle, can only take place between sovereign political entities (tribes, fiefs, nation-states, empires, etc.). According to the judicial conception, war is "a legal condition which equally permits two or more hostile groups to carry on a conflict by armed force" (Q.Wright, 1942; 1965). Those who stress the legal aspects of war also maintain that a belligerent status implies sovereignty. A struggle can be considered a war only if the contenders are sovereign political units (Cf. Lider, 1977). According to many cultural anthropologists, the anthropological literature illuminates the difficulties of setting definitional boundaries around such concepts as ’war’ and ’violence’. These difficulties are twofold. First, the terms express cultural categories; and, secondly, even as cultural categories warfare and violence are not phenomena sui generis; they occur as part of many kinds of social relationships and cultural forms (Greenhouse, 1987). A number of anthropologists distinguish ’war’ from ’warfare’. While warfare refers specifically to the process or activity of battle, war refers more broadly to the institution (e.g., Nettleship, 1975) or to the entire system, not only military,



through which hostilities are sustained (e.g., Wintrop, 1991).

2.2 Quantitative Criteria in the Definition of War If we take the view that war is simply one form of political intercourse, how do we know when the line dividing nonviolent conflict from violence has been crossed? One attempt to fix the threshold quantitatively was made by Richardson (1960) who tried to arrange all ’deadly quarrels’ on a continuum of violent conflict ranging from one killed (murder) to ten million killed. The threshold of war was crossed when deaths went over 1,000. Singer & Small (1972) and Deutsch & Senghaas (1973) call ’war’ any series of events that meets the following three criteria: (1) Size: It results in at least 1,000 battle deaths (not counting the indirect casualties); (2) Preparation: It has been prepared in advance, and/or is being maintained by large-scale social organizations; and (3) Legitimation: It is legitimized by an established governmental or quasi-governmental organization, so that large-scale killing is viewed not as a crime but as a duty. For the student of primitive warfare, it is obvious that for band- or tribe-level societies, the criterion of size is hardly ever met. Yet this should not present a problem, if one considers the round figure of 1,000 battle deaths as totally arbitrary and applicable only to contemporary wars. For primitive war the figure may either be proportionally reduced or the criterion of size eliminated altogether as irrelevant. The relevance of the other criteria for primitive war will be considered in the following paragraphs.

2.3 Concepts and Definitions of ’Primitive’ War Whether or not one accepts war as being as old as mankind, Harrison (1973) points out, is partially a matter of how one defines the concept. If within the framework of the definition are included those sporadic acts of violence that erupt into and maintain feuds between families or the small egalitarian bands that lack definite leadership (which must have been characteristic of social groups of early man), then warfare may indeed be as old as mankind itself. If, on the other hand, one insists that acts of hostility, in order to be defined as acts of war, must exhibit some form of leadership and some planning, as well as the use of armed force, then feuds as such could not be included within the domain of the concept of warfare. Warfare, thereby, would be seen as a social activity whose genesis arose later in time than the development of the species itself. It would have had to have been the result of activities or conditions related to the procession of man’s sociocultural evolution (Harrison, 1973; Lider, 1977).



Bernard (1944) proposed an all-purpose definition of war, which clearly encompasses primitive war: "War is organized continuous conflict of a transient character between or among collectivities of any sort capable of arming and organizing themselves for violent struggle carried on by armies in the field (or naval units on water) and supported by civil or incompletely militarized populations back of the battle areas constituted for the pursuit of some fairly well-defined public or quasi-public objective". Malinowski (1941) defined war as "an armed contest between two independent political units, by means of organized military force, in pursuit of a tribal or national policy". Similarly, Otterbein (1970) defines war as "armed combat between political communities" whereby a political community is understood to be a "a group of people whose membership is defined in terms of occupancy of a common territory and who have an official with a special function of announcing group decisions - a function exercised at least once a year" (Naroll, 1964). Riches (1987) understands war to be "the authorised employment of physical force against other persons, as a means by which groups competing for control of public resources and benefits attempt to influence the outcome of the competition in their favour". This definition leaves as unspecified the identity and boundaries of the groups concerned, but implies that their structure is corporate. War, after all, implies a considerable number of participants and a subtle synchronization of their behaviors (Meyer, 1990) which necessitates some discernible organization. These definitions contain the crucial and critical concepts of (1) armed combat; (2) political community; (3) organization; and (4) some form of group sanction for the implementation of collective policies vis-à-vis similar units operating in the same environment. These definitional components will be examined in more detail below. Definitions emphasizing the 'political community' have been formulated by Huber (1975) and Tefft (1975) (Cf. Q.Wright, 1942; 1968; Berndt, 1964; Winthrop, 1991). A minor variant is Ember & Ember's (1971 et seq.) and Ember's (1978 et seq.) definition which stresses 'the territorial unit' as a component: "Warfare is defined as fighting between two or more territorial units (at the community level on up) as long as there is a group of fighters on at least one side". A. Johnson (1934) refers to the belligerents as 'organic entities', and Winthrop (1991) as 'politically constituted, autonomous groups'. Other definitions emphasize the 'organized and/or sanctioned' aspects of violence: Hobhouse, Wheeler & Ginsberg (1915), Durbin & Bowlby (1938), Malinowski (1941), Huxley (1944), Bernard (1944), Hoebel (1949), Bouthoul (1953), Mead (1968), Kennedy (1971), Claessen (1975), Roper (1975), Meyer (1977 et seq.), Divale & Harris (1976). Furthermore, primitive war is regarded as a form or category or subset of (armed) conflict (A. Johnson, 1924; Newcomb, 1950; Driver, 1961; Mead, 1968; Alland, 1973; Tefft, 1975; Seymour-Smith, 1986), armed contest



(Malinowski, 1941), armed combat (Otterbein, 1970), struggle (’Kampf’: Meyer, 1977), force or (physical) violence (Malinowski, 1941; Huber, 1975; Melko in Nettleship et al., 1975; Hunter & Whitten, 1976), assault (Hoebel, 1949), intergroup competition (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1975; Durham, 1976; Riches, 1987), intergroup homicide (Divale & Harris, 1976), and as a species of the genus of fighting (Durbin & Bowlby, 1938; Ember & Ember, 1971 et seq.; Ember, 1978 et seq.). Some scholars have included in their definitions specifications of subcategories. For example, Driver (1961) reserves the term ’war’ for "conflicts between two factions with true political organization, each of which possesses definite leadership, some kind of military tactics, and at least the hope of being able to weather a series of battles". The term ’raid’ is used to designate "a single small military engagement of short duration; while ’feud’ is limited to "conflicts between two families, lineages, clans, sibs, or other kinship groups". Burch & Correll (1971) and Irwin (1990) define ’war’ as conflict between the members of a number of extended families from two or more regional groups, and ’feuding’ as hostilities limited to the members of two extended families. Otterbein (1970) states: "Armed combat, which is fighting with weapons, is performed by military organizations. When political communities within the same cultural unit engage in warfare, this is considered to be internal war. When warfare occurs between political communities which are not culturally similar, this is referred to as external war. If there is more than one military organization within a political community, and these military organizations engage in armed combat, this is considered feuding or civil war depending upon the scope of the conflict". Some theorists explicitly exclude 'feuding' from 'war' (e.g., Mühlmann, 1940; Meyer, 1977), while others explicitly include it (e.g., Divale & Harris, 1976; who define warfare as "all organized forms of intergroup homicide involving combat teams of two or more persons, including feuding and raiding"). This theme will be explored in more detail in the following paragraphs. A few rather atypical or idiosyncratic definitions merit some closer scrutiny. E.O. Wilson (1978) defines war as "the violent rupture of the intricate and powerful fabric of the territorial taboos observed by social groups". Such a definition is intelligible only in its own theoretical context (See Ch. 6). Mead (1968) defines the 'institution of warfare' (war is actually the more accurate term for the institution) as follows: "Warfare exists if the conflict is organized, and socially sanctioned and the killing is not regarded as murder. Warfare will be regarded as a cultural invention consequent upon group identification, the existence of shared taboos against intra-group killing and the equally culturally defined social sanctioning of killing members of the opposing group. If a people have, as part of their cultural repertoire of behavior, a set of articulated rules which distinguish intra-group killing from organized extra-group killing, they will be said to have the institution of warfare, whether it occurs frequently or infrequently in practice". Similar to



Mead’s ’articulated rules’ seems to be Bouthoul’s (1953) concept of ’war as a contract’. Also Kennedy (1971) regards as the distinguishing criterion of war the deliberate, approved, legalized killing of people outside the socially defined boundaries. Elsewhere (Mead, 1940), she diagnoses some peaceful primitive peoples as lacking the concept of war. Thus, her criterion seems to be predominantly a psychological one. A recent collective work, on the basis of several case studies (Bazin et al., 1982), defines the area of war as all the various confrontations which have no solution other than the verdict of arms. In this context, war has almost the status of an institution. There is a time for war, whose beginning and end are defined by mandatory procedures, including rituals. There are probable locations for war, an area where it takes place, boundaries which strictly mark off an internal area of peace (where conflicts are controlled) and an area of external relations (where ’real’ war is possible). While every society defines the ordinary scope of war, as it were, a minimal condition must be present if violence is to be properly described as warfare. It must take on the appearance of "a confrontation between two declared adversaries, an open and uncertain conflict between two forces which are independent or consider themselves to be so, at least for the duration of the war". This definition excludes by implication predatory operations such as raids and armed banditry. In such cases, there is a relationship based on aggression and a seizure carried out by surprise at the expense of the victim. Short attacks for the purpose of plunder differ from war operations which involve resistance to attacks, a struggle between conflicting wills and intervals of time between the clashes. These two forms of activity may be present in the same society but they are never confused (Balandier, 1986). The most general, yet precise and delimiting, definition of primitive war has been presented by Prosterman (1972): "A group activity, carried on by members of one community against members of another community, in which it is the primary purpose to inflict serious injury or death on multiple nonspecified members of that other community, or in which the primary purpose makes it highly likely that serious injury or death will be inflicted on multiple nonspecified members of that community in the accomplishment of that primary purpose". This definition thus identifies war as (1) a group enterprise; (2) directed not internally, but against a second community; (3) directed not against one individual or a specific family, but against any members of the opposing community - or at least any armed, adult, male members - who ’get in the way’ or offer resistance; and (4) aimed either at killing members of the other community, or at some goal that makes it likely they have to be killed in accomplishing it. This definition clearly excludes the murder of one man by another or a group attack on a specific individual or family, as in a blood feud or a revenge killing. Prosterman is trying to focus here on relatively impersonal group violence. But his definition does include situations where the aim of the



attack itself is not killing, but is such that the attackers reasonably expect to have to kill in order to achieve their object; for example, seizing land or women, or taking slaves from another group. In certain societies, the effort to take revenge on a specific individual will also generally necessitate the killing of nonspecified individuals. Prosterman’s definition, furthermore, has the advantage that it does not exclude certain forms of group fighting or lethal group violence per definitionem, i.e., those between units lacking ’true political organization’.

2.4 The Historical Continuity of War "By far the greater number of scholars of war treat it as something which has lasted as long as men have lived on earth. For most of them the question of what criteria to use to distinguish war from other kinds of fighting does not arise. For example, adherents of the biological approach have no need to address themselves to such a question. Within their frame of reference, all fighting is the result of an aggressive drive that man has inherited as an animal" (Lider, 1977). As will be seen, this is a rather grandiose and nonsensical contention, though, admittedly, not without a kernel of truth. Few ’adherents of the biological approach’ have indeed questioned the nature of aggression and/or the presumed aggression-warfare linkage. Historians more concerned with description than analysis usually discuss primitive warfare (if noticed at all) as the first stage in the history of war. Even when great fundamental differences are found to exist between primitive and modern war, it is nevertheless taken for granted that the same phenomenon is being studied (Vayda, 1968). Chagnon (1968) contends that primitive war differs from the modern one only by the small scale in military operations, short duration of active hostilities, poor development of command and discipline, and some other not too significant features. Nettleship (1975) observes that the definitions of ’the social institution of war’ by major thinkers on the subject "do not routinely treat primitive fighting as different from war" although, as he thinks, this may be a profitable differentiation. He points out the differences: Primitive societies are not sovereign states, they lack armed forces, and their fighting is of inconsiderable magnitude and especially brief duration. Moreover, in social science literature there are innumerable general comments reflecting the assumption that war, as a product of social structures, has always coexisted with man, since man as a social animal has always lived in organized societies, be they tribes, city-states, nation-states, or empires. And political realists, who disdain discussions of the origins of war, take it as an article of faith that men have in fact always pursued their goals by waging war, and that many goals could not have been achieved otherwise (e.g., Osgood & Tucker, 1967; Halle, 1973; Brodie, 1974; more nuanced: Ferrill, 1985; Dyer,



1985). There are scholars who, cognizant of the problem, distinguish between various kinds of fighting in primitive societies. Wars are differentiated from reprisals, feuds, and punishment (Hobhouse, Wheeler & Ginsberg, 1915; Q.Wright, 1942; 1965; Schneider, 1964; Pospisil, 1971; and others (vide infra). Some scholars state more generally that fighting in primitive society was between individuals, and the causes were more personal and familistic, than in modern wars waged for national interests, and characterized by essentially impersonal involvement and lack of personal motives (Beals & Hoijer, 1965; Lesser, 1968; Service, 1968; Dyer, 1985). Q.Wright (1942; 1965) states that the view of the origin of war in history depends on the meaning of war. If by war is meant the use of firearms to promote the policy of a group (war in the technological sense), people of modern civilization have been its ’inventors’. If by war is meant the reaction to certain situations by resort to violence (war in the psychological sense), it has always been fought by animals and men. War as a legitimate instrument of group policy (the legal, political, and economic sense of war) probably originated among civilizations, while war as a social custom utilizing regulated violence in connection with intergroup conflicts (war in the sociological sense) appears to have originated with permanent societies. Some authors contend that the differences between wars in primitive and modern societies are less important than they might seem, for they perform the same function of fulfilling social needs (e.g., attainment of political goals, acquisition of territory, the enforcement of authority, appropriation of material requirements) that (presumably) could not be satisfied without using violence. This is the main theme of Osgood (1957). Blainey (1973) contends that primitive war and civilized war seemingly have more causal similarities than differences; e.g., some anthropologists posit that primitive wars have a ’scapegoat’ background, like modern wars. Beaufre (1972) writes that the struggle of two tribes or two peoples is the simplest, archaic form of war. All features of the ’more perfect’ war can be found in that type of war. Coats (1966) describes primitive warfare as the first epoch in the history of war, characterized by a great variation of techniques and methods of fighting. Melko’s (Comment in Nettleship et al., 1975) broad definition of war in terms of ’physical violence between groups’ clearly encompasses contemporary war, primitive war, and even gang warfare. Richards (Comment, ibid) stresses the similarities between early and modern fighting: Only the decision-making process distinguishes the fighting of tribal peoples from that of nation-states. Tefft (Comment, ibid) writes that both civilized and tribal war involve armed conflict between sovereign political units no matter how small or large, structured or unstructured, decentralized or centralized; rather than stress the difference between them, he asserts, one should recognize the similarities.



2.5 Attempts to Define ’True’ War The view that wars did not appear until men had developed to a certain stage in their social relations is based on a more stringent definition of war. Two criteria in particular are usually regarded as vital: Fighting may be termed war if the hostilities are waged by organized forces for political goals (Lider, 1977). Malinowski’s (1941) analysis of war is perhaps the best known example of this point of view. Dividing the history of ’social fighting’ into six stages, he reserves the term war for hostilities fought in the pursuit of national policies by organized forces. The presented stages are: (1) Fighting, private and angry, within a group belongs to the type of breach of custom and law and is the prototype of criminal behavior. (2) Fighting, collective and organized, is a juridical mechanism for the adjustment of differences between constituent groups of the same larger cultural unit. Among the lowest savages these two types are the only forms of armed contest to be found. (3) Armed raids, as a type of manhunting sport, for purposes of head-hunting, cannibalism, human sacrifices, and the collection of other trophies. (4) Warfare as the political expression of early nationalism, that is, the tendency to make the tribenation and tribe-state coincide, and thus to form a primitive nation-state. (5) Military expeditions of organized pillage, slave-raiding, and collective robbery. (6) Wars between two culturally differentiated groups as an instrument of national policy. This type of fighting, with which war in the fullest sense of the word began, leads to conquest, and, through this, to the creation of full-fledged military and political states, armed for internal control, for defense and aggression. This type of state presents, as a rule, and for the first time in evolution, clear forms of administrative, political, and legal organization. The types of armed conquest, listed as (4) and (6) and these two only, have, in form, sociological foundations, and in the occurrence of constructive policy are comparable with historically defined wars. Every one of the six types here summed up presents an entirely different cultural phase in the development of organized fighting (Malinowski, 1941). Phase (3) he does not regard as ’cognate to warfare’, for it is devoid of any political relevance; nor can it be considered as any systematic pursuit of intertribal policy. Human man-hunting in search of anatomic trophies, the various types of armed body-snatching for cannibalism, actual or mystical, as food for men and food for gods, present a phase of human evolution which can be understood in terms of ambition, thirst for glory, and of mystical systems. In a competent analysis of warfare as a factor in human evolution, Malinowski



asserts, they must be kept apart from constructive or organized systems of warfare. The economic motive is conspicuously absent from the earliest types of fighting. Under conditions where portable wealth does not exist; where food is too perishable and too clumsy to be accumulated and transported; where slavery is of no value because every individual consumes exactly as much as he produces - force is a useless implement for the transfer of wealth. When material booty, human labor, and condensed wealth become fully available, predatory raids acquire a meaning and make their appearance. In the course of his analysis, Malinowski makes the following significant observation: "Everywhere, at all levels of development, and in all types of culture, we find that the direct effects of aggressiveness are eliminated by the transformation of pugnacity into collective hatreds, tribal or national policies, which lead to organized, ordered fighting, but prevent any physiological reactions of anger. Human beings never fight on an extensive scale under the direct influence of an aggressive impulse. They fight and organize for fighting because, through tribal tradition, through teachings of a religious system, or of an aggressive patriotism, they have been indoctrinated with certain cultural values which they are prepared to defend, and with certain collective hatreds on which they are ready to assault and kill". Turney-High (1949) introduced the concept of ’Military Horizon’ beyond which ’true’ war exists. The military horizon is one of social organization and has next to nothing to do with the state of weapons: "The military horizon depends, then, not upon the adequacy of weapons but the adequacy of team work, organization, and command working along certain simple principles. Some groups failed to achieve this and, despite their face-painting and sporadic butchery, were not soldiers". He contends that the invention of tactics is the threshold that divides true war from submilitary combat. The following conditions are necessary for true war: (1) Tactical operations; (2) Definite command and control: Without definite military authority in control throughout the action, there exists only a bloody brawl; (3) Ability to conduct a campaign for the reduction of enemy resistance if the first battle fails: This is a much higher condition than that of the mere raid, and implies more self-discipline and social organization; (4) The motive must have some clarity: The war must have a group motive rather than an individual one, or even one based on kinship. True war is above the plane of feuds; it is a political device; (5) An adequate supply (such logistic ability to provide surplus food for armies in the field, is so important that Turney-High is tempted to place it in the center of the whole military complex). Very few nonliterate tribes, Turney-High holds, have been able to meet these conditions, and thus were unable to cross the military horizon (See also Meyer, 1990). The same theme was picked up by Hoebel (1949), who regards war as a complex institution that involves definite purpose and organized sustained assault. According to him, true war has four necessary conditions: (1) A group



motive; (2) Leadership; (3) Tactical operations; and (4) Ability to sustain a series of assaults until the aim of the war is attained. Such concepts as the ’military horizon’ as a crucial criterion for distinguishing war from other types of fighting, has been criticized as presenting a highly ethnocentric, or maybe more aptly ’moderncentric’ perspective (Tefft, 1975; Kimball, 1974).

2.6 Types of Primitive Warfare According to Mead (1963), human primitive warfare can be separated into different strands. In one kind of warfare the emphasis is on destruction - killing - for its own sake. In various ways, head hunting, cannibalism, blood feud, and war games for the attainment of honors exemplify warfare of this kind. In contrast, there is the kind of warfare which is primarily protective of the life of the group. In both kinds of warfare the end results may be much the same, though. Men, killing in behalf of their women and children, may be caught up in the lust of battle. Benedict (1959) makes the distinction between ’socially lethal’ and ’non-lethal’ wars. In the latter, the aim is not subjugating other tribes to the victors; e.g., although there was much warfare among North American Indians, "The idea of conquest never arose in aboriginal North America, and this made it possible for almost all these Indian tribes to do a very extreme thing: to separate war from the state". But it was not, in fact, such an extreme thing as Benedict claims; it was, rather, a normal state of affairs in primitive peoples, for whom warfare as a practical instrument for achieving political aims was a relatively rare phenomenon (See Ch. 5). A distinction somewhat corresponding to Benedict’s has been proposed by Speier (1941). He distinguished three types of warfare according to the main objectives of the belligerents and, related to this primary aim, the perception of the enemy or the opponent: (a) Genocidal or absolute war: Primary objective is the utter elimination, devastation or destruction of the enemy. The enemy is perceived as vermin or the incorporation of evil, to be exterminated by all means. (b) Instrumental war: Main objective is the acquisition of territory, property, commodities, etc. belonging to the opponent, or some other purpose for which war may be instrumental. The enemy is perceived as an obstacle blocking the way to the primary goal. The enemy is to be overcome, not necessarily to be eliminated. (c) Agonistic war: Honor and glory of the individual warrior by means of brave and valorous exploits is the primary objective. The whole enterprise is highly ritualized. The opponent is perceived as a worthy antagonist, equally eager to establish his fame on the battlefield: "[T]he fight is waged under conditions of



studied equality and under strict observance of rules. Measured in terms of destruction such a fight is highly inefficient and ludicrously ceremonious. However, the agonistic fight... is not oriented toward the destruction of the enemy. Nor is it directed toward the acquisition of wealth or other useful ends. It is fought for a prize, i.e., for a symbolic value attached to victory (glory)." I will call these categories, for no other reason than the alliteration, Wars of Carnage, Wars of Coercion, and Wars of Calisthenics, respectively. Probably the best-known distinction among types of primitive war is Q.Wright’s (1942; 1965) motivational (and hypothetically reflecting levels of cultural-evolutionary advancement) categorization of defensive, social, economic, and political warfare (See ' 2.11.0.1). Based on different concepts of power, Meyer (1981 et seq.) makes the very important and illuminating distinction between two patterns of primitive war: The endemic war pattern, based on non-materialistic and metaphysical concepts of power and notions of resources, and the instrumental war pattern, based on materialistic concepts of power and resources. This distinction roughly coincides with Q.Wright’s distinction, mentioned above, in social versus economic/political war. A distinction of paramount importance regarding (the explanation of) primitive warfare is the distinction between intracultural, intraregional, or intratribal warfare (also called internal-structural), and intercultural, interregional, or intertribal warfare (also called external or ethnocentric). As Steager (1975) explains: "Once the militaristic tradition is established in a primitive community, there are two patterns: ethnocentric (e.g. Cheyenne) and internalstructural (e.g. Yanomamö). In the first mode, people fight only outsiders, and are often internally very harmonious. Foreigners are considered intrinsically inferior. In the second mode, people fight only their relatives, never foreigners. Warfare in the second mode is less extreme and genocidal than in the first, but more frequent - nearly continuous. When internal cleavages are so deep, people cannot unite even against an invader, so often fall prey to colonialism". Such a distinction between internal and external war was originally proposed by Otterbein (1968, 1970, 1973). Internal war is "warfare between political communities within the same cultural unit". External war is "warfare between culturally different political communities, i.e. political communities which are not members of the same cultural unit". The concept of cultural unit is derived from Malinowski (1941): "A cultural unit is composed of contiguous political communities that are culturally similar". Ember & Ember (1971 et seq.) make a similar distinction between internal and external war. Strate (1985) defines internal warfare as "armed combat by a political system against the property, population, or territory of another political system of the same society". And external offensive warfare as "armed combat by a political system against the property, population, or territory of a



political system of a different society". Two basic, and related, types of conflict are also identified by Ferguson (1984): (1) Conflict between similarly situated groups over control of a particularly important, but restricted, resource; and (2) conflict between groups in different ecological zones over access to more productive areas. The latter often takes the form of war between inland and coastal peoples. The majority of cases of tribal warfare is of the internal or intracultural type. The following are some examples of recently studied tribal peoples: Yanomamö (Chagnon, 1967 et seq.), Mae Enga (Meggitt, 1977), Tausug (Kiefer, 1968), Jalé (Koch, 1974), Kogu (Berndt, 1962), Fore (Lindenbaum, 1979), Kapauku (Pospisil, 1964), and Tonga (Colson, 1971). LeVine (1961) proposed the following structural conflict levels as applicable to virtually all societies: (a) Intrafamily; (b) intracommunity; (c) intercommunity; and (4) intercultural or intertribal. The nature of conflict and the responses to it vary according to the social relationships between the opponents. At each of the social levels - family and kinship groups, villages, groups of villages, and beyond - the rules of fighting and settling fights change. This principle is neatly illustrated by a group of Nigerian Ibo villages called Afikpo (Ottenberg, 1971; 1978). Murder within a clan does not require punishment, since it is regarded as a misfortune. Instead the group must be purified by mandatory ritual steps. In the case of murder outside the clan but within the Afikpo group, the murderer or a member of his clan must die and the matter is thereby closed. The nature of conflict among Afikpo groups is illustrated by disputes over their palm groves from which are derived valuable palm oil and much-desired wine. When it is time to harvest the fruit, members of two villages may quarrel over who owns the grove. They scream and wave their machetes at each other but seldom hurt anybody seriously; their objective is to scare the other group away. The rules for this mock warfare are strict: Participants are allowed to hit with the flat of the blade and even nick an opponent but killing is forbidden and necessitates revenge. Warfare between Afikpo and the four neighboring, related Ibo groups is another type of conflict. Disputes over border farmland can cause killings and retaliatory killings, small-scale fighting back and forth which can continue for years. But sooner or later one of the other related groups invariably suggests mediation. Finally, the Afikpo conduct warfare against the unrelated peoples who live across the Cross River, speak a different language, and are described as poisoners by the Afikpo. There is considerable raiding, much of it for pure excitement. Genuine wars have, however, been fought for control of movement and fishing on the river. This fighting is intermittent, long-term, and unresolved because the opponents see themselves as total strangers and no mechanism for mediation exists.



2.7 Lex Talionis: Feuding and/or/versus Warfare Should a blood feud be considered to be war, or is it a different phenomenon altogether? And if the latter, are these manifestations of collective violence related to each other, for instance in the sense that they have some common psychological roots, or that a blood feud can escalate into full-fledged war? And, if so, can there be drawn a meaningful boundary between them? Theorists have engaged in acrimonious polemics to make their respective points. Implied in the following concepts and definitions of feud and feuding are the rather confusing notions of feud as a form of primitive law and as a breakdown of the system of law; and as a form of warfare, and as a phenomenon quite distinct from warfare. These contradictory notions will be the subject of the next paragraphs. 2.7.1 The Concept of Feud The term ’feud’ is etymologically derived from Old High German fehida, meaning enmity (Winthrop, 1991). Feud has been defined by Lasswell (1931) as "relations of mutual animosity among intimate groups in which a resort to violence is anticipated on both sides", and by Evans-Pritchard (1940) as "lengthy mutual hostility between local communities within a tribe". A feud thus involves prolonged and intermittent hostilities. As a logical consequence, a single fight or a single killing do not qualify as a feud. Lasswell states that feuds often continue so long after they begin that the precipitating episodes are even forgotten. Long intervals of relative peace sometimes elapse between the fights and slayings (Lowie, 1920). "Feuds are a kind of war where the antagonists belong to a tribe rather than to a territory" Bataille (1962) states rather enigmatically. According to Otterbein (1968; 1970) and Tefft (1975), blood revenge within the same political community constitutes ’feuding’, while armed conflict between such political communities is war. Other conceptions of feuding stipulate that the ’local communities within a tribe’ are kinship groups. For example, Hammond (1971) and Leavitt (1977) define ’feuding’ as "armed combat and/or violent physical contact between two or more kinship groups". "Feud is a state of conflict between two kinship groups within a society, manifest by a series of unprivileged killings and counterkillings between the kinship groups, usually initiated in response to an original homicide or other grievous injury" (Hoebel, 1972). Hoebel goes on to observe that legal historians traditionally have seen primitive society as marked by a horrid and constant state of feud, rent by violent retaliation and blood revenge, and, in



general, an arena of violence ruled by the law of the jungle and the lex talionis (the iron law of an-eye-for-an-eye). On the other hand, according to Black-Michaud (1976) "feud may be regarded as a form of communicative behaviour uniting parts of society in alliance and locking opposite groups in hostile competition over shared values which are exchanged and intensified through such interaction". Leach (1977) complements such a notion by stating: "Within any small intimate circle of individuals who live and work together all the time... even the quarrels are conducted according to rules: there is, in effect, agreement about how to disagree. This also is what happens in feud-type warfare". Pospisil (1971) makes a distinction between ’feud’ and another mechanism which he calls ’self-redress’: "Instances of violence involving injury, revenge and counterrevenge within the political unit constitute feud. When only part of the political community, such as a family or lineage directs violence against outsiders, this is external self-redress. Feud occurs within political communities whose leadership is too weak or disinterested to control its constituents. External self-redress occurs under similar circumstances (See Fig. 2.7.3). The characteristics of violence that form one of the two major criteria of feud have been summed up by Pospisil (1971) as follows: (1) The violence of a feud ranges in intensity from injury to killing; (2) it is initiated on behalf of a particular individual or family that is a member of the more inclusive ’injured group’; and (3) it is of long duration, involving at least three instances of violence - injury, revenge, and counterrevenge. Hostile acts consisting of an injury and of an equivalent revenge that is accepted as final by both parties do not merit the term feud and should more properly be called self-redress. The nature of self-redress is, in most cases, basically different from the prolonged violence called feud. Bohannan (1963) similarly states that "feud occurs when the principle of selfhelp gets out of hand", implying that if an injury is redressed through violence and the self-redress is final and more or less accepted by the other party, such violence does not merit the term ’feud’ (Pospisil, 1971). The second major criterion of feud, which requires the committed violence to occur between ’intimate (or related) groups’, is far more complex. It is almost generally agreed that the two groups fighting each other must be related in order to qualify such hostilities as a feud. However, various authors differ in their explanation of the nature of this relationship. For example, for Q.Wright (1942; 1965) it is the family. For Malinowski (1941) it is groups belonging to ’the same larger cultural unit’. Similarly, those who use the phrase ’members of the same society’ or ’local community’ do not necessarily identify the political unit involved. For example, Gluckman (1940) speaks of a type of intertribal feud within a larger nation, while Hobhouse, Wheeler & Ginsberg (1915) restrict the relationship of feuding groups to membership in the same tribe:



"Feuds would thus also be the appropriate name for reprisals exercised by one branch of a community upon another, e.g., as between two clans or two local groups within a tribe". Evans-Pritchard (1940) contrasts the hostilities of the feud with the intertribally organized violence which he calls war: "Thus, if a man of one tribe kills a man of another tribe, retribution can only take the form of intertribal warfare... Between segments of the same tribe, opposition is expressed by the institution of the feud". Some authors theorize that marriage ties constitute the link between the two feuding groups. Accordingly, hostilities in a society with exogamous subgroups such as clans, lineages, or local communities are all regarded as feuds and not as wars (Schneider, 1964; also implied by Colson, 1962). Evans-Pritchard (1940) agrees with the criterion of prolonged violence (a chain or cycle of killings, retaliatory counter-killings, counter-counter-killings, etc.). However, he points out that a feud cannot go on indefinitely; otherwise the relationship of the fighting groups would be severed, and further hostilities, not occurring between related groups, could no longer by implication called feud. Pospisil (1971) concludes that feud involves prolonged, often intermittent violence which must end at some point short of the obliteration of the second criterion of feud - the intimate relationship of the feuding groups. Of course, concluding a feud does not necessarily mean that mutual hostility is transformed into indifference or friendship. A new feuding cycle most likely erupts between the old combatants any time that a new crime or injury is committed by an individual against a member of the other side. Another common characteristic of the violence that may be classified as feud is that the actual acts of hostility are regulated by customs shared by the two fighting groups (Radcliffe-Brown, 1952). In other words, the hostilities of the two groups are patterned upon, and subject to, rules which both sides observe. Furthermore, the initial act of violence is regarded as injury to the whole group to which the victim belongs (family, clan, or village), and the members consequently stand under an obligation to avenge the injustice (RadcliffeBrown, 1952; Nadel, 1947). Paraphrasing Durkheim, Radcliffe-Brown calls their duty an expression of ’collective solidarity’. However, this principle works also with regard to the opposite party, where it produces a group liability, with the effect that any member of the offender’s group may be slain for the crime of his relative, his friend, or a coresident. According to Radcliffe-Brown (1940; 1952), another aspect of the violence of feuds is that it is justified by ’public sentiment’. Unfortunately, he fails to specify whether this public sentiment pertains to the group of avengers, to both of the groups in conflict, or to the society at large (Pospisil, 1971). Not all acts of violence justify development of such a sentiment: In order that a violent revenge be considered a justifiable act, its magnitude should be valued



as an equivalent of the injury suffered (Radcliffe-Brown, 1952; Nadel, 1947). Among the Nuba, for example, ’equivalence’ is so specific that not only must a man be killed for a man and a woman for a woman, but the age of the person killed in revenge should approximate that of the original victim. For death in excess of requirement a compensation must be offered in the form of a person who is adopted into the offended clan (Nadel, 1947). In most other primitive societies such compensation is usually rendered in payment known in the literature as ’blood money’. 2.7.2 Feud as a Juridical Mechanism In stateless systems, disputes cannot be referred to an impartial government backed by a police force. The characteristic pattern of responding to criminal or civil wrongs is ’self-help’ or self-redress: The individual or group which feels injured considers himself or itself legitimately responsible for punishing a crime or penalizing a tort. Self-help in these circumstances involves two stages which appear to be directly comparable to the functions of adjudication and enforcement in modern legal systems (Masters, 1964). As Barton (1930) noted in his study of Philippine headhunters, the selfenforcement of legal penalties raises a crucial problem. The kinship group which enforces the lex talionis by killing a murderer or one of his kin sees this act as not only necessary, but also legitimate. Although unrelated bystanders may accept this interpretation, since retaliatory killing is customary, the kinship group which is penalized may not consider the retaliation to be a legitimate punishment, and, in its turn, resort to self-help. Middleton & Tait (1958) argue that within a local community or family unit, disputes culminating in violence are generally not self-perpetuating; a punishment or penalty ’atones’ for a crime and thereby completes the legal case. The more or less permanent condition of feuding is rendered unlikely, if not impossible, by the existence of close kinship ties and relationships of ’administrative organization’. Outside of this range of ’nuclear groups’, punishment does not terminate the rivalry arising out of a dispute; although retaliatory violence tends to be selfperpetuating. Middleton & Tait suggest that there is a zone in which the opposed groups recognize an obligation to settle their dispute. In this range of social interaction there are normally procedures for arriving at a settlement. Hence, among the Nuer, the ’leopard-skin chief’ holds an office which serves the function of settling feuds on the basis of compensation (Evans-Pritchard, 1940). The ’go-between’ among the Ifugao serves a similar function (Barton, 1930). Middleton & Tait use the term ’jural community’ to describe the unit within which disputes take the form of feuds to be settled by an established procedure. "The jural community... is the widest grouping within which there are a moral



obligation and a means ultimately to settle disputes peaceably". The fact that feuds are fought between subgroups of a more inclusive grouping possessing an overall network of political relations has led to the conclusion that feud is a primitive juridical mechanism and that it is an expression, or manifestation of primitive law (Pospisil, 1971). Tylor (1881) was one of the first to explain the ’Rule of Vengeance’ or Lex Talionis an as instrument of primitive law. Accordingly, Malinowski (1941) writes: "Fighting, collective and organized, is a juridical mechanism for the adjustment of differences between constituent groups of the same larger cultural unit". Spencer (1959) contends that after a north Alaskan Eskimo was killed, "his own kin became embroiled and the legal mechanism of the feud was put into motion". The notion that feuding is a manifestation of primitive law led Lasswell (1931) to the conclusion that there must be two types of feuds: "While the blood vengeance feud was itself the expression of primitive law, the modern feud is at least formally illegal and characteristically fills the interstices left in the functioning of the prevailing system of legal organization". 2.7.3 Feud as Outlaw Behavior Many anthropologists have disagreed with the idea that feud is the expression of primitive law. Hoebel (1949), for example, considers feud to lie outside the sphere of law, because (a) the counterkillings do not stop and (b) there is nothing one may regard as a mutually recognized coercive sanction against the killer and his group. Similarly, Bohannan (1963) calls feud "a faulty jural mechanism" because it does not lead to a final settlement - to peace and rectitude. Radcliffe-Brown (1940) refuses to regard feud as a juridical mechanism because it lacks "the exercise of recognized authority in settling disputes". Pospisil (1971) defined law by means of four criteria (relation to group, relation to authority, degree of participation, and duration), none of which, he said, is inherent in the phenomena of feuds. He considered feud to be prolonged, unauthorized, intergroup violence. Consequently, feud is an internal affair, conducted, however, by members of the subgroups of an overall political organization who ignore or even defy its political authority; it refers to intergroup phenomena. Law, on the contrary, is an intragroup affair in the full sense of the term: A decision of the authority who holds jurisdiction over both parties to the dispute is passed, and both disputing parties are induced or forced to comply with its provisions. The relationships between the various types of intra- and intergroup violence are shown in Fig. 2.7.3.



Fig. 2.7.3: Relationship between Various Types of Violence (Pospisil, 1971)

intergroup ˜ ˜ ˜ VIOLENCE ˜ ˜ intragroup

authorized ©©©©©©©©©©©©©©©War ˜ ™ prolonged Feud unauthorized ©©©©©©©©©™ brief ©© External self-redress group ©©©©©©©© authorized ©©©™ ˜ individual ©©©©©© ™ ˜ group ©©©©©©©© unauthorized ©©™ individual ©©©©©©

Law Internal self-redress Organized crime Indiv. crime

2.7.4 Primitive Warfare as an Extended Feud The concept of primitive warfare as an extended feud has been formulated as early as 1881 by Tylor. He wrote: "The relation of primitive vengeance to public war is well seen among rude tribes, such as inhabit the forests of Brazil. When a murder is done within the tribe, then of course vengeance lies between the two families concerned; but if the murderer is of another clan or tribe, then it becomes a public wrong. The injured community hold council, and mostly decide for war if they dare; then a war-party sets forth, in which the near kinsmen of the murdered man, their bodies painted with black daubs to show their deadly office, rush foremost into the fight. Among neighbouring tribes the ordinary way in which war begins is by some quarrel or trespass, then a man is killed on one side or the other, and the vengeance for his death spread into blood-feud and tribal war ever ready to break out from generation to generation. This barbaric state of things lasted far on into the history of Europe" (Tylor, 1881) Among contemporary writers, Mühlmann (1940 et seq.) defends the thesis that primitive warfare probably developed out of the blood feud (Cf. also Meyer, 1977 et seq.). Conceptually, Mühlmann (1940) is also weary to make a distinction between feud and war. Rather, he regards the blood feud as a 1 special type of war . Similarly, if warfare is defined as intergroup competition AEinige Schriftsteller möchten die Blutrachefehden nicht mit zum Kriege rechnen. Wir glauben, daß sich ihre Abtrennung vom Kriege nicht durchführen läßt, es gibt zu viele sachliche und psychologische Zusammenhänge. Die Blutfehde ist ein besonderer Typus des Krieges; sie ist ein Krieg mit mangelhaft präzisiertem Ziel: das Ziel ist die bloße Vergeltung@ (Mühlmann, 1940). 1



with intent to kill, if necessary, on both sides, Bigelow (1975) asserts, then even blood feuds are a form of warfare. The slippery line between warfare and personal retribution among hunters and gatherers is well illustrated in the example of armed conflict among the Tiwi of Bathurst and Melville Islands, Northern Australia. As recounted by Hart & Pilling (1960), a number of men from the Tiklauila and Rangwila bands developed personal grievances against a number of men who were residing with the Mandiimbula band. The aggrieved individuals, together with their relatives, put on the white paint of war, armed themselves, and set off, some thirty strong, to do battle with the Mandiimbula. The two armies lined up at opposite sides of the battlefield. Hostilities were begun by elders shouting insults and accusations at particular individuals in the ’enemy’ ranks. Although some of the old men urged that a general attack be launched, their grievances turned out to be directed not at the Mandiimbula band, but at one or at most two or three individuals. "Hence when spears began to be thrown, they were thrown by individuals for reasons based on individual disputes". As soon as somebody was wounded, fighting stopped immediately until the implications of this new incident could be assessed by both sides. 2.7.5 Feuding and Warfare: Distinct or Overlapping Categories? In his study of primitive war, Q.Wright (1942; 1965) observed that ’reprisals’ and ’war’ can, in theory, be distinguished. "They are, however, closely related, and it seems advisable to include all external, group-sanctioned violence against other human beings in the conception of primitive war" (Q.Wright, 1942). The use of the concept of legality misses the mark in defining what war is, Kimball (1974) states. It would be more appropriate to say that war and feud are neither legal nor illegal in the proper sense of the term, but that both are resorts to organized, collective violence in the absence of law or in the event of the breakdown of peaceful procedures of resolving group conflict and achieving group ends. Whether belligerents observe or break certain laws in resorting to or in conducting armed, organized, lethal violence does not change the fact that they are resorting to and conducting war. A more workable approach to a classification, Kimball suggests, would be to include under the heading of war all methodic, armed, and lethal violence between organized groups, making allowances for historical epoch and tradition, geographical area, social unit, and cultural stage. On the other hand, Masters (1964) holds that "a condition of feud should not be equated too completely with what we call ’war’; rather, it is a condition of rivalry in which intermittent violence (e.g., seizure of property as well as retaliatory killing) appears legitimate to those who attack, and illegitimate to



the victims". Similarly, Middleton & Tait (1958) suggest that primitive feuds and wars can be distinguished because only in the latter is there no obligation to attempt to settle the dispute (Cf. Barton, 1915; Radcliffe-Brown, 1940). Among many primitive peoples a distinction is made between those groups with whom violence is limited to feuding and those with whom there is a continuous condition of war. A given group is not bound by common procedures of dispute settlement with foreigners or with individuals from different parts (or ’jural communities’) of the same nation. For example, whereas conflicting groups from the same Nuer tribe could only be in a state of feud, individuals or groups from different Nuer tribes are always in a potential state of war with each other. When spatially or culturally distant groups are involved, violence is likely to emerge at any time, even in the absence of a formal dispute (Evans-Pritchard, 1940; Morgan, 1851). Among many primitive peoples, therefore, social distance (which is highly correlated with geographical distance) decreases the likelihood that violence, should it occur, will be limited. For many other primitive societies the group or ’political community’ to which allegiance is owed varies, depending on the dispute in question (Masters, 1964; Cf. Mair, 1962). Schneider (1950; 1952), in particular, opposes those ethnologists, who, unlike Malinowski (1941; see ' 2.5), classified all forms of group-sanctioned violence under the heading of primitive war. Feud, he concludes, "is a matter of crime and punishment within populations where systems of public justice are undeveloped. That is not war". To make the term ’war’ cross-culturally applicable and meaningful, Pospisil (1971) admonishes, it should be defined in terms of political-structural features. 2.7.6 Feuding and Warfare: Harsh Reality Strikes Back In their groundbreaking correlational study, Hobhouse, Wheeler & Ginsberg (1915) defined war as "an operation conducted in the name of the community as a whole" against another community, usually organized by a leader who is followed by a group of volunteers. Feuds, on the other hand, were "reprisals exercised by one branch of a community upon another, e.g. as between two clans or two local groups within a tribe" conducted by kinsfolk or a body of friends. But the authors’ examination of some 650 contemporary ’simpler peoples’ arranged in three grades of agriculture, two of pastoralism, and two of hunting-gathering, failed to uncover evidence adequate for making the distinction between wars and feuds. The only workable categories they could devise for statistical correlations were ’war and feuding’ on the one hand and ’no war’ on the other. Under these categories, they found 298 cases of war or feuds and nine certain and four doubtful cases of ’no war’. Wars and feuds were distributed through all the



grades, but cases of ’no war’ were confined primarily to hunting-gathering and lowest agriculture, the ’lowest’ grades of all. Their conclusion was that "as distinguished from a feud, war implies a certain development of social organisation, and is probably not so common at the lowest stages as it becomes higher up". But even at the lower stages of social organization, feuds are apt to take on a more or less organized form and are very difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish from wars. While they denied the validity of the view that war was the normal condition of primitive societies, they also argued that the absence of war or feuds among some groups did not indicate that there was "an association of peaceful propensities with the lowest stage of culture as such. At most it may be said that organised war develops with the advance of industry and of social organisation in general". Hobhouse (1956) subsequently reaffirmed and expanded upon this analysis in a comparative study of peace and order among 14 primitive populations which were often mentioned by ethnologists as representatives of the ’simplest’ of peoples. They possessed only rudimentary technology and lived as ’close to nature’ as any people known. Their basic social unit was the semi-permanent ’little group’ of roughly 30 to 80 closely-related individuals, who intermarried, had friendly relations, and shared a common culture with the members of similar groups in a fairly well-defined district. The aggregate of such groups he called a tribe, which comprised a few hundred individuals and lacked political union or government. Tribal groups usually roamed over common ground, and with men hunting and women gathering, each group obtained food cooperatively and shared it with all present. There were few distinctions of rank or wealth and little inequality between sexes. With the eldest male generally exercising some, but insecure and undefined, leadership, each group possessed very slight ’governmental’ organization. Collective fighting and bloodletting did occasionally occur within the tribe, beyond the tribe, and in one case, within the group. Excluding 2 of the 14 tribes on the grounds of inadequate evidence, Hobhouse found ’fighting between groups’ in 5 cases, ’concerted vengeance of families’ in 2, and ’no collective fighting within the tribe’ in 5. But of the latter, at least one tribe fought aliens. Of the remaining 4 tribes in this category "one... killed strange trespassers in recent times; one... had a tradition of group fighting; the remaining two admit private vengeance". Hobhouse was well aware of the argument that in many of these cases intergroup fighting should be called ’feuding’ (concerted vengeance) or ’assassination’ (personal reprisal) instead of ’war’. "We may agree that it is something less than war" he replied, "but it is also materially less than peace. Group fighting, in fact, is barely differentiated from personal and family vengeance. The common root is the resort to violence, which unites them in



opposition to law and peace". Group opinion in support of group and tribal custom, he maintained, was the basis of social life in the absence of government. When opinion failed to check or redress a wrong, usually personal injury and trespassing, self-help with the aid of friends was the only resort. Violence in this case was not necessarily the legal method of redress, but the only method in an undeveloped polity. The force of group opinion was most effective within the group, but less so in relation to other groups or aliens. In proportion to the degree the group supported its injured members, occasional personal reprisal could develop into concerted reprisal between individuals and their supporters, and, finally, into intergroup fighting. Hobhouse believed his study at least indicated that to wage bloody collective fighting, a people need not possess a complicated array of weaponry. And to those analysts who held that war was an organized operation of campaigns and pitched battles, he answered that "it would be meaningless to deny it of these peoples in their primitive condition, because they have no such organisation". To those who argued that verifiable war only took place against aliens or because of alien influence, such as civilization, he cautioned that to make "the inference that in a world of primitives all would be peace is unwarranted". Comparatively, collective primitive fighting involves smaller and less organized groups and fewer and less complex armaments than civilized war. It is less methodical and less political, and it usually results in less killing. In fact, words like ’organized’, ’methodical’, and ’political’, have little, or more accurately, different meaning when applied to primitive conditions. It is, therefore, somewhat inconsistent, anachronistic, and ethnocentric for scholars like Sumner (1911), Malinowski (1936; 1941), Turney-High (1949), Schneider (1950; 1952; 1959), and others, who claim the advantages of comparative, evolutionary, and functional methods to the study of war, to insist on conceptual criteria developed in the observance of civilized warfare. While it is correct to insist that war at least means armed and bloody struggle between organized groups, allowances must be made, as Bouthoul (1959) cautioned, for the nuances of interpretation in order to account for the waging of war in different places during different epochs, and one might add, by different cultures (Kimball, 1974). Furthermore, because the motives for going to war and the functions served by war have varied with time, place, and culture, it is of little use to emphasize any one motivational or functional criterion (Kimball, 1974; Cf. Harris, 1972; Lesser, 1968; Goldschmidt, 1966; Meyer, 1990). War, Kimball (1974) concludes his diatribe, is a collective activity performed by a fighting group in the name of a social group against another group for whatever rational, irrational, ritualistic, legitimate, or illegitimate purpose, for whatever intended or unintended result, and often despite the variety of individual motives found among the fighting group’s members and the social



group’s members, some of whom may not even support the war effort. Hoebel (1972) submits that there is very limited evidence for the actual occurrence of feuding in primitive societies. Legal procedures or ritual devices such as regulated combat as a means of avoiding or terminating feud have been universally found to exist in such cultures. The idea that feud is called for is widespread among primitive peoples, but they actually seem to prefer to accept damages rather than take blood revenge. An example would be the case of the Trobriand Islanders for whom Malinowski (1935) reported that although honor makes ’vendetta’ obligatory in cases of homicide, it was evaded by the substitution of blood money (compensation). There was much Trobriand talk of feud, but Malinowski could not find one specific case. In all anthropological reports, Hoebel (1972) asserts, this is the rule rather than the exception. Real feud is socially destructive and dangerous. When it does occur, it does represent a breakdown of peaceful resolution of conflict. As Drucker (1967) has written of the Northwest Coast Indians of North America: "[T]he threat of violence was always present if the claims of the aggrieved were disregarded... Settlement of these conflicts were usually reached, but never easily... And at times negotiations did break down and were followed by a period of bloody feuding". In spite of the hostile relations between feuding communities, the possibility of contact is virtually never completely cut off. For example, Kiefer (1972) says of the Tausug of the Philippines: "The ties between two feuding communities are never totally severed; there will always be persons who are able to freely travel between them, bringing gossip and information and perhaps arranging for settlement. Women, children, and the elderly are always de facto neutrals; it is considered very shameful to kill them, although sometimes they are hit by accident. Women are sometimes even sent to gather information about the enemy, usually on a ruse of visiting distant kin". Furthermore, cross-cutting kinship ties tend to attenuate all-out violence. For example, when the Kogu of New Guinea plan a raid or a fight, then "it is necessary to take into account the presence of women with brothers and other kin among the ’enemy’" (Berndt, 1962). In the highly ritualized battles of the Kapauku of West New Guinea, relatives position themselves so as not to face and fight each other (Pospisil, 1964). Moreover, the violence is often regulated by means of reciprocating or balancing of retaliatory actions. "Killing should have its limits" as the Kogu say (Berndt, 1962). And Lindenbaum (1979) writes of the Fore inhabiting the same region: "’If you want to avenge a death’, the young men are told, ’kill just one man or shoot one of his pigs. If you can’t find a pig, his dog will do. They are, after all, the children of men. You may even take something very good from his garden and eat it, but stop at that’" (See further Ch. 7).



2.8 Interlude: Discussion and Proposal The problem of the definition of ’war’, including ’primitive war’, is not merely a topic of sterile academic debate or trivial casuistry. On the contrary, it is of paramount importance within a general theoretical framework concerning the problem whether war existed at the dawn of mankind’s evolution - as is the one popular doctrine - or whether war is - as is the other popular doctrine - a rather recent cultural invention, a concomitant of the rise of civilization. The validity of any tentative answer to this problem may be questioned, or even denounced, on the ground of insufficient definitional delineation of the concept of war. Is there, for instance, any rationale for classifying a Bushman cattle-raiding expedition as warfare; or a Plains Indian horse-stealing party; or a Dayak head-hunting party; or, for that matter, a New Guinea pitched battle resulting in a single casualty? Definitions of ’war’ can be either dichotomous or polychotomous. The dichotomous definitions distinguish wars from non-wars; polychotomous definitions conceive of a series of events from most to least warlike. The former definition runs the risk of oversimplification, while the latter is more realistic but more complex. It provides for the distribution of violent events on a scale according to a number of characteristics, i.e., magnitude or size of violence (number of belligerents, number of casualties, etc.), duration, pervasiveness, organization, geography (locus, extent), power, participants, evaluation (moral, functional, utilitarian), and metamorphosis (many wars pass through specific stages). Violent events which exhibit these characteristics to a high degree are generally considered wars (Farrar, 1978). Yet, in this multidimensional conception of war there is virtually no criterion to distinguish warfare proper from a multitude of other violent events, nor is there any indication of a borderline distinguishing these two subsets of violent events. At what moment, for instance, does a local brawl, or mass-violence, escalate into what may properly be called war? Do not polychotomous definitions, in fact, entail some implicit, unarticulated notion of the very same dichotomy they attempt to avoid, i.e., some preconceived notion of what distinguishes wars from non-wars? Let us for a moment reconsider the restrictive elements in the definition of war. First, if war is explicitly defined as a business of states, then, evidently, war did not exist in pre-state societies. But this is considered to be a semantic subterfuge and a ’moderncentric’ sophism. Similarly, the requirement that wars can only be waged between or among politically organized entities (be they states or some equivalent thereof) introduces a ’Western-centered’ bias. Interdemic, intertribal, intercommunity, intergroup fighting in pre-state



societies did actually occur, and whether we call it ’war’, or ’proto-war’, or ’pseudo-war’, or ’micro-war’ or something else again, is rather immaterial. Theoretically, a clear distinction between all forms of intragroup and intergroup violence, especially between ’feuding’ and ’warfare’, would be preferable (and, perhaps, the only psychologically real distinction is who is considered to be ’the enemy’). For all practical purposes, however, stubborn reality defies our abstract scheming and borderlines appear to be fluid, nebulous, if they can be drawn at all. Secondly, a numerical criterion of so-and-so many direct battle casualties in the definition of war is (a) totally arbitrary even regarding modern warfare; and (b) absolutely not applicable to primitive peoples or band-level societies. This criterion may thus be rejected. Mead (1968) argued that war requires an organization for killing, willingness to die on the part of its members, social approval within the societies concerned, and agreement that it is a legitimate - not necessarily desirable way of solving problems. The ’self-sacrifice’ and the ’legitimacy’ components of this definition cannot, in most cases, be easily ascertained, for obvious reasons. Yet, the two other requirements may be maintained as necessary differentia specifica in the definition: An organization for killing, however informal; and the social approval or sanction of (at least part) of the communities concerned. A minimum definition of war, comprising ’primitive war’, should, thus, contain the following constituents: (1) The sanctioned (or legalized) use of violence or mandatory resort to violence, (2) by at least some members of a community (some minimum number of participants is required, mostly a small fighting group of warriors, or a standing army of soldiers), (3) organized for that purpose, however informally and temporarily (as in a Plains Indian raiding band), (4) against multiple, unspecified members of another community (or recognizably separate social entities: Ethnic groups, tribes, states), (5) aimed either at killing or inflicting serious injury on, or otherwise incapacitating, members of the other community, or aimed at some goal, or conducted for some purpose, that makes it likely that they have to be killed or incapacitated in accomplishing it. That is, in war - as contrasted with a feud - violence is relatively ’promiscuous’: Anyone of the opposing community may be defined as an ’enemy’ and thus be a potential victim. In a feud, the concept of the enemy - and potential victim - is more restricted and selective: A particular member or members of a particular kinship group, family or clan. ’Intergroup aggression’, though not a preferable term as it suggests ’aggression’ to be the main motive for warfare (or that it is a species of the genus of ’aggressive behaviors’), is generally used in the literature as a synonym, as are ’armed group fighting’, ’lethal group violence’, ’group antagonism’ and ’armed conflict’. Note that the collective enterprise of warfare does not require the sanction or mandate of the whole community or even the majority of a community. The



fighting group must, however, have (or feel to have) some tacit support of the community in the name of which they perpetrate the hostilities. In contrast to warfare proper, a ’state of war’ (status belli) does not necessarily imply fighting, bloodshed, skirmishes or fracas, while ’belligerence’ refers either to the readiness to engage in a state of war (also called ’bellicosity’), or to an existing antagonistic relationship between (political) entities (tribes, nationstates, etc.) in which violence may be used, or used intermittently, or not at all. ’Pseudo-peace’ is an apt characterization of the state of affairs which characterizes most primitive societies. Having said this, however, I believe one caveat is in order: We "actually know very little about the nature and function of aboriginal warfare, since nearly all descriptive accounts deal with intertribal warfare under the circumstances of European presence or penetration in the area..." (Hicks, 1974). Our basic ignorance concerning the native situation is highlighted here by Hicks for the Lower Colorado River area, but probably the statement is valid for primitive warfare in general, wherever it has been recorded. Ferguson (1992) and Ferguson & Whitehead (1992), especially, made a strong case against the accepted wisdom which holds that primitive cultures are typically at war and that the primary military effect of contact with the West is the suppression of ongoing combat and pacification. In fact, however, Ferguson (1992) states: "[T]he initial effect of European colonialism has generally been quite the opposite. Contact has invariably transformed war patterns, very frequently intensified war and not uncommonly generated war among groups who previously had lived in peace. Many, perhaps most, recorded wars involving tribal peoples can be directly attributed to the circumstances of Western contact". He calls this the ’cultural Heisenberg effect’. Most notably, he shows this effect to have operated among the Tupinamba, Mundurucu, Jivaro and Yanomamö, the traditional paragons of primitive ferocity. It is not necessary to endorse the too universal claim that all primitive war was a post-contact phenomenon, to be aware of the fact that intertribal warfare may have been greatly exacerbated by it (van der Dennen, 1990).

2.9 The Forms and Tactics of Primitive Warfare In his exhaustive study of war, Q.Wright (1942; 1965) gives a compact description of primitive warfare is his definition of 'Social war': "[W]arriors consist of all men of the tribe trained in the war moves from youth. Tactics involve little group formation or cooperation but consist of night raids, individual duels in formal pitched battles, or small headhunting or bloodrevenge parties". The following section on weapons and techniques is largely based on Wright.



2.9.1 Weapons and Techniques The striking weapons of primitive peoples are confined to arm-, foot-, or mouth-propelled instruments. These include war hammers, battle-axes, and swords; thrusting spears; and missile weapons, such as the hurled spear, or javelin, the arrow propelled by arm- or foot-drawn bow, or, seldom, the blowpipe. The striking edge or point of these weapons is of hard wood, stone, bone, or metal, and occasionally poison is used on the tip of arrow or spear. Among hunter-gatherers these weapons are usually not differentiated from those used in the hunt. The protection of primitive warriors consists of wood or leather shield and an occasional head or body armor of skin, feathers, textiles, or wood. There is little of mass organization or group tactics. War is usually conducted by sudden sallies or ambushes followed by individual duels and an inclination to retreat at the first reverse. Generally, in primitive societies fighting relies mainly on striking power at a distance, with bow and arrow, and on mobility, employing the stratagem of surprise from ambush. The war is one of pounce and retreat. Mass charges, complicated tactics, a professional military class, elaborate fortifications, and war of attrition are rare and, when existent, mainly post-contact phenomena. In primitive societies, wars, raids and feuds are primarily or exclusively male ’occupations’ and obligations, although exceptions to this general rule have been documented. The female of the species seems occasionally to have engaged in fighting or warlike exploits in Angola, Canary Islands, Valley of the Amazon, Patagonia, Central America, Hawaii, Australia, Tasmania, Arabia, and Albania and among the Ainu and Apache (Davie, 1929; Q.Wright, 1942). In most of these cases, however, the role of the women is confined to company, sutler and entertainer, supporter and ’cheerleader’ for the benefit of the hard core of male warriors. Although women are very rarely fighters, among the hardly primitive 19thcentury kingdom of the Fon or Dahomeans, battalions of female warriors have been reported. These women, "who for some reason or other came under the control of the king, but whom he did not desire because of their lack of personal attractiveness" (Herskovits, 1938), reportedly fought more bravely and more cruelly than their male counterparts. But this is exceptional. Among some tribes all men fight on occasions, as in Melanesia (Wedgwood, 1930); among others certain age groups alone fight, as among the Masai and other East African pastoral tribes; and among others fighting is confined to duels by a few champions. Only among the pastoral and agricultural peoples is there anything like a professional military class. Some have permanent war chiefs; some have dual chieftainship (peace- and war-chiefs), and some have neither.



Tactics and strategy also show variation. The surprise attack or raid with a brief period of fighting, and then withdrawal is the most common stratagem (considerably varying in bloodiness and destructiveness). Pitched battles on the field are relatively uncommon and far less bloody, and more ritualized, than the surprise attack. The discipline necessary for group tactics and strategic movement is most developed among the pastoral people, such as the the Masai of East Africa (Davie, 1929), and the Pondo of South Africa, who have a territorial military organization including all able-bodied men (Hunter, 1936). In summary, then, it appears that, as general culture advances, the size of the fighting group tends to increase; the warrior class tends to become more specialized; missile weapons tend to be superseded by piercing or striking weapons; discipline and morale tend to increase; and the battle of pounce and retreat tends to give way to the battle of mass attack and maneuver. With these changes the casualties and destructiveness of war tend to become greater. 2.9.2 The Raid The raid (dawn attack or ambush) was the most common form of primitive warfare, and it was responsible for the highest number of casualties. Following Divale’s (1973) account, the raiding or war party usually consisted of some ten or so men, but could number over a hundred, and was usually organized by the village headman or the men from a family with a death to avenge. Group size was very important in primitive warfare because political strategy revolved around attacking weaker and smaller groups with a lesser ability to strike back. Most primitive warfare was intracultural in nature (' 2.6) - that is, Yanomamö villages (Venezuela) raided other Yanomamö villages, and Kapauku villages (New Guinea) fought other Kapauku. Sometimes though the warfare would be along the borders of neighboring cultures, such as between the Eskimo and the Indians of the interior of Alaska and Canada (e.g., Hearne, 1795; Jenness, 1932; Divale, 1973; Irwin, 1987). The war party, after leaving the village, sometimes amidst much ceremony, entered enemy territory with great caution. Surprise attack was the key element in this type of primitive warfare, and the war party usually employed stealthy tactics and ambush. Solitary women or men encountered by the war party in the field were slain, and this was sometimes considered sufficient trophy to return home in triumph. Occasionally the enemy village was attacked outright, but this was usually impossible because of various defense alarm systems, such as barking dogs and dried brush placed around the village. At dawn the raiders hid around the enemy village or camp. Upon awakening, the enemy would leave the village, individually or in small groups, and go into the bush to relieve themselves. At this point the attack was launched. The war party tried to kill as many people as possible, take the necessary heads, or scalps, whatever young women or other booty they could capture, and flee, usually running for hours until it was fairly certain they were not being pursued.



A raid was considered a failure if any member of the war party was killed, regardless of how many enemy were slain. Quite often raids were a complete failure in the sense that no enemy were slain, or worse, only an attacker was killed. Sometimes a slaughter ensued, but most often only one or two people were killed on a raid. Casualties might be considerable, though, because the total number killed mounted up from the sometimes dozens of these raids that might occur each year. When the war party returned home, there was often dancing and celebrating, although the warriors who made the raid usually took little part, thus giving everyone an opportunity to engage, at least indirectly, in the warfare and to achieve greater solidarity and cohesion for the group (Divale, 1973). 2.9.3 The Treacherous Feast As with all warfare, treachery was an acceptable strategy of primitive societies. A standard procedure among the Yanomamö, as graphically described by Chagnon (1968 et seq.), was for one group to invite another to its village or camp for a feast. In primitive politics intergroup or intervillage feasting was a process by which alliances were built. Even if the group invited to the feast suspected a doublecross, they would usually accept the invitation because to refuse might imply fear, which in tribal politics was an open invitation to be attacked. A third group in treacherous complicity with the host village would wait in hiding, to attack when the visitors were drunk or sleeping or about to return home. Sometimes the hosts themselves would suddenly turn on their unsuspecting guests. Treachery usually resulted in tremendous slaughter because the victims were unaware and in close physical proximity to their killers. It was not uncommon for most of the visiting men to be murdered and most of the women to be stolen (Divale, 1973). 2.9.4 The Pitched Battle The final type of primitive warfare was the pitched battle, which involved anywhere from a few dozen to a few thousand warriors and was conducted in a prearranged area or no-man's land along the borders of the warring groups. Each army was composed of warriors, usually related by marriage, from several allied villages. Even though large numbers of warriors were involved, there was little or no organized, concerted, military effort; instead, multiple individual duels were engaged in. The lined-up warriors shouted insults and obscenities at their opponents and hurled spears or fired arrows. Agility in dodging arrows was highly praised and young warriors pranced about. The women often came to watch these wars and would sing or goad their men on. Women (and sometimes even children) also occasionally retrieved spent enemy arrows so that their husbands could shoot them back at their foes. Regularly occurring pitched battles were generally



found among ’advanced’ tribal people with fairly dense populations, such as in highland New Guinea. In spite of the huge array of warriors involved in these pitched battles, little killing took place. Because of the great distance between the opposing warriors and the relative inefficiency of primitive weapons, combined with a young warrior’s agility to dodge arrows, direct hits rarely occurred. The fighting often stops for the day after one side has exacted a death, with the losers mourning their loss and the other side celebrating its victory within sight of each other. Or the opposing parties retreat after having sustained some casualties, or simply because of imminent nightfall, which makes the brave warriors return to the safety of their homes before the evil spirits of the night catch up with them. There are often deliberate steps taken to ensure that the killing does not get too efficient. There are Californian Indian peoples, for instance, who are well aware that arrows with flights are more accurate and always fit feathers to its hunting arrows - but leaves them off its war arrows (Kroeber, 1925). Similarly, the Piegan (Blackfoot) and Shoshone Indians, who engaged in largescale battles on foot before the use of horses spread to the American plains, used to form lines facing each other that were just barely within arrow range and shoot at their opponents while taking cover behind shields three feet in diameter. Though they also had more lethal weapons - lances and battle-axes they never closed in to use them unless they had overwhelming numerical superiority (Walker, 1972). A number of primitive peoples engaged in warfare by means of regulated or expiatory combat. This was common among the Australian aborigines, for whom the ’makarata’ of the Murngin tribe, as described by Warner (1930) is a nice example. The Murngin had distinctive names for six types of warfare: (1) Fight within a camp, (2) secret interclan killing, (3) night raid on a camp, (4) general open fight, (5) pitched battle, and (6) ceremonial peace ordeal (Warner, 1930). The lack of pre-battle military organization, as well as the virtual absence of any discernible tactical coordination, command-structure organization and strategic anticipations of the violence clash itself, led Turney-High (1949), as we saw, to characterize such ’wars’ as ’submilitary’, and hardly deserving the name. We will encounter more examples of war-mitigation (deliberate attempts to reduce or confine the lethality and destructiveness of the violent encounter) and primitive ius in bello later on (Ch. 7). Perhaps the most graphic description of pitched battle among primitive peoples has been given by Hart & Pilling (1960) on the Tiwi, a polygynous and gerontocratic tribe of northern Australia: Thus Tiwi battles had to be the confused, disorderly, inconclusive things they always were. They usually lasted all day, during which about two-



thirds of the elapsed time was consumed in violent talk and mutual abuse between constantly changing central characters and satellites. The remaining third of the time was divided between duels involving a pair of men who threw spears at each other until one was wounded, and brief flurries of more general weapon throwing involving perhaps a dozen men at a time, which ended whenever somebody, even a spectator was hit. As a result of this full day of violence, perhaps a few of the cases would be settled that night - by a father handing over his delayed daughter, or a man with a disputed wife relinquishing her to her rightful husband - but when the war party left the next day to return home, the number of cases settled was likely to be less than the number of new feuds, grievances and injuries that had originated during the day of battle. For not only did the participants carry away from the battle field a vivid memory of all the physical wounds, intended or accidental, inflicted by whom on whom, but they also brooded long and suspiciously upon who had supported whom and why, either verbally or with spear in hand. Finally, through all these disputes and hostile actions between senior men ran their united suspicion of bachelors. The only ’battle’ in two years between large groups drawn from distinct bands that had a clear-cut and definite final act was one fought at Rongu in late 1928. On that occasion, after disputing and fighting among themselves from early morning until late afternoon, all the men present from both war parties gradually channeled all their anger toward one unfortunate young Mandiimbula bachelor whom they finally accused of going around from band to band creating misunderstandings between various elders. Several elders on both sides testified publicly that their mistrust of each other had started shortly after the bachelor in question had begun hanging around their households; whereupon the senior warriors of the two opposing armies had no difficulty in deciding that most of their suspicions of each other ’were all his fault’, and with great unanimity ganged up on the bachelor and quickly clubbed him into unconsciousness for being a troublemaker and a suspicion spreader. In the midst of battle the gerontocracy had reasserted its solidarity by finding a bachelor scapegoat upon whom to unload all their mutual suspicions and aggressions (Hart & Pilling, 1960). Among early American Indians quite similar practices occurred in California and in the Northern Plains. In prearranged fights among the Maidu of California both sides lined up out of arrow range, women and children behind the chiefs of both sides standing together on a knoll to watch the fun. When all was ready, the young men of the ’defendants’ advanced within range, unarmed. A volley of arrows was released against them. But because the men had been trained as artful dodgers since boyhood, no one would be hit. While they retired to get their weapons, the children of the attackers ran out to pick up the



arrows for reuse. Next their fighters advanced to be shot at. So it went for hours, until at last some tired leaper was struck. At this, his side, defeated, broke and ran. The victors chased them with yells of triumph. Those who were caught were pummeled. Then it was over. Everyone returned to the battlefield. The women brought forth food, and both sides together enjoyed a peace feast or was it a picnic? The victors paid compensation to the losers for having wounded their man (Hoebel, 1949). Somewhat more serious but hardly more dangerous were the early fights on the Northern Plains. When a group of Cree joined with the Blackfoot to make war on the Shoshones, about 1725, they spent a few days in speeches, feasting, and dancing before marching off to meet the foe. The Shoshones were ready for them. According to the account of Sankamappee, the Cree chief "Both parties made a great show of themselves. After some singing and dancing, they sat down on the ground and placed their large shields before them, which covered them. We did the same... Theirs were all placed touching each other... Our headed arrows did not go through their shields, but stuck in them; on both sides several were wounded, but none lay on the ground; and night put an end to the battle without a scalp being taken on either side, and in those days such was the result, unless one party was more numerous than the other". And this was a battle in which some 800 men took part. Such behavior is ’rudimentary warfare’, according to Hoebel (1949), who relates the above stories, but it hardly deserves to be called ’war’. In the past, many anthropologists viewed these pitched battles and, noting the small number of casualties, concluded that much or all of primitive warfare was a ritual or game. As, for example, Dyer (1985) wrote recently: "[I]t is an important ritual, an exciting and dangerous game, and perhaps even an opportunity for self-expression, but it is not about power in any recognizable modern sense of the word, and it most certainly is not about slaughter". Warfare among egalitarian societies, as also Service (1975) pointed out, is seldom a pitched and bloody affair, because this kind of society cannot sustain very many men in the field, and hence the battles are neither large nor protracted. But more important in limiting the scale of war is the egalitarian nature of the society. Leadership is ephemeral, for one thing, and the leader has no strong organization or authority to conscript or otherwise force people to serve his bidding. And he cannot force people to be brave by threats of legal punishment for dereliction of duty. Warriors left on their own usually will not run grave risks to their lives, and hence pitched battles are rare. When a battle does take place it is more noisy than bloody. However, this ’game’ perspective is now questioned, and it is suggested that such warfare was extremely effective, perhaps even overeffective, in the sense that many cultural controls existed the primary aim of which was the regulation and limitation of warfare (Divale, 1973).



Prehomeric and Homeric Greece still retained many primitive features in their warfare patterns (Cf. Loenen, 1953). Garlan (1975) writes about the ritual wars in ancient Greece: "Its ideal pattern, never fully realized, is as follows: between communities linked to each other by traditional ties of neighborhood and of kinship, wars, rather like long-term tournaments of competitions (agones), take place periodically within a religious context of a mythical or cultural nature, according to rules which restrict the object and extent of the conflict". She calls this state of affairs "micro-war or pseudo-peace".

2.10

General Characteristics of Primitive War

In this section I shall review the macroquantitative research on primitive war, i.e., studies employing more or less sophisticated statistical techniques or multivariate analyses on cross-cultural data bases, or subsets thereof called ’samples’, which are collections of empirical data on properties, behaviors and customs, institutions, social and political organization, and other characteristics of human societies. Virtually all contemporary studies use the data base compiled by the Human Relations Area Files (HRAF), New Haven, U.S.A., or samples like the Cross-Cultural Summary (Textor, 1967), the Ethnographic Atlas (Murdock, 1967), the World Ethnographic Sample (Murdock, 1957), and the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample (Murdock & White, 1969). There are two main reasons for reviewing this extensive literature. In the first place, the empirical studies reveal the constraints and variability which the theories should explain and clarify. In the second place, these synchronic studies may also reveal some consistent diachronic patterns, and thus may shed some light on the evolution of human warfare. As will be seen, quite a number of specific hypotheses have been tested crossculturally. Let us first look how the assumption of universal human belligerence, the notion that all societies everywhere and always have conducted wars, holds up against the empirical evidence.



2.11

The Hobbes-Rousseau Controversy

Following the Renaissance, two well-defined theories of the origin of war had become widely distributed among social thinkers. One of these was sponsored by the social contract theorists and by Hugo Grotius (1625) and Thomas Hobbes (1651) in particular. This theory, which was very widely accepted in the 17th and 18th centuries, held that the scarcity of resources in relation to the numbers and needs of early man, the lack of adequate technological development among primitive peoples, and their inherent suspicion and dislike of strangers made it inevitable that primitive society should be characterized by constant warfare (Bernard, 1944). However, the social-contract theorists of the 17th century were less concerned with explaining the causes of war than with describing what they conceived to be the war-ridden condition of primitive society, though in his Leviathan Hobbes (1651) made an interesting attempt to identify the causes as competition, diffidence, and glory. Nor did they attempt to determine when warfare first began. The lack of an evolutionary theory of society and the general acceptance of the doctrine of human origin set forth in Genesis made a theory of the gradual evolution of war seem unnecessary, if it did not render it inconceivable (Bernard, 1944). Hobbes may be taken as fairly typical of the general opinion of the time regarding the warlike attitudes and proclivities of early man. His aim was to describe human behavior in terms of a kind of social physics. Thus the tendency of physical objects to pursue their own trajectory when left to themselves, could be translated into an egoistic principle for human beings: That they pursue their own interests in the line of least resistance. This, of course, is the source of social conflict, of "Warre, as is of every man against every man" (bellum omnium contra omnes). Hobbes describes the status naturalis, the state of nature as the status hostilis. Man’s behavior, which, in the state of nature, is governed not by reason, but by passion and desire. Reason orients Man’s desires. "For the Thoughts, are to the Desires, as Scouts, and Spies, to range abroad, and find the way to the things desired". In Hobbes’ philosophy the homo homini Deus and the homo homini lupus must be set side by side. On the one hand, reason teaches Man to be peaceable, loyal and helpful. But, on the other hand, reason teaches us that desires predominate in Man’s nature and that his life is constantly in danger (Spits, 1977). The most dangerous of all desires is that for prestige, the craving for honor. Everything that gives joy to the mind relates to honor and fame. Vanity - and everything is vanity - is the root of all evil, the source of all vice. It makes Man crave for power. This brings him to his often quoted statement: "I put for a generall inclination of all mankind, a perpetuall and restlesse desire for Power after power, that ceaseth onely in Death". On this account, states as well as tribal societies are led to war because of



competition for material possessions, mistrust, fear, and the pursuit of power and glory, "with fear being the prime motive in that is supposedly leads to a concern to secure what we already have" (Walker, 1987; cf. Meyer, 1977; Spits, 1977). Diametrically opposed views were espoused by Rousseau (1762) in his Le Contrat Social, building on Montesquieu’s ideas exposed in L’Esprit des Lois (1748). Rousseau introduced the concept of the ’Noble Savage’, who did not wage war because he simply had no reason for doing so. Not only because he lacked the material incentive (there were no benefits to gain), but also because he lacked the necessary ’infrastructure’ which was expressed thus by Glover & Ginsberg (1934): "The antithesis between war and peace is really inapplicable to the simple conditions in which these [primitive] peoples live. Anything like the organized and aggressive warfare which we find in early history and among the more advanced of the simpler societies can have no place in the life of the simplest societies, for this implies organization, discipline and differentiation between leaders and led which the people of the lowest culture do not possess. But if these do not have war, neither have they peace. We must think of war not as a genus uniquely opposed to peace but as a species of violence opposed to social order and security" (Glover & Ginsberg, 1934). Property, which Rousseau singles out in the second Discourse as a crucial factor in inequality and consequently in violence, should not be seen as a cause of war but as a consequence of the ’cupidity’ and insecurity that dominate men once their original isolation comes to an end (Hoffmann, 1965). This so-called Hobbes-Rousseau controversy, a persistent and irreconcilable one, has dominated the anthropological, sociological, and psychological literature till today. The first to tackle the problem empirically was Adam Ferguson. In 1767 Adam Ferguson published An Essay on the History of Civil Society, which he based on Montesquieu while extending the latter’s method by drawing more upon the observations of primitive peoples made by contemporaneous missionaries and travelers such as Charlevoix, Lafitau, Dampier, and others, as well as the classical sources (Service, 1975). Ferguson concluded: "We had occasion to observe that in every rude state the great business is war; and that in barbarous times, mankind, being generally divided into small parties, are engaged in almost perpetual hostilities". War, armed group antagonism "has been the great business of mankind since time immemorial". Ferguson more than agreed with Montesquieu about the falseness of the common idea that ’Man in a state of nature’ was free to be his natural self. Man is governed by society, and never was outside it - he has always wandered or settled ’in troops and companies’. Ferguson saw human nature as being composed of many opposite propensities - sociability and egoism, love and



hostility, cooperation and conflict - an amalgam that is necessary to allow for the different kinds of characteristics demanded by society in different times and places. Ferguson felt - contrary to Rousseau’s belief - that conflict had a positive function in cultural evolution, and for that matter even in individual psychology: the stronger the hostility to outsiders, the closer the internal bonds of the collectivity; the very meaning of friendship is acquired from a 2 knowledge of enmity (Service, 1975) . These visions are not, however, as diametrically opposed as might prima facie appear. They are differences of emphasis rather than essential distinctions. Although "belligerence is a concomitant of increasing civilization" (Broch & Galtung, 1966), that does not mean that most primitive cultures lived in a paradisiac condition of perpetual peace and blissful harmony. On the contrary, the terms ’pseudo-peace’ (Garlan, 1975) or ’Friedlosigkeit’ (Hartmann, 1915) are more appropriate. "It is interesting", Service (1975) notes, "that the actual nature of primitive prestate society as we now know it ethnologically can support both Hobbes and Rousseau, each in part. War, as Hobbes meant it - as threat or imminence as much as action - certainly is an omnipresent feature of primitive life, as is, in part, an appearance of the Rousseauian peace and generosity. As we shall see, these two aspects of social life coexist; the threats of violence caused by the ego-demands of individuals are countered by social demands of generosity, kindness, and courtesy". Long ago, Sumner (1911) answered the question whether man began in a state of peace or a state of war as follows: "They began with both together. Which preponderated is a question of the intensity of the competition of life at the time. When that competition was intense, war was frequent and fierce, the weaker were exterminated or 2

The condition of "almost perpetual hostilities", or relative peacelessness among primitive peoples and early hominids was confirmed, after Ferguson, by Waitz (1859-62), Lyell (1863), Lubbock (1870), Tylor (1874), Jähns (1880; 1893), Gumplowicz (1883 et seq.), Hellwald (1883), Bagehot (1884), Spencer (1885 et seq.), Vaccaro (1886), Maine (1888), James (1890, 1910), Ratzel (1894), Novikow (1896), Vierkandt (1896), de Molinari (1898), Schultze (1900), Schaeffle (1900), Topinard (1900), Frobenius (1903), Lagorgette (1906), Steinmetz (1907; 1929), Sumner (1911), Boas (1912), McDougall (1914), Hartmann (1915), Jerusalem (1915), Weule (1916), Knabenhans (1917), Keller (1918), Müller-Lyer (1921), Hobhouse (1924), Sumner & Keller (1927), van Bemmelen (1928), Davie (1929), Andreski (1954), Bigelow (1969, 1975), Alexander (1971, 1979), E.O. Wilson (1978), Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1979, 1986), Cohen (1984), Krippendorff (1985), Dupuy & Dupuy (1986), Shaw (1985), Shaw & Wong (1987, 1988) and most contemporary evolutionary anthropologists and sociobiologists. Relative peace as the primeval condition of mankind was advocated by Montesquieu (1748), Rousseau (1755; 1762), Letourneau (1895; although Letourneau is ambiguous on this point), Westermarck (1889; 1907), Kropotkin (1902), Holsti (1912; 1913), Anthony (1917), Perry (1917; 1923), de Lavessan (1918), Dickinson (1920), Dewey (1922), Rivers (1922), G.E. Smith (1924), Wheeler (1928), Cleland (1928), van der Bij (1929), Schmitthenner (1930), MacLeod (1931), Benedict (1934), Malinowski (1936; 1941); Mead (1940 et seq.), and most contemporary cultural anthropologists.



absorbed by the stronger, the internal discipline of the conquerors became stronger, chiefs got more absolute power, laws became more stringent, religious observances won greater authority, and so the whole societal system was more firmly integrated. On the other hand, when there were no close or powerful neighbors, there was little or no war, the internal organization remained lax and feeble, chiefs had little power, and a societal system scarcely existed". 2.11.1 A Study of War A further impetus to the notion of the universality of primitive war probably came from Quincy Wright’s (1942) opus magnum A Study of War (actually a collective enterprise, and numbering some 1600 pages), in which a small section is devoted to primitive war: "Appendix IX. Relation between warlikeness and other characteristics of primitive peoples", comprising a crosscultural sample of some 650 distinctive primitive peoples, arranged alphabetically by continent and categorized with respect to warlikeness and other characteristics, and based on the list of peoples used by Hobhouse, Wheeler & Ginsberg (1915). This is followed by statistical tabulations indicating the relationship between warlikeness and a series of other variables such as habitat, political and social organization, etc. Furthermore, Wright introduced the important distinction between 4 types of primitive war: defensive, social, economic, and political. Defensive war was coded if war is never embarked upon except for immediate defense of the group against attack, with the inclusion of a few tribes who do not even defend themselves from attack. This category comprised 5 % of the total sample. If war is embarked upon for purposes of revenge, religious expiation, sport, or personal prestige, this was coded social war. This category comprised 59 % of the total sample. If war, in addition to utilization for defensive and social purposes, is an important method for acquiring slaves, women, cattle, pastures, agricultural lands, or other economic assets (including the provision of victims for human sacrifice), this was coded economic war. This category comprised 29 % of the total sample. Finally, if war is fought not only for defensive, social, and economic purposes but also to maintain a ruling class in power and to expand the area of empire or political control, this was coded political war. This category comprised 7 % of the total sample. Notice that (a) In toto this means 95 % warlike peoples versus 5 % unwarlike, a result which seems to substantiate the notion of universal belligerence. (b) In terms of cultural level, "It seems clear that the collectors, lower hunters,



and lower agriculturists are the least warlike, the higher hunters and higher agriculturists are more warlike, while the highest agriculturalists and the pastorals are the most warlike of all". A conclusion which seems to support van der Bij’s (1929) general conclusion, and which seems to indicate that belligerence is a concomitant of increasing civilization (See ' 2.11.3 and 2.11.4). Furthermore, these studies indicate that wanton cruelty, human sacrifice, and a general low valuation of life, do not seem to be a function of ’primitivity’; they are rather phenomena manifesting themselves on the level of chiefdoms, preliterate kingdoms and hierocracies. (c) Regarding the motives of primitive war, the contemporary emphasis on ’materialism’ is emphatically not endorsed by Wright. At several places in the text he states this quite clearly: Primitive wars "seldom have the object of territorial aggression or defense until the pastoral or agricultural stage of culture are reached, when they become a major cause of war" (p.76). And "Primitive peoples only rarely conduct formal hostilities with the object of achieving a tangible economic or political result" (p.58). "If acquisitive motives play a part in primitive war, the commodity sought is likely to be an object of magic, ritual or prestige value rather than of food value" (p.75). Table 2.11.1 shows the primitive peoples in Wright’s data classified by the four types of warfare and level of economic culture. It will be observed that 64 % of all the cases tabulated fall into the combined categories of defensive and social war. Second, among hunters 83 % of all the cases fall into these classifications, and none whatsoever into the category of political war. On the other hand, pastoral peoples tend to be warlike in the accepted sense, with agriculturists less so. Table 2.11.1: Number of cases practicing each type of warfare in Q.Wright’s data, classified by level of economic culture (after Schneider, 1950). Level of Econ. Culture

Defensive War

Social War

Economic War

Political War

Total

Lower Hunters Higher Hunters Lower Agriculturists Middle Agriculturists Higher Agriculturists Lower Pastorals Higher Pastorals

5 11 9 2 1 -

91 72 37 98 38 8 2

2 33 14 51 46 15 13

1 10 25 4

98 116 61 161 110 23 19

Total

28

346

174

40

588

from A Study of War, Appendix IX.

All in all, Wright’s conclusions seem to confirm the notion of universal belligerence, and so it has entered the cocktail-party wisdom of the average



Western intellectual. There are, however, apart from some minor flaws and shortcomings in Wright’s sample (e.g., Wurrunjerri and Yara Yara refer to the same Australian tribe, and not to two different ones; and the same holds for Hopi and Moqui, and Hottentots and Khoi-khoin, etc.), other reasons to doubt the validity and representativeness of his list. Interestingly, Hobhouse, Wheeler & Ginsberg (1915), who compiled the original list which Wright used for his statistical analysis, were much more reserved in their conclusions. They write: The question has been raised whether the traditional view of early society as one of constant warfare is really justified by the facts. There is, in fact, no doubt that to speak of a state of war as normal is in general a gross exaggeration. Relations between neighbouring communities are in general friendly, but they are apt to be interrupted by charges of murder owing to the belief in witchcraft, and feuds result which may take more or less organised form. There seems to be a persistent misunderstanding in the literature about Hobhouse et al.’s list. For example, Malmberg (1983), in his Human Territoriality, writes: "In their examination of 311 ’primitive’ societies Hobhouse, Wheeler and Ginsberg (1930: 228-233) found that 298 showed war and feud behaviour distributed through all the grades while in 9 certain and 4 doubtful cases war was not known" (Malmberg, 1983: 107; italics added). This author misquotes the figures, obviously because he did not consult the original source thoroughly, thus suggesting that virtually all peoples had war in their repertoire. Such misquotations have a nasty habit to assume a life of their own. For a similar uncritically parotting of fanciful figures on contemporary wars, see Jongman & van der Dennen (1988). Such a vast discrepancy between the figures provided by Hobhouse et al. (298 cases of war or feuds) and those of Wright (95% of the total sample: almost twice as much) requires explanation. Wright states that he used additional literature published after 1915 to code his sample. It is quite possible that he found information on the presence of war and/or feuding which was not available to Hobhouse et al. However, this is unlikely to explain all the difference. Unfortunately, Wright lumped together in his category ’social warfare’ all the subtle, but crucial, distinctions made by Hobhouse et al. regarding the maintenance of public justice (e.g., retaliation and self-help, regulated fight, expiatory fight, etc.). This is, for instance, what Hobhouse et al. had to say about the Australian tribes in their list: "The expiatory combats and the regulated fights of the Australians are also all



of them palpably means of ending a quarrel, or marking a point beyond which it is not to go. They do not seek to punish a wrong but to arrest vengeance for wrong at a point which will save the breaking-out of a devastating fight". I will leave it to the reader to decide whether such conflict-limiting procedures merit to be labeled ’social warfare’. Many of such and similar cases of private or public redress, retaliation, petty feuding, etc., have been classified as ’social warfare’ by Wright. The remaining numerical difference, however, is still considerable. Hobhouse, Wheeler & Ginsberg’s study was the first quantitative evidence that warfare is not a universal human characteristic. Also Swanton (1943) surveyed the anthropological literature for warfare and warlike attitudes among the world’s societies and found that there were as many that were peaceable as warlike; a result that matches the Hobhouse et al. findings. Swanton’s study apparently never penetrated the scientific 3 community . Another early cross-cultural, quantitative study of war was conducted by Simmons in 1937. However, this work, too, has been completely overlooked by the research literature, and was only recently rediscovered by Rudmin 4 (1990). Simmons coded 71 societies for 109 variables, including ’prevalence of warfare’. Rudmin cluster-analyzed the variables significantly correlated with warfare in Simmons’ sample, and found three distinct clusters. The first cluster might be labelled ’group life’. The appearance of this single variable as a cluster distinct from the other correlates of warfare supports the argument that warfare is primarily a phenomenon of social organization. As Margaret Mead (1962 et seq.), among others, has argued, not all violence is warfare. All societies have some amount of violence, but not all of them have organized war. Simmons had many measures of violence, including blood revenge, human sacrifice, and infanticide. None of these were highly significant correlates of warfare, however. The second cluster found by Rudmin might be labelled ’agricultural social ecology’. In accordance with Hobhouse, Wheeler & Ginsberg (1915) Simmons 3

The only publication in which I found this study ever mentioned is Mary LeCron Foster’s (1989) Is War Necessary?. Unfortunately, I have been unable to lay hands on Swanton’s monograph, and therefore I could not check the data. 4

These societies are: Abipones, Ainu, Akamba, Albanians, Andamanese, Araucanians, Arawak, Arunta, Ashanti, Aztecs, Bakongo, Banks Islanders, Berbers, Bontoc Igorot, Bushmen, Chin, Chippewa, Chukchee, Creek, Crow, Dahome, Dieri, Euahlayi, Fan, Haida, Hebrews, Hopi, Hottentots, Iban, Incas, Iroquois, Jivaro, Kafirs, Kazaks, Kiwai, Kutenai, Kwakiutl, Labrador Eskimo, Lango, Lapps, Lengua, Mafulu, Mangbetu, Maori, Menomini, Mongols, Munda, Navaho, Norse, Omaha, Palaung, Point Barrow Eskimo, Polar Eskimo, Pomo, Rwala, Samoans, Sema Nagas, Semang, Seri, Shilluk, Tasmanians, Todas, Trobriands, Tuareg, Vai, Veddas, Witoto, Yahgan, Yakut, Yuchi, Yukaghir.



(1937) concluded that agriculturalists, as opposed to hunter-gatherers, were warlike. It would seem, he reasoned, that agriculture requires the permanent, exclusive use of land. Therefore acquisition and defense of land becomes an essential aspect of the agricultural social ecology. Agricultural societies also produce the surpluses that release some members of society from productive 5 tasks to militaristic tasks . Cluster three would seem to indicate that a particular social order encourages war, a social order that might be called ’dominance stratification’. It is important to note that this cluster is distinct from ’group life’, and thus should not be interpreted as social organization per se. Rather it is a complex social order, with positions of command and positions of obedience, with the additional militaristic touch of ’mining and smelting of metals’. However, the interpretation that such war-prone social organization is necessarily patriarchal, misogynist or anti-feminist found little evidence here. Simmons included 40 variables that were gender-defined. Yet none of them were highly significant correlates of warfare. 2.11.2 Other General Conclusions from the Q.Wright Study Wright offers a number of propositions and conclusions on the basis of his statistical findings, arranged by geography, race, culture, and sociology. Geographically, people may be divided according to the continent in which they live. Among primitive people economic and political war has been least developed in Australia and most developed in Africa. European civilization seems to have sprung from very warlike primitive peoples, while America and Asia exhibit both very warlike and very unwarlike people. More significant geographical classifications can be made according to the climatological and topographical environment of peoples. Climatologically, a temperate or warm, somewhat variable, and stimulating climate favors warlikeness. However, it also favors civilization (Cf. Huntington, 1919). The favored regions have developed civilization or have been occupied by civilization, leaving the primitive people only the less satisfactory environments. As Marett (1933) states: "The world as it is now constituted consists of the piratical nations, thickly and firmly established in the world’s great areas of intercommunication and characterization, with dwindling folk of no importance scattered about in the odd corners, and lucky to be even there". Among contemporary primitive people the largest proportion of the warlike live in hot regions of medium climatic energy (Q.Wright, 1942; 1965). Topographically, primitive people inhabiting deserts or the seashore are more likely to be warlike than those in forests and mountains, and those in the Strangely enough, Otterbein (1989, 1991) found that Athe greater the dependence upon hunting, the greater the frequency of warfare (r = +.45, p < .01)@. See also Ember (1978). 5



grasslands are the most warlike of all. "If the genus Homo first differentiated on grassland and steppe, as held by Osborn (1929), Halperin (1936) and others, warlikeness may have been an original human characteristic". Warlikeness appears to be related to the stimulating character of the climate and to the lack of barriers to mobility rather than to the economic difficulty of the environment. Among primitive peoples it cannot be said that race [Remember that in those days ’race’ was not considered ’politically incorrect’ or a ’four-letter word’] is very closely related to war practices, although Pygmies and Australoids seem to be the least warlike; Negroes, Hamites, and whites the most warlike; with the red, yellow, and brown races occupying an intermediate position. Certain of the subraces belonging to these more warlike races, however, such as the Papuans, Dravidians, Arctics, and Eskimos, are quite unwarlike. Letourneau (1881; 1895) and Davie (1929) find the most peaceable people in the Mongolian race, and the latter regards the Negro as the most warlike race, although both recognize the great variations with respect to warlikeness within all races. Culturally, the collectors, lower hunters, and lower agriculturalists are the least warlike. The higher hunters and higher agriculturalists are more warlike, while the highest agriculturalists and the pastorals are the most warlike of all. Sociologically, primitive peoples may be classified into those who are integrated in primary (clan), secondary (village), tertiary (tribe), and quaternary (tribal federations or states) groups. In general, the first are the least and the latter the most warlike. In general, the more the division of labor, the more warlike; the peoples with compulsory classes being the most warlike of all primitive people. Finally, the peoples with the most varied and frequent contacts are the most warlike. This is explained by Hoijer (1929), who concludes a detailed study of the causes of primitive war with the following statement: The presence of many groups within a certain area offers - providing natural barriers do not interfere - opportunities for numerous cultural contacts. In striving to remain a tribal entity and to preserve itself physically, the group must perfect a strong social organization and a powerful war machinery. Needless to say, these strivings are unconscious. If they fail, they lose their group identity, if, indeed, they are not annihilated altogether. Those who succeed, establish strong tribal organizations whose lives can only be maintained by hostility - warfare becomes the necessary means of preserving group identity, in primitive society (Hoijer, 1929).



Similarly, Sumner (1906) wrote: "The closer the neighbors, and the stronger they are, the intenser is the warfare, and then the intenser is the internal organization and discipline of each". Also MacLeod (1931) insisted that "the form of a people’s state is a function of the people’s contacts". It would appear, then, that the seriousness and degree of institutionalization of war among primitive peoples is related more closely to the complexity of culture, political organization, and extra-group contacts than to race or physical environment, although a warm but stimulating climate and an environment favorable to mobility over wide areas seem also to be favorable to warlikeness. These conclusions with respect to the static circumstances of warlikeness and unwarlikeness among primitive peoples suggest the following generalizations with respect to the dynamics of the situation. Unwarlikeness has been the result of prolonged opportunity of neighboring groups to achieve equilibrium in relation to one another and to the physical environment. This opportunity has only been offered if the physical environment has been stable and if peoples of different culture have not interfered. The latter has resulted from natural barriers, lack of means of travel, or inhospitableness of climate. Reciprocally, warlikeness has resulted from frequent disturbances of the equilibrium of a group with respect to its physical environment or its neighbors. The first has usually resulted from climatic changes, migrations, or the invention or borrowing of new types of economic technique. The second has usually resulted from migrations, invasions, or other influences bringing a group into continuous contact with a very different culture. Among primitive peoples borrowing or invention of means of mobility or more efficient weapons promoting migration, invasion, or expansion of contacts increases warlikeness. Cleland (1928) thinks warlikeness was greatly stimulated by the use of metal, which necessitated expeditions to get ore and created a differential in military efficiency, making exploitation of the nonmetal users by the metal users practicable. Wissler (1914) comments on the influence of the horse, borrowed from Spaniards in the seventeenth century, in stimulating predatory warfare in the North American Plains culture. Such borrowing or invention proceeds very slowly among primitive groups unless forced by contact with much more civilized peoples. In summary, the most important conclusions to be derived from the Wright study are the following: <

War as a legitimate instrument for plunder or conquest is little known among primitive peoples.



< < < < < < <

Primitive peoples only rarely conduct formal hostilities with the object of achieving a tangible economic or political result. Neither territorial conquest nor seizure of slaves nor plunder of economic goods is characteristic of primitive warfare. Wars for political domination, so important among civilized peoples, hardly exist among the primitive collectors. Wars of independence are unknown among the most primitive peoples because slavery, subjection, and class stratification are unknown. War to proselytize others to their religion is unknown among primitive peoples. The most primitive peoples, isolated and uncorrupted by contact with higher cultures, often have neither war nor brutality in their mores. Thus, the more primitive the people, the less warlike it tends to be.

Q.Wright analyzed the quantitative evidence regarding primitive war rather exhaustively, given the state of the art. He ignored, however, some epiphenomena of primitive war, maybe because that ground had already been covered by Hobhouse et al. Their findings regarding Attitude to the Enemy, Cannibalism, and Human Sacrifice are briefly discussed. Attitude to the Enemy: Ignoring the pastoral peoples, for whom the numbers were too small to be of value, Hobhouse et al. found that (a) The practice of killing some or all of the vanquished predominates and is nearly constant till the highest agricultural stage is reached, where it drops by 50 per cent; and (b) The drop in the practice of killing prisoners in this stage is the reverse side of the equally sudden rise in the practice of enslavement. Apart from the capture of wives, the enslavement of captives is very rare below this stage. Cannibalism and Human Sacrifice: The total number of cases of cannibalism is very small and almost entirely confined to the Australian peoples in their sample. The distribution of cannibalism is in fact regional rather than cultural. Cannibalism barely exists in Asia and is very rare in North America. On the other continents it appears in from 20 to 30 per cent of the cases. With regard to human sacrifice the case is different. Among pastoral peoples cannibalism and human sacrifice are almost completely absent, which can hardly be accidental. "On the other hand, the practice reaches its maximum in the two higher grades of Agriculture, no doubt in response to well-known developments of religious belief. It is remarkable that as between the second and third grades of Agriculture the movement is exactly the reverse of that of cannibalism. It may perhaps be supposed that under the better economic conditions the desire for human flesh is less but that this influence is crossed by the growth of those special superstitions which connect the shedding of



blood with the fertility of the soil". 2.11.3 Cultural Evolution and War Surveys of contemporary primitive societies seem to show that those living in a more or less continual state of war greatly outnumber those that are predominantly peaceful (Vaccaro, 1886; 1898; Sorokin, 1928; van der Bij, 1929; Davie, 1929; Steinmetz, 1929; Q.Wright, 1942; 1965; Turney-High, 1949; Divale, 1973; Otterbein, 1973; Ember, 1978; Ross, 1985 et seq.; Ember & Ember, 1988, 1992; among others). Although Hobhouse et al. and Q.Wright were, as we saw, substantially prudent and nuanced in their propositions about human universal warlikeness, the common wisdom of the age, especially after the publications by Lorenz, Dart and Ardrey in the sixties, was that Homo s. sapiens was a bloodthirsty and brutal creature under a thin veneer of ’civilization’. Whoever might have doubted such a view - and some anthropologists, such as Lee & DeVore (1968), Service (1966), Steward (1968), Turnbull (1968) indeed defended the view that hunter-gatherers were relatively peaceful - was once more called to order. In a 1978 paper, Carol Ember shattered the ’myth about peaceful hunter-gatherers’. She obtained ratings of frequency of warfare for a world-wide sample of 50 hunter-gatherer societies. Tabulating the warfare data, and excluding those few cases that had a little herding or agriculture, 64% had warfare occurring at least once every two years, 26% had warfare somewhat less often, and only 10% (including the !Kung) were rated as having no or rare warfare (see Table 2.11.3). Even excluding equestrian hunters and those with 50% or more dependence on fishing, warfare is rare for only 12% of the remaining hunter-gatherers. In sum, Ember concluded, hunter-gatherers could hardly be described as peaceful. Table 2.11.3 Warfare Frequency among Hunter-Gatherers (Ember, 1978) More than once every two years

Andamanese Murngin Tiwi Aleut Sekani Yurok Bellacoola Squamish Klallam Maidu

S. Ute Kutenai Coeur D’Alene Yavapai Gros Ventres Comanche Crow Tehuelche Bororo Aweikoma

Less frequent

Dorobo Semang Nootka Tubatulabal

E. Pomo Sanpoil White Knife Shivwits

No or rare warfare

!Kung

Yahgan



Pekangekum

As a bonus, Ember included the following caveat: "[M]uch of the interest in the hunter-gatherer way of life appears to be associated with the belief that typical characteristics of recent hunter-gatherers were typical also in the Paleolithic. But even if we quantitatively establish the statistically ’normal’ cultural patterns of recent hunter-gatherers, I take issue with the belief that we are entitled to infer from this information what cultural patterns must have been typical in the distant past. We know, for example, that there is substantial variation among recent hunter-gatherers in residence, subsistence, division of labor, and warfare. If these variations are the result of different causal conditions, then what has been ’typical’ in recent times may only be a statistical artifact of the recent prevalence of certain causal conditions". There has been one line of reasoning according to which cultural evolution or civilization has led to progressive mitigation of war, which, at the dawn of history, must (therefore) have been incessant, bloody and inexorable. The inexorability of warfare, according to this thesis, has gradually decreased, and the institution of war will therefore inevitably disappear in the future. In other words: primitive man was more "rapacious, bloodthirsty and warlike than civilized man" (Sorokin, 1928), and this tendency toward "humanization of war" (Steinmetz, 1929) will continue in the future, qualitatively (war will become less cruel, less sanguinary, less internecine, less genocidal), as well as quantitatively (there will be fewer casualties: "Gesetz der relativ abnehmenden 6 Kriegsverluste" [law of relatively diminishing casualties]) (Steinmetz, 1929) . If this theory were correct, we would have to expect that war would be less known to, and the treatment of the vanquished more humane among, the ’higher’ agricultural peoples than among the ’lowest’ hunters. Facts, however, do not support this expectation. On the contrary, Hobhouse, Wheeler & Ginsberg’s (1915) major conclusion was that "organized war rather develops with the advance of industry and of social organization in general". Sorokin (1928) comments, with a feeling for understatement, that their study does not appear to show any progressive mitigation of war. Q.Wright (1942; 1965) similarly concludes that: "The more primitive the people, the less warlike it tends to be". This latter finding was fully confirmed 6

Protagonists of this ‘humanization-thesis’ (war as a ’childhood disease of mankind’) were Augustine (354-430), Emerson (1841), de Tocqueville (1863), Vaccaro (1886; 1898), Ferri (1895), Novikow (1896; 1911), Spencer (1896), Tarde (1897; 1899), de Molinari (1898), Ferrero (1898), Kovalevsky (1910), Sumner (1911), Petrajitzky (1913), Jerusalem (1915). Woods & Baltzly (1915), Nicolai (1918), Sumner & Keller (1927), Linton (1940), among others. The opposite position was defended by de Lapouge (1896), Hobhouse, Wheeler & Ginsberg (1915), Kidd (1918), Hobhouse (1924), van der Bij (1929), Davie (1929), Sorokin (1928; 1937), Engelgardt (1937), Q.Wright (1942; 1965), Hambly (1946), Turney-High (1949), Fahrenfort (1963), among others.



by subsequent macroquantitative studies (Broch, 1963; Broch & Galtung, 1966; Russell, 1972; Harrison, 1973; Eckhardt, 1975, 1981, 1982; Leavitt, 1977; Cf. Holsti, 1913; Hobhouse, Wheeler & Ginsberg, 1915; van der Bij, 1929; Toynbee, 1950; Sorokin, 1957; Sahlins, 1960; Harris, 1978; Beer, 1981; van der Dennen, 1981, 1986; Lenski & Lenski, 1987). 2.11.4 Belligerence and Civilization In a trivariate reanalysis of Wright’s data, Broch (1963) and Broch & Galtung (1966) were able to ascertain that "state organization with white people, state organization in close contact with others, and white people in close contact with others all produce 100% belligerence... In other words, size contributes to belligerence (tribe and state are ’big’), and particularly when combined with territorial bases into a state. Thus, as societies expand and get a fixed territorial base, they become more dangerous to each other, especially if they are in close contact and the population is white. And a reason for this lies in the nature of territory itself: conflicts over territory are of the constant-sum variety, one party’s gain is the other party’s loss". Broch & Galtung made no effort to improve the quality of the data utilized by Quincy Wright, as Wright had done with the Hobhouse et al. data by consulting a number of other anthropological works. What they did, however, was to exploit Wright’s data more fully using multivariate analysis techniques. Table 2.11.4 The Relationship between Belligerence and Primitivity, % Index level 0

1

2

3

4

5

6

Total

Defensive war Social war Econ. & political war No information

7 92 0 1

8 71 11 10

7 57 22 14

3 46 39 12

1 42 45 12

0 35 57 8

0 5 95 0

4 53 33 10

SUM

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

(N)

71

82

150

145

98

87

19

652

Suspecting some common factor underlying much of the correlation, Broch & Galtung devised an ’index of primitivity’, based on culture and subculture, political organization, and social organization: "Thus, the index will run from 0 to 6, where we find that the society scoring 0 is based on hunting in its lowest form and is a small group (clan) with stratification based on sex and age; at the other extreme, the society scoring 6 is agricultural in its highest form, with a state organization and a stratification system based on profession or caste... It



may be seen at a glance that this index catches almost all the variation there is in the data, and much better that any of the items one at a time". Broch & Galtung carefully ruled out the possibility of a spurious correlation, and concluded that "within the framework provided by these variables and the range provided by those societies, belligerence is a concomitant of increasing civilization" (emphasis in original). Two other findings stand out as particularly important: First of all, white people, by far the most belligerent of all ’races’, seem to be belligerent almost regardless of primitivity. Secondly, there is a positive interaction between degree of contact and degree of civilization when it comes to producing belligerence. In fact, these two variables together account completely for the variation in belligerence. These data, like Wright’s, are synchronic rather than diachronic, yet they strongly suggest that there is a process involved, in the sense that increasing civilization would lead to increasing belligerence (Broch & Galtung, 1966). For modern nations, too, relative economic and political power (if these may be regarded as indices of civilization) is grosso modo correlated with belligerence (Cf. review by van der Dennen, 1981). In a study of 84 primitive tribes, using a different data base (Eckhardt, 1975, 1982), it was concluded that peace is ’natural’ and war is ’civilized’: The more developed and settled agricultural tribes engaged in more acts of killing, mutilating, and torturing the enemy than did the more primitive nomadic tribes. These results suggested that "these atrocious behaviors were a function of historical development, accompanied by social discipline and sexual frustration, rather than human nature" (Eckhardt, 1982). Furthermore, Eckhardt found that crime and punishment, as well as war, occurred more frequently in more developed cultures. Crime, punishment, slavery, and war were less prevalent among gatherers and fishers, more prevalent among hunters, even more so among farmers and herders, and most of all among civilized city dwellers (Eckhardt, 1982). The historical evidence of the written records left by more than 30 civilizations from all over the world suggested that "War may actually have been a child of Civilization" (Toynbee, 1950). Toynbee found no civilization without war, except possibly the early Mayan. If civilization gave birth to war, "war has proved to be the proximate cause of the breakdown of every civilization" (Toynbee, 1950), so that the war-child has always destroyed its civilized parent. However, it is difficult, if not impossible to say whether civilization ’caused’ war, or whether war ’caused’ civilization. "It can only be said that civilization and war grew up in some sort of love-hate relationship, interacting in such a way as to increase their atrocities over time" (Eckhardt, 1982). On a more intuitive basis, without using elaborate statistical techniques, Holsti (1913) and van der Bij (1929) had come to the same general conclusion. Turney-High (1949), in discussing the ’military horizon’, probably had a similar



idea in mind. Also the recent theorizing by Knauft (1991), which will be dealt with later on, is in accordance with the above findings. 2.11.5 War as ’Agent of Progress’ It has long been generally believed that success in warfare and higher societal complexity (cultural evolution) were related; or formulated alternatively: that war, struggle and intergroup conflict have been the principal factors of human progress, or that war is the prime mover of human (cultural, moral, spiritual) 7 evolution: the Agent of Progress . This theory holds, in general, that old or ineffective social practices and obsolete institutions are weeded out of society through warfare. Societies survive - i.e., those successful in warfare - because their institutions are more adaptive and they expand at the expense of weaker societies, which perish. As a result of this continual process societies experience cultural evolution - e.g., they become more complex. According to the Social Darwinists, warfare is a mechanism of natural selection in and among societies (See Ch. 4). In a broad sense, the concept of war as a prime mover of sociocultural evolution suggests that the competition between human groups became ever fiercer with the quantitative growth of these groups. Access to resources was limited by this development, and warfare became an important means for differential reproduction (Meyer, 1987). A cross-cultural investigation conducted by Naroll & Divale (1974) failed to support the theory. They tested the hypothesis: "If warfare is the selective mechanism of cultural evolution, then militarily successful societies should tend to be higher on the scale of cultural evolution than militarily unsuccessful societies", by examining a world wide sample of 49 societies ranging from bands of hunter-gatherers to modern European societies. Military success was measured as a percentage of territorial change, in term of ground lost or gained by a society in one-hundred-year periods. Territorial change turned out to be a good objective measure of military success since 90% of all territorial change experienced by the societies in the sample was the result of warfare. Various indices of cultural evolution were employed to measure the degree of urbanization, economic specialization, social organization, and political integration of the societies studied. The results were conclusive: None of the measures of cultural evolution were in any way related to military success. 7

Hegel, 1821 et seq.; de Maistre, 1822; Proudhon, 1861; Spencer, 1864 et seq.; Nietzsche, 1882 et seq.; von der Goltz, 1883; Gumplowicz, 1883; Frölich, 1888; Luce, 1891; Jähns, 1893; Ratzenhofer, 1893; Ammon, 1900; Steinmetz, 1907; 1929; Constantin, 1907; Sumner, 1911; Sombart, 1913; Keller, 1916; LeBon, 1916; Bigelow, 1969; Carneiro, 1970; Alexander, 1979; among many others.



Otterbein (1970) found similar results: "Thus the evidence seems conclusive that it is the degree of military sophistication, rather than the degree of political centralization of a society, which explains its military success as measured by expanding territorial boundaries" (Otterbein, 1970). He concludes that "although military sophistication increases with an increase in political centralization, an increase in political centralization is not a necessity in order for a political community to develop a sophisticated military system and to become militarily successful. Moreover, the development of an efficient military organization appears to be a necessary condition for a political community to remain viable in intersocietal conflicts; whereas the development of a centralized political community which is not supported by an efficient military organization will not prevent a political community from being engulfed by militarily more efficient neighbors". This relationship between military efficiency and territorial expansion at the expense of other political communities has been eloquently stated by Q.Wright (1942; 1965): "Out of the warlike peoples arose civilization, while the peaceful collectors and hunters were driven to the ends of the earth, where they are gradually being exterminated or absorbed, with only the dubious satisfaction of observing the nations which had wielded war so effectively to destroy them and to become great, now victimized by their own instrument". Turney-High (1949) already emphasized that ’true’ war is a matter of social organization, not of material culture or weapons. Midlarsky & Thomas (1975) surprisingly found virtually no important effect of societal development or structural complexity on war experience. The Guttman scales of the causes of war in primitive societies (in terms of more to less ’advanced’: subjugation and tribute, land, plunder, trophies and honors, defense, and revenge) constructed by Naroll (1966) and Otterbein (1970) indicate - contrary to what Q.Wright (1942; 1965) hypothesized - that prestige (Wright’s social category) is a more advanced cause of war than plunder (Wright’s economic category), in the sense that wherever reasons of prestige are found, so are economic reasons, but where economic reasons are found, prestige reasons need not be present. In accordance with the above findings, Meyer (1987) draws the following conclusion: "While war undoubtedly played a major role in social evolution, at times accelerating change, this was not the case throughout the hunter and gatherer stage. Certainly hunter and gatherer societies are far from being ’generally peaceable’. Their ’primitive and endemic’ war did not exert any major impact on social change for a long period of human history, however. Only after some ’social inventions’ had occurred, war evolved in its military form and turned into an instrument of securing access to mostly material resources". Not only are the reasons why societies wage war subject to evolutionary change, but so too are the forms of warfare, the consequences for the



participants involved, and the technology with which it is fought. The technology of warfare and its level of availability to a population will have consequences in terms of who in a society will fight as well (e.g., Fried, 1967; Harrison, 1973; See further Ch. 5). 2.11.6 Political Centralization and Military Sophistication In an extensive study, using a sample of 50 primitive societies, Otterbein (1970) tested and confirmed the following hypotheses: The higher the level of political centralization, < < < < < < < < < <

the more likely that the military organization is composed of professionals ( = .31; p = 0.05); the less likely that war can be initiated by any member of the political community ( = .48; p = 0.01); the more likely that war will be initiated by announcement or by mutual arrangement ( = .29; p = 0.10). the more likely that war will be terminated by diplomatic negotiations ( = .30; p = 0.10); the more likely that the tactical system will be based upon both lines and ambushes ( = .26; p = 0.10); the more likely that shock weapons are used ( = .26; p = 0.10); the more likely that body armor is used ( = .36; p = 0.05); the more likely that field fortifications are used ( = .41; p = 0.05); the more advanced the reasons for going to war, or phrased differently, the greater the number of reasons for going to war ( = .68; p = 0.001); the higher the degree of military sophistication ( = .59; p = 0.001).

The greater the percentage of professionals in the military organization, < < < <

the higher the degree of subordination ( = .40; p = 0.02); the more likely that shock weapons are used ( = .41; p = 0.01); the more likely that body armor is used ( = .44; p = 0.01); the more likely that cavalry is used ( = .38; p = 0.02).

The higher the degree of military sophistication, < < <

the higher the casualty rates ( = .26; n.s.; point biserial (pb) = .48; p = 0.01); the more likely that the political communities of a cultural unit will engage in frequent or continual offensive external war ( = .17; n.s.; pb = .32; p = 0.05); the more likely that the political communities of a cultural unit will be



militarily successful ( = .40; p = 0.02). Important hypotheses not confirmed by Otterbein (1970): <

<

The higher the degree of military sophistication, the less likely that the political communities of a cultural unit will be attacked ( = .15; pb = .04). The deterrence hypothesis is not confirmed. Similar results have been obtained by Naroll (1966; 1969), Naroll et al. (1971), Naroll, Bullough & Naroll (1974), Eckhardt (1973; 1974; 1975), Tefft (1975); Cf. Ilfeld & Metzner (1970), Wallace (1972 et seq.), Weede (1975), Beer (1981), and Ferguson (1984). The higher the degree of military sophistication, the more likely that the political communities of a cultural unit will engage in frequent or continual internal war ( = .06; pb = -.05). Although the frequency of internal war is not related to the degree of military sophistication of the warring political communities, it has been shown in a cross-cultural study of internal war (Otterbein, 1968) that a high frequency of internal war is characteristic of political communities which have fraternal interest groups (' 2.11.7.4).

Strate (1985) tested the following set of hypotheses: (1) The more centralized is a political system, the more likely it is to gain territory/autonomy; (2) The incidence of sovereignty in defensive warfare should be higher than the incidence of sovereignty in other political activities; (3) Sovereignty in defensive warfare should be located at a territorial or subdivisional level as high or higher than sovereignty in any other activity; (4) A sovereign in defensive warfare should be more likely to hold sovereignty in other political activities than individuals and/or groups holding sovereignty in other activities. Strate hypothesizes that the necessary and sufficient function of political systems is defense. Defensive activities include all of those actions of political systems which deter enemy attacks or minimize losses to life, property, and territory in the event of an attack. They include activities associated with the recruitment, training, equipping, control, and use of military units. They also include other activities such as the construction of fortifications, the establishment of military alliances, and diplomacy. Modern evolutionary theory suggests, Strate reasons, that the function(s) of political systems are associated with a benefit(s) that enhance reproduction. If, therefore, the necessary and sufficient function of political systems is defense, this benefit is the protection that political systems afford their members from hostile groups of conspecifics. The close association in history between the



appearance and spread of large, complex political systems and warfare waged for the purposes of conquest and subjugation suggests several possible benefits of larger groups. One of these benefits is protection from predators, or for humans, protection from hostile groups of conspecifics. Another possible benefit of larger political systems is enhanced competitive ability. Strate argues that the benefit of protection from hostile groups of conspecifics is a more persuasive explanation of the reproductive advantages of political systems larger than hunter-gatherer groups than is the benefit of enhanced competitive ability. The reproductive advantages of belonging to a political system that is able to effectively defend its members are tangential. The land, lives, and property of ego, spouse, children, and other coresident relatives are protected. The reproductive advantages of belonging to a political system that is able to conquer and subjugate other political systems, however, are far less clear. Strate tested his hypotheses on a stratified sample of 60 societies drawn from the Ethnographic Atlas. He identified sovereignty, when sovereignty existed in a society, in eight activities: defensive warfare; internal warfare; external offensive warfare; the collection of taxes, tribute, and labor services; judicial/arbitration activities, police activities, and religious activities. He also determined the territorial or subdivisional level in the political system at which such sovereignty existed. As predicted, the incidence of sovereignty was higher in defensive warfare (95%) than in other activities. In only three - geographically isolated -societies (Dorobo, Manihikians, and Selung) sovereignty in defensive warfare did not exist. It thus appears from these data that sovereignty in defensive warfare, except in uncommon cases of geographical isolation, is universal among political systems. In 23 societies sovereignty in external offensive warfare was located at the same territorial level as sovereignty in defensive warfare; in 19 societies sovereignty in external offensive warfare was located at a lower territorial level or was absent. Most of the 19 had simple political systems in which there was no official with the authority to prevent attacks by raiding parties or other ad hoc military units on other political systems. The data on location of sovereignty were also generally consistent with the other hypotheses. Russell (1977) presented some propositions on the relationship between warfare and territorial expansion: (1) The territory of a political unit expands in direct proportion to its military sophistication (Naroll, 1966; Otterbein, 1970). (2) The territory expansion of a political unit increases in direct proportion to its previous size. (3) The territory of a political unit expands in proportion to the general level of internal cultural hostility and this effect is greater than the effect of either size or sophistication (Russell, 1972; 1973; Stewart & Jones, 1972).



Counteracting tendencies: (4) Instability increases in direct proportion to the increase in size of a political unit. (5) Instability increases in direct proportion to the increase of hostility in a political unit (Naroll, 1969). (6) The amount of political control necessary to prevent instability from increasing beyond a critical level is indirectly proportional to the product of the effects of hostility and size. This means that as hostility and size increase political control must increase at an equal rate. 2.11.7 Other Correlates of Primitive Belligerence 2.11.7.1 Primitive Militarism Textor (1967) includes in his Cross-Cultural Summary 480 characteristics of 400 primitive societies. Textor dichotomized 428 of his variables, compiled the 2 frequencies of his cultures in four-fold contingency tables, and obtained and -coefficients from these tables. The variables related to primitive ’militarism’ have been presented by Textor (1967) and Eckhardt (1973; 1974; 1975). Four of Textor’s variables were clearly related to militarism: (1) the prevalence of warfare, available for 43 cultures; (2) the pursuit of military glory, or 8 militarism as an attitudinal variable, available for 86 cultures; (3) bellicosity , which consisted largely of preparations for war, available for 87 cultures; and (4) acts of killing, torturing, or mutilating the enemy, available for 84 cultures. These four variables were all significantly correlated with one another from .35 to .72, so that they formed a single type of primitive militarism, the principal component of which is the attitude of military glory, defined in terms of high values placed on military virtues and warfare itself, either offensive or defensive. This attitudinal variable of militarism was correlated .72 with bellicosity or war preparations, .69 with the actual prevalence of war, and .54 with the extent of killing, torturing, or mutilating the enemy (which might as well be labelled ’sadism’ for short). This military type, where the prevalence of warfare was associated with war preparations, confirms the findings of ' 2.11.6 that preparing for war was no more of a deterrence to aggression in primitive cultures than it is in the contemporary international system. These four militaristic variables were significantly correlated with 109 of the other 424 variables for which correlations had been obtained. The 32 variables 8

Textor (1967), following Slater, codes ‘bellicosity’ as follows: High: When ethnographer describes tribe explicitly as currently belligerent or warlike. Or, when the majority of adult males are said to spend most of their daily life engaged in or preparing for war, raids, or homicidal vendettas. Or, when ethnographer says the tribe is feared by surrounding tribes as an aggressor. Low: When none of the above are present and: War is said to be defined as waged primarily in revenge, or defensively, in response to the presence of warlike neighbors. Or, when tribe is described as peaceful, meek, friendly, non-aggressive, etc. Or, war, raids, vendetta, etc. are said to be absent.



in the category ’Socio-economic development’ were most frequently related to actual warfare and least frequently related to sadism. Warfare was more prevalent where settlements were fixed in relation to agriculture and/or animal husbandry, and less prevalent among nomadic tribes whose subsistence was primarily gained by gathering food and fishing. Technological development (especially in metal work) was related to all four military variables. Social and political development, including the establishment of cities or towns, some hierarchical political structures, class stratification, and/or slavery, were related coefficients in this category to all military variables except sadism. The ranged from .20 to .71. Crime rate and severity of punishment were related to all military variables, but especially to military glory (the attitudinal variable). Frustrating childhood disciplines, including pressures for early socialization, achievement, obedience, responsibility, self-reliance, and associated anxieties, were related to all military variables, but especially to military glory and sadism. Although primitive religion was generally unrelated to primitive militarism, supernatural sanctions for morality were related to military glory, and religious experts’ contributing to the development of the individual’s need to achieve was related to war preparations. The 30 variables in this disciplinary category were most frequently related to sadism and least frequently related to the prevalence of warfare. The coefficients in this category ranged from .27 to .55. Cultures where exclusive mother-son sleeping arrangements lasted for one year or longer, where fathers avoided their sons’ wives, and where husbands avoided their mother-in-laws, were more likely to glorify war and prepare for it. This combination of anthropological variables would seem to constitute an operational definition of the Freudian Oedipus complex and its repression, so that the relationship between this psychosexual complex and primitive militarism received some confirmation from these anthropological findings. Post-partum sex taboos were related to both actual warfare and its glorification, and severe punishment for abortion was related to sadism. Sexual repression in infancy, adolescence, and adulthood (including castration anxiety and sexual segregation) was related to all aspects of primitive militarism. The coefficients in this category ranged from .23 to .54. Correlations between militarism, frustrating discipline, and sexual repression have also been found in the attitudes and behaviors of modern individuals (Eckhardt, 1972). All of the military variables were related to narcissism, especially in the forms of boastfulness and sensitivity to insult. Games of chance or strategy, as opposed to games of skill, were also related to all military variables. The coefficients in this ’narcissism’ category ranged from .20 to .48. The following features are correlated with the prevalence or non-prevalence of primitive warfare to a degree that could occur by chance less than one out of



twenty times: 34 cultures where warfare 9 is prevalent

9 cultures where warfare is 10 not prevalent

- outside East Eurasia - settlements fixed (sedentary) - husbandry of some kind - metal working and weaving present - city or town present, or average community size is fifty or greater - the level of political integration is the state

- located in East Eurasia - settlements non-fixed (nomadic) - husbandry absent - metal working and weaving absent - no city or town present, and average community size smaller than fifty - the level of political integration is the autonomous community, or the family - hierarchies simplest - class stratification absent - slavery absent - moderate, little, or negative emphasis - level of social sanction is public property sanction or private settlement - post-partum taboo limited or absent - early sexual satisfaction potential is high - military glory negligibly

- hierarchies complex - class stratification present - slavery present - emphasis on invidious display of wealth - level of social sanction is public corporeal sanction - post-partum taboo lasts longer than six months - early sexual satisfaction potential is low 11 - military glory emphasized 9

These are: Abipon, Albanians, Araucanians, Ashanti, Aztec, Chukchee, Creek, Crow, Dieri, Fang, Fon, Haida, Hano, Hebrews, Iban, Inca, Jivaro, Kazak, Kung, Kutenai, Kwakiutl, Lango, Maori, Mota, Nama, Navaho, Omaha, Rwala, Samoans, Seri, Shilluk, Trobriand, Witoto, Yakut. As cultures where warfare is common or chronic are listed: Abipon, Creek, Goajiro, Jivaro, Maricopa, Murngin, Papago, Tupinamba. 10

These are: Ainu, Andamanese, Aranda, Lapps, Semang, Toda, Vedda, Yahgan, Yukaghir. As cultures where warfare is rare or infrequent are listed: Ainu, Andamanese, Apinayé, Balinese, Carib, Cayapa, Choroti, Chukchee, Cuna, Gond, Hano, Huichol, Kazak, Khalka, Lamba, Lepcha, Naskapi, Samoyed, Tanala, Tarahumara, Tehuelche, Toda, Yakut, Zuñi. 11

Textor (1967) lists as cultures where military glory is strongly or moderately emphasized: Abipon, Ainu, Albanians, Araucanians, Ashanti, Azande, Aztec, Bemba, Bhil, Chagga, Cheyenne, Chiricahua Apache, Chukchee, Comanche, Creek, Crow, Dobuans, Fon, Ganda, Haida, Hebrews, Iban, Ifugao, Inca, Jivaro, Kaska, Kazak, Kurtatchi, Kwakiutl, Lakher, Lango, Manus, Maori,



- bellicosity extreme - high composite narcissism index - boastfulness extreme - achievement training and anxiety in childhood high - games and sports combative

emphasized - bellicosity moderate or negligible - low composite narcissism index - boastfulness moderate or negligible - achievement training and anxiety in childhood low - only games of skill

Stewart (1971) factor analyzed the correlations among 488 of the Textor variables across a random stratified sample of 98 of the cultures. One of his 12 factors was called ’Aggressive achievement’, and it contained the following variables: narcissism .61, bellicosity (war preparations) .56, glory (favorable attitude toward militarism) .56, boastfulness .52, achievement training in childhood .48, self-reliance training in childhood .48, warfare .42, crime .42, and full time entrepreneurs .41. Russell (1972; 1973) used all 400 of Textor’s cultures, but only 78 of his variables which were selected on the basis of their association with primitive militarism. All measures loaded strongly on one factor. From the factor analysis, the characteristics of warlike cultures were: (1) Emphasis on narcissism - boasting and sensitivity to insult; (2) Need for achievement; tendency to display wealth; (3) Restrictiveness in child-raising; Masai, Murngin, Nama, Navaho, Nuer, Nyakyusa, Ojibwa, Riffians, Rwala, Somali, Tanala, Tapirape, Thonga, Tikopia, Tiv, Trobriand, Venda, Warrau, Witoto, Wolof, Yakut, Zuñi. And as cultures where military glory is negligibly emphasized: Alorese, Americans, Andamanese, Aranda, Arapesh, Aymara, Balinese, Chenchu, Cuna, Czechs, Gond, Hano, Koreans, Lapps, Lau, Lepcha, Lesu, Papago, Pukapuka, Sanpoil, Siriono, Tallensi, Timbira, Toda, Trumai, Vietnamese, Wogeo, Woleaians, Yagua, Yahgan, Yurok. The coding for `Pursuit of Military Glory' is as follows: High: When the ethnographer says that members of the tribe seek death in battle, or regard it as preferable to defeat and behave accordingly, or see it as the principal road to earthly or other-wordly glory, Or, when war is said to be considered by the tribe as glorious, the primary source of status and prestige, or to be waged principally for the purpose of obtaining rank, honor, or fame. Or, when military virtues, such as valor, recklessness, fighting skill, etc. are said to be the most important ones in the society, Or, when military trophies are said to be the principal source of rank or prestige in the society. Low: When none of the above are present and ethnographer says military virtues are not valued. Or, some indication is given that saving one's own life in battle is considered normal and appropriate behavior. Or, war is regarded as abhorrent. Moderate: When none of the above are present, but defensive virtues are said to be valued C military resistance, endurance, fortitude, etc. Or, values other than military ones predominate, though the latter are important. Contests of bravery, skill or endurance (e.g., ability to withstand pain) are an important feature of masculine relationships. Raids, etc., are frequent, but conducted primarily for economic reasons.



(4) Punitiveness toward extramarital and premarital sex relations; (5) Anxiety. All forms of aggression, such as warfare, crime, theft, and punitiveness in general, were related to one another in this study (external aggression thus does not reduce hostility within the group, according to this investigation), as well as being related to emphasis on achievement, wealth, and entrepreneurial activities, suggesting that "There is thus not a constant amount of aggression in all cultures which simply takes alternative forms of release... Cultural factors themselves produce the level of hostility within a society" (Russell, 1972). Russell further concluded that primitive warfare was primarily related to personality variables rather than to cultural variables since orthogonal rotation of his factors resulted in separating these two sets of variables from each other, with the warfare variables loading on personality but not on culture. "Warmindedness is not determined by technology or social complexity, but by psychological variables". This conclusion would be somewhat consistent with Stewart’s factor of ’Aggressive achievement’ (which is largely personal in its characteristics), but not consistent with the findings that more primitive peoples were less warlike, which emphasizes the cultural contribution to primitive militarism (' 2.11.3). See ' 2.11.5.5 for a more sophisticated analysis of the culture vs. personality contribution to violent conflict. In a factor analysis of Textor’s (1967) Cross-Cultural Summary by Stewart & Jones (1972), the seventh factor that they derived is approximately the same as Russell’s aggression/hostility factor. In Stewart & Jones’ study ’Personal crime’ also loaded on this factor indicating that aggression internal to a culture is related to a tendency toward warfare (Cf. Russell, 1977). Eckhardt (1975) concludes from the above studies: "[T]he anthropological findings, like those from attitude studies, point very clearly to three basic variables contributing to war in primitive cultures as well as modern societies: private property, frustrated personality, and egoistic morality. These three variables tend to go together, feeding into one another in such a way as to constitute a vicious circle". The most militant societies are characterized by pronounced patriarchal values where masculinity is viewed as an end in itself (Machismo-syndrome). Women play an inferior secondary role and there is often a ’tenderness taboo’. The male must be strong, athletic, brave, fierce, and authoritarian. A notable feature of the militant is a form of ascetism which eschews pleasure, especially erotic pleasure (Anti-hedonism) (Cf. Clarke, 1971).



2.11.7.2 Anti-Hedonism Prescott (1975) advocates the view that the root cause of violence and warfare is somatosensory deprivation, i.e., the deprivation of physical sensory pleasure. Pleasure and violence have a reciprocal relationship, the presence of one inhibits the other. "Among human beings, a pleasure-prone personality rarely displays violence or aggressive behaviors, and a violent personality has little ability to tolerate, experience, or enjoy sensuously pleasing activities. As either violence or pleasure goes up, the other goes down". In order to test this hypothesis, Prescott examined the amount of warfare and interpersonal violence in 49 primitive societies (based on Textor, 1967). The results indicated that those societies which give their infants the greatest amount of physical affection were characterized by low theft, low infant physical pain, low religious activity, and negligible or absent killing, mutilating, or torturing of the enemy. When the six, apparently deviant, societies characterized by both high infant affection and high violence were compared in terms of their premarital sexual behavior, Prescott found that five of them exhibited premarital sexual repression, where virginity is a high value of these cultures. "It appears that the beneficial effects of infant physical affection can be negated by the repression of physical pleasure (premarital sex) later in life". The seven societies characterized by both low infant physical affection and low adult physical violence were all found to be characterized by permissive premarital sexual behavior. Thus, the detrimental effects of infant affectional deprivation seem to be compensated for later in life by sexual body pleasure experiences during adolescence. These findings led to a revision of the somatosensory deprivation theory from a one-stage to a two-stage developmental theory in which the physical violence in 48 of the 49 cultures could be accurately classified. "In short, violence may stem from deprivation of somatosensory pleasure either in infancy or in adolescence. The only true exception in this culture sample is the headhunting Jivaro tribe of South America". In the latter case, the Jivaro belief system may play an important role, for these Indians have a "deep-seated belief that killing leads to the acquisition of souls which provide a supernatural power conferring immunity from death" (Harner, 1962). Prescott also examined the influence of extramarital sex taboos upon crime and violence. The data clearly indicated that punitive-repressive attitudes toward extramarital sex were linked with physical violence, personal crime, and the practice of slavery. Societies which value monogamy also tend to emphasize military glory and worship aggressive gods. These cross-cultural findings thus support the thesis that deprivation of body pleasure throughout life - but particularly during the formative periods of infancy, childhood, and adolescence - are very closely related to the amount of warfare and interpersonal violence.



It has been noted time and again that peaceable communities generally manifest an enormous gusto for concrete physical pleasure - eating, drinking, sex, laughter - and they generally make little distinction between the ideal characters of men and women. Particularly, they seem to lack the ideal of brave, aggressive, macho-type masculinity. As Glad (1990) expressed it: "Each, in short, sees sexual differences as interesting and enjoyable facts of life rather than heroic roles which must be achieved". Related to the component of anti-hedonism in violent societies, McConahay & McConahay (1977) investigated the possible relationships between sexual permissiveness, sex role rigidity, and violence at the societal level, using a random sample of 17 cultures chosen from the Human Relations Area File. Do societies that make love refrain from making war? The data show that some do and some don’t. Across the 17 cultures the correlation between sexual permissiveness and violence did not differ significantly from zero ( = -.17). Furthermore, a scattergram of the two variables did not reveal any apparent nonlinear relationships. Though McConahay & McConahay were unable to test Gorer’s (1968) hypothesis that aggressive masculinity would be positively correlated with violence, they were able to test a second hypothesis derived from Gorer’s theory. As predicted, sex-role rigidity and violence were significantly positively correlated ( = +.70). Distinguishing between intra- and extracommunal types of violence did not materially affect the results. Sexual permissiveness and sex-role rigidity were not related in their sample. The one statistically significant correlation that emerges from this study is the positive relationship between sex-role rigidity and violence. This finding is similar to one by Divale & Harris (1976). Using a nonrandom (though larger) sample, they found significant correlations between the extent to which a tribe or society engaged in warfare and measures of the extent of gender inequality. They hypothesized that inequality was caused by warfare. This theory suggests the hypothesis that the correlation the McConahays found between rigidity (which was also inequality) and violence was the result of increasing levels of violence causing a culture to become rigid in its sex roles in order to deal with the violence. Societies with a great deal of violence, in this conception, must have rigid sex roles in order to survive outside attack and to prevent internal violence from tearing them apart. On the other hand, it may be that the strains generated by sex-role rigidity cause males (who engage in most internal and external violence) to behave more aggressively. This was the assumed direction of causation in Gorer’s (1968) hypothesis. However, the most likely explanation for the positive correlation between sex-role rigidity and violence, according to McConahay & McConahay, is that both were caused by some other factor. Sex-role rigidity may be a special case of a more general pattern of rigid social and caste stratification in a society, and



this stratification may also be accompanied by (or may even necessitate) internal and external violence (e.g., Dollard, 1937). Similarly, Fromm (1973), in an effort to show that aggressiveness is not just one trait, but part of a syndrome (in other words, that aggression is to be understood as part of the social character, not as an isolated behavioral trait), analyzed 30 primitive cultures from the point of view of ’aggressiveness’ versus peacefulness. His analysis resulted in the distinction of three different and clearly delineated social systems: System A: Life-affirmative societies In this system the main emphasis of ideals, customs and institutions is that they serve the preservation and growth of life in all its forms. There is a minimum of hostility, violence, or cruelty among people, no harsh punishment, hardly any crime, and the institution of war is absent or plays an exceedingly small role. Children are treated with kindness, there is no severe corporal punishment; women are in general considered equal to men, or at least not exploited or humiliated; there is a generally permissive and affirmative attitude toward sex. There is little envy, covetousness, greed, and exploitativeness. There is also little competition and individualism and a great deal of cooperation; personal property is only in things that are used. There is a general attitude of trust and confidence, not only in others but particularly in nature; a general prevalence of good humor, and a relative absence of depressive moods. Differences in socioeconomic structure of these societies do not seem to play a critical role in their character formation. This category comprised 8 societies (Aranda, Arapesh, Bathonga, Mbutu, Polar Eskimo, Semang, Toda, and Zuñi). System B: Nondestructive-aggressive societies This system shares with the first the basic element of not being destructive, but differs in that aggressiveness and war, although not central, are normal occurrences, and in that competition, hierarchy, and individualism are present. These societies are by no means permeated by destructiveness or cruelty or by exaggerated suspiciousness, but they do not have the kind of gentleness and trust which is characteristic of the system A societies. System B could perhaps be best characterized by stating that it is imbued with a spirit of male aggressiveness, individualism, the desire to get things and accomplish tasks. This category comprised 14 societies (Ainu, Bachiga, Crow, Dakota, Greenland Eskimo, Hottentots, Ifugao, Inca, Kazak, Manus, Maori, Ojibwa, Samoans, and Tasmanians). System C: Destructive societies The structure of the system C societies is very distinct. It is characterized by much interpersonal violence, destructiveness, aggression, and cruelty, both



within the tribe and against others, a pleasure in war, maliciousness, and treachery. The whole atmosphere of life is one of hostility, tension, and fear. Usually there is a great deal of competition, great emphasis on private property, strict hierarchies, and a considerable amount of war-making. This category comprised 6 societies (Aztec, Dobus, Ganda, Haida, Kwakiutl, and Witoto). Two societies, Hopi and Iroquois, Fromm could not classify. Palmer (1965) combined homicidal and suicidal acts as destructive acts and compared their incidence in 40 primitive societies. He found 22 of them with low and medium aggressiveness versus 18 with high aggressiveness. Although this a higher percentage of very aggressive societies than Fromm (1973) found, nevertheless, Palmer’s analysis does not confirm the thesis of the extreme aggressiveness of primitive peoples. 2.11.7.3 Combative Sports and Games As already mentioned, combative sports and games are correlates of belligerence in primitive societies (Textor, 1967). A subsequent cross-cultural study by Sipes (1973; 1975) shows that where we find warlike behavior, we typically find combative sports and where war is relatively rare, combative sports tend to be absent. Sipes (1975) presents the following model to account for the prevalence of warlike societies and the similar prevalence of combative sports: (1) The primary requirement of a society is survival of its critical members and of the society as a group. (2) Cultures are modified, at least sometimes, to fit the survival requirements of the social and natural environments. If this does not happen to a culture when it is required, the carrier society does not survive. (3) A society often is threatened by ambient societies. This is especially true if the other societies are proficient at and prepared for warfare and are willing to engage in it. (4) A society proficient at and prepared for warfare and willing to engage in it, other things being equal, has a greater chance of survival than a society not proficient, ready and willing. This amounts to sociocultural selection for warlike societies. (5) The state of being proficient at and prepared for warfare and willing to engage in it presupposes the existence in the society of those values and behaviors required for such action. These conceptually distinguishable core traits include, but are not limited to, willingness to engage in actions capable of physically harming another human, willingness to take risks with one’s own safety, interest in vanquishing an opponent, and aggressiveness. (6) Sports are highly susceptible to diffusion of values and behaviors from the military sphere of activity because of: (a) the relatively high and enduring critical uncertainty of military activity and the (b) relatively low survival contribution, (c) great flexibility, (d) lack of core requirements, (e) readily



achieved similarity of warfare, and (f) predominantly masculine orientation of sports. The prevalence of combative sports in the world, therefore, is the consequence of a selection for warlike societies and is not a manifestation of ’innate’ aggression (Sipes, 1975). Worchel (1974) predicted that societies that were restrictive in allowing individuals to express hostility would be more likely than nonrestrictive societies to supply formal sanctioned outlets for aggression. Data (65 societies) were obtained from Horton’s (1943) classification. Measures of warfare and games of physical skill were defined as sanctioned outlets for aggression. Worchel’s results support the prediction, though not necessarily his theorizing. 2.11.7.4 Matrilocality/Patrilocality, Feuding and Warfare A classical example of a matrilocal and ’Appolonian’ culture is the Puebloan. Ellis (1951) has noted of Pueblo warfare: "Beyond protection, warfare served to provide legitimate outlet for the frustrations and aggressions arising from unpermitted competition or suspicions thereof among peoples of the same general culture". Based on his study of the Mundurucu, Murphy (1957) proposed as a statistically testable hypothesis that matrilocal societies must repress open aggression in order to insure cohesion and continuity. He notes that not all matrilocal groups repress aggression to the same extent as do the Mundurucu, nor are they as warlike. The greater emphasis of the Mundurucu upon social cohesion and external aggression stems from the existence of patrilineal clans in a matrilocal society. This factor combined with intervillage matrilocality, made hostility even more explosive and internal release systems less workable. It oriented the group toward warfare and provided the organization for its effective pursuit (See further ' 5.2.7). Thoden van Velzen & van Wetering (1960) formulated the following hypotheses, based on Murphy’s observations: (1) Violence occurs less frequently in matrilocal than in patrilocal societies; (2) In matrilocal societies, in contrast to patrilocal societies, everything possible is done to prevent violence; (3) In contrast to patrilocal societies, peacefulness in social relations is a principal value in matrilocal societies. The authors used patrilocal residence as an index of the presence of fraternal interest groups because patrilocality results in a settlement pattern in which related males live near each other. Since fraternal interest groups are localized groups of related males, they can readily resort to concerted violent measures when the interests of their members are threatened. Matrilocal residence, on the other hand, results in a social structural condition in which related males are scattered over a large area and are unable to readily support each other’s interests. Societies with fraternal interest groups are, hypothetically, more likely to have both feuding and internal war than societies without these power groups,



because such groups form small-scale military organizations that attack enemies who are either members of the same or of a neighboring political community within the cultural unit (Otterbein, 1968). Paige & Paige (1981) propose a more refined version of fraternal interest group theory, suggesting that fraternal interest groups will be particularly strong when the resources males protect are significant, non-mobile and stable. Strong fraternal interest groups are a structural arrangement making possible the rapid mobilization of related males into fighting groups. Thoden van Velzen & van Wetering selected a sample of 51 unstratified societies, fairly evenly split between matrilocal and patrilocal groups, and rated each one on the frequency of fighting, murder, blood feuds, sexual revenge homicide, the separation of combatants in fights, and on the value set on aversion to intrasocietal bloodshed. A combined index of (internal) peaceful2 ness showed a strong association with matrilocal residence ( = 26.5; p < .001). The authors interpret this finding as a confirmation of Murphy’s (1957) hypothesis that relates matrilocality to intrasocietal peacefulness. Murphy views the incompatible loyalties in terms of a quantity of aggression which ’normally’ develops from the opposition of groups and which must, in the matrilocal situation, be displaced onto other societies. Thoden van Velzen & van Wetering, however, see most matrilocal societies as lacking fraternal interest groups, and, hence, as lacking the opposition-caused quantum of aggression. On the contrary, in their view it is the patrilocal societies with their opposed fraternal interest groups that magnify what could be minor interpersonal quarrels and homicides into group violence that affects many individuals in the society. According to them, the patrilocal structure generates aggression that never develops in the matrilocal societies rather than the matrilocal groups’ having to repress it. Their position is more purely structural than Murphy’s, eliminating any psychoanalytic assumptions concerning the channeling of aggression (LeVine & Campbell, 1972). Subsequently, Noberini (1966) tested the hypothesis that matrilocal societies exhibit more outgroup hostility than patrilocal ones. She rated the 40 societies from Thoden van Velzen & van Wetering’s sample on which information was available on a scale of external warfare frequency devised by Naroll, and found 2 an association between matrilocality and warfare ( = 3.88; p < .05) supporting Murphy’s hypothesis that the cross-cutting ties of matrilocal societies cause a displacement of aggression from the ethnic ingroup onto foreigners. Otterbein & Otterbein (1965), in a cross-cultural study of 50 societies, found a relation between the frequency of blood feud and patrilocal residence, indexed by the presence or absence of fraternal interest groups. This lends additional



support to Thoden van Velzen & van Wetering’s hypothesis concerning fraternal interest groups, but it is also consistent with Murphy’s formulation (LeVine & Campbell, 1972). The Otterbeins went on to measure the presence of fraternal interest groups in another way as well - through polygyny, on the assumption that the presence of polygyny makes internal feuding more likely. The Otterbeins found that polygyny is indeed positively related to the frequency of feuding and that polygyny and patrilocality together constitute a better predictive index of feuding than either alone. Using Murdock’s levels of political integration (based on the size of politically integrated population units), Otterbein & Otterbein (1965) divided their sample into societies high and low on political integration. They found no support for the hypothesis that the higher the level of political complexity the less frequent is internal feuding. The relations of patrilocality and polygyny were somewhat stronger among societies low on political integration than among societies high on it. For the hypothesis that societies that frequently engage in war with their neighbors are less likely to have feuding than societies that have peaceful external relations, the Otterbeins found no support ( = .04) when the whole sample was used, but strong support ( = -.48) when societies high on political integration are taken separately, and a relation inverse of that predicted ( = +.44) when societies of low political integration are taken by themselves. These findings contain several surprises. First, feuding is not significantly less frequent among the societies of larger-scale political integration, so that a simple relation between widening of political units and the suppression of internal feuding is not confirmed (at least in this study). Another important surprise is that the ’Real-threat-causes-ingroup-solidarity’ paradigm (LeVine & Campbell, 1972; See also Ch. 6) works for ’states’ but not ’stateless’ societies; among the latter, it is the more war, the more feuding. The Otterbeins explain this by stating that in stateless societies the threat of warfare from outside cannot be translated into a cessation of feuding because there are no superordinate officials to intervene effectively to stop feuding. In subsequent publications, reporting a study of ’internal war’ (between culturally similar groups) in a different sample of 50 societies, Otterbein (1968a,b) gives results that differ from, but do not contradict, the ones reported above. The results show no association between internal and external war (between political communities not culturally similar) for centralized or uncentralized political systems. Centralized political systems are just as likely to be characterized by feuding and internal war as uncentralized political systems. But when the relationship between fraternal interest groups and internal war is controlled for level of political complexity, a significant difference occurs between uncentralized and centralized political systems. Fraternal interest groups were found to be a factor



directly influencing the frequency of internal war only in uncentralized political systems. In centralized political systems the presence of fraternal interest groups was inversely related to internal war. In other words, LeVine & Campbell (1972) conclude, when the ingroup is defined in terms of cultural similarity rather than political community, the syndrome of internal solidarity-external hostility in centralized political systems does not hold up. This suggests that political boundaries are more salient than ethnic or cultural boundaries as organizers of military activity. Wheeler (1974; cf. White, 1989) also coded frequencies of internal war, using Otterbein’s criteria. She found Continual Internal War in 17 cases; Frequent Internal War in 54 cases; Infrequent Internal War in 89 cases; with 26 cases unascertained. She also tabulated the frequency of offensive external war and found Continual Offensive External War in 31 cases; Frequent Offensive External War in 61 cases; Infrequent Offensive External War in 65 cases; with 29 cases unascertained. Wheeler’s study is the only one which tried to ascertain quantitatively the value of war for the societies involved. In 72 societies war was enjoyed and considered to have a high value; in 51 societies war was considered to be a necessary evil; in 23 societies war was consistently avoided and denounced; with 40 cases unascertained. Harrison (1973) has argued that a case can be made to support the hypothesis that matrilocality may have been the result of warring activities for some groups. Within matrilocal groups women form the stable core of the social group. One of the conditions in which men would not be as predictably certain and available to the group as the women would be when the men of the society were engaged in fighting extensive wars beyond the boundaries of their communal locations. Such wars might be offensive rather than defensive ones. Thus, he concludes, matrilocality is no indication that a society is more peaceful than another which exhibits different modes of social organization. 2.11.7.5 Social-Structural and Psychocultural Dispositions In an ongoing series of studies, Ross (1985 et seq.) attempts to build a general theory of violent conflict, based on a sample of 90 preindustrial societies. In particular, he empirically tests hypotheses derived from structural and psychocultural explanations of violent conflict. The structural view accounts for patterns of conflict in terms of competing interests that develop in particular forms of social and economic organization. The contrasting view, the psychocultural theories, explain violent conflict as a result of both culturally learned dispositions and interpretations of the world typical in a society. Interestingly, his statistical results are consistent with both explanations for internal and external conflict. Even more interesting is his attempt to integrate the two to form a general theory of conflict behavior. His argument is that psychocultural dispositions, rooted in early learning



experiences and crucial in creating commonly held images of the self and others, determine a society’s overall level of conflict. But if psychocultural interpretations of the world lead to a certain propensity for disputing, they do not tell us very precisely who argues, contests, and fights with whom. Here the structural features of the social, economic, and political system are crucial in determining the people with whom one cooperates and with whom one fights, whether they are within one’s society, in another society, or both. Structural hypotheses link conflict to the interests associated with particular forms of social and economic organization and suggest ways in which the structure of a society creates interests directing conflict in particular directions (cf. Evans-Pritchard, 1940; Colson, 1953; Coleman, 1957; Gluckman, 1963; Beals & Siegel, 1966; Fried, 1967). Different theories, which can be placed in two major groups, identify a wide range of social structural elements as central. Cross-cutting ties theories (overlapping reference groups, kinship and marriage alliances, residence patterns, intercommunity trade, fraternal interest groups) explain conflict and conflict management in terms of the nature of links between different members of a society. Socioeconomic and political complexity theories, in contrast, give a primary role to the competing (group) interests associated with a society’s level of socioeconomic and/or political organization in accounting for conflict behavior. Whereas cross-cutting theories focus on the common interests formed through interaction and exchange, complexity theories emphasize competing and incompatible interests and the tensions that result from them. If structural explanations for conflict, violence, and warfare focus on how the organization of society shapes action, psychocultural explanations look to a very different place: the actors themselves. Psychocultural explanations emphasize conflict behavior as a consequence of actor interpretations arising from their internal images and perceptions of their external social worlds. Psychocultural theorists draw attention to culturally shared notions about trust, self-esteem, and identity, and how people define and defend each of these in light of specific events. Early socialization influences adult behavior by shaping the personality of the individual (Whiting & Child, 1953; Harrington & Whiting, 1972) as well as the cognitions that prepare individuals for patterns of conflict and cooperation in their society. Psychodynamic theories, beginning with Freud’s Civilization and its Discontents (1930), provide several key hypotheses relevant to internal violence and external warfare. Perspectives that are more social-psychological also attribute a role to social, economic, and political conditions while identifying different underlying mechanisms. Harsh socialization: Several psychological approaches - psychoanalytic theory, social learning theory, and frustration-aggression theory - associate harsh and severe child-training practices with later aggressiveness. Although the



mechanisms underlying each of the theories are different, the predictions are similar (Zigler & Child, 1969). For example, where psychoanalytic and frustration-aggression theory relate severe physical punishment of children to adult aggression through the mechanisms of externalization, projection and displacement of hostile feelings onto outgroups (Volkan, 1988), social learning theory explains the connection more in terms of imitation, modelling, and reinforcement. Several cross-cultural studies find a positive association between harsh socialization practices and physical aggression, bellicosity, or warfare (e.g., Levinson & Malone, 1980). Warmth and affection: A second perspective emphasizes that love-oriented socialization practices involving high affection and warmth are associated with low violence and conflict in adulthood. Both conceptually and empirically there is good reason to see this dimension as independent of harsh childtraining, not its inverse. Healthy psychosocial development of the individual, in terms of early ’object relations’ (internalized images of others based on early experiences) and of secure ties to parental figures, prepares the way for socially cooperative behavior later in life. The profiles of seven small-scale societies low on internal conflict and aggression present some good ethnographic examples of this pattern (Montagu, 1978). In these societies, great affection is frequently directed towards the child, whose overall feelings of security are high. Overt expression of aggression is discouraged, but not through physical punishment. Finally, these societies lack highly aggressive persons whom the child can imitate. Male gender identity conflict: The Whitings use the term ’protest masculinity’ to refer to the pattern which links uncertainty concerning gender identity to overt aggression (Whiting, 1965; Whiting & Whiting, 1975). In maledominated cultures, where fathers are distant and aloof from their children, young boys develop especially strong bonds with their mothers. Intense psychological conflict may occur when boys later need to forsake such identifications to meet societal expectations of adult male behavior (Herdt, 1987). Males in such cultures may develop very ambivalent feelings towards females and tend to exhibit narcissistic personalities marked by a preoccupation with early developmental tasks, pride, and a desire for self-enhancement that frequently lead to aggressive actions (Slater & Slater, 1965). Using multiple regression, Ross is able to show that both structural and psychocultural variables are significantly related to internal and external conflict and in combination they explain conflict better than either set of variables alone. Low affection, harsh socialization, and male gender identity conflict increase internal and external conflict and violence, but the specific structural factors which are associated with internal and external conflict differ. These results suggest a dispositional basis for aggression and violence rooted in early learning, while the selection of targets for aggression is shaped by the



structural features of a society. Internal conflict is higher in societies with few overlapping reference groups, and in uncentralized societies with strong fraternal interest groups. External conflict increases with socioeconomic complexity, and in uncentralized societies is higher where there are numerous overlapping reference groups and where there is a higher level of intracommunity marriage. If cross-cutting ties theory does better in explaining internal conflict and violence, complexity theory is stronger in the case of external conflict and warfare. The results, however, are only partially supportive of the specific hypotheses concerning residence, marriage, and trade which have been found in earlier work. Marital endogamy, not exogamy as expected, is associated with higher external warfare in uncentralized societies, but no connection was found between endogamy and internal conflict. Matrilocality, which a large number of previous studies identify as a crucial predictor of external warfare, is only weakly related to external conflict once the effect of the other variable in the model is taken into account. Similarly, patrilocality is not particularly related to internal violence and conflict in the multivariate model. The point is not so much that these residence variables are irrelevant to understanding patterns of violence and conflict, but rather that they do not operate in isolation and their effects need to be considered within the context of other structural and psychocultural variables. 2.11.7.6 Warfare Regulation in Primitive Societies In a cross-cultural study of warfare regulation, Tefft (1975; Tefft & Reinhardt, 1974), using a sample of 58 societies, obtained the following results: <

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Political communities which fight both internal and external wars primarily for conflict-oriented objectives have more frequent war than those which fight primarily for success-oriented objectives. However, such differences are statistically significant only for external war (’Conflict-oriented’ here means ’war for glory’). Destruction brought about by warfare is not a deterrent to war. The loss of material possessions as well as lives may merely generate desires for revenge. If warfare results in extreme destructiveness it may also generate fear. Fear creates mistrust and serves to undermine in one community’s view the legitimacy of the goals of the other. Such a situation also generates misunderstanding, anger, counter-violence, fear, and lack of trust. Under these circumstances successful collaboration and negotiation are immeasurably more difficult (Ilfeld & Metzner, 1970; Tefft, 1975). The fact that political communities share a similar culture does not deter war. Political communities with an advanced military capacity may be more



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inclined to use threat and intimidation against other communities perceived as being hostile to their interests. Such threats only serve to intensify group polarization and mistrust. Such communities are more likely to use intermittent "shows of force" (raids, ceremonial combat to demonstrate their own strength, etc.) in the belief that it is necessary to deter the enemy from possible aggression against themselves. Thus warfare may be intensified. The extensiveness of social ties is not a factor promoting peace. Intermarriage combined with economic and religious ties between political communities makes them no less likely to engage in frequent war than those with only kinship ties. Peace pacts which result from direct negotiation do not establish a more durable peace than pacts resulting from other peacemaking procedures. Interchange of membership through intermarriage does not seem to reduce substantially the frequency of war or to further peaceful relations between political communities. Insofar as internal war is concerned, political communities with numerous kinship ties war more frequently than those with fewer ties. This is not entirely surprising since internal wars are often fought over issues growing out of intermarriage (i.e., default of bridewealth, adultery, etc.). More significant is the fact that political communities which have important economic ties with one another fight internal wars less frequently than those whose ties are primarily one of kinship. Economic ties create more mutuality of interest and less division than kinship ties at the tribal level. However, neither kinship nor economic ties create strong enough bonds of mutual interest to prevent external war.

Tefft concludes that existing peace theories do not provide adequate explanations for the different frequencies of warfare between bands, tribes, chiefdoms, and small states. They do not provide a coherent theoretical framework by which we can predict how the interrelated variations in technoenvironmental and techno-economic factors, population levels, military organization, and military objectives affect the frequency of warfare. In a series of cross-cultural tests Kang (1976, 1979) compared levels of feuding in exogamous and nonexogamous societies and she, too, found no support for the thesis that exogamy leads to peace between the exogamous units. Feuding appears to be reduced only when fraternal interest groups are dispersed through matrilocality and other forms of nonpatrilocal residence. The classical exogamy theorists Tylor (1888), Lévi-Strauss (1949, 1956), White (1949, 1959), and Service (1962) all reasoned that given feuds among groups of related males, intermarriage would ameliorate conflict and create the possibility of alliance. From this perspective, Kang has not disconfirmed the pacifying effect of



exogamy but simply confirmed the operation of a second pacifying mechanism: matrilocality. Thus, while some human societies consistently ’marry their enemies’ (e.g., Berndt, 1964; Hayano, 1973; Black-Michaud, 1975), most patrilocal groups are at least temporarily allied through affinal ties (Rodseth et al., 1991). 2.11.7.7 Resource Unpredictability, Mistrust, and War Multivariate analysis suggests that one kind of ecological problem - a history of unpredictable natural disasters - strongly predicts higher frequencies of war among primitive peoples (Ember & Ember, 1992). By unpredictable natural disasters is meant events that destroy food resources, such as droughts, floods, storms, frosts, and locust infestations. Multivariate analysis also suggests another independent, but weaker, predictor of higher warfare frequencies, namely, socialization for mistrust (Ember & Ember, 1994). Ember & Ember suggest that both of these factors create fear - fear of nature and fear of others which may lead people to try to protect themselves against future unpredictable disasters by going to war to take resources from enemies. Using the Murdock & White (1969) sample of 186 societies, Ember & Ember found that threat of natural disasters significantly predicted warfare frequency, particularly in primitive societies ( = .71). Chronic scarcity is significantly, but not strongly, related to warfare frequency in nonstate societies ( = .35). Thus, these results suggest that resource problems, particularly nonchronic resource problems created by natural disasters, predict more war. The evidence also strongly suggests that socialization for aggression is more likely to be a consequence than a cause of war. The major finding consistent with this scenario is that socialization for aggression seems to decrease after warfare ceases because of pacification. The presence of war and the need to produce effective warriors may also be the major cause of intragroup violence: homicide and assault (Ember & Ember, 1994). Sexual frustration does not seem to be involved: Sexual restrictiveness does not appear to predict more war, according to this study. Societies that restrict their children sexually (codes from Barry et al., 1976) do not appear more warlike, nor does premarital sexual restrictiveness (codes from Broude & Green, 1976) predict more war. It looks like the people who go to war more or less constantly, the Embers explain, may be trying not to cover present or regularly recurring shortages, but to protect themselves against future disasters that they cannot predict; they seem to be trying to protect themselves ahead of time by taking resources from enemies. It seems then that the main motive for going to war is the fear of future loss, not current deprivation. If it is correct to assume that future loss is the main motive for going to war, it makes sense that chronic scarcity does not predict war. First, chronic scarcity



(annual shortages) may nor be as harmful or lethal as natural disasters that destroy food supplies. Second, chronic scarcity may be psychologically easier to deal with than threat of natural disasters because chronic scarcity is predictable. If you know there will be some ’hungry’ months, you can prepare yourself emotionally. But the threat of natural disasters, which occur rarely and unpredictably, may be so frightening a possibility that people might attempt to protect themselves against it by going to war even though they or loved one could die in the attempt. Thus, the tentative theory of war Ember & Ember are suggesting here is that war is mostly caused by a fear of unpredictable natural disasters and a partially resultant fear of others. 2.11.7.8 Peace between Participatory Policies A theoretical tradition as old as Immanuel Kant’s essay on perpetual peace asserts that democratic states are unlikely to fight each other. As an empirical statement about dyadic relations, the proposition that democracies are generally at peace with each other is strongly supported. The literature on this topic is now very substantial (see Ember, Ember & Russett [1992] and Russett, Ember & Ember [1993] for references). Why there should be a relationship between democracy and pacifism is still a matter of hot debate. As the term democracy has little relevance for preindustrial societies, Ember, Ember & Russett attempted to translate it to the nearest equivalent for purposes of cross-cultural examination. Their revised hypothesis is that political units with wider political participation engage in less warfare with one another than do less participatory political units. The statistical results are strong and robust, despite the relatively small sample and the difficulties in measuring the variable to minimize random error. Participatory institutions contribute to reducing the frequency of internal warfare, but in many of these cases the institutions as such are weak. More important, therefore, may be a culture wherein people perceive that they and others have the opportunity to participate widely in political decision making. If these institutions and cultures can be characterized as ’democratic’ in a meaningful way - and the authors believe they can, even allowing for the very different circumstances - we have one more piece of evidence to support the proposition that democratically governed people are less likely to fight one another than are autocratically governed peoples.



2.11.7.9 Fear and Inducement to Military Participation Why do men fight? Why do men leave the comfort and security of ordinary life to engage in an activity that has been described as long stretches of tedium interspersed with moments of terror? This is a different question from "Why warfare?" - an issue many anthropologists have addressed with different success (and which will be discussed in more detail in the next chapters). Here we are asking: Why do individuals willingly undertake such unpleasant, lifethreatening activity? The sample (n = 27) used by Goldschmidt (1988, 1989) was, with a few exceptions, taken from those primitive societies that had high scores on military involvement as established by Ross (1983) from the Standard Ethnographic Sample. Only a few ethnographers describe in detail the training of soldiers, but many give certain specifics. In Goldschmidt’s sample, six mentioned training in skills, seven apprenticeship in warfare, and seven games and contests designed to establish military qualities. Youths were made to endure pain in twelve societies and endurance of other hardships in nine. Legends and stories designed to reinforce militaristic attitudes were mentioned in seven instances. Thus, most societies consciously inculcate military virtues in some ways. Where ethnographers have investigated the matter directly, we find elaborate socialization and training for the warriors. For example, the Apache (Baldwin, 1965; Opler, 1937, 1941); Jivaro (Karsten, 1935; Stirling, 1938), and Mae Enga (Meggitt, 1977). Such descriptions make it clear that it takes a major effort to make fierce, aggressive warriors out of tribal children. When Ember & Ember (1984) examined the social and psychological correlates to warfare in primitive societies, the only significant relationship with intensity of warfare they found was the socialization and training of boys for aggressiveness. Goldschmidt summarizes the findings of his investigation by presenting a perceptive scenario of inducement to military participation among war-infested tribal societies: Youths from early onward are inculcated with the virtues of warfare and the need to be brave and aggressive. Despite the reiteration of such sentiments, they dread the actual battle, and to overcome such fear they engage in diverse religious (i.e., psychologically supportive) practices, ranging from talismans to drugs, and including the mob psychology induced by rituals of preparation for war. Even these are not always able to counteract the fear in their hearts, and many find excuses for avoiding combat, keeping as much self-respect intact as they can (e.g, Abipon: Dobrizhoffer, 1822; Creek: Adair quoted in Swanton, 1928; Mae Enga: Meggitt, 1977; Yanomamö: Chagnon, 1977). Yet engage in war they do. And if they do not fall in battle, they return with booty, women, slaves, scalps, cattle, tales of their exploits, and,



above all, honor. As these accumulate with each successive encounter, they find themselves increasingly attractive to the women, respected by the men, and influential in the community - providing, in passing, a model for their nephews and sons. Such a scenario does not support the perception of man as naturally aggressive and violent. It suggests rather that the potential for aggressiveness and violence must be carefully reinforced, nurtured, and channeled. These data suggest that the human capacity to fight rests more firmly on other - paradoxically, more social - attributes: pride and empathy. By pride is meant the concern with the public image of the self. This urge toward performance in accordance with the dictates of the community leads individuals to engage in those forms of behavior that society sees as admirable. The ethnographic literature indicates that this human attribute can lead people into very diverse courses of action - from celibacy to machismo; from self-abrogation to aggressive exploitation; from indolence to industriousness. It is a sentiment that is self-oriented, but significantly takes its form from other-directedness, since the qualities that enter into the behavior are set by the community. Empathy is the obverse of this coin; the identification with others. It is this identification with the group - family, clan, tribe, or nation - that transforms individual action into community action, that transforms fighting into warfare. These two attributes manifestly are interrelated and together they make warfare possible. Personal self-image and social identification constitute the basic reasons why men fight (Goldschmidt, 1988, 1989).

2.11.8 Epilogue The macroquantitative and cross-cultural studies have shattered a number of popular theories and hypotheses (e.g., the deterrence hypothesis, the agent-ofprogress hypothesis, the natural-aggressiveness-of-man, etc.), and rejected a number of other popular misconceptions. One of the most consistent and robust findings is the correlation between ’primitivity’ and absence of war or low-level warfare, or in other words, the correlation between war and civilization. One of the more ’counterintuitive’ findings emerging from these quantitative studies concerns the role of fear (rather than ’aggression’) in the etiology of human warfare.



3 Nonhuman Intergroup Agonistic Behavior and ’Warfare’ 3.1 Intergroup Agonistic Behavior: Introduction In this chapter the significance of nonhuman intergroup agonistic behavior for the explanation of human primitive warfare will be assessed. I shall, in other words, explore the possibility of some evolutionary precursors or phylogenetic preadaptations being involved in hominid warfare, by analyzing animal intergroup (or intercommunity) agonistic behavior (IAB). IAB will be considered to be any intraspecific agonistic interaction or episode of such interactions (e.g., threatening, chasing, hitting, biting, injuring, killing) between more or less cooperating members of two or more spatially separate, distinct and identifiable groups (troops, packs, collectivities, local populations), or between groups and individuals acting primarily as members or representatives of such collectivities. Such a circumscriptive definition includes the case of e.g., the single hyena of pack A who is chased and attacked by several members of pack B (Kruuk, 1972), but it obviously excludes e.g., the rape attacks of single male orang-utans on females with young (Galdikas, 1979; Mackinnon, 1971, 1979; Pitcairn, 1974). Similar categories, called ’Reactive Intergroup Aggression’ (i.e., mainly collective group defense) and ’Exported Intergroup Aggression’ (EIA), defined as "the regular conduct, by breeding adults, of aggressive, physically damaging cooperative raids against adults in neighboring groups" were suggested by Manson & Wrangham (1987). The latter category was changed to ’lethal male raiding’ in a later publication (Manson & Wrangham, 1991). Tooby & Cosmides (1988) use their term ’coalitional aggression’ also in a similar sense. Many authors simply prefer terms such as ’intergroup conflict’, ’intergroup aggression’ or ’intergroup aggressive encounters’ (e.g., Cheney, 1987; Tooby & DeVore, 1987; Manson & Wrangham, 1991). ’Aggression’ properly belongs to the individual organismic level-of-analysis; a term like ’group aggression’ cannot be more than a metaphor because a group does not have a source of behavior and motivation beyond the individual actors. The term is frequently used in the literature, however, and in this chapter I shall adopt it as a synonym of intergroup agonistic behavior (IAB). Furthermore, if it is stipulated that warfare involves armed conflict (in the sense of the use of artifactual weapons), there is no point in calling animal IAB ’warfare’. Such a distinction is considered trivial at the moment, for the sake of



argument, since I am interested in the ’why’ of such behavior more than in the ’how’. As will be seen, ’IAB’ is a rather heterogeneous category in which one might distinguish such dimensions as unstructured vs. concerted, lethal vs. nonlethal, skirmish-like vs. ambush-like, spontaneous vs. premeditated, and possibly others. I shall first epitomize the literature on animal IAB, and add a number of more or less tentative conclusions. Subsequently, I shall single out and analyze in some more detail two distinct patterns of IAB which I surmise to be basic in the sense that all other forms of IAB can be considered to be intermediate forms, and which are especially relevant to our main concern: hominid warfare. And lastly, I shall discuss the proximate and ultimate mechanisms involved in nonhuman IAB, and base some general conclusions on these observations. The occasional anthropomorphisms in the text are deliberately used and intended as such. At this point, it is important to acknowledge that, according to modern evolutionary biology, selection acts at the level of the gene (Hamilton, 1964; Maynard Smith, 1964; G.C. Williams, 1966, 1988; Dawkins, 1976, 1982; Cosmides & Tooby, 1981; Tooby & DeVore, 1987). The genes present in any generation are disproportionately those that had, in preceding environments, effective ’strategies’ for their own propagation. And conversely, the traits individuals express are present because the genes that govern their development have (had) successful strategies of self-propagation. In other words, "genes work through the individual in which they occur, and the individual’s morphology and behavior embody the strategies of the genes it contains" (Tooby & DeVore, 1987). The only currency in the cold calculus of evolution is reproductive success: the differential contribution of individuals to the gene pool of the population. The individual organism is, in this perspective, just a temporary, ephemeral and mortal vehicle with the only ’purpose’ to transmit its genes - which have the ’selfish’ interest of spreading as many replicas or copies of themselves as possible - to future generations. Those genes that have not ’programmed’ their temporary vehicles with strong urges to reproduce must have been selected against since time immemorial. Researchers now speak of organisms as ’strategists’, meaning that individual organisms are selected to manifest any property, behavioral or morphological, however fixed or plastic, that correlates with strategies of genic reproduction it is a convenient linguistic shorthand that bridges the gap between the level of the individual and the level of the gene. Thus, if one neglects the complications of intragenomic conflict (Cosmides & Tooby, 1981), organisms will be selected to behave as if they were following strategies to promote their inclusive fitness (Hamilton, 1964). A major implication of this genic-level-of-selection thinking is that characteristics of groups or species are not selected or shaped per se; they are the result



of the interactions among individuals whose behavior is controlled by proximate mechanisms, the properties of which correlate with genic fitness. The interests of different individuals in a group or population will often be in conflict. Therefore, broader patterns of social behavior are not necessarily optimal for any individual or group of individuals, but rather may be the emergent result of the conflicting interests of interacting individuals. Frequently, therefore, the behavior of an individual cannot be understood in isolation; its behavior will be the mutual result of its interests and strategies and the opposite interests and counter-strategies of those with whom the individual is associated. "Group processes and characteristics are not selected for in themselves (for example, by group selection), but are the emergent product of dynamic processes taking place at the individual strategic level, and must be analyzed at that level. Thus, intergroup conflict cannot be understood in terms of ’benefit to the group’, whatever that might mean. Instead, the costs and benefits to the individual actors must be analyzed. Thus, ’intergroup hostility’ may instead be hostility between different male coalitions (as in chimpanzees), or simply hostility between the dominant male of a group and outside males (as is usual in langurs)" (Tooby & DeVore, 1987). Evolutionarily, ’aggression’ may be considered to be a proximate mechanism of contest competition (Barash, 1977; E.O. Wilson, 1970, 1975), and mostly consists of acts, or the threat of acts, of an individual organism to reduce the fitness of, or enhance its own fitness at the expense of, another individual. E.O. Wilson (1978) adds the reduction of freedom to the reduction of genetic fitness in his definition, but some may consider the term ’freedom’ in the context of animal behavior to be rather meaningless. Such a definition, centering on the reduction of fitness of the competitor or opponent, deviates prima facie from the usual, sometimes cumbersome, definitions of the social sciences (centering on harming, injuring, damaging, destruction, or ’delivering noxious stimuli’; see van der Dennen [1980] and ' 5.2.7 for an extensive review), but it is no less valid or operationally useful. According to Barash (1977), aggression takes place when individuals interact with each other such that one of them is induced to surrender access to some resource important to its fitness. The exact forms of aggression range from intimidating displays and threats to actual fights. Organisms are expected to exert themselves to acquire important resources or enlarge their supply, thereby enhancing their fitness. They are as much expected to resist the loss of important resources, thereby avoiding decrements to their fitness. "Accordingly, animals may respond to aggression by threatening back, fighting back, and, occasionally, signalling their submission and/or running away. All these encounter patterns are subsumed under the term ’agonistic behavior’" (the term ’agonistic behavior’ was introduced by Scott & Fredericson in 1951). According to the group selection paradigm (the ’good-for-the-species’



reasoning), the killing or serious injury of one conspecific by another should occur only very rarely in nature. Lorenz (1966) expressed this view as follows: "Though occasionally, in territorial or rival fights, by some mishap a horn may penetrate an eye or a tooth or an artery, we have never found that the aim of aggression was the extermination of fellow members of the species concerned" (This view fits in very well with Lorenz’s view of the functions of aggression, which he indeed considered to be eufunctional at the group or species level). As more and more species have been subjected to extended field observations, however, the reports of intraspecific killings, mutilations, cannibalism, kronism and infanticide (pup-killing), siblicide and fratricide, (group) rape and courtship violence, have been steadily accumulating. Already in 1973 E.O. Wilson could comment that "Murder has now been observed frequently enough in gulls, hyenas, hippopotamuses, langurs, macaques and some other vertebrates to suggest that it is both widespread and, Konrad Lorenz and some other popular writers notwithstanding, far more common and hence ’normal’ in these species than in man". While such behaviors certainly contradict a species preservation paradigm within which animals are assumed to act for the social good of the group or the preservation of the species - they may be economically explained in terms of genic or kin selection theory. The evolutionary rationale has been elaborated by Hamilton (1971), Maynard Smith & Price (1973), Maynard Smith (1974, 1978), and Parker (1974), to mention only a few of the pioneers of the gametheoretical analysis of aggression: Animals may in fact kill or harm conspecifics when conditions are such that it is in the actor’s genetic selfinterest to do so, or, in other words, if the benefits or pay-offs of the behavior in terms of fitness exceed the costs to fitness. Accordingly, aggressive behavior has increasingly come to be viewed as an adaptive mechanism, a strategy or tactical option pursued when assessment indicates that it will be cost-effective in the competition for material and/or reproductive resources (E.O. Wilson, 1975; Dawkins, 1976; Durham, 1976; Geist, 1978; Schuster, 1978; Popp & DeVore, 1979; Borgia, 1980; Fry, 1980; Murray & Gerrard, 1984; Chagnon, 1988; Daly & Wilson, 1988; Alexander, 1989; Low, 1990; Manson & Wrangham, 1991; a.o.). (In order to avoid misunderstandings, it may be important to point out that the proximate model of aggression corresponding with the ultimate reasoning presented above is not a return to some ’instinct’ or ’drive’ conceptions of aggression: See Ch. 5). An individual enhances her/his reproductive fitness not only by successfully competing for resources, however, but also by directly or indirectly reducing the reproductive fitness of others: by destruction of nests, eggs, and fry; by cannibalism and infanticide or destroying the offspring of competitors; by interfering with mating (sexual harassment) or rearing of young; by keeping competitors in a state of chronic and costly stress; by reducing their social activities and thus their breeding opportunities; by delaying their mating and nesting; by inflicting injuries and wounds which are expensive to heal; by



exhausting and lowering their resistance to infection; even by affecting the viability of offspring of competitors in the intrauterine environment (Geist, 1978; see also Hausfater & Hrdy, 1984; Huntingford & Turner, 1989). To maximize reproductive fitness it obviously pays not only to maximize one’s own reproductive output, but also to minimize that of others, provided that the costs are low. Costs in this context do not, of course, refer to monetary currency, but are to be understood in terms of time and/or energy expenditure (or limited time and/or energy budgets) which could have been allocated to foraging, feeding, finding mates, copulation and so on. Animals do not habitually grab their pocket calculators to assess the cost/benefit ratio of their agonistic actions; instead, natural selection has done the necessary calculations for the organisms. It is not necessary to regard the organisms as consciously or rationally contemplating the reproductive advantage of a tidbit, after carefully subtracting the potential costs. Let there be no misunderstanding that the costs of agonistic interactions in most situations are often extremely, even prohibitively, high (death, fatal injuries, sublethal but extremely costly wounds and lacerations which may get infected, exhaustion and attrition, aggressive neglect, exposure to predation, ostracism and isolation, etc.) So, agonistic interactions are not likely to be engaged in just for the fun of it. A shrewd strategist, designed as such by natural selection, ’knows’ when the odds are against her/him. There is nothing mysterious in this ’knowledge’ or ’intuition’ or whatever one wishes to call it. It might be as simple as a translation of the costs assessment in the level or intensity of fear an organism experiences, so that the assessed cost/benefit ratio is reflected in the fight/flight balance. Selection theory thus predicts that serious fighting will be over serious matters, and the most serious matter of all - the evolutionary ultima ratio, so to speak is reproductive success. Reproductive success concerns the acquisition, defense and monopolization of mates particularly, and resources and positions of dominance or status, which may contribute to reproductive success, generally. Combatants assess the probability of a favorable outcome of an agonistic interaction on the basis of the information they possess about each other’s capabilities. Maynard Smith & Parker (1976) have proposed the term Resource Holding Power (RHP) as a shorthand for the sum total of these capabilities at any given point in time. RHP is intimately connected with the fitness budgets of the opponents (and therefore fluctuating over time). Assessment of each other’s RHP thus defines for each combatant a critical probability of winning above which fighting or escalation is the favored strategy, and below which withdrawal, flight or submission is the favorable strategy. Escalation of a fight ensues when both combatants assess their probability of winning as positive. The stake played for - the name of the game - is the infliction of loss of RHP of the adversary. But, alas, there is always a loser who has to bear the



consequences of his/her erroneous, too optimistic, assessment of the situation. Obviously, the information on which the assessment was based, proved to be inadequate, imperfect, insufficient, or plainly wrong. If information had been perfect the prospective loser would not have engaged in the tragic encounter to begin with. It is now easy to see how cost/benefit considerations, and assessment of RHP and the realistic estimation of the risks involved in mortal combat predict (a) low-level conflict (e.g., displays, threats, wars of attrition) over resources of low reproductive value; (b) escalation of fighting only when the stakes are high (for many mammalian species this means almost exclusively mating contests); (c) the significant sex difference in ’aggression’ in most sexually dimorphic organisms (males have generally more to gain by fighting than females, or females have more to loose); and (d) the individual differences in agonistic strategies among socially living animals. Consider for a moment a herd of red deer. The females in the herd have, at most, low-level, low-cost agonistic interactions because they do not have to compete for matings and so have reproductively little to gain by escalating fights. The dominant stags, being already in a privileged position, have little to gain either: for them fighting incurs costs without much additional gain. The subordinate, and mostly younger, stags bide their time - growing larger, growing stronger, growing more impressive antlers - and postpone serious confrontations with dominants because the risks of injury are too high now. Their chance will come in the next mating season; in the meantime it is better to keep a low profile than exhaust energy in inadvantageous adventures. So peace and quiet reigns in the herd, until the seasonal sexual competition will turn out to be lethal for some 20% of the males. But why, one may ask, it is worthwhile for males to fight to the death over females? The simple answer is: it is either that or oblivion. The somewhat less simple answer is: females are the reproductively limiting resource to the males. A somewhat more complicated answer is: the sexes have evolved different reproductive and parental strategies to achieve reproductive success. The fully complicated - yet, easy to understand once the underlying evolutionary rationale and logic are grasped - answer has been expressed most lucidly as follows by Low (1990): Mammalian aggression is sexually dimorphic. An analysis of coalitions in non-humans makes clear that, compared to females, males tend to form coalitions that are riskier, more aggressive, and more often among nonrelatives. Because females’ conflicts center on food or parental resources, while males’ conflicts are likely to center on the acquisition of mates, the reproductive impact of conflict for male mammals may be many times



greater than that for females. The return curve for reproductive success gained per unit of resources or status acquired differs for mating and parental effort. Mating effort, typical of mammalian males, has a large set-up cost; then the curve may rise steeply, for additional matings cost relatively little. For example, a red deer male, even to try for a first mating, must grow large (involving a cost of delayed maturation), grow antlers, and fight for dominance and control of good feeding grounds. The initial cost is great; the cost associated with each individual mating is small. For mammalian mothers, each offspring costs approximately as much parental effort as any other, and the maximum possible number of offspring is likely to be lower than for males. Males, while having the same average number of offspring as females, experience more variance in reproductive performance; more males than females in each generation fail to have any offspring in their lives, and the most successful males may have ten times as many offspring in their lives as the most successful female. Because males’ variance is high, great expenditure and risk may be profitable, so risky behavior and conflict are, in polygynous species, male endeavors. Thus conflicts arising under the influence of sexual selection (more frequently male in mammals) seem more likely to escalate to lethal proportions than conflicts arising from other sorts of individual selection. This difference, of course, is what prompted Darwin (1872) to treat sexual selection differently from other selection, even though functionally it is identical. Ross’s (1983) observation that women’s politics and conflict over resources tend to be at the familial and neighborhood level, while men’s conflicts tend to have a broader scope, is therefore hardly surprising; similarly, the rarity of women warriors is predicted. Through evolutionary history, then, men have been able to gain reproductively by warring behavior; women almost never have been able to do so (Low, 1990). The paramount majority of all animal agonistic interactions is apparently an intragroup phenomenon (i.e., it involves fighting among individuals within the same group, population or community: rats, red deer stags, elephant seal bulls, mountain sheep males, baboons, and so on, fight over dominance, females and territory). Some other species, especially nonhuman primates and carnivores, also exhibit intergroup agonistic behavior, which may be more or less collective and more or less orchestrated.



3.2 Animal ’Wars’ Animal ’wars’ are a part of popular Western folklore, and also figure prominently in the mythologies of peoples all over the world. Except for the social insects (vide infra), most cases described in the literature, however, concern spectacular forms of defense against predators or more or less collective and concerted attacks of members of one species on one or more members of another species. As van Hooff (1990) observes: "The ethological literature contains no reports of antelopes, rabbits or cats joining in an attack against a rival group or a threatening predator". It is not always easy to determine what phylogenetic and ecological factors (selection pressures) underlie the presence or absence of such behavior in particular species (and even local populations). Gregarious ungulates living in large amorphous herds depend chiefly on flight to escape from predators, and they do not generally cooperate in active defense. But ungulates that form kinship group or harems mutually assist one another against predator attacks. A well-known example is the perimeter defense by musk oxen against wolves, in which the bulls form a protective circular shield around the cows and calves (The same circular defensive strategy by buffalo on the American Plains proved fatal against the bullets of human hunters). Many more species, including primates, show coordinated group defense and sometimes quite elaborate and ’clever’ evasive tactics and complex patterns resembling military maneuvers (see especially E.O. Wilson [1975] for examples). In primate species with multimale groups, organized defense is the rule. As E.O. Wilson (1975) observed: "The defensive maneuvers of a troop of large terrestrial primates is one of the natural world’s most impressive sights". Less evasive is interspecific mobbing behavior, the active and joint assault on a predator or raptor too formidable to be handled by a single individual. It occurs in a number of social mammals, such as agoutis mobbing snakes (Smythe, 1970), and baboons and chimpanzees frenziedly attacking - and some daredevils even beating up - a leopard model (Kortlandt & Kooij, 1963; Kortlandt, 1965), but the most spectacular examples are encountered in the avian kingdom. Mobbing in birds is a well-defined behavioral pattern that occurs in a wide variety of taxonomic groups (Altmann, 1956). The attacks are normally directed at predatory birds, particularly hawks and owls, when they intrude into the territorial or roosting areas of the smaller birds. As Marler (1959) pointed out, the mobbing calls of different bird species are strongly convergent. Thus alerted birds are able to fly toward the predator being harassed, and sizeable mobs are quickly assembled. Furthermore, different species respond to each



other’s calls, since all make nearly the same sound, and mobbing becomes a cooperative venture. Detailed examples can be found in the monograph by Curio (1976) and in E.O. Wilson (1975), who states that the mobbing of some species has a vicious intent, and can result in severe injury or death to the predator. Gersdorf (1966), for example, described how starlings launched massive attacks against sparrow hawks in Germany, in which the hawks were sometimes killed. Migratory bird or mammal aggregations have been reported on rare occasions to engage in sanguinary ’wars’ when meeting another aggregation of the same or a different species. Letourneau (1895) refers to a ’war’ between magpies and jays in the 15th century in France, and a ’war’ between two huge flocks of starlings is said to have occurred in England in the 18th century. Red squirrels are said to have engaged in a sanguinary conflict, emasculating and driving the gray squirrels out of New England in 1935 (Jackson, 1935). These and similar instances of mobbing behavior can be understood as collective and organized defense against organisms which normally constitute sources of threat and danger, or as rather severe forms of interspecific competition. The boundary between inter- and intraspecific defense and competition is less clear in the social insects to which we now turn for a closer look. It has been observed time and again that there are only two kinds of animals that habitually make war: Humans and ants. Huxley (1944) was one of the first to draw explicit parallels between the warfare of these Hymenoptera and Homo sapiens/belligerens. 3.2.1 How Tiny Organisms Wage Huge Battles Even among ants ’war’ is mainly practiced by one taxonomic group, comprising only a few species among the tens of thousands known to myrmecologists. They are the harvester ants, inhabitants of arid regions where there is little to pick up during the dry months. Accordingly they collect the seeds of various grasses at the end of the growing season and store them in special underground granaries in their nests. It is these reserve supplies which are the object of ant warfare. The inhabitants of one nest set out deliberately to raid the supplies of another group (Huxley, 1944). According to Huber (1861), Forel (1874), McCook (1879) and other early students of ant life, they may employ elaborate tactics, and the battles generally result in heavy casualties. If the attackers win, they remove the stores grain by grain to their own nest. Harvesters are the only kind of ants to go in for accumulating property, as well as the chief kind to practice ’war’. From the point of view of parallel evolution, this association of property with war is interesting, as many anthropologists and historians believe that in humans war, or at any rate habitual and organized war, did not arise in human evolution until man had reached the stage of settled



civilization, when he began to accumulate stores of grain and other forms of wealth (See ' 5.2.3). Less deliberate ’wars’ may also occur in some other species, between communities whose nests are so close that they compete for the same food territory. When similarly provoked conflicts occur between closely related species, the term ’war’ may perhaps be extended to them. On the other hand, the raids of the slave-making ants are not true war, but a curious combination of predation and parasitism. There is another group of ants called army ants, which suggests military activity. But the phrase is really a misnomer, for these army ants are in reality simply predatory species which happen to hunt in packs; they are the wolves of the insect world, not the warmongers (Huxley, 1944). The evolutionary rationale underlying social insect organized defense and warfare, E.O. Wilson (1975) explains, is altruism: because the workers are reproductive neuters devoted to the sustenance of the queen and maximum production of her offspring, their own brothers and sisters, they can afford to throw their lives away. And if the colony welfare is threatened they do just that, with impressive efficiency. The result has been the evolution of elaborate communication systems devoted primarily or exclusively to group defense, together with special soldier castes programmed for no function other than combat (E.O. Wilson, 1971, 1975). For further details one may consult Emerson (1958), Brian (1965, 1983), and Hölldobler & Wilson (1990). According to E.O. Wilson, territorial fighting among mature colonies of both same and differing species is common but not universal in ants. It has been recorded in very diverse genera of which the following form only a partial list: Pseudomyrmex, Myrmica, Pogonomyrmex, Leptothorax, Solenopsis, Pheidole, Tetramorium, Iridomyrmex, Azteca, Anoplolepis, Oecophylla, Formica, Lasius, and Camponotus. Huber's (1861) observation of a great war originating in predation between two nests of ants of the same species some hundred steps distant from each other is thus recounted by Letourneau (1895): On the field of battle, some thousands of the ants struggled two by two, holding each other with their mandibles; others were searching for each other, attacking each other, forcing each other to come as prisoners into their city where they awaited an end most cruel. The combatants deluged each other with venom and rolled interlaced in the dust... In these curious wars the tactics of the ants is always free and courageous. Without doubt they sometimes resort to ambushes but only in skirmishing. In the great wars, they attack with open force and without recourse to ruse. They struggle, moreover, with extraordinary tenacity and it is more easy to tear them to pieces than to make them prisoners. Indeed when a combatant ant has been



sectioned in the middle of the body, the anterior part, the head and thorax separated from the abdomen still carry in their protection the menaced nymph. Often in the heat of action, one sees the severed head of an ant still suspended from the legs or antennae of the victorious adversary; sometimes it is a dead body which is thus dragged and which does not cease to move its legs convulsively. The most dramatic battles known within ant species are those conducted by the common pavement ant Tetramorium caespitum. First described by the American Reverend and myrmecologist McCook (1879) from observations in Penn Square, Philadelphia, these ’wars’ can be witnessed in abundance on sidewalks and lawns in towns and cities of the eastern United States throughout the summer. Masses of hundreds or thousands of the small dark brown workers lock in combat for hours at a time, tumbling, biting, and pulling one another, while new recruits are guided to the melee along freshly laid odor trails. Very probably, these are contests between adjacent colonies in the vicinity of their territorial boundaries. Curiously, only a minute fraction of the workers are injured or killed. One campaign observed by McCook lasted almost 3 weeks. The longest on record is 62 weeks. One of the more dramatic spectacles of insect biology is also provided by the large-headed soldiers of certain species belonging to the genus Pheidole. These individuals have mandibles shaped approximately like the blades of wire clippers, and their heads are largely filled by massive adductor muscles. When clashes occur between colonies the soldiers rush in, attack blindly, and leave the field littered with the severed antennae, legs, and abdomens of their defeated enemies. Territorial ’wars’ between colonies of different ant species occur only occasionally in the cold temperate zones. Colonies of Myrmica and Formica, for example, sometimes overrun and capture nest sites belonging to other species of the same genus (Brian, 1952; Scherba, 1964). By contrast, intense interspecific violence is very common in the tropics and warm temperate zones. Certain pest species, particularly Pheidole megacephala, Solenopsis invicta, and Iridomyrmex humilis, are (in)famous for their belligerency and destructiveness. They attack native ant faunas wherever they have been introduced. They even go so far as to totally annihilate some of the species, especially those taxonomically and ecologically closest to them. Some of the battles between ant species are epic in their proportions, and they may continue for several days or even weeks. E.S. Brown (1959), for example, has provided an account of a prolonged struggle between colonies of the introduced African ant Anoplolepis longipes and the defending phalanges of two native species, Oecophylla smaragdina and Iridomyrmex myrmecodiae, in the Solomon Islands. Territorial competition for food, involving fighting between nests in red wood



ants belonging to the Formica rufa group has recently been much investigated (e.g., Mabelis, 1979, 1984). Le Moli & Parmigiani (1981) have demonstrated that F. lugubris is likely to attack ’alien’ ants belonging to other species, e.g., F. cunicularia. Such combat generally ends in the death of the ’intruders’. Meetings of workers of wood ants (F. polyctena) also often result in an aggressive encounter. Locally, the number of fighting ants can increase rapidly due to storage and transfer of information about the battle: Ants can remember the location of the battlefield for a long time and can attract the attention of other workers by means of scent substances and excitable behavior (Mabelis, 1979; 1984). As a result, a ’war’ can develop to the point at which thousands of ants are involved. The number of casualties may be very high; a great many of the workers of a particular nest may be killed and sometimes a whole population is exterminated. Casualties are dragged to the warring nests and they will be consumed there (Mabelis, 1979; 1984). Le Moli & Parmigiani (1981; 1982) questioned whether (inter- and intraspecific) aggressive behavior in Red wood ants is an expression of predation or an expression of competition. According to Mabelis (1984) ’warfare’ in this species has both aspects; there seem to be no essential differences between predatory and aggressive behavior. There can be no question, E.O. Wilson (1975) concludes his extensive survey, that fighting, slave raiding, predation and robbery, parasitism, and even cannibalism are normal among the members of some insect species. In the life cycle of some species of parasitic Hymenoptera, for example, the larvae undergo a temporary transformation into a bizarre fighting form that kills and eats other conspecific larvae occupying the same host insect. Indeed, it has been remarked that there is no bizarre and quixotic form of violence imaginable that does not occur in these social insects. "What can be concluded from the evidence presented above? Mainly that there is no universal ’rule of conduct’, any more than there is a universal aggressive instinct - and for the same reason. Species are entirely opportunistic. Their behavior patterns do not conform to any general innate restrictions but are guided, like all other biological traits, solely by what happens to be advantageous over a period or time sufficient for evolution to occur. Thus, if it is even of temporary selective advantage for individuals of a given species to be cannibals, at least a moderate probability exists that the entire species will evolve toward cannibalism" (E.O. Wilson, 1975).



3.3 The Extent of Animal IAB Collective defensive behavior is highly differential among animal species. Most of them have neither defense nor offense in their repertoire. Collective defense is exemplified by avian mobbing of raptors, as we have seen, and collective territorial defense in some other bird species. White-fronted bee-eaters (Merops bulockoides) (Hegner, Emlen & Demong, 1981), Florida scrub jays (Aphelocoma c. coerulescens) (Woolfenden & Fitzpatrick, 1984, Mumme, 1992) and green woodhoopoes (Phoeniculus purpureus) (Ligon & Ligon, 1982) concertedly defend breeding communities. Cooperative territorial defense has also been reported recently in the Australian magpie (Gymnorhina tibicen) (Farabaugh, Brown & Hughes, 1992), and the white-browed sparrow weaver (Plocepasser mahali) (Wingfield & Lewis, 1993). In the latter species, territorial defense involves regular patrolling of territorial boundaries and chorus vocalizations by all group members in concert. Collective defense would be rather pointless if there were no threat or danger of offense. In the remainder of this chapter I shall focus on these (mainly mammalian) species in which intraspecific intergroup agonistic behavior, involving observed offensive episodes, has been clearly ascertained. Intergroup agonistic behavior has been described in the following species (Table 3.1): Table 3.1: Animal Intergroup Agonistic Behavior Turdoides squamiceps (Arabian babbler) Zahavi, 1987; Gallinula mortierii (Tasmanian native hen) Putland & Goldizen, 1998; Wrangham, 1999; Tursiops truncatus (dolphin) Connor, 1988; Connor, Smolker & Richards, 1992; Helogale undulata (dwarf-mongoose) Low, 1993; Rasa, 1985, 1986; %& Suricata suricatta (slender-tailed meerkat) No reference (TV-documentary); Otaria byronia (sea lion) Campagna, le Boeuf & Cappozzo, 1988; Gazella gazella gazella (mountain gazelle) Geffen, Perevolotsky, Geffen & Yom-Tov, 1999; & Crocuta crocuta (spotted hyena) Goodall, 1986; Henschel, 1986; Henschel & Skinner, 1991; Kruuk, 1972, 1975; Kruuk & MacDonald, 1985; van Lawick & van Lawick-Goodall, 1971; MacDonald, 1983; Mills, 1990; Tilson & Henschel, 1986; Wrangham, 1999; Canis lupus (wolf) Harrington, 1984, 1987; Mech, 1966 et seq.; Mech et al., 1998; Murie, 1944; Wrangham, 1999; Zimen, 1978; %& Lycaon pictus lupinus (Cape hunting dog) von Kühme, 1965; van Lawick & van Lawick-Goodall, 1971; %& Panthera leo (lion) Bertram, 1973 et seq.; Bygott, Bertram & Hanby, 1979; Eaton, 1975; Grinnell, Packer & Pusey, 1995; Heinsohn, 1997; Heinsohn & Packer, 1995; McComb, Packer & Pusey, 1994; Packer, 1986; Packer & Pusey, 1982, 1983, 1984; Packer, Scheel & Pusey, 1990; Packer et al., 1988; Schaller, 1972; Schenkel, 1966; Acynonyx (Cynaelurus) jubatus (cheetah) Caro & Collins, 1986; Frame & Frame, 1981; Hapalemur griseus (gentle lemur) Nievergelt, Mutschler & Feistner, 1998; Lemur catta (ring-tailed lemur) Budnitz & Dainis, 1975; Hood & Jolly, 1995; Jolly, 1966, 1972;



Klopfer & Jolly, 1970; Sussman & Richard, 1974; %& Lemur [Eulemur] fulvus (brown lemur) Pollock, 1979; Sussman & Richard, 1974; * Propithecus verreauxi (white or Verreaux’s sifaka) Jolly, 1966; Richard, 1977; Sussman & Richard, 1974; %& Indri indri (indri) Pollock, 1975, 1979; * Saguinus imperator (emperor tamarin) Terborgh, 1983; %& Saguinus fuscicollis (saddleback tamarin) Terborgh, 1983; %& Saguinus mystax (moustached tamarin) Garber, Pruetz & Isaacson, 1993; Heymann, 1996; Callicebus moloch (dusky titi) Mason, 1966, 1968; Robinson, 1979, 1981; Robinson, Wright & Kinzey, 1987; %& Saimiri sciureus (squirrel monkey) Baldwin & Baldwin, 1976; Candland et al., 1978; Castell & Ploog, 1967; Ploog, 1998; Terborgh, 1983; Alouatta palliata (mantled howler monkey) Carpenter, 1935, 1965, 1974; Chivers, 1969; Milton, 1980; Southwick, 1962; Alouatta seniculus (red howler monkey) Richard, 1985; Rudran, 1979; Sekulic, 1982a,b,c; %& Alouatta fusca (brown howler monkey) Chiarello, 1995; Cebus capucinus (white-faced capuchin) Klein, 1974; Oppenheimer, 1968; Cebus apella (brown, black-capped or tufted capuchin) Terborgh, 1983; * Cebus albifrons (white-fronted capuchin) Terborgh, 1983; * Cebus olivaceus (wedge-capped capuchin) Robinson, 1988; %& Ateles belzebuth ([long-haired] spider monkey) Klein, 1974; Klein & Klein, 1975; Richard, 1985; Brachyteles archnoides (muriqui or woolly spider monkey) Strier, 1992, 1994; Wrangham & Peterson, 1996; Lagothrix lagothricha ([Humboldt’s] woolly monkey) Durham, 1975; Nishimura & Izawa, 1975; %& Presbytis [Semnopithecus] entellus (gray or Hanuman langur) Jay, 1965; Hrdy, 1977; Mohnot, 1971, 1980; Nagel & Kummer, 1974; Ripley, 1967; Rudran, 1973; Sugiyama, 1967; Sugiyama et al., 1965; Vogel, 1975; Yoshiba, 1968; %& Presbytis [Trachypithecus] johnii (Nilgiri langur) Poirier, 1968, 1970, 1974; Presbytis pileata [Trachypithecus pileatus] (capped langur) Stanford, 1991; Presbytis cristata [Trachypithecus cristatus] (silvered leaf monkey or lutong) Bernstein, 1968; Presbytis senex [Trachypithecus retulus] (purple-faced langur) Rudran, 1973; Presbytis aygula (Sunda Island leaf monkey) Ruhiyat, 1983; %& Presbytis potenziani (Mentawai langur) Tilson & Tenaza, 1976; %& Presbytis thomasi (Thomas’s [leaf] langur) Steenbeek, 1999; Colobus [Procolobus] badius (red colobus) Isbell, 1984; Manson & Wrangham, 1991; Marsh, 1979; Richard, 1985; Starin, 1981, 1994; Struhsaker, 1975, 1980; Yreager & Kirkpatrick, 1998; Colobus guereza (black-and-white colobus) Marler, 1969, 1972; Oates, 1977; Schenkel & Schenkel-Hilliger, 1967; Yeager & Kirkpatrick, 1998; %& Cercocebus [Lophocebus] albigena (crested or gray-cheeked mangabey) Kinnaird, 1992; Struhsaker & Leland, 1979; Waser, 1976; %& Cercopithecus [Chlorocebus] aethiops (vervet) Cheney, 1981; Cheney & Seyfarth, 1987; Gartlan & Brain, 1968; Harrison, 1983; Kavanagh, 1981; Struhsaker, 1967; %& Cercopithecus ascanius (redtail monkey) Struhsaker, 1978, 1980; Struhsaker & Leland, 1979; %& Cercopithecus mitis (guenon or blue monkey) Aldritch-Blake, 1970; Lawes & Henzi, 1995; Rudran, 1978; Struhsaker, 1969; Struhsaker & Leland, 1979; %& Cercopithecus neglectus (De Brazza’s monkey) Gautier-Hion & Gautier, 1978; * Erythrocebus patas (patas monkey) Chism, Rowell & Olson, 1984; %& Papio hamadryas (hamadryas or desert baboon) Abegglen, 1984; Chalyan, 1998; Hall & DeVore, 1965; Kummer, 1968, 1971; Kummer & Kurt, 1963; Washburn & DeVore, 1961; Papio cynocephalus (yellow or savanna baboon) Altmann & Altmann, 1970; Byrne, Whiten &



Henzi, 1987; Cheney & Seyfarth, 1977; Richard, 1985; Shopland, 1982; %& Papio anubis (olive baboon) Hamilton, i.p.; van Hooff, 1990; Packer, 1979; Ransom, 1981; Rowell, 1966 et seq.; Strum, 1975 et seq.; Papio ursinus (chacma baboon) Anderson, 1981; DeVore & Hall, 1965; Hamilton et al., 1975, 1976; Stoltz & Saayman, 1970; Macaca mulatta (rhesus monkey) Altmann, 1962; Carpenter, 1942, 1964, 1974; Chapais, 1983; Ciani, 1982, 1986; Gabow, 1973; Hall, 1968; Hausfater, 1972; Koford, 1963, 1965; Lindburg, 1967, 1971, 1977; Morrison & Menzel, 1972; Neville, 1966; Singh, 1969; Southwick, 1962; 1969; Southwick et al., 1965; Teas et al., 1980, 1982; Vandenbergh, 1967; Vessey, 1968; A. Wilson, 1969; Wilson & Boelkins, 1970; %& Macaca fuscata (Japanese macaque) Alexander & Roth, 1971; Carpenter, 1968, 1974; Itani, 1954, 1982; Itani et al., 1963; Kawai, 1964; Kawanaka, 1973; Saito et al., 1998; Sugiura et al., 2000; Sugiyama, 1960; Takasaki, 1981; %& Macaca radiata (bonnet macaque) Rahaman & Parthasarathy, 1969; Simonds, 1965; Sugiyama, 1971; * Macaca sylvanus (barbary macaque) Deag, 1973; Mehlman & Parkhill, 1988; Macaca fascicularis (kra or long-tailed or crab-eating macaque) Angst, 1975; Davis, 1962; Furuya, 1965; Kurland, 1973; Shirek-Ellefson, 1968; %& Macaca thibetana (Tibetan macaque) Zhao, 1997; %& Hylobates lar (whitehanded gibbon) Carpenter, 1940, 1974; Chivers & Raemaekers, 1980; Ellefson, 1968, 1974; %& Hylobates klossii (Kloss’s gibbon) Tenaza, 1975; Tilson, 1981; %& Hylobates agilis (agile or dark-handed gibbon) Gittins, 1980; %& Hylobates moloch (moloch or silvery gibbon) Kappeler, 1984; Hylobates pileatus (pileated or capped gibbon) Brockelman & Srikosamatara, 1984; %& Hylobates (Symphalangus) syndactylus (siamang) Chivers, 1974; Gorilla g. berengei (mountain gorilla) Baumgartel, 1976; Bloom, 1995; Fossey, 1970 et seq.; Fossey & Harcourt, 1977; Harcourt, 1978, 1979; Manson & Wrangham, 1991; Pitcairn, 1974; Richard, 1985; Sicotte, 1993; Schaller, 1963 et seq.; Stewart & Harcourt, 1987; Watts, 1985, 1989; Yamagiwa, 1983; Pan paniscus (bonobo or pygmy chimpanzee) Badrian & Badrian, 1984; Blount, 1990; Furuichi, 1989; Kano, 1980 et seq; Kano & Mulavwa, 1984; Kitamura, 1983; Knauft, 1991; Nishida & Hiraiwa-Hasegawa, 1987; Uehara, 1988; F.White, 1992; Wrangham & Peterson, 1996; * Pan troglodytes (chimpanzee) Boesch & Boesch, 1999; Brewer, 1978; Bygott, 1974, 1979; Diamond, 1992; Ghiglieri, 1984, 1987, 1988; Goodall, 1979, 1983, 1986; Goodall et al., 1979; Hiraiwa-Hasegawa et al., 1983; Itani, 1966 et seq.; Izawa, 1970; Kawanaka, 1981, 1982; Manson & Wrangham, 1991; McGinnis, 1974, 1979; McGrew et al., 1981; Nishida, 1967 et seq.; Nishida & Hiraiwa-Hasegawa, 1985, 1987; Nishida et al., 1985; Pusey, 1977, 1979; Pusey & Packer, 1987; Reynolds, 1966; Reynolds & Reynolds, 1965; Sugiyama, 1981; Takahata, 1985; Tutin, 1975; de Waal, 1996; Wrangham, 1975 et seq.; Wrangham & Peterson, 1996; Wrangham et al., i.p.;

Legend: * = Aggressive intergroup encounters are reported to be (extremely) rare. %& = Both sexes actively participate in the conflict (vide infra). In brackets [] the names according to the recent primate taxonomy by Groves (1993). Secondary sources: Bernstein & Gordon, 1974; Chalmers, 1980; Charles-Dominique et al., 1980; Cheney, 1983, 1987, 1992; Chivers, 1980; DeVore, 1965; Dolhinow, 1972; Fry, 1980; Givens, 1975; Hamburg, 1972, 1978; Hamburg & McCown, 1979; Harcourt & de Waal, 1992; Harvey et al., 1987; Hinde, 1983; Holloway, 1974; van Hooff, 1990; Itani, 1982; Jay, 1968; Jolly, 1972; Low, 1993; Manson & Wrangham, 1991; Michael & Crook, 1973; Mitani & Rodman, 1979; Nagel



& Kummer, 1974; Passingham, 1982; Pitairn, 1974; Pusey & Packer, 1987; Richard, 1985; Russell & Russell, 1968; Schubert, 1983; Schultz, 1996; Trudeau, Bergmann-Riss & Hamburg, 1981; Tuttle, 1975; Washburn & Hamburg, 1972; de Waal, 1989; E.O. Wilson, 1975; Wrangham, 1987, 1999; Wrangham & Peterson, 1996.

3.4 General Observations on IAB The presence of one avian species, the Arabian babbler, in the Table is, by all means, surprising. Yet, this tiny bird is perfectly capable of what Zahavi (1987) unhesitantly compared to human ’warfare’. Rasa (1985, 1986) reported territorial group aggression in dwarf mongoose. Group meetings in this highly social species are random, and the animals do not appear to patrol territorial boundaries. Among dolphins, coalitions of young males may harass, attempt to isolate, ’aggressively herd’ and ’group rape’ females from other groups. Among social carnivores, a number of species show coordinated lethal attacks. In wolves, family-based packs occasionally invade neighboring packs’ territories, attacking residents; Mech (1977) found that intraspecific conflict accounted for 43% of deaths not caused by humans. Among spotted hyenas, who, like wolves, live in family-based, territory-holding groups, intruders into a clan’s territory are likely to be attacked and killed, and smaller clan subgroups patrol the territory boundaries, confronting other ’patrols’ (Kruuk, 1972, 1973). Neighboring clans sometimes engage in pitched battles over carcasses of prey that one or the other of the groups has killed. The following account is taken from Kruuk’s (1972) protocols (as cited in E.O. Wilson, 1975): The two groups mixed with an uproar of calls, but within seconds the sides parted again and the Mungi hyenas ran away, briefly pursued by the Scratching Rock hyenas, who then returned to the carcass. About a dozen of the Scratching Rock hyenas, though, grabbed one of the Mungi males and bit him wherever they could - especially in the belly, the feet, and the ears. The victim was completely covered by his attackers, who proceeded to maul him for about 10 min. while their clan fellows were eating the wildebeest. The Mungi male was literally pulled apart, and when I later studied the injuries more closely, it appeared that his ears were bitten off and so were his feet and testicles, he was paralyzed by a spinal injury, had large gashes in the hind legs and belly, and subcutaneous hemorrhages all over... The next morning I found a hyena eating from the carcass and saw evidence that more had been there; about one-third of the internal organs and muscles had been eaten. Cannibals! In lions, which also live in groups (prides) based on a group of related females



and one or more associated males, interpride encounters occur, but lethal injury is rare. When invading males are attempting to take over a pride, there may be lethal injuries, though once one male cedes reproductive rights, aggression typically stops. New males are likely to commit infanticide (Bertram, 1976, 1978; Packer, 1986; Packer & Pusey, 1982, 1983, 1984). Coalitions of male cheetahs driving smaller coalitions away from breeding females may inflict fatal injuries (Frame & Frame, 1981; Caro & Collins, 1986). The following observations pertain specifically to the nonhuman primate species in Table 3.1. 1. As may be gathered from the Table, the majority of species in which IAB has been documented belong to the primate order (containing both prosimians and ’true’ primates: the monkeys and apes). The intergroup behavior of primates is extremely variable - both inter- and intraspecifically - and ranges from very relaxed and ’peaceful’ to lethal raiding. In most primate species conflicts between groups are rare. Neighboring groups generally avoid each other. When groups spot one other, the group most eccentric in relation to its home range generally is the first to retreat, or, in case a dominance-subordination relationship exists among the groups (vide infra), the subordinate group retreats (Kawanaka, 1973; Eberhard & Candland, 1981; McKenna, 1982; Cheney, 1983, 1987). Among primates, exclusive use of space is generally maintained by (a) site attachment and avoidance of the ranges of neighboring groups (mutual proximity-dependent avoidance); (b) site-dependent aggression and regular definition of the conventional location of boundaries; and (c) active defense of (exclusive access to) an area’s resources by advertisement and/or eviction of intruders (territoriality). The behavioral mechanisms regulating spacing and grouping may vary within a genus, and even within a species (Robinson, Wright & Kinzey, 1987). For example, in a Callicebus torquatus population in Peru, exclusive use of space is maintained by mutual avoidance and restricting movements to familiar areas (Kinzey & Robinson, 1983). In contrast, Callicebus moloch has been described as ’territorial’ (Mason, 1966, 1968) in that, in addition to groups occupying exclusive areas, spacing between groups is maintained by site-dependent aggression: the probability that a group will attack, rather than avoid, another group depends on the site at which the encounter takes place. In this (and other) species, that probability is low at the center of the group’s own range, increases the closer the group is to the boundary, and then drops off rapidly as the boundary is crossed. The outcome of an aggressive encounter therefore varies with locality. Each group is more aggressive and therefore displaces other groups more easily when it is within its own exclusive area. Groups are most aggressive close to, but on their own side of, the boundary, a ’doughnut’-shaped aggression field (Waser & Wiley, 1979) that results in the clear definition and reinforcement of the conventional



location of the boundaries. Typically, chasing occurs, but physical contact is rare (Robinson, 1979, 1981; Robinson, Wright & Kinzey, 1987). As a rule, most primate agonistic group encounters are of the ’ritualized contact’ type, in which injuries are rare and hardly serious, and fatalities virtually unknown (Eberhard & Candland, 1981; King, 1980). The few times when contact between groups results in a collective skirmish, it seems to be the result of incidental escalation of brawls between peripheral individuals in which others interfere, rather than a deliberately coordinated and concerted enterprise (van Hooff, 1990). Observers of nonterritorial groups often comment upon the relative lack of intergroup aggression, even when groups are in close proximity (e.g., bonnet macaques: Sugiyama, 1971; baboons: Hall, 1964; DeVore & Hall, 1965; Anderson, 1981). Chacma and olive baboons are representative of the state of at least several species of primates. In over 2,000 hours of observation by Hall and DeVore, "no aggressive interactions between groups have ever been recorded" (Hall, 1964). Relationships between groups are characterized by mutual avoidance in most situations, and temporary mutual tolerance in special circumstances, such as gatherings at water holes in arid regions. Also groups of squirrel monkeys, woolly monkeys, brown capuchins, rhesus macaques, and Barbary macaques are occasionally observed to mingle peacefully in the same feeding tree, water hole, or sleeping site, even though long-term associations are rare. Some non-territorial species have evolved loud calls (’duetting calls’) that aid in the regulation of intergroup spacing and mutual avoidance (Cheney, 1987). In contrast, when groups defend all or part of their home ranges, most intergroup interactions are characterized by aggression rather than by mutual avoidance. Friendly interactions (play, grooming, copulation) between members of different intraspecific groups do, however, occur in both territorial and nonterritorial species (Cheney, 1987). When two or more groups of primates meet, the resulting behavior may range from complete fusion of the groups (no agonism), via threats and displays, fights and chases, to outright killing. Typical outcomes of primate group encounters in escalating order of antagonism (Eberhart & Candland, 1981) are: Table 3.2: Outcomes of Primate Group Encounters (Eberhard & Candland, 1981) Description Complete Fusion Fission-Fusion Indifference



Characteristic Groups coalesce permanently, with restructuring of social relations (e.g., rhesus monkeys: Bernstein, Gordon & Rose, 1974). Groups aggregate and interact, but subsequently diverge (e.g., mountain gorilla: Schaller, 1963). Groups in proximity, but appear indifferent to, or ignore each other (e.g., Himalayan langurs: Sugiyama, 1976).

Mutual Avoidance Unilateral Avoidance Mild Threat

Intensive Threat Ritualized Contact Injurious Contact Killing

Coordination of range use such that groups seem to avoid contact (e.g., prosimians: Sussman & Richard, 1974; Owl monkeys: Wright, 1978). Avoidance or displacement of one group by another (e.g., baboons: Nash, 1976; rhesus: Gabow, 1973; Japanese macaques: Kawanaka, 1973). Groups engage in gestural, locomotor, or vocal displays or threats (e.g., squirrel monkeys: Baldwin & Baldwin, 1976; bonobo: Nishida & HiraiwaHasegawa, 1987). High intensity threats involving chases, physical contact between animals is rare (e.g., Kloss’s gibbon: Tenaza, 1975); Aggressive physical contact between groups, but serious injury occurs rarely (e.g., black-and-white colobus: Schenkel & Schenkel-Hilliger, 1967). Severe aggressive contact, with injury or death in both groups (e.g., cercopithecines: Struhsaker, 1969). Death of one or more animals in one group (e.g., squirrel monkeys: Candland et al., 1978); chimpanzees (' 3.8).

2. Communal defense of home range or territory against intraspecific intruders seems to be the most common manifestation of IAB in primates and carnivores. However, relatively few primate species maintain true territories in the sense of defended spatial exclusiveness (Crook, 1968; Rowell, 1972; Schuster, 1978; Scott, 1969; Vine, 1973). Rather, there is some overlapping of foraging ranges in most studied species of Cercopithecoidea and Ceboidea. Troops of rhesus (Southwick, 1962; Southwick et al., 1965), langurs (Sugiyama et al., 1965; Ripley, 1967), howlers (Southwick, 1962; Carpenter, 1965), and Japanese macaques (Kawanaka, 1973) avoid contact with each other when approaching the overlapping zones. Adjacent social groups in the majority of colobines generally interact aggressively (Struhsaker & Leland, 1987), with adult males usually the most aggressive and frequent participants. In most populations of Presbytis entellus, adult females (Ripley, 1967), as well as youngsters (Hrdy, 1977) may play prominent roles in intergroup fights. In at least one population of this species, however, neighboring groups were extremely tolerant of one another (Jay, 1965). Little is known yet about bonobo intercommunity encounters. Encounters are mostly avoided, but when they occur they appear mildly antagonistic, ranging from nonlethal fighting (no observation has been made of participants killed in intergroup fights) to peaceful mixing in the border area, and mainly confined to adult males giving branch-dragging displays. There appears to be intergroup dominance attenuating agonistic contacts (Kano, 1987; Kitamura, 1983; Nishida & Hiraiwa-Hasegawa, 1987). Home range size is influenced by both dietary requirements and the spatiotemporal distribution of food (Cheney, 1987; Clutton-Brock & Harvey, 1977). A group’s ability to patrol its range on a regular basis is correlated with the presence or absence of territoriality (Mitani & Rodman, 1979). This is in accordance with the ’economic defendability’ model of territoriality (See ' 1.3.8). Perhaps because large ranges are difficult and uneconomical to patrol,



they often overlap extensively with those of other groups. When overlap is great, aggressive encounters occur at low rates, and those that do occur usually concern access to a clumped, desirable resource, such as a fruiting tree, rather than a range boundary. This occurs among e.g., capuchins, red howlers, baboons, and mangabeys (Cheney, 1987). In contrast to nonterritorial species, most territorial primates have specialized intergroup calls that seem to attract, rather than repel, neighboring groups. Interspecific joint-territoriality sometimes occurs despite its costs. For example, Peres (1992) described the joint-territorial behavior of saddleback tamarins (Saguinus fuscicollis) and moustached tamarins (S. mystax). Intergroup interactions imposed severe energetic costs on these monkeys, resulting in greater proportions of time spent in energetically expensive or negative activities, such as moving to boundaries, displaying to, and chasing nongroup members, allowing less time for foraging. 3. The agonistic repertoire in these encounters ranges from vocal and gestural displays, bluffing and intimidation, via threats, chases, ’pitched battles’ to ’deliberate’ killing (vide infra). The level of agonism in macaques depends on the previous history of the troops, familiarity of the members, rank of the troops, and location of the encounter (Chapais, 1983; Ciani, 1986; Hausfater, 1972; Vessey, 1968). 4. Facilitating and/or aggravating conditions of IAB in primates include: extreme crowding and population density due to e.g., areal reduction, competition for food at artificial feeding sites and other rather ’pathological’ conditions such as disruption caused by human interference (Ciani, 1986; Kawanaka, 1973; Kummer, 1968; Mitani & Rodman, 1979; Nagel & Kummer, 1974; Ripley, 1967; Singh, 1969; Southwick, 1969; Southwick, Beg & Siddiqi, 1965; Southwick, Siddiqi, Farooqi & Pal, 1974, 1976; Sugiyama, 1967; Wilson & Boelkins, 1970; Yoshiba, 1968), which is generally substantiated by reports on zoo massacres (Hall, 1964; Kummer, 1957; Kummer & Kurt, 1965; Reynolds, 1961; Russell & Russell, 1968; Zuckerman, 1932). In chimpanzees agonistic intergroup encounters increase when the balance of dominance gets out of order (Itani, 1982; de Waal, 1982 et seq.). These observations are in general agreement with E.O. Wilson’s (1975) concept of ’behavioral scaling’. 5. In primate species which form all-male groups, defense by the leader of the bisexual group against the violent appropriation and abduction of females by the all-male group may result in prolonged and severe fighting with skirmishes and raids lasting for periods of days (Bygott, 1979; Mohnot, 1971). In capped langurs, intergroup aggression is not related to defense of food sources by either sex, but rather appears to involve attempts by males from outside the group to interact with group females. During intergroup encounters, resident females bite and push females that approach an intruding male. Males



appear to use intergroup encounters as a means of defending their own females while gaining access to those of other groups (Stanford, 1991). Mate defense and the exploration of new breeding opportunities appear to be important functions of intergroup conflict in moustached tamarins too (Garber, Pruetz & Isaacson, 1993). These authors found no evidence that the tamarins patrolled range borders. In the population of mountain gorillas living in the Virunga Volcanoes of east central Africa, males acquire females by attracting them away from other silverbacks (adult males) during encounters with bisexual groups. Such encounters are characterized by intense male-male competition, involving vigorous threat displays (e.g., chest beating) in 80% and physical fights in 50% of the cases (Harcourt, 1978; Stewart & Harcourt, 1987). Severe wounding (Harcourt, 1978) and probably death (Baumgartel, 1976) of adult males can result. Infanticides may occur during intergroup encounters (Fossey, 1979, 1981). In another population (that of Kahuzi) intergroup interactions with fierce displays but no physical violence were reported by Yamagiwa (1983). 6. For some primate species agonistic intertroop or intercommunity encounters may be highly attractive (at least for some individuals, mostly young males) (Bygott, 1979; Ellefson, 1968; Fossey, 1979; Goodall, 1986; Ripley, 1967; Morrison & Menzel, 1972;), and confrontations may be actively sought and provoked (which suggests intrinsic motivation: They seem to be ’spoiling for a fight’) (vide infra). For the almost exclusive involvement of subadult and adult males in many Old World species, see: Cheney, 1987; Ciani, 1986; Deag, 1973; Goodall et al., 1979; Koford, 1963; Marsden, 1968; Neville, 1966; Rahaman & Parthasarathy, 1969; Southwick, 1962; Sugiyama, 1960; Vessey, 1968; A. Wilson, 1969. On the other hand, it has become increasingly clear lately that female involvement in IAB has been systematically underestimated. Manson & Wrangham (1991) state: Among humans and chimpanzees, males are actively involved in intergroup aggression whereas females are largely limited to a supporting role. This low level of involvement by females is unusual among primates. For example, among rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) at Cayo Santiago, ’violent intergroup squabbles... were marked by sustained fighting in line formation... 2-20 animals faced off with individuals of an opposing group and reciprocally lunged, batted, and growled... participants in the line were most often adult females and 2- to 5-year-old males (i.e., juveniles and subadults)’ (Hausfater, 1972). Although physical contact was rare among the Cayo Santiago rhesus macaques, at least 8% of wounds occurred during intergroup fighting. Adult females may be more involved than males and in a number of species are reported to constitute the central phalanx. In an unusually violent intergroup



confrontation among olive baboons at Gilgil, Kenya, older males watched the conflict from a safe distance while the younger adult males tried to pull their female troopmates away from the fray (Smuts, p.c.). These represent extreme examples of female involvement in intergroup conflicts, but they serve to illustrate that such participation can greatly exceed that typically shown in chimpanzees and humans (Manson & Wrangham, 1991). In many territorial primate species, females are frequently aggressive during intergroup interactions (e.g., ring-tailed lemurs, emperor and saddleback tamarins, vervets, redtail monkeys, blue monkeys, and Kloss’s gibbons). Female aggression is more variable, however, in species that only infrequently defend ranges. In some of these, female aggression is common (e.g., macaque spp., red howlers, capuchins). In other species, however, males are the primary antagonists, perhaps because, as Cheney (1987) suggested, encounters more often concern mate, rather than food, defense (e.g., baboons, mountain gorillas). In primate species characterized by male dispersal (or female philopatry), female hostility toward other groups and cooperation in intergroup aggression is common, and may involve both resource defense against extragroup females, and, more or less collective, antagonism toward migrant, potentially infanticidal, males. Gang attacks, involving mostly coalitions of females, have twice been reported to lead to deaths of males attempting to enter a group of red colobus (Manson & Wrangham, 1991; Starin, 1994; Wrangham, 1999). Cheney (1987) notes that the hostility of the females toward intruder males often escalates and affects the whole group. Female antagonism toward extragroup females also occurs in some of the social carnivores. Spotted hyena females returning to their natal group, after fissioning, were targets of severe aggression by adult female residents of the parent clan and by juveniles of both sexes. They fell, furthermore, to the bottom of the adult female hierarchy (Holekamp et al., 1993). In monogamous primate species females may be as aggressively participating in cooperative range or territory defense and other intergroup interactions as males. In these situations the animals tend to be most aggressive toward individuals of their own sex, perhaps because they represent potential mate competition (Cheney, 1987). In primate species characterized by female dispersion, in which the females transfer to new groups, on the other hand, females tend not to participate in aggressive intergroup interactions: e.g., in gorillas (Fossey, 1979; Harcourt, 1978), red colobus (Struhsaker & Leland, 1979), and hamadryas baboons (Abegglen, 1984). Among chimpanzee females attacks on females of other communities are rare, but not entirely absent (Goodall et al., 1979). The males in these species, in contrast, are generally hostile toward, especially male, members of other groups, which may be ultimately explained by male-male



competition for females (Cheney, 1987). Female involvement in intergroup aggression has been proposed to depend on whether resources that limit female reproduction are defensible through cooperative action. Where they are, females should form close bonds with allied females. Because of the effects of kin selection, such bonds are most effectively achieved through philopatry (i.e., breeding in their natal groups) (Wrangham, 1980, 1987; see van Schaik, 1989, for a contrasting view). Accordingly, species in which females cooperate may be expected to be those with female philopatry. This hypothesis was tested by Manson & Wrangham (1991). The data of Table 3.3 indicate that female philopatry and female participation 2 in intergroup aggression are indeed correlated ( = 8.26; = .76; p < 0.01). An alternative hypothesis appears not to be supported: there is no correlation between the degree of sexual dimorphism and the proportion of studies in which females are reported to participate regularly in intergroup aggression. Female philopatry also appears to be associated with female participation in intergroup aggression in social carnivores such as spotted hyenas (Kruuk, 1972) and lions (Packer, Scheel & Pusey, 1990). Table 3.3: Female Participation in Primate Intergroup Aggression in Relation to Pattern of Intergroup Migration and Degree of Sexual Dimorphism Species

%

N

FT

SD

Lemur catta Propithecus verreauxi Cebus olivaceus Papio cynocephalus Macaca mulatta Macaca fuscata Macaca fascicularis Cercopithecus mitis Cercopithecus aethiops Cercopithecus ascanius Cercocebus albigena Erythrocebus patas Colobus guereza Presbytis entellus Alouatta seniculus Macaca sylvanus Ateles belzebuth Papio hamadryas Colobus badius Pan troglodytes Gorilla gorilla

100 100 100 28 100 100 100 100 57 100 100 100 100 67 100 0 0 0 0 0 0

2 2 1 5 4 1 1 2 7 2 1 1 2 6 1 1 1 1 2 2 1

No No No No No No No No No No No No No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

1.16 1.06 1.26 1.33 2.07 1.29 1.44 1.73 1.33 1.45 1.41 1.79 1.28 1.61 1.27 1.12 1.07 2.29 1.81 1.34 1.72

% = Percent of studies reporting female participation



N = Number of such studies FT = Female Transfer (females typically transfer from natal group before breeding) SD = Sexual Dimorphism (male body weight divided by female body weight) Table from: Manson & Wrangham (1991) Sources: Cheney (1987), Pusey & Packer (1987) and Harvey et al. (1987).

Especially in relation to human ethnocentrism and xenophobia, which will be discussed in more detail in Ch. 6, it is particularly interesting that in the nonhuman primates generally - as in humans - intragroup cohesion and intergroup hostility may be correlated (Cheney, 1992). 7. In a number of primate and carnivore species IAB is accompanied by infanticide and, occasionally, cannibalism. Preferential gang-attacks on solitary females (with infants) are common in chimpanzees. For the possible evolutionary rationale behind infanticide, as a male reproductive strategy, see Angst & Thommen (1977) and Hausfater & Hrdy (1984), who also present evidence on other genera and taxa (When a female’s infant is killed she soon becomes sexually receptive again, and, more often than not, she mates with the killer of her infant (See Wrangham & Peterson, 1996, for the evolutionary logic of this behavior). 8. Personal idiosyncrasies and ’character structure’ of (mostly male) leaders strongly influence group integration, the movements of the group within its home range, and dominance-subordinate relationships with other groups (Itani et al., 1963; Kawai, 1964; Fossey, 1971 et seq; Kawanaka, 1973). Careful control of trouble within the group and leading attacks on other groups was for instance characteristic of some leader males at Takasakiyama. Furthermore, concerted action and scouting behavior of group males seem to indicate a ’consciousness of belonging’ (Kawanaka, 1973) in this species. Cf. also Altmann’s (1962), Russell & Russell’s (1968) and Carpenter’s (1974) story of Diablo, the ’monkey warlord’ of Cayo Santiago. 9. When home ranges overlap extensively, the aggressive defense of a particular resource may be more costly than the simple avoidance of other groups. In such cases, intergroup competition is often mediated by the relative dominance of the groups involved. There is evidence for a positive correlation between a group’s size (and the number of adult males) and its ability to displace other groups (though occasionally more subtle factors - such as the history of past relations between the groups - are involved). This results in a definite linear group dominance hierarchy revealed by approach-retreat encounters (Altmann, 1962; Cheney, 1987; Deag, 1973; Givens, 1975; Imanishi, 1963; Kawanaka, 1973; Koford, 1963; Koyama, 1970; Lindburg, 1971; Loy, 1970; Neville, 1966; Nishida, 1963; Rahaman & Parthasarathy,



1969; Southwick, 1962; Southwick, Beg & Siddiqi, 1965; Sugiyama, 1960, 1968; Vandenbergh, 1967; Vessey, 1968, 1971; A. Wilson, 1969; Yoshiba, 1968). Approach-retreat encounters (called Type C encounters by Deag [1973]) have, for example, been observed in most macaque species (Givens, 1975). Occasionally, groups expand their home ranges at the expense of their neighbors’, and in these cases the relative sizes of the groups - as well as the fighting ability of a particular individual - may determine success (Cheney, 1987). 10. With regard to the general function(s) of IAB in primates, Washburn & Hamburg (1972) succinctly epitomized: "Intergroup aggression either leads to one group’s having the resources of an area at its exclusive disposal, or at least creates a situation in which one is much more likely to obtain food in one area". Food is not the only resource nonhuman species fight over, however. Much more important - but only relatively recently acknowledged - is the struggle for differential reproduction. Nonhuman vertebrate males frequently come into open conflict over access to females, and/or control of resources useful in attracting females. Females, on the other hand, may cooperate in coalitions of kin to attack reproductive competitors, or the offspring of reproductive competitors (Wasser, 1983; Silk & Boyd, 1983); such situations typically involve harassment of subordinate females and infanticide, with little risk to the aggressors (Low, 1990; See review by van der Dennen, 1992). The basic reasons for male-male intergroup aggression, rather than intergroup aggression by both sexes, probably include the different reproductive payoff curves for the two sexes in mammals generally. Male-male cooperation, and the benefits of risk-taking, may be enhanced by groups of related males living together (called ’male-bonded’ or ’female transfer’ in primates, and ’patrilocality’ in humans), but this seems not to be an absolute requirement. In lions, males leave the natal group, while female relatives remain - yet, lions engage in male intergroup lethal conflict. In gorillas, both sexes may leave the natal group. In wild dogs, wolves, and mongooses, who have a monogamous, extended-family structure, both sexes are involved in lethal intergroup aggression (Low, 1990). See ' 3.7 for an attempt to put the above observations on primate intergroup behavior in a more comprehensive socio-ecological perspective.



3.5 The Chimpanzee versus the Baboon IAB Pattern Two distinct patterns of group antagonism in primates merit some closer scrutiny for reasons of later comparison with human primitive warfare. These are the baboon ’pitched battle’ and the chimpanzee ’ambush’. Let us examine them in turn. Van Hooff (1990) vividly portrays a massively escalated agonistic episode between two baboon (Papio anubis) groups of about 100 and 150 individuals respectively, at Gilgil, Kenya. He describes it as an impressive, sometimes earpiercing, spectacular and cacophonous event, lasting more than an hour. A great many animals from both groups formed two, more than 100 meters-long frontlines, mutually threatening and making small sorties, meanwhile alternately ’jerk-looking’ at their own neighbors (for reassurance) and at the adversaries, and making a hell of a noise (’shriekbarking’). Suddenly, presumably when one or more adversaries shrank and retreated, a number of animals simultaneously rushed forward in a massive assault. Almost immediately the entire frontline dashed forward and drove the other party before it for some hundred meters, accompanied by a crescendo of shriekbarking by the entire chasing group. Gradually the chase lost impetus, slowed down, the frontlines coming to a standstill and again the parties confronted each other. After a while a similar surging attack would be repeated in the same or the reverse direction, the groups chasing each other to and fro. The end of the confrontation was less spectacular: it ended not in a decisive final chase, but petered out because gradually less and less individuals participated in the forays. This was especially true for the intruding group, which finally withdrew to its own home area. Most notable, according to van Hooff’s account, was the small amount and short duration of physical contacts during the fight. There were no visible injuries, which was probably more due to the animals’ fear to be engulfed by the opponents, rather than to any magnanimous restraint or inhibition. Furthermore, there were no indications that the manifestly synchronized action could be ascribed to one or more coordinating leaders. "It was also striking that it were not primarily the males who stood in the front line. Contrary to what one would expect at first sight, the females were just as active in the skirmishes, if not more so. The same has also been observed in the defence of groups against predators. The classic picture of the adult male placing himself as a protective shield outside the group when it is threatened (Washburn & DeVore, 1961), does not seem to be a universal truth. Thus Rowell (1972) found that the long legs of the males in a threatened baboon group brought them soon to the head of the fleeing group. And Gouzoules et al. (1975) discovered, in one of the rare cases in which humans have witnessed a predator attacking a member of a primate group, that animals of all ages and both sexes took part in the defence when a lynx grabbed a young Japanese macaque" (van Hooff, 1990).



See especially Smuts et al. (1987) for pictorial evidence of similar ’pitched battles’ in a number of other primate species such as vervet monkeys, redtail monkeys, gray langurs, gelada baboons, and rhesus macaques. In all these cases the combatants are females. Bygott (1974, 1979), Jane Goodall (1979 et seq) and Goodall et al. (1979) recently reported on the intercommunity relationships of the Gombe (Tanzania) population of chimpanzees, especially episodes of what Goodall literally called ’primitive warfare’. Parties of up to ten adult males, sometimes accompanied by females and subadults, quite regularly patrol the boundaries, keeping close together, silent and alert, often stopping to listen intently, apparently actively searching for signs of neighbors. Sometimes they climb a tree to scout the ’hostile’ territory of the adjacent community, just like a human reconnaissance party might do (the original community had begun to divide into two separate communities about 1970). If no members of the neigboring community are detected, the patrol may stealthily intrude into the ’enemy’ territory. When a fairly large ’enemy’ party is encountered both parties may engage in vocal and gestural agonistic displays, or one of them may charge and chase the other away, or both give up and return to their core areas. At other times, a party, upon spotting ’enemies’, may flee, thus avoiding encounter. When, however, small parties or single ’enemy’ chimpanzees, particularly anestrous females, are encountered by the ’warriors’, these may be severely and viciously attacked and killed. Goodall describes several such lethal episodes in some (gruesome) detail. "It seems", she continues, "that we have been observing a phenomenon rarely recorded in field studies - the gradual extermination of one group of animals by another, stronger, group. Why these brutal attacks? The northern males were not defending their own territory, since all the attacks except one were deep within the southern community home range. On the other hand, the aggressor males, before the community split, had access to the area that the southern community took over. If they were merely trying to reclaim territory they had lost, then they have certainly succeeded" (Goodall, 1979). Subsequently, Goodall (1986) reported observations of five lethal attacks, and some 13 more that left the victims - including adults and infants of both sexes severely wounded and bleeding profusely. Why, she wondered, would the aggressors attempt to kill, maim or injure their victims instead of merely chasing them away? Bygott (1979) and Goodall et al. (1979) emphasize that the males actively seek out agonistic interactions with the adjacent community during their patrolling. Also Nishida (1979, 1980) and Itani (1982) have observed similar group antagonism in chimpanzees, which was described by Itani as a "skirmish in a war". On the patrolling behavior of some ’warrior groups’ Itani also reports: "they looked as if they were aiming for the best chance of encountering another group", or as if they were looking for an opportunity to ’hunt down’



conspecifics and inflict fatal injuries (Manson & Wrangham, 1991). Furthermore, the attacks were all characterized by "unusual brutality and persistence" (Bygott, 1979), and the observers could not escape feeling that the aggressors were ’intentionally’ trying to kill their victims. All observed lethal attacks were unprovoked and lasted at least ten minutes. The victim was deliberately held down by some of the attackers, and subjected to a treatment more brutal than any found in intracommunity aggressive episodes. As Itani (1982) phrased it: "antagonistic interactions of a group versus an individual, or a group versus another group, with the intent to kill, is peculiar to chimpanzee society" (Cf. Fossey, 1981; Ghiglieri, 1988; Goodall, 1986; Goodall et al., 1979; Schubert, 1983; Wrangham, 1975, 1979; Manson & Wrangham, 1991). Interestingly, intercommunity encounters involve mostly males. Females (usually while in estrous) sometimes accompany males on patrol, but they do not typically initiate ’hostilities’ (Goodall et al., 1979; Wrangham, 1975). Another intriguing observation is that the intense excitement shown by the aggressors during and after the attacks rather easily ’spills over’ into hunting and killing other primates (red colobus or baboons), which might suggest that at least in some instances similar motivational mechanisms may be involved in both intraspecific violence and interspecific predation (Bygott, 1979; Vogel, 1989). Possibly brief attacks on females encountered in overlap zones between neighboring communities attract rather than repel the females concerned (Goodall et al., 1979); some young unhabituated females not only remained within the home range but gradually moved into the core area despite occasional attacks (Pusey, 1979). The male gang attacks on the old male Goliath are particularly puzzling, both in view of his extreme old age and his history of long and peaceful associations with the aggressor males. He could in no way be considered a reproductive competitor (Bygott, 1979). It appears that the violence of the chimpanzee ’warriors’ is especially severe towards old, lactating, and anestrous females, and considerably less severe towards females in estrus, i.e., those with high repoductive value. "In particular, young nulliparous females are not attacked severely and instead may be escorted by or forced to travel with the aggressors (Wolf & Schulman, 1984; Goodall, 1986). This makes sense as part of a male reproductive strategy because such females are destined to transfer to a new group and are therefore potential mates. While lethal attacks were likely to be directed against solitary males and anestrous females, estrous females seem to be considered an attractive and alienable resource which can be transferred into the attackers’ group" (Manson & Wrangham, 1981). Similarly, Ghiglieri (1984, 1987, 1988) recently reported on the Kibale Forest chimpanzee society in which cooperatively territorial and murderous males were observed to kill the adult males of a smaller group and then absorb their reproductive females (which also may have been a common strategy in hominid warfare). See also Nishida et al. (1985) for an account of the Mahale



Mountains National Park chimpanzees. Ghiglieri (1987) and Alexander (1989) speculate that this strategy may be a pattern common to the human-chimpanzee-bonobo clade: "Unlike gorillas and orangutans, males of the chimpanzee-bonobo-human clade retain their male offspring predominantly, live in closed social groups containing multiple females, mate polygynously, restrict their ranging to a communal territory, are cooperatively active in territorial defense, and, apparently, when a neighboring community weakens, the males of some communities make a concerted strategic effort to stalk, attack, and kill their rivals as do men" (Ghiglieri, 1987). Especially, the combination of male-male cooperation, territoriality and female transfer has been singled out as the starting condition for lethal intergroup aggression (Goodall, 1986; Ghiglieri, 1987, 1988; Alexander, 1989; Manson & Wrangham, 1991; See also Ch. 8). In these sections I have indicated the extent of IAB as it occurs in primates, and to a lesser extent in group-territorial carnivores; and presented some general observations on IAB as it occurs in these species. In the final sections, I shall briefly discuss the proximate and ultimate mechanisms proposed to account for the phenomena observed. In the primates’ group-antagonistic behavior, morphologically two more or less distinct patterns are discernible: (1) a pattern resembling the ’pitched battle’ with parallel frontlines, mutual threats, sorties and chases, resulting in none to few casualties, as described in baboons (the baboon pattern); and (2) a sneakattack pattern, involving male patrolling, intentional and lethal attack on qualitatively and quantitatively weaker victims (often solitary and female), accompanied by unusual cruelty and frenzy, more resembling the human raidand ambush-type of warfare, exemplified by the chimps of Gombe (the chimpanzee pattern). The latter is peculiarly unique and confined as far as is known, among nonhuman primates, to this species. It seems that the particular social organization, cognitive capacities (and other psychological ’preadaptations’), as well as, possibly, ecological circumstances of increased group competition, have facilitated development of a close parallel to human raiding in the Gombe chimpanzees. The human male, evidently, has both patterns at his disposal. All the other descriptions of IAB in the literature can be understood to be various mixtures or combinations of these two idiotypical patterns. The pitched battle provides a striking parallel between primates and humans. In humans too, pitched battle is the least bloody and lethal form of primitive warfare (often boiling down to a few dyadic duels), and simultaneously the most clamorous, vociferous and emotional spectacle, abundant with magnificent display, showing-off of superb calisthenic skills, and torrents of verbal insults and obscenities: In short, an excellent show of ferocity, ending as soon as the first casualty has occurred. It also appears to be the most ritualized, regulated and conventionalized form of warfare. The main difference, of



course, is that in baboons it is often the result of a chance encounter between groups, while in humans it is more often than not premeditated and prearranged (even the identity of the casualty-to-be may be preordained). It is very probable that the two behavioral patterns in their (hypothetical) pure and unadulterated form correspond with two discernible motivational systems and their neurophysiological and neuroendocrine substrata: the one tilting toward fight/flight motivation, the other toward predation. It is not hard to envisage the physiological differences between the silent and stealthy sneakattack and the highly excited, clamorous and contagious ’pitched battles’. It is, indeed, remarkable how these primate battles and raids resemble those of human primitive societies, which brings us to the question whether any true homologies are involved. Any answer to this question must necessarily be speculative, but it would be a highly capricious and bizarre streak of nature if this would not turn out to be the case, at least for the chimpanzees, who are, after all, phylogenetically our very next-of-kin. All in all, our data on infrahuman IAB seem grosso modo to confirm the observation by Itani (1982) that "the higher the species phylogenetically, the more frequent and varied is intra-specific killing". This is, in my opinion, only a more specific instance of the more generic proposition that the closer to Homo s. sapiens the species is phylogenetically, the more individual behavior is multi-determined (and the mind multi-modular). There is no ’instinct’, in other words, to account for all the agonistic acts. But if there is no instinct or similar mechanism operating here, there must be something else: It may be a combination of ’male bonding’ which is sort of a synergistic effect bringing about a strong demarcation against anybody outside (a kind of protoethnocentrism), and a more elaborate cognitive make-up. I hypothesize, in other words, that ’higher’ species need extra strong group delimitations, the strength of which must be somehow related to the species’ affective system. Maybe chimpanzees, like our own species, have very strong imaginations (schemata or mental representations) of we and they (or what Kawanaka [1973] called "a consciousness of belonging"), which stress discreteness just like our symbols do. This discrimination may well be the price for ’de-instinctivation’ in both humans and chimpanzees. ’De-instinctivation’ is a very valuable asset: the individual is much less dependent on immediate external stimulus configurations. S/he ’knows’ symbolically about relevant phenomena in the external cosmos. This may be less so in chimpanzees than in humans but to a certain extent there must be something similar at work here. Besides the general, more elaborate cognitive make-up, there may be highly (content-)specific cognitive mechanisms involved, which would also, at least partly, explain why ’war-like’ intergroup conflict is actually so rare in mammals in general, and primates in particular. One should not loose sight of the fact that, despite the impressive list of species



which do, thousands of other species do not have ’group aggression’ in their behavioral repertoire. In a similar vein, Tooby & Cosmides (1988) reasoned that the distribution of war in the animal kingdom is limited by the same factor that limits the emergence of the multi-individual cooperation on which war depends: Specific cognitive preadaptations. Chimpanzees and humans appear to have the cognitive mechanisms it takes to observe, assess, and to regulate the appropriate pattern of response towards several different males structured into a coalition (e.g., de Waal 1982). They propose that these species have evolved specialized ’Darwinian algorithms’, cognitive programs, that govern coalitional behavior, and constitute a distinctive coalitional psychology. These cognitive mechanisms cannot simply be either culturally ’learned’ or be the product of ’general intelligence’, but must be adaptively designed information processing systems specialized for these functions (See ' 4.16.3). Manson & Wrangham (1991; Wrangham, 1999; Wrangham & Peterson, 1996) referred to the chimpanzee ambush-like pattern of stealth, stalking and ’stabbing in the back’ as ’lethal male raiding’, and assert that it is similar to armed raiding in small-scale human societies in being conducted by small groups of adult males, being initiated to the surprise of the victim(s), and involving deliberate searching for opportunities to injure or kill members of a neighboring social group. These similarities between chimpanzees and humans seem to suggest a common evolutionary background. Before I shall examine this proposition in more detail, a brief excursion to the proximate mechanisms involved in IAB may be in order.

3.6 Proximate Mechanisms Obviously there are vast differences between species in the extent to which they show IAB. It is also obvious that the motivational-emotional and behavioral mechanisms which bring about such diversity in group behaviors are of different kinds. Van Hooff (1990) discussed some of the behavioral and motivational mechanisms involved in IAB. In the simplest case the joint collective action is simply the summation of independent individual actions, each individual being affected by the same behavior-eliciting factors. Beyond this, several forms of individual interaction may lead to some structure and synchrony in collective action: ’social sensitization’ and ’mood-transfer’. Social sensitization is the mechanism by which the intentionality or activity of one group member directs attention of other group members, perhaps inadvertently, toward the stimulus source (e.g., by alarm calls), and thus contributes to the synchronization of action, which may, in the case of a



predator threat or territorial intrusion, result in a more effective, simultaneous and more or less concerted defense. When the fitness of the individuals is thereby enhanced, a selection process is generated by means of which diverse structures that may contribute to such synchronization and coordination will spread in the population. In its simplest form this is the case when animals warn each other about a threat with special alarm signals. The evolution of breeding in colonies among birds such as gulls (e.g., Tinbergen, 1963; Gotmark & Anderson, 1984), and terns (Møller, 1982) must have been selectively promoted by the increased security resulting from the united call for defense. A further stage in social influencing is the instigation or transfer of a particular attitude or mood. The receiver of an alarm call is then not merely made aware of a certain stimulus source, but the signal can also effectuate that initially neutral stimuli suddenly acquire an 'emotional color', for instance, that another animal is perceived as an 'enemy'. In many species aggressive displays have a contagious effect (cf. Russell & Russell, 1968). A classical example of mood-transfer is the enticing behavior, described in ducks by Lorenz (1963), in which the female instigates aggression of the drake against strangers. Analogously, in some species of Old-world monkeys 'side-directed' behavior can be observed: a form of polyadic agonistic interaction in which an animal can involve a third party in a dyadic conflict and incite the aggression of this third party against his adversary (van Hooff & de Waal, 1975; de Waal, 1976, 1977; de Waal & van Hooff, 1981). In an analysis of coalition formation and agonistic third-party intervention in a group of chimpanzees, de Waal (1978; cf. also 1982) distinguished a category of protective support, in favor of the weaker party in a conflict, and a category of opportunistic support, in favor of the stronger party. Opportunistic support concerns cases in which an animal helps another who is stronger than his opponent, and who would have had a large chance of winning the conflict on his own anyway. Such an exploitative and much less risky form of support is encountered, in chimpanzees, particularly among the males who seem to seek coalitions. Coalitions have the character of transactions which continue as long as both participants derive net benefits and/or have more influence or freedom of movement than in other possible combinations. The choice which side to support appears to be less consistent over time (i.e., to be opportunistic) and to depend less on pre-existing relationships of interdependence. The support often seems to be mutual, or 'favors' may be given in compensation, as a kind of reward for the support (e.g., sexual permissiveness). Opportunistic support may reflect the principles of 'reciprocal altruism' (Trivers, 1971), and seems to have a more calculated character than has protective support which seems to be more impulsive (and undoubtedly involves kinship considerations). Indications about this kind of difference between the more altruistic form of



support, which depends on a relationship of attachment and affiliation, and the more opportunistic kind, where intervention depends on the possible advantage gained by the supporter, have also been found in other primate species (e.g, Netto & van Hooff, 1986; See Harcourt & de Waal, 1992). Just as the giving of support can be facilitated by a relationship of attachment, so too can the reverse: Joining forces against a common enemy may enhance mutual attachment. A classic explanation of this phenomenon is the so-called redirection-of-aggression hypothesis. If an animal receives aggressionstimulating signals from a conspecific, but at the same time also receives signals which thwart the expression of that aggression (e.g., signals stimulating flight or sexual tendencies), the aggression may be redirected at an innocent third party. This redirection can be encouraged by one of the partners choosing a victim and ’picking on’ him. A typical example has been described for monogamous species such as ducks and geese. When there is tension or uncertainty in the pair bond the weaker party, often the female, may set its mate on an outsider. The bond-strengthening effect of joint action against such an outsider can now become the main causal factor of such behavior, whereby the cementing of the relationship is the primary goal. A fine example is the ’triumph ceremony’ of greylag geese, the origin of which can be traced back to the redirection incitation found in many duck species. When pairs meet again after some separation, they seem to be uncertain about the attitude of their partner. One of the two animals may now carry out an attack on an imaginary third party, in which he/she may be joined by his or her mate. After the attack both parties return to carry out synchronized, ecstatic pumping movements with their necks. Behavior which was originally intended as aggression redirection here has evolved into a declaration of attachment (Fischer, 1965). There are indications that in cognitively highly developed species, such as primates, the redirection-victim is chosen not only because it is an enemy of the redirector, but also because the redirector ’knows’ that it has a difficult relationship with its potential ally. This kind of strategy demands a high level of appraisal of the interaction possibilities among the other group members, and it has been postulated that the cognitive demands necessary for such a process must have formed the most important selective pressure in the development of primate intelligence (Humphrey, 1976, 1983), especially the kind of intelligence which has been labeled ’Machiavellian’ (Byrne & Whiten, 1988; See also Ch. 8). Concerted agonistic action or communal redirection of aggression against an enemy outsider may enhance durable emotional bonds (e.g., pair bonds). Some courting ceremonies may actually have evolved from such communal aggressive displays, as Lorenz (1963) has claimed. The process of regressive deritualization when such a bond occasionally breaks down then reveals its evolutionary origin.



In the case of the Gombe chimpanzees a kind of agonistic appetite seems to be involved, a real ’spoiling for a fight’ with ’intent to kill’ (counteracted by a healthy dose of ’cowardice’), as may be derived from their active patrolling, searching for clues of the ’enemy’, and the massive eruptions of intense and frenzied excitement during and after the rather vicious attacks (On primate agonistic intentionality, see Ellis [1986] who concludes: "behavior undertaken with some kind of neurological representation of the probable outcome of the behavior is intended behavior; many nonhuman primates appear to have these sorts of neurological representations just as humans do when they behave aggressively toward one another". See also: Griffin, 1981 et seq.; Dawkins, 1993; de Waal, 1982, 1987). The above observations seem to corroborate Rasa’s (1981) thesis that "selfdefensive behavior is aversive, property-protective behavior appetitive", at least in (male) chimpanzees, and assuming that some kind of property1 protective agonism is indeed operative . The sound and the fury accompanying the baboon confrontations probably functions simultaneously as reassurance ritual (for the own side) and aversive, threatening and intimidating stimuli directed at the other party. The shriekbarking may indicate a high-intensity fight/flight ambivalence. In most of the species reviewed here, gestures of submission elicit nonaggressive behavior by the attacker. In chimpanzees, attacks may continue in the face of submissive gestures (de Waal, 1982, 1989). Males form coalitions, fight single-handedly and in groups, and reconcile using vocal and behavioral signals of submission and alliance-seeking. Males have a formal dominance hierarchy, with far more aggression and reconciliation than females. De Waal (1989) suggests that the clear-cut dominance hierarchy provides a ritual format for reconciliation; reconciliations often follow a behavioral confirmation of formal status. Furthermore, "the unreliable, Machiavellian nature of the male power games implies that every friend is a potential foe, and vice versa. Males have good reason to restore disturbed relations; no male ever knows when he may need his strongest rival" (de Waal, 1989). Later, de Waal gives a striking and poignant example of how male-male power tensions, unresolved, can erupt with lethal consequences. An important distinction between all nonhuman species and humans is the lack of any elaborate mechanism in other species for ending inter- (as opposed to intra-) group conflict. While the patterns of reassurance, even negotiation, are sometimes present, these occur in resolution of disputes within the group (in which participants already know each other, and will probably continue to live 1

On the vexing problem of aggressive appetence, see also: Brace & Montagu, 1977; Craig, 1918, 1928; Crook, 1973; van der Dennen, 1980; van Dijk, 1977; Hinde, 1960, 1970, 1974; Lorenz, 1963; Marler & Hamilton, 1966; Potegal, 1979; Scherer, Abeles & Fischer, 1975; Schuster, 1978; Scott, 1968; Tinbergen, 1965; E.O. Wilson, 1975.



together). Low (1990) therefore argues that intragroup conflicts have been more frequent and selectively more important in these species’ evolutionary histories than intergroup conflicts.

3.7 Socio-ecology: Making Sense of It All Can we make sense of, and bring some order in, the apparent diversity of the intergroup behavioral patterns in the nonhuman primates and in the other species we have encountered? The most valiant attempt in that direction is the socio-ecological approach as developed by Wrangham (1980, 1987), van Schaik (1983, 1985, 1986, 1989), van Schaik & van Hooff (1983), Cheney (1987), and van Hooff (1988, 1990) a.o., on the ultimate causes of primate sociality. Though differing in detail and emphasis, these authors consider powerful ecological selection pressures to have shaped the social structure of primates (and by implication other species). Other factors, such as phylogenetic 2 inertia , are also acknowledged, but the emphasis is clearly on the physical and social environment. 3 The socio-ecological model underlying this reasoning is, highly simplified , the following: 1) Primates (organisms in general) are considered to behave as if they were maximizing their reproductive success (RS), and to compete for resources necessary to achieve this ’aim’. 2) As scramble competition (also called ’exploitation competition’) and contest 2

’Phylogenetic inertia’ refers to the (natural history of the) complex of traits a species has evolved which constrains the range of future evolutionary pathways. Natural selection has to work on, or tinker with, the material available. If there is no such material present, some options are simply closed. One cannot construct a Rolls Royce if there is no combustion engine, no brakes, no gear, etc. In a similar vein, we do not expect pigs to evolve wings B not overnight, not in ages to come B even if it would be highly advantageous for pigs to be ’on the wing’. In more technical terms, constraints on social organization, relatively immune to ecological pressures, could be imposed by cognitive abilities limiting the development of polyadic coalitional (involving both complexly interacting cooperative and competitive) behaviors, by communicative constraints, by morphological constraints in relation to sexual dimorphism, etc. (See Wrangham, 1987). 3

Admittedly, the following model is a rough sketch only. For a more complete picture of (primate) social organization, we would also be obliged to consider the sex- status-, and agerelated alternative, conditional reproductive strategies (conditional strategies have the general form: "If dominant do X; if subordinate try Y") of all individuals concerned, and always in relation to the strategies other conspecifics play (see Alcock, 1979; Smuts, 1987; van der Dennen, 1992; for reviews of such strategies); the powerful mechanisms of conflict resolution, reconciliation strategies and ’peace-keeping’ politics (e.g., de Waal, 1987, 1988); specific selection pressures; population dynamics; the specific history and quality of past intergroup relations; etc. etc. Please keep this in mind when the model seems occasionally to be too oversimplified, undetailed, sweeping, and ignoring exceptions to the general rules.



competition (also called ’exclusion competition’ or ’interference competition’) can occur within social groups as well as between social groups, four main types of competition ought to be distinguished: Within-Group Scramble (WGS), Within-Group Contest (WGC), Between-Group Scramble (BGS), and Between-Group Contest (BGC). All four types of competition can be present simultaneously in one species, but my main focus here is Between-Group Contest competition. The main conditions giving rise to contest competition within as well as between groups are: (a) resources in short supply, and (b) the defensibility of access to those resources. The factors limiting the reproductive success of males and females tend to be different, however, due to the strong asymmetry in parental investment. Consequently, males and females compete for different resources, and the competitive and cooperative (alliances, coalitions, bonding) isosexual interactions, as well as male-female bonds, are expected to reflect these different interests. For example, in situations where males are not able to provide significant services to females (such as protection against sexual harassment by other males), females are expected not to develop bonds with males, and in fact should actively attempt to keep them away or repel them from their groups. 3) Reproductive success of females is determined largely by the general factor ’health’, good condition, or nutritional and energetic status, meaning the combined effects of access to vital (food) resources, safety from predators, absence of stress overload and infectious diseases, and absence of other factors conducive to a poor physical condition, and which may adversely affect fecundity. 4) Reproductive success of males, on the other hand, is determined to a very large extent by access to fertile females (the only ’resources’ who can convert the males’ fitness potential into reproductive success). These two considerations combined predict strikingly different reproductive strategies for the sexes. Females, in general, will maximize RS by maintaining a good condition for a long period of time. Males, on the other hand, maximize RS (a) by fertilizing many females and by investing in the maximization of the chances of fertilization (a polygamist strategy); or (b) by investing in long-term paternal care for a small number of consecutively raised offspring (a monogamist strategy). In the former case, male will have to face fierce competition by other males. In the latter, males will have to face possible ’marital infidelity’ by their mates, and chronic challenges and threats to their paternity confidence. 5) Predation pressure largely determines sociality versus solitariness, while distribution and monopolizability of food resources largely determine the competition regime. Predictable and defendable resources are conducive to contest competition within and between groups, while abundant, non-clumped, undefendable food resources are conducive to scramble competition (i.e., competition in terms of efficiency of exploitation). When kin-based alliances of females increase access to food patches, females are expected to remain in their natal groups and cooperate with kin, and to form hierarchies of nepotistic



’matriarchal clan systems’. They are also expected, as the resident sex, to be hostile toward (females of) other groups, in proportion to the economic defensibility of the home ranges, and to participate in intergroup conflicts as ferociously as males or even more so. Because males may aid females in dominating other groups, aggression toward extragroup males is expected to be less severe than toward extragroup females. Similarly, monogamous species are predicted to aggressively defend home ranges. 6) The competition regime largely determines the distribution and organization of females (e.g., female-bonded societies with matrilines and complex hierarchies are common in frugivorous primates with within-group contest competition), and their attachment to the natal group, and, consequently, the migration of males. Males migrate (become the exogamous sex) when females are bonded in female kin-hierarchies and, therefore, discouraged from emigrating (because they will virtually always be worse off if they emigrate to another group). Once females emigrate as well, because they live in a situation of scramble competition and, therefore, are not forced into strong female bonds, males have the option to stay in their natal group and to develop longlasting relationships based on familiarity and kinship. In those species characterized by female dispersal, females are expected to avoid agonistic intergroup interactions and not to participate in home range defense. The intergroup behavior of males, on the other hand, should primarily involve defense of females against extragroup males. 7) The distribution, organization, and reproductive competition of males is determined largely by the distribution, organization, and monopolizability of females. When BGC competition is important, group members are expected to form a large alliance in order to improve their competitive ability as a group. This generally implies a more relaxed and egalitarian WGC regime, otherwise subordinates might either refrain from taking risks in intergroup conflicts, or even defect to another group. In addition to food, males are expected to compete above all over access to females. Whether this competition takes the form of scramble or contest competition is determined principally by the distribution in space and time of estrous females. If females live in compact groups, access to them can be monopolized, which results in female defense polygyny (either one-male groups if the females can be guarded or herded effectively, or else multi-male groups). If the home ranges in which the females live, or the resources to which they are attracted, can be defended effectively, this gives rise to resource defense polygyny. In these situations intrasexual selection will favor contest vigor and dimorphism in males. If monopolization of females is impossible (females actively resist being monopolized or choose a diversity of mating partners), males may form either monogamous bonds with a single female (most often in the form of exclusive consort relationships with fertile females), or engage in scramble competition polygyny, in which case natural selection



4

favors sperm competition . The male reproductive competition regime largely determines the ’politics’ of males, the genesis of (opportunistic) coalitions and support strategies, cooperation in hunting and intergroup conflict if present, the sharing of prey, and the functional analogon to human ’fraternal interest groups’ in chimpanzees. Male philopatry becomes an option when female contest competition is relaxed, and therefore the pressure on females to be philopatric is low. This situation is expected to facilitate the formation of preferably kin-based male alliances (’fraternities’), which defend access to a territory and to the females attracted to it. Such a cooperative resource defense polygyny thus depends on restraint in within-group competition (especially sexual tolerance) in combination with cooperation in between-group competition. The ’wars’ between chimpanzee communities may therefore be viewed as male reproductive strategies in which coalitions of males increase their territory and their access to females living on or lured to that territory. The intricacies and complexities involved in polyadic coalitions within, and fierce, stealthy, raiding-type coalitional competition between groups may also have established a positive feedback loop with social and Machiavellian intelligence, and, possibly, ’proto-ethnocentrism’ (See Ch. 7 and 8).

4

If this analysis gives the impression that primate females are passive recipients of male aggressive and sexual strategies and power games, it should be corrected immediately. As was seen, females are not only actively involved in agonistic intergroup encounters in many species, also in matters sexual females are the active solicitors in most species, and they exert their privilege of Female Choice in mate selection C as well as their personal ‘erotic’ preferences and aversions C with gusto and bravado (See Hrdy, 1981; Smuts, 1987). Female choice must have been a potent selective force in the evolution of primate C including human C societies.



3.8 Ultimate Explanations of Chimpanzee ’Warfare’ Chimpanzee social organization is relatively complex and differs from most other primate species. It has been speculated that it might be similar in many important ways to the societies of early Man (e.g., Hamburg, 1978; Itani, 1980; McGrew, 1981; Trudeau et al., 1981; de Waal, 1982; Nishida & HiraiwaHasegawa, 1987). Chimpanzees, like humans, are ’highly xenophobic’ (Schubert, 1983), and they sometimes engage in ’armed fighting’ (Kortlandt, 1972) in defense against predators, and, as we saw, lethal raids with ’intent to 5 kill’ (Itani, 1982) against conspecifics . Chimpanzees, like humans, are also conspicuous for their ’hunting and predatory behavior’ (Kortlandt, 1972). Many authors have pointed to the developing tradition of cooperative hunting in male chimpanzees as a possible facilitating factor in IAB (as it is also hypothesized to be in the evolution of human warfare; see ' 3.9). As possible advantages of collective patrolling and IAB by male chimpanzees have been suggested the increased access to females (e.g., Bygott, 1979; Goodall et al., 1979; Low, 1990; Manson & Wrangham, 1991) and foraging for food resources (Nishida, 1979). Bygott (1979) and Nishida (1979) have drawn attention to the size and composition of the respective groups as determinants of arousing the males either to attack or flee. The hypothesis that population pressure, due to increasing human encroachment on their habitat, is responsible for the aggravation of chimpanzee ’warfare’ (Goodall et al., 1979), has not been substantiated yet (Trudeau et al., 1981). From the individual-level-of-selection point of view, according to Bygott’s (1979) analysis, the chief advantage of collective territorial defense to a male chimpanzee is that he need be involved in very few potentially harmful confrontations with competitors from other communities. A group of males is a more powerful deterrent to intruders than a single one, since a group can inflict a severe or lethal attack with minimal risk to its members. Therefore "By merely accompanying other males on border patrols (which can be combined with foraging), an individual male can help to maintain his continued access to a large number of females. This model implies that there would be strong selection for males to be rapidly aroused to attack strangers, particularly males, 5

Chimpanzees are also in other ways extraordinary creatures. Young chimps may throw temper tantrums like spoiled human children do. The joyful games chimpanzee youngsters play resemble in considerable detail the games human children play all over the word, including teasing behaviors and quasi-aggression (Hebb & Thompson, 1968; Adang, 1985). And whole communities occasionally engage in ’festivals’ or ’carnivals’ (also called ’booming’ or ’rain dances’) with drumming and other clamorous fun going on for many hours (Nissen, 1931; Goodall, 1965; Reynolds & Reynolds, 1965; Sugiyama, 1969), and ’social feasting’ when the spoils of a successful hunt are to be shared (Teleki, 1973; Goodall, 1986).



on sight" (Bygott, 1979). Gang attacks on strange estrous females have not been recorded thus far. In contrast, Bygott continues, it might benefit males to attack strange females who were pregnant or had small infants, since by doing so they might destroy the offspring of competitor males and increase their own chances of genetic investment (which may also account for the infanticides observed). One major condition for the defense of a group territory, as well as collective hunting, is that males must cooperate to a certain extent. Cooperation depends on the strength of male bonding. Bonds should be strongest if males are incorporated into the male group at a relatively young age and if males are closely related (minimizing intermale competition for females). In chimpanzees, as we saw, males indeed remain in their natal group, while the females transfer (Goodall, 1986; Nishida, 1979; Pusey, 1979; Wrangham, 1979). Goodall (1986) herself explains the chimpanzee proto-warfare in terms of the idiosyncratic pattern of chimpanzee territoriality and preadaptations common in chimpanzees and early humans. In three important ways, she explains, chimpanzee behavior does not comply with classical territoriality: (a) Both at Gombe and Mahale it is the relative size and the composition of the two neighboring parties that determine the outcome of an encounter, rather than the geographic location; (b) Chimpanzees have a large home range with considerable overlap between neighboring communities; and (c) It is perhaps in the violence of their hostility towards neighbors that chimpanzees, like hyenas and lions, differ most from the traditional territory owners of the animal kingdom. Their victims are not simply chased out of the owners’ territory if they are found trespassing; they are assaulted and left, perhaps to die. Moreover, chimpanzees not only attack trespassers, but may make aggressive raids into the very heart of the core area of neighboring groups: "In the chimpanzee, territoriality functions not only to repel intruders from the home range, but sometimes to injure or eliminate them; not only to defend the existing home range and its resources, but to enlarge it opportunistically at the expense of weaker neighbors; not only to protect the female resources of a community, but to actively and aggressively recruit new sexual partners from neighboring social groups" (Goodall, 1986). In a subchapter ’The Precursors of Warfare’, Goodall highlights the common preadaptations as follows: Granted that destructive warfare in its typical human form (organized, armed conflict between groups) is a cultural development, it nevertheless required preadaptations to permit its emergence in the first place. The most crucial of these were probably cooperative group living, group territoriality, cooperative hunting skills, weapon use, and the intellectual ability to make cooperative plans. Another basic preadaptation was xenophobia: An inherent fear of, or aversion to, strangers, expressed by aggressive attack. Early



hominid groups possessing these behavioral characteristics would theoretically have been capable of the kind of organized intergroup conflict that could have led to destructive warfare. Chimpanzees not only posses, to a greater or lesser extent, the above preadaptations, but they show other inherent characteristics that would have been helpful to the dawn warriors in their primitive battles: (a) If the early hominid males were inherently disposed to find aggression attractive, particularly aggression directed against neighbors, as (at least some adolescent male) chimpanzees appear to do, this trait would have provided a biological basis for the cultural training of warriors. (b) In humans cultural evolution permits pseudospeciation (Erikson, 1966). In its extreme form pseudospeciation leads to the ’dehumanization’ of other groups, so that they may be regarded almost as members of a different species. This process, along with the ability to use weapons for hurting or killing at a distance, frees group members from the inhibitions and social sanctions that operate within the group and enables acts that would not be tolerated within the group. Thus it is of considerable interest to find that the chimpanzees show behaviors that bear strong resemblance to, and hence may be precursors to pseudospeciation in humans. First, their sense of group identity is strong; they clearly differentiate between ingroup and outgroup, between individuals who ’belong to us’ and those who do not. This sense of group identity is, Goodall claims, far more sophisticated than mere xenophobia. The members of the Kahame chimpanzee community had, before they split, enjoyed close and friendly relations with their aggressors. By separating themselves, it is as though they forfeited their ’right’ to be treated as group members - instead they were treated as strangers. Second, nongroup members may not only be violently attacked, but the patterns of attack may actually differ from those utilized in typical intracommunity aggression. The victims are treated more as 6 though they were prey animals; they are ’dechimpized’ . Two further aspects of chimpanzee behavior are of interest in relation to the evolution of behavior associated with human intergroup conflict: (a) In the chimpanzee, as in humans, cannibalism may follow intergroup conflict; and (b) 6

The behavioral patterns in intergroup aggression are strikingly different from those in intragroup aggression as Goodall in an interview on the West German Radio (1986, as cited in Vogel, 1989) relates: "The most severe fighting is fighting between chimps of different communities. And these fights are different from intra-community fights in two ways. First of all they last much longer, and all of those that we have seen have been gang attacks, that is two or more males, up to five males, attacking a single victim jointly, and they have been very much longer than the fights that we have seen between members of the same community. Fights between members of the same community last at the most three minutes, usually they are less than one minute. Fights on members of another community last up to twenty minutes. And secondly the patterns of aggression in inter-community fighting are sometimes different and we have seen patterns otherwise only observed in meat eating contexts, such as tearing off strips of skin from the victim, twisting limbs as so trying to dismember the victim, and even drinking his or her blood. Those we see in killing and hunting of large prey animals. Never ever have we seen them in fights between community members".



Chimpanzees appear to possess the cognitive sophistication which is a prerequisite for the genesis of cruelty: they are capable to some extent of imputing desires and feelings to others, and they are almost certainly capable of feelings akin to (human) sympathy and empathy. "The chimpanzee, as a result of a unique combination of strong affiliative bonds between adult males on the one hand and an unusually hostile and violently aggressive attitude toward nongroup individuals on the other, has clearly reached a stage where he stands at the very threshold of human achievement in destruction, cruelty, and planned intergroup conflict. If ever he develops the power of language - and, as we have seen, he stands close to that threshold, too - might he not push open the door and wage war with the best of us?" (Goodall, 1986). An alternative explanation is offered by Bailey’s (1987) phylogenetic progression/regression model, which presupposes a high degree of phylogenetic continuity in the primate - including Homo - order. If we assume, he says, a more or less constant, innate killing potential in baboons, chimpanzees, and humans, then the baboon 6 chimpanzee 6 human phylogenetic ’progression’ from less to more killing could be parsimoniously explained by the elaborationist hypothesis: That is, the primitive motive forces to kill and their associated behavior patterns may be homologous up to monkeys, apes, and humans, whereas the greater actual killing at ’higher’ levels is a product of greater intelligence and response elaboration within and across situations. A third explanation can be derived from the socio-ecological theorizing presented in ' 3.7 on the ultimate causes of primate sociality. In this model, as we saw, ecological factors such as distribution properties of preferred foods largely determine the nature of social organization and structure (which is itself the outcome of multiple interactions of individual adaptive strategies) of a primate species with respect to e.g., social hierarchies, coalition systems such as female kin bonds, and migration patterns. Now, in chimpanzees the females disperse (female exogamy), while the males remain in their natal groups. This state of affairs has a profound impact on the proximal mechanisms of chimpanzee social structure. It facilitates, for instance, the development of male bonding and coalition formation. In order to maximize their mating opportunities, male coalitions do not attempt to monopolize females directly, but indirectly by means of the monopolization and ’conquest’ of territory. A positive feedback loop of escalating intensity would then be established between successful conquest of territory, elimination of competitor groups by means of intimidation or violence, and the development of the male ’gangs’ into true ’warrior coalitions’. The amazing cognitive and affectional make-up of the chimpanzee might, then, partly be a spin-off of this ongoing evolution. Hamadryas baboons with their ’brother-clans’, red colobus, and the SouthAmerican spider monkeys (Ateles and Brachyteles) are each more or less



evolving in an analogous direction (van Hooff, p.c.). In baboons, macaques, and most other primate species the male competitive mating strategies of monopolization of females in harems, or of scramble promiscuity and sperm competition, do not give rise to male bonding beyond temporary and opportunistic (and mostly dyadic) coalitions, which, in turn, accounts to a large extent for the differences in the intergroup agonistic behavior patterns. Besides being more reliable, there is another reason why coalitions among male kin may be favored by natural selection. Van Hooff (1990) explained it as follows: Cooperation between males to monopolize access to a female or a group of females, or to monopolize certain consorts within a group, is not often seen among primates. This is probably hampered in most species by the males being strangers to each other. There is then no easy solution to the question of how the profits of the cooperation are to be shared: ’who gets the consort, of whom the coalition took possession?’ A recent study of baboons, where such coalitions do nevertheless occur, shows that this can lead to complex 'negotiating' situations (Packer, 1977: Noë, 1986, 1989). Coalitions for mates occur between males who have been in the same group for a long time, and have got to know each other so well that cooperation on a basis of mutual advantage becomes possible. A situation of male cooperation can occur more easily if the males are closely related. Even if there is no fair distribution of the profit, such cooperation can bring gain to all those involved in the form of an inclusive 'fitness' advantage by means of 'kin selection'. This situation exists where brothers migrate together, as they do in lions (Bertram, 1976) and turkeys (Watts & Stokes, 1971), or where males are the resident sex, and their family relations thus stay intact. This last situation has been discovered among a few populations of chimpanzees (Pusey, 1979; Tutin, 1979). These fruit-eaters can only form groups at times when the food supply is superabundant. In order to avoid competition for food, female chimpanzees usually travel alone or at most with a few relatives (offspring). On the whole the situation is characterized by scramble competition. Chimpanzee females are, therefore, hardly competitive amongst each other, and appear to migrate easily. Under these circumstances groups of related males can stay together and defend an area against other 'brotherhoods'. The larger and richer this area is, the more females will be able to live in it. The willingness of chimpanzee males to engage in intergroup 'warfare' now becomes understandable. We know from studies carried out in the wild (e.g., Goodall, 1986), and in captivity (de Waal, 1982), that dominant male chimpanzees can be tolerant, even if not always with heartfelt sincerity, of the sexual behavior



of their coalition partners. There is reason to assume that this tolerance of promiscuity makes it worthwhile for non-dominant males to keep lending their support to the coalition. Bearing this in mind, it is possible to comprehend the exceptional, ’purposeful’ cooperation which male chimpanzees give in intragroup conflicts. There is an amazing similarity to the situation among humans. The development of social structures, in which men join in discrete solidarity groups (fraternal interest groups) is regarded as a condition which favors the development of bellicose tendencies (van Hooff, 1990). Also Boehm (1992) noted that the human groups most similar to chimpanzees are the feuding nonliterate societies, that is, those in which closely related males stay in their natal groups for life and develop very close bonding. Otterbein & Otterbein (1965) have shown that in humans, feuding (with its limited, reciprocating homicidal retaliation between groups) is most likely to develop among exogamous patrilineal groups with patrilocal postmarital residence. This arrangement ensures that closely-related males will remain coresident or live contiguously for life, while females are exchanged among various patrilineages or patriclans. They have characterized these groups as ’fraternal interest groups’, and have argued that a group of coresident males who are closely related (e.g., a clan) may be prone to act politically as a single unit. Societies based on fraternal interest groups readily develop a politically competitive warrior mentality, and kin groups may compete as coalitions at many different levels. Such a segmentary lineage also can become an ’instrument of predatory expansion’, particularly when it shares frontiers with societies that lack their own segmentary organization. Note that in this socio-ecological model there is no scala naturae of ’higher’ or ’lower’ phylogeny as implied by Itani’s statement. The last category of explanations centers on a cost/benefit analysis of chimpanzee proto-warfare. Emphasizing the principle that different behaviors may be adaptive under different circumstances, Manson & Wrangham (1987) note that chimpanzee intergroup raiding has been observed to occur only when the attackers belonged to a community substantially larger than the community containing the defenders. "This suggests that chimpanzees conduct EIA [Exported Intergroup Aggression] in response to perceived intergroup strength differentials, although a complete model of this phenomenon is likely to be considerably more complex. Eventually, variation in the occurrence and intensity of human warfare may be explained rather completely via natural selection theory. This explanation will almost certainly refer, not to strength of selection for ’aggression’ as a global trait, but rather to a cost-benefit model incorporating those features of the social and physical environments that cause individual contributions to varying levels of intergroup competition to be more



or less effective means of increasing individual inclusive fitness". Manson & Wrangham (1991) base their explanation on the notions of ’resource alienability’ and ’(im)balance of power’, determining the cost/benefit ratio of the behavior: (intergroup) aggressive behavior has come to be viewed as a tactical option pursued when assessment indicates that it will be cost-effective, or, in other words, when the benefits sufficiently outweigh the inherent costs. The cost of severe aggression by chimpanzees appears to be unusually low, because, in contrast to the situation in aggression by other primates, chimpanzee victims are immobilized. This prompts the hypothesis, hinted at by King (1976) and implied by Goodall (1986), that lethal attacks are promoted by an imbalance of power. Specifically, unrestrained attacks on opponents are favored merely because their cost is low. According to this hypothesis, longterm social bonds facilitate the formation of cooperatively attacking subgroups, and variation in subgroup size reduces the cost of damaging aggression to attackers with sufficient numerical superiority. The hypothesis predicts that (1) the cost to the aggressors will be low, (2) attacks will be restricted to occasions of overwhelming superiority, (3) potential victims will attempt to travel in large subgroups, and (4) attacks will occur whenever the opportunity arises. In sum, evidence supports two influences on intergroup aggression by chimpanzees. First, attacks are lethal because where there is sufficient imbalance of power, their cost is negligible. Second, attacks are a male and not a female activity because males are the philopatric sex. This relationship conforms to Alexander’s (1989) proposal of the importance of male-male cooperation and female transfer, following earlier arguments by Bygott (1979), Goodall et al. (1979), Nishida (1979), and Wrangham (1979). The relationship between male philopatry and predominantly male participation in intergroup aggression is explicable as follows (Ghiglieri, 1987): Across primate species male philopatry is closely associated with male-male cooperation (Pusey & Packer, 1987). Chimpanzee (and spider monkey) social organization probably evolved from a system in which both sexes were solitary because of the high cost of feeding competition. Males then became able to travel in pairs, although this was still inferior to solitary travel as a foraging strategy (Wrangham, 1987). But because singletons were then necessarily subordinate to pairs in mate competition, selection began to favor male gregariousness. Bonded males compete more effectively than solitaires, so males form bonds wherever the ecological costs of bonding are not prohibitive (Rodman, 1984). Theoretically the ultimate benefit of intergroup aggression among chimpanzees is expected to be increased access by aggressive males to reproductively valuable females, via either incorporation of neighbors or encroachment on the territory of neighboring males. Given the chimpanzee evidence, Manson & Wrangham (1991) propose that imbalance of power must have been an important factor favoring the evolution



of damaging aggression in humans also and that, through variability in subgroup size alone, power imbalances may have favored lethal raiding even before the evolution of weapons. Accordingly, Manson & Wrangham hypothesize that, among foraging humans, where crucial material resources are alienable, intergroup aggression will occur primarily over those resources, while where they are not it will occur over women. To determine whether human intermale intergroup resource competition actually represents reproductive competition (i.e., whether material resources attract women), they also test the hypothesis that where crucial material resources are alienable the accumulation of wealth will be associated with hunting success, political skill, ability to defend women, or other characteristics (Table 3.6). In societies in which resources were coded as not alienable, the cause of warfare tended to be conflict over women, whereas the presence of alienable resources was significantly associated with conflict over resources. Polygyny and wealth should accordingly be associated in societies where resources are alienable, whereas there is no expectation that they will be in others. This expectation is also strongly supported. Why does all this not apply to females? Why do not females raid for reproductive access to males? Why is coalitional aggression either absent or extremely rare in females? Why are the Amazons mythical rather than historical reality? As we saw, coalitions play an important role in male chimpanzee politics. To be sure, coalitions are not unknown to, or beyond the grasp of female chimpanzees, but females never seem to form coalitions for the purpose of communal violence. Why and whence this conspicuous difference between the sexes? Tooby & Cosmides (1988), whose approach predicts the striking asymmetry that exists between males and females in coalitional aggression, suggest some answers (elaborated in Ch. 4), which may be summarized as follows: (1) Coalitional aggression evolved because it allowed participants in such coalitions to promote their fitness by gaining access to reproductive resources. For males, females are the limiting reproductive resource, and the ultimate benefit of multi-male coalitional aggression is increased access to females. Table 3.8: Human Foraging Societies (after Manson & Wrangham, 1991)

Society

Cause of Intergroup Aggression

Resources Alienable?

Polygyny and Wealth Related?

Ainu

Resources

Yes

?

Aleut

Women

Yes

No



Source Ohnuki-Tierney (1974), Watanabe (1973) Davydov (1977 [1812])

Andamanese Aranda Aweikoma Bellacoola Botocudo Cahuilla Chiric. Apache Eastern Pomo Eyak Gidjingali Haida Ingalik Kaska Kutenai Lengua Luiseño Mbuti Micmac Modoc Murngin Nambicuara Netsilik Eskimo Nisenan Nomlaki N. Alask. Eskimo Nunivak Eskimo Owens V. Paiute Patwin Salinan Shavante Sinkyone Siriono Slave Tiwi Tolowa Vedda Wappo Wintu Wodadika Paiute Yahgan

? Women Women Resources Women Resources Resources ? ? Women Resources ? ? Resources Resources Resources Resources ? Resources Women ? Women Resources Resources ? ? ? Resources ? ? Women Resources ? Women ? ? Resources Women ? ?

? No No Yes No Yes No ? ? No Yes ? ? Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No No No Yes Yes No ? ? Yes ? No Yes No ? No Yes ? Yes Yes No ?

? No No Yes ? ? Yes ? ? No ? ? ? ? ? ? No No Yes No No No Yes Yes No ? ? ? ? No Yes No ? No Yes ? No Yes No ?

Man (1932) Spencer & Gillen (1927) Henry (1941) McIlwraith (1948) Métraux (1946) Bean (1972) Opler (1941) Lowie (1939), Downs (1966) Birket-Smith & de Laguna (1938) Hiatt (1965) Murdock (1934) Osgood (1958) Honigmann (1954) Turney-High (1941) Grubb (1911) R.C. White (1963) Turnbull (1965) LeClercq (1910) Ray (1963) Warner (1937) Lévi-Strauss (1955) Balikci (1970) Beals (1933) Goldschmidt (1951) Spencer (1959) Lantis (1946) Steward (1934) Kroeber (1932) Mason (1912) Maybury-Lewis (1967) Nomland (1935) Holmberg (1950) Honigmann (1946) Hart & Pilling (1960) Drucker (1937) Seligmann & Seligmann (1911) Driver (1936) DuBois (1935) Kelly (1932) Cooper (1946)

Males can easily be induced to go to war, despite its lethal effects on many of them. Selection will favor participation in the coalitional aggression regardless of the mortality among the aggressors (within broad limits). (2) Females, on the other hand, are rarely limited by access to males, so that the net reproduction of a coalition of females would drop in direct proportion to the number of females killed. In a curious fashion, males may be so ready to engage in coalitional aggression because it is reproductively ’safer’ for them to do so. Females have more to lose, and less to gain, and such differences in



consequences should be reflected in psychological sex differences in attitudes towards coalition formation and coalition-based aggression. These considerations may be supplemented with the following: In a cross-cultural study of female participation in warfare, Adams (1983) presents evidence that women are excluded from participation in warfare where there is patrilocal residence, internal warfare, and community exogamy. Adams argues that under these conditions a woman will likely have a conflict of interest - her husband may be fighting with her father and brothers. Husbands will have reason to fear their wives’ knowledge of war plans and therefore will prevent them from handling weapons and obtaining such knowledge. The obverse, of course, is that matrilocal societies (which tend to lack community exogamy and tend to have external warfare; see Ember & Ember, 1971; Adams, 1983) are unlikely to generate a conflict of interest in women and therefore are more likely to allow women to participate in warfare. Adams’s explanation of female participation in intergroup aggression is different from Manson & Wrangham’s, but the results for humans parallel the results for nonhuman primates (Ember, 1991). Irons (1991) ventured the thesis that human females participate in warfare by proxy in letting the males do the fighting for them. The fact that males who reside uxorilocally (matrilocally) maintain ties with their natal groups through visiting, ritual, and important exchanges of benefits means that they can easily maintain kin-based male coalitions for purposes of intergroup aggression even though their residences are somewhat scattered. Thus which sex is philopatric may be of less consequence for human intergroup aggression than it is for other species. Given the fact that male kin coalitions are always available regardless of residence pattern and the fact that human females maintain extensive reciprocal exchanges of benefits with male kin, mates or both (Irons, 1983), the cost/benefit ratio may be more favorable for females’ indirect participation in intergroup aggression. That is, they may find it least risky and most beneficial to goad male allies (mates, kin, or both) into fighting their battles for them (Irons, 1991). In anthropology textbooks one may find many variants of the so-called ’relative expendability’ argument as an explanation of why males have monopolized violence in human societies. The ’relative expendability’ argument goes something like this: "Because fewer of them are needed to produce and maintain offspring, from a population maintenance perspective, males are more expendable than females" (Mukhopadhyay & Higgins, 1988). But, as Rodseth et al. (1991) observe, this argument is vulnerable to all the criticisms of group selection first articulated by G.C. Williams (1966). And even if a ’relative expendability’ argument were evolutionarily sound, it could not account for the fact that males seem equally expendable in savanna baboons and many other primate groups, yet females in these groups regularly



engage in violent competition with other females. All these attempts to explain chimpanzee proto-warfare are, not surprisingly, far from being mutually exclusive, rather they emphasize different aspects and facets of the same intriguing puzzle. Virtually all theories converge in their final conclusion: The ultimate rationale of male raiding is enhanced access to ’nubile’ females. And ecological selection pressures, sexual selection and kin selection have fueled this process. There is still one more relationship, only hinted at in the previous discussion, to be explored: Cooperative hunting and its relation to warfare in chimpanzees leading to a novel and fascinating hypothesis concerning the evolution of human war. This hypothesis has been developed by van Hooff (1990) and van Hooff & van Schaik (1991) in the context of the socio-ecological model presented above.

3.9 Chimpanzee Hunting and ’Warfare’ Deliberate coordination of male actions as observed in chimpanzee intercommunity raiding is also obvious in another form of cooperation, namely hunting. From the Gombe study area came the first observations that male chimpanzees regularly hunt baboons, colobus monkeys and a number of smaller animals. The chimps surrounded their victim by keeping a close watch on each other, and blocking the prey’s possible escape routes from the trees. Such hunting forays have been reported now in a number of populations (Teleki, 1973; McGrew, 1979; Nishida & Uehara, 1983; Hasegawa et al., 1983; Boesch & Boesch, 1989, 1994). Perhaps, van Hooff speculates, the development of coordinated male betweengroup aggression has paved the way for the development of such coordinated hunting. Structured between-group aggression and the relaxation of withingroup male competition is certainly not a necessary condition for the development of cooperative hunting. This behavior has also been reported in some populations of baboons (Harding, 1975; Strum, 1981). However, there it never took on the deliberate, coordinated character seen in chimpanzees, nor was it associated with the ’social feasting’, the sharing of the spoils (Teleki, 1973). The development of cooperative hunting and the transition to a hunter-gatherer culture by early hominids has often been proposed as a major pacemaker for the development of human characteristics such as sex-linked task differentiation, food sharing, male-female bonding and paternal care, the refinement of communication in cooperation (in particular the development of verbal communication), the manufacture and use of tools and weapons, the development of cooperative tactical skills, etc.



For some of these aspects there is a striking analogy with the social carnivores. It has often been claimed (e.g., Schaller & Lowther, 1969; Peters & Mech, 1975), that in order to appreciate the conditions which determined the evolution of mankind, we could learn a great deal by looking at analogous developments in other social-cooperative hunters such as the wolf (Mech, 1966, 1970; Fox, 1971; Zimen, 1978) and the Cape hunting dog (von Kühme, 1965; van Lawick & van Lawick-Goodall, 1971). These animals not only hunt cooperatively, often for game which is far larger than the hunters are themselves, but also share in a far-reaching responsibility for the rearing of the young. They bring back food for the nurses and the pups. Cape hunting dogs, which have developed this communality even further than wolves, will take care of sick and injured animals for long periods of time. Contrasting with this ingroup loyalty is a bloody and merciless enmity toward non-pack-members (Murie, 1944; Zimen, 1978). Cooperation in a hunt, and, possibly stimulated by this, collaboration in rearing offspring and in helping group-members, and the dedication to one's own group and its leader(s) - these are all characteristics highly developed in these carnivores. The suggestion is that by our transition to a more 'wolf-ish' lifestyle, these characteristics have been strongly enhanced. This, in turn, may have strengthened the assumption that the development of hunting was at the roots of the development of warlike behaviors, possibly via intraspecific predation (cannibalism), rather than vice versa (See Ch. 4: 7 Carnivorous Psychology Theory) . 7

Especially in regard to man’s alleged carnivorous psychology, it is of utmost interest that Goodall (1986) and Vogel (1989) have pointed to the striking differences between the hunting behavior of chimpanzees and those of the specialized predators such as the predatory felines and canines: (1) Specialized predators generally tend to have a quick and efficient way of killing prey (although hyenas and Cape hunting dogs may not kill first but tear apart their prey alive). Falling victim to a chimpanzee hunting group, on the other hand, more often than not entails a slow, painful, and agonizing death, sometimes even being devoured alive; (2) In catching prey, chimpanzees, quite unlike predators, show signs of arousal, such as piloerection, which might be interpreted as aggressive co-motivation; (3) Hunting in chimpanzees, unlike hunting in predators, is an occasion for intense excitement, almost a feast, the killing of prey being an opportunity to show intimidation displays to ’terrorize’ subordinates; (4) Also the distribution and consumption of the meat has the character of a ritual; (5) The boundaries between prey, conspecific, and social partner seem to be more hazy and nebulous in chimpanzees than in predators: (a) In Gombe, baboons constitute the bulk of prey animals in chimpanzee hunting. On other occasions, however, baboons are the playing and grooming partners of young chimpanzees, almost ’semi-conspecifics’; (b) In the same way as other monkeys, real conspecifics, i.e., (outgroup) chimpanzee infants, are sometimes captured, cruelly killed and cannibalized. During these episodes the ’killer-cannibals’ show highly ambivalent behavior, alternating between cruelty and tenderness. These observations led Goodall et al. (1979) to state: "Often it has been suggested that we should consider the behavioral and motivational mechanisms of hunting in a completely separate category from aggressive intraspecific interactions: the above observations suggest that, in some instances, similar motivational factors may be involved". Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1975) already asserted that ASeiner Motivation nach ist das Beutefangverhalten der Schimpansen wahrscheinlich von der innerartlichen Aggression abgeleitet worden@ [Motivationally, hunting behavior in chimpanzees



In this conception, motivational mechanisms and the derived satisfactions involved in the capturing and the killing of prey are assumed also to reward the warrior who slays an enemy; a process facilitated by the dehumanization of the outgroup conspecific. The recent observations of chimpanzee raiding suggest to van Hooff that the development may well have gone the other way around. Male philopatry has permitted the development of male-bonded defence polygyny. The concomitant cooperative tolerance has become manifest, among other things, in a more egalitarian distribution of resources, mates included, and a certain ’respect’ for the intersex bonds of group members, in a hamadryas-like manner. The cooperation in male between-group conflict may have brought about abilities and orientations which, subsequently, have allowed the development of systematic cooperation in hunting. In view of the comparative evidence it is more parsimonious to assume that hominid/human development has followed this course. Of course, a subsequent interaction between both processes might have occurred which could have facilitated the further development of each of the behaviors in its own context. Thus, certain actions which are useful as an instrument in hunting might also prove useful in battle against conspecifics, and vice versa. Tactical skills and the use of weapons can be applied in both contexts. A tactical refinement acquired in one functional context can be transferred to the other. If such an improvement increases the efficiency of this behavior pattern, then it might also shift the balance of costs and benefits. For example, a group which has developed a method of attack involving less personal risk, will come more easily to a decision to choose (pre-emptive) attack as a means of ’conflict-resolution’ (van Hooff, 1990). In this context, it may be significant that in the pygmy chimpanzee or bonobo (Pan paniscus), who exhibits only mild intergroup antagonism, males do not develop strong bonds and are not habitually cooperative hunters (Badrian et al., 1981). Kano (1987) made the intriguing suggestion that in the pygmy chimpanzees the ’in-group feeling’ among females is very strong, and therefore aggressive male expansion of territory is not connected with an increase in available females, and thus does not pay off. Van Hooff and van Schaik assume, as do many other scholars, that armed warfare is as old as mankind itself; and that human societies, in which violent confrontations between groups are reported never to occur, are remarkable but nevertheless marginal exceptions. The latter notion will be discussed more fully in Ch. 7. After a critical examination of the warfare-hunting hypothesis, I shall discuss the evidence on which the assumption that war is as old as mankind is allegedly based. has probably been derived from intraspecific aggression].



3.10

Criticism of the ’Chimp-Model’ of the Evolution of Warfare

Is, as van Hooff suggests, the ’chimp-model’ of the evolution of warfare - that is, that cooperation in ’tribal warfare’ subsequently set the scene for cooperative hunting - a valid model in hominid evolution? Despite the very different evolutionary trajectories of the two species, the suggested priority of intergroup conflict may have been the same for both of them. There is, however, some (circumstantial) evidence to throw doubt on such a scenario. (1) There is no compelling reason to assume that the early hominids had sociocultural patterns similar to those of contemporary chimpanzees (Panidae). The evolution of concealed ovulation, female orgasm, and similar adaptations in hominids make sense in a context of early hominid monogamy and pairbonding, or ’limited’ polygyny, and very little sense in a context of cooperative resource-defence polygyny. Or, as Rodseth et al. (1991) formulated a similar idea: "If protohominids, then, like chimpanzees, formed only temporary sexual consortships, a critical step toward human society would have been not outmarriage, as the exogamy theorists believed, but marriage itself. The problem, in other words, would be not how early hominids came to avoid incest or how one sex came to breed in other groups but how exclusive sexual bonds evolved from a chimpanzee-like pattern of promiscuity". It is, furthermore, a distinct possibility that the chimpanzee proto-warfare is one of those rare instances of observing evolution ’in action’, i.e., that it represents a truly novel evolutionary ’invention’, an emergent feature in statu nascendi, the birthpangs of which we have the privilege to witness. In that case, it is not very likely to be an exact duplicate of the processes among hominids some million years ago. (2) If the hypothesis were true, one would expect tools for hunting to have developed from tools for war (i.e., weapons). Archaeological evidence does not point to that direction. The oldest archaeological stone and bone artifacts known to us from all over the Old World (scrapers, burins, blades, denticulates, bone points, bone spatulates, beads and pendants) are clearly tools and items of personal adornment (Klein, 1992), and cannot possibly be construed as weapons. There are many archaeological artifacts which make perfect sense in a hunting context, but not in a context of war. Furthermore, there seem to be no peoples with tools specialized for war but not for hunting, many peoples with tools for both hunting and warfare, and many peoples with tools specialized for hunting and tools specialized for warfare (Among the Amazonian Indians, for example,



long arrows and blowpipes are used exclusively for hunting). This indicates that tools for warfare developed from tools for hunting, and not the other way around. (3) There is a growing body of evidence that the proto- and early hominids were gatherer-scavengers rather than hunters, and only relatively late developed (anatomical) adaptations for hunting. Regarding the anatomicalmorphological evidence, Trinkaus (1987) concludes: This consideration of the Pliocene and Pleistocene paleoanthropological record and its implications for the evolution of human predation reveals a complex process, one in which predation played an increasingly important role during the course of human evolution. Yet, it appears that human predation as known ethnographically and ethnohistorically is a recent phenomenon in human evolution, associated with anatomically modern humans. It also appears that relatively few of the anatomical characteristics of recent humans can be seen solely as the results of selective pressures generated by a predatory existence. Although the introduction of animal products into the human diet permitted expansion into increasingly seasonal environments, most of the distinguishing human characteristics, such as bipedality, manual dexterity and elaborate technology, and marked encephalization can be viewed as having been promoted by the demands of an opportunistic foraging system in which hominids fit themselves around more specialized mammalian groups (Trinkaus, 1987). It is hard to imagine how such an inadequate, not to say inept, hominid hunter could have been a competent warrior. On the other hand, it should be pointed out that the scavenger hypothesis (e.g., Shipman, 1983, 1986) is itself not without problems. As Tooby & DeVore (1987) have noted, the ecology of predation and scavenging makes it unlikely that scavenging is an adequate characterization of our ancestors’ major subsistence patterns, for the following reasons: (1) In the first place, due to their position in the food chain, large ranges are required to support predators, and consequently, in any specific area kills by large predators are rare. Scavenging as a form of subsistence is dependent on what is left over (often, very little) from such rare kills after the predator has finished. Add to this intense competition with micro-organisms, insects, avians, and mammalian carnivores and scavengers (not to mention the returning predator or its kin). Moreover, hominid competition for such remains would be actively dangerous: most mammalian scavengers are themselves predators. Active scavenging would continuously lead hominids to converge on the same resources as those



dangerous animals. (2) Scavenging as a niche is a specialized and competitive one. Observed primate behavior testifies to this: primates very rarely avail themselves of dead carcasses. Even modern humans do not seem to scavenge much. (3) If hominids were formidable enough to scavenge, hunting itself was open to them as an option. Hunting only opposes the hunter to game animals, which are far less dangerous than predators. Instead of the opposed concepts of the timid scavenger and the fearless hunter, a fairer characterization would be the timid hunter and the fearless scavenger. Tooby & DeVore do not deny that some opportunistic scavenging of meat occurred (e.g., scavenging of bones for their marrow content). What remains at issue, however, is the frequency and the importance of scavenging behavior at the various stages of hominid evolution. If hunting were a major part of hominid foraging, it would, according to Tooby & DeVore, elegantly and economically explain a large number of the unusual aspects of hominid evolution: male parental investment; sexual dimorphism; male coalitions; reciprocity, sharing, and social exchange; sexual division of labor; home bases; stone tool use; brain size; geographical distribution; and, finally, the pongid-hominid divergence. At this point some caveats are in order. Firstly, nonhuman primate models applied to hominids are problematical for a number of reasons, not the least of which is the arbitrariness involved in the selection of the species to serve as the model. Suppose, for example, that we were to single out the bonobo as a model for early hominid social organization. Cooperative as well as competitive interactions among males would have been low-level, and would probably not include cooperative hunting, nor the Machiavellian and opportunistic coalitional maneuvering encountered in the other Pan species. Intergroup agonistic behavior would have consisted of visual and vocal displays and mild threats uttered from a safe distance, after which the bonobo-hominid braves would return to the home group and try out all coital positions described in the Kama Sutra for reassurance and pleasure. There is, furthermore, no simple linear scale of complexity from prosimians, via monkeys and the great apes, leading to the human condition. The primates as a group have diverged widely, evolving in different directions. The nonhuman primates do not represent steps toward the evolution of humans, but rather, as Scott (1969), among many others, observed, diverging pathways from a common ancestor. Finally, the landscape of hominid evolution is far richer and much complex than a simple linear view - many researchers view human evolution as "a long corridor where chimpanzees enter at one end and modern hunter-gatherers exit at the other" (Tooby & DeVore, 1987) - can accomodate. It is more likely to be a discrete series of branches, stages, and chronospecies. A feature, such as hunting or warfare, that seems to be an appropriate major adaptation for one



chronospecies may have been completely inappropriate for others (for this line of argumentation see Tooby & DeVore, 1987). With these considerations in mind, one should be able to appreciate the specific differences as well as the communalities in the behaviors discussed. Boehm (1992) systematically enumerated the similarities as well as the differences between chimpanzee and human IAB. Among the similarities are: (a) Both species develop fraternal interest groups that are subject to divisive internal quarrels; (b) Effective management of internal conflicts helps to make possible the formation of community-wide macro-coalitions; (c) Acting as macro-coalitions both species go raiding for sustenance and breeding partners, and sometimes kill their enemies. Among the differences Boehm notes: (a) Chimpanzees do not seem to have anything resembling the blood feud; nor do they engage in all-out warfare, in which the mobilized males of one group attack another group as a whole, or in which two groups deliberately meet on the battlefield; (b) Communities of humans often ’manage’ such intensive external conflicts by making external alliances that balance power, and by ending their wars with peace treaties; and (c) Human warriors may be moved to engage in mass combat by a combination of patriotic ideology and negative sanctioning of cowards, two features of macro-coalitional competition that chimpanzees lack. All the remarkable similarities should not, in other words, blind us to the real differences that exist. Warfare sensu stricto remains a uniquely human phenomenon (Carpenter, 1968; Fox, 1968; Goodall, 1986; Jolly, 1972; Kennedy, 1971; Scott, 1969), which cannot be reduced to a mere summation of ’individual aggressions’ (see van der Dennen [1986] for the arguments against the aggression-warfare linkage). If a battle is defined as a violent encounter between two groups, then battles may be said to occur in nonhuman primate species. But, as Passingham (1982) observed, a battle is not a war: "To conduct a war over several days requires an intellectual, social and economic sophistication to which animals do not aspire. The reason why man is the only primate that conducts wars is that only man is ABLE to do so. There is no cause to suspect the monstrous presence of a ’beast within’. Our trouble is that we are too clever for our own good" (Passingham, 1982). In what way are we too clever for our own good? Many high-strung propositions have been advanced but, in the final analysis, these all collapse into the statement that man has embarked upon a new, autonomous (or so it is claimed) level of sociocultural evolution, and thereby created symbolic universes and moral cosmologies, or ’entered into the cognitive niche’. What this entails for the explanation and understanding of primitive warfare will be the subject matter of the next chapters. In the remainder of this chapter the claim that war is as old as mankind will be examined.



3.11

The Evidence of Human Warfare

Explicit claims that warfare is as old as mankind itself have been made by a great number of authors, and is implied in many theories (Ch. 4). Together with the claim that human warfare was/is universal (and often completed by a third claim: that ’man is aggressive/violent/warlike by nature’), these belong to the standard cocktail party wisdom of the average intellectual. Birdsell (1972) is often referred to as the authority to substantiate these claims. What evidence do we actually have? Birdsell’s book is a very competent and encompassing summary of the paleoanthropological and archeological state of the art anno 1972, but the subject of violence and warfare is limited to a few references to ’murder’ and alleged headhunting in relation to the practice of cerebrophagy (eating the brains of the deceased or alleged victims), a practice connected, in contemporary humans, with ritual-ceremonial cannibalism or 8 anthropophagy . These claims will be examined below. The only time Birdsell explicitly refers to ’population contest’ and ’powerful fighting bands’, it is in the context of explaining the ultimate extinction of European Neandertals and their - no doubt violent in his view - displacement by the more modern Cro-Magnon type. Placed on the evolutionary time scale, the human being appears as a mere afterthought. Placental mammals evolved around 100 million years ago, towards the end of the Cretaceous period. The primates diverged from the ancestral mammalian stock roughly 75 million years ago. The hominids, the ancestral stock from which humans are derived, split off from the remainder of the ape family (the pongids) some 8 million years ago, towards the end of the Miocene epoch, in Africa east of the Great Rift (Wood, 1992; Coppens, 1994; See Ch. 8). Archaic Homo sapiens appeared on the scene by about 400,000 8

The word ’cannibal’ is derived from the Latinized name of the Carib Indians of the West Indies, who were depicted by the Spaniards as notorious human meat eaters. Already Herodotus described tribes which practiced cannibalism. In 1559 Hans Staden published his account of Tupinamba cannibalism, and the first essay on the subject was written by Michel Eyquem de Montaigne in 1580. Helmuth (1968, 1973) proposed the following typology of anthropophagy (the more neutral term) in descending order from endo- to exocannibalism: (1) Endocannibalism motivated by love and affection (also called patrophagy); (2) Juridicial cannibalism; (3) Cannibalism motivated by the idea of continuity; (4) Magical-ceremonial cannibalism; (5) Funerary (or mortuary) cannibalism; (6) Exocannibalism for the purpose of transmittance of power; (7) Exocannibalism motivated by hate, scorn and contempt (also called revenge cannibalism). To this typology may be added (8) Consumptive (or gustatory) cannibalism motivated by the relishing of human flesh; and (9) Survival or emergency cannibalism in cases of extreme starvation. For the sake of convenience, types (1) to and including (5) may be collapsed into one generic category of Ritual Anthropophagy. Note that only the types (6) to and including (8) imply some degree of violence toward the victim and may be taken as valid indicators of the possible existence of intergroup violence and war.



years ago; and our subspecies Homo sapiens sapiens has been in existence for a mere 35 to 50,000 years or so (Passingham, 1982; Tooby & DeVore, 1987; Jones, Martin & Pilbeam, 1992; Stringer, 1992). The ancestors of the hominids were probably the ape-like creatures referred to as the dryopithecines, for which there is fossil evidence in Africa, Europe and Asia. The earliest dates for these apes are around 20 million years ago. The dryopithecine stock gave rise to several genera known collectively as the ramapithecids, deposits of which date from 14 to 8 or so million years ago. But there is then a gap of over 4 million years before good evidence is found of undisputed hominids in East Africa around 3.5 million years ago. It is not until less than 2 million years ago that we find fully convincing evidence of the presence of Homo. Most authorities agree that Homo erectus lies on the direct line to modern man. The earliest skull comes from the Lake Turkana region in East Africa, and it is estimated to be 1.5 million years old. Later skulls have been found at Trinil in Java, and in caves at Zhoukoudian (Chou Kou Tien) near Peking; the Trinil skulls are probably around 700,000 years old, the Peking skulls as recent as 400,000 years old. Modern man (Homo sapiens sapiens) is first found in Europe around 35,000 years ago. The skeletons of the slightly more rugged and robust Neandertal (also spelled Neanderthal) man (Homo [sapiens] neandert[h]alensis) are found in Europe from around 230,000 years on until they are rather suddenly (in geological terms) replaced by the more gracile Homo s. sapiens (Passingham, 1982; Klein, 1989; Bilsborough, 1992; Stringer & Gamble, 1993; a.o.). By just before 30,000 BP (Before Present) H. [s.] neandert[h]alensis has disappeared altogether. The possibility of interbreeding between the two Homo subspecies is often canvassed, but the majority opinion is that, if it occurred at all, it was to a very limited extent, and unlikely to have happened in Europe. It is more likely that the Neandertals were ousted by Homo s. sapiens. According to a still popular hypothesis, they were simply exterminated by the CroMagnons (e.g., Bigelow, 1969; Birdsell, 1972; Claiborne, 1974; Bailey, 1987; a.o.). "At one time dramatic genocidal massacres were envisaged, but no evidence exists for this, no caches of dozens of bones of Neanderthals slain in 9 battle , and on balance the studies of sites like Arcy-sur-Cure goes against it. The sinister picture of the anatomically more modern Cro-Magnons C arriving in Europe during the fluctuating climates of 45,000-30,000 years ago C massacring and wiping out the Neandertals they encountered there does not only lack fossil evidence. It is also an unlikely scenario. Stringer & Gamble (1993) sketch a simple Gaussian displacement scenario as follows: "If the Cro-Magnons became more skilled at coping with and exploiting the European environments than the Neanderthals, the Cro-Magnon populations and ranges would have increased. With only finite resources, the Neanderthals would have suffered from economic competition unless they withdrew to more marginal areas... [and] attrition would probably have caused Neanderthal populations gradually to decline towards extinction. In fact, using a computer-simulated model, archaeologist Ezra Zubrow (1989) has shown how rapidly the Neanderthals could have become extinct. Assuming interaction between stable populations of Neanderthals and Moderns, a Neanderthal mortality rate only 2 percent higher than 9



The demise was likely to have been a more long-drawn out affair, piecemeal, mosaic, in character, with attitudes towards the Neanderthals among Moderns varying across the spectrum as widely as they do on most subjects today, and perhaps vice versa" (Richards, 1987). The archeological and paleoanthropological evidence of human violence consists of skeletal material, artefacts and weapons, pictorial evidence such as petroglyphs (rock carvings), and fortifications. Let us first examine the skeletal evidence. 3.11.1

Skeletal Evidence

Birdsell (1972) presents the case of the australopithecines (Australopithecus africanus) - Lower Pleistocene bipedal ’apemen’ who hunted and killed baboons apparently by clubbing them on the head - dis- and uncovered in the 1920s by Dart in southern Africa, in the following words: The bones of the australopithecines themselves show evidences of violence. Sometimes the top of the skull contains depressed fractures not unlike those found on the baboons. Another time, the injury seems to have been inflicted with a round, pointed weapon. Some years ago when talking about the problem with Professor Dart, I asked him what proportion of the australopithecines he thought had been murdered. "Why, all of them, of course," he replied. The fragmentary nature of their remains, combined with the visible variety of fatal injuries, suggests that his estimate is not unduly exaggerated... The available evidence suggests that in addition to some scavenging and big game hunting, these early direct ancestors of ours also indulged in murder and gustatory cannibalism. The sanguinary fantasies ventilated by Dart (e.g., 1957) and popularized in the writings of Ardrey regarding these allegedly cannibalistic ’killer-apes’ (See Ch. 4) have in the mean time more or less quietly passed away. The earliest discovered forms of Homo erectus (" 400,000 to 600,000 years ago) come from Java and North China. Originally labeled by their discoverers with the genus names Pithecanthropus and Sinanthropus, they are now included in the Homo category and regarded as subspecies of Homo erectus. On Java, the Trinil beds, dating from the Middle Pleistocene, have yielded a number of incomplete crania (von Koenigswald, 1943, 1958; Helmuth, 1968, 1973). According to Birdsell (1972) "All of the cranial remains of these that of the Moderns could have resulted in Neanderthal extinction within about 1,000 years". See also Graves (1991).



Javanese men, women and children have been mutilated in such a fashion as to suggest that after they were murdered, their brains were eaten". And he notes that this treatment is very similar to that practiced in historical times by headhunters in both Indonesia and New Guinea. Opening the base of the skull by breaking away the bone around the foramen magnum in order to extract the brain may seem repulsive table manners by 20th-century Western standards, but it does not necessarily imply headhunting (not even murder, for that matter). Regarding the finds of Homo erectus pekinensis, known colloquially as Peking Man, at Zhoukoudian (Weidenreich, 1928 et seq.), Birdsell (1972) reports that they included 14 skullcaps in generally incomplete condition, six separate skull bones, portions of 10 jaws, and a total of 147 teeth. The distribution of skeletal parts in the deposit is biased, for from these nearly four dozen individuals were found only a few fragments of the postcranial skeleton. These included seven fragmentary thigh bones, portions of the shafts of two humeri, one damaged clavicle and a single hand bone. "There was no evidence of intentional burial and, ominously enough, all of the skulls had had their bases prised open, and some showed head injuries which had occurred in life". Helmuth (1968, 1973) considers this excavation to be the "first incontroversial claim of anthropophagy" because the "firesites contained human bones which had been broken and split by other humans". Lorenz (1966) described Peking Man as "the Prometheus who learned to preserve fire [and] used it to roast his brothers: beside the first traces of the regular use of fire lie the mutilated and roasted bones of Sinanthropus pekinensis himself". This view is an established one, although it is expressed less graphically in many textbooks, but in fact of all the human bones and bone fragments found at Zhoukoudian only one fragment showed evidence of burning, and even that one is doubtful (Weidenreich, 1939, 1943; Oakley, 1961; Montagu, 1976; Ferrill, 1985). Weidenreich, the excavator himself, had examined the depressed fractures on some of the skull fragments, and reported in 1943: My early suggestion still stands, namely: that the strange selection of human bones we are facing in Chou Kou Tien has been made by Sinanthropus himself. He hunted his own kind as he hunted other animals and treated all his victims in the same way. Whether he opened the human skulls for ritual or culinary purposes cannot be decided on the basis of the present evidence of his cultural life; but the breaking of the long bones of animals and man alike, apparently for the purpose of removing the marrow, indicates that the latter alternative is the more likely (Weidenreich, 1943). This conclusion went too far even for Birdsell (1972) to witness from his comment: "All the evidence points to cannibalism’s being consistently



practiced in Pleistocene times. But Weidenreich’s statement that the men of Chou Kou Tien consistently hunted neighboring men is probably an overstatement of the case. No carnivores earn their living by hunting their own kind, for this way of life would lead to extinction". Nevertheless, Birdsell, as well as the authors mentioned above, clearly believed that the evidence of cannibalism was there for anyone to see: When it is considered that the deposits at Chou Kou Tien may extend over a period of fifty thousand or more years, then the cannibalized relics of some forty individuals need not represent this vice’s going on at a very active rate. But the appetites of these pithecanthropines were not selective, as was indicated by the fact that both males and females are represented as adults in these grisly relics, and, even worse, 40 percent of the total were children of various ages. Those were not pleasant times in which to live (Birdsell, 1972). Yet, the whole issue of Zhoukoudian cannibalism may simply rest on a tragic misunderstanding. Richards (1987) tells the following sobering story about these and other allegedly cannibalistic cave dwellers: The earliest writers on Zhoukoudian, Breuil, Weidenreich and Chardin being the foremost, conjured up a fairly detailed picture of life in the cave which was almost ritually recited from then on. In this picture H. erectus is depicted as (a) a cave dweller (since the finds were made in a cave), (b) a hunter of deer (since deerbones were particularly numerous, (c) a fire user (since there appeared to be layers of ash, interpreted as hearth-sites), (d) a cannibal (on the basis of the nature of the damage to the base of the skull and face, combined with lack of post-cranial remains) and (e) a user of bone tools (on the basis of some features of the damage present in the animal bones). Binford (1981) raised some initial doubts about these interpretations and in a more recent paper, co-authored with a Chinese researcher (Binford and Ho, 1985) an attack is mounted on every single one of these conclusions, though fire-use is not entirely ruled out... Of particular interest is the belief that the Peking Man fossils showed evidence of cannibalism. This is still routinely mentioned in textbooks and popular summaries. Yet the matter rests on a dubious interpretation of two features of the fossils: firstly, the lack of a cranial base and facial area: secondly, the absence of other parts of the anatomy other than the skull. The former was thought to indicate that the skulls had been broken in such a fashion that the brains could be extracted, while the latter suggested that they had been brought into the cave separately from the rest of the skeleton. Ritual cerebrophagy by the camp-fire seemed the logical conclusion. But these kinds of damage are now known to be commonplace and ’understandable in terms of a number of taphonomic



alternatives’ (Binford and Ho, 1985, p. 8), ’hominid skulls recovered from secondary deposits... typically lack faces and parts of the skull base’ (ibid, p. 9). Having reviewed the ’evidence’ we are convinced that there is no support for the cannibalism interpretation. All such interpretations of the facts appear dependent upon a poor understanding of taphonomy and the modifications that bones can suffer after an animal’s death and during the inclusion of bones in geological deposits. (ibid., p. 11, italics in original)" The upshot is, as Richards concludes, that the evidence for H. erectus cannibalism in China seems, for the time being at any rate, to have evaporated (Cf. also Rowley-Conwy, 1993). Attempts at assessing the frequency of warfare among hunters and gatherers during the Paleolithic on the basis of archeological evidence have led to inconclusive results. Mutilated skulls found in Paleolithic caves, dating back some two million years, have been interpreted by Howell (1965), Lorenz (1966), Birdsell (1972), and many other influential scholars, as indicating prehistoric headhunting and cannibalism. Such evidence is equivocal, however, because it is not known how the individuals died; nor is it necessarily true, even if cannibalism was practiced, that the individuals were enemies, because, as Bigelow (1975) among others, argued, processing and eating of the skulls and brains of deceased kin as part of ritual mortuary practices (so-called funerary anthropophagy) is an ethnographically well-known custom (See also Harris, 1980). Furthermore, Steinmetz (1896), Behm-Blancke (1958, 1959), Becher (1967), Helmuth (1968, 1973) and others have gathered impressive evidence that the bases of human anthropophagy are most probably of a religious and ritual nature, and that exocannibalism developed out of ritual endocannibalism rather than the other way around. It is, however, equally unjustified to conclude, as did Eckhardt (1982), on the basis of this archeological evidence that "humans are basically cooperative rather than aggressive among themselves". Let us proceed now to the Neandertals who inhabited Europe and the Middle East before the Middle Pleistocene. From the first phases of the Würm ice advance (until about forty thousand years ago), all of the skeletal remains are those of Neandertal Man. Unlike the cartoons in which they are typically depicted with coarse and brutal features, and even more brutal habits, the Neandertals were a "people of some sensitivity and perceptiveness" (Birdsell, 1972). Even in their record of violence they may have resembled modern man more than any other hominid. There is ample, and less equivocal, evidence of



(gustatory?) cannibalism in the archeological finds. Very late in the Third interglacial period, or early in the first advance of the Würm, are placed a series of remains from Krapina (in former Yugoslavia). The exact number of individuals represented is difficult to estimate, for they are assumed to have been victims of intensive cannibalization (Gorganovic-Kramberger, 1906; Helmuth, 1968, 1973; Birdsell, 1972). Fragments of human skulls and long bones were discovered hacked and burned beside remnants of animal bones in and around a firesite. Similar remains of alleged cannibalism have been located in Weimar-Ehringsdorf (Virchow, 1920; Weidenreich, 1928; Behm-Blancke, 1959; Helmuth, 1968, 1973), and La Quina (Weinert, 1951; Gieseler, 1952; Helmuth, 1968, 1973). There is no conclusive evidence that cannibalism was practiced at other paleoanthropological finds such as La Chapelle, Le Moustier, La Ferrassie, Mount Carmel, Teshik-Tash, and Monte Circeo (Helmuth, 1968, 1973). For the latter site, Monte Circeo, there was, however, supposed to be evidence of another 'modern' practice: human sacrifice. Birdsell (1972) relates: In the inner chambers of Guattari cave some sixty miles south of Rome was discovered the skull of a classic Neanderthal man under what are certainly unusual circumstances. The find, known as Circeo I, was almost complete except for two significant mutilations. The right side of the skull and face had been badly damaged by violent blows. The base of the skull has further been mutilated so as to get at the brain in a way that is exactly similar to that practiced by living headhunters in Melanesia. The skull was found in an inner chamber which had not been used as a living site. It lay surrounded by a circle of stones with its base pointed upward. Three bundles of bones of wild cattle, red deer, and pigs were placed in the chamber in calculated clusters. From this evidence, Professor Blanc (1961) hypothesized that this skull represented a sacrificial victim who had been killed by a heavy blow on the temporal area of the skull as is done among present-day headhunters. The victim was beheaded and the skull mutilated outside of the cave, since there is no trace of either the rest of the skeleton or the fragments of the skull inside. The skull was then brought into the inner chamber and placed in an honored position within the circle of stones. This position suggests that it may have been used as a cup (Birdsell, 1972). There is little doubt that violence existed, Bailey (1987) asserts: "Ample evidence of killing, body mutilation, and cannibalism exist at many Neanderthal sites. Much of this violence was probably associated with ceremonies, rituals, and religious practices". Indeed, the cannibalism referred to here may still have been ritual and funerary, which does not, in any way, imply violence (unless the concept is stretched beyond credibility). The 'ample evidence of killing' is confined to a couple of



skeletons which exhibit wounds that seem to have resulted from weapons. This claim has, for example, been made regarding the pelvis of a skeleton from esSkhûl (Mt. Carmel caves, Israel) (the individual had incurred a spear wound in the leg, but is not usually considered a Neandertal: Richards, 1987), the ribs of one of the Shanidar Neandertals and the elbow of a skeleton found in Wadi Kubbuaniya (Egypt) (Clark & Piggott, 1965; Starr, 1974; Larsen, Matter & Gebo, 1992; Slurink, 1993). From the fact that many of the Neandertal fossils show signs of, sometimes severe, injuries from which the sufferer subsequently recovered, as well as other disabilities such as an atrophied arm in one of the Shanidar skeletons, one may conclude that Neandertal life was dangerous - as well as social and caring for the sick and disabled - but whether the danger emerged from predators and other exigencies of life, or from other Neandertals is hard to establish. For collective violence on the scale of warfare among them there is hardly any evidence. Some 40,000 years ago Neandertal populations began to disappear from Europe. Their disappearance remains a mystery, for while cave deposits show that Europe continued to be inhabited, there were no further human skeletons recovered during an interval of about 15,000 years, that is, until 25,000 years ago (Birdsell, 1972). Then a totally different, modern, kind of human being is found who produced stone tool making cultures such as the Perigordian, Aurignacian, Solutrean, and Magdalenian. (Today, the consensus seems to be that Neandertal Man was not an ancestor of anatomically modern humans, and consequently is no longer considered a subspecies of Homo sapiens). Proceeding now to this Homo sapiens sapiens level, the evidence of cannibalism among these 'modern' humans is solid, though the nature (gustatory cannibalism?, revenge cannibalism?) remains obscure in many cases, as well as the question whether the mutilations to the corpses were applied before or after death. According to Helmuth (1968, 1973), traces of cuts on the cervical vertebrae, suggesting decapitation; openings in the base of the skull; openings of the skull; and mutilation of the corpse in the case of a sapient skeleton from Döbritz are clearly ascertained (Mollison, 1936; Gieseler, 1952; Behm-Blancke, 1956; Grimm & Ullrich, 1965). Circumstances in the case of numerous finds from Bad Frankenhausen also seem to attest to cannibalistic practices (Behm-Blancke, 1956, 1958). The skeletal finds from Neuessing (Gieseler, 1953) revealed evidence of injuries and mutilations chiefly of the extremities in the area of the joints, while the effects of fire were also obvious. Finally, remains of human bones found in the kitchen-middens of North America among the Hopi Indians (Turner & Morris, 1970) and the Iroquois (Tuck, 1971) sites, on the coast of Cayenne, Brazil (Boehm, 1932) and Sumatra (Wastl, 1939) testify to the wide distribution of anthropophagy (Helmuth, 1968, 1973).



In a recent review of the evidence, Slurink (1993) notes: "Many presumed traces of cannibalistic practices in Homo erectus and Homo sapiens do not meet the criteria of scientific scrutiny. Yet the finds in Krapina and Hortus are difficult to explain otherwise. Research on the skull from Bodo, an archaic Homo sapiens of between 0.5 and 0.2 million years, shows that this has been deliberately defleshed (White, 1986). As cannibalism in the contemporary peoples who practice it is associated with the hope of acquiring the strength and courage of the enemy, clear traces of cannibalism could indicate also higher levels of intergroup competition". The kind of cannibalism that Slurink seems to envisage - based on the notion that by consuming enemy flesh one assimilates the animus of another group’s hostile power into one’s own (Sanday, 1986) or that one extracts regenerative or corroborative properties from the consumed flesh, while at the same time reducing and degrading the enemy to food and excrement as the ultimate act of revenge and domination - cannot be excluded as a possibility within the grasp of these hominids, but, once again, the ’deliberately defleshed skull’ and the other evidence cited do not exclude funerary endocannibalism - that symbolically ties the living to the ancestral dead in perpetuity - either. The issue whether warfare existed at this time is also highly controversial. Roper (1969), surveying the evidence for intra-human killing in the Pleistocene, concludes that some intra-hominid, perhaps intra-specific killing probably took place among Homo sapiens in the Upper Paleolithic. Claims rest primarily on certain damage to skulls, the so-called depressed fractures which occurred before or shortly after death when the bones still possessed some plasticity. On the basis of this, however, we can and may not conclude that there were wars. It is even impossible to tell whether the fractures "were the result of accidents, of attack by predators or intraspecies fighting" 10 (Huntingford & Turner, 1987) . Probably the most proper conclusion on the fossil evidence has been presented by Bailey (1987). He notes that the fossil evidence regarding man’s predecessors is very fragmented and incomplete. "Because all of man’s forbears are extinct, it is not possible to resolve any issue of man’s nature short of controversy, and what are cited as facts are, in reality, personal deductions based on scraps of evidence. Thus, the rightness or wrongness of evolutionary reconstructions reflects the theorist’s reputation, his or her skill in argument, 10

Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1984) refers to an article by Mohr (1971) "die 158 Knochenverletzungen aus der Alt- und Jungsteinzeit untersuchte. Von diesen waren 63 Prozent verheilt. Die Verletzungen betrafen den Schädel (47 Fälle), die oberen (16) und unteren (14) Extremitäten, die Wirbelsäule (16), das Brustbein (3) und das Becken (1). An Wirbelknochen und an den Knochen der unteren Extremitäten fand sie Pfeilverletzungen zum Teil mit eingeheilten Steinspitzen. Die Mehrzahl der Schädelverletzungen rührte von Steinäxten her". I have been unable to obtain a copy of this article, and thus to check the validity of these claims.



and reader’s receptivity to a great degree". In a thoughtful contribution to The Cambridge Encyclopaedia of Human Evolution (1992), Bahn discusses the prehistorical evidence of cannibalism (particularly in relation to the defleshing of bones) in the following words: Where prehistory is concerned, cannibalism has long been a favourite and dramatic theory, from the Palaeolithic to Minoan Crete and the Anasazi of the American Pueblo culture. All these interpretations depend on indirect cues and on assumptions, as nobody has yet found definite evidence of the practice, such as human remains inside preserved human faeces (coprolites). What appears at first sight to be overwhelming evidence for cannibalism was uncovered at the Neolithic cave of Fontbrégoua, southeastern France, where the bones of over a dozen people of the second millennium BC were found in three disposal pits, next to 10 pits containing animal bones. The human bones bore cut marks and breakage patterns identical to those on the animal remains, and were claimed to result from cannibalistic defleshing of fresh bones. However, the mortuary rituals of some Australian Aborigines can produce similar kinds of remains, from bodies left exposed to decompose, then defleshed and broken up for secondary disposal. Several individuals may be deposited together. So the onus of proof is still on those hoping for cannibalism at Fontbrégoua... Two principal sites were heralded as providing evidence of Neanderthal cannibalism: Krapina and Monte Circeo. Krapina, a cave in Yugoslavia, was first dug in 1899 and has yielded over 650 fragments of bones from dozens of inviduals, dating to between 100 000 and 50 000 years ago. These were interpreted as a cannibal feast, in which bodies had been smashed open to get at marrow and brains, and flesh cut off. This gruesome image does not stand up to scrutiny. The bones display no evidence of the impact fractures characteristic of marrow extraction by humans. Instead, the extensive fragmentation can be explained by rooffalls, crushing by sediments, and the use of dynamite during excavation. There are linear grooves and striations on some bones that seem to be cut marks; but a detailed comparison of these with butchery traces on reindeer bones at the Mousterian (Neanderthal) site of Combe Grenal, France, showed a great difference in the location, orientation and length of the marks. On the other hand, the Krapina marks resemble in appearance, location and frequency cut marks on human bones from secondary burials in a Michigan ossuary of the Late Woodland period (fourteenth century AD). It is therefore probable that the Krapina bones, like those at Fontbrégoua, were defleshed with stone tools after partial decomposition as a stage in a mortuary practice. At Monte Circeo, Italy, two Neanderthal bones where found in Guattari



Cave in 1939: a skull and a jawbone, probably from the same individual. The context of the find was extraordinary: the skull lay in a ’ring of stones’ on the cave floor, the hole at its base was enlarged, and there were fractures around the right temple. Inevitably, it was assumed that the Neanderthal, a man of about 45, had been killed by a blow to the head and his brains extracted through the basal hole for consumption. These factors - together with the position in a stone circle - all pointed to ritual cannibalism. Many popular works on prehistory have accepted this view unquestioningly. However, more careful analysis suggests that the ’ring of stones’ was not artificial but caused by a landslide; and the animal bones lying all over the cave floor, some of them bearing gnaw marks, and the presence of hyena bones and coprolites indicates that Monte Circeo was a hyena den around 50 000 years ago when the bones were depositied there. No cut marks have been seen on bones from the cave, and there are few stone tools on the floor. The skull itself displays no modification by humans, and it is known that hyenas sometimes carry human skulls into their lairs. The fractures on the skull are consistent with hyena tooth marks; the enlarged hole at the fragile base has gnawed edges without a trace of stone tools, and the jawbone was also gnawed by hyenas. Since the cave was used by Neanderthals before hyenas took possession, it is possible that the carnivores took the head from a burial in or near the site, but the skull’s preservation suggests that it was never interred. One cannot deny the possibility that cannibalism occasionally existed in prehistory, but concrete evidence is hard to find. Research is underway into marks on other human bones from early periods, but as yet they can all be interpreted as the result of mortuary practices (as at Krapina) or carnivore activity (as at Monte Circeo). In view of the extreme scarcity of cannibalism in historic times, its very existence in prehistory is becoming hard to swallow (Bahn, 1992; Cf. also Trinkaus, 1985; Russell, 1987; Bahn, 1991; White & Toth, 1991). It has been argued that indiscriminate massacres of enemy populations date back to the Paleolithic: the rock-shelter at Alfalou Ben Rhummel in North Africa contains remains of men, women and children who appear the victims of such misfortune (Arambourg et al., 1934). Clear cases of prehistoric genocide are very scarce. Klein (1989) mentions "an extraordinary terminal Pleistocene (ca. 14,000 - 12,000 years-old) cemetery near Jebel Sahaba in Sudanese Nubia where nearly half of the fifty-nine individuals exhumed had either unhealed antemortem skeletal injuries or had stone artefacts lodged in or near their bones". Ferrill (1985) paints a frightening picture of this burial site along the Nile in ancient Nubia. The prehistorians of ancient Egypt refer to the site as ’Cemetery



117’. Discovered in the 1960s, it belongs to the Qadan culture (12,000 to 4500 BC), possibly Proto-Neolithic, at least in its extensive use of microliths and its experimentation with agriculture. There were fifty-nine excavated burials at Site 117, and the skeletal remains are generally in a good state of preservation. Signs of staggering human savagery greeted the excavators. Included in the graves of about forty per cent of the skeletons were small flake points (microliths), probably arrowheads since they seem too small for spears or darts. Points were actually embedded in the bones of four of the dead men and women (some of whom suffered several wounds). In two of these cases the points were found in the sphenoid bones in the skull, and they must have entered from under the lower jaw. That probably means that the individuals were wounded and disabled, lying on their backs, in agony, heads thrown backwards, when they were shot through the throat with the bow and arrow. Although these remains may reflect a simple execution rather than war, some of the multiple wounds are frightening to imagine. Burial no. 44, a young adult female, had twenty-one chipped-stone artifacts in her body. Three of them found in front of, inside, and behind the mandible, must have been attached as points and barbs on an arrowshaft that was shot into her mouth. Essentially she has been hit over her entire body. Overkill may be a modern concept, but it was an ancient practice. Burials 20 and 21, two adult males, showed six and nineteen wounds respectively, including for no. 21 two stone artifacts in the skull. It is possible that many of the remaining sixty percent of Cemetery 117 died from wounds also. Presumably arrows could sometimes be extracted from the dead with points intact, and in that case there would be no archaeological evidence of death by violence. Seven of the skeletons show fractures of the arms that are characteristically produced when the arm is used to parry a blow. These fractures had healed before death, but they illustrate the dangers of life for the people of Cemetery 117. Altogether at the site there were skeletons of eleven children, twenty adult males, twenty-one adult females, and seven adults, sex unknown. Roughly the same percentage (about forty-five per cent) of men and women were clearly killed by microliths, and four of the eleven children (just over thirty-six per cent). We may have in this site the first extensive skeletal evidence for warfare in prehistoric times. It is possible that the dead with multiple wounds were simply executed, but it is far more likely, since the percentage of executions in the group would be incredibly high, that they died from an act of war. Whether it was organized war or simply a primitive ambush or skirmish, we cannot know, and the victims cannot now care (Ferrill, 1985). Also a recent excavation in the Netherlands is not conducive to the picture of



prehistoric man as a peaceful hunter-gatherer (Louwe-Kooijmans, 1990). "[T]he species concerned is, however, Homo sapiens sapiens. This suggests that only in this species the levels of intergroup conflict increased significantly as a result of ecological dominance" (Slurink, 1993; see Ch. 8). Also Ferrill (1985) presents the general conclusion: "In fact there is little evidence from all but Late Palaeolithic sites of anything that can be called organized warfare. Feuds and quarrels undoubtedly led occasionally to violence and killing. A few hominid and early human skeletons reflect violent death, but whether as a result of war or warlike action cannot be determined" (Cf. Childe, 1941; Eisler, 1987; Gabriel, 1990; Gowlett, 1984; Lindman, 1985, 1987; Keeley & Cahen, 1989; Milner et al., 1991; Roper, 1969; Vencl, 1984; World Archaeol., 1986; Sponsel, 1994; although it must be admitted that absence of evidence is not necessarily evidence of absence). 3.11.2

Pictorial Evidence

The next group of material to have bearings on the presence of war among prehistoric humans are the rock paintings and carvings or petroglyphs. Most of the Paleolithic petroglyphs do not depict any violent motif (such as the theme of the ’wounded man’ [Dams, 1984]), but examples of such motifs date from the Neolithic (beginning some 10,000 years ago in S.E. Europe) until the Bronze Age Period (e.g., Pidal, 1947; Maringer & Bandi, 1953; Kühn, 1955, 1958; Sandars, 1968; Hasselrot, 1984). Cave paintings in southern France and Spain depict scenes of people shooting at each other with arrows. Kühn (1958), who studied these cave paintings, was quite touched by those scenes. At the sight of the cave paintings in the Valltorta Cannon he wrote: "In another niche I can see the painting of a hunter hit by arrows and sinking to the ground. He has put one leg in front and his hand is resting on his knee. A head-dress like a crown is falling from his head. With his right hand he still clings to his bow, but the arrows of the enemies have pierced his body, his life is coming to an end. Consequently man killed his kind already in prehistoric times. The paradise - a fading dream of man? Is war - is fighting the essence? Is it as eternal as life? Here we are faced with pictures



dating from ancient times, older than our legends and fairy tales, and already the killing of man by his fellow-man, already fighting, already war" (quoted and translated by Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1977). Also Donahue (1985) has noted that "in the Saltadora Cave in Castile, Spain, there’s a crude painting of a man that [presumably] dates from the Mesolithic era. He has been shot with an arrow. He drops to the ground, clutching his own bow as he goes down: the first recorded victim of our own species’ thirst for its own blood" (depicted in Bandi et al., 1961; Prideaux, 1973; and Huntingford & Turner, 1987). But, as Kroeber & Fontana (1986) comment, it is a large step from what may well be an instance of individual aggression to socially sanctioned, organized warfare. For that matter, the Saltadora cave figure may be history’s first recorded hunting accident, a tragedy, rather than a thirst for blood. Several scenes in Spanish Levantine art show bands of archers attacking each other in what seems to be more or less disciplined combat. This early warfare involved simple forms of military ranking, military dress, and honor codes (Bandi et al., 1961; Prideaux, 1973; Beltran, 1982; Ferrill, 1985; Bailey, 1987; Huntington & Turner, 1987). Ferrill (1985) concludes that the cave paintings of Cougnac, Niaux, etc., "reflect very little evidence of warfare or of advances in weapons technology. There are several thousand scenes of animals, and, on the whole, they are idyllically peaceful. Only about 130 depictions altogether may be of men - the figures are too crudely drawn to permit certainty - and a few of the men (sometimes referred to as ’anthropomorphs’, meaning that they might possibly be men) seem to be dead or dying from wounds. Still, most of the 130 anthropomorphs are shown in peaceful scenes" (e.g., Leroi-Gourhan, 1967, 1968; Ucko & Rosenfeld, 1967; Hadingham, 1979; Moorey, 1979; Dams, 1984; Bahn & Vertut, 1988; Leakey & Lewin, 1992; For South Africa see Lewis-Williams, 1983; For North America see: Keyser, 1977, 1979; and Barry, 1991). It is not until in much later periods that unequivocal evidence of war can be observed in human pictorial art. Bleek (1930), Samachson & Samachson (1970), Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1975, 1977), Woodhouse (1979 et seq.), and Huntingford & Turner (1987) depict a North African rockpainting dating from ca. 4000 BC, in which a group of archers is involved in a cattle raid. The fresco called ’The Archers of Tassili’ (ca. 3500 BC), found at the Tassili Plateau of the Sahara Desert, depicts a combat between warriors using two different types of bow - one the ordinary semi-circular bow, the other a bow with a triple curve (UNESCO, 1963). The so-called ’palette of Narmer’, emblematically depicting the unification of lower and upper Egypt, and the subjection of the ’enemies’ (depicted with ignoble features), dates from ca. 3100 BC. The obverse side shows the king examining the headless bodies of his enemies under the standards of his army.



What may well be the oldest pictorial evidence of warfare was only recently discovered, and consists of battle scenes painted by northern Australian Aboriginals (in Arnhem Land) on rocks, dating from 6000 to as many as 10,000 years BP (Taçon, 1993; Taçon & Chippindale, 1994). In the earliest works male 'dynamic' figures are shown in combat, carrying large spears, hurling boomerangs, dodging spears and chasing one another with raised weapons. Some figures have spears sticking out of their bodies while others are bending down to help fallen comrades. Scenes produced some 6000 years ago show more 'modern' weapons such as spear-throwers and three-pronged spears. They also portray more numerous and larger battles involving leaders with special headdresses and dozens of warriors. Most earlier works depict small skirmishes or one-to-one contests. 3.11.3

Evidence from Weapons

An important part of the archaeological material indicating prehistoric war consists of weapons. Weapons are better (less equivocally) suited to this purpose than skeletal injuries. Weapons have received considerable attention in archeological studies and there is a vast literature on details of their typology and chronology (Lindman, 1987). According to Mansfield (1982; see also Zur, 1987), for the last 200,000 years hominids have had the technical and physical capability to create and use weapons against each other, but only since the Neolithic period have humans begun to design and use weapons to defend and attack against other human beings: "Thus for 187,000 years humans had the knowledge and ability to create warfare-type weaponry but did not" (Zur, 1987). In the Mesolithic Age, 12,000 to 8000 BC, there was a revolution in arms technology. Four staggeringly powerful new weapons make their first appearance, weapons (along with the Paleolithic spear) that would dominate warfare down to the present millennium: the bow, the sling, the dagger (or short sword), and the mace. This new, revolutionary technology was combined with the invention of military tactics and, by historical standards, enabled true warfare (Ferrill, 1985). Where the bow and arrow were invented nobody knows, but probably around 10,000 BC they appeared and spread rapidly around the Mediterranean. Neolithic cave painting clearly reveal their use against humans as well as animals (See e.g., Maringer & Bandi, 1953; Lommel, 1966; Prideaux, 1973; Brentjes, 1969; Brooks & Wakankar, 1976; Säve-Söderbergh, 1970; Uyanik, 1974). Bow, dagger, sling and mace have all been found at Çatal Hüyük in Anatolia dating from about 7000 BC.



3.11.4

Other Evidence

Roper (1975) investigated the evidence of warfare in the Near East from 10,000 to 4300 BC. Her main conclusions are the following. The earliest evidences of warfare in the Near East (and the world) are the massive fortification walls at Jericho dated to ca. 7500 BC. The sixth millenium exhibits three sites where conflict might have occurred: Ras Shamra Va, Tel es-Sawwan (in Iraq), and Hacilar on the Anatolian Plateau. About 5200 BC there was a fortress at Hacilar, thought to be the seat of a local ruler, which was destroyed. With the westward influence of the Halafians at the opening of the fifth millennium comes evidence of site destruction and fortifications on the ancient east-west trade route from central Mesopotamia to the Anatolian plateau and beyond. At Mersin XVI, a garrison with soldiers’ quarters provides evidence of centralized social control and a soldier or warrior class - two main characteristics exhibited by warring societies in succeeding millennia in the Near East. Trade, fortifications, and site destruction seem to be related factors with regard to early evidences of warfare in the Near East. Accumulations of negotiable wealth and control of strategic sites for exploitation of trade seem paramount as the instigators of hostilities. The social organization developed to handle trade relations may have been a prerequisite for the centralized control necessary to direct the building of fortifications. The old notion that hostilities developed between agriculturalists, pastoralists, and hunter-gatherers is not confirmed by the findings of Roper’s study. Indeed, events in the Israeli/Jordanian area in the 5th and 6th millennia and elsewhere indicate that diverse lifestyles existing near each other did not produce conflict. Rather, trade was the catalyst from which hostilities arose. Warfare became a popular method of getting what was wanted - which in the Near East appears to be materials attainable only from afar, negotiable wealth, and control of popular trade-related sites (Roper, 1975). According to Leakey (1981), the wall of Jericho may have been built for military defense, but, he submits, it is just as likely that the wall was erected to keep out silt, rather than people. Situated as it is near the slopes of mountains, large quantities of silt were probably washed down the valley during floods and could have buried the town’s buildings.



3.12

Some Conclusions

1. The main conclusion emerging from this chapter, namely that Intergroup Agonistic Behavior (IAB) is an adaptive behavior in a number of nonhuman (especially primate) species may sound disconcerting for many readers, yet this conclusion is inevitable given the evidence. The major implication of this conclusion is that a whole body of theories which regard IAB as erratic, or even pathological, behavior can be put quietly to rest. 2. The overwhelming majority of gregarious and social mammalian species does not have Intergroup Agonistic Behavior in its behavioral repertoire. For a good number of species the cost/benefit ratio of IAB precludes the evolution of such behavior anyway, but for an as yet unknown number of species it is less easy to explain why they lack this behavior, which would be highly profitable as a high-risk/high-gain strategy. It is likely that they lack the requisite social and cognitive (domain-specific) skills, such as a coalitional psychology, to cooperate for the sake of concerted competition. 3. In a number of the species reviewed, in which intergroup aggression is serious and concerted business, there seems to be an intricate relationship between intra- and intergroup processes. It even seems, particularly in the chimpanzee case, as if relatively ’peaceful’ intragroup relations are conditioned by, and interdependent on, some level of xenophobia (or, rather, protoethnocentrism, a "tendency toward closure of the social networks" [Wrangham, 1987]) and hostility toward outgroups, as if it were an export-of-conflict mechanism. This interrelationship will be discussed more fully in Ch. 6 on kin selection and ethnocentrism. Note, however, that intergroup antagonism is no guarantee for suspending intragroup competition, and not necessarily alleviates tense and ambivalent male-male relationships. 4. The role of females in primate intergroup agonistic behavior as well as in human primitive warfare has been, until very recently, seriously underestimated. War, as ’the great business of mankind’ has been mainly conducted by males - with females considered to be the active or passive victims of this male preoccupation - but the (reproductive) interests of females in matters of war and peace are at least as great as those of males. 5. Hominid/human warfare ’from the dawn of history onward’ is a distinct possibility, but it is not and can not be based on the fossil or pictorial evidence, in spite of vigorous claims to the contrary. Certainly, this conclusion is not meant to support the view that intergroup violence of any significance was launched only during the phase of agricultural settlement, and that (therefore)



intergroup competition has not played a central role in early hominid/human evolution (e.g., Montagu, 1976; Leakey & Lewin, 1977; Reynolds, 1980; and implied in evolutionary models such as those presented by Lovejoy, 1981; McGrew, 1981; and Tanner, 1981). By the same token, this conclusion is not meant to support the opposite point of view, most strongly articulated by Alexander (1979 et seq.). Alexander admits that the fossil and other archeological evidence is not unambiguous when one wants to prove the existence of violent intergroup competition as a regular (proto)human behavior pattern. Instead, he demands the evidence of no cut-throat intergroup competition to be unequivocal. Such a reversal of the burden of proof is scientifically inadmissible. By extrapolating and retrojecting contemporary intergroup behavior back into the evolutionary past, he seems to envisage some kind of unilineal trend which does neither do justice to the caleidoscopic picture of radiations, branches, chronospecies and populations in hominid/human evolution, nor allows for profound changes in the functions of this behavior over time and in varying ecological niches. In an attempt to reconstruct the social behavior of the common ancestor of both humans and the three living species of African apes by means of phylogenetic comparison, Wrangham (1987) presents the following conclusions: The common ancestor is implied to have commonly had closed social networks, hostile and male-dominated intergroup relationships with stalk-and-attack interactions, female exogamy and no alliance bonds between females, and males having sexual relationships with more than one female. This reconstruction of the ’ancestral suite’, Wrangham points out, does not imply an evolutionary history of inevitable territorial aggression (contra e.g., Ardrey, 1970; Lorenz, 1967) because there is no implication that territoriality occurred at all. And, more importantly, intergroup aggression was not necessarily universal (though it might have been). Instead, its distribution may have depended on ecological conditions, as it is probably true of chimpanzees and certainly is of humans (See Ch. 8). 6. Having established at least the possibility of phylogenetic precursors in (or phylogenetic continuities between nonhuman and) hominid intergroup antagonism, I am quite aware that many questions on nonhuman IAB have been left unanswered (To mention only one: Is there any parallel between the selection pressures and ecological conditions underlying both sociality and warfare in the social insects and humans?) This is not because these problems are not vexing and intriguing in their own right, but simply because they would detract us too much from, or are less relevant to, the exploration of our main theme.



4 Biological and Ecological Theories of the Origin and Evolution of War 4.1 Introduction In this chapter I shall review the ultimate-level explanations of primitive war, i.e., biological theories of the origin of warfare in human evolution. Biological theories are considered to be those which derive their main concepts from evolutionary biology, Darwinian psychology, ethology, socioecology, and related disciplines. Somewhat arbitrarily, I include in this chapter ecologicaldemographic, functionalist and materialist theories which propose the main ’purpose’ of war to be a solution to environmental problems, mainly the Malthusian population/land ratio. Ecological theories are biological in the sense that the environment is the main selective agent in the Evolution-by means-of-Natural-Selection paradigm. The theories reviewed range from the period of Social Darwinism to contemporary neoevolutionist anthropology and modern sociobiology. Most biological-evolutionary theories of the origin of war have their roots in Social-Darwinist thinking (although they are reluctant to acknowledge this heritage), so it seems only fair to begin with a tour d’horizon of Social Darwinism.

4.2 Social Darwinism Social Darwinism may be regarded as a peculiar theory of sociocultural evolution flourishing in a distinct historical period ranging from about the middle of the 19th century to about the middle of the 20th, but this is rather uninformative. It is more interesting to regard Social Darwinism as a confluence of ideas, a syndrome of doctrines and recurrent themes, loosely connected by the Spencerian-Darwinian postulates of ’survival of the fittest’ in the perpetual ’struggle for existence’. As the main intellectual inputs of this syndrome we shall consider: racialism, evolutionism/selectionism, instinctivism, and (though more implicitly) functionalism. In many people’s minds Social Darwinism is indissolubly associated with a particular brand of War Apology, eugenics, racism, imperialist policies in the political, and ruthless egotism and laissez faire policies in the socio-economic domain. As the focus of this treatise is primarily on (the evolutionary



explanation of) war, these subjects (with the exception of the war-apologetic part) can only be tangentially touched, but, as far as possible, they will be placed in their historical contexts. 4.2.1 Racialism During the era of Social Darwinism, Man definitely fell from his self-proclaimed Crown-of-Creation pedestal. Before that time the intellectual luggage concerning (non)human organisms included the idea of a Scala Naturae (with mankind - naturally - occupying the highest rung of the ladder), for all eternity created by a Benevolent and Infinitely Wise Demiurge or Providence; of fixed, static, permanent and immutable species, ancillary to mankind; and, within mankind, a steep hierarchy of human ’races’, the more ’inferior’ races commonly thought to have degenerated from a superior common stock (monogeny), or else to have been created separately (polygeny). As increasingly more ’primitive’ peoples were discovered and visited, and their appearance, languages, manners, and customs described, the idea that human history had been a progress from savagery to the superior perfection of western civilization, rather than a decline from original perfection took firm root. And as familiarity with racial types increased, a clamorous controversy arose between monogenists and polygenists, concerning the unity or diversity of the human species. When the monogenists attempted to explain the formation of human races, they were ’naturally’ inclined (given the assumptions of 18th-century biology) to view the process as one of degeneration from the primordial type of the species. Both Buffon (1707-1788) and Blumenbach (1752-1840) conceived the origin of racial types in this manner. According to Buffon, the peoples in the vicinity of the Caspian Sea were most perfect in form and feature, hence the progenitors of mankind must have lived there. To Blumenbach, too, this Caucasian type was the most beautiful and natural, the epitome and paragon of Man. The writings of Buffon, Blumenbach, Maupertuis, and Kant provided Cuvier (1769-1832) with three different approaches to the problem of explaining how human races could be derived from a single stock: first, Buffon’s and Blumenbach’s theory of degeneration through direct environmental influence; second, Maupertuis’ (1698-1959) idea of random variation and the establishment of new types through the operation of some selective agency; and third, Kant’s conception of preformation and subsequent adaptive exspeciation. In the interim, moreover, Erasmus Darwin (1731-1802) and Lamarck (1744-1829) had propounded a general theory of evolution, postulating the development of new biological types through the adaptive response of organisms to the changing demands of the environment (Greene, 1959; Mayr, 1991). But Cuvier was not much interested in the problem of racial origins. He recognized three main races - Caucasian (as whites are still called in the



U.S.A.), Mongolian, and Negroid - of which he considered the Caucasian the most beautiful, the most enterprising, and the most ’cultured’. The Negroes, he declared, constituted "the most degraded race among men, whose forms approach nearest to those of the inferior animals, and whose intellect has not yet arrived at the establishment of any regular form of government, nor at anything which has the least appearance of systematic knowledge" (Essay on the Theory of the Earth, 1818). In this passage, the intellectual enterprise of racialism clearly shows the prodromal symptoms of unadulterated racism, in which it would ultimately culminate. In Cuvier’s hands anthropology had little to contribute to the development of evolutionary ideas. In other hands, however, the search for a key to the origin of human races produced hypotheses which foreshadowed Charles Darwin’s theory of the origin of species. In 1813, James Prichard (1786-1848) published the first edition of his Researches into the Physical History of Man. Prichard was well aware of the importance of artificial selection in producing varieties of domesticated animals, and it occurred to him that a kind of unconscious selection went on in human society, namely, the selection of mating partners according to esthetic preference (what Darwin would later call ’sexual selection’). Interestingly, Prichard applied the concept of evolution and progress to Man’s physical as well as to his mental equipment. Like Lamarck, he faced the problem of accounting for a postulated evolutionary development and for the apparent exceptions to it, but, whereas Lamarck assumed the transmissibility of acquired characters, Prichard rejected this assumption and looked instead for some selective agency which could establish a variation. He recognized the importance of artificial selection in animal breeding and explored some of the implications of sexual selection among human beings, but he stopped short of the idea of natural selection through elimination of varieties poorly adapted to survive. The application of the idea of natural selection to the problem of the origin of human races was the work of an Anglo-American, William Wells (1957-1817) (Two Essays, 1818). If Wells had been a zoologist and geologist as well as a physician, Greene (1959) conjectures, Charles Darwin’s theory of the origin of species might have been anticipated by almost fifty years. All the elements of the theory were present in the scientific world by 1818. The idea that Homo sapiens, as he had been named by Linnaeus, was a product of Special Creation (’in the image of God’), and that an insurmountable schism separated Man from the rest of Nature, was obvious to 19th-century Europeans, and not only in religious circles. The tendency to place human evolution in a different class from prehuman evolution was also prominent in Alfred Russel Wallace’s (co-founder of ’classical’ evolution theory) writings on the origin of the human races. In an



article "The Origin of Human Races and the Antiquity of Man Deduced from the Theory of ’Natural Selection’" published in the Journal of the Anthropological Society of London in 1864, Wallace undertook to show that the theory of natural selection could bring to an end the long controversy between those who regarded all the races of Man as varieties of one species (monogenists) and those who considered each race a separate species (polygenists). In brief, Wallace argued that natural selection could have acted on Man’s body in any marked degree only during the period before Man acquired the intellectual capacities which made him truly Man. As long as Man’s ancestors depended on mere animal strength, agility, and cunning to make their way in the world, their bodies must have been subject, like those of other animals, to the winnowing action of natural selection: "Thus arose those striking and special modifications which still distinguish the chief races of mankind". At the same time this creature’s mental powers would be sharpened by natural selection. Eventually these would develop to the point where he could invent tools, fashion clothing, lay snares - in short, adapt to the environment by other means than hereditary variation. At that point, said Wallace, natural selection would cease to have much influence on his bodily form. From then on, his success or failure in the struggle for survival would depend on mental and moral qualities rather than on physical factors. The various races of Man, already formed by natural selection in the period before Man became Man, would henceforth continue with very little physical modification except insofar as the development of intellectual capacity was reflected in the shape and size of the cranium. In the mental and moral sphere, however, there would be a severe competition resulting in the spread of the best endowed races and the gradual extinction of the less gifted ones. In this competition some races would "advance and become improved merely by the harsh discipline of a sterile soil and inclement seasons", while others, inhabiting tropical regions, would stagnate from lack of environmental challenge. In Wallace’s opinion, the true ’grandeur and dignity of Man’ lay in his unique ability to transcend the law of natural selection which ruled the fates of all lower animals. Looking at the future, Wallace painted a dithyrambic picture of progressive cultural advance issuing from the steady predominance of ’the more intellectual and moral’ races over the ’lower and more degraded’ races in the conflict of cultures. Wallace was the author of this purple passage, but the ideas were derived from Herbert Spencer, the self-educated philosopher who applied the idea of natural selection to the evolution of human races several years before Darwin and Wallace first published their views. A devout believer in free, private enterprise unhampered by government regulation, Spencer had written his Social Statics in 1850 to show that the laissez faire policy in political and social matters was in keeping with nature’s



’stern discipline’ for accomplishing progress in the biological realm. Just as nature insured the survival of the fittest races by subjecting them all to a harsh struggle for existence, so society should compel its members to develop selfreliance, thrift, foresight, and industry by exposing them to the rigors of economic competition. By this policy the elevation of Man from his original savage condition, in which he could be governed only by force and fear, to the perfect society, in which every individual would be free to do as he pleased but none would wish to harm any other, would be greatly accelerated. The discipline of economic competition, seconding the stronger discipline of racial conflict, would develop a higher breed of Man capable of living without government. So ran Spencer’s argument in Social Statics, the book which suggested to Wallace the general idea of his article and some of its particular applications (Greene, 1959; Peel, 1972). At the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century, a number of philologists and historians (Schlegel, Klaproth, Grimm, Müller, a.o.) launched the theory of Aryanism (with subsequent variants such as Teutonism and Nordicism). Though some of these theorists understood that the Aryans were a hypothetical linguistic group, nevertheless they often mixed it with the 'Aryan race' (because of an alleged mystic union of language and 'blood'), Sorokin (1928) explains, and in this way facilitated the appearance of a purely racial interpretation of history (For the origin and history of the 'Aryan Myth', and its ultimate degeneration into anti-Semitism, see also: Poliakov, 1974). The most influential were the racial theories of Gobineau, Gumplowicz, and Chamberlain. The French race theorist Arthur de Gobineau's main thesis was that the racial question was the key to all problems of history, and that the "inequality of races is sufficient to explain the entire enchainment of the destinies of peoples" (Essay on the Inequality of the Human Races (1853-5). There are the inferior and the superior races, and only the latter are able to attain true civilization. Historical degeneration was the effect of racial miscegenation - the increasing impurity of a race's blood - and war was the moment where the weakness of the diluted race was exposed. Vigorous invasion and the annihilation of the defeated were to be understood as the ineluctable and natural triumph of the racially strong on the one side, the necessary capitulation of the degenerate stock on the other: "Societies perish because they are degenerate... The word degenerate when applied to a people means... that the people has no longer the same intrinsic value as it had before, because it has no longer the same blood in its veins, continual adulterations having gradually affected the quality of that blood". The sole fundamental reason for social degeneration and military defeat is racial decay resulting from the vitiating mixture of superior and inferior races. The enigma and the tragedy of civilization lies in the inevitable dilution of Aryan with other bloods. Collective demise, it seemed to Gobineau, was as



inevitable a fate as individual death (Pick, 1993; Sorokin, 1928). Chamberlain (Grundlagen des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts, 1899) added little to this scheme, except by popularizing the view that the most superior race is the white, particularly the Aryan ’race’. His work had a deleterious influence on 20th-century racist doctrines. According to Gumplowicz (Der Rassenkampf, 1883), mankind has a polygenist origin: each race comes from a distinct stock. Consequently, antagonism and hatred have always existed among the human races, and will continue to divide them till the end of time. "The perpetual struggle of the races is the law of history", Gumplowicz concludes, "while perpetual peace is nothing but the dream of the idealists". In Britain these ideas had already been anticipated by the theories of Robert Knox (1850). Knox believed that "Race is everything". Harris (1968) comments: "No one can read Knox without sensing the imminence of Darwin, for Knox’s interpretation of history involved a physical and cultural evolutionary progression, produced by a life and death struggle between the dark and light races of mankind. The dark races had evolved first, but the whites were destined to surpass them and to bring about their extinction. In this fashion Knox anticipated both Spencer and Darwin as far as natural selection applied to human evolution was concerned. Knox also proposed an evolutionary view of the origin of all other species, postulating an order of emergence through mollusks, fish, birds, quadrupeds, and man". The principles of Gumplowicz’s theory are as follows: First, the theory of polygenesis, or the multiple origin of mankind, developed by Gobineau thirty years before. Second, the assumption of an inherent and lethal hatred and animosity in the relationship of one racial group to another, resulting in an inevitable and deadly struggle or war between the races (Rassenkampf). Third, the assumption that only through such a struggle has any enlargement of the social group, or any consolidation of two or more groups into one social body, been possible. Fourth, the victorious group, having conquered its victim, pitilessly exploits it, turning it into either slaves or subjects. For the sake of successfully controlling them, it enacts laws, and in this way we have the explanation of (1) the origin of the state, (2) the origin of law, and (3) the origin of stratification and inequality (Sorokin, 1928). Once the means of warfare became developed, it was only natural that war would be a constant feature of humanity. With war comes the possibility of the conquest of one group by another and the development of a strong state to ensure a means for domination. With the consolidation of larger political units through war and conquest, a greater differentiation develops within the society. From then on, the range of conflict increases within societies to add to that between societies as, in the words of Gumplowicz, "the life and death struggle between hordes anthropologically different becomes a contest between social groups, classes, estates and political parties".



Class conflict is an especially prominent feature in developed states. In origin the dominant class usually represents a conquering group, but over time new classes develop to complicate the power relationships. Primary elements in the formation of the class system are opposing economic interests as well as the formation of alignments necessary to allow effective domination by a ruling group. The desire for greater material welfare for one’s group and a drive toward domination over other groups provide the constant stimuli for further conflicts of class against class and nation against nation (Schellenberg, 1982). One can easily recognize this theory to be a special variant of the Überlagerungs-theory first formulated by Ibn Khaldun (See Ch. 1). The most influential disciples and followers of Gumplowicz were, among others, Small (1905), Ward (1903), Oppenheimer (1908), de Savorgnan (1914), and Ratzenhofer (1893, 1908). Ratzenhofer (1893) condensed the theory to a single proposition: "The contact of two hordes produces rage and terror. They throw themselves upon one another in a fight to exterminate, or else they avoid contact". "Until now", Novikow (1912) commented in discussing these theories, "it was believed that men fought their fellows in order to obtain food, women, wealth, the profits derived from the possession of the government, or in order to impose a religion or a type of culture. In all these circumstances war is a means to an end. The new theorists proclaim that this is all wrong. Men must of necessity massacre one another because of polygeny. Savage carnage is a law of nature, operating through FATALITY". He has three objections against the racialist doctrine: (1) Until now there have been no race wars, for the simple reason that the races have not been conscious of their individuality. (2) When the wars of political domination took place between two linguistic groups, they became race wars by chance. (3) The Swedes, the Danes, and the Germans are Teutons. That has not prevented them from fighting one another furiously. While, reversely, on numerous occasions the first contact of two very different races has been peaceful (like that between Welsh and Tehuelche in Patagonia, 1865) (Novikow, 1912). Note that this racialist intellectual input to Social Darwinism has very little to do with Darwin. The Zeitgeist was apparently such, however, that it could easily be incorporated into Social Darwinism proper. It might even be claimed that racialism was the cradle of Darwinism, as all the elements that constitute the theory of evolution by means of natural selection were 'discovered' during the search for an explanation of the diversity of the human 'races'.



4.2.2 Evolutionism/Selectionism: The Struggle for Existence Conflict and struggle were long ago declared a fundamental law of the universe, of organic life in general, and of Man’s existence in particular; and the source of all change and progress. Even the theory of the ’survival of the fittest’ was outlined as early as the 5th century BC (Empedocles, Heraclitus), and may also be found in the Zend-Avesta (Sorokin, 1928). In the 19th century a great impetus to the idea was given by Spencer, Darwin, Wallace and Huxley. Darwin (1859 et seq.) took the idea of a ’struggle for existence’ from Malthus (and the term from Spencer), but hardly defined this basic concept. Later authors have interpreted it in their own way. Some authors talk of the struggle for existence among atoms, molecules, organisms, human beings, and societies (e.g., Novikow, 1896; Tarde, 1897). Others applied the term only to organisms, but in a very general and loose sense (e.g., Bagehot, 1884; Nicolai, 1919). The essence of Malthus’ (1798) doctrine - which catalyzed Darwin’s theory of selection - is that a population tends to increase faster than the means of subsistence and that this increase is checked by wars, epidemics and famines, to which Malthus subsequently added ’moral restraint’, meaning deferred marriage and sexual abstinence. He regarded warfare in the earlier ages of the world as "the great business of mankind", and as one of the first causes and most powerful impulses of war "undoubtedly an insufficiency of room and food; and greatly as the circumstances of mankind have changed since it first began, the same cause still continues to operate and to produce, though in smaller degree, the same effects". Before Malthus, many authors had indicated the demographic factor (i.e., overpopulation) as one of the principal causes of war. Malthus, however, generalized the theories into a ’law’ where war functions as one of the effective checks on population. Since that time, this idea has become quite common in various formulations (van der Dennen, 1975). Malthus is moderately optimistic about warfare as a population check in modern society. It was conceivable to him that by means of elaboration and rationalization of the other preventive checks, war would eventually be abolished: "It might fairly be expected that war, that great pest of the human race, would, under such circumstances, soon cease to extend its ravages so widely and so frequently as it does at present". Novikow (1896; 1912) distinguished four principal types in the evolution of the struggle for existence among human beings: the physiological, economic, political, and intellectual. According to Novikow, in the course of time the ruder forms of struggle are superseded by milder ones: "No grim fatality obliges us to massacre one another eternally like wild beasts... The Darwinian law in no wise prevents the whole of humanity from joining in a federation in



which peace will reign... All the theories based on that alleged fatality are pure phantasmagorias absolutely devoid of all positive reality" (Novikow, 1912). Also Vaccaro (1886 et seq.) envisioned a progress from ruthless extermination at the earliest stages of human evolution to the disappearance of war in the future. These ideas were welcomed by many authors such as Tarde (1899), Kropotkin (1902), Kovalevsky (1910), Ferri (1895), de Molinari (1898), Ferrero (1898), Nicolai (1919) and Sumner & Keller (1927), among many others. Steinmetz (1907; 1928) formulated "Das Gesetz der abnehmenden Kriegsverluste" (the law of diminishing war casualties - implying a gradual amel1 ioration of the cruelty of war during mankind’s progress toward civilization) . Sorokin (1928) outlined the fallacies in this kind of reasoning. The full title of Darwin’s famous book, The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life (1859), clarifies the central importance of natural selection, as well as the grim Malthusian doctrine, in Darwin’s theory of evolution. In his introduction he summarizes this idea as follows: "As many more individuals of each species are born than can possibly survive; and as, consequently, there is a frequently recurring struggle for existence, it follows that any being, if it vary however slightly in any manner profitable to itself, under the complex and sometimes varying conditions of life, will have a better chance of surviving, and thus be naturally selected". In the hundreds of fact-filled pages that follow, the theory of biological evolution is systematically developed. Although natural selection is not presented as a total explanation, it is regarded as the most important factor in the origin and ’transformation’, or ’descent with modification’ (terms Darwin preferred over ’evolution’) of species. "Thus", he says in his final paragraph, [F]rom the war of nature, from famine and death, the most exalted object which we are capable of conceiving, namely, the production of the higher animals, directly follows. There is grandeur in this view of life, with its several powers, having been originally breathed into a few forms or into one; and that, whilst this planet has gone cycling on according to the fixed law of gravity, from so simple a beginning endless forms most beautiful 2 and most wonderful have been, and are being, evolved (Darwin, 1859) . 1

These ideas also fitted nicely with other prevalent ideas about the future abolition of war in the course of social progress (Montesquieu, Kant, Saint-Simon, Comte, Jaurès, Spencer, Cobden, Angell, Constant, Nobel, Fourier, Bakunin, and many others). 2

Pick (1993) seems to detect in this passage the first 'biologically-inspired' glorification of war: "One has only to turn to the last pages of Darwin's The Origin of Species (1859) to find a figurative conflation of the idea of war and the sublime". See ' 4.2.4.



In the Origin Darwin says next to nothing about the evolution of humans. He does suggest that "much light will be thrown" in the future by similar analyses concerning "the origin of Man and his history". Twelve years later, in The Descent of Man (1871), he attempted to follow up on this direction of analysis. While still the central theme, natural selection is here joined by a suite of other ideas which were only briefly presented or hinted at in the Origin of Species. "The sole object of this work", Darwin announced in his The Descent of Man, "is to consider, firstly, whether Man, like every other species, is descended from some pre-existing form; secondly, the manner of his development; and thirdly, the value of the differences between the so-called races of Man". The anatomic peculiarities of Man (including rudimentary organs and vestiges) could be explained by assuming common descent with selective modification. But what about Man’s mental, moral, and spiritual faculties, those aspects of human nature which naturalists from the time of Linnaeus had regarded as raising Man immeasurably above the level of brute creation? Here Darwin appealed to the principle of gradation. If it could be shown that the difference between Man and other animals in these respects was one of degree and not one of kind, it could then be argued that the more highly developed forms of intellect, esthetic sensitivity, group spirit and the like had, gradually, evolved from lower forms in the course of time. So saying, Darwin proceeded to marshal the evidence he had been collecting for many years. A close observer of animals, he had been impressed by the range of their capacity for feeling and learning. In varying degrees he had found them capable, like Man, of pleasure and pain, happiness and misery, terror and shame, playfulness and boredom, courage and devotion, pride and jealousy. On the intellectual and esthetic side the higher animals exhibited a sense of wonder and curiosity, a capacity to learn by experience, an ability to communicate with each other by cries and sounds, and strong esthetic preferences. These qualities in animals should be compared, said Darwin, not with the highest manifestations of human art and intellect but with the attitudes, emotions, and thought processes of the ’crudest savages’. He who had seen the naked Fuegians gathering limpets and mussels in the cold rain or squatting in their wretched shelters ’conversing’ in hoarse grunts, he who had seen one of their chiefs dash his own child against the rocks for dropping a basket of sea-urchins, would not be inclined to exaggerate the difference between the lowest Man and the highest animals or reject as preposterous the suggestion that both might be descended from common ancestors. Having prepared his reader to entertain the possibility that Man’s ancestry was brutish, Darwin proceeded to investigate the genealogy of Man more fully. Like Thomas Huxley (1863) before him, he traced Man’s line of



descent to the progenitor of the Old World monkeys, possibly some lemur-like creature from whom both the Old World and the New World monkeys had sprung (Greene, 1959). Having thus given Man a pedigree "of prodigious length, but not, it may be said, of noble quality", Darwin next undertook to show the manner of Man’s development from his apelike ancestor. The principles of organic evolution expounded in the Origin of Species were as applicable to Man as to other animals, he declared. The variability of the human constitution was well known, though its causes were still uncertain. The tendency of human populations to press continually on the food supply had been noted by Malthus long ago. It followed that there must have been a struggle for existence from time to time in the long course of human history, especially at that remote period "before Man had arrived at the dignity of Manhood". The Descent of Man includes attention to, as factors in evolution, the inheritance of acquired characteristics, special accidents of heredity, what Darwin calls ’correlated variation’ (features which are not themselves adaptive but happen to be developed along with those which are), and differential fertility. Especially emphasized is ’sexual selection’ or the long-run genetic effects of esthetic preference in the choice of mates. In fact, the full title of the book is The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex, and a discussion of sexual selection actually constitutes most of the book. Sexual selection is invoked not only in explaining the differentiation of Man from his anthropoid cousins, but also, building on Prichard’s ideas, to explain the varieties (’races’) in the human stock itself. It is among higher animals that sexual selection becomes important in evolution: among lower animals "perceptive and intellectual faculties are not sufficiently advanced to allow of the feelings of love and jealousy, or of the exertion of choice". Sexual selection takes place in two kinds of ’sexual struggle’ between rivals: one is typically between males who seek "to drive away or kill their rivals", while the other is a more subtle competition for the attentions and favors of the opposite sex (male or female). In both cases, we have the basis of a rivalry between individuals within a species in seeking to mate which is a more direct confrontation than is the impersonal competition of natural selection (Greene, 1959; Schellenberg, 1982; Richards, 1987; Cronin, 1991). The phenomenon of ’sexual selection’ augments ’natural selection’ of the usual type. It refers to the fact that animals select mates according to physical attractiveness. This amplifies sexual dimorphism as each sex evolves those traits found most alluring by the other, and Darwin shows how at all levels, from reptile and insect to bird and mammal, this generates an extraordinary range of skin coloring, exuberant plumage (like the peacock’s flamboyant tail), horny excrescences and the like which serve to attract the opposite sex. Sometimes males compete for females, sometimes vice versa (In humans,



Darwin believed, it is the males who have the monopoly of choice). Why a feature should be found sexually attractive is often mysterious, though there might be a link with survival-relevant characteristics, thus large males might be more attractive than small ones. Nevertheless there is a high arbitrary component in esthetic preferences. It is this range of variability which Darwin uses to explain racial differences when he returns to Man in the last chapters of the book. In the human species, Darwin conjectured, sexual selection had probably produced its greatest effects at a very early period, "when Man had only just attained to the rank of Manhood". Judging from the present social habits of Man, it was probable that he originally lived in small communities, "each with a single wife, or if powerful with several, whom he jealously guarded against all other men". That the law of battle in the acquisition of choice females prevailed in those days was apparent, Darwin said, both from the practices of ’savage peoples’ and from the occasional atavistic appearance in modern Man of canine teeth. The greater size and strength of man as compared to woman, he continued, his greater courage and pugnacity, his higher powers of imagination and reason all these were undoubtedly due in large part to the struggle he had endured both in securing a mate and in the battle for life generally. These qualities would be transmitted chiefly to the male progeny, Darwin thought, but, as in mammals generally, there would be a tendency to transmit them to both sexes in some degree. Typical feminine qualities and female morphological and behavioral features were probably also acquired through the advantage they conferred in the competition for male notice. Sexual selection also provided Darwin with a clue to the origin of human races. Natural selection might explain Man’s gradual triumph over other anthropoid creatures, but the characteristic traits of the various human races, such as skin color, hair type, skull form, and the like, seemed to confer little or no advantage in the struggle for survival. In the competition for mates, however, they had undoubtedly played an important role, especially at the dawn of human history (Greene, 1959; Richards, 1987). The strongest and most vigorous men - those who could best defend and hunt for their families, who were provided with the best weapons and possessed the most property, such as a large number of dogs or other animals, - would succeed in rearing a greater average number of offspring than the weaker and poorer members of the same tribes. There can, also, be no doubt that such men would generally be able to select the more attractive women. At present the chiefs of nearly every tribe throughout the world succeed in obtaining more than one wife... We have seen that each race has its own style of beauty, and we know that it is natural to man to admire each characteristic point in his domestic animals, dress,



ornaments, and personal appearance, when carried a little beyond the average. If then the several foregoing propositions be admitted..., it would be an inexplicable circumstance if the selection of the more attractive women by the more powerful men of each tribe, who would rear on an average a greater number of children, did not after the lapse of many generations somewhat modify the character of the tribe (Darwin, 1871)

He concludes that the greater size, strength and pugnacity of males compared to females has arisen from contests between rival males for possession of females in ’primeval times’ and has been ’subsequently augmented’, while racial differences are due to sexual selection of the ’secondary sexual characteristics’, i.e., features not functionally involved in reproduction but found sexually attractive (Richards, 1987; Cronin, 1991). Like most social theorists of the nineteenth century, Darwin assumed that history was the record of Man’s unilineal progress from savagery to civilization, and his theory of social progress was similar in many respects to Spencer’s (Greene, 1959). That natural selection had played an important role in past progress Darwin was firmly convinced. It was natural selection which had produced Man’s erect posture, bipedal gait and manual dexterity. Above all, it had acted to develop Man’s mental and social character, for these attributes had been decisive in the struggle for existence. "I suppose you do not doubt that the intellectual powers are as important for the welfare of each being as corporeal structure", he wrote to Lyell in 1859; "if so, I can see no difficulty in the most intellectual individuals of a species being continually selected; and the intellect of the new species thus improved, aided probably by effects of inherited mental exercise, I look at this process as now going on with the races of Man; the less intellectual races being exterminated" (Life and Letters, II). The acquisition of tools, the use of fire, and the ’half-art and half-instinct’ of language would have stimulated the development of the brain and of the ’social sentiments’. These, in turn, brought about group progress through imitation of the inventions and discoveries of the most gifted members of the group: "If the invention were an important one, the tribe would increase in number, spread, and supplant other tribes". Meanwhile, social solidarity and common morality developed by a similar process of natural selection. To Darwin it seemed likely that any animal possessing strong social instincts would acquire a moral sense if its intellectual powers became developed to the point where it was conscious of a conflict between its immediate impulses and its enduring social instincts. There was no question, Darwin continued, that Man had strong social instincts, probably acquired at a very early period through the advantage they conferred on the tribes possessing them. Every advance in morality and social solidarity would have survival value for



the group in which it occurred, Darwin added: It must not be forgotten that although a high standard of morality gives but a slight or no advantage to each individual man and his children over the other men of the same tribe, yet that an increase in the number of wellendowed men and advancement in the standard of morality will certainly give an immense advantage to one tribe over another. A tribe including many members who, from possessing in a high degree the spirit of patriotism, fidelity, obedience, courage, and sympathy, were always ready to aid one another, and to sacrifice themselves for the common good, would be victorious over most other tribes; and this would be natural selection. At all times throughout the world tribes have supplanted other tribes; and as morality is one important element in their success, the standard of morality and the number of well-endowed men will thus everywhere tend to rise and increase (Darwin, 1871). In deriving human morality from social instincts, Darwin proposes a model of what would now be termed ’group selection’; the advantages of altruism, selfsacrifice, etc. accrue not to the individual but to the group. But this raises the difficulty of understanding how, since such individuals will reproduce at a lower rate than their less noble companions, it is nevertheless their behavior which is selected. For he acknowledged that the bravest "would on average perish in larger numbers than other men". Clearly, natural selection cannot straightforwardly explain this and Darwin proceeds to explain altruism by: (a) the evolution of improved reasoning leading our ancestors to see that it is advantageous to help their fellows, such habits becoming inherited over many generations (i.e., the mechanism of ’intelligence into instinct’); and (b) love of praise and fear of shame. Tribes in which noble behavior was high would come to dominate those in which it was low, thus group selection would favor tribes of brave and self-sacrificing individuals over the selfish and cowardly, whose undiscipline and lack of moral fiber would result in their succumbing should the groups come into conflict (Richards, 1987; Cronin, 1991; Ch. 1). Thus, for Darwin as for Spencer, human progress depended on the rise and spread of ever superior breeds of men. When Darwin talked about ’supplanting’, ’elimination’, ’extermination’ and ’extinction’ of tribes and races, he meant it quite literally. In discussing the problem of the causes of the decline and extinction of ’savage races’, he states: [T]he increase of each species and each race is constantly checked in various ways; so that if any new check, even a slight one, be superadded, the race will surely decrease in number; and decreasing numbers will sooner or later lead to extinction; the end, in most cases, being promptly determined by the inroads of conquering tribes (Darwin, 1871).



What Darwin had in mind was clearly a model of group selection (in the second meaning of the term we distinguished in Ch. 1), groups constantly being supplanted, conquered, incorporated or exterminated by other groups, the whole process being driven by intergroup competition. As Alexander (1974 et seq.) suggested, humans are an excellent model for the kind of group selection Darwin envisioned. It is an appropriate model because, despite Darwin’s ignorance of the genetic materials, it would operate through the survival of alleles as a result of selection at the group level. Other than in his extended discussion of sexual selection, Darwin had little to say about social or group factors in human evolution. He did briefly refer to the importance of ’social instincts’ which higher animals have acquired gradually ’for the good of the community’. Man, however, has "few or no special instincts"; social motives in humans, said Darwin, are much more influenced by learning than is the case with other animals. Other than making such general points, Darwin himself contributed little to what has come to be called Social Darwinism (Schellenberg, 1982) - and what more aptly would be called Social (or Not-So-Social) Spencerism. Other writers were far less reticent in tracing the implications of Darwinism for society. One whom Darwin cited with general approval was his fellow Englishman and cousin, Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), who was also influenced by Malthus. Spencer was an even more thoroughgoing evolutionist than Darwin, extending this idea to the far reaches of human society and, indeed, the whole universe. Spencer also talked about the importance of the ’survival of the fittest’ (a phrase which Darwin borrowed from him) long before the Origin of Species appeared. Surprisingly, he also was a convinced Lamarckian, believing in the inheritance of acquired characteristics (which he probably needed to fit in with his ideas of sociocultural progress), and not until after Darwinism became popular did he himself accept the theory that natural selection was at least one of the causes of biological evolution. In his First Principles, published in 1862, Spencer set forth a universal law of evolution: "Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion, during which the matter passes from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity, and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation" (This is, as Richerson [1995] remarks, the second law of thermodynamics backwards). Such evolution Spencer viewed as a cosmic law of nature, applicable alike to the inorganic (physical), organic (biological), and superorganic (or sociocultural) realms. Human societies, for example, evolved from undifferentiated hordes, by means of increasing division of labor, into complex civilizations. On the superorganic level, societies may be seen as significant integrations which continually increase in coherence and heterogeneity. This view of human society is parallel to the conception of biological organisms as emergent wholes. Societies, like individual organisms, develop their integrities or unities



through a struggle for survival, a struggle which in large parts pits society against society. Competition for survival is therefore characteristic of both individual organisms and societies, and in this struggle are forged the characteristic forms taken by animal species and human societies. Fear is endemic in the uncertainties of early forms of human society, which leads to religious and political forms of social control: "While the fear of the living becomes the root of the political control, the fear of the dead becomes the root of religious control" (Peel, 1972). Especially prominent is a military form of social organization. With the extending scope of social organization, however, more emphasis can be given to peaceful pursuits (Schellenberg, 1982; Cf. Hofstadter, 1955; Service, 1975). Gradually, then, as the scope of human society expands, the plasticity of society increases and individual spontaneity and initiative assume more importance. Coercion becomes less and less necessary as a basis of social integration as more effective institutions of human cooperation prove their survival value. Spencer’s view of the general evolution of society may thus be described as a transition from ’military’ (or coercively controlled) to ’industrial’ (or functionally cooperative) forms of social organization. As we move more and more toward an industrial society - that is, one of peaceful interdependence - obvious conflict becomes more muted. But, according to Spencer, competition is still going on indirectly, pitting individual against individual and institutional form against institutional form. This is nature’s way of discriminating between the more fit and less fit forms. And the less we consciously interfere with the process the better, for the most adaptive (and therefore best) forms are those which emerge gradually out of this longterm competition for survival. This, of course, led Spencer directly to the political position of laissez faire, arguing for a bare minimum of governmental regulation. This should allow, he believed, maximum room for the competitive process - the natural selection acting on variations in the population - which produces the survival of the best competitors, the extinction of the ’unfit’, and thus the gradual improvement of human society (Schellenberg, 1982). Class stratification was justified on the basis of ’natural’ inequalities among individuals, for the control of property was considered to be correlated with superior and inherent moral attributes like industriousness, temperance, and frugality. Attempts to reform society would interfere with natural processes; unrestricted competition and defense of the status quo were in accord with biological selection. The poor were soon regarded as the ’unfit’ and they should not be aided; and conversely, in the struggle for existence, wealth was considered to be a sign of success. Spencer, even more outspoken than Wallace and Darwin, was the principal proponent of the group-selection thesis. In his The Study of Sociology (1873) he stated:



Warfare among men, like warfare among animals, has had a large share in raising their organizations to a higher stage. The following are some of the various ways in which it has worked. In the first place, it has had the effect of continually extirpating races which, for some reason or other, were least fitted to cope with the conditions of existence they were subject to. The killing-off of relatively feeble tribes, or tribes relatively wanting in endurance, or courage, or sagacity, or power of co-operation, must have tended ever to maintain, and occasionally to increase, the amounts of life-preserving powers possessed by men. Beyond this average advance caused by destruction of the least-developed races and the least-developed individuals, there has been an average advance caused by inheritance of those further developments due to functional activity... A no less important benefit bequeathed by war, has been the formation of large societies. By force alone were small nomadic hordes welded into large tribes; by force alone were large tribes welded into small nations; by force alone have small nations been welded into large nations (Spencer, 1873). Elsewhere (Principles of Sociology, 1876), Spencer indicates the rationale behind this inexorable process: the antagonism between societies caused by the struggle for existence: Excluding a few simple groups such as the Esquimaux, inhabiting places where they are safe from invasion, all societies, simple and compound, are occasionally or habitually in antagonism with other societies; and, as we have seen, tend to evolve structures for carrying on offensive and defensive actions... Already we have ample proof that centralized control is the primary trait acquired by every body of fighting men, be it horde of savages, groups of brigands, or mass of soldiers. And this centralized control, necessitated during war, characterizes the government during peace (Spencer, 1876, Vol. I). What is more, Spencer already formulated what has virtually become an axiom among contemporary social scientists: ’Man’s Universal Belligerence’ (van der Dennen, 1990): "Antagonism more or less constant with other societies, having been almost everywhere and always the condition of each society, a social structure fitted for offence and defence exists in nearly all cases, and disguises the structure which social sustentation alone otherwise originates". Inter- and intra-group selection go on to the present day, but, Spencer asserts, in civilized warfare the intra-group selection has become negative and retrogressive, eliminating the best elements of the population. Furthermore, warfare is at variance with industrial development. As an institution it has become dysfunctional. Spencer was also one of the first to discuss what we call today ’ethnocentrism’



or the phenomenon of ingroup-outgroup differentiation. In his Principles of Ethics (1892-3) he wrote: "Rude tribes and... civilized societies... have had continually to carry on an external self-defence and internal co-operation external antagonism and internal friendship. Hence their members have acquired two different sets of sentiments and ideas, adjusted to these two kinds of activity". The theme of ethnocentrism was later elaborated by Sumner (1906; 1911), who also coined the term (See Ch. 6). Spencer was also the founder of functionalism in sociology and anthropology. Two years after Darwin’s The Descent of Man appeared the first significant work of biologically derived speculation to break Spencer’s monopoly in that field: Bagehot’s (1872) Physics and Politics: Thoughts on the Application of the Principles of ’Natural Selection’ and ’Inheritance’ to Political Society. Bagehot - the first avowed Social-Darwinist according to Service (1975) attempted to reconstruct the pattern of growth of political civilization in the manner of evolutionary ethnologists like Lubbock (1870) and Tylor (1865, 1871), from whom he drew some of his data. There is no doubt of the predominance of natural selection in early human history, Bagehot asserted: "The strongest killed out the weakest as they could". He felt that warlike competition among societies in early times would select for those with the best leadership and most obedient populace. Hence his much quoted adage: "The tamest are the strongest". Progress, habitually thought of as a normal fact in human society, is actually a rare occurrence among peoples. Of the existence of progress in the military art there can be no doubt, nor of its corollary that the most advanced will destroy the weaker, that the more compact will eliminate the scattered, and that the more civilized are the more compact (Hofstadter, 1955). In his Social Statics, Spencer (1851) had already voiced a similar conviction: "Evidently, therefore, from the very beginning, the conquest of one people over another has been, in the main, the conquest of the social man over the anti-social man; or, strictly speaking, of the more adapted over the less adapted" (Peel, 1972). Continuing Spencer’s functionalist line of thought was the American sociologist William Graham Sumner (1840-1910). "It is the competition of life" Sumner (1911) asserted, "which makes war, and that is why war always has existed and always will. It is the condition of human existence". The foundation of human society, said Sumner (1911; Sumner & Keller, 1927), is the man/land ratio. Conflict over the means of subsistence is the underlying fact which shapes the nature of human society. When population presses upon the land supply, earth-hunger arises, races of men move across the face of the world, militarism and imperialism flourish, and conflict rages. Where men are few and soil is abundant, the struggle for existence is less savage: "Wherever there is no war, there we find that there is no crowding". Sumner emphasized group factors (including the binding power of folkways



and mores) more strongly than did Spencer, and he was considerably less optimistic about the direction of evolutionary change (Hofstadter, 1955; Schellenberg, 1982). Sumner expounded his firm belief in laissez faire, individual liberty, and the innate inequalities among men. As a devout Social Darwinist he viewed competition for property and social status as resulting in a beneficial elimination of the ill-adapted and the preservation of racial ’soundness’ and cultural vigor. Governmental attempts to alter this situation through welfare measures would, he felt, impede progress. 4.2.3 Ignoble Savages Why, when and how did the 18th-century Rousseauian image of the ’noble savage’, uncorrupted by the evils of civilization, change into the image of the ’brutal, violent, ape-like savage’? First of all, the new conflict-model of nature and human society, introduced by Darwinian, Spencerian and Haeckelian thinking, also introduced the slogans of ’struggle for life’ and ’survival of the fittest’, which were taken quite literally, and soon became interpreted in terms of selection for the strongest and most violently aggressive individuals, groups, classes, ethnies, peoples, races and nations: the Agent of Progress. These notions combined with the pre-19thcentury idea of a Scala Naturae (or Great Chain of Being), a natural, fixed and linear hierarchy of species with Man, the Crown of Creation, at the top, and of races with the white, Caucasian race superior to all others and the final, ultimate stage of evolution and civilization. These views were translated in the new evolutionary framework as orthogenesis toward predetermined goals. Secondly, by the same logic, preliterate cultures and primitive peoples were considered to be at the lowest rung of the orthogenetic ladder, and by implication living fossils: wild, brutal, savage, base, crude, low, backward, uncivilized, and intellectually, morally, and technologically inferior. In short, our ’contemporary ancestors’, as they were called, were contemptible creatures, to be civilized by the White Man’s pacifying mission. Similarly, the simians (monkeys and apes) were considered to be everything We, the Civilized and Superior were not: debased, despicable, ferocious, voracious, shamelessly promiscuous, lewd and lascivious creatures. Thirdly, if primitive peoples were our contemporary ancestors, would not their appearance and conduct, in turn, be similar to our real Paleolithic ancestors, the ’missing link’ between Man and the apes: the apeman, whose fossil remains were slowly but gradually to be uncovered? One of the first to describe Man’s alleged ancestors as violent, ferocious and bloodthirsty creatures was Friedrich Albert Lange in 1866. He depicted them as prehistorical brutes who bashed each other’s skulls with clubs in order to devour the raw brains of their hapless competitors (Corbey, 1988). The authoritative and influential French archaeologist, Gabriel de Mortillet,



completes the now-stereotypical and well-known image of the ’missing link’, which was to dominate the thinking about our origins till far into the 20th century, and which was revived by the sanguinary slaughterhouse phantasmagorias of Dart and Ardrey and their disciples. The apeman, de Mortillet writes in 1883 in his Le Préhistorique - origine et antiquité de l'homme, was "colère, violent et bataillard": a savage brute, prone to fits of violent, furious and uncontrolled rage, without the faculty of speech, naked, still a semi-animal with apelike features and morally and intellectually a moron or worse. In this same tradition developed the explanation by the biocriminologist avant la lettre, Cesare Lombroso, of the criminal as a living atavism, a remnant from prehistorical times when we were still violent, bestial, brutal and barbarian semi-apes (See also Corbey, 1988 for more examples). Interestingly, Blainey (1988) provides casual evidence that the turn-over interval that preluded the Decline of the Noble Savage may be dated even earlier. He writes: As pride increased in European civilisation, the simpler cultures were dismissed. I recently found an obscure article written on the East Indies in 1865 by Alfred R. Wallace, who was co-discoverer with Charles Darwin of the theory of biological evolution; and in Wallace's eyes the villages in the Celebes were abject until the Dutch arrived with their cleanliness, hard work, education, law and order, and Christianity. 'Thirty years ago', wrote Wallace, 'the country was a wilderness, the people naked savages garnishing their rude houses with human heads'. The people, he said, had been constantly at war, primitive in their farming, and living in poverty on top of luxuriant soil... Sympathy towards the Aboriginals of Australia also fell. Writers and painters began to depict them with contempt. The sixth edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, published between 1815 and 1824, announced that there were no ferocious animals in Australia and New Zealand, with one striking exception: 'Man only in Australasia is an animal of prey; and more ferocious than the lynx, the leopard, or the hyena, he devours his own species'. Thus the Aboriginal was dismissed as an aggressive cannibal... It was increasingly believed that modern Man, unlike the ancient savage, was peaceful and would remain so. John Ferguson McLennan, the combative Scottish sociologist and lawyer who died in 1881, put the argument emphatically; 'Lay out the map of the world, and wherever you find populations unrestrained by the strong hand of government, there you will find perpetual feud, tribe against tribe, and family against family'. Likewise the world's authority on ancient law, Sir Henry Maine, saw tribal war as a frequent occurrence. The new emphasis on the warlike activities of simple societies was as much a reflection of Europe's



heightened pride in itself as of new evidence of barbarism in distant lands... Clearly, the meaning of the noun ’savage’ had slipped, and it was now sliding quickly towards its present meaning of barbarous and brutal... [Originally the term ’savage’, being derived from Italian-Latin ’silvagio’, simply and neutrally means wood-dweller]. In the last chapter of The Descent of Man, published in 1871, Charles Darwin recalled that the first time he had seen primitive people was on a wild shore in Tierra del Fuego. They were naked: worse, they were ’absolutely naked’. Their hair was tangled, their expression was wild and startled, and they excitedly frothed at the mouth. They had no government and they had barely any arts; ’like wild animals’ they lived on what they hunted; and they were merciless to members of other tribes. They even stood, in Darwin’s view, on a slightly lower level of civilisation than the Australians. Darwin hoped that civilised man, having already advanced far above his barbarian ancestors, would attain ’a still higher destiny in the distant future’. In that mental picture the once-noble savage had been reduced to little more than a twitching fossil (Blainey, 1988). From this chronology one might conclude that the founding fathers of evolutionary theory did not demolish the idea of the noble savage; they merely delivered the coup de grâce to an already moribund imagery. 4.2.4 Social Selectionism and Degenerationism In Darwin’s (and Spencer’s) view, the extinction of the ’inferior’ tribes and races signified the upward progress of Mankind as a whole through the triumph of the ’higher’ over the ’lower’ varieties of the human species. In general, progress seemed to result from the competition of individuals, tribes, and races. Unfortunately, however, in civilized societies the weak and sickly members are allowed to propagate their kind, and "No one who has attended to the breeding of domestic animals will doubt that this must be highly injurious to the race of man. It is surprising how soon a want of care, or care wrongly directed, leads to the degeneration of a domestic race; but excepting in the case of man himself, hardly any one is so ignorant as to allow his worst animals to breed" (Darwin, 1871). Thus Darwin joined Spencer, Wallace, Francis Galton and other prophets of doom in warning against policies which might endanger social progress by diminishing the competitive struggle which was its basic prerequisite: Man, like every other animal, has no doubt advanced to his present high condition through a struggle for existence consequent on his rapid multiplication; and if he is to advance still higher, it is to be feared that he must remain subject to a severe struggle. Otherwise he would sink into



indolence, and the more gifted men would not be more successful in the battle of life than the less gifted. Hence our natural rate of increase, though leading to many and obvious evils, must not be greatly diminished by any means. There should be open competition for all men; and the most able should not be prevented by laws or customs from succeeding best and rearing the largest number of offspring (Darwin, 1871). In such passages, Darwin seemed to subscribe heart and soul to Spencer’s 3 ’every-man-for-himself-and-the-Devil-take-the-hindmost’ social philosophy . But he was not consistent in this view. Deep in his character there was a warm humanitarianism and a strong holdover of the Christian ethic in which he had been trained: "What a book a devil’s champlain might write on the clumsy, wasteful, blundering, low, and horribly cruel works of nature!" he wrote - in a mood of despair? - in a letter to his friend Joseph Hooker in 1856 (Greene, 1959). Like the economist Richard Cobden before him, Spencer had argued that war had been (or at least ought to have been) transcended in the progress of history. He acknowledged that primitive societies were founded on the war ideal, but claimed that this was eventually surpassed: "In rude societies all adult males are warriors; consequently, the army is the mobilized community, and the community is the army at rest" (1876, Vol. II). Industrial society - in essence opposed to war - progressively evolved from the militant-type society. He witnessed many signs of relapse from ’industrial’ to ’militant’ society, however, and by 1882, when the second volume of The Principles of Sociology appeared, he had evidently come to doubt the natural inevitability of peaceful development upon which his social philosophy had hitherto been based (Pick, 1993). Following Spencer’s suggestion, Larroque (1856), de Lapouge (1896 et seq.), and Letourneau (1895) contended that the selection caused by war and other 3

"The latter part of Chapter 5 [of The Descent of Man] also provided the basis for what Galton was later to develop as Eugenics, with its doubts about the effects of civilization on the quality of the human stock: ’... the weaker members of civilised societies propagate their kind... this must be highly injurious to the race of man’ (p. 296). The ’reckless and degraded’ apparently increase more rapidly than the ’provident and generally virtuous’, though their higher mortality rate to some extent checks the effects of this. With side-swipes at the deleterious effects of celibacy in the Catholic Church and the selective culling of the intelligent by the Spanish Inquisition, he brings the topic to a close. Whilst Darwin cannot be held responsible for the later excesses of Social Darwinism, nor does he really share the associated terror of ’degeneration’ which widely affected later European thought (e.g. Nordau, 1895), there is little doubt that in The Descent of Man an influential rationale for them can be discovered" (Richards, 1987). Galton’s and Pearson’s hereditarist school led to a huge eugenics movement, especially in the Anglosaxon countries (Sorokin, 1928; Hofstadter, 1955).



forms of social (intragroup) selection had become essentially negative and deleterious. This led de Lapouge to the formulation of his ’law of the quicker destruction of the more perfect racial elements’. Ammon (1893 et seq.) agreed in essence with this ’law of decay’, as did Vaccaro (1886), Ferrero (1898), de Molinari (1898), Jordan (1907 et seq.), Novikow (1912), Nicolai (1919), and many others. The argument runs as follows: Armies, as a general rule, are composed of the ’best blood’ of the population. During a war, it is the army which suffers losses most. This means that war exterminates the ’best blood’ of a nation in greater proportion than its ’poorer blood’ (Sorokin, 1928). Also the removal of the vast majority of soldiers from marriage and reproduction even in times of peace was a cause of the proliferation of the weaker elements in the population, as Larroque (De la guerre, 1856) argued. "Military selection is necessarily retrograde since it exposes the flower of the species to death and disease... physical deterioration inevitably ensues from this reverse selection" claimed Letourneau in his La guerre dans les diverses races humaines (1895). And Jordan (The Human Harvest: A Study of the Decay of Races through the Survival of the Unfit, 1907) warned that "the decline of a people can have but one cause, the decline in the type from which it draws its sires". All in all, the social selectionists claimed, this means that militarism and war facilitate a survival of the unfit, favor a propagation of the poorer blood and in this way they are necessarily dysgenic: factors of negative selection, racial degeneration, and evolutionary regression into savagery. Vaccaro (1886) emphasized another variant of this claim: The Roman rule "parcere subjectes et debellare superbos" (spare the submissive and demolish the proud) has been a general rule of almost all wars. Therefore: "Since the submissive, to the exclusion of the brave and upright men, beget children, the traits of baseness and servility become fixed in the race". In this way war selection has exterminated millions of the best individuals, leaving a degraded and debased population to breed. Hundreds of studies were dedicated to the problem whether selection due to war was negative, neutral, or positive. Some of the authors went so far in an evaluation of the negative selection of war that they made it responsible for the decay of nations and empires (Seeck, 1910; Jordan, 1907). Ironically, the diametrically opposing view - arguing that war and struggle were indispensable to progress by exterminating the inferior ’races’ (an intergroup selection argument), and claiming that intragroup peacetime selection was even more negative and retrogressive than the selection due to war - also invoked their arguments from the new theories of organic (and sociocultural) evolution. Both peace and war arguments were increasingly to be grounded in the authority of evolutionary biology. A number of authors indicated that, even at that present time, war’s selection is far from being as negative as supposed. After all, "the great fact remains that



somehow Man has evolved, and he has fought, presumably, half of the time. If warfare is so deleterious it may be asked: How did he get where he is?" (Woods & Baltzly, 1915; Cf. Sumner, 1911). Gini (1921) and de Savorgnan (1926) added to these considerations a new one. If, in regard to men, war’s negative selection is true, its harm is compensated for through the positive selection of females due to war. Steinmetz (1907; 1929) brings out two reasons in his endeavor to show that even if war selection is in some degree negative, this harm is by far counterbalanced by war’s positive effects. Following the opinion of Plutarch, Polybius, Aristotle, Machiavelli, Vico, and of many others, he claims that the peacetime selection is negative also. Peace leads to vice, decadence, debauchery, apathy, effeminacy and loss of virility, and to a survival of the people who are far from being the best blood of the nation. Peaceful competition leads to a regressive selection, too. Therefore it is questionable which of these two negative selections is more harmful and retrogressive: "War that shatters her slain / And peace that grinds them as grain". Above all, war is the supreme instrument of group-selection. It is the only test serving this purpose, and the only test which is adequate because it tests at once all forces of the belligerent groups: their physical power, their intelligence, their sociality, and their morality. Victory is the result of a mobilization of all the forces of a nation. Steinmetz vigorously claims that war will not disappear in human history - if war has been the agent of progress in the past, abolition of war clearly would result in evolutionary stagnation, and abolition of war would not only be stupid but absolutely immoral - and this Dutch sociologist has gone into history as one of the most prominent and vigorous ’scientific’ apologists of war. He also endorsed the Hegelian dictum: "Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht". Steinmetz asserted that war is the usual business of primitive tribes; that the ’savages’, probably from the very first stage of hominization, were bloodthirsty, and that they waged their wars in the most cruel fashion and with horrible losses of life and numbers of casualties (Steinmetz, 1907). From a biological point of view, he continues, aggressiveness has been a condition necessary for progress. Without it, Man could not have emerged from his animal state, because he would have been exterminated by other species. Without war an upward movement within humanity itself would not be possible, because any means of finding out which social group is superior and which is inferior would be absent. A long or eternal peace would make Man an exclusively egotistical creature, without virility, courage, altruism, or bravery. Such a man would be entirely effeminated, and corrupted to the very heart of his nature (Sorokin, 1928). The controversy remained unsolved. The ’decay’ argument for peace was formulated in particularly vehement degenerationist terms in Nicolai’s The Biology of War (1919), in which he claims that war constitutes a tragic biological degeneration. The fighting of the First World War, he warns,



ensures that the ’unfittest’, the ’physically inferior’, survive: "Children and old men are protected by Government, but besides them the blind, deaf and dumb, idiots, hunchbacks, scrofulous and impotent persons, imbeciles, paralytics, epileptics, dwarfs and abortions - all this human riff-raff and dross need have no anxiety, for no bullets will come hissing against them, and they can stay at home and dress their ulcers while the brave, strong young men are rotting on the battle-field" (Nicolai, 1919). These ’stay-at-homes’, the ’idiotic and sickly indigenous race’ are ’producing the generation to come’ with disastrous long-term effects. To be thus aware of the war’s dysgenic results, he argues, is to lose all romantic illusions about the slaughter. It is true, Nicolai confesses, that war emanates from a deep human desire, stirring us "to the very depths of our being" and awakening "primitive and hallowed sentiments which we collectively call patriotism"; yet war is "wrong, harmful and needless" for the healthy nation. Whatever the robustness of the desires embedded in the drive to fight, wars in fact constitute the spasm of the degenerate, "the last great carouse of which even a degenerate nation can dream" (quoted in Pick, 1993). 4.2.5 The Moral Majesty of War As we saw, evolutionary theory was increasingly to be invoked in later 19thcentury accounts of the necessity of war (whether or not in the context of racial inequality and Rassenkampf). As Pick (1993) states: "Inter-state conflict, it seemed, was the brutal but necessary social equivalent to the ’natural struggle’, the indispensable method for sorting the weak from the strong. Moreover, war was often cast as the guarantor of a certain natural, biological or even racial progress". But Social Darwinism, in effect, did little more than adding evolutionarilyderived arguments to long-existing war-apologetic sentiments: It was the final crescendo in a time-honored tradition of the justification and apology of war in the history of western civilization. Many people in Germany seem to have welcomed, hailed, adored and glorified the First World War on the eve of its outbreak in 1914 (Stillman & Pfaff, 1964; Tuchman, 1967). The German cardiologist Georg F. Nicolai (we already met him before) observed a tidal wave of race-centered nationalism in his country, a furor teutonicus washing over Germany, and he abhorred it. He wondered how this national mass sentiment of Kriegsbegeisterung (war enthusiasm bordering on thanatic euphoria) could have arisen, considering that, as he states in his book The Biology of War (1919), "War had been hated for thousands of years past". The appropriateness of Nicolai’s contention that war had always been hated is questionable, since, as will be demonstrated, it is not a general disapproval of the institution of war which emerges from the literature on the subject. On the



contrary, it appears that the justification, and, in its wake, the apology of war has a long, recurrent, and time-honored scholarly tradition in European history. Universal and perpetual peace has not always been held in great respect, or even been felt desirable. The attempt by Nicolai to demonstrate the absurdity of the mass-hysterical glorification of war in his country can hardly be admired enough, especially taking into consideration that he sacrificed his professional position and risked his life (Ike, 1987). Nevertheless, his selection of anti-war quotations, which often range back to the Ancients, is rather heavily biased by what he wishes to prove. For the apology of war actually has been a constant undercurrent in European thought, periodically even surfacing to a full-blown panegyric. Nicolai’s observation that no thoughtful person has ever had anything favorable to say about war does not obviate the fact that there have been many thinking individuals who have extolled war. These persons we call the Apologists of War. The Apologists of War range from the fatalistic on the one hand, such as Thomas de Quincey (1896) who saw the necessity of war rooted in a sad overruling principle which it is in vain to fight against, to the positively glorifying on the other hand, such as the German geopolitician Ratzel, founder of the Lebensraum doctrine, who exclaimed: "Schade daß es nicht mehr Kriege gibt" [What a pity that there are not more wars]. Characteristic for the Apologists of War is the idea that peace is unfavorable, hence undesirable, and even pathological; and, conversely, that war therefore is desirable, positively functional, inevitable and ineluctable. In its most exalted manifestation war is glorified ["... warre, which is the greatest and most glorious of all humane actions" (Michel de Montaigne, 1580)], and, as will be seen, sometimes even sacralized and deified. Associated with this metaphysical tradition is the popular medieval conception of war as a periodic, inescapable catastrophe, an 'Act of God', as inevitable as an epidemic of bubonic plague. It is this 'Cataclysmic Theory of War', which, some centuries later, found an eloquent advocate in Tolstoy (1896). When infused with apocalyptic and chiliastic thinking, and the religious doctrine of Original Sin, the cataclysmic idea of war is easily transformed into the conception of war as penitence for divine punishment and castigation for Man's sinfulness: the Scourge of God. Among the War Apologists, a number of variant traditions or schools can be distinguished: (a) the Metaphysical or Mystico-sentimental variant, (b) the Mercantilist variant, (c) the Etatistic variant, (d) the Eschatological variant, and (e) the biosocial or Social Darwinist variant (cf. Juganaru, 1933). Each of these variants will be briefly introduced. They may be envisaged as tributaries, all cumulatively adding their contents to the mainstream of apologist philosophy, culminating in Social Darwinist doctrines of war as the Agent of Progress.



Within this constellation of ideas, war enthusiasm could bud, grow and flourish. (a) The Metaphysical Variant The metaphysical tradition of war apology is insolubly related to the JudaeoChristian religious tradition in European thought. The origin of war, according to its 14th century codifier Honoré Bonet, lay in Lucifer's war against God, and therefore "it is no great marvel if in this world there arise wars and battles since these existed first in heaven" (Bonet, ca 1385; quoted in Tuchman, 1978). The metaphysical apology of war dates back to biblical times when the Chosen People, under the direct supervision of their God of Wrath, eliminated the 'inferior peoples'. Since then, as Ecclesiasticus (3:8) says, there is "... a time of war and a time of peace". And God approved to this state of affairs, as did later Church Fathers, such as St. Augustine, and scholastic thinkers who contemplated the concept of the bellum iustum, the just war, which to all practical purposes proved to be a codified and sacrosanct justification of war. These patristic and scholastic thinkers could, in addition to the Old and New Testaments, refer to classical Greek and Roman philosophers and historiographers, who had considered war to be a perfectly natural state of affairs, often unvarnishedly justified with an appeal to the right of the stronger, or to human nature. On the eve of the Crusades, the transition from just war to 4 holy war appeared to be just a tiny step . The metaphysical variant of apologist thinking reached a provisional climax in the Elizabethan Alarmists (about 1600), who had inherited the patristic diffidence in an all-too-perfect harmony in this Valley of Tears, where mortal life was supposed to be struggle and sin - and sin flourished especially in times of peace. Peace, the Alarmists proclaimed in innumerable sermons and tractates, leads to abject idleness, luxury, decadence, corruption, effeminacy, adultery, and moral decay: a sordid and deplorable state of affairs, to be cured only by a sound portion of the therapeutic Tonic, Roborant, and Purgator of Bellicosity (the function of war as an aphrodisiac was already known for longer). When the Lord meaneth to plague a wicked nation for sinne and to translate them to the power and sceptre of another nation, then He filleth them with the fatnesse of the earth, and geeveth them peace that they wax 4

For the classical period see especially Loenen (1953), Garlan (1975), van der Dennen (1977), and Henssen (1978). For the early Christian period see Faunce (1918), Cadoux (1919), Heering (1928), Bainton (1960), Windass (1964), Deschner (1966), Wells (1967), and Russell (1975). Many other authors have noted the Christian preoccupation, if not obsession, with war, violence, sadomasochism (and sex). Also the Faustian character ascribed to Occidental culture adumbrates this schizoid aspect. Why it is that the great monotheistic religions (also Islam has its jihad or holy war) produced the concept of ’holy war’ I have to leave to the specialists. See Aho’s (1982) Religious Mythology and the Art of War for a valiant attempt.



rotten in idleness, and become of dulle wittes, and slow of courage, weak handed, and feeble kneede (Geoffrey Gates, 1579). In such a graphic, suggestive way and with so much morbid fantasy were the malaise and maladies of peace diagnosed, that peace virtually became a synonym of disease, a pathological condition: "[A] swelling soer, that festers sowndest mynd and so bursts owtt in bylls, in botch or ulcerrs greatt..." (Thomas Churchyard, 1578). Such a disgusting abscess could only be drained by war. The notion of war as therapy was a perfectly logical conclusion, given their premises. Secular Renaissance writers generally advocated a cyclical theory of war and peace, which was expressed thus by Thomas Fenne (1590): Warre bringeth ruine, ruine bringeth poverty, poverty procureth peace, and peace in time increaseth riches, riches causeth statelinesse, statelinesse increaseth envie, envie in the end procureth deadly malice, mortall malice proclaimeth open warre and bataille, and from warre again as before is rehearsed (Thomas Fenne, 1590). The Church fathers and clergy, however, had little sympathy for such a mechanistic and causal cyclicity which left little room for Divine Providence. For them, war had only one function: it was a "Divine Scourge for Sinne" (For 5 this period see also Jorgensen, 1956) . The deification of war by Joseph de Maistre (1822) can be considered to be the final apotheosis of the exalted mystico-sentimental conception of war, in which cataclysmic and masochistically-colored apocalyptic thinking, spiritualistic mystagogy, and war panegyric converge and concur. Not only is, in this grandiose scheme, human blood the fertilizer for the plant called human genius, but war is in essence divine. De Maistre refers to the "Loi occulte et terrible" of the bloody destruction of all creation. The globe, soaked with blood for all eternity, is nothing else but an immense slaughter-altar on which all living creatures must be sacrificed without end, without limit, and without relaxation, until Evil itself is extinguished and Death itself is dead. War is immanently divine for it is the law of nature. In war Divine Revenge on 5

Francis Bacon, Barnabie Barnes, Thomas Barnes, Robert Barret, Richard Bernard, Thomas Churchyard, William Cornwallis, Roger Cotton, Samuel Daniel, Dudley Digges, Earl of Essex, Thomas Fenne, C.G.., George Gascoigne, Geoffrey Gates, Stephen Gosson, Fulke Greville, Edmond Harris, John Norden, Thomas Nun, Thomas Procter, Barnaby Rich, John Smythe, John Stockwood, John Udall, and William Yanger left their sermons and tractates to prosperity. Many of the views of these Alarmists are to be found in the works of Shakespeare, who had a keen ear for the fads and fashions of his time.



mankind is accomplished. War is immanently divine because it purifies and regenerates mankind; "castigat pugnando mores". The only work approaching de Maistre’s thanatical status orgasticus is perhaps Proudhon’s La Guerre et la Paix (1861), in which war is attributed with a sacred character. War presents itself as a divine fact. It is immanently moral, necessary, just, virtuous, holy. War is a symbol of the ’grandeur’ of mankind. Peace only degrades mankind. War, for Proudhon, is not only sacred, it is, above all, "indispensable au developpement de l'humanité". War is the Great Creator of religion, ethics, the State, law and justice, even esthetics. War is also the Great Disciplinarian of mankind. Little less sacred is war in John Ruskin's (1819-1900) moral exhortation: I found, in brief, that all great nations learned their truth of word and strength of thought in war; that they were nourished in war and wasted in peace; taught in war and deceived by peace; trained by war and betrayed by peace - in a word, they were born in war and expired in peace (Ruskin, 1903). (b) The Mercantilist Variant For the Mercantilists, a school of thought of political economy flourishing roughly from the 16th to the 19th century, the inevitability of war was rooted in the conception of trade and commerce as offensive and predatory warfare, and the notion of economic relations as a zero-sum conflict: enrichment of the one party implied the impoverishment of the other. "Ogni Nazione cerca d'arrichirsi coll'impoverimento dell'altre... Il commercio esterno in sostanza non è, che una tacita, ma legittima guerra d'industria" (Paolini, 1785). Who would deny Montchrétien's (1615) dictum - paraphrasing Cicero - 'Pecunia nervus belli'? The Mercantilists found important instruments for their policies in consciously manipulated ethnocentrism and xenophobia, nationalism and, especially, the 'export' of internal conflict in order to unite a nation, riddled and torn apart by internal conflicts, behind one war banner against a common external enemy (Cf. Silberner, 1957). In Shakespeare's Henry IV the king advises his son: "Be it thy course to busy giddy minds / With foreign quarrels". "Le prince sage calme son peuple enragé en le menant à la guerre" (Botero, 1588). Forge 6 enemies if there are none, advises Bodin (1576) . A further benefit of war, in their eyes, was that war led to 'demographic relaxation'; the soldiers killed in battle were only "the very scomme, theeves, and roges of England and the Realme (being so full of people) is very well ridde of them" (John Smythe, 1590). 6

Other Mercantilists were Bacon, Child, Colbert, Dutot, Mun, La Noue, Raleigh, and Temple. The most thorough account of this school of thought, as well as its influence on later ’romantic’ political economists, is presented by Silberner (1939, 1957).



(c) The Etatistic Variant With Machiavelli (Il Principe, 1513) Realpolitik made its entry in European history. It included a treatise on the art of war in the service of the Raison d’Etat, a tradition which in India had already existed some 20 centuries before Machiavelli (Kautilya, Arthasastra). On Machiavelli, Nicolai states that In times past, premature war-advocates were only very occasionally to be found. Machiavelli was an instance of one such. In his Prince he praises or excuses murder and bad faith, treachery and brutality, everything, in short, which may lead a man to power. Thus he praises and excuses war, and even if he does not go to such lengths as men to-day and insists upon the advantages of war, still he glosses over its evils with the infamous grace of a pupil of the Borgias. But although Machiavelli extolled war, he was, after all, alone in doing so, and... not until the second half of the nineteenth century did any one venture openly to side with Machiavelli (Nicolai, 1919). Here, Nicolai, anxious and overzealous to prove his point, makes not only somewhat of a caricature of Machiavelli’s thought, but he also is plainly wrong in regarding him as exceptional. The absolute amorality of the State had been considered by others long before the second half of the nineteenth century. Bodin (1606) and Hobbes (1651), for example, had contemplated on this absolute amorality of the state and added absolute sovereignty to it. In the first formulations of international law, war as an instrument of politics for reasons of state was explicitly acknowledged as founded in natural law. Moreover, states were exempt from sanctions for waging war (e.g., Grotius, 1625). It was Hegel (1770-1831), the Prussian philosopher (or windbag and obscur7 antist, as Fichte called him), who formulated the most consistent and totalitarian etatistic apology of war. The State, for Hegel, is the Divine Idea as it exists on earth. The State is "vollendete Sittlichkeit" (Hegel, 1821). The deeper significance of war is identified thus: War is like the motion of the wind on the seas, preventing a foulness which a constant calm would otherwise produce. By means of war the State is born, and by means of war mankind escapes from intellectual and moral stagnation, degeneration, materialism, decadence, apathy, effeminacy, and other vices of peace. Furthermore, war has the character of a Divine Ordeal, for "Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht". Max Scheler (1915) summarizes in one sentence the quintessence of the etatistic apology of war: "Der kriegsführende Staat ist der Staat in der höchsten Aktualität seines Daseins". 7

Popper (1950) detects a direct link between the ’pompous’ Hegelian metaphysics and the more malignant ideas of Hitler cum suis (Blut und Boden, the Führer-principle, history as Weltgericht, der frische, fröhliche Krieg, etc.).



It is not to be wondered that the most fervent apologists of war, who blended the metaphysical and Hegelian etatistic elements, were Christian theologians and prelates. Entirely within the spirit of this Christian doctrine, the Prussian field marshall Helmuth von Moltke wrote in a letter to Bluntschli (1880): Perpetual peace is a dream, and not even a beautiful dream, and war is a link in God’s universal ordinance. In war, Man’s noblest qualities are developed. Without war the world would become swamped in materialism (von Moltke, 1880). Renan (1823-1892) was another war-apologist exemplifying so many of his generation: If the result of the folly, negligence, idleness and want of forethought of States were not to bring about wars between them, it is hard to say to what depths of degradation the human race might sink. War is thus one of the conditions of progress, that touch of the whip which prevents a country from falling asleep by forcing self-satisfied mediocrity out of its apathy. Man lives only by effort and struggle... and the day when mankind became a great, peaceful Roman Empire, with no more enemies abroad, would be the day when morality and intelligence would run the greatest dangers (Renan, 1871). Several of the views exposed above have been called ’Social Vitamin’ theories of war (May, 1943), because they regard war as vital for the growth, vigor and vitality of states, as vitamins are for individuals. Furthermore, war offers for the individual an escape from debilitating tedium and existential boredom, a glorious alternative to the banality of everyday life and work, and appeals to Man’s needs for excitement, adventure, stimulation, sensation, spectacle, and his craving for power, grandeur, and self-esteem. (d) The Eschatological Variant: Shortcuts to the Millennium The idea that war, on the contemporaneous level of social and cultural evolution, has lost its original function as agent of progress, or has made itself superfluous, or, as Emerson optimistically stated, is just a "childhood disease of mankind" - an idea that was nourished by several 19th century ideologies and doctrines - can be found in various disguises among the apologists of the eschatological school. But - and here is the joker in the sleeve - only on the condition that first the ’Proletarian Paradise’, ’Utopia’, the ’New Society’ or the ’1000-Year Reich’ has been realized; or the State has been abolished; or capitalism has collapsed; or the war to end all wars has been fought; or some totalitarian ideology has become victorious. In the meantime, in the waiting room of ineluctable history, class-struggle and war still are instrumental, functional, and necessary to accelerate the advent of the messianistic, utopian,



or chiliastic ideal. In the meantime "Our task is terrible, total, universal and merciless destruction" as Nechayev wrote in his Revolutionary Catechism. "For is not violence the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one?" (Marx & Engels, 1848). (e) The Social-Darwinist Variant To these long-existing apologetic sentiments, still more fuel was added by the Social-Darwinist apology of war. A brief recapitulation: Gobineau and Chamberlain interpreted the history of human civilization in terms of superior and inferior races and their contamination and degradation caused by interbreeding, which later was to be translated in the ideal of ’racial purity’, and the racist distinction between Übermenschen and Untermenschen. Gumplowicz (Der Rassenkampf, 1883) explained history as the product of an eternal and lethal race-antagonism and -struggle, providing the essential motive force behind the evolution of the human species and its cultural institutions. Bagehot (1872), Spencer (1873) and Steinmetz (1899 et seq.) translated these Rassenkampf interpretations in more neutral biological terms of intergroup selection. War was envisaged as an instrument of evolution and an Agent of Progress by eliminating the weaker or otherwise ’inferior’ peoples. As Spencer stated: "Warfare... had had the effect of continually extirpating races which, for some reason or other, were least fitted to cope with the conditions of existence they were subject to". Bagehot felt that warlike competition among human societies in early times would have selected for those with the best leadership and most obedient populace ("The tamest are the strongest"). More than by anyone else, the biological ultima ratio aspects of war were advocated by Steinmetz who envisaged war as the motive force behind the perfection of the race, of culture in general, the creation of the State, moral and intellectual progress, etc.: the Agent of Progress. Once again the now familiar litany of the vices and social diseases of peace is presented by Steinmetz with great fervor, calling war "an institution of God, Who is weighing the nations in His scales". Following Spencer, most of the selectionists, however, agreed that in modern times war selection (i.e., intragroup selection) had been negative and retrogressive by eliminating the ’best elements’ from the belligerent societies (i.e., the young, healthy and brave males). For Steinmetz, on the contrary, the natural and social selection during times of peace was even more deleterious and retrogressive, so that even in this respect the abolition of war would be not only a grave error and stupidity, but a Capital Sin. 8 Although racialism, which later on degenerated into unadulterated racism , originated outside Social Darwinism proper, its intellectual impact was 8

On the origins of the idea of, and the putative scientific foundations of racism see also Stanton (1960), Ludmerer (1972), Pagliaro (1973), Chase (1977) and Stepan (1987).



evidently such that it could easily be incorporated into the mainstream of ’Zeitgeistiges’ thinking. The selectionist theories would have been impossible without formulas like ’struggle for existence’ and ’survival of the fittest’. These ideas were already in essence conceived by the classical Greek philosophers Heraclitus and Empedocles. Heraclitus called war, struggle and conflict the father of all things R Y Y ") and looked upon it as the motive force that (" R kept the world going. These ideas came to full bloom in the works of Darwin, Wallace, Huxley, and Spencer, where they became the fundamental principles of the biological evolution of species. It is an ironical and frivolous whim of fate that the social interpretations of the ’struggle for existence’ were eventually to be known as Social Darwinism instead of ’Spencerism’, not in the least because Darwin was very reluctant in applying his ideas to the human realm, and had warned not to regard organisms in terms of higher and lower (Falger, 1994). Spencer, on the other hand, was a ’progressionist’ pur sang. Evolution to him was a progression from simplicity to complexity, from bacterium to primate, resulting in Man, the "apotheosis of the evolutionary climb". The Zeitgeist apparently was such that the ’struggle’ was translated in terms of ’the law of the jungle’ and "nature red in tooth and claw" (Tennyson); the ’fittest’ in terms of ’the most violent and egoistic’; and ’selection’ in terms of bloody elimination of the weakest in a permanent state of war (as Hobbes had envisaged the state of nature to be: a "bellum omnium contra omnes"). Soon after Darwin’s Origin of Species (1859), and especially Spencer’s works on societal evolution (which were, by the way, more Lamarckian than Darwinian), the principle of struggle was declared a fundamental and universal principle valid for both abiotic and biotic nature, and war a fundamental and universal law of nature: the Agent of Progress, the Motor of Evolution, the Creator of Civilization. In the work of the German General von Bernhardi, self-made disciple of Fichte, Hegel and Darwin, we find tortuous Hegelianism and Social Darwinist thinking almost idealtypically intertwined, while the martial tones of "Deutschland über Alles" already are to be heard in the background: War is a biological necessity of the first importance, a regulative element in the life of mankind which cannot be dispensed with, since without it an unhealthy development will follow, which excludes every advancement of the race, and therefore all real civilization. War is the father of all things. The sages of antiquity long before Darwin recognized this... war is not only a biological necessity, it is also in certain cases a moral obligation, and, as such, an indispensable factor of civilization. The desire for peace has rendered most civilized nations anaemic, and marks a decay of spirit and political courage such as often has been shown by a race of Epigoni (von Bernhardi, 1914).



Abolition of war, he maintains, would be absolutely immoral. War, "Stahlbad der Seele", is not only a moral obligation, it is also a civilizing force. To seek to abolish war is a ’mutilation of human nature’ as Heinrich von Treitschke put it tersely. "The grandeur of history lies in the perpetual conflict of nations, and it is simply foolish to desire the suppression of their rivalry" (Politics, 1916, 9 Vol. I) . As we know Germany’s civilizing mission blessed Europe twice; and already Nicolai’s comment on this sort of language is colored by regrets, an air of hopelessness and perhaps even foresight. The corrupted ideas of a God-given racial superiority, ’racial hygiene’, ’Lebensraum’, ’Blut und Boden’, the historic and charismatic Leader, and war as the motor of progress, began to get a pernicious influence in Germany (to be accurate: all over Europe) around the fin-de-siècle, which would ultimately 10 result in the gigantic organized genocide of the Nazi ’Vernichtungslager’ . 9

Von Bernhardi, von Treitschke, Ludendorff and von Moltke are the much-quoted paragons and ’cheerleaders of war’ in every textbook on the subject, but the biological necessity of war for reasons of racial, cultural and/or moral progress was advocated by hundreds of ideologues, poets, clergymen, military men, philosophers and scientists bien étonnés de se trouver ensemble. The following is only a selection of the better-known authors: Ancillon, d’Annunzio, Arndt, Banse, Bardin-Salières, Barrèt, Baudin, Baudrillart, Bergson, Bluntschli, von Boguslawski, de Bonald, Bonnal, Bonnard, Bosanquet, Brinton, Cherfils, Choppin, Cosentini, Cousin, Croce, Le Dantec, Dragomirof, Faquet, Anatole France, Gasparotto, Gentile, Geslin de Bourgogne, von Gierke, Gomperz, de Heysman, Hitler, von Humboldt, de Iglesia, von Ihering, Izoulet, Jähns, Jung, Jünger, Kiessling, Kipling, Kjellèn, Lange, Lasson, Lea, Lenz, Leer, Mabille, De Maeztu, Mahan, Marselli, McKay, Médine, Mussolini, Nietzsche, Picht, Portalis, Proudhon, Psichari, Quinton, Ratzel, Ratzenhofer, Reimer, Renan, Rey, Rocco, Roosevelt, Rosenberg, Ruskin, Santayana, Scheler, Schmitt, Segur, Sorel, Spann, Spengler, Stein, Steinmetz, von Stengel, Sumner, Tzchirner, Valbert, Valois, Visscher, de Vogüé, Klaus Wagner, Wellhausen, Xénopol, von Zareba-Wolf, Zimmermann, Zola. See Juganaru (1933), Hofstadter (1955), Wesseling (1969), van der Dennen (1977). On Social Darwinism in the context of the history of ideas see also: Wells et al. (1907), Spiller (1914), Chalmers (1916), Poliakov (1951 et seq.), Himmelfarb (1959), Gasman (1971), Jäckel (1972), Zmarzlick (1972), Koch (1972, 1973), Beyerchen (1977), Cohn (1981), Kaye (1986) and Stein (1987). 10

'Racial hygiene', Aryan and Teutonic mystique, paganism, Nordicism and rabid antiSemitism - this curious blend of ideas was propagated in the writings of Ahlwardt, Ammon, Boeckel, Clasz, Darré, Dühring, Fritsch, Gerke, Göbbels, Gödsche, Gross, Günther, Haeckel, Haiser, Hauser, Hentschel, Hildebrandt, de Lagarde, Langbehn, Lange, Lanz von Liebenfels, Lenz, von List, Lueger, Marr, Ploetz, Rohling, Rosenberg, Schallmayer, von Schönerer, Streicher, Schuler, Tille, Wagner, among many others and besides the hundreds of anonymous pamphleteers. See e.g., Poliakov (1951 et seq.), Gasman (1971), and Stein (1987). Stein states that it is now an academic commonplace to observe that national socialism was a crude Social Darwinism. "National socialist 'biopolicy', a policy based on a mystical/biological belief in racial inequality, a monistic, anti-transcendent moral nihilism based on the eternal struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest as the law of nature, and the consequent use of state power for a public policy of natural selection, is what national socialism is all about (Jäckel, 1972)... National socialism, whatever else it may have been (for example a revolt of the petty bourgeoisie, etc.) was



At that same period, on the eve of World War I, the "relentless war of extermination of inferior individuals and nations" had acquired the status of Natural Law: "There has always been constant and deadly war in the vegetable as well as in he animal kingdom, indeed, ever since the conditions of this planet permitted the existence of the lowest forms of organic life, and it has only been by war that from these humble beginnings it has been possible by evolution and natural selection to develop so comparatively perfect a creature as man" ("A vindication of war", 1911) states Brigadier-General Sir Reginald Clare Hart, echoing, in a kind of parodied travesty, Darwin’s words. Also representatives of the eugenics movement (Pearson, 1911; Melville, 1911) did not tire to spell out the advantages of war in checking the fertility of inferior stock. Paradoxically, when Eternal Truths and Natural Laws are being invoked, God is never far around the corner: "War has been the instrument, the surgical instrument as it were, which has cut the living flesh free from the dead flesh. Without war, a putrefaction would have set in and with it a creeping paralysis embracing in its chilly arms not only society and politics, but science and industry... War is a God-appointed instrument to teach wisdom to the foolish and righteousness to the evil-minded" states Major-General J.F.C. Fuller in his study War and Western Civilization (1932). Perhaps it was Quinton, in his Maximes sur la guerre (1930), who formulated, in one lapidary maxim, the quintessence of what was understood to be Darwinism’s ultima ratio: "La femelle propage l'espèce, le mâle, par sa mort, la sélectionne". What Spencer, Bagehot and Sumner were for Anglosaxon Social Darwinism, Ernst Haeckel was for the peculiar German offshoot of this syncretistic ideology-cum-pseudoscience. Ernst Haeckel (1834-1919) was the man who brought Darwinismus into German intellectual life. Not only did he succeed in establishing his interpretation of the strictly scientific aspects of Darwin as the correct view for a generation of scholars, but he went far beyond science to establish a unique German form of social Darwinism (Gasman, 1971). This social Darwinism combined an almost mystical, religious belief in the forces of nature (i.e. natural selection as the fundamental law of life) with a literal, and not analogical, transfer of the laws of biology to the social and political arena. It was, in essence, a romantic folkism synthesised with scientific evolutionism. It included the standard ultimately the first fully self-conscious attempt to organise a political community on a basis of an explicit biopolicy: a biopolicy fully congruent (or so it was claimed) with the scientific facts of the Darwinian revolution" (Stein, 1987).



Darwinian ideas of struggle (Kampf) and competition as the foundation for natural, and therefore social law, with a curious ’religion’ of nature which implied a small place for rationalism, the lack of free will, and happiness as submission to the eternal laws of nature. Blut und Boden were the reality of human existence (Stein, 1987). Haeckel also revived for German consumption Gobineau’s ideas about Aryan especially Teutonic - superiority, with its logical sequel: The utter inferiority of the ’lower races’, which, naturally, were at the disposal of the Herrenvolk. In Haeckel’s (and later Schallmayer’s and dozens of other racial hygienists’) writings the German eugenics program turned into an intra-racial euthanasia policy. The deformed, the sickly, the lunatics, the incurable, the mentally degenerate, the degraded criminals, the alien elements - all these ’utterly useless’ human beings would only pollute the breeding pool of the superior race, and they should be eliminated before they could transmit their injurious and deleterious non-qualities to the community. Thus the universal process of interracial natural selection would be aided by intraracial artificial selection. There was nothing in Darwinism, as Hofstadter (1955) points out, that inevitably made it an apology for competition or force. Kropotkin’s interpretation of Darwinism was as logical as Sumner’s. After the Franco-Prussian War Darwinism was for the first time invoked as an explanation of the facts of battle. "The greatest authority of all the advocates of war is Darwin", explained Max Nordau in the North American Review in 1889: "Since the theory of evolution has been promulgated, they can cover their natural barbarism with the name of Darwin and proclaim the sanguinary instincts of their inmost hearts as the last word of science". It would nevertheless be easy to exaggerate the significance of Darwin for race theory or militarism, as Hofstadter observes. Neither the philosophy of force nor doctrines of Machtpolitik had to wait upon Darwin to make their appearance. Nor was racism strictly a post-Darwinian phenomenon (as Gobineau testifies). Still, Darwinism was put in the service of the imperial urge. Although Darwinism was not the primary source of the belligerent ideology and dogmatic racism of the late 19th century, it did become a new instrument in the hands of theorists of race and struggle. The likeness of the Darwinian portrait of nature as a field of battle appealed to the prevailing conceptions of a militant age (Hofstadter, 1955), in which the ’struggle for existence’ was translated as permanent and bloody war, ’nature’ was conceived of as ’red in tooth and claw’ (Tennyson), and in which ’selection’ was interpreted as violent elimination of the weak. In the public’s mind, by the turn of the century, Darwin’s term ’fitness’ had already lost its biological meaning of reproductive success, and gradually came to imply physical strength or vigor or aggressiveness. If ’fitness’ is incorrectly interpreted to mean strength, then ’survival of the fittest’ means ’survival of the strongest’ rather than ’propagation



of those genes which confer the most adaptive advantage’ (Barash & Lipton, 1985). Nasmyth (1916) and Perry (1918) launched a formidable assault upon Social Darwinism and all its works. Perry’s Present Conflict of Ideals was the most substantial of all the refutations of the Darwinized ethics and sociology that had culminated in the monstrosities attributed to von Bernhardi and Nietzsche. The whole evolutionary dogma, the Darwin-Spencer legacy of progress, the glib optimism of John Fiske, the warnings of Benjamin Kidd, the natural-selection economics of Thomas Nixon Carver - all fell under Professor Perry’s axe (Hofstadter, 1955). Like William James before him, Perry pointed out the essential circularity of the Darwinian sociology, in which power and strength are defined in terms of survival, and survival is in turn explained by power and strength. 4.2.6 Instinctivism Instinctivism was a relative latecomer in the intellectual inputs that constitute the syndrome of Social Darwinism. Darwin (1872) in The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals had suggested an evolutionary interpretation of human emotions, which led many to base them on Man’s inheritance from his animal ancestry. This phylogenetic theory led to the preparation of numerous catalogues of (sometimes thousands of) human instincts (e.g., Bernard, 1924). In his Principles of Psychology (1890), and his later essay, The Moral Equivalent of War (1910), the psychologist and philosopher William James formulated the first Darwinistically-inspired instinctivist explanations of human belligerence. The ’instinct of pugnacity’ has been bred into the modern human being, in Lamarckian fashion, through the inheritance of the acquired characteristic of cruelty. "[M]odern man inherits all the innate pugnacity and all love of glory of his ancestors... Our ancestors have bred pugnacity into our bone and marrow, and thousands of years of peace won’t breed it out of us. The popular imagination fairly fattens on the thought of wars". Pacifism, he contends, cannot compete with the inspiring ’mystical’ impulse manifest in militarist writing (which, in principle, he accepts as valid): War was (and is) considered as a sort of sacrament. Its profits are to the vanquished as well as to the victor; and quite apart from any question of profit, it is an absolute good, we are told, for it is human nature at its highest dynamic. Its ’horrors’ are a cheap price to pay for rescue from the only alternative supposed, of a world of clerks and teachers, of co-education and zoophily, of ’consumers’ leagues’ and ’associated charities’, of industrialism unlimited, and



feminism unabashed. No scorn, no hardness, no valor any more! Fie upon such a cattleyard of a planet! (James, 1910). James quotes from Homer Lea’s Valor of Ignorance (1909), in which Lea defends the social necessity of war with the contemporarily fashionable ’organic’ metaphor (complementing the ’Social Vitamin’ [May, 1943] metaphors and metaphysical war apologies [see van der Dennen, 1977]). Like organisms, nations either have to grow or wither away. The growth of tribes, nations, civilizations always coincided, according to Lea, with a strong military apparatus and an expansionistic, aggressive policy, while the phase of withering, descent and degeneracy has historically been characterized by pacifism, the weakening of the military, and luxury, sophistication, effeminacy and decadence. James points out that The military party denies neither the bestiality nor the horror, nor the expense; it only says that these things tell but half the story. It only says that war is ’worth’ them; that, taking human nature as a whole, its wars are its last protection against its weaker and more cowardly self, and that mankind cannot afford to adopt a peace economy... Militarism is the great preserver of our ideals of hardihood, and human life with no use for hardihood would be contemptible. Without risks or prizes for the darer, history would be insipid indeed; and there is a type of military character which every one feels that the race should never cease to breed, for every one is sensitive to its superiority (James, 1910). James here touches upon a real psychological problem: the universal (?) human (or only male?) ambivalence toward violence and war, the secret mystique of violence, its plain attractiveness, its klammheimliche Freude, its fascination sometimes bordering on the obsessive - and deep emotional appeal; and simultaneous appall and disgust by too-concrete and too-nearby manifestations of it. The abhorrence and the fascination are two sides of the same medal; indeed, the horrors make the fascination. "[A] pallid world sicklied o’er with the pale cast of thought" (Hamlet) has never had universal appeal to mankind. Or in Lasswell’s (1935) words: "All the constitutive myths of history have promised something besides pale peace to their devotees". McDougall (1908, 1915, 1927), following James, admitted that his ’instinct of pugnacity’ did not conform to his general definition of instinct, since it had no specific stimulus to set it off. Consequently, he assumed that the inhibition of the exercise of any other instinctive impulse arouses the fighting instinct to action (the first formulation, by the way, of the Frustration-Aggression theory). It is, however, by no means essential that there should be some object worth fighting for in order to provoke the activity of this fighting instinct: People will fight for the sake of self-expression alone if they have no other motive (Indeed,



he regards the absence of material motives as the most convincing evidence for his theory). The instinct of pugnacity is not merely destructive in its operation: "The instinct of pugnacity has played a part second to none in the evolution of social organization". McDougall assumes that the "races of men certainly differ greatly in respect to the innate strength of this instinct", which may be directed from one’s fellow villagers to members of other villages: "The replacement of individual by collective pugnacity is most clearly illustrated by barbarous peoples living in small, strongly organized communities. Within such communities individual combat and even expression of personal anger may be almost completely suppressed, while the pugnacious instinct finds its vent in perpetual warfare between communities whose relations remain subject to no law". McDougall had been studying the headhunting tribes of Borneo, and in that context he states: This perpetual warfare, like the squabbles of a roomful of quarrelsome children, seems to be almost wholly and directly due to the uncomplicated operation of the instinct of pugnacity. No material benefits are sought; a few heads, and sometimes a slave or two, are the only trophies gained; and, if one asks of an intelligent chief why he keeps up this senseless practice of going on the warpath, the best reason he can give is that unless he does so his neighbors will not respect him and his people, and will fall upon them and exterminate them. How shall we begin to understand the prevalence of such a state of affairs, if we regard man as a rational creature guided only by intelligent self-interest, and if we neglect to take account of his instincts? And it is not among barbarous or savage peoples only that the instinct of pugnacity works in this way. The history of Christendom is largely the history of devastating wars from which few individuals or societies have reaped any immediate benefit, and in the causation of which the instinct of pugnacity of the rulers, or of the masses of the peoples, has played a leading part (McDougall, 1915) Intergroup warfare selected men not only for their pugnacity, but also for their ’moral qualities’ Those groups that had warriors who, because of a ’more developed self-consciousness’, obeyed the commands of leaders were the groups successful in war. Thus the instinct of pugnacity impelled primitive societies to war, which in turn led to the defeat of those societies whose warriors were deficient in ’fundamental social attributes’. Basing himself on the work The Primal Law by Atkinson (1903), McDougall proceeds to show the socializing influence of the instinct of pugnacity among primitive men. His theory is virtually identical to Freud’s Primal Horde speculation in Totem and Taboo (1913).



James and McDougall were soon followed by Reinach (1913) (l’instinct de combattivité et de destruction) Marshall (1915), Crile (1915) (phylogenetic action pattern of killing), Nussbaum (1916) (angeborener Kampfinstinkt), Knabenhans (1917) (rein instinktmäßige Kampflust), Santayana (1922), Bovet (1923) (l'instinct combatif), Ross (1923), Quinton (1930), Bergson (1932) (l'instinct guerrier), Nickerson (1933) (fighting instinct), among many others. The ’war instinct’ was sometimes regarded as being similar to the ’fighting instinct’ (in contemporary terms: a kind of aggressive drive), as in the writings of Nicolai (1919), but in other cases the two were regarded as something quite different (e.g., Woods & Baltzly, 1915). Some sociologists indicate a ’herd instinct’ as indirectly responsible for the existence of war (Trotter, 1916; MacCurdy, 1918), or a ’tribal instinct’ (Nicolai, 1919), or a sexual ’androgenic instinct’ (van Bemmelen, 1928): "[D]ie erste Veranlassung zum Kriege bei den Menschen... beruht auf der Existenz eines androgenen Instinktes, der die Männer dazu treibt sich durch Kampf mit Nebenbuhlern in den Augen der weibliche Sexe hervorzutun, und sich infolgedessen in den Besitz weiblicher Gefährten zu setzen" [The first inducement to war in humans... is rooted in an androgenic instinct, that urges the men to distinguish themselves in the eyes of the female sex by means of fights with rivals, in order to secure thereby the possession of female companions]. Weule (1916) envisaged "rein physiologischen Kraftüberschuß" as the root cause of war. Other formulations are more or less variations on the themes of 'Man's ineradicable warlike urges' or 'combativeness' or 'bellicosity', etc. Even relatively recent writers as Richardson (1960) and Falls (1961) use such instinctivist terminology. Thus Freud's formulation of the externalized 'Todestrieb' or 'Thanatos' underlying war already had an instinctivist context. Many psychoanalysts still believe in the existence of 'destructive instincts' underlying war. As Strachey (1957), for example, says: "[I]t must be remembered that the destructive instincts which, when all is said and done, are the greatest single cause of war, are instincts and that they are impossible to eradicate altogether, greatly though they may be modified". A similar view seems to underlie Durbin & Bowlby's (1939) theory of war. They state: "War occurs because fighting is a fundamental tendency in human things". Sociologists and psychologists like Steinmetz (1907; 1929), Thorndike (1913), Eltinge (1915), Patrick (1915), Conway (1916), LeBon (1916), Russell (1917), Hall (1919), White (1919), Rivers (1921), Park & Burgess (1924), and others indicated several varied instincts, drives, or fundamental motives responsible for war. Prominent among these are the view of war as an outcome of the escape from ennui and insignificance, a form of relaxation from those conventional rules which, through their drudgery and monotony tend to turn man into an automaton and repress the source of life itself; or as an outlet for the satisfaction of the innate drives of anger, 'Wanderlust', the military spirit, courage, rejuvenation, the spirit of adventure, 'Grausamkeit', 'Uraggressivität',



and so forth and so on (Sorokin, 1928; van der Dennen, 1979). The postulate of a war instinct, or an instinct of pugnacity lends itself rather easily to the justification of predatory and imperialistic wars. And indeed, it has been used as such. In general, however, instinctivism never received such a worldwide approval as did the other developments within Social Darwinism. ’Instinct’ explanations of warfare lost their appeal in the 1930’s (presumably under the influence of cultural relativism in anthropology and behaviorism in psychology, schools of thought which emphasized the plasticity and environmental determination of human behavior, and were more in accordance with the prevailing ideas of the time). They were revived by Lorenz (1963), Ardrey (1961 et seq.), Alcock (1972), and others (cf. Flügel, 1955; Malmberg, 1980). Until today wars are attributed to some kind of combative (pugnacious, aggressive, etc.) instinct, though the exaltedly romantic, metaphysical, Hegelian and Social-Darwinist versions of war apology (and too blatant racism) gradually faded away around and after World War II. 4.2.7 Epilogue Historically war has been valued, evaluated and valorized in very different ways. The Greek philosopher Gorgias, a contemporary of Hippocrates, compared war to disease and peace to health, whereas the Elizabethan Alarmists held the exact opposite position since for them peace was synonymous with disease. People have looked upon war as an 'act of God', a tragedy of fate beyond the power, range of influence, and scope of vision of the individual comparable to health and disease, similarly incomprehensible and elusive. Nevertheless, apart from reconciling themselves to the intangibility of war, people through the ages have also sanctioned war by pleading from all kinds of philosophical reflections, religious persuasions, and political ideologies. Some such schools of thought have been briefly reviewed. Myths play a crucial part in the apologetics of war. The 'blood and soil' mythology, the motherland and the fatherland, the 'honor of the flag', the deification of the Führer, etc., derive directly from the ancient urge of regarding inanimate group symbols as living entities and the living group symbols as gods. Parts of our self-images still derive from supra-individual group structures and symbols, and this inevitably involves the possibility of indoctrination to kill or to be killed for cause and country: Pro patria mori dulce et decorum est, fully in accordance with the arguments of ancient apologetic traditions (Ike & van der Dennen, 1989). It is not astonishing that the academic studies of war, especially primitive war, which appeared during the heydays of Social Darwinism, such as Jerusalem (Der Krieg im Lichte der Gesellschaftslehre, 1915), Weule (Der Krieg in den



Tiefen der Menschheit, 1916), and Knabenhans (Der Krieg bei den Naturvölkern, 1917), among others, were firmly rooted in Social Darwinist thought. More surprising is that the studies by Davie (1929) and Steinmetz (1929) were still imbued with Spencer’s and Sumner’s legacy. Even as late as 1954, Andreski recapitulates the arguments presented by Sumner in his own idiosyncratic terminology. Schmitthenner (1930) and Mühlmann (1940), in Germany, were able to avoid the pitfalls of Social Darwinism and travel their own course. After World War II, the studies by Turney-High (1949), and Meyer (1977) represent the nouvelle vague in the analysis of the origin and evolution of primitive war. "Idealism and peace-through-law ideas after the First World War" Falger (1994) observes were in many respects direct reactions to the deterministic vulgarities of social-Darwinism. Those in the Interbellum period who still believed in the social usefulness of biology were often defenders of racial superiority, providing political justification for the extermination of 'inferior' races (e.g., Gasman, 1971; Stein, 1987). Small wonder that biology did not take the first place in delivering theoretical foundations for the emerging social sciences after the second World War. This does not mean, however, that biology disappeared completely from political science and international relations. Two classic examples of biologically influenced international relations authors are Hans Morgenthau and Quincy Wright (Falger, 1994). The universal struggle for power, Morgenthau states in his Politics among Nations (1958) - the most influential realist classic since Machiavelli's Il Principe (1513) and Hobbes' Leviathan (1651) - is the resultant of certain basic bio-psychological drives: "The drives to live, to propagate, and to dominate are common to all men", and, presumably, to all organisms. And Quincy Wright (1955), whose monumental work on war we already encountered, holds that "No deduction from what is known of human nature and human motivations support the anticipation of harmony among all men, any more than that the lion will peacefully lie down with the lamb". The universal law of the struggle for existence was revived by biopolitical theory: Relationships between states "are treated as an inevitable outcome of the 'struggle for survival' to which all living organisms are presumably condemned" (Somit, 1972). Only with the recent (inter)disciplines of sociobiology and Darwinian psychology, 'human nature' has once more become an appropriate subject of inquiry, but never more, one may hope, for facile appeals in the service of the apology and glorification of war.



4.3 The True Heirs of Malthus (and Hobbes) "Land and women are the roots of war" (Maori proverb) The ecological approach to the study of war has a long history. The main idea of many earlier works was that the geographical environment directly determines the policy of nations and tribal societies, and consequently conflicts and wars. Men were compelled to strive for the best environment possible, but in the process, the environment indirectly moulded their character and affected their will to act (Lider, 1977; van der Dennen, 1983b). For example, Marett (1936) attempted to relate the belligerence of the steppe dwellers to endocrinological characteristics resulting from the abundance of carbon, sodium, and phosphorus in the diet provided by their environment. Ecological ideas have sometimes been borrowed by representatives of other disciplines and approaches as arguments in their theories of social evolution. Toynbee’s (1950) view of history as a cyclic pattern of challenge and response is one example: civilizations are born and grow in response to challenges posed by the environment. As was shown in ' 4.2.2., Spencer, Sumner, and Sumner & Keller founded the functionalist ecological orientation in sociology and anthropology. The foundation of human society, Sumner - following Malthus - asserted, is the man/land ratio. In his classical study on the evolution of primitive war, Davie (1929) lists population growth as one of the basic causes of the competition of life which makes war. He states: "Since war is so fundamental a phenomenon, its explanation must be sought in the basic conditions of life. One such life condition is land, for it is from the land that all means of subsistence are ultimately drawn. Man has had to struggle for a living, however, for there is no ’boon of nature’ or ’banquet of life’". However, the ’standard of living’ (. the level of sociocultural evolution) is a factor which must be considered in the relation of population to land. This relation Davie formulates into a law which reads as follows: Human population tends to increase up to the limit of the supporting power of the environment (land), on a given stage of the arts, and for a given standard of living. Increase of population varies directly with the stage of the arts and inversely with the standard of living. Also Bernard (1944) acknowledged overpopulation or population pressure as the "only one very significant biological cause of war in a general and fundamental sense". Of course, he explains, population pressure is not one and the same thing at all stages of social development. It is not a uniform and absolute fact under all conditions. One of the variables is the natural productiveness of



the area. The second is the stage of development of the arts (i.e., technology). A third one is the degree to which a country is unified around a militaristic organization and policy. War, according to Bernard, is also a social invention, for which most peoples have models which they can imitate and for which all peoples have abundant materials (The notion of human war as a social or cultural invention will be elaborated in Ch. 5). Any people that has reached the hunting stage of development possesses the weapons at hand with which to enter upon war. The early warriors were hunters who merely turned the weapons of the chase against other men and used the tactics of hunting game in ambushing and slaughtering human beings. It was easier for them to kill and rob than to find new ways of procuring a new food supply by peaceful means when nature could no longer furnish their growing populations with what they required. Peaceable peoples, in Bernard’s view, were either gatherers, without weapons even for the chase, or hunting peoples and primitive agriculturists in isolated localities where they did not have to compete with other tribes for a chance to exist (Cf. Mühlmann, 1940). It seems that war on anything like a conspicuous or an institutionalized scale began only after the hunting economy was well under way and the supply of game in proportion to the growing population of tribes had begun to decline. Such warfare probably began in occasional desultory conflicts of wandering rival hunting parties who found themselves chasing the same game. To the hostility which appears to have characterized all primitive peoples as strangers was added that of tired and hungry hunters seeking the same prizes. It should not be surprising if they fell to fighting one another while the game escaped, nor need we wonder if sometimes the conquerors satisfied their hunger with the human kill when the hunted animals fled. This may have been at least one of the origins of cannibalism. We know also, Bernard continues, that in the course of time, as rivalry for hunting grounds and fishing waters increased, most hunting and fishing tribes marked off for themselves certain territories which they regarded as their own and which they defended against invasion by other tribes. It was when this development of collective pre-emption and ownership arrived that warfare probably ceased to be merely accidental and began to be preceded by a considerable degree of preparation and expectancy. The possessors prepared to repel invasion and the invaders got ready for conquest. The coming of agriculture and the consequent settled mode of existence seems to have brought with it warfare as a regular and recurrent social phenomenon. Andreski's (1954 et seq.) most general assumption, based on Hobbes' (1651) views of human nature, is the recognition of the fact that the struggle for wealth, power, prestige and glory (for invidious values, i.e., desirable things of life) is the constant feature of the life of humanity. The admission of the omnipresence of struggle does not imply the denial of the existence of other more peaceful - socio-cultural processes. The struggle, moreover, does not



always need to be violent or to preclude any compromise and adjustment of interests. The irreducible residuum of it is the constant tendency of groups and individuals to acquire as much wealth, power and prestige as they can; and as these ’invidious values’ are limited, struggle must result. But forms of struggle can be regulated; certain rules of the game may be imposed and the outcome decided without resort to the ultima ratio of naked violence. But why do men fight for the necessities and values of life? Why can they not just share them and live quietly? The answer to this has been given by Malthus: "Killing one another could not have remained one of the chief occupations of men if there was no surplus of men available. And it was the natural tendency of the population to grow beyond the means of subsistence that assured the permanence of bloody struggle" (Andreski, 1954). The recognition of this fact enables him to advance a hypothesis about the origin of war. As nothing of that sort exists among the mammals, Andreski states (anticipating Alexander’s, Slurink’s and van der Dennen’s ’ecological dominance’ argument: See Ch. 8), this institution must be a creation of culture. It probably came into existence when the advance in material culture enabled man to defend himself better against the beasts which preyed on him, and thus to disturb the natural balance which keeps the numbers of any species stationary in the long run. After the predators had been subdued, another man became the chief obstacle in the search for food, and mutual killing began (Andreski, 1954). In a later version (Andreski, 1964), he succinctly states that "Given the propensities of human nature, the tendency of the population to grow beyond the resources has ensured the ubiquity of wars, although not every single instance of war had this factor as an immediate cause". Although Bouthoul (1951 et seq.) developed his demographic-relaxation theory of war as an explanation of contemporary wars, several components of the theory may also be valid for primitive warfare (and anticipate in several respects the Harris-Divale theory of ' 4.4.1). Bouthoul identifies one (covert or latent) function of warfare as ’delayed infanticide’. He regards the demographic factor as one of the structural constituents of collective aggressiveness: une structure belligène. A disproportional or irregular population increase or devastated population cohorts - what he calls deséquilibres démo-économiques - may contribute more to the problem of war, than population increase per se. He asserts that there is a clear correlation between a disequilibrated demographic constellation, for instance a surplus of young adult (dispensable) males, and a society’s bellicosity. This represents a structure explosive, for there will be a tendency for this category of people to seek refuge in war; anything, including the exaltation of a war adventure, being better than debilitating tedium and prospectless ennui (As Andreski (1954) observed: "For a vigorous man, war may appear very attractive as an alternative to exhausting, monotonous work and grinding poverty"). Furthermore, the plethora of young males constitutes a disturbing force within the society, tending to augment



delinquency and threatening the economic, hierarchical, social and sexual privileges of the older male generations, who then may be tempted to "chercher à canaliser cette turbulence dans une aventure collective: la guerre". The explosive structure, produced by a surplus of young men, is not, however, the determining cause of war, but simply a predisposing element that reinforces other causes; it simply sets in operation the destructive, eliminative institutions of which war is the extreme example and the most blatantly institutionalized (Cf. Fornari, 1974; See Ch. 5). The invariant of war is that people are killed; the massive elimination and destruction of human beings. The direct and indirect losses arrest or at least temporarily interrupt the numerical expansion of the populations involved. This is what Bouthoul calls 'demographic relaxation'.

4.4 Ecological-Demographic Theories The neoevolutionist school of American cultural anthropology founded by White (1949), was primarily interested in the ecological relationships of man and environment, and originally emphasized the level of socioeconomic development necessary before organized warfare can be conducted. White himself viewed warfare as a consequence rather than a cause of evolutionary development (cf. also Gorer, 1938; Newcomb, 1960). Other proponents of this school, however, more or less agree that "Wherever it exists, warfare serves a cultural adaptive purpose in that it results in a more advantageous relationship between people and their cultural ecology" (Chagnon, 1968; See also Gjessing, 1950; 1967; Otterbein, 1970; Corning, 1975; Nettleship, 1975; and Lider, 1977). Naroll (1964) presents the case of the "survival-of-the-warlike" school (as Lider [1977] called it) in an explicit propositional form: "A number of traits, many associated with social evolution, make for success in warfare; societies with traits making for success in warfare tend for this reason to displace those which lack such traits". Such displacing societies tend technologically to be more complex. Thus, another key aspect of neoevolutionist theory is that "high-energy societies replace low-energy societies", and "long range trends toward higher levels of productivity are related to intergroup hostility" (Harris, 1971; 1975), and that "Primitive warfare arose as part of a complex system that prevented human populations from exceeding the carrying capacity of their habitats" (Harris, 1972). Carneiro (1961; 1970) hypothesized (as did many before him; see especially the review by Holsti [1913] for the Social-Darwinist period) that warfare played a central role in the evolution of the state. However, warfare is viewed by Carneiro as itself only an intervening variable - as the catalyst and



instrument of the state-formation process. More fundamental in the chain of causation are demographic and ecological variables - the pressure of increasing population densities in ecologically constricted habitats. Chagnon (1968) later added the concept of ’social circumscription’. In short: population pressure on land - if the land has sufficient productive potential - encourages social evolution. "Warfare is likely to result where land is scarce, no matter how productive it is, and this leads to increased social complexity". 4.4.1 The Savage Solution to the Malthusian Dilemma While bands and villages do not generally conquer each other’s land the way states do, Harris (1978) theorizes, they nonetheless destroy settlements and rout each other from portions of the habitat that they would otherwise jointly exploit. Raids, routs, and the destruction of settlements tend to increase the average distance between settlements and thereby lower the overall regional density of populations. One of the most important benefits of this dispersion - a benefit shared by both victor and vanquished - is the creation of ’no man’s lands’ or buffer zones (first proposed by Hickerson, 1965) in areas normally providing game animals, fish, wild fruits, firewood, and other resources. Because the threat of ambush renders them too dangerous for such purposes, these ’no man’s lands’ play an important role in the overall ecosystem as preserves of plant and animal species that might otherwise be permanently depleted by human activity. The dispersal of populations and the creation of ecologically vital ’no man’s lands’ are, in Harris’ view, very considerable benefits which derive from intergroup hostilities among band and village peoples despite the costs of combat. With one proviso: Having dispersed the enemy camps and settlements, the victors cannot allow the population of their camps and settlements to increase to the point where game and other resources are threatened by their own population growth and intensification effort. Warfare under pre-state conditions cannot satisfy this proviso - at least not through the direct effect of combat deaths. How then is this effected? The answer provided by Harris is: By the practice of preferential female infanticide. This theory of population control in primitive society, involving the effects of preferential female infanticide and warfare, has been developed by Divale (1970 et seq.), Harris (1971 et seq.), and Divale & Harris (1976). The theory holds that every human society must take steps to control population growth. This is especially the case in primitive societies because their simpler technology places greater limits on their ability to expand food energy production. The manner in which most primitive societies regulate their population is postulated as follows: Infanticide is practiced on both males and females for a variety of reasons. However, since there is a general preference to have a boy as the first



child, and since the ratio of males and females at birth is almost equal, many more girl infants get killed. In terms of population control this is significant because excess females are eliminated before they reproduce. The effect of selective female infanticide is that many more boys reach maturity than do girls and a shortage of marriageable women exists among young adults. The women shortage leads to adultery, rape, and wife-stealing which in turn lead to frequent disputes over women. Deaths which result from these disputes lead to blood-revenge feuding and warfare in which the excess male population is eliminated. In the childhood generation boys greatly outnumber girls because of female infanticide. But in the adult generation the ratio between the sexes is balanced because males die in warfare. However, even though the adult ratio is about equal a relative women shortage still exists due to the practice of polygyny. The older and more influential males have several wives, leaving younger males wifeless. The constant warfare of these societies creates a constant need for warriors and it is this need which causes the cultural preference for a boy as the first child which begins the process in the first place. The root of this entire system is a culturally produced women shortage. Female infanticide and polygyny create a shortage of women which leads to wars which in turn favor male infants, etc. The cycle is continuous and each generation creates conditions which perpetuate the process in succeeding generations. The next effect is the control of excess population (Divale, 1974). There seems, according to Divale, to be a direct correlation between population density and the forms of violence (feuding, raiding, open battle) that occur. Bands of very low population densities practice mostly feuding. Among tribes with a higher population density than bands, feuding is still important, but takes a second place to the raiding or war party type of warfare. Among the more densely populated fully tribal peoples, such as in highland New Guinea, raids and battles play the major role. It is, as these theorists stipulate, not suggested that war caused female infanticide, or that the practice of female infanticide caused war. Rather, it is proposed "that without reproductive pressure neither warfare nor female infanticide would have become widespread and that the conjunction of the two represents a savage but uniquely effective solution to the Malthusian dilemma" (Harris, 1978). Furthermore, warfare functions in this system to sustain the so-called male supremacist complex (a cultural complex of social practices such as patrilocality, polygyny, marriage by capture, brideprice, postmarital sex restrictions on women, sexual hierarchy with female subordination, sexual privileges for fierce warriors, male machismo, masculine displays, dangerous



and competitive sports and martial skills, militancy, the warrior cult; and in general war-linked, male-centered institutions, prerogatives and ideologies - all because the survival of the group is contingent upon the rearing of fierce and combat-ready males) and thereby provide the practical exigencies and ideological imperatives for postpartum cultural selection against female infants (Divale & Harris, 1976). The (young) males have a price to pay for all this; they constitute the bulk of the victims of warfare in primitive societies (Harris, 1975). The theory explains, it is claimed, that peoples like the Yanomamö, Dani, Maring, and Maori attribute their wars to disputes over women. Although, Harris (1975) warns, such explanations cannot be accepted at face value; the belligerents who lose their lives in armed combat - Harris asserts - seldom accurately understand why they do so. "Excessive warfare is an ecological trap into which humanity has probably fallen again and again" (Harris, 1975). It is concluded that "war has been part of an adaptive strategy associated with particular technological, demographic, and ecological conditions", but that this does not require us to "invoke imaginary killer instincts or inscrutable or capricious motives to understand why armed combat has been so common in human history" (Harris, 1974). There remains the question of how men are to be trained to be fierce and aggressive so that they will risk their lives in combat. Since the preference for rearing males over females means that there will be a shortage of women as marriage partners, one way to insure that men will be aggressive in combat is to make sex and marriage contingent on being a fierce warrior. Logically, one might suppose that the solution to the problem of a shortage of women would be to have several men share a wife, but actually polyandry is extremely rare. Indeed, just the opposite occurs: In prestate societies practicing warfare there is a strong tendency for men to take several wives, that is, to be polygynous. Thus, instead of sharing women, men compete for them, and the shortage of women is made even more severe by the fact that some men have two or three wives. This leads to much jealousy, adultery, and sexually charged antagonism between men and women, as well as hostility between men and men, especially junior 'have nones' and senior 'have severals' (Harris, 1980; Divale & Harris, 1976; 1978a,b; Divale et al., 1978; Cf. Howe, 1978; Lancaster & Lancaster, 1978; Norton, 1978). The theory relates the intensity of the preindustrial male supremacist complex to the intensity of warfare and the intensity of reproductive pressures. It predicts that wherever the intensity of warfare and reproductive pressure are low, the male supremacist complex will be weak or virtually absent. This prediction conforms to the widely held view that many hunter-gatherer band societies had both low levels of warfare and high sexual parity or sexual autonomy, and that both warfare and sexual inequality increased with the development of agriculture and the state.



However, it also accounts for the reported occurrences of strong male supremacist complexes in warlike hunter-gatherer band societies. Not all band societies confronted similar ecological conditions and similar degrees of reproductive pressure (Leacock, 1978). In short, wherever there is intense preindustrial warfare, groups that develop the male supremacist complex are likely to rout and displace groups that do not (Harris, 1980). The above explanation actually reverses the causal arrows in Freudian explanations of warfare, Harris (1980) explains. Freud regarded the aggressivity and sexual jealousy of males to be instinctual. He saw both war and the Oedipus complex as products of this aggressive instinct. There is much evidence, however, to indicate that the aggressive and sexually jealous male personality is itself caused by warfare (See Ch. 2), whereas warfare itself is caused by ecological and political-economic stresses. Similarly, the Oedipus complex itself can be seen not as the cause of warfare, but as the consequence of having to train males to risk their lives in combat. Wherever the objective of child-rearing institutions is to produce aggressive, manipulative, fearless, virile, and dominant males, some form of sexually charged hostility between the junior and senior males is inevitable. But this does not mean that the Oedipus complex is an inevitable expression of human nature. Rather, it is a predictable outcome of training males to be combative and ’masculine’ (Harris, 1980). Whiting (1969) and his associates have developed an interesting theory to account for variations in the severity of male puberty rites. These rites are defined as severe when they involve circumcision or other forms of mutilation, prolonged seclusion, beatings, and trials of courage and stamina. Whiting has shown that statistical correlations exist between such rites and seven other factors: (1) protein scarcities, (2) nursing of children for one or more years, (3) prohibition on sex relations between husband and wife for one or more years after the birth of their child, (4) polygyny, (5) domestic sleeping arrangements in which mother and child sleep together and father sleeps elsewhere, (6) child training by women, and (7) patrilocality. "Following our model, the following chain develops: Low protein availability and the risk of Kwashiorkor (a protein deficiency disease) were correlated with an extended postpartum sex taboo to allow the mother time to nurse the infant through the critical stage before becoming pregnant again. The postpartum sex taboo was significantly correlated with the institution of polygyny, providing alternate sexual outlets to the male. Polygyny, in turn, is associated with mother-child households, child training by women, resultant cross-sex identity, and where patrilocality is also present, with initiation rites to resolve the conflict and properly inculcate male identity" (Harrington & Whiting, 1972). ’Cross-sex identity’ refers to the psychodynamic process by which boys who are reared exclusively by their mothers and older women identify themselves with their mothers and other women. Where patrilocality is present, Whiting



reasons, functional consistency demands that adult males must make a strong identification with their fathers and other males. Hence there is a conflict between what the male must do and think as an adult and what he is trained to do and think as an infant. Severe male initiation ceremonies are thus required to resolve this conflict by breaking the prepubescent identity. Much of this complex (for example, patrilocality, polygyny, men sleeping apart, and severe puberty rites) can be seen as part of the male supremacist warfare complex. Wherever primitive warfare is intense, one can expect that boys will have to undergo severe ordeals to test their manhood and to shock them into assuming their adult responsibilities as males and warriors. 4.4.2 Criticism The assumption of the authors that the conjunction of warfare and preferential female infanticide constitutes a solution to the Malthusian dilemma is ingenious but probably unwarranted. Alternative interpretations of preferential female infanticide have been proposed by Alexander (1974) and Dickemann (1979). The supporting evidence for the Harris-Divale argument consists of sex-ratio statistics and census data from indigenous bands and tribal societies around the world. The validity of their statistical material and tests has been severely challenged by Hirschfeld, Howe & Levin (1972); Harrison (1973); Bates & Lees (1979); Chagnon, Flinn & Melancon (1979); Fjellman (1979); Kang, Horan & Reis (1979); and Dow (1983) among others. "There is no reason to conclude that population regulation itself requires warfare, which would be an extremely costly and risky means of promoting female infanticide" (Bates & Lees, 1979). "It does not appear that we can accept Divale’s infanticide-marriage alliance-polygyny-warfare syndrome as having as universal an applicability as his data suggests might be the case" (Harrison, 1973). Harris and Divale assume that overbreeding is endemic to primitive populations, which seems unsupported by ethnographical evidence: Not all or even most primitive societies are or were expanding (Nettleship, Givens & Nettleship, 1975). Furthermore, these authors wonder, how could it be that "warfare began as part of an ecologically adaptive system of population control if the people fighting fought for prestige, or - more troublesome - for brides with whom to breed more children to add to the crowding?". According to the analysis of Netting (1973), the immediate result of armed conflict among the Kofyar of Northern Nigeria was to heighten population pressure rather than to relieve it; and also a study by Stauder (1972) of feuding and ecology among the Majangir of Ethiopia actually reverses the populationpressure theory (Cf. Koch, 1974). As a factor in primitive warfare, Shaw & Wong (1987) argue, the male supremacist complex lacks credibility. Where female-male sex ratios are low and warfare is active (a correlation does exist), Shaw & Wong interpret raiding and capture of females as an attempt to avoid inbreeding depression. It is when



the ratio of reproductive partners becomes undesirable and inbreeding depression threatens that raiding of females through primitive warfare will gain added impetus. All in all, as Dow (1983) points out, Divale & Harris do not present any evidence that (a) preferential female infanticide actually regulates population, (b) that it is a response to environmental degradation, or (c) that it has led to a stable population in any of the societies they consider. Bates & Lees (1979) make the additional point that because primitive human groups were often in competition, the obvious advantage in most circumstances would lie with expanding populations, not stable ones. Finally, Divale & Harris have been taken to task on many additional points concerning the adequacy of their sample, statistical techniques, empirical measures (which poorly reflect their theoretical constructs), and so on (Hirschfeld et al., 1978; Lancaster & Lancaster, 1978; Norton, 1978).

4.5 Functionalist and Multifunctionalist Theories Vayda (1961 et seq.) challenged the popular view of warfare as a ’safety-valve’ institution (as proposed by Wedgwood, 1930; Q.Wright, 1942; Whiting, 1944; Murphy, 1957 et seq.; among many others: See Ch. 5), and argued that the adaptive value of warfare is not limited to the promotion of ingroup solidarity. Vayda suggests that different predictions must be made for expanding and nonexpanding populations. For expanding populations, warfare is hypothesized to serve the function not only of reallocating resources but also of killing enough people to reduce population pressure on resources. He speculates that in nonexpanding populations warfare might serve other purposes no less important ecologically, for example, dispersal of groups in finite territories to optimally exploit the ecological niche, or the capture of women and children in small populations with unbalanced sex ratios. Most of these other adaptive functions do not require large-scale killing or even particularly lethal warfare. In accordance with this expectation, several evolutionary anthropologists have sought ecological functions for warfare in populations that occupy certain types of ecological niches. Sweet (1965), for example, has described such a pattern of low-level warfare (camel raiding) for the North Arabian Bedouin, and argued that it is a mechanism of ecological adaptation, supporting not only the Bedouin economy but also Bedouin political dominance over other peoples in the region and even "the whole network of social and ideological relations of Bedouin life". Studies attempting to show that warfare serves an adaptive purpose, or is ecologically functional, or both, abound nowadays (e.g., Wedgwood, 1930; Newcomb, 1950; Vayda, 1961 et seq.; Lathrap, 1962 et seq.; Leeds, 1964; Rappaport, 1967; Krapf-Askari, 1972; Harrison, 1973; Graham, 1975; Morey



& Marwitt, 1975; Meggitt, 1977; Stone, 1981; among numerous others). In a subsequent article, Vayda (1967) proposed that the functions of primitive war may be the maintaining of one or more variables (e.g., the man/land ratio) or activities in a certain state or within a certain range of states. He grossly designates these variables as psychological, socio-political, economic, and demographic. <

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Functions in the regulation of psychological variables: The notion that primitive war may operate so as to keep such variables as anxiety, tension, and hostility from exceeding certain limits is implicit in the statements of anthropologists who speak of primitive wars as ’safety-valve’ institution (serving to divert intrasocietal hostility onto substitute objects), as ’flightfrom-grief’ devices (Turney-High, 1949), or as "enabling a people to give expression to anger caused by a disturbance of the internal harmony" (Wedgwood, 1930). Functions in the regulation of socio-political variables: A characteristic hypothesis about stateless societies that lack a central government with penal jurisdiction over the separate local groups is the familiar hypothesis of deterrence or ’preventive war’. According to this hypothesis, warfare undertaken by a group to avenge an insult, theft, non-payment of bride price, abduction, rape, poaching, trespass, wounding, killing, or some other offense committed against its members deters members of other groups from committing further offenses. Putting it in more explicitly functional terms: "[W]hen some such variables as the number, frequency, or magnitude of the offenses committed against a group exceeds a certain value, then the group goes to war and thereafter, at least temporarily, the number, frequency, or magnitude of offenses committed declines". Functions in the regulation of economic and demographic variables: According to hypotheses presented by various writers, war breaks out when the inequalities between groups in their possession of or access to certain economic goods or resources reach a certain magnitude. Such hypotheses are ’functional’ ones if they go on to state that the effect of warfare is to reduce the inequalities to a point where they do not exceed a proper or acceptable level. Similar to these hypotheses are those about the regulation of demographic variables. In this case, the ’resources’ redistributed as a result of war are human beings. The redistribution of land as a result of primitive war can, of course, equally be seen as a redistribution of people upon the land, a process involving a victorious group’s movement into a vanquished and dispossessed enemy’s former territory. Should there be no place to which the vanquished can flee, the answer to problems of local population pressure may be heavy battle mortality.



A comparable multifunctional theory has been provided by Leeds (1963). Leeds distinguishes three phases in the institution called war: war prelude, war proper, and war cadence. He further distinguishes the adaptive functions of warfare as internal and external. As internal adaptive functions he mentions: consolidation of internal power; establishment of institutions of community coordination and control, and the creation of community consensus; sloughing off of antiquated or rigidified norms and structures; revitalization of norms and values; technological innovations; and resolution or intensification of social conflicts. Warfare also substantially reorders the allocation of rewards and prestige, statuses and roles within the society, and results in a redistribution of labor. As external adaptive functions of war Leeds identifies: <

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War may serve as the tool for reordering intersystemic relationships, where peaceful change cannot be accomplished: territorial hegemonies, trade routes, exchangeable goods, mutual rights and obligations, and so on, may be reallocated in terms of new exigencies. Ecologically, war may create no man’s lands or buffer zones, and augment the resources accessible as is clearly the case in territorial aggrandizement. Resources may be used more intensively during and after wars, or warfare may lead to exploitation of new resources or of old resources in new ways. Where culture is regarded as an allocation of symbols and values, warfare may be understood as a distributional institution. Another functional consequence of almost all warfare has been cultural diffusion. War may lead to genetic redistribution, a tendency towards panmixia and the elimination of local breeding populations, and tends to bring about demographic changes. Finally, a common effect of warfare is the dispersion of populations, their spacing out for wider resource use and greater exposure to variant ecological niches. As a highly multifunctional institution, war has a high probability of persistence (Leeds, 1963; Cf. also Vayda & Leeds, 1961; Leeds & Vayda, 1965).

Leeds asserts that individual motivations in war are irrelevant to the sociocultural demands (what he calls the ’social motivations’): "The motivations would quite possibly be almost as varied as the number of people affected by each function. The motivations demanded are institutional and conventionalized ones (’fight for freedom’), the responses largely institutionalized (fighting), but motivational states are exceedingly diverse (fighting with or out of fear, anger, hate, love, apathy, etc.) and not determined by social ’motivations’".



Tsembaga Maring warfare is described by Rappaport (1967) as an integral feature of a complex ritual cycle of religious practices which culminate in ceremonial pig slaughter (’kaiko’), and which are believed to regulate the relationship between Maring social groups and their environment. Rappaport (1967) has suggested that the ritual cycle acts as both a transducer and homeostat in the cybernetics of interaction between the ’local subsystem’ (Tsembaga relations with their immediate physical environment) and the "regional subsystem" (Tsembaga relations with neighboring social groups). Among other functions, the ritual cycle "helps to maintain an undergraded environment, limits fighting to frequencies which do not endanger the existence of the regional population, adjusts man/land ratios, facilitates trade, distributes local surpluses of pig throughout the regional population in the form of pork, and assures people of high quality protein when they are most in need of it" (Rappaport, 1967). Rappaport is quick to add that the ’cognized’ Tsembaga interpretation of their behavior (namely to appease the spirits) is very different from his own ’operational’ model (Durham, 1976). 4.5.1 Multiphase War Process In a number of recent anthropological studies of warfare, different grades of violence have been distinguished, separate causes have been sought for fighting at each grade, and, in some cases, escalations from grade to grade have been noted (e.g., Warner, 1930; Otterbein, 1968; Chagnon, 1967 et seq.). Vayda (1971; 1974) describes a multiphase war process operating among the Maring of eastern New Guinea. The significant features of this process include the following: (1) The later phases of the process, that involves heavy mortality and sometimes leads to territorial conquests, cannot occur unless preceded by periods of weeks or months marked by rather ritualized hostilities in which mortality is low; (2) Escalations from phase to phase in the war process are not inevitable; (3) The causes of entry into war are not the same as the causes of escalation from one phase to another of the war process. Evidence from case studies (Vayda, 1970; 1971) raises serious questions about the validity of cross-cultural or cross-societal studies that depend on the fixed assignment of the warfare of various societies to one or another of a limited number of such categories as ’revenge warfare’. The case studies point to the possibility that the ethnographic reports on which the assignments to the categories are based may be describing the causes of only the first phases of war processes; fighting for blood revenge, magical trophies, or sacrificial victims can become something else if there is escalation to the later phases.



4.5.2 Criticism The insight that relatively ritualized agonistic war may escalate into instrumental or even genocidal war is Vayda’s most valuable contribution. A war of callisthenics may escalate into a war of coercion or a war of carnage, in a process of constant assessment and testing of disparities between the belligerents. Regarding Vayda’s (multi)functionalism, however, Hallpike (1973) a.o. has pointed out that Vayda’s claims do sometimes not seem to be supported even by his own data. The obvious fact that warfare among the Maring patently did not have any noticeable effect in redistributing land drives Vayda to state that even so, their system of warfare might have had such effects if things had been different. All that Vayda establishes is that "in some cases warfare may be the means by which groups which are short of primary forest for new gardens may acquire other people’s. No one would suggest that in some cases, people may not fight over land, or anything else which they fancy and which is in short supply, but this does not explain why the Marings fought" (Hallpike, 1973). This comment points to the general weakness of functionalist theories: "To say that the function of primitive warfare is to limit population sounds almost as odd as saying that the function of hot weather is to increase beer consumption or that we have famines to keep population down", Howell (1975) remarks, and he adds that a great deal of the confusion in these arguments could be eliminated by consistently distinguishing ’effect’ and ’purpose’ instead of ambiguously employing the term ’function’. Vayda, Leeds, Harris and other functionalists are prone to reify adaptive systems and to express them in equilibrating functional terminology. For example, Vayda explains the complex system of pre-contact Maori fighting as a system of population growth, dispersal, and access to resources which, "while they did not know about the system, the Maori were still motivated to follow. It is implied that the ’motivation’ somehow stemmed from the functional nature of the system" (Nettleship, Givens & Nettleship, 1975). During the late 1970s and early 1980s, there was a growing dissatisfaction with the ahistorical nature of functional logic. The self-regulating functionalist models were criticized for "the fallacy of misplaced teleology [that] occurs when purpose is attributed to a unit of organization on which no creative process is known to operate" (Richerson, 1977). "The main objection raised against the ecological approach" according to Lider (1977) "is that rapid evolutionary changes have occurred in the absence of warlike activity; on the other hand, it has not been proved that war always contributed beneficially to human evolution or to human adaptation to the environment". Ferguson (1989) presents evidence that wherever war seems to



have beneficial consequences, these can also occur without war, and/or are of dubious ecological importance. People are not in a better relationship to their natural environment because of war. "War may produce a fit between population and resources, but it is a bad fit. Life is worse for war". For example, the Yanomamö of the area studied by Chagnon are growing at a fairly rapid pace (Chagnon et al., 1979; Harris, 1977; Lizot, 1977). Given the extraordinary intensity of warfare among the Yanomamö, this growth rate should dispel any idea that combat deaths and related mortality lead to an ecological balance. Furthermore, by far the greater number of wars recorded in historical and ethnographic literature do not appear to be related to population pressure even in the weakest sense. "It was the better organized, or the better armed, who behaved most aggressively, not those who were most hungry" (Hulse, 1961; cf. Hoebel, 1958). Sometimes, careful reanalysis of historical data may provide a refutation of eco-explanations (e.g., Kroeber & Fontana, 1987, on Quechan [Yuma] warfare). There is little doubt that what is described by Rappaport (1967) as the Tsembaga Maring regulatory system does indeed perform many 'functions'. However, as Durham (1976) warns, we should be very cautious in ascribing to each one an 'adaptive' significance. In many cases, what we interpret as 'system-regulating functions' and 'control mechanisms' may be no more than the aggregate consequences of individuals behaving in a genotypically selfish fashion. If indeed the maintenance of the ecosystem is but a consequence of (a) behavior which has evolved maximizing the long-term propagation of individuals' genes, and (b) selective retention most commonly maintains traits of advantage to individuals, it is unlikely that primitive warfare is a common adaptation for population control or "an ecological trap into which primitive man has fallen again and again" (Harris, 1971). The main postulate of functionalist theories is, as we saw, demographic regulation: Maintaining the man/land ratio by killing off human beings (One will seldom find words like 'killing off' or 'extermination' in these bloodless theories, yet this is exactly what is meant). Is demographic relaxation a fact in warfare? If contemporary wars are considered, population pressure, population dynamics and other demographic variables do not seem to play an important role, while combat losses, or even total war casualties (1-3%), tend to be negligible from a demographic point of view (e.g., Sorokin, 1928; Q.Wright, 1942; Vincent, 1947; Richardson, 1960; Sauvy, 1969; Singer & Small, 1972; Choucri, 1974). Contemporary warfare could not have had much effect on the ongoing evolution of man (Livingstone, 1968). In contrast to modern warfare, however, the continuous feuding among many



primitive peoples seems to have accounted for a much greater proportion of the deaths and thus could have been a major factor controlling the size of populations, and an agent of natural selection (Livingstone, 1968; Cf. Davie, 1929; Q.Wright, 1942). Estimates of the mortality resulting from primitive war and/or feuding range from < 1% to 33% of adult male deaths from all causes, with an average of about 20% (for war-infested areas such as Amazonia and Highland New Guinea), and < 1% to about 7% of adult female deaths from all causes. Among the Achuarä Jivaro studied by Ross (1984), even 59% of adult male and 27% of adult female deaths were caused by feuding. These are astounding figures for these relatively small populations. The following table lists a number of these studies (The figures may be skewed by overrepresentation of highly warlike New Guinea societies): Table 4.5.2: Lethality of war/feuding in a number of contemporary tribal societies Society

% of adult male deaths

Murngin New Guinea gen. Chimbu (NG) Fore (NG) Huli (NG) Mae Enga (NG) Dani (NG) Eipo (NG) Tsembaga (NG) Kapauku (NG) Marind Anim (NG) !Kung San Yanomamö Bellona Isl. Gebusi (NG) Hewa (NG) Nalumin (NG) Kunimaipa (NG) Etoro (NG) Piegan Buin (Solomon Isl.)

Rate per 100.000

28 25 (est.) 20 (est.) 14 13 25 29 24 20 (est.) 20 (est.) 20 (est.) 29.3* 165.9* 295.6* 683.0* 778.0*

33 35 1/1000/yr 5/1000/yr 10/1000/yr 25** 0.7***

Source(s)

Warner, 1930 Hayano, 1974 P.Brown, 1982 Bennett et al., 1959 Glasse, 1968 Meggitt, 1958 Matthiesen, 1962; Heider, 1972 Schiefenhövel, 1980, p.c. Rappaport, 1968 Pospisil, 1958 van Baal, 1966 Several sources Chagnon, 1968 Kuschel, 1988 Knauft, 1985, 1987 Steadman, 1971 Schiefenhövel, p.c. McArthur, 1971 Kelly, 1977 Ewers, 1955 Thurnwald, 1936

* Figures from Kuschel (1989), reprinted in Scott (1992) ** per generation *** of total population per annum

Sometimes comparably high casualty figures have resulted from spectacular battles (e.g., after a pitched battle of allied Plains tribes at the end of the last century, thousands of dead and wounded braves were left on the battlefield),



raids (e.g., a relatively small raiding party of Chippewa warriors once returned with 335 Dakota scalps [Warren, 1885; Ritzenthaler, 1978]), campaigns (e.g., the Zulu and Dahomean conquests literally obliterated many tribes; the Adirondack, Atikamec and Erie were almost totally annihilated by the Iroquois), or revenge massacres (such as the Beothuks massacring Micmacs in the late 17th century [Jukes, 1842; Reynolds, 1978). More often than not, however, it is the incessant nature of the hostilities which produces low but cumulative casualty figures (see also: Westergaard, 1923; Davie, 1929; 11 Steinmetz, 1929; Krzywicki, 1934; Q.Wright, 1942; Livingstone, 1968) . 4.5.3 General Criticism of Functionalist Theories The most devastating criticism of functionalist theories of primitive warfare has been provided by Hallpike (1973, 1979), from which the following is epitomized (Though he did not deliver the final coup de grâce to the functionalist theories, I do not want to deprive the reader of the enjoyable sarcasm in his argumentation): <

By its very nature, functionalist analysis cannot explain the genesis or emergence of primitive warfare. As Vayda (1968) himself states, the object of functional analysis is a "demonstration of how things work rather than an explanation of why they exist or how they have come to be". The concept of ’function’ is used to mean almost everything from ’operation’ to ’effect’ and ’purpose’. It is also often confused with ’adaptation’, ’social cohesion’, ’equilibrium’, etc. An adaptive institution may be dysfunctional, while a functional institution may be quite maladaptive.

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Circumstantial and anecdotal evidence of the dramatic and devastating destructiveness of tribal warfare in terms of human lives may be deduced from the following accounts: Loskiel (1789) and Hodge (1910) on precolumbian North America; Morgan (1851) on the Iroquois; Charlevoix (1744) on the Algonquians; Nelson (1899) on the Bering Strait Eskimo; Jones (1914) on the Tlingit; Tout (1904) on the British Columbian tribes; Bancroft (1875), Biart (1900) and Cook (1946) on the Meso-American tribes; Markham (1895) on the Shipibo, Mundurucu, Macu and Botocudo; Simson (1880) on the Jivaro; Latcham (1909) on the Araucanians; Simson (1878) on the Zaparo; Paulitschke (1893) on the Galla; Koettlitz (1900) on the Abyssinians; Roth (1887) on Central African tribes; Johnston (1902) on the Hima; Hobley (1903) on the Masai; Dundas (1910) on the Suk; Shooter (1857), Macdonald (1900), Stigand (1907, 1909), Johnston (1913) on southern African tribes; Holub (1881) on the Zulu; Gottschling (1905) on the Venda; Torday & Joyce (1905, 1906) on the Mbale and Huana; Ellis (1890) on the Dahomeans; Peal (1874), Watt (1887), Godden (1897) and Furness (1902) on the Nagas; Carey & Tuck (1896) on the Chin Hill tribes; Hose (1894) on the Kayans; Hose & Shelford (1906) on the Dyak; d’Albertis (1881) on New Guinea tribes generally; Krieger (1899) on the Tugeri; Seligman (1910) on the Binandere; Hunt (1899) on the Murray Islanders; Somerville (1897), Ribbe (1903), Hardy & Elkington (1907), and Woodford (1909) on the Solomon Islanders; Turner (1884) on the Samoans; Calder (1874) and de Quatrefages (1884) on the Tasmanians; Roth (1887) on the Maori; etc. etc.



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Functionalist arguments often depend upon the arbitrary selection of a particular organizational level, or group, in the society, with reference to which warfare or any other practice can then be said to be functional. By shifting one’s definition of the group for which violence is said to be advantageous to suit the case, one can, of course, always prove that it is advantageous to someone, ending with the extreme case of the functional value of murder for the killer, because it removes his inner tensions, and makes him feel that he is a fine fellow. A case in point is Chagnon’s (1967) hypothesis: "The hypothesis I put forward here is that a militant ideology and the warfare it entails function to preserve the sovereignty of independent villages in a milieu of chronic warfare". Now, disregarding the essential circularity of the hypothesis, while it can be argued that it is adaptive for any one village to engage in warfare, and be generally ferocious, in a situation where everyone else is equally ferocious, it does not follow that it is adaptive for that group of villages to engage in constant raiding and feuding among themselves - they would be much better off in terms of material prosperity if they lived at peace. The Yanomamö, like the Tauade, and other acephalous societies, engage in warfare because among other reasons they cannot stop, not because they necessarily as a culture derive any benefit from fighting. In the absence of any central authority they are condemned to fight forever, other conditions remaining the same, since for any group to cease defending itself would be suicidal. Functional analysis may be conducive to (more or less arrogantly) dismissing the motives of the individuals concerned as irrelevant. Rappoport (1967), for example, thinks that his interpretation of Tsembaga Maring reality is far superior to the Maring interpretation of their own reality. "Warfare", White (1947) claimed, "is a struggle between social organisms, not individuals. Its explanation is therefore social or cultural, not psychological". Following White's lead, Newcomb (1950) claimed that all warfare is "motivated by economic need, and the biological competition of societies". Now the claim that all warfare is always motivated by economic need is, in terms of the consensus of ethnographic facts, merely ridiculous, and needs no special refutation here. It turns out, however, that what Newcomb means by 'motivated' is not what most people would take the word to mean. In this way Newcomb can dismiss all the evidence of ethnographers of Plains Indian warfare upon the reasons why the Indians valued warfare so highly, on the grounds that "The motivation of the individual is not the cause of warfare, it is rather the method by which a cultural irritation or need is satisfied" (Newcomb, 1950). One feels inclined to ask at this point if a culture can scratch itself. For Newcomb, Plains "men were warlike because their socio-cultural systems obliged them to be". The causes of this sociocultural imperative

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were "powerful economic and historic forces", above and beyond the consciousness of individual actors. Economic rationality was still at the heart of the matter, but now it is to be calculated on a level above that of "economic man". Newcomb later (1960) elaborated on this point, arguing that wars usually are fought over some economic good, but the need for this good is determined by social forces. One cannot even discover the underlying economic drive by talking to participants, he continued, because it will be overlain by cultural values, distorted by rationalizations, and, at least in hierarchical societies, complicated by divergent interests and obscured by deliberate mystification. Newcomb was part of a trend away from ’psychological explanations’ in materialist studies, and he started a controversy (the so-called emic/etic controversy) which reverberates down to today. Newcomb and White are both in a philosophical muddle, which leads them to suppose that a social system can have needs, motives and frustrations unknown to its members. When Newcomb claims therefore that all warfare is economically motivated, he means that the motives or real people are irrelevant, and that warfare is "a function of socio-cultural systems, and individuals are... no more than the means through which these systems attain their ends... It does not matter for what reason the individual thinks he is fighting, and dying, as long as he is satisfying the needs and imperatives of his culture" (Newcomb, 1950). Leeds (1963) and Harris (1975) have made similar claims. Of course, the claim that a culture is an integrated kind of Being with distinct needs which have to be satisfied is to indulge in fantasy. When one reads such vain attempts to explain primitive warfare by appeals to its ecological effects or functions, one realizes that ’function’ has frequently the covert significance of "What a twentieth-century materialist rationalist intellectual from Europe or America thinks is a sensible allocation of labor and resources". When such a person encounters primitive societies, he is baffled by their indifference to his criteria of what is sensible, and therefore casts about for some hidden reason which will be the real explanation for their behavior. This is especially likely to be the case with that form of behavior which particularly horrifies intellectuals - warfare. In consequence, many such functionalist explanations of primitive warfare have a strong ethnocentric bias. In short, functionalism opens the possibility to invent and attribute all kinds of ’functions’, latent or manifest, direct or remote, to primitive societies, while simply ignoring or arrogantly dismissing their own ’cognitive model’. That primitive peoples could have genuine, even if sometimes mistaken or inadequate, reasons for these beliefs and behaviors is dismissed as the fallacy of taking native explanations at face value. Many functionalists in their determination to show that even such social institutions as warfare are adaptive, have adopted a view of natural



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selection which is more extreme in its rigidity than many biologists would claim for it in the study of animal populations. Finally, functionalists are almost always able to show that everything which people do has some advantageous aspects for someone, so that diametrically opposite situations will be described as adaptively - or functionally - advantageous. For example, if a group of tribes habitually lives at peace, it will be shown that there are certain conditions which make this possible, whose function will then have been demonstrated to contribute to the maintenance of peace. But, should the tribes concerned habitually have lived in a state of chronic anarchy and violence, the functionalist is not discouraged. He may either say that each tribe is a separate society, and that warfare contributes to the solidarity of each socalled society, or, that it eliminates weaklings and contributes to the vigor of the group, besides keeping down the surplus population, and supplying protein if they are cannibals. Remarkably, virtually none of the functionalist theories discussed above address the ’function’ or ’adaptiveness’ of peace, even though, as Kroeber & Fontana (1987) observed, a comprehensive theory of the origin(s) and motivations of war must also account for the absence of war. In Ch. 7 it will be argued that war is not the ’normal’ state of affairs among primitive peoples - claims to the contrary notwithstanding - no more than it is among contemporary nation-states.

4.6 Materialist Theories Lately, theorists of (cultural) ecological, ethological, sociobiological, and Marxist perspectives and/or signature have found themselves happily united, bien etonnés de se trouver ensemble, in a common emphasis on primitive war as a strategy to secure scarce and vital or strategic resources, such as land, protein, women, etc. Simply Cherchez la ressource and you will find the basic cause/deeper reason/ultimate explanation/the in-the-last-analysis rationale of that war. Though not all these scholars would call themselves such, I will, for the sake of convenience, call them the materialists or the school of materialism. Materialist theories are generally wider in scope than ecological and functionalist theories. The following account is based on Ferguson’s (1984) eloquent exposition of the basic tenets and history of the materialist school in relation to the explanation of primitive war. The materialist approach to war focuses on war’s relation to the practical problems of maintaining life and living standards. The roots of the materialist school sprouted in the 1940s when Hunt (1940), Mishkin (1940), Wagner (1940), Lewis (1942), Swadesh (1948), and Newcomb (1950) reanalyzed and reinterpreted Plains Indian, Iroquoian, and



Zulu warfare in thoroughly economic terms, i.e., as conscious, deliberate and violent struggles over material resources. In the case of the Iroquois, Hunt argued that their belligerence was based on attempts to control the fur trade (for reviews see Otterbein, 1973; Gramby, 1977; Trigger, 1978; Biolsi, 1984; and Ferguson, 1984b; 1990a). Previously, economic motives were thought to underlie war only in state-level societies, or societies approaching that level. Lowie (1935) and Linton (1935) (on Plains warfare), and Malinowski (1941), Q.Wright (1942) and TurneyHigh (1949) (on primitive war in general) converged on this opinion, although exceptions to this rule were recognized. Generally, material gain was not believed to be an important motivating force in the wars of primitive societies, or if it was, it was only one of many types of motives. Sport, revenge, or prestige were thought to be at least as important (See ' 5.3). 4.6.1 Land and Game Materialist studies of primitive war have focused mainly on two issues: land and game (or protein). One issue is the significance of land shortage, or scarcity of certain types of agricultural lands, in the war patterns of the western Pacific and parts of Southeast Asia. Many authors claim that war over land is common in those areas (Brookfield & Brown, 1963; Brown & Brookfield, 1959; Ember, 1982; Meggitt, 1972, 1977; Peoples, 1982; Rappaport, 1968, 1979; Sahlins, 1961; Vayda, 1969a,b, 1976, 1979; see also Bayliss-Smith & Feachem, 1977). Others dismiss or downgrade land as an important factor in war (Hallpike, 1973, 1977; Koch, 1974a,b; Sillitoe, 1977, 1978; P.Brown, 1978, 1982). A scarcity of agricultural land also was suggested as the basis of South American warfare, especially the fertile riverine lands (Lathrap, 1968, 1970; Morey & Marwitt, 1975; Roosevelt, 1980), but the proposition lost support for the interriverine areas after Chagnon (1967, 1977) documented an abundance of land for the Yanomamö (see also Carneiro, 1964; Murphy, 1970). Evaluation of these opposed views is difficult because of the distinction between land acquisition as a goal of war and its acquisition as a consequence of war (Ferguson, 1984). The limited amount of game and other sources of animal protein in the Amazon region had been noted by several researchers (e.g., Carneiro, 1964; Denevan, 1970; Harner, 1972; Lathrap, 1968). Hickerson (1965) was the first to propose that war creates buffer zones that act as game preserves for hunted animals. Protein (or game) scarcity soon was cited as the limited resource underlying several South American war complexes (e.g., Durham, 1976; Gross, 1975; Harris, 1974, 1977, 1980; E.Ross, 1978, 1979; J.Ross, 1971; Siskind, 1973; see also A.Johnson, 1982). Not unexpectedly, this view was challenged by others who claimed that the protein-game scarcity did not exist and/or could not



explain warfare (e.g., Beckerman, 1979; Chagnon, 1972, 1977; 1983; Chagnon & Hames, 1979; Hames, 1979; Lizot, 1977, 1979; Nugent, 1981). Scarcities of good agricultural land and animal protein sources have been implicated as sufficiently general considerations in war patterns to warrant broader testing of their significance. However, as Ferguson (1984) notes, the focus on land and game has created an oversimplified picture of ecological explanations. Whatever significance environmental phenomena have is a result of their interaction with a society of a given form. The salient environmental condition in any case may be something other than a scarce resource, as Morren (1984) in particular emphasizes. Nevertheless, competition for scarce resources very often is the basis of war. What type of resource may be involved will vary from one war pattern to another, and resources may be scarce due to many processes besides population numbers pressing on absolute supplies, as in cases when demand is affected by trade, contact circumstances, or political and economic differentiation. With higher levels of conflict and political development, actual scarcities of resources may be only one of several factors contributing to war. The idea that war forces people from densely settled areas into less hospitable population ’sinks’ has been argued, in varying formulations for the New Guinea Highlands (e.g., Meggitt, 1972) and for Amazonia, initially by Steward but especially by Lathrap (1970). The Steward-Lathrap hypothesis, succinctly, states that population growth in areas of high productivity ultimately stimulates warfare, which pumps population to progressively less productive areas, and people pushed into these marginal areas undergo a forced devolution to simpler, band forms of organization. Neither Steward nor Lathrap discuss the population effects of this ’population pump and sink’. Ferguson (1989) suggests that (1) forced population displacement, and the breakdown of complex forms of social organization, would be accompanied by major population losses; and (2) that the end points of these displacements, the areas of marginal productivity, may act as demographic sinks, with long-term population decline. 4.6.2 The Theoretical Basis of Materialism The basic tenets of materialism have been exposed by Ferguson (1984 et seq.) as follows. People depend on resources from the natural environment to survive and live at traditionally acceptable standards. With a given economy including technology, etc. - there will be finite amounts of some resources in a given area. This is not simply a matter of their presence, but also of their availability. Any change that increases demand for or decreases supply of a critical resource in a situation in which demand already is near the effective limit of that resource, can result in problems such as diminished per capita consumption, or depletion and degradation of the resource base. Under these circumstances, a people can opt for one or a combination of three



basic alternatives to alleviate the problems. (1) They can intensify application of existing production techniques (with potentially adverse consequences such as depletion). (2) They can shift to a new economic organization (often involving substantial risks). (3) They can acquire more of the scarce resource from outside their original territory. Trade sometimes can succeed in this, or migration to uninhabited areas might relieve all pressure. But when trade in the needed resources is not feasible, and neigboring areas are not vacant, but populated by groups in similar circumstances, then acquiring more of a resource may mean going to war. War to gain territory or tribute, despite all its hazards, may be the most viable of the alternatives. The circumstance of resource scarcity seems common enough, and so does war. The absence of war is expected, on the other hand, in the absence of challenges to material wellbeing. This materialist view contrasts with theories that explain war as generated by certain values, social structures, and so forth, in the absence of any material rationale. Such factors do effect the conduct of war and thresholds of violence. But a materialist theory directed at explaining the occurrence of war must hold these factors to be secondary, and not regularly capable of generating and sustaining war patterns in themselves. In 1990 Ferguson presented a more sophisticated reformulation of his earlier version of cultural materialist theory, based on three mutually reinforcing premises. The first premise is the causal primacy of the infrastructure (demography, resource base) vis-à-vis socioeconomic and political structure and ideological superstructure. The second premise is that there may be competition between and selection among groups, and that behaviors affecting military ability can be made uniform in a region as groups with less effective military patterns are eliminated. Warfare can result in the elimination of local groups by death, dispersion, or absorption. If their elimination is due to some cultural pattern related to the practice of war, it is likely that other local groups will take appropriate steps to avoid a similar fate, even if that requires that individual interests and tendencies be overruled (see Alexander & Borgia, 1978). The third and final materialist premise concerns motivation. All explanations of war are premised on some assumptions about human psychology, although these are usually not made explicit. The motivational assumption of materialism is that non-material goals will not regularly lead to war unless they accompany material objectives or incentives. That is because war itself typically involves major costs. This must be emphasized: war costs lives, health, resources, and effort. So, if the motivational premise is correct, we should expect peace if the probable costs of war are not outweighed by potential benefits. This perspective is also applicable to understanding transitions from one phase of war to another. It is compatible with a perspective which stresses the role of



purposeful decisions made by thinking cultural beings, but contradicts the view that war is in some sense normal, and it is peace which requires explanation (e.g., Gregor, 1990; See Ch. 7). The motivational premise can be expressed in one general proposition: Wars occur when those who make the decision to fight estimate that it is in their material interests to do so. This is a more precise and correct formulation than statements made previously (Ferguson, 1984) that wars are conflicts over scarce resources. The material interests of decision-makers can take the form of six strategic objectives of war: (1) to increase access to fixed resources; (2) to capture movable valuables; (3) to impose an exploitative relationship on another independent group; (4) to conquer and incorporate another group; (5) to use external conflict as a means of enhancing the decision-makers’ position within their own society; and (6) to forestall attacks by others. Objective (6) suggests an important clarification. A ’material interests’ perspective does not imply that war is always deliberately chosen and planned. It may be so, or it may be an unplanned and unwanted last resort, the outcome of a ’prisoner’s dilemma’ brought about as a result of previous self-interested strategic decisions. Even in such a situation, however, decision-makers will continue to act in accord with their perceived material interests. These three complementary materialist premises form a base for a structure of explanation extending through various areas of social life. The model can be summarized as follows: (1) Infrastructural factors explain why war occurs. In the absence of a pressing scarcity of some essential material resource(s), or when an existing scarcity can be addressed by alternatives less costly than war (e.g., intensification of production, trade, migration, etc.), the model indicates a low likelihood of war. The infrastructure also accounts for basic parameters of how warfare is actually practiced, and that in turn affects all other dimensions of war. (2) Structural factors explain the social patterning of war. Kinship affects how people are grouped to fight. Economics translates resource scarcity into hostile relations between groups. Politics is the means through which antagonistic interests become purposeful, violent, group action. Generally, structural factors do not generate war in themselves. They do largely determine such matters as why a particular war starts just where and when it does. (3) Superstructural patterns shape the way individuals perceive and act on conditions related to war. Calculation of material loss and gain necessarily must consider relevant properties of the existing social universe, and that includes the values and rules by which individuals are expected to live. But independent of infrastructural and structural patterns conducive to war, superstructural elements have a very limited effect. The rules, values, and attitudes affect how war is practiced and thresholds of violence, but generally, they alone do not cause war (Koch, 1979). They may reinforce the resolve of warriors (Whitehead, 1990). The decision to fight



might be made according to material interest, but those ultimate benefits may seem to pale as men march toward possible death. The rules, values, and attitudes give an added and more immediate incentive. They are hammered into boys from an early age, sometimes accompanied by severe punishment for failure to learn them. Individual military accomplishment may be a prerequisite for achieving adulthood; and is reinforced for adults by shame for cowards, and prestige for accomplished warriors (Fadiman, 1982; Heider, 1970; Voget, 1964). Shame and prestige do not stand alone, however. They often have very tangible correlates, in marriages, in resources, and in influence (Chagnon, 1990; Meggitt, 1977; Turney-High, 1949; Zegwaard, 1959). All these withingroup reinforcements will be backed up by the threat that war will ’select out’ groups which have not sufficiently motivated their fighters. Consideration of all these means of reinforcing the resolve of warriors should eliminate any notion of war being the result of an ’aggressive instinct’. Ferguson then goes on to reconsider some common proximate-level explanations of war (such as revenge) within his materialist framework. Proximatelevel explanations and theories of primitive war, and Ferguson’s relevant comments, will be considered in Ch. 5. 4.6.3 Criticism Ferguson’s version of materialism is a very reasonable one. According to him, "War is never a simple function of the natural environment" (Ferguson, 1984). Materialism apparently is a powerful paradigm. There is, however, an inherent tendency of this school toward ’vulgar’ materialism. War, any war, whether primitive or modern, is waged for the sake of securing material resources: Territory, protein, women, pigs, cattle, mineral deposits, oil, etc., and that is all there is to it (e.g., Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1986). Can competition for prestige, power, glory or even strategic interests be considered material resources? Is the equation of realistic conflict with materialist conflict a valid one? Not even the political realists (the Morgenthau school) define interests as only material ones. Security, for example, may be one of such ’superordinate’ interests. Brodie (1973) offers some devastating criticisms of materialist theories of contemporary wars. "Greed", he says, "is something we can all understand, though it is something we always attribute to others". Materialism at least has the advantage of dispelling any ’killer instinct’ or ’innate aggressiveness’ or similar constructs and quasi-explanations of primitive war; yet, at the same time, it points to another prime culprit of war: human greed, cupidity, acquisitiveness, pleonexia. So maybe we can expect the whole hilarious or acrimonious debate all over again: Is greed innate or acquired?, nature or nurture?; the frustration-greediness hypothesis; the learned acquisitiviness versus the innatist greed advocates; "Greed, the so-called-evil".



The focus on material causes leaves little room for consideration of human decision-making, and such concerns are often explicitly disavowed (Harris, 1964, 1974; Ross, 1980; Price, 1982). Such disclaimers notwithstanding, any theory of human behavior must necessarily presuppose a theory of motivation. It must at least incorporate some assumptions about why people behave at all. The motivational premise of materialism has been questioned in a most caustic criticism by Robarchek (1990). In most materialistic approaches the motivational theory is straightforward: Human motivation is maximization of material interests. More is better, and more of everything is always sought, whether land, meat, or women. If such striving results in conflict with others, the material ’ends’ are its ’cause’ (Durham, 1976; Chagnon & Bugos, 1979; Biolsi, 1984; Price, 1984; Ferguson, 1984 et seq.; cf. also Barnett, 1983). Robarchek contrasts this view with the following, which emphasizes the subjective and social meanings of people’s actions. People are conceived of by him "as active participants in their own destinies, goal-directed decision makers in pursuit of particular goals and objectives. They pick their ways through fields of options and constraints, many of which are indeed biologically and environmentally conditioned". Motivation, thus, involves all the forces, factors, options, and constraints, both intrinsic and extrinsic, that influence the choices people make. What these conflicting paradigms boil down to is a conflict over the anthropological axioms, the implicit Menschenbild. On the one hand, man as a puppet on the strings of evolutionary or environmental forces, however conceptualized; on the other hand, man as an active and conscious actor creating his own drama (which is not always a tragedy). Both terms of the ’material cause’ equation, Robarchek (1990) argues, are open to serious question. Are material causes, in fact, ’material’? And are they ’causal’? That is, even if people specifically reason together and decide to go to war to acquire more wives, or more buffalo horses, or a better salmon stream, does the ultimate cause of the behavior lie in the ’material’ end to be served? Or is it to be found in the cultural values that put a premium on salmon over other foods, or on buffalo horses as sources of status, or on multiple wives as symbols of virility or success? If we put aside the assumption of an innate drive to maximize material good, is greed a material cause? Put another way, if I own a Volkswagen and I steal a Mercedes, is the cause of my behavior ’material’? (Robarchek, 1990). Can the need for security (which Ferguson lists as "to forestall attacks by 12 others") really be classified as a material need? 12

The basic fallacy of materialism may simply be its conflation of the dimensions material (vs non-material), rational (vs non-rational) and realistic (vs non-realistic). It implicitly presupposes that only conflicts for material resources are rational and realistic, and, conversely, that rational actors only come into (realistic) conflict over material resources. Security, which Ferguson is



Robarchek also questions the proposition that only material factors are relevant to the explanation of behavior. From there, he says, the ontological assumption is made that only material causes are ’real’, thereby banishing human intentionality from the realm of science. Marvin Harris, a leading theorist of materialist anthropology, for example, argues that assumptions that the human actor knows the purpose or goal or meaning of his behavior "are totally alien to the spirit of science" (Harris, 1964). It might be worth noting that behaviorism rested on precisely this same transformation; the behaviorists reasoned that since only observable behavior was measurable and objectively verifiable, all else was irrelevant, leading academic psychology to spend half a century digging itself into a hole from which it has only recently begun to emerge (Robarchek, 1990; see also Fromm, 1973). Perhaps as a consequence of the difficulties inherent in teleological functionalism, some materialist approaches, while still seeing the ultimate explanation (cause) of warfare in the final state toward which it progresses (acquisition of territory, control of trade, etc.), stress initial material conditions. Climatic change, new trade opportunities, and so on, are seen as the material determinants of warfare. There are a number of problems with this approach, the most important of which is the mechanistic and deterministic assumption which underlies it. This assumption is that having identified even a necessary condition for human behavior is to have explained the behavior by virtue of some (never specified) mechanical linkage through which the material condition automatically generates the behavior. Both initial and final cause arguments are usually based on the demonstrated (or assumed) co-occurrence or correlation of material events or conditions with warfare: climatic change, population growth, annexation of territory, numbers of offspring, etc. A correlation is, of course, only an empirical generalization about the co-occurrence of events which, in itself, tells us nothing about causation. Causal statements require the postulation of processes connecting the correlated variables. Noting the correlation between swidden gardening and malaria, for example, tells us nothing, in the absence of intervening processes, about the efficient causes of the disease. The generalization will, in fact, make such understanding impossible if we assume, as do most materialist analyses (on the presumption of the primacy of material causes) that the correlation already describes the causal process: climatic change causes warfare; protein shortage causes warfare; resource competition causes eager to categorize as a material resource, is actually of quite a different order. It can neither be possessed nor exchanged. Its only similarity with material resources is that it always seems to be in short supply, necessitating a never-ending quest, which by its very nature reduces the ’volume’ of security for all actors involved (security-dilemma; See Ch. 7).



warfare, and so on (Robarchek, 1990). The most common solution to the problem of linking material ’cause’ with behavioral ’effect’, Robarchek argues, has been to relegate the intentionality to Culture, reifying and ascribing purposes to it, to "make society and culture think for the people" (Nadel, 1953). Somehow, the ’correct’ (in terms of inclusive fitness or ecological efficiency) decisions were institutionalized as part of the culture and individuals thereafter do not have to make decisions, they simply obey the dictates of their cultures. This sort of ’solution’ to the problem of motivation is obviously also unsatisfactory. It simply pushes the decisions back into the past where the analyst does not have to deal with the processes involved. More seriously, it entails a degree of cultural reification and a level of cultural determinism that cannot be taken seriously. The shared sets of values, beliefs, meanings, and assumptions, i.e., culture must be an indispensable part of any explanation of any human behavior, including warfare. Cultural traditions certainly do define certain options as more desirable than others, and certain methods as legitimate and others as illegitimate means to those ends. Thus, for example, like the Yanomamö, most Semai men would probably like to have sex with more women than they do. Yet no Semai man ever gets up one morning, turns to his brother-in-law and says, "Let's get a bunch of the guys together and go raid the next valley and see if we can kill some people and steal some women". For Semai, murder and rape are simply not legitimate means to any ends, no matter how 'objectively' desirable. However, while culture provides us with at least a partial answer to our questions about the basis for choices among options, considered as a determinant it, too, is unacceptable. The existence of a culturally institutionalized pattern of behavior (such as Yanomamö warfare) is at most a necessary, and not a sufficient condition for its performance. (It is not, in fact, even a necessary condition; if it were, culture change would be impossible). Ever since the Kinsey report, for example, it would be difficult to argue that marital infidelity is not an important component of the American cultural-behavioral inventory. That does not mean, however, that we are all constantly occupied every day in cheating on our spouses. Nor do the Yanomamö, even with their culture of war, fight, rape and kill every day, or every week, or every month, or even every year. That is to say that the individuals and groups must consciously decide whether or not to put their culturally-legitimized behavioral potentiality into action (Robarchek, 1990). When the subject is human behavior, materialist explanation must at least acknowledge (even if it does not address) the question of how the posited



material causes become parts of actors’ motivational schemata (Robarchek, 1990). A harsh criticism of materialism and related approaches may be that it is irrefutable or nearly so. One can always invoke a limiting resource, be it land, protein, or something else again, in any conflict. It seems so trivial a pursuit: Cherchez la ressource. It also tends to obscure the fact that it is human beings, in certain cultures and with that culture’s idiosyncratic notions, cognitions and constructions of reality, under certain circumstances, in certain political constellations and facing certain deprivations or certain forms of the security dilemma, who perceive and define what is a vital resource and decide whether or not it is worth fighting for: "To put it briefly, people don’t fight for resources but for ideas of resources. Some of these ideas are closer to the ’real’ importance of these resources in terms of metabolic needs, others are more distant from such realistic assessment... a culturalist notion of resources emphasizes the necessity of mental processing of resources or any other objects of human striving" (Meyer, 1987). For example, in the endemic stage of primitive war cultural ideas and definitions of resources are mainly metaphysical, magico-religious, or animistic notions of power (sometimes residing in heads or other trophies), or restauration of a threatened universe or restauration of the legitimate status quo ante (e.g., the Anggor of New Guinea: Huber, 1975). What strikes most researchers of primitive war is the virtually total absence of any ’economic’ motivation at this stage. One fairly recent example may suffice: Kuschel (1988) describes in unparalleled detail the way of life and the all-powerful code of honor which dictated the absolute necessity of revenge in blood among the inhabitants of Bellona (Solomon Islands). Almost all of these killings on Bellona took place purely in revenge for a loss of honor, and seldom had any social or economic advantage for the murderers, who often led a life filled with isolation, hunger and fear in the jungle after the attack. Furthermore, women and small children were not killed or harmed, for the same all-powerful code of honor also contained the admonishment that the gods looked upon attacks on women and children as shameful, and not worthy of an honorable man. It may be objected that the preceding theories (especially functionalism and materialism) are more proximate-level theories, i.e., theories about the possible causes of individual wars, and not so much theories about the evolutionary origin of war (the ultimate-level problem). As we saw, functionalist theories are even inherently incapable of addressing the question of evolution. These theories have been discussed in this chapter because of their theoretical coherence with the ecological theories and common emphasis on land and (material) resources in relation to (cultural) survival. The following suite of theories, however, do attempt to explain the evolutionary origin of human warfare more or less explicitly, and more or less successfully.



4.7 Group Territoriality and the Evolution of War In the ethological theory of the 1960s and 70s, ’aggression’, as Pettman (1975) noted, is inextricably interwoven with the concept of ’territoriality’. In anthropology, territorial divisions of human groups have been claimed to be virtually universal (Carr-Saunders, 1922; Malinowski, 1941; Wynne-Edwards, 1962; Murdock, 1963). Small wonder that it was an ethologist to propose territoriality as an explanation of (the origin of) human warfare. "In order to understand what makes us go to war", Tinbergen (1968) contends, "we have to recognize that man behaves very much like a group-territorial species". As a social, hunting primate, Man must originally have been organized on the principle of group territories. Having thus implicated group-territoriality in the evolution of human warfare, Tinbergen goes on to delineate other preconditions: The upsetting of the balance between aggression and fear (to which he adds the somewhat arcane assertion: "and this is what causes war"), is due to at least three other consequences of cultural evolution: the invention of longrange weapons which make killing easy, sophisticated indoctrination, increased population pressure, and other factors. In a later article (Tinbergen, 1976) he contends: "For a long time the step towards actual killing must have been prevented by the evolution of protective, cultural codes. But modern man, i.e., man from at least 10,000 years ago, has taken the disastrous step to war by using his unique capacity for foresight and experience, and recognising that under certain circumstances killing does pay, because a dead man will not return to fight again". In order to account for this transition, he discusses what might be called a process of ’emancipation of violence’, i.e., ’aggressive behavior’ in the service of a number of different functional and motivational systems; and he introduces the concept of ’super-motivation’. Man is the only mammal to blur the sharp dividing line between intraspecific aggression and interspecific predation: "[T]he enemy is to the warrior not merely another human being; he is at the same time a dangerous predator, a parasite, and/or an obstacle to be removed". Thus, war, insofar as the enemy is dehumanized, becomes interspecific killing. Tinbergen points out that interspecific forms of agonistic behavior, in contrast to intraspecific forms, have either very weak inhibitory mechanisms or none at all. Subsequently (Tinbergen, 1981), he develops his thesis of group territoriality as the root of war more fully, and he identifies a number of decisive and facilitating factors that have played a part in changing the initially useful system of group territoriality into the forceful, direct competition called war. As the decisive factors he mentions: (1) The insight that it is more practical to kill enemies than to scare them off; (2) Man’s long-term foresight made him realize the potential of planned conquest; (3) The ’super-motivation’ discussed



above. As war-facilitating factors he sees: increasing dependence on land; development of long-range weapons; increased population density; improved communication; fear and distrust between nations; etc. And he concludes: "War, then, has its origins in group territoriality, a system of indirect massive killing of surplus individuals in the interest of the well-being of the victors". Territoriality had been singled out as a root cause of war even before Tinbergen’s writings by Bates (1955) who stated: "[M]an’s ferocity to man does have one clear biological counterpart in territoriality. If war has any innate, ’instinctive’ basis, it may most likely be found to be a derivative of the reactions associated with defense of territory, so widely characteristic of the vertebrates" (Bates, 1955; cf. also Eyles, 1971; Malmberg, 1980). Reynolds (1966) also relates warfare to territoriality, though he regards territoriality as a relatively recent phenomenon, from the time that Man became sedentary: "[N]ow that communities were attached to particular territories as an ecological necessity, the advent of other tribes, still nomadic, on their land would be viewed with hostility; or, when a community grew too large for its land, a subcommunity might break off and search for new land on which to hunt or to cultivate or to graze its domestic animals. In these circumstances territoriality and inter-group aggression began". This appears to be a popular view in the literature on the subject; Cf. Carneiro, 1970; van Sommers, 1972; Galtung, 1973; Vine, 1973; Harris, 1975; among many others. Ardrey (1969) set out to demonstrate that Man defends territory by ’instinct’ (the so-called Territorial Imperative). Territory, he admits, does not cause war as such, but those who would transgress territorial boundaries must weigh thereby the strong possibility that war will occur. By animal example, he identifies two basic kinds of human society: (a) the nation, isolating itself through outward antagonism, and (b) the noyau held together by inward antagonism and mutual animosity. Another example of more or less naïve biologism is Alcock's (1972) proposition: "War is an overt action resulting from man's innate aggressiveness. Like other social animals, groups of men defend their home territories and aggressively seek to own or control larger territories".



4.7.1 Criticism Ardrey’s formulations have been criticized as loose, unscholarly and based on selective, or nonexistent evidence, especially since Man’s collateral relatives among the apes are "singularly lacking in simple territorial behavior" (Crook, 1968; Cf. Reynolds, 1966; Elms, 1972; King, 1976; Note that this was written before the discovery of the warfare between chimpanzee territorial groups). Furthermore, "His definitions have been assailed as flimsy concertina constructs that disintegrate on touch, and his use of the term ’territory’ is one of these" (Pettman, 1975). According to E.O. Wilson (1975), it is reasonable to conclude that territoriality, in the broad sense of any area occupied more or less exclusively by an animal or group of animals through overt defense or advertisement, is a general trait of hunter-gatherer societies. In a review of the evidence, Wilmsen (1973) found that these relatively primitive societies do not differ basically in their strategy of land tenure from many mammalian species. Wilson points to tribalism, ethnocentrism and xenophobia in producing fear and hostility among territorial groups. Subsequently (Wilson, 1978), after discussing the economicdefendability model of territoriality, he asserts that "We know that bands of hunter-gatherers around the world are commonly aggressive in their defense of land that contains a reliable food resource", referring to the research of DysonHudson & Smith (1978). This finding could, however, not be confirmed by Cashdan (1983), who studied four Bushman groups. The most territorial of these groups were found where resources were scarcest and most variable. One might well object that Tinbergen’s theory is not really about ’group territoriality’ (it does not seem to play a large role in his theory, either as a necessary or as a sufficient condition), rather his theory is a modest psychological one, which specifies some psychological preconditions of the origin of predatory warfare. Furthermore, it is not only territorial defense which has to be explained - obviously territorial defense itself does not constitute war (it takes two to tango) - but the reasons and motives of territorial transgressions and violations, territorial conquest, etc. Territorial defense is immaterial without its correlative: offense. What evidence do we have? In a quantitative survey of 50 primitive societies, Naroll (1966) found that territorial change is almost always brought about by warfare and has a strong positive correlation with frequency of war. Otterbein (1970) found the level of military sophistication to be the major cultural element in the tendency of a society to expand its territory. Russell (1973), however, indicates that the psychocultural element of ’ferocity’ is even more strongly related to territorial expansion. A high level of ferocity may lead to internal fighting and disintegration. It has to be controlled by authoritarian measures in order to produce territorial expansion (Cf. also Eckhardt, 1974;



1975; See also Ch. 2). Territoriality as a causal factor in primitive warfare and feuding has been described for hundreds of peoples (extensive reviews by Holsti, 1913; Davie, 1929; and King, 1976; among others). King (1976) concludes his review: "[A] number of hunter-gatherers are known to have regarded the violation of their land and/or resources as an occasion for violence. A few accounts suggest that violence sometimes occurred on a relatively large scale". Yet, most studies of primitive peoples indicate that "Effective conquest, as the term is understood in civilized warfare, is practically unknown among primitive peoples, since, owing to their mode of living, they rarely desire territory for permanent use, and since they lack the political development necessary to extend their dominion" (Davie, 1929), and that the conception of rigidly bounded territory as inviolable property to be strictly defended was lacking in the early human hunters (Fritsch, 1872; de Quatrefages, 1884; Curr, 1886; Ellis, 1890; Gardiner, 1898; Keller, 1906; Torday & Joyce, 1906; Tylor, 1909; Sumner, 1913; Havemeyer & Keller, 1917; van der Bij, 1929; Davie, 1929; Q. Wright, 1942; Service, 1966; 1968; Steward, 1968; Turnbull, 1968; Anderson, 1968; Birdsell, 1970; Keith, 1972; Vine, 1973; Shepard, 1973; Meyer, 1977; Melotti, 1984 et seq.; Campbell, 1985; Dyer, 1985; Gellner, 1989; Tiger, 1990; a.o). Q. Wright’s (1942) conclusion that "Wars seldom have the object of territorial aggression or defense until the pastoral or agricultural stages of culture are reached, when they become a major cause of war" may still be considered valid. In an early review Vine (1973) concluded: "[T]he genetic basis for the strict group territoriality which agricultural man has shown in certain cultural contexts and ecological situations is likely to be very slight, and to be little implicated in the basic causation of human aggression". As Chagnon (1968) and Carneiro (1968) have noted, the causes of warfare in Amazonia are not associated with economics, and successful warfare does not result in reassignment of resources or territorial conquest (contradicted, however, by Morey & Marwitt, 1975; see also Ferguson, 1984). Also in New Guinea, territorial adjustments are a possible but not inevitable outcome of war (Paula Brown, 1982). Regarding early Man’s alleged group territoriality, probably Schaller & Lowther’s (1969) apt remarks are closer to the truth: "If the early hominids relied predominantly on hunting for subsistence, they obviously had a choice of systems open to them. They could be resident, either territorial or nonterritorial... Or they could be migratory, following the herds as the wild dogs do. Or they could be resident for part of the time and nomadic for the rest, depending on the season. We believe that all these systems were used, that each species and population within a species adapted itself to local circumstances just as the wolf and lion do". Also Vallois (1961), on the basis of Paleolithic skeletal evidence, concluded that "All evidence suggests that the Paleolithic bands were not territorial units, that they were capable of large



migrations, and that sexual relations must have existed between them". Finally, Van den Berghe (1974) argued that since endemic warfare between human bands has probably been universal or nearly so for hundreds or thousands if not millions of years, it is quite possible that territoriality at the band level developed as a means of regulating inter-band aggression. Territoriality became a way to avoid continuous warfare. In contemporary warfare, on the other hand, territorial disputes have been perhaps the most important single cause of war between states in the last 2 or 3 centuries (See Ch. 8 in which territoriality as an evolved strategy in hominid/human evolution, in relation to economic defendability, will be more fully discussed.

4.8 Hunting and Warfare: ’Carnivorous Psychology’ Theory The earlier men were hunting men, and to hunt a neighbouring tribe, kill the males, loot the village, and possess the females was the most profitable, as well as the most exciting way of living. Thus were the more martial tribes selected, and in chiefs and peoples a pure pugnacity and love of glory came to mingle with the more fundamental appetite for plunder... Modern man inherits all the innate pugnacity and all the love of glory of his ancestors. William James (1910)

Hunting, according to ’carnivorous psychology’ theory, is considered to be the master behavior pattern of the human species. Man - so the argument goes evolved as a hunter, he spent over 99% of his species history as a hunter, and he spread over the entire habitable area of the world as a hunter (e.g., Laughlin, 1968; Lee & DeVore, 1968; Freeman, 1973; Nelson, 1974; Tooby & DeVore, 1987; Barkow, Cosmides & Tooby, 1992). The ’predatory adaptation’ achieved by the Australopithecinae probably involved "a behavioral transition from a retreating to an attacking pattern" (Freedman & Roe, 1958), and to related changes of a phylogenetic kind, integrating the morphological, physiological, genetic, and intellectual aspects of the human organism and the populations; during which, as Freeman (1973) contends, "carnivorous curiosity and aggression have been added to the inquisitiveness and dominance striving of the ape". With these considerations in mind, Washburn and his associates (Washburn, 1959; Hamburg, 1963; Washburn & Avis, 1958; Washburn & Howell, 1960; Washburn & DeVore, 1961; Washburn & Hamburg, 1968; Washburn & Lancaster, 1968) postulate a special learning disposition in the human animal for hunting and killing, with its own intrinsic source of satisfaction, pleasure and lust. This learning disposition would have been selected for during the very long, in evolutionary terms - period during which the protohominids as



well as Homo sapiens lived as nomadic hunters in small tribal communities. The hunting and killing of prey animals facilitated, in this view, the transposition to the hunting and killing of conspecifics - and even torture and the (vicarious) enjoyment of cruelty. Crook (1968) holds that the emergence of human territoriality involved shifts in social traditions in relation to ranging and an acquired lowering of the threshold for aggression towards outgroups as a result of repetitive experiences of hunger and ultimately an intellectual appreciation of its cause. Aggression itself would have become increasingly complex in manifestation and often separated in time from the events that lowered the threshold for its expression. The hunter’s pleasure in killing prey, Crook argues, may also have arisen at this time and the ’cruelty’ inflicted on the game animals subsequently became available for "translocation into a social agonistic context". Washburn and his associates also point to the popularity of war: "[U]ntil recently war was viewed in much the same way as hunting. Other human beings were simply the most dangerous game. War has been far too important in human history for it to be other than pleasurable for the males involved" (Washburn & Lancaster, 1968). This complex of factors the authors call Man’s ’Carnivorous Psychology’. The situation relative to human aggression can be briefly stated under three headings: First, man has been a predator for a long time and his nature is such that he easily learns to enjoy killing other animals. Hunting is still considered a sport, and millions of dollars are spent annually to provide birds, mammals, and fish to be killed for the amusement of sportsmen. In many cultures, animals are killed for the amusement of human observers (in bullfighting, cockfighting, bear baiting, and so forth). Second, man easily learns to enjoy torturing and killing other human beings. Whether one considers the Roman arena, public tortures and executions, or the sport of boxing, it is clear that humans have developed means to enjoy the sight of others being subjected to punishment. Third, war has been regarded as glorious and, whether one considers recent data from tribes in New Guinea or the behavior of the most civilized nations, until very recently war was a normal instrument of national policy and there was no revulsion from the events of victorious warfare, no matter how destructive. Aggression between man and animals, between man and man, and between groups of men has been encouraged by custom, learned in play, and rewarded by society (Washburn & Hamburg, 1968). The Carnivorous Psychology theory proposed by Washburn and associates was already anticipated by William James in his Principles of Psychology (1890) and The Moral Equivalent of War (1910), and by Frobenius (1914) who



formulated the hypothesis that war originated from the man-hunt. "If evolution and the survival of the fittest be true at all", James (1890) wrote, "the destruction of prey and human rivals must have been among the most important of man’s primitive functions, the fighting and the chasing instincts must have become ingrained... It is just because human bloodthirstiness is such a primitive part of us that it is hard to eradicate, especially where a fight or a hunt is promised as part of the fun". In a similar vein, Pfeiffer (1972), referring to Southwick, Beg & Siddiqi’s (1965) description of group violence among rhesus temple monkeys, writes: "Even though war like language is uniquely human, it has its roots at the subhuman level. Indeed the case of the temple monkeys suggests how war may have arisen as an established institution among men. As long as man lived in the wilderness, the excitement and glamour of the hunt had meaning in the context of survival, in promoting aggression against prey and predators. Man deprived of hunting as a major source of prestige, deprived of wild species as a major focus of aggression, began playing the most dangerous game of all. Men began to go after other men as if their peers were the only creatures clever enough to make hunting really interesting. So war, the cruelest and most elaborate and most human form of hunting, became one of the most appealing ways of expressing aggression". Lenski & Lenski (1987) present the rather unconvincing idea that in horticultural societies warfare serves as a psychic substitute for the excitement, challenge and rewards which hunting previously provided. 4.8.1 The ’Killer Ape’ Hypothesis In 1924 Raymond Dart discovered Australopithecus (literally, ’Southern Ape’) in South Africa. In a series of 39 papers published between 1949 and 1965, Dart reviewed the archaeological evidence of our hominid-becoming-carnivore ancestors found at Makapansgat. On the basis of fractured skulls and bone fragments of baboons and Australopithecines, Dart, in an article entitled "The predatory transition from Ape to Man" (1953) concluded that "[M]an’s predecessors differed from living apes in being confirmed killers". Killers, that is, of both prey animals and conspecifics, in spite of the fact that their brains were still relatively small (ca. 400-500 cc). Yet, Dart asserts, This microcephalic mental equipment was demonstrably more than adequate for their crude, omnivorous, cannibalistic, bone-club wielding, jaw-bone clieving, Samsonian phase of human emergence... [the so-called ’osteodontokeratic culture’]... The loathsome cruelty of mankind to man forms one of his inescapable, characteristic and differentiative features; it is explicable only in terms of his cannibalistic origins (Dart, 1953). Dart finds it only too easy to fit this primordial mark of Cain to Man’s



evolutionary origin: "The blood-bespattered, slaughter-gutted archives of human history from the earliest Egyptian and Sumerian records to the most recent atrocities of the second World War accord with early universal cannibalism, with animal and human sacrificial practices or their substitutes in formalized religions and with the worldwide scalping, headhunting, body-mutilating and necrophiliac practices of mankind in proclaiming this common bloodlust differentiator, this mark of Cain that separates man dietetically from his anthropoidal relatives and allies him rather with the deadliest of Carnivora" (Dart, 1953).

In a later book, Adventures with the Missing Link (1959), Dart analyzed an Australopithecine jaw and concluded that it was "bashed in by a formidable blow from the front and delivered with great accuracy just to the left of the point of the jaw". The weapon, he believed, was an antelope humerus. Australopithecines were in his view definitely nasty creatures: "They were murderers and flesh hunters; their favourite tool was a bludgeon of bone, usually the thighbone or armbone of an antelope". Dart’s ’killer ape’ hypothesis is, as E.O. Wilson (1975) aptly remarked, "very dubious anthropology, ethology, and genetics". Conceivably the issues raised by Dart about Man’s ’genetic drive to kill’, Ferrill (1985) says, might have remained in the obscurity of academic books and journals had it not been for his enthusiastic disciple, Robert Ardrey. Dart’s views inspired the first of Ardrey’s series of popular books. The basic tenet of Ardrey’s (1961) African Genesis is that contemporary Man is a descendant of a race of "terrestrial, flesh-eating killer apes", and that this fact an sich explains the aggressiveness and warlikeness of modern Homo s. sapiens: Man is a predator, with all the pleasure and lust in killing springing from his predatory nature. Australopithecus, the African ancestor of modern humans, was a rather primitive primate, who, out of sheer physical weakness not being equipped by nature with claws, fangs, hooves, horns, or agility in locomotion - began to use weapons. In Ardrey’s line of thought tools are identified with weapons, and these weapons - indeed, all human culture - result from Man’s predatory nature. Culture is a product of the use of weapons.



4.8.2 A Reformulation of the Redirection Hypothesis Humans emerged, according to Melotti (1984, 1986), from their anthropoid background because, among other things, they began to use weapons. Yet, they did not evolve beyond the anthropoid level for this same reason, as Dart (1953, 1959) suggested and Ardrey (1961) emphasized by stating that "man has not fathered the weapon, but the weapon has fathered man". Human destructive aggression is not, however, the outcome of an incoercible instinct to kill, dating back to our ancestral ’wild heritage’, as Dart and Ardrey and other scholars (e.g., Carrighar, 1965) have maintained. It is, rather, the consequence of some relatively recent developments in our evolutionary history which have entailed a hiatus between our phylogenetic inheritance (not so different from our close cousins, the great apes) and our newly-acquired capacity to make war. Archeological findings do not support the assumption of important warlike activities among Paleolithic bands and tribes. Moreover, very low population density, together with the small size of the groups involved, their loose social organization, and their dispersal over very large areas, made lethal conflicts rather unlikely or at least infrequent. In fact, the development of human destructiveness seems to be related to the growth of complex societies, i.e., societies with a hierarchical division of labor, social classes, and state-like organization. Nevertheless, intraspecific intergroup aggression could have been instigated in Paleolithic times by competition for some critical resources, such as drinking water, big game, and vegetable food (Bigelow, 1969; EiblEibesfeldt, 1975), or even for women, the highly strategic ’good’ that could convert the other resources controlled by the males into offspring (Borgia, 1980). However, Paleolithic bands and tribes very probably practised exogamy (Melotti, 1979), which entails gene exchange among groups. This seems to rule out any hypothesis of continual wars between them. Actually, a population could hardly survive if its constituent groups (usually bands among huntergatherers, or clans or moieties among horticulturalists) tried to exterminate each other regardless of the fact that they, to a considerable extent, shared the 13 same gene pool . 13

In a subsequent contribution (Melotti, 1987), he expands upon the effects of exogamous and endogamous rules on intergroup conflict C a theme that has been almost completely overlooked, he claims, by recent research on the biological bases of peace and war. This is a rather strange fact, since the relevance of this custom for peace and war in primitive peoples had already been pointed out by one of the founding fathers of cultural anthropology, Edward B. Tylor (1889). Exogamy, according to him, was an extraordinary factor of peace, for it developed a bond of solidarity between the groups by making them dependent on each other for wives and children. For primitive men, who generally had no ties of other sorts outside of their groups, the choice was, as Tylor emphasized, "between marrying out and being killed out". Far from being only an ’exchange of women’, as it is usually defined by social and cultural anthropologists, exogamy is also, and basically, an exchange of genes. Therefore, it does not serve



Melotti’s (1986) interpretation of the evolutionary origins of human aggressiveness is the following: Owing to their original lack of disposition for interspecific aggression, our hominid ancestors, in their transition from anthropoid life to systematic hunting, were obliged to derive the biological basis necessary for the new way of life from the potential for intraspecific aggressiveness that is common to all primates. In effect, human hunting (like hunting behavior in chimpanzees) appears to be much more aggressive than the predation practised by carnivores, and this seems to confirm the idea that human interspecific aggression is the result of the redirection of an originally intraspecific disposition against extraspecific targets. Middle and Upper Paleolithic hunting probably selected for increasingly aggressive individuals: for, to face big mammals, such a vulnerable being as Man needed a great endowment of aggressiveness. When, at the end of the last glacial era (about 10,000 years ago), big-game hunting became impossible in a large part of the then inhabited world, Man lost the main interspecific outlet for his increased aggressiveness. Thus, this drive, which was already intraspecific at its origins, was again directed at its former target: Fellow members of the human species.

a merely economic function, as some well-known anthropologists have suggested (e.g., Frazer, 1918, Lévi-Strauss, 1949, 1955, and Fox, 1967, who maintain that in exogamy women are treated only as a kind of exchange goods), but it also serves a primary biological function.



4.8.3 The ’Fear-Biter’ Hypothesis Diametrically opposed to the foregoing theories, Scott (1974 et seq.; Cf. also Simeons, 1960) proposed a picture of early Man as essentially a timid, relatively unaggressive ’fear-biter’. Scott holds that early Man was not basically adapted as a predator, and that he has only become one secondarily by the use of tools. Early men and women must have been few in numbers and relatively weak and defenseless; they may have been able to survive only by being extremely timid and wary of danger and, secondarily, by pretending to be brave. "We therefore arrive at a picture of primitive man, not as a fierce, dangerous, and constantly aggressive individual but rather as a relatively small, slight, and fearful being, finding safety only in groups, sometimes being called upon to act bravely, but actually inflicting damage only when extremely fearful... People become violent when they are afraid, when they are trapped, and when they are overwhelmed by circumstances. Under these conditions they often act like cornered rats or fear-biting dogs, without regard to either the amount of injury which they may inflict or the risk to their own lives" (Scott, 1976). In short, instead of the picture of early Man as a bloodthirsty savage or cannibalistic killer ape, Scott suggests the alternate picture of the timid fearbiter. In a later article (Scott, 1981), he adds: "Once tools were developed for hunting prey animals, it must have been quickly obvious that the same tools could be used against other humans... It must also have occurred to early humans, as it does to rhesus monkeys, that two weaker individuals can overcome one strong one by combining an attack. Such cooperative agonistic behavior could easily develop into war, a supertool whose rapid cultural evolution has been documented since the dawn of history". Scott (1980) contemplated on the relationship between hunting, predation and agonistic behavior. Group hunting contains elements of at least two behavioral systems: allelomimetic behavior whose primary function is probably providing safety, and defense against injury (from the prey animal). Also involved in a successful hunt is a food reward and social approval. Group attacks against an individual or against another group involve many of the same motivational and emotional elements. Thus there is a possibility that group hunting and group agonistic behavior have similar underlying emotional components. The other obvious connection between human hunting and agonistic behavior is that the same tools can be used in each. Finally, however, Scott issues a warning: "[W]e know almost nothing about the neurophysiological bases of either group hunting or warfare, although enough is known about the latter to indicate that it is entirely different from that involved in interindividual combat".



4.8.4 Criticism Apart from the fact that Carnivorous Psychology theory is marred by confusion among the concepts ’predatory’, ’carnivorous’ and ’hunting’, what is the evidence to substantiate its claims? First, as Fromm (1973) emphasized, the idea that hunting produces pleasure in cruelty and torture is unsubstantiated and most implausible. Hunting, as practised by primitive hunter-gatherers at least, is not an aggressive activity at all (e.g., Turnbull, 1965). There is also no evidence for the assumption that primitive hunters were motivated by destructive, or even sadistic, impulses. On the contrary, there is evidence that they had an affectionate feeling for the killed animals and possibly a feeling of guilt for the kill (Mahringer, 1952; Lewinsohn, 1954; Rensberger, 1977; Howell & Willis, 1989), as was already noted by Frazer in the 19th century. Fromm especially criticizes the assertion that Man has a drive for and pleasure in killing, although, as Nelson (1974) remarks, "Fromm’s interpretation that the pleasure was not in the killing but in the development of hunting skills is no more compelling than Washburn’s". Yet, when we examine the actual motives of killers in our contemporary society, Claiborne (1974) explained, we find that ’love of killing’ as such is irrelevant to nearly all of them. Even trained combat soldiers are for the most part not trigger-happy killers (Stouffer et al., 1949/50; van der Dennen, 1980; 1983). Finally, what body of information we have about contemporary primitive hunter-gatherers does not indicate that hunting is conducive to destructiveness, cruelty, or warfare (Fromm, 1973; Sahlins, 1960; Turnbull, 1965; Service, 1966; among many others). Furthermore, in the last decade or so, it has become apparent that hunting may not have been so important to the survival of our hominid ancestors as was previously thought. Anthropologists began to realize that, in the huntinggathering societies that still exist, it is the women, not the men, who provide most of the food. The vegetable foods that the women gather account for something like 80 % of the total caloric intake. Furthermore, hunting is not the only activity that adds animal protein to the diet. The women gatherers collect not only plants, but also such foods as frogs and birds’ eggs (e.g., Morris, 1984; See also Ch. 8). The notion of an aggressive drive, envisaged by Melotti to be some kind of energetic reservoir to tap from, is probably not warranted. There is no evidence whatsoever that big-game hunting requires specifically aggression as a prime motive or even co-motivation. The hypothesis that Paleolithic hunting selected for increasing aggression is therefore very dubious. Finally, the aggressionwarfare linkage itself is highly problematic (van der Dennen, 1986). The redirection hypothesis advanced by Melotti thus seems to have a very weak



factual basis. Scott’s view of the fear-biter early hominids accords rather well with modern ethological models of fear and aggression in mammals as provided by Archer (1976), Rasa (1981), Scott (e.g., 1981), and van der Molen & van der Dennen (1982; See also Ch. 5); and with human neuropathological evidence (van der Dennen, 1983a). Furthermore, Scott’s view is well in accordance with the analysis of causes and motives of primitive warfare as presented by many earlier anthropologists (e.g., Whiffen, 1915), contemporary anthropologists (e.g., Chagnon's [1977] analysis of the Yanomamö 'show of ferocity'), and most recently by Meyer (1977 et seq.) who states that the causes of the permanent mutual threat of the societies in the 'primitive' stage are neither to be found in some primordial aggressiveness permanently urging to express itself, nor in some economic motive transcending all cultural boundaries. Rather, the 14 most general cause seems to be fear . It has also become apparent by now that Dart's and Ardrey's sanguinary and phantasmagoric slaughterhouse imaginations have more (horror-)literary than scientific qualities. "First, the question of the incidence of interpersonal violence among australopithecines remains an open one. Second, it would appear that the Makapansgat fossils are not the tools and weapons of an ancient culture, but the leftovers of many carnivore meals" (Leakey, 1981). Furthermore, that the 'killer' prehominid Australopithecus africanus was a 'ferocious carnivore' and that this fact accounts for modern Man's aggressiveness is far from convincing. There is hardly any evidence that carnivores exhibit more, or more intense, intraspecific aggression than other mammalian orders. Herbivores, too, have it in their behavioral repertoire, as two fighting bulls demonstrate (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1963; Rapoport, 1965). "Today the vast majority of experts familiar with the fossil evidence agree that while man's ancestors appear to have been hunters who killed animals and consumed quantities of meat, there is no suggestion that they were driven by a blood lust any more than any other predator. More important, there is certainly no hint that they killed each other more than does any animal species known today" (Rensberger, 1977). Ardrey's 'killer apes' may not even be Man's ancestors at all, "but rather an unsuccessful side branch in the line of human evolution" (Nelson, 1974; Cf. Rensberger, 1977; Wood, 1992b). In a recent and extensive review of the evidence of ancestral human hunting, Trinkaus (1987) concludes that hunting is a rather recent phenomenon in human evolution (See ' 3.10). A conclusion, by the way, which seems to cast ADie Ursachen der dauerhaften wechselseitigen Bedrohung der Gesellschaften im ‘primitiven' Stadium sind weder in einer permanent auf Abfuhr drängenden Uraggressivität noch einem alle kulturellen Grenzen transzendierenden ökonomisch Motiv zu finden. Die allgemeinste Ursache scheint vielmehr Angst zu sein@ (Meyer, 1977). 14



severe doubts on the view that hunting has been the ’master pattern’ during hominid/human evolution. Finally, of course, if such biological freaks as ’killer apes’ had ever existed, they would have exterminated each other long before they would have given rise to modern humans.

4.9 The Balance-of-Power Hypothesis Alexander (1974 et seq.) has pointed out that there is no automatic or universal benefit from group living. Indeed, the opposite is true; there are automatic and universal detriments, namely, increased intensity of competition for resources, including mates, and increased likelihood of disease and parasite transmission. What, then, are the benefits of group living that offset its automatic detriments? Only three: (1) susceptibility to predation may be lowered; (2) the nature of food sources may make splintering off unprofitable; (3) there may be an extreme localization of some resource. To explain primate and hominid groups only the causative factor of predation remains. And once predation from other species relaxed (when humans crossed the ecological dominance barrier; see Ch. 8), early Man became his own predator: "When man developed his weapons, culture and population sizes to levels that essentially erased the significance of predators of other species, he simultaneously created a new predator: groups and coalitions within his own species" (Alexander, 1974). In subsequent publications, Alexander (1979; 1987) proposed the so-called ’balance-of-power’ hypothesis. This hypothesis contends that at some early point in our history the actual function of human groups - their significance for their individual members - was protection from the predatory effects of other human groups. "No other sexual organisms compete in groups as extensively, fluidly, and complexly as human do. No other organisms at all play competitively group-against-group. Most importantly, so far as we know, in no other species do social groups have as their main jeopardy other social groups of the same species - therefore, the unending selective race toward greater social complexity, intelligence, and cleverness in dealing with one another" (Alexander, 1987). The premise is that the necessary and sufficient forces to explain the maintenance of every kind and size of human group above the nuclear family, extant today and throughout all but the earliest portions of human history, were (a) war, or intergroup competition and aggression, and (b) the maintenance of balances of power between such groups. This argument would divide early human history into three periods of sociality, roughly as follows: 1. 2.

Small, polygynous, probably multi-male bands that stayed together for protection against large predators. Small, polygynous, multi-male bands that stayed together both for protec-



3.

tion against large predators (probably through aggressive defense) and in order to bring down large game. Increasingly large polygynous, multi-male bands that stayed together largely or entirely because of the threat of other, similar, nearby groups of humans.

Eaton (1978) suggests that early humans may have spent a very long time during which their social behavior was largely structured by both defense against predators and competition with them. The complex behaviors required for such activities could have ’primed’ or preadapted humans for their later evolution in hostile intraspecific groups. Balances-of-power depend to some extent on physiographic and other extrinsic environmental circumstances, and they may as well exist between tiny New Guinea tribes as between nuclear powers. Moreover, aspects of intergroup conflict among tribal peoples, which are commonly referred to as ceremonial or ritualistic, may actually reflect the importance of balances of power as exemplified by elaborate bluffing and the intensity of concern with avenging each death. Finally, the modern large nation is the result of power-balancing. "If, for whatever reasons, recurring imbalances are not possible through onesided expansions of first one group, then the other, or through alternations of superiority in weapons or other regards, then the balance-of-power races leading to large nations may never appear". Willhoite (1980) has shown how the balance-of-power hypothesis can explain the progressive evolution of hominids through the stages of the band, the sovereign village, the chiefdom, and finally the early state. At each level, as communities expand to include more distant kin or nonrelated kin-groups, the role of coercive institutions also expanded (Masters, 1983; see Ch. 5). Andreski (1954), and Lorenz (1966), the principal proponent of the instinctcum-selection thesis, had already advocated a similar notion: "[I]t is more than probable that the destructive intensity of the aggression drive, still a hereditary evil of mankind, is the consequence of a process of intraspecific selection which worked on our forefathers for roughly forty thousand years, that is, throughout the Early Stone Age. When man had reached the stage of having weapons, clothing, and social organization, so overcoming the dangers of starving, freezing, and being eaten by wild animals, and these dangers ceased to be the essential factors influencing selection, an evil intraspecific selection must have set in. The factor influencing selection was now the wars waged between hostile neighboring tribes" (Lorenz, 1966). Lorenz thus postulates warfare as a selective force operating in human evolution, and the warrior virtues as a product of this selection process. There is, however, a ’quantum jump’ from aggression (even if considered to be instinctive) to warfare which is not adequately accounted for. Basing himself on the by-now classic hydraulic model of aggression (Ch. 5),



Lorenz regards human hypertrophied aggression as an anomaly compared to other species. Indeed, Man seems unusually murderous, for his development of weapons came so fast that he has not yet evolved the biological mechanisms of restraint, the built-in inhibitions so common, he supposes, in the ritualized aggression of other species. There was no selective pressure, it seems, to develop innate constraints against killing conspecifics; while at the same time weapons created the geographical and psychological distance between attacker and attacked. Lorenz also identifies Militant enthusiasm, which, he says, originally evolved as a form of, and in the service of, communal defense, as an easily appealed to and easily surfacing psychological constellation in modern Man (see Ch. 6). 4.9.1 Criticism Lorenz and his generation of ethologists were apparently unaware of the ubiquity of animal violence, and thus they had to regard the human being as an anomaly among other species. Regarding the ’innate inhibitions’ which Lorenz attributed to nonhuman animals, his often-quoted case of apparent restraint of aggression in wolves turns out to be misleadingly idealized: "[A]mong strangers, ’wolf-wars’ are common, often resulting in death. The oft-reported cease-fire signal in which the loser bares its jugular vein and the winner refrains from finishing the victim off, apparently does not work with strangers" (Barash & Lipton, 1985). Hostile neighboring ’hordes’ may well be, as Montagu (1974) suggests, "the invention of nineteenth century antiquarians and their modern counterparts". And he continues: "As for the allegation of hostility between neighboring prehistoric populations, there is not the least evidence of anything of the sort having existed. This by no means rules out the possibility that such hostilities may occasionally have occurred. If such hostilities did occur, it is extremely unlikely that they were frequent. Neighboring populations in prehistoric times would have been few and far between, and when they met it is no more likely that they greeted each other with hostility than do gatherer-hunter peoples today" (Montagu, 1974; Cf. Shepard, 1973). Referring to contemporary hunter-gatherers, Service (1966) states: "The birthdeath ratio in hunting-gathering societies is such that it would be rare for population pressure to cause some part of the population to fight others for territorial acquisition. Even if such a circumstance occurred it would not lead to much of a battle. The stronger, more numerous, group would simply prevail, probably even without a battle, if hunting rights or rights to some gathering spot were demanded" (See also ' 4.7.1). Alexander (1979) counters with the objection that there is not an iota of evidence to support the idea that aggression and competition have not been central in human evolution (See also Ch. 3). He states:



Those who reject arguments like those given here also point to what they interpret as relatively nonaggressive behavior on the parts of the hunting and gathering societies that remain today in a few places like the Australian and African deserts, and the Arctic. They argue that for 99 percent of their history our ancestors lived as these people do. But such people survive today only in marginal impoverished habitats that support only the lowest of all densities of human population and also represent physical extremes that by themselves require cooperation among families for mere survival; moreover, hunter-gatherers survive today only because even the most advanced technological societies have found no way to use their homelands that would make it profitable to overrun or seize them by force. In other words, they are restricted by aggression, or its threat, to the localities where they exist now. Nevertheless, social competition, aggression, murder, and intergroup conflict are not by any means unknown among hunter-gatherers (Ember, 1978). I suggest that the ordinary interpretation may be precisely wrong, and that rather than all humans having spent 99 percent of their existence living as Eskimos and Bushmen do today, the ancestors of Eskimos and Bushmen more likely spent most of their existence in richer habitats where higher densities of population, more complex social structure, and less harsh physical environments led to both more complex and extensive cooperativeness and more complex and extensive social competition than now exists (Alexander, 1979). Alexander’s thesis is mainly or largely based on the argument of uniqueness; the unique evolutionary trajectory of the human species is related to an allegedly unique phenomenon during the course of hominid/human evolution: (Intra-group cooperation for the mutual advantages of) intergroup competition. Intergroup competition, even violent intergroup competition, however, has been far from unique in, or limited to hominid/human, evolution. "At the simplest level of comparison, the phenomenon of cooperation during competition, far from being primarily a human trait, occurs in a wide array of animal societies. Groups of Amazonian Indians, African lions, and Arizona ants compete with one another, and in all, individuals within groups cooperate in the conflict... Contrary to Alexander, therefore, lethal intergroup conflict is not uniquely, or even primarily, a characteristic of humans, and humans are not alone in experiencing conspecifics in the form of other groups as ’the principle hostile force of nature’" (Harcourt & de Waal, 1992). It may be argued that the balance-of-power concept actually weakens Alexander’s theoretical edifice because of its inherent ambiguity, if not actual lack of meaning. The term may be invoked to ’explain’ each and every, peaceful or warlike, interaction between groups (which can always be construed as



some balance-of-power maneuver), and is apt to become the same theoretical anodyne and ’catch-all’ phrase as it is in contemporary International Relations theory (e.g., Vasquez, 1993). One might even go one step further, and assert that the balance-of-power hypothesis is in principle irrefutable, and therefore belongs to the domain of metaphysical constructs and doctrines. In a more moderate form, it may be argued that the balance-of-power hypothesis remains a rather gratuitous statement until it is specified what would count as counterevidence.

4.10

Human Brain Evolution and Warfare

The idea that warfare influenced human brain evolution was proposed by Darwin (if not before) and again by Keith (1947). They meant, however, warfare in historical times and saw the effects of warfare in terms of refinements of the human brain. Bigelow (1969 et seq.), Alexander & Tinkle (1968) and Alexander (1971) were the first to propose that the evolution of the novel substance of the hominid brain may have been driven by warfare. Bigelow (1969 et seq.) presented the most comprehensive case. In a famous book The Dawn Warriors: Man’s Evolution towards Peace, Bigelow argued that the trebling in volume of the modern human brain since his emergence from his ape-australopithecine ancestors could have been caused only by a very powerful, very relentless, and very constant natural selection pressure in favor of brains endowed with more intelligence, permitting better communication and more effective cooperation between the individuals in social groups. The selection pressure could have been maintained only if these groups were increasingly at war with each other. Cooperation within the group is cooperation for the conflict against other groups. The course of history - and this explains Bigelow’s subtitle - shows the expansion to clan, tribe, nation, and superpower bloc as the expanding realm of the group in which men cooperate. Most studies associate increased brain size with the growing importance of tool making, hunting, and food sharing within the context of complex interpersonal and intergroup behavior (e.g., Isaac, 1980). Blumenberg (1983), however, argues convincingly that neither in isolation nor in combination can these behaviors account for the appearance of the advanced hominid brain. Bigelow’s hypothesis receives a measure of indirect support from Blumenberg’s study. Pitt (1978) reexamined the arguments and evidence of the brain evolutionwarfare linkage. The hypothesis that warfare was the selective force behind hominid brain evolution carries the advent of warfare back at least to the beginning of the Pleistocene, probably as much as four million years. Alexander & Tinkle make a credible case that warfare could have commenced in early hominid times: Warfare is a selective force that would act strongly,



would focus on intelligence, and could be exerted continually over long periods of time e.g., millions of years. However, they do not address the questions what sort of intellectual activities are necessary for waging true war, and whether these would be within the capability of hominids; what circumstances could lead hominids to the potentially suicidal step of frequently killing their own conspecifics. Nor do they give a satisfactory reason why hominid groups should not have coexisted fairly peaceably. Nevertheless, the warfare hypothesis is highly attractive for a reason they do not expound, namely, it is the only evolutionary pressure so far described that could make unlimited demands upon intelligence, and (assuming some linear relation between intelligence and brain volume) could lead to the remarkable human brain (Pitt, 1978). Bigelow (1969 et seq.) covers much of the ground of Alexander & Tinkle, showing how the needs of warfare would foster the duality of Man’s nature, and how well it accounts for the evolution of intelligence and the trebling in volume of Man’s brain. Warfare need not be a continuous series of year-in, year-out skirmishes in order to exert a strong selective pressure. A war once a generation can radically alter gene frequencies, especially if the losing females are incorporated into the victors’ group and propagate the victors’ genes. Human warfare, Bigelow emphasizes, is an organized activity. Success in war has always been due primarily to cooperation. Cooperation requires communication and efficient brains, emotional restraint as well as intelligence. Since success in intergroup competition was determined mainly by capacities for cooperation and intelligent self-control, the result of the selective process was definitely not an increasingly uncontrollable ’aggression instinct’ (Bigelow, 1972). What Bigelow does not adequately explain is why warfare should have evolved at such an early date, even though he remarks that it is most unlikely that intelligent human groups would have starved peacefully while the other groups were getting the game first. According to Pitt (1978), "Warfare was the logical culmination of escalating territorial competition between groups as population densities increased. The turning point from uneasy peace to war probably came at moments when a natural calamity, such as drought, caused starvation to become a serious threat to some of the groups". Hominid populations must have reached critical densities at fairly frequent intervals through the Pleistocene, and perhaps the late Pliocene. Several scenarios can be pictured in such a situation: (a) peaceful coexistence of the groups; (b) peaceful competition between groups with the losers starving; (c) violent conflict between individuals; (d) scrambling competition between groups; and (e) violent group conflict, i.e., warfare. Warfare would be the best alternative for the group that practiced it



successfully, assuming it to have been within their biological reach. Assuming that different groups tended towards one or another of these strategies, in varying degrees, it is easy to see that the warmongers would be the most successful, and could indeed overrun any group attempting to practice one of the other strategies (See also next paragraph). Plainly, it will be the warmongers whose genes are represented in the next generation. Indeed, the only possible competitive strategy for survival in competition with a group practising warfare, is warfare itself, either defensive or offensive. Thus, warfare would be an evolutionary successful strategy, and would tend to spread itself, if it once began. It is interesting to note that Pitt is one of the few evolutionary theorists who does not agree with the underlying assumption of other theorists that the principal characteristic which an organism needs to carry it over the threshold of warfare is an unusual degree of aggression; or more to the point, he does not think that ’aggression’ is particularly helpful in understanding the nature of warfare. Also Young (1975) states: "War is not a maladaptive human trait arising out of a previously adaptive animal instinct of aggression. It is a highly evolved aspect of human political organization which has proved its viability by becoming more highly organized and more murderous as cultural evolution has advanced. It is not derived from the day-to-day aggression balanced by submission that serves an adaptive role in the societies of nonhuman primates. Its source has been the previously untapped potentialities resident in the norm of reaction of the human genotype. Among these potentialities has been the aggressive potential characteristic of all animal species, but this potential has no more forced the evolution of war than some mythical killer instinct has". In order to adopt warfare as a normal, rather than aberrant behavior in certain circumstances, a group must overcome the deterrent the individual faces, namely the risk of serious damage to his ability to reproduce and raise his offspring. Pitt suggests that a solution to the deterrent problem might be the ancient concept of the ’noble warrior’, or when not in reach of the simple early hominids, there is still a simpler solution: Tools as weapons. The use of tools as weapons has three characteristics beyond the obvious, distinguishing it from the actions of the claws, teeth, horns and poisons of other animals: Weapons can act at a distance; they may take time to deploy (only moments perhaps; an unarmed hominid may need a few moments to grab a club to defend himself); and most notably, one well directed blow can incapacitate by stunning or killing. Thus, an armed hominid can, by the exercise of tactical ingenuity, especially to exploit the advantage of surprise, swing the odds in a one-to-one battle to give himself a substantial chance of success with a low risk of serious injury. And, more pertinently, he may readily persuade himself that, because of his superior skills and ingenuity, he faces little risk. The deterrent has been overcome and warfare becomes, in the right circumstances, a favored behavioral strategy, success in which is sensitive to tactical ingenuity, and



therefore to intelligence. Moreover, this relatively simple approach to the development of warfare would not seem to require too much intelligence for its initiation, and should have been well within the capabilities of the early hominids (Pitt, 1978).

4.11

Weapons, Intelligence, and Warfare

One does not necessarily need the Freudian phallic symbolism to acknowledge that the males of the human species are fascinated by weapons. Andreski (1954), and Tinbergen (1976) pointed out that lethal weapons fostered the concept that it is advantageous to kill the enemy, since a dead enemy does not return to fight again. Baer & McEachron (1982) and McEachron & Baer (1982) made it clear that the development of weapons lowered the costs of attacking while increasing the costs of being attacked. Thus, there was a selection pressure to develop pre-emptive strike or attack-before-beingattacked behavior. There is a long-standing principle in evolution that the greatest natural competitor of any animal is another member of the same species. This is because conspecifics share almost exactly the same requirements and, when resources are limited, must compete for the same resources. Within groups, the dominance system and genetic interrelatedness (kinship) tend to control and modulate aggressive competition. Between conspecific groups, it is quite a different story. When one group encounters another over a limited resource, each group has a number of options. If troop A is using a limited resource and troop B arrives, troop A can (1) avoid troop B by retreating, (2) try to ignore troop B, (3) cooperate with troop B, or (4) compete with troop B. If the resource is easily available, it might pay troop A to retreat and avoid any possibility of conflict. However, in the long evolutionary run, this is a selfdefeating strategy. Sharing a resource (options 2 and 3) is likely to occur when it is not very limited or extremely difficult to defend. If the resource is really limited, sharing is very unlikely. When A and B share a resource, this is equivalent to creating a larger group, AB, which automatically creates problems. First, the resource would have to be divided among more group members, thus lowering the inclusive fitness of every member in both groups. The reason, of course, is that individuals in group B are unlikely to be related to those of group A. Thus, sharing leads to a decrease in inclusive fitness of everyone involved. Second, there is the problem of social structure; group AB does not have one, it has two distinct organizations since no individual in group A has any rank in group B and vice versa. If exploiting the resource requires any kind of organization, it is likely that there will be rank-order conflicts to determine the appropriate structures.



If conflict is inevitable, it makes better evolutionary sense for the troops to determine ownership of the resources as groups, rather than having both conflict and decreased inclusive fitness. Once started, selection for conflict and weapons technology rapidly gained momentum by leading into a positive feedback system: Better weapons led to increased levels of group conflict. Conflict selected for (among other things) enhanced mental capacity in the form of increased learning capacity, improved communications, the emergence of the ability to plan, have foresight, improve technology etc. This increased mental capacity in turn not only created better weapons through an improving technology, but made the group a better fighting unit, and thus a more dangerous adversary. These factors in turn increased the selective pressure for conflict - and the cycle began again. The feedback system would have had other effects as well. Conflict tends to select e.g., for better organized and/or larger groups. Baer & McEachron (1982) further propose that the evolution of weapons had the effect of making unrelated individuals far more dangerous to one another, and that this, in turn, reduced intergroup transfer of individuals and made nucleus ethnic groups much more closed. Weapons would have altered the costs and benefits of armed violence since they could be developed faster than physiological protection against them would evolve. Weapons could also be thrown, thereby removing the need for the attacker to be in close proximity to the attacked. Thus, the development of arms would have lowered the cost of attacking while increasing the costs of being attacked. In doing so, xenophobia and antagonism toward strangers would likely have increased as well. This enmity would work to reduce intergroup transfer of individuals, which, in turn, would reinforce out-group enmity. Alexander (1971) proposed that intergroup conflict would select for greatly increased capacity to recognize relatives, friends and enemies. According to McEachron & Baer, the xenophobic attitude would remain, in the form of emotional tendencies and reinforcement, even after intergroup conflict ceased to be selective. These emotional tendencies would then initiate conflicts on their own (See further Ch. 6). The thrust of Baer & McEachron’s hypothesis is that one of the first evolutionary steps taken, as weapons developed, was to severely restrict individuals from changing groups. From an inclusive fitness point of view, the refused admission of an extragroup conspecific would have resulted in two beneficial effects for in-group members. First, because of the increased tendency of males to remain in their natal group, the genetic relatedness among the adult males, and the group as a whole, would increase. This would have increased solidarity among group members and, thus, cohesion of the group per se. It would also work to reduce within-group aggression, and thus genetic loss through injury or death from in-group fighting. Second, the new high costs of within-group aggression would act to change the character of the dominance system. Insofar as dominant individuals could not afford to be injured in rank-order fighting, there would be an increased



selection for social skills in attaining and maintaining status, and decreased emphasis on overt aggression. These would combine to produce a more effective internal ordering of power relations to the extent that groups could be more quickly mobilized to meet challenges from outsiders. In the process, intergroup conflict would select for greatly increased human capacity to establish and accept group hierarchy as well as to recognize enemies versus relatives and friends. According to Hamilton (1971), warfare was a natural and adaptive development from the evolutionary trends taking place in the hominid stock. He finds it only too easy to imagine that the genes that reared cruelty out of the primate’s aggressive drive have been favored by natural selection in the hominid line. Subsequently, Hamilton (1975) presented a ’stepping-stone’ model of hominid intergroup conflict. In his model, he proposed that a hominid group could expand into the territories of defeated neighboring groups, enlarge in size and consolidate its position and then expand again and so on. This model points out two other interesting aspects of intergroup warfare. First, warfare may gain the victorious group territory and resources that may in themselves have selective value. This would promote conflict in addition to and somewhat independent of the positive feedback system poposed by Baer & McEachron. Second, the capture and integration of a limited number of ’enemy’ females might be used to prevent inbreeding depression in the now-closed hominid groups, providing yet a third possible adaptive value for warfare (McEachron & Baer, 1982). 4.11.1

Criticism

The only weak spot in the theory advanced by Baer & McEachron and McEachron & Baer is the weapon technology part. In primitive societies there is hardly any evidence of improvement of weapons used in warfare - mainly the spear and bow-and-arrows - as a dynamic concomitant of warfare, as these authors seem to envisage. New Guinea communities, for example, may have been in a state of war for centuries without any indication that the weapons used then and the weapons used now are different to any significant degree in either construction or lethality. At least in this respect, war has never been much of an ’Agent of Progress’. Only when war transcends the endemic phase, weapon technology and warfare aspire to new spirals of mutually increasing destructiveness.



4.12

Level-of-Selection and the Evolution of Warfare

4.12.1

Group Selection

According to contemporary evolutionary theory (for reasons expounded in Ch. 1), so-called ’group selection’ is not typically expected to occur in nature. There are, however, some restricted circumstances in which the individualistic calculus of (kin)reciprocity does not hold, and ’group selection’ (in the first meaning of the term distinguished in Ch. 1) may indeed occur. Where a number of small populations of extended kin are relatively isolated from each other, conflicts between groups can and will occur if resources are insufficient to support all of them. In that case, a behavior that benefits the group - even at a cost to the actor - can be favored by natural selection whenever competition within the group is harmful to both the individual’s ’inclusive fitness’ and the group’s ’collective interest’. Under these circumstances (which Alexander [1978] describes as a balance-of-power between competing bands of extended kin), group selection would expand the sphere of social cooperation. As Benjamin Franklin put it "We must all hang together, or assuredly we shall all hang separately" (Masters, 1983). Furthermore, in such situations (when individuals live in discrete family groups as early humans probably did), kin selection might virtually encompass the group, and selection between groups might amount to a special case of kin selection (Corning, 1975). To the extent that intelligence, cooperation, tool use, bipedalism, inventiveness, physical stamina, and aggressiveness all enhanced the chances of success between warring groups, Corning (1975, 1983) argued, intergroup selection would have served to reinforce selection pressures already at work with respect to big-game hunting and other aspects of protohominid social life. Rather than opposing genic and kin selection, war-based group selection might merely have accelerated the trend. Though kin and group selection are theoretically quite different processes, in human evolution both may have worked together 15 in a synergistic way . The possibility that endemic warfare and genetic usurpation could be an effective force in group selection was clearly recognized by Darwin (1871). He envisioned some of the ’noblest traits’ of mankind, such as altruism, as the genetic product of intergroup competition. By adding the additional postulate 15

On the feasibility of group selection in human evolution see: Wallace, 1864; Darwin, 1871; Fisher, 1930; Keith, 1947; G.C. Williams, 1966; Bigelow, 1968 et seq.; Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1970 et seq.; Alexander, 1974 et seq.; Corning, 1975, 1983; E.O. Wilson, 1975; Alexander & Borgia, 1978; Wade, 1978; Durham, 1979; B.J. Williams, 1980; D.S. Wilson, 1980; Bear & McEachron, 1982; Melotti, 1987; Wilson & Sober, 1994; and Richerson, 1995.



of a threshold effect, according to E.O. Wilson (1975) it is possible to explain why the process has operated exclusively in human evolution: The capacity to consciously ponder the significance of adjacent social groups and to deal with them in an intelligent, organized fashion. The only combinations of genes able to confer superior fitness in contention with genocidal aggressors would be those that produce either a more effective technique of aggression or else the capacity to preempt genocide by some form of pacific maneuvering. Either probably entails mental and cultural advances. In addition to being autocatalytic, such evolution has the interesting property of requiring a selection episode only very occasionally in order to proceed as swiftly as individual-level selection. By current theory, genocide or genosorption strongly favoring the aggressor need take place only once every few generations to direct evolution. This alone could push truly altruistic genes to a high frequency within the bands. Furthermore, it is to be expected that some isolated cultures will escape the process for generations at a time, in effect reverting temporarily to what ethnographers classify as a pacific state (E.O. Wilson, 1975). The evolution of warfare was an autocatalytic reaction that could not be halted by any people, because to attempt to reverse the process unilaterally was to fall victim. A new mode of natural selection was operating at the level of entire societies. Van den Berghe (1978) similarly argued: Human coercion (and aggression) is a group enterprise, a conscious, premeditated one. The same intelligence that enabled humans to evolve complex systems of reciprocity as a means of extending the scope of our sociality beyond the confines of kin selection also gave us the capacity to use reciprocity for purposes of coercion and thus to evolve warfare and intraspecific parasitism. Once our species had become clever enough to cooperate on the basis of reciprocity for the purpose of garnering resources such as game, the development of intergroup aggression to eliminate competitors and steal women was around the evolutionary corner. Group coercion is reciprocity for purposes of intraspecific aggression and parasitism. In a species where coalitions for reciprocal benefit can be easily formed, it is inevitable that they will be formed against conspecifics. Plunder is always tempting if I can call on enough of my partners to ensure a cheap victory over my competitors. The incidence of warfare and other forms of aggression is therefore a function of the ease with which balances of power can be disrupted. The latter can be done either through better organization or through better technology (van den Berghe, 1978).



But, he adds, this should not be interpreted as constant carnage, because for all but the last few thousand years of hominid/human evolution, intergroup aggression was a modest, small-scale affair. Bands of hunters clashed with each other, but ecological constraints on population density were such that numbers were small and, what is more, fairly evenly balanced. Given an approximately equal level of technology and group size, the odds for success were roughly even, and therefore aggression was only moderately attractive. If, to those limiting conditions, one adds the absence of stored resources worth stealing, other than human meat and women, the attraction of plunder was also limited. One only came to blows if a particularly good opportunity for a quick kill with minimum risk of retribution arose, but such occasions were probably not common. 4.12.2

Genic/Individual Selection

Durham (1976) parts company with the ’group selectionists’ and reverts to the level of genic/individual selection. Ideally, according to Durham, the adaptiveness of primitive warfare would be ascertained by a rigorous test of three competing hypotheses: 1. 2. 3.

Cultural traditions of warfare in primitive societies evolved independently of the ability of human beings to survive and reproduce; Cultural traditions of primitive warfare evolved by the selective retention of traits that enhance the inclusive fitness of individual human beings; Cultural traditions of primitive warfare evolved by some process of group selection which commonly favored the altruistic tendencies of some warriors.

Durham then develops a model, based on the assumption of genotypic selfishness, which predicts the occurrence of ’intergroup aggression’ (Durham’s equivalent of ’warfare’) both defensive and offensive, under certain welldefined conditions. Theoretically, direct intergroup aggression would exist as a cultural tradition only where the participating individuals each derive net intrademic fitness advantages. Thus, warfare would exist as a cultural tradition only where social and environmental conditions result in continuous or recurrent net benefits to the aggressors. A cultural pattern of direct intergroup aggression could be the result of selection in at least three instances: (1) vengeance, (2) failure of reciprocity, and (3) resource competition. Durham focuses on resource competition. He emphasizes at the start that even where we may attribute human aggression to resource competition, relations of kinship and friendship may have an important effect on that behavior. It may well be that the human ability to recognize and therefore avoid harming - kin and friends is what has allowed the evolution



of deadly conflict. In principle, there are two ways in which participation in group aggression can have net individual fitness benefits. First, when human groups compete for limited resources, successful warriors may themselves directly benefit from the fitness value of resources defended or acquired. The requirements here are two: (1) the spoils must not be shared throughout the deme but must be shared within the group or subgroup of aggressors, so that (2) the fitness-value of resources gained by each participant must exceed his or her accumulated costs. Secondly, intergroup aggressiveness can evolve by Selection (Selection with a capital S here means biological plus cultural selection) even when all of the warriors do not derive direct resource benefits from the conflict, so long as their fitness costs are more than compensated by other benefits from within the group. The requirements here are (1) at least one important figure in the group must secure resource benefits, and (2) the benefactor(s) must provide other goods or services (or both) on which the other participants’ fitnesses depend. In theory, direct aggressiveness is therefore only to be expected in habitats where dependable or predictable high quality resources are in short supply. In contrast, more peaceful relations between groups are expected where (1) the resource demands show little overlap; (2) the combined demand for any common resource(s) is regulated below the levels of supply by other factors (disease, predation, or parasitism, for example); or (3) the spatial and temporal distribution of a scarce resource favors either high mobility (precluding high frequency contact of distinct groups) or reciprocal sharing of unpredictable patches. In environments where an alternative (if somewhat less desirable) supply of a scarce resource is available, the process of selective retention could actually favor reduced competition between groups, either through specialization of the techniques of resource harvest (cultural ’character displacement’) or migration. For instance, in many arctic areas, the absence of intergroup warfare appears to correlate with high regional variability in food supply. Durham’s model, he submits, has several important theoretical implications. First, it counters the view that primitive warfare constitutes a "theoretical embarrassment to a discipline [i.e., anthropology] which has tended to believe that human societies are functionally integrated systems, well adapted to their environments" (Hallpike, 1973). The model describes conditions in which intergroup aggression can be highly adaptive in terms of basic survival and reproduction. Second, it challenges a common presumption that primitive war has always evolved for some transcendent group-level function requiring individual sacrifice (as suggested, for example, by Harris, 1971; 1972; 1974; and Divale, 1973). At least in circumstances of resource competition, it is possible for aggressive intergroup behavior to have real benefits for participating individuals. Furthermore, Selection can favor widespread member participation in collective aggression even though each individual behaves in his or her own, distinct, genetic self-interest. Finally, the general model has several implications for the dynamics of intergroup aggression. Selection would mold



a warfare strategy that maximizes the participants’ net gains. These considerations may also explain some aspects of the multiphase war process in primitive war as outlined by Vayda (1971, 1974; ' 4.5.1). First, Selection may favor the use of low-cost ’assessment’ tactics in the early phases of war. This strategy would allow the participants to assess the capability and motivation of their opponents without an immediate risk of large losses. Second, it explains why escalation is not inevitable and why war is not an inescapable playing-out of forces set in motion at the outset. Escalation would be expected where earlier, less costly tactics seem insufficient to ensure net gain or where increased belligerence is necessary to prevent large losses to an escalating opponent. Third, belligerents may actually be able to redefine and expand their potential resource benefits in the course of conflict. Thus, Durham’s modest conclusion is that at least some cases of ’intergroup aggression’ can be seen as a behavioral adaptation to conditions of competition for limiting resources. 4.12.3

Criticism

Warfare is viewed by authors discussed as a significant general factor in human evolution. Anthropologists and historians, however, have not shown any consensus in support of such an interpretation. For example, Montagu (1976) counters with the view that "up to some twelve thousand years ago war played an insignificant role" in evolution, and that in the last 12,000 years war has become either biologically irrelevant or dysgenic. Durham’s reasoning assumes that warfare is simply aggression writ large. Basing himself on models of the evolution of individual aggressive behavior, Durham is almost forced to regard warfare as ’intergroup aggression’ which is unfortunate terminology (van der Dennen, 1986), while the adoption of a ’realistic conflict’ paradigm leads him somewhat astray. Most primitive warfare seems, at least in our Western eyes, rather ’pointless’. It is this conspicuous absence of ’economic motives’ that ought to be explained. In many cases the total losses exceed whatever benefits could possibly be gained. In other words, there is a discrepancy between Durham’s ’ultimate’ explanation and the ’proximate’ motives of primitive peoples. Furthermore, it is not clear from Durham’s model why virtually only human beings make war, or why ’group aggression’ is not more widespread in the animal world. Nor does it explain why warfare is predominantly a male business, or why disculpation ritual (indicating a profound ambivalence of the warrior vis-à-vis his victims) is so universal. This latter question is addressed by the next author.



4.13

Cultural Filter Superimposition and Preadaptations

According to Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1975 et seq.), humans, like other organisms, have inhibitions against killing conspecifics as part of a biological filter of norms. Yet he kills conspecifics on a large scale. How is this possible? Man tends to form closed groups. Cultural peculiarities tend to diverge rapidly, and the varieties of culture behave as if they were different species (Erikson’s [1966] ’pseudospeciation’). Others are not considered to count as full members of mankind, or even as human beings at all. By cultural definition, intraspecific aggression gets shifted to the level of interspecific aggression, which is destructive in the animal kingdom as well. Facilitated by communicational barriers and by armament which kills quickly, and often at a distance, Man shuts himself off against all appeals normally releasing the fighting inhibitions which are subjectively experienced as pity. Thus, upon the biological filter of norms which inhibits killing, is superimposed a cultural filter of norms commanding killing of the enemy. This leads to a conflict of norms, bad conscience, guilt and ambivalence, as already noted by Freud (1913). It takes, Eibl-Eibesfeldt asserts, quite a lot of indoctrination and coercion to bring people to fight each other. Unfortunately, war had functions to fulfill, it is not to be considered an evolutionary cul de sac or pathology: "Es handelt sich nicht um eine funktionslose Entgleisung, sondern um eine spezifisch menschliche Form der Zwischengruppen-Aggression mit deren Hilfe Menschengruppen um Land und Naturgüter konkurrieren" [It is not to be considered a mere functionless derailment, but rather a specific human form of intergroup aggression by means of which human groups compete for land and natural resources] (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1975). War is not, he emphasizes, explained by invoking an innate aggressive drive. It is the result of cultural evolution, which is superimposed on, and a continuation of, phylogenetic evolution. In the process of cultural pseudospeciation human groups isolated themselves as if they were representing different species. The innate aggression inhibitions, ameliorating intraspecific aggression just as they do in animals, fail to operate at the level of intergroup conflict. Intergroup conflict developed traits reminiscent of interspecific animal conflict, it became destructive. War, Eibl-Eibesfeldt holds, has surely selected for aggressiveness. War has, at least for a long period of human history, favored the selection of belligerence and aggression. But intergroup competition did not only select for human belligerence, but also - as Bigelow (1970; 1971) emphasized - for the 16 ability to cooperate and for intelligence . ADen Krieg schließlich erklären wir keineswegs aus einem uns angeborenen Aggressionstrieb. Er ist das Ergebnis der kulturellen Evolution, die allerdings durchaus auf der stammesgeschichtlichen Evolution aufbaut und diese weiterführt... Im Prozeß der kulturellen 16



In later publications (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1978; 1979; 1980; 1982; 1984; 1986; 1988), he argued that different levels of selection are discernible in Man, and that the group is indeed an important unit of selection for Homo sapiens. He identifies a number of preadaptions which evolved by individual selection, but which make group selection feasible: 1. 2.

Maternal care and the individualized bond, leading to xenophobia; and mechanisms of individual bonding (giving, sharing, requesting and the norm of property; strategies of agonistic buffering; behavioral mechanisms serving to maintain group harmony; and mechanisms promoting conformity).

Eibl-Eibesfeldt suggests that human indoctrinability and the inclination to polarize values are specific traits difficult to explain via selection at the level of the individual. The emotional basis of this response has its roots in family defense, but cultural evolution leads to the development of warfare ethics which cause individuals to act against their self-interest. At the tribal level, the costs for the young individual male are extremely high. Thus in nonliterate tribal cultures, indoctrination of heroic virtues creates a readiness for selfsacrifice in favor of the group. This often goes hand in hand with the training for obedience. The evolutionary vicissitudes of human indoctrinability are also discussed by Campbell (1972), in a revision of an earlier paper (Campbell, 1965). Freud’s view of the pervasively counter-hedonic content of culture is accepted and given a functional explanation: "Rather than a death-instinct, modern evolutionary genetics points to something closer to Freudian narcissism: selfserving aggressiveness in competition with coworkers for food, space, and mates; self-serving cowardice in war, self-serving dishonesty to fellow ingroup members: cheating, greed, disobedience, etc.". The survival value of complex social coordination has been achieved in Man as a social-evolutionary product which has had to inculcate behavioral dispositions directly counter to the selfish tendencies being produced by genetic selection: "I now believe that these self-sacrificial dispositions, including especially the willingness to risk death in warfare, are in man a product of social indoctrination, which is counter Pseudospeziation schlossen sich Menschengruppen voneinander ab, als wären sie Vertreter verschiedener Arten. Die dem Menschen angeborenen Aggressionskontrollen, die innerartliche Aggression wie beim Tier entschärfen, wirken damit nur nicht mehr im Innergruppenkonflikt. Der Zwischengruppenkonflikt nahm Züge an, die an den zwischenartlichen Konflikt bei Tieren erinnern, er wurde destruktiv... [Der Krieg] hat sicher selektiv in Richtung auf Aggressivität hin gezüchtet... Der Krieg hat damit die Auslese von Kampflust und Aggression zumindest für eine lange Zeit der menschlichen Geschichte begünstigt. Der Mensch wurde aber in diesem Zusammenhang nicht nur auf Kampftüchtigkeit, sondern auch C wie Bigelow (1970; 1971) betont C auf Kooperationsfähigkeit und Intelligenz selektiert, und zwar in der Konkurrenz der Gruppen@.



to rather than supported by genetically transmitted behavioral dispositions". However, if there were genetic differences in indoctrinability, and if warfare were the main selective system operating, then there would be genetic selection against indoctrinability. Probably, Campbell argues, the overall adaptive advantage for indoctrinability, group identification, and fear of ostracism is strong enough to overweigh the negative selection produced when the most indoctrinable incur greater fatality rates in wartime. There is probably positive selection for heroic bluff that persists as long as successful but turns into cowardly retreat when the odds become overwhelming. Also E.O. Wilson (1975) discusses the possible evolutionary pathways of human indoctrinability. Humans, he thinks, just beg to be indoctrinated. 4.13.1

Criticism

Vogel (1989) has argued against the existence of a ’biological filter of norms’, which seems to undermine the very fundament of Eibl-Eibesfeldt’s theory. Vogel states that as primates we have never possessed an ’innate inhibition against killing conspecifics’, a ’biological filter of norms prohibiting killing’ has never been part of our natural history, and for interindividual killing - whether in war or in other circumstances - the human being does not need 17 indoctrination which dehumanizes the enemy . If anything, Vogel asserts, it is the cultural human being we have to turn to for an effective counterbalance, not the natural human being. This last statement effectively reverses Eibl-Eibesfeldt’s argument. But even if he denies the existence of ’innate inhibitions’ against killing conspecifics, Vogel acknowledges the existence of facilitating factors in the process, such as anonymity and alienness of the ’enemy’, moral disculpation and the suspension of responsibility.

4.14

A Biocultural Approach to Human Nastiness

In this chapter, we have encountered attempts to base ’Man’s inhumanity to Man’ on some evolved behavioral predisposition (e.g., Hamilton’s ’cruelty’, Lorenz’s ’militant enthusiasm’, Ardrey’s ’Territorial Imperative’, etc.). One author, in particular, has elaborated such an approach - which he calls ’biocultural’ - in an attempt to explain general human nastiness. 17

"Als Primaten haben wir nie eine 'angeborene innerartliche Tötungshemmung' besessen, einen 'biologischen Normenfilter, der zu töten verbietet' hat es in unserer Naturgeschichte nie gegeben, und es bedarf zum Töten des Menschen durch den Menschen C sei dies im Krieg oder bei anderen Gelegenheiten C keiner Indoktrinierung, die den Gegner 'quasi zum Nichtmenschen' stempelt".



Lopreato (1984) subsumes primitive war and other forms of violence under the evolved behavioral predispositions of self-enhancement. These encompass a.o. the struggle for dominance or power; territoriality; the Urge to Victimize; and the Need for Vengeance. One criterion of a behavioral predisposition is that it can flower into hypertrophic expressions and manifestations that have little or nothing in common with its original adaptive function. The basic tenet of Lopreato’s biocultural approach is: "Fitness-enhancing sociocultural behaviors are favorably selected, and then react on natural selection by influencing the distribution of genetic material and the distribution of sociocultural behaviors that are associated with it". Lopreato regards territoriality as subject to behavioral scaling and therefore not universal in manifestation, but the territorial predisposition may well be universal (as is the striving for dominance); he therefore tends to agree with van den Berghe’s (1974) formulation that "Man is not only highly territorial, but he is territorial at practically every level of social organization", and with Dyson-Hudson & Smith’s (1978) economic-defendability model of human group territoriality Individuals and groups may be observed enhancing, or attempting to enhance, their life chances, and thus their reproductive fitness, by sacrificing the wealth, the freedom or altogether the life of others. Lopreato hypothesizes that such behavior flows from a predisposition that may be termed the Urge (or drive, impulse, etc.) to Victimize - or, more conveniently, merely ’Victimization’, and that it is one of the most effective forces of self-enhancement. This urge is generally exploitative, exploitation being the gratuitous and sustained appropriation of the resources of another for one’s own benefit, whereby the action tends to increase the exploiter’s genetic fitness at the expense of the exploited. Victimization, as envisaged by Lopreato, embraces slavery, human sacrifice, headhunting or war raids, cannibalism, and genocide (See Ch. 5). The last evolved predisposition of self-enhancement in Lopreato’s framework is the Need for Vengeance, which he regards as an extreme form of the tendency to seek reparation when an act of beneficence toward others fails to induce beneficent reciprocation: "In a general sense we are dealing with a force that impels humans - and other animals as well - to return harm for harm received". The predisposition for vengeance recalls the eye-for-an-eye principle of the Old Testament. Lopreato quotes the surprisingly ’modern’ explanation of this phenomenon by Durkheim (1893): "It is an error to believe that vengeance is but useless cruelty. It is very possible that, in itself, it consists of a mechanical and aimless reaction, in an emotional and irrational movement, in an unintelligent need to destroy; but, in fact, what it tends to destroy was a menace to us. It consists, then, in a veritable act of defense, although an instinctive and unreflective one. We avenge ourselves only upon what has done us evil, and what has done us evil is always dangerous. The instinct of vengeance is, in sum, only the instinct



of conservation exacerbated by peril". See further Ch. 5, where revenge as a proximate motive for warfare is examined.

4.15

From Cherchez la ressource to Cherchez la femme

In the preceding paragraphs, the concepts of kin selection and sexual selection have been repeatedly encountered. In the remainder of this chapter I shall summarize the theories in which sexual selection in relation to the origin of war, and the idea of females as the ’ultimate’ reproductive resource of males, are the central themes. In chapter 6 kin selection and its sequelae, implications and consequences - such as ethnocentrism and xenophobia - will be explored in depth. Kin selection is the principal explanans in the Genetic Seeds of Warfare theory (Shaw & Wong, 1989), and its merits and demerits will therefore be treated more extensively in that context. 4.15.1

Blood Revenge, Women and Warfare

In his 1988 article on Yanomamö feuding and warfare, Chagnon attempts to show how several forms of violence in a tribal society are interrelated, and he describes his theory of violent conflict among primitive peoples in which homicide, blood revenge, and warfare are manifestations of individual conflicts of interest over material and reproductive resources. Chagnon observes that many anthropologists tend to treat warfare as a phenomenon that occurs independently of other forms of violence in the same group. As a result many scholars restrict the search for the causes of war to issues over which whole groups might contest such as access to rich land, productive hunting regions, and scarce resources, and, hence, view primitive warfare as reducible solely to contests over scarce or dwindling material resources. Such views fail to take into account the developmental sequences of conflicts and the multiplicity of causes, especially sexual jealousy, accusations of sorcery, and revenge killing, in each step of conflict escalation: Duels may lead to deaths which, in turn, may lead to community fissioning and then to retaliatory killings by members of the two now-independent communities. Chagnon heavily draws on several key insights from modern evolutionary thought, specifically, 1.



the mechanisms that constitute organisms were designed by selection to promote survival and reproduction in the environments of evolutionary adaptedness. This implies that organisms living in such environments can be generally expected to act in ways that promote survival and reproduc-

2.

3.

4.

tion, i.e., their inclusive fitness. For humans, these mechanisms include learning and mimicking successful social strategies. Conflicts of interest between individuals are inevitable because the nature of some of life’s resources ensure that individuals can achieve certain goals only at the expense of other individuals. Organisms expend two kinds of effort during their lifetimes: Somatic effort, relevant to their survival, and reproductive effort in the interests of inclusive fitness. This often entails competition for both material and reproductive resources (i.e., mating partners). It is to be expected that individuals (or groups of closely related individuals) will attempt to appropriate both material and reproductive resources from neighbors whenever the probable costs are less than the benefits. While conflicts thus initiated need not take violent forms, they might be expected to do so when violence on average advances individual interests.

Chagnon does not assume that humans consciously strive to increase or maximize their inclusive fitness, but he does assume that humans strive for goals that their cultural tradition deems as valued and esteemed. In many societies, achieving cultural success appears to lead to biological (genetic) success. Chagnon focuses on revenge killing among the Yanomamö Indians of southern Venezuela and adjacent portions of northern Brazil. Blood revenge is one of the most commonly cited causes of violence and warfare in primitive societies, and it has persisted in many state-organized societies as well. Most fights among the Yanomamö begin over sexual issues: Infidelity and suspicion of infidelity, attempts to seduce another man's wife, sexual jealousy, forcible appropriation of women from visiting groups, failure to give a promised girl in marriage, and (rarely) rape. Yanomamö intragroup conflicts constitute a graded sequence of increasing seriousness and potential lethality: Shouting matches, chest pounding duels, side slapping duels, club fights, fights with axes and machetes, and, finally, shooting with bows and arrows with the intent to kill. In all but the last case, fights are not intended to, and generally do not lead to, mortalities. Nevertheless, many fights lead to killings both within and between villages. If killing occurs within the village, the village fissions and the principals of the two new groups then begin raiding each other. The most common explanation given for this raiding type of warfare is revenge for a previous killing, and the most common explanation for the initial cause of the fighting is 'women'. Revenge is also sought for the deaths of individuals who are alleged to have died as a consequence of harmful magic practiced by shamans in enemy villages. As is widely found in other primitive societies, an astonishing large fraction of deaths are considered to have been the result of human malevolence, i.e., sorcery in the form of stealing souls, blowing lethal charms, etc. Few



deaths are considered to be natural. Infant mortality is high and invariably attributed to enemy shamans. Long, bitter wars can be initiated when a visitor from a suspected village is killed by the bereaved of the dead infant. At first glance, raids motivated by revenge seem counterproductive. Raiders may inflict deaths on their enemies, but by so doing make themselves and kin prime targets for retaliation. But ethnographic evidence suggests that revenge has an underlying rationality: Swift retaliation in kind serves as a deterrent over the long run. War motivated by revenge seems to be a tit-for-tat strategy in which the participants’ score might best be measured in terms of minimizing losses rather than in terms of maximizing gains. If gain is associated with revenge killing in the primitive world, what is gained and precisely who gains? Casting these questions into evolutionary terms, where gain (benefit) is discussed in terms of individual differences in inclusive fitness, might shed new light on the problem. Losing a close genetic relative (for example, a parent, sibling, or child) potentially constitutes a significant loss to one’s inclusive fitness. Anything that counterbalances these losses would be advantageous. Yanomamö data suggest two possibilities. First, kinship groups that retaliate swiftly and demonstrate their resolve to avenge deaths acquire reputations for ferocity that deter the violent designs of their neighbors. The Yanomamö explain that a group with a reputation for swift retaliation is attacked less frequently and thus suffers a lower rate of mortality. They also note that other forms of predation, such as the abduction of women, are thwarted by adopting an aggressive stance. Aggressive groups coerce nubile females from less aggressive groups whenever the opportunity arises. Many appear to calculate the costs and benefits of forcibly appropriating or coercing females from groups that are perceived to be weak. The Yanomamö village is composed of large kin groups; people who are related to members of their own lineal descent group through male links and related to members of other lineal descent groups through consanguineal marriages and matrilateral ties. If someone in the village is killed, the probability is very high that he or she will have many bereaved close kin, including the village leader or leaders who have more kin than others; the leaders are the very individuals who decide whether killings will be revenged. "If, as Clausewitz suggested, (modern) warfare is the conduct of politics by other means, in the tribal world warfare is ipso facto the extension of kinship obligations by violence because the political system is organized by kinship". Second, men who demonstrate their willingness to act violently and to exact revenge for the deaths of kin may have higher marital and reproductive success. The higher reproductive success of unokais or 'killers' is mainly due to their greater success in finding mates, either by appropriating them forcibly from others, or by customary marriage alliance arrangements in which they



seem to be more attractive as mates than ’non-killers’. Among the Yanomamö, 'non-killers' might be willing to concede more reproductive opportunities to 'killers' in exchange for a life with fewer mortal risks and fewer reproductive advantages. Raiding parties usually include 10 to 20 men, but not all men go on all raids and some men never go on raids. An enemy village might be as far as 4 or 5 days' march away. Many raiding parties turn back before reaching their destination, either because someone has a dream that portends disaster, or because the enemy group is not where it was believed to be. In all but the most determined raiding parties, a few men drop out for reasons such as being 'sick' or 'stepping on a thorn'. Chronic dropouts acquire a reputation for cowardice and often become the subject of frequent insult and ridicule, and their wives become targets of increased sexual attention from other men. In a subsequent publication, Chagnon (1990) presents an addition to the traditional Carrying Capacity Model (the typically logistic population growth curve) in relation to his former distinction between somatic and reproductive effort. As a population enters a new niche, one that is free from conspecifics who might be competing for the same resources, the population begins to grow at a high rate; the curve climbs steeply. Over time, as resources become scarcer and/or more difficult or costly to obtain, and when 'hostile forces' (density dependent diseases and parasites) begin checking growth rates, fertility and mortality rates begin to converge. The population growth rate slows down and the population eventually approaches its theoretical upper limit: K, or 'carrying capacity'. Chagnon modifies the traditional graphic expression of the carrying capacity model by indicating three possible 'phases' in a population's history in any particular niche. Phase one represents the early phase of the population's history in the niche. Growth rates are very high and it is presumed that the individuals are expending relatively more of their efforts at reproduction rather than in somatic efforts. Conflicts, if they occur, should be expected to be primarily over reproductive issues. In phase two, the population continues to grow, but is beginning, toward the end of the phase, to slow down. Here we can expect conflicts to be more or less equally distributed between reproductive and somatic issues. Finally, in phase three, the population is nearing carrying capacity and one should expect that conflicts will become increasingly dominated by somatic issues, although reproductive conflicts will also occur. In a word, individuals fight for mates when resources are abundant, and fight for the means to acquire mates when resources become scarce. It cannot simply be assumed, as appears to be the case in many materialist works, that all human populations are in phase three of their history in any particular niche. The materialist preoccupation with explaining warfare in terms of scarcity of resources appears to be based on precisely this



assumption. At the same time there is an attempt to convey the message that this is the only ’scientific’ way to explain warfare, particularly in band and village societies. If it is to be truly scientific, then its proponents should make the effort to empirically document that populations are at or near carrying capacity. Otherwise, we have simply an elaborate tautology: War is a contest over scarce material resources; evidence that resources are scarce is the existence of war (Chagnon, 1990). 4.15.2

Criticism

The theory advanced by Chagnon has been criticized by Ferguson (1989) on the following points: (1) The idea that war is explainable as a sequence of revenge killings runs against the deterrence argument for somatic benefit. A violent attack will make a counter-attack either more likely (revenge) or less likely (deterrence), but it cannot do both at once. To the degree that deterrence is effective, it will act against the institutionalization of a pattern of strike and counter-strike. Vengeance is a motivation that is very real, but very malleable. The motive is harnessed in political decisions to retaliate, when retaliation is considered necessary to prevent future attacks. Chagnon’s paper illustrates that revenge sometimes is taken, but sometimes is not; in fact the entire deterrence argument is based on the premise that revenge can be discouraged by expectable danger. So revenge raiding is not automatic, it does not drive the system. The decision to retaliate is a tactical one, a part of the process of war, rather than its cause. (2) Chagnon’s data do not establish that becoming a ’killer’ is itself associated with having more children, for two reasons. First, in the study population, all headmen are ’killers’. It is a commonplace in Amazonian ethnography, at least since Lévi-Strauss' (1944) famous article, that headmen have more wives and more children, regardless of the presence or absence of war. The Yanomamö certainly follow this pattern, with one headman reportedly having 43 children by 11 wives. The greater number of offspring associated with headman status thus distorts the advantages attributable to 'killer' status by an unknown amount. Second, the table on reproductive success presents data only on children whose fathers are/were still alive. This raises the question: What is the effect of becoming a 'killer' on life chances? Does the average 'killer' live and breed longer than the average 'non-killer'? Higher mortality associated with 'killer' status could easily offset a greater number of offspring for living 'killers'. Combine that with the unknown impact of the headman factor, and there is no basis at present to conclude that becoming a 'killer' is associated with greater lifetime reproductive success. Furthermore, as Albert (1989) criticized, Chagnon takes the Yanomamö ritual category of unokai to be equivalent to the Western concept of 'killer'. Unokai, however, denotes a state of symbolic impurity that is said to result from the



supernatural incorporation by the killer of the blood and flesh of a slain enemy, whether this enemy was killed by an arrow, by shamanism, by sorcery, or by the killing of his animal alter ego. Lastly, Ferguson goes on to argue, the argument that the reproductive success of the 44% of the male population aged 25 or older who are unokais is increased by their capacity to abduct women is not supported by any empirical evidence, according to Albert (1989). On the contrary, Lizot (1988) reports that of a total of 350 marriages in a large village cluster that he surveyed in 1975, 0.9% were by abduction of women from allied villages and 0.8% by capture of women from enemy villages. Chagnon further argues that the unokais achieve greater marital and reproductive success because "they seem to be more attractive as mates than non-unokais" in marriage alliance arrangements, but the only ethnographic support he offers is the anecdotal and misleading association of unokai and waiteri (’fierce’) as equivalent qualities attributed to males supposed to be ’valuable’. 4.15.3

Male Coalitional Psychology and the Evolution of War

Coalitional aggression (i.e., raiding and warfare) evolved, Tooby & Cosmides (1988) hypothesize, because it allowed participants in such coalitions to promote their fitness by gaining access to disputed reproduction enhancing resources that would otherwise be denied to them. It is understood that females are generally the limiting reproductive resource to males, as explained in Ch. 3. Far fewer species manifest coalitional aggression than would be expected on the basis of the actual distribution of social conditions that would favor its evolution. The exploitation of such opportunities depends on the solution by individuals of highly complex and specialized information processing problems of cooperation and social exchange, and the difficulty of evolving cognitive mechanisms capable of solving such complex computational tasks may account for the phylogenetic rarity of such multi-individual coalitions. Tooby & Cosmides propose that humans and a few other cognitively preadapted species have evolved specialized Darwinian algorithms, cognitive programs, that govern coalitional behavior, and which constitute a distinctive coalitional psychology. An adaptive task analysis of what such algorithms need to accomplish, in the decisions regulating coalition formation, participation, cost and benefit allocation, allows the preliminary mapping of this coalitional psychology. Scrutiny of the adaptive features of coalitional aggression reveals some surprising characteristics, including that, under certain conditions, mortality rates do not negatively impact the fitness of males in the coalition, suggesting why warfare is so favored an activity, despite its risk to participating individuals’ welfare. Tooby & Cosmides propose that the distinctive and frequently surprising features of war stem from an underemphasized dimension: Cooperation.



Although a fight is an aggressive conflict between two individuals, and involves no cooperation, a war is an aggressive conflict between two coalitions of individuals, and would not be possible unless each coalition were able to coalesce, function, and sustain itself as a group of cooperating individuals. They suggest that a detailed analysis of the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in the context of coalitional aggression may explain: (1) Adaptive obstacles in the evolution of coalitional aggression, (2) why war is so rare among animal species, and (3) why, nevertheless, it is so easy to generate conditions in which human males find initiating warfare so psychologically appealing. Recent theoretical and empirical advances in evolutionary biology and game theory (Axelrod, 1984: Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Trivers, 1971; Maynard Smith, 1982) have shown that, if cooperation (independent of kin selection) is to evolve and function stably, it must function in a particular and structured fashion: 1. Social or ecological conditions must create frequent and recurrent situations where there are enhanced payoffs to cooperation. 2. Cooperators must be able to identify when other participants are not reciprocally cooperating, and who these cheaters or defectors are. 3. Cooperators must be able to exclude cheaters (defectors) from taking the benefits of cooperation without having paid the costs, or failing that, they must be able to exclude cheaters from future cooperative interactions they could exploit. These principles describe the narrow envelope of preconditions that allow cooperation to evolve among social organisms. Instances of such cooperation, while not common, occur with regularity among various animal species, including social primates. Moreover, not only is there cooperation in such activities as predator vigilance and foraging, but there is sometimes cooperation in aggressive competition as well (Packer, 1977; Packer & Pusey, 1982). However, it is a major puzzle why animals do not cooperate in aggressive conflicts far more often than they do. There frequently appear to be situations that would favor their doing so, but in which such cooperation is absent. Presumably, in all situations where two or more males, who are excluded from reproduction, could physically cooperate to break another male’s reproductive monopoly, selection would favor the formation of aggressive coalitions. For example, among elephant seals (LeBoeuf, 1974) or Hanuman langurs (Hrdy, 1977), single males are often able to defend and monopolize groups of females against large numbers of male competitors. It is not clear why excluded males who cannot singly best the resident male do not form aggressive coalitions, and through cooperation gain access to reproductive opportunities otherwise denied to them. This set of conditions seems widespread, and yet far fewer species manifest coalitional aggression than would be expected on the basis of the



actual distribution of social conditions that would favor its evolution (The special selection pressures on social insects would require separate analysis). When one restricts the focus to species where multi-individual (or polyadic) coalitions of males aggressively compete, reports are rarer still; only two species are known to exhibit warfare, defined in this fashion: Common chimpanzees (Ch. 3), and humans. Possibly, bottlenose dolphins (e.g., Connor, 1988; Connor, Smolker & Richards, 1992) also belong to this category. The phylogenetic distribution of these species suggests an answer to why coalitional aggression is so rare: Humans, common chimpanzees, and dolphins are arguably the most cognitively sophisticated social animals known. Tooby & Cosmides argue that the cognitive mechanisms regulating reciprocation and social exchange cannot simply be either culturally ’learned’ or be the product of ’general intelligence’, but must be adaptively designed information processing systems (termed Darwinian algorithms) specialized for these functions. It may be that the distribution of war in the animal kingdom is limited by the same factor that limits the emergence of the multi-individual cooperation on which war depends: The cognitive prerequisites necessary to exclude cheaters from benefiting from joint action as much as, or more than, genuine cooperators. It is suggested that, for example, elephant seals and langurs, despite the reproductive payoff implicit in their ecological situations, did not have the cognitive preadaptations necessary for the emergence even of enduring dyadic coalitions, which, for example, baboons are capable of orchestrating (Packer, 1977). The elements that must be integrated into a model of coalitional aggression (and into psychological mechanisms regulating participation) include: The risk to each participant, < the relative value of the actions of each participant to achieving the < common goal, the probability of achieving success given a certain set of performances < by the members of the coalition, the aggregate value of achieving the common goal, and < how the aggregate benefits of victory are allocated to each participant. < Each coalition member has impact on the coalition (1) by regulating the level of his own direct participation in the joint action, and (2) by the actions he undertakes to enforce the risk contract on the other coalition members. These two dimensions of regulating direct participation and enforcement have important and sometimes surprising properties. For example, the optimum level of direct participation is extremely sensitive to the probability of success, and the relationship between these variables may help explain why males will engage so readily in warfare when they are confident of success. It can be shown that given (1) certainty of victory, (2) the assurance of a random distribution of risk of death among participants, (3) the



assurance of a relatively ’fair’ allocation of the benefits of victory, and (4) efficiency in the utilization of reproductive resources on a zero-sum basis, selection will favor participation in the coalitional aggression regardless of the existence or even the level of mortality (within broad limits). Within a polygynous system with certain formal properties (e.g., access to females being the limiting resource for male reproduction; and male labor being comparatively unimportant to female reproduction), the deaths of some members of a coalition will not decrease the average reproduction of the members of the coalition, because the reproductive resources and opportunities within the coalition, or gained as the result of victory, will simply be reallocated among the survivors. As long as the members of the coalition do not lose reproductive resources, the level of deaths among the males will not influence the average success of the coalition members. Each individual who dies loses, but each survivor gains to the same extent, and provided the participants do not know in advance who will live and who will die, but rather that the risk is distributed randomly, and provided they are assured of success (as in, for example, a much larger group attacking a much smaller one), the collective decision of the coalition to go to war will benefit its members (in the currency of fitness). Natural selection weighs decisions on the basis of their average consequences to individuals, summed over evolutionary time; consequently, these factors explain why males can so easily be induced to go to war, despite its lethal effects on many of them. In this analysis, war is thus not simply a response to resource scarcity; when times are good, and male (economic) productivity irrelevant (which applies especially to horticultural societies), war may be very advantageous. Coalitions of males, when they assess the relevant variables indicating that they are larger or more formidable than any local competing coalitions, should appear to manifest an eagerness and satisfaction in initiating warfare and an obliviousness or insensitivity to the risk they run as individuals, in terms of their individual somatic welfare, which should be reflected in psychological sex differences in attitudes towards coalition formation and coalition-based aggression. However, it is important to bear in mind that this willingness to participate is directly dependent on the probability of success, and on the fact that the coalition members do not know which of them is going to suffer the costs of death or disability. Perception and belief in success play a crucial role in encouraging coalitions to initiate war. For polyadic male coalitions to evolve, the requirement that ’victory be assured’ or at least very likely, is not as stringent as it may seem. While modern history is full of surprises, primitive war between small coalitions may be more predictably related to relative size. Barring very large differentials in individual aggressive formidability, assembling a significantly larger coalition will



virtually guarantee victory. Such a consistent relationship between size and probability of victory leads to the balance-of-power races discussed by Alexander (1979) as being a prime mover in social evolution. Being a member of an identifiably small coalition, a ’minority’, is a dangerous proposition: The persecution and expropriation of local ’minorities’ is a relatively safe fitnessenhancing activity. Correspondingly, the most significant costs of mortality to males may be the risk that a high incidence of mortality in your coalition (e.g., a Pyrrhic victory) may weaken the local coalition so that it becomes smaller and weaker than neighboring coalitions, and itself subject to victimization. The second dimension of coalitional aggression involves the enforcement of the risk contract. It is not sufficient for members simply to regulate the level of their own direct participation; for coalitions to stably evolve and function, the risk contract must be enforced by some or all of its members on any cheaters, defectors, or non-participants. In situations where numbers are a key to success, exclusion as a punishment has direct costs to the coalition. Instead, enforced inclusion, coupled with punishment or retaliation for non-participation, is an alternative strategy that would be favored in conditions of intense coalitional competition. Tooby & Cosmides feel that evolutionary processes creating specialized cognitive adaptations in the context of coalitional aggression can be straightforwardly explained using standard genic selection, without recourse to either group selection or gene-culture coevolution theories. However, it is easy to see how cultural processes and/or group selection may magnify and/or modify the process. See also ' 3.8 for the explanation Tooby & Cosmides offer to account for the absence of female warriors. 4.15.4

Criticism

All the specifications listed by Tooby & Cosmides, which govern coalition formation and predispose to warfare, seem likely to be true for numerous other coalitions (e.g., hunting coalitions), Low (1990) criticized, and their argument thus does not lead to the deduction that humans and chimpanzees are unique in having the appropriate Darwinian algorithms for warfare. Shaw & Wong (1989) have argued that humanity’s propensity for warfare is equally prevalent among women and men. That warfare is perpetuated only by males, they state, is a misconception based on superficial observation. Greater visibility of males in warfare can be attributed to division of labor whereby both males and females contribute to inclusive fitness (survival and reproduction) in different, though complementary ways. Males were selected for greater physical strength. Where warfare was involved, this strength was readily transferred to the battlefield. At the same time, however, women were armed as ’protectors of the means of reproduction’. Though invisible on primitive battlefields, they contributed equally to inclusive fitness by (1)



assuming supportive or help-mate roles for their male, combative counterparts and (2) assuming defensive/protective roles for the group’s offspring and means of genetic reproduction. Shaw & Wong may be right in the assertion that the propensity for war may be equally prevalent among women and men, the conduct of war in primitive societies, as well as in chimpanzees, is an exclusively male affair, the ultimate rationale of which is the asymmetry between the sexes in the reproductive benefits to be gained. 4.15.5

Reproductive Success, Sexual Selection, and Conflict

"Why would anyone be so stupid as to initiate a war?" was the question posed by Leda Cosmides at the Fifth Annual Meeting of the Human Behavior and Evolution Society (1993). Her answer: "To get women". The reason Tooby & Cosmides think that the first warriors battled over women instead of food is that it is not worth the risk to die for fruit or land. If food was scarce and a group of men went after another group’s food stocks, they were taking a big chance: Their own offspring, already malnourished, could starve if the men were killed in the fighting and didn’t return to help scratch out a living. But women, the researchers argue, are worth dying for. A group of men would benefit from initiating a battle to claim new women if they were flush with food and other resources. Then they would know that their existing mates and offspring could survive without them. In evolutionary terms, they don’t lose much by going to war for women even if many were to die, their offspring would survive to pass on their genes. And if the group won and gained new mates, the male coalition would bear more young on average, even if a few men lost their lives in the effort... "Why fight over bananas" asked Chagnon at the same conference, "when you can fight over women?" (Meeting Brief in Science, 261, August 20, 1993, 987-8). Similar and comparable theories about the influence of sexual competition on the evolution of male behavior have been put forth by Alexander, Borgia, Manson & Wrangham, van den Berghe, Symons, Tiger, E.O. Wilson, Chagnon, and Low. The following is a summary of Low’s (1990) comprehensive account of sexual selection theory. Whenever an evolutionary history exists of reproductive advantage to some behavior such as human lethal conflict, and conditions change, there is a possibility for behavior to be driven by proximate cues (that in the past correlated with reproductive advantage), even when the proximate cues are currently unhinged from the (past) functional advantage. This situation is most



common in the case of environmental changes that represent evolutionarily novel events, such as human technological changes. Human war, Low holds (in contrast to Tooby & Cosmides) can become more complex and varied than intergroup aggression in other species, largely as a result of the development of technology (which itself is probably a product of intelligence, and probably a product specifically of Machiavellian intelligence; cf. Alexander, 1971; Humphrey, 1976, 1983; Byrne & Whiten, 1988; see also Ch. 8). The development of technology to currently lethal levels raises an important question: Is it analogous, if not identical, to runaway sexual selection, described by Fisher (1930)? Fisher noted that "remarkable consequences" follow if females exert a strong preference for particular traits in males. As Fisher pointed out, in sexual selection, two influences are important: Initial advantages (which may be considerable) not due to female preference (e.g., the advantage of large antlers in combat for red deer); and any additional advantage conferred by any female preference. The intensity of preference itself will continue to increase through sexual selection, so long as the sons of females exerting the preference have any advantage over other males. Fisher (1930) noted: "The importance of this situation lies in the fact that the further development [of the favored trait] will still proceed, by reason of the advantage gained in sexual selection, even after it has passed the point in development at which its advantage in Natural Selection has ceased" (See also Darwin, 1871; and Cronin, 1991). Thus, in sexual selection, the immediate reproductive gains can be so great, and so powerfully selected for, that they outstrip the countering pressure of ordinary natural selection for survival, resulting in the development of lethal traits leading to extinction. When, as in the Yanomamö, warring skill results in a significant increase in the number of children produced, sexual selection can be very powerful. Even in modern industrialized societies, in which participation in wars, and risk-taking behaviors may be 'unhooked' from the advantages given by sexual preference, if sexual preference still is exerted for 'war heroes' or if there are other proximate rewards, previously linked to selective advantage, the behavior may still be common. Aggression is usually related to the acquisition of resources. The significant aspect of a 'resource' in evolutionary perspective is its influence on survival and reproduction. Thus some biologists (e.g., Alexander, 1979) define as a resource anything giving relief from Darwin's 'Hostile Forces of Nature': Climate, weather, food shortages, predators, parasites, and so on. In this broad view, not only physical resources such as food and shelter, but also status, coalition allies, and members of the opposite sex (potential mates) become resources. Because environments are complex, the focal resource will differ for different kinds of individuals (old, young, male, female, solitary or groupliving).



Resources have been shown to have an impact on reproduction even when only skill in resource acquisition, independent of social factors, is considered. For example, Ritchie (1990) has demonstrated that optimally foraging ground squirrels leave approximately six times as many offspring as non-optimal foragers. Furthermore, in many species, there is a clear link between resource control or dominance status and reproductive success, at least for males. The distribution (specifically economic defendability), predictability, and richness of resources dictate the breeding system (Cf. Emlen & Oring, 1977; Clutton-Brock & Harvey, 1976; van Schaik & van Hooff, 1983; see Ch. 3). When resources are controllable by a single male, territorial systems are likely, and territorial males out-reproduce ’bachelor’ disenfranchised males. In non-resource controlling systems, while no physical resource of value may be controlled, more dominant males tend to out-reproduce less dominant males (Dewsbury, 1982; Huntingford & Turner, 1987). Thus males may fight directly over mates, they may fight for dominance (if females choose dominant males), or they may fight over territory (if females choose good territories). What is the role of resources in human reproduction? As in other mammals, a sexual dimorphism exists. Males appear to be able to use large amounts of resources as mating effort to gain sometimes extraordinary numbers of wives and children (e.g., Betzig, 1986, who reviews despotic societies in which rulers may have thousands of wives and concubines). Females use smaller amounts of resources as parental effort, to raise a more limited number of healthy thriving offspring. Cross-culturally, men use resources to gain reproductively; in many societies men’s increase in reproductive success is accomplished through polygyny - the acquisition of additional wives. The majority (85% according to Murdock, 1967) of societies for which there are data are polygynous. When resource differentials are great, men, like other mammalian males, can use resources to increase their lifetime fertility to a much greater extent than can women. As in other species, status, skill, dominance and power can be ’resources’, in addition to the things we commonly think of. Betzig’s (1986) work shows definitively that in a number of societies there are clear, formal reproductive rewards associated with status: High-ranking men have the right to more wives, and have significantly more children than others. White’s (1988) data on the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample reflect the fact that in a number of societies there are explicit rules granting more wives to political leaders, skilled hunters, shamans, and so forth. Even in societies like the Aché, in which there are no such formal rules, Hill & Kaplan (1988) found that skilled hunters have more wives, more children, and better-surviving children than other men. In 10 of 12 societies reviewed by Hill (1984), resource control clearly enhanced reproductive success. The two exceptions were large, densely settled societies with socially-imposed monogamy. In most societies the relationship was quite straightforward: Richer men had more wives and more children than



poorer men (Turkmen: Irons, 1979; African Kipsigis: Borgerhoff Mulder, 1988). Even in societies such as the Yanomamö, in which few physical resources are owned, male kin for coalitions represent a resource, and men manipulate kinship terms in ways that make more women available for mates, and powerful men as partners (Chagnon, 1982), so that reproductive success is uneven for men. The benefits of warfare to males in preindustrial societies include increased direct access to reproductive females, and increased material resources useful for the lineage and in contracting marriages (individual [including sexual] and kin selection), and the communal location of related males (kin selection) appears to enhance warring behavior. Among preindustrial societies, ambush warfare by raiding parties of varying size (almost indistinguishable from ambushes by male chimpanzees), appears to have been the common pattern. The rewards, as in the individual or communal fighting of other species, were reproductive: Women as mates, and resources to purchase women as mates. The transition from such warfare to the complex multi-national warfare discussed in treatises on military history seems almost unfathomable, but must be examined if we are to understand whether there has been any change in the function of war. Recognition of the importance of reproductive interests in the evolution of lethal conflict, as Low proposes, makes some apparent discrepancies among earlier models of warfare rather trivial. If competition can be driven to lethal levels by reproductive conflicts, it is no longer important whether population growth (e.g., Carneiro, 1970 vs Wright, 1977; Webster, 1975) is demonstrated to precede warfare. Reproductive competition is the evolutionarily important selective force underlying lethal conflict; warfare is a principal mechanism, and may be waged in the name of women, revenge, agricultural lands, new territory, or any devised reason. In evolutionary terms, warfare can only have evolved to be common in circumstances in which the net inclusive fitness of warriors has been enhanced. Reproductive costs and benefits, and conflicts of interest, are central. In an evolutionary sense, the ultimate causes of war, as of all lethal conflict, are sexual selection and kin selection. Throughout the animal kingdom, lethal risks are taken only when the reproductive stakes are high. Individuals and groups of individuals, principally males, fight over mates and resources important to reproduction. Sexual selection and kin selection are the driving forces creating the reproductive rewards that make the risk of death worthwhile; kinship and reciprocity are the principal binding forces among those who fight together. It is almost certainly true that past correlations between a warrior's behavior and reproductive success no longer hold. Nonetheless several aspects of men's



behavior in wars, and of the organization of fighting forces, suggest that (1) proximate correlates of reproductive success due to risky and aggressive behavior still exist in modern wars, and (2) successful leaders organize field units in ways that play on past kinship structure of warring groups. With the elaboration of war, and the increased pace of weapons development, selective outcomes became less tied to individual actions and characteristics. Those with the most to gain from warfare frequently suffered lower risks than those with little to gain. We may well have unhooked the reproductive rewards from the behavior, so that lethal conflict is now counter-selective, and driven only by proximate cues, but throughout the evolution of conflict in humans as well as other species, there have been reproductive profits associated with risks of lethal conflict. 4.15.6

Criticism

Low skips over, or hardly recognizes, the problem of group aggression. Given that reproductive competition underlies lethal conflict, this does not, in itself, explain why humans and chimpanzees compete in groups (have war), and virtually all other species do not. She fails to explain why warfare is limited to so few species. Although she criticizes Tooby & Cosmides’ reasoning, she presents no real alternative to their Darwinian algorithms and coalitional psychology. Regarding the evidence: In some people like the Yanomamö there may be some correlation between participation in revenge raiding and reproductive success. The Yanomamö are a very interesting but also quite exceptional people, however, who cannot be considered to be representative of primitive peoples generally. Among the highly militarized, pre-conquest Cheyenne, war chiefs favored celibacy and usually died young, either in battle or as a consequence of ritual suicide. In contrast, the peace chiefs, who eschewed warfare, were typically polygynous, long-lived, and fertile (J.H. Moore, 1990). So, in the Cheyenne case, the correlation between war participation and reproductive success is essentially negative and the reverse of that claimed by the sexual selection theorists. Probably more exceptions have to be acknowledged, related to different objectives and motives of warfare at different sociocultural levels. This is, for instance, what Carneiro (1990) writes about chiefdom-level warfare in Fiji and the Cauca Valley (South America): "Warfare among the Fijians was all-out and bloody, with no respect shown for sex or age. Women and children were killed ruthlessly and indiscriminately. The Cauca Valley tribes also killed women, no matter how young or attractive they might be, and slaughtered children as well". This seems an odd way of increasing access to reproductive females. In the next chapter I shall revisit the sexual selection theory in the context of the motivational analysis of primitive war.



5 Cultural Theories and Proximate-Level Explanations of Primitive War 5.1 Introduction Evolutionary theories (in the Darwinian sense) and ultimate-level explanations of the origin of war in hominid/human evolution, as reviewed in Ch. 4, have been proliferating ever since Darwin and, after the introduction of sociobiology, expecially in the last decades. In anthropology and the social sciences, however, the conception of primitive war as a social theme and cultural invention, and cultural-evolution theories of the origin of war have prevailed at least since Spencer, Tylor, Lubbock and other contemporaries of Darwin. I shall use the term ’cultural theories’ in this chapter - which has no more pretense than to give a reasonably adequate and complete review of the pertinent literature - as a convenient shorthand for all theories presented by such disciplines as cultural anthropology, ethnology, sociology, psychology, psychoanalysis, etc. By their very nature, many of these theories tend to focus on proximate-level explanations of primitive war causation and motivational analyses, and sometimes (seem to) preclude an evolutionary approach (in the Darwinian sense) altogether. Sometimes these theories are regarded as the sane alternative for the ’biological determinism’ and alleged ’innateness’ ascribed to the evolutionary theories. Yet, every theory, even the most anti-nativist one, does make implicit assumptions about universal human nature. The most common implicit assumption in the cultural theories is that the human being, by virtue of being a cultural animal, has severed all ties with organic evolution, and that ’biology’ (including phylogeny) is therefore quite irrelevant as an explanatory category. Human nature, in this conception, is equivalent to neonatal infinite behavioral plasticity (a tabula rasa) and subsequent cultural moulding; all behavior, including warring behavior, is essentially learned and modulated by the values and requirements of the sociocultural milieu. Cultural evolution has totally superseded natural evolution. Such views are squarely in accordance with the established Standard Social Science Model of Man (see Cosmides & Tooby, 1992). Yet, in view of the evidence of chimpanzee warfare, an exclusively cultural origin of war in the human species seems unlikely. It is, moreover, hard to imagine that humans suddenly and out-of-the-blue invented war and started to fight full-blown and vicious wars some centuries BC, without some prior



knowledge of and experience with the more severe and intense forms of intergroup competition and conflict (Cf. Bigelow, 1975). Finally, of course, the theory of war as a unique and one-time historical invention cannot account for the presence of war in primitive societies, unless it is assumed that it always ’diffused’ to them after contact with ’advanced’ cultures. Such a position - that war in primitive societies is essentially a post-contact phenomenon and that the ’simpler’ societies learned the tricks of the trade from their ’civilized’ conquerors or neighbors - has indeed been defended. It is certainly true that contact with expanding states more often than not intensified local antagonisms and conflicts, and uprooted entire societies, especially in the Americas and Africa (see especially Ferguson & Whitehead, 1992), but that does not mean that the practice of violent intergroup clashes was non-existent before contact. Being aware of the ultimate reasons for the emergence of war in the evolutionary history of the human species (i.e., the selective forces) does not provide any clue to the proximate motives for waging particular wars. The merit of the cultural theories is that they may illuminate the immediate causative factors and individual motives involved in the actual behavior of both the decision-makers and the combatants who are doing the ’dirty work’. This raises the question of the relationship(s) among causes, motives and adaptive consequences (if any) of warfare. Van Hooff (1990) reasoned that a ’primitive’ warrior may fight in order to restore injured honour, to make an offering to the gods, to avenge a family feud etc., without being aware that his actions will bring about changes at ecological, demographic and population-genetic levels. These changes may well influence his survival and his, and his family’s, fecundity. These could be the adaptive consequences which gave a selective advantage to those, who kept to suitable cultural rules under circumstances in which these effects could arise. At the same time the cultural system concerned would be successful. Even a primitive man, who cannot see through the maze of causal connections involved here, may nevertheless feel that things will be better for him and his kin, if he keeps himself to certain rules; therefore, he had better obey his gods (van Hooff, 1990). The train of thought underlying such a view seems to be the following: An evolutionary-theoretical perspective may provide some insight in understanding the relationships between, on the one hand, causes and motives of primitive war, and, on the other hand, the proximate and ultimate effects of warfare. These relationships can be envisaged as a multiple-feedback regulating mechanism or cybernetic system. Within an evolutionary framework, one might expect that the ultimate effects of a certain kind of behavior (in casu warring behavior), will, through feedback, have a selecting and directing influence on the motive systems of the



individuals exhibiting such behavior, in the sense that the motive systems as a rule will result in these ultimate effects (on the condition that these ultimate effects do indeed contribute to the inclusive fitness of the individuals concerned). This does not mean, however, that in the motive systems of the individuals concerned the ultimate effects also function as the goal states, the target values or Sollwert of the regulating mechanism. For example, in human sexual behavior, procreation (the ’ultimate’ effect) is generally not the proximate motive to engage and indulge in it. The motives of individuals will, also as a rule, be related to the causes of the behavior, but they can diverge, deviate from the latter to a certain extent, and acquire some degree of autonomy. Headhunting, with its magico-religious beliefs and practices, for example, may serve to decrease the local competition; the replenishment of game animals; a greater share of the protein supply to the successful warriors, which, in turn, gives the warriors a greater chance of reproducing; and the community acquires the trophies which it finds instrumental in magically influencing the capture of game or the growth of the crops, or the placation of the spirits. Whatever the initial motives behind the headhunting, the beneficial effects are clear to see for all parties involved, except of course the unfortunate victims. The immediate effects of a behavior are perceived and evaluated by the individuals involved on the basis of their connection to the motives, whereas the ultimate effects, not necessarily identified as such by the individuals concerned, will affect the conditions of life in such a way as to assert a directing and selecting effect on the pertinent motive systems. When the discrepancy, the gap grows too vast between the effects resulting from the proximate motives, on the one hand, and, on the other, the effects which should have been produced for the conditions of life for the individual to relatively improve, then such a motive system - with its adherent cognitions, ideas, attitudes, emotions, etc. - will be at a serious disadvantage vis-à-vis a better adapted motive system. In the Darwinian bio-logic of reproductive success, this means that the individuals and societies that waged war eratically or for rather bizarre, capricious, or trivial purposes did not achieve the same reproductive success as those that fought prudently for, evolutionarily, relevant and sound reasons. Even when caught in a virulent war-complex, trapped in a stalemate of fear and antagonism, societies are all absolute losers, but some of them are relative winners in that they are more reproductively successful (van Hooff, p.c.). The discrepancy between motive and adaptive effect will be greatest among the hunter-gatherers. As the socio-cultural revolution progresses, and man gains a better comprehension of the circumstances on which his existence depends, for example, farming, cattle-raising, storage of produce and equipment, the economic and political-strategic motives will start to coincide more and more with the adaptive consequences of war.



But even in the most advanced cultures immaterial, psycho-social and ideological motives emerge, whether or not to disguise material motives. Let’s return to primitive cultures. Here one finds the greatest diversity of belligerence. And it is also here that immediate material profit from a war is least visible. That is why some find it useless to regard the development of belligerence as an adjustment to ecological circumstances, let alone as an aspect of phylogenetic adaptation (van Hooff, 1990). 5.1.1 Warrior versus Soldier Why review cultural theories? They are unlikely to illuminate the problem why war evolved (in the Darwinian sense) in the course of hominid/human phylogeny. They can, however, throw considerable light on the corollary question why humans, or rather human males, fight wars at all. This is a question of proximate causes and precipitants of particular wars, and the motives to participate in the actual fighting of the individuals involved, i.e., not only what is known in contemporary military sociology as the question of ’combat motivation’, but what, in general terms, may be called ’the psychology of the warrior’. The psychology of the warrior is perhaps revealed best when contrasted with that of the contemporary soldier in a conscription army. The psychological ingredients which make an effective and efficient contemporary soldier are only remotely, if at all, related to the requisite qualities of the band-level or tribal warrior. Obedience to authority, submissiveness and servility, courage and bravery, contempt of death and unconditional self-sacrifice, and other qualities which are expected of the soldier are hardly relevant for the warrior, whose ’code of honor’ would contain a considerable dose of ’healthy cowardice’. A trueblooded warrior would not allow himself to be abused as cannon-fodder, and would probably look at the battlefields around Verdun in utter disbelief. The warrior’s ferocity is, to a large extent, fake; his ’aggressive’ posture makebelieve and bluff; his showing-off, intimidating and theatrical gestures a cloak, his vain-glorious callisthenics and histrionics an excellent ’show of ferocity’ (Chagnon, 1968): It is better to have a reputation of bravery and valiance, for whatever reason, than actually to be a brave and valiant warrior. Such dramatic expression of ’aggression’ has, as Jagers (1982) aptly observed, nothing to do with uncontrollable drives or spontaneously erupting impulses, but, on the contrary, everything with self-control and self-restraint. The overriding objective in primitive warfare is, generally speaking, the avoidance of casualties in one’s own ranks, while at the same time inflicting some damage to the enemy. This is the (tactical) reason behind the preference for surprise raiding, ambush and sneak attacks (Feest, 1980), which, as we have seen in Ch. 2, are much more prevalent than pitched battles in primitive



1

war . Raiding and ambushes, with dawn attacks on unsuspecting settlements, or the killing of a solitary worker (be it man, woman or child) in the field in order to obtain a trophy, is not conducive to martial valor. On the contrary, these stealthy tactics more often than not lead to acts which we would unhesitantly classify as ’cowardly’, ’foul play’, ’treacherous’, ’guileful’ and ’cruel’ if practiced by contemporary soldiers. "Since the purpose of the raids was to return with a human head, the Kalinga of Luzon considered themselves lucky if they could ambush a lone man, an old woman, or a child, because it was less dangerous to kill them" (Feest, 1980). Also among the Plains Indians, many tribes regarded the killing of a woman or a child as a feat entitling to war honors (Lowie, 1954). The methods of fighting and the ’code of honor’ of the warrior are adjusted to such surreptitious tactics and the demands of military exploits totally different from those of massive drilled armies of anonymous soldiers clashing on a mechanized battlefield, or remotely destroying each other from a comfortable position in front of a computer terminal. In terms of sheer survival chances and cost/benefit considerations, the behavior of the warrior is more (bio)logical than that of the modern soldier. In contemporary conscription armies very serious coercive measures (death penalty) against desertion are commonly implemented (in itself a sign that butchering each other is not man’s favorite sport). In primitive communities, on the other hand, the able-bodied male is a warrior on a relatively voluntary basis, and he can be coaxed, but not coerced to participate in raids or even in communal defense (with the exception of chiefdom-level societies and pristine states). He has to be coaxed by prospects of booty and beauty, or glory and renown - at low cost to himself. And even in the heat of battle (or when 2 perceiving a ’bad omen’ on the warpath ) an individual warrior might decide 1

The Anggor of New Guinea even consider a pitched battle a tactical failure because a successful raid should become a rout, not a battle (Huber, 1975). 2

Among the Plains Indians, for example, a bad omen sufficed to make the warriors give up an intended raid. Only if inspired by a supernatural being C a spirit appearing in a dream or vision C did a Crow venture to go on the warpath (Lowie, 1954). Similar accounts of this blending of supernaturalism and warfare can be found in numerous ethnographies. Elkin (1938) relates how ’fear of the unknown’ affected the ’wars’ of the Australian aborigines: "Not infrequently a local group sets out full of vim and boastfulness to go some distance away to attack another tribe, but some days later returns in ’ones’ and ’twos’ and ’threes’ and so on, without having sighted the group in the other tribe whom they set out to annihilate. Had they met the latter, they would have been brave enough, performed the preliminaries and had the fight C or if their heart had kept up, might have successfully attacked the ‘enemy’ camp at dawn. But as they got away from their own tribal territory, they passed into country of unknown totemic heroes and spirit-centers some of which might be lethal to those who did not know how to approach them. Moreover, they were in a region where the forms of magic, being unknown, were endowed by their imagination with special potency, and might cause them disaster. And so, one by one, in face of the terrors of the unknown, they gave in and turned back".



that fighting is not conducive to his health and corporeal integrity, and leave 3 the scene, without repercussions . The warrior keeps his self-interest keenly in mind, and - not being drilled and conditioned to be an efficient ’killing machine’ nor to be an equally efficient piece of cannon-fodder - his martial prowess and callisthenics easily change into athletic feats of tactical retreat if the situation so requires. Even among the fierce Yanomamö, who have been described as among the most violent and belligerent peoples in the world, the dose of 'healthy cowardice' I mentioned earlier is easily discernible and very evident. "Despite the Orinoco-Macava Yanomami's reputation for ferocity, their [the headmen's] efforts to organize war parties meet with resistance, counterarguments, and a high rate of 'deserters' (Biocca, 1971: 218; Chagnon, 1977: 115, 130; Lizot, 1985: 182-83)" (Ferguson, 1992). This may be one of the reasons why Turney-High (1949) regards the primitive warrior as militarily inept, despite all his pranks and occasional bloodshed. 5.1.2 A Brief Digression on ’Causes of War’ There is no general classification of primitive war theories. Otterbein (1973) attempted to bring some order in the chaos, but his classification of Causes of War is a curious hodgepodge of presumed causative factors on various and heterogeneous levels of analysis. He lists as Causes of War: innate aggression ('instinct of pugnacity' approaches); frustration-aggression (hatred of the enemy); diffusion (spread of invention); physical environment (a culture's mode of adaptation to its natural environment); goals of war (values of men); Social structure (fraternal interest group theory); military preparedness (efficient military organization); and cultural evolution (level of sociopolitical complexity). Simple as the words 'causes of war' may prima vista seem, a second look may teach otherwise. To some, as Q.Wright (1942, 1965) noted, a cause of war is an event, condition, act, or personality involved only in a particular war; to others it is a general proposition applicable to many wars. To some it is a class of human motives, ideals, or values; to others it is a class of impersonal forces, conditions, processes, patterns, or relations. In the historic sense a cause is any event or condition figuring in the description of the relevant antecedents of an effect. The historic causes of war are 3

Bancroft (1875), however, mentions some kind of ’losing face’ as a punishment incurred from cowardice among the Mohave. If a Mohave warrior is taken prisoner and later returns, "his mother even will not own him". And Speke (1908) states that runaways among the Wahuma were tortured to death. Such statements are, however, exceptional in societies ’below’ the chiefdom-level of sociopolitical organization. Bravery in battle, on the other hand, may be encouraged, as Holsti (1913) suggested, by the fear of being ridiculed, especially by wives or paramours.



sometimes subdivided into ’immediate causes’, ’special causes’, and ’general causes’. The historians of particular wars have usually distinguished idealistic, psychological, political, economic, and juridical elements in their causation. In the practical sense a cause is any controllable element in the statement of the origin, treatment, solution, or meaning of a problem or situation. In his opus magnum Q.Wright himself uses the Aristotelian distinction of ’efficient causes’ and ’final causes’ (comparable to necessary and sufficient conditions). In his study the term ’causes of war’ refers to ’efficient causes’ which precede the outbreak of war. Wright concludes his review with the rather all-embracing statement: "War has politico-technological, juroideological, socio-religious, and psycho-economic causes". In his influential Man, The State and War, Waltz (1959) asserts that the corpus of thought on war clusters about three basic images (or levels of explanation) of why conflict arises in international relations. According to one view, the locus of the major causes of war is found in the nature and behavior of man. Wars, according to this image, result from selfishness, from misdirected aggressive impulses, from stupidity, from lack of information, etc.; other causes are secondary and have to be interpreted in the light of these factors. In the second image the basic causes of war are found in the political structures and social, economic conditions of the separate states, or comparable actors in the political arena. Theorists of the second image emphasize the aggressive nature of certain states seeking to advance their power, prestige, and wealth. In the third image, the locus of major causes is found neither in men nor in states but in the state system itself: the anarchic character of international society with its lack of an effective machinery of social control and sanction. Waltz acknowledges that most scholars combine the three images in their thought, but tend to give prominence to one. Mutatis mutandis, these three levels of analysis may also be applied to the study of primitive war. In his Causes of War, Bernard (1944) presents a list of contrast pairs, distinguishing incidental/fundamental causes, superficial/underlying, accidental/purposive, unpremeditated/premeditated, temporary/persistent, transitory/continuous, proximate/remote, efficient/final, initial/ultimate, original/derivative, concrete/abstract, simple/complex, special/general, open/concealed, specific/circumstantial, human/natural, explicit/obscure, personal/social, single/multiple, contributing/exclusive, reputed/actual, ostensible/real, and physical/psychological. In contemporary quantitative studies of war, a distinction between ’underlying causes’ and ’proximate causes’ or precipitants (Vasquez, 1993) is generally made. The underlying causes are generally situated on the systemic level. In increasing order of complexity, one might also distinguish between (a) Anstoß causality, a simple Newtonian-mechanical cause-effect chain as in two billiard balls clashing (in which the ’cause’ energy is proportionate to the ’effect’ energy); (b) trigger causality, in which the energetic effect (the bullet speeding



from the barrel) is many times amplified and disproportionate with respect to the event which released it (the finger on the trigger); and (c) network causality, in which a change in one parameter of a system’s components reverberates through the entire system, or a distortion of one mesh in a net ripples through the net as a whole. In most complex systems this also implies feedback to one or more of the sensors, such that the end result may be either damping oscillations (in the case of negative feedback) or the collapse of the system (in the case of positive feedback). On the social level, events have aspects of all these three forms of causality in various combinations. In historical studies it is not unusual to encounter the, sometimes implicit, distinction between structural, conjunctural, and situational determinants of events such as wars. Many contemporary war researchers consider wars to be over-determined, and their model, accordingly, is one of multicausality or equifinality (See e.g., van der Dennen, 1980). In their case study of Quechan (Yuma) warfare, Kroeber & Fontana (1986) distinguish between motives and origins or causative factors. According to these authors, motives are overt and are triggers for particular battles, series of battles, or even prolonged enmities. Origins are the covert and latent wellsprings of warfare. Motives are immediate causes; origins are ultimate causes. What one scholar regards as the causes of war, another one considers to be the motives, and ’vice versa’. In this chapter I shall use the terms ’motive’ and ’causative factor’ in a rather loose sense as referring to any observable or hypothetical factor in the total network of conditions eventually resulting in war. Not all researchers agree that it is useful and worthwhile to uncover the causes of war. For instance, Service (1975) holds that "It is usually idle to talk of the ’causes of war’; it is the evolution of various causes of peace that can be studied in the human record; and a large and essential part of the evolution of political organization is simply an extension and intensification of peace-making 4 means" . 4

"Chagnon, along with Sahlins (1968) and Service (1967, 1975), invokes Hobbes to argue that war is the normal state of existence for ’tribal’ peoples who have no overarching authority to prevent war. By simple inference, or by direct implication in the case of Chagnon (1974: 195; 1977: 163), this proposition suggests that war is the normal state of existence for all societies, because even modern nations are not subject to an overarching power able to prevent war. And if war is normal, then it requires no special explanation. Chagnon states this view quite clearly in the second edition of Yanomamö: 'Warfare among the Yanomamö C or any sovereign tribal people C is an expectable form of political behavior and no more requires special explanations than do religion or economy' (Chagnon, 1977: 163). That statement remains in the third edition of Yanomamö (1983: 213), although some of the supporting argument has been cut. Given the widespread use of Yanomamö in introductory anthropology courses, the proposition is of more than theoretical concern. Thousands of students every year are learning that war between sovereign political groups is normal, expectable, and need not be questioned" (Ferguson, 1984).



5.2 Sociocultural Selection and Evolution of War The idea of cultural (also called social or sociocultural) selection is explained as follows by Carneiro (1970), one of its most ardent advocates. When societies fight, he contends, the cultural equivalent of natural selection comes into play. This ’cultural selection’ operates in two ways; within societies and between societies. In intrasocietal selection, two or more variants of a cultural trait compete for the same ’cultural slot’, with the more efficient one eventually displacing the less efficient. This is an example of the ’principle of competitive exclusion’ (Gause, 1932), an important principle in organic evolution. In intersocietal selection, however, the unit on which selection operates is not the culture-trait as such, but the society bearing it. As societies compete, the "less well adapted tend to fall by the wayside, leaving outstanding those best able to withstand the competition". From the point of view of the traits involved, the two forms of selection produce the same effect; more efficient traits survive and spread, while less efficient ones decline and disappear. Tylor (1871) saw this clearly when he wrote: "[T]he institutions which can best hold their own in the world gradually supersede the less fit ones, and... this incessant conflict determines the general course of culture". Cultural selection, which operates even on traits of little or no adaptive value (in the biological sense), acts with special intensity on traits directly concerned with survival. And since there is generally no greater challenge to a society’s existence than war, it is here that we find selection operating most rigorously. Both forms of selection are at work in warfare. For example, the gun displaced the bow-and-arrow as a weapon of war, not only because bow-using tribes abandoned the bow and took up the gun but also because peoples who relied on the bow were engulfed or exterminated by those with the gun. As Vayda (1968) has noted, war is often regarded as a "nonfunctional, pathological condition of society". But, Carneiro holds, to consider warfare as nothing more than this is to allow emotion to becloud understanding. From the time that cultural-evolutionary theory developed, in the midnineteenth century, scientists have proposed theories of sociocultural evolution which relate the development of war to various levels of political centralization. These theories have in common the notion that as societies evolve (become more complex sociopolitically), they come to wage war in more efficient ways. Sometimes war is seen as producing the evolution of societies; sometimes it is the political level of the societies which is seen as being responsible for the type of war waged. In either case, level of political centralization or sociopolitical complexity and degree of military efficiency are



viewed as being functionally related (Otterbein, 1970). Bagehot, 1872; Spencer, 1874 et seq.; Sumner, 1911; Holsti, 1913; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Keller, 1915; Sumner & Keller, 1927; van der Bij, 1929; Davie, 1929; Malinowski, 1941; Chapple & Coon, 1942; Q.Wright, 1942; TurneyHigh, 1949; White, 1949; Newcombe, 1960; Sahlins, 1961; Service, 1962; Andreski, 1964, 1968, 1971; Fried, 1967; Hunter & Whitten, 1976; Carneiro, 1970 et seq.; Harris, 1979, 1980; Feest, 1980; among others, all imply stages of 5 cultural evolution and changing war patterns in their theories . An avowed cultural evolutionist, White (1949) argued that as Man’s cultural heritage increases, economic and political goals become the causes of war. According to White, warfare is virtually non-existent among many primitive tribes; when cultures have progressed to the point where it is worth fighting over hunting or fishing grounds, grazing lands or fertile valleys, warfare emerges. Also Malinowski (1941) argued that warfare only slowly evolved as a mechanism of organized force for the pursuit of national policies. He described six types of armed contest, each of which, he said, "presents an entirely different cultural phase in the development of organized fighting". Only two of these types Malinowski considered to be war. Turney-High (1949) similarly argued that only the ’advanced’ societies have reached the ’military horizon’, by which he meant the military efficiency to wage ’true’ war. 5.2.0.1 Biphasic Theory of the Evolution of War: Endemic vs Instrumental In 1929, a Dutchman, van der Bij, wrote a dissertation entitled Ontstaan en eerste ontwikkeling van den oorlog [Genesis and initial development of war], in which he envisaged some kind of two-step or biphasic model of the evolution of human warfare on the basis of his findings (and quite in accordance with the results of Hobhouse et al., 1915; and Q.Wright, 1942) that the more ’simple’ the people the more peaceful it tended to be. Van der Bij concluded that in the initial phase of human evolution war did not play any significant role, and most probably was lacking altogether. Only in a more advanced phase or stage of human evolution did war emerge. Later, Mühlmann (1940) and Meyer (1977 et seq.) proposed a similar trajectory for the evolution of human war. The evolution of war as the most important form of collective violence is attributed by Meyer (1977 et seq.) to developments in Man's psycho-cultural sphere. Nevertheless, it is the 'deep grammar' of the bio-social level that sets the general frame within which the different ideas, social organizations, etc. 5

See also: Sahlins & Service, 1960; Krader, 1968; Sahlins, 1968; Flannery, 1972; Adams, 1975; Service, 1975; Webb, 1975; Webster, 1975, 1977; H.Wright, 1977; Claessen & Skalnik, 1978; Cohen & Service, 1978; Goody, 1980; Haas, 1982; Brumfiel, 1983; and Ferguson, 1984, 1990.



vary. The psycho-cultural level in Man, mainly the combination of vast perception, the algorithmic character of data processing and simultaneous feedback with built-in constancies of expectation seem to produce two closely interrelated results: An increasing demand for causal explanation, and fear. Among the characteristics of primitive society, the unified, unfragmented character of its cosmology seems most relevant for the topic of power and violence. Human action is intertwined with cosmic order, thus every single act might endanger this order. The all-pervasive importance of order in this stage seems to be a manifestation of the basic psychological problem: The necessity of delimiting the self-conscious individual or psycho-cultural entity from the surrounding chaos. The ’in-group’ represents form, whereas the ’out-group’, including aspects of the natural environment, represents formlessness, and therefore is alien and dangerous (See Ch. 6). Collective violence between groups, at this stage, seems to be caused by their mythologies. The strategic concept in these mythologies is power; actors strive for power in order to improve their positions. An analysis of such sociocultural systems must take the close interrelation of empirical and transempirical processes into account. Power, being essentially a quality of the transempirical realm, nevertheless is also the decisive quality of empirical social life. The psycho-cultural level is interrelated with the social level, where the subsequent blood feuds enhance the tendency towards an incessant cycle of violent interaction. The state of war between such societies may thus be characterized as endemic war - a relation between societies where war seems to be an end in itself rather than an instrument. Fear as the universal motive behind primitive warfare has been most eloquently exposed by Meyer: "Die Manifestationen kollektiver Gewalt erscheinen vielmehr einer Atmosphäre der Furcht vor dem Fremden zu entspringen, die, den Angriff des Fremden antizipierend, diesem zuvorzukommen trachtet" [The manifestations of collective violence appear to spring from an atmosphere of xenophobia which, anticipating the attack by the stranger, leads to pre-emptive attack] (Meyer, 1981a). Such fear-inspired pre-emptive attack is embedded in the extreme ethnocentrism of primitive societies. The decisive breakthrough in the evolution of war came about with the instrumentalization of collective violence, promoted by the development of specialized warrior societies or classes, technical inventions (weapons), and social inventions, mainly the idea of incorporating defeated social groups. Subsequently, Meyer (1987 et seq.) emphasizes the absence of economic motives for collective violence among hunter-gatherer societies, together with the insight that war is not a unitary phenomenon throughout social evolution. Quite to the contrary, the institution of war has changed its form, its underlying causes, and consequently its general 'function' for society as a whole during sociocultural evolution. Furthermore, he disputes that 'aggression' can account



for any relevant aspect of war. Explanations in terms of ultimate causality can account only for a very basic layer of aggressive dispositions. Such dispositions are not suited at all for an explanation of war (Meyer, 1981; van der Dennen, 1986); while aggression is an individual attribute, war is a special form of collective violence. Meyer stipulates that "people don’t fight for resources but for ideas of resources". What, then, are the ideas of resources that can motivate primitive peoples to invest their most precious resource (i.e., life) into ’senseless’ wars? The answer is that non-materialistic and metaphysical notions of resources prevail in the stage of endemic war. The major objective of primitive war seems to be the restoration of the metaphysical and legal status quo ante, exemplified by revenge feuding. In many tribal societies another typical motivation of recurrent raiding is head- and trophy-hunting, in which power, as essentially a cosmic property, resides. Participation in a war party is considered an important rite de passage; the acquisition of the power of the slain enemy gives additional power and ’magic fertility’ to the victor. Another important characteristic of cultures at this endemic stage of warfare is the absence of a clear-cut separation between the state of war and the state of peace. Feuding and other forms of violent interaction were quite common among primitive societies, and ethnographers interested in explanations found that the underlying enmity appeared quite natural and self-evident to the persons concerned. When asked about their reasons for this enmity, tribal people very frequently hinted at their group’s identity which was defined by its antagonistic relation with other groups. According to these views, membership in group A is defined by non-membership in groups B and C. Moreover, groups B and C are, by their very existence, a sort of negation of A, endangering its identity. From an evolutionary point of view this delimitation may not be surprising at all since it is a common feature of social life. Animal species have visual, olfactory and various other signals at their disposal enabling them to distinguish ’us’ from ’them’. This ability to make such distinctions obviously is a necessary concomitant of any type of sociality. Human sociality, however, additionally entails some cultural mechanisms which intensify the necessary distinctions between groups. The human mind succeeds in the functional integration of a purely informational system with an evaluative system, the first processing signs, the latter processing Gestalt qualities, images and their affective-emotional concomitants. Following this interpretation, the construction of identity in a hypothetical tribal situation combines a sort of ’logic’ peculiar to sign systems with evaluative standards from human affectivity. Unlike animals, humans have to define their identities by a peculiar logic of semiotic systems. An influential feature of such systems is, according to Bateson (1983), the feasibility and necessity of negation, of ’no’ and ’not’. Term A can only be defined by reference to the difference between A as compared to B, and as compared to C, etc. A’s identity can only be defined, in other words,



by the use of non-identities or contrasts. Cultural identity may be viewed as an expression of cooperation; it pays for actors to comply with social expectations. Such actors will gain in terms of social status, which will enable them in turn to reproduce their views and ideas, and themselves, at a higher rate than others. Numerous studies of tribal society have pointed out that usually permission for marriage was only granted after having successfully taken part in warfare. It is felt that such deeds impart ’magic fertility’ to warriors who will in turn be paid tribute to and, most importantly, will be allowed to marry and have children. Thus tribal warfare is imbued with a peculiar logic, the understanding of which requires cultural categories. While the motives of warfare undoubtedly are of a psychological and cultural nature, their effects are, also beyond any doubt, of a biological character. Some members of a population will reproduce at a higher rate than others and this, of course, is at the heart of evolutionary theory. Natural selection does not favor destructiveness as such, but reproductive success. Violent interaction makes evolutionary sense only if it serves reproduction. Contrary to the agonistic behavior of animal species, numerous human cultures have employed concepts of ’magic fertility’ which require a maximum toll of lives as a criterion of success. Ethnographic reports on tribal warfare among the Mundurucu and Jivaro exemplify uses of this concept while Aztec wars offer an example of a more complex society’s adherence to the concept of ’magic fertility’. In a situation of intertribal anarchy and insecurity, self-help (i.e., revenge and retaliation) is the only way to restore the political and metaphysical status quo. The talion law (lex talionis) and revenge is a mechanism of ’primitive’ distributive justice: a litigatio. At the same time, this stage of ’primitive war’ is not an ’Agent of Progress’, as has been widely claimed, but its exact opposite (Cf. Mühlmann, 1940; Meyer, 1990). As Meyer (1990) observed: "[T]he virtually incessant cycles of primitive war did not set in motion anything relevant for 6 social evolution" . This is not surprising because in rampant war complexes (i.e., in regions where warfare is endemic), war, in the form of periodic and mutual revenge raiding and/or headhunting, functions primarily as a strategy for the maintenance of territorial integrity and ethnic group identity, with only occasional, opportunistic, territorial expansion. If, as Agent of Progress theorists claim, intergroup competition/warfare has been a motor of human evolution, it should be possible to find evidence for this thesis in rampant war complex areas. We should see the motor of progress in 6

Cf. "Although war can be an important part of sociocultural evolution, it is not the prime mover" (Ferguson, 1994; Cf. Claessen & van de Velde, 1985).



statu operandi so to speak. But on the contrary, in Amazonia, precolumbian Coahuiltecan Texas, and New Guinea (to mention only the best known of these areas), there is no evidence of (1) arms-technological improvement; (2) progress in logistics, tactics and/or strategy of warfare; (3) socioeconomic, psychocultural or political development. Paula Brown (1978), in her analysis of New Guinea Highlands warfare, clearly noted the sociopolitical stagnation, rather than development, in her discussion of ’big men’ who lead the fights: "In the highlands, such exceptional men of great renown never established a long-term domination of any large group. No kingdom, establishment, permanent control, or continuity of leadership has ever occurred there. Highland leadership has always been the big man’s personal following, from his clan, tribe, kin, and affines, which did not survive him. It is difficult to imagine any long-lived political unification emerging from such a pattern". Lee (1990), commenting on Carneiro’s environmental circumscription theory of the origin of chiefdoms and states, noted that "Tropical forest South America and highland New Guinea both exhibit high levels of warfare, but they have not produced chiefdoms". It may be argued that instrumental war, war for economic, predatory reasons and territorial expansion and annexation is a relatively late, political invention that apparently has been made by only a minority of peoples. Mühlmann (1940) observed that war probably originated in and evolved from the blood feud. The least warlike peoples have only retaliation as a goal of war. That war opens the possibility of benefit, of economic gain, that war can be productive, is a discovery that is gradually made in the course of development. The discovery of economic goals of war is related to the valuation of wealth. Such 7 valuation arises only at a fairly advanced level of cultural evolution . The fact is, Mühlmann (1940) explains, that in the majority of primitive peoples "das Bestreben der scharfen Selbstbegrenzung den Ausdehnungsdrang überwiegt; und es ist gerade der rein defensive Character dieser Selbstbegrenzung, der diesen Völkern den Weg zu politischer Größe versperrt und sie auf der Stufe von Naturvölkern verharren läßt" [the striving for sharp ethnic boundaries prevails over expansionistic tendencies; and it is exactly the defensive character of this self-insulation that precludes sociopolitical progress and keeps these peoples on a primitive level]. "Regarding the diffusion of violent types of inter-societal relations, the cultural 7

"Daß der Krieg die Möglichkeit einer Vorteilserringung, eines ökonomisch ausdrückbaren Gewinnes bietet, daß er produktiv sein kann, ist eine Entdeckung, die erst im Verlaufe der Entwicklung allmählich gemacht wird... Nimmt doch der Krieg seinen Ausgang von der Blutrache. Die am wenigsten kriegerischen Völker kennen nur die Vergeltung als Kriegsziel... Die Entdeckung wirtschaftlicher Kriegsziele ist an die Schätzung des Reichtums geknüpft. Diese Schätzung stellt sich erst bei höheren Naturvölkern ein" (Mühlmann, 1940).



invention of the instrumental benefits of such collective behavior may be considered the single most important cause of the spread of violence" (Meyer, 1993). Once the threshold between primitive and full-fledged, instrumental, war was crossed a major push was exerted on social evolution, at times favoring the evolution of more complex political structures, sometimes fostering less complex solutions. The evolution of archaic empires and their succession by the less complex feudal societies demonstrate these alternating states of complexity. It may be argued that, prior to this invention, warfare was mostly synonymous with revenge feuding and other types of low-level and small-scale violence. 5.2.0.2 The Four-Stage Model of the Evolution of War Probably the best known typology of war as a product of cultural evolution (and vice versa) is that developed by Fried (1967) and Hunter & Whitten (1976), and the typology of military organization as a function of political organization as developed by Feest (1980). Also Andreski (1964, 1968) proposed an elaborate typology of idealtypical and transitional types of military organization in primitive cultures, which will be briefly discussed. Sahlins (1961) and Service (1962) proposed a scheme of social evolution in four stages: the band, the tribe, the chiefdom and finally the state, whereby ’civilization’ made its entry into history. A band is only an association, more or less residential, of nuclear families. A tribe is of the order of a large collection of bands but is not simply a collection of bands (Honigmann [1964] distinguishes three types of tribes by referring to their form of political organization: non-segmentary acephalous tribes, segmentary acephalous tribes, and the centralized tribes). A chiefdom is particularly distinguished from tribes by the presence of centers which coordinate economic, social and religious activities, and redistribute a large part of the production of local communities. Then the state appears, reinforcing this centralization and constituting a political structure definitely superior and exterior to the local social groups, transforming social inequality of rank into class privileges. When the distribution of warfare among groups described in the ethnographic literature is examined, a well-defined pattern in the evolution of warfare emerges. Fried (1967) and Hunter & Whitten (1976) also identified four levels or stages in the cultural and sociopolitical evolution of society (which has, with minor variants, become the standard paradigm among cultural evolutionists): egalitarian society, rank society, stratified society, and state-level society. These authors assume that this sequence represents a cultural-evolutionary development, not just the different levels of sociopolitical organization found in the world today. The nature of warfare as it is conducted at each of these levels of sociopolitical organization appears to differ in a systematic way.



Egalitarian Societies In egalitarian societies, which provide valued social positions for every member, subsistence activities are limited to food collecting - that is, hunting and gathering. Living in loosely defined territories at population densities approximating perhaps three people per square mile, these societies make all of nature’s strategic resources available to all members; only nonstrategic resources (such as personal adornments) are regarded as private property. This situation obviously makes irrelevant one of the major origins of conflict in more complex society: "The significant sources of food available to simple societies are not foreclosed to any member of the group and... usually are available to outsiders as well" (Fried, 1967). Given these features of social life, and given that virtually no power hierarchy exists, the following characteristics of the very limited amount of warfare waged at this level of sociopolitical development are hardly surprising: (1) No time is devoted to preparing for war; (2) no fortifications are built; (3) no food or supplies are stockpiled; (4) nobody engages in specialized training in the arts of war; (5) there is no specialized military technology - ordinary hunting weapons are used in warfare; (6) combat intensity is low; (7) prolonged actions such as sieges or campaigns do not occur; (8) the most typical action is a raid, involving a brief clash between the two sides; and (9) there is a complete absence of a command hierarchy and consequently minimal combat organization (Fried, 1967; Hunter & Whitten, 1976). Also Harris (1980) holds that warfare was probably practiced by Paleolithic hunters and gatherers but on a small scale and infrequently. To this sociopolitical level belong Q.Wright’s (1942) categories of Defensive and Social War. If war is never embarked upon except for immediate defense of the group against attack, military organization is usually nonexistent, tactics consist in the spontaneous use of methods and weapons employed in the hunt, and war is generally regarded as a calamity when it occurs. Groups with these characteristics are almost universally characterized as unwarlike. Even more does this characterization apply to the few tribes who do not even defend themselves from attack. If war is never embarked upon for economic or political purposes, but is regularly utilized to slaughter extra-group individuals or groups for purposes of revenge, religious expiation, sport, or personal prestige (Social War), there is seldom a specialized military class, though all boys are likely to have military training; tactics follow established methods of raid, ambush, and pitched battle, utilizing specialized military weapons; and portions of the tribe, at least, are inclined eagerly to embark upon war as a laudable and sporting adventure. While some writers characterize groups with this practice as warlike, and undoubtedly they are more warlike than groups of the first type, it seems appropriate to regard them as less warlike than those who utilize war for providing economic necessities (Q.Wright, 1942).



Rank Societies In rank societies "positions of valued status are somehow limited so that not all those of sufficient talent to occupy such statuses actually achieve them" (Fried, 1967). Although in rank societies the labor is divided mostly in terms of age and sex, as in egalitarian societies, work itself is confined to smaller, well-defined geographical territories and generally involves the planting and harvesting of domesticated plants (Hunter & Whitten, 1976). "All the sources of interpersonal conflict found in egalitarian society persist in rank society, as indeed they persist in all subsequently evolved types of society. Certain kinds of irritation not present in egalitarian society make their appearance in rank societies, although their expression may be relatively subdued. For example, while access to basic resources within the corporate unit is not significantly altered, there tends to be much more consumer’s property in rank society. Patterns of reciprocal exchange do operate to keep these things in circulation, but there is a qualitative break with egalitarian societies as accumulation of nonstrategic values is often the basis or means of validation of rank distinctions" (Fried, 1967). An outstanding feature of rank societies is their combativeness. Many seem to be in a relatively constant state of warfare, with group anxiety about war providing a psychological mechanism through which social cohesion is maintained - a crucial factor in the competition for survival. In rank societies, then, warfare is quite intense, and there are distinct military leadership roles. It appears that societies at this sociopolitical level interact with other such societies primarily in terms of military confrontation. However, the actual wars are generally quite brief: Periods between clashes are much longer than the clashes themselves. Thus Fried argues that rank societies are more accurately described as ’oriented around war’ rather than continually ’at war’ (Hunter & Whitten, 1976). After the development of permanent villages, with large investments in crops, animals, and stored foods, the form of warfare changed. Among huntergatherers, warfare involved a high degree of individualized combat directed toward the adjustment of real or imagined personal injuries and deprivations. Although the combat teams may have had a temporary territorial base, the organization of battle and the consequences of victory or defeat reflected the loose association between people and territory. The victors did not gain territory by routing their enemies. Warfare among village-dwelling cultivators (horti- and agriculturalists), however, frequently involves a total team effort in which definite territories are fought over and in which defeat may result in the rout of a whole community from its fields, dwellings, and natural resources. Although village peoples were not the first to practice warfare, they did expand the scale and ferocity of military engagements. Warfare among village cultivators is likely to be more costly in terms of battle casualties than among seminomadic hunters and gatherers (Harris, 1980).



To this, and the next, sociopolitical levels belong Q.Wright’s (1942) categories of Economic and Political War. If war, in addition to utilization for defensive and social purposes, is an important method for acquiring slaves, women, cattle, pastures, agricultural lands, or other economic assets essential to the life of the group, there are usually age groups specializing in warfare, trained in techniques of mass attack and mutual support, directed toward the most efficient achievement of the intended economic objects, and the group usually regards war as a necessary routine in its economic activities. As the objects of such war usually include the taking of women or slaves, enemies are, if possible, made prisoners instead of being slaughtered. Consequently, this type of war may seem more humane, and groups using it are by some considered less warlike than those in the second group. It appears, however, that the casualties of this kind of war are usually greater in proportion to the population than in purely social war. When defending his possessions, the enemy is more formidable than when his sole object is to save his skin or his head, for which purpose flight is adequate. Furthermore, groups which use war for economic purposes usually also employ it for social purposes, such as the provision of victims for human sacrifice or for blood revenge, frequently on a larger scale than do people in the second group. Finally, if war is fought not only for defensive, social, and economic purposes but also to maintain a ruling class in power and to expand the area of empire or political control, there is usually a specialized standing army, trained in mass maneuver, obedience to command, and the construction of artificial defenses. War is conducted by complicated operations often involving the cooperation of specialized military services, and war is regarded as particularly honorable and praiseworthy. It seems appropriate to regard people employing this type of war as the most warlike of all, not only because of their peculiarly favorable attitude toward war but also because they receive and inflict the greatest losses of population from war of any primitive people. The high morale which armies developed by people of this type customarily display enables them to endure more mutual slaughter than can the less-disciplined warriors involved in other types of primitive warfare. Furthermore, the tactics and weapons used by people of this class are more efficient for purposes of slaughter. Stratified Societies At this level of evolution societies are organized in such a way that "members of the same sex and equivalent age status do not have equal access to the basic resources that sustain life" (Fried, 1967). In other words, basic resources that are still available to all individuals in rank societies have been converted from shared, communal property to privately owned property in stratified societies. At this stage, warfare is even more frequent than among rank societies, and stratified societies have the resources in food surpluses to support military specialists and to wage highly sophisticated combat. "What is more, the



cultural development of warfare is more likely to receive special attention in a stratified society as owners can make economically rational decisions to divert resources and labor into military activities" (Fried, 1967). Examples are the wars of the Polynesian chiefdoms and African kingdoms. Wood (1870) relates about the wars of the Samoans: "The causes of war may mostly be reduced to four; namely, the desire of political supremacy, disputed succession to chieftainship, revenge for the murder of a chief, and infringement of the strange marriage laws of the Samoans. The first of these causes is always ranking. Each island is divided into several districts, and when one begins to show signs of special prosperity, another is sure to take umbrage at it and go to war in order to secure the ’Malo’, or political supremacy". The sweep of conquest of the Zulu, when Shaka had introduced system and discipline into warfare, throughout a huge portion of Africa, is well-known: "His troops swept over the country like an army of locusts, consuming everything on their way, and either exterminating the various tribes, or incorporating them in some capacity or other among the Zulus" (Wood, 1868). Sahlins (1961), and many others after him, argued that one specific type of sociopolitical organization, the so-called segmentary lineage, is particularly suited for predatory expansion. The State Once social stratification emerges, conflict develops between the ruling classes, who control access to basic resources such as land, and those classes who must pay for the right of access to these resources. At this point the state "a collection of specialized institutions and agencies, some formal and others informal, that maintains an order of stratification" (Fried, 1967) - arises as a mechanism by which the ruling classes maintain their position of advantage. The state protects itself against both internal and external attacks. It has the social, economic, and organizational resources to engage in extended and highly advanced forms of warfare and has the political flexibility to engulf and administer conquered peoples and territories. The state, not surprisingly, is the most warlike of all sociopolitical forms (Hunter & Whitten, 1976). But at this sociopolitical stage we have definitely left the domain of ’primitive’ warfare. 5.2.0.3 The Levels of Military Organization To the levels of sociopolitical organization presented above correspond the levels of military organization as distinguished by Feest (1980):

War-Chiefs on Basis of Reputation This level is exemplified by the Amazonian Jivaro, once notorious for their headhunting. The Jivaro ordinarily do not have a chief because there is no need



for a centralized political authority. Day-to-day decisions are made by the heads of kinship groups; they also settle disputes arising between those groups. Only in times of war will the Jivaro submit to the authority of an experienced warrior, whose commands in matters of war they obey strictly. Here, as in many similar cases, a war-chief is selected on the basis of proven ability, which illustrates the general rule that military leadership is more frequently based on achievement than is civil authority. The size of a raiding party will usually depend upon the reputation of its leader, whose following will increase with success and diminish with failure. Recruitment and participation in a war-party is voluntary and optional. Among the Plains Indians, for example, war parties were to a large extent private enterprises, organized on the personal initiative of some renowned warrior. A man who scored repeated successes as a leader came to be famous for his ’war medicine’, attracting young novices eager to share in its blessings (Lowie, 1954). Dual Leadership: Formal Peace- and War-Chiefs A more formalized distinction between the organization of a group in war and in peace is illustrated by the case of the Cherokee, a farming tribe of the southeastern United States. Each Cherokee town, a politically autonomous unit, was organized by two complementary authorities. White or Peace chiefs, consisting of clan leaders and respected elders, would rule by consensus in all matters relating to the internal affairs of the community. Red or War chiefs, drawn from the ranks of younger warriors, were responsible for the town’s external relations, including trade, hunting expeditions, and warfare. In their sphere they supplied assertive leadership. All townsmen were members of both organizations. Which of the two took precedence depended on the situation prevailing. See also Paula Brown (1978) for war and peace ’big men’ in the New Guinea Highlands societies. Some societies are themselves dually organized, divided into moieties (’halves’) or sodalities (nonexogamous moieties). Among some Pueblo Indian communities, such as the Tano, Keres, Taos, Picuris and Isleta, it was the kiva sodalities, for example, that organized communal hunts and retaliatory warfare under the direction of the moiety chiefs (Jorgensen, 1980). Hereditary Chiefs and Primordial Warrior Society By contrast, male members of the Dinka of Sudan either belong to a hereditary class who have a monopoly of ritual power and are exempt from military service; or else they are warriors. The religious specialists contribute to military affairs by praying for victory. There is a tendency to select war leaders from a specific kin group, but in practice ability counts for more than inheritance. Among the Masai of Kenya and their pastoralist neighbors, on the other hand, the class of warriors is defined strictly on age-grade principles. Those who, by a ceremony of circumcision, have passed the stage of boyhood, join the ranks



of the warriors until they get married, at which time they retire from active military duty. The warriors live segregated from the rest of the community and form a strongly integrated group. They are not allowed to drink beer, but are entitled to promiscuous sexual relations with unmarried girls. Full-Blown Military Societies An example of even more specialized organization is supplied by the military societies of the North American Plains Indians. These fraternities provided bonds across kinship groups, policed important communal events (such as the bison hunt) and acted as military units in times of war. Membership of such a society was indicated by special regalia, by which officers could also be distinguished from rank and file members. Within the fraternities a warlike spirit was cultivated. Membership sometimes entailed the obligation to be brave up to a certain point, for example, not to retreat behind a lance rammed into the ground (See ' 5.3.3, note 5). While some of these societies were agegraded, so that throughout his life a man would acquire membership in all of them in succession, others were not hierarchically ordered and members competed to outdo one another. Standing Armies Only with the emergence of a strong central authority do professional bodies of warriors gain prominence. In African kingdoms (but also in some other centralized chiefdoms) there were usually certain elite troops, such as border or palace guards, which were specially trained and supported by tributes paid to the ruler. Their duties might include construction and repair of public buildings to keep them busy during times of peace. Andreski (1964) distinguished six idealtypical types of military organization on the basis of 3 variables: Military Participation Ratio (M.P.R.: the number of warriors/soldiers relative to the total population), cohesion, and subordination. (1) Tallenic military organization is characterized by high M.P.R., low cohesion and low subordination. We should expect to find it, therefore, in egalitarian societies with rather inarticulate, amorphous political organization. High M.P.R. means that since all able-bodied males are supposed to be warriors if need be, there is no specialized warrior stratum, having the monopoly of arms, and thus able to acquire privileges. Nor are there, in view of the low degree of subordination, any rights to command which would enable their holders to elevate themselves above the common crowd. Indeed, any cohesion that there is in such societies stems from either far-reaching kinship links (e.g., the Tallensi) or from the consciousness of cultural identity. This type of military organization is found only in small, isolated tribes, usually situated in inaccessible places (e.g., the Tallensi, the Eskimo, the Australian aborigines). It cannot survive in conditions of intensive and frequent warfare.



(2) The Masaic type of military organization differs from the Tallenic only in its greater cohesion; M.P.R. remaining high and the degree of subordination low. It is usually found in societies which are small and unstratified, but possess definite political organization, even though this organization is extremely democratic. Its cohesion is mainly the result of military cohesion necessitated by constant warfare. The Masai and practically all small and warlike societies belong to this category. They can have leaders, who are, however, as a rule of charismatic type, and whose authority is very circumscribed. (3) The Mortazic (called after the mercenaries, or mortazeh, of the Abbaside Caliphate) type of military organization is characterized by low M.P.R., high cohesion and high subordination. It is not surprising, therefore, that it is found in societies which are steeply stratified and monocratically ruled. The organization of these societies may be segmentary (e.g., the Kitara Kingdom in Central Africa). This type of military organization can exist in very large societies, like the Roman Empire or Manchu China, but also in very small ones, like Milan under the Sforzas. (4) The Homoic type of military organization is characterized by low M.P.R., high cohesion and low subordination. Typically, it is found in nobiliary republics marked by steep stratification, high cohesion and egalitarianism within the ruling stratum (e.g., Sparta). (5) The Ritterian type of military organization is marked by a low M.P.R., low cohesion and low subordination. The political form which usually accompanies it is that of a nobiliary republic or feudal society. It seems inappropriate to apply the term feudal to all societies where a warrior stratum, possessing the monopoly of arms, rules unarmed masses. As such a type of society is, however, common enough, Andreski proposes to call it bookayan, and the dominating warrior stratum a bookay. These terms are derived from buke - the Japanese word for the military nobility. (6) The Neferic type of military organization is marked by high M.P.R., high cohesion and high subordination. It is generally found in totalitarian, bureaucratic, and despotic societies. The societies whose military organization was most purely neferic - the Ch’in (Qin) and the Inca states - were also the most despotic and totalitarian. Andreski also outlined in great detail the possible transitions from one type to another as a correlative of internal and external dynamics. 5.2.0.4

Simple vs Middle-range Societies and the U-shaped Trajectory of Violence Recently, Knauft (1991, 1994) made a distinction between ’simple’ and ’middle-range’ societies, and their concomitant patterns of (collective) violence. He proposed that the overall trajectory of violence and sociality in human evolution may be U-shaped instead of linear.



In simple human societies, according to Knauft’s analysis, lethal violence may be high in aggregate statistical terms, but the pervasive ethos is one of active cooperative affiliation among diverse groups of relatives and nonrelatives. Food sharing in simple societies is both an index of cooperation and a key symbol of what it is to be human. More generally, an ethic of communalism and equal access to resource production is highly developed. Perhaps the most striking thing about simple human societies is how decentralized they are. Instead of individuals’ striving to be "first among equals", aggressively assertive, or powerful striving to be big-men there tends to be active and assiduous devaluation of adult male status differentiation and minimization or denial of those asymmetries of ability that exist. Self-aggrandizing behavior is disparaged and open coercion considered highly improper. Leadership is rudimentary and uninstitutionalized, and political life is communal. Patriarchy and elders’ authority are minimal, and leadership is itself rarely a matter of assertion, dispute, or competition. The cultural norms of sociality in these societies seem to be both strong and prone to lethal contravention within the local group. The violence that does occur has relatively little to do with territorial rights, property, ritual status, or male leadership concerns and is based more on consensually approved status leveling among men than on status elevation. Rather than being valued or associated with kin-group or ethnic oppositions, violence emerges sporadically among local cooperative groups, especially as a social-control mechanism or as an expression - commonly displaced - of male sexual frustration. Such incidents are relatively uncontrolled and likely to result in homicide. This pattern of violence and sociality contrasts in very broad terms with that found in more complex prestate societies. In these ’middle-range’ societies (including complex hunter-gatherers and tribes and chiefdoms), sedentism, property ownership, and male status differentiation are more developed, and conflict tends to arise from overt and chronic political status competition, both within and between groups, and from competition over access to resources. In contrast to that in simpler human groups, violence in middle-range societies tends to be valued as a dimension of masculinity, frequently takes the form of collective reciprocating conflict (i.e., warfare), and is often linked with fraternal interest groups, social boundedness, and ethnocentrism. In the evolution of Homo sapiens sapiens, it is likely, that coercion and violence as systematic means of organizational constraint developed especially with the increasing socioeconomic complexity and potential for political hierarchy afforded by substantial food surplus and food production (e.g., Testart, 1982; Campbell, 1985; Gellner, 1989; Tiger, 1990; see Ch. 5). Among complex hunter-gatherers and with the advent of sedentism and horticulture/agriculture, male status differentiation and the potential for material wealth differentials increases. Opportunities increase for selective



control of the flow of information and material resources and the development of social inequality; competition over access to positions of control intensifies; and various forms of leadership and status hierarchy emerge (gerontocracy, headmen, war leaders, priests, big-men, and chiefs). As Collier & Rosaldo (1981) have noted, marriage and legitimate sexual access to a woman are predominant markers of male adulthood, and these rights are fervently protected. Correspondingly, much of the severe violence that occurs in simple societies is ultimately related to male sexual disputes over women. Displacement of affinal or sexual tensions also appears to underlie much of the seemingly irrational violence over ’trivial’ issues that occurs in many egalitarian societies. Sexual tensions in these societies are normally kept in check by norms of affinal harmony, group cooperation, and personal propriety. When they are ultimately galvanized, however, they are frequently quite intense. This threat is exacerbated by the absence of political leaders or dominant individuals who might exercise control and of institutionalized or formalized redress mechanisms. Indeed, violence occurs in significant degree to prevent some individuals from acquiring sexual dominance. In most simple societies, too aggressively self-interested persons may be killed with the consent or active collaboration of the community at large. This responsive violence can in a sense be considered a form of execution or capital punishment. Often, however, the rationale for violence in simple societies is not so clearcut. Violence often seems to erupt suddenly in a displaced, distorted, or noninstrumental manner. Cognitively displaced and projective aggression may also occur as violent scapegoating of persons within the community. Some forms of violence in simple societies thus appear almost more dysfunctional than functional and bear at least a passing resemblance to the syndrome of ’phylogenetic regression’ described by Bailey (1985, 1987). On the other hand, ethnocentric violence is rare. In simple human societies, exclusivity and boundedness of social groups are largely precluded by shifting resource availability, fluid population movement, lack of fixed property, and the need for intergroup alliance and support. Territorial rights, while often formally recognized, are rarely enforced when permission to hunt or forage is requested. Given migratory patterns and resource dispersal, resources are difficult if not impossible to defend, and the cost of such defense typically outweighs its benefit. Likewise, the cost of defense and retaliation against armed aggression is typically great; it is more expeditious to move away. This tends to shortcircuit patterns of feud and systematic raiding or warfare. There is evidence of reciprocating collective conflict, sometimes ethnically based, among simple foragers (e.g., Balikci, 1970; Lee, 1979; Clastres, 1972; Griffin, 1984; Robarchek, 1990). Feuding or warfare does not, however, appear pronounced except where, as among the Ache, Agta, and Waorani, large-scale



intrusion by agricultural societies resulted in conflict over land and internal societal reorganization. In significant contrast to simple human societies, great-ape and middle-range human ones display similarities, or at least analogies, between male dominance and differential sexual access. The evidence suggests therefore, Knauft submits, that the trajectory of male status differentiation and violence in hominid/human evolution is U-shaped rather than linear. In tribal and chiefly societies polygyny is both an index and a reflection of status or rank, as it is in great-ape societies. In middle-range societies, social competition increases with the increase in fixed, high-value resources, sedentism, and population density. Even where population density is low, valuable movable resources such as large domesticated animals may become a source of intergroup antagonism and systematic hostility. With sedentism and/or significant domestication of plants or animals there is a proliferation of corporate groups that stress exclusive membership and rituals of allegiance (e.g., Plog, 1990). Ethnic differentiation and ethnocentrism become more pronounced, and fraternal interest groups become increasingly important in armed conflict to protect or extend access to valued rights and resources. Johnson & Earle (1987) suggest that in "increasingly widespread and increasingly successful efforts to restrict access to critical resources, we encounter the beginnings of warfare." Some researchers, including Haas (1990), suggest that increased warfare in sedentary societies is a key dimension of what is termed ’tribalization’. Others, such as Braun (1990; Braun & Plog, 1982), emphasize multidimensional adaptations of sedentary communities. But, in either case, both the potential for and the incidence of collective armed conflict would appear to increase. Feinman & Neitzel (1984) found warfare to be the single most commonly reported function of leadership in sedentary prestate societies in Mesoamerica. Black (1990) has suggested that chronic vengeance as a mode of conflict management is especially pronounced when social groups are characterized by immobility, social distance, equality, and organization all typical of middlerange societies. In a cross-cultural analysis of aggression, Ross (1985, 1986) documents, among other things, a direct association between socioeconomic complexity and external warfare in prestate societies. The tendency toward warfare may yet be greater when paramount chiefdoms are created through conquest (Carneiro, 1981, 1990) and is also highly associated with if not partly causative of the rise of the state (e.g., Carneiro, 1970; Haas, 1982; Gabriel, 1990; cf. Claessen & Skalnik, 1978). Several authors, including Wrangham (1987); Manson & Wrangham (1991); Foley (1988); Foley & Lee (1989); and Ghiglieri (1987, 1989) posit a similarity between prestate human organizational patterns and chimpanzee patterns of male philopatry (males breeding within their natal group) and



violent male attacks on outside groups (See Ch. 3). These pongid patterns may provide an analogy with some sedentary human societies and complex huntergatherers, but they are highly questionable as a model for simpler human groups (Barnard, 1983; Knauft, 1991; Stanford & Allen, 1991). No single species is apt to provide an adequate model of early human social organization. Knauft concludes his analysis: That the evolutionary period characterized by simple human societies may have been many times longer than that characterized by middle-range ones suggests that findings about violence and sociality based on selected case studies of the latter may be limited in their evolutionary implications. From the present perspective, the evolution of Homo is likely to have proceeded in large part among groups that had relatively open social networks, nonhostile intergroup interactions, and a significant degree of institutionalized if not monogamous pair bonding. Generalizations about human societal evolution are easily biased by HRAF samples weighted heavily with middle-range societies, which are far more numerous in the ethnographic record than simple ones though they have persisted for a much shorter period of evolutionary time (Knauft, 1991). Rodseth (1991) and Abler (1991) pointed out that Knauft leaves open the question whether his ’simple societies’ are simply products of the marginal environments they exploit and the resulting low population densities. Simple foraging societies as known from the ethnographic record may not be representative of such societies in the Pleistocene and may in fact be radically different, precisely because they have adapted to marginal areas outside the ’main currents of human social evolution’. While simple human societies may be simpler than any others known to ethnography, they also may be simpler than those of earliest Homo sapiens (or even earlier hominids) known only from the archaeological record. The alternative scenario, as envisaged by Rodseth (1991), has the common ancestor of humans and African apes living in relatively closed, malephilopatric groups, then spreading out from central areas where resources were concentrated into marginal habitats where resources were dispersed. In these marginal areas, the open, flexible groupings characteristic of extant huntergatherers would have emerged, but in the central areas even simple foragers would have remained in relatively closed, male-philopatric communities. Eventually these would have been transformed smoothly into patrilocal tribal societies, with no intervening stage of flexible social organization. The Ushape of human social evolution proposed by Knauft would, on this account, be an illusion created by casting an adaptation to extreme conditions as a global evolutionary stage. Also troubling is Knauft’s failure to consider the effect of state or imperial



expansion (both military and economic) on middle-range societies (e.g., Ferguson, 1992; Ferguson & Whitehead, 1992; Wolf, 1982). 5.2.1 Warfare as Macroparasitism: The Prevailing View In contrast to the, mostly implicit, assumption of many evolutionary (in the Darwinian sense) theories of the origin of warfare, viz. that warfare is a concomitant of human evolutionary history and therefore existed from the dawn of mankind, there is another rather prevalent and popular view that envisages warfare as a relatively late (recent) cultural development. This is the view of warfare as macroparasitism. McNeill (1976) most cogently pointed out the parallels between the microparasitism of infectious diseases and the macroparasitism of military operations: "Only when civilized communities had built up a certain level of wealth and skill did war and raiding become an economically viable enterprise. But seizing the harvest by force, if it lead to speedy death of the agricultural work force from starvation, was an unstable form of macroparasitism... Very early in civilized history, successful raiders became conquerors, i.e., learned how to rob agriculturists in such a way as to 8 take from them some but not all of the harvest". Leakey & Lewin’s (1977) vision is fairly representative of the prevailing one. War, they write, is a battle for power over people and for resources such as land and minerals, neither of which were relevant in hunting and gathering societies. With the growth of agriculture and of materially-based societies, warfare has increased steadily in both ferocity and duration, culminating in our current capability to destroy even the planet: powerful leaders have found more and more to fight about, and increasingly effective ways of achieving their ends. We should not look to our genes for the seeds of war; those seeds were planted when, ten thousand years ago, our ancestors for the first time planted crops and began to be farmers. The transition from the nomadic hunting way of life to the sedentary one of farmers and industrialists made war possible and potentially profitable (Leakey & Lewin, 1977). The territoriality and economic surplus generated by the Agricultural Revolution thus commits people to defending the land they farm. "To run away in the face of hostility is to face certain loss: a year’s labour may be invested in 8

Related to this macroparasitism paradigm, with strong cataclysmic connotations, is another popular metaphor, the epidemiological one: War as a disease periodically afflicting mankind or specific subdivisions of mankind (See especially Alcock, 1972; and Beer, 1981), or as a pathological condition of society. While the methods of epidemiology may be fruitfully applied to wars, the conception of war as a disease of the body politic is not a very useful one.



the fields, and that cannot be given up easily... As well as land that requires defending, agriculturalists tend to acquire property, both personal and communal, that needs to be guarded" (Leakey, 1981). The accumulated 9 property also creates the temptation of, and the incentive for, macroparasitism . One of the most eloquent of the advocates of this ’conventional’ view of war is Boulding (1978), who states: A strong case can be made for the proposition that war is essentially a phenomenon of the age of civilization and that it is inappropriate both to precivilized and postcivilized societies. It represents an interlude in man’s development, dated 3000 B.C. to, say, 2000 A.D. It is particularly associated with the development of cities by the expropriation through coercion of the food surplus from agriculture. It is significant that the neolithic villages which preceded the development of cities, in which agriculture was practiced but the surplus from agriculture was not yet collected into large masses to feed urban organization, seem to have been very peaceful... We can hardly doubt that there were many violent encounters between the neolithic farmers and the paleolithic hunters and food gatherers whom they so largely displaced, but these were not organized as war... War, therefore, is peculiarly a property of a system of deterrence under urban - that is, civilized - conditions (Boulding, 1978).

Also Schneider (1950; 1952) maintains that "war is an invention of relatively late origin". Warfare as we know it, he explains, originated in Mesopotamia, where early civilization had built a military organization to penetrate the hinterland in search of land and resources and to defend itself against raiding nomads. Similar views have been proposed by White (1949) and his school of cultural evolutionists, and virtually all writers of international relations, political science, and general history textbooks (e.g., Mumford, 1960; Bronowski, 1973; Starr, 1974; Vasquez, 1993). It is clear that the Agricultural Revolution, the transition to a settled existence 9

The only problem with the ’progress’ from hunting-gathering to agriculture is the assumption that the agricultural revolution made the quantum jump in population possible. In view, however, of the facts that life expectancy of agriculturalists actually decreases in comparison with huntergatherers (Cohen, 1977, 1987; Slurink, 1993); that farmers have to spend more time and labor for less energetic returns; that the diet of hunter-gatherers is calorically quite adequate and richer in variety, vitamins, minerals, and proteins than that of agriculturalists; that hunting-gathering involves activities widely preferred to those of agriculture and provides foods widely preferred for consumption to the main agricultural staples; and that the food supply of hunter-gatherers is more reliable than that provided by primitive agriculture (Roele, 1993), the ’progress’ may actually have been a regress, a deterioration necessitated by prehistoric overpopulation. In other words, it may not have been the discovery of agriculture which led to population explosion, but overpopulation which led to the adoption of agriculture by necessity (Cohen, 1977, 1987).



and in its wake urbanization, centralization of political control, and the economic surplus and organizational ability to maintain standing armies, constituted a major turning point in human history. In his Parable of the Tribes, Schmookler (1984) sketched the following scenario of the consequences of this revolution, as summarized by Cashman (1993). Agricultural societies eventually encountered limits to their growth posed by the existence of other communities. This typical Malthusian problem could be resolved either by more intensive use of the land or by expanding one’s territory at the expense of one’s neighbors by means of force. The more highly organized emerging city-states pursued the latter course. In response, peaceful societies had essentially four possible options: Destruction by their neighbors, subjugation, withdrawal through migration, and imitation. Imitation proved to be the preferred choice of most communities. In order to survive, agrarian societies were compelled to emulate their most bellicose rivals. They built large communities through consolidation and aggregation; they constructed large-scale political organizations in order to efficiently mobilize their populations; they initiated taxation systems to make the wealth of society available to those governments; and they created military institutions to protect and extend their power. In reality, certain avenues of cultural evolution were closed off. More highly organized societies drove out the less highly organized; the large drove out the small; and the more warlike cultures drove out the more peaceful cultures into marginal habitats. Social evolution proceeded in only one direction: Toward the creation of ever more powerful and ever more militant societies. These militaristic societies spread throughout the world, and wars between them became endemic. In an interesting variant of this scenario, Mumford (1960; see also Wittfogel, 1957) suggests a basically religious origin of war in the early civilizations. With the agricultural revolution arose totalitarian bureaucracies supervising the gigantic public works (irrigation systems, canals, roads, walls, pyramids) based on forced labor or slavery, which in turn gave rise to despotic power (both sacred and secular), divine kingship and the related institution of human sacrifice; the underlying conception being that communal life and prosperity could be preserved only by sacrificial expiation, at first of the divine king himself but later of sacrificial substitutes. "As the demands for such victims increased in times of trouble, these substitutes were sought outside the community, by violent capture. And what began as a one-sided raid for captives in time brought about the collective reprisals and counterraids that became institutionalized as war. Back of war lay this barbarous religious sanction: only by human sacrifice can the community be saved. War, then, was a specific product of civilization - the outcome of an organized effort to obtain captives for a magical blood sacrifice". The capability to produce unprecedented, relentless violence and massive destruction became the symbol of royal power.



No doubt, part of the attractiveness and persistence of this prevailing view is due to the fact that the beginning of war coincides with the commencement of codified history, with written records (from Akkad, Sumer, Babylon and Assyria) of predatory and internecine warfare and horrible accounts of devastating destruction, massacres of entire populations, and remorseless, 10 unimaginable cruelty . 5.2.2 Marxism-Leninism The Marxist-Leninist views on war are broadly compatible with the cultural invention paradigm. Orthodox Marxism-Leninism conceives of war as an instrument in the political class struggle, and consequently contends that war is a social phenomenon coexistent with class society. In other words, wars first occurred once class societies (i.e., states) had emerged. Marxism-Leninism thus assumes that (a) there was no war in primitive societies: "The theory of Marxism-Leninism has proved that in the society of the primitive community, where no states and classes existed, no wars occurred, as an organized armed struggle for political goals. When states appeared, wars also appeared" (’Voina’ in Bolshaia Sovietskaya Entsiklopedia, 2nd ed., Vol. 8, 1951; Cf. Lider [1977] for other references). This ’narrow’ view is based on Lenin’s concept of war (derived from his notes on Clausewitz’s On War). (b) that armed clashes in primitive society must be considered to be a predecessor of war in their technical-military aspects (Kuzyakov, 1972). "There was war in its initial form as a social phenomenon in the tribe societies, but it only developed when state and division of the society in classes have appeared" (The Soviet Encyclopedia, Vol. 2, 1969). This ’broad’ view is derived from Engels (1878, 1884), following Morgan’s Ancient Society (1877). Primitive society, Morgan had contended, was basically communistic, lacking 10

"When Shalmaneser took Arzashku, the royal capital of Urartu (near Lake Van in eastern Turkey), he impaled the defenders on sharpened stakes and then piled their severed heads against the city’s walls. We know this because he boasted of his deed on bronze gates he had erected in the city of Imgur-Enlil, near his capital of Niniveh. The Assyrians had the reputation of being particularly ruthless even in the ancient world, but Shalmaneser’s behavior was by no means unusual. One of the very earliest records of Egypt, dating from around 3200 B.C., shows the Pharaoh Narmer (who may have been the man who united the entire kingdom for the first time) with the headless bodies of slain enemies. The oldest inscription that has survived from Mesopotamia is the Stele of the Vultures, which shows carrion birds fighting over the entrails of soldiers killed in the battle in which Eannatum of Lagash defeated the rival city-state of Umma. War has been the constant companion of civilization, and most of the time it has been waged with savage cruelty toward the defeated C far more remorseless and efficient cruelty than most of the world’s ’savages’ have ever displayed. And the reason for this is contained in the way that civilization was born" (Dyer, 1985).



important commerce, private property, economic classes, or despotic rulers. Increased productivity in some primitive societies had led to increased trade, and consequently to private property and classes of rich and poor. After Marx’s death Engels published the products of their joint appreciation of Morgan’s materials in his The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State (1884). Essentially, the book was an expanded version of the basic ideas germinated by Morgan: Certain primitive societies had improved the technological means of production, the surplus product of which was traded; as this process was expanded, society perforce changed from a production-for-use economy to a production of commodities, and with commodity production unearned increments arose due to differences in efficiency, in supply and demand, and in the activities of middlemen; thus, with the rise of private differences in wealth, economic classes appear. Here is the economic genesis of the state: From their material (economic) beginnings, classes become gradually social, and finally political as well when the rich erect a structure of permanent force to protect their class interests. The political state is thus a special means of repression by the propertied class (Service, 1975). Engels discusses the breakdown of the gens system of social organization, which, following Morgan, he believed to be the key to mankind’s prepolitical history. Pressure of population drove tribes to merge their separate territories into the aggregate territory of the nation, i.e., a social unit defined by the territory in its permanent possession (Gallie, 1978). "Thereupon war and the organization for war became a regular function of national life... the wealth of neighbors excited the greed of nations... Pillage seemed easier and even more honorable than acquisition of wealth by labor. War, previously waged only in revenge for attacks or to extend territory which had become insufficient, was now carried on for the sake of pure pillage... and became a permanent branch of industry" (Engels, 1884). War in this latter sense goes back to the very beginnings of mankind: "[W]ar was as old as the simultaneous existence of several adjacent tribal communities" (Engels, 1878). The ’narrow’ view was, however, at least in the former Soviet Union, the prevailing one (See especially Lider, 1977). On the vicissitudes of the MarxistLeninist conception of (primitive) war see also Kara (1968) and Gallie (1978).



5.2.3 Theory of the Unique Origin of War: The Diffusionists The theory that warfare is a relatively recent one-time cultural invention which diffused from one or a small number of centers in which the invention was made has been proposed by Perry (1917 et seq.), Rivers (1922), G.E.Smith (1924; 1929; 1930), and MacLeod (1931). The corollary of this theory, which in essence dates back to the classical Greek philosophers, is of course that before that invention mankind lived in a ’Golden Age of Peace’, in which, in spite of the discomforts and anxieties of daily life, men cheerfully enjoyed a state of Arcadian simplicity, of which poets have been writing for thirty centuries. Letourneau (1895) had been one of the first to assert that among the most primitive men "warlike conflicts have generally been retaliatory; they have assumed a juridical character and have been rare and not bloody. From this point of view, there was a golden age of the human race". The most elaborate and extreme exposition of the diffusionist theory has been that by Perry (1917; 1923) who contended that war was uniquely invented in predynastic Egypt and subsequently gradually diffused throughout the world from that focal country. After man had existed as a peaceful food-gatherer in a Garden of Eden for over half a million years, the inventions of agriculture, irrigation, class society, human sacrifice, slavery, civilization and war were all made in the valley of the Nile by a ’sun-worshipping aristocracy’, because to obtain victims for sacrifice (a practice associated with agriculture all over the world) and slaves to engage in cultivation and to maintain the ruling class in power, more violence was necessary. "The hypothesis that warfare originated among a sun-worshipping aristocracy is therefore in accordance with the facts... It can be shown that the motive which led the ’children of the sun’ to the ends of the earth, was that of the exploitation of wealth" (Perry, 1917). Perry marshalled a considerable body of evidence for his theory (See for a synopsis Q.Wright, 1942). The opponents of his theory, however, marshalled a no less formidable body of evidence, most of it summarized by Spinden (1927) and Q.Wright (1942), which led - like old soldiers who never die, but just pass away - to the demise of the Diffusionist school. Others, especially evolutionists, rejected the notion of a ’Golden Age of Peace’ and supported the Hobbesian conception of ’natural’ man: "There was no Arcadian peace and simplicity in the elder ages. Men always quarreled, if they did not fight it was because they were too broken, cowed-down, or cowardly. It was only as time went on that peace was found to be a more expedient policy... Generalization as to the warlike or unwarlike disposition of the savage must take account of many varying types; but it is fair to infer that mutual suspicion and fear were the rule among the scattered groups of early man, competing as they were for precarious sustenance" (Sumner & Keller, 1927).



5.2.4 War: A Social Theme and Cultural Invention The philosophy of John Dewey and the anthropological researches of Ruth Benedict, Margaret Mead, and others have, after the era in which instinctivism ruled supreme, provided a new aperçu to understand the problem of (primitive) war. Dewey (1922) reasoned that Man is essentially a creature of (learned) habit, and that social institutions and human cultures, which shape those habits, show a high degree of diversity. Applying these considerations to war, Dewey declared that war is just a 'social pattern' like slavery. Aristotle thought slavery was rooted in original human nature, and therefore natural and inevitable, because (he thought) some persons were by nature endowed with the power to plan and command, while others had only the capacity to obey. But, like slavery, war is not a psychological necessity, but a social institution, and is not rooted in original human nature, any more than slavery or polyandry. "What does our knowledge of cultural diversity and variety in social organization show? We have to give up antiquated ideas such as that competition is rooted in human nature, or that war is an inevitable result of man's pugnacity, or that man has an instinct for private property. Marriage, slavery, war - these are 'social themes'" (Dewey, 1922), which may or may not be used in some cultures, and used for different purposes and in different contexts. What is considered to be valuable in one culture may not be so in another (Murty & Bouquet, 1960). On the other hand, Dewey leaves no doubt that he locates the root cause of war in human psychology: "The trouble lies in the inertness of established habit. No matter how accidental and irrational the circumstances of its origin, no matter how different the conditions which now exist to those under which the habit was formed, the latter persist until the environment obstinately rejects it". Cultural anthropologists, such as Ruth Benedict (1934), reinforced the arguments and conclusions of Dewey. Certain cultures, she stated, have no place for the institution of war; and in those cultures which use it, it is used for achieving "contrasting objectives, with contrasting organization in relation to the state, and with contrasting sanctions" (Benedict, 1934). Margaret Mead (1964) asserts in a similar vein: "Warfare... is an invention like any other of the inventions in terms of which we order our lives, such as writing, marriage, cooking our food". War is, in Mead's most poignant formulation, "only a cultural invention, not a biological necessity" (Mead, 1940). She argued that some primitive societies, of which the Canadian Eskimo are the prime example, lack organized warfare because they simply do not have, and cannot grasp, the concept of war. "So simple peoples and civilized peoples, mild peoples and violent, assertive peoples, will all go to war if they have the invention... Warfare is just an invention known to the majority of



human societies" (Mead, 1940). Man an sich (whatever that may mean) would be peaceful, it is his culture which transforms him into a belligerent creature. Such an unspoken assumption seems to be implied by this school. Such cultural relativism tends to deteriorate into empty phraseology, however, as soon as it is cross-examined. For example, why do originally peaceful people create cultures in which it is possible to ’invent’ war; why was the institution of war invented at all; why was it invented in so many cultures, and left ’uninvented’ in so few? (Cf. Klineberg, 1960). 5.2.4.1 Cultural-Learning Theory Malinowski (1941), the most influential anthropologist of the middle years of this century, had argued that "All types of fighting are complex cultural responses due not to any direct dictates of an impulse but to collective forms of sentiment and value". Malinowski’s viewpoint paved the way for cultural-learning analyses of primitive and civilized war, of which May (1943) is the first and most important representative. He states: "If man is more agressive and warlike than he is peaceful, it is to be attributed not to perverseness in his nature or even to original sin, but rather to the fact that life, as he has been compelled to live it, has been such as to reward pugnaciousness and the use of force more than other forms of adaptive behavior... A group that has relatively little and wants much will employ aggression as a means to the achievement of its ends provided its members have learned that aggression pays. On the other hand, if a group has learned that aggression does not pay, at least in the type of situation that is confronting it, some other technique for achieving its ends will be employed or the ends will be renounced" (May, 1943). Other psychologists have not entirely abandoned the notion that some phylogenetic predisposition might enter into the human propensity for war or the learning of warlike behaviors. For example, Hebb & Thompson (1964) have pointed out that mammals seek excitement, and that this search has desirable possibilities in society as well as extremely undesirable ones. "The plain fact is that the primate is only too ready to become a trouble-maker when things are dull and we had better stop comforting ourselves with the accurate but insufficient statement that man has no instinct to make war. He also needs no special coaching to discover a taste for ’adventure’ and some of his adventures may be socially disastrous... Making war is not instinctive; neither, unfortunately, is an aversion to certain forms of excitement that may lead to war" (Hebb & Thompson, 1964). Knight (quoted in Cashman, 1993) formulated a similar maxim: "What people really want is trouble, and if they do not have enough of it, they will create it artificially". Against the "War is not in our genes" argument (Carrighar, 1968), Hebb &



Thompson would probably have replied: "Neither, unfortunately, is peace". In a similar vein, Macdonald (1975) contends that of the five factors in the etiology of war - biological, psychological, social, economic, and political - the biological is the basic one and its influence has been greatly underestimated. He considers the human affinity with, and fascination by, weapons to be basically biological: "The term ’biological’ implies that our use of weapons is not purely cultural in origin but that our genetic code conveys a message which renders resort to weapons a likely response to stimuli which threaten, or appear to threaten, the individual or group". Other behavioral scientists have argued that man is not by nature endowed with strong propensities for either peace or war. "Would it not be far more parsimonious to begin with the assumption that men are by nature neither aggressive nor peaceful, but rather are fashioned into one or another as the result of a complex interaction between a widely, but not infinitely, modifiable set of biological givens and the shaping influences of the biological environment, the cultural envelope, and individual experience?" (Eisenberg, 1972). Similarly, Leakey & Lewin (1977) hold that "Humans are not innately disposed powerfully either to aggression or to peace. It is culture that largely weaves the patterns in human societies". As one may deduce from these quotations, in the Anglo-American language area generally, the opposite of peace is not simply war, but a much more generic and encompassing concept: ’aggression’. Unfortunately, the term aggression has been used as a descriptive category on all levels-of-analysis (from single organisms to nations and empires) as well as an explanatory category (and, to make the confusion complete, a legal category in international law). Many scholars have invoked ’aggression’ in attempts to explain the institution of war, the occurrence of war, the propensity to war, (parts of) the processes and behaviors resulting in war, and the motivational make-up of the individuals fighting the war. To this enchanted domain we now turn.



5.2.5 Frustration-Aggression Displacement Theory 5.2.5.1 The Concept and Theories of Aggression ’Aggression’ is a rather elusive concept. It has been described as a "semantic jungle" (Berkowitz, 1981), a "portmanteau term which is fairly bursting at the seams" (Storr, 1968), and "an ill-defined array of different responses" (E.O. Wilson, 1978). In a 1980 publication, I have listed 106 more or less different definitions of aggression from all disciplines, and many more of related concepts such as ’agonistic behavior’ and ’violence’ (often regarded as the more destructive forms of ’aggression’). Ethologists, psychobiologists, sociobiologists, geneticists, psychopharmacologists, psychopathologists, neuropathologists, clinicians, psychiatrists, psychoanalysts, psychologists, sociologists, criminologists, anthropologists, political scientists and peace researchers - all have contributed some vision on the phenomena of aggression and/or violence. Considering their different and heterogeneous perspectives, disciplinarian traditions, paradigms, anthropological axioms, ontological assumptions, etc., it is no wonder that confusion and controversy are rampant; students muddling through the aggression quagmire, thrashing around in murky concepts and ill-defined terms; and theoretical positions seemingly irreconcilable. Aggression has been variously conceptualized as an instinct, appetence, drive, tendency, disposition, subinstinct, manifestation of energy or power, motivation, genetic trait, character or personality trait, subroutine, behavior, social interaction, a manner or style or intensity or vigor of behaving, custom or learned habit, script, and culture pattern. And definitions range from the simple "fighting instinct in animals and man" (Lorenz, 1966), through "the behavior intended to hurt or harm, or to inflict pain or noxious stimulation" (e.g., Dollard et al., 1939; Buss, 1961; Berkowitz, 1962), to the rather obnoxious "kinetic energy capable of accelerating a given system’s tendency towards entropy or thermodynamic equalization" (Laborit, 1978). For some aggression is equivalent to self-manifestation, the assertiveness and self-imposition of being; for others it is the employment of force or coercion in interpersonal interactions; for others it is the proximate mechanism of contest competition; for still others it is a behavior that results in personal injury; and for still another category it is equivalent to the workings of a ’death instinct’, periodically resulting in massive destruction, wars and atrocities. In their laboratories, scientists have studied the mouse-killing behavior of rats, the slapping of Bobo dolls by presumably frustrated children, the delivery of fake electric shocks or bursts of white noise in so-called learning paradigms, the hose-biting behavior of restrained monkeys following an electric tail shock; and have mutilated the bodies and brains of laboratory animals in all imaginable ways in order to understand some aspect of ’aggression’ and general human nastiness.



Controversies reign over questions whether ’aggression’ is a unitary construct or a multifactorial one comprising distinct types of behavior; whether to include or exclude assertiveness (self-imposition); whether to include or exclude violence; whether to include or exclude intentionality; whether to include or exclude predation (as ’interspecific aggression’); whether to include or exclude motivational constructs or limit the concept to observable behavior only, etc. Each proposed solution to these problems brings in its wake its own problems and limitations. For example, ethologists generally find no need for the concept of intentionality, while psychologists (hard-core behaviorists excepted) cannot reasonably do without it. In the Anglosaxon literature ’aggression’ and ’violence’ are generally coterminous and coextensive, while in the assertiveness and motivational formulations of aggression, manifestations of aggression are usually considered to be distinct from manifestations of violence. Comparatively, aggression is identifiable only at a broad functional level. Wind (1982) suggested that aggression "is, in fact, part of a vaguely circumscribed cluster of behavior modes which, due to our pattern recognition capacities, are usually classified as aggression. It is therefore a statistical concept following from a deeper level of behavior modes that are recognized in the species as a whole. These are probably the consequence of an Evolutionary Stable Strategy particular to that species. The described behavior, therefore, occurs on the phenotypic level, whereas the second, cluster-like, phenomena have to be localized on a deeper, i.e., genotypic, level as determined by its selective value in many previous generations". It would seem logical in terms of available evidence and what we think we know of phylogenetic orders and relationships, to view the design characteristics of aggressive activities as being homologous across the mammalian phyla including that of the human primate (Carpenter, 1968). So many subdivisions and dimensions of the concept of aggression have been proposed in the literature that the concept borders on the verge of meaninglessness. These range from simple dichotomies such as offensive versus defensive aggression, constructive versus destructive aggression, arousal (affective, angry, hostile, annoyance-motivated) aggression versus instrumental (incentive-motivated) aggression, physical versus verbal aggression, active versus passive aggression, benign versus malignant aggression, direct versus indirect aggression, antisocial versus prosocial aggression; other-directed versus self-directed aggression, individual versus collective aggression (to mention only the most salient), to elaborate typologies based on differential neurophysiological and endocrinological substrate involvement and situational diversity of eliciting cues, as proposed by van Sommers (1972), Moyer (1968 et seq.), and E.O. Wilson (1975) a.o. These latter typologies are mainly derived from animal models, and may be hard to



apply to most human situations. Moyer, for example, distinguishes predatory, antipredatory, intermale, fear-induced, maternal, sex-related, irritable, instrumental and territorial aggression (the last category was deleted from later works), and Wilson distinguishes territorial, dominance, sexual, parental disciplinary, weaning, moralistic, predatory and antipredatory aggression. See van der Dennen (1980) for an extensive overview of other typologies and taxonomies. It is small wonder that several researchers have proposed to abandon the concept of ’aggression’ altogether (e.g., van Es, 1978; Leyhausen, 1979; Tedeschi et al., 1974; van der Molen & van der Dennen, 1982; Tedeschi, 1983). Theories of (human) aggression can be categorized under the headings of (a) Instinct or appetence theories, including the hydraulic (also irreverently called ’toilet flush’) model of the Lorenz school of ethology, and the Trieb (instinct/drive discharge) models of some psychoanalytic schools. According to the German ethological school (Lorenz, Leyhausen, EiblEibesfeldt), aggression is a genuine instinct, as well as fear (Angst). They only make sense together (Leyhausen, 1967). In everyday life we ’spend’ our aggression (Kampfantriebe) and fear ’in small coins’, through rather innocent outlets. That is, aggression is virtually never so pent up as to need paroxysmal or cataclysmic outbursts. The dynamic instinct conception of this school implies an endogenous, relatively autonomous, self-regulating energetic system of drives (Antriebe) in temporal homeostasis. The performance of Fixed Action Patterns (FAPs), such as in sexual behavior, aggression, feeding, etc., depends upon the accumulation of energy specific to these activities in centers of the central nervous system. Inner rhythmicity and outer world are synchronized to a certain extent by means of Innate Releasing Mechanisms (IRMs) consisting of a sensory receptor component sensitized or tuned to certain releasing stimuli in the environment (called Auslöser, signal-, cue-, key-stimuli), constituting the Umwelt, and a releasing component, eliciting, activating, or disinhibiting the drive. In exceptional cases, the threshold lowering of eliciting stimuli can be said to sink to zero level, since under certain conditions the particular instinct movement can ’explode’ without demonstrable external stimulation (called Leerlauf or vacuum-reaction). The psychoanalytic Trieb formulations of aggression are considerably less specific regarding mechanisms of (energy) accumulation and release. Curiously, aggression had no place in Freud’s topographical theory of psychic structure. In 1908, Adler proposed the idea that aggression was an innate, primary, instinctual drive (soon reinterpreted in terms of ’masculine protest’). Not until 1915 (Instincts and their Vicissitudes) did Freud consider aggression to be a component of the ego instincts: Frustration of behavior aimed at gaining pleasure and avoiding pain led to (furious) aggression. Finally, in



Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920), Freud developed the ’death instinct’ hypothesis. Freud’s idea of a ’death instinct’ (Todestrieb, also called Thanatos, Destrudo, Mortido) - in which human destructiveness is explained as an externalization of this self-destructive tendency - was adopted by Melanie Klein (1932 et seq.) and Federn (1932) a.o., but has never found many followers, though some interesting attempts at reinterpretation have been proposed (Menninger, 1938; Deutsch & Senghaas, 1971; Fromm, 1973; and others). According to Ferguson (1984), only one anthropologist (Henry, 1941) has ever explicitly invoked the death drive in explaining a primitive war complex. After 1920, Freud devoted considerable attention to the role of the destructive instinct in group formation and civilization. The most detailed exposition of his views is to be found in Civilization and its Discontents (1930), where he states that a powerful share of aggressiveness must be counted among the instinctual endowments of man, which may "manifest itself spontaneously and reveal men as savage beasts to whom the thought of sparing their own kind is alien". Such a gloomy view of the human condition was grosso modo repeated in Why War? (1932): "We are led to conclude that this instinct functions in every living being, striving to work its ruin and to reduce life to its primal state of inert matter". Thus Freud came to envisage aggression as primarily to purely destructive, without any apparent biologically adaptive function. Some kind of organic or psychological ’law of entropy’. Most neo-Freudians and contemporary psychoanalysts have fused some drive conception of aggression with ego-psychological mechanisms, making it more compatible with frustration-aggression (Horney, 1937, 1939, 1960; Anna Freud, 1936 et seq.; A.Freud & Burlingham, 1943; Fenichel, 1945; Hartmann, Kris & Loewenstein, 1949; Sullivan, 1953 et seq.; Erikson, 1965; Mitscherlich, 1969; Fromm, 1973; Bender, 1973; a.o.) and social or cultural learning-theory formulations (Hacker, 1971; Horn, 1974; a.o.); have formulated dynamic psychiatric conceptions of aggression (e.g., Ammon, 1970), or have singled out narcissistic aggression as a contemporary problem (Kohut, 1973; Fromm, 1973; Kernberg, 1975). Others have attempted to synthesize psychoanalysis and Marxism (e.g., Marcuse, 1955), psychoanalysis and Lorenzian ethology (e.g., Storr, 1972), or psychoanalysis and sociobiology (e.g., Badcock, 1989 et seq.). (b) Frustration-aggression (F-A) theories, including many major modifications, reformulations and minor subvariants. Though receiving its classic expression in the work of a group of Yale psychologists (Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer & Sears, 1939), the theory was proposed much earlier by McDougall (1908) and Freud (1915). The basic assumption of the Yale school was that "aggression is always a consequence of frustration. More specifically, the proposition is that the occurrence of aggressive behavior always presupposes the existence of frustration and, contrariwise, that the existence of



frustration always leads to some form of aggression". This was a rather exorbitant claim and led two years later already to a major modification: "Frustration produces instigation to a number of different types of responses, one of which is an instigation to some form of aggression" (Miller, 1941). Aggression was regarded by the Yale group as a desire to hurt and injure others, and frustration was defined as an interference with an ongoing goal response (goal inaccessibility through thwarting, obstruction, a blockage or barrier). They also posited a direct proportionality between the amount of frustration and the instigation to aggression. The amount of frustration was thought to depend on the strength of the drive toward a goal, the degree of interference, and the number of frustrated responses. The resulting instigation to aggression could then be directed toward the agent of frustration, or could be redirected toward another person or the self (displacement). The act of aggression, finally, was thought to reduce the instigation to aggression (catharsis). The Yale school borrowed many concepts from psychoanalysis, though the theory was phrased in (quasi) behaviorist terminology. The original reactive-mechanistic F-A hypothesis of the Yale school has not stood up against the evidence. It soon became apparent that frustration did not invariably result in aggression, and that aggression was not automatically the result of frustration. Other instigators to aggression, such as threat or insult, proved much more effective than frustration. It was also overlooked how much human aggression is actually instrumental in character (McCauley, 1990). Yet, the simplicity of the F-A notion led to a widespread acceptance (despite the rather pessimistic implication of the theory, which went largely unnoticed, that because frustration was considered to be ubiquitous, aggression also would be ubiquitous). Social experiments in the United States to raise children in frustration-free educational environments failed dismally. The kiddos turned out to be unmanageable cookie-monsters rather than the unaggressive, stable and harmonious personalities the parents had hoped for. The most fervent critic-cum-advocate of F-A theory, Berkowitz (1962, 1965, 1969, 1982) proposed a major reformulation, as follows. The perception of frustration (now including ’annoyers’ and aversive stimuli) is considered to arouse anger, which functions as a drive. In other words, the emotional reaction (anger) to the frustration creates a readiness to commit aggressive acts. Aggressive behavior will not occur, even given this readiness, however, unless evoked by suitable external cue stimuli. The suitable cue stimuli may then lead to aggressive behavior by arousing previously learned but latent aggressiveness habits, and the occurrence of the aggressive behavior is an inherently satisfying response to the anger. Anger is conceived as an inborn reaction to goal blockage (The Yale school left the question whether the F-A linkage was considered to be ’learned’ or ’innate’ unanswered). Prior learning may influence how a given situation is perceived and interpreted, and therefore define the appropriateness of the behavior. Only a narrow range of objects provides



satisfying targets for the aggressive response, but almost any form of aggression can be satisfying as long as the angry person believes that he has in some way injured or hurt his supposed frustrater. Other theorists envisaged some kind of energy pool of ’free-floating aggression’ as a result of cumulative frustration (a basic idea in frustration-aggressiondisplacement theory). The mobilization of energy due to continued and cumulative frustration "tends to flow over into generalized destructive behavior" (Stagner, 1965). Other revisionist theories within the broad framework of F-A theory have been developed by McNeil (1959), Feshbach (1964 et seq.), Kaufmann (1970), Schuh & Mees (1972), J.Goldstein (1975), Larsen, 1976; Baron (1977), Zillmann (1979), Kornadt (1981), A.Goldstein (1983), among many others. Few contemporary theories have escaped the impact of F-A theory, though its extensive reformulations have made it rather nebulous and virtually useless (e.g., Selg, 1975; Ferguson, 1984; Krebs & Miller, 1985; McCauley, 1990; Cf. Cofer & Appley, 1964; Rummel, 1977; van der Dennen, 1980). (c) Learning theories, including cultural learning theory (e.g., Alland, 1972) and social learning theory (e.g., Mowrer, 1950; Bandura, 1973 et seq.; Bandura & Walters, 1959) with a number of subvariants: Operant conditioning (Skinner), social interactionist (Patterson), transactional (Goldstein), cognitive script (Eron, Huesmann), and cognitive-neoassociationist theory (Berkowitz). According to cultural learning theory, man is not aggressive, but cultures are. Aggression is seated within the culture, and it is learned, or rather absorbed, by the individual in the same way a language is acquired. The proper focus of research should thus be the cultural context of aggression, and its function in the maintenance and development of the culture. In social learning theory formulations aggression, rather than being a drive in search for gratification, is considered to be acquired through learning and experience, more specifically, by means of familial and subcultural socialization practices, behavioral (role) models and scripts, symbolic modeling, observational or vicarious learning and imitation, reinforcement, rewards, social facilitation, sanctioning and approval, conditioning, and similar processes. An important observation of social learning theory is that in the process of development and socialization, human beings learn a great variety of ways to express aggression and hostility other than in open and direct attack. "People ordinarily do not aggress in conspicuous and direct ways that carry high risks of retaliation. Instead, to protect against counterattack, they tend to hurt others in ways that diffuse or obscure responsibility for detrimental actions. The injurious consequences of major social concern are often caused remotely, circuitously, and impersonally" (Bandura, 1976, 1978). Particularly insightful are Bandura’s observations on the self-absolving cognitive maneuvers for performing injurious and cruel behavior without the pangs of a bad conscience.



The conception of aggression as an acquired drive (e.g., Miller & Dollard, 1941; Dollard & Miller, 1950; Sears et al., 1953), habit (e.g., Buss, 1961), etc. may be subsumed here, as fundamentally the same learning processes are considered to be involved. (d) Self-esteem theory, also called self-esteem restoration, self-consistency, existential validation, status-threat, or third-trend theory, developed out of humanistic (self-actualization) psychology (Maslow, Erikson, Fromm, May, White & Lippitt, Yablonsky, Feshbach, van Dijk, Siann, Heller, Rummel), and is only remotely related to F-A theory. Basically, the sole source of aggression, as seen by this school, is the frailty, shaky, vulnerable character of our selfesteem. Violations of self-esteem, be it threats to one’s status or prestige; challenges to one’s integrity, masculinity, or intrinsic worth; insult or humiliation; coercion or thwarting; moral indignation; personal failure, powerlessness or insignificance; mobilize the need to restore self-esteem, and one way of restoring self-esteem, and demonstrating one’s power, is (violent) aggression. Yablonsky (1962), in particular, has pointed out that the most quixotic and disgusting acts of violence, as in gang wars and massacres, may be understood as attempts at existential validation. Or, as Fromm (1973) summarized the basic tenet of this school: "If man cannot create anything or make a dent in anything or anybody, if he cannot break out of the prison of his total narcissism, he can escape the unbearable sense of powerlessness and nothingness only by affirming himself in the act of destruction of the life that he is unable to create". In essence, therefore, aggression is an ’escape from insignificance’ (and, if successful, may provide deep satisfaction, which, at least in part, explains its appeal and contagiousness, and even the ’esthetic’ pleasure inherent in destruction and vandalism, as implied by ’esthetic’ theories [e.g., Allen & Greenberger, 1980]). (e) Aggression as a subroutine or subsidiary instinct; the hierarchicocybernetic model. The spontaneous, specific energy accumulation implied in the hydraulic model of aggression has been seriously challenged especially by neurophysiology, neo-ethology and evolutionary biology. Scott (1958 et seq.) was one of the most outspoken and fervent critics of the Lorenzian proximate model of aggression - Lorenz’s ultimate explanation of the evolution of aggression and its social functions was, as we saw in Ch. 1, firmly rooted in group selectionism (Das sogenannte Böse was actually for the benefit of the species), and unable to explain the lethality of much animal agonistic behavior. Scott pointed out that "All of our present data indicate that fighting behavior among the higher mammals, including man, originates in external stimulation and that there is no evidence of spontaneous internal stimulation. Emotional and physiological processes prolong and magnify the effects of stimulation, but do not originate it". In other words, there exists what may be called a physiological disposition, "an internal physiological mechanism which has



only to be stimulated to produce fighting" (Scott, 1968). It was also observed by many ethologists and psychologists (Craig, 1918, 1928; Tinbergen, 1953; Hinde, 1960, 1970, 1974; Marler & Hamilton, 1966; Scott, 1968; E.O. Wilson, 1971, 1975; Crook, 1973; Schuster, 1978, among others) that an instinct of aggression as envisaged by the Lorenzians, or an endogenous tendency, an intrinsic motive to fight for its own sake would be selected against. Accordingly, the term ’instinct’ was gradually abandoned in favor of concepts like ’wiring diagram’ (Berkowitz, 1967), ’biogram’ (Count, 1973) or ’biogrammar’ (Tiger & Fox, 1971), and the notion of aggression as a subroutine or subsidiary ’instinct’. In psychology the concept was introduced by Scherer, Abeles & Fischer (1975). In their view, aggression is not a general instinct in its own right, but rather a part of more general instincts such as reproduction, feeding, or defense. They argue that "it seems more reasonable to assume aggressive subinstincts in the service of important species-preserving instincts than to posit a general aggressive instinct whose consequences would be dysfunctional during much of the individual’s life span" (despite the appeal to ’species-preserving instincts’, the message is clear). A similar concept of aggression as a low-level subroutine is implied in the hierarchico-cybernetic model of motivation developed by Tinbergen (1950, 1969) and Baerends (1956, 1960, 1976; see also: Baerends, Beer & Manning, 1975; Archer, 1976; van der Dennen & van der Molen, 1980; van der Molen & van der Dennen, 1982). The original versions of this motivational model were presented as tentative explanations of the complex organization of the reproductive behavioral system in certain fish and bird species. According to this model, the goal-orientedness of the reproductive system is based on the activity of hierarchically structured functional centers in the central nervous system. The reproductive system as a whole is considered to be activated by global inputs from the environment. More specific stimuli from the environment determine which concrete action patterns are subsequently displayed by the animal. The effects of these patterns are continuously fed back to the higher centers of the system. The perception of certain global goal situations would result in the behavioral system as a whole being switched off. Such a model can also fruitfully be applied to the agonistic behavioral system. The proximate model of aggression in the ultimate context discussed in Ch. 3 would then correspond to a species-specific subroutine conception of aggression (or a cluster of coevolved subroutines). A subroutine is a part of a wider program (the motivational system which evolved in the service of reproductive success), and can be called upon request (also by other subroutines). It does not have appetitive properties (Eigenappetenz) as most instinct or drive conceptions imply (i.e., a drive that builds up inside the organism and has to be worked off by fighting). Phylogenetically, the subroutine is probably derived from the repertoire of behaviors involved in self-defense and offspring-protection (Scott, 1976;



Albert, Walsh & Jonik, 1993), and it is still intimately (neurophysiologically and endocrinologically) connected with the fear/flight system (for the details see van der Dennen, 1985), such that fear-induced self-defensive aggression, when escape from the situation is somehow blocked (the ’cornered cat phenomenon’), is the most vehement and lethal (Archer, 1976; Rasa, 1981, 1982; van der Dennen, 1985). As aggression is extremely costly behavior, with potentially high benefits, it is supervised by sensitive cognitive (involving, for instance, the decision which stimuli are potentially noxious, or what resource is particularly desirable) and appraisal mechanisms (assessing e.g., indicators of the fighting ability of the opponent, the presence of potential allies, etc.), which can be calibrated and fine-tuned by feedbacks from the organism’s situational and accumulated experience. At the level of manifest behavior the system shows a number of contextsensitive levels of escalation depending on the balance between internal motivation and external cues. The appraisal/assessment mechanisms (which may well be sexually dimorphic, reflecting the differential parental investment strategies of the sexes) may, under certain neuro- or psychopathological conditions, become un-calibrated or out-of-tune, resulting in hypo- or hypertrophied escalation levels, or manifestation of aggressive behavior in inappropriate contexts (for a review of the neuro- and psychopathology of aggression see van der Dennen, 1983). Such a conception of aggression as a subroutine is comparable to E.O. Wilson’s (1975) idea of aggression as a "genetic contingency plan - a set of complex responses of the organism’s endocrine and nervous systems, programmed to be summoned up in times of stress", in which any of its components may have "a high degree of heritability" and is therefore subject to continuing evolution. The relatively long-term stable human attitude complexes and sentiment structures such as vengefulness, vindictiveness, rancorous resentment, hostility, enmity, hatred, animosity, etc. (what Fromm would call malignant aggression, as opposed to benign aggression), are commonly thought to be derivations or transformations of some malicious aggressive drive, but have probably more to do with the uniquely human cognitive capabilities of symbolizing, memory and anticipation, and fear/apprehension as a result of hypertrophied threat perception in combination with a vulnerable self-system. Hatred would be quite unthinkable without long-term memory, enabling the individual to recall and ruminate on previous humiliating experiences. Man ’incorporates’ his enemy so to speak. In a major application of the hierarchic motivational model by Archer (1976; see also Toates & Archer, 1978; Toates, 1980; Bolles, 1970; Leshner, 1975), he reasoned that the common factor involved in situations evoking attack and/or fear is that they provide a discrepancy of some magnitude from the



animal’s expectation model of its environment (the neuronal representation or template of the stable properties, spatial as well as temporal, of its surrounding area). Any such perceived discrepancy activates the orienting response (general alert), and, if sufficiently large, the attack/fear system. Fear behavior includes two contrasting types of responses: Freezing (tonic immobility, lethosis; presumably evolved as an anti-predator device) and fleeing. When escape is physically blocked, the motor command for escape is changed to attack, even though no general tendency to attack exists and the animal still shows the autonomic signs of fear. Van der Dennen & van der Molen (1980) and van der Molen & van der Dennen (1982) developed the model still further by integrating it with the conflict- or ambivalence hypothesis of motivational states (e.g., Tinbergen, 1952; Baerends, Brouwer & Waterbolk, 1955; Kruijt, 1964; Hinde, 1966; Baerends, 1975), the ’emergency-system’ hypothesis as developed by van Rooijen (1976), Kortmulder’s (1974) ’behavioral expansion’ hypothesis, reversal theory (Smith & Apter, 1975; Apter & Smith, 1979; Apter, 1982), the mathematical branch of catastrophe theory (Thom & Zeeman, 1974; Zeeman, 1976), and a new theory of positive and negative learning spirals and concomitant growth of skills and unskills, to account for the sudden (catastrophic) changes from flight to fight and vice versa but also the gradual and sudden changes from playful to full-scale agonistic interaction. The most surprising prediction derived from the resulting tri-stable system model (see Fig. 5.2) is the inevitability and involuntary nature of learning; the individual willy-nilly launches itself periodically into trouble through paratelic (explorative) action, and thus continues to accumulate experiences in relevant areas of life. A less surprising prediction involved the predominant role of threat perception and fear in all kinds and forms of human aggression and violence. This, of course, has been discovered again and again from Thucydides onward (See van der Dennen, 1985). Fear as the root cause of human aggression and violence in general has been identified by Bovet (1928), Browne (1938), Rombouts (1938), Marmor (1964), Carp (1967), Stagner (1967), Bychowski (1968), Horn (1969), Fromm (1973), Groen (1974), Vestdijk (1979), and its role in the genesis of war has been recognized by Mühlmann (1940), Turney-High (1949), Senghaas (1968), Horn (1970, 1972), Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff (1971), Scott (1974, 1976, 1981), Meyer (1977 et seq.), Taylor (1979), Humble (1980), among many others. Fear is also the most commonly reported emotion in battle (e.g., Marshall, 1947; Potegal, 1979). I have dwelt somewhat on the subject of aggression because 'aggression' (however conceived of) is an all-time favorite 'explanation' of war. Under closer scrutiny, however, the 'explanation' soon turns out to be tautological or circular. For example, war is often defined as a (special) category of aggressive behaviors (intergroup aggression), and subsequently 'explained' by 'aggression' (an aggressive drive seeking release, an uncontrollable aggressive instinct, a



Destrudo, or similar construct). E.O. Wilson (1978) answered the question "Are human beings innately aggressive?" in the affirmative by pointing to the ubiquity of primitive warfare as irrefutable evidence. In an examination of the alleged aggression-warfare linkage (van der Dennen, 1986), I have attempted to show that these and similar statements contain a number of non-sequiturs and fallacies, of which the so-called cumulative fallacy is the most prominent: Wars do not result from the summated aggressive tendencies of individuals. It is not simply accumulated and aggregated individual aggression. Primitive warfare is predominantly to exclusively a male business. Are women not afflicted by ’innate aggression’, or not counted as human beings? Only a small proportion of the male population actually engages in combat. The majority of the population never fights in war. Should we believe that in that majority the ’innate aggression’ is inoperative? Or, that for some mysterious reason the ’innate aggression’ manifests itself only in the warriors? Of course, in the face-to-face combat of primitive warfare, it might be highly profitable for the warrior to develop some kind of combat readiness or ’fighting 11 spirit’, if only to overcome or suppress fear . This actually often has to be induced artificially by means of ritual chants, war dances, incantations to the spirits, shamanistic practices ensuring invulnerability, and intoxication by alcoholic beverages or other psychotropic drugs. But a delirious mind, and a body geared for explosive, paroxysmal action should not be confused with aggression. For the contemporary situation, Levi (1960), among many others, has noted that there never seem to be enough ’aggressive’ men flocking to the recruiting stations during war, so that everywhere men are drafted to perform such services. Once drafted into the military, they need a heavy dose of conditioning, drill, training and indoctrination to turn them into efficient fighters in faceto-face combat. And even so, when actually engaged in combat, most soldiers do not even bother to pull the trigger (Marshall, 1947): "They were willing to die for their countries, but they were not willing to kill for them" as Cashman (1993) remarked. Studies of combat motivation have pointed primarily to factors as obedience, conformism, sense of duty, loyalty to one’s own primary combat unit, camaraderie, fear to lose ’face’ or self-esteem, considerations of individual selfconcern and survival, and, to a lesser extent, conviction and commitment, patriotism and moral indignation; rather than to motivations such as aggression or hatred of the enemy (though occasional, transient episodes of rage - when a buddy is killed or wounded - may accompany the war activities) (Marshall, 1947; Stouffer et al., 1949; van Meurs, 1955; Ashworth, 1968; Moskos, 1969, 1971, 1976; Gray, 1970; Shirom, 1976; Ellis, 1982; Kellett, 1982, 1990). ANowhere has the element of fear become more apparent than in nonliterate man’s military preparational ceremonies@ (Turney-High, 1949). See also Kennedy (1971). 11



In brief, explaining war by invoking aggression is no more convincing than invoking human stupidity or original sin. "Even if aggression is a universal human trait, war is not" (Ferguson, 1984). 5.2.5.2 Personal Aggressiveness and War One of the most ambitious explanations of the connection between personal ’transformed’ aggression and war was attempted by Durbin & Bowlby (1938). Though intended to be a theory of modern war, it clearly claims universal validity and applicability to pre-state level warfare. Man, they pointed out, is a naturally sociable animal and spends much more of his time at peace than at war. How does this natural sociability break down? There are ’simple causes of fighting’ among animals, especially primates, and children: Possessiveness, including jealousy; intrusion of a stranger (ethnocentric-xenophobic aggression); and frustration. In adults, however, these simple causes of fighting are modified or transformed by two facts. In the first place, the superordinate group interest: "[T]he aggression of adults is normally a group activity. Murder and assault are restricted to a small criminal minority. Adults kill and torture each other only when organized into political parties, or economic classes, or religious denominations, or nation states. A moral distinction is always made between the individual killing for himself and the same individual killing for some real or supposed group interest". In the second place, the superordinate group mentality or ideology; adult aggression is covered with a rich patina of ratiomorphic nonsense and rhetoric: "[T]he adult powers of imagination and reason are brought to the service of the aggressive intention. Apes and children, when they fight, simply fight. Men and women first construct towering systems of theology and religion... before they kill one another". At least three mechanisms, Durbin & Bowlby suggest, operate to transform personal tension into group aggression: (1) Animism (the universal tendency to attribute all events in the world to the deliberate activity of human or parahuman will). (2) Displacement (though not the ultimate cause, is a direct channel of the ultimate causes of war): "[T]he transference of fear or hatred or love from the true historical object to a secondary object simplifies life". (3) Projection. This consists essentially of crediting others with the aspects of one’s recognized and unrecognized motives that one most dislikes. But why do states/tribes/polities/groups wage war? For two reasons: "In the first place... the expression of aggression on a group scale appears to restore to it simplicity and direction. In the civilized adult the original and simple causes for fighting are forgotten and overlaid with every kind of excuse and transformation. But when aggression is made respectable by manifestation through the corporate will of the group, it resumes much of its amoral simplicity of purpose". In the second place, because of the pressure of transformed aggression within their members. The members of the group may



be so frustrated, and so unhappy that the burden of internal aggression may become intolerable. They have reached a point at which war has become a psychological necessity. Ambivalence is so severe, internal conflict so painful, fear and hatred of the scapegoat so intense, that a resolution of the crisis can only be found in war. In such cases war will be fought without adequate objective cause. It will have an objective occasion, some trifling incident or dispute, but the real effective causes will be elsewhere, within the tormented souls of the members of the aggressor group. 5.2.5.3 ’Belly hot with anger’: Redirection of Aggression Examples of the attempt to interweave psychological (frustration-aggression) and sociological (massive redirection as Ventilsitte) principles into an explanation of primitive warfare are e.g., Whiting’s (1944) analysis of Kwoma headhunting, and Murphy’s (1957) analysis of Mundurucu warfare. Their analyses are based on frustration-aggression theory, the basic tenet of which was, as we saw, that aggression is always a consequence of frustration. Warfare is considered by these authors as a more or less ’safe’ outlet for accumulated aggression (a tenacious idea repeated until today; e.g., Maryanski & Turner, 1992): Aggressive manifestations "are enjoined in war where the expression of aggression serves a socially useful end" (Dollard et al., 1939). Such deflection of internally generated aggression upon an outside target is called redirection or the frustration-aggression displacement syndrome. As Otterbein (1973) succinctly summarized the theory: "The frustrations of everyday life create an 12 aggressiveness that is often channeled into warfare". The Kwoma are a small tribe situated in the mountains just north of the Sepik River, New Guinea, and about 250 miles from its delta. As they dwell in a head-hunting area, they live in constant fear of being murdered in raids carried out against them by neighboring tribes. Whiting states about them: "The Kwoma also carry out head-hunting raids against tribes who have not directly frustrated them. They frequently displace to the outgroup, aggression which was generated within the tribe. This is evidenced by the fact that the only two raids, about which I was able to question participants, began with in-group quarrels. One informant said that he has organized a raid because his wife had teased him for not showing himself a man by taking a head. When he started to beat her for taunting him, she 12

Frustration-aggression displacement has also been a favorite and pervasive explanation of contemporary wars: "Any nation, or any society, where there are major frustrations may easily be led into war. It is not that there are warlike peoples so much as that when persons are frustrated long enough, they take recourse to war" (Gardner Murphy, 1945). The main problem of this theory concerns the degree or intensity of frustrations, and especially the distribution of the frustrated individuals. Should a frustrated group be equally and homogeneously frustrated? Or only the dominant group? Or only the leader(s)? Or only a certain percentage? And, if so, to what degree? Etc. etc. (Valkenburgh, 1964). All in all, it obscures more than it clarifies.



accused him of being a woman-beater but afraid of men. With his ’belly still hot with anger’ he had then organized a raid, in which he had taken a head. Another raid, organized during the period of field work, also grew out of a quarrel between a husband and wife" (Whiting, 1944). A similar ’belly-hot-with-anger’ case is that of the Nakoaktok (Kwakiutl) man, whose brother was taken prisoner by an unknown northern group. He "determined to go fighting and to attack whomever he should meet" (Curtis, 1915). Codere (1950) explains such reactions from the "desire to answer death with death". This desire springs from the conviction that "the death of anyone outside the local group could cancel out the effects of the death of one of its own members" (See also ' 5.2.10.5 on the paranoid elaboration of mourning). Among the South American Mundurucu, warfare operated, according to Murphy (1957), to maintain social cohesion by providing an outlet for frustrations and hostile feelings generated by the social organization of the group. As Murphy states: "[T]his type of social structure actually generated the bellicose activities and attitudes that functioned to preserve it, and... this circular relationship allowed Mundurucu society to continue through a period during which it was subjected to severe internal and external threats... Intercommunity cooperation in warfare was facilitated by the peculiar juxtaposition of matrilocal residence and patrilineal descent". Intervillage matrilocality distributed Mundurucu males throughout the cultural area, producing a social structural situation in which related male kinsmen resided in different communities with their affines. If overt conflict were to occur, Mundurucu villages would be torn to pieces. This did not occur because men repressed their grievances, since they could not rely upon the support of their kinsmen residing elsewhere. This repressed hostility then achieves release through warfare against distant enemy tribes (Otterbein, 1973). "Paradoxically", Murphy states, "for a people who considered all the world as an enemy, the true cause of enmity came from within their own society". Also Ellis (1951), in a review of Pueblo Indian warfare, concludes that "warfare served to provide legitimate outlet for the frustrations and aggressions arising from unpermitted competition or suspicions thereof among peoples of the same general culture". Similarly, Steward & Faron (1959) suggest that the need for social harmony in crowded Tupinamba villages resulted in frustrations that found expression in relentless warfare. See also Wedgwood (1930) and Kluckhohn (1949) for similar internal-fuel-for-external-war formulations. Ferguson (1984) observes that most anthropologists would agree that pent-up hostilities within a group can be redirected toward outsiders, but that not all of them would accept this mechanism as a cause or explanation of war (e.g., Newcomb, 1960; Leeds, 1963; Hallpike, 1973).



5.2.6 Schismogenesis An important concept relevant to understanding some instances of warfare, according to Harrison (1973), is the process termed schismogenesis, first described by Bateson (1936) in his psychological-anthropological study, Naven, of the Iatmul people of New Guinea. Schismogenesis, as defined by Bateson (1967), is "a process of differentiation in the norms of individual behavior resulting from cumulative interaction between individuals". Schismogenesis leads not only to greater differentiation in norms but also mutual opposition and rivalry within the context of the interaction as well. While Bateson describes this interactional, relational process generally in terms of individual behavior he suggests its application for groups and for understanding some of the conflict relations within and between nations as well (Harrison, 1973). Such behavior may occur in either one of two forms. The first is that of complementary schismogenesis: "If, for example, one of the patterns of cultural behavior, considered appropriate in individual A, is culturally labelled as an assertive pattern, while B is expected to reply to this with what is culturally regarded as submission, it is likely that this submission will encourage a further assertion, and that this assertion will demand still further submission. We have thus a potentially progressive state of affairs" (Bateson, 1967). The second type of schismogenetic relationship is termed a symmetrical one. In this dyadic relationship the behavior of one individual or group leads alter to respond with similar behavior: "If, for example, we find boasting as a cultural pattern of behavior in one group, and that the other group replies to this with boasting, a competitive situation may develop in which boasting leads to more boasting, and so on" (Bateson, 1967). Such a situation is exemplified by the pitched battles of primitive peoples, of which so many ethnographic accounts exist. Such behavior in which both sides challenge and taunt their foes and display bravery, would continue until either both parties decided to call a halt to the proceedings by truce or until one side was routed by the other. The potlatch of the Kwakiutl and other American Northwest Coast Indians, as described by Codere (1950), may also be regarded as a kind of symmetrical schismogenesis. In this situation the feasting, gift-giving or destroying of property by one group would eventually lead to an escalated response by those being hosted. This process would continue in stepwise fashion until it was no longer possible for one set of the participants to maintain or increase the intensity of interaction (Harrison, 1973).



5.2.7 Conflict Theories In a major review and analysis of New Guinea warfare, Paula Brown (1982) summarized the range of other possible interpretations of primitive warfare. Koch (1974) attributes warfare in Jalé society to the pattern of socialization and absence of accepted authority to settle disputes. Hayano (1974) considers warfare in the highlands generally as a means of settling intervillage disputes. Hallpike (1977) has stressed the apparent lack of population pressure and beneficial ecological consequences in the practice of warfare among the Tauade of highland New Guinea: "Tauade pig-rearing, feasts and dances, fighting and vengeance are not biologically adaptive, or even socially useful in any objective sense. They form a complex of traits which is given coherence by the... cognitive orientation and the value system of the society". Rappaport (1968) and Heider (1979) provide cultural, ideological, and ritual explanations, showing that warfare is part of cultural tradition and religious beliefs. The Maring cycle of pig production, ritual, and feasts permits warfare at certain times (Rappaport, 1968); the Dani belief that ghosts help living relatives kill enemies and also require warfare to avenge deaths (Heider, 1979). Sillitoe (1978) explains New Guinea warfare as the rivalry of big-men for followers and control. His conclusion that war is politically motivated rejects ecological, demographic, and similar causes of war. It emphasizes social and political relationships within and between groups. This introduces the factor that links these studies to conflict theory, following Simmel (1955) and Coser (1956), which is also the basis of Paula Brown's (1982) interpretation of Chimbu (Simbu) warfare. Simbu clans and tribes are good examples of Simmel's notion of the integrating role of antagonism and opposition. The continuing pressure, danger, and tensions between groups serve to ally the members of clans and tribes. This has been impressed upon many observers and is a basis of the idea of political autonomy of the groups. Simmel's other observations - that war is a form of contact between groups, that one fights under the mutually recognized control of norms and rules, and common membership in a larger social structure - also applies to this situation.



5.2.8 Exchange Theory, Reciprocity and War Sahlins (1965, 1972) identified three kinds of reciprocity in human social life: Generalized, balanced, and negative. Exchanges that are long-term and generally beneficial and not tallied, and made between members of the same household and others closely related by kinship or special ties constitute generalized reciprocity. Balanced reciprocity refers to equal exchanges, such as trades, that are not necessarily repeated and are characteristically made between distant relatives, intracommunity nonrelatives likely to interact repeatedly, and persons from other, non-hostile communities. In situations of negative reciprocity one partner gets something for nothing, or if articles are exchanged, one partner receives something he values more highly than what he gave in return. The most blatant negative exchanges between communities are the spoils of war. Negative reciprocity is characteristic of dealings between a home community and strangers and enemies far beyond its boundaries (See also Ch. 6). Schwimmer (1979), in an analysis of reciprocity in Orokaiva, another Papua New Guinea society, considers ceremonial exchange as an activity among the Orokaiva, and permanent war a form of negative reciprocity characteristic of relations with the mountain tribes outside this social realm. For structuralists (e.g., Lévi-Strauss, 1943; Mauss, 1967; Rubel & Rosman, 1978) generally, war is the other side of exchange within a structure of relations; "war is an exchange gone bad, and exchange is a war averted" (Ferguson, 1984). Moore (1978) considers primitive warfare complexes and trading rings to be functional equivalents in a world of cultural climax. "The primitive world at its most complex involves the two closely related institutions of warfare and trading rings... we shall see that these area wide systems integrate many communities in a precarious, fragile balance that is preserved by diplomatic exchanges oscillating between negative and balanced reciprocity. Such competitive alliances or communities constitute a 'cultural climax' that falls short of the simpler, more effective social organization of civilization. The climax is a saturation, leading nowhere". Primitive warfare, according to Moore, is a partial attempt to maintain longterm diplomatic equilibrium among circles of communities. The expeditions against the enemy and the alliance making of primitive warfare seem strange to us precisely because their overall function is to maintain the status quo, to keep many peoples over a broad area in long-term equilibrium, in which no one conquers anyone else and no one wins real victories. Such systems of war and trade are all symbolic treadmills, for no one makes a profit, no one gets something for nothing in the long run. And in spite of the many victories tallied to the multiple scores, no one ever wins, because there is



no victory, only constant efforts to achieve a balanced exchange on every side and on all scores. 5.2.9 Unrestricted Primitive Warfare and Trap Psychology Tefft (1988, 1990) explored this cul-de-sac of unrestricted primitive war (i.e., conflicts without institutionalized checks limiting the levels of intertribal violence) in greater detail. He suggests that political communities can become ’entrapped’ in violent patterns of interpolity behavior even though such collective aggression leads to total destruction of many of the polities involved. Therefore, Tefft argues, that unrestricted war in the long run, proves to be detrimental to the welfare of the participating polities or, in other words, unrestricted war is ’maladaptive’. Unrestricted war seems to entrap polities in repeated cycles of continued violence. "Initially, aggressiveness may have been of survival value to the tribe" states Rapoport (1974) but "eventually this contribution to survival potential may have vanished but the traditions related to aggressiveness and violence may have become internalized to the extent that they can no longer be modified or dislodged". In a similar fashion Hallpike (1973) has suggested that "we should recognize that there are likely to be many situations... where the society in question is caught in a vicious circle... and that while the society may not be wiped out, the institution may be perpetuated because there is no way to stop it, not because it is performing some vital function for that society" (Hallpike, 1973; italics added). Also Peoples (1982) points out that the assumption that because all local groups in a regional population participate in the warfare all must benefit from this behavior, is erroneous. See also Harris’ (1975) idea of war as an ’ecological’ trap (' 4.4.1). There is considerable ethnographic and ethnohistorical evidence which suggests that unrestricted war was widespread among tribal peoples, especially in those areas where war was ’endemic’ (Meyer, 1981 et seq.). Enemies tried to totally destroy each other (e.g., Langness, 1973 for Papua New Guinea). There is constant danger that communities may be annihilated or subjugated. Why do such unrestricted, internecine wars persist? Tefft invokes modern trap psychology and social learning theory (Cross & Guyer, 1980; Bandura, 1978, 1986) for a reanalysis of Mae Enga and Maori warfare. These theories suggest that as a result of actual or perceived rewards, symbolic reinforcement, ignorance of the long-term effects of various actions, miscalculations of the risks, and vicarious satisfactions, members of political communities fall into ’social traps’, here referred to as ’war traps’. Cross & Guyer (1980) differentiate between various types of social traps. Time-delay traps occur when current rewards reinforce the wrong actions. Since undesirable consequences occur only after a considerable time lag, punishment has little effect on inhibiting future recurrence of the same trap.



The negative consequences of a pattern of behavior may not be sufficiently contiguous to it to encourage a selection of alternatives. Miscalculations occur because "events are typically related to each other probabilistically rather than invariantly (and) such causal uncertainty leaves much room to err in judging why things happen" (Bandura, 1986). Relationships between cause and effect are unclear because the effect follows the cause by some period of time, or because the immediate cause cannot be distinguished from other possible causes (Kasper, 1980). Public occasions on which community leaders revivify past provocations or debate the threatening future create a social climate in which peoples’ emotions are stirred in such a way that they will support aggressive actions regardless of the future danger (Bandura, 1973). Consequently, people perceive their enemies as an external evil so threatening to their security that any violent collective action, no matter how desperate, is justified (Clark, 1986). The sliding-reinforcer traps refer to situations in which past positive reinforcement results in a continuation of a behavioral pattern "long after the circumstances under which that behavior was appropriate has ceased to be relevant, producing negative consequences which could have been avoided easily and the behavior stopped earlier" (Cross & Guyer, 1980). Moreover, over the long term rewarded behavior may have unintended effects that accumulate slowly. Sliding-reinforcer traps may be merely forms of time-delay traps. So-called external traps occur when the acts by a particular individual or group bring harm to other individuals. When the separate and independent acts of numerous individuals, groups, or polities bring collective harm to all, a form of externality trap called a collective trap has occurred. The collective trap is a form of externality trap in which similar behavior by individuals or social units, operating independently, bring collective harm to all the participants. Why would groups continue behavior that brings collective harm? Each independent decision-making unit perceives that there are no alternatives that bring immediate payoffs. Therefore it will be reluctant to abandon established behavior regardless of the ultimate adverse consequences. The long-range collective harm produced by the acts of individual units will not inhibit their behavior. The short-term benefits to each participant in the system may encourage imitation by other participants, thus compounding the collective harm that eventually results. Tefft suggests that the unrestricted wars initiated by the pastoral Dassanetch (Almagor, 1977, 1978a,b; Collins, 1961), living north of Lake Turkana, is the result of such an externality trap. It occurs because young warriors pursue their own interests - by conducting devastating raids agains their enemies - in a way in which they ultimately involve the whole tribe in destructive intertribal conflict. The self-interest of the warrior cliques forces the Dassanetch into a war trap contrary to the interests of the elders and probably the majority of tribal members.



5.2.10

Psychoanalytic Theories

In the preceding paragraphs we already encountered psychoanalytic concepts and terminology. The following paragraphs focus on more ’orthodox’ psychoanalytic theories, points of view and insights regarding primitive war. Freud’s name has been eminently connected with the topic of ’war and civilization’, and, indeed, there is no consistent theory on primitive war causation from his hand. Yet, some of his insights may be relevant to our subject-matter. In Totem and Taboo (1913) Freud followed Darwin’s suggestion that the primordial human society consisted of family hordes, and formulated his theory of the ’primal event’ (or ’primal horde’), and the basis of the incest taboo and the Oedipus complex. The workings of the speculative and rather obnoxious Todestrieb never inspired to any serious theory formation, in contrast to the Oedipus complex. Money-Kyrle (1937) described three psychoanalytic theories of primitive war, the first of which is what he calls the ’sexual theory’ of war (merely based on phallic symbolism). The second is the ’Oedipal theory’ (actually the reciprocal of the Oedipal complex; see ' 5.2.10.3). The third is the paranoiac theory, based on Melanie Klein’s (1932 et seq.) good/bad objects theory. According to the paranoiac theory of war, intergroup conflicts are transformed into war because real differences are not dealt with through realistic procedures, but rather through distortions of reality and through the assumption of a radically destructive attitude toward the other. The killing of enemies, Money-Kyrle believes, "is often an obsessional or ritual act, which, on account of its magical attack on his unconscious bogies, saves the savage from his neurotic fears". Wars among primitive peoples may have rational motives, such as the defense of or attack on land, pillage, slave raiding, etc., but, MoneyKyrle asserts, there is always some admixture of the irrational motives connected with the unconscious need to negate the bad presences and to firmly establish the good ones. 5.2.10.1 The Sadomasochistic Theory of War: ’Destructive orgasm’ Glover’s (1947) reflections on war mainly concern the role of sadistic and masochistic impulses in primitive and civilized armed conflicts. According to him, war provides perhaps the most dramatic piece of evidence that destructive impulses can be completely divorced from biological aims. Accordingly, he considers the political and economic theories of war (which regard war as the expression of a fight for self-preservation) reactionary and obscurantist because, he asserts, the real functions of war are purely destructive. Glover further maintains that the same basic mechanisms that are operative in the cannibalism of primitive tribes are also operative in war; both phenomena are traceable to Man’s unconscious sadism.



Primitive tribes do not hesitate to declare that they want to make war in order to give their enemies a reason for mourning, while civilized peoples strive to consider their wars justified by objective motives, such as economic interests or the defense of a political system (Fornari, 1974). Glover regards war as a manifestation of conflict between human impulses, an attempt to solve some problem, "a mass insanity, if you like, provided you remember that insanity is simply a dramatic attempt to deal with individual conflict, a curative process initiated in the hope of preventing disruption, but ending in hopeless disintegration". Glover notes that masochism contributes considerably to an unconscious readiness to tolerate or even welcome situations of war. And it does so because the acceptance of suffering, in addition to being a primary form of gratification, represents a primitive method of overcoming unconscious guilt. Glover views war as a mental disorder of the group mind. Conceiving the relations between groups as mutually sadomasochistic, Glover in effect puts the aggressors and the defenders on the same level. He notes, in fact, that the ’attacked’ are sometimes even more determined to win their ’defensive’ war than the ’attackers’ their ’aggressive’ war. Through war, then, society allows the individuals to experience the destructive orgasm which usually cannot be reached on the individual level (Fornari, 1974). A comparable idea was elaborated by Bataille (1962). According to him, the origins of war, sacrifice and orgy are identical; they spring from the existence of taboos set up to counter liberty in murder or sexual violence. These taboos inevitably shaped the explosive surge of transgression. Towards the end of the Upper Paleolithic ten or fifteen thousand years ago, the transgression of the taboo orginally forbidding the killing of animals, (considered as essentially the same as men), and then the killing of Man himself, became formalized in war. Primitive war is, according to Bataille, rather like a holiday, a feast day, and even modern war almost always has some of this paradoxical similarity. War was first another outlet for the feelings that are given expression in ceremonial rites; originally war was a luxury. It was no attempt to increase the peoples’ or rulers’ riches by conquest; it was an aggressive and extravagant exuberance, with the character of a destructive orgy. Rather enigmatic is DeMause’s (1977) assertion that "Groups go to war in order to overcome the helplessness of being trapped in a birth canal, through means of a sadomasochistic orgy in order to ’hack one’s way out’ of the mother’s body".



5.2.10.2 Herd Instincts As we have seen in Ch. 2, instinct psychology flourished around the fin de siècle period, exemplified by McDougall’s (1908) ’instinct of pugnacity’. Some early psychoanalysts held that any primitive instinct, when obstructed, might result in war without the intervention of a fighting instinct. For example, Beatrice Hinkle (1925) stated: "War instincts as such do not exist. The socalled war instincts are not instincts in themselves, but are compounds of numerous other primitive impulses. There is, however, an instinct, or impulse to action, of a kind which has enabled man to dominate his environment and to overcome the handicap of his original weakness... This same impulse to action, which subdued and changed his natural environment to suit his will was turned against his own kind, other humans, who also were part of his environment, when at any time they encroached upon the group organism with which the particular individuals were identified or stood in the way of his desired advance". Trotter (1915) developed a theory of three types of herds and of three corresponding ’isotropic’ herd instincts: The lupine or wolf type, the sheep form, and the bee type. The sheep never fight, while the bees fight only to protect themselves against invasion. The wolves, on the other hand, are aggressive, rapacious, cruel and treacherous. They are hell-bent on conquest and the enslavement of other peoples. They depend on force, intimidation and fraud to achieve their ends. But once they are whipped they behave like curs and retreat into their lairs to await another opportunity to bare their teeth and march to the slaughter. With such people in the world there can never be any adequate security and war will remain a constant menace and even an inevitability (Bernard, 1944). Such reasoning engendered much speculation on ’herd instincts’. MacCurdy (1918) developed such a theory (which is, in fact, an early formulation of a group selection theory of ethnocentrism; see Ch. 6). Briefly stated, it holds that primitive Man, moved by fear and sense of insecurity, identified himself closely with his group or herd - so closely in fact that the interests of the group took precedence over his own individual interests, which were merged in those of the group. This leads him to look with suspicion upon all outsiders, all people who have strange dress, manners, customs, or even beliefs. Primitive Man, as does modern Man, readily kills the outsider and willingly risks his own life for the protection and preservation of the lives of his fellow herdsmen or nationals. War, MacCurdy says, "is never far from consciousness when such suspicious rivalry is in the air". MacCurdy believes that there is a "deep-lying instinct for the preservation of the species" which makes this sort of loyalty or patriotism possible. This ’herd instinct’ he accepts as a true cause of war. There is, as Bernard (1944) observed, no need of assuming any underlying herd instinct, or instinct to preserve the species, or any other general instinct as



a basic or fundamental cause of war. There is, furthermore, nothing particularly psychoanalytic about this theory, except that it is put forth by a psychoanalyst. 5.2.10.3 Filicide and Intergenerational Male Hostility "The governing bodies and leaders of the nations of the world are made up predominantly of older males who recurrently produce mass murder, in recurring ’wars’ of younger males of each new generation who are... deprived of civil rights. This would strongly suggest an intense and murderous, albeit unconscious, hostility of older males for younger males" (Walsh, 1971). Some psychoanalysts have elaborated a theory that throws heavy reponsibility on something they call ’filicide’, which is the reciprocal of the well-known Freudian Oedipus complex. Where the Oedipus idea emphasizes the son’s unconscious fear and hatred of the father, mostly because of his jealous love for the mother, filicide refers to the unconscious hatred of the father for the son, upon whom the former may displace feelings of jealousy and hostility felt at an earlier stage of life toward siblings and indeed even toward the father (Cf. Rascovsky, 1970, 1974; Rascovsky & Rascovsky, 1972). And what better way, they hold, of finding expression for filicide than by sending the youth out to die in a war? How often indeed has it been remarked that "wars are made by the old for the young to die in?" (Brodie, 1973). Bouthoul (1951 et seq.) elaborated the same idea, which he (Bouthoul, 1970) later would call 'infanticide différé' [deferred infanticide]. He coined the sacrificial phenomenon involved 'le complexe d'Abraham' (also called 'Medea complex' and 'Isaac syndrome': Charny, 1973; Shoham, 1976; Corelis, 1980): An intergenerational conflict, in which the older male generation (the patriarchs) feels threatened in its hierarchical, economic and sexual privileges, and contemplates the sacrifice of the sons. Walsh (1971) relates 'recurrent mass homicides' (i.e., wars) especially to this strong and largely unconscious hostility of older males against younger males resulting from the Oedipal situation, i.e., the early competition of the father and the son for the mother, plus the jealous need of the older male to preserve his position which is progressively threatened by the arrival of the younger male at sexual maturity in late adolescence. Walsh & Scandalis (1975) subsequently developed this theory of war as an institutionalized form of intergenerational male hostility still further. They hypothesize that primitive male initiation rites and organized warfare are equivalent as cross-cultural expressions of psychosocial transitions. "In other words, war, i.e., recurrent mass homicide, is a culturally disguised representation of an unconscious symbolic acting out of the same psychic phenomenon expressed in initiation rites, though modified by cultural values, history, and traditions". Walsh & Scandalis believe that sexual rules which favor older males constitute a culture trait which augments tension between generations of males with



consequent envy on the part of the younger males and fear of the consequences of this envy on the part of the fathers. "Wars are caused by the decisions of men as members of organizations, whether they are military organizations or governing bodies" Otterbein (1968) states. Another culture trait which may well increase the hostility between fathers and sons is the high rate of polygyny in which older men are married to many of the young women. It is also probable that in cultures in which adolescent and young male adult sexual needs are not satisfied because of social prohibitions, there may be a correlation between such prohibitive behavior and warlike behavior. Boastfulness, indicative of envy, is another culture trait correlated with warfare (Textor, 1967). The material objects which appear to be the basis of the envy are merely symbolic of an unconscious envy of something more basic. Acquisition of wealth and material goods demonstrate masculine power. Young males desire and envy this power, which is characteristic of the fathers, and so are often nonreluctant participants in both intiation rites and warfare. In many societies a significant proportion of the young men are, indeed, killed each year in war. 5.2.10.4 War as Purification Rite Leach (1965), famous anthropologist with psychoanalytic sympathies, views primitive war as primarily a purification rite, a cleansing operation, a ’removal of dangerous dirt’. Primitive warfare is a kind of ritual game; any benefits that it may bring are metaphysical rather than material, virtue rather than loot. This is best exemplified by headhunting. Leach argues that primitive people conceive of the world ’out-there’ as composed of the concentric circles of the near, intermediate, and the far. The intermediate ’out-there’ consists of the neigboring villages, affinal relatives with whom ’we’ exchange wives, enemies against whom ’we’ make war, wild animals and spirits. People, ideas, ghosts, and matter cross from one range to another. Dirt is intermediate matter, and hunting, sacrifice and war are a removal of dangerous dirt. Running through all Leach’s themes is a principle of duality. This has its ultimate paradigm in our human recognition of the difference between life and death, and in our animal recognition of the difference between the sexes. In every case, both in reality and in ritual, fertility and life are the outcome of an activation of the relationship between the ’I’ and the ’other’ which results from male aggression, which may be either sexual or combative. In a sexual context the ’other’ is a woman; in a headhunting context, it is ’the enemy’; in a sacrificial context, it is ’God’. Thus, he says, "Killing is a classifying operation. We kill our enemies; we do not kill our friends". Illogically, yet very fundamentally, the slaughter of the enemy and the slaughter of one’s own side are both felt to be ’the supreme sacrifice’, a mystical sexual union of man and God.



There is a very widespread human tendency to make an association between the notion of ’divine power’ on the one hand and two different manifestations of aggression (’killing’ and ’male sexuality’) on the other. This is a curious triangle of ideas and it seems to arise because, even at the subhuman animal 13 level of existence, killing and male sexuality are very closely interlocked . Man has created institutions which channel the dangerous aggressive urges of the individual into modes of expression which are relatively harmless to the home society, whatever the consequences may be for those in the world outside. Warfare, religious ritual, and exogamous marriage are all institutions of this kind. Leach’s theory cannot be easily summarized, and I therefore refer the reader to his original (and insightful) article. 5.2.10.5 War and the Paranoid Elaboration of Mourning One aspect of the war phenomenon that most readily lends itself to psychoanalytic investigation, Fornari (1974) asserts, is the magico-religious aspect war assumes among primitive peoples. The magico-religious world against the background of which wars are waged among primitive peoples appears to be traceable to man’s primal reactions in the face of death. The gods of primitive peoples are barely distinguishable from the ghosts of their departed ancestors. Because of their invisibility, and the powers ascribed to them, ghosts are more terrifying than animals and living men. In the eyes of primitive men it is preferable to wage war on visible enemies who can be killed than to be at enmity with invisible spirits who are immortal and cannot be overcome. In order to escape misfortune, therefore, they must appease the spirits. Although the spirits are felt to be hostile, primitive men cannot wage war against them but must attempt to appease them by sacrificing to them, by providing them with the things they desire. If this is not done, the spirits become angry and show their displeasure by sending calamities of all kinds. This ghost fear cannot be controlled except by the paranoid mechanism of projective identification through which the bad parts that constitute the mysterious reasons for which the dead are filled with desires of revenge against the living, are projected onto the enemy tribe. While the propitiatory rites and the idealization of the relation to the ancestorgods may be understood as the elaboration of the depressive anxieties of mourning (since he who performs propitiatory rites as acts of reparation does 13

See also Moeller (1992) who concludes that "der Krieg nicht den Tod als letztes Ziel für Augen hat, sondern die Weiterentwicklung des Lebens... Der Krieg erscheint als getarnter kollektiver Geschlechtsakt. Die verborgene Absicht hinter der Zerstörung ist die Befruchtung... Der Akt der Slacht ist der Akt der Geschlechter", meaning that the ultimate purpose of war is not destruction but procreation. In Greek mythology, he notes, the goddess of love Aphrodite and Ares, the god of war, had a passionate liaison.



so because he feels that he himself has offended his gods), war-virtue, understood as a propitiation of the ancestor-gods, is based on a process of projection owing to which a tribe becomes convinced that its gods have been offended by the enemy. The slaughter of enemies, or any atrocity committed against them, acquires the character of virtue inasmuch as it is a battle against, and a punishment of, the projected bad parts of the self that are displeasing to the spirits. This is what Fornari calls the ’paranoid elaboration of mourning’. Since the injuries fathers inflict on boys during initiation rites - injuries which at times are so severe as to cause death - intensify the boys’ wish to kill their fathers, the fact that initiation rites are the rites of initiation into warfare leads Fornari to believe that war itself is intimately connected with the struggle against patricidal impulses projected onto the enemy tribe. A primitive tribe at war with another primitive tribe makes the other the receptacle of its own guilt needs, for which reason the slaughter of the enemy, who is perceived as guilty of the death of one’s relatives or fellow tribesmen, is sensed as blood revenge and serves to avoid the depressive pain of mourning. The paranoid significance of a primitive tribe’s relation to an enemy tribe, as a relation to the projected bad parts of the self, is also revealed by their belief that all whom they kill in this world will serve them as slaves in the next. In connection with the relation between the magico-religious world of primitive peoples and war, Davie (1929) held that the religion of primitive man fosters war. In Fornari’s view, it seems more correct to say that both religion and war originate in the elaboration of psychotic anxieties connected with mourning, and that each of them constitutes a socialized mode of defense against such anxieties. The intimate bond between war and the paranoid reaction to mourning becomes particularly evident if we consider the close connection between war and the belief that death is caused by the hostile magic of alien tribes. The need to accuse someone else of the death of a loved person, Fornari asserts, is the most obvious proof of man’s incapacity to bear guilt in the occasion of mourning. Among primitive peoples this incapacity to elaborate mourning is intimately associated with the outbreak of war. Headhunting, with its magicoreligious contents, appears to be comprehensible in the terms in which Melanie Klein (1932 et seq.) described the mechanism of omnipotent sadistic control as the manic defense against persecutory anxieties. Strehlow (1910) gives an explanation of war among the primitive tribes of Australia that is surprisingly close to Fornari’s theory of war as a paranoid elaboration of mourning: "The aim of the avenging expedition is to give the inhabitants of another camp the same reason for mourning that they have had". Marett (1933) referring to wars of revenge as "safety valves for the emotions", writes: We must recognize it, in fact, as originally no more than a quite blind and



undirected act of baffled rage, following hard upon the heels of an unmeasured grief... It is as if the demented mourners thought to discharge their random weapons at death itself, and thereupon some wretched mortal intercepted the blow... Just as he would not himself go down before death without a struggle, so through the sympathy of his kinsmen he continues to challenge the force that would annihilate him, and reaches a happy release for himself in and through their relief at finding a vent, however inappropriate, for their desire to maintain the fight against the common enemy (Marett, 1933). Through their propitiatory and expiatory rites, some primitive tribes seem to be able, on the psychological level, to master the paranoid position toward the enemy. The expiatory post-war rituals often show in a striking manner the sense of guilt that accompanies the killing of enemies among many primitive peoples (See Ch. 7). 5.2.10.6 War as the Supreme Feast In a chapter dedicated to the psychological aspects of war, Bouthoul (1951) described the ’new psychological world’, i.e., the radical transformation of values brought about by war. The charging of the enemy with guilt seems to be of fundamental importance in escaping the sense of guilt which war provokes in man; it also marks the moment when peace turns into war, by ceremonially inaugurating the new psychological world established by war. Following this rite, homicide, pillage, and rape become legal for a given period. From that moment on, men are willing to give and receive a violent death, to appropriate by violence the enemy’s goods and to lose their own, as if the sense of guilt, though eluded through projection, still involved the mobilization of self-punitive mechanisms. The splitting of the world into friend and enemy represents an extreme simplification whereby the good and the bad are no longer integrated in the same instinctual situation and in the same object relationship, but the same situation assumes different characters according as it is consummated upon the self, or upon the other, in the paranoid aphorism of mors tua vita mea. The enormous weight of human ambivalence is suddenly lifted when love and hate find two separate objects of attention. In Bouthoul’s opinion war has all the characteristics of a feast, whose principal function, according to Durkheim, is to unify the group. The most typical psychological aspects of a feast, in the sociological sense of the word, are the following: (1) It brings about a meeting of the members of a group; (2) it is a rite of expenditure and dissipation; (3) it is accompanied by a modification of certain moral laws; (4) it is a rite of collective exaltation; (5) it brings about a state of physical insensibility; (6) it is accompanied by sacrificial rites. As everyone of these characteristics is found in war, war might be regarded as ’the supreme feast’.



The sociological theory of war as the supreme feast is in agreement with Abraham’s (1955) psychoanalytic interpretation of war as a ’totemic feast’. 5.2.10.7 War-Breeding Complexes One of the essential differences between individual aggressiveness and the warlike impulse, according to Bouthoul (1951), is that while individual aggressiveness is momentary and transient, felt specifically as such and usually limited to one individual, the warlike impulse is a generalized, profound emotional state. Often it is a general state of acceptance and approval of future violence rather than a manifestation of violence itself. The warlike state corresponds, that is, to a sense of the need for a period of violence and destruction rather than to genuine aggressive excitation. In a subsequent publication, Bouthoul (1972) discussed the emotional processes in the genesis of ’collective aggressiveness’ and what he calls ’warbreeding complexes’ such as the Oedipus Complex and the Abraham Complex, among others. The principal war-breeding complexes all share a common feature; they converge by different paths on the choice of an enemy. They mark the psychological process of the transition from diffuse aggressiveness to specific animosity. They show how, as the ’aggressive tonus’ rises in a group, it unconsciously begins to seek an appropriate enemy; that is, another group of humans on whom to place the responsibility for all its ills and frustrations. This scapegoat group becomes the object to be hated, destroyed or humiliated. This search for an enemy is accompanied by the formulation of justifications to legitimize in advance the unleashing of the destructive institutions of war, persecution, ostracism, genocide, etc. The main lines of this process appear to Bouthoul to be as follows: (1) Inevitably, societies cause suffering, anxiety, thorny problems or exasperation, and, equally inevitable, they produce collective aggressiveness. (2) The most general reaction then consists in seeking people on whom to pin the blame for the unrest and disturbance. So, any society projects its anxieties about the future, its negativeness, its deaths, its destruction complexes, its terror and anger, on an enemy group that it holds responsible. (3) This pseudo-identification produces a first result; the fact of localizing the ill, even in an illusory fashion, produces considerable relief. Once the diagnosis is completed, people now ’know’ who will have to be dealt with. It is no longer a question of a hostile nature, fatalism, or of supernatural and incomprehensible threats. The ill is personified in men like us whom one can attack. This makes it possible to go from impotent terror to active anger. (4) From this moment on the remedy appears very simple: Destruction of the enemy.



5.2.10.8 The Emotional Satisfactions of War A last category of psychoanalysts seeks to find the answer to the war enigma in the emotional satisfactions war can provide. In his Man, Morals and Society, Fluegel (1950) thinks that the psychological appeal of war is based on (1) man’s zest for adventure, i.e., the desire to lead a dangerous life; (2) his need to have a feeling of harmony and cooperation with his fellow-men and participate in collective enterprises, i.e., social unity; (3) the desire for freedom from personal worries and moral restrictions which a great common and dangerous concern like war gives; and lastly, (4) the need of an outlet for man’s aggression, i.e., for finding an object on which his vices can be projected. Also Sturm (1972) outlined four kinds of emotional satisfactions of war: The first is ’excitement’; the second involves ’relaxation-satiation’; the third participation in ’meaningful social rhythms’; the fourth area is ’freedom from aversiveness’. Fromm (1941, 1973) pointed to the escape from insignificance and debilitating tedium which war can bring. It is highly doubtful, however, as Murty & Bouquet (1960) criticize, whether all men are animated by the spirit of adventure and the desire to lead a dangerous life. Mass inertia and mass apathy seem to be greater realities than a mass craving for adventure. After this, admittedly sometimes too selective, review of the main proximate theories and explanations of primitive war to be found in the literature, I now turn to another, fascinating, attempt at understanding the war mystique: The reports of the motivations of the individuals involved. What makes them tick?

5.3 Assessment of Motives War is carried on from one of the following motives: to kill one’s fellow-men for the sake of using them as food; to deprive them of their women; to obtain booty from them; to impose a religion, certain ideas, or a type of culture upon them (Novikow, 1912).

The most proximate approach to understanding primitive warfare is the assessment of the motives of the people fighting those wars - either as reported by the belligerent parties themselves or inferred by an observer. Such motivational assessments are usually to be found in the descriptive accounts of warfare in the bulk of the ethnographical literature. And, not surprisingly, the whole gamut of human motives is reflected in the literature on this subject. Table 5.3: A classification of motives for warfare as found in the literature

(I) SELF-DEFENSE Although it is not a priori obvious that a people reaches for its arms to defend itself



when attacked (some did and do not), this category is not an exclusive war motive. Defensive war is generally not voluntary, but forced upon one. One kind of selfdefense, however, is the striving for security and safety, which in extremis may lead to preemptive strikes and offensive war. (II) PSYCHOSOCIAL MOTIVES Meaning (1) motives originating in efforts at consolidation and reinforcement of internal cohesion, solidarity and integration of the ingroup, group identity and esprit de corps; and (2) motives postulated as inherent in the individual or ’human nature’. (A) Status hostilis, bloodrevenge, reprisal, retaliation, lex talionis, vendetta, extended feuding, hereditary enmity, ’revanchism’, redress of wrongs and grievances, grudge, hatred, vindictiveness, envy, jealousy, spite, hostility, etc. (a.1) based on talion law for murder, manslaughter, injury, insult, humiliation, repudiation, vituperation, scorn. (a.2) based on talion law for transgressions of the sexual mores; adultery, rape, abduction of women, elopement, conflicts over bride-price. (a.3) for territorial transgressions/intrusions. (a.4) for alleged malicious ’black magic’, sorcery, witchcraft. (B)

(b.1)

(b.2)

(b.3)

(b.4)

(b.5) (b.6) (b.7)

(C) (c.1) (c.2) (c.3)

The Warrior Cult as modus vivendi; prestige, honor, status, glory, dignitas, vertue, pride, machismo, male supremacist complex; National honor, grandeur, supremacy, superiority, etc. Animistically-inspired raids for objects and insignia of prestige and ’mana’; manhunting, headhunting, trophy hunting, scalphunting, ’counting coup’. War as (component of) rite de passage; war as proof of virile self-image and ultimate supreme test of masculinity (machismo syndrome; male supremacist complex). War as exaltation, sportive event, ’social vitamin’, fascinating adventure; ’war gloating’, display of martial skill and military bravado, flight from boredom and ennui, adventurism and urge for action; to gratify sexual lusts; to prevent decadence, degeneration and/or moral decay; to intensify national dynamism. War in order to diminish internal conflicts, strife, turmoil, rivalries (i.e., export of conflict; to unite a people under one banner against a common enemy). War as Ventilsitte (safety valve) for internally generated aggression, hatred, rancor, malice, sexual jealousy, tensions, frustrations, grief, etc. War to inspire awe, to spread terror, to give the enemy ’a reason for mourning’. Obedience (Soldiers fight predominantly out of obedience, but as a primitive war motive it is probably of minor explanatory power). Magicoreligious, ideological and legalistic (ius gentium) motives: ’Ancestor cult’; placating a bloodthirsty pantheon, pacification of the spirits of slain warriors; animism. Fear/terror-inspired ethnocentric-xenophobic warfare. Arrogance-inspired tribalistic superiority delusion: ’Chosen People Complex’.



(c.4)

(c.5) (c.6) (c.7) (c.8) (c.9)

Magicoreligious and ius gentium transgressions; war as punishment for violation of armistice, oath, treaty, law, right of hospitality; desecration and profanation of sanctuary; murder of negotiators, envoys, ambassadors; refusal of extradition; collaboration with the ’enemy’; desertion of allies; commitments; kinship duties; ’teaching another state a lesson’. Belief in divination and/or predestination. Magicoreligious ’acquisitiveness’; raids for victims of ritual sacrifice or ritual anthropophagia. Cultural imperialism and violent (religious, ideological) proselytism; to spread a doctrine, religion, ideology. Eschatological and/or chiliastic motives; liberation of the world, liberation of oppressed peoples; to establish a millennium. Cataclysmic motives; war as a consequence of, and obedience to, the machinations of the gods; war as divine punishment for sins committed.

(III) ECONOMIC (ACQUISITIVE, PREDATORY, MACROPARASITIC) MOTIVES (Greed, cupidity, pleonexia, acquisitiveness) (A) Plunder, spoils, robbery, piracy, loot, ’booty and beauty’, raids, marauding, croplooting, cattletheft, predatory incursions, rapine, pillaging, routing: (a.1) Raids for means of subsistence; croplooting, cattletheft, plunder of stocks, predation for coveted artifacts, replenishing of treasury. (a.2) Consumptive cannibalism. (a.3) Capture of women and/or children for enlarging the gene pool of the population; prospective rape as incentive. (a.4) Capture of slaves (for own use or for trade). (a.5) Capture of recruits, arms and implements of war. (B) Establishing or defending monopoly position of certain resources (drinking water sources, granaries, minerals, fishing waters, orchards, cultivated soil, etc.). (C) Territorial expansion; invasions, land-hunger, Lebensraum, migratory urge, territorial conquest and expansionism, based on overpopulation, reproductive pressure or demographic disequilibrium, exhaustion or scarcity of natural resources. (D) Economic imperialism, colonialism, subjugation, exploitation: (d.1) Capture of raw materials, cheap labor, new markets, trade routes, outlets for investments. (d.2) Collection of tributes and taxes. (IV) POLITICAL-STRATEGIC MOTIVES War as manifestation of Libido dominandi, lust for power. (A) Land or locations as strategic desiderata; for fortifications, army camps, control of hinterland, military security, control of vital supply routes, to regain territories formerly controlled, to maintain or increase the credibility of commitments or threats in other areas. (B) Utilizing weakness or underpopulation of the antagonist; power vacuum, power-gap; political opportunism; preventive or pre-emptive strike. (C) To achieve political independence. (D) To install or restore friendly regimes or governments in adjacent countries.



(E)

Political imperialism; power usurpation, expansion of political domain, spheres of influence and political dominance, satellites, coercion of alliance, imposition of power structure (dynastic wars, ’substitution’ wars, etc.).

This table is a compounded inventory based on the following sources: Novikow (1896, 1912), Sumner & Keller (1927), Van der Bij (1929), Davie (1929), Steinmetz (1929), Durbin & Bowlby (1939), Malinowski (1941), Q.Wright (1942; 1965), Métraux (1949), Turney-High (1949), Loenen (1953), Harrison (1973), Divale (1973), Otterbein (1973), Garlan (1975), Henssen (1978), among many others; as well as historiographic accounts of early historical warfare such as Thucydides, Xenophon, Titus Livy, Caesar, Tacitus, Suetonius, Ammianus Marcellinus, Cassius Dio, Diodorus Siculus, Sallust, Polybius, and Plutarch. The classification contains, under the common denominator and generic label 'motives', the self-professed motivations of individual warriors, groups, tribes, etc., or those attributed to them by ethnologists, anthropologists, or contempor14 aneous historiographers . The generic categories of motives as used in the table are identical to Q.Wright's (1942; 1965) categorization ( In the literature on primitive warfare, it is generally not very easy to discern what are considered to be the causes of war, the precipitating events, the 'drives toward' war, and the motives, the ulterior 'whys' underlying the entire process culminating in war. Motives generally are of two distinct types; either they are the motives reported by the participants involved themselves, and more or less accepted on face value by the ethnologist or anthropologist or other observer studying them, or they are the motives inferred by those students on the basis of a particular theory they adhere to, or the prevailing (or some idiosyncratic) 14

In analyzing the genesis or etiology of war, distinctions have been made between ultimate and proximate causes or causative factors, precipitants, inducements, motives, reasons, determinants, pretexts and façades, preconditions, and situational 'triggers'. Concerning 'motives', it seems recommendable to notice the following distinction: (a) `Real' motives (if motives can be attributed to collectivities): it may be clear that the real motives of officials, power holders, army commanders, etc. (which may be of a highly strategic or political nature) may differ substantially from those of the rank-and-file, the common soldiers or warriors, who may be inspired more by prospective 'booty and beauty'. (b) Moreover, the office holders, commanders, etc. are liable to cover up or conceal their real motives by translating them into ratiomorphic, culturally and ideologically sanctioned, and idealist terms. It is these codified motivations which will probably be reflected in at least some accounts of historiographers, not entirely lacking a touch of chauvinism or nationalism. (c) Later commentators will pretend to 'look through' the codified motivations and to approximate the `real' motives in their attributed motives. The attributed motives may implicitly reflect theories of war causation, or simply a moral judgment about culpability.



psychological paradigm or Menschenbild. The former distinction parallels that what is called in modern anthropology the ’emic’ and the ’etic’ approaches. Both thoughts and behavior of the participants can be viewed from two different perspectives; from the perspective of the participants themselves and from the perspective of the observers. In the first instance the observers employ concepts and distinctions that are meaningful and appropriate to the participants; in the second instance they employ concepts and distinctions that are meaningful and appropriate to the observers. The first way of studying culture is called ’emics’ and the second way is called ’etics’ (e.g., Harris, 1980; see also   In analyzing the motives of the warriors, we are a fortiori confronted with the emic/etic controversy. For example, Harris (1980) emphatically stated: Motives that the belligerents themselves cite for going to war do not explain the etic conditions under which wars recur... It may seem strange that the warriors who risk their lives in armed combat seldom seem to understand why they do so. But the masking of deeper causes by superficial psychological motives is advantageous for peoples who depend on war for their well-being. To be effective in combat, warriors must believe that the enemy, not the soil or the forest or impersonal population pressure, is at fault. Warriors who doubt their own cause are unlikely to be effective in hand-to-hand combat. Only those who are psychologically convinced that they must kill their enemies have a chance of winning (Harris, 1980). Such a view smacks somewhat of ’western-centered’ arrogance. Emic/etic distinctions may be useful for development of a (for us) plausible theory of (origin and causation) of primitive war. It is, however, rather pretentious, when asking the question why people actually fight, to deny them any insight in their own motives. For instance, Yanomamö warriors actually profess to fight over women and they are clearly aware of that. Chagnon (1977) relates how he explained to the Yanomamö warriors his disagreement with Harris (Chagnon, 1975; Harris, 1975) about the relevance of protein abundance in the genesis of their warfare, "and they laughed: 'Even though we like meat, we like women a whole lot more'" (Chagnon, 1977). A further complication is that, generally in ethnographic accounts, no differentiation is made between individuals; the warriors are more or less considered to be a homogeneous category 'driven' by the same or similar 'forces'. Thus, the Yanomamö fight over women; the Jivaro wage war for obtaining enemy heads; the Iroquois battle for control of the fur trade, etc. Levels of political development add other dimensions to motivation, as Ferguson (1984) argued: Differentiation of a society into groups with different positions in the political and economic structure raises the possibility of



divergent interests in war. A dominant segment may attempt to mystify or conceal its true interests by wrapping them in a cloak of patriotism or religious fervor. Their actual goals may involve political control within or beyond the polity’s frontier more than any direct economic benefits of a campaign. And with the advent of the state, rulers can compel people to fight for them, which substantially narrows down the question of motivation to that of obedience to authority and indoctrination to obedience. Darwin and Spencer, but most vociferously Bagehot (1869), Kidd (1902) and McDougall (1915), argued that self-control, discipline, law-abidingness, subordination and obedience to authority must have been the products of fierce and ruthless ’military’ group selection (Cf. Bigelow, 1969). Only when this first step had been taken, within-group cooperation - and, therefore, success - in military endeavors would have been possible. Obedience to authority, subordination in a command hierarchy, and the ’agentic shift’ have been rediscovered in psychology by Milgram (1965 et seq.; Cf. Prosterman, 1972; Zimbardo, 1974; A.G. Miller, 1986) as powerful - and to many people embarrassing - inducements to brutality and cruelty, as long as the ’agent’ perceives that the command comes from a legitimate authority. In the context of primitive war, the issues of indoctrinability and obedience were reexamined by Eibl-Eibesfeldt and Campbell (Ch. 4), and Shaw & Wong (1989; See Ch. 6). I am inclined to concede that inculcation of blind obedience, compliance to military authorities, of readiness to die without asking why, and the elevation of these habits to the status of highest virtues, cannot fail to propagate irrationality (See especially Dixon, 1976), but the relevance of obedience for the understanding of primitive war is, I submit, limited to those levels of sociopolitical organization where compulsion, coercion and forced conscription exist, i.e., chiefdom and (pristine) state. The warrior, as I tried to explain in the beginning of this chapter, is patently not a soldier. Indoctrination, on the other hand, may play a prominent role in the making of the warrior. Where longitudinal and reliable data are available, it appears that the making of a warrior is a time- and energy-consuming process (and not the smooth and organic unfolding of some alleged ’innate’ tendency in that direction). Chagnon (1968) presents evidence, for example, that even in an extremely belligerent and violent society such as the Yanomamö, boys fear violence, and that elaborate training and indoctrination is required to turn them into 'fierce warriors': "They are pressed into the fighting by their adult superiors, but are given privileged positions in raiding parties until they acquire the necessary skills and experience... Usually a boy does not take an active role in raiding until he is seventeen years old, and even then he may be so frightened that he will fake illness and return home before the enemy village has been reached. Yanomamö boys, like all boys, fear pain and personal danger. They must be forced to tolerate it and learn to accept ferocity as a way of life". Nevertheless, two central problems remain: (1) "Why would an individual



participate in competition/warfare even when she or he may expect no private gain?" as Shaw & Wong (1989) formulated the first problem. And even may risk death, physical injury, and other severe costs, one might add. For the warrior to accept these costs may be due to indoctrination, induced altruism and self-sacrifice. It is more likely, however, that it is a self-serving strategy. And (2) Has there indeed been selection for (general or specific) indoctrinability and/or obedience in the course of human evolution? In the next chapter I shall return to these cardinal questions. What I prefer to call motives of warfare is equivalent to what Otterbein (1973) called the Goals of War approach: The notion that wars are caused by men who are attempting to achieve certain goals at the expense of others. "Some analysts believe that the goals exist within the minds of individual warriors, while other analysts believe that the genesis of the goals is the culture itself". And he presents the following précis: Those subscribing to the view that the goals pursued by means of warfare are to be sought in the minds of the warriors include Fathauer (1954: 115), who argues that the Mohave of the American Southwest were motivated to go to war to satisfy magico-religious beliefs that were integral to their culture; Vayda (1969: 219), who believes that to understand the early phase of Iban headhunting satisfactorily, one must consider the thoughts and feelings of these Borneo warriors; and Naroll (1966: 17), who in a cross-cultural study of primitive war concerns himself with "what the members of a war party in a particular culture have in mind when they set out for the attack". Those who believe that the goals of war spring from the culture itself include White (1949: 132), who eschews psychological explanations and argues for a culturalogical explanation of war; Newcombe (1950: 329), who contends that Plains Indians went to war because their sociocultural systems obliged them to; and [H.C.] Wilson (1958: 1195), who sees in Mundurucu warfare a cultural imperative requiring these South American Indians to recruit new members. For empirical purposes it does not seem critical to maintain this culturalpsychological dichotomy, as Vayda (1969: 212) labels it. A similar point of view is expressed by [M.W.] Smith (1951: 359). When a goal is a part of the culture of the people, it is a value; when the goal becomes internalized in individuals, it is a motive. Thus a value and a motive are the same; the difference between them lies in the mind of the analyst. If he focuses upon the culture, he calls the goal a value; if he focuses upon individuals, he calls the goal a motive. Six 'reasons for going to war' are delineated in Otterbein's study: Subjugation and tribute, land, plunder, trophies and honors, defense, and revenge. These



six, he contends, represent a classification scheme for grouping a wide range of possible goals. Several general studies of primitive war provide lists of the various goals of war found in various cultures. Swanton (1943), who regards revenge as the leading war motive among primitive peoples, lists in addition social advancement, excitement, religious obligation, capture of women and slaves, plunder, appropriation of territory, trade, defense, and fear. Turney-High (1949) discusses these same goals and others at length under the headings of sociopsychological motives, the economic motive, and military values. M.W. Smith (1951) groups causes of American Indian warfare into "four major sets of distributions": Feud or simple reprisal, social contests, shame-aggression, and mourning-war. Many case studies of specific societies emphasize the importance of the goals of war in their descriptions of warfare. For example, according to Swadesh (1948), the Nootka of the American Northwest Coast fought for multiple reasons, including revenge, slaves, plunder, heads, status, and occasionally territorial rights (Academic battles of truly epic proportions were fought over the motivational complexes underlying Northwest Coast Indian warfare, Iroquois and Huron warfare, Plains Indian warfare, Californian Indian warfare, South American Indian warfare, etc. etc. - mainly concerning issues of material [i.e., economic] versus nonmaterial objectives. See e.g.,: Codere, 1950; Lowie, 1954; Trigger, 1962; Harris, 1968; Otterbein, 1973; Ferguson, 1984, 1990a; Kroeber & Fontana, 1987). Probably the best known global typology of primitive war motives is Q.Wright’s (1942) categorization (See  ZKLFKLVDFODVVLILFDtion both of forms of warfare as well as the corresponding motivational constellations. Elsewhere in his opus magnum he lists as ’drives toward war’: Food, sex, territory, activity, self-preservation, society, dominance, and independence. Divale (1973) lists as ’causes’ of primitive war: Revenge, adultery and wifestealing, infringement of territory, and witchcraft. The latter, however, he does not consider to be a genuine ’cause’. Other succinct formulations of war motives are the Hobbesian triad: Competition, diffidence, glory (Hobbes, 1651); W.James’ (1910): Lust, coveting, aggression, man’s irrational nature; Sumner’s (1911): Hunger, love, vanity, fear of superior powers (or ghost-fear); Thucydides’ (I, 76): Security, honor, self-interest; Davie’s (1929): War for economic motives, for women, for glory, and for religious reasons; and Andreski’s (1964): Power, wealth, and prestige. Particular goals of war can become so important to the members of a culture that they influence and dominate many other aspects of life. The more general version of this approach, relating a war pattern to some aspect of culturally patterned beliefs and attitudes, received its major theoretical elaboration from Benedict (1934). Voget (1964) applies this pervasive-cultural-pattern approach (also called patterns-and-themes approach) directly to the study of warfare. He



argues that warfare may be "primary institutionalized pattern" of a culture, by which he means that the pattern effects integration in two ways: "(1) by structuring roles and (2) by spreading its substance through other aspects of the culture". He shows that warfare was the primary focus for the integration of Crow Indian culture. Spicer (1947) demonstrates that the ’warlike’ Yaqui of northern Mexico "integrated warfare into their culture in a fashion resembling Pueblo Indian Apollonianism" (Otterbein, 1973). Burch (1974) attributes Northwest Alaskan Inuit (Eskimo) warfare to their "Spartan ethic", and Hallpike (1977) relates New Guinea Tauade warfare to their "Heraclitean cognitive orientation". See also Burch (1974), and Ferguson’s (1990a) criticism of this approach. Related to this cultural-value approach is the search for particular or modal personality types (e.g., Kluckhohn & Leighton, 1946; Kluckhohn & Murray, 1949), in connection with patterns of childhood socialization (e.g., Whiting, 1941). One such modal personality in primitive societies is, of course, the fierce warrior. Ferguson (1990a) summarizes this literature as follows: People who make war often have belligerent personalities (Berndt, 1962; Chagnon, 1977; Koch, 1974). But the relationship between aggressive personalities and war is hardly a necessary one. People with normally pacific personalities can be quite brutal in war (Ellis, 1951; Heider, 1970; Murphy, 1957; Robarchek, 1990; Wallace, 1853)... oftentimes aggressive fighters are kept out of or are secondary in making a decision to fight. (The ’hotheads’ may be young men, bachelors, who have less to lose and more to gain from combat than older family men [Baxter, 1979]). Even very aggressive persons can find outlet for their feelings in non-violent actions (Codere, 1950). Then there is the question of where these attitudes come from. Several studies discuss orientations to violence. All are consistent with the view that attitudes are products of (different) social circumstances. Generally, individual bellicosity would seem to be of secondary and derived significance. However, in specific cases of high politico-military tensions, unusually aggressive individuals, especially leaders, can take actions which precipitate new hostilities (Biocca, 1971; LiPuma, 1985; Trigger, 1976) (Ferguson, 1990a). In the remainder of this chapter the main motives of primitive warfare, as documented by numerous ethnologists and anthropologists, will be briefly reviewed, without giving much consideration to whether these are to be considered genuine motives, or ’ascribed’ or ’attributed’ motives, or selfdeceptions à la Harris.



5.3.1 Blood Revenge: Lex Talionis Revenge is so consistently and so universally reported as one of the principal motives and causes of feuding and war that it requires detailed analysis. According to Divale (1973), the principal and paramount purpose of primitive warfare was revenge against an earlier injustice or killing perpetrated by the enemy, and the sole object was to kill the enemy. As economic or territorial conquest motives were generally absent, except with groups at the chiefdom or higher levels of cultural evolution, the principle of blood-revenge maintained primitive warfare - it was the motor that kept the whole process going. But, as Moore (1978) observed: "[R]evenge alone cannot be the explanation for revenge warfare. The motive is circular; it explains what keeps the system going, but it does not explain the complex itself". Feest (1980) notes that revenge, at first sight, generally seems to be only a minor motive, but tends to become the primary reason if there is no other way of resolving the conflict. The question of who originally started the conflict is of little importance. All that matters is that the latest attack has to be countered. Feest does not, however, address the question why that is all that matters. The Lex talionis, the law of blood vengeance demands that blood be shed for blood. In its unmitigated form it is rigid and inexorable. Thus an endless chain of retaliation is started, one death commanding another, and blood revenge passes into a blood feud, which may last for years. Consequently, a situation is created from which there seems no escape: "Indeed, many savage tribes find themselves so involved in blood feuds and the resulting intertribal wars that they are totally unable to extricate themselves" (Davie, 1929). This is valid especially in societies with small and closely related decision groups (e.g., Langness, 1973; J.B. Ross, 1984; Ferguson, 1990a). The discovery of a way out of this dilemma, especially through the idea that blood revenge can be settled by compensation, by a property payment, is, as Davie (1929) stated, the ’grandest case’ in the mitigation of war (See Ch. 7). The relationship between recognition of kinship-group ownership over strategic resources and the incidence of feuding is undeniable. The North American Plateau and Great Basin societies, for example, made few claims to private property and the incidence of feuding was consequently very low. Among the Northwest coast societies, on the other hand, from the Tlingit to the north to the Cocopa on the south, there always was some feuding going on over fishing stations, water rights, oak trees, and other issues (Jorgensen, 1980). Curiously, in this area the societies that recognized private ownership of strategic resources had the most rudimentary political organizations. Tylor (1871), Steinmetz (1892), Westermarck (1906, 1934), Holsti (1913) and Numelin (1950) were among the first who tried to explain the phenomenon of



blood revenge. They all emphasized its litigatio aspect (as opposed to the certatio per vim aspect of war), the ’Rule of Vengeance’ as an instrument of primitive law, and even the embryonic beginning of international law, ius gentium: "In the primitive law of vengeance of blood, [the student of law] sees society using for the public benefit the instinct of revenge which man has in common with the lower animals. By holding the whole family answerable for the deed of one of its members, the public brings the full pressure of family influence to bear on each individual as a means of keeping the peace. No one who sees the working of blood-vengeance can deny its practical reasonableness, and its use in restraining men from violence while there are as yet no judges and executioners. Indeed among all savages and barbarians the avenger of blood, little as he thinks it himself in his wild fury, is doing his part toward saving his people from perishing by deeds of blood" (Tylor, 1871). In a similar vein, Numelin (1950) contends: "Far from being an expression of the supremacy of brute strength, a sign of constant war against all and everyone, blood revenge indicates a reaction of the self-esteem of more or less sovereign kinship organizations, that is, an expression of a feeling for law and morals, aiming at re-establishing balance among the wronged. Where there was no ruling authority, the individual family and the great family, the tribal group, could influence the matter by a threat of blood revenge; for the very fear of retaliation could have a restraining effect on the passions. It is even possible to see in the ’clear, inescapable message’... of blood revenge, in which the social conscience of the community was collected, a starting point for the law of punishment". More recently, Masters (1964) has again drawn attention to the role of retaliatory violence (self-help and the talion law) in maintaining the legal (and moral) order: Whatever the logical merits of Hobbes’s conception of a ’state of nature’, he states, it does not seem to follow, at least among primitive peoples, that the anarchy of social life without a government produces a violent war of all against all. Quite the contrary, it would appear that violence in such primitive societies often serves the function of maintaining law and order according to customary procedures (at the same time allowing kin groups to get rid of their ’bad seeds’). The possibility of violent counterretaliation may stabilize rivalries and limit conflicts when there is no governmental arbiter to enforce law and order (Masters, 1964). Westermarck (1934) asserted that the duty, indeed obligation, of blood revenge is in the first place regarded as a duty to the dead, not merely because he has been deprived of his highest good - his life, but because his spirit is believed to find no rest until the injury has been avenged, the loss been equalized, the equilibrium restored, the exchange reciprocated in kind: "An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth". The belief in animism, which attributes all disasters to human or parahuman agencies, and the human tendency to displace hostility and to project self-guilt upon a scapegoat, according to Durbin & Bowlby (1938), combine to suggest



identification of a hostile out-group as the agent responsible for disasters. Any death or other disaster in a tribe is therefore likely to be the occasion for a war of revenge. And Davie (1929) explained the peculiar psychological amalgamation of obligation, justice and honor as follows: Blood kinship is the basis of the peace-group. Outsiders are strangers, Blutfremde or blood aliens, with whom peaceful relations are impossible as long as unity of blood is the only known bond. Blood relationship involves the duty of blood revenge, the injunction to avenge by death the murder of one’s blood relatives, even their death in battle. If the survivors fail in their duty, the enraged ghost will haunt them all their lives. Ghost-fear, transcending all other forms of fear, assures the fulfilment of this obligation. Blood revenge, therefore, is fundamentally a form of propitiating the ghost or soul of the departed. It is from fear of the angry ghost that the crime of murder derives much of its horror in primitive society and that revenge is so persistently sought (Lippert, 1887; Frazer, 1890; Sumner, 1906; Sumner & Keller, 1927). Thus the duty of avenging the death of his nearest relatives is the most sacred and holy duty that a savage is called upon to perform, and he never neglects or forgets it. Other motives enter to support and strengthen this obligation. It comes to be considered a point of honor; the murdered man’s relatives think that their honor has been blackened and that the stain can only be cleansed by blood. Public opinion and the desire to stand well amongst one’s fellows also enforce this duty. Should a man leave it unfulfilled, ’the old women will taunt him; if he were unmarried, no girl would speak to him; if he had wives, they would leave him; his mother would cry and lament that she had given birth to so degenerate a son, his father would treat him with contempt, and he would be a mark of public scorn’ (Tylor, 1909). Blood revenge is set in motion not so much by murderous lust as by family affection (Davie, 1929). Why should the human personality yearn to compensate for its humilation in the blood of enemies? Turney-High (1949) adds the following psychological ingredients to complete the picture: "The tension-release motive plays a part here: Revenge loosens the taut feeling caused by the slaying or despoiling of one’s self, clan, tribe, nation. Even the hope for revenge helps the humiliated human to bear up, enables him to continue to function in a socially unfavorable environment. Fray Camposano (in Church, 1912) wrote of the Mojos of southwestern Amazonia to Philip II of Spain that ’The most valiant were the most respected and their patience under injuries was only dissimulation for subsequent vengeance’. Revenge, or the hope of revenge, restores the deflated ego, and is a conflict motive with which mankind must reckon with universally" (Turney-High, 1949).



Ferguson (1984, 1990a; Cf. Ferguson & Farragher, 1988) has drawn attention to the political, instrumental (non-)use of blood revenge. Revenge, he argued, often has been offered as an irreducible basic motivation. Perhaps it is, to some degree, but it needs more consideration. Although a desire to strike back at someone who has wronged us may seem so understandable that it needs no further discussion, the great cross-cultural variation in permissible revenge reactions, and in situations that call for revenge, indicate that this motive is an eminently variable response. Revenge truly is an important motivation in many war patterns. When it is, however, that fact itself needs to be explained. But even where the motive is prominent, revenge rarely is sufficient to explain why a war occurs. The invocation of vengeance is an assertion that "they started it", a claim that "we are in the right"; a clean-conscience maneuver. One might therefore expect to find it in informants’ statements. "[R]evenge-seeking often cannot possibly operate in the automatic form suggested by ethnographers or every member of the society would be killed (see Peters, 1967)... revenge requirements are frequently and obviously manipulated by decision-makers, with offenses ’forgotten’ or ’remembered’ at convenience (Berndt, 1962; Vayda, 1960; and see Balee, 1984; Ferguson, 1984). Analyses of revenge are on firmer ground when the goal is examined not as an autonomous cultural value, but as an element of tactics calculated to ward-off future attacks and serve other interests (Mair, 1977; Vayda, 1960) (Ferguson, 1990a). One way to approach this topic would be to investigate the material consequences of taking or not taking revenge in a given social context. Small attacks and counterattacks can constitute a probing for weakness in more serious confrontations. Larger retaliatory strikes may be necessitated more by questions of survival than sentiment. Whatever the independent role of pure revenge motivation, it seems to decline in importance as war comes to involve larger and more complex social groups (Ferguson, 1984). Retaliatory violence and frustration-aggression displacement ( DUHDOVR often assumed to serve a particular integrative and cementing function within a society: Social solidarity. One of the most common observations to be found in the literature is that among primitive peoples warfare is the primary means for maintaining, consolidating, or strengthening the internal cohesion, solidarity and integration of the group, reinforcing or invigorating group identity and esprit de corps. Warfare is supposed to preserve social solidarity, according to Q.Wright (1942), "(1) by keeping alive the realization of a common enemy who will destroy the group if it is not prepared to resist; (2) by strikingly symbolizing the group as a unit in a common enterprise; (3) by creating a certain discipline and subordination to leadership; (4) by providing an outlet for anger in activities not hostile to the harmony of the group; (5) by preventing the



amalgamation of neighboring groups into units too large and heterogeneous to function unitedly with the available means of communication and civic education; (6) by sanctioning the tribal mores; and (7) sometimes by limiting population, particularly the male population, to a figure adapted to the economy and mores of the group" (Q.Wright, 1942). Camilla Wedgwood (1930), in her study of warfare in Melanesia, first expressed this in functional terms: "One of the important functions of war is to increase the social solidarity of the opposing communities". Harris (1978) criticized the ’war as solidarity’ theory, according to which war is the price paid for building up group togetherness. But, he asked, would not verbal abuse, mock combat, or competitive sports be less costly ways of achieving solidarity? The claim that mutual slaughter is ’functional’ cannot be based on some vague abstract advantage of togetherness. Finally, there can be little doubt that one of the possible effects of primitive warfare can be increased group cohesiveness, but that is a far cry from elevating this potential effect to the level of a ’function’ or motive.

5.3.2 Vanity Fair: War for Honor, Glory, Prestige Among the scarce commodities that can be acquired by warfare are status and prestige. In primitive societies, success on the warpath is often the key to leadership (Feest, 1980). Societies relying on the military capacity of their adult males may be expected to bolster their resolve through enhancing the esteem of warriors. Successful fighters will have prestige. Many will internalize, or at least project the combative values they exemplify (Ferguson, 1984). Indeed, one of the most common motivations reported is the association of ego-validation of masculinity with valor and ferocity in combat. Along with this goes the assignment of at least some prestige and power to the successful warrior. "Social prestige has repeatedly fed on death in human history" (Kennedy, 1971). War furnishes a ready means of bringing distinction to one’s self, "for the military virtues have ever been honored and extolled. The women prefer men who have given proof of their prowess, they receive the returning warrior with songs of praise, they feast him and crowd around to listen to his exploits. All this appeals to man’s vanity and gives him additional motives for fighting" (Davie, 1929). In certain societies the alleged reasons for hostilities and the enemies themselves were less important than the system of values connected with warfare. Warfare was the principal means of acquiring prestige and high social status; consequently, pretexts for wars were eagerly sought, and expeditions and raids were part of the normal functioning of the society.



Sumner & Keller (1927), Davie (1929) and Turney-High (1949) have emphasized the importance of primitive war for war honors, glory and 15 ’vanity’. What Rochefort (1658) wrote about the Carib may well be applied to most primitive societies: "Their aim in war is not to make themselves the masters of a new country or wrench spoils from the enemy; they have as their only purpose the glory of defeating them and the pleasure of avenging on them the wrongs which they have suffered". Kroeber (1948) suggested that among the Indians of the eastern United States warfare was motivated "principally by individual desire for personal status within one’s society". Lowie (1920) says that "with the Plains Indians the quest of military renown was as hypertrophied as ever has been the lust for gold in our money-mad centers of high finance". Many of the mounted Indians of the Great Plains - the Dakota (Sioux), the Crow, the Cheyenne - kept a tally of their acts of bravado in war. A man’s reputation lay in counting coups. They gave the most points not to the warrior with the highest body count, but to the one who took the most risks. The greatest feat of all was to sneak in and out of an enemy camp without being detected. In Plains Indian warfare, with few exceptions, the coup proper greatly overshadowed scalping, or even killing, as a deed of merit. Often loosely applied to all recognized war deeds, the term (French coup, a blow) correctly designates the touching of an enemy’s body with the hand or with a special stick. On the same enemy the Cheyenne, for example, permitted three men to count coup, the first toucher taking precedence; the Crow, the Assiniboin, and the Arapaho allowed four men to score in descending order of merit. Nearly everywhere the coup definitely outranked the killing of a man (Lowie, 1954). In the case of the Crow it was not death as such that brought honor, but bravery (as defined by the Crow). A Crow would risk his life, for example, to cut loose a picketed horse in the midst of an enemy camp when he could easily have driven off a whole herd from the outskirts (Howell, 1975). Personal advantage was also a prominent motive of war in Central and South America (Métraux, 1949). A man's reputation as a warrior does not have to be based on actual warlike exploits. It may be much more convenient to have the reputation without the dangers involved in acquiring it. Among the Yanomamö, for example, an individual warrior's reputation of fierceness is, to a great extent, based on bluff and make-believe; a show of ferocity. "Young men are competitive and attempt 15

"Our own chevrons for service, campaign badges, medals, and so forth, are but modern forms of war honors" (Davie, 1929).



to show their capacity for rage, usually by temper tantrums that are ostentatious and faked. As they grow older and acquire wives, they vent their anger on the hapless women by beating them, burning them with glowing firebrands, or even shooting them in the buttocks with a barbed arrow. One of the implications of this behavior is that the man will be equally fierce with male opponents, and so they acquire a reputation for ferocity without much potential harm to their own persons" (Chagnon, 1968). Personal ambition, especially among chiefs, and intergroup rivalry are motives arising in the main from ’vanity’, Davie (1929) states, and they not infrequently lead to war. "Insults to chiefs" and the "despotism or ambition of chiefs whom the malcontents hope to settle by a blow from behind in the turmoil of battle" are ranked among the causes of war in the Fiji Islands (Thomson, 1908). ’Vanity’ plays another role in primitive warfare; it is the chief incentive to the taking of trophies ( $WURSK\LVVLPSO\DSURRIRIWKHZDUULRUVVXFFHVV in battle, it is evidence of his valor, it marks him as a distinguished and powerful person. 5.3.3 Warfare as Callisthenics and Catharsis: Game-like wars Howell (1975) has argued that there are at least three kinds of ’war’: (1) conflictive, marked especially by balance of forces and tendency toward resolution; (2) without conflict, due to lack of balance of forces or "no effective resistance"; and (3) nonconflictive, the "kind in which neither side is particularly interested in a more or less permanent disengagement". It is the latter "which is so widely distributed in the anthropological literature, and the type which may be described as a kind of game with moderately high stakes". His approach is reminiscent of Rapoport’s (1960) distinction between ’fight like’ and ’game like’ wars. Rappaport (1968) provides a detailed exploration of intergroup relations among the Maring-speaking Tsembaga and their neighbors in New Guinea. These societies have a fairly complex system of interrelationships, with groups which are close and groups which are traditional enemies. And in the latter case, if for any reason a group is spoiling for a fight, even a minor incident can precipitate one. 16 The Tsembaga Maring (as do numerous other peoples ) distinguish between minor and serious fights. In minor fights the offended party issues a challenge, after which allies are recruited and a battleground is selected and cleared. The clearing operation involves both sides but these avoid any encounters in 16

Many societies all over the world distinguished between some kind of conflictive, issuerelated ’real’ war and something akin to the game-like ’minor fight’ which was regarded as primarily recreative. Some peoples, such as the Australian Murngin (Warner, 1930, 1937), distinguished as many as six types of ’warfare’.



advance of the appointed hour for the fight. At that time the sides line up to fire arrows and sometimes spears at each other (some informants claimed that hand-to-hand weapons were not even brought to the scene of the fight). Large shields form a barricade from behind which the men pop out to shoot, then leap back to safety. But some men deliberately exposed themselves to enemy fire to show their bravery; casualties were not numerous and deaths were infrequent, "for the unfletched arrows of the Maring seldom kill". Rappaport suggests that such minor fights may serve to end a quarrel before it gets out of hand. They permit time for "tempers to cool while satisfying the bellicose imperatives of manhood". Turney-High (1949) was appalled by the evident lack of military sophistication of North American Indians and other warriors who nearly always yielded to "the temptation to accomplish useless little victories, the slaughter of one man or the crushing of one small party... so that more often than not no real advantage is acquired by the victor nor permanent injury done to the defeated". Kroeber (1923) reported that the California Indians "delivered mass fire, but the extreme range made it notably bloodless. They even went so far as to take poorer arrows to war than they used in economic hunting". With the Californians and Columbians war was really a form of amusement; it consisted merely of duels, and the two ’armies’ danced and sang at the battle. It was good fun and they enjoyed it (Breysig, 1907; Kroeber, 1925; Hoebel, 1949). Such reports inspired Turney-High to charge that most Californians "were too cowardly to make fighting men". But in such examples there is no evident interest in seeking a resolution by either victory or a peace pact, because the purpose of the war games is to demonstrate bravado, if not courage (Howell, 1975). War for adventure or sport is commonly reported among primitive peoples. Certain Australian tribes occasionally sent out expeditions, ostensibly to procure medicinal plants and minerals such as red ocher hundreds of miles away. They usually had to fight their way through tribes on whose territory they trespassed and returned with thrilling tales of adventure rather than with valuable commodities. Malinowski (1920) writes of the Trobriand Islanders: "The mere fact of fighting as a sport, and the glory derived from a display of daring and skill, were an important incitement to warfare". "Among peoples who esteem the military life, expeditions are sometimes launched for the sheer fun of it. Young Plains warriors were actually disappointed when older chieftains called off prospective fights through peace parleys. War can be loved by those who play it as a game and are willing to pay the croupier, Death" (Hoebel, 1949). The Californian Yuman tribes apparently needed no immediate provocation because they fought for the pleasure and excitement fighting produced (McCorkle, 1978).



These milder forms of war have also been interpreted as providing an opportunity for working off aggressive impulses without danger to the social solidarity or economic welfare of either of the contending parties (e.g., Howitt, 1904; Hoijer, 1929; Wedgwood, 1930). It has been observed time and again that war may provide an escape from debilitating tedium and ennui, from the monotony of the routine of everydaylife, frustration, and existential insignificance. "War is one of the most effective devices ever invented for this cathartic purpose" (Turney-High, 1949). As Andreski (1964) remarked: "For a vigorous man, war may appear very attractive as an alternative to exhausting monotonous work and grinding poverty. The ’heroic’ narrative poetry from the Iliad and the Nibelungenlied to the Mahabharatta is full of glowing pictures of the life of warriors, amusing themselves with gambling, wine, women and song, and basking in glory, which stands in strong contrast to the abject fate of toilers". "Men like war" Davie (1929), and more recently van Creveld (1991), stated rather apodictically and generalizingly. "They often fight for the love of excitement or the mere lust of fighting. While it is true, as someone has said, that anyone will fight when he is mad enough, it is also a fact that men will fight when they are not aroused, but just for the fun of it. War offers diversion and relief from ennui. It provides a mode of escape from the monotony of a dull existence. Primitive life seems to afford scanty amusements and means of recreation; the savage is so engrossed in a severe struggle for existence that his life leaves little room for diversion. Hence men like to fight. The most exciting things they know are hunting, herding, and warfare. These are the occupations they enjoy, and their pursuit affords a considerable measure of satisfaction and pleasure". Turney-High (1949) emphasized the psychological attractiveness of the sheer fun of recreational warfare especially if it is combined with the cathartic 17 function of tension-releasing warfare : "War is the most exciting exercise in the world. The real struggle of fighting is more thrilling than the mock opposition of games; the real man-hunt is incomparably more stimulating than the slaughter of animals. War is the great trigger-release of pent-up emotions, 17

Turney-High (1949) also relates victory-gloating to this tension-release mechanism: "Having conquered an enemy, there are no reasons why nonliterate tribes should have then indulged in gloating, orgiastic victory dances, except that tensions were thereby released. Such victory, scalp, and other dances afforded opportunity to tribes righteously to vent all possible spleen against a defeated foe, his scalp, one of his captive members, and his very name, regardless of the source of the ill-humor. Victory has ever been strong medicine. The victory dance restored the equilibrium of the ante-bellum frustrations and those caused by the war as well. They were also a necessary rite of passage indicating the return to normality of statuses which had been seriously disturbed by the war".



and it is apparent that more than one tribe has realized this. The Winnebago, for example, recognized that war affords an excellent release when the load of sorrow becomes too great to be borne (Fletcher & LaFlesche, 1906)". Among the headhunting peoples of the Philippines, such as the Ilongot, a death in the household, and the subsequent period of mourning, was among the chief conditions that would make a man wish to "relieve his heart" (Rosaldo, 1970; LeBar, 1975) by raiding for a head. "Many tribes, indeed, were more realistic in conceiving of war as a flight-from18 grief device than we are" (Turney-High, 1949). War stories are still the most entertaining stories, and in order to spin yarns there must be wars. Wissler’s (1906) discussion of the Blackfoot makes this clear. With them the military yarn was the most important form of entertainment, and the Blackfoot insisted that it be a true one. Plains life was probably very monotonous, and therefore the successful warrior had not only provided pleasure for himself in manhunting but was a public benefactor in relieving the ennui of his fellow-tribesmen. Much primitive war was more of an athletic than a military exercise. Of course, one sought to kill a human and risked being killed himself, but dangerous games have always been the most fun, especially those which look more dangerous than they are. When a Plains warrior got more honorable coups for slapping a living enemy in the face, for being first to whip a corpse, for taking a bow or blanket from a living man than for slaughtering a hundred troublesome enemies in ordinary battle, he was indulging in an athletic event, not war. California informants admitted as much to Kroeber (1925). They knew that war looked more dangerous than it was. These tribes knew how to make stone arrow points, for they used them in hunting. Yet, they carried headless arrows to war. Warriors would return from an engagement bristling like pin-cushions. Their wives would pull out the simple wood arrows, and they would live to ’fight’ another day. Landtman (1927) points out that the inter-clan and intra-village hostilities in Papua were exercised with much self-restraint. They were generally held at 18

Among the Plains tribes, ‘suicide squads’ might vow to fight to the death. Such Dog Societies as they were often called, or Inverted Warriors, who staked themselves to the ground existed among the Arapaho and Kiowa (Mooney, 1896; Lowie, 1909), the Gros Ventres, Mandan, and Blackfoot (Wissler, 1906), the Cheyenne (Dorsey, 1894), and the Oglala Dakota (Wissler, 1912). "The works of Lowie (1935) and Lindeman (1932) on the Crow show that such no-flight men did not have to be organized into mutually stimulating associations. For any number of reasons, or for just plain Weltschmerz, a young Crow might ’vow his body to the enemy’. His parents might grieve for him as one dead, but nothing would deflect him from his purpose of dying in an attack against hopeless odds at the first opportunity" (Turney-High, 1949). On the other hand, a man who did not feel particularly attracted to the status of warrior and/or the bloody business of warfare could make himself useful by impersonating a woman (berdache).



night by the light of torches held by women. The observer might think that the battle was frightful from the noise and expenditure of rage, but deadly missiles were aimed at the legs and deaths were rare. Unless viewed from the standpoint of a game, Turney-High (1949) comments, the whole thing seemed impossibly futile. Harris (1978) has criticized the ’war as play’ explanation of primitive war. If people can be taught to value war and to enjoy stalking and killing other human beings, one must also grant that they can be taught to hate and fear war and to be revolted by the spectacle of human beings trying to kill each other. Both kinds of teaching and learning actually do take place. So if warlike values cause wars, the crucial problem becomes that of specifying the conditions under which people are taught to value war rather than to abhor it. And this the ’war as play’ theory cannot do. Also Ferguson (1984) is skeptical: "It often is stated that war is enjoyed as an exciting, sport-like activity... Be that as it may, it seems implausible that this alone would motivate someone to risk his life. When war involves serious costs and risks to life, individuals are liable to be reluctant to move to the front line" (Ferguson, 1984).

5.3.4 Magico-Religious Motives The linkage of primitive war with magico-religious beliefs and practices is quite expectable. War, Ferguson (1990a) explained "is a virtual magicoreligious magnet". Davie (1929) subsumed blood revenge, human sacrifice, and headhunting under the special religious causes/motives of primitive war. Indeed, a strong case could be made that the origin of primitive war itself is religious in nature, a theory elaborated by Reinach (1913): The spirits or gods have to be placated, coaxed to take interest in the cause of their mortal servants, and not turn hostile to it. This is done by means of sacrifice, especially the commemorative proof of victory; the trophy. The trophy is the ex-voto of the gods’ favorable interference in the affairs of primitive man. Religious and magical notions, according to Hoebel (1949), probably rank next after revenge drives as the predominant motives in primitive war. All headhunting, for example, is tied up with supernaturalism and the belief that dead men’s power can be taken with their heads. Most of the spirits and gods in the primitive world are conceived as malevolent and hostile, as ever ready to harm the living (a fascinating fact still urgently in need of an adequate psychological explanation). Religious motives for war usually take the form of divine commands or precepts. These must be followed out to the bitter end; there can be no



deviation, lest the gods be angry and bring dire misfortune (Davie, 1929): Having no conception of causality, of natural laws and forces, primitive peoples ascribe all phenomena which they cannot understand to the agency of spirits. Especially do they attribute the ills of life to supernatural powers, for the most part malignant. In order to escape misfortunes, therefore, they must appease the evil spirits - by sacrificing to them, by providing them with the things they desire, and in general by performing all the obligations which the cult or care of the spirits enjoins on them. The spirits are particularly anxious that the living keep up the old ways and customs. If their descendants deviate from the traditional folkways or mores, they become angry and show their displeasure by sending calamities of all kinds. Fear of the ghosts is thus a sanction to the mores; it assures their continuance (Davie, 1929). Apotheosized warriors and chiefs usually become war gods. War gods are invariably depicted as bellicose, terrible, and bloodthirsty: "They demand human victims; hence war is waged to satisfy them: they delight in war; hence hostilities are begun for their pleasure. In these and other ways they incite to war, and they honor in afterlife those who have excelled in military prowess on earth" (Davie, 1929). The notion of an ’elysium of the brave’ or ’warrior walhalla’, where the souls of brave warriors indulge in carnal pleasures, may indeed be considered conducive to warfare, as much as the notion of a post mortem paradise was conducive to the crusades and ’holy wars’ of Christianity and Islam. To please the Fijian gods, for example, to be received after death in their paradise, it was necessary to have a firm record of carnage. "Upon his arrival in the other world, the double [soul] of a Fiji islander should be able to boast with good reason of having killed many people and destroyed many villages: these were his good works. He must be worthy of the gods whom he rejoins in the next world, and who, for the majority, were the incarnation of diverse atrocities..." (Letourneau, 1895). The slaughter of many enemies was considered most likely to propitiate the deity (Erskine, 1853; Thomson, 1908). According to Tremearne (1912), the belief that the spirit of a slaughtered enemy will attend the slayer in the next world increased the warlike activity of the Nigerian natives. Primitive peoples do not, as a rule, fight on account of religious or ideological differences; that noble motive was reserved for civilized men.



5.3.4.1 Belief in, and Fear of, Magic and Witchcraft A common source of hostility among primitive peoples is the belief in (black) magic, sorcery and witchcraft, also based on the notion that the spirits are the cause or agency of all phenomena. Another principle relevant in this connection is the post hoc ergo propter hoc. Both are apparent in the following account related by Davie (1929): The Motu of southeast New Guinea have a superstitious fear of the neighboring Koitapu, to the magical power of whom they attribute any calamity befalling them. In 1876 they lost much of their sago in a storm at sea, their frail canoes being unable to withstand the rough water and carry the cargo. They charged the Koitapu with bewitching their canoes and killed many of them in revenge. Again, in 1878, after a prolonged drought, for which they held a Koitapu village responsible, they attacked the village and killed all they could (Lawes, 1879). Most New Guineans believe that misfortune is always due to sorcery or witchcraft. The belief that sorcery is practiced by persons in other communities contributes to intercommunity tension and hostility. Sorcery accusations precipitate attack against the sorcerer or his community, and may start a feud or a war. The individual sorcerer need not be named, only his settlement; any member of the settlement is then exposed to attack to achieve vengeance (Paula Brown, 1978). See Huber (1975) for an excellent account of the role of sorcery, which is always the arcane work of alien villagers, in Anggor homicide and war. The belief in the ability to cause sickness and death by magic and witchcraft is thus a frequent and serious cause of feuds and war. How serious the consequences of this belief are may be seen from Mary Kingsley’s (1897) statement that "the belief in witchcraft is the cause of more African deaths than anything else. It has killed and still kills more men and women than the slavetrade". The fear engendered by the belief in the secret sorcery attacks of ’enemies’ has been aptly described by Whiffen (1915), who writes about the South American Putomayo River Indians in general: "This state of endless warfare is based not on avarice but on fear. They fight because they are afraid of each other, and see no protection but in the extermination of their neighbors. Every ill that befalls a man they set down to the evil intent of an enemy". Eventually, such a situation cannot but erupt into preemptive attack and internecine war. It is inherent in the trap psychology of every virulent war complex. Divale (1973) has objected to the notions of witchcraft and sorcery as being the cause of primitive wars. He holds that it confuses cause and effect. "The relevant point is that charges of witchcraft and sorcery were usually directed against individuals or groups where prior disputes were present. It is suggested that witchcraft be viewed, in respect to warfare, as a mechanism for maintaining group solidarity and hate for the enemy, rather than as a cause of



primitive war". But whether regarded as a causative or as an attributive factor in the genesis of primitive war is rather a matter of emphasis and perspective; the consequences are real and lethal. 5.3.4.2 Human Sacrifice The purpose of human sacrifice is to please or propitiate the gods. In return for such favors, the living expect certain advantages, usually the avoidance of misfortune and calamity or the success of some important undertaking, for instance a hunting expedition or war. The transaction actually is a bargain; if the gods send good fortune or at least withhold evil, Man will see that they are kept supplied with all they need or desire. "The significant point in the sacrifice of captives is that a rather high culture, indeed a civilization of sorts, has usually been attained before such practice has had any place in the complex. There had to be definite deities to whom sacrifice was directed, and specific, personalized gods were not characteristic of the simpler cultures. Such gods demanded organized, trained priesthoods with complicated rituals. In contrast with this, sacrifice of war captives has been a great rarity when the highest religious ministrant has been a shaman or ’medicine man’ seized with vague spirits, not gods" (Turney-High, 1949). The Aztecs of Mexico waged war primarily to secure victims for Huitzilopochtli, the insatiable god of war (Prescott, 1843). Practically all prisoners of war were sacrificed, the number amounting to at least twenty thousand annually (Bancroft, 1875; Biart, 1900, Cook, 1946). Other hierocratic societies practised human sacrifice on a far lesser scale. Lopreato (1984) regards the phenomenon of human sacrifice as the purest type of victimization: "To deprive others of their life is one of the most effective means of increasing one’s own fitness. This statement is especially true when the sacrificed are young males whose elimination releases for the victimizers the reproductive partnerships of women who would otherwise be unavailable. At the same time, human sacrifice is often, not always, linked to religious and other cultural ceremonies that justify the sacrifice, and in this sense we may speak of a biocultural interplay". It appears, then, that the sacrifice of war captives was not characteristic of the ’simpler’ cultures. This does not mean that captives were not tortured or sometimes even slain. Kroeber (1923) reports torture by several ’simple’ Californian tribes, such as the Maidu and Gabrieleño, as a preliminary to execution. This was only spleen-venting, according to Turney-High (1949), the release of tensions and emotions caused by the death of relatives and the other nuisance activities of the enemy. It had no religious meaning.



5.3.4.3 Head- and Trophy-hunting The headhunting culture complex is found in certain parts of Africa but is more widespread in Indonesia, New Guinea, Melanesia, and parts of Polynesia, Micronesia, India, and South America. Headhunting has been reported to be a frequent practice in over 90 percent of horticultural societies (Lenski & Lenski, 1970; Lopreato, 1984). The fundamental idea underlying the custom of headhunting is to obtain possession of a spirit by holding the object in which it is supposed to reside (Kenyah of Borneo: Haddon, 1901; Kalamantan Dyak: Furness, 1902; Sea Dyak: Gomes, 1911; Wa of Indo-China: Risley, 1903; Jivaro: Karsten, 1923, 1935). The skulls, carefully preserved and decorated, are regarded as a protection against the spirits of evil, and may even be coaxed to send blessings to the possessor, his kin, or his community. Without them the people could not enjoy peace, plenty, prosperity or comfort. Prestige and power motives also enter. The possession of many heads distinguished one as a valiant warrior. Headhunting was, for example, a major avenue to prestige and renown among the Kalinga (Barton, 1949; Dozier, 1966), the Ilongot (Rosaldo, 1970), and all other headhunting peoples of the Philippines (Kroeber, 1928; LeBar, 1975). The Jivaro warrior of Ecuador not only sought honor and fame when he took an enemy head but positive economic advantage. The captured head (’tsantsa’) became an object of magico-economic advantage. His behavior towards the ’wakani’, the enslaved spirit of the man whose head he had taken, was definitely practical, for the slayer became invested with great insight into the domestic affairs through its ownership. The Jivaro could also trade a shrunken head to Westerners for a rifle (Karsten, 1923, 1935; Turney-High, 1949; Ferguson, 1990a). Headhunting was also a means of ingratiating one’s self with the opposite sex, for "if a man has taken the head of an enemy, he is made much of by the women, and, if unmarried, mothers and fathers are anxious to secure him for a son-in-law" (Hose, 1894). Heads were even used as bridal gifts (Furness, 1902). Haddon (1901) said of the headhunters of Sarawak that "there can be little doubt that one of the chief incentives to procure heads was to please the women". In many headhunting societies it was absolutely obligatory for a man to have captured a head in order to marry. Among the Kiwai of New Guinea a ’non-killer’ was allowed to marry - if a woman would have such a husband at all - but he had to live in the men’s club house and had to refrain from intercourse with his wife (Riley, 1925; Landtman, 1927). But for most peoples marriage without a head trophy was out of the question. Barton (1930), in his study of Ifugao headhunting, noted that headhunting also served the ’latent function’ of providing "relief from the monotony of daily



life". Durham (1976) reasoned that the cultural tradition of headhunting among the South American Mundurucu had the effect of decimating neighboring peoples competing for scarce protein, while Lopreato (1984) regarded it as a "cultural accretion of the urge to victimize, enhancing the Darwinian fitness of the perpetrators". The American Northwest Coast peoples staked heads on poles in front of their settlements as a signal of the group’s ferocity to potential enemies (e.g., Ferguson, 1984). Headhunting expeditions could thus serve to demonstrate superiority over others, and at the same time to increase the warrior’s store of supernatural power, which he took from the enemy he has killed. Since supernatural power is the scarce commodity sought and an important way of acquiring it was by taking the heads of enemies, headhunting expeditions came to be regarded as essential for maintaining cosmic harmony, or to ensure fertility and masculinity (Feest, 1980; Meyer, 1981). For the Iatmul of the middle Sepik River, New Guinea, for example, headhunting, sexuality, and the fertility of nature were associated. Phallic ostentation, male pride and machismo, and aggression were closely linked in the Iatmul stereotype of the male role. A man was supposed to be competitive and hot-tempered and he adopted histrionic mannerisms. In order to prove himself a ’real man’ for marriage and procreation, a young warrior had to take an enemy head. This was a means of obtaining more of the spiritual life-force believed to reside in the head, thus increasing the tribe’s power and fertility at the enemy’s expense (Bateson, 1936; Cf. the Asmat [Zegwaard, 1959], and the Jivaro [Karsten, 1935, 1967]).

According to the Jivaro way of arguing, social order is based on moral order, and the latter is composed of a series of demands and obligations derived from a set of beliefs about souls and esoteric power and the way to obtain it. Only Jivaro own the souls and control the power, and killing another Jivaro is a means by which power is attained, hence a claim to be judged as Jivaro is to kill another Jivaro, or in Karsten’s (1935) words: "It is characteristic of the Jivaros that they especially wage war against tribes belonging to their own race and speaking the same language. To such an extent has this been the rule for centuries that the word shuara, ’Jivaro Indian’, has become synonymous with the word ’enemy’". Ceremonial headhunting was an endemic phenomenon in the area in question; a recurrent and expected event. Trophy hunting was considered highly rewarding in the Jivaro social ranking, indeed the very essence of being a Jivaro male. Intertribal warfare was a different undertaking from trophy hunting, the primary purpose of the former being the protection of the latter. The extension of territory as such was no goal in itself (Siverts, 1975).



Although headhunters attached great honor to the possession of a head (i.e., somebody else’s), they were not always particular about the means of securing it. Treacherous means or even purchases were often permissible. Indeed, the head of a woman or child might suffice. Thus, among the Naga, a common method - and a perfectly honorable one - was to lie in wait near the water ghat of a hostile village and kill the first woman or child who came to draw water. In apportioning honors, no distinction was drawn between the head of a man or that of a woman or child (Godden, 1897). Since the desire for heads was never satisfied, and every headhunting foray led to reprisals, expeditions and counterexpeditions were never ending. The effects of headhunting have been especially serious in the Solomon Islands, where tribe after tribe has been completely wiped out as the result of a long series of headhunting expeditions (Hardy & Elkington, 1907). When Rubiana was captured by the British in 1891, the beach was found absolutely littered with skulls, the cherished accumulation of years (Somerville, 1897). Trophies of all sorts have been recorded in the literature: Skulls, scalps, skins, leg or arm bones, male genital organs, and above all captives. Female captives are seldom counted as trophies, but are rather part of the booty to be enjoyed, not a point to be added to the score. An adult male in the prime of life is often considered the best trophy of all. This was true of North American Iroquoian groups (Trigger, 1969) as well as of the Tupinamba (Moore, 1978). Scalping was particularly common in North America and rare elsewhere (though not unknown; it has been reported of the Scyths [Herodotus], and the Ostyak, Vogul, and Samoyed [Czaplicka, 1914]); leg and arm bones (made into flutes) and skins (made into drums) have been mainly recorded in the South American region - obviously a musical continent. Feest (1980) has argued that war customs such as headhunting (and cannibalism) are more meaningfully viewed as religious practices which provide the impetus for a permanent state of war, rather than being war motives themselves.



5.3.5 ’Twixt Eros and Thanatos’: Sex, Women and Warfare Women, said Divale (1973), were the most frequent cause of feuding and warfare among primitive peoples. "The most common arguments were charges of adultery involving the irate husband and his wife’s lover, but equally as common were disputes over bride price (the wealth given to the bride’s relatives by the relatives of the groom). Divorce also often caused wars. If a woman wanted a divorce or if she ran off with another man, her husband and his relatives would want a return of the brideprice. The bride’s family might refuse, and in the event that the groom felt cheated, this constituted a reason to go to war" (Divale, 1973). Among the Kapauku of New Guinea, for example, almost half of the wars stemmed from the latter cause (Pospisil, 1958). Already Holsti (1913) pointed out that "relations of a matrimonial kind" have often been a cause of disturbance within and between groups of primitive peoples: "In fact, in the origin and maintenance of matrimonial relations, certain authors have seen a direct cause of incessant warfare". Breaches of the sex mores - rape or adultery - by nonmembers of the group are perhaps, together with murder of a group member, the most common causes of feuds and wars (Davie, 1929; Hoijer, 1929; van der Bij, 1929 [vrouwenzaken]; Q.Wright, 1942). "Squabbles about women" were a chief cause of war in New Zealand; another was land. Hence the Maori proverb: "Land and women are the roots of war" (Buller, 1878; Tregear, 1904). In other parts of Polynesia wars were frequently caused by adultery, breach of promise of marriage, and marriages between members of hostile tribes (Ratzel, 1896). Nearly all the native fights in Australia were over women. The abduction of women, rape, elopement, and the refusal to surrender a girl promised in marriage were the most common causes (Curr, 1886; Letourneau, 1895; Tindale, 1974). Also among the Dani of New Guinea conflicts over women, including abductions, are the most frequent cause of feuding and war (Larson, 1987). In many of these societies, conflicts are exacerbated by the relative scarcity of women as a consequence of polygyny (Andreski, 1964; Feest, 1980). But not only squabbles about women, ’matrimonial’ or not, has been an abundant source of intra- and intercommunity conflicts, the capture of women from other communities - remember the Sabine maidens seized by the men of Romulus - has been so as well, be it for recreative or procreative purposes. Men probably have fought for and over women since time immemorial. To abduct or capture the women of other groups has been a common practice and one often regarded as highly meritorious (Sumner & Keller, 1927; Davie, 1929; Q.Wright, 1942). Letourneau (1881; 1895) and Durbin & Bowlby (1938), among others, held that the chief interest served by the capture of women from other tribes is the gratification of sexual passion. This, however,



as Davie (1929), among others, objected, is quite secondary to the economic motive. "Primitive man desires women mainly as workers or slaves. The more women he has to labor for him, the more secure is his position in the struggle for existence. They are an economic asset for the work they do and the children they bear" (This latter aspect is, of course, the crux of selectionist/evolutionary theory). But why not combine business with pleasure? "The propensity of sex is inferior in motive power only to the need for food", Andreski (1964) states, "And sometimes the means of satisfying it may constitute the object of the struggle. Female slaves were always one of the most alluring kinds of booty. Wealth and power, moreover, may be desired because they enable one to indulge in sexual pleasures". And Turney-High (1949), in his customarily eloquent style, states: "If it is conceded that the reflection of the self in the mirror of the general community is important enough to impel a man to risk his life, the prestige mirror of Aphrodite has even more emotional import. Sex is an important consideration in work, play, eloquence, or war. Whatever the ethos of the group, prestigeconferring activity is sought avidly by the male that his glory may shine in the eyes of his own and other men’s women" (Cf. van Bemmelen, 1928). These types of prestige war are often directly encouraged by the women. Among the Yanomamö, displays of masculinity, such as fighting prowess and 'waiteri' (ferocity) are admired by Yanomamö women, and particularly aggressive men have an advantage both in soliciting the sexual favors of larger numbers of women as well as depressing the temptation of other men to seduce their wives (Chagnon, 1979). The Yanomamö are famous/notorious for their fighting over women, and Chagnon is, not amazingly, one of the proponents of the "Why-fight-over-bananas-if-you-can-fight-over-women"-theory of the evolutionary origin of war (Ch. 4). California presented a veritable mosaic of small tribelets, cultures and languages (Kroeber, 1925; McCorkle, 1978; Jorgensen, 1980). Especially in regard to the theory that women are the ultimate cause of warfare, the following account of the fate of female war captives is not particularly supportive. Among the Yurok, young women sometimes were carried off as captives but were likely to be returned to their kin at time of settlement (Wallace, 1949). Among the tribelets of the southern Athapaskans (Mattole, Nongatl, Sinkyone, Lassik, and Wailaki), no prisoners were taken, but some groups killed children and women, particularly if they had taken part in the conflicts (Elsasser, 1978). Among the Costanoan, captives were usually killed; only young women were spared (Duran & Fortuny, 1958), while the Quechan (Yuma) and Mohave sometimes took female captives, but it was considered dangerous to have intercourse with them. Only the Pomo (Loeb, 1926) and the Nisenan (Beals, 1933) are reported to regularly incorporate captive women into



their own tribe through marriage. Wholesale, massive and/or systematic rape of the vanquished female population (e.g., Brownmiller, 1975) seems to be more characteristic of contemporary ’civilized’ wars than of primitive wars: In the dawn attacks on isolated settlements it is much more commonly reported that the entire vanquished population is slaughtered irrespective of age, sex or combatant status. This appears to be the case from the band-level to the chiefdom level of sociopolitical organization. If rape occurs at all, it is the more or less personal initiative of one or more of the participants in a small raiding party, and more often than not the hapless victim is killed afterwards. For example, when a group of men from the South American Patangoro and Amani met a beautiful woman from another village, they first collectively raped, and then killed her, considering this to be an insult to her relatives (Kirchhoff, 1948). 5.3.5.1 The Warrior Cult In primitive societies, wars, raids and feuds are primarily or exclusively male ’occupations’ and obligations, although exceptions to this general rule have been documented. The famous or notorious Amazons of South America and classical Greece are probably not entirely mythical. The female of the species seems to have engaged in warlike exploits in Angola, Canary Islands, Amazonia, Patagonia, Central America, California, Hawaii, Australia, Tasmania, Arabia, Albania, and among the Ainu, Apache, and (occasionally) Cherokee (Davie, 1929; Q.Wright, 1942). In most of these cases, however, the role of the women is confined to company, sutler and entertainer, supporter and ’cheerleader’ for the benefit of the hard core of male warriors. The Dahomean women-soldier garrisons, on the other hand, have been reported to fight more bravely and more cruelly than their male counterparts. The fact that the warrior role is virtually confined to the male is so obvious that very few scholars have considered it worthy of contemplation or scientific enquiry. Having established that the conduct of war is quintessentially a male occupation, Kroeber & Fontana (1987), provide an interesting psycho-social theory, which, they state, is rooted in human cultural evolution. Kroeber & Fontana do not believe in the conventional argument that it is because of the physical superiority of males over females, neither do they believe the warrior role is the result of some instinctual perverseness in the character of males which inclines them to acts of violence, although they are aware that males - even as children - are more aggressive in all societies in which the phenomenon has been studied. But it is a large step from what may be innate inclinations toward individual aggression to ritualized, socially sanctioned, institutionalized group warfare. Kroeber & Fontana are instead persuaded that the reason why men are the chief proponents of warfare as well as the warriors is to be discovered in the nature



and evolution of culture, more specifically, the Neolithic Revolution. Before that time, males, as hunters and as gatherers who worked the distant perimeters of their group’s territory, were essential partners in the maintenance of family and community life. With the advent of agriculture (especially horticulture) and the domestication of animals, however, it became evident that women often could perform most or even all essential community chores: Tend the hearth, bear and raise children, and plant, cultivate, and harvest the calories needed to stay alive. The worth of males, their dignity as human beings, their existential validation, was challenged to the utmost. A major response appears to have been a shift from man the hunter (and killer) to man the warrior (and killer); from man the physically strong hunter and gatherer working the distant boundaries of his own territory to man the statesman and world diplomat. The new statuses may well be what Luckert (1981) has called "facesaving pretense". Thus, Kroeber & Fontana believe that the deeper reason - and one that might help explain the persistence of warfare as a modern phenomenon - may lie in the disequilibrium in the sex divisions of respected societal roles which resulted when males became less essential as hunters and gatherers, and their subsequent need to re-validate their existential status as dignified human beings. The selectionist explanation of why males are the warriors, in contrast, is that throughout evolutionary history, men have been able to gain reproductively by coalitional violence and warring behavior; women almost never have been able to do so (Low, 1990; Tooby & Cosmides, 1988; Chagnon, 1988; See Ch. 4). This argument, Low stipulates, does not reduce to an assertion that women are bound by the constraints of pregnancy, nursing and child care. If that were true, sterile women and post-menopausal women might broadly be expected to engage in intergroup conflict, as do other primate females (See Ch. 3). Furthermore, patrilinearity fosters men’s, but not women’s confluences of reproductive interests in war, because related men but not women live together. Adams (1983) has pointed out that under these conditions, women face a conflict of interest with their husbands (their husbands may be making war upon their fathers and brothers), and argues that women’s formal exclusion from warfare in so many societies may have its roots here. Nissen (1961; 1971) has emphasized the role of women and the differential sexual development of men and women (Kinsey et al., 1948; 1953) in a theory of the role of the ’sexual constellation’ in a society’s disposition to warfare: The fact that sexual activity in the female is relatively restrained in the period of life when sexual activity in the man is strongest, that is, in early youth, leads, in connection with the polygynous monopolization of young females by older males, to the result that the young men come to be a relatively isolated group in society. At the same time when all other groups have a social and legal place



for their sexuality, the group of younger men is permanently sexually deprived. This has the consequence, according to Nissen, that a deep complex of bitterness, resentment and misogyny is created in the young man. Society therefore had to deal with the problem of holding the young men under discipline. The most ’natural’ way to do this was by taking up the young men in the men’s club, and the (homo-erotic) cult of masculinity. In this way the men were bound together in an organization which has been called the (secret) male society or ’male bonding’ (See Schurtz, 1902; Tiger, 1969). The secret male society existed in many primitive societies and had an important place in most of the great civilized states in Asia, Africa and other parts of the world. It was, with respect to its practical policy, built upon the ideas of comradeship and leadership. It was, with regard to its structure, a mechanism which is most suited for conducting wars (Nissen, 1961; 1971). Vanggaard (1969) discussed the role of phallic aggression in hierarchical male relationships, characteristic of various warrior societies (Whiting [1965] and LeVine & Campbell [1972] would interpret this as a form of ’protest masculinity’; see Ch. 6). In such societies men (attempt to) assert their supremacy over women by aggressive phallic ostentation (See also Webb, 1983), rampant machismo, and (sometimes bizarre) sexual taboos for the warriors, lest they be contaminated by female weakness. In warlike African societies - indeed, in virtually all bellicose societies, virility and valor were interlinked as masculine attributes (Mazrui, 1975). In some African societies, special sexual rights were accorded to warriors. Among the Nandi, they enjoyed considerable sexual privileges, especially legitimate access to uninitiated girls who could thus be adopted as sweethearts. Given the link between masculinity and warfare there could also be an easy link between violence and sexuality. A man taunted as weak in a sexual sense could seek vindication in martial prowess ("Leaders as well as followers may be anxious to fight or to institute bold policies tending to war as a compensation for sexual impotence or as an escape from distressing matrimonial conditions" [Lasswell, 1930]). In this regard the story of Shaka emerges as profoundly symbolic (Mazrui, 1975). He not only forbade his warriors to marry, but also to have any sexual relations at all with women until he gave them permission to do so after retirement from active military service. Shaka’s adoption of this policy had its military rewards. The promise of a sexual paradise later on encouraged discipline, while maintaining hope for the future. Daly & Wilson (1988) have drawn attention to the pervasive role of sexual competition and male sexual proprietariness and jealousy in the masculine universe of blood revenge, gang war, and homicides all over the world. The Freudians have emphasized the role of sexual jealousy in creating the ingroup anxieties which can be remedied by displacing aggressive impulses upon an outgroup (Durbin & Bowlby, 1938). "The forms which sexual jealousy and disappointment take vary tremendously



in the cultures of the world; only their universality seems to be constant. War throughout the ages has been a method whereby the jilted, the snubbed, and the cuckolded could obtain release and restoration of self-respect" (Turney-High, 1949). Densmore (1918) says that a Teton Sioux, upon being teased about his girl’s infidelity, would go to war even though he knew the report to be false, and even though he was in no mood to fight. Before the fight he asked his comrades to tell the girl that he hoped he would be killed. Women may be a ’cause’ of war, not merely as the passive objects of capture, abduction, and the like, but also as active instigators. When warlike qualities are approved and admired in the men, the women glorify such qualities. By means of ridicule and approbation they exercise a large measure of social control in primitive societies (Davie, 1929). Feminine social pressure often influenced the warrior to take up arms in a quarrel which might or might not be his own. "In the light of such facts, the opinion that women inherently hate war is not borne out by the facts. Why should they? In an unsuccessful war of defense women may suffer as much as combatants, but women have been, are, and so far as anyone can see, will be essentially civilians. But women are just as enthusiastic for aggressive war as their men, leaving civilized people out of the discussion; this is testified in hundreds of pages of field reports. If riches infallibly get social adulation, men try for that with the urging of their women. So with piety, and all the other socially desirable traits. If the patterns of culture emphasize military preeminence, the women are not far behind urging the male to fight" (TurneyHigh, 1949). 5.3.6 War for Land and Territorial Encroachment In contemporary warfare, territorial defense and conquest figure prominently as causes and motives. In recent history, overpopulation and desiccation producing shortage of pasturage has induced many migrations of nomadic peoples, who, in their search to conquer new lands, clashed with the sedentary peoples, and instituted periods of general warfare (Robinson, 1900; Petrie, 1906; Carr-Saunders, 1922; Wrench, 1926; Davie, 1929; Sprengling, 1933; Lattimore, 1934; Q.Wright, 1942; Dixon, 1976). The Dorian conquest, the European Great Migrations, and the Viking expansions are some prime examples from recent history. ’Earth hunger’ Sumner (1913) called it. Territorial usurpation or conquest, and defense and maintenance of territorial integrity as causative factors/motives in primitive warfare and feuding have also been documented in many primitive peoples (although reports of wars for the explicit purpose of territorial conquest are very rare). The encroachment of one hunting tribe on the lands of another was, for example, a persistent cause of hostilities among the American Indians, who



"were very jealous of their boundaries" (Farrand, 1904). Near the mouth of the Mackenzie River, warfare arising from violation of tribal boundaries was incessant; anyone found hunting out of his own territory was slain. The disputed right of the Flatheads to hunt buffalo at the eastern foot of the Rockies was the cause of long-continued hostility with the Blackfeet (Bancroft, 1875). Poaching and trespass on the territory of another group without getting prior permission was a recurrent motive for feuding and warfare among the Californians (McCorkle, 1978), and the Plateau and Great Basin tribes (Jorgensen, 1980). The River Yumans were something of an exception in this area by dislocating the Kavelchadom and Halchidhoma (Kroeber & Fontana, 1987). Among the natives of Cape York, Australia, hostilities arose among the various groups as soon as "incursions are made into each others’ territories" (Macgillivray, 1852). According to Tindale (1974) "Trespassing to hunt was one of the main causes of fights between tribes, as well as between persons of local groups within tribes al over Australia. This form of trespass threatened the limited and always hard-pressed fundamental sources for living". Territorial conquest and usurpation were, however, rare on the Australian continent, for the aborigines "would ordinarily not conceive of taking land of others. Each band’s land is sacred and spirit infested" (Kennedy, 1971). Among horticulturists the territorial infringement may take the form of planting a garden in another group’s area or of stealing food from another group’s garden (New Guinea Highlands: Paula Brown, 1978). In geographically circumscribed and fertile, riverine areas, earth-hunger may be a prominent war motive, as suggested by Lathrap (1962 et seq.), Carneiro (1970 et seq.), Morey & Marwitt (1975) a.o.; though, as Ferguson (1984) has rightly pointed out, it is always difficult to distinguish between land acquisition as a goal of war and its acquisition as a consequence of war. 5.3.7 War for Booty and Spoils "To the victors belong the spoils" is a doctrine probably as old as history. The products of the land, even more than the land itself, may invite aggression and furnish a powerful motive and cause of war (Davie, 1929). Men, Davie said, have always been enticed by the hope of getting something for nothing. Pillaging another group has seemed a realization of this hope and has been considered until recently a legitimate way of gaining a living. Novikow (1911) stated: "The idea that we can enrich ourselves more speedily by seizing the possessions of our neighbors than by working ourselves is one of the notions most deeply imbedded in the human mind". Oppenheimer (1928) very suggestively terms one’s own labor ’the economic means’ for the satisfaction of needs, and robbery or the forcible appropriation of the labor of others ’the political means’. "Pillaging is an easy substitute for the arduous task of actual production and



accumulation, and is further attractive because of the excitement of war and the variety it offers in the monotony of a humdrum existence" (Davie, 1929). Many nomadic tribes have made their entire living by robbing and raiding each other and preying on their (sedentary, agricultural) neighbors, and this was regarded as a perfectly normal source of livelihood, as legitimate as any other mode of self-maintenance. This ’Bedouin livelihood’, as Lippert (1887) has termed it from its prevalence among nomadic pastoral peoples, has survived until modern times. It has been followed on the sea - piracy - as well as on land (Davie, 1929). It is often asserted in the literature that predatory warfare is virtually universal, and that the prospect of booty and beauty is one of the foremost reasons why primitive men fight. Throughout the African continent, for example, wherever cattle raising was the chief occupation, cattle lifting was the most frequent 19 casus belli (Ratzel, 1895; Steinmetz, 1907, 1929; Davie, 1929) . When the horse was introduced to the North American Plains, horse stealing became a prime motive of war among the Plains tribes, such as the Omaha (Dorsey, 1884). The mobility provided by the horse stimulated the Ute, Apache, Navaho, Shoshone, Paiute, and eastern Plateau dwellers such as the Nez Percé, Flathead and Coeur d'Alene to raid peoples they had never encountered in the pre-equestrian period (Jorgensen, 1980). Pig theft was, and still is, a typical incident of intergroup violence among the New Guinea Highland tribes (Paula Brown, 1978). 5.3.8 Cannibalism The most fundamental cause of war, according to Davie, is hunger or the economic motive, and this ties war up straightaway with the competition of life. Indeed, according to Spencer (1885-96) and many other authors (Darwin, 1871; Ratzenhofer, 1898; Lagorgette, 1906; Novikow, 1911), wars about food have undoubtedly been the earliest waged between human groups. The most elemental 'economic motive' is therefore the quest for food. On the 'lowest' stages of societal evolution - the reasoning continues - men themselves are regarded as part of the food supply. Human flesh is animal meat, and cannibalism in such cases is part of the group's self-maintenance. The Aztecs of Mexico waged war chiefly to gather victims for their religious sacrifices, but the slain captives were afterward eaten at the religious feasts, and Payne (1892) maintained that war was waged for this purpose as much as 19

"From this we have reason to conclude that previous to the domestication of cattle and the change this brought about in the occupation of the natives, the conditions must have been less warlike. Hence, the universal prevalence of cattle raids in Eastern Africa in the nineteenth century ought hardly to be counted among the facts brought forward C e.g. by Steinmetz (1907) C to prove the extremely warlike nature of early ages and primitive conditions in general" (Holsti, 1913).



for the former. See also the argumentation for this point of view in Harris (1977). Be that as it may, it is very difficult to find comestible or consumptive cannibalism as an explicit war motive reported in the pertinent literature. One such report is by Church (1912) who states that the constant wars of the Amazonian Cashibo were for the purpose of obtaining human flesh. The reliability, as well as the validity, of such reports is hard to establish, however. More commonly reported are revenge cannibalism (or ceremonial ’hateventing’ cannibalism as Turney-High [1949] calls it, in which some blood of the victim is drunk or scraps of his body devoured as an act of defilement and insult), and what might be called ’sympathetic’ anthropophagy; the consumption of part of the body of the slain enemy in order to magically partake of the supernatural power, strength or valor it contains. These are concomitants and consequences of war, however, not necessarily the motives for which the war was waged. Man is, whatever else he may be, a pragmatic animal, and if opportunity knocks, why not answer its call? After all, the slain enemy is tasty meat on the barbecue too. "Most Melanesians claimed that their real motive was to insult their foes [by revenge cannibalism] and that they did not cannibalize for food per se. Almost all admitted, though, that roast enemy was savory and that they enjoyed it" (Turney-High, 1949). The consumption of human flesh - which, as culinary experts in the field testify, tastes rather moreish, but, as other experts testify, has only limited nutritional value - may thus be the result of war, and, in turn, become an attendent incentive to war: "The slain may be eaten after a battle caused by other reasons than the desire for human flesh, and prisoners may meet the same fate. The fallen and captured are eaten lest good meat go to waste; man himself is the booty of war on an early stage. Prisoners are utilized as food, not as producers of food. Thus cannibalism becomes an incentive to war" (Davie, 1929). Consumptive cannibalism is considered to be intimately connected with the concept of war as man-hunt. Such warfare is "merely an intensified counterpart of the chase" (McGee, 1898). The weapons and the tactics are generally similar (Vaccaro, 1886; Letourneau, 1890; Deniker, 1900; Lagorgette, 1906; Seligman, 1910; Holsti, 1913; Frobenius, 1914; Davie, 1929). At the time Davie wrote his opus magnum, consumptive cannibalism was considered just one predatory motive for war among many others, neither noble nor ignoble, and it was generally believed that cannibalism was practiced extensively by primitive peoples all over the world - as well as very early in hominid/human evolution (See Ch. 3). Davie did not have to be particularly gullible to accept the ’eye-witness’ reports on cannibalistic feasts among the Tupinamba, Caribs, Botocudo, New Caledonians, Fijians, Maori, Australians, Papuans, Fang and many other peoples at face value. As expounded by Arens (1979) in his Man-Eating Myth, there is not one



reliable first-hand ethnographic eye-witness report on cannibalism (other than ’emergency-anthropophagy’). The first reports by the Conquistadors of cannibalism in Caribbean and other South-American Indians were justifications for enslavement and massacre rather than statements of fact. Even the Hans Staden story is extremely suspect on closer scrutiny. The Tupinamba did not survive to confirm or deny it. These observations are concordant with those of Elkin (1938; an anthropologist with experience in the field), and other ethnologists, that the war-mongers and the cannibals are always the other tribe. According to Arens the references to cannibalism in the HRAF-files consist mainly of statements by authors who explicitly pointed out that the people they studied were not cannibals. Furthermore, it strains all credulity to read, for example, that the inhabitants of a small Pacific Ocean island are "inveterate cannibals, manhunters and warriors". One wonders how such a population could have survived till now. 20 Though Arens may overstate his case , he justly points to the hazards of parroting ’authoritative’ sources. 5.3.9 War for Slaves "Everywhere", said Spencer (1912), "the tendency is for one man to make another man work for him". This applies chiefly to horti- and agriculture, tasks which are monotonous and arduous, and which men tend to avoid and like to force others to do. "Fighting, hunting, and herding are regarded by most primitive peoples as the only worthy occupation for a man, while tilling the soil is the duty of women or slaves. Consequently, the seizure of enemies as slaves is a prominent objective of warfare" (Davie, 1929). Slavery may also be prompted by feelings of ethnocentric superiority, "the love of dominion which belongs to vanity" (Sumner, 1906), or the Urge to Victimize (Lopreato, 1984). It is on the horti- and agricultural stage that slavery first develops into a real institution (Roth, 1887; Nieboer, 1910; Spencer, 1912; Davie, 1929; Sumner & Keller, 1927; Murdock, 1967; Lopreato, 1984; Richerson, 1995). Nieboer (1910) was the first to show empirically that slavery in any appreciable amount or degree does not occur until the agricultural stage is reached. Tribes which gain their livelihood by hunting or cattle raising have no real need for slaves. Why should especially horticultural societies, in comparison with other subsistence economies, be prone to exhibit raiding and slavery (as well as headhunting, witchcraft beliefs, and cannibalism)? Richerson (1995) points out 20

Major reviews of cannibalism include: Andree, 1887; Steinmetz, 1896; Descamps, 1925; Davie, 1929; Volhard, 1939; Hogg, 1966; Savon, 1972; Helmuth, 1973; Sagan, 1974; Tannahill, 1975; Anglo, 1979; Attali, 1981; Davies, 1981; Brown & Tuzin, 1983; Sanday, 1986; Shipman, 1987; and T. White, 1992.



that in horticultural societies men seem especially parasitical because they do relatively little subsistence work (in contrast to the women who work the gardens), but arrogate to themselves the important political and military roles in the community, and arrogate to themselves the women as well (polygyny is common). With the problem of in-group violence solved by the internal political organization, the men in the horticultural societies are now free to turn to their more distant neighbors to parasitize. Fixed property is readily and abundantly available as booty, as are land and humans as potential slaves, and these all provide powerful incentives for raiding. Horticultural societies may, furthermore, not particularly like their neighbors, but they cannot move away. Maybe this is the reason why witchcraft beliefs become particularly developed among horticulturalists. Lopreato (1984) suggested that slavery is perhaps more specifically associated with the invention of metallurgy. Thus, according to Murdock’s (1967) Ethnographic Atlas, as horticultural societies moved from the pre-metal to the metal stage, the percentage of societies practicing slavery increased from 14 to 83. "Chances are that human slavery is as old as human warfare. No doubt, however, with the advent of more efficient weapons and the associated emergence of property accumulation due to the cultivation of plants and animals, the victors had powerful reason to spare the vanquished and put them to forced labor instead. So, slavery at a grand scale is probably of rather recent vintage" (Lopreato, 1984). Slaves may become of such economic importance that prisoners of war are invariably enslaved and a traffic in human beings grows up. The slave market is kept supplied by wars waged for this special purpose. The demand for slaves stimulated slaving expeditions on a grand scale particularly in Africa and the North American Westcoast. The unimaginable devastation caused by slave raiding in Africa was one of the many man-made disasters that have plagued this poor continent (See e.g., Wood, 1868-70). Predatory warfare occasionally develops into ’group-slavery’, mostly the systematic exploitation of sedentary tillers by pastoral nomads. An excellent example is furnished by the Masai, "true warriors and raiders" who kept a subject tribe to do their hunting and tilling (French-Sheldon, 1892). Davie (1929) provides the following examples for the African continent: "In Nyassaland, the Asenga, Atumbuka, and Achipeta are subject to the warlike and dominant Angoni, while the unwarlike Manganja have been enslaved by their neighbors, the Ajawa and Angoni (Moggridge, 1902; Stigand, 1909). The Bechuanas conquered the Makalahari and made them slaves (Holub, 1881). The Vaganda are likewise subject to the Vahuma; the Makalolo hold the Makalaka in serfdom; the Masarva are slaves to the Bechuanas, Matabele, and Marsute (Livingstone, 1872; Ratzel, 1896). The Ba-Yaka enslave the tribes they conquer (Torday & Joyce, 1906). The Bakgalagadi are the serfs of the



Batlhaping, Barolong, and Bahurutshe (Willoughby, 1905), as are the Yalunka of the Sofas (Elliot, 1894)". 5.3.10 Power, Conquest and Political Expansion Politics is eminently the domain of the alleged universal power struggle between groups - be it at the band-level or the nation-state - as envisaged by the Realist School which has dominated Western political thought at least since Machiavelli and Hobbes. It is also the domain of intergroup conflict resolution. In this perspective war truly is a final court of appeal, ’the last resort of kings’, when other adjudicative, diplomatic and international law procedures, have reached an impasse or a stalemate. This is the ultima ratio aspect of war (May, 1943). Sumner & Keller (1927) have stressed this point in the following paragraph: "It should be clear enough that the primitive man, for the reason that he fought, was neither a degenerate, an obstinate and wrong-headed fool nor a knave. He saw nothing better to do, when he had reached the end of his short list of alternatives, any more than we do when we have reached the end of our somewhat longer list. His last resort was nearer the head of his list than ours because his list was shorter. It was often a list containing but one item. He did not know that violence is a crude way of settling difficulties and by no means always efficient; it has always seemed, indeed, to be getting results even when it is later seen not to have done so". Like Utopianism in international relations theory, Realism has its intellectual roots in the older political philosophy of the West and in the writings of non-Western ancient authors such as Mencius and the Legalists (Shang Yang, Han Fei Tzu) in China and Kautilya in India (See especially Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 1971; Rapoport, 1968). According to Morgenthau (1948 et seq.), who is the Grand Old Man and bestknown advocate of modern political Realism, the main principles of Realism are the following: (1) Realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature. (2) Realism assumes that its key concept of interest defined as power is an objective category which is universally valid (but it does not endow that concept with a meaning that is fixed once and for all). (3) In power struggles, nations (or other political units) follow policies designed to preserve the status-quo, to achieve imperialistic expansion, or to gain prestige. All politics can be reduced to these three basic types: "A political policy seeks either to keep power, to increase power, or to demonstrate power". Following Hobbes, Morgenthau sees the "ubiquity of evil in human action" arising from man’s ineradicable lust for power (animus dominandi). Power may comprise anything that establishes and maintains the control of man over man.



Thus power covers all social relationships which serve that end, from physical violence to the most subtle psychological ties by which one mind controls another. Furthermore, human reason is subservient to the fundamental and irrational motive forces of human existence. For most realists, balance-of-power theory is an integral and essential ingredient of their doctrine. Essentially, this theory is about the results produced by the uncoordinated actions of states (or other political units such as tribes, etc.) in an anarchic international political system, characterized by the absence of any powerful central authority. In such a state of anarchy, all actors necessarily resort to self-help. Striving for security, political units sooner or later confront the well-known Prisoner’s Dilemma: All players of the game follow their own interests, so that they end up worse off than if they had cooperated to achieve joint interests. This is, as Falger (1987, 1994) put it, the true nucleus of international politics: In an antagonistic world any measure to secure or improve one’s own security is a direct threat to all other opponents (See e.g., Falger, 1987, 1994; Waltz, 1979; Wight, 1979). This ubiquitous security-dilemma leads to mutual fear between political units, and "As soon as the au fond xenophobic fear of other groups is mixed up with moral and social feelings of superiority about one’s own group, it takes relatively little effort to escalate conflicts to violent levels of settlement" (Falger, 1987). In evolutionary biology the ’balance-of-power’ concept was introduced by Alexander (1979), but apparently not derived from political Realism (he does not even mention the existence of this school of thought). Such are the contours of the Realist paradigm, which is not, as e.g., Nobel (1985), Dougherty & Pfaltgraff (1971), and Rapoport (1968) have shown, without logical contradictions, internal inconsistencies, and unilluminating or elusive concepts. Especially the concept of ’interest defined as power’ may be universally valid, it also is quite lacking in explanatory power, not only with regard to primitive warfare. Blainey (1973) has argued that war and peace appear to share the same framework of causes. The same set of factors should thus appear in explanations of the causes of war and the causes of peace. This, however, is exactly what Realism cannot do, except in glittering generalities. Vasquez (1993) has cogently argued that instead of being an instrument of analysis, political Realism may itself be a factor in the pathway leading to the outbreak of contemporary wars. "Conquest, the integral occupation of another cultural area by force, combines all the benefits of loot, slavery, and increase in political power" (Malinowski, 1941). Malinowski thus points to the interdigitation or the virtually inextricable amalgamation of political and economic motives, as did Loenen (1953) and Garlan (1975) in their analyses of classical warfare. Effective political conquest, as the term is understood in civilized warfare, and



the desire for political domination are, however, virtually unknown among primitive peoples below the level of the chiefdom or pristine state, mainly because they lack the infrastructure and political institutions necessary for the integral occupation of another cultural area and the administration of a conquered people (Fritsch, 1872; de Quatrefages, 1884; Curr, 1886; Lippert, 1887; Ellis, 1890; Gardiner, 1898; Keller, 1906; Torday & Joyce, 1906; Tylor, 1909; Sumner, 1913; Havemeyer & Keller, 1917; Van der Bij, 1929; Davie, 1929; Hoijer, 1929; Q.Wright, 1942; 1965; Hoebel, 1949; Turney-High, 1949; Service, 1966; 1968; Steward, 1968; Turnbull, 1968; Anderson, 1968; Chagnon, 1968; Birdsell, 1970; Keith, 1972; Vine, 1973; Shepard, 1973; Meyer, 1977 et seq.; Carneiro, 1978; Harris, 1978; P.Brown, 1982). "The political motive for waging war is not a primitive one, nor has it often been found among primitive warriors. This trait has belonged principally to areas with fully developed or rudimentary (pristine) states [and empires] such as Middle America [the Aztec empire], the Iroquois League, Peru [the Inca empire], and Africa [e.g., the Dahomean empire] (Turney-High, 1949). Harris (1978) argued that the form of political organization which we call the state came into existence precisely because it was able to carry out wars of territorial conquest and economic plunder. But band and village warfare lacks this dimension. Band and village societies do not conquer territories or subjugate their enemies. In other words, the ’war as politics’ explanation cannot explain warfare among band and village societies because most such societies do not engage in political expansion. Where chieftainship arises, however, with more complex social organization, and usually a pastoral or agricultural way of life, fights among rivals to obtain the chieftainship and wars initiated by the chief to augment his prestige, to check internal disaffection, and for political domination and conquest, are common (Hoijer, 1929; Davie, 1929; Turney-High, 1949). Warfare for the purpose of laying other peoples under tribute can also hardly be considered a ’primitive’ motive: "It belongs to such tribute empires as those of the Romans, the Inca, and the Chinese. It is the mark of civilized military robbery, too gradual and drawn-out, too refined, and too productive for primitive society to appreciate" (Turney-High, 1949).



5.3.11 Epilogue 1. A number of psychoanalytic theories, having as their explanatory core concepts like destructiveness, sadomasochism, Todestrieb and similar formulations are neither evolutionarily plausible nor psychologically very relevant for the explanation of primitive war. Other psychoanalytic theories, such as Paranoid Elaboration of Mourning theory, on the other hand, may provide insights into what I called in the beginning of this chapter the ’psychology of the warrior’. 2. The concept of ’war trap’ and the theory of trap psychology are eminently suited to describe and understand the situation in rampant war complexes.



6 Of Badges, Bonds and Boundaries: Ethnocentrism, Xenophobia and War 6.1 Introduction Evolutionarily, the ultimate causes of war, as of all lethal conflict, have been claimed to be sexual selection and kin selection. Sexual selection in relation to primitive war has been discussed in more detail in chapter 4, leaving us to investigate the implications of kin selection - giving rise to interindividual bonds within and boundaries between human kin groups - for the explanation of primitive war. In this chapter relevant aspects of the ethnocentrism syndrome in relation to the explanation of primitive warfare will be presented, and theories of its origin in hominid/human evolution will be critically discussed. In order to appreciate what is so special about human group phenomena and ethnocentrism, I start by presenting some observations on human violence generally. 6.1.1 The Collectiveness of Human Violence Violence in and between human societies, with the exception of some forms of domestic, criminal and pathological violence, is virtually always a collective activity or committed in the name of a collectivity. "Adults kill and torture each other only when organized into political parties, or economic classes, or religious denominations, or nation states. A moral distinction is always made between individuals killing for themselves and the same individual killing for some real or supposed group interest" (Durbin & Bowlby, 1938). This moral double standard leads to the masquerading of the violence committed in the name of one’s own in-group as justified self-defense, or as a welldeserved punishment for transgressions of mores, laws, or ideological orthodoxy. The violence may range from sanctions against a dissenter or potential renegade within the group, to punitive expeditions, and even genocide, between groups. Total identification with the group makes the individual perform altruistic and heroic acts to the point of self-sacrifice, and at the same time behave with ruthless cruelty towards the enemy or victim of the group. As Koestler (1967) observed: The self-assertive behavior of the group is based on the selftranscending behavior of its members. The egotism of the group feeds on the altruism of its members.



6.1.2

The Justification of Violence

The ulterior justification and legitimation of collective violence invokes complex ideological, symbolic constructions, superordinate goals, spiritual values, high moral principles, and the most noble, virtuous, righteous, selftranscendent and altruistic motives. "The most pernicious phenomena of aggression, transcending self-preservation and self-destruction, are based upon a characteristic feature of man above the biological level, namely his capability of creating symbolic universes in thought, language and behavior" (von Bertalanffy, 1958). It is the ’good’ intentions of mankind, man’s ’high’ moral principles, his ’noble’ strivings that lead to Armageddon. Or, as Koestler (1967) eloquently stated: It is not the murderers, the criminals, the delinquents and the wild nonconformists who have embarked on the really significant rampages of killing, torture and mayhem. Rather it is the conformist, virtuous citizens, acting in the name of righteous causes and intensely held beliefs who throughout history have perpetrated the fiery holocausts of war, the religious persecutions, the sacks of cities, the wholesale rape of women, the dismemberment of the old and the young and the other unspeakable horrors... The crimes of violence committed for selfish, personal motives are historically insignificant compared to those committed ad majorem gloriam Dei, out of a selfsacrificing devotion to flag, a leader, a religious faith, or a political conviction. Man has always been prepared not only to kill but also to die for good, bad, or completely futile causes (Koestler, 1967). The problem, says Fox (1982), "lies with the capacity of the human imagination to create its encompassing, consummatory systems with violence as their focus and purpose". Thus, collective violence is covered with a thick patina of self-justification, ratiomorphic nonsense and pathos. "Men and women first construct towering structures of theology and religion, complex analyses of racial character and class structure, or moralities of group life and virility before they kill one another... Men will die like flies for theories and exterminate each other with every instrument of destruction for abstractions" (Durbin & Bowlby, 1938; Cf. Q.Wright, 1942; Huxley, 1959). The most extensive, quixotic and disgusting violence is justified with the invocation of a utopian ideology, a paradise myth, a superiority doctrine, an eschatological or millenarian ideal state, or other highly abstract political/ethical categories, metaphysical values, and quasi-metaphysical mental monstrosities: National Security, Raison d’Etat, Freedom, Democracy, God, Volk und Heimat, Blut und Boden, Peace, Progress, Empire, Historical Imperative, Sacred Order, Natural Necessity, Divine Will, and so on and so forth. The human being as the



’most ferocious of beasts’ as William James called him, is only a beast in the name of some superhuman ideal, which serves as a ’sanction for evil’ (Sanford & Comstock, 1971); divine or diffuse permission for large-scale destructiveness. The purity and sacredness of our cause, and the divine sanction of our actions (’with God on our side’) is guaranteed by the wickedness of the enemy, who is envisaged as the incorporation of evil, the devil incarnate. 6.1.3

The Maliciousness of Ideological Conflicts

Ideological conflicts are so malicious and venomous because they are totalitarian in pretense. The collision of two different ideologies (social cosmologies, Weltanschauungen, symbolic universes, or definitions of reality) will have a dramatic course because the other worldview constitutes a threat by the mere fact of demonstrating that the one worldview is not inevitable and absolute, but a more or less arbitrary construction; that our vision of reality is largely fictional; a collective delusional system, a social myth. And nothing is more terrifying and threatening to the ego than the prospect of chaos. As Berger & Luckmann (1966) explain: The confrontation of alternative symbolic universes implies a problem of power - which of the conflicting definitions of reality will be ’made to stick’ in the society. Two societies confronting each other with conflicting universes will both develop conceptual machineries designed to maintain their respective universes. From the point of view of intrinsic plausibility the two forms of conceptualization may seem to the outside observer to offer little choice. Which of the two will win however, will depend more on the power than on the theoretical ingenuity of the respective legitimators. It is possible to imagine that equally sophisticated Olympian and Chthonic mystagogues met together in oecumenical consultations, discussing the merits of their respective universes sine ira et studio, but it is more likely that the issue was decided on the less rarefied level of military might. The historical outcome of each clash of gods was determined by those who wielded the better weapons rather than those who had the better arguments. The same, of course, may be said of intrasocietal conflicts of this kind. He who has the bigger stick has the better chance of imposing his definition of reality (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). But it is not only a matter of power. Ubiquitously evident in all forms of collective intolerance, Willhoite (1977) observes, is an expressed desire by leaders and/or members to protect and promote the uniformity, conformity, ’purity’ of the group by denouncing or acting intolerantly toward individuals or



groups perceived - simply because, in some sense defined as critical, they are different - as threats to the well-being and integrity of the intolerant collectivity. "Groupings as diverse in size, character, and functions as clans, tribes, warrior bands, religious bodies, political parties, and nation-state have very commonly repressed internal diversity and also have often sought to force their beliefs and way of life upon unreceptive and resistant members of other collectivities" (Willhoite, 1977). Berger & Luckmann (1966) define the individual’s ’symbolic universe’ as a set of beliefs "that integrate different provinces of meaning and encompass the institutional order in a symbolic totality". This desired state is most readily achieved when one’s symbolic universe is shared by other persons - above all by a total society. Thus, society-wide, official symbolic universes have commonly existed. Not only do they assuage individuals’ anxieties; they also provide legitimation for the structure and character of the society itself. However, "All social reality is precarious. All societies are constructions in the face of chaos. The constant possibility of anomic terror is actualized whenever the legitimations that obscure the precariousness are threatened or collapse". Serious threats to a well-established, taken-for-granted symbolic universe may arise from deviants within the society (’heretics’) or from external contact with another society possessing a radically different - but also taken-for-granted internally - symbolic universe. One possible - and historically common response to such threats is ’nihilation’, the conceptual liquidation of everything inconsistent with the official doctrine. That is, deviants or foreigners may be labeled as less than human, as ’devils’ or ’barbarians’ who dwell in impenetrable darkness. "Whether one then proceeds from nihilation to therapy, or rather goes on to liquidate physically what one has liquidated conceptually, is a practical question of policy". Berger & Luckmann’s description of this device for protecting a symbolic universe is acutely perceptive, but, as Willhoite (1977) points out, it does not explain why such differences should be perceived as threats that demand a nihilating response. This question is, at least in part, answered by Erikson’s (1964) concept of cultural pseudospeciation. Man is the cultural animal par excellence. All members of the (sub)species Homo s. sapiens share the characteristic of being capable to create, and be created by, culture. At the same time, however, culture is the great unbalancer, the great catalyst of diversity and reinforcer of differences, underlying universal human cultural pseudospeciation. Owing to this process, human groups (be they ethnies, tribes or nations) tend to differ from one another to such a degree that the groups come to perceive each other as though they were totally different species, and to behave accordingly. Erikson’s concept of pseudospeciation denotes the fact that while Man is obviously one species, he appears on the scene split into groups (from tribes to nations, from castes to classes, from religions to ideologies) which provide



their members with a firm sense of distinct and superior identity and the illusion of immortality. This demands, however, that each group must invent for itself a place and moment in the very center of the universe where and when an especially provident deity caused it to be created superior to all others, the mere mortals. Thus Man is "indoctrinated with the conviction that his ’species’ alone was planned by an all-wise deity, created in a special cosmic event, and appointed by history to guard the only version of humanity... Man once possessed by this combination of lethal weaponry, moral hypocrisy, and identity panic is not only apt to lose all sense of species but also to turn on another subgroup with a ferocity generally alien to the ’social’ animal world" (Willhoite, 1977). The violence of pseudospeciation, according to Erikson, apparently comes from the manner societies link infantile aggression to role learning. Each culture in training its young exploits the inevitable anxieties of childhood in such a fashion that the infant comes to associate socially defined good with a lessening of anxiety, socially defined bad with its heightening. Especially Tinbergen (1968, 1981) has pointed out how violence changes in character from intraspecific to interspecific/predatory the more the enemy is dehumanized and ’pseudospeciated’. No holds are barred in hunting down a foreign species. MacCurdy (1918) foreshadowed this valuable concept of pseudospeciation in his Psychology of War. According to him, early tribal warfare had fixed the idea that strangers were another species, and thus was overcome the natural taboo [i.e., inhibition] against killing conspecifics. Humans by their herd nature were doomed to split into groups, and these groups behaved biologically like separate species struggling for existence. During times of war, he suggested, humans still felt vestigial emotions of hostility to their enemies as species other than themselves (Crook, 1994). 6.1.4 Symbol Systems-cum-Sentiment Structures Definitely involved in human violence are highly complex and elaborate, abstract and rule-governed, cognitive conceptual and symbolic processes, meanings and constructs of reality, attitudes, norms, values, codes of conduct, anticipations, strategies, etc. This, in turn, has its negative side; the ability of Man to create psychological ’distancing devices’, to dehumanize, diabolize, to exterminate his enemies like vermin in fantasy and in reality; and to generate Weltanschauungen in which only a small portion of humanity fits, and social paradises from which the ’misfits’ have to be expelled. Furthermore, the human being has a very vulnerable sense of self-esteem and group identity. These considerations lead to the following formulation that "the capacity for human aggression is an outcome, in part, of natural selection for heightened sentiment structures focused about self-identity and cooperative social structure... It is largely through his ’sentiment structures’ that man is



capable of the frantic antics of cathection upon diverse symbol clusters, is able to fan up and maintain hostilities in thought and deed toward symbol clusters and their human associations" (Holloway, 1968). The human self-concept can easily be ’inflated’ into narcissism and (in males) machismo, and the group concept into ethnocentrism and Manichaean dualism. The symbolic or conceptual content of such sentiment structures is so obvious that we propose to call them ’symbol systems-cum-sentiment structures’. A very similar concept is perhaps what A.D. Smith (1994) called mythomoteur, the constitutive political myth of the ethnic or national group which may evoke profound ’religious’ sentiments. Perhaps an example of such a ’symbol system-cum-sentiment structure’ is Lorenz’ (1966) formulation of what he calls ’militant enthusiasm’, the unconditional surrender to the Holy Cause, the Sacrosanct Task, which, according to him, is a phylogenetically preprogrammed sentiment-structure originally evolved as a specialized form of communal defensive aggression, and which can rather easily be elicited when the perception of a threat from a hateful enemy, an inspiring leader figure and many other individuals, all agitated by the same emotion, are present (think of the massive Nazi rallies). Together with the concept of cultural pseudospeciation, dehumanization is probably the most important proximate concept for understanding (mass)violence phenomena, including warfare, ’ethnic cleansing’, massacres and genocide, in humans (and probably as ’dechimpization’ [Goodall, 1987] in chimpanzees too). There is a profound paradox involved in the process of dehumanization in the sense that one can only dehumanize what is recognized and acknowledged to be human in the first place. Another curious paradox is that both superhuman and debased characteristics are ascribed simultaneously to certain groups in order to justify discrimination or violence against them. The foreigner, for instance, is seen at once as ’wicked, untrustworthy, dirty’, and ’uncanny, powerful, and cunning’. Similarly, according to the canons of race prejudice, contradictory qualities of exceptional prowess and extraordinary defect, together make them a menace toward whom customary restraints on behavior do not obtain. In its more complete form, however, dehumanization entails a perception of other people as nonhumans - as statistics, commodities, or interchangeable pieces in a vast ’numbers game’. Its predominant emotional tone is that of indifference and callousness (Bernard, Ottenberg & Redl, 1971; also see Sanford, 1971; Sanford & Comstock, 1971; Kelman, 1973; Volkan, 1988, 1991; Volkan, Julius & Montville, 1990). Dehumanization is more than calling the enemy ’cockroaches’. It refers to a combination of malignant psychological processes. Dehumanization is a response to the group’s need to keep alive the principle of not being like the enemy. It represents an attempt to establish firmer boundaries between the two groups. Hostility and fear maintain dehumanization; in turn, dehumanization



eliminates feelings of guilt, since it is acceptable to kill what is not human. Indeed, under these conditions the act of killing can be accompanied by feelings of pleasure and triumph, as it represents another step towards absolute control over the group’s psychological distance from the enemy. "It is dehumanization as a pathological human phenomenon which has permitted most of the world’s horrendous acts to occur. The atrocities of war, man’s cruel treatment of his fellow man, have their roots in this mental process" (Volkan, 1991). Volkan identifies two elements in the group dynamics toward violence and war: the ’Chosen trauma’ and the ’Chosen glory’ of the group. Similarly, Galtung (1994) identifies Chosenness, Trauma and Myths of a Glorious Past, which toegether form a syndrome: the Chosenness-Myth-Trauma (CMT) complex or, more evocatively, the collective megalo-paranoia syndrome. Chosenness means the idea of being a people chosen by transcendental forces, above all others, endowed, even anointed, to be a light unto others, with the right and even the duty to govern them. Trauma means the idea of being a people hit and hurt by others, possibly out of their envy, by enemies lurking anywhere, intent on hitting again. Chosenness induces collective sentiments of grandeur relative to all others. This is then built into the Myths of a Glorious Past to be recreated, the present being suspended between the glorious past and the glorious future. But the traumas can also be used to validate the idea of chosenness; "we have suffered so much, there must be a deeper meaning to that suffering". New traumas are then expected for the future, with a mixture of fear and the lustful anticipation of self-fulfilling prophecies coming true. The three parts of the syndrome reinforce each other socially, not only as ideas, in a vicious circle. The group incorporates the mental representation of the traumatic event(s) into its identity, thus leading to the intergenerational transmission of historical enmity. Once a trauma becomes a chosen trauma, the historical truth about it does not really matter. In war or war-like situations, the leader evokes the memory of the chosen trauma, as well as that of the chosen glory, to galvanize his people and make his group more cohesive. Historical enmity thus acts much like an amplifier in an electrical circuit (Volkan, 1991). "It is because we possess a symbol system and can formulate ideals and categorical imperatives that it is possible for human beings to achieve both sanctity and pure diabolism" (Huxley, 1959; Cf. Leach, 1968). Symbolic language may influence the stationarity and intransigence of human symbol systems-cum-sentiment structures in several ways; (1) by means of a functional relationship between information reception, storage, and extinction on the one hand, and codability on the other; that is, codability facilitates information storage, introduces redundancy, reduces complexity, labels and tags reality and necessarily distorts it. The human differences caused by pseudospeciation ensure high codability. (2) It may influence the refutability of the social



cosmology or Weltanschauung implied in the language system as a calibrating, constraining Steuerungssystem. The mythomagical universe, for example, requires a language different from the rational one, and, to a large extent these are mutually exclusive. (3) These influences may operate on the input as well as on the output side of the individual, constraining and directing perception into certain habitual channels, synthesizing and reinforcing ways of thinking, feeling, and modes of behavior; as well as discouraging, damning or even making unthinkable alternative ways. Man is entangled in a web of meanings which he himself has spun (Cf. Mead, 1963; Geertz, 1964; Becker, 1968). (This may, in part, explain why the social order is perceived by most people not only as a reified order, but also as a sacred order). Thus, the conceptual universe of ethnocentrism is created and maintained largely by ’semantic magic’. "The same symbolism that enhances sentimental bonds between kinsmen, and symbolically defined groups outside of biological relationships (clan, tribe, state, nation, ideology), bring in their wake its antithesis: extra-group aggressional tendencies" (Holloway, 1968). He suggested that one of the prime functions of the development of symbolization was social control. Fearing (1950) hypothesized that "communication, as a human activity involving the production and utilization of significant symbols, is always a part of the process through which the field is cognitively structured and operates to increase or decrease group tensions", and Hansen (1980) argued that linguistic communication evolved because it facilitated cooperation for intergroup competition. In this context it is appropriate to recall that hostility, enmity, and especially cruelty presuppose elaborate, highly evolved abstract symbolization as well as complex information processing, storage and recall facilities, or, in short: good long-term memory. [I]t is precisely what are widely thought to be the most unusually highly evolved biological characteristics of Homo sapiens, our cognitive and symbolic skills, which offer the readiest facilitation to violence and aggression. The same zest for analytical skill and strong commitment to group norms, which is the essence of science, is at the root of the successful construction of the social and ideological boundaries which are the effective prerequisite to large-scale persistent aggressive interaction. In effect this statement denies that the decisive stimulus for aggression/violence is at the lower-end of the evolutionary scale, for example at the gonadal level. Rather, it locates it at the higher end, for example at the cortical. This is not unreasonable because it means that the evolutionary adaptations which distinguish us most prominently as a species are also those which were and are most centrally involved in the basic processes of our survival (Tiger, 1990).



Leakey (1967) suggested that it was the humanization of Man and especially the development of speech in the last quarter million years or so of human evolution, that turned man against man. The characteristically human aspect of aggression, says Leakey, is that it is organized and premeditated. This requires abstract speech. Here, as van den Berghe (1974) points out, Leakey unwisely restricts the definition of aggression. Of course, it takes speech to plan military campaigns and execute them; but the scope of human aggression is far wider and the origin far more ancient than the more complexly organized forms of it, such as warfare. Surely, mute hominids were perfectly capable of bashing each other over the head. 6.1.5

Fear Susceptibility

From his protohominid past early Man must have inherited a great susceptibility to fear, which must have been amplified by his primordial intellectual and symbolizing capacities. His growing self-consciousness must have been accompanied by a great deal of anguish. Not only real dangers such as natural catastrophes, famines, diseases, and predators became more terrifying as he gradually came to realize their consequences, but internally generated, fantasized, imaginary fears began to haunt his overloaded brain as well. These fears include fear of revenge of killed animals and slaughtered enemies, fear of the spirits or ghosts of the dead, fear of malevolent demons or deities, fear of black magic, the evil eye, witchcraft, fear of the gods or other supernatural forces, fear, in short, of the nightmarish figments of his own imagination; but also more realistic fears: Fear of the stranger and the potential danger the stranger incorporates, the unknown, fear of death and dying, fear of anything that could demolish the vulnerable identity and the so painfully acquired social cosmology. The magical-animistic universe of primitive Man may, at least in part, be understood as a protective device against the ubiquitous fears and anxieties generated by a hostile world. Hebb & Thompson (1968) hypothesized that development of a higher level of intelligence (phylogenetically as well as ontogenetically) would mean an increased vulnerability to emotional disturbance. The evidence of the phylogenetic development of fear susceptibilities is particularly convincing. First, in most primitive societies it is clear that man has generally found himself ringed around by malignant ghosts and devils, with beneficent spirits in the minority, and has found it constantly necessary to spend time, effort and wealth to propitiate even the friendly ones. Fellow members of the tribe commonly possess evil powers; and the one who has the evil eye is feared and hated, or killed according to circumstances. For any one of the members to be



greatly different from the others in appearance, habits, skills or tastes would be more than apt to cost him his life. As for an outsider, even of the same race, language and culture - any foreigner is distrusted and feared. These are well-established facts of human behavior, and not rare exceptions either. However, if they are cited, and if one cites also the concentration and slave-labor camps of our own generation, to show that man is to be thought of as a wild animal, emotionally unstable and often vicious, the answer will be that these things may happen if people are taught as children to behave in these ways, but that fear, hatred and cruelty are not inherent in man’s nature. If so, one might wonder at the coincidences that allowed the same teaching to originate in so many parts of the globe (Hebb & Thompson, 1968).

6.2 Ethnocentrism The concept proposed to unify the observations made above is ’ethnocentrism’. Ethnocentrism is considered to be a schismatic in-group/out-group differentiation, in which internal cohesion, relative peace, solidarity, loyalty and devotion to the in-group, and the glorification of the sociocentric-sacred (the own cosmology, ideology, social myth, or Weltanschauung; the own ’godgiven’ social order) is correlated with a state of hostility or permanent quasi-war (status hostilis) toward out-groups, which are often perceived as inferior, subhuman, and/or the incorporation of evil. Ethnocentrism results in a dualistic, Manichaean morality which evaluates violence within the in-group as negative, and violence against the out-group as positive, even desirable and heroic. This is, admittedly, a rather extreme definition. The usual dictionary definition of ethnocentrism is "the tendency to regard one’s own group and culture as intrinsically superior to all others" (Webster’s Dictionary). Superiority of the own group and culture, however, (psycho)logically implies inferiority of other groups and cultures. And viewing other groups/cultures as inferior empirically appears to imply some degree (however small) of contempt, stereotyping, discrimination and dehumanization of, and at least a modicum of hostility toward, members of those other groups/cultures. Ethnocentrism and its canonical variants (tribalism, nationalism, patriotism, parochialism, jingoism, etc.) also appears to be intimately connected with xenophobia, a complex attitude system-cum-sentiment structure involving dislike, distrust, aversion, revulsion, fear and antagonism vis-à-vis strangers/foreigners/aliens and everything the stranger/foreigner/alien represents. The phenomena of 'moralistic' aggression (Anstoßnehmen, conspecific mob-



bing, ostracism, prosocial aggression, disciplinary aggression, conformityenforcement behavior, aggression towards deviants), xenophobic aggression (fear and enmity aroused by strangers), in-group/out-group differentiation, collective intolerance, ethnocentrism and intergroup violence - all these phenomena appear to show similarities and overlap to such a degree that in these paragraphs they will be considered together as one complex and composite syndrome. Two forms of the ethnocentric syndrome must probably be distinguished: (1) A belligerent, megalomaniac, superiority-delusional form (Chosen People complex), and (2) a relatively peaceful, self-conceited, isolationist form (e.g., the true Hellenes in relation to the 'Barbaroi'; the Han Chinese vis-à-vis the peripheral 'ymán' peoples). Hardin (1972) introduced the related concept of tribalism: "Any group of people that perceives itself as a distinct group, and which is so perceived by the outside world, may be called a tribe. The group might be a race, as ordinarily defined, but it need not be; it can just as well be a religious sect, a political group, or an occupational group. The essential characteristic of a tribe is that it should follow a double standard of morality - one kind of behavior for in-group relations, another for out-group". It is one of the unfortunate and inescapable characteristics of tribalism that it eventually evokes counter-tribalism, it 'polarizes' society (E.O. Wilson, 1975). There are two prevailing views of the fundamental nature of ethnicity. One emphasizes the ascriptive, or primordial, nature of ethnic group membership and the importance of kinship, early socialization, and strong emotional ties. The other insists that ethnicity is situationally defined, that ethnic group boundaries are malleable and permeable, and that ethnicity may be acquired or divested at will (Richmond, 1987). This has been called the instrumentalist position. Van den Berghe (1981) has attempted to show that the primordialistinstrumentalist controversy is based on a simple-minded antinomy, and that the two views complement rather than contradict each other.

6.3 Ethnocentrism: Brief History of the Concept 'Ethnocentrism' is a major theme in both biological and cultural theories of the causes of primitive war. Furthermore, it is a relatively old one. Though the term 'ethnocentrism' was to be coined a few decades later, the concept was by no means unknown among 19th century anthropologists such as Tylor (1871): The slaying of a man is scarcely held by the law of any people to be



of itself a crime, but on the contrary it has been regarded as an allowable or praiseworthy act under certain conditions, especially in self-defence, war, revenge, punishment and sacrifice. Yet, no known tribe, however low and ferocious, has ever held that men may kill another indiscriminately, for even the savage society of the desert or the jungle would collapse under such lawlessness. Thus all men acknowledge some law of "thou shalt not kill", but the question is how this law applies... The old state of things is well illustrated in the Latin word hostis, which, meaning originally stranger, passed quite naturally into the sense of enemy. Not only is slaying an enemy in open war looked on as righteous, but ancient law operates on the doctrine that slaying one’s own tribesman and slaying a foreigner are crimes of quite different order, while killing a slave is but a destruction of property (Tylor, 1871). Thus Tylor viewed ethnocentrism (as well as the obligations of the blood feud) as making sense within a framework of primitive concepts of law and justice. Also Darwin (1871) had noticed that early humans and contemporary primitive peoples as a rule confined their sympathy to the own tribe and generally did not regard violence against other tribes as a crime. He clearly saw the correlation between intergroup competition and intragroup cooperation, which is the core of the ethnocentrism syndrome, in human evolution. In his Cours de la philosophie positive (1830-42) Comte dismissed the notion of a peaceful golden age at the dawn of history. On the contrary, perennial and savage warfare forced, according to his rather gloomy view, social solidarity as a defense against enemy groups. Also Spencer (1850) thought that war had fostered ’social cohesion’ in ’conquering races’. Bagehot (1872), whose Physics and Politics heavily influenced Darwin’s thinking on hominid/human evolution (Crook, 1994), had observed that the most obedient, the ’tamest’ and the most compact (meaning approximately the same as Spencer’s ’social cohesion’) tribes had been the strongest in the early stages of human evolution: "The compact tribes win, and the compact tribes are the tamest. Civilisation begins, because the beginning of civilisation is a military advantage". In his Der Rassenkampf, Gumplowicz (1883) claimed to have found the genesis of society in the primal conflicts of primitive hordes bonded together by intense feelings of kinship and instinctive pugnacity against rival hordes and aliens. In 1892-1893, after half a century of work, Spencer completed his vast system of philosophy with two volumes on The Principles of Ethics. In his studies of evolution he had hoped to find a code which placed human conduct on a scientific footing. Instead, he discovered that evolution, as seen to work in human communities, spoke with two voices, each enunciating a separate code.



He called the one the ’Code of Amity’, and the other the ’Code of Enmity’: Rude tribes and... civilized societies... have had continually to carry on an external self-defence and internal co-operation - external antagonism and internal friendship. Hence their members have acquired two different sets of sentiments and ideas, adjusted to these two kinds of activity... A life of constant external enmity generates a code in which aggression, conquest and revenge, are inculcated, while peaceful occupations are reprobated. Conversely a life of settled internal amity generates a code inculcating the virtues conducing to a harmonious co-operation: justice, honesty, veracity, regard for each other’s claims (Spencer, 1892). Sumner (1906; 1911), who coined the term ’ethnocentrism’ for this dual code of conduct (See also Kulischer, 1885), heavily implicated ethnocentrism, and its collateral xenophobia, in the evolution of warfare. In his Folkways, Sumner (1906), echoing Spencer and Bagehot, writes: "The exigencies of war with outsiders are what make peace inside, lest internal discord should weaken the in-group for war. The exigencies also make government and law in the ingroup, in order to prevent quarrels and enforce discipline. Thus war and peace have reacted on each other, and developed each other, one within the group, the other in the inter-group relations. The closer the neighbors, the stronger they are, the intenser the warfare, and then the intenser is the internal organization and discipline of each". Subsequently, Sumner (1911) elaborated his concept of ethnocentrism as follows: Each group must regard every other as a possible enemy on account of the antagonism of interests, and so it views every other group with suspicion and distrust, although actual hostilities occur only on specific occasions. Every member of another group is a stranger; he may be admitted as a guest, in which case rights and security are granted him, but, if not so admitted, he is an enemy. We can now see why the sentiments of peace and cooperation inside are complementary to sentiments of hostility outside. It is because any group, in order to be strong against an outside enemy, must be well disciplined, harmonious, and peaceful inside; in other words, because discord inside would cause defeat in battle with another group. Therefore the same conditions which made men warlike against outsiders made them yield to the control of chiefs, submit to discipline, obey law, cultivate peace, and create institutions inside. The notion of rights grows up in the ingroup from the usages established there securing peace. There was a double education, at the same time, out of the same facts and relations. It is no paradox at all to say



that peace makes war and that war makes peace. There are two codes of morals and two sets of mores, one for comrades inside and the other for strangers outside, and they arise from the same interests. Against outsiders it was meritorious to kill, plunder, practice blood revenge, and to steal women and slaves, but inside none of these things could be allowed because they would produce discord and weakness. Hence, in the ingroup, law (under the forms of custom and taboo) and institutions had to take the place of force. Every group was a peace group inside, and the peace was sanctioned by the ghosts of the ancestors who had handed down the customs and taboos. Against outsiders religion sanctioned and encouraged war, for the ghosts of the ancestors, or the gods, would rejoice to see their posterity and worshippers once more defeat, slay, plunder, and enslave the ancient enemy... The sentiment of cohesion, internal comradeship, and devotion to the ingroup, which carries with it a sense of superiority to any outgroup and readiness to defend the interest of the ingroup against the outgroup is technically known as ethnocentrism. It is really the sentiment of patriotism in all its philosophic fullness, that is, both in its rationality and in its extravagant exaggeration... Perhaps ninetenths of all the names given by savage tribes to themselves mean ’men’, ’the only men’, or ’men of men’; that is, ’We are men, the rest are something else’... Religion has always intensified ethnocentrism; the adherents of a religion always think themselves the chosen people, or else they think that their god is superior to all others, which amounts to the same thing (Sumner, 1911). In his Folkways, Sumner (1906) had already emphasized this superioritydelusional aspect of ethnocentrism, which he regarded as universal, in describing it as "this view of things in which one’s own group is the center of everything, and all others are scaled and rated with reference to it... Each group nourishes its own pride and vanity, boasts itself superior, exalts its own divinities, and looks with contempt on outsiders. Each group thinks its own folkways the only right ones, and if it observes that other groups have other folkways, these excite its scorn". Though Sumner’s thesis, as Shaw & Wong (1989) observed, imposed a rather reductionistic and mechanistic interpretation on the relationship between 1 ethnocentrism and war proneness , it has been widely adopted (e.g., Murdock [1949]: "[I]ntergroup antagonism is the inevitable concomitant and counterpart 1

It should be noted that the causal arrow in most explanations is from ethnocentrism to intergroup interactions of a more or less antagonistic nature. This cause-effect relationship is not sacrosanct of course. Silverman (1987) has argued that ethnocentrism may be a consequence rather than a cause of intergroup strife. I think some kind of circular causality is most adequate.



of in-group solidarity"), supported by a substantial body of evidence (vide 2 infra), and widely debated since its inception . The herd psychologists and instinctivists of the fin de siècle period also acquitted themselves well in the evolution and ethnocentrism debate. McDougall (1908) developed Darwin’s theme that social solidarity and altruism arose from the need to organize for war. As group combat superseded individual fighting in early human history, he contended, success came to depend more and more upon the capacity of individuals for "united action, good comradeship, personal trustworthiness", and especially the ability "to subordinate their impulsive tendencies and egotistic promptings to the end of the group". According to Patrick (1915), ’man the fighting animal’ had evolved out of conditions of incessant conflict between races, with the continuous extermination of the unfit. Survival in this perpetual struggle had been the product of order and mutual aid within groups, but with fear, hatred, and the rule of might prevailing between groups. Read (1920) contended that hominids and early humans formed hunting packs that were predisposed to be aggressive toward all outsiders. "Wars strengthened the internal sympathies and loyalties of the pack or tribe and its external antipathies, and extended the range and influence of the more virile and capable tribes". Far from being the uncritical devotee of the ’Noble Savage’ myth as he is often represented, Kropotkin (1902) argued that the life of ’savages’ was split between two sets of actions and ethics, that applying within the group, and that applying to outsiders: "Therefore, when it comes to a war the most revolting cruelties may be considered as so many claims upon the admiration of the tribe. This double conception of morality passes through the whole evolution of mankind, and maintains itself until now" (quoted in Crook, 1994). The next author, after Sumner, to elaborate the theme of ethnocentrism in relation to primitive warfare was Davie (1929), who sketches a truly Hobbesian 2

E.g., Krehbiel, 1916; Pillsbury, 1919; Hayes, 1926; Murdock, 1931; Mühlmann, 1940, 1962; Keith, 1946, 1948; Mintz, 1951; Sullivan & Adelson, 1954; Huxley, 1959; Ardrey, 1961; Lorenz, 1963; Campbell & LeVine, 1968; Holloway, 1968; Bigelow, 1969; Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1970 et seq.; Monod, 1971; Tiger & Fox, 1971; LeVine & Campbell, 1972; Barclay et al., 1976; Brewer & Campbell, 1976; Lynn, 1976; Meyer, 1977 et seq.; Alexander & Borgia, 1978; Alexander, 1979 et seq.; Brewer, 1979; Boyd & Richerson, 1980, 1985; Lanternari, 1980; van den Berghe, 1981; Abruzzi, 1982; Baer & McEachron, 1982; Banton, 1983; Campbell, 1983; Corning, 1983; Patterson, 1983; G. Johnson, 1986; Dunbar, 1987; H. Flohr, 1987; Ike, 1987; Irwin, 1987; Melotti, 1987; Tönnesmann, 1987; van der Dennen, 1987; Vine, 1987; Shaw & Wong, 1989; A. Flohr, 1994; and many others. Catton (1961) presents a theory of the functions and dysfunctions of ethnocentrism, and Reynolds' (1966) theory of "Open Groups in Hominid Evolution" implies that ethnocentrism and xenophobia came into existence only at the stage when man became sedentary and autodomesticated.



picture of the ’savage’ world, pointing out that the relation of primitive groups to one another, where agreements or special conditions have not modified it, is one of isolation, suspicion, hostility and war; a status hostilis, if not a regular status belli. Yet within the tribe the common interest against every other tribe compels its members to unite for self-preservation. "Thus a distinction arises between one’s own tribe - the ’in-group’ - and other tribes - the ’out-group’; and between the members of the first peace and cooperation are essential, whereas their inbred sentiment toward all outsiders is one of hatred and hostility. These two relations are correlative". Thus Davie did not add much to Sumner’s arguments in terms of theoretical sophistication. He did, however, summarize the then available ethnological evidence from Africa (Steere, 1872; Dundas, 1913; Macdonald, 1893; Tate, 1904; Torday & Joyce, 1906; Weeks, 1909-10; Stannus, 1910; Tremearne, 1912), Australia (Curr, 1886; Basedow, 1913; Radcliffe-Brown, 1913), North America (Cremony, 1868; McGee, 1898; Nelson, 1899), South America (Im Thurn, 1883; Markham, 1895), New Guinea (Lawes, 1879; Krieger, 1899), Borneo (Bock, 1881), Celebes (Letourneau, 1881), Melanesia (White, 1884), Bismarck Archipelago (von Pfeil, 1898), and the Naga Hills of India (GodwinAusten, 1872). In the accounts of contemporary anthropologists, the theme or Leitmotif of ethnocentrism, whether implicit or explicit, is clearly recognizable (e.g., Rappaport, 1968; Koch, 1974; Huber, 1975; Chagnon, 1977; Herdt, 1981; Paula Brown, 1982; Knauft, 1983; among many others). Such a state of affairs has resulted in the isolation of many primitive peoples, their ignorance of one another, and the great variation in their mores (Davie, 1929), and languages (Bigelow, 1972). There are, for example, more than 700 mutually unintelligible languages in New Guinea today, and American Indians spoke several thousand different languages a few centuries ago. As Bigelow (1972) suggests: "When they cannot understand one another beyond the level of smiles and grunts and blatant gestures, people rarely achieve deep cultural bonds and common loyalties. It is therefore most unlikely that a sense of belonging and of mutual concern could have been extended through the whole of mankind during prehistoric times or that it could have persisted for several million years. The evolution of linguistic capacities, therefore, would have served to reinforce territorial and other segregating forces during prehistoric times. And greater linguistic abilities would have simultaneously increased the social cohesion within each separate group. Conceptual and emotional differences between ’us’ and ’them’ would have been accentuated". Tiger & Fox (1971) similarly hypothesized that the evolution of linguistic capacities would have served to reinforce segregating forces during prehistoric times, while simultaneously increasing social cohesion within each separate group.



6.4 Ethnocentrism and Nationalism Ethnocentrism is not a monopoly of primitive peoples. It is also a common theme, in the guise of nationalism, in the history of civilization (See e.g., Boehm, 1935; Rosenblatt, 1964; Snyder, 1964; Fuller, 1972; Le Nationalisme, 1972; LeVine & Campbell, 1972; Russell, 1975; van der Dennen, 1979; Gellner, 1983; Loewenberg, 1985; Volkan, Julius & Montville, 1990; Pfaff, 3 1993; A.Flohr, 1994; Ignatieff, 1994; A.D. Smith, 1994) . Nationalism and ethnocentrism are similar in the sense that usually they both involve positive attitudes toward an in-group and negative attitudes toward some or all out-groups. They do not overlap completely, however. Nationalism, more often than ethnocentrism, involves loyalty to a politically distinct entity, membership in an elaborately organized and relatively populous social grouping, adherence to a formalized ideology, and performance of relatively stereotyped allegiance-expressing behavior (Rosenblatt, 1964). Bauer (1907) defined a nation as a community shaped by shared experiences. The nation is a Schicksalsgemeinschaft - a community of fate (see also Loewenberg, 1985). This is, psychologically, a much more sensible conception of the nation than the formal definitions of the political scientists. The cognitive approach to nationalism, as exemplified by Gellner (1983) and Hobsbawm (1972, 1990), regards it as a historical phenomenon concomitant with the rise and decline of the nation-state. Thus Hobsbawm (1972) argued that nationalism is a historical phenomenon, the product of the fairly recent past, and unlikely to persist indefinitely. Nationalism, he predicts, "will decline with the decline of the nation-state" (Hobsbawm, 1990). This approach would deny any primordial, individual human propensity to one form of ethnocentrism or another. The rational choice, marginal utility, and transactional theories of ethnic and nationalist identification do not, however, take into consideration the often irrational, passionate animosities, equally passionate loyalties, strong affective attachments to sacred symbols and myths, threat perceptions, and other emotional aspects involved. All too often in 3

The literature on nationalism is an enormous ocean in which one soon drowns. I do not pretend, therefore, to even try to be complete with these references. Many authors on nationalism (being historians and sociologists mordicus against selection thinking) would probably deny that nationalism has anything to do with ethnocentrism. More realistic is the following quotation from Tullberg & Tullberg (1997): "Some scholars date the emergence of nationalism some 600 years ago, but most see it as a post-French Revolution phenomenon (e.g., Connor, 1994). However, why did something as strong and profound as nationalism emerge so late? If it is so primitive, how can the trigger mechanisms be so loosely connected to recognition markers? These questions resolve themselves if nationalism is not regarded as such a new and separate phenomenon (as most political scientists seem to regard it). Instead, it can be seen as a variant of ethnocentrism, somewhat different from more regional affiliations that may now be less appropriate vehicles for group egoism".



human affairs passion overrides reason, and ethnophobias turn into hatred, hostility, and violence (Loewenberg, 1994; Richmond, 1987). As Falger (1991, 1994) reasoned, the view of nationalism as a recent historical phenomenon is valid only for those who are insensitive to its underlying ultimate dimension. The association of nationalism with the nation-state is indeed relatively recent, but it is only one phenotypic expression of the deep in-group/out-group structure inherited from human prehistory. See also A.D. Smith (1971 et seq.), Lynn (1976), Barash & Lipton (1985) and Pfaff (1993). In the view of LeVine & Campbell (1972), nationalism represents an advance over earlier forms of ethnocentrism in the sense that it obtains the more intense and broad responsiveness of a large population to the state leadership. In a recent perceptive contribution to the problem of (ethnic) nationalism (Ignatieff, 1994), he notes that nationalism is everywhere characterized by a deeply insincere and unauthentic rhetoric functioning as an excuse for excesses and atrocities. Everywhere historical truth is the ’first casualty’. Wilson & Daly (1985) and Daly & Wilson (1987) noted the preponderance of young males in all kinds of criminal violence. They called it the "Young Male Syndrome". Ignatieff noticed that most nationalist violence, too, is committed by a small minority of young males (some of whom may be psychopathic; most, however, are perfectly sane). Apparently not everyone abhors or fears violence. Presumably, it is deeply pleasurable and satisfactory for young armed males to have the power of life and death over other people; to fanatically assert themselves at the cost of others and to escape from insignificance; to rebel against and disrupt the deeply resented order of the state; to massively rape; to psychologically and morally and phylogenetically regress (see Bailey, 4 1987, for the theory of phylogenetic regression) . Wrangham & Peterson (1996) note that the underlying psychology is no different for urban gangs, motorcycle gangs, criminal organizations, American football teams, pre-state warrior societies, and contemporary armies: "Demonic males gather in small, self-perpetuating, self-aggrandizing bands. They sight or invent an enemy ’over there’ - across the ridge, on the other side of the boundary, on the other side of a linguistic or social or political or ethnic or racial divide. The nature of the divide hardly seems to matter. What matters is the opportunity to engage in the vast and compelling drama of belonging to the gang, identifying the enemy, going on the patrol, participating in the attack" 4

Phylogenetic regression may be viewed as a form of hierarchic disintegration where neocortically mediated sociocultural functions give way to lower, more urgent and powerful functions in the paleomammalian and reptilian brain structures. MacLean’s (1973 et seq.) theory of the triune brain hierarchy implies momentary phylogenetic regressions and progressions as the focus of brain activity fluctuates between lower and higher functions in ongoing behavior. As Bailey sees it, the brain works as a dynamic cerebral system of regression-progression processes and MacLean’s three-brains-in-one gives meaning to the sheer complexity of it all. Phylogenetic regression is premised on the idea (1) that considerable phylogenetic continuity exists for many human morphological and behavioral traits, and (2) that regression is inherently pleasurable.



(italics added). The special blend of militant nationalism, pugnacious patriotism, and expansionist imperialism is called jingoism. In his The Psychology of Jingoism, Hobson (1901) attributed it to man’s ’ancient savage nature’ lurking somewhere in ’sub-conscious depths’, under the superstructure or thin veneer of civilization. He spoke of the "animal hate, vindictiveness, and bloodthirstiness" that lurked in the mildest-mannered patriot. Also Inge (1915) traced the ’perverted patriotism’ that according to him caused war to "the inborn pugnacity of the bête humaine". These are by now familiar variants of Plato’s ’Beast Within’. Marshall (1898), also writing in the fin de siècle instinct psychology tradition, included among his ’tribal instincts of a higher type’, the patriotic instinct, which was aroused by aggressive threats from neighboring nations, or by opportunity for tribal aggrandizement. He explained the self-sacrificial behavior of warriors in terms of biological sacrifice, a form of extreme altruism that paid off in ’tribal advantage’ (Crook, 1994), anticipating kin selection theory by more than half a century. Sir Arthur Keith (1919) discovered ’somehow’ (as Shafer [1972] condescendingly put it) that the feeling of nationality arose out of the ’tribal instinct’, fostered on ’nature’s cradles’ among early men. Nature had, he divined, separated "mankind into herds and tribes and kept them isolated and pure for an endless period... by real and most effective barriers in the human heart" (Keith, 1919, p.33). ’Nationalism’, according to A.D. Smith (1994), signifies both an ideological doctrine and a wider symbolic universe and fund of sentiments. The ideology holds that the world consists of separate, identifiable nations, each with its peculiar character; that the nation is the sole legitimate source of political power; that every individual must belong and owe supreme loyalty to one and only one nation; and that nations must be autonomous, preferably in states of their own, for only then can global freedom and peace be assured. To this ’core doctrine’, nationalists add their own secondary elaborations, themes and motifs that express the peculiar history and character of each nation, be they German Romantic notions of linguistic purity, or Russian theories of a nationalreligious mission in Pan-Slavism, or African ideas of Negritude (see Kedourie, 1960; A.D. Smith, 1973, 1983). But there is also a wider ’culture of nationalism’ which underpins the political doctrine and its variations: First, the recurrent central motifs or ideals of autonomy, unity and identity; and second, the panoply of symbols and rituals associated with the drama of the nation. The key motifs continually reappear in the writings and actions of nationalists everywhere, though in varying degrees, The nation, we are told, must have its own character, it must be distinctive, we must ’think our own thoughts’ as Herder put it, be ’authentic’ and ’individual’ in



a national sense. The nation must, for that reason, be ’free’, in the special sense of being autonomous, of operating according to the ’inward laws’ of an abstract community, without any external constraint. These ’inward laws’ or ’rhythms’ express the seamless unity of a community of citizens who share a common pattern of values and beliefs and are animated by a single will. Fraternity, the familial equality and integration of the nation’s members, is as much a social ideal as a territorial and legal expression; as in David’s great painting of the single, dynamic compact of the three brothers in The Oathe of the Horatii, the union of citizens in a political community is founded upon a myth of fictive descent and heroic destiny (Berlin, 1976; Barnard, 1965; Rosenblum, 1967). From these key motifs spring the whole gamut of symbols that express the culture and evoke the salvation drama of the nation. In the nation’s flags and anthems, its memorials and monuments, its parades and ceremonies, its coins and insignia, its capitals and assemblies, its arts and crafts, and its music and dance are distilled the pride and hope of a ’community of history and destiny’ which seeks to shape events and mould itself in the image of its ideals. To this end, the modern nation of fraternal citizens must always return to the idealizations of its past, to its myths of ethnic origin, descent and development, and above all, to the ’golden ages’ that guide its path and endow it with a confidence to face the unknown, and to the heroes whose virtues inspire public emulation and exalted faith. For as Durkheim (1915) reminded us: "There can be no society which does not feel the need of upholding and reaffirming at regular intervals the collective sentiments and the collective ideas which make its unity and its personality" (quoted in A.D. Smith, 1994).



6.5 The Adaptive Significance of Xenophobia There is an analogy, according to Rosenblatt (1964), between immunological reactions of the body and the ethnocentric reactions of the individual or of a society. Just as the body is better prepared to avoid destruction by foreign substances as a result of a generalized tendency to resist the impingement of foreign substances, so an individual or a society may be better prepared to avoid destruction by aliens as a result of a generalized tendency to distrust, avoid, or reject apparently foreign individuals. The disadvantage of severe damage or destruction, whether likely to occur or not, is so much greater than whatever advantages contact with things alien confers on one, that a psychological or biochemical paranoia is the preferred strategy for survival. Where one failure to anticipate the malevolence of an alien person or substance may be fatal, organisms that must acquire defensive reactions to each specific harmful person or substance are less likely to survive during a given period of time than organisms prepared to be defensive against all alien persons or substances (Rosenblatt, 1964) Also Barash & Lipton (1985) postulated an adaptive significance of (mildly) paranoid thinking. In situations of strong intergroup competition, they explain, the payoff for vigilance, suspiciousness, and aggression could be substantial. He who takes responsibility for the consequences of his aggression, and feels guilty or remorseful, would be far less successful than his colleague who murders without a second thought. In a fiercely competitive situation, both natural and cultural selection operate in favor of the individual who competes without internal conflict and self-doubt (In addition, the paranoid feels no internal conflict whatsoever, and might therefore be more successful as a leader, provided, of course, that his delusions are not especially flagrant.) Another reason for paranoid thinking is that self-deception can be adaptive when it gratifies self-esteem, and transfers responsibility for behavior from oneself to others. Accordingly, biological evolution can account for the development of mental mechanisms such as projection and denial, which prevent cognitive dissonance, even at the cost of self-deception. All too often nationalism and patriotism become intolerant chauvinism and militaristic jingoism. Barash & Lipton’s thesis is that because of our biological ancestry, given certain historical and cultural factors - notably conditions of stress or trauma - the policies and practices of nations may come to be dominated by paranoid attitudes, which in turn result in self-perpetuating cycles of aggression, hostility, and war (Cf. Mead, 1968). Similarly, Shaw & Wong (1989) contend, mechanisms which prompted



appropriate behavior on the first encounter with potentially dangerous predators/strangers would be favored through selection over alternate mechanisms where behavior required experience with strangers. Indeed, the costs of not suspecting strangers, and being wrong, would have been so high that natural selection would not likely have left defensive behaviors to an openminded experimental strategy alone. Flohr (1987) makes a similar point with respect to nonhuman animals. Cognitive appraisals of threats would not have been limited to imminent danger but to any special circumstances that might have upset the status quo. As Thomson (1979) and Fromm (1973) point out, objects of our fear and anxiety need not be causal antecedent conditions. Rather, they can be anticipated events which might or might not happen. "Thus, the evolution of weapons which could be thrown, combined with selection for increased intelligence in human predation, might well have produced ’free-floating’ anxiety states or paranoia toward any potential predators, including other nucleus ethnic groups, clans, tribes, and so on. A genetically coded aversion toward strangers would have enabled individuals to avoid attack more readily or immediately than would learning alone, and by avoiding injury and death, survival would be enhanced, leaving more offspring from these individuals. Over time, those with the genetically coded aversion toward strangers would come to prevail in the population" (Shaw & Wong, 1989). In their fictional reconstruction of the social world of Homo erectus, Lumsden & Wilson (1983) imply that warfare (in the broadest sense) already existed at this stage of human evolution. "Some of the men will organize long-distance marches to hunt big game. Their parties will move with growing circumspection as they approach a distant stream that runs to the sea. There lie the territorial boundaries of strangers. During vicious raids those aliens have killed members of the band, and a few have fallen in turn. Although they look the same (and are in fact Homo erectus), these creature seem wicked and not truly human. They are almost as little known as the unseen forces patrolling the night. If they could be destroyed or driven away, the entire band would experience indescribable relief and joy". The element of ethnocentric/xenophobic fear is clearly discernible here. Indeed, as Lumsden & Wilson observe: "Better to have a generalized fear of the dark and to shrink thrilled and apprehensive from the unknown than to take time to learn and deal with each menace in turn". MacDonald (1992) has probably explained the rationale underlying the paranoid stance most clearly: From an evolutionary perspective, he says, it would appear to be adaptive to exaggerate negative stereotypes about a genetically segregated group, or accept negative information based on minimal evidence, or to develop a generalized negative belief about an out-group which is based on the behavior of only a small minority of the out-group. Such a perspective can be seen to conform to a simple cost/benefit analysis: Members of Group A benefit by erring on the side of preventing the error of rejecting a



negative proposition regarding members of group non-A, when it could be true. In the language of statistics, people are proposed to behave as if attempting to minimize the probability of a Type II error: If the hypothesis is "Members of Group A are disloyal", people appear to be greatly concerned about making the error of rejecting this proposition when in fact it could be true. They place less emphasis on making a Type I error, which is the probability of accepting the proposition "Members of Group A are disloyal" when in fact they are loyal. The cost/benefit reasoning is that making a Type II error could be extremely costly, while making a Type I error costs little or nothing. The general principle here is that if one knows that at least some members of a group are deceivers, but does not know exactly which ones, the best policy it to assume that all are deceivers if this policy has no negative consequences. Such a strategy also makes good evolutionary sense for the explanation of the overperception of threat. An organism contemplating sine ira et studio every new situation arising in its immediate environment probably would not survive its first encounter with a predator. To be overcautious, overperceptive of threat or oversensitive to even minor signs of danger carries with it high costs in terms of vigilance (time/energy budget), sheltering, hiding, fleeing, etc., but these costs are insignificant compared to the costs of making the error of being not cautious enough. Such an error is fatal and final. An evolutionary strategy of being overcautious - jumping to conclusions given the slightest indication of danger - thus pays off in terms of survival and reproductive success, and may therefore be expected to be selected for (On the other hand, it may be argued that humans evolved as Tit-for-Tat strategists; i.e., cooperate on the first move, and subsequently reciprocate in kind). A similar reasoning may apply to the advantage of the superiority-delusional aspect of the ethnocentrism syndrome. A study of Yuman warfare by Dobyns et al. (1957) concludes with the following general hypothesis: "We suggest that this basic postulate of moral superiority is a functional prerequisite for any tribal society plagued with hostile neighbors. Without such a basic postulate, and the expression of cultural themes to reinforce it constantly, members of a tribal society probably could not resist conquest". According to Koestler (1967) the built-in schizophysiology of the human triune brain (e.g., MacLean, 1990) provides a physiological basis for "the paranoid streak running through human history". Xenophobia is a widespread trait throughout the animal kingdom, according to Southwick et al. (1974), but it is by no means universal. It has been shown experimentally in various species of social insects, especially bees and ants (Chauvin, 1968; Wallis, 1970; E.O. Wilson, 1971; 1975), but it evidently does not occur among other aggregational insects. Among vertebrates, xenophobic aggression has been demonstrated experimentally in a great number of species, especially those with prominent territorial and/or relatively closed social



groups, which are organized on a hierarchical basis (Lorenz, 1931; Alverdes, 1935; Carpenter, 1942; Collias, 1944; Holloway, 1974; Southwick et al., 1974; E.O. Wilson, 1971, 1975; See van der Dennen, 1987 for a review). The introduction of unfamiliar conspecifics to such groups (e.g., rodents, many monkey species) may release massive attacks and even killing from the resident animals. As we have seen (Ch. 3), primate social units appear, in general, to be intolerant to close proximity of extra-group conspecifics. Moreover, Goodall (e.g., 1986) documented discrimination of, and even attack on, a group member deformed and paralyzed by poliomyelitis (who was probably perceived as a fear-inspiring stranger due to his ’odd’ behavior). On the other hand, xenophobic behavior has not been observed, nor would it be expected to occur, in most typical encounters of vertebrates with relatively open societies. It is important to point out, according to Southwick et al. (1974), that xenophobic aggression is not the same as territorial aggression or aggression related to dominance hierarchies. In both territorial and hierarchical behavior, aggression is often directed toward socially familiar animals. The territorial animal may interact aggressively most often with his nearest neighbor, and the socially-ranked animal may interact most often with his nearest-ranked peer. The essence of xenophobia is an aggressive response toward a complete social stranger. This may occur, of course, in either territorial or socially ranked animals, so there is considerable overlap in these behaviors, but there are also significant differences. Territorialism and hierarchical behavior are very often maintained by display, whereas xenophobic aggression frequently involves lethal violence. When it occurs in natural settings, xenophobia is a functional and adaptive trait in that it maintains the integrity of the social group. It ensures that group members will be socially familiar. It limits the flow of individuals between groups, and can therefore affect patterns of both social and genetic evolution. Xenophobia has apparently evolved in those species and populations where discrete, bounded social groups are adaptively favored (Southwick et al., 1974). Also Hebb & Thompson (1968) cite the evidence in favor of the mammal’s xenophobia; the fear of and hostility towards strangers, even when no injury has ever been received from a stranger. The enmity aroused by conspecifics which are different (in anatomy, in coloration, in behavior, in language use) or by strangers, may easily lead toward discrimination, ostracism and cruelty in animals as well as man. Children too will attack another child who is perceived as being an outsider (McNeil, 1965). In observing young children in her own nursery school during the 1920s and 30s Susan Isaacs (1933) found extreme hostility toward newcomers. Adults, as well as children, often ’test out’ newcomers or strangers by violent behavior (Gerson, 1968). Aggressive behavior may also serve the newcomer as a means of winning his way into the



group (Bridges, 1931; Jersild, 1947). Markl (1976) deduced the following general rule from observations such as these: Species with highly cooperative social behavior within the group are particularly apt to be very aggressive towards conspecifics that are not members of their group. Dubos (1973) has suggested that mistrust and fear of the foreigner or the stranger may have biological origins. A similar but even broader idea is suggested by Bolles (1970): "What keeps animals alive in the world is that they have very effective innate defensive reactions which occur when they encounter any kind of new or sudden stimulus. These defensive reactions vary somewhat from species to species, but they generally take one of three forms: animals generally run or fly away, freeze (thanatosis, catatonia), or adopt some type of threat... The animal which survives is the one which comes into the environment with defensive reactions already a prominent part of its repertoire" (Cf. Archer, 1976). McGuire (1969) discussed the possible genetic transmission of xenophobia: "[I]t appears possible for specific attitudes of hostility to be transmitted genetically in such a way that hostility is directed toward strangers of one’s own species to a greater extent than toward familiars of one’s own species or toward members of other species. It would not be impossible for xenophobia to be a partially innate attitude in the human". Vine (1987) argued for a genetically primed, generalized, weakly xenophobic and suspicious tendency as a defense against being deceived. This is a mild version of the paranoia thesis. Holloway (1974) would submit that at least for adult humans, xenophobic responses are normative unless there has been strong cultural training and conditioning against it. Clannishness, or strong intragroup affiliation coupled with distantiation of other ethnic, religious, racial, or political groups, is an enforcing mechanism for continued xenophobias. The demagogue knows this fact only too well. Trivers (1971) speculated that ’moralistic aggression’ - an urge to attack someone who is acting unjustly or unfairly - evolved in humans as indispensable protection against excessive failure to reciprocate altruistic acts. ’Moralistic aggression’ seems to be readily mobilized against individuals believed to be deviating from basic group norms and symbolic allegiances; that is, it can help enforce collective intolerance. Hebb (1946) and Hebb & Thompson (1968) argued that fear or dislike of the stranger is not innate, since it depends on certain prior experiences, yet it still does not have to be taught. "If, therefore, man is not born with a dislike for those who differ from him in habits or appearance, he can still pick up the dislike with no help or encouragement" (Hebb & Thompson, 1968). Also Hamilton (1975) and Alexander (1979) argue that social interactions of



an individual with his close relatives can provide all of the experiential background necessary to produce xenophobia. We tend to react negatively to countenances which are uncommunicative, and which convey contradictory or paradoxical messages. "If, for whatever reason, the countenance of a stranger is noncommunicative or confusing in its messages - the response of an individual to it, which would be termed xenophobia, could very well be entirely a consequence of previous learning experiences involving countenances familiar to the reacting individual" (Alexander, 1979). It is possible that morphological differences alone can make different countenances more or less communicative, so that differences between individuals belonging to different populations could lead to xenophobic reactions solely on the basis of conditioning that occurred within each population. It is not clear whether the transient phenomenon of the fear of strangers in infants - which predictably develops between 6 and 9 months of age - has any impact on adult xenophobia (See Allport, 1954; Freedman, 1961 et seq.; Bowlby, 1969, 1973; Ainsworth, 1973; Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1973, 1979, 1982, 1984; Morgan & Ricciuti, 1973; Gouin Décarie, 1974; Argyle & Cook, 1976; Sroufe, 1977; R.A. Russell, 1979; P.K. Smith, 1979; Feinman, 1980; Firrari, 1981; Markl, 1982; R.Flohr, 1987; Konner, 1990; Maxwell, 1990; A.Flohr, 1994). This infantile fear of strangers is also reported in other social species (e.g., canids), and its development does not depend upon aversive experience with strangers. Furthermore, it also develops in congenitally deaf and blind children (e.g., Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1982). Although the expression of these predispositions varies, Emmert (1984) and Shaw & Wong (1989) conclude, it seems that initial distrust of social strangers is universal among humans and nonhuman primates. Also R.Flohr (1987) concludes that xenophobia seems to be universal, i.e., it seems to occur in all cultures. This is no proof, he states, but strong evidence in favor of a biological basis of xenophobia (Cf. Dickstein, 1979; Gerard, 1979; Neumann, 1979; Markl, 1982; A.Flohr, 1994). The biological basis concerns, of course, the tendency towards xenophobic prejudices, not their specific content. Peck (1990) has shown through formal models that mechanisms of outsider exclusion can be favored by evolution, thereby enhancing altruism within the group (Warnecke, Masters & Kempter, 1992).



6.5.1The Function of Enemies and the Need to Have Enemies Studies of conflict in settings ranging from small-scale primitive societies to international disputes suggest a fundamental need to have enemies. For the psychological functions of the enemy and Feindbilder see: Meerloo, 1940 et seq.; Newcomb, 1947; Gladstone, 1959; Finlay, Holsti & Fagen, 1967; Horn, 1970 et seq.; Senghaas, 1972; Fornari, 1974; Stein, 1976; Mitchell, 1980; Wecke & de la Haye, 1980; Hartmann, 1982; Volkan, 1985, 1988; Herdt, 1986; Ross, 1986; Barnes et al., 1987; Volkan et al., 1990. Having an enemy provides many pragmatic advantages. It provides a clear Manichaean structuring of the world; it simplifies the social cosmology. It provides an affirmation of one’s own moral superiority, and, by implication, the moral inferiority - even to the point of dehumanization and/or diabolization - of the enemy. Moreover, it provides the opportunities for gratification of the satisfactions inherent in all kinds of ego-defense mechanisms, especially those of projection and scapegoating. "And there is the red-blooded satisfaction of being able to hate and to prepare to kill and destroy without feeling qualms of conscience" (Gladstone, 1959). Furthermore, when ’the enemy’ is a member of the out-group in a social conflict, one of the major pay-offs is the increased sense of purpose and personal identity that participation with others (the in-group) in a conflict can bring. Often, the act of transforming a category of individuals into a collectivity, and then an organization consciously sharing goals, policy and purposeful behaviors, brings a tremendous increase in positive self-evaluation, and sense of belonging to a worthwhile cause and solidarity with a worthy grouping (a very rewarding sensation). In the case of the ’lunatic fringe’ members of such ’hate-monger’ groups as e.g., the Ku Klux Klan, a grandiose pseudo-personality is provided for those who would otherwise be insignificant social ’non-entities’ or peripheral psychotics. Apart from increasing an individual’s sense of identity with a larger social entity, engaging in a conflict can also result in the release of a considerable amount of personal tension, fear and frustration in a legitimate manner. Categories and concepts, generalizations and unifications, enable us to create order out of chaos. At the same time, however, these are necessarily simplifications of reality, and may easily lead to stereotypes and prejudices. One of the latter is the enemy image, which may be partly based on real experience, but virtually always has an aspect of prejudice. Enemy images have several functions in relation to individual and collective processes. Wecke & de la Haye (1980; see also: Finlay, Holsti & Fagen, 1967) distinguish the following functions: Order and stability: The determination and clear demarcation of friend and foe is a necessary precondition of interstate (intertribal, intergroup) and intrastate



(intratribal, intragroup) order and stability. It is not necessary for the enemy to be real; he may be totally imaginary. Projection: Direct and complementary projection, and the ’mote-beam mechanism’ (Allport, 1958) increase the group’s self-esteem, while at the same time attributing to the enemy evil intentions creates a redirection potential for hostility and aggressiveness. Because the enemy is by definition the perfect ’outsider’, all violence directed at the enemy is positively sanctioned. Solidarity: Internal or external scapegoats can be effective means to increase internal solidarity. Perception of a dangerous, threatening enemy produces fear in the population, which can be exploited and manipulated in many ways. Justification: The enemy must be criminal, inhuman and immoral, if our own threat and destruction potential is to be human and moral. Enemy image thinking has its own (psycho)logic: If we are good, the enemy must be evil; if we are moral creatures, the enemy must be immoral; if we are virtuous, the enemy must be lascivious and vile; if we are human, the enemy must be less than human (See e.g. Osgood, 1960; Rokeach, 1960; Harary, 1961; Jaspers et al., 1965). Enemy images are not easily susceptible to change, among other things because they lead to the institutionalization of selective perception. Only that, whatever, confirms the threat and the evil intentions of the enemy is perceived. Contradictory information does not pass this perceptual filter.

6.6 Theories of Ethnocentrism Several theories have been proposed to explain the phenomenon of ethnocentrism. LeVine & Campbell (1972), whose work on the subject is a classic, listed the following: Realistic group conflict theory; evolutionary theories; reference group theory; sociopsychological theories (including a.o. group narcissism theory, projection theory, protest masculinity theory, and frustration-aggression-displacement theory which has been discussed more fully in Ch. 5); cognitive congruity theories; transfer theory; and reinforcement theory. The most relevant of these theories will be briefly discussed.



6.6.1 Realistic Group Conflict Theory This theory assumes that group conflicts are rational in the sense that groups do have incompatible goals and are in competition for scarce resources (Sumner, 1906; Davie, 1929; White, 1949; 1959; Sherif et al., 1953; 1961; Coser, 1956; Bernard, 1957; Newcomb, 1960; and Boulding, 1962; among others). Such ’realistic’ sources of group conflict are contrasted with the psychological theories that consider intergroup conflicts as displacements or projective expressions of problems that are essentially intragroup or intraindividual in origin. "Real threat causes in-group solidarity" is the most recurrent explicit proposition of the theory. A parallel mechanism is the rejection of deviants and vengeance against renegades, apostates, revisionists, and heretics as a solidarity-promoting mechanism. Leaders may also seek out an enemy or create a fictitious one just to preserve or achieve in-group solidarity. This is certainly one of the most ubiquitous observations in the literature. Evolutionary theories of ethnocentrism - which will be presented in more detail later on - comprise a subset of realistic-group-conflict theory. 6.6.2 Sociopsychological Theories 6.6.2.1 Group Narcissism In Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921), Freud regarded ethnocentrism as a form of narcissism at the group level. Later, in Civilization and Its Discontents (1930), he stated explicitly that the social function of group narcissism lay in its facilitating the displacement of aggression from in-group to out-group: "It is clearly not easy for men to give up the satisfaction of this inclination to aggression. They do not feel comfortable without it. The advantage which a comparatively small cultural group offers of allowing this instinct an outlet in the form of hostility against intruders is not to be despised. It is always possible to bind together a considerable number of people in love, so long as there are other people left over to receive the manifestations of their aggressiveness". Ethnocentrism may also be interpreted as redirected expression of individual narcissism, providing individual group members with narcissistic gratification (e.g., MacCrone, 1937; Alexander, 1941; Fromm, 1964; Kohut, 1973). "In the setting of history, thwarted narcissistic aspirations, hurts to one’s pride, injuries to one’s prestige needs, interferences with conscious, preconscious, or unconscious fantasies concerning one’s greatness, power, and specialness, or concerning the greatness, power, and specialness of the group that one identifies with are important motivations for group behavior" (Kohut, 1973). A further narcissistic aspect of tribalism and nationalism is that the idealized people or nation supplies grandeur to those who feel personally inadequate and



flawed: "The last refuge of a scoundrel" as Samuel Johnson aptly remarked. The various human pseudospecies also exploit what Freud called the "narcissism of minor differences" to exaggerate their own distinctiveness and, by implication, their superiority. All too often the behavior of national governments or group leaders provides ammunition to those who revel in these differences, especially when they permit the luxury of dehumanization. "The easiest way to persuade ourselves that someone else deserves to die is to convince ourselves that he or she isn’t quite human. It is an old trick - define someone as different, and killing becomes merely exterminating a pest rather than murdering a fellow human being" (Barash & Lipton, 1985). Frank (1985) has convincingly argued that being a low-ranking member of a group (as the majority of members must be) is such a strain that compensation is needed, or else the person will withdraw from the group if possible. One way to compensate for low rank is to emphasize group narcissism and superiority versus the out-group (not infrequently placed outside humanity). E.O.Wilson (1979) makes the generalization that the poorer the in-group, the more group narcissism is generated as compensation. 6.6.2.2 Projection Perhaps no concept has been more consistently applied to group stereotypes by psychoanalytic observers than that of projection, that is, the attribution to others of unacceptable impulses within one’s self (Ackerman & Jahoda, 1950; Bettelheim & Janowitz, 1950; Horn, 1970 et seq.; among many others). Taken in its most extreme form this approach argues that stereotypes of outgroups are simply fantasies wholly derived from the unconscious needs of ingroup members with no correspondence to the objective attributes of outgroups. "Identity formation", Erikson (1964) argued, "involves a continuous conflict with powerful negative identity elements: what we know or fear or are told we are but try not to be or not to see; and what we consequently see in exaggeration in others. In times of aggravated crises all this can arouse in man a murderous hate of all kinds of ’otherness’ in strangers and in himself". Pseudospeciation may, therefore be understood - at least in part - as an expression of one group’s projection of its demonology and displacement of its self-generated aggression onto another. In brief, undesirable characteristics will turn up attributed to an out-group (projection) which will then serve as a rationalization for violence against the out-group (aggression displacement) (Erikson, 1964; T.Smith, 1976). Loewenberg (1994) expressed the ambivalence within us and the projection of the bad internal objects thus: "The good is what is me and mine - my family, village, clan, and people. The bad is outside - the others, them, the aliens, foreigners, the strangers. The strangers are uncanny because they contain parts of the self which are unacceptable, asocial, dirty, foul, lascivious, murderous and cruel. Therefore these parts are projected onto outsiders and strangers".



Elkin (1938) described how Australian Aboriginal tribes attributed ’evil’ practices to other tribes, an attribution increasing with distance. "Thus the cannibals and the savage treacherous natives are always those of the next tribe or the next but one, though when the investigator visits and studies them, he finds them quite as peaceable ans courteous as those he just left, but now it is the latter who are credited with savage attributes". 6.6.2.3 Compensatory or Protest Masculinity Bacon, Child & Barry (1963) present the basic position succinctly, in their discussion of the sex role identification of males as especially pertinent to the development of violent behavior. "It is assumed that the very young boy tends to identify with his mother rather than his father because of his almost exclusive contact with his mother. Later in his development he becomes aware of expectations that he behave in a masculine way and as a result his behavior tends to be marked by a compulsive masculinity which is really a defense against feminine identification". The authors identify a particular pattern of child training factors which tends to produce in the child persistent attitudes of rivalry, distrust and hostility which would probably continue into adult life (Cf. Whiting et al., 1958; Whiting, 1965; Burton & Whiting, 1961). The protest masculinity hypothesis may have even broader application to the phenomena of intergroup conflict. LeVine & Campbell (1972) speculate "that it is protest masculinity, with its heightened group narcissism, its hypersensitive, proud, prestige-conscious belligerence, that lies behind the ethnocentrism syndrome in its most extreme and irrational forms, not only in fighting gangs and feuding warriors but in the contemporary nationalistic leadership of competing states". 6.6.3 LeVine & Campbell’s Conclusion LeVine & Campbell (1972; to which I have added Rosenblatt (1964), Eldridge (1979), and other sources) present a number of propositions on conflict, ethnocentrism and nationalism which seem to be to a large extent empirically substantiated: (1) To the extent that the group is perceived as a source of defense, nationalism and ethnocentrism increase in time of competition or threat (Pillsbury, 1919; Hayes, 1926; Murdock, 1931; Williams, 1947; Alexander, 1951; Coser, 1956; Berkowitz, 1962). However, when the group is obviously powerless to defend itself against threat, nationalism or ethnocentrism is unlikely to increase. (2) Sensing the advantage of ethnocentrism or nationalism for themselves and for the group, militarily, administratively, and otherwise, group leaders frequently act to increase group ethnocentrism and nationalism, often through opportunistic exploitation of fear or hate of some out-group.



(3) The greater the difference between groups, summing across dimensions of similarity, the greater the contempt one groups has for another. The propensity of any two groups to fight increases as the differences between them (in language, religion, race and culture style) increase (Richardson, 1960; Wilkinson, 1980). (4) Frustrations may produce increased ethnocentric or nationalistic hostility (Freud, 1922; Lasswell, 1935; Dollard et al., 1939; Williams, 1947; Bettelheim & Janowitz, 1950; Grodzins, 1956; McNeil, 1959; Buss, 1961; Campbell & LeVine, 1961; Berkowitz, 1962; Yates, 1962). (5) Nationalism and ethnocentrism make it easier for one to cheat, to fight, or to kill an outsider (Cooley, 1902; Krehbiel, 1916; Lasswell, 1927; Davie, 1929; Murdock, 1931; Katz, 1940; Bernard, 1944; Gilbert, 1950; Coser, 1956; Green, 1956; Goffman, 1959). Nationalism and ethnocentrism increase one’s motivation to fight to defend the group (Murdock, 1931; Coser, 1956). (6) There is considerable evidence that group cohesiveness and intergroup hostility both cause and affect each other. The technical term for such a relationship is bidirectionality. In everyday usage, this means that intergroup conflict can stimulate group solidarity. As group solidarity increases, ethnocentric sentiments tend to emerge, promoting intergroup hostilities (Deutsch, 1973). This ’spiral effect’ can and usually does result in aggressive conflict (Eldridge, 1979). (7) All in-groups, as judged by the average member, hold most out-groups at some degree of social distance, even if not that all in-groups hold all outgroups at some social distance (Bogardus, 1959; LeVine & Campbell, 1972). (8) "[M]ost societies condemn killing as a means of attaining power within society, but all societies encourage killing of enemies in that struggle for power which is called war" (Morgenthau, 1948). After their extensive review of the theoretical and empirical literature, LeVine & Campbell (1972) conclude: "Thus recent anthropological studies have produced a number of cases that are not consistent with the assumption that the ethnocentrism syndrome, as Sumner described it, is universal". Yet, if perhaps not universal, ethnocentrism and its canonical variants (nationalism, parochialism, patriotism, tribalism, etc.) may still be easily appealed to, and easily surfacing, with the proviso that "the altruistic willingness for selfsacrificial death in group causes may be more significant than the tendency for covetous hostility toward outgroup members" (LeVine & Campbell, 1972). But, if ethnocentrism and political boundedness is advantageous for ethnic survival and has been selectively propagated through evolutionary mechanisms operating over a long period of time, LeVine & Campbell wonder, how is it that ethnocentrism and sharp political boundaries are not universal among human social systems? Many North American Indian peoples, for example, were characterized by the absence of any real political organization above the



band level and the absence of any feeling of tribal unity (e.g., Kroeber, 1925; Newcomb, 1961). How could ethnocentrism remain an evolutionary tendency for so long without becoming an accomplished fact? LeVine & Campbell provide two answers. The first is that environmental pressures for survival were not the same everywhere. When a group can survive without creating sharp boundaries, it might not only find no need to create them but may even turn the flexibility of unbounded organization into an adaptive asset. The variety of physiographical environments in which human beings live and the varieties of economies that have survived to the present makes it inevitable that some ecological niches would exist in which environmental pressures were not operating toward boundedness, or were operating too weakly to achieve sharp boundaries. If a group can survive at a stable level of efficiency and is protected by geography from direct competition with better coordinated, bounded groups, then its evolution toward sharp political boundaries could be very slow or nonexistent, and this was true in many isolated areas of low population density. The second answer is that ethnocentrism destroys boundaries as well as creates them, and sometimes empires disintegrate under external attack and revolt from within without being fully replaced by stable political units.

6.7 Social Identity Theory and Group Animosity Tajfel (1970 et seq.) argues that in-group/out-group distinction is necessarily based on belonging. To relate self to group the individual uses categorization, identity, comparison and psychological distinctiveness. It is the awareness of the existence of categories which generates the in-group response, not necessarily past hostility nor objective conflict. Tajfel provides experimental support for the hypothesis that an individual will discriminate against a member of an out-group even when (a) there is no conflict of interest; (b) there is no past history of intergroup hostility; and (c) the individual does not benefit personally from this behavior. Mere (random) categorization is sufficient to produce intergroup discrimination and prejudice (Cf. Allport, 1954; Tajfel et al., 1971; Doise et al., 1972; Kahn & Ryen, 1972; Billig, 1973, 1976; Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Doise & Sinclair, 1973; Ehrlich, 1973; Tajfel & Billig, 1974; Allen & Wilder, 1975; Brewer & Silver, 1978; Doise, 1978; Turner, 1978; Austin & Worchel, 1979; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Anderson, 1980; Locksley, Ortiz & Hepburn, 1980; Milner, 1981; Tajfel, 1981 et seq.; Turner, 1981 et seq.; Turner & Giles, 1981; Rabbie, 1982, 1992; R.Brown, 1985; Horowitz, 1985; Hogg & Abrams, 1987, 1993; Tönnesmann, 1987; Vine, 1987; Abrams & Hogg, 1993; Triandis, 1990; MacDonald, 1992, 1996). Social identity theory - which was largely developed after the appearance of



LeVine & Campbell’s classic opus - proposes that individuals engage in a process in which they place themselves and others in social categories. There are several important consequences of this process: (1) The social categorization process results in discontinuities such that individuals exaggerate the similarities of individuals within each category (the accentuation effect). By this mechanism, continuous distributions are reconceptualized as sharply discontinuous, and the effect is particularly strong if the dimension is of importance to the categorizer. In the case of intergroup conflict, the dimensions are in fact likely to be imbued with great subjective importance. The shared characteristics of the out-group as perceived by the in-group are likely to be negative, while the shared characteristics of the in-group as perceived by the in-group are likely to be positive. Moreover, the individual also places himself/herself into one of the categories (an in-group), with the result that similarities between self and in-group are exaggerated and dissimilarities with out-group members are exaggerated. An important result of this self-categorization process is that individuals adopt behavior and beliefs congruent with the stereotype of the in-group (MacDonald, 1992). (2) Social identity research indicates that the stereotypic behavior and attitudes of the in-group are positively valued, while out-group behavior and attitudes are negatively valued. Individuals develop favorable attitudes toward in-group members and unfavorable attitudes toward out-group members. The in-group develops a positive distinctness, a positive social identity and increased selfesteem as a result of this process. Within the group there is a great deal of cohesiveness, positive affective regard, and camaraderie, while relationships outside the group can be hostile and distrustful. Furthermore, people very easily adopt negative stereotypes about out-groups and these stereotypes possess a great deal of inertia (i.e., they are slow to change and are resistant to countervailing examples). Resistance to change is especially robust if the category is one which is highly important to the positive evaluation of the in-group or the negative evaluation of the out-group. Stereotypes are learned at a very early age, even before a child has much awareness or explicit knowledge of the other group. Finally, the stereotypes tend to become more negative and hostile in situations where there is actual intergroup competition and tension. Social identity theorists propose that it is the need for high self-esteem which drives the entire process (MacDonald, 1992, 1996). Also Horowitz (1985) posits the quest for the affirmation of ’personal worth’ as a central motive of human behavior: "[S]elf-esteem is in large measure a function of the esteem accorded to groups of which one is a member". Hence, "the sources of ethnic conflict reside, above all, in the struggle for relative group worth". This threat to group (and hence personal) worth was, he argues,



a real and sufficient motive for mass involvement in ethnic conflict. Legitimacy gives ethnic claims to pre-eminence or exclusive domination a moral basis. This moral justification is most often (and effectively) based on prior occupation or ’indigenousness’, but it may also be rooted in a belief that the group has some special mission to perform in the territory, a leading role in the independence movement, and so on. The contest for group legitimacy, for political inclusion and exclusion, merges with the quest for group worth to form "a politics of ethnic entitlement". For Horowitz, this is the engine of mass ethnic conflict. He also understands ethnicity to be a form of "greatly extended kinship". The particular fierceness, bitterness and cruelty of ethnic conflicts can be understood, at least in part, through the relatedness of familial and ethnic consciousness: "If group members are potential kinsmen, a threat to any member of the group may be seen in somewhat the same light as a threat to the family" (Horowitz, 1985), to which Meyer (1987) added: "[P]rior investments into offspring within a genetic population will make common defence against non-members very economical and very likely". (3) The result of these categorization processes is group behavior which involves discrimination against the out-group; beliefs in the superiority of the in-group and inferiority of the out-group; and positive affective preference for the in-group and negative affect directed toward the out-group. Although groups may be originally dichotomized on only one dimension, there is a tendency to expand the number of dimensions in which the individuals in the groups are categorized and do so in an evaluative manner. Besides categorization on specific negatively evaluated traits, social identity theorists have noted that the stereotyping process can also result in scapegoating (i.e., the explanation of complex events as resulting from the behavior of the out-group). Another common correlate is the process of dehumanizing the out-group. These tendencies toward in-group cohesiveness and devaluations of the out-group are exacerbated by real conflicts of interest. There is evidence that where there are proportionate differences in group size, individuals from minority groups are generally more prone to ingroup bias than are majority group members (Mullen, 1991; MacDonald, 1996). The empirical results of social identity research are highly compatible with an evolutionary basis for ethnocentric group behavior. Vine (1987) notes that the available evidence supports the universality of the tendency to view one’s own group as superior. "Its cross-cultural ubiquity in human social life provides a prima facie reason for hypothesising that at least some of its facets reflect gemetically rooted features of our species-specific nature". Roberts (1990) argued that ethnocentrism is easily learned and unlearned only with difficulty a condition we would expect of an evolutionary based trait. Also Kellas (1991) states: "The universal presence of ethnocentrism gives some support to the



argument that it is genetically determined". A.Flohr (1994) similarly concludes her extensive review that there is a biological disposition toward ethnocentrism. Lopreato (1984) and Irwin (1987) provide some compelling arguments why humans are genetically predisposed to ethnocentrism (Cf. also Wuketits, 1993). Tullberg & Tullberg (1997) argue that if ethnocentrism (they use the term ’group egoism’) "is a product of natural selection, it follows that it has been rational in the sense that is has increased individual survival and reproduction... Several writers consider ethnocentrism irrational (e.g., Connor, 1994), in that it is ultimately not tied to real interests, even if ethnocentric proponents refer to such interests. We disagree with this view and think that group egoism is consistent with a crude rationality and therefore ethnocentrism also has a rational foundation". Current evidence indicates that the mimimal group findings can be generalized across subjects of different ages, nationalities, social classes, and a wide range of dependent variables (Bourhis, 1994), and anthropological evidence indicates the universality of the tendency to view one’s own group as superior (Vine, 1987; MacDonald, 1996). In addition to the suggestion of universality, an evolutionary interpretation of these findings is supported by results indicating that these social identity processes also occur among advanced animal species such as chimpanzees. Social identity processes also occur very early in life, prior to explicit knowledge about the out-group. Moreover, the powerful affective component of social identity processes is very difficult to explain except as an aspect of the evolved machinery of the human mind. As Hogg & Abrams (1987) note, this result cannot be explained in terms of purely cognitive processes, and a learning theory seems hopelessly ad hoc and gratuitous. The tendency for humans to place themselves in social categories and for these categories to assume immense affective, evaluative overtones is the best candidate for the biological underpinning of ethnocentrism (MacDonald, 1992, 1996; Shaw & Wong, 1989). Finally, the fact that social identity processes and tendencies toward collectivism increase during times of resource competition and threat to the group (see Hogg & Abrams, 1987; Triandis, 1990, 1991) is highly compatible with the supposition that these processes involve facultative mechanisms triggered by between-group conflict (MacDonald, 1996). As emphasized by evolutionists such as Alexander (1979) and G.Johnson (1995), external threat tends to reduce internal divisions and maximize perceptions of common interest among group members. Also the social dominance theory developed by Sidanius (Sidanius, 1993; Sidanius & Pratto, 1993) argues that the many forms of group-based oppression, plus the culturally shared justifications for them (e.g., religions) are as pervasive as they are because they have been of survival value for the human



group throughout its evolutionary history. Within the framework of social identity theory, there is clearly no requirement that the beliefs regarding the in-group or the out-group be true. Bigelow (1969) notes that "each group requires something intimate, unique to itself, around which its members can cohere. Irrational beliefs serve this purpose far better than rational ones; they are not only easier to produce, but also less likely to be confused with enemy beliefs. Irrational fantasies produce a continuous supply of ’group uniforms’, promoting and maintaining internal cohesion within each group, and segregation between groups". Also Tiger (1969) suggested that "males bond in terms of either a pre-existent object of aggression or a concocted one". As Krebs, Denton & Higgins (1988) note, evolution is only concerned with ensuring accuracy of beliefs and attitudes when the truth is in the interests of those having those beliefs and attitudes. Natural selection in man, as Monod (1971) suggested, may well have favored group conformism and automatic respect for tribal law rather than individual initiative. The more effectively a belief - whatever its objective validity - could facilitate self-confidence and cohesiveness in a people (and thereby subserve each individual’s ’indirectly selfish’ goal of group-preservation), the less likely they would be to tolerate challenges to that belief. They would be more likely to feel impelled by their gods or sacred cause to impose their ’truth’ on unbelievers, even by force of arms. Therefore, Lorenz’s (1967) assertion that natural selection would have established as a psychological predisposition in Man a "phylogenetically programmed love for traditional custom", seems eminently plausible.

6.8 Dynamics of In-group/Out-group Differentiation Newcomb (1947), Senghaas (1971, 1972), and Scherer, Abeles & Fisher (1975) suggest that the separation of ethnic, racial, or social groups fosters hostility by blocking off communication. Without interaction, it is impossible for people to discover that they are basically similar to each other in their values, beliefs, concerns, and experiences. In addition, without communication between people or groups, it is easy for autistic spirals of hostility to develop. Especially, Newcomb (1947) pointed out the vicious circle by which an individual or a group once ready for hostile responses gradually reduces the channels of communication with the potential enemy, thus preventing rectification of the early impression of hostility and redress by friendly actions. Hostile isolation or autistic hostility is likely to make hostile tension more enduring. Indeed, numerous studies of interracial contact show that equal-status contact reduces prejudice and intergroup hostilities (Allport, 1954). However, when



people are separated, they tend to exaggerate differences, and this increases their hostility and the probability of conflict. In a series of experiments (Rabbie & Wilkens, 1971; Rabbie & de Brey, 1971; Rabbie et al., 1974; Rabbie & Huygen, 1974; Rabbie & Visser, 1976), it was found that subjects classified into two distinct groups and expecting to work with each other showed a significant bias in favor of their own group. As could be expected, cooperative processes during the actual intragroup interaction invariably increased the intergroup bias (Homans, 1950; Deutsch, 1973). The increased bias, moreover, could be attributed to an enhancement of the ingroup evaluation rather than to a devaluation of the out-group. Other studies have obtained similar results (Wilson & Miller, 1961; Dion, 1973; Reyen & Kahn, 1975; Worchel, Lind & Kaufman, 1975; Stephenson, Skinner & Brotherton, 1976). The expectation of intergroup competition per se does not appear to produce greater solidarity than the expectation of intergroup cooperation (Rabbie & Wilkens, 1971; Rabbie & de Brey, 1971; Rabbie et al., 1974; Rabbie & Visser, 1976). In-group cohesion is not necessarily accompanied by out-group hostility. This result calls into question that group goal incompatibility per se is sufficient to generate negative attitudes toward other groups unless the intergroup conflict is quite intense. The findings by Rabbie & Bekkers (1976; 1978) suggest that under some conditions threatened leaders are more likely to engage in intergroup conflict and to be more hostile toward other groups than leaders who feel more certain in their tenure of power. The dynamics involved in these experimental studies of in-group/out-group differentiation can be summarized as follows: Within the groups the members close ranks; there is an increase in group cohesiveness and solidarity; the one group is considered to be superior to the other group; each group becomes more hierarchically organized; there is a greater willingness to accept centralized leadership; deviating opinions are barely tolerated; the group demands more loyalty and conformity from its members. Between the groups negative stereotypes tend to develop; communication between the groups decreases preventing the correction of negative stereotypes; during intergroup negotiations, members pay more attention to points of disagreement than they do to agreement; distrust and hostility towards the other group rises, sometimes erupting into open aggression; tactics and strategy for winning are emphasized at the expense of concern about the merits of the problem to be negotiated (Rabbie, 1982; Janis, 1971, 1972). Realistic conflict does not always involve an opposition of material and objective interests, as is sometimes suggested. Sherif & Sherif (1966), for example, make it clear that groups may compete about both material and nonmaterial interests; "the issues at stake may relate to values and goals shared by group members, a real or imagined threat to the safety of the group, an



economic interest, a political advantage, a military consideration, prestige, or a number of others". Mutually incompatible goals between groups are themselves considered to be sufficient condition for the rise of hostile attitudes and deeds toward another group. Simmel (1904) held that conflict sets boundaries between groups within a social system by strengthening group consciousness and awareness of separateness, thus establishing the identity of groups within the system. Coser (1956) noted that Simmel did not explicitly distinguish between feelings of hostility and the actual acting out of these feelings; and he rephrased Simmel’s proposition as follows: Conflict serves to establish and maintain the identity and boundary lines of societies and groups. Conflict with other groups contributes to the establishment and reaffirmation of the identity of the group and maintains its boundaries against the surrounding social world. Patterned enmities and reciprocal antagonisms conserve social divisions and systems of stratification. Simmel may be said to advance a ’safety-valve theory’ of conflict. Conflict serves as an outlet for the release of hostilities which, were no such outlet provided, would sunder the relation between the antagonists. The German ethnologist Schurtz (1902) coined the word Ventilsitten for those mores and institutions in primitive societies that provide institutionalized outlets for hostilities and drives which are ordinarily suppressed by the group. Orgiastic feasts in which ordinary rules of sexual behavior and avoidance can safely be infringed is a convenient example. Such outlets, as Vierkandt (1928) pointed out, serve as a kind of river bed for repressed drives and thus preserve the rest of social life from their destructive impact. Hallowell (1940) and Kluckhohn (1944), for example, describe witchcraft, malevolent magic, and sorcery as institutions permitting covert and indirect displacement of hostility onto substitute objects. According to the Simmel-Coser theory of conflict, external threat would be expected to increase internal cohesion. Illustrative anthropological studies generally tend to support the external conflict/internal cohesion hypothesis. There are also many observational as well as experimental studies of individual behavior in situations of stress, disaster and/or extreme threat, such as wartime, and most such studies find increased cohesion present in some way. Not only during wartime, but in times of general threat as well, ethnocentrism and nationalism increase. It is generally felt that ethnocentrism and nationalism promote group cohesion and integration (see van der Dennen, 1987 for references). And reversely, some studies have shown that more cohesive groups express more hostility (e.g., Pepitone & Reichling, 1955; Lott & Lott, 1965).



Schopler et al. (1993) hypothesized that the discontinuity effect (i.e., the tendency for intergroup interactions to be more competitive than interindividual interactions) is mediated by a fear of the out-group’s competitiveness and, when this fear is less salient, by a greedy desire to exploit the out-group’s expected cooperativeness. Risk taking tends to be greater in groups than in individuals because no one person must (or can) take responsibility for the outcome. And contrary to the widespread belief that ’tough’ leadership makes would-be aggressors back down, there is convincing evidence to show that the likelihood of war increases when leaders are willing to accept a high level of risk (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita, 1981 et seq.; Vasquez, 1993). Moreover, the greater the outside threat, the greater the tendency to put up a united front, to suppress personal doubts, and foster an illusion of unanimity. In addition, high-level leaders tend to surround themselves with ’yes men’, people who agree with them and who rarely present contrary views. Leaders become victims of ’groupthink’: "Groupthink refers to a deterioration of mental efficiency, reality testing, and moral judgment that results from in-group pressures" (Janis, 1972). In addition, Janis emphasizes that groupthink "is likely to result in irrational and dehumanizing actions directed against outgroups". Like social identity processes, tendencies toward collectivism are exacerbated in times of external threat, again suggesting that the tendency to collectivism is a facultative response that evolved as a mechanism of intergroup conflict. According to MacDonald (1992, 1996), the existence of such a mechanism implies that the group has been the vehicle of selection, in Wilson & Sober’s (1994) terms. In times of threat, group and individual interests increasingly coincide (see also Barkow, 1989). On the other hand, Tullberg & Tullberg (1997) emphasize that there is no assumption of group selection in their group egoism concept, but since the original human groups consisted of close kin, kin selection may well have been a stepping stone in the evolution of human group egoism (see ' 6.10.3). Sherif and his coworkers (Sherif, 1956 et seq.; Sherif & Sherif, 1953; 1966; Sherif et al., 1961) have been particularly interested in the experimental production and reduction of friction, conflict and negative stereotypes between groups. All the field experiments verify the hypothesis that "conflict between two groups tends to produce an increase in solidarity within the groups". In the first experiment, the introduction of a common enemy (another competing group) was successful in reducing conflict between the original two groups. This set of studies substantiate the point that the external threat that increased internal cohesion must involve an achievable superordinate goal (Stein, 1976). One of the few attempts to replicate the Sherif experiments was that of Diab (1970). This experiment had some frightening consequences for the subjects as



well as for the researcher who had to be hospitalized for exhaustion after the experiment was abruptly terminated. He had been too successful in arousing intergroup hostility. The conflict got completely out of hand; some boys knifed each other and the police had to evacuate the camp to prevent further violence (Rabbie, 1982). Some of the intricate dynamics of the process of in-group/out-group antagonism, escalating into downright ’warfare’, may be grasped from the accounts of McNeil (1961), living with a group of 70 "aggressive, anti-social, anti-adult boys" in a therapeutic summer camp. At once, the boys began a pattern of militant probing of one another in their individual and group relations seeking to establish a basis for dominance and submission. The camp’s aggressive pecking order was established through a number of interpersonal devices which resemble those used by primitive communities as well as civilized states to establish their position in the world: Saber rattling, recounting past glories, the role call of allies, and deterrence by attack. See van der Dennen (1987) and Flohr (1987) for a review of scapegoating, ostracism, rejection of deviants and dissenters, discrimination, conspecific mobbing, and moralistic aggression in the context of within-group dynamics, as well as the role of anonymity, deindividuation, obedience, compliance, conformity, dehumanization and suspension of personal responsibility on the facilitation of atrocities and other extreme violence when people act as part of a group.

6.9 The Logic of Ethnocentrism: The Duality of the Human Mind The particular logic of ethnocentrism, its Manichaean duality which dichotomizes the world into A and non-A, self and other, in-group and outgroup, us and them, friend and foe, seems to spring from the cognitive capacity of Man to juxtapose, classify, categorize, distinguish, differentiate, dichotomize and discriminate, but also his ability to abstract, generalize and detect common determinators in things highly diverse. In this section I shall examine the cognitive aspects of the ethnocentrism syndrome, i.e., information processing and its distortions and biases, the mental representation of the social world, and the evolutionary algorithms underlying decision processes based on these cognitive maps. The concept of ’social construction of reality’ (Berger & Luckmann, 1969), contemplated in extremis, inevitably leads to the conclusion that reality is nothing but a collective delusion, a shared folie à tous. And, indeed, such a position could be defended. But in this context it is only necessary to remember the Thomas theorem: Whatever people define as real will be real in its



consequences. Which in plain language means that when people believe in their racial superiority, rampant and rabid racism is not far around the corner (to mention only one example from recent history). The human tendency to think in binary categories or oppositions has often been noted, ever since Boole in his Laws of Thought (1854) made a strong case for its inevitability (Cf. Lévi-Strauss, 1966; Lorenz, 1973; E.O. Wilson, 1978; Douglas, 1981; Lorenz & Wuketits, 1983; Flohr, 1987; Konner, 1990). It is part of our phylogenetic substrate of basic problem-solving strategies and cognitive heuristics; it is, in fact, the most basic analytical tool available. It is already evident in the animal that can successfully distinguish between predator and non-predator. Perhaps it is, in origin, as simple as the distinction between ego and non-ego, self and other, the 'I-in-here' against 'the-rest-of-theworld-out-there'. The world view of many peoples seems to be made up of a number of binary opposites or antinomies (self/other; order/chaos; safety/danger; friend/foe; peace/war; clean/dirty; human/nonhuman; good/bad; familiar/alien, etcetera), which, furthermore, tend to cluster together at the positive and negative poles, such that the self (and, by extension, the in-group) is good, clean, and associated with order and safety; while the other (and, by extension, the out-group) is alien and strange, and associated with chaos, danger, dirt, and potential violence. The human being has a powerful urge to dichotomize, E.O. Wilson (1978) states, and "We seem able to be fully comfortable only when the remainder of humanity can be labelled as members versus nonmembers, kin versus nonkin, friend versus foe". Possibly ethnocentrism operates as a primordial psychological mechanism which brings about a distinction of 'us' and 'them', in-group and out-group, and it may be hypothesized that 'advanced' species like chimpanzees and humans have extra-strong needs for group boundaries, demarcations or delimitations, the strength of which must somehow be related to the species' affective systems (See Ch. 3). MacDonald (1996) agrees with this observation and suggests that one such affective mechanism is in fact the self-esteem mechanism proposed by social identity theorists. Other emotional mechanisms that may be involved are the social conscientiousness/guilt mechanism discussed in MacDonald (1994), and the experience of psychological relief obtained by individuals who join highly collectivist, authoritarian groups such as religious sects (Galanter, 1989). Altemeyer (1994) found associations among attraction to cohesive groups, authoritarianism, feelings of ingroup superiority, hostility toward outgroups, a heightened concern for social identity, and religious fundamentalism. Collectivist cultures such as sects develop an unquestioned attachment to the ingroup, including the perception that ingroup norms are universally valid, automatic obedience to ingroup authorities, and willingness to fight and die for the ingroup. These characteristics are usually associated with distrust of and



unwillingness to cooperate with outgroups (Triandis, 1990; MacDonald, 1996) Meyer (1987) pointed to the phenomenon that members of primitive groups frequently take their traditional enemy group as a kind of negative identity. For the logic of totemistic classification systems see: Leach (1976) and Meyer (1987). "[It] is a rather widely-held notion that the brain evolved to think, particularly about technical matters such as hunting and gathering, tool-making, painting on cave walls, and the like. This is likely to be wrong. It evolved to act, not to think; not only to act, but to interact; not only to interact, but to interact sexually, in the imperatively pleasurable and ramified action which is the immediate engine of change in species" (Tiger, 1990). Our way of thinking has evolved as a response to the practical problems of living and reproducing in the Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness, and not to solve academic puzzles. We tend to think more in terms of categories or classes than in terms of individuals. Using these generalizations we form schemata. These schemata are extremely useful, but at the same time they enable us to form stereotypes. With regard to this regrettable side-product one could say with Anderson (1980): "Stereotyping reflects the dark side of schema abstraction". This tendency culminates in a tendency to dichotomize phenomena. This involves the classification of objects within the nervous system - often beginning with our sensory perception - according to some kind of either-or rule (Flohr, 1987). Prejudices thrive on polarization, on the maximization of differences between classes. Stereotypes and prejudices are, unmoralistically considered, heuristics or cognitive templates which work most of the time, and which prevent the stimulus overload of the cognitive system, and which provide some degree of self-esteem by creating a simple order out of chaos and uncertainty. 6.9.1 Limited Sympathy All these phenomena can be understood, in the last analysis, as pertaining to our finite time-and-energy budgets, and consequently our limited capacity for problem-solving, the limited ’channel capacity’ of the human brain, and our limited capacity to sympathize with, identify with and be emotionally involved with more than a very limited number of conspecifics (Warnock, 1975; Ike, 1987). It may seem odd to discuss man’s limited sympathy in the context of cognitive constraints, but a moment of reflection may reveal that the ability to identify has strong cognitive overtones (as well as emotional and motivational ones). "Being a limited resource, affectivity in man favors interaction units where this resource may be invested in the most economical manner: it can be bestowed on a limited number of persons only" (Meyer, 1987). Hence the individual’s limited niche in the nexus of cross-cutting human configurations. Human affectivity is of major importance in the establishment of social boundaries.



Any social system requires boundary maintenance and mutual identification of actors (Meyer, 1987; Ike, 1987; Cf. Little, 1964; Moreno, 1967; Goffman, 1976; a.o.). The human sympathy group seems to be limited to about 11 individuals (Buys & Larson, 1979). These authors suppose that this magnitude possibly has coantecedents in the human social-biological evolution, i.e., in the small hunting bands of our ancestors: "We believe that the data suggests a possible relationship between our evolution into social beings and our apparent limited capacity for human sympathy". So too, Washburn & Harding (1975) state: "Man evolved to feel strongly about few people, short distances, and relatively brief intervals of time; and these are still the dimensions of life that are psychologically important to him". Limited sympathy, according to Ike (1987), is one of the basic propensities of the human animal, together with obedience and Manichaean dualism, which do not in themselves constitute causes of war, but which make war possible. 6.9.2 Group Identification and Prejudice For most of our evolutionary history group identification was essential to the survival and well-being of the individual (Wallace, 1864; Darwin, 1871; Alexander, 1974 et seq.; Corning, 1983; Barash & Lipton, 1985; Dunbar, 1987; Flohr, 1987; Slurink, 1994; Caporael, 1996; a.o.). Thus we see that an important element in the psychological make up of human beings is a profound inclination to belong, to be part of a group, and the bigger and more powerful the group, the better. Moreover, it even feels good to defend that group, since our personal well-being has typically been so closely tied to the success and well-being of the group, and the personal costs of engaging in such defense were generally not all that great: "Our ancestors were almost certainly selected to identify with and fight for social groups, against other human beings in other social groups. For adults, then, security came in large part from the defense of the tribe against other tribes" (Barash & Lipton, 1985). Our existence has always depended and our continued existence still depends largely on cooperative living, and this often means subserving our own reproductive goals to those of the group (as a collection of individuals) in order to benefit from the advantages of group living. Survival depends on the cooperative assistance of one’s fellow group members. It is this intrinsic willingness to acquiesce in group decisions that lays us, as a species, so open to cultural manipulation for political or ideological/religious ends (Dunbar, 1987). Alexander (1974 et seq,), Slurink (1994) and Caporael (1996), among others, argued that during hominid/human evolution (see also Ch. 8) to the extent that exploiting a habitat and solving intergroup conflicts are more successful as collective group processes than as individual processes, not only would more successful groups persist, but so also would individuals better adapted to



group-living. "We would expect humans to be obligately interdependent; that is, their prospects for survival or reproduction outside group contexts would be greatly diminished" (Caporael, 1996), which is rather mildly put. At all times we had to rely on support by the group, and also on being accepted by the group. For this reason we had to adapt to the group; we had to adopt its modes of behavior and its value orientations. High respect for one’s group more or less (psycho)logically implies devaluing out-groups. A tendency to form prejudices can thus be derived from our striving for group identity (Flohr, 1987). Because prejudices contribute to supporting exchange, they fulfil an adaptive function. "We love our prejudices, because they not only provide us with cognitive, but also with social stability" (Bergler, 1976). Prejudices acquired at some time are stabilized not only by selective perception, but also by the fact that the behavior of those who are discriminated against is changed due to our discrimination in a way that further seems to justify our stereotypes and feelings. Using the example of prejudices, Merton (1957) demonstrated some time ago the way in which ’self-fulfilling prophecies’ influence human behavior. Ethnic and racial prejudices are not necessarily based on personal experiences and that they do not necessarily have to reflect private interests. Instead they can be acquired early in life along with other values and attitudes that are normative in their social environment. There seems to be something like ’symbolic racism’ which can persist independent of ’realistic threats’ (Kinder & Sears, 1981). According to Kinder & Sears conformity pressures as well as the willingness to accept socially given distinctions between in-group and outgroup are involved in the acquisition of these prejudices (Flohr, 1987). Prejudices are particularly resistant to change when they are integral parts of a ’culture pattern’. 6.9.3 Stereotypes Stereotypes exaggerate the differences between groups (dichotomization) and underestimate the differences within them (generalization). They can result from erroneous attribution or from simplified judgment. Erroneous attribution can be the consequence not only of social pressures but also of endogenous factors. The ease, however, with which even absurd stereotypes are being formed all the time point in itself towards an innate tendency to think in stereotypes (Flohr, 1987). Pinderhughes (1979; see also Abraham, 1983) has presented the thesis that stereotyping may represent a psychobiological need for cognitive stability, which suggests that a psychological need to dichotomize reality into positive and negative categories may not be as much Manichaean as it is a drive to create affiliative, loving bonds and differentiative, aggressive ones. Such a



psychological process he calls ’differential bonding’. Lorenz (1966) hypothesized that the formation of bonds between members of the same group are intensified by aggression directed towards individuals outside of the group: "The principle of the bond formed by having something in common which has to be defended against outsiders remains the same, from cichlids defending a common territory or brood, right up to scientists defending a common opinion and - most dangerous of all - fanatics defending a common ideology. In all these cases aggression is necessary to enhance the bond". But as Pinderhughes points out, the creation of an affiliative bond may have as a consequence the sacrifice of perceptual objectivity: "The biological process of differential bonding offers stability and certainty at the expense of objectivity and validity, producing a biologically mature organism that may know it is right even when it is wrong. This, in my opinion, constitutes the main source of bias in human thinking and behavior and the primary basis for social conflict". MacCauley (1990) has objected that stereotyping and ethnocentrism are found in both warlike and peaceful groups and, therefore, these phenomena cannot alone explain the difference between peace and war. R.Brown (1985) offered an analysis that puts ethnocentrism together with group stereotyping and perceived inequity in resources to explain group conflict. He regards the individual’s desire for a positive self-image and in-group preference a basic tendency of humanity, and perception of inequity as a factor that moves a group from ethnocentrism to agression and hostility. Here it is not the fact of inequality of resources (either material or status resources) that is crucial, but the perception of unfair distribution or illegitimate inequality that leads to anger, aggression and violence. "Of course, war is not an automatic reaction to either inequity or iniquity. These may explain the transition from ethnocentrism to hostility toward outgroup, but neither contributes much to our understanding of the transition from hostility to conflict and war. It appears then that either perception of iniquity or the impact of that perception is moderated by the potential costs of conflict" (MacCauley, 1990). 6.9.4 Self-system and Self-deception Vine (1987) suggests the possibility that organized aggressive competition between groups of hominids did not appear during hominid evolution until the ’self-system’ had evolved to an appreciable degree - making strong yet fluid collective social loyalties possible. Vine proposes that self-awareness has as its concomitant self-deception. All that is required is that gene-based natural self-system biases should be able to distort the processing of information which affects our social evaluations and intentional choices. The overarching ’meta-motive’ of self-esteem makes adaptive sense for a species that relies heavily upon the self-system for the mediation of goaldirected activities. The ’psychological integrity’ of this system is a precondition



for effective engagement with the outer world. Without self-esteem we are indeed vulnerable to a range of maladaptive mental, behavioral and even physiological conditions (Crook, 1980). In a pioneering analysis of the evolution of the self, Hallowell (1959) had seen "the social as well as the individual adaptive value of universal psychological processes such as repression, rationalization, and other defence mechanisms". Thus we can understand that selectively screening negative social feedback from awareness, and distorting self-perceptions of one’s degree of conformity to norms are varieties of self-deception serving the goal of self-esteem. During the evolutionary transition to self-awareness, Vine (1987) proposes, selection would have favored moderate levels of self-bias, in preference to strictly realistic self-consciousness - especially if the former protected the individual from excessive self-sacrifice. 6.9.5 Pre-judgments: The Logic of Probability All animals have to rely to a considerable degree on extrapolations based on their experiences, i.e., they have to make inferential judgments, so to speak, whenever they cannot rely on genetically controlled behavioral instructions. Based on inferential judgments an animal will develop behaviors which could turn out to be wrong, but which could, by and large, overcompensate for this disadvantage by an increase in security and in rapidity (Flohr, 1987). Riedl (1980, 1985) has pointed to the enormous role that pre-judgments play in the behavior of all living systems. As he puts it: "The algorithm of living systems is not founded on the apparent contradictions of our inductive logic, but on probability". In order to perceive and to evaluate, we have innate prejudgments at our disposal, a whole system of phylogenetically acquired orientations that has been called ’ratiomorphic apparatus’ by Brunswik (1955). This apparatus induces us to make judgments that are on the whole correct and make sense with regard to practical problems, but in a certain way this apparatus is uncritical and misleads us by suggesting wrong conclusions. Pre-judgments are, according to Riedl (1980), a precondition for our existence. As long as they are more likely than a random search to lead to correct judgments, thereby protecting the conditions of survival, they are functional. 6.9.6 Reduction of Uncertainty From a purely biological perspective one would definitely expect that humans have evolved mechanisms to cope with the problem of reduction of uncertainty (Flohr, 1987). Insufficient reduction of uncertainty leads in humans and animals to ’learned helplessness’ (Seligman, 1975). Seligman’s research points to the extremely great importance of information that reduces uncertainty. If such information is not available, humans will create it or otherwise employ strategies to at least have the illusion of control (Kalma, 1986, 1989).



The psychology of perception shows that our emotions and cognitions have a considerable impact on the selection, retention, and distortion of information. It has also been demonstrated that the processing of the perceived information is not some kind of objective, ’interest-free’ registration. It is influenced instead at each important junction by emotional and cognitive commitments (wishful thinking). The frequent overestimation of environmental conditions (’force of circumstances’) when accounting for our own behavior, and the overestimation of personality characteristics (or evil intentions) in observations of other people is one such perceptual (attributional) distortion. By sorting information from past experiences or environments through the use of behavioral predilections, such as rules of thumb or habit, adaptive rationality permits the efficient management of considerable information. More than this, rules of thumb reduce uncertainty by prescribing paths of action that have worked, in the past, to yield positive net returns (Shaw & Wong, 1989). 6.9.7 Reification Reification (’ideas-become-real’), also called ’hypostatization’, refers to the human capacity to treat an abstraction as a real thing, substance or entity. It may even be anthropomorphized, taking on human or quasi-human form. A familiar example of reification would be the following: The category of ’things and acts considered to be bad’ gives rise to the abstract concept of ’evil’, which in turn can be easily reified and quasi-anthropomorphized as ’the devil’ (and subsequently ’evil’ can now be ’explained’ as the works of the devil). Other familiar examples are the anthropomorphized and personalized representations of the mother- or fatherland in nationalistic hymns, patriotic battle songs, and national anthems from all over the world. Such images are almost always employed as powerful mobilization devices in warfare. Reification is critical to human action (Peterson, 1981; Lumsden & Wilson, 1981, 1983). It imposes familiarity and order on an otherwise chaotic environment. The leader as the reification of the group is perhaps the most powerful form of symbolization. As Ike (1987) observes "An individual person cannot identify himself with a large number of people; he needs a small group, a reference group, a peer group. Or he wants a symbol, a leader as stand-in for the larger mass of individuals with whom he cannot identify. The leader is the symbol, and the larger and stronger the number of individuals he represents, the better qualities are attributed to, or ’projected’ on him". History abounds in charismatic leaders who symbolize the group and successfully mobilize their followers. Many adopt a patriarchical role, representing themselves as symbolic fathers and their followers as symbolic children. Followers, in turn, are typically consumed by familylike devotion and, not infrequently, by fanatic loyalty (Shaw & Wong, 1989).



6.9.8 Emotions Strong emotions are likely to accompany perceptions of one’s ethnicity. Reviewing an extensive anthropological literature, Isaacs (1975) concluded that we have a deep-rooted propensity to respond emotionally to the name of our own group, sounds of our mother tongue, signs of the group’s traditional religion, and other symbolic representations of our in-group. These emotional qualities may include spontaneous joy, a sense of pride, and the security of belonging. The larger group becomes emotionally integrated into the individual's self-system or identity (Tönnesman, 1987). In the expanded group context, emotions are typically aroused and reinforced through the language of kinship and the use of rituals, flags, anthems, drums, marches, and various kin-related heuristics (sacrifice for the Motherland) that have proven highly effective in promoting group solidarity (e.g., Stokes, 1982; Patterson, 1983; G.R. Johnson, 1986). Emotions attached to cognitions and perceptions of threatening out-groups can be very intense. As White (1984) observed, "what emerges is the really startling importance of fear (sometimes realistic but usually exaggerated) as a cause of aggression and therefore of war". A rather neglected aspect of the dangers human groups constitute for each other is their emotional aspect, Elias (1987) observed. Human groups seem to take a strange delight in asserting their superiority over others, particularly if it has been attained by violent means. The feeling of group superiority appears to provide its members with an immense narcissistic gratification. People in power can usually count on a warm response of approval and often of affection and love from their compatriots whenever they praise or add to the glory of the social unit. The remarkable propensity of people for projecting part of their individual self-love into specific social units, to which they are linked by strong feelings of identity and of belonging, is one of the roots of the dangers which human groups constitute for each other. Anne Flohr (1994) lists the following cognitive mechanisms: selective perception and perceptual distortions (double standard in judging the same behavior of members of ingroup and outgroup), avoidance of dissonant information, 'boomerang effect' (Jervis), 'confirmation bias' (Peterson), 'availability heuristic', 'halo effect', and 'evoked sets'. Furthermore, she identifies 'fundamental attribution error', 'black-white thinking' (dualities), 'worst-case thinking', 'self-fulfilling prophecies', and 'projection'. Also personality factors may play a role, such as authoritarian personality, dogmatism, intolerance of ambiguity, and misanthropy (all positively covarying with ethnocentrism). She concludes: "Ethnozentrismus erfültt wichtige Funktionen für den 'Psychohaushalt' des einzelnen... Andere Funktionen von Ethnozentrismus sind die Reduzierung von Komplexität und



die Aggressionskanalisierung".

6.10

Evolutionary Theories of Ethnocentrism

Ethnocentrism is a major explanans in contemporary theories of primitive warfare. The founding father of modern sociobiology, E.O. Wilson (1978) regards it as a culturally hypertrophied biological predisposition, drawing heavily from Leach’s (1965) split universe imagery: The practice of war is a straightforward example of a hypertrophied biological predisposition. Primitive men cleaved their universe into friends and enemies and responded with quick, deep emotion to even the mildest threats emanating from outside the arbitrary boundary... The force behind most warlike policies is ethnocentrism, the irrationally exaggerated allegiance of individuals to their kin and fellow tribesmen. In general, primitive men divide the world into two tangible parts, the near environment of home, local villages, kin, friends, tame animals, and witches, and the more distant universe of neighboring villages, intertribal allies, enemies, wild animals, and ghosts. This elemental topography makes easier the distinction between enemies who can be attacked and killed and friends who cannot. The contrast is heightened by reducing enemies to frightful and even subhuman status (E.O. Wilson, 1978) Also Meyer (1977 et seq.) regards ethnocentrism and xenophobia as cultural hypertrophies. He argues that the extreme ethnocentrism on the primitive level sets preconditions for violent interaction, while specific conditions serve as triggers ["Der extreme Ethno-Zentrismus in der primitiven Stufe bildet Rahmenbedingungen für das Eintreten in eine destruktiv-gewaltsame Interaktion, spezifische Bedingungen sind die Anlässe"]. Meyer suggests that the basic motivation in violent encounters between members of distinct groups is not 'aggression' impelled by some sort of drive, instinct, or appetite, but 'fear'. Fear generated by the position of the cultural 'we-group' in a threatening universe made up of 'they-groups', endangering the social cosmos by their very existence, as well as a vast array of non-intelligible forces. The degrees of enmity are dependent upon the respective groups' ideologies, i.e., their psycho-cultural interpretations of the cosmos. While any social system requires boundary maintenance and mutual identification of actors, man's condition as a psycho-cultural animal brings about hypertrophies of these needs.



6.10.1

Kin Selection and Inclusive Fitness

Evolutionary and sociobiological explanations of ethnocentrism and xenophobia are for the most part rooted in kin selection, inclusive fitness, and altruism theories (See Ch. 1). Inclusive fitness, as Alexander (1979) explains, is a simple idea. As social organisms we tend to lead our lives embedded in networks of near and distant kin. The concept of inclusive fitness simply tells us that not merely our offspring but any genetic relative socially available to us is a potential avenue of genetic reproduction. Altruism toward relatives is of course not really altruism at all, but rather the tendency of individuals to maximize the reproductive success of their genes via their relatives, that is, via the other bodies in which copies of these genes reside. Alexander & Borgia (1978) argued that nepotism to nondescendants and distant descendant relatives is an extension of (evolutionarily) earlier altruism in the form of parental care. Alexander (1979) argued that reciprocity (or ’selfish cooperation’ as Corning [1983] called it) is in turn largely derived from nepotism (On nepotism see also: Hamilton, 1987; Wells, 1987; Kenrick, 1989; S.Johnson & R.Johnson, 1991; and A.Flohr, 1994; Vanhanen [1992] considers tribalism, casteism, nationalism, etc. as forms of nepotism adapted to large societies). In the small bands in which humans are generally presumed to have lived during most of their evolutionary history, virtually all social interactions were among relatives. The same is probably true for contemporary hunter-gatherer societies.’Generalized reciprocity’ involves mostly one-way flows of benefits because it is largely nepotism (the return is genetic), and ’negative reciprocity’ involves one-way flows because it consists of one-time interactions accompanied by a great deal of social cheating. ’Balanced reciprocity’, on the other hand, tends to occur between distant relatives or nonrelatives that are likely to interact repeatedly, and therefore involves balanced flows of benefits (see also Masters, 1964; Service, 1966; and Shaw & Wong, 1989). The moral gradient and the vector of violence and dehumanization running through these concentric circles was already clearly seen and eloquently formulated by Marett (1933): Taking, then, the average community of savages who, thanks mostly to the custom of exogamy, have reached the tribal stage of society, we can represent its moral relationships by three concentric circles. That which immediately surrounds the centre stands for the consanguine group, or kin, which whether it counts descent in the mother’s or the father’s line, restricts this veritable homecircle to that one side of the family. The intermediate zone contains the rest of the tribe, and marks what is roughly the outer limit of the criss-cross of affinities which exogamy produces. A



tribesman as opposed to the kinsman by blood is thus any possible connexion by marriage who does not happen to be a pure stranger. There remains the vast outer circle of those who are neither kith nor kin, neither acquaintances nor birth-mates, but live beyond the bounds of tribal law and religion. Correspondingly, then, there are three degrees of moral responsibility severally involving an intense solidarity, a half-hearted neighborliness, and an utter aloofness. Hence there will be as many different ways in which fighting and killing may come about, namely, through intestine strife, through feud, or through downright war. These distinctions are by no means arbitrary, since they are based on a real and well-recognized departmentalization of the social life. The stupidest savage is not likely to confuse in his mind the occasions on which he is liable to commit the abominable sin, to become implicated in an affair of honour, and on behalf of home and country to take up arms against foreign devils. There are bound to be marginal cases, of course, as when duty towards the mother’s clan begins to include the father and his people as well, or, again, when distant or disaffected members of the tribe rank as hardly better than sworn foes. On the whole, however, there stand out in sharp contrast to each other three spheres of conduct, to which entirely separate commandments apply as follows: to the first, Thou shalt commit no murder; to the second, Thou shalt compound with thy neighbor on the principle that a life for a life is fair give-and-take; and to the third, Thou shalt utterly destroy the destroyer (Marett, 1933). In discussing the absence of war in some Inuit tribes, Irwin (1987) predicted (in contrast to Hamilton, 1975) that social behavior can be polarized at all population boundaries where there is some variation in the coefficient of relatedness between adjacent demes. In other words, Irwin said, rivalry between closely related human populations is as predictable a phenomenon as sibling rivalry. Brothers have been known to kill each other and closely related tribes sometimes do indeed go to war. So the fact that the Inuit tribes of the Central Canadian Arctic are closely related to each other can not, in and of itself, explain their state of relative peace. If the humans in these populations stopped making war then something must have happened to the coefficient of relatedness, or the cost/benefit ratio, or both. Irwin’s explanation of Inuit peacefulness is that at some point in history the cost of war (the loss of male protein harvesters), came to exceed the benefits of war (more females and territory).



6.10.2

Cultural Badges (Markers) and the Proximate Mechanisms of Kin Recognition

The importance of kin recognition mechanisms as intermediaries of kin selection was recognized by Hamilton in his 1964 classic paper. He proposed four possible mechanisms: (1) recognition alleles; (2) spatial distribution or location (depending upon a high correlation between location and kinship); (3) association or familiarity (due to living and rearing arrangements, individuals with whom one is familiar are more likely to be kin than others); (4) phenotypic matching (dependent upon an assumed correlation between genotype and phenotype). Phenotypic matching, or self-referent phenotype matching (also known as the armpit effect because many animals recognize each other olfactorily - through the smell of their sweat) is based on perceived similarities and differences. See also Maynard Smith, 1964; Alexander, 1979; Dawkins, 1979; Kurland, 1980; van den Berghe, 1978, 1981; Barash, 1982; Michod, 1982; Blaustein, 1983; Holmes & Sherman, 1983; Hepper, 1986, 1991; G.R. Johnson, 1986; Rushton, 1986, 1989; Fletcher & Michener, 1987; Irwin, 1987; Silverman, 1987; Waldman, 1987; Wells, 1987; Shaw & Wong, 1989; Maxwell, 1990; Porter, 1991; Sherman, 1992; and A.Flohr, 1994. To deal with the problem of in-group membership recognition, natural selection has repeatedly evolved a proximate mechanism known as badging. Badges can be learned and may be one of the simplest, most rudimentary forms of culture presently known (e.g., bird song dialects). As related individuals possess genes in common, they may produce a cue which is genetically determined and thus possessed by all kin. Detection of such a cue (innate badge) is possible due to a genetic mechanism in which a genetically coded phenotypic trait is tied to a genetically coded basis for recognition of that trait. This is the idea behind recognition alleles. Of the mechanisms of kin identification, Holmes & Sherman (1983) consider the possibility of recognition alleles (’innate feature detectors’ as Rushton [1989] called them) as most problematic. However, this ’green beard effect’, as Dawkins (1976; 1981) calls it, is essentially what badging is; the only difference is that humans (and some song birds) do not grow differently colored beards to identify kin, they may wear false beards of different colors in the form of culture. Human dialects, like bird song dialects, may also function as population markers. Thus, as Irwin (1987) suggests, many aspects of culture which vary dramatically from tribe to tribe could be understood as learned and culturally transmitted ethnocentric expressions of a genetic predisposition to group bonding and badging, rather than as adaptations of tribe to tribe differences in immediate ecology. Differences in dialect, dress, art, symbol, ritual, scarification, tattoos and/or body paint symptomatic of group membership could fall into this



class of culture traits. Most cultural differences may be assumed to be of the badging variety. This would be especially true when sexual organs are involved, as in various forms of circumcision, which become cultural and tribal requirements for acceptable mates (Irwin, 1987). As badging of the kind described here evolved, at least in part, to determine questions of mate choice, then it would follow that tribal enculturation of this variety should be completed prior to mating (Bateson, 1979; Shields, 1982). Thus it comes as no surprise that young adolescents are particularly impressionable and prone to the creation and wearing of badges with which to identify their ethnic in-groups. Association/familiarity is a very likely candidate for kin recognition among humans. But it seems probable that phenotypic matching is another and supplementary mechanism (Alexander, 1979; Essock-Vitale & McGuire, 1980; Michod, 1982). From a sociobiological perspective, as Tönnesmann (1987) points out, one should not expect a human being to be willing to cooperate indiscriminately with any other conspecific, but to apply criteria such as similarity in physical appearance in order to assess the possibility of a genetic relationship. Thus one could say with Barkow (1980) that the theory of ethnocentrism is "the converse of altruism", and "that we should most readily learn distrust and hostility towards those who least resemble us, and towards those with whom we have no personal relationship, that is, strangers" (Barkow, 1980; Cf. Rushton, 1980). In fact, similarity seems to be related to empathic responses, and, more generally, liking between individuals is increased when they perceive each other as similar (e.g., Turner, 1982). Although similarity in physical appearance may serve as an indicator of consanguinity in the absence of genealogical knowledge, as Barkow (1980) suggests, such knowledge could be fabricated, at least in superficial terms, by making people believe that they have descended from common ancestors. Ethnic markers, such as skin color, clothing, or behavioral peculiarities, could be used for the purpose of making an ethnic group appear to be a group of genetically related individuals. Altruistic acts on behalf of non-kin can be elicited by taking advantage of the cues produced by evolution for kin recognition. According to G.R. Johnson (1986), patriotism in contemporary large-scale societies is a brand of manipulated altruism. Large-scale human societies have evolved processes of socialization which exploit the cues by which altruism originally came to be elicited in the course of several million years of hominid evolution. Rushton (1986, 1989) and Rushton, Russell & Wells (1984) developed 'genetic similarity theory': "If a gene can better ensure its own survival by acting so as to bring about the reproduction of family members with whom it shares copies, then it can also do so by bringing about the reproduction of any organism in



which copies can be found... It can be expected that two individuals within an ethnic group will, on average, be more similar to each other genetically than two individuals from different ethnic groups" (Rushton, 1986; see also EiblEibesfeldt, 1989). Kenrick (1989), on the other hand, argued that "people are not so much attracted to similar others, as they are repulsed by those who are not similar". The consequence, however, a biologically based disposition toward ethnocentrism, would be the same (A.Flohr, 1994). In the remainder of this chapter I shall give the floor to van den Berghe (1981) and Shaw & Wong (1989), who have contributed most to the development of evolutionary ethnocentrism theory. 6.10.3

The Ethnic Phenomenon

In The Ethnic Phenomenon, van den Berghe (1981) formulated the first theory of ethnocentrism as extended kin selection. Van den Berghe’s basic argument is quite simple: Ethnic sentiments are extensions of kinship sentiments. Ethnocentrism is thus an extended form of nepotism - the propensity to favor kin over nonkin. There exists a general behavioral predisposition, in our species as in many others, to react favorably toward other organisms to the extent these organisms are biologically related to the actor. The closer the relationship is, the stronger the preferential behavior. Genes that predispose their carrying organisms to behave nepotistically will be selected for, because, by favoring nepotism, they enhance their own replication. This genetically selected propensity for nepotism is also called kin selection. The degree of cooperation between organisms can be expected to be a direct function of the proportion of the genes they share. Conversely, the degree of conflict between them is an inverse function of the proportion of shared genes. Ethnicity is a matter of degree of relatedness. People typically form both alliances and cleavages, and grade the violence and destructiveness they inflict on each other on the basis of their real or perceived degree of relatedness. That is, both cooperation and conflict in human societies follow a calculus of inclusive fitness. An ethnic group (or ethny) can be represented as a cluster of overlapping, egocentered, concentric kin circles, encompassed within an ethnic boundary. The ethnic boundary is seldom completely closed. More typically, there is some migration, principally of women, among groups. Ethnicity is defined, in the last analysis, by common descent. Ethnic boundaries are created socially by preferential endogamy and physically by territoriality. The prototypical ethny is thus a descent group bounded socially by inbreeding and spatially by territory. We have evolved, van den Berghe argues, the kind of brain to deal with smallscale, Gemeinschaft-type groups, the prototype of which is the ethny, the ’we-



group’, the ’in-group’ of intimates who think of each other as an extended family. Indeed, the ethny represents the outer limits of that inbred group of near or distant kinsmen whom one knows as intimates and whom therefore one can trust. One intuitively expects fellow ethnics to behave at least somewhat benevolently toward one because of kin selection, reinforced by reciprocity. The shared genes predispose toward beneficence; the daily interdependence reinforces that kin selection. Fellow ethnics are, in the deepest sense, ’our people’. Ethnicity can be manipulated but not manufactured. Unless ethnicity is rooted in generations of shared historical experience, it cannot be created ex nihilo. If kinship in the most restricted circle of the nuclear family is sometimes a biological fiction, it is little wonder that the greatly extended kind of kinship implicit in ethnicity should often be putative. The larger the ethny, the more likely this is. Yet - and this is what begs explanation - the fiction of kinship, even in modern industrial societies, has to be sufficiently credible for ethnic solidarity to be effective. One cannot create an instant ethny by creating a myth. The myth has to be rooted in historical reality to be accepted. What features will be chosen as ethnic markers or badges? There are many possibilities, tending to fall into three main categories of traits. The three are not mutually exclusive, and their respective effectiveness varies greatly according to circumstances. First, one can pick a genetically transmitted phenotype, such as skin pigmentation, stature, hair texture, facial features or some such ’racial’ characteristic. Groups that are socially defined by genetic phenotypes are called ’races’, and societies that put emphasis on biological traits to differentiate groups within it can be called ’racist’. Second, one can rely on a man-made ethnic uniform. Members of one group are identified by bodily mutilations and/or adornments carried as visible badges of group belonging. These markers range from clothing and headgear to body painting, tattooing, circumcision, tooth filing and sundry mutilations of the lips, nose and earlobes. Third, the test can be behavioral. Ethnicity is determined by speech, demeanour, manners, rituals, ceremonies, etiquette, esoteric lore or some other proof of competence in a behavioral repertoire characteristic of the group. Language is the supreme test of ethnicity (e.g., the shibboleth), because it is almost absolutely ’fake-proof’. Many, including non-ethnic groups, use particular attitudes or idiosyncrasies as litmus tests of group membership. Some criteria seem to have more staying power than others, and the ones with high heritability appear to have an edge. The ultimate scarce resource for competing males in the fitness game is reproductive females. Thus, the capture, defense and seduction of women often plays as salient a role in intergroup relations, as it does between the individual



members of the same ethny. One may look at ethnic relations from the point of view of the circulation of women, and arrive at the following formulation. Within the ethny, a group of related men peaceably exchange kinswomen for wives among themselves. After the system has been in operation for several generations, the wives are also related to their husbands; frequently, they are preferentially cousins, in fact. This leads to a certain degree of inbreeding that is all the greater as the ethny is small. Between ethnies, men use power and violence to secure access to women from other groups, and this reduces the level of inbreeding. When the ethnies in presence are equally matched, male competition for foreign women takes the form of interethnic raids. After an ethnic hierarchy has been established, subordinate-group men loose all or part of their control of ’their’ women and their reproductive success is curtailed, while upper-group men are polygynous and incorporate subordinate-group women. An ethnic hierarchy, therefore, generally results in a reduced fitness for subordinate-group males. The classical scenario for conquest is to rape the women and kill, castrate or enslave the men. Asymmetry of reproductive strategies for males and females has another important corollary for ethnic relations. In a situation of ethnic hierarchy, ethnic solidarity between men and women is undermined. The men of the subordinate group are always the losers and therefore have a reproductive interest in overthrowing the system. The women of the subordinate group, however, frequently have the option of being reproductively successful with dominant-group males. Indeed, even where forced into relationships with dominant males, they must cooperate in the interest of their children. Human hierarchies are vastly more complex that anything found in other species because: (1) Humans form not only individual dominance hierarchies, as do other animals, but also establish group hierarchies. (2) Humans have the capacity to magnify, indeed to reverse, through an increasingly lethal technology of violence, biological inequalities of strength or intelligence between individuals. Biological differences of strength based on age and sex still explain human dominance orders within small groups, such as families or gangs, but human group-based hierarchies are explainable almost entirely in terms of social organization of the technology of violence. (3) The human capacity for conscious deceit (through ideology, inter alia) further enhances our species’ capacity for group inequality beyond anything known in other species. Human systems of group inequality, especially the ones perpetuated by all large, centralized states, are almost invariably bolstered by an ideology that disguises the parasitism of the ruling class as either kin selection or reciprocity. Group stratification is a relatively recent phenomenon in human evolution; it



accompanied the so-called Neolithic Revolution. Group stratification coevolved with the state. Plunder and predation between human societies existed long before the rise of states. With the emergence of the state, however, parasitism was extended within societies. In addition to territoriality and hierarchy, humans have also developed group specialization, so that different sympatric ethnies have adapted to different ecological niches. Much of ethnic relations represents niche specialization between ethnies that are thus in much the same ecological relationship to each other as symbionts of different species in the rest of the animal kingdom. Indeed, members of different ethnies often treat each other and regard each other as if they did indeed belong to different species. Treating each other as prey - cannibalism - is but a widespread illustration of this human capacity to draw a sharp line between in-group and out-group, and to create pseudospecific lines between ethnies. Racist ideologies are another example. 6.10.4

The Genetic Seeds of Warfare

Building on Alexander’s (1971, 1979) balance-of-power hypothesis, McEachron & Baer’s (1982) hypothesis on the evolution of weapons, and especially the principle of kin selection (Hamilton, 1964, 1975), Shaw (1985) and Shaw & Wong (1987, 1989) present an elaborate theory of kin selection, ethnocentrism, and the evolution of human warfare. They propose that inclusive fitness considerations have combined with competition over scarce resources, intergroup conflict, and weapon development, to (1) reinforce humanity’s propensity to band together in groups of genetically related individuals; (2) predispose group members to act in concert for their own well-being; and (3) promote xenophobia, fear, and antagonism among genetically related individuals towards strangers. Shaw & Wong interpret these responses as ’emerging’ or reinforcing proximate causes which shaped the structure of social behavior in hunter/gatherer groups for 99 percent of humanity’s existence. Their model rests on three premises: That individuals have evolved not only to be egoistic, but to be nepotistically altruistic; that individuals in nucleus ethnic groups, are predisposed to mobilize for resource competition in ways that will enhance inclusive fitness and reproductive potential; and that intergroup conflict/warfare has been positively functional in humanity’s evolution. An evolutionary approach, the authors emphasize, is essential to understanding humanity’s propensity for warfare. Behavioral strategies to enhance biological goals of survival, reproduction, and genetic fitness have not evolved independently of humanity’s environment: They have coevolved. To decipher



the ’deep structure’ of warfare propensities it is thus crucial to bear in mind that evolution always involves adaptation to past, not present environments. Moreover, most genetic evolution of human behavior has occurred over a span of hundreds of thousands of years prior to civilization. A ’red line’ throughout the theory is that the evolution of much contemporary social behavior has originated during the past 1 to 2 million years when our ancestors lived in small, tight-knit kin groups. Shaw & Wong call these groups ’nucleus ethnic groups’. Numbering approximately 100 individuals at most, a nucleus ethnic group comprises one’s offspring, one’s siblings’ offspring, and one’s parents and their siblings and their offspring. It cannot be emphasized too strongly that their theory is most relevant to understanding central tendencies in humanity’s propensity for warfare. It does not presume to explain all wars. Kin selection implies that sexual organisms, such as humans, have evolved not only to be egoistic but to be fundamentally nepotistically altruistic (Flinn & Alexander, 1982). Inclusive fitness and, more specifically, kin selection also provide an ultimate, evolutionary rationale for anticipating origins of ’self-sacrifice to the death’. As individuals are motivated to maximize their inclusive fitness rather than personal survival and reproduction alone, sacrifice to the death can still have a genetic payoff; it can enhance reproduction and survival of close relatives who share the same genes by common descent. That is, an individual’s genes - the units of natural selection - can still be propagated even though personal fitness is lost in the process. On the basis of inclusive fitness considerations and coefficients of genetic relatedness, Shaw & Wong show that an individual could emulate ’true’ sacrificial behavior (go to war and die in the process), without violating rational strategy considerations since indirect gain (assuming success in conflict) outweighs the alternative of nonaction in units of inclusive fitness. Inclusive fitness has also been demonstrated to be an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS). This means that it would not likely be easily displaced by competing ’behavioral strategies’ (that is, pure selfishness or unrestrained altruism) because of its superiority in maximizing reproduction and survival throughout evolution (Breuer, 1982; von Schilcher & Tennant, 1984). The axiom of inclusive fitness is crucial to understanding the importance of ethnicity in the expression of humanity’s propensity for warfare for five reasons. First, it implies that individuals judge net benefits of engaging in competition not only in terms of direct private gain but also in terms of indirect gain associated with the well-being of genetically related individuals. It thus provides a social rationale for related individuals banding together to pursue competition (nepotistic altruism).



Second, inclusive fitness considerations militate against free-riders (cheaters). Third, inclusive fitness considerations reduce problems of unequal distribution of the spoils of warfare. Fourth, inclusive fitness considerations enhance the process of selecting a group leader. Finally, the axiom of inclusive fitness allows to postulate how death can be tolerated in warfare situations. As shocking and destabilizing as the death of a group member may be, inclusive fitness considerations provide a rational basis for accepting costs of death in warfare. The considerations raised above interact to make mobilization for conflict or warfare a more viable, cohesive strategy if pursued among related kin. From an evolutionary perspective, these considerations are the bedrock upon which Shaw & Wong link ethnic mobilization and the seeds of warfare. To assume that ethnocentrism is a universal syndrome, and thus a primary cause of warfare, is appealing, according to the authors, for several reasons. First, it seems to be virtually universal. The crucial change in humanity’s past involved an increased prevalence of other human groups competing for scarce resources. To counter this competition, groups of tightly related kin (nucleus ethnic groups) began to ally and merge through intermarriage. Failure of nucleus ethnic groups to cooperate in fending off competition or threats from a larger group meant reduced access to scarce resources, subjugation, and even extinction. Alternatively, the capacity of Homo sapiens to respond to competition, to counter a larger group with an equally large group, would have yielded a balance of power necessary to assure security and, perhaps, the status quo. Since failure to maintain a balance of power could have resulted in extinction, groups and their expansion figure as forces of selection in Shaw & Wong’s theory. Motivated by resource competition, conflict, and warfare, struggles to maintain balances of power gave rise to more complex societal units (e.g., chiefdoms, states) which continued the legacy of intergroup warfare. Groups as forces of selection must have reinforced suspicion and intolerance of out-group members as well as war proneness during a long period of humanity’s past. Because evolution always involves adaptation to past, not present, environments, Shaw & Wong interpret the processes involved as a seed of humanity’s propensity for warfare. They are indicative of the ’deep structure’ of human nature itself. Alexander (1971, 1979) proposed that other human groups would have become a problem under three conditions. First, a particularly successful group may have reproduced to the extent it reached a critical mass, fissioned, and produced two groups. These, in turn, may have competed for scarce resources in the same, familiar niche. Second, the distribution of scarce food resources may have become increasingly concentrated, prompting groups to reside and compete in closer proximity to one another. Third, groups may have migrated



into already occupied territory, fostering competition and conflict. It is the first and second process, accompanied by increasingly rapid population growth, that likely triggered sustained intergroup competition. Joyce (1987) argued that changes in the distribution of food resources were probably the single most important catalyst in this competition. If resources are defendable, and if conflict is inevitable, as McEachron & Baer (1982; see Ch. 4) have explained, it makes better evolutionary sense for groups to compete to resolve ownership of the resources as groups rather than being submitted to both the internal conflict and decreased inclusive fitness that would accompany a merger. In accordance with Alexander’s balance of power hypothesis, Shaw & Wong stress the point that in the past one million year or so an increasing proportion of man’s ’hostile environment’ has been other nucleus ethnic groups engaged in resource competition. While the unit of selection remains that of the gene and their individual carriers, intergroup conflict has rendered groups of everexpanding size and internal structure effective forces of selection. Expansion of nucleus ethnic groups through intermarriage, or their expansion via amalgamation with other nucleus ethnic groups, was motivated by the fact that other groups were doing so. Failure to maintain a balance of power (initially in terms of numbers only), would inevitably mean the domination of one group by a larger group and, consequently, unequal access to fitness enhancing resources. As Hamilton (1975) observed, to raise mean fitness in hunter-gatherer groups either new territory or outside mates had to somehow be obtained. Capture of out-group females through successful warfare, Shaw & Wong continue, serves three functions: (1) It reduces inbreeding depression by increasing the number of available partners for reproduction; (2) it increases variation in the warring group’s genetic stock; and (3) it contributes to group size. The latter consideration would have been especially important in environments where groups were effective forces of selection. The practice of taking females for loot would undoubtedly have set rival groups on edge and reinforced xenophobia and out-group enmity in the process. Avoidance of inbreeding depression could have been accommodated by (1) the transfer of males between groups, (2) the transfer of females between groups, or (3) raiding of other groups for females. With everything else held constant, any of these strategies would have served the purpose. However, a propensity for kin selection and nepotistic altruism would favor some inbreeding. This would have led to an aversion toward extensive intergroup transfers. Not to have done so would have led to a weakening of kin cohesion within groups. So, raiding for females would have thus been most preferable. Furthermore, groups as forces of selection and the balance-of-power process would have placed a priority on larger group size. Since reciprocal exchange of individuals between groups would have stabilized group size, raiding for



women would again have been attractive. It is also important to acknowledge that males would have been the predominant fighters in offensive or defensive war. Balances of power and intergroup competition would thus have placed a premium on retaining males in the group. Related males would be more inclined to fight to the death in the service of inclusive fitness than would unrelated males (brought in by intergroup transfer). This consideration would further tip the balance against intergroup transfer of males, which is so prevalent among nonhuman primates, toward plunder for females. A second-best strategy would have been the intergroup transfer of females between nucleus ethnic groups to maintain alliances. Indeed, intermarriage involving transfer of females between nearby and perhaps related nucleus ethnic groups (through group fissioning) would have helped to make alliances possible, thus contributing to groups as forces of selection. The indirect effect of these inbreeding/outbreeding strategies would have been reinforcement of fear and hostility toward members of out-groups as individuals who might steal one’s wife and daughters. Taking of females through raiding and warfare is, of course, evident in the behavior of tribes today (van den Berghe, 1981). Plunder and rape are also well recorded aspects of virtually every war involving postindustrial society and can reasonably be expected to be one of the fears promoting xenophobia between hostile states. From Shaw & Wong’s perspective, the important point is not whether warfare per se was or was not the singular force in the rise of tribes, chiefdoms, and states. Nor do they feel obliged to argue that groups were in a constant state of warfare with one another. Rather, it is the threat of resource competition, competitive exclusion, and warfare that matters. With Alexander (1971), Schmookler (1984), Falger (1987), and others, they submit that balance of power strategies evolved to help minimize these threats from expanding outgroups. The motivation of one group to expand (ally or merge) was essentially that another competing group had done so. Balance-of-power strategies thus represent a major vehicle by which ’peace’ was extended beyond members of one’ own nucleus ethnic group to members of the newly expanded group. As a raison d'être for alliances or mergers of nucleus ethnic groups, balances of power also broadened the boundaries of ethnocentrism and redirected outgroup enmity to competitors of ever-increasing size and societal complexity. In addition, it is important to acknowledge that regardless of the exact process that led to group expansion, larger groups would likely have enjoyed a competitive advantage over smaller groups (everything else being equal). In the evolutionary long run, larger groups would have displaced smaller groups and their members would thus have staked out a larger share of humanity’s gene pool. This implies that behavioral predispositions that facilitated group expansion would have been retained and incorporated into the more permanent repertoire of individual and group behavior (see also Bigelow, 1969, 1972).



6.10.4.1 Identification Mechanism To understand how humanity’s alleged propensity for warfare finds continuous expression in a given group context, let us briefly examine the bond between the individual and his or her membership in the larger group. The first variable in Shaw & Wong’s model, the recognition markers (RM), takes on potent heuristic and emotive value in demarcating in-group/out-group boundaries. RMs include language, religion, phenotype, homeland, and myth of common descent. Language, religion and phenotypic characteristics are highly effective stimuli in shaping perception and stereotyping (Ashmore & Delboca, 1981; Hamilton, 1987). In situations of congruence, recognition markers reinforce each other as criteria of group allegiance. Most effective congruence will occur when RMs are convincingly anthropomorphized in the person of a charismatic leader. The second variable in the model is affective intensity (AIi). This refers to the extent that cognitively perceived recognition markers are accompanied by emotively charged motivation for action. The third variable is size of the larger group. Group size (GS) denotes in-group membership as prescribed by the territorial boundaries of the larger group. It is reasonable to expect that the larger the group, the more the identification mechanism will have difficulty in functioning. The reason is that Homo sapiens is best equipped to deal with small groups in terms of intense emotional relationships (Ike, 1987). To determine the strength of the bond (GB) between an individual and his or her group, the identification mechanism (IM) functions as follows: GB = f(IM) [RM,AIi,GS] The equation states that the effectiveness of the identification mechanism (IM) in linking the individual’s inclusive fitness concerns to the welfare of the given larger group is a function of three factors. These are the degree of congruence of the five recognition marker (RM), the affective intensity associated with each of the five recognition markers (AIi), and the population size of the larger group (GS). As the degree of congruence of the recognition markers increases, cognitive processes in the identification mechanism are expected to function more effectively to select and bond the individual to a preferred larger group. As affective intensity associated with each recognition marker increases, the individual’s emotional bond to the group is expected to become stronger. And, everything else equal, the efficiency of cognitive and emotive processes in the identification mechanism is expected to decline as group size increases. When one or more of the five recognition markers are out of step or not present, ambiguity presents itself to the cognitive and emotive processes in the identification mechanism. Allegiance to the larger group is automatically weakened. The identification mechanism tends to function most effectively



(with least ambiguity) in an ethnically homogeneous society. When the identification mechanism operates in situations of nonambiguity (cultural ethnic groups), strong nationalism results. Inclusive fitness priorities are well aligned with interests of the larger group, in-group amity/out-group enmity is easily transferred to the larger group’s boundaries, mobilization for conflict against out-groups is relatively easy, and continuities in humanity’s propensity for warfare are highly visible. When the identification mechanism operates in situations of ambiguity, such as multiethnic states, group cohesiveness is threatened. In environments shaped by balance-of-power considerations, this becomes problematic - a noncohesive group may not be trusted by its members to foster and protect their inclusive fitness priorities. When group cohesion is threatened, the identification mechanism will tend to direct membership and allegiance to a subgroup, thus fostering intergroup strife, secessionist movements within the larger group, and perhaps civil war. To avoid this, cultural incentives must be introduced to foster and protect inclusive fitness priorities. In this case, patriotism is typically used by leaders to promote group cohesion and mobilize for warfare. In the case that the identification mechanism fails to function, individuals may cease to identify with the larger group, and realign themselves into smaller groups. These smaller groups would represent new foci where recognition markers, group size, and affective intensity tend toward congruency, at least in sufficient strength to enable the identification mechanism to function. A perspective very similar to van den Berghe’s and Shaw & Wong’s theories has been presented by Vanhanen (1991, 1992). 6.10.5

Criticism

So far a brief outline of Shaw & Wong’s theory of kin selection, ethnocentrism and the seeds of warfare. "Inclusive fitness may account for xenophobia and kin group warfare", Somit (1990) commented, "but I find it unpersuasive when stretched to explain nationalism, patriotism, and contemporary warfare. I doubt, for example, that very many of the millions of soldiers who died during the last two great wars were motivated to any significant degree by the desire, conscious or unconscious, to maximize their inclusive fitness". Furthermore, one gets the impression that the authors view war as a spontaneous manifestation of mass sentiment. Little weight is given to the personal ambitions and animosities of those in high office, political rivalries, dynastic aspirations, or the capacity of the regime to compel, as well as persuade, military service. Not the many but the few make the ultimate decision to take up arms (Somit, 1990). When forced to explain variability of culture and diversity of social behavior found in different parts of the world and at different periods of time, van den



Berghe and Shaw & Wong as well as other evolutionary theorists have to do this by invoking the usual and proximate explananda such as specific historical circumstances and contingencies, particular cultural patterns, sociological processes and psychological mechanisms (Richmond, 1987). The question, for example, "why were some primitive peoples more belligerent than others, and some not belligerent at all?" cannot be easily answered by Shaw & Wong’s theory. Given that band-level and tribal peoples were all more or less ethnocentric, where does the huge variation in belligerence stem from? Clearly factors such as the intertribal political constellation, ecological constraints, cultural traditions and mores, historical contingencies, societal configurations, and individual cognitions and inclinations here interact in a highly complex fashion. Other than Shaw & Wong seem to believe, many nonbelligerent primitive peoples are known to have existed (besides the Eskimo, Semai and Siriono they mention), and many of them even still exist (see Ch. 7). The institute of (primitive) war has been subject to changes in form, function and motivation related to sociopolitical levels and historical stages. The development of warrior sodalities within tribal societies, and of military aristocracies within states, for example, have brought about new levels of typical social motivation for war which had not existed previously. For the evidence of historical wars (wars in recorded human history) - in order to illustrate human ’war proneness’ - Shaw & Wong quote the ’magical’ figures of 14,500 wars during the last 5,600 years of recorded history, with peace comprising only 8% of the entire history of recorded civilization. These figures have been shown, however, to be a hoax or a mystification (Jongman & van der Dennen, 1988). It is one of those myths which have acquired the status of ’scientific fact’ due to uncritical quoting of ’authoritative’ sources. Jongman & van der Dennen have shown that these imaginary figures have no factual basis 5 whatsoever . Wars and warlike actions have been, were, and are in the contemporary world highly exceptional (and mostly marginal) events (in spite of the history books which capitalize on war and the rumours of war): See Harbottle, 1904; Bodart, 5

Jongman & van der Dennen (1988) discovered, partly by sheer luck, the historical source of these ‘magical figures’: the work of an obscure French philosopher, Odysse Barot, Lettres sur la philosophie de l’histoire (Paris, 1864), in which Barot claims to have counted 8397 treaties between 1496 B.C. and A.D. 1861 (which were later extrapolated to 14,500 wars during a period of 5560 years), and, furthermore, to have found the ratio of 13 years of war to every year of peace (which is the basis for the rather nonsensical figure of 8% of peace during the history of civilization). These figures are total fantasy to begin with (Barot nowhere presents any shred of evidence), erroneously interpreted, and tenaciously presented as facts in the pertinent literature, mostly with the addition of the equally ‘magical’ number of 3,640,000,000 people killed in these wars. The war figures hoax has been exposed earlier by Haydon (1962), and Singer & Small (1972), but they were unable to explain the arbitrariness of the figures, or to trace the historical source of the grandiose claims.



1908, 1916; Woods & Baltzly, 1915; Dumas & Vedel-Peterson, 1923; Sorokin, 1937; Q.Wright, 1942; Klingberg, 1945, 1966; Nef, 1950; Richardson, 1960; Perré, 1961, 1962; Wood, 1968; Leckie, 1970; Clarke, 1971; Alker & Bock, 1972; Singer & Small, 1972; Beer, 1974; Stefflre, 1974; van der Dennen, 1981; Small & Singer, 1982; Dyer, 1985; Dupuy & Dupuy, 1986; Houweling & Siccama, 1986; Luard, 1986; O'Connell, 1989; Seabury & Codevilla, 1989; Barash, 1991; a.o. The total number of war casualties during the last 5 centuries - including the 20th century with its two World Wars - fluctuates between 1.5 and 3 percent of the total population. Indeed, compared to the number of victims of the infectious diseases that plague mankind, this number dwindles into insignificance. "Those who enjoy wars can excuse their taste by saying that wars after all are much less deadly than disease" Richardson (1960) remarked sardonically in his Statistics of Deadly Quarrels. These figures are not meant to disparage the problem of war, but to put it in proper perspective. The sober fact is that wars are not nearly as frequent or normal as Shaw & Wong seem to envisage. Neither normatively/idealtypically nor statistically (summing over all possible dyads in the international system) can wars be considered 'normal'. Recently, Barash (1991) reached a comparable conclusion: "By some measures, war has actually been relatively unimportant on the human scene. Based on the number of national states existing since 1815, there have been approximately 16,000 nation-years, and during this time, war has occupied 'only' 600 of these nation-years, or somewhat less than 4 percent of the possible total. The twentieth century has been, overall, a very warlike one, and yet modern warfare, even with its enormous capacity for devastation, was directly responsible for fewer than about 2 percent of all human deaths occurring during that time" (Barash, 1991). What seems to be the most serious problem in the evolutionary ethnocentrism theory as exposed by Shaw & Wong is that as soon as group competition for resources and the balance-of-power concept is introduced, the foregoing considerations of kin selection, nepotism, xenophobia and ethnocentrism seem to dwindle into insignificance as their role as explanatory categories vanishes. The theories presented by van den Berghe and Shaw & Wong also do not adequately explain why warfare is not more widely distributed in the animal kingdom. The most scathing criticism of (evolutionary) ethnocentrism theory has been formulated by Ferguson & Whitehead (1992): "With astonishing frequency, in popular media and even scholarly tracts, one finds collective violence explained as an outgrowth of 'tribal loyalties'. With greater or lesser biologism, it is asserted that humans are fundamentally tribalistic in orientation, and that relations between tribes are inherently hostile. In other words, people tend to identify blindly with their own social group or 'tribe', and to react with virtually instinctive animosity toward those belonging



to other groups... Stereotypes of savages nothwithstanding, it would be an extremely rare occurrence for members of one tribe to attack members of another simply because they are different, apart from any other source of conflict... Any idea that an innate sense of tribalism inclines people toward collective violence is sheer fantasy". In other words, ethnic conflicts do not occur in an economic or political vacuum; but at the same time the salience of the political and economic dimensions of the conflict make it increasingly invisible as an ’ethnic’ conflict. 6.10.6

Epilogue

As soon as xenophobic fear of other groups combines with feelings of moral and social superiority of one’s own group, it takes relatively little effort to escalate conflicts to violent levels of settlement. Without some form of groupconforming collective perception, however, intergroup violence would be hardly imaginable (Falger, 1987, 1994).



7 The Politics of Peace in Primitive Societies: The Adaptive Rationale behind Corroboree and Calumet War makes rattling good history; but peace is poor reading. Thomas Hardy War: long periods of tedium interspersed with moments of terror. Walter Goldschmidt Peace: a period of cheating between two periods of fighting Ambrose Bierce, Devil’s Dictionary

7.1 Introduction Hominid/human warfare probably evolved as a facultative male-coalitional reproductive strategy, as it did in chimpanzees (See Ch. 3). The concept of an evolutionary strategy does not necessitate the ’dogma’ of Universal Human Belligerence (van der Dennen, 1990), nor even aggression (the proximate mechanism of contest competition at the individual level) as (prime) motivation. Peaceable preindustrial peoples constitute a nuisance to most theories of warfare and they are thus either ’explained away’, denied, or negated 1 (contending theories, with few exceptions , have also tended to severely underestimate the costs of war to the individuals involved as well as to the community). Peaceability and warlikeness are, however, not Platonic essences but the outcomes of a rational (Realpolitical) cost/benefit calculus (though the benefits of war or peace to the warrior-participants are not always prima facie obvious) and an adaptive response (in the Darwinian sense) to particular sociopolitical ecologies. Most people seem to prefer peace when they can afford it, i.e., when they can solve the internal problem of the ’male fierce warrior syndrome’, and the external problem of being left ’in peace’ by other peoples. 1

Materialist theory, as formulated by Ferguson, is one such exception: "[I]n contrast to the Hobbesian view, we should find nonwar, the absence of active fighting, in the absence of challenges to material well-being" (Ferguson, 1984). Where the costs of initiating violence outweigh the benefits, war is expected to be absent (Durham, 1976; Symons, 1979; Braun & Plog, 1982; Ferguson, 1984, 1990, 1994). There is no theoretical reason to deny the possibility of peaceful societies. Indeed, "there may be alternative peaceable and militaristic trajectories of evolution" (Ferguson, 1994).



The ecological roots of peace may be as complex as, or even more so than, the roots of violence and war. There may be as many reasons for peaceability as there are for war: Nonviolence may be a response to overwhelming odds; it may be the taming effect of defeat; it may be enforced by colonial or imperial powers; it may be the result of isolation and/or xenophobia; it may be due to a negative cost/benefit balance of war, making peace more opportune under the given circumstances; it may be due to a voluntary decision to abstain from or abandon violence, or to a nonviolent ethic or pacifistic ideology; or some combination of all these factors. As Dentan (1992) reminds us: "[P]eaceability is not disability, not a cultural essence unrelated to a people’s actual circumstances. It should not be surprising that nonviolent peoples can become violent or vice versa. Nor does violence in a particular time and place necessarily indicate that peaceability in a different time or place is illusory". Thus, warlike people are quite capable of peacefulness, while peaceable peoples are perfectly capable of violence under altered circumstances. From the point of view of evolutionary psychobiology, if war is so universal and ubiquitous as has been claimed by advocates of the Universal Human Belligerence theorem, the mere fact of peace constitutes a problem, and we would have to develop a theory of peace as an abnormal, anomalous condition. Gregor (1990) has actually proposed such a perspective: "Comparative research on the cause of war and peace is based on the hidden premises that peace is an expectable state of affairs in human relationships were it not for conflict. Peace is the absence of conflict, and it is conflict that needs to be explained (Cf. Haas, 1990)". Gregor’s perspective is the reverse: "Political systems are so volatile and war is so contagious that its existence should occasion little surprise. It is peace that needs special explanation" (Gregor, 1990). If we were to translate Gregor’s proposition in terms of health and disease, it would read something like: Organisms are so vulnerable and diseases are so ubiquitous and contagious, that it is health which requires special explanation. In this chapter I shall argue that the claim of universal human belligerence is grossly exaggerated; and that those students who have been developing theories of war, proceeding from the premise that peace is the ’normal’ situation, have not been erring nincompoops or starry-eyed utopians; and that peace - the continuation of potentially conflictuous interactions between discernible groups of human beings with other means (to paraphrase the famous Clausewitzian dictum) - in primitive peoples is just as much a deliberate and conscious and rational political strategy, based on cost/benefit considerations and ethical judgments, as is war. The supposition that war evolved as a reproductive strategy does not contradict the notion of peace as the normal condition among primitive peoples. An evolved strategy specifies the (ecological) condition or range of conditions that may make the warring behavior profitable or ’adaptive’ (involving assessment,



cognitive processing, and alternative courses of action chosen on the basis of expected fitness payoffs). Conversely, it specifies under what (range of) 2 conditions war is not advantageous or profitable .

7.2 The Security Dilemma For Warre, consisteth not in Battell onely, or the act of fighting; but in a tract of time, wherein the Will to contend by Battell is sufficiently known... As the nature of foul weather lieth not in a shower or two of rain, but in an inclination thereto of many days together; so the nature of war consisteth not in actual fighting, but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is PEACE (Hobbes, 1651).

General Robert E. Lee is reported to have said that "it is a good thing that war is so horrible or else we would grow too fond of it". The statement by Davie (1929) that "Men like war" is as apodictic as it is general (referring to all men), and obstinately reiterated to the present day. Lately, van Creveld (1991) stated (with a similar universal pretense): "However unpalatable the fact, the real reason why we have wars is that men like fighting, and women like those men who are prepared to fight on their behalf" (Cf. William James, 1910; Freud, 1930; Dart, 1953; Freeman, 1964; Washburn & Lancaster, 1968; Hallpike, 1973; among many others). Goodall (1986) observed a great eagerness in young prime male chimpanzees for the behaviors involved in male raiding parties, but she also points out quite emphatically that there are distinct individual differences. Fox (1991; Cf. Klineberg, 1964; Enzensberger, 1966) seems to advance what may be called a Bad Seed or Rotten Apple theory of war: One rotten apple soon spoils the whole basket. Similarly, one or a few percent of hyperaggressive or belligerent males distributed more or less at random throughout the megapopulation would be sufficient to create a rampant war complex among all the demes involved. The "potentials for aggressivity are not uniform but are normally distributed in any population. Thus, in any naturally occuring population, only about 1% of the individuals will be hyperaggressive" (Fox, 1991). But this one percent might be responsible for the horrors of internecine wars. There is a much more ’tragic’ variant of this theory in which no one has to 2

The cost/benefit equation of war is a complex one. The advantages, the potential gains, of going to war apply only to certain patterns of competition and resource distribution. Other conditions may make the peaceful coexistence of neighboring bands an adaptive strategy for all concerned (Alcock, 1979). Harsh ecosystems may, for example, have promoted peaceful relations among the widely dispersed groups of central Arctic Inuit (Eskimo). Furthermore, warfare is expected to be less frequent or absent when contiguous tribal units contain close relatives. And thirdly, there is the risk that an attack will destroy the possibility of mutually beneficial arrangements between groups, whether related or not.



harbor ill will. The expectation or suspicion thereof is sufficient for a rampant war complex to develop. Virulent war complexes do not have to be explained by some evil streak in human nature, but can be understood - at least in part - as the result of a war 3 trap, from which nobody can disengage on penalty of annihilation . Bands, tribes, city-states and nation-states can probably best conceived of as survival units in the sense of Elias (1978; Cf. van Benthem van den Berg, 1984); units which have exercised comparatively strict control over the use of physical violence in the relations between their members, whereas at the same time they have allowed, and often encouraged, their members to use physical violence against non-members. Such survival units are, on all levels, trapped in double-bind figurations and processes; they confront a security dilemma. Double-bind figurations are formed by "human groups which are interdependent because each of them is without redress, without the chance to appeal for protection to any superior force of to a binding code of self-restraint and civilized conduct, exposed to the possible use of violence by the other group. Wherever human groups are arranged in the form of such a figuration they are with great regularity drawn into a power struggle and, if they form the top of an inter-state hierarchy, into a hegemonial struggle with a strong self-perpetuating tendency" (Elias, 1978). Primitive societies, like modern nation-states, are trapped in a security dilemma. Simple game-theoretical analysis reveals why such a situation most of the time results in an equilibrial stalemate of mutual deterrence (assuming short term rational choices of actors) even if none of the actors harbors evil intentions or sinister motives (or is equipped with aggressive/violent/belligerent 4 drives, urges or instincts) . Richerson (1995) advances what he calls the ’evolutionary tragedy’ hypothesis: Warfare is liable to evolve even if it makes everybody worse off. It is the perversion of the situation (the logic of the war ’game’) rather than that of the actors involved. The only practical way to avoid victimization by aggressors and to avoid most wars is to deter attack by being conspicuously prepared to 3

The Kapauku Papuans do not find warfare profitable. Pospisil (1963) quotes one leader as saying: "War is bad and nobody likes it. Sweet potatoes disappear, pigs disappear, fields deteriorate and many relatives and friends get killed". Yet, willy-nilly the Kapauku too are caught in the war trap, in the web of internecine conflicts that seems to be ubiquitous, because, as one Kapauku man explained: "[N]obody can help it. A man starts a fight and no matter how much one despises him, one has to go and help because he is one’s relative and one feels sorry for him" (quoted in Goldschmidt, 1994). 4

"We need not postulate an instinctive predisposition to violence to explain the violence or violence-provoking behavior [among groups, bands, tribes or states]. The only necessary premises are a modicum of acquisitiveness, a scarcity of some valued amenity, and the absence of strong internal and external inhibitions against violence; given these conditions, the violence is an unsurprising resultant of rational calculations on both sides" (S.Brown, 1994).



fight. Deterrence - the dissuasion of an action by means of the threat of imposing costs on the potential aggressor in excess of his or her anticipated gains, even though not necessarily prevailing over the aggressor - may appear to be the most efficacious means of controlling violence. In basically anarchic situations the deterrence of violent behavior often requires that the individuals or groups trying to protect themselves display a credible ability and will to inflict unacceptable damage on their would-be attackers (e.g., S.Brown, 1994). Preemptive attack in such a situation may have the advantage of reducing uncertainty. Also the advertizement of retaliation, threat, and once in a while actually spreading terror, may enhance one’s credibility as a fierce and fearsome opponent. A people may intentionally attempt to develop a reputation horrific enough to deter future opponents. Deterrence rests upon participants’ fears of the other’s destructive capabilities. Too much fear, however, may be a destabilizing force. See also the analyses by Barrington Moore (1972) and de Vree (1982), who deduce violence and warfare purely from the dynamics of human interactions. The security dilemma in which (primitive) peoples find themselves has the formal structure of a Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) in which individual short-term rational behavior leads to a collectively irrational outcome: All parties involved defect and lose (in terms of casualties, destruction of property, costs of war preparations, opportunity costs, etc.). In a relatively stable socio-ecological environment (in which each society knows its and others’ place, numerical strength, retaliatory capacity, etc.) to be on the alert and be prepared to defend itself may be a beneficial strategy resulting in a kind of peace through insulation with only sporadic and incidental flares of overt violence. In this case, which has the formal structure of an iterated PD, diplomacy and peace become viable options. In such an iterated PD situation, when both parties know each other more or less intimately, and expect future interactions, mutual suspicion and xenophobic fear can give rise to mutual caution and diplomatic maneuvering, but only if there also is a higher (e.g., tribal) authority to stop the private-enterprise revenge raiding, or relax the obligations of the blood feud (and the concomitant male ideal of the macho warrior, and social privileges attached to the warrior role). As Goldschmidt (1994) points out, the problem of internal dissatisfaction with existing peace treaties among acephalous societies is a recurrent one. The problem is caused partly by (a) distrust and fear; and (b) inability to restrain the (entrepreneurial raiding of the) warriors. Ad (a): At a peace conference attended by Salish, Spokane, and several other Plateau tribes, an old Spokane warrior said: "A state of peace has always been a time of anxiety, we were willing to trust and sure to be deceived" (Tyrrell, 1916). The alliance was rejected as a result of this distrust, and in the next



hunting season many Salish were killed. Ad (b): The Assiniboine established amity with the Gros Ventre. The peace lasted for four years to the advantage of the Assiniboine, but though the Gros Ventre desired to maintain the peace, according to Denig (1952), "the Assiniboines were not united enough among themselves for this end". Some warriors were dissatisfied with the peace offerings and began to steal the Gros Ventre horses. Similarly, a peace mission of a Crow chief to the Blackfeet was abruptly and definitely ended when two Crow warriors used the opportunity to get revenge by killing two Blackfeet (Chittenden & Richardson, 1905). The Cheyenne could not make peace until they had cleared the issue with the Dog Soldiers, their ’elite troops’, who would make sure that the peace would not block their path to glory and wealth (Grinnell, 1915; Jablow, 1951; Llewellyn & Hoebel, 1941). In a similar vein, when the Big Men of the Mae Enga and other New Guinea tribes wish to negotiate a peace, they must persuade the warriors to agree. The above examples are collected by Goldschmidt (1994), who adds the following conclusion: "Even when the population is war weary, even when there is a genuine need for peace, the peace is fragile precisely because there remain those who feel that their masculinity, by which we mean their social identity, is lost if they do not press their cause", that is, the hatchet will not be ceremonially buried, when there is no acceptable face-saving device (peace with honor) for the fierce warriors. Nevertheless, even in a situation of chronic insecurity, the acceptance of mitigating rules of combat, of a common law of war and peace, is in accordance with enlightened self-interest: "Die Annahme bestimmter Kampfesregeln entspricht schließlich einem wohlverstandenen Selbstinteresse" (Mühlmann (1940). Rules for war mitigation and a common law of war and peace can gradually 5 develop (only) in a situation of hereditary enmity . The resulting, so-called restrictive (rather 'restricted' or ritualized) wars, as Tefft (1988, 1990) calls them, enable political communities to pursue their economic and political interests relatively free of maladaptive consequences. These wars, Tefft says, being largely wars of redress, are limited in duration and destructiveness. Tribes involved in such conflicts often have institutionalized checks limiting the levels of intertribal violence (Cf. Langness, 1973).

5

"Wenn wir uns fragen, wann und wo solche Regelungen möglich sind, so müssen wir uns sagen: Sie können sich nur zwischen Erbfeinden, zwischen traditionell verfeindeten nachbarlichen Stämmen allmählich einspielen und im Laufe der Zeiten zu einer Art von Gewohnheitsrecht werden" (Mühlmann, 1940).



7.3 Fierce Peoples? Many peoples traditionally considered to be ’fierce’ or ’ferocious’ are, as Turney-High (1949) noticed, militarily rather inept. Even tribes such as the Apache, Seri, Karankawa, Masai, Kikuyu, Yanomamö, Carib, Plains Indians, Iroquois, Hurons, Modoc, Mohave, and Maori who traditionally have a reputation of extreme warlikeness, may actually ill deserve such a reputation. For example, the fighting of the Apaches had "more the character of assassination and murder than warfare" (Bancroft, 1875). There is considerable evidence that the Iroquoian Confederacy (League of the Iroquois, comprising the Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, Cayuga, Seneca, and, later, the Tuscarora) started as an attempt to establish peace; "one of the League's great objects was to maintain peace and to break up the spirit of warfare, and to live in harmony with the neighboring peoples" (Hale, 1886; Cf. Colden, 1747; Hartland, 1921; Holsti, 1913; Mooney, 1894; Morgan, 1851; Murdock, 1934; Numelin, 1950; Radin, 1932; Speck, 1945; Tozzer, 1925; Wissler, 1923). "Not before the formation of the famous league in 1570 did the different tribes of the Iroquois display any particular propensity to warfare, but as soon as the league was established 'a thirst for military glory' arose among them, and this again was promoted by the facility with which firearms were procured from the Dutch and English (Morgan, 1851; Cf. Mooney, 1894)" (Holsti, 1913). The same is true of the Powhatan Confederacy comprising the majority of the tribes of Virginia and Maryland (Mooney, 1907). "The Iroquois League was founded as an experiment in practical pacifism, an institution to put down war. The Iroquois horror of needless bloodshed was probably real, for they believed in the brotherhood of man and the fatherhood of the Manitou, which they sought to impress on all peoples. Those who rejected this noble principle were thought unworthy of life, and fit only for extermination" (Turney-High, 1949). Their main adversaries were the Hurons: "This nation (Hurones) is very timid... they take no precautions against surprise, they are not careful to prepare arms or to inclose their villages with palisades; their usual recourse, especially when the enemy is powerful, is flight" (Brébeuf, in Thwaites, 1896). Kroeber (1925) gives the following sobering account of Modoc exploits: "Their military reputation rests mainly on the famous Modoc war of 1872-73 [against the American army]. Their raiding of the Achomawi of Pit River has also been exploited. That they were the better warriors is undisputable. But if they had conducted annual raids, slaughtering the men and dragging the women and children off to sell at The Dalles [as the horror story goes], the Achomawi would long since have ceased to exist instead of being found by the Americans a fairly numerous and resistant tribe in a rather adverse habitat, and



being today one of the most populous groups in California". In fact, Kroeber states, investigation may reveal that the slave raiding consisted of only two or three incidents, and that the basis of all the clashes may have been a mere vengeance feud such as sooner or later embroiled almost all Californian groups. Thus it is known that while the Modoc fought with certain Achomawi groups or villages, they remained friendly with others. "The Mohave Indians of the Colorado River valley are by reputation a warlike tribe, although my informants insisted that the people as a whole were pacifically inclined. It was asserted that, while war was disliked by a majority of the Mohave, battle was the dominant concern of the kwanamis (’brave men’), who were responsible for the recurrent hostilities and over whom there was no effective control" (Stewart, 1947). Although the Seri came to be regarded, with considerable justification, as a fierce people, there is no indication that they were initially hostile to outsiders (Bowen, 1983). The Masai (Maasai) in East Africa were formerly described as "a relatively peaceful race" (Merker, 1904). In response to invasion by the Masai, the Kikuyu "a once peaceful agricultural tribe had become a warring one, losing its native culture in exchange for a pastoral and foreign one" (Dyk, 1931; see also Kenyatta, 1938). "Meinicke (1875) does not give a favourable account of the character of the Melanesians in general. They are rude, warlike, and excitable. Nevertheless, Dr. Codrington (1891) testifies that the slaughter in their wars is insignificant. With regard to a really fierce warrior race, the Maori, Mr. Taylor (1870) gives an account to the effect that ’before firearms were introduced the battle was chiefly a trial of skill and strength between the principal chiefs, and the fall of one was often the signal of flight of his people’; and even in the case of a general fight the slaughter was inconsiderable (Gudgeon, 1902)" (Holsti, 1913). Many subdivisions of the Yanomamö were, and are, according to Ferguson (1992), not nearly as violent and belligerent as those described and made (in)famous by Chagnon (1968 et seq.). Smole (1976), Ramos (e.g., 1987), Lizot (1985, 1989), Albert (1989, 1990), and Good (1991), who have conducted field research among the Yanomamö, have found Chagnon's reports of violence inapplicable to the people they studied. Lizot (1985), who spent many years among them, criticized the Hobbesian view of the Yanomamö: "I would like my book to help revise the exaggerated representation that has been given of Yanomami violence. The Yanomami are warriors: they can be brutal and cruel, but they can also be delicate, sensitive, and loving. Violence is sporadic; it never dominates social life for any length of time, and long peaceful moments can separate two explosions". Another people made infamous in early reports were the Carib, notorious for cannibalism and slave raiding. "Although both practices do appear in the earliest contact reports, as my colleague Neil Whitehead has shown, the Carib



reputation for cannibalism was deliberately inflated. The more careful and less self-serving accounts show that cannibalism was a limited ritual practice in which warriors ate small portions of individuals they captured. Because Spanish law made cannibal tribes fair game for immediate enslavement, Europeans employed stories of huge cannibal buffets as a pretext" (Ferguson, 1992). Similarly, the allegedly warlike and ferocious cannibals, the Karankawa, may well have been a "rather inoffensive, poorly known, much put upon, extinct, coastal people" (Newcomb, 1983), much maligned by early Spanish sources. Their ’ferocious cannibalism’ being nothing more than the customary ritual/religious type, which was prevalent in the region. "The military ambition of the Blackfeet was satisfied when the war party had succeeded in killing one adversary, and great festivities were arranged on account of a single scalp" (Holsti, 1913; referring to McClintock, 1910). "Among the Oakinacken Indians, ’the moment a chief... falls, fighting gives place to mourning; they get discouraged and instantly fly without disgrace, and the battle is ended (Ross, 1849)’" (Holsti, 1913). Finally, and paradoxically, the Plains Indians’ warrior complex with its emphasis on solism and individual feats of bravery and bravado (as exemplified by counting coup; touching the enemy, whether alive or dead, was the ultimate act of bravery) actually limited violence, so that warfare, though incessant, boiled down to a series of small-scale raids of a few ’braves’ striking coup and stealing horses, which were far more important objectives than killing the enemy.

7.4 The Inventory of Allegedly Peaceful Societies ’Simple’ human societies, according to Knauft (1991, 1994; see Ch. 5) place great emphasis on generalized reciprocity and far less on balanced competition or negative reciprocity. Concomitantly, ethnocentrism and collective military action or warfare tend to be rudimentary of absent in simple human societies. This contrasts in aggregate terms with more complex, sedentary, food-producing societies, among which subsistence and demographic intensification are associated with increasing property ownership and status inequality, and increasingly competitive politicoeconomic and military rivalry (e.g., Fried, 1967; Carneiro, 1970, 1981; Price & Brown, 1985; Johnson & Earle, 1987; Ingold, Riches & Woodburn, 1988-89; Upham, 1990; Maryanski & Turner, 1992). Accordingly, we should be able to find a number of such ’simple’ societies without war, or with only rudimentary war, in the literature. Swanton (1943) surveyed the anthropological literature and found that there were about as many societies that were peaceable as warlike. Leavitt (1977) found war absent or rare in 73% of hunting and gathering societies (n=22), 41% of simple horticultural (n=22), and 17% of advanced horticultural societies (n=29). Van der Bij (1929) and Bonta (1993) both present inventories of a great number of



peaceful peoples. In the Appendices, I present my own inventory, investigation and evaluation of the primitive (preindustrial, acephalous, band-level, tribal) societies which have been claimed to be highly unwarlike (i.e., war reported to be absent or mainly defensive), and peoples (ethnies) with allegedly mild, low-level and/or ritualized warfare, together with the main sources. This inventory is part of my ongoing Ethnological Inventory Project (see e.g., van der Dennen, 1988, 1990), which purports to catalogue all primitive societies mentioned in the ethnographical literature, and describe and categorize the characteristics of their warring and/or feuding behavior (or the absence thereof). The criteria I used for inclusion in this list of allegedly peaceful peoples are the following: It is stipulated by the observer that ! ! ! ! ! !

fighting does not exceed the level of petty feuding (mostly for purposes of revenge); or warfare is explicitly and only for defense; or fighting results in none to few casualties; or an ethic of nonviolence is present; or the particular ethny is ’peaceful’, ’peaceable’, ’not hostile’ or similar terms, or the particular ethny is ’inept at warfare’ or ’unfamiliar with warfare’ or similar terms.

My inventory deviates from other lists of allegedly peaceful peoples because my criteria (mainly the absence of offensive warfare) are different from those applied by the other authors, who focus mainly on intrasocietal absence of ’aggression’ or conflict behavior generally, or presence of ’harmony’, etc. (which excludes the Balinese, Fiji Islanders, Samoans, Solomon Islanders, Tahitians, and Toraja, a.o.). Furthermore, my inventory excludes cenobites (i.e., non-ethnic, religion-based, and contemporary peace groups, such as Hutterites, Mennonites, Quakers, etc.), as well as contemporary nation-states (such as Koreans, Thai, etc. included in Textor, 1967; and Bonta, 1993). The evidence of a substantial number of peoples without warfare, or with mainly defensive and/or low-level warfare (i.e., seldom exceeding the level of petty feuding) does not support the view of universal human belligerence. It does not support the equally erroneous view of universal peaceability either. Rather, it supports Mühlmann's (1940) and Dentan's (1992) view that peace as well as war are the results of illuminated and opportunistic self-interest in the political arena, "an adaptive response (in the Darwinian sense) to particular political ecologies" (Dentan, 1992).



Knauft (1991) concluded, on the basis of his theoretical considerations, that "Generalizations about human societal evolution are easily biased by HRAF samples weighted heavily with middle-range societies, which are far more numerous in the ethnographic record than simple ones though they have persisted for a much shorter period of evolutionary time". Results of my Ethnological Inventory Project also suggest that the HRAF cross-cultural standard samples may be skewed in the direction of overrepresentation of complex (in the sense of Knauft) societies, in which economic and/or political war motives are more conspicuous than in ’simple’ societies. Van der Bij (1929) concluded that primitive peoples were peaceful because they were primitive. Steinmetz (1929), on the other hand, concluded that primitive peoples were primitive because they were peaceful. Steinmetz thereby reiterated the statement by Gumplowicz (1892) that peaceful peoples "bleiben auf der Stufe der Affen" [remain on the level of monkeys]. (Gumplowicz, by the way, admits that ethnology offers numerous examples of such peaceful peoples, without giving any explanation of why and how these monkey-like peaceful peoples have been able to survive in so warlike a world as he envisaged). One might have expected such argumentation to have disappeared with the demise of Social Darwinism, but it did not. A similar kind of argument was revived by Morris (1967), who considered primitive peoples "remote cultural backwaters so atypical and unsuccessful that they are nearly extinct"; they are to be considered stultified non-mainstream humans. Needless to say, I do not endorse such a caricature.

7.5 Peace as the Normal Condition "No general golden age of peace existed at any stage of human history nor did any general iron age of war. Neither the Rousseauian nor the Hobbesian concept of natural man is adequate" (Q.Wright, 1942). "[S]ome people live in what appears to be a Rousseauian paradise because they take a Hobbesian view of their situation: they walk softly because they believe it necessary not to offend others whom they regard as dangerous" (Colson, 1974).

"The question has been raised whether the traditional view of early society as one of constant warfare is really justified by the facts. There is, in fact, no doubt that to speak of a state of war as normal is in general a gross exaggeration" Hobhouse, Wheeler & Ginsberg (1915) conclude in their extensive survey of some 650 primitive peoples (see Ch. 2). "On the face of it, a disproportionate interest in warfare by anthropologists is strange. For human society to persist, even the most violent of them, there must be order, sociability, reciprocity, cooperation and empathy - perhaps, even



compassion and love. In even the most warlike societies, the vast preponderance of time is spent in the pursuit of ordinary, peaceful activities that embody these qualities" (Gregor & Sponsel, 1994). The unsentimental military analyst Turney-High (1949) proved, in several parts of his work on primitive war, to be a perceptive and keen psychologist. He observed that "primitive war, in spite of the dancing about, honors-counting, scalping, and head-hunting, was remarkably tame. Perhaps this is because it so rarely was thoroughly economic. One might even be justified in observing that feelings were more often hurt than bodies, that primitive war was more psychological than lethal. In all but a few areas the bloodiness of primitive war has been greatly exaggerated... Cold-blooded slaughter has really never been approved by the bulk of mankind. All have understood the amenities of peace to a greater or less degree. Civilized and savage men understand that war requires regulation and that human death is full of mana, which is a fearsome thing... Peace, then, seems to be the normal situation in the minds of even warlike peoples (Turney-High, 1949; italics added). In discussing the Inevitability Belief (i.e., the belief that war is ’natural’ and, therefore, inevitable, Ferguson (1989a) notes: Another version [of the Inevitability Belief] is that war is a natural form of expression for politically autonomous groups. This Hobbesian view is discussed and criticized elsewhere (Bennett Ross, 1980; Ferguson, 1984, 1986). Supporting the Hobbesian view is the corollary belief that war is universal, found in all societies. But there are societies without war (Fabbro, 1980). In fact, the claim for universality can only be advanced by relying on several dubious procedures: letting one cultural subdivision with war represent a broader cultural grouping which includes some groups without war; letting war at any point in time count, and disregarding what may be much more typical periods of peace; and when these fail, falling back on the untestable assertion that a peaceful people might have had war before the Westerners arrived. Even if we focus on societies where warfare is an undisputed occurrence, periods of active warfare involving a given group usually are relatively brief. The vast majority of humans, living or dead, have spent most of their lives at peace. So one can agree with Hobbes that politically autonomous groups have the potential for war, but this tells us nothing about why real war occurs. Contrary to the Hobbesian image, peace is the normal human condition (Ferguson, 1989a; italics added).



7.6 Prudent Feuders Many instances exist in which tribal communities will not support members in their personal vendettas against outsiders in fear that such revenge actions may escalate intercommunity violence which would prove detrimental to the collective interests of the whole community. In certain instances the community may turn a murderer over to the victim’s kin (A.Moore, 1978). Sally Moore (1972) has argued that in situations of homicidal ’self-help’ nonliterate people consider kin units such as patriclans to be corporate entities that share corporate liability. In the classical case, any adult male member of a first group can legitimately avenge a homicidal grievance against a particular individual in a second group by killing any of that group’s adult males. When one of their members has become incorrigibly reckless in the matter of actions likely to invite such homicidal retaliation, there are three ways to avoid unnecessary feuds: (1) They may send the culprit into exile; (2) they may renounce the clan’s responsibility to avenge him, giving other clans a free license to hunt him down; or (3) his own clan may put him to death (S.Moore, 1972; Boehm, 1986b). "A clan system of collectivized self-defense and liability ’works’ only if clan members are reasonably prudent in committing homicides or in otherwise stimulating members of other clans to kill them. Too much heroic aggressiveness can embroil a clan in so many feuds that it faces serious decimation or cannot earn its subsistence. Warriors living in feuding societies [such as the Pathans (Pashtun) and Montenegrins] are aware of these costs, and mostly they behave accordingly - that is, prudently. They try to be as aggressive as honor demands, but also try not to initiate feuds recklessly or pointlessly" (Boehm, 1986b).

7.7 Peacefulness Does Not Equal Pusillanimity or ’Gentleness’ When Gregor (1990) tried to find comparative data to complement his study of the relatively peaceful Xingu communities, he was frustrated by the minimal number of peaceful peoples he could find. He writes: Other researchers, who have combed the literature more systematically than myself, have reached the same conclusion. Thus Richard Sipes notes in his study of war and combative sports: ’Relatively peaceful societies are not easy to find. I had to investigate 130 societies to find eleven, of which five were rejected because of insufficient information’ (1973: 68).



Similarly, Otterbein (1970) found only four peaceful cultures among the fifty in his study of the evolution of war. Turning to advanced, state-level societies the searcher for peace becomes even more disheartened... The societies that come closest to fitting the model of the truly peaceful culture are small in scale and primarily hunters and foragers. This conclusion is in keeping with research on war by Wright... and others who have positively associated war with community size and cultural development. Peaceful peoples also tend to be geographically isolated. Otterbein (1970), for example, finds that societies lacking in military organizations, such as the Copper Eskimo, the Dorobo and the Tikopians, live on islands, mountain tops, arctic wastelands and plateaus surrounded by malaria infested jungles. In some cases this isolation is a strategic adaptation to dealing with more aggressive societies that surround them. In most instances, however, peaceful societies appear to achieve their status by evading rather than solving the problems of intertribal relations (Gregor, 1990). Isolation, splendid or not, seems prima facie to be the most prominent condition for peacefulness. So much so, in fact, that Mühlmann (1936, 1940) virtually identified peaceful peoples with Rückzugsvölker (litt. evading/retreating peoples). Why could Gregor find so few peaceful peoples? One of the reasons might be simply because his criteria were wrong. We do not demand absolute extramarital chastity in order to classify a people as monogamous. Yet, in order to classify a people as ’peaceable’, we demand not only absolute proof of the absence of warring and feuding, but also the absence of every trace of intragroup violence, aggression, and even assertiveness. We quite unrealistically require them to be ’gentle’ and pusillanimous in all walks of life. As Turney-High (1949) observed: "Such warless people have by no means been friendly and pacific. They have not been ignorant of how to shed human blood, nor have they abhorred it. Neither have they been without social institutions which formalized man-killing. The lack of organized war may demonstrate certain points, but it should not be overstressed, as it sometimes is. Field ethnology no more demonstrates that a warless people are per se a kindly one than it shows that a monogamous tribe is sexually chaste" (Turney-High, 1949).



7.8 Bellicosity Does Not Equal Aggression The conspicuous absence of intergroup violence in mammals generally (only a few species apparently have mastered the art; see Ch. 3) is the major argument against a simple and naive aggression-warfare linkage. All these mammalian species do have aggression in their behavioral repertoire, but very few have war or its nonhuman equivalent (the chimpanzees of Gombe as described by Jane Goodall and others, and dolphins, in which separate groups may sometimes cooperate in attacks on rival communities, are the most convincing examples). If war were just another manifestation of aggression, intergroup agonistic behavior should be much more widespread in the animal kingdom than it actually is. Tooby & Cosmides (1988) argued that specific Darwinian algorithms must be involved (to account for the coalitional psychology supposed to be operative in chimpanzees and humans). Whatever function aggression or violence may serve in the life of the individual or the small group, Malinowski (1941) already observed, it does not serve the same function between political units. Wars between bands, tribes, states or similar political entities are not just magnified quarrels between individuals. Warfare is not just simply aggregated individual aggression. The profound misunderstanding about aggression and warlikeness, and the fundamental confusion concerning ’nonaggressive’ and ’peaceful’ is perhaps best exemplified by Heelas (1989; Cf. also Dentan, 1992), who devotes his whole contribution discussing definitions of aggression in his Search for Peaceful Peoples. It may be important to note that ’peace’ as used by Heelas and Dentan, and by many other Anglo-American authors, refers to the absence of physical violence generally (including intra- and intergroup violence), while in most other languages ’peace’ (except in such metaphors as ’peace of mind’, etc.) refers preferentially or exclusively to the absence of ’war’ (as collective, organized, armed and violent intergroup or interstate conflict). Montagu (1978) makes the same distinction between intragroup or intergroup ’aggression’ and implies that they may vary independently: "When reference is made to aggressive societies we have to be quite clear whether the reference is to intragroup or intergroup aggression. There are societies in which intergroup aggression is high but in which intragroup aggression is low, as among a number of New Guinea peoples. There are some societies in which aggression is high both within the group and between groups, as among the Yanomamö. There are societies in which both inter- and intragroup aggression is low, as among the Toda of Southern India, and there are some societies in which both inter- and intragroup aggression are nonexistent, as among the Tasaday of Mindanao, in the Philippines" (Montagu, 1978) (The Tasaday have in the



meantime been exposed as victims or perpetrators of a hoax; see Appendices). The only reasonable criterion for peacefulness is the presence or absence of offensive war or warlike behaviors (which implies that it is an intergroup phenomenon), and not the presence or absence of any and all forms of intragroup violence, or aggression, or conflict. The confusion rests on the, mostly implicit, assumption that war in some unspecified way is the result of 6 the collective outpouring of accumulated ’raw aggression’ . In a previous publication (van der Dennen, 1986) I have tried to outline the fallacies involved in this kind of reasoning, especially the fallacy of subreption (the ’moves unaccounted for’ in equating aggression and war) and the cumulative fallacy (the confounding of levels-of-analysis). It was also pointed out in that study that even in an extremely warlike society such as the Yanomamö, boys fear pain and personal danger, and that elaborate training and indoctrination is required to turn them into 'fierce warriors'. And even then men may fake illness and find other excuses to stay home or desert from a raiding party, or to call the whole enterprise off at the last moment (Chagnon, 1968 et seq.; Goldschmidt, 1988, 1989; Ferguson, 1992, 1994). In former times, anthropologists and ethnologists were very eager to classify tribes or peoples as 'warlike' or 'peaceful', without giving much consideration to the nature of this supposed 'warlikeness' or 'peacefulness'. Even the frequency of wars cannot be taken as a valid measure of 'warlikeness', if we do not consider whether the warfare is defensive or offensive, and what the motives and the issues at stake are. For example, the Pueblo Indians in New Mexico were frequently engaged in defensive warfare against marauding neighboring tribes. Yet, it makes little sense to call them 'warlike' (van der Dennen, 1986). In virtually all discussions on the warlikeness or peacefulness of primitive peoples the distinction between offensive and defensive warfare is conspicuously absent. Yet, such a distinction is crucial, if only because a defensive stance does not and can not, in itself, initiate war ("It takes two to tango"; see van der Dennen, 1986). Most students of the field seem to endorse the view that war is war, period and full stop, regardless of motives, goals and circumstances. Or as a French rhyme goes: "Cet animal est très méchant / Quand on l'attaque, il se défend". 6

According to Kennedy (1971) and numerous other authors (see van der Dennen, 1986), aggression is obviously correlated with, and an integral aspect of war, but the relationships between war and aggression are reciprocal, complex, and mediated by intervening variables. There is no simple cause and effect relationship, and as White (1949) and others have long contended, there is probably more evidence to support the proposition that war produces aggression than the reverse. Ember & Ember (1992, 1994) found empirical evidence that among primitive peoples socialization for aggression is more likely to be a consequence than a cause of war. Grudges of ‘unemployed’ warriors after coercive pacification have sometimes been (mis)construed as evidence of some kind of innate bellicosity.



Actually, it may make little sense to apply the distinction belligerent/peaceful, warlike/unwarlike too rigidly. It is not a neat, static (binary, either/or) and historically fixed dichotomy. Furthermore, to speak of societies as ’peaceful’ or ’warlike’ may analytically not be very helpful, since, as highly abstract categories, societies (groups in general) do not act purposively, as Riches (1987) has pointed out. Peace and war represent the two extremes of a whole array of collective survival strategies, ranging from collective retreat and cultural insulation to imperialist war. Many adjacent peoples lived or live in what may be termed a state of permanent peacelessness; not exactly a state of perpetual war but neither a state of perpetual peace. Sometimes originally peaceful peoples are forced by circumstances to wage defensive wars, which, in turn, generates its own dynamics toward an optimal adaptation to a potentially hostile environment. War has high ’opportunity costs’, while peace to all price carries with it high ’existential costs’ in the form of loss of life, territory, vital resources, cultural integrity, etc. Thus most peoples may be seen maneuvering, ’cybernating’ between Scylla and Charibdis, in a continual effort to reach an optimal balance. To say that man is belligerent by nature is a phrase devoid of any meaning (the savage, one might paraphrase Rousseau, is neither noble nor ignoble; he is just utterly human). Robarchek & Robarchek (1992), discussing the Waorani in Amazonia (who are probably unique in deliberately and consciously abandoning feuding and warfare; see Appendices), draw attention to the often limited options available in a hostile environment: "In such a situation, where warfare is endemic [and rampant], a people’s options are rather limited: they can either flee, fight back, or be overwhelmed. Given the sociocultural environment of the region (and with no safe refuge available), engaging in at least defensive warfare becomes a functional necessity for group survival. Warfare, under these conditions, is contagious; once one group adopts it as a tactic for advancing its ends, others must either take it up or be destroyed". The result is a more or less stable balance of terror with constant raiding among the various social groups (Robarchek & Robarchek, 1992). In such a situation, fear, as Whiffen (1915) long ago, and Mühlmann (1940) and Meyer (1977) more recently, pointed out, seems to be the predominant war motive. There is, furthermore, a strong sexist - androcentric - bias in the accounts relating aggression and warfare in primitive societies; "with a sleight-of-hand extension of man into Man... Woman is either ignored or presented as innately less aggressive than man. The arguments for a biological difference in the sexes in this regard are far from conclusive, but in cases where such a difference is put forward, the general conclusions of humanity’s aggressive nature are not revised" (Howell & Willis, 1989; for 'aggressive' read 'bellicose').



These authors also draw attention to the fact that aggression/violence/warlikeness, though considered ’natural’ (particularly or exclusively in males) is also condemned as ’bad’, while its perceived opposite, peacefulness, carries with it the negatively valued connotations of being passive and inert, qualities which are associated with females. One might go so far as to state that for many males in primitive communities, as well as in our Western culture, ’peaceful’ equals ’weak’ equals ’unmasculine/feminine’ equals ’impotent’ equals ’emasculated/castrated’.

7.9 Primitive War as a Post-Contact Phenomenon The conspicuous and inconspicuous effects of contact with ’civilized’ states and colonialism in the warfare patterns of primitive peoples have, until recently, not sufficiently been acknowledged. Virtually all over the globe such contact has exacerbated warfare within and among nonstate societies to a degree we are only beginning to sense (Service, 1968; Morey & Marwitt, 1975; Blick, 1988; Ferguson, 1992b; Ferguson & Whitehead, 1992). "Accepted wisdom even now holds that ’primitive’ cultures are typically at war and that the primary military effect of contact with the West is the suppression of ongoing combat. In fact, the initial effect of European colonialism has generally been quite the opposite. Contact has invariably transformed war patterns, very frequently intensified war and not uncommonly generated war among groups who previously had lived in peace. Many, perhaps most, recorded wars involving tribal peoples can be directly attributed to the circumstances of Western contact" (Ferguson, 1992b; italics added). A consequence of this is, as he explains elsewhere (Ferguson, 1990a), a systematic exaggeration of images of warlike behavior in supposedly ’first contact’ accounts. Three types of war are stimulated by state expansion into the tribal zone: (1) war by indigenous people directed against the state presence, that is, wars of resistance and rebellion; (2) war by indigenous people carried out under the control or influence of state agents; that is, ethnic soldiering; and (3) war between indigenous peoples responding to their own perceived interests in the changing circumstances of the tribal zone; or internecine warfare (Ferguson & Whitehead, 1992; Sponsel, 1994). The Miskito-Sumo case is instructive: Once there were numerous villages of horticultural-fishing chiefdoms located in favorable areas along the Gulf Coast of Nicaragua. Shortly after the arrival of the Spaniards the native chiefdoms simply disintegrated and the surviving inhabitants fled to the interior forests. In the late 1600s those now called Miskito (or Mosquito) received guns in trade with the buccaneers and began raiding for slaves. The defeated Indians retreated in small groups into the interior. By 1700 the Miskito had formed



their famous kingdom while the scattered victims became the ’Sumo’ which is simply a collective name for such refugees (Service, 1968).

7.10

The Characteristics of Peaceful Peoples 7

Fabbro (1978) analyzed five peaceful primitive societies, including the Semai of Malaya (Dentan, 1968), the Siriono of Eastern Bolivia (Holmberg, 1966), the Mbuti Pygmies of the Ituri Forest (Turnbull, 1961; 1965; Moore, 1972), the !Kung Bushmen of the Kalahari Desert (Schapera, 1930; Fourie, 1960; Marshall, 1960 et seq.), and the Copper Eskimo of Northern Canada (Jenness, 1922; 1946; Rasmussen, 1932; Palmer, 1965). To these ’traditional’ groups, Fabbro added two literate peaceful communities for reasons of comparison, the Hutterites of North America (Hostetler, 1974; Hostetler & Huntington, 1967), and the Islanders of Tristan da Cunha (Munch, 1964 et seq.). Contemporary peace groups, such as Hutterites and Amish, living in permanent communities based on a common religion, are also called ’cenobites’. A peaceful society, according to Fabbro’s criteria, is one that is not involved in internal collective violence; one that exhibits relatively little interpersonal violence; one that provides no special role for warriors; and one that has values and sanctions precluding violence as a means for resolving conflict. McCauley (1990) presented the results of a study of the Semai and two other peaceful societies, the Buid of the Philippines, and the South American Xingu River conglomeration of tribes. Various combinations of the peaceful communities mentioned above were also present in the analyses of Gregor (1990) and Dentan (1992, 1994). From the combined analyses of this rather small sample a number of patterns emerge: <

All peaceful societies are essentially small, local, face-to-face, communities with very low degree of social stratification, and open and egalitarian decision-making, although some of them exist within a larger cultural milieu (there are, for example, some 40,000 Mbuti). The ’traditional’ groups all experience a changing composition in their membership in the short term. This ’flux’ derives in part from seasonalecological variables. They do not maintain an exclusive monopoly over an area of land. Other groups may come and go, and in times of shortage an incumbent band may share the food and water resources with another less fortunate group. But conflicts within these groups are also partly responsible for personnel changes, fission being used as a dissociative conflict resolution form. The changing composition of these traditional societies is partly responsible for the lack of lineal leadership. It may be

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7

Peaceability should not be confused with pacifism, which is only one genre of peaceability (Dentan, 1992).



important to notice that the scarcity of resources, with which most of these societies are faced, is not a factor that contributes to violence; quite the contrary, it is a factor that encourages close cooperation (Fabbro, 1978; Cashman, 1993). The traditional groups produce little or no economic surplus. Material inequality between individuals on a long-term basis is, therefore, impossible. As a corollary, leadership remains on the level of personal authority rather than coercive power because there is no surplus to appropriate and utilize. If there is no surplus, the political authorities can not confiscate it and use the wealth derived from it as a basis for carrying on coercive activities, including the creation of a military organization (Cashman, 1993). Fabbro (1978) concludes that peaceful societies are peaceful essentially because they lack some of the most important structural prerequisites for engaging in war: A coercive hierarchy and leadership and an economic surplus to support a nonproductive military organization. The differences in child-rearing practices between the traditional and the cenobite societies are open to a number of possible - and contradictory explanations. Cenobites generally are more authoritarian with children than are peaceable ’refugees’ like Semai, and they approve the spanking and whipping of children as corporal punishment of last resort (Dentan, 8 1992, 1994) . Many of the peaceful societies develop what Gregor (1990) calls an ’antiviolent’ value system; cultural norms and ideologies which discourage both intra- and intergroup violence (an important component of which seems to be Gelassenheit at least among cenobites). Nonviolence is supported by stigmatizing quarreling, boasting, stinginess, anger, and violence, and by according prestige for generosity, gentleness, and conflict avoidance. This value system is supported by supernatural beliefs (McCauley, 1990). Peaceability and nonviolence among the primitive peoples and contemporary peace groups seems to stem from (a psychology of) defeat: "Defeat tamed them... those that survived did so by learning virtues of political accommodation or withdrawal from temporal affairs" (Barkun, 1986; see

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8

"[A] focus on general emotional training may be expected to promise rather little as regards subsequent social interactions in adult life; per se, the training in appropriate emotional controls appears not to incorporate in any prominent fashion the fact that in adult life, different behavior, with different emotional loads, is appropriate to different people C varying according to the category of social relation in which these people are incumbent" (Riches, 1987). Enculturating nonaggression may be a relatively minor factor in the creation of peaceability (e.g., Dentan, 1992; Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1993), and vice versa, though some cross-cultural studies find a positive correlation between child abuse and neglect or harsh socialization practices and bellicosity (e.g., Levinson & Malone, 1980; Ross, 1992).



9

Dentan, 1992, 1994) . ’Islets of peaceability’ can arise as an adaptive response to defeat by neighboring peoples when there are relatively unpopulated areas (called ’refuges’ or ’enclaves’) to flee to. Peaceable ’refugees’ tend to be insulationist and xenophobic. Lacking the oppositional frontier processes that create peaceable ’refugees’, cenobites need specific mechanisms to maintain the boundaries between their people and the ’others’ by means of physical isolation. Peaceable peoples like Semai contrast themselves with the peoples they fear, creating a counterculture. The antiviolent value system is embodied in a contrast between the peacefulness of the ingroup and the violence of outsiders, a contrast that forms an important part of the everyday maintenance of the system. Outsiders are bloody, violent, dangerous, ugly, evil, animal-like and, in a real sense, less than human. Children are warned against outsiders and, especially, about behaving like outsiders. Apparently, "hating violence requires violent people to hate" (McCauley, 1990). The cenobites control in-group conflicts about sex in various ways. Like the Semai, all of them stress self-control over sexual urges. Following common Western praxis, Amish and Hutterites equate the suppression of women with the control of sexuality. Thus, the gender-equality characteristic of many band societies, like Semai, is not a necessary correlate of peacefulness among enclaved peoples, although the two phenomena can co-occur. None of the peaceful societies would seem to operate on the premise that its members would automatically refrain from violence (even though aggressive models are absent). Even the most peaceful of these societies employ various forms of social conditioning to constrain and deflect the tendencies to resort to violence, as well as community inducements to discourage violence, and instructions in the virtues and arts of nonviolent

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9

"At any time during the Pleistocene there must have been many scattered groups of people who, like the Paiute, the Bushmen, the Congo Pygmies, and today’s Australian aborigines, were hovering on the brink of extinction in unwanted deserts, jungles, and cold northern forests. As the centuries succeeded one another, such peripheral peoples must often have passed into extinction, to be replaced by other fugitives from ’hot centers’... In most cases... the people banished to the deserts would have been too ‘retarded’ to learn social cooperation adequate for the defense or conquest of a more desirable area. All these peoples were surrounded by warlike agricultural peoples, and their ‘peacefulness’ was imposed on them by force@ (Bigelow, 1969; italics added). Similarly, Alexander (1979) states on the still extant hunter-gatherer societies: "Such people survive today only in marginal impoverished habitats that support only the lowest of all densities of human population and also represent physical extremes that by themselves require cooperation among families for mere survival; moreover, hunter-gatherers survive today only because even the most advanced technological societies have found no way to use their homelands that would make it profitable to overrun or seize them by force. In other words, they are restricted by aggression, or its threat, to the localities where they exist now". War may have an impact on demographics as a ’pump’ driving population movements toward demographic ’sinks’, i.e., marginal and suboptimal areas (Ferguson, 1990a, 1994).



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conflict resolution. Tribal cosmology, rituals, legends, religious and ethical concepts and precepts reinforce the nonviolent norms of the society. And social ostracism is typically inflicted on individuals who violate these norms (S.Brown, 1994). A commitment to peaceability always runs the unacceptable risk of inviting attack by peoples not so committed (Dentan, 1994).

The tribes of the Upper Xingu are of special interest because they do not conform to the profile of the typical peaceful society. Unlike most peaceful peoples they are sedentary with fairly advanced economies based on slash and burn horticulture (a system that is often associated with warfare [Vayda, 1961]). The isolation characteristic of many peaceful societies is also not typical of the Xinguanos. Indeed, the unique feature of the area is the intensity and richness of intertribal relations (Gregor, 1990). The irony of the uneasy Xingu peace is that the institutions which curb conflict are also those which painfully express fear and anger: Belief in witchcraft, ethnocentrism and hostile stereotypes. The 52 Peaceful Societies investigated by Melko (1973) are not really societies (in the ethnological sense) but particular historical periods of particular civilizations (such as the Han and T’ang dynasties in China) without major internal physical conflicts. Yet, some of his findings may be summarized for reasons of comparison. < < < <

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No one form of government, no one economic system, no one structure of society, no one system of education seems to be essential to peace. On the whole, political factors seem to play a more important part than economic or social factors in the creation, maintenance and termination of peace periods. If alleged pugnacious and hostile attitudes are deeply embedded in man, they are often neutralized within peace periods. Moderate powers seem to have had the advantage over great powers in maintaining peace. They are strong enough to resist attack, but not strong enough to become overextended. Small powers that have been successful in maintaining peace have refrained from interfering in the affairs of their neighbors. Great powers seem to succeed in attaining peace only if they conquer all other great powers within range. Peace is the normal internal condition for a society. Conflict involving physical fighting is exceptional. When it occurs, most people involved in it are not fighting most of the time. Most people in most places in most periods of history have not been killed or injured by war.

Vasquez (1993) has analyzed peace in the contemporary world. His findings



are also summarized for reasons of comparison. The ability of the contemporary global system to avoid war seems to be a function of the extent to which it has an ordered structure. A system can be considered ordered to the extent to which actors are constrained from unilaterally imposing their issue preference on others. In an ordered political system, actors officially recognize and feel it necessary to follow certain rules of the game, and institutions exist for the resolution of issues. On the basis of Wallensteen’s (1984), Kegley & Raymonds’ (1981 et seq.), and Väyrynen's (e.g., 1987) findings, Vasquez (1993) reached the following conclusions about the characteristics associated with contemporary peace. In peaceful periods, rules of the game have been created and norms are not unilaterally abrogated. The system as a whole restrains the contention of actors by offering them practices other than power politics for the resolution of issues. In particular, practices - such as buffer states, compensation, and concerts of power - that permit states to deal with territorial issues have been implemented. Issues involving severe threats to territory, especially to the core territory of major states, and certain life and death issues are kept off the agenda through the creation of a tolerable status quo and the avoidance of messianism. The most important conclusion is that peace is not simply a negative phenomenon (the absence of war), but the active creation of relationships that permit actors to contend over issues whose resolution will enhance or harm their value satisfaction. Nations not only learn how to go to war; nations also learn how to construct a peace. In the next section, I shall more fully discuss some of the strategies and mechanisms of peace-making in primitive societies.

7.11

A Typology of Peace

DISSOCIATIVE (SEPARATIVE) PEACE Peace by isolation; accomplished by (1) geographical distance; insurmountable barriers; large no-man's lands; (2) absence of technical means of telecommunication; (3) conscious insulation, 'splendid isolation', and non-intervention policies Peace by extermination or annihilation Peace by flight and migration Peace by defeat or stalemate peace Peace by incorporation or subjugation (debellatio) (1) conquest and annexation of the territory of the vanquished and/or (2) subjugation of the population resulting in (a) slavery; (b) vassalage;



(c) tribute; (d) satellite group; (e) colonization; or (f) assimilation Peace by war-weariness Peace by deterrence ASSOCIATIVE (SOCIATIVE) PEACE Peace through union by means of (1) fusion; (2) alliance; (3) federation and confederacy Peace by convention (1) Armistices, truces, and cease-fires; (2) peace treaties, covenants and ceremonies Means to enforce peace treaties: (a) intervention by invisible powers (magic, religion); (b) hostages; (c) cautions and guarantees; (d) military occupation or reprisals Institutions for safeguarding peace: (1) Sanctuaries, asylums and refuges (2) Neutrality (3) Treuga Dei Institutions and conventions tending to counteract or mitigate war: (1) Connubium; exogamy and intermarriage (2) Arbitration and mediation by religious authorities or third parties (3) Permanent international jurisdictions (4) Commercium; trade (5) Diplomacy; messengers, heralds, envoys, couriers (6) Intercommunity rites and feasts; corroboree, etc. (7) Hospitality (8) War substitutes (e.g., potlatch) (9) Personal union (blood-brotherhood and friendship) (10) Formal declaration of war (11) Fixing time and place of battle in advance (12) Post-battle compensation, indemnification and reparation Ius in bello: (1) Inviolability of certain persons (women, children, arbitrators) (2) Inviolability of certain places: refuges; neutral areas; tabooed times (3) Use of special, sublethal weapons (e.g., arrows without points or shafts: California), or special tactics (e.g., the custom of counting coup in Plains warfare) (4) Expiatory combat; judicial duels; sham battles (5) Chivalry and courtesy in battle



(after Holsti, 1913; Mühlmann, 1940; Turney-High, 1949; Numelin, 1950; Gilissen, 1961; Galtung, 1965, 1968; Oliver, 1989; Gregor, 1990; a.o.)

7.11.1

Strategies of Negative Peace

Negative or dissociative peace in a pure form is based on minimal relationships: "Good fences make good neighbors" (see Galtung, 1968). War presupposes contact between political entities. When these entities live apart and separated without any mutual contact, problems of war or peace are nonexistent. Another classic form of negative peace is peace by deterrence, a conscious political policy that goes back at least as far as ancient Greece and remains an active part of military doctrine (Gregor, 1990). The efficacy of deterrence in primitive societies is attested to by a substantial number of anthropological studies, such as Evans-Pritchard's (1940) examination of the 'ordered anarchy' of stateless societies. In Oceanian societies, as discussed by Oliver (1989), four kinds of peace prevailed between otherwise warring peoples. The first ensued when one of the sides had been exterminated, or decimated and widely scattered, a common and widespread occurrence. This state of affairs one might call the peace by annihilation or 'peace of the graveyard'. The second resulted when defeated survivors were assimilated or became a subdivision of the victors' political unit - a less common occurrence, but not unusual in parts of Polynesia. This may be called peace by incorporation or subjugation. The third kind of peace occurred when one side was beaten but retained enough numerical strength to remain autonomous. This is peace by defeat or stalemate-peace. In some places this kind of peace was put into effect simply by disengagement of forces, in others it was ratified by ceremony - specifically by payments of indemnities and rites signifying 'submission' on the part of the defeated side. The fourth kind eventuated when two evenly matched opponents mutually agreed to call off active battling and resume 'normal' relations, i.e., mutual weariness punctuated by restricted episodes of combat. This may be called peace by war-weariness or exhaustion (Oliver, 1989).



7.11.2 Strategies of Positive Peace Positive peace depends on the exchange of goods, services and peoples. One of the effects of exchange is to create loyalties which are divided by both territory and bonds of interest, such as kinship and economics. These competing allegiances attract a natural constituency in favor of maintaining peaceful relations (Colson, 1953; Gluckman, 1955; Murphy, 1957). Moreover, exchange leads to the creation of a common culture. Parallel institutions in different societies can generate a consensus of values and stimulate the kind of diffuse emotionally meaningful relationships that would inhibit violence (interdependency model) (Galtung, 1968; Gregor, 1990). Most of the strategies, institutions, customs and conventions of positive peace mentioned in the typology are more or less self-evident and well-known in our contemporary repertoire of peacekeeping efforts. I shall review here a number of strategies and conventions of positive peace and mitigation of war among primitive peoples which may be less self-evident (not necessarily in the same sequence as mentioned in the typology). Diplomacy: The most ’primitive’ form of diplomatic communication was probably the custom of sending occasional messengers to transmit important messages from one tribe or local group to another. Special envoys are sent from one chief to another for the purpose of discussing questions of intertribal interest, such as war and peace, hunting and fishing, commerce, intertribal marriages, feasts and rituals, etc. Material evidence consists of messenger sticks. It may be assumed that messengers and envoys were initially sent only to friendly neighbors, and that gradually this intercourse was extended also to less amicable tribes and remoter peoples. Many primitive peoples have employed women both as messengers and envoys. Females not uncommonly are sacrosanct, i.e., enjoy personal inviolability in war, and are consequently available for missions, trade, and peacemaking (Holsti, 1913; Numelin, 1950). Among the Iroquois, young men were not regarded as reliable or trustworthy bearers of messages between communities. They were suspected of trying to stir up warfare in the hope of being able to acquire personal prestige by performing deeds of valor. This tendency was opposed by older men who were more interested in trade and friendly relations with other tribes (Trigger, 1990). Connubium: "Exogamous tribes generally - though there are exceptions - live in peace with each other" Numelin (1950) claims, though this seems not to be substantiated by the evidence (see ' 7.13). Exogamy, or marriage outside the group, is claimed to be an aid in binding groups together. Exogamy, according to Tylor (1889), was an extraordinary factor of peace, for it developed a bond of solidarity between the groups by making them dependent on each other for



wives and children. For primitive men the choice was, as Tylor emphasized, "between marrying out and being killed out" (Tylor, 1889; see also Melotti, 1990). Also Fox (1967) noted this pacifying effect: "You would not try to exterminate a band whose wives were your daughters and whose daughters were your potential wives; you would become, in one sense at least, one people; you would be dependent on each other for your continuity and survival". Thus, far from being only an economic ’exchange of women’ in the Lévi-Straussian sense, exogamy is basically an exchange of genes (Melotti, 1990). Kinship and marital bonds may also lead to divided loyalties and conflicts of allegiance, which, in turn, may lead to neutrality and war mitigation; an idea 10 already expressed by Mühlmann (1940) . Among the Alaskan Inuit (Eskimo), for example, relatives were neutral when their communities were in conflict (Nelson, 1899). But, building upon the idea of divided loyalties, conflicts may, in effect, be resolved by expanding them. "Despite their avowed emphasis upon taking revenge for wrongs, the Choiseulese generally preferred to settle disputes peacefully when possible... It was better to settle things peacefully with fines, exchanges of ziku or kesa [valuables], 'because then no one was killed'." writes Scheffler (1965) on the Choiseul Islanders. Despite these sentiments, the obligations of the blood feud led to continuous conflict. When war ensued, however, its organization entailed its resolution. "The organization of warfare involved expansion of the conflict through a multiplication of the number of parties; and as the number of parties increased, so did the likelihood of conflicts of allegiance, and in these resided the possibility of peace" (Scheffler, 1965). The Mae Enga 'great fights', of which the prevailing spirit was that of a sporting event ('pleasantly spiced with danger, a day of splendid fun') were the culmination of numerous interclan grievances that might otherwise have ended in ferocious warfare. They were terminated by ceremonial peacemaking, accompanied by exchange of valuables. By deliberately widening, formalizing, and blunting conflicts, they served somewhat to contain and mitigate intergroup hostility (Goldschmidt, 1994). A widespread characteristic of Highlands warfare was the existence of institutionalized means for halting escalation: By mutual exchanges of compensation, by spirit-sanctioned truces, or simply by mutually respected withdrawal from battle. Even in the event that there were no 'doves' in Highland societies, there were some people discerning enough to recognize the mutual destructiveness of further fighting, particularly if, as often happened, they had kinfolks in both camps (Oliver, 1989). 10

"Im Verwandtschaftssystem liegt nun aber zugleich auch ein den Streit begrenzendes Moment. Da nämlich alle Klans unter einander zusammenhängen, wird es unvermeidlich, daß zahlreiche Leute mit beiden Parteien verwandt sind. Diese Leute zeigen eine 'geteilte Loyalität', neigen zur Neutralität" (Mühlmann, 1940).



The same effect can be obtained not only by bonds of marriage but also by bonds of friendship. Sometimes a man in one tribe in the New Hebrides, about to go to the assistance of its ally, had a friend in the tribe about to be attacked and, through him, a warning was sent so that the latter was prepared and fully armed when the attack began. "Again, if a man had a friend in one of the groups to be attacked, it was his prerogative to refuse to fight along side with his own tribe... if a man chose not to join in the expedition, he had a perfect right to do so, and no question as to his bravery was involved" (Humphreys, 1926). Because Kapauku men often married women of confederacies that traditionally were regarded as enemies, ’in-law’ relatives, blood relatives, and friends met on the battlefield as enemies. To avoid hurting or killing one’s relative or friend, one fought on the other end of the battlefield (Pospisil, 1994). Persons related by kinship or marriage to both belligerents could sometimes pass with impunity from the territory of the one to that of the other and be regarded as a friend of both. Such persons were, especially in Oceania, employed to carry proposals of peace (Holsti, 1913; Numelin, 1950). In the retaliatory violence of blood feuds and wars, persons and families allied by marriage might be spared (Stewart, 1832; Vincendom-Dumoulin & Desgraz, 1843). Women related to both belligerent parties in Samoa were allowed to pass in time of war from one camp to another without hindrance, and "as is proverbially the case with the sex all the world over, they divulge the secrets of both parties" (Rowe, 1930). Best (1902 et seq.) observed that a person related to both hostile parties was often spared among the Maori, though living with the enemy and probably caught in arms against the tribe that spared him. Not only more or less permanent exchange of women in exogamy, also shortterm exchange of women is sometimes part of the peacemaking ritual. Among the Kiwai Papuans, the peacemaking feast that each enemy tribe gives its opponent includes giving their hosts access to their women "to put out the fire" (Landtman, 1927). Among the Maring, women are exchanged between enemies as part of the peace negotiations, ideally one woman from one tribe for each man slain in the other (Rappaport, 1967; Goldschmidt, 1994). Among the Australians the exchange of women is part of the peacemaking ceremony, as well as direct dispute settlement: "When an attacking party is about to attack the home party, the latter if it does not want to fight, sends a number of its women over to the former. If these are willing to settle the matter in dispute without fighting, they have sexual intercourse with the women; if not, they send them back untouched... the Aborigines have no desire to exterminate each other’s groups, for, if they did, how could wives be found?"



(Elkin, 1938). Closely connected with consanguinity is common worship or religion, which 11 may sometimes mitigate war (Holsti, 1913; Numelin, 1950) . Among the North Australians it was believed that while a totemic emblem is in camp all fighting should cease, and any infraction of the tribal law was considered a direct insult to the clan (Warner, 1930). In Nukuhiva (Marquesas) priests were always immune from violence (Krusenstern, 1810; Langsdorff, 1812). The Tahitians would not molest an enemy who came to offer sacrifice to the national god (Ellis, 1830). Common worship has also led to the custom of forbidding war during religious festivals, a custom analogous to the Western treuga Dei (peace of God). Commercium; Trade as promoter of intertribal relations: Barter exists virtually all over the primitive world. Silent trade probably originated from distrust, fear or enmity, prohibiting any direct contact with strangers. Territorial boundaries gradually came to be recognized as neutral areas where one might occasionally meet for mutual benefit, if not on friendly terms, at least without hostility. In Queensland, tribes are free to travel unmolested on certain trade routes, laid down from time immemorial. "The boundary stone was perhaps the predecessor of the market-cross. As distrust declines, the former silent trade becomes less silent and the tribal representatives (mostly women) begin, though at first shy, to meet at regular intervals: The primitive market. The market day necessarily has the character of a restday, holiday, affording opportunities for social intercourse, sport and amusement, during which hostilities are suspended. The market place can also become a kind of asylum, violation of which is sacrilege" (Numelin, 1950). Intercommunity rituals, feasts, and festivals: Mühlmann (1940) regards the male initiation ceremonies as the evolutionary matrix of the amphictyony because several sovereign clans unite for the occasion (e.g., corroboree of the Australians, the 'Balum' festival of the Huon Gulf Papuans, 'Mambela' festival of the Babali, etc.). In Australia hostile tribes met in peace during the performance of certain initiation rites; all hostilities are suspended for the time being. The intertribal 11

After discussing the cases of the Cherokee (Mooney, 1891), Ojibwa (P. Jones, 1861), Jivaro and Zaparo (Markham, 1895), Dinka (Schweinfurth, 1873), and other Africans (Lenz, 1878), Holsti (1913) notes: "These instances show that if the bonds of consanguinity, common worship, and other peaceful ties have not been strong enough to prevent groups from waging war upon each other, a further union has often been rendered impossible. Thus, not the occurrence of wars, but the absence of them, has been the main condition for a more advanced social integration between neighboring communities. Steinmetz (1892) is partly aware of this when he asserts that bloodrevenge carried on within a tribe must necessarily have prevented integration".



character and significance of these ceremonies appears from the fact that persons travelling to or from such feasts could pass unmolested through the territory of hostile tribes. There are instances of peaceful relations being maintained between primitive tribes by means of festivals specially arranged for the invocation of peace. All fighting is placed under a ban or taboo for the time of the festival, and this ban may sometimes have great and lasting consequences (e.g., corroborees, Mindarie feast of the Dieri, etc.) (Numelin, 1950). (On the other hand, instances are not lacking in which the former enemy was invited to a feast in the other’s camp only to be treacherously attacked there (e.g., Easter Islanders: Knoche, 1936; Nagas: Mills, 1937; Yanomamö: Chagnon, 1968 et seq.). Elaborate and complex rituals of peacemaking have also been described for a number of highly warlike Papuans, e.g., Tsembaga Maring (Rappaport, 1968), Jalé (Koch, 1974), and Mount Hagen tribes (Strathern, 1971; Vicedom & Tischner, 1962). Post-battle indemnification and compensation: In her study of Melanesian warfare, Camilla Wedgwood (1930) found that peacemaking procedures usually "fall into two distinct parts; the making of compensation for injuries inflicted during the fighting; and the performance of some ceremonial, such as the exchange of gifts or food, which symbolically unites the erstwhile opponents". McCorkle (1978) states on the effects of compensation and indemnity payments (bloodmoney) in the Californian region: "It also appears that regional, intertribal adherence to the unwritten law that each injury must be exactly recompensed limited armed aggression, since restraint served to save wealth goods that would have to be expended at the settlement marking the end of hostilities". Another kind of compensation (non-monetary) is related by Whitehead (1990). He states that according to Gumilla (1745), among the South American Otomaco and Saliva, ceremonies of peace were concluded by individuals interchanging as many blows with a club (though not the war club) as amounted to complete satisfaction for both parties. This practice and its context, is, Whitehead observes, very reminiscent of the chest-pounding and club duels of the Yanomamö, as reported by Chagnon (1968 et seq.). Third party mediation: Whitehead (1990) presents the following example of third party mediation and peacemaking: On March 22nd, 1624, a large Aricoure war party, from the Cassipour River in Brazil, stopped at a Yao village on the Oyapock, en route to attack Carib settlements at Cayenne. The Yao intervened, as they were 'common friends of



the two’. They secured a peace between the Caribs and the Aricoures, but only on condition that the Aricoures should ask for it: Their ceremony was as follows; the Caribs obliged them to wait on the seashore with their arms and as the Caribs fitted the arrow to the bow, ready to let fly, the Aricoures took water and poured it on their heads. This done, the Caribs, throwing down their arms, rushed into the canoes of the others and embraced them. On the occasion of this peace the Yaos entertained them together for eight days, peace having never been known between them before (Sloane, 1707). Barrère (1743) reported a similar procedure whereby one of the opposing warchiefs would approach the enemy with a small band of warriors declaring that they wished friendship. If this proposition was well received then both parties would array their forces in battle-order and start singing, recounting the past capture of women and the death or cannibalism of relatives. Following these declarations both sides would throw down their arms, rush to embrace each other and then retire to one or another village for a feast. Among the North American Plateau tribes, hostilities were limited to raids and occasional small-scale feuds by self-interested volunteers. Headmen and chiefs of villages and bands, however, disapproved of such entrepreneurial raids and went to great length to maintain peace, sometimes risking their lives in negotiations with hostile outsiders. Feuds between kin groups were known but not common, and chiefs served as arbiters of such disputes, which were often settled by bloodmoney. The rudiments of a legal mechanism were, therefore, present (Driver, 1961). On mediation and negotiation see also Gulliver (1979) and Greenhouse (1985). Formal declarations of war: A further step toward the mitigation of war is the formal declaration of war (indictio belli) and the ultimatum (Mühlmann, 1940). A declaration of war seems to have been the custom among many peoples (e.g., Kabyles: Letourneau, 1895; Ovambo (Ambo): Hahn, 1928; Warega (Rega): Delhaise & Overbergh, 1909; Lango: Driberg, 1923; Masai (Maasai): Hinde, 1901; Toala: Sarasin & Sarasin, 1905; Solomon Islanders: Thurnwald, 1912; Yap Islanders: Müller-Wismar, 1917; Melanesians: Malinowski, 1920; Tonga Islanders: Mariner, 1817; Polynesians: Williamson & Piddington, 1939; Tasmanians: Roth, 1890; and Columbians: Spier & Sapir, 1930). The Caribs declared war by hurling arrows or javelins into the enemy country, or sticking them into the ground at the boundary (von Martius, 1867). The effect of these war declarations is, as Numelin (1950) states, obviously to give the enemy a fair chance and can thus be considered to be some kind of chivalrous action. Turney-High (1949) offered the following interpretation: The importance of closely integrated and efficiently functioning sociopolitical institutions has been strikingly demonstrated in the power or lack of power to declare states of war or peace. To be sure, many people think



that the universal state of all persons below literate levels has been one of war. This hardly squares with the facts. Many tribes in varying states of culture considered war the unusual, so unusual that it required some formal act of declaration. It is impossible to say that this idea correlates with either the very simple or the complicated cultures. It has been evident in all degrees of cultural development. Perhaps no simpler or more wretched people existed in either of the Americas than the inhabitants of Tierra del Fuego. They were also accustomed to bitter and long standing feuds. Nevertheless, one Captain Low, quoted by Cooper (1917), says that the West Patagonians made a rude image of a man with long red teeth and with a neck halter of hide. Around this they stuck spears, arrows and clubs. This they set up as a declaration of war. A similar method was used by the Araucanians... When the somewhat better organized but yet simple Canadian Algonkians went to war, they sent as a messenger to the people they intended to attack a slave formerly captured from that people, bearing an axe with a handle painted red and black (Lahontan in Mallery, 1888). The Huron sent a black wampum belt to the enemy-to-be. The royal Natchez lagged little behind the level which civil and civilized states had achieved a few years ago. They declared war by leaving a ’hieroglyph’ picture in enemy territory to announce their intention of attacking at a certain phase of the moon (Mallery, 1888). The anythingbut-royal Pomo behaved similarly. This, to be sure, destroyed the surprise element, which may be why modern nations have lost their manners (Turney-High, 1949). Fixing time and place of battle in advance: A still further step toward the mitigation of war is, in addition to the formal declaration of war, the agreement on the war theater or battle field (and by implication the neutrality of other localities): "Die Festsetzung besonderer Kampfplätze bringt beinahe automatisch die Neutralisierung der anderen Örtlichkeiten mit sich" (Mühlmann, 1940). The most important development of the 'law of war' is the transition from the treacherous attack to the pitched battle on an agreed-upon battlefield. All other developments can be more or less logically derived from this primordial achievement: Neutrality of certain places; non-belligerence and truces at certain times; neutrality and inviolability of certain persons, especially noncombatants (women and children); asylums and safe havens; use of sublethal weapons, etc. Davie (1929) considers the sparing of women and children in war to be the beginning of a common law of war and peace. Efforts to confine armed conflict to the fighting male population has also been observed by Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1986) to be part of the institutionalization of rules of warfare that help to avoid unnecessary bloodshed. Cultural evolution, he submits, here phenocopies



ritualizations that in the animal kingdom repeatedly led from damaging fights 12 to tournement-like contests .

Many primitive peoples spared and/or protected women and children of both sides (e.g., Australians: Wheeler, 1910; Fijians: Seemann, 1862, Stewart, 1832; Samoans: Ellis, 1830 ["only cowards would kill women"]; Andaman Islanders: Man, 1878; Masai: Hinde, 1901; Iroquois: Morgan, 1851; Omaha and Ponka: Dorsey, 1884; and Huron: Powell, 1880). Among the New Guinea Kapauku, the women, being tabooed from injury by the enemy, moved around the battle lines collecting arrows for their husbands (Pospisil, 1994). This has also been commonly reported of Californian societies (e.g., Kroeber, 1925). Many primitive peoples had special theaters of war; arenas often located at the boundary between the inhabited areas of the disputants. Sometimes neutral zones were arranged while the rest of the country was looked upon as dangerous (Holsti, 1913; Mühlmann, 1940; Numelin, 1950). The idea of neutral zones and the right of asylum probably arose originally from magical and religious conceptions of spirits dwelling in certain places which are sacred and must be kept free from disturbances, as Westermarck (1907) suggested. The graves of chiefs and ancestors are often sacred and taboo, as are the sanctuaries and temples beside them. Such 'holy' places can become asylums where fighting is prohibited. Among many primitive peoples there are taboo or fetish houses where protection and peace is secured for all who enter. Sometimes related tribes could take refuge in one another's territory. Like 'holy' places there are also 'holy' days when peace and rest must be observed (Holsti, 1913; Mühlmann, 1940; Numelin, 1950). Expiatory combat and judicial duels: Hobhouse, Wheeler & Ginsberg (1915) leave little misunderstanding about expiatory combat as a conflict-limiting procedure. They state: "The expiatory combats and the regulated fights of the Australians are also all of them palpably means of ending a quarrel, or marking a point beyond which it is not to go. They do not seek to punish a wrong but to arrest vengeance for wrong at a point which will save the breaking-out of a 12

"Wir beobachten ferner die Ausbildung von Regeln der Kriegsführung, die unnötiges Blutvergießen vermeiden helfen, und insbesondere auch das Bemühen, die bewaffnete Auseindersetzung auf die kämpfende männliche Bevölkerung zu beschränken. Hier phänokopiert die kulturelle Evolution in ganz auffälliger Weise jene Ritualisierungen die im Tierreich wiederholt von Beschädigungskämpfen zu Turnierkämpfen führten. Beim Menschen findet eine analoge Entwicklung zweimal statt C bei den Zweikämpfen mit Waffen und dann beim Kriegführen zwischen Gruppen. Hier sind vermutlich ähnliche Selektionsdrucke wirksam. Bei dieser kulturellen Entschärfung des Krieges dürfte die uns angeborene Aggressionshemmung eine wichtige Rolle spielen" (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1986).



devastating fight". The judicial ’duel of champions’ has a similar objective of limiting ’devastating fights’. Instances of duels and single combats to settle intra- and intertribal disputes have been documented for the Inuit (Eskimo) (Boas, 1888; Ratzel, 1896; Hoebel, 1940; 1967; 1972), Malays (Brinton, 1886), Australians (Dawson, 1881; Smyth, 1878), and ancient Greeks, Hebrews, and Romans (Keller, 1906; Seymour, 1907; Numelin, 1950). Marian Smith (1951) described sham battles among the North American Plains Indians, in which the braves could display their strength, boldness and agility in bloodless contests. Similarly, on San Cristoval "When peace is made... there is a preliminary payment of money... after which fighting ceases. Then a day and place are fixed, and the two parties meet, fully decorated and armed for war, and engage in sham fighting. This sometimes ends in actual fighting" (Fox, 1924). Significantly, he adds: "It looked much more like a fighting party than a peace party; but it is the custom to make peace with the whole army, to convince the enemy that it is only for his accommodation that they are making peace, and not because they are afraid to fight him". Thus, an important ingredient of mock fighting seems to be the face-saving it offers to the fierce warriors. Among the Australians of Arnhem Land, one of the types of battling was itself a peacemaking ceremony; the Makarata, in which members of an aggrieved clan were allowed to throw spears, in a controlled and usually non-lethal way, at relatives of the individuals who had killed one of them, until their anger had subsided. The ceremony did not end, however, until the injured clansmen had drawn blood from the actual killers by jabbing spears through their thighs (Warner, 1937). Chivalry and courtesy in battle: The Samoans were capable of the most intense hatred toward their enemies. Yet they often showed them the most intense ceremonial courtesy before the action began. The combat lines would meet and address each other with formality as great chiefs and warriors, and present each other with food in an excess of courtesy. Once the fight was joined, however, the Samoans meant to kill and all chivalry was dropped, the language bandied between the lines becoming very scurrilous (G.Brown, 1910; Turney-High, 1949). "Gallantry paid the Maori poorly when they tried it with modern British troops. They played the game more fairly than fair in the European concept. They were amazed when the British shot the people whom they sent from the palisades for water, for was not water necessary? When British ammunition ran low they waited for them to bring up supplies, for why fight a man on uneven terms?" (Del Mar, 1924; Turney-High, 1949). Chivalry in combat can probably develop only in ’agonal’ types of warfare.



Peace treaties, covenants and ceremonies: Fighting among primitive peoples is not only often preceded by ceremonial consultations but also regularly succeeded by a peace treaty, covenant or ceremony. Frazer (1890) has collected and expounded a number of cases of covenants by sacrifice of a slave or an animal, and the taking of an oath by the peacemaking parties between the divided halves of the victim. In its crudest form the sacrifice is seen for instance among the African Boumali, where a slave is sacrificed; but an animal, which is cut in two, can substitute for the human sacrifice (e.g., Oronn: Talbot, 1923; Turney-High, 1949). Many Papuans considered peace declaration women’s work. If peace was desired, a couple of men went with their wives to the hostile village. The presence of the women indicated the end sought, so the rights of embassy were respected. The suit for peace was almost always accepted, and the men thereupon broke each other’s beheading knives and exchanged arm guards. At night the hosts had relations with their guests’ women, "and that is the real object of the visit". In a few days the erstwhile hosts returned the visit and brought some of their wives for their former foes to enjoy (Landtman, 1927). The more chiefly Solomon Islanders were not quite so informal about peacemaking as the Papuans, but the end and the means were largely the same. When one side had enough war they would inform the enemy of the fact and ask for one of their chiefly daughters as a bride for one of their own chiefs. If all went well the fighting ceased and the side which sued for peace brought a large bride price for the young woman (Ivens, 1927). Melanesian peace declarations had little idea of honor (Powdermaker, 1933). The signal for peace in the New Hebrides seems to have been fronds of palm carried between the combatants (Humphreys, 1926). Peace had to be formally declared among the Polynesian Mangaian by announcement on the peace drums and a human sacrifice to the war god. These people recognized war and peace as separate states of affairs (or definite social statuses, or domains of reality) and observed the shift from one to the other by specific rites of passage (Buck, 1934). Dual chieftainship (separate peace and war chiefs) may have served the same function (i.e., to demarcate the separate states of affairs) among many North American Indians (Numelin, 1944, 1950). Peace can also be ratified by means of exchange of gifts, and a variety of other peace ceremonies, such as burying the hatchet, breaking of spears, planting of trees, smoking the peace-pipe or calumet, etc. Blood-brotherhood and friendship: The exchange of blood between persons who are establishing friendship is a relatively common ceremony. Drinking or mixing blood establishes peace relations. Blood-brotherhood is, in the primitive world, regarded as one of the chief factors in preventing feuds. It is not improbable that the pledging of friendship or the drinking of health in wine is a



survival of the ancient ceremonial of pledging in blood. Friendship ties between Kapauku headmen of confederacies pacified formerly vicious enemies for the time of their lives (Pospisil, 1994). Between some Australian tribes close bonds of friendship were maintained, sometimes for several generations. Among South Australian tribes for example, contiguous hordes of the Tanganekald and Jarildekald were friendly and frequently intermarried so that access rights through marriage tended to develop between some families. As in most fraternizations of this kind, jealousies, thefts of women, and deaths ascribed to sorcery tended to limit the growth and continuation of such bonds (Elkin, 1938). Also adoption may work as an avenue for preserving peace. The Inca emperor adopted sons of conquered chiefs and thus cemented his empire into a formidable monolith. Similarly among the Kapauku adoption of young people of influential families was used to bring lasting friendly relations (Pospisil, 1994). War substitutes and institutions of peace: Goldschmidt (1994) examines in some detail three instances of what he calls the ’institutions of peace’; the White Deerskin Dance (as practised by the Hupa, Karok and Yurok of California); the potlatch (as practised by the Northwest Coast Kwakiutl and Tlingit); and the kula (as practised by the Melanesians). These institutions of peace (or war substitutes in the case of the potlatch) are, Goldschmidt says, socially constructed patterns of behavior in which antagonism and competitiveness are expressed in ways that are neither lethal nor violent. They do not eliminate war; they do, however, tend to reduce the level of military conflict. Numelin (1950) ascribes a prominent part in the development of peaceful relations to the secret societies flourishing in the primitive world. "The secret societies seem to be so eminently peaceful in character that it is a question whether one of their chief purposes is not to prevent hostilities between local groups and tribes". For example, one of the most potent secret societies, the ’Duk-Duk’ in the Bismarck Archipelago has been described by von Pfeil (1898) as "a power with sufficient influence to enjoin peace on contending parties". In general, Numelin’s claim seems grossly exaggerated, however. It is more likely that these secret societies performed internal militia and policing tasks, thus being able to control feuding to a certain extent.



7.12

Purification Rituals: Ambivalence toward the Enemy

We have been led to think that disregard for enemy life and his feelings are characteristic of warfare, Turney-High (1949) states, but this is not necessarily so, as evidenced by ambivalent feelings toward the enemy and guilt-expiating ritual, both of which seem to be universal and betraying ’bad conscience’. "War and killing push men into some kind of marginality which is at least uncomfortable, for there seems to be a basic fear of blood contamination, an essential dread of human murder. If man did not consider human killing something out of the ordinary, why has there been such common fear of the enemy dead, the idea of contamination of even a prestigeful warrior of the wegroup? We have seen that the channeling of frustration into hatred toward the enemy is good for the internal harmony of the we-group, but the enemy is human, too. Humanity is capable of ambivalent attitudes toward its enemies" (Turney-High, 1949). Ritual seems to have a primarily apotropaic function; it reduces fear and anxiety. It has the effect of coordinating preparations for action among several organisms. It also functions as a means of organizing the perception of reality, i.e., chaos is replaced by order (Kennedy, 1971). Rituals seem to play an important and even indispensable role in social intercourse. According to Durkheim, societies must periodically "recharge their social and moral sentiments of solidarity". Furthermore, rituals "receive their special character from underlying and overarching semiotic structures that arrange concepts in patterns of binary oppositions" (P.Smith, 1991). The ritualistic confirmation of an ethnocentric cosmos apparently played a major role throughout the history of war (Meyer, 1993). Ritual (especially pre-battle or preparatory ritual) reduces anxiety and fear and institutes confidence. It reinforces the solidarity of the group by dramatizing its status structure. It strengthens group boundaries, justifies its hostile or defensive activities, and expiates its guilt. It supports the warrior values and the warfare process by ceremonially transforming the guilt of killing into selfrighteous virtue and strength. The great ritual efforts to induce commitment may be seen, according to Kennedy (1971), as culturally developed means for overcoming the subconscious repugnance to killing as well as for reduction of fear. The warrior value system apparently needs a great deal of social buttressing, from early training in fierceness through divine validation and many shaming devices to fear-reducing rituals (Kennedy, 1971; see also Turney-High, 1949; Andreski, 1964; Potegal, 1979; van der Dennen, 1979, 1980; Goldschmidt, 1988, 1989). In a chapter of his The Golden Bough, aptly entitled "Taboo and the Perils of



the Soul", Frazer (1890) was the first to acknowledge the existence, and summarize the available evidence of disculpation ritual, taboos and purification ceremonies (or lustration), indicative of some sense of guilt, in the post-war behavior of primitive peoples. The purpose of the seclusion and the expiatory rites which the warriors who have taken the life of a foe have to perform is, he points out, "no other than to shake off, frighten, or appease the angry spirit of the slain man". In his Totem und Tabu, Freud (1913) was so impressed by these examples of disculpation ritual among primitive peoples that he discussed the subject at length, connecting the expiatory ceremonies following the killing of an enemy with the general ambivalence of taboo: "We conclude from all these regulations that other than purely hostile sentiments are expressed in the behavior toward the enemy. We see in them manifestations of repentance, or regard of the enemy, and of bad conscience for having slain him. It seems that the commandment, Thou shalt not kill, which could not be violated without punishment, existed also among these savages long before any legislation was 13 received from the hands of a God" . Much of the post-war ritual activity in primitive societies seems clearly to indicate the expiation of guilt, even more than it indicates a rite de passage, marking the return to the normality of daily life, or the release of tension and the victory gloating of triumph ("Victory has ever been strong medicine" as Turney-High (1949) puts it). Various kinds of ritual penance after killing were widespread in primitive (and ancient) societies. Fasting, sexual abstinence, and separation were common, as were ritual responsibilities such as sacrifices for vows given. Often the returning warrior was considered sacredly polluted and had to undergo additional purification rituals. The Pima, for example, regarded the killing of an enemy to be such a dangerous act that, according to some observers, a Pima warrior withdrew from battle the moment he killed his opponent to begin his rites of purification, or lustration (Kroeber & Fontana, 1987). The Papago considered an enemy life precious and its destruction a murder, even though committed by a Papago warrior in legitimate war. A Papago man who had killed an enemy was unclean and dangerous, and the ordeal of purification (lasting sixteen days) necessary to readmit him to society was even more severe than the hardships of the warpath. The Papago wounded were also thought to have received contamination from the enemy, and were forced to 13

"Wir schließen aus all diesen Vorschriften, daß im Benehmen gegen die Feinde noch andere als bloß feindselige Regungen zum Ausdruck kommen. Wir erblicken in ihnen Äusserungen der Reue, der Wertschätzung des Feindes, des bösen Gewissens, ihn ums Leben gebracht zu haben. Es will uns scheinen, als wäre auch in diesen Wilden das Gebot lebendig: Du sollst nicht töten, welches nicht ungestraft verletzt werden darf, lange vor jeder Gesetzgebung, die aus den Händen eines Gottes empfangen wird" (Freud, 1913).



purify themselves for four days (Densmore, 1929). The Jivaro killer also had to go through a lengthy and troublesome purification rite, but presumably from different motives than those of the Papago; fear of the enemy spirit thirsting for revenge (Karsten, 1923). Similarly, among the military Zulu the victorious slayer had to receive magical medication to purge him of ’nuru’, his victim’s vengeful spirit (Junod, 1927; Krige, 1936). An Ibo warrior, after decapitating an enemy, licked some of the blood from the knife in order to become identified with the slain, thereby becoming immune from attack by his ghost (Meek, 1937). "There has existed" Turney-High (1949) concludes his perceptive review, "a dread of taking enemy life, a feeling that if the life of a member of the wegroup was precious, so was that of a member of the other-group. Fear of deathcontamination has demanded expiation or purification among many folk".

7.13

Epilogue

Although all of the theories of negative and positive peace are intuitively reasonable, none of them survives the test of the cross-cultural data, says Gregor (1990). Deterrence does not work (Ch. 2). Exogamy and trade are actually positively correlated with war frequency (Tefft, 1975). Just as interpersonal violence often occurs in close relationships, the most intense conflicts seem to occur between polities that are similar in structure and 14 intensely engaged with one another . Tefft (1975) notes: Interchange of membership through intermarriage does not seem to reduce substantially the frequency of war or to further peaceful relations between political communities. In so far as internal war is concerned, political communities with numerous kinship ties war more frequently than those with fewer ties. This is not entirely surprising since internal wars are often fought over issues growing out of intermarriage (i.e., default of bridewealth, adultery, etc.). More significant is the fact that political communities which have important economic ties with one another fight internal wars less frequently than those whose ties are primarily one of kinship. Economic ties create more mutuality of interest and less division than kinship ties at the tribal level. However, neither kinship nor economic ties create strong enough bonds of mutual interest to prevent external war (Tefft, 1975).

14

As Waltz (1979) observed for the contemporary international system: "[T]he fiercest civil wars and the bloodiest international ones are fought within arenas populated by highly similar people whose affairs are closely knit".



This conclusion is, however, contestable. Tefft does not sufficiently distinguish types of warfare, nor does he take into account the various cultural, political, or socioeconomic levels among the societies studied, lumping them all together. It may well be that the mechanisms and processes in question are conducive to peace at some level of socioeconomic development, but not on others. Or only when a particular type of warfare prevails, and not when other types prevail. Divale, Chamberis & Gangloff (1976) have proposed an alternative explanation of the Tefft (1975) and Tefft & Reinhardt (1974) findings that internal war was correlated with the presence of peacemaking mechanisms, and external war with their absence. The alternative explanation runs as follows: Cultural homogeneity between combatants may facilitate peace negotiations, and, once established, peace may be more stable. But cultural homogeneity cannot be used to explain the occurrence of internal war, nor can its absence explain external war. We suggest that with respect to prestate level society, there is a fundamental difference between internal and external war, which involves more than the fact that internal war is between members of the same society while external war is between different societies. We suggest that internal war is of a regulatory nature connected to a system of population control (Divale & Harris, 1976; Divale, 1972). On the other hand, we suggest that external war is a struggle for survival between two or more societies fighting for space in the same ecosystem - it is on the order of the competitive exclusion principle in biology, that two species or populations cannot occupy the same ecological niche (Gause, 1932). External war is part of a process that leads to the development of matrilocal residence, which is a structural adaptation made by a pre-state level society struggling to maintain its niche (Divale, 1974). If internal war is regulatory, it follows that there should be many mechanisms to regulate it (i.e. peacemaking mechanisms) or to stop it for long periods (i.e. stable peace). If external war represents a struggle for survival between two societies trying to occupy the same niche, it follows that there can be no compromise or mechanism to regulate it (i.e. peacemaking mechanisms or stable peace) (Divale, Chamberis & Gangloff, 1976). Dentan (1992) sketches a political ecological model for the origin, persistence and demise of peaceable societies. The model fleshes out the familiar suggestion that nonviolence is a way less powerful societies respond to violence by stronger ones (e.g., Gardner, 1966; Sipes, 1973; Dentan, 1978, 1979; Endicott, 1983; Donald, 1987; but Cf. Fabbro, 1980; Knauft, 1987). Dentan argues especially (1) that ideology by itself does not determine peacefulness, (2) that nonviolence is not due to a psychic or cultural inability to be violent, and



(3) that static interpretations of dynamic adaptations and situations are unlikely to be helpful. Some of the important observations and conclusions of the studies discussed are the following: <

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Peaceability is not disability, not a cultural essence unrelated to a people’s actual circumstances. Warlike peoples are capable of peacefulness, while peaceable peoples are capable of waging war under appropriate circumstances. Violence in a particular time and place does not necessarily indicate that peaceability in a different time or place is illusory. Many peoples who value peace positively still have relatively high rates of violence, e.g., Gebusi of New Guinea (Knauft, 1985a,b, 1987), the Pacaa Nova peoples (von Graeve, 1989) and San foragers (’Bushmen’) of southern and eastern Africa (e.g., Thomas, 1994). Thus a cultural emphasis on dependence and nurturance does not by itself account for nonviolence. Social support networks themselves involve costs and conflicts. Besides, the social cohesion which stems from external stress can be pathogenic (Schaffer, 1964). In other words, people are not nonviolent unless they feel nonviolence is good or at least that violence is bad; but peace-loving people on occasion may commit acts of violence, and those occasions may come often. The discussion of human violence and nonviolence, war and peace, has suffered from ahistorical essentialism, treating particular historical moments as if they represented universal evolutionary trends or deeprooted manifestations of quasi-national characters (Sponsel, 1989). A Darwinian approach, which takes peace and nonviolence as an adaptation to particular political ecological circumstances, seems more viable. Under some circumstances, opting for warfare is fatal. Death obviously decreases one’s fitness to zero. The choice of flight, on the other hand, has also complex social and psychological consequences. The rise and survival of peaceful societies suggests that human peaceability is not an impossible, anti-Darwinian fantasy but instead an adaptive response (in the Darwinian sense) to particular political ecologies.



8 By Way of Summary: An Evolutionario 8.1 Introduction The time has now come to put all the separate pieces of the jigsaw puzzle together for a panoramic view of mankind, its place in nature, and its capacities for violence and warfare as well as peace. In this, final, chapter, I shall argue that the complex of collective behaviors we call war evolved as a facultative male-coalitional reproductive (or parental investment) strategy. In order to understand this prima vista rather exuberant claim, I shall spell out in some detail how and why this strategy came to be, and why it, within the logic of selection, was overdetermined and so good as inevitable. Via a nearly similar trajectory some communities of chimpanzees evolved ’lethal male raiding’, while the other pongids (gorilla and orang-utan), lacking some necessary preadaptations, evolved rape as an equivalent reproductive strategy at the individual level, as did a number of other vertebrates (see van der Dennen, 1992). The war strategy was a novel pattern which tapped into a number of phylogenetically old adaptive behavioral systems (e.g., the agonistic system), but it was not simply an extension of the agonistic system. It also, and a fortiori, required the existence of recently acquired patterns, notably polyadicallycoalitional cooperation, cultural badges as markers of group identity and ethnocentrism, social and operational intelligence and artifactual weapons; among others. It was not only a novel pattern, it was also ’invented’ or stumbled upon by very few, typically brainy, species, which may explain why it arose so late on the evolutionary time scale. Alcock (1979) reasoned that the evidence indicates that the genotypes of humans do not blindly program them to engage in warfare. Some ecological circumstances may, however, elevate the benefits of warfare to individuals to such an extent that they exceed the costs to individual inclusive fitness. Tragically, and perhaps paradoxically, warfare as organized and premeditated lethal group violence, is promoted by the cooperative abilities of the members of each warring group. Humans and chimpanzees also belong to the most unaggressive and nonviolent species within their own community. Both species, moreover, possess a rich repertoire of reconciliatory behaviors that serve to counteract disruptive violence and maintain or restore social harmony and promote cohesion among community members (Goodall, 1986, 1990; de Waal, 1989). There is no need to postulate a Beast Within to explain the



evolutionary origin of war. In the evolutionary scenario, or evolutionario for short (Wrangham, 1987), we have to meticulously reconstruct the hominid/human evolutionary trajectory from its humble beginnings onward. In order to do that we also have to revivify the hominid-pongid common ancestor, by means of phylogenetic comparison (Tooby & DeVore, 1987; Wrangham, 1987), as a starting point of the specifically hominid/human trajectory. The best methodology to accomplish this is ’strategic modeling’; the development of principles of behavioral ecology (or socioecology) and evolutionary psychology that apply across taxonomic groups, and hence can be used to reconstruct (aspects of) hominid behavior (Tooby & DeVore, 1987). In order to transcend the level of gratuitous just-so stories the evolutionario should meet the following three ’rules of the game’ (Symons, 1979) and four criteria (Slurink, 1994; Tooby & DeVore, 1987): 1. Teleological explanations are not permitted; 2. No superorganic force is to be invoked as a deus ex machina to explain evolutionary change; 3. Behavior and mind are to be explained as adaptations to promote the inclusive fitness (i.e., reproductive success) of the individual, and not to promote the fitness of abstractions like society. It is also understood that what inclusive fitness optimizing is at the ultimate level, utility optimizing is at the proximate level. Furthermore, the evolutionario should be 4. phylogenetically plausible; 5. paleontologically adequate; 6. evolutionarily feasible; and finally 7. it should exhibit explanatory specificity (i.e., it should not only explain why hominids/humans and chimpanzees evolved ’lethal male raiding’, but also why the other primates, and mammals in general, did not). Hominization was, in all probability, not a single process but consisted of a number of discrete stages characterized by sharply differentiated selective forces and adaptive complexes: "Both socioecology and the increasingly complete stratified fossil record require that hominid evolution be regarded as a discrete series of branches and stages. In the first place, the discovery that hominids were fully bipedal at 4 million years (Johanson, White and Coppens, 1978), long before the appearance of the first detectable stone tools, has decoupled Darwin’s compelling trinity of bipedalism, tool use, and brain expansion, at least in any simple form, and thereby made bipedalism the original trait requiring independent explanation. Second, the simultaneous and possibly sympatric existence of several hominid species in the 2 million year range is a fact which, by itself, destroys the linear model of human evolution" (Tooby & DeVore, 1987; Cf. Foley, 1987). Furthermore, because a species’ adaptations form a coevolved and coadapted system, only some clusters of traits are mutually consistent with each other and therefore acceptable as models. What could be appropriate analogues and models for events and processes in



early hominid evolution? Do contemporary hunter-gatherer societies provide suitable material for drawing parallels? Contemporary populations of hunter-gatherers are virtually confined to areas that are currently marginal to agriculture, and furthermore do not live in a world of hunter-gatherers and nonhuman competitors as the early hominids did, but in a world dominated by agricultural and horticultural food producers. The use of contemporary hunter-gatherers as a model for early, pre-sapient hominids involves crossing taxonomic boundaries. They are not only members of different species, they have also undergone their own subsequent evolutionary and historical trajectories and developments. Simplistic huntergatherer models have been heavily criticized for being based on outmoded notions of cultural evolution that place living hunter-gatherers in a primitive, ancestral state as ’living fossils’ (Lafitau, 1724; Morgan, 1877; Lowie, 1937; Freeman, 1968; M.Harris, 1968; Testart, 1978; Schrire, 1980, 1984; Berndt, 1981; Shipman, 1983; Fedigan, 1986; Foley, 1987, 1991; Myers, 1988; Headland & Reid, 1989; Musonda, 1991, a.o.). The alternative source of analogue models is nonhuman primatology, but many problems arise here as well. While we share a close phylogenetic relationship and evolutionary history with other primates, they too have evolved in response to their own, unique, evolutionary context. Apes and monkeys are not just hominids manqués, they are species as well adapted to their niches as the hominids were to theirs. Analogies may be based on either phylogenetic or socioecological similarity. Historically, chimpanzees and baboons respectively have been taken as models for the two roles, but again there are problems with this approach, because evolution is the result of interaction between phylogeny and environment, and for every species this produces a unique set of circumstances (Foley, 1987). Because of the limitations and difficulties provided by the analogue models, ’strategic modeling’ has been proposed as the sane alternative. But let us begin at the beginning of the story.

8.2 Prelude: Humble Beginnings Taxonomically, humans belong to the Kingdom Animalia, the Phylum Chordata, the Subphylum Vertebrata, the Class Mammalia, the Subclass Eutheria or Placentalia, the Order Primates, the Suborder Anthropoidea, the Superfamily Hominoidea, the Family Hominidae, the Genus Homo, the Species sapiens, and the Subspecies sapiens. Each of these categories has uniquely contributed some morphological and/or behavioral features to what we are here and now. Ever since a molecule for the first time started to replicate, i.e., to make copies



of itself, life existed on earth and, with it, the process of natural selection. Those self-replicating molecules (let us call them proto-organisms) which reproduced fastest or most efficiently, inevitably became the most numerous in the population of self-replicating molecules. From a Darwinian perspective the defining property of life is self-replication; any organism is a self-reproducing entity or ’machine’. It is important to understand that organic life as we know it - with its nucleotides, proteins, DNA, etcetera - is not essential in this conception: The principles and the logic of Darwinism would apply equally to self-reproducing robots. The matter of self-replicators is immaterial. The process of natural selection is an inevitable concomitant of reproduction and inheritance whatever chemical composition the reproducers are manufactured of. In any pool of self-replicators, some will replicate faster or more efficiently than others - and maybe even at the expense of others - and their replicas will eventually prevail (e.g., Dawkins, 1976 et seq.; Slurink, 1989, 1994; Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). Natural selection also explains the existence of goal-directedness or teleonomy (not to be confused with teleology) in nature. The design of organisms will more and more reflect their ’purpose’ to replicate themselves; their structure will increasingly behave as a program for optimal self-replication (Pittendrigh, 1958; Mayr, 1974 et seq.; Slurink, 1989, 1994). In other words, "Natural selection guides the incorporation of design modifications over generations according to their consequences on their own reproduction. Over the long run, down chains of descent, this cycle of chance modification and reproductive feedback leads to the systematic accretion within architectures of design features that promote or formerly promoted their own propagation" (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). So, we can be reasonably certain that selection will act on any feature to the extent that it has a significant effect on reproduction. Differential reproduction, reproductive success is the currency in the calculus of evolution by means of natural selection, not, as was formerly thought, differential mortality. Life on this earth undoubtedly originated in an oxygenless (or -poor) and aquatic environment, and certain of the earliest organisms, the cyanophytes or blue-green algae, played a crucial part in producing, after about a thousand million years, the oxygen-rich atmosphere as we breathe it by releasing gaseous oxygen as a by-product of the process of photosynthesis. The earliest cells had no nuclei. There were two groups of these prokaryotic cells; bacteria and cyanophytes. All other organisms (plants, fungi, protozoa, metazoa) are eukaryotic: Within each cell they have a membrane-bound nucleus containing the chromosomes and various other structures and organelles, such as mitochondria, which prokaryotes lack. The eukaryotes generally exchange genetic material by means of sexual reproduction. The evolution of the eukaryotes from prokaryotes was, together with the so-called Cambrian explosion (in which all the major radiations of multicellular architecture occurred in a relatively short period) about 530 million years ago (mya), one of



the most significant - and puzzling - events in the earth’s history (e.g., Leakey, 1979; Gould, 1994). These events should, however, not be construed as evidence of inevitable progress and complexification inherent in the evolutionary process; on the contrary, the great success story of life’s pathway were, are, and will be the bacteria. Cell membranes, eukaryotic (about two billion years ago) and multicellular (about 600 mya) organisms - increasingly complex ’survival machines’ for the replicators - may have evolved as a direct consequence of competition between similar replicators. Competition is a universal aspect of life because organisms are basically selfish (i.e., they are ’programmed’ to propagate their own genes, not somebody else’s), and they have incompatible and conflicting goals, needs and demands in a world of limited resources; they are indeed, as Spencer and Darwin acknowledged, engaged in a continual struggle for existence. The more (phylogenetically) related and (specifically) similar organisms are, the more they tend to compete for the same resources - which is one of the reasons why intraspecific aggression (a behavioral strategy in the service of contest competition) is ubiquitous at least in the ’higher’ organisms (the phyla arthropoda and chordata [e.g. Scott, 1969]). From the time of these humble beginnings, organisms had two viable options, two different strategies of life regarding their energy supplies (ignoring for the sake of argument, that intermediate life forms can and do exist). Plants we call those organisms which are autotrophic (bind solar energy by means of photosynthesis for their growth and reproduction), and are relatively immobile. Animals we call those organisms which are heterotrophic, i.e., which parasitize on plants (herbivores) or on each other (carnivores) for their ’fuel’. The parasitic lifestyle is incompatible with the immobility of the plants. Slurink (1994) explains this with great clarity: "To collect enough fuel to grow and reproduce, it may be necessary to move and look around. But moving and looking around pose new energy problems, for which the most natural solution may be to steal the energy which another parasite has collected. But other parasites may have found that solution as well. So, there is an extra reason to be mobile: to prevent other parasites from using your valuable life as fuel. Animal mobility, therefore, can be interpreted as an optimal strategy that allows individual survival machines to collect fuel without being collected as fuel themselves". Besides these problems of survival, there is one other problem: A mobile organism needs information about the outside world, about its position and orientation in relation to its immediate surroundings. Sensors and receptors sensitive to certain patterns of variability of physical properties of the environment (e.g., light contrasts, sound waves, etc.) thus evolved as part of the emergency or alarm systems of the mobile survival machines. The more sensors and receptors an organism has at its disposal, the greater the need to coordinate, synchronize, make sense of, and adequately react to, the various



information flows. Therefore central nervous systems and brains evolved as coordinating sensory information and motor control centers. It is important to understand that brains did not evolve to think, or solve academic puzzles, but to act, or at least to make optimal decisions for the animal to act upon in the light of its survival interests. The picture of the outside world the senses and the brain reconstruct from the signals they receive has only to be ’adequate for survival’ (überlebungsadequat: Vollmer, 1983), not to provide deep insights into the objective world an sich. This helps us to understand why all knowledge arises from evaluative perspectives, or from subjects that select world signals like sieves and transform them according to the meaning they have in the light of their interests. The animal only needs to know its own part in the universe, and this knowledge must direct its behavior. So, everything the animal encounters must be valued from the viewpoint of its survival interests. This may also explain the evolution of emotions and of consciousness. Pugh claims that emotions can be compared to the values that govern decisions in the so-called ’value-driven decision system’ (Pugh, 1978)... Pugh proposes that a key problem for an imaginary ’evolutionary designer’ is that one cannot predict the situations that an animal will encounter. The program of a survival machine with only a fixed set of responses will result in a high number of wrong decisions. Thus, the evolution of a more flexible decision system in which alternatives can be weighed in relation to their contribution to evolutionary goals and subgoals becomes understandable (Slurink, 1994). The human being likes to think of itself as the tabula rasa organism par excellence. There are sound theoretical reasons, however, why such a blank slate organism (i.e., an organism without some kind of value-driven decision system) could not possibly evolve. Consider the evolutionary fate of an organism that would not immediately and appropriately react to any contingencies in its environment - the appearance of a predator, say - but instead would sine ira et studio contemplate the potential impact of this event. In order to contribute to survival, the emotions - the values of the value-driven decision system - must have a compulsory character: They must be able to force the organism to behave in an appropriate and adaptive fashion. Similarly, consciousness may be expected to be linked with emotions more than with pure informational or cognitive content. Besides mobility, it paid off in terms of reproductive success to develop behavioral systems of self- and offspring defense and improved competitive abilities, in brief: Aggression (extensively discussed in former chapters). But first let us explore why some of these organisms ’invented’ sex (or, technically, amphimixis; see especially Ghiselin, 1974) as a reproductive strategy, and why the combination of sex and aggression is such an explosive



one.

8.3 Why Did Sex Evolve? In the view of modern evolutionary biology, organisms are just temporary biodegradable vehicles with only one purpose: To transmit their genes to future generations. The organism is ephemeral and mortal. The genes are, in principle, immortal and have the ’selfish’ interest (due to their biochemical properties) of spreading as many copies of themselves as possible. Natural selection in fact selects for Reproductive Success (RS). Many organisms, such as protozoans, have reproduced, and still reproduce, asexually, by means of budding, fission or parthenogenesis, and they have been doing so successfully for millions of years. Then what is so special about sexual reproduction (needing two different morphs who each contribute only one half of their genes to the offspring), the way all animals best known to us, the mammals, and we ourselves do it? This question becomes especially enigmatic when we realize the costs involved in sexual reproduction. Sex is wasteful and inefficient: It uses energy, materials and time; and the highest cost of all is the damage, wounds and even death incurred in the cut-throat competition for mates. Crow (1987) and Stearns (1988) summarized the costs and disadvantages of sexual reproduction and recombination as follows: 1. Sexual reproduction is not very efficient qua reproduction. The time and energy required for meiosis and syngamy are substantial. As a means of multiplication, many asexual systems are more effective and less error-prone. 2. With anisogamy and separate sexes there is the cost of males. A female that could produce female progeny asexually with the same efficiency as by fertilization would have a twofold advantage. For bacteria and single-celled organisms, the principal cost of sex is probably the time it takes to carry out recombination. This can lengthen the normal cell division time by a factor of two or more. In anisogamous species - all ’higher’ plants and animals - the female provides cytoplasm to support the male genome. This results in the twofold cost of males, or cost of genome dilution. Compare a sexually reproducing female with an asexually reproducing female. Suppose that all offspring cost the same amount in both cases. The sexually reproducing female has offspring that are half male, half female. The asexually reproducing female has offspring that are all female, each of which also reproduces asexually and replicates her entire genome. Because she produces twice as many female offspring, after, for example, five generations she should have 32 times as many female descendants, each of which will also contain a complete copy of her genome. Not only does the sexually reproducing female make only half as many female offspring per generation; each of them contains



only half of her genome. 3. With sexual reproduction selection acts on the genic or additive component of the genetic variance, whereas selection among asexual individuals acts on the genotypic or total genetic variance. If the genetic variances are the same, an asexual species can respond more rapidly to selection - at least for a limited time. 4. If dominance and epistasis are present, there may be segregation and recombination loads. 5. Free recombination does not provide a way for two or more rare genes that are individually deleterious, but collectively beneficial, to spread through a population. 6. There are well-established examples of situations in which there is a clear advantage in holding certain genes together. Sexual reproduction regularly breaks up such favorable gene combinations. It was these costs which first convinced G.C. Williams (1975) and Ghiselin (1974) that the prevalence of sexual reproduction poses a serious problem for evolutionary theory. The advantages of sex to the individual have to be very large if sex is to be maintained by natural selection in any population in which parthenogenesis can arise. What could the possible benefits be that transcend the substantial costs involved? Why did sex(ual reproduction) evolve? The usual textbook answer to this vexing question is: "For the preservation of the species, of course". And, like so many textbook answers, it is wrong. The answer is based on the, still very en vogue, so-called ’group-selection’ paradigm (see Ch. 1). The first problem with the traditional explanation in terms of group selection is, Stearns (1988) explains, that group selection - or in this case, selection of the attributes of species - does not work under most circumstances. The reasons for this are as follows: (1) Selection pressure on a trait is proportional to the amount of variation in reproductive success among individuals that can be accounted for (a) by variation in the trait in question, divided (b) by the generation time (In this case, the variation would be between sexual and asexual individuals). (1a) Generation times of individuals are much shorter than lifetimes of species - by a factor of 10,000 to 100,000 for most eukaryotes. Thus selection pressures on individuals are correspondingly much larger than selection pressures on species. (1b) The response to selection depends on the amount of heritable variation available among the units selected. There is much more variation available for selection among individuals within a sexually reproducing species than there is among species within a lineage. Therefore the response to selection is much faster and larger for individuals than for species. (2) Thus selfish individuals can always outcompete individuals that sacrifice their own interests to those of the species. If asexuality is an advantage to an individual, and sexuality an advantage to the species, then we should find that



most organisms are asexual, for only rarely would the advantages of sexuality be so strong that species selection would overcome individual selection. So, once again, why did sex(ual reproduction) evolve if not for the good of the species? Although some asexual species have apparently survived for very long times, this is not the general rule. Asexually reproducing species may well have immediate evolutionary advantages, but must be less successful in the long run. The prevailing view is that asexual species are less able to keep up with environmental changes than are sexual ones. The three arguments for the evolutionary advantages of sexual reproduction are (1) adjusting to a changing environment, (2) incorporating beneficial mutations, and (3) getting rid of deleterious mutations (Crow, 1987). In practice, the advantage of being asexual is rarely twofold. In most animals the transition to asexuality is difficult. In small organisms the actual costs of sex are reduced by intermittent sexuality - a series of asexual generations followed by an occasional sexual generation. In large organisms, such as mammals and birds, the realized costs of sex are quite small because sexuality is fixed in these lineages. Because the asexual option is simply unavailable, mutant asexual competitors cannot invade. The major contemporary hypotheses for the maintenance of recombination are: 1. The ’Tangled Bank’ hypothesis: The production of genetically diverse offspring is advantageous in an environment that is saturated, heterogeneous, or both. Ghiselin (1974) appears to have priority for this idea, which was further developed by G.C. Williams (1975), Maynard Smith (1978) and Bell (1982). Bell named it the Tangled Bank hypothesis, after the closing paragraph in Darwin’s Origin. 2. The ’Red Queen’ hypothesis or Coevolutionary Arms Race (so called after Lewis Carroll’s Alice in Wonderland, in which the Red Queen has to run very fast in order to stay in the same place): The idea that recombination is an advantage in a coevolutionary race against competitors, predators, parasites and disease organisms has been brought up repeatedly. Disease organisms and parasites have a fundamental advantage in an evolutionary arms race. They can adapt themselves quickly to a specific host genotype. This brings the host population under strong frequency-dependent selection, for it pays to have a rare genotype during an epidemic (See especially Ridley, 1993). 3. DNA Repair Mechanism: The advocates of this hypothesis postulate that recombination evolved as a mechanism by which damage in one chromosome could be repaired by information from the homologous chromosome. This advantage was later followed by biochemical complementation between the homologous chromosomes that exploited the redundant information available in the diploid genome. The ’Red Queen’ hypothesis seems to be the most viable at the moment (e.g., Hamilton & Zuk, 1989; Hamilton, Axelrod & Tanese, 1990; Ridley, 1993).



8.3.1 Why Only Two Sexes? Biologically speaking, a female is by definition that sex that specializes in the production of a few, large, nutritious, and relatively immobile gametes (ova), while the male is by definition that sex that specializes in the production of a huge quantity of small, non-nutritious, motile gametes (sperm). Imagine an initial isogamic population in which individuals differ slightly in the size of gametes they produce. Some individuals will produce large gametes with high prospects of survivorship as zygotes, others will produce many smaller gametes with poorer prospects of survival. Most individuals under the normal distribution curve produce intermediate gametes. With random fusion of gametes, such a system stabilizes over time - via a transient bimodal distribution - with mainly two genotypes (males and females) in a 1:1 ratio. As Parker (1984b) explains: "The third genotype tends not to be represented either because it arises as the rather inviable product of the fusion of two ’protosperm’ or because it is formed by the fusion of two ’proto-ova’, depending on dominance. This latter fusion is rare because most gametes fuse with small gametes because of their numerical predominance. After several generations, the population is essentially anisogamous as a result of disruptive selection". This means that the final result of this process is the existence of two discrete and non-overlapping distributions of ovum-producers (females) and spermproducers (males). In other words, the Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) in this case is the stable coexistence of two morphs for gamete size. "Sperm producers survive by parasitizing the investment of ovum producers; the ESS solution (stable anisogamy) is essentially driven by sperm competition" (Parker, 1984b). But what if for whatever reason a third breeding morph arose in such a population, or that there would be three sexes: X, Y and Z, with mating patterns XZ, YZ, and XY? In that case a minimal selective advantage of one sex or zygote would eventually outcompete the others (simply by being more prolific), and again the final result would be two sexes. Why is there a fifty/fifty sex ratio; why are there approximately equal numbers of each sex? This puzzle was in principle solved only in the 1930s by R.A. Fisher, and is accordingly called ’Fisher’s principle’. When one sex numerically predominates in a population, it becomes advantageous for parents to invest in the opposite sex because that maximizes their offspring’s reproductive success. With a preponderance of females, investment in males will ensure high opportunities for fertilization; and, conversely, with a preponderance of males, investment in females will produce the highest pay-off. This mechanism eventually stabilizes the sex ratio around 1:1. Fisher stated his solution in genetic terms, but the potential of parents to actually vary and manipulate the sex of their offspring may also be involved (Trivers-Willard hypothesis:



Trivers & Willard, 1973). 8.3.2 Quantity versus Quality: r- versus K-selection Every season, a female cod may release many millions of eggs in the ocean for external fertilization. At the other extreme, human, chimpanzee and elephant females gestate, lactate, and intensively care for a relatively small number of young during their life times. These extremes represent two basic evolutionary strategies concerning reproduction: Low parental investment in quantity versus high parental investment in quality of offspring. Where a species lives in an environment in which the population is well below carrying capacity, it will be selected for its ability to reproduce rapidly. Because resources are at least temporarily abundant, reproductive rate will be more important than competitive ability in resource exploitation. Such a species is described as rselected (where r = maximum intrinsic rate of growth of the population). In an environment where populations are close to the carrying capacity (K), on the other hand, then a high reproductive rate will be less advantageous. More individuals cannot be ’fitted in’, and so instead there will be selective advantage for those individuals able to compete effectively for what resources do exist. In this case, the species is described as K-selected. Besides greater competitive ability, K-selection is generally associated with a number of other characteristics such as slower development and longer juvenile phase, larger body size, internal fertilization, delayed reproduction, lower birth rate, greater birth interval, fewer but larger progeny and more parental investment in progeny (low infant mortality), longer gestation, longevity, slower sexual maturation and later menarche, etc. etc. (e.g., E.O. Wilson, 1975; Hrdy, 1981; Foley, 1987). Increased body size is in its turn, according to Foley (1987), associated with a decrease in relative metabolic costs, larger home range, greater mobility, greater heat retention, increased strength and speed, enlarged brain, increased longevity, longer prenatal period, kin-centered sociality, and altered predatorprey relations. All these factors tend to amplify each other in a complex evolutionary cause-effect network.



8.3.3 Sexual Selection Sexual selection depends on the success of certain individuals over others of the same sex, in relation to propagation of the species; whilst natural selection depends on the success of both sexes at all ages, in relation to the general conditions of life. The sexual struggle is of two kinds; in the one it is between individuals of the same sex, generally the males, in order to drive away or kill their rivals... whilst in the other, the struggle is likewise between individuals of the same sex, in order to excite or charm those of the opposite sex, generally the females, which no longer remain passive, but select the more agreeable partners (Darwin, 1871). This is how Darwin introduced the concept of sexual selection. The first kind of the sexual struggle is now better known as male-male and female-female competition. The second kind of the sexual struggle envisaged by Darwin is now known as epigamic selection or, simply, the principle of female choice. Darwin indicated the sexually dimorphic secondary sexual characteristics of many species, including humans, as the result of sexual selection. The gorgeous and exorbitant plumage of male birds-of-paradise, for example, is the result of such a kind of runaway sexual selection, based on the attractiveness to the females of the most exuberant-looking males. When sexual selection operates among males, adult males tend to become larger, heavier, showier, more competitive and better armed, and their behavior patterns and ecological requirements tend to diverge from those of the females. This is one of the reasons why E.O. Wilson (1975) calls sex "an antisocial force in evolution"; it generates, exacerbates, and multiplies conflicts of interests. A whole array of traits is associated with the greater sexual competitiveness of males in a wide range of species. These include not only greater size and gaudiness, but also the price males have to pay for this: Greater vulnerability and frailty in development, and shorter lifespans due to senescence, high risktaking and mortality from fighting. Table 8.3.3 summarizes the modes of sexual selection. Of the two aspects Darwin distinguished, male competition has received broader acceptance than female choice; many biologists question female choice (in humans, e.g., Low, 1988); or acknowledge constraints on female choice (e.g., Trivers, 1985), and especially the notion that it can engender runaway selection, i.e., rapid selection for traits females prefer for strictly aesthetic reasons (Fisher, 1930; Ghiselin, 1969; Arnold, 1983; Cf. Cronin, 1991). Trivers (1972) argues that the intensity of sexual selection is determined by the magnitude of the difference in parental investment of the two sexes in their offspring. Since greater parental investment in one offspring implies lesser parental investment for other offspring, the sex that invests more heavily in its



offspring (and given the inequity in sperm and eggs, this is usually the female) becomes a limiting resource for the other sex. To the degree that they are freed from parental investment in their offspring, members of the sex with the lesser investment can increase their reproductive success by leaving offspring with more members of the opposite sex. Hence males tend to be sexually selected for sexually dimorphic features that are an advantage in competition with other males (Parker, 1987; Borgia, 1979, 1980). While the average reproduction of males and females is identical, Low (1992) explains, the variance is not (Fisher, 1930; Bateman, 1948). More males than females fail to reproduce, and the most successful male produces many more offspring than the most successful female. Males must expend enormous effort to get resources or status to accomplish even a single mating (and thus offspring), but subsequent offspring may impose relatively little additional cost. Hence, much male striving is mating effort rather than parental effort; there are potentially very high reproductive returns, and high risks are acceptable. Females in most species have no trouble getting matings, but each offspring imposes a unit cost, so that the female return curve for her parental effort is linear for some portion, and levels off earlier than the male curve. Eventually females reach a limit such that further resources cannot produce further successful offspring. Table 8.3.3: The modes of sexual selection (E.O. Wilson, 1975) I. Epigamic Selection A. Based on choices made among courting partners 1. The choice among the different types of suitors is dependent on their relative frequencies 2. The choice is not frequency-dependent B. Based on differences in breeding time: superior suitors offer to breed more at certain times than at others II. Intrasexual Selection C. Precopulatory competition 1. Differential ability in finding mates 2. Territorial exclusion 3. Dominance within permanent social groups 4. Dominance during group courtship displays D. Postcopulatory competition 1. Sperm displacement 2. Induced abortion and reinsemination by the winning suitor 3. Infanticide of loser’s offspring and reinsemination by the winning suitor 4. Mating plugs and repellents 5. Prolonged copulation 6. In ’passive phase’ of courtship, suitor remains attached to partner during a period before or after copulation 7. Suitor guards partner but without physical contact 8. Mated pair leaves vicinity of competing suitors



Thus, the ultimate basis of sexual selection is greater variance in mating success within one sex. In humans, for example, some powerful men may have many wives and children, while many poor, low-status men have neither kith nor kin. This differential in reproductive success underlies the formulation of Parental Investment Theory, developed by Trivers (1972). 8.3.4 Reproductive Success (RS) and Parental Investment Theory [W]e have evolved a nervous system that acts in the interests of our gonads, and one attuned to the demands of reproductive competition. If fools are more prolific than wise men, then to that degree folly will be favored by selection. And if ignorance aids in obtaining a mate, then men and women will tend to be ignorant (Ghiselin, 1974).

As explained in chapter 1, we may expect all organisms, including our own species, to be programmed to compete for differential reproductive success with conspecifics, and for the resources and status positions which lead to the enhancement of reproductive success. But because our next-of-kin also bear replicas or copies of our own genes, natural selection will also favor those behavioral strategies which increase the reproductive success of our next-ofkin. The concepts of ’differential parental investment’, ’differential reproductive strategy’ and ’male confidence of paternity’ provide the basis for an understanding of the ubiquitous phenomena relating to the conflict-ridden and uneasy coexistence of the sexes, known as the perpetual ’battle’ or even ’war’ of the sexes. Basically, the sociobiological reasoning behind the ’battle of the sexes’ is simple and straightforward: Men and women invest differently in their reproductive success. For mammalian species, such as we ourselves are, female reproductive success is limited only by the amount of resources (time, energy, nutrients, etc.) she has to invest in offspring. But for the male, the female herself is the limiting resource: One male can inseminate many females and male reproductive success is only limited by the number of matings a male can achieve. Even in species where males typically invest in their offspring - and human males certainly do - the temptation of enhancing reproductive success by means of securing extra-pair copulations and inseminating other females without further investment tends to select for a mixed male strategy of pairbonding and philandering, and a female counter-strategy of carefully assessing the male’s potential and willingness to invest in her offspring. Thus there is a basic asymmetry in female and male parental investment strategies. As Daly & Wilson (1978) eloquently explain: At conception the female role already involves greater care for the young, for it is the large ovum that



provides the nutrients for early development of the zygote. In the language of the evolutionary economic model, the female’s initial ’parental investment’ in each offspring surpasses the male’s. Parental investment is a concept developed mainly by Fisher (1930) and Trivers (1972). The latter defined parental investment as "any investment by the parent in an individual offspring that increases the offspring’s chance of surviving (and hence reproductive success) at the cost of the parent’s ability to invest in other offspring". This definition stresses the trade-offs implicit in any course of action. Parents who invest in one offspring sacrifice the opportunity to invest in others. More generally, an animal’s parental investment is part of its total reproductive effort, which also includes the effort expended in finding and winning mates. With a finite amount of time, energy, and resources, that can be devoted to reproduction, each animal should strive to distribute its reproductive effort so as to maximize inclusive fitness... The common denominator of all such investments is ’the expenditure of the animal’s remaining reproductive potential’, for it is reproductive success alone that appears on the scorecard of natural selection. The basic difference between the sexes is the vastly greater size of an ovum in comparison with a sperm. From its very beginning, then, sexual reproduction has entailed a disparity of parental investment: The mother provides the cytoplasm. This situation sets the stage for a number of evolutionary developments that have greatly amplified the initial difference in the parental investment of female and male... Internal fertilization, gestation, placentation, lactation: Each of these evolutionary developments results in a more concentrated female investment and in a decreasing number of offspring... The males are competing with one another for the opportunity to inseminate females. By apportioning a relatively large part of their reproductive effort to such competition, males of most species devote rather little to parental care. The nurture that females bestow becomes a resource for which males compete: The male who wins the right to inseminate a female also wins for his progeny a share of the female’s parental investment (Daly & Wilson, 1978). The concept of differential parental investment provides an explanation for the fact that males are almost universally the more competitive sex. In general, females invest considerably in the nurture of each of a relatively small number of young, while male fitness depends on maximizing mating frequency. The resultant competition is not something that males can afford to take lightly. The prize is substantial, and the greater the prize (e.g., a harem of females), the greater will be the risk that the hopeful male should venture in order to secure it: "For a big enough prize it will even be worth his while to risk death" (Daly & Wilson, 1978).



Male-male reproductive competition can take several forms (Borgia, 1979; Parker, 1987): Gametic competition for copulations and inseminations (sperm competition); harem competition for control of females; resource competition for territories or commodities that attract females; and labor competition to provide services that females need for their eggs or their offspring. In other words, males compete through a variety of behaviors including territoriality, dominance, female guarding, nuptial feeding, and sperm production. Although less attention has been paid to female-female competition, several forms have been identified: Direct competition for resources necessary for producing and nurturing gametes, fetuses and offspring and competition for parental investment of high ranking males; and competition for males of high genetic quality (Hrdy, 1981; Hrdy & Williams, 1983; Parker, 1987). Male sexual competitiveness and promiscuity, aggression and rivalry, and other secondary sex differences are not inherent, intrinsic aspects of maleness, rather these are the resultants of sex differences in reproductive strategies. In those (few) cases in which males provide significant parental investment, there is intense female-female competition for males, and females are the larger and more aggressive sex (G.C. Williams, 1966, 1975; Ghiselin, 1974; Symons, 1979; E.O. Wilson, 1975; Hrdy, 1981; Trivers, 1985; Badcock, 1989 et seq.; a.o.). These behavioral sex differences do, therefore, not depend on the possession of a particular pendulous sexual organ, as Freud and other psychoanalysts were inclined to believe. To a male the costs of parental investment in somebody else’s offspring are very substantial, therefore males are expected to provide parental investment pari passu with their certainty of paternity.

8.4 Of Primates, HUCHIBOs and Hominids Man likes to think of himself as the ultimate outcome of a long line of evolutionary progress and inevitable complexification: The crown of creation. In reality, however, progress and complexity are not even a primary thrust of the evolutionary process - the bacterial style of life is the most common and the most successful - and Man is but a tiny, late-arising, and very contingent twig on life’s enormously arborescent bush: "Humans arose rather as a fortuitous and contingent outcome of thousands of linked events, anyone of which could have occurred differently and sent history on an alternative pathway that would not have led to consciousness" (Gould, 1994). Just consider the following ’ifs’: 1. If our inconspicuous and fragile lineage had not been among the few survivors of the initial radiation of multicellular animal life in the Cambrian explosion 530 mya, then no vertebrates would have inhabited the earth at all. 2. If a small and unpromising group of lobe-finned fishes had not evolved fin bones, vertebrates might never have become terrestrial.



3. If a large extraterrestrial body had not struck the earth 65 mya, then dinosaurs would still be dominant and mammals insignificant. 8.4.1 The Primate Adaptations Many vertebrates are land-dwelling (terrestrial) creatures. All animals that succesfully adjusted to terrestrial life had to solve a number of problems: Respiration (obtaining oxygen), dehydration (necessitating protective covering), and reproduction (necessitating hard-shelled eggs). Between 225 and 200 mya, a new group of vertebrates, the reptiles, rose to dominance. They were the first completely terrestrial vertebrates. With the evolution of internal fertilization, reptiles were no longer required to return to water in order to reproduce. After fertilization, the embryo is contained in an amniotic egg, maintaining the moist environment, and surrounded by a thick leathery shell preventing dehydration. The egg also contains a food supply, as well as a number of other evolutionary novelties (Poirier, 1993). From these reptiles the first true mammals evolved about 200 mya. An important mammalian feature is the ability to generate heat and maintain a constant body temperature, a condition called homeothermy. Warm-blooded mammals could exploit and inhabit a wider range of habitats than those available to reptiles. Mammals also have evolved different kinds of teeth specialized for different functions (heterodontism); canines and incisors for jabbing, cutting and slicing, premolars and molars for grinding. The mammalian mode of reproduction (internal fertilization, placentation and early stages of development in the mother’s womb) is significant in understanding mammalian evolutionary success. The reproductive mode of one group, the placentals, allows an extensive period of prenatal development. Mammals also have fewer births per parturition, and the mammalian mother protects, nurses and nourishes the neonates by providing milk secreted by her mammary glands. The developmental period among the young is extended by nursing, and the infant’s longer period of attachment to its mother increases the potential period of learning behaviors necessary (or at least helpful) for survival. Also play behavior is an important means of environmental exploration, and of practicing social behaviors and communication skills, as well as physical coordination. Not surprisingly, mammals are generally more intelligent than their reptilian predecessors (Poirier, 1993). Angiosperm forests spread across the earth during the late Cretaceous (94 to 64 mya). About 55 mya, some small, insectivorous, tree shrew-like mammal climbed into the trees in search for insects. Its descendants came to rely substantially on edible plant parts from the canopy; a change that set the stage for the emergence of the primate order (Milton, 1993). Natural selection strongly favors traits that enhance foraging efficiency. Hence as plant foods assumed increasing importance over evolutionary time, selection



gradually gave rise to the suite of traits (mostly facilitating arboreal foraging) characteristic of the primates: Stereoscopic (3D) and color vision, enhanced depth perception and visual acuity; agile and prehensile hands and feet, adept at grasping and clutching, with opposable thumb; small number of, or single, offspring; prolongation of gestation and infancy; complexity of social behavior; behavioral flexibility, and the capacity to learn and remember the identity and locations of edible plant parts, correlated with larger brains than other same-sized mammals (Harris, 1975; Milton, 1993). Milton found that the frugivorous spider monkeys (Ateles geoffroyi) have a brain twice as large as the same-sized (and also sharing a common ancestor) howler monkeys (Alouatta palliata), who consume large quantities of leaves. As the brain is an expensive organ to maintain, usurping a disproportionate amount of energy (glucose) extracted from food, Milton hypothesized that a) Natural selection favored a larger brain in spider monkeys, in part because enhanced mental capacity helped them remember where ripe fruits could be found (Spider monkeys also range farther each day because in any patch of forest, ripe fruits are less abundant than leaves); and b) The striking expansion of brain size in the genus Homo indicates that humans became so successful because selection amplified a tendency inherent in the primate order since its inception: That of using brain power, or behavior, to solve dietary and foraging problems. Thus primates with relatively large brains have larger home ranges, perhaps because species with large home ranges need to remember complex information about food distribution (Harvey & Read, 1992; Milton, 1993). Aiello & Dunbar (1993) recently reported a robust correlation between neocortex size and group size among primates, possibly reflecting the increasing importance of social intelligence and communication in larger groups. In humans the increase in neocortical brain size is predominantly linked to the substrates of speech production and perception, suggesting that the human brain has been shaped by evolutionary processes that elaborated the capacities needed for language, and not just by a general demand for greater intelligence (Deacon, 1992). The primates are generally regarded as an arboreal order. Yet, about a quarter of all primate species has returned to mother earth and become terrestrial (sensu stricto) again, especially species belonging to the most recently evolved group of the catarrhines, comprising the Old World monkeys and apes (Clutton-Brock & Harvey, 1977; Foley, 1987). The primary constraint on an arboreal way of life is body size. Access to many food types in trees is best served by a small body size. For a primate, the price of release from the high energy costs of a small body size is terrestriality. Consequently, if there already is a trend towards increased size among primates, a trend towards increased terrestriality should also be expected. Constraints on body size alone, however, are insufficient to account for the



evolution of terrestriality. A terrestrial way of life must also be viable in its own right. Appropriate terrestrial environments must be present (Foley, 1987). The date of the divergence between the ancestors of the apes and the Old World monkeys is probably at about 23 mya. The best evidence for the earliest appearance of hominids in the fossil record is at about 5 mya from Tabarin and Lothagam in Kenya. 8.4.2 The Pongid-Hominid Common Ancestor Wrangham (1987) used the method of phylogenetic comparison to identify possible conservative features in social organization of humans and the African apes (for which molecular biology suggested their close relatedness) in an attempt to characterize the hominid-pongid common ancestor. According to this approach, shared features of social organization among humans, chimpanzees, bonobos, and gorillas are likely to have been present in the common ancestor, and can be viewed as part of an ’ancestral suite’ of behaviors likely to have characterized hominids (and pongids) at any point in their evolutionary history. From the correspondences in the behavioral repertoires of these species, Wrangham concluded that the last hominid-pongid common ancestor probably had closed social networks (i.e., some degree of ethnocentrism and xenophobia), hostile and male-dominated intergroup relationships with stalk-and-attack interactions (i.e., male coalitional psychology and [lethal] male raiding), female exogamy and a lack of alliance bonds between females, and males having sexual relationships with more than one female (i.e., polygyny). Wrangham considered territoriality to be too labile a trait (depending on ecological conditions) to reliably attribute it to the common ancestor. It is problematic whether the usually non-coalitional interindividual aggression of the gorilla may legitimately be classified as intergroup aggression. Thus, if the gorilla is eliminated from the comparative list, we are left with the genetically most related human-chimpanzee-bonobo clade (or HUCHIBO clade, for short). Ghiglieri (1987) was able to show that the HUCHIBO clade is characterized by a unique cooperative defense of a common territory by closely related males (we might call these clans), who exhibit only moderate sexual dimorphism, "presumably because success in male-male competition hinges on having larger group size (of kin-related males) during conflicts rather than larger individual size" (Ghiglieri, 1987).



Between the common ancestor of gorillas and HUCHIBOs and the common ancestor of all HUCHIBOs (a period of about 2 million years) some kind of revolution had occurred: Unlike all other primate social organization which is largely structured around female kin groups with the adolescent males leaving their natal group, HUCHIBO males, on the contrary, stay in their own natal group providing the opportunity and impetus for increased cooperation and clannishness among kin-related males. This male cooperation and clannishness (resembling fraternal interest groups in human societies) thus sharply distinguishes the HUCHIBOs from the other great apes. "Unlike gorillas and orangutans, males of the chimpanzee-bonobo-human clade retain their male offspring predominantly, live in closed social groups containing multiple females, mate polygynously, restrict their range to a communal territory, are cooperatively active in territorial defense, and, apparently, when a neighboring community weakens, the males of some communities make a concerted strategic effort to stalk, attack, and kill their rivals as do men" (Ghiglieri, 1987). Only in those few species with female-biased dispersal - chimpanzees, hamadryas baboons, red colobus, and perhaps spider monkeys - are there known or suspected to be enduring affiliative relationships among males; philopatry, consanguinity, and cooperation tend to coincide (Rodseth et al., 1991). The most common kind of cladistic speciation is created simply by geographical isolation, and the early phases of hominid evolution may not have been fundamentally different from the early hominoid branches in this respect



(Tooby & DeVore, 1987; Mayr, 1963 et seq.). When was the pongid-hominid split taking place? Coppens (1994), following earlier intimations by Kortlandt (1972), suggested the following intriguing scenario. 8.4.3 East of Eden What emerged clearly from excavations and finds in Africa during the last decades was that there was absolutely no sign of the common chimpanzee (Pan), or one of its direct ancestors, in eastern Africa during the time of the Australopithecines (to 8 mya). Yet, molecular biology, biochemistry and cytogenetics continued to demonstrate that humans and chimpanzees were molecularly extremely close, which meant, in evolutionary terms, that they shared a common ancestor not very far back in time, geologically speaking. All the hominid sites that dated to three million years ago were found, without exception, on the eastern side of the Rift Valley, the huge furrow that cuts across eastern Africa from north to south. Only one solution could explain, according to Kortlandt (1972) and Coppens (1994), how, at one and the same time, Hominidae and Panidae were close in molecular terms but never side by side in the fossil record. And the solution was that Hominidae and Panidae had never been together. Eight million years ago, a tectonic crisis arose on the African continent that entailed two distinct movements; sinking produced the Rift Valley, while rising gave birth to the line of peaks forming the western rim of the valley. The Rift Valley not only broke up the population of the common ancestor of the Hominidae and the Panidae in two divisions, it also disturbed the global circulation of air, the climate, and thus the vegetation. The west maintained a generous amount of precipitation and kept its forests and woodlands, while the east, gradually getting colder and drier, evolved into open savannah (via a mosaic forest/savannah phase). Coppens speculates that the western descendants of these common ancestors pursued their adaptation to life in a humid, arboreal milieu; these are the Panidae. The eastern descendants of these same common ancestors, in contrast, invented a completely new repertoire in order to adapt to their new life in an increasingly open and arid environment; the Hominidae. Thus, geographic isolation and the need to adapt to a new habitat promoted further genetic divergence between the families. Man, one could say, is the result of a tectonic and climatic catastrophe. Coppens called this scenario the East Side Story. He might as well have called it East of Eden. Later on, some 3 mya, the whole earth cooled, and adaptation to a still more arid and cooler habitat, with a concomitant decrease in plant foods, led in two directions, reflecting two different strategies: A strong robust physique and a narrow, specialized vegetarian diet for the large robust Australopithecines (also called Paranthropus), whose heavy dentition and facial musculature suggests a



diet of hard coarse roots and tubers, dry fruits, etc.; and a large brain and a broad-ranging, opportunistic diet - involving greater dependency on mobility and scavenging/hunting - for the gracile hominids (Foley, 1987; Coppens, 1994; Slurink, 1994). The dentition and tooth-wear patterns of early Homo habilis is compatible with an omnivorous diet (Musonda, 1991). Furthermore, the modern human digestive tract is adapted to a plant-rich and fibrous diet (Milton, 1993). According to Johanson & White (1979), Foley (1987), and Parker (1987) the early Australopithecines (Australopithecus afarensis) were highly sexually dimorphic (more within the range of the gorilla than that of the chimpanzee) as 1 were their descendants A. robustus and A. boisei . They probably specialized in extracting with tools a variety of energy-rich embedded foods such as nuts, roots, tubers, fungi, ants, termites, grubs, and eggs that were unavailable to non-tool using species living in the same environment. Although it is likely that both sexes engaged in extractive foraging with tools, as well as opportunistic foraging on a variety of fruits and buds, as in chimpanzees, males probably supplemented their foraging by hunting small birds and mammals. Extractive foraging with tools would have favored advanced sensorimotor and symbolic intelligence. Moreover, it would have provided a basis for deferred imitation and symbolic communication of the location and nature of hidden embedded foods (Parker & Gibson, 1979; Parker, 1987). 8.4.4 Bipedalism Three basic systems of locomotion have evolved among terrestrial primates: Quadrupedalism, knuckle-walking and bipedalism. Bipedalism, adopted by the hominids, is the most specialized, requiring major anatomical modifications. Hominids (Australopithecus afarensis) were more or less bipedal by just about 4 mya, as attested by the morphology of the Hadar fossils (Lucy) and the Laetoli footprints (Johanson & Edey, 1981; Foley, 1987; Richards, 1987; some scholars deny this categorically, however, and some anatomical features such as curved phalanges [toe bones] indicate a still arboreal heritage). It thus occurred sufficiently early for it to be considered to be part of the original adaptive shifts of the hominids. Depending on one’s view of the early hominid paleoenvironment (savannah, forest/woodland, and/or a more aquatic environment of marshes, lakes and rivers), different explanations identifying different selection pressures for the origin of human uprightness and bipedalism - freeing the hands for purposes 1

The marked sexual dimorphism of these species, Slurink (1994) notes, seems to refute Ghiglieri’s model of the common HUCHIBO ancestor: "Either the similarities between the HUCHIBOs are a product of convergent evolution, or the Hadar-hominids belong to more than one species as suggested by the heterogeneity of the Hadar materials (Schmid, 1989)".



other than locomotion - have been proposed: Carrying of food in the context of male provisioning (Hewes, 1961, 1964; Kortlandt, 1967; Lovejoy, 1981; Isaac, 1983); reaching upward for food (Jolly, 1970); feeding adaptations, e.g., a diet of grass seeds (DeBrul, 1962; Jolly, 1970); early warning system, increasing the visual horizon to better spot both prey and predators (Ravey, 1978); carrying tools and weapons (Darwin, 1871; Washburn, 1950 et seq.); improved bioenergetic efficiency (Taylor & Rowntree, 1973; Rodman & McHenry, 1980; Pickford, 1989); stalking, chasing and hunting (Merker, 1984); intimidating predators (Livingstone, 1962); thermoregulation, reducing the risk of hyperthermia (Wheeler, 1984 et seq.), and enabling mid-day foraging and avoidance of predators (Foley, 1987); wading in shallow water and floating in deep water (Morgan, 1972, 1982); a preadaptation in relation to climbing trees (Susman, 1986); or in relation to terrestriality (Foley, 1987); etc. (For reviews of these hypotheses see: McHenry, 1978, 1982; Lovejoy, 1981; Isaac, 1983; Foley, 1987; Richards, 1987; Slurink, 1994). The proposed hypotheses fall into two separate categories; those that account for the origins of bipedality in terms of its direct locomotor advantages, and those that regard it as a byproduct of other selective factors, mainly the advantages of having a specialized, and ’freed’, grasping hand (Foley, 1987). The selective advantage of an upright posture was apparently great enough to offset severe disadvantages involving the reproductive system itself (not to mention the vulnerability to lumbar and circulatory malfunctioning). In evolutionary terms this means that it must have been a very potent selective force. Darwin (and later repeated by Dart, Lorenz, Bigelow and many others) already suggested that an erect posture and bipedalism, together with the reduction of male canines, were favored originally by selection because the hands were freed for fighting with weapons (a view no longer tenable; the erect posture existed long before any evidence of tools). Although bipedalism as a savannah adaptation is the most widely accepted view, it has been recognized that bipedalism in a savannah paleoenvironment makes little immediate sense: It is inherently unstable, and it is not more energy-efficient than quadrupedalism or more effective in carrying things than knuckle-walking (as chimps do). Also the slight initial advantages for improved vision would hardly have outweighed the drawbacks. Bipedality is useless for escape from predators (Lovejoy, 1981). The upright posture makes excellent sense, on the other hand, in a wading context. Most African hominid fossil sites are located in the vicinity of former marshes, lakes and/or rivers, and the early hominids - much like modern humans - may have preferred a mixed and variegated biotope of woodland, water and savannah. During the dry season savannah animals gather around the remaining water resources and the hominids may have exploited such an opportunity, while at the same time being relatively safe from, especially feline, predators in the water (Foley, 1987; Slurink, 1993). As outlined by Richards (1987), Hardy’s (1960, 1977) and Morgan’s (1972,



1982) so-called Aquatic Ape theory argues that (a) a number of the most characteristic human behaviors, notably bipedalism and vocal communication (speech), and (b) a suite of idiosyncratic physiological features such as hairlessness, subcutaneous fat, sweating, weeping, nose-form, breast-form, ventral orientation of the vagina and highly developed sense of balance can be economically explained by an aquatic or semi-aquatic (lacustrine, riverine) phase in hominid evolution presumably having taken place after the chimpanzee-hominid split but before the Laetoli australopithecines. The orthodox savannah model leaves many of these unique features enigmatic, especially the erect posture and the, suicidal due to moisture loss, perspiration method. See Roede et al. (1991) for a critical evaluation of the Aquatic Ape theory. Furthermore, Slurink (1994) points out that bonobos, who are much better adapted to water than chimpanzees, have been observed to catch fish while wading upright in the water: "It seems that in bonobos uprightness is sometimes used to intimidate predators, sometimes it is used to carry fruit and sometimes to catch fish (De Waal, 1989). This could imply that the carrying hypothesis (Hewes, 1961) and other hypotheses (a wading ape theory, a predator intimidation theory (references in Pickford, 1989) need not be mutually exclusive. Bipedality need not have evolved as the result of one specific selection pressure; but it could have been the best general solution for a multitude of separate problems". Though still enigmatic in its origins, once in existence, however, bipedalism opened up new avenues and revolutionary strategies. Parker (1987) suggested that bipedal locomotion initially arose in the earliest hominids through sexual selection as part of a male reproductive strategy of nuptial or courtship feeding of estrus females rather than as a means for provisioning mate and offspring. The nuptial feeding model for the origin of bipedalism has the advantage of providing a model for a transition from a pattern of low male parental investment and promiscuous mating to a pattern of high male parental investment and provisioning of mate and offspring in long term, if not necessarily exclusive, pairbonds. In Parker’s sexual selection thinking, male competition through nuptial feeding on scavenged brains and marrow would have favored larger body size in male hominids because of the rigor of long distance walking and carrying and defending themselves against competing scavengers and hunters. Male canine reduction too may have evolved through sexual selection. Newman (1970), Wheeler (1984, 1985), and Foley (1987) relate bipedality, loss of functional body hair and Man’s remarkable thermoregulatory mechanisms to selection as a result of thermal stress. Foley (1987) argued that the bioenergetic advantages of bipedalism seem to lie in long-distance endurance. This is consistent with a model of extreme thermoregulatory characteristics, and prolonged and long-distance foraging of the early hominids. The latter may have been the selective pressure leading to bipedalism acting on a number of necessary preadaptations and changing



paleoenvironments (See Aiello, 1981; Foley, 1978). Reduced thermal stress could be bought only at the cost of increased water dependence, with profound consequences for ranging and foraging behavior. It seems sensible to avoid the most extreme versions of both the savannah- and the aquatic theory (Pickford, 1989; Reynolds, 1991; Tobias, 1991; Slurink, 1994). The question of why our protohominid ancestors opted for bipedalism is still largely unanswered. 8.4.5 The Chimpanzee Connection The vicissitudes of the chimpanzee evolutionary trajectory - on the western side of the Great Rift - have been explored in considerable detail in Ch. 3. Here I shall briefly recapitulate only the main arguments. Our knowledge of bonobo (Pan paniscus) social, especially intergroup, behavior is too fragmentary to be of much use, and I shall exclude this intriguing species, which appears to have evolved highly effective conflict-resolution and reconciliation procedures, 2 from the discussion in this section . As we saw, it was the female transfer in the HUCHIBO clade which made the evolution of a ’male coalitional psychology’ (Tooby & Cosmides, 1988) feasible. Ghiglieri (1987) speculated that it was this evolved propensity for cooperation and solidarity between kin-related males that could well have been the critical preadaptation for male cooperation in dangerous scavenging or hunting in the hominid ancestor. In the chimpanzee it must also have given rise within the group to opportunistic coalitional politics and the concomitant Machiavellian intelligence (vide infra), while, between the groups, the chimpanzee equivalent of pseudospeciation gave rise to the chimpanzee equivalent of militant ethnocentrism and xenophobia, strong consciousness of community territorial boundaries as well as community identity; a strong ’consciousness of belonging’. What factor(s) promoted the transition from male exogamy in other primate groups towards female exogamy in the HUCHIBO clade is unknown, though it 2

It should, however, be remembered (See Ch. 3) that intergroup agonistic behavior among overlapping bonobo groups is minimal. Bonobos do not show the all-male patrols found among common chimpanzees, nor do they show cooperative hunting. Strong group cohesion is maintained by genito-genital rubbing in females, a lengthened period of female receptivity, high tolerance and male-female affinities, and widespread food sharing (Kuroda, 1979; Kano, 1982, 1990; Susman, 1987). Despite female transfer, the core of bonobo society consists of strongly bonded females and the males associated with them (Badrian & Badrian, 1984). This is quite the opposite of the male kinship groups found among common chimpanzees (Poirier, 1993). Bonobo males have never been observed to kill conspecifics. Shea (1983) suggested that group cohesiveness among pygmy chimpanzees, coupled with reduced sexual dimorphism (Kinzey, 1984), helps explain the lack of aggression. Susman (1987) suggested that the lack of aggression, reduced sexual dimorphism, and increased female sexual receptivity are tied to the bonobo’s more stable forest habitat, with its reduced seasonality, relaxed feeding competition, and reduced predator pressure.



is tempting to speculate, as did Slurink (1994), that a temporarily reduced threat of predators in one of the chronospecies ancestral to all great apes was the ultimate cause, leading to an initial loosening of the group structure, via transition to one-male groups, to subsequent competition for harems starting an arms race in which dominant males were forced more and more to rely on their male kin. 8.4.6 Group Territoriality In the male chimpanzees of Gombe "territoriality functions not only to repel intruders from the home range, but sometimes to injure or eliminate them; not only to defend the existing home range and its resources, but to enlarge it opportunistically at the expense of weaker neighbors; not only to protect the female resources of a community, but to actively and aggressively recruit new sexual partners from neighboring social groups" (Goodall, 1986). They deliberately and intentionally kill ’the enemy’ for that purpose. I submit that a similar scenario operated in hominid/human evolution: Opportunistic and occasional territorial aggrandizement and violent recruitment of females are also the fundamental causes of hominid/human warfare. It is as if both chimps and early humans had read Hamilton (1975): "[I]t has to be remembered that to raise mean fitness in a group either new territory or outside mates have to be obtained somehow", and both species had stumbled upon the same solution. Ultimately the fundamental causes are related to the different reproductive strategies of the sexes. Group territoriality is the trait-d’union between, and the communal theme in, chimpanzee ’lethal male raiding’, primitive war, and contemporary state-level warfare (not to mention the social carnivores and warmaking ants). As we have seen (Ch. 3), the raiding chimps attempted to extend their territory by encroaching on the territory of neighboring males, thereby increasing the probability of access to reproductively valuable females. In primitive war, territorial intrusion and the defense of territorial integrity rank next to revenge as the main war motives (Ch. 5). In contemporary state-level war, territory/territoriality/territorial contiguity (border disputes) has been singled out by quite a number of researchers as the universal and persistent underlying cause (Richardson, 1960; Rummel, 1968, 1972; Luard, 1970; Alcock, 1972; Singer, 1972; Singer & Small, 1972; Dowty & Kochan, 1974; Starr & Most, 1976, 1978; Wallensteen, 1981; Small & Singer, 1982; Gochman & Maoz, 1984; Diehl, 1985; Luard, 1986; Maoz, 1989; Gochman, 1990; Holsti, 1991; Bremer, 1992; Goertz & Diehl, 1992; Vasquez, 1993). 3 Concerns over territory have been the underlying and fundamental source of 3

Rather than the struggle for power as advocated by the (neo)realists. The father of political realism, Morgenthau (1948) related the ubiquitous struggle for power to "drives to live, to



conflicts ending in war during at least the last 3 or 4 centuries (Vasquez, 1993): "[I]t seems to be connected with genetic proclivities associated with territoriality, which in turn may be related to the connection between territory and biological sustenance [i.e., resources]" This ’territorial propensity’, he holds (thereby reiterating and epitomizing many other scholars), is deeply ingrained and is part of humanity’s collective inheritance. It may be argued that there must be a profound relationship between territoriality and ethnocentrism; ethnocentrism expressed spatially is territoriality; territoriality expressed psychologically as strong group identity with clear demarcation of in- and out-group is ethnocentrism. If revenge raiding in human primitive warfare is, inter alia, also a defense of the group identity and an instrument of distributive justice (reciprocal exchange), then it makes sense that the preponderant majority of accounts of warfare in primitive peoples concerns petty feuding, and ranks with territoriality as the prime motives. As Daly & Wilson (1987) observed: "Effective deterrence is the ultimate function behind the human passion for measured retributive justice - it is the reason why that passion evolved. But our passion for evening the score has thus become an entity in its own right, an evolved aspect of the human mind. Our desire for justice fundamentally entails a desire for revenge". The acquisition of heads or other trophies, by serving the accretion of soul power, also increases the power of the entire community and intensifies group identity. All this does not, in my opinion, imply any 'Territorial Imperative' mystique à la Ardrey, but it is rather easy to imagine that the proximate motive system underlying these behaviors may acquire some kind of Eigenappetenz, and that all other acquisitive motives reported in the literature may be spin-offs of this 'territorial propensity' (which always operates in interaction with the actual economic defendability of the resources available; see Ch. 1).

propagate, and to dominate". And he actually referred to studies of animal dominance hierarchies, which were at that time more commonly known than studies of animal territoriality. Anyway, group territoriality and group dominance do not differ dramatically. They are both components of one behavioral scale (e.g., E.O. Wilson, 1975).



8.4.7 Social and Machiavellian Intelligence The preadaptations required to permit the emergence of warfare in both chimps and early human ’dawn warriors’ (as Bigelow called them) were, according to Goodall (1986), probably cooperative group living, group territoriality, cooperative hunting skills, tool/weapon use, an inherent fear of, or aversion to, strangers, and the intellectual ability to make cooperative plans. This intellectual ability for tactical maneuvering in intergroup competition requires what has been called social and Machiavellian intelligence in the context of intragroup competition. What is Machiavellian intelligence? In contrast to technical (or causal or instrumental) intelligence, Machiavellian intelligence works in the context of social interaction. The fundamental hypothesis (the Chance-Mead-JollyKummer-Humphrey hypothesis) here is that the social world contrasts with the physical world in that it is more challenging. This leads to the hypotheses that (a) intellectual capacities adapted to social life may have special and even particularly sophisticated attributes; and (b) that very social species should be intellectually different from, or in some ways even superior to, less socially elaborate ones (Whiten & Byrne, 1988). Thus it is suggested that it is the evolution of social intelligence which explains human brain power. The social environment is special because it is reactive, and dealing with it thus requires a constant monitoring of its state and an appropriately timed regulation of even such behavior as approaching, which in the case of physical object would be straightforward. The life of social animals is highly complicated and problematic. What is special about the social context is that the data on which the individual’s predictions are to be based are (a) highly changeable, and (b) contingent on one’s own actions too. The metaphor of social interaction as a game in which the winner is the one who outwits the other is strong in Humphrey’s (1976) analysis of what is special about social intellect: "the game of social plot and counter-plot cannot be played merely on the basis of accumulated knowledge, any more than can a game of chess" - unlike interactions with the physical environment, such as foraging. In particular, it may be necessary to change tactics as such a game evolves. In this way, he is pointing to primate intelligence being not just ’social’, but Machiavellian in its origins (Whiten & Byrne, 1988). Humphrey also discussed the possibility that, without further change in extrasocial selection pressures, any increase in Machiavellian skill by one ’player in the game’ will select for enhanced skill in the other, both in competitive and cooperative interaction, thus resulting in an evolutionary ’arms race’ of Machiavellian cleverness. What would be the functional advantage of being a ’natural psychologist’, i.e., an animal sufficiently social intelligent to read the mind of another individual?



If we start with Craik’s (1943) suggestion that what brains do is build a ’smallscale model’ of external reality, then a more intelligent brain can be recognized by the accuracy and completeness of its cognitive model. Now, in the case of social intellect, this modelling will have to be extended to that part of the world constituted by other individuals. If we think of social interaction as a game between competitors, in which success depends not on brute strength but on social skill, then, like in a game of chess, out-maneuvering one’s opponent will depend on how many of the possible future moves one can anticipate, and thus in turn on the adequacy of one’s internal model of the operations of the other’s mind. This will involve not only a capacity to represent a certain number of orders of intentionality, but to represent the rapidly branching alternatives which are raised with each anticipatory step back and forth between self and opponent. So yet again we have a potential selection pressure working on social intellect which is a geometric function, rather than an additive one, of increases in social complexity. As Humphrey noted, the evolution of more sophisticated Machiavellian intelligence in succeeding generations should create a spiralling pressure for greater and greater powers of gamemanship (Whiten & Byrne, 1988) and, inevitably, deception. ’Tactical deception’ will be confined to any interaction in which Sender deliberately conceals or falsifies information in order to manipulate Receiver’s behavior (LaFrenière, 1988). The importance of deception in human affairs has long been recognized. For example, deception has been considered central to intergroup conflict from the biblical accounts of the siege of Ai and the Greek legend of the Trojan horse, to the modern example of Pearl Harbor in 1941. This fact is so much in evidence that one is inclined to agree with Sun Tzu, that "all warfare is based on deception" or with Sir Winston Churchill, who is reported to have said that "in time of war, the truth is so precious it must be attended by a bodyguard of lies". While warfare is certainly one of the most dramatic illustrations of the human capacity for deceit, the intricacies of political intrigue from Machiavelli's (1513) classic work (Il Principe) in the early renaissance to the unfolding of Watergate in our own times, provide further examples of the extent of duplicity in public life. In everyday life, social psychologists such as Mead (1934) and Goffman (1959) view all social interaction as involving an element of deception, in the sense that participants are engaged in a dramatic performance to control the impressions of themselves that are presented to others. Perhaps the most extreme view of human deception is everyday life was articulated by Alexander (1977) who views human society as "network of lies and deception, persisting only because systems of conventions about permissible kinds of lying have arisen". This rather one-sided view of human sociality ignores the vital function of reliable communication in human intercourse. The possibility, however, of deceptive, well calculated communications and the necessity of detecting such machinations and manipulations must have provided a major



impetus for the evolution of primate and human intelligence (LaFrenière, 1988; see also van den Berghe, 1981). There is a profound sex difference in Machiavellian intelligence related to coalitional behavior in the evolution of chimpanzees and humans. Machiavellian intelligence (MI) is a) social (as opposed to technical); b) self-interested; c) short-term rational; d) manipulative, involving (some degree of) deceit and self-deceit. In humans and chimpanzees (and perhaps bonobos), male coalitional behavior is more opportunistic and Machiavellian than female coalitional behavior, is more dominance/power/violence (including lethal male raiding) oriented (e.g., Harcourt & de Waal, 1992), and is ultimately related to the different reproductive strategies of the sexes; males generally compete and may fight over females, either individually or in coalitions, while females generally do not fight, either individually or in coalitions, over males, but over resources to invest in offspring. I therefore postulate a relationship between Machiavellian intelligence (MI), (proto)ethnocentrism (PE) (codetermined by the clannishness of the HUCHIBO clade, coalitional psychology, and xenophobia) and (lethal) intergroup competition (IC) in chimpanzees and early hominids/humans. Low (1992) argued that men and women, pursuing as they do typically mating and parental effort, will tend to form different sorts of dyadic or polyadic coalitions, at different risk levels. Men, like other male mammals, will be more often involved in fluid, risky coalitions with non-relatives, while women will, like other female mammals, be more often involved in information-sharing and foraging coalitions with female relatives and co-wives. The two sexes will differentially be involved in community and wider levels of politics. Tooby & Cosmides (1988) explain the striking asymmetry that exists between males and females in coalitional aggression as follows: Females are rarely limited by access to males, so that the net reproduction of a coalition of females would drop in direct proportion to the number of females killed. In a curious fashion, males may be so ready to engage in coalitional aggression because it is reproductively 'safer' for them to do so. Females have more to lose, and less to gain, and such differences in consequences should be reflected in psychological sex differences in attitudes towards coalition formation and coalition-based aggression. Goodall (1986) pointed out that cruelty presupposes some level of cognitive sophistication as well as the ability to empathize with the victim, which probably only chimps and humans have reached. Chimps, like humans, also scavenge/hunt cooperatively in some regions (a.o. Hasegawa et al., 1983; Goodall, 1986; Boesch & Boesch, 1989; Boesch, 1994), and the amount of meat (high-quality proteins) in their diet is probably surpassed only by humans.



8.4.8 Brains and the Cognitive Niche The core of our zoological distinctiveness, according to Tooby & DeVore (1987), is our entry into the cognitive niche, which has made available a plethora of new prey species both plant and animal, as well as allowing us to adopt flexible solutions to a wide array of other adaptive problems. At the core of this lies another type of intelligence: Causal or instrumental intelligence which is more or less clearly distinguishable from social and Machiavellian intelligence. It implies the ability to create and maintain cause-effect models of the world as guides for prejudging which courses of action will lead to which results. ’Behavioral flexibility’ is not an adequate characterization of this innovative adaptive pattern: The human cognitive system is knowledge or information driven. Many other zoologically anomalous features of hominids/humans may be considered to be aspects of the cognitive niche: Tool use, skill acquisition, and language. Language drastically reduces the costs of information transfer to other individuals. This social dimension of the cognitive niche constitutes the basis for culture - the transmission between individuals and generations of the information necessary to pursue fitness in a particular social and ecological habitat. Entering the cognitive niche was also responsible for the radiation of humans into all terrestrial habitats (Tooby & DeVore, 1987). But why did only humans enter into the cognitive niche, why did the great apes not develop along hominid lines? One possible, and partial, answer is bipedalism (vide supra). Another partial answer might be that sociality reduces the cost of information seeking which may explain why the solitary primates did not more fully enter the cognitive niche. A third possible answer involves the ratio of the costs of added cognitive abilities versus the increased pay-offs: "The brain is a nutritionally and metabolically costly organ (Martin, 1983). To justify the marginal cost of increasing its size, the marginal benefit must be correspondingly high. It may be that for brain expansion to pay off, it must increase access to very nutritionally rich sources of food, such as meat. Open habitats are far more meat productive than tropical forests, and it may be that occupation of the meat-rich savannah is what differentiated hominids from the forest-bound apes. The role of meat may go beyond its production of calories: the constituents of the brain require essential fatty acids, which may prove to be the real limiting factor made available by meat" (Tooby & DeVore, 1987). Chimpanzees seem to have an outspoken preference for the brains of their prey (bushbucks, young baboons), as early humans may have had; brains may have evolved by feeding upon brains. The part of the brain mainly responsible for the trebling in brain size during hominid/human evolution is the cauliflower-like neocortex, a neomammalian development that mushroomed late in evolution and achieved its greatest proportions in human beings. MacLean (1987) says about this cytoarchitecton-



ically complex structure: "The neocortex is oriented primarily to the external world and seems to serve as a kind of problem-solving and memorizing device to aid the two older formations of the brain [the reptilian brain and the paleomammalian brain or limbic system] in the struggle for survival. With its focus on material things, the neocortex develops somewhat like a coldly reasoning, heartless computer. It is a type of computer that has the capacity to devise the most violent ways of destroying our own kind as well as other forms of life". Tiger (1990) asserts that it is precisely the most unusually highly evolved biological characteristics of Homo sapiens sapiens, our cognitive and symbolic skills, which offer the readiest facilitation to violence and aggression. That is, that the same kind of analytical skill and strong commitment to group norms which is the essence of science, is at the root of the successful construction of the social and ideological boundaries which are the effective prerequisite to ’large-scale persistent aggressive interaction’ (i.e., war). Tiger offers four propositions on which he bases this claim: (1) Cortical tissue developed to facilitate action (not thinking) and the most basic action to which it had to become directed was courtship and reproduction. (2) While the most obvious outcome of effective aggressive behavior is on the outside environment - either people or things or places may be violated and coerced - it is possible that the more parsimonious process at work has to do with solidifying internal solidarity rather than conducting external adventure. That is, not until pastoralism or agriculture would it have made economic sense to conduct aggressive enterprises as a way of securing resources (with possible exception of female captives); but by then we had already developed our wonderful brain and as a result different processes than that would have led to rapid selection of cortical tissue. One such process could well have been a set of social skills supporting cooperation, even relatively bellicose cooperation, which would in turn translate into reproductive access and success. (3) The brain evolved in the context of a powerful ramified overwhelming concern with kinship, with the reproductive lives of members of family - this was more important even than their productive lives. (4) The function of the great learning system encoded in the brain is to make members of groups more the same rather than to stimulate them to cultivate differentiation. This brings us full circle to conflict and violence because these depend on the assured commitment of members of groups to their own indigenous certainties and on their willingness to commit themselves strenuously for the defence of their groups and their dignity. To this end kinship terminology is employed for the mobilization for conflict. Bigelow (1969 et seq.) is one of the most ardent advocates of the thesis that human cooperation and intelligence were actually favored by the selective force of warfare. The ’highest’ human qualities, he states, were demanded by the ’lowest’ human qualities, with such enormous force and relentless constancy that the size of the brain trebled very rapidly.



Discussions of the evolution of the human brain tend to emphasize the explosive expansion of the cerebral cortex in relation to Man’s extraordinary cognitive abilities. But, as Symons (1979) pointed out, the ’lower centers’ also have expanded tremendously. Thus, the neocortex and the limbic system expanded together. Organisms are moved by emotions, both figuratively and literally. ’Motive’, ’motion’ and ’emotion’ are very close in derivation and in meaning. Emotions may be considered evaluations of stimuli, whether these stimuli originate outside the organism (sensation) or in the brain itself (memory, fantasy), and motivate the seeking of particular stimuli. Human beings probably exhibit unprecedented emotional complexity (Symons, 1979; Hebb & Thompson, 1968; Shaw & Wong, 1989). 8.4.9 Sociality Why would basically selfish organisms bother to live socially? Why be social beyond what is required to mate and reproduce? The general opinion for long has been that group-living and cooperativeness are universally and automatically beneficial to all concerned, and hardly require special explanation. Alexander (1979) and Alcock (1979), however, have made clear that groupliving carries with it automatic detriments and inevitably entails high costs to individuals, such as (1) augmented conflicts of interests and increased competition for all kinds of limited resources, including sexual partners; (2) increased risk of infection by contagious diseases and parasite transmission; (3) increased risk of exploitation of parental care by conspecifics; and (4) increased risk that conspecifics will kill one’s progeny (i.e., infanticide or cannibalism). So, what specific reproductive benefits accrue from social life? Remember that selection operates principally on the genetic replicators of individuals. This leads to the expectation that individuals generally should avoid competitors and be nonsocial, and that (large) groups should appear only (1) when the resources of reproduction are so clumped that individuals must come into close proximity, a situation implying no cooperation, hence no special social organization, or (2) when cooperation contributes to individual reproduction in the population or species at large because of some hostile environmental force. An exhaustive list of the selective background favoring group living in all organisms may contain no more than the following general items: (1) Reduction in predator pressure by improved detection or repulsion of enemies: Susceptibility to predation (by members of one’s own or some other species) may be lowered either because of aggressive group defense (as in musk oxen, for example), or because of the opportunity for individuals to use the group as cover, or to cause other individuals to be more available to predators, as with shoals of fish and herds of ungulates (’Selfish herds’ as these have been called); (2) Improved foraging efficiency for large game or clumped ephemeral food resources: The nature of food resources may make it unprofitable for



individuals to splinter off, as, for example, with wolves and other predators dependent on large game which cannot be caught by one lone animal; (3) Improved care of offspring through communal feeding and protection; and (4) Some resources, especially predator-free sleeping and breeding places, may be extremely localized. Alexander submits that sociality in any organism, including humans, only appears because one or some combination of these factors renders individuals accepting the automatic detriments of group living more fit, in terms of reproductive success, than solitary individuals. Thus, sociality too is a consequence of individuals pursuing their own genetic interests. One interesting implication of this view is that those aspects of human culture which give it a group flavor, notably its temporal inertia and its spatial patterning, are incidental outcomes of the collective effects of generations of individual humans pursuing their personal reproductive interests (as maximally effective nepotists). When humans began to live continuously in viscous social groups, first presumably in bands of close kin and later in larger societies, within which they could distinguish relatives of differing degree, two new selective forces were added to their social life: Extended extrafamilial nepotism and extended outbreeding. And, finally, social cooperativeness and eventually culture became the chief vehicle of intergroup competition, the more violent forms of which we call war. Human hypersociality, the organization and maintenance of recent and large human social groups cannot, Alexander insists, be explained by a grouphunting hypothesis; the upper size of a group in which each individual would gain because of the group’s ability to bring down large game would be rather small. Instead human group sizes went right up to nations of hundreds of millions of individuals.



8.4.10

Hunting

Sexual division of labor may be as old as the habiline hominids (H. habilis, " 2.5 mya), who in all probability practiced a flexible subsistence strategy of "ecological opportunism optimized by tool use" (Slurink, 1994; Foley, 1987; Tooby & DeVore, 1987), i.e., gathering, scavenging and hunting; whatever fitted their omnivorous appetites. Despite Tooby & DeVore’s (1987) criticism (Ch. 3), early hominids may have practiced scavenging, as chimpanzees sometimes do (Hasegawa, 1983), and, as only male chimpanzees do and males in contemporary hunter-gatherer societies still do, male hominids occasionally may have practiced big game hunting as a risky strategy for obtaining nutritious high-quality protein food not only for ready on-the-spot consumption but also for ’showing off’ (Hawkes, 1991) and the exchange of meat for (sexual) favors, status and other privileges. With increased male parental investment (' 8.3.13) this could develop into reciprocal food sharing between the sexes. The females of the species, often either pregnant or encumbered with dependent offspring (and somewhat impeded by the increasingly enlarged pelvic structures needed for giving birth to increasingly large-brained infants), like female chimpanzees and the females of contemporary hunter-gatherers, specialized in collecting plant foods, fruits, tubers, small animals, and other edible organic materials. Vegetable foods are relatively abundant, sedentary, predictable and reliable, while game animals are relatively scarce, mobile, unpredictable and thus unreliable as a food source, and certainly difficult, and possibly dangerous, to catch. Hunting takes individuals also farther afield than is demanded by the gathering of food plants. So it makes good sense for females, encumbered with young infants, to forage for plant foods and leave the hunting to the males (Isaac, 1978; Symons, 1979; Leakey, 1981). Murdock (1937) found that in all contemporary preindustrial societies he surveyed hunting was an exclusively male occupation. Female gathering and male hunting/scavenging proved to be complementary and highly efficient survival strategies, which eventually resulted in semipermanent home bases and male parental investment (Slurink, 1994; Tooby & DeVore, 1987). Hunting not only contributed to intelligence and the expansion of the hominid brain (Laughlin, 1968), it also led to the penetration of habitats and niches where plant foods would be scarce during winter. Open country habitats support more game animals than forest habitats and therefore the opportunities and payoffs of increased hominid predation are highest on the savannah. "If males changed from occasional to intensive hunting, one consequence would be the extreme sexual division of labor found among humans, with females exploiting the more sessile food sources. Male parental investment through provisioning, exchange of hunted for collected food, and exchange of meat for sexual access all provide possible and mutually



compatible avenues for the extreme development of the sexual division of labor characteristic for modern humans. The evolution of this behavior requires no qualitative leaps from other primates: in chimpanzees (Teleki, 1973) and baboons (Strum, 1981; Strum & Mitchell, 1987) estrous females receive disproportionate shares of meat from hunts made by males... For food exchange and meat provisioning to take place between independently foraging subgroups, there must be a home base. Such a meeting area to exchange food makes sense if the supply is irregular: either more (in the case of success) or less (in the case of failure) than the hunters would need for themselves" (Tooby & DeVore, 1987). Alcock (1979) reasoned that the suite of occasional bipedalism, tool use, incidental hunting, adaptable and flexible behavior, cooperation, and prolonged infant care and family maintenance, may be a phylogenetically ancient pongid package of adaptations modified by the new selection pressures associated with the hunting-gathering niche. Hunting large and sometimes dangerous animals, repelling nonhuman predators and driving off competitive species, should favor individuals capable of cooperation in planning and executing such complex behaviors. The great likelihood that members of a band were close relatives would have further elevated the benefits of sociality and intraband cooperation. It should be clear that accepting the greater or lesser role hunting may have played in hominid/human evolution, does not, in any way, imply some kind of ’killer ape’ mystique as propagated by Dart and Ardrey, with hunting and killing prey animals as well as conspecifics as the primordial forces shaping human nature. Though it is probably true that mass extinction of megafauna may have coincided in some cases with the presence of H. s. sapiens ("prehistoric overkill": Martin, 1967), it is only very late in human evolution that unequivocal evidence of hunting turns up. The anatomical evidence of poor adaptation collected by Trinkaus has already been presented in ' 3.10. It might be added that nothing might be more ill-suited to the needs of a ’killer ape’ than the set of twelve massive, high-crowned, flat ’grinders’ possessed by both habilines and australopithecines, and anatomically modern humans. These are, as Harris (1975) notes, clearly the dental features of an animal with superherbivore rather than supercarnivore affinities. Furthermore, "for 3 million years, from the oldest tools at Rudolf and Omo to Bed II at Olduvai, there is no evidence of improvements in technology related to hunting. Hunting technology, in other words, remained rudimentary for millions of years. Hence if hunting were the primary adaptive mode of these ancestral hominids, it is inconceivable that their dentition would have evolved in a direction contrary to what would have been useful for puncturing, slicing, and chewing meat" (Harris, 1975). Boxgrove Man (recently - 1994 - unearthed in the south of England and



tentatively classified as Homo heidelbergensis), estimated to have lived half a million years BP, was in all probability still a scavenger rather than a hunter. This observation undermines much of the machismo-flavored Carnivorous Psychology theories and the Foxian ’sin of Cain’ version in which hunting equals destroying (Fox, 1989). Together with the analysis by Trinkaus the evidence points in the direction of a relatively recent development of big-game hunting in Man. Also the argument that the Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness (EEA) of Man was for million years a hunting environment loses much of its strength (Cf. also Zihlman & Tanner, 1978; Binford, 1985; and Kuper, 1994, who holds that "effective hunting must have become possible only in relatively recent times"). Especially Tooby & DeVore (1987) and Cosmides, Tooby & Barkow (1992) have argued that hunting-gathering was the ancestral EEA: "[O]ur ancestors spent the last two million years as Pleistocene hunter-gatherers, and, of course, several hundred million years before that as one kind of forager or another... The few thousand years since the scattered appearance of agriculture is only a small stretch in evolutionary terms, less than 1% of the two million years our ancestors spent as Pleistocene hunter-gatherers" (Cosmides, Tooby & Barkow, 1992). But, as D.S. Wilson (1994) objects, it makes no sense to express evolutionary time as a proportion of the species history (the 1% fallacy). If the environment of a species changes, the evolutionary response will depend on the heritability of traits, the intensity of selection, and the number of generations the selection pressure continues. The number of generations that the species existed in the old environment is irrelevant, except insofar as it affects the heritability of traits. Binford (1981, 1984) has claimed that early hominids did not hunt and had only very small components of meat in their diet. While such a view is probably incorrect, it is equally untrue to say that early hominids were full hunters in the same way as modern hunter-gatherers. Foley (1988) argued that if the term ’hunter-gatherer’ is to mean more that just wild resource omnivory (in which case it would include baboons, chimpanzees and many other animals), "then early hominids were neither human nor hunter-gatherers". Foley suggests that the foraging and reproductive strategies of Pleistocene anatomically modern humans differed markedly from those of most modern hunter-gatherers. In contemporary hunter-gatherer societies (except in high latitudes where plants are scarce) one fifth to one third of the total caloric intake comes from meat, which means that females provide the bulk of the (vegetable) food (Lee, 1968; Zihlman & Tanner, 1978; Musonda, 1991; D.R. Harris, 1992; Poirier, 4 1993) . Among agricultural societies, which depend mainly on domesticated 4

Therefore, some have suggested that the term hunter-gatherer be replaced by a term more closely mirroring reality, such as gathering-hunting or collecting societies (Poirier, 1993).



crop plants, animals contribute still less to the average diet. Despite the hunting hype, it may be said that by shortly after 2 mya some African hominids were exploiting a range of mammalian (especially ungulate) species to an extent unknown in nonhuman primates. This does not mean that these early hominids were hunter-gatherers in the organizational sense, merely that they were omnivores/diversivores in a significant manner, and reflecting the early hominids’ strategy of opportunistic foraging. Few changes in evolution are free from ’knock-on’ effects that may themselves come to act as selective pressures inducing yet further change. Some of the evolutionary consequences of this new foraging pattern were: 1. Encephalization: Complex foraging strategies tend to select for larger brain size (e.g., Eisenberg, 1981; Harvey & Read, 1992; Milton, 1993; see ' 8.3.1). 2. Social behavior: Tolerated scrounging and genuine food-sharing simply as a function of ’package size’ of large game animals. 3. Spatial organization: Both increasing body size and terrestriality are likely to lead to an increase in home range for a species. The same holds for utilization of animal resources. In seasonal savannah environments resources are seldom highly predictable. Thus, in accordance with the economic defendability model, strict territoriality is unlikely to have evolved (Foley, 1987). 8.4.11

The Other Mammalian Social Hunters

The mammalian social carnivores are not closely related to humans but they have faced the same problems related to the capturing of large game. Through convergent evolution, humans have come to possess a suite of behavioral traits and attributes found more commonly in the social carnivores than in our primate relatives. Lions, for example, have a sexual division of labor in hunting: The females hunt while the males act as baby-sitters (Schaller, 1972). Male and female carnivores also establish reasonably permanent pair bonds. But of special significance for the understanding of the evolution of warfare among humans is the exceptionally high degree of cooperation and group integration exhibited by the social carnivores, demonstrated in (1) communal hunting of big game and food sharing within the group; (2) defense of the hunting preserve of the pride, pack, or clan to some extent against carnivores of other species but especially against conspecific intruders; and (3) the occasional killing of members of their own species in such encounters. Interestingly, the social carnivores are no more blindly programmed to be aggressive and ’warlike’ than are human beings. Individuals are sensitive to the risks of aggression and seek to avoid conflict they are likely to lose. They kill one another when the odds are highly in their favor, as when an adult male lion finds the cubs of another male in a den (Schaller, 1972). They engage in group aggression to defend or expand group territorial borders only when game is



exceptionally abundant within certain defensible areas. Thus comparisons with social carnivores make more plausible the argument that the cooperative capacity of individuals, which promotes the efficiency of group hunting, will be extended only to members of one’s own group and may be used in ’wars’ against the members of other bands. These comparisons, as Alcock (1979) argued, draw attention to the ecological foundations of ’group aggression’. In a study of territorial behavior by a clan of spotted hyenas, Henschel & Skinner (1991) suggest that larger clans can gain access to new food patches at the expense of smaller clans. Their study outlines the consequences of clans attempting and finally succeeding to expand their territories into those of neighbors. They could demonstrate some of the costs of defense for residents, but the actual costs of offense are much less clear. Furthermore, in spotted hyenas the degree of exhibiting territorial behavior (in which the adult females were the most active) is also a function of the degree of intrusion pressure: In comparing various studies of spotted hyaenas, there indeed appears to be a relationship between the degree of intrusion pressure, the intensity of direct and indirect defence of territories and the scale of resource fluctuations. Where resident prey is relatively abundant, such as at Mavumbye and Ngorongoro (Kruuk, 1972), intruding and resident hyaenas compete for predictable, rich resource patches. This gives rise to strong territoriality. In contrast, where most prey is highly mobile and concentrated, as in Serengeti (Kruuk, 1972), hyaenas tend to follow prey migrations to some extent. With such high intrusion pressure, the potential costs of territory defence may be so high that it is little expressed. Where resident hyaenas depend on a succession of migrating prey passing through their territory, as at Mara (Frank, 1986) and Etosha (Gasaway et al., 1989), intrusions (by non-immigrants) and territorial activities were reported to be rare. Intermediately mobile prey was so widely dispersed in the Namib (Tilson & Henschel, 1986) and Kalahari (Mills, 1990) that territories were vast, the chances of detecting intruders in the periphery was slim, and only the territory centre was advertised strongly (Henschel & Skinner, 1991). 8.4.12

Tool Use and Culture

Hominids have been manufacturing stone tools for at least 2 million years (Isaac, 1984; Harris, 1986). The changing technology of the early hominids reflects partly greater manipulative skill, but also partly a change in cognitive skills (Foley, 1987). The use of tools - promoted by the liberation of the hands due to bipedalism became a central adaptation that enabled the (proto)hominids to forage on vegetative food resources and capture and process game more efficiently. The



importance of this culturally transmitted adaptation may be related to the increase in brain size and the explosive increase of the neocortex, but is surely reflected in the anatomy of the hand, permitting a more powerful power grip and a more precise precision grip (Alcock, 1979; Harris, 1975). Once it was thought that bipedalism, tool use and brain size came in one neat package in hominid evolution. More recently, however, it has become clear that there is no necessary connection between erect gait and encephalization (the robust Australopithecines walked erect for more than a million years without showing any increase in brain size); between tool use and encephalization (chimpanzees may use tools for several hours a day); or between the erect posture and tool use (the robust Australopithecines were probably able to use tools - their hands are completely modern - but did not) (Slurink, 1993). It has long been thought that it was the butchering of game animals that stimulated the development of tool making. Equally plausible arguments have been made, however, in favor of tool-making as a part of plant exploitation strategies, and, furthermore, nonhuman primates can hunt and consume prey without the use of tools (Foley, 1987). One area, according to Foley, where tools would have been of some use, and would have given hominids an advantage, is the scavenging of very large, thick-skinned mammals. These animals, which are usually immune from predation, often remain untouched for some time after death, as no animals can break the skin and gain access to the meat. Tools might well have given the hominids the ability to have early access to these carcasses, and thus a competitive advantage over other scavengers at least in the initial phases of exploitation. Broadly speaking, ’culture’ refers to the non-genetically transmitted aspects of the human species, incorporating such features as tool-use and tool-making, making artifacts and art, symbolic thought and language, mentifacts and accumulated knowledge, vast capacity for learning, imitation and innovation, increased behavioral flexibility and plasticity, all transmitted through learning and teaching rather than through any genetic system. Humans like to think of culture as distinctly or uniquely human, as the proper domain of the ’Crown of Creation’. Culture in this sense is not confined to humans, however (e.g., Bonner, 1980). Furthermore, in the context of this study, the concept is not analytically useful for a number of reasons (Foley, 1987). The main reason is the following: Culture is a composite term bringing together a whole series of attributes that are important in the life of humans today. In studying the origins of these features (speech, tool-making, etc.), it may not be particularly useful to link them together, however. We do not know when any of these features first occurred within the hominid lineage. That is what we are trying to find out. Each of these features may have evolved separately, subject to independent selective forces, and so to lump these all together as ’culture’ is to remove the possibility that hominids may, in the past, have possessed only part of their



present behavioral repertoire, or that repertoire combined in different ways. Foley reasons that it is far more productive to adopt a reductionist approach to deal with the minimalist categories of behavior, and making the fewest assumptions. It is methodologically unacceptable to assume a different set of evolutionary rules for hominids. But what about learning? Humans are inclined to think that there is some evolutionarily inherent advantage or superiority in learning abilities, and tend to forget how rare these actually are in nature; adaptation in most animal species depends very little on learning abilities. Indeed, why should an organism learn anything at all? It smacks of negligence, of unfinished business of evolution. Why not make the behavior built-in from the start? Learning is wasteful of time and energy; it is highly inefficient and may lead to maladaptive and even disastrous behaviors (e.g., when the correct response to sighting a predator has to be learned, or even the identity of the predator; a rabbit who had to learn that the presence of a fox signals a state of acute danger would probably not grow to reproductive age), or wrong and selfdestructive ideas and superstitions, and manipulability, exploitability, deceivability and indoctrinability by conspecifics, etc. There seem to be three general circumstances in which selection may favor learning abilities (Alcock, 1975; E.O. Wilson, 1975; Symons, 1979): 1. Learning processes may be a byproduct of selection for neural economy; 2. learning abilities may represent adaptations to make complex discriminations (e.g., in species or sex recognition); and 3. learning may be adaptive when environmental unpredictability (i.e., unpredictable by the genome) of some biological importance to an individual is reliably present in certain situations. Furthermore, as Tooby & Cosmides (1992) noted, ’learning’, like ’culture’ is not an explanation for anything, but is rather a phenomenon that itself requires explanation. These authors, and other evolutionary psychologists, submit that the human capacity for adaptive flexibility and powerful problem solving is so great not because we have fewer, but exactly because we have more ’instincts’ (i.e., content-specific problem-solving specializations, or Darwinian algorithms) than other animals, as William James (1892) already argued. What is so special about the human mind is not that it gave up ’instinct’ in order to become flexible, but that it proliferated ’instincts’. The single major question facing hominid social theory, as Tooby & DeVore (1987) noted, is the reconciliation of group life with high male parental investment and sexual exclusivity. To this problem we now turn.



8.4.13

The Human Mating System

Bonobos are the least known of any ape. What we do know, however, is that bonobos do have a number of unique and striking features among primates that may prove pivotal in discovering the principles governing male-female relations among hominoids, by providing yet another distinctive configuration of evolutionary variables (Tooby & DeVore, 1987; Susman, 1987). These features include female nearly-continuous sexual receptivity, the resumption of ovulation within one year after parturition, semipermanent male-female associations, male hunting and meat sharing contingent on copulation, and cohesive mixed sex groups. "Among primates, humans are unique in simultaneously practicing (on a facultative basis): high MPI, multiple breeding males and females in the same social group, and sexual exclusivity (of at least limited duration) of individual females for males and males for females, frequently simultaneous and reciprocal. The features of this unique mating system are not directly paralleled by any other primate, and are not well captured by the term ’monogamy’, especially given the statistical distribution of deviations on most of these practices" (Tooby & DeVore, 1987). As we saw, several researchers have claimed that there is considerable sexual dimorphism in body size within Australopithecus afarensis, the earliest recognizable hominid. If the specimens ascribed to this taxon do indeed belong to a single species, then the earliest hominids are probably the most dimorphic of the family as a whole. Other members of the Hominidae also seem to show large to moderate sexual dimorphism. With the evolution of anatomically modern humans there seems to have been a reduction in sexual dimorphism. This pattern suggests that the classical model of the early appearance of the pair bond, monogamy, in human evolution is incorrect, and instead that the early hominids may have possessed a social organization not dissimilar to that of other terrestrial primates; large group size and competition between males for access to females. Harcourt et al. (1981), following work initiated by Short (1979) have shown that among primates testes size correlates with the social system (intensity of sperm competition). Martin & May (1981) have extended this analysis to include a discussion of possible mating patterns of early hominids. From this evidence it may tentatively be concluded that early hominids may have had a small-group, single-male, polygynous reproductive system (resembling modern gorilla). Moving to a more open savannah environment, however, would have placed tremendous strain on this system as males would be unable to defend large territories, and, furthermore, there would be considerable selection pressure for larger group size as is seen among other terrestrial primates. This strain could



be resolved, according to Foley (1987), through increased kin-based male cooperation - in other words, away from simple polygyny to kin-regulated polygyny, where groups of related males remain loosely associated in larger groups with more specific polygynous family structures. The most general reason for primate monogamy is the reproductive benefit to males if they protect their offspring from either predators or other, conspecific, infanticidal males (who may kill the infants in order to breed with the female). Infanticide has been observed in a great number of primate species. The solitary-living females benefit by having a protecting male around to reduce these risks (Dunbar, 1992; van Schaik & Dunbar, 1990). Food-sharing occurs in all human societies, and, given its rarity among nonhuman primates (where it never transcends the level of ’tolerated scrounging’), it is taken to be a key human characteristic. Assuming that it must have been primarily male hominids who did longdistance scavenging and/or hunting for large carrion and/or prey; assuming that the relatively less mobile females and their dependent offspring had something to gain from the nutrients in large game and/or carrion, and assuming that the females themselves continued to gather vegetable foods and perhaps killed small game, then the way was paved for active food sharing (as opposed to tolerated scrounging sometimes observed in chimpanzees). A number of scholars (e.g., Morris, 1967; Washburn & Lancaster, 1968; Fox, 1972, 1980; Reynolds, 1974; Lancaster, 1975; Isaac, 1976, 1978; Zihlman & Tanner, 1976; Shepher, 1978; Zihlman, 1978; Campbell, 1979; Parker & Gibson, 1979; Symons, 1979; Endleman, 1981; Galdikas & Teleki, 1981; McGrew, 1981; Mellen, 1981; Fisher, 1982; Passingham, 1982; Daniels, 1983; Rancour-Laferrière, 1985; Parker, 1987; Foley, 1987, 1988; Slurink, 1994; a.o.) envisage that males and females at some point started to share/exchange food. These exchanges probably took place, moreover, at the 'home base' of a group, where males rejoined females and young after an expedition. Isaac (1978) has argued on the basis of archaeological evidence that food sharing can already be documented among the early hominids of the PlioPleistocene. In this view, the division of labor, food-sharing, and the establishment of a home base where food is shared all occur rather early in hominid evolution (Foley, 1987). Fox (1980) suggested that the ever increasing period of infant dependency put females at a disadvantage in the exchange, that is, left them more in need of meat than males were in need of plant food. Females began to offer themselves as part of the exchange: "The impulse was more likely to have come from the female kin-coalitions. The need of the female coalitions for male provisioning - meat for the children - was undoubtedly the push. The females could easily trade on the male's tendency to want to monopolize (or at least think he was monopolizing) the females for mating purposes, and say, in effect, 'Okay, you get the monopoly -



or the appearance of it anyway - and we get the meat’. Insofar as the male was successful in turn, he would have had females to trade". Over a dozen different hypotheses have been proposed for human female concealed ovulation (e.g., Morris, 1967; Pfeiffer, 1969; Alcock, 1979; Alexander & Noonan, 1979; Benshoof & Thornhill, 1979; Burley, 1979; Hrdy, 1979, 1981; Symons, 1979; Lovejoy, 1981; Strassman, 1981; Turke, 1984; Alexander, 1990). Most theorists have suggested that concealed ovulation and continuous female receptivity facilitate monogamous pair-bonding through the mechanism of permanent sexual attractiveness. Alexander & Noonan (1979) and Alcock (1979) proposed that concealment of ovulation evolved in humans because it enabled females to force desirable mates into consort relationships long enough to reduce their likelihood of success in seeking other matings, and simultaneously raise the male’s confidence of paternity by failing to inform other, potentially competing males of the timing of ovulation. If these events occurred in a situation in which paternal care was valuable, but not sufficiently valuable to males to offset philandering, and in which desertion was frequent when confidence of paternity was low, they could tip the balance, making increased paternal investment profitable to males. The intensity of sexual competition among males and the intensity of intergroup competition, both resulting in high mortality of young males, would have been of vital importance in this process. During the consort phase a male might share captured prey with the female because it would be likely that the progeny produced by the female would bear his genes; protein gifts to the female might, therefore, have genetic gain for the male. As usual, there is no requirement that individuals have to be aware of the genetic consequences of their acts. According to Symons (1979), the most straightforward interpretation of the loss of estrus is suggested by the data on chimpanzee hunting. Estrous female chimpanzees are more successful than their anestrous counterparts in obtaining meat from males. When hunting became a dominant male economic activity, as it did during human evolution, perhaps the costs (in terms of fitness) to females of constant sexual activity were outweighed by the benefits of receiving meat, hence selection favored females who advertized continuously and thus were continuously attractive to males. Heterosexual exchanges of sex for food are common in the animal kingdom generally, and hominid female sexual overtures may have been motivated more by pragmatism about protein than by sexual emotion (Symons, 1979). If hominid males regularly possessed meat surpluses before estrus was lost, a good hunter might do best reproductively by exchanging meat for copulations with estrous females. If ovulation could not be detected, however, a successful male might be better off acquiring permanent sexual rights to a female or females, resulting in a relatively high confidence in paternity, male provisioning of his mate’s offspring, and the evolution of other kinds of



paternal behaviors and dispositions. In this scenario the loss of estrus is a precipitating cause of the evolution of marriage and the family. In Isaac’s (1978 et seq.) model home bases are an essential component of hominid foraging patterns. Potts (1984), on the other hand, argued that areas where carcasses are located would be places where hominids would minimize rather than maximize their activities on account of the threat of interactions with large carnivores. Potts envisages, as energetically most efficient, caches of stone tools distributed across the home range, and carcasses transported to the caches when discovered or hunted down. These caches would have been the antecedents of central-place-foraging, and, eventually, of shelters and home bases. Binford (1984), on the other hand, has argued that there is no indication of the development of home bases until the appearance of anatomically modern humans. As male parental investment increased in importance in early Homo (" 2 mya), female competition for resource contributions would increase along with male efforts to increase their confidence of paternity. In Parker’s (1987) sexual selection model, he envisaged it as follows. A male subsistence strategy of bringing carcasses of scavenged prey to special sites where processing tools were stored (tool caches: Potts, 1984) would have paid off reproductively by attracting females to locations where they could be guarded at least temporarily. Hence a shift in subsistence toward butchery sites may have been the first step toward increasing control of females by hominid males. It may also have increased the incentive for aggressive competition among males and hence the value of using aimed missiles in combat. At the same time the existence of desirable high-energy food gifts may have favored females who shifted from estrus advertizing to estrus concealment, thereby increasing their share of male courtship feeding as compared to females who relied on extended estrus and estrus advertizement. Display of permanently enlarged breasts and hips may have been favored as substitutes for epigamic genital display of chimpanzees (Short, 1980), or they may have evolved as advertizements of lactation competence (Lancaster, 1984). The advantage of storing energy for reproduction in fat deposits in the breasts and hips would have increased in proportion to the increasing energy demands inherent in the development of large brained infants (Lancaster, 1984). A larger brain implies increased infant dependency which implies increased parental investment and hence in increased period of food sharing and economic apprenticeship. This in turn would favor females who traded the increased confidence of paternity (or the appearance of it) for increased male parental investment. Sexually selected shifts in courtship would have provided a mechanism for rapid divergence of early Homo from Australopithecus given minor habitat changes. Once early hominids evolved, continued sexual selection for increasing male control of females through provision of meat would have



fuelled the evolution of cooperative scavenging and hunting of big game. Sexual selection may also have favored shelter construction as another form of nuptial gift and parental investment especially as hominids migrated out of the tropics into temperate regions (Parker, 1987). Increasing male control of females conflicts with female strategies. Females stand to benefit from polyandry (access to several males) in a variety of ways: "[G]ood genes, sexy son’s effects (both somatic and genetic), genetic diversity, fertility backup, material resources, and protection of self and offspring... and enhancement of social status" (R.L. Smith, 1984). Smith argued that continuous sexual receptivity in human females, cryptic or concealed ovulation, and some other female anatomical peculiarities and feminine characteristics (such as the hemispheric, pendulous breasts, and menstrual synchronization) have evolved to obscure a human female’s current reproductive value and confuse males as a countermeasure to male resource allocation and anticuckoldry strategies. These female adaptations enhance opportunities for facultative polyandry and thus promote human sperm competition. In a marital environment, females may have minimized their husbands’ abilities to monitor and to sequester them by not advertizing ovulation, and at the same time maximized their own opportunities to be fertilized by males other than their husbands (Symons, 1979; Benshoof & Thornhill, 1979; a.o.). The conceptual modeling of this part of the hominid/human trajectory is marred with androcentric thinking (a ’Tarzanist’ scenario as Morgan [1985] called it, in which males are created with sexual needs and desires, the attainment of which is attended with sexual pleasure, and females are created to serve their needs and facilitate their pleasures and bear their young). Furthermore, concealed ovulation may not even be an exclusively hominid/human female attribute. None of the theorists have ever systematically reviewed the patterning of sexual activity among nonhuman primates. When this is done, it might well be that the dichotomy is really an oversimplification (Hrdy & Whitten, 1987; Cf. Hrdy, 1981). Thus, rather than asking, ’Why have human females lost estrus?’ we might better ask ’Under what conditions do primates generally shift away from circumscribed to noncyclical or situationdependent receptivity, and how do these changes contribute to female reproductive success?’. Alexander (1990) argued that male confidence of paternity can be high in multi-male bands only (a) when each female restricts her matings to one male, and (b) when that male has a way of knowing it. Concealment of ovulation might have begun as concealment of copulation, or perhaps more narrowly as copulation sneaked by males otherwise subordinate, and possible because females agreed to them. A special kind of pair bonding would be tied to this



secrecy. The next step would be that the females simply conceal ovulation from the other males, and eventually start resisting them in copulation. Presumably, such a scenario would appear only when males really could help females and their offspring. One massively important way that a male might help his female and the offspring he sires is the prevention of infanticide by other males. The honoring of the female-male pair bond may have been among the beginnings of morality. Socially imposed monogamy, Alexander asserts, seems to have spread across the world largely as the result of military advantages of the peoples promoting this particular marriage system. These and other considerations suggests to Alexander "that a strong tendency toward monogamy occurred early in human history, a unique kind of monogamy because it existed under social life in groups containing multiple males who cooperated with each other against males from other groups. It suggests that paternal care became important early in human evolution, and that extreme polygyny and domination of females within groups by subgroups of old males as occurs in some modern societies may actually be a derived feature of human social life, associated with extremes of social power developed by older males".



8.4.14

Ecological Dominance

Home bases not only complicated social life, but may also have facilitated social intelligence and increase of brain size, (proto)language as a reporting system, more permanent bonds between males and females, averting predators, intermale cooperation for intergroup conflict, more elaborate cultural traditions, etc. The Acheulian culture of Homo erectus (about 750,000 BP) contains hand axes and other stone implements. Also the bones of large game mammals are common at Acheulian sites. Zhoukoudian Homo erectus seems to have taken a cultural step even more important than carefully fashioned stone implements. Deep layers of charcoal fragments and pieces of carbonized bone indicate that the cave-inhabiting Zhoukoudian hominids were among the first to control the use of fire (M.Harris, 1975; Wu & Lin, 1983; Klein, 1989; see also Fig. 8.4). The discovery of the use of fire would have made drives and surrounds more effective; would have permitted the manufacture of firehardened wooden spears; would have made formerly inedible vegetable foods palatable; would have improved digestibility of starch and enabled degradation of toxins; and would have opened up new ways to prepare and store (and savor and relish) meat. Remains of hearths have been found at sites occupied by hominids between 400,000 and 300,000 years ago (D.R. Harris, 1992). Davidson & Noble (1993), on the other hand, have objected that there seems to be no good evidence that hominids regularly made and used fire, built shelters or hunted systematically, earlier than 125,000 years ago. They state that "although evidence of fire has been claimed from sites such as Chesowanja, dating back to 1.4 million years ago, and Zhoukoudian, dating back to 500,000 years ago, a recent assessment suggests that none of the claims earlier than Terra Amata is reliable - and even 230,000 years ago, it is doubtful whether hominids could regularly make fire". The control and, later, the making of fire (e.g., Brain, 1981; Gowlett et al., 1981; Poirier, 1987; Brain & Sillen, 1988; Goudsblom, 1989; Klein, 1989; Slurink, 1993, 1994) may have enabled or facilitated the conquering of caves from inhabiting predatory animals, thereby creating safe havens from predators and climatic contingencies, effectively forming a protective shield against the dangers of the outside world, turning the hunted hominid into a hunting hominid (Brain, 1981), and crossing the ’ecological dominance’ barrier (Slurink, 1993, 1994). It is surely not a coincidence that the mastery of fire and the eviction of the big feline predators from habitable caves took place in the same time period. This is what Brain (1981) has to say on the Sterkfontein cave taphonomy: At Sterkfontein, the interface between the top of Member 4 and the bottom of Member 5 represents a time interval crucial in the course of human evolution. During this interval the gracile australopithecines



disappeared from the Transvaal scene and the first men appeared. In this interval, too, the evolving men mastered a threat to their security that had been posed by the cave cats over countless generations. During Member 4 times the cats apparently controlled the Sterkfontein cave, dragging their australopithecine victims into its dark recesses. By Member 5 days, however, the new men not only had evicted the predators, but had taken up residence in the very chamber where their ancestors had been eaten. How the people managed this is not recorded, but it could surely have been achieved only through increasing intelligence reflected in developing technology. It is tempting to suggest that the mastery of fire had already been acquired and that this, together with the development of crude weapons, tipped the balance of power in their favor (Brain, 1981).

Alexander argued that when man developed his weapons, culture and population sizes to levels that erased the significance of predation by other species - and that is what ’ecologically dominant’ means - he simultaneously created a new predator: Other human groups, leading to either manifest intergroup competition (i.e., war) or the maintenance of balances of power between such groups (i.e., the threat of war). Alexander did not specify, however, what made our ancestors ecologically dominant, nor did he specify when and how the entire process is supposed to have started. Somewhere along the hominid trajectory groups of males began to compete as groups over what they perceived to be limiting resources, and what actually have been limiting resources for male organisms since time immemorial: Land and women. We do not know exactly when this happened. But it is tempting to speculate that it was the moment that home bases (be it caves, caches, or other hot spots) became relatively permanent safe havens and shelters from nonhuman predators and climatic contingencies, and thereby favorable, desirable, economically defendable, and suddenly extremely scarce sites, that territorial competition between hominid groups intensified in violence and frequency, and turned into genuine ’warfare’. It was not simply an extension of ’aggression’ (as the individual motivational and behavioral system for contest competition) from the individual to the group level (otherwise numerous other mammalian species would have mastered the ’art’ of warfare). On the contrary, males in the groups who were able to suspend interindividual competitive aggression for even the slightest period of time in order to cooperate to compete as groups had the competitive edge. As Bigelow (1969) stated: "Cooperation-for-conflict has probably always been the key to human survival". Similarly, differences in groups between preadaptations for (a) group or tribal identity (ethnocentrism), together with xenophobia and slight paranoia (as the



evolved proximate psychology of intergroup competition); (b) some ability to dehumanize the ’enemy’ (turning intraspecific violence into interspecific predation); (c) as well as numerical superiority; (d) weapon technology; (e) and social intelligence (itself the result of intragroup competition); and (f) whatever apotropaic ritual, anxiolytic drug, or superiority-delusional belief, doctrine or religion which could overcome or reduce fear; would have given the competitive edge. 8.4.15

War as a Parental Investment Strategy

During the Pleistocene male sexual access to women was in part dependent on achieving positions of dominance or leadership. Selection probably favored social skills and political abilities, such as judgment, oratory, and persuasion, abilities to conceive and carry out complex plans, and skills in cooperative and coalitional violence, including the evaluation of violent situations and the taking of calculated risks, as well as controlling and managing aggression. In such a milieu selection is extremely unlikely to favor simple male belligerence, aggressive drives, or territorial imperatives. Human violence usually is a complex group activity, and good judgment, not simple belligerence, seems to be adaptive in a state of chronic violence (Chance & Mead, 1953; Fox, 1967; Tiger, 1969; Bigelow, 1969, 1973; Tiger & Fox, 1971; Caspari, 1972; Symons, 1979; Chagnon, 1979 et seq.; a.o.). In a situation of relentless intergroup competition and the continuous dangers posed by other groups on the one hand, and complete intragroup mutual interdependence for defense and protection on the other, cooperation with members of one’s own group was a matter of life and death, and the evolution of the hominid ability to cooperate in ever larger groups can be explained without resort to group selection (Slurink, 1994). It seems likely as well that in a milieu of complex, cooperative violence, selection would favor a male who was able to induce other males to take risks for his benefit. To these skills and abilities might be added: Hunting-prowess, and capacities as seducer and/or lover. Chagnon (1979 et seq.) notes that among the Yanomamö Indians a major portion of the variation in male reproductive success results from differential success in the political maneuverings and machinations associated with male competition for mates. Among many hunting-gathering peoples a man's hunting prowess is directly related to the number of wives he can obtain. "The evidence suggests, then, that for millions of years hominid males and females pursued substantially different reproductive 'strategies' and typically exhibited very different behaviors: throughout most of human evolutionary history, hunting, fighting, and that elusive activity, 'politics', were highly competitive, largely male domains. It is not a simple question of high female parental investment and male competition for females: males and females invested in different ways. Not only did males hunt while females gathered,



but, if warfare was often over land and other scarce resources from which the winning males’ offspring benefited, male fighting was in part parental investment; that is, like hunting and gathering, fighting and nurturing were part of the human division of labor by sex" (Symons, 1979). In a similar vein, Trivers (1985) states: "We appear to have built on a chimpanzee proclivity for organized intergroup conflict and murder to produce a sexual selection extravaganza, in the form of full-scale war: the death of many or all male combatants, the capture of concubines or rape of the defeated women, the plunder of wealth, and the enslaving of peoples" (italics added). If hominid/human warfare is evolutionarily the result of (sexually dimorphic) brains and vice versa (as argued by Bigelow and Alexander), and if brains developed in the interests of, and as an extension of, our gonads (as argued by Ghiselin), it follows that war evolved as a facultative male reproductive (or parental investment) strategy (as argued by Symons and Low). This, then, is how a sexually reproducing, K-selected, mammalian, terrestrial, bipedal, tool-using, hypersocial, slightly ethnocentric and predatory, and, especially, brainy primate also became a group territorial and warring species. Once in existence, (once "one band would have the capacity to consciously ponder the significance of adjacent social groups and to deal with them in an intelligent, organized fashion"), the process would be autocatalytic, and no group could, on penalty of extermination, afford to ignore this new mode of competition, as E.O. Wilson (1975; see Ch. 4) explained. "Once begun, such a mutual reinforcement could be irreversible. The only combinations of genes able to confer superior fitness in contention with genocidal aggressors would be those that produce either a more effective technique of aggression or else the capacity to preempt genocide by some form of pacific maneuvering". It probably was not so much "consciously pondering the significance of adjacent groups" as envisaged by Wilson, as it was immediately and unreflectively recognizing competitors, and acknowledging the tactical advantage of preemptive attack, as envisaged by Alcock (1979). From the point of view of a member of one band of hominids/humans, stranger hominids/humans are serious competitors whose presence will probably reduce the resources available to the band. Intraspecific competition for valuable resources might have favored hominids/humans that mobilized their cooperative and tool-using abilities against competing bands, giving the edge to the members of a band possessing superior technology and/or organization: "A sufficiently well-armed and well-organized group could hope to destroy the defenses of an unprepared group so quickly that the risk of personal injury to the attackers would be greatly lowered, reducing a major cost of aggression to them" (Alcock, 1979).



8.4.16

Group Size and Balances of Power

Alexander (1979 et seq.; Alexander & Borgia, 1978) agrees with Bigelow (1969 et seq.) and Darwin that violent intergroup competition was a primum movens in human evolution and that it selected for intragroup reciprocity, altruism, cooperation, intelligence, morality, etc. (As in all monocausal theories, the problem is what moves the prime mover?). War, according to Alexander & Borgia (1978), was a result of culture. Culture continually rebuilds the differences between neighboring human populations (a process called pseudospeciation; see Ch. 6). Culture is the great unbalancer that reinforces human tendencies to live and compete in groups and to engage in an unusual (and unusually ferocious) group-against-group competition. Culture frequently leads to imbalances that make such all-out aggression apparently profitable (Melotti, 1987). Shaw & Wong (1989; Ch. 6) argued that larger groups would likely have enjoyed a competitive advantage over smaller groups (everything else being equal). This constituted a strong selection pressure toward larger group size: "In the evolutionary long run, larger groups would have displaced smaller groups and their members would thus have staked out a larger share of humanity’s gene pool. This implies that behavioral predispositions that facilitated group expansion would have been retained and incorporated into the more permanent repertoire of individual and group behavior". Balance-of-power politics created a potent selection pressure toward bigger, stronger, more disciplined and sociopolitically better organized groups. Furthermore, within groups (a) a runaway selection for mental proficiency and complexity, inventiveness and cultural skills arose; and (b) because dominant males were increasingly dependent on cooperation with other males, they had to renounce their reproductive monopolies. This ’reproductive opportunity leveling’ (or socially-imposed monogamy) enabled increasingly big groups to overcome potential sources of internal disruption (Slurink, 1993). "Balances of power are also significant within groups, continually denying to individuals and subgroups the possibility of initiating individualistic reproduction strategies or of fragmenting the larger group by secession or fission" (Alexander, 1979). Another factor resulting from the increase in population may have been the increasing gracility seen in some hominid lineages. It might have paid to be a (smaller and lighter) member of a big group than to be a big member of a small group which would be no group at all in no time given the new rules of the game: It paid, in other words, to be big in number, not in stature. Once humans began to use social cooperation as a principal means of competition, Alexander (1990) argued, they began to compete socially not only



as individuals but in coalitions of every imaginable size and variety. Moreover, once humans started living in groups (or continued group-living) explicitly because this enhanced their ability to compete with other neighboring groups, then the possibility of living nonsocially or solitary virtually disappeared - even if predators were removed, and food and shelter became abundant - because humans themselves would not allow it. We usually think of cooperation as the opposite of competition. But if cooperation works, the evolutionary effect is to cause a kind of indirect competition with everyone else who did not cooperate quite as well. Regardless whether one individual ever interacts with another, the two are inevitably competing in regard to which will leave more copies of its genes. And, over the long run, those who are better at it become the ancestors of whoever remains. In this sense, cooperation is always competition as well, and competition thus is not only inevitable but, in evolutionary terms, has no alternative. Social and Machiavellian intelligence (the brain as a social tool as envisaged by Humphrey, 1976), especially through success in competition achieved by cooperation, becomes paramount, and the race toward intellectual complexity, especially consciousness and the abilities to plan and anticipate, i.e., mental scenario-building and language, is on. Nothing, Alexander contends, "would select more potently for increased social intelligence - for better ability to look ahead and survey the alternatives accurately - than a within-species coevolutionary race in which success depended on effectiveness in social competition". None of the supposed causes except balances of power, Alexander holds, seems even remotely appropriate to explain the rise of the state. Many scholars, from Spencer and Bagehot onward, regard the rise of tribal organization, chiefdoms, as well as state formation, as stimulated and perpetuated by continual power balancing or warfare with neighboring groups (Sahlins, 1968; Carneiro, 1970 et seq.; Harner, 1970; Service, 1971, 1975; Dumond, 1972; Adams, 1975; Fried, 1975; Lewellen, 1983; Cohen, 1984; Ferrill, 1985; Falger, 1994; among many others). However, viewing conflict and warfare as though they were the only forces neglects other interacting factors (Holsti, 1913; Corning & Corning, 1972; Corning, 1973 et seq.; Braun & Plog, 1982; Cohen, 1984; Creamer & Haas, 1985; Masters, 1989; Shaw & Wong, 1989; Lee, 1990). Corning (1983), for example, in his synergistic view, states that warfare was most likely both a cause and an effect of socioeconomic and political evolution.



8.4.17

The Agricultural Revolution

Between 1.5 and 1.0 mya there is evidence of hominids in regions of subSaharan Africa and Southeast Asia. Between 700,000 and 300,000 years ago the more northerly temperate environments were colonized by Homo erectus; and between 300,000 and 40,000 years ago northerly latitudes came within the compass of hominid occupation (this phase coinciding with the evolution from H. erectus to H. sapiens); and between 40,000 and 10,000 years ago, by the end of the Pleistocene, virtually all the major habitats of the earth were colonized (Foley, 1987). Interestingly, Homo erectus (possibly even as a single small group of a few dozen individuals) and a range of other species (lion, leopard, hyena and wolf) all reached temperate Eurasia at about the same time. Why? There are some general principles governing the extent to which species may be stenotopic (confined to a specific habitat as a result of specialization and/or local adaptation) or eurytopic (able to tolerate a wide range of conditions and exploit resources from a variety of niches). Species with (a) relatively large body size; (b) carnivorous behavior; and (c) sociality, apparently had the adaptive capacity to exploit new temperate environments despite their tropical origins. Carnivores are more eurytopic than herbivores; relatively large body size is advantageous in colder climates; and group hunting apparently is a highly efficient resource extraction strategy. The moment the ecological barrier was crossed, intergroup competition and/or balances of power forced groups to become bigger because numerical superiority is a vital advantage in (violent) intergroup competition. The steady increase in size of populations in Neolithic times once more made land/territory a limiting resource, and necessitated the transition to the agricultural mode of subsistence. The only advantage of agriculture compared to hunting-gathering is that agriculture requires less space and supports denser populations. The spread of agriculture was accomplished in about 8000 years beginning some 10,000 years BP (Cohen, 1977; Roele, 1993). This is also the time that war enters recorded history and is instrumental in building city-states, pristine states, and finally empires, beginning in the environs of Mesopotamia (The political instrumentality of war must have been independently ’invented’ many times later on, e.g., in Meso- and South-America). The agricultural societies would have had lesser economic product per capita, but they simply had more capita, and their militarily numerical preponderance would have left to the remaining hunter-gatherer societies only the marginal, peripheral, suboptimal habitats and low-quality refuges (Q.Wright, 1942; Roele, 1993; see Ch. 7). Eventually, such a marginal international system stabilizes as a system of stalemate (war trap) and rampant war complexes, of balances-of-power and



endemic feuding, and occasional pockets of peace. In such circumstances there is no ’progress’, but only stagnation. Netting (1990) observed that even in autonomous communities of agriculturalists "fighting may well be episodic and fitful, directed at a variety of neighboring villages and without permanent coalitions or effective conquest". Observations such as these should dispel any notions of war as an inevitable ’Agent of Progress’. The invention of agriculture made instrumental warfare in the Fertile Crescent increasingly profitable (for the victors, that is) simply because agricultural produce provided a more reliable, storable, or larger resource base (Alcock, 1979; Bigelow, 1969). It also had a price: The greater carbohydrate intake of early agricultural populations compared with hunter-gatherers led to nutritional imbalances and to protein- and vitamin-deficiency diseases, the effects of which are still manifest in their skeletal remains (D.R. Harris, 1992). Another result of the population explosion after the agricultural transition would have been the necessity of morality (Alexander, 1979; Irons, 1991; Roele, 1993; Slurink, 1994). Roele (1993) explains: "If the size of societies increases, the basis for altruism erodes and the enactment of a (religiously inspired) system of morality becomes necessary. The system of morality would require individuals to help their neighbors and act in the common interest and would aim to reduce intragroup competition", especially reproductive competition, e.g., by means of socially-imposed monogamy, but possibly also by fomenting intergroup competition; such a system of morality is an ideal one for exploitation, indoctrination and disciplinization of young males in standing armies and warlike exploits. Multi-village political aggregates and imminent chiefdoms are superior instruments of military defense and expansionist warfare. A permanent alliance of villages under unified authority provides protection, and community units may sacrifice local sovereignty and a degree of economic independence for this crucial goal. "In agricultural groups the primary cause of organizational elaboration appears to be defensive needs" (Johnson & Earle, 1987). But, like everything else in evolution, such a benefit does not come cheap: Physical relocation, military service, and tribute payment would all decrease agricultural efficiency, especially for intensive cultivators with high-value fixed property. Thus, the economic costs of voluntary incorporation into a chiefdom would be considerable. Perhaps only the threat of warfare and destruction would justify the economic advantages foregone (Netting, 1990). Once in a while pastoral peoples turned into pests and all but destroyed agricultural civilizations, but eventually the nomads were absorbed by the sedentary peoples or settled down after a period of wreaking havoc. The sinification of the Mongols is a prime example.



"Pastoralists tend to be particularly warlike and the histories of civilizations are punctuated by their inroads. [But] incursions of barbaric pastoralists seem to do civilizations less harm in the long run than one might expect [because] certain genes or traditions of the pastoralists revitalize the conquered people with an ingredient of progress which tends to die out in a large panmictic population... I have in mind altruism which is perhaps better described as self-sacrificial daring" (Hamilton, 1975). The rest is history. As James Joyce is reputed to have said: "History is a nightmare from which I try in vain to wake up".

8.4.18

Epilogue

The main contention of this chapter is that warfare evolved as a high-risk/highgain male-coalitional reproductive (or parental-investment) strategy. This, at least partially, explains why it is universally the males who are the warriors. Warring behavior is confined to typically highly-social and ’brainy’ species, cognitively capable of establishing relatively long-term polyadic coalitions, mainly Hominidae and Panidae. This, at least partially, explains why warfare emerged so (relatively) late in evolution and why it is so conspicuously absent in mammals generally.



APPENDICES Table of Primitive Peoples Claimed to be Highly Unwarlike (War reported as absent or mainly defensive)

Name:

Location:

References:

Aboriginals

AUST

Achagua Aché Acoma Aëta/Agta Aguitequedichaga Ainu

S-AM S-AM N-AM PHIL S-AM EURA

Aita Ajuran Akasguy Akka Alacaluf Alangan Aleuts Algonquin

PHIL AFRI N-AM AFRI S-AM PHIL N-AM N-AM

Angas, 1847; Basedow, 1925; Bates, 1906 et seq.; Berndt, 1978; Bigelow, 1969; Van der Bij, 1929; Bonney, 1884; Browne, 1856; Cunow, 1894; Curr, 1886; Davie, 1929; Dawson, 1881; Elkin, 1938; Eylmann, 1908; Foelsche, 1895; Fraser, 1892; Frazer, 1910, 1939; Graebner, 1906; Grey, 1841; Hartland, 1921; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Holsti, 1913; Horne & Aiston, 1924; Howitt, 1904; Howitt & Fison, 1889; Knabenhans, 1919; Letourneau, 1895; Lumholtz, 1889; Macgillivray, 1852; Malinowski, 1913; Mathew, 1899, 1910; Mathews, 1906; Montagu, 1978; Numelin, 1950; Oldfield, 1865; Palmer, 1884; Parker, 1905; Porteus, 1931; Radcliffe-Brown, 1913; Ratzel, 1896; Roth, 1897, 1901; Sadleir, 1883; Salvado, 1854; G.Smith, 1930; Smyth, 1878; Spencer & Gillen, 1899 et seq.; Steinmetz, 1892; Strehlow, 1910, 1970; Sumner, 1911; Thomas, 1906; Tindale, 1974; Ward, 1965; Warner, 1937; Wheeler, 1910; Wood, 1868; Q.Wright, 1942; De Alba, 1948; Steward, 1948; See: Guayaki See: Pueblos See: Negritos De Azara, 1809; Van der Bij, 1929; Batchelor, 1895, 1901, 1927; Bickmore, 1868; von Brandt, 1874; Dixon, 1883; Dröber, 1909; Fromm, 1974; Hitchcock, 1891; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Holland, 1874; Kelley, 2000; Kindaichi, 1928; Koganei, 1903; Landor, 1893; McRitchie, 1892; Munro, 1911, 1963; Murdock, 1934; Ross, 1983; St.John, 1873; Scheube, 1882; von Siebold, 1881; Textor, 1967; Q.Wright, 1942; See: Negritos See: Boran Stammel, 1977; See: Khoisan See: Ona See: Negritos See: Inuit Van der Bij, 1929; De Champlain, 1619; Day & Trigger, 1978; Jenness, 1932; M.Johnson, 1992; G.Smith, 1930; Thwaites, 1897;

Allar Alon Amahuaca Amasifuin Ammassalik Amuesha/Amueixa Anasazi (Early) Andamanese

EURA S-AM S-AM S-AM N-AM S-AM N-AM EURA

Apinayé Aradhya Arafuras

S-AM EURA N-GU

Arawak

S-AM

Arctic Eskimo Arecuna Arhuaco Aros Aru Islanders

N-AM S-AM S-AM AFRI OCEA

Arupai Attikamek

S-AM N-AM

Auca/Auka Auétí Aurohuacos Badaga Badeshi Bagielli-Pygmies Bahima

S-AM S-AM S-AM EURA EURA AFRI AFRI

Baiga

EURA

Bajau/Bajau Laut

PHIL

Bakoba Bakonjo Bambuti Banyoro

AFRI AFRI AFRI AFRI

Fuchs, 1973; See: Jibito Steward & Métraux, 1948; See: Jibito See: Inuit Steward & Métraux, 1948: Wise, 1994; Haas, 1990; Van der Bij, 1929; Bonington, 1935; Bonta, 1993; Cipriani, 1953, 1966; Cooper, 1993; Danda, 1987; Dentan, 1992; Dobson, 1875; Dutta, 1978; Hobhouse, 1929; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Kelly, 2000; Lesser, 1968; Malhotra, 1989; Man, 1883; Nag, 1972; Otterbein, 1968, 1970; Pandit, 1990; Peschel, 1874; Portman, 1896, 1899; Radcliffe-Brown, 1933; Sarkar, 1990; G.Smith, 1930; Temple, 1903; Textor, 1967; Q.Wright, 1942; Lowie, 1948; Iyer, 1935; Van der Bij, 1929; Davie, 1929; Farrer, 1880; Holsti, 1913; Kolff, 1840; Spencer, 1876; Van der Bij, 1929; Columbus, 1893; Gumilla, 1791; Im Thurm, 1883; Hobhouse et al., 1915; KochGrünberg, 1921; von Martius, 1867; Métraux, 1949; Numelin, 1950; Radin, 1942; Rouse, 1948; Steward & Faron, 1959; Q.Wright, 1942; See: Inuit See: Pemon Davie, 1929; Nicholas, 1901; Numelin, 1950; See: Krepi Van der Bij, 1929; Hobhouse et al., 1915; von Rosenberg, 1878; G.Smith, 1930; Nimuendaju, 1948; Van der Bij, 1929; McNulty & Gilbert, 1981; Thwaites, 1897: See: Waorani See: Xinguanos See: Arhuaco See: Toda See: Malapantaram See: Khoisan Davie, 1929; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Johnston, 1902; Numelin, 1950; Roscoe, 1907; Q.Wright, 1942; Forsyth, 1871; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Montagu, 1994; Q.Wright, 1942; Featherman, 1887; Geoghegan, 1975, 1977; Sather, 1977; Strate, 1985; See: Bayeiye Van der Bij, 1929; Holsti, 1913; Johnston, 1902; See: Khoisan Numelin, 1950; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Roscoe, 1915;

Bara Bari Batak (of Palawan) Batek BaThonga/Batonga Batti Batwa/Batua Bayeiye Belsano Benecki Beothuc/Beothuk

S-AM AFRI PHIL EURA AFRI EURA AFRI AFRI S-AM AFRI N-AM

Binjhwari Bisaya (of Borneo) Bodo

EURA INDO EURA

Boksa Boma Bonthuks

EURA AFRI EURA

Boran Btsisi' Buid/Bu'id/Buhid Bunlap Islanders Burusha Bushmen Bygas Cagaba Cahuapana

AFRI EURA PHIL OCEA EURA AFRI EURA S-AM S-AM

Canamari

S-AM

Candoshi Catauxi

S-AM S-AM

Cayapa Cayua

S-AM S-AM

Cayuvava Celilo Central Eskimo Chané Chaouanons Chasutino Chauci

S-AM N-AM N-AM S-AM N-AM S-AM EURA

Q.Wright, 1942; Van der Bij, 1929; Koch-Grünberg, 1906, 1921; See: Khoisan See: Negritos See: Semang See: Tonga See: Ladaki See: Khoisan Van der Bij, 1929; Livingstone, 1857; See: Jibito Van der Bij, 1929; Wissmann, 1889; Cartwright, 1826; Jenness, 1932; Jukes, 1842; Reynolds, 1978; G.Smith, 1930; See: Baiga Peranio, 1976; Bonta, 1993; Dentan, 1992; Gardner, 1966 et seq.; Hodgson, 1850; Holsti, 1913; Numelin, 1950; Spencer, 1876; See: Tharu Van der Bij, 1929; Johnston, 1884; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Newbold, 1879; Q.Wright, 1942; Aylmer, 1911; Numelin, 1950; See: Semang See: Negritos Lane, 1923; Lane & Lane, n.d.; White, 1989; See: Malapantaram See: Khoisan See: Baiga See: Kogi Markham, 1895, 1910; Steward & Métraux, 1948; De Velasco, 1789; Bates, 1863; Chandless, 1863; Markham, 1895, 1910; Serafim, 1852; von Spix & von Martius, 1823; Urbano, 1864; Tuggy, 1994; De Acuña, 1639; Bates, 1863; Chandless, 1863; Markham, 1895, 1910; von Spix & von Martius, 1823; Wallace, 1853; Keeley, 1996; Murra, 1948; Van der Bij, 1929; Coudreau, 1893; Franssen Herderschee, 1905; De Goeje, 1908; von Koenigswald, 1908; Schomburgk, 1847; See: Chuncho and Moxo See: Columbians See: Inuit Brandon, 1961; Métraux, 1948; Van der Bij, 1929; Thwaites, 1896; See: Jibito Tacitus, n.d.;

Chayawita Chébero Chedua Cherusci Chewong Chichas Orejones Chichimec Chobaabish Cholon Cholto Chunatahua Chuncho Chunipi Chuntaquiru Chupacho Churumatas Chuvash/Chuwash Chuzco/Chusco Ciboney Cingacushusca Cipo Coast Salish

S-AM S-AM S-AM EURA EURA S-AM S-AM N-AM S-AM S-AM S-AM S-AM S-AM S-AM S-AM S-AM EURA S-AM S-AM S-AM S-AM N-AM

Cochiti Coeur d'Alene Cognomona Comanahua Concho Conibo Copper Eskimo Cumbaza Curetu/Cureto

N-AM N-AM S-AM S-AM S-AM S-AM N-AM S-AM S-AM

Dabop Dené Tha Desana Dhimal

N-AM N-AM S-AM EURA

Doko Dorobo Dosewallips Duckabush Duhlelap

AFRI AFRI N-AM N-AM N-AM

See: Cahuapana See: Cahuapana See: Jibito Tacitus, n.d.; See: Semang Lozano, 1733; Markham, 1895, 1910; Driver, 1961; See: Coast Salish See: Jibito See: Jibito See: Jibito Markham, 1895, 1910; Steward & Faron, 1959; Lozano, 1733; Markham, 1895, 1910; See: Piro See: Jibito See: Chichas Orejones Featherman (1891); See: Jibito See: Arawak See: Cahuapana Chandless, 1863; Markham, 1895, 1910; Adamson, 1926-27; Bancroft, 1875; Barnett, 1955; Bigelow, 1969; Van der Bij, 1929; Boas, 1887, 1888; R.Brown, 1873-76; Curtis, 1907-30; Donovan, 1960; Franchère, 1854; Hajda, 1984, 1990; Henry (in Coues, 1897); Hobhouse et al., 1915; Kennedy & Bouchart, 1990; Leechman, 1956; Olson, 1936; Otterbein, 1970; Ross, 1855; Suttles, 1990; Suttles & Lane, 1990; Taylor & Duff, 1956; Q.Wright, 1942; See: Pueblos See: Columbians See: Jibito See: Jibito See: Cahuapana See: Manoa See: Inuit See: Jibito Hobhouse et al., 1915; Markham, 1895, 1910; Ribeiro, 1774; von Spix & von Martius, 1823; Wallace, 1853; Q.Wright, 1942; See: Coast Salish See: Slave See: Tukano Hobhouse et al., 1915; Hodgson, 1850; Holsti, 1913; Numelin, 1950; Spencer, 1876; Q.Wright, 1942; See: Khoisan See: Okiek See: Coast Salish See: Coast Salish See: Coast Salish

Duwamish (Dwamish) Edo Efe Eskimo Esselen Eta Fenni

N-AM AFRI AFRI N-AM N-AM PHIL EURA

Finns (Early) Fipa/Wafipa

EURA AFRI

Fore

N-GU

Fuegians

S-AM

Galong Garo

EURA EURA

Gens des Bois Forts Ghiliaks/Gilyak

N-AM EURA

Goaynazes Goliath

S-AM N-GU

Greenland Eskimo Guaja Guamalca Guana

N-AM S-AM S-AM S-AM

Guanche Guatinguapa Guato

AFRI S-AM S-AM

See: Coast Salish Featherman, 1885; See: Khoisan See: Inuit See: Californians See: Negritos Ailio, 1911; Appelgren-Kivalo, 1911; Holsti, 1913; Koskinen, 1881; Numelin, 1950; Tacitus, n.d.; YrjöKoskinen, 1890; See: Fenni Bonta, 1993 et seq.; Burton, 1860; Davie, 1929; Farrer, 1880; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Holsti, 1913; Hore, 1892; Nieboer, 1910; Ratzel, 1895; Reichard, 1892; Thomson, 1881; Willis, 1966 et seq.; Q.Wright, 1942; R. Berndt, 1955; Bonta, 1993; Glasse & Lindenbaum, 1973; Lindenbaum, 1971; Sorenson, 1972 et seq.; Benignus, 1912; Van der Bij, 1929; Bird, 1946; von Bibra, n.d.; Bove, 1883; Bridges, 1866 et seq.; Cooper, 1917, 1946; Coppinger, 1883; Darwin, 1878; Dobrizhoffer, 1784/1822; D'Orbigny, 1835; Fitz-Roy, 1839; Garson, 1886; Gusinde, 1923; Hawkesworth, 1774; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Holsti, 1913; Hyades & Deniker, 1891; Koppers, 1924; Latcham, 1909; Letourneau, 1895; Molina, 1809; Musters, 1873; Ochsenius, n.d.; Nordenskiöld, 1904; Numelin, 1950; Oyarzun, 1922; G.Smith, 1930; Q.Wright, 1942; Fuchs, 1973; Bahadur, 1977; Burling, 1963; Dalton, 1872; Davie, 1929; Fuchs, 1973; Godwin-Austen, 1872, 1873; Hobhouse et al., 1915; LeBar et al., 1964; Numelin, 1950; Peal, 1874; White, 1989; Q.Wright, 1942; See: Slave Austerlitz, 1994; Van der Bij, 1929; Czaplicka, 1914; Deniker, 1883; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Ivanov, Levin & Smolyak, 1964; Kelley, 2000; Ross, 1983; Q.Wright, 1942; Turney-High, 1949; Van der Bij, 1929; Van den Broek, 1913; De Kock, 1912; See: Inuit Nimuendaju, 1948; See: Chunipi De Almeida Serra, 1845; De Azara, 1809; Van der Bij, 1929; Hobhouse et al., 1915; von Martius, 1867; Métraux, 1946; Steward & Faron, 1959; Q.Wright, 1942; Cook, 1899; Davie, 1929; Numelin, 1950; See: Jibito De Azara, 1809; Van der Bij, 1929; De Castelnau, 1850; Hobouse et al., 1915; von Martius, 1867;

Guayaki

S-AM

Gubbra Gurreh G/wi Hadza

AFRI AFRI AFRI AFRI

Hagahai

N-GU

Haihai Hano Hanunoo Hare

N-AM N-AM PHIL N-AM

Havasupai

N-AM

Hierro Hill Damaras Hill Pandaram Homamish Hoodsport Hopi

AFRI AFRI EURA N-AM N-AM N-AM

Hottentots Huatana Huatsahuana Huchnom Hudson Bay Eskimo Hukwe Humboldt Bay tribes

AFRI S-AM S-AM N-AM N-AM AFRI N-GU

Ifaluk

OCEA

Imono Inughuit Inuit

S-AM N-AM N-AM

Métraux, 1946; Schmidt, 1905, 1914; Q.Wright, 1942; Van der Bij, 1929; Clastres, 1972; Dobrizhoffer, 1784/1822; Ehrenreich, 1898; De la Hitte & ten Kate, 1897; Métraux & Baldus, 1946; Vogt, 1902; See: Boran See: Boran See: Khoisan Bagshawe, 1924; Dentan, 1992; Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1975, 1986; Kelly, 2000; Knauft, 1991; Kohl-Larsen, 1958; Montagu, 1978; Obst, 1912; White, 1989; Woodburn, 1964 et seq.; Jenkins et al., 1989; Times of Papua New Guinea, 1986; See: Oowekeeno See: Hopi See: Negritos Allen, 2000; Jennes, 1932; Krech, 1991; Mackenzie, 1801; Richardson, 1851; Savishinsky & Hara, 1981; Kroeber, 1925; Kroeber & Fontana, 1986; Möllhausen, 1858; Schwartz, 1983; Spier, 1928; See: Guanche See: Khoisan See: Malapantaram See: Coast Salish See: Coast Salish Bancroft, 1875; Brandon, 1961; Coolidge, 1929; Crane, 1925; Curtis, 1922; Cushing et al., 1922; Dorsey, 1903; Eggan, 1943; Farrand, 1904; Fewkes, 1903; Goddard, 1913; Goldschmidt, 1988, 1989; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Hodge, 1907; Hough, 1915; G.James, 1903; H.James, 1956, 1974; Lowie, 1929; Montagu, 1978; Murdock, 1934; Numelin, 1950; Schlegel, 1991; Schoolcraft, 1851; Simmons, 1942; Sumner & Keller, 1927; Textor, 1967; Voth, 1912; Q.Wright, 1942; See: Khoisan See: Jibito See: Jibito See: Tatu See: Inuit See: Khoisan Van der Bij, 1929; Davie, 1929; Krieger, 1899; Lorentz, 1905; Numelin, 1950; Alkire, 1991; Bates, 1953; Bates & Abbott, 1958; Betzig & Wichimai, 1991; Bonta, 1993, 1997; Burrows, 1952; Burrows & Spiro, 1970; Lutz, 1990; Montagu, 1978; Spiro, 1950 et seq.; Textor, 1967; Métraux, 1946; See: Inuit Balikci, 1970; Bancroft, 1875; Bessels, 1884; Van der

Iraya Irula

PHIL EURA

Ishogo Isleta Itonama Ituri-Pygmies Jakun Jemez Jibito

AFRI N-AM S-AM AFRI EURA N-AM S-AM

Ju/wa(si) Jumana Kadar Kalapalo Kalispel Kamayura Karagas Karakalpak Karamojo Kariaks Kashihá Kawaiisu Kawchadinneh Keddah Semang Kenkob Kerintji Khasi Kho Khoisan

AFRI S-AM EURA S-AM N-AM S-Am EURA EURA AFRI N-AM S-AM N-AM N-AM EURA AFRI INDO EURA EURA AFRI

Bij, 1929; Birket Smith, 1948; Bonta, 1993, 1997; Briggs, 1970 et seq.; Boas, 1888 et seq.; Crantz, 1767; Damas, 1984; Davie, 1929; Eckert & Newmark, 1980; Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1975; Fabbro, 1978; Fromm, 1974; Gilberg, 1984, 1991; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Hodge, 1907; Hoebel, 1940 et seq.; Holsti, 1913; Hrdlicka, 1910; Irwin, 1981 et seq; Jayewardene, 1975; Jenness, 1922, 1946; Kane, 1856; Kelly, 2000; Kleivan, 1991; Klutschak, 1881; Knauft, 1991; Kroeber, 1899; Markham, 1866; Mead, 1961; Murdoch, 1892; Murdock, 1934; Nansen, 1893; Nelson, 1899; Numelin, 1950; Otterbein, 1970; Palmer, 1965; Peary, 1893 et seq.; Petersen, 1963; Rasmussen, 1905 et seq.; Ratzel, 1896; Reclus, 1891; Rink, 1887; G.Smith, 1930; Steensby, 1910; Sumner, 1911; Textor, 1967; Thalbitzer, 1914; Turner, 1894; Weyer, 1932; Q.Wright, 1942; See: Negritos Bahadur, 1977; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Iyer, 1935; Murdock, 1934; Shortt, 1869; Thurston, 1909; Q.Wright, 1942; Van der Bij, 1929; du Chaillu, 1863, 1867; See: Pueblos See: Chuncho See: Khoisan See: Semang See: Pueblos Markham, 1895, 1910; Pöppig, 1835; Raimondi, 1862; Steward & Métraux, 1948; See: Khoisan See: Tucuna Bonta, 1993, 1997; Ehrenfels, 1952; See: Xinguanos See: Columbians See: Xinguanos See: Tofalar Stöhr, 1972; Holsti, 1913; Johnston, 1902; Numelin, 1950; See: Inuit Baldus, 1931; Numelin, 1950; Kroeber, 1917, 1925; Zigmond, 1986; See: Hare See: Semang See: Khoisan Jaspan, 1976; Marsden, 1783; See: Garo See: Malapantaram Andersson, 1857; Bahuchet, 1983; Bailey, 1991; Behm, 1871; Van den Bergh, 1922; Van den Berghe, 1981; Bicchieri, 1969; Biesele, 1975, 1976; Van der

Kikiallus Kisama Kittitas Kivu-Pygmies Klikitat/Klickitat !Ko Kogi/Kogui Koksoagmiut Kolai Korumba Kota Krepi

N-AM AFRI N-AM AFRI N-AM AFRI S-AM N-AM EURA EURA EURA AFRI

Kuala Kurnam Sakai Kubu

EURA INDO

Bij, 1929; Bleek, 1864, 1930; Bonta, 1993 et seq.; Brownlee, 1943; Burchell, 1822; C.Campbell, 1986; Casati, 1891; Cashdan, 1983; du Chaillu, 1867; Christiansen & Winkler, 1992; Commerson, 1772; David, 1904; Dentan, 1992; Draper, 1973 et seq.; Dornan, 1925; Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1975, 1984, 1986; Ellis, 1838; Ember, 1978; Emin Pascha, 1886, 1894; Fabbro, 1978; Featherman, 1885; Fourie, 1960; von François, 1895; Fritsch, 1872; Fromm, 1974; Godelier, 1978; Guenther, 1981, 1986, 1992; Gusinde, 1956; Hahn, 1867, 1870; Harpending, 1972; Hartland, 1914; Heinz, 1966, 1972; Heinz & Lee, 1978; Hobhouse, 1929; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Hoernle, 1925; Howell, 1976; Hutereau, 1909; Johnston, 1884; Junker, 1891; Kelly, 2000; Kent, 1989; Knauft, 1991; Koelle, 1854; Kohler, 1902; Kolb, 1745; Konner, 1976; Krapf, 1858; Le Roy, 1897; Lee, 1968 et seq.; Lee & DeVore, 1976; Lee & Hurlich, 1982; Lewis-Wiliams, 1982; Lichtenstein, 1812; Marshall, 1960 et seq.; Moffat, 1842; Murdock, 1934, 1959; Panckow, 1892; Passarge, 1907; Van der Post & Taylor, 1985; Ross, 1985 et seq.; Sahlins, 1960; Schapera, 1930; Schebesta, 1930 et seq.; Schinz, 1891; Schmidt, 1910, 1930; Schultze, 1907; Schumacher, 1925, 1950; Schweinfurth, 1875; Seiwert, 1926; Shostak, 1981; Sievers-Hahn, 1903; Silberbauer, 1973, 1981, 1982; G.Smith, 1930; Stanley, 1878; Stow, 1905; Stuhlmann, 1894; Sugawara, 1988; Thomas, 1958 et seq.; Tobias, 1964, 1978; Trenk, 1910; Turnbull, 1961 et seq.; Vedder, 1928, 1937, 1952; Wanders, 1903; Weule, 1916; Wiessner, 1982; Wilhelm, 1953; Wilmsen, 1989; Wilmsen & Denbow, 1990; Wissmann, 1886; Wood, 1868; Woodhouse, 1979 et seq.; Q.Wright, 1942; Yellen & Lee, 1976; Zastrow & Vedder, 1930; See: Coast Salish See: Quissama See: Columbians See: Khoisan See: Columbians See: Khoisan Reichel-Dolmatoff, 1994 See: Inuit See: Malapantaram See: Naikens See: Toda Holsti, 1913; Numelin, 1950; Partridge, 1905; Ratzel, 1895; Westermann, 1912; See: Semang Van der Bij, 1929; Boers, 1838; Davie, 1929; Van Dongen, 1906, 1910, 1913; Forbes, 1884, 1885;

Kuikuru !Kung Kurumba Kwaialk Kwehtlmamish Ladakhi/Ladaki

S-AM AFRI EURA N-AM N-AM EURA

Laguna Lamista Lapps

N-AM S-AM EURA

Leco Lepcha

S-AM EURA

Lhota/Lhota Naga

EURA

Li

EURA

Lucayo Machicui/Machicuy Machiguenga Macu/Maku

S-AM S-AM S-AM S-AM

Mailona Makalaka Maku Malabarese Malapantaram

S-AM AFRI S-AM EURA EURA

Mamanua Mambutu Manam Islanders Manansa Mandai/Mandaeans Manganja Manihikians Manties Mantra Mapari Mardu/Mardujarra Masco Matipú Matsigenka

PHIL AFRI N-GU AFRI EURA AFRI OCEA S-AM EURA S-AM AUST S-AM A-AM S-AM

Hagen, 1908; Van Hasselt, 1876; Hobhouse, 1929; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Möhnike, 1874; Numelin, 1950; Olivier, 1828; G.Smith, 1930; De Sturler, 1843; Winter, 1901; Q.Wright, 1942; See: Xinguanos See: Khoisan See: Toda See: Coast Salish See: Coast Salish Bonta, 1993, 1997; Harvey, 1983; Holsti, 1913; Mann, 1972, 1986; Norberg-Hodge, 1991; Ratzel, 1895; See: Pueblos See: Jibito Bosi, 1960; Davie, 1929; Featherman, 1891; Keane, 1886; Numelin, 1950; Ross, 1983; Textor, 1967; See: Mosetene Bonta, 1993, 1997; Dalton, 1872; Ember & Ember, 1994; Gorer, 1938; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Holsti, 1913; Hooker, 1854; Montagu, 1978; Morris, 1938; Risley, 1891; Ross, 1985 et seq.; Textor, 1967; Q.Wright, 1942; Fuchs, 1973; Godden, 1897, 1898; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Q.Wright, 1942; Hobhouse, 1906; Numelin, 1950; Stübel & Meriggi, 1937; See: Arawak De Azara, 1809; Van der Bij, 1929; Johnson & Johnson, 1994; Steward & Métraux, 1948; Van der Bij, 1939; Gillin, 1948; Koch-Grünberg, 1900 et seq.; See: Jibito Davie, 1929; Holub, 1881; See: Macu Magelhaes, 1576; Numelin, 1950; Bonta, 1993, 1996; Fürer-Haimendorf, 1960; Iyer, 1937; Mateer, 1883; Morris, 1975 et seq,; See: Negritos See: Khoisan Bjerre, n.d.; Davie, 1929; Holub, 1881; Nieboer, 1910; Drower, 1937; Numelin, 1950; Davie, 1929; Moggridge, 1902; Monteiro, 1876; Piddington, 1950; Strate, 1985; See: Tukano See: Semang See: Jibito Tonkinson, 1974 et seq.; Steward & Métraux, 1948; See: Xinguanos See: Machiguenga

Maué

S-AM

Mbuba Mbuti/Mbutu Mehinacu/Mehinaku Mentawei Isl.

AFRI AFRI S-AM INDO

Mesekwegwils Meshal Mikir/Mikir Naga Minangkabau Miseekwigweelis Mishmi

N-AM N-AM EURA INDO N-AM EURA

Miskaiwhu Mocetenes Molala

N-AM S-AM N-AM

Momfu Moqui Moré Moriori

AFRI N-AM S-AM OCEA

Mosetene Motilones Moxo

S-AM S-AM S-AM

Mrabri Munichi Murato Musu Muzape Nafukuá Nago

EURA S-AM S-AM S-AM S-AM S-AM AFRI

Naikens Nama/Namaqua/Namkwa Nambe Napo Nayaka Ndjavi Negritos

EURA AFRI N-AM S-AM EURA AFRI PHIL

von Martius, 1867; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Nimuendaju, 1948; Q.Wright, 1942; See: Khoisan See: Khoisan See: Xinguanos Van der Bij, 1929; Frazer, 1910; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Holsti, 1913; Nooy-Palm, 1972, 1976; Numelin, 1950; von Rosenberg, 1878; Q.Wright, 1942; See: Coast Salish See: Coast Salish Fuchs, 1973; Tanner, 1972, 1976; See: Coast Salish Dalton, 1872; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Holsti, 1913; Numelin, 1950; Spencer, 1876; Q.Wright, 1942; See: Coast Salish See: Mosetene Drucker, 1934; Gatschet, 1890; Jacobs, 1939; Murdock, 1938; Rigsby, 1969: Zenk & Rigsby, 1998; See: Khoisan See: Hopi See: Chuncho Davie, 1929; Holsti, 1913; Mair, 1905; Numelin, 1950; Shand, 1905; Tregear, 1904; Métraux, 1948; Nieboer, 1910; d'Orbigny (1835); See: Jibito Armendia, 1890; Church, 1877; D'Orbigny, 1829, 1835; Garcilaso de la Vega, 1609; Gibbon, 1852; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Larrabure, 1905; Markham, 1895, 1920; von Martius, 1832; Stocklein, 1726; Q.Wright, 1942; See: Semang See: Cahuapana See: Candoshi See: Moxo See: Jibito See: Xinguanos Hagen, 1887; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Holsti, 1913; Ratzel, 1895; Q.Wright, 1942; Bird-David, 1983 et seq.; Bonta, 1993, 1997; See: Khoisan See: Pueblos Davie, 1929; Simpson, 1883; See: Naikens Van der Bij, 1929; du Chaillu, 1863, 1867; Van der Bij, 1929; Blumentritt, 1882, 1884, 1892; Bonta, 1993, 1997; Conklin, 1954; Dentan, 1992; Fox, 1953; Frake, 1960; Fray Pedro de Medio (in Blumentritt, 1892); Gibson, 1985 et seq.; Hobhouse, 1929; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Kroeber, 1928; LeBar,

Netsilik/Netsilingmiut Nganasans Nharo Nicola Ninaquiguila Ninaxo Nindaso Nisqually Nivkhi Nomona Nookachamps Nubians

N-AM EURA AFRI N-AM S-AM S-AM S-AM N-AM EURA S-AM N-AM AFRI

Nukuoro Nukwatsamish Nusehchatl/Nusehtsatl Nuwhaha Obongo-Pygmies Oedos Okiek (Dorobo)

OCEA N-AM N-AM N-AM AFRI AFRI AFRI

Ona

S-AM

Onge Oowekeeno

EURA N-AM

Orang Asli/Benua/Bukit Orang Bajau Otomac Pacaa Nova Pacaguara Pageh Islanders Pahari/Paharia Palawan Paliyan Pampadoque Panare/Panaré Panatahua Papago

EURA PHIL S-AM S-AM S-AM INDO EURA PHIL EURA S-AM S-AM S-AM N-AM

1975; Maceda, 1977; Manuel, 1977; Meyer & Schadenberg, 1890; Moore, 1975; Miller, 1905; Murdock, 1949; Postma, 1965; Price, 1989; Reed, 1904; Schadenberg, 1880; Schlegel, 1970; Schmidt, 1910; Scott, 1966; G.Smith, 1930; St.Bille (in Meyer & Schadenberg, 1890); Tenorio, 1892; Tweddell, 1970; Vanoverbergh, 1925; Villaverde (in van der Bij, 1929); Venturillo, 1908; Warren, 1977; Wood, 1957; Q.Wright, 1942; Yengoyan, 1977; See: Inuit See: Samoyed See: Khoisan See: Columbians See: Poturero See: Jibito See: Jibito See: Coast Salish See: Ghiliaks See: Jibito See: Coast Salish Bonta, 1993 et seq.; Callender, 1966; Fernea, 1966, 1973; Fernea & Fernea, 1991; Kubary, 1900; Moerenhout, 1837; Numelin, 1950; See: Coast Salish See: Coast Salish See: Coast Salish See: Khoisan See: Edo Blackburn, 1974 et seq.; Dentan, 1992; Ember, 1978; Kelly, 2000; Otterbein, 1968, 1970; Strate, 1985; Woodburn, 1988; Bird, 1946; Bridges, 1893; Cooper, 1917, 1946; Gallardo, 1910; Hobhouse, 1929; Numelin, 1950; Oyarzun, 1922; See: Andamanese Drucker, 1950, 1965; Hilton, 1990; McIlwraith, 1948; Olson, 1954, 1955; See: Semang See: Bajau Gumilla, 1745; Kirchhoff, 1948; Dentan, 1992; von Graeve, 1989; See: Moxo See: Mentawei See: Malapantaram See: Negritos See: Bodo See: Cahuapana Henley, 1994; See: Jibito Bancroft, 1875; Brandon, 1961; Browne, 1869;

Passes/Passé

S-AM

Pasto Paumari/Paumary

S-AM S-AM

Peaux de Lièvre Pecos Pemon Penan Pend d'Oreille Perak Sakai Pesechem/Pesegem Phi Thong Luang Picuris Pima

N-AM N-AM S-AM INDO N-AM EURA N-GU EURA N-AM N-AM

Piro Piro/Pirro

N-AM S-AM

Point Barrow Eskimo Pojoaque Polar Eskimo Poturero Pueblos

N-AM N-AM N-AM S-AM N-AM

Puinave Punan

S-AM INDO

Puri

S-AM

Goldschmidt, 1988, 1989; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Lumholtz, 1902, 1912; Montagu, 1978; Otterbein, 1968, 1970; Ross, 1985 et seq.; Textor, 1967; Q.Wright, 1942; Bates, 1863; Markham, 1895, 1910; von Martius, 1832; Simson, 1877; von Spix & von Martius, 1823; De Alba, 1946; Albis, 1934; Chandless, 1863; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Markham, 1895, 1910; Von Martius, 1867; Métraux, 1948; Wallace, 1853; Q.Wright, 1942; See: Hare See: Pueblos Thomas, 1994; See: Punan See: Columbians See: Semang Van der Bij, 1929; Pulle, 1916; See: Semang See: Pueblos Bahr & Kozak, 1991; Bancroft, 1875; Van der Bij, 1929; Brandon, 1961; Browne, 1869; Davie, 1929; Davis, 1857; Dobyns, 1972; Ezell, 1983; Fremont & Emory, 1849; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Holsti, 1913; Jorgensen, 1980; Russell, 1908; Q.Wright, 1942; See: Pueblos De Castelnau, 1850; Markham, 1895, 1910; Matteson, 1994; Raimondi, 1862; Smyth, 1832; Steward & Métraux, 1948; De Velasco, 1789; See: Inuit See: Pueblos See: Inuit De Azara, 1809; Van der Bij, 1929; Métraux, 1946; Arnon & Hill, 1979; Bancroft, 1875; Benedict, 1934; Van der Bij, 1929; Brandt, 1979; Davie, 1929; Davis, 1857; Driver, 1961; Featherman, 1889; Hammond & Rey, 1940; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Holsti, 1913; Jacobs, 1991; Montagu, 1978; Numelin, 1950; Schoolcraft, 1851; Schroeder, 1979; Spencer, 1876; Spicer, 1980; Winship, 1896; Q.Wright, 1942; Métraux & Kirchhoff, 1948; Bigelow, 1969; Van der Bij, 1929; Davie, 1929; Dentan, 1992; Furness, 1902; Hobhouse, 1929; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Holsti, 1913; Hose, 1894, 1926; Hose & McDougall, 1912; Jongejans, 1922; Montagu, 1978; Needham, 1954, 1972; Nieuwenhuis, 1904, 1907; Numelin, 1950; Rousseau, 1990; G.Smith, 1930; Q.Wright, 1942; Van der Bij, 1929; Hobhouse et al., 1915; von Königswald, 1908; von Martius, 1867; Métraux, 1946; zu Wied-Neuwied, 1820; Q.Wright, 1942;

Puyallup Qipi Quarré Quidquidcana Quilcene (Colcene) Quimos Quissama/Kisama

N-AM N-AM AFRI S-AM N-AM AFRI AFRI

Ryukyu Archipelago Saami Sahewamish Sakai/Sakei Saktamish Sakuju Sakumehu/Sauk Saliva

EURA EURA N-AM EURA N-AM AFRI N-AM S-AM

Sami Sammamish San San Felipe San Ildefonso San Juan Sandia Sanpoil

EURA N-AM AFRI N-AM N-AM N-AM N-AM N-AM

Santa Ana Santa Clara Santo Domingo Saulteaux

N-AM N-AM N-AM N-AM

Sawamish Selung Semai Semang

N-AM PHIL EURA EURA

See: Coast Salish See: Inuit Van der Bij, 1929; Huot & Voivenel, 1917; See: Jibito See: Coast Salish See: Khoisan Van der Bij, 1929; Davie, 1929; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Magyar, 1859; Monteiro, 1876; Price, 1872; Q.Wright, 1942; Davie, 1929; Letourneau, 1881; See: Lapps See: Coast Salish See: Semang See: Coast Salish See: Boran See: Coast Salish Flowers, 1994; Gumilla, 1745; Morey & Morey, 1980; Nieboer, 1910; Steward, 1948; See: Lapps See: Coast Salish See: Khoisan See: Pueblos See: Pueblos See: Pueblos See: Pueblos Bonta, 1993; Ember, 1978; Miller, 1998; Ray, 1933; Textor, 1967; See: Pueblos See: Pueblos See: Pueblos Bonta, 1993; Hallowell, 1940, 1941; Holsti, 1913; Kane, 1859; Kelly, 2000; Otterbein, 1970; Ross, 1983; See: Coast Salish See: Bajau See: Semang Anderson, 1850; Annandale & Robinson, 1903; Bernatzik, 1938 et seq.; Van der Bij, 1929; Bonta, 1993 et seq.; Borie, 1861; Dentan, 1968 et seq.; EiblEibesfeldt, 1975; Ember, 1978; Endicott, 1974 et seq.; 1988; Evans, 1927; Fabbro, 1978; Favre, 1848; Fromm, 1974; Grabowsky, 1885; Hale, 1886; Hobhouse, 1929; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Howell, 1984 et seq.; Kelly, 2000; Knauft, 1987, 1991; Knocker, 1907, 1909; LeBar et al., 1964; Lesser, 1968; Letessier, n.d.; Logan, 1847; Martin, 1905; Menic, 1642 (in Martin, 1905); Miklucho-Maclay, 1875; Montagu, 1978; Montano, 1886; De Morgan, n.d.; Murdock, 1934; Noone & Holman, 1972; Numelin, 1950; Robarchek, 1977 et seq.; Robarchek & Dentan, 1987; Robarchek & Robarchek, 1992; Ross, 1985 et seq.;

Semendo Senoi Setebo

INDO EURA S-AM

Shina Shingu Shotlemamish Shumashti Sia Similkameen

EURA S-AM N-AM EURA N-AM N-AM

Sio Siriono

N-GU S-AM

Sisinpari Skagit Skin Skitswish Skokomish Skopamish Skykomish Slave/Slavey

S-AM N-AM N-AM N-AM N-AM N-AM N-AM N-AM

Smaliwhu Smulkamish Snohomish Snoqualmie Soones Squaxin/Squaxon Squiaitl Squinamish Staktalijamish Stehchass/Stehtsasamish Steilacoom(amish) Stillaguamish Stkamish Stkehlmish Stuwihamuq Subanun Suchichi Suiattle Sulod/Sulod Ilongot Suquamish

N-AM N-AM N-AM N-AM N-AM N-AM N-AM N-AM N-AM N-AM N-AM N-AM N-AM N-AM N-AM PHIL S-AM N-AM PHIL N-AM

Schebesta, 1923 et seq.; Skeat, 1902; Skeat & Blagden, 1906; G.Smith, 1930; Stevens, 1892; Swettenham, 1887; Textor, 1967; Wilkinson, 1910; Winstedt, 1923; Q.Wright, 1942; Jaspan, 1976; See: Semang Herndon, 1852; Markham, 1895, 1910; Raimondi, 1862; Smyth, 1832; See: Malapantaram See: Xinguanos See: Coast Salish See: Malapantaram See: Pueblos Allison, 1892; Davie, 1929; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Q.Wright, 1942; Harding, 1967 et seq.; Van der Bij, 1929; Califano, 1994; Dentan, 1992; Fabbro, 1978, 1980; von Graeve, 1989; Holmberg, 1946 et seq.; Kelly, 2000; Morey & Marwitt, 1975; Nordenskiöld, 1911 et seq.; Textor, 1967; See: Jibito See: Coast Salish See: Columbians See: Columbians See: Coast Salish See: Coast Salish See: Coast Salish Asch, 1981; Honigmann, 1946; Jenness, 1932; Kelly, 2000; Mackenzie, 1801; Mason, 1946; Ross, 1983; Rushforth, 1991; White, 1989; See: Coast Salish See: Coast Salish See: Coast Salish See: Coast Salish See: Zuñi See: Coast Salish See: Coast Salish See: Coast Salish See: Coast Salish See: Coast Salish See: Coast Salish See: Coast Salish See: Coast Salish See: Coast Salish See: Columbians See: Negritos See: Jibito See: Coast Salish Dentan, 1992; Gibson, 1986; See: Coast Salish

Swinomish Tabalosa Tacunyapé Tagbanua/Tagbanuwa Tagish Tahuya Taino Taitnapam Taos Tapeeksin Tapirapé Tapiro Tapuya

N-AM S-AM S-AM PHIL N-AM N-AM S-AM N-AM N-AM N-AM S-AM N-GU S-AM

Tarahumara

S-AM

*Tasaday* Tatu

PHIL N-AM

Taubuid Taulipang Temiar Tenae Tenggerese Tenino Tepqui Tequete Tesuque Tête de Boule Tewa Tharu

PHIL A-AM EURA EURA INDO N-AM S-AM S-AM N-AM N-AM N-AM EURA

Thonga Ticuna/Tikuna Tierra del Fuegians Tikana Tiki-Tiki Tikopia

AFRI S-AM S-AM OCEA AFRI OCEA

Timayo Timorini Timorlaut

S-AM N-GU INDO

Timote Tingan Tiruray Tiwa Tjumba

S-AM S-AM PHIL N-AM INDO

See: Coast Salish See: Jibito Nimuendaju, 1948; See: Negritos Jenness, 1932; See: Coast Salish See: Arawak See: Columbians See: Pueblos See: Coast Salish Textor, 1967; Wagley, 1977; Wagley & Galvão, 1948; Van der Bij, 1929; Rawling, 1913; Wollaston, 1912; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Jesuit Letters, n.d.; Q.Wright, 1942; Bennett & Zingg, 1935; Cassell, 1969; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Lumholtz, 1902, 1912; Merrill, 1983; Montagu, 1974; West et al., 1969; Q.Wright, 1942; See comments in the Notes section Van der Bij, 1929; Kroeber, 1925; Miller, 1978; Powers, 1877; See: Negritos See: Pemon See: Semang Dalton, 1872; Holsti, 1913: Featherman, 1887; Junghuhn, 1847; See: Columbians See: Jibito See: Chunipi See: Pueblos See: Attikamek See: Pueblos Bahadur, 1977; Crooke, 1897; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Risley, 1891; Steward, 1865; Q.Wright, 1942; See: Tonga See: Tucuna See: Fuegians Billings, 1972, 1991; Billings & Peterson, 1967; See: Khoisan Firth, 1936 et seq; Montagu, 1978; Otterbein, 1968, 1970; Textor, 1967; See: Jibito Van der Bij, 1929; Bijlmer, 1922; Thurnwald, 1917; Van der Bij, 1929; Davie, 1929; Forbes, 1884, 1885; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Q.Wright, 1942; Métraux & Kirchhoff, 1948; See: Jibito See: Negritos See: Pueblos Hobhouse et al., 1915; Junghuhn, 1847; Q.Wright, 1942;

Tkwakwamish Tlakluit/Tlaqluit Toala Toda

N-AM N-AM INDO EURA

Tofalar/Tofa Tonga

EURA AFRI

Towa Towhaha Trique Trumai Tuba Tucano Tucuna

N-AM N-Am S-AM S-AM EURA S-AM S-AM

Tukano

S-AM

Tulalip Tulumayo Twa Twana Twiden Txicão/Txikão Tygh Uaupés Utkuhikhalingmiut Vance Creek Vazimba Vedda/Veddah

N-AM S-AM AFRI N-AM AFRI S-AM N-AM S-AM N-AM N-AM AFRI EURA

Vilela/Velela Wabuma Wafipa Wafiumi

S-AM AFRI AFRI AFRI

See: Coast Salish See: Columbians Holsti, 1913; Sarasin & Sarasin, 1905; Breeks, 1873; Davie, 1929; Farrer, 1880; Fuchs, 1973; Harkness, 1832; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Holsti, 1913; Lesser, 1968; King, 1870; Metz, 1864; Modi, 1904; Montagu, 1978; Murdock, 1934; Numelin, 1950; Oppert, 1896; Otterbein, 1970; Rivers, 1906; Shortt, 1869; Spencer, 1876; Textor, 1967; Thurston, 1896 et seq.; Q.Wright, 1942; Rasadin, 1994; Fromm, 1974; Goldschmidt, 1988, 1989; Holsti, 1913; Junod, 1927, 1935; Mead, 1961; Ratzel, 1895; Stöhr, 1972; Textor, 1967; Turney-High, 1949; White, 1989; See: Pueblos See: Coast Salish Nader, 1969; Tibon, 1961; See: Xinguanos See: Tofalar See: Tukano Hobhouse et al., 1915; Markham, 1910; von Martius, 1867; Nimuendaju, 1948; Stöhr, 1972; Q.Wright, 1942; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Durham, 1976; Holsti, 1913; Markham, 1895, 1910; von Martius, 1867; Orton, 1876; Reichel-Dolmatoff, 1971, 1975; Wallace, 1853; Q.Wright, 1942; See: Coast Salish See: Jibito See: Khoisan See: Coast Salish See: Khoisan See: Xinguanos See: Columbians See: Tukano See: Inuit See: Coast Salish See: Khoisan Bailey, 1863; Van der Bij, 1929; Davie, 1929; Deschamps, 1891; Van Goens, 1932; Hobhouse, 1929; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Holsti, 1913; Knox, 1817; Montagu, 1978; Nevill, 1887; Numelin, 1950; Sarasin & Sarasin, 1893; Seligman & Seligman, 1911; G.Smith, 1930; Stevens, 1892; Tennent, 1859; Textor, 1967; Valentijn, 1724; Virchow (in Sarasin & Sarasin, 1893); Q.Wright, 1942; See: Chunipi Van der Bij, 1929; Johnston, 1884; See: Fipa Baumann, 1894; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Holsti, 1913;

Wakhutu Wambuti/Wambutti Wana Wanapam Waorani

AFRI AFRI INDO N-AM S-AM

Wape Warrau/Warao

N-GU S-AM

Wasco Waura/Waurá Wawira Wayam Wishram Wotschua Xam Xinguanos/Xingu

N-AM S-AM AFRI N-AM N-AM AFRI AFRI S-AM

Yagua

S-AM

Yahgan

S-AM

Yakima/Yakama Yamorai Yanadi

N-AM S-AM EURA

Yaulapiti/Yawalapiti Yilalkoamish Yucunampa Yumbri Zapaso/Zapazo Zapotec

S-AM N-AM S-AM EURA S-AM S-AM

Zia Zuñi

N-AM N-AM

Q.Wright, 1942; Van der Bij, 1929; Thomson, 1881; See: Khoisan Dentan, 1992; Gibson, 1986; See: Columbians Dentan, 1992; Kelly, 2000; Knauft, 1987; Robarchek & Robarchek, 1992; Mitchell, 1973 et seq.; Heinen, 1994; Kelley, 2000; Kirchhoff, 1948; Morey & Marwitt, 1975; Ross, 1983; Turrado Moreno, 1945; White, 1989; See: Columbians See: Xinguanos Van der Bij, 1929; Stuhlmann, 1894; See: Columbians See: Columbians See: Khoisan See: Khoisan Van der Bij, 1929; Bonta, 1993; Carneiro, 1994; Dentan, 1992; Dole, 1956, 1966; Ember & Ember, 1994; Gaisford et al., 1978; Galvão, 1953; Gregor, 1990, 1994; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Ireland, 1988, 1991; Lévi-Strauss, 1948; Murphy & Quain, 1955; Schmidt, 1904; von den Steinen, 1888, 1894; Textor, 1967; Q.Wright, 1942; Zeleny, 1994; Lowie, 1948; Seiler-Baldinger, 1994; Steward & Métraux, 1948; Textor, 1967; Bove, 1884; Bridges, 1893; Cooper, 1946; Ember, 1978; Ember & Ember, 1983; Hobhouse, 1929; Kelly, 2000; Lesser, 1968; Lothrop, 1928; Métraux, 1949; Steward & Faron, 1959; Textor, 1967; See: Columbians See: Cahuapana Agrawal, Reddy & Rao, 1984; Bonta, 1993, 1996; Raghaviah, 1963; Reddy, 1947; Reddy & Reddy, 1987; See: Xinguanos See: Coast Salish See: Chunipi See: Semang See: Jibito Bancroft, 1875; Beals, 1970; Bonta, 1993, 1997; Dentan, 1992; Fry, 1986 et seq.; Hauer, 1978; Hobhouse et al., 1915; O'Nell, 1969 et seq.; Paddock, 1975 et seq.; Stöhr, 1972; Sumner, 1978; Q.Wright, 1942; See: Pueblos Benedict, 1934; Van der Bij, 1929; Bonta, 1993; Brandon, 1961; Bunzel, 1932; Eggan, 1950; EiblEibesfeldt, 1975; Ferguson & Eriacho, 1990; Fremont & Emory, 1849; Frisbie, 1991; Fromm, 1974;

Goldfrank, 1945; Goldman, 1937, 1961; Helmuth, 1967; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Holsti, 1913; Leighton & Adair, 1966; Mead, 1961; Montagu, 1978; Pandey, 1977; Smith & Roberts, 1954; Stevenson, 1903; Textor, 1967; Weidkuhn, 1968; Whiting et al., 1967; Q.Wright, 1942;

Table of Primitive Peoples with Allegedly Mild, Low-Level and/or Ritualized Warfare

Name:

Location:

References:

Abipon

S-AM

Achomawi/Achumawi

N-AM

Ahtna Alayas Alorese

N-AM S-AM INDO

Alsea Aminas Apa Tani Apingi(*) Apono(*) Aranda

N-AM AFRI EURA AFRI AFRI AUST

Arapesh

N-GU

Araucanians Arikara Arunta Ashira(*) Athna/Ahtna Atsugewi Auetö(*) Aviira(*) Aymara Babine Bachigas Bageshu

S-AM N-AM AUST AFRI N-AM N-AM S-AM AFRI M-AM N-AM AFRI AFRI

Bagobo Baholoholo Bakaïri(*) Bakalai (part)(*)

PHIL AFRI S-AM AFRI

Balunda/Balonda Banyankole Barea

AFRI AFRI AFRI

Dobrizhoffer, 1784/1822; Fitz-Roy, 1839; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Holsti, 1913; Kelly, 2000; Molina, 1809; Otterbein, 1968, 1970; Ross, 1983; Q.Wright, 1942; Garth, 1953 et seq.; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Kroeber, 1925; O’Leary & Levinson, 1991; Olmsted & Stewart, 1978; Powers, 1877; Q.Wright, 1942; See: Athna Featherman, 1890; DuBois, 1944; LeBar, 1972; Numelin, 1950; Textor, 1967; Zenk, 1990; Featherman, 1885; Fuchs, 1973; von Fürer-Haimendorf, 1962 et seq.; Van der Bij, 1929; du Chaillu, 1867; Van der Bij, 1929; du Chaillu, 1867; Basedow, 1925; Eylmann, 1908; Fromm, 1974; Gillen, 1896; Howitt, 1904; Mathews, 1907; Murdock, 1934; Porteus, 1931; Schulze, 1891; Spencer & Gillen, 1899, 1904, 1927; Strehlow, 1910; Textor, 1967; Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1975; Fortune, 1939; Fromm, 1974; Mead, 1935 et seq.; Montagu, 1978; Rubel & Rosman, 1978; Textor, 1967; See: Abipon M.Johnson, 1992; Lowie, 1916; Turney-High, 1949; See: Aranda Van der Bij, 1929; du Chaillu, 1867; DeLaguna & McClellan, 1981; Kelly, 2000; See: Achomawi Van der Bij, 1929; Schmidt, 1904; Van der Bij, 1929; du Chaillu, 1867; Otterbein, 1968; Textor, 1967; Tschopik, 1946, 1951; See: Carrier Fromm, 1974; Mead, 1974; Davie, 1929; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Numelin, 1950; Otterbein, 1968, 1970; Roscoe, 1909, 1915; Q.Wright, 1942; See: Negritos Van der Bij, 1929; Numelin, 1950; Schmitz, 1912; Van der Bij, 1929; Schmidt, 1904; Van der Bij, 1929; du Chaillu, 1867; De Compiègne, 1875; See: Lunda Numelin, 1950; Roscoe, 1923; Stöhr, 1972; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Holsti, 1913; Munzinger, 1864;

Basoga Battle Mountain Bedouins

AFRI N-AM AFRI

Bella Coola/Bellacoola

N-AM

Bete Betundu(*) Bidais Atakapa

AFRI AFRI N-AM

Birhor

EURA

Bongo Boobies/Bubi Caddo Cahto

AFRI AFRI N-AM N-AM

Cahuilla Californians

N-AM N-AM

Carrier

N-AM

Cathlamet/Cathlamaws Chamorro Chapacura Chehalis Chelam Chenchu

N-AM OCEA S-AM N-AM N-AM EURA

Chickasaw Chilcotin/Chilkotin Chilula Chimariko Chinook

N-AM N-AM N-AM N-AM N-AM

Murdock, 1939; Wood, 1868; Q.Wright, 1942; Numelin, 1915; Roscoe, 1915; Q.Wright, 1942; See: Shoshone Burckhardt, 1830; Davie, 1929; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Munzinger, 1864; Numelin, 1950; Otterbein, 1968; Q.Wright, 1942; Boas, 1891, 1892; Ferguson, 1984; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Kelley, 2000; Kennedy & Bouchard, 1990; McIlwraith, 1948; Ross, 1983; Q.Wright, 1942; Balandier, 1986; Tefft, 1988; Van der Bij, 1929; Wissmann, 1886; Morfi, 1932; Newcomb, 1961; Sibley, 1832; Sjoberg, 1951; Adhikary, 1984; Bhattacharyya, 1953; Bonta, 1993; Dalton, 1872; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Montagu, 1978; Roy, 1925; Sarkar, 1990; Sen & Sen, 1955; Sinha, 1972; B.J. Williams, 1968; Q.Wright, 1942; See: Madi See: Pove Morfi, 1932; Newcomb, 1961; Essene, 1935, 1942; Kroeber, 1925 et seq.; Myers, 1978; Powers, 1877; See: Californians Bancroft, 1875; Bean, 1978; Bean & Smith, 1978; Van der Bij, 1929; Blackburn & Bean, 1978; Brandon, 1961; Davie, 1929; Driver, 1961; Elsasser, 1978; Featherman, 1881; Goldschmidt, 1978; Goldschmidt, Foster & Essene, 1939; Heizer & Whipple, 1960; Hester, 1978; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Holsti, 1913; James, 1960; Kroeber, 1925; McCorkle, 1978; Powers, 1877; Silver, 1978; G.Smith, 1930; Turney-High, 1949; Q.Wright, 1942; Bancroft, 1875; Boas, 1898; Cox, 1831; Ferguson, 1984; Hill-Tout, 1907; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Holsti, 1913; Jenness, 1932; Lane, 1981; McClellan & Denniston, 1981; McIlwraith, 1948; Morice, 1893; Tobey, 1981; Q.Wright, 1942; See: Columbians Featherman (1888); See: Chiquito See: Coast Salish See: Columbians Bahadur, 1977; von Fürer-Haimendorf, 1943; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Iyer, 1935; Textor, 1967; Q.Wright, 1942; Adair, 1775; Holsti, 1913; Steinmetz, 1907; See: Carrier See: Hupa See: Californians See: Columbians

Chipaya(*)

S-AM

Chipewyan/Chepewyan

N-AM

Chippewa Chiquito

N-AM S-AM

Chocktaw Choroti Chukchee

N-AM S-AM EURA

Chumash

N-AM

Clatsop Coast Yuki Columbians

N-AM N-AM N-AM

Copalis Cowlitz Cree Cuna Cupeño Curicuriary(*) Curuahé(*)

N-AM N-AM N-AM M-AM N-AM S-AM S-AM

D'Entrecasteaux Diegueño Diggers Diours Dogrib

OCEA N-AM N-AM AFRI N-AM

Van der Bij, 1929; Koch-Grünberg & Snethlage, 1910; Adalbert von Preussen, 1849; Bancroft, 1875; Van der Bij, 1929; Driver, 1961; Hearne, 1795; Hill-Tout, 1907; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Jenness, 1932; Ross, 1866; G.Smith, 1930; J.Smith, 1981; Textor, 1967; Q.Wright, 1942; See: Ojibwa Baraza, 1713; Van der Bij, 1929; De Castelnau, 1850; Dobrizhoffer, 1784/1822; D'Orbigny, 1829, 1835; Gibbon, 1852; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Markham, 1895, 1910; Métraux, 1948; d'Orbigny, 1825, 1839; Nieboer, 1910; von Spix & von Martius, 1823; Steward & Faron, 1959; Q.Wright, 1942; See: Chickasaw See: Kashihá Antropova & Kuznetsova, 1964; Van der Bij, 1929; Bogoraz, 1905 et seq.; Czaplicka, 1914; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Nordenskiöld, 1881; Textor, 1967; TurneyHigh, 1949; Q.Wright, 1942; Grant, 1978; Kroeber, 1925; Kroeber & Fontana, 1986; Powers, 1877; See: Columbians See: Californians Bancroft, 1875; Van der Bij, 1929; Boas, 1888 et seq.; Cox, 1831; Davie, 1929; Driver, 1961; Dunn, 1844; Featherman, 1889; Franchère, 1854; French & French, 1998; Hajda, 1987; Henry in Coues, 1897; Hill-Tout, 1905, 1907; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Holsti, 1913; Hunn & French, 1998; Ignace, 1998; Jorgensen, 1980; Keeley, 1996; Lahren, 1998; Lewis & Clark, 1814; McKenney & Hall, 1836; Miller, 1998; Minto, 1900; Murdock, 1938, 1965; Niblack, 1890; Nieboer, 1910; Numelin, 1950; O'Leary & Levinson, 1991; Otterbein, 1970; Palmer, 1998; Ray, 1936; Ross, 1855; Schuster, 1998; Scouler, 1848, 1905; Silverstein, 1990; G.Smith, 1930; Spier & Sapir, 1940; Teit, 1906, 1909, 1928, 1930; Q.Wright, 1942; Wyatt, 1998; See: Coast Salish See: Coast Salish See: Saulteaux Steward, 1948; Textor, 1967; See: Californians Van der Bij, 1929; Koch-Grünberg, 1921; Van der Bij, 1929; Koch-Grünberg & Snethlage, 1910; Adalbert von Preussen, 1849; Van der Bij, 1929; Thomson, 1908; See: Ipai and Tipai See: Paiute See: Kavirondo Helm, 1972, 1991;

Dor Dualla

AFRI AFRI

Dyoors Edeeyahs Ellice Islanders Enggano

AFRI AFRI OCEA OCEA

Entiat Entsy Esthonians (Early) Evenks/Evens Fan Fernandeño Flatheads Gallinomero Gazelle Peninsula(*)

N-AM EURA EURA EURA AFRI N-AM N-AM N-AM OCEA

Gebusi Geshu/Gisu Gonds

N-GU AFRI EURA

Gosiute Guentusé(*) Gula Hawaiians

N-AM S-AM AFRI OCEA

Hoquiam Hukundika Humphrey Islanders Humptulips Hupa

N-AM N-AM OCEA N-AM N-AM

Ifugao Ingalik

PHIL N-AM

Ipai and Tipai

N-AM

Juaneño Kabyles Kaibab Kalapuya Kamayura(*) Kamia Kara Karok

N-AM AFRI N-AM N-AM S-AM N-AM AFRI N-AM

See: Madi Van der Bij, 1929; Buchholz, 1880; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Kohler, 1902; Q.Wright, 1942; See: Kavirondo See: Pove See: Tokelau Van der Bij, 1929; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Kennedy, 1935; LeBar, 1972; Oudemans, 1889; von Rosenberg, 1878; Walland, 1864; Q.Wright, 1942; See: Columbians See: Samoyed Holsti, 1913; Weinberg, 1903; See: Tungus Lenz, 1878; Numelin, 1950; See: Californians See: Columbians See: Pomo Van der Bij, 1929; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Parkinson, 1887, 1907; Q.Wright, 1942; Dentan, 1992; Kelly, 2000; Knauft, 1985 et seq.; See: Bageshu Bahadur, 1977; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Textor, 1967; Q.Wright, 1942; See: Paiute De Azara, 1809; Van der Bij, 1929; See: Sara Ellis, 1827, 1830; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Holsti, 1913; Marcuse, 1894; Meinicke, 1875; Wood, 1870; Q.Wright, 1942; See: Coast Salish See: Shoshone See: Tokelau See: Coast Salish Kroeber, 1925; McCorkle, 1978; Powers, 1877; Sapir, 1927; Spott & Kroeber, 1942; Wallace, 1949, 1978; Q.Wright, 1942; Fromm, 1974; Mead, 1961; Hosley, 1991; Kelly, 1958, 2000; Osgood, 1958, 1959; Oswalt, 1962; Petroff, 1884; Snow, 1981; Zagoskin, 1967; Kroeber, 1925; Luomala, 1978; Luomala & Toffelmier, 1934; Shipek, 1991; Spier, 1925; See: Californians Hanoteau & Letourneux, 1893; Holsti, 1913; See: Paiute Gatschet, 1900; Holsti, 1913; Zenk, 1990; Van der Bij, 1929; Schmidt, 1904; See: Ipai and Tipai See: Sara Bright, 1978, 1991; Kroeber, 1904 et seq.; McCorkle,

Kaska

N-AM

Kato Kavirondo

N-AM AFRI

Kitanemuk Kofyar Kreish Kukatas Kumeyaay Kwakiutl

N-AM AFRI AFRI AUST N-AM N-AM

Lassik Lau Islanders Lendu Lesu Lillooet Loango tribes(*) Logo Loyalty Islanders

N-AM OCEA AFRI OCEA N-AM AFRI AFRI OCEA

Lugbara Luiseño Luluba Lunda

AFRI N-AM AFRI AFRI

Luo Madi

AFRI AFRI

Maidu

N-AM

Mainland Comox Makonde (part)(*) Malays

N-AM AFRI EURA

Malekula Mandan

OCEA N-AM

1978; Powers, 1877; Honigmann, 1946, 1954, 1981; Jennes, 1932; McClellan & Denniston, 1981; Textor, 1967; See: Cahto Van der Bij, 1929; Davie, 1929; Featherman, 1885; Johnston, 1902; Northcote, 1907; Numelin, 1950; Roscoe, 1915; See: Californians Netting, 1973 et seq.; See: Sara Holsti, 1913; Schürmann, 1879; See: Ipai & Tipai Boas, 1889 et seq.; Codere, 1950, 1961, 1990; Curtis, 1915; Ferguson, 1984; Hawthorn et al., 1958; HillTout, 1907; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Taylor & Duff, 1956; Textor, 1967; Q.Wright, 1942; See: Californians Textor, 1967; See: Madi Textor, 1967; See: Columbians Van der Bij, 1929; Pechuël-Lösche, 1874; See: Madi Van der Bij, 1929; Hadfield, 1920; Numelin, 1950; Textor, 1967; Turney-High, 1949; Wedgwood, 1930; Q.Wright, 1942; See: Madi See: Californians See: Madi Baumann, 1935; Featherman, 1885; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Numelin, 1950; Pogge, 1880; Schütt, 1881; Q.Wright, 1942; See: Kavirondo Felkin, 1884; McConnell, 1925; Middleton, 1955; Murdock, 1959; Nalder, 1937; Seligman & Seligman, 1932; Bancroft, 1875; Beals, 1933; Van der Bij, 1929; Davie, 1929; Dixon, 1905; Faye, 1923; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Hoebel, 1949; Jorgensen, 1980; Kroeber, 1925, 1929; Powers, 1874, 1877; Riddell, 1978; Wilson, 1957; Wilson & Towne, 1978; Q.Wright, 1942; See: Coast Salish Van der Bij, 1929; Livingstone, 1865; Brinton, 1886; Davie, 1929; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Holsti, 1913; Jähns, 1880; Junghuhn, 1847; Knocker, 1907; Numelin, 1950; Raffles, 1817; Ratzel, 1894; Sarasin & Sarasin, 1905; Skeat, 1902; Skeat & Blagden, 1906; Winstedt, 1950; Q.Wright, 1942; See: New Hebrides Van der Bij, 1929; Catlin, 1841; Davie, 1929;

Mandja

AFRI

Manobo Manus

PHIL N-GU

Manuvu Marquesas Islanders

PHIL OCEA

Masaba(*) Mataco

AFRI S-AM

Mattole Maya (Early)

N-AM M-AM

Medjertines Meru Methow Mishikhwutmetunne

AFRI AFRI N-AM N-AM

Mission Indians Mittu Miwok Modoc

N-AM AFRI N-AM N-AM

Monache/Monachi Montagnais-Naskapi Moru Mota

N-AM N-AM AFRI OCEA

Nahugua(*) Naskapi Navaho/Navajo

S-AM N-AM N-AM

Nduka Nespelem New Caledonia

AFRI N-AM OCEA

New Hebrides

OCEA

Newaukum

N-AM

Dellenbaugh, 1901; Dorsey, 1897; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Lewis & Clark, 1814; Schneider, 1991; Stammel, 1977; Q.Wright, 1942; Van der Bij, 1929; Gaud & Van Overbergh, 1911; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Q.Wright, 1942; See: Negritos Carrier, 1991; Fromm, 1974; Mead, 1930, 1961; Numelin, 1950; Turney-High, 1949; See: Negritos Hobhouse et al., 1915; Holsti, 1913; Meinicke, 1875; Numelin, 1950; Textor, 1967; Toutain, 1898; Q.Wright, 1942; Van der Bij, 1929; Johnston, 1902; D'Orbigny, 1835; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Métraux, 1946; Q.Wright, 1942; See: Californians Bancroft, 1875; Brinton, 1882; Clendinnen, 1987; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Holsti, 1913; Numelin, 1950; Q.Wright, 1942; Featherman, 1885; Fadiman, 1980; Tefft, 1988; See: Columbians Bakken, 1973; Beckham, 1971; Miller & Seaburg, 1990; See: Californians See: Madi See: Californians Hobhouse et al., 1915; Kroeber, 1925; Ray, 1963; Turney-High, 1949; Q.Wright, 1942; See: Yokuts See: Ojibwa See: Madi Codrington, 1881, 1891; Coombe, 1911; Rivers, 1914; Textor, 1967; Turney-High, 1949; Van der Bij, 1929; Schmidt, 1904; See: Ojibwa Bailey, 1966; Bancroft, 1875; Van der Bij, 1929; Davis, 1857; Driver, 1961; Forbes, 1960; Hill, 1936; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Mindeleff, 1898; Roessel, 1983; Sanday, 1986; Schoolcraft, 1851; Textor, 1967; Q.Wright, 1942; See: Sara See: Sanpoil and Columbians Atkinson, n.d.; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Holsti, 1913; Moncelon, n.d.; Rochas, 1862; De Vaux, 1883; Wedgwood, 1930; Q.Wright, 1942; Agostini, 1900; Van der Bij, 1929; Codrington, 1891; Deacon, 1934; Humphreys, 1926; Numelin, 1950; Wedgwood, 1930; J.Williams, n.d.; Q.Wright, 1942; See: Coast Salish

Nez Percé Ngama Nicobarese

N-AM AFRI EURA

Nisenan/Nishinan Nkole Nomlaki Nongatl Ojibwa

N-AM AFRI N-AM N-AM N-AM

Olando(*) Omaha

AFRI N-AM

Osage Otoro Ovambo Paiute

N-AM AFRI AFRI N-AM

Palouse Panamint Paressi/Parexi

N-AM N-AM S-AM

Patagonians Pekangekum Pentlatch (Puntlatch) Piaroa

S-AM N-AM N-AM S-AM

Pishquitpaw Polopa Pomo

N-AM N-GU N-AM

Ponca

N-AM

See: Columbians See: Sara Van der Bij, 1929; Featherman, 1887; Man, 1886; Nag, 1972; Q.Wright, 1942; see: Maidu See: Banyankole See: Californians See: Californians Anderson, 1985; Bigelow, 1969; Van der Bij, 1929; Bonta, 1993, 1997; Brine, 1894; Ember, 1978; Fromm, 1974; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Jenness, 1935; Leacock, 1969; Leechman, 1956; Lips, 1937, 1947; Mead, 1961; Reid, 1991; Ross, 1855; G.Smith, 1930; Speck, 1933, 1935; Spicer, 1980; Textor, 1967; Thwaites, 1897; Q.Wright, 1942; Van der Bij, 1929; du Chaillu, 1867; Dorsey, 1884a,b; Fletcher & LaFlesche, 1906; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Holsti, 1913; Howard, 1965; Numelin, 1950; Textor, 1967; Turney-High, 1949; Q.Wright, 1942; See: Omaha Nadel, 1947; White, 1989; Holsti, 1913; Otterbein, 1968; Ratzel, 1895; Bigelow, 1969; Chalfant, 1931; Ember, 1978; Fowler, 1991; Fremont, 1845; Heizer, 1970; Heizer & Hester, 1972; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Jorgensen, 1980; Keeley, 1996; Kelly & Fowler, 1986; Kroeber, 1925; O'Leary & Levinson, 1991; Ross, 1824; Service, 1968; G.Smith, 1930; Steward, 1933; Steward & Voegelin, 1974; Thomas et al., 1986; Whiting, 1950; Q.Wright, 1942; See: Columbians See: Shoshone Van der Bij, 1929; Chandless, 1863; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Lowie, 1948; Markham, 1895; Métraux, 1948; Schmidt, 1914; von den Steinen, 1894; Q.Wright, 1942; See: Abipon See: Ojibwa See: Coast Salish Bonta, 1993, 1997; Gaisford et al., 1978; Overing, 1975 et seq.; Overing & Kaplan, 1988; Zent, 1994; See: Columbians D.Brown, 1979; Tefft, 1988; Barrett, 1908; Bean & Theodoratus, 1978; Van der Bij, 1929; Ember, 1978; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Kroeber, 1902 et seq; Kunkel, 1962; Loeb, 1926; Powers, 1872, 1877; Spicer, 1980; Turney-High, 1949; Q.Wright, 1942; See: Omaha

Pove Pukapuka Queets Quinault Rio Envira(*) Rossel Islanders Roucoyennes

AFRI OCEA N-AM N-AM S-AM OCEA S-AM

Sahaptin Salish Samoyed

N-AM N-AM EURA

Sara Satsop Savage Islanders

AFRI N-AM OCEA

Sechelt/Seechelt Secwepemc Serrano Shasta/Shastika

N-AM N-AM N-AM N-AM

Shivwits Shoalwater Shoshone/Shoshoni

N-AM N-AM N-AM

Shuswap/Shushwap Siberians Sinkaietk Sinkyone Siwan Berbers Slavs (Early) Sokulk Solor Islanders

N-AM EURA N-AM N-AM AFRI EURA N-AM OCEA

Suaheli

AFRI

Suku Tacullies Talkotin Tallensi

AFRI N-AM N-AM AFRI

Featherman, 1885; Textor, 1967; See: Coast Salish See: Coast Salish Van der Bij, 1929; Stegelmann, 1903; Armstrong, 1928; Numelin, 1967; Turney-High, 1949; Van der Bij, 1929; Coudreau, 1893; Hobhouse et al., 1914; Q.Wright, 1942; See: Columbians See: Columbians Van der Bij, 1929; Czaplicka, 1914; Dolgikh, 1964; Featherman, 1881; Finsch, 1879; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Nordenskiöld, 1882; Popov, 1964; G.Smith, 1930; von Stenin, 1891; White, 1989; Q.Wright, 1942; Delafosse, 1897; Murdock, 1959; See: Coast Salish Davie, 1929; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Holsti, 1913; Thomson, 1901; Q.Wright, 1942; See: Coast Salish See: Columbians See: Californians Van der Bij, 1929; Dixon, 1907; Harrington, 1928; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Holt, 1946; Jorgensen, 1980; Kroeber, 1904 et seq.; Merriam, 1955; Powers, 1877; Silver, 1978; Q.Wright, 1942; See: Paiute See: Coast Salish Bancroft, 1875; Van der Bij, 1929; Catlin, 1841; Davie, 1929; Driver, 1961; Ember, 1978; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Hoffman, 1896; Holsti, 1913; Jorgensen, 1980; Keeley, 1996; Lewis & Clark, 1814; O'Leary & Levinson, 1991; Remy & Blanchley, n.d.; Steward, 1955; Steward & Voegelin, 1974; Thomas et al., 1986; Q.Wright, 1942; See: Columbians See: Samoyed See: Columbians See: Californians Textor, 1967; Holsti, 1913; Wilser, 1904; See: Columbians Arndt, 1940; Barnes, 1968, 1972; Dubois, 1941, 1944; Vatter, 1932; Van der Bij, 1929; Burton, 1860; Cameron, 1877; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Krapf, 1858; Nieboer, 1910; Niese, 1903; Thomson, 1881, 1885; Q.Wright, 1942; Kopytoff, 1961, 1965; White, 1989; See: Carrier See: Carrier Fortes, 1945; Numelin, 1950; Textor, 1967;

Tamul(*) Tanala Tanana Tasmanians

N-GU AFRI N-AM OCEA

Tataviam Theraka Thlingchadinne Timbira

N-AM AFRI N-AM S-AM

Tiruray

PHIL

Tiv Tokelau Islanders Tolowa Toltec (Early) Tonga Islanders

AFRI OCEA N-AM M-AM OCEA

Trio Trobriand Isl.

S-AM N-GU

Tubatulabal

N-AM

Tungus

EURA

Tuski Ualan

EURA OCEA

Udegey Umpqua Upper Coquille Vanatinai Vanyume Voltaic peoples Wadjoko(*)

EURA N-AM N-AM OCEA N-AM AFRI AFRI

Van der Bij, 1929; Vallentin, 1897; Linton, 1933; Textor, 1967; White, 1989; McKennan, 1981; Anderson (in Roth); Barnard, 1890; Van der Bij, 1929; La Billardière, 1800; Bonwick, 1870, 1884; Calder, 1874; Davie, 1929; Featherman, 1887; Fromm, 1974; Giblin, 1928; Hays & Levinson, 1991; Hobhouse, 1929; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Lord, 1921; Melville, 1847; Milligan, 1859; Montagu, 1974; Murdock, 1934; Numelin, 1950; Péron & Freycinet, 1807; De Quatrefages, 1884; Rhys Jones, 1974; Robinson, 1829; Roth, 1890, 1899; Scott, 1928; Thirkell, 1874; Turnbull, 1948; Tylor, 1894; West, 1852; Q.Wright, 1942; See: Californians Davie, 1929; Dundas, 1913; See: Dogrib Lowie, 1946; Newton, 1994; Otterbein, 1968; Textor, 1967; Kroeber, 1928; Moore, 1975; Schlegel, 1970; Tenorio, 1892; Wood, 1957; Otterbein, 1968; Textor, 1967; Holsti, 1913; Turner, 1884; See: Californians Clavigero, 1787; Holsti, 1913; Van der Bij, 1929; Dumont d'Urville, 1842; Featherman, 1888; Friederici, 1912; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Mariner, 1817; Meinicke, 1875; Nieboer, 1910; Numelin, 1950; Urbanowicz, 1991; West, 1865; Wood, 1868; Q.Wright, 1942; Van der Bij, 1929; Rivière, 1969, 1994; Van der Bij, 1929; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Malinowski, 1920; Numelin, 1950; Ross, 1985 et seq.; Seligman, 1910; Wedgwood, 1930; Q.Wright, 1942; Ember, 1978; Kroeber, 1907, 1925; McCorkle, 1978; O'Leary & Levinson, 1991; Powers, 1877; C.Smith, 1978; Voegelin, 1935, 1938; Hiekisch, 1879; Ivanov, Smolyak & Levin, 1964; Levin & Vasil'yev, 1964; Numelin, 1950; Vasilevich & Smolyak, 1964; See: Chukche Van der Bij, 1929; Featherman, 1888; Finch, 1880, 1899; Lesson, 1829; See: Tungus See: Mishikhwutmetunne See: Mishikhwutmetunne Lepowsky, 1994; See: Californians Murdock, 1959; Van der Bij, 1929; Stuhlmann, 1894;

Waganda Wailaki Waiwai/Wai-Wai Wambugwe

AFRI N-AM S-AM AFRI

Wangata(*) Wanigela Papuans

AFRI N-GU

Wanyaturu Wappo

AFRI N-AM

Warao Warega

S-AM AFRI

Washo/Washoe

N-AM

Wataturu

AFRI

Wawira(*)

AFRI

Wazaramo Wenatchee/Wenatchi Whilkut White Knife Wintu/Wintun

AFRI N-AM N-AM N-AM N-AM

Wishkah Wiyot

N-AM N-AM

Wogeo Woleaians Wolof Wynoochee Yapocoyes(*) Yami Yokuts

N-GU OCEA AFRI N-AM S-AM EURA N-AM

Yukaghir

EURA

Yurok

N-AM

Casati, 1891; Holsti, 1913; Speke, 1908; See: Californians Howard, 1994; Baumann, 1894; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Holsti, 1913; Numelin, 1950; Q.Wright, 1942; Van der Bij, 1929; Coquilhat, 1888; Davie, 1929; Guise, 1899; Holsti, 1913; Krieger, 1899; Seligman, 1910; See: Wambugwe Hobhouse et al., 1915; Kroeber, 1925; McCorkle, 1978; Powers, 1877; Sawyer, 1978; Q.Wright, 1942; See: Siriono Van der Bij, 1929; Delhaise & Van Overbergh, 1909; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Q.Wright, 1942; d’Azevedo, 1986, 1991; Downs, 1966; Kroeber, 1925; Lowie, 1939; Powers, 1876; Baumann, 1894; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Holsti, 1913; Q.Wright, 1942; Van der Bij, 1929; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Stuhlmann, 1894; Q.Wright, 1942; See: Suaheli See: Columbians See: Wiyot See: Shoshone DuBois, 1935; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Kroeber, 1925; LaPena, 1978; Powers, 1877; Silver, 1978; Q.Wright, 1942; See: Coast Salish Van der Bij, 1929; Curtis, 1907; Elsasser, 1978; Kroeber, 1925; Powers, 1877; Wallace, 1978; Hogbin, 1935 et seq.; Textor, 1967; See: Ifaluk Textor, 1967; Q.Wright, 1942; See: Coast Salish Van der Bij, 1929; Coudreau, 1893; De Beauclair, 1958; LeBar, 1975; Montagu, 1978; Van der Bij, 1929; Gayton, 1948; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Kelly, 2000; Kroeber, 1908, 1925; Latta, 1949; McCorkle, 1978; Otterbein, 1970; Powers, 1877; Reid, 1991; Ross, 1983; Spier, 1978; Wallace, 1978a,b; Q.Wright, 1942; Van der Bij, 1929; Czaplicka, 1914; Otterbein, 1968; Stepanova, Gurwich & Khramova, 1964; Textor, 1967; Hester, 1991; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Kelly, 2000; Kroeber, 1904 et seq.; Pilling, 1978; Ross, 1983; Textor, 1967; Turney-High, 1949; Q.Wright, 1942;

(*) Coded in Van der Bij (1929) as ’weinig oorlog’ (infrequent or low-level war)

NOTES Abipon (South America): "Amidst their cups and their songs they are bold as lions but in battle more cowardly than hares" (Dobrizhoffer, 1822). "Of the very warlike Abipones, Dobrizhoffer (1822) states that ’they always desire to conquer, but are never willing to die. They will curse a victory obtained at the expense of one of their countrymen’s lives. They abhor triumphal hymns if mingled with funeral lamentations, and would reject a victory accompanied by the sighs of one mourning widow or orphan’. If it comes to an open combat, it is commenced with the shooting of arrows, and subsequently they will come to close fighting with a spear. ’Neither then, however, will the plain be inundated with human blood. The savages have indeed great power in dealing blows, but they have still greater swiftness in eluding them. The whole combat is often confined to threats and vociferations... Terrified at the slaughter of a very few of their fellow soldiers, they desert their leader and escape how they can’. As regards the battles of the Araucanians, Molina (1809) says that ’they are generally unaccompanied with the fusion of blood’, and are confined to pillage alone. Among the Patagonians and the Fuegians, wars do not last very long. Warfare is desultory and on a very small scale (Fitz-Roy, 1839)" (Holsti, 1913). The Abipon are coded Frequent Attackers External War and Frequent Internal War by Otterbein (1968). Ross (1983; cf. Kelly, 2000) codes the Abipon as ’warlike’. See also: Fuegians. Aboriginals (Australia): Strehlow (1970) states of the Central Australian tribes: "Since the land rights of all tribal units... were believed to have been laid down for all time by the supernatural beings, no organized wars of aggression or territorial conquest were possible in Central Australia". Among the $XVWUDOLDQWULEDOXQLWVDQGWKHPDQ\WKRXVDQGVRIEDQGVRU KRUGHV LQWHUJURXS violence seldom exceeded the level of petty retaliation (e.g. Tindale, 1974). Davie (1929) states: "The native Australians are far from being a warlike race in spite of their frequent affrays. These arise chiefly over women and are settled bloodlessly... The natives of Victoria are reported as being by no means treacherous and bloodthirsty (Smyth, 1878)". The aboriginals "did not delight in violence for its own sake, or in inflicting harm or injury on others... territorial defence and territorial conquest were not salient issues in Aboriginal Australia" (Berndt, 1978). "The fight for territory is unknown" (Hartland, 1921); "Er is niet zoiets als een constante toestand van vijandschap" (Van der Bij, 1929); "When the time [of fighting] came the dispute was settled by single combat... This is the common course and issue of a tribal quarrel" (Fraser, 1892); Such single combats with the intent to settle the conflict, terminate hostilities, and to prevent extended feuding, have been called "juridical fights" (Wheeler, 1910), or "expiatory combat" (Hobhouse et al., 1915). All the Australian tribes are coded Social War by Wright (1942). Sources generally agree that "The Australians have no idea of conquest or battle. Their fights do not lead to slaughter or spoils or other consequences of victory" (Sumner, 1911; referring to Curr, 1886). "An exception to the absence of real warfare in Australia is the case, mentioned by Creed in 1878, of the Yaldaigan who almost exterminated the Gudan of Cape York" (Davie, 1929). "In Australia, battles properly speaking do not occur. The fights of the natives lead to neither slaughter not spoils and are devoid of the ordinary consequences which follow battles and victories in civilized countries. ’When one has been killed, both parties usually retire at once, and another battle may take place later. If nothing worse has happened then severe wounds, peace is made’ (Curr, 1886). An encounter rarely lasts more than half an hour. Fighting might even be classed among Australian amusements... The chief weapon used is the tongue, and insults are a preliminary to every battle (Foelsche, 1895; Parker, 1905)... Fights among the northern tribes of Central Australia generally consists of a series of single combats to which the participants are challenged individually... A few wounds are the only results (Spencer & Gillen, 1904). As a rule, fights in Central Australia are accompanied by much noise and little bloodshed... The same general method of fighting prevails throughout Victoria, where battles are often decided by champions from each side, the casualties being limited to wounds and an occasional death.

Frequently a war is concluded without any loss of life (Dawson, 1881; Smyth, 1878)" (Davie, 1929). Real war does not exist among the Australians "because they have no property that is worth pillaging; no tribe has anything to tempt the cupidity of another. They have no political organization, so there can be no war for power" (Sumner, 1911; Davie, 1929; cf. Curr, 1886; Wood, 1868; Smyth, 1878; Ratzel, 1896; Howitt, 1904; Frazer, 1910; Van der Bij, 1929). Rather unsubstantiated is the following claim: "Yet, though real war is unknown... almost every tribe is at feud with its neighbor. The cause of quarrel with them is almost invariably the possession of some territory" (Wood, 1870). "There are no examples of regularly organized warfare in Australia" (Wheeler, 1910; as quoted in Holsti, 1913). "There are no wars for territorial aggrandizement" (Elkin, 1938). "According to the prehistoric peace doctrine, Australian aborigines should have been living in peace before the Europeans arrived. Carleton Coon says they represent the survival, with very little change, of a cultural level found elsewhere between 70,000 and 100,000 years ago, and that they were not, and are not, peaceful. Russel Ward, however, describes them - under the heading ’Mild Aborigines’ - as the most primitive and peaceable peoples known to history" (Bigelow, 1969). The tribes coded as having expiatory combat by Hobhouse et al. (1915) include: Bangerang, Etecup, Euahlayi, Geawegal, Gringai, Kamilaroi, Koynup, Kurnai, Maryborough tribe(s), Milya Uppa, Narrinjerri, New South Wales tribes, Ngurla, Perth tribe(s), Port Darwin tribe(s), Port Lincoln tribe(s), Queensland tribes, Turbal, Victoria tribes, Waimbaio, Wayook, Western Australian tribes, Wotjobaluk, Wurunjerri, and Yuin. Achagua (South America): "The Achagua and Saliva fought mainly defensively against predatory tribes, such as the Carib, Caberre, and others" (Steward, 1948). "The Achagua were more often victims" (De Alba, 1948). The Chiricoa, Guahibo, and Carib tribes of the interior attacked them and took them as slaves; the Chibcha captured them for sacrificial victims; and the Spaniards made them the object of repeated attacks and depredations. Achomawi and Atsugewi (North America): The Modoc and Klamath raided the Achomawi (Achumawi) country for slaves. It is likely, says Kroeber (1925) that fear tempered their desire for vengeance, for they hardly ever retaliated. "The Achomawi reaction was usually not to respond in kind but to hide out until the raiders had given up and left for home" (Olmsted & Stewart, 1978). With the Atsugewi and Wintun to the southwest the Achomawi were friendly. The Atsugewi were friendly with the Achomawi, the northeastern Maidu and with most of the Yana (Kroeber, 1925). "The Atsugewi were normally on the best of terms with immediate neighbors and shared hunting and gathering resources... Groups of Atsugewi, Achumawi, Yana, and Maidu congregated for salmon on the Pit River or for acorns or roots in other areas. Such fraternization led to frequent intertribal marriages, an important factor in cementing intertribal bonds. Nonetheless, intertribal frictions and warfare might arise when shamans in one tribe were suspected of poisoning people in another. Though one retaliatory war excursion to the Sacramento River is recorded, rarely did Atsugewi war parties visit distant areas. There was no memory of an expedition into Modoc or Paiute territory in spite of almost endless provocation... The unmounted Atsugewi could offer little resistance" (Garth, 1965, 1978). In Wright’s (1942) list the Achumawi, under the name Pit River Indians, are coded Social War. See also: Californians. Aguitequedichaga (South America): "De Aguitequedichagas doen nooit iemand oorlog aan" (Van der Bij, 1929, referring to De Azara, 1809). Ainu (Japan): Peaceful refuge-people, coercively pacified (Batchelor, 1895, 1901; Murdock, 1934). Davie (1929) states: "When the Ainu... were at war with one another, all the men and women turned out to fight ’The women were left to fight their own sex, whilst the men fought with the men’" (Batchelor, 1895). And elsewhere: "Among the Ainu of Japan, night raids in which men were

murdered in their sleep, were frequently made by one town upon another. These internecine wars, together with the wars of extermination carried on by the Japanese against them, have greatly decreased the population" (Davie, 1929; referring to Batchelor, 1895). "Until their pacification by the Japanese, the Ainus seem to have been a warlike people. Petty conflicts between villages and districts, caused in the main by encroachments on hunting and fishing grounds, were common, and the Ainus fought sanguinary battles with the Oroks and Gilyaks of Sakhalin as well as with the Japanese... Thoroughly subdued [by the Japanese], the Ainus laid down their arms and have now lived in peace with their conquerors for several centuries" (Murdock, 1934). Textor (1967) coded the Ainu as a culture where bellicosity is moderate or negligible, where warfare is not prevalent, but where military glory is emphasized. The Ainu are coded Social War by Wright (1942), and PS/PE (Prisoners [i.e., war captives] Slain and Prisoners Enslaved) by Hobhouse et al. (1915). Fromm (1974) counts the Ainu as belonging to his ’Nondestructive-aggressive’ societies. Ross (1983; cf. Kelly, 2000) codes the Ainu as ’warlike’. Akasguy (North America). According to Stammel (1977), the Akasguy were a peaceful, nowextinct tribe living on the Brazos River in Texas. "Die letzten friedfertigen Akasguys wurden 1858 von Texas Rangern in einem 'Slachtfest' (laut Texas Ranger Big Foot Wallace) 'genüchlich abgemurkst'". Alayas (Arawakans from Haiti, Meso-America) "The Alayas lived in perfect harmony among themselves, and entertained for each other feelings of sincere friendship and attachment... they never waged war to increase the extent of their territorial possessions, although they never failed to defend their rights when their country was invaded by the bloodthirsty Caribs... When differences arose between different chiefs, which made war necessary as a means of adjustment, the affair was generally terminated without much effusion of blood" (Featherman, 1890). They were gradually enslaved and exterminated by the Spaniards. Algonquin (North America): The Algonquin (Algonkin) are mentioned by G. Elliot Smith (1930) in his list of peaceful peoples. In the 17th century, the Iroquois drove the Algonquin to the north and east away from the lower Ottawa and St.Lawrence rivers (Jenness, 1932). They carried on intermittent defensive warfare with the Iroquois (de Champlain, 1619; Day & Trigger, 1978; M.Johnson, 1992). The Quebec Algonquins are coded Political War by Wright (1942), which seems inappropiate. Allar (Eurasia): The Allar of India "have no bows and arrows nor spears" (Fuchs, 1973). Alorese (Indonesia): "In the island of Alor (an East Indian Island) warfare, DuBois (1944) states, when it was in vogue, was rarely on a large scale or of a very bloody nature. It was characterized more by treachery than by boldness" (Numelin, 1950). It consisted chiefly of family feuds over exchange transactions. The kinsmen of a man slain in a feud were formerly obliged to seek a head (DuBois, 1944; LeBar, 1972). Textor (1967) coded the Alorese as a culture where bellicosity is moderate or negligible and where military glory is negligibly emphasized. Alsea (North America): Grievances were customarily redressed through indemnities paid by the offending party. However, serious matters sometimes resulted in feuds (Zenk, 1990). The Tillamook raided the Alseans for slaves. Amahuaca (South America): The Amahuaca tried in vain to defend themselves against the Piro, Conibo and Shipibo, who enslaved them (Steward & Métraux, 1948). Aminas (Africa): Featherman (1885) states of this people (probably Gunda): "Their encounters are

not very bloody, for they never fight in an open field, and as soon a few of them are killed, the others save themselves by flight. They have neither order nor discipline when engaged in battle; they make but partial attacks, and always advance with their body bent, that the balls of the enmy may miss their aim". Amuesha/Amueixa (South America): Their warfare was largely defensive, and they had neither exo- nor endocannibalism (Steward & Métraux, 1948). Wise (1994) reports: "Linguistic, archaeological, and mythological evidence suggests that the Amuesha were later dominated by the Incas and were forced to work for them. The [highly egalitarian] Amuesha highly value peace; the ostracism that follows being known as an angry of stingy person is usually sufficient to keep most quarrels under control. There is always a certain amount of tension between affines, but open conflict is rare. Even when outsiders dispossess them of their land, the Amuesha will avoid a fight if at all possible. Homicide and theft were almost unknown in aboriginal times". Anasazi (North America): "[T]he initial stages of social consolidation and increased integration begin at approximately A.D. 1150 and develop in response to environmental variables. There is simply no evidence for any kind of conflict, competition or warfare at this time period. At 1250, however, an organizational transformation of the local political system with much greater consolidation of communities within the valley is directly associated with the appearance of warfare... At this point in the research, it is uncertain whether the people in neigboring valleys were raiding each other, as might be indicated by the wide 'no-man's-land' between Long House and Klethla, or if the Kayenta [Anasazi] were being subject to attack from outside groups such as the Mesa Verde in southern Colorado or the Cibola further to the south in Arizona" (Haas, 1990). Andamanese (Andaman Islands): The Andaman Islands were indigenously inhabited by thirteen named groups that each claimed a separate identity, posessed a distinctive language or dialect, and occupied a particular territory: Aka-Cari, Aka-Kora, Aka-Jeru, Aka-Bo, Aka-Kede, Aka-Kol, AkaPucikwar, Aka-Bea, Akar-Bale, Oko-Juwoi, Jarawa, Onge, and Sentinelese (Kelley, 2000: 77-80). The Andamanese were a very unwarlike people (Radcliffe-Brown, 1922; van der Bij, 1929). The Andamanese are coded Frequent Internal War and Infrequent Attackers in External War by Otterbein (1968), and Plunder by Otterbein (1970). They are coded Social War by Wright (1942). Hobhouse (1929) counts them among his peaceful peoples, as does Dentan (1992). Textor (1967) codes the Andamanese as a culture where bellicosity is moderate or negligible, where military glory is negligibly emphasized, and where warfare is not prevalent. Feuds between local groups and between tribes may result in bloodshed. After one or two small raids, however, a peace is normally made, mainly through the negotiations of women. Headhunting is unknown. Cannibalism, although imputed by early accounts, is not confirmed in the ethnographic literature (Man, 1883; RadcliffeBrown, 1922; Bonington, 1935; Nag, 1972). The early accounts provided by (Aka-)Bea informants indicate that traditionally the Bea and Jarawa fought whenever they encountered one another (Portman, 1899: 704, 712; Kelley, 2000: 88). "The Aka-Bea and Jarawa were inveterate enemies. Whenever two parties of them met by chance, or came into the neighborhood of one another, the larger party would attack the other (Radcliffe-Brown, 1964: 86). Spontaneous attacks and opportunistic ambushes were not the only form of armed conflict between these two tribes. There were also at least some preplanned raids by the Jarawa on the Bea (and vice versa) (Kelly, 2000: 91). Radcliffe-Brown found that from 1872 to 1902 inclusive the Jarawa made eight attacks on camps of Friendly Andamanese (Aka-Bea) in which two Friendly Andaman men and one girl were killed, three men and one boy wounded, and, in addition, there were two or three chance meetings in which killings occurred, but apparently the total war and feud casualties in thirty years could be counted on the fingers of one hand. "Such a thing as fighting on a large scale seems to have been unknown amongst the Andamanese. In the early days of the Penal Settlement of Port Blair, the

natives of the South Andaman combined in large numbers to make an attack on the Settlement, but this seems to have been an unusual course of action in order to meet what was to them an altogether unusual contingency, their territory having been invaded by a large force of foreigners. Their only fights amongst themselves seem to have been the brief and far from bloody skirmishes described above, where only a handful of warriors were engaged in each side and rarely more than one or two were killed. Of such a thing as war in which the whole of one tribe joined to fight with another tribe I could not find any evidence in what the natives were able to tell me of their former customs" (Radcliffe-Brown, 1922). The Onge groups avoided disputes over territory by a common understanding of their territorial boundaries (Cipriani, 1966). Portman (1899: 26) notes that fights sometimes occurred between coastal and forest-dwelling bands of the same tribe, despite intermarriage. Radcliffe-Brown (1964: 85) provides a concise description of Andamanese ’warfare’: "It does not seem that there was ever such a thing as a stand-up fight between two parties. The whole art of fighting was to come upon your enemies, kill one or two of them and then retreat". Q.Wright (1942: 569) estimates an annual average loss of less than 0.02 percent of the population, and Kelly (2000: 145) suggests a rate of 0.04 percent for the Bea, with 5/6 of this mortality being among males. Kelly characterizes Andamanese warfare as essentially wars of attrition. Each side is able to inflict not only casualties but also hardship on the other, by impairing their access to needed subsistence resources, but neither side is able to achieve dramatic territorial gains (in uncontested access) at the other’s expense through a decisive victory. In other words, the outcome of the war of attrition is a stalemate. Apa Tani (Eurasia): The Apa Tanis of India had sporadic feuds and occasional revenge raiding against Daflas and Miris (von Fürer-Haimendorf, 1982). They suffered especially from Dafla aggression (Fuchs, 1973). Apinayé (South America): "Except for the Apinayé, the Timbira were warlike" (Lowie, 1948). Aradhya (Eurasia): The Aradhya of India are "a peace-loving community" (Iyer, 1935). Arafuras (New Guinea): "The Papuan Arafuras, who live in peace and brotherly love with one another" (Farrer, 1880). A statement endorsed by Spencer (1876), but doubted by Van der Bij (1929). "To the Arafuras are ascribed no warlike qualities whatsoever (Kolff, 1840)" (Holsti, 1913). Aranda/Arunta (Australia): Murdock (1934) gives the following account of blood revenge of the Aranda (Aranta, Arunta) of Central Australia (based on Spencer & Gillen, 1904): "They may accomplish the actual deed by stealth, or they may advance openly against the enemy in battle array. In the latter case, nothing more than a battle of vituperation may result. Often, however, after a conference between the elders, the victim is treacherously slain with the connivance of his fellows. If the criminal is a member of the group, a party from a neigboring group may be called in to execute the murderer. The members of a successful avenging party disguise themselves against the ghost of the murdered man by painting themselves with charcoal and wearing green twigs on their heads and in their noses. Even blood-revenge, therefore, rarely leads to actual fighting". He further notes that "Relations between groups, even of different tribes, are almost equally amicable. No such thing as a chronic state of hostility exists". Textor (1967) codes the Aranda as a culture where bellicosity is moderate or negligible, where military glory is negligibly emphasized, and where warfare is not prevalent. Fromm (1974) counts the Aranda as belonging to his 'Life-affirmative' societies. See also: Aborigines. Arapesh (New Guinea): Though Mead (1935, 1947) indicates that "actual warfare... is absent", brawls and clashes between villages do occur, mainly over (abduction of) women (Fortune, 1939;

Rubel & Rosman, 1978). Textor (1967) codes the Arapesh as a culture where bellicosity is moderate or negligible and where military glory is negligibly emphasized. "Von den angeblich nicht kriegerischen Arapesh weiß man mittlerweile daß sie Kriege führen (Fortune, 1939)" (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1975). Fromm (1974) counts the Arapesh as belonging to his 'Life-affirmative' societies. Arawak (South America): 'Arawak' is a generic term comprising many hundreds of tribal units. Columbus wrote in his journal about the Arawak of the Bahamas: "These people are totally ignorant of the martial arts". Some Arawakan tribes practiced revenge raiding (Koch-Grünberg, 1921; Van der Bij, 1929), and revenge cannibalism: "Originally, the Arawakan tribes of the West Indies and the Guianas seem not to have been cannibals, but some tribes may have adopted the practice as a form of revenge against their Carib enemies. The Arawak of Puerto Rico are said to have treated their Carib captives as they themselves were treated. A Dutch author of the 17th century has given an eyewitness account of the treatment inflicted by Arawak on some Carib prisoners... According to Gumilla (1791), the Arawakan Caberre of the Orinoco River feasted on the corpses of their hereditary enemies, the Carib" (Métraux, 1949). "Bloody feuds mark the relationships between the Panoan and Arawakan tribes of the Madre de Dios and Jurua Basin. The Tucano and Arawakan tribes of the Yapura and the Uaupés River attack the so-called Macu and subjugate those whom they do not kill" (Métraux, 1949). On the other hand, Rouse (1948) reports that the Arawakan tribes of Cuba, Jamaica, and the Bahamas were most peaceful. The Antillean Arawak were on the whole rather peaceful. They fought defensively against the marauding Carib (Steward & Faron, 1959). The Ciboney, one of the Arawakan tribes of Cuba, and the Lucayo of Jamaica were very peaceful (Rouse, 1948). The Taino of Hispaniola "were a relatively peaceful people who had little success in defending themselves against Carib raids" (Rouse, 1948). The Puerto Rican Arawak were more warlike than the other Taino perhaps because of greater exposure to Carib raids (Rouse, 1948). Arhuaco (South America): 'Arhuaco' (Aurohuacos) is a collective name for the Chibchan-speaking tribes of the Sierra Nevada, Colombia. Nicholas (1901) states that they have no weapons of offense or defense (in Davie, 1929). Davie adds: "Nothing is said of the relation of the Aurohuacos to other groups. Their lack of weapons, however, would argue that they are unused to war. This is possibly a case of cultural degeneration". The Arhuaco were erroneously referred to as "Arawak of Colombia" in my former list (Van der Dennen, 1992). Arikara (North America): "The Arikara were a rather peaceful group of farmers on the margins of the Plains" (Turney-High, 1949; Lowie, 1915). However, M.Johnson (1992) says that they were often on unfriendly terms with the Mandan, Hidatsa and surrounding Sioux. Aru Islanders (Indonesia): The Aru Islanders were claimed by G. Elliot Smith (1930) to be peaceful. Von Rosenberg (1878) and Van der Bij (1929), however, reported pitched battles. The Arunese are coded PS by Hobhouse et al. (1915). If peaceful, they would have been very exceptional among the headhunting Moluccan peoples. Arupai (South America): Nimuendaju (1948) calls them "peaceable". The evidence is, however, contradictory and inconclusive. Athna (North America): "Disputes between Lower and Upper Athna [Ahtna, Athena] were sometimes called wars but, like quarrels between bands of the same division, were more apt to be settled by discussions and payments than by fighting" (DeLaguna & McClellan, 1981). The Chugash Eskimos timed their pillaging of Ahtna riverine settlements, and the looting and destruction of their fish caches, at the time the Ahtna were away hunting in the mountains. This untenable situation prompted the Ahtna to unite on a sufficient scale to carry out effective

countermeasures. "After several such [Chugash] raids, the Ahtna claim to have slaughtered the Chugash on Mummy Island in Price William Sound, thus ending the Eskimo attacks and justifying the composition of several victory songs. Although these raids occurred some time in the nineteenth century, the two people remained unfriendly in the mid-twentieth" (DeLaguna & McClellan, 1981: 642-43; Kelley, 2000: 70-71). Attikamek (North America): The Attikamek (Attikamègues, Tête de Boule) are described in the Jesuit Relations (Thwaites, 1897) as "simple, kind, candid and peaceful" (quoted in Van der Bij, 1929). "The Attikamègue were reputed to be essentially peaceful. Only with the Iroquois, beginning at least by 1636, were hostilities constant" (McNulty & Gilbert, 1981). Warfare mainly defensive against Iroquois raiding. Aymara (Meso-America): Textor (1967) codes the Aymara as a culture where bellicosity is moderate or negligible and where military glory is negligibly emphasized. In contrast, Tschopik (1946, 1951) states that the Aymara, prior to Inca domination, were divided into a number of independent warring states, the most powerful of which were the Colla and the Lupaca. Raids were undertaken chiefly for loot and slaves, while war captives were roasted and eaten in the field. Otterbein (1968) codes the Aymara as Continual Internal War and Frequent Attackers External War. Textor probably refers to contemporary Aymara. Bageshu (Africa): "The tactics of the Bageshu [Geshu, Gisu] are very similar [to those of the Bahima]. 'Every now and again some one breaks out singly and rushes upon the foe. Sometimes two men may rush out to be met by a couple of the opposing army; it thus becomes a series of hand-tohand fights, whilst the bulk of the army stands and looks on. When one or two have been killed and several wounded the battle ends' (Roscoe, 1909)" (Davie, 1929). "Among the Bageshu, also a Bantu tribe in Uganda, there is war only on rare occasions. They prefer to retreat to the safety of the mountains rather than make a stand" (Numelin, 1950). They are coded Infrequent Attackers External War and Frequent Internal War by Otterbein (1968), with plunder as main motive (Otterbein, 1970). Bahima (Africa): "The Bahima [Hima, Encole] are also spoken of as a peaceful people. 'They seldom make war upon other tribes; their chief object in life is to live quietly with their cattle. Nevertheless they have ever to be on the defensive, for other tribes have always looked upon their vast herds of cattle with jealous eyes' (Davie, 1929, quoting Roscoe, 1907). The Bahima have no organization in battle. "The men stand together in an unruly mass, now and again one man rushes out from the main body to shoot an arrow or throw a spear, and having done this he hastily retires into the main body again. When a rush is made it is done by the whole body; should the rush be successful the battle may be decided in one attack; should the foe resist, the attacking party must fall back and resort to other tactics. In such battles the loss of life is never great, ten or twelve casualties being considered a heavy loss" (Davie, 1929; quoting Roscoe, 1907). However, elsewhere Davie quotes Johnston (1902): "In their internecine wars the Hima aristocracy must have destroyed during the last fifty years a quarter of a million people according to native accounts". The Bahima are coded No War by Hobhouse et al. (1915), and Social War by Wright (1942). The evidence is confusing, to say the least. Baholoholo (Africa): "De Baholoholo [Holoholo] zouden volgens Schmitz (1912) in voortdurende vriendschappelijke betrekking staan tot alle min of meer verwante buurstammen terwijl zij bovendien met de niet verwante Babudja in het N.W. 'en bonne intelligence' leven... maar ook: 'Les Baholoholo sont batailleurs et leurs voisins aussi, guerroyer est une fête pour eux'" (Van der Bij, 1929). The evidence is contradictory.

Baiga (Eurasia): The Baiga of Central India are mentioned by Montagu (1994) as a peaceful people. The Binjhwari are similarly described as a quiet, unwarlike people. The ’Bygas’ are coded Social War in Wright’s (1942) list. Bajau Laut (Philippines): "The Bajau Laut view themselves as a peaceful, nonviolent people. Despite a system of protective alliances, they were frequently harried in the past by their more powerful neighbors. Their response was generally flight and most present-day communities have moved repeatedly" (Sather, 1977). According to Featherman (1887), "The Orang Bajows are timid, live peaceably together, are very honest, industrious and docile". Bakonjo (Africa): "The Bakonjo [Konjo] are not a warlike people... The Bakonjo for centuries have been raided and robbed by the Banyoro people of Unyoro, Toro and Ankole" (Johnston, 1902; quoted in Holsti, 1913; and Van der Bij, 1929). We are not told whether and how they resisted these raids. Banyankole (Africa): The Banyankole (Nkole) are "Not a warlike people" (Numelin, 1950; referring to Roscoe, 1923). Also Stöhr (1972) calls them peaceful. Numelin adds that the same is true of the Ba-Mbala [Bambala, Mbala] and Ba-Yaka [Bayaka, Yaka], studied by Torday & Joyce (1905, 1906). I could not, however, confirm this latter assertion. Banyoro (Africa): "The Banyoro [Nyoro], also a Bantu tribe in Uganda, investigated by Roscoe (1915), have not for years been an aggressive people; they have in reality no conception of other than defensive war" (Numelin, 1950). The Banyoro were coded Economic War by Wright (1942), and, according to other sources, they raided the Konjo for centuries. Bara (South America): Koch-Grünberg (1921) states of the Bara, a small, agricultural tribelet, that they were "shy, nonaggressive and peaceful" (quoted in Van der Bij, 1929). Barea (Africa): The Barea are described as peaceable by Munzinger (1864), but as "inborn marauders" by Wood (1868). "Complete internal peace certainly did not prevail, for local chiefs often raided one another for cattle. It is nevertheless clear that when such depredations became excessive the king intervened" (Murdock, 1959). The Barea are coded Economic War by Wright (1942), although this probably refers to their internal affairs. "According to Munzinger (1864), among the natives in North-Eastern Africa most of the agricultural tribes are peaceable. Thus e.g. among the Barea we do not find enmity and deeds of blood between families, or between tribes, though they are common enough in North Abyssinia" (Holsti, 1913). On African warfare in general, Paulitschke (1893) writes: "War among African tribes is generally not very bloody and the loss is relatively slight". Similarly, Westermann (1940) remarks: "Die Kriege afrikanischer Stämme kosteten in der Regel wenig Menschenleben, zu einem wirklichen Schaden wurden auch sie erst, als sie oft von Weissen hervorgerufen oder dort gefördert dem Menschenfang dienten". Such statements should be kept in mind when consulting Davie (1929) - who regarded the Negro as the most warlike 'race' - on African warfare. Furthermore, as Numelin (1950) points out, pastoralism was a relatively late development in Africa, cattle-raiding (the predominant war motive in Davie) must thus equally have been a rather recent development. Finally, it should be emphasized that among many African peoples, like the Galla (Oromo), the 'military spirit' appears to have grown pari passu with the spread of Islam, and the demand for slaves by the colonial powers. Thus, cattle-raiding as well as slave-hunting were both late developments and do not prove some kind of 'primal belligerence' as Davie seems to envisage.

Basoga (Africa): "The Basoga [Soga] also are described by the same authority [Roscoe, 1915] as a peaceable people, who never have any prolonged wars of a serious nature" (Numelin, 1950). The Basoga Batamba are coded Economic War by Wright (1942). Bayeiye (Africa): Livingstone (1857) states of the Bayeiye (Yeiye, Yeye) or Bakoba (Koba - not to be confused with Bakuba or Kuba) that "They have never been known to fight... and, indeed, have a tradition that their forefathers in their first essays at war made their bows of the Palma-Christi; and, when these broke, they gave up fighting altogether. They have invariably submitted to the rule of every horde which has overrun the countries adjacent to the rivers on which they specially love to dwell... A long time after the period of our visit, the chief of the Lake, thinking to make soldiers of them, took the trouble to furnish them with shields. ’Ah! we never had these before; that is the reason we have always succumbed, Now we will fight!’. But a marauding party came from the Makololo and our ’Friends’ at once paddled quickly, night and day, down the Zouga, never daring to look behind them till they reached the end of the river" (quoted in Van der Bij, 1929). Bedouins (Africa): "Among the Bedouins, although it is true that a tribe seldom enjoys a moment of peace with all its neighbors, war between two tribes is scarcely ever of long duration, and comparatively few combatants are killed... The dread of blood revenge is so great that it prevents many sanguinary conflicts" (Davie, 1929; referring to Burckhardt, 1830). "The Bedouin mode of fighting consists principally of single combat" (Numelin, 1950). The Bedouins are coded Continual Internal War by Otterbein (1968). Bella Coola (North America): "Most Bella Coola fighting was defensive, and they were rather inept when pressed to offensive actions. Two attempts to punish Tsimshian slave raiders were disorganized disasters that cost the Bella Coola many lives and further emboldened the raiders... On occasion, they even put themselves under military command of the Bella Bella" (Ferguson, 1984; referring to McIlwraith, 1948). The Bella Coola are coded Social War by Wright (1942), and PS/PE by Hobhouse et al. (1915). Kennedy & Bouchard (1990) state: "The Bella Coola did intermarry and trade with the Carrier and the Chilcotin, as well as with the Bella Bella, yet they have had ’wars’ with all these groups... McIlwraith (1948) noted that for the Bella Coola people, ’war was secondary in importance to ceremonial rites’. He added that peace reigned during the winter, and members of groups who were hostile to the Bella Coola were even received as guests at some dances. Although such enemies might be subjected to insult at potlatches, seldom was there actual violence offered either to envoys or guests. The lack of centralized authority among the Bella Coola often made retaliation difficult, and raiding parties frequently deserted their task when the fighting was not going in their favor. Sometimes a war party leader was chosen by popular opinion, but not even a chief could compel anyone, other than his own slaves, to fight... Bella Coola raiding parties traveled in canoes... Attacks were made at dawn; women and children were taken as slaves, but all the men were killed. Before leaving, the raiding party looted and burned the village. When the successful raiding party got within sight of its home village, the captain of each canoe sang a victory song (McIlwraith, 1948). Probably the last ’war’ in which the Bella Coola participated was with the Kwakiutl in the late 1850s (Boas, 1892, 1897)". Benecki (Africa): "Over de Benecki hebben wij het bericht van Wissmann (1889) dat zij een vreedzaam landbouwvolk vormden, welks welvaart door de slavenjachten in enkele jaren werd verwoest, waarbij ’die tapfersten, die sich des Raubes wehrten, getötet wurden'" (Van der Bij, 1929). I was unable to find any other reference to this people. Beothuc (North America): The Beothuc (Beothuk) are mentioned by G. Elliot Smith (1930) in his list of peaceful peoples. Reynolds (1978), however, states: "A traditional enmity existed between

the Beothuks [of Newfoundland] and the Labrador Eskimos, the Beothuks having a particular dislike for Eskimos and deriding them as ’the fourpaws’. Fighting is reported to have occurred between the two, particularly along the east coast (Cartwright, 1826). By the Indian immigrants from the mainland - the Abenakis and Micmacs from the west and the Montagnais from the north the Beothuks were respected for their fighting abilities. Their relationship with the Montagnais, with whom they traded for stone axes and other implements, was particularly friendly. The groups visited each other, and it is thought that the last few surviving Beothuks [they were exterminated by Micmacs and whites] may have joined the Montagnais in Labrador (Jukes, 1842)". Bete (Africa): The Bete of the Western Ivory Coast regulated fighting between villages in order to prevent warfare escalation (Balandier, 1986; Tefft, 1988). Bidais (North America): According to Newcomb (1961), the Bidais Atakapa of Texas were described as honest and peaceful by Sibley (1832). Fray Morfi (1932) stated of the Atakapa generally: "The nation is not very populous, and it is very cowardly. They only use their arms against wild beasts and those who are so unfortunate as to be shipwrecked on their shores". Birhor (India): Montagu (1978) mentions the Birhor as one of the societies notable for their unaggressiveness. The Birhor are honest, peaceful people who never become involved in crimes, seldom fight among themselves, and avoid conflicts with the neighboring agricultural villages (Adhikary, 1984; Bhattacharyya, 1953; Bonta, 1993; Sinha, 1972). On the other hand, the Birhor are coded Social War by Wright (1942), and CA (Cannibalism) by Hobhouse et al. (1915), referring to Dalton (1872). Bisaya (Borneo): "The Bisaya tended to engage in defensive rather than offensive warfare... During the 19th century there were periodic skirmishes with the Tabun and later the Kayan, who were very much feared... The Bisaya did not develop any war leaders... The Bisaya have no tradition of headhunting" (Peranio, 1976). Bodo (Eurasia): "The amiable Bodo, said to be wholly unmilitary" (Spencer, 1876). "The Bodo and Dhimal are peaceful agriculturists (Hodgson, 1850)" (Holsti, 1913). The Paliyan of South India (possibly the same as Bodo) are also mentioned by Dentan (1992) as a peaceable people. The Paliyans assert an explicit code of nonviolence, and they place a strong prohibition on competition and all signs of overt aggression (Gardner, 1966 et seq.; Bonta, 1993 et seq.). Boma (Africa): The Boma are described as "gentle and inoffensive" (Johnston, 1884; as quoted by Van der Bij, 1929). Bonthuks (Eurasia): The Bonthuks are coded Defensive War in Wright’s (1942) list. I was unable to find more information on this people. Boran (Africa): "The five tribes in Jubaland in British East Africa, Boran, Sakuju, Gubbra, Ajuran and Gurreh are bound together by treaties of friendship which are furthermore ratified by intermarriages" (Numelin, 1950; referring to Aylmer, 1911). Bunlap (Pentecost Islanders): White (1989) states that in the Lane manuscript there is no mention of internal or any other type of warfare. Caddo (North America): Precolumbian Caddo culture was not oriented around warfare and the warrior hero (Newcomb, 1961). Their largely ceremonial warfare was not particularly lethal. "Flight

at the sight of an enemy is not a dishonor" (Morfi, 1932). Following European contact, however, the reasons which spurred the Caddoes to war were considerably altered. Cahto/Kato (North America): "Although warfare on a large scale was rare, murder or trespassing frequently led to brief conflicts among the Cahto and Sinkyone, Yuki, Huchnom, Wailaki, or nothern Pomo... At the end of the war, payment was made for those killed on both sides... Mortalities were usually low" (Myers, 1978). Kroeber (1925) states that a series of petty hostilities between certain of the Kato and the Yuki shortly before the coming of the Americans had been recorded from a Yuki source. See also: Californians. Cahuapana (South America): "The Cahuapanan tribes of the Montaña (Cahuapana, Concho, Chébero, Chayawita, Yamorai, Munichi, Pampadoque, Cingacushusca) were remarkably peaceful in late historic times... But warfare must once have been of some importance for the Munichi formerly protected their villages... and the Chébero practiced cannibalism" (Steward & Métraux, 1948). Californians (North America): "Among the Central Californians, battles, though frequent, were not attended with much loss of life. 'Each side was anxious for the fight to be over, and the first blood would often terminate the contest'. Their method of warfare was not conducive to great slaughter, for is is said that among some tribes 'children are sent by mutual arrangement into the enemy's ranks during the heat of the battle to pick up the fallen arrows and carry them back to their owners to be used again' (Bancroft, 1875)" (Davie, 1929). "The California area was marked by peoples of simple cultures, small social groups, and great social isolation. Only one California group, the Modoc, had any success against the white man. Most of them were peaceful and were ruthlessly enserfed and slaughtered, the first by the Spanish, the second by the Americans. Tactically they were as incompetent as anything America could show, although Kroeber (1923) hints that the Maidu formed a line for fighting... Most Californians were too cowardly to make fighting men" (Turney-High, 1949). On the whole, Driver (1961) says, "the Indians of California were among the most mild-tempered and peace-loving on the entire North American continent". Also the practice of paying indemnities after a fight curbed the intensity and extent of lethal conflict (McCorkle, 1978). Elsasser (1978) states: "In general, the southern Athapaskans [Mattole, Nongatl, Sinkyone, Lassik, and Wailaki] were not particularly warlike; they seem to have fought among themselves but not much with outsiders. The Bear River and Mattole fights with the Wiyot are an exception to this". Among these peoples compensation was observed. Other unfortunate Californian peoples, such as the Lake Miwok, the Yana, and the Chimariko were slaughtered by the whites. Kroeber (1925) concludes in his famous monograph on the Californians: "Warfare throughout California was carried on only for revenge, never for plunder or from a desire for distinction. The Mohave and Yuma must, indeed, be excepted from this statement, but their attitude is entirely unique. Perhaps the cause that most commonly originated feuds was a belief that a death had been caused by witchcraft". The Wailaki "fought the Yuki, at least along the Eel River, but also married among them and intruded their customs. Not long before 1850 the two tribes united and engaged in a bitter quarrel with the Kato. Before this, the Wailaki seem to have been on good terms with the Kato and their friend the Coast Yuki" (Kroeber, 1925). "The Coast Yuki were friendly with all their neighbors: the northern Pomo, Huchnom, Kato, and Sinkyone. These various neighbors, however, were often hostile to their neighbors beyond, and this to some extent involved the Coast Yuki into warfare, though at long range and probably with no serious losses" (Kroeber, 1925). "The Juaneño never waged war for conquest, but for revenge... Theft, a slight to a chief, the seizure of a woman, and perhaps also the conviction that witchcraft had been practiced, were causes" (Kroeber, 1925). About the Sinkyone Kroeber merely says that feuds and wars were closed only on payment for every life lost. The only martial exploit of the Lassik seems to have been the ambush and killing of some Chilula around 1850 (Kroeber, 1925). "The Kitanemuk relationship with the Yokuts and Tataviam was one of enmity, while an amity

relationship seems to have linked the Kitanemuk with the Chumash and Tubatulabal in a complex trading and ritual alliance. In addition, the Mohave and Quechan [Yuma] visited frequently for trading purposes. Intermarriage seems to have occurred with all groups" (Blackburn & Bean, 1978). The Vanyume differed from the Serrano proper in enjoying friendly relations with the Mohave and Chemehuevi, who were enemies of the Serrano (Kroeber, 1925; Bean & Smith, 1978). "Disputes among the Cahuilla were usually over economic resources because of poaching or trespassing or because a lineage failed to fulfill its responsibility in the reciprocal ritual system. Sorcery against another lineage, personal insults, kidnapping of women, nonpayment of bride price, and theft were other reasons for going to war, but armed conflict was attempted only when all other efforts failed (Bean, 1978). Kroeber (1925) reports of the Chimariko: "Since known to the Americans, the Chimariko have been hostile to the Hupa downstream, but friendly with the upriver Wintun". "Indications of status are found in statements that compensation for injury or death in war or a dispute was paid according to wealth" (Silver, 1978). "Esselens were described by the Spanish as friendly and generous people... After 20 years of mission life the Esselen apparently existed in a degraded state" (Hester, 1978). Around 1820 Esselen culture had completely disappeared. Among the Nomlaki "The cause of war was usually transgression of property rights or occasionally a murder growing out of a dispute over a woman. There was no clearly demarcated warrior class... not all men engaged in warfare... While warfare took place among the Nomlaki villages and especially between the Hill and river-dwelling Nomlaki, their major enemy was the Yuki of Round Valley" (Goldschmidt, 1978; Goldschmidt, Foster & Essene, 1939). The Yurok are coded Defensive War by Wright (1942). The Isthmians, Jupa (Hupa), Karok, Kelta (Hupa), Kombo (Yana), Lassiks, Luiseños, Lower Californians, Miwok, Nishinan, Patwin, Pomo, Shastika, Southern Californians, Tolowa, Wappo, Wintun, Yokuts and Yuki are coded Social War by Wright (1942). The Kombo, Lassiks, Nishinan, Patwin, Pomo, Southern Californians, and Yuki are coded PS; the Tolowa and Yokuts are coded PA (Prisoners [i.e., war captives] Adopted); the Southern Californians and Yokuts are also coded PE; and the Wintun are coded No War by Hobhouse et al. (1915). Canamari (South America): "A tribe of the Rivers Jurua and Purus. Serafim says that they are cannibals and are met with in the upper part of the Purus, and that they are constantly attacking the villages of Cocoma Indians there. But Manuel Urbino [Urbano] found the Canamaris on the Hyuacu and affluent of the Purus peaceful and agricultural..." (Markham, 1895, 1910). Apparently a peaceful branch or subdivision, or possible confusion because actually three different tribes have the same name: the Arawakan Canamari, the Panoan Canamari, and the Catukinan Canamari. Candoshi (Murato) (South America) Interfamily blood feuds were the predominant cause of warfare. In avenging a relative's death, a chief and his followers killed all the males of a community and captured the females. By the 1930s the Candoshi were continually at war among themselves and with the Ashuar and Huambisas (neighboring Jivaroan groups). In the 1950s a leading war chief stopped killing, and although his village was attacked, two of his men were killed, and he was wounded, he refused to take revenge. Word of this spread and, as there was a strong desire for peace, more people decided to obey Christian teaching. Over a period of twenty years the war raids gradually stopped (Tuggy, 1994). Carrier (North America): "The Talkotins... were formerly on the most friendly terms with the Chilcotins" (Jenness, 1932, referring to Cox, 1831). "Relations among subtribes were generally friendly but varied in intensity. The Bulkley River, Babine Lake, and Takla Lake subtribes visited and traded with one another frequently" (Tobey, 1981). "The Carrier [Atlashimih] sporadically raided Bella Coola settlements, and the latter retaliated" (Ferguson, 1984; referring to McIlwraith, 1948). Lane (1981) states of the Chilcotin: "The entire Chilcotin never assembled or acted together.

Feuding occurred between Chilcotin but attacks were against specific individuals rather than entire communities; however, given kinship ties, an attack against an individual inevitably drew in others... Despite an ideal of peaceful existence, fighting occurred. There were striking occasions when large numbers of Chilcotin joined to make determined attack upon non-Chilcotin communities". The Tacullies are a "quiet, inoffensive people" (Holsti, 1913; referring to Bancroft, 1875). McClellan & Denniston (1981) state about the pre-contact Cordillera Indians (Chilcotin, Carrier, Sekani, Kaska, Tsetsaut, Tahltan, Tagish, Inland Tlingit, Tutchone, Han, and Kutchin) in general: "The stealing of women or territorial trespass sometimes led to feuding or raids between local groups or segments of them, but there was no full-scale warfare between large regional groups". This state of affairs drastically changed in contact times. The Carriers are coded Social War by Wright (1942) and PS by Hobhouse et al. (1915). Catauxi (Catauixi, Catawishi) (South America): "A tribe on the River Purus, 16 to 30 days’ voyage up... They eat forest game, tapirs, monkeys and birds; and they are cannibals, eating Indians of other tribes. They are numerous and warlike. Acuña called them Quatausis. They are also met with on the Upper Teffé, between the Jurua and Purus, and between the Purus and Madeira, especially on the River Mucuin. Chandless describes them as a fine handsome tribe, free from the Puru-puru skin disease, and remarkably clear complexioned. He says that they are warlike if attacked and prompt to guard their own; but by disposition peaceful and industrious, fond of agriculture, and even of manufacture..." (Markham, 1895, 1910). Apparently a peaceful branch or subdivision. Cayapa (South America): "The Cayapa [not to be confused with the belligerent Cayapo] pride themselves on their peaceable relations with their neighbors" (Murra, 1948). According to Keeley (1996), the Cayapa were indeed peaceful since they had no traditional memory of warfare since mythological times. Cayua (South America): The Cayua "sind friedliebend und vermeiden, ohne feige zu sein, jede Berührung mit den benachbarten feindlichen Stämmen" (Von Königswald, 1908; quoted in Van der Bij, 1929). "Toch komen kleinere oorlogjes menigmaal voor" (Van der Bij, 1929; referring to Coudreau, 1893). Chamorro (Oceania): "The Chamorres were not professional warriors, and never went to war for the sake of plunder; nor were they ever activated by a spirit of conquest. They only took up arms when forced to do so, in order to revenge some grave insult, or to restrain the capricious and vexatious practices of a disagreeable neighbour. They were easily irritated and their passions were reaily excited; but if they did not hesitate to engage in a warlike encounter when the circumstances justified them to have recourse to such an extreme measure, they were easily pacified, and they laid aside their arms with the utmost readiness and upon the slightest inducement. Their wars were neither bloody nor of long duration... There was no preconcerted plan, there was no united action in the fight, and when engaged in battle each soldier acted on his own responsibility. They hardly ever fought at close quarters, and the killing or wounding of two or three men decided the victory. As they were not naturally brave the first sight of blood often produced a panic in their ranks, when they had recourse to flight and dispersed to save themselves as best they could" (Featherman, 1888). Chané (South America): Métraux (1948) states that the Chiriguano, a notorious cannibal tribe, had eaten about 60.000 Chané during the 16th century. Apparently, the Chané did not even defend themselves. "The Arawakan Chané of the eastern slope of the Andes were conquered, enslaved, eventually destroyed as a separate entity by the Guarani, all without fighting back... an early Spanish explorer reported 400 Guarani ruling a herd of 5,000 Chané, regularly rounding up a few to butcher

and eat" (Brandon, 1961). Chaouanons (North America): This tribe is mentioned in the Jesuit Relations, LIX (Thwaites, 1896), and is most probably the Shawnee, or some subdivision. The Chaouanons are described as extremely peaceful. Cf. Van der Bij (1929). Chauci (Eurasia): "Untouched by greed or lawless ambition, they dwell in quiet seclusion, never provoking a war, never robbing or plundering their neighbors" (Tacitus, Germania 35). Chenchu (Eurasia): Textor (1967) coded the Chenchu as a culture where bellicosity is moderate or negligible and where military glory is negligibly emphasized. It is not clear on what grounds, however. Bahadur (1977) characterizes the Chenchu as "brigands and robbers", while Q.Wright (1942) coded them as Economic War. The Irula (q.v.) may well have been a distinct and more peaceable subdivision (Iyer, 1935; Bahadur, 1977). Cherusci (Eurasia): The Cherusci "have been left free from attack to enjoy a prolonged peace" (Tacitus, Germania 36). Apparently they also left others in peace, at least until Varus appeared with his Roman legions. Chichas Orejones (South America): "A tribe of the Gran Chacu, met with between the Chiriguanas and Guaycurus, in a very inaccessible country... They live peaceably with another tribe of Indians called Churumatas" (Markham, 1895, 1910). Chichimec (Meso-America): "The Chichimecs apparently lacked true warfare in pre-Columbian times" (Driver, 1961). Chickasaw (North America): "Peaceably disposed are the Choktaws and Chickasaws also (Adair, 1775)" (Holsti, 1913). "Adair allein rühmt den südlichen Indianern, den Choktaws und Chickasaws, nach, daß sie nur ungerne Krieg führen und dann mit einer kleinen Beute, einigen Kopfhäuten und einem Gefangenen, zufrieden sind" (Steinmetz, 1907). Chipewyan/Chepewayan (North America): The Chipewyan are coded No War by Hobhouse et al. (1915), and Defensive War by Wright (1942). The evidence is very confusing and contradictory, however. Other sources report fairly frequent raiding. As motives are reported: plunder, women capture, blood revenge, prestige, and territorial intrusion (Bancroft, 1875; Van der Bij, 1929). "The Chipewyans, Slaves, Dogribs, Yellowknives, Kaskas and Beavers fought one another regularly, more often for material goods and women than for any other reason, although revenge was also a motive. However, the number of persons involved was too small and their organization too little to call these encounters war" (Driver, 1961). "With the section of the Cree that drove the Beaver and Slave Indians from the Athabaska and Slave Rivers they [the Chipewyan] fought intermittently until about 1760... the Chipewyan massacred enemies from other tribes without respect to age or sex" (Jenness, 1932). "Ross's (1866) account of the E. Dené including the Chepewayans, says they were unwarlike and that he had never seen weapons used. Bancroft's (1875) account of the N. Indians is that warfare was frequent. It is clear that Bancroft and Ross are partly dealing with the same peoples, but presumably these statements would refer to different tribes, Bancroft's to the more northerly Chepewayans" (Hobhouse et al., 1915). A Chipewyan 'gang', joined by Yellowknife, annihilated an Eskimo band at Bloody Falls around 1770 (Hearne, 1795; J.Smith, 1981). Chiquito (South America): The evidence on the Chiquito (a group of numerous tribes in Bolivia) is rather inconsistent, probably also because they are not a homogeneous tribal entity. Some sources

report raids for headhunting and plunder, and unbloody battles (Baraza, 1713; Dobrizhoffer, 1784; Van der Bij, 1929). Métraux (1948) and Steward & Faron (1959) report of them: The Chiquito raided neighboring groups. War prisoners were well treated and married within their captors' tribe. Other sources describe the Chiquito as very peaceful. Markham (1895) states, for instance: "They are very fond of singing and dancing and seldom quarrel amongst themselves. They are a peaceful race". The Chiquito often raided the new Spanish settlements to steal iron tools. The Chiquito were constantly harassed by the Paulista slavers: entire tribes were exterminated or taken as slaves (Métraux, 1948). The Chapacura Chiquito were very peaceable, and but seldom attacked their neighbors (d'Orbigny, 1835, 1839; Nieboer, 1910). The Chiquito are coded Social War by Wright (1942) and PA by Hobhouse et al. (1915). Chukchee (Eurasia): Nordenskiöld (1904) stated: "The greatest unanimity reigned in the little headless community... Even the present Chukchees form, without doubt, a mixture of several races, formerly savage and warlike, who have been driven by foreign invaders from south to north... It would be of great psychological interest to ascertain whether the change which has taken place in a peaceful direction is progress or decadence" (quoted in Van der Bij, 1929). Textor (1967) codes the Chukchee as a culture where bellicosity is moderate or negligible, but warfare prevalent and military glory emphasized. Van der Bij (1929) reported: "De Tsjoektsjen zijn zeker geenszins vredelievend... Zij schuwen de strijd niet, ook niet tegen Korjaken en Eskimo's". See also Bogoraz, 1905 et seq.; Czaplicka, 1914; Antropova & Kuznetsova, 1964. The Tuski (Chukchee) are coded Social War by Wright (1942) and PE by Hobhouse et al. (1915). Chumash (North America): "The early Spanish invariably found the Chumash gentle and friendly, a quality that led to their undoing as they entered the fatal mission system without a struggle... Among the Chumash, the cause for war could be the infringement of a village hunting and gathering preserve, the refusal of a chief to accept an invitation to a feast or dance, or the avenging of witchcraft. Warfare was arranged formally as opposed to the surprise raid. The aggrieved group would send a messenger to arrange a meeting at a certain place. Here both parties met, throwing feathers in the air and shouting their battle cries. An Indian from one side would then step forward and fire a series of arrows at the other side. Then one from the other side shot off an equal number" (Grant, 1978). This then concluded Chumash 'warfare'. Kroeber (1925) states: "All accounts unite in making the Chumash an unwarlike people, although intervillage feuds were common and the fighter who killed was accorded public esteem. A little war between Santa Barbara and Rincon [villages], probably in Mission times, seems to be the chief one of which knowledge has been perpetuated". See also: Californians. Chuncho (South America): The inhabitants of the Montaña are sometimes collectively called the Chuncho. Most of these societies, especially Cayuvava, Itonama and Moré, were quite unwarlike (Steward & Faron, 1959). Chunipi (South America): "A tribe of the Gran Chacu, between the Rio Grande and Bermejo. They are said to be descended from Spaniards, and are very peaceful and courteous... They go quite naked, and are constantly at war with the Tobas and Mocovies, but live in friendship with four other tribes, who appear to be of the same origin, and who resemble each other closely, namely the Tequetes, Guamalcas, Yucunampas, and Velelas" (Markham, 1895, 1910). Warfare mainly defensive against raiding Toba and Mocovi. The Vilela did not offer any resistance against the Spaniards. The Vilela are coded Social War by Wright (1942). Chuvash/Chuwash (Eurasia): "They live on friendly terms with their neighbors, and they hardly ever quarrel among themselves" (Featherman, 1891).

Cipo (South America): "A small and friendly tribe on the Tapaua, a tributary of the Purus. They are very industrious" (Markham, 1895, 1910; Chandless, 1863). Coast Salish (North America): The marital, economic, and ceremonial ties that linked the WULEDO groups within the southern Coast Salish (Puget Sound) region extended into adjacent regions. "The Suquamish and Twana intermarried with the Clallam, the Swinomish and Skagit with the Northern Straits, the Upper Skagit with the Nooksack, the Twana with the Upper and Lower Chehalis, and the tribes of Southern Puget Sound with the Upper Chehalis... With more distant tribes or ones seldom encountered there was conflict or at least the expectation of conflict. Most of the southern Coast Salish probably viewed the Cowichan with suspicion or hostility. But the real enemies of all, for much of the first half of the 19th century, were the Lekwiltok Kwakiutl, who raided the area for slaves and loot. According to traditions, on one or two occasions leaders of several of the Southern Coast Salish tribes organized retaliatory expeditions (R.Brown, 1873-6; Curtis, 1907-30). There were professional warriors, but warfare was, at least in the 19th century, largely defensive. People were generally on good terms with their closer neighbors, with whom they intermarried and had kinship ties. Visitors from outside this circle, regardless of language or cultural similarities, were seen as possibly hostile. What warfare there was can be attributed to the ambition of professional warriors and the desire for revenge. Occasionally a warrior led a small party into territory where they had no relatives, hoping to waylay unarmed women and children and to be able to take a few as slaves, perhaps by intimidation rather than violence. If the victims’ village was sufficiently provoked, could identify the aggressors, and had a warrior, he might lead another small party in a surprise dawn attack on the aggressors’ village, attempting to kill the men, burn the houses, smash the canoes, and make off with captives and loot. But there was no institution through which warriors could be mobilized, and so fighting of this sort did not develop into more organized warfare, except in response to persistent raiding by the Lekwiltok" (Suttles & Lane, 1990). The southwestern Coast Salish consist of the Queets, Quinault, Copalis, Cowlitz (Newaukum), and Chehalis (Humptulips, Hoquiam, Wishkah, Wynoochee, Shoalwater, Satsop, Squiaitl or Kwaialk and many other groups for which there is no English name). Hajda (1990) states: "Travels and contacts among groups were sometimes disrupted by conflicts among neighbors. The dispute between Upper and Lower Chehalis over territory is one example (Donovan, 1960), but this conflict, like others, was undoubtedly only among the villages immediately affected; whole ’tribes’ did not make war on each other. Such conflicts were eventually settled by the payment of valuables (Olson, 1936) and perhaps by a marriage between the disputants, after which social contacts would be resumed. To the south, slaves were not taken in conflicts among related groups, and the fights appear to have been regulated to some degree; these restrictions seem to have been observed less often in the north (Adamson, 1926-27; Olson, 1936; Henry [in Coues, 1897]; Franchère, 1969; Ross, 1855; Hajda, 1984)". The northern Coast Salish consist of the Island Comox (Sasitla, Tatpoos, Kaake, Eeksen, Kakekt), Mainland Comox (Homalco, Klahoose, Sliammon), Pentlatch (Qualicum), and Sechelt (Hunechen, Tsonai, Tuwanek, Skaiakos). Kennedy & Bouchart (1990) state of them: "There are traditions of prolonged hostile relations with the Lekwiltok who gradually usurped Comox territory, and the Pentlatch are believed to have been the victims of Nootkan raids (Douglas, 1840, 1853; Curtis, 1907-30). By the late 1800s all Island Comox territory was under the control of the Lekwiltok (Boas, 1887, 1888; Barnett, 1955; Taylor & Duff, 1956). According to traditions, in the 1840s some of the Island Comox began to join with the Lekwiltok in their attacks against other Coast Salish groups to the south. In response, the Coast Salish allied together to avenge the decades of injury inflicted on them by the Lekwiltok and mounted a decisive retaliatory expedition aimed at incapacitating their enemy. But despite heavy losses, the Lekwiltok domination continued. Disease, battles with Nootkans, and the southward movement of the Lekwiltok and Island Comox all

contributed to the demise of the Pentlatch". Among the Central Coast Salish (Halkomelem [with some 20 subdivisions], Squamish, Nooksack, Sooke, Songhees, Saanich, Semiahmoo, Lummi, Samish, Klalakamish, Swallah, Skelakhan and Clallam), conflicts both within and between villages seem to have been more common than in the other Coast Salish groups (Suttles, 1990), though battles have been recorded only against the invading Lekwiltok. The Lkungen, Halkomelem (Halkamelen) and Cowichan (Kowitchen) are coded Social War by Wright (1942), while the Coast Salish in toto are coded Economic War, which seems quite inappropriate. Columbians and Plateau (North America): Bancroft (1875) says the inland Columbians [i.e., interior Salishan tribes, such as the Flatheads (Salish), the Shushwap and the Sahaptin or Nez Percé of the Great Basin] were peaceful peoples. Resort to arms for the settlement of their intertribal disputes seems to have been very rare. Yet, he adds, "all are brave warriors when fighting becomes necessary for defense or vengeance against a foreign foe" (Davie, 1929). "After a day-long fight between two strong bands among the Columbians, it often resulted that only one man was killed (Breysig, 1907). The Chinooks, if unable to settle their differences amicably, would commence the battle, or if the hour was late, postpone fighting until the next morning. 'As their armor was arrowproof and as they rarely came near enough for hand-to-hand conflict [they fought generally on the water], the battles were of short duration and accompanied by little bloodshed; the fall of a few warriors decided the victory'. The same was true of the inland Columbians, in whose battles 'the number slain is rarely large; the fall of a few men, or the loss of a chief decides the victory (Bancroft, 1875)'" (Davie, 1929). Also Featherman (1889) says that the "Chinooks were not even in olden times very warlike". "Concerning the Chinooks in British Columbia we hear that they were always a commercial rather than a warlike people. They tried to settle their differences amicably; if, however, battles ensued, they were of short duration and accompanied by little bloodshed (Bancroft, 1875; Nieboer, 1910). Of the Columbian Indians, Franchère (1854) states that combat is conducted "with fury on both sides, but as soon as one or two men are killed, the party which has lost these owns itself beaten and the battle ceases" (cited in Holsti, 1913). The chief reason for the comparative harmlessness of their combats is the inefficiency of their offensive weapons and the excellence of their defensive arms. "Many observers ascribe mild and peaceable qualities also to the Flatheads and some other neighbouring races (McKenney & Hall, 1836; Scouler, 1848; Dunn, 1844)" (Holsti, 1913). Among the inland tribes of British Columbia resort to arms for the settlement of their intertribal disputes seems to have been very rare... departure on a foreign warlike expedition was always preceded by ceremonies, preparations including council-meetings of the wise, great and old, the smoking of the pipe, harangues by the chiefs, dances and a general review or display of festivals and other manoeuvres. The battles are said not to have been attended with much loss of life. The children of many tribes were sent by mutual arrangement into the enemy ranks during the heat of the battle to pick up the fallen arrows and to carry them back to their owners to be used again. After the fight or before it, when either party lacked confidence in the result, peace was made by smoking the pipe with the most solemn protestations of goodwill and promises which neither party had the slightest intention of fulfilling (Bancroft, 1875)" (Numelin, 1950). Leechman (1956) "says there was little systematic warfare between them, though some fought each other more than others did. The Chilcotin often fought the Shuswap, the Kootenays had frequent trouble with the Blackfoot, while Smith's Salish tribe dipped their arrows [in rattle snake venom]" (Bigelow, 1969). The Lilooet (Lillooet), Thompson Indians, Shushwap, Similkameen, and Nez Percés are coded Social War by Wright (1942). Lillooet warfare with other groups was unusual, with intensive intertribal trade the more typical state of affairs (O'Leary & Levinson, 1991). Lewis & Clark (1814) reported of the inland Chinookans, such as the Cathlamet, Clatsop, and Palouse (Sokulks) that they were not warlike, but Van der Bij (1929) regards their report, except for the Palouse, as unreliable. Silverstein (1990) says of the Chinookans of Lower Columbia (Cathlamet, Multnomah and Clacka-

mas): "War between villages resulted when some affront could not be smoothed over by negotiated payments or arbitrated revenge. The regional system of intergroup diplomacy led to formalized reparations by payment, enslavement, or execution of the offending party, or, if no satisfaction was so obtained from the offender’s village, it led to formalized warfare of honor, terminating in payment of wealth to the victors. This regional system included the Tillamook, Lower Chehalis, Lower Cowlitz, Tualatin, and others as well as Chinookan-speaking groups (Franchère in Thwaites, 1904-7; Henry in Coues, 1897; Scouler, 1905; Minto, 1900; Hajda, 1987)". Driver (1961) says of the Plateau area in general: "Raiding parties were small, normally two or three canoes full of men representing only their own selfish interests. Volunteers made up the entire party, and anyone who wished could lead a party. Headmen and chiefs of villages and bands disapproved of such raids and went to great lengths to maintain peace, sometimes risking their lives in negotiations with hostile outsiders. Feuds between kin groups were known, but not common, and chiefs served as arbiters of such disputes, which were often settled by blood money". "The Shuswap as a whole were never organized as a cohesive political unit. Although the Shuswap never warred as an organized group, individual bands fought with other groups, including the Cree, Sekani, Okanagon, Beaver, and Assiniboin" (O'Leary & Levinson, 1991). Peaceful relations with the neighboring people were maintained through marital alliance (Ignace, 1998: 205). Teit (1909: 540) noted that "the Shuswap were formerly noted as a warlike people; but this only held true of the Fraser River, Bonaparte and Kamloops Divisions. The others seldom engaged in war, and acted only on the defensive". Wyatt (1998: 221) says of the Nicola (Stuwihamuq/Stuwihamuk) that "Warfare became more intense and common [after the acquisition of horses] and the Nicola always acted defensively". Jorgensen (1980) considers the Wenatchee (Wenatchi) to be a peaceful people. Miller (1998: 255) states about the Plateau Salishans (such as Wenatchee, Entiat, Chelam, Methow, Nespelem, Sanpoil, and Sinkaietk): "Raiding for horses and hostilities with Plains tribes like the Blackfoot encouraged a warrior ethic among these tribes, although pacifism was a strong ethic". Lahren (1998: 284) states of the Kalispel or Pend d'Oreille that "Warfare was almost nonexistent prior to the arrival of the horse". Such warfare as may have occurred among the Coeur d'Alene or Skitswish during the prehorse period was chiefly with the Kalispel, Nez Perce, and Kootenai. It is unlikely that conflicts ever involved a larger number of warriors than those supplied by a single division. Most, if not all, probably occurred on the level of the band or family. To avoid warfare and strengthen their military position, chiefs attempted to form and maintain alliances by exchanging their daughters in marriage (Palmer, 1998: 321). Most relations of the Yakima and related tribes (such as the Wenatchee, Kittitas, Klikitat, Taitnapam and Wanapam) with other bands and tribes were of a friendly, peaceful nature. The Salish-speaking Wenatchee shared the fishery in their territory with the Kittitas (Ray, 1936: 142). Intermarriage between them was so common that some Wenatchee adopted the Sahaptin dialect, and some moved to the Yakima Reservation in 1859. The Taitnapam intermarried with the Klikitat. Information on hostilities, war, and raiding for the Yakima and related tribes is meager until the period of the Yakima wars that followed the treaty of 1855, probably because the Walla Walla, Umatilla, and Nez Perce served as a buffer zone between the Yakima and the traditional enemy of these Sahaptin-speaking groups, the Northern Shoshone to the south (Schuster, 1998: 369). Armed conflict between villages and groups of villages occurred in the Plateau. Although Chinookans such as Wishram and Wasco fought offensively as well as defensively, and participated in raiding for slaves, peace was a significant norm (cf. Murdock, 1965: 203; French & French, 1998: 369). "In sum, eastern Columbia River Sahaptin [Tenino, Skin, Celilo, Wayam, Tygh] participated in a network of peaceful trade relations reinforced by intermarriage that encompassed all Columbia River basin Indians, whether speakers of Sahaptin, Nez Perce, Cayuse, or Upper Chinookan. Chronic hostile relations were restricted to distant peoples to the south accessible only after a journey of several to many days" (Hunn & French, 1998: 380). Cuna (Meso-America): Textor (1967) codes the Cuna as a culture where bellicosity is moderate or

negligible, and where military glory is negligibly emphasized. According to Steward (1948), however, in precolumbian times warfare was well developed and there were standing armies. Captives were taken and the early Cuna killed male enemies so that the sun might drink their blood. Secondary pacifists? Curetu/Cureto (South America): Coded No War by Hobhouse et al. (1915), and Defensive War by Wright (1942). Markham (1895) states of the Curetus: "A tribe inhabiting the country between the Rivers Japura and Uaupés... They reside in small villages governed by a chief, and are long lived and peaceable". D’Entrecasteaux (Oceania): "Every man lived in active terror of his neighbour. The fear being mutual, there was, in reality scarcely any war; an occcasional attack upon a woman or an unarmed man served to keep the hereditary feud alive. The social evils of such a state of 'morcellement' may easily be exaggerated. The trivial loss of life is more than counterbalanced by the activity, alertness and tribal patriotism which are fostered in an atmosphere of personal danger" (Thomson, 1908, as quoted in Van der Bij, 1929). Dhimal (Eurasia): The Dhimal of India are described as a very unwarlike people (Hodgson, 1850). "The amicable... Dhimals, said to be wholly unmilitary" (Spencer, 1876). "The Bodo and Dhimal are peaceful agriculturists (Hodgson, 1850)" (Holsti, 1913). The Dhimal are coded Social by Wright (1942), though it is unclear on what grounds. Dogrib (North America): "With the Slavey to the west and the Hare Indians north of Great Bear Lake, also Athapaskan speakers, the Dogrib seem always to have been on peaceful terms. Those groups as well as the Dogrib suffered intermittent predations by the Algonkian-speaking Cree from the southeast in the late eighteenth century and by the Copper (Yellowknife) Indians up to 1823. In 1823 a successful attack by the Dogrib on a band of the small Copper Indian tribe brought first an uneasy and then an enduring peace" (Helm, 1991). Dualla (Africa): "De reeds uit honderden krijgers bestaande legertjes der Dualla negers worden volgens Buchholz [1880] nooit handgemeen; zij blijven op eerbiedigen afstand, zorgen voor dekking door struiken etc. Zij vuren met afgewend gelaat zonder mikken, werpen zich daarna dadelijk plat op den grond neer of vluchten. Een massa kruit wordt in de maandenlange oorlogen verschoten, maar slechts weinigen sneuvelen" (Van der Bij, 1929). Edo (Africa): "The Odoes are not a warlike race; they hardly ever engage in offensive warfare, and if they are attacked by enemies, and find themselves under the necessity of defending themselves, they show very little discipline and still less courage, for they prefer to have recourse to flight or surrender rather than make a bold stand and repulse the assailants" (Featherman, 1885). Engano/Enggano (Oceania): "Rosenberg [1878] vertelt dat op Engano gevechten voorkomen, die op een bepaalden tijd en plaats gehouden worden en in zekeren zin gereglementeerd zijn; als een man door een lans wordt getroffen, vlucht zijn partij en is de oorlog uit" (Van der Bij, 1929). Other sources report that intervillage feuding and warfare were endemic in former times (Oudemans, 1889; Kennedy, 1935; LeBar, 1972), without mentioning the regulated and rather unbloody pitched battles which Van der Bij refers to. Esthonians (Eurasia): The "primitive Esthonians were, Dr. Weinberg (1903) assumes, previous to their later great struggles, probably in the main peaceful settlers" (Holsti, 1913).

Fan (Africa): "The Fans are said to be one of the most warlike nations of West Africa; but according to Lenz (1878), their warfare consists merely in one family letting another know that for such and such a reason there will be hostility from that day onward between the two parties. It is then only a matter of each side trying to capture and kill single members of the other side who may happen to be in the forest, far from their homes, while hunting or for any other purpose. ’It is seldom that two large bodies of Negroes are ranged against one another to fight, and, if this happens, fighting comes to an end as soon as one or more persons have been put out of the fighting’ (Lenz, 1878)" (Numelin, 1950). Fenni (Early Finns) (Eurasia): "They have no proper weapons" (Tacitus, Germania). "With regard to the Finnish races, Dr. Ailio (1911) supposes that the Finns were in remote times comparatively peaceful and similarly Dr. Appelgren-Kivalo believes that they gradually spread over the country by peaceful occupation and not through warlike conquest. Nor do their institutions directly indicate an early predominance of warlike efforts (Koskinen, 1881; Yrjö-Koskinen, 1890)" (Numelin, 1950). Fipa: (Africa): The Fipa, or Wafipa, present a most interesting case of secondary pacifism: "[B]y 1880 the Fipa had acquired the reputation, as the Scots explorer Joseph Thomson put it, of being the most peaceable race in Central Africa (Thomson, 1881 II: 221): ... 'They never engage in war, though they will, of course, defend themselves'" (see also Nieboer, 1910). This was achieved after a long period of political conflict and warfare between two rival factions of the Twa dynasty. Willis (1989) concludes: "[W]e have a picture of a people who in the middle of the nineteenth century emerged from a period of conflict and civil war to construct a peaceful, orderly, and prosperous society". Bonta (1997) states: "Willis never saw anyone fighting, even children except in play". In Farrer (1880), Davie (1929), and my former list (Van der Dennen, 1992) the Fipa appear erroneously as "Fida (peoples)". Fore (New Guinea): "Even in the most congested regions the Fore tended to avoid conflict when possible, often by moving... Fighting and raiding were usually by a few directly aggrieved close associates who felt personally wronged" (Sorenson, 1978). At the time of first contact with Westerners in the 1950s, about 12.000 Fore lived in the mountains of Papua New Guinea. The became renowned because of reports on their cannibalism, intervillage warfare, and the debilitating disease kuru. While several scholars described them as highly warlike (Berndt, 1955; Glasse & Lindenbaum, 1973; Lindenbaum, 1971), Sorenson (1972) found the Fore to be not nearly so aggressive as they had been portrayed (Bonta, 1993). When the first Australian patrols arrived in the mid-1950s the Fore welcomed them. They quickly gave up their fighting and adopted an antifighting ethic (Sorenson, 1972). Fuegians (South America): "Le désir de la vengeance ne préoccupe pas beaucoup les Fuégiens" (Hyades & Deniker, 1891). "Among the tribes of Tierra del Fuego 'human life was normally sacred' as stated by various authorities. Even if the custom of bloodrevenge was emphatically prevalent in their relations, the Fuegians were reported to be very peaceful (Cooper, 1917; Bridges, 1884; Gallardo, 1910; Hyades & Deniker, 1891)... Prof. Martin Gusinde and Wilhelm Koppers have given me the same information" (Numelin, 1950). See also: Abipon, Ona, and Yahgan. Galong/Gallong (Eurasia): The Galong of India are a peaceable people, though "In the past, the Galongs were a warlike race" (Fuchs, 1973). Garo (Eurasia): "The Garos [of India] are a peaceful law abiding race" (Bahadur, 1977), though in the past they were ferocious raiders and headhunters (Godwin-Austen, 1872, 1873; Peal, 1874; Davie, 1929; LeBar et al., 1964; Fuchs, 1973). "In the Khasi Hills of India war does not occur

[because] the Garos and Khasis in this district are restrained by mutual fear from raiding one another" (Davie, 1929, referring to Godwin-Austen, 1872). Peace was achieved after 1867 (Burling, 1963; White, 1989). The Garos are coded Economic War by Wright (1942) and PS by Hobhouse et al. (1913). Gebusi (New Guinea): In spite of their relatively high rates of violence, the Gebusi value peace positively (Knauft, 1985 et seq.; Dentan, 1992). The Gebusi are subject to occasional lethal raids by their neighbors, the Bedamini (Knauft, 1985: 8-9, 118-21). However, they never counterraid the Bedamini. Internal war (including feud) is rare to nonexistent (Kelly, 2000: 164). Ghiliaks/Gilyak (Eurasia): The Gilyak (Nivkhi, Nivkh) are coded No War by Hobhouse et al. (1915), and Defensive War by Wright (1942). "De bloedwraaktochten van de Giljaken worden tegengegaan door exogamie en clan-allianties" (Van der Bij, 1929; referring to Czaplicka, 1915). From Shternberg (1933) we learn that the Gilyak did not kill women in their skirmishes, and that female captives and children were incorporated into the clan of the conqueror. White (1989) speaks of "warring clans", "ambushes" and "Fights until fatalities occurred", which may indicate petty feuding. "Long ago, the Nivkhi [Gilyak] had the institution of vendetta. All members of a clan were bound to avenge a murder upon all the men of the murderer’s clan. Later, vendetta began to be replaced by blood-money... When agreement was reached [between the parties, the intermediary] came to the offending clan with men of the victim clan, fully armed, and a duel was enacted between the representatives of the two clans. Then each clan representative killed a dog, and peace was considered established" (Ivanov, Levin & Smolyak, 1964). "Relics and fragments in Nivkh folklore tell of ’wars’, but it is difficult to find empirical evidence of these" (Austerlitz, 1994). Goaynazes (South America): Turney-High (1949) regards the Goaynazes (Guayana?) as peaceful, though capable of fighting ably to defend themselves. Goliath Mountain Pygmies (New Guinea): When De Kock (1912) visited them, they seemed to live in friendship and undisturbed peace with their neighbors (Van der Bij, 1929). "Zij waren vrolijk en hulpvaardig en schenen in ongestoorde vrede en vriendschap met hun naburen te leven". Gonds (Eurasia): Textor (1967) codes the Gonds of India as a culture where bellicosity is moderate or negligible, and where military glory is negligibly emphasized. The Gonds are coded Political War by Q.Wright (1942), however, and Bahadur (1977) refers to them as a "tribe of marauders". Guaja (South America): "The Guaja did not have any agriculture whatever, but at times stole from the plantations of the Tembé, Guajajara, and Urubu... When caught they were killed. Described as timorous and meek" (Nimuendaju, 1948). Guana (South America): "Leur système politique est d'être en paix avec toutes les nations et de ne faire jamais de guerre offensive; mais si on les insulte ils combattent et se défendent avec beaucoup de valeur" (De Azara, 1809, quoted in Van der Bij, 1929). "The peaceful Guana farmers have been subdued by roving Mbaya" (Métraux, 1946). "The prehorse Mbaya had conquered the sedentary horticultural Guana, an Arawakan group who lived east of the Paraguay River, and made them vassals" (Steward & Faron, 1959). Guanche (Canary Islands): "Among the Canary Islanders, the people of Hierro [the Guanche] were exceptional in knowing no war and having no weapons, although their long leaping-poles could be used as such when occasion demanded" (Davie, 1929, referring to Cook, 1899).

Guato (South America): "De Guatos verlaten nooit hun lagune... zodra zij iemand in de verte bespeuren vluchten zij en verbergen zich tusschen het riet" (Van der Bij, 1929, referring to De Azara, 1809). Evidence somewhat conflicting (De Azara, 1809; Schmidt, 1905, 1914; Van der Bij, 1929). "Except for many years’ warfare against the Caingang, the Guato were peaceful and did not trespass on the territory of their neighbors" (Métraux, 1946). Warfare mainly defensive against Caingang depredations. Guayaki/Guayaquis (South America): "Destitute of clothing and settled habitations, a timid race, they pass their lives without injuring anyone" (Dobrizhoffer, 1784). "Scheue Furchtsamkeit ist der Hauptzug ihres Charakters, bedingt durch fortwährende Nahrungssorgen und die Ungunst aller Lebensverhältnisse überhaupt" (Ehrenreich, 1898). The very timid Guayaki think only of fleeing at the approach of strangers, and they live constantly on the run to avoid slave raiders (Clastres, 1972; Cf. Ehrenreich, 1898; De la Hitte & ten Kate, 1897; Van der Bij, 1929). Women stealing causes numerous feuds between bands (Métraux & Baldus, 1946), but bloody encounters between bands are rare because the various hostile bands take care not to cross paths (Clastres, 1972). Hadza (Africa): The Hadza (Hadzapi/Tindiga/Kangeju) are described as a very peaceful people by Woodburn (1964 et seq.). Internally, conflicts are confined to fights over women from time to time between individual men, "nor do [camps] combine for offensive or defensive action against nonHadza or against other camps of Hadza". Woodburn reports "no occasion in which all the male members of a camp united to attack the men of another camp". The Hadza "had had to wage constant bloody feuds with their neighbors, especially with the Waissanzu [Isanzu] and the Wamburu [Mbulu, Iraqw]. Their strength was already shattered when the Massai [Maasai] broke in from the north east... they made repeated attempts to defend themselves against the tiresome intruders, but finally had to yield to their superior power" (Obst, 1912; as quoted in Woodburn, 1988). White (1989) states that the Hadza knew fights between individual men, assisted by brothers or classificatory brothers, about rights over women from time to time. According to Bagshawe (1924) "numerous deaths have occurred as the result of feuds between individuals and families and between them and the Dorroggo". "Ältere Berichte belegen, daß die Hadza sehr wohl Jagdreviere besaßen und daß sie auch in Gruppen gegen einander Krieg führten (Kohl-Larsen, 1943, 1958)" (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1986). It would therefore be a false generalization "wenn man aus dem heutigen Verhalten der Hadza auf eine ursprüngliche Friedfertigkeit der Gruppe schließt" (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1977). Hagahai (New Guinea): The Times of Papua New Guinea, Dec. 12, 1986, reported the discovery of a shy, hidden, destitute, and nonviolent tribelet, called the Hagahai. Anthropologist Carol Jenkins subsequently reported on them. I have been unable to obtain more information on this people. Hare (North America): "[T]he Hare [Kawchadinneh, Peaux de Lièvre] also had a wide reputation for timidity, as indicated by their reported fear of the Kutchin, the Eskimo, and strangers in general, and this was similarly emphasized by early writers as another distinctive trait that set them apart from neighboring ethnic groups (Mackenzie, 1801; Richardson, 1851; Jenness, 1932)" (Savishinsky & Hara, 1981). However, male war prisoners were, according the Jenness (1932), staked to the ground and their quivering hearts given to the women to devour. Allen (2000) presents detailed evidence of former Hare hostility and ethnocentrism. Havasupai (North America): "Both the Havasupai and the Walapai carried on hostile relations with the Yavapai, by whom they were frequently raided during the harvest season. Western Apache groups also joined in some of these raids. Due to their small population, Havasupai response was usually limited to defense and occasional brief retaliatory attacks; offensive action was seldom

undertaken" (Schwartz, 1983). About 1865 the Havasupai and Yavapai agreed to end hostilities, and they have conducted peaceful trade relations since then. Similarly, earliest contacts with the Navaho in the mid-nineteenth century were antagonistic, but relations of trade and friendship developed subsequently. See also: Californians. Hawaiians (Oceania): Warfare as originally practiced by the Sandwich Islanders was scarcely deserving of the name, being little more than a series of desultory skirmishes (Wood, 1870). "With reference to the Hawaiians, Ellis (1827) states that once the chief was killed [in a battle] his people immediately ran away" (Holsti, 1913). The Hawaiians are coded Political War by Wright (1942) and PE by Hobhouse et al. (1915). Hopi (North America): Very peaceful (Eggan, 1943; Murdock, 1934; Simmons, 1942); "The Hopi by some authors translated to peace-Indians as their name indicates - are said to be ’preeminently a people of peace’ (Fewkes, 1903; Sumner & Keller, 1927)" (Numelin, 1950). Defensive warfare against predatory tribes, especially Apache raiders. Murdock (1934) states: "Though naturally peace-loving - their very name signifies ’peaceful ones’ - the Hopi are frequently compelled to take the warpath against the neighboring Navaho, Apache, and Ute. Marauding bands of these nomadic tribes descend periodically on the sedentary villagers, plundering their fields, burning their crops, cutting off detached hunting parties, and stealing women. The Hopi maintain themselves only by the impregnable strength of their settlements, by ceaseless vigilance, and by prompt defensive and retaliatory measures". Before American domination, war sometimes erupted between villages over land boundaries or vengeance (Schlegel, 1991). Textor (1967) codes the Hano (Hopi-Tewa) as a culture where bellicosity is moderate or negligible and where military glory is negligibly emphasized. The Hopi (as well as the synonymous Moqui) are coded Social War by Wright (1942), and Defensive War by Goldschmidt (1988, 1989). Humboldt Bay tribes (New Guinea): "While all the tribes around them are in a state of continual warfare, the inhabitants of Humboldt Bay enjoy a peaceful existence. The reasons are that firearms have not yet found entrance among them, that kidnapping and slavery do not exist as in other parts of New Guinea, and that they are neither head-hunters nor cannibals" (Davie, 1929; referring to Krieger, 1899). "Lorentz [1905] trof bij de Humboldt-baai vijf dorpen aan die onderling vriendschappelijk waren; het zesde verkeerde evenwel in vijandschap met de vijf andere" (Van der Bij, 1929). Hupa (North America): "Hostilities ended with a formal peace-keeping ceremony arranged by an intermediary. Each death and injury suffered was paid for separately and recompense was made for all property taken or destroyed... Normally hostilities concerned only a few individuals and took the form of blood feuds between Hupa kin groups or with corresponding divisions among a neighboring people (Wallace, 1949). Rarely, an entire village community became involved but never the Hupa as a whole" (Wallace, 1978). Kroeber (1925) states that the Hupa were allied with the Chilula in hostility toward the Teswan or Coast Yurok, and mentions a feud between the Hupa villages Takimitlding and Tsenewalding around 1868. Generally the conflicts were short-lived and the casualties few, but a rather protracted war with the Yurok, which took place sometime between 1830 and 1840, resulted in a heavy loss of life on both sides (Kroeber, 1925; Sapir, 1927; Spott & Kroeber, 1942; Wallace, 1978); The Jupa (Hupa) are coded Social War by Wright (1942), as well as the synonymous Kelta. See also: Californians. Ifaluk (Oceania): Montagu (1978) mentions Ifaluk of the Carolines as one of the societies notable for their unaggressiveness. Other sources seem to agree that the inhabitants of Ifaluk are rather peaceful, and that the Ifaluk ethic values non-aggression and cooperation (Spiro, 1950 et seq.;

Burrows, 1952; Textor, 1967; Lutz, 1985, 1990; Bonta, 1993). Although legends tell of violent periods in the distant past (with Ifaluk warriors wiping out the people of other islands), there is no memory of violence, and the distance between the islands would have militated against interisland wars (Betzig & Wichimai, 1991). Textor codes the Woleaians of Ifaluk as a culture where bellicosity is moderate or negligible and where military glory is negligibly emphasized. "Although sometimes they express their anger through shouting at one another, murder is unknown among these people; their primary values are nonaggression, sharing, cooperation, and obedience to social superiors within their highly ranked society. One article seeking to debunk the peacefulness of these peoples, by Betzig & Wichimai (1991) was singularly unconvincing..." (Bonta, 1997). Imono (South America): "This peaceful tribe of about 300 people was destroyed by the Mbaya in 1763" (Métraux, 1946). Ingalik (North America): "Compared to the Athapaskans living farther up the Yukon, the Ingalik were a peaceful people, according to Osgood's informants. Osgood (1959) notes that historical evidence seems to verify their view of the past. Raids and other hostile actions did of course take place. Warfare among the Ingalik "was probably infrequent, mitigated by the importance of trade between groups (Hosley, 1991). The traditional enemies of the Yukon Ingalik were two neighboring segmental societies, the Koyukon and Kolchan, while no significant conflicts occurred between the Ingalik and their unsegmented Kuskowagamuit Eskimo neighbors (Snow, 1981: 603; Oswalt, 1962: 11) The Ingalik repaid raids upon their settlements in kind. When they attacked a Koyukon or Kolchan village they endeavored to block the doors of the dwellings and to shoot the men trapped inside through the smoke hole. When successful in dispatching their enemies in this manner, caches were looted and captured women and children also appropriated. The frequency of such raids is not clear from Osgood's (1958: 63-65) account, based on an informant's recollection of stories from an earlier era, though he notes that 'a number of years might elapse' between an initial conflict and a subsequent retaliatory raid (Kelly, 2000: 142-43). Inuit (North America): For the Copper Eskimo No War coded by Otterbein (1970); Greenland Eskimo and Point Barrow Eskimo No War coded by Hobhouse et al. (1915), and Defensive War by Wright (1942). Central and Labrador Eskimo, and Kariaks (Greenland Eskimo), also coded Defensive War by Wright (1942). "The classical example of the absence of war is that of the Eskimos [Greenland Eskimo (Davie, 1929; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Nansen, 1893; Sumner, 1911); Point Barrow Eskimo (Hobhouse et al., 1915); Central Eskimo (Van der Bij, 1929; Boas, 1888; Davie, 1929); Koksoagmiut (Hudson Bay Eskimo): Turner, 1894; Davie, 1929); Netsilingmiut (Irwin, 1981 et seq.)]. Among the Greenlanders warfare is unknown; this state of affairs is explained by the lack of crowding (Sumner, 1911)... 'The Greenlanders cannot afford to waste time in wrangling amongst themselves... Good-humour, peaceableness, and evenness of temper are the most prominent features in his character,' says Nansen (1893) of the Greenlander... Fighting and brutality, he says, are unknown, and murder is very rare. 'They hold it atrocious to kill a fellowcreature; therefore war is in their eyes incomprehensible and repulsive, a thing for which their language has no word...' Also Crantz (1767) praised the friendly and peaceful social character of the Greenland Eskimo: "They are not litigious but patient, and recede when anyone encroaches upon them; but if they are pushed to that degree that they can go no further, they become so desperate, that they regard neither fire nor water". A similar situation prevails among the Central Eskimos, of whom Boas (1888) writes, "Real wars or fights between settlements, I believe, have never happened, but contests have always been confined to single families." The Koksoagmyut of the Hudson Bay Territory are likewise "usually peaceful and mild tempered. Among themselves affrays are of rare occurrence" (Turner, 1894)" (Davie, 1929). See also Briggs' (1970 et seq.) and Irwin's (1981 et seq.) comprehensive and excellent analyses of Netsilingmiut nonviolence. "The Aleuts

fight only with words. They do not understand what war is (Reclus, 1891)" (Numelin, 1950). Both the Athka and Unalaska Aleuts are coded Social War by Wright (1942). Textor (1967) codes the Copper Eskimo as a culture where bellicosity is moderate or negligible. However, due to the practice of female infanticide, rivalry over women may lead to murder and counterkilling. Blood revenge was highly developed in the Copper Eskimo region, and Rasmussen (1932) states of an encampment of 15 families: "[T]here was not a single grown man who had not been involved in a killing one way or another" (Cf. Birket Smith, 1948; Rasmussen, 1924, 1930). Territorial conflicts between Inuit groups have been described (Klutschak, 1881; Nelson, 1899; Boas, 1901; Rasmussen, 1905, 1908, 1932; Petersen, 1963). "In der Tat kennt man gerade von den Eskimos eine Fülle mehr oder weniger ritualisierter Aggressionsformen, die von Ring- und Faustkämpfen bis zu den berühmten Gesangsduellen der West- und Ostgrönländer reichen. Auch berichten die Erzählungen und Specksteinschnitzereien der Eskimos von Gewaltakten und Mord... Klutschak (1881)... erwähnt ferner, daß Kriege manche Stämme dezimiert hätten. So seien die Ukusiksillik-Eskimos die Überreste eines einst großen Stammes... Wenn die Bering-Eskimos eines Dorfes auf Krieg ziehen wollten... umstellten sie heimlich das feindliche Dorf. Nachts slichen sie sich an die Häuser der Gegner heran, verrammelten die Eingänge von außen und erschossen die Eingeschlossenen ungestört durch die Rauchlöcher. Sie plünderten die Dörfer und die Leichen der Besiegten. Die Bristol-Bay-Eskimos nahmen sogar Kopftrophäen" (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1975). The famous song dueling was an Inuit technique for bringing conflicts between men out into the open before they became serious enough to provoke overt violence (Eckert & Newmark, 1980), fostering peaceful relationships between the communities involved (Kleivan, 1991). Fromm (1974) counts the Polar Eskimo as belonging to his 'Life-affirmative' societies, and the Greenland Eskimo as belonging to his 'Nondestructive-aggressive' societies. Ipai and Tipai (North America): Formerly called Diegueño and Kamia (Kumeyaay). Luomala (1978) states: "Although aggressive, Tipais and Ipais were less warlike than the Colorado River tribes. Traditionally, clans feuded over women, trespass, murder, and sorcery. Ambushing a lone trespasser or chasing the enemy away was satisfaction enough for most people". Relations with neighbors alternated between war, trade, intermarriage, and ceremonial exchange (Shipek, 1991). See also: Californians. Irula (Eurasia): "In Madura... [the Chenchu] were able to ravage this country... One of the Mackenzie manuscripts, however, describes the Irulas as a distinct and more peaceable tribe" (Iyer, 1935). "Mackenzie describes them as a peaceful race" (Bahadur, 1977). I have been unable to trace this manuscript. In Wright's (1942) list the Irulas are coded Social War. Ishogo (Africa): Peaceful (du Chaillu, 1863, 1867; Van der Bij, 1929). They lived among the Apono after being expelled from their own territory. Jibito (South America): "All these tribes (Jibito, Cognomona, Chunatahua, Timayo, Mailona, Cholon, Comanahua, Tulumayo, Huatsahuana, Chuzco/Chusco, Tepqui, Chupacho, Sisinpari, Ninaxo, Lamista, Muzape, Panatahua, Tingan, Guatinguapa, Motilon, Tabalosa, Suchichi, Chasutino, Amasifuin, Huatana, Nindaso, Nomona, Zapaso/Zapazo, Chedua, Alon, Cholto, Cumbaza, Belsano, Mapari, Quidquidcana) are all virtually unknown but seem not particularly warlike to singularly peaceful" (Steward & Métraux, 1948). For the Lamista see also Markham (1895, 1910). Kabyles (Africa): "Of the Kabyles of Algeria, we are told that their wars are never very murderous. 'Tout se borne, en général, à des combats de tirailleurs à longue distance. Chaque homme se glisse en rampant dans les ravins et les brousailles et, profitant de tous les accidents du terrain, des arbres, des rochers, s'embusque et tire à couvert. Lorsque la fussilade a duré un temps raisonnable, les deux

partis se retirent... Les hostilités ne continuent... que pour arriver à une egalité de pertes" (Hanoteau & Letourneux, 1893; as quoted in Holsti, 1913). Kadar (Eurasia): The Kadar of India (a small tribe and neighbors of the peaceful Paliyan and Malapantaram) have never experienced murder or crime, and they normally settle their disagreements peacefully to avoid physical violence. Ehrenfels found that there was no memory among the Kadar of murder or violent acts of revenge (Ehrenfels, 1952; Bonta, 1993, 1997). Kalapuya/Kalapooia (North America): "According to Mr. Gatschet (1900) the seven tribes of Kalapuya Indians were not warlike and are not known to have participated in any war expeditions" (Holsti, 1913). Actually, according to Zenk (1990), there were 13 Kalapuyan tribes (Tualatin, Yamhill, Ahantchuyuk, Luckiamute, Santiam, Mary's River, Chemapho, Tsankupi, Tsanchifin, Chelamela, Winnefelly, Yoncalla, and Mohawk River). The central and southern Kalapuyans were reportedly victimized by slave raiders including Molalas and Tualatins. The Tualatins were northern Kalapuyans (Zenk, 1990). Karakalpak (Eurasia): Stöhr (1972) describes the Siberian Karakalpak as "sehr friedfertig". Karamojo (Africa): "The Karamojo 'are industrious agriculturists and a peaceful people with a love of commerce' (Johnston, 1902)" (Holsti, 1913). Karok (North America): Bright (1978) reports of the Karok petty feuds which could be settled by paying indemnity. As Powers (1877) described it: "If the money is paid without haggling, the slayer and the avenger at once become boon companions. If not, the avenger must have the murderer's blood, and a system of retaliation is initiated which would be without end were it not that it may be arrested at any moment by the payment of money". Bright adds: "What is sometimes referred to as 'war' in northwest California was simply this type of retaliatory activity, expanded to involve fellow villagers of the aggrieved parties. Such feuds could be settled with a aid of a go-between, who was paid for his services". Kroeber (1925) states: "Of the wars and feuds of the Karok little is known, except that the Tolowa sometimes crossed the high southern spur of the Siskiyous to attack villages in the Clear Creek and Salmon River districts, and that the Karok probably reciprocated. Toward the Hupa and Yurok friendly feelings generally prevailed. There no doubt were feuds between individual villages, but there is no record of these ever involving the nation as a whole". The Karok (Kark) are coded Social War by Wright (1942). See also: Californians. Kashihá (South America): "The Kashihá in the North-western Chaco are described by Baldus (1931) as peaceable agriculturalists who keep to the defensive in fighting" (Numelin, 1950). He adds on the Chaco tribes in general: "Prof. Karsten (1932) observes how the warlike character of some Chaco tribes often has been exaggerated and generalized to all Chaco tribes. 'The Choroti is by nature a peaceful people', Karsten says". Kaska (North America): Honigmann (1981) states of the Kaska: "[L]arge-scale aggression did not occur frequently, and the Kaska did not value fighting for its own sake". Textor codes the Kaska as a culture where bellicosity is moderate or negligible, but where military glory is emphasized. McClellan & Denniston (1981) state about the pre-contact Cordillera Indians (Chilcotin, Carrier, Sekani, Kaska, Tsetsaut, Tahltan, Tagish, Inland Tlingit, Tutchone, Han, and Kutchin) in general: "The stealing of women or territorial trespass sometimes led to feuding or raids between local groups or segments of them, but there was no full-scale warfare between large regional groups". Kavirondo (Africa): "The Nilotic Kavirondo [Luo, Diours, Dyoors] are a comparatively peaceful,

non-aggressive folk, though by no means cowards, for when forced to it they are better fighters than many of their more warlike neighbors" (Davie, 1929, referring to Northcote, 1907). The Kavirondo "may be termed a peaceful race of genial savages" in comparison to surrounding tribes, yet "they were still inured to warfare and could often turn out sturdy warriors" (Van der Bij, 1929, quoting Johnston, 1902). "The Nilotic Kavirondo, Roscoe (1915) tells us, ’are not fond of war and fortunately their wars are never a serious matter’" (Numelin, 1950). According to Featherman (1885), "The Dyoors are not naturally a warlike race; but they are frequently compelled to defend themselves and their growing crops from the marauding expeditions of the Nubians, who carry off their corn, and reduce the men they can capture to servitude". Kawaiisu (North America): "[B]oth modern consultants, and the archaeological evidence portray the Kawaiisu as friendly, peaceful people whose group conduct was not violent or warlike" (Zigmond, 1986). See also: Californians. Kerintji (Redjang of Sumatra): "Little is known about traditional Kerintji warfare... From the earliest times they were reported to be peaceful, inoffensive and hardworking (Marsden, 1983). They could, however, be roused to bold physical action in self-defence" (Jaspan, 1976). Khoisan (Africa): Also called African Pygmies, Bushmen, Bambuti, Mbuti, San, Khoi, Khoi-Khoi, Khoi-Khoin, Hottentots, !Kung, etc. "Harmless people" (Thomas, 1958); Thomas describes how the San much prefer to flee and hide from danger rather than to fight. "[T]he !Kung are a people who devalue aggression" (Draper, 1978). Lee (1979) argued that the !Kung had a fairly violent society, with a homicide rate of 29.3 per 100.000 person/years. The !Kung have such a fear of vioence that they split their groups in order to avoid it. Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1974 et seq.) has focused on the !Kung/!Ko Bushmen to expose ’the myth of the aggression-free hunter-gatherer societies’. "Im Grunde ist es rätselhaft, wieso gerade die Buschleute zum Typus der nichtterritorialen Jägers und Sammlers hochstilisiert werden konnten, denn gerade von ihnen liegen viele Zeugnisse zum Gegenteil vor. So stellen sie sich in ihren Felsmalereien aus der Vorkontaktzeit im Kampf gegeneinander dar - und zwar im Kleinkrieg, Gruppe gegen Gruppe" (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1986). "Nach Wilhelms Schilderung überfallen die bewaffneten Männer im Morgengrauen die Werft der feindlichen Gruppe. Sie töten alle, die nicht fliehen können, auch Frauen und Kinder, stecken die Hütten in Brand und nehmen die Gegenstände, die sie tragen können, als Beute mit... Bei den interethnischen Auseinandersetzungen waren die Buschleute oft Angreifer, da sie das Vieh der Hirtenvölker zu rauben suchten" (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1975). This is, however, a blatant example of what might be called the essentialist fallacy: Once a thief, always a thief. The !Kung were certainly not aggression-free or nonviolent, and they were exquisitely capable of defending themselves. Bonta (1997) states: "Clearly from the literature, overall they had a fairly, if not highly peaceful society. Whereas they did, on occasion, experience violent conflicts, Lee's analysis [of their high rate of murders] appears to exaggerate the evidence". The Khoisan (with the possible exception of the Batwa) just did not habitually engage in offensive warfare in recent times. Murdock (1959) states about the Batwa: "Though the Pygmies are in general peaceful, interband feuds and even warfare sometimes occur. Unlike their Negro neighbors, however, the Pygmies do not indulge in cannibalism". All the other sources are essentially in agreement that the Khoisan are not warlike. Perhaps Wood (1868) is nearest to the truth: "Of systematic warfare the Bosjesmans know nothing, although they are perhaps the most dangerous enemies that a man can have". About the Colonial Hottentots the sources are generally in agreement, too: "As far as is known, the Hottentots never made war, according to the usual acceptation of the word. If insulted or aggrieved by having their cattle stolen, they would go off and make reprisals, but they had no idea of carrying on a war for any political object" (Wood, 1868). "Warfare is confined to petty raids and blood feuds among neighboring bands" (Murdock, 1959), though earlier (Murdock, 1934) he had written about the Hottentots:

"Jealousy, petty quarrels, and shifting alliances characterized intertribal relations. A cattle raid, the abduction of a woman, or an unwarranted encroachment upon the territory of another tribe converts latent antagonism into open warfare". In Wright’s (1942) list the Batua are coded as Defensive War, while both the Bushmen and the Colonial Hottentots (doubling as Khoi-Khoin), as well as the Korana, are coded Social War. Turnbull (1965) states of the Mbuti (Bambuti) that "Physical violence as a means for settling a dispute is abhorred as sacrilege". Van den Berghe (1981) presents the following comprehensive inventory of explanations of Bambuti peacefulness, which also have a more universal validity: "The Bambuti are among the few ’peaceful’ human groups. In recent times, they have not waged war, either between Bambuti bands or with their Bantu neighbors, and they seldom resort to violence in the settlement of disputes either within or between bands. Conflicts and arguments are settled by public discussion, compromise and social pressure - primarily ridicule and witchcraft. Each band has its hunting and foraging territory, and territorial disputes are relatively rare. Several complementary explanations help to account for this unusually idyllic state of affairs. First, the colonial administration imposed, by superior force, a Pax belgica on both Bantu and Bambuti. ’Intertribal warfare’ was suppressed by the Force publique, the Belgian colonial army. Second, between Bantu and Bambuti, a mutually beneficial relationship exists... that would be destroyed by violence. The two do not directly compete with each other, as each is specialized for completely different niches. Third, the Bambuti, being much less numerous and less cohesively organized than the Bantu, find it prudent not to antagonize them. Fourth, the Bantu would find the Bambuti elusive and hardly worth the effort to attack since they possess little of value that cannot be obtained by peaceful trade. Fifth, while Bambuti bands do compete with each other, forest resources are abundant, and therefore the competition is not severe. Sixth, since families frequently change bands and since individuals commonly marry outside their own band, neighboring bands are linked by numerous ties of kinship and marriage, so that the peace group, and indeed the ethny are the Bambuti as a whole, not the individual band". Formerly, Schebesta (1941) reported on Bambuti territoriality: "Das Eindringen Fremder zum Zwecke der Jagd- und Nahrungsbeuterei ist unstatthaft und führt zu Zwistigkeiten und Kriegen. Befreundeten und verschwägerten Nachbargruppen wird allenfals das Recht zugestanden, die Grenzen gelegentlich zu überschreiten". The historical moment of !Kung San peaceability seems to have been between the mid-1950s and the mid-1970s: "the heyday of their equestrian cattle raiding was long over, their refuge still intact, and their homicide rate low (Lee, 1984). Later, as armed recruits for a hierarchical society which richly rewards violence, protected from their enemies by their comrades in arms, dealing with traditional enemies with whom they have no social ties, San, like some nonviolent Malaysian indigenes in similar circumstances, again became violent enough to earn their keep" (Dentan, 1992). Similarly, Thomas (1994) reports of the original 'Harmless People': "In the forty years between 1950 and 1990, the Ju/wa Bushmen of Nyae Nyae in Namibia have found it increasingly more difficult to deal with inter-group aggression. That this change accompanies a dramatic change in economic conditions suggests that the old ways of coping were part of a long-term economic and cultural stability that the Ju/wasi of Nyae Nyae once enjoyed and that the new ways of life are disrupting... In conclusion, it was my impression that the peacekeeping efforts of the Ju/wasi of Nyae Nyae, in the past if not in the present, were not so much the product of a people who in some state of Utopian idealism had assigned negative moral values to violence, but rather the products of a people who were highly pragmatic and realistic, who understood full well the kind of devastation that violence could unleash, and who - until cultural destruction and alcoholism arrived in Nyae Nyae to erode Ju/wa society - had the will and the self-control to block violence before it got started". Textor (1967) codes the !Kung as a culture where warfare is prevalent, and the Nama as a culture where warfare is prevalent, bellicosity extreme, and military glory emphasized. Wilmsen (1989) argued that the culture of the Kalahari San is a culture of poverty, an adaptation to marginality, powerlessness, and subordination and exploitation by their Bantu-speaking neighbors. Finally, Konner (1982) contended: "While the !Kung, like most hunter-gatherers, do not have war or other organized group

conflicts, their explicitly stated contempt for non-San people, for San people speaking languages other than !Kung, and even for !Kung in other village camps who are not relatives, makes it perfectly clear that if they had the technological opportunity and the ecological necessity to make war, they would probably be capable of the requisite emotions, despite of their oft-stated opposition to and fear of war" (quoted in Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1984). According to Featherman (1885), "The Hill Damaras are rather cowardly, and are hardly ever involved in war, unless they are placed in the necessity of defending themselves from the attacks of their enemies, which happens very rarely, for they possess no cattle, nor any other property that is desirable as an object of plunder". Fromm (1974) counts the Mbutu as belonging to is ’Life-affirmative’ societies, and the Hottentots to the ’Nondestructive-aggressive’ societies. Ross (1985) codes the Mbuti as Infrequent Physical Violence, and the !Kung as Low External Conflict. Kofyar (Africa): "From a summary of 37 recorded instances of armed conflict among the Kofyar, it is apparent that casualties were low and tended to be fairly evenly distributed between the opposing sides. No single engagement seems to have cost more than five lives, and many skirmishes took place without any fatalities" (Netting, 1973). Kogi (Kogui, Cagaba) (South America): Kogi society condemns all manifestations of aggressiveness: murder, arson, rape, and vandalism are almost unknown. Petty thefts do occur and drunken fistfights are fairly frequent. The Kogi are a quarrelsome people. Kogi traditions speak of many conflict situations in the past, some of them going back to the Spanish Conquest, whereas others refer to past intertribal warfare. There has been no tribal revolt established authority since 1600, and the Kogi pride themselves on their peaceable attitudes in the face of outside pressures or occasional interpersonal tensions (Reichel-Dolmatoff, 1994). Krepi (Africa): "Of the Ewe-speaking Krepi the same author (Ratzel, 1895) says that they are peaceably disposed and industrious [cf. Westermann, 1912]. This is also, according to Mr. Partridge (1905) the case with the Aros Negroes" (Holsti, 1913). Kubu (Sumatra): The Kubus are the paragons of primitive peacefulness (Forbes, 1884, 1885,; Van Dongen, 1906 et seq.; Van der Bij, 1929; Hobhouse et al., 1915; Smith, 1930) "[U]nkriegerisches, friedsames Völkchen" (Hagen, 1908). "The Kubus of Sumatra are another peaceably inclined group which is said to dislike aggressive war. They resemble the Veddahs also in being timid toward strangers. Forbes (1885) says: 'They are so timorous and shy that it is a rare circumstance for any one to see them... They are so afraid of seeing anyone not of their own race that if suddenly met or come up with in the forest, they will drop everything and flee away.' These are certainly not bellicose characteristics. Forbes, in fact, was struck by 'their extreme submissiveness, their want of independence and will; they seemed too meek ever to act on the offensive'" (Davie, 1929). Coded No War by Hobhouse et al. (1915), and Defensive War by Wright (1942). Kukatas (Australia): "The Kukatas are universally feared and abominated apparently more on account of their 'reputed skill in witchcraft and various other dangerous tricks than for their warlike qualities' (Schürmann, 1879). Hence peaceful tribes need not as a matter of course be doomed to disappear in the struggle for existence" (Holsti, 1913). See also: Aboriginals. Kwakiutl (North America): Textor (1967) codes the Kwakiutl as a culture where bellicosity is moderate or negligible, but, nevertheless, warfare is prevalent and military glory emphasized. Codere (1990) explains: "The Kwakiutl once consisted of around 30 autonomous groups usually identified as 'tribes'. Relations among the Kwakiutl tribes were not stabilized on any Kwakiutl-wide basis until about 1900 when potlatching with its attendant social alliances, relations, and social

ranking of tribes became a system in which all participated. In the earlier days of the historical period, which is well reported upon from about the mid-1800s, the picture is one of fairly close and dependable alliances between neighboring tribes, but more infrequent and even strained relations beyond such clusters of neighbors. However, even relatives in neighboring tribes were not safe from the type of head-hunting that took place on the occasion of the death of some close relative and was designed to both honor the deceased and to ’let someone else wail’ (Boas, 1921), and acts of blood revenge in which the aim was to kill either a person of social rank equal to that of the deceased or several persons of lower rank in the offending kin group (Boas, 1966). By about 1850 (Curtis, 190730) such practices had ceased. Kwakiutl external relations were even less free of the possibility of violence than their internal relations until 1865, which is the final date of any intertribal hostilities (Codere, 1950). The kind and degree of violence ranged from the sort of mourning or revenge raid that could take place among the various Kwakiutl tribes themselves to the outright predatory warfare the southernmost Kwakiutl, the Lekwiltok, waged against the Comox (Northern Coast Salish), driving them out of their lands and villages between the Salmon River and Cape Mudge (Taylor & Duff, 1956). The Lekwiltok also raided Central and Southern Coast Salish groups, taking heads and captives (Hill-Tout, 1907; Codere, 1950). The scale and territorial aims of Lekwiltok warfare set them apart from other Kwakiutl. In one view (Codere, 1950, 1961; Hawthorn, Belshaw & Jamieson, 1958), the term ’warfare’ is inappropriate for the kind of raiding, headhunting, and opportunistic acts of violence the Kwakiutl, apart from the truly warlike Lekwiltok, practiced and suffered. In another view (Ferguson, 1984), the Kwakiutl, like other Northwest Coast peoples, fought for loot, slaves, and territory as well as for vengeance". The Kwakiutl are coded Economic War by Wright (1942) (which seems inappropriate), and PE by Hobhouse et al. (1915). Ladaki/Ladakhi (Eurasia): "According to Ratzel (1895), the Ladaki are a peaceful, hardworking people among whom murder, stealing or violence are almost unknown and the Batti are merry and good-natured" (Holsti, 1913). Peacefulness among the Tibetan Ladakhi, Mann (1986) observes, is a result of their Buddhist beliefs and their adaptation to the harsh natural environment: cooperation is essential for survival. Major crimes are unknown, and when individuals violate important social norms without repenting, villages may, as a last resort, ostracize them. Norberg-Hodge (1991), who lived for 16 years aming the Ladakhis, described aggression as "extremely rare". Villagers who were asked about the nonviolence in their communities indicated that "there has been no fighting in the village in living memory" (Bonta, 1997). Lapps (Eurasia): "The Lapps [Saami, Sami], for somewhat the same reasons as apply in the case of the Greenlanders, are said to be ’extremely peaceful, possessing no offensive weapons, carrying on no inter-tribal feuds, kind, good-natured, and, except in Russia, strictly honest and trustworthy" (Davie, 1929, quoting Keane, 1886). Featherman (1891) stated that "they are peacefully inclined, and scarcely ever engage in quarrels". Textor (1967) codes the Lapps as a culture where warfare is not prevalent, where bellicosity is moderate or negligible, and military glory negligibly emphasized. Lau Islanders (Oceania): Textor codes the Lau Islanders as a culture where bellicosity is moderate or negligible, and where military glory is negligibly emphasized. If true, they are exceptional in the highly warlike Fijian context. Lepcha (Eurasia): The Lepcha of Sikkim are described by all observers as extremely peaceful (Gorer, 1938; Hooker, 1854; Morris, 1938). "As to the Lepchas, Hooker (1854) makes the following remarks: ’That six or seven different tribes, without any feudal system or coercive head, with different languages and customs, should dwell in close proximity and in peace within the confined territory of Sikkim, even for a limited period, is an anomaly... Wars have been waged amongst them, but they were neither sanguinary nor destructive, and the fact remains no less remarkable, that

at the period of our occupying Dorjiling, friendship and unanimity existed amongst all those tribes; from the Tibetan at 14000 feet to the Meche of the plains..." (Holsti, 1913). The Lepcha almost completely suppress competitiveness and aggression, and strongly disapprove of quarreling. When quarrels do occur, mutual friends try to resolve the problems. If that fails, village leaders will discuss the issues and threaten heavy fines to force the people to patch up their differences (Gorer, 1938, 1967; Bonta, 1993, 1997). Textor (1967) codes the Lepcha as a culture where bellicosity is moderate or negligible, and military glory is negligibly emphasized. The Lepcha are coded Social War by Wright (1942). Ross codes the Lepcha as Low External Conflict. Lesu (Oceania): Textor (1967) codes the Lesu people as a culture where bellicosity is moderate or negligible, and military glory is negligibly emphasized. It is not clear on what sources this coding is based. Powdermaker (1931, 1933) relates a quite different story. "The Lesu people said that war captives were just another meat dish, wrapped in leaves and baked in the ovens, and savored as food without any idea of acquiring spiritual power" (Turney-High, 1949; referring to Powdermaker). Until recently, when it was prohibited by the white government, there was fighting between the villages. Lhota/Lhota Naga (India): "The Lhota Nagas are, contrary to the Semas who are ferocious and warlike, a quiet and industrious people" (Fuchs, 1973). Hodson (1911) stated of the Naga in general that they aim in their battles more at blows than actual killing (in Holsti, 1913). Li (Eurasia): "Many primitive Chinese tribes have never been at war" states Numelin (1950), referring especially to the Li tribes of Hainan (Stübel & Meriggi, 1937; Hobhouse, 1906). Loyalty Islanders (Oceania): The Loyalty Islanders were divided into mutually hostile moieties which fought periodically but not too destructively without economic or political objectives or consequences (Wedgwood, 1930; Q.Wright, 1942). Shouting, frightful gestures, and screaming were more important than discipline, order, and the subordination of the individual (Hadfield, 1920; Turney-High, 1949). Lunda (Africa): "Among the Lunda in the interior part of Angola war plays such a small role that the younger generation know very little of war ('weiß über Kriegstaktik und dergleichen nichts mehr zu sagen') (Baumann, 1935)" (Numelin, 1950). Featherman (1885) stated: "The Balonda are a warlike race, and they are always ready to undertake a predatory expedition, either to break the resistance of some rebellious chief, or attack some neighbouring tribe with the avowed object of executing an act of retaliatory vengeance. At the first encounter they raise the most fearful war-cry and show the greatest ferocity in their onset; but as soon as a few of their men are wounded they abandon the ground, and each one makes his escape as best he can". Machicui/Machicuys (South America): Warfare largely defensive (De Azara, 1809; Van der Bij, 1929). Possibly a more peaceful Lengua subdivision. Machiguenga/Matsigenka (South America): Warfare largely defensive; neither exo- nor endocannibalism (Steward & Métraux, 1948). The Machiguenga (Matsigenka) have inhabited their present territory (Rio Urubamba and Rio Madre de Dios) since long before the Spanish Conquest. It may be called a 'refuge zone', in the sense of being a niche in a somewhat less favorable environment than surrounding ones, where they have sought to live peaceably and to be left alone. The Machiguenga were surrounded to the north, east, and south by Arawakan and Panoan groups among whom warfare was endemic. At least as early as the mid-19th century, the Machiguenga were described as less fierce than their neighbors and more likely to avoid violence. Early

socialization and shaming are quite effective in teaching people to control aggressive impulses. Late in the 20th century conflict with outside groups is at a minimum (Johnson & Johnson, 1994). Macu/Maku (South America): "The Macu seem to have been singularly peaceful and furnished many captives to more warlike tribes" (Gillin, 1948). Koch-Grünberg (1900) and Van der Bij (1929) report the same. Madi (Africa): The Madi peoples of Central Sudan are composed of groups of diverse ethnic origins including Lugbara, Bongo (Dor), Lendu, Logo, Mittu and Moru. "Unfamiliar with warfare, except in the form of petty raiding, and defenseless because of their dispersed settlement pattern, the peoples of the Madi and Sara clusters have been unable to offer serious resistance to better organized groups impinging on them from all directions" (Murdock, 1959). Maidu and Nisenan/Nishinan/Neeshenam (North America): Most 'warfare' among the Maidu involved petty feuding between villages in a village-community or between village-communities. There were also traditional enmities with Washo, Yana, and Achumawi (Dixon, 1905; Kroeber, 1925; Riddell, 1978). Hostilities between the Maidu and Wintun of the valley were intermittent and most probably affairs of individual villages (Kroeber, 1925). "Often [Maidu] war was associated with blood revenge and could be avoided by meeting a demanded price as restitution... warning of an attack was given with smoke signals and fire" (Riddell, 1978). Hoebel (1949) tells the following amusing story: "In prearranged fights among the Maidu of California both sides lined up out of arrow range, women and children behind the chiefs of both sides standing together on a knoll to watch the fun. When all was ready, the young men of the 'defendants' advanced within range, unarmed. A volley of arrows was released against them. But because the men had been trained as artful dodgers since boyhood, no one would be hit. While they retired to get their weapons, the children of the attackers ran out to pick up the arrows for reuse. Next their fighters advanced to be shot at. So it went for hours, until at last some tired leaper was struck. At this, his side, defeated, broke and ran. The victors chased them with yells of triumph. Those who were caught were pummeled. Then it was over. Everyone returned to the battlefield. The women brought forth food, and both sides together enjoyed a peace feast - or was it a picnic? The victors paid compensation to the losers for having wounded their man". Large-group, organized warfare was also uncommon for the Nisenan. Differences were usually caused by trespass and ranged from random feuds between families to raids and surprise attacks. Often challenges were sent and battleground and time agreed upon before the battle (Faye, 1923; Beals, 1933; Wilson, 1957; Wilson & Towne, 1978). "The Neeshenams adopted a time taboo. 'Revenge must be had within twelve months after the murder or not at all'" (Davie, 1929; quoting Bancroft, 1875). The Nisenan tribelets were exceptional, according to Jorgensen (1980), in that "They are said to have mounted more offensive raids than the average California tribelet". Among the Nisenan, male war captives were sometimes tortured, and female war captives sometimes married and sometimes slain (Powers, 1877; Hobhouse et al., 1915). The Nishinan are coded Social War by Wright (1942), and PS by Hobhouse et al. (1915). See also: Californians Makalaka (Africa): "The Makalakas, said to be the best tillers among the natives of South Africa, were very peaceful; they were conquered by the nomadic Zulus" (Davie, 1929; referring to Holub, 1881). Malabarese (Eurasia): "Magellan, according to Stefan Zweig, says the natives on the Malabar Peninsula were peaceable, living in a golden age, without care: 'Questi popoli vivano con justicia, peso e misura; amano la pace, l'otio e la quiete'. Magellan also states, writing of the natives of the Ladrones Islands, that these children of nature were so inexperienced in the art of killing that when

they suddenly felt the Spaniards’ arrows in their bodies they could not understand how these sharp, feathered things could do harm" (Numelin, 1950). Malapantaram/Malapandaram (Eurasia): The Malapantaram are a nomadic people with a strong emphasis on equality of the sexes, individual autonomy, frequent separation and forming of new groups, no group formation above the family level, and no assertion of territoriality. "[T]heir extreme nomadism, the ’timidity they indicate in the village setting’, and the ’non-violent image’ they express, are clearly related to the harassment and bullying they receive from the agricultural peoples of the plains" (Morris, 1982; see also Bonta, 1993, 1996). Traditionally, the Malapantaram lacked weapons of any kind (Fürer-Haimendorf, 1960). The northern Pakistani tribes (Badeshi, Burusha, Kolai, Punjabi Pahari, Shina, Shumashti, Kho) are known as quiet and peace-loving peoples. Malays (Malaysia/Indonesia): Very inconsistent evidence. On the one hand, "War to the Malays is the noblest occupation. The warriors are ranked and graded according to the number of brave deeds" (Jähns, 1880; in Davie, 1929). On the other hand, the peoples of Malaya are described as very unwarlike (Ratzel, 1894; Skeat, 1902; Skeat & Blagden, 1906; Winstedt, 1950). In Malaysia, "the armies generally have champions, who, fantastically attired, challenge the hostile champions to single combat" (Davie, 1929; quoting Brinton, 1886). "In speaking of the Malays in general Ratzel (1894) observes that not all of them are warlike; on the contrary, some of them undoubtedly are mild, peaceable, quiet and polite, to those over them submissive and seldom inclined to commit offences" (Holsti, 1913). "The Malays have always been regarded as rather peaceful... The most primitive tribes in Java are also described as peaceable and polite (Raffles, 1817)... The natives of Celebes are said to be very peaceable (Sarasin & Sarasin, 1905)" (Numelin, 1950). The Malays are coded Economic War by Wright (1942) and PS by Hobhouse et al. (1915). Manam Islanders (New Guinea): According to Bjerre (n.d.), the Manam Islanders had no weapons, and enjoyed peace through insular isolation. Manansa (Africa): "The Manansas, too, were splendid agriculturists in former times, and peace was their pride. 'They hated to fight, and they killed their game in traps or holes in the ground. When the Matabele [who are cattle raisers and very warlike] came into their country the Manansas threw their assegais to the ground and said, 'We do not want to fight...'" (Davie, 1929, quoting Holub, 1881). Mandai (Eurasia): "Among the Mandai in Iraq war is prohibited. The people say: 'We may not fight, because it is forbidden to us to kill' (Drower, 1937)" (Numelin, 1950). Mandan (North America): Warfare mainly defensive (Catlin, 1841; Lewis & Clark, 1814; Van der Bij, 1929; Stammel, 1977). Davie (1929), referring to Dellenbaugh (1901), describes their war adornments, which suggests that the warrior status conferred some prestige. Stammel (1977) says that Lewis & Clark called them extraordinarily peaceful. Traditionally, the Mandan had a strong belief in internal harmony and intravillage disagreements usually resulted in the unhappy segment moving to another village (Schneider, 1991). In Wright's (1942) list the Mandan are coded Economic War, though it is not clear on what grounds. Mandja (Africa): "Les Mandja ont une manière assez inoffensive de faire la guerre. Ils n'ont pas plus de tactique que d'entente... Quand deux bandes se trouvent inopinément face à face, leur premier mouvement est de lancer leurs trombaches ou leurs sagaies, et le deuxième de s'enfuir" (Gaud & Van Overbergh, 1911; quoted by Van der Bij, 1929). War is over at the first casualty. Women and children are spared. The Mandja are coded Social War by Wright (1942), and PS/PA/CA by Hobhouse et al. (1915).

Manganja (Africa): "The Manganja of Nyassaland... ’are a very unwarlike tribe - they themselves say with perfect unconcern that ’every Manganja has the heart of a chicken’’. The effect of their lack of fighting spirit is to be seen in the fact that for fifty years or so before the British pacified the country in 1891-1892, they were harried, raided and enslaved by their neigbors. ’Their language has become a sort of lingua franca all over southern Nyassaland, owing, no doubt, to their having been the slaves of every tribe’" (Davie, 1929, quoting Moggridge, 1902). Manihikians (Oceania): Strate (1985) calls the Manihikians rather peaceful. Piddington (1950) states that in Manihiki and Rakahanga (Hervey Islands) there were occasional family quarrels, but nothing which could properly be called warfare. Manus (New Guinea): "Among the Manus in New Guinea people seem to have abolished war" (Numelin, 1950; referring to Mead, 1930). On the other hand, prior to colonial control, raiding and open warfare between villages were common. Conflict was common when mainland or island groups moved to coastal land, and so it helped maintain the ecological division of villages and the related trade system. Intravillage, interclan fighting occurred, but such conflicts seem to have been unusual and informal, though sorcery attacks among villagers did occur. Such fighting could lead to village fission. Modern intervillage conflict is not common (Carrier, 1991); Textor codes the Manus as a culture where military glory is emphasized; Fromm counts the Manus among his Nondestructive-aggressive societies. Marquesas Islanders (Oceania): "Speaking of the Marquesas Islanders, Dr. Toutain (1898) remarks: 'Les guerres étaient en général peu meurtrières, car il y avait rarement de véritable batailles. Elles consistaient en un état d'hostilité se traduisant par des ambuscades, des surprises d'une case, l'enlèvement d'un isolé, d'une pirogue qui s'écartait" (Holsti, 1913). On the other hand, Textor (1967) codes the Marquesans as a culture where bellicosity is extreme, and Wright (1942) coded Economic War. Mardu/Mardujarra (Australia): Mardu(jarra) is the collective name for the tribes of the Gibson Desert of Western Australia, mainly Gardujarra (Kartudjara), Budijarra (Potidjara), Gurajarra, Manyjilyjarra (Mandjildjara), and Giyajarra (Keiadjara). "There is no ethnographic evidence of any longstanding intergroup animosity akin to feud among the Mardu, and no word exists for either feud or warfare in their language. Conflict was closely controlled traditionally, and the ritualized settlement of disputes was a vital preliminary to every 'big meeting'" (Tonkinson, 1991). See also: Aboriginals. Masco (South America): Warfare largely defensive; neither exo- nor endocannibalism (Steward & Métraux, 1948). Mataco (South America): The Mataco (Mataguayo) are "reputed to be a peaceful tribe" (Métraux, 1946), after a turbulent and belligerent past. The Mataco and Toba have ceased killing each other only in recent times. Maué (South America): Nimuendaju (1948) calls the Maué (Mauhé, Mauhes) peaceloving, but also mentions that they warred with the Mundurucu. Mainly defensive warfare against Mundurucu depredations? Maya (Early) (Meso-America): The early Maya were considered peaceful by Brinton (1882); "... they seem to have been 'an ancient race of mild manners'" (Holsti, 1913). The Maya state probably

collapsed into destructive warfare (warring-states) beginning with Ruler 2 (698-725) (Clendinnen, 1987). Medjertines (Africa) According to Featherman (1885) "The Medjertines [Somali] are of a peaceable disposition, and inter-tribal warfare is not practised among them. When they are involved in war with their neighbours, which happens but rarely, the hostilities are of very little consequence, and but very little blood is shed". Mentawei/Mentawai/Mentawez Islanders (Indonesia): "Warfare hardly existed, in cases of disagreement or quarrels, one moved to another village... In the old days headhunting was practiced but only Siberut was notorious in this respect" (Nooy-Palm, 1972, 1976; Cf. Van der Bij, 1929; Rosenberg, 1878). "In Paggi or Pageh Island, off Sumatra, where there is no government, but every man protects himself, the people nevertheless ’live on peaceable and friendly terms with each other; quarrels are rare and murder almost unknown’ (Frazer, 1910)" (Holsti, 1913; Numelin, 1950). The Mentawei Islanders are coded Economic War by Wright (1942) and PS by Hobhouse et al. (1915). Meru (Africa): The Meru of Mt.Kenya have established rules of war which protect all private property except livestock from confiscation in raids (Fadiman, 1980; Tefft, 1988). Mikir/Mikir Naga (India): "The Mikirs took no part in the internecine feuds of the other tribes" (Fuchs, 1973). Minangkabau (Sumatra): "When speaking of the distant past, the Minangkabau sometimes refer to parang batu, lit. ’stone wars’. In those days villages were often surrounded by hedges or groves of a type of bamboo having sharp protrusions. Usually there were also forested areas around villages where guards could hide themselves and waylay hostile intruders. A common contemporary tactic one which probably has a long history - is called hilang malam, lit. ’lost at night’; it usually consists of abduction and murder. In most cases, nothing further is heard of the victim. There is no record of either headhunting or cannibalism among the Minangkabau" (Tanner, 1972, 1976). Mishikhwutmetunne (North America): The Mishikhwutmetunne or Upper Coquille of Oregon "were careful no to kill too many of the enemy so that they would have enough wealth to pay for the slain... If a battle developed [only when all negotiations had failed] the sides separated when the first person was killed" (Miller & Seaburg, 1990). The same may be true of the other Athapaskans of Southwest Oregon: the Upper Umpqua (’peaceful’: Bakken, 1973), Dakubetede (GalliceApplegate), Tututni and Chetco (Tolowa), as well as the neighboring Siuslawans and Coosans (Siuslaw, Lower Umpqua, Hanis, Miluk and Lower Coquille) (Zenk, 1990). Mishmi (India): The Mishmi are described as a very unwarlike people (Dalton, 1872). "The Mishmis... described as quiet, inoffensive, not warlike, and only occasionally uniting in selfdefence" (Spencer, 1876, probably referring to Dalton, 1872). "the Mishmis, another peaceable race, are occupied with barter (Dalton, 1872)" (Holsti, 1913). The Mishmi are coded Social War by Wright (1942). Molala (North America): In the north, Molalas were in close contact with Upper Chinookans, with whom they enjoyed cordial relations characterized by intermarriage and exchanges of foods and valuables (Jacobs, 1929-1930; Drucker, 1934). A number of Kalapuyan-Molala marriages have been reported. Reports of Molala-Klamath intermarriage, coresidence, and cooperation suggest contact between these two groups throughout the entire area of Molala occupation. Some problems of documentation and interpretation complicate the description of Molala contacts on the east,

especially in the Warm Springs region. According to Murdock (1938: 397-398), aggressive Tenino Sahaptins attacked resident Molala in this area sometimes around 1810-1820, dispossessing them from a fishing site on the Deschutes River and an associated winter village site. However, Warm Springs Reservation informants interviewed by Rigsby and David French (see Rigsby, 1969: 81-82) could recall no tradition of Sahaptin-Molala conflict (Zenk & Rigsby, 1998: 439-440). See also: Columbians. Moriori (Chatham Islands): "The Moriori of the Chatham Islands were a very unwarlike people" (Davie, 1929, referring to Tregear, 1904). The Moriori were all but exterminated by the Maori. "As for the Moriori, their chief causes of quarrel were ’curses and insulting and derisive songs at one another’s women’ (Shand, 1905)... The Moriori were a peaceable people (Mair, 1905)" (Holsti, 1913). Mosetene (Leco) (South America): According to d’Orbigny (1835), the Mosetene were not warlike (Nieboer, 1910). The Mosetene were well disposed toward the Spaniards. Métraux (1946) does not mention any hostilities whatsoever. Mota (Banks Islands, New Hebrides): "Bishop Codrington states on the Banks Islands: These people had bows, but the real fight was 'shouting of defiance, cursing, abuse and boasting', and stamping the ground with little bloodshed... After commenting on their dislike for close fighting and love of boasting, a missionary (Coombe, 1911) says of the Gaua warriors on Santa Maria, Banks Islands, that six men like to lie in wait for one victim. If the first shot fails, they take to their heels and wait for better luck next time. If they succeed, they may expect the dead man's kin to try the same thing on them" (Turney-High, 1949). Textor (1967) codes the Mota as a culture where warfare is prevalent. Moxo (South America): The Moxos or Musus (a group of some 26 tribes) are described as very peaceful by Markham (1895, 1910). "The Moxos are a grave, sedate, and thoughful people, and fond of cultivating the soil. They have set aside the bow and arrow, and taken up the lasso, which they handle well. They are civil, quiet, peaceable, and seldom quarrel among themselves. The Bolivians treat them worse than slaves. They number over 30,000 souls, settled in fifteen mission villages..." (Markham, 1895, 1910). The Cayuvava (one of the group) are described as 'quite unwarlike'. In Wright's (1942) list the Moxo are coded Social War. Nago (Africa): The tribes belonging to the Nago group are described as peaceful (Ratzel, 1895). Wright (1942) coded the Nagos as Social War, suggesting some feuding. "... speaking of the tribes belonging to the Nago group, Ratzel (1895) informs us that they are extremely industrious, and have mild manners. In many descriptions they come before us as a pattern people" (Holsti, 1913). Naikens/Nayaka (Eurasia): The Naikens or Nayaka (a Kurumba subgroup), numbering about 1.400 people in 1981, live in the Indian Nilgiri Hills. Conflicts are rare because they live as families relatively autonomously from one another, avoiding both conflict and cooperation with others by moving away from potential confrontation (Bonta, 1993, 1997). They have no concept of a common territory (Bird-David, 1989) and communal fighting is nonexistent. The few conflicts that occur are mainly over women. Napo (South America): "The Napo Indians of Ecuador are said to possess no arms for warfare... These Indians are also reported as being 'timid towards man' and 'inoffensive', though in their past history they were well acquainted with real warfare" (Davie, 1929, referring to Simpson, 1883). Davie does not explain how they could be well acquainted with warfare without weapons for war.

Navaho/Navajo/Najabo (North America): War frequent in former times (Bancroft, 1875; Van der Bij, 1929). Driver (1961) states: "The predatory character of the Navaho and Apache bands can be seen in their relations with the Pueblos. The economic motive... dominates all other causes of hostilities". The contemporary Navaho are very peaceful (W.Davis, 1857). "The Najabos ’have ever been known as a pastoral and peaceful race of men’ (Davis, 1857)" (Holsti, 1913). "Navajo war parties mounted raids on neighboring groups. Hill (1936) says that in general the Navajo disapproved of warfare. In most cases, war parties were motivated by the desire for plunder. However, Hill notes that ’the majority were opposed to these expeditions and the local headmen did all in their power to suppress them’. The people involved in offensive warfare ’were always members of a single locality or at most of a district’. As a nation, the Navajo never mounted warfare for conquest" (Sanday, 1986). Forbes (1960) stated that the Spaniards and not the Athapaskans were responsible for the increased warfare after the arrival of the Spaniards. Bailey (1966) declared that the documentary record shows that "the Navajos did not make war just to steal and kill, they earned their reputation as warriors fighting to protect their lands, property and families - and a just cause it was" (quoted in Roessel, 1983). Textor (1967) codes the Navaho as a culture where bellicosity is moderate or negligible, but where warfare is nevertheless prevalent, and military glory emphasized. The Navahoes are coded Economic War by Wright (1942). Ndjavi (Africa): The Ndjavi (Ndjabi, Njavi, etc.] are described by du Chaillu (1863, 1867) as very timid and unwarlike (in Van der Bij, 1929). They were expelled from their territory by the Ashangui. Negritos of Philippines (Philippines): Also called Aëta, Agta, Aita, etc, these comprise the Alangan, Batak (Baatak, Bateq), Buid (Bu'id, Buhid), Hanunoo, Iraya, Mamanua, Manobo (Bagobo), Palawan, Subanun (Subanos), Tagbanua (Tagbanuwa), Taubuid, Tiruray, a.o. (cf. LeBar, 1975; Gibson, 1986; Dentan, 1992; Scott, 1979). With the exception of the Bagobo, the Negritos were very peaceful. "Very peaceful character" (Vanoverbergh, 1925). "As a people the Mamanua are peace-loving... Even during the time when they were hunted down by the Manobos they never mounted any punitive party against the marauders" (Maceda, 1977). "In western Mindanao, ethnic groups such as the Subanun (Frake, 1960) are devoid of any headhunting practices and warfare was not a cultural institution" (Yengoyan, 1977). "The Tagbanua do not engage in warfare" (Warren, 1977). "The Buid are very peaceful" (Gibson, 1986). The Buid "can be placed in a category of relatively 'peaceful' societies because of the complete absence of any social situation in which aggressive conduct is assigned a positive value" (Gibson, 1989). "This is not to say that acts which we, or the Buid, would interpret as aggressive never occur, but that such acts are viewed as deviations from the ideals of Buid political culture. The facts that acts of violence... are consistently condemned; and the lack of any positive evaluation of acts of 'bravery' or 'courage', probably does result in a lower rate of intentional maiming and homicide among the Buid than among populations which attach positive evaluations to such acts" (Gibson, 1986). Gibson indicated that the Buid never quarrel and never "show any signs of aggression of violence" (Bonta, 1997). Dentan (1992) considers as peaceful peoples comparable to Buid the hill peoples of Palawan (Palawan, Tagbanuwa, Batak); Mindoro (Hanunoo, Taubuid, Alangan, Iraya), and Mindanao (Subanun, Tiruray); Wana of Sulawesi and Sulod of Panay. In Zambales society intragroup conflict is to be avoided at all costs (Fox, 1953). Among the Hanunoo "Warfare, either actual or traditional is absent" (Conklin, 1954; LeBar, 1975). The Batak of Palawan (not to be confused with Borneo Batak) have never waged war (Warren, 1977); Present-day Subanun consider any kind of violent behavior highly undesirable. It is not clear whether this was the case prior to Spanish and Moro pacification. There is some evidence that the death of a highly regarded individual formerly required the killing of a victim by the relatives, in order to provide a soul companion for the deceased (Frake,

1967; LeBar, 1975). Among the Tiruray "Disputes, unless negotiated, may lead to vengeance killings, accomplished by a few men lying in ambush or creeping under a house to kill the occupants. There is no evidence of headhunting or cannibalism... Relations with the Manobo are generally peaceful" (Moore, 1975). "Warfare is an undertaking that the Manobo does not take up easily. Most of the killings are activities of a person or member of one family... Headhunting and cannibalism have not been reported in Manoboland" (Maceda, 1977). Also Manuel (1977) reports: "Inter-village or inter-tribal feuding was rampant before the recent war and retaliation is still the norm... There is no headhunting in Manuvu land, but human sacrifice was practiced in the past". Other sources documented headhunting among the Bagobo (Blumentritt, 1882 et seq.; Van der Bij, 1929). Hobhouse et al. (1915) report of the Manobo (based on Blumentritt, 1892): "Constant feuds with other tribes and among themselves. Avoid open battles but make sudden raids in order to kill or sell as slaves". All Negritos (7x) are coded Social War by Wright (1942). The Zambales Tinos are coded Economic War by Wright and PS/CA by Hobhouse et al. (1915). The Batak of Palawan are coded Social War by Wright and PS/PE/CA by Hobhouse et al., which flatly contradicts Warren’s statement (confusion with Sumatran Batak?). New Caledonians (Oceania): The New Caledonians were divided into mutually hostile moieties which fought periodically but not too destructively without economic or political objectives or consequences (Wedgwood, 1930; Q.Wright, 1942). "In New Caledonia the battle ceases very soon, because it 'devient complète pour la troisième ou quatrième victime qu'un parti est obligé d'enlever et de défendre dans la fuite' (Rochas, 1862)" (Holsti, 1913). The New Caledonians are coded Social War by Wright (1942) and PS/CA by Hobhouse et al. (1915). New Hebrides (Oceania): The inhabitants of the New Hebrides were divided into mutually hostile moieties which fought periodically but not too destructively without economic or political objectives or consequences (Wedgwood, 1930; Q.Wright, 1942). If a warrior has a friend in the tribe to be attacked, this friend may be forewarned, Humphreys (1926) writes about the southern New Hebrides. "Again if a man had a friend in one of the groups to be attacked, it was his prerogative to refuse to fight with his own tribe... This prerogative to remain neutral did not apply to members of the tribe beginning the hostilities, but only to those friendly tribes which agreed to come to its aid". The form of the struggle on these islands is a series of duels, sometimes culminating in a general skirmish, but "as a rule the casualties in massed fighting were rare" (quoted in Van der Bij, 1929). "In Malekula in the New Hebrides it is said that war is very unusual (Deacon, 1934)" (Numelin, 1950). The New Hebrides are coded Social War by Wright (1942) and PS by Hobhouse et al. (1915). Nicobarese (Eurasia): Featherman (1887) stated that "the Nicobarese were formerly at least hones and peaceable. Theft, murder and robbery were unknown to them; but they readily revenged an injury and resolutely slew their enemies". No headhunting or cannibalism. Man (1886) mentions hostile Shompen making looting raids on the Coastal Nicobarese (Nag, 1972). The Nicobarese are coded Social War by Wright (1942). Nubians (Africa): Fernea (1966, 1973) describes the Nubians of Egypt as a peaceful people. The Nubians strongly believe that they are a peaceful people who are able to resolve internal and external conflicts effectively (see also Bonta, 1993 et seq.). Nukuoro (Oceania): "The Nukuoro [of the Monteverde Islands] never needed to fight an enemy; they knew nothing of war (Kubary, 1900; Moerenhout, 1837)" (Numelin, 1950). Ojibwa (Ojibway, Chippewa) and Montagnais-Naskapi (North America): G. Elliot Smith (1930)

cites the northern Ojibway (Chippewas) as an example of primitive peacefulness. Other sources consider the Naskapi in general to be relatively peaceful (Le Jeune in Thwaites, 1897; Speck, 1933; Lips, 1947). Leechman (1956) says there was no ’organized’ warfare among these people, but that friction between them was so constant that they might easily decide it was safer to kill strangers than to risk being killed themselves. "According to Leechman, there was occasional trouble with the Eskimos; the Chippewas bullied the Dogribs and the Yellowknives; the Crees bullied the Chippewas; and they all felt it was safe to attack the ’timid’ Hares and Slaves. Oliver LaFarge says the Chippewas forced the Sioux tribes westward, which could not have been easy" (Bigelow, 1969). Textor (1967) coded the Ojibwa as a culture where bellicosity is moderate or negligible, but where military glory is nevertheless emphasized. Jenness (1935), on the other hand, stated that the "Sioux and Iroquois were the principal enemies of the Ojibwa... while the fighting lasted they [the Ojibwa] spared neither man, woman, nor child". In the earlier phase of European invasion the Chippewas had expanded their territory considerably and doubled their population as they sought new trapping grounds for their increasing involvement in the fur trade with the French. Groups of Chippewas moved from their original Lake Huron area into Western Minnesota and fought the eastern Sioux for their lands. By the end of the 1700s the Chippewas had taken over the territory as far west as the eastern prairies (Spicer, 1980). The Ojibwa are coded Economic War by Wright (1942) and PS/PA by Hobhouse et al. (1915). Fromm (1974) counts the Ojibwa as belonging to his ’Nondestructiveaggressive’ societies. Generosity, cooperation and food-sharing, harmony, and patience were key elements in the fabric of Montagnais-Naskapi society (Reid, 1991). Although historically the Montagnais-Naskapi fought some wars with neighboring peoples, particularly the Iroquois, they preferred peaceful external relations (Bonta, 1993). In the early period of French-Indian contact the Montagnais-Naskapi had hardly any political organization (Anderson, 1985; Leacock, 1969), and individual revenge-taking as well as feuding were essentially absent (Speck, 1933). The Montagnais are coded Social War by Wright (1942), and PS/PA/CA by Hobhouse et al. (1915). Ember (1978) mentions the Pekangekum Ojibwa as having ’no or rare warfare’. Okiek (Dorobo) (Africa): The Okiek are coded Infrequent Attackers External War and Infrequent Internal War by Otterbein (1968), and No War by Otterbein (1970). Blackburn (1982) states of the Okiek (Dorobo): "Maasai fear the forest and harbour all sorts of unfounded suspicions about the dangers of the forest and of the Okiek, to whom they impute certain malevolent supernatural powers. An aggressive people, the Maasai tended to want to treat the Okiek as they have treated other tribes... [but Okiek] do not hold the things Maasai covet most: cattle, sheep and goats. Furthermore, the Okiek, with nothing to lose or gain, would not stand and fight. The Okiek were and are wisely passive and slip back into the shadows of the forest when confronted with Maasai warriors... The Okiek are not organized for large-scale combat... The fundamental reason the Okiek, as a people, have survived the waves of pastoral invasions in central Kenya, when all previous groups have been decimated, scattered, or merged with their conquerors, is that pasturalists have no use for forests" (Blackburn, 1982). Central Kenya, the area in which the Okiek live, has a long history of warfare and raiding. "Maasai warriors sometimes act aggressively towards Okiek individuals or small groups whom they happen to meet when travelling. The Okiek, aware of their numerical weakness, tend not to retaliate for fear of attracting retribution" (Woodburn, 1988). Omaha (North America): "’Protracted warfare’, Mr. Dorsey (1884a) remarks, ’or fighting for several days in succession, has not been the Omaha custom’. On the contrary, careful inquiries have made clear that among this people ’war was secondary’; its true function was protective, whereas aggressive warfare was discouraged, as ’any gains made by it were more than offset by the troubles entailed’ (Fletcher & LaFlesche, 1906). Hence the restriction was laid on predatory warfare that all who went on the war-path should secure permission. If a man who organized a war party secretly stole away to carry out his designs for revenge or the acquiring of spoil, and in the fighting lost a

member of his party, he was punished as a murderer. Accordingly, the war parties were as a rule small, and it could often happen that when one single adversary was killed the war party returned home. Similar customs were prevalent among the Ponca, Padousa [=Padouca Comanche], and Osages. Thus, according to an old tradition, the Ponca and Padousa tribes once ’had a great battle. The people fought all day long. Sometimes the Ponca were driven, sometimes the Padousa, until at last a Ponca shot a Padousa in the eye. Then the battle ceased’ (Dorsey, 1884b). And Dr. Dorsey states of the Osages that even large war parties acquiesced in the fall of one of the enemy as deciding the conflict" (Holsti, 1913). Numelin (1950) adds: "A natural consequence of the character of their conflicts was that it was not compulsory for the warriors of the community to join the war party". Turney-High (1949) states: "The semi-agricultural Omaha, though Plainsmen, had essentially pacific attitudes. They considered aggressive war a disintegrating force... War to such people was a necessary evil which they practiced efficiently, but the Omaha did not revere it as an end in itself... War was secondary and its real function was protective". Similarly, according to Howard (1965), the Ponca were not a warlike people, and they were content to live in peace with other tribes. Warfare with the predatory Padouca Comanche was, however, continuous, until the Padouca were broken and driven from the land. Textor (1967) codes the Omaha as a culture where warfare is prevalent. The Omaha are coded Economic War by Wright (1942) and PS/PA by Hobhouse et al. (1915). Ona (South America): "There were no wars in which large numbers took part" (Cooper, 1946). "Cooper (1917) says that among the Onas intertribal feuds have occurred, but ’warfare, properly called, can not be said to exist’" (Numelin, 1950). The same is reported of the Alacaluf (Oyarzun, 1922; Bird, 1946). See also: Fuegians. Oowekeeno and Haihai (North America): The Oowekeeno and Haihai belong, together with the Bella Bella, to the Heiltsuk language group of the northwest coast. The Bella Bella were well skilled in military strategies. The Oowekeeno could easily afford to be peaceful as they were out of the main path of the war canoes, being well protected by the easily defendable Wannock River. The unfortunate Haihais, on the other hand, "had no chance to be peaceable as they were for ever embroiled in and afflicted by attack from both the northern tribes and the Bella Bellas, having to defend against predatory expeditions directed toward their resource base and to protect themselves from these warring tribes who wanted to practice on them in preparation for more serious expeditions" (Hilton, 1990; McIlwraith, 1948; Drucker, 1950, 1965; Olson, 1954, 1955). Otomac/Otomaco (South America): The Otomac practiced continuous defensive warfare against Carib raiders (Kirchhoff, 1948). Otoro (Nuba) (Africa): "[A]ttacks on life or property were... even between hill communities of the same tribe... the normal thing... they never reached the scale of planned collective actions of the group at large... not real wars, but irregular raids for livestock or slaves, carried out by a few individuals on the settlements of another group" (Nadel, 1947). Ovambo (Africa): "In West Africa, the Ovambo [Ambo], says Ratzel (1895), are not only the leading agricultural people one meets with when one comes from the south; but they are moreover one of the most industrious and most peaceful among African agricultural peoples" (Holsti, 1913). The Ambo are coded Infrequent Attackers External War and Continual Internal War by Otterbein (1968). Pacaa Nova (South America): "...the Brazilian peoples of the Pacaa Nova River seem to have alternated between flight and counterviolence as a response to the penetration of their area by

settlers (Von Graeve, 1980). Their traditions refer to some feuding among themselves before contact... Early on, they staged revenge raids against slavers, and in 1724 the government armed and trained them to resist... Later, as rubber tappers moved in, they began simply to flee settler violence... until finally increasing numbers of settlers made flight almost impossible, and a brief final phase of violent resistance began, only to end in final regroupment and coercive pacification" (Dentan, 1992). Paiute (North America): "The Southern Paiute were notably pacific. The Chemehuevi were more warlike, undoubtedly reflecting Mohave influences" (Kelly & Fowler, 1986). Fights between Paiute bands were rare, amounting only to rock-throwing - slings were sometimes used - during squabbles over food territory. Relations with the Shoshoni and other neighboring peoples were generally peaceful. "In former times, most Southern Paiute were peaceful and rarely engaged in fighting with each other or with neighbors" (Fowler, 1991). Chalfant (1933) recounts a foray against ’Diggers’ (Western Shoshone). Scalping was not usual (Steward, 1933; Heizer & Hester, 1972). Bigelow (1969) states: "The Paiute of Nevada are another tribe cited by [G. Elliot] Smith [1930] as proof of primitive peacefulness. He said they were peaceful ’as a rule’, and though they were not so bright in intellect as the prairie tribes, they displayed more ’solidity of character’ in resisting the ’vices of civilization’. LaFarge [1956] says they did not fight often because they were too busy keeping themselves alive. When they were forced to fight, he says, they fought well, with effective bows, and with spears twelve feet long. Their military prowess was not, however, highly honored by their neighbors, and in some of the more warlike tribes the name Paiute came to mean ’ignorance’. This pathetically impoverished people stayed where they were - in the desert - with scarcely any social organization, because they were, according to LaFarge, too few, too weak, and too poor to encroach on the more desirable lands of the more powerful tribes around them". The Petaweet (Paiute) are coded Social War by Wright (1942). Among the Western Shoshone (’Diggers’) and Gosiute of northwestern Utah warfare was not common before contact. There is some evidence of low-level conflict with the Ute and Northern Paiute (O’Leary & Levinson, 1991). Jorgensen (1980) considers the Kaibab Paiute and the Gosiute to be peaceful. Panare/Panaré (South America) Panare society is highly egalitarian. Oral tradition includes accounts of warfare in the distant past, but physical violence is abhorred by the Panare and is almost unknown today (Henley, 1994). Papago (North and Meso-America): The Papago are mentioned by Montagu (1978) as one of the societies notable for their unaggressivess. The Papago are described as peaceful by Browne (1869) and Brandon (1961). Coded Frequent External War by Otterbein (1968), but mainly defensive against raiding Apache (Otterbein, 1970). Textor (1967) codes the Papago as a culture where bellicosity is moderate or negligible and where military glory is negligibly emphasized. The Papago are coded Social War by Wright (1942), Physical Violence Infrequent by Ross (1985 et seq.), and Defensive War by Goldschmidt (1988, 1989). See further: Pima. Paressi/Parexi (South America): War not frequent (Von den Steinen, 1894; Van der Bij, 1929). On the other hand, "The Paressi are unique [in the region] in their wars of conquest" (Lowie, 1948). Markham (1895) states of the Parexis: "They are indolent and inoffensive". And Métraux (1948) states: "As recently as 1910, when Max Schmidt visited them, the Cozarini still fought the Nambicuara and kidnapped the men for slaves and the women for wives. The other Paressi looked down on the Cozarini as an inferior branch". In Wright's (1942) list the Paressi are coded Social War. Passes/Passé (South America): Markham (1895, 1910) states: "They are clever, gentle, open,

peaceful, and industrious. Martius says they intermarry very much among relations. They are now nearly extinct. Bates says they are the noblest of the Amazonian tribes". Pasto (South America): "A peaceable people" (De Alba, 1946). Paumari/Paumary/Pammarys (South America): The Paumari are described as very peaceful by Markham (1895, 1910): "A tribe of the River Purus, a branch of the old tribe of Purupurus, the name of which is now extinct. A very peaceful tribe, good-humoured and famed for singing". The Paumaris are coded No War by Hobhouse et al. (1915), and Defensive War by Wright (1942). Pemon (Arecuna, Taulipang) (South America): The Pemon entered the Western historical record in the mid-18th century when they were encountered by Spanish missionaries in the Caroni and Icabaru river valleys. In 1817, with the collapse of the Spanish missions, this pressure subsided. Early reports from the 1770s indicated raiding and hostilities among Pemon in the Caroni region, and 19th-century reports (Koch-Grünberg, 1917; de Armellada, 1964) refer to raiding among settlements in the Roraima area and elsewhere. No extensive warfare has been reported among the Pemon during the last 200 years, however. Overt conflict, anger, and fighting are strongly reproved by the Pemon. Homicide is very rare. It is difficult to gather people for vengeance against the perpetrator, who generally flees the territory and does not return. The Pemon say trouble occurs over women and false gossip (Thomas, 1994). Pesechem/Pesegem (New Guinea): Pulle (1916) found the Pesegem to be very distrustful, but not violent or warlike (Van der Bij, 1929). "Hij meent ook dat de twisten met hun vijanden de Woeliks slechts van geringe betekenis zijn en dat groote krijgstochten nooit ondernomen worden". According to Van der Bij, headhunting was absent. Piaroa (South America): "Piaroaland is almost free of all forms of physical violence... This is not to say that the Piaroa have formed a totally peaceful society, and I have written elsewhere (1986a) on their discourse of predation, cannibalism, and revenge" (Overing, 1989). Armed conflict between territories in unthinkable. Their ideal of masculinity is one of control and tranquility rather than fighting (Overing, 1984 et seq.; see also Bonta, 1993, 1997). Secondary pacifists. Zent (1994) reports: "The Piaroa insulated themselves deep in the forest, and avoided (until the 1950s) exposure to Whites, who they thought to be cannibals... Control of temperament is considered the mark of a powerful man. In general, the Piaroa are very pacific in all apsects of life... Personal conflicts between individuals or families within a community are defused by fission from the local group". Overing (1986) indicated that spouses and children are never struck, and they are "appalled by any display of aggression, much less physical aggression" (in Bonta, 1997). Pima (North and Meso-America): Generally peaceful (Browne, 1869; Brandon, 1961), despite frequent defensive wars (Bancroft, 1875; Van der Bij, 1929). "Among the later Papagos and Pimas, when war was forced upon them... they discovered a taste for it and fought well" (Brandon, 1961). "In some conflicts the Pima Indians killed several hundred warriors, but these were rare occasions. Their raids usually ended with the loss of a man or two and the destruction of an Apache camp, with perhaps half a dozen of the enemy killed and a child taken prisoner" (Davie, 1929; referring to Russell, 1908). "The Pimas wage unceasing war against the Apaches" (Davie, 1929; referring to Bancroft, 1875). The Pimas "massed large and moderately successful armies to withstand Apachean and some Yuman attacks in late historic times" (Jorgensen, 1980). "Ross Browne (1869) observes that the Pimos have always manifested a friendly disposition towards the Whites and seem much devoted to the peaceful pursuit of agriculture and stock-raising (cf. also Davis, 1857; Fremont & Emory, 1849). This holds good also of the Papagoes (Browne, 1869) and the Soones [Zuñi]

(Fremont & Emory, 1849)" (Holsti, 1913). "Although the Pimas continued to place a high value on peace, [under pressure of Apache raiding] prowess in battle came to carry respect and admiration; a growing orientation toward war can be discerned" (Ezell, 1983; see also Dobyns, 1932). According to Bahr & Kozak (1991) warfare was ’rationalized’ as defensive. The Pima are coded Economic War by Wright (1942) (which seems inappropriate), and PE by Hobhouse et al. (1915). Piro/Pirro/Chuntaquiris/Simirinches (South America): Warfare largely defensive, neither exonor endocannibalism (Steward & Métraux, 1948). "Until at least 1950 there was continual fear of raids from surrounding tribes. The Piro themselves had taken children of their neighbors into slavery. No intertribal attacks have been reported during the past five decades... Prior to contact with Whites, the husband of an adulterous wife was expected to kill his rival, thus initiating a series of revenge killings. The only suggestion of major conflict among the Piro is the former fissioning of some communities, along with mention of hostile separations in legends" (Matteson, 1994). Polopa (New Guinea): Polopa adversaries place restrictions on the magnitude of their retaliatory raids in order to prevent warfare escalation (D.Brown, 1979; Tefft, 1988). Pomo (North America): All sources agree that the Pomo are peaceably inclined (Powers, 1872, 1877; Kroeber, 1902 et seq.; Van der Bij, 1929; Turney-High, 1949; Spicer, 1980). In the 18th century there were roughly 8000 Pomo organized into some 70 politically autonomous communities. Kroeber (1925) states: "Little is known of the wars of the Pomo communities, either among themselves or with their neighbors. They were on the whole, there is little doubt, peaceably inclined. There was hostility between the Kuhla-napo and Habe-napo at one time, and the southeastern people of Kamdot must have had their quarrel with one of these divisions, because they supported the Lile'ek [Wappo] against them. The Komli group in the north and of Ukiah Valley fought the Yokaia-pomo". Revenge for poaching and witchcraft seem to have been the main motives. In another context (see: Tatu), Kroeber mentions frequent hostilities between Pomo and Yuki. Spicer (1980) states "[T]here never was any organized warfare by the Pomos. They lived like most native Californians in small villages that were not organized politically beyond the local community and not at all for war". On the other hand, Bean & Theodoratus (1978) state "Warfare among the Pomo was institutionalized in varying ways. Among the Valley Pomo it was most intense, with a war chief acting as a secular leader for a number of confederated tribelets... Wars often occurred in response to poaching, poisoning (witchcraft), abduction of women and children, theft of goods, or to protect or acquire prime resource areas. Some wars were precipitated by the drive to acquire high priority goods (like salt or obsidian) or territorial rights, often leading to the displacement of some groups (cf. Kunkel, 1962; Loeb, 1926; Barrett, 1908). The intensity of warfare varied from ritual conflict (where the battle ended with the first casualty) to annihilation of a village. Women and children on gathering expeditions were often the targets of a war party... Reparations were usually paid after cessation of hostilities". The Pomo are coded Social War by Wright (1942), and PS by Hobhouse et al. (1915), on the basis of the strange assertion that "The Pomo were said to be a powerful people who paid the Tatu to bring them Yuki scalps, but they also killed women in war". See also: Californians. Poturero (South America): "De Ninaquiguilas [Poturero] doen nooit iemand oorlog aan" (Van der Bij, 1929, referring to De Azara, 1809); "They were peaceful farmers" (Métraux, 1946). Pove (Africa); Featherman (1885) states about the Pove (Boobies, Bubi, Edeeyahs) "Their wars are principally caused by some unwarranted aggression on the part of a distant town, but the result is not attended with any loss of life, for after a few spear-wounds have been inflicted and received on either side, the matter in contest is always amicably arranged".

Pueblo Indians (North and Meso-America): The Pueblo Indians are "Industrious and peaceful agriculturists... who fight only when invaded" (Spencer, 1876). The conquistadores, says Davis (1857) found the Pueblo Indians "numerous and powerful, living peaceful and happy lives in their villages" (quoted in Holsti, 1913). The Pueblo Indians have also been characterized as peaceful by Benedict (1934). There is, however, a good deal of evidence, according to Driver (1961), that all the Pueblos at one time or another fought with other Pueblos as well as with Navahos, Apaches, and Utes. "The Pueblos are ever at enmity with their neighbors, the Navajos" (Davie, 1929; referring to Bancroft, 1875). The Tewa conducted raids against their traditional enemies, the Navaho (Arnon & Hill, 1979). On the other hand, Jacobs (1991) states: "The Tewa have a reputation for nonviolence and peaceful settlement of disputes. Overall, most Tewa abhor conflict and avoid it at all cost". The Sandias were often raided by Navaho, Apache, and Comanche (Brandt, 1979). Around the 16th century, reportedly because of the need for more lands, Pecos Pueblo was warring against the Tiwas (Hammond & Rey, 1940; Schroeder, 1979). Yet, warfare mainly defensive against predatory tribes. "Though the Pueblos are an agricultural people and are established in permanent settlements, yet they are frequently forced to have recourse to war in defence of their persons and property, as they are exposed to the hostile incursions of the Apaches and the Navajos, their nearest neighbours and natural enemies.... For the recovery of stolen property they sometimes organise a plundering expedition as a retaliatory measure" (Featherman, 1889). The New Mexico Pueblos are coded Social War by Wright (1942), and PS/PE by Hobhouse et al. (1915). Puinave (South America): Warfare largely defensive against predatory tribes (Métraux & Kirchhoff, 1948). Pukapuka (Oceania): Textor codes the Pukapuka people as a culture where bellicosity is moderate or negligible and where military glory is negligibly emphasized. Punan (Indonesia): The Punan of Borneo are a very unwarlike people (Furness, 1902; Hose & McDougall, 1912; Hose, 1926; Davie, 1929; Van der Bij, 1929;). "They are quite inoffensive and never engage in open warfare, though they will avenge injuries by stealthy attacks on individuals... he never goes upon the warpath... but he will defend himself and his family pluckily" (Hose & McDougall, 1912). "Of the Punans Mr. Furness observes that they have 'no enemies, for they desire nothing that other peoples have'... According to Mr. Furness (1902) the head-hunters of Borneo were in themselves amicable and peaceably disposed. As regards the nomadic Punans, it is said that 'of all the tribes they are perhaps the most mild and gentle; they are not head-hunters, and care no more for a collection of human heads than for that of any other animal, and therefore never go on a raid' (Furness, 1902)" (Holsti, 1913). "Various authors also inform us that head-hunting is a fashion of comparatively modern growth: although it existed before, it was only in the last century that it became a predominant feature in the life of the Dyaks (Low, 1848)" (Numelin, 1950). Dentan (1992) states: "[T]he Penan peoples of east Malaysia - their territories completely penetrated and occupied by swiddeners who occasionally raided them for slaves and heads - traditionally retaliated with violence and even hunted heads like their neighbors (Rousseau, 1990). In the 1980s, however, a Swiss botanist introduced them to the tactics of nonviolent protest". Needham (1972) states of the Penan/Punan: "The Penan claim that thy have never initiated attacks on others, and not even their longhouse neighbors report it of them. They themselves have until recently been prime targets for headhunters, of whom they are still in dread. There is no cannibalism. Contemporary Penan, especially the Eastern tribe, are remarkable for their pacific character and their abhorrence of physical violence". Bigelow (1969) somewhat grudgingly states: "The Punan of Borneo, like the Paiute of Nevada, seem to have been peaceful through sheer force of circumstances rather than 'by nature'. [G. Elliot] Smith [1930] concedes that they would fight back if attacked, when there was 'no

choice of flight’. If a relative was murdered, they would seek an opportunity of planting a poisoned dart in the body of the murderer. But, like the Paiute, they could not compete with the military organization of the surrounding tribes". The Punan are coded No War by Hobhouse et al. (1915), and Defensive War by Wright (1942). Puri (South America): "Zij zijn in hoge mate schuw" and inoffensive (Van der Bij, 1929, referring to zu Wied-Neuwied, 1820). "the Puri, who lacked agriculture, looted the fields of the colonists... such inroads caused continuous warfare" (Métraux, 1946). 'Warfare' in this context is a very inappropriate term for the slaughter of this destitute people. In the 18th century several hundred Puri were lured to Villa Rica, where they were sold as slaves. In Wright's (1942) list the Puri are coded Social War. Quarré (Africa): This people was described as totally defenseless. The surrounding tribes considered them "gibier humain, sans armes, sans défence" (Huot & Voivenel, 1917, as quoted by Van der Bij, 1929). I have been unable to trace any further references to this peculiar people. Quissama/Kisama (Africa): Monteiro (1876) regards them as peaceable. Some intervillage feuding has been reported (Magyar, 1859; Van der Bij, 1929). The Quissama refer disputes between villages to arbitration (Davie, 1929; referring to Price, 1872). Rossel Islanders (Oceania): "Armstrong (1928) says that there was 'no real war' on Rossel, because the islanders do not fight in the open but 'murder in safety'... Armstrong relates that war was very unusual on Rossel Island" (Turney-High, 1949). Roucouyenne (South America): The Roucouyenne (Roucoyenne, Roucoujenne, Oyana) were relatively peaceful (Coudreau, 1893; Van der Bij, 1929). They are coded Social War in Wright's (1942) list. Ryukyu Archipelago (Japan): "The inhabitants of the Riukiu Archipelago seem to be wanting in every warlike sentiment. 'They have no arms, either offensive or defensive. They declared to the traveller Hall that they did not know what war was like, either by experience or by tradition, and that it was with the greatest astonishment that they looked at the kriss used by the Malays" (Davie, 1929, quoting Letourneau, 1881). Saliva (South America): "The Achagua and Saliva fought mainly defensively against predatory tribes, such as the Carib, Caberre, and others" (Steward, 1948). The early Jesuit sources "se refieren a los Sáliva y a los Achagua como gente dócil, amistosa, con poca habilidad en la guerra y escasa inclinación hacia ella, aun a su propria defensa. Se dice que estaban continuamente dominados y sometidos por las tribus más guerreras y agresivas" (Morey & Morey, 1980). "The Saliva were settled in a number of missions in the late 17th century, but they suffered greatly from epidemics and Carib slave raids. The Jesuits found the Saliva to be a docile group that willingly accepted settlement in the missions, perhaps seeking protection from the warlike Caribs with whom the Saliva maintained an ambiguous relationship - they traded with them and even intermarried, although they were often the victims of Carib raids. The Saliva made a favorable impression on early European observers as a clean, peaceful, and hardworking people" (Flowers, 1994). On the other hand, according to Gumilla (1745), the Saliva made war in order to acquire slaves to till their lands (Nieboer, 1910). Samoyed (Eurasia): Except for defensive war against the Ostyak (Sel'kups), the Samoyedes (Entsy, Nganasans) were peaceable (Finsch, 1879; Nordenskiöld, 1882; Czaplicka, 1914; Van der Bij,

1929; Dolgikh, 1964). Apparently no internal war (White, 1989). On the other hand, Popov (1964) states that the numerous legends of the Nganasans deal with their wars with Nentsy and Evenk (Tungus). The Samoyedes are coded Social War by Wright (1942). G. Elliot Smith (1930) claimed that the Siberian peoples in general were peaceful. This seems to be rather exaggerated. Sanpoil (North America): Textor (1967) codes the Sanpoil as a culture where bellicosity is moderate or negligible, and where military glory is negligibly emphasized. According to Ray (1933), the elderly Sanpoil informants had no memory of their people ever having been involved in war; even their mythology did not include warfare. When raiding parties descended on their villages, they would not retaliate; after one village had been destroyed, the chief’s comments epitomized their peaceful ethics: "Our children are dead and our property is destroyed. We are sad. But can we bring our children to life or restore our property by killing other people? It is better not to fight. It can do no good" (quoted in Bonta, 1993). Miller (1998: 255) states about the Sanpoil and other Plateau Salishans (such as Wenatchee, Entiat, Chelam, Methow, Nespelem and Sinkaietk): "Raiding for horses and hostilities with Plains tribes like the Blackfoot encouraged a warrior ethic among these tribes, although pacifism was a strong ethic". See also: Columbians. Sara (Africa): The Sara peoples of southern Sudan and Lake Chad include the Gula, Kara, Kreish, Nduka, Ngama and Sara. They suffered heavily at the hands of slave traders in the 19th century. "Unfamiliar with warfare, except in the form of petty raiding, and defenseless because of their dispersed settlement pattern, the peoples of the Madi and Sara clusters have been unable to offer serious resistance to better organized groups impinging upon them from all directions" (Murdock, 1959). Saulteaux (North America): The Saulteaux are described by Hallowell (1940) as peaceful: "To the casual observer, co-operation, laughter, harmony, patience, and self control appear to be the key notes of Saulteaux interpersonal relations. These people have never engaged in war with the whites nor with other Indian tribes". "[T]he Salteaux... ’although numerous are not a warlike tribe’ (Kane, 1859)" (Holsti, 1913). According to Hallowell, their outward harmony and apparently complete peacefulness masks a great deal of inner tensions and feelings of animosity and hostility for others. Aggressive impulses are disposed of by the Saulteaux, still according to Hallowell, through gossip, behind-the-scenes maneuvering, and particularly through sorcery and magic. Savage Islanders (Niue) (Oceania): "That war was not bloody in Savage Island is indicated by the following incident. The king, Tongia, in relating the prowess of his forefather, ’the greatest warrior in the world’, showed Mr. Lawes the spot where his ancestor had engaged in combat with the ’second greatest warrior’. Mr. Lawes, seeing that the space was confined, asked which of them was killed. ’Oh, neither of them’, the king replied. This historic duel Thomson (1901) considers as a fair example of Savage Island warfare" (Davie, 1929). "According to Captain Cook and the missionary John Williams the aborigines of Niue were most ferocious warriors, but Mr. Basil Thomson substantially modifies this statement and remarks that even their weapons were of a rather harmless quality" (Holsti, 1913). The Savage Islanders are coded Economic War by Wright (1942). Semang (Malaysia): "War is unknown" (Logan, 1847); "extraordinary peaceful nature" (Letessier, n.d.); "entirely inoffensive" (Skeat & Blagden, 1906; Schebesta, 1928); Semai abhorrence of violence has been noted by various observers for 100 years. Flight seems always preferred to fight. As Robarchek (1989) observes: "peacefulness does not require suppression of individuality and renunciation of autonomy: it is simply the only sensible way for people to behave, and it has, for Semai, become a crucial part of a definition of self and a positive goal in its own right" though "[E]nculturation [to nonviolence] has not incapacitated Semai for violence in response to the

violence of others" (Dentan, 1978). The Sakai and Semang are coded No War by Hobhouse et al. (1915), and Defensive War by Wright (1942). Also the Mantra and Orang Bukit are coded Defensive War. "Other than reports of Negrito bowmen with a Siamese army fighting the Malays in the seventeenth century, and an occasional feud, there is no evidence of Semang warring with one another or with non-Semang" (LeBar et al., 1964; c.f. Van der Bij, 1929; Schebesta, 1924 et seq.; Dentan, 1968 et seq.; Robarchek, 1977 et seq.). The same is true for the Semai, Senoi, Sakai, Jakun, Chewong, Batek, and Mantra (also collectively known as ’Orang Asli’, meaning ’original people’). "To flee from danger is the explicit mechanism of Chewong defence" (Howell, 1989). The Batek abhor interpersonal violence and have generally fled from their enemies rather than fighting back (Endicott, 1988). The Phi Thong Luang or Mrabri did not possess weapons when Bernatzik (1941) contacted them (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1975). "All the tribes in Selangor Pahang and other parts of Negri Sembilan as well as in Sungei Ujong ’possess no idea of warfare or racial strife and freely admit their preference for a life of seclusion and peace’ (Knocker, 1907)" (Holsti, 1913). Murdock (1934) states of the Semang generally: "The various bands live at peace with one another. They roam with perfect freedom over the territories of other groups in the same tribe - always, of course, respecting their fruit trees. War, or any other form of hostility, is absolutely unknown, not only between the different bands and tribes of the Semang themselves, but also with the Sakai, and even with the Malays, by whom they are not infrequently harassed. They never react to ill-treatment with treachery, much less with open violence. They merely withdraw and avoid their oppressors". According to Endicott (1983), the distinctive feature of the Orang Asli, their peacefulness and nonviolence, can be directly traced to their formerly being the objects of violent slave raids by the Malays. Most of the groups learned that flight into the forests meant the possibility of survival, while fighting was generally hopeless. One group, the Temiars, could not flee their settled villages, so they lived in defensive longhouses and learned to fight for their freedom (see also Bonta, 1993). Textor (1967) codes the Semang as a culture where warfare is not prevalent. Fromm (1974) counts the Semang as belonging to his ’Life-affirmative’ societies. Ross (1985 et seq.) codes the Semang as Infrequent Physical Violence. Semendo (Redjang of Sumatra): "Though no war with neigboring ethnic groups is reported in either the Dutch literature of Semendo ethnohistory, Pauw ten Kate (1869) describes blood feuds in the past, and mechanisms to mediate or reduce these by burying murderers alive" (Jaspan, 1976). Setebo (South America): In 1736 the Setebo were routed and almost destroyed by the Shipibo in a bloody battle. In 1764 the Franciscans brought about a reconciliation between the two tribes. "Father Girbal, when he founded Sarayacu in 1792, induced some of them to settle there. They are now said to be quiet, tractable, and well disposed towards the missions" (Markham, 1895, 1910). Secondary pacifists? Shasta (North America): Revenge for murder, rape, witchcraft, or insult to a headman was the primary Shasta reason for intertribal conflict (Powers, 1877; Kroeber, 1925; Van der Bij, 1929; Silver, 1978). They occasionally fought the Achumawi and had a number of ’battles’ with the Wintu (Merriam, 1955; Silver, 1978). Retaliatory forays against the Modoc, who conducted annual summer raids into Shasta territory, were the closest the Shasta came to organized warfare (Holt, 1946; Silver, 1978). "The Shastas, who were not known to send raiders, unprovoked, into other communities, marshaled potent and well-disciplined warriors when attacked by the Modoc" (Jorgensen, 1980). "Although the Konomihu feuded with the Scott Valley Shasta, they traded leggings and robes to them and intermarried with them... Although the Oregon Shasta and their neighbors in the Rogue River area were longtime enemies and in frequent conflict for territory, they shared attempts to resist invasion by Whitte miners and settlers. The Shasta were friendly with their western neighbors; however, they were apprehensive of the Hupa and Yurok who came into their

territory" (Silver, 1978). Women are said sometimes to have accompanied the war party (Kroeber, 1925). The Shastika are coded Social War by Wright (1942). See also: Californians. Shoshone/Shoshoni (North America): Some sources report frequent hostilities, raiding and pitched battles (Catlin, 1841; Lewis & Clark, 1814; Van der Bij, 1929). Other sources, however, regard them as relatively peaceful (Hoffman, 1896; Driver, 1961; Steward, 1955; Steward & Voegelin, 1974; O’Leary & Levinson, 1991). "In aboriginal times most of the Shoshonean people (Ute, Western Shoshoni, and Northern Paiute) had no national or tribal warfare. There were no territorial rights to be defended, no military honors to be gained, and no means of organizing groups of individuals for concerted action. When war parties of neighboring peoples invaded their country, the Shoshoneans ran away more often than they fought. Hostilies generally consisted of feuds... These were purely personal and could not involve definable superfamilial groups, for such groups did not exist... After the Shoshonean tribes acquired horses and the territory was occupied by white settlers, warfare of a collective nature developed" (Steward, 1955). "Among the Great Basin Shoshoneans, there seems to have been no native form of national or group warfare" (Steward & Voegelin, 1974). "The Western Shoshoni and their neighbors in the heart of the Basin area lacked definite warfare. With the family the largest permanent residential unit, there was no government to carry on a true war. Violence, raids, and feuds were not totally lacking, however, although they were normally carried on without any special organization, regalia or ritual. Such hostilities were more frequent between speakers of different languages: Shoshoni versus Nothern Paiute, Southern Paiute, Ute, or even Mohave. Woman-stealing is the most frequently reported motivation for such attacks, although economic motives were not lacking" (Driver, 1961). "[T]he Shoshoni, says Hoffman (1896), have always been peaceable, and so are the Fox Islanders (Coxe, 1787)" (Holsti, 1913). Thomas, Pendleton & Cappannari (1986) state about the Western Shoshone: "[W]arfare was not common prior to contact, although killing of individuals, especially strangers did occur. Steward (1938) describes a fight between Reese River Western Shoshones and some Northern Paiutes who had stolen two Shoshone girls". According to O’Leary & Levinson (1991) "Warfare among the Western Shoshone (including the Gosiute of northestern Utah) was not common before contact, although killing of individuals did occur". Jorgensen (1980) considers the Panamint, Battle Mountain, and Hukundika Shoshone to be peaceful. "Prisoners of war are killed with great tortures by the Shoshones" (Davie, 1929; referring to Bancroft, 1875). The Shoshones are coded Economic War by Wright (1942) (which does not seem to be entirely warranted) and PS/PE/PA/CA by Hobhouse et al. (1915). Similkameen (North America): "The Similkameen [of British Columbia] of today are a peaceloving people - indeed, they have too much property to wish for war, and they have frequently said that if trouble arose between the white settlers and any of the kindred tribes they would go to the mountains and abide the event, as they would neither fight the whites nor their own kinsmen" (Davie, 1929, quoting Allison, 1892). The Similkameen are coded Social War by Wright (1942) and PE by Hobhouse et al. (1915). See also: Columbians. Sio (New Guinea) "The interior peoples were the traditional enemies in contrast to island and coastal neighbors with whom Sio had mainly peaceful dealings in trade. Their military posture was primarily defensive; the island village provided a natural defense and remote gardens were worked by associations that were large enough to cope with parties of raiders (Harding, 1991) Siriono/Sirionó (South America): "As the Siriono are not warlike relations between bands are peaceful" (Holmberg, 1948). The evidence is somewhat conflicting: cf. Van der Bij, 1929; Nordenskiöld, 1911 et seq. Dentan (1992) regards the Siriono as a peaceable people. "[A]lthough the Siriono of Bolivia normally fled from more powerful invader tribes who killed the men and

enslaved the women and children (Holmberg, 1950), they may have sporadically resisted European invasion (Fabbro, 1980; cf. von Graeve, 1989)" (Dentan, 1992). Textor (1967) codes the Siriono as a culture where bellicosity is moderate or negligible, and where military glory is negligibly emphasized. The Siriono and the Warao were not warlike, Morey & Marwitt (1975) state, "but it is important to note that these groups were displaced by more powerful neighbors". Califano (1994) states: "Among the Sirionó, war took on a different character depending on the adversary. With the much-feared Ayoreo, conflict was limited to defense, which in many cases ended with the Sirionó fleeing. Some chiefs fought the invaders until they either vanquished them or died under their clubs. Conflict with Whites was limited to surprise attacks carried out for the purpose of appropriating some of their iron tools". The Siriono were subject to to raids by their neighbors to the south (the Yanaigua) and the north (the wild Baure), according to Holmberg, 1969: 159; Fabbro, 1978; Kelly, 2000: 164). However, they responded by avoidance and withdrawal. Internal war between Siriono bands is also reported to be entirely absent (Holmberg, 1969: 157). Siwan (Africa): Textor (1967) codes the Siwan Berbers as a culture where bellicosity is moderate or negligible. Slave/Slavey (North America): Asch (1981) states of the Slave Indians [Slavey, Dené Tha, Etchaottine, Gens des Bois Forts]: "Relations among local groups were characterized by friendship and warmth... Disputes between local groups were usually resolved peacefully by means of a hand-game competition or a ritual contest of medicine men... the European trade rivalries stimulated the Cree to raid into Slavey territory" (Asch, 1981; Mackenzie, 1801; Honigmann, 1946). On the other hand, Jenness (1932) reports: "They had the reputation of being peaceable, inoffensive people, although they treacherously massacred many Nahani Indians of the Upper Liard". According to Rushforth (1991) "Raiding and warfare were matters for families and local groups, not regional groups or tribes. Revenge for the death of a kinsperson or for the theft of a woman was the primary motive". "Although the Slave were subject to external war in the form of raids carried out against them by the Cree (and Chipewyan), they did not counterraid these tribes or offer any defense other than flight. They were called the Esclave by the early French explorers because so many of their women and children were taken captive by the Cree. The name is a translation of the Cree word for captive. These data suggest that the Slave would have been a warless society if left alone, and the description of them as 'abject cowards' [Mason, 1946] could alternatively be rendered as 'peaceful'. Internally, homicide occurred, deaths attributed to witchcraft lead to execution of the witch, and strangers encountered while hunting might be ambushed and killed for fear that they come 'with evil intent' (Mason, 1946: 36). However, raids by members of one Slave band against another are not reported" (Kelly, 2000: 53). Slavs (Early): "The Slavs were originally much more peaceable than the Germans, as Dr. Wilser (1904) justly points out" (Holsti, 1913). Solor Islanders (Oceania): "War parties are led by the ata maan, red men, who are proven warriors. In general there are not many casualties. One side will withdraw after a few of its members have fallen; sometimes the death of a man will decide a battle. Women and girls are never killed, although a village may be plundered and its houses and fields burned (Vatter, 1932; Arndt, 1940); Formerly heads were taken in battles between Padzi and Demon (Barnes, 1968 et seq.). Suaheli (Africa): Not particularly warlike (Cameron, 1877; Krapf, 1858; Thomson, 1881, 1885; Van der Bij, 1929). "Van de Wazaramo meldt Thomson: Vreedzaam, bescheiden en zeer schuw. Burton bezocht dezen stam in 1857 en spreekt van verschanste dorpen en van schijnbare gastvrijheid... hij noemt de Wazaramo de gevaarlijkste stam aan de route naar het meer" (Van der

Bij, 1929). It is not clear why they were considered dangerous by Burton. Nieboer (1910), also referring to Thomson (1881), says: "The Wazaramo have no weapons of war; warfare seems unknown among them. They formerly suffered much from the slave-trade". Suku (Africa): "[A]nother method of direct action was warfare. The wronged lineage invited the people of neighboring villages, particularly of those where there were relatives, to join in the common battle... After a night of drumming and dancing, the first party would begin the attack on the village of the enemy. Few people were killed in these skirmishes" (Kopytoff, 1965). Sulod (Philippines): According to Dentan (1992), the Sulod Ilongot belong to Gibson’s Type 1 (i.e., peaceful) societies. Tacunyapé (South America): The Tacunyapé were considered to be peaceable by Nimuendaju (1948), though "The Tacunyapé were never at peace with the Cayapo [and] the Asurini and Tacunyapé were at war recently". Defensive? Tagish (North America): "The Tagish were completely dominated by the Tlinkit" (Jenness, 1932). Apparently, they did not resist this domination too vigorously. McClellan (1981) states: "the Tagish became effectively Tlingitized. However, ill feeling, and even fighting, sometimes arose when the Tlingit took advantage of the Tagish, seizing Tagish women temporarily or cheating their partners too blatantly". Tallensi (Africa): "Among the Tallensi of the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast 'a general war consisted of a series of local skirmishes without any organized methods of collective attack or defence or any military leadership, and lasted only two or three days' (Fortes, 1945). It ceased as abruptly as it usually began, and soon the clans which had initiated hostilities made peace" (Numelin, 1950). Textor (1967) codes the Tallensi as a culture where bellicosity is moderate or negligible, and where military glory is negligibly emphasized. Tanala (Madagascar): One of the least warlike tribes of Madagascar; weak and politically divided, content to remain in their own territory (i.e., little or no external war) (White, 1989). "The various political groups fought among themselves from time to time, but their wars were rarely of long duration" (Linton, 1933). Textor (1967) codes the Tanala as a culture where bellicosity is moderate or negligible, but nevertheless military glory is emphasized. Tanana (North America): "Adjacent local bands often came together for purposes of communal hunting, trade, or potlatch ceremonies except for those periods when local 'wars' (more often vendettas) temporarily separated them. Intermarriages between bands often took place, as the native genealogies attest" (McKennan, 1981). Tapirapé (South America): Textor (1967) codes the Tapirapé as a culture where bellicosity is moderate or negligible, but nevertheless military glory is emphasized. "The Tapirapé have always been at war with the Cayapo. Tapirapé groups have been massacred on several occasions by both the Caraja and Cayapo" (Wagley & Galvão, 1948). Defensive? Most likely, the Cayapo were the attackers. Tapiro (New Guinea): The Tapiro 'pygmies' were very shy and unwarlike (Van der Bij, 1929; Rawling, 1913; Wollaston, 1912). Tapuya (South America): "The 16th-century Jesuits found the Tapuya people to be such lovers of

peace that none of them had any remembrance of ’batterie’ or quarreling among themselves, while they even treated their enemies humanely" (Hobhouse et al., 1915). Tarahumara (Meso-America): The Tarahumara are generally described as peaceful (Bennett & Zingg, 1935; Cassell, 1969; West et al., 1969; Montagu, 1974). Tasaday (Philippines): The Tasaday have been regarded as the paragons of primitive peacefulness, and many monographs have been written on them. They are, however, the victims or perpetrators of a clever hoax, according to the International Herald Tribune, April 14, 1986, and probably the most spectacular fraud in the history of anthropology. For an assessment of the evidence see Vine (1989), Berreman (1991), and Headland (1992). Tasmanians: The precolonial Tasmanians are described as non-belligerent, peaceful, inoffensive, mild, friendly, and extremely timid (La Billardière, 1800; Péron & Freycinet, 1807; Bonwick, 1870; Thirkell, 1874; De Quatrefages, 1884; Roth, 1890; Davie, 1929; Van der Bij, 1929; Turnbull, 1948; Montagu, 1974). "Infidelity, jealousy, and raids for women were the chief causes for fights in Tasmania and often resulted in the death of some of the principal parties... The band was the basic warmaking unit, but sometimes men from several related bands cooperated to make war against a common enemy. The combats usually took the form of ambushes or personal fights" (Rhys Jones, 1974; citing Robinson, 1829); Within a tribe, there was considerable cooperation between bands in economic and military matters. Most of the fights and ambushes recorded are between individuals or bands of different tribes. The usual causes for hostility were quarrels over women, breakage of trading agreements, and trespass (Rhys Jones, 1974). The underlying cause of these wars was identified as follows: "Each tribe occupied certain tracts of country, but they were constantly invading and at war with each other... For the cause of these wars we have not far to look, the chief cause being probably the pressing presence of the colonists" (Roth, 1890). "Even after the arrival of the English, they were at war with each other - tribe against tribe; and this was owing to their having been forced to trespass on each other's hunting-grounds, being driven from their own by the white population" (Melville, 1847; cf. Milligan, 1859; Van der Bij, 1929: "de meer voortdurende en bloedige oorlogjes kwamen na en door de blanken"). According to Featherman (1887), "The intertribal wars of the Tasmanians were neither bloody, nor of long duration. Sometimes they decided their contests in single combat. These duels were fought with the waddy with perfect fairness, for each of the champions in turn offered his skull as a mark to be hit by his antagonist. They used neither stratagem nor ambuscade, and never attacked an enemy at night. When one of the parties was determined to bring the contest to a close the old women acted as negotiators; they threw up their arms three times or offered a green branch as a sign of peace, and immediately all the spears were lowered and the battle was at an end". "Battles consisted mainly of skirmishes with little loss of life. The whole attacking party usually withdrew if one of its members was killed, making every effort, however, to carry off its own wounded. Women were ordinarily spared. The killing of an enemy gave occasion for dancing and great rejoicing" (Murdock, 1934). Hays & Levinson (1991) summarized the evidence as follows: "War between communities from different societies is reported to have been common, although this may reflect only the postcontact situation. Trespassing and stealing a woman were the major reasons for war, which consisted mostly of surprise attacks and skirmishes and rarely produced more than one death". Fromm (1974) counts the Tasmanians as belonging to his 'Nondestructive-agressive' societies. The Tasmanians are coded Social War by Wright. The Tasmanians were totally eradicated by the whites. Tatu (North America): The Tatu, or Huchnom, are described as very timid and peaceably inclined (Powers, 1877; Kroeber, 1925); Cf. Van der Bij (1929). Miller (1978) states: "Unlike the Yuki, the Huchnom were 'timid' Indians... Huchnom were generally friendly with Pomoans, sometimes allying

with them in fights against the Yuki". Kroeber (1925) says: "In the frequent hostilities between the Pomo and Yuki the Huchnom sympathized with the Pomo and no doubt were occasionally involved". See also: Californians. Tenae (Eurasia): "The Tenae [of Bengal] are peaceably disposed, though they occasionally have to take up arms to punish marauders (Dalton, 1872)" (Holsti, 1913). Tenggerese (Indonesia) "The moral character of the Teng-’ger tribes is most exemplary. Crimes do not exist among them, and they are exempt from the vices of gambling and smoking opium. They are universally acknowledged to be peaceable, orderly, honest, industrious and happy people (Featherman, 1887). Tharu (Eurasia): Bahadur (1977) describes the Boksas of India as "simple, inoffensive" people and the Tharus in general as "inoffensive and peaceable". The Tharu are coded Social War by Wright (1942). Theraka (Africa): "The Theraka say that they were women in war, but very dangerous in thick bush; but among themselves warfare seems to have consisted largely of much rushing about and shouting until one side or the other was terrified and ran away. Natives have told me," writes Dundas (1913) of them, "that certain people had medicine which they smeared between their thumb and forefinger, the merit of which was that it made it impossible for them to err in their aim, and that such people were often not allowed to go to war because of the destruction that they did. This somewhat comic view of warfare shows that the object of fighting was not so much the destruction of the enemy, but when, despite this, it is certain that numbers were killed, this is only to be explained by the fact that the fighting went on continuously" (Dundas, 1913, quoted in Davie, 1929). Tikana (New Ireland): "Tikana give priority to peace, even over justice... Violence is rare, to my knowledge, among the Tikana [though] There used to be violence in warfare" (Billings, 1991). Secondary pacifists. Tikopia (Oceania): Infrequent Attackers External War coded by Otterbein (1968) and No War by Otterbein (1970). Firth (1936; see also Firth, 1967) reports that "When pressure of population... becomes severe the last resort is to drive out a section of the people". No further references to any kind of internal or external violence. Textor (1967) codes the Tikopia as a culture where bellicosity is moderate or negligible, but nevertheless military glory is emphasized. Timbira (South America): Textor (1967) codes the Timbira as a culture where bellicosity is moderate or negligible, and where military glory is negligibly emphasized. However, according to Lowie (1946), except for the Apinayé, the Timbira were warlike. They took neither prisoners nor trophies but killed all enemies they could. The Timbira are coded Continual Internal War and Continual Attackers External War by Otterbein (1968). The Krikati Timbira have not had organized warfare with Brasilians or other Indians for over a century (Newton, 1994). Timorini (New Guinea): "Zij waren vredelievend en toch moedig, vriendelijk en desalniettemin standvastig" (Van der Bij, 1929, referring to Bijlmer, 1922). Timorlaut (Indonesia): "The inhabitants of Timorlaut in Indonesia, like the Kubus, are meek and opposed to war, yet 'they have bravery of a kind, having little fear of death whether occurring in battle or in the course of nature... They are not bloodthirsty when not excited to the height of

passion’ (Forbes, 1884)" (Davie, 1929). Yet, headhunting (van der Bij, 1929, also referring to Forbes)? Timote (South America): The Timote comprised some 100 tribes and tribelets. There was no human sacrifice and no cannibalism. Warfare may have been of some importance but virtually nothing is known about these peoples (Métraux & Kirchhoff, 1948). Tiv (Africa): Textor (1967) codes the Tiv as a culture where bellicosity is moderate or negligible, but nevertheless military glory is emphasized. On the other hand, the Tiv are coded Frequent Attackers External War and Continual Internal War by Otterbein (1968). Tjumba (Indonesia): The Tjumba were coded No War by Hobhouse et al. (1915), and Defensive War by Wright (1942), on the basis of Junghuhn (1847). I have been unable to identify this people or find any further reference. Toala (Indonesia): "The only form of combat that occurs among the very primitive Toala in Celebes is the driving away of thieves... to the Toala in Celebes are ascribed no warlike qualities whatsoever" (Holsti, 1913; referring to Sarasin & Sarasin, 1905). Toda (Eurasia): "The Todas, Kotas and Badagas have lived together amicably in undisturbed relations" (Fuchs, 1973), though in the past the Badagas were notorious robbers. The Todas "who lead a peaceful, tranquil life" (Spencer, 1876) are coded No War by Otterbein (1970), uncoded by Hobhouse et al. (1915), and coded Social War by Wright (1942). "The Todas of South India are said to be entirely destitute of military organization and are described as peaceable, mild and friendly. Rivers (1906), the leading authority on these people, knew of no case of assault by one Toda on another with the exception of incidents accompanying the transfer of wives and never heard of any offense against property except in connection with the dairy, their chief occupation. Moreover, he writes, 'I heard of no disputes between members of different clans or different villages about grazing rights.' Though at the present time the Todas are unacquainted with war and use no weapons, they nevertheless retain in their ceremonies the club and the bow and arrow - weapons which were - no doubt - formerly used" (Davie, 1929). Rivers writes that they "have literally no man-killing weapons at all". "The political supremacy of the peaceable Todas over their numerous neighbours is maintained by magical fear only" (Holsti, 1913). Also other sources describe them as peaceable (Harkness, 1832). In Wright's (1942) list the Badaga are erroneously referred to as 'Badoga'. Holsti (1913) states of the peoples of India generally: "Remarkable is likewise the statement made by Sir Henry Maine (1876) with reference to [probably the original Dravidian peoples of] India: 'It may be proper to remember that, though no country was so perpetually scourged with war as India before the establishment of the Pax Britannica, the people of India were never a military people'". "The Dravidian people in India were not warlike in the same way as the Aryans, says Haddon (1911), who adds that they were agriculturalists and 'lacked the element of mobility so characteristic of the great warrior peoples in history'" (Numelin, 1950). Murdock (1934) states: "The relations of these three tribes [Toda, Kota, Badaga] with the Kurumbas and Irulas are much less intimate, though the latter furnish certain forest products. Between all the tribes, however, complete peace prevails. War is absolutely unknown. The Todas, indeed, do not even possess weapons, save for degenerate clubs, bows, and arrows which survive in certain ceremonies". Textor (1967) codes the Toda as a culture where warfare is not prevalent, where bellicosity is moderate or negligible, and where military glory is negligibly emphasized. Fromm (1974) counts the Toda as belonging to his 'Life-affirmative' societies. Tofalar/Tofa/Tuba (Eurasia) The Tofalar (also called Karagas) "have always been a peaceful

people who did not wage war with their neighbors. On the contrary, more powerful neighbors were always conquering them. To escape conflict, the Tofalar often practiced nomadism high in the mountains, where they waited until the trouble passed" (Rasadin, 1994). Tokelau Islanders (Oceania): "The inhabitants of Tokelau Island as described by Turner (1884) ’were a quiet people and rarely fought’. This holds good also of the aborigines of Humphrey Island (Turner, 1884), and the same author adds that in Ellice Island ’wars were rare’" (Holsti, 1913). Toltec/Toltek (Early) (Meso-America): "The early Tolteks were not warlike (Clavigero, 1787)" (Holsti, 1913). Tonga (Africa): Referring to Ratzel (1895), Holsti (1913) considers the Tonga (Thonga, Batonga, Bathonga), like the Karamojo, to be painstaking agriculturists and a peaceful people. "Friedfertig" (Stöhr, 1972). "The BaThonga were not particularly warlike until the Zulu diffused their bellicose attitudes to them... Junod thinks that the Thonga considered peace the normal situation. The adoption of war - a dangerous and abnormal status - was considered a 'rite de passage'" (TurneyHigh, 1949). White (1989) objects that Junod's positive bias towards them as an aboriginally peaceful people is belied by their cultural customs following war. Textor (1967) codes the Thonga as a culture where bellicosity is extreme and military glory is emphasized. Fromm (1974), on the other hand, counts the Bathonga as belonging to his 'Life-affirmative' societies. The Tonga are coded Defensive War by Goldschmidt (1988, 1989). Tongans/Tonga Islanders (Oceania): "By nature the Tongans are gentle and kind-hearted, and present a most curious mixture of mildness and courage. Two hundred years ago, the Tongan appears to have been ignorant of weapons and warfare, and to have borrowed his first knowledge of both from Fiji" (Wood, 1870). Dumont d'Urville (1842) does not reckon the Tonga Islanders among the more warlike tribes... Mariner (1817) states of the Tonga Islands that when Captain Cook was there the customs of war were little known to the natives" (Numelin, 1950). The Tongans are coded Social War by Wright (1942) and PE by Hobhouse et al. (1915). According to Meinicke (1875), the Tongans had slaves, partly prisoners of war. Mariner (1817) only makes mention of captive women, so it is possible that no men were taken prisoners in their wars (Nieboer, 1910). According to Urbanowicz (1991), "Although Tongan oral histories report some traditional conflicts relating to political situations, Tongans were essentially peaceful islanders prior to the coming of European missionaries... the divide-and-conquer policy of the missionaries led to religious wars of intense fury beginning in 1826". Featherman (1888), on the other hand, has quite a different story to tell: "The Tongas were a warlike nation, and they were not only brave and intrepid warriors; but they displayed much prudence and sagacity in conducting a campaign... armmies from three thousand to four thousand men were often arrayed against each other; and fleets of a hundred or a hundred and fifty canoes carried the invading armies from island to island... It was but rarely that they engaged in an open battle; but they harassed their enemy in unceasing skirmishes, and attacked them in partial engagements which were sometimes very bloody... Although the Tongas were not originally cannibals, yet in their intimate intercourse with the Fijians, who delighted in cannibal banquets, they found it necessary, as a measure of retaliation, to devour, in their turn, the enemies killed in battle". Trio (South America): "There is a strong ideal of harmonious relations, which are maintained by the fact that settlements cannot contain conflict, either physical or supernatural. If either arises, the settlement will automatically fission. Conflict, usually in the form of accusations of sorcery, is deflected to the outside. Trio traditions speak of past wars and raiding, but within this century these seem to have been on a small scale. Cases of physical violence are are" (Revière, 1994).

Trique (Meso-America): The Trique have had a long history of escaping to the mountain forests in time of attack (Tibon, 1961; Nader, 1969). Trobriand Islanders (New Guinea): "In the Trobriand Archipelago to the south-east of New Guinea, although various districts into which the archipelago was divided were frequently at war, Malinowski, who must be regarded as an authority on this area, states that war however was carried out with ’a considerable amount of fairness and loyalty, there being strict rules of conduct which were scrupulously observed’ (Malinowski, 1920)" (Numelin, 1950). Hostilities among the Trobrianders were "rather a form of social duel in which one side earned glory and humiliated the other, than warfare conducted to obtain any decisive advantage, economic or other... The mere fact of fighting as a sport, and the glory derived from a display of daring and skill, were an important incitement to warfare" (Malinowski, 1920). Textor (1967) nevertheless codes the Trobriand Islanders as a culture where warfare is prevalent and bellicosity is extreme. They are coded Social War by Wright (1942), PS by Hobhouse et al. (1915), and Low External Conflict by Ross (1985 et seq.). Tubatulabal (North America): "Although not a markedly aggressive people, the Tubatulabal bands engaged in hostilities against neighboring groups (Kawaiisu to the south, Koso to the east, and Yokuts to the west). The motive was always revenge for their neighbors’ previous attacks. Wars lasted one to two days, and casualties were light" (C.Smith, 1978; Cf. O’Leary & Levinson, 1991). Kroeber (1925) states that the Tubatulabal were in the main on amicable terms with the Yokuts tribes. See also: Californians. Tucuna (South America): "The Tucuna [Ticuna, Tikuna] are not warlike. They defend themselves against the Omagua, their principal enemies" (Nimuendaju, 1948). "Während die Omagua (Todfeind der friedliebende Tikuna) praktisch ausgestorben sind, konnten sich die Tikuna behaupten und ihr Wohngebiet ausdehnen" (Stöhr, 1972). Tukano (South America): Reichel-Dolmatoff (1971, 1975) describes the Tukano (Tucano) Indians of the Uaupés Territory of Colombia (Desana) as a peaceful people who frequently talk of violent vengeance but find an outlet for aggression through drugs rather than physical violence. "All aggressiveness... is acted out in the hallucinatory dimension... and tensions are relieved that would otherwise be intolerable" (1975). Some sources describe the Uaupés as peaceful (Orton, 1876; Markham, 1895, 1910). Markham refers to the Uaupés as "An extensive group of tribes inhabiting the banks of the River Uaupés [He mentions 30 tribes by name]... Some of the Uaupés tribes never intermarry among themselves, but obtain wives from other kindred tribes; and these intermarrying tribes always live at peace with each other. This is the case with the Tarianas and Tucanos". On the other hand, Goldman (1948) states of the Tucano in general: "Wars are waged for revenge and to capture women and children as slaves. Trespass by a distant group or tribe usually precipitates hostilities that continue for generations... Dead enemies are eaten at a dance celebrating the victory". Holsti (1913) states: "'The typical South American Indian is', Professor Orton (1876) affirms, 'by nature more peaceable and submissive than his Northern brother'. Thus for example the Manties are an agricultural tribe 'of mild disposition', and the Uaupes are likewise an agricultural people 'peaceable and ingenious'". Evidence is inconclusive. The Desana may be a more peaceful Tukano subdivision. Tungus (Eurasia): "[I]n spite of their sanguine temperament and great activity, the Tungus [Evenks, Evens, Udegeys] live for the most part in harmony and peace among themselves. Injury and strife often result in a knightly duel, which is fought out after due challenge according to all known rules (Hiekisch, 1879)" (Numelin, 1950). Ivanov, Smolyak & Levin (1964) state about the Udegey Tungus: "Clan members were bound to exact blood vengeance for a fellow clansman. This caused

interclan wars, even as late as in the 19th century. These wars were conducted according to traditional rules: only cold weapons (i.e., no firearms) were used... Women and children were inviolable". "The causes of war were the abduction of women, vendetta, occasional disputes over hunting grounds and attempts to seize property, reindeer and so on... Sometimes the fight was decided by a dual between the warrior leaders... The men were killed, the women and children were taken captive and forced to work, and in certain cases the victors married captive women. Sometimes the belligerent parties settled the dispute peaceably" (Vasilevich & Smolyak, 1964). "The epic tales [of the Evens] contain references to interclan wars, and clashes with the Koryaks and the Chukchi" (Levin & Vasil’yev, 1964). Ualan (Oceania): "The Ipilaoos (Caroline Islanders) are not a warlike race in the real sense of that expression. They do not seek war for its own sake, nor do they shun it when forced upon them. Sometimes difficulties arise between different communities, which can only be adjusted by the force of arms... The people of Ualan are the least warlike of all the Ipalaoos" (Featherman, 1888). Confirmed by Lesson (1829), but doubted by Finsch (1880, 1899) and van der Bij (1929). Vanatinai (Oceania): The Vanatinai of the D’Entrecasteaux Islands off the New Guinea coast are an egalitarian and small society. Lepowsky (1994) reports that overt aggression is condemned and violence is rare. When it occurs sexual jealousy seems to be the dominant motive. Vedda (Ceylon): The Vedda (Veddah, Wedda, Vaedda, Vaddah) of Ceylon "sont honnêtes et inoffensifs pourvu qu'on ne viole pas leur domicile et qu'on les laisse en paix" (Tennent, 1859; as quoted in Deschamps, 1891). "War does not exist among the Veddahs of Ceylon. Van Goens, writing in the seventeenth century, says, 'They live so peacefully together that one seldom hears of quarrels among them and never of war.' The Sarasin brothers state [1893] that murder, robbery, infanticide, and cruelty are completely foreign to the Veddahs, who live together without strife and are timid and silent toward strangers. Virchow [in Sarasin & Sarasin, 1893] explains their lack of war as due to the fact that they have not yet made the step from hunter to warrior. The Sarasins corroborate this statement. The Veddahs are among the most primitive peoples extant; they represent the lowest stage of self-maintenance - collecting with some hunting - and have almost no conception of property. They do not as yet possess well-defined hunting boundaries as a source of disputes leading to war. Nevertheless, strife over property rights is not entirely unknown... Other authors state that the Veddahs will shoot trespassers; the death of a man arouses his clan members and leads to a fight between the clans. This is the only trace of war among these people. According to the Sarasins this germ does not develop into real war, for after a certain number have fallen the affair stops. The result is never conquest but only the fixing of boundaries between hunting grounds" (Davie, 1929). The Vedda are coded Social War by Wright (1942). Textor (1967) codes the Vedda as a culture where warfare is not prevalent. Voltaic peoples (Africa): "Among the Voltaic peoples neither headhunting nor cannibalism is found. The spilling of blood upon the earth is believed to be especially abhorrent to the deity of the earth. A killing in war or a murder defiles the earth and must be expiated by extraordinary sacrifices. To prevent such contamination and its possible awful consequences, the headman has the ritual authority to put a stop to feuding or warfare and to mediate in disputes which threaten to provoke them. This complex of beliefs and practices obviously exerts a powerful influence toward peace and social order" (Murdock, 1959). Wabuma (Africa): The Wabuma (Buma, Boma) were described by Johnston (1884) as "gentle, inoffensive" and very fearful (quoted in Van der Bij, 1929). They had friendly and peaceful relations with the Batéké and Bayanzi.

Wafiumi (Africa); "Of the Wafiumi [Fiumi, Fiomi], we are told (Baumann, 1894) that the inhabitants of the neighbouring districts do not make war upon each other, but only beat each other with their long sticks" (Holsti, 1913). Waganda (Africa): "Of the warfare of the Waganda [Baganda, Ganda] Casati (1891) writes: "They are fierce in battle, but only as long as reserves are in the rear ready to strengthen the weak and threatened position, for should they be unsupported or hard pressed they quickly take to flight. The death of a chief also has a discouraging effect upon them’. Describing a war between ’the great chief of Nunda’ and a petty chief, Speke (1908) observes that during the whole of the two years’ warfare the loss was only three men on each side; and this remark seems to hold good of many other wars among the natives of East Africa (Baumann, 1894)" (Numelin, 1950). On the other hand, "The Ganda wage war nearly every year with Kitara and other neighboring states, chiefly for captives and plunder" (Murdock, 1934). The Buganda are coded Political War by Wright (1942) and PE by Hobhouse et al. (1915). Waiwai/Wai-Wai (South America): "The Waiwai assimilated many local groups such as the Parukoto, Mawayana, Sherew, Taruma, Hishkaryana, Katuena, and the Karafawyana... In the past some tribes developed enmities that sometimes broke out in violence, although warfare was not a cultural focus and customs such as ceremonial wrestling and trade served as curbs. Many former enemies now live together. Overt conflict, aggression, or discord are highly censured. The Waiwai ethos rests on the contrast between being 'tawake' (peaceful, sociable), and 'tirwoñe' (angry, hostile). They have avoided conflicts with colonists by retreating" (Howard, 1994). Wakhutu (Africa): "De Wakhutu [Bakhutu, Bakutu, Khutu, Kutu] beschrijft Thomson (1881) als een bedeesd 'ras', dat onophoudelijk beoorloogd werd en toch nimmer aan tegenaanvallen deed" (a shy 'race', permanently being attacked and yet never retaliating)(Van der Bij, 1929). Wambugwe (Africa): "In the wars of the Wambugwe [Mbugwe], there is said to be little bloodshed; they do not even take goats or cattle as spoil, only fowl and household utensils (Baumann, 1894). But all this does not refer to wars with the Masai, who are bitterly hated and to whom no mercy is shown" (Holsti, 1913). Curious is the statement by Numelin (1950): "Some authorities have said that the Masai are warlike but among them are the Wambugwe and Wanyaturu, who scarcely know war, as an authority like Baumann points out". Wana (Indonesia): Dentan (1992) considers the Wana of Sulawesi to belong to Gibson's (1986) Type 1 (i.e., peaceful) peoples. Wanigela River Papuans (New Guinea): "Although the natives of New Guinea are warlike, their conflicts do not always end disastrously. In the Dutch Protectorate the wounding or killing of one or two combatants on either side gives victory to the other (Krieger, 1899). At Hood Point the hostile tribes arrange themselves in two lines facing one another with an interval of about one hundred yards between them. 'A man slips out from one line and abuses the other side. He is soon confronted by an opponent equally versed in the science of vituperation and the amount of bad language used would satisfy an Australian bullock-driver. They gradually become more excited until finally they dash at one another and a spear or two is thrown; other warriors now rush out from either side and the battle commences. It is, however, of short duration, as a man or two wounded on one side is considered sufficient excuse for that side to run away' (Guise, 1899)" (Davie, 1929). "Dr. Loria (in Seligman, 1910) similarly states of these natives that when the assailants succeed in capturing or killing one person, they do not care to run the risk of losing any of their men, and gladly listen to the

voice of any one of them who says ’Let us go back and eat him’, and return to their canoes carrying with them the slain or captured person’" (Holsti, 1913). Waorani (South America): Robarchek & Robarchek (1992) report the transition of the Waorani (Auca, Auka) of the Ecuadorian Amazon from the most warlike society yet described to an "essentially nonviolent one". Individual bands of Waorani abandoned warfare consciously and voluntarily in a matter of months after contact. "When the first missionaries appeared as mediators between hostile groups, most Waorani were surprisingly willing to cease raiding, once they were convinced that the other groups would do the same. This transition is even more remarkable in that it occurred, at least in its initial phases, in the absence of other major changes, either inside or outside Waorani society. There was no military conquest, social organization had not changed, and the ecological situation had not been altered. The killing stopped because the people themselves made a consious decision to end it. It is important to emphasize that the Waorani were not conquered, nor were they coerced into giving up warfare" (Robarchek & Robarchek, 1992). Wape (New Guinea): "The Wape generally are a pacific people who dislike conflict and work hard to prevent it. When a villager is deeply offended they go to the offender’s house and, standing outside, give a haranguing lecture. If a problem escalates, the village is called together to hash out the dispute and reach a consensus decision. Villagers generally avoid using the courts for recourse when possible. Traditionally, pay-back killings with enemy villages did occur, but sometimes there were intervals of several years between killings. Some villages had abandoned feuding even before visitations by government patrols" (Mitchell, 1991)] Wappo (North America): "One of the few exceptions to their generally peaceful reputation among other Indians was the Wappo-Pomo war. The Wappo apparently attacked the Alexander Valley Pomo who had carried off some Wappo supplies of acorns. In the two attacks made a number of Pomo were killed. The Pomo sought peace, which was granted at once... To speak of war in the context of Wappo culture is incongruous... The raids and avenging expeditions which took place stemmed for the most part from stealing, murder and poisoning... In most engagements, an attack terminated when one important person was killed or the sun went down. At most a full-scale ’war’ might end with the death of 6 or 10 people. Women and children were usually spared" (Sawyer, 1978). Kroeber (1925) reported a ’war’ for the Lile’ek Wappo against the Habenapo Pomo. "They fought in a long line. The Wappo line was broken after some hours... Casualties were few, with only two or three deaths". There was, furthermore, some feuding among Wappo villages. The Wappo are coded Social War by Wright (1942). See also: Californians. Warega (Africa): Delhaise & Van Overbergh (1909) state about the Warega [Rega]: "Les Warega vivent en bonne intelligence avec tous leurs voisins... par conséquent les alliances sont inutiles" (quoted in Van der Bij, 1929). Yet, elsewhere these authors state that they (the Warega) kill everyone in their revenge raids. The 'Warege' are coded Social War by Wright (1942) and PS/PA/CA by Hobhouse et al. (1915). Warrau/Warao (South America): "In 1596 Sir Walter Raleigh found two chiefs of Warrau [Warao] subtribes warring with each other and with neighboring tribes, especially the Carib" (Kirchhoff, 1948). After that date no internal violence has been reported: Warrau do not fight among themselves, but they used to fight against the marauding Carib. The Carib conquered them and took over the highlands, the Warrau retreated to the flooded lowlands of the Orinoco delta (Turrado Moreno, 1945; White, 1989). Warfare largely defensive. The Siriono and the Warao were not warlike, Morey & Marwitt (1975) state, "but it is important to note that these groups were displaced by more powerful neighbors". "According to Warao oral tradition, relations with the

neighboring Lokono, an Arawak-speaking population, were peaceful, but not so with the Caribspeaking Cariña (Carinya) ('red faces'), or Mussimotuma, who are still feared today... The Warao do not wage war; traditionally, they have retreated deeper into the swamps when threatened by neighbors or invaders. They are known to be very pacific, but there are occasional outbursts of violent reactions to abuses by outsiders... Intergroup conflicts are handled by the Warao through the use of witchcraft (hoa). 'We kill each other with hoa', the Warao say. Among interrelated groups a quite peaceful contest with shields is used to vent anger" (Heinen, 1994). Washo/Washoe (North America): The Californian Washoe were a peaceable people. Warfare among aboriginal Washoe subgroups seems to have been absent, though occasional feuds between families erupted briefly into open violence (d'Azevedo, 1991). "There is no evidence that the Washoe regularly defended or excluded others from their territory. Reports of hostilities are of localized events involving aggression or the threat of aggression by others in the vicinity of their settlements or of established hunting and gathering locations in current use. Moreover, much of the Washoe range, including the core area, was jointly used by adjacent non-Washoe peoples or provided a corridor of trade and travel. Such trespass was usually accomodated by negotiation or the prior withdrawal of one group from confrontation. Many of the so-called wars between the Washoe and the Northern Paiute, Miwok, or Maidu were of this nature and represent skirmishes between small parties whose general associations were peaceful (Downs, 1966)" (d'Azevedo, 1986; Cf. Kroeber, 1925). See also: Californians. Wataturu (Africa): "Among the Wataturu [Taturu], the fighting ceases when a few men are slain" (Baumann, 1894)" (Holsti, 1913). Nevertheless, the Wataturu are coded Economic War by Wright (1942). Wawira (Africa): "Die Wawira [Wira, Bira, etc.] sind friedliche Ackerbauer und Viehzüchter, können jedoch, wenn man sie reizt, sehr ungemütlich werden" (Stuhlmann, 1894; as quoted in Van der Bij, 1929). "Verderop blijkt... dat zij oorlog verklaren, formeel vrede sluiten en bloedwraakoorlog tegen het dorp van den moordenaar kennen". Wintu/Wintun (North America): Coded No War by Hobhouse et al. (1915), and Social War by Wright (1942). Silver (1978) states that the Shasta had a number of battles with the Wintu. "Warfare was usually a neighborhood feud between individuals. The bonds of kinship were as a rule strong enough to prevent major bloodshed... Murder and the theft of women were the most frequent causes of war. The theft of an acorn cache once caused war between the McCloud Wintu and Achumawi. Small numbers of men went to war and few individuals were killed" (LaPena, 1978). According to Kroeber (1925) "The Cortina Valley people fought the northeastern Pomo, with whom the neighboring Wintun of Little Stony Creek were probably allied. The were also in feud with certain of the Sacramento River people. The hill Nomlaki of Thomas and Elder Creeks also warred with the plains people below them. The latter in turn were unfriendly with the valley people of Stony Creek and southward, if their name for this group, No-yuki or 'southern enemies' may be depended on. Another feud prevailed between the Lol-sel of Long Valley and the Chenpo-sel of middle Cache Creek". The Patwin, or southern Wintun, are coded Social War by Wright (1942), and PS by Hobhouse et al. (1915). See also: Californians. Wiyot (North America): The Wiyot are described by Powers (1877) as "very timid" (Cf. Van der Bij, 1929). Elsasser (1978) states of the Wiyot: "Usual causes for physical conflict were murder, insult, or poaching. Surprise attack was most common, as with other Northwestern Californian groups, but the Wiyot also engaged in prearranged battles with enemies. Women and children were not killed in wars, and compensation by both sides in the fighting for all property destroyed was

customary". Hostilities between Wiyot and Whilkut occurred with some frequency. Wiyot women caught harvesting acorns in groves that the Whilkut considered their own property were often killed. Their kinsmen retaliated and petty feuds ensued (Wallace, 1978; Curtis, 1907). See also: Californians. Wogeo (New Guinea): Textor (1967) codes the Wogeo as a culture where bellicosity is moderate or negligible, and where military glory is negligibly emphasized. Hogbin (1939) observed that "Jealousy between the districts is keen, and the most trifling incidents such as theft of a pig of a case of adultery have several times led to battles. Yet, very little blood is shed, and no ground has ever changed hands afterwards". Wolof (Africa): Textor (1967) codes the Wolof (Woloff) as a culture where bellicosity is moderate or negligible, but nevertheless military glory emphasized. The Woloff are coded Political War by Wright (1942). Xinguanos/Xingu tribes (South America): "What is striking about the Xinguanos is that they are peaceful. During the one hundred years over which we have records there is no evidence of warfare among the Xingu groups... defensive raids clearly show that the Xinguanos are fully capable of organized armed conflict." (Gregor, 1990). Lévi-Strauss (1948) mentions the formerly half warlike, half friendly relations among the tribes of the Upper Xingu (Bacaïri, Camayura, Custenau, Mehinacu (Mehinaku), Nahukwa, Suya, Trumai, Waura, a.o.). He relates: "When Von den Steinen visited the Culiseu River, the Trumai had just been attacked by the Suya, who had also captured a large number of prisoners from the Manitsaua. The Bacaïri feared the Trumai because of their alleged custom of tying up and drowning their war prisoners". The Trumai joined the other villages in a revenge attack against the Suya. When Quain studied the Trumai in 1938, they lived in a single village and had frequent, peaceful relations with the other tribes inhabiting the Upper Xingu Basin (Murphy & Quain, 1955; Ember & Ember, 1994). Textor (1967) codes the Trumai as a culture where bellicosity is moderate or negligible, and where military glory is negligibly emphasized. The Waura reject warfare and violence as morally degrading. Yet, they recognize that they may be forced to become violent to defend their territory against white poachers and settlers (Ireland, 1988, 1991; see also Bonta, 1993 et seq.) How the Xingu system of indigenous accultivation evolved is a matter of speculation. It is possible, as proposed by Carneiro, that the Xingu tribes are an example of cultural devolution from a more warlike chieftainship that existed prior to Columbus and contact with Western diseases. Alternatively, as Gregor (1994) proposed, the Mehinaku and their neighbors may be refugees from more aggressive Gê-speaking tribes who live to the north of the Xingu peoples. The more recent history of the Mehinaku has been one of avoiding warlike tribes outside the Xingu region and establishing friendly relations with Brazilians. Until the pacification of the Carib-speaking Txicão tribe in the 1960s, the villages lived in fear of attack. Xingu women and children were kidnapped by the Txicão. Mehinaku ideology is generally antiviolent. Although they have participated in retaliatory raids against the warlike tribes surrounding the upper Xingu Basin, war is regarded as an ungly act, typical of 'wild' (non-Xingu) Indians and Whites. Within the village, violence is limited to relatively rare altercations between spouses and, more significantly, to witchcraft killings (Gregor, 1994). Carneiro (1994) states: "Near the Kuikuru in the Upper Xingu Basin are villages representing four different language families: Carib (Kalapalo, Nafukuá, Matipú), Arawak (Waurá, Mehinaku, Yawalapití), Tupian (Kamayura, Auétí), and the isolated Trumai. These groups, the so-called Xinguanos, isolated for centuries from surrounding tribes, are all very similar culturally and engage in joint ceremonies and sporting events, trade with each other, and intermarry. There has been no warfare among these nine upper Xingu villages since they were discovered by Karl von den Steinen in 1884. Hostilities have occasionally occurred, however, between Xinguano villages and surrounding groups of 'Wild Indians', such as the Suya, Shavante (Xavante),

Chukahamay (Mekranoti), and Txikão... The one incident of violence involving the Kuikuru was their murder, around 1935, of five visiting Yarumá from a now-extinct village of Carib-speaking Indians of the Rio Kuluene... There is archaeological evidence in the form of defensive trenches to indicate that, centuries ago, warfare was prevalent in the upper Xingu. However, no oral tradition of this survives... the Kuikuru are strongly socialized from childhood to be amiable and to refrain from expressing anger. Indeed, fights among men in the village are unknown". Zeleny (1994) presents a similar report about the Yawalapiti. Yagua (South America): "Peaceable" (Lowie, 1948). "The modern Yagua are entirely peaceful and recalled having fought only the Mayoruna" (Steward & Métraux, 1948). Textor (1967) codes the Yagua as a culture where bellicosity is moderate or negligible, and where military glory is negligibly emphasized. According to Seiler-Baldinger (1994) "The Yagua were quite warlike in the past. Traditional enemies included the Omagua, the Ticuna, the Bora, the Mayoruna, and the Witoto. There is evidence of past aggression between Yagua local groups and nonallied clans. The reason for conflict was usually witchcraft or the rape of women. Today, although the Yagua are very peaceful, conflict within the group still occurs because of sorcery and jealousy". Yahgan (South America): Organized warfare did not exist and "The Yahgan had no defensive weapons. The weapons used in their feuds were primarily made for, and adapted to hunting" (Cooper, 1946). Their feuding was not very significant, more akin to homicide. Ember (1978) mentions the Yahgan as having 'no or rare warfare'. Ember & Ember (1983) report Divale's rating as Some internal war as opposed to their own Warfare rarely or never. Textor (1967) codes the Yahgan as a culture where warfare is not prevalent, where bellicosity is moderate or negligible, and military glory is negligibly emphasized. Yahgan families relied on shellfish as a dietary staple and moved along the beach from one shellfish bed to another every few days. "If... a family attempted to exploit a side already occupied by another family, a fight ensued (Steward & Faron, 1959: 402). Lothrop (1928: 164) reports that the weaker group usually withdrew from contested sites when trouble arose, but that fighting sometimes occurred (Kelly, 2000: 136). See also: Fuegians. Yami (Taiwan): Montagu (1978) mentions the Yami of Taiwan as one of the societies notable for their unaggressiveness. "Yami warfare appears to have been largely a matter of boasting and bravado, with hostilities ceasing at the first sign of serious bloodshed" (de Beauclair, 1958; LeBar, 1975). Unlike the majority of tribes on the Formosan mainland the Yami of Botel Tobago have by all accounts never participated in headhunting practices. Yanadi (Eurasia): The worldview of the Yanadi of India is to live in complete harmony with god, man and nature (Agrawal, Reddy & Rao, 1984). The Yanadi are a completely peaceful and nonviolent people who avoid unpleasantness, provocation, drunkenness, and crime. They have no memory of warfare - it does not even figure in their mythology (Raghaviah, 1962; Bonta, 1993, 1996). Yokuts and Monache (North America): "Peaceful" (Powers, 1877); "On the whole a peaceable people" (Kroeber, 1908; in Van der Bij (1929). Hostilities over resources of the land were rare (Gayton, 1948). Latta (1949) describes one of the northern groups, the Chawchila, as the only warlike Yokuts tribe. Described conflicts occurred between Yokuts groups, between Yokuts and Tubatulabal, between Yokuts and Eastern Mono (Paiute), and between intertribal coalitions of Yokuts and Monache versus other Yokuts and Monache. Yokuts and Monache societies apparently were generally peaceable ones with their peoples showing little enthusiasm for armed conflict (McCorkle, 1978; Reid, 1991). Wallace (1978a) states of the Southern Valley Yokuts: "Friendly and even intimate relations generally prevailed between the local groups... Certain enmities did exist,

however, and armed conflict occasionally broke out... Fighting occurred on a small scale and rarely more than two or three persons were killed". And of the Northern Valley Yokuts, Wallace (1978b) states: "Originally the Northern Valley Yokuts were not prone to warfare and the various tribes lived in peace with one another; however, petty hostilities did arise... The general impression gained is that they were following a long-established native custom of retreating rather than fighting". Kroeber (1925) contends that "Very little is known of Yokuts warfare. The [sub]tribes [numbering some fifty] seem generally to have acted as units when conflicts arose. This should have given them some advantage of solidarity and numbers over most of their neighbors, but there is nothing to show that they were specially feared... The Yokuts were evidently on the whole a peaceable people". Spier (1978) states of the Monache: "Hostilities involving the Monache and other tribes usually stemmed from injuries, often atributed to malevolent shamans, occurring to individuals... Rarely did such incidents lead to wholesale hostilities". The Monache are coded Defensive War by Otterbein (1970). The Yokuts are coded Social War by Wright (1942), Infrequent Internal War and Infrequent Attackers External War by Otterbein (1968), and PE/PA by Hobhouse et al. (1915). See also: Californians. Yukaghir (Eurasia): Textor (1967) codes the Yukaghir as a culture where warfare is not prevalent. "De Yukagiren kennen slechts strijd tussen de eigen clans om vrouwenzaken of om aan de eischen van bloedwraak to voldoen; daarnaast komen evenwel georganiseerde oorlogen tegen ander stammen voor" (Van der Bij, 1929; referring to Czaplicka, 1914), especially Koryak according to their legends (Stepanova, Gurwich & Khranova, 1964). Otterbein (1968) codes the Yukaghir as Continual Attackers External War and Infrequent Internal War. Yurok (North America): Turney-High (1949) states of them: "[T]he Yurok were absolutely subtactical and to all intents a warless people. Their scuffling amounted to no more than feuds wherein little blood was shed". "Traditional Yurok law was entwined with a complex system of compensating for deaths, injuries, even insults and destruction of another’s property... Even feuds elaborate enough to be called wars were ended by compensation (Kroeber, 1925, 1945)" (Pilling, 1978). Kroeber (1925) states: "No distinction of principle existed in the native mind between murder and war. It is rather clear that all so-called wars were only feuds that happened to involve large groups of kinsmen, several such groups, or unrelated fellow townsmen of the original participants. Whoever was not drawn into a war was as careful to remain neutral as in a private quarrel". According to Hester (1991), some raiding and retaliation for such raids took place between the Yurok and their neighbors, such as the Hupa. After raids, however, compensation was always required. The Yurok are coded Defensive War by Wright (1942). Textor (1967) codes the Yurok as a culture where bellicosity is moderate or negligible, and where military glory is negligibly emphasized. See also: Californians. Zapotec (Meso-America): Stöhr (1972) says they were "friedfertig". The contemporary Zapotec of Oaxaca have been subject to extensive studies because of their general nonviolence. The Zapotec "emphasize values or ideals which in their enactment stand as antithetical to a violent way of life" (O'Nell, 1989). Fry (1995) and Bonta (1997) note that some Zapotec communities are very peaceful, whereas others are much more violent. Zuñi (North America): The Zuñi are generally described as extremely peaceful (Fremont & Emory, 1849; Van der Bij, 1929; Benedict, 1934; Goldman, 1937; Eggan, 1950; Brandon, 1961). In early times, according to Zuñi mythology, before they were able to settle in their present community, they moved about, encountering and frequently fighting hostile peoples (Ferguson & Eriacho, 1990). Early in the 1700s, the Zuñi killed three Spaniards and briefly fled to Dowa Yalanne Mesa. There were also problems with the Hopi, and mutual raiding of villages occurred (The Hopi Wars)

(Frisbie, 1991). In Zuñi society physical violence is rare to absent, and the children are taught nonviolent ways of conflict resolution and nonaggressive values. Several scholars have observed and discussed the Zuñi antipathy to overt violence; however, vicious gossip (and sometimes physical violence) is also an aspect of pueblo life (see Bonta, 1993). The Zuñi are coded Social War in Wright's (1942) list. Textor (1967) codes the Zuñi as a culture where bellicosity is moderate or negligible, but nevertheless military glory is emphasized. Fromm (1974) counts the Zuñi as belonging to his 'Life-affirmative' societies. "Als Modelle aggressionsarmer Gesellschaften werden auch einige Akkerbauer und Pflanzer immer wieder genannt, so die Zuni, von denen Helmuth (1967) behauptet: $XVNHLQHQ6DW]GHU6FKLOGHUXQJ5%HQHdicts über das Leben der Zuni kann auf etwaige Aggressionen derselben geschlossen werden6 ZRUDXI:HLGNXKQ erwiderte, daß er wohl unaufmerksam gelesen habe, denn die von Benedict beschriebenen Initiationsrituale wären doch sehr aggressiv" (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1975). See also: Pueblos.

The following claims could not be confirmed:

Aguaruna (Markham, 1895, 1910) Araona/Caviña (Markham, 1895) Balinese (Textor, 1967; Bonta, 1993) Camuchiro (Markham, 1895, 1910) Egyptians (Predynastic) (Numelin, 1950) Fiji Islanders (Davie, 1929; Numelin, 1950) Guarayo (Markham, 1895) Italmen/Itelmen (van der Bij, 1929) Lakhers (Numelin, 1950) Lamista (Markham, 1895, 1910) Land Dayak (Montagu, 1978) Lushei (Holsti, 1913) Mafulu (Holsti, 1913) Manyari (Markham, 1910) Maori (Holsti, 1913) Milanow (Davie, 1929) Pawnee (Numelin, 1950) Samoans (Davie, 1929; Numelin, 1950; Textor, 1967) Singalese (Holsti, 1913) Society Islanders/Tahitians (Numelin, 1950; Montagu, 1978; Bonta, 1997) Solomon Islanders (Numelin, 1950) Tamils (Holsti, 1913) Tibetans (Bell, 1928; Numelin, 1950) Toraja (Bonta, 1993, 1996) Tupi (Markham, 1895, 1910) Yakuts (Featherman, 1891)

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