THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA TODAY Internal and External Challenges
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THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA TODAY Internal and External Challenges
Zhiqun Zhu Bucknell University, USA
editor
World Scientific NEW JERSEY
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LONDON
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SINGAPORE
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BEIJING
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SHANGHAI
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HONG KONG
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TA I P E I
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CHENNAI
Published by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. 5 Toh Tuck Link, Singapore 596224 USA office: 27 Warren Street, Suite 401-402, Hackensack, NJ 07601 UK office: 57 Shelton Street, Covent Garden, London WC2H 9HE
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA TODAY Internal and External Challenges Copyright © 2011 by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. All rights reserved. This book, or parts thereof, may not be reproduced in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or any information storage and retrieval system now known or to be invented, without written permission from the Publisher.
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ISBN-13 978-981-4313-50-6 ISBN-10 981-4313-50-5
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Contents
List of Abbreviations
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Notes on the Editor and Contributors
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Foreword Delving Into the Challenges Confronting China David M. Lampton
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Introduction The People’s Republic of China Today Zhiqun Zhu Part I:
Political Changes and Democratization
Chapter One China’s Leadership Succession and Change Weixing Chen Chapter Two A Tragic Miscarriage: How China’s Quest for Political Reform is Undercut by the China Model Yawei Liu
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Chapter Three Concluding the Complex Learning Process: The Chinese Elites’ Acceptance of Outward-Oriented Development Lawrence C. Reardon Chapter Four Political Accountability in Governance: An Informative Appraisal of China’s Political Change Yuchao Zhu
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Chapter Five Liberalism and Its Impact on China’s Reform He Li
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Part II:
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Economic and Social Challenges
Chapter Six China’s Demographic Dividends: Past Gains and Future Pains Ding Lu Chapter Seven Smashing the Iron Rice Bowls: Severing Ties Between the Chinese State and Socialist Workers Jin Zeng Chapter Eight Developing a PAYGO Social Security System in China: Retrospect and Prospect Lin Ye Chapter Nine An Unprecedented Challenge: Can the Internet be Successfully Controlled? Junhao Hong
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Chapter Ten Spiritual Beliefs and Ethnic Relations in China: A Cross-Cultural and Social Psychological Perspective Yueh-Ting Lee and Hong Li Chapter Eleven Tourism, Modernization, and Nation-Building: The Case of the Yangzi Delta Cecilia L.F. Chien Part III: Challenges in Foreign, Security, and Military Policies Chapter Twelve China’s Public Diplomacy in a New Era Zhaoying Han Chapter Thirteen Foreign Publicity with Weak Political Credibility: A Case Study of Beijing’s Foreign Publicity Over the Tibet Riots Sheng Ding Chapter Fourteen China’s Search for Energy and Climate Security in an Interdependent World Jean Garrison Chapter Fifteen The Coming of a Prosperous China with Strong Military Power David Lai Chapter Sixteen Extended Horizon: China’s Blue-Water Navy Ambition and Its Implications Qiang Xin
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Chapter Seventeen Alternative Perspectives on US–China Relations Eric Hyer
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Conclusion Whither China in the 21st Century? Zhiqun Zhu
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Index
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List of Abbreviations
ADB
Asian Development Bank
APEC
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
APP
Asia-Pacific Partnership (On Clean Development and Climate)
ARF
ASEAN Regional Forum
BBS
bulletin board system
CAS
Chinese Academy of Sciences
CASS
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
CCP
Chinese Communist Party
CCS
carbon capture and storage
CCYL
Chinese Communist Youth League
CCTV
China Central Television
CDM
Clean Development Mechanism
CIPG
China International Publishing Group
CMC
Central Military Commission
CNN
Cable News Network
CNOOC
China National Offshore Oil Corporation
CNR
China National Radio
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List of Abbreviations
CNTA
China National Tourism Administration
CPAFFC
Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries
CPIFA
Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs
CPJ
Committee to Protect Journalists
CPPCC
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference
CRI
China Radio International
CSC
China Scholarship Council
DB
defined benefit
DC
defined contribution
DPP
Democratic Progressive Party
DINK
double income, no kids
ECPBs
export commodity processing bases
EIA
(US) Energy Information Administration
FAO
Food and Agriculture Organization
FDI
foreign direct investment
FFYP
First Five-Year Plan
GATT
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP
gross domestic product
GLF
Great Leap Forward
GNI
gross national income
HGI
Human Governance Index
ICP
Internet content providers
ICTs
information and communication technologies
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IEA
International Energy Agency
IGCC
integrated gas combined cycle
IPCC
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
ISI
import substitution industrialization
ISOC
the Internet Society of China
ISP
Internet service providers
KMT
Kuomintang (The Nationalist Party)
LDCs
less developed countries
MEP
Ministry of Environmental Protection
MFN
most-favored-nation
MIIT
Ministry of Industry and Information Technology
MOOTW
military operations other than war
NBSC
National Bureau of Statistics of China
NDRC
National Development and Reform Commission
NGO
non-governmental organization
NPC
National People’s Congress
OASS
Old-Age Social Security
PAYGO
pay-as-you-go
PBS
Public Security Bureau
PLA
People’s Liberation Army
PLAN
People’s Liberation Army Navy
PNTR
permanent normal trading relations
PPP
purchasing power parity
PRC
People’s Republic of China
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RMA
revolution in military affairs
RMB
renminbi (yuan)
ROC
Republic of China
RSF
Reporters Sans Frontières (Reporters Without Borders)
SCIO
State Council Information Office
SED
Strategic and Economic Dialogue
SEPA
State Environmental Protection Agency
SEZ
special economic zone
SLOCs
sea lines of communications
SMS
short message services
SOEs
state-owned enterprises
SSF
social security fund
TRA
Taiwan Relations Act
UN
United Nations
UNDP
United Nations Development Programme
USIA
United States Information Agency
WEC
World Energy Council
WGI
Worldwide Governance Indicators
WPNS
Western Pacific Naval Symposium
WTO
World Trade Organization
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The Editor Zhiqun Zhu is currently John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Chair in East Asian Politics and an Associate Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Bucknell University in Pennsylvania. His teaching and research interests include Chinese politics, East Asian political economy, and US–East Asian relations. His recent books include China’s New Diplomacy: Rationale, Strategies and Significance (Ashgate, 2010), Understanding East Asia’s Economic “Miracles” (Ann Arbor: Association for Asian Studies, 2009), Global Studies: China [ed., 13th edition] (McGraw-Hill, 2009) and US–China Relations in the 21st Century: Power Transition and Peace (Routledge, 2006). He has won several research fellowships including a POSCO Fellowship at the EastWest Center in Hawaii and a Visiting Research Fellowship at the East Asian Institute of National University of Singapore. Contributors Weixing Chen is a professor of political science and chair of the Department of Political Science at East Tennessee State University. He has published books and journal articles and contributed book chapters to many books on the transition of China and transformation of the Chinese Communist Party. Cecilia L.F. Chien has been an Associate Professor of History at West Chester University of Pennsylvania since 2005. Previously she taught for ten years in the Humanities Division at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology in colonial and postcolonial Hong Kong.
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She received her PhD in history from Harvard University in 1994. Her research interests include the regional history of mid-imperial China, kinship and genealogy, and tourism and development in the Yangzi River Delta today. She has published a monograph, Salt and State (University of Michigan, Center for Chinese Studies, 2004), an annotated translation of the treatise on the government salt monopoly in the Song dynastic history. Sheng Ding is an associate professor of political science at Bloomsburg University of Pennsylvania. His research interests include soft power, information technology and world politics, Asian politics, Chinese politics and foreign policy, US–China relations, etc. He is the author of The Dragon’s Hidden Wings: How China Rises with Its Soft Power (Lexington Books, 2008). His research articles have appeared in Pacific Affairs, Journal of Contemporary China, Journal of Asian and African Studies, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, East Asia: An International Quarterly, Journal of Chinese Political Science, and Journal of Information Technology and Politics. Jean Garrison is Director of International Studies and Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Wyoming. Her research interests focus on American foreign policy with an emphasis on US–China relations, energy security, and foreign policy advisory systems. She is the author of three books, China and the Energy Equation in Asia: Determinants of Policy Choice (2009), Making China Policy: Nixon to G.W. Bush (2005), and Games Advisors Play: Foreign Policy in the Nixon and Carter Administrations (1999), and numerous articles in journals such as Asia Policy, Asian Affairs: An American Review, Asian Perspective, International Studies Review, Foreign Policy Analysis, and Political Psychology. She has been a visiting fellow with the Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation and in 2004 received a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellowship and served in the Office of Chinese and Mongolian Affairs with the US State Department’s Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Zhaoying Han currently serves as a visiting professor and co-director of the Confucius Institute at University of South Florida and is a professor of international studies from Zhou Enlai School of Government at Nankai University. His major research fields include foreign policy analysis,
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American foreign policy, Chinese foreign policy, and US–China relations. Previously he was a Fulbright visiting research scholar at the SAIS of Johns Hopkins University. He also taught as a visiting professor at the Mansfield Center of the University of Montana. He is the author of Exporting America: USIA and Public Diplomacy (Tianjin People’s Publishing House, 2000) and American Politics and Foreign Policy (Tianjin People’s Publishing House, 2007). He has translated (from English to Chinese) America Unrivalled: The Future of the Balance of Power (Beijing University Press, 2005) and Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Beijing University Press, 2005). Junhao Hong received a PhD in communication from University of Texas at Austin in 1995. Presently he is a professor in the Department of Communication, State University of New York at Buffalo. He is also appointed as a Research Associate by the Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies at Harvard University and a Senior Fellow by the Center for Sustainable Social Change at University of Massachusetts. His research areas include international communication, media and social development/change, and the social impact of new media and new communication technology, with a focus on East Asian countries and particularly on China. He has published or co-published several authored and edited books, numerous research articles in various international refereed journals, and dozens of book chapters. Eric Hyer received his PhD in political science from Columbia University in 1990 and is presently an associate professor in the Department of Political Science and the Coordinator of Asian Studies at Brigham Young University. As a Fulbright Scholar at the Foreign Affairs College in Beijing in 1995–1996, he taught courses on international relations theory, US foreign policy, and US–China relations. His research focuses on China’s foreign relations, especially China’s territorial conflicts. He has conducted field research on China’s boundaries in Russia, Vietnam, Mongolia, and along China’s border with Central Asia. He has traveled extensively within China, including Tibet, and twice traversed the Karakorum Highway between western China and Pakistan. He has written many academic articles and produced two documentary movies on
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China. He is currently completing a book manuscript on China’s boundary disputes and settlements. David Lai is Research Professor of Asian Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College. Previously, he was on the faculty of the International Security Studies Department of the US Air War College. Dr Lai’s research interests are in international relations theory, war and peace studies, comparative foreign and security policies, US–China and US–Asian security relations, and Chinese strategic thinking and operational art. Yueh-Ting Lee is a Professor of Psychology at the University of Toledo Ohio. He received his PhD from SUNY Stony Brook and completed his postdoctoral research at the University of Pennsylvania. He has authored and co-authored approximately 80 refereed journal articles and produced several scholarly books including: Leadership and Management in China: Philosophies, Theories and Practices (Cambridge University Press, 2008); The Psychology of Ethnic and Cultural Conflict (Praeger, 2004); Personality and Person Perceptions across Cultures (Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers, 1999); and Stereotype Accuracy: Toward Appreciating Group Differences (American Psychological Association, 1995). His research was funded by various federal and state agencies. He has taught courses in psychology and cultural and ethnic studies for years in American higher education. He has also been invited to do consulting and training for multinational corporations and public agencies in both the US and China regarding cultural competency, differences appreciation, and conflict management. He Li is a professor of political science at Merrimack College in North Andover, Massachusetts. Dr Li is the author of From Revolution to Reform: A Comparative Study of China and Mexico (University Press of America, 2004) and Sino-Latin American Economic Relations (Praeger, 1991). He has published dozens of articles in journals such as Journal of Strategic Studies, Problems of Post-Communism, The Historian, Policy Studies Journal, Journal of Chinese Political Science, and Asian Affairs, and chapters in several books.
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Hong Li is a Professor of Psychology at Tsinghua University in Beijing. She received her PhD from the Department of Psychology at the University of Hong Kong. She has published numerous articles and a few books on health psychology, educational and developmental psychology with a focus on stress, beliefs, and healthy personality. Yawei Liu is Director of The Carter Center’s China Program. He has written extensively on China’s political developments and grassroots democracy. He edited two Chinese book series: Rural Election and Governance in Contemporary China (Northwestern University Press, Xian, 2002 and 2004) and The Political Readers (China Central Translation Bureau Press, 2006). He is the coauthor of Obama: The Man Who Will Change America (Chinese language, 2008). He is the founder and editor of China Elections and Governance (www.chinaelections.org and www.chinaelections.net), a Website sponsored by The Carter Center on political and election issues of China (2002 to now). Dr Liu taught American history at Georgia Perimeter College from 1996 to 2008 as a tenured professor. He is also the associate director of the China Research Center based in Metro Atlanta. He earned his BA in English literature from Xian Foreign Languages Institute (1982), MA in recent Chinese history from the University of Hawaii (1989), and PhD in American History from Emory University (1996). Ding Lu is an economics professor and senior associate at University of the Fraser Valley, Canada. A graduate from Fudan University, he obtained his PhD from Northwestern University in 1991. Before joining his current university, Dr Lu was affiliated with Sophia University in Tokyo (2005–2008), National University of Singapore (1992–2005) and University of Nebraska at Omaha (1991–1992). His research interests include international trade and investment, regional economic development, and comparative economic systems. He has published dozens of papers in peer-reviewed journals. He is the author of Entrepreneurship in Suppressed Markets: China’s Private Sector Experience (Garland, 1994), State Intervention and Business in China: The Role of Preferential Policies (Edward Elgar, 1997), China’s Telecommunications Market: Entering a New Competitive Age (Edward Elgar, 2004), and book chapters in dozens of academic volumes. Most
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of his publications involve development issues in Pacific Asia, particularly the Chinese economy. Lawrence C. Reardon received his Ph.D. in political science from Columbia University in 1991. He is currently completing a follow-up study of The Reluctant Dragon: The Impact of Crisis Cycles on Chinese Foreign Economic Policy (University of Washington Press, 2002). He also has written on China’s foreign economic policy for China Quarterly, The Journal of Contemporary China, China Business Review, and The Journal of Shenzhen University. He translated two volumes of key policy documents concerning China’s coastal development strategy (Chinese Law and Government, 1994). He also writes on Chinese religion, and was the co-editor of The Catholic Church and the Nation-State (Georgetown University Press, 2006). He is a research associate at Harvard University’s Fairbank Center, was a Luce fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and a special researcher at Jinan University. At the University of New Hampshire (USA), he holds the Hood House Professorship, is an associate professor of political science, and is the coordinator for Asian studies. Qiang Xin is Professor and Deputy Director of the Center for American Studies, Fudan University in Shanghai. His research focuses on Sino–US relations, security studies, US politics and the Taiwan issue. He is the author of Interpreting US Taiwan Policymaking: Perspective of Congress (Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 2010), “Semi-Self-Contained” Congress: Models of US Congressional Diplomacy (Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 2005), and co-author of US Congress and US Security Policy toward China, 1989–2004 (Beijing: Shishi Press, 2005). He has published numerous articles on Mainland China, the U.S., Japan, Hong Kong and Taiwan. Lin Ye is an associate professor at the School of Government, Sun Yat-sen University in Guangzhou, China. His research interest includes public administration, urban affairs, and comparative governance issues in China and the United States. He has published articles at Public Administration Review, Journal of Urban Affairs, American Review of
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Public Administration, Journal of Public Affairs Education, Journal of Planning Literature, and China Public Administration Review. His recent research work on China’s social welfare reform has appeared in several edited book chapters. Lin Ye received his PhD degree from the University of Louisville and taught public administration in the United States for several years before joining Sun Yat-sen University. Jin Zeng is an assistant professor in the Department of Politics and International Relations at Florida International University. Her research interests include Chinese politics, privatization in transitional economies, international political economy, and international relations of East Asia. She is currently revising her dissertation on privatization in China into a book manuscript. Yuchao Zhu received a BA from Nankai University in Tianjin. He worked as a journalist in Beijing for six years before obtaining an MA from the University of Regina in 1991 and his PhD in political science from Queen’s University in 1996. He has taught at the Royal Military College of Canada, Queen’s University and the University of British Columbia (Kelowna Campus). He is currently an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science of the University of Regina. His teaching areas include comparative politics, international relations, and international (Asian) studies. His research focuses on China’s political and legal reforms, ethnic issues, and China’s foreign policy. He has published many articles in English and Chinese academic journals.
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Foreword Delving into the Challenges Confronting China David M. Lampton1
Professor Zhiqun Zhu deserves enormous credit for convening the October 2009 conference at Bucknell University in Pennsylvania entitled “The People’s Republic of China at 60: Internal and External Challenges,” and thereafter integrating selected conference papers and several other scholarly articles into this volume. The chapters that follow “delve” into many of the key challenges that will preoccupy China’s leaders for the first half of the 21st century — DELVE standing for Demographics; Environment and resources; Legitimacy and political institutions; Values in society; and the External world. Indeed, so extensive and daunting is the agenda facing the People’s Republic of China (PRC) that one wonders how its leaders have the courage to get up in the morning. Using the leadership typology developed by James David Barber decades ago in his classic entitled The Presidential Character, China will need a long line of “active-positive” leaders in its future to address the agenda this volume describes and analyzes. This book describes not only the agenda facing Chinese leaders, it also offers insight into the research concerns of China scholars around the world. 1 David M. Lampton is Dean of Faculty, George and Sadie Hyman Professor, and Director of China Studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. His most recent book is: The Three Faces of Chinese Power: Might, Money, and Minds (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2008).
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The sheer diversity, scale, and complexity of the PRC’s challenges should be a sober reminder to those who project in straight-line fashion China’s success in the last two decades of the 20th century and the first decade of the 21st into the indefinite future. This volume is an admonition to those who suggest China is destined to “rule the world.”2 Rather, this compendium suggests a more measured conclusion, namely that China likely will continue to make progress, that its growing strength will have many implications for the world, but that for decades into the future leaders in Beijing will be concerned with challenges at home and seek to minimize draining entanglements abroad — success at home is not assured. China will become more involved in, and important to, global decisions with each passing day, but ever present in the front of Chinese minds will be the staggering and persistent problems they confront domestically. The reticence this creates in China’s leaders (and in its citizenry) in assuming major external commitments was starkly indicated at the December 2009 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen. Delving into this volume, there are several themes worth underscoring: Demographics: One of the most substantial challenges China’s leaders face is an aging population, a skewed gender distribution, and an urban populace that may be less willing to have children, even if the one-child policy is substantially ratcheted back. This will have implications for worker-dependent ratios, future economic productivity, the rate of economic growth, and quite possibly social stability, as Ding Lu points out. In a separate chapter on social security by Lin Ye, there is an enlightening discussion of how difficult it is going to be to pay for China’s rapidly aging population, not least in the rural areas. Environment and resources: Here there are many issues, but perhaps the keyword is “carbon”; carbon is inseparable from coal and climate change. The PRC will be heavily dependent upon coal for as far as the eye can see. The issues are: How can Chinese policy and the rest of the world help to
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Martin Jacques, When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order (New York: Penguin Books, 2009).
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reduce the negative externalities of coal combustion through carbon sequestration and other technologies, decrease the carbon emitted per unit of GDP, and move to non-carbon-based energy sources as rapidly as possible? This will require international cooperation on science and technology development, technology transfer and assistance, and it will require putting a price on carbon, as pointed out in Jean Garrison’s chapter. Legitimacy and political institutions: Several chapters in this volume speak to this bundle of issues, with the core problem being the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party, a legitimacy that currently is grounded in economic growth, not ideology. This economic growth, however, is generating inequalities and new social groups gradually demanding more participation, both of which can be expected, over time, to create challenges to the unquestioned supremacy of the Party itself. Legitimacy must be continuous, but the economic growth upon which it now rests is volatile. This gives rise to a broad range of political system needs, most important of which are institutionalizing leadership succession, building systems of accountability (the chapter by Yuchao Zhu), enhancing other governance capacities, and creating the institutions by which the public is given voice, as Weixing Chen explains. Values and society: One of the signally interesting discussions in this volume concerns socio-political values in China and their bearing on the political evolution of China domestically, the country’s economic development, and the PRC’s behavior and role in the world. As He Li asks: Will the Chinese embrace the values of liberalism, nationalism, or socialism as they deal with their daunting agenda? Though there are considerations in China that foster liberalism, there also are forces working against it, not least the rise of materialist values, strong anti-liberal institutions in the PRC, and the fear of instability and insecurity still gripping much of the population, not least a just-emergent middle social stratum. Yueh-Ting Lee and Hong Li remind us that there are three kinds of capital — spiritual, financial, and technological — and that spiritual values and social capital have a great bearing on a society’s development. It is clear that China has the second form of capital (financial), is getting the third (technological), but questions remain vis-ã-vis the first (spiritual), despite recent regime efforts to resurrect Confucian values.
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As I sit in Shanghai writing this Foreword, I read the following, which described Chinese film director Lu Chuan’s reaction to the fact that the American film Avatar was sweeping through Chinese box offices: “Avatar made me realize that what we [China] lack is not technology — we can learn technology…. I suddenly realized how far away our films are from simple beauty, crystal-clear purity and passionate dreams. We Chinese filmmakers should be ashamed of being far from sincerity and being embroiled in a carnival of twisted, dim and absurd vulgarity.”3 External world: Woven throughout this book are threads concerning how China’s domestic successes and failures will affect the world and how China will be affected by the way in which the rest of the international community interacts with the PRC. Beyond the chapters on energy, resource, and US–China relations that follow, this interestingly is seen in the chapter by Sheng Ding, which explains in some detail how Beijing is seeking to shape the world’s perception of China and increase China’s soft power. The degree to which China can use what Joseph Nye calls “attractive power” is the degree to which the probabilities of international conflict will be reduced. In short, this is a book that is broad in conception and laden with implications. It is worth delving into. David M. Lampton Shanghai January 2010
3
Liu Wei, “Avatar Sees Box Office High amid Cold,” China Daily, January 9–10, 2010, 1.
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Introduction: The People’s Republic of China Today Zhiqun Zhu
On October 1, 1949, Mao Zedong stood atop Tiananmen Rostrum in Beijing and proclaimed the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The PRC turned 60 in 2009. In Chinese culture, a cycle of 60 years is referred to as jiazi ( ), an ancient term based on the Chinese zodiac. The twelve animals in the zodiac interact with the five elements to produce a cycle of 60. The 60th anniversary is a most auspicious day and a significant point in a person’s life and a nation’s history. All over China, there were organized celebrations for the PRC’s 60th birthday, and in Beijing the communist government staged a spectacular ceremony and an imposing military parade to display some of its most advanced weapons as part of the celebrations on October 1, 2009. To mark the occasion, some 40 “tribute films” were produced in China, including the blockbuster Jianguo Daye ( or “The Founding of A Republic”) that featured many of China’s best-known entertainment stars. The international community is watching China closely as it quickly reemerges as a great power at the beginning of the 21st century. There is a high interest in China as it plays an increasingly critical role in today’s international political economy. Not a single day goes by without China being mentioned in the world’s headlines. On one hand, China is the envy of the world today. A 2009 Pew Research Center poll found that 44 percent of Americans viewed China as the world’s leading economic power 1
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while only 27 percent named their own country.1 This was the first time a plurality of Americans thought that China — not the United States — was the world’s leading economic power. The numbers may have reflected the poor US economy and China’s continued growth and its control of the US national debt. Even during the global financial crisis of 2008–2010, the Chinese economy was still able to grow at over 8 percent yearly. On the other hand, China is a country full of contrasts and contradictions. For example, it has the second largest economy in the world, yet it remains a lower middle-income developing nation in terms of per capita gross domestic product (GDP). In 2009 China’s per capita GDP based on purchasing power parity (PPP) was about $6,000 (the real income was much lower), compared with America’s $48,000. China has a dynamic free-market style economy, yet it maintains a one-party political system dominated by the communist party. What has China achieved since 1949? Where has it failed? Where is it headed? What internal and external challenges does China face today? And how can China and the United States manage their complex relations in the context of China’s rise? These are some of the important questions this book will address. On October 1 and 2, 2009, a group of established and emerging scholars on Chinese politics, economics, history, society, mass communication, national security, and foreign policy gathered on the beautiful campus of Bucknell University in central Pennsylvania to discuss China’s past, present, and future. In his opening address, David M. Lampton, one of America’s preeminent China experts and currently Director of the China Studies Program at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, discussed the growth of various forms of Chinese power and the implications of these developments for China itself and the world. According to Lampton, the PRC has become a powerful international force with remarkable growth in its coercive, economic, and intellectual strengths, most notably in the decades since Mao Zedong’s death in 1976. This growing strength, however, has been accompanied by staggering challenges, not least the rising inequality, dramatic social restructuring,
1 “US Seen As Less Important, China As More Powerful,” The Pew Research Center, Washington, DC, December 4, 2009.
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demographic changes, environmental degradation, ethnic tensions, and China’s poor international image, to name a few. In his keynote speech, Douglas Spelman, a veteran US diplomat and currently Deputy Director of the Kissinger Institute on China and the United States, reflected upon the history of PRC–US relations since Nixon’s visit to China in 1972 and observed that despite many differences, the two countries have made tremendous progress in improving bilateral relations. David Shear, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs at the US State Department, took time from his busy schedule between his official trips to China and attended the conference, sharing with the audience his assessment of China’s growth and US–China relations and exploring the future of what is arguably the most important bilateral relationship. In addition to these three speakers, a fine group of China scholars and experts from the United States, Canada, China, and Britain were divided into three panels to discuss China’s internal and external challenges. These scholars agreed that despite the significant progress it had achieved in the past 60 years, especially in the past 30 years, since Deng Xiaoping’s reform initiatives in the late 1970s, China faces daunting challenges today. Panelists engaged in heated debates and discussions among themselves and exchanged views with equally enthusiastic audiences that included scholars and students from Bucknell University and other colleges and universities in the region, as well as interested local residents. Most of the chapters in this book were drawn from the papers originally presented at the conference. All the papers selected were thoroughly revised after the October 2009 conference. Four other chapters by China specialists in the United States and China were added to complement the conference papers and broaden the scope of the topics covered by this book. This edited volume is an effort to provide a most up-to-date and comprehensive assessment of the PRC’s political, economic, social, ethnic, energy, security, military, diplomatic, and other developments and challenges at the beginning of the 2010s. This volume distinguishes itself from other books on China by the scope of its study, the disciplines it covers, the timeliness of its publication, and the diverse backgrounds of the contributors. The contributors hail from a variety of backgrounds — national, academic, and geographic. Teaching, researching, and writing at various
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institutions of higher learning, the contributors are active China scholars and experts in political science, international relations, economics, public administration, history, mass communication, psychology, and diplomacy. In their cool-headed and objective analyses, the contributors caution that great efforts are needed for China to develop healthily and to become a respected global power. With each chapter addressing a different and yet interrelated issue of the PRC’s development, this book aims to make a significant contribution to our understanding of the key challenges China faces today as it strives to become a global power.
Milestones in the History of the PRC The PRC’s history can be divided into two periods. During the first 30 years (1949–1979), China was governed by a very rigid economic and political system, and suffered a number of man-made political and economic disasters. Under Mao Zedong, significant progress was made in national unification, agricultural development, and promotion of education, healthcare, and women’s status, all of which laid a strong foundation for the economic developments and social progress that were to come. China bade farewell to disunity and cast aside its image as the “sick man of East Asia,” ending the so-called “century of humiliation” which started with the Opium War (1839–1842). On September 21, 1949, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Chairman Mao Zedong addressed the first session of the provisional government of the People’s Republic saying, “Ours will no longer be a nation subject to insult and humiliation. We have stood up.” China restored its national self-confidence politically, realized diplomatic independence, and stood up in the international political arena as a big, albeit weak, power. Nevertheless, Mao’s political campaigns such as the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution plunged the nation into deep turmoil. China failed to secure a path toward building a dynamic economy and was marginalized in the international economic system. As the economies of Japan and the four “Asian tigers” took off in the 1960s and 1970s, China was busy with internal struggles and lived in isolation from the developed world. Politically, the CCP maintained an iron-hand control
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over the Chinese society. Mao died in 1976, leaving behind him a poor, traumatized, and chaotic country. The second period, which began with Deng Xiaoping’s reform and opening-up policy, set China on the fast development track. During this period, China steadily became a global economic powerhouse and a much more open and dynamic society. China was a “late late developer” in the global waves of modernization and was able to take advantage of trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), globalization, and technological advances. The most significant achievement of the Deng Xiaoping era was economic development. In a matter of 30 years, China transformed itself from a backward developing country to an emerging global power. At the end of the 1970s, China was a closed agrarian economy. Thirty years later, it had become an indispensable player in the global economy. Real GDP growth averaged 10 percent, and hundreds and millions of the population have been lifted out of poverty. In 1978, with a quarter of the world’s population, China represented less than 0.5 percent of total global economic output. In 2008 it accounted for between 7 and 10 percent and its economy was still fast growing.2 Deng Xiaoping’s policy has its limitations too. Compared with its economic achievements, China’s development in other fields has proven to be relatively slow and even stagnant, especially in political democratization. Environmental protection and efforts to narrow the income gap have also fallen behind economic development. The greatest achievement of the CCP so far is raising the living standards of the Chinese people. Lifting some 400 million people out of abject poverty within a short period of time is undoubtedly one of the greatest achievements in human history. Yet for many observers, China remains a puzzle. They wonder why economic freedom and political liberty are still divorced. By some calculations, China will overtake the United States to be the largest economy as early as 2025. Few note, though, that even if the prediction becomes reality, China will remain a developing country for a long time to come. 2 C. Fred Bergsten et al., China’s Rise: Challenges and Opportunities (Washington, DC: The Peterson Institute and the CSIS, 2008), 3.
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There are several significant milestones in the history of the PRC: 1949: The founding of a new People’s Republic ended foreign domination and civil wars and ushered in a new era in Chinese history. The CCP, established in 1921 as a revolutionary party, became a governing party of China, a position it has held uninterrupted for over 60 years. 1971: The PRC’s entry into the United Nations (UN) to replace Taiwan as China’s sole legal government represented the international community’s acceptance of the PRC as a political force in world affairs. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China has advocated peaceful resolution of international disputes through dialogue and negotiations and has actively participated in UN peacekeeping missions. The number of countries having diplomatic relations with the PRC had increased to 171 by the late 2000s.3 1978: Two years after Mao passed away, Deng Xiaoping returned to the political power center in Beijing and initiated economic reform policies, including promoting the household responsibility system first practiced by several farmers in Anhui Province and establishing the four special economic zones (SEZs) in southern China — measures which unleashed the productivity and efficiency of the Chinese overnight. In 1979, Shenzhen, the first and largest of the SEZs, was just a small frontier town with a population of 30,000. After 30 years of rapid growth, it has become one of the most vibrant, modern, and economically diverse metropolises in the world, with its population growing to 14 million (including the “floating residents” who come to the city from other parts of China) for jobs and opportunities. 1979: The establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United States and Deng Xiaoping’s first and only visit to the United States laid the foundation for the so-called honeymoon period of US–China relations of the 1980s. Thirty years later, US–China relations have reached an unprecedented level in both depth and breadth.
3 As of 2010, Taiwan still maintains formal diplomatic relations with 23 countries, most of which are poor and small developing nations in South America, the South Pacific, and Africa.
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During President Barack Obama’s visit to China in November 2009, the two countries agreed to build a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive relationship for the 21st century. Many would agree that the US–China relationship has become the most important bilateral relationship now. 1989: The tragic ending of the students’ demonstration on Tiananmen Square dashed many people’s hope that China was moving towards political democracy. After Tiananmen, the CCP retained tight control of China’s political and economic apparatus. Its ability to hold on to power, despite many predictions to the contrary, has largely been due to postTiananmen policies to prevent social instability and promote economic growth at all costs. During his southern inspection tour of Shenzhen and other cities in 1992, Deng Xiaoping committed the party to further economic reforms and encouraged the nation to move faster and act bolder to achieve economic prosperity. The Tiananmen tragedy led the CCP to evaluate policy decisions based on their effects on social stability. This imperative has led to agreement within the party that change must be gradual. The CCP has become a more technocratic, competent, and capitalist-minded party. Of its members, 70 percent are university-educated elites now. Since the late 1980s, the CCP has opened its doors to people from all walks of life, especially private entrepreneurs. As of late 2010, the CCP’s membership reached some 78 million, 5 or 6 percent of China’s total population, but the percentage of private entrepreneurs with CCP membership had soared to 37.8 percent by 2007.4 This has significant impact on China’s democratization. When the growing middle class in China are beneficiaries of the economic policies and allies of the CCP, they are less likely to push for more political freedom in China. Unlike in many other countries, China’s fledging middle class are more interested in their own welfare than the country’s political reform. Nevertheless, Chinese citizens enjoy significant personal freedom today. Long gone, for example, are the CCP campaigns against “spiritual pollution” — music, movies, and literature
4
Cheng Li and Jordan Lee, “Obama’s China Trip: Forging Middle Class Ties,” China Brief 9, No. 20 (October 7, 2009): 5.
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about the “decadent” Western way of life. Unfortunately, this personal freedom does not extend to politics: citizens are still forbidden from challenging the Communist Party’s rule. 1997: Hong Kong was returned to China from the British colonial rule. For China, this was not just a simple act of re-exercising sovereignty over a lost territory; it closed a chapter of past humiliation. The Asian financial crisis which started in the same year also offered China an opportunity to demonstrate its commitment as a responsible and stabilizing power in the region. China–Southeast Asia relations greatly improved as a result, helping China break out of the isolation and sanctions imposed by Western powers after the Tiananmen incident. 2001: After over 13 years of tough negotiations, the United States and China eventually reached an agreement for China’s membership at the World Trade Organization (WTO), marking China’s full integration into the world trade system and the international community’s acceptance of China as an economic and trading power. 2008: the successful hosting of the Summer Olympics in Beijing was often interpreted as China’s coming-out party as a great power. China’s comprehensive power has strengthened and its global influence expanded. At the end of 2008, Chinese warships armed with special forces, missiles, and helicopters set sail for anti-piracy missions in the Gulf of Aden — the first time the PRC had sent ships abroad that could involve fighting so far beyond its territorial waters. China also weathered the global financial crisis with remarkable resilience. China’s GDP growth rate for 2009 reached 8.7 percent, retaining its position as the fastest growing major economy in the world.
Problems The CCP’s six-plus decades in power have not exactly been an uninterrupted period of economic growth and political stability. Two of those decades (1957–1976) are known for the worst human suffering, brutality, and fanaticism in Chinese history. In the Anti-Rightist Campaign of 1957 alone, more than 500,000 intellectuals and professionals were purged by the party under the rule of Mao Zedong.
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And during the Great Leap Forward that began in 1958, about 36 million people starved to death.5 Fortunately, that dark era in its history is over. As Premier Wen Jiabao once said, any big achievements divided up by 1.3 billion people will be small, but any tiny problem multiplied by 1.3 billion will be enormous. Indeed, while China’s progress has been remarkable, its problems are clearly huge, some of which may become insurmountable anytime soon. As the chapters in this book will illustrate, China faces tremendous challenges and problems in the years ahead. The growing income gap, environmental degradation, water and energy shortages, rampant corruption, decline of social morality, and ethnic tensions are just some of the gravest and most severe problems. There are, in fact, two Chinas today: coastal (capitalist) China, represented by Shanghai and Guangdong, where the nation’s wealth is concentrated; and western (socialist) China, where tens of millions of Chinese still live below the poverty line. The emergence of a higher living standard in general is a source of pride for the CCP, but while the rich are getting richer, the poor are getting poorer. These two worlds within China reflect the country’s paradoxes as it moves up the ladder to prosperity: rising living standards and a growing income gap; luxury apartments and filthy shantytowns; shining futuristic infrastructure and serious environmental damage; and, most glaringly, wide economic choices and limited political freedom. Below is a list of a few of the most daunting challenges facing the PRC today, some of which will be elaborated in the chapters that follow. Damaged environment One of the biggest negative consequences of China’s rapid industrialization is increased air and water pollution, smog, and damage of natural environment. According to a March 2006 Forbes article, all ten of the
5 Minxin Pei, “China Must Face up to Its Own History,” The Financial Times, October 2, 2009, 8.
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ten most polluted cities in the world were in China.6 In 2007 China overtook the United States to become the world’s largest emitter of carbon dioxide. Many middle-aged Chinese remember that as they grew up they could swim and fish in the rivers next to their villages. To their sadness, most of those rivers are filled with trash and dead things now. China has passed environmental laws, but the central government does not control all aspects of the implementation. As a Chinese saying goes, tian gao huang di yuan (The sky is high and the emperor is far away). Local officials often ignore Beijing’s environmental mandates, preferring to concentrate their energies and resources on further advancing economic growth. Turning the environmental situation in China around will require something far more difficult than setting targets and spending money; it will require revolutionary bottom-up political and economic reforms, as China scholar Elizabeth Economy remarked.7 Hu Angang, a noted Chinese economist at Tsinghua University, is one of the scholars who have advocated a “green revolution” in China. In a public speech in Taipei in January 2010, Professor Hu, borrowing from Deng Xiaoping’s “cat theory” (It does not matter whether a cat is white or black, it’s a good cat so long as it catches mice), suggested that after 30 years of rapid growth, China has become a “black cat,” with severe pollution and other problems resulting from industrialization. To achieve sustainable development, China must start a green revolution and become a “green cat.”8 Indeed, if China does not take action now, its natural environment will become unlivable for its future generations, and China’s growth may be nullified by the cost to clean up the environment.
6
The ten most polluted cities in China (and the world) are: 1. Linfen, Shanxi Province, 2. Yangquan, Shanxi Province, 3. Datong, Shanxi Province, 4. Shizuishan, Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, 5. Sanmanxia, Henan Province, 6. Jincheng, Gansu Province, 7. Shijiazhuang, Hebei Province, 8. Xianyang, Shanxi Province, 9. Zhuzhou, Hunan Province, 10. Luoyang, Henan Province. See Robert Malone, “America’s Most Polluted Cities,” Forbes.com, March 22, 2006. 7 Elizabeth C. Economy, “China’s Great Leap Backward?” Foreign Affairs 86, No. 5 (September/October, 2007): 38–60. 8 Hu Angang, “China’s Green Industrial Revolution,” a speech given in Taipei, Taiwan on January 19, 2010. Radio Free Asia (Chinese), January 19, 2010.
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Wealthy nation, poor people By 2009 China had become the world’s largest exporter and had accumulated over $2.4 trillion in foreign exchange reserves. Obviously, China is rich, but the biggest contradiction and irony is that most of the ordinary people do not have money and the income gap between the rich and the poor and between the coast and the inland continues to widen despite the government’s efforts to address this serious issue. Policies such as western development (xibu kaifa) have not brought about many tangible benefits to ordinary citizens in the less developed provinces. Farmers and those living in rural communities form the majority of the population, yet they make up less than 18 percent of the country’s wealth. Hundreds of millions of Chinese still live in poverty, creating a constant threat of social tension. China has experienced a housing boom since the 1990s, but the high prices are prohibitively unaffordable for most people. The potential burst of real estate bubbles may lead to a sharp drop in China’s economic growth. One may wonder: Where has all the money gone? Why are all government officials affluent? What is the purpose of hoarding a huge foreign exchange reserve if it cannot bring more wealth to ordinary people? Where is the hope for the hundreds of millions who have been left behind? Of course, the living standards of the Chinese will steadily improve, but compared with Americans, Europeans, and even its East Asian neighbors, ordinary Chinese still have a long way to go to enjoy a comfortable and quality life. For China to reach a per capita GDP of $20,000, it will take several more decades of further development and growth. Uneven development and a growing income gap will continue to frustrate many Chinese and will be a major source of social instability. Already, tens of thousands mass protests take place in China every year, many of which are caused by perceived social injustice and widening income discrepancy.
Lack of political reform The future of the CCP hinges on its ability to promote continued high economic performance — a difficult job without corresponding political reforms. No one but the CCP can defeat itself. Western development,
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harmonious society (hexie shehui), green GDP, and sustainable development — all these terms have gained currency in the discourse of Chinese politics and economics. Indeed, they represent some of the biggest challenges for China now. Western development was a strategy introduced in the early 2000s by the Chinese central government to bring more investment to the less developed western part of the country as a way to narrow the income gap between the coastal regions and the inland provinces. Harmonious society is one of the key policy objectives of the Hu Jintao–Wen Jiabao team. The Chinese leadership also realizes the importance of sustainable development. President Hu Jintao and his advisors even elevated the status of the “scientific development” concept to that of a theory. But without fundamental political reforms, China faces an uphill battle in achieving its stated objectives. Rampant corruption and decaying of moral standards It is fair to say that nowadays it is very hard to find a “clean” official in China. While the CCP consistently identifies corruption as a threat to its rule, it has taken only halting steps to address the problem. In 2009 party leaders said they wanted to force top officials to declare homes, investments, and their family members’ jobs and incomes, but reached no consensus on when and how to do that. It was disclosed in the media in January 2010 that a Shenzhen senior police officer threw a lavish, 110-table wedding dinner for his daughter at a five-star hotel. The cost of the banquet was estimated to be up to 600,000 yuan ($88,000).9 These types of banquets are very common for officials to network and display their wealth and influence. Such news may shock foreigners but not the Chinese. Abusing power for personal benefits and maintaining mistresses ( bao er nai) have become standard practices of government officials. The Chinese public detests these officials but feels powerless in the absence of a healthy legal system. The society is running around money and has become a place without morality. Crimes, scandals, and protests are on the rise. If you see an
9
“Lavish Chinese Police Wedding Sparks Outrage,” The New York Times, January 5, 2010.
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elderly person fall down on the street, it is probably not a good idea to go and offer help. The elderly person and his/her family members are likely to accuse you of knocking down the former and demand exorbitant “compensation and medical fees” from you. No wonder Mao’s selfless soldier-hero Lei Feng of the 1960s who always helped others would be considered an idiot in today’s China. A declining moral standard is not going to help China to become a modern society. Poor international image Externally, despite its efforts to enhance its soft power, China’s image abroad is not so positive. While almost every country welcomes China’s growth, China is often perceived as an economic and military threat by its neighbors and some other countries, notably Japan and the United States. In Africa, Latin America, and other developing regions, China has invested enormously and trade has grown exponentially. While aid and trade have helped many developing countries, some of China’s practices such as bringing in Chinese workers for China-funded infrastructure projects (without generating local jobs), paying little attention to labor and environmental standards, and allying with dictatorial governments have raised some eyebrows in many parts of the world. To its great bewilderment and disappointment, China has even been accused of practicing neo-colonialism in Africa and other developing regions. Beijing is just beginning to realize that with growing power comes global responsibilities. It has a lot to do to win the hearts and minds of the people around the world. The Content of the Book The book is divided into three sections, dealing with the various challenges the PRC faces today: Part I — the first five chapters — covers challenges in political reform and democratization; Part II — Chapters Six through Eleven — contains essays on economic, social, environmental, ethnic, and information challenges; and Part III — Chapters Twelve through Seventeen — highlights diplomatic, security, and foreign policy challenges.
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In Chapter One, Weixing Chen argues that Chinese politics has been and continues to be the politics of change and transformation. Change and transformation are often associated with leadership successions. The PRC has had four generations of leadership since 1949: Mao Zedong (1949–1976), Deng Xiaoping (1978–1992), Jiang Zemin (1992–2002), and Hu Jintao (2002–2012). Chen focuses on leadership successions and changes and addresses three specific issues in Chinese politics: institutionalization of leadership succession, performance criteria of legitimacy and party doctrines, and legalization and democratization. He concludes by briefly discussing party leadership and intra-party democracy today. What will be the Chinese style of democracy if democracy ever comes to China? As this chapter suggests, the outcome will have to be determined by the political skills of Chinese leaders in the short run and by their courage, wisdom, and willingness to meet the demands of Chinese citizens in the long run. In Chapter Two, Yawei Liu discusses the Chinese development model or the so-called “Beijing Consensus” and its relations with China’s political reform. CCP Secretary General Zhao Ziyang laid out an executable plan for China’s political reform in 1987. If implemented, this plan would have put Deng Xiaoping’s dual-track reform — political and economic — into action. The 1989 incident derailed the plan, sent Zhao Ziyang into political exile, and almost terminated China’s economic reform as well. Deng’s “Southern Tour” in 1992 managed to revive the economic reform but he was never able to put political reform back on track. The tremendous economic growth without tinkering with the political system has changed China’s discourse on the necessity of political reform and emboldened many Chinese officials and scholars to declare that the China model is not only a solution for China but can be the key to development for other developing countries. Liu argues that this developmental hubris will further delay China’s long overdue political reform and will eventually make the China model unsustainable. The campaign to pitch the China model to both domestic and overseas audiences is so intense and effective that the need for a debate on political reform has been swept aside. Liu warns that in the long term, this blind belief in Chinese exceptionalism will put China on a collision course with the Western world.
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In Chapter Three, Lawrence C. Reardon explores how Chinese elites experienced a learning process and decided to embark upon outward-oriented development. Chinese elites had confronted anomalies in the long-term revolutionary development paradigm, which sought to establish a strong independent China by achieving three interrelated goals: security, prosperity, and the Party’s comprehensive control of the state; when applied to China’s development, elites had focused on establishing a self-sufficient economy by utilizing either semiautarchic or import substitution industrialization. Based on the success of the SEZs and the nascent coastal development strategy in the 1980s, elites agreed that China should join the rest of the East Asian economies in adopting an outwardly oriented development regime, which regarded foreign capital, technology, and markets as tools to empower China. Elites initiated the GATT/WTO accession process, established the fifth SEZ on Hainan Island, and publically announced the coastal development strategy. Henceforth, a new generation of technocratic elites would institute a new technocratic regime, whose long-term goals became security, prosperity, and the Party’s partial control of the state. Will these less ideological technocrats bring more economic growth, social stability, and political liberalization to China? One has to wait and see. In Chapter Four, Yuchao Zhu suggests that in studying China’s political change, researchers often use the democratization principle as a criterion to assess China’s problems and to prescribe what should be done. However, by rigidly applying this perspective, too much analysis relies on the “qualitative bar” which may fail to grasp China’s incremental changes. He proposes using the variable of “political accountability” in governance as a central position to examine China’s political change. A comprehensive understanding of factors like political accountability, administrative rules and procedures, political norms and practices, as well as monitoring mechanisms, will provide us with a very informative assessment of China’s problems and prospects in its political development. Zhu cautions that in order to have an internal check and balance and to allow the public’s more informed participation in the political process, judicial accountability has to be established. Without it, China’s political reform will remain incomplete.
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In Chapter Five, He Li addresses the following questions: When and how has liberalism spread to China? Who are the key representatives of the liberals in the post-Mao China? What are the major arguments of Chinese liberal intellectuals? To what extent do the policies of the current Chinese leadership reflect the major concerns of Chinese liberals? What are the prospects for liberalism in China? Li points out that liberalism has a long history in China. Although poorly understood and inadequately diffused before the market reform of the late 1970s, liberalism has become a dominant ideology among Chinese intellectuals and a liberal camp was established in China in the late 1990s. Liberalism has become a powerful intellectual movement in Chinese society. It is much more intellectually appealing than the official ideology. However, he argues that the diffusion of liberalism alone is unlikely to bring about political democracy in China. While this could facilitate some changes, it cannot determine the outcome of political reform in China. In fact, it is not impossible that an alliance of nationalism and neo-Leftism will become the country’s leading ideological force in the coming one or two decades. In Chapter Six, Ding Lu addresses the demographic challenges China faces. Thanks to a mix of state family planning and historical coincidence of events, China’s demographic transition has been taking place like a video playing in fast-forward. Since the late 1970s, demographic change has been characterized by a falling dependency ratio, which is very favorable to economic growth and rise in standard of living. However, as we enter the 2010s, the demographic pattern has come to a turning point: With a rapidly aging population, its labor force is reaching its peak and will soon enter a long-term declining phase. The dependency ratio will soon start to rise and the so-called demographic dividends evaporate. That trend poses serious challenges to public policies in the coming decades. Lu concludes by discussing China’s policy options to deal with these challenges. Most notably, should China change its “one-child” policy? In Chapter Seven, Jin Zeng discusses the impact of privatization on workers at the state-owned enterprises. Jobs in the state sector used to be considered “iron rice bowls” as they provided lifetime employment, stable income, as well as housing, education, and medical care. However, privatization in the late 1990s abruptly terminated the seemingly eternal social contracts between the Chinese state and socialist workers.
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Interestingly, despite the magnitude of the social transformation and its profound consequences on workers’ livelihoods, there has been a lack of large-scale workers’ protests in China in the late 1990s. How did the Chinese state smash the “iron rice bowls” of hundreds of millions of socialist workers without causing large-scale social unrest? How can we explain the political passivity of workers when privatization endangered their job security and social welfare? Instead of examining the barriers to workers organizing effective collective actions, Zeng argues that the local officials’ roles in mobilizing support for restructuring and in appeasing workers with various measures partially explain the workers’ political quiescence amid the radical transformation of both ownership and labor relations of state enterprises. In Chapter Eight, Lin Ye deals with social security reforms in China, using data from academic literature, government documents, and census statistics. China has experienced tremendous economic growth and social development since the late 1970s. However, some systematic issues have emerged and are now at the top of China’s national policy agenda. Social security reform is one of these issues and there have been several major reform movements. The central government started to design and implement a more financially sound and socially responsible social security system after the 1980s. Ye reviews the history of China’s Old-Age Social Security (OASS) system reforms and examines the system’s development and problems. Special attention is paid to the fiscal arrangement of account payments, urban and rural systems, and existing concerns. The goal for China to establish a universally covered, financially sound, and socially responsible OASS system will not be easy. In Chapter Nine, Junhao Hong discusses the sensitive issue of internet control in China. With a growing number of netizens, online public opinion is becoming a new societal force yielding a very powerful impact on every aspect of Chinese society. The internet has come to challenge the Chinese government’s control of information on an unprecedented level. Until recently, the CCP and the Chinese government were very successful in controlling the mass media, flow of information, and freedom of speech. But will they succeed in controlling online information, online “public media,” and online public opinion? To answer these questions, Hong examines five aspects that are related to the challenge of the
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internet: 1) the scale and scope of the internet development, the unique power of internet-related activities in the Chinese socio-political context, and the country’s social transformation and political modernization; 2) the split strategy of “economic openness” and “political closeness” for China’s internet industry; 3) the historical tradition and present situation of China’s information control; 4) the various internet control mechanisms of the Chinese authorities, including the bureaucratic/political/ ideological controls, the “economic approach,” the unique online policing systems, and sophisticated firewall censorship software technologies; and 5) the challenges to China’s control of the internet, including the policy/regulation difficulty, the political and ideological difficulty, and the technological difficulty. In Chapter Ten, Yueh-Ting Lee and Hong Li point out that China has been well-accomplished economically and technologically (i.e., hardware) in the past decades, but the Chinese people need to pay more attention to two areas — spiritual beliefs and ethnic relations (i.e., software) in order to build a more harmonious and stable society. From a perspective of cross-cultural and social psychology, they address three issues: 1) previous research on cultural and psychological beliefs and the current situation of spiritual beliefs in China; 2) why China’s ethnic issues are more cultural or religious than racial; and 3) the possible solutions to problems in Chinese cultural beliefs and ethnic relations. They suggest that China needs to enhance and build its socio-cultural and psychological (including spiritual) capital while continuing to build its economic–financial capital and scientific and technological capital. In Chapter Eleven, Cecilia L.F. Chien discusses a new challenge China faces: tourism, environment, and nation-building. Tourism in the PRC has been transformed from a taboo activity to a hot industry. After the fall of the Tang dynasty in the 10th century, China experienced political division. In the south, ten kingdoms co-existed, one of which was Wu-Yue (907–978). Its first king, Qian Liu, led it to become one of the richest, most cultured, and most populous kingdoms of the time, laying the foundations of the Yangzi Delta, which is witnessing unprecedented development today. The PRC government is highly interested in promoting the theme of the Wu-Yue Kingdom as a prime tourist attraction. It has invested millions into developing sites in Linan, the birthplace
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of Wu-Yue’s founder, and in Hangzhou, his capital city, as major tourist draws. State tourism policy in this location has implications beyond domestic leisure travel: it is tied to economic modernization, cultural preservation, environmental conservation, as well as political reunification with Taiwan. This unique development model that combines tourism, environmental protection, and nation-building has been successful. However, there is no single development path. Less developed regions in China and other developing countries that wish to learn from Linan and Hangzhou should chart their own path based on their own history, culture, and other local resources. China’s major external challenges include how to manage relations with the United States, Japan, and other major powers; how to maintain energy security by ensuring a steady supply of energy and other resources from various regions; how to improve its international image by enhancing soft power; and how to convince others that its military modernization is for peaceful purposes. In Chapter Twelve, Zhaoying Han provides an overview of China’s public diplomacy today. He discusses the motivations, major programs and their characteristics, and effects and challenges of Chinese public diplomacy. China strengthened its public diplomacy in the past decade as a result of its increasing influences on world economy, finance, energy, environment, and security. Chinese public diplomacy has been experiencing great transformations since the beginning of the 21st century. Han asserts that Chinese public diplomacy is mainly defensive. Its effectiveness is still difficult to tell and the feedback varies with different audiences in developed and developing countries, social elites, and the general public. In the future, in order to improve its image abroad, China needs to learn from the West and adjust to the new conditions and challenges domestically and internationally in conducting its public diplomacy. In Chapter Thirteen, Sheng Ding discusses how China has stepped up its efforts in foreign publicity and focused on building a favorable national brand — “a peaceful and responsible great power.” In the global information age, a state’s successful foreign publicity depends not only on a combination of national power resources and a country’s public communications capabilities, but also on its political credibility, which can attract attention to information distribution from a state’s foreign publicity. Due
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to its questionable governance performance, lack of commitment to democracy and human rights, and some controversial foreign policy behaviors, Beijing doesn’t have enough political credibility to become a capable national brand builder. By examining Beijing’s foreign publicity during the Tibet riots in 2008, Ding argues that weak political credibility has become one of the biggest hurdles for China’s foreign publicity in the global information age. In order to launch successful foreign publicity campaigns and brand itself as a peaceful and responsible great power, China has to make serious efforts to improve its political credibility. In Chapter Fourteen, Jean Garrison addresses China’s dual challenges in energy security and climate change. She notes that China’s rapid industrialization raises the issue of sustainable development. The accompanying rising demand for fuel, particularly fossil fuels, comes at a time when access to reliable and cheap energy has become more difficult and pollution problems (including the climate challenge) threaten its continued development. While security analysts representing a traditional geopolitical perspective are inclined to explain the energy and climate security challenges through the lens of a classic zero-sum competition and anticipate future resource wars, a more complex interdependent perspective acknowledges the international and domestic contests of the linked energy and sustainable development challenges. For China, the real challenge arises from the long-term consequences if energy use behavior does not change and the path of economic development is not cleaned up. As Garrison argues, how China addresses energy and climate security now will fundamentally shape China’s future. In Chapter Fifteen, David Lai deals with the unprecedented challenge of China becoming both prosperous and militarily powerful. As its modernization continues, China has started to expand its economic investment and operation overseas. A more powerful China also wants to settle its disputed interests in the Western Pacific (territories and maritime resources) and develop its maritime power so that it can become a full-fledged great power. While these developments and ambitions are desirable for China, they make Chinese interests vulnerable in a world still filled with widespread conflicts and bring China to challenge the world’s only superpower, the United States. China’s answer to these challenges is to set its long-awaited national defense modernization in full motion and assign
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its armed forces, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), a new mission to help China pursue and protect its interests at home and abroad. Peace and prosperity must have a strong military underpinning. China, however, wants to blaze a new path for the world by promising peaceful development and promoting a harmonious world. In the coming decades, while China and the PLA take steps to continue economic modernization and military transformation, they will try to find ways to fulfill their promise. It is a monumental undertaking that will meet with setbacks but hopefully will not fail. In Chapter Sixteen, Qiang Xin focuses on the strategies of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) since 1949. With the impressive military modernization process, China is gradually going beyond its present “offshore defense” strategy and witnessing a profound strategic transformation featuring an expanded power projection capability in distant waters. The strategic transition can be traced from several recent developments such as the promotion of PLAN’s status, improvement of capabilities on high seas, acquisition of overseas facilities, and construction plans for aircraft carriers. Xin examines various motivations of China’s blue-water navy ambition, including the resurgence of “ocean consciousness,” deterring Taiwan’s independence, defending maritime territory and interests, protecting Chinese interests overseas, and safeguarding the sea lines of communications. He argues that although China is justified in the PLAN’s blue-water buildup, it should increase transparency in its naval development, employ power in a cooperative and responsible way, and provide more public goods to the world so as to address concerns about the “China threat” in some countries. In Chapter Seventeen, Eric Hyer offers some alternative perspectives on US–China relations. He examines Sino–American relations using three prominent theories of international relations: realism, liberalism, and domestic determinants of foreign policy. While realist conclusions about the future of US–China relations and liberal expectations are generally negative and positive respectively, the factors that these theories do not take into consideration are highlighted, resulting in a more mixed conclusion than either theory would draw. The analysis of domestic politics focuses on the challenges of growing Chinese nationalism as a complicating factor for the Chinese leadership’s conduct of foreign policy and
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likewise examines the Americans’ growing negative views of the rise of China as a possible influence on the United States’ policy towards China. Hyer observes that while these theories offer a framework for analysis, they are not normative guides for the conduct of Sino–American relations; rather, the importance of developing an institutionalized relationship for the successful management of bilateral cooperation when dealing with global challenges needs to be emphasized. Together, the chapters in this book present the reader with a clear picture of the major internal and external challenges China is facing today. Many of these challenges are the byproducts or consequences of China’s rapid growth in the post-Mao era. To overcome these daunting difficulties is no easy task. If this book can help readers gain a better understanding of the PRC’s past achievements and failures, current challenges and problems, and future trends and potentials, the editor and the contributors will be very satisfied. References Bergsten, C. Fred, et al. China’s Rise: Challenges and Opportunities. Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics and Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2008. Brown, Jeremy and Paul G. Pickowicz. Dilemmas of Victory: The Early Years of the People’s Republic of China. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007. Chen, Gang. Politics of China’s Environmental Protection: Problems and Progress. New Jersey: World Scientific, 2009. Dickson, Bruce. Wealth into Power: The Communist Party’s Embrace of China’s Private Sector. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008. Economy, Elizabeth. “China’s Great Leap Backward?” Foreign Affairs 86, No. 5 (September/October, 2007): 38–60. Fewsmith, Joseph. China Since Tiananmen: From Deng Xiaoping to Hu Jintao. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008. Huang, Yasheng. Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics: Entrepreneurship and the State: New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008. Lampton, David M. The Three Faces of Chinese Power: Might, Money, and Minds. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2008.
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Leonard, Mark. What Does China Think. New York: PublicAffairs, 2008. Li, Cheng, ed. China’s Changing Political Landscape: Prospects for Democracy. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 2008. Li, Mingjiang, ed. Soft Power: China’s Emerging Strategy in International Politics. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2009. MacFarquhar, Roderick. The Politics of China: The Eras of Mao and Deng. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Pei, Minxin. China’s Trapped Transition: The Limits of Developmental Autocracy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008. Peerenboom, Randall. China Modernizes: Threat to the West or Model for the Rest? New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. Ross, Robert S. Chinese Security Policy: Structure, Power, and Politics. Abingdon: Routledge, 2009. Ross, Robert S. and Zhu Feng, eds. China’s Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008. Schwartz, Jonathan and Shawn Shieh, eds. State and Society Responses to Social Welfare Needs in China: Serving the People. London: Routledge, 2009. Scott, David. ‘The Chinese Century’? The Challenge to Global Order. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. Shambaugh, David. China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2009. Shirk, Susan. China: Fragile Superpower. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. Sutter, Robert G. Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy since the Cold War, 2nd ed. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010. Sweetman, Arthur and Jun Zhang, eds. Economic Transitions with Chinese Characteristics, Vol. 1: Thirty Years of Reform and Opening Up. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009. ———. Economic Transitions with Chinese Characteristics, Vol. 2: Social Change During Thirty Years of Reform. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009. Tsai, Kellee S. Capitalism Without Democracy: The Private Sector in Contemporary China. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007. Yu, Keping. Democracy is a Good Thing: Essays on Politics, Society, and Culture in Contemporary China. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2008.
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Part I
Political Changes and Democratization
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Chapter One
China’s Leadership Succession and Change Weixing Chen
Chinese politics has been and continues to be the politics of change and transformation. Change and transformation are often associated with leadership successions. The PRC has had four generations of leadership since 1949: Mao Zedong (1949–1976), Deng Xiaoping (1978–1992), Jiang Zemin (1992–2002), and Hu Jintao (2002–2012). This chapter focuses on leadership successions and changes and addresses three specific issues in Chinese politics: institutionalization of leadership succession, performance criteria of legitimacy and party doctrines, and legalization and democratization. Valerie Bunce observed in her book Do New Leaders Make a Difference? Executive Succession and Public Policy under Capitalism and Socialism published two decades ago that “in both systems innovative changes will occur early under the new administration, but the changes tend to slow down and the leadership settles into routines until the next leadership change.”1 China witnessed some chaotic years under Mao Zedong during the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. The economic reform that changed Mao’s China started with Deng’s return to power as the second generation of Chinese leadership, which Harry Harding describes as
1
Valerie Bunce, Do New Leaders Make a Difference? Excecutive Succession and Public Policy under Capitalism and Socialism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 223. 27
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“China’s second revolution.”2 Jiang Zemin, who was once dismissed as no more than a mere seat-warmer in 1989,3 presided over an unprecedented peaceful transition in post-Deng China. The 16th National Congress of the CCP, convened in Beijing on November 8–14, 2002, marked the first ever smooth and non-violent transition of power since the CCP was founded in 1921. Transformation and transition continue under the fourth generation of Chinese leadership with Hu Jintao at the core. The one-party rule by the CCP has not changed under the four generations of Chinese leadership over the last 60 years, but CCP leadership and legitimacy criteria have. If the legitimacy of the CCP used to be based on communist ideology and the charisma of revolutionaries like Mao and Deng under the first two generations of leadership, the era of communist ideology and charismatic leaders came to an end with the death of Deng in 1997. Chinese leaders after Deng have been technocrats rather than revolutionaries. For technocrats, like engineers and managers, performance has become the new criterion of legitimacy. Performance is reflected in economic growth and the state’s capacity to meet the public’s social, cultural, and political needs. Economic growth has provided legitimacy for the CCP during the reform era under Deng and Jiang. Economic growth, institutionalization, and procedural democracy have served to compromise the contradictions between economic liberalism and political authoritarianism even though the contradiction from the combination of one-party state socialism with competitive capitalism is far from being resolved. Maintaining sustained economic growth and meeting the demands of the people and society remains a daunting challenge for the fourth and the fifth generation (2012–2017) of Chinese leadership. At stake are the legitimacy of the CCP and the stability and prosperity of China. The three issues of institutionalization of leadership succession, performance criteria of legitimacy and party doctrines, and legalization and democratization are fully discussed below. 2 Harry Harding, China’s Second Revolution: Reform after Mao (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1987). 3 Zheng Yongnian, “The 16th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party: Institutionalization of Succession Politics,” in Weixing Chen and Yang Zhong, eds., Leadership in a Changing China (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 15.
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Institutionalization of Leadership Succession The CCP held its 17th National Congress on October 15–21, 2007, in Beijing. A party congress that is held every five years is a significant event in Chinese politics, because it decides the leadership of China. The CCP’s 16th National Congress in 2002 created a good precedent of a peaceful transition of power. The incremental institutionalization of leadership succession and China’s political process continued during the CCP’s 17th National Congress. The criteria and processes used to promote leaders to the top of the political order are being revised and the transition from informality to formality is proceeding.4 The institutionalization process is reflected in the following developments and trends. First, since the mid-1980s, the CCP has attempted to maintain a smooth and orderly leadership transition and avoid a cult of personality by having a major shift in personnel every ten years in even-numbered party congresses and by promoting people in preparation for this shift in odd-numbered party congresses. The 17th Party Congress saw major membership changes in leading party organs, including the CCP Politburo Standing Committee — the apex of power in China, and determined China’s top leadership until 2012. The newly formed Politburo Standing Committee consisted of Hu Jintao, Wu Bangguo, Wen Jiabao, Jia Qinglin, Li Changchun from the 16th CCP Central Committee, and four newcomers: Shanghai Party chief Xi Jinping, Liaoning Party chief Li Keqiang, CCP Organization Department head He Guoqiang, and Minister of Public Security Zhou Yongkang. Although the 17th National Congress formally elected the CCP Central Committee and Politburo, these positions had been negotiated before the Congress, which in a way reminds people of the “model of informal politics” among the top 20–25 leaders based on patronage, structure, the cyclical pattern of stable hierarchy, and polarized conflict as described by political scientist Lowell Dittmer.5 Since the
4
Alice L. Miller, “Institutionalization and the Changing Dynamics of Chinese Leadership Politics,” in Cheng Li, ed., China’s Changing Political Landscape (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), 61. 5 See Jonathan Unger, ed., The Nature of Chinese Politics: From Mao to Jiang (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2002).
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CCP’s 17th National Congress happened in an odd-numbered year, one of its purposes was to promote people for a major shift in personnel in 2012. Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang were elevated into the Politburo Standing Committee to form the core of the fifth generation (2012–2022) of Chinese leadership. Nominees to top Party positions were invariably elected by wide margins. A lot of things could still happen before the party’s 18th National Congress in 2012, but two years after the 17th National Congress, Xi seems to have become the heir apparent. In addition to his position as No. 6 in the Politburo Standing Committee and the only Politburo standing member in the Secretariat, Xi was subsequently elected vice president of the PRC in March 2008. Xi was also entrusted with the task of managing the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games on behalf of the Politburo Standing Committee. Many signs have indicated that Xi may succeed Hu as CCP General Secretary and Chairman of the Military Commission of the CCP Central Committee at the next party congress, and Li is most likely to succeed Wen Jiabao to become the premier. Second, group representation has become a new trend. Three groups increased their representation in the CCP Politburo at the 17th Party Congress, which is a continuation of the trend started at the 16th Party Congress. The three groups are tuanpai (people who advanced their political careers through the Chinese Communist Youth League), taizidang (offspring of former high-ranking officials), and difangpai (people promoted from local and provincial levels). The number of the Politburo members of the 17th Central Committee with experience as provincial chiefs increased from 16 (67 percent) in the 16th Politburo to 19 (76 percent). All four newly elected Politburo Standing Committee members have had leadership experience as provincial party secretaries, and all the nine members of the Politburo Standing Committee except Premier Wen Jiabao had experience as provincial chiefs prior to their ascent to the Politburo Standing Committee. Among the eight rising stars in the Politburo, four are from high-ranking family backgrounds and four advanced their careers through the Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL). Of the 371-member Central Committee, 86 had served in the CCYL and 32 are princelings. Among the Politburo Standing Committee members, Xi Jinping and Zhou Yongkang are princelings.
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The princelings or taizidang are not necessarily a “party” or “dang” but they do share a strong political identity. With no exception, all prominent leaders with princeling backgrounds greatly benefited from their family ties early in their careers.6 The offspring of high-ranking party leaders was sidelined during the Deng era in fear of evoking ill will among the people, but that changed at the 16th Party Congress for three reasons, according to Zheng Yongnian of the National University of Singapore. First, they are considered to be reliable and loyal. Second, some of them have proven to be very capable. Third, there is less concern among the people since many of the CCP old guards are no longer around.7 Of the 371 full and alternate members of the new Central Committee, 154 are local leaders, including 62 provincial chiefs, 62 deputy provincial leaders, and 30 municipal or prefecture level leaders. Third, age and term limits have become the formal and informal rules governing leadership transition in China. Mandatory retirement ages and provisions in both the party and state constitutions that limit the term of office of officials to two five-year terms have been institutionalized. Those who left the Politburo at the 17th Party Congress include Zeng Qinghong, ranked 5th in the Politburo Standing Committee; Wu Guanzheng, ranked 7th in the Politburo Standing Committee; Luo Gan, ranked 9th in the Politburo Standing Committee; Wu Yi, Vice Premier and often referred to as China’s “iron lady”; Zeng Peiyan, Vice Premier; and Cao Gangchuan, Minister of Defense, all due to age. Evidently, the informal two-term limit is not applicable to Politburo members who would be promoted into higher ranks. Hu Jintao became CCP General Secretary after having served on the Politburo Standing Committee for two full terms. Likewise, Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang would serve more than two terms if one of them becomes CCP General Secretary and the othser the premier of the State Council at the 18th Party Congress.
6
Li Cheng, “China’s Most Powerful ‘Princelings’: How Many Will Enter the New Politburo?” Brookings Institution, October 20, 2008. 7 Weixing Chen and Yang Zhong, eds., Leadership in a Changing China (New York: Palgrave, 2005), 21.
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Fourth, anchoring party leadership to the government, another unwritten norm regarding leadership transition in China, also continued.8 Mao and Deng did not need institutional titles to exercise power on behalf of the party and state. But anchoring party leadership to the government is important to leaders like Jiang and Hu in post-Deng China, because they need institutional titles to legitimately exercise power on behalf of the state. Jiang Zemin assumed the presidency of the PRC after he became the CCP general secretary, and the other three key members of the Politburo Standing Committee, Li Peng, Qiao Shi, and Li Ruihuan, took office respectively as premier, chairman of the National People’s Congress (NPC), and chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) at the 8th NPC in 1998. Based on previous practice, Hu Jintao was confirmed for another term as general secretary at the 17th Party Congress and therefore was also elected as state president at the NPC in March 2008. Wen Jiabao retained his seat on the Politburo Standing Committee at the 17th Party Congress and therefore was reconfirmed as the premier of the State Council in March 2008. Jiang Zemin gave up his position as the general secretary of the party at the 16th Party Congress but retained the chairmanship of the CCP’s Central Military Commission after the 16th Party Congress, which Lin Gang of Shanghai Jiaotong University describes as a “grace period” for the retired Jiang.9 Since the 17th Party Congress was an odd-numbered party congress, we do not know whether a “grace period” will continue for Hu Jintao until the next even-numbered party congress in 2012. Finally, the education level of the CCP Central Committee members and members of the Politburo and Politburo Standing Committee greatly increased at the 16th Party Congress, a trend that continued at the 17th Party Congress. All CCP Politburo members of the 16th Central Committee had a college degree, and so do the Politburo members of the 17th Central Committee. What is worth noticing is that the leaders who make up the core 8
Zhu Guanglei, Dangdai Zhongguo zhengfu guocheng [The Process of Government in Contemporary China] (Tianjin: Tianjin renmin chubanshe, 1997), 7. 9 Lin Gang, “Leadership Transition, Intra-Party Democracy, and Institution Building in China,” in Weixing Chen and Yang Zhong, eds., Leadership in a Changing China (New York: Palgrave, 2005), 40.
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of the fifth generation produced at the 17th Party Congress are much more diverse in their educational backgrounds, which is a welcome change. The majority of Politburo members of the 16th Central Committee had engineering backgrounds and all members on the Politburo Standing Committee of the 16th Central Committee were engineers by training. Xi Jinping has his training in law and Li Keqiang in economics. The six who were promoted to the Politburo have their training in law (Li Yuanchao), history (Wang Qishan), journalism (Bo Xilai), business administration (Ling Jihua), and political science (Wang Huning), respectively. In addition, the number of people educated abroad increased from 20 on the 16th Central Committee to 36 on the 17th Central Committee. Interestingly, very few members of the US Congress, if any, were engineers by training. Performance Criteria of Legitimacy and Party Doctrines Legitimizing the power and leadership of the CCP through performance has become the essence of Chinese politics in post-Deng China. Performance is largely measured by “economic performance, the maintenance of social stability, and procedural democracy.”10 Performance has become the new legitimacy criterion for Chinese leaderships in post-Deng China for two reasons. First, the communist ideology on which the CCP legitimacy used to be based has eroded since the economic reform started in the late 1970s. During the Mao years, Chinese polity, economy, and culture were highly politicized when politics was in command. With the demise of communist ideology, Chinese polity, economy, and culture have been depoliticized. The CCP is still in power, but it is economics instead of politics that is in command in the reform era. Economic performance therefore has become the new legitimacy criterion. Second, leaders in post-Deng China are technocrats rather than revolutionary leaders. “Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping could base their legitimacy on their participation in the revolution” and personal charisma.11 Party doctrines under 10
Joseph Fewsmith, “Staying in Power: What does the Chinese Communist Party Have to Do?” in Cheng Li, ed., China’s Changing Political Landscape: Prospects for Democracy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), 212. 11 Ibid., 212.
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Jiang and Hu in post-Deng China should therefore be understood in light of the shift of the legitimacy criteria. The CCP doctrine under Jiang is encapsulated in the “three emphases” (emphasizing politics, political study, and political moral spirit), the “three represents” (the CCP represents the most advanced culture, forces of production, and the interest of the majority of Chinese population), the combination of the rule of law with rule by virtue, and Jiang’s vision of xiaokang shehui (a modestly wealthy society). The Jiang leadership was confronted with unprecedented challenges of governance. To rise to the challenges of governance, Jiang and his associates decided to re-politicize the Chinese polity and culture in response to the immediate social and political ramifications of Deng’s depoliticization.12 The “three represents,” which served as the core of the CCP doctrine during the Jiang period, was a response to the wide income gaps between the rich and the poor that resulted from Deng’s policy of “let a few individuals get rich first.” “Representing the interest of the majority of the people,” which is the core of the “three represents,” redefined the CCP’s mission and pointed the direction of development in post-Deng China. Jiang’s vision of xiaokang shehui is to bring prosperity to the majority of the Chinese population, because many workers and peasants were left behind despite high economic growth rates for decades. Improving the standard of living and social status of the majority of the population through policies of redistribution and resource allocation and reincorporating workers and peasants into China’s social and political order concerned China’s social stability and the legitimacy of the CCP. The vision of xiaokang shehui did not mean that China would change the course of transition toward a market economy but rather placed more emphasis on redistributing wealth through growth. It propounds the notion that everybody could eventually attain at least a comfortable standard living. These challenges remain for the fourth generation of Chinese leadership. The 17th Party Congress is an odd-number party congress and therefore serves as a forum for Hu Jintao to institutionalize his policy view as 12 Dwight Perkins, “History, Politics, and the Sources of Economic Growth: China and the East Asian Way of Growth,” in Fumio Itoh, ed., China in the 21st Century: Politics, Economics, and Society (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1997), 29.
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an addition to the party doctrine in preparation for his retirement at the next party congress. In response to the challenges facing his leadership, Hu put forward the “scientific development concept” and the idea of a “harmonious society,” which is enshrined as the party’s new guiding ideology. The “scientific development concept” and a “harmonious society” as the new party doctrines are the response of the fourth generation of Chinese leadership to the eroded social solidarity and lack of harmony between government and people, between the central government and local governments, between the rich and the poor, between urban and rural residents, and between money-making enterprises and consumers. Hu’s “scientific development concept” takes people as the primary goal of economic development and emphasizes “sustainable development,” because sustainable economic development, in a way, means sustainable legitimacy for the CCP. With the demise of communist ideology and the collapse of the ideology-based social solidarity in the process of China’s economic reform, economic development has provided and will continue to provide legitimacy for the CCP in the near future. While economic growth has improved the material well-being of the Chinese society as a whole, it could not resolve the ills accompanying China’s economic development. Some of the ills include income disparity and the wealth gap between the rich and the poor, uneven development between the coast and the inland regions and between the urban and rural areas, a high unemployment rate, lack of social insurance and a social safety net, no access for many to human services such as education, health care, and housing, and the issue of rural development. These issues concern social justice, but more importantly, China’s social stability. A “harmonious society” places top priority on reducing disparities, establishing a social safety net, and providing basic public health care, issues which have become the sources of disharmony in recent years in the Chinese society. The trouble in China is not just the issues and problems, but also people’s perceptions of them. The Chinese people’s perception is primarily based on their own well-being and the impact of government policies on them and the society. These perceptions matter in Chinese politics, because the CCP is the only party in power and therefore the only party to blame. In this context, grievances are inevitably targeted at the party. When problems are piling up and people are unhappy, pressures
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will build up on the government. The large issue raised by “scientific development concept” and “harmonious society” concerns “for whom and for what China’s economic growth and development are.” For over two decades, the development strategy under two generations of Chinese leadership, Deng Xiaoping’s and Jiang Zemin’s, was to promote economic growth at all expense. It is obvious that economic growth has not benefited everybody equally and a large population has been dislocated in the process. In contrast to the third generation of Chinese leadership, the fourth generation of Chinese leadership under Hu is trying to create a more populist, pro-people image as people are at the center of the “scientific development concept” and a “harmonious society.” In the meantime, the fourth generation is trying to address issues that are affecting people’s perception of the party, such as widespread corruption, enormous waste and unfair practices by the government, the government’s sporadic approach to problems, etc. Driven by political considerations, President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao are trying to adopt a more populist approach by favoring slower growth and distributing wealth more evenly to poorer rural regions. A case in point is the leadership’s policy toward Chinese peasants. About 60 percent of Chinese population still lives in rural areas, and Chinese peasants have not been the beneficiaries of China’s fast economic growth since the 1980s. The rural situation has been a trouble spot for years. Rural problems are often summarized as san nong wenti (three rural issues): nongmin wenti (referring to peasants’ declining income, poor living conditions, and problems resulting from them), nongye wenti (referring to the low profitability of agricultural products, low agricultural technology levels, and scarce agricultural land use), and nongcun wenti (referring to the instability and potential chaos in China’s rural areas resulting from nongmin wenti and nongcun wenti). China’s old family-based agriculture has collapsed and Chinese agriculture is no longer able to support such a huge rural population. It is estimated that there are 700 million laborers in China’s rural areas while only 100 million rural laborers are needed in agriculture. Between 150 million and 250 million rural laborers have become the so-called “floating population,” moving between and seeking employment in the country’s large cities. Rural businesses and enterprises only employ one
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fifth of rural laborers and there are an additional 220 million or so surplus laborers in rural areas. For years, the CCP has tried piecemeal solutions to the san nong wenti but never addressed the fundamental issue underlying them until now. The CCP’s 17th Central Committee passed a resolution regarding China’s rural areas on October 12, 2008, at the 3rd Plenum of the 17th CCP Central Committee. It reconfirmed that the terms of the land lease with the state by peasants would not change for a long time and emphasized the importance of the transition of agriculture toward technology and the support for professional and special cooperatives. Legalization and Democratization “Economic, societal, and political pressures appear to make the continuation of Leninist rule impossible, yet the CCP continues to hold power.”13 It is probably the best of times and the worst of times for the CCP today. Due to economic success since 1979, the Chinese standard of living has improved overall. Economic growth and the wealth accumulated over the course of economic reform have helped the Chinese leadership defuse dangerous contradictions in Chinese society. However, there are disturbing signs. “Signs of social upheaval are increasing despite Hu–Wen team’s apparent decision to use conciliatory measures to bring about a ‘harmonious society’,” observed China watcher Willy Wo-lap Lam.14 How will the Chinese leadership manage the incompatible combination of a free market economy and a one-party rule to maintain the dominance and leadership of the CCP on the one hand and sustained economic growth and social stability on the other? How will it respond to the rising popular pressure and resentment against corruption and the widening wealth gap, and increase the state’s ability in maintaining equitable economic growth and redistributive capacity? How will the Chinese leadership try to meet the increasing demands of citizens and groups? “Throughout the reform era, China’s leaders have expected law and the legal system to play unprecedented and
13
Fewsmith, 212. Willy Wo-lap Lam, Chinese Politics in the Hu Jintao Era: New Leaders, New Challenges (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2006), 247. 14
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important roles,” and laws and legal institutions have contributed greatly to the diffusion of international norms, construction of a market-oriented economy, and amelioration of problematic features of authoritarian rule.”15 But could legalization be successful without democratization? In China, the party’s legitimacy derives from its successful leadership and its commitment to economic development. The rule of law in the Chinese political context is secondary to the party, and the legislature, NPC, is also secondary to the party. However, it is becoming increasingly important to establish the rule of law in China as it has both a private and a public dimension — private in guaranteeing predictability for economic transactions and resolving private disputes, and public in restraining the powers of officialdom and regulating the transfer of political power.16 Economic growth requires a government that can provide the needed infrastructure for development, including stable and supportive policy and a stable legal environment for private or public investors.17 The establishment of the rule of law is, no doubt, one big social infrastructural project that is linked to China’s transition to a complete market economy, because a market economy must be a legal economy. That is, a market economy is possible only if there is a level competing ground, which requires a high degree of regularity, predictability, and transparency. The traditional reliance on policies and individuals would ill-suit the needs of a market economy. Not only does the market require strong laws, Chinese leaderships in post-Deng China also wish to strengthen their legal-rational authority.18 It is obvious that no leader in post-Deng China can resort to revolutionary experience or charismatic authority like Mao or Deng, because Jiang and Hu are both technocrats. Jiang Zemin held the position
15
Jacques Delisle, “Legalization without Democratization in China under Hu Jintao,” in Cheng Li, ed., China’s Changing Political Landscape: Prospects for Democracy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), 185. 16 Kathryn Hendley, Trying to Make Law Matter (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 12. 17 See Dwight Perkins, 29. 18 About the three types of authority patterns: traditional, charismatic, and legal-rational legitimacy, see Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” in David Held et al., eds., States and Societies (New York: New York University Press, 1983), 111–112.
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of general secretary of the CCP, president of the PRC, and chairman of the CCP Central Military Commission simultaneously. It is the institutional titles that gave Jiang the authority. Jiang’s authority was therefore more institutional than personal. Likewise, Hu Jintao is concurrently holding the top positions of the party, the state, and the military. China has moved into a new era of modernization. The authority of current leaders and leaders of the fifth generation are to be based more on legal-rational legitimacy. China’s transition, to a large extent, also depends on a successful transition to legal-rational authority, which will promote China’s effort in building a more democratic society. The rule of law is also essential in addressing the rampant corruption in Chinese society, which has affected the image, reputation, and legitimacy of the CCP. China’s corruption is structured corruption, a result of the bad combination of market greed and the monopoly of political power in the one-party rule context. The elimination of structured corruption in China must start with the restructuring of institutions and establishment of the rule of law even though they will represent significant departures from the current CCP politics. Inherent in the political system, corruption cannot be resolved by political campaigns or the CCP’s Disciplinary Inspection Committees. The rule by law in the context of one-party rule has been part of the problem so far. The transition from the rule by law to the rule of law is essential in addressing the corruption issue. After three decades of economic reform, state-society relations have changed, and a middle class and civil society are emerging in China. Different voices from many new socioeconomic groups as well as old ones can be heard openly. Ideas such as citizenship, human rights, transparency, and political accountability are taking form in political life. The internet has definitely facilitated civil society activities by offering new possibilities for citizen participation.19 Jiang’s “three represents” and Hu’s “scientific development concept” and “harmonious society” were, to a certain extent, responses to the emergence of new socioeconomic groups
19 Guobin Yang, “The Internet and Civil Society in China,” in Lowell Dittmer and Guoli Liu, eds., China’s Deep Reform (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006), 303.
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in China. For instance, entrepreneurs as an emerging elite group have increased from 9 on the 16th CCP Central Committee to 18 on the 17th CCP Central Committee. More importantly, groups, whether they are elite or vulnerable social ones, are more cognizant of how to protect and advance their interests and rights. Further reform of the institutions linking state to society will be further promoted within the general parameters of maintaining stability.20 Party Leadership and Inner-Party Democracy in the 21st Century Chinese leadership and institutions have shown their capacity to cope with the rapid pace of socioeconomic change and address issues and challenges raised by the success of reform and openness over the last 30 years. However, it is hard to see the leadership’s effort simply as a top-down process in the 21st century. Procedural democracy and institutionalization have proven to be essential to the CCP in the reform era, which simply means increased structural differentiation, more regularized decisionmaking processes, and more society autonomy from the state.21 Leadership successions at both the 16th and the 17th Party Congresses have shown the increased level of institutionalization. Chinese leaders after Deng have also shown a consistent trend toward a more collective leadership away from “strongman” politics. Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang were promoted to the Politburo Standing Committee at the 17th Party Congress. Which of these two men will succeed Hu remains to be determined, though Xi is apparently the frontrunner as a potential successor to Hu Jintao as the core of the fifth generation of Chinese leadership at the 18th Party Congress in 2012. This is also unprecedented in CCP history as past successions have been more straightforward, which is another indication of the consistent trend toward collective leadership since Deng Xiaoping. Xi’s father was the veteran CCP leader Xi Zhongxun, who served as a member of the Politburo in 20 See John P. Burns, “The People’s Republic of China at 50: National Political Reform,” China Quarterly 159 (September 1999), 580–594. 21 Lowell Dittmer and Guoli Liu, eds., China’s Deep Reform (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006), 13.
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the 1980s. Li is from a humble family background but is known as a tuanpai leader. So Xi and Li represent the taizidang and tuanpai respectively. They each also represent different socioeconomic groups and geographic constituencies. Xi seems to be the candidate of entrepreneurs and the emerging middle class while Li the less privileged social groups. Lieberthal and Oksenberg once argued that the interests of social groups are articulated not through autonomous interest groups but through bureaucratic organizations.22 If the diversification of the Chinese economy has created favorable conditions for a pluralist society, the interests of social groups should be represented and articulated by individual leaders in the Politburo, NPC, the Party Central Committee, and the central government in the Chinese political context. Since the performance criteria are more than just economic growth, interest representation must be part of the criteria. The trend toward more representation is driven by three factors: the need for sustained economic growth, the consensus among top Chinese leaders on the top priority issue of stability, and the necessity of creating more institutional outlets for grievances to alleviate social pressures. Sustained economic growth would require more space and freedom for the society and individuals, because innovative ideas and entrepreneurship cannot flourish under tight political control. It is also important to create institutional channels for the articulation and aggregation of the interests of entrepreneurs and businesses, which demand representation in the party and government. Stability has become the top priority of the party, because order can no longer be taken for granted in post-Deng China. Order and stability override any other concerns, which is a consensus among top Chinese leaders across factions within the party. Chinese leaders have come to realize that the CCP will be in jeopardy and nobody’s interest will be served if order and stability are disrupted. Such a consensus has served as a catalyst for unity, which also encourages more representation in the party and government. Related to the issue of order and stability is the establishment of institutional outlets for grievances to alleviate social pressures. Efforts have 22
See Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg, Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and Processes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).
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been made on three fronts: the People’s Congress system, village elections, and offices of correspondence. Procedural democracy is created and strengthened as a result. A case in point that helps illustrate the political rationale of the CCP leadership’s effort in this regard is the village election. Village elections serve three purposes. First, the CCP could not afford to have chaos in China’s rural areas, not can it afford economic stagnation in rural areas as economic development is the key to China’s prosperity and concerns the well-being of 60 percent of the Chinese population. Reorganizing peasants through elections after the collapse of the commune system would enable the CCP to have control over peasants without negative economic consequences. Second, only when peasants were organized could state policies be carried out and state laws enforced in rural areas, which strengthens the party’s control. Third, village elections would create opportunities for capable villagers who could develop and promote the village economy, and increase the accountability of village leaders at the same time, which would help improve relations between village leaders and villagers.23 Inner-party democracy has been advocated in China for a long time, but it suffers severe limitations. “Its inherent limitations include continuing party domination, limited roles for active civil society, a failure to fully protect civic rights, and a lack of transparency and openness.”24 Given China’s population and history and the CCP’s economic success since Deng Xiaoping’s reforms, it does not seem likely that China can and will copy democratic models elsewhere. China is too confident to copy others. What will be the Chinese model of democracy if China is to create its own style of democracy? It is both a theoretical and a practical question that requires new thinking. Procedural democracy, legalization, and institutionalization have helped ameliorate the contradictions in the Chinese society so far. But could the top-down approach without the public’s participation
23 See Weixing Chen and Guoli Liu, “Building a New Political Order in China: Interpreting the New Directions in Chinese Politics,” in Weixing Chen and Yang Zhong, eds., Leadership in a Changing China (New York: Palgrave, 2005), 63. 24 He Baogang, “Intra-Party Democracy: A Revisionist Perspective from Below,” in Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard and Zheng Yongnian, eds., The Chinese Communist Party in Reform (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 192.
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in the political process of decision making continue to help ameliorate the various contradictions in the Chinese society? In the end, the outcome will have to be determined by the political skills of Chinese leaders in the short run and by their courage, wisdom, and willingness to meet the demands of the citizen masses in the long run. References Bunce, Valerie. Do New Leaders Make a Difference? Excecutive Succession and Public Policy under Capitalism and Socialism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981. Burns, John P. “The People’s Republic of China at 50: National Political Reform,” China Quarterly 159 (September 1999): 580–594. Chen, Weixing and Yang Zhong, eds. Leadership in a Changing China. New York: Palgrave, 2005. Chen, Weixing and Guoli Liu. “Building a New Political Order in China: Interpreting the New Directions in Chinese Politics,” in Leadership in a Changing China, edited by Weixing Chen and Yang Zhong, 63. New York: Palgrave, 2005. Delisle, Jacques. “Legalization without Democratization in China under Hu Jintao,” in China’s Changing Political Landscape: Prospects for Democracy, edited by Cheng Li, 185. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008. Dittmer, Lowell and Guoli Liu, eds. China’s Deep Reform. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006. Fewsmith, Joseph. “Staying in Power: What does the Chinese Communist Party Have to Do?” in China’s Changing Political Landscape: Prospects for Democracy, edited by Cheng Li, 212. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008. Harding, Harry. China’s Second Revolution: Reform after Mao. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1987. He, Baogang. “Intra-Party Democracy: A Revisionist Perspective from Below,” in The Chinese Communist Party in Reform, edited by Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard and Zheng Yongnian, 192. London and New York: Routledge, 2006. Hendley, Kathryn. Trying to Make Law Matter. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996. Lam, Willy Wo-lap. Chinese Politics in the Hu Jintao Era: New Leaders, New Challenges. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2006.
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Li, Cheng. “China’s Most Powerful ‘Princelings’: How Many Will Enter the New Politburo?” Brookings Institution. http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2007/ 1017china.aspx?rssid=Chinas +17th+Party+Congress (accessed October 20, 2008). Lieberthal, Kenneth and Michel Oksenberg. Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and Processes. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988. Lin, Gang. “Leadership Transition, Intra-Party Democracy, and Institution Building in China,” in Leadership in a Changing China, edited by Weixing Chen and Yang Zhong, 40. New York: Palgrave, 2005. Miller, Alice L. “Institutionalization and the Changing Dynamics of Chinese Leadership Politics,” in China’s Changing Political Landscape, edited by Cheng Li, 61. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008. Perkins, Dwight. “History, Politics, and the Sources of Economic Growth: China and the East Asian Way of Growth,” in China in the 21st Century: Politics, Economics, and Society, edited by Fumio Itoh, 29. Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1997. Unger, Jonathan, ed. The Nature of Chinese Politics: From Mao to Jiang. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2002. Weber, Max. “Politics as a Vocation,” in States and Societies, edited by David Held et al., 111–112. New York: New York University Press, 1983. Yang, Guobin. “The Internet and Civil Society in China,” in China’s Deep Reform, edited by Lowell Dittmer and Guoli Liu, 303. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006. Zheng, Yongnian. “The 16th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party: Institutionalization of Succession Politics,” in Leadership in a Changing China, edited by Weixing Chen and Yang Zhong, 15. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. Zhu, Guanglei. Dangdai Zhongguo zhengfu guocheng [The Process of Government in Contemporary China]. Tianjin: Tianjin renmin chubanshe, 1997.
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Chapter Two
A Tragic Miscarriage: How China’s Quest for Political Reform is Undercut by the China Model1 Yawei Liu
Slow Decline of the CCP’s Interest in Political Reform By the time Mao Zedong passed away in 1976, China was inching toward a general political and economic paralysis if not a dire collapse. Mao’s successor, Hua Guofeng, did realize that China’s modernization must be put on the front burner but he was unable to move away from the “two whatevers.” In a series of shrewd political maneuvers, Deng Xiaoping managed to assert himself into the decision-making process of the Party, the state and the military.2 With senior CCP leaders coming to a tentative consensus, Deng presided over the historic Third Plenum of the 11th National Congress of the CCP in December 1978 and made the momentous decision to disengage from the irrational class struggle and focus on economic development. The foundation 1
In this chapter, the China model and the “Beijing Consensus” are used interchangeably. Sometimes, they are put next to each other. 2 “The two whatevers” refer to Hua Guofeng’s declaration that 1) “whatever Mao has decided we will carry through” and 2) “whatever Mao has said we will obey.” For details of Deng and his supporters’ epic battle to move China away from old ideology and quest for socialist purity, see Su Shuangbi, “Liangge fanshi shi zenme bei fouding de” [How the “Two Whatevers” were Negated], Beijing ribao [Beijing Daily], July 21, 2008. 45
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for the launch of the so-called reform and opening up in December 1978 was the gigantic effort to swing back to pragmatism although it was still couched in the rhetoric of building a new socialist country. The next 10 years saw phenomenal economic development and an impressive improvement of the living conditions of the Chinese people. Deng Xiaoping had another reform agenda on his mind. He believed economic reform efforts would eventually be curbed up if political reform was not initiated. He had a strong feeling that without reforming the political structure, 1) the accomplishments of the economic reform could not be protected; 2) further deepening of the economic reform could not be secured; 3) productivity would be blunted; and 4) the four modernizations of China would not be achieved.3 But Deng also understood how important a politically correct ideological façade was in order to deepen the reform. To move forward, he had to put himself in a politically unassailable position first. On March 3, 1979, in a speech on the CCP’s theoretical work, he introduced the concept of insisting on four cardinal principles, namely, 1) insisting on the socialist road; 2) insisting on the proletarian dictatorship; 3) insisting on the leadership of the CCP; and 4) insisting on Marxism, Leninism, and Mao Zedong Thought. This was as good a political cover as one could ever get but to make each and every decision in accordance with the “four cardinal principles” alone would be self-defeating. A new framework had to be developed and it was called “one core and two fundamentals.” The core was that “developing the economy is the top priority” and the two fundamentals were 1) “the four cardinal principles will always be adhered to” and 2) “reform and opening up cannot be abandoned.”4 Deng began his push for political reform in the 1980s. One Chinese scholar believes that Deng had identified two main areas for the proposed political reform, namely the separation of the Party and the state in decision making and transforming the role of the government. Another scholar
3
See Deng Xiaoping wenxuan [Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping], Vol. III, 164 and 176. For the Chinese language description of the pillars of Deng’s reform, please see “Sixiang jiben yuanze” [Four Cardinal Principles] at http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2003-01/20/ content_698005.htm. 4
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lists three areas that were of extreme concern to Deng: source of legitimacy, concentration of power in the hands of the CCP, and lack of a system of checks and balances.5 The final package was put forward by Zhao Ziyang, general secretary of the CCP, in his political report to the 13th CCP National Congress on October 25, 1988. Zhao listed eight tasks in the soon-to-be-launched political reform. The four most important were: 1) to initiate the separation of the CCP and the state apparatus, 2) to improve cadre selection procedures, 3) to establish mechanisms for societal consultation, and 4) to perfect the system of democratic politics.6 The Tiananmen Square incident in 1989 derailed the long planned political reform. Zhao Ziyang was removed from his position and put under house arrest. Shanghai Party head Jiang Zemin was abruptly promoted to be CCP’s new general secretary, a position he held until 2002. Busy with consolidating his power and scrambling to deflect attacks from the left, Jiang made a hard turn to the left. The collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the disintegration of the Soviet Union convinced the CCP leadership that the train of reform had to be slowed down. Not totally sidelined but losing political clout as a result of the crackdown, Deng felt powerless and was unable to reverse the rising tide of political conservatism. Not only was political reform tabled, his economic reform was to be frozen as well.7 In 1992, at age 87, isolated and not often consulted in Beijing, Deng headed south, visiting Wuhan, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shanghai where he talked to local officials. Initially, his tour was not even reported by the 5 See Xu Yansong, “Zhongguo zhengzhi tizhi gaige zhihou de yuanyin fenxi” [Analysis of the Lack of Progress of China’s Political Reform], August 20, 2003, on the China elections and governance website at http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=18837. For details of Deng’s political reform agenda, Xu cites Deng Xiaoping wenxuan [Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping], Vol. II, 176 and 213. The second scholar Cao Youqin’s article is entitled “chaozhe Deng Xiaoping sheji de zhengzhi1 gaige fangxiang qianjin” [March Toward the Goals of Political Reform set by Deng Xiaoping], Zhonggai luntan [China Reform Forum], at http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=103302. Cao cites Deng Xiaoping wenxuan, Vol. II, 328 and Vol. III, 131. 6 The section on political reform in Zhao Ziyang’s historic political report is available at http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=157257. 7 See Xu, “Analysis of the Lack of Progress of China’s Political Reform.”
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Beijing media outlets. When newspapers in Shenzhen and Shanghai began reporting Deng’s visits and his remarks, the top Chinese military leadership vowed to usher in reform and opening up. This “southern tour” jump-started the stalled reform. This was the second time that Deng had pulled the government back to the middle from the left using a pragmatist approach. He said there were only three measures that could determine if a policy was right or wrong: 1) if it was beneficial to increasing socialist productivity; 2) if it was conducive to increasing the comprehensive power of the nation; and 3) if it was helpful in improving the living conditions of the people. Deng’s tour caused a panic in Beijing. Jiang and his supporters stopped their turn to the left and decided to come back to the center, returning to the reform and opening up started by Deng back in 1978.8 Unfortunately, Deng was no longer in a position to oversee the launch of the political reform. His ideas, well defined by Zhao Ziyang in 1988, were diluted beyond recognition. China moved into a new era of economic liberalization and political tightening, a development that later would be a salient component of the so-called China model. Political reform did not come to a complete stop. It continued in ways that could not and would not even leave a dent on the supremacy of the CCP. According to Xu Yansong, a Tsinghua University political scientist, political reform since 1992 has followed four trajectories: 1) improving the administrative efficiency of the government through restructuring; 2) introducing a civil servant system; 3) extensive research on source of power and its legitimacy; and 4) promoting the rule of law.9 At the same time, direct village elections were mandated by the Organic Law of the Villagers Committees of the PRC, promulgated on a provisional basis by the National People’s Congress (NPC) in 1986 and made into a basic law in November 1998.10 Jiang Zemin presided over three CCP National Congresses but no new platform on political reform was ever introduced. The 14th CCP Congress 8
See Qin Xiaoying, “Deng Xiaoping lilun yu hexie shehui” [Deng Xiaoping’s Theory and the Harmonious Society], Ta Kung Pao, January 26, 2007. 9 See Xu, “Analysis of the Lack of Progress of China’s Political Reform.” 10 For details of the history of direct village elections in China, see Yawei Liu, “Consequences of Village Elections,” China Perspective (Fall 2000).
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was held in 1992 after Deng’s southern tour. It pledged to continue the reform. Five years later, in the political report of the 15th CCP Congress, Jiang declared that the CCP would build a socialist China with the rule of law.11 Before and after the 16th CCP Congress, there was a flurry of activity. First, Jiang came up with “the Three Represents,” effectively changing the mission of the CCP, which used to represent the industrial workers and farmers. Second, there were talks of adding “political civilization” to the two existing civilizations that CCP had vowed to build, namely “materialistic civilization” (economic activity) and “spiritual civilization” (ideological purification). In his political report delivered on November 18, 2002, Jiang outlined the tasks of political reform and added that political reform meant “perfecting the democratic system, enriching democratic formats, expanding channels for citizens’ orderly participation in politics, guaranteeing people’s entitlement to democratic election, democratic decision-making, democratic management and democratic supervision, making more rights and freedom available to the people, and respecting and defending human rights.” Finally, other democratic parties in China could only provide consultation under CCP leadership.12 After Jiang delivered his swan-song report, Hu Jintao was “elected” by members of the CCP Central Committee as the new general secretary. In March 2003, he was “elected” by deputies to the NPC as president of China. This was the first smooth change of top leadership in CCP history, a sign of political progress and a more institutionalized transfer of power. However, not until 2004 was Hu able to assume the powerful chairmanship of the CCP Central Military Commission (CMC). What many had hoped to be a new deal began to emerge quickly. Hu and Premier Wen Jiabao adopted several “people-first” policies. However, the long anticipated political reform was not launched. All hope was pinned on the 17th CCP Congress in 2007. But it came and went without any “big bang” proposal in Hu’s report. In terms of the 11 For details of China’s slow move toward political reform in terms of changing ideas and adopting new thinking, see Yu Keping, “Sixiang jiefang yu zhengzhi jinbu” [Mind Emancipation and Political Progress], Beijing ribao [Beijing Daily], September 17, 2007. 12 For details of political reform advanced by Jiang Zemin at the 6th CCP Congress, see http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=17193.
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significance of conducting political reform, Hu said that the expansion of socialist democracy was to serve the purpose of defending people’s interests and maintaining social fairness and justice. Without political reform, China would become politically disoriented, the Party and the state would lose their vitality, and the initiative of the people could not be unleashed. On how to proceed with political reform, Hu listed a total of seven tasks, including expanding the people’s democracy, promoting grassroots democracy, implementing the rule of law, and building a service-oriented government.13 Parallel to the increasingly vague discourse on political reform, a new concept began to emerge. This was the concept of a “peaceful rise.” In 2003, at the Boao Forum, Zheng Bijian, former vice president of the Central Party School, described the nature of China’s development: First, China had 1.3 billion people and this would make China a developing nation for a long time to come. Second, in the 25 years since the launch of reform and opening up, China had invented a new model of development. Third, this new model could be characterized as actively participating in globalization, being independent, and not seeking conquest and hegemony. China’s peaceful rise would not only solve the development issue for the most populous nation in the world but would also make an enduring contribution to peace and prosperity in the world.14 Zheng gave equal emphasis to both the market economy and political democracy. In other words, political reform was not only needed; it was a must for China to sustain its growth. Two years later, in an article that appeared in the overseas edition of the People’s Daily, Zheng Bijian tried to define the nature and orientation of the CCP: First, the CCP was different from the Communist Party of the former Soviet Union. It did not seek conquest and denounced wars. Second, it was economic globalization that had contributed to China’s growth miracle. Therefore, destroying the existing power balance and
13 Hu Jintao’s report at the 17th CCP National Congress. To see the differences between the political reform agenda of the 13th CCP Congress and 17th CPP Congress, see Wang Xiao, “Shisanda baogao yu shiqida baogao de bijiao” [Comparing the Political Reports of the 13th CCP Congress and the 17th CCP Congress], http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo. asp?NewsID=118807, November 16, 2007. 14 Zheng Bijian, “Zhongguo heping jueqi xindaolu he yazhou de weilai” [The New Road of China’s Peaceful Rise and the Future of Asia], November 23, 2003.
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challenging the United States was not in the best interests of the CCP. Third, seeking three “ ”s (peace) was the paramount mission of the CCP: pursuing peace outside China, building harmony domestically, and seeking reconciliation across the Taiwan Strait. Zheng emphasized that Moscow and Beijing had taken divergent roads largely because it was against the very essence of the Chinese culture to use force or violence to expand territorially, develop economically, and influence ideologically. The CCP’s mission was to increase productivity at home and wage peace abroad.15 To a certain extent, Zheng advanced what later became a trademark of Hu Jintao, the idea of harmony. Obviously, one of Zheng’s goals was to dismiss the “China threat” theory and disarm the Americans who felt uneasy about China’s phenomenal growth. In the process, he actually achieved something more. His treatise on China’s peaceful rise was the first step toward defining an emerging China model, building a new consensus, and identifying the uniqueness of China’s development.16 However, Zheng did not discredit the necessity of political reform. He was one of a few CCP thinkers that had access to the top leadership. While Hu Jintao liked the idea of harmony, he appeared to dislike Zheng’s emphasis on the urgent need to carry out political reform and economic development with the same force and determination. The idea of harmony is a new turning point for the CCP engineered by Hu Jintao. The first generation of the CCP leaders applied the ideas of continuous revolution and class struggle in pursuit of an egalitarian world. They ran into a dead end at gigantic social and human cost. Deng Xiaoping put the brakes on that frenzied quest for the communist utopia. His efforts to secure economic development through political reform were derailed by the unforeseen event in 1989. After a few years of wavering and hesitation, Jiang Zemin began to deepen the economic reform without giving too much thought to political reform. China’s GDP soared. Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao came in with a new playbook. They understood that the reckless pursuit of revolution was as bad as the reckless pursuit of GDP. While it was glorious 15 Zheng Bijian, “Zhongguo gongchandang zai ershiyi shiji de zouxiang,” The People’s Daily, November 22, 2005. 16 See Hong Zhaohui, “Zhongguo tesulun yu zhongguo fazhan lujing” [China Uniqueness and China’s Path of Development], Dangdai zhongguo yanjiu [Journal of Contemporary China] 2, 2004, at http://www.chinayj.net.
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to be rich when Deng first started the reform, it was dangerous if the gap between the haves and have-nots became too wide. A harmonious society, by way of focusing more on the people’s affairs, was the way to go. Although democracy remained part of the package, it was moved to the backburner. All in all, there has been a precipitous decline of interest in political reform on the part of the CCP top leadership.17 It is still on the lips of CCP leaders and runs in the articles penned by scholars from think tanks and universities. But as the CCP is completing its historic transition from “war and revolution” to “peace and development,” less and less attention is being given to political reform. Deng’s success was to instill the CCP with the idea that development was the hard truth. Hu’s achievement is to inject the notion of social justice and equitable development into Deng’s formula. All he has done is to get CCP officials to pay more attention to the people’s concerns and make them happy, feel indebted to the CCP and thank the top leadership for everything. The China model/Beijing Consensus talk surfaced against this backdrop. The Origin and Evolution of the “Beijing Consensus” Chinese officials, scholars, and reporters are very adept at inventing new terms to describe and define the CCP or state policies but the “Beijing Consensus” or the “China model” was not invented by them. It was coined by Joshua Cooper Ramo, a partner at the consulting firm Kissinger Associates. In 2004, Ramo wrote a paper entitled “The Beijing Consensus.” In this paper, Ramo identified three underlying grids of the Beijing Consensus, namely, 1) a strong commitment to innovation and experimentation; 2) a nice combination of increasing per capita GDP and securing
17
Qian Gang wrote in his article “Where is political reform” that one of the most prominent developments was the disappearance of the term “political reform” in current CCP rhetoric. Qian came to this conclusion through looking at the use and frequency of keywords related to political reform in the Party reports, resolutions and speeches. According to him, “political reform” appeared in the political reports of the 13th, 14th, 15th, and 16th CCP National Congresses but was replaced by “democratic politics” in the political report of the 17th CCP National Congress. See Qian Gang, “Zhengzhi tizhi gaige zai nail,” http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=118562, November 11, 2007.
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sustainability and the equitable distribution of wealth; and 3) a firm adherence to national self-determination which guards against Western financial encroachments and adopts an asymmetrical military strategy.18 It seems that Ramo has coined the term “Beijing Consensus” deliberately to offer an alternative to the so-called “Washington Consensus.” He writes, “China is marking a path for other nations around the world who are trying to figure out not simply how to develop their countries, but also how to fit into the international order in a way that allows them to be truly independent, to protect their way of life and political choices in a world with a single massively powerful center of gravity.”19 Since its inception, the neat formulation of China’s development has been warmly received not only in China but also in many corners of the developing world. With China’s economy enjoying double-digit growth in almost three decades and with Washington’s advice of privatization, deregulation, trade liberalization, and fiscal austerity leading to economic disaster in countries like Argentina, the “Beijing Consensus” has become more attractive in both intellectual and policymaking circles in many capitals. It must be pointed out that well-informed Chinese do not seem to accept the idea of a China model. The People’s Daily online launched a poll on the China model in March 2009 during the Second Session of the 10th NPC. The numbers of the ongoing poll clearly show there is no consensus among the netizens on the so-called “Beijing Consensus.” The first question is “Do you believe in the existence of China Model?” Over 65 percent (1487) of those who responded to the poll answered “no.” Only 369 (16 percent) believe the China model has matured.20 18
See details at http://joshuaramo.com/beijing-consensus, accessed September 1, 2009. Quoted in http://www.salon.com/tech/htww/2006/09/15/beijing_consensus, accessed September 10, 2009. 20 I use the term “informed Chinese” to include Chinese who are not only well-educated but also frequent the Internet. There are four questions in the poll. Only a significant number of people chose to answer the first question “Do you believe in the existence of the China Model.” The other three questions are on the nature and contents of the China model and have been barely answered. The numbers for the first question on September 24, 2009, are as follows: there is a China model (369, 16.2%); it is a model still in development (400, 17.5%); there is a China model but it has yet to win official recognition (28, 1.2%); and there is no China model (1487, 65.1%). The results are at http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/49150/49152/9033838.html. 19
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The rise of the discourse on the China model seems to be a response to Western theories such as “China will quickly collapse” and “China is a threat.” In the process, Chinese scholars began to develop a new theory to counter these ill-intentioned predictions and bad-spirited descriptions of China. In 1994, two years after Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour, Justin Lin, an economics professor at Peking University and now vice president of the World Bank, and two other scholars published a book entitled The China Miracle: Development Strategy and Economic Reform. The notion of a China miracle was first introduced in this book. Five years later, Tsinghua University economist Hu Angang penned an article on China’s economic reform in the journal Strategy and Management. Hu believes that China possesses a very sound strategy to develop and sustain its economic growth. In 2003, Kang Xiaoguang published an article in the same journal in which he declares that China’s success is due to its “successful transformation” and “successful conservatism.” “Successful transformation” refers to China’s adoption of the market economy and “successful conservatism” to China’s strong adherence to the one-party rule.21 This discovery of China’s exceptionalism coincided with the collapse of communist powers in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and with China’s economic assertiveness. It was also a time when the “Washington Consensus” introduced by John Williamson in 1989 did not succeed in reviving the economies of developing nations and when Westerners began to feel uneasy about an increasingly powerful China. Furthermore, there was an urgent need to solve the China riddle: how can 21
For books and articles on China’s possible collapse and China as a threat, see Bill Gertz, The China Threat: How the People’s Republic Targets America (Washington, DC: Regnery Publisher, 2000). Nicholas Kristof and Sheryl Wudunn, China Wakes: The Struggle for the Soul of a Rising Power (New York: Vintage Books, 1994); Nicholas Kristof, “The China Threat?” New York Times, December 20, 2003; Gordon Chang, The Coming Collapse of China (New York: Random House, 2001); Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro, The Coming Conflict with China (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997); Lin Yifu et al., Zhongguo de qiji [China’s Miracle] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1994); Hu Angang, “Zhongguo jingji zhengzang de xianzhuang, quanqi qianjing ji changqi qushi” [The Current Status, Short-Term and Long-term Prospect of the Chinese Economy], Zhanlue yu guanli [Strategy and Management], Issue 3, 1999; and Kang Xiaoguang, “Zhongguo teshulun” [Chinese Exceptionalism], Zhanlue yu guanli, Issue 4, 2004.
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one explain China’s economic development, which lifted hundreds of millions of its people from poverty and sustained a double-digit growth for so long when it has resisted successfully changing its political structure? Ramo’s paper, published in 2004, filled the theoretical void. Between 2004 and 2005, there were many articles in the Chinese media on the decline of the “Washington Consensus” and the rise of the “Beijing Consensus.” An article in China Economic Weekly in 2004 predicted that the debate of Ramo’s theory would become increasingly prominent. A newspaper forum organized by the 21st Century Economic Report, a newspaper in Guangzhou, invited prominent scholars such as Justin Lin, Joseph Stiglitz, Fan Gang, Tang Min, and Li Daokui to share their views on both the “Washington Consensus” and the “Beijing Consensus.” An article in the China Reform Forum on April 16, 2005, described the clash of the two consensuses and its impact on China’s reform.22 By 2008, in the wake of the snowstorm in the South, the earthquake in Sichuan, the first space walk conducted by Chinese astronauts, and the Summer Olympics in Beijing, the China model/Beijing Consensus talk had solidified among Chinese scholars. In December 2008, Pan Wei, a US-educated professor teaching at Peking University, organized an international conference called “The PRC at 60 and the China Model.”23 In the same month, Wang Shaoguang, another US-educated professor teaching at the Chinese University in Hong Kong, published his speech at the conference on the China Review website, defining the China model as PRC government’s keen desire to learn and its skillful capacity to adapt.24 22
Zhao Xiao, “Cong Huashengdun gongshi dao Beijing gongshi” [From the Washington Consensus to the Beijing Consensus], China Economic Weekly, Issue 23, 2004; Wang Zi, “From the Washington Consensus to the Beijing Consensus,” Ershiyi shiji jingji baodao [21st Century Economic Report], March 28, 2005; and Xie Minggan, “Cong Huashengdun gongshi dao Beijing gongshi jiantan Zhongguo gaige jingyan jiaoxu” [From the Washington Consensus to the Beijing Consensus and Lessons of the Chinese Reform], China Reform Forum, April 16, 2005. 23 Minutes of this conference were published in Kaifang shidai [Open Times], Issue 4, 2009, 140–148. 24 Wang Shaoguang, “Lun Zhongguo zhengfu de xuexi jizhi yu shiying nengli” [On the Chinese Government’s Mechanism of Learning and Capacity to Adapt], http://www. chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=143268.
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In January 2009, Red Flag Articles, a journal affiliated with CCP’s theoretical journal Seeking Truth, ran an article on the status of research on the China model. According to the authors, foreign scholars had begun to examine China’s development model since the 1960s. Halfway through China’s economic reform, many of these scholars began to question if an old and autocratic political system could coexist with a vibrant market economy. However, the advantage and strength of China’s national mobilization model ( juguo tizhi) was so powerful in overcoming the difficulties caused by the snowstorm, providing relief to earthquake victims, and hosting the Summer Olympics that the international suspicion has subsided and criticisms decreased tremendously.25 In the same month, a Chinese national living in France, Song Luzheng, wrote an article that was circulated widely on many Chinese online portals. In it, He declares that democracy is not invincible but the China model is.26 In May 2009, a People’s Daily reporter filed a story from the United Nations, using his interview with a Harvard Business School professor to underscore the point that the China model is challenging traditional development theories.27 One month later, a Guangming Daily article called “Why is the China model so attractive in the world?” appeared.28 In July 2009, Zhang Wei-wei, who was once Deng Xiaoping’s interpreter and currently does research in a couple of European universities, was invited to the People’s Daily Online to talk about the China model and its impact. In his view, the China model is political, economic, and cultural. It is a cornucopia of solutions to most of the problems in the world.29
25
Zhuang Junju and Zhang Xili, “Jinqi youguan Zhongguo moshi yanjiu guandian zongshu” [An Examination of Viewpoints in Recent Research on the China Model], Hongqi wengao [Red Flag Articles], January 21, 2009. 26 Song Luzheng, “Minzhu bisheng haishi Zhongguo moshi bisheng” [Is Democracy or the China Model Invincible], http://www.chinaelections.org/newsinfo.asp?newsid=143294, accessed September 23, 2009. 27 Wu Yun, “Zhongguo moshi tiaozhan chuantong lilun” [The China Model is Challenging Traditional Development Theories], People’s Daily Online, May 8, 2009. 28 Wang Jiabo, “Zhongguo moshi yuanhe dui shijie chongman meili” [Why is the China Model So Attractive in the World], Guangming Daily, June 27, 2009. 29 Zhang Wei-wei, “Zhongguo moshi beihou de linian ji dui jiejue shijie wenti de yingxiang” [The Ideas Behind the China Model and Its Impact on Solving Problems of the World], People’s Daily Online, July 17, 2009.
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As the PRC celebrated its 60th anniversary, there was a full-court press in the Chinese media to publicize the China model. In August 2009, the New China News Agency changed the title of an article penned by Francis Fukuyama in a Japanese journal into “More countries favor the China model.”30 The cover story of the September issue of Liaowang Newsweekly, one of China’s most famous current affairs magazines, was on the China model. The China model works and it may have universal applicability, asserted the cover story.31 On September 26, Hu Wei, Dean of the School of International Affairs and Public Administration at Shanghai Jiaotong University, published an article in Jiefang Daily, on the China model’s special place in the world. Hu Wei writes that the China model is not only a model for economic development but also a model for political development. It is the logical result of mankind’s democratic political processes. It is a gift of a rising power to the troubled world.32 No top Chinese leader has been recorded referring to the China model or the “Beijing Consensus” in their official speeches or writings. However, this does not mean they do not approve or endorse this idea.33 In February 2009, Xi Jinping, Hu Jintao’s heir apparent, made some remarks that shocked the world. When meeting with Chinese Mexicans while visiting Mexico, Xi said that China did not export revolution, hunger, or poverty, and did not create problems for any countries. He said that those foreigners who kept nitpicking China should find better things to do. Although some Chinese intellectuals were upset by the cockiness of
30
See the Xinhua story at http://www.chinaelections.org/newsinfo.asp?newsid=155493, accessed September 20, 2009. 31 Tang Yaoguo, “Zhongguo jiazhi — Jiema Zhongguo moshi: quanqiu weiji zhong de Zhongguo re” [Deciphering the China Model: The China Wave Amidst Global Crisis], Liaowang Newsweekly, September 2009. 32 Hu Wei, “Zhongguo moshi de shenceng hanyi yu shijie yiyi” [The Deeper Meaning of the China Model and Its Global Significance], Jiefang Daily, September 26, 2009. 33 When the term “peaceful rise” was first introduced by Zheng Bijian, it was wildly popular. However, it eventually became “peaceful development” in official speeches and writings. As a Chinese scholar told the author, Hu Jintao felt the term “peaceful rise” sounded arrogant. By the same token, for top Chinese leaders to echo the “China model” or “Beijing consensus” in their speeches does not project an image of modesty. After all, by many measures, China is still a developing country.
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the remarks, many interpreted this as a reflection of growing confidence in the China model. On March 9, 2009, in his speech to the NPC annual session, Chairman Wu Bangguo declared that the socialist political development road with Chinese characteristics is the only correct road for the Chinese people under the CCP leadership. “While actively absorbing useful achievements of political civilizations of the mankind, we will never ever copy the Western style of politics, never ever adopt a multiparty system, checks and balances and a parliament divided by two chambers.”34 Wu, who ranks second in the powerful CCP Politburo Standing Committee, did not refer to the China model, but who can deny that he sees a vibrant China model in operation? On January 1, 2009, Qiushi magazine published Hu Jintao’s speech on the outlook of scientific development. Hu writes that raising high the flag of socialism with Chinese characteristics is a must for every CCP member in the nation.35 In July, the newly created China mega think tank, the China Center for International Economic Exchanges headed by former State Councilor Zeng Peiyan, had its inaugural meeting with a focus on examining the China model during the worldwide economic downturn. In endorsing the conference that was attended by think tank representatives around the world, Vice Premier Li Keqiang delivered a keynote speech.36 In a speech commemorating the 60th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) on September 20, 2009, President Hu Jintao said that the road of political development a nation chooses is decided by the nature and circumstances of this particular nation. The socialist road of political development with Chinese characteristics is a road that has been traveled by the Chinese people under the CCP leadership. It is a road that fits China’s circumstances. He repeated what Wu Bangguo said back in March: China does not reject working governance formulae from other countries but will
34
Wu Bangguo, “Gongzuo baogao” [Work Report], Xinhuanet.com, March 9, 2009. Hu Jintao, “Guanche luoshi kexue fazhan guan” [Carry Out and Implement the Outlook of Scientific Development], Qiushi [Seeking Truth], January, 1, 2009. 36 The People’s Daily, July 4, 2009. 35
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never adopt Western political systems in a wholesale manner.37 Four days later, Hu Jintao addressed the General Assembly of the United Nations. He mentioned “three insistences” in his speech, namely, insisting on making decisions in accordance with Chinese circumstances, insisting on taking the socialist road with Chinese characteristics, and insisting on building a China that is civilized economically, politically, socially, and ecologically through continuous reform.38 This brief review indicates that the chorus on the China model/Beijing consensus inside China is orchestrated by the Chinese government. Many Chinese scholars and media workers have participated to broaden and deepen the campaign. The top CCP leadership not only endorses the China model but also speaks collectively on the uniqueness of China’s development. But why do most of the people polled not support this brave new model? In fact, a few Chinese scholars have openly criticized the China model, its impact on China, and its possible application outside China. On what grounds have they rendered their critique? The Goods in the China Model Basket When Chinese officials and scholars describe the China model, they go far beyond Ramo’s initial definition. They simplify the “Washington Consensus” into a combination of liberal democracy and market economy and frame the China model as its very opposite. In a recent interview, Ma Zhengang, China’s former ambassador to the United Kingdom and president of the Chinese Institute of International Affairs, said the core of the Western model is political democratization and economic liberalization. But without political democratization, economic development can be secured. He said China has taken a different path and scored big successes, which is why Westerners are dumbfounded, upset and scared. He then said that two very important components of the China model are a
37 Hu Jintao, “Zai qingzhu zhengxie liushi zhounian dahui shang de jianghua” [Speech on the Occasion of the 60th Anniversary of the Founding of CPPCC], September 20, 2009. 38 Hu Jintao, “Tongzhou gongji gong chuang weilai” [Let’s Build a Brave New Future Together], chinanews.com.cn, September 24, 2009.
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strong and firm CCP leadership and the people’s keen desire to see the rise of China.39 Fang Ning, director of the Institute of Political Science under the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), said that the two fundamental characteristics of the China model are 1) protecting the people’s right to pursue happiness and 2) centralizing power at the top. The first has unleashed the people’s energies and initiatives and the second is the key to improving the decision-making process and marshalling resources to achieve predetermined goals.40 Some scholars go as far as to say that the shaping of the China model is merely the outcome of applying Marxist theory to the special circumstances of China. Xu Chongwen, a CASS senior researcher said in a recent interview that China’s contribution to the world is to have sinified Marxism and solved problems that cannot be effectively dealt with by any other ideology or political system in the world. This is a new path in pursuing the progress of civilization, producing a developmental alternative to the one offered by developed countries, and securing global harmony and world peace. He added, what else can explain China’s achievement in becoming the second largest economy and reducing poverty in such a dramatic manner?41 Hu Wei is more interested in examining the political component of the China model. He outlines two Western theories in his recent article. One, according to him, is that China is doing relatively well economically but its political development is quite backward. The other theory is that China cannot sustain its economic growth without liberalizing politically. He uses John Naisbitt’s recent book to buttress his view that China has not only managed to adapt to economic globalization but also weathered the political challenge from the West. Whereas Western nations have horizontal democracy, China has introduced vertical democracy. Since all democratic nations have different formats of democracy, China is by all means entitled to have its own democratic system. The China model should not be narrowly defined as one-dimensional. It includes a unique political system that will enrich the arsenal of democracy in the world.42 39
See Tang Yaoguo. Ibid. 41 Ibid. 42 See Hu Wei. 40
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Some scholars see the China model as an epic battle to crush the Western monopoly on the discourse of development and human progress and to secure a safe place for the China development experience that can be easily identified and understood by other developing nations. Wang Hui, a Tsinghua University professor, feels the key to the success of this battle is the CCP’s courage to stay independent and focus on developing China in its own unique way.43 Zhang Wei-wei summarizes the China model as “strong government,” “pragmatic approach,” “people focused” and “gradual reform.” He even challenges both Chinese scholars and Western experts to identity a single nation that has used the Western political system to successfully turn itself into a more advanced nation. In his view, there are two benchmarks for measuring whether a nation is successful: elimination of corruption and achieving modernization. He sees three major trends in the world in the past 30 years: The first is the rise of radical Islam. The second is the so-called third wave of democratization. Countries that have become democratic during this wave, particularly Eastern European nations, are now facing serious challenges. The third is the modernization drive led by China. It has triggered seismic reactions and will eventually impact the political landscape of the world.44 Some scholars see other unique aspects of the China model. He Xuefeng, an influential researcher on China’s rural development, believes that China’s economic takeoff is due to the artificial and deliberate division of urban centers and the countryside. Farmers can migrate to the cities when jobs are available and return home when life becomes unbearable. The availability of this large army of cheap labor and the fact that their land provides a safety valve give China a unique master key that opens the door of development without paying too high a social price.45 Zhang Yu, an economics professor at Renmin University of China, defines the China model as 1) combining strong and large state-owned businesses with a vibrant private sector, 2) running a market economy that is subject to tough state regulations, and 3) opening up to the outside world gradually with state control.46 43
See Zhi Zhengfeng and Zang Li, “Minutes of the Conference on Sixty Years of New China and the China Model”, Political Science Review, September 2009. 44 See Zhang Wei-wei. 45 See Zhi Zhengfeng and Zang Li. 46 Ibid.
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Pan Wei, who earlier called on Chinese scholars to declare war on Western civilization, divides the China model into three sub-models: social, economic and political. The economic sub-model provides two strong feet and huge wings for China. As a result, China is soaring and cannot be stopped.47 Finally, the China model is not something that suddenly appeared in China and became the beacon for its development. It is the cumulative learning, adaptation, and exploration by several generations of CCP leaders. It began with Mao’s heroic effort to select what was useful for China from the classics of Karl Marx and Vladimir Lenin. It moved a step further with Deng Xiaoping placing the bricks of pragmatism in Mao’s theoretical warehouse. Jiang Zemin came along and supplied the “Three Represents” to the CCP inventory. Hu Jintao has introduced the outlook of “Scientific Development” and “Harmony” to this development treasure house. None of the four have severed the relationship with Marxism but all have made creative and positive adjustments and contributions.48 As indicated by the CCP Resolution adopted on September 18, 2009, 88 years after it was founded, 60 years after it came to power, and 30 years after it launched its reform, the CCP has transformed China from a weak, poor, and pathetic country into a great power of peace, prosperity, and harmony. This is an unprecedented achievement of the CCP. This is an unsurpassable glory of changing China and making contributions to universal human progress. Without the CCP, there would have been no new China, no socialist road with Chinese characteristics. In other words, the China model is undeniably a CCP innovation of epic proportions.49 Lingering Doubts about the China Model The talk about the China model is largely an intellectual exercise conducted away from most of the Chinese people. From the CCP’s perspective, it is 47
Ibid. Yan Shuhan, “Zhongguo daolu de shijie yingxiang” [The Global Impact of the Chinese Road], Liaowang [Outlook Newsweekly], September 8, 2009. 49 CCP Central Committee, “Guanyu dangjian luogan zhongda wenti de jueding” [Several Major Decisions on CCP Construction], September 18, 2009. 48
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something that is very useful in injecting a sense of pride into the Chinese people and strengthening the legitimacy of the government. It may also be useful in competing with the West in the area of development discourse, which used to be monopolized by Western scholars and experts. For the CCP, it further builds a wall against any sinister attempts at a “color revolution” by Westerners led by Washington. Zheng Yongnian, a China policy analyst and Director of the East Asian Institute at the National University of Singapore, detects Western fear of the China model. According to Zheng, this fear originates from two primary sources. First, the rise of China is different from the rise of any other Western nations. Second, Westerners consider their values as universal and applicable to other nations. When China rises along a different path, they are concerned that their value system as well as their way of making the economy work and keeping the government clean will eventually be replaced by the China model. Westerners, particularly Americans, are mission-oriented. They have spent a large quantity of resources, used a huge amount of manpower, and even conducted military operations to expand their democratic system to other countries. As China rises, the China model has begun to expand to developing nations without any strings attached. Zheng also sees a third source of fear which is the simplification of the China model. Many Westerns draw an equal sign between the China model and China’s poor human rights record, neglect of individual liberty, and non-interference in nations where there are abuses of human rights or abundant corruption. However, Zheng feels that Westerners should not be terribly worried by the rise of China and its development path. They should understand that China’s rise is largely due to a global system established by Westerners and that each nation is entitled to its own way of developing the economy and building legitimacy for its government.50 Zheng does not believe the West can contain the spread of the China model. To block the expansion of the China model would be as futile as the earlier attempt by the West to block China’s economic rise. It is understandable that British professor Martin Jacques predicts the rise of the Middle Kingdom and the end of the Western world but the West can do what China has done, i.e. learn
50
Zheng Yongnian, “Xifang weihe jupa Zhogguo moshi” [Why the West is Afraid of the China Model], Lianhe Zaobao, April 10, 2009.
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from the West while preserving what is still working in China. Managing international relations is not a zero-sum game. If China and the West work together, a gentler and kinder world may emerge.51 Not all Chinese scholars are as optimistic. A few of them have serious issues with the China model. Some have raised concerns in a very public manner. Others may not have the courage or platform to make their voices heard. Ding Xueliang, a US-educated professor at the Hong Kong Institute of Technology, wrote an article in September 2008 raising the concern that the China model cannot be easily promoted outside China. Ding centers his concern on two questions: 1) What did this model achieve? 2) How did it get there? He believes that the social cost of the China model is so high that it is impossible for any other nation to adopt it. This sky-high cost is shown in three areas: lack of social justice and fairness, environmental degradation, and administrative cost. Ding writes that in no normal nation is collective bargaining not allowed. But in China, those who try to bargain and defend their interests will go straight to jail. Industrial workers are not respected and farmers’ interests are not protected. Under the doctrine that maintaining social stability is paramount, any Chinese who dare to take on the government will be harassed and silenced. Environmental degradation is so serious that it is doubtful if China can overcome its water crisis any time soon. China’s governance through national mobilization is effective but its cost is mind-boggling and can never be applied in any country where spending taxpayers’ money requires debate and approval. The cost of the 2008 Beijing Olympics was respectively four and five times higher than that of the Athens and the Sydney Games and this does not include expenses paid by other government agencies in China. Ding uses Hu’s outlook of “Scientific Development” to issue his serious warning: it is perfectly all right to acknowledge the amazing achievements of reform but it would be criminal to be blind to the gigantic cost of these achievements. Without lowering the cost, not only will the China model be irrelevant to other nations, the sustainability of China’s own reform may be questionable.52 51 Zheng Yongnian, “Zhongguo moshi neng bei xifang weidu ma” [Can the West Contain the China Model?], Lianhe Zaobao, September 9, 2009. 52 Ding Xueliang, “Zhongguo moshi weishenme bu hao tuiguang” [Why is it Difficult to Promote the China Model], Financial Times Chinese Online edition, September 19, 2009.
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An article in Study Times, a journal edited and published by the Central Party School, echoes Ding Xueliang’s view. According to the author, Qiu Gengtian, there is a price for any successful experiment. What attracts the world about the China model is the scale and speed of the economic development; what the world has yet to notice is the high price China has paid for it. China’s wealth and progress have indeed come at a huge expense of human and environmental degradation. This is neither acceptable to China nor tolerable to the world. China must seek a low-cost development road. Otherwise, the global warning of yet another China threat will be just around the corner.53 Yu Keping, vice president of the CCP Central Bureau of Translation, does not think the China model is a finished model. First, China is still in the process of finding new solutions to sustain its economy. Second, China’s circumstances are so special that this model cannot be easily applied to other nations.54 Li Jianhua cautions Chinese scholars not to be so enthralled by the China model. According to him, it is absurd to try to spread the China model through a think tank summit. It is ironic for a nation that has always denied the universality of any development models to trumpet the China model as an attractive model to others. China itself has suffered a great deal in adopting development methods from the Soviet Union. It is hard to understand why so many Chinese officials and scholars are in such a hurry to sell the China model. It is a dangerous business.55 Wang Jingjun, a professor at the Zhejiang Provincial Party School, thinks that there are key differences between the “Beijing Consensus” and the “Washington Consensus.” Whereas the former is designed to explain what China has done in the past, the latter is basically a forward-looking formula intended for reform and reconstruction. The “Beijing Consensus” indicates the experiences of a developing nation but the “Washington Consensus” sheds light on the practices of a developed nation which is the
53
Qiu Gengtian, “Zhongguo moshi de didaijia fazhan zhilu” [The Low-Cost Development Road of the China Model], Xuexi shibao [Study Times], September 14, 2009. 54 Yu Keping, “Zhongguo moshi bing meiyou dingxin” [The China Model is Yet to be Completed], Jiaoyu yuren [Journal for Education], Issue 9, 2009. 55 Li Jianhua, “Bubi mangzhe gei fazhan zhong guojia chuanshou Zhongguo moshi” [No Need to Busy Ourselves Selling the China Model to Developing Nations], Changjiang ribao [Yangzi River Daily], June 30, 2009.
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sole superpower in the world. While it is hard to say with certainty that the two consensuses are on a collision course, it is easy to see that the “Beijing Consensus” has the tendency to deny individual aspirations that are built on universal values such as liberty and equality.56 Can China move from economic reform which deals with people’s physical survival and the improvement of living standards to political reform that respects human rights and political liberty? The most serious criticism of the China model rendered by the Chinese scholars is the absence of political reform/democratization components. Gao Ren, a columnist for the China elections and governance Website, declares that it is a violation of the Hu Jintao Doctrine of Scientific Development to say that the China model is perfect for China and the world. The China model is just going through the stage of primitive molding. It was not introduced until a few years ago. As it stands now, it is a model that saves no place for political reform. Without meaningful political reform, this model creates inequitable distribution of wealth, expands the income gap, breeds rampant corruption, and turns the Chinese government into an agency that believes superficial stability is consent to legitimacy.57 In 2006, Yang Guang published an article in the Journal of Contemporary China in which he questions the absence of political reform in the China model. In the conclusion he writes, “In today’s China, there will be very few people believing that there is absolute no need for political reform. Political reform will be launched sooner or later in China and its breakthrough probably will come when people realize the China model cannot be sustained exactly because it shuns political reform.”58
56
Wang Jingjun, “Zhongguo moshi he Zhongguo fazhan zhilu” [The China Model and China’s Development Road], March 5, 2007, http://www.chinaelections.org/newsinfo. asp?newsid=103943. 57 Gao Ren, “Mei ren weidu Zhongguo moshi” [No One is Containing the China Model], September 10, 2009. 58 Yang Guang, “Zhengzhi gaige: Zhongguo moshi de nanti” [Political Reform: The Difficult Issue of the China Model], Dangdai Zhongguo yanjiu [Journal of Contemporary China], Issue 10, 2006.
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Conclusions The key difference between the Soviet reform and China’s reform is that Moscow began in the political arena while Beijing refused to put political reform ahead of economic reform. From the Chinese perspective, that is exactly why the Soviet Union quickly collapsed while China has achieved territorial integrity, one-party supremacy, and an economic development miracle. But this priority shift only came after 1989. When reform and opening up was launched in 1978, Deng had a two-step plan and believed the success of all reforms would hinge on the success of political reform. The year 1989 not only saw the plan for political reform dashed but also witnessed a hard left turn in the economic sector. This retreat from reform was finally reversed by Deng in 1992 by which time he was too old to push forward political reform. As China’s economic performance continues to shine year after year, the CCP, whose top leadership and many rank and file members are afraid of any real political reform, has begun to push political reform to the side. The “Beijing Consensus” provides a perfect theoretical framework and a practical excuse to postpone political reform or even to declare it totally irrelevant and unnecessary. This is something Joshua Cooper Ramo probably never expected when he first introduced the term. The China model/Beijing Consensus is neither a sound theory nor a good set of benchmarks by which to design reform and measure its success. It is a highly effective system under the domination of one political party through which resources can be marshaled, dissent silenced, land grabbed, lakes and rivers dammed, international events paid for and organized without looking into the human or ecological costs as long as the outcome of the activity makes the state and the Party look good. It is a system whose declared mission is to serve the people but whose possible abuse of power cannot be checked and balanced by the people. It is a system responsive to the people when pressured but which always blames the people for all the problems in the society. It is a system whose output has awed many foreigners, delighted millions of Chinese, and appealed to leaders and elites in other developing countries, but the cost of this “miracle” is staggering and long-term. It is a system that does not acknowledge the existence of universal values, trashes democratic arrangements to hold government officials accountable, and sees a constant Western conspiracy
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to destroy China. It is a system that recognizes talent at the top, demands total obedience at the bottom, and uses incentives or fear to rein in those in the middle. It is a system that may elevate China to the global stage of national wealth and power but it will not be able to make China a nation where the individual pursuit of happiness is guaranteed and protected. It is a system that cannot resolve the tension between an autocratic government and the people who want more say in their quest for individual rights. The China model is an effective weapon for shattering the need for political reform into pieces. The “Beijing Consensus” is an artificial consensus that democratization will bring about harm and even destruction to China. Scholars and media workers both inside and outside China have played a very important role in building the myth of the China model/ Beijing Consensus. We praise those who constantly question the validity and applicability of the China model and raise doubts about its usefulness. We are appalled by those who have joined the chorus on the China model without sound judgment or any judgment at all. When scholars work with the state and party apparatus to advance something that may eventually hurt the well-being of the nation and erode the liberty of the people, they are colluding with power in a reckless way. Many Chinese and Western scholars are trumpeting the China model which, unless modified significantly down the road, will hurt both China and those nations which decide to experiment with it. The China miracle is not just an outcome of the China model, nor an outcome of China’s political, economic, social, and cultural peculiarities. To a large extent, China’s successes, as pointed out by Zheng Bijian, are due to the existing economic globalization and rule of law, all achievements of the West currently under the leadership of the United States. The China model should not be the opposite of this system, defined by the “Washington Consensus.” The two development paths should complement each other and benefit from each other. Some Chinese scholars have shown arrogance in describing the significance of the China model and downgrading the usefulness of the “Washington Consensus.” What they may not be aware of is that China’s political system and treatment of its people cannot be easily accepted by most of the world. China may never collapse but its way of life can pose a threat to Western countries and their values. In other words, if China does not change course and deviate from
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the now fixed path called the China model, it will certainly be on a collision course with the West. It is difficult to predict the fallout of this collision but it will not be pretty. It will be an economic confrontation, a cultural clash, and a war between political systems. For China to avoid this clash, it is necessary to revive the political reform that was on the CCP’s agenda but rendered inactive by the China model. Yes, China will have a democratic system different from the United States, the United Kingdom, France, South Africa, Japan, or South Korea, but it has to have a system that can be defined as truly democratic. References Buruma, Ian. “The Year of the China Model.” Project Syndicate, January 2008, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/buruma8, accessed September 27, 2009. Bernstein, Richard and Ross Munro. The Coming Conflict with China. New York: Vintage, 1997. Chang, Gordon. The Coming Collapse of China. New York: Random House, 2001. Derlik, Arif. “Beijing Consensus: Beijing ‘Gongshi’. Who Recognizes Whom and to What End?” Globalization and Autonomy Online Compendium, http:// anscombe.mcmaster.ca/global1/servlet/Position2pdf?fn=PP_Dirlik_Beijing Consensus, accessed September 18, 2009. Dickson, Bruce. Wealth into Power: The Communist Party’s Embrace of China’s Private Sector. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. Gertz, Bill. The China Threat: How the People’s Republic Targets America. Washington, DC: Regnery, 2000. Kristof, Nicholas and Sheryl Wudunn. China Wakes: The Struggle for the Soul of a Rising Power. New York, 1994. ———. “The China Threat?” New York Times, December 20, 2003. Lampton, D. Michael. Three Faces of Chinese Power: Might, Money and Mind. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009. Lee, Sunny. “Why China’s Communist Party Lasts,” Korean Times, September 18, 2009. Leonard, Andrew. “No Consensus on the Beijing Consensus, Neoliberalism with Chinese Characteristics? Or the Long-Lost Third Way?” Salon, September 15,
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2006. http://www.salon.com/tech/htww/2006/09/15/beijing_consensus, accessed September 18, 2009. Mann, James. “A Shinning Model of Wealth Without Liberty,” Washington Post, May 20, 2007. Naisbitt, John. China’s Megatrends: The Eight Pillars of A New Society. Beijing, HarperCollins 2009. Perry, Elizabeth and Merle Goldman, eds. Grassroots Political Reform in Contemporary China. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004. Ramo, Joshua Cooper. Beijing Consensus, 2005. http://joshuaramo.com/ beijing-consensus, accessed September 1, 2009. Shambaugh, David. “China’s Road to Prosperity.” Time, September 28, 2009. ———. China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2009. Shirk, Susan. China Fragile Superpower: How China’s Internal Politics Could Derail Its Peaceful Rise. London: Oxford University Press, 2008. Zhao, Suisheng. China and Democracy: Reconsidering the Prospects for a Democratic China. New York: Routledge, 2000. ———. Debating Political Reform in China: Rule of Law vs. Democratization. Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 2006. Zhao, Ziyang. Prisoner of the State: The Secret Journal of Zhao Ziyang. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2007.
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Chapter Three
Concluding the Complex Learning Process: The Chinese Elites’ Acceptance of Outward-Oriented Development Lawrence C. Reardon
To demonstrate the dynamics of learning and preference change,1 this chapter focuses on the Chinese elites’ decision to reject its revolutionary inward-oriented development paradigm implemented since the 1950s and adopt a technocratic, outward-oriented development paradigm in the 1980s. The Chinese elites underwent a process of complex learning, during which they carried out various decentralization and export promotion experiments, such as the SEZs and FDI. After evaluating the experiment results and adjusting implementation policies, the elites eventually adopted outward-oriented development, initially characterized by the formalization and expansion of 1
For other studies applying the learning paradigm to China, see Lowell Dittmer, Learning and the Reform of Chinese Foreign Policy (Singapore: World Scientific, 1999); Sebastian Heilmann, “From Local Experiments to National Policy: The Origins of China’s Distinctive Policy Process,” The China Journal 59 (January 2008): 1–30; ——— “Policy Experimentation in China’s Economic Rise,” Studies in Comparative International Development 43, 1 (Spring 2008): 1–26; Alastair Iain Johnston, “Learning Versus Adaptation: Explaining Change in Chinese Arms Control Policy in the 1980s and the 1990s,” The China Journal 35 (January 1996): 27–61; Lawrence C. Reardon, “Learning How to Open the Door: A Reassessment of China’s ‘Opening’ Strategy,” The China Quarterly 155 (September 1998): 479–511; ———, Reluctant Dragon: Crisis Cycles and Chinese Foreign Economic Policy (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2002). 71
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the coastal development strategy and the state’s application to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the predecessor of the WTO. Elite learning was key to the success of this paradigm change. The postGreat Leap Forward (GLF) coalition, which included Deng Xiaoping and his erstwhile companion-in-arms Chen Yun, implemented for 30 years an inward-oriented development strategy of import substitution industrialization (ISI) to achieve a strong, prosperous, and self-reliant state completely dominated by the CCP.2 However, after implementing a series of adaptations to the original ISI strategy, the post-GLF coalition incrementally learned that their development strategy was flawed. By experimenting with the international marketplace, these elites created a technocratic development paradigm, which enabled the state to become one of the most important political, economic, and military players in world politics today.3 The Ideational Learning Model: Authoritarian Variation Mark Blyth hypothesizes that economic ideas create institutional change by reducing leadership uncertainty during periods of crisis, act as an organizing principle for interest groups, and provide a weapon to dismantle and rebuild the state, business and labor institutions, as well as reduce the uncertainty of the future by providing a blueprint for change.4 This chapter adopts Blyth’s emphasis on ideas — ideational learning — while incorporating concepts and measures from the new institutionalist literature such as rational choice, which “explains both individual and collective (social) outcomes in terms of individual goal-seeking under constraints.”5 The 2
Reardon, Reluctant Dragon. Li Cheng and Lynn White, “Elite Transformation and Modern Change in Mainland China and Taiwan: Empirical Data and the Theory of Technocracy,” The China Quarterly 121 (March, 1990): 12–6; Li Cheng and Lynn White, “The Thirteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: From Mobilizers to Managers,” Asian Survey 28, 4 (April, 1988): 393–398. 4 Mark M. Blyth, Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 5 Duncan Snidal, “Rational Choice and International Relations,” in Handbook of International Relations, ed. by Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse-Kappen, Beth A. Simmons (London: Sage, 2001), 74. 3
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approach also assumes that elites are influenced by certain endogenous and exogenous variables: their Weltanschauung based on previous interactions with the international and domestic environments; interactions with other actors pursuing their long-term goals; access to production inputs such as capital, land, and labor; access to the international marketplace, etc. While elites share a common, relatively unchanging preference of longterm goals, they employ a simple learning process, which “uses new information merely to adapt the means, without altering any deeper goals in the ends-mean chain. The actor simply uses a different instrument to attain the same goal.”6 Simple learning can result in relatively minor or routine adaptations of policy (first-order changes), or large-scale policy adaptations, which are not “radically altering the hierarchy of goals behind policy” (second-order changes).7 Although relatively rare, these strategy adaptations can result in anomalies, which Kuhn considered to be crucial in creating fundamental changes in scientific thinking.8 Under special circumstances, such anomalies can result in complex learning, which “involves recognition of conflicts among means and goals in causally complicated situations, and lead to new priorities and trade-offs.”9 Complex learning can eventually result in a paradigm change, which radically alters long-term goals and the strategies to achieve those goals (third-order change).10 Elite learning approaches assume learning is a subjective process; elites do not necessarily share the same Weltanschauung, and thus seek out others who share general expectations about causal relationships, about the domestic and international marketplace, cooperation with international competitors, 6 Joseph Nye, “Nuclear Learning and US–Soviet Security Regimes,” International Organization 41, 3 (Summer 1987): 380; also see Karl Deutsch, The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control (London: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963): 92; Chris Argyris and Donald Schon, Organizational Learning: A Theory of Action Perspective (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1980): 20–26; J. S. Levy, “Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield,” International Organization, 48 (1994): 286–287. 7 Peter A. Hall, “Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State,” Comparative Politics 25 (April 1993): 281–283. 8 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 3rd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), Chapter 8 9 Nye, 380. 10 Hall, 283–287.
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and technology.11 Opinion groups form around collective consensus over the strategies to achieve long-term goals; they accumulate longitudinal learning concerning effective strategies, which they utilize in formulating first- and second-order changes. The perception of crisis acts as a catalyst to delegitimize the ruling opinion group and its preferred strategies to achieve long-term goals. After readjusting the previous strategy, the newly empowered elite opinion group introduces second-order changes based on the results of strategy implementation of the past (simple learning/adaptation) or by experimenting with new strategies. If problems that occur during the implementation phase cannot be corrected by first- or second-order policy changes, the crisis cycle is reinitiated.12 Such policy cycling results in incremental learning, which can create the conditions for complex learning and third-order changes — or in Kuhnian terms, a paradigm shift. This chapter analyzes the conditions leading up to the actual paradigm shift that took place in China in the 1980s. Focusing on foreign economic policy, the chapter argues that elites incrementally learned that inwardoriented development was a failure, which prompted experimentation and eventual adoption of a technological development paradigm that promoted outward-oriented development. Adapting the Old: The Revolutionary Development Paradigm, Simple Learning, and Import Substitution Industrial Development The revolutionary development paradigm was created by a new set of elites — Mao Zedong as the preeminent leader along with the Yan’an Roundtable, which included key elites from the CCP Political Bureau.13 During the ensuing complex learning process that lasted until the adoption of the First Five-Year Plan (FFYP, 1953–1957), these elites established new long-term goals for the state that included security, prosperity, and the Party’s comprehensive control of the state. 11
James Clay Moltz, “Divergent Learning and the Failed Politics of Soviet Economic Reform,” World Politics 45, 2 (January 1993): 24f; Adler, 109; Blyth, 253–257. 12 For more on the crisis cycle, see Reardon, Reluctant Dragon, 37–46. 13 Kenneth Lieberthal, “The Great Leap Forward and the split in the Yan’an leadership,” in Roderick MacFarquhar and John Fairbank, eds., The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 14 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 326–327.
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While agreeing to the new long-term goals, elites disagreed over the specific development strategies to achieve them. Mao Zedong and those elites who had very little contact with the world during their formative adult years argued for a uniquely Chinese path of development beginning in 1955.14 Reacting to China’s dependence on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe for technology imports, these Nativists promoted a semiautarchic development strategy that relied on China’s own innate abilities — communist man15 — to transform the state into a strong, self-sufficient economy; utilization of the international marketplace was no longer necessary as the FFYP had already imported the basic technological tools of development. These elite opinions coalesced in the mid to late 1950s to form the “politics in command” coalition, which would be responsible for the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution policies. While not disputing the importance of self-reliance, Zhou Enlai and others saw the continuation of technology imports as the best strategy to obtain the revolutionary development paradigm. Many of these Internationalists had either studied or worked overseas or in the most cosmopolitan areas of China, such as Shanghai. They believed that the FFYP had not provided China with sufficient technology and know-how to develop into a strong, self-reliant economy. While wary of the exploitative power of foreign market economies, the Internationalists championed an inward-oriented ISI strategy, which harnessed the financial and technical know-how of the international marketplace. Their opinions coalesced in the late 1950s, resulting in the formation of the post-GLF coalition, whose remunerative-based policies accelerated the economic recovery of the early 1960s and the reimplementation of the ISI strategy. For the next two decades, both elite opinion groups supported the longterm goals of the revolutionary development paradigm. Yet, the actual strategies to achieve the paradigm’s long-term goals cycled between semiautarchy and ISI, reflecting the shifting in and out of political power of these two coalitions and their different opinions concerning their preferred 14
Mao Zedong, “Summing-up Speech at 6th Expanded Plenum of 7th Central Committee,” September 1955, in Miscellany of Mao Tse-tung Thought (1949–1968) (Arlington, VA: Joint Publications Research Service, 612690-1), 1974, 17. 15 Richard Lowenthal, “Development vs. Utopia in Communist Policy,” in Chalmers Johnson, ed., Change in Communist Systems (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1970).
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development strategy.16 The “politics in command” and post-GLF coalitions continued to adapt their policies to their preferred development strategy, but this was not collective learning in which all the elites learned the same lesson; this was divergent learning, or “the adoption of different new policy understandings by members of a group.”17 When in power, both opinion groups implemented their preferred strategies, and made second-order changes according to lessons learned incrementally over a period of time. The Internationalists who composed the post-GLF coalition formulated four phases of second-order changes to their ISI development strategy: import substitution project sourcing changes, 1956–1957; export procurement changes, 1959–1964; adaptation of post-GLF procurement strategies, 1972–1975; and use of foreign capital, 1975/1978. By experimenting with each set of second-order changes, the post-GLF coalition learned the strength and weaknesses of the first- and second-order changes whenever they were in power. It is the accumulation of this learning — longitudinal learning — that contributed to the recognition of paradigm anomalies in the late 1970s. Second-Order Change: ISI Sourcing, 1956–1957 Following Mao’s call for a Chinese-style, semi-autarchic development model embodied in “rash advance” (maojin),18 a new Internationalist opinion group began to emerge led by Zhou Enlai, Chen Yun, and Zhu De; they implemented the slower path toward development that entailed three fiveyear plans to establish a “comprehensive industrial system.”19 As China still needed to import 40 percent of its industrial needs from abroad after the FFYP,20 Zhou continued to import equipment and technology
16
Reardon, Reluctant Dragon, Chapter 2. Moltz, 303. 18 Bo Yibo, Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu [Looking Back on Certain Important Decisions and Events] (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1991), 522. 19 Zhou Enlai, “Diyige wunian jihua de jingyan he jiaoxun” [The Experiences and Lessons to be Learned From the First Five-Year Plan], in Zhou Enlai jingji wenxuan [A Selection of Zhou Enlai’s Economic Works] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1993), 278–328. 20 Ibid., 295. 17
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from the Soviet Union, including a $1.25 billion agreement with the Soviet Union to build 78 ISI projects such as chemical factories, petrochemical complexes, power generation and machinery manufacturing plants.21 However, Zhou also expanded sourcing for the ISI strategy by importing technology from Western Europe and Japan.22 To finance the ISI projects, Zhou sought to use Hong Kong to export Chinese goods and harness Overseas Chinese investment to develop areas around the Pearl River Delta. According to Zhou, Hong Kong was to become “our base for making economic connections with foreign countries, for attracting foreign capital and earning foreign exchange.”23 The experiment with Overseas Chinese investment in local industries in the form of Overseas Chinese Investment Enterprises was expanded nationwide in 1957 so that Overseas Chinese could invest in schools and factories in their hometowns and elsewhere.24 Finally in Spring 1957, the government held the first Guangzhou trade fair to promote Chinese exports to pay for Chinese import substitution projects.25 This first major adaptation of the ISI strategy is intriguing. While successfully thwarting Mao’s rash advance initiative which had strong autarchic overtones, Zhou Enlai, Chen Yun, Zhu De, and other Internationalists clearly accommodated Mao’s concerns about overreliance on the Soviet Union. Diversifying the ISI technology sourcing thus makes political sense…but it also shows a growing acceptance of the positive role of the international marketplace in accelerating domestic development. Zhou’s promotion of Hong Kong as both a base to sell its exports to the Western marketplace and as a source of capital investment also had far-reaching consequences. 21 Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxian Yanjiushi, ed., Zhou Enlai nianpu (1949–1976), zhongjuan [A Chronicle of Zhou Enlai’s Life (1949–1976)], Vol. 2, 205. 22 Qing Simei, “The Eisenhower Administration and Changes in Western Embargo Policy against China, 1954–1958,” in Warren I. Cohen and Akira Iriye, eds., The Great Powers in East Asia 1953–1960 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990). 23 Zhou Enlai, “Guanyu Xianggang wenti,” [Concerning the Hong Kong Problem], in Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxian Yanjiushi, ed., Zhou Enlai jingji wenxuan, 54. 24 Lin Jinzhi, ed., Huaqiao huaren yu Zhongguo geming he jianshe [Overseas Chinese Involvement in the Revolution and Construction of China] (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 1993), 478–484. 25 Guangdong nianjian, 1987 [The Guangdong Yearbook, 1987] (Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1987), 225.
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Second-Order Change: Export Product Procurement, 1959–1964 The second major adaptation of the ISI strategy was implemented in the wake of the GLF disaster, in which over 30 million people starved to death. Although unable to affect a comprehensive readjustment program until after Fall 1960,26 Zhou Enlai and the post-GLF coalition implemented a series of readjustment measures starting in December 1958 in the foreign economic sector. They prevented a “Great Leap Forward” in exports, recentralized controls over all foreign trade activities, separated the foreign trade system from the domestic economy, and placed the highest priority on the acquisition, processing, and exporting of all export goods;27 this eventually included diverting from the domestic economy any commodity needed to fulfill the export plan, which exacerbated domestic food shortages.28 Finally, Chinese elites temporarily froze its debt repayments to the Soviet Union and other creditors in 1960, which compounded the problems of the Sino–Soviet schism.29 Yet these plan-oriented administrative measures were not enough to guarantee export supplies to repay foreign creditors for the ISI projects, to finance wheat imports, which Zhou Enlai had approved on December 30,
26
Tong Xiaopeng, Fengyu sishinian, 2 [The Forty-Year Storm, v. 2] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1996), 389. 27 “Guanyu zhixing duiwai maoyi jihuazhong cunzai wenti de qingshi baogao” [The Report and Request of Instructions Concerning Existing Problems in Carrying Out the Foreign Trade Plan], approved by the Central Committee on March 18, 1959, in Zhou Enlai jingji wenxuan, 397 (176f). 28 “Lizheng wancheng dangnian duiwai maoyi de shougou he chukou renwu de jinji zhishi” [Emergency Directive to Exert Utmost Effort to Meet Foreign Trade Procurement and Export Responsibilities], issued by the CCP Central Committee and the State Council, October 26, 1959, in Dangdai Zhongguo De Jingji Guanli Bianjibu, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo jingji guanli dashiji [A Chronology of the PRC’s Commerce] (Beijing: Zhongguo shangye chubanshe, 1990), 131. 29 Li Xiannian, “Liangnian yilai guomin jingji tiaozheng gongzuo qude juda chengjiu” [The Two Years of Readjustment Work Pays Off with Tremendous Achievements], presented to the NPC et al. on August 5, 1963, and approved/transmitted by the Central Committee on August 11, 1963, in Li Xiannian lun caizheng jinrong maoyi, 1950-1991, 2 [Li Xiannian’s Discussions on Finance and Trade, 1950–1991, Vol. 2] (Beijing: Zhongguo caizheng jingji chubanshe, 1992), 134.
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1960, or eventually to restart the ISI strategy.30 To guarantee raw material supplies needed for exports, the post-GLF coalition approved a series of remunerative measures to “motivate” the individual producer. Zhou Enlai also approved the establishment of the export commodity processing bases (ECPBs) in early 1960, which, according to Chen Yun, could guarantee the supply of high quality exports of both agricultural and industrial items.31 This combination of both administrative and remunerative measures adopted in the early 1960s allowed China to pay off its ISI debts to the Soviet Union and finance grain imports to feed China’s starving millions. These adaptations also allowed the post-GLF coalition to propose a new comprehensive ISI strategy, the Four Modernizations. At a September 1963 work conference, Premier Zhou Enlai presented his Four Modernizations plan, which was his attempt to replace once and for all Mao’s vision of a semi-autarchic “rash advance” strategy embodied by the GLF. In its stead, the Four Modernizations was a long-term ISI strategy, which “by the end of the twentieth century would complete the building of a strong socialist state that enjoyed a modernized agricultural sector, a modernized industrial sector, a modernized national defense sector and a modernized science and technology sector.”32 This second major adaptation of the ISI strategy augmented the command economy’s ability to finance ISI by introducing remunerative export promotion measures and export processing zones. However, Zhou Enlai’s attempt to institutionalize the Four Modernizations strategy failed by the mid-1960s as Mao Zedong had learned from his GLF mistakes and instituted a politics-in-command/Third Front strategy of development — embodied by the Cultural Revolution. Second-Order Change: Export Product Mix, 1971–1975 Following the death of Lin Biao in September 1971, Zhou Enlai reasserted control over the State Council and, with Mao’s approval, rehabilitated the 30
Zhou Enlai nianpu (1949–1976), zhongjuan, 382. Reardon, Reluctant Dragon, 119–128. 32 Zhou Enlai nianpu (1949–1976), zhongjuan, 577–578. 31
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surviving members of the post-GLF coalition. Zhou and the post-GLF coalition set about dismantling the semi-autarchic Third Front development strategy and rebuilding the dismantled foreign trade production system. Zhou revived the Four Modernizations strategy and formally introduced the 4-3 ISI plan in February 1972, which was a $4.3 billion ISI program. In addition to buying the turnkey plants from Western European and Japanese suppliers, Chen Yun announced in 1973 the Chinese intention to import from the United States $300 million worth of technology to produce steel. To finance the new ISI strategy, the post-GLF coalition revived and adapted the post-GLF administrative and remunerative measures to guarantee export procurement. Having determined that the Specialized Loan Program for Industrial Export Production had been effective in the early 1960s, the post-GLF coalition revived and expanded the program. In addition, the post-GLF coalition started a short-term foreign exchange loan program for the foreign trade corporations, established an investment fund for export commodity production, and revived and expanded the bonus scheme for agricultural exports.33 The ECPBs were also revived; the postGLF coalition approved the experimentation with a variety of different forms, including the export production bases for individual agricultural or sideline export commodities, the specialized factories, and the comprehensive bases for export commodity production. The comprehensive bases, such as the one established in Foshan, Guangdong Province, produced a variety of agricultural and light industrial goods for export and are the direct forerunner of the special economic zones. For the second time, Zhou Enlai attempted to consolidate his vision of development as embodied by the Four Modernizations. The new largescale ISI strategy was financed by increasing export production utilizing the administrative and remunerative measures adapted from the early 1960s. Besides these adaptations, the post-GLF coalition demonstrated an increased awareness of the dynamics of the international marketplace and the necessity to develop exports according to international market 33
For a detailed description of these second-order changes, see Tan Qingfeng, Yao Xuecong, and Li Shusen, eds., Waimao fuchi shengchan shijian [The Practice of Supporting Foreign Trade Production] (Beijing: Zhongguo duiwai jingji maoyi chubanshe, 1984), 70.
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standards and international demand. Thus, many of the new export processing zones were located in the coastal areas and developed products specifically for the Hong Kong/Macao and Japanese markets. The Final Second-Order Change: Active Use of Foreign Investment, 1975–1978 Following the rehabilitation of Deng Xiaoping and the discovery of Zhou Enlai’s cancer in 1973, Deng took over the day-to-day affairs of the State Council. Deng also became the de facto heir of Zhou Enlai’s legacy, including the Four Modernizations ISI strategy, which Zhou had reiterated in his last government work report delivered in January 1975. As the first Vice Premier in the mid-1970s, Deng was responsible for financing the current and future ISI strategy, and continued to adapt the post-GLF foreign economic administrative and remunerative policies. Deng strongly criticized the autarchic path to self-reliance, and argued for broadening China’s foreign trade and importation of foreign technology. He even attempted a more “active” use of foreign capital by using “deferred payment and installment payment” schemes.34 Following the Nativist assault on Zhou Enlai’s ISI program and Deng’s removal from power in April 1976, Deng had had several years to contemplate China’s development dilemma before returning to Beijing in 1978. Complex Learning and Paradigm Shifts With the death of Mao and the demise of the “politics in command” coalition, Deng and the post-GLF coalition were free to experiment with new ways of thinking. They severely criticized Hua Guofeng’s “two whatevers” approach as simplistic, old-style thinking; Hua was reluctant to “actively” use foreign capital in the form of large-scale compensation trade,
34
Deng Xiaoping, “Guanyu fazhan gongye de jidian yijian” [A Few Ideas on Industrial Development], in Deng Xiaoping wenxuan, 1975–1982 (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1983), 15–18; Deng Xiaoping sixiang nianpu (1975–1997) [A Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Thought (1975–1997)]. (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1998), 16.
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cooperative production, equity joint ventures, and 100 percent foreignowned ventures because Mao had not approved of them.35 Deng proffered an alternate, pragmatic attitude toward development based on the idea of “practice as the sole criterion of truth.” This was an adaptive strategy allowing a more “liberal” interpretation of Maoist teachings, including the self-reliance principle.36 Deng’s views became the basis for a new technocratic approach to China’s development. Deng appointed a new generation of technocratic leaders, including Premier Zhao Ziyang, who formulated and implemented most of the key market-oriented experiments in the 1980s. In his autobiography, Zhao Ziyang reaffirms the role that one’s Weltanschauung and incremental learning played in inspiring the market-oriented reforms of the 1980s. Zhao states that his trip to Western Europe in 1979 had a great impact on his views of the marketplace. He was amazed that European farmers living in arid regions were relatively prosperous. Zhao realized that the state had not pursued self-reliant development, but “instead relied on trade with the outside world and utilized their strengths to export their goods in exchange for what they needed.”37 In explaining China’s gradual adoption of marketoriented reforms, Zhao argued that change was “not instantaneous. Instead it began with a small number of minor changes, but it gradually involved bigger changes…. [However] problems will erupt. Only by achieving further economic and political reforms can such problems be resolved.”38 Deng’s approval of this technocratic thinking would lead to a greater acceptance of the Party’s indirect role in economic affairs. Not all of the ruling elites would share Deng’s open-minded attitude towards the role of the domestic and international market in China’s development. As a primary architect of the FFYP and having spent time in both capitalist Shanghai and the Soviet Union of the 1950s, Chen Yun held a strong belief in the role of the primary role of the planner, while
35
An interesting comparison could be made between Deng and Gorbachev, as both could be described as having new thinking and a highly complex cognitive schemata. See Stein. 36 “Zai quanjun zhengzhi gongzuo huiyishang de jianghua,” in Deng Xiaoping wenxuan, 109. 37 Zhao Ziyang, Prisoner of the State (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009), 134–135. 38 Ibid., 126.
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regarding the marketplace as a dispensable supporting actor. While never advocating the Nativist’s semi-autarchic vision, Chen Yun and others would break with the post-GLF coalition in the early 1980s to call for a more moderate agenda with the “planned economy as primary, market adjustments as auxiliary.” They increasingly opposed expanding experimentation with market reforms and outward-oriented development in the 1980s. According to Zhao Ziyang, Chen Yun “persisted in his belief in ‘small amounts of freedom under a predominately planned economy;’ or ‘planned economy as primary, market adjustments as auxiliary,’ he became more and more out of tune with the overall goals of reform and the reality of the time.”39 Acute differences within the GLF coalition resulted in its breakdown after 1981 and the emergence of a moderate and a radical Internationalist opinion group, with Deng Xiaoping balancing the two groups in his key role as the preeminent leader. Both opinion groups would agree that the long-term goal of comprehensive Party control of the economy should be altered; but they disagreed on the degree to which the market and the Party should dominate. Yet in the late 1970s, the newly reinstalled post-GLF coalition was unanimous in their belief that the economic plan had to be radically readjusted. They reviewed reports on Zhou Enlai’s early 1970s ISI projects, which were now in operation. Over two-thirds of the turnkey plants were losing money. There were massive overruns, as the State Planning Committee failed to import the correct technology or spare parts. Technology was often inappropriate, and there were not enough qualified technicians or managers to run the turnkey operations. The most famous debacle was the $600 million steel projects for the Wuhan Steel Company. Following completion in 1978, an investigation revealed a project suffering from low productivity, insufficient understanding of infrastructure requirements, and lack of preparatory work. The turnkey project was only able to produce about one quarter of its projected steel production.40 39
Ibid., 94. Fang Weizhong, ed., Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo jingji dashiji, 1949–1980 [A Chronology of Major Events in the PRC’s Economy, 1949–1980] (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1984), 496–497.
40
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Although delaying and then rejecting their decades-long ISI strategy, the post-GLF coalition revived and/or strengthened the remunerative policies initiated during the post-GLF period originally designed to empower local producers, increase domestic production, and, in some cases, finance the ISI technology imports. No longer facing criticism from the Nativists who had claimed during the Cultural Revolution that such measures were revisionist, Wan Li in Anhui and Zhao Ziyang in Sichuan experimented with the contract responsibility system.41 Deng Xiaoping and the postGLF coalition experimented with decentralizing power to Guangdong and Fujian Provinces, which included expansion of the export processing zone idea initially approved by Zhou Enlai in 1960 and other export promotion remunerative schemes. While conditioned in their early adult life to have a pessimistic attitude towards the long-term utility of the domestic and international marketplace, these elites learned through experience that comprehensive control of the economy, the inward-oriented development regime, and the ISI strategy had severe limitations.42 Based on their longitudinal learning gained during the three decades of ISI development,43 these elites acknowledged the anomalies in the revolutionary development paradigm and initiated a fundamental revision of their Weltanschauung. Thus began the complex learning process. Measuring Complex Learning and Paradigm Shifts Complex learning is far more complicated than simple learning, as elites are challenging strongly held views of the long-term goals of the state. The learning process involves five phases, which often overlapped and
41 David Zweig, “Opposition to Change in Rural China: The System of Responsibility and People’s Communes,” Asian Survey 23, 7 (July 1983): 879–900. 42 Reardon, Reluctant Dragon, 184–185. 43 William Mishler and Richard Rose, “What are the Origins of Political Trust? Testing Institutional and Cultural Theories in Post-Communist Societies,” Comparative Political Studies 34, 1 (2001): 30–62; William Mishler and Richard Rose, “Generation, Age, and Time: The Dynamics of Political Learning during Russia’s Transformation,” American Journal of Political Science 51, 4 (October 2007): 822–834.
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crossed over various policy areas: crisis; readjustment; adaptation and experimentation; review; and paradigm consensus. Crisis The perception of crisis initiates both the simple and complex learning processes. Should elites agree that a crisis is taking place, they are motivated to act to prevent the crisis from devolving into chaos. Although some academics argue that crisis results in reform,44 it is the perception of crisis and the internal political and economic conditions that determine whether reform and political learning can take place.45 Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, and the other members of the post-GLF coalition opposed Hua Guofeng’s acceleration of the large-scale import substitution program in 1978 (the Ten-Year Plan) that would have cost up to $300 billion.46 While ideologically consistent with the Four Modernizations ISI program promoted by Zhou Enlai in the early 1960s and 1970s, China lacked the resources to finance such a large import bill, and would have been required to go abroad to finance the large-scale projects. While an actual physical crisis akin to the 30 million people dying during the Great Leap Forward was avoided, the post-GLF coalition used the threat of crisis to thoroughly discredit Hua. In their place, Deng Xiaoping and the other members of the post-GLF coalition, including Li Xiannian, Ye Jianying, Chen Yun, Wang Zhen, Bo Yibo, and Yang Shangkun, assumed control. Beginning in the late 1950s, these elites had rallied around Premier Zhou Enlai to support a more remunerative recovery strategy during the post-GLF period and promoted a limited ISI program with Western economies. While a limited ISI
44 Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, eds., The Politics of Economic Adjustment: International Constraints, Distributive Conflicts, and the State (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992). 45 Sarah M. Brooks and Marcus J. Kurtz, “Capital, Trade, and the Political Economies of Reform,” American Journal of Political Science 51, 4 (October 2007): 703–720; Domínguez, 199. 46 Zhao Ziyang, “Dangqian de jingji xingshi he jinhou jianshe fangzhen” [The Current Economic Situation and Future Development Plans], delivered on November 30, 1981, and December 1, 1981, to the Fourth Plenary Session of the Fifth NPC.
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program would continue in the early 1980s, these elites had learned that a new “Great Leap” utilizing an ISI strategy was doomed to fail. Without a clear long-term path to guide them, the elites readjusted Hua Guofeng’s large-scale ISI strategy, and began the process of adapting old policies and experimenting with new policies. Readjustment During the second phase, the post-GLF elites readjusted the previous secondorder elite preferences to mitigate the deleterious effects of crisis. The elites readjusted the entire Ten-Year Plan, and agreed to implement a three-year period of “readjustment, reform, reorganization, and improving standards” that included the reduction or elimination of many of Hua Guofeng’s largescale ISI projects.47 Chen Yun and Li Xiannian’s Finance and Economics Commission guided the readjustment program, which first focused on readjusting the 1979 economic plan, “proportional imbalances” within various economic sectors, and the reduction in capital construction.48 Not all large-scale ISI projects were eliminated, including the massive Baoshan Iron and Steel Corporation in Shanghai, which today is one of the top ten steel producers in the world. Instead, Li Xiannian argued that a reimplementation of the large-scale ISI strategy would be delayed until 1985. During the interim period, turnkey projects would be substituted with the importation of key technology or projects that required “less coal, less electrical demand, less investment, have a quicker return on investment and a greater ability to earn foreign exchange.”49 Most importantly, 47
Li Xiannian, “Zai zhongyang gongzuo huiyishang de jianghua” [Speech to the Central Work Conference], in Sanzhong quanhui yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1998), 109, 121. 48 Li Xiannian, “Zai zhongyang,” 112–117; Zheng Derong, et al., Zhongguo jingji tizhi gaige jishi [Chronology of China’s Economic Structural Reforms] (Beijing: Chunqiu chubanshe, 1987), 81. 49 Li Xiannian, “Zai zhongyang,” 130; “Guanyu banfa ‘Jixu yinjin he shebei jinkou gongzuo zhanxing tiaoli’ de tongzhi” [Circular on the Issuance of “The Temporary Regulations on Technology and Equipment Importation”], State Council document 81.12, issued January 21, 1981, in 1981 Jinrong guizhang zhidu xuanbian (Beijing: Zhongguo jinrong chubanshe, 1983), v. 2, 311–314.
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Li Xiannian reaffirmed the post-GLF coalition’s intentions to have “the plan of self-reliance as the primary goal and external assistance as a supplementary. We cannot rely on borrowing foreign capital.”50 Li’s words cannot be interpreted as a rejection of foreign capital, but as a reflection of the elites’ concern about the lack of finances, as well as a growing divide within the post-GLF coalition on the role of the Plan and the marketplace.51 Adaptation and experimentation The third phase is the core phase of the complex learning process. Older second-order policy changes can be adapted, based on the policies’ past effectiveness. Experimentation involves the testing of completely new policy measures. Elites use such experiments to search for a new consensus on first- and second-order preferences; in his speech to the December 16, 1980, Work Conference, Chen Yun described the process as “crossing the river by feeling the rocks,” which was reaffirmed by Deng Xiaoping in his October 6, 1984, speech on China’s cooperation with the international economy. In many cases, the ruling opinion group initiates such small- or large-scale experiments as a response to problems or crises. However, experiments can also be initiated by local provincial elites, who must gain the approval of Beijing before the experiment is considered for wider adoption. Elite support is especially important for any experiment that challenges the logic of current strategies or long-term goals of the state. The post-GLF coalition did not adapt older policies and experiment with new strategies with the express idea of testing a new development paradigm. Wan Li and Zhao Ziyang’s experimentation with the agricultural contract responsibility system in the late 1970s was their response to local agricultural problems; the elites’ adoption of the contract system nationwide was their response to the immediate problems posed by the state’s agricultural problems, and not as a purposeful experiment with a new market-oriented development paradigm.52 As the export promotion 50
Li Xiannian, “Zai zhongyang,” 124–125. Zhao Ziyang, Prisoner, 92. 52 For instance, see Jean Oi, “Fiscal Reform and the Economic Foundations of Local State Corporatism in China,” World Politics 45, 1 (October 1992): (99–132), 102–103. 51
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experiments of the late 1950s were a response to the inability to repay the Soviet Union for the “156 projects,” adaptation and experimentation beginning in the late 1970s was a response to the need to finance the remaining small-scale ISI strategy. At the April 1979 Work Conference, the post-GLF coalition adapted various plan-oriented export promotion policies initiated since the late 1950s, originally designed to finance the ISI strategy. These new adaptations were outlined in State Council document 79.202, “The Regulations Regarding Problems in Putting Great Effort in Developing Foreign Trade and Increasing Foreign Exchange Revenue.”53 The document altered the export procurement price to encourage export production, strengthened loan programs to promote traditional and new export production, increased local retention of foreign exchange revenue, provided greater preferential tax treatment to export producers, the post-GLF reprocessing program of importing materials to develop exports as well as expanding new regulations for the various export processing zones first established in 1960, the export commodity processing bases. Hua Guofeng originally had approved a limited number of processing and assembly projects, compensation trade, and foreign direct investment in new hotel construction for foreigners. These initiatives were expanded to include cooperative production, equity joint ventures, 100 percent foreignowned ventures, and the acceptance of capital from foreign governments and international organizations.54 Deng Xiaoping had proposed many of these second-order policy changes in 1975, which were blocked by Nativist opposition. However, Chen Yun aptly described the changed atmosphere of the late 1970s: “Because capital is not enough, we can borrow from abroad.”55 The financing crisis of the late 1970s forced the elites to question the wisdom of one of China’s long-term goals: self-sufficiency.
53 “Guanyu dali fazhan duiwai maoyi cengjia waihui shouru ruogan wenti de guiding,” State Council document 79.202, as trans. in Reardon, China’s Coastal Development Strategy, 1979–1984, I, 9–18. 54 For the actual documents, see Reardon, Reluctant Dragon, 194–199. 55 Chen Yun, “Jingji xingshi yu jingyan jiaoxun” [The Economic Situation and Lessons from Experience], in Sanzhong, 601.
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The finance crisis is also one of the primary reasons why the post-GLF elites, on July 15, 1979, approved Central Committee document 79.50, which authorized experimentation with decentralization policies and the SEZs.56 As part of the Third Front strategy, coastal and border regions were part of the “political frontier defense,” where state investment was minimized. By the late 1970s, growth rates were low, infrastructure was falling apart, and unemployment led to massive migrations to Hong Kong. However, Guangdong and Fujian leaders argued that they enjoyed easy access to capital and management and technical know-how from Chinese living in Hong Kong and abroad; these two provinces thus were in a special position to “expand foreign economic trade, reform the economic management structure, and accelerate its economic development.”57 Lacking the financial ability to rebuild the local economies, the postGLF coalition implemented a five-year experiment with decentralization in these two relatively isolated provinces. Document 79.50 gave greater decision-making rights to provincial authorities over provincial economic planning and foreign trade, foreign investment projects, foreign trade revenue, commodity pricing and supplies, and banking and labor sectors. With the strong support of Deng Xiaoping, the document also approved the “trial operation” of first SEZs in Shenzhen and Zhuhai; “after gaining experience, [the Central Committee would] consider establishing them in Shantou and Xiamen.”58 While there had been a series of adaptations to the original 1960 ECPB concepts, the SEZs were a completely new and separate form of export processing zone experiment.59 The ECPBs would continue to be 56 “Guangdong shengwei, Fujian shengwei guanyu duiwai jingji huodong shixing texu zhengce he linghuo cuoshi de liangge baogao” [The Approval and Transmittal of the “Two Reports of the Guangdong and Fujian Provincial Committee Concerning the Implementation of Special Policies and Flexible Measures in Foreign Trade Activities], Central Committee document 79.50, issued by the Central Committee and State Council on July 15, 1979, trans. in Reardon, China’s Coastal Development Strategy, 1979–1984, I, 19–44. 57 Sun Ru, Qianjinzhong de Zhongguo jingji tequ [The Chinese SEZs on the Move] (Beijing: Zhongguo caizheng jingji chubanshe, 1983), 12–13. 58 Central Committee document 79.50, in Reardon, China’s Coastal Development Strategy, 1979–1984, I, 20. 59 State Council document 79.202, in 14, 17–18.
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fully integrated into the state command economic system, guaranteeing a relatively stable source of high quality export goods to finance China’s import needs. Instead of receiving direct financial support from the state, the SEZ experiment would be financed by foreign capital, especially from the Overseas Chinese community. To attract such investments, document 79.50 and subsequent documents allowed various types of investment incentives in the zones, ranging from preferential tax treatment and larger retention of foreign exchange profits to the ability to import a variety of items unavailable in the domestic economy. The outside world was no longer considered an enemy, but a partner in development, a view encapsulated in Deng’s guiding mantra, “opening to the outside world and invigorating the domestic economy” (duiwai kaifang, duinei gaohuo). Review The fourth phase entails the review and adjustment of the experimentation process, or as Chen Yun stated in his December 1981 speech, to “summarize experiences.” The elites have continuously reviewed the implementation of the initial experiments; through this process, they learn which policies work well. They thus convene central and regional meetings and conferences, conduct on-site inspections, discuss policy implementation with the relevant bureaucracies and leaders, etc. When faced with major implementation problems, the elites initiate in-depth policy reviews and order mid-course readjustments. Such mid-course readjustments can be radical, moderate, or minimal and can result in experiment moratoriums or full-scale, nationwide implementation of the experiment. Disagreements over the experimentation can lead to elite coalition fragmentation, the severity of which is dependent on the ability of the preeminent leader’s ability to maintain the coalition. Perceived success of such experiments can result in the promulgation of the success nationwide, as well as giving legitimacy to new long-term goals of the state. To review the Guangdong and Fujian decentralization and the SEZ experiments, the Central Committee and State Council sponsored major conferences in Beijing in March 1980 (Central Committee document 80.41)
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and a second conference in May–June 1981 (Central Committee document 81.27).60 Provincial and SEZ officials reported on the progress of the experiments; the Central Committee subsequently promulgated firstorder change policies to correct problems and expand the experiment parameters. However, first-order policy adjustments could not control experiment implementation problems, such as the “Case of the Shenzhen Branch,” which involved the “temporary” secretary of the Shenzhen Party Committee, Zhou Zhirong. Zhou’s large-scale smuggling operation was officially reported to “the leading comrades of the Central Committee” on January 11, 1982.61 According to the emergency circular of January 11, 1982, the Standing Committee also discussed the serious economic crimes committed by “some cadre and responsible cadre in other provinces, cities, special administrative regions and central government departments”62 the directive specifically mentioned Guangdong, Fujian, Zhejiang, and Yunnan. As a result, Chen Yun successfully argued for a review of the SEZ policy, saying, “We must summarize the experiences of the SEZs in Guangdong and Fujian and the foreign economic activities of every province. Currently we haven’t summarized them well.”63 After 1981, the cohesiveness of the post-GLF elite coalition deteriorated, resulting in the formation of two elite opinion groups: the Radical and Moderate Internationalist coalitions, with Deng Xiaoping as the paramount
60
“Guangdong, Fujian liangsheng huiyi jiyao de pishi” [Comment on the “Summary of the Conference on Guangdong and Fujian Provinces”], Central Committee document 80.41, issued on May 16, 1980; “‘Guangdong, Fujian liangsheng he jingji tequ gongzuo huiyi jiyao’ de tongzhi” [Circular Promulgating the “Summary of the Guangdong, Fujian and SEZ Work Conference”], Central Committee document 81.27, issued by the Central Committee and the State Council on July 19, 1981, trans. in Reardon, China’s Coastal Development Strategy, 1979–1984, I, 45–58; 59–79. 61 For a translation of the emergency circular, see Reardon, China’s Coastal Development Strategy, 1979–1984, II, 21–23. 62 Si Fu, ed., Guoneiwai dashiji, 1981 [The Major Foreign and Domestic Events of 1981] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1982), 21. 63 Chen Yun, “Dui jingji gongzuo de jidian yijian,” in Sanzhong quanhui yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian [Selected Important Documents Issued Since the Third Plenum] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1982), 1059.
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leader. Between 1982 and 1983, the Moderate Internationalists prevented the expansion of the decentralization and SEZ experiment to the national economy, which they believed would lead to chaos. Yet, the Radical Internationalists proposed an alternate vision. They argued for a greater role of the marketplace and the expansion of the outward-oriented development experiment, which resulted in the establishment of the 14 open coastal cities, the economic and technical development zones, and the coastal development zones.64 The Central Committee had thus recognized that FDI was the primary financial tool used to fuel coastal development. According to Central Committee document 84.13 that approved the 14 open cities, “limited access to internal markets can be allowed in exchange for needed advanced technology…. We assuredly must protect our industry and promote continuous development. However, we can’t call for protection of those products that have backward technology and poor quality. This would defeat the purpose of development.”65 This is truly an amazing if not pathbreaking passage. The Central Committee recognized that the inward-oriented development path of the previous 30 years was moribund, and had resulted in products of “backward technology and poor quality.” Instead, Central Committee document 84.13 argued for an outward-oriented development strategy — not to open up all of China to the vicissitudes of the international marketplace, but to allow foreign investors and foreign products access to the domestic marketplace. Of course, such access was to be monitored and controlled; the Central Committee entrusted the State Economic Commission, the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (MOFERT), and the State Planning Commission to formulate new rules and regulations to control foreign penetration. But this passage and this document is the key that opened China to the outside economy — and eventually would result in China’s partial integration with the world economy. 64
For the opening of the 14 coastal cities, see “Yanhai bufen chengshi zuotanhui jiyao” [Summary of the Conference of Some Coastal Municipalities], Central Committee document 84.13, issued on May 4, 1984, trans. in Reardon, China’s Coastal Development Strategy, 1979–1984, II, 49–66. 65 Central Committee document 84.13, 64–65.
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Paradigm Consensus Unlike in the late 1950s under Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping avoided a major split between the market-oriented and plan-oriented Internationalists, thus facilitating the completion of the fifth and final phase of the complex learning process. Based on the perceived success of the SEZs and the nascent coastal development strategy, the elites reached a consensus over a new long-term goal of the state: a state-managed embrace of the international economy and rejection of the former goal of self-reliance. The concept of self-reliance and Zhou Enlai’s Four Modernizations thus became obsolete as elites were no longer tethered to the Nativist beliefs of Mao Zedong and had incrementally learned the limitations of an inward-oriented development regime. They agreed that China should join the rest of the East Asian economies in adopting an outward-oriented development strategy; instead of rejecting the international marketplace, they regarded foreign capital, technology, and markets as tools to empower China. While ensuing strategy debates caused delays and readjustments in policy, the elites formally accepted an outward-oriented development regime by 1987.66 They thus began the process of GATT admittance67 and established the fifth SEZ on Hainan Island. Henceforth, a new generation of technocratic elites would take over the country’s leadership to institute the new technocratic regime. Conclusion By the late 1970s, the post-GLF coalition had accumulated three decades of experience with ISI development in their pursuit of the state’s revolutionary
66
“Guanyu yanhai diqu fazhan waixiangxing jingji de ruogan buchong guiding” [Several Supplementary Regulations Regarding the Development of an Outwardly Oriented Economy in the Coastal Areas], State Council document 88.22, issued on March 23, 1988, in Yanhai chengshi kaifang he tequ gongzuo wenjian xuanbian [A Selection of Public Documents Relating to the Opening of the Coastal Cities and the Special Economic Zones] (Beijing: Guowuyuan tequ bangongshi, Guowyuan bangongting mishuju, 1986), 11–14. 67 Scott Harold, “Freeing Trade: Negotiating Domestic and International Obstacles on China’s Long Road to the GATT/WTO, 1971–2001,” PhD diss, Columbia University, 2008, 133–136.
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development paradigm: security, prosperity, and the Party’s comprehensive control of the economy by achieving self-reliance. When in power, they incrementally adapted the ISI strategy to diversify overseas technology sources, strengthened administrative tools to ensure export product procurement, and implemented innovative remunerative incentives to motivate producers to supply high quality goods suitable for the international marketplace. However, the post-GLF coalition failed to overcome anomalies within the revolutionary development paradigm. While import substitution development had enabled China to build a solid infrastructure base, the elites learned that comprehensive Party control of the economy could not continue to make China secure and prosperous. Based on this longitudinal learning, the elites began a top-down process of controlled experimentation with a new outward-orientation of the Chinese economy, starting with the establishment of the special economic zones in the late 1970s. Not surprisingly, elites encountered implementation problems involving central and local Party officials, bureaucrats, and entrepreneurs that either enhanced or sidetracked the various experiments, which forced elites to adapt the experiments. Despite implementation problems, the elites concluded that these experiments had been successful by the late 1980s. The international marketplace was no longer the enemy, but a potential partner of development. By adopting an outward-oriented development strategy, the post-GLF coalition demonstrated that they could engage in complex thinking and alter their long-term goals for the state by reducing the role of the Party and allowing the marketplace to take the most prominent role. The revolutionary development paradigm was thus superseded by the technocratic development paradigm, which replaced the goal of achieving a comprehensive Party control of the economy with economic globalization. The current generation of Chinese elites have chosen to adapt the technocratic development paradigm and its export-oriented strategies to emphasize domestic consumption, thus balancing the previous emphasis on export growth. This perhaps will assuage the wrath of foreign protectionists and economists such as Paul Krugman, who describe China’s development strategies as mercantilist.
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The question remains whether China’s technocratic elites are willing to undergo complex learning in non-economic sectors. Since the 1980s, China’s elites have engaged in simple learning by adapting its one-party authoritarian political paradigm to allow greater freedom to entrepreneurs, scholars, artists, and individuals. Over a period of time, such adaptations can instigate a crisis of legitimacy and a bottom-up movement for change, which occurred in Taiwan and South Korea. On the other hand, Chinese elites have already demonstrated their willingness to initiate complex thinking and paradigm change; Party leaders Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang eventually advocated the adoption of parliamentary democracy. As China’s technocratic elites accrue greater longitudinal learning and are faced with growing paradigm anomalies, they might realize that a political paradigm change is necessary to maintain China’s security and prosperity. References Argyris, Chris and Donald Schon. Organizational Learning: A Theory of Action Perspective. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1980. Blyth, Mark M. Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the Twentieth Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Brooks, Sarah M. and Marcus J. Kurtz. “Capital, Trade, and the Political Economies of Reform,” American Journal of Political Science 51 (October 2007): 703–720. Dangdai Zhongguo De Jingji Guanli Bianjibu. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo jingji guanli dashiji [A Chronology of the PRC’s Commerce]. Beijing: Zhongguo shangye chubanshe, 1990. Deng Xiaoping. Deng Xiaoping wenxuan 1975–1982 [Collected Works of Deng Xiaoping, 1975–1982]. Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1983. Deutsch, Karl. The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control. London: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963. Haggard, Stephan and Robert Kaufman, eds. The Politics of Economic Adjustment: International Constraints, Distributive Conflicts, and the State. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992. Hall, Peter A. “Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State,” Comparative Politics 25 (April 1993): 281–283.
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Harold, Scott. “Freeing Trade: Negotiating Domestic and International Obstacles on China’s Long Road to the GATT/WTO, 1971–2001.” Unpublished PhD dissertation, Columbia University, 2008. Heilmann, Sebastian. “From Local Experiments to National Policy: The Origins of China’s Distinctive Policy Process,” The China Journal 59 (January 2008): 1–30. ———. “Policy Experimentation in China’s Economic Rise,” Studies in Comparative International Development 43, 1 (Spring 2008): 1–26. Johnston, Alastair Iain. “Learning Versus Adaptation: Explaining Change in Chinese Arms Control Policy in the 1980s and the 1990s,” The China Journal 35 (January 1996): 27–61. Levy, J. S. “Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield,” International Organization 48 (1994): 279–312. Li Cheng and Lynn White. “Elite Transformation and Modern Change in Mainland China and Taiwan: Empirical Data and the Theory of Technocracy,” The China Quarterly 121 (March, 1990): 1–35. Lieberthal, Kenneth. “The Great Leap Forward and the Split in the Yan’an Leadership,” in Roderick MacFarquhar and John Fairbank, eds., The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 14 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). Lowenthal, Richard. “Development vs. Utopia in Communist Policy,” in Chalmers Johnson, ed., Change in Communist Systems. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1970. Kuhn, Thomas S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 3rd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962. Mishler, William and Richard Rose. “Generation, Age, and Time: The Dynamics of Political Learning during Russia’s Transformation,” American Journal of Political Science 51, 4 (October 2007): 822–834. ———. “What are the Origins of Political Trust? Testing Institutional and Cultural Theories in Post-Communist Societies,” Comparative Political Studies 34, 1 (2001): 30–62. Moltz, James Clay. “Divergent Learning and the Failed Politics of Soviet Economic Reform,” World Politics 45, 2 (January 1993): 301–325. Nye, Joseph. “Nuclear Learning and US-Soviet Security Regimes,” International Organization 41, 3 (Summer 1987): 371–402. Oi, Jean. “Fiscal Reform and the Economic Foundations of Local State Corporatism in China,” World Politics 45, 1 (October 1992): 99–132.
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Qing Simei. “The Eisenhower Administration and Changes in Western Embargo Policy against China, 1954–1958,” in Warren I. Cohen and Akira Iriye, eds., The Great Powers in East Asia 1953–1960. New York: Columbia University Press, 1990. Reardon, Lawrence C., trans. and ed. “China’s Coastal Development Strategy, 1979–1984, I” China Law and Government 27 (May/June, 1994). ———, trans. and ed. “China’s Coastal Development Strategy, 1979–1984, II” in China Law and Government 27 (July/August, 1994). ———. “Learning How to Open the Door: A Reassessment of China’s ‘Opening’ Strategy,” The China Quarterly 155 (September 1998): 479–511; ———. Reluctant Dragon: Crisis Cycles and Chinese Foreign Economic Policy. Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2002. Snidal, Duncan. “Rational Choice and International Relations,” in Handbook of International Relations, ed. by Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse-Kappen, Beth A. Simmons. London: Sage, 2001. Sun Ru. Qianjinzhong de Zhongguo jingji tequ [The Chinese SEZs on the Move]. Beijing: Zhongguo caizheng jingji chubanshe, 1983. Zhao Ziyang. Prisoner of the State. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009. Zweig, David. “Opposition to Change in Rural China: The System of Responsibility and People’s Communes,” Asian Survey, 23, 7 (July, 1983): 879–900.
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Chapter Four
Political Accountability in Governance: An Informative Appraisal of China’s Political Change Yuchao Zhu
Making Sense of China’s Political Change China’s political development continues to intrigue people. While it has shown no sign of democratization despite high expectations, the Chinese regime has demonstrated an incredible ability to survive since 1989. China has not only become an economic powerhouse, it presents an alternative development model which challenges the conventional wisdom of Western modernization. In particular, while the CCP continues to have a monopoly on political power, it has enacted innovative reform policies to promote economic growth and political adaptation, and in so doing it has attained significant domestic support. Sixty years after the founding of the PRC, China watchers, viewing a complex picture and a mixed balance sheet, cannot come to an agreement on China’s current state of affairs and political future. The key question is how to understand China’s political change, from what perspective, and based on what criteria. Since the 1990s many observers have used democratization as a criterion to assess China’s political change. For example, Bruce Gilley (2004) expects a breakthrough in China’s democratic prospects. Zheng Yongnian (2004) and Suisheng Zhao (2000) emphasize the cultural factors and social impediments to democratization in 99
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China but they remain hopeful that democratization will eventually take place. Likewise, John Thornton (2008) reminds us that China’s prospects for democracy are still bright, though it may not happen smoothly. Others are not so optimistic. Edward Friedman and Barrett McCormick (2000) are concerned about the lack of prospect for democracy in China and its negative implications for international security. Minxin Pei (2008) describes China’s current regime as being in a “trapped transition,” with a lot of acute crises, but its “soft authoritarianism” seems survivable, at least on its own terms. James Mann (2007) believes that China is heading in a direction where Chinese capitalism continues “to evolve and expand but the government fails to liberalize.” Andrew Nathan (2003) calls the current Chinese regime “resilient authoritarianism,” and Bruce Dickson (2005) highlights the “populist” aspect of Chinas authoritarianism. According to Kellee Tsai (2007), China proves to be an extraordinary case of “capitalism without democracy.” Daniel Bell (2008) claims that China’s political change can be defined as “new Confucianism.” David Shambaugh (2008) finds that the CCP has to face both atrophy and adaptation problems simultaneously, and so far it has responded to the challenges with some significant adjustment. Most China observers in the West have remained skeptical about the prospects for China’s democratization. While all these studies provide informative analyzes and critiques of China’s reform, there are deficiencies. For example, if people apply general principles such as democracy too rigidly, the analyzes may rely too much on the “qualitative bar” and fail to grasp China’s incremental changes. Finding no real progress in democratization, people are likely to overlook China’s gradual change. So we need a different perspective to examine China’s political change. There are already various qualitative and quantitative measures available to evaluate a country’s political development and social change. For example, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) has Human Governance Indicators (HGI); the World Bank uses Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI);1 and the OECD focuses on Measuring 1
The WGI is widely used and consists of seven specific indicators: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability, Absence of Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. See http://info.worldbank.org/governance/ wgi/index.asp (accessed August 2009).
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Human Rights and Democratic Governance. Each indicator project presents a specified viewpoint to measure a country’s state of affairs in terms of political legitimacy, good governance, human rights, political accountability, and other aspects of development. These indicators help set an important benchmark to evaluate a country’s progress and deficiencies. But there are also potential problems: the criteria may be too broad and the selection criteria may be heavily influenced by dominant Western discourses, and the interpretations of the information may not take into account sufficiently social specifics and cultural sensitivities. Thus, in the study of China’s political change, we might be better off focusing on more specific indicators. In doing so, we should be able to analyze the controlled variables on the topic more effectively. This chapter intends to utilize two key concepts: governance and political accountability. These concepts are not particularly original as many have already analyzed and applied them in their studies. A general definition of governance “consists of the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This also includes the process by which governments are selected, monitored, and replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them.”2
It is worth noting that the Chinese view regarding “governance” is similar to the conceptualizations mentioned above.3 For example, Yu 2 UNDP also defines governance as “the system of values, policies and institutions by which a society manages its economic, political and social affairs through interactions within and among the state, civil society and private sector… It comprises the mechanisms and processes for citizens and groups to articulate their interests, mediate their differences and exercise their legal rights and obligations. It is the rules, institutions and practices that set limits and provide incentives for individuals, organizations and firms.” — UNDP Strategy Note on Governance for Human Development, 2000, UNDP: Governance Indicators: A Users’ Guide. 3 In this chapter, when I say “China’s view” it refers to an officially accepted position, but it does not mean that everyone in government agrees with it. The opinions in China are quite diverse.
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Keping states that “[t]he basic meaning of governance refers to a governing authority’s efforts to maintain order and to enhance public welfare.”4 While Yu emphasizes authority and power in his definition of governance, he also acknowledges that “governance requires cooperation between state and civil society, between government and extra-governmental bodies, public and private institutions and between compulsory and voluntary service.” As a leading proponent for political reform in China, Yu especially appreciates the concept of “good governance” and stresses that China’s assessment of good governance must reflect “common universal values.”5 He identifies the term with some key components of the CCP’s main policy themes, such as a scientific view of development (balanced and sustainable development), a small, well-off and harmonious society, a responsible government, and political civilization construction. In Yu’s research report, which is supported by the UNDP, he describes the central criteria of good governance as follows: “[t]he essence of good governance is the management of public life through cooperation between government and citizens, a new relationship between political power and civil society and the best possible relationship between the two. Key elements include 1) legitimacy; 2) transparency; 3) accountability; 4) the rule of law; 5) responsiveness; 6) effectiveness; 7) uprightness; 8) civic engagement/participation; 9) social justice; and 10) stability.”6
The idea is to make better governance a main principle in directing and to evaluating government performance in China, especially after the publication in 1992 of the World Bank Report on Good Governance.
4
Yu Keping, Globalization and Changes in China’s Governance (Boston: Brill, 2008), 138. Yu Keping, “Zhongguo zhili pinggu kuangjia ye ying fanying renlei gongtong de jiazhi,” [China’s Assessment Framework for Governance Should Reflect Humanity’s Universal Values], 2009. http://news.xinhuanet.com/local/2009-04/02/content_11117379.htm (accessed August 2009). 6 Yu, 130; also see Yu Keping, “Zhongguo zhili kuangjia” [Framework of Governance Assessment in China] http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/8198/44004/44005/8525929.html (accessed August 2009). 5
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Since then, standardized evaluation frameworks of “good governance” have been widely used by various levels of government and research institutes in their activities. This chapter argues that governance is not only a synthesis of government rules, regulations, strategies, and policies, but also represents the outcome of the interaction and cooperation between the state and society, thus reflecting the overall nature and quality of the state and the state–society relationship. Though the CCP is not an ordinary governing party but a dominant political force in an authoritarian system, the central job of the regime is still best accomplished by delivering policy outcomes as “public goods.” Thus, concrete policy achievement is what governance is all about. Among other things, in a market economy, there are “hard targets” for governments to attain, e.g., GDP growth rate. In other words, like it or not, the CCP regime has to face this reality: without some concrete accomplishments, especially in economic development, it cannot claim “good governance.” For a government which does not need to face periodic tests of elections, the Chinese regime has to meet other challenges. Competence in governance is a new challenge the regime has to confront. Thus, in order to gain a better understanding of China’s political change, the governance situation must be analyzed. Since 2004 the CCP has set “good governance” as the central political aim of governing. The Chinese regime has begun to acknowledge that as the time for revolution and national reconstruction has long passed, the CCP’s main job now is to promote economic growth, strengthen national power, and serve the needs of the people and society. The government today is not a revolutionary government but a service-oriented one that requires a very fundamental alteration in its way of governing. In 2004 the CCP Central Committee passed an important resolution to make “strengthening governance ability” the core task of the party and of the country. Since then, a whole package of “good governance” policies has been introduced by the central government. In 2006 the government announced the Five Principles of Cadres’ Management, the five new regulations on government officials’ tenure limitations, transfers, avoidance of conflicts of interest, and performance review requirements. In 2009 a specific political responsibility regulation was declared, which imposes punitive measures on government officials who make policy blunders.
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Other mechanisms in political and legal avenues also exist for citizens to check on the government, e.g., xinfang (Letters and Visits) became a popular way for people to appeal to all levels of government to protest wrongdoings.7 The xinfang situation in a region becomes a key criterion in evaluating the performance of local officials. Also, more social monitoring mechanisms are in place, in particular, various news media are blossoming, and a diversified press has begun to inform the public more thoroughly. Some non-conventional media, especially, such as web-based news through the Internet, have begun to play a critical role as monitoring agents. All of these have led to more government exposure and imposed more constraints, which have further intensified the interactions between the state and society and thus strengthened government transparency and accountability in general. However, the Chinese regime, often through its law-enforcement agencies, continues to use coercive measures to crack down on dissidents and to implement draconian policies in social control. As some scholars put it, “[t]he Chinese government today has grown fingers, but it is not ready to abandon its strong thumbs.”8 Nonetheless, the overall governance situation, which can reveal the state’s political nature and quality, remains a mix of more transparency and accountability, but with favoritism, corporatism and coercion.9 If one examines China’s governance practice carefully, one also finds that the ideological influence is minimal and the concrete, practical result is the ultimate goal. The old ideological doctrine largely exists only in rhetoric. The governance target is often quantified by authorities in terms of the GDP goal, poverty reduction target, employment target, or taxation target. The positive result of imposing these concrete goals is that quantitative measurements
7 For an overview of xinfang, see Laura M. Luehrmann, 2003. It is worth mentioning that by definition, xinfang has two major forms: writing petition letters and paying direct visits to the government office to make petitions. The former are the majority of xinfang cases. This is why the overall number of cases could be more than ten million a year nationwide. But the latter form is more direct and attracts public attention. 8 Barry Naughton and Dali Yang, eds., Holding China Together: Diversity and National Integration in the Post-Deng Era (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 22. 9 Bruce Dickson, 2007. “Pressures for Political Change and Sources of Regime Continuity in China,” 19.
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are more available to the public and so makes government performance more transparent. The negative result is that the government could continue to manipulate its overwhelming control of social, political, and economic resources to strengthen the power it deems important for attaining those goals. Normally, by reforming its governing capacity and practice, the government will lose power and be more readily checked by society. In China, the government’s power may be strengthened instead. This can be seen as a partial result of a new “double movement” in the clash between “political dynamics” and “market dynamics.”10 In order to examine governance in China accurately, a variable of “political accountability” will be our central analytical perspective. Political accountability defines the extent to which government officials can practically deviate from their responsibilities and reflects the competence of the government in response to public expectations and societal demands. Strengthening political accountability can improve governance, enhance public scrutiny, and reduce system malfunction and corruption. In the Chinese context, the government accountability situation can fully reveal the quality of governance, good or bad. In the past, the government had very little political accountability vis-à-vis the public and society. But since China’s reforms started in the early 1980s, especially since the late 1990s, some new reform policies have been made to establish and enhance the government’s accountability. A comprehensive understanding of important governance factors, such as accountability in China’s political and legal institutions, administrative rules and procedures, political norms and practices, as well as monitoring mechanisms, will help us to make a better assessment of the problems and prospects in China’s political development. Theorists and analysts of Chinese politics seem to agree that China is now demonstrating the distinctive characteristics of a “hybrid regime,” a successful capitalist market economy but with limited liberalization and democratization.11 China’s experience of remarkable economic growth with no significant political democratization so far is very 10
Ibid., 23. David Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008).
11
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puzzling. As Andrew Nathan points out, “the regime has retained its grip on power, responded agilely to policy challenges, and continues to command a high level of public support, all without democratization.”12 To answer convincingly the complex question of how and why this occurred is a daunting job. Measuring Political Accountability in Governance More openness, more transparency, and more constraints on government are evident as we carefully examine China’s political change in recent years. By looking at these changes, we can have a better view of the condition as well as the outcome of the CCP’s adaptation and adjustment policies. But one big question is why the Chinese regime desires to strengthen its governing ability and political accountability. In other words, if, as many have assumed, the CCP regime has pursued some reforms so as to maintain the monopoly on power, what is the rationale behind the regime becoming more accountable and further constraining its own power? There are at least three imperatives behind the regime’s decision to promote the idea and policy of strengthening accountability. First, the institutional imperative: The post-Mao Chinese government realized the growing importance of various institutions for rule making and administration and understood that the old practices of arbitrary, unpredictable, and highly secretive policymaking carried with it enormous costs and thus it was desirable to have more predictable and procedural politics. Increasing political accountability might be an effective antidote to the regime’s institution-building deficiency problem. Second, the economic imperative: The rule of law and a regulatory regime are essential to bringing basic efficiency into the Chinese economy. An economy based on competitive or quasi-competitive production requires an established legal system such as commercial law, contract law, and labor relations law to operate. That is also a demand of international investors and those who participate in
12
Andrew Nathan, “China’s Political Trajectory: What Are the Chinese Saying?” in Cheng Li, ed. (2008), 25.
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China’s economic activities in terms of fair rules and procedures, transparent process, and law-binding behaviors. Accountability is a key pre-condition for a successful market economy. Third, the social imperative: The development of civil society and increasing awareness of citizens’ rights instigates popular demands in Chinese society for a people’s voice and responsibility from the state. The government simply cannot ignore the public demand for fairness, transparency, and accountability. As the CCP acknowledges, a service-oriented government requires a socially accepted interactive relationship between the state and society based on mutual understanding, requires some clearly defined responsibilities for the state and society, and requires the basic elements of accountability for all the actors and agents. The circumstances the Chinese regime has to cope with include continued economic reform, the move toward a market economy, increasing integration with the world economy, rapidly rising living standards, higher education levels, and greater access to information. All of these have had a remarkable impact on the environment in which the CCP has to operate. Given this new environment, if the CCP wants to survive, it has to reform itself and adopt new policies. We have to note that the CCP has a selfjustifying logic for its power: It regards its governing mandate as having been obtained through its victory in the revolution. It always portrays itself as the best representative of the nation’s and the people’s interests. However, this logic may be problematic. In order to maintain its legitimacy, the CCP must obtain new mandates from “new revolutions;” it must enact new policies to promote economic growth, to preserve national unity, to strengthen the state’s power and to harmonize the society. As Shambaugh explains, “[e]ven oneparty states need to periodically re-legitimize themselves by addressing the needs of different constituencies within the nation.”13 The CCP has painfully realized its governing deficiencies and is determined to correct them in order to stay in power. An important decision has been made: To strengthen its governing ability and effectiveness in order to protect its governing position. This “performance-produced legitimacy” is the critical rationale behind the regime adapting to the new reality. In other words, what the CCP intends to
13
Shambaugh, 3.
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do is not to build a democracy to resolve the fundamental question of legitimacy, i.e., “who rules and whether or not it is justifiable,” but to promote better governance in order to “rule better,” which is to resolve the administrative issue of government effectiveness and efficiency. No matter whether the CCP sees its power as a means or an end, the regime is certainly becoming more pragmatic and flexible. Jiang Zemin’s “Three Representatives” and Hu Jintao’s “Harmonious Society” and “Peaceful Development” are good examples of how they can create new doctrines that may be contradictory to the CCP’s ideological orientation but are beneficial for maintaining its power under the new conditions. In fact, since the late 1970s the CCP has gradually changed from an ideological party to a pragmatic party, from a revolutionary party to a management party. As this becomes normative thinking even among many CCP leaders, radical adaptation and dramatic adjustment in its policies can be expected. Thus, the central question is not whether strengthening political accountability is for the purpose of maintaining CCP power or some legitimate reason; the key point is that the CCP is not static and passive, but actively pursues new directions. The practical result of its policy adaptation and adjustment, therefore, is more important than the party’s original intention. The dynamics of change might be more powerful than the original designer’s expectations. A consensus among the Chinese leadership seems to have formed: The party should pursue international economic integration, a market economy, sound policies, accountable institutions, and public goods. The CCP is not a monolithic and ideologically rigid regime. It can be seen as a modern institution which is internally differentiated, equipped with established rules, regulations, procedures, and decision-making. The first thing a regime is concerned about might be survival but the principal goal for an institution is to function properly. Thus, institutions can respond to changes in its operating environment and make necessary adjustments. To define the CCP as an institution would better accommodate its adjustments and adaptations. In fact, since 1995 the CCP has begun to implement a series of internal discipline and monitoring policies to institutionalize its elite management. Among other things, some very strict regulations are made on the one hand to “reinforce the party’s dominance over transfers, resignations, and demotions,” and on the other to “curb arbitrary personal
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decisions.”14 The new regulations certainly have redesigned the normal process of elite management and imposed more accountability. Some China analysts state that the current CCP is already a real representative of a broader category of political, social, and economic elites in China, and no longer the pioneer of working class.15 Among top CCP leaders, there are divergent views, ranging from how to deal with issues of principle to how to resolve pragmatic problems. The CCP has produced some very liberal-minded leaders like Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang as well as some conservative diehards. The CCP is just as diversified as the Chinese society. Generational change in its leadership has made it very different from what it was in the past, either as a political organization or as an established institution. Second, as the CCP regime is a mirror of society with diverse interests, social aggregation and articulation certainly will also be reflected in its policies. This is probably why we see major decisions on new welfare programs by the Wen Jiabao government, such as the elimination of all agricultural taxes, the preliminary health insurance and pension program for peasants, or the gradual phasing out of the discriminatory hukou ( ) system, etc. The Chinese regime has decided to do something innovative to strengthen its accountability and provide public goods. One needs to focus on various accountability mechanisms implemented to find out the significant implications of such policies for the state–society relationship and for China’s political future. These accountability mechanisms are a result of dynamic policy. Three Main Political Accountability Mechanisms In order to examine the purposes, functions, and effects of political accountability in China’s governance, this chapter focuses on three mechanisms: administrative reviews, interactive political and legal practice, and media scrutiny. In terms of administrative reviews, the recent implementation of a series of review mechanisms, such as open inquiry on policy issues, 14 Bo Zhiyue, “The Institutionalization of Elite Management in China,” in Barry J. Naughton and Dali Yang, eds. (2004), 93–99. 15 Walder, 15–32.
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annual performance review (individual officials or collective units), internal survey, responsibility rules like the chief administrator’s removal or dismissal for major policy blunders, and other pertinent regulations, has dramatically increased the political responsibility of officials at various levels.16 Now, administrative reviews have become an indispensable part of the bureaucratic process. In general, administrative reviews may include different forms, such as performance review, (specific) policy inquiry, and budget-related inquiry. Other periodical and specific review mechanisms are also available; together, they constitute a new requirement for the government to fulfill its duty. For example, in most provincial, municipal, and county level governments, annual administrative reviews have become a critical checking and rectifying mechanism. When they were originally initiated in the early 1990s, the reviews seemed to be largely for information gathering. Gradually, management mechanisms become more and more like devices for public scrutiny and evaluation. Also, the review mechanism is the main instrument of the CCP’s cadre responsibility system.17 Both internal and external reviews are used to evaluate cadres’ performances. In terms of internal review, for example, cadres at higher levels and lower levels are annually reviewed by each other, though in different ways.18 In terms of external review, if the chief administrative officer does not have a very positive review during the annual local People’s Congress session, then it will be almost impossible for upper-level governments to reward this official, such as with a promotion; often, the concerned person has to be transferred to a different post at the same or a lower administrative rank. In recent years, some local governments have decided to open their annual budget sessions to the public or conduct open spending-related hearings.19 In
16 In terms of the regulation regarding government employees’ work performance and promotion, see Wu Jiannan and Ma Liang, 2009. 17 Maria Heimer, “The cadre responsibility system and the changing needs of the party,” in Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard and Zheng Yongnian, eds. (2004), 120–138. 18 Ibid., 123. 19 See Jiang Xun, “Yusuan gaige ye shi zhengzhi gaige: Zhongguo zheng bulu shengse tuijin zhenggai?” [Budget Reform is Political Reform: China Quietly Pushes for Political Reform?], AsianWeek (April 2, 2009).
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general, public hearing as a means of soliciting ideas and opinions from the public has become very crucial; combined with other administrative review mechanisms, it greatly increases public input in the process of government decision-making. Even though sometimes public inquiries can be superficial and function only as a procedure, the very existence and popularity of this open platform is a great indication of increasing government openness and public scrutiny. There are also more central government review mechanisms in place. For example, according to the National Auditing Law (2006), auditing agencies were established nationwide. The central government’s chief auditor often became a very high-profile public figure because of his open criticism of mismanagement or corruption cases in various central ministries. His Annual Auditing Report to the NPC is an important document to reveal mismanagement and wrongdoing at the very top administrative level. From the government’s perspective, publicizing auditing reports strengthens its image and greatly helps its governing practice to be transparent.20 Another new practice is ombudsman investigations. The ombudsman missions, mandated by the central government, are often launched to investigate fishy local projects or some powerful public institutes’ financial books. The second major accountability mechanism we will discuss is a political and legal practice citizens carry out to check the government — xinfang. More precisely, rather than presenting their cases through the formal judicial process, xinfang petitioners usually write letters or go directly to visit a higher political or legal authority to plead their cases. Xinfang is a very Chinese-style political-legal measure for citizens seeking justice against the government’s violation of their rights and interests, and is an institution “explicitly designed to mediate citizen-based complaints against governmental officials.”21 Technically, it is more of a supplementary remedy
20
“Shenji gonggao yu zhizheng nengli jianshe” [Auditing Reports and Construction of Government’s Governing Ability], http://www.zfwlxt.com/html/2009-2/20092201444421.htm (accessed August 2009). 21 Laura Luehrmann, “Facing Citizen Complaints in China, 1951–1996,” Asian Survey 43, 5 (2003), 846.
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mechanism for social justice.22 Almost at all levels of government, there is a xinfang department. For the government, this measure serves an important function in that it is a useful remedy for social justice as well as a mechanism to check and correct the wrongdoings of local governments. In PRC history, there have been three “high tides” of xinfang activity, all related to policy remedies after serious political, economic, and social crises.23 The popularity of xinfang during these times demonstrates its valuable function of repairing the badly damaged state-society relationship. In more recent years, China’s state–society relationship again deteriorated and the dramatic increase in xinfang cases nationwide clearly demonstrates this. For example, in 2004 there were more than four million cases geared toward different levels of government all over China.24 The radical increase points to serious problems of social stratification, corruption, inequality, and injustice in Chinese society. For many citizens, xinfang is the most familiar and available avenue to protect their rights and interests against the abusive actions of government. The government takes xinfang more seriously and enhances xinfang practices now. Because various levels of government faced pressure from the dramatic increase in number of petitions, in early 2005, the State Council decreed new guidelines on how to manage xinfang activities.25 But one 22
It should be noted that xinfang activities also occur in the judicial system. E.g., China’s Supreme Court has a major xinfang reception center and its responses to petitions in the form of “judicial opinions” do have judicial status. The scope of xinfang in the court system includes disputes over judicial decisions, court rulings, and mediation; accusations of misconduct on the part of the judiciary; and seeking legal consultation on political and legal affairs, etc. But, overall, xinfang is viewed largely as an administrative measure. See Zuo Weimin and He Yongjun, 2005. 23 For example, the periods immediately after the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution saw large numbers of xinfang petitions; see Xu Zhiyong et al., 2005. 24 Hao Jing, “Xinfang zhidu buying qianghua qi sifa jiuji gongneng” [We Should Not Strengthen Xinfang’s Judicial Remedy Function], Guangdong Administrative College Journal 6 (2005), 41–44. 25 The new policy guidelines to enforce more accountable results from petitions include: a 30-day timeframe for answering petitions, and in particular, forbidding sending a petitioner’s case to the same government department/office which is being accused. See Decree of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China (No. 431), “Regulations on Letters and Visits,” adopted at the 76th Executive Meeting of the State Council on January 5, 2005 and effective as of May 1, 2005.
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notable part of these new measures is the explicit control mechanism which seems to strengthen management power, rather than allowing more social input. One consequence is that various levels of local government have sent their law-enforcement agents to Beijing or provincial capitals to prevent petitioners from visiting higher-level xinfang offices. This is called “blocking visits” ( jiefang).26 Nonetheless, xinfang as an administrative measure continues to be integrated into China’s normal political process.27 For example, at every level of government, annual assessments of xinfang results have become a critical part of the administrative reviews. If xinfang case numbers are particularly high and the results are unsatisfactory in a locale, the government responsible will have a negative review which in turn will badly influence their tangible and intangible benefits.28 On July 25, 2008, the government announced new Guidelines for Disciplinary Action which lay out punitive measures against officials who violate relevant policies in their xinfang practice. The intention is to make xinfang more accountable and press local officials to manage it more carefully. This has led to a new attitude in xinfang practice, especially in 2008: Local governments tended to have more open venues to solicit petitions, which was also called the “big reception of xinfang” (da jie fang). In late 2009, the central government sent its xinfang reception teams to conduct direct hearings in cases in five xinfangconcentrated provinces.29 How does xinfang influence the state–society relationship and serve the people? What does this mechanism do for political accountability? First, xinfang is a lawful avenue for citizens to appeal their cases to the government. The government has to respond to their petitions. Second, xinfang remains largely in the administrative domain which allows for
26
Guo Yukuan, Beifen de chaosheng zhilu (Sad and Angry Road of Appeal — Investigation of Xinfang Petitioners and Thoughts about the Institutional-Cultural Roots of Xinfang) (2006), http://www.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/wk_wzdetails.asp?id=4442 (accessed May 2009). 27 Zhao Xiaoli, “Xinfang de zhidu luoji” (Xinfang’s Institutional Logic), Twenty-First Century 41 (2005). 28 Xu Zhiyonge et al., “Xianzheng shiye zhong de xinfang zhili” (Xinfang Management from the Perspective of Constitutionalism), Yangguan Xianzheng (2005), http:// www.tecn.cn/data/detail.php?id=7453 (accessed August 2008). 29 http://news.backchina.com/2009/9/8/gb2312_55843.html (accessed September 2009).
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more direct government intervention. Thus, xinfang directly helps to strengthen administrative accountability. While xinfang is not a new mechanism, the dramatic increase in xinfang cases and some high-profile ones which garnered national attention have had a significant impact on government policies. For example, Sun Zhigang’s death in 2003, though not purely a xinfang case because the victim died in a confined institute which also deals with xinfang petitioners, attracted national attention including the central government’s.30 The prompt abolishment of the abusive Custody and Repatriation Law by the government was not only a popular decision which won support from the whole country; more importantly, it removed a critical barrier to xinfang petitioners. So xinfang is institutionalized in the sense that it has become an integral part of the political and legal process. Though there are people who propose abolishing xinfang and replacing it with a judicial checking mechanism, xinfang remains a popular choice as it is consistent with traditional social norms. Before the establishment of an independent judiciary, xinfang will continue to function as a mechanism to check the government. However, unlike the former mechanism, xinfang is more of a society-oriented measure and mainly utilized by citizens. Thus, this reflects the development of an intensive, interactive, and dynamic relationship between the state and society in general. The third major mechanism we will discuss is media scrutiny. The background to the rising role of the media is the marketization of the media industry and the government’s recognition that it can no longer maintain a total monopoly on information in an information age. In the 1990s, the government began to have regular news conferences and every central
30 Sun Zhigang, a college graduate who worked temporarily in Guangzhou, was detained by the police according to the Custody & Repatriation Law (C & R) and later beaten to death in Guangzhou’s C & R facility in April 2003. This tragedy became a major media story nationwide and finally led to the abolishment of the C & R by the State Council on June 18, 2003. So Sun Zhigang became the last known victim of this notorious administrative measure. Re: the whole story of the process to abolish the C & R, see, e.g., Zhao Ling, “Feizhi shourong qiansong banfa de juece licheng” (The Decision-Making Process in the Abolishment of the C & R), Southern Weekend, June 26, 2003, also see special report: China Abolishes C & R, http://www.dwnews.com/gb/index1.html (accessed July 2007); and Zhu, 2006.
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ministry or state bureau was required to appoint and publicize a spokesperson, which opened the government up to the public. For media enterprises in general, especially party-controlled ones, the function of information provider began to outweigh their role as agents of propaganda. This is mainly because news media had to face a new reality of survival in competitive press markets with little to no government subsidies. Emerging news media groupings, such as the Southern News Group and its Metropolitan Daily, began to dramatically restructure China’s media market. Various newspapers and journals began to compete relentlessly in the new media market. Competition for audience and readership drove most to adjust their operation and to try to provide more news and information. On the other hand, people became more aware of their right to information and, in various forms, began to pursue justice through available avenues; and they were eager for open platforms of self-expression. In short, on both the supply and demand sides, the news media and the news market was totally reorganized and ultimately sought a new balance. The news media need an audience and people need means of staying informed and of expressing themselves. National and local affairs all attract people’s attention because of the increasing social mobility and formation of diversified social interests. Because of all of these developments, a rudimentary civil society began to emerge in China. The mass media and unconventional media such as the Internet have become widely utilized by citizens to scrutinize the public policies and behavior of the government. Yet, while the “state continues to retain close control over media and the Internet to limit the free exchange of ideas and exposure of government misconduct,”31 the emergence of civil society, diversified media ownership, and the popularity of multifunctional and non-traditional media have made strict state control much more difficult. Particularly noticeable is the role played by what we call “unconventional” media. For example, in recent years, many cases of corruption and law-enforcement abuse were exposed through the mass media, especially the Internet, and that subsequently exerted powerful societal pressures on the government to react. Due to public exposure, many of these issues had to be resolved
31
Dickson, 18.
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transparently. It is estimated that by the year 2018, 70 percent of the population may be common users of the Internet. We can use some recent web-based news as examples to demonstrate this powerful new mechanism. First is the “duo maomao” (hide-and-seek) case that occurred in Yunnan Province. A young farmer Li Qiaoming who was detained for a minor offence was beaten to death in a prison cell by other inmates, but it was covered up by the police who claimed the death was an accident of inmates “playing hide-and-seek.” People immediately found this cover-up story outrageous and refused to accept it. Finally, because of public pressure due to Internet exposure, the authorities allowed 15 citizen representatives to participate in the criminal investigation. Criminal charges were then brought against those inmates and policemen. Obviously, without the Internet expose and public pressure, this issue would not have been resolved in a transparent manner. Another case concerns a Shanghai IT worker Wang Shuai who through the Internet wrote a critical news piece about unlawful land purchases made by the local government in his hometown of Lingbao County in Henan Province. The Lingbao Public Security Bureau then sent its people to Shanghai to arrest Wang Shuai and charged him with slandering the government. This news story spread across the whole country via the Internet and, amidst public outcry, the Henan government had to release Wang Shuai, declare his innocence, and punish those responsible for this unlawful detention. The third case involves a Hubei girl Deng Yujiao who killed a local official when he attempted to force her to provide sexual services. In Internet discussions, Deng was praised as a national heroine in protest against abusive government officials. Under mounting public pressure, the local judicial authority released Deng without a criminal charge. The fourth case is called “diaoyu” (“fishing” or entrapment) which involves the Shanghai transportation authority’s unlawful and abusive measures to entrap and charge private car owners for “illegal” car pool activities. Because of the victimized drivers’ public appeal through the Internet and strong public criticism, the Shanghai Municipal Government had to order an independent investigation and finally acknowledged its wrong conduct and made a high-profile public apology. These incidents demonstrate how bad state–society relations could be in
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some of China’s localities and how irresponsible governments could be punished seriously due to media exposure and public protests. These are just a few well-publicized and high-profile media events that took place in 2009. Public calls through the Internet for legislation requiring government officials to publicize their incomes and properties have become very powerful.32 This imposes growing pressures on the central government to act. Clearly, no government can take public opinion and media scrutiny lightly. Of course, the government continues to monitor media services and Internet activities very closely. But because of the open and accessible nature of the web, government control is always met with strong resistance.33 In particular, many well-known chat rooms and popular bloggers often take advantage of local management discrepancy and the time difference to spread sensible news and express their views. Thus, the strengthened role of media scrutiny increases pressure on various levels of governments. Many officials become very concerned about news media exposure of their behavior. Others actively pursue media attention to win public opinion battles.34 So these media interactions constitute a new dynamic in the state–society relationship. Media scrutiny by nature is also a society-oriented measure to examine government conduct. This mechanism manifests in divergent ways across the country. In many instances, local barriers block the spread of news and thus a case in one area may have to be exposed by media in other areas. So this is not only a civil society action to check the government but a mechanism to break down local political protectionism and favoritism. In this sense, it reflects new aspects of Chinese politics. 32
“Zhongguo gongmin wangluo zhengji qianming: Yaoqiu shengshizhang gonghai caichan” [Chinese Citizens Call for Signatures Through the Web: Demanding Provincial Governors and Mayors Publicize Their Income and Property], www.dwnews.com (accessed August 2009). 33 He Weifang, “Xiang taobi wangluo? Nashi zhongshiji naodai” [Escape the Internet? A Medieval Thought], Southern Metropolitan Weekly, July 20, 2009. 34 Re: the Internet’s media role in general, see “Wangluo shidai biaoda minyi dabiange zhutui zhengfu zhizheng nengli tigao” [Changing Public Opinion in the Internet Age: Help Promote Better Governing Capacity], http://xz.daynews.com.cn/2008/1105/article_36660. html (accessed August 2009).
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Significance of Increasing Political Accountability What can we learn from the discussion of political accountability in China’s governance? First, we should understand that strengthening accountability is not only a purported government policy, but also an outcome of the ongoing interactions between the government and the people, and between state and society. Thus the results of increasing accountability are an indication of the interactive dynamics in China’s political process. However, we should also note that the measures to promote political accountability are not really institutionalized and the practice is often conducted in a haphazard manner. It is not easy to generalize the practice of increasing accountability nationwide since, in different areas, the efforts and policies are often different. A lot of new mechanisms are actually initiated by certain localities for various reasons. Thus, except for a general trend of increasing government accountability, the effects of accountability mechanisms have to be assessed individually. Second, certainly there are also loopholes and irregularities in accountability mechanisms, and the involved players need to constantly adjust themselves in order to get optimal results. In other words, in the interactive process, deviation and adjustment always occur. For example, within China’s central and peripheral bureaucracy, not all the sections have to face the same level of demand for accountability; Personnel Departments and Party Organization branches usually are much less accountable due to the nomenclature tradition and their secretive natures.35 In the government structure, Propaganda and United Front Departments are also much less accountable because of party traditions and more exclusive management controls. Even within bureaucracies that are supposed to be accountable, officials may take advantage of available management mechanisms, such as the power to make regulations or job transfers and rotations, to escape from the demands of accountability. For one thing, officials who are removed from their posts because of policy blundering may be transferred to other posts where they are less monitored; or, when the cases cool down, they may also be reappointed or transferred to other equivalent positions. But 35
John. Burns, “The Chinese Communist Party’s nomenklatura system as a leadership selection mechanism,” in Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard and Zheng Yongnian, eds. (2004), 33–58.
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public scrutiny mechanisms through the Internet or other media venues may follow up and expose their reappointment and thus prolong the battles.36 In this sense, it is an open-ended process of interaction. Thus, to assess political accountability meaningfully, we need to distinguish between superficial change versus institutional and real behavior change. In fact, we should be able to see institutional, social structural, and cultural change as the outcome of strengthening political accountability. The CCP as an institution continues to reform itself and functions more like a normal bureaucracy, rather than a political agent of ideals. The recent policies and institution-building efforts to strengthen political accountability have greatly changed the function of the CCP as a political institution and increasingly equipped it with more regulations and other administrative mechanisms. It means that the CCP cannot rule at will and has to be more receptive to political, economic, and social demands from society. That may not change the nature of this regime now, but it does apply more populist elements to its operation. Regarding social structural change, diversified social interests based on division and stratification emerge. But social mobility has substantially increased and the original discriminative hukou system has also been abolished and will be replaced by a simple registration system.37 Social structural change is an important factor in why increasing political accountability is possible. At the same time, it also is a condition for achieving positive results from active policies. In turn, social structural change continues to push political change and reinforce the trend of strengthening accountability. In this sense, a self-fulfilling prophecy occurs where increasing accountability creates the very environment for its own continuation. In terms of cultural change, strengthening scrutiny mechanisms through political, legal, and public media avenues reflect the values of selfexpression that have developed and become more embedded in society. All
36 For example, China’s web users often use “renrou sousuo” (body searching) through the Internet to find Internet news stories focused on and other private information, and then publicizing them openly. This type of action identites is a violation of privacy, but it may also expose the behavior of corrupt officials. 37 According to officials at China’s Statistics Bureau, the hukou system will be replaced by the year 2015.
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involved players, such as cadres or common citizens, are also undergoing important behavior change as the result of increasing accountability. This cultural change is due to normative alteration in China’s state–society relationship, allowing more public input and citizen participation. Most likely, it will help the development of democratic values gradually and explicitly. Finally, what kind of accountability is China developing now? Through our preliminary discussion of the main accountability mechanisms, one finds that China’s political accountability remains very limited, though it has been strengthened to various degrees in different areas. Generally speaking, what has been particularly strengthened is administrative accountability. This is mostly because of practical needs and determination on the part of administrative branches of the government. What it has not done is to construct a necessary internal structure to institutionally define and regulate government accountability. Therefore, increasing accountability has given some scrutiny power to the public but not the equivalent in political power. Society becomes the source of some input but not truly the source of inspirational ideas and legitimacy. In order to have an internal check and balance and to allow people and society to become formative participants in political interactions, judicial accountability must be established. Without it, China’s political accountability remains a work in progress. Overall, increasing accountability is a critical aspect of China’s recent political change. It enhances China’s governmental performance and allows more open avenues for the common people in society to counterbalance state domination. Although individually minor, collectively, these social challenges will amass greater pressure and lead to stronger demands for political democracy and the rule of law in Chinese society. Thus, the incremental nature of “endogenous institutional change” could indicate an unusual possibility: “that is, short of authoritarian breakdown, it is plausible that significant changes could occur within the apparent limits of the existing political system.”38 In this sense, while China’s political reform so far remains more of an administrative-oriented modification
38
Kellee S. Tsai, Capitalism Without Democracy: The Private Sector in Contemporary China (New York: Cornell University Press, 2007), 33.
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and not a fundamental change, the political and legal reforms are not static, but are in a state of flux or a volatile process of change. While governments tend to decentralize and reallocate power without necessarily relinquishing control,39 continued political change is expected as the initial push is made and momentum is gained. But the driving forces for change are complex and its exact direction remains unclear. Increasing administrative efficiency and effectiveness is a positive thing but that has to be accompanied by strengthening political accountability. The external and internal demand for change is also reinforced in this process. The key point is that change in political accountability will spread to other areas as a catalyst for more changes.40 As Dickson rightly claims, “[t]he potential for political change comes in the potentially complementary and reinforcing relationship between the political and market dynamics, and the critical and noncritical realms they create.”41 It is believed that the accumulated pressure and demand for change will eventually bring about qualitative political change in China. Therefore, the next step of our study should be to assess the development of political accountability and its significant implications for political change in other areas. It is important and interesting to find out how much accumulation and gradual change can lead to a systematic breakthrough, and what kind of trajectory or catalyst will cause a fundamental change towards democratization and the rule of law in China. References Bao Yajun. Dangdai Zhongguo jingji zhengzhi xietiao Fazhan Yanjiu [Research of Contemporary China’s Economic and Political Coordinative Development], Beijing: Zhongyang bianyi chubanshe, 2008. Bell, Daniel A. China’s New Confucianism: Politics and Everyday Life in a Changing Society. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008.
39
Sophie Richardson, “Self-Reform Within Authoritarian Regimes: Reallocation of Power in Contemporary China,” in Yang Zhong and Shiping Hua, eds. (2006), 173. 40 Shambaugh, 180. 41 Dickson, 17.
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Bo, Zhiyue. “The Institutionalization of Elite Management in China” in Barry J. Naughton and Dali Yang, eds., Holding China Together. New York: Cambridge University Press (2004), 83–99. Brodsgaard, Kjeld Erik and Zheng Yongnian, eds., The Chinese Communist Party in Reform. London and New York: Routledge, 2004. Burns, John. The Chinese Communist Party’s nomenklatura system as a leadership selection mechanism, in Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard and Zheng Yongnian, eds. (2004), 33–58. Dickson, Bruce J. “Pressures for Political Change and Sources of Regime Continuity in China,” accessed from http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~asiactr/ Archive%20Files/Dickson_RuleAndReformInTheGiants_Harvard_2007.pdf (2007). Dickson, Bruce J. “Populist Authoritarianism: The Future of the Chinese Communist Party,” 2005. http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Dickson.pdf (accessed August 2009). Friedman, Edward and Barrett L. McCormick, eds., What if China Doesn’t Democratize? Implications for War and Peace. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2000. Gilley, Bruce. China’s Democratic Future: how It Will Happen and Where It Will Lead. New York: Columbia University Press, 2004. Hao Jing. “Xinfang zhidu buying qianghua qi sifa jiuji gongneng” [We Should Not Strengthen Xinfang’s Judicial Remedy Function], Guangdong Administrative College Journal (6) (2005), 41–44. Li Fan, ed., Zhongguo jiceng minzhu fazhan baogao 2008 (2008 report on China’s Grassroots Democracy), Beijing: Zhishi chanquan chubanshe, 2008. Li, Cheng et al. China’s Changing Political Landscape, Washington: Brooking Institution Press, 2008. Luehrmann, Laura M. “Facing Citizen Complaints in China, 1951–1996,” Asian Survey 43(5) (2003), 845–865. Mann, James. The China Fantasy, New York: Viking, 2007. Nathan, Andrew. “China’s Resilient Authoritarianism.,” Journal of Democracy, (1) (2003), 6–17. Naughton, Barry J. and Dali Yang, eds., Holding China Together: Diversity and National Integration in the Post-Deng Era. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Pei, Minxin. China’s Trapped Transition: The Limits of Developmental Autocracy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008.
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Shambaugh, David. China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008. Tanner, Murray. The Politics of Lawmaking in Post-Mao China: Institutions, Processes and Democratic Prospects. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. Thornton, John L. “Long Time Coming: The Prospects for Democracy in China,” Foreign Affairs, January/February, 2008. Tsai, Kellee S. Capitalism without Democracy: The Private Sector in Contemporary China. New York: Cornell University Press, 2007. Walder, Andrew. “The Party Elite and China’s Trajectory of Change,” in Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard and Zheng Yongnian, eds., The Chinese Communist Party in Reform. London and New York: Rutledge, 2004, pp. 15–32. Whiting, Susan H. The Cadre Evaluation System at the GrassRoots: The Paradox of Party Rule, in Barry J. Naughton and Dali Yang, eds., Holding China Together. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 101–119. Yu Keping. Globalization and Changes in China’s Governance. Boston: Brill, 2008. Zhao, Suisheng, ed., China and Democracy. New York: Routledge, 2000. Zheng Hangsheng, ed., Zhongguo shehui fazhan yanjiu baogao 2009 [Research Report on China’s Social Development, 2009], Beijing: Renmin University Press, 2009. Zheng Yongnian. Will China Become Democratic? Elite, Class and Regime Transition. Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2004. Zhong, Yang and Shiping Hua, eds., Political Civilization and Modernization in China. London: World Scientific, 2006. Zhu, Yuchao. “Proclamation, Implementation, and Abolishment of China’s Custody and Repatriation Law — An Institutionalist Analysis,” American Journal of Chinese Studies 13(2) (2006), 187–208. Zuo Weimin and He Yongjun. “Zhengfa chuantong yu sifa lixing” [Political-Legal Tradition and Judicial Reasoning], Sichuan University Journal 1 (2005).
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Chapter Five
Liberalism and Its Impact on China’s Reform He Li
Liberalism has a long history in China. Although poorly understood and inadequately diffused before the market reform of the late 1970s, liberalism has become a dominant ideology among Chinese intellectuals and a liberal camp was established in China in the late 1990s.1 A 2009 study of youth attitudes prepared by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) found that more than 61 percent identified with liberalism and believed it to be a concept of universal moral significance, despite the fact, as the surveyors put it, that everyone knows liberalism is a part of Western political thought and constitutes the basis of the “democratic system” associated with Western capitalism. In like manner, the surveyors were dismayed to find that close to 36 percent of respondents endorsed the concept of “separation of powers” associated with Western political and legal systems, while more than 20 percent said that they were “uncertain” as to whether they endorsed it; only 44 percent expressed opposition to the concept.2 Liberalism is notoriously difficult to define. The term has been used to describe a sprawling profusion of ideas, practices, movements, and
1 Chongyi Feng, “The Chinese Liberal Camp in Post-June 4th China,” China Perspectives no. 2 (2009): 30–41. 2 Stanley Rosen, “Contemporary Chinese Youth and the State,” The Journal of Asian Studies 68, no. 2 (May 2009): 366.
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practices in different societies and historical periods.3 In the view of Zhu Xueqin, a professor of political thought and a leading Chinese liberal, liberalism can be defined as the following: “It is first of all a theory, then a realist claim. Its philosophical conception is empiricism as opposed to apriorism; its historical conception, contrary to any kind of historical determinism, originates from the evolutionist theory likely to eliminate errors; its reformist vision is dependent on a moderate progressivism that prefers gradual expansion and evolution to the artificial construction of radicalism. At the economic level, it calls for the market economy over the planned economy; at the political level, it calls for representative and constitutional democracy and the rule of law, while opposing the dictatorship of a single person or of a minority just as much as the dictatorship of the masses exercised in the name of the general will; at the ethical level, it calls for the guarantee of the irreducible value of the individual, which cannot be sacrificed, in contrast to other reducible values, as an instrument for whatever abstract goals it may be.”4
A large number of Chinese intellectuals are, or intend to be, liberals, socialists, and nationalists at the same time, without fully understanding the tensions or contradictions between these different ideologies. Such intellectuals may subscribe to liberal and democratic values, but in the end cannot resist the seduction of state socialism and nationalism. In this chapter, liberals (ziyoupai ) refer to those who are committed to fundamental liberal values. Political reform is considered most urgent to Chinese liberals. They hold that without political reform, equity and social justice are impossible. The major objectives of the Chinese liberal intellectuals are summarized in Charter 08 (lingba xianzhang ) which was signed by more
3
Paul Starr, Freedom’s Power: The True Force of Liberalism (New York: Basic Books, 2007), 2. 4 Zhu Xueqin, “1998, ziyouzhuyi xueli de yanshuo” [1998, the Philosophical Discourse of Liberalism], in Shuzhaili de geming: Zhu Xueqin wenxuan [The Revolution in the Study: Selected Texts by Zhu Xueqin] (Changchun Changchun chubanshe, 1999), 381.
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than 9,000 Chinese citizens from all walks of life before the party completely shut down the Charter 08 website in mid-January 2009. Charter 08 calls on the Chinese people to “embrace universal human values, join the mainstream of civilized nations, and build a democratic system” as an alternative to one-party dictatorship; it provides a succinct exposition of six basic liberal values and concepts: freedom, human rights, equality, republicanism, democracy, and constitutional rule. In addition, it sets forth liberal positions on 19 major issues for political reform: a new constitution, separation of powers, legislative democracy, an independent judiciary, public control of public servants and separation of the military from political parties, guarantees of human rights, election of public officials, rural–urban equality, freedom of association, freedom of assembly, freedom of expression, freedom of religion, civic education, protection of private property, financial and tax reform, social security, protection of the environment, a federated republic, and truth and reconciliation.5 Throughout history, ideology and political discourse have been used as tools to promote change and transformation. Political discourse was considered essential to political life.6 In the words of Confucius: “ming bu zheng, ze yan bu shun, yan bu shun, ze shi bu cheng” (The name has to be right; otherwise, the discourse won’t be right. If the discourse is not right, the work of the state cannot be carried out successfully). Reformers used new ideas to challenge the existing regimes or institutions. Of course, ideology is also used by the ruling elites to create consensus among the population for the maintenance of the existing system. The role played by ideology is also extremely important in modern China. In the words of Brantly Womack, “One essential aspect of China’s modernization process, which is likely to remain important for the foreseeable future, is the role of ideological politics. Ideology almost necessarily plays a larger role in the modernization
5
The English translation of the document by Perry Link is available at http:// www.2008xianzhang.info/english.htm. 6 Shiping Hua, Chinese Utopianism: A Comparative Study of Reformist Thought in Japan, Russia and China (1898–1997) (Stanford University Press-Wilson Center Press, 2008), 8.
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process of late starters because the presence of targets, models and threats from advanced countries invites prescriptive, transformative politics.”7
Several studies indicate that intellectual discourse matters and that it has affected the Chinese economic reform and political change, which merits the focus of scholars’ attention.8 This chapter addresses the following questions: When and how has liberalism spread to China? What are the major arguments of Chinese liberal intellectuals? To what extent do the policies of the current Chinese leadership reflect the major concerns of the liberals? What are the prospects for liberalism in China? Early Spread and Re-emergence of Liberalism Chinese liberals have made remarkable advances in their intellectual endeavors since the late 1970s. This section will answer the question of how liberalism became a prominent discourse in China. Many Western liberal ideas were introduced into China at the turn of the 19th century. Late Qing liberals, such as Yan Fu and Liang Qichao, were primarily progressive reformers. They looked to Western liberalism for a source of wealth and power which would revitalize the declining state.9 The spread
7
Brantly Womack, “The Phases of Chinese Modernization,” Collected Papers of History Studies no. 4 (1999): 1–15. 8 For an excellent assessment of the subject, see Yinghong Cheng, “Liberalism in Contemporary China: Ten Years after Its ‘Resurface’,” Journal of Contemporary China 17, no. 55 (2008): 383–400, Merle Goldman and Ashley Esarey, “Intellectual Pluralism and Dissent,” in Bruce Gilley and Larry Diamond, eds., Political Change in China: Comparisons with Taiwan (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008), 49–78; and Junning Liu, “Classical Liberalism Catches on in China,” Journal of Democracy 11, no. 3 (July 2000): 48–57. 9 While Chinese liberalism by now has over a 100-year history stretching back to Yan Fu’s translations of works of Victorian liberalism in the late 19th century, it is beyond the scope of this paper. For a sophisticated examination of the subject, see Max Ko-wu Huang, The Meaning of Freedom: Yan Fu and the Origins of Chinese Liberalism (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2008), Philip Huang, Liang Ch’i-chiao and Modern Chinese Liberalism (Pullman: State University of Washington Press, 1972), and Yung-Tsu Wong, “The Fate of Liberalism in Revolutionary China: Chu Anping and His Circle, 1946–1950,” Modern China (October 1993), 457–490.
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of liberalism thus contributed to the establishment of the Republic of China in 1911. Chinese liberalism culminated in the first phase of the New Culture Movement from 1915 to 1919. However, the Russian Revolution in 1917 became an attractive alternative to the Chinese intellectuals. With the communist victory in 1949, classic liberalism in China lost its political base and Maoism triumphed. Liberalism, in the sense of tolerance of dissent, protection of civil rights, and the encouragement of individualism, was considered an obstacle in the post-1949 China.10 In Mao’s China, no independent ideology was allowed to exist. Liberalism ceased to function after the Anti-Rightist campaign of 1957–1958 due to harsh persecution. In spite of the long and dark shadows of totalitarianism, Chinese liberalism re-emerged in the late 1970s. In the wake of the Cultural Revolution, the negative attitude toward the Cultural Revolution was shared by many Chinese people, especially the Chinese literati. Many of these intellectuals had been severely persecuted during the Cultural Revolution. They were determined to find out what had caused such a disaster in Chinese history and how to prevent its reoccurrence. Since China started its economic reform and opened up to the rest of the world in the late 1970s, the Chinese leadership has promoted a market-oriented economy.11 The majority of Chinese intellectuals embraced liberal ideology and supported Deng Xiaoping’s reforms. Diffusion of liberalism was extensive by the late 1980s.12 Deng maintained that Mao had focused too much on politics; and that China instead needed to concentrate on economic development. In contrast, liberals argued that the fundamental problem was the political system — under the totalitarian regime. When Deng enunciated his four cardinal principles, the liberals began to diverge from him.
10 Eugene Lubot, Liberalism in an Illiberal Age: New Culture Liberals in Republican China, 1919–1937 (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1982), 131. 11 Joseph Fewsmith, China since Tiananmen, 2nd edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 12 For more information on the rise of liberalism in China, see Xu Youyu, “The Debates between Liberalism and the New Left in China since the 1990s,” Contemporary Chinese Thought 34, no. 3 (2003): 6–17.
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After June 1989, proponents of liberal democracy and liberal wings within the system were suppressed. Some were arrested and imprisoned, others were sent into exile; almost all were silenced. Because of the control by the authorities, the liberal bloc virtually disappeared until the early 1990s. The government accused students and scholars who took part in the protest movement of being “liberal” and their ideology “bourgeois liberalism.” For a time, liberalism was a taboo in the intellectual discourse. After Deng’s southern tour in 1992, liberalism gradually reappeared on the scene of China.13 The regime has prevented the liberal scholars from forming an organization for their political endeavor, but they have managed to congregate regularly at informal occasions and at conferences organized by liberal colleagues. At present, the liberals consist of six vaguely distinctive but, to some extent, overlapping categories: liberal intellectuals, liberals within the CCP, Christian liberals, democracy activists, human rights lawyers, and grassroots rights activists. These six groups have advocated liberalism in their own perspectives through publications and speeches, taken part in a variety of social and political activities for the cause of democracy, expressed mutual support for each other when persecuted by the party-state, and occasionally united to issue joint petitions or open letters on the Internet to express their shared concerns or demands for democratic change.14 Chinese liberalism itself tends to be divided into market liberalism, impressed by the US as a political model and adhering to the doctrines of classical liberalism, and left-liberalism, more aligned with European social democracy and the welfare state which calls on the government to pay more attention to inequality and environmental protection. For his
13 In early 1992, Deng Xiaoping paid a visit to a few southern cities, including Shenzhen. During the tour, he criticized those who harbored doubts about the country’s reform and opening-up policy and stressed the importance of economic development. Deng noted that a market economy did not equal to capitalism and that socialism also has its own market. Deng’s talks, which helped bring China’s reform program back on track, are considered to have had a far-reaching influence on reforms in China. 14 Chongyi Feng, “The Chinese Liberal Camp in Post-June 4th China,” China Perspectives no. 2, 31.
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part, Qin Hui, one of the prominent liberals, positions himself on the common ground shared by liberalism and social democracy.15 The community of liberals can also be divided into two major groups: inside the system (tizhinei) and external to the system (tizhiwai). The former are typically professors, economists, journalists, lawyers, think tank policy analysts, and members of administration and management. They believe that the existing party-state can be transformed from within, and that the development of civil society depends to some extent on the tacit consent of the party in power. The latter group is normally not affiliated with any danwei (work unit) in the public sector. It is due to the fact that the community of liberal intellectuals was badly damaged by the Tiananmen incident and its aftermath. They either gave up the hope of transforming “the untransformable” and decided to search for better and more feasible alternatives or took up residence overseas. Without a domestic presence, the influence of the exiled intellectuals is limited; and they have become increasingly irrelevant to politics back in China. So far in mainland China, there is no powerful and visible dissident influence that can really shake the CCP rule. This chapter focuses on those liberals inside the system. In fact, the majority of liberal scholars in mainland China belong to this camp. In spite of the common goal of liberal democracy, liberals within the system have adopted an approach and strategies fundamentally different from those of the liberals in exile. Whereas the Chinese democracy movement in exile sees the political opposition (namely themselves) as the driving force for China’s transition to democracy, the liberals within the system cherish the hope that democratic elements within the CCP will initiate the process of democratization, building on the existing institutions which are conducive to democracy. To this end, leading liberal intellectuals have made heartfelt proposals to the Party leadership for a smooth political transition from within. 15
Qin Hui, “Ziyouzhuyi, shehuiminzhuzhuyi yu dangdai Zhongguo wenti” [Liberalism, Social-democracy and Problems in Contemporary China], in Sichao: Zhongguo xinzuopai jiqi yingxiang [Stream of Ideas: Chinese Neo-Leftism and Its Influence] (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2003), 385.
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Chongyi Feng states correctly that the majority of intellectuals in China today are at least semi-liberals in the sense that they share beliefs in market economy, individual rights and, to a lesser extent, liberal democracy. Yet, only a tiny minority of them hold these liberal ideals profoundly enough to express them in a systematic way or are brave enough to put their beliefs into practice by actively confronting the party-state.16 Unlike “establishment intellectuals” who were mainly state servants under Mao,17 today’s liberal scholars are “critical intellectuals.” In Western parlance, they could be called public intellectuals. In the absence of any political pluralism in today’s China, “the public intellectuals” are called upon to play the role of an opposition.18 Some leading liberal intellectuals are called “public intellectuals” as they frequently bring important and sometimes controversial topics to the forefront of public discussion and assert themselves in the defense of the political or economic rights of a population that has been misguided or ill-informed.19 A quick survey of the background of prominent liberal intellectuals indicates a similar pattern (see Table 1). The senior members of the camp belong to the “Rightist Generation.” Both Li Shenzhi and Mao Yushi were labeled rightists in 1957. A great majority of them are associated with top
16
Chongyi Feng, “The Chinese Liberal Camp in Post-June 4th China,” China Perspectives no. 2, 31. 17 “Establishment intellectual” is a term coined by Carol Hamrin and Timothy Cheek. For more details, see Carol Lee Hamrin and Timothy Cheek, eds., China’s Establishment Intellectuals (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1986). 18 As Xu Jilin underlines, regarding the formation of a community of intellectuals and of a new form of engagement, “It is precisely this global network of knowledge that can construct a complete meaning for this world and represent a third force outside of power and of capital, that is to say an autonomous and expanding cultural field. It is the foundation of the public commitment of intellectuals.” See Xu Jilin, “Some Possibilities for Committed Intellectuals? Specialization of Knowledge, Commercialization of Culture and Commerce of Post-Modernism Characterizes the China of the 1990s”, Chinese Perspectives 81 (Jan/Feb 2004): 16–31. 19 For an excellent case study on China’s public intellectual, see Timothy Cheek, “Xu Jilin and the Thought Work of China’s Public Intellectuals,” China Quarterly 186 (2006): 401–420.
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Name
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Key Chinese liberal intellectuals.
Education
Current position
Main arguments and activities
Li Shenzhi Graduate from 1923–2004 Yenching University, the precursor of Peking University He Weifang LLM from b. 1960 Peking College of Political Science and Law
Former vice-president Hailed as the “father of of the Chinese contemporary Chinese Academy of liberalism” Social Sciences
Liu Xiaobo b. 1955
Writer, human rights activist
Liu Junning b. 1961
PhD from Beijing Normal University, has been a visiting scholar at several universities, including the University of Oslo, University of Hawaii, and Columbia University PhD from Peking University
Professor of Law at Beijing University
Institute of Chinese Cultural Studies
Author of many papers on the importance of modernizing China’s judicial system, earning him the nickname of “Justice He” He has called on the Chinese government to be accountable for its actions, and has served as President of the Independent Chinese PEN Center since 2003. He also signed Charter 08
Editor of several liberal journals and book series and founder of the journal Res Publica, which fosters the theoretical and public rise of liberal thinking in China (Continued )
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He Li Table 1.
Name Qin Hui b. 1953
Education
(Continued )
Current position
Main arguments and activities
MA from Lanzhou University
Institute of A prominent public Humanities and intellectual taking a stand Social Sciences, on a range of issues, Tsinghua his major contribution University, Beijing as a public intellectual has been to initiate wide debates on social justice Zhu Xueqin PhD from Professor of Proposed combining b. 1952 Fudan History, Shanghai the principles of University University liberalism with policies of the social democrats Wu Guguang PhD from Professor of Worked for the then b. 1958 Princeton Political Science Party Secretary Zhao University at the University Ziyang in the 1980s of Victoria Xu Youyu MA from CASS Research Fellow, A main bearer of liberal b. 1947 and visiting Institute of ideas scholar at Oxford Philosophy, University Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Mao Yushi Shanghai Director of Unirule, A strong advocate of the b. 1928 Jiaotong a private liberal need for political reform University research to accompany China’s institution economic reforms Source: Adapted from Dictionary of the Political Thought of the People’s Republic of China and other sources.
Chinese universities and think tanks. Usually, they are middle-aged, spent their childhood during the Cultural Revolution, and participated in the Tiananmen Square demonstration, thus leading one analyst to conclude that they can be largely identified as members of the “1989 Generation.”20
20 Merle Goldman, From Comrade to Citizen: The Struggle for Political Rights in China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), 128.
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Some of them are also returned students. Their conversion to liberalism is rooted in their own political experience as well as their exposure to liberal theories. In addition, their experience of and reflections on totalitarian rule during the Cultural Revolution provided strong stimuli for them to search for a new political belief.21 A large number of them are signatories to Charter 08, the manifesto to promote political reform and democratization in China. Apart from personal networking, they exercise their influence mainly through their publications. Their liberal views are usually published on the Internet as well as in liberal journals and newspapers such as Yanhuang Chunqiu (Chinese Spring and Autumn), Nanfang Dushi Bao (Southern Metropolitan Daily), and Nanfang Zhoumo (Southern Weekend). The Liberal Discourse The basic concern of the liberals is the political regime, but they differ greatly among themselves in terms of how they regard the regime. In the words of Liu Junning, “it has become the consensus among most contemporary Chinese liberals that it is important to distinguish themselves as classical liberals — in the tradition of Locke, Smith, and Hayek — since that distinction affects the destiny of liberalism in China and even the future of China itself.”22
Liberal discourse in China highlights four issues: individual freedom, economic liberalism, constitutional democracy, and embrace of the Western model and globalization. First, the Chinese liberals hold that the fundamental purpose of democracy is the protection of individual freedom. As a consequence, the protection of the right to own private property is a basic condition both for 21 Chongyi Feng, “The Chinese Liberal Camp in Post-June 4th China,” China Perspectives no. 2, 31. 22 Liu Junning, “Intellectual Turn: The Emergence of Liberalism in Contemporary China,” in Ted Galen Carpenter and James A. Dorn, eds., China’s Future: Constructive Partner or Emerging Threat (Washington DC: Cato Institute, 2000), 56–57.
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guaranteeing individual liberty as well as for furnishing a legal framework that is indispensable for the development of the market economy.23 Chinese liberalism was born in protest against the totalitarian rule. It seeks to establish both a limitation to authority and a division of authority. According to Xu Youyu, “the core of liberalism is affirmation of individual value and esteem, respect and protection of personal rights and interests. Profound understanding of liberalism would necessarily break with the traditional conception that suppresses individuality and takes the nation and collective as the only value. But it also requires a clear distinction between individualism and egoism or selfishness.”24
Individualism ( geren zhuyi ) was seen by many as utterly alien to Chinese culture. Second, liberals uphold economic liberalism. Chinese liberals believe that although the market economy does not necessarily lead to democracy, it remains no less a necessary condition for that; in the history of the modern world there is no example of a stable democracy that does not have a market economy.25 Liberal economists believe that the government’s interventions in economic and social affairs are the root causes of corruption and inefficiency, and thus have to be reduced to a minimum. They have supported core values of economic liberalism, including the protection of personal property rights, free competition, fair trade, and faith in the market mechanism. The works of liberal economists such as Keith Joseph, Enoch Powell, and Milton Friedman have a large number of Chinese followers. Liu Junning has developed Hayek’s idea by stating that “private property rights are the
23 Xu Youyu, “Ziyouzhuyi yu dangdai Zhongguo” [Liberalism and Contemporary China], in Zhishifenzi lichang — ziyouzhuyi zhizheng yu Zhongguo sixiangjie de fenhua [The Positions of the Intellectuals — Debate on Liberalism and the Scission among the Chinese Intelligentsia] (Changchun: Shidai wenyi chubanshe, 1999), 417. 24 Available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xu_Youyu. 25 Xu Youyu, “Ziyouzhuyi yu dangdai Zhongguo” [Liberalism and Contemporary China], in Zhishifenzi lichang — ziyouzhuyi zhizheng yu Zhongguo sixiangjie de fenhua, op. cit., 419.
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most basic human rights in the world.”26 Liu saw private property rights as necessary for economic reform and ultimately for political reform, which he believed entailed “restructuring of political system.” Liu explained that “as long as we acknowledge a market economy, then we must acknowledge that the goal of the government is to protect each person’s private property.”27 Like Liu Junning, Qin Hui called for a change in ownership right away “to make breakthroughs to political reform.” He urged that “state-owned firms should be sold, otherwise they will be stolen.”28 Liberals hold that privatization is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for the country to make the transition from a central command system to an efficient market economy. Chinese liberals strongly advocated that the state must shrink in order to facilitate a growing market economy. Such voices in favor of an unfettered and omnipotent market became more and more influential not only in the academia, but also in the government and media. Liberals also advocate economic competition to disrupt monopolies and protect private property. Third, they uphold the concept of constitutional democracy. Constitutionalism appeared in China considerably early on, as the banner of the political reform launched by the late Qing Dynasty. However, like other political ideas, it was banned during the Mao era but reappeared when the reform-oriented leaders revised the constitution. In the 1990s it became a key term used in the liberal discourse because it not only embodied liberal political ideas but was also accepted by the authorities. Thus, constitutionalism was a concept that was acceptable to all major political forces. For the authorities, constitutionalism meant rule by law, but for liberals, it referred to a political system with checks and balances. The 1990s witnessed a robust debate between “rule of law” and “rule by law.” Liberals argue that China needs the rule of law rather than the arbitrary whims of party officials. The so-called “socialist legality” is at best “rule by law,” in which the law is used by the party-state as an instrument 26
Kate Zhou, “China’s Break from Serfdom,” available at http://www.mackinac.org/article.aspx?ID=6479. 27 Cited in Merle Goldman, From Comrade to Citizen: The Struggle for Political Rights in China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), 149. 28 Ibid., 151.
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to control society, while the Party itself exercises its power above the law and is not subject to the law. Since then, tremendous efforts have been made by Chinese liberals to promote the concept of “rule of law,” in which everyone, the government in particular, is subject to the law, and government power is limited by law, with the result that individual rights are effectively protected by the law against the abuse of the government in particular. Due to the efforts of Chinese liberals and other legal scholars, the CCP leadership has abandoned the concept of “rule by law” for the concept of “rule of law” since 1997. It was in the process of this debate that the concept of constitutional government (xianzheng ) was revived and incorporated into the common vocabulary of formal publications in China. In 2003, when the Chinese Constitution was undergoing a major revision, participants in both official and unofficial conferences on constitutional revision called for replacing the concept of renmin minzhu zhuanzheng (people’s democratic dictatorship) in the Constitution with the concept of renmin minzhu xianzheng (people’s democratic constitutional rule). Democracy is a central concern of Chinese liberals, who advocate liberalism as an alternative to the established Marxist ideology. Liberals are convinced that liberalism is the only and best path that Chinese modernity could take and liberal democracy the best available form of government. Li Shenzhi wrote his famous statement: “After 300 years of comparison and selection in the whole world since the age of industrialization, and particularly after more than 100 years of Chinese experimentation, the largest in scale in human history, there is sufficient evidence to prove that liberalism is the best and universal value.”29
Li Shenzhi pointed out that China’s implementation of political reform will clearly determine the ultimate success or failure of its economic reform. A mere open door to the outside world is not enough or even genuine without 29 Li Shenzhi, “Hongyang Beida de ziyouzhuyi chuantong” [Promoting and Developing the Liberal Tradition of Peking University], in Liu Junning, ed., Ziyouzhuyi de xiansheng: Beida chuantong yu jinxiandai Zhongguo [The Harbinger of Liberalism: The Tradition of Peking University and Modern China] (Beijing: Zhongguo renshi chubanshe, 1998), 4–5.
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a domestic opening. Domestically, the door should also be open to all spheres: the economy, politics, society, culture, media, freedom of speech, freedom association, etc. Only by doing so can China make true progress.30 Liberal intellectuals share with Western democracy theorists the belief that democracy provides regime legitimacy. They became ever more convinced that political reform was truly indispensable to any successful economic reform. As a result, the question of constitutional democracy occupied more and more of their attention. It was against this background that the call for constitutional democracy, with all of its standard features such as general elections, multi-party competition, safeguards of human rights, and checks and balances of power between legislative, executive and judiciary branches went out. To them, multi-party democracy is not just the only way out for China but also the only way to save and regenerate the CCP. Finally, liberals maintain that Western democracy is the model to be followed in China. Many liberals associate democracy with modernity and seek to join the modern world. In the words of Li Shenzhi, “modernization means Americanization.”31 No doubt, Li’s extensive experience in international affairs fully convinced him that the United States was the appropriate model for China to emulate.32 China’s liberal thinkers favor a “complete and thorough globalization” and promote the concept of “universal values” (quanqiu jiazhi). According to the liberals, in today’s world, globalization is gaining momentum. Under the prevailing circumstances, China cannot, and should not, embark on its own road to modernization. They believe that liberalism, now being rejuvenated in the country, will bring freedom to China and lead a free China into a world of globalization. While New Left scholars emphasize the detrimental effects of foreign trade and foreign investment, liberals argue that poverty and corruption
30
Li Shenzhi, “Ye yao tuidong zhengzhi gaige” [Promoting Political Reform Too], Dangdai Zhongguo yanjiu [Modern China Studies] (April 1998): 17–19. 31 Huainian Li Shenzhi [In Commemoration of Li Shenzhi], 2 vols., published unofficially in January 2006, 339. 32 From late 1978 to early 1980, Li was a member of the International Issues Writing Group established by the Party Central Committee. Meanwhile, he accompanied Deng Xiaoping on his visit to the USA, serving as adviser to the delegation.
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are all China’s internal problems and that they have little to do with globalization.33 Chinese liberals warn against the potential dangers of nationalism in causing social disorder, in arousing xenophobia and chauvinism, in suppressing individual freedom and personal rights, and in sabotaging projects of democratization and modernization.34 Implications of the Spread of Liberalism The growth of liberalism has several important implications. China’s marketoriented reform is greatly influenced by liberalism. Chinese scholars have been exploring the general characteristics of Western democratic theories and ideas. They have translated numerous books by Western scholars on democracy, civil society, law, media, and interest groups. More and more classic liberal texts are being translated into Chinese, including the works of Wilhelm von Humboldt, Thomas Jefferson, Alexis de Tocqueville, Herbert Spencer, Frédéric Bastiat, Ludwig von Mises, Karl Popper, F.A. Hayek, Milton Friedman, James Buchanan, Robert Nozick, Douglass C. North, Michael Novak, Isaiah Berlin, and Ayn Rand. Most of Hayek’s important works have been translated into Chinese, including The Road to Serfdom, Individualism and Economic Order, The Constitution of Liberty, The Fatal Conceit, and Law, Legislation, and Liberty. These works reflected major important intellectual trends in the West and offered Chinese people new alternatives.35 These translations also had an impact on the Chinese elites’ understanding of the social, political, and economic theories of liberalism. Since Hayek is recognized in China as one of the few who foresaw the failures of socialism, he is highly respected by most Chinese scholars. 33 See He Li, “China’s New Left,” East Asian Policy 1, no. 1 (January–March 2009): 30–37; and Mierzejewski, Dominik, “Not to Oppose but to Rethink’ The New Left Discourse on the Chinese Reforms,” Journal of Contemporary Eastern Asia 8, no. 1 (2009): 15–29. 34 Li Shenzhi, “Heping fendou xing Zhongguo” [Rejuvenating China through peaceful efforts], in Li Shenzhi, ed., Ershiyi shiji de yousi [Concerns about the 12th Century] (Hong Kong: Mingbao chubanshe, 2003), 30–41. 35 Liu Junning, “Intellectual Turn: The Emergence of Liberalism in Contemporary China,” in Ted Galen Carpenter and James A. Dorn, eds., China’s Future: Constructive Partner or Emerging Threat (Washington DC: Cato Institute, 2000), 57.
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Even former Premier Zhu Rongji had Hayek on his bookshelf. The fact that economic reform has been carried on in the direction of laissez-faire market economics illustrates the elite’s acceptance of its basic tenets. In the 1980s, liberal ideas were so powerful that even top Party leaders, including Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang, Hu Qili, and Zhu Muzhi, became inclined to liberalism to a certain extent.36 Chinese liberal economists are reform advocators who support the efficient market hypothesis, the privatization of state-owned enterprises, and trade liberalization. The reform policy is based on liberal theory, for example, marketization and privatization. Deng Xiaoping’s “let some people get rich first, so others can get rich later” sounds like Ronald Reagan’s neo-liberal “trickle-down economics.” Economic liberalism has become an important force in China since 1978 when a significant portion in the political elite had at least some knowledge of the basic principles of the liberal political economy. Of course, the CCP still controls the levers of power, but it has abandoned most of its principles. In all but name, the market rules China. Liberalism that stresses primacy of market allocations and privatization of state enterprises came into vogue in China’s academia after Deng’s “southern tour” in 1992. Market rules and efficiency prevailed over state intervention, social preoccupation, and redistribution. Nowadays, economics as a discipline is dominated by neoclassical economics with only a trace of left-wing Marxist economics. Foreign trade models based on comparative advantage may have been the most durable aspect of liberalism at the ideological level. It was the liberals who proposed adding to the Chinese Constitution the clause invoking private property rights, an amendment finally adopted in March 2004 during the tenth plenary session of the NPC. Just as Hayek predicted that economic freedom would go hand in hand with liberty, the return of private economic activity in China since the late 1970s has led to relative freedom of movement, press, religion, 36
Chongyi Feng, “The Return of Liberalism and Social Democracy: Breaking Through the Barriers of State Socialism, Nationalism, and Cynicism in Contemporary China,” Issues & Studies: An International Quarterly on China, Taiwan, and East Asian Affairs 39, no. 3 (2003): 8.
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and pursuit of happiness despite the communist state. The people’s demand for civil liberties and media freedom is undeniably on the rise. Liberalism has made a significant impact upon the party-state’s political ideology. Chinese leaders are learning that liberalism is a by-product of the market economy.37 In 2002, the “Three Represents” became a guiding ideology of the CCP at its 16th Party Congress. The ideology is important as it attempted to transform the CCP from a vanguard revolutionary party, led by the proletariat, to a ruling party representing the majority of the people. The liberals claimed it as a victory because it legitimized the inclusion of members of the business class, i.e. capitalists, into the Party. With the diffusion of liberalism, Chinese leaders have become increasingly interested and willing to accept international norms. China signed the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 1997 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1998. Some liberal economists served as advisers to top Chinese leaders, including Premier Zhu Rongji, who supported a faster pace of reform and steered the country into the WTO in 2001. Some reforms advocated by liberals, such as the abolition of life tenure of leading posts and the establishment of a civil service system, were implemented. Grappling with increasing challenges, the Chinese leadership has come to see the advantages of liberalization. The current CCP leaders, Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, have accepted liberal values such as human rights and rule of law as “universal values,” but Chinese liberals used these terms long before the CCP made them part of its vocabulary. The liberals have demonstrated a strong “opinion power” in advocating freedom and democracy as well as human rights. The very concept of “the state respecting and protecting human rights” has now been written into China’s revised constitution. The new political philosophy adopted by Hu and Wen is best embodied in the slogan “people as the end” or “putting people first” (yi ren wei ben), compared to previous party lines that treated people as means to other ends, as expressed in the slogan “class struggle as the key link” (yi jieji douzheng wei gang) or “development as
37
Elizabeth Rosenthal, “China’s Leading University Celebrates and Ponders,” New York Times May 5, 1998.
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the priority” (fazhan shi ying daoli). Subsequently, the idea of “putting people first” was further extended into and supplemented by the “scientific development concept” and the theory of “building a harmonious society,” which lists “democracy and rule of law” as the top criteria. At a press conference on March 16, 2007, Wen Jiabao declared, “Democracy, the rule of law, freedom, human rights, equality, and fraternity are not something peculiar to capitalism. They are the joint achievements of civilization of the entire world during its long historical process and the common values pursued by mankind.”38 Such open discourse on liberalism is effectively disarming the Leninist party-state intellectually, ideologically, and morally, and may in the end subdue it without a physical fight, as preached in Daoist strategies. It should be noted that since the late 1990s, the Chinese discourse on democracy has changed profoundly, and today much of it focuses on institutional and procedural matters.39 Liberals practiced what they preached. For instance, Li Fan, Director of the World and China Institute, is very active in promoting grassroots election at the township level. He helped organize an unauthorized election for township head that took place in Buyun Township in Sichuan in 2000. In short, liberalism has played a crucial role in the Chinese transition from planned economy to market economy. Certainly it is true that so far it has had at least a limited impact on China’s transformation into a constitutional democracy. Liberalism and Prospects for Political Change Though the history of Chinese liberalism can be traced to the late 19th century, the question of how to adapt Western liberalism to a culturally unique China remains. Liberals dominated the political discourse before 1989 and slowly revived by the late 1990s. As Chongyi Feng pointed out,
38 “Full text of PRC Premier Wen Jiabao’s News Conference,” http://www.chinaelections. org/en/17/03/2007. 39 Cheng Li, China’s Changing Political landscape (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution Press), 6–7.
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compared to the role played by communist liberals in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, the feat of liberal dissidents within the CCP has been much less impressive.40 What factors have undermined liberalism in China? Will liberalism be able to take root in China? Liberal intellectuals dominated China’s intellectual arena in the first part of the nation’s reform. However, the decline of Marxism does not mean that liberalism prevails in succession. In recent years, an increasing number of disillusioned and frustrated people have turned to the New Left and nationalism. Indeed, some of the autarkic, populist, and illiberal features of Mao’s China have resurfaced in recent years. A large number of Chinese intellectuals began to believe that the American model of development is deeply flawed. Support for laissez faire waned as disparities continued and unemployment worsened. Some people have lost faith in the market-oriented reform and demand more government regulation of the market. According to Yongnian Zheng, liberalism advocates rationality, peace, compromise, and social justice. Yet it has become less and less relevant when these ideas are badly needed in China.41 Liberalism continues to be only what might be called an oppositional ideology, and basic liberal views are held only by academics in urban centers. There are at least five factors that have weakened the liberals in recent years. First, the global financial crisis has severely damaged confidence in the invisible hand of the market. For many Chinese, the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s weakened their trust in market economy. The recent global financial crisis has further undermined their belief in the Western model of development. Twenty years after the “end of history,” liberalism seems increasingly under threat. Debate between the New Left and liberals cooled in the late 1990s, but heated up with the recent global
40
Chongyi Feng, “The Return of Liberalism and Social Democracy: Breaking Through the Barriers of State Socialism, Nationalism, and Cynicism in Contemporary China,” Issues & Studies: An International Quarterly on China, Taiwan, and East Asian Affairs 39, no. 3 (2003): 11. 41 Yongnian Zheng, “Zhiyouzhuyi de zhongguohua jiqi zai zhongguo de qiantu,” [Sinonization of Liberalism and its Fate in China], Lianhe Zaobao (Singapore), August 11, 2009.
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recession.42 In the wake of the global financial meltdown, many intellectuals’ admiration for the free market mechanism has began to evaporate. The liberals continue to refuse to parrot the party line. However, in the minds of a majority of peasants and unemployed workers, the liberal demands for a free market seem to make less and less sense. Second, Beijing is fundamentally committed to liberal principles in the economic sense but clearly not in other matters. Currently, Beijing has managed 1.3 billion people into the East Asian tradition of free-market authoritarianism, and so far, there has been no sweeping political transformation. China sees market-Leninism as the way to its future.43 Singapore is a model that Beijing tries to emulate. The attraction of Singapore is that it has achieved Western living standards without being shaped by Western political standards. China’s dream is to become another Singapore. Such a dream is shared by an increasing number of Chinese. Yet, whether that will happen in China is a fundamental international question for the next decade or two. Third, another reason for the relatively slow diffusion of liberalism is the rise of materialism in China. Since the mid-1990s, many Chinese have become obsessed with materialism, and intellectual endeavors have lost popularity. In Chinese history, there was never a strong religious tradition: the Chinese were generally secular and material interests were always an important factor influencing their evaluation of careers and professions. Salaries for Chinese intellectuals have increased considerably. Meanwhile, welfare provisions available to them are comprehensive and relatively generous. Against this background, anti-establishment intellectuals have little to gain and much to lose. Fourth, for as long as there has been liberalism, there has been antiliberalism. The CCP fears that liberalism could weaken its autocratic power, which it seems to cherish above all else. Party censorship has limited people’s knowledge of liberalism. For instance, the four characters ling ba xian zhang (Charter 08) have been completely blocked on Google.cn or Baidu.com, and most of the web pages that contain the four
42
He Li, “China’s New Left,” East Asian Policy 1, no. 1 (January–March 2009): 30–37. Nicholas D. Kristof, “China Sees ‘Market-Leninism’ as Way to Future,” New York Times September 6, 1993.
43
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characters cannot be opened inside China. Some intellectuals who signed Charter 08 have been told by the Chinese police to retract their signature. Liu Xiaobo, a leading liberal thinker who helped write Charter 08, was sentenced to 11 years in prison on December 25, 2009, by the government for “inciting subversion of state power.” It is worth noting that the government does and can set the agenda for academic work through a variety of lucrative fellowships and grants. Scholars within the system have to restrict their work within the range of tolerance of the CCP ideology. Official ideology can be developed within the officially established institutions, but other schools of thought may only emerge within a new intellectual atmosphere. The government controls much of the resources (time and funding) required for the production and spread of new ideas. In China, the framework for research and development of political ideas includes the following: research institutes, associations, educational institutes, professionals, publications, conferences, and research projects. These institutions not only provide an infrastructure to produce and spread ideas, but also organize a marketplace for those ideas. In exchange for a lifelong salary and other welfare, a large number of writers and artists have lost the freedom to express themselves and to tell the truth. Official propaganda has also created a distorted description of liberalism.44 This distorted version depicts liberalism as alien, irrelevant, and detrimental to China’s socioeconomic order and national interest.45 As a result, the real progressive meaning of liberalism has not been fully understood in China. Fifth, the stunted growth of Chinese liberalism is largely because it had only found roots at the elite level, not at the mass level. China’s liberals lack the political and institutional mechanisms to implement their political views. Given this strict control, they are not able to form a viable Chinese liberal party. Up to this time, liberals have not taken to grassroots organizing either among workers or in the villages. 44 The Chinese people were required to study Mao Zedong’s “five old essays” (“Serve the People,” “In Memory of Norman Bethune,” “The Foolish Old Man Who Moved the Mountain,” “Where Do Correct Thoughts Come From?” as well as “Oppose Liberalism”). 45 See, for example, He Bingmeng, ed., Xinziyouzhuyi pingxi [Analysis of Neoliberalism] (Beijing: Social Science Documentation Publishing House, 2004).
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Moreover, given that the traditional value placed on the welfare of the group has dominated China for hundreds of years, along with the negative tone or translation of individualism and the influence of Mao’s famous booklet attacking individualism, it might be a long way for liberals to establish individualism as a dominant feature of ideology. As Liu Junning pointed out correctly, liberalism has never entered deeply into Chinese society, except among a certain number of educated people.46 Though it is a daunting task for liberalism to become firmly established in China, there is a real possibility that it will prevail in the long run. Four factors will be crucial to the future diffusion of liberalism in China. First, the development of a market economy has laid a solid foundation for the development of liberal ideas and liberal social forces. The advancement of economic freedom and private property has given people an appetite for civil and political liberties. The cases of many other societies indicate that a free market in commodities will ultimately result in a free market of ideas and a demand for liberal ideas. As long as people are free to choose, most people will choose liberty and liberalism.47 With increasing private ownership, people will want more transparency, predictable laws, less corruption, freer speech, and less red tape. Economic reform has expanded personal freedom: people are freer to choose an occupation, to move from one danwei to another, and to speak more openly. And command economies have proven inefficient.48 It is widely recognized that China will continue its marketoriented reform and that return to the central-plan economy is highly unlikely. A growing middle class would help the spread of liberalism. Second, China’s increasing interaction with the rest of the world, particularly with the West, has been another factor promoting a more liberalizing environment. The reemergence of liberalism coincided with China’s policy
46
Liu Junning, ed., Ziyouzhuyi de xiansheng: Beida chuantong yu jinxiandai Zhongguo [The Harbinger of Liberalism: The Tradition of Peking University and Modern China] (Beijing: Zhongguo renshi chubanshe, 1998). 47 Junning Liu, “Classical Liberalism Catches On in China,” Journal of Democracy 11, no. 3 (July 2000): 48–57. 48 Mao Yushi, “Fifty Years of China’s Economy with Its Background in Politics and Society,” in Ted Galen Carpenter and James A. Dorn, eds., China’s Future: Constructive Partner or Emerging Threat (Washington DC: Cato Institute, 2000), 19.
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of opening to the outside world in late 1978. Trade liberalization has helped China to grow in the non-state sector, dramatically increase per capita income, and invigorate civil society. The process of opening to the outside world in modern China accompanied the rising importance and popularity of overseas studies. As a result, foreign education (mainly in the West) has gradually replaced traditional Chinese education as the dominating cultural capital and the most important means of social mobility in modern China.49 Furthermore, with the introduction of Western science and technology and managerial skills, Western political ideas naturally followed. Globalization and the opening of the Chinese television market to satellite and cable broadcasts have also brought various foreign broadcast and print media directly into Chinese homes and work units. Globalization will promote Chinese liberalism in the long run. It is true that no one can be certain how China will behave on international trade issues in the future. Yet, it is hard to imagine that China, as the largest benefactor of globalization, will go back to its autarkic self-sufficient policy under Mao. Third, an increasing number of Chinese citizens are traveling and studying abroad, and are becoming more pluralistic and autonomous. Scholars and students who had gone abroad for social sciences studies since the late 1970s have begun to return home. Meanwhile, many other Chinese scholars have traveled abroad as visiting scholars. These returned scholars are now able to accurately introduce Western social sciences, methodologies, thoughts, and theories to the Chinese audience. In the West, as well as in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and other places, research institutes on China issued a variety of publications, held a number of conferences to which they invited mainland scholars, and supported research projects. Sino–Western contact in this way brought about the spread of new ideas. Furthermore, young students on campus in China have stronger foreign language skills and more access to Western works. Although the overwhelming majority of the Chinese students who studied abroad majored in the sciences, technology, and business, quite a few studied economics and political science. In politics, Rousseau, Mill,
49
Hui Huang, “Overseas Studies and the Rise of Foreign Cultural Capital in Modern China,” International Sociology 17, no. 1 (2002): 35.
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and Hayek attracted their attention. Many returned students believe that socialism is not the right track for China. They ascribe the wealth and power of the West to economic freedom and democracy, endorsing the idea that economic freedom and democracy are universal principles governing the whole world.50 The current leaders will retire soon. Based on the experience of Taiwan and other Asian societies, the national authorities will change hands from traditional leaders to students returning from the West. That is happening in China too. Fourth, although scholars in China and Chinese studies commonly think China’s allegedly illiberal authoritarian culture inevitably generates authoritarian politics, there are limits to Chinese anti-liberalism.51 Confucius, for example, can be interpreted as compatible with Western concepts of liberty and democracy. And the democratic transition in Taiwan and Hong Kong demonstrates that liberalism and pluralism can survive and gain adherents in a Chinese environment.52 Fifth, the Internet has grown into the most powerful means to build up a public sphere. By the end of 2009, over 350 million Chinese had access to the Internet. Websites, blogs, and other cyber forums have become very popular, contributing to the spread of liberal ideas. Although the authorities attempt to control the content of the Internet through political surveillance, experienced Chinese have found ways to work around the surveillance to express their ideas on the Internet. For many publications, state subsidies have declined considerably. The shift from propaganda to profit means that journalists, broadcasters, publishers, and filmmakers must shift their thinking from being agents of the partystate to becoming commercially viable, which in turn means that they must be appealing enough for people to pay for their production. These market-driven trends are only going to continue to gather force and propel China’s media and publishing industry in new and more open directions. As a result, it is simply impossible for the CCP Propaganda
50
Personal interviews in China in 2008 and 2009. Barrett L. McCormick and David Kelley, “The Limits of Anti-Liberalism,” Journal of Asian Studies 53, no. 3 (August 1994): 804–831 52 Yun-han Chu, “The Evolution of Political Values,” in Bruce Gilley and Larry Diamond eds., Political Change in China: Comparison with Taiwan (Lynne Rienner, 2008), 27–48. 51
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Department and other censorship authorities to effectively police the cyber world and control the flow of information. Paralleling this trend, the past decade has witnessed a nascent civil society developing in China. In short, contrasting with the dominance of one ideology during the Mao years, by the end of the 20th century China’s intellectuals had opened up a public space and filled it with a variety of ideals and vigorous debates. Although most of the conditions such as an adequate literacy rate, the existence of a sizable urban middle class, and the protection of certain human rights which spawn Western liberalism were absent in traditional China, these have changed since the market-oriented reform in the late 1970s. Under such circumstances, liberalism has become a powerful intellectual movement in Chinese society. Liberalism is much more intellectually appealing than the official ideology, which will undermine the CCP’s role as the sole source of ideological authority. The Chinese economy has grown rapidly since 1979. The liberals’ intensive commitment to a market economy and their discourse on globalization have accompanied and, to a certain extent, contributed to this tremendous development. It must be pointed out that the diffusion of liberalism alone is unlikely to bring about political democracy in China. While this could facilitate some changes, it cannot determine the outcome of political reform in China. As far as China is concerned, it is not impossible that an alliance of nationalism and neo-Leftism will become the country’s leading ideological force in the coming one or two decades. Acknowledgments The author gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the Faculty Development Grant from Merrimack College. He would like to thank Curtis Martin, Baogang Guo, Fujia Lu, and Victoria Zhuang for their valuable comments on earlier versions of this chapter. References Cheng, Yinghong. “Liberalism in Contemporary China: Ten Years after Its Resurface.” Journal of Contemporary China 17, no. 55 (2008): 383–400. Davies, Gloria. Worrying about China: The Language of Chinese Critical Inquiry. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007.
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Feng, Chongyi. “The Chinese Liberal Camp in Post-June 4th China,” China Perspectives no. 2 (2009), 30–41. ———. “Democrats within the Chinese Communist Party since 1989,” Journal of Contemporary China 17, no. 57 (2008): 673–688. ———. “The Return of Liberalism and Social Democracy in Contemporary China,” Issues & Studies 39, no. 3 (September, 2003): 1–31. Feng, Chongyi and Zhu Xueqin, eds. Xianzheng yu Zhongguo. Zhongguo ziyouzhuyiluncong zhi yi [Constitutionalism and China, Book Series on Chinese Liberalism Vol. 1]. Hong Kong: Hong Kong Press for Social Sciences Ltd., 2004. Goldman, Merle. “China’s Beleaguered Intellectuals,” Current History 108, no. 719 (September, 2009): 264–269. ———. From Comrade to Citizen: The Struggle for Political Rights in China. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005. Hao, Zhidong Chinese Intellectuals at a Crossroads: The Changing Politics of the Chinese Knowledge Workers. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003. Leonard, Mark. What Does China Think? New York: Public Affairs, 2008. Li, Cheng ed. China’s Changing Political Landscape. Washington DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 2008. Li, He. “Returned Students and Political Change in China,” Asian Perspective 30, no. 2 (Summer, 2006): 5–29. ———. “China’s Path of Economic Reform and Its Implications,” Asian Affairs: An American Review 31, no. 4 (Winter, 2005): 195–211. Liu Junning. “China’s Reform: Approaching a Dead End” China Security, 3. no. 4 (2007) 99–102. ———. “Classical Liberalism Catches on in China,” Journal of Democracy 11, 3 (July, 2000): 48–57. ———. ed. Peking University and the Liberalism in Modern China. Beijing: China Renshi Press, 1998. Lubot, Eugene. Liberalism in an Illiberal Age: New Culture Liberals in Republican China, 1919–1937 (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1982. Ma Licheng and Ling Zhijun. Jiaofeng sanci sixiang jiefang shilu [Crossed Swords: A True Account of the Three Periods of Ideological Liberation] (Beijing: Jinri zhongguo chubanshe, 1998). Mao, Yushi. “Liberalism, Equal Status, and Human Rights,” Journal of Democracy 9, no. 4 (1998): 20–23.
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McCormick, Barrett L. and David, Kelley. “The Limits of Anti-Liberalism,” Journal of Asian Studies. 53, No. 3 (August, 1994): 804–831. Mishra, Pankaj. “Neo-Left and Neo-Right in Post-Tiananmen China,” Asian Survey 43, no. 5 (2003): 717–744. ———. From Post-Maoism to Post-Marxism: The Erosion of Official Ideology in Deng’s China. New York: Routledge, 1998. Moody, Peter. Conservative Thought in Contemporary China. Lanham MD: Lexington Books, 2007. Murphy, Melissa. Decoding Chinese Politics: Intellectual Debates and Why They Matter. Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2008. Nathan, Andrew J. “China’s Political Trajectory: What Are the Chinese Saying?” in Cheng Li ed., China’s Changing Political Landscape. Washington DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 2008, 25–43. Xiao, Gongqin. “Dangdai Zhongguo liuda shehui sichao de lishi yanbian yu weilai zhanwang, [Evolution and Future Development of Six Major Social Thoughts in Contemporary China], Leaders No. 29 (August, 2009), available at http://www.21ccom.net/newsinfo-1.asp?id=2009. Wong, Yung-Tsu. “The Fate of Liberalism in Revolutionary China: Chu Anping and His Circle, 1946–1950,” Modern China (October, 1993): 457–490. Wu, Guoguang. “From Hu Shi to Li Shenzhi: Historic Development of Chinese Liberalism,” in Feng Chongyi ed., Li Shenzhi and the Chinese Fate of Liberalism. (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Press for Social Sciences, 2004): 27–38. Xu, Youyu. “Social Thoughts in Contemporary China, Liberalism and New Left,” Shehui kexue luntan [Tribune of Social Sciences], no. 11 (2006): 101–115. Xu, Jilin. “The Fate of Enlightenment: Twenty Years in the Chinese Intellectual Sphere (1978–1998),” in Merle Goldman and Edward Gu, eds., Chinese Intellectuals Between State and Market. London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004. Zheng, Yongnian. Globalization and State Transformation in China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
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Part II
Economic and Social Challenges
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Chapter Six
China’s Demographic Dividends: Past Gains and Future Pains Ding Lu
Introduction The PRC has experienced two phases of demographic changes. The first occurred between 1949 and 1970, when population growth was unprecedentedly fast thanks to high birth rates and declining death rates (except for the 1959–1961 famine period). The second phase started in the 1970s when the government implemented family planning programs that later evolved to the one-child policy in the 1980s. Since then, the fast-declining fertility rates and entry of baby boomers into the labor force have led to a three-decade decline of the overall dependency ratio and an expanding labor force that has grown faster than the population. Such a demographic change has been very favorable to economic growth when China’s economy took off in the market-oriented reform era (Fig. 1). At the beginning of the 2010s China is entering the third phase of its demographic changes as it reaches the trough of the dependency-ratio curve, which will soon start climbing while its population quickly ages in the coming decades. By international comparison, China’s demographic transition has occurred much faster than in other parts of the world. What are the implications of the diminishing “demographic dividends” for China’s economic prospect? What challenges will it pose to public policies and social institutions? What are the policy options to deal with these challenges? These are the issues to be discussed in this chapter. 155
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Fig. 1.
China’s dependency ratios (1950–2050).
Notes: Child dependency ratio = population aged 0–14 to population aged 15–64; Elderly dependency ratio = population aged 65 and above to population aged 15–64; Total dependency ratio = population aged 0–14 and population aged 65+ to population aged 15–64. Source: The United Nations (2009).
In the next section, we will first review the main demographic challenges China faces in the coming decades, as revealed in the related literature. In the section that follows, we will observe several unique features of China’s population growth pattern. We will then empirically analyze the economic implications of China’s rapid demographic transition. In the concluding section, we will briefly discuss the policy options to deal with these challenges. China’s Demographic Challenges Concerns over the implications of demographic changes on China’s growth prospect have been rising in recent years. Such concerns are based on the hypothesis of demographic dividends.
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The typical “demographic transition” occurs as a society goes through economic modernization and thus experiences several stages of demographic changes. At the initial stage, both the fertility rate and the death rate are high and life expectancy is relatively short so the population growth is constrained and dependency ratio is high due to the large number of children each couple has to take care of. When economic modernization arrives with improved public health care methods, better diets, and rising income, the death rate (especially infant mortality rate) starts to plummet and people live longer. The growing divergence between the high birth rate and the falling death rate accelerates population growth and leads to an unprecedented expansion of the population size which features in the second stage of demographic transition. Sooner or later, with further modernization and rise in the standard of living, the fertility rate starts to decline and population growth slows, thus reaching the third stage of transition. Eventually, the falling birth rate converges with the lower death rate over time, resulting in a stable population size. Among the world’s richest countries, a post-transition era (or the fourth stage) is unfolding: As the fertility decline nears or passes the replacement level, population growth eventually comes to a halt and even starts to decline. With the low birth rate and lengthening life expectancy, the population age structure gets older and an aging society emerges. In the process of transition, when the productive population grows at a faster rate than the total population, it may bring about faster growth in per capita income if the productive population is sufficiently employed. This is likely to occur when the demographic transition moves from the second stage to the third stage. Demographic economists call this benefit “the demographic dividend” or “a window of development opportunity”: as fertility falls and the earlier baby boomers enter the working age, there are fewer young mouths to feed and more youthful workers who produce.1 As seen in Fig. 1, the child dependency ratio (between the population aged 0–14 and the population aged 15–64) fell all the way from over 70 percent in 1970 to below 30 percent after the turn of the century, while the elderly dependency ratio (between the population aged 65+ and the 1 Ronald Lee and Andrew Mason, “What is the Demographic Dividend?” Finance & Development 43, no. 3 (2006): 16–17.
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population aged 15–64) remained relatively stable below 10 percent. The total dependency ratio (between the population aged 0–14 and 65+ and the population aged 15–64) thus fell from nearly 80 percent to below 40 percent. Such a drastic decline in the dependency ratio has brought in a golden era of economic growth. Now the curve of China’s dependency ratio has hit its bottom and is set to rise in the coming years. That will inevitably reverse the demographic dividend. All indicators of demographic trends suggest that the population structure is becoming less favorable to economic growth.2 According to a projection by Wang and Mason (2005), the drying up of the demographic dividend will reduce growth in per capita income by 0.45 percent annually between 2014 and 2050. According to the World Bank (2009), China’s per capita gross national income (GNI) in 2007 was $2,360 (using the Atlas adjusted exchange rate) and $5,370 (using the purchasing power parity or PPP), which positioned the country in the rank of middle-income economies. This is a remarkable achievement obtained through fast economic growth over the past three decades. Despite the momentum of growth, however, the share of the poorest quintile in national income is only 4.3 percent, which implies that one fifth of Chinese — 264 million — live on $1,150 per person (by PPP), even less than the mean per capita income of lowincome countries. Entering an aging society at this level of development is worrying. Wu Cangping, a leading Chinese demographist, coined the phrase “getting old before getting rich” to describe the predicament China faces.3 China has already entered a post-transition era, in which the population is fast aging and population growth has slowed down significantly. This is rather unique among developing countries. In 2000, China’s population age structure was that of a mature population with a median age of about 30 years old, where the largest shares were found in the working age cohorts. By 2030, however, its median age will be 41 years old, 10 years 2 Cai Fang and Meiyan Wang, “Challenge Facing China’s Economic Growth in Its Aging But Not Affluent Era,” China & World Economy 14, no. 5 (2006): 20–31. 3 Wu Cangping, Wu Cangping zixuanji [A Collection of Self-Selected Papers] (Beijing: Renmin University Press, 2007).
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older than that of India.4 That year will also likely mark a reversal point when the population size peaks before commencing its decline. By 2025, China will account for less than a fifth of the world’s population but almost a fourth of the world’s senior citizens.5 The rapidly aging population structure may severely undermine China’s comparative advantage arising from its labor abundance, which so far has contributed to the economy’s formidable competitiveness in labor-intensive exports. The United Nations (2009) projects that China’s population aged 15–64 will peak around 2015 and then start to decline, eventually to be overtaken by that of India (Fig. 2). This is consistent with
Fig. 2.
Total population and labor force: China vs. India (1950–2050).
Note: Labor force refers to the population aged 15–64. Source: The United Nations (2009).
4
United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision. http://data.un.org/ (last update on June 18, 2009). 5 Nicholas Eberstadt, “Growing Old the Hard Way: China, Russia, India — Living Longer But Poorer,” Policy Review 136 (April & May, 2006).
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the turning point of China’s labor force size projected by the China Center for Population and Development and others.6 Cai and Wang (2006) warned that a possible gap between labor demand and supply may happen in the “very near future” (i.e. in the coming decade), causing “structural labor shortage in terms of region, sector and specific skills” from time to time. Using the effective number of workers weighted by age-specific productivity, Wang and Mason (2005) estimated that the growth rate of the effective labor force has been halved from its peak rate of 3 percent per annum in the late 1980s and early 1990s to the current rate of about 1.5 percent per annum. The steadily declining growth rate will continue and labor force growth will cease altogether by 2020 and turn strongly negative thereafter. It is noteworthy that the timing of the labor force decline compares China rather unfavorably with India and other emerging-market economies. As pointed out by Golley and Tyers, “even though India is also ageing, its most populous age groups are very young and, as these groups age, they raise the labor force participation rate and the crude birth rate. Thus, in a period during which China’s labor force shows little net growth, that of India rises by half. The same pattern is observed in other populous developing countries in South Asia and Africa.”7 Yi Fuxian (2007), a fierce critic of China’s birth control policy, disputes the credibility of official demographic statistics by pointing out that the official figures of the fertility rate (1.77 for 2000–2005) contradicts the rate of 1.22 from the 2000 census data. He thus argues that the actual aging rate should be much faster than the official projection. Unique Features of China’s Demographic Change In over half a century, China’s population growth has gone through a demographic transition similar to what has happened in other parts of the world. This transition, however, has had some unique features, which can 6 Cai and Wang, op. cit.; Jane Golley and Rod Tyers, China’s Growth to 2030: Demographic Change and the Labor Supply Constraint, Program on the Global Demography of Aging, PGDA Working Papers 1106 (2006). 7 Golley and Tyers, op. cit., 4 (2006).
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be attributed to a few historical incidents and state interventions in family size. The first was the three-year famine (1959–1961) as a result of the Great Leap Forward, which interrupted the population boom in the 1950s and caused a sharp and temporary fall in the population growth rate. According to official statistics, during the three-year famine, the death rate shot up to 25.4 per thousand people nationwide in 1960 and the birth rate fell for four years down to 18 per thousand people in 1961, resulting in a few-year period of unusually low and even negative population growth (see Fig. 3). The second event was the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), during which the state-administrated migration campaign sent over 17 million urban youths (mostly secondary and high school graduates) to live and work in rural areas during 1968–1976. The consequence was not only
Fig. 3.
Birth rate, death rate, and natural growth rate of population (1949–2007).
Sources: National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC) (various years); National Population and Family Planning Commission (2005).
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quantitative but also qualitative: On the quantity side, many of these urban youth had to postpone their marriage till the Cultural Revolution was over. On the quality side, the whole generation of youths lost the opportunity to receive a proper education while they physically and psychologically endured hard labor in farm fields and factories. The hardship and poor nutrition suffered by the generation also have had long-term consequences on the cohort’s health conditions. The third factor was the state-imposed birth control. It started with the family planning program promoting “later marriage, longer birth intervals, and fewer births” ( , , ) in the early 1970s and evolved to the draconian one-child-per-couple policy that was implemented in the 1980s.8 Last but not least is the remarkable takeoff of the Chinese economy since the early 1980s. In just one generation, China has successfully transformed itself from a secluded, poor, and centrally planned command economy to an open, prosperous, and market-based one. By growing at about 10 percent per annum for three decades, the world’s most populous nation has miraculously lifted itself from a low-income country to a middle-income one. Wealth creation on such a scale in such a period of time is unprecedented in human history. Due to these events, China’s population growth has exhibited some unique features. As shown in Fig. 3, from 1949 to 1970, China was roughly in the second stage of demographic transition, with high birth rates and declining death rates. Except for the three-year famine period (1959–1961), the annual death rate declined continuously in most years, falling from 1.7–2.0 percent in 1949–1952 to 0.76 percent in 1970. Meanwhile, the annual birth rate hovered between 2.9 percent and 4.3 percent for all years except for 1959–1961. The famine-period setback in the population growth broke up the baby booms in those years into two waves — the first wave came in the post-civil-war period (1949–1954) when the birth rate stayed above 3.6 percent for six years and the second wave arrived in the postfamine period (1962–1965) when the birth rate shot up above 3.7 percent for 8 Ding Lu, “Diminishing Demographic Dividends: Implications for China’s Growth Sustainability,” in Dali Yang and Litao Zhao, eds., China’s Reforms at 30: Challenges and Prospects (Singapore: World Scientific, 2009), 93–116.
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four years. The enlarged gap between birth and death rates led to an unprecedented expansion of the population at an annual rate above 1.6 percent throughout the period except during the three-year famine period. During the Cultural Revolution, several factors caused the birth rates to fall fast and continuously in most years. In the context of political chaos and the state-coerced massive migration of urban youth, many had to delay their marriage and childbirth. At the start of the 1970s, a family planning campaign was launched to promote late marriage and fewer births. Throughout the 1970s, the female mean age at first marriage rose from 19.7 to 22.8.9 Between 1970 and 1979, both the total fertility rate and annual birth rate fell sharply, with the former reduced from 5.81 births per woman to 2.75 births per woman and the latter from 3.34 percent to 1.78 percent. The decline of total fertility rate was further accelerated by the strong-handed state intervention in family reproduction after 1980 when the one-child policy was initiated and practiced. With a combination of coercive and incentive-based interventions, the total fertility rate fell further in the 1980s and reached the replacement level of 2.1 per woman around 1990. Despite the declining fertility rate, the crude birth rate bounced back in the 1980s, when 9 out of 10 years had birth rates above 2 percent (Fig. 3). The bulging birth rates in these years were largely caused by the coincidental arrival of the marriage-childbirth tides with the two waves of baby boomers. In a normal situation, the first-wave baby boomers, who were born in the post-civil-war period of 1949–1954, would on average have families and children at least 10 years earlier than the second-wave baby boomers, who were born in the post-famine period of 1962–1965. However, many first-wave baby boomers had to delay starting their families in the Cultural Revolution for various reasons, especially due to the state-administered massive migration of urban youth to rural areas. When this policy was reversed in the early 1980s, most of the rusticated youth were able to return to their hometowns and many started their families in their late 20s to early 30s. The marriage-childbirth tide of the first-wave baby boomers thus coincided with that of the second-wave baby boomers in the 1980s to create the bulging birth rates. 9 Ansley J. Coale and Chen Shengli. Basic Data on Fertility in the Provinces of China, 1942–1982 (Honolulu: East-West Population Institute Paper Series, 1987).
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By the end of the 1980s, the mini baby boom of the decade soon gave way to a resumed falling trend of birth rates, which dropped all the way to below 0.15 percent per annum by the turn of the century (Fig. 3). China’s fertility decline within a relatively short time period is drastic, rarely seen elsewhere in the world.10 Despite continuing debates over the extent of China’s fertility decline, most researchers accepted that by the turn of the century the fertility rate had fallen to well below the replacement level of 2.1 births per woman. The United Nations (2009) estimated that the fertility rate in 2000–2005 was around 1.77 births per woman. A combination of several events has caused the sharp fall in birth rates: The rapidly rising standard of living, thanks to the successful economic takeoff since the early 1980s, has reduced incentives for child bearing like in other parts of the world. The draconian one-child policy has further dampened the fertility rate. The peak age for marriage and childbirth among the second-wave baby boomers was phased out. Thus another unique feature of China’s demographic transition is presented — its astonishing speed. The whole episode of transformation from the second-stage demographic transition to a post-transition aging society took place in merely a little longer than one generation. Such a drastically rapid demographic transition has never occurred in other parts of the world. Figure 4 compares the fertility rates of China and India. Between 1970 and 2000, the fall in the fertility rate in China was astonishingly steeper than that in India. Consequences of Rapid Demographic Transition This fast-forward play of demographic transition is bound to have two consequences. First, a V-shape movement in dependency ratios. As remarked by Lee and Mason (2006), in industrialized countries, the demographic dividend period typically lasted five decades or more, which is also generally true for most other places in the world. In Fig. 5, one can observe that India’s dependency ratios started to fall in 1965–1970, about the same time when China’s did. It will take about seven decades for the 10 Feng Wang and Andrew Mason, Demographic Dividend and Prospects for Economic Development in China, United Nations, UN/POP/PD/2005/5, July 25, 2005.
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Fig. 4.
Fertility rates: China vs. India (1950–2050).
Source: The United Nations (2009).
Fig. 5.
Dependency ratios: China vs. India (1950–2050).
Source: The United Nations (2009).
165
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ratio to reach its trough in around 2035–2040. In China, it has only taken about four decades. The fall in dependency ratios in China is not only much steeper but also much deeper — the lowest dependency ratio is projected to be 39 percent in 2010, five percentage points lower than the lowest India is expected to reach in 2040. The second consequence is an avalanche of a fast aging population. As shown in Fig. 6, starting at about the same median age in 1970, China has advanced much faster than India towards an aged society. The difference between the two countries’ aging progress is shockingly evident when we compare their population age structures (or the population pyramids) in Fig. 7. In the mid-1990s, China’s population age structure still had a heavy base with every elderly supported by more than 10 workingage people. This ratio had risen only slightly before 2010, when the population had a bulge of working-age adults. When China’s median age rises from the current 30 years old to 41 years old in 2030, the country will
Fig. 6.
Median age: China vs. India (1950–2050).
Source: The United Nations (2009).
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Fig. 7.
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Population age structures: China vs. India (1995, 2010, 2030).
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division, www.census.gov.
have more elderly dependents than children. By that time, every elderly citizen will be supported by only four working age persons. When the median age reaches 45 years old in 2050, it will have a 38 percent elderly dependency ratio, 13 percentage points higher than its child dependency ratio. Such a level of aged society will place China alongside those rich aging countries, including most Western European countries and Japan. In contrast, India’s population age structure will continue to remain bottomheavy in the coming decades.
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How will these two consequences affect the prospects of China’s economic growth? We may consider the following channels through which these demographic changes may influence the growth of GDP and standard of living. First, when the dependency ratio falls, it allows the labor force to grow faster than the population. Other things being equal, if a larger proportion of the population is sufficiently employed, per capita income will be higher. When the dependency ratio rises, the labor force will grow more slowly than the population and its influence on per capita income growth will turn negative. The second channel is savings. When a greater proportion of people are of working age, the society has the potential to generate higher savings. A falling dependency ratio thus enhances savings while a rising one dampens savings. A rising elderly dependency ratio tends to dampen savings even more: According to the life-cycle hypothesis, individuals save when they are working and use up their savings after retirement. When the society ages, the number of those who are not saving rises relative to the number of those who are saving, and thus reduces the aggregate saving. It is a well-known health economics norm that the medical expenses of the elderly increase exponentially with age. When China’s elderly dependency ratio rises to overtake its child dependency ratio (which will occur around 2030, see Fig. 1), the overall financial burden of dependency will certainly multiply. The third channel is the link between age structure and productivity. In most careers, workers’ productivity increases with training and experience at younger ages, gradually reaches a peak in mid-life, and then declines toward retirement age. Therefore, when the labor force grows older, the overall age-related productivity may rise at first and fall after reaching a peak. To examine these implications quantitatively, we will apply a neoclassical growth approach. Suppose a Cobb–Douglas aggregate production function: Y = AE l K b
(1)
where Y = output, A = a coefficient that indicates overall productivity, E = employed labor, K = capital stock, and λ and β are elasticity coefficients
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of output to labor and capital respectively. Assuming constant returns to scale, λ = 1 − β. To evaluate the impact of the population structure, we introduce two more variables — population, N, and labor force, L, into this model to write per capita income as:
y=
Y AE1- b K b AE1- b K b E = = ◊ N N E N b
=
AE1- b K b E L Ê Kˆ E L ◊ ◊ = A◊Á ˜ ◊ ◊ Ë E¯ L N E L N
(2)
The growth rate of per capita income is: y=
A + b ◊ k + e + l A
(3)
where k = K/E, e = E/L, and l = L/N. We collected data on China’s real per capita GDP (proxy for y), real value of fixed capital formation and capital depreciation rate (used for calculating K by the standard perpetual inventory approach),11 number of employees (proxy for E), working-age (15–64 years old, proxy for L) and total population (N) for the period 1982–2007. The value of β is imputed from data on the “compensation of employees” in GDP statistics.12 The estimates of the composition of per capita income growth are presented in Table 1. For reference, we present the dependency ratios in the last column. Figure 8 displays the graphic presentation of the composition of per capita income growth. From Table 1 and Fig. 8, we can observe that per capita income growth since 1981 has been mainly driven by capital accumulation 11 In real value, capital stock at time t is Kt = Kt-1 + It − δt, where It is investment (capital formation) and δt is depreciation. 12 Data of “compensation of employees” and “capital depreciation” were published for years 1994, 1997–2003, and 2005–2007. For missing years, the values are the estimated average of values in subsequent years or backward moving average.
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Ding Lu Table 1.
Period 1981–84 1984–87 1987–90 1990–93 1993–96 1996–99 1999–02 2002–05 2004–07 Average
Estimated Sources of Per Capita GDP Growth (1981–2007). Contribution of
Annual growth rate of per capita income (%)
K/E (%)
E/L (%)
L/N (%)
Residual (%)
Dependency ratio (%)
11.4 10.4 5.1 12.1 10.6 7.8 8.6 11.1 12.4 9.9
3.3 4.2 0.9 5.7 6.2 4.8 4.5 6.7 8.1 4.9
0.8 0.4 4.6 −0.1 −0.3 −0.4 −0.6 −0.1 −0.1 0.5
1.1 1.0 1.0 −0.1 0.3 0.6 1.0 0.4 0.3 0.6
6.3 4.7 −1.5 6.6 4.5 2.8 3.6 4.0 4.0 3.9
60.9 56.8 52.1 50.0 49.8 47.1 43.2 40.3 38.6
Source: Calculated from NBSC data (various issues).
Fig. 8.
Estimated sources of per capita GDP growth.
Note: See text for assumptions underlining projected data of 2011–2050. Source: Calculated from data of NBSC (various issues), and the United Nations (2009).
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(growth of per employee’s capital stock) and the residual factor, which can be interpreted as the total factor productivity growth due to technological progress and efficiency improvement. Of the average 9.9 percent annual growth in the 27-year period, growth in per capita capital stock has contributed 4.9 percentage points while total factor productivity accounted for another 3.9 percentage points of growth. When China’s population structure starts to age, saving rates will inevitably fall so that the resources for capital accumulation will become scarcer overtime. In Fig. 8, we use the linear regression of contributions of capital accumulation on dependency ratios during 1981–2007 to project the downward trend of contributions of capital stock growth to per capita income growth, which is set to fall below 6 percentage points a year after 2020 and further below 4 percentage points after 2035. As for productivity growth, the trend in age structure is also not favorable. Currently, China’s median age is about 30 years old (see Fig. 6) and the labor force median age (which is about 15 years older, at around 45 years old) should have reached the peak of age-related productivity. When the labor force median age continues to rise, age-related productivity must fall. However, age-related productivity loss may be somewhat offset by the better human capital of the younger generations of workers and improved market-based institutions. We therefore presume optimistically that China would be able to maintain its average total factor productivity growth rate since the mid-1990s. We thus project a flat 3.6 percentage point annual contribution of productivity growth to per capita income growth. In the 1980s when market-oriented reforms were at early stages, job creation was buoyant and so employment rate (E/L) was rising, making positive contributions to per capita income growth. Since 1990, employment growth has largely been slower than labor force growth, thus contributing negatively to per capita income growth by −0.1 to −0.6 percentage points. For the coming years, we take a precautious projection that the contribution of employment growth to per capita income growth will stay close to zero. For most years since 1981, labor force growth has contributed positively (0.3 to 1.1 percentage points) to per capita income growth, reflecting the demographic dividends arising from a labor force growing
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faster than the population. These dividends are dissipating. Based on the United Nations figures (2009), it can be projected that in the coming decades, labor force to population (L / N ) ratios are going to decline and will thus reduce annual per capita GDP growth by 0.3 to 0.7 percentage points from 2016–40. Compared to its positive contribution in the past three decades, the falling L / N ratios will result in 0.6 to 1.8 percentage points loss of annual per capita income growth (Fig. 8). With the above analysis, we conclude that: (a) Falling savings rates due to population aging will severely reduce the financial resources for capital accumulation, thus slowing down the most important engine of per capita income growth. (b) Further aging of the labor force tends to retard productivity growth, another major engine of income growth. (c) In the past three decades, demographic dividends in terms of faster growth of the productive population have been relatively small as compared to the contributions of capital accumulation and productivity growth. In the coming decades, when the ratio of labor force to population starts falling, their contributions to per capita income growth will turn from positive to negative. (d) Employment rate of the labor force is unlikely to rise so its contribution to per capita income growth will be very limited in the coming decades. Policy Options Facing the grim prospect of unfavorable demographic changes, one obvious option is to relax the one-child policy and even reverse the population policy from controlling fertility to encouraging fertility. Such an option is a logical and reasonable rectification of a problematic policy, and therefore has been proposed and debated by demographists, including those in China.13 There are also recent reports that some reform of birth control policies have taken place at the provincial level.14 As the fertility rates plummet, reversing the draconian state-enforced birth control policy becomes increasingly urgent and inevitable for China’s 13
“Family Planning Becomes a Controversial Topic,” Xinhuanet, December 30, 2005. “Shanghai Urges Couples to Have Second Child Amid Concerns Over Rapidly Ageing Population,” http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news, July 23, 2009. 14
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long-term well-being. However, doing it now is not enough to deal with the avalanche of a fast-aging population in the coming decades for the following reasons. First, the fertility rate decline started in the 1970s before the era of the one-child policy. The declining fertility and birth rates in the recent decades are a common phenomenon occurred in other parts of the world where economic development and rising standards of living increased the opportunity costs of raising children. The one-child policy that started in 1980 has just accelerated this declining trend. Second, even if a pro-fertility policy replaces the birth control policy, it may not be effective in combating the falling trend of fertility rate, as testified by the experience of other low-fertility countries like Japan and Singapore.15 Despite various pro-birth public policies, the fertility rates in these more developed economies are still well below the replacement level. Finally, even if such policies succeed in lifting the fertility rate above the replacement level by causing a “mini baby boom” in a few years — which is unlikely — it will not change the fact that the dependency ratio will rise sharply in the coming two decades before the new wave of baby boomers reach their productive age at least 20 years later. As a matter of fact, if the fertility rate does rise at a time of fast aging of the elder generations, it will push the dependency ratio even higher in the next two decades. The second policy approach is to develop a pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) social security system that can effectively raise the coverage of basic pension insurance and medical insurance for the greying population. That would be equivalent to setting up a massive inter-generation wealth transfer scheme, which would have to be supported by the younger generations of shrinking sizes. Such a scheme will be neither politically acceptable for the younger population nor economically efficient. On the one hand, the wealth-income transfer or redistribution will not create new wealth or faster income growth so it is a zero-sum game. On the other hand, if the contribution to the system comes from tax-like levies linked to income, it may have a negative impact on work incentives. An alternative policy is to use the gain from capital accumulation to finance old-age support. Based on the neoclassical growth model that 15
Paul Demeny, “Population Policy: A Concise Summary,” Population Council, Policy Research Division Working Paper No. 173, 2003.
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assumes steady-state growth equilibrium, Wang and Mason (2005) calculate that, given the demographic conditions in China, if all old-age support is financed by capital accumulation, the incremental investment would raise the capital–output ratio from of 2.6 in 1982 to 7.1 in 2050. An increase in the capital–output ratio of this magnitude would lead to a doubling of output per worker under some simple assumptions. This projection implies that public policies and institutional reforms should be geared to encourage savings and investment as a major vehicle for financing old-age support. From this perspective, it is better for China to develop a fully funded personal account-based pension-cum-health insurance system, like the Central Provident Fund system in Singapore. Such a system has the advantage of ensuring a minimum rate of personal savings for retirement and old-age medical needs while offering incentives for individuals to save and invest more in capital assets.16 In the past years, China has had one of the world’s highest savings rates. Since the high savings have not been fully converted into investment, China’s excess savings have translated into a huge current account surplus. By this measure, the most challenging task in the coming years may not be sustaining a high savings rate but developing financial institutions that can more effectively channel savings to productive investment. Our analysis of sources of per capita income growth in Table 1 reveals that rising capital stock has been a major engine of economic growth. It is therefore more crucial for China to maintain a rate of capital accumulation conducive for future economic growth. Our analysis in Table 1 and Fig. 8 also shows that the declining labor force ratio (L / N ) is going to be a drag on per capita income growth in the coming decades. Our estimates in Table 1 also suggest that raising the employment rate in the working-age population may counter the loss due to falling labor force ratios. It is therefore important to implement policies that facilitate job creation and job search. One option to counter the negative impact of the declining share of working-age population is to raise the labor force participation rates among 16
For more details, see Ding Lu, “Choice of Social Security Systems: Singapore’s Experience,” in Jason Yin, S. Lin and D. F. Gates, eds., Social Security Reform: Options for China (Singapore: World Scientific, 2000), pp. 410–431.
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the aged population, as promoted by Golley and Tyers (2006). This approach is feasible since China’s labor force participation rates for oldage groups are quite low as compared to some other Asian countries. These low participation rates were mainly due to two factors: (a) The mandatory retirement ages of 60 for men and 55 for women, which were set at a time when life expectancy was only 50 years (compared with over 70 years now). (b) Economic reform and transition in the late 1990s, especially the restructuring of state-owned enterprises, led to massive layoffs, rising unemployment, and forced early retirements. Using a GTAP-Dynamic global economic model, Golley and Tyers (2006) simulated the effects of alternative policy approaches. According to their results, a transition to a two-child policy in China would boost its GDP growth, enlarging the projected 2030 Chinese economy by about a tenth. The approach, however, would slow the growth rate of real per capita income, reducing the level projected by the baseline scenario for 2030 by a tenth. Alternatively, almost the same GDP growth performance might be achieved with continued low fertility if China’s aged labor participation rates rise gradually through 2030 to approximate the rates currently observed in Japan. Starting from the current low level, the increased employment of the aged might be sufficiently life-enriching to offset the decline in leisure time. The simulated results suggest that the approach of raising aged labor participation offers superior per capita real income growth compared to what might be achieved via a policy-driven boost to fertility. To make this approach workable, a series of reforms are needed, including raising mandatory retirement ages, introducing tax schemes and other policy incentives for old-age job creation and employment, and developing a pension system conducive for aged labor participation. The snag in the approach is the relatively poor health and educational condition of China’s aged population,17 especially China’s two waves of baby boomers who experienced the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution in their childhood and youth. Finally, the results in Table 1 and Fig. 8 also highlight the importance of productivity growth to income growth. To counter the negative impact 17 For more discussions on the issue, see Eberstadt, “Growing Old the Hard Way: China, Russia, India — Living Longer But Poorer.”
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of an aging labor force on productivity, more investment in education, more incentives for technological progress, and more reforms to promote efficiency are necessary to maintain the momentum of productivity growth. Public policies in these areas must be made in accordance with the demographic reality in the coming decades. References Cai Fang and Meiyan Wang. “Challenge Facing China’s Economic Growth In Its Aging But Not Affluent Era.” China & World Economy 14(5), (2006): 20–31. Coale, Ansley J. and Chen Shengli. Basic Data on Fertility in the Provinces of China, 1942–1982. Honolulu: East-West Population Institute Paper Series, 1987. Demeny, Paul. “Population Policy: A Concise Summary, Population Council.” Policy Research Division Working Paper, No. 173, 2003. Eberstadt, Nicholas. Growing Old the Hard Way: China, Russia, India — living longer but poorer. Policy Review 136, April–May, 2006. Golley, Jane and Rod Tyers. “China’s Growth to 2030: Demographic Change and the Labour Supply Constraint.” Program on the Global Demography of Aging, PGDA Working Papers 1106, 2006. Lee, Ronald and Andrew Mason. What is the demographic dividend? Finance & Development, 43 (3), (2006): 16–17. Lu, Ding. “Choice of Social Security Systems: Singapore’s Experience.” In Social Security Reform: Options for China, eds. Jason Yin, S. Lin and D. F. Gates (Singapore: World Scientific, 2000), 410–431. Lu, Ding. “Diminishing Demographic Dividends: Implications for China’s Growth Sustainability.” In China’s Reforms at 30: Challenges and Prospects, eds. Dali Yang and Litao Zhao (Singapore: World Scientific, 2009), 93–116. Mason, Andrew and Wang Feng. “Demographic Dividends and China’s PostReform Economy.” Paper presented to the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population. XXV International Population Conference, Tours, France, July 18–23, 2005. National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC). Various issues from 1996 to 2008. China Statistical Yearbook. Beijing: China Statistics Press.
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National Population and Family Planning Commission. 2005. China’s Population, www.chinapop.gov.cn, September 20, 2005. United Nations. World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision. http://data.un. org/ (last updated on June 18, 2009). Wang, Feng and Andrew Mason. Demographic Dividend and Prospects for Economic Development in China. United Nations, UN/POP/PD/2005/5, July 25, 2005. Wu Cangping. Wu Cangping zixuanji [A Collection of Self-Selected Papers, in Chinese]. Beijing: Renmin University Press, 2007. Yi Fuxian. Daguo kongchao [A Big Country in an Empty Nest — Wrong Direction of China’s Birth Control Policy, in Chinese]. Da Feng Press, Hong Kong, 2007.
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Chapter Seven
Smashing the Iron Rice Bowls: Severing Ties Between the Chinese State and Socialist Workers Jin Zeng
Introduction For more than three decades, from the early 1960s to the mid 1990s, the Chinese state-owned work unit, or danwei, remained a fundamental institution in the Chinese economy and the lives of urban people. “Beginning in the 1960s, urban Chinese were, with rare exceptions, assigned to a work unit upon leaving school and then remained with that single work unit for the remaining of their working lives” (Naughton, 1997: 173). Jobs in danwei used to be considered “iron rice bowls” (tie fan wan), as they provided a variety of perquisites denied to peasants in the countryside: lifetime employment, stable income, affordable housing, inexpensive medical care, and generous retirement pensions. To urban Chinese residents, danwei was not only a workplace but also the center of social activities, responsible for the political and social well-being of workers. It is thus not an exaggeration to say that “one could be without a job, but not without a danwei” (Lü and Perry, 1997: 3). However, marketization and economic reforms since the late 1970s gradually eroded the danwei system. Many state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were losing out in the competition against thriving private enterprises, and it has been increasingly difficult for SOEs to continue to provide their workers 179
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with the same bundle of economic benefits as they used to. Wage arrears became a common problem among many SOEs, while state-supplied housing, medical care, and education have declined in quality and availability.1 In the late 1990s, waves of privatization, engulfing a majority of small and medium SOEs, struck a last blow to the core of the danwei system — employment security.2 Ownership transformation not only smashed the “iron rice bowl” but also abruptly terminated the seemingly eternal social contracts between the Chinese state and socialist workers. Tens of millions of workers, originally granted the status of “masters of the enterprise,” were forced to leave their danwei and fend for themselves in the job market. Both the scale and speed of the transformation were astonishing. About 85 percent of small and medium enterprises supervised by local governments had been restructured by the end of 2003 (OECD, 2005: 120). Over 30 million workers were laid off, many of whom were reduced to abject poverty.3 Not all former “masters of the enterprise” accepted the transformation passively. Several thousands of worker protests erupted every year throughout the late 1990s. There have been numerous reports of workers lodging complaints, blocking traffic in the streets, lying on railroads, or staging sit-ins in front of government buildings (see Hurst, 2004; Chen, 2000; Lee, 2000). Yet, worker protests remain spasmodic, localized, and uncoordinated (Blecher, 2002; Cai, 2006; Lee, 2007). Despite the magnitude of the social transformation and its profound consequences on workers’ livelihoods, there was a lack of large-scale worker protests in China during the late 1990s.4 In the All-China Federation of Trade Unions 1
According to Blecher (2002: 284), over 11 million workers were subject to wage arrears averaging 1,900 yuan per worker in 1997. “Almost 20 per cent of those responding to the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) 1997 survey reported experiencing wage arrears, and 46 per cent of those said that they were due three months’ pay or more” (Blelcher 2002: 284). 2 The word “privatization” remains politically sensitive in China. To avoid potential political problems, governments at all levels have adopted other terms to refer to the process of reforming SOEs, such as “restructuring” (gaizhi) and “ownership transformation” (suoyouzhi gaizao). This paper uses “privatization,” “restructuring,” and “ownership transformation” interchangeably. 3 For more information on the dire straits of laid-off workers, see Solinger (2002). 4 Blecher (2002), Cai (2006), and Lee (2007) share this observation.
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survey of 1997, 96 percent of respondents said that they had not participated in any sort of labor protest at any time during the previous five years.5 How did the Chinese state smash the iron rice bowls of hundreds of millions of socialist workers in the late 1990s without causing large-scale social unrest? How were the socially costly privatization programs implemented at the local level, where workers’ resistance to reform could be fierce and strong? Existing studies have addressed these issues from various perspectives: political repression (Goldstone and Tilly, 2001), workers’ lack of political resources, a shortage of political opportunities (Lee, 2000), lack of leadership (Cai, 2006), political incorporation of would-be leaders and activists, the fragmentation of the Chinese working class (Lee, 2007), and workers’ acceptance of the core value of the market and the state (Blecher, 2002). Although each of the perspectives sheds light on the workers’ quiescence, we still lack an adequate understanding of how the entrenched danwei system was rapidly dismantled without causing large-scale social unrest. This chapter aims to complement previous studies by explicating how local governments launched massive campaigns for SOE restructuring and how former SOE managers and workers were appeased in the privatization process. The massive campaigns elevated SOE restructuring as the priority of reform and created intense pressures for local officials to push for privatization. They also helped to shape the public perception of the urgency and desirability of reform, thus reducing workers’ motivation for resistance. Moreover, local officials employed a wide array of strategies to pacify workers and to court their cooperation, including providing monetary compensation for severing ties with the state sector, supplying reemployment assistance, and offering workers shares to secure their jobs with privatized firms. The prevalence of insider privatization in China illustrates the compromises between local officials and employees of the state sector. The critical roles played by local officials partially explain the relatively peaceful transition from a planned to a market economy in China. This chapter is based on twelve months of fieldwork from 2005 to 2006 in five Chinese cities — Shenyang, Shanghai, Wuhan, Chongqing, 5 1997 Zhongguo zhigong zhuangkuang diaocha [Survey of the Status of Chinese Staff and Workers in 1997] (Beijing: Xifan chubanshe, 1999), 1244. Cited by Blecher (2002: 286).
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and Xiamen, which respectively represent the northern, eastern, central, western, and southern part of China. In these five cities, I conducted over 150 intensive interviews with local officials (both at the municipal and district levels), bank officials, as well as former managers and workers of public enterprises. Although the five cities represent different patterns of political economy, local officials in these cities took a similar approach to implementing privatization programs: massive mobilization campaigns and appeasing workers with various measures. In the following sections, I analyze how local governments launched massive campaigns for SOE restructuring and how former SOE managers and workers were appeased in the privatization process. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the broad implication of the politics of privatization in China. Mobilizing Support for Privatization The acceleration of marketization and economic reforms in the early 1990s witnessed the gradual declining of the state sector. Many SOEs, especially small and medium ones, were operating at a loss. The privileges of lifetime employment and the generous welfare benefits associated with the “iron rice bowl” had become increasingly cumbersome for SOEs to compete against privately owned enterprises. The entry and expansion of non-state enterprises had squeezed the profit margins of SOEs, whose monopolized profits used to be protected by high barriers to entry under the planned economy (Naughton, 1997: 236–240; Lardy, 1998: 47–48). For the first time ever, the state sector as a whole was actually in the red in the first quarter of 1996. In other words, the losses of money-losing SOEs started to exceed the profits of other SOEs (Lardy, 1998: 34). The declining performance of SOEs imposed a severe burden on the fiscal capacity of governments at different levels, as local governments acted as “firefighters” on an ad hoc basis to rescue insolvent SOEs that were unable to pay salaries to their workers. It was not until 1997 that the danwei system was officially dismantled on a national scale. In that year, the policy of “grasping the large and letting the small go” (zhuada fangxiao) was formally endorsed at the 15th CCP National Congress, which meant retaining state ownership of large
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SOEs while allowing small and medium-sized ones to undergo ownership transformation. Officials in many localities seized the opportunity and pushed for large-scale restructuring of small and medium-sized public firms with mobilization campaigns. Transformation campaigns, as Tyrene White puts it, are “that of an extraordinary, revolutionary political technique designed to mobilize the entire political apparatus and galvanize mass participation to achieve a concrete policy objective” (2006: 7). In the case of China’s privatization, mobilization campaigns were carried out at two levels — both within the party to promote restructuring as a primary political task and at the societal level to garner support from the public for restructuring. As will be discussed below, mobilization campaigns transformed the political, social, and policy climate for privatization and for the reform of state–labor relations. Mobilization within the party The policy of zhuada fangxiao in 1997 sent a clear signal to local governments that for the first time in socialist China, ownership transformation of SOEs was officially allowed. As a majority of small and medium SOEs were supervised by local governments, local cadres were key agents in implementing privatization programs and in severing ties between the state and socialist workers. However, their incentives for privatization could not be taken for granted. In cities like Shanghai and Xiamen, where the local economy was booming with a vibrant non-public sector, restructuring the state sector seemed less important than other priorities due to the small contribution of the public sector to the local economy, as well as the political and economic constraints associated with the restructuring process (Oi, 2005: 135). Another important reason for the local officials’ disincentive for privatization is that SOE restructuring would not necessarily improve firm performance in a short period of time, but was likely to create immediate problems of debt repayment, rising unemployment, and the need to compensate workers with adequate severance packages. Therefore, local officials were cautious to avoid the risks associated with initiating largescale restructuring. Even in cities whose economies were characterized by a dominant public sector, the problems of a multitude of loss-making public enterprises
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and the need to develop the private sector might not provide local officials with sufficient motivation for restructuring. Local governments might have lacked the financial capability to foot the bill or they preferred not to invest the scarce fiscal resources in SOE restructuring. According to a district official in Chongqing, some local cadres were not enthusiastic about restructuring insolvent SOEs before 1997. The central government called for SOE restructuring without necessary capital investment or institutional support. But restructuring meant that we need to compensate workers for severing ties with SOEs, and the money has to come from local revenue. Yet, local cadres preferred to spend the money on building infrastructure or image projects (xingxiang gongcheng), such as bridges, roads, or a public square… Other government agencies were keen to attract investment, and paid little attention to SOE restructuring.6
Among the competing tasks local officials were assigned to, many preferred to devote limited local resources (e.g. fiscal revenue, local officials’ time and energy) to gaining recognition from their superiors so as to be promoted, while postponing difficult and risky tasks to the point that further delay would endanger their political careers. Hence, even though district officials in Chongqing realized the severe problems facing the ailing state sector, they might not have strong incentives to launch a large-scale restructuring program. However, the political landscape for privatization changed in 1997, when the urgency of ownership transformation was transmitted from the central government down to each level of local governments. Broad efforts were taken to mobilize the cadre force to support and push for SOE restructuring, including setting timetables and targets for the reform, establishing leading teams to be responsible for restructuring, as well as employing propaganda and training sessions to prepare local cadres for privatization. Shenyang was one of the first cities that carried out large-scale SOE restructuring. In December 1997, the Liaoning provincial party committee
6
Interview with a district official in Chongqing, October 18, 2006.
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and provincial government issued a joint circular on concrete strategies for alleviating large and medium SOEs’ poverty within three years. To achieve this ambitious goal, the Shenyang municipal government sent clear mandates to district governments to impose rapid restructuring of small and medium SOEs, which ushered in the first major wave of privatization in Shenyang. District governments were required to sign responsibility contracts with the municipal government, and commit to finish restructuring 90 percent of local SOEs by the end of 1998. The actual finished quota became a criterion for evaluating the performance of local officials, which created strong incentives for district officials to push for local restructuring. One district official quoted a threat from his superior, “Can you promise to finish restructuring by the end of this year? If not, then we will change another person [to take your position] (Neng bu? Buxing, huanren).”7 A former manager of a collective enterprise indicated that during the first wave of restructuring, the head of the district faced “restructuring criteria” (gaizhi zhibiao), which replaced the former “profit criteria” (lirun zhibiao).8 The change in ranking of performance criteria reflected the priorities of municipal leaders, and was one means of conveying these priorities to local officials at different levels and eventually to former SOE managers and workers. Shenyang was not the only city that linked local officials’ job performance with the progress of SOE restructuring. In the other four cities where I conducted fieldwork, district officials were required to identify local SOEs that needed to be restructured and were held responsible for restructuring them within a time frame. For example, in a survey conducted by the Wuhan Party School in November 2000, SOE restructuring was ranked by the Wuhan municipal leaders as the second priority, after organizational reform (jigou renshi gaige).9 In one district in Wuhan, SOE restructuring was promoted as an important performance evaluation target (jixiao kahe mubiao) for district leaders, which was included in the contract signed between the district government and the municipal government. The guideline for restructuring
7
Interview with the head of a district industrial bureau, Shenyang, August 3, 2005. Interview with a former manager of a collective enterprise in Shenyang, August 12, 2005. 9 See Liao, Zeng and Qian (2000). 8
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in one district in Wuhan was “restructure all SOEs that can be restructured” (nenggai quangai). However, setting timetables for restructuring SOEs could be a thorny task: on the one hand, local officials were required by their superiors to expedite SOE restructuring at the risk of generating massive layoffs; on the other hand, they were held responsible for maintaining social stability, which represents a “priority target with veto power” (yipiao fojue) (Edin, 2003: 39; Liu, et al., 2006: 2022). Thousands of laid-off workers unleashed in the restructuring process could jeopardize social stability, which would “cancel out all other work performance (of local officials), however successful, in the comprehensive evaluation at the end of the year” (Edin, 2003: 39). Therefore, district officials were cautious to promote privatization while trying to minimize the risks of social unrest associated with large-scale restructuring. Their incentive structure explains why district officials were willing to make concessions with former SOE workers while pushing for privatization. Organizational development The mobilization efforts were coupled with organizational development, which facilitated the implementation of restructuring programs. To guide SOE restructuring at the district level, major leaders from district party committees, NPC at the district level, district governments, and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference at the district level participated in the process. District governments in Shenyang also formed “property rights leading groups” (chanquan lingdao xiaozu) made up of leaders from several district-level agencies, including the economic bureau, land bureau, audit bureau, inspection bureau, and workers’ union. In Xiamen, the municipal government held a mobilization meeting with the theme of deepening SOE restructuring in October 2000. In order to supervise and coordinate the local restructuring process, the municipal government established a joint meeting system as the top decision-making body, which was chaired by the top officials of the Xiamen Municipality and consisted of the heads of different government agencies. At joint meetings, participants proposed solutions and made progress reports on restructuring in different sectors. The Xiamen Reform Liaison Office for Small and Medium Enterprises was established to directly report to the joint meeting.
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Training and education As SOE restructuring was new to the cadres of socialist China, local officials held a series of training sessions for their subordinates and SOE managers, which were intended to inform them about restructuring policies and mobilize them into enforcing the policies. For instance, the Xiamen Reform Liaison Office, Xiamen Economic and Development Commission, and Xiamen State Investment Corporation jointly held three Xiamen Training Sessions for the Restructuring of Small and Medium Enterprises. The training sessions disseminated relevant restructuring policies to about one thousand SOE managers.
Mobilizing managers and workers The mobilization campaign for SOE restructuring was not limited to government officials. To garner social support for SOE restructuring, the municipal government employed the party-state’s propaganda machine to launch a society-wide campaign. More specifically, different media (television, radio, newspapers, flyers, brochures, etc.) publicized central and local policies on SOE restructuring with the aim of eliciting public understanding and support for SOE restructuring. For instance, the Xiamen television station aired a series of special reports on SOE restructuring and invited relevant authorities to answer questions on restructuring from listeners. The mobilization campaign reinforced the idea that SOE restructuring was inevitable, and helped to shape the expectations of SOE managers and workers. With the overwhelming information on the desirability of restructuring, the question of whether or not to restructure was replaced by the questions of when and how privatization should take place. These official efforts were aimed at increasing public acceptance of restructuring and shaping the public perception of solutions to the problems faced by SOEs. In addition to a wide range of public education programs, officials of the Xiamen Reform Liaison Office paid many visits to public enterprises to persuade workers to accept restructuring by explaining governmental policies, as well as highlighting the potential benefits of restructuring to enterprises and individuals. The municipal government also selected
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profitable or better-performing firms to be restructured first to demonstrate the benefits of restructuring. Such a large-scale campaign was unprecedented in the history of SOE reforms in Xiamen. The political mobilization, coercion, and persuasion set the stage for SOE restructuring. One of the slogans widely publicized was “restructure early to develop early; restructure early to benefit early” (zaogai zao fazhan; zaogai zao shouyi). In Chongqing, district officials printed out brochures for each worker, publicized government policies, and persuaded workers to accept restructuring. They also employed the strategy of “divide and rule” by organizing mobilization meetings with top managers, mid-level managers, party representatives, worker representatives, and retiree representatives respectively. This strategy contributed to the fragmentation of workers and the erosion of worker solidarity, which made it more difficult for different groups to cooperate and demonstrate collective resistance. Appeasing Workers SOE restructuring entailed both the ownership transformation of state enterprises and the dismantling of the lifetime employment system previously enjoyed by SOE managers and workers. My interviews with local officials and former SOE managers reveal that most SOE managers and workers were unwilling to sever their ties with SOEs. The resistance to privatization was especially high among workers in their 40s and 50s, because it was unlikely for them to find alternative jobs in private enterprises or joint ventures, which tend to prefer low-waged migrant workers or high-skilled labor.10 If restructuring is compared to a bitter pill for ailing SOEs, local officials certainly tried various means to sugar-coat the pill for workers, whose 10
According to “An Analysis on Urban Employment Situation in Xiamen in 2005,” about 28.61 percent of the total number of the registered unemployed in Xiamen (20,594) were in their 40s or 50s in 2005. The “4050,” commonly referring to the laid-off workers in their 40s and 50s, could not find suitable jobs due to their low skills and lack of competence. In comparison, there were 275,500 migrant workers employed by foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) in 2005. FIEs preferred migrant workers because they asked for lower wages than native workers, as well as because they were young and willing to endure hardship. Data available online at the official website of Xiamen Statistical Bureau. http://www.stats-xm.gov.cn/staanis/tjfx00149.htm. For more information on the plight of laid-off workers, see Solinger (2002, 2003), Cai (2006, 2002).
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cooperation was key in the decentralized privatization process. As Cai (2006: 87) points out, “Although individuals’ motivation for resistance alone is not sufficient for them to take action, diluting such motivations is an effective way of reducing or preventing resistance.” Local officials resorted to a wide variety of measures to gain workers’ compliance, including economic compensations for severing ties with the work unit, setting up reemployment centers to cushion the shocks of layoffs, targeting former SOE managers and workers as new buyers, and making concessions to rebellious workers to avoid escalation of confrontations. Economic compensation One of the important measures local officials employed to appease workers was to offer monetary compensations to workers for severing ties with the state. However, monetary compensations to workers varied by region and firm, depending on local fiscal strength, basic cost of living in a locality, and the financial status of individual firms. The following section focuses on the case of Xiamen. Compared with other cities, Xiamen offered a relatively high severance pay to former SOE workers because of the relatively robust local fiscal strength and higher cost of living in Xiamen. Anticipating opposition from SOE workers, the Xiamen municipal government committed to giving workers monetary compensation for severing ties with SOEs. A municipal policy in 2001 specified that each SOE worker’s compensation would be determined by multiplying the years of his/her seniority at the SOE by the average monthly salary in the SOE in the previous year. To maintain the legitimacy and equity of the restructuring process, the policy stipulated the floor and ceiling of the standard for compensation. If the average monthly salary in the SOE in the previous year was higher than the average monthly salary in Xiamen in the previous year, the latter would be the ceiling of the standard. But if it was lower than 60 percent of the average monthly salary in Xiamen, 60 percent of the latter would be the floor of the standard. To prevent incidents of higher compensation for workers in loss-making SOEs than those in profitable SOEs, the policy specifically stipulated that the ceiling of the standard of worker compensation in loss-making SOEs would be no higher than 80 percent of the average monthly salary in the society in the previous year.
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To guarantee severance payment, the municipal policy in 2001 further stipulated that the sources of compensation would first come from SOEs, followed by investment entities of these SOEs, after which the municipal government would serve as the last resort. Accordingly, the municipal government set up a fund for SOE restructuring and bankruptcy, and RMB60 million (about $8.8 million) was allocated annually from the municipal coffer to ensure that workers would be compensated in a timely manner. This fund won Xiamen the honorary title of, “The Only City in Fujian Province That Does Not Issue IOUs in Workers’ Monetary Compensation.” The municipal government also distributed side-payments or “rents” by offering SOE workers and mangers economic incentives to restructure early. A bonus of RMB6,000 (about six months’ salary for an average worker) was promised to each worker in the SOEs restructured before December 2000. The measures adopted by the municipal government were quite effective. The number of enterprises registered to experiment with SOE restructuring immediately increased from 46 to 64. Reemployment centers During my interviews, many local officials acknowledged that former SOE workers shouldered disproportionately high costs of restructuring and their interests were poorly protected in the initial stage of restructuring. But how did local officials manage to overcome the constraints of massive numbers of laid-off workers and push for local restructuring without causing serious social unrest? To cope with the problem of massive unemployment, Shanghai pioneered a model “re-employment service centre” (zai jiuye zhongxin) in 1996, and workers were allowed to stay in reemployment centers for a maximum of three years.11 Reemployment centers were widely promoted in China around 1996 but most of them were abolished in 2001 as they were designed as transitional institutions to cope with the problem of massive numbers of laid-off workers. The activities of re-employment service centers included disbursing “basic livelihood allowances” ( jiben shenghuofei) to laid-off workers; paying 11 See Solinger (2002), Cai (2006: 20–23), and Naughton (2007: 185–188) for more detailed discussion on the operation of re-employment service centers and the plight of laid-off workers in China.
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into funds for their medical insurance and pensions; retraining them; and finding them new employment (Solinger, 2002: 316). However, the majority of SOE workers were unwilling to enter reemployment centers for fear of the loss of state safeguards. Local officials’ persuasion played a key role in coaxing workers to join reemployment centers. For example, in the first half of 1996, the Shanghai Textile Business Group as a whole was loss-making for the first time.12 The Shanghai Textile Business Group set up the first reemployment center in Shanghai, which enabled the Group to reduce its employment from 550,000 to 90,000 workers in the late 1990s. To persuade workers to join the reemployment center, local officials told the workers, “You have contributed to our country’s economic development, and the government will not forget about you.” An official of the workers’ union at the Group admitted, We were coaxing workers by saying, “You need to trust our party. Even if we sacrifice the textile sector, we still have metallurgy and steel sectors. The wealth accumulated from those sectors will strengthen our social security system, and the laid-off workers from the textile sector will benefit as well.” Under our persuasion, many workers were willing to retire early or join reemployment centers, which allowed us to lay off 460,000 workers at a very low cost. But even now most members of this group are still living in poverty, and could not benefit from the city’s rapid economic development.13
Despite the problems of reemployment centers, this makeshift arrangement served two purposes. First, it served as a useful buffer when dismantling the lifetime employment system was too big a shock for most layoffs, who were unlikely to find alternative jobs in a short period of time. It also helped to ease the transition for former SOE workers before they were left to fend for themselves in the competitive job market. Second, it helped to reduce or postpone the costs of restructuring, and enabled local governments to push forward privatization by circumventing the financial 12 Refer to the article from Renmin Daily, July 23, 1998. Available online at http://www. people.com.cn/9807/23/current/newfiles/b1020.html. 13 I wish to thank Professor Gu Guangqing for generously sharing with me this quote from her interview with three union officials of the Shanghai Textile Group on March 7, 2003.
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constraint. Laid-off workers at reemployment centers did not officially sever their ties with SOEs, and were thus not given monetary compensations. As explained by a municipal official in Shanghai, “Workers were not paid monetary compensations in the initial stage of restructuring, because using state assets to compensate workers would incur accusation of the loss of state assets, and local cadres were trying to avoid this accusation.”14 Upon leaving reemployment centers, former SOE workers were often given lower monetary compensation than incumbent SOE workers. Privatization strategies Given China’s size and diversity, one might expect that small and medium public enterprises in China were privatized via a variety of strategies. In localities with a thriving non-state sector, private entrepreneurs or foreign investors could have actively participated in the restructuring process and become qualified new owners. Compared with insider privatization, outsider privatization through market mechanisms is in theory more likely to bring about economic efficiency, as outsiders, selected through a competitive bidding process, are more capable of bringing in new technology, introducing changes in governance, and making new investment in privatized firms (Yusuf et al., 2006: 38).15 However, one surprising finding from my fieldwork 14
Interview with a municipal official in Shanghai, April 8, 2005. Privatization strategies, according to the identities of new owners, can be put into two broad categories: insider privatization and outsider privatization. Outsiders can be domestic private entrepreneurs, domestic private enterprises, or foreign investors. Insiders can be incumbent managers and workers of public enterprises. Depending on the degree of the inclusion of insiders and the degree of the concentration of share ownership, insider privatization can take the form of shareholding cooperatives, employee stock ownership plan, management buyout, and manager buyout. Shareholding cooperative and employee stock ownership are the two most inclusive forms of insider privatization. Shareholding cooperative system is characterized by a dispersed share ownership structure among former managers and workers of public enterprises. Employee stock ownership plan has a relatively concentrated share ownership among former management members of public enterprises with former workers holding minority shares. Management buyouts occur when management members buy out all the shares of their public enterprises, and the ownership structure is more concentrated than employee stock ownership plan. Manager buyout is the most exclusive form of insider privatization with the most concentrated share ownership among all the forms of insider privatization, as an individual manager buys out the whole enterprise. 15
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in the five Chinese cities is that insider privatization has been the prevailing strategy, regardless of the levels of local non-state sector development. The key to this puzzle is that the choice of a specific privatization strategy is not based on considerations for economic efficiency. Rather, it is a result of bargaining among local officials, workers, and managers of public enterprises. With jobs and positions at stake, managers and workers were trying to bargain with local officials for a favorable share of privatization. Fearing that outsiders would lay off workers and remove managers from their managerial positions, they might take collective actions to block outsider buyout. Local officials, in order to push for privatization and secure cooperation from insiders, especially managers, were likely to accommodate the demands from insiders and opt for insider privatization. In addition, district officials had a general distrust of private entrepreneurs:16 Private entrepreneurs are for profits. They wish to buy SOEs to expand their business at a low cost. If the privatized firm did not operate well, they may negate their promise and sack a lot of former SOE workers, who will then turn to the government for help.
To minimize the resistance of employees and to reduce the number of laid-off workers, the guiding principle of SOE restructuring in most localities was to transfer state assets to insiders of state enterprises, although the inclusion of insiders varied from one manager to all SOE employees. In some cities, Workers’ Congresses of SOEs were given the right to approve both privatization strategies and workers’ compensations. Outside private entrepreneurs were barred from participating in the process unless insiders were not interested in buying their firms or the net value of the firms exceeded the financial capacity of insiders.17 As a result, most small and medium SOEs were sold to their former managers (and workers), who were then turned into shareholders of privatized firms. 16 Interview with the director of district Economic Restructuring Office in Chongqing, November 13, 2005. 17 In order to make SOEs affordable to themselves, some management members either concealed parts of state assets or deliberately deflated the value of state assets. In some extreme cases, the district government sold SOEs at prices according to the purchasing power of former SOE managers. Interview with a district official in Shanghai, November 13, 2005.
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Although the iron rice bowls were smashed, former SOE managers and workers were able to keep their jobs or positions in new shareholding cooperatives. In some cases, both former SOE managers and workers were at least short-term beneficiaries of the privatization process, as the SOEs were sold to them at highly discounted or nominal prices. Due to the underdeveloped local asset evaluation institutions and the lack of effective supervision, the final sale prices were at the discretion of local officials. This left ample room for rent-seeking behavior and asset stripping. To accelerate privatization, district officials preferred to sell public enterprises to their employees at favorable discounts (30 percent or even 50 percent in some cases). One local official justified such “generosity” by saying, “They (SOE managers and workers) have worked hard in the factories all their lives. They deserved to be treated well.”18 Selective concessions The above measures for appeasing workers were not always effective in dispelling workers’ motivations for resistance. Numerous incidents of collective action have been organized by aggrieved layoffs, demanding back pay, payment of medical bills, a job, or a fair severance package. As social security has always been the paramount concern of local officials, such incidents were closely monitored and taken seriously by local officials. As Cai (2006: 86) observes, “the demands of most laid-off workers are economic in nature, and the government is reluctant to repress such nonpolitical demands for the sake of legitimacy.” To avoid escalation of the confrontation, local officials were willing to make selective concessions to meet the demands of the workers. For instance, in 2003, the lowest salary standard for severance pay in Shanghai was set at 535 yuan per month, while the average salary at the Shanghai Textile Group was 1,000 yuan per month and the average salary in Shanghai was 1,400 yuan per month. It was at the discretion of local officials as to which of the three standards was to be adopted for compensating layoffs at the Shanghai Textile Group. When the laid-off
18
Interview with a district official in Wuhan, March 29, 2006.
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workers protested against being compensated at a low level of 535 yuan per month, local officials could arbitrarily elevate the standard to 1,000 yuan or 1,400 yuan per month, depending on the intensity of the confrontation.19 Selective concessions, like a Band-Aid solution, were applied to places to contain further deterioration.20 Conclusion This chapter aims to enrich the understanding of how the local Chinese government orchestrated the most difficult reform of SOE restructuring and how the entrenched danwei system was rapidly dismantled without causing large-scale social unrest. Rather than focusing on the incentives for workers to take collective action, the chapter emphasizes how such incentives were shaped and affected by the restructuring process. It argues that local officials’ roles in mobilizing support for restructuring and in appeasing workers with various measures partially explain workers’ political passivity amid the radical transformation of both the ownership and labor relations of state enterprises. Local officials, following the central government’s call for “grasping the large and letting the small go” in 1997, resorted to the Mao-era mobilization campaigns to rally support for restructuring. Such campaigns transformed the political, social, and policy climate for privatization. The mobilization campaigns were carried out at two levels. First, mobilization campaigns were carried out within the party to promote restructuring as a primary political task. The campaigns include setting timetables for restructuring, connecting the political careers of local officials with the 19
Interview with a local official in Shanghai, June 6, 2005. The riot of 30,000 steel workers at the Tonghua Iron and Steel Works (Tonghua Steel) in Jilin Province in July 2009 and the subsequent government response further illustrate this point. Tonghua Steel is the largest SOE of Jilin Province, and was going to be taken over by a private company — Jianlong Steel. In the protest against privatization, infuriated workers beat the chief executive of Jianlong Steel to death after he threatened mass layoffs of the SOE. Shortly after the incident, the provincial government of Jilin explicitly declared through various media (including TV and radio) that “Jianlong would never participate in the restructuring of Tonghua Steel.” For more details, see two online articles http://chinaworker.info/en/ content/news/796/ and http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/27/world/asia/27steelchina.html. 20
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progress of SOE restructuring, establishing specific organizations to be responsible for restructuring, and providing training sessions for local officials and SOE managers to inform them about privatization policies and to induce their compliance. The campaigns effectively overcame the inertia of local officials and created intense pressures for local officials to push for privatization and the restructuring of state–labor relations. Second, mobilization campaigns were also carried out at the societal level to garner support from the public for restructuring. They included mobilizing managers and workers for privatization with the party-state’s propaganda machine. The mobilization campaign reinforced the idea that SOE restructuring was inevitable, which in turn changed the expectations of SOE managers and workers. They also helped to shape the public perception of the solutions to the problems faced by SOEs and increase public acceptance of restructuring. Local officials also employed a wide array of measures to appease workers, including economic compensation for severing ties with the work unit, setting up reemployment centers to cushion the shocks to layoffs, targeting former SOE managers and workers as new buyers, and making concessions to rebellious workers to avoid escalation of confrontation. By explicating local officials’ roles in the decentralized restructuring process, this chapter underlines the state’s capacity in orchestrating difficult economic reforms while minimizing social resistance. The makeshift strategies employed in the restructuring process, such as reemployment centers and insider privatization, indicate the flexibility and pragmatism of the authoritarian regime. This chapter does not mean to vindicate the restructuring policies of the Chinese government at various levels, nor does it mean to deny the existence and potential of worker protests. There are certain limitations of government measures in appeasing workers. As discussed in the chapter, most of the measures taken by local officials had their drawbacks. For example, the selective concessions made by local officials could encourage more collective action of laid-off workers. Asset stripping by former SOE managers and rent-seeking behaviors at the grassroots level could lead to worker discontent and collective action. In short, the analysis of this chapter mainly explains why there was a lack of large-scale social unrest in the past rather than predicting the level of collective action in the future.
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References Blecher, Marc. “What — and How — Have Tianjin Workers Been Thinking?” Journal of Chinese Political Science 13(3) (2008): 249–267. ———. “Hegemony and Workers’ Politics in China,” The China Quarterly 170 (2002) 283–303. Cai, Yongshun. State and Laid-Off Workers in Reform China: The Silence and Collective Action of the Retrenched (London; New York: Routledge, 2006). ———. “The Resistance of Chinese Laid-off Workers in the Reform Period.” The China Quarterly 170 (2002): 327–44. Cao, Yuanzheng, Yingyi Qian, and Barry R. Weingast. “From Federalism, Chinese Style, to Privatization, Chinese Style.” Economics of Transition 7(1) (1999): 103–131. Chen, Feng. “Subsistence Crises, Managerial Corruption and Labor Protests in China.” China Journal 44 (2000): 41–63. Cook, L. The Soviet Social Contract and Why it Failed: Welfare Policy and Workers’ Politics from Brezhnev to Yeltsin (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993). Edin, Maria. “State Capacity and Local Agent Control in China: CCP Cadre Management from a Township Perspective.” China Quarterly 173 (2003): 35–52. Goldstone, J. and Tilly, C. “Threat (and Opportunity): Popular Action and State Response in the Dynamics of Contentious Action,” in Silence and Voice in the Study of Contentious Politics. eds. Aminzade, R. R., Goldstone, J., McAdam, D., Perry, E., Sewell, W. H., Tarrow, S., and Tilly, C. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). Green, Stephen Paul and Guy Shaojia Liu. “Introduction.” In Exit the Dragon?: Privatization and State Control in China, edited by Stephen Paul Green, Guy Shaojia Liu, 1–14 (London; Malden, MA: Chatham House; Blackwell, 2005). Holz, Carsten. “Economic Reforms and State Sector Bankruptcy in China.” The China Quarterly 166 (2001): 342–367. Hurst, William. Understanding Contentious Collective Action by Chinese LaidOff Workers: The Importance of Regional Political Economy. Studies in Comparative International Development 39(2) (2004): 94–120. Lardy, Nicholas R. China’s Unfinished Economic Revolution (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1998).
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Lee, Ching Kwan. Against the Law: Labor Protests in China’s Rustbelt and Sunbelt. Berkeley (University of California Press, 2007). Liao, Shiping, Duanxiang Zeng, and Yanrong Qian. 2000. “Dangzheng lingdao ganbu dui 2000–2001 nian Wuhan shehui xingshi de fenxi yu yuce” [The Analysis and Forecast of Wuhan’s Social Situation 2000–2001 By Party Leaders and Cadres]. Chongjing luntan [Yangtze Forum]. Liu, Guy S., Pei Sun, and Wing Thye Woo. “The Political Economy of ChineseStyle Privatization: Motives and Constraints.” World Development 34(12) (2006): 2016–2033. Lü, Hsiao-Po, and Elizabeth J. Perry. “Introduction: The Changing Chinese Workplace in Historical and Comparative Perspective.” in Danwei: The Changing Chinese Workplace in Historical and Comparative Perspective. eds. Lü, Hsiao-Po, and Elizabeth J. Perry, (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1997). Naughton, Barry. The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth. Cambridge, MIT Press, 2007. ———. “Danwei: The Economic Foundations of a Unique Institution.” In Lü, Hsiao-Po, and Elizabeth J. Perry, eds. Danwei: The Changing Chinese Workplace in Historical and Comparative Perspective (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1997). Oi, Jean C., “Patterns of Corporate Restructuring in China: Political Constraints on Privatization.” The China Journal 53 (2005): 115–136. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. OECD Economic Surveys: China, 2005. Solinger, Dorothy J. “Labor Market Reform and the Plight of the Laid-off Proletariat.” The China Quarterly 170 (2002): 304–326. ———. “State and Society in Urban China in the Wake of the 16th Party Congress.” The China Quarterly 176 (2003): 943–959. Yusuf, Shahid, Kaoru Nabeshima, and Dwight H. Perkins. Under New Ownership: Privatizing China’s State-Owned Enterprises (Palo Alto, CA; Washington DC: Stanford University Press; The World Bank, 2006).
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Chapter Eight
Developing a PAYGO Social Security System in China: Retrospect and Prospect Lin Ye
Introduction: History of China’s Old-Age Social Security System Since 1949 China has witnessed several major transformations of its old-age social security (pension) system. Before the late 1960s, China’s national old-age social security program covered employees of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) with virtually no financial contribution from individuals. The government had to assume, the sole responsibility for paying pensions to all the SOE retirees. During the Cultural Revolution, a short-lived scheme existed under which each individual enterprise assumed financial responsibility for its own retirees’ pensions but employees still paid virtually nothing to receive their pensions after they retired. These two systems didn’t encounter substantial problems before the 1980s because the ratio of retirees to workers was relatively small. In 1980, more than 50 workers supported one retiree. This ratio soared to 20:1 in 2000 and has continued to grow.1 The working population in China is facing far greater financial challenges to support retirees in the new century. The traditional national pooling without individual contributions to provide retirement benefits puts too much of the burden on the shoulders of the government. Although
1 Joe CB Leung, “Social Security Reforms in China: Issues and Prospects,” International Journal of Social Welfare 12 (2003): 73–85.
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the system implemented during the Cultural Revolution partially released the government from this responsibility, SOEs resumed the role of payers in the pension system. Since most traditional industries are run by SOEs in China, it had been very difficult for major SOEs to support their large number of retirees. After China adopted its opening and reform policies in the late 1970s, it became a significant financial burden and a competitive disadvantage for SOEs to compete with newer enterprises with fewer retirees. This problem has been considered to be one of the underlying reasons why China has had so many failed SOEs in the new economy.2 After the Cultural Revolution, China carried out several major reforms to develop a modern Old-Age Social Security (OASS) system. The first major national decision was announced in 1978 to regulate the retirement of government officials and public employees in SOEs, government bureaus, and schools. This document also specified the retirement benefits for many veterans of the Anti-Japanese War and the Liberation War, as those veterans were entering retirement age. Some of the fundamental clauses in this legislation are still being implemented when applicable. In the mid 1980s, the Chinese government introduced a new national OASS scheme with a combination of government pooling and personal contribution accounts being proposed and implemented. Some local and provincial-level pension pooling was developed and individual workers were required to make monthly contributions to their own pension accounts. Cities were encouraged to set up pooling pension funds to help local enterprises with different numbers of retirees to share their pension costs. Several major industries, including civil aviation, railway transportation, banking, electric power, coal mining, and the postal service, also established their own pooling funds. In the 1990s, several major legislative acts were adopted and China’s OASS system gradually developed into its current form. In 1991 the State Council announced its decision to reform the pension system for 2 Robert Grafstein and Ruoxi Li, “The Politics of Social Security in China,” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, April 2–6, 2008, Chicago, IL. See also Kwong-Leung Tang and Raymond Ngan, “China: Developmentism and Social Security,” International Journal of Social Welfare 10 (2001): 253–259.
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non-governmental employees. The decision made it obligatory for the three parties, including the government, the employer, and the employee, to share the financial responsibility of employee pensions. Different provinces and regions were allowed to develop some differentiated pension policies under the national guidelines. The funding from the employer and employee contributions are to be administered by the provincial or local pension board, which will involve several agencies including finance, labor, planning, audit, and other related bureaus. Working on a pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) basis, participating work units (danwei) paid contributions to the fund at a defined rate, with retirees drawing their benefits from the same source. The rate of contribution for each work unit was primarily based on the amount of pension payment made each year, with a small accumulation normally being permitted. Thereafter, retirees, in theory, would receive their monthly benefits directly from local banks or post offices rather than from their previous employers. In 1995 the State Council published a more detailed implementation scheme to support its decision in 1991. While acknowledging the reform accomplishment in the early 1990s, the 1995 legislation reiterated the importance of a modern PAYGO pension system to provide secured retirement benefits to millions of Chinese citizens. One of the major policies in this legislation was the integration of the pooling and the individual pension accounts. The individual account will record all contributions from the individual before retirement, which will return to the individual as pension payments after retirement. The pooling account is the contribution from the employer, which is made up of two parts. The first part is the monthly or annual matching contribution based on the employee contribution. The employee and employer contribution made up around 11 percent of the employee’s salary. The second part requires the employer to contribute around 5 percent of the regional average salary to the pooling account. This legislation also requires every employee to contribute at least 3 percent of their salary to the pension pooling fund. The percentage of contribution will increase by 1 percent every two years until reaching 50 percent of the required contributions, with the matching contribution from employer reducing accordingly. In 1997, the State Council increased the minimum individual contribution from 3 percent to 4 percent. It also mandated that in order to enjoy the
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full retirement benefit, an individual has to make contribution payments for at least 15 years before the retirement age. The previous requirement was 10 years. In 1998 the State Council decided to integrate some previously selfadministered industry pension funds, including civil aviation, railway transportation, banking, electric power, coal mining, and the postal service, into provincial or local pooling funds. This decision further enabled the national pension scheme to cover millions more employees. The above-mentioned major legislative acts in the 1990s established the foundation of China’s current PAYGO pension system with contributions from the government, the employee, and the employer to cover the employee’s retirement benefits. There are now three pension sources for retirees. The primary source remains the contribution from employers, who contribute a portion of its employees’ total annual salary as determined by the local government. The second part is contributed by employees. The third part, from the government, makes up any shortfall that might arise. When employees retire, their pension is derived from two sources. The “basic pension” is based on the number of years of employment and the average salary of the current workforce. Usually 20 percent of the average salary of the current workforce will be paid as the “basic pension.” The “personal account” is paid out of the retiree’s accumulated individual contributions and based on the age of retirement and the local life expectancy.3 In the new century, a few new pieces of legislation made some pragmatic changes to this scheme. For example, in 2005 the combined employee and employer contribution of 11 percent of the individual’s salary was replaced by a pure employee contribution of 8 percent of the individual’s salary to make up the individual account. The entire employer contribution is to be included in the pooling fund. For employees who do not meet the minimum of 15 years of required contribution, all their individual contributions plus the benefits from the pooling fund will be paid to the individual as a one-time benefit at retirement and the individual will not receive monthly retirement benefits. After 30 years of economic reforms, most of the SOEs are no longer responsible for the pensions of their retired employees. A PAYGO system
3
Grafstein and Li, 2008.
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that covers most urban residents has been established. In the rural areas, some pilot OASS programs have been implemented prior to the national adoption.4 The next section will examine the current urban and rural OASS systems in China before issues and concerns are raised for future improvement. Current Urban OASS System in China Currently in most countries in the world, there are two major types of pension schemes: defined benefit (DB) and defined contribution (DC) schemes. A DB pension plan provides a “defined benefit,” a guaranteed annuity either in absolute currency or as a fraction of salary for retirees from the time of their retirement until their death. The amount of the annuity is calculated by specified formulas taking into consideration factors including the number of years of service. A DC pension plan specifies contributions from participants (employees), sponsors (employers), or both, either in absolute currency or as a fraction of salary. Participants choose to invest the contributions in assets. The final pension amount will depend entirely on the asset performance of the accumulated contributions.5 China’s current national pension system is a combination of these two models. As discussed above, retirees will receive their retirement benefits from a two-part plan. The first part is based on DB, financed by the PAYGO system, which will guarantee the benefits are approximately equal to 20 percent of the regional average wage. The second part has a DC feature, with employees and employers contributing around 10 percent of wages to individual accounts managed by municipal or provincial authorities. This part of the contribution will roughly replace about 35 percent of
4
Xiaoyi Hu, “Launch The Pilot Rural Healthcare and Social Security Reform” (in Chinese), 2009, http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2009-08/05/content_1383730.htm (accessed August 10, 2009). See also the State Council of China, The Decision on the Pilot New Rural Area Old-Age Social Security Program (in Chinese), 2009, http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2009-09/04/content_1409216. htm (accessed September 14, 2009). 5 Lin Ye , “Pensions,” in Governing America: Major Policies and Decisions of Federal, State, and Local Government, eds. Paul Quirk and William Cunion (New York, NY: Facts-on-File, 2010).
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the earnings of the individual’s final year.6 After the aggressive reform in the 1990s, most urban residents in China are now covered under this system. However, due to the relatively short period of implementation, there are several different groups of urban residents who will enjoy differentiated retirement benefits due to their age and employment history. The first group of retirees retired before the current pension system was implemented. These people did not make any contribution to the current system. They will continue to enjoy the designated retirement benefits as set in place when they retired and will not be affected in any way by the new system. Their pensions are usually a high percentage of the salaries they earned before they retired. The government and their employers are responsible for making their pension payments. The second group of retirees retired not long after the current pension system was implemented. They made some financial contribution to the pooling fund but the funds in their individual accounts are too small to provide a substantial retirement payment. In addition to the “basic pension” these people will enjoy, the government set up a pool of “transitional pension fund” to compensate these retirees so their pensions will be financially comparable to other retirees. For some retirees in this group, their pensions may rely heavily upon this “transitional pension fund” because they only contributed for a limited number of years to their individual retirement account. The amount in this fund will be determined by the number of years the retiree contributed to the pooling fund and the regional average salary. The third group of employees includes all the people who joined the workforce after the current pension system was implemented. Their future pensions will strictly be calculated by the formulas set up by the government. As indicated previously, their pensions will be derived from two sources — the “basic pension” and the accumulated individual account fund. Although some provinces or regions may have slightly different formulas to calculate the “basic pension,” there is some commonality in calculation. Usually the amount of a retiree’s “basic pension” will be determined by the number of 6 Martin Feldstein, “Social Security Pension Reform in China,” in Social Security Reform: Options for China, eds. Jason Z. Yin, Shuanglin Lin, and David F. Gates (Singapore: World Scientific, 2000).
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years this person contributed to the pooling fund and the average salary of the workforce in the region. A weighted index will be calculated by the number of years this person contributed to the pooling fund. A weight of 1 percent will be given to one year of contribution. A person can earn up to 20 percent of the average salary of the workforce in the region with 20 years of qualified contributions. In order to enjoy the full pension benefit, an individual has to make at least 15 years of contribution before retiring. The other part of the pension will come from the accumulated individual account fund. The total accumulated fund will be divided by a number, which is determined by the retirement age of the employee. The older the retirement age, the smaller this number will be. For example, in many provinces, if an employee retires at age 60, this retiree’s accumulated individual account fund will be divided by 120 to calculate this part of the monthly pension. If an earlier retirement age of 50 occurs, the accumulated individual account fund will then be divided by 200 to give that retiree a smaller monthly pension. Some provinces have developed a standard denominator for employees who retire after the legal age to calculate this part of their monthly pensions. The Newly Launched Rural OASS System in China In order to establish a universal OASS system in rural areas, the State Council passed the decision to set up a pilot program in some rural areas in 2009. The target was to experiment with the program in 10 percent of rural villages across the country by the end of 2009 and to cover all rural areas by 2020 under the four principles of “basic benefit, broad coverage, policy flexibility, and sustainable development.”7 Because there is no legal retirement age for agricultural workers, the government sets the age of 60 as the qualified age for those farmers to receive a standard pension payment. The funds of the system will be made up of individual contributions, local government reimbursements, and central government subsidies. Individuals can elect to contribute an annual amount of 100, 200, 300, 400, or 500 yuan to their personal accounts. Local village governments are to reimburse at least 30 yuan of the individual contribution annually. For individuals who elect
7
The State Council of China, 2009.
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higher contribution levels, local governments are expected to reimburse a larger proportion of the premium. Once the personal contribution has been made for a minimum of 15 years, individuals are entitled to receive two pension payments — the standard government pension and payment from the accumulated fund in personal accounts. Currently the standard government pension payment is set at atleast 55 yuan every month, with the possibility of higher payment in areas that have better fiscal and financial conditions. The monthly payment from the accumulated fund in personal accounts is calculated as the total funds divided by 139, an index similar to that of the urban system. With positive results from those pilot areas, the national adoption of the plan will be possible in coming years. Figures 1 and 2 depict the latest development in OASS coverage in China. As is discussed in the next page, 1998 was the year when the previously self-administered industry pension funds, including civil aviation, railway transportation, banking, electric power, coal mining and the postal service, were integrated into provincial or local pooling funds and the nationwide OASS coverage framework was set up. Since then, a phenomenal growth in total revenue, expenditure, and accumulated funds has occurred, as shown in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1.
Total revenue, expenditure, and accumulated fund (in billion yuan), 1998–2007.
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Fig. 2.
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Total participating employees (in million), 1998–2007.
Note: Figures 1 and 2 do not include statistics from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan. Source: Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security of China.
In 1998 the total national revenue was 146 billion yuan, with 151 billion yuan in expenditure. That was the last year that total expenditure exceeded total revenue. In that year, the national accumulated OASS fund was 61 billion yuan. As the system became fully developed, the total revenue grew by an annual average of 21 percent in the following ten-year period while the total expenditure increased by 17 percent annually. The accumulated fund saw an even stronger growth trend. In 2007, the account grew to 739 billion yuan, representing an annual average growth rate of 35 percent from 1998. With the increase in funding, more employees and retirees in China are now covered under the system. As shown in Fig. 2, there were 113 million participants in 1998. The figure grew to 201 million in 2007. Over 90 percent of the retirees in urban areas have been included in the system and enjoy pension coverage. After 2005, the system expanded to cover migrant workers who move from rural areas to cities to seek employment. It has been a challenge to develop a system for these migrant workers due to their high rate of relocation and unstable employment. So far, over 15 million migrant workers have been included in a system that aims to provide similar retirement benefits. The target of the national government is to cover most of the 150–200 million migrant workers in the years ahead.
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Issues and Concerns of the Current Systems In general, China has established a nationwide PAYGO pension system that requires contribution from both employers and employees with a government subsidy for shortfalls. In urban areas, this system has been implemented for over two decades and covers more than 90 percent of all workers. The national account has accumulated over 739 billion yuan to cover future pension payments. This newly developed system indicates the Chinese government’s resolution to build a modern OASS system that can be self-sufficient and economically efficient. The design of this system took into account many specific aspects of China’s economic and social conditions. Experiences of many other countries were studied and many international scholars and practitioners were involved in the developing of this mega-scale reform.8 So far this system has served the purpose well. However, there are several practical issues that need to be addressed for this system to run better. One of the most important issues is how to manage pension funds at different levels of government. In 2006 several high-ranking government officials in Shanghai were indicted for misuse and illegal investment of Shanghai’s social security funds in various real estate and infrastructure projects.9 This scandal revealed the great challenge of legally and efficiently managing the billions of yuan in pension funds in China. In many other countries, governments have been searching for better ways to manage pension funds so they can both be secure and provide reasonable financial returns. The Chinese government established the National Council for Social Security Fund (SSF) in 2000. Currently the chair of SSF is the former CEO of Bank of China, the central bank of China. The functions of the SSF include managing the national social security fund, regulating the investment of the social security fund at the
8 China Economic Research and Advisory Program, Social Security Reform in China: Issues and Options (Beijing, China, 2005). Figures 1 and 2 depict the latest development in OASS coverage in China. 9 David Barboza, “Former Party Boss in China Gets 18 Years,” New York Times, April 12, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/12/world/asia/12shanghai.html?em&ex=1208145 600&en=372ecf974b73d985&ei=5087%0A (accessed August 16, 2009).
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national level, and coordinating policy with other bureaus, including the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security and the Ministry of Finance for issues related to the social security fund. The SSF has the authority to invest the national social security fund in domestic or foreign financial markets, including bank instruments, stocks, bonds, and other financial products. A major challenge for the SSF is how to find a balance between seeking high returns and controlling high risks. Due to the longterm liquidity of the social security fund, the Chinese government allows the SSF to invest in domestic or foreign financial markets. However, in order to maintain a reasonable risk level, a certain percentage of the fund is required to be invested in national government debt and bank certificates of deposit. In the first eight years of its operation, the SSF reported an annual average capital investment return rate of 8.98 percent.10 Another aspect of the social security fund management in China is how to regulate investment at different levels of government. The SSF only regulates the national fund management and investment. Provinces and some major cities have their own authorities and agencies to manage and invest their social security funds. The previously mentioned Shanghai scandal suggests that the national government needs to provide tighter regulation to oversee provincial and local operations. Secondly, the portability of an individual’s pension account across jurisdictions is very poor under current systems. Although China has a centralized government system, the social security system doesn’t offer much consistency among jurisdictions, particularly among provinces. Different provinces adopt their own formula to calculate a retiree’s pension and different policies to manage pension funds. Currently, if a worker moves from one province to another, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to carry this individual’s pension account to his new residence. The amount of accumulated individual contributions will have to be transferred from one system to another system. All future pension benefits have to be re-calculated based on different formulas used by the new jurisdiction. The reason for such difficulties is that these provinces and regions are at different stages of
10 National Council for Social Security Fund, Annual Report of Social Security Fund 2008 (Beijing, China, 2009).
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developing their pension systems. Some provinces were selected to run pilot programs earlier so they have developed relatively advanced systems. Others may be following these provinces’ practice, and still others have not started yet. Hopefully, when all provinces and regions have developed consistent systems, a national network will make worker movement between jurisdictions technically easier and more feasible. Perhaps the most serious challenge the Chinese government faces is how to provide old-age social security benefits for agricultural workers in rural areas and tens of millions of migrant workers. After almost 30 years of development, the OASS system in urban China covers over 95 percent of employees and retirees. However, such a system in rural China has not been fully established to cover rural residents and migrant workers. Since 2005, China has started to include migrant workers who work in cities in the urban OASS system. In 2008 only 15 million migrant workers participated in the system and made contributions to receive future retirement benefits. Conclusions As one of the major social issues arising with the phenomenal economic development in China since the late 1970s, the OASS reform has become a major policy challenge for the Chinese government. The country urgently needs a fiscally sound system that can provide desirable governmentsupported retirement benefits for both urban and rural residents. After almost 30 years of continuous exploration and development, China has established a universal OASS system in urban areas to cover over 90 percent of retirees. All urban workers and their employers are included in the system to make financial contributions to support the PAYGO system. In rural areas, some of China’s latest efforts, such as the State Council’s 2009 decision to implement pilot programs, aim to establish a new pension system for agricultural workers and other rural residents. All these efforts have received wide public attention. Some systematic issues, including the management of social security funds and poor nationwide portability of pension benefits, may hinder the future success of the government’s endeavor. Until these systematic and structural issues are addressed, it will be difficult to achieve satisfactory outcomes. In general, China is on its
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way to achieving a universal PAYGO pension system as long as the government can tackle the intertwined economic and political issues. References Barboza, David. “Former Party Boss in China Gets 18 Years.” New York Times April 12, 2008. China Economic Research and Advisory Program. Social Security Reform in China: Issues and Options. Beijing, China, 2005. Feldstein, Martin. “Social Security Pension Reform in China.” in Social Security Reform: Options for China, eds. Jason Z Yin, Shuanglin Lin and David F Gates (Singapore: World Scientific, 2000): pp. 3–13. Grafstein, Robert and Ruoxi Li. “The Politics of Social Security in China.” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, April 2–6, 2008. Hu, Xiaoyi. “Launch The Pilot Rural Healthcare and Social Security Reform.” http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2009-08/05/content_1383730.htm (accessed August 10, 2009). Leung, Joe CB. “Social Security Reforms in China: Issues and Prospects.” International Journal of Social Welfare 12 (2003): 73–85. Li, Tieying. “Establish a Social Security System with Chinese Features.” in Social Security Reform: Options for China, eds. Jason Z Yin, Shuanglin Lin, and David F Gates (Singapore: World Scientific, 2000): pp. 39–50. Lin, Shuanglin, “The Effect of an Expansion of the Pay-As-You-Go Social Security System in China.” in Social Security Reform Options for China, eds. Jason Z Yin, Shuanglin Lin and David F Gates (Singapore: World Scientific, 2000): 61–82. National Council for Social Security Fund. Annual Report of Social Security Fund 2008. Beijing, China, 2009. The State Council of China. “The Decision on the Pilot New Rural Area Old-Age Social Security Program.” http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2009-09/04/content_ 1409216.htm (accessed September 14, 2009). Tang, Kwong-Leung and Raymond Ngan, “China: Developmentism and Social Security,” International Journal of Social Welfare 10 (2001): 253–259.
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Ye, Lin, “Pensions”. in Governing America: Major Policies and Decisions of Federal, State, and Local Government. eds. Paul Quirk and William Cunion New York, NY: Facts-on-File, 2010. ———, “China’s Healthcare System Reform: Development, Issues, and Prospects.” in Toward Better Governance in China: An Unconventional Pathway of Political Reform. eds. Baogang Guo and Dennis Hickey (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009).
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Chapter Nine
An Unprecedented Challenge: Can the Internet be Successfully Controlled? Junhao Hong
Introduction Although the Internet emerged in China less than two decades ago, this new communication technology has had faster development in China than in any other country. At the beginning of the 21st century, China was still one of the world’s most underdeveloped nations in terms of Internet users. By mid-2010, it had become the nation with the most netizens — online citizens. Moreover, with the rapid increase in Internet users, a new format of public opinion has emerged in the country. This new format of public opinion — the online public opinion — is becoming a new societal force with a very powerful impact on every aspect of Chinese society, ranging from people’s daily life to the political system and ruling ideology. Thus, the Internet has come to challenge the Chinese government’s control of information and freedom of speech on an unprecedented level. Until recently, the CCP and the Chinese government have been very successful in controlling the mass media, flow of information, and freedom of speech. In doing so, they have also been successful in controlling public opinion. But will they succeed in controlling online information, online “public media,” and online public opinion? This chapter examines the following five aspects that are related to the challenge of the Internet in China: (1) the scale and scope of Internet 213
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development in China and the unique power of Internet-related activities in the Chinese socio-political context and the country’s social transformation and political modernization; (2) the split strategy of “economic openness” and “political closedness” for China’s Internet industry; (3) the historical tradition and present situation of China’s information control; (4) the various Internet control mechanisms of the Chinese authorities, including the bureaucratic/political/ideological controls, the “economic approach,” the unique online policing systems, and sophisticated firewall censorship software technologies; and (5) the challenges to China’s control of the Internet, including policy/regulation difficulty, political and ideological difficulty, and technological difficulty. A Strong Tradition of Information Control Since the 1980s, the Chinese media have become more diversified as they extended their reach across the country through multiple transmissions, including satellite, wireless, and wired systems.1 While the mass media in China, such as newspapers, radio, and television, have traditionally operated under the government’s broad regulatory policies, Internet content providers face a more meticulous level of regulation. In September 2000, State Council Order No. 292 issued the first content restriction for Internet content providers. It mandates that China-based Websites cannot link to overseas news Websites or carry news from overseas media without separate approval. Furthermore, only “licensed print publishers” have the authority to bring out news online, while non-licensed Websites can only publish information already released publicly by the state news media. Legally speaking, all these Websites would need to obtain approval from the State Council Information Agency. In addition, Article 12 of State Council Order No. 292 states that “Internet content providers are responsible for ensuring the legality of any information disseminated through their services.” Article 14 gives Chinese officials full access to any kind of sensitive information: “An IIS provider must keep a copy of its records for 60 days and furnish them to the relevant
1
“China in Brief: Mass Media,” China.org.cn, December 27, 2006.
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state authorities upon demand in accordance to the law.” Finally, Article 15 defines what information must be restricted: “IIS providers shall not produce, reproduce, release, or disseminate information that: […] endangers national security, […] is detrimental to the honor of the state, […] undermines social stability, the state’s policy towards religion, […] other information prohibited by the law or administrative regulations.”2
As evidence of China’s tougher regulation on online media than on traditional mass media, Reporters Without Borders (RSF) worldwide statistics show that China has the highest number of journalists imprisoned, a total of 30; yet, there are more cyber-dissidents suffering a similar fate, totaling 49. This explains why China is still considered to have a “very serious situation” in terms of press freedom. Li Xiguang, Director of Tsinghua University’s Center for International Communications Studies, summarized how traditional media in China now felt restricted by geographic region, audience reach, the bureaucratic licensing system, the fierce market entry and competition for survival, high delivery costs, the unreliability of newspaper and magazine mailing, and the one-way communication which created passive audiences. In contrast, he emphasized how the World Wide Web allowed Chinese-produced content to be unrestricted by geography, and to have an unlimited audience reach, a high level of freedom from license requirements under electronic publications, low costs of market entry and survival, and, most importantly, an unprecedented and profoundly crucial system that is designed for two-way communication.3 Therefore, the Internet has brought about new realms of social affordances to Chinese citizens, including anonymous communication between users, greater freedom of expression, and, above all, the sharing of
2
CECC, Freedom of Expression — Laws and Regulations, April 2006. Li Xiguang, “The Internet’s Impact on China’s Press,” keynote speech at Asia-Pacific Journalists Meeting. 4 E Huang, “Flying Freely But in the Cage — An Empirical Study of Using Internet for the Democratic Development in China,” Information Technology for Development 9, no. 3 (1999): 145–162. 3
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information that traditional media would not publish. Since the Internet provides Chinese citizens with free and anonymous means of exchanging information, online chat rooms are sometimes described as dianzi dazibao or electronic versions of the “big-character posters” that were used to galvanize public opinion during the Cultural Revolution.4 The swift development of the Internet in China has made the country a giant in this new communication technology worldwide. By the end of 2009, Internet users in China surpassed 350 million, a number much larger than in any other country in the world. Also, with the launch of the 3G cellular data service, China will leapfrog the United States in terms of mobile Internet access, where fixed network lines and personal computers are typical means of Internet access. In China, Internet use on mobile phones has increased by 32.1 percent since the beginning of 2009, reaching 155 million, spurred by the rising Internet use of rural dwellers.5 With so many people now online, the CCP has made a series of attempts to assert its political control over this new medium. The first few attempts to regulate the Internet focused on the development of a nationwide intranet. Unlike the Internet, the intranet is a computer network that is distinctly isolated from the Internet. This meant that the control of the web was based on inclusion rather than exclusion, which controls what users can see, rather than what they cannot see. This was perhaps the most extreme form of Internet control, since only desirable Websites were accessible. The national intranet never caught on with the Chinese public and was soon scrapped. The CCP turned towards a policy of control based on exclusion, such as the use of blacklists for undesirable sites, something we find familiar in China’s Internet today.6 One of the “Top Ten” Worst Countries China is not the only country to manage public opinion by controlling the media, including the Internet. Yet China has often borne the brunt of the blame because it was the first to launch elaborate programs to censor online speech 5 CNNIC, Twenty-Fourth Statistical Survey Report on the Internet Development in China, July 16, 2009. 6 L Tsui, “The Panopticon as the Antithesis of a Space of Freedom: Control and Regulation of the Internet in China,” China Information 17 (2003): 65–82.
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and to monitor e-mail and text messaging. In fact, China’s approach to online censorship is so technically sophisticated that a number of countries, such as Vietnam, Zimbabwe, and Thailand, have adopted its practices. To assess the political conditions worldwide for blogging, the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) recently conducted a study of Internet censorship related issues in selected countries. Among the “top ten” worst nations, Burma is ranked the first with the world’s most restrictive media censorship under the authoritarian military junta. It is followed by Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and Egypt, which have emerged as the leading online oppressors. It is not surprising that China is one of the “top ten” worst nations, ranking eighth. However, the reason for that ranking is because China still has a relatively vibrant digital culture despite intense online censorship, and the Chinese government has dutifully provided Internet access to more than 400 million people. Vietnam, Cuba, and Turkmenistan have joined China in having a growing blogging culture under extensive monitoring and restriction. From the Freedom House assessments of 186 countries, it was evident that press controls were becoming subtler and less detectable. For 400 years, governments have learned to censor each new medium as it appeared, and the independence of the Internet has become the latest test of a government’s will to encourage and sustain a free press. Nevertheless, recent reports have shown that China has not been the nation with the most restricted form of Internet filtering instead, China’s Internet environment can be seen to possess various strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats when compared globally. With respect to how the Internet is regulated in China, it is important to recall how countries, especially Asian countries, have enormously different historical backgrounds, which influence their respective legal systems. Most Asian countries retain some elements of indigenous laws and customs, laid over by laws imposed during periods of colonization, while countries like China have instead modeled their laws in accordance with broader political and ideological philosophies such as communism. In the political context, law enforcement and politics/ideology are typically interrelated or even intertwined to varying degrees, rather than being treated as two independent practices. In these countries, laws inevitably reflect political/ideological programs, and political/ideological considerations are often crafted in the way in which these laws are enforced. Especially in the case of China, as Clarke points out, a sharp distinction
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between law and policy does not exist and state/government policy can have exactly the same effect as formally enacted legislation.7 This is very different from the common law tradition, where acts of government may be challenged if found to be beyond legislative power. A Split Strategy for Building the Internet Industry While China is clearly governed by communist authoritarian rule, the general Internet policies have seemingly helped country to advance its Internet development. China decided to make the Internet a priority of its modernization campaign and began developing it in an earnest way. The economic reform helped to intensify national Internet development by absorbing foreign capital and opening the country to the outside world.8 Particularly, the ability to efficiently execute by decree rather than consensus building, followed by legislative and regulatory reform, has tremendously accelerated the diffusion of the Internet. Since the late 1990s, China’s telecommunication adoption has leapfrogged that of most developed nations. During the period, the Institute of High Energy Physics set up China’s first web server and made the first set of web pages under the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS). The National Research Center for Intelligent Computing System also opened China’s first Bulletin Board System (BBS), called “Dawn BBS.” These two events are milestones for the development of cultural Websites and cyber-forums. As China’s government allowed access to more information communication technology to the public, Internet connectivity started to go beyond fixed lines, as more Chinese users started to adopt cell phonebased connectivity. Since 2004, the Chinese fixed line and mobile operators have invested an average of $25 billion on the network infrastructure annually. Also, by 2001, the Chinese had become the largest users of both fixed network and cellular services in the world. Within just a decade, the telecommunication penetration rate had grown from 8.11 percent in 1997 to an astounding 66 percent in 2007. As of mid-2005, there 7 R Clarke, “Information Wants to be Free,” retrieved June 10, 2009 from http://www. rogerclarke.com/II/IWtbF.html. 8 A Keidel, “Assessing China’s Economic Rise: Strengths, Weaknesses and Implications.”
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were a total of 700 million telephone subscribers, out of which 337 million were on fixed lines, and 363 million were on cellular networks. While conventional wisdom assumes that democracy will contribute more to the spread of the Internet than autocracy, on the contrary, less democratic countries have had greater success in Internet diffusion. In comparison to more democratic countries, less democratic countries have more effective national modernization strategies and prioritze the development of new information technology move. For example, China can move faster than India which has to go through the difficulty of implementing reforms under a democratic system. On the other hand, China is also renowned for its suppressive Internet policies. The most interesting finding is that the high level of Internet regulation has been met with an equally high level of Internet activism. Since the high growth of Internet adoption from 1998, each year has been filled with cases of Internet-mediated activism. As noted by Guobin Yang, there is almost a symbiotic relationship between Internet-related control and resistance in China.9 The situation becomes highly paradoxical when one realizes how Internet activism is actually sustainable, or even promoted, under the Chinese government’s extreme control. Twenty years after the Tiananmen Square incident, the Communist regime has been able to resist the Western nations’ “anticipated” democratic transformation. While liberalizing towards a capitalist globalized economy, China has been persistently struggling to accommodate its socialist roots. Within this distinctive milieu, the CCP operates one of the most politically omnipresent and technologically sophisticated systems of Internet regulation in the world. In dealing with the potential threat of Internet use by dissidents and anti-regime activities, China’s early approach had been largely based on the Leninist roots in state organizational management. In essence, this refers to the non-technological solutions, including the practice of surveillance and use of informants, arrests and seizures of Internet dissidents, declaration of Internet directives and regulations, and the constant presence of authority. These practices form the legal, economic,
9 Yang Guobin, “Activists Beyond Virtual Borders: Internet-Mediated Networks and Informational Politics in China,” First Monday [Online], September 4, 2006.
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and social norms of Lessig’s regulatory “pathetic dot.”10 More recently, however, the control of the Internet has evolved to be more comprehensive, which also includes high-tech-based mechanisms and approaches. Using the Bureaucratic System for Political/Ideological Control One of the most effective approaches in China’s Internet censorship has been the use of bureaucratic regulations that favor the incumbent government. Typically, such regulations are used to shape the market environment and to enconrage participants to promote the state’s interest, most of which is political and ideological. The government first passed some Internet regulations in 1994, and has since followed up with more than 40 rules and regulations to reinforce its control of the Internet. These new rules simply repeat that the Party has a monopoly on the dissemination of information and that the media’s task is not to be objective but to relay state propaganda. The rules govern all Internet-based “news information.” Specifically, they ban the dissemination of news of the following categories: (a) information that goes against the basic principles set in the Constitution; (b) information that endangers national security, divulges state secrets, subverts the government, or undermines national unification; (c) information that is detrimental to the honor and interests of the state; (d) information that instigates ethnic hatred, ethnic discrimination, or that undermines national unity; (e) information that undermines the state’s policy on religion or that promotes evil cults or preaches feudalistic and superstitious beliefs; (f) information that disseminates rumors, disturbs the social order, or undermines social stability; (g) information that disseminates pornography and other salacious materials; that promotes gambling, violence, homicide, and terror; or that instigates the commission of crimes; (h) information that insults or slanders other people, or that infringes upon other people’s legitimate rights and interests; and (i) information prohibited by the law or administrative regulations. In September 2005, two new bans were announced: it is forbidden to encourage illegal gatherings, strikes, etc., to create public disorder; and it is forbidden to organize activities under illegal social associations or organizations.
10
L Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1999).
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In addition, from time to time Chinese authorities have continued to issue various ad hoc rules and regulations in response to various “perceived” Internet-based challenges to the regime. For instance, in September 2001 authorities shut down the popular Baiyun Huanghe bulletin board hosted by the Huazhong University of Science and Technology in Wuhan, after students posted articles about the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown.11 Later, the university’s Communist Party Committee required all users of that BBS to register under their real names. By October 20, 2005, the “system of real-name registration” had gone into effect across most BBS in China, causing a stir among both the netizens and citizens. Along with regulating discussions over BBSes, in November 2000 the government also enforced regulations that require privately owned, popular news portals to carry only news content that is approved by state-run media organs. In January 2002, extending the responsibilities of Internet service providers (ISP), the Ministry of Information Industry announced new regulations requiring ISPs to maintain detailed records on their users, install software to record e-mail messages sent and received by their users, and send copies of any e-mails that violate the law to the appropriate Chinese government departments. While intimidation through regulations, loss of business and network licenses, as well as the threat of arrest already seem sufficient, the government still makes a point to remind Chinese netizens of its presence in order to instill the broad sense of self-censorship. Moreover, once dissident activity is identified, authorities shifts focus from obtaining and surveying electronic communication to gathering physical evidence. This involves security agents conducting surprise raids on dissidents’ premises. During such arrests and seizures, the seized item would be the suspect’s computer, which is likely to contain incriminating evidence of anti-government activities.12 On January 20, 1999, Lin Hai became the first person in China to be imprisoned for “subversive” use of the Internet. Lin was sentenced to two years in prison after being charged with subversion, for providing a total of 30,000 e-mail addresses to VIP
11
“Student Net Site Closed over Talk of Tiananmen,” Reuters, September 6, 2001. Kevin Platt, “China’s ‘Cybercops’ Clamp Down,” Christian Science Monitor, November 17, 1999. 12
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Reference, a widely distributed pro-democracy newsletter which reports on dissident activities and human rights in China.13 Lin’s sentence was intended to deter potential “cyber-dissidents” from using the Internet for similar “subversive ends.” Besides charging dissidents for anti-government uses of the Internet, the authorities have also resorted to targeting dissidents whose subversive uses of the Internet are not inherently political in nature. This particular tactic allows the authorities to silence or smear their target’s character, rendering them less effective in their discourse with the general public. For example, in January 2000, the Public Security Bureau in Shanghai arrested Wang Yiliang, a dissident writer, for his participation in an unauthorized literary association. When the authorities raided his home, they discovered images of nude women on his computer. The authorities subsequently used this to sentence him to two years of “re-education” through labor for “possessing pornographic articles.”14 When there is widespread unrest and the above regulatory tactics fail, the government’s ultimate response would be simply to shut down Internet networks in order to regain control. The “shut down” tactic has also been employed across other communication networks, such as short message services (SMS). Using the Lucrative Market in Exchange for Control The Chinese government has also devised a barrage of regulations covering almost every corner of the Internet market. For these regulations to be effective, as early as in 1997, the Public Security Bureau (PSB) produced the Computer Information Network and Internet Security, Protection and Management Regulations. This placed most of the responsibility for monitoring, reporting, and preventing politically subversive use of the Internet upon local Internet service providers. Whenever a violation occurs, Internet service providers are required to assist the PSB in investigations by providing information on the suspect’s online activities. Typically deemed
13
Hong Kong Information Center, “Court Verdict on Dissident Lin Hai,” January 20, 1999. Hong Kong Information Center, “Guizhou Poet Ma Zhe Has Been Sentenced to Five Years’ Imprisonment on Subversion Charge,” March 14, 2000.
14
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as an “invasion of privacy” by most democratic nations, this particular piece of regulation becomes especially thorny for American Internet-based businesses operating in China. In September 2000, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) added a license targeting Internet content providers (ICP), aptly named the ICP record. Internet content providers refer to organizations or individuals who provide publicly available content on the web, or who provide platforms on which users can communicate and converse with one another (e.g. chat rooms, bulletin board systems), or on which users can create and share text, photographs, audio, and video (blogging services, photo- and video-sharing sites, podcasting and audio-sharing services, etc.). The ICP license permits China-based Websites to operate in the market, and these ICP records appear as license numbers at the bottom of the front page of these Websites. The license can be obtained through registering at www.miibeian.gov.cn, where relevant information about the Website owner, its content, the hosting provideretc, etc., needs to be provided.15 By China’s law, all Websites with their own domain names that operate inside China are required to obtain a license, and China-based Internet service providers are required to block the site if a license is not acquired within the grace period. Also, if an ICP wants to maintain its business license to operate in the market, it is expected to prevent the appearance of politically objectionable content on its Website through automated means, or to police content uploaded by users for “unacceptable” material, which is then taken down manually by company employees.16 The result of this legal requirement has led many ISPs and ICPs to implement self-censoring policies, including going to the extent of paying employees to lead “armies” of volunteers who patrol chat rooms and bulletin boards to ferret out risky political commentary, foul language, and unwanted advertisements.17 Known as “Big Mamas” in China, these paid, powerful moderators are likened to the Orwellian “Big Brother” in Western nations. 15
China Hosting Blog, “ICP License in China: What You Need to Know,” April 2, 2009. OpenNet Initiative, “Analysis of China’s Non-Commercial Web Site Registration Regulation,” February 22, 2006. 17 Lokman Tsui, “Internet in China: Big Mama is Watching You: Internet Control and the Chinese Government,” University of Leiden, 2001. 16
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In order to minimize reprimands from China’s security organs and to keep their licenses in good standing, BBS and blog-hosting services also maintain lists of words and phrases that either cannot be posted or which may cause monitoring software to “flag” the content for manual removal by ISP or ICP employees. Meanwhile, search engine businesses maintain lists of thousands of words, phrases, and web addresses to be filtered out of search results, so links to politically objectionable Websites do not appear on the search engine’s results pages. Consequently, the users are prevented from knowing that the forbidden content exists at all.18 Since the government does not provide such sensitive lists directly to Internet businesses, the specific method of censorship is left up to companies themselves. Through educated guesswork, as well as trial and error, Internet companies generate their “block lists” based on what they know to be politically sensitive, what they are told in meetings with officials, and “complaints” or warnings they receive from the authorities in response to the appearance of politically objectionable search results.19 As evidence of how developed these self-generated block lists are, a list of politically “sensitive” words used for censorship and monitoring at China’s largest search engine, Baidu, was discovered on May 11, 2009. The list contains 13 categories of politically sensitive words, including those related to “counter-revolutionary” activities, human rights and appeals, the Tiananmen Square Massacre, Falun Gong, ethnic and race relations, military secrets, and organ harvesting. Since Baidu claims 63 percent of the online search market share in China, this affects the majority of Chinese netizens and how they view the world based on Chinese cyberspace.20 Affirming China’s Internet regulation practices, Jennifer Windsor, Executive Director of Freedom House, stated that “[t]he Chinese government is hoping to enjoy the benefits of the global economy without jeopardizing its political control.” A Freedom House report entitled “Speak
18
“China to Tighten Supervision Over Blogs, Online Search Engines” Xinhua, June 29, 2006. Also, Howard French, “Chinese Discuss Plan to Tighten Restrictions on Cyberspace,” The New York Times, July 4, 2006 19 Philip Pan, “What Do Cat Abuse, Mascot and Cash fiesta Have in Common?” The Washington Post, February 19, 2006. 20 “Words Censored by China’s Largest Search Engine,” Epoch Times, May 11, 2009.
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No Evil: Mass Media Control in Contemporary China” highlighted how senior media managers appointed by the CCP are responsible for the news content of the media organizations they oversee, and how they are expected to censor content deemed unfavorable.21 As Christopher Walker, Director of Studies at Freedom House, summed it up, the old system of control relied primarily on repression and direct censorship, whereas the new “China model” relies on carrots and sticks and self-censorship.22 Ultimately, Internet companies are doing the government’s work by stifling access to information. Instead of being censored, they have taken on the role of censor. A similar strategy of seducing global Internet companies to exchange their principles for entry into the huge and lucrative Chinese market has also been effectively used in the last few years. Although most Western observers were optimistic that China’s entry into the WTO in 2001 would inexorably lead to an open society with improvements in human rights and the rule of law, the past few years have shown that China’s political status quo has been largely continued. Even after China became a WTO member, its media censorship and human rights suppression have persisted. Attracted by the potentially huge revenue from China’s lucrative market, several multinational Internet companies that wanted to do business in China had little choice but to subject themselves to the political and ideological will of the Chinese government. Yahoo was the first major US Internet content company to make headway into the Chinese market by operating its Chinese-language search engine in Beijing in 1999. As part of Yahoo’s early entry into China, the company voluntarily signed the “Public Pledge on Self-Discipline for the Chinese Internet Industry,” which was initiated by the Internet Society of China (ISOC). The ISOC is an official government organization that appears to be, or disguises itself, as an NGO. Human rights groups were clearly upset, because they expected a US company to help introduce democratic reform into China. In its defense, Yahoo explained that the
21 Freedom House, “Speak No Evil — Mass Media Control in Contemporary China,” February, 2006. 22 Ibid.
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restrictions on content contained in the pledge imposed no greater obligation than already exists in laws in China. As with all Chinese search engine services, Yahoo China adheres to the Chinese government’s censorship by maintaining a block list with thousands of words, phrases, and web addresses to be filtered from search results. Blocked Websites include US-based Radio Free Asia and Human Rights Watch, while searches for politically sensitive keywords would either deliver no response or generate an error message.23 Yahoo’s search engine filtering also allows for news blackouts of major controversial events. Besides information censorship, Yahoo has also disclosed private user data from its Chinese-language e-mail service to Chinese law enforcement agencies. Four of the most pertinent cases Yahoo assisted with in recent years were the arrest and conviction of online dissident Wang Xiaoning, pro-democracy activist Jiang Lijun, Internet writer Li Zhi, and journalist Shi Tao.24 In particular, Shi Tao’s arrest came as a shock to the American public after they discovered that Yahoo had provided the journalist’s private e-mail conversations to the Chinese authorities. This ultimately led to the arrest of the 37-year-old writer for the Dangdai Shang Bao (Contemporary Business News) and later a severe sentence of ten years in prison.25 These cases have become infamous examples of what some transnational companies would do to seek economic profits, even at the cost of giving up fundamental principles. What is most serious is that all of these incidents also have had a profound negative impact on China’s democratization process. While Microsoft has had industry presence in China since 1992, the Chinese-language Microsoft Network (MSN) online portal was launched much later in 2005. One month into service, Microsoft quickly came under pressure from the US press and Chinese bloggers for censoring words such as “democracy” and “freedom” in the titles of its Chinese blogs. By December of that year, censorship of MSN Spaces Chinese blogs had been extended beyond the titles of the full blogs to the titles of individual blog 23
Human Rights Watch, “Race to the Bottom: Corporate Complicity in Chinese Internet Censorship,” August 9, 2006. 24 Ibid. 25 “CHINA: Yahoo Gave E-mail Account Data Used to Imprison Journalist,” Committee to Protect Journalists, September 7, 2006.
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posts.26 Public outcry about MSN Spaces censorship peaked when the popular blog of Zhao Jing was completely shut down on December 30, 2005.27 Zhao had used his blog to speak out when propaganda authorities cracked down on Beijing News, a relatively new political tabloid with a national reputation for exposing corruption and official abuse. The editor and deputy editors were fired and more than one hundred members of the newspaper’s staff walked out in protest. Zhao’s blog content caused Chinese authorities to issue the removal request to Microsoft in China. Public criticism of Microsoft’s action was so strong that it was called before the US House of Representatives to explain its collaboration with the Chinese government’s censorship practices. Microsoft’s defense was that it had to comply with the Chinese government’s demands, but made it clear that it was making efforts to be transparent in the process.28 Now, Microsoft’s Chinese Hotmail servers have tried to remain offshore from mainland China in order to avoid the same ethical dilemma as Yahoos e-mail service, by citing that the data is not under China’s legal jurisdiction. Google’s entry into China became a test of its principles as well. In September 2002, the Chinese government started blocking access to Google.com, redirecting users instead to Chinese search engines. Even though Google explained that no negotiations had been made with the Chinese authorities, it seemed that public outcry in China coerced the authorities to bring it back two weeks later. Despite Google’s return to service in China, not all of its features were functioning as they would outside China. The most prominent feature missing from the search engine was Google’s cache, which would give users access to an earlier version of a webpage in case the current version was inaccessible for any reason. This feature would allow users to read content that would otherwise have been filtered by the Chinese Internet service and content providers.29 In December 2005, Google finally received its ICP license to operate in
26
R MacKinnon, “Chinese Blogs: Censorship and Civic Discourse,” 2006. R Soong, “The Anti Blog is Gone,” December 31, 2005. 28 Jack Krumholtz, “The Internet in China: A Tool for Freedom or Suppression?” February 15, 2006. 29 Google Search & Cache Filtering Behind China’s Great Firewall,” OpenNet Initiative, August 30, 2004. 27
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China. One month later, Google released a censored version of its search engine for the Chinese market. As with Yahoo and Microsoft, Google became its own censor by generating its own block list based on its research of what was being blocked by Chinese ISPs. Similarly, Google maintained that its approach was necessary to provide better service to Chinese Internet users.30 Perhaps this is indeed a very difficult dilemma for these transnational companies in the era of globalization when their business survival relies heavily on a global market. Nevertheless, in all three instances of multinational Internet corporations doing business in China, every company succumbed to the Chinese government’s stringent censorship and law enforcement procedures by proactively helping to screen content. Unfortunately, in today’s world, exchanging fundamental principles for economic profits seems to have become a common and acceptable practice among global companies. These companies have become “smarter” — or cynical — when dealing with China’s market and political system. They are very eager to get a foot in the Chinese market, but they know very well that in order to reach that goal they cannot offend the communist regime. As a result, after being seduced by the potentially huge profits, countless large companies have surrendered to the Chinese regime in order to be permitted to enter the irresistibly lucrative market. In so doing, they have — willingly or unwillingly — become agents of political and ideological censorship for the Chinese government. Online Policing with Unique Chinese Characteristics One of China’s best-known and closely monitored civil rights activists, Hu Jia, campaigned for years for democracy, the environment, and the rights of HIV/AIDS patients. Hu was sentenced to serve three and a half years in jail for “incitement to subvert state power.” The intensity of intrusive surveillance experienced by Hu Jia and his wife is commonplace for most dissidents in China, particularly those blacklisted by the Chinese authorities. These
30
D Sullivan, “Google Created Evil Rank Scale To Decide On Chinese Censorship,” January 30, 2006.
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types of government police enforcement generally peak during sensitive political anniversaries or visits by sympathetic foreign dignitaries. As of 1998, the Chinese authorities had reportedly placed 150 dissidents on an intensive watch list. The authorities were particularly alarmed by the dissidents’ ability to form an effective national network, which led to heightened surveillance.31 The dissidents are typically placed into three categories:32 (a) to be arrested upon entry into China; (b) to be refused re-entry into China; and (c) to be dealt with “according to the circumstances of the situation.” Once a dissident has been identified, the authorities will monitor their electronic communications, especially their use of the Internet.33 In September 2006, Foreign Policy published an interview with Li Wufeng, Director-General of China’s State Council Information Office (SCIO). The SCIO is supposedly the agency in charge of regulating Internet content inside China. In this interview with Western journalists, Li revealed some statistics about China’s massive Internet presence. As staggering as the numbers might sound, Li stated, ironically, that they neither had the technology nor the manpower to censor or filter the Internet, as they had only a few people in the Internet Affairs Bureau. He also noted that Internet regulation was an international practice. Other Chinese observers pointed out that Li Wufeng should not be considered a “cop” in the first place, as SCIO itself is neither a public nor state security agency; instead, the real manpower for policing the Internet could be seen by the sheer number of Internet police working in the police force in different cities and provinces but fulfilling their functions online. To reinforce the presence of Internet police online, two cartoon figures “Jingjing” and “Chacha” (the pronunciation of the two Chinese characters jing cha is exactly the same as the pronunciation of the Chinese term for “Police”) were first introduced to Chinese netizens who visited the main portals of Shenzhen in January 2006. As Director Chen of the Information Center, Internet Security and Surveillance Division of Shenzhen Public 31 Willy Wo-Lap Lam, “Beijing Orders Close Watch on 150 Dissidents,” South China Morning Post, December 24, 1998. 32 Beck, Simon “Concern Grows Over Secret Ban; Rights Chief Puts Exiles On Agenda,” South China Morning Post, January 8, 1995. 33 James Mulvenon, “RAND Center for Asia-Pacific Policy,” April 15, 2002.
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Security Bureau, stated, “We publish the image of Internet police in the form of a cartoon with the purpose of letting all Internet users know that the Internet is not a place beyond the law and the Internet police will maintain order in all online behaviors.”34 When Internet users visited websites and discussion forums in Shenzhen, they would see the two cartoon police figures floating on their screen. Jingjing and Chacha each had their own homepage, and netizens could communicate with them about Internet security via QQ instant messaging. However, officials in charge of the Internet Security and Surveillance Division of Shenzhen Public Security Bureau noted that “the main function of Jingjing and Chacha is to intimidate, not to answer questions.” The significance of Jingjing and Chacha’s appearance is to publicly remind all netizens to be conscious of “safe” and “healthy” uses of the Internet and to self-regulate their online behavior. In August 2007 Beijing police launched a similar campaign. Besides using police mascots as a form of online intimidation, the police have also posted intimidating signs at the physical premises of Internet cafes. The messages usually read “You should not spread antisocial material on the Internet” at the top, and “Please come with me because you published materials to harm the unity of the nation” at the bottom. To compound the “Big Mama” effect, around the time of the Beijing Olympic Games in August 2008, all Internet cafes in the 14 main city districts of Beijing were mandated to install surveillance cameras to take photographs of people as they entered the shops. These photographs, as well as scanned identity cards, were then uploaded to a citywide database maintained by the Cultural Law Enforcement Taskforce. An online survey by the People’s Daily showed that 72 percent of the respondents opposed this measure, calling it an infringement of their rights, while only 26 percent supported the regulation mainly because of their concern for children. Regardless of whether the Chinese public like it or not, the Washington Post estimated that to support its censorship effort, the Chinese government employs 30,000 Internet censors, or cyber-cops, whose job is to monitor web content and activities in China. The official
34
Mackinnon.
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Xinhua News Agency confirmed with a report that “[t]he Ministry of Public Security will be dispatching virtual cops to China’s major web sites. […] All major portals and online forums will be monitored.”35 These cyber-cops periodically appear on contentious discussion forums as police mascots Jingjing and Chacha, which serve as visual warnings to Internet users that they are being monitored. Many observers inside China believe, however, the actual number of full-time cyber-cops across the whole country could easily exceed 100,000, excluding another huge number of people working at all administrative levels in the nation and whose work is partially like that of a cyber-cop. A New “Great Wall” for Cyber Control Despite the Chinese government’s denial that it restricts any Internet content, China is renowned for operating the world’s most sophisticated Internet filtering system. With China’s Internet population standing at 400 million users by mid-2010, there may be enough reasons for the communist authorities to invest in the technological infrastructure in order to help maintain control over cyberspace. Underlying President Hu Jintao’s call for promoting a “healthy” online culture,36 every possible technological step has been taken to limit access to any content that might potentially undermine the state’s control or the country’s “social stability.” While China’s approach in the past several decades had been traditionally “low-tech Leninist,” the present communist regime’s counterstrategies now include the most up-to-date technical solutions. These include highly advanced devices for filtering Websites, e-mail monitoring, deception through disinformation, and the hacking of dissident and Falun Gong Websites. The motivation for using these particular techniques, as Mulvenon emphasized, derives from the fact that the regime understands implicitly that the center of gravity is not necessarily the information itself, but the organization and use of information for political action; therefore, the
35
“President Hu Jintao Asks Officials to Better Cope With Internet,” Xinhua, January 24, 2007. 36 Ibid.
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strategy of the security apparatus is to create a climate that promotes selfcensorship and self-deterrence.37 The domestication of this attitude can be seen in how the Chinese government encourages the commercialization of the Internet, as opposed to its politicization. For Chinese as well as foreign companies in the Internet industry, the point would be to make economic profits, not political effects. This point became obvious in 2006, when 52 individuals were imprisoned for their subversive online activities. Among them were several writers and journalists, who were convicted after the disclosure of their personal e-mail accounts by Yahoo’s Chinese partner. China is one of the very few countries in the world that has such extensive external and internal censorship of the Internet. According to a Reporters Without Borders report entitled “Journey to the Heart of Internet Censorship,” China’s Internet consisted of external as well as internal censorship.38 On the external front, a filtering system blocks what the Chinese authorities consider to be undesirable overseas Websites from being viewed by people inside China. This external censorship is best represented by the very effective, yet internationally infamous, technology of the “Great Firewall of China.” A firewall is a kind of censorship software system, and the Great Firewall of China is a China-made worldwide brand name censorship software system known for its great effectiveness. Interestingly, and ironically too, the Great Wall of China was built and so named more than 2,000 years ago by China’s first emperor in an attempt to block foreign invasions. Now, 2,000 years later, China has built a new technological Great Wall with the same name and for the same purpose. However, this time the Chinese authorities intend to use this new, strong Great Wall to block a different type of “foreign invasions” that would come from cyberspace. Although researchers have quickly pointed out that technically it is not really a network firewall that is able to block or censor all “unwanted” information, the Great Firewall of China is used as protection for the nine gateways connecting China to the global Internet. Its key function is to prevent surfers in China from accessing “undesirable” web content in global cyberspace. In essence, the Great Firewall of China allows the
37 38
Mulvenon, “RAND Center for Asia-Pacific Policy.” Ibid.
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Chinese authorities to block web pages that they do not wish their citizens to see, grants them the ability to disrupt web sessions if certain taboo keywords like “democracy” and “freedom” are searched for, and removes links that would take viewers to forbidden Websites. These banned Websites include international news sites, pornography, the search engines of unlawful companies, a multitude of blogs, and sites related to Tibet and the banned religious movements such as Falun Gong.39 On the internal front, the censorship system focuses on content published locally on China-hosted web servers. This system of domestic control is more thorough and permanent than the externally focused Great Firewall of China. While Chinese authorities are typically unable to take down content posted on overseas web servers, they alternatively have been able to pressure local web companies and Internet service providers to keep “undesirable” content off the web as much as possible. Sohu, Sina, and other major Chinese web companies have been — willingly or unwillingly — following the “guidance” of the various government agencies simply because the government ultimately controls the fate of these web companies. In other words, they either obediently do whatever they are told to do by the government, or they simply face being cut off. Just as China’s system of filtering external Websites is renowned enough to earn the moniker of “Great Firewall of China,” so is China’s internal web censorship system, which is actually much more effective, especially with the co-operation of the private sector in doing its censorship work. Content filtering is not only implemented at the “national gateway” level, but also throughout the public Internet access facilities in China. In 2003 alone, for example, the Internet police closed down almost half of the country’s 200,000 Internet cafes and installed surveillance cameras and filtering software in the remaining establishments.40 Conclusion While the swift development of the Internet has greatly promoted China’s economy and changed the lives of the Chinese people, politically and 39
Xiao Qiang, “The ‘Blog’ Revolution Sweeps Across China,” New Scientist, November 24, 2004. 40 Ibid.
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ideologically it has also become an unprecedented challenge to the CCP. The Chinese authorities have made every effort to ensure that they have complete control over this new, powerful communication technology. A central question is: How effective is the control? Can they really control the minds of 1.3 billion people? Can they really control the impact of the Internet on the historical transformation of the Chinese society? If their control is still effective at present, then a further question is: How much longer can this control last? Generally speaking, with all the above-discussed control mechanisms, Internet control by the Chinese government has been very effective so far. At the macro level, the Internet is largely used to serve the interest of the authorities, be it economic, political, or ideological, though at the micro level some netizens use the Internet as a new venue for their political activities. However, nowadays Internet control by the Chinese authorities is becoming more and more difficult and less and less effective. First, using the bureaucratic system for political and ideological control is facing increasing pressures and criticisms from both the Chinese public and the international community. The new global political environment favors and promotes a more open and liberal system. Under this tendency, China’s bureaucratic system is becoming decreasingly rigid, and the political and ideological control system, including the Internet control system, is becoming increasingly loose. A recent example is the case of the Green Dam project, a censorship software system. The Chinese government first mandated that all foreign computer manufacturers install this censorship software system before they sell their computers to China. This mandate was cancelled minutes before the deadline of July 1, 2009, under the pressures from various international groups. Second, the Chinese government’s “economic approach” to the political/ ideological control of the Internet is becoming both increasingly difficult and less effective. On one hand, Chinese domestic Internet businesses are discovering new ways to bypass or find loopholes in the government regulations; on the other hand, large transnational Internet businesses are becoming less obedient to the Chinese authorities due to the public pressures from their own countries. Third, regardless of how advanced and effective a censorship technology is, there will always be a more advanced technology to render the firewall technology ineffective. The online
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policing system is also becoming less and less effective. One reason is that the online police can only, to some extent, effectively deal with a situation that has happened, not something that has not happened. So, in a way, they are just like firefighters. Even though the online police can somewhat effectively deal with what has been posted online, by the time the “unwanted” material is detected, it will have been seen by millions of people already. Another reason is that regardless of whether there are 30,000 or 100,000 cyber-cops in China presently, the number is always too small when compared to an Internet population of 400 million with hundreds of millions of computers and cell phones. Finally, the fundamental questions are: Should the Internet be controlled? If so, how should it be controlled? Who should control it? Does the ruling party or the government have the right to control the public’s use of the Internet? The answers to these questions are fundamentally different for Western countries and non-Western countries, for democratic philosophies and authoritarian and communist philosophies, and for the people who are rulers and those who are being ruled. In fact, the long-practiced political and ideological control of every aspect of society and the people’s life by the CCP has met with unprecedented challenges: a repressive, tightly controlled political system is being questioned by more and more of the public; the legitimacy of one-party ruling structure is being openly challenged; the dominance of the communist ideology is becoming weaker; and the interaction between China and the outside world on various issues is becoming unstoppable. While being challenged, there is no sign that the communist regime is willing or ready to give up its political and ideological ruling of the Chinese society. Thus, there will be a long battle of control and anti-control of the Internet between the authorities and the Chinese public. References Beck, Simon. “Concern Grows Over Secret Ban; Rights Chief Puts Exiles On Agenda.” South China Morning Post, January 8, 1995. CECC. Freedom of Expression — Laws and Regulations (April 2006). http://www. cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/exp/explaws.php (accessed August 2, 2008).
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Clarke, R. “Information Wants to be Free.”(2009). http://www.rogerclarke.com/II/ IWtbF.html (aceessed June 10, 2009). CNNIC. Twenty-Fourth Statistical Survey Report on the Internet Development in China at http://research.cnnic.cn/html/1247709553d1049.html, July 16, 2009. Epoch Times. “Words Censored by China’s Largest Search Engine.” (May 11, 2009.) Retrieved June 15, 2009 from http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2/ content/view/16651/ Freedom House. Speak No Evil — Mass Media Control in Contemporary China. (February, 2006) Retrieved June 6, 2009 from http://www.unhcr.org/ refworld/docid/473aae932.html French, Howard, “Chinese Discuss Plan to Tighten Restrictions on Cyberspace,” The New York Times, July 4, 2006. Huang, E. “Flying Freely But In The Cage — An Empirical Study of Using Internet for the Democratic Development in China,” Information Technology for Development 9(3), (1999): 145–162. Human Rights Watch. “Race to the Bottom: Corporate Complicity in Chinese Internet Censorship” (August 9, 2006) Retrieved October 16, 2008. Keidel, A. “Assessing China’s Economic Rise: Strengths, Weaknesses and Implications” (July, 2007) Retrieved November 28, 2008. Krumholtz, Jack. “The Internet in China: A Tool for Freedom or Suppression?” (February 15, 2006) Retrieved on June 8, 2009 from http://wwwc. house.gov/international_relations/109/kru021506.pdf Lessig, L. Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1999). MacKinnon, R. “Chinese Blogs: Censorship and Civic Discourse.” accessed on June 10, 2009 http://rconversation.blogs.com/rconversation/files/mackinnon_ chinese_blogs_chapter.pdf Mufson, Steve. “Chinese Protest Finds a Path on the Internet,” The Washington Post, September 17, 1996, p. A9. Mulvenon, James. “RAND Center for Asia-Pacific Policy” (April 15, 2002) Retrieved on July 21, 2008 from http://www.cecc.gov/pages/roundtables/041502/mulvenon.php OpenNet Initiative, “Internet Filtering in China in 2004/2005,” (2005). Retrieved April 14, 2005 from http://www.opennetinitiative.net/studies/china/ OpenNet Initiative. “Google.cn Filtering: How It Works” (January 25, 2006) Retrieved on June 13, 2009 from http://www.opennetinitiative.net/blog/?p=87
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Pan, Philip “What Do Cat Abuse, Mascot and Cash Fiesta Have in Common?” The Washington Post, February 19, 2006. Platt, Kevin, “China’s ‘cybercops’ clamp down,” Christian Science Monitor, November 17, 1999. Reporters Sans Frontières Google — Yahoo Market Battle Threatens Freedom of Expression (July 26, 2004). Reporters Without Borders. “Verdict in cyberdissident Li Zhi case confirms implication of Yahoo!.” February 27, 2006. Reporters Without Borders. “Bad start to year for online free expression.” January 12, 2007. Soong, R. “The Anti Blog is Gone.” (December 31, 2005). Retrieved on June 5, 2009 from http://www.zonaeuropa.com/200512brief.htm#100 Sullivan, D. “Google Created Evil Rank Scale To Decide On Chinese Censorship” (January 30, 2006). Retrieved on June 14, 2009 from http://blog. searchenginewatch.com/blog/060130–154414 Tsui, L. “The Panopticon as the Antithesis of a Space of Freedom: Control and Regulation of the Internet in China.” China Information 17 (2003): 65–82. Tsui, L. “Internet in China: Big Mama is watching you: Internet control and the Chinese government.” University of Leiden (2001). Lam, Willy Wo-Lap, “Beijing Orders Close Watch on 150 Dissidents,” South China Morning Post, December 24, 1998. Xiguang, Li. “The Internet’s Impact on China’s Press.” Keynote speech at Asia-Pacific Journalists Meeting, 2001. Xinhua, “China to tighten supervision over blogs, online search engines,” June 29, 2006. Xinhua, “President Hu Jintao asks officials to better cope with Internet,” January 24, 2007.
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Chapter Ten
Spiritual Beliefs and Ethnic Relations in China: A Cross-Cultural and Social Psychological Perspective Yueh-Ting Lee and Hong Li
What are the major challenges and difficulties that the PRC faces today? Obviously, different individuals, including scholars or lay people, may have different opinions of, or answers to, this question. From the perspective of social and cross-cultural psychology, the two interrelated areas of spiritual beliefs and ethnic relations seem to be very challenging. This chapter addresses three issues: (a) previous research on cultural and psychological beliefs and the current situation of spiritual beliefs in China; (b) whether China’s ethnic issues are more cultural or religious than racial; and (c) the possible solutions to problems in Chinese cultural beliefs and ethnic relations. Previous Research on Cultural and Psychological Beliefs and the Current Situation of Spiritual Beliefs in China If you travel around China, you may notice that the crime rate has increased, and so has the current suicide rate in comparison with the past three decades. Many people complain that products made in China are fake or substandard. When you read the newspapers or watch the news on the TV, it is not unusual to observe cases of corruption, organized crime or gangs, murder, prostitution, pollution, cheating, and vandalism at the 239
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cost of other Chinese people. There is no doubt that economically and technologically speaking (i.e., hardware), China is well-accomplished in the world. Culturally and spiritually (especially morally, i.e., software), China has almost failed to a large extent (Lee, 2001; Chen and Lee, 2008). Do the success of economics and the development of science and technology determine the harmony and stability of a society or country? The answer to this question is no. Based on research in social psychology and anthropology (Lee, McCauley, and Draguns, 1999; Lee, 2001), growth in economics and finance and the development of science and technology are just parts of social achievements. Further, national success and civilization can be broken down into three types of capital: (a) socio-cultural and psychological capital, (b) financial and economic capital, and (c) scientifictechnological capital.1 Though the three types of capital are interrelated (see Fig. 1a), our own research showed that the first capital is the foundation, or primary determinant, of the second and third capital (see Fig. 1b) (Lee, 2001; Lee, Pepitone, and Albright, 1997; Triandis, 2009). B B
A
A
C (a)
C (b)
Fig. 1a (left) and Fig. 1b (right). The relations between the three types of capital. Component A = socio-cultural and psychological capital; Component B = financial and economic capital; Component C = scientific-technological capital.
1
Originally this idea was presented by the first author in 2000. See Lee, Yueh-Ting, “The 1st Capital Needed for China in the 21st Century’s Globalization: Rebuilding Chinese ‘Dao,’ ‘De Governance’ and ‘Socio-Cultural/Psychological Beliefs.’” Paper presented at the 5th Annual Conference by Western Returned Scholars Association Beijing, China, August 8–10, 2000.
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There is much empirical research to support the idea that the first capital — socio-cultural and psychological — plays a very important role in economic and technological development. According to McCauley, Ottati, and Lee, Weber was perhaps the first to point it out. In his The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (first published in 1904), Weber noticed that modern industrial development had proceeded faster in Northern Europe, especially in Calvinist nations like England and the Netherlands, than in Catholic France, Italy, and Spain. He held that the Reformation had led to different values in the Protestant nations, in particular to encouraging hard work, thrift, and a concern for worldly success.2 Similarly, social psychologist McClelland (1961, 1953) continued Weber’s idea by linking values with economics and developed a measure of achievement motivation from the content analysis of stories told by individuals in reaction to ambiguous pictures. He intended to test Weber’s thesis by relating the national level of achievement motivation to economic growth. For example, taking kilowatt-hours per capita as a measure of national economic performance, McClelland used the economic level of 1925 to predict the economic level of 1950 in a regression model. The result was consistent with Weber’s finding: the 1920 scores had a correlation of 0.53 with economic over- and underachieving between 1925 and 1950 (McCauley, Ottati, and Lee, 1999). From the perspective of political economy, Putnam (1993) seized the opportunity of this quasi-experiment in institutional formation to track the success of the new regional governments, and to relate differences in government success to differences in civic culture measured in the early 1900s. In Putnam’s research, a measure of the strength of civic traditions in the early 1900s was found to be a better predictor (beta = −0.73, p < 0.01) of the percentage working in agriculture in 1977 than was the percentage working in agriculture in 1901 (beta = 0.26, ns). Similarly, the strength of civic traditions in the early 1900s was a better predictor (beta = 0.82, p < 0.01) of the percentage working 2
CR McCauley Victor Ottati and Yueh-Ting Lee, “Cultural Differences in Economic Growth,” in Personality and Person Perception Across Cultures, eds. YT Lee, CR McCauley, and J Draguns (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. Publishers, 1999), pp. 85–100.
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in industry in 1977 than was the percentage working in industry in 1901 (beta = 0.01, ns).3 Led by Michael Bond, a cross-cultural social psychologist at the Chinese University of Hong Kong (Chinese Culture Connection, 1987), social and cross-cultural psychologists developed a survey to assess particularly Chinese values. They obtained samples of university students from 22 nations, and found a dimension that Bond called “Confucian Dynamism.”4 Nations high on this dimension gave more importance to persistence, thrift, observing status differences, and having a sense of shame, and gave less importance to personal steadiness, face saving, respect for tradition, and reciprocation of favors. The new dimension was interesting because it was correlated with recent variations in economic growth; in particular, the Asian Dragons (South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong) were notably high on Confucian Dynamism. For the ten nations with the required data (Brazil, Canada, Germany, Great Britain, India, Japan, South Korea, Netherlands, Sweden, the United States), it was found that there was a correlation of +0.72 between Confucian Dynamism scores (Hofstede and Bond, 1988) and economic growth between 1960–1989 (Granato, Inglehart, and Leblang, 1996). All of these research findings suggest that the socio-cultural and psychological capital played a very important role in economic and industrial/technological success. What about China today? There is too much emphasis on Component B (financial and economic capital) and C (scientific technological capital) while Component A, socio-cultural and psychological capital, has been marginalized or neglected. The Chinese people are successful in building their hardware via the last two capitals (i.e., Components B and C) but have almost failed to catch up with regard to the cultural and spiritual (or psychological) components (i.e., Component A) (Lee 2000, 2001). An example is the belief void (e.g., little spiritual belief, a spiritual vacuum, or a hunger for spiritual belief) of most individuals in mainland China. Relatively speaking, religious or spiritual beliefs are very common and necessary in human life elsewhere in the world. For example, from a cross-cultural 3
Ibid., 89. For more information, please see Chinese Culture Connection, “Chinese Values and the Search for Culture-Free Dimensions of Culture,” Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 18 (1987): 143–164.
4
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International statistics on religion: China, the United States, and India. Chinaa
Population Spiritual
1,330,044,544 53% (33% Daoist and traditional Chinese religions, 10% Christianity, 8% Buddhism, 2% for Islam or other)
Non-religious (unaffiliated)
47%
USAb
Indiac
303,824,640 1,147,995,904 87% (80% Christians 96% (72% Hinduist, including 44% 12% Muslim, Protestant, 26% 7% Christians, Catholic, and 10% 5% traditional, Other Christian and Sikhs & Others). 7% other religions — Jewish, Buddhism, Muslim) 13% 4%
Sources: a http://www.worldstatesmen.org/China.html, b http://www.worldstatesmen.org/United_States. c html and http://www.worldstatesmen.org/India.htm.
perspective, India is the most spiritual country (94 percent), and the United States is also more spiritual (87 percent) than China, as seen in Table 1. This information suggests that religion or spirituality plays a role in human life. More specifically, approximately 65 percent of Americans stated that religion was an important part of their daily lives as per the recent Gallup Poll data (Newport, 2009).5 Psychologically, it was found that when people are under stress or face a problem or crisis, 80 percent of individuals in the USA prayed and 64 percent reported that they read the Bible or other inspirational literature (Pargament, 2007). Reading the Bible or holy works indeed produced a positive impact on individuals’ behavior. For example, approximately 89 percent of respondents tended to agree that reading the Bible or other holy books made them more honest and more likely to stand up against evil behavior or social injustice.6
5
For Newport’s report, please also see http://www.gallup.com/poll/114022/state-statesimportance-religion.aspx. 6 The data were reported in Lee, ‘The First Capital Needed for China in the 21st Century’s Globalization: Rebuilding Chinese ‘Dao,’ ‘Benevolent Governance’ and ‘Socio-Cultural and Psychological Beliefs,’ Journal of Yuncheng University 19(1), (2001): 37–45 (in Chinese with an English abstract). Also see p. 98 in Kenneth T. Pargament, Spiritually Integrated Psychotherapy: Understanding and Addressing the Sacred (New York: The Guilford Press, 2007).
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Moreover, religious or spiritual beliefs have been found to play a very important role in human mental health and social harmony. Previous research has already documented that ideological, religious, and cultural beliefs can have an impact on explanatory or attributional style (Lee and Seligman, 1997; Oettingen and Seligman, 1990; Sethi and Seligman, 1993). For example, Chinese culture has changed substantially since the death of Chairman Mao (Lee, 2000, 2001), and ordinary Chinese citizens no longer believe in Marxist Communism or Maoism. At the same time, political restrictions limit the free articulation of religious and ideological thought. Other research (Lee, 2000, 2001) suggests that this might place Chinese people within a “belief void” that might increase their susceptibility to crime, divorce, suicide, anxiety, depression, or other mental or social problems.7 In other words, an abundance of data has demonstrated that religion, or other spiritual belief, is very important to our way of life. China’s Ethnic Issues are More Cultural or Religious Than Racial Ethnic relations, which like spiritual beliefs, are a challenge in China, also deserve more research. Cross-culturally, in spite of the riot in Tibet in March 2008, the riot in Xinjiang in July 2009, or possible unrest in the future, China’s ethnic relations are much better and much less challenging than ethnic relations in the United States. There are three reasons for this: (a) ethnic problems are more cultural than racial; (b) ethnic integration is historically and gradually evolutionary; and (c) Chinese integration is easier compared to the unresolvable American dilemma. Ethnic problems in China are more cultural than racial What is ethnicity, culture, or race conceptually? Two clarifications are in order. First, it is very unfortunate that scholars or lay people in China have often translated “minzu” (i.e., ethnicities) into “nationalities” in Chinese
7 Yueh-Ting Lee, Victor Ottati and Dejun Guo, “Understanding and Preventing Depression Among Mainland Chinese Children,” Prevention and Treatment (the e-journal of American Psychological Association), http://journals.apa.org/prevention/volume5/pre0050010c.html.
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(Lee et al., 2004). This translation is ostensibly inaccurate, though ethnicity is partially related to nationality. Second, though it is difficult to define and distinguish between ethnic or national groups, cultural groups, and racial groups, we will try to offer some tentative explanations based on prior research. For example, while this is very controversial, probably changeable, and sometimes inaccurate, a racial group is largely related to a category of people who may be different with regard to their skin color, facial features, and the like, which could be transmitted from generation to generation (Aguirre and Turner, 1998; Marger, 2003). An ethnic group consists of people who perceive themselves as having a common descent. This perception is often associated with land, leadership, shared language, religion, and lifestyle.8 A cultural group consists of people who share enough to define a distinct meaning system, a worldview that leads them to evaluate people and events in a distinct way. It is politically important to the extent that the shared meaning system is not only shared but also perceived as shared, and becomes especially important if the meaning system is seen to be threatened (Hall, 1975; Campbell, 1967). In other words, ethnicity is often, but not necessarily, part of the shared perspective that defines a cultural group as a group entity (Campbell, 1958). Simply put, culture is embedded in “variable systems of meaning”9 or “human-made parts of the environment”10 and it is learned and shared by members of a society. Based on the Greek concept of ethnos, ethnicity refers to the people of a nation or tribe (often with its own languages, land or territory, leadership, lifestyle, or religious or other beliefs and behaviors). Though it is associated with culture and is often interchangeable with culture11 as well 8 These four L’s were discussed in Yueh-Ting Lee, Clark McCauley, Fathali Moghaddam and Stephen Worchel, eds., Psychology of Ethnic and Cultural Conflict (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004). 9 R. Rohner, “Towards a Conception of Culture for Cross-Cultural Psychology, “Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 15 (1984): 111–138. 10 Please see Triandis, Harry C. 1994. Culture and social behavior. New York: McGrawHill, and Triandis, Harry C. Fooling ourselves: Self-deception in politics, religion, and terrorism (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2009). 11 See Lee, Yueh-Ting, Clark McCauley and Juris Draguns Eds. Personality and Person perception Across Cultures (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. Publishers, 1999), p. 5.
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as race, ethnicity focuses on “groups that are characterized in terms of a common nationality, culture, or language” (Betancourt and Lopez, 1993).12 Cultural background can be a determinant of ethnic identity or affiliation, but being part of an ethnic group can also determine culture. On the other hand, race is more physiological and physical than religious or cultural. China has 56 ethnic groups, i.e., 55 officially recognized national minorities plus the Han Chinese as a majority group. The Han and those 55 minority groups are called Zhonghua Minzu, which is the name for the big Chinese family.13 The largest administrative ethnic minorities are the Zhuang (in southern China), the Manchu (in northeast China), the Hui and the Mongols (in northern China), the Yi (in southwest China), the Miao (in southwest China, also known as the Hmong outside China), the Tibetan (western China), and the Uyghur (in Xinjiang, northwest China). The 56 ethnic groups in China are culturally dynamic and politically complex, but four clarifications are needed. First, 9000 years ago, there were over tens of thousands of ethnic groups, of which the Han people were an ethnic minority group in northwest China (Lee and Liu, 2010). Due to cultural integration and assimilation, the Han group has become a majority group which accounts for 95 percent of the Chinese today. Second, based on recent research (Bilik et al., 2004) it is unknown exactly how many ethnic groups existed in China before 1949, when the Communist Party took power. Through the ethnic program of recognition and recategorization, the Chinese government officially recognized and recategorized all ethnic groups into the Han and the other 55 ethnic minority groups. Based on this, the government could make preferential policies for those ethnic minority groups. Third, in Taiwan, which is considered a part of China, there are two major categories of ethnic groups: the mountain people (e.g., Atayal, Seedeq, Saisiyat, Bunnun, Tsou, Kanakanabu,
12
See Betancourt, H and Lopez, SR. The study of culture, ethnicity and race in American Psychology. American Psychologist 48(6) (1993): 629–637, 631. 13 For the term minzu or Zhonghua minzu and its following data, we cited them from Bilik, Naren, Yueh-Ting Lee, Hanh H Phan and Kan Shi. The Ethnic and Cultural Processes of Zhongguo (China) as a Central Kingdom. In The Psychology of Ethnic and Cultural Conflict, ed. Y-T Lee, C McCauley, F Moghaddam and S Worchel (Westport CT: Praeger Publishers), pp. 193–215.
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Rukai, Paiwan, Puyama, Ami, and Yami) and the people from the plains in central Taiwan or near the Sun Moon Lake (Bilik et al., 2004). Finally, relatively and cross-culturally, ethnic relations are much better and more easily handled in China than in the United States. Except for those minorities in Xinjiang (e.g., the Uyghur and Kazak Chinese) who are Caucasians (less than 0.1 percent, i.e., one white out of 1000 yellow individuals), the Han Chinese and the rest of the Chinese ethnic groups look more alike (yellow). On the other hand, in the US, there are African Americans (black), American Indians, Latino Americans, Asian Americans (yellow), and Caucasian or European Americans (white), who all look quite different physically. If a person is a minority in China and accepts the Han cultural values and beliefs, he or she can easily pass into the mainstream Han group because he or she looks like them. However, an African, Asian, or Latino racial minority may not be easily accepted into the mainstream Caucasian group or society for various reasons. This is to be discussed in greater length in the following paragraphs. Ethnic integration is historically and gradually evolutionary in China while American immigration is complicated China has had a history of ethnic integration and assimilation of 9000 years (Wang and Song, 2007). Ethnic integration has been historically developed and embedded evolutionarily. On the other hand, America has experienced a history of ethnic conflict and immigration, and American ethnic immigration has become more and more confrontational in the past 300 years (Dinnerstein, Nichols, and Reimers, 1996). From the 16th through the 20th century, Native Americans have been victims of the genocide committed by the Europeans. Native Americans were driven away or died due to disease or war (Lee, Quinones-Perdomo, and Perdomo, 2003). The outcome of this migrant superordination was abysmal. Statistically, before Europeans arrived, there were about 100 million indigenous people in the North and South Americas (Stannard, 1992). By the end of the 19th century, fewer than one million remained. Because Europeans had little success in turning Native Americans (who, after all, knew the territory much better than the colonizers) into slaves, they brought thousands of Africans to the so-called New World as
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slaves. Inhumane treatment was integral to maintaining social control, as noted by Dinnerstein, Nichols, and Reimers (1996). In the middle of the 19th century, Chinese immigrants began turning up in ever-larger numbers to the United States. According to Lee, Quinones-Perdomo, and Perdomo (2003), the Chinese went to the US for three major reasons: European powers had intruded into China, the results of which were internal turmoil and emigration; gold had been discovered in California; and the industrial development of the United States called for a large labor force. With respect to the latter, by the end of the 19th century, Chinese laborers worked long hours and received less pay than their competitors, the Irish immigrants who were also mistreated. Many Caucasians considered the Chinese to be “yellow devils” that should be driven into the Pacific Ocean (Joshi, 1999). Personal accounts of Chinese immigrants gave witness to their particular experiences (Lee, Quinones-Perdomo, and Perdomo, 2003; Rico and Mano, 2001). The American immigration policy has a history of being racist or at least race-preferential (Cao and Novas, 1996; Takaki, 1989). The first anti-immigration law in the history of America was the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act (Cao and Novas, 1996; Lee, Quinones-Perdomo, and Perdomo, 2003). This act was not repealed or abandoned until 1943 (although Chinese immigrants still did not receive full rights until the mid 1960s). Also, the 1901 “Gentleman’s Agreement” slowed the immigration of Japanese laborers.14 In other words, while millions of Europeans immigrated to the United States, very few Asians were allowed (i.e., the Asiatic Barred Zone Act which occurred before 1965, when the Hart–Celler Act was issued).15 In the 19th century, Manifest Destiny became popular among white Americans. It was the belief that white people had the duty and right to control and develop the entire North American continent (Hu-DeHart, 2000). As more and more European immigrants arrived, there was a great demand for Native American land. In 1830, the Indian Removal Act was
14 For this, please see Cao, Land and Himilce Novas. Everything You Need to Know About Asian American History (New York: Plume, 1996). 15 Ibid.
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passed by the United States Congress, giving President Andrew Jackson power to force Indians to move west of the Mississippi River. The Cherokee, Chickasaw, Choctaw, Seminole, and Creek made the journey under the threat of violence. The Indian “Trail of Tears” was a typical case of migrant superordination (Lee, Quinones-Perdomo, and Perdomo, 2003; Dinnerstein, Nichols, and Reimers, 1996).16 Also in the early 19th century, relations between the British and Spanish colonialists were tense as the British sought more land. This led to the Mexican–American War, the outcome of which was the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo of 1848. By this treaty, Mexico ceded to the US much of the territory now referred to as the American Southwest (California, Utah, Arizona, New Mexico, Nevada, and Texas). The treaty clearly stated that “those who shall prefer to remain in the said territories may either retain the title and rights of Mexican citizens, or acquire those of citizens of the United States” (Rico and Mano, 2001).17 Though the residents seemed to have a choice, they were later pushed out as “illegal” residents.18 Similarly, as the indigenous owners of the land that became the United States, Native Americans or Indians were ironically not allowed to become US citizens until 1924 when the Indian Citizenship Act was passed (Aguirre and Turner, 1998). Until the 1930s, American Indians had to ask permission if they wanted to leave their reservations. Those who lived in Arizona and New Mexico remained disfranchised until the late 1940s. All of this suggests that American immigration or naturalization has been a power issue politically and racially (Lee, Quinones-Perdomo, and Perdomo, 2003). 16
Please refer to the following materials: A Aguirre and J Turner, American Ethnicity: The Dynamics and Consequence of Discrimination (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1998). Dinnerstein, L, Nichols RL and Reimers DM. Natives and strangers: A Multicultural History of Americans (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). Lee, Yueh-Ting, Joan Quinones-Perdomo and Edison Perdomo, 2003. An Integrative Model of Ethnic Contact, Identity and Conflict (CIC): Application to U.S. immigration and naturalization. Ethnic Studies Review 26(2), (1996): 57–80. 17 Barbara R Rico and Sandra Mano, American Mosaic (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2001). 18 Lee, Quinones-Perdomo and Perdomo, 2003.
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Chinese integration model and American dilemma Relatively speaking, America faces an unsolvable dilemma (Myrdal, 1944) which China does not have. On one hand, the United States claims that the country has freedom, democracy, and human rights, which many or most racial minority members may not experience historically or today. On the other hand, minorities have constantly experienced discrimination, e.g., the genocide against American Indians, the expulsion of Latinos or Mexicans, the exclusion of Chinese, and the segregation of Blacks (Aguirre and Turner, 1998). The catchphrase “One world, one dream” of the 2008 Olympic Games in China is symbolic of Chinese ethnic relations — integration, assimilation, or embracement. Ethnic relations in China seem to follow the pattern of “A + B + C = A” or “A + B + C = D”, whereas the ethnic and racial relations in the United States seem to be represented by “A + B + C = A + B + C.” In a formula like “A + B + C = A,” A is the dominant group while B and C are different minority groups (Fong and Shinagawa, 2000).19 Minority groups B and C (e.g., the Zhuang, Miao or Hmong, or Li) have lost much of their cultural traits to become part of the dominant group (i.e., the Han) in China. Although early history in the United States primarily focused on assimilation and integration, this policy or practice has failed largely due to anti-interracial marriage or miscegenation laws (Hodes, 1999). In fact, amalgamation, or the melting pot model had never occurred racially among those non-European immigrants in America (Takaki, 1989). Diverse racial groups in the United States have not been blended together to form a new society that incorporates the special contributions of each group as represented by the formula A + B + C = D where A, B, and C are distinct groups that come together to form a unique society D. Perhaps Brazil is such an excellent racially integrative model (Marger, 2003). This is why it is reasonable to
19
See the following references: Fong, Timothy P and Larry Shinagawa. Asian Americans: Experiences and Perspectives (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2000). eds. Lee, Yueh-Ting, Clark McCauley, Fathali Moghaddam and Stephen Worchel, Psychology of Ethnic and Cultural Conflict ( Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004).
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state that the ethnic relations in America are more complicated, i.e., A + B + C = A + B + C rather than A + B + C = A or A + B + C = D.20 The formula of A + B + C = A + B + C is a double-edged sword. In its negative extreme, segregation occurs, which is “the social and geographic separation within a society of people based on race and/or ethnicity, class, religion, or other social characteristics” (Fong and Shinagawa, 2000).21 On the positive side, people accept and understand differences. Various groups retain their culture and cultural identities and have the opportunity to exist on their own terms while interacting with each other (Gordon, 1964; Lee and Jussim, 2010; and Lee, Jussim, and McCauley, 1995). The Chinese pattern of A + B + C = A may not be democratic, but historically and currently it works well and effectively. A cautionary note is in order. While the United States has failed to encourage interracial marriage and miscegenation, marriage between the Han (yellow) and the Uyghur (white or Caucasian) has not been successful either (Li, 2004). In other words, it is easier to have interethnic marriages than interracial marriages (Hodge, 1999). Cultural and ethnic differences are easier to deal with than racial differences. Except for the Uyghur and the Kazak, who are Caucasian, the remaining 99.99 percent of the population look alike in China, whereas in the United States, 70 percent are Caucasian and 30 percent are Black, Asian, Latino, American Indian, or biracial. While Chinese ethnic relations are seen to be better than America’s longstanding ethnic or racial problems, this does not mean that the Chinese pattern of A + B + C = A is without problems. It may work at the cost of respecting diversity and unique ethnic identities. Further, too much assimilation or integration could produce a negative impact or disorder such as that which occurred in Tibet in 2008 and in Xinjiang in 2009. If the Chinese people or leaders can learn how to deal with their ethnic problems strategically and effectively along with cultural and spiritual beliefs, similar ethnic challenges or discord may be avoided. Therefore, there must be an optimum between diversity and integration. With so many ethnic groups, it is
20 21
Ibid. Ibid.
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important for China to respect diverse cultural identities while maintaining harmony in greater China via integrative and evolutionary processes. Possible Solutions to Problems in Chinese Cultural Beliefs and Ethnic Relations To a certain extent, Chinese ethnic issues are related to cultural and spiritual beliefs. The Han, Zhuang, Manchu, Miao or Hmong, Tujia, Yi, and Yao either believe in Shamanism, Confucianism, Daoism, Buddhism, or have no spiritual beliefs. The non-Han Chinese in Tibet and nearby areas believe in Lama or Tibetan Buddhism. The Uyghur, Hui, Mongol, and several other ethnic minority groups are Islamic or Shamanic. Take Tibet and Xinjiang, for example. The ethnic Chinese in Tibet tend to believe in Lama Buddhism, and the Uyghur in Xinjiang tend to believe in Islam. The extreme Muslims may often have connections with the separatists in Xinjiang. In other words, dealing well with religious or spiritual beliefs will definitely help to deal with ethnic conflicts in China. According to a recent report (Li, 2004), many Han people in China do not get engaged or married with those who are Islamic, especially the Uyghur in Xinjiang, partially because the Han do not believe in Islam, while the Uyghur strongly believe in the Islamic religion. In fact, many Han people do not have any spiritual beliefs, and there is a spiritual vacuum or hunger for spirituality (Lee, 2001). Why and how should we strategically deal with the issues of spiritual beliefs and ethnic relations in China? There are three major reasons that demonstrate spiritual beliefs are needed. First, human beings are not all-powerful. Cognitively and physically, we cannot know everything, nor can we do everything. We have to count on gods or spiritual agents to help us to accomplish our intellectual and physical objectives. Second, we are psychological animals with desires, emotions and feelings (e.g., happiness, sadness, anxiety, threat, fear, desire or hope to be rich, healthy, and successful, etc., or to solve problems). Practically speaking we need to pray for help in distressful or fearful times, or when we feel stress and anxiety (Pargament, 2007). Spiritual beliefs help to fulfill the psychological function. Third, spiritual beliefs help to fulfill the moral function which social laws or regulations may not accomplish. Laws only control human behavior but not internalized
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beliefs. It is spiritual beliefs that can control our thinking and behavior. In a sense, these three functions are consistent with Pargament’s three criteria of spirituality (i.e., truth-based criteria, pragmatic criteria, and process criteria).22 From the perspective of developmental or educational psychology, it is more effective to teach children the moral value of shame or guilt about theft than to teach them the laws of punishment for theft. If spirituality is important intellectually, psychologically, and morally, what possible solutions can we propose to help China build a better and greater society for all 56 ethnic groups? First we will elaborate on the Chinese socio-cultural capital using Lee’s six criteria (2001): “ , , , , , ( ) ” which could be translated as: “the amendment of the constitution or grand laws; the adherence to rituals and laws; the implementation of benevolent governance; the promotion of sincerity, integrity and honesty among people; the advocacy of ancestor worship; and belief in god or gods.”23 Theoretically, we must go through a spiritual revolution. That is, the socio-cultural and psychological capital should theoretically integrate all of the following five components into one: (A1) original Chinese beliefs (e.g., the most ancient Shamanism or other traditional beliefs of Chinese ethnic groups (Lin, 2001; Su, 2006); (A2) mainstream and traditional Chinese beliefs (e.g., Confucianism, Daoism, Buddhism); (A3) modern Chinese ideologies (e.g., Sun Yat-sen’s philosophy, Socialism/Marxism, Maoism, Deng’s ideas and perhaps other leaders’ philosophies); (A4) certain exotic but useful ideas or beliefs (e.g., Islamic, Christian, or Western beliefs or certain advanced and functional philosophies); and (A5) other ideas or beliefs to be included. To do so, we should be open to the discussion of the amendment of the Chinese constitution on beliefs and responsibilities. Simply put, the theoretical formula of the capital may be as follows: A = A1 + A2 + A3 + A4 + A5.24 What can we do to build a more harmonious relationship between the Han and the various ethnic minorities? There are two possible solutions.
22
See Pargament, 130–137. This was originally discussed in Lee (2000) and (2001). 24 Ibid. 23
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First, we need to develop a long-term strategy for integrating the sizable but culturally different ethnic minorities (e.g., in Xinjiang, Tibet, and Inner Mongolia) into the mainstream society. Both the Han and the other ethnic groups should learn from each other linguistically and culturally. Second, we must promote the enhancement of the Chinese identity via increased ethnic interaction and recategorization, especially through interethnic marriage or other sustainable integration. On one hand, we must recognize and respect the ethnic minority cultures and their identity.25 On the other hand, the ethnic identities could be recategorized or integrated into greater China as Chinese e.g., Tibetan Chinese, Hmong Chinese, Hui Chinese, Manchurian Chinese, Uyghur Chinese and so on (Lee et al., 2004). In conclusion, as seen in Figs. 1a and 1b, China needs to enhance and build its socio-cultural and psychological (including spiritual) capital (i.e., software) Component A — while continuing to build its economicfinancial capital (Component B) and its scientific and technological capital (i.e., hardware) — Component C. Much research has demonstrated that the first capital has a significant impact on the second and third capital. While China faces ethnic challenges, Chinese ethnic relations are more cultural than racial. The ethnic relations in China face different challenges from that in the United States. Finally, to build a more harmonious and sustainable society, we have proposed possible solutions for enhancing the first Chinese capital and strategizing ethnic relations via the enhancement of the greater Chinese identity. Acknowledgments Thanks are extended to Victoria Csomos, Chad Paben, Clark McCauley, and Kenneth Pargament for offering us helpful comments. While this 25
With regard to ancient Chinese beliefs and today’s ethnic integration, two notes are in order. First, please see a monumental book on ancient Chinese beliefs of various ethnic groups where those beliefs of numerous ethnic groups in ancient Asia and Americas are based on wu-nuo jiao (i.e., shamanism): Lin, He. The History of Chinese wu-nuo (Shamanism) (Guangzhou: Chinese Flower City Press, 2001) Second, while we respect diversity and unique ethnic identities, there must be an optimum between diversity and integration. China has many ethnic groups, and it is important to respect their cultural identity and also maintain harmony in greater China via integrative and evolutionary processes.
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scholarly work is based on our rigorous research, the first author takes full responsibility for any error, political incorrectness or controversy if in the chapter. Correspondence concerning this chapter should be addressed to Dr. Yueh-Ting Lee, Department of Psychology, University of Toledo, MS 948, Toledo, Ohio 43606 (
[email protected] or
[email protected]). References Bilik, Naren, Yueh-Ting Lee, Hanh H Phan and Kan Shi. “The Ethnic and Cultural Processes of Zhongguo (China) as a Central Kingdom.” In The Psychology of Ethnic and Cultural Conflict, eds. Y-T Lee, C McCauley, F Moghaddam and S Worchel (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2004), pp. 193–215. Campbell, Donald T. “Common Fate, Similarities, and Other Indices of the Status of Aggregates of Persons as Social Entities.” Behavioral Science 3 (1958): 14–25. Campbell, Donald T. Stereotypes and perceptions of group differences. American Psychologist 22 (1967): 817–829. Chen, Chao-Chuan and Yueh-Ting Lee. Leadership and Management in China: Philosophies, Theories and Practices (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008). Chinese Culture Connection. Chinese values and the search for culture-free dimensions of culture. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 18 (1987): 143–164. Dinnerstein, L, RL Nichols and DM Reimers. Natives and strangers: A multicultural history of Americans (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). Fong, Timothy P and Larry Shinagawa. Asian Americans: Experiences and perspectives (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2000). Gordon, M. Assimilation in American life: The role of race, religion, and national origins (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964). Granato, J, R Inglehart and D Leblang. The effect of cultural values on economic development: Theory, Hypothesis and empirical tests.” American Journal of Political Science 40 (1996): 607–631. Hall, Edward T. Beyond Culture (Garden City, NY: Anchor Press, 1975). Hodes, Martha (ed.) Sex, Love, Race: Crossing Boundaries in North American History. New York: New York University Press, 1999. Hofstede, G and M Bond. The Confucius connection: From cultural roots to economic growth. Organizational Dynamics 16(4) (1988): 4–21.
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Hu-DeHart, E. Rethinking America. In Experiencing Race, Class, and Gender in the United States, ed. Virginia Cyrus, (Mountain View: Mayfield Publishing Company, 2000), pp. 168–171. Joshi, S T. ed. Documents of American Prejudice: An Anthology of Writings on Race from Thomas Jefferson to David Duke (New York: Basic Books, 1999). Lee, Yueh-Ting. “The 1st Capital Needed for China in the 21st Century’s Globalization: Rebuilding Chinese “Dao,” ‘De Governance’and ‘Socio-Cultural/ Psychological Beliefs.’ Paper presented at the 5th Annual Conference by Western Returned Scholars Association, August 8–10, 2000, Beijing, China. Lee, Yueh-Ting. The first capital needed for China in the 21st century’s globalization: Rebuilding Chinese “Dao”, “benevolent governance” and “socio-cultural and psychological beliefs.” Journal of Yuncheng University 19(1) (2001): 37–45 (in Chinese with an English abstract). Lee, Yueh-Ting and Li Liu, L. Social Cognition: Understanding Ourselves and Others. Beijing: Beijing Normal University Press (in Chinese and in English) 2010. Lee, Yueh-Ting, Clark McCauley and Juris Draguns, eds. Personality and Person Perception Across Cultures (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. Publishers, 1999). Lee, Yueh-Ting, Albert Pepitone and Linda Albright. Descriptive and Prescriptive Beliefs about Justice: A Sino-U.S. Comparison. Cross-Cultural Research 31(2), (1997): 101–120. Lee, Yueh-Ting, Victor Ottati and Dejun Guo, Understanding and preventing depression among mainland Chinese children. Prevention and Treatment, 2002, (the e-journal of American Psychological Association) http://journals.apa.org/ prevention/volume5/pre0050010c.html Lee, Yueh-Ting and Martin E. P. Seligman. Are Americans more optimistic than the Chinese? Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 23(1), (1997): 32–40. Lee, Yuch-Ting, Joan Quinones-Perdomo and Edison Perdomo, “An Integrative Model of Ethnic Contact Identity and Conflict (CIC): Applications to US Immigration and Naturalization, Ethnic Studies Review, 26(2) (2008): 57–80. Lee, Yueh-Ting, Clark McCauley, Fithali Moghaddam and Stephen Worchel, eds. Psychology of Ethnic and Cultural Conflict. Westport, CT: Prager, 2004. Lee, Yueh-Ting and Lee Jussim, Back in the Real World, American Psychologist 65 (2010): pp. 130–131.
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Li, Xiaoxia. Analysis of the current interethnic marriage in China today. Population Studies in China, 3, 2004 (retrieved from http://www.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/ wk_wzdetails.asp?id=5247). Lin, He. The History of Chinese Wu-nuo (Shamanism). Guangzhou, Chinese Flower City Press, 2001. Marger, Martin. Race and ethnic relations: American and global perspective. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2003. McCauley, CR, Victor Ottati and Yueh-Ting Lee. Cultural differences in economic growth. In Personality and Person Perception Across Cultures, eds. YT Lee, CR McCauley, and J Draguns (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. Publishers, 1999), pp. 85–100. McClelland, DC. The achieving society (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1961). McClelland, DC, Atkinson, JW Clark, RA and Lowell, EL. The achievement motive (New York: Appleton-Century, 1953). Myrdal, Gunnar, An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy. (New York: Harper & Bros, 1944). Newport, Frank. State of the States: Importance of Religion. Gallup, 2009 (see http://www.gallup.com/poll/114022/state-states-importance-religion.aspx). Oettingen, G and M.E.P. Seligman, Pessimism and Behavioral Signs of Depression in East versus West Berlin, European Journal of Social Psychology 20, (1990): 207–220. Pargament, Kenneth T. Spiritually integrated psychotherapy: Understanding and addressing the sacred (New York: The Guilford Press, 2007). Putnam, R. D. Making democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). Rohner, R. Towards a conception of culture for cross-cultural psychology. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 15 (1984): 111–138. Sethi, S and M.E.P. Seligman, Optimism and Fundamentalism, Psychological Science 4 (1993): 256–259. Stannard, D.E. American Holocaust: Columbus and the Conquest of New World. New York: New York Univesity Press, 1992. Su, Luge. The History of Mongolians (Shenyang: Liaoning People’s Press, 2006). Takaki, Ronald. Strangers from a different shore: A History of Asian Americans (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1989). Triandis, Harry C. Culture and social behavior (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1994).
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Triandis, Harry C. Fooling ourselves: Self-deception in politics, religion, and terrorism (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2009). Wang, Da-you and Bao Zhong Song. The mystery of Native Americans immigrating to the North America from China (Beijing: Great Times and Economics Publishers, 2007). Weber, M. The Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism (1st ed. 1904). Trans. T. Parson (New York: Scribner, 1930).
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Chapter 11
Tourism, Modernization, and Nation-Building: The Case of the Yangzi Delta Cecilia L.F. Chien
Over a thousand years ago, Tang China (618–907) fragmented into five short-lived regimes in the north and ten independent kingdoms in the south. This division of the Five Dynasties era (907–960) persisted until reunification under the Song Dynasty (960–1279). Of the kingdoms which divided south China among themselves in the 10th century, the Wu-Yue Kingdom (907–978) arguably laid the foundations for the phenomenal development of the Yangzi Delta today. At its height, Wu-Yue comprised all of present-day Zhejiang Province, the municipality of Shanghai, southwest Jiangsu Province up to Suzhou, and northeast Fujian Province down to Fuzhou. Its founding king, Qian Liu (852–932), was born in Linan County in Hangzhou Prefecture. In 887 under the Tang emperor, Qian Liu was appointed prefect of Hangzhou; by 907, the inaugural year of the Later Liang (907–923), he was invested as King of Wu-Yue. He died at age 80 after administering the region for half a century, for which he was given the posthumous title Martial and August King .1 His son, Qian Yuanguan (890–944), and three grandsons, Qian Hongzuo , 1
Ouyang Xiu, Historical Records of the Five Dynasties, trans. Richard L. Davis (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), pp. 561–568. 259
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Qian Hongzong , and Qian Hongchu , succeeded him. Over the course of the 10th century, the five kings left such a mark in terms of the prosperity, demographics, culture, and landscape of the lower Yangzi that, in the 21st century, the Wu-Yue Kingdom has been made the centerpiece of a massive tourist initiative. From the 1990s, government officials as well as business investors and academics have shown keen interest in developing old Wu-Yue as a major tourist draw, and using Qian Liu as its biggest brand. They have launched projects in two cities in Zhejiang in particular: Linan, the birthplace and final resting place of Qian Liu, and Hangzhou, his capital. But state tourism policy in the delta has implications far beyond pleasure travel: it is a multifaceted program not only for economic development but also for cultural preservation, environmental conservation, and political reunification. These, indeed, are some of the pressing issues currently facing the PRC. Tourism and Economic Development One appealing strategy for promoting growth is tourism, now one of the biggest industries globally. According to the World Tourism Organization, in 2008 tourism generated US$944 billion in revenues, equal to 30 percent of the world’s export of services. International arrivals in 2008 reached 922 million; by 2020, they are projected to reach 1.6 billion.2 Tourism will comprise a significant component of economies, particularly that of developing countries. In the West to date, much scholarly attention has been paid to the impact of Western tourism on non-Western societies. Extensive studies have focused on beaches and their development in Europe, the Mediterranean, and North America. Theories of tourism stemming from the Western experience suggest that concepts such as authenticity, development, and heritage are universally applicable.3 At the outset of the 2 World Tourism Organization, www.unwto.org (accessed December 4, 2009). See for facts and figures on tourist arrivals, revenues, forecasts, trends, and travel news of world regions. 3 Tim Winter, Peggy Teo, and T. C. Chang, eds., Asia on Tour: Exploring the Rise of Asian Tourism (London: Routledge, 2009), pp. 1–8. This is a new theoretical work providing the big picture of scholarship on tourism in comparative terms. It has an extensive 32-page Bibliography including key new works on global, Asian, and Chinese tourism, both theoretical and empirical, in historical and interdisciplinary contexts.
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21st century, however, the pattern of tourist flows is being redrawn. Asia will be the most active tourism region, with 40 percent of the world’s population and the fastest tourism growth rate.4 This transformation has led to new attention being paid to non-Western contexts such as Asia. Developments in China, in turn, have begun to revolutionize tourism in Asia. Mobility was restricted by the state from at least the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644), when it required household registration of all subjects. After the PRC’s founding in 1949, the government mandated a family registration system which tied citizens to their place of birth. Travel for business or pleasure was limited, and reservations for a hotel or a train ticket required authorization by one’s employer. Before the commencement of economic reforms in 1978, tourism was seen as bourgeois and taboo.5 Since 1980, however, China’s GDP growth has leapt, disposable income has increased, and the populace has enjoyed greater movement. In 1981, the China National Tourism Administration (CNTA) was established as the principle tourism organization under the State Council. In 1985, the CNTA created a domestic travel department. In 1995, it introduced the five-day work week. In 1997, it launched the Year of Leisure and Vacation as part of a “leisure culture” campaign.6 That year, triggered by the Asian financial crisis, the government created three week-long holidays to stimulate demand: Lunar New Year, Labor Day, and National Day. During these “golden weeks” (later revised to reduce trade disruption), tens of millions of Chinese traveled. Trips taken by hundreds of millions over Lunar New Year have been described as the largest seasonal human migration on the planet. “Travel fever” has propelled tourism. In ten years, China is expected to have a middle class of 400 million people. “China is not a country, China is a continent,” asserts the AsiaPacific chief at Hilton Worldwide. While foreign tourism has increased during the reform process, domestic tourism has grown even more. Cities in the interior, furthermore, which depend less on international travelers 4
Winter et al., eds., Asia on Tour, p. 68. Robert Shepherd, “Cultural Preservation,” in Asia on Tour, eds. Winter et al., p. 256. 6 Pal Nyiri, Scenic Spots: Chinese Tourism, the State, and Cultural Authority (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006), pp. 3–5. 5
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and see 80 percent or more internal tourists, have been resilient during the worldwide slowdown.7 The city of Linan is located 125 miles southwest of Shanghai. In 2002, Linan, population 500,000, saw 2.35 million tourist arrivals and tourism revenues reaching 1.2 billion RMB, or US$175 million.8 That year, it was named among China’s Top 100 Economically Competitive Counties and Cities and ranked 17th among well-off cities in Zhejiang. It is recognized as the hometown of bamboo, of the hickory nut, of painting and calligraphy, a hygienic city, a technologically advanced city, a model agricultural city, and an outstanding tourist city.9 Before 1980, Linan was a very poor mountainous area based upon rice cultivation. Per capita annual income in 1980 was only 270 RMB, or less than US$50. Since the economic reforms, however, the structure has been totally altered. As of 2002, per capita income reached US$654 and residents are much better off. By 2002, only 10 percent of Linan’s GDP was derived from agriculture, nearly 60 percent was from manufacturing, and over 30 percent was from services, into which tourism falls. In 2003, GDP grew 14.8 percent over the previous year. In each succeeding year up to 2010, the manufacturing sector especially has bounded 20 percent annually.10 For the Linan government, a chief aim of tourism is modernization and development. The Cultural Affairs director of the city, in describing tourism in the early 2000s, articulated improving the life of residents as a main 7
Bettina Wassener, “Hoteliers See Big Growth Ahead in Asia: Global and Local Chains Have Scores of New Properties in the Pipeline,” New York Times, November 27, 2009. 8 Hu Hong, “Zai Senbohui haineiwai Qian wang houyi zuotanhui shang de jianghua” [Speech Given at International Symposium of King Qian Descendants at Forestry Exhibition], Linan Mayoral Address, International Symposium of King Qian Descendants, Linan, China, September 21, 2003. 9 Fang Jingui, “Zai Senbohui Qian Liu yanjiu xueshu yantaohui shang de jianghua” [Speech Given at Conference on Qian Liu Studies of Forestry Exhibition], Linan, China, September 22, 2003; Hu, “Zai Senbohui.” 10 Zhu Zhaohua and Elsie Yang, “Impact Assessment of Bamboo Shoot on Poverty Reduction in Linan, China,” International Network for Bamboo and Rattan, http://www. inbar.int/publication/txt/INBAR_Working_Paper_No52.htm (accessed December 22, 2009); Hangzhou Municipal Economic Commission, “Hangzhou China Industrial Investment: Counties and Districts’ Industry,” www.hzindus.gov.cn/en/district.asp?type=10 (accessed January 8, 2010).
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Memorial Gate to Qian Liu’s Mausoleum, Linan, 2003.
goal.11 Linan places the economic and social development of the area in the context of former President Jiang Zemin’s “Three Represents,” the guiding ideology from 2002 which includes the business class in the communist party. In 2003, the mayor of Linan elaborated on the city’s direction: “Integrate into a metropolitan city [Shanghai], stride towards modernization, and comprehensively create an ecologically sound city, a Wu-Yue culture famed city, and a leisure resort city.”12 This has been abbreviated in the media as the effort to create “a strong city, a famed city, a resort city” (see Fig. 1). Hangzhou, population 6.6 million, is the capital of Zhejiang located 110 miles southwest of Shanghai and due east of Linan. Hangzhou has been a renowned city from Wu-Yue times. The most famous Western traveler to China, Marco Polo (1254–1324), described it as “the city beyond
11 Zhang Yan, “Ju shehui gejie zhi li, jian Wu-Yue wenhua mingcheng” [Combining Strengths of Various Social Groups to Construct a Tourist Site of Wu-Yue Culture], Linan Cultural Affairs Director address, International Symposium of King Qian Descendants, Linan, China, September 21, 2003. 12 Hu, “Zai Senbohui.”
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dispute the finest and the noblest in the world.”13 From the 1980s, it has enjoyed double-digit growth; by 2008, its per capita GDP reached a startling US$10,200. Hangzhou’s GDP in 2008 comprised 4 percent from agriculture, 50 percent from manufacturing, and 46 percent from services. As of 2005, domestic arrivals were 33 million and international arrivals were 1.5 million, reaping tourist revenues of 46.5 billion RMB, or 16 percent of its GDP of 290 billion RMB. From 2004, for five years now, it has received the award for “Happiest City in China.”14 According to the dean of the Hangzhou Academy of Tourism Science, in 1949 China’s urbanization was only 10 percent, as compared to a global average of nearly 30 percent and a European and North American average of over 60 percent.15 As of 2008, the rate of urbanization in China reached 45 percent, with over 600 million living in cities.16 Since the reform period, he sees Hangzhou’s urbanization as having gotten on “the fast track.” West Lake, its top attraction, has a 5A (AAAAA) rating, the top class in the ranking system for the standardization and evaluation of national tourist attractions. Hangzhou has been immortalized in the expression, “Above is Heaven, below are Suzhou and Hangzhou.” Hangzhou is situated on the Qiantang (“Qian Pond”) River, so called in honor of the Qian kings. Besides cultural relics, Hangzhou claims the world’s largest tidal bore, which sweeps from the sea into the bottleneck mouth of the Qiantang River each autumn. Roaring up to 25 miles per 13
Marco Polo, The Travels of Marco Polo, Vol. 2, trans. Henry Yule, rev. Henri Cordier (New York: Dover Publications, 1993), p. 185. 14 Information Center of General Office of Zhejiang Provincial Government 2006, http:// www.zhejiang.gov.cn/zjforeign/english/node493/node499/userobject1ai5843.html (accessed December 23, 2009); Hangzhou Municipal Government, “Comprehensive Str-ength,” www.hangzhou.gov.cn/main/zpd/English/AboutHangZhou/T303918.shtml (accessed January 8, 2010); Zhejiang International Investment Promotion Center, “An Introduction to Hangzhou,” www.zjfdi.com/UploadFiles/law0012009729125349_4.doc (accessed December 27, 2009). 15 Zou Shencheng, “Tuijin Hangzhou ‘Gudai chengshihua’ de diyi gongchen — Qian Liu” [Qian Liu — First Meritorious Minister to Promote Urbanization of Hangzhou], Qian Liu yanjiu, no. 13 (2004): p. 24. 16 Xia Yuhua, “Shekeyuan: Zhongguo chengzhen renkou 2008 nian mo 6.07 yi” [Academy of Social Sciences: China urban population at 2008 end is 607 million], China Popin, http://www.cpirc.org.cn/news/rkxw_gn_detail.asp?id=10684 (accessed December 25, 2009).
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hour and cresting at 30 feet across the width of the Qiantang, it was a devastating phenomenon in ancient times. In the apocryphal story, Qian Liu resolved the tide’s destruction by ordering 500 expert archers armed with 3,000 arrows to shoot the oncoming Wave God. A scene of the archers appears in the illustrated life of Qian Liu in the museum on the grounds of his mausoleum. After he launched large-scale water control projects, the area became the rice basket of China. Today, the Tidal Bore Festival on the eighth day of the eighth lunar month draws hordes of onlookers as well as professional surfers from the US.17 The name of the Wu-Yue founder has been linked to urban modernity and invoked on streets and in businesses. A billboard on a Linan thoroughfare in 2003 advertised the King Qian Credit Union: “Holding hands with you to create a beautiful tomorrow together,” with the New York skyline and still standing World Trade Center towers in the background. On King Qian Avenue is the flashy King Qian Holiday Hotel (see Fig. 2). On its opening in 1997, this was the best accommodation in Linan: the first three-star “luxury” establishment in town, the first tall building in the city at 21 stories, with 244 “ultra-modern” suites and amenities including a massage and sauna center, a bowling alley, and conference rooms. The hotel is owned by the King Qian Group, with 5,000 employees and annual revenue in the millions.18 In Hangzhou, across the street from the Qian Ancestral Temple compound is the similarly modern King Qian Hotel with a neon sign over the lobby guaranteeing smiles to all guests. Tourism and Cultural Preservation At the same time, China’s tourism highlights a common cultural heritage and serves to reconstruct her antiquity and continuity. Every locale is attempting to unearth its unique roots in order to attract business. After 17
Yang Yiping, “Qian Liu dui baohu Hangzhou he baohu junshen Xihu liangxiang zhongyao lishi gongxian” [Two Historical Contributions of Qian Liu: Protecting Hangzhou, Dredging West Lake), Qian Liu yanjiu, no. 13 (2004): pp. 98–99; Greg Long, Rusty Long, and Mark Healey’s “Surfing China’s Qiantang River Tidal Bore, Hangzhou, September 2008,” http://vimeo.com/1871269 (accessed December 10, 2009). 18 “Linan dajiudian” [Major Linan Hotel], Qian Liu yanjiu, no. 11 (February 2003): i; “Fu ji” (Addendum), Qian Liu yanjiu 7 (March 1998): p. 106.
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Fig. 2.
King Qian Holiday Hotel, Linan, 2003.
undergoing several permutations since 1973, the State Bureau of Cultural Relics, under the Ministry of Culture, became the agency charged with the conservation of heritage. The Bureau is responsible for unmovable relics under the protection of national, provincial, county, and municipal authorities. As of 2006, there were over 2,300 national relics, nearly 9,400 provincial relics, and 58,300 county or municipal relics. By comparison, the US lists 80,000 properties representing 1.4 million individual resources on its National Register.19 19
Ministry of Culture, “Protection of Cultural Heritage in China, May 25, 2006,” http:// en.chinagate.cn/english/reports/48279.htm (accessed December 12, 2009); US National Register of Historic Places, http://www.nps.gov/nr/about.htm (accessed December 12, 2009).
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In 2001, in a fifth round of designations, the State Council announced 518 national cultural preservation sites. Four in Linan made the list, all connected to the Wu-Yue Kingdom: King Qian’s Mausoleum, the Qian Kuan and Shuiqiu Shi Mausoleum, The Kang Mausoleum, and the Pagoda of the Meritorious Subject.20 The first of the four national treasures in Linan is King Qian’s Mausoleum. As early as 1961, the government named it a key Zhejiang relic. This is one of the most complete and best-preserved royal tombs in south China. It comprises an earth mound 9 meters tall, 50 meters long, and 50 meters wide, met by a spirit way originally 300 meters long, flanked by pairs of stone tigers, sheep, horses, and human figures.21 Upon completion, King Qian’s Mausoleum district will include the Martial and August Plaza, a public space which can accommodate 5,000; the Ancestral Temple (see Fig. 3); a Literary Center with praise of Qian Liu by celebrated Song literati carved into stone steles; the Lingyan Pavilion; and the Peaceful Kingdom Pagoda with spectacular views. Investment will total an estimated 200 million RMB, or approximately US$30 million. A 2003 honor roll of donors listed companies which had contributed up to US$160,000 as well as dozens of individuals who had contributed up to US$2,000. The next step is to seek further funding from government, investors, and partnerships.22 The second national treasure, the Qian Kuan–Shuiqiu Mausoleum, is the sepulcher of Qian Liu’s father, Qian Kuan (d. 900), and mother, nee Shuiqiu (d. 901). This is the only Tang period tomb of the Wu-Yue royal clan yet discovered. The tomb contains two chambers, astronomical drawings on the ceiling, and many artifacts of interest. It was discovered in 1978; in 1989, Zhejiang declared it a key provincial relic.23 20 Hu, “Zai Senbohui,” p. 2; Guan Kanglin, “Mantan Qianwang gulide Wu-Yue wenhua guji” [Historic Sites of Wu-Yue Culture in King Qian’s Native Place], Qian Clan Association, http://www.qsly.org/text/wywh/wywhgj.htm (accessed September 9, 2003); Zhu Xiaodong and Sun Lei, “Wu Yue guowangling, gongchenta lieru quanguo wenbao danwei” [Wu-Yue Royal Tomb and Meritorious Subject Pagoda Enter List of National Cultural Treasure Sites], Qian Clan Association, http://www.qsly.org/text/qsxw/lrqgwb.htm (accessed 2004). 21 Qian Dafang, Qian Cheng, Qian Hong, and Qian Yong, “Lun Wu-Yue wenhua” [On WuYue Culture], Qian Liu yanjiu, no. 13 (2004): p. 33; Zhu and Sun, “Wu Yue guowangling.” 22 Zhang, “Ju shehui.” 23 Zhu and Sun, “Wu Yue guowangling.”
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Fig. 3.
Ancestral Temple at King Qian’s Mausoleum, Linan, 2009.
The third national treasure, the Kang Mausoleum, is the tomb of the wife of Qian Liu’s seventh son and successor, Qian Yuanguan. It is one of the most richly filled and well-preserved tombs, containing large numbers of Yue porcelain, jade jewelry, and bronze implements. Inscribed on the walls are designs of peonies, dragons, tigers, and the mythical tortoisesnake. The Kang Mausoleum was discovered in 1996; in 1997, Zhejiang declared it a key provincial relic.24 The last national treasure of Linan, the Pagoda of the Meritorious Subject, constructed in 915, rests atop the Mountain of the Meritorious Subject, named so by the Tang emperor after Qian Liu subdued a revolt in the 890s.25 The pagoda comprises five floors, with a large interior space. It represented a new architectural style and is the earliest pagoda in Zhejiang. As of 1961, Zhejiang declared it a key provincial relic.26
24
Ibid. Guan, “Mantan Qianwang.” 26 Zhu and Sun, “Wu-Yue guowangling.” 25
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Wu-Yue Culture Park ground-breaking ceremony, Linan, 2003.
Theme park development in China took off in the 1990s after the success of Splendid China in Shenzhen in the Pearl River Delta.27 The key theme park project in Linan is the Wu-Yue Culture Park (see Fig. 4). Portions of the park are ancient sites; some are new recreations. It combines entertainment, education, culture, and recreation all in one. Planning began in 1996 after consultation with the public as well as support from overseas. In 2003, the Linan assistant researcher on party history argued for the city image planning practiced in developed countries: using architecture, civil engineering, and urban design to parse a city’s image into Mind Identity, Visual Identity, and Behavior Identity. The researcher took a cue from this to emphasize Linan’s theoretical objectives, such as development aims; the city’s physical look, such as public spaces and hygiene; and the city’s behavioral image, such as the level of education of inhabitants.28 27 John Ap, “An Assessment of Theme Park Development in China,” in Tourism in China, ed. Alan Lew, Lawrence Yu, John Ap, and Guangrui Zhang (New York: Haworth Hospitality Press, 2003), p. 195. 28 Tang Jianping, “Guanyu chuangjian Wu-Yue wenhua mingcheng de sikao” (Reflections on Creating a Wu-Yue Famous Culture City), Qian Liu yanjiu, no. 13 (2004): pp. 63–64; Liu Yuan and Chen Chong, “Effects of Festivals and Special Events on City Image Design,” Frontiers of Architecture and Civil Engineering in China (Higher Education Press, May 2007), pp. 255–259, translated from Architecture Journal 2006.
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In 2003, the Linan government sponsored an all-expenses paid conference on Wu-Yue to bring planners and researchers together to discuss the cultural site, which would comprise many neighboring towns. Invitees included descendants of Qian Liu — professionals, academics, businessmen, and retirees hailing from Beijing, Shanghai, Henan, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Jiangxi, Guangdong, and Hong Kong, as well as Malaysia and the US. The conference chair was the chair of the Linan People’s Political Consultative Conference, vice chairs included the Linan deputy mayor and vice chair of the Linan People’s Congress. The opening ceremony on the first night of the conference featured star entertainment and 20,000 in attendance at a local university stadium. At the ensuing proceedings, the Linan Cultural Affairs director described the background for tourism centering on Wu-Yue.29 Back in 1992, the Linan Culture and History Committee established the Qian Liu Research Society. It has since spawned branches around the country for investigation into Wu-Yue history, each of which publishes a research journal.30 In 1994, the Zhejiang Cultural Affairs Bureau and Linan commissioned the Institute of Architecture and Forestry at Southeast University in Nanjing, one of the key universities directly under the Ministry of Education, to draw up a plan.31 Phase 1 was accomplished by 1997, Phase 2 by 2000, and Phase 3 ongoing as of 2003. The cost of the plan for the Wu-Yue Culture Park is 100 million RMB, or approximately US$15 million. It will comprise ten functional units. The Service District at the entrance will feature a commemorative arch. The Orchard will serve both scenic and commercial purposes and host a fruit-picking festival annually. The Historical District will comprise ancestral tombs and a sacrificial hall. The Viewing Peak will include the Pagoda of the Meritorious Subject and a path of old paving stones with nine bends and eighteen curves winding through sights. The Thousand
29
Zhang, “Ju shehui.” Qian Wenxuan, comp., Qianshi jiasheng [Qian Clan Genealogy] (Shanghai: Shanghai shudian, 1996), p. 1. 31 Qian Liu yanjiuhui, “Qianwang ling jinqi kuojian gongcheng” [Recent Expansion Project for King Qian’s Mausoleum], Qian Liu yanjiu, no. 6 (August 1997): p. 1; Qian Zhiren, Qian Wenhao, and Qian Yu, “Mingji xianzu yixun, jianshe meihao shenghuo” [Remember Instructions of Our Ancestors to Create a Good Life], Qian Liu yanjiu, no. 13 (2004): p. 113. 30
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Year Cradle District will spotlight the well where Qian Liu’s grandmother saved him from drowning by his father due to his unlucky appearance at birth. The Wu-Yue Folk Village will recreate a street lined with traditional workshops and souvenirs. The Qian Liu Amusement Park will reconstruct episodes from his childhood. The Wu-Yue Mountain Resort will include cottages and villas. Lastly, the Folk Religion District will include the monk Puguang’s tomb and the Pure Land Forest. In his later years, Qian Liu became a devout Buddhist and so, too, his successors. They promoted rituals, printed sutras, and dispatched envoys to Korea and Japan to recover texts. They built or repaired hundreds of temples and pagodas throughout the kingdom; Hangzhou alone counted over 150, notably Lingyin Temple, Six Harmonies Pagoda, Baochu Pagoda, and Leifeng Pagoda. The region became an important center for Buddhism.32 One specific target is the diaspora of descendants of the Qian founder, so that they may find their roots.33 The gateway to Qian Liu’s Mausoleum bears the calligraphy of former Vice Premier and 33rd generation descendant Qian Qichen. In the exhibit inside, large color-coded maps show the distribution of Qians throughout China; another wall displays the family tree and its branches. In 2007, on the 1,100th anniversary of the investiture of Qian Liu as king in 907, Hangzhou organized the largest sacrificial ceremony to ancestors in the city at the Qian Ancestral Temple on the shores of the West Lake. The vice-mayor read an elegiac address before 400 descendants of the king on the red carpet facing the Five Kings Hall. The ritual included offerings of ox, sheep, and boar heads, grains and silks, music, incense, and the striking of a bell 14 times for each of the prefectures under Wu-Yue authority. The director of the Shanghai Qian Liu Research Society indicated that the ceremony would be held annually.34 32
Zhang, “Ju shehui;” Bian Chuyang, “Chulun Qian Liu yu Wu-Yue jingshen,” [A Preliminary Discussion of Qian Liu and the Wu-Yue spirit], Qian Liu yanjiu, no. 13 (2004): p. 47. 33 Zhang, “Ju shehui.” 34 Shijie Qian wang, “Hai neiwai Qianshi houyi daibiao zai Hang gongji Qianwang” [Memorial Ceremony to King Qian at Hangzhou for Descendants in China and Abroad], http://www.qianhome.com/Article/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=232 (accessed November 27, 2009); Shijie Qian wang, “Wu-Yue wang Qian Liu jinfeng 1100 zhounian daxing gongji zai han juxing” [Large-scale Memorial Ceremony at Hangzhou on 1100th Anniversary of Investiture of Wu-Yue King Qian Liu], http://www.qianhome.com/Article/ShowArticle. asp?ArticleID=127 (accessed November 27, 2009).
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In line with ancient culture, tourism is seen as a method to help the population develop modern culture and civility, with an awareness of manners, cleanliness, and the law. On a plaque at King Qian’s Mausoleum in 2008, the rules included: “Upon entering the Park, tourists must tour in civilized fashion and not raise their voices; they are prohibited from climbing walls, statues, or carvings; they must not carve or scrawl anywhere.” Examples abound in every city of public exhortations contrasting desired and shameful behavior. In 2006, the Spiritual Civilization Commission along with the CNTA released an “Action Plan to Raise the Civilizational Quality of Chinese Tourists” and a “Civilized Behavior Convention of Chinese Domestic Tourists.” They called for agencies to award such titles as “Civilized Travel Agency,” “Civilized Tourist,” even “Civilized Airport” and “Civilized Toilet.”35 When asked about the benefits of tourism, Chinese emphasize that it increases the “quality” of the people. Linan, Hangzhou, and surrounding cities are all competing to use the Wu-Yue culture. The chair of Linan’s Political Consultative Conference urged everyone to “take the past as key... use the past for prosperity.”36 Another planner called for a new understanding of the use of the past, authenticity as seen in the Chinese context: To propagate the spirit of Wu-Yue is not necessarily to return to the original, nor is it simply a restoration of tradition, much less is it to promote conservatism ... New elements through history have continuously become “the old songs” and embodiment of traditional culture ... Thus to make known the spirit of Wu-Yue culture is to continue it, develop it, and also create it anew ... according to the needs of the times.37
Tourism and Environmental Conservation One movement in the tourism industry aims at environmental awareness, also connected to efforts at modernization and social equity. Linan is one of 35
National Tourism Administration, “Tisheng Zhongguo gongmin luyou wenming suzhi xingdong jihua,” [Plan to Raise Cultural Level of Chinese Tourists, 2006], www.cnta.gov.cn/ Upfiles/200681784098.doc (accessed December 26, 2009). 36 Fang, “Zai Senbohui,” p. 2. 37 Qian et al., “Lun Wu-Yue wenhua,” p. 4.
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the most mountainous cities in the Yangzi Delta. Before forest management began there, monocropping and forest damage led to serious environmental problems of erosion and flooding, as well as poverty. The early decades of the PRC in general were characterized by severe deforestation and one of the lowest per capita averages of forest cover in the world.38 From 1983, the Linan government encouraged the development of non-timber forest products such as bamboo, hickory, and medicinal plants. In accord with the central government’s objective in the early 1980s to increase GDP fourfold by 2000, the local government surveyed farmers and fielded proposals from non-governmental organizations to start the Bamboo Shoot Project. It advocated the cultivation of bamboo on hillsides, such that the industry grew from virtually nil to China’s largest bamboo shoot producing base, accounting for 20 percent of the total. It is also the largest shoot processing county, with 400 factories. Bamboo species are used in 500 product lines — not just edible fresh or dried shoots but also flooring, paneling, curtains, scaffolding, furniture, toothpicks, handicrafts, pulp, and mulch. The One Billion Yuan Project for Moso Bamboo and the 800 Million Yuan Project for Bamboo Shoot Industrialization aimed at production values nearing 2 billion RMB annually by 2007.39 While bamboo groves are located mainly east of Linan, westward are steeper slopes suitable for hickory. Linan has subsequently become known for its high-quality hickory forests, and has elaborated a series of best practices including “Technology for Cultivating High and Steady Yield Hickory Nuts.” Of the scores of hickory product lines, the most popular are hand-peeled and fried hickory nuts, hickory kernels, hickory cakes, hickory oil, and hickory wine.40 One year before CNTA’s theme of “China eco-tourism in 1999, ecological tourism began in Linan, assisted by the rehabilitation of large areas of land with bamboo and hickory plantations. Linan’s forest cover rate has 38
Julia C. Strauss, “Forestry Reform and the Transformation of State Capacity in Finde-Siecle China,” Journal of Asian Studies 68, no. 4 (November 2009): p. 1169. 39 Zhu and Yang, “Impact Assessment of Bamboo.” 40 Yu Ling, “Linan County: A Model for the Future?” United Nations Forest and Agriculture Organization, http://www.fao.org/docrep/007/ae542e/ae542e08.htm (accessed December 23, 2009).
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thereby attained an unusually high 75 percent, at the forefront of the country. The government has designated half of its total forest for conservation and protection: its landscape includes a national forest, two national nature reserves, and 19 environmental districts open to the public. Protected area designations admit differing levels of activities: national parks allow both recreation and conservation while strict reserves allow much less use.41 Of the many local eco-tourism sites which have been created, Linan adopted a strategy aimed at creating China’s premier site by promoting Mt. Tianmu and Mt. Qianwang, with an emphasis on ecologically sound development and non-polluting industries. This explains the enigmatic title of the 2003 conference on Qian Liu and Wu-Yue history: “Mt. Tianmu Forestry Tourism Resource Exposition Conference.” The Wu-Yue Culture Park’s tenth and last functional unit is a Nature District, environmentally conscious in all its designs, with a Hundred Flowers Park, a Hundred Grasses Park, and a Hundred Birds Park.42 Linan has consequently become the only county in China to participate in the International Model Forest Network as of 1999, supported by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations along with the Canadian and Japanese governments. It has been included on China’s own lists of Model Cities for Integrated Development in Mountainous Areas, Model Cities for Prospering Forests through Science and Technology, and Model Cities for Ecological Development. The principal goal is to determine the best approach to environmental conservation.43 Related to ecology and healthful living is a mythicized figure called Pengzu , originally named Jian Keng and purported to be the progenitor of the Qians. When the legendary sage emperor Yao (r. 2457–2384 B.C.E.) enfeoffed Jian Keng with the state of Peng, he became referred to as Pengzu or “Ancestor from Peng.”44 Many families 41
Hu, “Zai Senbohui,” pp. 2–4; Yu, “Linan County: A Model for the Future?”; Kreg Lindberg, Clem Tisdell, and Xue Dayuan, “Ecotourism in China’s Nature Reserves,” in Tourism in China, ed. Lew et al., p. 111. 42 Zhang, “Ju shehui.” 43 Yu, “Linan County: A Model for the Future?” 44 Qian Bin, “Wusuwang jiaxun fazhan wei tianxia Qianshi dazong” [Family Instructions of Martial and August King are Spread to all Qians], Qian Liu Yanjiu, no. 13 (2004): 122–124; Qian Dafang, et al.,“Pengzu qi ren” [On Pengzu], Qian Liu Yanjiu, no. 11 (February 2003): pp. 34–38.
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begin their self-identification with such a mythical origin. By the Western Zhou (1066–1771 B.C.E.), when one of Pengzu’s descendants became an official in the Ministry of Finance, the bamboo radical above the surname Jian was removed to leave the character for “money” or qian . Pengzu was a star of longevity who lived to 800 years of age, outliving 49 wives. He followed a daily regimen of breathing exercises, sit-ups, massage, sparing sexual relations, and led a life of calm and moderation. He was a talented cook. His savory wild chicken soup impressed the sage emperor Yao so much that he gave him the fief of Pengcheng, or modernday Xuzhou, Jiangsu. According to Biographies of Immortals, when Pengzu was already 767 years old, his visage still seemed very young. A female in his clan who followed his techniques never felt fatigue and lived to be several hundred years old.45 Today Pengzu is celebrated around the country, including near his tomb in Pengshan, Sichuan, where 20 times the national average of residents are centenarians. Pengzu’s lifestyle has in turn been linked with the Confucian virtue of filial piety. In 2005 at a Festival of Longevity Culture, nine long-lived individuals appeared on stage with the ten most filial children. This event coincided with the Double Ninth Festival, for which it is customary to sweep the graves of ancestors, drink chrysanthemum wine, and wear a zhuyu plant, said to have cleansing properties.46 In Linan, one of the main centers of Pengzu culture, investment in the preservation of his lifestyle has been directly linked to tourism. In the outskirts of the city, it is the focus of Babaili (“800 Villages”) Environmental Park, named after the ripe old age to which he lived. It features his ancestral temple, a white stone statue of his likeness, and his Hat and Clothing Tomb (his body is not interred there). Babaili also contains the recreation of an ancient residential street selling medicines, with a reconstructed villa, performance stage, homes of examination degree holders, and a
45
Lu Hongnian, “Lun ‘Qianwang de xianzu shi Pengzu’ shuo” [On the Theory of Pengzu as the First Ancestor of King Qian], Qian Liu yanjiu jingxuanji (The Best Articles of Qian Liu Research) (n.d.), pp. 129–133. 46 Shijie Qian wang, “Pengzu wenhua xuanyan” [Declaration of Pengzu Culture], http:// www.qianhome.com/Article/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=115 (accessed November 27, 2009).
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Fig. 5.
Snake show, Babaili Environmental Park, 2003.
medicinal foods restaurant, another example of creating a tourist product with a narrative. Young women dressed in red mandarin gowns guide visitors around with a stock script. Through a picturesque Moon Gate the visitor is greeted by a view of Snake Valley and a snake farm. Scientists there not only milk the venom for antidotes, but also market skin creams for women, pellets for men, and other beauty and medicinal products extracted from snake organs. Tourists may view snakes in jars of formaldehyde and listen to a sales pitch, the climax of which is an open air show featuring a handler tossing dozens of writhing serpents onto a female assistant lying motionless in a glass box (see Fig. 5). The goal is to popularize Pengzu’s macrobiotics and ideal of environmental harmony. The Hangzhou municipal government has likewise been vigorously implementing environmental protection. Its Four Projects are Blue Sky, Green Water, Greenness, and Cleanliness. While Hangzhou’s green cover rate is less than half that of Linan, its air quality, sulphur dioxide emissions, and wastewater treatment have all improved year after year.47 47
Information Center of General Office of Zhejiang.
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The city has an extensive bicycle rental system, with dedicated bicycle lanes on most roads. It has won awards for being a National Greening Model City and National Environmental Protection Model City. On World Habitat Day 2001, the United Nations bestowed upon Hangzhou the Best Human Settlement Award for a livable urban center.48 Tourism and Political Reunification Lastly, the idea of the scenic spot has been appropriated by the state’s nation-building.49 Politically, the government views domestic tourism as a force to strengthen the national consciousness and for political unification; local and central level officials underscore Wu-Yue’s policy of maintaining security by economic and diplomatic means. In the 1990s, Qian Liu’s Mausoleum was declared one of the region’s ten patriotic educational centers for young people. An argument for its role in cross-straits unification listed Qian Fu, Taiwan’s Foreign Minister; his elder brother Qian Chun, former Taiwan Finance Minister; and their father Qian Siliang, of the Taiwan Academia Sinica, all from the same branch as PRC Foreign Minister Qian Qichen. It was urged that the Mausoleum be restored quickly so that descendants in Taiwan might also share their aspirations for reunion. The commemorative album of the activities associated with the 2007 ceremony celebrating the ascension of King Qian featured a photograph of Shanghai Qian Liu Research Society directors welcoming a group of Qian clan representatives from Taiwan. Photographs of a Mao Zedong impersonator surnamed Qian also appears prominently in the volume.50
48 United Nations Habitat for a Better Urban Future, “Previous Scroll Winners,” UN Habitat, http://www.unhabitat.org/content.asp?typeid=19&catid=490&cid=2909 (accessed December 26, 2009); Information Center of the General Office of Zhejiang. 49 Nyiri, Scenic Spots, p. xi. 50 Tao Fuxian, ed., Qiangu yizu [One Thousand Years of a Family] (Linan: Jinghua chubanshe, 2004), p. 241; Shanghai Qian Clan Association and Shanghai Qian Liu Research Society, Wu-Yue shijia [An Eminent Wu-Yue Family] (Shanghai: Shanghai Qian Liu Research Society and Shanghai Qian Clan Association, 2008), pp. 17, 72, 92.
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Fig. 6.
Statue of Qian Liu, King Qian Ancestral Compound, Hangzhou, 2006.
The Hangzhou mayor in 1997 stated that the King Qian Hometown Holiday that year was in fact also for the sake of promoting unification.51 Tourist literature quotes the Song literatus Su Dongpo who had once administered the region: “Because of [the Qians of Wu-Yue], the common people from birth to death never knew military conflict and their days were filled with happiness.” Ouyang Xiu likewise evaluated: “Without the worries of war, the people prospered in peace.” Qian Liu considered the imperial designs of the other kingdoms to be “like sitting on a stove’s red-hot coals”52 (see Fig. 6). 51
Tao, Qiangu yizu, pp. 208–209. Qian Wenxuan, Qianshi jiasheng, pp. 11–18; Zhu Fusheng, “Wu-Yueguo gaiyuan tansuo” [An Investigation into Wu-Yue’s Changing of Reign Title], Qian Liu yanjiu, no. 6 (August 1997): pp. 11–12; Bian Chuyang, “Chulun Qian Liu,” pp. 42–44. 52
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Qian Weichang, then vice-chair of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, pioneer of modern mechanics in China, and president of Shanghai University, said in 1997 to compatriots in Taiwan that they should learn from his ancestors, look at the big picture, and peacefully reunify as soon as possible. He pointed out that Taiwan was wealthier than the mainland, just as Wu-Yue was wealthier than the central plain regime, and if men of a thousand years ago could accomplish unity, they can do so today.53 The Linan Cultural Affairs director similarly emphasized the nationalistic Significance: With respect to our current reform period and opening, the example of Wu-Yue has many applications for the present day in terms of political strategy and economic construction. In particular, the Wu-Yue spirit of presenting the territory intact to the Song and emphasizing the unification of the country’s people has immediate significance and political meaning in light of realizing cross-straits unification.54
Family instructions or jiaxun is a genre with a long history, used by clan patriarchs to teach their families. Qian Liu had some 40 sons, including 10 adoptive sons.55 He composed for them a set of rules called The Eight Teachings of the Martial and August King, and later wrote The Ten Item Inheritance. A reworking of these two original sources in the Qing Dynasty (1644–1911) was the Qian Family Instructions. The Instructions set forth strict expectations of behavior and Confucian morality, beginning with oneself, then the family, the society, and finally the country.56 They are now being promoted to make the family tradition known to the public. They have been reprinted in color on glossy paper in the traditional scroll form with matting suitable for framing. They appear on the inside of the front cover of scholarly journals. There are plans to add the English translation to business cards and publications of the institutes dedicated to Qian Liu research. This exhortation is in keeping with the call put out at 53
Tao, Qiangu yizu, p. 208. Zhang, “Ju shehui.” 55 Qian, “Wusuwang jiaxun,” p. 125. 56 Qian Zhiren, Qian Wenhao, and Qian Yu (2004): p. 115. 54
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the 2007 celebration of King Qian’s enthronement to spread a patriotic spirit and national cohesion.57 A much better known text is The Hundred Surnames, compiled early in the Song Dynasty. It is still being reprinted today in numerous editions, with romanization, explanation, and illustrations, for the benefit of schoolchildren who in traditional times memorized it. The Hundred Surnames is actually a list of some 500 surnames, all those in use at the time, and ranked in order of political importance. First listed was Zhao, the imperial surname; second was Qian; and third was Sun, surname of the Wu-Yue queen. Qian is a relatively uncommon surname, numbering 2.5 million and ranking 89th in occurrence in the country.58 That Qian was ranked second only to that of the emperor is an indication of the significance of the clan. Finally, Wu-Yue has entered the Chinese popular culture. Television is the most important mass medium through which the public is nowadays socialized.59 The media has shifted from propaganda to entertainment but the use of the past to comment on the contemporary is common.60 After President Hu Jintao’s call to “Seek peace in the world, reconciliation with Taiwan, and harmony in Chinese society,” such aims are being pursued in the media: “Harmony between art and the public, harmony between people, and harmony between man and nature.”61 In 2007, a directive from the State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television announced that for at least eight months, only ethically inspiring TV series would be aired in primetime.62 In 2009, China announced plans to spend billions of dollars to develop media companies to compete with the likes of the global News Corporation and Time Warner. State broadcasting companies will be 57
Shijie Qian wang, “Hai neiwai Qianshi.” Qian, “Wusuwang jiaxun,” p. 134. 59 Zhu Ying, Television in Post-Reform China: Serial Dramas, Confucian Leadership and the Global Television Market (London: Routledge, 2008), p. 10. 60 Zhu, Television, pp. 10, 74. See also Stanley Rosen, foreword to Television in PostReform China: Serial Dramas, Confucian Leadership and the Global Television Market, by Zhu Ying (London: Routledge, 2008), pp. xiv–xv. 61 Zhu, Television, pp. 12–13. 62 Rosen, foreword, p. xix. 58
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allowed greater freedom in financing and to produce content for domestic distribution and export.63 The success of costume dramas has shown that there is profit to be made in popularizing Chinese history. Dynasty dramas, many of which deal with emperors and patriots struggling against internal and external challenges, can be seen as nationalist cultural discourse.64 Mr Zhang Bo of the Huawen Film Company in Hangzhou has written and produced a 28-part drama on the life and exploits of Qian Liu. This made-for-television series, entitled King Qian of Wu-Yue, was released in 2007. It is available on DVD in stores and on VCD online. It stars the well-known Wang Yanan as Qian Liu, and an actual descendant, Qian Yongchen, in a lesser role (he was deemed too young to carry the lead, fitting though it may have been). The production is in negotiations to be shown on China Central Television (CCTV), the largest and state-owned national level broadcaster. The hope is that the series will boost interest in Wu-Yue and its tourist attractions. The onscreen opening lines of King Qian of Wu-Yue introduce its message: When Song was first established, there were ten kingdoms to be conquered, hence there was war year after year. One kingdom, however, in modern-day Jiangsu and Zhejiang, followed a tradition of peace for the benefit of the people. It did not engage in war. It submitted its territory to the Song court in 978, which accelerated the unification of the Chinese empire.65
Episode 1 opens with the first Song emperor receiving the last Wu-Yue king: Your subordinate prostrates himself and pays his respects to Your Majesty! It is fortunate that Your Majesty has unified China as one country. Only Wu-Yue on the coast is still separated. This is my fault. Thus, I now present my territory of 13 prefectures, including 86 counties, 550,000 families, and 115,036 granaries to Your Majesty. Please accept ... 63
David Barboza, “China Yearns to Form Its Own Media Empires,” New York Times, October 5, 2009. 64 Zhu, Television, pp. 1, 6. 65 Wu-Yue qianwang, episode 1.
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Our ancestors made great efforts to develop the Wu-Yue region; this is known to all. Our ancestors taught us to cooperate with the central government and, at the right moment, to join it; we have also followed this diligently. Today I have done just that and received the honorary title of King of Huaihai. Ancestors above — please note that now China is united and the people of Wu-Yue live in peace. May you also rest in peace.66
The story then flashes back to the outset of Qian Liu’s career. Succeeding episodes include romance, melodrama, action, and humor, but continue the patriotic message. The concluding Episode 28 reveals Qian Liu’s inner thoughts, in which he debates waging war against the Later Liang after the fall of the Tang Dynasty. He reaches a determination: The people of Wu-Yue need peace. The people of the Central Plain also need peace. No matter who is on the throne, the Central Plain is China’s center. Wu-Yue must obey the center of China, since it will ultimately be united as one . . . [Repeated in unison by all:] Continue the tradition of China. Keep it united forever. Show respect to the central government. Do not cease the annual tributes. Do not disregard the rites and rituals of respect just because of the change of imperial family. The sun and moon are my witness. [Final lines, onscreen:] Qian Liu initiated Hangzhou as a Heaven on Earth and established it as the Country of Fish and Rice. He followed the principle of “the people first.” He was always loyal to the Central Plain and taught his descendants to be the same. In 978, his grandson Qian [Hong]chu followed his teaching and yielded his land to the Song court. He completed the unity of China. [THE END]67
Conclusion In 1949, travel in China was seen as a political activity that was micromanaged and entailed inbound travel only. Sixty years later, in 2009, it is a comprehensive activity addressed in national planning for social and 66 67
Ibid. Wu-Yue qianwang, episode 28.
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economic development, macro-managed, and emphasizes the business of travel.68 Each region of China differs in its tourism development and issues, but in the Yangzi delta at sites of the former Wu-Yue Kingdom, the government has attempted a multi-pronged economic, social, cultural, environmental, and political agenda. One may say that Linan and Hangzhou have been largely successful cases of “modernization with local characteristics.” The state has promoted tourism in the region for the sake of modernization and improvement of living standards. Having met goals to increase GDP, a challenge may be how to avoid aggravated socio-economic differentiation among the populace. Officials have managed tourism in order to preserve the cultural heritage, and Chinese tourists do enjoy local culture and historical monuments. In the face of competition from other parks in the delta, however, including Shanghai Disneyland by perhaps 2014, a challenge may be to extend the name recognition of Wu-Yue and its kings outside the region and even market it overseas. Environmental awareness has been heightened so that creating “a green Linan,” “a green Hangzhou,” and “a green Zhejiang” are stated policy goals. A challenge may be how to implement and sustain this goal in the face of large numbers of people in fragile ecosystems or where the infrastructure has not yet caught up. Finally, further tourism development can be expected with the rise of income and city population such that the very growth of the industry is a reflection of peace and political stability. The government is changing its centralized manner of policy formulation and adjusting its methods to be more participatory in decision making.69 The “state” itself does not speak in one voice, depending on the agency and level of government, but the exchange of ideas by bringing together various stakeholders, including government, NGOs, farmers, entrepreneurs, industry, and academic organizations may help achieve goals. Cooperation on issues and clarifying and sharing information regarding new technology, products, market information, events, and government policy can build consensus on diverse objectives. 68 Zhang Guangrui, “China’s Tourism Since 1978: Policies, Experiences, and Lessons Learned,” in Tourism in China, ed. Lew et al., pp. 24–26. 69 Yu, “Linan County: A Model for the Future?”
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Furthermore, the pursuit of networks beyond China will be important to keeping up with trends and advances, and the number of international linkages in every field is growing. At the start of restructuring in 1978, the question was what model China should take in tourism. Case histories of tourism in China, placing it within its own context and informed by local resources, culture, and practices, suggest that China will determine its own models and paths in the new millennium. References Ap, John. “An Assessment of Theme Park Development in China.” In Tourism in China, edited by Alan Lew, Lawrence Yu, John Ap, and Guangrui Zhang (New York: Haworth Hospitality Press, 2003), pp. 195–214. Bian Chuyang. “Chulun Qian Liu yu Wu-Yue jingshen” [A Preliminary Discussion of Qian Liu and the Wu-Yue Spirit]. Qian Liu yanjiu, no. 13 (2004): pp. 41–49. Franklin, Adrian. Tourism: An Introduction (London: Sage Publications, 2003). Guan Kanglin. “Mantan Qianwang gulide Wu-Yue wenhua guji” [Discussion of Historic Sites of Wu-Yue Culture in King Qian’s Native place]. Qian Clan Association. http://www.qsly.org/text/wywh/wywhgj.htm (accessed September 9, 2003). Hangzhou Municipal Economic Commission. “Hangzhou China Industrial Investment.” www.hzindus.gov.cn/en/district.asp?type=10 (accessed January 8, 2010). Hangzhou Municipal Government. “Comprehensive Strength.” www.hangzhou. gov.cn/main/zpd/English/AboutHangZhou/T303918.shtml [accessed January 8, 2010]. Information Center of General Office of Zhejiang Provincial Government 2006. http://www.zhejiang.gov.cn/zjforeign/english/node493/node499/ userobject1ai5843.html [accessed December 23, 2009]. Lew, Alan, Lawrence Yu, John Ap, and Guangrui Zhang, eds. Tourism in China (New York: Haworth Hospitality Press, 2003). “Linan dajiudian” [Linan major hotel]. Qian Liu yanjiu no. 11 (February 2003): p. i. Lindberg, Kreg, Clem Tisdell, and Xue Dayuan. “Ecotourism in China’s Nature Reserves.” In Tourism in China, edited by Alan Lew, Lawrence Yu, John Ap, and Zhang Guangrui (New York: Haworth Hospitality Press, 2003), pp. 103–125.
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Long, Greg, Rusty Long, and Mark Healey. “Surfing China’s Qiantang River Tidal Bore, Hangzhou, September 2008.” http://vimeo.com/1871269 [accessed December 10, 2009]. Ministry of Culture, “Protection of Cultural Heritage in China, May 25, 2006.” http:// en.chinagate.cn/english/reports/48279.htm (accessed December 12, 2009). National Register of Historic Places. “The US National Register of Historic Places,” http://www.nps.gov/nr/about.htm [accessed December 12, 2009]. National Tourism Administration. “Tisheng Zhongguo gongmin luyou wenming suzhi xingdong jihua” [Plan to Raise Cultural Level of Chinese Tourists, 2006]. www.cnta.gov.cn/Upfiles/200681784098.doc (accessed December 26, 2009). Nyiri, Pal. “Between Encouragement and Control.” In Asia on Tour, eds. Tim Winter, Peggy Teo, and T. C. Chang (London: Routledge, 2009), pp. 153–169. Nyiri, Pal. Scenic Spots: Chinese Tourism, the State, and Cultural Authority (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006). Polo, Marco. The Travels of Marco Polo, Vol. 2. Translated by Henry Yule. Revised by Henri Cordier (New York: Dover Publications, 1993). Qian Bin. “Wusuwang jiaxun fazhan wei tianxia Qianshi dazong” [Family Instructions of Martial and August King are Spread to All Qians). Qian Liu Yanjiu no. 13 (2004): pp. 122–138. Qian Dafang, Qian Cheng, Qian Hong, and Qian Yong. “Lun Wu-Yue wenhua” [On Wu-Yue Culture]. Qian Liu yanjiu, no. 13 (2004): pp. 31–34. Qian Dafang, Qian Hong, Qian Yongjian, Qian Yong, and Qian Xueli. “Pengzu qi ren” [On Pengzu]. Qian Liu Yanjiu, no. 11 (February 2003): pp. 34–38. “Qianwang ling jinqi kuojian gongcheng” [Recent Expansion Project for King Qian’s Tomb]. Qian Liu yanjiu, no. 6 (August 1997): pp. 1–2. Qian Wenxuan, ed. Qianshi jiasheng [Qian Clan Genealogy] (Shanghai: Shanghai shudian, 1996). Rosen, Stanley. Foreword to Television in Post-Reform China: Serial Dramas, Confucian Leadership and the Global Television Market, by Ying Zhu (London: Routledge, 2008). Shanghai Qian Clan Association and Shanghai Qian Liu Research Society. Wu-Yue shijia [An Eminent Wu-Yue Family] (Shanghai: Shanghai Qian Liu Research Society and Shanghai Qian Clan Association, 2008).
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Shijie Qian wang. “Haineiwai Qianshi houyi daibiao zai Hang gongji Qianwang” [Memorial Ceremony to King Qian at Hangzhou for Descendants in China and Abroad]. http://www.qianhome.com/Article/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID= 232 [accessed November 27, 2009]. Shijie Qian wang. “Hangzhou Qianwangci” [King Qian Ancestral Temple, Hangzhou]. http://www.qianhome.com/Article/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID= 127 [accessed November 27, 2009]. Shijie Qian wang. “Pengzu wenhua xuanyan” [Declaration of Pengzu Culture]. http://www.qianhome.com/Article/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=115 [accessed November 27, 2009]. Tang Jianping. “Guanyu chuangjian Wu-Yue wenhua mingcheng de sikao” [Reflections on Creating a Wu-Yue Famous Culture City), Qian Liu yanjiu, no. 13 (2004): pp. 60–64. Tao Fuxian, ed. Qiangu yizu (One Thousand Years of a family] (Linan: Jinghua chubanshe, 2004). United Nations Habitat for a Better Future. “Previous Scroll Winners.” http://www.unhabitat.org/content.asp?typeid=19&catid=490&cid=2909 [accessed December 26, 2009] Winter, Tim, Peggy Teo, and T. C. Chang, eds. Asia on Tour: Exploring the Rise of Asian Tourism (London: Routledge, 2009). World Tourism Organization. http://www.unwto.org [accessed December 4, 2009]. Xia Yuhua. “Shekeyuan: Zhongguo chengzhen renkou 2008 nian mo 6.07 yi” [Academy of Social Sciences: China’s Urban Population at End of 2008 is 607 million]. China Popin. http://www.cpirc.org.cn/news/rkxw_gn_detail.asp? id=10684 [accessed December 25, 2009]. Yang Yiping. “Qian Liu dui baohu Hangzhou he baohu junshen Xihu liangxiang zhongyao lishi gongxian” [Two Historical Contributions of Qian Liu: Protecting Hangzhou and Dredging West Lake]. Qian Liu yanjiu, no. 13 (2004): pp. 97–103. Zhang Guangrui. “China’s Tourism Since 1978: Policies, Experiences, and Lessons Learned.” In Tourism in China, edited by Alan Lew, Lawrence Yu, John Ap, and Guangrui Zhang (New York: Haworth Hospitality Press, 2003), pp. 13–34. Zhang Yan. “Ju shehui gejie zhi li, jian Wu-Yue wenhua mingcheng” [Combining Strengths of Various Social Groups to Construct a Wu-Yue Culture Tourist City]. Linan Cultural Affairs Director Address, Inter-national Symposium of King Qian Descendants, Linan, China, September 21, 2003.
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Zhu Fusheng. “Wu-Yue guo gaiyuan tansuo” [An Investigation Into Wu-Yue’s Changing of Reign Title]. Qian Liu yanjiu , no. 6 (August 1997): pp. 69–75. Zhu Xiaodong and Sun Lei. “Wu-Yue guowangling, gongchenta lieru quanguo wenbao danwei” [Wu-Yue Royal Tomb and Meritorious Subject Pagoda Enter List of National Cultural Sites]. Qian Clan Association. http://www. qsly.org/text/qsxw/lrqgwb.htm [accessed 2004]. Zhu Ying. Television in Post-Reform China: Serial Dramas, Confucian Leadership and the Global Television Market (London: Routledge, 2008). Zhu Zhaohua and Elsie Yang, Impact Assessment of Bamboo Shoot on Poverty Reduction in Linan, China. International Network for Bamboo and Rattam. http://www.inbar.int/publication/txt/INBAR_Working_Paper_No52. htm [accessed December 22, 2009]. Zou Shencheng, Tuijin Hangzhou, ‘Gudai Chengshihua’ de diyi gongchen — Qian Liu [Qian Liu — The Most Meritorious Subject to Promote Urbanization of old Hangzhou]. Qian Liu yanjiu, 13 (2004), pp. 1–24.
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Part III
Challenges in Foreign, Security, and Military Policies
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Chapter Twelve
China’s Public Diplomacy in a New Era Zhaoying Han
Most major powers in the world promote their images abroad through a foreign policy instrument — public diplomacy. Although the promotion of Chinese policies is not new, public diplomacy as a common diplomatic practice has been used only recently by Chinese leaders and officials. It has quickly become an important component of China’s diplomacy. This chapter explores why the Chinese government has placed much emphasis on public diplomacy, discusses major public diplomacy programs and their implementation, and analyzes the characteristics and effectiveness as well as the challenges and limitations of China’s public diplomacy. What is Public Diplomacy? Diplomacy is an important instrument of foreign policy. Traditional diplomacy mainly relies on official visits, negotiation, meditation, treaty making, and participation in international conferences and intergovernmental organizations by diplomats and diplomatic agencies representing sovereign states. These traditional diplomatic activities focus on the political, military, and economic aspects of foreign behavior by states. In the early 20th century, politicians and diplomats in the West realized the importance of moral persuasion in foreign behavior to protect national interests, as implied in “winning without launching a war,” a quotation from Sun Tzu’s classic The Art of War. Different from the military, economic, and political aspects of a state’s foreign behavior, moral persuasion 291
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takes advantage of the cultural activities of a state. Therefore, it is often referred to as cultural diplomacy. Since this type of diplomacy targets the public in other countries, not foreign governments and intergovernmental organizations, it is more commonly known as public diplomacy. After World War II, international cultural relations became an important dimension of international relations. Former German foreign minister Willy Brandt referred to cultural relations as “the third pillar of foreign policy.”1 Philip Coombs, former US assistant secretary of state for educational and cultural affairs, wrote that “the educational and cultural activities … have become a new and powerful dimension of American foreign policy.”2 The definition of public diplomacy is still being debated in academic circles in China and other countries. Edmund Gullion, Dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, was believed to be the first to use the term “public diplomacy” in 1965 when the Edward R. Murrow Center for Public Diplomacy was established. The definitions of public diplomacy in the United States have adopted a state-centered approach. For example, in the Dictionary of International Relations Terms published by the Department of State in 1987, public diplomacy is defined as “government-sponsored programs intended to inform or influence public opinion in other countries; its chief instruments are publications, motion pictures, cultural exchanges, radio and television.” According to Hans N. Tuch, former American diplomat and author of Communicating with the World, public diplomacy refers to “official government efforts to shape the communications environment overseas in which American foreign policy is played out, in order to reduce the degree to which misperceptions and misunderstandings complicate relations between the US and other nations.”3 The now defunct United States Information Agency (USIA) defined public diplomacy as follows: “Public diplomacy seeks to promote the national interest and the national security of the United States through understanding, informing, and influencing foreign publics and 1 Philip H. Coombs, The Fourth Dimension of Foreign Policy: Educational and Cultural Affairs (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), pp. 1–2. 2 Ibid. 3 Hans N. Tuch, Communicating with the World: US Public Diplomacy Overseas (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990), p. 3.
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broadening dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad.” According to the Planning Group for Integration of USIA into the US Department of State (1997), public diplomacy “seeks to promote the national interest of the United States through understanding, informing and influencing foreign audiences.” This chapter defines public diplomacy as the foreign behavior of a sovereign state to promote its policies and culture to the publics abroad. Public diplomacy aims at promoting the understanding of the policies, culture, history, society, and institutions of a state by foreign publics through the media, publications, and educational and cultural activities. Public diplomacy activities fall into two categories: information programs and educational and cultural programs. The information programs are conducted through the media and publications to promote the understanding of current policies; the educational and cultural programs are conducted through the exchanges of scholars, students, and other visitors, research, and language teaching to promote the understanding of history, culture, society, and institutions. Motivations China’s public diplomacy activities can be traced back to the CCP’s efforts to win the support of the West during the Anti-Japanese War in the 1930s. Under the leadership of Zhou Enlai, the CCP established the International Propaganda Group (Guoji Xuanchuan Xiaozu) in Wuhan at the time when Japan began to invade China. Zhou instructed the International Propaganda Group to translate and publish the writings by Mao Zedong on establishing a united front in fighting against the Japanese and to promote the understanding of the CCP’s policies by foreign publics and officials. Zhou himself met many Western journalists and scholars and made arrangements for them to visit Yanan, where the headquarters of the CCP were located.4 Immediately after the founding of the PRC, China had diplomatic relations mainly with socialist countries, isolated on the world stage by the West. While taking efforts to promote the understanding of the New China and the CCP’s policies by advocating China’s policies and encouraging educational 4 Tao Wenzhao, China–US Relations, 1911–1950 (Chongqing: Chongqing Press, 1993), pp. 235–241.
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and cultural exchanges with socialist countries, China also promoted people-to-people exchanges and trade with some Western states such as Japan and sought diplomatic recognition from the West. The development of Chinese public diplomacy in the past decade grew from the rise of China as an important global player and its increasing influence on the world economy, finance, energy, environment, and security. China’s reemergence as a great power has made some governments and people worry about issues ranging from the growing trade deficits with China to China’s expanding influence in different regions of the world. G. John Ikenberry, an American scholar of international studies, wrote in 2008: “The rise of China will undoubtedly be one of the great dramas of the twenty-first century. China’s extraordinary economic growth and active diplomacy are already transforming East Asia, and future decades will see even greater increases in Chinese power and influence.”5
The potential “China threat” has continued to be a hotly debated topic. Denny Roy has stated that an increasingly powerful China is likely to destablize regional security in the near future. A developed economy could potentially turn China’s huge population from a weakness into a strength, and give China the basis for world-class military and technological capabilities. In short, it could make China a superpower.6 China’s economy heavily depends on export. China has to seek friendship and cooperation with its trade partners. To convince them that China’s rise is peaceful has become a major challenge to Chinese foreign policy. Chinese scholars proposed the concept of a “peaceful rise” in the early 2000s, which was quickly adopted by Chinese leaders and officials who repeatedly explained why the rise of China would be peaceful. “Public diplomacy” is a relatively new term in China. The two categories of public diplomacy programs used to be called “propaganda” in China. “Propaganda” is a derogatory term in the West. Even though views in the West differ as to whether or not “public diplomacy” and “propaganda” 5
G. John Ikenberry, “The Rise of China and the Future of the West,” Foreign Affairs 87, no. 1 (January/February 2008): 23. 6 Denny Roy, “The ‘China Threat’ Issue: Major Arguments,” Asian Survey 36, no. 8 (1996): 758.
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are similar, some contend that “since propaganda can be based on fact, public diplomacy can be equated with propaganda, i.e. ideas, information, or other material disseminated to win people over to a given doctrine.”7 Public diplomacy has become a common diplomatic practiced by many Western states. To avoid misleading and negative understanding of China’s efforts and to seek a full and true image abroad, public diplomacy has been studied by Chinese scholars and applied by Chinese leaders and officials in recent years, although the concept is still being debated in academic circles in China.8 Different from traditional diplomacy, public diplomacy not only deals with governments but primarily with nongovernmental individuals and organizations. Furthermore, public diplomacy activities present many differing views as represented by private Chinese individuals and organizations in addition to official government views. The establishment of Confucius Institutes around the world is a good example. As the Chinese economy keeps growing and Chinese society becomes more open, the Chinese government has become more confident that open information and more understanding about China would be good for its image abroad. Zhao Qizheng, former director of State Council Information Office (SCIO), called on Chinese information officials “to publicize China’s economic and social achievements and explain China’s official positions and policies on issues more fully to foreigners, and to create a more favorable image of China in world opinion.”9 Liu Yandong, State Councilor and Chair of the Council of the Confucius Institute Headquarters, stated in her speech delivered at the Fourth Confucius Institute Conference: “I am convinced that through our concerted efforts, China studies will surely keep pace with times, lay a solid foundation for the long-term development of Confucius Institutes and make contribution to the understanding of a true China by the world.”10 The phrase “a full and true image of China in the
7
http://www.publicdiplomacy.org/1.htm, accessed December 31, 2009. Ingrid d’Hooghe, The Rise of Chinese Public Diplomacy, p. 4. 9 Quoted from Ingrid d’Hooghe, The Rise of Chinese Public Diplomacy, p. 4. 10 Liu Yandong, “Mutual Collabration, Continuous Innovation and Sustainable Development for the Future of the Confucius Institute around the World,” Keynote speech at the Fourth Confucius Institute Conference, December 11, 2009. 8
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world” has been more frequently used to discuss Chinese public diplomacy efforts by Chinese leaders and officials. The motivation behind this rhetorical change is not only from the ideological differences but also the reality that the image of China presented by some Western media has been greatly twisted. With the opening of China, more and more international media have come to China and the number of international journalists is increasing. With different cultural, political, and ideological backgrounds, it is normal for them to have their own perceptions of China and present their own perspectives or reports of China. However, due to their own interests, they might present misperceptions or prejudiced reports on China. China has realized that the government should have its own voice in shaping and constructing a full and true image of China in the world. In 2004, the Central Foreign Propaganda Annual Working Conference formulated guidelines, principles, and development goals and started to develop a long-term policy plan. By 2005, the central government had formulated the 2006–2010 Work Plan for the national foreign propaganda, aimed at establishing a comprehensive, multi-level, and wide-ranging pattern for a large foreign propaganda leadership system and working mechanism. By “large foreign propaganda,” it actually refers to public diplomacy which includes both the international information programs and the educational and cultural programs. European scholar Ingrid d’Hooghe summarized the major goals of Chinese public diplomacy nicely: “China wants to be seen as a country that strives after building a harmonious society and that works hard to give its people a better future … a stable, reliable and responsible economic partner, a rising economic power that does not have to be feared … a trustworthy and responsible member of international political community, capable of and willing to contribute actively to world peace … to be acknowledged and respected as an ancient but vibrant culture.”11 Major Programs China’s public diplomacy programs can be divided into two categories: (1) information programs and (2) educational and cultural programs. 11
Ingrid d’Hooghe, The Rise of Chinese Public Diplomacy, pp. 18–19.
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The information programs are usually called foreign propaganda in China. In the Chinese political system, the Foreign Propaganda Small Leading Group of the CCP, which consists of top CCP leaders, is the highest organization for policy guidance, planning, and decision making, with the help of the Office for Foreign Propaganda of the CCP’s Central Committee. The Office for Foreign Propaganda, renamed the State Council Information Office (SCIO) in 1991, has the following primary responsibility: to promote the Chinese media to report on China to the world, not only on China’s domestic and foreign policies and the economic and social developments, but also on the new developments of Chinese science and technology, education, culture, and history. To achieve its mission, the SCIO provides policy guidance and coordinates the external media reports, holds regular press conferences on important economic, political, and social issues and policies, issues white papers to clarify China’s policies on critical issues such as human rights, foreign policies, national defense development, the Chinese party system, energy, climate change, Tibet, Xinjiang, etc.12 The SCIO has played a significant role in promoting the development of the new form of media — the Internet — by providing policy planning and coordination. The SCIO also assists foreign journalists in conducting their interviews in China to promote objective and accurate reporting on China. The SCIO issues publications on the Chinese economy, history, culture and geography, etc., in the form of books, journals, and audio and video products. The China Foreign Language Publishing Bureau, which is commonly known as the China International Publishing Group (CIPG), is the oldest and largest Chinese government agency targeting foreign audiences. Founded in October 1949 as the International Information Bureau in the Information Agency of the Chinese government, it has experienced several reorganizations since then. It has been affiliated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Culture. In 1991, it started to be supervised by the Office for Foreign Propaganda and later by the SCIO. The CIPG, as China’s most professional and resourceful foreign language publishing group, introduces China to foreign countries through periodicals and books. The CIPG publishes periodicals in 9 languages 12
http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/, accessed December 31, 2009.
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(Chinese, English, French, Russian, Spanish, Arabic, Japanese, Korean, and Tibetan) and 14 editions, which are distributed to over 180 countries and regions. The list of its periodicals includes People Pictorial, China Pictorial, China, China Reports, China Today, People China, Beijing Review, and ChinAfrica. The CIPG has accumulated much experience in understanding foreign readers’ needs and publishing and distributing publications overseas. It has ten publishing houses, including seven in China (Foreign Languages Press, New World Press, Sinolingua, China Pictorial Publishing House, Delphin Books, Morning Glory Publisher, and New Star Publisher) and three overseas (Peace Book Co. Ltd in Hong Kong, Long River Press, and Cypress Book Co. Ltd). Every year, the CIPG publishes nearly 3,000 titles in nearly 20 languages, covering a wide range of topics in politics, economy, culture, art, history, Chinese teaching, and children’s books.13 The CIPG has maintained websites to promote the understanding of China since the late 1990s. There are more than 30 Websites, including www.china.org.cn, under the CIPG. With a multilingual advantage, these Websites provide visitors with authoritative and timely information on China. Meanwhile, www.china.org.cn has cooperated with the World Bank, UN Development Program, foreign embassies in China, and foreign chambers of commerce in China to launch professional Websites such as www.chinagate.com.cn and e-commerce platforms such as www.invest.china.cn, which provide various e-commerce services and products. The CIPG has gained an obvious advantage over foreign language publishing and a core competitive edge on multilingual programs. It has developed into an organization with more than 20 subsidiaries as well as 12 overseas branches located in the United States, Britain, Germany, Belgium, Russia, Egypt, Mexico, Japan, and Hong Kong, constituting a conglomerate of foreign language publishing and marketing. The rapid development of information technology and the Internet has dramatically increased the role of traditional Chinese media in reaching out to the audiences abroad. Xinhua News Agency, founded on November 7, 1931, is China’s national news agency as well as a global news and 13
http://www.cipg.com.cn/product_service/book_publishers/, accessed December 31, 2009.
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information network. Xinhua provides its worldwide subscribers with news and financial information in the form of text, photos, graphics, audio, video, and mobile phone text messages 24 hours a day in 8 languages: Chinese, English, French, Russian, Spanish, Arabic, Portuguese, and Japanese. Xinhua publishes more than 20 newspapers and magazines, with the combined single-issue circulation record topping 10 million. Its newspapers, represented by the Xinhua Daily Telegraph, and news magazines, represented by Outlook, are among the most authoritative in the country. In its latest moves to expand into a modern, multimedia news and information service provider, Xinhua has launched a video news service, an English TV news service, a mobile phone TV station, and a multimedia news desk. Xinhuanet.com, Xinhua’s Website, is one of China’s top news Websites and has been called the country’s “most influential Website.” It supplies news in 6 languages and multimedia formats 24 hours a day. It has 31 local channels and hosts China’s largest block of government websites including gov.cn, the official Website of the Chinese government. Xinhua’s multimedia database is the largest multilanguage databank in China’s media industry. It has been upgraded over the years into a modern, commercial database, directly serving its end-users in China and around the world.14 People’s Daily, started in June 1948 and with a current circulation of 3 million, is among the most influential and authoritative newspapers in China. People’s Daily Online (http://www.people.com.cn) was formally launched on January 1, 1997. It has become one of the most authoritative, comprehensive, and influential Websites and the disseminator of information claiming the largest daily amount of new releases in China. Now it has in its possession Websites in simplified Chinese, traditional Chinese, Tibetan, Korean, Mongolian, English, Japanese, French, Spanish, Russian, and Arabic, altogether ten lingual versions, disseminating information and news throughout the world. It has also set up mirror sites in Japan and the United States, with contributions from more than 1,000 journalists from over 70 stations around the world and 500-plus cooperative media as an important channel for overseas readers. 14
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-09/09/content_12023111.htm, accessed December 31, 2009.
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China Daily, founded on June 1, 1981, is the national English-language newspaper and is targeted at the Western mainstream society. The China Daily Group includes 12 English publications and the country’s top news Internet portal. China Daily serves as a key reference point for overseas media and society. The newspaper has an average daily circulation of more than 300,000 in 150 countries and regions. Two-thirds of China Daily’s worldwide readers are government officials, think tanks, and decisionmakers, as well as top executives from multinational corporations. The China Daily Website, launched in 1995, is the premier English portal in China. Backed by China Daily’s highly professional group of journalists and editors, it feeds up-to-the-minute, accurate, in-depth, and real-life news and information to online readers with state-of-the-art technology. More than 200 reports from China Daily are quoted over 2,000 times in an average week by foreign media such as the Associated, Press, Reuters, Agence France-Presse, Washington Post, New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Financial Times, CNN, and the BBC.15 China Radio International (CRI), founded on December 3, 1941, and owned and operated by the state, is China’s only overseas broadcaster. It is one of the “three central media organizations” along with China National Radio (CNR) and China Central Television (CCTV). CRI now broadcasts in 59 languages domestically and internationally. Its English Service is one of its most important divisions. It provides the world with one of the most efficient and convenient ways of learning about China. CRI has also expanded its services with new developments in information technology. CRI Online, founded in 1998 as one of the key official website, operates in 59 languages.16 China Central Television (CCTV) is the national TV station of China and is one of China’s most important news broadcast companies. In addition to its TV programs, CCTV has built up a multimedia broadcasting platform and business operation, which includes movies, newspapers, and the Internet. CCTV is the main news source for the Chinese public. It is also an important window through which the Chinese can learn about the outside world, and through which the world can learn about China. 15 16
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cd/introduction.html, accessed December 31, 2009. http://gb.cri.cn/21344/2007/09/29/
[email protected], accessed December 31, 2009.
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Currently CCTV is running six international Channels in 6 different languages, which include Chinese, English, French, Spanish, Russian, and Arabic. CCTV International (CCTV-9) is the English-language 24-hour news channel. It is dedicated to reporting news and information to its global audience, with a special focus on China. CCTV has also started business in the new media platforms such as Internet TV, Mobile TV, Bus Mobile TV, and Internet Protocol TV provided by CCTV.com. The signals of CCTV are available around the globe. Its programs reach 140 countries and regions. CCTV maintains cooperation with 241 media outlets in 140 countries and regions, and has correspondents in 19 places around the world.17 The Information Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has improved its information program by running its Website and the International Press Center. The International Press Center was established in 2000 to provide services to all resident or temporary foreign journalists in China. It deals with foreign press in China, organizes regular press conferences, arranges visits and interviews for foreign journalists, and provides printed and audio-visual materials and other information on China. The second category of Chinese public diplomacy, activities are educational and cultural programs conducted through the exchange of scholars, students, and other visitors, and the promotion of Chinese language teaching and Chinese studies. These programs are mainly conducted by the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Culture, the Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs (CPIFA), and the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (CPAFFC). The Department of International Cooperation and Exchanges in the Ministry of Education is primarily responsible for international educational exchanges. As an important component of international exchanges and cooperation, international student education has been given great importance by the Chinese government. In 1950, China received the first group of 33 students from East European countries. By the end of 2008, the total number 17 http://www.cctv.com/english/special/news/20091207/103449.shtml, accessed December 31, 2009.
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of international students who had studied in China had increased to over 1,460,000. In 2008, the total number of international students from 189 countries and areas reached 223,499, an increase by 14.32 percent from 2007. Among them, Chinese Government Scholarship students numbered 13,516. Since 1997, the Chinese Scholarships Council (CSC) has been entrusted by the Ministry of Education with the enrollment and administration of daily operations concerning international students. Chinese language teaching overseas is an important part of Chinese public diplomacy. In 1950, the first group of exchange students came to Qinghua University to learn Chinese. Two years later, Prof. Zhu Dexi, a distinguished linguist, was sent to Bulgaria to teach Chinese language. In 1965, Beijing Language Institute was founded as the institution for international students to learn Chinese. In the 1960s, international students in China came mainly from African countries. Since 1978, the Chinese language teaching program has grown rapidly. In 1987, the National Small Leading Group for Chinese Language Teaching Overseas was set up by the State Council. It experienced reorganization in 1998 and was renamed in 2006 as the Chinese Language Council International, and is non composed of members from 12 state ministries and commissions. Hanban, as a non-governmental and non-profit public institution affiliated with the Chinese Ministry of Education, is the executive body of the Chinese Language Council International. The reorganization of the institution for Chinese language teaching was a result of the increasing demand for learning Chinese overseas in the past decade. To meet such a great demand, Hanban created a new institution, the Confucius Institute, to promote Chinese language and culture overseas. The first Confucius Institute opened in South Korea in 2004. By early 2010, over 530 Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms had been established in 87 countries and regions. The Bureau for External Cultural Relations in the Ministry of Culture provides policy guidance and administers international cultural exchanges and cultural communications, and make policies and drafts related laws and regulations. Since the late 1980s, China has established seven Chinese Cultural Centers abroad, in Mauritius (established in 1988), Benin (1988), Cairo (2002), Paris (2002), Malta (2003), Seoul (2004), and Berlin (2008). These Cultural Centers provide information services and training
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programs and organize various educational and cultural activities such as lectures on China. The CPIFA and the CPAFFC, which claim to be NGOs (but with strong connections with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), are also important participants in Chinese public diplomacy. The CPIFA was established in December 1949 with the initiative from Zhou Enlai. It targets mainly the social elites in other countries, including distinguished politicians, former officials, social activists, successful entrepreneurs, and well-known scholars of international studies. The CPAFFC, founded in 1954, primarily promotes exchange and cooperation between private organizations and local governments in China and other countries. It has developed friendships and cooperative relations with 458 organizations in 148 countries. With its help, many cities and provinces have established sistership relations with their counterparts abroad, and the educational, cultural, scientific, technological exchanges and trade between them have thus been promoted greatly. In addition to the two major categories of public diplomacy activities, the efforts by Chinese leaders and diplomats in recent years to reach out to the foreign public should not be neglected. For example, during their official visits abroad, President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao often take time to meet with and talk to “ordinary people.” During his visit to Japan in April 2007, Premier Wen did his morning exercises in a park in Tokyo, chatted with the locals, planted tomatoes with farmers, and practiced baseball with students from Ritsumeikan University.18 Chinese diplomats are getting involved more active with foreign audiences as well. For example, shortly after her arrival at The Hague, China’s Ambassador to Netherlands, Ms Xue Hanqin, gave several interviews to the Dutch press and wrote a week-long diary for one of the Netherlands’ newspapers. One Dutch scholar commented that “the diary and many interviews that followed impressed people favorably, with the result that for the first time a wider audience than just the diplomatic community in The Hague knows a Chinese Ambassador to Netherlands.”19 18 Ingrid d’Hooghe, The Rise of Chinese Public Diplomacy, Clingendael Diplomacy Papers No. 12 (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, July 2007), p. 23. 19 Ingrid d’Hooghe, The Rise of Chinese Public Diplomacy, p. 24.
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Characteristics and Effectiveness There are two distinctive characteristics of Chinese public diplomacy. First, due to the concentration of power in the government, the Chinese authorities are able to mobilize huge resources for the conduct of public diplomacy from various government agencies and different levels of government. Chinese public diplomacy involves not only various ministries, such as the State Council Information Office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Culture, the Department of Publicity of the CCP, etc., but also leading national media and publication institutions, such as the China International Publishing Group (CIPG), People’s Daily, China Daily, CCTV, China Radio International (CRI), Xinhua, etc. Chinese educational and cultural institutions rely on government funding. Almost all of the key Chinese universities are national and they are major players in educational exchanges. In addition, provincial governments in China receive policy guidance and instructions from the central government in their efforts to present or publicize themselves to the world. The provincial governments have their own information offices in their government structure. Usually the central government holds the annual propaganda work meeting at the beginning of each year to report on the work of the past year and to offer policy guidance and instructions for the coming year. In the West, most of the media are private businesses and independent. Of course, the Western media also have their own ideological preferences, and some Western media and educational institutions also receive funding from the government or government-affiliated organizations. But overall, Western educational and cultural institutions have diverse financial resources and are therefore more independent of government control. In addition, the civil society is stronger in Western countries than in China. The number of NGOs is much larger than that in China. These NGOs play important roles in the promotion of Western values and culture. Second, Chinese public diplomacy efforts have been defensive so far. Chinese public diplomacy is a response by the Chinese government to the misunderstanding and misperception of China abroad. The Chinese government used to be weak or late in making statements on and explanations
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for important domestic and international issues and criticism from others. By introducing the concept of public diplomacy and improving its efforts in this regard, the Chinese government nowadays responds more quickly to what happens in China and elsewhere. For example, when Akmal Shaikh, a British national convicted of smuggling drugs into China, was executed by lethal injection in Urumqi in late December 2009, the British government condemned the execution. The Chinese government immediately responded and defended the execution by issuing a statement: “Drug trafficking is a grave crime worldwide,” “the concerns of the British side have been duly noted and taken into consideration by the Chinese judicial authorities in the legal process, and Mr Shaikh’s rights and interests under Chinese law are properly respected and guaranteed.”20 This story was reported in major Chinese media such as People’s Daily, Xinhua, China Daily, etc. Through educational and cultural exchange programs, China seeks to promote further understanding of Chinese history, traditions, culture, and society instead of spreading or imposing Chinese values upon others. In contrast, Western governments and media tend to take initiatives to set up agendas on the world stage. Even their educational and cultural programs seek not only the understanding of their cultures but also the acceptance of their political system and values as universal. Such public diplomacy efforts are much more offensive. Since the aim of Chinese public diplomacy is to promote the good image of China, the perception of China abroad is an important index to assess the effectiveness of Chinese public diplomacy. The perception of China is influenced not only by Chinese public diplomacy but also by other factors such as Chinese foreign and security policies, economic performances, different values and ideologies, etc. Therefore, it is difficult and may be too early to tell how Chinese public diplomacy has improved its image abroad. A BBC World Service public opinion poll, which has been tracking opinions about a country’s influence in the world since 2005, found that among the people polled in tracking countries, excluding China, an average 20 “Condemnation as China Executes Briton For Drug Smuggling,” http://www.cnn.com/ 2009/WORLD/asiapcf/12/29/china.britain.smuggler/index.html, accessed January 24, 2010.
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of 47 percent held mainly positive views of China while 32 percent held mainly negative views in December 2007; 44 percent were mainly positive while 32 percent were mainly negative in March 2007; 45 percent were mainly positive while 27 percent were mainly negative in February 2006; 48 percent were mainly positive while 30 percent were mainly negative in March 2005.21 These results do not tell us much about the change in the Chinese image abroad, but they do reveal that the most positive views of China are found in the Middle East and Africa, though Asian views tend toward the positive. The most negative views are found in Europe and the United States. Another multinational survey of public opinion conducted by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs in 2006 confirmed with a similar result. “Asked to rate their feelings toward China on the thermometer scale, where fifty is neutral, publics in Asia express fairly warm feelings. China receives a mean of 61 from Australians, 57 from South Koreans, and 54 from Indians. However, China receives a fairly cool 40 from Americans.”22 It seems easier for China to win friends from developing countries with whom it shares political values. The effectiveness of Chinese public diplomacy may also vary with different groups of audience. The Chicago Council on Global Affairs in collaboration with the East Asia Institute (South Korea) conducted in 2008 a six-nation public opinion survey examining the current and potential use of soft power in East Asia. The survey’s findings indicate that China’s soft power image among the common public in Asia and the United States “is more limited than the scholarly and journalistic communities have suggested 21
Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA), “Global Views on USA Improve,” April 2008. PIPA, at the University of Maryland, carried out the poll for the BBC World Service with GlobeScan, an international polling company. The latest results are based on 17,457 in-home or telephone interviews conducted across a total of 34 countries (including the 23 tracking countries) by the international polling firm GlobeScan together with the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) at the University of Maryland. GlobeScan coordinated fieldwork between October 31, 2007, and January 25, 2008. See http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/apr08/BBCEvals_Apr08_rpt.pdf, accessed January 25, 2010; also see James F. Paradise, “China and International Harmony: The Role of Confucius Institutes in Bolstering Beijing’s Soft Power,” Asian Survey 49, Issue 4, (2009): 663. 22 The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, “The United States and the Rise of China and India,” 2006, p. 39.
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in recent years.”23 The survey also finds that “China’s regional diplomacy is not perceived by respondents to be as effective as is commonly portrayed in the media and the policy expert community.”24 These findings imply Chinese public diplomacy is more successful with the social elite than the public. The Washington Post reported that “Although many Americans still view China with deep suspicion because of its communist system and human rights record, the results of Beijing’s image-and-influence campaign are clear.” The report quoted Rep. Earl Blumenauer (D-Ore.) as saying that “Members of Congress ‘are starting to understand that the Chinese are not communist but that the Chinese are Chinese’.”25 China’s diplomacy used to focus on foreign governments and officials. However, in the democratic states, the elected officials cannot neglect public opinion. In dealing with democracies, China has learned that officials change with elections but the general public vote all the time. Seeking the understanding of China by foreign publics is more sustainable. Of course, the social elite as opinion leaders should be an important target audience for public diplomacy. The survey by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs concluded that “China emerges as one of the stronger regional actors in terms of its economic power and attractiveness, but this is not matched by its ability to serve as a regional negotiator and political and cultural leader.”26 This perception ignores the political, social, and cultural developments in China in the past decade. The success of the promotion of a true and full image of China will depend much on the efforts of Chinese public diplomacy. Only time can tell what effects Chinese public diplomacy can produce. Challenges Ahead Chinese public diplomacy has been experiencing great changes and transformations since the beginning of the 21st century. China is learning from the West in the conduct of diplomacy, both traditional and public. China is reconstructing and consolidating the institutions of public diplomacy. 23
Ibid., pp. 17–18. Ibid., p. 17. 25 John Pomfret, “China’s Lobbying Efforts Yield New Influence, Openness on Capitol Hill,” The Washington Post, Saturday, January 9, 2010. 26 The Chicago Council on Global affairs, “Soft Power in Asia,” p. 18. 24
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Although the Foreign Propaganda Small Leading Group of the CCP is the organization dealing with policy planning, guidance, and coordination, the division of functions and responsibilities of the government agencies involved is still not quite clear; overlapping of their functions is common, especially in the conduct of information programs. Coordination among these government agencies needs to be improved. For information programs, even though many sensitive economic and social issues such as corruption and environmental damage can be discussed publicly, the press in China is still under scrutiny and the Chinese media sometimes are unable to report on certain issues. The credibility of the press is in doubt. With the democratization process taking place within the CCP, hopefully the Chinese media will enjoy more freedom. For educational and cultural programs, the effectiveness of such programs takes a much longer time to tell. Moreover, since these programs demand huge and ongoing investment, for China, which is still striving to improve the basic social welfare of its people in education, medical care, social security, and so forth, such a huge and long-term investment has been questioned by some Chinese scholars and government officials. Even some Chinese leaders and top government officials have reservations, according to one Chinese official in charge of the educational and cultural programs. In addition to these domestic challenges, Chinese public diplomacy has to meet even greater international challenges. International media are dominated by the West today, especially in English-speaking countries. Media in English-speaking countries can take initiatives in agenda-setting in world politics, have greater impact on world opinion, and impose much influence in shaping the image of China in the world. The Chinese government and media are making great efforts to have voices from China heard, but ideological differences put Chinese media and information programs in a position of disadvantage. What the Chinese media can do is to provide truthful information. China information officials may wish to learn from what Edward R. Murrow, former director of the USIA in the Kennedy administration, said: “Truth is the best propaganda and lies are the worst. To be persuasive we must be believable; to be believable we must be credible; to be credible we must be truthful. It is as simple as that.”27 27
http://www.publicdiplomacy.org/1.htm, accessed December 31, 2009.
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Although educational and cultural programs have been expanding dramatically in recent years, the motivation of these programs is suspicious for others. Over 40 countries are planning or negotiating with the Chinese government to establish Chinese cultural centers in their major cities. But such expansion of educational and cultural programs does not mean that they have been fully accepted abroad. Suspicions about the Confucius Institutes are not unheard of. An article in The Economist on October 22, 2009, noted that “China’s partial financial backing, its hands-off approach to management and the huge unmet demand in many countries for Chinese-language tuition have helped Confucius Institutes embed themselves in universities that might have been suspicious.”28 According to a December 2009 Associated Press report, “The University of Pennsylvania never applied to host an institute, nor did China ever ask the school to do so,” said G. Cameron Hurst III, the former director of Penn’s Center for East Asian Studies. “There was a general feeling that it was not an appropriate thing for us to do.” Hurst said of Chinese educational officials that “we were not sure of what their political motivations really are, anyway.”29 The transformation of Chinese public diplomacy is still under way. China is learning from others while becoming more integrated into the global community. In the past 30 years, China succeeded in changing itself into a market economy by learning from the West. China can also learn from others in conducting better and more effective public diplomacy. Hopefully, China’s public diplomacy will promote foreign understanding of China and improve China’s global image. References Coombs, Philip H. The Fourth Dimention of Foreign Policy: Educational and Cultural Affairs (New York: Harper and Row, 1964). d’Hooghe, Ingrid. “The Rise of Chinese Public Diplomacy.” Clingendael Diplomacy Papers No. 12. The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Clingendael, July 2007. 28
“A message from Confucius: New ways of projecting soft power”, The Economist, October 22, 2009. 29 Christine Armario, “China Expands Language Institutes at US Colleges,” http://abcnews. go.com/US/wireStory?id=8954627, accessed December 31, 2009.
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Han, Zhaoying. Exporting America: USIA and Public Diplomacy (Tianjin: Tianjin People’s Publishing House, 2000). Han, Zhaoying. American politics and foreign Policy (Tianjin: Tianjin People’s Publishing House, 2000). Ikenberry, G. John. “The Rise of China and the Future of the West.” Foreign Affairs 87, no. 1 (January/February 2008): 23–37. James F. Paradise, “China and International Harmony: The Role of Confucius Institutes in Bolstering Beijing’s Soft Power,” Asian Survey, 49, no 4 (July 2009): 647–669. Mitchell, J.M. International Cultural Relations (London: Allen and Unwin (Publishers) Ltd., 1986). Muravchik, Joshua, Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America’s Destiny (Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, 1995). Ninkovich, Frank A. The Diplomacy of Ideas: U.S. Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). Ninkovich, Frank A. U.S. Information Policy and Cultural Diplomacy, Foreign Policy Association, Headline Series No. 308, 1996. Roy, Denny, “The ‘China Threat’ Issue: Major Arguments,” Asian Survey, 36, no. 8 (August 1996): 758–771 Sorensen, Thomas C. The Word War: The Story of American Propaganda (New York: Harper and Row, 1968). Tao, Wenzhao, China-U.S. Relations, 1911–1950 (Chongqing: Chongqing Press, 1993). Tuch, Hans N. Communicating with the World: US Public Diplomacy Overseas (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990).
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Chapter Thirteen
Foreign Publicity with Weak Political Credibility: A Case Study of Beijing’s Foreign Publicity Over the Tibet Riots Sheng Ding
Introduction After Thanksgiving Day 2009, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce launched a global advertisement campaign to promote Chinese-made products. The 30-second TV commercial debuted on CNN. With the tagline “Made in China, Made with the world,” the commercial highlighted the way Chinese companies cooperate with overseas firms to produce high-quality goods that benefit worldwide consumers. China’s makeover attempt for “Made in China” can effectively benefit Chinese products from two aspects. During the previous two decades, among the Western consumers, “Made in China” has become the embodiment of a product “made by cheap labor and sold at a low price.” This new TV commercial can help correct such an inaccurate image of Chinese products and tell Westerners that Chinese companies also produce high-tech and high-quality products which benefit all. Second, this TV commercial reminds the Western audience of the fact that in the age of economic globalization, the relationship between China and other counties is deep interdependence. Only by strengthening cooperation and reducing trade protectionism can the whole world work together to overcome the current global economic downturn. 311
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Such a noticeable public relations campaign is illustrative of not only the Chinese government’s concentrated efforts in its foreign publicity but also the urgent need for China to build a favorable national brand. A rising China has become increasingly important to global economy, geopolitics, and other countries’ long-term national interests. Policymakers, academics, and the media around the world have a deep interest in the implications of China’s rise on the peace and stability of the international system. According to Joshua Cooper Ramo, China’s greatest strategic threat today is its national image.1 Indeed, China’s most important strategic issues — challenges as diverse as sustaining economic growth, the threat of Taiwanese independence, the Tibetan separatist movement, and the ethnic conflict in Xinjiang — have at their roots a shared connection to its national image. In this milieu, it has become increasingly important for the Chinese government to build a desirable national brand and to step up its efforts at foreign publicity. Since the Tiananmen crackdown in 1989, Beijing’s policymakers have put foreign publicity as one of their strategic priorities. At the National Conference on Foreign Publicity in October 2001, Zhao Qizheng, Director of the State Council Information Office, stressed that in order to create a favorable international public opinion, “we must from now on have greater awareness of the need to provide better services, study the needs of overseas audiences, provide them with large quantities of information, help them understand China better, and make it possible for them to make use of various opportunities available in China.”2 During the last two decades, in order to build a desirable national brand around the world, the Chinese government has adopted a strategy of “foreign publicity with Chinese characteristics” and employed new methods of publicizing itself to the outside world.3 Since the mid-1980s, Beijing has taken great strides to improve the competencies and skills of its officials and the efficiency of government organizations in charge of waishi (foreign affairs). While Beijing built a large bureaucratic apparatus for policy-making and ceded more power to 1
Joshua Cooper Ramo, Brand China (London, UK: Foreign Policy Centre, 2007), p. 12. Quoted from People’s Daily, October 15, 2001, and January 30, 2002. 3 Sheng Ding, “Digital Diaspora and National Image Building: A New Perspective on Chinese Diaspora Study in the Age of China’s Rise,” Pacific Affairs 80, no. 4 (2007): 627–648. 2
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experts, hundreds of officials have received professional and linguistic training in order to increase their skills and professionalism in waishi.4 Beijing has comprehensively utilized the internet to publicize its views on such sensitive topics as human rights, the situation in Tibet, national defense, and environmental protection. As part of its national efforts, Beijing has showed great enthusiasm in developing its own e-government projects, and the major government organizations at all levels have set up their own Websites. The government-controlled media, such as Xinhua, CCTV, China Daily, and China Radio International, etc., aim to become global media broadcasters. To some extent, the Chinese government’s foreign publicity has been effective in showcasing the country’s rapid economic growth and modernization to the outside world. However, Beijing’s foreign publicity faces an unpredictable battle in the global information age. Conventional wisdom foretells that globalization and the information revolution pose more challenges than opportunities to China’s national brand building. Beijing’s heavy-handed propaganda practices and its consistent policy of information control are counterproductive for China’s foreign publicity in the global information age. For example, while many China scholars and media pundits agree that the Chinese government scored high marks in the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, it is an indisputable fact that Beijing lost its battle of foreign publicity over the Tibet riots before the Games. Following a theoretical discussion about foreign publicity in the global information age and an examination of China’s political credibility, this chapter attempts to answer the question of why Beijing’s foreign publicity faces an uphill battle in the global information age through a case study of Beijing’s foreign publicity over the Tibet riots in 2008. Political Credibility and Foreign Publicity in the Global Information Age In the field of international relations, foreign publicity has long been an integral part of the foreign policy process, and it has received much, albeit 4
Anne-Marie Brady, “Treat Insiders and Outsiders Differently: the Use and Control of Foreigners in China,” China Quarterly 164, no. 4 (2000): 943–964.
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not systematic, attention from theorists. State governments care about their reputation because they think other governments depend on them to predict their future behaviors. Generally speaking, realists focus on the use of reputation in international confrontation, and they stress the importance of reputation in the resolution and discouragement of hostile actions from enemies. For example, Hans Morgenthau argued that the realist foreign policy wants to “impress other nations with the power one’s own nation actually possesses, or with the power it believes, or wants the other nations to believe, it possesses.”5 In contrast, idealists approach the role of national brand by emphasizing the utility of reputation in international cooperation. Robert Keohane argues that the most important aspect of an actor’s reputation in international relations is the belief of others that it will keep its future commitments even when a particular situation makes it seem disadvantageous to do so.6 Since the end of the Cold War, economic globalization, democratization, and the information revolution have greatly deepened global interdependence and expanded the amount and speed of information flow. In this global information age, foreign publicity has become an intrinsic element of relations between nations. According to Peter Van Ham, branded states, like branded products, depend on trust and customer satisfaction, and image and reputation have become essential parts of a state’s strategic capital: Globalization and the media revolution have made each state more aware of itself, its image, its reputation, and its attitude — in short, its brand … Their tasks will include finding a brand niche for their state, engaging in competitive marketing, assuring customer satisfaction, and most of all creating brand loyalty. Brand states will compete not only among themselves but also with superbrands such as the EU, CNN, Microsoft, and the Roman Catholic Church … In this crowded arena, states that lack relevant brand equity will not survive.7 5 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 6th edition, revised by Kenneth W. Thompson (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1985), pp. 69–70. 6 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 116. 7 Peter Van Ham, “The Rise of the Brand State: The Postmodern Politics of Image and Reputation,” Foreign Affairs 80, no. 5 (2001): 2–6.
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How does a state’s brand affect its foreign policy process? Drawing on the idealist approach, Joseph Nye provides a framework for explaining the role of foreign publicity in a state’s foreign policy process. According to Nye, if states make their power legitimate in the eyes of others, they encounter less resistance to their wishes; if a state’s culture and ideology are attractive, others are more willing to follow; if a state can shape international rules that are consistent with its interests and values, its actions will more likely appear legitimate in the eyes of others; and if a state uses institutions and follows rules that encourage other nations to channel or limit their activities in ways it prefers, it will not need many costly “carrots” and “sticks.”8 Those positive results of a state’s foreign publicity — legitimacy of state power, cultural attractiveness, the appeal of political values, and agenda-setting capabilities in global affairs — are based on its political credibility. A state government’s political credibility is mainly defined as efficient governance, respect for democracy and human rights, and responsible international behavior. Without political credibility, a state cannot launch a successful foreign publicity campaign nor can its desired national brand be sustained in the long term. Since the end of the Cold War, the rapid technological advances in computers, communication, and software have led to dramatic decreases in the cost of processing and transmitting information. Not only is the information revolution changing the world economy, national political and business institutions, and foreign policy objectives and methods of achieving them, it has also had tremendous impact on states’ foreign publicity. Keohane and Nye stress that information does not flow in a vacuum, but in political space that is already occupied. Therefore, the quantity of information available in cyberspace means little by itself.9 Indeed, in the global information age, the question of who has the capacity to transmit information has become trivial. Focus has instead been placed on those who have the capacity to attract attention to their transmission and distribution of information (i.e., international broadcasting power), because garnering 8
Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), pp. 11–15. 9 Robert Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, 3rd edition (New York: Longman, 2001), pp. 217–218.
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global attention is a necessity for states attempting to establish favorable state brands. Such international broadcasting power is essentially associated with a state government’s political credibility. While the information revolution highlights the importance of international broadcasting power in states’ foreign publicity, it has also radically altered the consumption and production of information by the non-state actors. The information and communication technologies (ICTs) are central to the emergence of a multicentric world and to the forces of globalization, and therefore to the rise of non-state actors who rarely possessed many resources to compete with states. Empowered by the ICTs, the non-state actors are capable of communicating with high levels of anonymity and simultaneity which have proved to be difficult for state governments to regulate. As Nye observed, some non-state actors may have reputations and credibility that give them impressive domestic or international political clout; the others may have organizational and communications skills that allow them to organize and mobilize at an unprecedented level (Nye 2004). In the global information age, there are so many competing messages from so many sources, and only the states which possess strong political credibility can compete with those empowered non-state actors. Therefore, successful foreign publicity in the global information age depends on not only a combination of national power resources and a country’s capabilities of public communications, but also on its political credibility, which can attract attention to the information distribution from a state’s foreign publicity. To a great extent, attention has become a scarce resource and international politics has become a contest of states’ political credibility.10 Since state governments’ statements and actions are under greater scrutiny in the global information age, political credibility has become difficult to establish in a short term. The Dragon’s Soft Spot: China’s Weak Political Credibility As a rising power, China wants to brand itself as a “peaceful and responsible great power.” By creating a “friendly” international environment, 10
Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 8–12.
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Beijing can focus on its domestic agenda such as sustaining the statedirected economic growth and gradualist reforms. Does the Chinese government have enough political credibility to establish its desired national brand or attract attention to its spreading of ideas, information, and allegations in its foreign publicity? By examining Beijing’s governance performance, commitments to democracy and human rights, and foreign policy behaviors, this section attempts to assess China’s political credibility. As he critically analyzed the American government’s governance performance, Nye concluded that a decline in the quality of American society or unattractive policies at home and abroad had weakened America’s political credibility.11 Similarly, the mixed outcomes of China’s economic development, its half-hearted political reforms, and its missteps in foreign policy have complicated the government’s governance performance and weakened its political credibility. As observed by Joshua Ramo, the Chinese government has not communicated honestly and openly about its challenges has not, worked hard to explain the context that leads to friction with international expectations, and has not constantly reinforced the idea that the country is in the process of inventing itself, with the goal of a richer and freer society in mind.12 As China’s modernization proceeds, many question whether the authoritarian rule of the CCP is viable in the long term. China’s current serious problems like the widespread corruption, social injustice, and environmental degradation are all associated with its outmoded political system. Despite the glamour of economic growth, Beijing’s development model is flawed in its nature because the CCP has always attempted to combine the introduction of economic market forces with tight political control. Such selective reform strategy will not steer China to real modernization, but will plunge China further into various governance crises. According to Minxin Pei, China’s current reform process has become a “trapped transition.” In his views, Beijing is incapable of facilitating the representation of China’s complex and diverse social interests or mediating the conflict between an authoritarian state and a liberating society.13 11
See Nye (2004), p. 58. See Ramo. 13 Minxin Pei, China’s Trapped Transition: The Limits of Developmental Autocracy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), p. 206. 12
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Although no one expects to see China move to a parliamentary democracy in the short term, most China observers believe that political reform which is conductive to Chinese citizens’ participation in governance is essential for realizing China’s modernization dream. Since the fourth generation of CCP leaders came to power in 2002, they have adopted a set of populist policy initiatives such as more balanced regional development, increased concern for social justice and fairness, and greater political transparency and institutionalization.14 But the CCP’s governance performance is still far from satisfactory in the eyes of many Chinese people. An obvious example is that protests in China appear to be growing in frequency, scale, and level of violence in recent years. It underscores the tensions of a society plagued by widespread social injustice and a lack of official channels for airing grievances.15 According to Jianrong Yu, a Chinese social scientist, China has seen a continuous increase of major incidents of social unrest during the last two decades, from 8,700 incidents in 1993 to 87,000 incidents in 2005. He believes that such a worrying trend underlines a deep loss of faith in the system on the part of many citizens and a weakening in the traditional means of state control in China.16 Some scholars predict that if the CCP fails to develop institutions capable of adequately addressing its rising social problems, China could face a process of “Latin Americanization,” characterized by a polarized urban society, intensifying social conflict, and failed economic promises.17 The widespread middle-class discontent, combined with the growing dissatisfaction of dispossessed migrants and laid-off workers, impose a greater threat to stability than any that Beijing now faces. Without real political reform, China’s fast economic growth will be difficult to sustain in the long term. 14 Cheng Li, “The New Bipartisanship within the Chinese Communist Party,” Orbis 49, no. 3, (2005): 387–400. 15 Kathy Chen, “Chinese Protests Grow More Frequent, Violent,” Asian Wall Street Journal, November 6, 2004. 16 Jianrong Yu, “China’s Crisis of Control and Response: An Analysis of Recent Incidents of Social Unrest,” Speech made at UC-Berkeley on October 30, 2007. The relevant transcript is available at http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=118361. 17 George Gilboy and Eric Heginbotham, “The Latin Americanization of China?” Current History (September 2004): 256–261.
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Even China’s sizzling GDP growth cannot conceal the government’s underperformance in some aspects of China’s economic development. The widening wealth gap and its related social injustice have become dampers on China’s efforts in building a favorable national brand. For example, when overseas media reported on the Sichuan earthquake, they threw a harsh spotlight on the widening gap between the nation’s rich and poor and the notoriously less than stringent building-safety practices.18 Such media coverage only made the Chinese government’s unprecedented disaster relief operations less creditable in the eyes of the foreign audience. In recent years, from poisonous pet food, unsafe toys, lethal medicine, counterfeit toothpaste, to contaminated seafood, there has been global exposure of scandals associated with Chinese exports. In some countries, the connotation of “made in China” has gradually changed from “made by cheap labor and sold at low prices” to “potential hazards.” The lack of an independent legal system and efficient governmental supervision has cost Beijing dearly not only in its foreign trade but also its national brand. Against this backdrop, many question whether the CCP’s current development model can really contribute to China’s national brand. According to Kenneth Lieberthal, China has become a society with a potential source of major instability, where the regime’s legitimacy strategy is based on a flawed premise of economic growth satiating political demands.19 Not only have the Chinese government’s mixed results of economic development and political reform weakened its political credibility, but its problematic foreign policies have put China’s national brand in peril. A telling example is that in the year prior to the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, the Chinese government found itself beleaguered by various public relations crises. Human rights activists around the world were protesting not only Beijing’s policy in Tibet, but also the country’s policies on Darfur, the Falun Gong, political dissent, religious freedom, and so on. Particularly, the Chinese government has been accused of adopting 18 See Chao, Leow, Areddy and Fairclough, “China Earthquake Exposes A Widening Wealth Gap,” Wall Street Journal, May 14, 2008. 19 Kenneth Lieberthal, Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform, 2nd edition (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004).
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a state-centered approach towards foreign trade to deepen its political and commercial relationships with those countries rich in energy resources and industrial materials. Applying this approach to its relations with trade partners in Africa, Asia, and Latin America has produced mixed results for China’s national brand building. According to Suisheng Zhao, this approach is based on neo-mercantilist thinking that relies on bilateral diplomatic contacts with oil-producing countries to beef up energy security by using national resources and state-owned enterprise investments in overseas energy assets and keeping a tight control of exports and imports of energy products.20 It is doubtful that China’s increasing presence in those regions guided by a state-centered approach will have much positive impact on its desired national brand in the long term. Specifically, Beijing’s business connections with the Sudanese government have come under the spotlight of the global media coverage of Darfur. Beijing is believed to have special influence on the government of Sudan because it buys two-thirds of Sudan’s oil exports while it has continuously foiled Western efforts to punish Sudan and defended Khartoum in the UN Security Council. While some Western political leaders and human rights activists, as well as some athletes, called for a boycot of the 2008 Olympic Games, the Chinese government repeatedly insisted that China was unfairly treated as a “scapegoat” of the Western governments who were evading responsibility for a humanitarian crisis that they could do far more to stop. But such rebuttals are powerless given that China not only has structural limits in its access to world media resources, it also has a long-time woeful human rights record. Coddling dictators today will only antagonize the democratic opposition in these countries and will not help China build a favorable national brand at all. Given that political credibility also rests on the legitimacy of foreign policy, to some extent, Beijing’s approach of “Let’s do business and not talk about politics” has caused some inharmonious realities for China’s foreign publicity. Furthermore, Beijing’s “friendships” with some problematic regimes have already brought a lot of negative publicity to its carefully cultivated national brand as a “peaceful and responsible great power.” As the world’s 20 Suisheng Zhao, “China’s Global Search for Energy Security: cooperation and competition in the Asia-Pacific,” The Asia-Pacific Journal 49, no. 4 (2008): 207–227.
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second-largest oil consumer and importer, China has vital oil interests in Sudan, Nigeria, Angola, Iran, Myanmar, and Venezuela, all with questionable governments. In boosting aid and investment in those countries, Beijing appears to have no qualms about dealing with corrupt, even brutal, dictators such as Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe. Close economic and political ties keep afloat these dictatorships and blunt international pressures for any meaningful economic and political reform in those countries. In April 2008, An Yue Jiang, a container vessel owned by a Chinese state-owned shipping company and loaded with weapons destined for Zimbabwe, became a notable target for those who oppose Beijing’s support for Mugabe’s repressive regime. Faced with widespread protests, the Chinese government was forced to recall the ship. This incident fully demonstrated the damage of Beijing’s unpopular foreign policies to its foreign publicity and national brand building. China’s weak political credibility has become the biggest hurdle for Beijing’s foreign publicity and national brand building. Without political credibility, the global attractiveness of the Chinese culture and impressive economic development cannot make real contributions to China’s national brand in the long term. Beijing’s foreign publicity are only well accepted in those corners of the world where good governance, respect for human rights, and political pluralism are not held in high regard. More specifically, various global surveys have found that a majority of people in the Western countries do not believe China’s government is becoming more democratic or that it allows more freedom for Chinese citizens. According to a BBC World Service poll conducted four months after the Beijing Olympics, China’s positive ratings had fallen six points over the year to 39 percent.21 The poll results did not indicate that a successful Olympic Games had been helpful in China’s national brand building. Also, in a 2007 Pew research report on “Global Unease with Major World Powers,” global attitudes toward China have grown more negative in recent years in most countries where trends are available, though the balance of opinion regarding China is still decidedly favorable in 27 of the 47 nations 21
See “Views of China and Russia Decline in Global Poll,” February 6, 2009. The relevant report is available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/pressoffice/pressreleases/stories/2009/02_ february/06/poll.shtml, accessed on November 15, 2009.
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surveyed.22 Europeans also have become much more critical of China. The trend is decidedly downward in many of the European countries that were surveyed in earlier Global Attitudes studies. Since 2005, favorable ratings for China have fallen 18 points in Spain, 16 points in Great Britain, 12 points in Germany, and 11 points in France.23 In a BBC World Service Poll, when asked how they would feel if “China becomes significantly more powerful militarily than it is today,” more than half the citizens in the surveyed countries (59 percent) responded negatively, with an average of just 24 percent expressing positive feelings.24 Most citizens in European nations polled have a negative view of China’s growing military power (Germany: 87 percent, Spain: 74 percent, Italy: 74 percent, Britain: 65 percent, Poland: 65 percent, and France: 64 percent).25 Without political credibility, China still has a long way to go to before it can launch successful foreign publicity and establish a cooperative and peace-loving national brand. Beijing’s Flawed Foreign Publicity over the Tibet Riots On March 10, 2008, some Tibetan monks demonstrated in Lhasa and demanded the release of some other monks who had been detained by a local government. Those demonstrations quickly turned violent and some Tibetans attacked non-Tibetan residents. On March 14, large-scale burning, looting, and killing broke out in Lhasa and other Tibetan residential areas. Since local governments took action to quell those riots, Beijing was dragged into an unprecedented public relations battle with the Tibetan separatists and their Western supporters before the Beijing Olympics. In this uphill battle, Beijing’s weak political credibility and its related policy missteps fully exposed the weakness and limits of China’s foreign publicity.
22
See the recent studies implemented by the Pew Research Center. The relevant reports are available at http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=256 (accessed June 28, 2007). 23 Ibid. 24 See the same poll conducted for the BBC World Service in December 2004. 25 Andrew Kohut, “How the World Sees China,” Pew Global Attitudes Project, sourced online December 11, 2007, at http://pewresearch.org/pubs/656/how-the-world-sees-china.
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From the beginning of the Tibet riots, the Chinese government had been caught in a dilemma. On one hand, Beijing policymakers routinely took a hard-line stance and kept a menacing presence in Tibetans’ residential areas in order to stop the escalation of unrest. On the other hand, Beijing policymakers wanted to quell the riots quickly and peacefully in order to create a harmonious domestic and international environment for the Beijing Olympics. After the major riot in Lhasa, the Chinese government employed its old policy in dealing with domestic crisis — information control. Not only did Beijing micromanage domestic media coverage of the Tibetan riots, it also did not allow foreign reporters to enter the riot regions when the world media were hungry for the true story of those riots. Beijing barred foreign journalists from entering large parts of western China including the Tibet Autonomous Region, the western part of Sichuan Province, and parts of Qinghai. Local police set up many checkpoints in those areas in order to keep out foreign journalists and other unwanted visitors. Obviously Beijing wanted to silence any potential negative publicity about China ahead of the Beijing Olympics. This information control practice contravened the Chinese government’s “no restrictions” commitment. According to the relevant Regulations on Reporting Activities in China by Foreign Journalists during the Olympic Games and the Preparatory Period, which was issued by China’s State Council on December 1, 2006, foreign journalists in China need only obtain the consent of the organization or individual they wish to interview. Keeping foreign journalists from entering the riot areas only further undercut Beijing’s limited access to international broadcasting. Such restrictions had very negative impacts on China’s foreign publicity. The results of this bizarre policy quickly turned disastrous for China’s foreign publicity ahead of the Beijing Olympics. Not only did the international media provide significant press coverage of human rights violations in China, a lot of biased coverage from some Western media organizations has also added more fuel to the worldwide accusations against Beijing’s human rights records and to the global campaign to boycot the Olympics. Moreover, China’s state-run propaganda machine had aggressively censored foreign media in an attempt to lock down information following the Tibet riots. They also imposed strict controls over the Internet in an
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effort to spin what happened in the Tibetan-populated regions to conform with Beijing’s version of events. In the early days of the riots, the statecontrolled media like Xinhua and CCTV had intentionally avoided or played down the severity of the Tibet riots. Most of the Chinese at the time were unaware of those ongoing riots. After major Western media picked up the stories and began their intensive reporting, China’s state-controlled media quickly devoted extensive coverage to this matter. The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman explained that the “main reason for the inaccessibility of some foreign websites in China is that they spread information prohibited by Chinese law” and “Chinese laws have clearly stipulated which online activities are prohibited.”26 The Chinese government naively believed that it was capable of shaping the public opinion by pointing out some of the Western media organizations’ many untruthful reports and by micromanaging its domestic media coverage of the Tibet riots. Unfortunately, due to its weak political credibility, the structural limits of its access to international broadcasting, and the unstoppable information flow in the global information, Beijing has increasingly found itself on the defensive in its foreign publicity. Indeed, from excitement to anger, and from high expectation to frustration, Beijing’s efforts at improving its national brand have not been repaid by the respect, trust, and favor it expects from the international community. Furthermore, in order to justify the legitimacy of its crackdown, Chinese state-controlled media reports on the Tibet riots focused on the violence of some Tibetan protesters like their criminal behavior involving beating, smashing, looting, and arson. These reports have raised many eyebrows in China. Some independent Chinese intellectuals released a petition letter on several Chinese websites on March 22, 2008. In the letter, they urged the Chinese government to end the propaganda and news blockade and allow credible national and international media to go to Tibet to conduct independent interviews and news reports. They claimed that “in our view, the current news blockade cannot gain credit with the Chinese people or the international community, and is harmful to the credibility of the Chinese government … Only by adopting an open
26
See the full text of Foreign Ministry press briefing on April 1, 2008.
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attitude can we turn around the international community’s distrust of our government.”27 Indeed, these violence-centered media reports have indirectly helped to inflame popular nationalism among China’s public and many overseas Chinese. Soon after the Tibet riots erupted, a strong anti-West national sentiment emerged in China, and millions of Chinese, including many overseas Chinese, voluntarily participated in a worldwide campaign of denouncing the prejudice of the Western media. Especially after the Olympic Torch Relay was disrupted in Paris, London, San Francisco, etc., many of the Chinese people believed that China’s national brand had been tarnished and the Chinese nation humiliated when China had a historical opportunity to appear as a major power on equal footing with other world powers. The Chinese government has been frequently accused of consciously harnessing popular nationalism to buttress its legitimacy, dampen potential dissent, and distract public attention on various governance issues. The surge of nationalist sentiment ahead of the Beijing Olympics further weakened the Chinese government’s political credibility in the view of Western audiences. Many coercive characteristics of Chinese popular nationalism have posed serious challenges to Beijing’s national brand building. As reported by the New York Times, “With less than five months before the opening of the Olympic Games in Beijing, the sharp criticism of the foreign news media comes precisely when it wants to present a welcoming impression to the outside world. Instead, Chinese citizens, including many overseas, are posting thousands of angry messages on websites and making crank calls to some foreign news media offices in Beijing.”28 Those so-called Chinese “Internet Red Guards” (or “Online Angry Youths”) hurled threats and insults not only at their perceived foreign “enemies,” but also against moderate and cautious Chinese netizens who stand against such jingoistic excesses. A notable case is that Internet death threats and attacks on property were targeted at a Chinese student at Duke University who showed some sympathy towards Tibetan separatists.
27 28
See “Intellectuals in China Condemn Crackdown,” New York Times, March 24, 2008. See “Chinese Nationalism Fuels Tibet Crackdown,” New York Times, March 31, 2008.
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Favorable (percent) 06/27/2007 Survey Favorable (percent) 06/12/2008 Survey
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Views of China.
US
Britain
France
Germany
Spain
Japan
Mexico
52
49
47
34
39
29
43
39
47
28
26
31
14
38
Sources: 47-Nation Pew Global Attitudes Survey “Global Unease with Major World Powers,” June 27, 2007; and 4-Nation Pew Global Attitudes Survey “Global Economic Gloom — China and India Notable Exceptions,” June 12, 2008.
These extreme forms of nationalism have sabotaged the Chinese government’s political credibility and ruined Beijing’s attempts to build a desired national brand — a peaceful and responsible great power. According to two surveys released by the Pew Global Attitude Project separately on June 27, 2007, and on June 12, 2008, China’s national brand obviously became more negative, especially among those Western liberal democracies (see Table 1). The survey of June 12, 2008, was conducted from March 17 to April 21, 2008, following the series of Tibet riots, and prior to the May 12 Sichuan earthquake. This survey accurately reflects the impact of the Tibet riots on China’s national brand and Beijing’s performance of national brand building over the Tibet riots. All surveyed Western countries have a large portion of people who thought it was a bad decision to hold the Olympic Games in China — Britain (38 percent), Germany (47 percent), Spain (39 percent), France (55 percent), the US (43 percent), and Japan (55 percent). As shown in the table, compared to the survey released one year ago, the percentage of the Western public who viewed China favorably decreased in most surveyed countries. The United States, France, Germany, Spain, and Japan registered double-digit drops. In Spain (56 percent), France (72 percent), Germany (68 percent), Poland (54 percent), Japan (84 percent), and South Africa (51 percent), the majority of populations held unfavorable views of China. Conclusion As a rising power, China needs to focus on launching successful foreign publicity campaigns and building a favorable national brand. The further
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China integrates itself into the processes of marketization, globalization, and informationization, the more attention Beijing must pay to its national brand in the eyes of other states, international organizations, NGOs, multinational corporations, and millions of netizens. China’s open-door policy and continued modernization process have transformed the country from a reclusive hermit in the Western-dominated world system to the keystone in the Asia-Pacific’s globalization. With its strategy of “foreign publicity with Chinese characteristics” in place during the last two decades, Beijing has made some progress in projecting an image of a “new China” across the globe. However, due to its continued aloofness from political reform, deteriorating human rights record, growing social injustices, as well as various missteps in its foreign policies, China currently lacks sufficient political credibility to become a capable national brand builder in the global information age. Beijing’s lack of political credibility not only weakens the persuasiveness of its foreign publicity, but also makes it difficult for the global attractiveness of the Chinese culture and impressive economic development to make real contributions to China’s national brand in the long term. In order to successfully launch foreign publicity campaigns and brand itself as a “peaceful and responsible great power,” China has to make some serious efforts to implement real political reform and improve its political credibility. Otherwise, China’s foreign publicity will not be able to create a friendly international environment and its efforts at public communication will only become rhetorical propaganda that will be misconstrued by other countries, risking conflict with them. After realizing the urgent need for foreign publicity ahead of the Beijing Olympics, the Chinese government had taken some action to better its national brand building. Beijing’s top leaders and state-controlled media publicly called on Chinese citizens to harness their nationalistic fervor for constructive ends. On April 25, 2008, the Chinese government announced it would meet with envoys of the Dalai Lama. On May 4, 2008, Beijing officials and the Dalai Lama’s envoys had an informal meeting in Shenzhen. On June 25, 2008, the Chinese government reopened Tibet to foreign tourists, and also announced that foreign journalists could apply for permission to visit Tibet. More importantly, after the catastrophic Sichuan earthquake on May 12, the Chinese government mounted aggressive rescue efforts and employed nimble and effective
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publicity to project itself as a responsible government. Beijing’s policymakers were clearly aware that the Chinese public and the whole world were closely watching its governance performance. After two months of the national image crisis over its handling of the Tibet riots, obviously, the Chinese government had drawn some lessons from its previous mistakes. References Brady, Anne-Marie.“Treat Insiders and Outsiders Differently: The Use and Control of Foreigners in China.” China Quarterly 164, no. 4 (2000): 943–64. Chao, Lovetta, Jason Leow, James Areddy and Gordon Fairclough. “China Earthquake Exposes A Widening Wealth Gap.” Wall Street Journal, May 14, 2008. Chen, Kathy. “Chinese Protests Grow More Frequent, Violent.” Asian Wall Street Journal, November 6, 2004. Ding, Sheng. “Digital Diaspora and National Image Building: A New Perspective on Chinese Diaspora Study in the Age of China’s Rise.” Pacific Affairs 80, no. 4 (2007): 627–648. Gilboy, George and Eric Heginbotham, “The Latin Americanization of China?” Current History (September 2004): 256–61. Ham, Peter Van, “The Rise of the Brand State: The Postmodern Politics of Image and Reputation,” Foreign Affairs 80, no. 5 (2001): 2–6. Keohane, Robert O. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 116. Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, 3rd edition (New York: Longman, 2001), pp. 217–218. Kohut, Andrew, “How the World Sees China,” Pew Global Attitudes Project, December 11, 2007. Li, Cheng, “The New Bipartisanship within the Chinese Communist Party,” Orbis 49, no. 3 (2005): 387–400. Lieberthal, Kenneth. Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform, 2nd edition (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004). Morgenthau, Hans. Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 6th edition, revised by Kenneth W. Thompson, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1985), pp. 69–70.
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Nye, Joseph S. Jr., The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 8–12. Nye, Joseph S. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), pp. 11–15. Pei, Minxin. China’s Trapped Transition: The Limits of Developmental Autocracy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), p. 206. Ramo, Joshua Cooper. Brand China (London, U.K.: Foreign Policy Centre, 2007), p. 12. Yu, Jianrong. “China’s Crisis of Control and Response: An Analysis of Recent Incidents of Social Unrest.” Speech made at UC-Berkeley on October 30, 2007. Zhao, Suisheng, “China’s Global Search for Energy Security: Cooperation and Competition in the Asia-Pacific”, The Asia-Pacific Journal 49 no. 4 (2008): 207–227.
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Chapter Fourteen
China’s Search for Energy and Climate Security in an Interdependent World1 Jean Garrison
Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms that spurred China’s record economic growth and rise to be the world’s second largest economy were a miracle. Today the PRC has become the globe’s manufacturing center and growth engine. China’s rapid industrialization and growing wealth, however, have led to two new challenges — its rising demand for fuel and serious pollution. Together they threaten to choke China’s future. The international community faces a future in which cheap and easily accessible fuel supplies will be increasingly difficult to find. According to the US Energy Information Administration’s (EIA) 2009 International Energy Outlook, in the near future there will be a sharp drop in projected global oil output and an increase in reliance on hard-to-access “unconventional fuels,” which may lead to an era of cutthroat energy competition.2 Because China may surpass the US as the world’s leading energy consumer soon, its energy-use is at the heart of the energy competition equation. Accompanying the dire predictions regarding our energy future is the
1 This chapter draws, in part, upon the author’s recent book China and the Energy Equation in Asia: Determinants of Policy Choice (Boulder, CO: First Forum Press — A Division of Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009). 2 Energy Information Administration, International Energy Outlook (2009), http://www.eia. doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/ (accessed September 9, 2009).
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climate challenge and the corresponding energy-use patterns which exacerbate the climate crisis. Here, again, China is at the heart of the problem. Its rapid economic growth and reliance on fossil fuels made it the world’s leading greenhouse gas emitter in 2007. Given the link between climate change and energy-use practices, together these issues provide a litmus test that will shape the options governments have to take in response to the crisis. Security analysts representing a traditional geopolitical perspective are inclined to explain the energy and climate security challenges through the lens of a classic zero-sum competition and anticipate future resource wars. This context places China’s record economic growth and its subsequent growing energy demand into a win-lose, threat multiplier scenario that pits it against the United States and all other contenders.3 Neoliberal economic perspectives, on the other hand, discuss energy security in market terms, noting that energy is like any other commodity sold on the open market while downplaying how scarcity can change the psychology of the energy equation. Such a complex interdependence perspective emphasizes that the energy and climate futures of China and the United States, as well as the globe as a whole, are intimately linked.4 While national security consequences defined in terms of immediate threats are dramatic, the real challenge arises from the long-term consequences if energy-use behavior does not change and the path for economic development is not cleaned up. On the energy side, reducing reliance on imported oil and diversifying the energy mix will improve energy security in terms of dependency. On the other hand, addressing climate change means reducing the use of dirty fossil fuels (as the central means to reduce/prevent emissions) and searching for cleaner energy sources. The common denominator of both questions is the need to diversify energy supply with a particular focus on low-carbon energy sources.
3
Michael T. Klare, Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet: The New Geopolitics of Energy (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2008). See also David Howell and Carole Nakhle, Out of the Energy Labyrinth: Uniting Energy and the Environment to Avert Catastrophe (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007). 4 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, 3rd edition (New York: Longman, 2001).
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The central premise of this chapter is that the way in which the energy and climate security debates are defined by Chinese leaders (and other important actors) now — in geopolitical, interdependent, developmental, and environmental terms — will fundamentally shape China’s future economic and political stability equations. For governments, the challenge is to maintain economic prosperity and, specifically, sustainable development in an environment of sustained, high energy prices and increasing scarcity. Understanding the Energy and Climate Challenges by the Numbers Energy-use and carbon emission levels are highly correlated. The more energy consumed, the more carbon emitted and the more greenhouse gases build up in the atmosphere. In 2007, the International Energy Agency (IEA) projected that global energy demand would increase by 50 percent by 2030, with 70 percent of that increase coming from energy demand in the developing world (30 percent from China alone). This increase was anticipated to lead to a corresponding 55 percent increase in carbon emissions.5 In its Energy Policy Scenarios to 2050, the industryled World Energy Congress (WEC) emphasized the dual challenge of doubling energy supplies by 2050 in order to meet the growing energy demand worldwide (with fossil fuels anticipated to account for more than 80 percent of primary energy requirements) and the need to effectively manage greenhouse gas emissions to address climate change.6 All three fossil fuels — oil, natural gas, and coal — are problematic, particularly without adopting new technologies to mitigate carbon emissions. Oil is the most efficient for transport fuels and faces growing worldwide demand. With no clear substitute on hand, oil remains essential for China’s
5
Jean-Claude Lauzon, Richard Preng, Bob Sutton, and Bojan Pavlovic, World Energy Council (WEC), 2007 Global Energy Survey, (London: World Energy Council-Korn/Ferry, June 2007), pp. 3–6; International Energy Agency (IEA), “Searching for Optimism in IEA’s Latest Energy Projection,” Energy Bulletin (November 7, 2006) IEA, World Energy Outlook 2006 (November 2006). 6 WEC, Deciding the Future: Energy Policy Scenarios to 2050: Executive Summary (London: World Energy Council, 2007).
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growing car culture. Natural gas is the most environmentally friendly option vis-à-vis oil and coal, but still has a significant carbon footprint. Coal is the dirtiest, but its competitive position in states such as China and the United States make it the domestic energy security choice because of their large coal reserves and reliance on it for power generation.7 However, without a change in these energy-use practices, the corresponding greenhouse gas emissions that accompany the continued use of fossil fuels will keep increasing. The main “driver” to address the dual energy-climate challenge is higher energy prices that can propel the developed world toward greater efficiency and provide the opportunity to attract the investment needed to make the transition. Building common ground between China and the United States has both a domestic and an international context. Each country must make its own choices, but the discussion at the Copenhagen climate meeting in December 2009 illustrated that what China and the United States do bilaterally shapes the future of global climate responses. Challenges to Building Common Ground in Energy and Climate Security The commonality across most energy and climate voices is the need to create an energy-climate roadmap fostering a sustainable energy future that reaffirms a cleaner place for fossil fuels in the energy mix while promoting an appropriate regulatory environment to promote technological innovation, appropriate market mechanisms, and technology deployment to address greenhouse gas reduction. During his visit to Beijing in November 2009, President Obama together with President Hu agreed to a new “roadmap” for greater cooperation and research into clean energy, particularly in the areas of energy efficiency, clean coal with carbon sequestration, a renewable energy partnership, and an electric vehicle initiative.8 The failure in Copenhagen in December 2009 to set global targets for greenhouse gas emissions demonstrates that policy questions remain 7 WEC, 2007 Survey of Energy Resources: Executive Summary (London: World Energy Council, 2007), pp. 6–10. 8 Andrew Revkin, “Energy Plan from the Greenhouse Giants,” New York Times (November 17, 2009), p. A1.
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unresolved and that a few intransigents (i.e., the United States and developing states, China in particular) have the ability to help or hinder consensus-building on a global climate response. Similarly, the September 2009 UN meeting on climate change and the G-20 meeting in Pittsburgh showed that while national leaders stressed the urgency of combating climate change, they offered no concrete proposals for financing a climate agreement. Finding the means to pay for the agreement, specifically to help less developed countries (LDCs), is seen as an essential component of any successful agreement.9 This remains a theme in the bilateral US–China discussions on climate change. Failure to reach an agreement so far reflects differences in perspectives on political questions about why, when, and how to reconcile climate change with broader questions of energy-use and economic development. Although climate change negotiations and incentives through international negotiating schemes offer an opportunity for countries to share the burden, politically it has been difficult at home to motivate some states to take action together because national interests seem to diverge. In particular, the issue of mandatory targets slows the process. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) argues that to stabilize the climate, greenhouse gases must be reduced by 60 percent by 2050 if the climate challenge is to be addressed. Developing countries in general and China in particular view efforts to set absolute greenhouse gas targets as an attempt to cap their economic growth. These countries assert their priority and right to develop as they see fit. This perspective rests on efforts to maintain sovereignty over natural resources and the ability to develop economically as cheaply as possible. Although China signed the Kyoto Protocol in 2002, it resists calls for a legally- binding commitment to limit greenhouse gas emissions.10
9 Elisabeth Rosenthal, “Biggest Obstacle to Global Climate Deal May Be How to Pay for It,” New York Times (October 14, 2009), p. A6. 10 China Energy Group, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL), “People’s Republic of China Renewable Energy Law, 2006,” (January 1, 2006), pp. 20–21; see also Wang Yanjia, “Energy Efficiency and CO2 in China’s Industry: Tapping the Potential” (the first draft of background paper for Annex I Expert Group Seminar in Conjunction with the OECD Global Forum on Sustainable Development, “Working Together to Respond to climate change,” Paris, France, March 27–28, 2006), pp. 18–19.
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National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) Director Ma Kai has argued that China is committed to addressing climate change by adhering to the “principle of common but differentiated responsibilities.” Under this rubric, China argues that developed countries should take the lead in reducing emissions due to their historical responsibility for the carbon problem.11 Beijing calls on developed countries to provide financial and technological support to developing countries to better address climate change. President Hu notes that while China is under no obligation to cut emissions, it will shoulder its share of the responsibility, push forward post-Kyoto negotiations, and facilitate projects under the clean development mechanism.12 Industrialized states resist costly retrofitting without commitments from the developing world to further their own reductions; particularly because the bulk of future emissions will come from the developing world. Industrialized states argue that because the developing world will benefit most from climate change mitigation efforts, they should pay some of the cost. The US has rejected a mandate proposed by the Chinese that 0.5 percent of the GDP of industrialized nations be used to spread nonpolluting and energy technologies. Government and industry groups argue that addressing the climate challenge requires the cooperation of state and nonstate actors in the developed and developing world, with global financial institutions along with government funding the shift, and the energy industry implementing change.13 Various energy-oriented savings strategies already in place such as increased energy efficiency, cleaner fuels, greener power generation with carbon capture, and more efficient transportation may lead to a low carbon world with sustainable economic growth. The IEA and WEC contend this can be accomplished by 2030 with an increase in nuclear power, as carbon capture and storage are applied to coal-fired plants
11 Ma Kai, “China is Shouldering Its Climate Change Burden,” Financial Times (June 4, 2007), p. 13. 12 Jane Macartney, “Troubled Waters Form Backdrop to Climate Plan,” The Times (June 5, 2007), p. 39. 13 Jason Furman, Jason E. Bordoff and Manasi Deshpande, “An Economic Strategy to Address Climate Change and Promote Energy Security,” The Hamilton Project, Brookings Institution, Strategy Paper (October 2007), pp. 5–7.
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and gasification, and hydrogen fuel vehicles come online. They see solar and other forms of renewable energy remaining a small part of the mix.14 However, economists like Jeffrey Sachs and climate change experts argue that aggressive investments beyond what has been allowed for in R&D and aggressive deployment of new technologies must occur if global warming is to be addressed.15 In that vein, the Human Development Report from 2007 suggested that the Montreal Protocol might offer the best model to overcome the current political bottleneck between the North and South. In that instance, developing country participation was secured through a multilateral fund in which targets for phasing out substances were met by developed countries. Kyoto’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) model incentivizes carbon savings and technology transfer and offers a way to finance mitigation in developing countries. The report calls on governments from the North to launch a bold Manhattan Project to deploy technology at a more rapid pace.16 The challenge at the international level has always been to overcome the impasse in determining responsibility in the climate equation. If China agrees to voluntary but verifiable greenhouse gas reductions, this might fulfill the US stipulation that China must make cuts. This compromise does not force the Chinese into mandatory cuts which they see as a risk to their continued economic growth, a context necessary to lift millions out of poverty and for political stability.17 But the US and China’s inability to seal a bilateral deal before and during the December 2009 Copenhagen talks made it difficult to achieve substantial progress at the international meeting. The importance of climate change within the broader US–China relationship was signaled when it became a substantial plank in the Obama 14
Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum, Near-Term Opportunities for Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage, Summary Report, OECD/IEA (June 2007), 1–20; WEC, “The Energy Industry Unveils its Blueprint for Tackling Climate Change” (World Energy Council Statement, March 2007), pp. 1–6. 15 Revkin, “A Shift in the Debate over Global Warming,” p. 3. 16 United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Human Development Report 2007/2008, Fighting Climate Change: Human Solidarity in a Divided World (New York: United Nations Development Program, 2007), pp. 143–44; p. 155. 17 Jonathan Watts, “China Alone Could Bring World to Brink of Climate Calamity Claims US. Official,” The Guardian (June 9, 2009).
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administration’s Strategic and Economic Dialogue (SED). This dialogue is an outgrowth of the need for practical and technical cooperation and coordination in energy and climate issues, as seen by the outcomes of Obama’s November 2009 visit to China. On the practical political side, the important question is whether decision makers will make the tough choice to implement a carbon cap and trade system and other incentives that may increase energy costs for average citizens. In China, the series of decisions are similar in kind, but complicated by a competing set of interests and the lack of a centralized bureaucracy to coordinate its energy/climate policy. Energy shortages throughout the last decade have led to an untenable development situation with tough decisions to be made in a society with continued poverty problems and increasing dependence on foreign energy sources. Understanding China’s Domestic Energy and Climate Challenge China has some tough choices to make which involve reconciling its longterm energy-intensive, export-led development model with growing environmental and energy-use pressures. It is clear that throughout the 1990s raising economic standards for its people came first and addressing environmental problems second. For example, development goals still trumped environmental concerns during China’s “Western Development” campaign launched in 1999, which targeted the poor western provinces for the development of their rich but remote natural resources despite environmental concerns. Development projects such as the East–West pipeline proceeded despite the strain it placed on an already fragile ecosystem subject to erosion, low agricultural productivity, and water problems. In the end some modifications were made to the original plans, but only when international NGOs raised environmental and social concerns that forced China’s international partners to factor these considerations into the business plan.18 Pressures from the international community and growing domestic pollution problems from the late 1980s onward have set the stage for
18
Elizabeth C. Economy, The River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenge to China’s Future (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004), pp. 178–185.
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China’s shift to a sustainable development debate that acknowledges the social and environmental costs that come with its growth model. At least rhetorically, China recognizes that unfettered growth leads to certain social and environmental tradeoffs. Premier Wen Jiabao acknowledged that serious environmental problems are caused by “a wrong view of development” that takes pure GDP growth as the yardstick for success. Acknowledging the dilemma, the premier noted that building a “resource conserving and environmentally friendly society” is a test of “the [g]overnment’s ability to govern and the extent of public trust in it, and it is a responsibility to the international community which China must shoulder.”19 China’s leaders stress the hard work that has been done to adjust China’s economic structure with plans for energy conservation. In fact, China’s goals in the 11th Five-Year Plan (2006–2010) are impressive. For example, by 2010 China is to reduce energy intensity by 20 percent while per capita GDP doubles, to reduce air pollution by 10 percent, and to set new efficiency targets for the 1,000 largest enterprises through monitoring efficiency improvement plans, promoting advanced technology initiatives, and retiring inefficient power plants with a capacity of less than 50 MW. China’s energy consumption per unit of GDP did drop by 4.59 percent in 2008, and 10.08 percent in total over the previous three years, putting it within striking distance of its overall five-year goal.20 Addressing the inefficiency of China’s industry through an energy efficiency policy has the added benefit of mitigating its carbon emissions tremendously. China’s industrial contribution to GDP hovers around 40 percent and industry consumed 67 percent of total final energy in 2003, producing a corresponding amount of carbon.21 In the industrial sector there are targets to close inefficient steel and cement plants with reduction quotas for regional and provincial governments. In addition, as part of its industrial policy, the government taxes exports of energy-intensive industries, such as its 15 percent tax on copper, 19
“Wen Jiabao Convenes First Meeting of the State Leading Group on Work to Respond to Climate Change, Energy Conservation, and Emissions Reduction,” Xinhua, July 11, 2007). 20 Shaobin Zhu, “China’s Economic Stimulus Plans Benefit Environment,” Xinhua, March 10, 2009. 21 Wang, “Energy Efficiency and CO2 in China’s Industry,” pp. 1–2.
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nickel, and aluminum; 10 percent on steel; and 5 percent on petroleum, coal, and coke. Chinese officials also placed import tariffs on energy and resource products such as coal, petroleum, and minerals.22 Further, under the 2005 Renewable Energy Law, China has a national target of producing 17 percent of its primary energy from renewable sources by 2020 with hydropower to be the main source.23 This theme continued in China’s recent stimulus package which prioritized green energy development. The government approved a massive 4-trillion yuan (about $586 billion), two-year investment plan in November 2008 to curb economic downturn, which included a 580-billion yuan investment in environmental protection and energy conservation.24 The money was to be used to address climate change from different angles, employing strategies such as ecological restoration and pollution control as well as development of low-carbon and other energy-efficient technologies.25 In addition, the National Energy Administration drafted an energy stimulus plan in June 2009. Preliminary reports indicate that economic and tax incentives will be offered to encourage the development of cleaner energy and other environmental protection technologies.26 The Sustainable Development Debate and Competing Government Priorities By looking more closely at the sustainable development debate, we can see the cleavages and competing interests that exist across China’s energy and development policies. This debate is an umbrella under which a variety of competing geostrategic, economic, and environmental issues sit, all relating to how energy should be used and how priorities are allocated.
22
Joanna I. Lewis, Testimony before the US–China Economic and Security Review Commission (August 13, 2008), p. 4. 23 David M. Lampton and Bo Kong, “China Comes in From the Cold.” (John Hopkins University School of Advanced Studies, 2005). 24 Zhu, “China’s Economic Stimulus Plans Benefit Environment.” 25 “Former British PM Praises China’s Efforts in Tackling Climate Change,” Xinhua, August 20, 2009. 26 “China Drafts Energy Stimulus Plan,” Xinhua, June 1, 2009.
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Long gone are the days when the central government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were at the center of all foreign policymaking and led through the Central Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group. With Deng’s market reform, foreign economic policy made the economic and trade ministries newly important players, while SOEs took the place of formerly powerful ministries. The provinces also gained central importance in economic development policy.27 As a result, the number of stakeholders involved in foreign policy debates expanded over time from the Deng Xiaoping reform period through to the present. Kenneth Lieberthal and David Lampton refer to this matrix of competing bureaucracies and the growing influence of the provinces as “fragmented authoritarianism.”28 The decentralized central government The government stakeholders and interests in the energy-climate debate range from the NDRC focusing on broad development goals and state control, to the Ministry of Commerce which prioritizes economic, trade, and market issues, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which focuses on sovereignty over natural resources in international negotiations. Others such as the Ministry of Finance set fines while the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP), formerly the State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA), holds regulatory powers in the environmental area.29 These are just a sample of the variety of agencies that have a say in the energyclimate puzzle. There is no Ministry of Energy to take the lead. Even though the system of Leading Small Groups, including the one led by Wen Jiabao for climate, is supposed to coordinate policy discussion, such
27 Lu Ning, The Dynamics of Foreign-Policy Decisionmaking in China, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000), pp. 118–127; See also Thomas G. Moore and Dixia Yang, “Empowered and Restrained: China’s Foreign Policy in the Age of Economic Interdependence” in The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, ed. David M. Lampton (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), pp. 191–229 , pp. 202–215; “Wen Jiabao Convenes First Meeting To Respond to Climate Change,” Xinhua. 28 See Kenneth Lieberthal and David M. Lampton, eds., Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992). 29 Economy, The River Runs Black, 178–185.
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groups only set the general government policy direction. This leaves wide tactical latitude for agencies to make specific policy choices, to work to influence the policy agenda, and to make plans to implement policy goals. Further, the National Energy Administration (which replaced the Energy Leading Small Group), which was created to better coordinate China’s energy policy, has yet to gain the appropriate capacity to direct a cohesive energy policy. China’s energy and climate discussions become subsumed into the broader sustainable development debate which means something different to each potential stakeholder. So far, growth-first advocates have had the upper hand in Chinese politics because they have the means to overcome the weak efforts of an environmental bureaucracy, which is understaffed and over the long term has been kept out of many of these policy discussions. Until 2008, China’s environmental protection agency did not have the status or authority to implement its conservation mandate. Pan Yue, a former vice minister from the environmental bureaucracy, argues that without a strategic environmental evaluation system, “China will not solve the problem of its too high resource and environmental price for economic growth. Without strategic environmental evaluation, more energy-consuming and heavy-polluting industries [will] spring up.”30 Underlying this bureaucratic competition is the accompanying debate regarding the proper role of the government in the market process that also weighs into the mix. Broad debates between liberalism and mercantilism inform the specific policy debate over issues related to the proper path for development and energy-use. For example, as accession to WTO and China’s broad policy orientation heated up people from the Commerce Ministry supported liberal reform because they believe negotiations and international trade are good for China. The more conservative state planning organizations and SOEs supported more mercantilist positions to keep policy control in government hands and prevent undue foreign competition.31 The development debate in the context of energy security triggers the same range of issues. When the development-first,
30
Pan Yue, “Working Toward a better environment,” China Daily, November 22, 2007, 10. Margaret Pearson, “The Case of China’s Accession to GATT/WTO” in The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy, ed. David M. Lampton, pp. 358–359. 31
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supply-side and climate issues related to scarcity are emphasized, China’s mercantilism and sovereignty over natural resources themes dominate the debate. As issues emphasizing the costs of energy-use, such as energy intensity and efficiency come to the forefront, however, a more marketoriented set of solutions come forth. The opportunities that come with international climate change negotiations focusing on shared technology become a policy driver in the energy-use debate which emphasizes shared problems and share solutions. International climate change negotiations may provide a forum for China to seek help to promote its linked domestic energy and conservation goals and to work with the outside world. Push back from the provinces Another major barrier to China’s government implementing a coordinated energy strategy comes from the local resistance to Beijing’s sustainable development goals and demandside mandates. Ironically, Deng’s economic reforms, which decentralized China’s political system, also provided provincial authorities with the fiscal authority to follow their own foreign economic policies. This has led to pockets of great economic reform and success while other areas lag behind. In practice, provinces have the ability to pick and choose the central government administrative and legal guidance they want to follow. If government mandates threaten local economic growth, they are likely to be ignored. This central–local confrontation arises because there are competing interests between the provincial-level need for economic growth and the center’s push for policy reform that increases local costs (whether market reforms or calls for environmental protection). For example, Beijing’s efforts to eliminate energy price subsidies in order to eliminate inefficiencies face great local opposition because they lead to unpopular price increases. While the central government might aspire to see a rationalization in energy pricing to reduce energy consumption, local economic and social development concerns hinder its progress.32
32 Daniel H. Rosen and Trevor Houser, “China Energy: A Guide for the Perplexed,” Peterson Institute for International Economics (Washington, D.C., May 2007), pp. 10–11.
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China’s power generation sector and reliance on coal is the biggest problem. It remains dirty and very inefficient, in part due to the deliberate actions by local officials to keep open power plants that provide local jobs and keep cheap energy readily available. For example, as the central government attempts to consolidate energy suppliers into larger power plants where environmental technologies are employed, local governments have encouraged the proliferation of small plants under 50 MW (which in practice usually release three to eight times more particulates, consume 60 percent more coal, and add negatively to health and environmental concerns).33 These small enterprises have used a loophole in the law that allows local officials to approve the building of small plants (less than 50 MW) which do not need NDRC approval. Ironically, these are precisely the ones the central government tries to shut down.34 Despite growing attention to environmental issues, electric sector carbon emissions are growing rather than decreasing. Estimates from 2009 suggest that there will be a 65 percent increase over current levels of coal-fired power capacity and 80 percent of this growth will occur in China and India by 2020. China’s fleet capacity of 417 GW now exceeds that of the United States and, with its third largest coal reserves in the world, this capacity will continue to grow. China builds new power plants at the rate of one coal-fired plant per week, at roughly one-third the cost of those built in the United States.35 According to the EIA, coal use in China’s electricity sector is anticipated to more than double by 2030 with an average growth rate of 3.5 percent per year. By comparison, growth in the US electric power sector is projected to grow by just 0.7 percent annually across this same period of time.36 Together, China and the US account for half of the global coal use. While half of all US power generation comes from coal power plants, in
33
Economy, The River Runs Black, pp. 72–76. The previous examples were provided by US government sources, interviewed on November 1, 2007. 35 “Retrofitting of Coal-Fired Power Plants for CO2 Emissions Reductions,” An MIT Energy Initiative Symposium Final Report, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, (March 23, 2009), p. 15. 36 Energy Information Administration, International Energy Outlook 2009, September 9, 2009. 34
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China this figure is as high as 89 percent. This dependence on coal means that mitigation of carbon emissions from these plants must be a high priority if the climate challenge is to be addressed.37 If China’s growing coal fleet adopts more efficient technology, the average efficiency of coal-fired generation could improve from 32 percent in 2005 to 39 percent by 2030. But reaching this goal becomes an issue of cost and enforcement which has been a challenge to China’s central government for some of the reasons outlined above.38 There are challenges to implementing a clean coal agenda, not the least of which is the provincial push back on efforts to consolidate coal and other industries. It means strengthening agencies to better implement sound environmental, health, and safety policies and finding a way to absorb the costs. According to the 2009 IEA report, adopting new technology and management practices in China’s coal sector has led to immediate and sustainable improvements, for example, to local air quality. China already has most of the technologies; it just needs to install and use them. Along with using the new equipment and technology, it needs a staff for the independent regulatory authorities to oversee the whole process. Change comes when players see a competitive advantage in becoming cleaner.39 As part of a campaign to consolidate its fragmented coal sector, China argues it will use its vast coal reserves more efficiently by merging mining operations, promoting the best technology, pursuing efficient and safe mining practices, and simultaneously addressing development and environmental priorities.40 It seeks to consolidate a major portion of the coal sector, now fragmented into more than 10,000 small mines, into six to eight large coal companies with an output of 100 million tons and eight to
37
“Retrofitting of Coal-Fired Power Plants for CO2 Emissions Reductions,” p. 5. International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2007 — China and India Insights, (Paris: OECD/IEA, 2007); Jonathan Sinton and Robert Taylor, “China Grapples with its Energy Challenges” (Presentations at Woodrow Wilson Center, December 12, 2007). 39 IEA Press Release, “IEA Sees China Lead the Way in Developing New Cleaner Coal Technologies,” April 20, 2009. 40 See “China Coal Industry Policy 2007,” English translation provided by Shanghai Zoom Intelligence Co., Ltd, www.zoomchina.com.cn. 38
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ten operators with a capacity of 50 m tons by 2010.41 These targets are part of the goal to close 50 m kW of thermal power capacity across the 11th five-year planning period. In 2007, the government closed 533 small thermal power generators.42 The IEA alternative policy scenario argues that China can increase its efficiency considerably by 2030 by retiring old plants more rapidly and replacing them with more efficient integrated gas combined cycle (IGCC) technologies with carbon capture and storage (CCS) that could raise efficiency levels to 45 percent.43 However, finding the financing for such big, front-loaded investments in new technology in the context of higher-risk investment presents obstacles to technology deployment. New IGCC plants cost up to $1b more than conventional plants and CCS is estimated to increase operational costs of electricity generation by 35–60 percent. By adopting newer technologies, China could significantly increase its efficiency and reduce its greenhouse gas emissions. However, they are more expensive and some technologies such as CCS have yet to be commercialized fully. Local efforts to block central government mandates often succeed because companies and local officials work together to resist new standards which increase costs. When threatened with environmental enforcement, industry complains of a loss of competitiveness to provinces next door (i.e., jobs and tax revenue) to sympathetic local officials.44 However, areas whose wealth is derived from foreign investment are much more receptive to change. Communities with ties to the international community and financiers such as the World Bank, Asian Development Bank (ADB), and countries like Japan have been the direct beneficiaries of attempts to increase energy conservation and to change practices. Without a strong center to serve as advocate, monitor, and enforcer of conservation practices, however, other divided interests prevail and the
41
Eric Ng, “China Coal Buying Mine from Parent,” South China Morning Post, December 3, 2007. 42 “Coal-Fired Power on the Way Out, Says NDRC,” China Daily, January 29, 2008. 43 UNDP, Human Development Report 2007/2008, Fighting Climate Change, pp. 149–150. 44 Rosen et al., “China Energy: A Guide for the Perplexed,” pp. 11–13.
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status quo persists.45 In a report prepared for the OECD in 2007, Wang Yanjia from Tsinghua University notes that Beijing adopts mainly administrative methods to limit outdated production processes and to shut down inefficient small-scale enterprises in the provinces. The problem she identifies is that most policies provide loose guidelines or directives rather than enforceable measures.46 To make consistent progress, China’s decision makers will have to reconcile the need to control dirty energy growth with the local need to maintain economic growth. To do this they must get a handle on their growing energy demand in terms of volume and type. China’s Policy Drivers and Challenges in the Energy-Climate Debate The central drivers of this acceleration in energy demand and carbon emissions are China’s increasing population, growth in its industry, building and manufacturing sectors, and the greater wealth of a rising middle class that is driven by globalized markets. For example, between 1990 and 2007, the average Chinese doubled her income while increasing energy consumption by 15 percent. However, energy demand will spike as people buy appliances and cars and consume more electricity and transport fuel. Today there are three cars for every 100 people in China (40 million overall), but China became the world’s largest car market in 2009 and by 2020 the forecast is that it will have 150 million cars on its roads. Fueling the new cars will require an additional 2–3 million barrels of imported oil per day.47 Already, globally, demand for transport and electricity account for 66 percent of total carbon emissions. While North America accounts for 39 percent of the total emissions today, global emissions from the transport sector are projected to double over the next 30 years, much of this
45
Economy, The River Runs Black, pp. 55–56, 108. Wang, “Energy Efficiency and CO2 in China’s Industry,” pp. 1–2; Joanna I. Lewis, “China’s Strategic Priorities in International Climate Change Negotiations,” Washington Quarterly 31, no. 1 (Winter 2007–08): 158–61. 47 Brookings Roundtable, “A Climate of Change: Economic Approaches to Reforming Energy and Protecting the Environment,” Uncorrected Transcript, The Hamilton Project, Brookings Institution, October 30, 2007. 46
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coming from China and other developing economies. Transport is dominated by petroleum, making increased fuel efficiency standards, the use of hybrids, and the cleaning up of the fuel mix central priorities. Adopting these changes simultaneously diversify the energy supply base and potentially reduce carbon emissions. These changes, however, are set to be outpaced by the shear increase in China’s domestic demand. With a growing car culture and increased demand addressed by oil imports, strategies to change the transportation energy mix fit squarely into the energy and climate security discussion. In China one focus is on coal liquefaction processes (also known as coal-to-liquids or CtL). Until recently CtL was hindered by the low crude oil price and its wide availability, but this has changed with recent price spikes. Existing CtL practices create diesel fuel to replace conventional oil, but emit more than twice the greenhouse gases as oil production.48 Despite the potential carbon spike, China looks set to become the world leader in CtL production with 88 CtL projects included in the 11th Five-Year Plan and more in the works. As such, the driving factor behind investment in CtL is to make more efficient use of secure domestic and regional coal supplies rather than to offset climate change. Assuming the price of oil remains high and these projects are successful, production of oil substitutes may account for 10–15 percent of China’s coal consumption by 2015. It will provide the equivalent of up to two million bpd of oil products in an environment in which China currently consumes about seven million bpd. Despite the energy conservation targets in recent environmental laws and five-year plans, coal is set to remain China’s primary energy source well into the 21st century. With its huge coal reserves and two-thirds of its total energy consumption coming from burning coal, China’s economic growth is very polluting and requires major adjustments to create a lowcarbon economy. The costs associated with China’s growth and progress are tangible, including the untenable fact that China is home to 16 of the world’s 20 most polluted cities. The World Bank conservatively projects that pollution damage costs China nearly 1–3 percent of China’s annual
48
Furman et al., “An Economic Strategy to Address Climate Change and Promote Energy Security,” pp. 5–7.
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GDP growth of 8 percent. Further, China has become the world’s largest emitter of sulfur dioxide and carbon dioxide and its air pollution kills around 750,000 citizens prematurely each year.49 Reconciling Growing Energy Demand with Its Environmental Costs From the national security/resource or growth-first development perspective, coal continues to make sense for China in the short and mid-term. China relies on coal because of its large coal reserves and the cheap price relative to other energy sources — especially when a carbon price is not factored into the mix. On a practical level, no other source of power can meet China’s energy demands in the near future (i.e., nuclear power is projected to provide less than 10 percent of China’s energy in 2030 and natural gas less still). Coal power plants will make up the difference for the next 40 years.50 From a climate perspective, given that coal dominates electricity generation in China, abatement strategies that clean up coal or replace coal are essential. Today coal accounts for about 89 percent of China’s power generation and its coal consumption continues to increase rather than decline. For example, in 2008 China’s consumption climbed 7.1 percent, adding 366 million tons of extra emissions.51 Coal-fired generation contributes over 80 percent of the carbon emissions from China’s electric power sector, and China is on a path to increase its coal power generating fleet in order to bring electricity to people who do not have it. Once built, coal plants remain online because they are the cheapest kind of power generation and there is little economic incentive to phase them out. For the climate challenge, more than a short-term economic equation is needed to incentivize a change in behavior. There needs to be a real push to deploy new technologies to retrofit existing coal plants and reduce their carbon emissions.52 49
Lampton et al., “China Comes in From the Cold.” John Podesta, John Deutch and Peter Ogden, “China’s Energy Challenge,” in China’s March in the 21st Century, eds. K. Campbell and W. Darsie (Washington DC: The Aspen Institute, 2007), pp. 53–61. 51 Matthew Carr and Alex Morales, “World CO2-Emissions Growth Keeps Focus on Coal, China (Update5),” Bloomberg.com, June 10, 2009. 52 “Retrofitting of Coal-Fired Power Plants for CO2 Emissions Reductions,” p. 4. 50
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To avoid carbon lock-in, China needs to start the transition now to a more efficient coal fleet. By volume it adds a capacity comparable to the entire United Kingdom power grid each year. To make inroads on this demand, the priority objective with respect to coal must be the successful large-scale demonstration of the technical, economic, and environmental performance of the technologies that make a large-scale integrated CCS system. Industry voices note that it is essential to demonstrate and multiply CCS applications in power generation. It will be a learn-by-doing model to reduce costs, for economic incentives to move it forward, and to avoid a carbon lock-in with other plants. The immediate need in the developing world is to quicken the pace of such projects. But carbon mitigation policies need a monetary value for research and deployment to move forward, and a huge investment if the estimated deployment of around 6,000 new projects to reach the goal of sequestering one million tons of carbon per year is to be met. The major danger of slow progress in these areas is the carbon lock-in effect, given the current fast pace of deployment of coal-fired power generation in China and throughout the developing world. Without the deployment of more efficient plants, it will be hard to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions without more expensive retrofitting of power plants later on. A partnership model involving government, industry, and public collaboration has been pushed to share the risks and accelerate the deployment of new technologies such as CCS.53 Bilateral and Multilateral Opportunities and Challenges Both bilateral and multilateral settings are in play to push for change in China’s energy-use equation. When China’s government is in a tough position to promote its conservation goals domestically, these negotiations become a useful tool to promote change at home. First, this has become a means to find others to pay for China’s environmental policy goals over time. Historically China has relied on outside donations to finance its
53 Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum, “Near-Term Opportunities for Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage, Summary Report,” 1–20; see also “The Future of Coal: Options for a Carbon-Constrained World.”
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environmental policies and until recently Japan played a major role. In the climate context, China uses bilateral and multilateral negotiation settings to advocate Western subsidies for incentivizing climate change policies. The US-led Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP) and the US Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum, among others, have become hybrid vehicles in a multilateral setting to stimulate joint ventures and investment that cover the cost of energy conservation and simultaneously the creation of a lower-carbon economy.54 The APP has working groups involving government and industry representatives focusing on areas from clean coal and renewable energy to buildings, appliances, cement, and steel. The challenge in the APP structure has been the development and deployment of specific projects to its Chinese and Indian partners.55 Further, sideline discussions at these bilateral and multilateral meetings reveal the persistent challenges in all these forums. Funding has been sporadic with the APP with modest US funding coming online only in late 2007. The Chinese find it problematic that most joint projects focus on “soft” activities like information sharing, capacity building, and standardization. Director General Gao Guangsheng, from the Office of National Climate Change Committee, notes “there are almost no joint R&D projects between developed and developing Partnership countries.” To him, the core issue is “the price of technology transfer and dissemination.”56 For China, there needs to be a financial mechanism to facilitate cooperation among the private sectors of partner countries. This is still a drop in the bucket in the face of China’s growing demand and conservation needs.57 The transfer of US and OECD technologies to countries such as
54
For more information on the U.S. Department of Energy’s Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum see http://www.fe.doe.gov/programs/sequestration/cslf/ and for information on the Asian Pacific Partnership see http://www.state.gov/r/pa/scp/2006/ 60852.htm. 55 Asia-Pacific Partnership (APP), “Communiqué from the Second Ministerial Meeting, New Delhi, India,” Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate, October 15, 2007. 56 Gao Guangsheng, speech at the 2nd Ministerial meeting of the Asian Pacific Partnership, New Delhi, India, October 15, 2007. 57 UNDP, Human Development Report 2007/2008, Fighting Climate Change.
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China and India seems the easiest way to facilitate their participation at the global level in climate change mitigation programs. If a post-2012 framework includes emissions targets, the incentive for others to make policy commitments comes with trading marketable emissions credits.58 Abundant external investment is necessary for China and beyond if the developing world is to adjust to a low-carbon economy. Despite these ongoing challenges, it would be a mistake not to acknowledge the huge changes that have occurred in China in its development, particularly in the last 30 years. Slowly China is opening itself to market processes. Even its energy sector is opening more to international investment and greater transparency and companies can get good returns on their investments in China. Even skeptics see such investment as a means to ease China’s reliance on foreign oil and curtail its greenhouse gas emissions. These incremental changes have led to a shift in orientation in China’s government that is slowly taking root. Conclusion Given the rise of energy security concerns as seen through a climate lens, China and others must substantially reduce the consumption of fossil fuels and clean up their use. Decision makers need to wake up and recognize the scale of change that is needed to achieve sustainable energy and climate security. Sustainability in these areas is integrally linked to a country’s sustainable development policies and how it manages the domestic political debate. Given the slow pace of financing and deployment, there is a risk of carbon lock-in if a number of actions are not taken now. For China to truly embrace “clean energy” and, by definition, a lower-carbon economy, its concerns over the cost of moving toward higher-efficiency coal technology and CCS technology will have to be addressed. While climate negotiations at the international level seem to highlight the intransigence between the Chinese and US positions, there are hints of progress in some practical policy areas such as energy efficiency and possibly within clean coal.
58 For a thorough discussion of climate change, see Lewis, “China’s Strategic Priorities in International Climate Change Negotiations,” pp. 155–174.
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The issue of “who pays” takes center stage. While Western handouts are unlikely, if funds provided can be defined as needed investments in green technology, some movement might be forthcoming. This means that progress in international climate negotiations hinges specifically on the domestic debate within a few key states which are responsible for setting the regulatory environment which can incentivize corporate behavior. As such, what the US does is central for change to occur in China. Because China’s goal is to be seen as a responsible stakeholder in the world system, it seems set to cooperate under certain circumstances as well. By looking at the sustainable development and energy debates within China, we can see that energy and related climate issues are intermestic issues, meaning that both domestic and international contexts affect the government’s foreign policy choices. While central government policymakers must seek to make deals internationally, they must be able to sell them at home as well. This requires leaders to build policy coalitions in order to balance strategic imperatives against domestic possibilities.59 Already China has accepted new environmental standards, an environmental bureaucracy has developed, and the economy has become more efficient. The US can play a constructive role by leading by example and participating fully in the energy-climate dialogue. In this context, securitizing the debate draws attention to the problem, but simultaneously limits the possibilities for cooperation and collaborative responses so essential if the energy-climate problem is to be addressed effectively. Given the practical issue of the interconnected costs, if nothing is done — in both a dollar and a human sense — the shared interests in cooperating should be clear to see.
59 In international relations most are familiar with Robert Putnam’s characterization of the two-level game where decision makers must balance domestic considerations with international imperatives when making policy choices. See Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” in Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics, eds. P. Evans, H. Jacobson and R. Putnam (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1992), pp. 431–468.
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References Asia-Pacific Partnership (APP). “Communiqué from the Second Ministerial Meeting, New Delhi, India.” October 15, 2007. Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum. “Near-Term Opportunities for Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage, Summary Report.” Paris: OECD/IEA, June 2007. Carr, Matthew and Alex Morales. “World CO2-Emissions Growth Keeps Focus on Coal, China (Update 5),” Bloomberg.com, June 10, 2009. “China Coal Industry Policy 2007.” English translation provided by Shanghai Zoom Intelligence Co., Ltd, www.zoomchina.com.cn (accessed March 5, 2008). “China Drafts Energy Stimulus Plan,” Xinhua, June 1, 2009. China Energy Group, Lawrence Berkeley National Lab, (LBNL). “People’s Republic of China Renewable Energy Law” (Berkeley, CA: LBNL, 2006). “China’s National Climate Change Programme,” National Development and Reform Commission of People’s Republic of China, June 2007, 178–185. “Coal-Fired Power on the Way Out, Says NDRC,” China Daily, January 29, 2008. Economy, Elizabeth C. The River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenge to China’s Future (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004). Energy Information Administration, U.S. (EIA). International Energy Outlook, 2009. “Former British PM Praises China’s Efforts in Tackling Climate Change,” Xinhua, August 20, 2009. Garrison, Jean. China and the Energy Equation in Asia: The Determinants of Policy Choice (Boulder, CO: First Forum Press, 2009). Guangsheng, Gao. “Speech at the 2nd Ministerial Meeting of the Asian Pacific Partnership.” New Delhi, India, October 15, 2007. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report: Summary for Policymakers. Fourth Assessment Report, 2007. International Energy Agency (IEA). “Searching for Optimism in IEA’s Latest Energy Projection.” Energy Bulletin, November 7, 2006. ———. World Energy Outlook 2007 — China and India Insights (Paris: OECD/IEA, 2007).
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———. “IEA Sees China Lead the Way in Developing New Cleaner Coal Technologies.” Press Release, April 20, 2009. Lampton, David M. and Bo Kong. “China Comes in from the Cold.” Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced Studies publication, Winter 2005. Lieberthal, Kenneth and David M. Lampton, eds. Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post Mao China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992). Ma, Kai. “China Is Shouldering Its Climate Change Burden.” Financial Times, June 4, 2007, 13. Macartney, Jane. “Troubled Waters Form Backdrop to Climate Plan.” Times, June 5, 2007, 39. Moore, Thomas G. and Dixia Yang. “Empowered and Restrained: China’s Foreign Policy in the Age of Economic Interdependence,” in The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, edited by David M. Lampton (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), pp. 191–229. Ning, Lu. The Dynamics of Foreign-Policy Decision-making in China, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000). Pan, Yue. “Working toward a Better Environment.” China Daily, November 22, 2007, 10. Podesta, John, John Deutch, and Peter Ogden. “China’s Energy Challenge” in China’s March in the 21st Century, eds. K. Campbell and W. Darsie (Washington DC: The Aspen Institute, 2007), pp. 53–61. Putnam, Robert. “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games.” In Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics, eds. P. Evans, H. Jacobson and R. Putnam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), pp. 431–468. Revkin, Andrew. “Energy Plan from the Greenhouse Giants.” New York Times, November 17, 2009, A1. ———. “A Shift in the Debate over Global Warming.” New York Times, April 6, 2008, “Week in Review” section, 3. Sinton, Jonathan and Robert Taylor. China Grapples with its Energy Challenges. Presentations at Woodrow Wilson Center, December 12, 2007. United Nations Development Program (UNDP). Human Development Report 2007/2008, Fighting Climate Change: Human Solidarity in a Divided World (New York: United Nations Development Program, 2007).
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“Wen Jiabao Convenes First Meeting of the State Leading Group on Work to Respond to Climate Change, Energy Conservation, and Emissions Reduction.” Xinhua, July 11, 2007. World Energy Council (WEC). Deciding the Future: Energy Policy Scenarios to 2050: Executive Summary (London: World Energy Council, 2007). Zhu, Shaobin. “China’s Economic Stimulus Plans Benefit Environment.” Xinhua, March 10, 2009.
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Chapter Fifteen
The Coming of a Prosperous China with Strong Military Power* David Lai
The rise of China is one of the most defining developments in the postCold War world. The nation embarked on a mission of modernization in 1978. In retrospect, few had expected China to develop anything extraordinary; after all, China had made several false starts before. Yet by the late 1980s, the changes in China turned out to be fundamental. China’s economic reform and open policy had set China on a path to replicate the successes of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore. Before long, “Made in China” products started to fill the shelves in US department stores and eventually everywhere in the world. The money earned, mostly from its export-oriented business, has returned to fund the improvement of the Chinese standard of living. Robert Fogel, a Nobel laureate in economics, predicts that by 2040, “Chinese economy will reach $123 trillion, or nearly three times the economic output of the entire globe in 2000… China’s share of global GDP — 40 percent — will dwarf that of the United States (14 percent) and the European Union (5 percent) 30 years from now.”1 * The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Army was College, the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense or the U.S. government. 1 Robert Fogel, “$123,000,000,000,000: China’s Estimated Economy by the Year 2040. Be Warned,” Foreign Policy, January 7, 2010. 357
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This impressive economic development, however, has come with mixed blessings. On one hand, a more developed China naturally wants to get even more. The most notable development is China’s economic expansion abroad into practically every region of the world. Another agenda high on China’s list of priorities is to pursue maritime interests first in the East and South China Seas, and then in other parts of the world. On the other hand, these developments have made and will continue to make China dependent on the well- and ill-being of the outside world. Indeed, China relies on an unfettered supply of natural resources to feed its massive production and seaborne transportation to ship its products everywhere. China became the largest trading nation in 2009. Over 90 percent of China’s trade goes by sea. In addition, China has in recent years become the second largest consumer of crude oil in the world. Much of its trade and oil shipment sail through some key international passages such as the Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf of Aden, and the Strait of Malacca that are under security threats from time to time. It is easy to see that any disruption in China’s sea lines of communications (SLOC) will put this “world factory” in jeopardy. In the meantime, China’s economic expansion overseas also makes its national interests vulnerable to threats or attacks in a world still filled with deadly conflicts. Perhaps the most serious of all is that China’s rapid development and expansion bring it to challenge the United States — everywhere China expands, it runs into established US “turfs” (interests and established relations). In the face of such daunting challenges, what can China do? A New Mission for the PLA in the New Century One new development in China’s efforts to pursue and protect its interests is to assign its military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), a new role in China’s modernization mission. This assignment came from Chinese President Hu Jintao in his inaugural address to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Military Commission (CMC) on December 24, 2004, as he assumed chairmanship of this powerful institution. “Commander-inChief ” Hu promulgated it as a new mission for the PLA in the new century. The full text of Hu’s speech was not made public, but the key elements found expression at the CCP’s 17th National Congress platform (Hu’s report) in October 2007 and in China’s 2006 and 2008 Defense
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White Papers. As characterized by the Chinese analysts, the PLA is tasked to carry out “three provides and one role.” Specifically, it is to • • • •
provide an important source of strength for consolidating the ruling position of the Chinese Communist Party of China;2 provide a solid security guarantee for sustaining the important period of strategic opportunity for national development; provide a strong strategic support for safeguarding national interests; and play a major role in maintaining world peace and promoting common development.3
This new mission reflects several significant developments in Beijing’s conception of its national interests and the principles upon which China expects to advance these interests. First, the call reiterates China’s long-held position that the rights to survival and development are more important to China than the right to political participation as emphasized by the West. Second, China’s national interests have already expanded beyond its geographic borders — in the words of a high-profile PLA Daily editorial, China’s national interests are spreading everywhere in the world, into the open seas, outer space, and in the magnetic field of cyberspace.4 Third, China claims that the 20th century was one much filled with war and confrontation whereas the 21st century will be one of economic competition and marginalization. All nations, especially great powers, must therefore seize strategic opportunities and make development their top national priority or face marginalization. In addition, as China’s economic reform and development has entered a very critical stage where China is to “build a well-off society with Chinese characteristics in an allround way,”5 Hu wants the PLA to ensure that China’s pursuit of such opportunities are not compromised by internal or external interference. 2
China Defense White Paper 2006. China Defense White Paper 2008. Of note is that the first “provide” as not reiterated in the 2008 Defense White Paper. 4 Jiefangjun Bao (The PLA Daily) Editorial “On the PLA’s Historical Mission in the New Stage of the New Century,” January 9, 2006. 5 This is the title of Jiang Zemin’s “Report to the 16th CCP National Congress” in November 2002. 3
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Finally, China accepts that its expanding global interests will eventually come into conflict with those of other nations, and that its military must be prepared to come to the protection of these expanding national interests.6 For that matter, many of China’s new global interests require a powerful military underpinning. So long as China believes it must have a military force commensurate with its rising international status, the missions of the PLA will follow the development of China’s national interests wherever they go.7 This new mission is revolutionary to the PLA. For much of its 80-plus year history, the PLA has been a domestically focused military force. From its inception in 1927 to 1949, as the Red Army, its primary mission was political revolution and nation-making. Indeed, as Mao Zedong famously put it, political power grows out of the barrel of a gun, and the PLA was one of the three key “Magic Instruments” ( ) Chinese leaders used to establish the People’s Republic: the Communist Party, the Red Army, and the Chinese people. Upon the founding of the PRC, the PLA’s mission switched to China’s national defense and nation-building. In the early decades of the PRC, the PLA bore heavy responsibility for defending China’s vast and disputed borders. In pursuing this mission, the PLA fought directly against the United States in the Korean War and indirectly in the Vietnam War, the Indians in the Indo-China War of 1962, the Soviets in the Sino-Russo border skirmishes of 1969, and the Vietnamese in the 1974 and 1988 naval battles in the South China Sea, and the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979, to name the major military confrontations. The PLA also had to continue to fight the unfinished Chinese Civil War with the Nationalist government forces in Taiwan. The Chinese Nationalists lost the war to the Communists in 1949 and took shelter on the island about 100 miles from mainland China, restoring the government of the Republic of China (ROC) there and committing themselves to the mission of reclaiming mainland China. The two Chinese governments 6 See Luo Yabo, “A Scientific Understanding of the PLA Historic Mission in the New Century,” Theoretical Studies on PLA Political Work 6, no. 3 (2005). 7 Numerous publications by PLA writers celebrate this new mission. The aforementioned editorial by the PLA mouthpiece newspaper, Jiefangjun Bao, provides perhaps the most authoritative expansion of the thoughts behind the new mission.
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(PRC and ROC) across the Taiwan Strait subsequently fought for survival and legitimate representation of the whole China in the international arena. The United States denounced the Communist regime in Beijing but maintained diplomatic and military alliance relations with the ROC government in Taipei for the next 30 years. When President Richard Nixon reopened US relations with China in 1972 and President Jimmy Carter switched US diplomatic recognition of the Chinese government from Taipei to Beijing in 1979, Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) committing the United States to the defense of Taiwan against armed coercion. For over 60 years, the CCP has made the unification with Taiwan one of its three historic tasks: rejuvenation and modernization of China, unification of China, and safeguarding world peace. The fight over the fate of Taiwan ties China, Taiwan, and the United States in a repeated test of will and strength, and even the threat of war. The Taiwan issue took a fundamental turn in the early and mid-1990s when Taiwan made its transition to democracy. The “engineer” of Taiwan’s democratic change, ROC President Lee Teng-hui, was also surreptitiously pushing Taiwan toward de jure independence from mainland China. In March 1996, Taiwan held its first ever direct presidential election and the call for Taiwan’s independence was a rallying issue in the election campaigns. In an attempt to deter Taiwan’s pro-independence forces, China fired missiles at Taiwan. In response, the United States sent two aircraft carrier battle groups to the troubled waters, staging the largest show of force in the Western Pacific by the United States since WWII. The crisis faded away, yet the tension stayed and engulfed the Taiwan Strait again four years later. This time, an openly pro-Taiwan independence candidate, Chen Shui-bian, led his openly pro-Taiwan independence party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), to win Taiwan’s 2000 presidential election. This epoch-making change completely altered the nature of cross-Taiwan Strait relations and gave the United States one more reason to help defend Taiwan — protecting a fellow democracy from intimidation by an authoritarian regime. The PRC was furious about this change and vowed to take serious measures to prevent Taiwan from taking “dare” moves towards independence. In the midst of this high tension across the Taiwan Strait, the United States had a new and combative president. George W. Bush ran his
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presidential campaign promising to get tough with China (recall Bush’s intention to recast China as a “strategic competitor”). Shortly after taking office, President Bush found himself in a standoff with China over a confrontational US–China military airplane collision over the South China Sea (the EP-3 incident on April Fool’s Day 2001). Upon the release of the American military crew members from China, President Bush authorized a multi-billion dollar package of arms sales to Taiwan. At the same time, Bush bluntly stated that the United States would do “whatever it takes to help Taiwan defend itself.”8 The PLA started a military buildup following the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis that included mainly the deployment of missiles along the eastern seaboard of China aiming at Taiwan and the purchase of advanced air and naval capabilities from Russia. Chinese leaders understood that in order to keep Taiwan in the fold, they had to hold possible US intervention in check. From the mid-1990s to 2008, China spent an average of $2.5 billion a year on acquiring advanced weapons. This heavy spending made China repeatedly the top recipient of major conventional weapons in the world in those 15 years.9 The money was not wasted. The PLA has effectively established a credible deterrence against Taiwan’s proindependence forces. It has also acquired anti-access capability against possible US intervention. In the meantime, China aggressively pursued economic integration with Taiwan. Over the past 15 years, Taiwan has been one of the top investors in China. It is one of China’s top trading partners as well. With massive economic and social exchanges between the two sides, a virtual economic unification of China and Taiwan is in the making.10 In 2008, the KMT won a landslide election victory to retake the presidency of Taiwan. The new leader, Ma Ying-jeou, exchanged goodwill with President Hu Jintao and put forward a “Three No’s” call: no use of force, no move to
8
Interview with ABC’s “Good Morning America” anchor Charlie Gibson. Reported also in The New York Times “US Would Defend Taiwan, Bush Says,” April 26, 2001. 9 SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), Yearbooks 1992 to 2008. 10 See Taiwan government’s Mainland Affairs Council statistics on cross-Taiwan Strait exchanges available at http://www.mac.gov.tw and China’s statistics available at the PRC’s Commerce Ministry and Websites such as Investment in China at http://www.fdi.gov.cn.
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formal independence, and no hasty unification,11 as a response to Hu Jintao’s appeal for a peace agreement with Taiwan along these lines.12 With tensions reduced, the two sides have taken measures to broaden exchanges. On the US side, the terrorist attacks on the United States and the subsequent War on Terrorism compelled Bush to take a constructive and cooperative approach with China. In 2005, the United States invited China to become a “responsible stakeholder” in the current international system and join the United States in advancing common interests in this international order from which China has benefited tremendously over the past 30 years.13 With these changes, along with continued development in China’s economic and comprehensive national power, China was ready to do more in international affairs. The PLA was confident to look beyond Taiwan and carry out its new mission in the new century. : A Prosperous Nation with a Strong Military At the CCP’s 17th national convention in October 2007, while reiterating his new mission call of 2004, General Secretary Hu Jintao also gave his blessing to the nation’s defense modernization drive: Bearing in mind the overall strategic interests of national security and development, we must take both economic and national defense development 11
The KMT is pro-unification, but insists that unification be on democratic principles. Ma Ying-jeou stands firm on this position. In other words, Taiwan will wait until mainland China turns democratic to consider unification. 12 The idea of a peace agreement between China and Taiwan first came from Kenneth Lieberthal, a noted China observer and one-time Senior Director for Asia in the Clinton Administration’s National Security Council. Lieberthal proposes that the two sides sign a 20- to-30-year “agreed framework” so that China will not use force to threaten Taiwan and the latter will not seek formal independence; and let time to wash away the differences between the two sides. See Kenneth Lieberthal’s article in Foreign Affairs, “Preventing a War Over Taiwan,” March/April 2005. If Ma Ying-jeou and Hu Jintao can reach this agreement, they must be in line to receive the next Nobel Peace Prize (in the footsteps of Kim Dae-jung and Yasser Arafat, Shimon Peres, and Yitzhak Rabin). 13 See Robert B. Zoellick, Deputy Secretary of State 2005–2006, “Wither China: From Membership to Responsibility?” Remarks to the National Committee on US–China Relations, New York City, September 21, 2005.
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into consideration and make our country prosperous and our armed forces powerful while building a moderately prosperous society in all respects.14
For the first time in its history, the CCP put the “prosperous nation with a strong military” call in its party platform. Ever since China’s fall from grace in the mid-19th century, generations of ambitious Chinese leaders have wanted to restore the greatness of China. However, many of them failed. In all fairness, the CCP leaders have advanced this mission the most so far. Now, with a rejuvenated and prosperous China within reach, the CCP is ready to accelerate the buildup of its military muscle. This move draws on painful lessons from the past and the hard reality of the present. As noted PLA analyst Wang Faan observes, although Chinese leaders believe that peace and development are the main themes of the time, they also see that the world is still a dangerous place and hegemonic powers continue to dominate world affairs; moreover, as China tries to become a great power of the world, its acts will profoundly change the strategic makeup of Asia and the world, and it has to face resistance and even sabotage from the other great powers; in fact, among all the big nations in the world, China is under the most serious security pressure from outside. Yet unlike Germany and Japan, which restored their great power status under the US umbrella, China must rely on itself to promote its welfare and security. In the face of this tough security environment, any illusion in neglect in its security will put China in danger.15 The call for a prosperous nation and strong military signifies an adjustment in China’s development strategy. Back in 1978 when the CCP switched its central task from class struggle to economic development, Deng Xiaoping, the architect of China’s reform, set the priorities of modernization in the following order: The four modernizations include the modernization of defense. Without that modernization there would be only three [agriculture, industry, and
14
Hu Jintao, “Report to the 17th Party Congress,” October 25, 2007. Wang Faan, “ ( , , )” [Stressing the Unity of , Building a Prosperous Nation and Strong Military, Pursuing the Strategy of Strong Military at a Higher Level, Parts I, II, and III], Guofang (National Defense), Vols. 1, 2, and 3, 2008.
15
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science and technology]. But the four modernizations should be achieved in order of priority. Only when we have a good economic foundation will it be possible for us to modernize the army’s equipment. […] When we are strong economically, we can buy some [military equipment] from abroad, but we should rely on ourselves to conduct research and design superior planes for the air force and equipment for the navy and army. If the economy develops, we can accomplish anything. What we have to do now is to put all our efforts into developing the economy. That is the most important thing …16
Much of what Deng said is reality now. It is time to turn on the green light for defense modernization. China is looking to to complete its mission by 2050. Indeed, Hu Jintao has made it clear that economic development will still be the overarching task in the years to come; defense modernization will be an integral part of this mission. The way to do it is to make economic and defense modernizations complement each other instead of being a choice between guns and butter. (integrating military with civil, ian development and embedding the military in the civilian sector) is the way to go. Moreover, the CCP leaders are mindful of the lessons from the former Soviet Union. They promise not to exhaust China’s economy to develop its military. China will not be caught in the trap of an arms race with other great powers but will develop its military according to its developmental needs. The “prosperous nation, strong military call,” as the Chinese characterize it, is the CCP’s timely adjustment to the changing situation and the advance of times ( ). It is a well-conceived and calculated move to advance the modernization mission. As Sun Kejia, a professor at the Chinese National Defense University, puts it, This call reflects the elevation of the importance of national defense modernization in China’s overall strategy. As China’s development progresses, its national security content and outreach will expand from the traditional “national sovereignty security” to “national interest security;” from the
16 Deng Xiaoping, Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. III, June 4, 1985 (Beijing: The People’s Daily), Online at http://www.people.com.cn/english/dengxp/.
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traditional territorial security to a wide variety of security in the nation’s politics, system, economy, science and technology, social life, culture, information, ideology, and military. The level and quality of national defense and military power affect … China’s peaceful development, and eventually the life and death of China.17
Transformation in Military Affairs with Chinese Characteristics The new mission and “prosperous nation, strong military” call give blessing to China’s defense modernization that has been going on for close to 20 years under a different agenda — it is called transformation in military affairs with Chinese characteristics.18 The impetus for the early start of China’s defense modernization is twofold; both are closely related to the United States. In a practical sense, China’s confrontation with the United States during the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, in 1999, the EP-3 incident in 2001, and so on, got the Chinese to upgrade the PLA’s fighting power. Their efforts unavoidably jumpstarted China’s long-awaited defense modernization. At the strategic level, the US-led revolution in military affairs (RMA) and its impressive demonstrations in the Gulf War of 1991, the Kosovo campaign of 1999,
17
Sun Kejia, “Bring About Unification of Making the Country Wealthy and the Military Powerful — Studying the Relevant Important Discussions in the 17th CPC National Congress Report,” Xuexi shibao [Study Times], no. 417, December 2007. 18 Chinese leaders chose to use the term “transformation” rather than “revolution” for several reasons. First, revolution suggests complete change whereas transformation means adaptation. Second, revolution usually comes as a sudden change while transformation makes gradual progress. Finally, and as a corollary to the first two, China wants to make transformation while retaining its “core values” such as Chinese military thought and political and military systems. The decision to use this term came all the way from President Jiang Zemin. See Xiong Guangkai, “On the Trend of Change in the World’s New Transformation in Military Affairs and China’s New Transformation in Military Affairs,” Journal of China Foreign Affairs University 76, June 2004, and Fang Gongli, “A Study of the Evolution of the PRC’s Defense Strategy,” PhD Dissertation, The Central Party School, 2004, pp. 197–198.
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and the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003 got the Chinese to see the fundamental changes taking place in military affairs and compelled them to ask hard questions: Where is the RMA leading the world? Can China afford to wait? Over the centuries, China has missed several important revolutions in military affairs, the most critical of which were the transitions from coldweapon warfare (with the use of mainly knives) to hot-weapon warfare (with the development of guns and firepower) and from hot-weapon warfare to mechanized warfare (with the employment of tanks, battleships, and airplanes, etc.). The consequences were devastating. When the wellarmed Western powers forced their way into China 150 years ago, the Chinese were defenseless with their outmoded weapons (the Opium War is a good example in point; the Boxer Rebellion is another). When the Western powers developed mechanized weapons during and after WWII, China was in the midst of internal turmoil and suffered from foreign invasion; it did not have the capacity to keep up with the developments of the time. In fact, China is still trying to catch up with the mechanization of its armed forces. Today, an opportunity not seen in a hundred years is unfolding in its early stage; failing to seize the opportunity could put China another generation behind the Western powers. China must act.19 The current Chinese leaders are quick to grasp the significance of RMA and are supportive of the PLA’s quest for transformation. As Xiong Guangkai, a retired PLA general and former Vice Chief of Staff of the PLA, recalls, while the Gulf War of 1991 was still going on, Chinese President Jiang Zemin tasked the PLA to study it; shortly after the war in 1992, Jiang instructed the Chinese Central Military Commission to host seminars to discuss the key aspects and lessons of the American new fighting power; they subsequently published their study in a book entitled
19 See Sun Kejia, “On Military Reform with Chinese Characteristics,” Military Science 16, no. 1 (2003); Pi Mingyong, “Concern and Surpassing: Perspective of the History of Military Reform in China,” cited in Southern Weekend, June 12, 2003; Peng Guangqian, “Embrace the Challenge of Transformation in Military Affairs,” Liaowang Weekly, June 9, 2003; Wang Baocun, Wu Yujin, and Ku Guisheng, “On Transformation in Military Affairs — Chinese Generals Discuss Opportunities and Challenges,” Liaowang Weekly, July 16, 2003.
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(Aspects of the Gulf War).20 Jiang’s following remarks also gave a sense of urgency to China’s efforts: From now to the first two decades of the 21st century, we have a very critical time period. During this time period, the world’s new revolution in military affairs will be at its early stage. If we can make good observation and take appropriate measures, we can achieve a big stride in our national defense and armed forces modernization, greatly reducing the gap between us and the world’s advanced powers, and laying a solid foundation for our further development.21
In December 1993 at an expanded CMC meeting, Jiang put forward a new military strategy guideline for the PLA to pursue the following: (1) China’s defense strategy to move from sole protection of national boundaries to protecting national unity and, however reluctant, to win a local war if forced to; (2) China’s defense forces to change from a quantity-based to quality-based military; and (3) China will develop its armed forces to handle limited war under high-tech conditions, possibly involving hegemonic powers (read as the United States and its allies).22 Two years later at another expanded CMC meeting, Jiang proposed that the PLA prepare for two fundamental transformations, a change from a manpower-intensive military to a science and technology-intensive one and a transformation from a quantity-based force to a quality-based military. To prepare the groundwork for these two transformations, Jiang took the initiative to downsize the PLA. In what the PLA analysts called “ ” (weight loss) exercises, Jiang brought the oversized PLA down from about 3.5 million to 2.3 million.23 In 1997, the CCP put forward a “Three-Stage” plan for the remainder of its modernization mission: (1) to double China’s 2000 GDP by the year
20 Xiong Guangkai, “On the New Revolution in Military Affairs,” Military History, no. 4 (2003). 21 Jiang Zemin, On National Defense and Armed Forces Building (Beijing: PLA Publishing, 2003), pp. 288–89. 22 Ibid., p. 82. 23 Xinhuanet, “PLA Major Downsizing Measures: Total Number Down to 2.3 Million,” July 31, 2009. China’s National Defense in 2004 (Defense White Paper).
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2010; (2) to further improve the economy and various aspects of the society by 2020; and (3) to bring about a prosperous, strong, democratic, and culturally advanced socialist China by 2050.24 Later in the same year, Jiang instructed the PLA to follow the CCP’s design to develop a “ThreeStep” plan as well. In 2002, the PLA came up with its roadmap for transformation. Specially, the PLA will lay a solid foundation for force informationization and mechanization by 2010, complete force mechanization and the initial stage of informationization by 2020, and complete informationization for all services and national defense modernization by 2050.25 Jiang Zemin characterized this as an “action plan for the PLA.” Chinese leaders are well aware of the huge challenge in their endeavor. They do not have the luxury to follow what the Western powers have gone through in their RMA. First, Western powers made their militaries’ transition to the information age on the basis of their fully developed economy. China has to make the transition while at the same time trying to develop its economy. Second, Western military powers were highly mechanized when they added their informationized capabilities. China’s force mechanization is only halfway through. Yet China cannot afford to wait until the completion of its force mechanization before making the transition o informationization. Its decision is to make a “leap-over development” ( ), striving to make mechanization and informationization mutually reinforcing and complementary. The revolution in military affairs which started as speculations in the mid-1970s by the Soviet military leaders on future means of waging war but was turned into reality by the United States in the last two to three decades has now come to mean the fundamental changes that have taken place, in the words of the Pentagon’s 1999 Annual Report to the President and the Congress, in military strategy, doctrine, training, education, organization, equipment, logistics operations, and tactics.26 China follows closely the development of RMA and learns from the experience of the US armed forces. It is interesting to note that the Chinese leaders at this critical time are mostly well-educated engineers (Jiang has a degree in electrical engineering and had 24
Jiang Zemin, “Report to the 15th CCP National Congress,” September 1997. China’s National Defense in 2006. 26 William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, Department of Defense, United States of America (Washington DC: USGPO, 1999), p. 122. 25
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further training in automobile works in Moscow; he was also the Minister of Electronic Industries in the early 1980s; Hu graduated from Tsinghua University with a degree in hydraulic engineering). Other factors aside, their “engineer’s instinct” may be instrumental in getting them enthusiastic about science and technology and wholeheartedly embracing the transformation in military affairs in China. In carrying out the reform and transformation, the PLA has also learned from the US military to prepare for military operations other than war (MOOTW). It has prepared the PLA to respond readily and quickly to natural disasters. In the years to come, one would not be surprised to see the arrival of a more powerful and professional PLA. The New Mission in Action With the new mission and the “prosperous nation, strong military” call well-introduced, “ ” (the PLA going out the door of China) has become a buzzword in China’s diplomatic and defense circles nowadays. The PLA has been waiting for such a call. Indeed, in the last 20 years, while developing its capability and carrying out its transformation in military affairs, the PLA has also been preparing the groundwork for its eventual global role. Its efforts are broadly known as the PLA’s military diplomacy. The key activities include: • • • • •
high-level military diplomacy; participation in UN peacekeeping missions; PLA Navy (PLAN) port calls; exchange of military students with foreign military institutions; and joint exercises with foreign troops.
Military diplomacy is an important tool of statecraft which the CCP employs to enhance its position in international affairs. As American analysts of PLA affairs, Kenneth Allen and Heidi Holz, observe, the PLA employs military diplomacy to reassure selected nations of its intentions, enhance China’s image as a responsible member of the international community, gain access to foreign military technology and expertise, and deter threats to stability by demonstrating the PLA’s improving capabilities. High-level military visits are an important component of military diplomacy. According
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to their study, the PLA has conducted an average of 150 per year high-level exchanges since 2001.27 Its 2008 Defense White Paper states that in 2007 and 2008 alone, China had 79 high-ranking military officials visiting foreign countries. At the same time, 130 foreign military senior leaders visited China. China has established military ties with over 150 nations and has military attaché offices in 109 countries. Reciprocally, a total of 98 foreign nations have their military attaché offices in China.28 Another aspect of PLA diplomacy is its participation in UN peacekeeping missions. Since 1990, the PLA has contributed more than 11,063 peacekeepers to 18 UN peacekeeping operations. China is also the second largest contributor to UN peacekeeping operations among the permanent members of the UN Security Council.29 Naval port call is another important means which the PLA employs to advance its interests. Since 2000, the PLAN has made many foreign port calls. The PLAN claims to have traveled all the waters in the world. Since 2007, China has held over 20 joint military exercises with a score of foreign countries. In August 2007, the PLA participated in a major land-air joint exercise outside the Chinese territory. Joint exercises have given the PLA many opportunities to interact directly with foreign military. It provides the PLA with an opportunity to interact with foreign counterparts in combat uniform instead of business suits. Moreover, China has sent over 900 military students to study in more than 30 foreign countries in the last 10 years. Twenty military educational institutions in China have established and maintained inter-collegiate exchange relations with their counterparts in over 20 foreign countries, including the United States, Russia, Japan, and Pakistan. Meanwhile, some 27 Heidi Holz and Kenneth Allen, “Military Exchanges with Chinese Characteristics: The PLA Experience with Military Relations,” Paper presented to the Annual Conference on PLA, Carlisle Pennsylvania, September 28, 2009. An earlier study of PLA diplomacy is by Kenneth Allen and Eric A. McVadon, China’s Foreign Military Relations (Washington DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 1999). 28 China’s Defense White Paper 2008. 29 See Bates Gill and Chin-hao Huang, “China’s Expanding Presence in UN Peacekeeping Operations and Implications for the United States,” in Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Andrew Scobell, eds. Beyond the Strait: PLA Missions Other Than Taiwan (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2009); and China’s Defense White Paper 2008.
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4,000 military personnel from more than 130 foreign nations have come to China to study at Chinese military educational institutions.30 Through these active and intensive foreign contacts, the PLA has gained military soft power, silenced many claims of the “China threat,” and built a good reputation. The PLA places high hopes on its foreign engagement — it paves the way for the PLA to carry out its new mission in the 21st century.31 PLA in the Gulf of Aden The PLA took on its first overseas combat operation in late 2008 and early 2009 when the PLAN dispatched its counter-piracy fleet to the Gulf of Aden. It was a significant step in the PLA’s new mission in the 21st century and China’s march to become a fully functional world power in international security affairs. As of its one-year anniversary, the PLAN has dispatched and rotated four fleets to the Gulf of Aden, executing 150 escort tasks with over 1,300 Chinese and other nations’ commercial vessels.32 During this time, the PLA has established a very good record from its first overseas combat operation. It follows strictly the rules of engagement laid down by the United Nations. It protects Chinese (China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong) as well as foreign vessels. In addition, the PLA has gained much experience in this operation. Another great benefit to the PLA is its interaction with the US forces in this operation. PLA and US commanders, Chinese Rear Admiral and commander of the Chinese operation Wang Zhiguo and US Rear Admiral and commander of the Combined Task Force 151 Scott Sanders have exchanged visits, boarding each other’s flagships.33 This PLA overseas operation has so far received mostly positive returns.
30
China’s Defense White Paper 2008. Wang Hongwei, “On China’s Military Diplomacy: the Use of Military Soft Power,” Theory Monthly, no. 4 (2009). 32 Xinhua, “Chinese Navy Escort Fleet Celebrates One-Year Anniversary of Escort Mission,” December 27, 2009. 33 US Central Command, “CTF 151 Commander Visits Chinese Counter-Piracy Flagship.” Available at http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/articles/2009/183.html. US Central Command, “Chinese Admiral Visits Coalition Warship.” Available at http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/ articles/2009/203.html. Accessed both on January 10, 2010. 31
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PLA in the Western Pacific By any account, the Western Pacific is China’s most important area of interest. This is the place where some of China’s “core interests” still “hang in the balance.” These include (1) territorial settlement, the most important of which is its quest for unification with Taiwan and, to a lesser extent, recovery of the “stolen” islands in the East and South China Seas;34 (2) effective control of the exclusive economic zones (EEZ); and (3) realization of China’s dream of becoming a great maritime power. China must settle these interests before it can claim victory in its modernization mission. Yet its challenges are monumental. First, China’s quest for unification with Taiwan has been going on for over 60 years, but there is still no end in sight. As it stands now, the main roadblock appears to be the political gap between the two sides. Taiwan is already a functional democracy. mainland China is still decades away (if democracy comes to China at all). With Taiwan insisting on unification on the basis of both sides being democratic societies (if the DPP is to consider this option as well), the road to unification will be a long one. Over the years, the PLA has developed a credible threat against Taiwan’s separation attempts, but forceful unification cannot be an option. The cost is simply too high for the two sides. In addition, the United States opposes any use of force to change the status of Taiwan. Second, China’s quest for the “recovery” of the islands in the East and South China Seas will not be easy either. None of the disputants, Japan (on the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands), the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia (on the South China Sea islands), is willing to give up their claims or control of the disputed territories. All are making efforts to strengthen their military, especially their naval forces, with clear intent to protect their interests.35 The PLA does not have the capability to assert China’s claims. Although there are increasing calls in China for the PLA to develop blue-water capabilities, the development of these capabilities, especially aircraft carrier battle groups, will take time. Finally, and most importantly, is China’s relation with the United States. The United States has had a capricious and at times confrontational 34
In the literature on the territorial conflicts in the Pacific, “disputed islands” is the standard term. However, in Chinese discussions, the term “stolen” is often used. 35 Xu Liping, “Southeast Asian Nations Step Up Military Preparation for Conflict in the South China Sea and Join Hands against China,” China Youth Online, June 6, 2009.
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relationship with China since 1949. It is at odds with China over a wide range of issues such as the way of government, human rights, economic policies, China’s quest for maritime power, and so on. On top of these, the United States also has a thorny issue with China over the fate of Taiwan, which could bring the United States and China to war. Deep-seated distrust also prevents the two sides from dealing with each other in good faith. The rise of China has further complicated this relationship. Ostensibly, it has got the two nations on a power transition process. Power transition is a serious business among great powers. It is about the rise of a great power (or a few) and its (their) challenge to the hegemonic power of the international system at the time. Throughout history, great powers rise and fall. The transition of power among them has led to changes in leadership and in the makeup of international systems. Unfortunately, most changes took place in war and bloodshed. China’s rise and expansion are impacting the economic, political and security landscape in Asia and in the world eventually. The discussion of a clash between China and the United States has been going on for quite some time. The discussion of a possible clash between China and the United States has been going on for quite some time.36 It appears that while China and the United States will try to find ways to manage the power transition and deal with each other in various parts 36
The theory of power transition comes from A. F. K. Organski’s seminal work World Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958). Throughout history, power transition has resulted in war. It is an important issue in international relations. Robert Gilpin’s work of War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981) is another important writing on this theory. A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler put the theory to a test in their work of The War Ledger (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980). Organski’s students subsequently pursued this study and published their works. The key ones are: Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke, eds. Parity and War: Evaluations and Extensions of the War Ledger (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996). This theory gained a new lease of life in the mid-1990s when China’s rise caught the attention of the outside world, especially the United States. The “China threat” debate came right out of the fear of the power transition between China and the United States. Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, The Coming Conflict with China (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1997). John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001). Zhiqun Zhu, US–China Relations in the 21st Century (New York: Routledge, 2006). See also an excellent critique of the power transition theory and the debate on US–China power transition in Steve Chan, China, the US, and the Power-Transition Theory (New York: Routledge, 2008).
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of the world, their ultimate area of contest will be in the Western Pacific. And other factors aside, the arrival of a powerful PLA will be a decisive variable in this contest. The PLA’s mission in the Western Pacific will be different from those in other parts of the world. The PLA’s combat operation in the Gulf of Aden comes under the UN mandate and enjoys multilateral cooperation with naval forces from other nations. There is a good chance that future PLA combat or non-combat operations in other parts of the world will have similar legitimacy and support. As such, the PLA will not be considered a threat to US interests. Yet PLA’s pursuit of China’s national interests in the Western Pacific will be likely on China’s own judgment calls. On the Taiwan issue, China has made it clear time and again that it is China’s internal issue; China has worked very hard to prevent the “internationalization” of the Taiwan issue; and by virtue of it being a veto member of the UN Security Council, China can make sure that there will be no UN “interference” if conflict erupts across the Taiwan Strait. The United States is concerned with the rise of China and the emergence of its steadily growing military. A recent writing by Aaron Friedberg, a Princeton University professor and former adviser to Vice President Dick Cheney on national security affairs, sheds good light on the US concerns (italics added for emphasis): By the early 1990s, the Pacific had become, for all intents and purposes, an American lake. US forces were invulnerable and able to operate with impunity wherever and whenever they chose. Using forward-deployed ships, aircraft and troops operating from local bases and facilities in Japan, South Korea, Thailand, and Singapore, as well as those that could be dispatched from Hawaii and the West Coast, the United States could defend its friends, threaten its enemies and move its forces freely throughout the western Pacific. American air and naval units conducted routine deployments and reconnaissance missions just outside (and at times, no doubt, within) China’s airspace and territorial waters with little fear of harassment or interdiction, while US satellites passed overhead, unseen and unmolested. The US Navy was in complete command of the world’s oceans … In sum, at every level of potential conflict, from limited engagements at sea to transcontinental nuclear war, the Americans held the upper hand.
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America’s ability to project power into the western Pacific, once unchallenged, is now threatened by the maturation of what Pentagon planners refer to as China’s “anti-access/area-denial” strategy…What is worse, over the next several years there will be an increasing danger that, in an extreme crisis, China’s leaders might believe that they have a chance of starting a war by effectively knocking the United States out of the western Pacific …37
Friedberg’s “China threat” view is challenged as “vastly overrated” by Robert Ross, a professor at Boston College and noted China observer, in his article in the same publication, The National Interest.38 Yet with recent US–China clashes over the US military surveillance ships in the South China Sea (USNS Impeccable, March 2009), the Yellow Sea (USNS Victorious, May 2009), and near the Subic Bay of the Philippines (USS John McCain destroyer, June 2009), and China’s demand that the United States reduce and eventually halt air and sea military surveillance close to its shores,39 Friedberg’s call finds many echoes in the United States. As US Senator Jim Webb of Virginia writes, With China’s growing economic and military power and its willingness to use it, I see a real challenge for the United States in maintaining its strategic presence in Asia. The United States is fundamentally a naval power and an Asian nation, and we must develop a long-term comprehensive strategy to protect our legitimate security interests in the region … The harassment of the USNS Impeccable this past March is only one example of a growing assertiveness in the Chinese navy. If you look at events such as this over the past three decades, you will see an incremental encroachment into the South China Sea that is intended to intimidate smaller countries, such as Vietnam and the Philippines that also claim territory and continental shelf rights in such places as the Spratly Islands and Paracel Islands. We need to view these activities not as singular, tactical events, 37
Aaron L. Friedberg, “Menace: Here Be Dragons: Is China a Military Threat?” The National Interest, September/October 2009. 38 Robert S. Ross, “Myth: Here Be Dragons: Is China a Military Threat?” The National Interest, September/October 2009. 39 Xinhua, “China Asks U.S. to Prevent Illegal Entry to Its EEZ,” May 6, 2009. Lucy Hornby, “China Urges US to Halt Surveillance Near Its Shores,” Reuters, August 27, 2009.
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but as a concerted, calculated effort by the Chinese Communist Party and its military to enlarge China’s strategic space in the region.40
The United States takes the changes in the Western Pacific seriously. Over the past 15 years, the United States has strengthened relations with allies in Asia and restructured forward-deployed forces. As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates asserts at the Asia Security Summit in Singapore in 2008, … there is sovereign American territory in the western Pacific, from the Aleutian Islands all the way down to Guam. […] The United States is a Pacific nation with an enduring role in Asia. […] Any speculation in the region about the United States losing interest in Asia strikes me as either preposterous, or disingenuous, or both. America’s status in Asia rests on long-standing interests and deeply held notions about the basic character of the United States. Projecting outward from our Pacific coastline, the US has had a cultural, economic, educational, geographic, historical, and political presence in Asia since the 19th century.41
For China, a good part of the US freedom of action in the Western Pacific and expansive interests have come at China’s expense. Friedberg’s admission above (the emphasized lines) is one example. US involvement in the Taiwan issue, as well as the Tibet and Xinjiang issues, are also perceived as intrusions in China’s core interests.42 China is very sensitive to US stands on the South China Sea disputes and the China–Japan dispute in the East China Sea.43 The Chinese see a US-led encirclement 40
Jim Webb, US Senator from Virginia, Statement at the hearing on “The Implications of China’s Naval Modernization for the United States” at the US–China Economic and Security Review Commission, Washington DC, June 11, 2009. 41 Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, “Challenges to Stability in the Asia-Pacific.” Speech at the 7th IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies) Asia Security Summit, Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, May 31, 2008. 42 Guo Yonghu, “US Congress and the “Tibet Problem” in Sino-American Relations” PhD Dissertation, Northeast Normal University, 2007. Liu Weidong, “The US Factor in the Issue of ‘East Turkistan,” Journal of Jiangnan Social University 9, no. 4 (2007). 43 Cai Penghong, “An Analysis of US Policy on the South China Sea,” Contemporary International Relations, no. 9 (2009). Zheng Zemin, “South China Sea Disputes in AsiaPacific Perspective,” PhD Dissertation, CCP Central Party School, 2004. Guo Yuan, “US Policy on South China Sea in the Post-Cold War Era,” Academic Exploration, no. 1 (2008).
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around China. The United States is the biggest external factor in China’s security. PLA in a harmonious world? China in recent years has promoted the idea of a harmonious world. It is an idea from Confucius’s teaching. The harmonious world is putatively a Chinese alternative to the heavy-handed US approach of promoting democracy in the world. In essence, China is asking for respect and tolerance. As President Hu Jintao put it in his speech to the United Nations General Assembly, “We should respect the right of all countries to independently choose a social system and a development path. […] Seeking uniformity with force can only lead to the decline and ossification of human civilizations.” Hu also called on the United States and the West to “discard Cold-War mentality, foster mutually beneficial, equal, and coordinated new security concept of mutual trust, build a fair and effective mechanism of collective security, jointly prevent conflicts and wars, and safeguard world peace and security.”44 During the PLAN’s birthday in April 2009, with a large number of foreign military dignitaries present, President Hu Jintao also put forward a call for the building of “harmonious oceans” in the world. Hu pledged again that “for now and in the future, China would never seek hegemony, nor would it turn to military expansion or arms race with other nations … China would never threaten others or seek regional dominance but will always be a force for the preservation of world peace and advancement of common development.”45 Getting along with the United States is certainly the most important part of Hu’s call for a harmonious world. Many Chinese analysts have proposed ways to deal with this problem. PLAN Major General Yang Yi said that the United States has two big misunderstandings of China. One is about transparency. Yang said that although the United States often takes wrongful action towards China, China should not play tit-for-tat 44
Hu Jintao, Speech at the United Nations 60th Anniversary, New York, September 16, 2005. 45 Xinhua, “China Sets Sail on Unity for ‘Harmonious’ Seas,” April 24, 2009.
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with the United States. China should stick to its path of peaceful development. Eventually, the United States will learn to appreciate and respect China.46 The United States is the dominant power in Western Pacific. China has to come to terms with the United States in its quest for maritime interests. In addition, becoming a challenger to the world’s hegemonic power is the last thing a latecomer wants to do.47 China’s strategy must follow this rule. A one-sided pursuit of maritime power will get China to spearhead a challenge to the United States. This will be a burden and disaster for China as the United States cannot stand any challenge to its naval power.48 Instead, China should develop its naval power to protect its interests but avoid challenging the United States. In a forward-looking way, China should actively engage in improving the international laws and regulations governing the proper use of oceans, since the world is moving in this direction rather than continuing to rely on the self-help type of sea power.49 Liu Zhongmin, a professor at the Chinese Ocean University,
46
Liaowang Weekly, “PLA Major General on US–China Military Relations: We Should Not Do Tit-for-Tat,” Xinhua Net, November 3, 2009. 47 See Steve Chan’s argument. 48 Tang Shiping, Creating China’s Ideal Security Environment (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan, 2003). 49 Xu Qiyu, a PLA researcher at the PLA National Defense University Strategic Studies Institute, published an influential article to question the calls by the advocates of a strong navy, “Reflection on the Blind Spots of Strong Sea Power Thinking,” Strategy and Management, Issue 5 (2003). Liu Zhongmin, a professor at China’s University of Maritime Sciences, has provided well-balanced analyses on China’s sea power. See Liu Zhongmin, “On Sea Power and the Rise of Great Powers,” World Economy and Politics, Issue 12 (2007); Liu Zhongmin and Zhao Chengguo, “On the Debate about China’s Strategy on Sea Power Development,” Journal of Guangdong University of Foreign Studies 16, no. 1 (2005). See also Professor Ye Zicheng of Beijing University who argues that it is China’s comprehensive national power, especially China’s land power, that is crucial to China’s security; naval power should play a subordinate role: “China’s Sea Power Must be Subordinate to Its Land Power,” International Pioneer Herald, March 2, 2007; Ye Zicheng and Mu Xinhai, “Some Thoughts on China’s Sea Power Development Strategy,” Studies of International Politics, no. 3 (2005). For the last point, see Li Yamin, “On the Role and Impact of Ocean Order on the Changing International System,” PhD Dissertation (Beijing, China: Strategic Studies Institute, Chinese Communist Party Central Cadre School, 2007).
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suggests that China take a level-headed approach and try to avoid a clash with the United States; China should also step up its measures to develop confidence and maritime security mechanisms with the US military.50 Others point out that one of the CCP’s three historic tasks is to safeguard world peace; the United States has been providing this international public good (security) for a long time, and China can join the United States and share some of the burden. Many in the PLA also share this view. As Wang Baofu writes, a review of the US–China military relations in the past 30 years suggests that (1) strengthening mutual trust is the foundation for developing US–China military relations; (2) promoting mutual benefit and a win–win solution is the motivation to sustain this relationship; (3) expanding exchanges is the way to promote stability in the relation between the two militaries; and (4) building a mature crisis management mechanism is a guarantee against any big setbacks in US–China military relations.51 However, there are still many roadblocks along the way. PLA Major General Luo Yuan points out four major problems. The most difficult one is the Taiwan issue. Other problems are US military intrusions in China’s EEZ, US restrictions on US–China military exchanges, and US understanding of the PLA’s intentions and development. Luo points out that the annual Pentagon report to the US Congress has always distorted the PLA and raised concerns of a “China threat.”52 Another new aspect in US–China relations is that as China becomes more powerful, it is bound to take more a assertive position in its interests and relations with the United States. Some Chinese analysts are already suggesting
50
Liu Zhongmin, “Maritime Power and Post-Cold War US–China Relations: Contradictions and Difficult Choices,” Foreign Affairs Review, December 2005. See also Qian Chuntai, “An Analysis of US–China Maritime Military Security Consultation Mechanism,” Contemporary International Relations, no. 4 (2002); Yang Kai, “On US–China Military Exchange and Security Mutual Trust Mechanism Building,” World Economic and Political Forum, no. 4 (2009). 51 Wang Baofu, “A Review of US–China Military Relations in the Past 30 Years and An Outlook for the Future,” International Issue Studies, no. 1 (2009). 52 Luo Yuan, “PLA Major General on the Four Roadblocks in US–China Military Exchanges,” International Pioneer Herald, December 15, 2009.
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that China should start to set up rules for the United States to follow.53 China should no longer accept whatever is imposed by the United States. Many Chinese analysts see that the United States does not yet have a good understanding of where China is heading. As Wang Fan, an analyst at the International Relations Institute of China Foreign Affairs University, writes, the United States saw that the founding of PRC in 1949 changed Asia, that the rise of China in the 21st century would change the world, and the United States cannot accept this and will do all it can to prevent it from happening. In the years to come, China may overstep US interests; the United States may overreact to China’s moves. War still cannot be ruled out from the US–China contest. At the end of the day, the United States will have to learn and prepare to compromise on China’s major core interests.54 During her first visit to China since becoming the US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton made the following remark: Even with our differences, the United States will remain committed to pursuing a positive relationship with China, one that we believe is essential to America’s future peace, progress, and prosperity. An ancient Chinese story tells of warring feudal states, whose soldiers find themselves on a boat together crossing a wide river in a storm. Instead of fighting one another, they work together and survive. Now, from this story comes a Chinese aphorism that says, ‘When you are in a common boat, you need to cross the river peacefully together.’ The wisdom of that aphorism must continue to guide us today.55
China and the United States are indeed in the same boat. But there will be plenty of rough waters to rock the boat. As Qian Lihua, director of the
53
Guo Xuetang, “Why We Should Set Rules for the United States,” Wenhui Bao, January 18, 2010. 54 Wang Fan, “Expert: War Trigger Still Exists Between China and the United States, No Full Trust,.” Huanqiu, December 14, 2009. 55 Hillary Clinton, “US–Asia Relations: Indispensable to Our Future.” Remarks at the Asia Society, New York, NY, February 13, 2009. Available at http://www.state.gov/ secretary/rm/2009a/02/117333.htm.
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Foreign Affairs Office of the Chinese Defense Ministry, puts it, US–China military relations will develop in a tortuous way; it will take great effort on both sides to make this journey into uncharted waters a safe one.56 References Allen, Kenneth and Eric A. McVadon. China’s Foreign Military Relations (Washington DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 1999). Cai, Penghong. “ ” [An Analysis of U.S. Policy on the South China Sea]. (Contemporary International Relations), no. 9 (2009). Fang, Gongli. “ ” [A Study of the Evolution of the PRC’s Defense Strategy], PhD Dissertation (Beijing: The Central Party School, 2004). Friedberg, Aaron L. “Menace: Here Be Dragons: Is China a Military Threat?” The National Interest, September/October 2009. Gates, Robert. “Challenges to Stability in the Asia-Pacific.” Speech at the 7th IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies) Asia Security Summit, Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, May 31, 2008. Gilpin, Robert. War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). Guo, Xuetang. “ ‘ ’” [Why We Should Set Rules for the United States]. Wenhui Bao, January 18, 2010. Holz, Heidi and Kenneth Allen. “Military Exchanges with Chinese Characteristics: The PLA Experience with Military Relations.” Paper presented to the Annual Conference on PLA, Carlisle Pennsylvania, September 28, 2009. Jiefangjun Bao (The PLA Daily) editorial. “ ” [On the PLA’s Historical Mission in the New Stage of the New Century]. January 9, 2006. Kamphausen, Roy, Andrew Scobell, and Travis Tanner, eds. The “People” in the PLA: Recruitment, Training, and Education in China’s Military (Carlisle, Strategic Studies Institute, 2008).
56
Xinhuanet, “ Way], March 1, 2009.
” [US–China Military Relations Develop in Tortuous
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Kamphausen, Roy, David Lai, and Andrew Scobell eds. Beyond the Strait: PLA Missions Other Than Taiwan (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2009). Li, Yamin. “ ” On the Role and Impact of Ocean Order on the Changing International System. PhD Dissertation (Beijing, China: Strategic Studies Institute, Chinese Communist Party Central Cadre School, 2007). Lieberthal, Kenneth. “Preventing a War over Taiwan.” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2005. Liu, Zhongmin. “ ” [(On Sea Power and the Rise of Great Powers]. [World Economy and Politics], Issue 12 (2007). Luo, Yabo. “ ” [A Scientific Understanding of the PLA Historic Mission in the New Century]. [Theoretical Studies on PLA Political Work], Vol. 6, no. 3 (2005). Luo, Yuan. “PLA Major General on the Four Roadblocks in U.S.-China Military Exchanges).” [International Pioneer Herald], December 15, 2009. Peng, Guangqian. “ ” [Embrace the Challenge of Transformation in Military Affairs]. [Liaowang Weekly News], June 9, 2003. Ross, Robert S. “Myth: Here Be Dragons: Is China a Military Threat?” The National Interest, September/October 2009. SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), Yearbooks 1992 to 2008. Sun, Kejia ( ). “ ” [On Military Reform with Chinese Characteristics]. [Military Science], Vol. 16, no. 1 (2003). Tang Shiping. [Creating China’s Ideal Security Environment] (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan, 2003). Wang, Baocun, Wu Yujin ( ), and Ku Guisheng ( ). “ — ” [On Transformation in Military Affairs — Chinese Generals Discuss Opportunities and Challenges]. [Liaowang Weekly]. July 16, 2003. Wang, Baofu. “ 30 ” [A Review of U.S.-China Military Relations in the Past 30 Years and An Outlook for the Future]. [International Issue Studies], no. 1 (2009). Xiong, Guangkai. “ ” [On the New Revolution in Military Affairs]. [Military History], no. 4 (2003).
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Ye, Zicheng. “ ” [China’s Sea Power Must be Subordinate to Its Land Power], [International Relations Herald], March 2, 2007. Zhang Wei and Feng Liang. [National Maritime Security] (Beijing: [Haichao Press], 2008). Zheng, Zemin. [South China Sea Disputes in Asia-Pacific Perspective]. PhD Dissertation, CCP Central Party School, 2004.
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Chapter Sixteen
Extended Horizon: China’s Blue-Water Navy Ambition and Its Implications Qiang Xin
China’s Naval Strategy in Transition Since the establishment of the PRC in 1949, the strategy of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has witnessed several changes concurrent with transformations of China’s national defense strategy and progress in industrial and technological capabilities. After six years of development, mainly through obtaining, repairing, and imitating foreign weapons, the PLAN developed from a “coastal defense” ( yan’an fangyu) force into an “inshore defense” ( jinhai fangyu) force in 1955, which was exemplified by the establishment of the Donghai Fleet.1 Starting from the early 1980s when China opened up to the outside world again, the PLAN has realized a strategic transformation to “offshore defense operation.”2 Given the considerable upgrading of weaponry and equipment and the rising strategic status of the offshore battlefields, the “offshore defense” strategy changed the duty of the PLAN to “cooperate with the army to
1
Some in China term the PLAN strategy from 1949 to 1955 as “coastal defense” (yan’an fangyu) and consider it as an independent and the first phrase of PLAN’s strategic development, cf: “Zhongguo haijun ying zouxiang yuanyang jiaqiang yuanyang daji nengli” [The PLAN Should Be Ocean-going and Strengthen Blue-Water Operation Capabilities], cf: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/hqzg/2007-05/08/content_867755_6.htm. 2 White Paper on “China’s National Defense 2008,” p. 31. 385
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defend the landmass” into a new mission of “ensuring the unification of the nation, defending the integrity of the territory, as well as safeguarding the maritime rights and interests of China.”3 Geographically, China’s “offshore” area covers the maritime territory of the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea. Strategically, as Deng Xiaoping pointed out clearly, the “offshore” covers “the nearby sea area, in other words, the Northern Pacific Ocean. [The PLAN] will not go to the Southern Pacific, the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean, nor the Atlantic Ocean.”4 With the “offshore defense” strategy, China’s naval modernization effort was put on a fast-speed track from the early 1990s, including the laying of the keel of the first Song-class submarine in 1991 and the purchase of the Russian-made Kilo-class submarines in 1993. It is widely believed that this undertaking was strengthened and accelerated after the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis when the United States deployed two aircraft carrier battle groups to the scene in response to Beijing’s military pressure. Then a broad array of weapon acquisition programs started, concurrent with reforms and improvements in maintenance and logistics, naval doctrine, personnel quality, education, training, and exercises.5 At the beginning of the 21st century, the PLAN’s strategy is undergoing another important shift. On one hand, the PLAN will continue to improve its capabilities of offshore operations, strategic deterrence, and counterattacks in accordance with the principle of defensive operations and self-defense. On the other hand, the PLAN is gradually developing its power projection capability in distant waters.6 In sum, the present naval strategy of the PLAN is to stick to offshore defense while developing limited blue-water maneuverability and operational capabilities. Such a 3 “Chinese Navy to Stick to Defensive Strategy,” Jiefangjun Bao [PLA Daily], April 23, 2009. 4 Jie Li, “Zhongguo haijun fazhan zhanlue fenxi: Jianchi jinhai fangyu tigao zonghe nengli” [Analysis of PLAN Development Strategy: Adhere to Offshore Defense and Enhance Comprehensive Capabilities], China Daily, April 22, 2009. 5 Ronald O’Rourke, “China Naval Modernization: Implications for US Navy CapabilitiesBackground and Issues for Congress,” CRS Report RL33153, May 29, 2009; Arthur Waldron, “China’s New Navy,” Looking Forward, December 15, 2005; Bernard Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy Enters the Twenty-First Century (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001). 6 White Paper on “China’s National Defense 2008,” p. 31.
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combination will function as a transitional strategy and a prelude to China’s real blue-water naval strategy for its global presence in the future. These strategic transitions can be traced from several recent developments. Promotion of the PLAN’s status The origin of the PLA since its establishment in 1927 led to the prominence of the Army while the Air Force and the Navy were regarded as supplemental and subordinate services for years. For example, the highest military headquarters, the Central Military Commission of China, have been controlled by Army generals for a long time, thereby giving the PLA the nickname of “Big Army Force” (Da Lujun). With the deepening understanding of modern wars and the construction of “joint forces,” the strategic position of the Navy as well as the Air Force and the Second Artillery Force has been enhanced.7 The 2004 National Defense White Paper stated clearly that the PLA would “give priority to the building of the Navy, the Air Force and the Second Artillery Force to seek balanced development of the combat force structure.”8 In 2005, the Commander in Chief of the PLAN was promoted to the Central Military Commission, a promotion whereby the PLAN gained a stronger leverage to influence the overall strategy of China’s national defense and the PLA’s development.9 In the 2008 National Defense White Paper, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Second Artillery Force were listed and described for the first time in independent chapters along with the Army. All of these developments reflect a strategic shift from the PLA’s traditional focus on ground forces. Improved capabilities on high seas Since its first 24-day joint cruise and exercise in the Western Pacific in May 1986, the power projection capabilities of the PLAN have been growing 7
The Second Artillery Force refers to the ballistic missile force of the PLA. White Paper on “China’s National Defense 2004,” cf: http://www.mod.gov.cn/gwgb/ 2004-12/27/content_3054939.htm. 9 The Commanders in Chief of the PLAAir Force and Second Artillery Force were promoted at the same time to the commission. Although all of the vice chairmen of the commission come from the Army, it still implies a structural progress in the PLA leadership. 8
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steadily. In March 1989, the training vessel Zheng He made the first visit to Hawaii; in February 1997, a three-ship fleet started the maiden voyage around the Pacific; in April 1998, another three-ship fleet visited Australia and New Zealand; on May 15, 2002, a two-ship formation led by the Commander in Chief of the Beihai Fleet set out on its historic global cruise. This 132-day voyage marked the PLAN’s first global navigation. The report that in 2004 a Han-class submarine cruised all the way to Guam, circumnavigated the island, and surfaced in Japanese waters on its return voyage to China demonstrated that the PLAN’s submarines were beginning to be deployed much further from China’s coast and to penetrate the “first island chain” in the Western Pacific.10 On December 26, 2008, a blue-water convoy flotilla composed of two destroyers and one depot ship was sent to the waters off the Horn of Africa to fight piracy and provide protection for businesspeople from China and other countries. It was the first time that the Chinese navy had participated in a combat expedition since 1433.11 In June 2009, five warships of the PLAN conducted its first exercise in the waters near the Chong Bird Reef (Okinotorishima), which is close to the “second island chain” in the Pacific Ocean.12 Gradually the PLAN is gaining a global presence and is improving its projection capability. Construction plan for aircraft carriers After World War II, aircraft carriers became the trump card and mainstay of the world’s great naval powers for deterrence, combat, and maintaining global reach. As early as the mid-1980s, China’s leaders began to consider the possibility of building its own aircraft carrier, and such a program gained momentum in the 2000s.13 On December 23, 2008, China’s Ministry of National Defense stated publicly for the first time that the aircraft carrier
10
Bernard Cole, “Beijing’s Strategy of Sea Denial,” China Brief 6, Issue 23 (May 9, 2007). “Chinese Navy off on Historic Anti-Piracy Mission,” Agency France Press, December 26, 2008; Bill Gertz, “Chinese Dragon Awakens,” Washington Times, June 26, 2005. 12 “Zhonggong haijun tingjin di’er daolian riben zhenjing” [Chinese Mainland Navy Marched to Second Island Chain and Japan Is Shocked], Zhongguo shibao [China Times], July 17, 2009. 13 “Aircraft Carrier Project,” cf: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/cv.htm 11
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was “a reflection of a nation’s comprehensive power” and was needed to meet the demands of a country’s growing navy. The Chinese government would seriously consider “relevant issues” on building its first aircraft carrier.14 In March 2009, during his visit in Japan, Chinese Defense Minister Liang Guanglie announced unambiguously that “among the big nations only China does not have an aircraft carrier. China cannot be without an aircraft carrier forever.”15 Such statements at the highest military level confirm that China aims to acquire an aircraft carrier soon. The successive statements of Chinese military officials have demonstrated China’s ambition to develop a blue-water navy.16 China’s acquisition of aircraft carriers, a sophisticated piece of military hardware that can be used to project power far beyond a nation’s shores, has significant impact on the naval balance of power in the Western Pacific, which has been dominated exclusively by the United States and its ally Japan since WWII. Acquisition of overseas facilities Obtaining solid and widespread access to overseas logistical support is essential for any blue-water navy. With a strategic approach that “integrates financial incentives with aid, infrastructure projects, diplomatic incentives and arms packages,” China is striving to pursue a strategy of “facilities/places instead of bases”17 and to set up a “string of pearls” along its key sea lanes running from the Persian Gulf to Chinese ports through the Strait of Malacca.18 Those “pearls” stretch from China’s “deepwater 14
“China to ‘Seriously Consider’ Building Aircraft Carrier,” Xinhua, December 23, 2008. Xiaohuo Cui, “Aircraft Carriers Needed: Minister,” China Daily, March 24, 2009. 16 David Lague, “An Aircraft Carrier for China?” International Herald Tribune, January 30, 2006. 17 Cf: Michael Chase and Andrew Erickson, “Changes in Beijing’s Approach to Overseas Basing?” China Brief 9, Issue 19 (September 24, 2009); G. S. Khurana, “China’s ‘String of Pearls’ in the Indian Ocean and its Security Implications,” Strategic Analysis 32, no. 1 (January 2008); Li Jie, “Junshi zhuanjia: Zhongguo ying kaolü zai Dongfei she lushang zhiyuan zhongxin” [Military Expert: China Should Consider Establishing a Land-Sea Support Center in East Africa], Zhongping News Agency [China Review News], May 21, 2009. 18 Chietigj Bajpaee, “The Panda and the Peacock,” China Security 3, no. 4, (Autumn 2007), pp. 108, 112. 15
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port at Hainan Island, past a string of port facilities on the Burmese coast and in Bangladesh, on to a deepwater port in Pakistan that China finished overhauling in 2008.”19 The $1 billion investment of China into the port at Hambantota in Sri Lanka in 2009 added the most recent “pearl” to this “string,” which will provide a network of facilities to China’s fleet conducting missions further offshore and enhance its strategic influence in distant waters.20 Dynamics of China’s Blue-Water Navy Ambition After almost half a century of hesitation and preparation, the Chinese leadership has at last come to the conclusion that an advanced naval force with long-range power projection capabilities is necessary for safeguarding national sovereignty, security, and development in a globalized world. Several dynamics are behind the undergoing deep-sea naval modernization process and strategic transition. Resurgence of the “ocean consciousness” As a traditional continental power, China had a rather weak “ocean consciousness,” let alone a positive naval strategy, for centuries. After the exceptional expedition led by Admiral Zheng He in the early 15th century, a closed-door policy was pursued by China for hundreds of years. Although the PLA established its navy as early as April 1949, the great security pressure imposed by the former Soviet Union drove China’s national security concerns almost exclusively towards continental rather than maritime dangers.21 Furthermore, its highly independent economy and the backward
19 Dan Murphy, “Indian Ocean as New Strategic Playing Field,” The Christian Science Monitor, June 28, 2009. 20 David Blair, “Sri Lanka Analysis: China Emerges as Key Player in Victory over Tamil Tigers,” Daily Telegraph, May 18, 2009. 21 Zhang Dehua and Feng Liang, “Zhonghua minzu haiyang yishi yingxiang yinsu tanxi” [Factors Affecting Chinese Nationality’s Ocean Awareness], Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi luntan [Forum of World Economics & Politics], no. 3 (2009): 79–82; Bernard Cole, “The PLA Navy’s Developing Strategy,” China Brief 6, no. 21 (May 9, 2007).
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shipbuilding technology prevented China from developing a far-reaching and advanced naval power. The economic reform and opening-up policy adopted in 1979 successfully integrated China’s economy into a globalizing world where nine-tenths of all trade and two-thirds of all petroleum are transported by sea.22 In 2008, the sea-related GDP amounted to 2.9 trillion yuan, which was 9.87 percent of China’s total GDP.23 The ever-growing importance of the maritime interests toward national economic development, including sea-lane transportation, maritime space, resources, and industry, is leading to the change of the conventional “land first, sea second” mentality (zhonglu qinghai) to one of “land and sea being equal” (luhai bingzhong). As a country with about 3 million square kilometers of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), over 18,000 kilometers of coastline, and more than 7,000 islands, China is witnessing a strong wave of the resurgence of “ocean consciousness,” triggered somewhat by the irritating memory of the humiliation China suffered from foreign invasions from the sea in modern history.24 It provides a basic momentum for transcending the land power tradition, reevaluating naval power, and advocating and implementating a new blue-water navy strategy to “defend the country’s maritime rights, interests and security, safeguard its economic development, and serve its peaceful diplomacy.”25
22 Wang Lidong, Guojia haishang liyi lun [National Maritime Interests] (Beijing: University of National Defense Press, 2007), pp. 116–120; “A Cooperative Strategy for the 21st Century Sea Power,” Oct. 17, 2007, cf: http://www.navy.mil/maritime/MaritimeStrategy.pdf, 5. 23 2008 Niandu Zhongguo haiyang jingji tongji gongbao [Statistical Report of China’s Oceanic Economy 2008], issued by State Oceanic Administration of the PRC, cf: http://www.soa.gov.cn/hyjww/ml/tj/ba/webinfo/2009/02/1225332549642758.htm. 24 Liang Feng, “Lun 21 shiji Zhonghua minzu haiyang yishi de shenke neihan yu diwei zuoyong” [Ocean Consciousness of Chinese Nationality in the 21st Century: Deep Connotation and Role], Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi luntan [Forum of World Economics & Politics], no. 1 (2009): 71–79; Yang Jinsen, Zhongguo haiyang zhanlue wenji [Paper Collection of China Ocean Strategy Studies] (Beijing: Haiyang Press, 2006); Zhongguo haiyang fazhan baogao [China’s Ocean Development Report] (Beijing: Haiyang Press, 2009). 25 “Chinese Navy to Stick to Defensive Strategy,” Jiefangjun bao [PLA Daily], April 23, 2009, cf: http://english.pladaily.com.cn/site2/special-reports/2009-04/23/content_1737881.htm.
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Deterring Taiwan independence The modernization of naval power is driven primarily by the PLAN’s preparation for possible Taiwan independence. There is no way for Beijing to accept de jure independence of Taiwan. Developing a navy strong enough to deter Taiwan authorities from claiming de jure independence has always been the top objective of China’s naval modernization. What makes the PLAN’s modernization more challenging is the likely involvement of the US military. Although the Taiwan Relations Act passed by the US Congress in 1979 committed the United States to the defense of Taiwan from the PRC’s military pressure, it was still beyond the PRC’s expectation that the Clinton administration would deploy two aircraft carrier battle groups to the waters near Taiwan in response to the PLA’s ballistic missile tests and live-fire amphibious exercises in 1996. From then on, how to deal with the very likely intervention of the US military in a cross-strait conflict has become a major concern of China’s leaders. Given the prominence enjoyed by the US Navy, it is believed by some foreign observers that China is pursuing the regional “anti-access” tactics, that is, to develop a force that can deter US intervention near the Taiwan Strait, or, failing that, “delay the arrival or reduce the effectiveness of intervening US naval and air forces.”26 The tension across the Taiwan Strait undoubtedly reinforced the modernization effort of the PLAN, and some specific programs, including the purchase and self-building of advanced submarines, supersonic anti-ship missiles, aircrafts, destroyers and surface-to-air missiles have been given top priority. Defending maritime territories and interests China’s reiterated sovereignty claims over the Nansha Islands in the South China Sea have been challenged, even ignored. Nowadays, most of the islands and reefs in this area have been occupied and garrisoned
26 Ronald O’Rourke, “China Naval Modernization: Implications for US Navy CapabilitiesBackground and Issues for Congress,” CRS Report RL33153, May 29, 2009, p. 3; US Department of Defense, Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2009, Washington, 2009.
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by Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia. China only controls 7 out of the 132. The struggle for maritime resources behind the territorial disputes makes it more difficult to reach a resolution.27 More than 50 million tons of oil and natural gas have been extracted from over 1,000 wells every year, none of it belonging to China.28 In addition, the confrontational policies involving Diaoyu Island (Senkaku) and the delimitation of maritime boundaries in the East China Sea impose potential conflicts between China and Japan.29 Along with the unilateral actions taken by some countries, such as the airport construction of Vietnam on Nanwei Island in 2004, the construction of a permanent station for Japan’s patrol craft on Diaoyu Island in 2008, and the claim by the Philippine’s legislation over some Nansha Islands in 2009, the PLA is facing growing domestic pressure and criticism for its “weakness and incompetence.” Since its 20-year politeness and tolerance cannot invite reciprocity,30 the PLAN must extend its defense range further from the coastal area and establish a convincing deterrence power so as to defend China’s disputed territory and sovereignty, and secure its maritime rights and interests.
27
Mi Hong and Zhou Wei, “Liang’an hezuo kaifa nanhai youqi ziyuan yanjiu chutan” [Analysis of Joint Exploration of South China Sea Oil and Gas Resources Across the Taiwan Strait], Xiandai Taiwan yanjiu [Modern Taiwan Studies], no. 2 (2008): 32–34. 28 Dai Xu, “Zhongguo ying jiajin kaifa Nanhai ziyuan” [China Should Speed up Exploration of South China Sea Resources], Huanqiu shibao [Global Times], March 16, 2009, p. 11. 29 James Manicom, “China’s Claims to an Extended Continental Shelf in the East China Sea: Meaning and Implication,” China Brief 9, no. 14 (July 9, 2009): 9–11; Mark Valencia, “The East China Sea Dispute: Context, Claims, Issues and Possible Solutions,” Asia Perspective 31, no. 1 (2007); Reinhard Drifte, “Territorial Conflicts in the East China Sea — From Missed Opportunities to Negotiation Stalemate,” The Asia-Pacific Journal 22 (June 1, 2009). 30 In 1991, China proposed the principle of “suspending disputes and advocating joint exploration” [Gezhi zhengyi, gongtong kaifa] to deal with the disputes involving the South China Sea. From then on, China has refrained itself from exploring any resources over there and reached several agreements with concerning countries, but such a gesture and proposal have not met with reciprocal reaction and self-constraint from those neighboring countries.
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Protecting ever-increasing interests overseas The economic reform and opening-up policy not only brought China an unprecedented economic boom but also the extension of its national interests. In terms of business, in 1978 the total value of China’s foreign trade amounted to $20.6 billion. By 2008, the total value had leapt to $2,562 billion, with a net surplus of about $295 billion.31 In 2003 foreign trade had already contributed 65 percent of China’s GDP growth, while in 2004 the percentage had risen dangerously as high as about 70 percent.32 According to WTO statistics, since China’s entry into the WTO in 2001, foreign trade in China has been developing rapidly with an average annual growth rate of 28.13 percent, far higher than the average growth rate of GDP.33 In 2009 China was ranked the third largest importer and the largest exporter in the world. Economic prosperity has made China one of the biggest import countries of iron ore, oil, copper stone, nickel, alumina, and a long list of other raw materials from the global market. Foreign trade on such a large scale has driven China to become a country with a deep dependence on overseas commerce. Concurrent with its growth of economic power, especially the piling up of massive foreign exchange reserves of over $2 trillion, the Chinese government is encouraging companies, both state-owned and private, to “go out” and invest abroad.34 By the end of 2007, about 7,000 Chinese companies had invested in more than 10,000 foreign companies scattered in 173 countries, with the total sum of the direct investment reaching $112 billion.35 China is weaving a strategic net of global investment from Central Asia, Latin America, and the South Pacific islands to Africa and Southeast Asia in order
31
“2008 Guomin jingji he shehui fazhan tongji gongbao” [Statistical Report of National Economy and Social Development 2008], February 26, 2009, cf: http://www.stats.gov.cn/ tjgb/ndtjgb/qgndtjgb/t20090226_402540710.htm. 32 Gregory C. Chow, “Globalization and China’s Economic Development,” Pacific Economic Review 11, no. 3 (2006): 272. 33 Appendix Tables 14 of “International Trade Statistics 2007” issued by WTO, cf: http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2007_e/its07_appendix_e.htm. 34 Wenran Jiang, “China Makes Strides in Energy ‘Go-out’ Strategy,” China Brief 9, Issue 15 (July 23, 2009): 7–10. 35 “2007 Niandu Zhongguo duiwai zhijie touzi tongji gongbao” [Statistical Report of China’s Direct Foreign Investment 2007], cf: http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2008-09/18/content_ 1098419.htm.
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to secure resource supply and access to overseas markets, which are vital for China’s economic development. At the same time, hundreds and thousands of China’s managers, engineers, businessmen, and workers also set foot in the world. In 2008 the number of Chinese who traveled abroad amounted to 46 million person-times, a 11.9 percent increase from 2007.36 Along with the expansion of China’s overseas interests, a modern naval strategy corresponding with the extending horizon is required. Safeguarding sea lines of communications (SLOCs) China is heavily dependent upon the safety and security of maritime shipping. How to secure the sea lines of communications (SLOCs), by which 90 percent of China’s foreign trade is conducted and carried out, bears vital importance to China’s economic development. However, “the SLOCs defense — coastal, regional, inter-regional, global — remains ill defined by the PLAN.”37 Such a shortage of capability and vulnerability are reflected in the so-called “Malacca dilemma.” China has become the world’s second largest importer of crude oil. China’s dependence on oil imports reached 48.6 percent in 2003, while in 2007, when China imported 197 million tons of oil, this number climbed up to 50 percent.38 The fact that “90 percent of China’s oil imports come by sea and 80 percent transit through the Strait of Malacca” imposes upon China huge stakes in the security of the SLOCs running from the Persian Gulf to the South China Sea.39 Even though this shipping route means so much to China, the PLAN has lacked the power to protect it from various threats such as piracy, terrorist attacks, and hostile
36
“2008 Guomin jingji he shehui fazhan tongji gongbao” [Statistical Report of National Economy and Social Development 2008], February 26, 2009, cf: http://www.stats.gov.cn/ tjgb/ndtjgb/qgndtjgb/t20090226_402540710.htm. 37 Bernard Cole, “The PLA Navy’s Developing Strategy,” China Brief 6, no. 21 (May 9): 2007. 38 “Current Situation of China’s Energy Consumption,” cf: http://www.worldenergy.com.cn/ StatisticsData/2007/0924/content_24119.htm. 39 “China Builds up Strategic Sea Lanes,” Washington Times, January 23, 2005; Chietigj Bajpaee, “The Panda and the Peacock,” China Security 3, no. 4 (Autumn 2007): 112; Vijay Sakhuja, “Indian Ocean and the Safety of Sea Lines of Communication,” Strategic Analysis, no. 5 (August 2001): 20–28; Haishang tongdao anquan yu guoji hezuo [Sea Lane Security and International Cooperation (Beijing: Shishi Press, 2005), p. 108, 117.
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interference from other naval powers.40 Therefore, it is quite reasonable for the PLAN to strengthen its blue-water “capability to effectively control, when necessary, the major sea routes linking China’s waters, and to operate in the seas adjacent to China’s maritime territory” in the near future.41 Implications and China’s Policy Choices Benefiting from its economic boom, China has experienced double-digit increases in its annual military budget since 1988, including a 17.8 percent increase to 355 billion yuan for 2007 and a 17.6 percent increase to 417 billion yuan for 2008.42 The PLAN has accelerated its pace of modernization with upgraded naval equipments and strengthened operational capabilities. The recent deployment of a flotilla in East Africa and the construction of aircraft carriers have signaled the undergoing transition of the PLAN’s strategies, which, undoubtedly, will trigger imminent suspicions and concerns over China’s alleged blue-water naval ambitions from some of its neighboring countries. For instance, facing the naval modernization of China, the United States and Japan openly announced the “peaceful resolution” of the Taiwan Strait disputes as a “common strategic objective” in their joint statement in February 2005.43 In the same year, the United States and India signed the “New Framework for the US–India Defense Relations” in New Delhi, which illustrated the commitment of the US to assist India’s military modernization. In April 2007, the US, Japan, and India held a trilateral naval exercise in the Sea of Japan. In September the same year, the Bay of Bengal witnessed the 40
“Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships,” Annual Report, January 1–December 31, 2001 (UK: ICC International Maritime Bureau, 2002), p. 5; Li Wei, “Kongbu huodong dui haishang tongdao anquan de weixie” [Terrorist Threats to Sea-Lane Security], Haishang tongdao anquan yu guoji hezuo [Sea Lane Security and International Cooperation] (Beijing: Shishi Press, 2005), pp. 117–120. 41 Dao Shulin, “Yatai haishang tongdao dili jieding he anquan hezuo chutan” [Geographical Definition of Sea-Lanes in the Asia-Pacific Region and Pilot Study on Its Security Cooperation], Haishang tongdao anquan yu guoji hezuo [Sea Lane Security and International Cooperation] (Beijing: Shishi Press, 2005), pp. 75–76. 42 White paper on “China’s National Defense 2008,” p. 66. 43 “Joint Statement of US-Japan Security Consultative Committee,” February 20, 2005, p. 3. cf: http://csis.org/images/stories/taiwan/japan_2005_jointstatement.pdf.
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“Malabar 07-2” joint exercise between the navies of the US, India, Japan, Australia, and Singapore. The declaration in August 2008 that Japan and India were forming a “strategic global partnership,” and the evolving “quadrilateral initiative” among the US, Japan, India, and Australia, function as potential countermeasures to Beijing’s military buildup. Encouraged by the US, the Indian navy is establishing a Far Eastern Naval Command off Port Blair on the Andaman Islands, which is at the entrance of the Strait of Malacca and close to one of China’s signal intelligence station located on Myanmar’s Coco Islands.44 All of these imply a looming alliance against China’s naval modernization led by the US in the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean. It is not surprising to see the acceleration of the “China threat” thesis and the continued mistrust demonstrated by other countries towards China’s deep-sea navy ambition. However, along with its ever-increasing interests overseas and its multifaceted maritime security concerns, there is no reason for China to constrain itself from developing from a sole continental power into a bidimensional power in the coming decades. The key issue that lies before Beijing is how to convince its neighbors that China’s growing power will be employed constructively and responsibly, instead of being abused for military coercion and aggression. Increasing transparency in naval development The classic hypothesis that a rising power will definitely impose challenges to the status quo and threaten the existing international order, even by force, strengthens the deep-rooted worries about China’s ambition to build a modern navy power with long-range power projection capabilities.45 China should explain, clearly and frankly, its transitional navy strategy to the outside world, 44
Chietigj Bajpaee, “The Panda and the Peacock,” China Security 3, no. 4 (Autumn 2007): 112. 45 Cf: A series of annual reports of Military Power of People’s Republic of China issued by US Department of Defense to Congress; Defense of Japan 2009 (Annual White Paper), cf: http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2009.html; Bill Gertz, “Chinese Dragon Awakens,” Washington Times, June 26, 2005; John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton & Company Ltd., 2001); James Auer and Robyn Lim, “The Maritime Basis of American Security in East Asia,” Naval War College Review 54, no. 1 (2001); Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro, The Coming Conflict with China (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997).
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including its range of interests, reasons, goals, intentions, rules, and contents. Three points need to be made emphatically. First, China’s transitional navy strategy is consistent with its overall national defense strategy, which is defensive in nature. China will not build an offensive navy cruising the globe; even if in future the navy is modernized, it will concentrate on its offshore area. Just as Admiral Wu Shengli, the commander-in-chief of the PLAN, has stated, the major mission of the navy is to “protect China’s maritime security and economic development.”46 The tension across the Taiwan Strait and the territorial imbroglio involving the Nansha Islands will keep the focus of the PLAN on the offshore area for a rather long time. Second, the acquisition of limited blue-water naval capability does not mean the PLAN is shifting from a defensive stance to an offensive one. China, a country with increasing stakes in the security of the SLOCs, must develop its own long-range power projection capabilities. Essentially, such a power is, and will be, used for defensive purposes, instead of displacing America’s influence or disrupting the balance of power in the Western Pacific in China’s favor. Third, China will not have a navy strong enough to challenge the US maritime dominance in the near future, given its weaker comprehensive national power and modest military budget compared with the US. Most importantly, in contrast with some US strategists’ calculation, China does not have the intention to pursue maritime hegemony, neither globally nor regionally. As a bidimensional power, China is constrained by its geopolitical environment and security situation from developing an omnibus global navy.47 The first and foremost objective of China will always be to safeguard its maritime territory and sovereignty, and to protect its legislative maritime interests from foreign intrusion. Using power in a cooperative and responsible way In a continent where territorial disputes and potential hostility among nations are widespread, whether the growing naval power of China will 46
“Navy Chief Lists Key Objective,” China Daily, April 16, 2009. Robert Ross, “The Geography of Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-First Century,” International Security 23, no. 4 (Spring 1999): 81–117. 47
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be used unilaterally and aggressively, or cooperatively and responsibly, is a deep concern for most of its neighbors. Although China has reiterated its willingness to solve disputes by peaceful means and to enhance security through equal cooperation, which was termed as the “New Security Concept” (Xin An Quan Guan) on March 26, 1999,48 it remains a question that needs to be answered convincingly. Action always speaks more loudly than words. China should demonstrate to the world that it is a responsible stakeholder and a constructive partner in regional and global security. First, China should ease the tension across the Taiwan Strait. The Chen Shui-bian administration’s (2000–2008) provocative policies had greatly raised the tension and reinforced mainland China’s countermeasures against Taiwan. On one hand, China must adhere to its principle of “one China” and deter any pro-independence behaviors by continued military buildup. On the other hand, the mainland should display more goodwill and try its best to enhance “peaceful development” across the Taiwan Strait by reaching political and economic accords and establishing military confidence building mechanisms. Meanwhile, the US should refrain from selling advanced weapons and encouraging Taiwan to pursue pro-independence policies. Second, China should address maritime territorial disputes cooperatively and constructively. The longstanding maritime territorial disputes involving Diaoyu Island in the East China Sea and Nansha Islands in the South China Sea, against the background of the PLAN’s modernization, has triggered widespread apprehension from Japan and some Southeast Asian countries. A regional naval arms race is looming ahead, fueled by increasingly fervent nationalism. China must handle these issues carefully and try to reach a resolution through in-depth dialogues and negotiations, instead of resorting to force. While sticking to its legitimate claims on maritime territory and interests, China should continue to encourage the suspension of disputes and devote itself actively to the joint exploration of ocean resources in those sea areas in a cooperative way.
48 White Paper on “China’s National Defense 1998”, cf: http://news.163.com/06/ 1228/18/33EUVQDQ0001252H_2.html; Yan Gaohong, “Quanqiuhua shidai zhongguo guojia anquan de zhanlue xuanze” [Strategic Choices of China’s National Security in Global Age], Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi luntan [Forum of World Economics & Politics], no. 6 (2004): 76.
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Third, China should endeavor to further develop bilateral and multilateral naval cooperation. Since 2006, the PLAN has proactively held joint maritime training exercises with the navies of a dozen countries and conducted various forms of multilateral maritime exercises with relevant countries. Take the year 2007 as an example. In March, China held the “Peace 2007” joint exercise in the Arabian Sea with seven other countries; in May, China and eight other countries conducted a multilateral joint maritime exercise in Singaporean waters within the framework of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS); and in October, China, Australia, and New Zealand staged a joint maritime search-and-rescue training exercise in the Tasman Sea. Concerning the naval high-level exchanges, a telephone link between China’s Ministry of National Defense and the US Department of Defense was formally established in April 2008; China and Japan made their first exchange of port calls by naval ships, and held the first consultation over the establishment of a maritime liaison mechanism; China also has begun to hold defense and security consultations with India.49 China’s military exchanges and cooperation with its neighboring naval powers have definitely witnessed a great and comprehensive expansion. In order to establish maritime military mutual trust and weaken the suspicions and precautions against China’s blue-water navy development, China should maintain the momentum and integrate the PLAN into a network of bilateral and multilateral maritime security arrangements. On the other hand, the US and its allies should seize every opportunity to enhance mutual understanding at sea with China and incorporate China’s navy into an international framework of maritime cooperation.50 Providing more public goods In a world where non-traditional security threats are imposing increasing challenges upon national security, non-war military operations have
49
White Paper on “China’s National Defense 2008,” p. 73. Robert Kaplan, “Center Stage for the 21st Century: Power Plays in the Indian Ocean,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2009, pp. 20–32.
50
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become an important form of applying national military forces. Along with its military modernization, China can lend its stronger muscle, especially its far-sea naval capability, to address those threats and provide more public goods to the interdependent world.51 For example, China has been a free rider on the security of SLOCs provided mainly by the US navy. Benefiting from the maritime “highway” of energy supply and foreign trade, China has grown into the third biggest trade and economic giant in the world.52 It is time for China to share more of the responsibility and turn into a provider of maritime security. From December 2008 to July 2010, the PLAN dispatched six convoy fleets successively to East Africa to fight against Somali pirates. From then on, the PLAN has provided convoy protection to more than 2248 civilian ships both from China and other countries. The PLAN should normalize and institutionalize such operations. In addition, by incorporating the capacity for non-war military actions into the integrated construction of naval power, China should put emphasis on conducting naval cooperations with other militaries, ranging from peacekeeping operations, emergency offshore search and rescue missions, natural disaster relief, maritime salvage, narcotics control to refugee protection.53 What happened after the Indonesian tsunami in 2004 and the 2010 Haiti earthquake shows that it is the global reach of the US navy that provided it with a powerful leverage to engage in various operations and play a constructive role in a timely fashion. The PLAN should make more effort in dealing with common challenges through international security coordination so as to weaken the suspicions and enhance China’s soft power abroad. 51
“Naval Contingents in Parade Highlight China’s Growing Ocean Presence,” Xinhua Agency, October 1, 2009, cf: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-10/01/ content_12149353.htm. 52 “Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships,” Annual Report, January 1–December 31, 2001 (UK: ICC International Maritime Bureau, 2002), p. 5; Li Wei, “Kongbu huodong dui haishang tongdao anquan de weixie” [Terrorist Threats to Sea-Lane Security], Haishang tongdao Anquan yu Guoji hezuo [Sea Lane Security and International Cooperation] (Beijing: Shishi Press, 2005), p. 108, 117. 53 “PLA Navy Commander Admiral Wu: We will Build Larger Warships,” China Daily, April 16, 2009.
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Conclusion In the 21st century, China is facing multi-layered maritime security threats and challenges. Along with its naval modernization, the PLAN is preparing for a strategic transformation beyond “offshore defense” in order to protect China’s expanding interests. Such a transition, along with the improvement of its capacity in deep-sea and long-distance missions, will definitely have a substantial impact on the regional balance of power and arouse suspicion, even hostility, from some other countries. In the foreseeable future, there are two major obstacles lying before the PLAN: one is the development of its shipbuilding capabilities and relevant technologies; another is the countermeasure or even deterrence of the US and its allies. Without the understanding of and accommodation from the US navy, the “go to blue-water” goal of the PLAN will face unexpected challenges, even undesirable conflicts. Therefore, maritime military confidence building between the United States and China should be the top priority on the agenda for both sides. The US navy, as the strongest naval power in the world, should discard the “Cold War mentality” and display an adequate understanding of China’s maritime interests and concerns. The PLAN, meanwhile, will develop a responsible and constructive way of employing power within a multilateral framework in the coming decades.
References 2008 Niandu Zhongguo haiyang jingji tongji gongbao [Statistical Report of China’s Oceanic Economy 2008], issued by the State Oceanic Administration of China. Bajpaee, Chietigj. “The Panda and the Peacock.” China Security 3, no. 4 (Autumn 2007). Bernstein, Richard and Ross Munro. The Coming Conflict with China (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997). Chase, Michael and Andrew Erickson. “Changes in Beijing’s Approach to Overseas Basing?” China Brief, 9, Issue 19 (September 24): 2009. Chow, Gregory C. “Globalization and China’s Economic Development.” Pacific Economic Review 11(3) (2006): 271–285.
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Cole, Bernard. “Beijing’s Strategy of Sea Denial,” China Brief, 6, Issue 23 (May 9, 2007). Cole, Bernard. “The PLA Navy’s Developing Strategy,” China Brief, 6, no. 21 (May 9, 2007). Cole, Bernard. The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy Enters the Twenty-First Century (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001). Dao, Shulin. “Yatai haishang tongdao dili jieding he anquan hezuo chutan” [Geographical Definition of Sea-Lanes in the Asia-Pacific Region and Pilot Study On Its Security Cooperation], haishang tongdao anquan yu guoji hezuo [Sea Lane Security and International Cooperation] (Beijing: Shishi Press, 2005). Drifte, Reinhard. “Territorial Conflicts in the East China Sea-From Missed Opportunities to Negotiation Stalemate,” The Asia-Pacific Journal 22 (June 1, 2009). James Auer and Robyn Lim. “The Maritime Basis of American Security in East Asia,” Naval War College Review 54, no. 1 (2001): 39–58. Jiang, Wenran. “China Makes Strides in Energy ‘Go-out’ Strategy,” China Brief, 9(15) (July 23, 2009). Kaplan, Robert. “Center Stage for the 21st Century: Power Plays in the Indian Ocean,” Foreign Affairs, March/April, 2009, pp. 16–32. Khurana, G.S. “China’s ‘String of Pearls’ in the Indian Ocean and its Security Implications,” Strategic Analysis 32(1) (January 2008). Li, Jie. “Junshi Zhuanjia: zhongguo ying kaolu zai Dongfei she lushang zhiyuan zhongxin” [Military Expert: China Should Consider Establishing a Land-Sea Support Center in East Africa], Zhongping News Agency [China Review News], May 21, 2009. Li, Wei. “Kongbu huodong dui haishang tongdao anquan de weixie” [Terrorist Threats to Sea-Lane Security], Haishang tongdao anquan yu guoji hezuo [Sea Lane Security and International Cooperation] (Beijing: Shishi Press, 2005). Liang, Feng. “Lun 21 shiji Zhonghua minzu haiyang yishi de shenke neihan yu diwei zuoyong” [Ocean Consciousness of Chinese Nationality in the 21st Century: Deep Connotation and Role], Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi luntan [Forum of World Economics & Politics], no. 1 (2009). Manicom, James. “China’s Claims to an Extended Continental Shelf in the East China Sea: Meaning and Implication,” China Brief 9, no. 14 (July 9, 2009).
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Mearsheimer, John. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton & Company Ltd., 2001). Mi, Hong and Zhou Wei. “Liang’an hezuo kaifa nanhai youqi ziyuan yanjiu chutan” [Analysis of Joint Exploration of South China Sea Oil and Gas Resources Across the Taiwan Strait], Xiandai Taiwan yanjiu [Modern Taiwan Studies], no. 2 (2008). O’Rourke, Ronald. “China Naval Modernization: Implications for US Navy Capabilities-Background and Issues for Congress,” CRS Report RL33153, May 29, 2009; Ross, Robert. “The Geography of Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-First Century,” International Security 23(4) (Spring 1999): 81–118. Sakhuja, Vijay. “Indian Ocean and the Safety of Sea Lines of Communication,” Strategic Analysis 25(5) (August 2001): 689–702. US Department of Defense, Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2009, Washington, DC, 2009. Valencia, Mark. “The East China Sea Dispute: Context, Claims, Issues and Possible Solutions,” Asia Perspective 31(1) (2007): 127–167. Waldron, Arthur. “China’s New Navy,” Looking Forward, December 15, 2005. Wang, Lidong. Guojia haishang liyi lun [National Maritime Interests] (Beijing: University of National Defense Press, 2007). Yan, Gaohong. “Quanqiuhua shidai Zhongguo guojia anquan de zhanlue xuanze” [Strategic Choices of China’s National Security in Global Age], Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi luntan [Forum of World Economics & Politics], no. 6 (2004). Yang, Jinsen. Zhongguo haiyang zhanlue wenji [Paper Collection of China Ocean Strategy Studies] (Beijing: Haiyang Press, 2006). Zhang, Dehua & Feng Liang. “Zhonghua minzu haiyang yishi yingxiang yinsu tanxi” [Factors Affecting Chinese Nationality’s Ocean awareness], Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi luntan [Forum of World Economics & Politics], no. 3 (2009). Zhongguo haiyang fazhan baogao [China’s Ocean Development Report] (Beijing: Haiyang Press, 2009).
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Chapter Seventeen
Alternative Perspectives on US–China Relations Eric Hyer
Introduction At the beginning of the 21st century, US–China relations are becoming the most important bilateral relationship in East Asia, if not the world, evidenced in part by the new “G-2” grouping. Over the past decade, US–China relations have expanded from a limited focus on Taiwan, human rights, and trade to encompass most major policy issues facing the world such as the global recession, nuclear proliferation, climate change, global pandemics, and China’s role as the United States’ largest creditor. Both countries share a responsibility for international leadership as permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. Their relationship is not only important to themselves but also to the entire world. Although the US and China have a long history of bilateral relations extending back nearly two hundred years, they do not have a well-developed institutional framework for managing bilateral relations. An “institutionalized” relationship is one characterized by mutually accepted principles, practices, and organizational relationships that shape expectations and behavior. US–China relations lack such institutionalization and therefore the two countries often move from crisis to crisis without learning how to understand each other and, what is more important, how to manage or regularize their relationship to avoid such crises in the future. The newly initiated Strategic and Economic Dialogue (SED) is an effort to institutionalize 405
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bilateral relations. President Obama characterized this development as “an essential step in advancing a positive, constructive, and comprehensive relationship between our countries.” He recognized that The relationship between the United States and China will shape the 21st century, which makes it as important as any bilateral relationship in the world. That really must underpin our partnership. That is the responsibility that together we bear ... [N]o one nation can meet the challenges of the 21st century on its own, nor effectively advance its interests in isolation. It is this fundamental truth that compels us to cooperate. I have no illusion that the United States and China will agree on every issue, nor choose to see the world in the same way ... But that only makes dialogue more important — so that we can know each other better, and communicate our concerns with candor.1
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton described the dialogue as an effort to “lay the groundwork for a new pattern of cooperation, a new forum for discussion, a new structure for engagement that will allow us to work together far into the future.”2 China’s dramatic rise to global prominence has altered the geostrategic landscape. The challenge for both governments is to develop a new rationale for bilateral relations as global leaders, and to seek to institutionalize bilateral relations to avoid the recurrence of past problems and crises. China and the United States remain wary of the motivations and intentions of each other. Among the American public, concern over the “rise of China” is growing, and among Chinese, resentment of what is viewed as an American effort to “contain China” is openly expressed. The major causes of friction in US–China relations are issues such as Taiwan, Tibet, human rights, nuclear proliferation, trade relations, currency exchange rates, and climate change. The two countries have a complex and 1 Remarks by the President at the US–China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, Washington, D.C., July 27, 2009. 2 Remarks At the US Chamber of Commerce Dinner Honoring His Excellency Wu Bangguo, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China, September 21, 2009.
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burdened agenda of issues, but no well-developed institutional framework to solve differences. It is in the interest of both nations to institutionalize their relationship so that differences can be addressed in an effective manner. Longtime China watcher and journalist James Mann wrote The China Fantasy which, as the title indicates, explores the different rationalizations Americans use to justify various China policies characterized as “engagement” or “integration.” Rooted in the “democratic peace” theory, the assumption is that democratic culture and institutions as well as democratic political processes emerge as states develop economically and this ultimately make states less likely to wage war, especially with each other.3 Mann is critical of these “delusions and false assumptions,” identifying three scenarios that he believes envision the future of US–China relations. The first is the “soothing scenario:” China’s “rapid economic growth will lead to far-reaching political change as well. Eventually, increasing trade and prosperity will bring liberalization and democracy to China.” According to the “upheaval scenario,” China is “headed for some sort of disaster, such as an economic collapse or political disintegration, because it won’t be able to maintain political stability” if it remains a single-party dictatorship. The “third scenario” sees China’s one-party regime enduring and a wealthier and more powerful China emerging. Mann insists that Americans need to consider how the US should deal with such a China.4 Probing Mann’s scenarios more deeply, this chapter will identify the theoretical models that envision alternative future patterns based on recent history and present trajectories. Theoretical assumptions held (most often unconsciously) by policymakers influence their policy preferences. It is important therefore that we probe the underlying assumptions to understand their policy implications. Three general models are helpful when analyzing US–China relations. The “neorealist” or “structural conflict” model, the “neoliberal” or
3 Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, eds. Debating the Democratic Peace (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997). 4 James Mann, The China Fantasy: How Our Leaders Explain Away Chinese Repression (New York: Viking, 2007). For an alternative presentation of the argument, see John Lee, “An Insider’s Guide to Washington’s China War: Where and How the Battle Lines are Being Drawn,” Foreign Policy (July 28, 2009).
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“neoliberal institutionalist” model and the “domestic politics” model. Each of these three models is based on a particular paradigm of international relations and offers a different explanation of US–China relations. The model a politician, scholar, or student prefers is based on his or her fundamental assumptions about the nature of international politics. Neorealism/Structural Conflict The neorealist or structural conflict model is based on political realism.5 A basic assumption of this model is that the world is an international system of independent states existing in a situation of “anarchy.” Because no world government exists to force states to cooperate, all states naturally seek their own national interests and are therefore constantly in conflict with each other. This does not mean that states are constantly at war with each other, but simply that the possibility of war is ever-present and so all states must always be prepared for war.6 Great powers, by nature, are usually in conflict with each other as they seek to assert some form of hegemony over other states and seek allies to counterbalance the growing power of other nations. Balance-of-power politics is therefore endemic in international relations and a fundamental cause of conflict. The world is experiencing a period of power transition driven by both “hard” and “soft” changes in the relative power of China and the United States, and those who accept the “structural conflict” model predict that we are entering a period of instability.7 As China becomes more powerful both economically and militarily, asserting its leadership and seeking hegemony is normal for such a rising 5
Robert O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986); John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. norton & Co., 2001). For an application to US–China relations see Aaron L. Friedberg, “The Future of US–China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?” International Security 30, no. 2 (Fall 2005): 16–24. 6 Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs 70, no. 1 (1990/1991): 23–33. 7 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 401–402; see also Zbigniew Brzezinski and John J. Mearsheimer, “Clash of the Titans,” Foreign Policy 146 (January/February 2005): 46–50.
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power. However, it is also normal for the US to seek to maintain its dominant position. John Mearsheimer concludes that when “China becomes an economic powerhouse it will almost certainly translate its economic might into military might and make a run at dominating Northeast Asia.” Therefore, China and the United States are “destined to be adversaries as China’s power grows.”8 This argument is illustrated by the growing number of incidents involving the US and PRC navies. As China’s capabilities have increased, it has projected its naval power away from land defense and into the “blue water” to secure strategic interests. This has predictably resulted in confrontations with the US Navy. Defense experts with a neorealist point of view predicted that China would become more assertive toward the US. In August 2009, during negotiations over maritime safety, Chinese officials “called on the US to phase out its military surveillance missions” close to China’s coast, signaling that Beijing “will not tolerate American dominance indefinitely in an area it views as its strategic sphere of influence.”9 China’s large size — geographically, economically, and militarily — makes China a potential hegemonic power. Many Americans wonder what kind of a “great power” China will become and whether it will be a peaceful or disruptive country. China and the US have significant differences over important military security issues. Developments in Taiwan or the South China Sea, where both China and the US feel they have significant national interests to protect, could trigger armed conflict. China’s 1996 missile tests near Taiwan and the US response of sending two aircraft carriers to the area underscored the realists’ assumption that future conflict is inevitable. Realists who accept the structural conflict model are therefore pessimistic about the future of US–China relations, arguing that as China grows stronger economically and militarily, conflict between the US and China will increase. According to Mearsheimer, the likelihood of a “clash between China and the United States over Taiwan is hardly remote.”10 Shared strategic interests no 8
Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 4. See also Ross Terrill, The New Chinese Empire and What it Means for the United States (New York: Basic Books, 2003), p. 255. 9 “China Urges US to End Coast Surveillance,” Financial Times, August 27, 2009. 10 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 2.
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longer provide a solid foundation for US–China relations as they did during the 1970s and 1980s when the two states together confronted the Soviet Union. Mutual suspicion and mistrust are increasing, and threat perception is magnified under the circumstances.11 Paul Wolfowitz articulates this, viewing China as analogous to Germany in the 20th century: “the obvious and disturbing analogy is the position of Germany, a country that felt it had been denied its ‘place in the sun’, that believed it had been mistreated by the other powers, and that was determined to achieve its rightful place by nationalistic assertiveness ... China is going through a transition from two decades of extremely skillful management of its international relationships to a new leadership of uncertain quality. It was just such a transition from the statesmanship of Bismarck to the incompetence of his successors that is considered to be a principal factor leading to the tragedy of the First World War.”12
However, Robert Jervis, focusing on leadership perceptions and feedback in the system, points to a different outcome from inevitable conflict. Leaders are aware that attributing national intentions based on national capabilities and attributes can result in pessimistic inferences that exacerbate the security dilemma. This awareness can make the theorized outcome unlikely because both US and Chinese leaders realize that efforts at “strategic reassurance” can defuse tensions and improve relations, thereby averting the outcome that neorealism predicts.13 Neoliberalism/Liberal Institutionalism Similar to the neorealist model, the neoliberal or liberal institutionalist model adopts a rationalist assumption, but it is rooted in political liberalism
11 David M. Lampton, The Three Faces of China: Might, Money, and Minds (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), pp. 2–3, 36. 12 Paul Wolfowitz, “Bridging Centuries: Fin de Siècle All Over Again” The National Interest, no. 47 (Spring 1997). 13 Robert Jervis, “Thinking Systemically About China,” International Security 31, no. 2 (Fall 2006): 206–208.
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rather than political realism.14 Domestic determinants such as democracy, economic development, and international trade reinforce the liberal institutionalists’ assumptions about the potential for interstate cooperation motivated by expected mutual benefits. This model is therefore much more optimistic about the future of US–China relations. According to this model, China and the US share a common stake in economic development, environmental challenges, global health crises, military security, and political stability. The two countries also share global leadership as countries with responsibility for international security as permanent members of the UN Security Council. The growing interdependence of US–China relations is creating a complex web of bilateral relationships. As interdependence ties the US and China more closely together, it will make it more difficult for economic and political friction to drive a wedge between the two because of the enormous economic costs and the loss of the security benefits both countries enjoy. Therefore, both governments attempt to dampen down crises that could disrupt bilateral ties. Despite the very negative shock to Sino-American relations of the 1999 Chinese embassy bombing and the April 2001 US reconnaissance plane incident that resulted in the death of a Chinese fighter pilot, the impact was short-lived and leaders in both countries exerted maximum effort to ensure that economic and diplomatic relations were not seriously disrupted. China and the United States consult and coordinate policies on issues before the United Nations and through other international gatherings such as the G-20. Membership in multilateral organizations such as AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) are examples of shared leadership in East Asia. A closer look at economic ties illustrates the point. Currently US–China bilateral trade is worth over $400 billion annually, a 400 percent increase over the past decade. Over the past five years, US exports to China nearly tripled and 14
Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence (New York: Longman, 2001); David A. Baldwin, ed. Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). For an application to US–China relations see Aaron L. Friedberg, “The Future of US–China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?” International Security 30, no. 2 (Fall 2005): 12–16.
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China’s exports to the US have doubled. Any disruption in US–China trade would be very costly in economic terms for both countries. Military-to-military dialogue is an important aspect of managing US–China relations. The Commander of the US Pacific Command, Admiral Timothy Keating, expressed the importance of this relationship: “We ignore them at our own peril and they ignore us at their own peril. We don’t want to end up in a confrontational situation with them, and we’re very confident they don’t want to end up in the same situation with us.” But he also voiced a concern that “I don’t know that I’d be able to get hold of [them] . . . in a very timely manner if there was some conflict [we] could perhaps address and forestall unpleasantries that might follow.”15 Moreover, China and the US face several common threats — preventing nuclear proliferation in North Korea and the war on terrorism are two examples. The Six-Party Talks framework to deal with the North Korean nuclear issue is the clearest example of how closely the US and China cooperate on regional security challenges. According to the neoliberal institutionalist model, as countries’ mutual interests and institutionalized relationships grow, the likelihood of serious conflict will diminish. Therefore, US–China relations should improve in the future due to the growing economic and security ties. A second aspect of the neoliberal model is the belief among many Americans that as China has become integrated into the international market, it is increasingly exposed to democratic nations, undertakes domestic economic reform, and so the eventual liberalization of the Chinese political system is inevitable. And as China becomes more democratic, the chasm that separates China and the US will be narrowed. Such a view clearly informs those who advocate “constructive engagement” with China. The neoliberal institutionalist model goes beyond government-togovernment interactions when analyzing US–China relations, adopting the perspective that NGOs play an important role in the relationship of the two counties.16 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton expressed this view 15
“Fears over Poor State of Sino–US Naval Links,” Financial Times, October 1, 2009. Sanjeev Khagram, James V. Riker and Kathryn Sikkink, eds., Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Social Movements, Networks, and Norms (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002); Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).
16
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when addressing the US Chamber of Commerce during the visit of Wu Bangguo, chairman of the Standing Committee of the NPC. She acknowledged that the US and China need “partnerships beyond government that stretch across sectors and engage the full range of talent in our countries — from the expertise of our scholars and scientists to the creative energy of our young people and the adventurous spirit of our entrepreneurs.”17 Various interest groups in both countries often share common concerns and cooperate to influence the policy of their respective governments. Environmental groups, human rights organizations, and the business community in both countries often cooperate closely to lobby their respective governments for policy changes. For example, in the 1990s, on the issue of granting most-favored-nation (MFN) status to China, the US business community and China’s growing class of entrepreneurs worked together to ensure that the US did not revoke China’s MFN status. These same organizations pushed to grant China permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) status and for China’s admission to the WTO. In both cases, this nongovernmental pressure influenced America’s China policy. During this same period, American human rights groups pushed the government to link human rights, US–China trade relations, and China’s admission to the WTO. Scientific developments are tying the two countries together in ways that governments cannot easily control. Using the internet and Twitter, we can access news and information from around the world, and this is largely uncontrolled by government censorship. E-mail makes spontaneous communications across borders possible. This means that Americans and Chinese can now establish relationships that the two governments do not mediate. Tens of thousands of Chinese students educated in the US have returned to China, but maintain scholarly communication with the academic community in the US. A vast network of business relationships and cultural exchange is developing. The implications of such developments are very significant politically. This process facilitates understanding between Chinese and Americans. Those who accept the neoliberal institutionalist perspective
17 “Remarks at the US Chamber of Commerce Dinner Honoring His Excellency Wu Bangguo, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China,” September 21, 2009.
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believe that over time, universally accepted norms, principles, and institutionalized arrangements make possible cooperation and coordination when addressing global challenges beyond the abilities of single governments. According to US Ambassador to China Jon Huntsman, “China is in fact a stakeholder in all of these issues, and arguably wasn’t in years past. If there’s one aspect of the relationships that’s unique and different from what it was before, it is the number of truly global issues that together we’re approaching and hoping to seek solutions on.”18 While many Chinese scholars and officials may accept the neoliberal institutionalist perspective and believe China’s development benefits from “playing by the rules,” others put a Chinese spin on the liberal argument, arguing that the US relative decline presents China with the opportunity to “exert more leverage . . . to rein in the US and mould its engagement with the rest of the world” much the way that the American neoliberals claim to be doing with China. They argue that a more confident China can “define the terms by which the US behaves” and constrain US unilateralism. This perspective envisions “establish[ing] a multilateral order on Chinese terms, where countries cooperate on global problems, but where China is able to ring-fence its political arrangements” to reflect China’s national interests more clearly.19 In fact, responding to the United States’ call for “strategic reassurance,” one Chinese scholar pointed out that this should be “mutual reassurance” whereby a consensus is “based on mutual respect and equality.” In other words, “the US should confirm that Washington respects Beijing’s interests.” It is clear that as China becomes more powerful, Beijing wants Washington to reciprocate and reassure it that China’s “core interests” also will be respected.20 Another prominent Chinese scholar remarked that “the US is not able to force its agenda on China anymore.”21
18
Ian Johnson, “Envoy’s Challenges in China,” Wall Street Journal, September 3, 2009, A11. Geoff Dyer, “The Dragon Stirs,” Financial Times, September 24, 2009. 20 Shen Yi, “Consensus Based on Mutual Respect and Equality: The Cornerstone of ‘Strategic Reassurance’,” PacNet Newsletter no. 73A [Pacific Forum Center for Strategic and International Studies], November 12, 2009. 21 Peter Foster, “Barack Obama Visit Signals New Era in US–China Relations,” Daily Telegraph (November 21, 2009); Ian Johnson and Jonathan Weisman, “Beijing Limits Obama’s Exposure,” The Wall Street Journal, November 17, 2009. 19
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Neoliberals believe that authoritarian nations move in the direction of political democratization through economic engagement, but as one Chinese scholar observed, the “ironic logic is that the more China is involved in globalization, the more powerful its authoritarianism becomes.” China’s rapid economic development has given Beijing “structural advantages” and reversed the “dependent relationship” on the advanced democracies, enabling Beijing to use the leverage of economic interdependence to push its political agenda.22 In recent years Beijing has increased pressure on governments to ban visits by the Dalai Lama or the Uyghur activist Rebiya Kadeer, or prevent Chinese dissidents from participating in international events. China’s foreign minister, Yang Jiechi, made Beijing’s perspective explicit when he stated that satisfying Beijing’s demands on these issues is “not a matter of doing a favor to China, but rather an obligation under the basic principles of international relations.”23 According to Wu Guoguang, the “message was that those who want to benefit from China’s economic prosperity must carefully observe Beijing’s political criteria and follow them when Beijing demands, even if China’s criteria conflict with domestic public opinion and democratic procedures.”24 Susan Shirk, a former deputy assistant secretary of state for Asian and Pacific affairs, has concluded that the “era when China made all the compromises in the relationship has passed.”25 Realists put little faith in international institutions and assert that “as China’s power grows, it will press its own perceived self-interests vigorously, just as other great powers do. It will continue to join and participate in a wide array of existing institutions, but it will use them to advance its own interests and will also try to shape those institutions according to its own preferences and values. Expecting them to conform
22 Guoguang Wu, “A Shadow over Western Democracies: China’s Political Use of Economic Power,” China Perspectives no. 2 (2009): 81, 88. 23 Cited in Guoguang Wu, original at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-03/07/ content_10961657.htm. 24 Guoguang Wu, “A Shadow over Western Democracies: China’s Political Use of Economic Power,” China Perspectives no. 2 (2009): 82. 25 Susan Shirk, “A Mountain to Climb: Don’t Expect Earth-Shattering Agreements during Barack Obama’s First Summit in China,” South China Morning Post (October 28, 2009)
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their behavior to someone else’s idea of what is right and proper is . . . well . . . not very realistic.”26
Interdependence does not tie countries together in a way that thwarts the logic of international conflict. Niall Ferguson envisions “a re-run of the Anglo-German antagonism of the early 1900s, with America in the role of Britain, and China in the role of imperial Germany. This is a better analogy because it captures the fact that a high level of economic integration does not necessarily prevent the growth of strategic rivalry and, ultimately, conflict.”27
But China’s more assertive tone does not necessarily mean that US–China conflict is inevitable either. China is a “limited-aims revisionist power” and shares with the United States mutual interests in nonproliferation, climate changes, global health, and other concerns which engage China and the US together as world leaders. But just as the United States did in the postWorld War II era, China may press for a reorientation of international norms and institutions so that they reflect its core values and hierarchical prestige. Domestic Politics The domestic politics model assumes that a state’s domestic politics largely determines its foreign policy. This “two-level” model assumes that US–China relations depend more on the domestic political factors in each country.28 With the end of the Cold War, the threat of superpower conflict ceased to have a dominant influence on US–China relations, and the influence of domestic politics increased. Just as the Cold War was coming to an end, the violent response to student demonstrations in Tiananmen Square was a watershed event, marking the emergence of domestic politics as a more salient issue in US–China bilateral relations. 26
Stephen M. Walt, “Is China ‘Acting like a Great Power?’” Foreign Policy, October 5, 2009. 27 Niall Ferguson, “‘Chimerica’ is Headed for Divorce,” Newsweek, August 15, 2009. 28 Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization 43 (Summer 1988): 427–462.
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US presidential campaigns often exacerbate anti-China rhetoric when candidates try to “out-tough” each other in response to a more negative public opinion toward China. Clinton criticized George H.W. Bush’s postTiananmen policy toward China for accommodating Beijing and pledged to take a firmer stand on China’s human rights policy. After entering office, Clinton delinked the trade and human rights issues. As a candidate, George W. Bush rejected Clinton’s view of treating China as a “strategic partner” and considered China a “strategic competitor.” However, September 11, 2001, changed the strategic imperatives and China and the US pledged to cooperate in the “global war on terror.”29 During the 2008 campaign, Obama signaled a less accommodating trade policy toward China and promised to “crack down on China . . . to ensure that China is no longer given a free pass to undermine US workers.” As with previous presidents, Obama softened his rhetoric as the centrality of US–China relations became clear to him. In both countries domestic players and crosscutting bureaucratic interests have increased, thus greatly complicating each country’s foreign policy process. China’s fourth generation of leadership, while forced to deal with a growing agenda of international issues, still faces significant challenges at home due to rapid economic development and this has been exacerbated by the recent global economic downturn. These leaders do not have the same stature as the revolutionary generation and are less willing to make bold moves like Mao did when he initiated rapprochement with the United States or Deng Xiaoping when he promoted the “one country, two systems” formula to deal with Hong Kong and Taiwan. Feelings of nationalism are heightened as communist doctrine no longer provides legitimacy to the CCP’s rule and “patriotic education” replaces Marxism–Leninism–Mao Zedong Thought. China’s discourse of a “century of humiliation” still casts a shadow over the Chinese, but China’s rapid rise as a world power has made young Chinese more confidently arrogant and assertive. Some Chinese scholars argue that the time has come for China to take a more assertive or confrontational approach to the US.30 29
For a review of the evolution of Bush’s China policy, see Robert Sutter, “The United States’ Response to the China Challenge,” in Quansheng Zhao and Guoli Liu, eds., Managing the China Challenge: Global Perspectives (New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 83–102. 30 Xiao Gongqin, “Superficial, Arrogant Nationalism,” China Security 5, no. 3 (2009): 55.
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Given the heightened sense of nationalism among the Chinese and the increased social space within which they can express their views and even discontent with the Party’s leadership, making concessions to reach a compromise settlement with the US is more difficult. Fifty percent of Chinese surveyed believe that the US poses the greatest threat to China, more than Japan, India, or Russia.31 China’s fenqing (angry youth), who have emerged as a significant factor and more openly express political dissent, have a more negative view of the US. Even the better educated Chinese youth are more nationalistic than the older Chinese — they are twice as likely to believe the US poses a threat to China (60 percent versus 30 percent). The 2009 Pew Research Center Global Attitudes Project found that 59 percent of Chinese believe that China will eventually replace the US as the leading global superpower (8 percent believe China already has replaced the US). General Xu Caihou, vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission, expressed this view during a US visit when he stated that “China and the US are the two countries that have significant influence in the world.”32 As China’s public opinion becomes a more significant influence on Beijing’s foreign policy, leaders may feel pushed to take a hard line to satisfy “compelling domestic expectations” even when they would rather seek conciliation.33 Leaders cannot risk being accused of being “soft” or not vigilantly protecting China’s national interests and sovereignty. This pressures Chinese leaders to take extreme foreign policy positions for fear of not satisfying the “patriotic expectations” of a population that is much more politically savvy and interconnected by modern communications technology. A recent book, China Is Not Happy (Zhongguo bugaoxing), tapped this nationalistic nerve and the phenomenon that as China becomes more 31 All public opinion data (unless otherwise noted) come from Committee of 100, “Hope and Fear: Full Report of C-100s Survey on American and Chinese Attitudes Toward Each Other” (New York, 2008); Chicago Council on Global Affairs 2008 Global Views survey (Chicago 2008); Pew Research Center Global Attitudes Project 2009 (Washington, D.C., 2009); Fergus Hanson and Andrew Shearer, China and the World: Public Opinion and Foreign Policy (Sydney, Australia, 2009). 32 Wendell Minnick, “Sino–US Military Relations may be Improving,” DefenseNews, November 2, 2009. 33 Denny Roy, “China’s Democratized Foreign Policy,” Survival 51, no. 2 (April–May 2009): 28–30.
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connected internationally, many Chinese are in fact becoming more hostile toward American pressure on issues such as trade, human rights, Taiwan, and Tibet.34 This was clear when the Olympic torch relay became a rallying point for anti-China demonstrations. The popular response among the Chinese was intense anger toward those who used the Olympic torch as an anti-China rallying point, in their minds, robbing China of its deserved moment to shine before the world and sullying China’s “debut” as a world power and the Olympics as a celebration of China’s new stature in world politics. But unlike concentrated outbursts of nationalism which also followed the US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999 and the 2001 spy plane incident in which a Chinese pilot was killed, this recent book taps into a much more fundamental nationalistic dissatisfaction with China’s status in the world and the disrespect these angry youth perceive China is subjected to by the US.35 A prominent Chinese scholar recognizes that “radicals in China are advocating radical nationalism” and the “domestic pressure on the reform-oriented government is high,” which could be triggered by a combination of “negative international factors” and domestic political pressures. However, to date, such domestic pressures have not negatively influenced China’s foreign policy.36 President Obama’s decision to impose tariffs on Chinese tire imports in September 2009 shows the power of labor unions. The decision came at a time when the White House needed the labor unions’ support on critical domestic legislation such as healthcare reform. Labor unions backed Obama during his presidential campaign and feel entitled to his support. Popular support made the decision easier too; a 2007 survey revealed that only 53 percent of Americans believed that trade was good for the US (down from
34 “David or Goliath? China’s Battle to Win The War of Perceptions,” (May 21, 2009) http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/may/21/china-identity-foreign-relations. For a review of anti-American books, see Hongshan Li, “China Talks Back: Anti-Americanism or Nationalism? A Review of Recent ‘Anti-American’ Books in China,” Journal of Contemporary China 6, no. 14 (1997): 153–160. 35 Xiao Gongqin, “Superficial, Arrogant Nationalism,” China Security 5, no. 3 (2009): 52. 36 Qin Yaqing, “International Factors and China’s External Behavior: Power, Interdependence, and Institutions,” in Pauline Kerr, Stuart Harris and Qin Yaqing, eds., China’s “New” Diplomacy: Tactical or Fundamental Change? (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 47.
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78 percent in 2002) and in 2007, 74 percent of Americans felt outsourcing production was wrong, even if it resulted in less expensive products for American consumers. China accused Obama of “bowing before domestic protectionist forces” and condemned the decision as a “grave act of trade protectionism.” The Xinhua news agency wrote in a commentary that “it is a huge regret that crucial China–US trade relations are once again disrupted by [domestic] political disputes.” Beijing’s threat of retaliation a few days later followed on the heels of a “crescendo of nationalistic vitriol” on Chinese internet sites. No doubt China’s “more combative stance” was driven by the Chinese public opinion voiced on the internet. According to one trade policy expert, in China “all kinds of policymaking, not just trade policy, is increasingly reactive to internet opinion.”37 Members of Congress used this pressure to push for restrictive trade legislation to curtail Chinese imports or pressure China on currency valuation. A China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) bid to purchase Unocal Oil Company sparked an outcry so strong from anti-China lobbies and in Congress that China withdrew the bid. China’s economic rise does cause apprehension among Americans with 42 percent believing it will have a mostly negative impact (up from 33 percent in 2006) and 51 percent believing that it will be both negative and positive (down from 54 percent in 2008). Sixty-seven percent of Americans believe China engages in unfair trade practices (up from 58 percent in 2008). Bush’s Treasury Secretary, Henry Paulson, recognized this, lamenting that “unfortunately, in America this is manifesting itself as anti-China sentiment as China becomes a symbol of the real and imagined downside of global competition.” This anti-free trade feeling is often directed against China but faults the US government for “not standing up to the Chinese,” thus increasing pressure on the administration to take a stronger stand against China on trade issues.38 This is expressed at the grassroots level by the online campaign at WakeUpWalMart.com that alleges that Wal-Mart is China’s sixth largest trading partner and accuses Wal-Mart of having a 37 www.mofcom.gov.cn; Ian Johnson, “China Strikes Back on Trade,” Wall Street Journal, September 14, 2009; Keith Bradsher, “China Weighs Tariffs on Some US. Exports as Tensions Rise,” New York Times, September 14, 2009. 38 “Trade Jitters, Anti-China Sentiment Rouse US Voters,” Reuters, November 14, 2007.
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“buy China” program that improves Wal-Mart’s bottomline while “weakening America.” This trend has increased the pressure on President Obama to take stronger measures against China. Every US president has met with the Dalai Lama since George H.W. Bush did in 1991. An Obama meeting would have inevitably irritated the Chinese on the eve of Obama’s November 2009 China trip. White House advisors concerned about working with Beijing on issues like climate change and economic challenges pushed to put off the meeting, arguing that it would disrupt the president’s China visit. The Obama administration’s new approach toward China was made clear by Secretary of State Clinton when she stated that issues such as a meeting with the Dalai Lama could not “interfere with the global economic crisis, the global climate-change crisis and the security crisis.”39 One scholar from the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, a more conservative think tank, questioned the US promotion of human rights and democracy, wondering “what good is that for dealing with bird flu?”40 House Speaker Nancy Pelosi signaled her understanding of this reality in US–China relations during her May 2009 visit and avoided publicly raising China’s human rights record, acknowledging that there are weightier issues where bilateral cooperation is necessary.41 As China becomes more powerful and the relative power of the US declines, Chinese officials and scholars debate the consequences for US–China relations. Some sound a cautious note and believe the continued growth of China’s economy depends on a vibrant US economy. Others believe the time is ripe to challenge US hegemony and push for a multipolar world in which China plays a key role. It is certainly too soon to draw any concrete conclusions, but the financial crisis has had a big impact on US–China relations.42
39
John Pomfret, “Obama’s Meeting with the Dalai Lama is Delayed,” The Washington Post (October 5, 2009); Emily Kaiser, “US Softens Tone to Improve China Relations,” Reuters, October 11, 2009. 40 Geoff Dyer, “The Dragon Stirs,” Financial Times, September 24, 2009. 41 Elaine Kurtenbach, “Pelosi Dodges Human Rights on China Visit,” Washington Times, May 25, 2009. 42 Bonnie S. Glaser and Lyle Morris, “Chinese Perceptions of US Decline and Power,” China Brief 9, no. 14 (July 9, 2009).
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The United States has also gone through an important political transition. The majority of the members of Congress were elected after the fall of the Berlin Wall. These newly elected officials did not experience the Cold War when there was generally a greater bipartisan consensus and support for the president of the United States as the chief spokesperson for US foreign policy. Congress has asserted greater influence on foreign relations and has reduced the president’s latitude in conducting US foreign policy. Congressional opinion on China is much more complicated, but generally more negative toward China. When surveyed, congressional staffers hold stronger negative views of China than the American public generally. Congressional staffers also misperceive the public, believing that 86 percent of Americans have a negative view of China, but in fact only about 56 percent do. But China’s lobbying efforts have yielded a growing influence in Congress.43 These changes will influence the United States’ China policy. Members of Congress have often forced the president to take a harder position on some issues than he would prefer and increasingly try to tie the president’s hands in dealing with China. Taiwan has always been an emotional issue. For example, President Clinton was forced to bend to congressional pressure and grant Li Teng-hui, the president of Taiwan, a visa to come to the United States to attend his college reunion, causing a crisis in US–China relations. Congress has put pressure on the administration to revise the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) to upgrade US relations with Taiwan and encouraged more arms sales to Taiwan. China often retaliates by canceling military-to-military relations. The point was driven home when Army Chief of Staff General George W. Casey Jr. met with General Chen Bingde, the PLA chief of staff, in 2009 and was told that “Washington is only friendly when it seeks Beijing’s cooperation on terrorism and piracy” but US arms sales to Taiwan “undermined trust” and “offend[s] the Chinese people.” General Chen asserted, “I don’t think that kind of cooperation can continue.”44 President Obama feels pressure from
43
John Pomfret, “China’s Lobbying Efforts Yield New Influence, Openness on Capitol Hill,” Washington Post, January 9, 2010. 44 Bill Gertz, “Inside the Ring,” Washington Times, August 27, 2009.
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Congress to abide by the TRA that requires the US to provide Taiwan with defensive armaments. This Taiwan arms sale dilemma is a perennial irritant in US–China relations and an issue on which members of Congress have strong feelings. Public opinion in the US toward China is basically divided, with the 2009 Pew Research Center poll on global attitudes finding 50 percent of Americans have a favorable view of China (up from 39 percent in 2008). After several years of difficult Sino–American relations, influenced by the negotiations over China’s membership in the World Trade Organization, the 1999 bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, and the April 2001 reconnaissance plane incident along China’s coast, the war on terrorism following the 9/11 terrorist attack on the US suddenly provided China and the US with a common international objective. Nevertheless, by a small margin, more Americans view China as an unreliable ally in the war on terrorism. While a majority of Americans believe China is the second most influential country in the world and 52 percent believe China is very important to the US, according to the Chicago Council on Global Affairs 2008 Global Views survey, 43 percent of Americans surveyed believe that the development of China as a great power is a “critical threat” to the vital interests of the US while 61 percent believe China is an “important but not critical” threat. In a 2007 survey, 75 percent of Americans did perceive China’s military power posing a potential or serious threat to the US (up from 66 percent in 2005). Nevertheless, 64 percent of Americans favor seeking better relations rather than trying to contain China (33 percent). Only 32 percent support sending troops to defend Taiwan if China launches an attack and 19 percent view such an attack as a critical threat to the vital interests of the US. Among congressional staffers, 50 percent view Taiwan as a source of potential conflict with China and 49 percent feel the US should assist Taiwan in the event of military conflict. Public opinion is driven by US press coverage that focuses more on the human rights issue and does not provide the space to cover the complexities of foreign policy, economics, and China’s domestic politics. This press coverage is reflected in the views and rhetoric of elected officials that in turn feed media and public opinion. The Committee of 100 survey in 2008 revealed that 62 percent of congressional staffers have a negative
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image of China (down from 79 percent in 2005). Seventy-one percent perceive China’s emergence as a global power as a serious or potential threat to the US. Roughly an equal number (25 percent/27 percent) feel that the US trade deficit and human rights in China are of equal concern. Sixty-four percent believe the two countries have a common interest in trade, but 55 percent feel trade relations are the most likely source of conflict. Despite these relatively negative views, 82 percent of congressional staffers believe that China is an important partner of the US, but only 55 percent of the general public feel this way about China; in comparison, 78 percent of congressional staffers see Japan as an important partner and 59 percent of the general public do. Twenty-four percent of congressional staffers believe US–China relations are improving while 39 percent believe they are getting worse; this compares to 28 percent for improving and 26 percent for getting worse among the general public. Congressional staffers place the blame for deteriorating relations on Beijing with 71 percent believing that the Chinese government handles US–China relations poorly. The more emotional issues like human rights and Tibet are allowed to dominate the debate and obscure other more complex bilateral challenges.45 The leadership in both countries is consumed with domestic concerns and is unable or unwilling to take domestic political risks for the sake of US–China relations. Even if they are inclined to, domestic political considerations make it difficult for leaders to undertake any new initiatives to improve relations. The present top leaders in China have no solid base of support and are always looking over their shoulders for the approval of the previous generation of leaders. China’s history of humiliation by Western nations, combined with China’s growing economic and military power, makes them extremely sensitive to any perceived condescension or reluctance to recognize China’s status as an emerging great power. David Shambaugh concludes that China still suffers from a “century of shame and humiliation” and as a result “contemporary Chinese nationalism is not really self-confident . . . [because] many present-day challenges to Chinese policy are filtered through this historical prism. One might have
45 “China Caucus Welcomes ‘Panda Slayers’ and Boosters in Congress,” Bloomberg News, September 8, 2009.
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expected China’s growing power to help overcome this insecurity and defensiveness, but in fact it seems to have fueled it.” Thus a “defensive China” will be “reluctant and difficult to engage in the years to come.”46 From the perspective of the domestic politics model, US–China relations are determined primarily by the domestic political situation in each country. Given the ongoing leadership transition in China and the broader changes in the political situation in the US, advocates of this model are not too optimistic about US–China relations in the short term. Many Americans also feel China will remain a threat to the US as long as it has an authoritarian political system that they believe makes China more likely to be confrontational. Conclusion This chapter has outlined three models that US–China relations may follow in the coming decades. In fact, these are only models and reality may prove otherwise because US–China relations are contingent and subject to unfathomable factors. Unanticipated events such as the 9/11 terrorist attack can have significant consequences for international relations. US–China relations could follow some kind of combination of two or more models, or follow a pattern not envisioned by any of the models. Mutual interests exist that will mitigate conflict, but friction will occur on issues of trade, arms exports, Taiwan, human rights, among others. Since larger structural forces buffet the relationship and domestic political pressures can hamper cooperation, a more institutionalized relationship will help bilateral cooperation. The two countries need a regular and institutionalized dialogue that formulates policies based on their common interests. The “rise of China” debate has focused on whether China will be a “stakeholder” that cooperates with the US in global governance or whether China will be a “challenger” that will trigger a “new cold war.” But the key is to build a firmer institutional foundation for bilateral cooperation. The
46
David Shambaugh, “Containment or Engagement of China? Calculating Beijing’s Responses,” International Security 21, no. 2 (Autumn 1996): 209.
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debate should focus on how an economically and militarily powerful China will impact America’s heretofore predominance and domination of international institutions and how China must be integrated into the global leadership. According to one Chinese scholar, this is possible only when China’s “primacy among nations [is] accepted, its responsible behavior recognized, and its interests respected.”47 China is taking its place in the world economy and global leadership structure and US–China relations should focus on “strategic collaboration.” US ambassador Jon Huntsman remarked, “We’re putting the relationship to the test, there’s no doubt about that. And I suspect we have more on our plate than ever before in our 30 years of formal diplomatic relationship.”48 Premier Wen Jiabao characterized the US–China relationship as one of “harmony without uniformity.” A robust institutionalized relationship, like the one initiated by the SED, will go a long way to moderate the differences and strengthen cooperation in the management of the global challenges the two countries face collectively. References Baldwin, David A., ed. Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). Brzezinski, Zbigniew and John J. Mearsheimer. “Clash of the Titans,” Foreign Policy 146, (January/February 2005): 46–50. Chicago Council on Global Affairs. Chicago Council on Global Affairs 2008 Global Views Survey (Chicago: Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 2008). Committee of 100. Hope and Fear: Full Report of C-100s Survey on American and Chinese Attitudes Toward Each Other (Committee of 100: New York, 2008). Friedberg, Aaron L. “The Future of US–China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?” International Security, 30, no. 2 (Fall 2005): 7–45. Glaser, Bonnie S. and Lyle Morris. “Chinese Perceptions of US. Decline and Power,” China Brief, 9, no. 14 (July 9, 2009). Goldstein, Avery. “Great Expectations: Interpreting China’s Arrival,” International Security, 22, no. 3 (Winter 1997/1998): 36–73. 47
Wen Liao, “If China’s So Powerful, Why Isn’t It More Powerful?” Foreign Policy, July 28, 2009. 48 Ian Johnson, “Envoy’s Challenges in China,” Wall Street Journal, September 3, 2009, p. A11.
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Hanson, Fergus and Andrew Shearer. China and the World: Public Opinion and Foreign Policy (Sydney, Australia: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2009). Jervis, Robert. “Thinking Systemically About China,” International Security, 31, no. 2 (Fall 2006): 206–208. Johnston, Alastair Iain and Robert S. Ross. Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power (New York: Routledge, 1999). Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye. Power and Interdependence (New York: Longman, 2001). Kerr, Pauline, Stuart Harris and Qin Yaqing eds. China’s “New” Diplomacy: Tactical or Fundamental Change? (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). Krauthammer, Charles. “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs 70, no. 1 (1990/1991): 23–33. Lampton, David M. Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing US–China Relations, 1989–2000 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2001). Lampton, David M. The Three Faces of China: Might, Money, and Minds (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008). Lee, John. “An Insider’s Guide to Washington’s China War: Where and How the Battle Lines are Begin Drawn.” Foreign Policy, July 28, 2009. Li, Hongshan. “China Talks Back: Anti-Americanism or Nationalism? A Review of Recent ‘Anti-American’ Books in China,” Journal of Contemporary China 6, no. 14 (1997): 153–160. Mann, James. The China Fantasy: How Our Leaders Explain Away Chinese Repression (New York: Viking, 2007). Organski, A.F.K. and Jack Kugler. The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981). Putnam, Robert D. “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization, no. 43 (Summer 1988): 427–460. Roy, Denny. “China’s Democratized Foreign Policy,” Survival, 51, no. 2 (April–May 2009): 25–40. Shambaugh, David. “Containment or Engagement of China? Calculating Beijing’s Responses,” International Security, 21, no. 2 (Autumn 1996): 180–209. Shen, Yi. “Consensus Based on Mutual Respect and Equality: The Cornerstone of ‘Strategic Reassurance’,” PacNet Newsletter, no. 73A [Pacific Forum Center for Strategic and International Studies], November 12, 2009.
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Sutter, Robert G. “United States-East Asian Relations: An Optimistic Outlook,” The American Asian Review, 20, no. 4 (Winter 2002): 39–64. Terrill, Ross. The New Chinese Empire and What It Means for the United States (New York: Basic Books, 2003). Walt, Stephen M. “Is China ‘Acting like a Great Power?’” Foreign Policy, October 5, 2009. Wolfowitz, Paul. “Bridging Centuries: Fin de Siècle All Over Again,” The National Interest, no. 47 (Spring 1997): 3–8. Wu, Guoguang. “A Shadow over Western Democracies: China’s Political Use of Economic Power,” China Perspectives, no. 2 (2009): 80–89. Xiao, Gongqin. “Superficial, Arrogant Nationalism,” China Security, 5, no. 3 (2009): 53–58. Zhao, Quansheng and Guoli Liu eds. Managing the China Challenge: Global Perspectives (New York: Routledge, 2009).
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Conclusion
Whither China in the 21st Century? Zhiqun Zhu
“China is no longer emerging. It has emerged,” declared The New York Times on January 27, 2010.1 Emerged it may have, but this is a power with many challenges ahead. The previous chapters give us a broad and wellinformed assessment of some of the most staggering challenges China faces today. While many people, the contributors to this volume included, tend to be optimistic about the future of China, they also realize that China has to overcome all the major hurdles in order to achieve its full potential. Mishandling these problems may derail and even doom China’s further development. Since China’s future is uncertain, it is premature to call the 21st century “the Chinese Century.” How do we see the PRC’s experience so far? The PRC’s development trajectory has been tortuous. With the transformation still going on, it may take a few more decades for China to become a fully developed and democratized nation. Despite some academic and journalistic labels used to describe the PRC’s development experience such as “the China model” or “the Beijing Consensus,” it is difficult to fully explain China’s development path. In a comparative sense, the PRC’s growth shares some similarities with that of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, but on a much larger scale.2 1 Katrin Bennhold, “As China Rises, Economic Conflict with West Rises Too,” The New York Times, January 27, 2010. 2 For a useful comparative study of these economies, see Zhiqun Zhu, Understanding East Asia’s Economic “Miracle” (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Association for Asian Studies, 2009).
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The developmental model of a vibrant market economy combined with heavy state intervention that was first developed in Japan has been adopted by China. Like its Asian neighbors, China’s economy is also heavily exportoriented and its economic activities are conducted under strict state regulation. This state-guided capitalism has created economic wonders in China. But China’s huge size and scale and its non-democratic nature of government have led to problems much bigger than those of its neighbors. China’s development seems less sustainable and China is far from being a relatively equitable society. Whether the Chinese experience can be mimicked by other developing nations is also questionable. The fact that South Korea and Taiwan gradually moved towards democratization two to three decades after their economic take-off make many people wonder whether China will follow suit. Another interesting question to ask from a comparative perspective is: Since the 1964 Tokyo Olympics and the 1988 Seoul Olympics signified Japan’s and South Korea’s full integration into the international system and their democratic consolidation/transition, how has the 2008 Beijing Olympics affected China’s democratization process? Obviously every country has to find a development strategy that is most suitable for itself based on its own unique conditions. In fact, Beijing’s official description of its development is “socialism with Chinese characteristics.” Chinese officials and scholars have refrained from using the term “China model” since “model” means example and can also suggest that China’s reform policies are fixed. They prefer to use “the Chinese case,” “Chinese characteristic,” “China’s experience,” or simply “China’s development” instead.3 Many Chinese officials and scholars believe that China is still searching for its own unique way to modernity. Different from democracies in which political legitimacy and power are derived from elections, the Chinese polity has developed an alternative path to maintaining legitimacy. Some Chinese scholars argue that the idea that legitimacy is conferred on a government by elections is a Western obsession. The CCP’s legitimacy is based on performance. If the CCP governs well and promotes economic growth, it is perceived as legitimate.
3 “Senior Officials and Scholars Challenge ‘China Model’,” People’s Daily Online, December 10, 2009.
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Many in China admire the Singaporean-style of paternalistic “soft authoritarianism” that creates governing efficiency in the absence of democracy.4 Will this combination of a semi-capitalist economy under authoritarian state control be sustainable? How long can China’s economic modernization and political democratization remain divorced? As far as political, economic, and social developments are concerned, it is hard to predict what will happen to China in the years ahead. Any discussions of China’s prospects are necessarily based on the assumption that the current trends of development will continue. While analysts may disagree on the future developments in China, the following general trends seem highly likely as China enters the second and third decades of the 21st century. A graying society As Professor Ding Lu suggested in his chapter, China will become older before getting richer, which will create tremendous demographic challenges for China’s economy and society. China became an “aging society” in 1999 when the composition of people over 60 years of age within its entire population broke the 10 percent benchmark. According to officials from the Ministry of Civil Affairs, China’s aging population reached 12.79 percent (169 million) of the total population at the end of 2008. More than 8.3 percent of Chinese population were above 65, and in most cities, more than 50 percent of the elderly people live without the company of their children. The aging problem has become a major issue that concerns “people’s livelihood and the nation’s lasting peace and stability,” according to Vice Premier Hui Liangyu.5 The aging of China’s population could usher in a new era of slower economic growth and mounting social stress as tens of millions of Chinese reach old age over the next few decades without pensions and with inadequate
4 For a helpful discussion of “soft authoritarianism,” see Denny Roy’s “Singapore, China, and the ‘Soft Authoritarianism’ Challenge,” Asian Survey, 34, no. 3 (March 1994): 231–242. 5 “Chinese Vice Premier Calls for Attention on Ageing Problem,” Xinhua, October 25, 2009.
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family support. The sheer magnitude of China’s age wave — by 2030 China will be an older country than the United States — would alone pose a serious challenge, as warned by a report on China’s retirement reform by CSIS and Prudential Foundation.6 What makes the challenge even more daunting is that the age wave will arrive when China is still a developing nation. The public pension system covers only a fraction of the population and could collapse under the weight of unfunded benefit promises. China is not well-prepared for the upcoming graying of its population and needs to take proper measures now such as building a new pension system in the cities and a new healthcare network in the countryside. The Chinese government implemented the one-child policy in the early 1980s, amid fears that the country would not be able to feed a skyrocketing population. According to official statistics, the policy has prevented about 400 million births. Until now, couples living in cities are barred from having more than one child, unless neither parent has siblings. In rural areas, the law allows for a second child under certain circumstances. And the guidelines are looser for the country’s ethnic minorities. Enforcement varies, but usually takes the form of fines to discourage extra births. The one-child policy has led to problems such as abortion of female fetuses, abduction and trafficking of women in areas with excess numbers of men, illegal marriages, and forced prostitution. Authorities put the normal male–female ratio at 103–107 males for every 100 females. In 2005, the last year for which data were made available, there were 119 boys for every 100 girls in China.7 In certain regions, the male : female ratio is even higher. Some 24 million Chinese men of marrying age will find themselves lacking wives in 2020, partly because of the one-child policy, reported the official China Daily.8 Today’s college-age population grew up in the so-called “421” family, i.e. four grandparents, two parents, and one child. When they get married, will the young couple be ready to take care of eight grandparents and four parents? The graying of the society will become a huge burden for the young and working generation in the years ahead. 6
“China’s Long March to Retirement Reform,” Center for Strategic & International Studies and Prudential Foundation, 2009. 7 “Skewed China Birth Rate to Leave 24 Million Men Single,” AFP, January 11, 2010. 8 “24 Million Men Unable to Find Spouses in 2020,” China Daily, January 11, 2010.
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Children born and living in the cities tend to have better education and healthcare than those in minority and rural areas, but many young westernized professionals in urban areas have become hedonistic and choose to have one or even no child (DINK — double income, no kids). The fact that the one-child policy has not been strictly enforced in minority areas and the countryside creates a long-term challenge for China. The population base in the countryside and minority areas is becoming bigger while that in the cities is shrinking. If this trend continues, the quality of China’s population is going to decline. The family planning policy, though not solely responsible for all these problems, needs to be re-examined by the government as part of the measure to arrest the quick graying of the society and the sharp decline in new-borns in big cities. Officials in Shanghai and Beijing have begun encouraging newlywed couples who are the only children in their families to have two children. Some scholars such as Tsinghua University economist Hu Angang predict that within a decade or so, China will have a two-child policy.9 Cautious and gradual political opening A compelling reason for the CCP to implement political reform is to overcome obstacles to continued growth and avoid another Tiananmen tragedy. However, the CCP has resisted political reform so far for fear that change could rip the party apart. Prevailing modernization theories suggest that the market economy and a rising middle class will lead to a demand and push for democracy. However, Professor Kellee Tsai in her Capitalism without Democracy maintains that private entrepreneurs in China show no intention of agitating for democracy and that capitalism can exist without democracy, provided the Chinese government can attend to adaptive informal institutions that complement endogenous institutional change. Most of these entrepreneurs are working relentlessly to stay in business, while others are saving for their only child’s education or planning to leave the country. Significantly, many are CCP members.10 9
Peter Ford, “Will China Ease Its One-Child Policy?” The Christian Science Monitor, December 17, 2009. 10 Kellee S. Tsai, Capitalism Without Democracy: The Private Sector in Contemporary China (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007).
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In December 2006, Yu Keping, deputy director of the CCP’s Central Translation Bureau and reportedly an advisor to Hu Jintao, published an article in Xuexi Shibao (Study Times) entitled “Democracy is a Good Thing,” offering a vision of gradual, incremental democratization with Chinese characteristics.11 The article set off a new round of discussions and debates about democracy and political reform in China. Democracy has become a hot topic in the CCP’s internal debates, and in the years ahead the CCP is likely to allow more debates in the society over policy directions and decisions. With a political system that still largely relies on the rule of man, China faces public governance problems of inadequate delivery of public services, lack of transparency, abuse of power by government officials, the immaturity of civil society, and weak coordination among major public organizations. Yu Keping suggested that China’s reforms should focus on social justice to reduce the country’s apparent disparities, delivering more high-quality public services, encouraging more government openness, and raising competency and efficiency. These reforms should also continue to push for the rule of law, emphasize intra-party and grassrootslevel democracy, improve ecological governance, as well as push for a clean government.12 The “one party, two coalitions” power structure may be helpful for China’s democratic development, according to Brookings Institution’s China scholar Cheng Li.13 Factional politics have existed in China for a long time, but for the first time two factions or coalitions share power and influence and are almost equally powerful in the political system. The Populist Coalition is led by President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao. At the core of this faction are the tuanpai: those leaders who moved up through the Chinese Communist Youth League (Hu Jintao’s power base). This faction also includes party functionaries and leaders coming from
11 Yu Keping, Democracy is a Good Thing: Essays on Politics, Society, and Culture in Contemporary China (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2008). 12 Yu made the remarks during his keynote speech at the 2nd International Forum for Contemporary Chinese Studies (IFCCS), University of Nottingham, Britain, September 7–9, 2009. 13 Cheng Li, “One Party, Two Coalitions in China’s Politics,” The Brookings Institution, August 16, 2009.
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rural regions. The Elitist Coalition includes the “princelings” or taizidang (children of high-ranking officials), entrepreneurs, capitalists, and urban leaders from China’s coastal region. Xi Jinping, who is likely to succeed Hu Jintao as the top CCP leader in 2012, is from the taizidang. It is not inconceivable that the two coalitions may become the two dominant forces in a two-party or multi-party system if one emerges in the future. These two coalitions compete for power and influence but also collaborate pragmatically. This Chinese style of checks and balances between the two coalitions will help China’s politics to develop steadily and healthily. China’s lack of progress in democratization does not necessarily prove modernization theories wrong. After all, the middle class is still small in China. What will happen in the decades ahead? As the number of capitalists continues to expand, demand for more political freedom will rise. Sooner or later, one of the competing forces within the party will attempt to answer the growing popular demand. Because of the inherent constraints, no faction is likely to introduce big-bang political reforms. Therefore, China’s political opening will be gradual. A viable alternative to the CCP as the ruling party is not in sight. A form of deliberative or consultative democracy or inner-party democracy may emerge in China. Different from mainstream democracies, China seems to be aiming at a vertical type of one party-led democracy instead of a horizontal type of competitive multi-party democracy. It is also likely that the Tiananmen incident will be reassessed by future Chinese leaders. The Chinese government stopped calling it an “antirevolutionary movement” shortly after the tragedy, but a more objective reevaluation of the whole event and its impact will be necessary as China moves towards democratization. A mature and confident nation must have the courage to face up to its own history. Today’s young generation in China will eventually learn about what happened in the late 1980s and who Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang were. China’s lingering poor international image The biggest international concern about the future of China is how the communist country is going to use its increasing power in world affairs. Having accumulated both hard power and soft power, it becomes a challenge for
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China to display and project its “smart power” now. To a large extent, China is “a big power with a medium-power mindset, and a small-power chip on its shoulder,” commented an article in The Economist.14 China must overcome its historical victim complex and shoulder more responsibilities in today’s international affairs. The PLA is in the middle of a major technology upgrade, spurred on by double-digit annual percentage increases in defense spending. It is believed to be pursuing a number of programs aimed at shooting down stealth aircraft and downing or disabling cruise missiles and precision-guided weapons.15 From China’s perspective, the PLA’s military modernization is a natural outcome of China’s economic growth. But to some of China’s neighbors and other powers, the PLA’s modernization may pose a threat or challenge to their national security. China continues to send out mixed messages to the international community. As Google and the US government challenged China to end the internet censorship in early 2010, the Chinese government did not bow down to the pressure and insisted that foreign businesses must follow Chinese laws. In January 2010 when a devastating earthquake hit Haiti, the Chinese government immediately offered material help and dispatched a 60-member rescue team to Port-au-Prince. China has maintained a contingent of about 130 officers as part of the UN peacekeeping forces in Haiti, which does not have diplomatic relations with China. Putting politics aside and being actively involved in the global rescue efforts have earned the Chinese government some international approval. In the years ahead, China will continue to conduct its smile diplomacy to enhance its soft power. Meanwhile it remains non-negotiable on issues relating to national unity, sovereignty, and the CCP’s broad control over society. The international community’s perceptions of China will remain divided, and China’s image in the Western world is likely to remain poor as long as China maintains its current political and economic structures.
14
“China’s Place in the World,” The Economist, October 3, 2009, 12. “China Says Missile Defense System Test Successful,” The Associated Press, January 11, 2010.
15
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China and the United States: Joined at the hip One of the most daunting external challenges for China is to eliminate the “China threat” theory against the overall backdrop of China’s rise. There are different versions of the “China threat” theory. The voice claiming China’s “military threat” is likely to become weaker with the establishment of the image of a peaceful China in the future. Certain quarters in the United States, Japan, and Taiwan may still be concerned about China’s military buildup, but by and large, China will be considered as a peaceful power. The “economic threat” will be harder to eliminate with the development of the Chinese economy and this will impose huge pressure on Chinese diplomacy, remarked Wang Yizhou, deputy director of the Institute of World Economics and Politics at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and a professor at the School of International Studies, Peking University.16 The United States and European Union will continue to blame China for their trade deficits and loss of jobs. Even many developing countries will feel threatened by the tough competition from China, especially in traditional industries such as manufacturing. As the 2009 Copenhagen world climate change conference demonstrated, developed and developing countries sharply disagree over how to deal with climate change. As the largest emitter of greenhouse gases, China has become a target in global politics about climate change. A new form of the “China threat” — the environmental threat — will find receptive audiences in the United States and other developed countries in the years ahead. As of 2010, the Chinese economy, already the second largest in the world, is about a quarter the size of America’s. About 60 percent of Chinese citizens live in the much less developed rural areas of the country. The Chinese government argues that with such overwhelming domestic problems, China has neither the capability nor intention to challenge the United States in world affairs. It may well be so, but China has a lot of work to do to convince the United States and other countries that China’s rise will be peaceful and beneficial for all.
16 “Chinese Diplomacy since 1949: An Overview,” Beijing Review, November 12, 2009. Accessed from http://www.bjreview.com.cn/print/txt/2009-11/07/content_229045.htm.
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While the concept of G-2 (for the United States and China to co-lead and co-manage global issues) is premature, the two great powers do share many interests in international political economy and must cooperate and take leadership roles in addressing many of today’s global problems. The question of whether China and the United States are friends or foes misses the central point that the two powers are inextricably interdependent. They no longer have the luxury of making such either/or choices. In the years ahead, the two powers will have to continue to cooperate in dealing with common global challenges. Final Thoughts Even during the global economic downturn, China continues to set new records. It replaced Germany as the world’s largest exporter and surpassed the United States as the largest automobile market in 2009. According to Chinese official statistics, China’s GDP grew at 8.7 percent in 2009, the fastest among major economies. In January 2010, China successfully tested its ground-based mid-course missile interception technology, making it the second country to demonstrate the capability of destroying an incoming missile target beyond the Earth’s atmosphere. What we see is a continuously growing China as we enter the second decade of the 21st century. Despite its many achievements, China is unlikely to replace the United States as a superpower anytime soon because tremendous domestic challenges will keep China from developing its full potential. Nevertheless, China’s global influence is expanding as its economic and military strengths continue to grow. China will always have a seat at the table for great powers. In the next few decades, China will remain a great power with many domestic problems and challenges, and a huge country full of contrasts and contradictions. China will maintain its independent foreign policy and firmly defend its national interests that have grown beyond its borders. It will continue to expand its economic reach, political influence, cultural exchange, and military presence around the world. Is the glass half full or half empty? Optimists and pessimists will continue to argue over the future of China. Observers and analysts will continue to disagree over the nature of the transformation going on in China as well as the future of China. No matter how we look at it, one undeniable fact is
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that China will continue to shape the global development of the 21st century and beyond. This alone requires our undivided attention on China’s development as we enter the second decade of the 21st century. References Callahan, Maureen. “Don’t Panic Because China Won’t Overtake the US As the World’s Superpower.” New York Post, January 17, 2010. “From the Charm to the Offensive.” The Economist, January 9, 2010, 46. Hutton, Will. The Writing on the Wall: China and the West in the 21st Century (London: Little, Brown and Company, 2008). Jacques, Martin. When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order (New York: Penguin Press, 2009). James, Harold. “Is China the New America?” Foreign Policy (web exclusive), March 2009. Naisbitt, John and Doris Naisbitt. China’s Megatrends: The 8 Pillars of a New Society (New York: HarperBusiness, 2010). Pei, Minxin, “China’s Not a Superpower,” The Diplomat, December 29, 2009. Rachman, Gideon, “Why America and China Will Clash,” The Financial Times, January 19, 2010. Tsai, Kellee S. Capitalism without Democracy: The Private Sector in Contemporary China (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007). Zhu, Zhiqun. China’s New Diplomacy: Rationale, Strategies and Significance (Survey: Ashgate, 2010).
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century of humiliation 4, 417 China exceptionalism 14, 54 China International Publishing Group (CIPG) 297, 298, 304 “China model” 14, 45, 48, 51–69, 225, 429, 430 “China’s experience” 105, 430 “the Chinese case” 430 “the Chinese Century” 429 Chinese characteristic 58, 59, 62, 228, 312, 327, 359, 366, 367, 371, 430, 434 Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 4, 28, 33, 42, 72, 118, 318, 358, 359, 377, 379 Chinese Culture Center 302, 309 Chinese language teaching 301, 302 climate change 20, 297, 332, 333, 335–337, 339–341, 343, 346–348, 351, 352, 405, 406, 416, 421, 437 climate security 20, 331–334, 348, 352 Cobb-Douglas production function 168 collective action 17, 193–196
accountability 15, 39, 42, 99–102, 104–109, 111, 113, 114, 118–121 administrative review 109–111, 113 Africa 6, 13, 69, 160, 247, 302, 306, 320, 326, 388, 389, 394, 396, 401 aircraft carrier 21, 361, 373, 386, 388, 389, 392, 396, 409 ancient shamanism 253 authoritarianism 28, 100, 145, 341, 415, 431 Barack Obama 7, 414, 415 Beijing Consensus 14, 45, 52, 53, 55, 57, 59, 65–68, 249 Beijing Olympics 64, 321–323, 325, 327, 430 beliefs 18, 93, 132, 220, 239, 240, 242–245, 247, 251–254 birth control policy 160, 172, 173 family planning policy 433 one-child policy 16, 155, 163, 164, 172, 173, 432, 433 blue-water navy 21, 385, 389–391, 400 441
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Color Revolution 63 complex learning 71, 73, 74, 81, 84, 85, 87, 93, 95 Communist Youth League 30, 434 Confucius Institute 295, 302, 306, 309 constitutionalism 113, 137 cultural preservation 19, 260, 261, 265, 267 Cultural Revolution 4, 27, 75, 79, 84, 112, 129, 134, 135, 161–163, 175, 199, 200, 216 danwei 131, 147, 179–182, 195, 201, 267 democracy 7, 14, 16, 20, 28, 32, 33, 38, 40, 42, 50, 52, 56, 59, 60, 95, 100, 108, 120, 126–128, 130–132, 135–144, 147, 149, 150, 219, 222, 226, 228, 233, 250, 315, 317, 318, 361, 373, 378, 407, 411, 421, 431, 433–435 democratization 5, 7, 13–15, 25, 27, 28, 37, 38, 59, 61, 66, 68, 99, 100, 105, 106, 121, 131, 135, 140, 226, 308, 314, 415, 430, 431, 434, 435 demographics 260 demographic dividends 16, 155, 156, 162, 171, 172 demographic transition 16, 155–157, 160, 162, 164 defense modernization 20, 363, 365, 366, 369 dependency ratio 16, 155–158, 164–169, 171, 173
Deng Xiaoping 3, 5–7, 10, 14, 27, 33, 36, 40, 42, 45–48, 51, 54, 56, 62, 72, 81–85, 87–89, 91, 93, 129, 130, 139, 141, 331, 341, 364, 365, 386, 417 DINK 433 domestic politics 21, 353, 408, 416, 423, 425 economic development 4, 5, 20, 35, 38, 42, 45, 46, 51, 55, 57, 59, 65, 67, 89, 103, 129, 130, 164, 173, 191, 210, 260, 283, 317, 319, 321, 327, 332, 335, 341, 358, 364, 365, 391, 394, 395, 398, 411, 415, 417 educational and cultural programs 293, 296, 301, 305, 308, 309 energy-use 331–335, 338, 342, 343, 350 energy security 3, 19, 20, 320, 332, 334, 336, 342, 348, 352 environment 9, 10, 18, 19, 38, 107, 108, 119, 127, 147, 149, 217, 220, 228, 234, 245, 292, 294, 316, 323, 327, 332–334, 339, 340, 342, 347, 348, 353, 364, 379, 398 environmental conservation 19, 260, 272, 274 ethnic relations 18, 239, 244, 247, 250–252, 254 European Union 357, 437 fertility rate 155, 157, 160, 163–165, 172, 173 firewall 18, 214, 227, 232–234 financial crisis 2, 8, 144, 261, 421
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foreign direct investment (FDI) 5, 71, 88, 92, 362 foreign publicity 19, 20, 311–317, 320–324, 326, 327 fund management 209 GATT 15, 72, 93, 342 G-2 335, 405, 411, 438 global information age 19, 20, 313–316, 327 globalization 5, 50, 60, 68, 94, 102, 135, 139, 140, 148, 150, 228, 240, 243, 311, 313, 314, 316, 327, 394, 415 good governance 101–103, 321 Google 145, 227, 228, 436 Great Leap Forward 4, 9, 27, 72, 74, 75, 78, 85, 112, 161, 175 Hainan Island 15, 93, 390 Hangzhou 19, 259, 260, 262–265, 271, 272, 276–278, 281–283 hard power 435 harmonious society 12, 35–37, 39, 48, 52, 102, 108, 143, 296 harmony 35, 51, 60, 62, 240, 244, 252, 254, 276, 280, 306, 426 Hong Kong 8, 55, 64, 77, 81, 89, 128, 140, 148, 149, 207, 222, 242, 270, 298, 357, 372, 417 Hu Angang 10, 54, 433 Hu Jintao 12, 14, 27–29, 31, 32, 34, 36–40, 49–51, 57–59, 62, 66, 108, 142, 231, 280, 303, 358, 362–365, 378, 434, 435 Hu Yaobang 95, 109, 141, 435
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Hua Guofeng 45, 81, 85, 86, 88 human rights 20, 39, 49, 63, 66, 101, 127, 130, 137, 139, 142, 143, 150, 222, 224–226, 250, 297, 307, 313, 315, 317, 319–321, 323, 327, 374, 405, 406, 413, 417, 419, 421, 423–425 ideology 16, 28, 33, 35, 45, 60, 125, 127, 129, 130, 138, 142, 144, 146, 147, 150, 213, 217, 235, 263, 315, 366 import substitution industrialization 15, 72 India 159, 160, 164–167, 175, 219, 242, 243, 247–251, 306, 326, 344, 345, 351, 352, 360, 386, 389, 390, 395–397, 400, 418 information censorship 226 information control 18, 214, 313, 323 inner-party democracy 40, 42, 435 institution-building 106, 119 institutionalization 14, 27–29, 40, 42, 109, 318, 405 interest groups 41, 72, 140, 413 international image 3, 13, 19, 435 international students 302 Internet 17, 18, 39, 53, 104, 115–117, 119, 130, 135, 149, 213–235, 297, 298, 300, 301, 313, 323, 325, 413, 420, 436 inwardly oriented development 71, 72, 74, 84, 92, 93 “iron rice bowls” 16, 17, 179, 181, 194
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Japan 4, 13, 19, 69, 77, 127, 167, 173, 175, 242, 271, 293, 294, 298, 299, 303, 326, 346, 351, 357, 364, 371, 373, 375, 377, 388, 389, 393, 396, 397, 399, 400, 418, 424, 429, 430, 437 Jiang Zemin 14, 27, 28, 32, 36, 38, 47–49, 51, 62, 108, 263, 359, 366–369 John Naisbitt 60 Joseph Nye 73, 315 Joshua Cooper Ramo 52, 67, 312 juguo tizhi 56 Justin Yifu Lin 54, 55 labor force participation rate 160, 174, 175 laid-off workers 180, 186, 188, 190–194, 196, 318 Latin America 13, 318, 320, 394 leadership succession 14, 27–29, 40 legitimacy 14, 27, 28, 33–35, 38, 39, 47, 48, 63, 66, 90, 95, 101, 102, 107, 108, 120, 139, 189, 194, 235, 315, 319, 320, 324, 325, 375, 417, 430 Lei Feng 13 Li Keqiang 29, 30, 31, 33, 40, 58 Li Shenzhi 132, 133, 138–140 liberalism 16, 21, 28, 125, 126, 128–131, 133–150, 342, 410, 411 life-cycle hypothesis 168 Linan 18, 19, 259, 260, 262, 263, 265–270, 272–277, 279, 283
Index
Liu Junning 133, 135–138, 140, 147 low-carbon economy 352 Mao Zedong 1, 2, 4, 8, 14, 27, 33, 45, 46, 74, 75, 79, 93, 146, 277, 293, 360, 417 market reform 16, 83, 125, 341, 343 mass media 17, 115, 213–215, 225 media scrutiny 109, 114, 117 mobilization 56, 64, 182, 183, 186–188, 195, 196 military modernization 19, 21, 396, 401, 436 Ministry of Environmental Protection 341 national brand 19, 20, 312–315, 317, 319–322, 324–327 nation-building 18, 19, 259, 277, 360 National Development and Reform Commission 336 National Energy Administration 340, 342 national interest 146, 291–293, 312, 335, 358–360, 365, 375, 376, 394, 408–410, 414, 418, 438 nationalism 16, 21, 126, 140, 141, 144, 150, 325, 326, 399, 417–419, 424 neo-leftism 16, 131, 150 neo-realism 408, 410, 411 new mission 21, 358–360, 363, 366, 370, 372, 386
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offshore defense 21, 385, 386, 402 Old Age Social Security (OASS) 17, 199, 200, 203, 205–208, 210 outwardly oriented development 15 ownership transformation 180, 183, 184, 188 Party doctrine 14, 27, 28, 33, 35 pay-as-you-go 173, 201 pension reform 204 performance criteria 14, 27, 28, 33, 41, 185 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 21, 358–360, 362–364, 367–373, 375, 378–380, 385–387, 390, 391, 393, 395, 401, 422, 436 People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) 14, 21, 67, 74, 76, 78–80, 83, 85–88, 93, 147, 192, 203, 206, 224, 270, 272, 296, 334, 336, 338–340, 348, 368, 369–372, 378, 385–388, 392, 393, 395, 396, 398, 400–402 political accountability 15, 39, 99, 101, 105, 106, 108, 109, 113, 118–121 political and ideological control 234, 235 political credibility 19, 20, 311, 313, 315–317, 319–322, 324–327 political institutions 119 political liberalization 15 political reform 7, 11–16, 40, 45–52, 66–69, 82, 102, 110, 120,
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126, 127, 134, 135, 137–139, 150, 317–319, 321, 327, 433–435 political unification 277 population age structure 157, 158, 166, 167 power projection 21, 386, 387, 390, 397, 398 privatization 16, 17, 53, 137, 141, 180–189, 191–196 procedural democracy 28, 33, 40, 42 public diplomacy 19, 291–296, 301–309 public opinion 17, 117, 213, 216, 292, 305–307, 312, 324, 415, 417, 418, 420, 423 public sphere 149 purchasing power parity (PPP) 2, 158 rational choice 72 restructuring 2, 17, 39, 48, 137, 175, 180–196, 284, 412 revolution in military affairs (RMA) 366–369 semi-capitalist economy 431 simple learning 73, 74, 84, 95 smart power 436 social psychology 18, 240 social security fund 208–210 social security system 17, 173, 174, 191, 199, 209 soft-authoritarianism 100, 431 soft power 13, 19, 306, 307, 315, 372, 401, 435, 436
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Southeast Asia 8, 373, 394, 399 Southern Tour 14, 48, 49, 54, 130, 141 special economic zones (SEZs) 6, 15, 71, 80, 89, 91, 93, 94 State Council Information Office (SCIO) 229, 295, 297, 304, 312 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 16, 141, 175, 179, 180, 182–190, 192–194, 196, 199, 200, 202, 341, 342 Strategic and Economic Dialogue 338, 405, 406 strategic reassurance 410, 414 superpower 20, 66, 294, 316, 416, 418, 438 sustainable development 10, 12, 20, 35, 102, 205, 295, 333, 335, 339, 340, 342, 343, 352, 353 Taiwan 6, 10, 19, 21, 51, 72, 95, 128, 141, 144, 148, 149, 207, 242, 246, 247, 277, 279, 280, 312, 357, 360–363, 366, 371–375, 377, 380, 386, 392, 393, 396, 398, 399, 405, 406, 409, 417, 419, 422, 423, 425, 429, 430, 437 taizidang 30, 31, 41, 435 technocratic regime 15, 93 “Three Represents” 34, 39, 49, 62, 142, 263 Three-year famine 161–163 Tiananmen 1, 7, 8, 47, 129, 131, 134, 219, 221, 224, 312, 416, 417, 433, 435
Index
Tibet 20, 233, 244, 251, 252, 254, 297, 311, 313, 319, 322–328, 377, 406, 419, 424 tourism 18, 19, 259–262, 264, 265, 269, 270, 272–275, 277, 283, 284 transparency 21, 38, 39, 42, 102, 104, 106, 107, 147, 318, 352, 378, 397, 434 tuanpai 30, 41, 434 United Nations (UN) 6, 34, 56, 59, 100, 156, 159, 164, 172, 273, 274, 277, 337, 372, 378, 405, 411 urban and rural system 17 US-China relations (also SinoAmerican relations) 3, 6, 7, 21, 337, 363, 374, 380, 405–412, 414, 416, 417, 421–426 values 63, 66–68, 101, 102, 119, 120, 126, 127, 136, 139, 142, 143, 149, 169, 241, 242, 247, 273, 304–306, 315, 366, 415, 416 Wang Hui 61 Washington Consensus 53–55, 59, 65, 68 Wen Jiabao 9, 12, 29, 30, 32, 36, 49, 51, 109, 142, 143, 303, 339, 341, 426, 434 western development 11, 12, 338 Western Pacific 20, 361, 373, 375–377, 379, 387–389, 397, 398, 400 World Bank 54, 100, 102, 158, 298, 346, 348
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World Trade Organization (WTO) 8, 15, 72, 93, 142, 225, 342, 394, 413, 423 Wu Bangguo 29, 58, 406, 413 Wu-Yue Kingdom 18, 259, 260, 267, 283 Xi Jinping
29–31, 33, 40, 57, 435
xinfang
447
104, 111–114
Yangzi delta 18, 259, 273, 283 Yu Keping 49, 65, 102, 434 Zhao Ziyang 14, 47, 48, 82–85, 87, 95, 109, 141, 435 Zheng Bijian 50, 51, 57, 68
